Presented to the
LIBRARY of the
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
by
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THE
HISTORY OF ROME
MOMMSEN
THE
HISTORY OF ROME
BY
THEODOR MOMMSEN
TRANSLATED
WITH THE SANCTION OF THE AUTHOR
BY
WILLIAM PURDIE DICKSON, D.D., LL.D.
PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW
A NEW EDITION REVISED THROUGHOUT AND
EMBODYING RECENT ADDITIONS
VOL. V
NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
1905
Da
)66
CONTENTS
BOOK FIFTH
The Establishment of the Military Monarchy —
Continued
CHAPTER VII
PACE
The Subjugation of the West ...» 3
CHAPTER VIII
The Joint Rule of Pompeius and Caesar . . 107
CHAPTER IX
Death of Ckassus— Rupture between the Joint Rulers 150
CHAPTER X
Brundisium, Ilerda, Pharsalus, and Thapsus . . 193
CHAPTER XI
The Old Republic and the New Monarchy . . 305
CHAPTER XII
Religion, Culture, Literature, and Art . . 443
Index ........ 5J9
Collation of Paging of other Editions for verifying
References ...... 589
BOOK FIFTH
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MILITARY
MONARCHY
Continued
vol. v 1 34
CHAPTER VII
THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST
When the course of history turns from the miserable mono- The
tony of the political selfishness, which fought its battles j^1"^"
in the senate-house and in the streets of the capital, to the west
matters of greater importance than the question whether
the first monarch of Rome should be called Gnaeus, Gaius,
or Marcus, we may well be allowed — on the threshold of
an event, the effects of which still at the present day influ-
ence the destinies of the world — to look round us for a
moment, and to indicate the point of view under which
the conquest of what is now France by the Romans, and
their first contact with the inhabitants of Germany and of
Great Britain, are to be apprehended in their bearing on
the general history of the world.
By virtue of the law, that a people which has grown
into a state absorbs its neighbours who are in political
nonage, and a civilized people absorbs its neighbours who
are in intellectual nonage — by virtue of this law, which is as
universally valid and as much a law of nature as the law
of gravity — the Italian nation (the only one in antiquity
which was able to combine a superior political development
and a superior civilization, though it presented the latter
only in an imperfect and external manner) was entitled to
reduce to subjection the Greek states of the east which
were ripe for destruction, and to dispossess the peoples c/
4 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
lower grades of culture in the west — Libyans, Iberians,
Celts, Gerrnans — by means of its settlers ; just as England
with equal right has in Asia reduced to subjection a civil-
ization of rival standing but politically impotent, and in
America and Australia has marked and ennobled, and still
continues to mark and ennoble, extensive barbarian
countries with the impress of its nationality. The Roman
aristocracy had accomplished the preliminary condition
required for this task — the union of Italy ; the task itself
it never solved, but always regarded the extra-Italian con-
quests either as simply a necessary evil, or as a fiscal
possession virtually beyond the pale of the state. It is
the imperishable glory of the Roman democracy or mon-
archy— for the two coincide — to have correctly apprehended
and vigorously realized this its highest destination. What
the irresistible force of circumstances had paved the way
for, through the senate establishing against its will the
foundations of the future Roman dominion in the west as
in the east ; what thereafter the Roman emigration to the
provinces — which came as a public calamity, no doubt,
but also in the western regions at any rate as a pioneer of
a higher culture — pursued as matter of instinct ; the creator
of the Roman democracy, Gaius Gracchus, grasped and
began to carry out with statesmanlike clearness and deci-
sion. The two fundamental ideas of the new policy — to
reunite the territories under the power of Rome, so far as
they were Hellenic, and to colonize them, so far as they
were not Hellenic — had already in the Gracchan age been
practically recognized by the annexation of the kingdom of
Attalus and by the Transalpine conquests of Flaccus : but
the prevailing reaction once more arrested their application.
The Roman state remained a chaotic mass of countries
without thorough occupation and without proper limits.
Spain and the Graeco- Asiatic possessions were separated
rom the mother country by wide territories, of which
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 5
barely the borders along the coast were subject to the
Romans ; on the north coast of Africa the domains of
Carthage and Cyrene alone were occupied like oases ; large
tracts even of the subject territory, especially in Spain, were
but nominally subject to the Romans. Absolutely nothing
was done on the part of the government towards concen-
trating and rounding off their dominion, and the decay of
the fleet seemed at length to dissolve the last bond of
connection between the distant possessions. The demo-
cracy no doubt attempted, so soon as it again raised its
head, to shape its external policy in the spirit of Gracchus
— Marius in particular cherished such ideas — but as it did
not for any length of time attain the helm, its projects were
left unfulfilled. It was not till the democracy practically
took in hand the government on the overthrow of the
Sullan constitution in 684, that a revolution in this respect 70.
occurred. First of all their sovereignty on the Mediter-
ranean was restored — the most vital question for a state
like that of Rome. Towards the east, moreover, the
boundary of the Euphrates was secured by the annexation
of the provinces of Pontus and Syria. But there still
remained beyond the Alps the task of at once rounding off
the Roman territory towards the north and west, and of
gaining a fresh virgin soil there for Hellenic civilization and
for the yet unbroken vigour of the Italic race.
This task Gaius Caesar undertook. It is more than an Historical
error, it is an outrage upon the sacred spirit dominant in *!f™e'
history, to regard Gaul solely as the parade ground on of the
which Caesar exercised himself and his legions for the ££ Q^esar.
impending civil war. Though the subjugation of the west
was for Caesar so far a means to an end that he laid the
foundations of his later height of power in the Transalpine
wars, it is the especial privilege of a statesman of genius
that his means themselves are ends in their turn. Caesar
needed no doubt for his party aims a military power, but
( THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
he did not conquer Gaul as a partisan. There was a direct
political necessity for Rome to meet the perpetually threat-
ened invasion of the Germans thus early beyond the Alps,
and to construct a rampart there which should secure the
peace of the Roman world. But even this important object
was not the highest and ultimate reason for which Gaul
was conquered by Caesar. When the old home had
become too narrow for the Roman burgesses and they were
in danger of decay, the senate's policy of Italian conquest
saved them from ruin. Now the Italian home had become
in its turn too narrow; once more the state languished
under the same social evils repeating themselves in similar
fashion only on a greater scale. It was a brilliant idea, a
grand hope, which led Caesar over the Alps — the idea and
the confident expectation that he should gain there for
his fellow-burgesses a new boundless home, and regenerate
the state a second time by placing it on a broader basis.
Caesar [61. The campaign which Caesar undertook in 693 in Further
in Spam. Spa{n> mav De m some sense included among the enterprises
which aimed at the subjugation of the west. Long as Spain
had obeyed the Romans, its western shore had remained sub-
stantially independent of them even after the expedition of
Decimus Brutus against the Callaeci (iii. 232), and they had
not even set foot on the northern coast ; while the predatory
raids, to which the subject provinces found themselves
continually exposed from those quarters, did no small injury
to the civilization and Romanizing of Spain. Against these
the expedition of Caesar along the west coast was directed.
He crossed the chain of the Herminian mountains (Sierra
de Estrella) bounding the Tagus on the north ; after having
conquered their inhabitants and transplanted them in part
to the plain, he reduced the country on both sides of the
Douro and arrived at the north-west point of the peninsula,
where with the aid of a flotilla brought up from Gades he
occupied Brigantium (Corunna). By this means the
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 7
peoples adjoining the Atlantic Ocean, Lusitanians and Cal-
laecians, were forced to acknowledge the Roman suprem-
acy, while the conqueror was at the same time careful to
render the position of the subjects generally more tolerable
by reducing the tribute to be paid to Rome and regulating
the financial affairs of the communities.
But, although in this military and administrative debut
of the great general and statesman the same talents and
the same leading ideas are discernible which he afterwards
evinced on a greater stage, his agency in the Iberian penin-
sula was much too transient to have any deep effect ; the
more especially as, owing to its physical and national
peculiarities, nothing but action steadily continued for a
considerable time could exert any durable influence there.
A more important part in the Romanic development of Gaul,
the west was reserved by destiny for the country which
stretches between the Pyrenees and the Rhine, the Medi-
terranean and the Atlantic Ocean, and which since the
Augustan age has been especially designated by the name
of the land of the Celts — Gallia — although strictly speaking
the land of the Celts was partly narrower, partly much
more extensive, and the country so called never formed a
national unity, and did not form a political unity before
Augustus. For this very reason it is not easy to present
a clear picture of the very heterogeneous state of things
which Caesar encountered on his arrival there in 696. 58.
In the region on the Mediterranean, which, embracing The
approximately Languedoc on the west of the Rhone, on the v^^ce
east Dauphine* and Provence, had been for sixty years a
Roman province, the Roman arms had seldom been at rest
since the Cimbrian invasion which had swept over it. In
664 Gaius Caelius had fought with the Salyes about Aquae Wars [90.
Sextiae, and in 674 Gaius Flaccus (iv. 93), on his march to ^ereVrg0S
Spain, with other Celtic nations. When in the Sertorian
war the governor Lucius Manlius, compelled to hasten to
8 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST BOOK V
the aid of his colleagues beyond the Pyrenees, returned
defeated from Ilerda (Lerida) and on his way home was
vanquished a second time by the western neighbours of the
78. Roman province, the Aquitani (about 676 ; iv. 283^), this
seems to have provoked a general rising of the provincials
between the Pyrenees and the Rhone, perhaps even of
those between the Rhone and Alps. Pompeius had to
make his way with the sword through the insurgent Gaul to
Spain (iv. 293), and by way of penalty for their rebellion gave
the territories of the Volcae-Arecomici and the Helvii (dep.
Gard and Ardeche) over to the Massiliots ; the governor
76-74. Manius Fonteius (678-680) carried out these arrangements
and restored tranquillity in the province by subduing the
Vocontii (dep. Drome), protecting Massilia from the
insurgents, and liberating the Roman capital Narbo which
they invested. Despair, however, and the financial em-
barrassment which the participation in the sufferings of the
Spanish war (iv. 298) and generally the official and non-
official exactions of the Romans brought upon the Gallic
provinces, did not allow them to be tranquil; and in
particular the canton of the Allobroges, the most remote
from Narbo, was in a perpetual ferment, which was attested
by the " pacification " that Gaius Piso undertook there in
66. 688 as well as by the behaviour of the Allobrogian embassy
63. in Rome on occasion of the anarchist plot in 691 (iv. 480),
61. and which soon afterwards (693) broke into open revolt.
Catugnatus the leader of the Allobroges in this war of
despair, who had at first fought not unsuccessfully, was
conquered at Solonium after a glorious resistance by the
governor Gaius Pomptinus.
Bounds. Notwithstanding all these conflicts the bounds of the
Roman territory were not materially advanced; Lugudunum
Convenarum, where Pompeius had settled the remnant of
the Sertorian army (iv. 304), Tolosa, Vienna and Genava
were still the most remote Roman townships towards the
chaf. vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 9
west and north. But at the same time the importance of Relation!
these Gallic possessions for the mother country was con- ° ome"
tinually on the increase. The glorious climate, akin to
that of Italy, the favourable nature of the soil, the large and
rich region lying behind so advantageous for commerce
with its mercantile routes reaching as far as Britain, the
easy intercourse by land and sea with the mother country,
rapidly gave to southern Gaul an economic importance for
Italy, which much older possessions, such as those in Spain,
had not acquired in the course of centuries ; and as the
Romans who had suffered political shipwreck at this period
sought an asylum especially in Massilia, and there found
once more Italian culture and Italian luxury, voluntary
emigrants from Italy also were attracted more and more to
the Rhone and the Garonne. " The province of Gaul," it
was said in a sketch drawn ten years before Caesar's
arrival, " is full of merchants ; it swarms with Roman
burgesses. No native of Gaul transacts a piece of business
without the intervention of a Roman ; every penny, that
passes from one hand to another in Gaul, goes through the
account books of the Roman burgesses." From the same
description it appears that in addition to the colonists of
Narbo there were Romans cultivating land and rearing
cattle, resident in great numbers in Gaul ; as to which,
however, it must not be overlooked that most of the pro-
vincial land possessed by Romans, just like the greater part
of the English possessions in the earliest times in America,
was in the hands of the high nobility living in Italy, and
those farmers and graziers consisted for the most part of
their stewards — slaves or freedmen.
It is easy to understand how under such circumstances Indpiert
civilization and Romanizing rapidly spread among the izing>
natives. These Celts were not fond of agriculture ; but
their new masters compelled them to exchange the sword
for the plough, and it is very credible that the embittered
io THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
resistance of the Allobroges was provoked in part by some
such injunctions. In earlier timer Hellenism had also to
a certain degree dominated those regions ; the elements of a
higher culture, the stimulus to the cultivation of the vine
and the olive (iii. 315), to the use of writing1 and to the
coining of money, came to them from Massilia. The
Hellenic culture was in this case far from being set aside
by the Romans; Massilia gained through them more
influence than it lost ; and even in the Roman period
Greek physicians and rhetoricians were publicly employed
in the Gallic cantons. But, as may readily be conceived,
Hellenism in southern Gaul acquired through the agency
of the Romans the same character as in Italy; the dis-
tinctively Hellenic civilization gave place to the Latino-
Greek mixed culture, which soon made proselytes here in
great numbers. The " Gauls in the breeches," as the
inhabitants of southern Gaul were called by way of contrast
to the "Gauls in the toga" of northern Italy, were not
indeed like the latter already completely Romanized, but
they were even now very perceptibly distinguished from
the "longhaired Gauls" of the northern regions still
unsubdued. The semiculture becoming naturalized among
them furnished, doubtless, materials enough for ridicule of
their barbarous Latin, and people did not fail to suggest to
any one suspected of Celtic descent his " relationship with
the breeches " ; but this bad Latin was yet sufficient to
enable even the remote Allobroges to transact business with
the Roman authorities, and even to give testimony in the
Roman courts without an interpreter.
While the Celtic and Ligurian population of these regions
was thus in the course of losing its nationality, and was
1 There was found, for instance, at Vaison in the Vocontian canton an
inscription written in the Celtic language with the ord nary Greek alphabet.
It runs thus : aeyo/xapos oviWoveos toovtiovs va/xavo utis eiupov ^vXrjaa-
fnffoaiv yefxrp-oy. The last word means "holy."
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST n
languishing and pining withal under a political and economic
oppression, the intolerable nature of which is sufficiently
attested by their hopeless insurrections, the decline of the
native population here went hand in hand with the natural-
izing of the same higher culture which we find at this period
in Italy. Aquae Sextiae and still more Narbo were con-
siderable townships, which might probably be named by the
side of Beneventum and Capua ; and Massilia, the best
organized, most free, most capable of self-defence, and most
powerful of all the Greek cities dependent on Rome, under
its rigorous aristocratic government to which the Roman
conservatives probably pointed as the model of a good urban
constitution, in possession of an important territory which
had been considerably enlarged by the Romans and of an
extensive trade, stood by the side of those Latin towns
as Rhegium and Neapolis stood in Italy by the side of
Beneventum and Capua.
Matters wore a different aspect, when one crossed the Free GauL
Roman frontier. The great Celtic nation, which in the
southern districts already began to be crushed by the Italian
immigration, still moved to the north of the Cevennes in its
time-hallowed freedom. It is not the first time that we
meet it : the Italians had already fought with the offsets and
advanced posts of this vast stock on the Tiber and on the
Po, in the mountains of Castile and Carinthia, and even in
the heart of Asia Minor; but it was here that the main
stock was first assailed at its very core by their attacks. The
Celtic race had on its settlement in central Europe diffused
itself chiefly over the rich river-valleys and the pleasant
hill-country of the present France, including the western
districts of Germany and Switzerland, and from thence had
occupied at least the southern part of England, perhaps even
at this time all Great Britain and Ireland ; 1 it formed here
1 An immigration of Belgic Celts to Britain continuing for a considerable
time seems indicated by the names of English tribes on both banks of the
12 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
more than anywhere else a broad, geographically compact,
mass of peoples. In spite of the differences in language
and manners which naturally were to be found within this
wide territory, a close mutual intercourse, an innate sense
of fellowship, seems to have knit together the tribes from
the Rhone and Garonne to the Rhine and the Thames ;
whereas, although these doubtless were in a certain measure
locally connected with the Celts in Spain and in the modern
Austria, the mighty mountain barriers of the Pyrenees and
the Alps on the one hand, and the encroachments of the
Romans and the Germans which also operated here on the
other, interrupted the intercourse and the intrinsic connec-
tion of the cognate peoples far otherwise than the narrow
arm of the sea interrupted the relations of the continental
and the British Celts. Unhappily we are not permitted to
trace stage by stage the history of the internal development
of this remarkable people in these its chief seats ; we must
be content with presenting at least some outline of its
historical culture and political condition, as it here meets us
in the time of Caesar.
Population. Gaul was, according to the reports of the ancients, com-
paratively well peopled. Certain statements lead us to infer
that in the Belgic districts there were some 200 persons to
the square mile — a proportion such as nearly holds at present
for Wales and for Livonia — in the Helvetic canton about
245 ; x it is probable that in the districts which were more
Thames borrowed from Belgic cantons ; such as the Atrebates, the Belgae,
and even the Britanni themselves, which word appears to have been trans-
ferred from the Brittones settled on the Somme below Amiens first to an
English canton and then to the whole island. The English gold coinage
was also derived from the Belgic and originally identical with it.
1 The first levy of the Belgic cantons exclusive of the Remi, that is, of
the country between the Seine and the Scheldt and eastward as far as the
vicinity of Rheims and Andernach, from 9000 to 10,000 square miles, is
reckoned at about 300,000 men ; in accordance with which, if we regard
the proportion of the first levy to the whole men capable of bearing arms
specified for the Bellovaci as holding good generally, the number of the
Belgae capable of bearing arms would amount to 500,000 and the whole
population accordingly to at least 2,000,000. The Helvetii with the
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 13
cultivated than the Belgic and less mountainous than the
Helvetian, as among the Bituriges, Arverni, Haedui, the
uumber rose still higher. Agriculture was no doubt prac- Agriculture
tised in Gaul — for even the contemporaries of Caesar were *^r he .
surprised in the region of the Rhine by the custom of cattle,
manuring with marl,1 and the primitive Celtic custom of
preparing beer (ccrvesia) from barley is likewise an evidence
of the early and wide diffusion of the culture of grain — but
it was not held in estimation. Even in the more civilized
south it was reckoned not becoming for the free Celts to
handle the plough. In far higher estimation among the
Celts stood pastoral husbandry, for which the Roman land-
holders of this epoch very gladly availed themselves both of
the Celtic breed of cattle, and of the brave Celtic slaves
skilled in riding and familiar with the rearing of animals.2
adjoining peoples numbered before their migration 336,000 ; if we assume
that they were at that time already dislodged from the right bank of the
Rhine, their territory may be estimated at nearly 1350 square miles.
Whether the serfs are included in this, we can the less determine, as we
do not know the form which slavery assumed amongst the Celts ; what
Caesar relates (i. 4) as to the slaves, clients, and debtors of Orgetorix tells
rather in favour of, than against, their being included.
That, moreover, every such attempt to make up by combinations for
the statistical basis, in which ancient history is especially deficient, must be
received with due caution, will be at once apprehended by the intelligent
reader, while he will not absolutely reject it on that account.
1 "In the interior of Transalpine Gaul on the Rhine," says Scrofa in
Varro, De R. R. i. 7, 8, "when I commanded there, I traversed some
districts, where neither the vine nor the olive nor the fruit-tree appears,
where they manure the fields with white Pit-chalk, where they have neither
rock- nor sea-salt, but make use of the saline ashes of certain burnt wood
instead of salt." This description refers probably to the period before
Caesar and to the eastern districts of the old province, such as the country
of the Allobroges ; subsequently Pliny (H. N. xvii. 6, 42 seq. ) describes at
length the Gallo- Britannic manuring with marl.
* "The Gallic oxen especially are of good repute in Italy, for field labour
forsooth ; whereas the Ligurian are good for nothing " (Varro, De R. R. a.
5, 9). Here, no doubt, Cisalpine Gaul is referred to, but the cattle-
husbandry there doubtless goes back to the Celtic epoch. Plautus already
mentions the "Gallic ponies" (Gallici canterii, Aul. iii. 5, 21). "It is
not every race that is suited for the business of herdsmen ; neither the
Bastulians nor the Turdulians" (both in Andalusia) "are fit for it ; the
Celts are the best, especially as respects beasts for riding and burder
(lumenia) " (Varro, De R. R. ii. 10, 4).
14 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
Particularly in the northern Celtic districts pastoral
husbandry was thoroughly predominant. Brittany was in
Caesar's time a country poor in corn. In the north-east
dense forests, attaching themselves to the heart of the
Ardennes, stretched almost without interruption from the
German Ocean to the Rhine ; and on the plains of Flanders
and Lorraine, now so fertile, the Menapian and Treverian
herdsman then fed his half-wild swine in the impenetrable
oak-forest Just as in the valley of the Po the Romans
made the production of wool and the culture of corn super-
sede the Celtic feeding of pigs on acorns, so the rearing of
sheep and the agriculture in the plains of the Scheldt and
the Maas are traceable to their influence. In Britain
even the threshing of corn was not yet usual ; and in
its more northern districts agriculture was not practised,
and the rearing of cattle was the only known mode of turning
the soil to account. The culture of the olive and
vine, which yielded rich produce to the Massiliots, was
not yet prosecuted beyond the Cevennes in the time
of Caesar.
Urban life. The Gauls were from the first disposed to settle in
groups ; there were open villages everywhere, and the
68. Helvetic canton alone numbered in 696 four hundred of
these, besides a multitude of single homesteads. But there
were not wanting also walled towns, whose walls of alternate
layers surprised the Romans both by their suitableness and
by the elegant interweaving of timber and stones in their
construction ; while, it is true, even in the towns of the
Allobroges the buildings were erected solely of wood. Of
such towns the Helvetii had twelve and the Suessiones an
equal number ; whereas at all events in the more northern
districts, such as among the Nervii, while there were doubt-
less also towns, the population during war sought protection
in the morasses and forests rather than behind their walls,
and beyond the Thames the primitive defence of the wooden
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 15
barricade altogether took the place of towns and was in war
the only place of refuge for men and herds.
In close association with the comparatively consider- Inter-
able development of urban life stands the activity of inter- cour>**
course by land and by water. Everywhere there were
roads and bridges. The river -navigation, which streams
like the Rhone, Garonne, Loire, and Seine, of themselves
invited, was considerable and lucrative. But far more
remarkable was the maritime navigation of the Celts. Not
only were the Celts, to all appearance, the nation that first
regularly navigated the Atlantic ocean, but we find that the
art of building and of managing vessels had attained among
them a remarkable development. The navigation of the
peoples of the Mediterranean had, as may readily be
conceived from the nature of the waters traversed by them,
for a comparatively long period adhered to the oar ; the
war-vessels of the Phoenicians, Hellenes, and Romans were
at all times oared galleys, in which the sail was applied
only as an occasional aid to the oar; the trading vessels
alone were in the epoch of developed ancient civilization
" sailers " properly so called.1 On the other hand the
Gauls doubtless employed in the Channel in Caesar's time,
as for long afterwards, a species of portable leathern skiffs,
which seem to have been in the main common oared boats,
but on the west coast of Gaul the Santones, the Pictones,
and above all the Veneti sailed in large though clumsily
built ships, which were not impelled by oars but were
provided with leathern sails and iron anchor-chains ; and
they employed these not only for their traffic with Britain,
1 We are led to this conclusion by the designation of the trading or
"round" as contrasted with the "long" or war vessel, and the similar
contrast of the "oared ships" (iirlicwwoi. vijes) and the "merchantmen"
(oXnades, Dionys. iii. 44) ; and moreover by the smallness of the crew in
the trading vessels, which in the very largest amounted to not more than
200 men {Rhein. Mus. N. F. xl. 625), while it, the ordinary galley of
three decks there were employed 170 rowers (ii. 174). Conip. Movers,
Pkoen. ii. 3, 167 seq .
16 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
but also in naval combat. Here therefore we not only
.fleet for the first time with navigation in the open ocean,
but we find that here the sailing vessel first fully took the
place of the oared boat — an improvement, it is true, which
the declining activity of the old world did not know how
to turn to account, and the immeasurable results of which
our own epoch of renewed culture is employed in gradually
reaping.
Commerce. With this regular maritime intercourse between the
British and Gallic coasts, the very close political connection
between the inhabitants on both sides of the Channel is as
easily explained as the flourishing of transmarine commerce
and of fisheries. It was the Celts of Brittany in particular,
that brought the tin of the mines of Cornwall from England
and carried it by the river and land routes of Gaul to Narbo
and Massilia. The statement, that in Caesar's time certain
tribes at the mouth of the Rhine subsisted on fish and
birds' eggs, may probably refer to the circumstance that
marine fishing and the collection of the eggs of sea-birds
were prosecuted there on an extensive scale. When we
put together and endeavour to fill up the isolated and
scanty statements which have reached us regarding the
Celtic commerce and intercourse, we come to see why the
tolls of the river and maritime ports play a great part in the
budgets of certain cantons, such as those of the Haedui
and the Veneti, and why the chief god of the nation was
regarded by them as the protector of the roads and of
commerce, and at the same time as the inventor of manu-
Manufac- factures. Accordingly the Celtic industry cannot have been
wholly undeveloped ; indeed the singular dexterity of the
Celts, and their peculiar skill in imitating any model and
executing any instructions, are noticed by Caesar. In most
branches, however, their handicraft does not appear to have
risen above the ordinary level ; the manufacture of linen and
woollen stuffs, that subsequently flourished in central and
ghap. vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 17
northern Gaul, was demonstrably called into existence only
by the Romans. The elaboration of metals forms an
exception, and so far as we know the only one. The
copper implements not unfrequently of excellent work-
manship and even now malleable, which are brought to light
in the tombs of Gaul, and the carefully adjusted Arvernian
gold coins, are still at the present day striking witnesses of
the skill of the Celtic workers in copper and gold; and
with this the reports of the ancients well accord, that the
Romans learned the art of tinning from the Bituriges and
that of silvering from the Alesini — inventions, the first of
which was naturally suggested by the traffic in tin, and both
of which were probably made in the period of Celtic
freedom.
Hand in hand with dexterity in the elaboration of the Mining,
metals went the art of procuring them, which had attained,
more especially in the iron mines on the Loire, such a degree
of professional skill that the miners played an important
part in the sieges. The opinion prevalent among the
Romans of this period, that Gaul was one of the richest
gold countries in the world, is no doubt refuted by the
well-known nature of the soil and by the character of the
articles found in the Celtic tombs, in which gold appears
but sparingly and with far less frequency than in the
similar repositories of the true native regions of gold ; this
conception no doubt had its origin merely from the
descriptions which Greek travellers and Roman soldiers,
doubtless not without strong exaggeration, gave to their
countrymen of the magnificence of the Arvernian kings
(iii. 416), and of the treasures of the Tolosan temples (iii.
436). But their stories were not pure fictions. It may well
be believed that in and near the rivers which flow from the
Alps and the Pyrenees gold-washing and searches for gold,
which are unprofitable at the present value of labour, were
worked with profit and on a considerable scale in ruder
vol. v 135
18
THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
Art and
science.
Political
organiza-
tion.
times and with a system of slavery ; besides, the commercial
relations of Gaul may, as is not unfrequently the case with
half-civilized peoples, have favoured the accumulation of a
dead stock of the precious metals.
The low state of the arts of design is remarkable, and
is the more striking by the side of this mechanical skill in
handling the metals. The fondness for parti-coloured and
brilliant ornaments shows the want of a proper taste, which
is sadly confirmed by the Gallic coins with their representa-
tions sometimes exceedingly simple, sometimes odd, but
always childish in design, and almost without exception
rude beyond parallel in their execution. It is perhaps
unexampled that a coinage practised for centuries with a
certain technical skill should have essentially limited itself
to always imitating two or three Greek dies, and always
with increasing deformity. On the other hand the art of
poetry was highly valued by the Celts, and intimately
blended with the religious and even with the political
institutions of the nation ; we find religious poetry, as well
as that of the court and of the mendicant, flourishing
(iii. 416). Natural science and philosophy also found,
although subject to the forms and fetters of the theology of
the country, a certain amount of attention among the
Celts ; and Hellenic humanism met with a ready reception
wherever and in whatever shape it approached them. The
knowledge of writing was general at least among the
priests. For the most part in free Gaul the Greek writing
was made use of in Caesar's time, as was done among others
by the Helvetii; but in its most southern districts even
then, in consequence of intercourse with the Romanized
Celts, the Latin attained predominance — we meet with it,
for instance, on the Arvernian coins of this period.
The political development of the Celtic nation also
presents very remarkable phenomena. The constitution of
the state was based in this case, as everywhere, on the clan-
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 19
canton, with its prince, its council of the elders, and its
community of freemen capable of bearing arms ; but the
peculiarity in this case was that it never got beyond this
cantonal constitution. Among the Greeks and Romans Cantonal
the canton was very early superseded by the ring -wall jj!^ "
as the basis of political unity ; where two cantons found
themselves together within the same walls, they amal-
gamated into one commonwealth ; where a body of
burgesses assigned to a portion of their fellow -burgesses
a new ring-wall, there regularly arose in this way a new
state connected with the mother community only by
ties of piety and, at most, of clientship. Among the
Celts on the other hand the " burgess-body " continued at
all times to be the clan ; prince and council presided over
the canton and not over any town, and the general diet of
the canton formed the authority of last resort in the state.
The town had, as in the east, merely mercantile and
strategic, not political importance ; for which reason the
Gallic townships, even when walled and very considerable
such as Vienna and Genava, were in the view of the Greeks
and Romans nothing but villages. In the time of Caesar
the original clan -constitution still subsisted substantially
unaltered among the insular Celts and in the northern
cantons of the mainland ; the general assembly held the
supreme authority ; the prince was in essential questions
bound by its decrees ; the common council was numerous
— it numbered in certain clans six hundred members —
but does not appear to have had more importance than the
senate under the Roman kings. In the more stirring southern
portion of the land, again, one or two generations before
Caesar — the children of the last kings were still living in
his time — there had occurred, at least among the larger
clans, the Arverni, Haedui, Sequani, Helvetii, a revolution
which set aside the royal dominion and gave the power into
the hands of the nobility.
20 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
Develop It is simply the reverse side of the total want of urban
knigh° commonwealths among the Celts just noticed, that the
hood. opposite pole of political development, knighthood, so
thoroughly preponderates in the Celtic clan- constitution.
The Celtic aristocracy was to all appearance a high nobility,
for the most part perhaps the members of the royal or
formerly royal families ; as indeed it is remarkable that the
heads of the opposite parties in the same clan very fre-
quently belong to the same house. These great families
combined in their hands financial, warlike, and political
ascendency. They monopolized the leases of the profitable
rights of the state. They compelled the free commons,
who were oppressed by the burden of taxation, to borrow
from them, and to surrender their freedom first de facto as
debtors, then de jure as bondmen. They developed the
system of retainers, that is, the privilege of the nobility to
surround themselves with a number of hired mounted
servants — the ambacti as they were called 1 — and thereby
1 This remarkable word must have been in use as early as the sixth
century of Rome among the Celts in the valley of the Po ; for Ennius is
already acquainted with it, and it can only have reached the Italians at
so early a period from that quarter. It is not merely Celtic, however,
but also German, the root of our " Arat," as indeed the retainer-system
itself is common to the Celts and the Germans. It would be of great
historical importance to ascertain whether the word — and so also the thing
— came to the Celts from the Germans, or to the Germans from the Celts.
If, as is usually supposed, the word is originally German and primarily
signified the servant standing in battle " against the back " {and — against
bak = back) of his master, this is not wholly irreconcileable with the singu-
larly early occurrence of this word among the Celts. According to all
analogy the right to keep ambacti, that is, 5o£\oi luaBunol, cannot have
belonged to the Celtic nobility from the outset, but must only have de-
veloped itself gradually in antagonism to the older monarchy and to the
equality of the free commons. If thus the system of ambacti among the
Celts was not an ancient and national, but a comparatively recent institu-
tion, it is — looking to the relation which had subsisted for centuries between
the Celts and Germans, and which is to be explained farther on— not
merely possible but even probable that the Celts, in Italy as in Gaul,
employed Germans chiefly as those hired servants-at-arms. The " Swiss
guard" would therefore in that case be some thousands of years older
than people suppose. Should the term by which the Romans, perhaps
after the example of the Celts, designate the Germans as a nation — the
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 21
to form a state within the state; and, resting on the sup-
port of these troops of their own, they defied the legal
authorities and the common levy and practically broke up
the commonwealth. If in a clan, which numbered about Breaking
80,000 men capable of arms, a single noble could appear upofthe
at the diet with 10,000 retainers, not reckoning the bond- tonal con-
men and the debtors, it is clear that such an one was more stltution'
an independent dynast than a burgess of his clan. More-
over, the leading families of the different clans were closely
connected and through intermarriages and special treaties
formed virtually a compact league, in presence of which
the single clan was powerless. Therefore the communities
were no longer able to maintain the public peace, and the
law of the strong arm reigned throughout. The dependent
found protection only from his master, whom duty and
interest compelled to redress the injury inflicted on his
client ; the state had no longer the power to protect those
who were free, and consequently these gave themselves
over in numbers to some powerful man as clients.
The common assembly lost its political importance; Abolition
and even the power of the prince, which should have ofthe .
checked the encroachments of the nobility, succumbed to
it among the Celts as well as in Latium. In place of the
king came the "judgment-worker" or Vergobretus,1 who
was like the Roman consul nominated only for a year.
So far as the canton still held together at all, it was led by
the common council, in which naturally the heads of the
aristocracy usurped the government. Of course under such
name Germani — be really of Celtic origin, this obviously accords very well
with that hypothesis. — No doubt these assumptions must necessarily give
way, should the word ambactus be explained in a satisfactory way from a
Celtic root ; as in fact Zeuss (Gramm. p. 796), though doubtfully, traces
it to ambi = around and aig—agere, viz. one moving round or moved round,
and so attendants, servants. The circumstance that the word occurs also
as a Celtic proper name (Zeuss, p. 77), and is perhaps preserved in the
Cambrian amaeth — peasant, labourer (Zeuss, p. 156), cannot decide the
point either way.
1 From the Celtic words guerg— worker and breth — judgment.
2t THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
circumstances there was agitation in the several clans much
in the same way as there had been agitation in Latium for
centuries after the expulsion of the kings : while the nobility
of the different communities combined to form a separate
alliance hostile to the power of the community, the multi-
tude ceased not to desire the restoration of the monarchy ;
and not unfrequently a prominent nobleman attempted, as
Spurius Cassius had done in Rome, with the support of the
mass of those belonging to the canton to break down the
power of his peers, and to reinstate the crown in its rights
for his own special benefit.
Efforts While the individual cantons were thus irremediably
t01tional declining, the sense of unity was at the same time power-
unity, fully stirring in the nation and seeking in various ways to
take shape and hold. That combination of the whole
Celtic nobility in contradistinction to the individual canton-
unions, while disturbing the existing order of things,
awakened and fostered the conception of the collective unity
of the nation. The attacks directed against the nation from
without, and the continued diminution of its territory in
war with its neighbours, operated in the same direction.
Like the Hellenes in their wars with the Persians, and the
Italians in their wars with the Celts, the Transalpine Gauls
seem to have become conscious of the existence and the
power of their national unity in the wars against Rome.
Amidst the dissensions of rival clans and all their feudal
quarrelling there might still be heard the voices of those
who were ready to purchase the independence of the nation
at the cost of the independence of the several cantons, and
even at that of the seignorial rights of the knights. The
thorough popularity of the opposition to a foreign yoke was
shown by the wars of Caesar, with reference to whom the
Celtic patriot party occupied a position entirely similar to
that of the German patriots towards Napoleon ; its extent
and organization are attested, among other things, by the
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 23
telegraphic rapidity with which news was communicated
from one point to another.
The universality and the strength of the Celtic national Religions
feeling would be inexplicable but for the circumstance that, j£"on °.f
amidst the greatest political disruption, the Celtic nation
had for long been centralized in respect of religion and
even of theology. The Celtic priesthood or, to use the Druids,
native name, the corporation of the Druids, certainly
embraced the British islands and all Gaul, and perhaps
also other Celtic countries, in a common religious-national
bond. It possessed a special head elected by the priests
themselves ; special schools, in which its very compre-
hensive tradition was transmitted ; special privileges, par-
ticularly exemption from taxation and military service, which
every clan respected ; annual councils, which were held near
Chartres at the " centre of the Celtic earth " ; and above
all, a believing people, who in painful piety and blind
obedience to their priests seem to have been nowise inferior
to the Irish of modern times. It may readily be conceived
that such a priesthood attempted to usurp, as it partially
did usurp, the secular government; where the annual
monarchy subsisted, it conducted the elections in the event
of an interregnum ; it successfully laid claim to the right of
excluding individuals and whole communities from religious,
and consequently also from civil, society ; it was careful to
draw to itself the most important civil causes, especially
processes as to boundaries and inheritance ; on the ground,
apparently, of its right to exclude from the community, and
perhaps also of the national custom that criminals should
be by preference taken for the usual human sacrifices, it
developed an extensive priestly criminal jurisdiction, which
was co-ordinate with that of the kings and vergobrets ; it
even claimed the right of deciding on war and peace. The
Gauls were not far removed from an ecclesiastical state
with its pope and councils, its immunities, interdicts, and
Want of
political
central-
ization.
The
canton-
leagues.
The Belgic
league.
24 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
spiritual courts ; only this ecclesiastical state did not, like
that of recent times, stand aloof from the nations, but was
on the contrary pre-eminently national.
But while the sense of mutual relationship was thus
vividly awakened among the Celtic tribes, the nation was
still precluded from attaining a basis of political centraliza-
tion such as Italy found in the Roman burgesses, and the
Hellenes and Germans in the Macedonian and Frank kings.
The Celtic priesthood and likewise the nobility — although
both in a certain sense represented and combined the
nation — were yet, on the one hand, incapable of uniting it
in consequence of their particular class-interests, and, on
the other hand, sufficiently powerful to allow no king and
no canton to accomplish the work of union. Attempts at
this work were not wanting ; they followed, as the cantonal
constitution suggested, the system of hegemony. A powerful
canton induced a weaker to become subordinate, on such
a footing that the leading canton acted for the other as
well as for itself in its external relations and stipulated for
it in state-treaties, while the dependent canton bound itself
to render military service and sometimes also to pay a
tribute. In this way a series of separate leagues arose;
but there was no leading canton for all Gaul — no tie,
however loose, combining the nation as a whole.
It has been already mentioned (iii. 416) that the Romans
at the commencement of their Transalpine conquests found
in the north a Britanno-Belgic league under the leadership
of the Suessiones, and in central and southern Gaul the
confederation of the Arverni, with which latter the Haedui,
although having a weaker body of clients, carried on a
rivalry. In Caesar's time we find the Belgae in north-eastern
Gaul between the Seine and the Rhine still forming such an
association, which, however, apparently no longer extends to
Britain; by their side there appears, in the modern Normandy
and Brittany, the league of the Aremorican or the maritime
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 25
cantons : in central or proper Gaul two parties as formerly The
contended far the hegemony, the one headed by the Haedui, maritime
. . cantoni.
the other by the Sequani after the Arvernians weakened by
the wars with Rome had retired. These different confed- The
eracies subsisted independently side by side ; the leading £^tnl °
states of central Gaul appear never to have extended their GaoL
clientship to the north-east nor, seriously, perhaps even to
the north-west of Gaul.
The impulse of the nation towards freedom found doubt- Character
less a certain gratification in these cantonal unions ; but they ^ ^
were in every respect unsatisfactory. The union was of the
loosest kind, constantly fluctuating between alliance and
hegemony ; the representation of the whole body in peace
by the federal diets, in war by the general,1 was in the
highest degree feeble. The Belgian confederacy alone seems
to have been bound together somewhat more firmly ; the
national enthusiasm, from which the successful repulse of the
Cimbri proceeded (iii. 430 /.), may have proved beneficial
to it The rivalries for the hegemony made a breach in
every league, which time did not close but widened, because
the victory of one competitor still left his opponent in pos-
session of political existence, and it always remained open
to him, even though he had submitted to clientship,
subsequently to renew the struggle. The rivalry among the
more powerful cantons not only set these at variance, but
spread into every dependent clan, into every village, often
indeed into every house, for each individual chose his side
according to his personal relations. As Hellas exhausted
its strength not so much in the struggle of Athens against
Sparta as in the internal strife of the Athenian and Lace-
daemonian factions in every dependent community, and even
in Athens itself, so the rivalry of the Arverni and Haedui
1 The position which such ,1 federal general occupied with reference to
his troops, is shown by the accusation of high treason raised against
Vercingetorix (Caesar, B. G. vii. 20).
26 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
with its repetitions on a smaller and smaller scale destroyed
the Celtic people.
The Celtic The military capability of the nation felt the reflex in-
military fluence 0f these political and social relations. The cavalry
system. r J
Cavalry. was throughout the predominant arm ; alongside of which
among the Belgae, and still more in the British islands, the
old national war-chariots appear in remarkable perfection.
These equally numerous and efficient bands of combatants
on horseback and in chariots were formed from the nobility
and its vassals; for the nobles had a genuine knightly
delight in dogs and horses, and were at much expense to
procure noble horses of foreign breed. It is characteristic
of the spirit and the mode of fighting of these nobles that,
when the levy was called out, whoever could keep his seat
on horseback, even the gray-haired old man, took the field,
and that, when on the point of beginning a combat with an
enemy of whom they made little account, they swore man by
man that they would keep aloof from house and homestead,
unless their band should charge at least twice through the
enemy's line. Among the hired warriors the free-lance spirit
prevailed with all its demoralized and stolid indifference
towards their own life and that of others. This is apparent
from the stories — however anecdotic their colouring — of the
Celtic custom of tilting by way of sport and now and then
fighting for life or death at a banquet, and of the usage
(which prevailed among the Celts, and outdid even the
Roman gladiatorial games) of selling themselves to be killed
for a set sum of money or a number of casks of wine, and
voluntarily accepting the fatal blow stretched on their shield
before the eyes of the whole multitude.
infantry. By the side of these mounted warriors the infantry fell
into the background. In the main it essentially resembled
the bands of Celts, with whom the Romans had fought in
Italy and Spain. The large shield was, as then, the prin-
cipal weapon of defence ; among the offensive arms, on the
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 27
other hand, the long thrusting lance now played the chief
part in room of the sword. Where several cantons waged
war in league, they naturally encamped and fought clan
against clan ; there is no trace of their giving to the levy of
each canton military organization and forming smaller and
more regular tactical subdivisions. A long train of waggons
still dragged the baggage of the Celtic army ; instead of an
entrenched camp, such as the Romans pitched every night,
the poor substitute of a barricade of waggons still sufficed
In the case of certain cantons, such as the Nervii, the
efficiency of their infantry is noticed as exceptional ; it is
remarkable that these had no cavalry, and perhaps were
not even a Celtic but an immigrant German tribe. But in
general the Celtic infantry of this period appears as an
unwarlike and unwieldy levy en masse ; most of all in the
more southern provinces, where along with barbarism valour
had also disappeared. The Celt, says Caesar, ventures not
to face the German in battle. The Roman general passed
a censure still more severe than this judgment on the Celtic
infantry, seeing that, after having become acquainted with
them in his first campaign, he never again employed them
in connection with Roman infantry.
If we survey the whole condition of the Celts as Caesar Stage of
found it in the Transalpine regions, there is an unmistake- develoPr
able advance in civilization, as compared with the stage of the Celtic
culture at which the Celts came before us a century and a C1V1 lzatl0n'
half previously in the valley of the Po. Then the militia,
excellent of its kind, thoroughly preponderated in their
armies (i. 423) ; now the cavalry occupies the first place.
Then the Celts dwelt in open villages ; now well-constructed
walls surrounded their townships. The objects too found in
the tombs of Lombardy are, especially as respects articles
of copper and glass, far inferior to those of northern Gaul.
Perhaps the most trustworthy measure of the increase of
culture is the sense of a common relationship in the nation ;
28 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book V
so little of it comes to light in the Celtic battles fought
on the soil of what is now Lombardy, while it strikingly
appears in the struggles against Caesar. To all appearance
the Celtic nation, when Caesar encountered it, had already
reached the maximum of the culture allotted to it, and was
even now on the decline. The civilization of the Trans-
alpine Celts in Caesar's time presents, even for us who are
but very imperfectly informed regarding it, several aspects
that are estimable, and yet more that are interesting ; in
some respects it is more akin to the modern than to the
Hellenic-Roman culture, with its sailing vessels, its knight-
hood, its ecclesiastical constitution, above all with its
attempts, however imperfect, to build the state not on the
city, but on the tribe and in a higher degree on the nation.
But just because we here meet the Celtic nation at the
culminating point of its development, its lesser degree of
moral endowment or, which is the same thing, its lesser
capacity of culture, comes more distinctly into view. It
was unable to produce from its own resources either a
national art or a national state ; it attained at the utmost
a national theology and a peculiar type of nobility. The
original simple valour was no more ; the military courage
based on higher morality and judicious organization, which
comes in the train of increased civilization, had only made
its appearance in a very stunted form among the knights.
Barbarism in the strict sense was doubtless outlived ; the
times had gone by, when in Gaul the fat haunch was
assigned to the bravest of the guests, but each of his
fellow-guests who thought himself offended thereby was at
liberty to challenge the receiver on that score to combat,
and when the most faithful retainers of a deceased chief
were burnt along with him. But human sacrifices still
continued, and the maxim of law, that torture was inad-
missible in the case of the free man but allowable in that
of the free woman as well as of slaves, throws a far from
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 29
pleasing light on the position which the female sex held
among the Celts even in their period of culture. The Celts
had lost the advantages which specially belong to the
primitive epoch of nations, but had not acquired those
which civilization brings with it when it intimately and
thoroughly pervades a people.
Such was the internal condition of the Celtic nation. External
It remains that we set forth their external relations with relatlons"
their neighbours, and describe the part which they sustained
at this moment in the mighty rival race and rival struggle
of the nations, in which it is everywhere still more difficult
to maintain than to acquire. Along the Pyrenees the Celts and
relations of the peoples had for long been peaceably settled, Ibenans-
and the times had long gone by when the Celts there
pressed hard on, and to some extent supplanted, the
Iberian, that is, the Basque, original population. The
valleys of the Pyrenees as well as the mountains of Beam
and Gascony, and also the coast-steppes to the south of the
Garonne, were at the time of Caesar in the undisputed
possession of the Aquitani, a great number of small tribes
of Iberian descent, coming little into contact with each other
and still less with the outer world ; in this quarter only
the mouth of the Garonne with the important port of Bur-
digala (Bordeaux) was in the hands of a Celtic tribe, the
Bituriges-Vivisci.
Of far greater importance was the contact of the Celtic Celts and
nation with the Roman people, and with the Germans. Roman3,
We need not here repeat — what has been related already —
how the Romans in their slow advance had gradually
pressed back the Celts, had at last occupied the belt of
coast between the Alps and the Pyrenees, and had thereby
totally cut them off from Italy, Spain and the Mediterranean
Sea — a catastrophe, for which the way had already been
prepared centuries before by the laying out of the Hellenic
stronghold at the mouth of the Rhone. But we must
3o THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
Advance of here recall the fact that it was not merely the superiority of
Ro™annd the Roman arms which pressed hard on the Celts, but
commerce quite as much that of Roman culture, which likewise
GauL™8 reaped the ultimate benefit of the respectable beginnings of
Hellenic civilization in Gaul. Here too, as so often
happens, trade and commerce paved the way for conquest
The Celt after northern fashion was fond of fiery drinks ;
the fact that like the Scythian he drank the generous wine
unmingled and to intoxication, excited the surprise and the
disgust of the temperate southern ; but the trader has no
objection to deal with such customers. Soon the trade
with Gaul became a mine of gold for the Italian merchant ;
it was nothing unusual there for a jar of wine to be
exchanged for a slave. Other articles of luxury, such as
Italian horses, found advantageous sale in Gaul. There
were instances even already of Roman burgesses acquiring
landed property beyond the Roman frontier, and turning
it to profit after the Italian fashion ; there is mention, for
example, of Roman estates in the canton of the Segusiavi
81. (near Lyons) as early as about 673. Beyond doubt it was
a consequence of this that, as already mentioned (p. 18)
in free Gaul itself, e.g. among the Arverni, the Roman
language was not unknown even before the conquest ;
although this knowledge was presumably still restricted to
few, and even the men of rank in the allied canton of the
Haedui had to be conversed with through interpreters.
Just as the traffickers in fire-water and the squatters led the
way in the occupation of North America, so these Roman
wine-traders and landlords paved the way for, and beckoned
onward, the future conqueror of Gaul. How vividly this
was felt even on the opposite side, is shown by the pro-
hibition which one of the most energetic tribes of Gaul, the
canton of the Nervii, like some German peoples, issued
against trafficking with the Romans.
Still more violent even than the pressure of the Romans
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 31
from the Mediterranean was that of the Germans downward Celts and
from the Baltic and the North Sea— a fresh stock from the German*-
great cradle of peoples in the east, which made room for
itself by the side of its elder brethren with youthful vigour,
although also with youthful rudeness. Though the tribes
of this stock dwelling nearest to the Rhine — the Usipetes,
Tencteri, Sugambri, Ubii — had begun to be in some degree
civilized, and had at least ceased voluntarily to change their
abodes, all accounts yet agree that farther inland agriculture
was of little importance, and the several tribes had hardly
yet attained fixed abodes. It is significant in this respect
that their western neighbours at this time hardly knew how
to name any one of the peoples of the interior of Germany
by its cantonal name ; these were only known to them under
the general appellations of the Suebi, that is, the roving
people or nomads, and the Marcomani, that is, the land-
guard1 — names which were hardly cantonal names in
Caesar's time, although they appeared as such to the
Romans and subsequently became in various cases names of
cantons.
The most violent onset of this great nation fell upon The right
the Celts. The struggles, in which the Germans probably the Rhine
engaged with the Celts for the possession of the regions to lost to tiw*
the east of the Rhine, are wholly withdrawn from our view.
We are only able to perceive, that about the end of the
seventh century of Rome all the land as far as the Rhine
1 Caesar's Suebi thus were probably the Chatti ; but that designation
certainly belonged in Caesar's time, and even much later, also to every
other German stock which could be described as a regularly wandering
one. Accordingly if, as is not to be doubted, the "king of the Suebi"
in Mela (iii. 1) and Pliny {H. N. ii. 67, 170) was Ariovistus, it by no
means therefore follows that Ariovistus was a Chattan. The Marcomani
cannot be demonstrated asa distinct people before Marbod ; it is very possible
that the word up to that point indicates nothing but what it etymologically
signifies — the land, or frontier, guard. When Caesar (i. 51) mentions
Marcomani among the peoples fighting in the army of Ariovistus, he may
in this instance have misunderstood a merely appellative designation,
just as he has decidedly done in the case of the Suebi.
3*
THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
German
tribes on
the left
bank of
the Rhine.
was already lost to the Celts ; that the Boii, who were prob
ably once settled in Bavaria and Bohemia (in. 423), were
homeless wanderers; and that even the Black Forest for-
merly possessed by the Helvetii (iii. 423), if not yet taken
possession of by the German tribes dwelling in the vicinity,
was at least waste debateable border-land, and was presum-
ably even then, what it was afterwards called, the Helvetian
desert. The barbarous strategy of the Germans — which
secured them from hostile attacks by laying waste the
neighbourhood for miles — seems to have been applied here
on the greatest scale.
But the Germans had not remained stationary at the
Rhine. The march of the Cimbrian and Teutonic host,
composed, as respects its flower, of German tribes, which
had swept with such force fifty years before over Pannonia,
Gaul, Italy, and Spain, seemed to have been nothing but a
grand reconnaissance. Already different German tribes had
formed permanent settlements to the west of the Rhine,
especially of its lower course ; having intruded as conquerors,
these settlers continued to demand hostages and to levy
annual tribute from the Gallic inhabitants in their neigh-
bourhood, as if from subjects. Among these German tribes
were the Aduatuci, who from a fragment of the Cimbrian
horde (iii. 445) had grown into a considerable canton, and a
number of other tribes afterwards comprehended under the
name of the Tungri on the Maas in the region of Liege ;
even the Treveri (about Treves) and the Nervii (in
Hainault), two of the largest and most powerful peoples of
this region, are directly designated by respectable author-
ities as Germans. The complete credibility of these accounts
must certainly remain doubtful, since, as Tacitus remarks in
reference to the two peoples last mentioned, it was
subsequently, at least in these regions, reckoned an honour
to be descended of German blood and not to belong to the
little-esteemed Celtic nation; yet the population in the
chak vn THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 33
region of the Scheldt, Maas, and Moselle seems certainly to
have become, in one way or another, largely mingled with
German elements, or at any rate to have come under German
influences. The German settlements themselves were
perhaps small ; they were not unimportant, for amidst the
chaotic obscurity, through which we see the stream of
peoples on the right bank of the Rhine ebbing and flowing
about this period, we can well perceive that larger German
hordes were preparing to cross the Rhine in the track of
these advanced posts. Threatened on two sides by foreign
domination and torn by internal dissension, it was scarcely
to be expected that the unhappy Celtic nation would now
rally and save itself by its own vigour. Dismemberment,
and decay in virtue of dismemberment, had hitherto been
its history ; how should a nation, which could name no day
like those of Marathon and Salamis, of Aricia and the
Raudine plain — a nation which, even in its time of vigour,
had made no attempt to destroy Massilia by a united effort
— now when evening had come, defend itself against so
formidable foes?
The less the Celts, left to themselves, were a match for The
the Germans, the more reason had the Romans carefully to poi™^^
watch over the complications in which the two nations reference
might be involved. Although the movements thence Qerman
arising had not up to the present time directly affected them, invasion,
they and their most important interests were yet concerned
in the issue of those movements. As may readily be con-
ceived, the internal demeanour of the Celtic nation had
become speedily and permanently influenced by its outward
relations. As in Greece the Lacedaemonian party combined
with Persia against the Athenians, so the Romans from their
first appearance beyond the Alps had found a support
against the Arverni, who were then the ruling power among
the southern Celts, in their rivals for the hegemony, the
Haedui : and with the aid of these new " brothers of the
vol. v 136
34 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
Roman nation " they had not merely reduced to subjection
the Allobroges and a great portion of the indirect territory
of the Arverni, but had also, in the Gaul that remained free,
occasioned by their influence the transference of the hege-
mony from the Arverni to these Haedui. But while the
Greeks were threatened with danger to their nationality only
from one side, the Celts found themselves hard pressed
simultaneously by two national foes ; and it was natural that
they should seek from the one protection against the other,
and that, if the one Celtic party attached itself to the
Romans, their opponents should on the contrary form
alliance with the Germans. This course was most natural
for the Belgae, who were brought by neighbourhood and
manifold intermixture into closer relation to the Germans
who had crossed the Rhine, and moreover, with their less-
developed culture, probably felt themselves at least as much
akin to the Suebian of alien race as to their cultivated
Allobrogian or Helvetic countryman. But the southern
Celts also, among whom now, as already mentioned, the
considerable canton of the Sequani (about Besangon) stood
at the head of the party hostile to the Romans, had every
reason at this very time to call in the Germans against the
Romans who immediately threatened them ; the remiss
government of the senate and the signs of the revolution
preparing in Rome, which had not remained unknown to
the Celts, made this very moment seem suitable for ridding
themselves of the Roman influence and primarily for
humbling the Roman clients, the Haedui. A rupture had
taken place between the two cantons respecting the tolls
on the Saone, which separated the territory of the Haedui
71. from that of the Sequani, and about the year 683 the
German prince Ariovistus with some 15,000 armed men
had crossed the Rhine as condottiere of the Sequani.
The war was prolonged for some years with varying
success; on the whole the results were unfavourable to the
CHAP, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 35
Haedui. Their leader Eporedorix at length called out Ariovistaa
their whole clients, and marched forth with an enormous £jjddlg
superiority of force against the Germans. These obstinately Rhine,
refused battle, and kept themselves under cover of morasses
and forests. It was not till the clans, weary of waiting,
began to break up and disperse, that the Germans appeared
in the open field, and then Ariovistus compelled a battle at
Admagetobriga, in which the flower of the cavalry of the
Haedui were left on the field. The Haedui, forced by this
defeat to conclude peace on the terms which the victor
proposed, were obliged to renounce the hegemony, and to
consent with their whole adherents to become clients of the
Sequani ; they had to bind themselves to pay tribute to the
Sequani or rather to Ariovistus, and to furnish the children
of their principal nobles as hostages ; and lastly they had to
swear that they would never demand back these hostages
nor invoke the intervention of the Romans.
This peace was concluded apparently about 693. l 61.
Honour and advantage enjoined the Romans to come 0f^e°D
forward in opposition to it ; the noble Haeduan Divitiacus, Romans,
the head of the Roman party in his clan, and for that
reason now banished by his countrymen, went in person to
Rome to solicit their intervention. A still more serious warn-
ing was the insurrection of the Allobroges in 693 (p. 8) — 61.
the neighbours of the Sequani — which was beyond doubt
connected with these events. In reality orders were issued
to the Gallic governors to assist the Haedui ; they talked of
sending consuls and consular armies over the Alps ; but the
senate, to whose decision these affairs primarily fell, at
length here also crowned great words with little deeds.
The insurrection of the Allobroges was suppressed by arms,
1 The arrival of Ariovistus in Gaul has been placed, according to
Caesar, i. 36, in 683, and the battle of Admagetobriga (for such was the 71.
name of the place now usually, in accordance with a false inscription,
called Magetobriga), according to Caesar i. 35 and Cicero Ad. Ait. i. 19,
in 693. 61.
36 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
but nothing was done for the Haedui ; on the contrary,
59. Ariovistus was even enrolled in 695 in the list of kings
friendly with the Romans.1
Founda- The German warrior- prince naturally took this as a
Germaif renunciation by the Romans of the Celtic land which they
empire in had not occupied ; he accordingly took up his abode there,
and began to establish a German principality on Gallic
soil. It was his intention that the numerous bands which
he had brought with him, and the still more numerous
bands that afterwards followed at his call from home — it
58. was reckoned that up to 696 some 120,00c Germans had
crossed the Rhine — this whole mighty immigration of the
German nation, which poured through the once opened
sluices like a stream over the beautiful west, should become
settled there and form a basis on which he might build his
dominion over Gaul. The extent of the German settle-
ments which he called into existence on the left bank of
the Rhine cannot be determined ; beyond doubt it was
great, and his projects were far greater still. The Celts
were treated by him as a wholly subjugated nation, and
no distinction was made between the several cantons.
Even the Sequani, as whose hired commander-in-chief he
had crossed the Rhine, were obliged, as if they were van-
quished enemies, to cede to him for his people a third of
their territory — presumably upper Alsace afterwards in-
habited by the Triboci — where Ariovistus permanently
settled with his followers ; nay, as if this were not enough,
a second third was afterwards demanded of them for the
Harudes who arrived subsequently. Ariovistus seemed as
if he wished to take up in Gaul the part of Philip of
Macedonia, and to play the master over the Celts who were
1 That we may not deem this course of things incredible, or even impute
to it deeper motives than ignorance and laziness in statesmen, we shall do
well to realize the frivolous tone in which a distinguished senator like
Cicero expresses himself in his correspondence respecting these important
Transalpine affairs.
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 37
friendly to the Germans no less than over those who ad-
hered to the Romans.
The appearance of the energetic German prince in so The
dangerous proximity, which could not but in itself excite Germans
, . . on the
the most serious apprehension in the Romans, appeared Lower
still more threatening, inasmuch as it stood by no means Rhme-
alone. The Usipetes and Tencteri settled on the right
bank of the Rhine, weary of the incessant devastation of
their territory by the overbearing Suebian tribes, had, the
year before Caesar arrived in Gaul (695), set out from 69.
their previous abodes to seek others at the mouth of the
Rhine. They had already taken away from the Menapii
there the portion of their territory situated on the right
bank, and it might be foreseen that they would make the
attempt to establish themselves also on the left. Suebian
bands, moreover, assembled between Cologne and Mayence,
and threatened to appear as uninvited guests in the The
opposite Celtic canton of the Treveri. Lastly, the terri- Gennans
" -"on the
tory of the most easterly clan of the Celts, the warlike and Upper
numerous Helvetii, was visited with growing frequency by Rhme*
the Germans, so that the Helvetii, who perhaps even apart
from this were suffering from over-population through the
reflux of their settlers from the territory which they had
lost to the north of the Rhine, and besides were liable to
be completely isolated from their kinsmen by the settle-
ment of Ariovistus in the territory of the Sequani, conceived
the desperate resolution of voluntarily evacuating the
territory hitherto in their possession to the Germans, and Spread
acquiring larger and more fertile abodes to the west of the „ l.he .
Tura, along with, if possible, the hegemony in the interior invasion
of Gaul — a plan which some of their districts had already *° th-e t
^ J interior 01
formed and attempted to execute during the Cimbrian Gaul,
invasion (iii. 435). The Rauraci whose territory (Basle
and southern Alsace) was similarly threatened, the remains,
moreover, of the Boii who had already at an earlier period
38 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
been compelled by the Germans to forsake their homes
and were now unsettled wanderers, and other smaller tribes,
«1. made common cause with the Helvetii. As early as 693
their flying parties came over the Jura and even as far as
the Roman province ; their departure itself could not be
much longer delayed; inevitably German settlers would
then advance into the important region between the lakes
of Constance and Geneva forsaken by its defenders. From
the sources of the Rhine to the Atlantic Ocean the German
tribes were in motion ; the whole line of the Rhine was
threatened by them ; it was a moment like that when the
Alamanni and the Franks threw themselves on the falling
empire of the Caesars ; and even now there seemed on the
eve of being carried into effect against the Celts that very
movement which was successful five hundred years after-
wards against the Romans.
Caesar Under these circumstances the new governor Gaius
proceeds^ caesar arrived in the spring of 696 in Narbonese Gaul,
GauL which had been added by decree of the senate to his
original province embracing Cisalpine Gaul along with
Istria and Dalmatia. His office, which was committed to
54. 55. him first for five years (to the end of 700), then in 699
49. for five more (to the end of 705), gave him the right to
nominate ten lieutenants of propraetorian rank, and (at
least according to his own interpretation) to fill up his
legions, or even to form new ones at his discretion out of
the burgess-population — who were especially numerous in
Cisalpine Gaul — of the territory under his sway. The
army, which he received in the two provinces, consisted,
as regards infantry of the line, of four legions trained and
inured to war, the seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth, or at
the utmost 24,000 men, to which fell to be added, as
usual, the contingents of the subjects. The cavalry and
light-armed troops, moreover, were represented by horse-
men from Spain, and bv Numidian, Cretan, and Balearic
Caesar s
army.
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 39
archers and slingers. The staff of Caesar — the elite of the
democracy of the capital — contained, along with not a few
useless young men of rank, some able officers, such as
Publius Crassus the younger son of the old political ally of
Caesar, and Titus Labienus, who followed the chief of the
democracy as a faithful adjutant from the Forum to the
battle-field. Caesar had not received definite instructions ;
to one who was discerning and courageous these were
implied in the circumstances with which he had to deal.
Here too the negligence of the senate had to be retrieved,
and first of all the stream of migration of the German
peoples had to be checked.
Just at this time the Helvetic invasion, which was Repulse
closely interwoven with the German and had been in Dre- of the
r H ?'etH.
paration for years, began. That they might not make a
grant of their abandoned huts to the Germans and might
render their own return impossible, the Helvetii had burnt
their towns and villages ; and their long trains of waggons,
laden with women, children, and the best part of their
moveables, arrived from all sides at the Leman lake near
Genava (Geneva), where they and their comrades had
fixed their rendezvous for the 28th of March1 of this year.
According to their own reckoning the whole body consisted
of 368,000 persons, of whom about a fourth part were able
to bear arms. As the mountain chain of the Jura, stretch-
ing from the Rhine to the Rhone, almost completely closed
in the Helvetic country towards the west, and its narrow
defiles were as ill adapted for the passage of such a caravan
as they were well adapted for defence, the leaders had
resolved to go round in a southerly direction, and to open
up for themselves a way to the west at the point, where
the Rhone has broken through the mountain-chain between
1 According to the uncorrected calendar. According to the current
rectification, which however here by no means rests on sufficiently trust-
worthy data, this day corresponds to the 16th of April of the Julian
calendar.
4o THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book V
the south-western and highest part of the Jura and the
Savoy mountains, near the modern Fort de 1'Ecluse. But
on the right bank here the rocks and precipices come so
close to the river that there remained only a narrow path
which could easily be blocked up, and the Sequani, to
whom this bank belonged, could with ease intercept the
route of the Helvetii. They preferred therefore to pass
over, above the point where the Rhone breaks through,
to the left Allobrogian bank, with the view of regaining the
right bank further down the stream where the Rhone
enters the plain, and then marching on towards the level
west of Gaul ; there the fertile canton of the Santones
(Saintonge, the valley of the Charente) on the Atlantic
Ocean was selected by the wanderers for their new abode.
This march led, where it touched the left bank of the
Rhone, through Roman territory ; and Caesar, otherwise
not disposed to acquiesce in the establishment of the
Helvetii in western Gaul, was firmly resolved not to permit
their passage. But of his four legions three were stationed
far off at Aquileia ; although he called out in haste the
militia of the Transalpine province, it seemed scarcely
possible with so small a force to hinder the innumerable
Celtic host from crossing the Rhone, between its exit from
the Leman lake at Geneva and the point of its breaking
through the mountains, over a distance of more than
fourteen miles. Caesar, however, by negotiations with the
Helvetii, who would gladly have effected by peaceable
means the crossing of the river and the march through
the Allobrogian territory, gained a respite of fifteen days,
which was employed in breaking down the bridge over the
Rhone at Genava, and barring the southern bank of the
Rhone against the enemy by an entrenchment nearly
nineteen miles long : it was the first application of the
system— afterwards carried out on so immense a scale by
the Romans — of guarding the frontier of the empire in a
CHAr. vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 41
military point of view by a chain of forts placed in connec-
tion with each other by ramparts and ditches. The
a tempts of the Helvetii to gain the other bank at different
places in boats or by means of fords were successfully
frustrated by the Romans in these lines, and the Helvetii
were compelled to desist from the passage of the Rhone.
On the other hand, the party in Gaul hostile to the The
Romans, which hoped to obtain a powerful reinforcement Helveti*
... move
in the Helvetii, more especially the Haeduan Dumnorix towards
brother of Divitiacus, and at the head of the national party Gaul*
in his canton as the latter was at the head of the Romans,
procured for them a passage through the passes of the Jura
and the territory of the Sequani. The Romans had no
legal title to forbid this ; but other and higher interests
were at stake for them in the Helvetic expedition than the
question of the formal integrity of the Roman territory —
interests which could only be guarded, if Caesar, instead of
confining himself, as all the governors of the senate and
even Marius (iii. 444) had done, to the modest task of
watching the frontier, should cross what had hitherto been
the frontier at the head of a considerable army. Caesar
was general not of the senate, but of the state ; he showed
no hesitation. He had immediately proceeded from
Genava in person to Italy, and with characteristic speed
brought up the three legions cantoned there as well as two
newly-formed legions of recruits.
These troops he united with the corps stationed at The
Genava, and crossed the Rhone with his whole force. His Helvet,an
war.
unexpected appearance in the territory of the Haedui
naturally at once restored the Roman party there to power,
which was not unimportant as regarded supplies. He
found the Helvetii employed in crossing the Saone, and
moving from the territory of the Sequani into that of the
Haedui ; those of them that were still on the left bank of
the Saone, especially the corps of the Tigorini, were
42 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
caught and destroyed by the Romans rapidly advancing.
The bulk of the expedition, however, had already crossed
to the right bank of the river ; Caesar followed them and in
twenty-four hours effected the passage, which the unwieldy
host of the Helvetii had not been able to accomplish in
twenty days. The Helvetii, prevented by this passage of the
river on the part of the Roman army from continuing their
march westward, turned in a northerly direction, doubtless
under the supposition that Caesar would not venture to
follow them far into the interior of Gaul, and with the
intention, if he should desist from following them, of turning
again toward their proper destination. For fifteen days
the Roman army marched behind that of the enemy at a
distance of about four miles, clinging to its rear, and
hoping for an advantageous opportunity of assailing the
Helvetic host under conditions favourable to victory, and
destroying it But this moment came not : unwieldy as
was the march of the Helvetic caravan, the leaders knew
how to guard against a surprise, and appeared to be
copiously provided with supplies as well as most accurately
informed by their spies of every event in the Roman camp.
On the other hand the Romans began to suffer from want
of necessaries, especially when the Helvetii removed from
the Saone and the means of river-transport ceased. The
non-arrival of the supplies promised by the Haedui, from
which this embarrassment primarily arose, excited the more
suspicion, as both armies were still moving about in their
territory. Moreover the considerable Roman cavalry,
numbering almost 4000 horse, proved utterly untrustworthy
— which doubtless admitted of explanation, for they consisted
almost wholly of Celtic horsemen, especially of the mounted
retainers of the Haedui, under the command of Dumnorix
the well-known enemy of the Romans, and Caesar himself
had taken them over still more as hostages than as soldiers.
There was good reason to believe that a defeat which they
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 43
suffered at the hands of the far weaker Helvetic cavalry was
occasioned by themselves, and that the enemy was informed
by them of all occurrences in the Roman camp. The
position of Caesar grew critical ; it was becoming disagree-
ably evident, how much the Celtic patriot party could
effect even with the Haedui in spite of their official alliance
with Rome, and of the distinctive interests of this canton
•'nclining it towards the Romans ; what was to be the issue,
if they ventured deeper and deeper into a country full of
excitement, and if they removed daily farther from their
means of communication ? The armies were just marching
past Bibracte (Autun), the capital of the Haedui, at a
moderate distance ; Caesar resolved to seize this important
place by force before he continued his march into the
interior ; and it is very possible, that he intended to desist
altogether from farther pursuit and to establish himself in
Bibracte. But when he ceased from the pursuit and turned
against Bibracte, the Helvetii thought that the Romans were
making preparations for flight, and now attacked in their
turn.
Caesar desired nothing better. The two armies posted Battle at
themselves on two parallel chains of hills ; the Celts began
the engagement, broke up the Roman cavalry which had
advanced into the plain, and rushed on against the Roman
legions posted on the slope of the hill, but were there
obliged to give way before Caesar's veterans. When the
Romans thereupon, following up their advantage, descended
in their turn to the plain, the Celts again advanced against
them, and a reserved Celtic corps took them at the same
time in flank. The reserve of the Roman attacking column
was pushed forward against the latter; it forced it away
from the main body towards the baggage and the barricade
of waggons, where it was destroyed. The bulk of the
Helvetic host was at length brought to give way, and com-
pelled to beat a retreat in an easterly direction — the
44
THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book *
The
Helretil
sent back
to their
original
abodes.
opposite of that towards which their expedition led them.
This day had frustrated the scheme of the Helvetii to
establish for themselves new settlements on the Atlantic
Ocean, and handed them over to the pleasure of the victor ;
but it had been a hot day also for the conquerors. Caesar,
who had reason for not altogether trusting his staff of
officers, had at the very outset sent away all the officers'
horses, so as to make the necessity of holding their ground
thoroughly clear to his troops ; in fact the battle, had the
Romans lost it, would have probably brought about the
annihilation of the Roman army. The Roman troops were
too much exhausted to pursue the conquered with vigour ;
but in consequence of the proclamation of Caesar that he
would treat all who should support the Helvetii as like the
Helvetii themselves enemies of the Romans, all support
was refused to the beaten army whithersoever it went — in
the first instance, in the canton of the Lingones (about
Langres) — and, deprived of all supplies and of their baggage
and burdened by the mass of camp-followers incapable of
fighting, they were under the necessity of submitting to the
Roman general.
The lot of the vanquished was a comparatively mild
one. The Haedui were directed to concede settlements
in their territory to the homeless Boii ; and this settlement
of the conquered foe in the midst of the most powerful
Celtic cantons rendered almost the services of a Roman
colony. The survivors of the Helvetii and Rauraci, some-
thing more than a third of the men that had marched forth,
were naturally sent back to their former territory. It was
incorporated with the Roman province, but the inhabitants
were admitted to alliance with Rome under favourable
conditions, in order to defend, under Roman supremacy,
the frontier along the upper Rhine against the Germans.
Only the south-western point of the Helvetic canton was
directly taken into the possession of the Romans, and there
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 45
subsequently, on the charming shore of the Lenian lake,
the old Celtic town Noviodunum (now Nyon) was converted
into a Roman frontier- fortress, the "Julian equestrian
colony." *
Thus the threatening invasion of the Germans on the Caesar and
upper Rhine was obviated, and, at the same time, the party Ariovistufc
hostile to the Romans among the Celts was humbled. On
the middle Rhine also, where the Germans had already
crossed years ago, and where the power of Ariovistus which
vied with that of Rome in Gaul was daily spreading, there
was need of similar action, and the occasion for a rupture
was easily found. In comparison with the yoke threatened Negotia-
or already imposed on them by Ariovistus, the Roman tl0ns*
supremacy probably now appeared to the greater part of
the Celts in this quarter the lesser evil ; the minority, who
retained their hatred of the Romans, had at least to keep
silence. A diet of the Celtic tribes of central Gaul, held
under Roman influence, requested the Roman general in
name of the Celtic nation for aid against the Germans.
Caesar consented. At his suggestion the Haedui stopped
the payment of the tribute stipulated to be paid to
Ariovistus, and demanded back the hostages furnished ;
and when Ariovistus on account of this breach of treaty
attacked the clients of Rome, Caesar took occasion thereby
to enter into direct negotiation with him and specially to
demand, in addition to the return of the hostages and a
promise to keep peace with the Haedui, that Ariovistus
should bind himself to allure no more Germans over the
Rhine. The German general replied to the Roman, in the
full consciousness of equality of rights, that northern Gaul
had become subject to him by right of war as fairly as
1 Julia Equestris, where the last surname is to be taken as in other
colonies of Caesar the surnames of sextanorum, decimanorutn, etc. It was
Celtic or German horsemen of Caesar, who, of course with the bestowal of
the Roman or, at any rate, Latin franchise, received land-allotments there.
46 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
southern Gaul to the Romans; and that, as he did not
hinder the Romans from taking tribute from the Allobroges,
so they should not prevent him from taxing his subjects.
In later secret overtures it appenred that the prince was
well aware of the circumstances of the Romans ; he men-
tioned the invitations which had been addressed to him
from Rome to put Caesar out of the way, and offered, if
Caesar would leave to him northern Gaul, to assist him in
turn to obtain the sovereignty of Italy — as the party-quarrels
of the Celtic nation had opened up an entrance for him
into Gaul, he seemed to expect from the party-quarrels of
the Italian nation the consolidation of his rule there. For
centuries no such language of power completely on a footing
of equality and bluntly and carelessly expressing its inde-
pendence had been held in presence of the Romans, as
was now heard from the king of the German host ; he
summarily refused to come, when the Roman general
suggested that he should appear personally before him
according to the usual practice with client-princes.
Ariovistus It was the more necessary not to delay ; Caesar imme-
diately set out against Ariovistus. A panic seized his troops,
especially his officers, when they were to measure their
strength with the flower of the German troops that for four-
teen years had not come under shelter of a roof: it seemed
as if the deep decay of Roman moral and military discipline
would assert itself and provoke desertion and mutiny even
in Caesar's camp. But the general, while declaring that
in case of need he would march with the tenth legion alone
against the enemy, knew not merely how to influence these
by such an appeal to honour, but also how to bind the
other regiments to their eagles by warlike emulation, and
to inspire the troops with something of his own energy.
Without leaving them time for reflection, he led them
onward in rapid marches, and fortunately anticipated
Ariovistus in the occupation of Vesontio (Besancon), the
attacked,
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 47
capital of the Sequani. A personal conference between
the two generals, which took place at the request of
Ariovistus, seemed as if solely meant to cover an attempt
against the person of Caesar; arms alone could decide
between the two oppressors of Gaul. The war came
temporarily to a stand. In lower Alsace somewhere in the
region of Miihlhausen, five miles from the Rhine,1 the two
armies lay at a little distance from each other, till Ariovistus
with his very superior force succeeded in marching past the
Roman camp, placing himself in its rear, and cutting off
the Romans from their base and their supplies. Caesar
attempted to free himself from his painful situation by a
battle ; but Ariovistus did not accept it. Nothing remained
for the Roman general but, in spite of his inferior strength,
to imitate the movement of the Germans, and to recover
his communications by making two legions march past the
enemy and take up a position beyond the camp of the
Germans, while four legions remained behind in the former
camp. Ariovistus, when he saw the Romans divided,
attempted an assault on their lesser camp ; but the Romans
1 Goler {Caesars gall. Krieg, p. 45, etc.) thinks that he has found the
field of battle at Cernay not far from Miihlhausen, which, on the whole,
agrees with Napoleon's {Precis, p. 35) placing of the battle-field in the
district of Belfort. This hypothesis, although not certain, suits the
circumstances of the case ; for the fact that Caesar required seven days'
march for the short space from Besancon to that point, is explained by
his own remark (i. 41) that he had taken a circuit of fifty miles to avoid
the mountain paths ; and the whole description of the pursuit continued
as far as the Rhine, and evidently not lasting for several days but ending on
the very day of the battle, decides — the authority of tradition being equally
balanced — in favour of the view that the battle was fought five, not fifty,
miles from the Rhine. The proposal of Riistow {Einleitung zu Caesars
Comtn. p. 117) to transfer the field of battle to the upper Saar rests on a
misunderstanding. The corn expected from the Sequani, Leuci, Lingones
was not to come to the Roman army in the course of their march against
Ariovistus, but to be delivered at Besancon before their departure, and
taken by the troops along with them ; as is clearly apparent from the
fact that Caesar, while pointing his troops to those supplies, comforts
them at the same time with the hope of corn to be brought in on the route.
From Besancon Caesar commanded the region of Langres and Epinal,
and, as may be well conceived, preferred to levy his requisitions there
rather than in the exhausted districts from which he came.
48 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
and repulsed it. Under the impression made by this success,
be**e"* the whole Roman army was brought forward to the attack ;
and the Germans also placed themselves in battle array, in
a long line, each tribe for itself, the cars of the army with
the baggage and women being placed behind them to
render flight more difficult. The right wing of the Romans,
led by Caesar himself, threw itself rapidly on the enemy,
and drove them before it ; the right wing of the Germans
was in like manner successful. The balance still stood
equal ; but the tactics of the reserve, which had decided
so many other conflicts with barbarians, decided the conflict
with the Germans also in favour of the Romans; their
third line, which Publius Crassus seasonably sent to render
help, restored the battle on the left wing and thereby
decided the victory. The pursuit was continued to the
Rhine ; only a few, including the king, succeeded in
58. escaping to the other bank (696).
German Thus brilliantly the Roman rule announced its advent
settlements t0 ^e mighty stream, which the Italian soldiers here saw
on the left .
bank of the for the first time; by a single fortunate battle the line of
ne* the Rhine was won. The fate of the German settlements
on the left bank of the Rhine lay in the hands of Caesar ;
the victor could destroy them, but he did not do so. The
neighbouring Celtic cantons — the Sequani, Leuci, Medio-
matrici — were neither capable of self-defence nor trust-
worthy ; the transplanted Germans promised to become
not merely brave guardians of the frontier but also better
subjects of Rome, for their nationality severed them from
the Celts, and their own interest in the preservation of
their newly-won settlements severed them from their
countrymen across the Rhine, so that in their isolated
position they could not avoid adhering to the central
power. Caesar here, as everywhere, preferred conquered
foes to doubtful friends ; he left the Germans settled by
Ariovistus along the left bank of the Rhine — the Triboci
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 49
about Strassburg, the Nemetes about Spires, the Vangiones
about Worms — in possession of their new abodes, and
entrusted them with the guarding of the Rhine-frontier
against their countrymen.1
The Suebi, who threatened the territory of the Treveri
on the middle Rhine, on receiving news of the defeat of
Ariovistus, again retreated into the interior of Germany;
on which occasion they sustained considerable loss by the
way at the hands of the adjoining tribes.
The consequences of this one campaign were immense ; The Rhine
they were felt for many centuries after. The Rhine had
become the boundary of the Roman empire against the
Germans. In Gaul, which was no longer able to govern
itself, the Romans had hitherto ruled on the south coast,
while lately the Germans had attempted to establish them-
selves farther up. The recent events had decided that
Gaul was to succumb not merely in part but wholly to the
Roman supremacy, and that the natural boundary presented
by the mighty river was also to become the political
boundary. The senate in its better times had not rested,
till the dominion of Rome had reached the natural bounds
of Italy — the Alps and the Mediterranean — and its
adjacent islands. The enlarged empire also needed a
similar military rounding off; but the present government
left the matter to accident, and sought at most to see, not
that the frontiers were capable of defence, but that they
should not need to be defended directly by itself. People
1 This seems the simplest hypothesis regarding the origin of these
Germanic settlements. That Ariovistus settled those peoples on the
middle Rhine is probable, because they fight in his army (Caes. i. 51) and
do not appear earlier ; that Caesar left them in possession of their
setdements is probable, because he in presence of Ariovistus declared
himself ready to tolerate the Germans already settled in Gaul (Caes. i. 35,
43), and because we find them afterwards in these abodes. Caesar does
not mention the directions given after the battle concerning these
Germanic settlements, because he keeps silence on principle regarding all
the organic arrangements made by him in Gaul.
voi* v »37
tion of
GauL
So THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST Book V
felt that now another spirit and another arm began to guide
the destinies of Rome.
Subjuga- The foundations of the future edifice were laid ; but in
order to finish the building and completely to secure the
recognition of the Roman rule by the Gauls, and that of
the Rhine- frontier by the Germans, very much still
remained to be done. All central Gaul indeed from the
Roman frontier as far up as Chartres and Treves submitted
without objection to the new ruler; and on the upper and
middle Rhine also no attack was for the present to be
apprehended from the Germans. But the northern
provinces — as well the Aremorican cantons in Brittany
and Normandy as the more powerful confederation of the
Belgae — were not affected by the blows directed against
central Gaul, and found no occasion to submit to the
conqueror of Ariovistus. Moreover, as was already
remarked, very close relations subsisted between the
Belgae and the Germans over the Rhine, and at the
mouth of the Rhine also Germanic tribes made themselves
Belgic ready to cross the stream. In consequence of this Caesar
expedition. set out wjtj1 ^g army} now increased to eight legions, in
57. the spring of 697 against the Belgic cantons. Mindful of
the brave and successful resistance which fifty years before
they had with united strength presented to the Cimbri on
the borders of their land (iii. 444), and stimulated by the
patriots who had fled to them in numbers from central
Gaul, the confederacy of the Belgae sent their whole first
levy — 300,000 armed men under the leadership of Galba
the king of the Suessiones — to their southern frontier to
receive Caesar there. A single canton alone, that of the
powerful Remi (about Rheims) discerned in this invasion
of the foreigners an opportunity to shake off the rule which
their neighbours the Suessiones exercised over them, and
prepared to take up in the north the part which the
Haedui had played in central Gaul. The Roman and the
CHAP, va THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEoT 51
Belgic armies arrived in their territory almost at the same
time.
Caesar did not venture to give battle to the brave Conflict*
on the
Aisnc.
enemy six times as strong ; to the north of the Aisne, not °
far from the modern Pontavert between Rheims and Laon,
he pitched his camp on a plateau rendered almost unas-
sailable on all sides partly by the river and by morasses,
partly by fosses and redoubts, and contented himself with
thwarting by defensive measures the attempts of the Belgae
to cross the Aisne and thereby to cut him off from his
communications. When he counted on the likelihood
that the coalition would speedily collapse under its own
weight, he had reckoned rightly. King Galba was an
honest man, held in universal respect ; but he was not
equal to the management of an army of 300,000 men on
hostile soil. No progress was made, and provisions began
to fail ; discontent and dissension began to insinuate
themselves into the camp of the confederates. The
Bellovaci in particular, equal to the Suessiones in power,
and already dissatisfied that the supreme command of the
confederate army had not fallen to them, could no longer
be detained after news had arrived that the Haedui as
allies of the Romans were making preparations to enter
the Bellovacic territory. They determined to break up
and go home ; though for honour's sake all the cantons at
the same time bound themselves to hasten with their united
strength to the help of the one first attacked, the miserable
dispersion of the confederacy was but miserably palliated
by such impracticable stipulations. It was a catastrophe
which vividly reminds us of that which occurred almost on
the same spot in 1792 ; and, just as with the campaign in
Champagne, the defeat was all the more severe that it took
place without a battle. The bad leadership of the retreat-
ing army allowed the Roman general to pursue it as if it
were beaten, and to destroy a portion of the contingents
52 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
Submission that had remained to the last. But the consequences of
western tne victory were not confined to this. As Caesar ad-
cantons, vanced into the western cantons of the Belgae, one after
another gave themselves up as lost almost without resist-
ance ; the powerful Suessiones (about Soissons), as well as
their rivals, the Bellovaci (about Beauvais) and the
Ambiani (about Amiens). The towns opened their gates
when they saw the strange besieging machines, the towers
rolling up to their walls ; those who would not submit to the
foreign masters sought a refuge beyond the sea in Britain.
Tn* . But in the eastern cantons the national feeling was
with the more energetically roused. The Viromandui (about Arras),
Nervii the Atrebates (about St. Quentin), the German Aduatuci
(about Namur), but above all the Nervii (in Hainault) with
their not inconsiderable body of clients, little inferior in
number to the Suessiones and Bellovaci, far superior to
them in valour and vigorous patriotic spirit, concluded a
second and closer league, and assembled their forces on
the upper Sambre. Celtic spies informed them most
accurately of the movements of the Roman army ; their
own local knowledge, and the high tree- barricades which
were formed everywhere in these districts to obstruct the
bands of mounted robbers who often visited them, allowed
the allies to conceal their own operations for the most part
from the view of the Romans. When these arrived on the
Sambre not far from Bavay, and the legions were occupied
in pitching their camp on the crest of the left bank, while
the cavalry and light infantry were exploring the opposite
heights, the latter were all at once assailed by the whole
mass of the enemy's forces and driven down the hill into
the river. In a moment the enemy had crossed this also,
and stormed the heights of the left bank with a determina-
tion that braved death. Scarcely was there time left for
the entrenching legionaries to exchange the mattock for the
sword ; the soldiers, many without helmets, had to fight
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 53
just as they stood, without line of battle, without plan,
without proper command ; for, owing to the suddenness of
the attack and the intersection of the ground by tall
hedges, the several divisions had wholly lost their com-
munications. Instead of a battle there arose a number of
unconnected conflicts. Labienus with the left wing over-
threw the Atrebates and pursued them even across the
river. The Roman central division forced the Viromandui
down the declivity. But the right wing, where the general
himself was present, was outflanked by the far more
numerous Nervii the more easily, as the central division
carried away by its own success had evacuated the ground
alongside of it, and even the half-ready camp was occupied
by the Nervii; the two legions, each separately rolled
together into a dense mass and assailed in front and on
both flanks, deprived of most of their officers and their
best soldiers, appeared on the point of being broken and
cut to pieces. The Roman camp-followers and the allied
troops were already fleeing in all directions ; of the Celtic
cavalry whole divisions, like the contingent of the Treveri,
galloped off at full speed, that from the battle-field itself
they might announce at home the welcome news of the
defeat which had been sustained. Everything was at
stake. The general himself seized his shield and fought
among the foremost; his example, his call even now
inspiring enthusiasm, induced the wavering ranks to rally.
They had already in some measure extricated themselves
and had at least restored the connection between the two
legions of this wing, when help came up — -partly down
from the crest of the bank, where in the interval the
Roman rearguard with the baggage had arrived, partly
from the other bank of the river, where Labienus had
meanwhile penetrated to the enemy's camp and taken
possession of it, and now, perceiving at length the danger
that menaced the right wing, despatched the victorious
of the
Belgae.
54 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
tenth legion to the aid of his general. The Nervii,
separated from their confederates and simultaneously
assailed on all sides, now showed, when fortune turned,
the same heroic courage as when they believed themselves
victors; still over the pile of corpses of their fallen
comrades they fought to the last man. According to theii
own statement, of their six hundred senators only three
survived this day.
Subjection After this annihilating defeat the Nervii, Atrebates, and
Viromandui could not but recognize the Roman supremacy.
The Aduatuci, who arrived too late to take part in the
fight on the Sambre, attempted still to hold their ground
in the strongest of their towns (on the mount Falhize near
the Maas not far from Huy), but they too soon submitted.
A nocturnal attack on the Roman camp in front of the
town, which they ventured after the surrender, miscarried ;
and the perfidy was avenged by the Romans with fearful
severity. The clients of the Aduatuci, consisting of the
Eburones between the Maas and Rhine and other small
adjoining tribes, were declared independent by the Romans,
while the Aduatuci taken prisoners were sold under the
hammer en masse for the benefit of the Roman treasury.
It seemed as if the fate which had befallen the Cimbri still
pursued even this last Cimbrian fragment. Caesar con-
tented himself with imposing on the other subdued tribes a
general disarmament and furnishing of hostages. The
Remi became naturally the leading canton in Belgic, like
the Haedui in central Gaul ; even in the latter several clans
at enmity with the Haedui preferred to rank among the
clients of the Remi. Only the remote maritime cantons of
the Morini (Artois) and the Menapii (Flanders and Brabant),
and the country between the Scheldt and the Rhine
inhabited in great part by Germans, remained still for the
present exempt from Roman invasion and in possession of
their hereditary freedom.
chap, vn THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 55
The turn of the Aremorican cantons came. In the Expedi-
autumn of 697 Publius Crassus was sent thither with a tl0n.s Al7*
* , against tne
Roman corps ; he induced the Veneti — who as masters of maritime
the ports of the modern Morbihan and of a respectable fleet cantons-
occupied the first place among all the Celtic cantons in
navigation and commerce — and generally the coast-districts
between the Loire and Seine, to submit to the Romans and
give them hostages. But they soon repented. When in
the following winter (697-698) Roman officers came to these 57-56.
legions to levy requisitions of grain there, they were
detained by the Veneti as counter-hostages. The example
thus set was quickly followed not only by the Aremorican
cantons, but also by the maritime cantons of the Belgae
that still remained free ; where, as in some cantons of
Normandy, the common council refused to join the
insurrection, the multitude put them to death and attached
itself with redoubled zeal to the national cause. The whole Venetian
coast from the mouth of the Loire to that of the Rhine war*
rose against Rome ; the most resolute patriots from all the
Celtic cantons hastened thither to co-operate in the great
work of liberation ; they already calculated on the rising of
the whole Belgic confederacy, on aid from Britain, on the
arrival of Germans from beyond the Rhine.
Caesar sent Labienus with all the cavalry to the Rhine,
with a view to hold in check the agitation in the Belgic
province, and in case of need to prevent the Germans from
crossing the river; another of his lieutenants, Quintus
Titurius Sabinus, went with three legions to Normandy,
where the main body of the insurgents assembled But the
powerful and intelligent Veneti were the true centre of the
insurrection ; the chief attack by land and sea was directed
against them. Caesar's lieutenant, Decimus Brutus, brought
up the fleet formed partly of the ships of the subject Celtic
cantons, partly of a number of Roman galleys hastily built
on the Loire and manned with rowers from the Narbonese
56 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
province ; Caesar himself advanced with the flower of his
infantry into the territory of the Veneti. But these were
prepared beforehand, and had with equal skill and resolu-
tion availed themselves of the favourable circumstances
which the nature of the ground in Brittany and the
possession of a considerable naval power presented. The
country was much intersected and poorly furnished with
grain, the towns were situated for the most part on cliffs
and tongues of land, and were accessible from the mainland
only by shallows which it was difficult to cross ; the provi-
sion of supplies and the conducting of sieges were equally
difficult for the army attacking by land, while the Celts by
means of their vessels could furnish the towns easily with
everything needful, and in the event of the worst could
accomplish their evacuation. The legions expended their
time and strength in the sieges of the Venetian townships.
only to see the substantial fruits of victory ultimately carried
off in the vessels of the enemy.
Naval Accordingly when the Roman fleet, long detained by
?attle storms at the mouth of the Loire, arrived at length on the
between m ' °
the coast of Brittany, it was left to decide the struggle by a
R°dUinS naval battle. The Celts, conscious of their superiority on
Veneti. this element, brought forth their fleet against that of the
Romans commanded by Brutus. Not only did it number
220 sail, far more than the Romans had been able to bring
up, but their high-decked strong sailing-vessels with flat
bottoms were also far better adapted for the high-running
waves of the Atlantic Ocean than the low, lightly-built
oared galleys of the Romans with their sharp keels.
Neither the missiles nor the boarding-bridges of the Roman?
could reach the high deck of the enemy's vessels, and th(
iron beaks recoiled powerless from the strong oaken planks.
But the Roman mariners cut the ropes, by which the yards
were fastened to the masts, by means of sickles fastened to
long poles ; the yards and sails fell down, and, as they did
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 57
not know how to repair the damage speedily, the ship v*as
thus rendered a wreck just as it is at the present day by the
falling of the masts, and the Roman boats easily succeeded
by a joint attack in mastering the maimed vessel of the
enemy. When the Gauls perceived this manoeuvre, they
attempted to move from the coast on which they had taken
up the combat with the Romans, and to gain the high seas,
whither the Roman galleys could not follow them ; but
unhappily for them there suddenly set in a dead calm, and
the immense fleet, towards the equipment of which the
maritime cantons had applied all their energies, was almost
wholly destroyed by the Romans. Thus was this naval
battle — so far as historical knowledge reaches, the earliest
fought on the Atlantic Ocean — just like the engagement at
Mylae two hundred years before (ii. 175), notwithstanding
the most unfavourable circumstances, decided in favour of
the Romans by a lucky invention suggested by necessity.
The consequence of the victory achieved by Brutus was the Sabmlnloa
surrender of the Veneti and of all Brittany. More with a ™^rjlltJ
view to impress the Celtic nation, after so manifold cantom.
evidences of clemency towards the vanquished, by an example
of fearful severity now against those whose resistance had
been obstinate, than with the view of punishing the breach
of treaty and the arrest of the Roman officers, Caesar
caused the whole common council to be executed and the
people of the Venetian canton to the last man to be sold
into slavery. By this dreadful fate, as well as by their
intelligence and their patriotism, the Veneti have more
than any other Celtic clan acquired a title to the sympathy
of posterity.
Sabinus meanwhile opposed to the levy of the coast-
states assembled on the Channel the same tactics by which
Caesar had in the previous year conquered the Belgic
general levy on the Aisne ; he stood on the defensive till
impatience and want invaded the ranks of the enemy, and
58 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
then managed by deceiving them as to the temper and
strength of his troops, and above all by means of their own
impatience, to allure them to an imprudent assault upon the
Roman camp, in which they were defeated ; whereupon the
militia dispersed and the country as far as the Seine submitted-
Expedi- The Morini and Menapii alone persevered in withhold-
against the m§ tneu" recognition of the Roman supremacy. To compel
Morini and them to this, Caesar appeared on their borders ; but,
enapn. rendered wiser by the experiences of their countrymen,
they avoided accepting battle on the borders of their land,
and retired into the forests which then stretched almost
without interruption from the Ardennes towards the German
Ocean. The Romans attempted to make a road through
the forest with the axe, ranging the felled trees on each
side as a barricade against the enemy's attacks ; but even
Caesar, daring as he was, found it advisable after some
days of most laborious marching, especially as it was verg-
ing towards winter, to order a retreat, although but a small
portion of the Morini had submitted and the powerful
Menapii had not been reached at alL In the following
55. year (699), while Caesar himself was employed in Britain,
the greater part of the army was sent afresh against these
tribes ; but this expedition also remained in the main un-
successful. Nevertheless the result of the last campaigns
was the almost complete reduction of Caul under the
dominion of the Romans. While central Gaul had sub-
57. mitted to it without resistance, during the campaign of 697
the Belgic, and during that of the following year the mari-
time, cantons had been compelled by force of arms to
acknowledge the Roman rule. The lofty hopes, with
which the Celtic patriots had begun the last campaign,
had nowhere been fulfilled. Neither Germans nor Britons
had come to their aid ; and in Belgica the presence of
Labienus had sufficed to prevent the renewal of the con-
flicts of the previous year.
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 59
While Caesar was thus forming the Roman domain in Establish-
the west by force of arms into a compact whole, he did ment of .
' r ' communi-
not neglect to open up for the newly-conquered country — cations
which was destined in fact to fill up the wide gap in that r11^11^
domain between Italy and Spain — communications both Valais,
with the Italian home and with the Spanish provinces.
The communication between Gaul and Italy had certainly
been materially facilitated by the military road laid out by
Pompeius in 677 over Mont Genevre (iv. 293); but since the 77.
whole of Gaul had been subdued by the Romans, there was
need of a route crossing the ridge of the Alps from the valley
of the Po, not in a westerly but in a northerly direction,
and furnishing a shorter communication between Italy and
central Gaul. The way which leads over the Great St.
Bernard into the Valais and along the lake of Geneva had
long served the merchant for this purpose ; to get this road
into his power, Caesar as early as the autumn of 697 caused 57.
Octodurum (Martigny) to be occupied by Servius Galba,
and the inhabitants of the Valais to be reduced to subjec-
tion— a result which was, of course, merely postponed,
not prevented, by the brave resistance of these mountain-
peoples.
To gain communication with Spain, moreover, Publius and with
Crassus was sent in the following year (698) to Aquitania fgain"
with instructions to compel the Iberian tribes dwelling
there to acknowledge the Roman rule. The task was not
without difficulty ; the Iberians held together more com-
pactly than the Celts and knew better than these how to
learn from their enemies. The tribes beyond the Pyrenees,
especially the valiant Cantabri, sent a contingent to their
threatened countrymen ; with this there came experienced
officers trained under the leadership of Sertorius in the
Roman fashion, who introduced as far as possible the
principles of the Roman art of war, and especially of en-
campment, among the Aquitanian levy already respectable
60 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST pock v
from its numbers and its valour. But the excellent officer
who led the Romans knew how to surmount all difficulties,
and after some hardly-contested but successful battles he
induced the peoples from the Garonne to the vicinity of
the Pyrenees to submit to the new masters.
Fresh One of the objects which Caesar had proposed to him-
of°the°nS se^ — tne subjugation of Gaul — had been in substance, with
Rhine- exceptions scarcely worth mentioning, attained so far as it
bythe*17 could be attained at all by the sword. But the other half
Germans, of the work undertaken by Caesar was still far from being
satisfactorily accomplished, and the Germans had by no
means as yet been everywhere compelled to recognize the
66-65. Rhine as their limit. Even now, in the winter of 698-699,
a fresh crossing of the boundary had taken place on the
lower course of the river, whither the Romans had not
The yet penetrated. The German tribes of the Usipetes and
^petes Tencteri whose attempts to cross the Rhine in the territory
Tencteri. of the Menapii have been already mentioned (p. 37), had at
length, eluding the vigilance of their opponents by a feigned
retreat, crossed in the vessels belonging to the Menapii —
an enormous host, which is said, including women and
children, to have amounted to 430,000 persons. They still
lay, apparently, in the region of Nimeguen and Cleves ; but
it was said that, following the invitations of the Celtic patriot
party, they intended to advance into the interior of Gaul ;
and the rumour was confirmed by the fact that bands of
their horsemen already roamed as far as the borders of the
Treveri. But when Caesar with his legions arrived oppo-
site to them, the sorely-harassed emigrants seemed not
desirous of fresh conflicts, but very ready to accept land
from the Romans and to till it in peace under their
supremacy. While negotiations as to this were going on,
a suspicion arose in the mind of the Roman general that
the Germans only sought to gain time till the bands of
horsemen sent out by them had returned. Whether this
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 61
suspicion was well founded or not, we cannot tell, but
confirmed in it by an attack, which in spite of the de facto
suspension of arms a troop of the enemy made on his van-
guard, and exasperated by the severe loss thereby sustained,
Caesar believed himself entitled to disregard every consi-
deration of international law. When on the second morning
the princes and elders of the Germans appeared in the
Roman camp to apologize for the attack made without
their knowledge, they were arrested, and the multitude*
anticipating no assault and deprived of their leaders were
suddenly fallen upon by the Roman army. It was rather a
man-hunt than a battle ; those that did not fall under the
swords of the Romans were drowned in the Rhine ; almost
none but the divisions detached at the time of the attack
escaped the massacre and succeeded in recrossing the
Rhine, where the Sugambri gave them an asylum in their
territory, apparently on the Lippe. The behaviour of
Caesar towards these German immigrants met with severe
and just censure in the senate ; but, however little it can
be excused, the German encroachments were emphatically
checked by the terror which it occasioned.
Caesar however found it advisable to take yet a further Ca«w on
step and to lead the legions over the Rhine. He was not !^e J?8^*
without connections beyond the river. The Germans at the Rhine,
the stage of culture which they had then reached, lacked
as yet any national coherence ; in political distraction they
— though from other causes — fell nothing short of the
Celts. The Ubii (on the Sieg and Lahn), the most cityl-
ired among the German tribes, had recently been made
subject and tributary by a powerful Suebian canton of the
interior, and had as early as 697 through their envoys en- 57.
treated Caesar to free them like the Gauls from the Suebian
rule. It was not Caesar's design seriously to respond to
this suggestion, which would have involved him in endless
enterprises ; but it seemed advisable, with the view of pre-
62 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
venting the appearance of the Germanic arms on the south
of the Rhine, at least to show the Roman arms beyond it.
The protection which the fugitive Usipetes and Tencteri
had found among the Sugambri afforded a suitable occa-
sion. In the region, apparently between Coblentz and
Andernach, Caesar erected a bridge of piles over the
Rhine and led his legions across from the Treverian to the
Ubian territory. Some smaller cantons gave in their sub-
mission ; but the Sugambri, against whom the expedition
was primarily directed, withdrew, on the approach of the
Roman army, with those under their protection into the
interior. In like manner the powerful Suebian canton
which oppressed the Ubii — presumably the same which
subsequently appears under the name of the Chatti —
caused the districts immediately adjoining the Ubian terri-
tory to be evacuated and the non-combatant portion of the
people to be placed in safety, while all the men capable of
arms were directed to assemble at the centre of the canton.
The Roman general had neither occasion nor desire to
accept this challenge ; his object — partly to reconnoitre,
partly to produce an impressive effect if possible upon the
Germans, or at least on the Celts and his countrymen at
home, by an expedition over the Rhine — was substantially
attained ; after remaining eighteen days on the right bank
of the Rhine he again arrived in Gaul and broke down the
65. Rhine bridge behind him (699).
Expedi- There remained the insular Celts. From the close
tions to connection between them and the Celts of the continent.
Britain. '
especially the maritime cantons, it may readily be conceived
that they had at least sympathized with the national resist-
ance, and that if they did not grant armed assistance to the
patriots, they gave at any rate an honourable asylum in
their sea-protected isle to every one who was no longer safe
in his native land. This certainly involved a danger, if not
for the present, at any rate for the future ; it seemed judi-
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 63
cious — if not to undertake the conquest of the island itself
— at any rate to conduct there also defensive operations by
offensive means, and to show the islanders by a landing on
the coast that the arm of the Romans reached even across
the Channel. The first Roman officer who entered Brittany,
Publius Crassus, had already (697) crossed thence to the 57.
"tin-islands" at the south-west point of England (Scilly
islands) ; in the summer of 699 Caesar himself with only 55.
two legions crossed the Channel at its narrowest part.1
He found the coast covered with masses of the enemy's
troops and sailed onward with his vessels ; but the British
war-chariots moved on quite as fast by land as the Roman
galleys by sea, and it was only with the utmost difficulty
that the Roman soldiers succeeded in gaining the shore in
the face of the enemy, partly by wading, partly in boats,
under the protection of the ships of war, which swept the
beach with missiles thrown from machines and by the hand.
In the first alarm the nearest villages submitted ; but the
islanders soon perceived how weak the enemy was, and
1 The nature of the case as well as Caesar's express statement proves
that the passages of Caesar to Britain were made from ports of the coast
between Calais and Boulogne to the coast of Kent. A more exact deter-
mination of the localities has often been attempted, but without success.
All that is recorded is, that on the first voyage the infantry embarked at
one port, the cavalry at another distant from the former eight miles in an
easterly direction (iv. 22, 23, 28), and that the second voyage was made
from that one of those two ports which Caesar had found most convenient,
the (otherwise not further mentioned) Portus Itius, distant from the British
coast 30 (so according to the MSS. of Caesar v. 2) or 40 miles ( = 320
stadia, according to Strabo iv. 5, 2, who doubtless drew his account from
Caesar). From Caesar's words (iv. 21) that he had chosen "the shortest
crossing," we may doubtless reasonably infer that he crossed not the
Channel but the Straits of Calais, but by no means that he crossed the
latter by the mathematically shortest line. It requires the implicit faith of
local topographers to proceed to the determination of the locality with such
data in hand — data of which the best in itself becomes almost useless from
the variation of the authorities as to the number ; but among the many
possibilities most may perhaps be said in favour of the view that the Itian
port (which Strabo I.e. is probably right in identifying with that from
which the infantry crossed in the first voyage) is to be sought near Amble-
teuse to the west of Cape Gris Nez, and the cavalry-harbour near Ecale
(Wissant) to the east of the same promontory, and that the landing took
place to the east of Dover near Walmer Castle.
64 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
how he did not venture to move far from the shore. The
natives disappeared into the interior and returned only to
threaten the camp ; and the fleet, which had been left in
the open roads, suffered very considerable damage from the
first tempest that burst upon it. The Romans had to
reckon themselves fortunate in repelling the attacks of the
barbarians till they had bestowed the necessary repairs on
the ships, and in regaining with these the Gallic coast
before the bad season of the year came on.
Caesar himself was so dissatisfied with the results of this
expedition undertaken inconsiderately and with inadequate
M-54. means, that he immediately (in the winter of 699-700)
ordered a transport fleet of 800 sail to be fitted out,
54. and in the spring of 700 sailed a second time for the
Kentish coast, on this occasion with five legions and 2000
cavalry. The forces of the Britons, assembled this time
also on the shore, retired before the mighty armada without
risking a battle ; Caesar immediately set out on his march
into the interior, and after some successful conflicts crossed
the river Stour; but he was obliged to halt very much against
his will, because the fleet in the open roads had been again
half destroyed by the storms of the Channel. Before they
got the ships drawn up upon the beach and the extensive
arrangements made for their repair, precious time was lost,
which the Celts wisely turned to account.
Cassivel- The brave and cautious prince Cassivellaunus, who
ruled in what is now Middlesex and the surrounding district
— formerly the terror of the Celts to the south of the
Thames, but now the protector and champion of the whole
nation — had headed the defence of the land. He soon
saw that nothing at all could be done with the Celtic
infantry against the Roman, and that the mass of the
general levy — which it was difficult to feed and difficult to
control — was only a hindrance to the defence ; he therefore
dismissed it and retained only the war-chariots, of which
chap, va THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 65
he collected 4000, and in which the warriors, accustomed
to leap down from their chariots and fight on foot, could
be employed in a twofold manner like the burgess-cavalry
of the earliest Rome. When Caesar was once more able
to continue his march, he met with no interruption to it;
but the British war-chariots moved always in front and
alongside of the Roman army, induced the evacuation of
the country (which from the absence of towns proved no
great difficulty), prevented the sending out of detachments,
and threatened the communications. The Thames was
crossed — apparently between Kingston and Brentford
above London — by the Romans ; they moved forward, but
made no real progress ; the general achieved no victory,
the soldiers made no booty, and the only actual result, the
submission of the Trinobantes in the modern Essex, was
less the effect of a dread of the Romans than of the deep
hostility between this canton and Cassivellaunus. The
danger increased with every onward step, and the attack,
which the princes of Kent by the orders of Cassivellaunus
made on the Roman naval camp, although it was repulsed,
was an urgent warning to turn back. The taking by storm
of a great British tree-barricade, in which a multitude of
cattle fell into the hands of the Romans, furnished a pass-
able conclusion to the aimless advance and a tolerable
pretext for returning. Cassivellaunus was sagacious enough
not to drive the dangerous enemy to extremities, and pro-
mised, as Caesar desired him, to abstain from disturbing
the Trinobantes, to pay tribute and to furnish hostages;
nothing was said of delivering up arms or leaving behind a
Roman garrison, and even those promises were, it may be
presumed, so far as they concerned the future, neither given
nor received in earnest. After receiving the hostages Caesar
returned to the naval camp and thence to Gaul. If he, as
it would certainly seem, had hoped on this occasion to
conquer Britain, the scheme was totally thwarted partly by
VOL. V I38
66 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
the wise defensive system of Cassivellaunus, partly and
chiefly by the unserviceableness of the Italian oared fleet
in the waters of the North Sea ; for it is certain that the
stipulated tribute was never paid. But the immediate
object — of rousing the islanders out of their haughty
security and inducing them in their own interest no longer
to allow their island to be a rendezvous for continental
emigrants — seems certainly to have been attained ; at least
no complaints are afterwards heard as to the bestowal of
such protection.
The The work of repelling the Germanic invasion and of
of'the1™0* subduing the continental Celts was completed. But it is
patriots. often easier to subdue a free nation than to keep a subdued
one in subjection. The rivalry for the hegemony, by which
more even than by the attacks of Rome the Celtic nation
had been ruined, was in some measure set aside by the
conquest, inasmuch as the conqueror took the hegemony
to himself. Separate interests were silent ; under the com-
mon oppression at any rate they felt themselves again as
one people ; and the infinite value of that which they had
with indifference gambled away when they possessed it —
freedom and nationality — was now, when it was too late,
fully appreciated by their infinite longing. But was it,
then, too late? With indignant shame they confessed to
themselves that a nation, which numbered at least a million
of men capable of arms, a nation of ancient and well-founded
warlike renown, had allowed the yoke to be imposed upon
it by, at the most, 50,000 Romans. The submission of
the confederacy of central Gaul without having struck even
a blow ; the submission of the Belgic confederacy without
having done more than merely shown a wish to strike ; tht
heroic fall on the other hand of the Nervii and the Veneti,
the sagacious and successful resistance of the Morini, and
of the Britons under Cassivellaunus — all that in each case
had been done or neglected, had failed or had succeeded —
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 67
spurred the minds of the patriots to new attempts, if possible,
more united and more successful. Especially among the
Celtic nobility there prevailed an excitement, which seemed
every moment as if it must break out into a general insur-
rection. Even before the second expedition to Britain in
the spring of 700 Caesar had found it necessary to go in 54.
person to the Treveri, who, since they had compromised
themselves in the Nervian conflict in 697, had no longer 57.
appeared at the general diets and had formed more than
suspicious connections with the Germans beyond the Rhine.
At that time Caesar had contented himself with carrying
the men of most note among the patriot party, particularly
Indutiomarus, along with him to Britain in the ranks of
the Treverian cavalry-contingent ; he did his utmost to over-
look the conspiracy, that he might not by strict measures
ripen it into insurrection. But when the Haeduan Dum-
norix, who likewise was present in the army destined
for Britain, nominally as a cavalry officer, but really as a
hostage, peremptorily refused to embark and rode home
instead, Caesar could not do otherwise than have him
pursued as a deserter ; he was accordingly overtaken by the
division sent after him and, when he stood on his defence,
was cut down (700). That the most esteemed knight of the 64.
most powerful and still the least dependent of the Celtic
cantons should have been put to death by the Romans, was
a thunder-clap for the whole Celtic nobility ; every one who
was conscious of similar sentiments — and they formed the
great majority — saw in that catastrophe the picture of what
was in store for himself.
If patriotism and despair had induced the heads of the Insurrec
Celtic nobility to conspire, fear and self-defence now drove tlon"
the conspirators to strike. In the winter of 700—701, with 54-53.
the exception of a legion stationed in Brittany and a second
in the very unsettled canton of the Carnutes (near Chartres),
the whole Roman army numbering six legions was en-
68 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
camped in the Belgic territory. The scantiness of the
supplies of grain had induced Caesar to station his troops
farther apart than he was otherwise wont to do — in six
different camps constructed in the cantons of the Bellovaci,
Ambiani, Morini, Nervii, Remi, and Eburones. The fixed
camp placed farthest towards the east in the territory of the
Eburones, probably not far from the later Aduatuca (the
modern Tongern), the strongest of all, consisting of a
legion under one of the most respected of Caesar's leaders
of division, Quintus Titurius Sabinus, besides different
detachments led by the brave Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta1
and amounting together to the strength of half a legion,
found itself all of a sudden surrounded by the general
levy of the Eburones under the kings Ambiorix and Catu-
volcus. The attack came so unexpectedly, that the very
men absent from the camp could not be recalled and were
cut of by the enemy ; otherwise the immediate danger was
not great, as there was no lack of provisions, and the
assault, which the Eburones attempted, recoiled powerless
from the Roman intrenchments. But king Ambiorix
informed the Roman commander that all the Roman
camps in Gaul were similarly assailed on the same day,
and that the Romans would undoubtedly be lost if the
several corps did not quickly set out and effect a junction ;
that Sabinus had the more reason to make haste, as the
1 That Cotta, although not lieutenant-general of Sabinus, but like him
legate, was yet the younger and less esteemed general and was probably
directed in the event of a difference to yield, may be inferred both from
the earlier services of Sabinus and from the fact that, where the two are
named together (iv. 22, 38 ; v. 24, 26, 52 ; vi. 32 ; otherwise in vi. 37)
Sabinus regularly takes precedence, as also from the narrative of the cata-
strophe itself. Besides we cannot possibly suppose that Caesar should have
placed over a camp two officers with equal authority, and have made no
arrangement at all for the case of a difference of opinion. The five cohorts
are not counted as part of a legion (comp. vi. 32, 33) any more than the
twelve cohorts at the Rhine bridge (vi. 29, comp. 32, 33), and appear to
have consisted of detachments of other portions of the army, which had
been assigned to reinforce this camp situated nearest to the Germans.
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 69
Germans too from beyond the Rhine were already advanc-
ing against him ; that he himself out of friendship for the
Romans would promise them a free retreat as far as the
nearest Roman camp, only two days' march distant.
Some things in these statements seemed no fiction ; that the
little canton of the Eburones specially favoured by the
Romans (p. 54) should have undertaken the attack of its own
accord was in reality incredible, and, owing to the difficulty
of effecting a communication with the other far -distant
camps, the danger of being attacked by the whole mass
of the insurgents and destroyed in detail was by no means
to be esteemed slight ; nevertheless it could not admit of
the smallest doubt that both honour and prudence required
them to reject the capitulation offered by the enemy and
to maintain the post entrusted to them. Yet, although in
the council of war numerous voices and especially the
weighty voice of Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta supported
this view, the commandant determined to accept the pro-
posal of Ambiorix. The Roman troops accordingly
marched off next morning; but when they had arrived
at a narrow valley about two miles from the camp they
found themselves surrounded by the Eburones and every
outlet blocked. They attempted to open a way for them-
selves by force of arms ; but the Eburones would not
enter into any close combat, and contented themselves
with discharging their missiles from their unassailable posi-
tions into the dense mass of the Romans. Bewildered, as
if seeking deliverance from treachery at the hands of the
(traitor, Sabinus requested a conference with Ambiorix ; it
was granted, and he and the officers accompanying him
were first disarmed and then slain. After the fall of the
commander the Eburones threw themselves from all sides
at once on the exhausted and despairing Romans, and
broke their ranks ; most of them, including Cotta who had
already been wounded, met their death in this attack; a
70 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
small portion, who had succeeded in regaining the aban-
doned camp, flung themselves on their own swords during
ibe following night. The whole corps was annihilated.
Cicero This success, such as the insurgents themselves had
Attacked •
hardly ventured to hope for, increased the ferment among
the Celtic patriots so greatly that the Romans were no
longer sure of a single district with the exception of the
Haedui and Remi, and the insurrection broke out at the
most diverse points. First of all the Eburones followed
up their victory. Reinforced by the levy of the Aduatuci,
who gladly embraced the opportunity of requiting the
injury done to them by Caesar, and of the powerful and
still unsubdued Menapii, they appeared in the territory of
the Nervii, who immediately joined them, and the whole
host thus swelled to 60,000 moved forward to confront
the Roman camp formed in the Nervian canton. Quintus
Cicero, who commanded there, had with his weak corps
a difficult position, especially as the besiegers, learning
from the foe, constructed ramparts and trenches, testudines
and moveable towers after the Roman fashion, and
showered fire - balls and burning spears over the straw-
covered huts of the camp. The only hope of the besieged
rested on Caesar, who lay not so very far off with three
legions in his winter encampment in the region of Amiens.
But — a significant proof of the feeling that prevailed in
Gaul — for a considerable time not the slightest hint reached
the general either of the disaster of Sabinus or of the peril-
ous situation of Cicero.
Caesar At length a Celtic horseman from Cicero's camp suc-
his°reiieft0 ceeded m stealing through the enemy to Caesar. On
receiving the startling news Caesar immediately set out,
although only with two weak legions, together numbering
about 7000, and 400 horsemen ; nevertheless the an-
nouncement that Caesar was advancing sufficed to induce
the insurgents to raise the siege. It was time; not one-
chap, vu THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 7 1
tenth of the men in Cicero's camp remained unwounded.
Caesar, against whom the insurgent army had turned, The insur-
deceived the enemy, in the way which he had already on checked
several occasions successfully applied, as to his strength ;
under the most unfavourable circumstances they ventured
an assault upon the Roman camp and in doing so suffered
a defeat. It is singular, but characteristic of the Celtic
nation, that in consequence of this one lost battle, or
perhaps rather in consequence of Caesar's appearance in
person on the scene of conflict, the insurrection, which
had commenced so victoriously and extended so widely,
suddenly and pitiably broke off the war. The Nervii,
Menapii, Aduatuci, Eburones, returned to their homes.
The forces of the maritime cantons, who had made pre-
parations for assailing the legion in Brittany, did the
same. The Treveri, through whose leader Indutiomarus
the Eburones, the clients of the powerful neighbouring
canton, had been chiefly induced to that so successful
attack, had taken arms on the news of the disaster of
Aduatuca and advanced into the territory of the Remi
with the view of attacking the legion cantoned there under
the command of Labienus ; they too desisted for the present
from continuing the struggle. Caesar not unwillingly
postponed farther measures against the revolted districts
till the spring, in order not to expose his troops which
had suffered much to the whole severity of the Gallic
winter, and with the view of only reappearing in the field
when the fifteen cohorts destroyed should have been re-
placed in an imposing manner by the levy of thirty new
cohorts which he had ordered. The insurrection mean-
while pursued its course, although there was for the
moment a suspension of arms. Its chief seats in central
Gaul were, partly the districts of the Carnutes and the
neighbouring Senones (about Sens), the latter of whom
drove the king appointed by Caesar out of their country;
72 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
partly the region of the Treveri, who invited the whole
Celtic emigrants and the Germans beyond the Rhine to
take part in the impending national war, and called out
their whole force, with a view to advance in the spring a
second time into the territory of the Remi, to capture the
corps of Labienus, and to seek a communication with the
insurgents on the Seine and Loire. The deputies of these
three cantons remained absent from the diet convoked by
Caesar in central Gaul, and thereby declared war just as
openly as a part of the Belgic cantons had done by the
attacks on the camps of Sabinus and Cicero.
and sup- The winter was drawing to a close when Caesar set out
pressed. wjth ^ arrny, which meanwhile had been considerably re-
inforced, against the insurgents. The attempts of the
Treveri to concentrate the revolt had not succeeded ; the
agitated districts were kept in check by the marching in of
Roman troops, and those in open rebellion were attacked
in detail. First the Nervii were routed by Caesar in
person. The Senones and Carnutes met the same fate.
The Menapii, the only canton which had never submitted
to the Romans, were compelled by a grand attack simul-
taneously directed against them from three sides to re-
nounce their long-preserved freedom. Labienus meanwhile
was preparing the same fate for the Treveri. Their first
attack had been paralyzed, partly by the refusal of the
adjoining German tribes to furnish them with mercenaries,
partly by the fact that Indutiomarus, the soul of the whole
movement, had fallen in a skirmish with the cavalry of
Labienus. But they did not on this account abandon
their projects. With their whole levy they appeared in
front of Labienus and waited for the German bands that
were to follow, for their recruiting agents found a better
reception than they had met with from the dwellers on the
Rhine, among the warlike tribes of the interior of Germany,
especially, as it would appear, among the Chatti. But
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 73
when Labienus seemed as if he wished to avoid these and
to march off in all haste, the Treveri attacked the Romans
even before the Germans arrived and in a most unfavour-
able spot, and were completely defeated. Nothing remained
for the Germans who came up too late but to return,
nothing for the Treverian canton but to submit; its
government reverted to the head of the Roman party
Cingetorix, the son-in-law of Indutiomarus. After these
expeditions of Caesar against the Menapii and of Labienus
against the Treveri the whole Roman army was again
united in the territory of the latter. With the view of
rendering the Germans disinclined to come back, Caesar
once more crossed the Rhine, in order if possible to strike
an emphatic blow against the troublesome neighbours;
but, as the Chatti, faithful to their tried tactics, assembled
not on their western boundary, but far in the interior,
apparently at the Harz mountains, for the defence of the
land, he immediately turned back and contented himself
with leaving behind a garrison at the passage of the Rhine.
Accounts had thus been settled with all the tribes that Retaliatory
took part in the rising; the Eburones alone were passed aglaLst'the
over but not forgotten. Since Caesar had met with the Eburones.
disaster of Aduatuca, he had worn mourning and had
sworn that he would only lay it aside when he should have
avenged his soldiers, who had not fallen in honourable
war, but had been treacherously murdered. Helpless and
passive the Eburones sat in their huts and looked on, as
the neighbouring cantons one after another submitted to
the Romans, till the Roman cavalry from the Treverian
territory advanced through the Ardennes into their land.
So little were they prepared for the attack, that the cavalry
had almost seized the king Ambiorix in his house; with
great difficulty, while his attendants sacrificed themselves
on his behalf, he escaped into the neighbouring thicket.
Ten Roman legions soon followed the cavalry At the
74 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST fook \
same time a summons was issued to the surrounding tribes
to hunt the outlawed Eburones and pillage their land in
concert with the Roman soldiers ; not a few complied
with the call, including even an audacious band of
Sugambrian horsemen from the other side of the Rhine,
who for that matter treated the Romans no better than
the Eburones, and had almost by a daring coup de main
surprised the Roman camp at Aduatuca. The fate of the
Eburones was dreadful. However they might hide them-
selves in forests and morasses, there were more hunters
than game. Many put themselves to death like the gray-
haired prince Catuvolcus ; only a few saved life and liberty,
but among these few was the man whom the Romans
sought above all to seize, the prince Ambiorix; with but
four horsemen he escaped over the Rhine. This execution
against the canton which had transgressed above all the
rest was followed in the other districts by processes of
high treason against individuals. The season for clemency
was past. At the bidding of the Roman proconsul the
eminent Carnutic knight Acco was beheaded by Roman
53. lictors (701) and the rule of the fasces was thus formally
inaugurated. Opposition was silent ; tranquillity every-
where prevailed. Caesar went as he was wont towards
58. the end of the year (701) over the Alps, that through the
winter he might observe more closely the daily-increasing
complications in the capital.
Second in- The sagacious calculator had on this occasion miscal-
surrection. cuiated. The fire was smothered, but not extinguished.
The stroke, under which the head of Acco fell, was felt
by the whole Celtic nobility. At this very moment the
position of affairs presented better prospects than ever.
The insurrection of the last winter had evidently failed
only through Caesar himself appearing on the scene of
action ; now he was at a distance, detained on the Po by
the imminence of civil war, and the Gallic army, which
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 75
was collected on the upper Seine, was far separated from
its dreaded leader. If a general insurrection now broke
out in central Gaul, the Roman army might be surrounded,
and the almost undefended old Roman province be over-
run, before Caesar reappeared beyond the Alps, even if
the Italian complications did not altogether prevent him
from further concerning himself about Gaul.
Conspirators from all the cantons of central Gaul The
assembled ; the Carnutes, as most directly affected by the Carnutes'
execution of Acco, offered to take the lead. On a set
day in the winter of 701-702 the Carnutic knights 53-52.
Gutruatus and Conconnetodumnus gave at Cenabum
(Orleans) the signal for the rising, and put to death in a
body the Romans who happened to be there. The most
vehement agitation seized the length and breadth of the
great Celtic land ; the patriots everywhere bestirred them-
selves. But nothing stirred the nation so deeply as the
insurrection of the Arverni. The government of this The
community, which had formerly under its kings been the Arvemi*
first in southern Gaul, and had still after the fall of its
principality occasioned by the unfortunate wars against
Rome (iii. 418) continued to be one of the wealthiest,
most civilized, and most powerful in all Gaul, had hitherto
inviolably adhered to Rome. Even now the patriot party
in the governing common council was in the minority;
an attempt to induce it to join the insurrection was in
vain. The attacks of the patriots were therefore directed
against the common council and the existing constitution
itself; and the more so, that the change of constitution
which among the Arverni had substituted the common
council for the prince (p. 19) had taken place after the
victories of the Romans and probably under their influence.
The leader of the Arvernian patriots Vercingetorix, one Vercinge-
of those nobles whom we meet with among the Celts, of torix*
almost regal repute in and beyond his canton, and a
the insur
rection.
76 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
stately, brave, sagacious man to boot, left the capital and
summoned the country people, who were as hostile to the
ruling oligarchy as to the Romans, at once to re-establish
the Arvernian monarchy and to go to war with Rome.
The multitude quickly joined him ; the restoration of the
throne of Luerius and Betuitus was at the same time the
declaration of a national war against Rome. The centre
of unity, from the want of which all previous attempts of
the nation to shake off the foreign yoke had failed, was
now found in the new self-nominated king of the Arverni.
Vercingetorix became for the Celts of the continent what
Cassivellaunus was for the insular Celts ; the feeling
strongly pervaded the masses that he, if any one, was the
man to save the nation.
Spread of The west from the mouth of the Garonne to that of the
Seine was rapidly infected by the insurrection, and Ver-
cingetorix was recognized by all the cantons there as
commander-in-chief; where the common council made
any difficulty, the multitude compelled it to join the
movement; only a few cantons, such as that of the
Bituriges, required compulsion to join it, and these per-
haps only for appearance' sake. The insurrection found
a less favourable soil in the regions to the east of the
upper Loire. Everything here depended on the Haedui ;
and these wavered. The patriotic party was very strong
in this canton ; but the old antagonism to the leading of
the Arverni counterbalanced their influence — to the most
serious detriment of the insurrection, as the accession of
the eastern cantons, particularly of the Sequani and
Helvetii, was conditional on the accession of the Haedui,
and generally in this part of Gaul the decision rested with
them. While the insurgents were thus labouring partly to
induce the cantons that still hesitated, especially the
Haedui, to join them, partly to get possession of Narbo —
one of their leaders, the daring Lucterius, had already
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 77
appeared on the Tarn within the limits of the old pro-
vince— the Roman commander-in-chief suddenly presented Appear-
himself in the depth of winter, unexpected alike by friend £Pce °f
and foe, on this side of the Alps. He quickly made the
necessary preparations to cover the old province, and not
only so, but sent also a corps over the snow -covered
Cevennes into the Arvernian territory; but he could not
remain here, where the accession of the Haedui to the
Gallic alliance might any moment cut him off from his
army encamped about Sens and Langres. With all secrecy
he went to Vienna, and thence, attended by only a few
horsemen, through the territory of the Haedui to his troops.
The hopes, which had induced the conspirators to declare
themselves, vanished ; peace continued in Italy, and Caesar
stood once more at the head of his army.
But what were they to do? It was folly under such The
circumstances to let the matter come to the decision of G,allic Flan
of war.
arms ; for these had already decidedly irrevocably. They
might as well attempt to shake the Alps by throwing stones
at them as to shake the legions by means of the Celtic
bands, whether these might be congregated in huge masses
or sacrificed in detail canton after canton. Vercingetorix
despaired of defeating the Romans. He adopted a system
of warfare similar to that by which Cassivellaunus had
saved the insular Celts. The Roman infantry was not to
be vanquished ; but Caesar's cavalry consisted almost
exclusively of the contingent of the Celtic nobility, and was
practically dissolved by the general revolt. It was possible
for the insurrection, which was in fact essentially composed
of the Celtic nobility, to develop such a superiority in this
arm, that it could lay waste the land far and wide, burn
down towns and villages, destroy the magazines, and en-
danger the supplies and the communications of the enemy,
without his being able seriously to hinder it. Vercinge-
torix accordingly directed all his efforts to the increase of his
78 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
cavalry, and of the infantry-archers who were according to
the mode of fighting of that time regularly associated with
it. He did not send the immense and self- obstructing
masses of the militia of the line to their homes, but he did
not allow them to face the enemy, and attempted to impart
to them gradually some capacity of intrenching, marching,
and manoeuvring, and some perception that the soldier is
not destined merely for hand-to-hand combat. Learning
from the enemy, he adopted in particular the Roman
system of encampment, on which depended the whole
secret of the tactical superiority of the Romans ; for in
consequence of it every Roman corps combined all the
advantages of the garrison of a fortress with all the
advantages of an offensive army.1 It is true that a system
completely adapted to Britain which had few towns and to
its rude, resolute, and on the whole united inhabitants was
not absolutely transferable to the rich regions on the Loire
and their indolent inhabitants on the eve of utter political
dissolution. Vercingetorix at least accomplished this much,
that they did not attempt as hitherto to hold every town
with the result of holding none ; they agreed to destroy the
townships not capable of defence before attack reached
them, but to defend with all their might the strong
fortresses. At the same time the Arvernian king did what
he could to bind to the cause of their country the cowardly
and backward by stern seventy, the hesitating by entreaties
and representations, the covetous by gold, the decided
opponents by force, and to compel or allure the rabble
high or low to some manifestation of patriotism.
Beginning Even before the winter was at an end, he threw himself
of the
struggle.
1 This, it is true, was only possible, so long as offensive weapons chiefly
aimed at cutting and stabbing. In the modern mode of warfare, as
Napoleon has excellently explained, this system has become inapplicable,
because with our offensive weapons operating from a distance the deployed
position is more advantageous than the concentrated. In Caesar's time
the reverse was the case.
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 79
on the Boii settled by Caesar in the territory of the Haedui,
with the view of annihilating these, almost the sole trust-
worthy allies of Rome, before Caesar came up. The news
of this attack induced Caesar, leaving behind the baggage
and two legions in the winter quarters of Agedincum
(Sens), to march immediately and earlier than he would
doubtless otherwise have done, against the insurgents. He
remedied the sorely-felt want of cavalry and light infantry in
some measure by gradually bringing up German mercenaries,
who instead of using their own small and weak ponies were
furnished with Italian and Spanish horses partly bought, partly
procured by requisition of the officers. Caesar, after having
by the way caused Cenabum, the capital of the Carnutes,
which had given the signal for the revolt, to be pillaged
and laid in ashes, moved over the Loire into the country of
the Bituriges. He thereby induced Vercingetorix to
abandon the siege of the town of the Boii, and to resort
likewise to the Bituriges. Here the new mode of warfare
was first to be tried. By order of Vercingetorix more than
twenty townships of the Bituriges perished in the flames on
one day ; the general decreed a similar self-devastation as
to the neighbour cantons, so far as they could be reached
by the Roman foraging parties.
According to his intention, Avaricum (Bourges), the Caesar
rich and strong capital of the Bituriges, was to meet the AvSum.
same fate ; but the majority of the war-council yielded to
the suppliant entreaties of the Biturigian authorities, and
resolved rather to defend that city with all their energy.
Thus the war was concentrated in the first instance around
Avaricum. Vercingetorix placed his infantry amidst the
morasses adjoining the town in a position so unapproach-
able, that even without being covered by the cavalry they
needed not to fear the attack of the legions. The Celtic
cavalry covered all the roads and obstructed the communica-
tion. The town was strongly garrisoned, and the connec-
80 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
tion between it and the army before the walls was kept
open. Caesar's position was very awkward. The attempt
to induce the Celtic infantry to fight was unsuccessful \ it
stirred not from its unassailable lines. Bravely as his
soldiers in front of the town trenched and fought, the
besieged vied with them in ingenuity and courage, and they
had almost succeeded in setting fire to the siege apparatus
of their opponents. The task withal of supplying an army
of nearly 60,000 men with provisions in a country devastated
far and wide and scoured by far superior bodies of cavalry
became daily more difficult. The slender stores of the Boii
were soon used up ; the supply promised by the Haedui
failed to appear ; the corn was already consumed, and the
soldier was placed exclusively on flesh-rations. But the
moment was approaching when the town, with whatever
contempt of death the garrison fought, could be held no
longer. Still it was not impossible to withdraw the troops
secretly by night and destroy the town, before the enemy
occupied it Vercingetorix made arrangements for this
purpose, but the cry of distress raised at the moment of
evacuation by the women and children left behind attracted
the attention of the Romans ; the departure miscarried.
Avaricum On the following gloomy and rainy day the Romans
conquered. scaie(j ty,e wa\\S} an(j) exasperated by the obstinate defence,
spared neither age nor sex in the conquered town. The
ample stores, which the Celts had accumulated in it, were
welcome to the starved soldiers of Caesar. With the capture
52. of Avaricum (spring of 702), a first success had been
achieved over the insurrection, and according to former ex-
perience Caesar might well expect that it would now dissolve,
and that it would only be requisite to deal with the cantons
individually. After he had therefore shown himself with
his whole army in the canton of the Haedui and had by
this imposing demonstration compelled the patriot party in
a ferment there to keep quiet at least for the moment, he
chap, vn THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 81
divided his army and sent Labienus back to Agedincum, Caesar
that in combination with the troops left there he might at g^J*
the head of four legions suppress in the first instance the
movement in the territory of the Carnutes and Senones,
who on this occasion once more took the lead ; while he
himself with the six remaining legions turned to the south
and prepared to carry the war into the Arvernian mountains,
the proper territory of Vercingetorix.
Labienus moved from Agedincum up the left bank of Labienus
the Seine with a view to possess himself of Lutetia (Paris), 1^,°^
the town of the Parisii situated on an island in the Seine,
and from this well -secured position in the heart of the
insurgent country to reduce it again to subjection. But
behind Melodunum (Melun), he found his route barred by
the whole army of the insurgents, which had here taken
up a position between unassailable morasses under the
leadership of the aged Camulogenus. Labienus retreated
a certain distance, crossed the Seine at Melodunum, and
moved up its right bank unhindered towards Lutetia;
Camulogenus caused this town to be burnt and the bridges
leading to the left bank to be broken down, and took up a
position over against Labienus, in which the latter could
neither bring him to battle nor effect a passage under the
eyes of the hostile army.
The Roman main army in its turn advanced along the Caesar
Allier down into the canton of the Arverni. Vercingetorix Gergovjfc
attempted to prevent it from crossing to the left bank of
the Allier, but Caesar overreached him and after some
days stood before the Arvernian capital Gergovia.1 Ver-
1 This place has been sought on a rising ground which is still named
Gergoie, a league to the south of the Arvernian capital Nemetum, the
modern Clermont ; and both the remains of rude fortress-walls brought to
light in excavations there, and the tradition of the name which is traced
in documents up to the tenth century, leave no room for doubt as to the
correctness of this determination of the locality. Moreover it accords, as
with the other statements of Caesar, so especially with the fact that he
pretty clearly indicates Gergovia as the chief place of the Arverni (vii. 4).
VOL. V 139
82
THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
Fruitless
blockade.
The
Haedui
waver.
cingetorix, however, doubtless even while he was confronting
Caesar on the Allier, had caused sufficient stores to be
collected in Gergovia and a fixed camp provided with
strong stone ramparts to be constructed for his troops in
front of the walls of the town, which was situated on the
summit of a pretty steep hill ; and, as he had a sufficient
start, he arrived before Caesar at Gergovia and awaited the
attack in the fortified camp under the wall of the fortress.
Caesar with his comparatively weak army could neither
regularly besiege the place nor even sufficiently blockade
it ; he pitched his camp below the rising ground occupied
by Vercingetorix, and was compelled to preserve an attitude
as inactive as his opponent. It was almost a victory for
the insurgents, that Caesar's career of advance from triumph
to triumph had been suddenly checked on the Seine as on
the Allier. In fact the consequences of this check for
Caesar were almost equivalent to those of a defeat.
The Haedui, who had hitherto continued vacillating,
now made preparations in earnest to join the patriotic
party; the body of men, whom Caesar had ordered to
Gergovia, had on the march been induced by its officers to
declare for the insurgents; at the same time they had
begun in the canton itself to plunder and kill the Romans
settled there. Caesar, who had gone with two-thirds of
the blockading army to meet that corps of the Haedui
which was being brought up to Gergovia, had by his
sudden appearance recalled it to nominal obedience ; but
it was more than ever a hollow and fragile relation, the
continuance of which had been almost too dearly purchased
by the great peril of the two legions left behind in front of
Gergovia. For Vercingetorix, rapidly and resolutely
availing himself of Caesar's departure, had during his
We shall have accordingly to assume, that the Arvernians after their
defeat were compelled to transfer their settlement from Gergovia to the
neighbouring less strong Nemetum.
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 83
absence made an attack on them, which had wellnigh
ended in their being overpowered, and the Roman camp
being taken by storm. Caesar's unrivalled celerity alone
averted a second catastrophe like that of Aduatuca.
Though the Haedui made once more fair promises, it
might be foreseen that, if the blockade should still be
prolonged without result, they would openly range them-
selves on the side of the insurgents and would thereby
compel Caesar to raise it; for their accession would
interrupt the communication between him and Labienus,
and expose the latter especially in his isolation to the
greatest peril. Caesar was resolved not to let matters
come to this pass, but, however painful and even dangerous
it was to retire from Gergovia without having accomplished
his object, nevertheless, if it must be done, rather to set
out immediately and by marching into the canton of the
Haedui to prevent at any cost their formal desertion.
Before entering however on this retreat, which was far Caesar
from agreeable to his quick and confident temperament, he 1*5^
made yet a last attempt to free himself from his painful Gergovia,
perplexity by a brilliant success. While the bulk of the
garrison of Gergovia was occupied in intrenching the side
on which the assault was expected, the Roman general
watched his opportunity to surprise another access less
conveniently situated but at the moment left bare. In
reality the Roman storming columns scaled the camp-wall,
and occupied the nearest quarters of the camp ; but the
whole garrison was already alarmed, and owing to the
small distances Caesar found it not advisable to risk the
second assault on the city-wall. He gave the signal for
retreat; but the foremost legions, carried away by the
impetuosity of victory, heard not or did not wish to hear,
and pushed forward without halting, up to the city-wall,
some even into the city. But masses more and mere
dense threw themselves in front of the intruders j the fore-
84
THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
Renewed
Insurrec-
tion.
Rising
of the
Haedui.
Rising
of the
Belgae.
most fell, the columns stopped ; in vain centurions and
legionaries fought with the most devoted and heroic
courage ; the assailants were chased with very considerable
loss out of the town and down the hill, where the troops
stationed by Caesar in the plain received them and
prevented greater mischief. The expected capture of
Gergovia had been converted into a defeat, and the con-
siderable loss in killed and wounded — there were counted
700 soldiers that had fallen, including 46 centurions — was
the least part of the misfortune suffered.
The imposing position of Caesar in Gaul depended
essentially on the halo of victory that surrounded him ; and
this began to grow pale. The conflicts around Avaricum,
Caesar's vain attempts to compel the enemy to fight, the
resolute defence of the city and its almost accidental
capture by storm bore a stamp different from that of the
earlier Celtic wars, and had strengthened rather than
impaired the confidence of the Celts in themselves and
their leader. Moreover, the new system of warfare — the
making head against the enemy in intrenched camps
under the protection of fortresses — had completely approved
itself at Lutetia as well as at Gergovia. Lastly, this defeat,
the first which Caesar in person had suffered from the
Celts, crowned their success, and it accordingly gave as it
were the signal for a second outbreak of the insurrection.
The Haedui now broke formally with Caesar and entered
into union with Vercingetorix. Their contingent, which
was still with Caesar's army, not only deserted from it, but
also took occasion to carry off the depots of the army of
Caesar at Noviodunum on the Loire, whereby the chests
and magazines, a number of remount-horses, and all the
hostages furnished to Caesar, fell into the hands of the
insurgents. It was of at least equal importance, that on
this news the Belgae, who had hitherto kept aloof from the
whole movement, began to bestir themselves. The
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 85
powerful canton of the Bellovaci rose with the view of
attacking in the rear the corps of Labienus, while it
confronted at Lutetia the levy of the surrounding cantons
of central Gaul. Everywhere else too men were taking to
arms ; the strength of patriotic enthusiasm carried along
with it even the most decided and most favoured partisans
of Rome, such as Commius king of the Atrebates, who on
account of his faithful services had received from the
Romans important privileges for his community and the
hegemony over the Morini. The threads of the insurrec-
tion ramified even into the old Roman province : they
cherished the hope, perhaps not without ground, of
inducing the Allobroges themselves to take arms against
the Romans. With the single exception of the Remi and
of the districts — dependent immediately on the Remi — of
the Suessiones, Leuci, and Lingones, whose peculiar
isolation was not affected even amidst this general en-
thusiasm, the whole Celtic nation from the Pyrenees to the
Rhine was now in reality, for the first and for the last time,
in arms for its freedom and nationality ; whereas, singularly
enough, the whole German communities, who in the former
struggles had held the foremost rank, kept aloof. In fact,
the Treveri, and as it would seem the Menapii also, were
prevented by their feuds with the Germans from taking an
active part in the national war.
It was a grave and decisive moment, when after the Caesar's
retreat from Gergovia and the loss of Noviodunum a p
0 war.
council of war was held in Caesar's headquarters regarding
the measures now to be adopted. Various voices expressed
themselves in favour of a retreat over the Cevennes into
the old Roman province, which now lay open on all sides
to the insurrection and certainly was in urgent need of the
legions that had been sent from Rome primarily for its
protection. But Caesar rejected this timid strategy
suggested not by the position of affairs, but by government-
86
THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
Caesar
unites
with
Labienus.
Position
of the
insurgents
at Alesia.
instructions and fear of responsibility. He contented
himself with calling the general levy of the Romans settled
in the province to arms, and having the frontiers guarded
by that levy to the best of its ability. On the other hand
he himself set out in the opposite direction and advanced
by forced marches to Agedincum, to which he ordered
Labienus to retreat in all haste. The Celts naturally
endeavoured to prevent the junction of the two Roman
armies. Labienus might by crossing the Marne and
marching down the right bank of the Seine have reached
Agedincum, where he had left his reserve and his baggage ;
but he preferred not to allow the Celts again to behold the
retreat of Roman troops. He therefore instead of crossing
the Marne crossed the Seine under the eyes of the deluded
enemy, and on its left bank fought a battle with the hostile
forces, in which he conquered, and among many others
the Celtic general himself, the old Camulogenus, was left
on the field. Nor were the insurgents more successful in
detaining Caesar on the Loire ; Caesar gave them no time
to assemble larger masses there, and without difficulty
dispersed the militia of the Haedui, which alone he found
at that point
Thus the junction of the two divisions of the army was
happily accomplished. The insurgents meanwhile had con-
sulted as to the farther conduct of the war at Bibracte
(Autun) the capital of the Haedui ; the soul of these con-
sultations was again Vercingetorix, to whom the nation was
enthusiastically attached after the victory of Gergovia.
Particular interests were not, it is true, even now silent ;
the Haedui still in this death-struggle of the nation asserted
their claims to the hegemony, and made a proposal in the
national assembly to substitute a leader of their own for
Vercingetorix. But the national representatives had not
merely declined this and confirmed Vercingetorix in the
supreme command, but had also adopted his plan of wai
chap. Vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 87
without alteration. It was substantially the same as that
on which he had operated at Avaricum and at Gergovia.
As the base of the new position there was selected the
strong city of the Mandubii, Alesia (Alise Sainte Reine
near Semur in the department Cote d'Or)1 and another
entrenched camp was constructed under its walls. Im-
mense stores were here accumulated, and the army was
ordered thither from Gergovia, having its cavalry raised
by resolution of the national assembly to 15,000 horse.
Caesar with the whole strength of his army after it was
reunited at Agedincum took the direction of Besancon,
with the view of now approaching the alarmed province
and protecting it from an invasion, for in fact bands of
insurgents had already shown themselves in the territory
of the Helvii on the south slope of the Cevennes. Alesia
lay almost on his way ; the cavalry of the Celts, the only
arm with which Vercingetorix chose to operate, attacked
him on the route, but to the surprise of all was worsted
by the new German squadrons of Caesar and the Roman
infantry drawn up in support of them.
Vercingetorix hastened the more to shut himself up in Caesar
Alesia ; and if Caesar was not disposed altogether to ^^ ol
renounce the offensive, no course was left to him but for
the third time in this campaign to proceed by way of attack
with a far weaker force against an army encamped under a
well-garrisoned and well-provisioned fortress and supplied
with immense masses of cavalry. But, while the Celts had Siege of
hitherto been opposed by only a part of the Roman legions, Alesia*
the whole forces of Caesar were united in the lines round
Alesia, and Vercingetorix did not succeed, as he had suc-
ceeded at Avaricum and Gergovia, in placing his infantry
under the protection of the walls of the fortress and keeping
1 The question so much discussed of late, whether Alesia is not rather
to be identified with Alaise (25 kilometres to the south of Besancon, dep.
Doubs), has been rightly answered in the negative by all judicious inquirers.
88 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book *
his external communications open for his own benefit by
his cavalry, while he interrupted those of the enemy. The
Celtic cavalry, already discouraged by that defeat inflicted
on them by their lightly esteemed opponents, was beaten
by Caesar's German horse in every encounter. The line
of circumvallation of the besiegers extending about nine
miles invested the whole town, including the camp attached
to it. Vercingetorix had been prepared for a struggle
under the walls, but not for being besieged in Alesia ; in
that point of view the accumulated stores, considerable as
they were, were yet far from sufficient for his army — which
was said to amount to 80,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry
— and for the numerous inhabitants of the town. Vercinge-
torix could not but perceive that his plan of warfare had on
this occasion turned to his own destruction, and that he
was lost unless the whole nation hastened up to the rescue
of its blockaded general. The existing provisions were
still, when the Roman circumvallation was closed, sufficien
for a month and perhaps something more; at the lasl
moment, when there was still free passage at least foi
horsemen, Vercingetorix dismissed his whole cavalry, and
sent at the same time to the heads of the nation instructions
to call out all their forces and lead them to the relief of
Alesia. He himself, resolved to bear in person the re-
sponsibility for the plan of war which he had projected
and which had miscarried, remained in the fortress, t>
share in good or evil the fate of his followers. But Caesar
made up his mind at once to besiege and to be besieged.
He prepared his line of circumvallation for defence also
on its outer side, and furnished himself with provisions for
a longer period. The days passed ; they had no longer a
boll of grain in the fortress, and they were obliged to drive
out the unhappy inhabitants of the town to perish miserably
between the entrenchments of the Celts and of the Romans,
pitilessly rejected by both.
■ •-■
t. «■,
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 89
At the last hour there appeared behind Caesar's lines Attempt
the interminable array of the Celto-Belgic relieving army, at
said to amount to 250,000 infantry and 8000 cavalry.
From the Channel to the Cevennes the insurgent cantons
had strained every nerve to rescue the flower of their
patriots and the general of their choice — the Bellovaci
alone had answered that they were doubtless disposed to
fight against the Romans, but not beyond their own
bounds. The first assault, which the besieged of Alesia Conflicts
and the relieving troops without made on the Roman Alesia.
double line, was repulsed; but, when after a day's rest it
was repeated, the Celts succeeded — at a spot where the
line of circumvallation ran over the slope of a hill and
could be assailed from the height above — in filling up the
trenches and hurling the defenders down from the ram-
part. Then Labienus, sent thither by Caesar, collected
the nearest cohorts and threw himself with four legions
on the foe. Under the eyes of the general, who himself
appeared at the most dangerous moment, the assailants
were driven back in a desperate hand-to-hand conflict,
and the squadrons of cavalry that came with Caesar taking
the fugitives in rear completed the defeat.
It was more than a great victory ; the fate of Alesia, Alesia
and indeed of the Celtic nation, was thereby irrevocably ^^ **
decided. The Celtic army, utterly disheartened, dispersed
at once from the battle-field and went home. Vercinge-
torix might perhaps have even now taken to flight, or at
least have saved himself by the last means open to a free
man ; he did not do so, but declared in a council of war
that, since he had not succeeded in breaking off the alien
yoke, he was ready to give himself up as a victim and to
avert as far as possible destruction from the nation by
bringing it on his own head. This was done. The Celtic
officers delivered their general — the solemn choice of the
whole nation — over to the enemy of their country for such
9°
THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book \
52.
Vercinge-
torix
executed.
punishment as might be thought fit. Mounted on his
steed and in full armour the king of the Arverni appeared
before the Roman proconsul and rode round his tribunal ;
then he surrendered his horse and arms, and sat down in
silence on the steps at Caesar's feet (702).
Five years afterwards he was led in triumph through
the streets of the Italian capital, and, while his conqueror
was offering solemn thanks to the gods on the summit of
the Capitol, Vercingetorix was beheaded at its foot as guilty
of high treason against the Roman nation. As after a day
of gloom the sun may perhaps break through the clouds at its
setting, so destiny may bestow on nations in their decline
yet a last great man. Thus Hannibal stands at the close
of the Phoenician history, and Vercingetorix at the close
of the Celtic. They were not able to save the nations to
which they belonged from a foreign yoke, but they spared
them the last remaining disgrace — an inglorious fall.
Vercingetorix, just like the Carthaginian, was obliged to
contend not merely against the public foe, but also and
above all against that anti-national opposition of wounded
egotists and startled cowards, which regularly accompanies
a degenerate civilization ; for him too a place in history is
secured, not by his battles and sieges, but by the fact that
he was able to furnish in his own person a centre and
rallying -point to a nation distracted and ruined by the
rivalry of individual interests. And yet there can hardly
be a more marked contrast than between the sober towns-
man of the Phoenician mercantile city, whose plans were
directed towards one great object with unchanging energy
throughout fifty years, and the bold prince of the Celtic
land, whose mighty deeds and high-minded self-sacrifice
fall within the compass of one brief summer. The whole
ancient world presents no more genuine knight, whether
as regards his essential character or his outward appear-
ance, But man ought not to be a mere knight, and least
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 91
of all the statesman. It was the knight, not the hero, who
disdained to escape from Alesia, when for the nation more
depended on him than on a hundred thousand ordinary
brave men. It was the knight, not the hero, who gave
himself up as a sacrifice, when the only thing gained by
that sacrifice was that the nation publicly dishonoured
itself and with equal cowardice and absurdity employed
its last breath in proclaiming that its great historical death-
struggle was a crime against its oppressor. How very
different was the conduct of Hannibal in similar positions !
It is impossible to part from the noble king of the Arverni
without a feeling of historical and human sympathy; but
it is a significant trait of the Celtic nation, that its greatest
man was after all merely a knight.
The fall of Alesia and the capitulation of the army The last
enclosed in it were fearful blows for the Celtic insurrection ; conflicts
but blows quite as heavy had befallen the nation and yet
the conflict had been renewed. The loss of Vercingetorix,
however, was irreparable. With him unity had come to
the nation ; with him it seemed also to have departed.
We do not find that the insurgents made any attempt to
continue their joint defence and to appoint another general-
issimo; the league of patriots fell to pieces of itself, and
every clan was left to fight or come to terms with the
Romans as it pleased. Naturally the desire after rest
everywhere prevailed. Caesar too had an interest in bring-
ing the war quickly to an end. Of the ten years of his
governorship seven had elapsed, and the last was called in
question by his political opponents in the capital ; he could
only reckon with some degree of certainty on two more
summers, and, while his interest as well as his honour
required that he should hand over the newly-acquired
regions to his successor in a condition of tolerable peace
and tranquillity, there was in truth but scanty time to bring
about such a state of things. To exercise mercy was in
92
THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
with the
Bituriges
and
Carnutes,
52-51.
with the
Bellovaci,
this case still more a necessity for the victor than for the
vanquished ; and he might thank his stars that the internal
dissensions and tne easy temperament of the Celts met
him in this respect half way. Where — as in the two most
eminent cantons of central Gaul, those of the Haedui and
Arverni — there existed a strong party well disposed to
Rome, the cantons obtained immediately after the fall of
Alesia a complete restoration of their former relations with
Rome, and even their captives, 20,000 in number, were
released without ransom, while those of the other clans
passed into the hard bondage of the victorious legionaries.
The greater portion of the Gallic districts submitted like
the Haedui and Arverni to their fate, and allowed their
inevitable punishment to be inflicted without farther resist-
ance. But not a few clung in foolish frivolity or sullen
despair to the lost cause, till the Roman troops of execution
appeared within their borders. Such expeditions were in
the winter of 702-703 undertaken against the Bituriges and
the Carnutes.
More serious resistance was offered by the Bellovaci,
who in the previous year had kept aloof from the relief of
Alesia ; they seem to have wished to show that their absence
on that decisive day at least did not proceed from want of
courage or of love for freedom. The Atrebates, Ambiani,
Caletes, and other Belgic cantons took part in this struggle ;
the brave king of the Atrebates Commius, whose accession
to the insurrection the Romans had least of all forgiven,
and against whom recently Labienus had even directed an
atrocious attempt at assassination, brought to the Bellovaci
500 German horse, whose value the campaign of the pre-
vious year had shown. The resolute and talented Bello-
vacian Correus, to whom the chief conduct of the war had
fallen, waged warfare as Vercingetorix had waged it, and
with no small success. Although Caesar had gradually
brought up the greater part of his army, he could neither
chap, vu THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 93
bring the infantry of the Bellovaci to a battle, nor even
prevent it from taking up other positions which afforded
better protection against his augmented forces ; while the
Roman horse, especially the Celtic contingents, suffered
most severe losses in various combats at the hands of the
enemy's cavalry, especially of the German cavalry of
Commius. But after Correus had met his death in a
skirmish with the Roman foragers, the resistance here too
was broken ; the victor proposed tolerable conditions, to
which the Bellovaci along with their confederates submitted.
The Treveri were reduced to obedience by Labienus, and
incidentally the territory of the outlawed Eburones was
once more traversed and laid waste. Thus the last resist-
ance of the Belgic confederacy was broken.
The maritime cantons still made an attempt to defend on the
themselves against the Roman domination in concert with oire*
their neighbours on the Loire. Insurgent bands from the
A.ndian, Carnutic, and other surrounding cantons assembled
on the lower Loire and besieged in Lemonum (Poitiers)
the prince of the Pictones who was friendly to the Romans.
But here too a considerable Roman force soon appeared
against them ; the insurgents abandoned the siege, and
retreated with the view of placing the Loire between them-
selves and the enemy, but were overtaken on the march
and defeated ; whereupon the Carnutes and the other
revolted cantons, including even the maritime ones, sent in
their submission.
The resistance was at an end ; save that an isolated and ia
leader of free bands still here and there upheld the national i0dun"um.
banner. The bold Drappes and the brave comrade in
arms of Vercingetorix Lucterius, after the breaking up of
the army united on the Loire, gathered together the most
resolute men, and with these threw themselves into the
strong mountain-town of Uxellodunum on the Lot,1 which
1 This is usually sought at Capdenac not far from Figeac ; Goler has
94 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book V
amidst severe and fatal conflicts the)- succeeded in suffi-
ciently provisioning. In spite of the loss of their leaders,
of whom Drappes had been taken prisoner, and Lucterius
had been cut off from the town, the garrison resisted to the
uttermost ; it was not till Caesar appeared in person, and
under his orders the spring from which the besieged derived
their water was diverted by means of subterranean drains,
that the fortress, the last stronghold of the Celtic nation,
fell. To distinguish the last champions of the cause of
freedom, Caesar ordered that the whole garrison should
have their hands cut off and should then be dismissed, each
one to his home. Caesar, who felt it all-important to put
an end at least to open resistance throughout Gaul, allowed
king Commius, who still held out in the region of Arras
and maintained desultory warfare with the Roman troops
51-50. there down to the winter of 703-704, to make his peace,
and even acquiesced when the irritated and justly distrustful
man haughtily refused to appear in person in the Roman
camp. It is very probable that Caesar in a similar way
allowed himself to be satisfied with a merely nominal sub-
mission, perhaps even with a de facto armistice, in the less
accessible districts of the north-west and north-east of Gaul.1
Gaul Thus was Gaul — or, in other words, the land west of
lubdued. ^ Rhine and north of the Pyrenees — rendered subject
58-51. after only eight years of conflict (696-703) to the Romans.
Hardly a year after the full pacification of the land, at the
49. beginning of 705, the Roman troops had to be withdrawn
over the Alps in consequence of the civil war, which had
now at length broken out in Italy, and there remained
nothing but at the most some weak divisions of recruits in
recently declared himself in favour of Luzech to the west of Cahors, a site
which had been previously suggested.
1 This indeed, as may readily be conceived, is not recorded by Caesar
himself , but an intelligible hint on this subject is given by Sallust (Hist.
\, 9 Kritz), although he too wrote as a partisan of Caesar. Further proofs
are furnished by the coins.
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 95
Gaul. Nevertheless the Celts did not again rise against
the foreign yoke ; and, while in all the old provinces of the
empire there was fighting against Caesar, the newly-acquired
country alone remained continuously obedient to its con-
queror. Even the Germans did not during those decisive
years repeat their attempts to conquer new settlements on
the left bank of the Rhine. As little did there occur in
Gaul any national insurrection or German invasion during
the crises that followed, although these offered the most
favourable opportunities. If disturbances broke out any-
where, such as the rising of the Bellovaci against the
Romans in 708, these movements were so isolated and so 46
unconnected with the complications in Italy, that they
were suppressed without material difficulty by the Roman
governors. Certainly this state of peace was most probably,
just as was the peace of Spain for centuries, purchased by
provisionally allowing the regions that were most remote
and most strongly pervaded by national feeling — Brittany,
the districts on the Scheldt, the region of the Pyrenees — to
withdraw themselves de facto in a more or less definite
manner from the Roman allegiance. Nevertheless the build-
ing of Caesar — however scanty the time which he found for
it amidst other and at the moment still more urgent labours,
however unfinished and but provisionally rounded off he
may have left it — in substance stood the test of this fiery
trial, as respected both the repelling of the Germans and
the subjugation of the Celts.
As to administration in chief, the territories newly Organiza-
acquired by the governor of Narbonese Gaul remained for ^
the time being united with the province of Narbo ; it was
not till Caesar gave up this office (710) that two new 44.
governorships — Gaul proper and Belgica — were formed out
of the territory which he conquered. That the individual
cantons lost their political independence, was implied in the
very nature of conquest. They became throughout tributary
96 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
Roman to the Roman community. Their system of tribute however
was, of course, not that by means of which the nobles and
financial aristocracy turned Asia to profitable account ; but,
as was the case in Spain, a tribute fixed once for all was
imposed on each individual community, and the levying
of it was left to itself. In this way forty million sesterces
(^400,000) flowed annually from Gaul into the chests of
the Roman government ; which, no doubt, undertook in
return the cost of defending the frontier of the Rhine.
Moreover, the masses of gold accumulated in the temples
of the gods and the treasuries of the grandees found their
way, as a matter of course, to Rome ; when Caesar offered
his Gallic gold throughout the Roman empire and brought
such masses of it at once into the money market that gold
as compared with silver fell about 25 per cent, we may
guess what sums Gaul lost through the war.
Indulgence The former cantonal constitutions with their hereditary
towards • • ■
existing kings, or their presiding feudal-oligarchies, continued in the
arrange- main to subsist after the conquest, and even the system of
clientship, which made certain cantons dependent on others
more powerful, was not abolished, although no doubt with
the loss of political independence its edge was taken off.
The sole object of Caesar was, while making use of the
existing dynastic, feudalist, and hegemonic divisions, to
arrange matters in the interest of Rome, and to bring
everywhere into power the men favourably disposed to the
foreign rule. Caesar spared no pains to form a Roman
party in Gaul ; extensive rewards in money and specially in
confiscated estates were bestowed on his adherents, and
places in the common council and the first offices of state
in their cantons were procured for them by Caesar's
influence. Those cantons in which a sufficiently strong and
trustworthy Roman party existed, such as those of the Remi,
the Lingones, the Haedui, were favoured by the bestowal of
a freer communal constitution — the right of alliance, as it
men is.
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 97
was called — and by preferences in the regulation of the
matter of hegemony. The national worship and its priests
seem to have been spared by Caesar from the outset as far
as possible ; no trace is found in his case of measures such
as were adopted in later times by the Roman rulers against
the Druidical system, and with this is probably connected
the fact that his Gallic wars, so far as we see, do not at all
bear the character of religious warfare after the fashion
which formed so prominent a feature of the Britannic wars
subsequently.
While Caesar thus showed to the conquered nation Introduc-
every allowable consideration and spared their national, p^L
political, and religious institutions as far as was at all com- izing of the
patible with their subjection to Rome, he did so, not as countr3r*
renouncing the fundamental idea of his conquest, the
Romanization of Gaul, but with a view to realize it in the
most indulgent way. He did not content himself with
letting the same circumstances, which had already in great
part Romanized the south province, produce their effect
likewise in the north; but, like a genuine statesman, he
sought to stimulate the natural course of development and,
moreover, to shorten as far as possible the always painful
period of transition. To say nothing of the admission of a
number of Celts of rank into Roman citizenship and even
of several perhaps into the Roman senate, it was probably
Caesar who introduced, although with certain restrictions,
the Latin instead of the native tongue as the official language
within the several cantons in Gaul, and who introduced the
Roman instead of the national monetary system on the
footing of reserving the coinage of gold and of denarii to
the Roman authorities, while the smaller money was to be
coined by the several cantons, but only for circulation within
the cantonal bounds, and this too in accordance with the
Roman standard. We may smile at the Latin jargon,
which the dwellers by the Loire and the Seine henceforth
VOL. V I40
98
THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
The cata-
strophe of
the Celtic
nation.
employed in accordance with orders ; * but these barbarisms
were pregnant with a greater future than the correct Latin
of the capital. Perhaps too, if the cantonal constitution in
Gaul afterwards appears more closely approximated to the
Italian urban constitution, and the chief places of the
canton as well as the common councils attain a more
marked prominence in it than was probably the case in the
original Celtic organization, the change may be referred to
Caesar. No one probably felt more than the political heir
of Gaius Gracchus and of Marius, how desirable in a
military as well as in a political point of view it would have
been to establish a series of Transalpine colonies as bases
of support for the new rule and starting-points of the new
civilization. If nevertheless he confined himself to the
settlement of his Celtic or German horsemen in Noviodunum
(p. 45) and to that of the Boii in the canton of the
Haedui (p. 44) — which latter settlement already rendered
quite the services of a Roman colony in the war with
Vercingetorix (p. 79) — the reason was merely that his
farther plans did not permit him to put the plough instead
of the sword into the hands of his legions. What he did in
later years for the old Roman province in this respect, will
be explained in its own place ; it is probable that the want
of time alone prevented him from extending the same system
to the regions which he had recently subdued.
All was over with the Celtic nation. Its political
dissolution had been completed by Caesar; its national
dissolution was begun and in course of regular progress.
This was no accidental destruction, such as destiny some-
times prepares even for peoples capable of development,
but a self-incurred and in some measure historically necessary
1 Thus we read on a semis which a Vergobretus of the Lexovii (Lisieux,
dep. Calvados) caused to be struck, the following inscription : Cisiambos
Cattos vercobreto ; simissos (sic) publicos Lixovio. The often scarcely
legible writing and the incredibly wretched stamping of these coins are in
excellent harmony with their stammering Latin.
chap. Vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 99
catastrophe. The very course of the last war proves this,
whether we view it as a whole or in detail. When the
establishment of the foreign rule was in contemplation, only
single districts — mostly, moreover. German or half-German
— offered energetic resistance. When the foreign rule was
actually established, the attempts to shake it off were either
undertaken altogether without judgment, or they were to
an undue extent the work of certain prominent nobles, and
were therefore immediately and entirely brought to an end
with the death or capture of an Indutiomarus, Camulogenus,
Vercingetorix, or Correus. The sieges and guerilla warfare,
in which elsewhere the whole moral depth of national
struggles displays itself, were throughout this Celtic struggle
of a peculiarly pitiable character. Every page of Celtic
history confirms the severe saying of one of the few Romans
who had the judgment not to despise the so-called bar-
barians— that the Celts boldly challenge danger while future,
but lose their courage before its presence. In the mighty
vortex of the world's history, which inexorably crushes all
peoples that are not as hard and as flexible as steel, such a
nation could not permanently maintain itself; with reason
the Celts of the continent suffered the same fate at the
hands of the Romans, as their kinsmen in Ireland suffer
down to our own day at the hands of the Saxons — the fate
of becoming merged as a leaven of future development in a
politically superior nationality. On the eve of parting from Traits
this remarkable nation we may be allowed to call attention com™°n to
' the Celts
to the fact, that in the accounts of the ancients as to the and Irish.
Celts on the Loire and Seine we find almost every one of
the characteristic traits which we are accustomed to recognize
as marking the Irish. Every feature reappears : the laziness
in the culture of the fields ; the delight in tippling and
brawling; the ostentation — we may recall that sword of
Caesar hung up in the sacred grove of the Arverni after
the victory of Gergovia, which its alleged former owner
loo THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
viewed with a smile at the consecrated spot and ordered
the sacred property to be carefully spared ; the language
full of comparisons and hyperboles, of allusions and quaint
turns ; the droll humour — an excellent example of which
was the rule, that if any one interrupted a person speaking
in public, a substantial and very visible hole should be cut,
as a measure of police, in the coat of the disturber of the
peace ; the hearty delight in singing and reciting the deeds
of past ages, and the most decided gifts of rhetoric and
poetry ; the curiosity — no trader was allowed to pass, before
he had told in the open street what he knew, or did not
know, in the shape of news — and the extravagant credulity
which acted on such accounts, for which reason in the
better regulated cantons travellers were prohibited on pain
of severe punishment from communicating unauthenticated
reports to others than the public magistrates ; the childlike
piety, which sees in the priest a father and asks for his
counsel in all things ; the unsurpassed fervour of national
feeling, and the closeness with which those who are fellow-
countrymen cling together almost like one family in
opposition to strangers ; the inclination to rise in revolt
under the first chance-leader that presents himself and to
form bands, but at the same time the utter incapacity to
preserve a self-reliant courage equally remote from presump-
tion and from pusillanimity, to perceive the right time for
waiting and for striking a blow, to attain or even barely to
tolerate any organization, any sort of fixed military or
political discipline. It is, and remains, at all times and all
places the same indolent and poetical, irresolute and fervid,
inquisitive, credulous, amiable, clever, but — in a political
point of view — thoroughly useless nation ; and therefore its
fate has been always and everywhere the same.
The But the fact that this great people was ruined by the
beginnings Transalpine wars of Caesar, was not the most important
of Romanic r
develop- result of that grand enterprise ; far more momentous than
menU
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 101
the negative was the positive result. It hardly admits of
a doubt that, if the rule of the senate had prolonged its
semblance of life for some generations longer, the migration
of peoples, as it is called, would have occurred four
hundred years sooner than it did, and would have occurred
at a time when the Italian civilization had not become
naturalized either in Gaul, or on the Danube, or in Africa
and Spain. Inasmuch as the great general and statesman
of Rome with sure glance perceived in the German tribes
the rival antagonists of the Romano -Greek world; inas-
much as with firm hand he established the new system of
aggressive defence down even to its details, and taught
men to protect the frontiers of the empire by rivers or
artificial ramparts, to colonize the nearest barbarian tribes
along the frontier with the view of warding off the more
remote, and to recruit the Roman army by enlistment
from the enemy's country; he gained for the Hellenico-
Italian culture the interval necessary to civilize the west
just as it had already civilized the east. Ordinary men see
the fruits of their action ; the seed sown by men of genius
germinates slowly. Centuries elapsed before men under-
stood that Alexander had not merely erected an ephemeral
kingdom in the east, but had carried Hellenism to Asia ;
centuries again elapsed before men understood that Caesar
had not merely conquered a new province for the Romans,
but had laid the foundation for the Romanizing of the
regions of the west. It was only a late posterity that
perceived the meaning of those expeditions to England
and Germany, so inconsiderate in a military point of view,
and so barren of immediate result. An immense circle of
peoples, whose existence and condition hitherto were
known barely through the reports — mingling some truth
with much fiction — of the mariner and the trader, was
disclosed by this means to the Greek and Roman world.
"Daily," it is said in a Roman writing of May 698, "the 56.
102 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
letters and messages from Gaul are announcing names of
peoples, cantons, and regions hitherto unknown to us."
This enlargement of the historical horizon by the expedi-
tions of Caesar beyond the Alps was as significant an
event in the world's history as the exploring of America by
European bands. To the narrow circle of the Mediter-
ranean states were added the peoples of central and
northern Europe, the dwellers on the Baltic and North
seas ; to the old world was added a new one, which thence-
forth was influenced by the old and influenced it in turn.
What the Gothic Theodoric afterwards succeeded in, came
very near to being already carried out by Ariovistus.
Had it so happened, our civilization would have hardly
stood in any more intimate relation to the Romano-Greek
than to the Indian and Assyrian culture. That there is a
bridge connecting the past glory of Hellas and Rome with
the prouder fabric of modern history ; that Western Europe
is Romanic, and Germanic Europe classic ; that the names
of Themistocles and Scipio have to us a very different
sound from those of Asoka and Salmanassar ; that Homer
and Sophocles are not merely like the Vedas and Kalidasa
attractive to the literary botanist, but bloom for us in our
own garden — all this is the work of Caesar; and, while
the creation of his great predecessor in the east has been
almost wholly reduced to ruin by the tempests of the
Middle Ages, the structure of Caesar has outlasted those
thousands of years which have changed religion and polity
for the human race and even shifted for it the centre of
civilization itself, and it stands erect for what we may
designate as eternity.
To complete the sketch of the relations of Rome to the
countries , . . , , . ...
on the peoples of the north at this period, it remains that we
Danube. cast a glance at the countries which stretch to the north
of the Italian and Greek peninsulas, from the sources of
the Rhine to the Black Sea. It is true that the torch of
The
countries
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 103
nistory does not illumine the mighty stir and turmoil of
peoples which probably prevailed at that time there, and
the solitary gleams of light that fall on this region are, like
a faint glimmer amidst deep darkness, more fitted to be-
wilder than to enlighten. But it is the duty of the
historian to indicate also the gaps in the record of the
history of nations; he may not deem it beneath him to
mention, by the side of Caesar's magnificent system of
defence, the paltry arrangements by which the generals of
the senate professed to protect on this side the frontier of
the empire.
North-eastern Italy was still as before (iii. 424) left ex- Alpine
posed to the attacks of the Alpine tribes. The strong peopes-
Roman army encamped at Aquileia in 695, and the 59.
triumph of the governor of Cisalpine Gaul, Lucius Afranius,
lead us to infer, that about this time an expedition to the
Alps took place, and it may have been in consequence of
this that we find the Romans soon afterwards in closer
connection with a king of the Noricans. But that even
subsequently Italy was not at all secure on this side, is
shown by the sudden assault of the Alpine barbarians on
the flourishing town of Tergeste in 702, when the Trans- 52.
alpine insurrection had compelled Caesar to divest upper
Italy wholly of troops.
The turbulent peoples also, who had possession of the iiiyria.
district along the Illyrian coast, gave their Roman masters
constant employment. The Dalmatians, even at an earlier
period the most considerable people of this region, en-
larged their power so much by admitting their neighbours
into their union, that the number of their townships rose
from twenty to eighty. When they refused to give up
once more the town of Promona (not far from the river
Kerka), which they had wrested from the Liburnians,
Caesar after the battle of Pharsalia gave orders to march
against them; but the Romans were in the first instance
io4 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book >
worsted, and in consequence of this Dalmatia became for
some time a rendezvous of the party hostile to Caesar, and
the inhabitants in concert with the Pompeians and with
the pirates offered an energetic resistance to the generals
of Caesar both by land and by water.
Mace- Lastly Macedonia along with Epirus and Hellas lay in
greater desolation and decay than almost any other part of
the Roman empire. Dyrrhachium, Thessalonica, and By-
zantium had still some trade and commerce ; Athens
attracted travellers and students by its name and its philo-
sophical school ; but on the whole there lay over the
formerly populous little towns of Hellas, and her seaports
once swarming with men, the calm of the grave. But if
the Greeks stirred not, the inhabitants of the hardly
accessible Macedonian mountains on the other hand con-
tinued after the old fashion their predatory raids and feuds ;
57-56. for instance about 697—698 Agraeans and Dolopians over-
64. ran the Aetolian towns, and in 700 the Pirustae dwelling
in the valleys of the Drin overran southern Illyria. The
neighbouring peoples did likewise. The Dardani on the
northern frontier as well as the Thracians in the east had
no doubt been humbled by the Romans in the eight years'
78-71. conflicts from 676 to 683; the most powerful of the
Thracian princes, Cotys, the ruler of the old Odrysian
kingdom, was thenceforth numbered among the client
kings of Rome. Nevertheless the pacified land had still
as before to suffer invasions from the north and east. The
governor Gaius Antonius was severely handled both by
the Dardani and by the tribes settled in the modern
Dobrudscha, who, with the help of the dreaded Bastarnae
brought up from the left bank of the Danube, inflicted
62-61. on him an important defeat (692-693) at Istropolis (Istere,
not far from Kustendji). Gaius Octavius fought with better
60. fortune against the Bessi and Thracians (694). Marcus
67-66. Piso again (697—698) as general-in-chief wretchedly mis-
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 105
managed matters ; which was no wonder, seeing that for
money he gave friends and foes whatever they wished.
The Thracian Dentheletae (on the Strymon) under his
governorship plundered Macedonia far and wide, and
even stationed their posts on the great Roman military
road leading from Dyrrhachium to Thessalonica; the
people in Thessalonica made up their minds to stand a
siege from them, while the strong Roman army in the
province seemed to be present only as an onlooker when
the inhabitants of the mountains and neighbouring peoples
levied contributions from the peaceful subjects of Rome.
Such attacks could not indeed endanger the power of The new
Rome, and a fresh disgrace had long ago ceased to occasion ^^
concern. But just about this period a people began to
acquire political consolidation beyond the Danube in the
wide Dacian steppes — a people which seemed destined to
play a different part in history from that of the Bessi and
the Dentheletae. Among the Getae or Dacians in primeval
times there had been associated with the king of the people
a holy man called Zalmoxis, who, after having explored the
ways and wonders of the gods in distant travel in foreign
lands, and having thoroughly studied in particular the
wisdom of the Egyptian priests and of the Greek Pytha-
goreans, had returned to his native country to end his life
as a pious hermit in a cavern of the "holy mountain."
He remained accessible only to the king and his servants,
and gave forth to the king and through him to the people
his oracles with reference to every important undertaking.
He was regarded by his countrymen at first as priest of the
supreme god and ultimately as himself a god, just as it is
said of Moses and Aaron that the Lord had made Aaron
the prophet and Moses the god of the prophet. This
had become a permanent institution ; there was regularly
associated with the king of the Getae such a god, from
whose mouth everything which the king ordered proceeded
io6 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
or appeared to proceed. This peculiar constitution, in
which the theocratic idea had become subservient to the
apparently absolute power of the king, probably gave to
the kings of the Getae some such position with respect to
their subjects as the caliphs had with respect to the Arabs ;
and one result of it was the marvellous religious-political
reform of the nation, which was carried out about this
time by the king of the Getae, Burebistas, and the god
Dekaeneos. The people, which had morally and politically
fallen into utter decay through unexampled drunkenness,
was as it were metamorphosed by the new gospel of
temperance and valour; with his bands under the influ-
ence, so to speak, of puritanic discipline and enthusiasm
king Burebistas founded within a few years a mighty
kingdom, which extended along both banks of the Danube
and reached southward far into Thrace, Illyria, and
Noricum. No direct contact with the Romans had yet
taken place, and no one could tell what might come out of
this singular state, which reminds us of the early times of
Islam ; but this much it needed no prophetic gift to foretell,
that proconsuls like Antonius and Piso were not called to
contend with gods.
chap, via RULE OF POMPEIUS AND CAESAR 107
CHAPTER VIII
THE JOINT RULE OF POMPEIUS AND CAESAR
Among the democratic chiefs, who from the time of the Pompehw
consulate of Caesar were recognized officially, so to speak, fnjuxta.
as the joint rulers of the commonwealth, as the governing position.
" triumvirs," Pompeius according to public opinion occupied
decidedly the first place. It was he who was called by the
Optimates the " private dictator " ; it was before him that
Cicero prostrated himself in vain ; against him were directed
the sharpest sarcasms in the wall-placards of Bibulus, and
the most envenomed arrows of the talk in the saloons of the
opposition. This was only to be expected. According to
the facts before the public Pompeius was indisputably the
first general of his time ; Caesar was a dexterous party-
leader and party -orator, of undeniable talents, but as
notoriously of unwarlike and indeed of effeminate tempera-
ment Such opinions had been long current; it could
not be expected of the rabble of quality that it should
trouble itself about the real state of things and abandon
once established platitudes because of obscure feats of
heroism on the Tagus. Caesar evidently played in the
league the mere part of the adjutant who executed for his
chief the work which Flavins, Afranius, and other less
capable instruments had attempted and not performed.
Even his governorship seemed not to alter this state of
things. Afranius had but recently occupied a very similar
io8
THE JOINT RULE OF
BOOK V
Pompeius
and the
capital
Anarchy.
position, without thereby acquiring any special importance j
several provinces at once had been of late years repeatedly
placed under one governor, and often far more than four
legions had been united in one hand; as matters were
again quiet beyond the Alps and prince Ariovistus was
recognized by the Romans as a friend and neighbour, there
was no prospect of conducting a war of any moment there.
It was natural to compare the position which Pompeius
had obtained by the Gabinio-Manilian law with that which
Caesar had obtained by the Vatinian ; but the comparison
did not turn out to Caesar's advantage. Pompeius ruled
over nearly the whole Roman empire ; Caesar over two
provinces. Pompeius had the soldiers and the treasures
of the state almost absolutely at his disposal j Caesar had
only the sums assigned to him and an army of 24,000
men. It was left to Pompeius himself to fix the point of
time for his retirement ; Caesar's command was secured to
him for a long period no doubt, but yet only for a limited
term. Pompeius, in fine, had been entrusted with the
most important undertakings by sea and land ; Caesar was
sent to the north, to watch over the capital from upper
Italy and to take care that Pompeius should rule it undis-
turbed.
But when Pompeius was appointed by the coalition to
be ruler of the capital, he undertook a task far exceeding
his powers. Pompeius understood nothing further of
ruling than may be summed up in the word of command.
The waves of agitation in the capital were swelled at once
by past and by future revolutions ; the problem of ruling
this city — which in every respect might be compared to
the Paris of the nineteenth century — without an armed
force was infinitely difficult, and for that stiff and stately
pattern -soldier altogether insoluble. Very soon matters
reached such a pitch that friends and foes, both equally
inconvenient to him, could, so far as he was concerned, do
chap, viii POMPEIUS AND CAESAR 109
what they pleased ; after Caesar's departure from Rome
the coalition ruled doubtless still the destinies of the world,
but not the streets of the capital. The senate too, to
whom there still belonged a sort of nominal government,
allowed things in the capital to follow their natural course ;
partly because the section of this body controlled by the
coalition lacked the instructions of the regents, partly
because the angry opposition kept aloof out of indifference
or pessimism, but chiefly because the whole aristocratic
corporation began to feel at any rate, if not to comprehend,
its utter impotence. For the moment therefore there was
nowhere at Rome any power of resistance in any sort of
government, nowhere a real authority. Men were living
in an interregnum between the ruin of the aristocratic, and
the rise of the military, rule ; and, if the Roman common-
wealth has presented all the different political functions
and organizations more purely and normally than any other
in ancient or modern times, it has also exhibited political
disorganization — anarchy — with an unenviable clearness.
It is a strange coincidence that in the same years, in which
Caesar was creating beyond the Alps a work to last for
ever, there was enacted in Rome one of the most extra-
vagant political farces that was ever produced upon the
stage of the world's history. The new regent of the
commonwealth did not rule, but shut himself up in his
house and sulked in silence. The former half- deposed
government likewise did not rule, but sighed, sometimes
in private amidst the confidential circles of the villas,
sometimes in chorus in the senate-house. The portion of
the burgesses which had still at heart freedom and order
was disgusted with the reign of confusion, but utterly
without leaders and counsel it maintained a passive attitude
— not merely avoiding all political activity, but keeping
aloof, as far as possible, from the political Sodom itself.
On the other hand the rabble of every sort never had
"o THE JOINT RULE OF book v
The better days, never found a merrier arena. The number
of little great men was legion. Demagogism became quite
a trade, which accordingly did not lack its professional
insignia — the threadbare mantle, the shaggy beard, the
long streaming hair, the deep bass voice ; and not seldom
it was a trade with golden soil. For the standing declama-
tions the tried gargles of the theatrical staff were an article
in much request ; l Greeks and Jews, freedmen and slaves,
were the most regular attenders and the loudest criers in
the public assemblies ; frequently, even when it came to a
vote, only a minority of those voting consisted of burgesses
* constitutionally entitled to do so. " Next time," it is said
in a letter of this period, " we may expect our lackeys to
outvote the emancipation-tax." The real powers of the day
were the compact and armed bands, the battalions of
anarchy raised by adventurers of rank out of gladiatorial
slaves and blackguards. Their possessors had from the
outset been mostly numbered among the popular party ;
but since the departure of Caesar, who alone understood
how to impress the democracy, and alone knew how to
manage it, all discipline had departed from them and
every partisan practised politics at his own hand. Even
now, no doubt, these men fought with most pleasure
under the banner of freedom; but, strictly speaking, they
were neither of democratic nor of anti-democratic views ;
they inscribed on the — in itself indispensable — banner,
as it happened, now the name of the people, anon that
of the senate or that of a party -chief; Clodius for
instance fought or professed to fight in succession for the
ruling democracy, for the senate, and for Crassus. The
leaders of these bands kept to their colours only so far as
they inexorably persecuted their personal enemies — as in
the case of Clodius against Cicero and Milo against
1 This is the meaning of cantor um convitio condones celebrare (Cic
fro Sest. 55, 118).
chap, viii POMPEIUS AND CAESAR ill
Clodius — while their partisan position served them merely
as a handle in these personal feuds. We might as well
seek to set a charivari to music as to write the history
of this political witches' revel ; nor is it of any moment
to enumerate all the deeds of murder, besiegings of
houses, acts of incendiarism and other scenes of violence
within a great capital, and to reckon up how often the
gamut was traversed from hissing and shouting to spitting
on and trampling down opponents, and thence to throwing
stones and drawing swords.
The principal performer in this theatre of political ciodlu*
rascality was that Publius Clodius, of whose services, as
already mentioned (iv. 517), the regents availed themselves
against Cato and Cicero. Left to himself, this influential,
talented, energetic and — in his trade — really exemplary
partisan pursued during his tribunate of the people (696) 58.
an ultra-democratic policy, gave the citizens corn gratis,
restricted the right of the censors to stigmatize immoral
burgesses, prohibited the magistrates from obstructing the
course of the comitial machinery by religious formalities,
set aside the limits which had shortly before (690), for the 64.
purpose of checking the system of bands, been imposed on
the right of association of the lower classes, and re-
established the " street-clubs " {collegia compitaliria) at that
time abolished, which were nothing else than a formal
organization — subdivided according to the streets, and with
an almost military arrangement — of the whole free or slave
proletariate of the capital. If in addition the further law,
which Clodius had likewise already projected and purposed
to introduce when praetor in 702, should give to freedmen 62.
and to slaves living in de facto possession of freedom the
same political rights with the freeborn, the author of all
these brave improvements of the constitution might declare
his work complete, and as a second Numa of freedom and
equality might invite the sweet rabble of the capital to see
112
THE JOINT RULE OF
BOOK V
Quarrel of
Pompeius
with
Clodius.
him celebrate high mass in honour of the arrival of the
democratic millennium in the temple of Liberty which he
had erected on the site of one of his burnings at the
Palatine. Of course these exertions in behalf of freedom
did not exclude a traffic in decrees of the burgesses ; like
Caesar himself, Caesar's ape kept governorships and other
posts great and small on sale for the benefit of his fellow-
citizens, and sold the sovereign rights of the state for the
benefit of subject kings and cities.
At all these things Pompeius looked on without stirring.
If he did not perceive how seriously he thus compromised
himself, his opponent perceived it. Clodius had the
hardihood to engage in a dispute with the regent of Rome
on a question of little moment, as to the sending back of
a captive Armenian prince ; and the variance soon became
a formal feud, in which the utter helplessness of Pompeius
was displayed. The head of the state knew not how to
meet the partisan otherwise than with his own weapons,
only wielded with far less dexterity. If he had been
tricked by Clodius respecting the Armenian prince, he
offended him in turn by releasing Cicero, who was pre-
eminently obnoxious to Clodius, from the exile into which
Clodius had sent him ; and he attained his object so
thoroughly, that he converted his opponent into an
implacable foe. If Clodius made the streets insecure with
his bands, the victorious general likewise set slaves and
pugilists to work; in the frays which ensued the general
naturally was worsted by the demagogue and defeated in
the street, and Gaius Cato was kept almost constantly
under siege in his garden by Clodius and his comrades.
It is not the least remarkable feature in this remarkable
spectacle, that the regent and the rogue amidst their
quarrel vied in courting the favour of the fallen govern-
ment ; Pompeius, partly to please the senate, permitted
Cicero's recall, Clodius on the other hand declared the
CHAP. VIII POMPEIUS AND CAESAR 113
Julian laws null and void, and called on Marcus Bibulus
publicly to testify to their having been unconstitutionally
passed.
Naturally no positive result could issue from this
imbroglio of dark passions; its most distinctive character
was just its utterly ludicrous want of object. Even a man
of Caesar's genius had to learn by experience that demo-
cratic agitation was completely worn out, and that even
the way to the throne no longer lay through demagogism.
It was nothing more than a historical makeshift, if now, in
the interregnum between republic and monarchy, some
whimsical fellow dressed himself out with the prophet's
mantle and staff which Caesar had himself laid aside, and
the great ideals of Gaius Gracchus came once more upon
the stage distorted into a parody ; the so-called party from
which this democratic agitation proceeded was so little
such in reality, that afterwards it had not even a part
falling to it in the decisive struggle. It cannot even be
asserted that by means of this anarchical state of things
the desire after a strong government based on military
power had been vividly kindled in the minds of those who
were indifferent to politics. Even apart from the fact that
such neutral burgesses were chiefly to be sought outside
of Rome, and thus were not directly affected by the rioting
in the capital, those minds which could be at all influenced
by such motives had been already by their former
experiences, and especially by the Catilinarian conspiracy,
thoroughly converted to the principle of authority; but
those that were really alarmed were affected far more
emphatically by a dread of the gigantic crisis inseparable
from an overthrow of the constitution, than by dread of
the mere continuance of the — at bottom withal very
superficial — anarchy in the capital. The only result of it
which historically deserves notice was the painful position
in which Pompeius was placed by the attacks of the
VOL. V 141
H4 THE JOINT RULE OF BOOK V
Clodians, and which had a material share in determining
his farther steps.
Pompeius Little as Pompeius liked and understood taking the
to the initiative, he was yet on this occasion compelled by the
Gallic change of his position towards both Clodius and Caesar to
Caesar. depart from his previous inaction. The irksome and
disgraceful situation to which Clodius had reduced him,
could not but at length arouse even his sluggish nature to
hatred and anger. But far more important was the change
which took place in his relation to Caesar. While, of the
two confederate regents, Pompeius had utterly failed in
the functions which he had undertaken, Caesar had the
skill to turn his official position to an account which left
all calculations and all fears far behind. Without much
inquiry as to permission, Caesar had doubled his army by
levies in his southern province inhabited in great measure
by Roman burgesses ; had with this army crossed the Alps
instead of keeping watch over Rome from Northern Italy ;
had crushed in the bud a new Cimbrian invasion, and
68, 67. within two years (696, 697) had carried the Roman arms
to the Rhine and the Channel. In presence of such facts
even the aristocratic tactics of ignoring and disparaging
were baffled. He who had often been scoffed at as
effeminate was now the idol of the army, the celebrated
victory-crowned hero, whose fresh laurels outshone the
faded laurels of Pompeius, and to whom even the senate
67. as early as 697 accorded the demonstrations of honour
usual after successful campaigns in richer measure than
had ever fallen to the share of Pompeius. Pompeius
stood towards his former adjutant precisely as after the
Gabinio-Manilian laws the latter had stood towards him.
Caesar was now the hero of the day and the master of
the most powerful Roman army ; Pompeius was an ex-
general who had once been famous. It is true that no
collision had yet occurred between father-in-law and son-
CHAP. Vlli POMPEIUS AND CAESAR 115
in-law, and the relation was externally undisturbed; but
every political alliance is inwardly broken up, when the
relative proportions of the power of the parties are materi-
ally altered. While the quarrel with Clodius was merely
annoying, the change in the position of Caesar involved a
very serious danger for Pompeius ; just as Caesar and his
confederates had formerly sought a military support against
him, he found himself now compelled to seek a military
support against Caesar, and, laying aside his haughty
privacy, to come forward as a candidate for some extra-
ordinary magistracy, which would enable him to hold his
place by the side of the governor of the two Gauls with
equal and, if possible, with superior power. His tactics, like
his position, were exactly those of Caesar during the Mithra-
datic war. To balance the military power of a superior
but still remote adversary by the obtaining of a similar
command, Pompeius required in the first instance the
official machinery of government. A year and a half ago
this had been absolutely at his disposal. The regents
then ruled the state both by the comitia, which absolutely
obeyed them as the masters of the street, and by the
senate, which was energetically overawed by Caesar; as
representative of the coalition in Rome and as its ac-
knowledged head, Pompeius would have doubtless ob-
tained from the senate and from the burgesses any decree
which he wished, even if it were against Caesar's interest.
But by the awkward quarrel with Clodius, Pompeius had
lost the command of the streets, and could not expect to
carry a proposal in his favour in the popular assembly.
Things were not quite so unfavourable for him in the
senate ; but even there it was doubtful whether Pompeius
after that long and fatal inaction still held the reins of the
majority firmly enough in hand to procure such a decree
as he needed.
The position of the senate also, or rather of the nobility
n6 THE JOINT RULE OF book v
The generally, had meanwhile undergone a change. From the
opposition velT ^act °*" *ts cornplete abasement it drew fresh energy.
among the In the coalition of 694 various things had come to light,
° 60 wn'cn were by no means as yet ripe for it. The banish-
ment of Cato and Cicero — which public opinion, however
much the regents kept themselves in the background and
even professed to lament it, referred with unerring tact to
its real authors — and the marriage -relationship formed
between Caesar and Pompeius suggested to men's minds
with disagreeable clearness monarchical decrees of banish-
ment and family alliances. The larger public too, which
stood more aloof from political events, observed the
foundations of the future monarchy coming more and
more distinctly into view. From the moment when the
public perceived that Caesar's object was not a modification
of the republican constitution, but that the question at
stake was the existence or non-existence of the republic,
many of the best men, who had hitherto reckoned them-
selves of the popular party and honoured in Caesar its
head, must infallibly have passed over to the opposite side.
It was no longer in the saloons and the country houses
of the governing nobility alone that men talked of the
"three dynasts," of the "three-headed monster." The
dense crowds of people listened to the consular orations of
Caesar without a sound of acclamation or approval ; not a
hand stirred to applaud when the democratic consul
entered the theatre. But they hissed when one of the
tools of the regents showed himself in public, and even
staid men applauded when an actor uttered an anti-
monarchic sentence or an allusion against Pompeius.
Nay, when Cicero was to be banished, a great number of
burgesses — it is said twenty thousand — mostly of the middle
classes, put on mourning after the example of the senate.
"Nothing is now more popular," it is said in a letter of
this period, " than hatred of the popular party."
chap, viii POMPEIUS AND CAESAR 117
The regents dropped hints, that through such opposi- Attempt!
tion the equites might easily lose their new special places regents t0
in the theatre, and the commons their bread-corn ; people check it
were therefore somewhat more guarded perhaps in the
expression of their displeasure, but the feeling remained
the same. The lever of material interests was applied with
better success. Caesar's gold flowed in streams. Men of
seeming riches whose finances were in disorder, influential
ladies who were in pecuniary embarrassment, insolvent
young nobles, merchants and bankers in difficulties, either
went in person to Gaul with the view of drawing from the
fountain-head, or applied to Caesar's agents in the capital ;
and rarely was any man outwardly respectable — Caesar
avoided dealings with vagabonds who were utterly lost —
rejected in either quarter. To this fell to be added the
enormous buildings which Caesar caused to be executed
on his account in the capital — and by which a countless
number of men of all ranks from the consular down to the
common porter found opportunity of profiting — as well as
the immense sums expended for public amusements.
Pompeius did the same on a more limited scale; to him
the capital was indebted for the first theatre of stone, and
he celebrated its dedication with a magnificence never seen
before. Of course such distributions reconciled a number
of men who were inclined towards opposition, more
especially in the capital, to the new order of things up to a
certain extent ; but the marrow of the opposition was not
to be reached by this system of corruption. Every day
more and more clearly showed how deeply the existing
constitution had struck root among the people, and how
little, in particular, the circles more aloof from direct party-
agitation, especially the country towns, were inclined
towards monarchy or even simply ready to let it take its
course.
If Rome had had a representative constitution, the
ti8 THE JOINT RULE OF book v
Increasing discontent of the burgesses would have found its natural
oTthe nCC expression in the elections, and have increased by so ex-
senate, pressing itself; under the existing circumstances nothing
was left for those true to the constitution but to place
themselves under the senate, which, degraded as it was,
still appeared the representative and champion of the
legitimate republic. Thus it happened that the senate,
now when it had been overthrown, suddenly found at its
disposal an army far more considerable and far more
earnestly faithful, than when in its power and splendour
it overthrew the Gracchi and under the protection of Sulla's
sword restored the state. The aristocracy felt this ; it
began to bestir itself afresh. Just at this time Marcus Cicero,
after having bound himself to join the obsequious party in
the senate and not only to offer no opposition, but to
work with all his might for the regents, had obtained from
them permission to return. Although Pompeius in this
matter only made an incidental concession to the oligarchy,
and intended first of all to play a trick on Clodius, and
secondly to acquire in the fluent consular a tool rendered
pliant by sufficient blows, the opportunity afforded by the
return of Cicero was embraced for republican demonstra-
tions, just as his banishment had been a demonstration
against the senate. With all possible solemnity, protected
moreover against the Clodians by the band of Titus Annius
Milo, the two consuls, following out a resolution of the
senate, submitted a proposal to the burgesses to permit the
return of the consular Cicero, and the senate called on all
burgesses true to the constitution not to be absent from
the vote. An unusual number of worthy men, especially
from the country towns, actually assembled in Rome on
67. the day of voting (4 Aug. 697). The journey of the con-
sular from Brundisium to the capital gave occasion to a
series of similar, but not less brilliant manifestations of
public feeling. The new alliance between the senate and
chap, viii POMPEIUS AND CAESAR 119
the burgesses faithful to the constitution was on this
occasion as it were publicly proclaimed, and a sort of
review of the latter was held, the singularly favourable
result of which contributed not a little to revive the sunken
courage of the aristocracy.
The helplessness of Pompeius in presence of these daring Helpless-
demonstrations, as well as the undignified and almost °ess of.
' , ° Pompeius.
ridiculous position into which he had fallen with reference
to Clodius, deprived him and the coalition of their credit ;
and the section of the senate which adhered to the
regents, demoralized by the singular inaptitude of Pompeius
and helplessly left to itself, could not prevent the republican-
aristocratic party from regaining completely the ascendency
in the corporation. The game of this party really at that
time (697) was still by no means desperate for a courageous 57.
and dexterous player. It had now — what it had not
possessed for a century past — a firm support in the people ;
if it trusted the people and itself, it might attain its object
in the shortest and most honourable way. Why not attack
the regents openly and avowedly? Why should not a
resolute and eminent man at the head of the senate cancel
the extraordinary powers as unconstitutional, and summon
all the republicans of Italy to arms against the tyrants and
their following ? It was possible perhaps in this way once
more to restore the rule of the senate Certainly the
republicans would thus play a bold game ; but perhaps in
this case, as often, the most courageous resolution might
have been at the same time the most prudent. Only, it is
true, the indolent aristocracy of this period was scarcely
capable of so simple and bold a resolution. There was
however another way perhaps more sure, at any rate better
adapted to the character and nature of these constitu-
tionalists ; they might labour to set the two regents at
variance and through this variance to attain ultimately to
the helm themselves. The relations between the two men
120 THE JOINT RULE OF book V
ruling the state had become altered and relaxed, now that
Caesar had acquired a standing of preponderant power by the
side of Pompeius and had compelled the latter to canvass
for a new position of command ; it was probable that, if he
obtained it, there would arise in one way or other a rupture
and struggle between them. If Pompeius remained un-
supported in this, his defeat was scarcely doubtful, and the
constitutional party would in that event find themselves
after the close of the conflict under the rule of one master
instead of two. But if the nobility employed against
Caesar the same means by which the latter had won his
previous victories, and entered into alliance with the weaker
competitor, victory would probably, with a general like
Pompeius, and with an army such as that of the constitu-
tionalists, fall to the coalition ; and to settle matters with
Pompeius after the victory could not — judging from the
proofs of political incapacity which he had already given —
appear a specially difficult task.
Attempts Things had taken such a turn as naturally to suggest an
°f . understanding between Pompeius and the republican party,
to obtain a Whether such an approximation was to take place, and what
command shape the mutual relations of the two regents and of the
the senate, aristocracy, which had become utterly enigmatical, were
next to assume, fell necessarily to be decided, when in the
67. autumn of 697 Pompeius came to the senate with the
proposal to entrust him with extraordinary official power.
Adminis- He based his proposal once more on that by which he had
of the" eleven years before laid the foundations of his power, the
supplies of price of bread in the capital, which had just then — as
previously to the Gabinian law — reached an oppressive
height. Whether it had been forced up by special
machinations, such as Clodius imputed sometimes to
Pompeius, sometimes to Cicero, and these in their turn
charged on Clodius, cannot be determined; the continuance
of piracy, the emptiness of the public chest, and the
chap, vin POMPEIUS AND CAESAR 121
negligent and disorderly supervision of the supplies of corn
by the government were already quite sufficient of them-
selves, even without political forestalling, to produce
scarcities of bread in a great city dependent almost solely
on transmarine supplies. The plan of Pompeius was to get
the senate to commit to him the superintendence of the
matters relating to corn throughout the whole Roman empire,
and, with a view to this ultimate object, to entrust him on
the one hand with the unlimited disposal of the Roman
state-treasure, and on the other hand with an army and
fleet, as well as a command which not only stretched over
the whole Roman empire, but was superior in each province
to that of the governor — in short he designed to institute
an improved edition of the Gabinian law, to which the
conduct of the Egyptian war just then pending (iii. 451)
would therefore quite as naturally have been annexed as
the conduct of the Mithradatic war to the razzia against the
pirates. However much the opposition to the new dynasts
had gained ground in recent years, the majority of the
senate was still, when this matter came to be discussed in
Sept. 697, under the constraint of the terror excited by 57.
Caesar. It obsequiously accepted the project in principle,
and that on the proposition of Marcus Cicero, who was ex-
pected to give, and gave, in this case the first proof of the
pliableness learned by him in exile. But in the settlement
of the details very material portions were abated from the
original plan, which the tribune of the people Gaius Messius
submitted. Pompeius obtained neither free control over
the treasury, nor legions and ships of his own, nor even an
authority superior to that of the governors ; but they
contented themselves with granting to him, for the purpose
of his organizing due supplies for the capital, considerable
sums, fifteen adjutants, and in all affairs relating to the
supply of grain full proconsular power throughout the
Roman dominions for the next five years, and with having
122 THE JOINT RULE OF book v
this decree confirmed by the burgesses. There were many
different reasons which led to this alteration, almost
equivalent to a rejection, of the original plan : a regard to
Caesar, with reference to whom the most timid could not
but have the greatest scruples in investing his colleague
not merely with equal but with superior authority in Gaul
itself; the concealed opposition of Pompeius' hereditary
enemy and reluctant ally Crassus, to whom Pompeius
himself attributed or professed to attribute primarily the
failure of his plan ; the antipathy of the republican opposi-
tion in the senate to any decree which really or nominally
enlarged the authority of the regents ; lastly and mainly,
the incapacity of Pompeius himself, who even after having
been compelled to act could not prevail on himself to
acknowledge his own action, but chose always to bring
forward his real design as it were in incognito by means of
his friends, while he himself in his well-known modesty
declared his willingness to be content with even less. No
wonder that they took him at his word, and gave him the
less.
Egyptian Pompeius was nevertheless glad to have found at any
rate a serious employment, and above all a fitting pretext
for leaving the capital. He succeeded, moreover, in pro-
viding it with ampler and cheaper supplies, although not
without the provinces severely feeling the reflex effect.
But he had missed his real object ; the proconsular title,
which he had a right to bear in all the provinces, remained
an empty name, so long as he had not troops of his own at
his disposal. Accordingly he soon afterwards got a second
proposition made to the senate, that it should confer on
him the charge of conducting back the expelled king of
Egypt, if necessary by force of arms, to his home. But
the more that his urgent need of the senate became evident,
the senators received his wishes with a less pliant and less
respectful spirit. It was immediately discovered in the
expedition.
chap, viii POMPEIUS AND CAESAR 123
Sibylline oracles that it was impious to send a Roman
army to Egypt; whereupon the pious senate almost
unanimously resolved to abstain from armed intervention.
Pompeius was already so humbled, that he would have
accepted the mission even without an army ; but in his
incorrigible dissimulation he left this also to be declared
merely by his friends, and spoke and voted for the despatch
of another senator. Of course the senate rejected a pro-
posal which wantonly risked a life so precious to his
country ; and the ultimate issue of the endless discussions
was the resolution not to interfere in Egypt at all (Jan. 698). 56.
These repeated repulses which Pompeius met with in Attempt
the senate and, what was worse, had to acquiesce in with- at.an
' * aristocratic
out retaliation, were naturally regarded — come from what restoration,
side they would — by the public at large as so many
victories of the republicans and defeats of the regents
generally ; the tide of republican opposition was accord-
ingly always on the increase. Already the elections for
698 had gone but partially according to the minds of 58.
the dynasts ; Caesar's candidates for the praetorship,
Publius Vatinius and Gaius Alfius, had failed, while two
decided adherents of the fallen government, Gnaeus
Lentulus Marcellinus and Gnaeus Domitius Calvinus, had
been elected, the former as consul, the latter as praetor.
But for 699 there even appeared as candidate for the 65.
consulship Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, whose election
it was difficult to prevent owing to his influence in the
capital and his colossal wealth, and who, it was sufficiently
well known, would not be content with a concealed opposi-
tion. The comitia thus rebelled ; and the senate chimed
in. It solemnly deliberated over an opinion, which
Etruscan soothsayers of acknowledged wisdom had fur-
nished respecting certain signs and wonders at its special
request. The celestial revelation announced that through
the dissension of the upper classes the whole power over
I24 THE JOINT RULE OF book v
the army and treasure threatened to pass to one ruler, and
the state to incur loss of freedom — it seemed that the gods
pointed primarily at the proposal of Gaius Messius. The re-
Attack on publicans soon descended from heaven to earth. The law as
£*"'* t0 the domain of Capua and the other laws issued by Caesar
as consul had been constantly described by them as null
and void, and an opinion had been expressed in the senate
57. as early as Dec. 697 that it was necessary to cancel them
56. on account of their informalities. On the 6th April 698
the consular Cicero proposed in a full senate to put the
consideration of the Campanian land distribution in the
order of the day for the 15 th May. It was the formal
declaration of war ; and it was the more significant, that
it came from the mouth of one of those men who only
show their colours when they think that they can do so
with safety. Evidently the aristocracy held that the
moment had come for beginning the struggle not with
Pompeius against Caesar, but against the tyrannis gener-
ally. What would further follow might easily be seen.
Domitius made no secret that he intended as consul to
propose to the burgesses the immediate recall of Caesar
from Gaul. An aristocratic restoration was at work ; and
with the attack on the colony of Capua the nobility threw
down the gauntlet to the regents.
Conference Caesar, although receiving from day to day detailed
regents at accounts of the events in the capital and, whenever military
Luca. considerations allowed, watching their progress from as
near a point of his southern province as possible, had not
hitherto, visibly at least, interfered in them. But now war
had been declared against him as well as his colleague, in
fact against him especially ; he was compelled to act, and
he acted quickly. He happened to be in the very neigh-
bourhood ; the aristocracy had not even found it advisable
to delay the rupture, till he should have again crossed the
56. Alps. In the beginning of April 698 Crassus left the
chap. VHI POMPEIUS AND CAESAR 125
capital, to concert the necessary measures with his more
powerful colleague ; he found Caesar in Ravenna. Thence
both proceeded to Luca, and there they were joined by
Pompeius, who had departed from Rome soon after Crassus
(1 1 April), ostensibly for the purpose of procuring supplies
of grain from Sardinia and Africa. The most noted ad-
herents of the regents, such as Metellus Nepos the pro-
consul of Hither Spain, Appius Claudius the propraetor
of Sardinia, and many others, followed them ; a hundred
and twenty lictors, and upwards of two hundred senators
were counted at this conference, where already the new
monarchical senate was represented in contradistinction to
the republican. In every respect the decisive voice lay
with Caesar. He used it to re-establish and consolidate
the existing joint rule on a new basis of more equal dis-
tribution of power. The governorships of most importance
in a military point of view, next to that of the two Gauls,
were assigned to his two colleagues — that of the two Spains
to Pompeius, that of Syria to Crassus; and these offices
were to be secured to them by decree of the people for
five years (700-704), and to be suitably provided for in a 5150.
military and financial point of view. On the other hand
Caesar stipulated for the prolongation of his command,
which expired with the year 700, to the close of 705, as 54. 49
well as for the prerogative of increasing his legions to ten
and of charging the pay for the troops arbitrarily levied by
him on the state-chest. Pompeius and Crassus were more-
over promised a second consulship for the next year (699) 55.
before they departed for their governorships, while Caesar
kept it open to himself to administer the supreme magis-
tracy a second time after the termination of his governor-
ship in 706, when the ten years' interval legally requisite 48
between two consulships should have in his case elapsed.
The military support, which Pompeius and Crassus required
for regulating the affairs of the capital all the more that the
126
THE JOINT RULE OF
BOOK V
legions of Caesar originally destined for this purpose could
not now be withdrawn from Transalpine Gaul, was to be
found in new legions, which they were to raise for the
Spanish and Syrian armies and were not to despatch from
Italy to their several destinations until it should seem to
themselves convenient to do so. The main questions were
thus settled ; subordinate matters, such as the settlement
of the tactics to be followed against the opposition in the
capital, the regulation of the candidatures for the ensuing
years, and the like, did not long detain them. The great
master of mediation composed the personal differences
which stood in the way of an agreement with his wonted
ease, and compelled the most refractory elements to act in
concert. An understanding befitting colleagues was re-
established, externally at least, between Pompeius and
Crassus. Even Publius Clodius was induced to keep
himself and his pack quiet, and to give no farther annoy-
ance to Pompeius — not the least marvellous feat of the
mighty magician.
That this whole settlement of the pending questions
proceeded, not from a compromise among independent
mngement. and rival regents meeting on equal terms, but solely from
the good will of Caesar, is evident from the circumstances.
Pompeius appeared at Luca in the painful position of a
powerless refugee, who comes to ask aid from his opponent.
Whether Caesar chose to dismiss him and to declare the
coalition dissolved, or to receive him and to let the league
continue just as it stood — Pompeius was in either view
politically annihilated. If he did not in this case break
with Caesar, he became the powerless client of his con-
federate. If on the other hand he did break with Caesar
and, which was not very probable, effected even now a
coalition with the aristocracy, this alliance between op-
ponents, concluded under pressure of necessity and at the
last moment, was so little formidable that it was hardly for
Designs of
Caesar in
this ar-
chap, viii POMPEIUS AND CAESAR 127
the sake of averting it that Caesar agreed to those conces-
sions. A serious rivalry on the part of Crassus with Caesar
was utterly impossible. It is difficult to say what motives
induced Caesar to surrender without necessity his superior
position, and now voluntarily to concede — what he had
refused to his rival even on the conclusion of the league
of 694, and what the latter had since, with the evident 60«
design of being armed against Caesar, vainly striven in
different ways to attain without, nay against, Caesar's will
— the second consulate and military power. Certainly it
was not Pompeius alone that was placed at the head of an
army, but also his old enemy and Caesar's ally throughout
many years, Crassus ; and undoubtedly Crassus obtained
his respectable military position merely as a counterpoise
to the new power of Pompeius. Nevertheless Caesar was
a great loser, when his rival exchanged his former power-
lessness for an important command. It is possible that
Caesar did not yet feel himself sufficiently master of his
soldiers to lead them with confidence to a warfare against
the formal authorities of the land, and was therefore anxious
not to be forced to civil war now by being recalled from
Gaul ; but whether civil war should come or not, depended
at the moment far more on the aristocracy of the capital
than on Pompeius, and this would have been at most a
reason for Caesar not breaking openly with Pompeius, so
that the opposition might not be emboldened by this
breach, but not a reason for conceding to him what he
did concede. Purely personal motives may have con-
tributed to the result ; it may be that Caesar recollected
how he had once stood in a position of similar powerless-
ness in presence of Pompeius, and had been saved from
destruction only by his — pusillanimous, it is true, rather
than magnanimous — retirement ; it is probable that Caesar
hesitated to break the heart of his beloved daughter who
was sincerely attached to her husband — in his soul there
128 THE JOINT RULE OF book v
was room for much besides the statesman. But the
decisive reason was doubtless the consideration of Gaul.
Caesar — differing from his biographers — regarded the sub-
jugation of Gaul not as an incidental enterprise useful to
him for the gaining of the crown, but as one on which
depended the external security and the internal reorganiza-
tion, in a word the future, of his country. That he might
be enabled to complete this conquest undisturbed and
might not be obliged to take in hand just at once the
extrication of Italian affairs, he unhesitatingly gave up his
superiority over his rivals and granted to Pompeius suffi-
cient power to settle matters with the senate and its
adherents. This was a grave political blunder, if Caesar
had no other object than to become as quickly as possible
king of Rome ; but the ambition of that rare man was not
confined to the vulgar aim of a crown. He had the bold-
ness to prosecute side by side, and to complete, two labours
equally vast — the arranging of the internal affairs of Italy,
and the acquisition and securing of a new and fresh soil
for Italian civilization. These tasks of course interfered
with each other ; his Gallic conquests hindered much more
than helped him on his way to the throne. It was fraught
to him with bitter fruit that, instead of settling the Italian
66. 48. revolution in 698, he postponed it to 706. But as a states-
man as well as a general Caesar was a peculiarly daring
player, who, confiding in himself and despising his op-
ponents, gave them always great and sometimes extravagant
odds.
The It was now therefore the turn of the aristocracy to make
submitraCy £00(* ^e^r k*Sn gaSe> anc* to wa§e war as boldly as they
had boldly declared it But there is no more pitiable
spectacle than when cowardly men have the misfortune to
take a bold resolution. They had simply exercised no
foresight at all. It seemed to have occurred to nobody
that Caesar would possibly stand on his defence, or that
chap, via POMPEIUS AND CAESAR 129
even now Pompeius and Crassus would combine with him
afresh and more closely than ever. This seems incredible ;
but it becomes intelligible, when we glance at the persons
who then led the constitutional opposition in the senate.
Cato was still absent ; l the most influential man in the
senate at this time was Marcus Bibulus, the hero of passive
resistance, the most obstinate and most stupid of all con-
sulars. They had taken up arms only to lay them down,
so soon as the adversary merely put his hand to the sheath ;
the bare news of the conferences in Luca sufficed to suppress
all thought of a serious opposition and to bring the mass
of the timid — that is, the immense majority of the senate —
back to their duty as subjects, which in an unhappy hour
they had abandoned. There was no further talk of the
appointed discussion to try the validity of the Julian laws ;
the legions raised by Caesar on his own behalf were charged
by decree of the senate on the public chest ; the attempts
on occasion of regulating the next consular provinces to
take away both Gauls or one of them by decree from Caesar
were rejected by the majority (end of May 698). Thus M.
the corporation did public penance. In secret the indi-
vidual lords, one after another, thoroughly frightened at
their own temerity, came to make their peace and vow
unconditional obedience — none more quickly than Marcus
Cicero, who repented too late of his perfidy, and in respect
of the most recent period of his life clothed himself with
titles of honour which were altogether more appropriate than
flattering.2 Of course the regents agreed to be pacified;
1 Cato was not yet in Rome when Cicero spoke on nth March 698 in 56
favour of Sestius (Pro Sesi. 28, 60) and when the discussion took place in
the senate in consequence of the resolutions of Luca respecting Caesar's
legions (Plut. Caes. 21) ; it is not till the discussions at the beginning of
699 that we find him once more busy, and, as he travelled in winter (Plut 55.
Cato Min. 38), he thus returned to Rome in the end of 698. He cannot 56.
therefore, as has been mistakenly inferred from Asconius (p. 35, S3)> have
defended Milo in Feb. 698. 56.
J Me aiinum germanum fuisse (Ad Att. iv. 5, 3),
VOL. V X4>
130 THE JOINT RULE OF
BOOK V
they refused nobody pardon, for there was nobody who was
worth the trouble of making him an exception. That we
may see how suddenly the tone in aristocratic circles changed
after the resolutions of Luca became known, it is worth while
to compare the pamphlets given forth by Cicero shortly
before with the palinode which he caused to be issued to
evince publicly his repentance and his good intentions.1
Settlement The regents could thus arrange Italian affairs at their
of the new . °
monarch- pleasure and more thoroughly than before. Italy and the
icalrule. capital obtained practically a garrison although not as-
sembled in arms, and one of the regents as commandant.
Of the troops levied for Syria and Spain by Crassus and
Pompeius, those destined for the east no doubt took their
departure ; but Pompeius caused the two Spanish provinces
to be administered by his lieutenants with the garrison
hitherto stationed there, while he dismissed the officers and
soldiers of the legions which were newly raised — nominally
for despatch to Spain — on furlough, and remained himself
with them in Italy.
Doubtless the tacit resistance of public opinion increased,
the more clearly and generally men perceived that the
regents were working to put an end to the old constitution
and with as much gentleness as possible to accommodate
the existing condition of the government and administration
to the forms of the monarchy ; but they submitted, because
they were obliged to submit. First of all, all the more
important affairs, and particularly aU that related to military
matters and external relations, were disposed of without
1 This palinode is the still extant oration on the Provinces to be assigned
5&. 56. to the consuls of 699. It was delivered in the end of May 698. The
pieces contrasting with it are the orations for Sestius and against Vatinius
and that upon the opinion of the Etruscan soothsayers, dating from the
months of March and April, in which the aristocratic regime is glorified to
the best of his ability and Caesar in particular is treated in a very cavalier
tone. It was but reasonable that Cicero should, as he himself confesses
(Ad Att. iv. s, 1), be ashamed to transmit even to intimate friends that
attestation of his resumed allegiance.
chap, vin POMPEIUS AND CAESAR 131
consulting the senate upon them, sometimes by decree of
the people, sometimes by the mere good pleasure of the
rulers. The arrangements agreed on at Luca respecting
the military command of Gaul were submitted directly to
the burgesses by Crassus and Pompeius, those relating to
Spain and Syria by the tribune of the people Gaius Tre-
bonius, and in other instances the more important governor-
ships were frequently filled up by decree of the people.
That the regents did not need the consent of the authorities
to increase their troops at pleasure, Caesar had already
sufficiently shown : as little did they hesitate mutually to
borrow troops ; Caesar for instance received such col-
legiate support from Pompeius for the Gallic, and Crassus
from Caesar for the Parthian, war. The Transpadanes,
who possessed according to the existing constitution only
Latin rights, were treated by Caesar during his administra-
tion practically as full burgesses of Rome.1 While formerly
1 This is not stated by our authorities. But the view that Caesar levied
no soldiers at all from the Latin communities, that is to say from by far
the greater part of his province, is in itself utterly incredible, and is
directly refuted by the fact that the opposition-party slightingly designates
the force levied by Caesar as ' ' for the most part natives of the Transpadane
colonies" (Caes. B. C. iii. 87); for here the Latin colonies of Strabo
(Ascon. in Pison. p. 3 ; Sueton. Caes. 8) are evidently meant. Yet there
is no trace of Latin cohorts in Caesar's Gallic army ; on the contrary
according to his express statements all the recruits levied by him in Cis-
alpine Gaul were added to the legions or distributed into legions. It is
possible that Caesar combined with the levy the bestowal of the franchise ;
but more probably he adhered in this matter to the standpoint of his
party, which did not so much seek to procure for the Transpadanes the
Roman franchise as rather regarded it as already legally belonging to them
(iv. 457). Only thus could the report spread, that Caesar had introduced
of his own authority the Roman municipal constitution among the Trans-
padane communities (Cic. Ad Att. v. 3, 2 ; Ad Fam. viii. 1, 2). This
hypothesis too explains why Hirtius designates the Transpadane towns as
" colonies of Roman burgesses" (B. G. viii. 24), and why Caesar treated
the colony of Comum founded by him as a burgess-colony (Sueton. Caes.
28 ; Strabo, v. 1, p. 213 ; Plutarch, Caes. 29), while the moderate party
of the aristocracy conceded to it only the same rights as to the other
Transpadane communities, viz. Latin rights, and the ultras even declared
the civic rights conferred on the settlers as altogether null, and conse-
quently did not concede to the Comenses the privileges attached to the
holding of a Latin municipal magistracy (Cic Ad Att. v. 11, 2 ; Appian,
B. C. ii. 26). Comp. Hermes, xvi. 30.
13* THE JOINT RULE OF book V
the organization of newly-acquired territories had been
managed by a senatorial commission, Caesar organized his
extensive Gallic conquests altogether according to his own
judgment, and founded, for instance, without having received
any farther full powers burgess-colonies, particularly Novum-
Comum (Como) with five thousand colonists. Piso con-
ducted the Thracian, Gabinius the Egyptian, Crassus the
Parthian war, without consulting the senate, and without
even reporting, as was usual, to that body ; in like manner
triumphs and other marks of honour were accorded and
carried out, without the senate being asked about them.
Obviously this did not arise from a mere neglect of forms,
which would be the less intelligible, seeing that in the great
majority of cases no opposition from the senate was to be
expected. On the contrary, it was a well-calculated design
to dislodge the senate from the domain of military arrange-
ments and of higher politics, and to restrict its share of
administration to financial questions and internal affairs;
and even opponents plainly discerned this and protested,
so far as they could, against this conduct of the regents by
means of senatorial decrees and criminal actions. While
the regents thus in the main set aside the senate, they still
made some use of the less dangerous popular assemblies —
care was taken that in these the lords of the street should
put no farther difficulty in the way of the lords of the state ;
in many cases however they dispensed even with this empty
shadow, and employed without disguise autocratic forms.
The senate The humbled senate had to submit to its position
monarchy wnetner lt would or not The leader of the compliant
Cicero majority continued to be Marcus Cicero. He was useful
majority. on account or" ms lawyer's talent of finding reasons, or at
any rate words, for everything; and there was a genuine
Caesarian irony in employing the man, by means of whom
mainly the aristocracy had conducted their demonstrations
against the regents, as the mouthpiece of servility. Accord-
chap, vni POMPEIUS AND CAESAR 133
ingly they pardoned him for his brief desire to kick against
the pricks, not however without having previously assured
themselves of his submissiveness in every way. His brother
had been obliged to take the position of an officer in the
Gallic army to answer in some measure as a hostage for
him ; Pompeius had compelled Cicero himself to accept a
lieutenant-generalship under him, which furnished a handle
for politely banishing him at any moment. Clodius had
doubtless been instructed to leave him meanwhile at peace,
but Caesar as little threw off Clodius on account of Cicero
as he threw off Cicero on account of Clodius ; and the
great saviour of his country and the no less great hero of
liberty entered into an antechamber-rivalry in the head-
quarters of Samarobriva, for the befitting illustration of
which there lacked, unfortunately, a Roman Aristophanes.
But not only was the same rod kept in suspense over
Cicero's head, which had once already descended on him so
severely ; golden fetters were also laid upon him. Amidst
the serious embarrassment of his finances the loans of
Caesar free of interest, and the joint overseership of those
buildings which occasioned the circulation of enormous
sums in the capital, were in a high degree welcome to him ;
and many an immortal oration for the senate was nipped
in the bud by the thought of Caesar's agent, who might
present a bill to him after the close of the sitting. Conse-
quently he vowed " in future to ask no more after right and
honour, but to strive for the favour of the regents," and
" to be as flexible as an ear-lap." They used him accord-
ingly as — what he was good for — an advocate; in which
capacity it was on various occasions his lot to be obliged
to defend his very bitterest foes at a higher bidding, and
that especially in the senate, where he almost regularly
served as the organ of the dynasts and submitted the pro-
posals "to which others probably consented, but not he
himself " ; indeed, as recognized leader of the majority of
U4 THE JOINT RULE OF book v
the compliant, he obtained even a certain political import-
ance. They dealt with the other members of the governing
corporation accessible to fear, flattery, or gold in the same
way as they had dealt with Cicero, and succeeded in keeping
it on the whole in subjection.
Ca*° Certainly there remained a section of their opponents,
minority, who at least kept to their colours and were neither to be
terrified nor to be won. The regents had become con-
vinced that exceptional measures, such as those against
Cato and Cicero, did their cause more harm than good,
and that it was a lesser evil to tolerate an inconvenient
republican opposition than to convert their opponents
into martyrs for the republic Therefore they allowed
fi6. Cato to return (end of 698) and thenceforward in the
senate and in the Forum, often at the peril of his life,
to offer a continued opposition to the regents, which
was doubtless worthy of honour, but unhappily was at
the same time ridiculous. They allowed him on occasion
of the proposals of Trebonius to push matters once more
to a hand-to-hand conflict in the Forum, and to submit
to the senate a proposal that the proconsul Caesar should
be given over to the Usipetes and Tencteri on account
of his perfidious conduct toward those barbarians (p. 60).
They were patient when Marcus Favonius, Cato's Sancho,
after the senate had adopted the resolution to charge the
legions of Caesar on the state-chest, sprang to the door
of the senate -house and proclaimed to the streets the
danger of the country ; when the same person in his
scurrilous fashion called the white bandage, which Pom-
peius wore round his weak leg, a displaced diadein ; when
the consular Lentulus Marcellinus, on being applauded,
called out to the assembly to make diligent use of this
privilege of expressing their opinion now while they were
still allowed to do so ; when the tribune of the people
Gaius Ateius Capito consigned Crassus on his departure
chap, viii POMPEIUS AND CAESAR 135
for Syria, with all the formalities of the theology of the
day, publicly to the evil spirits. These were, on the
whole, vain demonstrations of an irritated minority ; yet
the little party from which they issued was so far of
importance, that it on the one hand fostered and gave
the watchword to the republican opposition fermenting
in secret, and on the other hand now and then dragged
the majority of the senate, which withal cherished at
bottom quite the same sentiments with reference to the
regents, into an isolated decree directed against them.
For even the majority felt the need of giving vent, at least
sometimes and in subordinate matters to their suppressed
indignation, and especially — after the manner of those who
are servile with reluctance — of exhibiting their resentment
towards the great foes in rage against the small. Wherever
it was possible, a gentle blow was administered to the
instruments of the regents ; thus Gabinius was refused the
thanksgiving -festival that he asked (698) ; thus Piso was 66.
recalled from his province ; thus mourning was put on
by the senate, when the tribune of the people Gaius Cato
hindered the elections for 699 as long as the consul Mar- 56.
cellinus belonging to the constitutional party was in office.
Even Cicero, however humbly he always bowed before
the regents, issued an equally envenomed and insipid
pamphlet against Caesar's father-in-law. But both these
feeble signs of opposition by the majority of the senate
and the ineffectual resistance of the minority show only
the more clearly, that the government had now passed
from the senate to the regents as it formerly passed from
the burgesses to the senate ; and that the senate was
already not much more than a monarchical council of state
employed also to absorb tha anti- monarchical elements.
" No man," the adherents of the fallen government com-
plained, "is of the slightest account except the three ; the
regents are all-powerful, and they take care that no one
I3«
THE JOINT RULE OF
BOOK V
shall remain in doubt about it ; the whole senate is virtu-
ally transformed and obeys the dictators ; our generation
will not live to see a change of things." They were
living in fact no longer under the republic, but under
monarchy.
Continued But if the guidance of the state was at the absolute dis-
°PP°sltl0n posal of the regents, there remained still a political domain
elections, separated in some measure from the government proper,
which it was more easy to defend and more difficult to con-
quer ; the field of the ordinary elections of magistrates, and
that of the jury-courts. That the latter do not fall directly
under politics, but everywhere, and above all in Rome,
come partly under the control of the spirit dominating
state-affairs, is of itself clear. The elections of magistrates
certainly belonged by right to the government proper of
the state ; but, as at this period the state was administered
substantially by extraordinary magistrates or by men wholly
without title, and even the supreme ordinary magistrates,
if they belonged to the anti -monarchical party, were not
able in any tangible way to influence the state-machinery,
the ordinary magistrates sank more and more into mere
puppets — as, in fact, even those of them who were most
disposed to opposition described themselves frankly and
with entire justice as powerless ciphers — and their elections
therefore sank into mere demonstrations. Thus, after the
opposition had already been wholly dislodged from the
proper field of battle, hostilities might nevertheless be
continued in the field of elections and of processes. The
regents spared no pains to remain victors also in this field.
As to the elections, they had already at Luca settled
between themselves the lists of candidates for the next
years, and they left no means untried to carry the can-
didates agreed upon there. They expended their gold
primarily for the purpose of influencing the elections. A
great number of soldiers were dismissed annually on fur-
chap, vin POMPEIUS AND CAESAR 137
lough from the armies of Caesar and Pompekas to take
part in the voting at Rome. Caesar was wont himself
to guide, and watch over, the election movements from
as near a point as possible of Upper Italy. Yet the
object was but very imperfectly attained. For 699 no 55.
doubt Pompeius and Crassus were elected consuls, agree-
ably to the convention of Luca, and Lucius Domitius,
the only candidate of the opposition who persevered, was
set aside ; but this had been effected only by open
violence, on which occasion Cato was wounded and other
extremely scandalous incidents occurred. In the next
consular elections for 700, in spite of all the exertions 54.
of the regents, Domitius was actually elected, and Cato
likewise now prevailed in the candidature for the praetor-
ship, in which to the scandal of the whole burgesses
Caesar's client Vatinius had during the previous year
beaten him off the field. At the elections for 701 the 5t.
opposition succeeded in so indisputably convicting the
candidates of the regents, along with others, of the most
shameful electioneering intrigues that the regents, on
whom the scandal recoiled, could not do otherwise than
abandon them. These repeated and severe defeats of
the dynasts on the battle-field of the elections may be
traceable in part to the unmanageableness of the rusty
machinery, to the incalculable accidents of the polling,
to the opposition at heart of the middle classes, to the
various private considerations that interfere in such cases
and often strangely clash with those of party; but the main
cause lies elsewhere. The elections were at this time essen-
tially in the power of the different clubs into which the
aristocracy had grouped themselves ; the system of briber/
was organized by them on the most extensive scale and
with the utmost method. The same aristocracy therefore,
which was represented in the senate, ruled also the
elections ; but while in the senate it yielded with a
courts.
138 THE JOINT RULE OF book v
grudge, it worked and voted here — in secret and secure
from all reckoning — absolutely against the regents. That
the influence of the nobility in this field was by no means
broken by the strict penal law against the electioneering
65. intrigues of the clubs, which Crassus when consul in 699
caused to be confirmed by the burgesses, is self-evident,
and is shown by the elections of the succeeding years.
*nd in the The jury-courts occasioned equally great difficulty to
the regents. As they were then composed, while the
senatorial nobility was here also influential, the decisive
voice lay chiefly with the middle class. The fixing of a
high -rated census for jurymen by a law proposed by
55. Pompeius in 699 is a remarkable proof that the opposition
to the regents had its chief seat in the middle class
properly so called, and that the great capitalists showed
themselves here, as everywhere, more compliant than the
latter. Nevertheless the republican party was not yet
deprived of all hold in the courts, and it was never weary
of directing political impeachments, not indeed against
the regents themselves, but against their prominent instru-
ments. This warfare of prosecutions was waged the more
keenly, that according to usage the duty of accusation
belonged to the senatorial youth, and, as may readily be
conceived, there was more of republican passion, fresh
talent, and bold delight in attack to be found among these
youths than among the older members of their order.
Certainly the courts were not free ; if the regents were in
earnest, the courts ventured as little as the senate to refuse
obedience. None of their antagonists were prosecuted by
the opposition with such hatred — so furious that it almost
passed into a proverb— -as Vatinius, by far the most
audacious and unscrupulous of the closer adherents of
Caesar; but his master gave the command, and he was
acquitted in all the processes raised against him. But
impeachments by men who knew how to wield the sword
chap, vin POMPEIUS AND CAESAR 139
of dialectics and the lash of sarcasm as did Gaius Licinius
Calvus and Gaius Asinius Pollio, did not miss their mark
even when they failed ; nor were isolated successes wanting.
They were mostly, no doubt, obtained over subordinate
individuals, but even one of the most high -placed and
most hated adherents of the dynasts, the consular Gabinius,
was overthrown in this way. Certainly in his case the
implacable hatred of the aristocracy, which as little forgave
him for the law regarding the conducting of the war with
the pirates as for his disparaging treatment of the senate
during his Syrian governorship, was combined with the
rage of the great capitalists, against whom he had when
governor of Syria ventured to defend the interests of the
provincials, and even with the resentment of Crassus, with
whom he had stood on ceremony in handing over to him
the province. His only protection against all these foes
was Pompeius, and the latter had every reason to defend
his ablest, boldest, and most faithful adjutant at any price ;
but here, as everywhere, he knew not how to use his power
and to defend his clients, as Caesar defended his ; in the
end of 700 the jurymen found Gabinius guilty of extortions 54.
and sent him into banishment.
On the whole, therefore, in the sphere of the popular
elections and of the jury-courts it was the regents that fared
worst. The factors which ruled in these were less tangible,
and therefore more difficult to be terrified or corrupted
than the direct organs of government and administration.
The holders of power encountered here, especially in the
popular elections, the tough energy of a close oligarchy —
grouped in coteries — which is by no means finally disposed
of when its rule is overthrown, and which is the more
difficult to vanquish the more covert its action. They
encountered here too, especially in the jury- courts, the
repugnance of the middle classes towards the new mon-
archical rule, which with all the perplexities springing out
140
THE JOINT RULE OF
IO0K V
Literature
of the
opposition.
of it they were as little able to remove. They suffered in
both quarters a series of defeats. The election-victories of
the opposition had, it is true, merely the value of demon-
strations, since the regents possessed and employed the
means of practically annulling any magistrate whom they
disliked ; but the criminal trials in which the opposition
carried condemnations deprived them, in a way keenly
felt, of useful auxiliaries. As things stood, the regents
could neither set aside nor adequately control the popular
elections and the jury-courts, and the opposition, however
much it felt itself straitened even here, maintained to a
certain extent the field of battle.
It proved, however, yet a more difficult task to en-
counter the opposition in a field, to which it turned with
the greater zeal the more it was dislodged from direct
political action. This was literature. Even the judicial
opposition was at the same time a literary one, and indeed
pre-eminently so, for the orations were regularly published
and served as political pamphlets. The arrows of poetry
hit their mark still more rapidly and sharply. The lively
youth of the high aristocracy, and still more energetically
perhaps the cultivated middle class in the Italian country
towns, waged the war of pamphlets and epigrams with zeal
and success. There fought side by side on this field the
82-48. genteel senator's son Gaius Licinius Calvus (672 — 706)
who was as much feared in the character of an orator and
pamphleteer as of a versatile poet, and the municipals of
102-63. Cremona and Verona Marcus Furius Bibaculus (652-691)
87-54. and Quintus Valerius Catullus (667-^. 700) whose elegant
and pungent epigrams flew swiftly like arrows through Italy
and were sure to hit their mark. An oppositional tone
prevails throughout the literature of these years. It is full
of indignant sarcasm against the "great Caesar." "the
unique general," against the affectionate father-in-law and
son-in-law, who ruin the whole globe in order to give their
chap, vhi POMPEIUS AND CAESAR 141
dissolute favourites opportunity to parade the spoils of the
long-haired Celts through the streets of Rome, to furnish
royal banquets with the booty of the farthest isles of the
west, and as rivals showering gold to supplant honest youths
at home in the favour of their mistresses. There is in the
poems of Catullus1 and the other fragments of the literature
of this period something of that fervour of personal and
political hatred, of that republican agony overflowing in
riotous humour or in stern despair, which are more
prominently and powerfully apparent in Aristophanes and
Demosthenes.
The most sagacious of the three rulers at least saw well
that it was as impossible to despise this opposition as to
suppress it by word of command. So far as he could,
Caesar tried rather personally to gain over the more notable
authors. Cicero himself had to thank his literary reputa-
tion in good part for the respectful treatment which he
especially experienced from Caesar; but the governor of
Gaul did not disdain to conclude a special peace even with
Catullus himself through the intervention of his father who
had become personally known to him in Verona; and the
young poet, who had just heaped upon the powerful general
the bitterest and most personal sarcasms, was treated by
him with the most flattering distinction. In fact Caesar
was gifted enough to follow his literary opponents on their
own domain and to publish — as an indirect way of repelling
manifold attacks — a detailed report on the Gallic wars,
1 The collection handed down to us is full of references to the events
of 699 and 700 and was doubtless published in the latter year ; the most 55. 54,
recent event, which it mentions, is the prosecution of Vatinius (Aug. 700). 54.
The statement of Hieronymus that Catullus died in 697-698 requires 57-66.
therefore to be altered only by a few years. From the circumstance that
Vatinius "swears falsely by his consulship," it has been erroneously in-
ferred that the collection did not appear till after the consulate of Vatinius
(707) ; it only follows from it that Vatinius, when the collection appeared, 47.
might already reckon on becoming consul in a definite year, for which he
had every reason as early as 700 ; for his name certainly stood on the list 54.
of candidates agreed on at Luca (Cicero, Ad, Att. iv. 8 b. 2).
142 THE JOINT RULE OF book v
which set forth before the public, with happily assumed
naivete^ the necessity and constitutional propriety of his
military operations. But it is freedom alone that is abso-
lutely and exclusively poetical and creative ; it and it alone
is able even in its most wretched caricature, even with its
latest breath, to inspire fresh enthusiasm. All the sound
elements of literature were and remained anti-monarchical ;
and, if Caesar himself could venture on this domain with-
out proving a failure, the reason was merely that even now
he still cherished at heart the magnificent dream of a free
commonwealth, although he was unable to transfer it either
to his adversaries or to his adherents. Practical politics
was not more absolutely controlled by the regents than
literature by the republicans.1
1 The well-known poem of Catullus (numbered as xxix.) was written
55. 54. in 699 or 700 after Caesar's Britannic expedition and before the death of
Julia :
Quis hoc potest videre, quis potest pati,
Nisi impudicus et vorax et aleo,
Mamurram habere quod comata Gallia
Habebat ante et ultima Britannia ? etc.
Mamurra of Formiae, Caesar's favourite and for a time during the
Gallic wars an officer in his army, had, presumably a short time before
the composition of this poem, returned to the capital and was in all like-
lihood then occupied with the building of his much - talked- of marble
palace furnished with lavish magnificence on the Caelian hill. The
Iberian booty mentioned in the poem must have reference to Caesar's
governorship of Further Spain, and Mamurra must even then, as certainly
afterwards in Gaul, have been found at Caesar's headquarters ; the
Pontic booty presumably has reference to the war of Pompeius against
Mithradates, especially as according to the hint of the poet it was not
merely Caesar that enriched Mamurra.
More innocent than this virulent invective, '^hich was bitterly felt by
Caesar (Suet. Caes. 73), is another nearly contemporary poem of the
same author (xi. ) to which we may here refer, because with its pathetic
introduction to an anything but pathetic commission it very cleverly quizzes
the general staff of the new regents — the Gabiniuses, Antoniuses, and
such like, suddenly advanced from the lowest haunts to headquarters.
Let it be remembered that it was written at a time when Caesar was
fighting on the Rhine and on the Thames, and when the expeditions of
Crassus to Parthia and of Gabinius to Egypt were in preparation. The
poet, as if he too expected one of the vacant posts from one of the regents,
gives to two of his clients their last instructions before departure :
Furi et Aureli, comites Cat u Hi, etc.
chap, vm POMPEIUS AND CAESAR 143
It became necessary to take serious steps against this New ex-
opposition, which was powerless indeed, but was always be- measures
coming more troublesome and audacious. The condemna- resolved
tion of Gabinius, apparently, turned the scale (end of 700). ^
The regents agreed to introduce a dictatorship, though only
a temporary one, and by means of this to carry new coercive
measures especially respecting the elections and the jury-
courts. Pompeius, as the regent on whom primarily devolved
the government of Rome and Italy, was charged with the
execution of this resolve; which accordingly bore the
impress of the awkwardness in resolution and action that
characterized him, and of his singular incapacity of speak-
ing out frankly, even where he would and could command.
Already at the close of 700 the demand for a dictatorship 54.
was brought forward in the senate in the form of hints,
and that not by Pompeius himself. There served as its
ostensible ground the continuance of the system of clubs
and bands in the capital, which by acts of bribery and
violence certainly exercised the most pernicious pressure
on the elections as well as on the jury-courts and kept it
in a perpetual state of disturbance ; we must allow that
this rendered it easy for the regents to justify their ex-
ceptional measures. But, as may well be conceived, even
the servile majority shrank from granting what the future
dictator himself seemed to shrink from openly asking.
When the unparalleled agitation regarding the elections
for the consulship of 701 led to the most scandalous scenes, 53.
so that the elections were postponed a full year beyond
the fixed time and only took place after a seven months'
interregnum in July 701, Pompeius found in this state 53.
of things the desired occasion for indicating now distinctly
to the senate that the dictatorship was the only means
of cutting, if not of loosing the knot; but the decisive
word of command was not even yet spoken. Perhaps it
would have still remained for long unuttered, had not
144 THE JOINT RULE OF book v
the most audacious partisan of the republican opposition
Titus Annius Milo stepped into the field at the consular
62. elections for 702 as a candidate in opposition to the
candidates of the regents, Quintus Metellus Scipio and
Publius Plautius Hypsaeus, both men closely connected
with Pompeius personally and thoroughly devoted to him.
Milo. Milo, endowed with physical courage, with a certain
talent for intrigue and for contracting debt, and above all
with an ample amount of native assurance which had been
carefully cultivated, had made himself a name among the
political adventurers of the time, and was the greatest
bully in his trade next to Clodius, and naturally therefore
through rivalry at the most deadly feud with the latter.
As this Achilles of the streets had been acquired by the
regents and with their permission was again playing the
ultra-democrat, the Hector of the streets became as a
matter of course an aristocrat ! and the republican opposi-
tion, which now would have concluded an alliance with
Catilina in person, had he presented himself to them,
readily acknowledged Milo as their legitimate champion
in all riots. In fact the few successes, which they carried
off in this field of battle, were the work of Milo and of
his well -trained band of gladiators. So Cato and his
friends in return supported the candidature of Milo for
the consulship ; even Cicero could not avoid recommend-
ing one who had been his enemy's enemy and his own
protector during many years ; and as Milo himself spared
neither money nor violence to carry his election, it seemed
secured. For the regents it would have been not only
a new and keenly-felt defeat, but also a real danger ; for
it was to be foreseen that the bold partisan would not
allow himself as consul to be reduced to insignificance so
easily as Domitius and other men of the respectable
Killing of opposition. It happened that Achilles and Hector
Clodius. accidentally encountered each other not far from the
chap, vill POMPEIUS AND CAESAR 145
capital on the Appian Way, and a fray arose between
their respective bands, in which Clodius himself received
a sword-cut on the shoulder and was compelled to take
refuge in a neighbouring house. This had occurred with-
out orders from Milo ; but, as the matter had gone so
far and as the storm had now to be encountered at any
rate, the whole crime seemed to Milo more desirable and
even less dangerous than the half; he ordered his men
to drag Clodius forth from his lurking place and to put
him to death (13 Jan. 702). 52.
The street leaders of the regents' party — the tribunes Anarchy ia
of the people Titus Munatius Plancus, Quintus Pompeius Rome*
Rufus, and Gaius Sallustius Crispus — saw in this occurrence
a fitting opportunity to thwart in the interest of their
masters the candidature of Milo and carry the dictator-
ship of Pompeius. The dregs of the populace, especially
the freedmen and slaves, had lost in Clodius their patron
and future deliverer (p. in); the requisite excitement
was thus easily aroused. After the bloody corpse had
been exposed for show at the orators' platform in the
Forum and the speeches appropriate to the occasion had
been made, the riot broke forth. The seat of the perfidious
aristocracy was destined as a funeral pile for the great
liberator ; the mob carried the body to the senate-house,
and set the building on fire. Thereafter the multitude
proceeded to the front of Milo's house and kept it under
siege, till his band drove off the assailants by discharges
of arrows. They passed on to the house of Pompeius and
of his consular candidates, of whom the former was saluted
as dictator and the latter as consuls, and thence to the
house of the interrex Marcus Lepidus, on whom devolved
the conduct of the consular elections. When the latter, as
in duty bound, refused to make arrangements for the elections
immediately, as the clamorous multitude demanded, he
was kept during five days under siege in his dwelling house.
VOL. V 143
146 THE JOINT RULE OF book v
d ctator- But the instigators of these scandalous scenes had over-
Pompdus. acted their Part Certainly their lord and master was
resolved to employ this favourable episode in order not
merely to set aside Milo, but also to seize the dictatorship ;
he wished, however, to receive it not from a mob of
bludgeon-men, but from the senate. Pompeius brought
up troops to put down the anarchy which prevailed in the
capital, and which had in reality become intolerable to
everybody; at the same time he now enjoined what he
had hitherto requested, and the senate complied. It was
merely an empty subterfuge, that on the proposal of Cato
and Bibulus the proconsul Pompeius, retaining his former
offices, was nominated as "consul without colleague"
instead of dictator (on the 25 th of the intercalary month1
62. 702) — a subterfuge, which admitted an appellation labour-
ing under a double incongruity 2 for the mere purpose of
avoiding one which expressed the simple fact, and which
vividly reminds us of the sagacious resolution of the waning
patriciate to concede to the plebeians not the consulship,
but only the consular power (i. 372).
Changes Thus in legal possession of full power, Pompeius set
rangenSnt to work and proceeded with energy against the republican
of magis- party which was powerful in the clubs and the jury-courts.
tTctcics 3.nd . . .
the jury- Tne existing enactments as to elections were repeated
system. and enforced by a special law; and by another against
electioneering intrigues, which obtained retrospective force
70. for all offences of this sort committed since 684, the
penalties hitherto imposed were augmented. Still more
important was the enactment, that the governorships, which
were by far the more important and especially by far the
more lucrative half of official life, should be conferred on
the consuls and praetors not immediately on their retire-
1 In this year the January with 29 and the February with 23 days
were followed by the intercalary month with 28, and then by March.
2 Consul signifies "colleague" (i. 318), and a consul who is at the
same time proconsul is at once an actual consul and a consul's substitute.
chap, viii POMPEIUS AND CAESAR 147
ment from the consulate or praetorship, but only after the
expiry of other five years ; an arrangement which of course
could only come into effect after four years, and therefore
made the filling up of the governorships for the next few
years substantially dependent on decrees of senate which
were to be issued for the regulation of this interval, and
thus practically on the person or section ruling the senate
at the moment. The jury - commissions were left in
existence, but limits were put to the right of counter-plea,
and — what was perhaps still more important — the liberty
of speech in the courts was done away ; for both the
number of the advocates and the time of speaking appor-
tioned to each were restricted by fixing a maximum, and
the bad habit which had prevailed of adducing, in addition
to the witnesses as to facts, witnesses to character or lauda-
tores, as they were called, in favour of the accused was
prohibited. The obsequious senate further decreed on the
suggestion of Pompeius that the country had been placed
in peril by the quarrel on the Appian Way; accordingly
a special commission was appointed by an exceptional
law for all crimes connected with it, the members of
which were directly nominated by Pompeius. An attempt
was also made to give once more a serious importance to
the office of the censors, and by that agency to purge the
deeply disordered burgess-body of the worst rabble.
All these measures were adopted under the pressure of
the sword. In consequence of the declaration of the senate
that the country was in danger, Pompeius called the men
capable of service throughout Italy to arms and made them
swear allegiance for all contingencies; an adequate and
trustworthy corps was temporarily stationed at the Capitol ;
at every stirring of opposition Pompeius threatened armed
intervention, and during the proceedings at the trial re-
specting the murder of Clodius stationed, contrary to all
precedent, a guard over the place of trial itself.
148
THE JOINT RULE OF
BOOK V
Humilia-
tion of
the re-
publicans.
52.
51.
The scheme for the revival of the censorship failed,
because among the servile majority of the senate no one
possessed sufficient moral courage and authority even to
become a candidate for such an office. On the other hand
Milo was condemned by the jurymen (8 April 702) and
Cato's candidature for the consulship of 703 was frustrated.
The opposition of speeches and pamphlets received through
the new judicial ordinance a blow from which it never re-
covered ; the dreaded forensic eloquence was thereby driven
from the field of politics, and thenceforth felt the restraints
of monarchy. Opposition of course had not disappeared
either from the minds of the great majority of the nation
or even wholly from public life — to effect that end the
popular elections, the jury-courts, and literature must have
been not merely restricted, but annihilated. Indeed, in
these very transactions themselves, Pompeius by his un-
skilfulness and perversity helped the republicans to gain
even under his dictatorship several triumphs which he
severely felt. The special measures, which the rulers took
to strengthen their power, were of course officially charac-
terized as enactments made in the interest of public tran-
quillity and order, and every burgess, who did not desire
anarchy, was described as substantially concurring in them.
But Pompeius pushed this transparent fiction so far, that
instead of putting safe instruments into the special com-
mission for the investigation of the last tumult, he chose the
most respectable men of all parties, including even Cato,
and applied his influence over the court essentially to
maintain order, and to render it impossible for his adherents
as well as for his opponents to indulge in the scenes of
disturbance customary in the courts of this period. This
neutrality of the regent was discernible in the judgments of
the special court. The jurymen did not venture to acquit
Milo himself; but most of the subordinate persons accused
belonging to the party of the republican opposition were
chap, viil POMPEIUS AND CAESAR 149
acquitted, while condemnation inexorably befell those who
in the last riot had taken part for Clodius, or in other words
for the regents, including not a few of Caesar's and of
Pompeius' own most intimate friends — even Hypsaeus his
candidate for the consulship, and the tribunes of the people
Plancus and Rufus, who had directed the tmeute in his
interest. That Pompeius did not prevent their condemna-
tion for the sake of appearing impartial, was one specimen
of his folly ; and a second was, that he withal in matters
quite indifferent violated his own laws to favour his friends
— appearing for example as a witness to character in the
trial of Plancus, and in fact protecting from condemnation
several accused persons specially connected with him, such
as Metellus Scipio. As usual, he wished here also to
accomplish opposite things; in attempting to satisfy the
duties at once of the impartial regent and of the party-chief,
he fulfilled neither the one nor the other, and was regarded
by public opinion with justice as a despotic regent, and by
his adherents with equal justice as a leader who either
could not or would not protect his followers.
But, although the republicans were still stirring and were
even refreshed by an isolated success here and there, chiefly
through the blunders of Pompeius, the object which the
regents had proposed to themselves in that dictatorship was
on the whole attained, the reins were drawn tighter, the
republican party was humbled, and the new monarchy was
strengthened. The public began to reconcile themselves
to the latter. When Pompeius not long after recovered
from a serious illness, his restoration was celebrated through-
out Italy with the accompanying demonstrations of joy
which are usual on such occasions in monarchies. The
regents showed themselves satisfied ; as early as the 1st of
August 702 Pompeius resigned his dictatorship, and shared 62
the consulship with his client Metellus Scipio.
150 DEATH OF CRASSUS book y
CHAPTER IX
DEATH OF CRASSUS — RUPTURE BETWEEN THE JOINT
RULERS
Crassus Marcus Crassus had for years been reckoned among the
goes to heads of the " three-headed monster," without any proper
title to be so included. He served as a makeweight to
trim the balance between the real regents Pompeius and
Caesar, or, to speak more accurately, his weight fell into
the scale of Caesar against Pompeius. This part is not a
too reputable one ; but Crassus was never hindered by any
keen sense of honour from pursuing his own advantage.
He was a merchant and was open to be dealt with. What
was offered to him was not much ; but, when more was not
to be got. he accepted it, and sought to forget the ambition
that fretted him, and his chagrin at occupying a position so
near to power and yet so powerless, amidst his always
accumulating piles of gold. But the conference at Luca
changed the state of matters also for him ; with the view
of still retaining the preponderance as compared with
Pompeius after concessions so extensive, Caesar gave to his
old confederate Crassus an opportunity of attaining in Syria
through the Parthian war the same position to which Caesar
had attained by the Celtic war in Gaul. It was difficult to
say whether these new prospects proved more attractive to
the ardent thirst for gold which had now become at the age
of sixty a second nature and grew only the more intense
chap, ix RUPTURE BETWEEN THE JOINT RULERS 151
with every newly-won million, or to the ambition which had
been long repressed with difficulty in the old man's breast
and now glowed in it with restless fire. He arrived in
Syria as early as the beginning of 700 ; he had not even 64.
waited for the expiry of his consulship to depart. Full of
impatient ardour he seemed desirous to redeem every
minute with the view of making up for what he had lost, of
gathering in the treasures of the east in addition to those
of the west, of achieving the power and glory of a general
as rapidly as Caesar, and with as little trouble as Pompeius.
He found the Parthian war already commenced. The Expedition
faithless conduct of Pompeius towards the Parthians has ^P1"?1 the
c Parthians
been already mentioned (iv. 434); he had not respected resolved
the stipulated frontier of the Euphrates and had wrested on"
several provinces from the Parthian empire for the benefit
of Armenia, which was now a client state of Rome. King
Phraates had submitted to this treatment ; but after he
had been murdered by his two sons Mithradates and
Orodes, the new king Mithradates immediately declared
war on the king of Armenia, Artavasdes, son of the recently
deceased Tigranes (about 698).1 This was at the same 66.
time a declaration of war against Rome ; as soon therefore
as the revolt of the Jews was suppressed, Gabinius, the
able and spirited governor of Syria, led the legions over
the Euphrates. Meanwhile, however, a revolution had
occurred in the Parthian empire ; the grandees of the
kingdom, with the young, bold, and talented grand vizier
at their head, had overthrown king Mithradates and placed
his brother Orodes on the throne. Mithradates therefore
made common cause with the Romans and resorted to the
camp of Gabinius. Everything promised the best results
to the enterprise of the Roman governor, when he un-
1 Tigranes was still living in February 698 (Cic. pro Sest. 27, 59) ; on 56.
the other hand Artavasdes was already reigning before 700 (Justin, xlii. 54.
2, 4 ; Plut Crass. 49).
152 DEATH OF CRASSUS book v
expectedly received orders to conduct the king of Egypt
back by force of arms to Alexandria (iv. 451). He was
obliged to obey ; but, in the expectation of soon coming
back, he induced the dethroned Parthian prince who
solicited aid from him to commence the war in the mean-
while at his own hand. Mithradates did so ; and Seleucia
and Babylon declared for him ; but the vizier captured
Seleucia by assault, having been in person the first to
mount the battlements, and in Babylon Mithradates him-
self was forced by famine to surrender, whereupon he was
by his brother's orders put to death. His death was a
palpable loss to the Romans ; but it by no means put an
end to the ferment in the Parthian empire, and the
Armenian war continued. Gabinius, after ending the
Egyptian campaign, was just on the eve of turning to
account the still favourable opportunity and resuming
the interrupted Parthian war, when Crassus arrived in
Syria and along with the command took up also the plans
of his predecessor. Full of high-flown hopes he estimated
the difficulties of the march as slight, and the power of
resistance in the armies of the enemy as yet slighter ; he
not only spoke confidently of the subjugation of the
Parthians, but was already in imagination the conqueror
of the kingdoms of Bactria and India.
Plan of the The new Alexander, however, was in no haste. Before
campaign. ^g carried into effect these great plans, he found leisure
for very tedious and very lucrative collateral transactions.
The temples of Derceto at Hierapolis Bambyce and of
Jehovah at Jerusalem and other rich shrines of the Syrian
province, were by order of Crassus despoiled of their
treasures ; and contingents or, still better, sums of money
instead were levied from all the subjects. The military
operations of the first summer were limited to an extensive
reconnaissance in Mesopotamia ; the Euphrates was
crossed, the Parthian satrap was defeated at Ichnae (on
chap, ix RUPTURE BETWEEN THE JOINT RULERS 153
the Belik to the north of Rakkah), and the neighbouring
towns, including the considerable one of Nicephorium
(Rakkah), were occupied, after which the Romans having
left garrisons behind in them returned to Syria. They had
hitherto been in doubt whether it was more advisable to
march to Parthia by the circuitous route of Armenia or by
the direct route through the Mesopotamian desert. The
first route, leading through mountainous regions under the
control of trustworthy allies, commended itself by its
greater safety ; king Artavasdes came in person to the
Roman headquarters to advocate this plan of the cam-
paign. But that reconnaissance decided in favour of the
march through Mesopotamia. The numerous and flourish-
ing Greek and half-Greek towns in the regions along the
Euphrates and Tigris, above all the great city of Seleucia,
were altogether averse to the Parthian rule ; all the Greek
townships with which the Romans came into contact had
now, like the citizens of Carrhae at an earlier time (iv.
429), practically shown how ready they were to shake oft*
the intolerable foreign yoke and to receive the Romans
as deliverers, almost as countrymen. The Arab prince
Abgarus, who commanded the desert of Edessa and
Carrhae and thereby the usual route from the Euphrates
to the Tigris, had arrived in the camp of the Romans to
assure them in person of his devotedness. The Parthians
had appeared to be wholly unprepared.
Accordingly (701) the Euphrates was crossed (near 63.
Biradjik). To reach the Tigris from this point they had Euphrates
the choice of two routes ; either the army might move crossed,
downward along the Euphrates to the latitude of Seleucia
where the Euphrates and Tigris are only a few miles dis-
tant from each other ; or they might immediately after
crossing take the shortest line to the Tigris right across
the great Mesopotamian desert. The former route led
directly to the Parthian capital Ctesiphon, which lay
154 DEATH OF CRASSUS book v
opposite Seleucia on the other bank of the Tigris ; several
weighty voices were raised in favour of this route in the
Roman council of war; in particular the quaestor Gaius
Cassius pointed to the difficulties of the march in the
desert, and to the suspicious reports arriving from the
Roman garrisons on the left bank of the Euphrates as to
the Parthian warlike preparations. But in opposition to
this the Arab prince Abgarus announced that the Parthians
were employed in evacuating their western provinces.
They had already packed up their treasures and put
themselves in motion to flee to the Hyrcanians and
Scythians; only through a forced march by the shortest
route was it at all possible still to reach them; but by
such a march the Romans would probably succeed in
overtaking and cutting up at least the rear-guard of the
great army under Sillaces and the vizier, and obtaining
enormous spoil. These reports of the friendly Bedouins
decided the direction of the march ; the Roman army,
consisting of seven legions, 4000 cavalry, and 4000 slingers
and archers, turned off from the Euphrates and away into
the inhospitable plains of northern Mesopotamia.
The march Far and wide not an enemy showed himself; only
hunger and thirst, and the endless sandy desert, seemed
to keep watch at the gates of the east. At length, after
many days of toilsome marching, not far from the first
river which the Roman army had to cross, the Balissus
(Belik), the first horsemen of the enemy were descried.
Abgarus with his Arabs was sent out to reconnoitre ; the
Parthian squadrons retired up to and over the river and
vanished in the distance, pursued by Abgarus and his
followers. With impatience the Romans waited for his
return and for more exact information. The general
hoped here at length to come upon the constantly re-
treating foe; his young and brave son Publius, who had
fought with the greatest distinction in Gaul under Caesar
in the
desert
chap, ix RUPTURE BETWEEN THE JOINT RULERS 155
(p. 39, 55), and had been sent by the latter at the head
of a Celtic squadron of horse to take part in the Parthian
war, was inflamed with a vehement desire for the fight
When no tidings came, they resolved to advance at a
venture ; the signal for starting was given, the Balissus was
crossed, the army after a brief insufficient rest at noon was
led on without delay at a rapid pace. Then suddenly the
kettledrums of the Parthians sounded all around ; on every
side their silken gold - embroidered banners were seen
waving, and their iron helmets and coats of mail glittering
in the blaze of the hot noonday sun ; and by the side of
the vizier stood prince Abgarus with his Bedouins.
The Romans saw too late the net into which they had Roman
allowed themselves to be ensnared. With sure glance the p1"^-
vizier had thoroughly seen both the danger and the means systems of
of meeting it Nothing could be accomplished against the warfare*
Roman infantry of the line with Oriental infantry ; so he
had rid himself of it, and by sending a mass, which was
useless in the main field of battle, under the personal
leadership of king Orodes to Armenia, he had prevented
king Artavasdes from allowing the promised 10,000 heavy
cavalry to join the army of Crassus, who now painfully felt
the want of them. On the other hand the vizier met the
Roman tactics, unsurpassed of their kind, with a system
entirely different. His army consisted exclusively of
cavalry ; the line was formed of the heavy horsemen
armed with long thrusting-lances, and protected, man and
horse, by a coat of mail of metallic plates or. a' leathern
doublet and by similar greaves ; the mass of the troops
consisted of mounted archers. As compared with these,
the Romans were thoroughly inferior in the corresponding
arms both as to number and excellence. Their infantry of
the line, excellent as they were in close combat, whether at
a short distance with the heavy javelin or in hand-to-hand
combat with the sword, could not compel an army consist-
156 DEATH OF CRASSUS book v
ing merely of cavalry to come to an engagement with them ;
and they found, even when they did come to a hand-to-
hand conflict, an equal if not superior adversary in the
iron-clad hosts of lancers. As compared with an army like
this Parthian one, the Roman army was at a disadvantage
strategically, because the cavalry commanded the communi-
cations ; and at a disadvantage tactically, because every
weapon of close combat must succumb to that which is
wielded from a distance, unless the struggle becomes an
individual one, man against man. The concentrated posi-
tion, on which the whole Roman method of war was based,
increased the danger in presence of such an attack ; the
closer the ranks of the Roman column, the more irresistible
certainly was its onset, but the less also could the missiles
fail to hit their mark. Under ordinary circumstances,
where towns have to be defended and difficulties of the
ground have to be considered, such tactics operating merely
with cavalry against infantry could never be completely
carried out; but in the Mesopotamian desert, where the
army, almost like a ship on the high seas, neither en-
countered an obstacle nor met with a basis for strategic
dispositions during many days' march, this mode of war-
fare was irresistible for the very reason that circumstances
allowed it to be developed there in all its purity and there-
fore in all its power. There everything combined to put
the foreign infantry at a disadvantage against the native
cavalry. Where the heavy - laden Roman foot - soldier
dragged himself toilsomely through the sand or the steppe,
and perished from hunger or still more from thirst amid the
pathless route marked only by water-springs that were far
apart and difficult to find, the Parthian horseman, accus-
tomed from childhood to sit on his fleet steed or camel,
nay almost to spend his life in the saddle, easily traversed
the desert whose hardships he had long learned how to
lighten or in case of need to endure. There no rain fell
CHAr. ix RUPTURE BETWEEN THE JOINT RULERS 157
to mitigate the intolerable heat, and to slacken the bow-
strings and leathern thongs of the enemy's archers and
slingers ; there amidst the deep sand at many places
ordinary ditches and ramparts could hardly be formed for
the camp. Imagination can scarcely conceive a situation
in which all the military advantages were more on the one
side, and all the disadvantages more thoroughly on the
other.
To the question, under what circumstances this new
style of tactics, the first national system that on its own
proper ground showed itself superior to the Roman, arose
among the Parthians, we unfortunately can only reply by
conjectures. The lancers and mounted archers were of
great antiquity in the east, and already formed the flower
of the armies of Cyrus and Darius ; but hitherto these
arms had been employed only as secondary, and essentially
to cover the thoroughly useless Oriental infantry. The
Parthian armies also by no means differed in this respect
from the other Oriental ones ; armies are mentioned, five-
sixths of which consisted of infantry. In the campaign of
Crassus, on the other hand, the cavalry for the first time
came forward independently, and this arm obtained quite
a new application and quite a different value. The
irresistible superiority of the Roman infantry in close
combat seems to have led the adversaries of Rome in very
different parts of the world independently of each other —
at the same time and with similar success — to meet it with
cavalry and distant weapons. What was completely
successful with Cassivellaunus in Britain (p. 64 /.) and
partially successful with Vercingetorix in Gaul (p. T5f.) —
what was to a certain degree attempted even by Mithradates
Eupator (iv. 344) — the vizier of Orodes carried out only on
a larger scale and more completely. And in doing so he
had special advantages : for he found in the heavy cavalry
the means of forming a line ; the bow which was national
158 DEATH OF CRASSUS book v
in the east and was handled with masterly skill in the
Persian provinces gave him an effective weapon for distant
combat ; and lastly the peculiarities of the country and the
people enabled him freely to realize his brilliant idea.
Here, where the Roman weapons of close combat and the
Roman system of concentration yielded for the first time
before the weapons of more distant warfare and the system
of deploying, was initiated that military revolution which
only reached its completion with the introduction of
firearms.
Battle near Under such circumstances the first battle between the
Romans and Parthians was fought amidst the sandy desert
thirty miles to the south of Carrhae (Harran) where there
was a Roman garrison, and at a somewhat less distance to
the north of Ichnae. The Roman archers were sent
forward, but retired immediately before the enormous
numerical superiority and the far greater elasticity and
range of the Parthian bows. The legions, which, in spite
of the advice of the more sagacious officers that they
should be deployed as much as possible against the enemy,
had been drawn up in a dense square of twelve cohorts on
each side, were soon outflanked and overwhelmed with the
formidable arrows, which under such circumstances hit
their man even without special aim, and against which the
soldiers had no means of retaliation. The hope that the
enemy might expend his missiles vanished with a glance at
the endless range of camels laden with arrows. The
Parthians were still extending their line. That the out-
flanking might not end in surrounding, Publius Crassus
advanced to the attack with a select corps of cavalry,
archers, and infantry of the line. The enemy in fact
abandoned the attempt to close the circle, and retreated,
hotly pursued by the impetuous leader of the Romans.
But, when the corps of Publius had totally lost sight of the
main army, the heavy cavalry made a stand against it, and
CHAP. IX RUPTURE BETWEEN THE JOINT RULERS 159
the Parthian host hastening up from all sides closed in like
a net round it. Publius, who saw his troops falling thickly
and vainly around him under the arrows of the mounted
archers, threw himself in desperation with his Celtic cavalry
unprotected by any coats of mail on the iron-clad lancers
of the enemy ; but the death-despising valour of his Celts,
who seized the lances with their hands or sprang from
their horses to stab the enemy, performed its marvels in
vain. The remains of the corps, including their leader
wounded in the sword-arm, were driven to a slight
eminence, where they only served for an easier mark to
the enemy's archers. Mesopotamian Greeks, who were
accurately acquainted with the country, adjured Crassus to
ride off with them and make an attempt to escape ; but he
refused to separate his fate from that of the brave men
whom his too -daring courage had led to death, and he
caused himself to be stabbed by the hand of his shield-
bearer. Following his example, most of the still surviving
officers put themselves to death. Of the whole division,
about 6000 strong, not more than 500 were taken
prisoners; no one was able to escape. Meanwhile the
attack on the main army had slackened, and the Romans
were but too glad to rest. When at length the absence of
any tidings from the corps sent out startled them out of
the deceitful calm, and they drew near to the scene of the
battle for the purpose of learning its fate, the head of the
son was displayed on a pole before his father's eyes; and
the terrible onslaught began once more against the main
army with the same fury and the same hopeless uniformity.
They could neither break the ranks of the lancers nor
reach the archers ; night alone put an end to the slaughter.
Had the Parthians bivouacked on the battle-field, hardly a
man of the Roman army would have escaped. But not
trained to fight otherwise than on horseback, and therefore
afraid of a surprise, they were wont never to encamp close
i6o
DEATH OF CRASSUS
BOOK V
Retreat to
Carrhae.
Departure
from
Carrhae.
Surprise at
Sinnaca.
to the enemy ; jeeringly they shouted to the Romans that
they would give the general a night to bewail his son, and
galloped off to return next morning and despatch the game
that lay bleeding on the ground.
Of course the Romans did not wait for the morning.
The lieutenant-generals Cassius and Octavius — Crassus
himself had completely lost his judgment — ordered the
men still capable of marching to set out immediately and
with the utmost silence (while the whole — said to amount
to 4000 — of the wounded and stragglers were left), with
the view of seeking protection within the walls of Carrhae.
The fact that the Parthians, when they returned on the
following day, applied themselves first of all to seek out
and massacre the scattered Romans left behind, and the
further fact that the garrison and inhabitants of Carrhae,
early informed of the disaster by fugitives, had marched
forth in all haste to meet the beaten army, saved the
remnants of it from what seemed inevitable destruction.
The squadrons of Parthian horsemen could not think of
undertaking a siege of Carrhae. But the Romans soon
voluntarily departed, whether compelled by want of
provisions, or in consequence of the desponding precipita-
tion of their commander-in-chief, whom the soldiers had
vainly attempted to remove from the command and to
replace by Cassius. They moved in the direction of the
Armenian mountains ; marching by night and resting by
day Octavius with a band of 5000 men reached the
fortress of Sinnaca, which was only a day's march distant
from the heights that would give shelter, and liberated
even at the peril of his own life the commander-in chief,
whom the guide had led astray and given up to the enemy.
Then the vizier rode in front of the Roman camp to offer,
in the name of his king, peace and friendship to the
Romans, and to propose a personal conference between
the two generals. The Roman army, demoralized as it
chap, ix RUPTURE BETWEEN THE JOINT RULERS 161
was, adjured and indeed compelled its leader to accept the
offer. The vizier received the consular and his staff with
the usual honours, and offered anew to conclude a compact
of friendship; only, with just bitterness recalling the fate
of the agreements concluded with Lucullus and Pompeius
respecting the Euphrates boundary (iv. 434), he demanded
that it should be immediately reduced to writing. A
richly adorned horse was produced ; it was a present from
the king to the Roman commander-in-chief; the servants
of the vizier crowded round Crassus, zealous to mount him
on the steed. It seemed to the Roman officers as if there
was a design to seize the person of the commander-in-chief;
Octavius, unarmed as he was, pulled the sword of one of
the Parthians from its sheath and stabbed the groom. In
the tumult which thereupon arose, the Roman officers were
all put to death ; the gray-haired commander-in-chief also,
like his grand-uncle (iii. 279), was unwilling to serve as a
living trophy to the enemy, and sought and found death.
The multitude left behind in the camp without a leader
were partly taken prisoners, partly dispersed. What the
day of Carrhae had begun, the day of Sinnaca completed
(June 9, 701); the two took their place side by side with 58.
the days of the Allia, of Cannae, and of Arausio. The
army of the Euphrates was no more. Only the squadron
of Gaius Cassius, which had been broken off from the
main army on the retreat from Carrhae, and some other
scattered bands and isolated fugitives succeeded in escaping
from the Parthians and Bedouins and separately finding
their way back to Syria. Of above 40,000 Roman legion-
aries, who had crossed the Euphrates, not a fourth part
returned; the half had perished; nearly 10,000 Roman
prisoners were settled by the victors in the extreme east of
their kingdom — in the oasis of Merv — as bondsmen
compelled after the Parthian fashion to render military
service. For the first time since the eagles had headed
VOL V 144
162 DEATH OF CRASSUS book v
the legions, they had become in the same year trophies of
victory in the hands of foreign nations, almost contempor-
aneously of a German tribe in the west (p. 69) and of
the Parthians in the east. As to the impression which the
defeat of the Romans produced in the east, unfortunately
no adequate information has reached us ; but it must have
been deep and lasting. King Orodes was just celebrating
the marriage of his son Pacorus with the sister of his new
ally, Artavasdes the king of Armenia, when the announce-
ment of the victory of his vizier arrived, and along with it,
according to Oriental usage, the cut-off head of Crassus.
The tables were already removed; one of the wandering
companies of actors from Asia Minor, numbers of which at
that time existed and carried Hellenic poetry and the
Hellenic drama far into the east, was just performing
before the assembled court the Bacchae of Euripides.
The actor playing the part of Agave, who in her Dionysiac
frenzy has torn in pieces her son and returns from
Cithaeron carrying his head on the thyrsus, exchanged this
for the bloody head of Crassus, and to the infinite delight
of his audience of half-Hellenized barbarians began afresh
the well-known song :
tp4pop.ev 4£ 6peos
£Xt/ea vebrofiov iirl fti\a9pa
fw.Ka.plav 6i)pav,
It was, since the times of the Achaemenids, the first
serious victory which the Orientals had achieved over the
west ; and there was a deep significance in the fact that,
by way of celebrating this victory, the fail est product of the
western world — Greek tragedy — parodied itself through its
degenerate representatives in that hideous burlesque. The
civic spirit of Rome and the genius of Hellas began simul-
taneously to accommodate themselves to the chains of sul
tanism.
The disaster, terrible in itself, seemed also as though i
chap, ix RUPTURE BETWEEN THE JOINT RULERS 163
was to be dreadful in its consequences, and to shake the Conso-
foundations of the Roman power in the east. It was q^^3
among the least of its results, that the Parthians now had defeat
absolute sway beyond the Euphrates ; that Armenia, after
having fallen away from the Roman alliance even before
the disaster of Crassus, was reduced by it into entire
dependence on Parthia ; that the faithful citizens of Carrhae
were bitterly punished for their adherence to the Occidentals
by the new master appointed over them by the Parthians,
one of the treacherous guides of the Romans, named
Andromachus. The Parthians now prepared in all earnest
to cross the Euphrates in their turn, and, in union with the
Armenians and Arabs, to dislodge the Romans from Syria.
The Jews and various other Occidentals awaited emancipa-
tion from the Roman rule there, no less impatiently than
the Hellenes beyond the Euphrates awaited relief from the
Parthian ; in Rome civil war was at the door ; an attack at
this particular place and time was a grave peril. But
fortunately for Rome the leaders on each side had
changed. Sultan Orodes was too much indebted to the
heroic prince, who had first placed the crown on his head
and then cleared the land from the enemy, not to get rid
of him as soon as possible by the executioner. His place
as commander-in-chief of the invading army destined for
Syria was filled by a prince, the king's son Pacorus, with
whom on account of his youth and inexperience the prince
Osaces had to be associated as military adviser. On the
other side the interim command in Syria in room of Crassus
was taken up by the prudent and resolute quaestor Gaius
Cassius.
The Parthians were, just like Crassus formerly, in no Repulse
haste to attack, but during the years 701 and 702 sent only °f th^.
weak flying bands, who were easily repulsed, across the 53, 52.
Euphrates ; so that Cassius obtained time to reorganize the
army in some measure, and with the help of the faithful
164 DEATH OF CRASSUS book v
adherent of the Romans, Herodes Antipater, to reduce to
obedience the Jews, whom resentment at the spoliation of
the temple perpetrated by Crassus had already driven to
arms. The Roman government would thus have had full
time to send fresh troops for the defence of the threatened
frontier ; but this was left undone amidst the convulsions of
51. the incipient revolution, and, when at length in 703 the
great Parthian invading army appeared on the Euphrates,
Cassius had still nothing to oppose to it but the two weak
legions formed from the remains of the army of Crassus.
Of course with these he could neither prevent the crossing
nor defend the province. Syria was overrun by the
Parthians, and all Western Asia trembled. But the Parthians
did not understand the besieging of towns. They not only
retreated from Antioch, into which Cassius had thrown
himself with his troops, without having accomplished their
object, but they were on their retreat along the Orontes
allured into an ambush by Cassius' cavalry and there severely
handled by the Roman infantry ; prince Osaces was himself
among the slain. Friend and foe thus perceived that the
Parthian army under an ordinary general and on ordinary
ground was not capable of much more than any other
Oriental army. However, the attack was not abandoned.
61-50. Still during the winter of 703-704 Pacorus lay encamped in
Cyrrhestica on this side of the Euphrates ; and the new
governor of Syria, Marcus Bibulus, as wretched a general
as he was an incapable statesman, knew no better course of
action than to shut himself up in his fortresses. It was
50. generally expected that the war would break out in 704
with renewed fury. But instead of turning his arms against
the Romans, Pacorus turned against his own father, and
accordingly even entered into an understanding with the
Roman governor. Thus the stain was not wiped from the
shield of Roman honour, nor was the reputation of Rome
restored in the east ; but the Parthian invasion of Western
chap, ix RUPTURE BETWEEN THE JOINT RULERS 165
Asia was over, and the Euphrates boundary was, for the
time being at least, retained.
In Rome meanwhile the periodical volcano of revolution impression
was whirling upward its clouds of stupefying smoke. The pr°^uced
Romans began to have no longer a soldier or a denarius to the defeat
be employed against the public foe — no longer a thought ofCarrhae-
for the destinies of the nations. It is one of the most
dreadful signs of the times, that the huge national disaster
of Carrhae and Sinnaca gave the politicians of that time far
less to think and speak of than that wretched tumult on the
Appian road, in which, a couple of months after Crassus,
Clodius the partisan-leader perished ; but it is easily con-
ceivable and almost excusable. The breach between the
two regents, long felt as inevitable and often announced as
near, was now assuming such a shape that it could not be
arrested. Like the boat of the ancient Greek mariners'
tale, the vessel of the Roman community now found itself
as it were between two rocks swimming towards each other ;
expecting every moment the crash of collision, those whom
it was bearing, tortured by nameless anguish, into the
eddying surge that rose higher and higher were benumbed ;
and, while every slightest movement there attracted a
thousand eyes, no one ventured to give a glance to the right
or the left.
After Caesar had, at the conference of Luca in April The good
698, agreed to considerable concessions as regarded "^dine
Pompeius, and the regents had thus placed themselves between
substantially on a level, their relation was not without the relaxed?113
outward conditions of durability, so far as a division of the
monarchical power — in itself indivisible — could be lasting
at all. It was a different question whether the regents, at
least for the present, were determined to keep together
and mutually to acknowledge without reserve their title to
rank as equals. That this was the case with Caesar, in so
far as he had acquired the interval necessary for the
1 66 DEATH OF CRASS US book v
conquest of Gaul at the price of equalization with Pompeius,
has been already set forth. But Pompeius was hardly
ever, even provisionally, in earnest with the collegiate
scheme. His was one of those petty and mean natures,
towards which it is dangerous to practise magnanimity ; to
his paltry spirit it appeared certainly a dictate of prudence
to supplant at the first opportunity his reluctantly acknow-
ledged rival, and his mean soul thirsted after a possibility
of retaliating on Caesar for the humiliation which he had
suffered through Caesar's indulgence. But while it is
probable that Pompeius in accordance with his dull and
sluggish nature never properly consented to let Caesar hold
a position of equality by his side, yet the design of breaking
up the alliance doubtless came only by degrees to be
distinctly entertained by him. At any rate the public,
which usually saw better through the views and intentions
of Pompeius than he did himself, could not be mistaken
in thinking that at least with the death of the beautiful
Julia — who died in the bloom of womanhood in the
54 autumn of 700 and was soon followed by her only child
to the tomb — the personal relation between her father
and her husband was broken up. Caesar attempted to
re-establish the ties of affinity which fate had severed ; he
asked for himself the hand of the only daughter of
Pompeius, and offered Octavia, his sister's grand-daughter,
who was now his nearest relative, in marriage to his fellow-
regent; but Pompeius left his daughter to her existing
husband Faustus Sulla the son of the regent, and he him-
self married the daughter of Quintus Metellus Scipio.
The personal breach had unmistakeably begun, and it was
Pompeius who drew back his hand. It was expected that
a political breach would at once follow ; but in this people
were mistaken ; in public affairs a collegiate understanding
continued for a time to subsist. The reason was, that
Caesar did not wish publicly to dissolve the relation before
chap, ix RUPTURE BETWEEN THE JOINT RULERS 167
the subjugation of Gaul was accomplished, and Pompeius
did not wish to dissolve it before the governing authorities
and Italy should be wholly reduced under his power by
his investiture with the dictatorship. It is singular, but
yet readily admits of explanation, that the regents under
these circumstances supported each other ; Pompeius after
the disaster of Aduatuca in the winter of 700 handed over 64.
one of his Italian legions that were dismissed on furlough
by way of loan to Caesar; on the other hand Caesar
granted his consent and his moral support to Pompeius in
the repressive measures which the latter took against the
stubborn republican opposition.
It was only after Pompeius had in this way procured Dictator-
for himself at the beginning of 702 the undivided consul- pJLjjJ1
ship and an influence in the capital thoroughly outweighing
that of Caesar, and after all the men capable of arms in
Italy had tendered their military oath to himself personally
and in his name, that he formed the resolution to break
as soon as possible formally with Caesar; and the design
became distinctly enough apparent. That the judicial Covert
prosecution which took place after the tumult on the pompei„
Appian Way lighted with unsparing severity precisely on on Caesar.
the old democratic partisans of Caesar (p. 149), might
perhaps pass as a mere awkwardness. That the new law
against electioneering intrigues, which had retrospective
effect as far as 684, included also the dubious proceedings 70.
at Caesar's candidature for the consulship (p. 146), might
likewise be nothing more, although not a few Caesarians
thought that they perceived in it a definite design. But
people could no longer shut their eyes, however willing
they might be to do so, when Pompeius did not select for
his colleague in the consulship his former father-in-law
Caesar, as was fitting in the circumstances of the case and
was in many quarters demanded, but associated with
himself a puppet wholly dependent on him in his new
168 DEATH OF CRASSUS book v
father-in-law Scipio (p. 149) ; and still less, when Pompeius
at the same time got the governorship of the two Spains
45. continued to him for five years more, that is to 709, and
a. considerable fixed sum appropriated from the state-chest
for the payment of his troops, not only without stipu-
lating for a like prolongation of command and a like
grant of money to Caesar, but even while labouring
ulteriorly to effect the recall of Caesar before the term
formerly agreed on through the new regulations which
were issued at the same time regarding the holding of the
governorships. These encroachments were unmistakeably
calculated to undermine Caesar's position and eventually
to overthrow him. The moment could not be more
favourable. Caesar had conceded so much to Pompeius
at Luca, only because Crassus and his Syrian army would
necessarily, in the event of any rupture with Pompeius, be
thrown into Caesar's scale ; for upon Crassus — who since
the times of Sulla had been at the deepest enmity with
Pompeius and almost as long politically and personally
allied with Caesar, and who from his peculiar character at
all events, if he could not himself be king of Rome, would
have been content with being the new king's banker —
Caesar could always reckon, and could have no appre-
hension at all of seeing Crassus confronting him as an ally
63. of his enemies. The catastrophe of June 701, by which
army and general in Syria perished, was therefore a terribly
severe blow also for Caesar. A few months later the
national insurrection blazed up more violently than ever
in Gaul, just when it had seemed completely subdued, and
for the first time Caesar here encountered an equal
opponent in the Arvernian king Vercingetorix. Once
more fate had been working for Pompeius ; Crassus was
dead, all Gaul was in revolt, Pompeius was practically
dictator of Rome and master of the senate. What might
have happened, if he had now, instead of remotely in-
chap, ix RUPTURE BETWEEN THE JOINT RULERS 169
triguing against Caesar, summarily compelled the burgesses
or the senate to recall Caesar at once from Gaul ! But
Pompeius never understood how to take advantage of
fortune. He heralded the breach clearly enough ; already
in 702 his acts left no doubt about it, and in the spring 52.
of 703 he openly expressed his purpose of breaking with 51.
Caesar; but he did not break with him, and allowed the
months to slip away unemployed.
But however Pompeius might delay, the crisis was The old
incessantly urged on by the mere force of circumstances. nanves and
The impending war was not a struggle possibly between the pre-
republic and monarchy — for that had been virtually decided
years before — but a struggle between Pompeius and Caesar
for the possession of the crown of Rome. But neither of
the pretenders found his account in uttering the plain
truth ; he would have thereby driven all that very respect-
able portion of the burgesses, which desired the con-
tinuance of the republic and believed in its possibility,
directly into the camp of his opponent. The old battle-
cries raised by Gracchus and Drusus, Cinna and Sulla,
used up and meaningless as they were, remained still
good enough for watchwords in the struggle of the two
generals contending for the sole rule ; and, though for the
moment both Pompeius and Caesar ranked themselves
officially with the so-called popular party, it could not be
for a moment doubtful that Caesar would inscribe on his
banner the people and democratic progress, Pompeius the
aristocracy and the legitimate constitution.
Caesar had no choice. He was from the outset and The
very earnestly a democrat ; the monarchy as he understood and
it differed more outwardly than in reality from the Caesar.
Gracchan government of the people ; and he was too
magnanimous and too profound a statesman to conceal
his colours and to fight under any other escutcheon than
his own. The immediate advantage no doubt, which this
170 DEATH OF CRASSUS book V
battle-cry brought to him, was trifling ; it was confined
mainly to the circumstance that he was thereby relieved
from the inconvenience of directly naming the kingly office,
and so alarming the mass of the lukewarm and his own
adherents by that detested word. The democratic banner
hardly yielded farther positive gain, since the ideals of
Gracchus had been rendered infamous and ridiculous by
Clodius ; for where was there now — laying aside perhaps
the Transpadanes — any class of any sort of importance,
which would have been induced by the battle-cries of the
democracy to take part in the struggle ?
The This state of things would have decided the part of
and°CraCy PomPerus m trie impending struggle, even if apart from this
Pompeius. it had not been self-evident that he could only enter into it
as the general of the legitimate republic. Nature had
destined him, if ever any one, to be a member of an aristo-
cracy ; and nothing but very accidental and very selfish
motives had carried him over as a deserter from the aristo-
cratic to the democratic camp. That he should now revert
to his Sullan traditions, was not merely befitting in the
case, but in every respect of essential advantage. Effete
as was the democratic cry, the conservative cry could not
but have the more potent effect, if it proceeded from the
right man. Perhaps the majority, at any rate the flower of
the burgesses, belonged to the constitutional party ; and as
respected its numerical and moral strength might well be
called to interfere powerfully, perhaps decisively, in the
impending struggle of the pretenders. It wanted nothing
but a leader. Marcus Cato, its present head, did the duty,
as he understood it, of its leader amidst daily peril to his
life and perhaps without hope of success ; his fidelity to
duty deserves respect, but to be the last at a forlorn post is
commendable in the soldier, not in the general. He had
not the skill either to organize or to bring into action at
the proper time the powerful reserve, which had sprung up
CHAP. IX RUPTURE BETWEEN THE JOINT RULERS 171
as it were spontaneously in Italy for the party of the over-
thrown government ; and he had for good reasons never
made any pretension to the military leadership, on which
everything ultimately depended. If instead of this man,
who knew not how to act either as party-chief or as general,
a man of the political and military mark of Pompeius
should raise the banner of the existing constitution, the
municipals of Italy would necessarily flock towards it in
crowds, that under it they might help to fight, if not indeed
for the kingship of Pompeius, at any rate against the king-
ship of Caesar.
To this was added another consideration at least as
important. It was characteristic of Pompeius, even when
he had formed a resolve, not to be able to find his way to
its execution. While he knew perhaps how to conduct
war but certainly not how to declare it, the Catonian party,
although assuredly unable to conduct it, was very able and
above all very ready to supply grounds for the war against
the monarchy on the point of being founded. According to
the intention of Pompeius, while he kept himself aloof and
in his peculiar way now talked as though he would imme-
diately depart for his Spanish provinces, now made prepara-
tions as though he would set out to take over the command
on the Euphrates, the legitimate governing board, namely
the senate, were to break with Caesar, to declare war against
him, and to entrust the conduct of it to Pompeius, who
then, yielding to the general desire, was to come forward as
the protector of the constitution against demagogico-mon-
archical plots, as an upright man and champion of the
existing order of things against the profligates and anarchists,
as the duly -installed general of the seriate against the
Imperator of the street, and so once mjre to save his
country. Thus Pompeius gained by the alliance with the
conservatives both a second army in addition to his personal
adherents, and a suitable war-manifesto — advantages which
172 DEATH OF CRASSUS book v
certainly were purchased at the high price of coalescing
with those who were in principle opposed to him. Of the
countless evils involved in this coalition, there was developed
in the meantime only one — but that already a very grave
one — that Pompeius surrendered the power of commencing
hostilities against Caesar when and how he pleased, and in
this decisive point made himself dependent on all the
accidents and caprices of an aristocratic corporation.
There- Thus the republican opposition, after having been for
pu ican . years 0Diige(j t0 rest content with the part of a mere spec-
tator and having hardly ventured to whisper, was now
brought back once more to the political stage by the
impending rupture between the regents. It consisted
primarily of the circle which rallied round Cato — those
republicans who were resolved to venture on the struggle
for the republic and against the monarchy under all circum-
stances, and the sooner the better. The pitiful issue of
66. the attempt made in 698 (p. 128/?) had taught them that
they by themselves alone were not in a position either to
conduct war or even to call it forth ; it was known to every-
one that even in the senate, while the whole corporation
with a few isolated exceptions was averse to monarchy, the
majority would still only restore the oligarchic government
if it might be restored without danger — in which case,
doubtless, it had a good while to wait. In presence of the
regents on the one hand, and on the other hand of this
indolent majority, which desired peace above all things
and at any price, and was averse to any decided action and
most of all to a decided rupture with one or other of the
regents, the only possible course for the Catonian party to
obtain a restoration of the old rule lay in a coalition with
the less dangerous of the rulers. If Pompeius acknowledged
the oligarchic constitution and offered to fight for it against
Caesar, the republican opposition might and must recognize
him as its general, and in alliance with him compel the
chap, ix RUPTURE BETWEEN THE JOINT RULERS 173
timid majority tc a declaration of war. That Pompeius
was not quite in earnest with his fidelity to the constitution,
could indeed escape nobody ; but, undecided as he was in
everything, he had by no means arrived like Caesar at a
clear and firm conviction that it must be the first business
of the new monarch to sweep off thoroughly and conclu-
sively the oligarchic lumber. At any rate the war would
train a really republican army and really republican generals ;
and, after the victory over Caesar, they might proceed with
more favourable prospects to set aside not merely one of
the monarchs, but the monarchy itself, which was in the
course of formation. Desperate as was the cause of the
oligarchy, the offer of Pompeius to become its ally was the
most favourable arrangement possible for it.
The conclusion of the alliance between Pompeius and Their
the Catonian party was effected with comparative rapidity. ^ague*Ml
Already during the dictatorship of Pompeius a remarkable
approximation had taken place between them. The whole
behaviour of Pompeius in the Milonian crisis, his abrupt
repulse of the mob that offered him the dictatorship, his
distinct declaration that he would accept this office only
from the senate, his unrelenting severity against disturbers
of the peace of every sort and especially against the ultra-
democrats, the surprising complaisance with which he treated
Cato and those who shared his views, appeared as much
calculated to gain the men of order as they were offensive
to the democrat Caesar. On the other hand Cato and his
followers, instead of combating with their wonted sternness
the proposal to confer the dictatorship on Pompeius, had
made it with immaterial alterations of form their own ;
Pompeius had received the undivided consulship primarily
from the hands of Bibulus and Cato. While the Catonian
party and Pompeius had thus at least a tacit understanding
as early as the beginning of 702, the alliance might be held 52.
as formally concluded, when at the consular elections for
174
DEATH OF CRASSUS
BOOK V
Passive
resistance
of Caesar.
51. 703 there was elected not Cato himself indeed, but — along
with an insignificant man belonging to the majority of the
senate — one of the most decided adherents of Cato, Marcus
Claudius Marcellus. Marcellus was no furious zealot and
still less a genius, but a steadfast and strict aristocrat, just
the right man to declare war if war was to be begun with
Caesar. As the case stood, this election, so surprising after
the repressive measures adopted immediately before against
the republican opposition, can hardly have occurred other-
wise than with the consent, or at least under the tacit per-
mission, of the regent of Rome for the time being. Slowly
and clumsily, as was his wont, but steadily Pompeius moved
onward to the rupture.
It was not the intention of Caesar on the other hand to
fall out at this moment with Pompeius. He could not
indeed desire seriously and permanently to share the ruling
power with any colleague, least of all with one of so second-
ary a sort as was Pompeius; and beyond doubt he had
long resolved after terminating the conquest of Gaul to take
the sole power for himself, and in case of need to extort it
by force of arms. But a man like Caesar, in whom the
officer was thoroughly subordinate to the statesman, could
not fail to perceive that the regulation of the political
organism by force of arms does in its consequences deeply
and often permanently disorganize it ; and therefore he
could not but seek to solve the difficulty, if at all possible,
by peaceful means or at least without open civil war. But
even if civil war was not to be avoided, he could not desire
to be driven to it at a time, when in Gaul the rising of
Vercingetorix imperilled afresh all that had been obtained
and occupied him without interruption from the winter of
58-62. 701-702 to the winter of 702— 703, and when Pompeius and
52-51. tne constitutional party opposed to him on principle were
dominant in Italy. Accordingly he sought to preserve the
relation with Pompeius and thereby the peace unbroken,
chap, ix RUPTURE BETWEEN THE JOINT RULERS 175
and to attain, if at all possible, by peaceful means to the
consulship for 706 already assured to him at Luca. If he 48.
should then after a conclusive settlement of Celtic affairs
be placed in a regular manner at the head of the state, he,
who was still more decidedly superior to Pompeius as a
statesman than as a general, might well reckon on out-
manoeuvring the latter in the senate-house and in the
Forum without special difficulty. Perhaps it was possible
to find out for his awkward, vacillating, and arrogant rival
some sort of honourable and influential position, in which
the latter might be content to sink into a nullity; the
repeated attempts of Caesar to keep himself related by
marriage to Pompeius, may have been designed to pave
the way for such a solution and to bring about a final
settlement of the old quarrel through the succession of off-
spring inheriting the blood of both competitors. The
republican opposition would then remain without a leader
and therefore probably quiet, and peace would be preserved.
If this should not be successful, and if there should be, as
was certainly possible, a necessity for ultimately resorting
to the decision of arms, Caesar would then as consul in
Rome dispose of the compliant majority of the senate;
and he could impede or perhaps frustrate the coalition of
the Pompeians and the republicans, and conduct the war
far more suitably and more advantageously, than if he now
as proconsul of Gaul gave orders to march against the
senate and its general. Certainly the success of this plan
depended on Pompeius being good-natured enough to let
Caesar still obtain the consulship for 706 assured to him at 48.
Luca ; but, even if it failed, it would be always of advantage
for Caesar to have given practical and repeated evidence of
the most yielding disposition. On the one hand time
would thus be gained for attaining his object meanwhile in
Gaul ; on the other hand his opponents would be left with
the odium of initiating the rupture and consequently the
176 DEATH OF CRASSUS book v
civil war — which was of the utmost moment for Caesar with
reference to the majority of the senate and the party of
material interests, and more especially with reference to his
own soldiers.
On these views he acted. He armed certainly; the
number of his legions was raised through new levies in
52-51. the winter of 702—703 to eleven, including that borrowed
from Pompeius. But at the same time he expressly and
openly approved of Pompeius' conduct during the dictator-
ship and the restoration of order in the capital which he
had effected, rejected the warnings of officious friends as
calumnies, reckoned every day by which he succeeded in
postponing the catastrophe a gain, overlooked whatever
could be overlooked and bore whatever could be borne
— immoveably adhering only to the one decisive demand
that, when his governorship of Gaul came to an end
49. with 705, the second consulship, admissible by republican
state-law and promised to him according to agreement by
48. his colleague, should be granted to him for the year 706.
Prepara- This very demand became the battle - field of the
"tta ks diplomatic war which now began. If Caesar were compelled
Caesar. either to resign his office of governor before the last day
49. of December 705, or to postpone the assumption of the
48. magistracy in the capital beyond the 1st January 706, so
that he should remain for a time between the governorship
and the consulate without office, and consequently liable
to criminal impeachment — which according to Roman law
was only allowable against one who was not in office —
the public had good reason to prophesy for him in this
case the fate of Milo, because Cato had for long been
ready to impeach him and Pompeius was a more than
doubtful protector.
Attempt Now, to attain that object, Caesar's opponents had a
JJ keep v simple means. According to the existing ordinance
of the as to elections, every candidate for the consulship was*
consulship.
chap, ix RUPTURE BETWEEN THE JOINT RULERS 177
obliged to announce himself personally to the presiding
magistrate, and to cause his name to be inscribed on the
official list of candidates before the election, that is half
a year before entering on office. It had probably been
regarded in the conferences at Luca as a matter of course
that Caesar would be released from this obligation, which
was purely formal and was very often dispensed with ; but
the decree to that effect had not yet been issued, and, as
Pompeius was now in possession of the decretive machinery,
Caesar depended in this respect on the good will of his
rival. Pompeius incomprehensibly abandoned of his
own accord this completely secure position ; with his
consent and during his dictatorship (702) the personal 52.
appearance of Caesar was dispensed with by a tribunician
law. When however soon afterwards the new election-
ordinance (p. 146) was issued, the obligation of candidates
personally to enrol themselves was repeated in general
terms, and no sort of exception was added in favour of
those released from it by earlier resolutions of the people ;
according to strict form the privilege granted in favour of
Caesar was cancelled by the later general law. Caesar
complained, and the clause was subsequently appended
but not confirmed by special decree of the people, so
that this enactment inserted by mere interpolation in the
already promulgated law could only be looked on de jure
as a nullity. Where Pompeius, therefore, might have
simply kept by the law, he had preferred first to make a
spontaneous concession, then to recall it, and lastly to
cloak this recall in a manner most disloyal.
While in this way the shortening of Caesar's governor- Attempt to
ship was only aimed at indirectly, the regulations issued £Ss
at the same time as to the governorships sought the same governor-
object directly. The ten years for which the governorship **"
had been secured to Caesar, in the last instance through
the law proposed by Pompeius himself in concert with
VOL. V 145
i?8 DEATH OF CRASSUS book V
Crassus, ran according to the usual mode of reckoning
69. 49. from i March 695 to the last day of February 705. As,
however, according to the earlier practice, the proconsul
or propraetor had the right of entering on his provincial
magistracy immediately after the termination of his consul-
ship or praetorship, the successor of Caesar was to be
50. nominated, not from the urban magistrates of 704, but
49. from those of 705, and could not therefore enter before
48. 1 st Jan. 706. So far Caesar had still during the last
49. ten months of the year 705 a right to the command, not
on the ground of the Pompeio-Licinian law, but on the
ground of the old rule that a command with a set term
still continued after the expiry of the term up to the
arrival of the successor. But now, since the new regulation
52. of 702 called to the governorships not the consuls and
praetors going out, but those who had gone out five
years ago or more, and thus prescribed an interval between
the civil magistracy and the command instead of the
previous immediate sequence, there was no longer any
difficulty in straightway filling up from another quarter
every legally vacant governorship, and so, in the case in
question, bringing about for the Gallic provinces the
49. change of command on the 1st March 705, instead of the
48. istjan. 706. The pitiful dissimulation and procrastinating
artifice of Pompeius are after a remarkable manner mixed
up, in these arrangements, with the wily formalism and
the constitutional erudition of the republican party. Years
before these weapons of state-law could be employed, they
had them duly prepared, and put themselves in a condition
on the one hand to compel Caesar to the resignation of
his command from the day when the term secured to
him by Pompeius' own law expired, that is from the 1st
49. March 705, by sending successors to him, and on the
other hand to be able to treat as null and void the votes
48. tendered for him at the elections for 706. Caesar, not
CHAP, ix RUPTURE BETWEEN THE JOINT RULERS 179
m a position to hinder these moves in the game, kept
silence and left things to their own course.
Gradually therefore the slow course of constitutional Debates as
procedure developed itself. According to custom the TecajL
senate had to deliberate on the governorships of the year
705, so far as they went to former consuls, at the beginning 49.
of 703, so far as they went to former praetors, at the 51.
beginning of 704; that earlier deliberation gave the first 50.
occasion to discuss the nomination of new governors for
the two Gauls in the senate, and thereby the first occasion
for open collision between the constitutional party pushed
forward by Pompeius and the senatorial supporters of
Caesar. The consul Marcus Marcellus introduced a
proposal to give the two provinces hitherto administered
by the proconsul Gaius Caesar from the 1st March 705 49.
to the two consulars who were to be provided with governor-
ships for that year. The long-repressed indignation burst
forth in a torrent through the sluice once opened ; every-
thing that the Catonians were meditating against Caesar
was brought forward in these discussions. For them it
was a settled point, that the right granted by exceptional
law to the proconsul Caesar of announcing his candidature
for the consulship in absence had been again cancelled
by a subsequent decree of the people, and that the
reservation inserted in the latter was invalid. The senate
should in their opinion cause this magistrate, now that
the subjugation of Gaul was ended, to discharge immediately
the soldiers who had served out their time. The cases
in which Caesar had bestowed burgess-rights and established
colonies in Upper Italy were described by them as un-
constitutional and null ; in further illustration of which
Marcellus ordained that a respected senator of the
Caesarian colony of Comum, who, even if that place had
not burgess but only Latin rights, was entitled to lay
claim to Roman citizenship (p. 132), should receive the
i8o DEATH OF CRASSUS book v
punishment of scourging, which was admissible only in
the case of non-burgesses.
The supporters of Caesar at this time — among whom
Gaius Vibius Pansa, who was the son of a man proscribed
by Sulla but yet had entered on a political career, formerly
an officer in Caesar's army and in this year tribune of the
people, was the most notable — affirmed in the senate that
both the state of things in Gaul and equity demanded not
only that Caesar should not be recalled before the time,
but that he should be allowed to retain the command along
with the consulship ; and they pointed beyond doubt to
the facts, that a few years previously Pompeius had just in
the same way combined the Spanish governorships with
the consulate, that even at the present time, besides the
important office of superintending the supply of food to
the capital, he held the supreme command in Italy in
addition to the Spanish, and that in fact the whole men
capable of arms had been sworn in by him and had not
yet been released from their oath.
The process began to take shape, but its course was not
on that account more rapid. The majority of the senate,
seeing the breach approaching, allowed no sitting capable
of issuing a decree to take place for months ; and other
months in their turn were lost over the solemn procrastina-
tion of Pompeius. At length the latter broke the silence
and ranged himself, in a reserved and vacillating fashion as
usual but yet plainly enough, on the side of the constitu-
tional party against his former ally. He summarily and
abruptly rejected the demand of the Caesarians that their
master should be allowed to conjoin the consulship and the
proconsulship ; this demand, he added with blunt coarse-
ness, seemed to him no better than if a son should offer to
flog his father. He approved in principle the proposal or
Marcellus, in so far as he too declared that he would not
allow Caesar directly to attach the consulship to the pro-
chap, ix RUPTURE BETWEEN THE JOINT RULERS 181
consulship. He hinted, however, although without making
any binding declaration on the point, that they would
perhaps grant to Caesar admission to the elections for 706 48.
without requiring his personal announcement, as well as the
continuance of his governorship at the utmost to the 13th
Nov. 705. But in the meantime the incorrigible pro- 49.
crastinator consented to the postponement of the nomination
of successors to the last day of Feb. 704, which was asked 50.
by the representatives of Caesar, probably on the ground
of a clause of the Pompeio-Licinian law forbidding
any discussion in the senate as to the nomination of
successors before the beginning of Caesar's last year of
office.
In this sense accordingly the decrees of the senate were
issued (29 Sept. 703). The filling up of the Gallic 51.
governorships was placed in the order of the day for the 1st
March 704; but even now it was attempted to break up 50.
the army of Caesar — just as had formerly been done by
decree of the people with the army of Lucullus (iv. 349, 387)
— by inducing his veterans to apply to the senate for their
discharge. Caesar's supporters effected, indeed, as far as
they constitutionally could, the cancelling of these decrees
by their tribunician veto ; but Pompeius very distinctly
declared that the magistrates were bound unconditionally
to obey the senate, and that intercessions and similar
antiquated formalities would produce no change. The
oligarchical party, whose organ Pompeius now made
himself, betrayed not obscurely the design, in the event of
a victory, of revising the constitution in their sense and
removing everything which had even the semblance of
popular freedom ; as indeed, doubtless for this reason, it
omitted to avail itself of the comitia at all in its attacks
directed against Caesar. The coalition between Pompeius
and the constitutional party was thus formally declared;
sentence too was already evidently passed on Caesar, and
182 DEATH OF CRASSUS xJOOk v
the term of its promulgation was simply postponed The
elections for the following year proved thoroughly 'adverse
to him.
Counter- During these party manoeuvres of hh antagonists pre-
mentsof paratory to war, Caesar had succeeded in getting rid of the
Caesar. Gallic insurrection and restoring the state of peace in the
61. whole subject territory. As early ar. the summer of 703,
under the convenient pretext of defending the frontier (p. 103)
but evidently in token of the fact that the legions in Gaul
were now beginning to be no longe* needed there, he moved
one of them to North Italy. He could not avoid per
ceiving now at any rate, if not earlier, that he would :iot b*
spared the necessity of drawing the sword against his
fellow-citizens ; nevertheless, as it was highly desirable to
leave the legions still f jr a time in the barely pacified Gaul,
he sought even yei to procrastinate, and, ^e1! acquainted
with the extreme lova of peace in the rr.ajor>/ of the senate,
did not abandon the hope of still restra'ning them from the
declaration cf war in spite of the prepare exercised over
them by Pompeius. He did no'. ev,n hesitate to make
great sacrifices, if only he might avoii for the present open
variance with the supreme gjvf,r.ii.ng board. When the
60. senate (in the spring of 704) r.t the suggestion of Pompeius
requested both him and Cuef-ir to furnish each a legion
for the impending Parthkx war (p. 167) and when agreeably
to this resolution Po:r.pe:i's demanded back from Caesar
the legion lent to him sjme years before, so as to send it
to Syria, Caesar complied with the double demand, because
neither the oppoitu.icness of this decree of the senate nor
the justice of the demand of Pompeius could in themselves
be disputed, and the keeping within the bounds of the law
and of formal loyalty was of more consequence to Caesar
than a few thousand soldiers. The two legions came without
delay and placed themselves at the disposal of the govern-
ment, but instead of sending them to the Euphrates, the
chap, ix RUPTURE BETWEEN THE JOINT RULERS 183
latter kept them at Capua in readiness for Pompeius ; and
the public had once more the opportunity of comparing
the manifest endeavours of Caesar to avoid a rupture with
the perfidious preparation for war by his opponents.
For the discussions with the senate Caesar had succeeded Curia
in purchasing not only one of the two consuls of the year,
Lucius Aemilius Paullus, but above all the tribune of the
people Gaius Curio, probably the most eminent among the
many profligate men of parts in this epoch ; 1 unsurpassed in
refined elegance, in fluent and clever oratory, in dexterity
of intrigue, and in that energy which in the case of vigorous
but vicious characters bestirs itself only the more powerfully
amid the pauses of idleness ; but also unsurpassed in his
dissolute life, in his talent for borrowing — his debts were
estimated at 60,000,000 sesterces (^600,000) — and in his
moral and political want of principle. He had previously
offered himself to be bought by Caesar and had been
rejected ; the talent, which he thenceforward displayed in
his attacks on Caesar, induced the latter subsequently to
buy him up — the price was high, but the commodity was
worth the money.
Curio had in the first months of his tribunate of the Debates
people played the independent republican, and had as such *"*~ 5
thundered both against Caesar and against Pompeius. He Caesar and
availed himself with rare skill of the apparently impartia omPeius-
position which this gave him, when in March 704 the 50.
proposal as to the filling up of the Gallic governorships for
the next year came up afresh for discussion in the senate ;
he completely approved the decree, but asked that it should
be at the same time extended to Pompeius and his extra-
ordinary commands. His arguments— that a constitutional
state of things could only be brought about by the removal
of all exceptional positions, that Pompeius as merely en-
trusted by the senate with the proconsulship could still less
1 Homo ingatiosissime nequam (Vellei. ii. 48).
i84 DEATH OF CRASSUS book v
than Caesar refuse obedience to it, that the one-sided
removal of one of the two generals would only increase the
danger to the constitution — carried complete conviction to
superficial politicians and to the public at large ; and the
declaration of Curio, that he intended to prevent any one-
sided proceedings against Caesar by the veto constitutionally
belonging to him, met with much approval in and out of
the senate. Caesar declared his consent at once to Curio's
proposal and offered to resign his governorship and command
at any moment on the summons of the senate, provided
Pompeius would do the same; he might safely do so, for
Pompeius without his Italo-Spanish command was no
longer formidable. Pompeius again for that very reason
could not avoid refusing ; his reply — that Caesar must first
resign, and that he meant speedily to follow the example
thus set — was the less satisfactory, that he did not even
specify a definite term for his retirement. Again the
decision was delayed for months; Pompeius and the
Catonians, perceiving the dubious humour of the majority of
the senate, did not venture to bring Curio's proposal to a
vote. Caesar employed the summer in establishing the
state of peace in the regions which he had conquered, in
holding a great review of his troops on the Scheldt, and
in making a triumphal march through the province of
North Italy, which was entirely devoted to him ; autumn
found him in Ravenna, the southern frontier-town of his
province.
Caesar and The vote which could no longer be delayed on Curio's
Pompeius pr0p0sai at length took place, and exhibited the defeat of
recalled. the party of Pompeius and Cato in all its extent. By 370
votes against 20 the senate resolved that the proconsuls of
Spain and Gaul should both be called upon to resign their
offices; and with boundless joy the good burgesses of
Rome heard the glad news of the saving achievement of
Curio. Pompeius was thus recalled by the senate no less
chap, ix RUPTURE BETWEEN THE JOINT RULERS 185
than Caesar, and while Caesar was ready to comply with
the command, Pompeius positively refused obedience.
The presiding consul Gaius Marcellus, cousin of Marcus
Marcellus and like the latter belonging to the Catonian
party, addressed a severe lecture to the servile majority;
and it was, no doubt, vexatious to be thus beaten in their
own camp and beaten by means of a phalanx of poltroons.
But where was victory to come from under a leader, who,
instead of shortly and distinctly dictating his orders to the
senators, resorted in his old days a second time to the in-
structions of a professor of rhetoric, that with eloquence
polished up afresh he might encounter the youthful vigour
and brilliant talents of Curio ?
The coalition, defeated in the senate, was in the most Declara-
painful position. The Catonian section had undertaken to tionoflM*
push matters to a rupture and to carry the senate along
with them, and now saw their vessel stranded after a most
vexatious manner on the sandbanks of the indolent majority.
Their leaders had to listen in their conferences to the
bitterest reproaches from Pompeius ; he pointed out em-
phatically and with entire justice the dangers of the seem-
ing peace ; and, though it depended on himself alone to
cut the knot by rapid action, his allies knew very well that
they could never expect this from him, and that it was for
them, as they had promised, to bring matters to a crisis.
After the champions of the constitution and of senatorial
government had already declared the constitutional rights
of the burgesses and of the tribunes of the people to be
meaningless formalities (p. 181), they now found them-
selves driven by necessity to treat the constitutional
decision; of the senate itself in a similar manner and, as
the legitimate government would not let itself be saved
with its own consent, to save it against its will. This was
neither new nor accidental ; Sulla (iv. 97) and Lucullus
(iv. 335)hadbeenobligedtocarry every energeticresolu-
186 DEATH OF CRASSUS book v
tion conceived by them in the true interest of the govern-
ment with a high hand irrespective of it, just as Cato and
his friends now proposed to do ; the machinery of the
constitution was in fact utterly effete, and the senate was
now — as the comitia had been for centuries — nothing but
a worn-out wheel slipping constantly out of its track.
60. It was rumoured (Oct. 704) that Caesar had moved
four legions from Transalpine into Cisalpine Gaul and
stationed them at Placentia. This transference of troops
was of itself within the prerogative of the governor ; Curio
moreover palpably showed in the senate the utter ground-
lessness of the rumour; and they by a majority rejected
the proposal of the consul Gaius Marcellus to give Pompeius
on the strength of it orders to march against Caesar. Yet
the said consul, in concert with the two consuls elected for
49. 705 who likewise belonged to the Catonian party, proceeded
to Pompeius, and these three men by virtue of their own
plenitude of power requested the general to put himself at
the head of the two legions stationed at Capua, and to call
the Italian militia to arms at his discretion. A more in-
formal authorization for the commencement of a civil war
can hardly be conceived ; but people had no longer time
to attend to such secondary matters ; Pompeius accepted
it. The military preparations, the levies began ; in order
personally to forward them, Pompeius left the capital in
50. December 704.
The Caesar had completely attained the object of devolving
ultimatum ^q initiative of civil war on his opponents. He had, while
i m * tlt'ScLT*
himself keeping on legal ground, compelled Pompeius to
declare war, and to declare it not as representative of the
legitimate authority, but as general of an openly revolution-
ary minority of the senate which overawed the majority.
This result was not to be reckoned of slight importance,
although the instinct of the masses could not and did not
deceive itself for a moment as to the fact that the war con-
chap, ix RUPTURE BETWEEN THE JOINT RULERS 187
cerned other things than questions of formal law. Now,
when war was declared, it was Caesar's interest to strike a
blow as soon as possible. The preparations of his oppo-
nents were just beginning, and even the capital was not
occupied. In ten or twelve days an army three times as
strong as the troops of Caesar that were in Upper Italy
could be collected at Rome ; but still it was not impossible
to surprise the city undefended, or even perhaps by a rapid
winter campaign to seize all Italy, and to shut off the best
resources of his opponents before they could make them
available. The sagacious and energetic Curio, who after
resigning his tribunate (10 Dec. 704) had immediately 50.
gone to Caesar at Ravenna, vividly represented the state
of things to his master ; and it hardly needed such a repre-
sentation to convince Caesar that longer delay now could
only be injurious. But, as he with the view of not giving
his antagonists occasion to complain had hitherto brought
no troops to Ravenna itself, he could for the present do
nothing but despatch orders to his whole force to set out
with all haste ; and he had to wait till at least the one
legion stationed in Upper Italy reached Ravenna. Mean-
while he sent an ultimatum to Rome, which, if useful for
nothing else, by its extreme submissiveness still farther
compromised his opponents in public opinion, and perhaps
even, as he seemed himself to hesitate, induced them to
prosecute more remissly their preparations against him.
In this ultimatum Caesar dropped all the counter-demands
which he formerly made on Pompeius, and offered on his
own part both to resign the governorship of Transalpine
Gaul, and to dismiss eight of the ten legions belonging to
him, at the term fixed by the senate ; he declared himself
content, if the senate would leave him either the governor-
ship of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyria with one, or that of Cis-
alpine Gaul alone with two, legions, not, forsooth, up to his
investiture with the consulship, but till after the close of
188 DEATH OF CRASSUS book v
48. the consular elections for 706. He thus consented to
those proposals of accommodation, with which at the begin-
ning of the discussions the senatorial party and even
Pompeius himself had declared that they would be satis-
fied, and showed himself ready to remain in a private
position from his election to the consulate down to his
entering on office. Whether Caesar was in earnest with
these astonishing concessions and had confidence that he
should be able to carry through his game against Pompeius
even after granting so much, or whether he reckoned that
those on the other side had already gone too far to find in
these proposals of compromise more than a proof that
Caesar regarded his cause itself as lost, can no longer be
with certainty determined. The probability is, that Caesar
committed the fault of playing a too bold game, far rather
than the worse fault of promising something which he was
not minded to perform ; and that, if strangely enough his
proposals had been accepted, he would have made good
his word.
Last Curio undertook once more to represent his master in
fhesenate. tne lion's den- *n tnree days he made the journey from
Ravenna to Rome. When the new consuls Lucius Lentulus
and Gaius Marcellus the younger1 assembled the senate
49. for the first time on 1 Jan. 705, he delivered in a full
meeting the letter addressed by the general to the senate.
The tribunes of the people, Marcus Antonius well known
in the chronicle of scandal of the city as the intimate friend
of Curio and his accomplice in all his follies, but at the
same time known from the Egyptian and Gallic campaigns
as a brilliant cavalry officer, and Quintus Cassius, Pompeius'
former quaestor, — the two, who were now in Curio's stead
managing the cause of Caesar in Rome — insisted on the
60. * To be distinguished from the consul having the same name of 704 ;
49. the latter was a cousin, the consul of 705 a brother, of the Marcus Mar-
51. cellus who was consul in 703.
chap, ix RUPTURE BETWEEN THE JOINT RULERS 189
immediate reading of the despatch. The grave and clear
words in which Caesar set forth the imminence of civil
war, the general wish for peace, the arrogance of Pompeius,
and his own yielding disposition, with all the irresistible
force of truth ; the proposals for a compromise, of a mod-
eration which doubtless surprised his own partisans; the
distinct declaration that this was the last time that he
should offer his hand for peace — made the deepest impres-
sion. In spite of the dread inspired by the numerous
soldiers of Pompeius who flocked into the capital, the
sentiment of the majority was not doubtful ; the consuls
could not venture to let it find expression. Respecting
the proposal renewed by Caesar that both generals might
be enjoined to resign their commands simultaneously,
respecting all the projects of accommodation suggested by
his letter, and respecting the proposal made by Marcus
Coelius Rufus and Marcus Calidius that Pompeius should
be urged immediately to depart for Spain, the consuls
refused — as they in the capacity of presiding officers were
entitled to do — to let a vote take place. Even the pro-
posal of one of their most decided partisans who was
simply not so blind to the military position of affairs as his
party, Marcus Marcellus — to defer the determination till
the Italian levy en masse could be under arms and could
protect the senate — was not allowed to be brought to a
vote. Pompeius caused it to be declared through his
usual organ, Quintus Scipio, that he was resolved to take
up the cause of the senate now or never, and that he would
let it drop if they longer delayed. The consul Lentulus
said in plain terms that even the decree of the senate was
no longer of consequence, and that, if it should persevere
in its servility, he would act of himself and with his power-
ful friends take the farther steps necessary. Thus over-
awed, the majority decreed what was commanded — that
^•a^ar should at a definite and not distant day give up
190 DEATH OF CRASSUS book V
Transalpine Gaul to Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, and
Cisalpine Gaul to Marcus Servilius Nonianus, and should
dismiss his army, failing which he should be esteemed a
traitor. When the tribunes of Caesar's party made use of
their right of veto against this resolution, not only were
they, as they at least asserted, threatened in the senate-
house itself by the swords of Pompeian soldiers, and forced,
in order to save their lives, to flee in slaves' clothing from
the capital ; but the now sufficiently overawed senate
treated their formally quite constitutional interference as
an attempt at revolution, declared the country in danger,
and in the usual forms called the whole burgesses to take
up arms, and all magistrates faithful to the constitution to
49. place themselves at the head of the armed (7 Jan. 705).
Caesar Now it was enough. When Caesar was informed by the
tntlTltal tribunes who had fled to his camp entreating protection as
to the reception which his proposals had met with in the
capital, he called together the soldiers of the thirteenth
legion, which had meanwhile arrived from its cantonments
near Tergeste (Trieste) at Ravenna, and unfolded before
them the state of things. It was not merely the man of
genius versed in the knowledge and skilled in the control
of men's hearts, whose brilliant eloquence shone forth and
glowed in this agitating crisis of his own and the world's
destiny; nor merely the generous commander-in-chief
and the victorious general, addressing soldiers, who had
been called by himself to arms and for eight years had
followed his banners with daily - increasing enthusiasm.
There spoke, above all, the energetic and consistent states-
man, who had now for nine- and -twenty years defended
the cause of freedom in good and evil times ; who had
braved for it the daggers of assassins and the executioners
of the aristocracy, the swords of the Germans and the
waves of the unknown ocean, without ever yielding or
wavering ; who had torn to pieces the Sullan constitution,
chap, ix RUPTURE BETWEEN THE JOINT RULERS 191
'iad overthrown the rule of the senate, and had furnished
the defenceless and unarmed democracy with protection
and with arms by means of the struggle beyond the Alps
And he spoke, not to the Clodian public whose republican
enthusiasm had been long burnt down to ashes and dross,
but to the young men from the towns and villages of
Northern Italy, who still felt freshly and purely the mighty
influence of the thought of civic freedom ; who were still
capable of fighting and of dying for ideals ; who had them-
selves received for their country in a revolutionary way
from Caesar the burgess - rights which the government
refused to them ; whom Caesar's fall would leave once
more at the mercy of the fasces, and who already pos-
sessed practical proofs (p. 179 /.) of the inexorable use which
the oligarchy proposed to make of these against the Trans-
padanes. Such were the listeners before whom such an
orator set forth the facts — the thanks for the conquest of
Gaul which the nobility were preparing for the general and
his army ; the contemptuous setting aside of the comitia ;
the overawing of the senate ; the sacred duty of protecting
with armed hand the tribunate of the people wrested five
hundred years ago by their fathers arms in hand from
the nobility, and of keeping the ancient oath which these
had taken for themselves as for their children's children
that they would man by man stand firm even to death
for the tribunes of the people (i. 350). And then, when
he — the leader and general of the popular party — sum-
moned the soldiers of the people, now that conciliatory
means had been exhausted and concession had reached
its utmost limits, to follow him in the last, the inevitable,
the decisive struggle against the equally hated and despised,
equally perfidious and incapable, and in fact ludicrously
incorrigible aristocracy — there was not an officer or a
soldier who could hold back. The order was given for
departure ; at the head of his vanguard Caesar crossed
192 DEATH OF CRASSUS book v
the narrow brook which separated his province from Italy,
and which the constitution forbade the proconsul of Gaul
to pass. When after nine years' absence he trod once
more the soil of his native land, he trod at the same time
the path of revolution. " The die was cast"
CH. x BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, PHARSALUS, THAPSUS 193
CHAPTER X
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
Arms were thus to decide which of the two men who had The
hitherto jointly ruled Rome was now to be its first sole resoVI]ces
J J on either
ruler. Let us see what were the comparative resources side,
at the disposal of Caesar and Pompeius for the waging
of the impending war.
Caesar's power rested primarily on the wholly unlimited Caesar's
authority which he enjoyed within his party. If the ideas po^„e
of democracy and of monarchy met together in it, this was within his
not the result of a coalition which had been accidentally party*
entered into and might be accidentally dissolved ; on the
contrary it was involved in the very essence of a democracy
without a representative constitution, that democracy and
monarchy should find in Caesar at once their highest and
ultimate expression. In political as in military matters
throughout the first and the final decision lay with Caesar.
However high the honour in which he held any serviceable
instrument, it remained an instrument still ; Caesar stood
in his own party without confederates, surrounded only by
military-political adjutants, who as a rule had risen from
the army and as soldiers were trained never to ask the
reason and purpose of any thing, but unconditionally to
obey. On this account especially, at the decisive moment
when the civil war began, of all the officers and soldiers
of Caesar one alone refused him obedience ; and the cir-
VOL. V X46
i94 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
cumstance that that one was precisely the foremost of
them all, serves simply to confirm this view of the relation
of Caesar to his adherents.
Labienus. Titus Labienus had shared with Caesar all the troubles
of the dark times of Catilina (iv. 457) as well as all the lustre
of the Gallic career of victory, had regularly held inde-
pendent command, and frequently led half the army ; as he
was the oldest, ablest, and most faithful of Caesar's adju-
tants, he was beyond question also highest in position and
60. highest in honour. As late as in 704 Caesar had entrusted
to him the supreme command in Cisalpine Gaul, in order
partly to put this confidential post into safe hands, partly to
forward the views of Labienus in his canvass for the consul-
ship. But from this very position Labienus entered into
communication with the opposite party, resorted at the
49. beginning of hostilities in 705 to the headquarters of
Pompeius instead of those of Caesar, and fought through
the whole civil strife with unparalleled bitterness against
his old friend and master in war. We are not suffi-
ciently informed either as to the character of Labienus
or as to the special circumstances of his changing sides;
but in the main his case certainly presents nothing but
a further proof of the fact, that a military chief can
reckon far more surely on his captains than on his
marshals. To all appearance Labienus was one of those
persons who combine with military efficiency utter in-
capacity as statesmen, and who in consequence, if they
unhappily choose or are compelled to take part in politics,
are exposed to those strange paroxysms of giddiness, of
which the history of Napoleon's marshals supplies so
many tragi-comic examples. He may probably have held
himself entitled to rank alongside of Caesar as the second
chief of the democracy ; and the rejection of this claim
of his may have sent him over to the camp of his
opponents. His case rendered for the first time apparent
chap. X PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS \g&
the whole gravity of the evil, that Caesar's treatment of
his officers as adjutants without independence admitted
of the rise of no men fitted to undertake a separate com-
mand in his camp, while at the same time he stood
urgently in need of such men amidst the diffusion —
which might easily be foreseen — of the impending struggle
through all the provinces of the wide empire. But this
disadvantage was far outweighed by that unity in the
supreme leadership, which was the primary condition of
all success, and a condition only to be preserved at such
a cost.
This unity of leadership acquired its full power through Caesar'*
the efficiency of its instruments. Here the army comes, army"
first of all, into view. It still numbered nine legions of
infantry or at the most 50,000 men, all of whom however
had faced the enemy and two-thirds had served in all the
campaigns against the Celts. The cavalry consisted of
German and Noric mercenaries, whose usefulness and trust-
worthiness had been proved in the war against Vercingetorix.
The eight years' warfare, full of varied vicissitudes, against
the Celtic nation — which was brave, although in a military
point of view decidedly inferior to the Italian — had given
Caesar the opportunity of organizing his army as he alone
knew how to organize it. The whole efficiency of the
soldier presupposes physical vigour ; in Caesar's levies more
regard was had to the strength and activity of the recruits
than to their means or their morals. But the serviceable-
ness of an army, like that of any other machine, depends
above all on the ease and quickness of its movements ; the
soldiers of Caesar attained a perfection rarely reached ai."?
probably never surpassed in their readiness for immediate
departure at any time, and in the rapidity of their marching.
Courage, oi course, was valued above everything ; Caesar
practised with unrivalled mastery the art of stimulating
martial emulation and the esprit de corps, so that the pre-
196 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
eminence accorded to particular soldiers and divisions
appeared even to those who were postponed as the necessary
hierarchy of valour. He weaned his men from fear by not
unfrequently — where it could be done without serious
danger — keeping his soldiers in ignorance of an approaching
conflict, and allowing them to encounter the enemy unex-
pectedly. But obedience was on a parity with valour.
The soldier was required to do what he was bidden, without
asking the reason or the object; many an aimless fatigue
was imposed on him solely as a training in the difficult art
of blind obedience. The discipline was strict but not
harassing; it was exercised with unrelenting vigour when
the soldier was in presence of the enemy ; at other times,
especially after victory, the reins were relaxed, and if an
otherwise efficient soldier was then pleased to indulge in
perfumery or to deck himself with elegant arms and the
like, or even if he allowed himself to be guilty of outrages
or irregularities of a very questionable kind, provided only
his military duties were not immediately affected, the foolery
and the crime were allowed to pass, and the general lent a
deaf ear to the complaints of the provincials on such points.
Mutiny on the other hand was never pardoned, either in
the instigators, or even in the guilty corps itself.
But the true soldier ought to be not merely capable,
brave, and obedient, he ought to be all this willingly and
spontaneously; and it is the privilege of gifted natures
alone to induce the animated machine which they govern
to a joyful service by means of example and of hope, and
especially by the consciousness of being turned to befitting
use. As the officer, who would demand valour from his
troops, must himself have looked danger in the face with
them, Caesar had even when general found opportunity of
drawing his sword and had then used it like the best ; in
activity, moreover, and fatigue he was constantly far more
exacting from himself than from his soldiers. Caesar took
CHAP. X PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 197
care that victory, which primarily no doubt brings gain to
the general, should be associated also with personal hopes
in the minds of the soldiers. We have already mentioned
that he knew how to render his soldiers enthusiastic for
the cause of the democracy, so far as the times which had
become prosaic still admitted of enthusiasm, and that the
political equalization of the Transpadane country — the
native land of most of his soldiers — with Italy proper was
set forth as one of the objects of the struggle (iv. 457). Of
course material recompenses were at the same time not
wanting — as well special rewards for distinguished feats of
arms as general rewards for every efficient soldier; the
officers had their portions, the soldiers received presents,
and the most lavish gifts were placed in prospect for the
triumph.
Above all things Caesar as a true commander under-
stood how to awaken in every single component element,
large or small, of the mighty machine the consciousness of
its befitting application. The ordinary man is destined
for service, and he has no objection to be an instrument,
if he feels that a master guides him. Everywhere and at
all times the eagle eye of the general rested on the whole
army, rewarding and punishing with impartial justice, and
directing the action of each towards the course con-
ducive to the good of all : so that there was no experi-
menting or trifling with the sweat and blood of the
humblest, but for that very reason, where it was necessary,
unconditional devotion even to death was required. With-
out allowing each individual to see into the whole springs
of action, Caesar yet allowed each to catch such glimpses
of the political and military connection of things as to
secure that he should be recognized — and it may be
idealized — by the soldiers as a statesman and a general.
He treated his soldiers throughout, not as his equals, but
as men who are entitled to demand and were able to
198 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
endure the truth, and who had to put faith in the promises
and the assurances of their general, without thinking of
deception or listening to rumours ; as comrades through
long years in warfare and victory, among whom there was
hardly any one that was not known to him by name and
that in the course of so many campaigns had not formed
more or less of a personal relation to the general ; as good
companions, with whom he talked and dealt confidentially
and with the cheerful elasticity peculiar to him ; as clients,
to requite whose services, and to avenge whose wrongs
and death, constituted in his view a sacred duty. Perhaps
there never was an army which was so perfectly what an
army ought to be — a machine able for its ends and willing
for its ends, in the hand of a master, who transfers to it
his own elasticity. Caesar's soldiers were, and felt them-
selves, a match for a tenfold superior force ; in connection
with which it should not be overlooked, that under the
Roman tactics — calculated altogether for hand-to-hand
conflict and especially for combat with the sword — the
practised Roman soldier was superior to the novice in a
far higher degree than is now the case under the circum-
stances of modern times.1 But still more than by the
superiority of valour the adversaries of Caesar felt them-
selves humbled by the unchangeable and touching fidelity
with which his soldiers clung to their general It is
perhaps without a parallel in history, that when the general
summoned his soldiers to follow him into the civil war,
1 A centurion of Caesar's tenth legion, taken prisoner, declared to the
commander-in-chief of the enemy that he was ready with ten of his men
to make head against the best cohort of the enemy (500 men ; Bell.
Afric. 45). " In the ancient mode of fighting," to quote the opinion of
Napoleon I., "a battle consisted simply of duels ; what was only correct
in the mouth ot that centurion, would be mere boasting in the mouth of
the modern soldier." Vivid proofs of the soldierly spirit that pervaded
Caesar's army are furnished by the Reports — appended to his Memoirs —
respecting the African and the second Spanish wars, of which the former
appears to have had as its author an officer of the second rank, while the
latter is in every respect a subaltern camp-journal.
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 199
with the single exception already mentioned of Labienus,
no Roman officer and no Roman soldier deserted him.
The hopes of his opponents as to an extensive desertion
were thwarted as ignominiously as the former attempts to
break up his army like that of Lucullus (p. 181). Labienus
himself appeared in the camp of Pompeius with a band
doubtless of Celtic and German horsemen but without a
single legionary. Indeed the soldiers, as if they would
show that the war was quite as much their matter as that
of their general, settled among themselves that they would
give credit for the pay, which Caesar had promised to
double for them at the outbreak of the civil war, to their
commander up to its termination, and would meanwhile
support their poorer comrades from the general means ;
besides, every subaltern officer equipped and paid a trooper
out of his own purse.
While Caesar thus had the one thing which was need- Field of
ful — unlimited political and military authority and a trust- Vq^%
worthy army ready for the fight — his power extended,
comparatively speaking, over only a very limited space.
It was based essentially on the province of Upper Italy.
This region was not merely the most populous of all the Uppei
districts of Italy, but also devoted to the cause of the Italy'
democracy as its own. The feeling which prevailed there
is shown by the conduct of a division of recruits from
Opitergium (Oderzo in the delegation of Treviso), which
not long after the outbreak of the war in the Illyrian
waters, surrounded on a wretched raft by the war- vessels of
the enemy, allowed themselves to be shot at during the
whole day down to sunset without surrendering, and, such
of them as had escaped the missiles, put themselves to
death with their own hands during the following night.
It is easy to conceive what might be expected of such a
population. As they had already granted to Caesar the
means of more than doubling his original army, so after
200 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, BOOK y
the outbreak of the civil war recruits presented themselves
in great numbers for the ample levies that were immediately
instituted.
Italy. In Italy proper, on the other hand, the influence of
Caesar was not even remotely to be compared to that of
his opponents. Although he had the skill by dexterous
manoeuvres to put the Catonian party in the wrong, and
had sufficiently commended the rectitude of his cause to
all who wished for a pretext with a good conscience either
to remain neutral, like the majority of the senate, or to
embrace his side, like his soldiers and the Transpadanes,
the mass of the burgesses naturally did not allow themselves
to be misled by these things and, when the commandant
of Gaul put his legions in motion against Rome, they
beheld — despite all formal explanations as to law — in
Cato and Pompeius the defenders of the legitimate republic,
in Caesar the democratic usurper. People in general
moreover expected from the nephew of Marius, the son-in-
law of Cinna, the ally of Catilina, a repetition of the
Marian and Cinnan horrors, a realization of the saturnalia
of anarchy projected by Catilina; and though Caesar
certainly gained allies through this expectation — so that
the political refugees immediately put themselves in a body
at his disposal, the ruined men saw in him their deliverer,
and the lowest ranks of the rabble in the capital and
country towns were thrown into a ferment on the news of
his advance, — these belonged to the class of friends who
are more dangerous than foes.
Provinces. In the provinces and the dependent states Caesar had
even less influence than in Italy. Transalpine Gaul indeed
as far as the Rhine and the Channel obeyed him, and the
colonists of Narbo as well as the Roman burgesses else-
where settled in Gaul were devoted to him ; but in the
Narbonese province itself the constitutional party had
numerous adherents, and now even the newly-conquered
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 201
regions were far more a burden than a benefit to Caesar
in the impending civil war; in fact, for good reasons he
made no use of the Celtic infantry at all in that war, and
but sparing use of the cavalry. In the other provinces
and the neighbouring half or wholly independent states
Caesar had indeed attempted to procure for himself sup-
port, had lavished rich presents on the princes, caused
great buildings to be executed h various towns, and
granted to them in case of need financial and military
assistance; but on the whole, of course, not much had
been gained by this means, and the relations with the
German and Celtic princes in 'he regions of the Rhine and
the Danube, — particularly the connection with the Noric
king Voccio, so important for the recruiting of cavalry, —
were probably the only re'atious of this sort which were of
any moment for him.
While Caesar thus entered the struggle only as com- The
mandant of Gaul, without other essential resources than
efficient adjutants, a faithful army, and a devoted province,
Pompeius began it as de facto supreme head of the Roman
commonwealth, and in full possession of all the resources
that stood at the disposal of the legitimate government of
the great Roman empire. But while his position was in a
political and military point of view far more considerable,
it was also on the other hand far less definite and firm.
The unity of leadership, which resulted of itself and by
necessity from the position of Caesar, was inconsistent
with the nature of a coalition ; and although Pompeius,
too much of a soldier to deceive himself as to its being
indispensable, attempted to force it on the coalition and
got himself nominated by the senate as sole and absolute
generalissimo by land and sea, yet the senate itself could
not be set aside nor hindered from a preponderating
influence on the political, and an occasional and therefore
doubly injurious interference with the military, superin-
coalitioo.
202 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
tendence. The recollection of the twenty years' war
waged on both sides with envenomed weapons between
Pompeius and the constitutional party ; the feeling which
vividly prevailed on both sides, and which they with
difficulty concealed, that the first consequence of the
victory when achieved would be a rupture between the
victors ; the contempt which they entertained for each
other and with only too good grounds in either case ; the
inconvenient number of respectable and influential men
in the ranks of the aristocracy and the intellectual and
moral inferiority of almost all who took part in the matter
— altogether produced among the opponents of Caesar a
reluctant and refractory co-operation, which formed the
saddest contrast to the harmonious and compact action on
the other side.
Field of While all the disadvantages incident to the coalition of
power powers naturally hostile were thus felt in an unusual
of the r , ' , . , . ... . ,
coalition, measure by Caesar s antagonists, this coalition was certainly
still a very considerable power. It had exclusive command
of the sea ; all ports, all ships of war, all the materials for
equipping a fleet were at its disposal. The two Spains —
as it were the home of the power of Pompeius just as the
two Gauls were the home of that of Caesar — were faithful
adherents to their master and in the hands of able and
trustworthy administrators. In the other provinces also,
of course with the exception of the two Gauls, the posts of
the governors and commanders had during recent years
been filled up with safe men under the influence of
Pompeius and the minority of the senate. The client-
states throughout and with great decision took part against
Caesar and in favour of Pompeius. The most important
princes and cities had been brought into the closest
personal relations with Pompeius in virtue of the different
sections of his manifold activity. In the war against the
Marians, for instance, he had been the companion in arms
chap. X PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 203
of the kings of Numidia and Mauretania and had re-
established the kingdom of the former (iv. 94) ; in the
Mithradatic war, in addition to a number of other minor
principalities spiritual and temporal, he had re-established
the kingdoms of Bosporus, Armenia, and Cappadocia, and
created that of Deiotarus in Galatia (iv. 431, 437); '^
was primarily at his instigation that the Egyptian war was
undertaken, and it was by his adjutant that the rule of the
Lagids had been confirmed afresh (iv. 451). Even the city
of Massilia in Caesar's own province, while indebted to
the latter doubtless for various favours, was indebted to
Pompeius at the time of the Sertorian war for a very con-
siderable extension of territory (p. 8); and, besides, the
ruling oligarchy there stood in natural alliance — strengthened
by various mutual relations — with the oligarchy in Rome.
But these personal and relative considerations as well as
the glory of the victor in three continents, which in these
more remote parts of the empire far outshone that of the
conqueror of Gaul, did perhaps less harm to Caesar in
those quarters than the views and designs — which had not
remained there unknown — of the heir of Gaius Gracchus
as to the necessity of uniting the dependent states and
the usefulness of provincial colonizations. No one of
the dependent dynasts found himself more imminently
threatened by this peril than Juba king of Numidia. Not Juba of
only had he years before, in the lifetime of his father umi
Hiempsal, fallen into a vehement personal quarrel with
Caesar, but recently the same Curio, who now occupied
almost the first place among Caesar's adjutants, had pro-
posed to the Roman burgesses the annexation of the
Numidian kingdom. Lastly, if matters should go so far
as to lead the independent neighbouring states to interfere
in the Roman civil war, the only state really powerful,
that of the Parthians, was practically already allied with
the aristocratic party by the connection entered into
204 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
between Pacorus and Bibulus (p. 164), while Caesar was
far too much a Roman to league himself for party-interests
with the conquerors of his friend Crassus.
Italy As to Italy the great majority of the burgesses were, as
against kas ^Qen airea(iy mentioned, averse to Caesar — more
especially, of course, the whole aristocracy with their very
considerable following, but also in a not much less degree
the great capitalists, who could not hope in the event of
a thorough reform of the commonwealth to preserve their
partisan jury-courts and their monopoly of extortion. Of
equally anti-democratic sentiments were the small capitalists,
the landholders and generally all classes that had anything
to lose; but in these ranks of life the cares of the next
rent-term and of sowing and reaping outweighed, as a rule,
every other consideration.
The The army at the disposal of Pompeius consisted chiefly
Pompeian of the gpanjsn troops, seven legions inured to war and in
every respect trustworthy ; to which fell to be added the
divisions of troops — weak indeed, and very much scattered
— which were to be found in Syria, Asia, Macedonia,
Africa, Sicily, and elsewhere. In Italy there were under
arms at the outset only the two legions recently given off
by Caesar, whose effective strength did not amount to
more than 7000 men, and whose trustworthiness was
more than doubtful, because — levied in Cisalpine Gaul
and old comrades in arms of Caesar — they were in a high
degree displeased at the unbecoming intrigue by which
they had been made to change camps (p. 182), and recalled
with longing their general who had magnanimously paid to
them beforehand at their departure the presents which were
promised to every soldier for the triumph. But, apart from
the circumstance that the Spanish troops might arrive in
Italy with the spring either by the land route through Gaul
or by sea, the men of the three legions still remaining from
66. the levies of 699 (p. 131), as well as the Italian levy sworn
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 205
to allegiance in 702 (p. 147), could be recalled from their 62.
furlough. Including these, the number of troops standing
at the disposal of Pompeius on the whole, without reckon-
ing the seven legions in Spain and those scattered in other
provinces, amounted in Italy alone to ten legions x or about
60,000 men, so that it was no exaggeration at all, when
Pompeius asserted that he had only to stamp with his foot
to cover the ground with armed men. It is true that it
required some interval — though but short — to render these
soldiers available ; but the arrangements for this purpose
as well as for the carrying out of the new levies ordered
by the senate in consequence of the outbreak of the civil
war were already everywhere in progress. Immediately
after the decisive decree of the senate (7 Jan. 705), in the 49.
very depth of winter the most eminent men of the aristo-
cracy set out to the different districts, to hasten the calling
up of recruits and the preparation of arms. The want of
cavalry was much felt, as for this arm they had been ac-
customed to rely wholly on the provinces and especially on
the Celtic contingents ■ to make at least a beginning, three
hundred gladiators belonging to Caesar were taken from
the fencing-schools of Capua and mounted — a step which
however met with so general disapproval, that Pompeius
again broke up this troop and levied in room of it 300
horsemen from the mounted slave-herdmen of Apulia.
The state -treasury was at a low ebb as usual ; they
busied themselves in supplementing the inadequate amour t
of cash out of the local treasuries and even from the temple-
treasures of the municipia.
Under these circumstances the war opened at the begin- Caesar
ning of January 705. Of troops capable of marching ^ es *■ '
Caesar had not more than a legion — 5000 infantry and offensive.
1 This number was specified by Pompeius himself (Caesar, B. C. i. 6),
and it agrees with the statement that he lost in Italy about 60 cohort ore
30,000 men, and took 25,000 over to Greece (Caesar, B.C. iii. 10).
206 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
300 cavalry — at Ravenna, which was by the highway some
240 miles distant from Rome ; Pompeius had two weak
legions — 7000 infantry and a small squadron of cavalry —
under the orders of Appius Claudius at Luceria, from which,
likewise by the highway, the distance was just about as
great to the capital. The other troops of Caesar, leaving
out of account the raw divisions of recruits still in course
of formation, were stationed, one half on the Saone and
Loire, the other half in Belgica, while Pompeius' Italian
reserves were already arriving from all sides at their
rendezvous ; long before even the first of the Transalpine
divisions of Caesar could arrive in Italy, a far superior
army could not but be ready to receive it there. It
seemed folly, with a band of the strength of that of
Catilina and for the moment without any effective reserve,
to assume the aggressive against a superior and hourly-
increasing army under an able general ; but it was a folly
in the spirit of Hannibal. If the beginning of the struggle
were postponed till spring, the Spanish troops of Pompeius
would assume the offensive in Transalpine, and his Italian
troops in Cisalpine, Gaul, and Pompeius, a match for
Caesar in tactics and superior to him in experience, was
a formidable antagonist in such a campaign running its
regular course. Now perhaps, accustomed as he was to
operate slowly and surely with superior masses, he might
be disconcerted by a wholly improvised attack ; and that
which could not greatly discompose Caesar's thirteenth
legion after the severe trial of the Gallic surprise and the
January campaign in the land of the Bellovaci (p. 93), —
the suddenness of the war and the toil of a winter cam-
paign— could not but disorganize the Pompeian corps
consisting of old soldiers of Caesar or of ill-trained recruits,
and still only in the course of formation.
Caesar's Accordingly Caesar advanced into Italy.1 Two highways
advance.
1 The decree of the senate was passed on the 7th January ; on the 18th
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 207
led at that time from the Romagna to the south ; the
Aemilio-Cassian which led from Bononia over the Apennines
to Arretium and Rome, and the Popillio-Flaminian, which
led from Ravenna along the coast of the Adriatic to Fanum
and was there divided, one branch running westward through
the Furlo pass to Rome, another southward to Ancona and
thence onward to Apulia. On the former Marcus Antonius
advanced as far as Arretium, on the second Caesar himself
pushed forward. Resistance was nowhere encountered ; the
recruiting officers of quality had no military skill, their bands
of recruits were no soldiers, the inhabitants of the country
towns were only anxious not to be involved in a siege.
When Curio with 1500 men approached Iguvium, where a
couple of thousand Umbrian recruits had assembled under
the praetor Quintus Minucius Thermus, general and soldiers
took to flight at the bare tidings of his approach; and
similar results on a small scale everywhere ensued.
Caesar had to choose whether he would march against Rome
Rome, from which his cavalry at Arretium were already only evacuated*
about 130 miles distant, or against the legions encamped at
Luceria. He chose the latter plan. The consternation of
the opposite party was boundless. Pompeius received the
news of Caesar's advance at Rome ; he seemed at first dis-
posed to defend the capital, but, when the tidings arrived
of Caesar's entrance into the Picenian territory and of his
first successes there, he abandoned Rome and ordered its
evacuation. A panic, augmented by the false report that
Caesar's cavalry had appeared before the gates, came over
the world of quality. The senators, who had been informed
that every one who should remain behind in the capital
would be treated as an accomplice of the rebel Caesar,
it had been already for several days known in Rome that Caesar had crossed
the boundary (Cic. ad Att. vii. 10 ; ix. 10, 4) ; the messenger needed at the
very least three days from Rome to Ravenna. According to this the
setting out of Caesar falls about the 12th January, which according to the
current reduction corresponds to the Julian 24 Nov. 704. 50.
208 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
flocked in crowds out at the gates. The consuls themselves
had so totally lost their senses, that they did not even secure
the treasure ; when Pompeius called upon them to fetch it,
for which there was sufficient time, they returned the reply
that they would deem it safer, if he should first occupy
Picenum. All was perplexity ; consequently a great council
of war was held in Teanum Sidicinum (23 Jan.), at which
Pompeius, Labienus, and both consuls were present. First
of all proposals of accommodation from Caesar were again
submitted ; even now he declared himself ready at once to
dismiss his army, to hand over his provinces to the successors
nominated, and to become a candidate in the regular way
for the consulship, provided that Pompeius were to depart
for Spain, and Italy were to be disarmed. The answer was,
that if Caesar would immediately return to his province,
they would bind themselves to procure the disarming of
Italy and the departure of Pompeius by a decree of the
senate to be passed in due form in the capital; perhaps
this reply was intended not as a bare artifice to deceive, but
as an acceptance of the proposal of compromise ; it was,
however, in reality the opposite. The personal conference
which Caesar desired with Pompeius the latter declined,
and could not but decline, that he might not by the
semblance of a new coalition with Caesar provoke still more
the distrust already felt by the constitutional party. Con-
cerning the management of the war it was agreed in Teanum,
that Pompeius should take the command of the troops
stationed at Luceria, on which notwithstanding their
untrustworthiness all hope depended ; that he should ad-
vance with these into his own and Labienus' native country,
Picenum ; that he should personally call the general levy
there to arms, as he had done some thirty-five years ago
(iv. 78), and should attempt at the head of the faithful
Picentine cohorts and the veterans formerly under Caesar to
set a limit to the advance of the enemy.
chap. X PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 209
Everything depended on whether Picenum would hold Conflicts la
out until Pompeius should come up to its defence. Already PlcenunL
Caesar with his reunited army had penetrated into it along
the coast road by way of Ancona. Here too the prepara-
tions were in full course ; in the very northernmost Picenian
town Auximum a considerable band of recruits was collected
under Publius Attius Varus ; but at the entreaty of the
municipality Varus evacuated the town even before Caesar
appeared, and a handful of Caesar's soldiers which overtook
the troop not far from Auximum totally dispersed it after a
brief conflict — the first in this war. In like manner soon
afterwards Gaius Lucilius Hirrus with 3000 men evacuated
Camerinum, and Publius Lentulus Spinther with 5000
Asculum. The men, thoroughly devoted to Pompeius,
willingly for the most part abandoned their houses and
farms, and followed their leaders over the frontier ; but the
district itself was already lost, when the officer sent by
Pompeius for the temporary conduct of the defence, Lucius
Vibullius Rufus — no genteel senator, but a soldier
experienced in war — arrived there ; he had to content him-
self with taking the six or seven thousand recruits who were
saved away from the incapable recruiting officers, and
conducting them for the time to the nearest rendezvous.
This was Corfinium, the place of meeting for the levies Corfinium
in the Albensian, Marsian and Paelignian territories ; the esiege
body of recruits here assembled, of nearly 1 5,000 men, was
the contingent of the most warlike and trustworthy regions
of Italy, and the flower of the army in course of formation
for the constitutional party. When Vibullius arrived here,
Caesar was still several days' march behind ; there was
nothing to prevent him from immediately starting agreeably
to Pompeius' instructions and conducting the saved Picenian
recruits along with those assembled at Corfinium to join the
main army in Apulia. But the commandant in Corfinium
was the designated successor to Caesar in the governorship
vol. v 147
2io BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
of Transalpine Gaul, Lucius Domitius, one of the most
narrow-minded and stubborn of the Roman aristocracy ; and
he not only refused to comply with the orders of Pompeius,
but also prevented Vibullius from departing at least with the
men from Picenum for Apulia. So firmly was he persuaded
that Pompeius only delayed from obstinacy and must
necessarily come up to his relief, that he scarcely made any
serious preparations for a siege and did not even gather into
Corfinium the bands of recruits placed in the surrounding
towns. Pompeius however did not appear, and for good
reasons ; for, while he might perhaps apply his two untrust-
worthy legions as a reserved support for the Picenian general
levy, he could not with them alone offer battle to Caesar.
Instead of him after a few days Caesar came (14 Feb.).
His troops had been joined in Picenum by the twelfth, and
before Corfinium by the eighth, legion from beyond the
Alps, and, besides these, three new legions had been formed
partly from the Pompeian men that were taken prisoners or
presented themselves voluntarily, partly from the recruits
that were at once levied everywhere ; so that Caesar before
Corfinium was already at the head of an army of 40,000
men, half of whom had seen service. So long as Domitius
hoped for the arrival of Pompeius, he caused the town to
be defended ; when the letters of Pompeius had at length
undeceived him, he resolved, not forsooth to persevere at
the forlorn post — by which he would have rendered the
greatest service to his party — nor even to capitulate, but,
while the common soldiers were informed that relief was
close at hand, to make his own escape along with his
officers of quality during the next night. Yet he had not
the judgment to carry into effect even this pretty scheme.
The confusion of his behaviour betrayed him. A part of
the men began to mutiny ; the Marsian recruits, who held
such an infamy on the part of their general to be impossible,
wished to fight against the mutineers; but they too were
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 2u
obliged reluctantly to believe the truth of the accusation,
whereupon the whole garrison arrested their staff and and
handed it, themselves, and the town over to Caesar (20 caPturcd-
Feb.). The corps in Alba, 3000 strong, and 1500 recruits
assembled in Tarracina thereupon laid down their arms, as
soon as Caesar's patrols of horsemen appeared; a third
division in Sulmo of 3500 men had been previously
compelled to surrender.
Pompeius had given up Italy as lost, so soon as Caesar Pompeius
had occupied Picenum ; only he wished to delay his goes to
. Brundi-
embarkation as long as possible, with the view of saving so sium.
much of his force as could still be saved. Accordingly he
had slowly put himself in motion for the nearest seaport
Brundisium. Thither came the two legions of Luceria and
such recruits as Pompeius had been able hastily to collect
in the deserted Apulia, as well as the troops raised by the
consuls and other commissioners in Campania and con-
ducted in all haste to Brundisium ; thither too resorted a
number of political fugitives, including the most respected
of the senators accompanied by their families. The Embarka-
embarkation began ; but the vessels at hand did not suffice p0n for
to transport all at once the whole multitude, which still
amounted to 25,000 persons. No course remained but to
divide the army. The larger half went first (4 March);
with the smaller division of some 10,000 men Pompeius
awaited at Brundisium the return of the fleet ; for, however
desirable the possession of Brundisium might be for an
eventual attempt to reoccupy Italy, they did not presume
to hold the place permanently against Caesar. Meanwhile
Caesar arrived before Brundisium; the siege began.
Caesar attempted first of all to close the mouth of the
harbour by moles and floating bridges, with a view to
exclude the returning fleet ; but Pompeius caused the
trading vessels lying in the harbour to be armed, and
managed to prevent the complete closing of the harbour
212
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA,
BOOK V
Military
and
financial
results of
the seizure
of Italy.
49.
until the fleet appeared and the troops — whom Pompeius
with great dexterity, in spite of the vigilance of the
besiegers and the hostile feeling of the inhabitants, with-
drew from the town to the last man unharmed — were
carried off beyond Caesar's reach to Greece ( 1 7 March).
The further pursuit, like the siege itself, failed for want of
a fleet.
In a campaign of two months, without a single serious
engagement, Caesar had so broken up an army of ten
legions, that less than the half of it had with great difficulty
escaped in a confused flight across the sea, and the whole
Italian peninsula, including the capital with the state-chest
and all the stores accumulated there, had fallen into the
power of the victor. Not without reason did the beaten
party bewail the terrible rapidity, sagacity, and energy of
the "monster."
But it may be questioned whether Caesar gained or lost
more by the conquest of Italy. In a military respect, no
doubt, very considerable resources were now not merely
withdrawn from his opponents, but rendered available for
himself; even in the spring of 705 his army embraced, in
consequence of the levies en masse instituted everywhere, a
considerable number of legions of recruits in addition to
the nine old ones. But on the other hand it now became
necessary not merely to leave behind a considerable
garrison in Italy, but also to take measures against the
closing of the transmarine traffic contemplated by his
opponents who commanded the sea, and against the
famine with which the capital was consequently threatened ;
whereby Caesar's already sufficiently complicated military
task was complicated further still. Financially it was
certainly of importance, that Caesar had the good fortune
to obtain possession of the stock of money in the capital ;
but the principal sources of income and particularly the
revenues from the east were withal in the hands of the
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 213
enemy, and, in consequence of the greatly increased
demands for the army and the new obligation to provide
for the starving population of the capital, the considerable
sums which were found quickly melted away. Caesar
soon found himself compelled to appeal to private credit,
and, as it seemed that he could not possibly gain any long
respite by this means, extensive confiscations were generally
anticipated as the only remaining expedient.
More serious difficulties still were created by the Its political
results
political relations amidst which Caesar found himself
placed on the conquest of Italy. The apprehension of an Fear of
anarchical revolution was universal among the propertied
classes. Friends and foes saw in Caesar a second Catilina ;
Pompeius believed or affected to believe that Caesar had
been driven to civil war merely by the impossibility of
paying his debts. This was certainly absurd ; but in fact
Caesar's antecedents were anything but reassuring, and still
less reassuring was the aspect of the retinue that now
surrounded him. Individuals of the most broken reputa-
tion, notorious personages like Quintus Hortensius, Gaius
Curio, Marcus Antonius, — the latter the stepson of the
Catilinarian Lentulus who was executed by the orders of
Cicero — were the most prominent actors in it ; the highest
posts of trust were bestowed on men who had long ceased
even to reckon up their debts ; people saw men who held
office under Caesar not merely keeping dancing-girls —
which was done by others also — but appearing publicly in
company with them. Was there any wonder, that even
grave and politically impartial men expected amnesty for
all exiled criminals, cancelling of creditors' claims, compre-
hensive mandates of confiscation, proscription, and murder,
nay, even a plundering of Rome by the Gallic soldiery ?
But in this respect the " monster " deceived the expecta- dispelled
tions of his foes as well as of his friends. As soon even as by Caesar*
Caesar occupied the first Italian town, Ariminum, he
214 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
prohibited all common soldiers from appearing armed
within the walls; the country towns were protected from
all injury throughout and without distinction, whether they
had given him a friendly or hostile reception. When the
mutinous garrison surrendered Corfinium late in the
evening, he in the face of every military consideration
postponed the occupation of the town till the following
morning, solely that he might not abandon the burgesses
to the nocturnal invasion of his exasperated soldiers. Of
the prisoners the common soldiers, as presumably indifferent
to politics, were incorporated with his own army, while the
officers were not merely spared, but also freely released
without distinction of person and without the exaction of
any promises whatever; and all which they claimed as
private property was frankly given up to them, without
even investigating with any strictness the warrant for their
claims. Lucius Domitius himself was thus treated, and
even Labienus had the money and baggage which he had
left behind sent after him to the enemy's camp. In the
most painful financial embarrassment the immense estates
of his opponents whether present or absent were not
assailed ; indeed Caesar preferred to borrow from friends,
rather than that he should stir up the possessors of property
against him even by exacting the formally admissible, but
practically antiquated, land tax (iv. 156). The victor
regarded only the half, and that not the more difficult half,
of his task as solved with the victory ; he saw the security
for its duration, according to his own expression, only in
the unconditional pardon of the vanquished, and had
accordingly during the whole march from Ravenna to
Brundisium incessantly renewed his efforts to bring about
a personal conference with Pompeius and a tolerable
accommodation.
Threats But, if the aristocracy had previously refused to listen
of the .... . ... ,.,..,
emigrants. to any reconciliation, the unexpected emigration of a kind
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 215
so disgraceful had raised their wrath to madness, and the
wild vengeance breathed by the beaten contrasted strangely
with the placability of the victor. The communications
regularly coming from the camp of the emigrants to their
friends left behind in Italy were full of projects for
confiscations and proscriptions, of plans for purifying the
senate and the state, compared with which the restoration
of Sulla was child's play, and which even the moderate
men of their own party heard with horror. The frantic The mass
passion of impotence, the wise moderation of power, peoS^
produced their effect. The whole mass, in whose eyes gained for
material interests were superior to political, threw itself
into the arms of Caesar. The country towns idolized " the
uprightness, the moderation, the prudence " of the victor ;
and even opponents conceded that these demonstrations of
respect were meant in earnest. The great capitalists,
farmers of the taxes, and jurymen, showed no special
desire, after the severe shipwreck which had befallen the
constitutional party in Italy, to entrust themselves farther
to the same pilots ; capital came once more to the light,
and "the rich lords resorted again to their daily task of
writing their rent-rolls." Even the great majority of the
senate, at least numerically speaking — for certainly but few
of the nobler and more influential members of the senate
were included in it — had notwithstanding the orders of
Pompeius and of the consuls remained behind in Italy, and
a portion of them even in the capital itself; and they acqui-
esced in Caesar's rule. The moderation of Caesar, well
calculated even in its very semblance of excess, attained
its object : the trembling anxiety of the propertied classes
as to the impending anarchy was in some measure allayed.
This was doubtless an incalculable gain for the future ; the
prevention of anarchy, and of the scarcely less dangerous
alarm of anarchy, was the indispensable preliminary con-
dition to the future reorganization of the commonwealth.
2l6
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA,
BOOK V
Indigna-
tion of the
anarchist
party
against
Caesar.
The
republican
party in
Italy.
But at the moment this moderation was more dangerous
for Caesar than the renewal of the Cinnan and Catilinarian
fury would have been ; it did not convert enemies into
friends, and it converted friends into enemies. Caesar's
Catilinarian adherents were indignant that murder and
pillage remained in abeyance ; these audacious and
desperate personages, some of whom were men of talent,
might be expected to prove cross and untractable. The
republicans of all shades, on the other hand, were neither
converted nor propitiated by the leniency of the conqueror.
According to the creed of the Catonian party, duty towards
what they called their fatherland absolved them from
every other consideration ; even one who owed freedom
and life to Caesar remained entitled and in duty bound
to take up arms or at least to engage in plots against him.
The less decided sections of the constitutional party were
no doubt found willing to accept peace and protection
from the new monarch; nevertheless they ceased not to
curse the monarchy and the monarch at heart. The more
clearly the change of the constitution became manifest,
the more distinctly the great majority of the burgesses —
both in the capital with its keener susceptibility of political
excitement, and among the more energetic population of
the country and country towns — awoke to a consciousness
of their republican sentiments ; so far the friends of the
constitution in Rome reported with truth to their brethren
of kindred views in exile, that at home all classes and all
persons were friendly to Pompeius. The discontented
temper of all these circles was further increased by the
moral pressure, which the more decided and more notable
men who shared such views exercised from their very position
as emigrants over the multitude of the humbler and more
lukewarm. The conscience of the honourable man smote
him in regard to his remaining in Italy ; the half-aristocrat
fancied that he was ranked among the plebeians, if he
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 217
did not go into exile with the Domitii and the Metelli,
and even if he took his seat in the Caesarian senate of
nobodies. The victor's special clemency gave to this
silent opposition increased political importance ; seeing
that Caesar abstained from terrorism, it seemed as if his
secret opponents could display their disinclination to his
rule without much danger.
Very soon he experienced remarkable treatment in this Passive
respect at the hands of the senate. Caesar had begun of^e"0*
the struggle to liberate the overawed senate from its senate to
oppressors. This was done; consequently he wished to
obtain from the senate approval of what had been done,
and full powers for the continuance of the war. For this
purpose, when Caesar appeared before the capital (end of
March) the tribunes of the people belonging to his party
convoked for him the senate (1 April). The meeting was
tolerably numerous, but the more notable of the very
senators that remained in Italy were absent, including even
the former leader of the servile majority Marcus Cicero
and Caesar's own father-in-law Lucius Piso ; and, what
was worse, those who did appear were not inclined to
enter into Caesar's proposals. When Caesar spoke of
full power to continue the war, one of the only two
consulars present, Servius Sulpicius Rufus, a very timid
man who desired nothing but a quiet death in his bed,
was of opinion that Caesar would deserve well of his
country if he should abandon the thought of carrying the
war to Greece and Spain. When Caesar thereupon
requested the senate at least to be the medium of trans-
mitting his peace proposals to Pompeius, they were not
indeed opposed to that course in itself, but the threats of
the emigrants against the neutrals had so terrified the
latter, that no one was found to undertake the message
of peace. Through the disinclination of the aristocracy
to help the erection of the monarch's throne, and through
2i3 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
the same inertness of the dignified corporation, by means
of which Caesar had shortly before frustrated the legal
nomination of Pompeius as generalissimo in the civil war,
he too was now thwarted when making a like request.
Other impediments, moreover, occurred. Caesar desired,
with the view of regulating in some sort of way his
position, to be named as dictator; but his wish was not
complied with, because such a magistrate could only be
constitutionally appointed by one of the consuls, and the
attempt of Caesar to buy the consul Lentulus — of which
owing to the disordered condition of his finances there
was a good prospect — nevertheless proved a failure. The
tribune of the people Lucius Metellus, moreover, lodged
a protest against all the steps of the proconsul, and made
signs as though he would protect with his person the
public chest, when Caesar's men came to empty it. Caesar
could not avoid in this case ordering that the inviolable
person should be pushed aside as gently as possible ;
otherwise, he kept by his purpose of abstaining from all
violent steps. He declared to the senate, just as the
constitutional party had done shortly before, that he had
certainly desired to regulate things in a legal way and
with the help of the supreme authority ; but, since this
help was refused, he could dispense with it.
Provisional Without further concerning himself about the senate
memof the ano- tne formalities of state law, he handed over the
affairs of temporary administration of the capital to the praetor
ecapi Marcus Aemilius Lepidus as city - prefect, and made the
The requisite arrangements for the administration of the
provinces. provjnces that obeyed him and the continuance of the
war. Even amidst the din of the gigantic struggle, and
with all the alluring sound of Caesar's lavish promises, it
still made a deep impression on the multitude of the
capital, when they saw in their free Rome the monarch
for the first time wielding a monarch's power and breakirg
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 219
open the doors of the treasury by his soldiers. But the
times had gone by, when the impressions and feelings of
the multitude determined the course of events ; it was
with the legions that the decision lay, and a few painful
feelings more or less were of no farther moment.
Caesar hastened to resume the war. He owed his The
successes hitherto to the offensive, and he intended still ^spA^9
to maintain it. The position of his antagonist was singular.
After the original plan of carrying on the campaign
simultaneously in the two Gauls by offensive operations
from the bases of Italy and Spain had been frustrated by
Caesar's aggressive, Pompeius had intended to go to
Spain. There he had a very strong position. The army
amounted to seven legions ; a large number of Pompeius'
veterans served in it, and several years of conflicts in the
Lusitanian mountains had hardened soldiers and officers.
Among its captains Marcus Varro indeed was simply a
celebrated scholar and a faithful partisan ; but Lucius
Afranius had fought with distinction in the east and in
the Alps, and Marcus Petreius, the conqueror of Catilina,
was an officer as dauntless as he was able. While in the
Further province Caesar had still various adherents from
the time of his governorship there (p. 6), the more
important province of the Ebro was attached by all the
ties of veneration and gratitude to the celebrated general,
who twenty years before had held the command in it
during the Sertorian war, and after the termination of
that war had organized it anew. Pompeius could evidently
after the Italian disaster do nothing better than proceed
to Spain with the saved remnant of his army, and then at
the head of his whole force advance to meet Caesar. But
unfortunately he had, in the hope of being able still to
save the troops that were in Corfinium, tarried in Apulia
so long that he was compelled to choose the nearer
Brundisium as his place of embarkation instead of the
220 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
Campanian ports. Why, master as he was of the sea
and Sicily, he did not subsequently revert to his original
plan, cannot be determined ; whether it was that perhaps
the aristocracy after their short - sighted and distrustful
fashion showed no desire to entrust themselves to the
Spanish troops and the Spanish population, it is enough
to say that Pompeius remained in the east, and Caesar
had the option of directing his first attack either against
the army which was being organized in Greece under
Pompeius' own command, or against that which was
ready for battle under his lieutenants in Spain. He had
decided in favour of the latter course, and, as soon as
the Italian campaign ended, had taken measures to collect
on the lower Rhone nine of his best legions, as also 6000
cavalry — partly men individually picked out by Caesar
in the Celtic cantons, partly German mercenaries — and a
number of Iberian and Ligurian archers.
Massilia But at this point his opponents also had been active.
q^£ Lucius Domitius, who was nominated by the senate in
Caesar's stead as governor of Transalpine Gaul, had
proceeded from Corfinium — as soon as Caesar had
released him — along with his attendants and with Pom-
peius' confidant Lucius Vibullius Rufus to Massilia, and
actually induced that city to declare for Pompeius and
even to refuse a passage to Caesar's troops. Of the
Spanish troops the two least trustworthy legions were left
behind under the command of Varro in the Further
province; while the five best, reinforced by 40,000 Spanish
infantry — partly Celtiberian infantry of the line, partly
Lusitanian and other light troops — and by 5000 Spanish
cavalry, under Afranius and Petreius, had, in accordance
with the orders of Pompeius transmitted by Vibullius, set
out to close the Pyrenees against the enemy.
Meanwhile Caesar himself arrived in Gaul and, as the
commencement of the siege of Massilia still detained him
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 221
in person, he immediately despatched the greater part of Caesar
his troops assembled on the Rhone — six legions and the ^e^"*
cavalry — along the great road leading by way of Narbo Pyrenees.
(Narbonne) to Rhode (Rosas) with the view of anticipating
the enemy at the Pyrenees. The movement was successful ;
when Afranius and Petreius arrived at the passes, they
found them already occupied by the Caesarians and the
line of the Pyrenees lost They then took up a position at Position at
Ilerda (Lerida) between the Pyrenees and the Ebro. This Ilerda*
town lies twenty miles to the north of the Ebro on the right
bank of one of its tributaries, the Sicoris (Segre), which was
crossed by only a single solid bridge immediately at Ilerda.
To the south of Ilerda the mountains which adjoin the left
bank of the Ebro approach pretty close to the town ; to the
northward there stretches on both sides of the Sicoris a
level country which is commanded by the hill on which the
town is built. For an army, which had to submit to a
siege, it was an excellent position ; but the defence of Spain,
after the occupation of the line of the Pyrenees had been
neglected, could only be undertaken in earnest behind the
Ebro, and, as no secure communication was established
between Ilerda and the Ebro, and no bridge existed over
the latter stream, the retreat from the temporary to the true
defensive position was not sufficiently secured. The
Caesarians established themselves above Ilerda, in the delta
which the river Sicoris forms with the Cinga (Cinca), which
unites with it below Ilerda ; but the attack only began in
earnest after Caesar had arrived in the camp (23 June).
Ui-der the walls of the town the struggle was maintained
with equal exasperation and equal valour on both sides, and
with frequent alternations of success ; but the Caesarians
did not attain their object — which was, to establish them-
selves between the Pompeian camp and the town and there-
by to possess themselves of the stone bridge — and they
consequently remained dependent for their communication
cut off.
222 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
with Gaul solely on two bridges which they had hastily
tonstructed over the Sicoris, and that indeed, as the river
at Ilerda itself was too considerable to be bridged over,
about eighteen or twenty miles farther up.
Caesar When the floods came on with the melting of the snow,
these temporary bridges were swept away ; and, as they had
no vessels for the passage of the highly swollen rivers and
under such circumstances the restoration of the bridges
could not for the present be thought of, the Caesarian army
was confined to the narrow space between the Cinca and
the Sicoris, while the left bank of the Sicoris and with it
the road, by which the army communicated with Gaul and
Italy, were exposed almost undefended to the Pompeians,
who passed the river partly by the town-bridge, partly by
swimming after the Lusitanian fashion on skins. It was the
season shortly before harvest ; the old produce was almost
used up, the new was not yet gathered, and the narrow
stripe of land between the two streams was soon exhausted.
In the camp actual famine prevailed — the modius of wheat
cost 50 denarii (£1 : 16s.) — and dangerous diseases broke
out; whereas on the left bank there were accumulated
provisions and varied supplies, as well as troops of all sorts
— reinforcements from Gaul of cavalry and archers, officers
and soldiers from furlough, foraging parties returning — in
all a mass of 6000 men, whom the Pompeians attacked
with superior force and drove with great loss to the moun-
tains, while the Caesarians on the right bank were obliged
to remain passive spectators of the unequal conflict. The
communications of the army were in the hands of the
Pompeians ; in Italy the accounts from Spain suddenly
ceased, and the suspicious rumours, which began to circu-
late there, were not so very remote from the truth. Had
the Pompeians followed up their advantage with some
energy, they could not have failed either to reduce under
their power or at least to drive back towards Gaul the mass
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 223
scarcely capable of resistance which was crowded together
on the left bank of the Sicoris, and to occupy this bank so
completely that not a man could cross the river without
their knowledge. But both points were neglected ; those
bands were doubtless pushed aside with loss but neither
destroyed nor completely beaten back, and the prevention
of the crossing of the river was left substantially to the river
itself.
Thereupon Caesar formed his plan. He ordered port- Caesai re-
able boats of a light wooden frame and osier work lined establishes
0 m the com-
with leather, after the model of those used in the Channel munica-
among the Britons and subsequently by the Saxons, to be tlons"
prepared in the camp and transported in waggons to the
point where the bridges had stood. On these frail barks
the other bank was reached and, as it was found unoccupied,
the bridge was re-established without much difficulty ; the
road in connection with it was thereupon quickly cleared,
and the eagerly- expected supplies were conveyed to the
camp. Caesar's happy idea thus rescued the army from
the immense peril in which it was placed. Then the cavalry
of Caesar which in efficiency far surpassed that of the enemy
began at once to scour the country on the left bank of the
Sicoris ; the most considerable Spanish communities between
the Pyrenees and the Ebro — Osca, Tarraco, Dertosa, and
others — nay, even several to the south of the Ebro, passed
over to Caesar's side.
The supplies of the Pompeians were now rendered scarce Retreat
through the foraging parties of Caesar and the defection of of the
° ° ° r Pompeians
the neighbouring communities ; they resolved at length to from
retire behind the line of the Ebro, and set themselves in all Ilerda-
haste to form a bridge of boats over the Ebro below the
mouth of the Sicoris. Caesar sought to cut off the retreat
of his opponents over the Ebro and to detain them in
Ilerda ; but so long as the enemy remained in possession
of the bridge at Ilerda and he had control of neither ford
follows.
224 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
nor bridge there, he could not distribute his army over both
banks of the river and could not invest Ilerda. His soldiers
therefore worked day and night to lower the depth of the
river by means of canals drawing off the water, so that the
infantry could wade through it. But the preparations of
the Pompeians to pass the Ebro were sooner finished than
the arrangements of the Caesarians for investing Ilerda;
when the former after finishing the bridge of boats began
their march towards the Ebro along the left bank of the
Sicoris, the canals of the Caesarians seemed to the general
not yet far enough advanced to make the ford available for
the infantry \ he ordered only his cavalry to pass the stream
and, by clinging to the rear of the enemy, at least to detain
and harass them.
Caesar But when Caesar's legions saw in the gray morning the
enemy's columns which had been retiring since midnight,
they discerned with the sure instinct of experienced veterans
the strategic importance of this retreat, which would
compel them to follow their antagonists into distant and
impracticable regions filled by hostile troops ; at their own
request the general ventured to lead the infantry also into
the river, and although the water reached up to the
shoulders of the men, it was crossed without accident. It
was high time. If the narrow plain, which separated the
town of Ilerda from the mountains enclosing the Ebro
were once traversed and the army of the Pompeians
entered the mountains, their retreat to the Ebro could no
longer be prevented. Already they had, notwithstanding
the constant attacks of the enemy's cavalry which greatly
delayed their march, approached within five miles of the
mountains, when they, having been on the march since
midnight and unspeakably exhausted, abandoned their
original plan of traversing the whole plain on the same
day, and pitched their camp. Here the infantry of Caesar
overtook them and encamped opposite to them in the
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 225
evening and during the night, as the nocturnal march
which the Pompeians had at first contemplated was
abandoned from fear of the night-attacks of the cavalry.
On the following day also both armies remained immove-
able, occupied only in reconnoitring the country.
Early in the morning of the third day Caesar's infantry The route
set out, that by a movement through the pathless mountains g^6
alongside of the road they might turn the position of the closed,
enemy and bar their route to the Ebro. The object of the
strange march, which seemed at first to turn back towards
the camp before Ilerda, was not at once perceived by the
Pompeian officers. When they discerned it, they sacrificed
camp and baggage and advanced by a forced march along
the highway, to gain the crest of the ridge before the
Caesarians. But it was already too late ; when they came
up, the compact masses of the enemy were already posted
on the highway itself. A desperate attempt of the
Pompeians to discover other routes to the Ebro over the
steep mountains was frustrated by Caesar's cavalry, which
surrounded and cut to pieces the Lusitanian troops sent
forth for that purpose. Had a battle taken place between
the Pompeian army — which had the enemy's cavalry in its
rear and their infantry in front, and was utterly demoralized
— and the Caesarians, the issue was scarcely doubtful, and
the opportunity for fighting several times presented itself;
but Caesar made no use of it, and, not without difficulty,
restrained the impatient eagerness for the combat in his
soldiers sure of victory. The Pompeian army was at any
rate strategically lost ; Caesar avoided weakening his army
and still further envenoming the bitter feud by useless
bloodshed. On the very day after he had succeeded in
cutting off the Pompeians from the Ebro, the soldiers of
the two armies had begun to fraternize and to negotiate
respecting surrender; indeed the terms asked by the
Pompeians, especially as to the sparing of their officers,
VOL. V I48
226 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
had been already conceded by Caesar, when Petreius with
his escort consisting of slaves and Spaniards came upon
the negotiators and caused the Caesarians, on whom he
could lay hands, to be put to death. Caesar nevertheless
sent the Pompeians who had come to his camp back un-
harmed, and persevered in seeking a peaceful solution.
Ilerda, where the Pompeians had still a garrison and con-
siderable magazines, became now the point which they
sought to reach ; but with the hostile army in front and
the Sicoris between them and the fortress, they marched
without coming nearer to their object. Their cavalry
became gradually so afraid that the infantry had to take
them into the centre and legions had to be set as the rear-
guard; the procuring of water and forage became more
and more difficult ; they had already to kill the beasts of
burden, because they could no longer feed them. At
length the wandering army found itself formally inclosed,
with the Sicoris in its rear and the enemy's force in front,
which drew rampart and trench around it It attempted
to cross the river, but Caesar's German horsemen and light
infantry anticipated it in the occupation of the opposite
bank.
Capitula- No bravery and no fidelity could longer avert the in-
Pom- [49. evitable capitulation (2 Aug. 705). Caesar granted to
peians. officers and soldiers their life and liberty, and the posses-
sion of the property which they still retained as well as the
restoration of what had been already taken from them, the
full value of which he undertook personally to make good
to his soldiers ; and not only so, but while he had compul-
sorily enrolled in his army the recruits captured in Italy,
he honoured these old legionaries of Pompeius by the
promise that no one should be compelled against his will
to enter Caesar's army. He required only that each should
give up his arms and repair to his home. Accordingly the
soldiers who were natives of Spain, about a third of the
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 227
army, were disbanded at once, while the Italian soldiers
were discharged on the borders of Transalpine and Cis-
alpine Gaul.
Hither Spain on the breaking up of this army fell of Further
itself into the power of the victor. In Further Spain, where gu^ts.
Marcus Varro held the chief command for Pompeius, it
seemed to him, when he learned the disaster of Ilerda,
most advisable that he should throw himself into the insular
town of Gades and should carry thither for safety the con-
siderable sums which he had collected by confiscating the
treasures of the temples and the property of prominent
Caesarians, the not inconsiderable fleet which he had
raised, and the two legions entrusted to him. But on the
mere rumour of Caesar's arrival the most notable towns of
the province which had been for long attached to Caesar
declared for the latter and drove away the Pompeian
garrisons or induced them to a similar revolt ; such was
the case with Corduba, Carmo, and Gades itself. One of
the legions also set out of its own accord for Hispalis, and
passed over along with this town to Caesar's side. When
at length even Italica closed its gates against Varro, the
latter resolved to capitulate.
About the same time Massilia also submitted. With Siege of
rare energy the Massiliots had not merely sustained a siege,
but had also kept the sea against Caesar; it was their
native element, and they might hope to obtain vigorous
support on it from Pompeius, who in fact had the exclusive
command of it. But Caesar's lieutenant, the able Decimus
Brutus, the same who had achieved the first naval victory
in the Atlantic over the Veneti (p. 55/), managed rapidly
to equip a fleet ; and in spite of the brave resistance of the
enemy's crews — consisting partly of Albioecian mercenaries
of the Massiliots, partly of slave-herdsmen of Domitius —
he vanquished by means of his brave marines selected from
the legions the stronger Massiliot fleet, and sank or captured
Massilia.
228 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book V
the greater part of their ships. When therefore a small
Pompeian squadron under Lucius Nasidius arrived from
the east by way of Sicily and Sardinia in the port of
Massilia, the Massiliots once more renewed their naval
armament and sailed forth along with the ships of Nasidius
against Brutus. The engagement which took place off
Tauroeis (La Ciotat to the east of Marseilles) might prob-
ably have had a different result, if the vessels of Nasidius
had fought with the same desperate courage which the
Massiliots displayed on that day; but the flight of the
Nasidians decided the victory in favour of Brutus, and the
remains of the Pompeian fleet fled to Spain. The besieged
were completely driven from the sea. On the landward
side, where Gaius Trebonius conducted the siege, the most
resolute resistance was still continued ; but in spite of the
frequent sallies of the Albioecian mercenaries and the skilful
expenditure of the immense stores of projectiles accumu-
lated in the city, the works of the besiegers were at length
advanced up to the walls and one of the towers fell. The
Massiliots declared that they would give up the defence,
but desired to conclude the capitulation with Caesar him-
self, and entreated the Roman commander to suspend the
siege operations till Caesar's arrival. Trebonius had ex-
press orders from Caesar to spare the town as far as
possible ; he granted the armistice desired. But when the
Massiliots made use of it for an artful sally, in which they
completely burnt the one-half of the almost unguarded
Roman works, the struggle of the siege began anew and
with increased exasperation. The vigorous commander of
the Romans repaired with surprising rapidity the destroyed
towers and the mound ; soon the Massiliots were once
more completely invested.
Massilia When Caesar on his return from the conquest of Spain
capitulates. arrive(} before their city, he found it reduced to extremities
partly by the enemy's attacks, partly by famine and pesti-
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 229
lence, and ready for the second time — on this occasion in
right earnest — to surrender on any terms. Domitius alone,
remembering the indulgence of the victor which he had
shamefully misused, embarked in a boat and stole through
the Roman fleet, to seek a third battle-field for his implac-
able resentment. Caesar's soldiers had sworn to put to
the sword the whole male population of the perfidious city,
and vehemently demanded from the general the signal for
plunder. But Caesar, mindful here also of his great task
of establishing Helleno-Italic civilization in the west, was
not to be coerced into furnishing a sequel to the destruc-
tion of Corinth. Massilia — the most remote from the
mother-country of all those cities, once so numerous, free,
and powerful, that belonged to the old Ionic mariner-
nation, and almost the last in which the Hellenic seafaring
life had preserved itself fresh and pure, as in fact it was
the last Greek city that fought at sea — Massilia had to
surrender its magazines of arms and naval stores to the
victor, and lost a portion of its territory and of its privi-
leges ; but it retained its freedom and its nationality
and continued, though with diminished proportions in a
material point of view, to be still as before intellectually
the centre of Hellenic culture in that distant Celtic country
which at this very time was attaining a new historical
significance.
While thus in the western provinces the war after Expedi-
various critical vicissitudes was thoroughly decided at caesarto
length in favour of Caesar, Spain and Massilia were the corQ-
, provinces,
subdued, and the chief army of the enemy was captured
to the last man, the decision of arms had also taken place
on the second arena of warfare, on which Caesar had
found it necessary immediately after the conquest of Italy
to assume the offensive.
We have already mentioned that the Pompeianu
intended to reduce Italy to starvation. They had the
23°
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA,
BOOK V
Sardinia
occupied
means of doing so in their hands. They had thorough
command of the sea and laboured with great zeal every-
where— in Gades, Utica, Messana, above all in the east —
to increase their fleet. They held moreover all the
provinces, from which the capital drew its means of
subsistence : Sardinia and Corsica through Marcus Cotta,
Sicily through Marcus Cato, Africa through the self-
nominated commander-in-chief Titus Attius Varus and
their ally Juba king of Numidia. It was indispensably
needful for Caesar to thwart these plans of the enemy and
to wrest from them the corn-provinces. Quintus Valerius
was sent with a legion to Sardinia and compelled the
Pompeian governor to evacuate the island. The more
important enterprise of taking Sicily and Africa from the
enemy was entrusted to the young Gaius Curio with the
assistance of the able Gaius Caninius Rebilus, who
possessed experience in war. Sicily was occupied by him
without a blow; Cato, without a proper army and not a
man of the sword, evacuated the island, after having in
his straightforward manner previously warned the Siceliots
not to compromise themselves uselessly by an ineffectual
resistance.
Landing of Curio left behind half of his troops to protect this island
Afric° m so imPortant f°r tne capital, and embarked with the other
half — two legions and 500 horsemen — for Africa. Here
he might expect to encounter more serious resistance;
besides the considerable and in its own fashion efficient
army of Juba, the governor Varus had formed two legions
from the Romans settled in Africa and also fitted out a
small squadron of ten sail. With the aid of his superior
fleet, however, Curio effected without difficulty a landing
between Hadrumetum, where the one legion of the enemy
lay along with their ships of war, and Utica, in front of
which town lay the second legion under Varus himself.
Curio turned against the latter, and pitched his camp not
Sicily
occupied,
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 231
far from Utica, just where a century and a half before the
elder Scipio had taken up his first winter-camp in Africa
(ii. 355). Caesar, compelled to keep together his best
troops for the Spanish war, had been obliged to make up
the Sicilo-African army for the most part out of the legions
taken over from the enemy, more especially the war-
prisoners of Corfinium ; the officers of the Pompeian army
in Africa, some of whom had served in the very legions
that were conquered at Corfinium, now left no means
untried to bring back their old soldiers who were now
fighting against them to their first allegiance. But Caesar
had not erred in the choice of his lieutenant. Curio knew
as well how to direct the movements of the army and of
the fleet, as how to acquire personal influence over the
soldiers ; the supplies were abundant, the conflicts without
exception successful.
When Varus, presuming that the troops of Curio wanted Curio
opportunity to pass over to his side, resolved to give battle atLJtica!
chiefly for the sake of affording them this opportunity, the
result did not justify his expectations. Animated by the
fiery appeal of their youthful leader, the cavalry of Curio
put to flight the horsemen of the enemy, and in presence
of the two armies cut down also the light infantry which
had accompanied the horsemen ; and emboldened by this
success and by Curio's personal example, his legions
advanced through the difficult ravine separating the two
lines to the attack, for which the Pompeians however did
not wait, but disgracefully fled back to their camp and
evacuated even this in the ensuing night. The victory
was so complete that Curio at once took steps to besiege
Utica. When news arrived, however, that king Juba was
advancing with all his forces to its relief, Curio resolved,
just as Scipio had done on the arrival of Syphax, to raise
the siege and to return to Scipio's former camp till rein-
forcements should arrive from Sicily. Soon afterwards
232 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
came a second report, that king Juba had been induced
by the attacks of neighbouring princes to turn back with
his main force and was sending to the aid of the besieged
merely a moderate corps under Saburra. Curio, who from
his lively temperament had only with great reluctance
made up his mind to rest, now set out again at once to
fight with Saburra before he could enter into communi-
cation with the garrison of Utica.
Curio His cavalry, which had gone forward in the evening,
by Juba actually succeeded in surprising the corps of Saburra on
on the the Bagradas during the night and inflicting much damage
upon it ; and on the news of this victory Curio hastened
the march of the infantry, in order by their means to
complete the defeat Soon they perceived on the last
slopes of the heights that sank towards the Bagradas
the corps of Saburra, which was skirmishing with the
Roman horsemen ; the legions coming up helped to drive
it completely down into the plain. But here the combat
changed its aspect. Saburra was not, as they supposed,
destitute of support ; on the contrary he was not much
more than five miles distant from the Numidian main
force. Already the flower of the Numidian infantry and
2000 Gallic and Spanish horsemen had arrived on the
field of battle to support Saburra, and the king in person
with the bulk of the army and sixteen elephants was
approaching. After the nocturnal march and the hot
conflict there were at the moment not more than 200 of
the Roman cavalry together, and these as well as the
infantry, extremely exhausted by fatigue and fighting, were
all surrounded, in the wide plain into which they had
allowed themselves to be allured, by the continually
increasing hosts of the enemy. Vainly Curio endeavoured
to engage in close combat ; the Libyan horsemen retreated,
as they were wont, so soon as a Roman division advanced,
only to pursue it when it turned. In vain he attempted
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 233
to regain the heights; they were occupied and foreclosed
by the enemy's horse. All was lost. The infantry was
cut down to the last man. Of the cavalry a few succeeded Death of
in cutting their way through; Curio too might have Cuna
probably saved himself, but he could not bear to appear
alone before his master without the army entrusted to him,
and died sword in hand. Even the force which was
collected in the camp before Utica, and that which
guarded the fleet — which might so easily have escaped to
Sicily — surrendered under the impression made by the
fearfully rapid catastrophe on the following day to Varus
(Aug. or Sept. 705). 49.
So ended the expedition arranged by Caesar to Sicily
and Africa. It attained its object so far, since by the
occupation of Sicily in connection with that of Sardinia at
least the most urgent wants of the capital were relieved ;
the miscarriage of the conquest of Africa — from which the
victorious party drew no farther substantial gain — and the
loss of two untrustworthy legions might be got over. But
the early death of Curio was an irreparable loss for Caesar,
and indeed for Rome. Not without reason had Caesar
entrusted the most important independent command to this
young man, although he had no military experience and
was notorious for his dissolute life ; there was a spark of
Caesar's own spirit in the fiery youth. He resembled
Caesar, inasmuch as he too had drained the cup of pleasure
to the dregs ; inasmuch as he did not become a statesman
because he was an officer, but on the contrary it was his
political action that placed the sword in his hands ; inas-
much as his eloquence was not that of rounded periods, but
the eloquence of deeply -felt thought; inasmuch as his
mode of warfare was based on rapid action with slight
means ; inasmuch as his character was marked by levity
and often by frivolity, by pleasant frankness and thorough
life in the moment. If, as his general says of him, youthful
234
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA,
BOOK V
Pompeius'
plan of [49,
campaign
for 705.
fire and high courage carried him into incautious acts, and
if he too proudly accepted death that he might not submit
to be pardoned for a pardonable fault, traits of similar
imprudence and similar pride are not wanting in Caesar's
history also. We may regret that this exuberant nature was
not permitted to work off its follies and to preserve itself
for the following generation so miserably poor in talents, and
so rapidly falling a prey to the dreadful rule of mediocrities.
How far these events of the war in 705 interfered with
Pompeius' general plan for the campaign, and particularly
what part in that plan was assigned after the loss of Italy
to the important military corps in the west, can only
be determined by conjecture. That Pompeius had the
intention of coming by way of Africa and Mauretania to
the aid of his army fighting in Spain, was simply a romantic,
and beyond doubt altogether groundless, rumour circu-
lating in the camp of Ilerda. It is much more likely that
he still kept by his earlier plan of attacking Caesar from
both sides in Transalpine and Cisalpine Gaul (p. 206) even
after the loss of Italy, and meditated a combined attack at
once from Spain and Macedonia. It may be presumed
that the Spanish army was meant to remain on the defensive
at the Pyrenees till the Macedonian army in the course of
organization was likewise ready to march ; whereupon both
would then have started simultaneously and effected a
junction according to circumstances either on the Rhone or
on the Po, while the fleet, it may be conjectured, would
have attempted at the same time to reconquer Italy proper.
On this supposition apparently Caesar had first prepared
himself to meet an attack on Italy. One of the ablest of
his officers, the tribune of the people Marcus Antonius,
commanded there with propraetorian powers. The south-
eastern ports — Sipus, Brundisium, Tarentum — where an
attempt at landing was first to be expected, had received a
garrison of three legions. Besides this Quintus Hortensius,
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 235
the degenerate son of the well-known orator, collected a
fleet in the Tyrrhene Sea, and Publius Dolabella a second
fleet in the Adriatic, which were to be employed partly to
support the defence, partly to transport the intended
expedition to Greece. In the event of Pompeius
attempting to penetrate by land into Italy, Marcus Licinius
Crassus, the eldest son of the old colleague of Caesar, was
to conduct the defence of Cisalpine Gaul, Gaius the
younger brother of Marcus Antonius that of Illyricum.
But the expected attack was long in coming. It was Caesars
not till the height of summer that the conflict began in fleeta?d
Illyria. There Caesar's lieutenant Gaius Antonius with illyricum
his two legions lay in the island of Curicta (Veglia in the destro^e
gulf of Quarnero), and Caesar's admiral Publius Dolabella
with forty ships lay in the narrow arm of the sea between
this island and the mainland. The admirals of Pompeius
in the Adriatic, Marcus Octavius with the Greek, Lucius
Scribonius Libo with the Illyrian division of the fleet,
attacked the squadron of Dolabella, destroyed all his ships,
and cut off Antonius on his island. To rescue him, a
corps under Basilus and Sallustius came from Italy and the
squadron of Hortensius from the Tyrrhene Sea; but
neither the former nor the latter were able to effect
anything in presence of the far superior fleet of the enemy.
The legions of Antonius had to be abandoned to their fate.
Provisions came to an end, the troops became troublesome
and mutinous ; with the exception of a few divisions,
which succeeded in reaching the mainland on rafts, the
corps, still fifteen cohorts strong, laid down their arms and
were conveyed in the vessels of Libo to Macedonia to be
there incorporated with the Pompeian army, while Octavius
was left to complete the subjugation of the Illyrian coast
now denuded of troops. The Dalmatae, now far the most
powerful tribe in these regions (p. 103), the important
insular town of Issa (Lissa), and other townships, embraced
236 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, BOOK v
the party of Pompeius; but the adherents of Caesar
maintained themselves in Salonae (Spalato) and Lissus
(Alessio), and in the former town not merely sustained with
courage a siege, but when they were reduced to extremities,
made a sally with such effect that Octavius raised the siege
and sailed off to Dyrrhachium to pass the winter there.
Result The success achieved in Illyricum by the Pompeian
. fleet, although of itself not inconsiderable, had yet but
campaign * ° J
as a whole, little influence on the issue of the campaign as a whole ;
and it appears miserably small, when we consider that the
performances of the land and naval forces under the
supreme command of Pompeius during the whole eventful
49. year 705 were confined to this single feat of arms, and
that from the east, where the general, the senate, the
second great army, the principal fleet, the immense military
and still more extensive financial resources of the antagon-
ists of Caesar were united, no intervention at all took place
where it was needed in that all-decisive struggle in the
west. The scattered condition of the forces in the eastern
half of the empire, the method of the general never to
operate except with superior masses, his cumbrous and
tedious movements, and the discord of the coalition may
perhaps explain in some measure, though not excuse, the
inactivity of the land-force; but that the fleet, which
commanded the Mediterranean without a rival, should have
thus done nothing to influence the course of affairs —
nothing for Spain, next to nothing for the faithful Massiliots,
nothing to defend Sardinia, Sicily, Africa, or, if not to
reoccupy Italy, at least to obstruct its supplies — this
makes demands on our ideas of the confusion and per-
versity prevailing in the Pompeian camp, which we can
only with difficulty meet.
The aggregate result of this campaign was corresponding.
Caesar's double aggressive movement, against Spain and
against Sicily and Africa, was successful in the former case
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 237
completely, in the latter at least partially ; while Pompeius'
plan of starving Italy was thwarted in the main by the
taking away of Sicily, and his general plan of campaign
was frustrated completely by the destruction of the Spanish
army; and in Italy only a very small portion of Caesar's
defensive arrangements had come to be applied. Notwith-
standing the painfully- felt losses in Africa and Illyria,
Caesar came forth from this first year of the war in the
most decided and most decisive manner as victor.
If, however, nothing material was done from the east to Organia*.
obstruct Caesar in the subjugation of the west, efforts at ^^ in
least were made towards securing political and military donia.
consolidation there during the respite so ignominiously
obtained. The great rendezvous of the opponents of
Caesar was Macedonia. Thither Pompeius himself and The
the mass of the emigrants from Brundisium resorted ; em,gran
thither came the other refugees from the west : Marcus
Cato from Sicily, Lucius Domitius from Massilia, but more
especially a number of the best officers and soldiers of the
broken-up army of Spain, with its generals Afranius and
Varro at their head. In Italy emigration gradually became
among the aristocrats a question not of honour merely but
almost of fashion, and it obtained a fresh impulse through
the unfavourable accounts which arrived regarding Caesar's
position before Ilerda ; not a few of the more lukewarm
partisans and the political trimmers went over by degrees,
and even Marcus Cicero at last persuaded himself that he
did not adequately discharge his duty as a citizen by writing
a dissertation on concord. The senate of emigrants at
Thessalonica, where the official Rome pitched its interim
abode, numbered nearly 200 members, including many
venerable old men and almost all the consulars. But
emigrants indeed they were. This Roman Coblentz
displayed a pitiful spectacle in the high pretensions and
paltry performances of the genteel world of Rome, their
hikewjiiiru
238 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
unseasonable reminiscences and still more unseasonable
recriminations, their political perversities and financial
embarrassments. It was a matter of comparatively slight
moment that, while the old structure was falling to pieces,
they were with the most painstaking gravity watching over
every old ornamental scroll and every speck of rust in the
constitution ; after all it was simply ridiculous, when the
genteel lords had scruples of conscience as to calling their
deliberative assembly beyond the sacred soil of the city the
senate, and cautiously gave it the title of the "three
hundred " ;x or when they instituted tedious investigations
in state law as to whether and how a curiate law could be
legitimately enacted elsewhere than within the ring-wall of
Rome.
The Far worse traits were the indifference of the lukewarm
and the narrow-minded stubbornness of the ultras. The
former could not be brought to act or even to keep silence.
If they were asked to exert themselves in some definite
way for the common good, with the inconsistency charac-
teristic of weak people they regarded any such suggestion
as a malicious attempt to compromise them still further,
and either did not do what they were ordered at all or did
it with half heart. At the same time of course, with their
affectation of knowing better when it was too late and their
over-wise impracticabilities, they proved a perpetual clog
to those who were acting ; their daily work consisted in
criticizing, ridiculing, and bemoaning every occurrence great
1 As according to formal law the "legal deliberative assembly"
undoubtedly, just like the "legal court," could only take place in the city
itself or within the precincts, the assembly representing the senate in the
African army called itself the "three hundred" (Bell. Afric. 88, 90;
Appian, ii. 95), not because it consisted of 300 members, but because this
was the ancient normal number of senators (i. 98). It is very likely that
this assembly recruited its ranks by equites of repute ; but, when Plutarch
makes the three hundred to be Italian wholesale dealers (Cato Mitt. 59,
61), he has misunderstood his authority (Bell. Afr. 90). Of a similar
kind must have been the arrangement as to the quasi-senate already in
Thessalonica.
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 239
and small, and in unnerving and discouraging the multitude
by their own sluggishness and hopelessness.
While these displayed the utter prostration of weakness, The ultras,
the ultras on the other hand exhibited in full display its
exaggerated action. With them there was no attempt to
conceal that the preliminary to any negotiation for peace
was the bringing over of Caesar's head ; every one of the
attempts towards peace, which Caesar repeatedly made
even now, was tossed aside without being examined, or
employed only to cover insidious attempts on the lives of
the commissioners of their opponent. That the declared
partisans of Caesar had jointly and severally forfeited life
and property, was a matter of course; but it fared little
better with those more or less neutral. Lucius Domitius,
the hero of Corfinium, gravely proposed in the council of
war that those senators who had fought in the army of
Pompeius should come to a vote on all who had either re-
mained neutral or had emigrated but not entered the army,
and should according to their own pleasure individually acquit
them or punish them by fine or even by the forfeiture of
life and property. Another of these ultras formally lodged
with Pompeius a charge of corruption and treason against
Lucius Afranius for his defective defence of Spain. Among
these deep-dyed republicans their political theory assumed
almost the character of a confession of religious faith ; they
accordingly hated their own more lukewarm partisans and
Pompeius with his personal adherents, if possible, still
more than their open opponents, and that with all the dull
obstinacy of hatred which is wont to characterize orthodox
theologians; and they were mainly to blame for the
numberless and bitter separate quarrels which distracted
the emigrant army and emigrant senate. But they did
not confine themselves to words. Marcus Bibulus, Titus
Labienus, and others of this coterie carried out their theory
in practice, and caused such officers or soldiers of Caesar's
«40 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
army as fell into their hands to be executed en masse;
which, as may well be conceived, did not tend to make
Caesar's troops fight with less energy. If the counter-
revolution in favour of the friends of the constitution, for
which all the elements were in existence (p. 216), did not
break out in Italy during Caesar's absence, the reason,
according to the assurance of discerning opponents of
Caesar, lay chiefly in the general dread of the unbridled
fury of the republican ultras after the restoration should
have taken place. The better men in the Pompeian camp
were in despair over this frantic behaviour. Pompeius,
himself a brave soldier, spared the prisoners as far as he
might and could ; but he was too pusillanimous and in too
awkward a position to prevent or even to punish all
atrocities of this sort, as it became him as commander-in-
chief to do. Marcus Cato, the only man who at least
carried moral consistency into the struggle, attempted with
more energy to check such proceedings ; he induced the
emigrant senate to prohibit by a special decree the pillage
of subject towns and the putting to death of a burgess
otherwise than in battle. The able Marcus Marcellus had
similar views. No one, indeed, knew better than Cato
and Marcellus that the extreme party would carry out their
saving deeds, if necessary, in defiance of all decrees of the
senate. But if even now, when they had still to regard
considerations of prudence, the rage of the ultras could
not be tamed, people might prepare themselves after the
victory for a reign of terror from which Marius and Sulla
themselves would have turned away with horror; and we
can understand why Cato, according to his own confession,
was more afraid of the victory than of the defeat of his
own party.
The pre- The management of the military preparations in the
^^M Macedonian camp was in the hands of Pompeius the
commander-in-chief. His position, always troublesome
chap. X PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 241
and galling, had become still worse through the unfortunate
events of 705. In the eyes of his partisans he was mainly *9«
to blame for this result. This judgment was in various
respects not just. A considerable part of the misfortunes
endured was to be laid to the account of the perversity
and insubordination of the lieutenant-generals, especially
of the consul Lentulus and Lucius Domitius; from the
moment when Pompeius took the head of the army, he
had led it with skill and courage, and had saved at least
very considerable forces from the shipwreck; that he
was not a match for Caesar's altogether superior genius,
which was now recognized by all, could not be fairly
made matter of reproach to him. But the result alone
decided men's judgment. Trusting to the general Pompeius,
the constitutional party had broken with Caesar; the
pernicious consequences of this breach recoiled upon the
general Pompeius; and, though owing to the notorious
military incapacity of all the other chiefs no attempt was
made to change the supreme command, yet confidence at
any rate in the commander-in-chief was paralyzed. To
these painful consequences of the defeats endured were
added the injurious influences of the emigration. Among
the refugees who arrived there were certainly a number
of efficient soldiers and capable officers, especially those
belonging to the former Spanish army; but the number
of those who came to serve and fight was just as small as
that of the generals of quality who called themselves pro-
consuls and imperators with as good title as Pompeius,
and of the genteel lords who took part in active military
service more or less reluctantly, was alarmingly great.
Through these the mode of life in the capital was introduced
into the camp, not at all to the advantage of the army ;
the tents of such grandees were graceful bowers, the ground
elegantly covered with fresh turf, the walls clothed with
ivy; silver plate stood on the table, and the wine-cup
VOL V 149
242 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
often circulated there even in broad daylight. Those
fashionable warriors formed a singular contrast with Caesar's
daredevils, who ate coarse bread from which the former
recoiled, and who, when that failed, devoured even roots
and swore that they would rather chew the bark of trees
than desist from the enemy. While, moreover, the action
of Pompeius was hampered by the necessity of having
regard to the authority of a collegiate board personally
disinclined to him, this embarrassment was singularly
increased when the senate of emigrants took up its abode
almost in his very headquarters and all the venom of
the emigrants now found vent in these senatorial sittings.
Lastly there was nowhere any man of mark, who could
have thrown his own weight into the scale against all
these preposterous doings. Pompeius himself was in-
tellectually far too secondary for that purpose, and far
too hesitating, awkward, and reserved. Marcus Cato would
have had at least the requisite moral authority, and would
not have lacked the good will to support Pompeius with
it ; but Pompeius, instead of calling him to his assistance,
out of distrustful jealousy kept him in the background,
and preferred for instance to commit the highly important
chief command of the fleet to the in every respect incapable
Marcus Bibulus raiher than to Cato.
The While Pompeius thus treated the political aspect of
PomDeius. ^is position with his characteristic perversity, and did his
best to make what was already bad in itself still worse,
he devoted himself on the other hand with commendable
zeal to his duty of giving military organization to the
considerable but scattered forces of his party. The flower
of his force was composed of the troops brought with
him from Italy, out of which with the supplementary aid
of the Ulyrian prisoners of war and the Romans domiciled
in Greece five legions in all were formed. Three others
came from the east — the two Syrian legions formed from
Pompeius.
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 243
the remains of the army of Crassus, and one made up out
of the two weak legions hitherto stationed in Cilicia.
Nothing stood in the way of the withdrawal of these corps
of occupation : because on the one hand the Pompeians
had an understanding with the Parthians, and might even
have had an alliance with them if Pompeius had not
indignantly refused to pay them the price which they
demanded for it — the cession of the Syrian province added
by himself to the empke ; and on the other hand Caesar's
plan of despatching two legions to Syria, and inducing the
Jews once more to take up arms by means of the prince
Aristobulus kept a prisoner in Rome, was frustrated partly
by other causes, partly by the death of Aristobulus. New
legions were moreover raised — one from the veteran soldiers
settled in Crete and Macedonia, two from the Romans
of Asia Minor. To all these fell to be added 2000
volunteers, who were derived from the remains of the
Spanish select corps and other similar sources ; and, lastly,
the contingents of the subjects. Pompeius like Caesar had
disdained to make requisitions of infantry from them ; only
the Epirot, Aetolian, and Thracian militia were called out
to guard the coast, and moreover 3000 archers from Greece
and Asia Minor and 1200 slingers were taken up as light
troops.
The cavalry on the other hand— with the exception of His
a noble guard, more respectable than militarily important, cava"*'
formed from the young aristocracy of Rome, and of the
Apulian slave - herdsmen whom Pompeius had mounted
(p. 205) — consisted exclusively of the contingents of the
subjects and clients of Rome. The flower of it consisted
of the Celts, partly from the garrison of Alexandria (iv. 452),
partly the contingents of king Deiotarus who in spite of
his great age had appeared in person at the head of his
troops, and of the other Galatian dynasts. With them
were associated the excellent Thracian horsemen, who
244 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
were partly brought up by their princes Sadala and
Rhascuporis, partly enlisted by Pompeius in the Mace-
donian province ; the Cappadocian cavalry ; the mounted
archers sent by Antiochus king of Commagene ; the con-
tingents of the Armenians from the west side of the
Euphrates under Taxiles, and from the other side under
Megabates, and the Numidian bands sent by king Juba
— the whole body amounted to 7000 horsemen.
Fleet Lastly the fleet of Pompeius was very considerable. It
was formed partly of the Roman transports brought from
Brundisium or subsequently built, partly of the war
vessels of the king of Egypt, of the Colchian princes, of
the Cilician dynast Tarcondimotus, of the cities of Tyre,
Rhodes, Athens, Corcyra, and generally of all the Asiatic
and Greek maritime states; and it numbered nearly 500
sail, of which the Roman vessels formed a fifth. Immense
magazines of corn and military stores were accumulated
in Dyrrhachium. The war-chest was well filled, for the
Pompeians found themselves in possession of the principal
sources of the public revenue and turned to their own
account the moneyed resources of the client-princes, of
the senators of distinction, of the farmers of the taxes,
and generally of the whole Roman and non-Roman popu-
lation within their reach. Every appliance that the
reputation of the legitimate government and the much-
renowned protectorship of Pompeius over kings and peoples
could move in Africa, Egypt, Macedonia, Greece, Western
Asia and Syria, had been put in motion for the protection
of the Roman republic; the report which circulated in
Italy that Pompeius was arming the Getae, Colchians, and
Armenians against Rome, and the designation of " king of
kings" given to Pompeius in the camp, could hardly be
called exaggerations. On the whole he had command
over an army of 7000 cavalry and eleven legions, of which}
it is true, but five at the most could be described as
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 245
accustomed to war, and over a fleet of 500 sail. The
temper of the soldiers, for whose provisioning and pay
Pompeius manifested adequate care, and to whom in the
event of victory the most abundant rewards were promised,
was throughout good, in several — and these precisely the
most efficient — divisions even excellent ; but a great
part of the army consisted of newly- raised troops, the
formation and training of which, however zealously it
was prosecuted, necessarily required time. The force
altogether was imposing, but at the same time of a some-
what motley character.
According to the design of the commander-in-chief the Junction
army and fleet were to be in substance completely united pompejans
by the winter of 705-706 along the coast and in the waters [49-48.
of Epirus. The admiral Bibulus had already arrived with coast of
no ships at his new headquarters, Corcyra. On the other Epirus.
hand the land-army, the headquarters of which had been
during the summer at Berrhoea on the Haliacmon, had not
yet come up ; the mass of it was moving slowly along the
great highway from Thessalonica towards the west coast to
the future headquarters Dyrrhachium ; the two legions,
which Metellus Scipio was bringing up from Syria, remained
at Pergamus in Asia for winter quarters and were expected
in Europe only towards spring. They were taking time in
fact for their movements. For the moment the ports of
Epirus were guarded, over and above the fleet, merely by
their own civic defences and the levies of the adjoining
districts.
Tt thus remained possible for Caesar, notwithstanding Caesar
the intervention of the Spanish war, to assume the offensive pompeius.
also in Macedonia ; and he at least was not slow to act
He had long ago ordered the collection of vessels of war
and transports in Brundisium, and after the capitulation
of the Spanish army and the fall of Massilia had directed
the greater portion of the select troops employed there
246 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
to proceed to that destination. The unparalleled exer-
tions no doubt, which were thus required by Caesar from
his soldiers, thinned the ranks more than their conflicts
had done, and the mutiny of one of the four oldest legions,
the ninth, on its march through Placentia was a dangerous
indication of the temper prevailing in the army ; but
Caesar's presence of mind and personal authority gained
the mastery, and from this quarter nothing impeded the
embarkation. But the want of ships, through which the
49. pursuit of Pompeius had failed in March 705, threatened
also to frustrate this expedition. The war-vessels, which
Caesar had given orders to build in the Gallic, Sicilian,
and Italian ports, were not yet ready or at any rate not
on the spot ; his squadron in the Adriatic had been in
the previous year destroyed at Curicta (p. 235) ; he found
at Brundisium not more than twelve ships of war and
scarcely transports enough to convey over at once the
third part of his army — of twelve legions and 10,000
cavalry — destined for Greece. The considerable fleet
of the enemy exclusively commanded the Adriatic and
especially all the harbours of the mainland and islands
on its eastern coast. Under such circumstances the
question presents itself, why Caesar did not instead of
the maritime route choose the land route through Illyria,
which relieved him from all the perils threatened by the
fleet and besides was shorter for his troops, who mostly
came from Gaul, than the route by Brundisium. It is true
that the regions of Illyria were rugged and poor beyond
description ; but they were traversed by other armies not
long afterwards, and this obstacle can hardly have appeared
insurmountable to the conqueror of Gaul. Perhaps he
apprehended that during the troublesome march through
Illyria Pompeius might convey his whole force over the
Adriatic, whereby their parts might come at once to be
changed — with Caesar in Macedonia, and Pompeius in
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 247
Italy ; although such a rapid change was scarcely to be
expected from his slow-moving antagonist. Perhaps Caesar
had decided for the maritime route on the supposition
that his fleet would meanwhile be brought into a condi-
tion to command respect, and, when after his return
from Spain he became aware of the true state of things
in the Adriatic, it might be too late to change the plan
of campaign. Perhaps — and, in accordance with Caesar's
quick temperament always urging him to decision, we
may even say in all probability — he found himself irre-
sistibly tempted by the circumstance that the Epirot
coast was still at the moment unoccupied but would
certainly be covered in a few days by the enemy, to
thwart once more by a bold stroke the whole plan of
his antagonist.
However this may be, on the 4th Jan. 706 x Caesar set 48.
sail with six legions greatly thinned by toil and sickness i^Thi
and 600 horsemen from Brundisium for the coast of Epirus.
Epirus. It was a counterpart to the foolhardy Britannic
expedition ; but at least the first throw was fortunate.
The coast was reached in the middle of the Acrocer-
aunian (Chimara) cliffs, at the little- frequented roadstead
of Paleassa (Paljassa). The transports were seen both
from the harbour of Oricum (creek of Avlona) where a
Pompeian squadron of eighteen sail was lying, and from
the headquarters of the hostile fleet at Corcyra ; but in
the one quarter they deemed themselves too weak, in the
other they were not ready to sail, so that the first freight
was landed without hindrance. While the vessels at
once returned to bring over the second, Caesar on that
same evening scaled the Acroceraunian mountains. His First
first successes were as great as the surprise of his enemies.
The Epirot militia nowhere offered resistance ; the import-
ant seaport towns of Oricum and Apollonia along with a
1 According to the rectified calendar on the 5th Nov. 705. 49.
248 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book %
number of smaller townships were taken, and Dyrrhachium,
selected by the Pompeians as their chief arsenal and filled
with stores of all sorts, but only feebly garrisoned, was in
the utmost danger.
Caesar cut But the further course of the campaign did not cor-
itaiy.°m respond to this brilliant beginning. Bibulus subsequently
made up in some measure for the negligence, of which he
had allowed himself to be guilty, by redoubling his exer-
tions. He not only captured nearly thirty of the trans-
ports returning home, and caused them with every living
thing on board to be burnt, but he also established along
the whole district of coast occupied by Caesar, from the
island Sason (Saseno) as far as the ports of Corcyra, a
most careful watch, however troublesome it was rendered
by the inclement season of the year and the necessity of
bringing everything necessary for the guard-ships, even
wood and water, from Corcyra ; in fact his successor Libo
— for he himself soon succumbed to the unwonted fatigues
— even blockaded for a time the port of Brundisium, till
the want of water again dislodged him from the little island
in front of it on which he had established himself. It was
not possible for Caesar's officers to convey the second
portion of the army over to their general. As little did
he himself succeed in the capture of Dyrrhachium. Pom-
peius learned through one of Caesar's peace envoys as to
his preparations for the voyage to the Epirot coast, and,
thereupon accelerating his march, threw himself just at the
right time into that important arsenal. The situation of
Caesar was critical. Although he extended his range in
Epirus as far as with his slight strength was at all possible,
the subsistence of his army remained difficult and precari-
ous, while the enemy, in possession of the magazines of
Dyrrhachium and masters of the sea, had abundance of
everything. With his army presumably little above 20,000
strong he could not offer battle to that of Pompeius at
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 249
least twice as numerous, but had to deem himself fortunate
that Pompeius went methodically to work and, instead of
immediately forcing a battle, took up his winter quarters
between Dyrrhachium and Apollonia on the right bank of
the Apsus, facing Caesar on the left, in order that after the
arrival of the legions from Pergamus in the spring he
might annihilate the enemy with an irresistibly superior
force. Thus months passed. If the arrival of the better
season, which brought to the enemy a strong additional
force and the free use of his fleet, found Caesar still in
the same position, he was to all appearance lost, with his
weak band wedged in among the rocks of Epirus between
the immense fleet and the three times superior land army
of the enemy; and already the winter was drawing to a
close. His sole hope still depended on the transport fleet ;
that it should steal or fight its way through the blockade
was hardly to be hoped for; but after the first voluntary
foolhardiness this second venture was enjoined by necessity.
How desperate his situation appeared to Caesar himself, is
shown by his resolution — when the fleet still came not —
to sail alone in a fisherman's boat across the Adriatic to
Brundisium in order to fetch it; which, in reality, was
only abandoned because no mariner was found to under-
take the daring voyage.
But his appearance in person was not needed to induce Antonlui
the faithful officer who commanded in Italy, Marcus Epinis.*
Antonius, to make this last effort for the saving of his
master. Once more the transport fleet, with four legions
and 800 horsemen on board, sailed from the harbour of
Brundisium, and fortunately a strong south wind carried it
past Libo's galleys. But the same wind, which thus saved
the fleet, rendered it impossible for it to land as it was
directed on the coast of Apollonia, and compelled it to
sail past the camps of Caesar and Pompeius and to steer
to the north of Dyrrhachium towards Lissus, which town
250 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
fortunately still adhered to Caesar (p. 236). When it
sailed past the harbour of Dyrrhachium, the Rhodian
galleys started in pursuit, and hardly had the ships of
Antonius entered the port of Lissus when the enemy's
squadron appeared before it. But just at this moment the
wind suddenly veered, and drove the pursuing galleys back
into the open sea and partly on the rocky coast. Through
the most marvellous good fortune the landing of the second
freight had also been successful.
Junction Antonius and Caesar were no doubt still some four
a .CSarS days' march from each other, separated by Dyrrhachium
and the whole army of the enemy ; but Antonius happily
effected the perilous march round about Dyrrhachium
through the passes of the Graba Balkan, and was received
by Caesar, who had gone to meet him, on the right bank
of the Apsus. Pompeius, after having vainly attempted
to prevent the junction of the two armies of the enemy
and to force the corps of Antonius to fight by itself, took
up a new position at Asparagium on the river Genusus
(Skumbi), which flows parallel to the Apsus between the
latter and the town of Dyrrhachium, and here remained
once more immoveable. Caesar felt himself now strong
enough to give battle ; but Pompeius declined it. On the
other hand Caesar succeeded in deceiving his adversary
and throwing himself unawares with his better marching
troops, just as at Ilerda, between the enemy's camp and
the fortress of Dyrrhachium on which it rested as a basis.
The chain of the Graba Balkan, which stretching in a
direction from east to west ends on the Adriatic in the
narrow tongue of land at Dyrrhachium, sends off — fourteen
miles to the east of Dyrrhachium — in a south-westerly direc-
tion a lateral branch which likewise turns in the form of a
crescent towards the sea, and the main chain and lateral
branch of the mountains enclose between themselves a
small plain extending round a cliff on the seashore. Here
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 251
Pompeius now took up his camp, and, although Caesar's
army kept the land route to Dyrrhachium closed against
him, he yet with the aid of his fleet remained constantly
in communication with the town and was amply and easily
provided from it with everything needful ; while among
the Caesarians, notwithstanding strong detachments to the
country lying behind, and notwithstanding all the exertions
of the general to bring about an organized system of con-
veyance and thereby a regular supply, there was more than
scarcity, and flesh, barley, nay even roots had very fre-
quently to take the place of the wheat to which they were
accustomed.
As his phlegmatic opponent persevered in his inaction, Caesar
Caesar undertook to occupy the circle of heights which mvests ™
enclosed the plain on the shore held by Pompeius, with Pompeius.
the view of being able at least to arrest the movements of
the superior cavalry of the enemy and to operate with more
freedom against Dyrrhachium, and if possible to compel
his opponent either to battle or to embarkation. Nearly
the half of Caesar's troops was detached to the interior ;
it seemed almost Quixotic to propose with the rest virtually
to besiege an army perhaps twice as strong, concentrated
in position, and resting on the sea and the fleet. Yet
Caesar's veterans by infinite exertions invested the Pom-
peian camp with a chain of posts sixteen miles long, and
afterwards added, just as before Alesia, to this inner line a
second outer one, to protect themselves against attacks
from Dyrrhachium and against attempts to turn their
position which could so easily be executed with the aid of
the fleet. Pompeius attacked more than once portions of
these entrenchments with a view to break if possible the
enemy's line, but he did not attempt to prevent the invest-
ment by a battle ; he preferred to construct in his turn a
number of entrenchments around his camp, and to connect
them with one another by lines. Both sides exerted
252 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
themselves to push forward their trenches as far as possible,
and the earthworks advanced but slowly amidst constant
conflicts. At the same time skirmishing went on on the
opposite side of Caesar's camp with the garrison of
Dyrrhachium ; Caesar hoped to get the fortress into his
power by means of an understanding with some of its
inmates, but was prevented by the enemy's fleet. There
was incessant fighting at very different points — on one of
the hottest days at six places simultaneously — and, as a
rule, the tried valour of the Caesarians had the advantage
in these skirmishes; once, for instance, a single cohort
maintained itself in its entrenchments against four legions
for several hours, till support came up. No prominent
success was attained on either side ; yet the effects of the
investment came by degrees to be oppressively felt by the
Pompeians. The stopping of the rivulets flowing from the
heights into the plain compelled them to be content with
scanty and bad well-water. Still more severely felt was
the want of fodder for the beasts of burden and the horses,
which the fleet was unable adequately to remedy ; numbers
of them died, and it was of but little avail that the horses
were conveyed by the fleet to Dyrrhachium, because there
also they did not find sufficient fodder.
Caesar'a Pompeius could not much longer delay to free himself
broken. ^rom ms disagreeable position by a blow struck against the
enemy. He was informed by Celtic deserters that the
enemy had neglected to secure the beach between his two
chains of entrenchments 600 feet distant from each other
by a cross-wall, and on this he formed his plan. While he
caused the inner line of Caesar's entrenchments to be
attacked by the legions from the camp, and the outer line
by the light troops placed in vessels and landed beyond the
enemy's entrenchments, a third division landed in the space
left between the two lines and attacked in the rear their
already sufficiently occupied defenders. The entrenchment
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 253
next to the sea was taken, and the garrison fled in wild
confusion ; with difficulty the commander of the next trench
Marcus Antonius succeeded in maintaining it and in setting
a limit for the moment to the advance of the Pompeians ;
but, apart from the considerable loss, the outermost
entrenchment along the sea remained in the hands of the
Pompeians and the line was broken through. Caesar the Caesar
more eagerly seized the opportunity, which soon after defeated!*
presented itself, of attacking a Pompeian legion, which had
incautiously become isolated, with the bulk of his infantry.
But the attacked offered valiant resistance, and, as the
ground on which the fight took place had been several times
employed for the encampment of larger and lesser divisions
and was intersected in various directions by mounds and
ditches, Caesar's right wing along with the cavalry entirely
missed its way ; instead of supporting the left in attacking
the Pompeian legion, it got into a narrow trench that led
from one of the old camps towards the river. So Pompeius,
who came up in all haste with five legions to the aid of his
troops, found the two wings of the enemy separated from
each other, and one of them in an utterly forlorn position.
When the Caesarians saw him advance, a panic seized them ;
the whole plunged into disorderly flight ; and, if the matter
ended with the loss of 1000 of the best soldiers and Caesar's
army did not sustain a complete defeat, this was due simply to
the circumstance that Pompeius also could not freely develop
his force on the broken ground, and to the further fact that,
fearing a stratagem, he at first held back his troops.
But, even as it was, these days were fraught with Conse-
mischief. Not only had Caesar endured the most serious Quencef °*
C&6S2T S
losses and forfeited at a blow his entrenchments, the result defeats,
of four months of gigantic labour ; he was by the recent
engagements thrown back again exactly to the point from
which he had set out. From the sea he was more com-
pletely driven than ever, since Pompeius' elder son Gnaeus
2<4 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
had by a bold attack partly burnt, partly carried off, Caesar's
few ships of war lying in the port of Oricum, and had soon
afterwards also set fire to the transport fleet that was left
behind in Lissus; all possibility of bringing up fresh
reinforcements to Caesar by sea from Brundisium was thut
lost. The numerous Pompeian cavalry, now released from
their confinement, poured themselves over the adjacent
country and threatened to render the provisioning of
Caesar's army, which had always been difficult, utterly
impossible. Caesar's daring enterprise of carrying on
offensive operations without ships against an enemy in
command of the sea and resting on his fleet had totally
failed. On what had hitherto been the theatre of war he
found himself in presence of an impregnable defensive
position, and unable to strike a serious blow either against
Dyrrhachium or against the hostile army; on the other
hand it depended now solely on Pompeius whether he
should proceed to attack under the most favourable cir-
cumstances an antagonist already in grave danger as to his
means of subsistence. The war had arrived at a crisis.
Hitherto Pompeius had, to all appearance, played the game
of war without special plan, and only adjusted his defence
according to the exigencies of each attack; and this was
not to be censured, for the protraction of the war gave him
opportunity of making his recruits capable of fighting, of
bringing up his reserves, and of bringing more fully into
play the superiority of his fleet in the Adriatic. Caesar
was beaten not merely in tactics but also in strategy. This
defeat had not, it is true, that effect which Pompeius not
without reason expected ; the eminent soldierly energy of
Caesar's veterans did not allow matters to come to an
immediate and total breaking up of the army by hunger and
mutiny. But yet it seemed as if it depended solely on his
opponent by judiciously following up his victory to reap its
full fruits.
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND TIIAPSUS 255
It was for Pompeius to assume the aggressive ; and he War
was resolved to do so. Three different ways of rendering *£ sp c
his victory fruitful presented themselves to him. The first Pompeius.
and simplest was not to desist from assailing the vanquished
army, and, if it departed, to pursue it. Secondly, Pompeius
might leave Caesar himself and his best troops in Greece,
and might cross in person, as he had long been making
preparations for doing, with the main army to Italy, where
the feeling was decidedly antimonarchical and the forces of
Caesar, after the despatch of the best troops and their brave
and trustworthy commandant to the Greek army, would not
be of very much moment. Lastly, the victor might turn Scipio and
inland, effect a junction with the legions of Metellus Scipio, a vinus'
and attempt to capture the troops of Caesar stationed in
the interior. The latter forsooth had, immediately after
the arrival of the second freight from Italy, on the one hand
despatched strong detachments to Aetolia and Thessaly to
procure means of subsistence for his army, and on the other
had ordered a corps of two legions under Gnaeus Domitius
Calvinus to advance on the Egnatian highway towards
Macedonia, with the view of intercepting and if possible
defeating in detail the corps of Scipio advancing on the same
road from Thessalonica. Calvinus and Scipio had already
approached within a few miles of each other, when Scipio
suddenly turned southward and, rapidly crossing the
Haliacmon (Tnje Karasu) and leaving his baggage there
under Marcus Favonius, penetrated into Thessaly, in order
to attack with superior force Caesar's legion of recruits
employed in the reduction of the country under Lucius
Cassius Longinus. But Longinus retired over the
mountains towards Ambracia to join the detachment under
Gnaeus Calvisius Sabinus sent by Caesar to Aetolia, and
Scipio could only cause him to be pursued by his Thracian
cavalry, for Calvinus threatened his reserve left behind
under Favonius on the Haliacmon with the same fat^ which
l56
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA,
BOOK V
Caesar's
retreat
from
Dyrrha-
chium to
Thessaly.
he had himself destined for Longinus. So Calvinus and
Scipio met again on the Haliacmon, and encamped there
for a considerable time opposite to each other.
Pompeius might choose among these plans ; no choice
was left to Caesar. After that unfortunate engagement he
entered on his retreat to Apollonia. Pompeius followed.
The march from Dyrrhachium to Apollonia along a difficult
road crossed by several rivers was no easy task for a
defeated army pursued by the enemy ; but the dexterous
leadership of their general and the indestructible marching
energy of the soldiers compelled Pompeius after four days'
pursuit to suspend it as useless. He had now to decide
between the Italian expedition and the march into the
interior. However advisable and attractive the former
might seem, and though various voices were raised in its
favour, he preferred not to abandon the corps of Scipio,
the more especially as he hoped by this march to ^et the
corps of Calvinus into his hands. Calvinus lay at the
moment on the Egnatian road at Heraclea Lyncestis,
between Pompeius and Scipio, and, after Caesar had re-
treated to Apollonia, farther distant from the latter than from
the great army of Pompeius ; without knowledge, moreover,
of the events at Dyrrhachium and of his hazardous position,
since after the successes achieved at Dyrrhachium the whole
country inclined to Pompeius and the messengers of Caesar
were everywhere seized. It was not till the enemy's main
force had approached within a few hours of him that
Calvinus learned from the accounts of the enemy's advanced
posts themselves the state of things. A quick departure in
a southerly direction towards Thessaly withdrew him at
the last moment from imminent destruction ; Pompeius had
to content himself with having liberated Scipio from his
position of peril. Caesar had meanwhile arrived unmolested
at Apollonia. Immediately after the disaster of Dyrrhachium
he had resolved if possible to transfer the struggle from the
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 257
coast away into the interior, with the view of getting beyond
the reach of the enemy's fleet — the ultimate cause of the
failure of his previous exertions. The march to Apollonia
had only been intended to place his wounded in safety and
to pay his soldiers there, where his depots were stationed ;
as soon as this was done, he set out for Thessaly, leaving
behind garrisons in Apollonia, Oricum, and Lissus. The
corps of Calvinus had also put itself in motion towards
Thessaly; and Caesar could effect a junction with the
reinforcements coming up from Italy, this time by the land-
route through Illyria — two legions under Quintus Cornificius
— still more easily in Thessaly than in Epirus. Ascending
by difficult paths in the valley of the Aous and crossing the
mountain-chain which separates Epirus from Thessaly, he
arrived at the Peneius; Calvinus was likewise directed
thither, and the junction of the two armies was thus
accomplished by the shortest route and that which was
least exposed to the enemy. It took place at Aeginium
not far from the source of the Peneius. The first Thessalian
town before which the now united army appeared, Gomphi,
closed its gates against it ; it was quickly stormed and given
up to pillage, and the other towns of Thessaly terrified by
this example submitted, so soon as Caesar's legions merely
appeared before the walls. Amidst these marches and
conflicts, and with the help of the supplies — albeit not too
ample — which the region on the Peneius afforded, the
traces and recollections of the calamitous days through
which they had passed gradually vanished.
The victories of Dyrrhachium had thus borne not much
immediate fruit for the victors. Pompeius with his unwieldy
army and his numerous cavalry had not been able to follow
his versatile enemy into the mountains ; Caesar like Calvinus
had escaped from pursuit, and the two stood united and in
full security in Thessaly. Perhaps it would have been the
best course, if Pompeius had now without delay embarked
VOL. V IS®
258 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
with his main force for Italy, where success was scarcely
doubtful. But in the meantime only a division of the fleet
departed for Sicily and Italy. In the camp of the coalition
the contest with Caesar was looked on as so completely
decided by the battles of Dyrrhachium that it only remained
to reap the fruits of victory, in other words, to seek out and
capture the defeated army. Their former over-cautious
reserve was succeeded by an arrogance still less justified by
the circumstances ; they gave no heed to the facts, that they
had, strictly speaking, failed in the pursuit, that they had to
hold themselves in readiness to encounter a completely re-
freshed and reorganized army in Thessaly, and that there
was no small risk in moving away from the sea, renouncing
the support of the fleet, and following their antagonist to
the battle-field chosen by himself. They were simply
resolved at any price to fight with Caesar, and therefore to
get at him as soon as possible and by the most convenient
way. Cato took up the command in Dyrrhachium, where
a garrison was left behind of eighteen cohorts, and in
Corcyra, where 300 ships of war were left ; Pompeius and
Scipio proceeded — the former, apparently, following the
Egnatian way as far as Pella and then striking into the
great road to the south, the latter from the Haliacmon
through the passes of Olympus — to the lower Peneius and
met at Larisa.
The Caesar lay to the south of Larisa in the plain — which
extends between the hill-country of Cynoscephalae and the
chain of Othrys and is intersected by a tributary of the
Peneius, the Enipeus — on the left bank of the latter stream
near the town of Pharsalus ; Pompeius pitched his camp
opposite to him on the right bank of the Enipeus along the
slope of the heights of Cynoscephalae.1 The entire army
1 The exact determination of the field of battle is difficult. Appian (fa.
75) expressly places it between (New) Pharsalus (now Fersala) and the
Enipeus. Of the two streams, which alone are of any importance in the
armies at
Pharsalus.
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 259
of Pompeius was assembled ; Caesar on the other hand
still expected the corps of nearly two legions formerly
question, and are undoubtedly the Apidanus and Enipens of the ancients —
the Sofadhitiko and the Fersaliti — the former has its sources in the
mountains of Thaumaci (Dhomoko) and the Dolopian heights, the latter
in mount Othrys, and the Fersaliti alone flows past Pharsalus ; now as the
Enipeus according to Strabo (ix. p. 432) springs from mount Othrys and
flows past Pharsalus, the Fersaliti has been most justly pronounced by
Leake {Northern Greece, iv. 320) to be the Enipeus, and the hypothesis
followed by Goler that the Fersaliti is the Apidanus is untenable. With
this all the other statements of the ancients as to the two rivers agree.
Only we must doubtless assume with Leake, that the river of Vlokho
formed by the union of the Fersaliti and the Sofadhitiko and going to the
Peneius was called by the ancients Apidanus as well as the Sofadhitiko ;
which, however, is the more natural, as while the Sofadhitiko probably has,
the Fersaliti has not, constantly water (Leake, iv. 321). Old Pharsalus,
from which the battle takes its name, must therefore have been situated
between Fersala and the Fersaliti. Accordingly the battle was fought on
the left bank of the Fersaliti, and in such a way that the Pompeians,
standing with their faces towards Pharsalus, leaned their right wing on the
river (Caesar, B. C. iii. 83 ; Frontinus, Strat. ii. 3, 22). The camp of the
Pompeians, however, cannot have stood here, but only on the slope of the
heights of Cynoscephalae, on the right bank of the Enipeus, partly because
they barred the route of Caesar to Scotussa, partly because their line of
retreat evidently went over the mountains that were to be found above the
camp towards Larisa ; if they had, according to Leake's hypothesis (iv. 482),
encamped to the east of Pharsalus on the left bank of the Enipeus, they
could never have got to the northward through this stream, which at this
very point has a deeply cut bed (Leake, iv. 469), and Pompeius must
have fled to Lamia instead of Larisa. Probably therefore the Pompeians
pitched their camp on the right bank of the Fersaliti, and passed the river
both in order to fight and in order, after the battle, to regain their
camp, whence they then moved up the slopes of Crannon and Scotussa,
which culminate above the latter place in the heights of Cynoscephalae.
This was not impossible. The Enipeus is a narrow slow-flowing rivulet,
which Leake found two feet deep in November, and which in the hot
season often lies quite dry (Leake, i. 448, and iv. 472 ; comp. Lucan, vi.
373), and the battle was fought in the height of summer. Further the
armies before the battle lay three miles and a half from each other (Appian,
B. C. ii. 65), so that the Pompeians could make all preparations and also
properly secure the communication with their camp by bridges. Had the
battle terminated in a complete rout, no doubt the retreat to and over the
river could not have been executed, and doubtless for this reason Pompeius
only reluctantly agreed to fight here. The left wing of the Pompeians
which was the most remote from the base of retreat felt this ; but the
retreat at least of their centre and their right wing was not accomplished'
in such haste as to be impracticable under the given conditions. Cae? n
and his copyists are silent as to the crossing of the river, because this
would place in too clear a light the eagerness for battle of the Pompeians
apparent otherwise from the whole narrative, and they are also silent as
to the conditions of r«treat favourabb for these.
260 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
detached to Aetolia and Thessaly, now stationed under
Quintus Fun us Calenus in Greece, and the two legions of
Cornificius which were sent after him by the land-route
from Italy and had already arrived in Illyria. The army
of Pompeius, numbering eleven legions or 47,000 men and
7000 horse, was more than double that of Caesar in infantry,
and seven times as numerous in cavalry; fatigue and
conflicts had so decimated Caesar's troops, that his eight
legions did not number more than 22,000 men under arms,
consequently not nearly the half of their normal amount.
The victorious army of Pompeius provided with a countless
cavalry and good magazines had provisions in abundance,
while the troops of Caesar had difficulty in keeping them-
selves alive and only hoped for better supplies from the
corn-harvest not far distant. The Pompeian soldiers, who
had learned in the last campaign to know war and trust their
leader, were in the best of humour. All military reasons on
the side of Pompeius favoured the view, that the decisive
battle should not be long delayed, seeing that they now
confronted Caesar in Thessaly ; and the emigrant impatience
of the many genteel officers and others accompanying the
army doubtless had more weight than even such reasons in
the council of war. Since the events of Dyrrhachium these
lords regarded the triumph of their party as an ascertained
fact ; already there was eager strife as to the filling up of
Caesar's supreme pontificate, and instructions were sent to
Rome to hire houses at the Forum for the next elections.
When Pompeius hesitated on his part to cross the rivule'
which separated the two armies, and which Caesar with his
much weaker army did not venture to pass, this excited
great indignation; Pompeius, it was alleged, only delayed
the battle in order to rule somewhat longer over so many
consulars and praetorians and to perpetuate his part of
Agamemnon. Pompeius yielded; and Caesar, who under
the impression that matters would not come to a battle, had
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 261
just projected a mode of turning the enemy's army and for
that purpose was on the point of setting out towards
Scotussa, likewise arrayed his legions for battle, when he
saw the Pompeians preparing to offer it to him on his
bank.
Thus the battle of Pharsalus was fought on the 9th The battle.
August 706, almost on the same field where a hundred and 48.
fifty years before the Romans had laid the foundation of
their dominion in the east (ii. 433). Pompeius rested his
right wing on the Enipeus ; Caesar opposite to him rested
his left on the broken ground stretching in front of the
Enipeus; the two other wings were stationed out in the
plain, covered in each case by the cavalry and the light
troops. The intention of Pompeius was to keep his infantry
on the defensive, but with bis cavalry to scatter the weak
band of horsemen which, mixed after the German fashion
with light infantry, confronted him, and then to take
Caesar's right wing in rear. His infantry courageously
sustained the first charge of that of the enemy, and the
engagement there came to a stand. Labienus likewise
dispersed the enemy's cavalry after a brave but short resist-
ance, and deployed his force to the left with the view of
turning the infantry. But Caesar, foreseeing the defeat of
his cavalry, had stationed behind it on the threatened flank
of his right wing some 2000 of his best legionaries. As the
enemy's horsemen, driving those of Caesar before them,
galloped along and around the line, they suddenly came
upon this select corps advancing intrepidly against them
and, rapidly thrown into confusion by the unexpected and
unusual infantry attack,1 they galloped at full speed from
1 With this is connected the well-known direction of Caesar to his sol-
diers to strike at the faces of the enemy's horsemen. The infantry — which
here in an altogether irregular way acted on the offensive against cavalry,
who were not to be reached with the sabres — were not to throw their pila,
but to use them as hand-spears against the cavalry and, in order to defend
themselves better against these, to thrust at their faces (Plutarch, Pomp.
26a BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
the field of battle. The victorious legionaries cut to pieces
the enemy's archers now unprotected, then rushed at the
left wing of the enemy, and began now on their part to turn
it. At the same time Caesar's third division hitherto re-
served advanced along the whole line to the attack. The
unexpected defeat of the best arm of the Pompeian army,
as it raised the courage of their opponents, broke that of
the army and above all that of the general. When
Pompeius, who from the outset did not trust his infantry,
saw the horsemen gallop off, he rode back at once from the
field of battle to the camp, without even awaiting the issue
of the general attack ordered by Caesar. His legions began
to waver and soon to retire over the brook into the camp,
which was not accomplished without severe loss.
Iu Issue. The day was thus lost and many an able soldier had
fallen, but the army was still substantially intact, and the
situation of Pompeius was far less perilous than that of
Caesar after the defeat of Dyrrhachium. But while Caesar
in the vicissitudes of his destiny had learned that fortune
loves to withdraw herself at certain moments even from her
favourites in order to be once more won back through their
perseverance, Pompeius knew fortune hitherto only as the
constant goddess, and despaired of himself and of her when
she withdrew from him ; and, while in Caesar's grander
nature despair only developed yet mightier energies, the
inferior soul of Pompeius under similar pressure sank into
the infinite abyss of despondency. As once in the war with
Sertorius he had been on the point of abandoning the office
69, 71 ; Cues. 45 ; Appian, ii. 76, 78 ; Flor. ii. 12 ; Oros. vi. 15 ; erron-
eously Frontinus, iv. 7, 32). The anecdotical turn given to this instruction,
that the Pompeian horsemen were to be brought to run away by the fear
of receiving scars in their faces, and that they actually galloped off " hold-
ing their hands before their eyes" (Plutarch), collapses of itself; for it
has point only on the supposition that the Pompeian cavalry had consisted
principally of the young nobility of Rome, the " graceful dancers" ; and
this was not the case (p. 224). At the most it may be, that the wit of the
camp gave to that simple and judicious military order this very irrational
but certainly comic turn.
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 263
entrusted to him in presence of his superior opponent and Flight of
of departing (iv. 298), so now, when he saw the legions retire )mPeius-
over the stream, he threw from him the fatal general's scarf,
and rode off by the nearest route to the sea, to find means
of embarking there. His army discouraged and leaderless
— for Scipio, although recognized by Pompeius as colleague
in supreme command, was yet general-in-chief only in name
— hoped to find protection behind the camp-walls ; but
Caesar allowed it no rest ; the obstinate resistance of the
Roman and Thracian guard of the camp was speedily over-
come, and the mass was compelled to withdraw in disorder
to the heights of Crannon and Scotussa, at the foot of
which the camp was pitched. It attempted by moving
forward along these hills to regain Larisa; but the troops
of Caesar, heeding neither booty nor fatigue and advancing
by better paths in the plain, intercepted the route of the
fugitives ; in fact, when late in the evening the Pompeians
suspended their march, their pursuers were able even to
draw an entrenched line which precluded the fugitives from
access to the only rivulet to be found in the neighbourhood.
So ended the day of Pharsalus. The enemy's army was
not only defeated, but annihilated; 15,000 of the enemy
lay dead or wounded on the field of battle, while the
Caesarians missed only 200 men ; the body which remained
together, amounting still to nearly 20,000 men, laid down
their arms on the morning after the battle ; only isolated
troops, including, it is true, the officers of most note, sought
a refuge in the mountains ; of the eleven eagles of the
enemy nine were handed over to Caesar. Caesar, who on
the very day of the battle had reminded the soldiers that
they should not forget the fellow-citizen in the foe, did not
treat the captives as did Bibulus and Labienus ; neverthe-
less he too found it necessary now to exercise some severity.
The common soldiers were incorporated in the army, fines
or confiscations of property were inflicted on the men of
264
BRUNDIblUM, ILERDA,
BOOK V
48.
The
political
effects of
the battle
of Phar-
salus.
The east
submits.
The
aristocracy
after the
battle of
Pharsalus.
better rank ; the senators and equites of note who were
taken, with few exceptions, suffered death. The time for
clemency was past; the longer the civil war lasted, the
more remorseless and implacable it became.
Some time elapsed, before the consequences of the 9th
of August 706 could be fully discerned. What admitted
of least doubt, was the passing over to the side of Caesar
of all those who had attached themselves to the party
vanquished at Pharsalus merely as to the more powerful ;
the defeat was so thoroughly decisive, that the victor was
joined by all who were not willing or were not obliged to
fight for a lost cause. All the kings, peoples, and cities,
which had hitherto been the clients of Pompeius, now
recalled their naval and military contingents and declined to
receive the refugees of the beaten party ; such as Egypt,
Cyrene, the communities of Syria, Phoenicia, Cilicia and
Asia Minor, Rhodes, Athens, and generally the whole east.
In fact Pharnaces king of the Bosporus pushed his officious-
ness so far, that on the news of the Pharsalian battle he
took possession not only of the town of Phanagoria which
several years before had been declared free by Pompeius,
and of the dominions of the Colchian princes confirmed by
him, but even of the kingdom of Little Armenia which
Pompeius had conferred on king Deiotarus. Almost the
sole exceptions to this general submission were the little
town of Megara which allowed itself to be besieged and
stormed by the Caesarians, and Juba king of Numidia,
who had for long expected, and after the victory over
Curio expected only with all the greater certainty, that
his kingdom would be annexed by Caesar, and was thus
obliged for better or for worse to abide by the defeated
party.
In the same way as the client communities submitted to
the victor of Pharsalus, the tail of the constitutional party
— all who had joined it with half a heart or had even, like
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 265
Marcus Cicero and his congeners, merely danced around
the aristocracy like the witches around the Brocken —
approached to make their peace with the new monarch, a
peace accordingly which his contemptuous indulgence readily
and courteously granted to the petitioners. But the flower
of the defeated party made no compromise. All was over
with the aristocracy ; but the aristocrats could never
become converted to monarchy. The highest revelations
of humanity are perishable; the religion once true may
become a lie,1 the polity once fraught with blessing may
become a curse ; but even the gospel that is past still finds
confessors, and if such a faith cannot remove mountains
like faith in the living truth, it yet remains true to itself
down to its very end, and does not depart from the realm
of the living till it has dragged its last priests and its last
partisans along with it, and a new generation, freed from
those shadows of the past and the perishing, rules over a
world that has renewed its youth. So it was in Rome.
Into whatever abyss of degeneracy the aristocratic rule had
now sunk, it had once been a great political system ; the
sacred fire, by which Italy had been conquered and
Hannibal had been vanquished, continued to glow —
although somewhat dimmed and dull — in the Roman
nobility so long as that nobility existed, and rendered a
cordial understanding between the men of the old regime
and the new monarch impossible. A large portion of the
constitutional party submitted at least outwardly, and
recognized the monarchy so far as to accept pardon from
Caesar and to retire as much as possible into private life ;
which, however, ordinarily was not done without the
1 [I may here state once for all that in this and other passages, where
Dr. Mommsen appears incidentally to express views of religion or
philosophy with which I can scarcely be supposed to agree, 1 have not
thought it right — as is, I believe, sometimes done in similar cases — to
omit or modify any portion of what he has written. The reader must
judge for himself as to thu truth or value of such assertions as those given
in the text. — 7V.]
266 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
mental reservation of thereby preserving themselves for a
future change of things. This course was chiefly followed
by the partisans of lesser note ; but the able Marcus
Marcellus, the same who had brought about the rupture
with Caesar (p. 174), was to be found among these judicious
persons and voluntarily banished himself to Lesbos. In the
majority, however, of the genuine aristocracy passion was
more powerful than cool reflection ; along with which, no
doubt, self-deceptions as to success being still possible
and apprehensions of the inevitable vengeance of the victor
variously co-operated.
Ca*o. No one probably formed a judgment as to the situation
of affairs with so painful a clearness, and so free from fear
or hope on his own account, as Marcus Cato. Completely
convinced that after the days of Ilerda r nd Pharsalus the
monarchy was inevitable, and morally firm enough to
confess to himself this bitter truth and to act in accordance
with it, he hesitated for a moment whether the constitu-
tional party ought at all to continue a war, which would
necessarily require sacrifices for a lost cause on the part of
many who did not know why they offered them. And
when he resolved to fight against the monarchy not for
victory, but for a speedier and more honourable fall, he
yet sought as far as possible to draw no one into this war,
who chose to survive the fall of the republic and to be
reconciled to monarchy. He conceived that, so long as
the republic had been merely threatened, it was a right
and a duty to compel the lukewarm and bad citizen to
take part in the struggle ; but that now it was senseless
and cruel to compel the individual to share the ruin of the
lost republic. Not only did he himself discharge every one
who desired to return to Italy ; but when the wildest of the
wild partisans, Gnaeus Pompeius the younger, insisted on
the execution of these people and of Cicero in particular?
it was Cato alone who by his moral authority prevented it.
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 267
Pompeius also had no desire for peace. Had he been Pompeius.
a man who deserved to hold the position which he
occupied, we might suppose him to have perceived that
he who aspires to a crown cannot return to the beaten
track of ordinary existence, and that there is accordingly
no place left on earth for one who has failed. But
Pompeius was hardly too noble-minded to ask a favour,
which the victor would have been perhaps magnanimous
enough not to refuse to him; on the contrary, he was
probably too mean to do so. Whether it was that he
could not make up his mind to trust himself to Caesar, or
that in his usual vague and undecided way, after the first
immediate impression of the disaster of Pharsalus had
vanished, be began again to cherish hope, Pompeius was
resolved to continue the struggle against Caesar and to
seek for himself yet another battle-field after that of
Pharsalus.
Thus, however much Caesar had striven by prudence Military
and moderation to appease the fury of his opponents and ^battle,
to lessen their number, the struggle nevertheless went on
without alteration. But the leading men had almost all The
taken part in the fight at Pharsalus ; and, although they all scattered>
escaped with the exception of Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus,
who was killed in the flight, they were yet scattered in all
directions, so that they were unable to concert a common
plan for the continuance of the campaign. Most of them
found their way, partly through the desolate mountains of
Macedonia and Illyria, partly by the aid of the fleet, to
Corcyra, where Marcus Cato commanded the reserve left
behind. Here a sort of council of war took place under
the presidency of Cato, at which Metellus Scipio, Titus
Labienus, Lucius Afranius, Gnaeus Pompeius the younger
and others were present; but the absence of the commander-
in-chief and the painful uncertainty as to his fate, as well
as the internal dissensions of the party, prevented the
268 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
adoption of any common resolution, and ultimately each
took the course which seemed to him the most suitable for
himself or for the common cause. It was in fact in a high
degree difficult to say among the many straws to which
they might possibly cling which was the one that would
keep longest above water.
Macedonia Macedonia and Greece were lost by the battle of
Greece. Pharsalus. It is true that Cato, who had immediately
on the news of the defeat evacuated Dyrrhachium, still
held Corcyra, and Rutilius Lupus the Peloponnesus, during
a time for the constitutional party. For a moment it
seemed also as if the Pompeians would make a stand
at Patrae in the Peloponnesus ; but the accounts of the
advance of Calenus sufficed to frighten them from that
quarter. As little was there any attempt to maintain
Italy. Corcyra. On the Italian and Sicilian coasts the Pompeian
squadrons despatched thither after the victories of Dyrrha-
chium (p. 258) had achieved not unimportant successes
against the ports of Brundisium, Messana and Vibo, and
at Messana especially had burnt the whole fleet in course
of being fitted out for Caesar ; but the ships that were
thus active, mostly from Asia Minor and Syria, were
recalled by their communities in consequence of the
Pharsalian battle, so that the expedition came to an end
The east, of itself. In Asia Minor and Syria there were at the
moment no troops of either party, with the exception of
the Bosporan army of Pharnaces which had taken posses
sion, ostensibly on Caesar's account, of different regions
Egypt- belonging to his opponents. In Egypt there was still
indeed a considerable Roman army, formed of the troops
left behind there by Gabinius (iv. 452) and thereafter
recruited from Italian vagrants and Syrian or Cilician
banditti ; but it was self-evident and was soon officially
confirmed by the recall of the Egyptian vessels, that the
court of Alexandria by no means had the intention of
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 269
holding firmly by the defeated party or of even placing
its force of troops at their disposal. Somewhat more
favourable prospects presented themselves to the van-
quished in the west. In Spain Pompeian sympathies Spain,
were so strong among the population, that the Caesarians
had on that account to give up the attack which they con-
templated from this quarter against Africa, and an insurrec-
tion seemed inevitable, so soon as a leader of note should
appear in the peninsula. In Africa moreover the coalition, Africa,
or rather Juba king of Numidia, who was the true regent
there, had been arming unmolested since the autumn of
705. While the whole east was consequently lost to the 49.
coalition by the battle of Pharsalus, it might on the other
hand continue the war after an honourable manner probably
in Spain, and certainly in Africa ; for to claim the aid of
the king of Numidia, who had for a long time been subject
to the Roman community, against revolutionary fellow-
burgesses was for Romans a painful humiliation doubtless,
but by no means an act of treason. Those again who
in this conflict of despair had no further regard for right
or honour, might declare themselves beyond the pale of
the law, and commence hostilities as robbers ; or might
enter into alliance with independent neighbouring states,
and introduce the public foe into the intestine strife ; or,
lastly, might profess monarchy with the lips and prosecute
the restoration of the legitimate republic with the dagger of
the assassin.
That the vanquished should withdraw and renounce the Hostilities
new monarchy, was at least the natural and so far the truest and
expression of their desperate position. The mountains and pirates,
above all the sea had been in those times ever since the
memory of man the asylum not only of all crime, but also
of intolerable misery and of oppressed right ; it was natural
for Pompeians and republicans to wage a defiant war
against the monarchy of Caesar, which had ejected them,
270 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
in the mountains and on the seas, and especially natural
for them to take up piracy on a greater scale, with more
compact organization, and with more definite aims. Even
after the recall of the squadrons that had come from the
east they still possessed a very considerable fleet of their
own, while Caesar was as yet virtually without vessels of
war ; and their connection with the Dalmatae who had
risen in their own interest against Caesar (p. 235), and their
control over the most important seas and seaports, pre-
sented the most advantageous prospects for a naval war,
especially on a small scale. As formerly Sulla's hunting
out of the democrats had ended in the Sertorian insurrec-
tion, which was a conflict first waged by pirates and then
by robbers and ultimately became a very serious war, so
possibly, if there was in the Catonian aristocracy or among
the adherents of Pompeius as much spirit and fire as in
the Marian democracy, and if there was found among
them a true sea-king, a commonwealth independent of
the monarchy of Caesar and perhaps a match for it might
arise on the still unconquered sea.
Parthian Far more serious disapproval in every respect is due to
the idea of dragging an independent neighbouring state into
the Roman civil war and of bringing about by its means
a counter-revolution ; law and conscience condemn the
deserter more severely than the robber, and a victorious
band of robbers finds its way back to a free and well-
ordered commonwealth more easily than the emigrants
who are conducted back by the public foe. Besides it
was scarcely probable that the beaten party would be
able to effect a restoration in this way. The only state,
from which they could attempt to seek support, was that
of the Parthians; and as to this it was at least doubtful
whether it would make their cause its own, and very
improbable that it would fight out that cause against
Caesar.
alliance.
chap. X PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 271
The time for republican conspiracies had not yet
come.
While the remnant of the defeated party thus allowed Caesar
themselves to be helplessly driven about by fate, and even p^pdus
those who had determined to continue the struggle knew to Egypt,
not how or where to do so, Caesar, quickly as ever
resolving and quickly acting, laid everything aside to
pursue Pompeius — the only one of his opponents whom
he respected as an officer, and the one whose personal
capture would have probably paralyzed a half, and that
perhaps the more dangerous half, of his opponents. With
a few men he crossed the Hellespont — his single bark
encountered in it a fleet of the enemy destined for the
Black Sea, and took the whole crews, struck as with
stupefaction by the news of the battle of Pharsalus,
prisoners — and as soon as the most necessary prepara-
tions were made, hastened in pursuit of Pompeius to the
east The latter had gone from the Pharsalian battle-
field to Lesbos, whence he brought away his wife and
his second son Sextus, and had sailed onward round
Asia Minor to Cilicia and thence to Cyprus. He might
have joined his partisans at Corcyra or Africa ; but
repugnance toward his aristocratic allies and the thought
of the reception which awaited him there after the day
of Pharsalus and above all after his disgraceful flight,
appear to have induced him to take his own course and
rather to resort to the protection of the Parthian king
than to that of Cato. While he was employed in
collecting money and slaves from the Roman revenue-
farmers and merchants in Cyprus, and in arming a band
of 2000 slaves, he received news that Antioch had
declared for Caesar and that the route to the Parthians
was no longer open. So he altered his plan and sailed
to Egypt, where a number of his old soldiers served in
the army and the situation and rich resources of the
272 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book y
country allowed him time and opportunity to reorganize
the war.
In Egypt, after the death of Ptolemaeus Auletes (May
01. 703) his children, Cleopatra about sixteen years of age and
Ptolemaeus Dionysus about ten, had ascended the throne
according to their father's will jointly, and as consorts ; but
soon the brother or rather his guardian Pothinus had driven
the sister from the kingdom and compelled her to seek a
refuge in Syria, whence she made preparations to get back
to her paternal kingdom. Ptolemaeus and Pothinus lay
with the whole Egyptian army at Pelusium for the sake
of protecting the eastern frontier against her, just when
Pompeius cast anchor at the Casian promontory and sent
a request to the king to allow him to land. The Egyptian
court, long informed of the disaster at Pharsalus, was on
the point of refusing to receive Pompeius ; but the king's
tutor Theodotus pointed out that in that case Pompeius
would probably employ his connections in the Egyptian
army to instigate rebellion; and that it would be safer,
and also preferable with regard to Caesar, if they embraced
the opportunity of making away with Pompeius. Political
reasonings of this sort did not readily fail of their effect
among the statesmen of the Hellenic world.
Death of Achillas the general of the royal troops and some of the
ompeius. former soi(jiers 0f Pompeius went off in a boat to his vessel;
and invited him to come to the king and, as the water was
shallow, to enter their barge. As he was stepping ashore,
the military tribune Lucius Septimius stabbed him from
behind, under the eyes of his wife and son, who were
compelled to be spectators of the murder from the deck
of their vessel, without being able to rescue or revenge
48. (28 Sept. 706). On the same day, on which thirteen
years before he had entered the capital in triumph over
Mithradates (iv. 444), the man, who for a generation had
been called the Great and for years had ruled Rome,
chap. X PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 273
died on the desert sands of the inhospitable Casian
shore by the hand of one of his old soldiers. A good
officer, but otherwise of mediocre gifts of intellect and of
heart, fate had with superhuman constancy for thirty years
allowed him to solve all brilliant and toilless tasks ; had
permitted him to pluck all laurels planted and fostered
by others ; had brought him face to face with all the
conditions requisite for obtaining the supreme power —
only in order to exhibit in his person an example of
spurious greatness, to which history knows no parallel.
Of all pitiful parts there is none more pitiful than that
of passing for more than one really is ; and it is the fate
of monarchy that this misfortune inevitably clings to it,
for barely once in a thousand years does there arise
among the people a man who is a king not merely in
name, but in reality. If this disproportion between
semblance and reality has never perhaps been so abruptly
marked as in Pompeius, the fact may well excite grave
reflection that it was precisely he who in a certain sense
opened the series of Roman monarchs.
When Caesar following the track of Pompeius arrived Arrival of
in the roadstead of Alexandria, all was already over. With Caesar-
deep agitation he turned away when the murderer brought
to his ship the head of the man, who had been his son-in-
law and for long years his colleague in rule, and to get
whom alive into his power he had come to Egypt. The
dagger of the rash assassin precluded an answer to the
question, how Caesar would have dealt with the captive
Pompeius ; but, while the humane sympathy, which still
found a place in the great soul of Caesar side by side
with ambition, enjoined that he should spare his former
friend, his interest also required that he should annihilate
Pompeius otherwise than by the executioner. Pompeius
had been for twenty years the acknowledged ruler of
Rome ; a dominion so deeply rooted does not perish
NOL. V ISI
274 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
with the ruler's death. The death of Pompeius did not
break up the Pompeians, but gave to them instead of an
aged, incapable, and worn-out chief in his sons Gnaeus
and Sextus two leaders, both of whom were young and
active and the second was a man of decided capacity.
To the newly - founded hereditary monarchy hereditary
pretendership attached itself at once like a parasite, and
it was very doubtful whether by this change of persons
Caesar did not lose more than he gained.
Caesar Meanwhile in Egypt Caesar had now nothing further to
E* t do, and the Romans and the Egyptians expected that he
would immediately set sail and apply himself to the sub-
jugation of Africa, and to the huge task of organization
which awaited him after the victory. But Caesar faithful
to his custom — wherever he found himself in the wide
empire — of finally regulating matters at once and in
person, and firmly convinced that no resistance was to
be expected either from the Roman garrison or from the
court, being, moreover, in urgent pecuniary embarrassment,
landed in Alexandria with the two amalgamated legions
accompanying him to the number of 3200 men and 800
Celtic and German cavalry, took up his quarters in the
royal palace, and proceeded to collect the necessary sums
of money and to regulate the Egyptian succession, without
allowing himself to be disturbed by the saucy remark of
Pothinus that Caesar should not for such petty matters
neglect his own so important affairs. In his dealing with
the Egyptians he was just and even indulgent. Although
the aid which they had given to Pompeius justified *he
imposing of a war contribution, the exhausted land was
spared from this ; and, while the arrears of the sum
69. stipulated for in 695 (iv. 451) and since then only about
half paid were remitted, there was required merely a final
payment of 10,000,000 denarii (^400,000). The belli-
gerent brother and sister were enjoined immediately to
CHAP, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS *75
suspend hostilities, and were invited to have their dispute
investigated and decided before the arbiter. They sub-
mitted ; the royal boy was already in the palace and
Cleopatra also presented herself there. Caesar adjudged
the kingdom of Egypt, agreeably to the testament of
Auletes, to the intermarried brother and sister Cleopatra
and Ptolemaeus Dionysus, and further gave unasked the
kingdom of Cyprus — cancelling the earlier act of annexa-
tion (iv. 450) — as the appanage of the second-born of
Egypt to the younger children of Auletes, Arsinoe and
Ptolemaeus the younger.
But a storm was secretly preparing. Alexandria was insurrec-
a cosmopolitan city as well as Rome, hardly inferior to Alexandria,
the Italian capital in the number of its inhabitants, far
superior to it in stirring commercial spirit, in skill of
handicraft, in taste for science and art : in the citizens
there was a lively sense of their own national importance,
and, if there was no political sentiment, there was at any
rate a turbulent spirit, which induced them to indulge in
their street riots as regularly and as heartily as the Parisians
of the present day : one may conceive their feelings, when
they saw the Roman general ruling in the palace of the
Lagids and their kings accepting the award of his tribunal.
Pothinus and the boy-king, both as may be conceived very
dissatisfied at once with the peremptory requisition of old
debts and with the intervention in the throne-dispute which
could only issue, as it did, in favour of Cleopatra, sent — in
order to pacify the Roman demands — the treasures of the
temples and the gold plate of the king with intentional
ostentation to be melted at the mint; with increasing
indignation the Egyptians — who were pious even to
superstition, and who rejoiced in the world - renowned
magnificence of their court as if it were a possession of
their own — beheld the bare walls of their temples and
the wooden cups on the table of their king. The Roman
276 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
army of occupation also, which had been essentially
denationalized by its long abode in Egypt and the many
intermarriages between the soldiers and Egyptian women,
and which moreover numbered a multitude of the old
soldiers of Pompeius and runaway Italian criminals and
slaves in its ranks, was indignant at Caesar, by whose
orders it had been obliged to suspend its action on the
Syrian frontier, and at his handful of haughty legionaries.
The tumult even at the landing, when the multitude saw
the Roman axes carried into the old palace, and the
numerous cases in which his soldiers were assassinated
in the city, had taught Caesar the immense danger in
which he was placed with his small force in presence of
that exasperated multitude. But it was difficult to return
on account of the north-west winds prevailing at this season
of the year, and the attempt at embarkation might easily
become a signal for the outbreak of the insurrection ;
besides, it was not the nature of Caesar to take his
departure without having accomplished his work. He
accordingly ordered up at once reinforcements from Asia,
and meanwhile, till these arrived, made a show of the
utmost self-possession. Never was there greater gaiety
in his camp than during this rest at Alexandria ; and
while the beautiful and clever Cleopatra was not sparing
of her charms in general and least of all towards her judge,
Caesar also appeared among all his victories to value most
those won over beautiful women. It was a merry prelude
to graver scenes. Under the leadership of Achillas and,
as was afterwards proved, by the secret orders of the king
and his guardian, the Roman army of occupation stationed
in Egypt appeared unexpectedly in Alexandria; and as
soon as the citizens saw that it had come to attack Caesar,
they made common cause with the soldiers.
Caesar in With a presence of mind, which in some measure
justifies his earlier foolhardiness, Caesar hastily collected
Alexandria.
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 277
his scattered men ; seized the persons of the king and his
ministers ; entrenched himself in the royal residence and
the adjoining theatre ; and gave orders, as there was no
time to place in safety the war - fleet stationed in the
principal harbour immediately in front of the theatre, that
it should be set on fire and that Pharos, the island with
the light-tower commanding the harbour, should be oc-
cupied by means of boats. Thus at least a restricted
position for defence was secured, and the way was kept
open to procure supplies and reinforcements. At the same
time orders were issued to the commandant of Asia Minor
as well as to the nearest subject countries, the Syrians and
Nabataeans, the Cretans and the Rhodians, to send troops
and ships in all haste to Egypt. The insurrection at the
head of which the princess Arsinoe and her confidant the
eunuch Ganymedes had placed themselves, meanwhile had
free course in all Egypt and in the greater part of the
capital. In the streets of the latter there was daily fighting,
but without success either on the part of Caesar in gaining
freer scope and breaking through to the fresh water lake of
Marea which lay behind the town, where he could have
provided himself with water and forage, or on the part
of the Alexandrians in acquiring superiority over the
besieged and depriving them of all drinking water ; for,
when the Nile canals in Caesar's part of the town had been
spoiled by the introduction of salt water, drinkable water
was unexpectedly found in wells dug on the beach.
As Caesar was not to be overcome from the landward
side, the exertions of the besiegers were directed to destroy
his fleet and cut him off from the sea by which supplies
reached him. The island with the lighthouse and the
mole by which this was connected with the mainland
divided the harbour into a western and an eastern half, which
were in communication with each other through two arched
openings in the mole. Caesar commanded the island and
278 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
the east harbour, while the mole and the west harbour were
in possession of the citizens; and, as the Alexandrian
fleet was burnt, his vessels sailed in and out without
hindrance. The Alexandrians, after having vainly at-
tempted to introduce fire-ships from the western into the
eastern harbour, equipped with the remnant of their arsenal
a small squadron and with this blocked up the way of
Caesar's vessels, when these were towing in a fleet of
transports with a legion that had arrived from Asia Minor ;
but the excellent Rhodian mariners of Caesar mastered the
enemy. Not long afterwards, however, the citizens
captured the lighthouse-island,1 and from that point totally
closed the narrow and rocky mouth of the east harbour for
larger ships ; so that Caesar's fleet was compelled to take
its station in the open roads before the east harbour, and
his communication with the sea hung only on a weak
thread. Caesar's fleet, attacked in that roadstead repeatedly
by the superior naval force of the enemy, could neither
shun the unequal strife, since the loss of the lighthouse-
island closed the inner harbour against it, nor yet withdraw,
for the loss of the roadstead would have debarred Caesar
wholly from the sea. Though the brave legionaries,
supported by the dexterity of the Rhodian sailors, had
always hitherto decided these conflicts in favour of the
Romans, the Alexandrians renewed and augmented their
naval armaments with unwearied perseverance ; the besieged
had to fight as often as it pleased the besiegers, and if the
former should be on a single occasion vanquished, Caesar
would be totally hemmed in and probably lost
It was absolutely necessary to make an attempt to
recover the lighthouse-island. The double attack, which
1 The loss of the lighthouse-island must have fallen out, where there is
now a chasm (B. A. 12), for the island was in fact at first in Caesar's power
(B. C. iii. 12 ; B. A. 8). The mole must have been constantly in the
power of the enemy, for Caesar held intercourse with the island only by
ships-
chap. X PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 279
was made by boats from the side of the harbour and by
the war-vessels from the seaboard, in reality brought not
only the island but also the lower part of the mole into
Caesar's power ; it was only at the second arch-opening of
the mole that Caesar ordered the attack to be stopped, and
the mole to be there closed towards the city by a transverse
wall. But while a violent conflict arose here around the
entrenchers, the Roman troops left the lower part of the
mole adjoining the island bare of defenders ; a division of
Egyptians landed there unexpectedly, attacked in the rear
the Roman soldiers and sailors crowded together on the
mole at the transverse wall, and drove the whole mass in
wild confusion into the sea. A part were taken on board
by the Roman ships ; the most were drowned. Some 400
soldiers and a still greater number of men belonging to the
fleet were sacrificed on this day ; the general himself, who
had shared the fate of his men, had been obliged to seek
refuge in his ship, and when this sank from having been
overloaded with men, he had to save himself by swimming
to another. But, severe as was the loss suffered, it was
amply compensated by the recovery of the lighthouse-island,
which along with the mole as far as the first arch-opening
remained in the hands of Caesar.
At length the longed-for relief arrived. Mithradates of Relieving
Pergamus, an able warrior of the school of Mithradates army from
o ' Asia
Eupator, whose natural son he claimed to be, brought up Minor,
by land from Syria a motley army — the Ityraeans of the
prince of the Libanus (iv. 423), the Bedouins of Jamblichus,
son of Sampsiceramus (iv. 423), the Jews under the minister
Vntipater, and the contingents generally of the petty chiefs
and communities of Cilicia and Syria. From Pelusium,
which Mithradates had the fortune to occupy on the day
of his arrival, he took the great road towards Memphis
with the view of avoiding the intersected ground of the
Delta and crossing the Nile before its division ; during
2$o BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book *
which movement his troops received manifold support from
the Jewish peasants who were settled in peculiar numbers
in this part of Egypt. The Egyptians, with the yorng king
Ptolemaeus now at their head, whom Caesar had released
to his people in the vain hope of allaying the insurrection
by his means, despatched an army to the Nile, to detain
Mithradates on its farther bank. This army fell in with the
enemy even beyond Memphis at the so-called Jews'-camp,
between Onion and Heliopolis ; nevertheless Mithradates,
trained in the Roman fashion of manoeuvring and en-
camping, amidst successful conflicts gained the opposite
bank at Memphis. Caesar, on the other hand, as soon as
he obtained news of the arrival of the relieving army,
conveyed a part of his troops in ships to the end of the
lake of Marea to the west of Alexandria, and marched
round this lake and down the Nile to meet Mithradates
advancing up the river.
Battle at The junction took place without the enemy attempting
the Nile. t0 hjn(jer }t. Caesar then marched into the Delta, whither
the king had retreated, overthrew, notwithstanding the
deeply cut canal in their front, the Egyptian vanguard at
the first onset, and immediately stormed the Egyptian
camp itself. It lay at the foot of a rising ground between
the Nile — from which only a narrow path separated it —
and marshes difficult of access. Caesar caused the camp
to be assailed simultaneously from the front and from the
flank on the path along the Nile ; and during this assault
ordered a third detachment to ascend unseen the heights
behind the camp. The victory was complete ; the camp
was taken, and those of the Egyptians who did not fall
beneath the sword of the enemy were drowned in the
attempt to escape to the fleet on the Nile. With one of
the boats, which sank overladen with men, the young
king also disappeared in the waters of his native stream.
Immediately after the battle Caesar advanced at the
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 281
head of his cavalry from the land- side straight into the Pacifica-
portion of the capital occupied by the Egyptians. In Aiwandria.
mourning attire, with the images of their gods in their
hands, the enemy received him and sued for peace ; and
his troops, when they saw him return as victor from the
side opposite to that by which he had set forth, welcomed
him with boundless joy. The fate of the town, which had
ventured to thwart the plans of the master of the world
and had brought him within a hair's-breadth of destruction,
lay in Caesar's hands ; but he was too much of a ruler to
be sensitive, and dealt with the Alexandrians as with the
Massiliots. Caesar — pointing to their city severely
devastated and deprived of its granaries, of its world-
renowned library, and of other important public buildings
on occasion of the burning of the fleet — exhorted the
inhabitants in future earnestly to cultivate the arts of peace
alone, and to heal the wounds which they had inflicted on
themselves ; for the rest, he contented himself with granting
to the Jews settled in Alexandria the same rights which the
Greek population of the city enjoyed, and with placing in
Alexandria, instead of the previous Roman army of occupa-
tion which nominally at least obeyed the kings of Egypt, a
formal Roman garrison — two of the legions besieged there,
and a third which afterwards arrived from Syria — under a
commander nominated by himself. For this position of
trust a man was purposely selected, whose birth made it
impossible for him to abuse it — Rufio, an able soldier, but
the son of a freedman. Cleopatra and her younger brother
Ptolemaeus obtained the sovereignty of Egypt under the
supremacy of Rome ; the princess Arsinoe was carried off to
Italy, that she might not serve once more as a pretext for
insurrections to the Egyptians, who were after the Oriental
fashion quite as much devoted to their dynasty as they
were indifferent towards the individual dynasts ; Cyprus
became again a part of the Roman province of Cilicia.
282 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, BOOK v
Course of This Alexandrian insurrection, insignificant as it was in
during itself and slight as was its intrinsic connection with the
Caesar's events of importance in the world's history which took
Alexandria. P^ace at tne same time in the Roman state, had neverthe-
less so far a momentous influence on them that it compelled
the man, who was all in all and without whom nothing
could be despatched and nothing could be solved, to leav:
48. his proper tasks in abeyance from October 706 up to
47. March 707 in order to fight along with Jews and Bedouins
against a city rabble. The consequences of personal rule
began to make themselves felt. They had the monarchy ;
but the wildest confusion prevailed everywhere, and the
monarch was absent. The Caesarians were for the
moment, just like the Pompeians, without superintendence;
the ability of the individual officers and, above all, accident
decided matters everywhere.
Insubor- In Asia Minor there was, at the time of Caesar's de-
Phamaces. parture for Egypt, no enemy. But Caesar's lieutenant
there, the able Gnaeus Domitius Calvinus, had received
orders to take away again from king Pharnaces what he
had without instructions wrested from the allies of
Pompeius ; and, as Pharnaces, an obstinate and arrogant
despot like his father, perseveringly refused to evacuate
Lesser Armenia, no course remained but to march against
him. Calvinus had been obliged to despatch to Egypt two
out of the three legions left behind with him and formed
out of the Pharsalian prisoners of war; he filled up the
gap by one legion hastily gathered from the Romans
domiciled in Pontus and two legions of Deiotarus exercised
after the Roman manner, and advanced into Lesser
Armenia. But the Bosporan army, tried in numerous
conflicts with the dwellers on the Black Sea, showed itself
more efficient than his own.
Calvinus In an engagement at Nicopolis the Pontic levy of Cal-
defeated at vjRUS was p^j. t0 pieces and the Galatian legions ran off; only
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 283
the one old legion of the Romans fought its way through
with moderate loss. Instead of conquering Lesser Armenia,
Calvinus could not even prevent Pharnaces from repossess-
ing himself of his Pontic "hereditary states," and pouring
forth the whole vials of his horrible sultanic caprices on
their inhabitants, especially the unhappy Amisenes (winter
of 706-707). When Caesar in person arrived in Asia 48-47.
Minor and intimated to him that the service which
Pharnaces had rendered to him personally by having
granted no help to Pompeius could not be taken into
account against the injury inflicted on the empire, and
that before any negotiation he must evacuate the province
of Pontus and send back the property which he had
pillaged, he declared himself doubtless ready to submit ;
nevertheless, well knowing how good reason Caesar had for
hastening to the west, he made no serious preparations for
the evacuation. He did not know that Caesar finished
whatever he took in hand. Without negotiating further,
Caesar took with him the one legion which he brought
from Alexandria and the troops of Calvinus and Deiotarus,
and advanced against the camp of Pharnaces at Ziela.
When the Bosporans saw him approach, they boldly victory of
crossed the deep mountain -ravine which covered their Caesar at
Ziela.
front, and charged the Romans up the hill. Caesar's
soldiers were still occupied in pitching their camp, and the
ranks wavered for a moment ; but the veterans accustomed
to war rapidly rallied and set the example for a general
attack and for a complete victory (2 Aug. 707) In five 47,
days the campaign was ended — an invaluable piece of
good fortune at this time, when every hour was precious.
Caesar entrusted the pursuit of the king, who had gone Regulation
home by way of Sinope, to Pharnaces' illegitimate brother, ^i^*
the brave Mithradates of Pergamus, who as a reward for the
services rendered by him in Egypt received the crown of
the Bosporan kingdom in room of Pharnaces. In other
284 BRUNDISIUM, ILEKDA, book v
respects the affairs of Syria and Asia Minor were peacefully
settled ; Caesar's own allies were richly rewarded, those of
Pompeius were in general dismissed with fines or repri-
mands. Deiotarus alone, the most powerful of the clients
of Pompeius, was again confined to his narrow hereditaiy
domain, the canton of the Tolistobogii. In his stead
Ariobarzanes king of Cappadocia was invested with Lesser
Armenia, and the tetrarchy of the Trocmi usurped by
Deiotarus was conferred on the new king of the Bosporus,
who was descended by the maternal side from one of the
Galatian princely houses as by the paternal from that of
Pontus.
War by In Illyria also, while Caesar was in Egypt, incidents of
land and , , , _, _ .
sea in a vei7 Erave nature had occurred. The Dalmatian coast
Illyria. had been for centuries a sore blemish on the Roman rule,
and its inhabitants had been at open feud with Caesar since
the conflicts around Dyrrhachium ; while the interior also
since the time of the Thessalian war, swarmed with
dispersed Pompeians. Quintus Cornificius had however,
with the legions that followed him from Italy, kept both
the natives and the refugees in check and had at the same
time sufficiently met the difficult task of provisioning the
troops in these rugged districts. Even when the able
Marcus Octavius, the victor of Curicta (p. 235), appeared
with a part of the Pompeian fleet in these waters to wage
war there against Caesar by sea and land, Cornificius not
only knew how to maintain himself, resting for support on
the ships and the harbour of the Iadestini (Zara), but in
his turn also sustained several successful engagements at
sea with the fleet of his antagonist. But when the new
governor of Illyria, the Aulus Gabinius recalled by Caesar
from exile (p. 139), arrived by the landward route in Illyria
48-47. in the winter of 706-707 with fifteen cohorts and 3000
horse, the system of warfare changed. Instead of confining
himself like his predecessor to war on a small scale, the
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 285
bold active man undertook at once, in spite of the in-
clement season, an expedition with his whole force to the
mountains. But the unfavourable weather, the difficulty
of providing supplies, and the brave resistance of the Defeat of
Dalmatians, swept away the army; Gabinius had to Gabimus-
commence his retreat, was attacked in the course of it and
disgracefully defeated by the Dalmatians, and with the
feeble remains of his fine army had difficulty in reaching
Salonae, where he soon afterwards died. Most of the
Illyrian coast towns thereupon surrendered to the fleet of
Octavius; those that adhered to Caesar, such as Salonae
and Epidaurus (Ragusa vecchia), were so hard pressed by
the fleet at sea and by the barbarians on land, that the
surrender and capitulation of the remains of the army
enclosed in Salonae seemed not far distant. Then the
commandant of the depot at Brundisium, the energetic
Publius Vatinius, in the absence of ships of war caused
common boats to be provided with beaks and manned with
the soldiers dismissed from the hospitals, and with this ex-
temporized war-fleet gave battle to the far superior fleet of
Octavius at the island of Tauris (Torcola between Lesina Naval
and Curzola) — a battle in which, as in so many cases, the ^ctory at
bravery of the leader and of the marines compensated for
the deficiencies of the vessels, and the Caesarians achieved
a brilliant victory. Marcus Octavius left these waters and
proceeded to Africa (spring of 707); the Dalmatians no 47.
doubt continued their resistance for years with great
obstinacy, but it was nothing beyond a local mountain-war-
fare. When Caesar returned from Egypt, his resolute
adjutant had already got rid of the danger that was
imminent in Illyria.
All the more serious was the position of things in Reorgan-
Africa, where the constitutional party had from the kation
outset of the civil war ruled absolutely and had continually coalition .in
augmented their power. Down to the battle of Pharsalus Afric*"
286 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, BOOK v
king Juba had, properly speaking, borne rule there; he
had vanquished Curio, and his flying horsemen and his
numberless archers were the main strength of the army ;
the Pompeian governor Varus played by his side so sub-
ordinate a part that he even had to deliver those soldiers
of Curio, who had surrendered to him, over to the king,
and had to look on while they were executed or carried
away into the interior of Numidia. After the battle of
Pharsalus a change took place. With the exception of
Pompeius himself, no man of note among the defeated
party thought of flight to the Parthians. As little did
they attempt to hold the sea with their united resources ;
the warfare waged by Marcus Octavius in the Illyrian
waters was isolated, and was without permanent success.
The great majority of the republicans as of the Pompeians
betook themselves to Africa, where alone an honourable
and constitutional warfare might still be waged against the
usurper. There the fragments of the army scattered at
Pharsalus, the troops that had garrisoned Dyrrhachium,
Corcyra, and the Peloponnesus, the remains of the Illyrian
fleet, gradually congregated ; there the second commander-
in-chief Metellus Scipio, the two sons of Pompeius, Gnaeus
and Sextus, the political leader of the republicans Marcus
Cato, the able officers Labienus, Afranius, Petreius,
Octavius and others met. If the resources of the
emigrants had diminished, their fanaticism had, if possible,
even increased. Not only did they continue to murder
their prisoners and even the officers of Caesar under flag
of truce, but king Juba, in whom the exasperation of the
partisan mingled with the fury of the half-barbarous
African, laid down the maxim that in every community
suspected of sympathizing with the enemy the burgesses
ought to be extirpated and the town burnt down, and even
practically carried out this theory against some townships,
such as the unfortunate Vaga near Hadrumetum. In fact
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAfSUS 287
it was solely owing to the energetic intervention of Cato
that the capital of the province itself, the flourishing Utica
— which, just like Carthage formerly, had been long
regarded with a jealous eye by the Numidian kings — did
not experience the same treatment from Juba, and that
measures of precaution merely were taken against its
citizens, who certainly were not unjustly accused of leaning
towards Caesar.
As neither Caesar himself nor any of his lieutenants
undertook the smallest movement against Africa, the
coalition had full time to acquire political and military
reorganization there. First of all, it was necessary to fill
up anew the place of commander-in-chief vacant by the
death of Pompeius. King Juba was not disinclined still
to maintain the position which he had held in Africa up
to the battle of Pharsalus ; indeed he bore himself no
longer as a client of the Romans but as an equal ally or
even as a protector, and took it upon him, for example,
to coin Roman silver money with his name and device ;
nay, he even raised a claim to be the sole wearer of purple
in the camp, and suggested to the Roman commanders
that they should lay aside their purple mantle of office.
Further, Metellus Scipio demanded the supreme command
for himself, because Pompeius had recognized him in the
Thessalian campaign as on a footing of equality, more
from the consideration that he was his son-in-law than on
military grounds. The like demand was raised by Varus
as the governor — self-nominated, it is true — of Africa,
seeing that the war was to be waged in his province.
Lastly the army desired for its leader the propraetor
Marcus Cato. Obviously it was right. Cato was the only
man who possessed the requisite devotedness, energy, and
authority for the difficult office; if he was no military
man, it was infinitely better to appoint as commander-in-
chief a non-military man who understood how to listen to
288 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
reason and make his subordinates act, than an officer of
untried capacity like Varus, or even one of tried incapa-
city like Metellus Scipio. But the decision fell at length
on this same Scipio, and it was Cato himself who mainly
determined that decision. He did so, not because he felt
himself unequal to such a task, or because his vanity found
its account rather in declining than in accepting ; still less
because he loved or respected Scipio, with whom he on
the contrary was personally at variance, and who with his
notorious inefficiency had attained a certain importance
merely in virtue of his position as father-in-law to
Pompeius; but simply and solely because his obstinate
legal formalism chose rather to let the republic go to ruin
in due course of law than to save it in an irregular way.
When after the battle of Pharsalus he met with Marcus
Cicero at Corcyra, he had offered to hand over the com-
mand in Corcyra to the latter — who was still from the
time of his Cilician administration invested with the rank
of general — as the officer of higher standing according to
the letter of the law, and by this readiness had driven the
unfortunate advocate, who now cursed a thousand times
his laurels from the Amanus, almost to despair ; but he
had at the same time astonished all men of any tolerable
discernment. The same principles were applied now,
when something more was at stake ; Cato weighed the
question to whom the place of commander-in-chief
belonged, as if the matter had reference to a field at
Tusculum, and adjudged it to Scipio. By this sentence
his own candidature and that of Varus were set aside.
But he it was also, and he alone, who confronted with
energy the claims of king Juba, and made him feel that
the Roman nobility came to him not suppliant, as to the
great-prince of the Parthians, with a view to ask aid at
the hands of a protector, but as entitled to command and
require aid from a subject. In the present state of the
CHAP. X PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 289
Roman forces in Africa, Juba could not avoid lowering
his claims to some extent; although he still carried the
point with the weak Scipio, that the pay of his troops
should be charged on the Roman treasury and the cession
of the province of Africa should be assured to him in the
event of victory.
By the side of the new general -in -chief the senate of
the "three hundred" again emerged. It established its
seat in Utica, and replenished its thinned ranks by the
admission of the most esteemed and the wealthiest men
of the equestrian order.
The warlike preparations were pushed forward, chiefly
through the zeal of Cato, with the greatest energy, and
every man capable of arms, even the freedman and Libyan,
was enrolled in the legions; by which course so many
hands were withdrawn from agriculture that a great part
of the fields remained uncultivated, but an imposing result
was certainly attained. The heavy infantry numbered
fourteen legions, of which two were already raised by
Varus, eight others were formed partly from the refugees,
partly from the conscripts in the province, and four were
legions of king Juba armed in the Roman manner. The
heavy cavalry, consisting of the Celts and Germans who
arrived with Labienus and sundry others incorporated in
their ranks, was, apart from Juba's squadron of cavalry
equipped in the Roman style, 1600 strong. The light
troops consisted of innumerable masses of Numidians
riding without bridle or rein and armed merely with
javelins, of a number of mounted bowmen, and a large
host of archers on foot. To these fell to be added Juba's
120 elephants, and the fleet of 55 sail commanded by
Publius Varus and Marcus Octavius. The urgent want
of money was in some measure remedied by a self-taxation
on the part of the senate, which was the more productive
as the richest African capitalists had been induced to enter
VOL. V I52
290 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
it. Corn and other supplies were accumulated in immense
quantities in the fortresses capable of defence ; at the
same time the stores were as far as possible removed from
the open townships. The absence of Caesar, the trouble-
some temper of his legions, the ferment in Spain and Italy
gradually raised men's spirits, and the recollection of the
Pharsalian defeat began to give way to fresh hopes of
victory.
The time lost by Caesar in Egypt nowhere revenged
itself more severely than here. Had he proceeded to
Africa immediately after the death of Pompeius, he would
have found there a weak, disorganized, and frightened
army and utter anarchy among the leaders ; whereas there
was now in Africa, owing more especially to Cato's energy, an
army equal in number to that defeated at Pharsalus, under
leaders of note, and under a regulated superintendence.
Move- A peculiar evil star seemed altogether to preside over
Spate!, Q ^s African expedition of Caesar. He had, even before
his embarkation for Egypt, arranged in Spain and Italy
various measures preliminary and preparatory to the
African war ; but out of all there had sprung nothing but
mischief. From Spain, according to Caesar's arrangement,
the governor of the southern province Quintus Cassius
Longinus was to cross with four legions to Africa, to be
joined there by Bogud king of West Mauretania,1 and to
1 Much obscurity rests on the shape assumed by the states in north-
western Africa during this period. After the Jugurthine war Bocchus
king of Mauretania ruled probably from the western sea to the port of
Saldae, in what is now Morocco and Algiers (iii. 410) ; the princes of
Tingis (Tangiers) — probably from the outset different from the Maure-
tanian sovereigns — who occur even earlier (Plut. Serf. 9), and to whom it
may be conjectured that Sallust's Leptasta {Hist. ii. 31 Kritz) and
Cicero's Mastanesosus {In Vat. 5, 12) belong, may have been independent
within certain limits or may have held from him as feudatories ; just as
Syphax already ruled over many chieftains of tribes (Appian, Pun. 10),
and about this time in the neighbouring Numidia Cirta was possessed,
probably however under Juba's supremacy, by the prince Massinissa
82. (Appian, B. C. iv. 54). About 672 we find in Bocchus' stead a king
called Bocut or Bogud (iv. 92 ; Orosius, v. 21, 14), the son of Bocchus.
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 291
advance with him towards Numidia and Africa. But that
army destined for Africa included in it a number of native
Spaniards and two whole legions formerly Pompeian;
Pompeian sympathies prevailed in the army as in the
province, and the unskilful and tyrannical behaviour of the
Caesarian governor was not fitted to allay them. A formal
revolt took place ; troops and towns took part for or against
the governor; already those who had risen against the
lieutenant of Caesar were on the point of openly displaying
the banner of Pompeius ; already had Pompeius' elder son
Gnaeus embarked from Africa for Spain to take advantage
of this favourable turn, when the disavowal of the governor
by the most respectable Caesarians themselves and the
interference of the commander of the northern province
suppressed just in right time the insurrection. Gnaeus
Pompeius, who had lost time on the way with a vain
attempt to establish himself in Mauretania, came too late ;
Gaius Trebonius, whom Caesar after his return from the
east sent to Spain to relieve Cassius (autumn of 707), met 47.
everywhere with absolute obedience. But of course amidst
these blunders nothing was done from Spain to disturb the
organization of the republicans in Africa ; indeed in con-
sequence of the complications with Longinus, Bogud king
of West Mauretania, who was on Caesar's side and might at
least have put some obstacles in the way of king Juba,
had been called away with his troops to Spain.
Still more critical were the occurrences among the troops Military
whom Caesar had caused to be collected in southern Italy, campaniai
in order to his embarkation with them for Africa. They
were for the most part the old legions, which had founded
Caesar's throne in Gaul, Spain, and Thessaly. The spirit
From 705 the kingdom appears divided between king Bogud who possesses 49.
the western, and king Bocchus who possesses the eastern half, and to this
the later partition of Mauretania into Bogud's kingdom or the state of
Tingis and Bocchos' kingdom or the state of Iol (Caesarea) refers (Plin.
H. N. v. a, 19 ; comp. Bell. Afric. 23).
292 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, BOOK V
of these troops had not been improved by victories, and
had been utterly disorganized by long repose in Lower
Italy. The almost superhuman demands which the general
made on them, and the effects of which were only too
clearly apparent in their fearfully thinned ranks, left behind
even in these men of iron a leaven of secret rancour which
required only time and quiet to set their minds in a
ferment. The only man who had influence over them,
had been absent and almost unheard-of for a year ; while
the officers placed over them were far more afraid of the
soldiers than the soldiers of them, and overlooked in the
conquerors of the world every outrage against those that
gave them quarters, and every breach of discipline. When
the orders to embark for Sicily arrived, and the soldier was
to exchange the luxurious ease of Campania for a third
campaign certainly not inferior to those of Spain and
Thessaly in point of hardship, the reins, which had been
too long relaxed and were too suddenly tightened, snapt
asunder. The legions refused to obey till the promised
presents were paid to them, scornfully repulsed the officers
sent by Caesar, and even threw stones at them. An
attempt to extinguish the incipient revolt by increasing the
sums promised not only had no success, but the soldiers
set out in masses to extort the fulfilment of the promises
from the general in the capital. Several officers, who
attempted to restrain the mutinous bands on the way, were
slain. It was a formidable danger. Caesar ordered the
few soldiers who were in the city to occupy the gates, with
the view of warding off the justly apprehended pillage at
least at the first onset, and suddenly appeared among the
furious bands demanding to know what they wanted.
They exclaimed : " discharge." In a moment the request
was granted. Respecting the presents, Caesar added,
which he had promised to his soldiers at his triumph, as
well as respecting the lands which he had not promised
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 293
to them but had destined for them, they might apply to him
on the day when he and the other soldiers should triumph ;
in the triumph itself they could not of course participate,
as having been previously discharged. The masses were
not prepared for things taking this turn ; convinced that
Caesar could not do without them for the African campaign,
they had demanded their discharge only in order that, if it
were refused, they might annex their own conditions to
their service. Half unsettled in their belief as to their
own indispensableness ; too awkward to return to their
object, and to bring the negotiation which had missed its
course back to the right channel ; ashamed, as men, by the
fidelity with which the Imperator kept his word even to
soldiers who had forgotten their allegiance, and by his
generosity which even now granted far more than he had
ever promised; deeply affected, as soldiers, when the
general presented to them the prospect of their being
necessarily mere civilian spectators of the triumph of their
comrades, and when he called them no longer " comrades "
but "burgesses," — by this very form of address, which from
his mouth sounded so strangely, destroying as it were with
one blow the whole pride of their past soldierly career;
and, besides all this, under the spell of the man whose
presence had an irresistible power — the soldiers stood /or
a while mute and lingering, till from all sides a cry arose
that the general would once more receive them into favour
and again permit them to be called Caesar's soldiers.
Caesar, after having allowed himself to be sufficiently
entreated, granted the permission ; but the ringleaders in
this mutiny had a third cut off from their triumphal
presents. History knows no greater psychological master-
piece, and none that was more completely successful.
This mutiny operated injuriously on the African cam- Caesar
paign, at least in so far as it considerably delayed the ^-^ *
commencement of it. When Caesar arrived at the port
294 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
of Lilybaeum destined for the embarkation, the ten legions
intended for Africa were far from being fully assembled
there, and it was the experienced troops that were farthest
behind. Hardly however had six legions, of which five were
newly formed, arrived there and the necessary war-vessels
and transports come forward, when Caesar put to sea with
47. them (25 Dec. 707 of the uncorrected, about 8 Oct. of the
Julian, calendar). The enemy's fleet, which on account
of the prevailing equinoctial gales was drawn up on the
beach at the island Aegimurus in front of the bay of
Carthage, did not oppose the passage ; but the same
storms scattered the fleet of Caesar in all directions, and,
when he availed himself of the opportunity of landing not
far from Hadrumetum (Susa), he could not disembark more
than some 3000 men, mostly recruits, and 150 horsemen.
His attempt to capture Hadrumetum strongly occupied by
the enemy miscarried ; but Caesar possessed himself of the
two seaports not far distant from each other, Ruspina
(Monastir near Susa) and Little Leptis. Here he en-
trenched himself ; but his position was so insecure, that he
kept his cavalry in the ships and the ships ready for sea
and provided with a supply of water, in order to re-embark
at any moment if he should be attacked by a superior
force. This however was not necessary, for just at the
right time the ships that had been driven out of their course
46. arrived (3 Jan. 708). On the very following day Caesar,
whose army in consequence of the arrangements made by
the Pompeians suffered from want of corn, undertook with
three legions an expedition into the interior of the country,
but was attacked on the march not far from Ruspina by
the corps which Labienus had brought up to dislodge
Conflict at Caesar from the coast. As Labienus had exclusively
Ruspina. cavalry and archers, and Caesar almost nothing but infantry
of the line, the legions were quickly surrounded and
exposed to the missiles of the enemy, without being able to
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 295
retaliate or to attack with success. No doubt the deploying
of the entire line relieved once more the flanks, and spirited
charges saved the honour of their arms ; but a retreat was
unavoidable, and had Ruspina not been so near, the
Moorish javelin would perhaps have accomplished the same
result here as the Parthian bow at Carrhae.
Caesar, whom this day had fully convinced of the Caesar's
difficulty of the impending war, would not again expose j^p1^**
his soldiers untried and discouraged by the new mode of
fighting to any such attack, but awaited the arrival of his
veteran legions. The interval was employed in providing
some sort of compensation against the crushing superiority
of the enemy in the weapons of distant warfare. The
incorporation of the suitable men from the fleet as light
horsemen or archers in the land -army could not be of
much avail. The diversions which Caesar suggested were
somewhat more effectual. He succeeded in bringing into
arms against Juba the Gaetulian pastoral tribes wandering
on the southern slope of the great Atlas towards the
Sahara; for the blows of the Marian and Sullan period
had reached even to them, and their indignation against
Pompeius, who had at that time made them subordinate to
the Numidian kings (iv. 94), rendered them from the
outset favourably inclined to the hair of the mighty Marius
of whose Jugurthine campaign they had still a lively
recollection. The Mauretanian kings, Bogud in Tingis and
Bocchus in Iol, were Juba's natural rivals and to a certain
extent long since in alliance with Caesar. Further, there
still roamed in the border-region between the kingdoms of
Juba and Pocchus the last of the Catilinarians, that Publius
Sittius of Nuceria (iv. 469), who eighteen years before
had become converted from a bankrupt Italian merchant
into a Mauretanian leader of free bands, and since that time
had procured for himself a name and a body of retainers
amidst the Libyan quarrels. Socchus and Sittius united
296 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
fell on the Numidian land, and occupied the important
town of Cirta ; and their attack, as well as that of the
Gaetulians, compelled king Juba to send a portion of his
troops to his southern and western frontiers.
Caesar's situation, however, continued sufficiently un-
pleasant. His army was crowded together within a space
of six square miles ; though the fleet conveyed corn, the
want of forage was as much felt by Caesar's cavalry as by
those of Pompeius before Dyrrhachium. The light troops
of the enemy remained notwithstanding all the exertions
of Caesar so immeasurably superior to his, that it seemed
almost impossible to carry offensive operations into the
interior even with veterans. If Scipio retired and aban-
doned the coast towns, he might perhaps achieve a victory
like those which the vizier of Orodes had won over Crassus
and Juba over Curio, and he could at least endlessly
protract the war. The simplest consideration suggested
this plan of campaign ; even Cato, although far from a
strategist, counselled its adoption, and offered at the same
time to cross with a corps to Italy and to call the republicans
there to arms — which, amidst the utter confusion in that
quarter, might very well meet with success. But Cato
could only advise, not command ; Scipio the commander-
in-chief decided that the war should be carried on in the
region of the coast. This was a blunder, not merely
inasmuch as they thereby dropped a plan of war promising
a sure result, but also inasmuch as the region to which
they transferred the war was in dangerous agitation, and a
good part of the army which they opposed to Caesar was
likewise in a troublesome temper. The fearfully strict
levy, the carrying off of the supplies, the devastating of the
smaller townships, the feeling in general that they were
being sacrificed for a cause which from the outset was
foreign to them and was already lost, had exasperated the
native population against the Roman republicans fighting
chap, x PIIARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 297
out their last struggle of despair on African soil ; and the
terrorist proceedings of the latter against all communities
that were but suspected of indifference (p. 286), had raised
thii exasperation to the most fearful hatred. The African
towns declared, wherever they could venture to do so, for
Caesar ; among the Gaetulians and the Libyans, who
served in numbers among the light troops and even in the
legions, desertion was spreading. But Scipio with all the
obstinacy characteristic of folly persevered in his plan,
marched with all his force from Utica to appear before the
towns of Ruspina and Little Leptis occupied by Caesar,
furnished Hadrumetum to the north and Thapsus to the
south (on the promontory Ras Dimas) with strong garrisons,
and in concert with Juba, who likewise appeared before
Ruspina with all his troops not required by the defence of
the frontier, offered battle repeatedly to the enemy. But
Caesar was resolved to wait for his veteran legions. As
these one after another arrived and appeared on the scene
of strife, Scipio and Juba lost the desire to risk a pitched
battle, and Caesar had no means of compelling them to
fight owing to their extraordinary superiority in light
cavalry. Nearly two months passed away in marches and
skirmishes in the neighbourhood of Ruspina and Thapsus,
which chiefly had relation to the finding out of the concealed
store-pits (silos) common in the country, and to the exten-
sion of posts. Caesar, compelled by the enemy's horsemen
to keep as much as possible to the heights or even to
cover his flanks by entrenched lines, yet accustomed his
soldiers gradually during this laborious and apparently
endless warfare to the foreign mode of fighting. Friend
and foe hardly recognized the rapid general in the cautious
master of fence who trained his men carefully and not
unfrequently in person ; and they became almost puzzled
by the masterly skill which displayed itself as conspicuously
in delay as in promptitude of action,
ag8 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
Battle at At last Caesar, after being joined by his last reinforce-
apsus. mentS) ma(je a lateral movement towards Thapsus. Scipio
had, as we have said, strongly garrisoned this town, and
thereby committed the blunder of presenting to his
opponent an object of attack easy to be seized ; to this
first error he soon added the second still less excusable
blunder of now for the rescue of Thapsus giving the battle,
which Caesar had wished and Scipio had hitherto rightly
refused, on ground which placed the decision in the hands
of the infantry of the line. Immediately along the shore,
opposite to Caesar's camp, the legions of Scipio and
Juba appeared, the fore ranks ready for fighting, the
hinder ranks occupied in forming an entrenched camp ; at
the same time the garrison of Thapsus prepared for a sally.
Caesar's camp-guard sufficed to repulse the latter. His
legions, accustomed to war, already forming a correct
estimate of the enemy from the want of precision in their
mode of array and their ill-closed ranks, compelled — while
yet the entrenching was going forward on that side, and
before even the general gave the signal — a trumpeter to
sound for the attack, and advanced along the whole line
headed by Caesar himself, who, when he saw his men
advance without waiting for his orders, galloped forward to
lead them against the enemy. The right wing, in advance
of the other divisions, frightened the line of elephants
opposed to it — this was the last great battle in which these
animals were employed — by throwing bullets and arrows,
so that they wheeled round on their own ranks. The
covering force was cut down, the left wing of the enemy
was broken, and the whole line was overthrown. The
defeat was the more destructive, as the new camp of the
beaten army was not yet ready, and the old one was at a
considerable distance ; both were successively captured
almost without resistance. The mass of the defeated army
threw away their arms and sued for quarter; but Caesar's
chap. X PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 299
soldiers were no longer the same who had readily refrained
from battle before Ilerda and honourably spared the
defenceless at Pharsalus. The habit of civil war and the
rancour left behind by the mutiny asserted their power in
a terrible manner on the battle-field of Thapsus. If the
hydra with which they fought always put forth new energies,
if the army was hurried from Italy to Spain, from Spain to
Macedonia, from Macedonia to Africa, and if the repose
ever more eagerly longed for never came, the soldier
sought, and not wholly without cause, the reason of this
state of things in the unseasonable clemency of Caesar.
He had sworn to retrieve the general's neglect, and
remained deaf to the entreaties of his disarmed fellow-
citizens as well as to the commands of Caesar and the
superior officers. The fifty thousand corpses that covered
the battle-field of Thapsus, among whom were several
Caesarian officers known as secret opponents of the new
monarchy, and therefore cut down on this occasion by their
own men, showed how the soldier procures for himself
repose. The victorious army on the other hand numbered
no more than fifty dead (6 April 708). 46.
There was as little a continuance of the struggle in Cato in
Africa after the battle of Thapsus, as there had been a tlca'
year and a half before in the east after the defeat of
Pharsalus. Cato as commandant of Utica convoked the
senate, set forth how the means of defence stood, and
submitted it to the decision of those assembled whether
they would yield or defend themselves to the last man —
only adjuring them to resolve and to act not each one for
himself, but all in unison. The more courageous view
found several supporters ; it was proposed to manumit on
behalf of the state the slaves capable of arms, which
however Cato rejected as an illegal encroachment on
private property, and suggested in its stead a patriotic
appeal to the slave-owners. But soon this fit of resolution
3°°
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA,
BOOK \
His death.
The
leaders of
the re-
publicans
put to
death.
in an assembly consisting in great part of African merchants
passed off, and they agreed to capitulate. Thereupon
when Faustus Sulla, son of the regent, and Lucius Afranius
arrived in Utica with a strong division of cavalry from the
field of battle, Cato still made an attempt to hold the town
through them ; but he indignantly rejected their demand
to let them first of all put to death the untrustworthy
citizens of Utica en masse, and chose to let the last strong-
hold of the republicans fall into the hands of the monarch
without resistance rather than to profane the last moments
of the republic by such a massacre. After he had — partly
by his authority, partly by liberal largesses — checked so far
as he could the fury of the soldiery against the unfortunate
Uticans ; after he had with touching solicitude furnished
to those who preferred not to trust themselves to Caesar's
mercy the means for flight, and to those who wished to
remain the opportunity of capitulating under the most
tolerable conditions, so far as his ability reached ; and
after having thoroughly satisfied himself that he could
render to no one any farther aid, he held himself released
from his command, retired to his bedchamber, and plunged
his sword into his breast.
Of the other fugitive leaders only a few escaped. The
cavalry that fled from Thapsus encountered the bands of
Sittius, and were cut down or captured by them; their
leaders Afranius and Faustus were delivered up to Caesar,
and, when the latter did not order their immediate execu-
tion, they were slain in a tumult by his veterans. The
commander-in-chief Metellus Scipio with the fleet of the
defeated party fell into the power of the cruisers of Sittius
and, when they were about to lay hands on him, stabbed
himself. King Juba, not unprepared for such an issue,
had in that case resolved to die in a way which seemed to
him befitting a king, and had caused an enormous funeral
pile to be prepared in the market-place of his city Zama,
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 301
which was intended to consume along with his body all
his treasures and the dead bodies of the whole citizens of
Zama. But the inhabitants of the town showed no desire
to let themselves be employed by way of decoration for
the funeral rites of the African Sardanapalus ; and they
closed the gates against the king when fleeing from the
battle-field he appeared, accompanied by Marcus Petreius,
before their city. The king — one of those natures that
become savage amidst a life of dazzling and insolent en-
joyment, and prepare for themselves even out of death an
intoxicating feast — resorted with his companion to one of
his country houses, caused a copious banquet to be served
up, and at the close of the feast challenged Petreius to
fight him to death in single combat. It was the con-
queror of Catilina that received his death at the hand of
the king ; the latter thereupon caused himself to be stabbed
by one of his slaves. The few men of eminence that
escaped, such as Labienus and Sextus Pompeius, followed
the elder brother of the latter to Spain and sought, like
Sertorius formerly, a last refuge of robbers and pirates in
the waters and the mountains of that still half-independent
land.
Without resistance Caesar regulated the affairs of Africa. Regulation
As Curio had already proposed, the kingdom of Massinissa ° nca*
was broken up. The most eastern portion or region of
Sitifis was united with the kingdom of Bocchus king of
East Mauretania (iii. 410), and the faithful king Bogud
of Tingis was rewarded with considerable gifts. Cirta
(Constantine) and the surrounding district, hitherto pos-
sessed under the supremacy of Juba by the prince
Massinissa and his son Arabion, were conferred on the
condottiere Publius Sittius that he might settle his half-
Roman bands there ; * but at the same time this district,
1 The inscriptions of the region referred to preserve numerous traces of
this colonization. The name of the Sittii is there unusually frequent ; the
302 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
as well as by far the largest and most fertile portion of the
late Numidian kingdom, were united as "New Africa"
with the older province of Africa, and the defence of the
country along the coast against the roving tribes of the
desert, which the republic had entrusted to a client-king,
was imposed by the new ruler on the empire itself.
The The struggle, which Pompeius and the republicans had
monarchy, undertaken against the monarchy of Caesar, thus terminated,
after having lasted for four years, in the complete victory
of the new monarch. No doubt the monarchy was not
established for the first time on the battle-fields of Pharsalus
and Thapsus ; it might already be dated from the moment
when Pompeius and Caesar in league had established their
joint rule and overthrown the previous aristocratic constitu-
tion. Yet it was only those baptisms of blood of the ninth
48. 46. August 706 and the sixth April 708 that set aside the
conjoint rule so opposed to the nature of absolute dominion,
and conferred fixed status and formal recognition on the
new monarchy. Risings of pretenders and republican
conspiracies might ensue and provoke new commotions,
perhaps even new revolutions and restorations ; but the
continuity of the free republic that had been uninterrupted
for five hundred years was broken through, and monarchy
was established throughout the range of the wide Roman
empire by the legitimacy of accomplished fact.
The end The constitutional struggle was at an end ; and that it
0 * ^ was so, was proclaimed by Marcus Cato when he fell on
his sword at Utica. For many years he had been the
foremost man in the struggle of the legitimate republic
against its oppressors ; he had continued it, long after he
had ceased to cherish any hope of victory. But now the
struggle itself had become impossible ; the republic which
African township Milev bears as Roman the name colonia Sarnensis
(C. /. L. viii. p. 1094) evidently from the Nucerian river-god Sarnus
(Sueton. Rhet. 4).
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 303
Marcus Brutus had founded was dead and never to be
revived ; what were the republicans now to do on the
earth? The treasure was carried off, the sentinels were
thereby relieved ; who could blame them if they departed ?
There was more nobility, and above all more judgment, in
the death of Cato than there had been in his life. Cato
was anything but a great man ; but with all that short-
sightedness, that perversity, that dry prolixity, and those
spurious phrases which have stamped him, for his own and
for all time, as the ideal of unreflecting republicanism and
the favourite of all who make it their hobby, he was yet
the only man who honourably and courageously championed
in the last struggle the great system doomed to destruction.
Just because the shrewdest lie feels itself inwardly anni-
hilated before the simple truth, and because all the dignity
and glory of human nature ultimately depend not on
shrewdness but on honesty, Cato has played a greater part
in history than many men far superior to him in intellect.
It only heightens the deep and tragic significance of his
death that he was himself a fool ; in truth it is just because
Don Quixote is a fool that he is a tragic figure. It is an
affecting fact, that on that world-stage, on which so many
great and wise men had moved and acted, the fool was
destined to give the epilogue. He too died not in vain.
It was a fearfully striking protest of the republic against
the monarchy, that the last republican went as the first
monarch came — a protest which tore asunder like gossamer
all that so-called constitutional character with which Caesar
invested his monarchy, and exposed in all its hypocritical
falsehood the shibboleth of the reconciliation of all parties,
under the aegis of which despotism grew up. The unre-
lenting warfare which the ghost of the legitimate republic
waged for centuries, from Cassius and Brutus down to
Thrasea and Tacitus, nay, even far later, against the
Caesarian monarchy — a warfare of plots and of literature
304 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, PHARSALUS, THAPSUS bk. v
— was the legacy which the dying Cato bequeathed to his
enemies. This republican opposition derived from Cato
its whole attitude — stately, transcendental in its rhetoric,
pretentiously rigid, hopeless, and faithful to death ; and
accordingly it began even immediately after his death to
revere as a saint the man who in his lifetime was not un-
frequently its laughing-stock and its scandal. But the
greatest of these marks of respect was the involuntary
homage which Caesar rendered to him, when he made an
exception to the contemptuous clemency with which he was
wont to treat his opponents, Pompeians as well as re-
publicans, in the case of Cato alone, and pursued him
even beyond the grave with that energetic hatred which
practical statesmen are wont to feel towards antagonists
opposing them from a region of ideas which they regard
as equally dangerous and impracticable.
ch. xi THE OLD REPUBLIC AND NEW MONARCHY 305
CHAPTER XI
THE OLD REPUBLIC AND THE NEW MONARCHY
The new monarch of Rome, the first ruler over the whole Character
domain of Romano -Hellenic civilization, Gaius Julius ° aesar#
Caesar, was in his fifty -sixth year (born 12 July 652?) 102.
when the battle at Thapsus, the last link in a long chain
of momentous victories, placed the decision as to the future
of the world in his hands. Few men have had their
elasticity so thoroughly put to the proof as Caesar — the
sole creative genius produced by Rome, and the last
produced by the ancient world, which accordingly moved
on in the path that he marked out for it until its sun went
down. Sprung from one of the oldest noble families of
Latium — which traced back its lineage to the heroes of
the Iliad and the kings of Rome, and in fact to the Venus-
Aphrodite common to both nations — he spent the years
of his boyhood and early manhood as the genteel youth of
that epoch were wont to spend them. He had tasted the
sweetness as well as the bitterness of the cup of fashionable
life, had recited and declaimed, had practised literature
and made verses in his idle hours, had prosecuted love-
intrigues of every sort, and got himself initiated into all the
mysteries of shaving, curls, and ruffles pertaining to the
toilette-wisdom of the day, as well as into the still more
mysterious art of always borrowing and never paying. But
the flexible steel of that nature was proof against even
VOL. V *£3
30o THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
these dissipated and flighty courses ; Caesar retained both
his bodily vigour and his elasticity of mind and of heart
unimpaired. In fencing and in riding he was a match for
any of his soldiers, and his swimming saved his life at
Alexandria ; the incredible rapidity of his journeys, which
usually for the sake of gaining time were performed by
night — a thorough contrast to the procession-like slowness
with which Pompeius moved from one place to another —
was the astonishment of his contemporaries and not the
least among the causes of his success. The mind was like
the body. His remarkable power of intuition revealed
itself in the precision and practicability of all his arrange-
ments, even where he gave orders without having seen
with his own eyes. His memory was matchless, and it
was easy for him to carry on several occupations simulta-
neously with equal self-possession. Although a gentleman,
a man of genius, and a monarch, he had still a heart. So
long as he lived, he cherished the purest veneration for his
worthy mother Aurelia (his father having died early); to
his wives and above all to his daughter Julia he devoted
an honourable affection, which was not without reflex
influence even on political affairs. With the ablest and
most excellent men of his time, of high and of humbler
rank, he maintained noble relations of mutual fidelity, with
each after his kind. As he himself never abandoned any
of his partisans after the pusillanimous and unfeeling
manner of Pompeius, but adhered to his friends — and
that not merely from calculation — through good and bad
times without wavering, several of these, such as Aulus
Hirtius and Gaius Matius, gave, even after his death, noble
testimonies of their attachment to him.
If in a nature so harmoniously organized any one aspect
of it may be singled out as characteristic, it is this — that
he stood aloof from all ideology and everything fanciful.
As a matter of course, Caesar was a man of passion, for
chap. Xi THE NEW MONARCHY 307
without passion there is no genius ; but his passion was
never stronger than he could control. He had had his
season of youth, and song, love, and wine had taken lively
possession of his spirit ; but with him they did not penetrate
to the inmost core of his nature. Literature occupied him
long and earnestly ; but, while Alexander could not sleep
for thinking of the Homeric Achilles, Caesar in his sleepless
hours mused on the inflections of the Latin nouns and
verbs. He made verses, as everybody then did, but they
were weak ; on the other hand he was interested in subjects
of astronomy and natural science. While wine was and
continued to be with Alexander the destroyer of care, the
temperate Roman, after the revels of his youth were over,
avoided it entirely. Around him, as around all those
whom the full lustre of woman's love has dazzled in youth,
fainter gleams of it continued imperishably to linger ; even
in later years he had love-adventures and successes with
women, and he retained a certain foppishness in his out-
ward appearance, or, to speak more correctly, the pleasing
consciousness of his own manly beauty. He carefully
covered the baldness, which he keenly felt, with the laurel
chaplet that he wore in public in his later years, and he
would doubtless have surrendered some of his victories, if
he could thereby have brought back his youthful locks.
But, however much even when monarch he enjoyed the
society of women, he only amused himself with them, and
allowed them no manner of influence over him ; even his
much-censured relation to queen Cleopatra was only con-
trived to mask a weak point in his political position (p. 276).
Caesar was thoroughly a realist and a man of sense ;
and whatever he undertook and achieved was pervaded
and guided by the cool sobriety which constitutes the most
marked peculiarity of his genius. To this he owed the
power of living energetically in the present, undisturbed
either by recollection or by expectation ; to this he owed
308 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
the capacity of acting at any moment with collected vigour,
and of applying his whole genius even to the smallest and
most incidental enterprise ; to this he owed the many-sided
power with which he grasped and mastered whatever under-
standing can comprehend and will can compel ; to this he
owed the self-possessed ease with which he arranged his
periods as well as projected his campaigns ; to this he
owed the "marvellous serenity" which remained steadily
with him through good and evil days ; to this he owed the
complete independence, which admitted of no control by
favourite or by mistress, or even by friend. It resulted,
moreover, from this clearness of judgment that Caesar
never formed to himself illusions regarding the power of
fate and the ability of man ; in his case the friendly veil
was lifted up, which conceals from man the inadequacy of
his working. Prudently as he laid his plans and considered
all possibilities, the feeling was never absent from his breast
that in all things fortune, that is to say accident, must
bestow success ; and with this may be connected the
circumstance that he so often played a desperate game
with destiny, and in particular again and again hazarded
his person with daring indifference. As indeed occasion-
ally men of predominant sagacity betake themselves to a
pure game of hazard, so there was in Caesar's rationalism a
point at which it came in some measure into contact with
mysticism.
Caesar as Gifts such as these could not fail to produce a states-
man. From early youth, accordingly, Caesar was a states-
man in the deepest sense of the term, and his aim was the
highest which man is allowed to propose to himself — the
political, military, intellectual, and moral regeneration of
his own deeply decayed nation, and of the still more deeply
decayed Hellenic nation intimately akin to his own. The
hard school of thirty years' experience changed his views
as to the means by which this aim was to be reached ; his
a states
man,
chap. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 309
aim itself remained the same in the times of his hopeless
humiliation and of his unlimited plenitude of power, in the
times when as demagogue and conspirator he stole towards
it by paths of darkness, and in those when, as joint pos-
sessor of the supreme power and then as monarch, he
worked at his task in the full light of day before the eyes
of the world. All the measures of a permanent kind that
proceeded from him at the most various times assume their
appropriate places in the great building-plan. We cannot
therefore properly speak of isolated achievements of
Caesar ; he did nothing isolated. With justice men com-
mend Caesar the orator for his masculine eloquence, which,
scorning all the arts of the advocate, like a clear flame at
once enlightened and warmed. With justice men admire
in Caesar the author the inimitable simplicity of the com-
position, the unique purity and beauty of the language.
With justice the greatest masters of war of all times have
praised Caesar the general, who, in a singular degree dis-
regarding routine and tradition, knew always how to find
out the mode of warfare by which in the given case the
enemy was conquered, and which was thus in the given
case the right one ; who with the certainty of divination
found the proper means for every end ; who after defeat
stood ready for battle like William of Orange, and ended
the campaign invariably with victory; who managed that
element of warfare, the treatment of which serves to dis-
tinguish military genius from the mere ordinary ability of
an officer — the rapid movement of masses — with unsur-
passed perfection, and found the guarantee of victory not
in the massiveness of his forces but in the celerity of their
movements, not in long preparation but in rapid and daring
action even with inadequate means. But all these were
with Caesar mere secondary matters ; he was no doubt a
great orator, author, and general, but he became each of
these merely because he was a consummate statesman.
310 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND BOOK V
The soldier more especially played in him altogether an
accessory part, and it is one of the principal peculiarities
by which he is distinguished from Alexander, Hannibal,
and Napoleon, that he began his political activity not as
an officer, but as a demagogue. According to his original
plan he had purposed to reach his object, like Pericles and
Gaius Gracchus, without force of arms, and throughout
eighteen years he had as leader of the popular party moved
exclusively amid political plans and intrigues — until, re-
luctantly convinced of the necessity for a military support,
he, when already forty years of age, put himself at the
head of an army. It was natural that he should even
afterwards remain still more statesman than general — just
like Cromwell, who also transformed himself from a leader
of opposition into a military chief and democratic king,
and who in general, little as the prince of Puritans seems
to resemble the dissolute Roman, is yet in his development
as well as in the objects which he aimed at and the results
which he achieved of all statesmen perhaps the most akin
to Caesar. Even in his mode of warfare this improvised
generalship may still be recognized ; the enterprises of
Napoleon against Egypt and against England do not more
clearly exhibit the artillery-lieutenant who had risen by
service to command than the similar enterprises of Caesar
exhibit the demagogue metamorphosed into a general.
A regularly trained officer would hardly have been prepared,
through political considerations of a not altogether stringent
nature, to set aside the best-founded military scruples in
the way in which Caesar did on several occasions, most
strikingly in the case of his landing in Epirus. Several of
his acts are therefore censurable from a military point of
view ; but what the general loses, the statesman gains.
The task of the statesman is universal in its nature like
Caesar's genius ; if he undertook things the most varied
and most remote one from another, they had all without
chap, xi THE NEW MONARCHY 311
exception a bearing on the one great object to which with
infinite fidelity and consistency he devoted himself; and of
the manifold aspects and directions of his great activity he
never preferred one to another. Although a master of the
art of war, he yet from statesmanly considerations did his
utmost to avert civil strife and, when it nevertheless began,
to earn laurels stained as little as possible by blood.
Although the founder of a military monarchy, he yet, with
an energy unexampled in history, allowed no hierarchy of
marshals or government of praetorians to come into exist-
ence. If he had a preference for any one form of services
rendered to the state, it was for the sciences and arts of
peace rather than for those of war.
The most remarkable peculiarity of his action as a
statesman was its perfect harmony. In reality all the con-
ditions for this most difficult of all human functions were
united in Caesar. A thorough realist, he never allowed
the images of the past or venerable tradition to disturb
him ; for him nothing was of value in politics but the living
present and the law of reason, just as in his character of
grammarian he set aside historical and antiquarian research
and recognized nothing but on the one hand the living
usus loquendi and on the other hand the rule of symmetry.
A born ruler, he governed the minds of men as the wind
drives the clouds, and compelled the most heterogeneous
natures to place themselves at his service — the plain citizen
and the rough subaltern, the genteel matrons of Rome and
the fair princesses of Egypt and Mauretania, the brilliant
cavalry-officer and the calculating banker. His talent for
organization was marvellous ; no statesman has ever com-
pelled alliances, no general has ever collected an army out
of unyielding and refractory elements with such decision,
and kept them together with such firmness, as Caesar dis-
played in constraining and upholding his coalitions and his
legions ; never did regent judge his instruments and assign
3i2 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
each to the place appropriate for him with so acute an
eye.
He was monarch ; but he never played the king. Even
when absolute lord of Rome, he retained the deportment
of the party-leader ; perfectly pliant and smooth, easy and
charming in conversation, complaisant towards every one,
it seemed as if he wished to be nothing but the first among
his peers. Caesar entirely avoided the blunder into which
so many men otherwise on an equality with him have
fallen, of carrying into politics the military tone of
command ; however much occasion his disagreeable rela-
tions with the senate gave for it, he never resorted to out-
rages such as was that of the eighteenth Brumaire. Caesar
was monarch 3 but he was never seized with the giddiness
of the tyrant. He is perhaps the only one among the
mighty ones of the earth, who in great matters and little
never acted according to inclination or caprice, but always
without exception according to his duty as ruler, and who,
when he looked back on his life, found doubtless erroneous
calculations to deplore, but no false step of passion to
regret. There is nothing in the history of Caesar's life,
which even on a small scale * can be compared with those
poetico-sensual ebullitions — such as the murder of Kleitos
or the burning of Persepolis — which the history of his
great predecessor in the east records. He is, in fine,
perhaps the only one of those mighty ones, who has pre-
served to the end of his career the statesman's tact of
discriminating between the possible and the impossible,
and has not broken down in the task which for greatly
gifted natures is the most difficult of all — the task of
recognizing, when on the pinnacle of success, its natural
1 The affair with Laberius, told in the well-known prologue, has been
quoted as an instance of Caesar's tyrannical caprices, but those who have
done so have thoroughly misunderstood the irony of the situation as well
as of the poet ; to say nothing of the naivett of lamenting as a martyr the
poet who readily pockets his honorarium.
chap, xi THE NEW MONARCHY 313
limits. What was possible he performed, and never left
the possible good undone for the sake of the impossible
better, never disdained at least to mitigate by palliatives
evils that were incurable. But where he recognized that
fate had spoken, he always obeyed. Alexander on the
Hypanis, Napoleon at Moscow, turned back because they
were compelled to do so, and were indignant at destiny for
bestowing even on its favourites merely limited successes ;
Caesar turned back voluntarily on the Thames and on the
Rhine; and thought of carrying into effect even at the
Danube and the Euphrates not unbounded plans of world-
conquest, but merely well-considered frontier-regulations.
Such was this unique man, whom it seems so easy and
yet is so infinitely difficult to describe. His whole nature
is transparent clearness ; and tradition preserves more
copious and more vivid information about him than about
any of his peers in the ancient world. Of such a personage
our conceptions may well vary in point of shallowness or
depth, but they cannot be, strictly speaking, different; to
every not utterly perverted inquirer the grand figure has
exhibited the same essential features, and yet no one has
succeeded in reproducing it to the life. The secret lies in
its perfection. In his character as a man as well as in his
place in history, Caesar occupies a position where the great
contrasts of existence meet and balance each other. Of
mighty creative power and yet at the same time of the
most penetrating judgment; no longer a youth and not
yet an old man ; of the highest energy of will and the
highest capacity of execution ; filled with republican ideals
and at the same time born to be a king ; a Roman in the
deepest essence of his nature, and yet called to reconcile
and combine in himself as well as in the outer world the
Roman and the Hellenic types of culture — Caesar was the
entire and perfect man. Accordingly we miss in him more
than in any other historical personage what are called
3H THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
characteristic features, which are in reality nothing else
than deviations from the natural course of human develop-
ment. What in Caesar passes for such at the first super-
ficial glance is, when more closely observed, seen to be
the peculiarity not of the individual, but of the epoch of
culture or of the nation ; his youthful adventures, for
instance, were common to him with all his more gifted
contemporaries of like position, his unpoetical but strongly
logical temperament was the temperament of Romans in
general. It formed part also of Caesar's full humanity that
he was in the highest degree influenced by the conditions
of time and place ; for there is no abstract humanity — the
living man cannot but occupy a place in a given nationality
and in a definite line of cultuie. Caesar was a perfect man
just because he more than any other placed himself amidst
the currents of his time, and because he more than any
other possessed the essential peculiarity of the Roman nation
— practical aptitude as a citizen — in perfection : for his
Hellenism in fact was only the Hellenism which had been
long intimately blended with the Italian nationality. But
in this very circumstance lies the difficulty, we may perhaps
say the impossibility, of depicting Caesar to the life. As
the artist can paint everything save only consummate
beauty, so the historian, when once in a thousand years
he encounters the perfect, can only be silent regarding it.
For normality admits doubtless of being expressed, but it
gives us only the negative notion of the absence of defect ;
the secret of nature, whereby in her most finished manifesta-
tions normality and individuality are combined, is beyond
expression. Nothing is left for us but to deem those
fortunate who beheld this perfection, and to gain some
faint conception of it from the reflected lustre which rests
imperishably on the works that were the creation of this
great nature. These also, it is true, bear the stamp of the
time. The Roman hero himself stood by the side of his
chap, xi THE NEW MONARCHY
315
youthful Greek predecessor not merely as an equal, but as
a superior ; but the world had meanwhile become old and
its youthful lustre had faded. The action of Caesar was
no longer, like that of Alexander, a joyous marching onward
towards a goal indefinitely remote ; he built on, and out of,
ruins, and was content to establish himself as tolerably and
as securely as possible within the ample but yet definite
bounds once assigned to him. With reason therefore the
delicate poetic tact of the nations has not troubled itself
about the unpoetical Roman, and on the other hand has
invested the son of Philip with all the golden lustre of
poetry, with all the rainbow hues of legend. But with
equal reason the political life of the nations has during
thousands of years again and again reverted to the lines
which Caesar drew; and the fact, that the peoples to
whom the world belongs still at the present day designate
the highest of their monarchs by his name, conveys a
warning deeply significant and, unhappily, fraught with
shame.
If the old, in every respect vicious, state of things was Setting
to be successfully got rid of and the commonwealth was to aside of
. the old
be renovated, it was necessary first of all that the country parties,
should be practically tranquillized and that the ground
should be cleared from the rubbish with which since the
recent catastrophe it was everywhere strewed. In this
work Caesar set out from the principle of the recon-
ciliation of the hitherto subsisting parties or, to put it
more correctly — for, where the antagonistic principles are
irreconcilable, we cannot speak of real reconciliation — from
the principle that the arena, on which the nobility and
the populace had hitherto contended with each other, was
to be abandoned by both parties, and that both were to
meet together on the ground of the new monarchical
constitution. First of all therefore all the older quarrels
of the republican past were regarded as done away for
3i6 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
ever and irrevocably. While Caesar gave orders that the
statues of Sulla which had been thrown down by the mob
of the capital on the news of the battle of Pharsalus should
be re-erected, and thus recognized the fact that it became
history alone to sit in judgment on that great man, he at
the same time cancelled the last remaining effects of Sulla's
exceptional laws, recalled from exile those who had been
banished in the times of the Cinnan and Sertorian troubles,
and restored to the children of those outlawed by Sulla
their forfeited privilege of eligibility to office. In like
manner all those were restored, who in the preliminary
stage of the recent catastrophe had lost their seat in the
senate or their civil existence through sentence of the
censors or political process, especially through the im-
peachments raised on the basis of the exceptional laws
62. of 702. Those alone who had put to death the proscribed
for money remained, as was reasonable, still under attainder;
and Milo, the most daring condottiere of the senatorial party,
was excluded from the general pardon.
Discontent Far more difficult than the settlement of these questions
democrats wn'cn already belonged substantially to the past was the
treatment of the parties confronting each other at the
moment — on the one hand Caesar's own democratic
adherents, on the other hand the overthrown aristocracy.
That the former should be, if possible, still less satisfied
than the latter with Caesar's conduct after the victory and
with his summons to abandon the old standing-ground of
party, was to be expected. Caesar himself desired doubtless
on the whole the same issue which Gaius Gracchus had
contemplated ; but the designs of the Caesarians were no
longer those of the Gracchans. The Roman popular party
had been driven onward in gradual progression from reform
to revolution, from revolution to anarchy, from anarchy to
a war against property ; they celebrated among themselves
the memory of the reign of terror and now adorned the
chap, xi THE NEW MONARCHY 317
tomb of Catilina, as formerly that of the Gracchi, with
flowers and garlands ; they had placed themselves under
Caesar's banner, because they expected him to do for
them what Catilina had not been able to accomplish.
But as it speedily became plain that Caesar was very
far from intending to be the testamentary executor of
Catilina, and that the utmost which debtors might expect
from him was some alleviations of payment and modifica-
tions of procedure, indignation found loud vent in the
inquiry, For whom then had the popular party conquered,
if not for the people ? and the rabble of this description,
high and low, out of pure chagrin at the miscarriage of
their politico-economic Saturnalia began first to coquet with
the Pompeians, and then even during Caesar's absence of
nearly two years from Italy (Jan. 706 — autumn 707) to 48-47.
instigate there a second civil war within the first.
The praetor Marcus Caelius Rufus, a good aristocrat Caelius
and bad payer of debts, of some talent and much culture, aDd Mda
as a vehement and fluent orator hitherto in the senate and
in the Forum one of the most zealous champions for Caesar,
proposed to the people — without being instructed from
any higher quarter to do so — a law which granted to
debtors a respite of six years free of interest, and then,
when he was opposed in this step, proposed a second law
which even cancelled all claims arising out of loans and
current house rents; whereupon the Caesarian senate
deposed him from his office. It was just on the eve of
the battle of Pharsalus, and the balance in the great
contest seemed to incline to the side of the Pompeians;
Rufus entered into communication with the old senatorian
band-leader Milo, and the two contrived a counter-revolu-
tion, which inscribed on its banner partly the republican
constitution, partly the cancelling of creditors' claims and
the manumission of slaves. Milo left his place of exile
Massilia, and called the Pompeians and the slave-herdsmen
3i8
THE OLD REPUBLIC AND
BOOK V
47.
Dolabella.
Measures
against
Pompeians
and re-
publicans.
to arras in the region of Thurii ; Rufus made arrangements
to seize the town of Capua by armed slaves. But the latter
plan was detected before its execution and frustrated by
the Capuan militia; Quintus Pedius, who advanced with
a legion into the territory of Thurii, scattered the band
making havoc there ; and the fall of the two leaders put
48. an end to the scandal (706).
Nevertheless there was found in the following year (707)
a second fool, the tribune of the people, Publius Dolabella,
who, equally insolvent but far from being equally gifted
with his predecessor, introduced afresh his law as to
creditors' claims and house rents, and with his colleague
Lucius Trebellius began on that point once more — it
was the last time — the demagogic war ; there were
serious frays between the armed bands on both sides
and various street - riots, till the commandant of Italy
Marcus Antonius ordered the military to interfere, and
soon afterwards Caesar's return from the east completely
put an end to the preposterous proceedings. Caesar
attributed to these brainless attempts to revive the projects
of Catilina so little importance, that he tolerated Dolabella
in Italy and indeed after some time even received him
again into favour. Against a rabble of this sort, which
had nothing to do with any political question at all, but
solely with a war against property — as against gangs of
banditti — the mere existence of a strong government is
sufficient ; and Caesar was too great and too considerate
to busy himself with the apprehensions which the Italian
alarmists felt regarding these communists of that day,
and thereby unduly to procure a false popularity for
his monarchy.
While Caesar thus might leave, and actually left, the late
democratic party to the process of decomposition which had
already in its case advanced almost to the utmost limit, he
had on the other hand, with reference to the former aristo
chap, xi THE NEW MONARCHY 319
cratic party possessing a far greater vitality, not to bring
about its dissolution — which time alone could accomplish
— but to pave the way for and initiate it by a proper
combination of repression and conciliation. Among minor
measures, .Caesar, even from a natural sense of propriety,
avoided exasperating the fallen party by empty sarcasm ;
he did not triumph over his conquered fellow-burgesses ; l
he mentioned Pompeius often and always with respect,
and caused his statue overthrown by the people to be
re-erected at the senate-house, when the latter was restored,
in its earlier distinguished place. To political prosecutions
after the victory Caesar assigned the narrowest possible
limits. No investigation was instituted into the various
communications which the constitutional party had held
even with nominal Caesarians ; Caesar threw the piles
of papers found in the enemy's headquarters at Pharsalus
and Thapsus into the fire unread, and spared himself
and the country from political processes against individuals
suspected of high treason. Further, all the common
soldiers who had followed their Roman or provincial
officers into the contest against Caesar came off with
impunity. The sole exception made was in the case of
those Roman burgesses, who had taken service in the
army of the Numidian king Juba ; their property was
confiscated by way of penalty for their treason. Even
to the officers of the conquered party Caesar had granted
unlimited pardon up to the close of the Spanish campaign
of "05 ; but he became convinced that in this he had 49.
gone too far, and that the removal at least of the leaders
among them was inevitable. The rule by which he was
thenceforth guided was, that every one who after the
capitulation of Ilerda had served as an officer in the
1 The triumph after the battle of Munda subsequently to be mentioned
probably had reference only to the Lusitanians who served in great
numbers in the conquered army.
320 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
enemy's army or had sat in the opposition -senate, if he
survived the close of the struggle, forfeited his property
and his political rights, and was banished from Italy for
life ; if he did not survive the close of the struggle, his
property at least fell to the state; but any one of these,
who had formerly accepted pardon from Caesar and was
once more found in the ranks of the enemy, thereby
forfeited his life. These rules were however materially
modified in the execution. The sentence of death was
actually executed only against a very few of the numerous
backsliders. In the confiscation of the property of the
fallen not only were the debts attaching to the several
portions of the estate as well as the claims of the widows
for their dowries paid off, as was reasonable, but a portion
of the paternal estate was left also to the children of the
deceased. Lastly not a few of those, who in consequence
of those rules were liable to banishment and confiscation
of property, were at once pardoned entirely or got off with
fines, like the African capitalists who were impressed as
members of the senate of Utica. And even the others
almost without exception got their freedom and property
restored to them, if they could only prevail on themselves
to petition Caesar to that effect ; on several who declined
to do so, such as the consular Marcus Marcellus, pardon
44, was even conferred unasked, and ultimately in 710 a
general amnesty was issued for all who were still unre-
called.
Amnesty. The republican opposition submitted to be pardoned ;
but it was not reconciled. Discontent with the new order
of things and exasperation against the unwonted ruler were
general. For open political resistance there was indeed
no farther opportunity — it was hardly worth taking into
account, that some oppositional tribunes on occasion of the
question of title acquired for themselves the republican
crown of martyrdom by a demonstrative intervention against
chap. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 321
those who had called Caesar king — but republicanism
found expression all the more decidedly as an opposition
of sentiment, and in secret agitation and plotting. Not
a hand stirred when the Imperator appeared in public.
There was abundance of wall-placards and sarcastic verses
full of bitter and telling popular satire against the new
monarchy. When a comedian ventured on a republican
allusion, he was saluted with the loudest applause. The
praise of Cato formed the fashionable theme of oppositional
pamphleteers, and their writings found a public all the
more grateful because even literature was no longer free.
Caesar indeed combated the republicans even now on
their own field ; he himself and his abler confidants
replied to the Cato -literature with Anticatones, and the
republican and Caesarian scribes fought round the dead
hero of Utica like the Trojans and Hellenes round the
dead body of Patroclus ; but as a matter of course in
this conflict — where the public thoroughly republican in
its feelings was judge — the Caesarians had the worst of
it. No course remained but to overawe the authors; on
which account men well known and dangerous in a
literary point of view, such as Publius Nigidius Figulus
and Aulus Caecina, had more difficulty in obtaining
permission to return to Italy than other exiles, while the
oppositional writers tolerated in Italy were subjected to
a practical censorship, the restraints of which were all
the more annoying that the measure of punishment to
be dreaded was utterly arbitrary.1 The underground
machinations of the overthrown parties against the new
monarchy will be more fitly set forth in another connec-
tion. Here it is sufficient to say that risings of pre-
tenders as well as of republicans were incessantly brewing
1 Any one who desires to compare the old and new hardships of
authors will find opportunity of doing so in the letter of Caecina (Cicero,
A&. Fam. vi. 7).
vol. v 154
322 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
throughout the Roman empire ; that the flames of civil war
kindled now by the Pompeians, now by the republicans,
again burst forth brightly at various places ; and that in
the capital there was perpetual conspiracy against the life
of the monarch. But Caesar could not be induced by
these plots even to surround himself permanently with a
body-guard, and usually contented himself with making
known the detected conspiracies by public placards.
Bearing of However much Caesar was wont to treat all things
towards the relating to his personal safety with daring indifference, he
parties. could not possibly conceal from himself the very serious
danger with which this mass of malcontents threatened not
merely himself but also his creations. If nevertheless,
disregarding all the warning and urgency of his friends, he
without deluding himself as to the implacability of the very
opponents to whom he showed mercy, persevered with
marvellous composure and energy in the course of pardon-
ing by far the greater number of them, he did so neither
from the chivalrous magnanimity of a proud, nor from the
sentimental clemency of an effeminate, nature, but from the
correct statesmanly consideration that vanquished parties
are disposed of more rapidly and with less public injury by
their absorption within the state than by any attempt to
extirpate them by proscription or to eject them from the
commonwealth by banishment. Caesar could not for his
high objects dispense with the constitutional party itself,
which in fact embraced not the aristocracy merely but all
the elements of a free and national spirit among the Italian
burgesses; for his schemes, which contemplated the re-
novation of the antiquated state, he needed the whole mass
of talent, culture, hereditary and self-acquired distinction,
which this party embraced ; and in this sense he may
well have named the pardoning of his opponents the finest
reward of victory. Accordingly the most prominent chiefs of
the defeated parties were indeed removed, but full pardon
CHAP. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 323
was not withheld from the men of the second and third
rank and especially of the younger generation ; they were
not, however, allowed to sulk in passive opposition, but
were by more or less gentle pressure induced to take an
active part in the new administration, and to accept honours
and offices from it. As with Henry the Fourth and William
of Orange, so with Caesar his greatest difficulties began
only after the victory. Every revolutionary conqueror
learns by experience that, if after vanquishing his opponents
he would not remain like Cinna and Sulla a mere party-
chief, but would like Caesar, Henry the Fourth, and William
of Orange substitute the welfare of the commonwealth for
the necessarily one-sided programme of his own party, for
the moment all parties, his own as well as the vanquished,
unite against the new chief; and the more so, the more
great and pure his idea of his new vocation. The friends
of the constitution and the Pompeians, though doing
homage with the lips to Caesar, bore yet in heart a grudge
either at monarchy or at least at the dynasty ; the degen-
erate democracy was in open rebellion against Caesar from
the moment of its perceiving that Caesar's objects were by
no means its own ; even the personal adherents of Caesar
murmured, when they found that their chief was establishing
instead of a state of condottieri a monarchy equal and just
towards all, and that the portions of gain accruing to them
were to be diminished by the accession of the vanquished.
This settlement of the commonwealth was acceptable to no
party, and had to be imposed on his associates no less than
on his opponents. Caesar's own position was now in a
certain sense more imperilled than before the victory ; but
what he lost, the state gained. By annihilating the parties
and not simply sparing the partisans but allowing every man
of talent or even merely of good descent to attain to office
irrespective of his political past, he gained for his great
building all the working power extant in the state ; and not
324 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
only so, but the voluntary or compulsory participation of
men of all parties in the same work led the nation also
over imperceptibly to the newly prepared ground. The
fact that this reconciliation of the parties was for the
moment only external and that they were for the present
much less agreed in adherence to the new state of things
than in hatred against Caesar, did not mislead him ; he
knew well that antagonisms lose their keenness when
brought into such outward union, and that only in this way
can the statesman anticipate the work of time, which alone
is able finally to heal such a strife by laying the old genera-
tion in the grave. Still less did he inquire who hated him
or meditated his assassination. Like every genuine states-
man he served not the people for reward — not even for the
reward of their love — but sacrificed the favour of his con-
temporaries for the blessing of posterity, and above all for
the permission to save and renew his nation.
Caesar's In attempting to give a detailed account of the mode
in which the transition was effected from the old to the new
state of things, we must first of all recollect that Caesar
came not to begin, but to complete. The plan of a new
polity suited to the times, long ago projected by Gaius
Gracchus, had been maintained by his adherents and suc-
cessors with more or less of spirit and success, but without
wavering. Caesar, from the outset and as it were by
hereditary right the head of the popular party, had for
thirty years borne aloft its banner without ever changing
or even so much as concealing his colours ; he remained
democrat even when monarch. As he accepted without
limitation, apart of course from the preposterous projects of
Catilina and Clodius, the heritage of his party ; as he dis-
played the bitterest, even personal, hatred to the aristocracy
and the genuine aristocrats ; and as he retained unchanged
the essential ideas of Roman democracy, viz. alleviation of
the burdens of debtors, transmarine colonization, gradual
chap. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 325
equalization of the differences of rights among the classes
belonging to the state, emancipation of the executive power
from the senate : his monarchy was so little at variance
with democracy, that democracy on the contrary only
attained its completion and fulfilment by means of
that monarchy. For this monarchy was not the Oriental
despotism of divine right, but a monarchy such as Gaius
Gracchus wished to found, such as Pericles and Cromwell
founded — the representation of the nation by the man in
whom it puts supreme and unlimited confidence. The
ideas, which lay at the foundation of Caesar's work, were
so far not strictly new ; but to him belongs their realization,
which after all is everywhere the main matter ; and to him
pertains the grandeur of execution, which would probably
have surprised the brilliant projector himself if he could
have seen it, and which has impressed, and will always
impress, every one to whom it has been presented in the
living reality or in the mirror of history — to whatever his-
torical epoch or whatever shade of politics he may belong
■ — according to the measure of his ability to comprehend
human and historical greatness, with deep and ever-deepen-
ing emotion and admiration.
At this point however it is proper expressly once for all
to claim what the historian everywhere tacitly presumes,
and to protest against the custom — common to simplicity
and perfidy — of using historical praise and historical censure,
dissociated from the given circumstances, as phrases of
general application, and in the present case of construing
the judgment as to Caesar into a judgment as to what is
called Caesarism. It is true that the history of past cen-
turies ought to be the instructress of the present ; but not
in the vulgar sense, as if one could simply by turning over
the leaves discover the conjunctures of the present in the
records of the past, and collect from these the symptoms
for a political diagnosis and the specifics for a prescription ;
326 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
it is instructive only so far as the observation of older forms
of culture reveals the organic conditions of civilization
generally — the fundamental forces everywhere alike, and
the manner of their combination everywhere different — and
leads and encourages men, not to unreflecting imitation,
but to independent reproduction. In this sense the hiitory
of Caesar and of Roman Imperialism, with all the unsur-
passed greatness of the master-worker, with all the historical
necessity of the work, is in truth a sharper censure of
modern autocracy than could be written by the hand of
man. According to the same law of nature in virtue of
which the smallest organism infinitely surpasses the most
artistic machine, every constitution however defective which
gives play to the free self-determination of a majority of
citizens infinitely surpasses the most brilliant and humane
absolutism ; for the former is capable of development and
therefore living, the latter is what it is and therefore dead.
This law of nature has verified itself in the Roman absolute
military monarchy and verified itself all the more com-
pletely, that, under the impulse of its creator's genius and
in the absence of all material complications from without,
that monarchy developed itself more purely and freely than
any similar state. From Caesar's time, as the sequel will
show and Gibbon has shown long ago, the Roman system
had only an external coherence and received only a
mechanical extension, while internally it became even with
him utterly withered and dead. If in the early stages of the
autocracy and above all in Caesar's own soul (iv. 504) the
hopeful dream of a combination of free popular development
and absolute rule was still cherished, the government of the
highly-gifted emperors of the Julian house soon taught men
in a terrible form how far it was possible to hold fire and
water in the same vessel. Caesar's work was necessary and
salutary, not because it was or could be fraught with bless-
ing in itself, but because — with the national organization of
chap, xi THE NEW MONARCHY 327
antiquity, which was based on slavery and was utterly a
stranger to republican-constitutional representation, and in
presence of the legitimate urban constitution which in the
course of five hundred years had ripened into oligarchic
absolutism — absolute military monarchy was the copestone
logically necessary and the least of evils. When once the
slave-holding aristocracy in Virginia and the Carolinas shall
have carried matters as far as their congeners in the Sullan
Rome, Caesarism will there too be legitimized at the bar
of the spirit of history ; l where it appears under other con-
ditions of development, it is at once a caricature and a
usurpation. But history will not submit to curtail the true
Caesar of his due honour, because her verdict may in the
presence of bad Caesars lead simplicity astray and may give
to roguery occasion for lying and fraud. She too is a Bible,
and if she cannot any more than the Bible hinder the fool
from misunderstanding and the devil from quoting her, she
too will be able to bear with, and to requite, them both.
The position of the new supreme head of the state Dictator-
appears formally, at least in the first instance, as a dictator- ship'
ship. Caesar took it up at first after his return from Spain
in 705, but laid it down again after a few days, and waged 49.
the decisive campaign of 706 simply as consul — this was 48.
the office his tenure of which was the primary occasion
for the outbreak of the civil war (p. 176) But in the
autumn of this year after the battle of Pharsalus he reverted
to the dictatorship and had it repeatedly entrusted to him,
at first for an undefined period, but from the 1st January
709 as an annual office, and then in January or February 45.
7102 for the duration of his life, so that he in the end 44.
1 When this was written — in the year 1857 — no one could foresee how
soon the mightiest struggle and most glorious victory as yet recorded in
human annals would save the United States from this fearful trial, and
secure the future existence of an absolute self-governing freedom not to be
permanently kept in check by any local Caesarism.
2 On the 26th January 710 Caesar is still called dictator III J, (triumphal 44.
328 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
expressly dropped the earlier reservation as to his laying
down the office and gave formal expression to its tenure for
life in the new title of dictator perpetuus. This dictatorship,
both in its first ephemeral and in its second enduring tenure,
was not that of the old constitution, but — what was coincident
with this merely in the name — the supreme exceptional
office as arranged by Sulla (iv. ioo) ; an office, the functions
of which were fixed, not by the constitutional ordinances
regarding the supreme single magistracy, but by special
decree of the people, to such an effect that the holder re-
ceived, in the commission to project laws and to regulate
the commonwealth, an official prerogative de jure un-
limited which superseded the republican partition of powers.
Those were merely applications of this general prerogative
to the particular case, when the holder of power was further
entrusted by separate acts with the right of deciding on
war and peace without consulting the senate and the people,
with the independent disposal of armies and finances, and
with the nomination of the provincial governors. Caesar
could accordingly de jure assign to himself even such
prerogatives as lay outside of the proper functions of the
magistracy and even outside of the province of state-powers
at all ; x and it appears almost as a concession on his part,
that he abstained from nominating the magistrates instead
of the Comitia and limited himself to claiming a binding
right of proposal for a proportion of the praetors and of
the lower magistrates ; and that he moreover had himself
empowered by special decree of the people for the creation
of patricians, which was not at all allowable according to
use and wont.
table) ; on the 18th February of this year he was already dictator perpetuus
(Cicero, Philip, ii. 34, 87). Comp. Staatsrecht, ii.8 716.
1 The formulation of that dictatorship appears to have expressly
brought into prominenceamong other things the ' ' improvement of morals " ;
but Caesar did not hold on his own part an office of this sort (Staatsrecht,
ii.8705).
chap, xi THE NEW MONARCHY 3*9
For other magistracies in the proper sense there remained Other
alongside of this dictatorship no room ; Caesar did not ^^^^
take up the censorship as such,1 but he doubtless exercised and atui
:,., .,».i. -i^/- • butions.
censorial rights — particularly the important right of norm
nating senators — after a comprehensive fashion.
He held the consulship frequently alongside of the
dictatorship, once even without colleague ; but he by no
means attached it permanently to his person, and he gave
no effect to the calls addressed to him to undertake it for
five or even for ten years in succession.
Caesar had no need to have the superintendence of
worship now committed to him, since he was already
pontifex tnaximus (iv. 460). As a matter of course the
membership of the college of augurs was conferred on him,
and generally an abundance of old and new honorary rights,
such as the title of a " father of the fatherland," the
designation of the month of his birth by the name which it
still bears of Julius, and other manifestations of the incipient
courtly tone which ultimately ran into utter deification.
Two only of the arrangements deserve to be singled out :
namely that Caesar was placed on the same footing with
the tribunes of the people as regards their special personal
inviolability, and that the appellation of Imperator was
permanently attached to his person and borne by him as a
title alongside of his other official designations.
Men of judgment will not require any proof, either that
Caesar intended to engraft on the commonwealth his
supreme power, and this not merely for a few years or even
as a personal office for an indefinite period somewhat like
Sulla's regency, but as an essential and permanent organ ;
or that he selected for the new institution an appropriate and
simple designation ; for, if it is a political blunder to create
1 Caesar bears the designation of imperator always without any number
indicative of iteration, and always in the first place after his name
[Staatsrecht , iLs 767, note 1).
33° THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
names without substantial meaning, it is scarcely a less
error to set up the substance of plenary power without a
name. Only it is not easy to determine what definitive
formal shape Caesar had in view; partly because in this
period of transition the ephemeral and the permanent
buildings are not clearly discriminated from each other,
partly because the devotion of his clients which already
anticipated the nod of their master loaded him with a
multitude — offensive doubtless to himself — of decrees of
confidence and laws conferring honours. Least of all
could the new monarchy attach itself to the consulship, just
on account of the collegiate character that could not well be
separated from this office ; Caesar also evidently laboured
to degrade this hitherto supreme magistracy into an empty
title, and subsequently, when he undertook it, he did not
hold it through the whole year, but before the year expired
gave it away to personages of secondary rank. The
dictatorship came practically into prominence most frequently
and most definitely, but probably only because Caesar
wished to use it in the significance which it had of old in
the constitutional machinery — as an extraordinary presidency
for surmounting extraordinary crises. On the other hand
it was far from recommending itself as an expression for the
new monarchy, for the magistracy was inherently clothed
with an exceptional and unpopular character, and it
could hardly be expected of the representative of the
democracy that he should choose for its permanent organiza-
tion that form, which the most gifted champion of the
opposing party had created for his own ends.
Caesar The new name of Imperator, on the other hand, appears
Imperator. jn every respect by far more appropriate for the formal
expression of the monarchy ; just because it is in this
application * new, and no definite outward occasion for its
1 During the republican period the name Imperator, which denotes the
victorious general, was laid aside with the end of the campaign ; as a
permanent title it first appears in the case of Caesar.
CHAP. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 331
introduction is apparent. The new wine might not be put
into old bottles ; here is a new name for the new thing,
and that name most pregnantly sums up what the demo-
cratic party had already expressed in the Gabinian law,
only with less precision, as the function of its chief — the
concentration and perpetuation of official power (imperium)
in the hands of a popular chief independent of the senate.
We find on Caesar's coins, especially those of the last
period, alongside of the dictatorship the title of Imperator
prevailing, and in Caesar's law as to political crimes the
monarch seems to have been designated by this name.
Accordingly the following times, though not immediately,
connected the monarchy with the name of Imperator. To
lend to this new office at once a democratic and religious
sanction, Caesar probably intended to associate with it
once for all on the one hand the tribunician power, on the
other the supreme pontificate.
That the new organization was not meant to be restricted
merely to the lifetime of its founder, is beyond doubt ; but
he did not succeed in settling the especially difficult
question of the succession, and it must remain an undecided
point whether he had it in view to institute some sort of
form for the election of a successor, such as had subsisted in
the case of the original kingly office, or whether he wished
to introduce for the supreme office not merely the tenure
for life but also the hereditary character, as his adopted
son subsequently maintained.1 It is not improbable that
he had the intention of combining in seme measure the
two systems, and of arranging the succession, similarly to the
1 That in Caesar's lifetime the imperium as well as the supreme
pontificate was rendered by a formal legislative act hereditary for his
agnate descendants — of his own body or through the medium of adoption
— was asserted by Caesar the Younger as his legal title to rale. As our
traditional accounts stand, the existence of such a law or resolution of the
6enate must be decidedly called in question ; but doubtless it remains
possible that Caesar intended the issue of such.a decree. (Comp. Staatsreckt,
ii.' 787, 1 106.)
332 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
course followed by Cromwell and by Napoleon, in such a
way that the ruler should be succeeded in rule by his son,
but, if he had no son, or the son should not seem fitted for
the succession, the ruler should of his free choice nominate
his successor in the form of adoption.
In point of state law the new office of Imperator was
based on the position which the consuls or proconsuls
occupied outside of the pomerium, so that primarily the
military command, but, along with this, the supreme judi-
cial and consequently also the administrative power, were
included in it1 But the authority of the Imperator was
qualitatively superior to the consular-proconsular, in so far as
the former was not limited as respected time or space, but
was held for life and operative also in the capital ; 2 as the
1 The widely-spread opinion, which sees in the imperial office of
Imperator nothing but the dignity of general of the empire tenable for life,
is not warranted either by the signification of the word or by the view
taken by the old authorities. Imperium is the power of command,
imperator is the possessor of that power ; in these words as in the corre-
sponding Greek terms Kp&ros, avroKp&Twp so little is there implied a specific
military reference, that it is on the contrary the very characteristic of the
Roman official power, where it appears purely and completely, to embrace
in it war and process — that is, the military and the civil power of command
— as one inseparable whole. Dio says quite correctly (liii. 17 ; comp. xliii.
44 ; lii. 41) that the name Imperator was assumed by the emperors "to
indicate their full power instead of the title of king and dictator (irpbs
5r}\<j)<nv rrjs avToreXovs a<pQv i£ovo~las, avrl ttjs tov /Sa<n\<:ws tov re ducra-
rupos iiriKXrfirew) ; for these other older titles disappeared in name, but
in reality the title of Imperator gives the same prerogatives (t6 Bt 6r} Zpyov
avTwv t% tov avTOKp&ropos irpocr-qyoplq. (3efiaiovvTcu), for instance the right
of levying soldiers, imposing taxes, declaring war and concluding peace,
exercising the supreme authority over burgess and non-burgess in and out
of the city and punishing any one at any place capitally or otherwise, and
in general of assuming the prerogatives connected in the earliest times
with the supreme imperium." It could not well be said in plainer terms,
that imperator is nothing at all but a synonym for rex, just as imperare
coincides with regere,
% When Augustus in constituting the principate resumed the Caesarian
imperium, this was done with the restriction that it should be limited as to
space and in a certain sense also as to time ; the proconsular power of the
emperors, which was nothing but just this imperium, was not to come into
application as regards Rome and Italy (Staatsrecht, ii.s 854). On this
element rests the essential distinction between the Caesarian imp*rium
and the Augustan principate, just as on the other hand the real equality
chap, xi THE NEW MONARCHY 333
Imperator could not, while the consul could, be checked
by colleagues of equal power ; and as all the restrictions
placed in course of time on the original supreme official
power — especially the obligation to give place to the
provocatio and to respect the advice of the senate — did not
apply to the Imperator.
In a word, this new office of Imperator was nothing else Re-estab-
than the primitive regal office re-established ; for it was the regal
those very restrictions — as respected the temporal and local office,
limitation of power, the collegiate arrangement, and the co-
operation of the senate or the community that was necessary
for certain cases — which distinguished the consul from the
king (i. 318 /). There is hardly a trait of the new
monarchy which was not found in the old : the union of
the supreme military, judicial, and administrative authority
in the hands of the prince ; a religious presidency over
the commonwealth ; the right of issuing ordinances with
binding power ; the reduction of the senate to a council
of state ; the revival of the patriciate and of the praefecture
of the city. But still more striking than these analogies is
the internal similarity of the monarchy of Servius Tullius
and the monarchy of Caesar ; if those old kings of Rome
with all their plenitude of power had yet been rulers of a
free community and themselves the protectors of the
commons against the nobility, Caesar too had not come
to destroy liberty but to fulfil it, and primarily to break
the intolerable yoke of the aristocracy. Nor need it
surprise us that Caesar, anything but a political antiquary,
went back five hundred years to find the model for his
new state ; for, seeing that the highest office of the
Roman commonwealth had remained at all times a king-
ship restricted by a number of special laws, the idea of
the regal office itself had by no means become obsolete.
of the two institutions rests on the imperfection with which even in prin-
ciple and still more in practice that limit was realized.
334 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
At very various periods and from very different sides —
in the decemviral power, in the Sullan regency, and in
Caesar's own dictatorship — there had been during the
republic a practical recurrence to it ; indeed by a certain
logical necessity, whenever an exceptional power seemed
requisite there emerged, in contradistinction to the usual
limited imperium, the unlimited imperium which was
simply nothing else than the regal power.
Lastly, outward considerations also recommended this
recurrence to the former kingly position. Mankind have
infinite difficulty in reaching new creations, and therefore
cherish the once developed forms as sacred heirlooms.
Accordingly Caesar very judiciously connected himself
with Servius Tullius, in the same way as subsequently
Charlemagne connected himself with Caesar, and Napoleon
attempted at least to connect himself with Charlemagne.
He did so, not in a circuitous way and secretly, but, as
well as his successors, in the most open manner possible ;
it was indeed the very object of this connection to find
a clear, national and popular form of expression for the
new state. From ancient times there stood on the Capitol
the statues of those seven kings, whom the conventional
history of Rome was wont to bring on the stage ; Caesar
ordered his own to be erected beside them as the eighth.
He appeared publicly in the costume of the old kings of
Alba. In his new law as to political crimes the principal
variation from that of Sulla was, that there was placed
alongside of the collective community, and on a level with
it, the Imperator as the living and personal expression of the
people. In the formula used for political oaths there was
added to the Jovis and the Penates of the Roman people the
Genius of the Imperator. The outward badge of monarchy
was, according to the view univerally diffused in antiquity,
44. the image of the monarch on the coins ; from the year 710
the head of Caesar appears on those of the Roman state.
chap, xi THE NEW MONARCHY 335
There could accordingly be no complaint at least on the
score that Caesar left the public in the dark as to his view
of his position ; as distinctly and as formally as possible he
came forward not merely as monarch, but as very king of
Rome. It is possible even, although not exactly probable,
and at any rate of subordinate importance, that he had it
in view to designate his official power not with the new
name of Imperator, but directly with the old one of King.1
Even in his lifetime many of his enemies as of his friends
were of opinion that he intended to have himself expressly
nominated king of Rome ; several indeed of his most
vehement adherents suggested to him in different ways
and at different times that he should assume the crown ;
most strikingly of all, Marcus Antonius, when he as consul
offered the diadem to Caesar before all the people (15
Feb. 710). But Caesar rejected these proposals without 44.
exception at once. If he at the same time took steps
against those who made use of these incidents to stir
republican opposition, it by no means follows from this
that he was not in earnest with his rejection. The
1 On this question there may be difference of opinion, whereas the hypo-
thesis that it was Caesar's intention to rule the Romans as Imperator, the
non- Romans as Rex, must be simply dismissed. It is based solely on the
story that in the sitting of the senate in which Caesar was assassinated a
Sibylline utterance was brought forward by one of the priests in charge of
the oracles, Lucius Cotta, to the effect that the Parthians could only be
vanquished by a " king," and in consequence of this the resolution was
adopted to commit to Caesar regal power over the Roman provinces.
This story was certainly in circulation immediately after Caesar's death.
But not only does it nowhere find any sort of even indirect confirmation,
but it is even expressly pronounced false by the contemporary Cicero (De
Div. ii. 54, 119) and reported by the later historians, especially by
Suetonius (79) and Dio (xliv. 15) merely as a rumour which they are far
from wishing to guarantee ; and it is under such circumstances no better
accredited by the fact of Plutarch [Cats. 60, 64 ; Brut. 10) and Appian
(B. C. ii. no) repeating it after their wont, the former by way of anecdote,
the latter by way of causal explanation. But the story is not merely
unattested ; it is also intrinsically impossible. Even leaving out of
account that Caesar had too much intellect and too much political tact
to decide important questions of state after the oligarchic fashion by a
stroke of the oracle-machinery, he could never think of thus formally and
legally splitting uj the state which he wished to reduce to a level
33« THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book vr
assumption that these invitations took place at his bidding,
with the view of preparing the multitude for the unwonted
spectacle of the Roman diadem, utterly misapprehends the
mighty power of the sentimental opposition with which
Caesar had to reckon, and which could not be rendered
more compliant, but on the contrary necessarily gained
a broader basis, through such a public recognition of its
warrant on the part of Caesar himself. It may have been
the uncalled-for zeal of vehement adherents alone that
occasioned these incidents ; it may be also, that Caesar
merely permitted or even suggested the scene with Anton ius,
in order to put an end in as marked a manner as possible
to the inconvenient gossip by a declinature which took place
before the eyes of the burgesses and was inserted by his com-
mand even in the calendar of the state and could not, in
fact, be well revoked. The probability is that Caesar, who
appreciated alike the value of a convenient formal designa-
tion and the antipathies of the multitude which fasten more
on the names than on the essence of things, was resolved
to avoid the name of king as tainted with an ancient curse
and as more familiar to the Romans of his time when
applied to the despots of the east than to their own Numa
and Servius, and to appropriate the substance of the regal
office under the title of Imperator.
The new But, whatever may have been the definitive title present
to his thoughts, the sovereign ruler was there, and accord-
ingly the court established itself at once with all its due
accompaniments of pomp, insipidity, and emptiness. Caesar
appeared in public not in the robe of the consuls which was
bordered with purple stripes, but in the robe wholly of
purple which was reckoned in antiquity as the proper regal
attire, and received, seated on his golden chair and without
rising from it, the solemn procession of the senate. The
festivals in his honour commemorative of birthday, of
victories, and of vows, filled the calendar. When Caesar
court.
chap. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 337
came to the capital, his principal servants marched forth
in troops to great distances so as to meet and escort him.
To be near to him began to be of such importance, that
the rents rose in the quarter of the city where he dwelt.
Personal interviews with him were rendered so difficult
by the multitude of individuals soliciting audience, that
Caesar found himself compelled in many cases to com-
municate even with his intimate friends in writing, and
that persons even of the highest rank had to wait for hours
in the antechamber. People felt, more clearly than was
agreeable to Caesar himself, that they no longer approached
a fellow- citizen. There arose a monarchical aristocracy, The new
which was in a remarkable manner at once new and old, Pat™ciau
nobility.
and which had sprung out of the idea of casting into the
shade the aristocracy of the oligarchy by that of royalty,
the nobility by the patriciate. The patrician body still
subsisted, although without essential privileges as an order,
in the character of a close aristocratic guild (i. 370) ; but as
it could receive no new gentes (i. 333) it had dwindled away
more and more in the course of centuries, and in the time
of Caesar there were not more than fifteen or sixteen
patrician gentes still in existence. Caesar, himself sprung
from one of them, got the right of creating new patrician
gentes conferred on the Imperator by decree of the people,
and so established, in contrast to the republican nobility,
the new aristocracy of the patriciate, which most happily
combined all the requisites of a monarchical aristocracy —
the charm of antiquity, entire dependence on the govern-
ment, and total insignificance. On all sides the new sove-
reignty revealed itself.
Under a monarch thus practically unlimited there could
hardly be scope for a constitution at all — still less for a
continuance of the hitherto existing commonwealth based
on the legal co-operation of the burgesses, the senate,
and the several magistrates. Caesar fully and definitely
VOL. V 155
338 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
reverted to the tradition of the regal period ; the burgess-
assembly remained — what it had already been in that
period — by the side of and with the king the supreme
and ultimate expression of the will of the sovereign people ;
the senate was brought back to its original destination of
giving advice to the ruler when he requested it ; and lastly
the ruler concentrated in his person anew the whole magis-
terial authority, so that there existed no other independent
state-official by his side any more than by the side of the
kings of the earliest times.
Legisla For legislation the democratic monarch adhered to the
primitive maxim of Roman state-law, that the community
of the people in concert with the king convoking them had
alone the power of organically regulating the common-
wealth ; and he had his constitutive enactments regularly
sanctioned by decree of the people. The free energy and
the authority half-moral, half-political, which the yea or
nay of those old warrior-assemblies had carried with it, could
not indeed be again instilled into the so-called comitia of
this period; the co-operation of the burgesses in legisla-
tion, which in the old constitution had been extremely
limited but real and living, was in the new practically an
unsubstantial shadow. There was therefore no need of
special restrictive measures against the comitia ; many
years' experience had shown that every government — the
oligarchy as well as the monarch — easily kept on good
terms with this formal sovereign. These Caesarian comitia
were an important element in the Caesarian system and
indirectly of practical significance, only in so far as they
served to retain in principle the sovereignty of the people
and to constitute an energetic protest against sultanism.
Edicts. But at the same time — as is not only obvious of itself,
but is also distinctly attested — the other maxim also of the
oldest state -law was revived by Caesar himself, and not
merely for the first time by his successors ; viz. that what
CHAP, xi THE NEW MONARCHY 339
the supreme, or rather sole, magistrate commands is un-
conditionally valid so long as he remains in office, and that,
while legislation no doubt belongs only to the king and the
burgesses in concert, the royal edict is equivalent to law at
least till the demission of its author.
While the democratic king thus conceded to the com- The senate
munity of the people at least a formal share in the sove- ^a[e.e
reignty, it was by no means his intention to divide his council
authority with what had hitherto been the governing body, ^onarcn-
the college of senators. The senate of Caesar was to be —
in a quite different way from the later senate of Augustus —
nothing but a supreme council of state, which he made use
of for advising with him beforehand as to laws, and for the
issuing of the more important administrative ordinances
through it, or at least under its name — for cases in fact
occurred where decrees of senate were issued, of which
none of the senators recited as present at their preparation
had any cognizance. There were no material difficulties
of form in reducing the senate to its original deliberative
position, which it had overstepped more de facto than de
jure ; but in this case it was necessary to protect himself
from practical resistance, for the Roman senate was as
much the headquarters of the opposition to Caesar as the
Attic Areopagus was of the opposition to Pericles. Chiefly
for this reason the number of senators, which had hitherto
amounted at most to six hundred in its normal condition
(iv. 113) and had been greatly reduced by the recent crises,
was raised by extraordinary supplement to nine hundred ;
and at the same time, to keep it at least up to this mark, the
number of quaestors to be nominated annually, that is of
members annually admitted to the senate, was raised from
twenty to forty.1 The extraordinary filling up of the senate
1 According to the probable calculation formerly assumed (iv. 113),
this would yield an average aggregate number of from 1000 to 1200
senators.
340 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
was undertaken by the monarch alone. In the case of
the ordinary additions he secured to himself a permanent
influence through the circumstance, that the electoral
colleges were bound by law1 to give their votes to the
first twenty candidates for the quaestorship who were pro-
vided with letters of recommendation from the monarch ;
besides, the crown was at liberty to confer the honorary
rights attaching to the quaestorship or to any office superior
to it, and consequently a seat in the senate in particular,
by way of exception even on individuals not qualified.
The selection of the extraordinary members who were
added naturally fell in the main on adherents of the new
order of things, and introduced, along with equitts of
respectable standing, various dubious and plebeian person-
ages into the proud corporation — former senators who had
been erased from the roll by the censor or in consequence
of a judicial sentence, foreigners from Spain and Gaul who
had to some extent to learn their Latin in the senate, men
lately subaltern officers who had not previously received
even the equestrian ring, sons of freedmen or of such as
followed dishonourable trades, and other elements of a
like kind. The exclusive circles of the nobility, to whom
this change in the personal composition of the senate
naturally gave the bitterest offence, saw in it an intentional
depreciation of the very institution itself. Caesar was not
capable of such a self-destructive policy ; he was as deter-
mined not to let himself be governed by his council as he
was convinced of the necessity of the institute in itself.
They might more correctly have discerned in this proceeding
the intention of the monarch to take away from the senate
its former character of an exclusive representation of the
oligarchic aristocracy, and to make it once more — what it
48. * This certainly had reference merely to the elections for the years 711
42. and 71a {Staatsrechi, ii.3 730) ; but the arrangement was doubtless meant
to become permanent.
chap, xi THE NEW MONARCHY 341
had been in the regal period — a state-council representing
all classes of persons belonging to the state through their
most intelligent elements, and not necessarily excluding the
man of humble birth or even the foreigner ; just as those
earliest kings introduced non - burgesses (i. 102, 329),
Caesar introduced non-Italians into his senate.
While the rule of the nobility was thus set aside and its Personal
existence undermined, and while the senate in its new form j^t™"
was merely a tool of the monarch, autocracy was at the Caesar
same time most strictly carried out in the administration
and government of the state, and the whole executive was
concentrated in the hands of the monarch. First of all,
the Imperator naturally decided in person every question
of any moment. Caesar was able to carry personal govern-
ment to an extent which we puny men can hardly conceive,
and which is not to be explained solely from the un-
paralleled rapidity and decision of his working, but has
moreover its ground in a more general cause. When we
see Caesar, Sulla, Gaius Gracchus, and Roman statesmen
in general displaying throughout an activity which tran-
scends our notions of human powers of working, the reason
lies, not in any change that human nature has undergone
since that time, but in the change which has taken place
since then in the organization of the household. The
Roman house was a machine, in which even the mental
powers of the slaves and freedmen yielded their produce
to the master ; a master, who knew how to govern these,
worked as it were with countless minds. It was the beau
ideal of bureaucratic centralization ; which our counting-
house system strives indeed zealously to imitate, but
remains as far behind its prototype as the modern power
of capital is inferior to the ancient system of slavery.
Caesar knew how to profit by this advantage ; wherever
any post demanded special confidence, we see him filling
it up on principle — so far as other considerations at all
342 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
permit — with his slaves, freedmen, or clients of humble
birth. His works as a whole show what an organizing
genius like his could accomplish with such an instrument ;
but to the question, how in detail these marvellous feats
were achieved, we have no adequate answer. Bureau-
cracy resembles a manufactory also in this respect, that the
work done does not appear as that of the individual who
has worked at it, but as that of the manufactory which
stamps it. This much only is quite clear, that Caesar in
his work had no helper at all who exerted a personal in-
fluence over it or was even so much as initiated into the
whole plan; he was not only the sole master, but he
worked also without skilled associates, merely with common
labourers.
With respect to details as a matter of course in strictly
political affairs Caesar avoided, so far as was at all possible,
any delegation of his functions. Where it was inevitable,
as especially when during his frequent absence from Rome
he had need of a higher organ there, the person destined
for this purpose was, significantly enough, not the legal
deputy of the monarch, the prefect of the city, but a
confidant without officially-recognized jurisdiction, usually
Caesar's banker, the cunning and pliant Phoenician
in matters merchant Lucius Cornelius Balbus from Gades. In ad-
1 ministration Caesar was above all careful to resume the
keys of the state-chest — which the senate had appropriated
to itself after the fall of the regal power, and by means of
which it had possessed itself of the government — and to
entrust them only to those servants who with their persons
were absolutely and exclusively devoted to him. In
respect of ownership indeed the private means of the
monarch remained, of course, strictly separate from the
property of the state ; but Caesar took in hand the
administration of the whole financial and monetary system
of the state, and conducted it entirely in the way in which
chap. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 343
he and the Roman grandees generally were wont to
manage the administration of their own means and sub-
stance. For the future the levying of the provincial
revenues and in the main also the management of the
coinage were entrusted to the slaves and freedmen of the
Imperator, and men of the senatorial order were excluded
from it — a momentous step, out of which grew in course
of time the important class of procurators and the " imperial
household."
Of the governorships on the other hand, which, after they jn the
had handed their financial business over to the new imperial &overnor-
r ships,
tax-receivers, were still more than they had formerly been
essentially military commands, that of Egypt alone was
transferred to the monarch's own retainers. The country
of the Nile, in a peculiar manner geographically isolated
and politically centralized, was better fitted than any other
district to break off permanently under an able leader from
the central power, as the attempts which had repeatedly
been made by hard-pressed Italian party-chiefs to establish
themselves there during the recent crisis sufficiently proved.
Probably it was just this consideration that induced Caesar
not to declare the land formally a province, but to leave
the harmless Lagids there ; and certainly for this reason
the legions stationed in Egypt were not entrusted to a man
belonging to the senate or, in other words, to the former
government, but this command was, just like the posts of
tax-receivers, treated as a menial office (p. 281). In general
however the consideration had weight with Caesar, that the
soldiers of Rome should not, like those of Oriental kings,
be commanded by lackeys. It remained the rule to entrust
the more important governorships to those who had been
consuls, the less important to those who had been praetors;
and once more, instead of the five years' interval prescribed
by the law of 702 (p. 147), the commencement of the 62.
governorship probably was in the ancient fashion annexed
344 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
directly to the close of the official functions in the city.
On the other hand the distribution of the provinces among
the qualified candidates, which had hitherto been arranged
sometimes by decree of the people or senate, sometimes by
concert among the magistrates or by lot, passed over to the
monarch. And, as the consuls were frequently induced to
abdicate before the end of the year and to make room for
after- elected consuls {consules suffecti) ; as, moreover, the
number of praetors annually nominated was raised from
eight to sixteen, and the nomination of half of them was
entrusted to the Imperator in the same way as that of the
half of the quaestors ; and, lastly, as there was reserved to
the Imperator the right of nominating, if not titular
consuls, at any rate titular praetors and titular quaestors :
Caesar secured a sufficient number of candidates acceptable
to him for filling up the governorships. Their recall
remained of course left to the discretion of the regent
as well as their nomination ; as a rule it was assumed
that the consular governor should not remain more than
two years, nor the praetorian more than one year, in the
province.
in the Lastly, so far as concerns the administration of the city
trationof wnicn was his capital and residence, the Imperator evi-
the capital, dently intended for a time to entrust this also to magis-
trates similarly nominated by him. He revived the old
city-lieutenancy of the regal period (i. 83) ; on different
occasions he committed during his absence the adminis-
tration of the capital to one or more such lieutenants nomi-
nated by him without consulting the people and for an
indefinite period, who united in themselves the functions
of all the administrative magistrates and possessed even the
right of coining money with their own name, although of
47. course not with their own effigy. In 707 and in the first
45. nine months of 709 there were, moreover, neither praetors
nor curule aediles nor quaestors ; the consuls too were
chap, xi THE NEW MONARCHY 345
nominated in the former year only towards its close, and
in the latter Caesar was even consul without a colleague.
This looks altogether like an attempt to revive completely
the old regal authority within the city of Rome, as far
as the limits enjoined by the democratic past of the new
monarch ; in other words, of magistrates additional to
the king himself, to allow only the prefect of the city
during the king's absence and the tribunes and plebeian
aediles appointed for protecting popular freedom to con-
tinue in existence, and to abolish the consulship, the
censorship, the praetorship, the curule aedileship and
the quaestorship.1 But Caesar subsequently departed
from this ; he neither accepted the royal title himself,
nor did he cancel those venerable names interwoven
with the glorious history of the republic. The consuls,
praetors, aediles, tribunes, and quaestors retained sub-
stantially their previous formal powers ; nevertheless their
pqsition was totally altered. It was the political idea
lying at the foundation of the republic that the Roman
empire was identified with the city of Rome, and in
consistency with it the municipal magistrates of the capital
were treated throughout as magistrates of the empire. In
the monarchy of Caesar that view and this consequence
of it fell into abeyance ; the magistrates of Rome formed
thenceforth only the first among the many municipalities
of the empire, and the consulship in particular became a
purely titular post, which preserved a certain practical im-
portance only in virtue of the reversion of a higher
governorship annexed to it. The fate, which the Roman
community had been wont to prepare for the vanquished,
now by means of Caesar befell itself; its sovereignty over
1 Hence accordingly the cautious turns of expression on the mention of
these magistracies in Caesar's laws ; cum censor aliusve quis magistratus
Romae populi censum aget (L. Jul. mun. 1. 144) ; praetor isve quei Romae
iure deicundo pratrit (L. Rubr. often) ; quaestor urbanus queive aerario
praerit (L. Jul. mun. L 37 et al.).
346 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
the Roman empire was converted into a limited communal
freedom within the Roman state. That at the same time
the number of the praetors and quaestors was doubled, has
been already mentioned; the same course was followed
with the plebeian aediles, to whom two new " corn-aediles "
(aediles Ceriales) were added to superintend the supplies of
the capital. The appointment to those offices remained
with the community, and was subject to no restriction as
respected the consuls and perhaps also the tribunes of
the people and plebeian aediles \ we have already adverted
to the fact, that the Imperator reserved a right of proposal
binding on the electors as regards the half of the praetors,
curule aediles, and quaestors to be annually nominated.
In general the ancient and hallowed palladia of popular
freedom were not touched ; which, of course, did not
prevent the individual refractory tribune of the people
from being seriously interfered with and, in fact, deposed
and erased from the roll of senators.
As the Imperator was thus, for the more general and
more important questions, his own minister ; as he con-
trolled the finances by his servants, and the army by his
adjutants ; and as the old republican state- magistracies
were again converted into municipal magistracies of the
city of Rome ; the autocracy was sufficiently established.
The state- In the spiritual hierarchy on the other hand Caesar,
hierarchy. aith0Ugh he issued a detailed law respecting this portion of
the state-economy, made no material alteration, except that
he connected with the person of the regent the supreme
pontificate and perhaps also the membership of the higher
priestly colleges generally ; and, partly in connection with
this, one new stall was created in each of the three supreme
colleges, and three new stalls in the fourth college of thr
banquet-masters. If the Roman state-hierarchy had hitherto
served as a support to the ruling oligarchy, it might render
precisely the same service to the new monarchy. The
chap, xi THE NEW MONARCHY 347
conservative religious policy of the senate was transferred
to the new kings of Rome ; when the strictly conservative
Varro published about this time his " Antiquities of Divine
Things," the great fundamental repository of Roman state-
theology, he was allowed to dedicate it to the Pontifex
Maximus Caesar. The faint lustre which the worship of
Jovis was still able to impart shone round the newly-estab-
lished throne ; and the old national faith became in its
last stages the instrument of a Caesarian papacy, which,
however, was from the outset but hollow and feeble.
In judicial matters, first of all, the old regal jurisdiction Regal
was re-established. As the king had originally been judge J"?n!"
in criminal and civil causes, without being legally bound in
the former to respect an appeal to the prerogative of mercy
in the people, or in the latter to commit the decision of the
question in dispute to jurymen ; so Caesar claimed the right
of bringing capital causes as well as private processes for
sole and final decision to his own bar, and disposing of
them in the event of his presence personally, in the event
of his absence by the city-lieutenant. In fact we find him,
quite after the manner of the ancient kings, now sitting in
judgment publicly in the Forum of the capital on Roman
burgesses accused of high treason, now holding a judicial
inquiry in his house regarding the client princes accused of
the like crime ; so that the only privilege, which the Roman
burgesses had as compared with the other subjects of the
king, seems to have consisted in the publicity of the judicial
procedure. But this resuscitated supreme jurisdiction of
the kings, although Caesar discharged its duties with
impartiality and care, could only from the nature of the
case find practical application in exceptional cases.
For the usual procedure in criminal and civil causes the Retention
former republican mode of administering justice was sub- previous
stantially retained. Criminal causes were still disposed of adminis-
as formerly before the different jury-commissions competent justice.
348 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
to deal with the several crimes, civil causes partly before
the court of inheritance or, as it was commonly called, of
the centumviri, partly before the single iudices ; the super-
intendence of judicial proceedings was as formerly con-
ducted in the capital chiefly by the praetors, in the
provinces by the governors. Political crimes too continued
even under the monarchy to be referred to a jury-commis-
sion ; the new ordinance, which Caesar issued respecting
them, specified the acts legally punishable with precision
and in a liberal spirit which excluded a.11 prosecution of
opinions, and it fixed as the penalty not death, but banish-
ment. As respects the selection of the jurymen, whom the
senatorial party desired to see chosen exclusively from the
senate and the strict Gracchans exclusively from the eques-
trian order, Caesar, faithful to the principle of reconciling
the parties, left the matter on the footing of the com-
promise-law of Cotta (iv. 380), but with the modification
— for which the way was probably prepared by the law
55. of Pompeius of 699 (p. 138) — that the tribuni aerarii who
came from the lower ranks of the people were set aside ;
so that there was established a rating for jurymen of at
least 400,000 sesterces (^4000), and senators and equites
now divided the functions of jurymen which had so long
been an apple of discord between them.
The relations of the regal and the republican jurisdiction
were on the whole co-ordinate, so that any cause might ba
initiated as well before the king's bar as before the com-
petent republican tribunal, the latter of course in the event
of collision giving way ; if on the other hand the one or the
other tribunal had pronounced sentence, the cause was
Appeal thereby finally disposed of. To overturn a verdict pro-
msnarcfa. nounced by the jurymen duly called to act in a civil or
in a criminal cause even the new ruler was not entitled,
except where special incidents, such as corruption or
violence, already according to the law of the republic
chap. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 349
gave occasion for cancelling the jurymen's sentence. On
the other hand the principle that, as concerned any
decree emanating merely from magistrates, the person
aggrieved by it was entitled to appeal to the superior
of the decreeing authority, probably obtained even now
the great extension, out of which the subsequent imperial
appellate jurisdiction arose ; perhaps all the magistrates
administering law, at least the governors of all the pro-
vinces, were regarded so far as subordinates of the ruler,
that appeal to him might be lodged from any of their
decrees.
Certainly these innovations, the most important of which Decay
— the general extension given to appeal — cannot even be °fd^^i
reckoned absolutely an improvement, by no means healed system,
thoroughly the evils from which the Roman administration
of justice was suffering. Criminal procedure cannot be
sound in any slave-state, inasmuch as the task of proceed-
ing against slaves lies, if not de jure, at least dt facto in the
hands of the master. The Roman master, as may readily
be conceived, punished throughout the crime of his serf,
not as a crime, but only so far as it rendered the slave
useless or disagreeable to him ; slave criit'nals were merely
drafted off somewhat like oxen addicted to goring, and, as
the latter were sold to the butcher, so were the former sold
to the fencing -booth. But even the criminal procedure
against free men, which had been from the outset and
always in great part continued to be a political process,
had amidst the disorder of the last generations become
transformed from a grave legal proceeding into a faction-
fight to be fought out by means of favour, money, and
violence. The blame rested jointly on all that took part
in it, on the magistrates, the jury, the parties, even the
public who were spectators ; but the most incurable
wounds were inflicted on justice by the doings of the advo-
cates. In proportion as the parasitic plant of Roman
350 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
forensic eloquence flourished, all positive ideas of right
became broken up ; and the distinction, so difficult of
apprehension by the public, between opinion and evidence
was in reality expelled from the Roman criminal practice.
"A plain simple defendant," says a Roman advocate of
much experience at this period, "may be accused of any
crime at pleasure which he has or has not committed, and
will be certainly condemned." Numerous pleadings in
criminal causes have been preserved to us from this epoch;
there is hardly one of them which makes even a serious
attempt to fix the crime in question and to put into proper
shape the proof or counterproof.1 That the contemporary
civil procedure was likewise in various respects unsound,
we need hardly mention ; it too suffered from the effects
of the party politics mixed up with all things, as for
88-81. instance in the process of Publius Quinctius (671-
673), where the most contradictory decisions were given
according as Cinna or Sulla had the ascendency in Rome ;
and the advocates, frequently non- jurists, produced here
also intentionally and unintentionally abundance of con-
fusion. But it was implied in the nature of the case, that
party mixed itself up with such matters only by way of
exception, and that here the quibbles of advocates could
not so rapidly or so deeply break up the ideas of right ;
accordingly the civil pleadings which we possess from this
epoch, while not according to our stricter ideas effective
compositions for their purpose, are yet of a far less libellous
and far more juristic character than the contemporary
speeches in criminal causes. If Caesar permitted the
1 Plura enim multo, says Cicero in his treatise De Oratore (ii. 42, 178),
primarily with reference to criminal trials, homines iudicant odio aut amore
aut cupiditate aut iracundia aut dolore aut laetitia aut spe aut timore aut
errore aut aliqua permotione mentis, quam veritate aut praescripto aut
iuris norma aliqua aut iudicii formula aut legibus. On this accordingly
are founded the further instructions which he gives for advocates entering
on their profession.
chap, xi THE NEW MONARCHY 35*
curb imposed on the eloquence of advocates by Pom-
peius (p. 138) to remain, or even rendered it more severe,
there was at least nothing lost by this ; and much was
gained, when better selected and better superintended
magistrates and jurymen were nominated and the palpable
corruption and intimidation of the courts came to an end.
But the sacred sense of right and the reverence for the
law, which it is difficult to destroy in the minds of the
multitude, it is still more difficult to reproduce. Though
the legislator did away with various abuses, he could not
heal the root of the evil ; and it might be doubted whether
time, which cures everything curable, would in this case
bring relief.
The Roman military system of this period was nearly Decay of
in the same condition as the Carthaginian at the time of mjijtary
HannibaL The governing classes furnished only the system,
officers ; the subjects, plebeians and provincials, formed
the army. The general was, financially and militarily,
almost independent of the central government, and,
whether in fortune or misfortune, substantially left to
himself and to the resources of his province. Civic
and even national spirit had vanished from the army,
and the esprit de corps was alone left as a bond of inward
union. The army had ceased to be an instrument of
the commonwealth ; in a political point of view it had
no will of its own, but it was doubtless able to adopt
that of the master who wielded it; in a military point
of view it sank under the ordinary miserable leaders into
a disorganized useless rabble, but under a right general
it attained a military perfection which the burgess -army
could never reach. The class of officers especially had
deeply degenerated. The higher ranks, senators and
equites, grew more and more unused to arms. While
formerly there had been a zealous competition for the
posts of staff officers, now every man of equestrian rank,
352 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
who chose to serve, was sure of a military tribuneship, and
several of these posts had even to be filled with men of
humbler rank ; and any man of quality at all who still
served sought at least to finish his term of service in Sicily
or some other province where he was sure not to face the
enemy. Officers of ordinary bravery and efficiency were
stared at as prodigies ; as to Pompeius especially, his
contemporaries practised a military idolatry which in every
respect compromised them. The staff, as a rule, gave the
signal for desertion and for mutiny; in spite of the culpable
indulgence of the commanders proposals for the cashiering
of officers of rank were daily occurrences. We still possess
the picture — drawn not without irony by Caesar's own
hand — of the state of matters at his own headquarters
when orders were given to march against Ariovistus, of
the cursing and weeping, and preparing of testaments,
and presenting even of requests for furlough. In the
soldiery not a trace of the better classes could any longer
be discovered. Legally the general obligation to bear
arms still subsisted ; but the levy, if resorted to alongside
of enlisting, took place in the most irregular manner ;
numerous persons liable to serve were wholly passed over,
while those once levied were retained thirty years and
longer beneath the eagles. The Roman burgess -cavalry
now merely vegetated as a sort of mounted noble guard,
whose perfumed cavaliers and exquisite high-bred horses
only played a part in the festivals of the capital ; the so-
called burgess -infantry was a troop of mercenaries swept
together from the lowest ranks of the burgess-population;
the subjects furnished the cavalry and the light troops
exclusively, and came to be more and more extensively
employed also in the infantry. The posts of centurions
in the legions, on which in the mode of warfare of that
time the efficiency of the divisions essentially depended,
and to which according to the national military constitu-
chap, xi THE NEW MONARCHY 353
tion the soldier served his way upward with the pike, were
now not merely regularly conferred according to favour,
but were not unfrequently sold to the highest bidder. In
consequence of the bad financial management of the
government and the venality and fraud of the great
majority of the magistrates, the payment of the soldiers
was extremely defective and irregular.
The necessary consequence of this was, that in the
ordinary course of things the Roman armies pillaged the
provincials, mutinied against their officers, and ran off in
presence of the enemy ; instances occurred where consider-
able armies, such as the Macedonian army of Piso in 697 67.
(p. 104/), were without any proper defeat utterly ruined,
simply by this misconduct. Capable leaders on the other
hand, such as Pompeius, Caesar, Gabinius, formed doubt-
less out of the existing materials able and effective, and
to some extent exemplary, armies ; but these armies
belonged far more to their general than to the common-
wealth. The still more complete decay of the Roman
marine — which, moreover, had remained an object of
antipathy to the Romans and had never been fully
nationalized — scarcely requires to be mentioned. Here
too, on all sides, everything that could be ruined at all
had been reduced to ruin under the oligarchic govern-
ment.
The reorganization of the Roman military system by Its reor-
Caesar was substantially limited to the tightening and ^Caesar.
strengthening of the reins of discipline, which had been
relaxed under the negligent and incapable supervision
previously subsisting. The Roman military system seemed
to him neither to need, nor to be capable of, radical
reform ; he accepted the elements of the army, just as
Hannibal had accepted them. The enactment of his
municipal ordinance that, in order to the holding of a
municipal magistracy or sitting in the municipal council
VOL. V 156
354
THE OLD REPUBLIC AND
BOOK V
Foreign
mercen-
aries.
Adjutants
of the
legion.
before the thirtieth year, three years' service on horseback
— that is, as officer — or six years' service on foot should be
required, proves indeed that he wished to attract the better
classes to the army ; but it proves with equal clearness that
amidst the ever-increasing prevalence of an unwarlike spirit
in the nation he himself held it no longer possible to
associate the holding of an honorary office with the fulfil-
ment of the time of service unconditionally as hitherto.
This very circumstance serves to explain why Caesar made
no attempt to re-establish the Roman burgess -cavalry.
The levy was better arranged, the time of service was
regulated and abridged ; otherwise matters remained on
the footing that the infantry of the line were raised chiefly
from the lower orders of the Roman burgesses, the cavalry
and the light infantry from the subjects. That nothing
was done for the reorganization of the fleet, is surprising.
It was an innovation — hazardous beyond doubt even in
the view of its author — to which the untrustworthy character
of the cavalry furnished by the subjects compelled him
(p. 77), that Caesar for the first time deviated from the old
Roman system of never fighting with mercenaries, and in-
corporated in the cavalry hired foreigners, especially Germans.
Another innovation was the appointment of adjutants of the
legion {legati legionis). Hitherto the military tribunes,
nominated partly by the burgesses, partly by the governor
concerned, had led the legions in such a way that six of
them were placed over each legion, and the command
alternated among these ; a single commandant of the
legion was appointed by the general only as a temporary
and extraordinary measure. In subsequent times on the
other hand those colonels or adjutants of legions appear
as a permanent and organic institution, and as nominated
no longer by the governor whom they obey, but by the
supreme command in Rome ; both changes seem referable
to Caesar's arrangements connected with the Gabinian law
chap, xi THE NEW MONARCHY 355
(iv. 388). The reason for the introduction of this important
intervening step in the military hierarchy must be sought
partly in the necessity for a more energetic centralization of
the command, partly in the felt want of capable superior
officers, partly and chiefly in the design of providing a
counterpoise to the governor by associating with him one
or more colonels nominated by the Imperator.
The most essential change in the military system con- The
sisted in the institution of a permanent military head in the ^^°™
person of the Imperator, who, superseding the previous ship-in-
unmilitary and in every respect incapable governing cor-
poration, united in his hands the whole control of the
army, and thus converted it from a direction which for
the most part was merely nominal into a real and energetic
supreme command. We are not properly informed as to the
position which this supreme command occupied towards the
special commands hitherto omnipotent in their respective
spheres. Probably the analogy of the relation subsisting
between the praetor and the consul or the consul and
the dictator served generally as a basis, so that, while the
governor in his own right retained the supreme military
authority in his province, the Imperator was entitled at
any moment to take it away from him and assume it for
himself or his delegates, and, while the authority of the
governor was confined to the province, that of the Im-
perator, like the regal and the earlier consular authority,
extended over the whole empire. Moreover it is ex-
tremely probable that now the nomination of the officers,
both the military tribunes and the centurions, so far as it
had hitherto belonged to the governor,1 as well as the nomi-
nation of the new adjutants of the legion, passed directly
into the hands of the Imperator ; and in like manner even
now the arrangement of the levies, the bestowal of leave of
1 With the nomination of a part of the military tribunes by the
burgesses (in. 13) Caesar — in this also a democrat — did not meddle.
356 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
absence, and the more important criminal cases, may have
been submitted to the judgment of the commander-in-
chief. With this limitation of the powers of the governors
and with the regulated control of the Imperator, there was
no great room to apprehend in future either that the armies
might be utterly disorganized or that they might be con-
verted into retainers personally devoted to their respective
officers.
Caesar's But, however decidedly and urgently the circumstances
plans pointed to military monarchy, and however distinctly Caesar
took the supreme command exclusively for himself, he was
nevertheless not at all inclined to establish his authority by
Defence means of, and on, the army. No doubt he deemed a
? L~? standing army necessary for his state, but only because
from its geographical position it required a comprehensive
regulation of the frontiers and permanent frontier garrisons.
Partly at earlier periods, partly during the recent civil war,
he had worked at the tranquillizing of Spain, and had
established strong positions for the defence of the frontier
in Africa along the great desert, and in the north-west of
the empire along the line of the Rhine. He occupied
himself with similar plans for the regions on the Euphrates
and on the Danube. Above all he designed an expedition
against the Parthians, to avenge the day of Carrhae ; he
had destined three years for this war, and was resolved
to settle accounts with these dangerous enemies once for all
and not less cautiously than thoroughly. In like manner
he had projected the scheme of attacking Burebistas king
of the Getae, who was greatly extending his power on both
sides of the Danube (p. 106), and of protecting Italy in the
north-east by border-districts similar to those which he had
created for it in Gaul. On the other hand there is no
evidence at all that Caesar contemplated like Alexander
a career of victory extending indefinitely far ; it is said
indeed that he had intended to march from Parthia to
chap. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 357
the Caspian and from this to the Black Sea and then
along its northern shores to the Danube, to annex to
the empire all Scythia and Germany as far as the Northern
Ocean — which according to the notions of that time was
not so very distant from the Mediterranean — and to return
home through Gaul ; but no authority at all deserving of
credit vouches for the existence of these fabulous projects.
In the case of a state which, like the Roman state of
Caesar, already included a mass of barbaric elements
difficult to be controlled, and had still for centuries to
come more than enough to do with their assimilation,
such conquests, even granting their military practicability,
would have been nothing but blunders far more brilliant
and far worse than the Indian expedition of Alexander.
Judging both from Caesar's conduct in Britain and
Germany and from the conduct of those who became
the heirs of his political ideas, it is in a high degree
probable that Caesar with Scipio Aemilianus called on
the gods not to increase the empire, but to preserve it,
and that his schemes of conquest restricted themselves
to a settlement of the frontier — measured, it is true, by
his own great scale — which should secure the line of the
Euphrates and, instead of the fluctuating and militarily
useless boundary of the empire on the north-east, should
establish and render defensible the line of the Danube.
But, if it remains a mere probability that Caesar ought Attempts
not to be designated a world-conqueror in the same sense °o J^I
as Alexander and Napoleon, it is quite certain that his military
, , . , • -i despotism,
design was not to rest his new monarchy primarily on
the support of the army nor generally to place the military
authority above the civil, but to incorporate it with, and as
far as possible subordinate it to, the civil commonwealth.
The invaluable pillars of a military state, those old and far-
famed Gallic legions, were honourably dissolved just on
account of the incompatibility of their esprit de corps
358 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
with a civil commonwealth, and their glorious names
were only perpetuated in newly-founded urban communi-
ties. The soldiers presented by Caesar with allotments
of land on their discharge were not, like those of Sulla,
settled together — as it were militarily — in colonies of their
own, but, especially when they settled in Italy, were isolated
as much as possible and scattered throughout the penin-
sula j it was only in the case of the portions of the
Campanian land that remained for disposal, that an
aggregation of the old soldiers of Caesar could not be
avoided. Caesar sought to solve the difficult task of
keeping the soldiers of a standing army within the spheres
of civil life, partly by retaining the former arrangement
which prescribed merely certain years of service, and not
a service strictly constant, that is, uninterrupted by any
discharge ; partly by the already- mentioned shortening
of the term of service, which occasioned a speedier change
in the personal composition of the army ; partly by the
regular settlement of the soldiers who had served out their
time as agricultural colonists ; partly and principally by
keeping the army aloof from Italy and generally from the
proper seats of the civil and political life of the nation,
and directing the soldier to the points, where according
to the opinion of the great king he was alone in his place
— to the frontier stations, that he might ward off the
extraneous foe.
Absence The true criterion also of the military state — the develop-
ed corps of ment 0f5 an(j trie privileged position assigned to, the corps
of guards — is not to be met with in the case of Caesar.
Although as respects the army on active service the institu-
tion of a special bodyguard for the general had been
already long in existence (iii. 460), in Caesar's system this
fell completely into the background ; his praetorian cohort
seems to have essentially consisted merely of orderly officers
or non-military attendants, and never to have been in the
chap. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 359
proper sense a select corps, consequently never an object
of jealousy to the troops of the line. While Caesar even
as general practically dropped the bodyguard, he still less
as king tolerated a guard round his person. Although
constantly beset by lurking assassins and well aware of
it, he yet rejected the proposal of the senate to institute
a select guard ; dismissed, as soon as things grew in some
measure quiet, the Spanish escort which he had made use
of at first in the capital ; and contented himself with the
retinue of lictors sanctioned by traditional usage for the
Roman supreme magistrates.
However much of the idea of his party and of his youth Impracti-
— to found a Periclean government in Rome not by virtue ^ J^^
of the sword, but by virtue of the confidence of the nation
— Caesar had been obliged to abandon in the struggle with
realities, he retained even now the fundamental idea — of
not founding a military monarchy — with an energy to which
history scarcely supplies a parallel. Certainly this too was
an impracticable ideal — it was the sole illusion, in regard
to which the earnest longing of that vigorous mind was
more powerful than its clear judgment. A government,
such as Caesar had in view, was not merely of necessity
in its nature highly personal, and so liable to perish with
the death of its author just as the kindred creations of
Pericles and Cromwell with the death of their founders ;
but, amidst the deeply disorganized state of the nation, it
was not at all credible that the eighth king of Rome would
succeed even for his lifetime in ruling, as his seven prede-
cessors had ruled, his fellow-burgesses merely by virtue of
law and justice, and as little probable that he would suc-
ceed in incorporating the standing army — after it had during
the last civil war learned its power and unlearned its rever-
ence— once more as a subservient element in civil society.
To any one who calmly considered to what extent reverence
for the law had disappeared from the lowest as from the
3<5o THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
highest ranks of society, the former hope must have seemed
almost a dream ; and, if with the Marian reform of the
military system the soldier generally had ceased to be a
citizen (iii. 461), the Campanian mutiny and the battle-field
of Thapsus showed with painful clearness the nature of the
support which the army now lent to the law. Even the
great democrat could only with difficulty and imperfectly
hold in check the powers which he had unchained ;
thousands of swords still at his signal flew from the
scabbard, but they were no longer equally ready upon
that signal to return to the sheath. Fate is mightier
than genius. Caesar desired to become the restorer of
the civil commonwealth, and became the founder of the
military monarchy which he abhorred ; he overthrew the
regime of aristocrats and bankers in the state, only to
put a military regime in their place, and the common-
wealth continued as before to be tyrannized and worked
for profit by a privileged minority. And yet it is a
privilege of the highest natures thus creatively to err.
The brilliant attempts of great men to realize the ideal,
though they do not reach their aim, form the best treasure
of the nations. It was owing to the work of Caesar that
the Roman military state did not become a police-state till
after the lapse of several centuries, and that the Roman
Imperators, however little they otherwise resembled the
great founder of their sovereignty, yet employed the soldier
in the main not against the citizen but against the public
foe, and esteemed both nation and army too highly to set
the latter as constable over the former.
Financial The regulation of financial matters occasioned compara-
f£™mistra* ^vely ntt^e difficulty in consequence of the solid foundations
which the immense magnitude of the empire and the
exclusion of the system of credit supplied. If the state
had hitherto found itself in constant financial embarrass-
ment, the fault was far from chargeable on the inadequacy
Hon
chap. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 361
of the state revenues ; on the contrary these had of late
years immensely increased. To the earlier aggregate
income, which is estimated at 200,000,000 sesterces
(^2,000,000), there were added 85,000,000 sesterces
(^850,000) by the erection of the provinces of Bithynia-
Pontus and Syria ; which increase, along with the other
newly opened up or augmented sources of income, especi-
ally from the constantly increasing produce of the taxes
on luxuries, far outweighed the loss of the Campanian
rents. Besides, immense sums had been brought from
extraordinary sources into the exchequer through Lucullus,
Metellus, Pompeius, Cato and others. The cause of the
financial embarrassments rather lay partly in the increase
of the ordinary and extraordinary expenditure, partly in
the disorder of management. Under the former head, the
distribution of corn to the multitude of the capital claimed
almost exorbitant sums ; through the extension given
to it by Cato in 691 (iv. 490) the yearly expenditure for 63.
that purpose amounted to 30,000,000 sesterces (,£300,000)
and after the abolition in 696 of the compensation hitherto 58.
paid, it swallowed up even a fifth of the state revenues.
The military budget also had risen, since the garrisons
of Cilicia, Syria, and Gaul had been added to those of
Spain, Macedonia, and the other provinces. Among the
extraordinary items of expenditure must be named in the
first place the great cost of fitting out fleets, on which,
for example, five years after the great razzia of 687, 67.
34,000,000 sesterces (^340,000) were expended at once.
Add to this the very considerable sums which were
consumed in wars and warlike preparations ; such as
18,000,000 sesterces (^180,000) paid at once to Piso
merely for the outfit of the Macedonian army, 24,000,000
sesterces (^240,000) even annually to Pompeius for the
maintenance and pay of the Spanish army, and similar
sums to Caesar for the Gallic legions. But considerable
362 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
as were these demands made on the Roman exchequer,
it would still have been able probably to meet them, had
not its administration once so exemplary been affected
by the universal laxity and dishonesty of this age ; the
payments of the treasury were often suspended meiely
because of the neglect to call up its outstanding claims.
The magistrates placed over it, two of the quaestors —
young men annually changed — contented themselves at the
best with inaction; among the official staff of clerks and
others, formerly so justly held in high esteem for its in-
tegrity, the worst abuses now prevailed, more especially
since such posts had come to be bought and sold.
Financial As soon however as the threads of Roman state-finance
Caesar! ° were concentrated no longer as hitherto in the senate, but
in the cabinet of Caesar, new life, stricter order, and more
compact connection at once pervaded all the wheels and
springs of that great machine. The two institutions, v/hich
originated with Gaius Gracchus and ate like a gangrene into
the Roman financial system — the leasing of the direct
taxes, and the distributions of grain — were partly abolished,
partly remodelled. Caesar wished not, like his predecessor,
to hold the nobility in check by the banker-aristocracy and
the populace of the capital, but to set them aside and to
deliver the commonwealth from all parasites whether of high
or lower rank ; and therefore he went in these two important
questions not with Gaius Gracchus, but with the oligarch
Leasing of Sulla. The leasing system was allowed to continue for the
taxes indirect taxes, in the case of which it was very old and —
abolished, under the maxim of Roman financial administration, which
was retained inviolable also by Caesar, that the levying of
the taxes should at any cost be kept simple and readily
manageable — absolutely could not be dispensed with. But
the direct taxes were thenceforth universally either treated,
like the African and Sardinian deliveries of corn and oil,
as contributions in kind to be directly supplied to the state,
CHAP. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 363
or converted, like the revenues of Asia Minor, into fixed
money payments, in which case the collection of the
several sums payable was entrusted to the tax - districts
themselves.
The corn-distributions in the capital had hitherto been Reform of
looked on as a profitable prerogative of the community bmionof
which ruled and, because it ruled, had to be fed by its corn,
subjects. This infamous principle was set aside by Caesar ;
but it could not be overlooked that a multitude of wholly
destitute burgesses had been protected solely by these
largesses of food from starvation. In this aspect Caesar
retained them. While according to the Sempronian
ordinance renewed by Cato every Roman burgess settled
in Rome had legally a claim to bread -corn without
payment, this list of recipients, which had at last risen to
the number of 320,000, was reduced by the exclusion of
all individuals having means or otherwise provided for to
150,000, and this number was fixed once for all as the
maximum number of recipients of free corn ; at the same
time an annual revision of the list was ordered, so that the
places vacated by removal or death might be again filled
up with the most needful among the applicants. By this
conversion of the political privilege into a provision for the
poor, a principle remarkable in a moral as well as in a
historical point of view came for the first time into living
operation. Civil society but slowly and gradually works its
way to a perception of the interdependence of interests ; in
earlier antiquity the state doubtless protected its members
from the public enemy and the murderer, but it was not
bound to protect the totally helpless fellow-citizen from the
worse enemy, want, by affording the needful means of
subsistence. It was the Attic civilization which first
developed, in the Solonian and post-Solonian legislation,
the principle that it is the duty of the community to provide
for its invalids and indeed for its poor generally and it was
income.
364 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
Caesar that first developed what in the restricted compass
of Attic life had remained a municipal matter into an
organic institution of state, and transformed an arrangement,
which was a burden and a disgrace for the commonwealth,
into the first of those institutions — in modern times as count-
less as they are beneficial — where the infinite depth of human
compassion contends with the infinite depth of human misery.
The In addition to these fundamental reforms a thorough
budget of vision of the income and expenditure took place. The
ordinary sources of income were everywhere regulated
and fixed. Exemption from taxation was conferred on not
a few communities and even on whole districts, whether
indirectly by the bestowal of the Roman or Latin franchise,
or directly by special privilege ; it was obtained e.g. by all
the Sicilian communities * in the former, by the town of
Ilion in the latter way. Still greater was the number of
those whose proportion of tribute was lowered ; the com-
munities in Further Spain, for instance, already after
Caesar's governorship had on his suggestion a reduction of
tribute granted to them by the senate, and now the most
oppressed province of Asia had not only the levying of its
direct taxes facilitated, but also a third of them wholly
remitted. The newly- added taxes, such as those of
the communities subdued in Illyria and above all of the
Gallic communities — which latter together paid annually
40,000,000 sesterces (^400,000) — were fixed throughout
on a low scale. It is true on the other hand that various
towns such as Little Leptis in Africa, Sulci in Sardinia, and
several Spanish communities, had their tribute raised by way
of penalty for their conduct during the last war. The very
1 Varro attests the discontinuance of the Sicilian decutnae in a
treatise published after Cicero's death (De R. R. 2 praef. ) where he names
as the corn - provinces whence Rome derives her subsistence — only
Africa and Sardinia, no longer Sicily. The Latinitas, which Sicily
obtained, must thus doubtless have included this immunity (comp.
Staatsrecht, iii. 684).
chap, xi THE NEW MONARCHY 365
lucrative Italian harbour-tolls abolished in the recent times
of anarchy (iv. 502) were re-established all the more readily,
that this tax fell essentially on luxuries imported from the
east To these new or revived sources of ordinary income
were added the sums which accrued by extraordinary
means, especially in consequence of the civil war, to the
victor — the booty collected in Gaul ; the stock of cash in
the capital; the treasures taken from the Italian and
Spanish temples ; the sums raised in the shape of forced
loan, compulsory present, or fine, from the dependent
communities and dynasts, and the pecuniary penalties
imposed in a similar way by judicial sentence, or simply by
sending an order to pay, on individual wealthy Romans;
and above all things the proceeds from the estate of
defeated opponents. How productive these sources of
income were, we may learn from the fact, that the fine of
the African capitalists who sat in the opposition-senate
alone amounted to 100,000,000 sesterces (;£i, 000,000)
and the price paid by the purchasers of the property of
Pompeius to 70,000,000 sesterces (^700,000). This
course was necessary, because the power of the beaten
nobility rested in great measure on their colossal wealth
and could only be effectually broken by imposing on them
the defrayment of the costs of the war. But the odium of
the confiscations was in some measure mitigated by the
fact that Caesar directed their proceeds solely to the benefit
of the state, and, instead of overlooking after the manner
of Sulla any act of fraud in his favourites, exacted the
purchase -money with rigour even from his most faithful
adherents, e.g. from Marcus Antonius.
In the expenditure a diminution was in the first place The
obtained by the considerable restriction of the largesses of budSe* of
_ . . . expeadi-
grain. The distribution of corn to the poor of the capital ture.
which was retained, as well as the kindred supply of oil newly
introduced by Caesar for the Roman baths, were at least
366 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
in great part charged once for all on the contributions in
kind from Sardinia and especially from Africa, and were
thereby wholly or for the most part kept separate from the
exchequer. On the other hand the regular expenditure for
the military system was increased partly by the augmenta-
tion of the standing army, partly by the raising of the pay
of the legionary from 480 sesterces (,£5) to 900 (,£9)
annually. Both steps were in fact indispensable. There
was a total want of any real defence for the frontiers, and
an indispensable preliminary to it was a considerable
increase of the army. The doubling of the pay was
doubtless employed by Caesar to attach his soldiers
firmly to him (p. 199), but was not introduced as a
permanent innovation on that account. The former pay
of i£ sesterces (3 |d.) per day had been fixed in very ancient
times, when money had an altogether different value from
that which it had in the Rome of Caesar's day ; it could
only have been retained down to a period when the
common day-labourer in the capital earned by the labour
of his hands daily on an average 3 sesterces (7|d.),
because in those times the soldier entered the army not for
the sake of the pay, but chiefly for the sake of the — in
great measure illicit — perquisites of military service. The
first condition in order to a serious reform in the military
system, and to the getting rid of those irregular gains of the
soldier which formed a burden mostly on the provincials,
was an increase suitable to the times in the regular pay ;
and the fixing of it at z\ sesterces (6|d.) may be regarded
as an equitable step, while the great burden thereby
imposed on the treasury was a necessary, and in its con
sequences a beneficial, course.
Of the amount of the extraordinary expenses which
Caesar had to undertake or voluntarily undertook, it is
difficult to form a conception. The wars themselves
consumed enormous sums; and sums perhaps not less
chap. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 367
were required to fulfil the promises which Caesar had been
obliged to make during the civil war. It was a bad
example and one unhappily not lost sight of in the
sequel, that every common soldier received for his partici-
pation in the civil war 20,000 sesterces (^200), every
burgess of the multitude in the capital for his non-participa-
tion in it 300 sesterces (£3) as an addition to his aliment;
but Caesar, after having once under the pressure of
circumstances pledged his word, was too much of a king to
abate from it. Besides, Caesar answered innumerable
demands of honourable liberality,, and put into circulation
immense sums for building more especially, which had
been shamefully neglected during the financial distress of
the last times of the republic — the cost of his buildings
executed partly during the Gallic campaigns, partly after-
wards, in the capital was reckoned at 160,000,000
sesterces (^1,600,000). The general result of the
financial administration of Caesar is expressed in the fact
that, while by sagacious and energetic reforms and by a
right combination of economy and liberality he amply and
fully met all equitable claims, nevertheless already in
March 710 there lay in the public treasury 700,000,000 44.
and in his own 100,000,000 sesterces (together ^8,000,000)
— a sum which exceeded by tenfold the amount of cash in
the treasury in the most flourishing times of the republic
(in. 23).
But the task of breaking up the old parties and furnish- Social
ing the new commonwealth with an appropriate constitu- ^^j,^011
tion, an efficient army, and well-ordered finances, difficult nation,
as it was, was not the most difficult part of Caesar's work.
If the Italian nation was really to be regenerated, it
required a reorganization which should transform all parts
of the great empire — Rome, Italy, and the provinces. Let
us endeavour here also to delineate the old state of things,
as well as the beginnings of a new and more tolerable time.
Th«
capital.
368 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
The good stock of the Latin nation had long since
wholly disappeared from Rome. It is implied in the
very nature of the case, that a capital loses its municipal
and even its national stamp more quickly than any subor-
dinate community. There the upper classes speedily with-
draw from urban public life, in order to find their home
rather in the state as a whole than in a single city ; there
are inevitably concentrated the foreign settlers, the fluctu-
ating population of travellers for pleasure or business, the
mass of the indolent, lazy, criminal, financially and morally
bankrupt, and for that very reason cosmopolitan, rabble. All
this pre-eminently applied to Rome. The opulent Roman
frequently regarded his town-house merely as a lodging.
When the urban municipal offices were converted into im-
perial magistracies ; when the civic assembly became the
assembly of burgesses of the empire ; and when smaller
self-governing tribal or other associations were not tolerated
within the capital : all proper communal life ceased for Rome.
From the whole compass of the widespread empire people
flocked to Rome, for speculation, for debauchery, for
intrigue, for training in crime, or even for the purpose of
hiding there from the eye of the law.
These evils arose in some measure necessarily from the
very nature of a capital; others more accidental and
perhaps still more grave were associated with them. There
has never perhaps existed a great city so thoroughly
destitute of the means of support as Rome; importation
on the one hand, and domestic manufacture by slaves on
the other, rendered any free industry from the outset
impossible there. The injurious consequences of the
radical evil pervading the politics of antiquity in general —
the slave-system — were more conspicuous in the capital than
anywhere else. Nowhere were such masses of slaves
accumulated as in the city palaces of the great families or
of wealthy upstarts. Nowhere were the nations of the
chap. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 369
three continents mingled as in the slave -population of
the capital — Syrians, Phrygians and other half- Hellenes
with Libyans and Moors, Getae and Iberians with
the daily-increasing influx of Celts and Germans. The
demoralization inseparable from the absence of freedom,
and the terrible inconsistency between formal and moral
right, were far more glaringly apparent in the case of the
half or wholly cultivated — as it were genteel — city-slave
than in that of the rural serf who tilled the field in chains
like the fettered ox. Still worse than the masses of slaves
were those who had been de jure or simply de facto
released from slavery — a mixture of mendicant rabble and
very rich parvenus, no longer slaves and not yet fully bur-
gesses, economically and even legally dependent on their
master and yet with the pretensions of free men ; and these
freedmen made their way above all towards the capital,
where gain of various sorts was to be had and the retail
traffic as well as the minor handicrafts were almost wholly
in their hands. Their influence on the elections is
expressly attested; and that they took a leading part in
the street riots, is very evident from the ordinary signal by
means of which these were virtually proclaimed by the
demagogues — the closing of the shops and places of sale.
Moreover, the government not only did nothing to coun- Relations
teract this corruption of the population of the capital, but °[jg^chy
even encouraged it for the benefit of their selfish policy, to the
The judicious rule of law, which prohibited individuals popu
condemned for a capital offence from dwelling in the
capital, was not carried into effect by the negligent police.
The police-supervision — so urgently required — of associa-
tion on the part of the rabble was at first neglected, and
afterwards (p. in) even declared punishable as a restriction
inconsistent with the freedom of the people. The popular
festivals had been allowed so to increase that the seven
ordinary ones alone — the Roman, the Plebeian, those of
VOL. V *i7
the capital.
370 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
the Mother of the Gods, of Ceres, of Apollo, of Flora (iii.
125) and of Victoria — lasted altogether sixty-two days ; and
to these were added the gladiatorial games and numerous
other extraordinary amusements. The duty of providing
grain at low prices — which was unavoidably necessary with
such a proletariate living wholly from hand to mouth — was
treated with the most unscrupulous frivolity, and the
fluctuations in the price of bread-corn were of a fabulous
and incalculable description.1 Lastly, the distributions of
grain formed an official invitation to the whole burgess-
proletariate who were destitute of food and indisposed for
work to take up their abode in the capital.
Anarchy of The seed sown was bad, and the harvest corresponded.
The system of clubs and bands in the sphere of politics,
the worship of Isis and similar pious extravagances in that
of religion, had their root in this state of things. People
were constantly in prospect of a dearth, and not unfre-
quently in utter famine. Nowhere was a man less secure
of his life than in the capital ; murder professionally
prosecuted by banditti was the single trade peculiar to it ;
the alluring of the victim to Rome was the preliminary to
his assassination ; no one ventured into the country in the
vicinity of the capital without an armed retinue. Its out-
ward condition corresponded to this inward disorganization,
and seemed a keen satire on the aristocratic government.
Nothing was done for the regulation of the stream of the
Tiber; excepting that they caused the only bridge, with which
they still made shift (iv. 169), to be constructed of stone
at least as far as the Tiber-island. As little was anything
done toward the levelling of the city of the Seven Hills,
except where perhaps the accumulation of rubbish had
effected some improvement. The streets ascended and
1 In Sicily, the country of production, the modius was sold within a
few years at two and at twenty sesterces ; from this we may guess what
must have been the fluctuations of price in Rome, which subsisted on
transmarine corn and was the seat of speculators.
chap, xi THE NEW MONARCHY 371
descended narrow and angular, and were wretchedly kept ;
the footpaths were small and ill paved. The ordinary
houses were built of bricks negligently and to a giddy
height, mostly by speculative builders on account of the
small proprietors ; by which means the former became
vastly rich, and the latter were reduced to beggary. Like
isolated islands amidst this sea of wretched buildings were
seen the splendid palaces of the rich, which curtailed the
space for the smaller houses just as their owners curtailed
the burgess-rights of smaller men in the state, and beside
whose marble pillars and Greek statues the decaying
temples, with their images of the gods still in great part
carved of wood, made a melancholy figure. A police-
supervision of streets, of river-banks, of fires, or of building
was almost unheard of; if the government troubled itself at
all about the inundations, conflagrations, and falls of
houses which were of yearly occurrence, it was only to ask
from the state-theologians their report and advice regarding
the true import of such signs and wonders. If we try to
conceive to ourselves a London with the slave-population
of New Orleans, with the police of Constantinople, with
the non-industrial character of the modern Rome, and
agitated by politics after the fashion of the Paris in 1848,
we shall acquire an approximate idea of the republican
glory, the departure of which Cicero and his associates in
their sulky letters deplore.
Caesar did not deplore, but he sought to help so far as Caesar's
help was possible. Rome remained, of course, what it was ^matters
— a cosmopolitan city. Not only would the attempt to in the
give to it once more a specifically Italian character have capi
been impracticable ; it would not have suited Caesar's plan.
Just as Alexander found for his Graeco-Oriental empire an
appropriate capital in the Hellenic, Jewish, Egyptian, and
above all cosmopolitan, Alexandria, so the capital of the
new Romano -Hellenic universal empire, situated at the
372 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
meeting-point of the east and the west, was to be not an
Italian community, but the denationalized capital of many
nations. For this reason Caesar tolerated the worship of
the newly-settled Egyptian gods alongside of Father Jovis,
and granted even to the Jews the free exercise of their
strangely foreign ritual in the very capital of the empire.
However offensive was the motley mixture of the parasitic
— especially the Helleno-Oriental — population in Rome, he
nowhere opposed its extension ; it is significant, that at his
popular festivals for the capital he caused dramas to be per-
formed not merely in Latin and Greek, but also in other lan-
guages, presumably in Phoenician, Hebrew, Syrian, Spanish.
Diminution But, if Caesar accepted with the full consciousness of
ktariate;0" w^at ne was doing tne fundamental character of the capital
such as he found it, he yet worked energetically at the
improvement of the lamentable and disgraceful state of
things prevailing there. Unhappily the primary evils were
the least capable of being eradicated. Caesar could not
abolish slavery with its train of national calamities ; it must
remain an open question, whether he would in the course
of time have attempted at least to limit the slave-population
in the capital, as he undertook to do so in another field.
As little could Caesar conjure into existence a free industry
in the capital ; yet the great building-operations remedied
in some measure the want of means of support there, and
opened up to the proletariate a source of small but honour-
able gain. On the other hand Caesar laboured energetically
to diminish the mass of the free proletariate. The constant
influx of persons brought by the corn-largesses to Rome
was, if not wholly stopped,1 at least very materially restricted
1 It is a fact not without interest that a political writer of later date
but much judgment, the author of the letters addressed in the name of
Sallust to Caesar, advises the latter to transfer the corn-distribution of the
capital to the several municipia. There is good sense in the admonition ;
■s indeed similar ideas obviously prevailed in the noble municipal provision
for orphans under Trajan.
hap. xi THE NEW MONARCHY 373
y the conversion of these largesses into a provision for
le poor limited to a fixed number. The ranks of the
xisting proletariate were thinned on the one hand by the
■ibunals which were instructed to proceed with unrelenting
igour against the rabble, on the other hand by a compre-
ensive transmarine colonization ; of the 80,000 colonists
'horn Caesar sent beyond the seas in the few years of his
overnment, a very great portion must have been taken
ora the lower ranks of the population of the capital ; most
f the Corinthian settlers indeed were freedmen. When in
eviation from the previous order of things, which precluded
le freedmen from any urban honorary office, Caesar
pened to them in his colonies the doors of the senate-
ouse, this was doubtless done in order to gain those of
lem who were in better positions to favour the cause of emi-
ration. This emigration, however, must have been more
lan a mere temporary arrangement; Caesar, convinced
ke every other man of sense that the only true remedy
Dr the misery of the proletariate consisted in a well-regulated
ystem of colonization, and placed by the condition of the
mpire in a position to realize it to an almost unlimited
xtent, must have had the design of permanently continuing
be process, and so opening up a constant means of abating
n evil which was constantly reproducing itself. Measures
rere further taken to set bounds to the serious fluctuations in
be price of the most important means of subsistence in the
larkets of the capital. The newly-organized and liberally-
dministered finances of the state furnished the means for
his purpose, and two newly-nominated magistrates, the
orn-aediles (p. 346) were charged with the special supervi-
ion of the contractors and of the market of the capital.
The club system was checked, more effectually than was The club
tossible through prohibitive laws, by the change of the con- ^^ted>
titution ; inasmuch as with the republic and the republican
lections and tribunals the corruption and violence of the
374 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book
electioneering and judicial collegia — and generally the polit
cal Saturnalia of the canaille — came to an end of themselve:
Moreover the combinations called into existence by th
Clodian law were broken up, and the whole system c
association was placed under the superintendence of th
governing authorities. With the exception of the ancier
guilds and associations, of the religious unions of the Jew:
and of other specially excepted categories, for which
simple intimation to the senate seems to have sufficec
the permission to constitute a permanent society wit
fixed times of assembling and standing deposits was mad
dependent on a concession to be granted by the senate
and, as a rule, doubtless only after the consent of th
monarch had been obtained.
Street To this was added a stricter administration of crimins
justice and an energetic police. The laws, especially a
regards the crime of violence, were rendered more strir
gent ; and the irrational enactment of the republican law
that the convicted criminal was entitled to withdraw himsei
from a part of the penalty which he had incurred by sell
banishment, was with reason set aside. The detailei
regulations, which Caesar issued regarding the police c
the capital, are in great part still preserved ; and all whi
choose may convince themselves that the Imperator di<
not disdain to insist on the house-proprietors putting th<
streets into repair and paving the footpath in its whoL
breadth with hewn stones, and to issue appropriate enact
ments regarding the carrying of litters and the driving o
waggons, which from the nature of the streets were onl;
allowed to move freely through the capital in the evening
and by night. The supervision of the local police remainec
as hitherto chiefly with the four aediles, who were instructec
now at least, if not earlier, each to superintend a distinctly
marked-off police district within the capital.
Lastly, building in the capital, and the oro vision con
chap, xi THE NEW MONARCHY 375
nected therewith of institutions for the public benefit, Buildings
received from Caesar — who combined in himself the love ffl -fw1<
for building of a Roman and of an organizer — a sudden
stimulus, which not merely put to shame the mismanage-
ment of the recent anarchic times, but also left all that the
Roman aristocracy had done in their best days as far behind
as the genius of Caesar surpassed the honest endeavours of
the Marcii and Aemilii. It was not merely by the extent
of the buildings in themselves and the magnitude of the
sums expended on them that Caesar excelled his prede-
cessors ; but a genuine statesmanly perception of what
was for the public good distinguishes what Caesar did
for the public institutions of Rome from all similar
services. He did not build, like his successors, temples
and other splendid structures, but he relieved the market-
place of Rome — in which the burgess-assemblies, the seats
of the chief courts, the exchange, and the daily business-
traffic as well as the daily idleness, still were crowded
together — at least from the assemblies and the courts by
constructing for the former a new comitium, the Saepta Julia
in the Campus Martius, and for the latter a separate place
of judicature, the Forum Julium between the Capitol and
Palatine. Of a kindred spirit is the arrangement originat-
ing with him, by which there were supplied to the baths of
the capital annually three million pounds of oil, mostly
from Africa, and they were thereby enabled to furnish
to the bathers gratuitously the oil required for the anoint-
ing of the body — a measure of cleanliness and sanitary
polic2 which, according to the ancient dietetics based
substantially on bathing and anointing, was highly judi-
cious.
But these noble arrangements were only the first steps
towards a complete remodelling of Rome. Projects were
already formed for a new senate-house, for a new magnifi-
cent bazaar, for a theatre to rival that of Pompeius, for a
376 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book \
public Latin and Greek library after the model of thai
recently destroyed at Alexandria — the first institution 01
the sort in Rome — lastly for a temple of Mars, whicr
was to surpass all that had hitherto existed in riches anc
glory. Still more brilliant was the idea, first, of construct
ing a canal through the Pomptine marshes and drawing
off their waters to Tarracina, and secondly, of altering
the lower course of the Tiber and of leading it from th<
present Ponte Molle, not through between the Campu!
Vaticanus and the Campus Martius, but rather round th<
Campus Vaticanus and the Janiculum to Ostia, where th<
miserable roadstead was to give place to an adequate arti
ficial harbour. By this gigantic plan on the one hand th<
most dangerous enemy of the capital, the malaria of th<
neighbourhood would be banished ; on the other hand th<
extremely limited facilities for building in the capital woulc
be at once enlarged by substituting the Campus Vaticanu
thereby transferred to the left bank of the Tiber for th<
Campus Martius, and allowing the latter spacious field t<
be applied for public and private edifices ; while the capita
would at the same time obtain a safe seaport, the want o
which was so painfully felt. It seemed as if the Imperato
would remove mountains and rivers, and venture to conteni
with nature herself.
Much however as the city of Rome gained by the ne^
order of things in commodiousness and magnificence, it
political supremacy was, as we have already said, lost to i
irrecoverably through that very change. The idea that th
Roman state should coincide with the city of Rome had ir
deed in the course of time become more and more unnatura
and preposterous ; but the maxim had been so intimatel
blended with the essence of the Roman republic, that i
could not perish before the republic itself. It was only i;
the new state of Caesar that it was, with the exception pei
haps of some legal fictions, completely set aside, and th
chap, xi THE NEW MONARCHY 377
community of the capital was placed legally on a level with
all other municipalities ; indeed Caesar — here as everywhere
endeavouring not merely to regulate the thing, but also to
call it officially by the right name — issued his Italian muni-
cipal ordinance, beyond doubt purposely, at once for the
capital and for the other urban communities. We may add
that Rome, just because it was incapable of a living com-
munal character as a capital, was even essentially inferior to
the other municipalities of the imperial period. The re-
publican Rome was a den of robbers, but it was at the same
time the state ; the Rome of the monarchy, although it
began to embellish itself with all the glories of the three
continents and to glitter in gold and marble, was yet
nothing in the state but a royal residence in connec-
tion with a poor-house, or in other words a necessary evil.
While in the capital the only object aimed at was to Italy.
get rid of palpable evils by police ordinances on the great-
est scale, it was a far more difficult task to remedy the
deep disorganization of Italian economics. Its radical
misfortunes were those which we previously noticed in
detail — the disappearance of the agricultural, and the un-
natural increase of the mercantile, population — with which
an endless train of other evils was associated. The reader
will not fail to remember what was the state of Italian agri-
culture. In spite of the most earnest attempts to check the Italian
annihilation of the small holdings, farm -husbandry was agn ture*
scarcely any longer the predominant species of economy
during this epoch in any region of Italy proper, with the
exception perhaps of the valleys of the Apennines and
Abruzzi. As to the management of estates, no material
difference is perceptible between the Catonian system for-
merly set forth (iii. 64-73) and that described to us by Varro,
except that the latter shows the traces for better and for
worse of the progress of city-life on a great scale in Rome.
" Formerly," says Varro, " the barn on the estate was larger
378 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
than the manor-house; now it is wont to be the reverse."
In the domains of Tusculum and Tibur, on the shores of
Tarracina and Baiae — where the old Latin and Italian
farmers had sown and reaped — there now rose in barren
splendour the villas of the Roman nobles, some of which
covered the space of a moderate -sized town with their
appurtenances of garden-grounds and aqueducts, fresh and
salt water ponds for the preservation and breeding of river
and marine fishes, nurseries of snails and slugs, game-
preserves for keeping hares, rabbits, stags, roes, and wild
boars, and aviaries in which even cranes and peacocks
were kept. But the luxury of a great city enriches also
many an industrious hand, and supports more poor than
philanthropy with its expenditure of alms. Those aviaries
and fish-ponds of the grandees were of course, as a rule,
a very costly indulgence. But this system was carried to
such an extent and prosecuted with so much keenness,
that e.g. the stock of a pigeon-house was valued at 100,000
sesterces (^1000); a methodical system of fattening had
sprung up, and the manure got from the aviaries became
of importance in agriculture ; a single bird-dealer was able
to furnish at once 5000 fieldfares — for they knew how to
rear these also — at three denarii (2 s.) each, and a single
possessor of a fish-pond 2000 mwaenae ; and the fishes
left behind by Lucius Lucullus brought 40,000 sesterces
(^400). As may readily be conceived, under such cir-
cumstances any one who followed this occupation industri-
ously and intelligently might obtain very large profits with
a comparatively small outlay of capital. A small bee-
breeder of this period sold from his thyme-garden not
larger than an acre in the neighbourhood of Falerii honey
to an average annual amount of at least 10,000 sesterces
(^100). The rivalry of the growers of fruit was carried
so far, that in elegant villas the fruit-chamber lined with
marble was not unfrequently fitted up at the same time as
chap, xi THE NEW MONARCHY 379
a dining-room, and sometimes fine fruit acquired by pur-
chase was exhibited there as of home growth. At this
period the cherry from Asia Minor and other foreign fruit-
trees were first planted in the gardens of Italy. The
vegetable gardens, the beds of roses and violets in Latium
and Campania, yielded rich produce, and the " market for
dainties " {Jorum cupedinis) by the side of the Via Sacra,
where fruits, honey, and chaplets were wont to be exposed
for sale, played an important part in the life of the capital
Generally the management of estates, worked as they were
on the planter-system, had reached in an economic point
of view a height scarcely to be surpassed. The valley of
Rieti, the region round the Fucine lake, the districts on
the Liris and Volturnus, and indeed Central Italy in
general, were as respects husbandry in the most flourishing
condition ; even certain branches of industry, which were
suitable accompaniments of the management of an estate
by means of slaves, were taken up by intelligent landlords,
and, where the circumstances were favourable, inns, weaving
factories, and especially brickworks were constructed on
the estate. The Italian producers of wine and oil in
particular not only supplied the Italian markets, but
carried on also in both articles a considerable business of
transmarine exportation. A homely professional treatise of
this period compares Italy to a great fruit-garden ; and the
pictures which a contemporary poet gives of his beautiful
native land, where the well-watered meadow, the luxuriant
corn-field, the pleasant vine-covered hill are fringed by the
dark line of the olive-trees — where the " ornament " of the
land, smiling in varied charms, cherishes the loveliest
gardens in its bosom and is itself wreathed round by food-
producing trees — these descriptions, evidently faithful
pictures of the landscape daily presented to the eye of the
poet, transplant us into the most flourishing districts of
Tuscany and Terra di Lavoro. The pastoral husbandry,
3&>
THE OLD REPUBLIC AND
BOOK V
Money-
dealing.
it is true, which for reasons formerly explained was always
spreading farther especially in the south and south-east of
Italy, was in every respect a retrograde movement ; but it
too participated to a certain degree in the general progress
of agriculture ; much was done for the improvement of the
breeds, e.g. asses for breeding brought 60,000 sesterces
(£600), 100,000 (^iooo), and even 400,000 (^4000).
The solid Italian husbandry obtained at this period, when
the general development of intelligence and abundance of
capital rendered it fruitful, far more brilliant results than
ever the old system of small cultivators could have given ;
and was carried even already beyond the bounds of Italy,
for the Italian agriculturist turned to account large tracts
in the provinces by rearing cattle and even cultivating corn.
In order to show what dimensions money- dealing
assumed by the side of this estate-husbandry unnaturally
prospering over the ruin of the small farmers, how the
Italian merchants vying with the Jews poured themselves
into all the provinces and client-states of the empire, and
how all capital ultimately flowed to Rome, it will be
sufficient, after what has been already said, to point to the
single fact that in the money-market of the capital the
regular rate of interest at this time was six per cent, and
consequently money there was cheaper by a half than it
was on an average elsewhere in antiquity.
In consequence of this economic system based both in
proportion. ^g agrarjan an(j mercantile aspects on masses of capital
and on speculation, there arose a most fearful disproportion
in the distribution of wealth. The often-used and often-
abused phrase of a commonwealth composed of millionaires
and beggars applies perhaps nowhere so completely as to
the Rome of the last age of the republic ; and nowhere
perhaps has the essential maxim of the slave-state — that
the rich man who lives by the exertions of his slaves is
necessarily respectable, and the poor man who lives by the
Social dis-
chap, xi THE NEW MONARCHY 381
labour of his hands is necessarily vulgar — been recognized
with so terrible a precision as the undoubted principle
underlying all public and private intercourse.1 A real
middle class in our sense of the term there was not, as
indeed no such class can exist in any fully-developed slave-
state ; what appears as if it were a good middle class and is
so in a certain measure, is composed of those rich men of
business and landholders who are so uncultivated or so
highly cultivated as to content themselves within the sphere
of their activity and to keep aloof from public life. Of the
men of business — a class, among whom the numerous
freedmen and other upstarts, as a rule, were seized with
the giddy fancy of playing the man of quality — there were
not very many who showed so much judgment. A model
1 The following exposition in Cicero's treatise De Officiis (i. 42) is
characteristic : lam de artificiis et quaestibus, qui liberates habendi, qui
sordidi sint, haec fere accepimus. Primum improbantur it quaestus, qui
in odia hominum incurrunt, ut portitorum, ut feneratorum. Illiberales
autem et sordidi quaestus mercenat iorum omnium, quorum operae, non
artes emuntur. Est autem in illis ipsa merces auctoramentum servitutis.
Sordidi etiam putandi, qui mercantur a mercatoribus quod statim vendant,
nihil enim prqficiant, nisi admodu?n mejitiantur. Nee vero est quidquum
turpius vanitate. Opificesque omnes in sordida arte versantur ; nee enim
quidquam ingenuum habere potest officina. Minimeque artes eae pro-
bandae, quae ministrae sunt voluptatum,
" Cetarii, lanii, coqui, fartores, piscatores,"
ut ait Terentius. Adde hue, si placet, unguentarios, saltatores, totumque
ludum talarium. Quibus autem artibus aut prudentia maior inest, aut non
mediocris utilitas quaeritur, ut medicina, ut architeclura, ut doctrina rerum
honestarum, eae sunt Us, quorum ordini conveniunt, honestae. Merea-
tura autem, si tenuis est, sordida putanda est ; sin magna et copiosa, multa
undique apportans, multaque sine vanitate impertiens, non est admodum
vituperanda ; atque etiam, si satiata quaestu, vel contenta potius ; ut
saepe ex alto in portum, ex ipso portu in agros se possessionesque contulerit,
videtur Optimo iure posse laudari. Omnium autem rerum, ex quibus
aliquid acquiritur, nihil est agricultura melius, nihil uberius, nihil
dulcius, nihil homine libera dignius. According to this the respectable
man must, in strictness, be a landowner ; the trade of a merchant becomes
him only so far as it is a means to this ultimate end ; science as a pro-
fession is suitable only for the Greeks and for Romans not belonging to
the ruling classes, who by this means may purchase at all events a certain
toleration of their personal presence in genteel circles. It is a thoroughly
developed aristocracy of planters, with a strong infusion of mercantile
speculation and a slight shading of general culture.
382 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
of this sort was the Titus Pomponius Atticus frequently
mentioned in the accounts of this period. He acquired
an immense fortune partly from the great estate-farming
which he prosecuted in Italy and Epirus, partly from his
money-transactions which ramified throughout Italy, Greece,
Macedonia, and Asia Minor; but at the same time he
continued to be throughout the simple man of business,
did not allow himself to be seduced into soliciting office
or even into monetary transactions with the state, and,
equally remote from the avaricious niggardliness and from
the prodigal and burdensome luxury of his time — his table,
for instance, was maintained at a daily cost of ioo sesterces
(£i) — contented himself with an easy existence appropri-
ating to itself the charms of a country and a city life, the
pleasures of intercourse with the best society of Rome and
Greece, and all the enjoyments of literature and art.
More numerous and more solid were the Italian land-
holders of the old type. Contemporary literature preserves
in the description of Sextus Roscius, who was murdered
M. amidst the proscriptions of 673, the picture of such a rural
nobleman (pater fa mi lias riisticanus) ; his wealth, estimated
at 6,000,000 sesterces (^60,000), is mainly invested in
his thirteen landed estates ; he attends to the management
of it in person systematically and with enthusiasm; he
comes seldom or never to the capital, and, when he does
appear there, by his clownish manners he contrasts not less
with the polished senator than the innumerable hosts of
his uncouth rural slaves with the elegant train of domestic
slaves in the capital. Far more than the circles of the
nobility with their cosmopolitan culture and the mercantile
class at home everywhere and nowhere, these landlords
and the "country towns" to which they essentially gave
tone (municipia rusticana) preserved as well the discipline
and manners as the pure and noble language of their
fathers. The order of landlords was regarded as the
chap. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 383
flower of the nation ; the speculator, who has made his
fortune and wishes to appear among the notables of the
land, buys an estate and seeks, if not to become himself
the squire, at any rate to rear his son with that view. We
meet the traces of this class of landlords, wherever a
national movement appears in politics, and wherever
literature puts forth any fresh growth ; from it the patriotic
opposition to the new monarchy drew its best strength ;
to it belonged Varro, Lucretius, Catullus ; and nowhere
perhaps does the comparative freshness of this landlord-life
come more characteristically to light than in the graceful
Arpinate introduction to the second book of Cicero's
treatise De Legibus — a green oasis amidst the fearful desert
of that equally empty and voluminous writer.
But the cultivated class of merchants and the vigorous The poor,
order of landlords were far overgrown by the two classes
that gave tone to society — the mass of beggars, and the
world of quality proper. We have no statistical figures to
indicate precisely the relative proportions of poverty and
riches for this epoch ; yet we may here perhaps again recall
the expression which a Roman statesman employed some
fifty years before (iii. 380) — that the number of families of
firmly-established riches among the Roman burgesses did
not amount to 2000. The burgess-body had since then
become different ; but clear indications attest that the
disproportion between poor and rich had remained at least
as great. The increasing impoverishment of the multitude
shows itself only too plainly in their crowding to the corn-
largesses and to enlistment in the army ; the corresponding
increase of riches is attested expressly by an author of this
generation, when, speaking of the circumstances of the
Marian period, he describes an estate of 2,000,000 sesterces
(^20,000) as "riches according to the circumstances of
that day " ; and the statements which we find as to the
property of individuals lead to the same conclusion. The
384 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
very rich Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus promised to twenty
thousand soldiers four iugera of land each, out of his own
property; the estate of Pompeius amounted to 70,000,000
sesterces (.£700,000); that of Aesopus the actor to
20,000,000 (£200,000); Marcus Crassus, the richest of
the rich, possessed at the outset of his career, 7,000,000
(jC7°)000\ a* its close, after lavishing enormous sums on
the people, 170,000,000 sesterces (£1,700,000). The
effect of such poverty and such riches was on both sides
an economic and moral disorganization outwardly different,
but at bottom of the same character. If the common
man was saved from starvation only by support from the
resources of the state, it was the necessary consequence
of this mendicant misery — although it also reciprocally
appears as a cause of it — that he addicted himself to the
beggar's laziness and to the beggar's good cheer. The
Roman plebeian was fonder of gazing in the theatre than
of working ; the taverns and brothels were so frequented,
that the demagogues found their special account in gaining
the possessors of such establishments over to their interests.
The gladiatorial games — which revealed, at the same time
that they fostered, the worst demoralization of the ancient
world — had become so flourishing that a lucrative business
was done in the sale of the programmes for them ; and it
was at this time that the horrible innovation was adopted
by which the decision as to the life or death of the
vanquished became dependent, not on the law of duel or
on the pleasure of the victor, but on the caprice of the
onlooking public, and according to its signal the victor
either spared or transfixed his prostrate antagonist. The
trade of fighting had so risen or freedom had so fallen in
value, that the intrepidity and the emulation, which were
lacking on the battle-fields of this age, were universal in
the armies of the arena, and, where the law of the duel
required, every gladiator allowed himself to be stabbed
CHAP. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 385
mutely and without shrinking ; that in fact free men not
unfrequently sold themselves to the contractors for board
and wages as gladiatorial slaves. The plebeians of the
fifth century had also suffered want and famine, but they
had not sold their freedom ; and still less would the
jurisconsults of that period have lent themselves to pro-
nounce the equally immoral and illegal contract of such a
gladiatorial slave "to let himself be chained, scourged,
burnt or killed without opposition, if the laws of the
institution should so require" by means of unbecoming
juristic subtleties as a contract lawful and actionable.
In the world of quality such things did not occur, but Extra-
at bottom it was hardly different, and least of all better. ^S*008-
In doing nothing the aristocrat boldly competed with the
proletarian; if the latter lounged on the pavement, the
former lay in bed till far on in the day. Extravagance
prevailed here as unbounded as it was devoid of taste.
It was lavished on politics and on the theatre, of course to
the corruption of both ; the consular office was purchased
at an incredible price — in the summer of 700 the first 54.
voting - division alone was paid 10,000,000 sesterces
(;£i 00,000) — and all the pleasure of the man of culture
in the drama was spoilt by the insane luxury of decoration.
Rents in Rome appear to have been on an average four
times as high as in the country-towns ; a house there was
once sold for 15,000,000 sesterces (.£15 0,000). The
house of Marcus Lepidus (consul in 676) which was at 78.
the time of the death of Sulla the finest in Rome, did not
rank a generation afterwards even as the hundredth on the
list of Roman palaces. We have already mentioned the
extravagance practised in the matter of country-houses;
we find that 4,000,000 sesterces (^40,000) were paid
for such a house, which was valued chiefly for its fish-pond ;
and the thoroughly fashionable grandee now needed at
least two villas — one in the Sabine or Alban mountains
VOL. V 158
386 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
near the capital, and a second in the vicinity of the
Campanian baths — and in addition if possible a garden
immediately outside of the gates of Rome. Still more
irrational than these villa - palaces were the palatial
sepulchres, several of which still existing at the present
day attest what a lofty pile of masonry the rich Roman
needed in order that he might die as became his rank.
Fanciers of horses and dogs too were not wanting ; 24,000
sesterces (,£240) was no uncommon price for a showy
horse. They indulged in furniture of fine wood — a
table of African cypress-wood cost 1,000,000 sesterces
(^io,ooo); in dresses of purple stuffs or transparent
gauzes accompanied by an elegant adjustment of their
folds before the mirror — the orator Hortensius is said to
have brought an action of damages against a colleague
because he ruffled his dress in a crowd ; in precious stones
and pearls, which first at this period took the place of the
far more beautiful and more artistic ornaments of gold — it
was already utter barbarism, when at the triumph of
Pompeius over Mithradates the image of the victor
appeared wrought wholly of pearls, and when the sofas
and the shelves in the dining-hall were silver-mounted and
even the kitchen-utensils were made of silver. In a similar
spirit the collectors of this period took out the artistic
medallions from the old silver cups, to set them anew in
vessels of gold. Nor was there any lack of luxury also
in travelling. " When the governor travelled," Cicero tells
us as to one of the Sicilian governors, " which of course he
did not in winter, but only at the beginning of spring — not
the spring of the calendar but the beginning of the season
of roses — he had himself conveyed, as was the custom with
the kings of Bithynia, in a litter with eight bearers, sitting
on a cushion of Maltese gauze stuffed with rose-leaves,
with one garland on his head and a second twined round
his .neck, applying to his nose a little smelling bag of fine
chap. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 387
linen, with minute meshes, filled with roses ; and thus he
had himself carried even to his bed-chamber."
But no sort of luxury flourished so much as the coarsest Table
luxury
of all — the luxury of the table. The whole villa arrange-
ments and the whole villa life had ultimate reference to
dining ; not only had they different dining-rooms for winter
and summer, but dinner was served in the picture-gallery,
in the fruit-chamber, in the aviary, or on a platform erected
in the deer-park, around which, when the bespoken
" Orpheus " appeared in theatrical costume and blew his
flourish, the duly-trained roes and wild boars congregated.
Such was the care bestowed on decoration ; but amidst all
this the reality was by no means forgotten. Not only was
the cook a graduate in gastronomy, but the master himself
often acted as the instructor of his cooks. The roast had
been long ago thrown into the shade by marine fishes and
oysters ; now the Italian river-fishes were utterly banished
from good tables, and Italian delicacies and Italian wines
were looked on as almost vulgar. Now even at the
popular festivals there were distributed, besides the Italian
Falerian, three sorts of foreign wine — Sicilian, Lesbian,
Chian, while a generation before it had been sufficient even
at great banquets to send round Greek wine once ; in the
cellar of the orator Hortensius there was found a stock of
10,000 jars (at 33 quarts) of foreign wine. It was no
wonder that the Italian wine-growers began to complain of
the competition of the wines from the Greek islands. No
naturalist could ransack land and sea more zealously for
new animals and plants, than the epicures of that day
ransacked them for new culinary dainties.1 The circum-
1 We have still (Macrobius, iii, 13) the bill of fare of the banquet
which Mucius Lentulus Niger gave before 691 on entering on his pontifi- 03.
cate, and of which the pontifices — Caesar included — the Vestal Virgins,
and some other priests and ladies nearly related to them partook. Before
the dinner proper came sea-hedgehogs ; fresh oysters as many as the
guests wished ; large mussels ; sphondyli ; fieldfares with asj. tragus ;
388 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
stance of the guest taking an emetic after a banquet, to
avoid the consequences of the varied fare set before him,
no longer created surprise. Debauchery of every sort
became so systematic and aggravated that it found its
professors, who earned a livelihood by serving as instructors
of the youth of quality in the theory and practice of vice.
Debt. It will not be necessary to dwell longer on this confused
picture, so monotonous in its variety ; and the less so, that
the Romans were far from original in this respect, and con-
fined themselves to exhibiting a copy of the Helleno-Asiatic
luxury still more exaggerated and stupid than their model
Plutos naturally devours his children as well as Kronos ;
the competition for all these mostly worthless objects of
fashionable longing so forced up prices, than those who
swam with the stream found the most colossal estate melt
away in a short time, and even those, who only for credit's
sake joined in what was most necessary, saw their inherited
and firmly- established wealth rapidly undermined. The
canvass for the consulship, for instance, was the usual
highway to ruin for houses of distinction ; and nearly the
same description applies to the games, the great buildings,
and all those other pleasant, doubtless, but expensive
pursuits. The princely wealth of that period is only
surpassed by its still more princely liabilities ; Caesar owed
(52. about 692, after deducting his assets, 25,000,000 sesterces
fattened fowls ; oyster and mussel pasties ; black and white sea-acorns ;
sphondyli again ; glycimarides ; sea-netUes ; becaficoes ; roe-ribs ; boar's-
ribs ; fowls dressed with flour ; becaficoes ; purple shell-fish of two sorts.
The dinner itself consisted of sow's udder ; boar's - head ; fish-pasties ;
boar-pasties ; ducks ; boiled teals ; hares ; roasted fowls ; starch-pastry ;
Pontic pastry.
These are the college-banquets regarding which Varro (De R. R. iii.
2, 16) says that they forced up the prices of all delicacies. Varro in one
of his satires enumerates the following as the most notable foreign delicacies :
peacocks from Samos ; grouse from Phrygia ; cranes from Melos ; kids
from Ambracia ; tunny fishes from Chalcedon ; muraenas from the Straits
of Gades ; bleak-fishes (? aselli) from Pessinus ; oysters and scallops fror
Tarentum ; sturgeons (?) from Rhodes ; jfarw-fishes (?) from Cilicia ;
nuts from Thasos ; dates from Egypt ; acorns from Spain.
CHAP. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 389
(.£250,000); Marcus Antonius, at the age of twenty-four
6,000,000 sesterces (,£60,000), fourteen years afterwards
40,000,000 (,£400,000) ; Curio owed 60,000,000
(,£600,000); Milo 70,000,000 (.£700,000). That those
extravagant habits of the Roman world of quality rested
throughout on credit, is shown by the fact that the monthly
interest in Rome was once suddenly raised from four to
eight per cent, through the borrowing of the different
competitors for the consulship. Insolvency, instead of
leading in due time to a meeting of creditors or at any rate
to a liquidation which might at least place matters once
more on a clear footing, was ordinarily prolonged by the
debtor as much as possible ; instead of selling his property
and especially his landed estates, he continued to borrow
and to present the semblance of riches, till the crash only
became the worse and the winding-up yielded a result
like that of Milo, in which the creditors obtained some-
what above four per cent of the sums for which they
ranked. Amidst this startlingly rapid transition from riches
to bankruptcy and this systematic swindling, nobody of
course gained so much as the cool banker, who knew how
to give and refuse credit. The relations of debtor and
creditor thus returned almost to the same point at which
they had stood in the worst times of the social crises of
the fifth century ; the nominal landowners held virtually by
sufferance of their creditors ; the debtors were either in
servile subjection to their creditors, so that the humbler of
them appeared like freedmen in the creditor's train and
those of higher rank spoke and voted even in the senate at
the nod of their creditor-lord ; or they were on the point
of declaring war on property itself, and either of intimidating
their creditors by threats or getting rid of them by con-
spiracy and civil war. On these relations was based the
power of Crassus ; out of them arose the insurrections —
whose motto was "a clear sheet " — of Cinna (iii. 530, iv. 74)
39°
THE OLD REPUBLIC AND
BOOK V
Im-
morality.
Friendship,
and still more definitely of Catilina, of Coelius, of Dolabella
entirely resembling the battles between those who had and
those who had not, which a century before agitated the
Hellenic world (ii. 495). That amidst so rotten an
economic condition every financial or political crisis should
occasion the most dreadful confusion, was to be expected
from the nature of the case ; we need hardly mention that
the usual phenomena — the disappearance of capital, the
sudden depreciation of landed estates, innumerable bank-
ruptcies, and an almost universal insolvency — made their
appearance now during the civil war, just as they had done
during the Social and Mithradatic wars (iv. 1 7 6).
Under such circumstances, as a matter of course,
morality and family life were treated as antiquated things
among all ranks of society. To be poor was not merely
the sorest disgrace and the worst crime, but the only
disgrace and the only crime : for money the statesman sold
the state, and the burgess sold his freedom ; the post of
the officer and the vote of the juryman were to be had for
money ; for money the lady of quality surrendered her
person as well as the common courtesan ; falsifying of
documents and perjuries had become so common that in
a popular poet of this age an oath is called "the plaster
for debts." Men had forgotten what honesty was ; a
person who refused a bribe was regarded not as an upright
man, but as a personal foe. The criminal statistics of all
times and countries will hardly furnish a parallel to the
dreadful picture of crimes — so varied, so horrible, and so
unnatural — which the trial of Aulus Cluentius unrolls
before us in the bosom of one of the most respected
families of an Italian country town.
But while at the bottom of the national life the slime
was thus constantly accumulating more and more deleteri-
ously and deeply, so much the more smooth and glittering
was the surface, overlaid with the varnish of polished
chap. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 391
manners and universal friendship. All the world inter-
changed visits ; so that in the houses of quality it was
necessary to admit the persons presenting themselves every
morning for the levee in a certain order fixed by the master
or occasionally by the attendant in waiting, and to give
audience only to the more notable one by one, while the
rest were more summarily admitted partly in groups, partly
en masse at the close — a distinction which Gaius Gracchus,
in this too paving the way for the new monarchy, is said
to have introduced. The interchange of letters of courtesy
was carried to as great an extent as the visits of courtesy ;
" friendly " letters flew over land and sea between persons
who had neither personal relations nor business with each
other, whereas proper and formal business-letters scarcely
occur except where the letter is addressed to a corporation.
In like manner invitations to dinner, the customary new
year's presents, the domestic festivals, were divested of
their proper character and converted almost into public
ceremonials ; even death itself did not release the Roman
from these attentions to his countless " neighbours," but in
order to die with due respectability he had to provide each
of them at any rate with a keepsake. Just as in certain
circles of our mercantile world, the genuine intimacy of
family ties and family friendships had so totally vanished
from the Rome of that day that the whole intercourse of
business and acquaintance could be garnished with forms
and flourishes of affection which had lost all meaning, and
thus by degrees the reality came to be superseded by that
spectral shadow of " friendship," which holds by no means
the least place among the various evil spirits brooding over
the proscriptions and civil wars of this age.
An equally characteristic feature in the brilliant decay Wcmen.
of this period was the emancipation of women. In an
economic point of view the women had long since made
themselves independent (iii. 123); in the present epoch
392 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND BOOK v
we even meet with solicitors acting specially for women,
who officiously lend their aid to solitary rich ladies in
the management of their property and their lawsuits, make
an impression on them by their knowledge of business and
law, and thereby procure for themselves ampler perquisites
and legacies than other loungers on the exchange. But it
was not merely from the economic guardianship of father
or husband that women felt themselves emancipated.
Love -intrigues of all sorts were constantly in progress.
The ballet-dancers (mi'mae) were quite a match for those
of the present day in the variety of their pursuits and the
skill with which they followed them out ; their prima-
donnas, Cytheris and the like, pollute even the pages of
history. But their, as it were, licensed trade was very
materially injured by the free art of the ladies of aristo-
cratic circles. Liaisons in the first houses had become so
frequent, that only a scandal altogether exceptional could
make them the subject of special talk ; a judicial inter-
ference seemed now almost ridiculous. An unparalleled
81. scandal, such as Publius Clodius produced in 693 at the
women's festival in the house of the Pontifex Maximus,
although a thousand times worse than the occurrences
which fifty years before had led to a series of capital
sentences (iv. 207), passed almost without investigation
and wholly without punishment The watering-place
season — in April, when political business was suspended
and the world of quality congregated in Baiae and Puteoli
— derived its chief charm from the relations licit and illicit
which, along with music and song and elegant breakfasts
on board or on shore, enlivened the gondola voyages.
There the ladies held absolute sway ; but they were by no
means content with this domain which rightfully belonged
to them ; they also acted as politicians, appeared in party
conferences, and took part with their money and their
intrigues in the wild coterie-doings of the time. Any one
chap, xi THE NEW MONARCHY 393
who beheld these female statesmen performing on the stage
of Scipio and Cato and saw at their side the young fop —
as with smooth chin, delicate voice, and mincing gait, with
headdress and neckerchiefs, frilled robe, and women's
sandals he copied the loose courtesan — might well have
a horror of the unnatural world, in which the sexes seemed
as though they wished to change parts. What ideas as to
divorce prevailed in the circles of the aristocracy may be
discerned in the conduct of their best and most moral
hero Marcus Cato, who did not hesitate to separate from
his wife at the request of a friend desirous to marry her,
and as little scrupled on the death of this friend to marry
the same wife a second time. Celibacy and childlessness
became more and more common, especially among the
upper classes. While among these marriage had for long
been regarded as a burden which people took upon them
at the best in the public interest (iii. 118, iv. iZ6f.), we now
encounter even in Cato and those who shared Cato's senti-
ments the maxim to which Polybius a century before traced
the decay of Hellas (iii. 265), that it is the duty of a citizen
to keep great wealth together and therefore not to beget
too many children. Where were the times, when the
designation "children-producer" (proletarius) had been a
term of honour for the Roman ?
In consequence of such a social condition the Latin Depopula-
stock in Italy underwent an alarming diminution, and its V°?
fair provinces were overspread partly by parasitic immi-
grants, partly by sheer desolation. A considerable portion
of the population of Italy flocked to foreign lands. Already
the aggregate amount of talent and of working power,
which the supply of Italian magistrates and Italian garri-
sons for the whole domain of the Mediterranean demanded,
transcended the resources of the peninsula, especially as
the elements thus sent abroad were in great part lost for
ever to the nation. For the more that the Roman com-
394 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
munity grew into an empire embracing many nations, the
more the governing aristocracy lost the habit of looking
on Italy as their exclusive home ; while of the men levied
or enlisted for service a considerable portion perished in
the many wars, especially in the bloody civil war, and
another portion became wholly estranged from their native
country by the long period of service, which sometimes
lasted for a generation. In like manner with the public
service, speculation kept a portion of the landholders and
almost the whole body of merchants all their lives or at
any rate for a long time out of the country, and the de-
moralising itinerant life of trading in particular estranged
the latter altogether from civic existence in the mother
country and from the various conditions of family life.
As a compensation for these, Italy obtained on the one
hand the proletariate of slaves and freedmen, on the other
hand the craftsmen and traders flocking thither from Asia
Minor, Syria, and Egypt, who flourished chiefly in the
capital and still more in the seaport towns of Ostia, Puteoli,
and Brundisium (iv. 194). In the largest and most im-
portant part of Italy however, there was not even such a
substitution of impure elements for pure ; but the popula-
tion was visibly on the decline. Especially was this true
of the pastoral districts such as Apulia, the chosen land of
cattle-breeding, which is called by contemporaries the most
deserted part of Italy, and of the region around Rome,
where the Campagna was annually becoming more desolate
under the constant reciprocal action of the retrograde
agriculture and the increasing malaria. Labici, Gabii,
Bovillae, once cheerful little country towns, were so de-
cayed, that it was difficult to find representatives of them
for the ceremony of the Latin festival. Tusculum, although
still one of the most esteemed communities of Latium,
consisted almost solely of some genteel families who lived
in the capital but retained their native Tusculan franchise,
CHAP. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 395
and was far inferior in the number of burgesses entitled to
vote even to small communities in the interior of Italy.
The stock of men capable of arms in this district, on which
Rome's ability to defend herself had once mainly depended,
had so totally vanished, that people read with astonishment
and perhaps with horror the accounts of the annals —
sounding fabulous in comparison with things as they stood
— respecting the Aequian and Volscian wars. Matters
were not so bad everywhere, especially in the other portions
of Central Italy and in Campania ; nevertheless, as Varro
complains, " the once populous cities of Italy," in general
" stood desolate."
It is a dreadful picture — this picture of Italy under the Italy under
rule of the oligarchy. There was nothing to bridge over or ^"L^-
soften the fatal contrast between the world of the beggars
and the world of the rich. The more clearly and painfully
this contrast was felt on both sides — the giddier the height
to which riches rose, the deeper the abyss of poverty
yawned — the more frequently, amidst that changeful world
of speculation and playing at hazard, were individuals
tossed from the bottom to the top and again from the top to
the bottom. The wider the chasm by which the two worlds
were externally divided, the more completely they coincided
in the like annihilation of family life — which is yet the
germ and core of all nationality — in the like laziness and
luxury, the like unsubstantial economy, the like unmanly
dependence, the like corruption differing only in its tariff,
the like criminal demoralization, the like longing to begin
the war with property. Riches and misery in close league
drove the Italians out of Italy, and filled the pemnsula
partly with swarms of slaves, partly with awful silence. It
is a terrible picture, but not one peculiar to Italy ; wher-
ever the government of capitalists in a slave-state has fully
developed itself, it has desolated God's fair world in the
same wav As rivers glisten in different colours, but a
396 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book *
common sewer everywhere looks like itself, so the Italy of
the Ciceronian epoch resembles substantially the Hellas of
Polybius and still more decidedly the Carthage of Hannibal's
time, where in exactly similar fashion the all-powerful rule of
capital ruined the middle class, raised trade and estate-
farming to the highest prosperity, and ultimately led to a
— hypocritically whitewashed — moral and political corruption
of the nation. All the arrant sins that capital has been
guilty of against nation and civilization in the modern
world, remain as far inferior to the abominations of the
ancient capitalist-states as the free man, be he ever so poor,
remains superior to the slave ; and not until the dragon-
seed of North America ripens, will the world have again
similar fruits to reap.
Reforms of These evils, under which the national economy of Italy
lay prostrate, were in their deepest essence irremediable,
and so much of them as still admitted of remedy depended
essentially for its amendment on the people and on time ;
for the wisest government is as little able as the more
skilful physician to give freshness to the corrupt juices of
the organism, or to do more in the case of the deeper-
rooted evils than to prevent those accidents which obstruct
the remedial power of nature in its working. The
peaceful energy of the new rule even of itself furnished
such a preventive, for by its means some of the worst
excrescences were done away, such as the artificial
pampering of the proletariate, the impunity of crimes,
the purchase of offices, and various others. But the
government could do something more than simply
abstain from harm. Caesar was not one of those
over -wise people who refuse to embank the sea, be-
cause forsooth no dike can defy some sudden influx of
the tide. It is better, if a nation and its economy follow
spontaneously the path prescribed by nature ; but, seeing
that they had got out of this path, Caesar applied all his
chap, xi THE NEW MONARCHY 397
energies to bring back by special intervention the nation
to its home and family life, and to reform the national
economy by law and decree.
With a view to check the continued absence of the Measures
Italians from Italy and to induce the world of quality and absentees
the merchants to establish their homes in their native land, from Italy,
not only was the term of service for the soldiers shortened,
but men of senatorial rank were altogether prohibited from
taking up their abode out of Italy except when on public
business, while the other Italians of marriageable age (from
the twentieth to the fortieth year) were enjoined not to be
absent from Italy for more than three consecutive years. In
the same spirit Caesar had already in his first consulship on Measures
founding the colony of Capua kept specially in view fathers for the
who had several children (iv. 508); and now as Imperator he of the
proposed extraordinary rewards for the fathers of numerous faraily«^/
families, while he at the same time as supreme judge of the
nation treated divorce and adultery with a rigour according
to Roman ideas unparalleled. _— ^.^
Nor did he even think it beneath his dignity to issue a Laws^\
detailed law as to luxury — which, among other points, cut resPectin8
down extravagance in building at least in one of its most l"7'
irrational forms, that of sepulchral monuments; restricted
the use of purple robes and pearls to certain times, ages,
and classes, and totally prohibited it in grown-up men;
fixed a maximum for the expenditure of the table; and
directly forbade a number of luxurious dishes. Such
ordinances doubtless were not new ; but it was a new thing
that the " master of morals " seriously insisted on their
observance, superintended the provision-markets by means
of paid overseers, and ordered that the tables of men of
rank should be examined by his officers and the forbidden
dishes on them should be confiscated. It is true that by
such theoretical and practical instructions in moderation as
the new monarchical police gave to the fashionable world
398 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
hardly more could be accomplished than the compelling
luxury to retire somewhat more into concealment ; but, if
hypocrisy is the homage which vice pays to virtue, under
the circumstances of the times even a semblance of
propriety established by police measures was a step towards
improvement not to be despised.
The debt The measures of Caesar for the better regulation of
Italian monetary and agricultural relations were of a graver
character and promised greater results. The first question
here related to temporary enactments respecting the scarcity
of money and the debt-crisis generally. The law called forth
by the outcry as to locked-up capital — that no one should
have on hand more than 60,000 sesterces (^600) in gold
and silver cash — was probably only issued to allay the
indignation of the blind public against the usurers; the
form of publication, which proceeded on the fiction that
this was merely the renewed enforcing of an earlier law that
had fallen into oblivion, shows that Caesar was ashamed
of this enactment, and it can hardly have passed into
actual application. A far more serious question was the
treatment of the pending claims for debt, the complete
remission of which was vehemently demanded from Caesar
by the party which called itself by his name. We have
already mentioned, that he did not yield to this demand
(p. 318); but two important concessions were made to
49. the debtors, and that as early as 705. First, the interest
in arrear was struck off,1 and that which was paid
was deducted from the capital. Secondly, the creditor
was compelled to accept the moveable and immoveable
property of the debtor in lieu of payment at the estimated
value which his effects had before the civil war and the
1 This is not stated by our authorities, but it necessarily follows from the
permission to deduct the interest paid by cash or assignation (si quid
usurae nomine numeratum aut perscriptum fuisset ; Sueton. Cats. 42), as
paid contrary to law, from the capital.
cha?. xi THE NEW MONARCHY 399
general depreciation which it had occasioned. The latter
enactment was not unreasonable ; if the creditor was to be
looked on de facto as the owner of the property of his
debtor to the amount of the sum due to him, it was doubt-
less proper that he should bear his share in the general
depreciation of the property. On the other hand the
cancelling of the payments of interest made or outstanding
— which practically amounted to this, that the creditors
lost, besides the interest itself, on an average 25 per cent
of what they were entitled to claim as capital at the time of
the issuing of the law — was in fact nothing else than a
partial concession of that cancelling of creditors' claims
springing out of loans, for which the democrats had
clamoured so vehemently; and, however bad may have
been the conduct of the usurers, it is not possible thereby
to justify the retrospective abolition of all claims for interest
without distinction. In order at least to understand this
agitation we must recollect how the democratic party stood
towards the question of interest. The legal prohibition
against taking interest, which the old plebeian opposition
had extorted in 412 (i. 389), had no doubt been practi- 8*2.
cally disregarded by the nobility which controlled the
civil procedure by means of the praetorship, but had
still remained since that period formally valid ; and the
democrats of the seventh century, who regarded themselves
throughout as the continuers of that old agitation as to
privilege and social position (iv. 474), had maintained the
illegality of payment of interest at any time, and even
already practically enforced that principle, at least tem-
porarily, in the confusion of the Marian period (iii. 530).
It is not credible that Caesar shared the crude views of his
party on the interest question ; the fact, that in his account
of the matter of liquidation he mentions the enactment as
to the surrender of the property of the debtor in lieu of
payment but is silent as to the cancelling of the interest, is
4QO THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book V
perhaps a tacit self-reproach. But he was, like every party-
leader, dependent on his party and could not directly
repudiate the traditional maxims of the democracy in the
question of interest ; the more especially when he had to
decide this question, not as the all-powerful conqueror of
Pharsalus, but even before his departure for Epirus. But,
while he permitted perhaps rather than originated this
violation of legal order and of property, it is certainly his
merit that that monstrous demand for the annulling of all
claims arising from loans was rejected ; and it may perhaps
be looked on as a saving of his honour, that the debtors
were far more indignant at the — according to their view
extremely unsatisfactory — concession given to them than
the injured creditors, and made under Caelius and Dola-
bella those foolish and (as already mentioned) speedily
frustrated attempts to extort by riot and civil war what
Caesar refused to them.
New But Caesar did not confine himself to helping the
as to bank- debtor for the moment ; he did what as legislator he could,
ruptcy. permanently to keep down the fearful omnipotence of
capital. First of all the great legal maxim was proclaimed,
that freedom is not a possession commensurable with
property, but an eternal right of man, of which the state is
entitled judicially to deprive the criminal alone, not the
debtor. It was Caesar, who, perhaps stimulated in this
case also by the more humane Egyptian and Greek legis-
lation, especially that of Solon,1 introduced this principle —
diametrically opposed to the maxims of the earlier ordi-
nances as to bankruptcy — into the common law, where it
has since retained its place undisputed. According to
Roman law the debtor unable to pay became the serf of
1 The Egyptian royal laws (Diodorus, i. 79) and likewise the legisla-
tion of Solon (Plutarch, Sol. 13, 15) forbade bonds in which the loss of the
personal liberty of the debtor was made the penalty of non-payment ; and
at least the latter imposed on the debtor in the event of bankruptcy no
more than the cession of his whole assets.
CHAP. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 401
his creditor (i. 198). The Poetelian law no doubt had
allowed a debtor, who had become unable to pay only
through temporary embarrassments, not through genuine
insolvency, to save his personal freedom by the cession of
his property (i. 390) ; nevertheless for the really insolvent
that principle of law, though doubtless modified in
secondary points, had been in substance retained unaltered
for five hundred years ; a direct recourse to the debtor's
estate only occurred exceptionally, when the debtor had
died or had forfeited his burgess -rights or could not be
found. It was Caesar who first gave an insolvent the
right — on which our modern bankruptcy regulations are
based — of formally ceding his estate to his creditors,
whether it might suffice to satisfy them or not, so as to
save at all events his personal freedom although with
diminished honorary and political rights, and to begin a
new financial existence, in which he could only be sued on
account of claims proceeding from the earlier period and
not protected in the liquidation, if he could pay them
without renewed financial ruin.
While thus the great democrat had the imperishable Usury-
honour of emancipating personal freedom in principle from laws"
capital, he attempted moreover to impose a police limit on
the excessive power of capital by usury-laws. He did not
affect to disown the democratic antipathy to stipulations
for interest. For Italian money-dealing there was fixed a
maximum amount of the loans at interest to be allowed in
the case of the individual capitalist, which appears to have
been proportioned to the Italian landed estate belonging
to each, and perhaps amounted to half its value. Trans-
gressions of this enactment were, after the fashion of the
procedure prescribed in the republican usury-laws, treated
as criminal offences and sent before a special jury-com-
mission. If these regulations were successfully carried into
effect, every Italian man of business would be compelled
VOL. V 159
402 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
to become at the same time an Italian landholder, and the
class of capitalists subsisting merely on their interest would
disappear wholly from Italy. Indirectly too the no less
injurious category of insolvent landowners who practically
managed their estates merely for their creditors was by
this means materially curtailed, inasmuch as the creditors,
if they desired to continue their lending business, were
compelled to buy for themselves. From this very fact
besides it is plain that Caesar wished by no means simply
to renew that naive prohibition of interest by the old
popular party, but on the contrary to allow the taking of
interest within certain limits. It is very probable however
that he did not confine himself to that injunction — which
applied merely to Italy — of a maximum amount of sums
to be lent, but also, especially with respect to the provinces,
prescribed maximum rates for interest itself. The enact-
ments— that it was illegal to take higher interest than i
per cent per month, or to take interest on arrears of
interest, or in fine to make a judicial claim for arrears of
interest to a greater amount than a sum equal to the
capital — were, probably also after the Graeco- Egyptian
model,1 first introduced in the Roman empire by Lucius
Lucullus for Asia Minor and retained there by his better
successors ; soon afterwards they were transferred to other
provinces by edicts of the governors, and ultimately at
least part of them was provided with the force of law in
60. all provinces by a decree of the Roman senate of 704.
The fact that these Lucullan enactments afterwards appear
in all their compass as imperial law and have thus become
the basis of the Roman and indeed of modern legislation
as to interest, may also perhaps be traced back to an
ordinance of Caesar.
1 At least the latter rule occurs in the old Egyptian royal laws (Dio-
dorus, i. 79). On the other hand the Solonian legislation knows no
restrictions on interest, but on the contrary expressly allows interest to be
fixed of any amount at pleasure.
chap. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 4°3
Hand in hand with these efforts to guard against the Elevation
ascendency of capital went the endeavours to bring back ^^
agriculture to the path which was most advantageous for
the commonwealth. For this purpose the improvement of
the administration of justice and of police was very
essential. While hitherto nobody in Italy had been sure
of his life and of his moveable or immoveable property,
while Roman condottieri for instance, at the intervals when
their gangs were not helping to manage the politics of the
capital, applied themselves to robbery in the forests of
Etruria or rounded off the country estates of their pay-
masters by fresh acquisitions, this sort of club-law was now
at an end ; and in particular the agricultural population of
all classes must have felt the beneficial effects of the
change. The plans of Caesar for great works also, which
were not at all limited to the capital, were intended to tell
in this respect; the construction, for instance, of a con-
venient high-road from Rome through the passes of the
Apennines to the Adriatic was designed to stimulate the
internal traffic of Italy, and the lowering the level of the
Fucine lake to benefit the Marsian farmers. But Caesar
also sought by more direct measures to influence the state
of Italian husbandry. The Italian graziers were required
to take at least a third of their herdsmen from freeborn
adults, whereby brigandage was checked and at the same
time a source of gain was opened to the free proletariate.
In the agrarian question Caesar, who already in his first pistribu-
consulship had been in a position to regulate it (iv. 508), ]&aiL
more judicious than Tiberius Gracchus, did not seek to
restore the farmer-system at any price, even at that of a re-
volution— concealed under juristic clauses — directed against
property ; by him on the contrary, as by every other genuine
statesman, the security of that which is property or is at
any rate regarded by the public as property was esteemed
as the first and most inviolable of all political maxims, and
404 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book V
it was only within the limits assigned by this maxim that
he sought to accomplish the elevation of the Italian small
holdings, which also appeared to him as a vital question for
the nation. Even as it was, there was much still left for
him in this respect to do. Every private right, whether it
was called property or entitled heritable possession, whether
traceable to Gracchus or to Sulla, was unconditionally re-
spected by him. On the other hand Caesar, after he had in
his strictly economical fashion — which tolerated no waste
and no negligence even on a small scale — instituted a general
revision of the Italian titles to possession by the revived
commission of Twenty (iv. 509), destined the whole actual
domain land of Italy (including a considerable portion of
the real estates that were in the hands of spiritual guilds
but legally belonged to the state) for distribution in the
Gracchan fashion, so far, of course, as it was fitted for
agriculture ; the Apulian summer and the Samnite winter
pastures belonging to the state continued to be domain;
and it was at least the design of the Imperator, if these
domains should not suffice, to procure the additional land
requisite by the purchase of Italian estates from the public
funds. In the selection of the new farmers provision was
naturally made first of all for the veteran soldiers, and as
far as possible the burden, which the levy imposed on the
mother country, was converted into a benefit by the fact
that Caesar gave the proletarian, who was levied from it as
a recruit, back to it as a farmer ; it is remarkable also that
the desolate Latin communities, such as Veii and Capena,
seem to have been preferentially provided with new colonists.
The regulation of Caesar that the new owners should not
be entitled to alienate the lands received by them till after
twenty years, was a happy medium between the full bestowal
of the right of alienation, which would have brought the
larger portion of the distributed land speedily back into
the hands of the great capitalists, and the permanent V
chap. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 405
strictions on freedom of dealing in land which Tiberius
Gracchus (Hi. 320, 327, 373) and Sulla (iv. 199, 370) had
enacted, both equally in vain.
Lastly while the government thus energetically applied Elevation
itself to remove the diseased, and to strengthen the sound, ofth.e.
0 ' municipal
elements of the Italian national life, the newly-regulated system.
municipal system — which had but recently developed itself
out of the crisis of the Social war in and alongside of the
state-economy (iv. 131) — was intended to communicate to
the new absolute monarchy the communal life which was
compatible with it, and to impart to the sluggish circulation
of the noblest elements of public life once more a quickened
action. The leading principles in the two municipal ordi-
nances issued in 705 for Cisalpine Gaul and in 709 for 49. 45.
Italy,1 the latter of which remained the fundamental law for
all succeeding times, are apparently, first, the strict purifying
of the urban corporations from all immoral elements, while
yet no trace of political police occurs ; secondly, the
utmost restriction of centralization and the utmost freedom
of movement in the communities, to which there was even
now reserved the election of magistrates and an — although
limited — civil and criminal jurisdiction. The general police
enactments, such as the restrictions on the right of associa-
tion (p. 373), came, it is true, into operation also here.
Such were the ordinances, by which Caesar attempted
to reform the Italian national economy. It is easy both to
show their insufficiency, seeing that they allowed a multitude
of evils still to exist, and to prove that they operated in
various respects injuriously by imposing restrictions, some
of which were very severely felt, on freedom of dealing.
It is still easier to show that the evils of the Italian national
economy generally were incurable. But in spite of this
the practical statesman will admire the work as well as the
master-workman. It was already no small achievement
1 Of both laws considerable fragments still exist
406
THE OLD REPUBLIC AND
BOOK V
Provinces.
Provincial
adminis-
tration
of the
oligarchy.
that, where a man like Sulla, despairing of remedy, had
contented himself with a mere formal reorganization, the
evil was seized in its proper seat and grappled with there ;
and we may well conclude that Caesar with his reforms
came as near to the measure of what was possible as it was
given to a statesman and a Roman to come. He could
not and did not expect from them the regeneration of Italy ;
but he sought on the contrary to attain this in a very
different way, for the right apprehension of which it is
necessary first of all to review the condition of the provinces
as Caesar found them.
The provinces, which Caesar found in existence, were
fourteen in number : seven European — the Further and
the Hither Spain, Transalpine Gaul, Italian Gaul with
Illyricum, Macedonia with Greece, Sicily, Sardinia with
Corsica ; five Asiatic — Asia, Bithynia and Pontus, Cilicia
with Cyprus, Syria, Crete ; and two African — Cyrene and
Africa. To these Caesar added three new ones by the
erection of the two new governorships of Lugdunese Gaul
and Belgica (p. 95) and by constituting Illyricum a province
by itself.1
In the administration of these provinces oligarchic
misrule had reached a point which, notwithstanding various
noteworthy performances in this line, no second govern-
ment has ever attained at least in the west, and which
according to our ideas it seems no longer possible to
surpass. Certainly the responsibility for this rests not
on the Romans alone. Almost everywhere before their
day the Greek, Phoenician, or Asiatic rule had already
driven out of the nations the higher spirit and the sense
1 As according to Caesar's ordinance annually sixteen propraetors and
two proconsuls divided the governorships among them, and the latter
remained two years in office (p. 344), we might conclude that he intended
to bring the number of provinces in all up to twenty. Certainty is, how-
ever, the less attainable as to this, seeing that Caesar perhaps designedly
instituted fewer offices than candidatures.
CHAP. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 407
of right and of liberty belonging to better times. It was
doubtless bad, that every accused provincial was bound,
when asked, to appear personally in Rome to answer for
himself; that the Roman governor interfered at pleasure
in the administration of justice and the management of
the dependent communities, pronounced capital sentences,
and cancelled transactions of the municipal council ; and
that in case of war he treated the militia as he chose and
often infamously, as e.g. when Cotta at the siege of the
Pontic Heraclea assigned to the militia all the posts of
danger, to spare his Italians, and on the siege not going
according to his wish, ordered the heads of his engineers
to be laid at his feet. It was doubtless bad, that no rule
of morality or of criminal law bound either the Roman
administrators or their retinue, and that violent outrages,
rapes, and murders with or without form of law were of
daily occurrence in the provinces. But these things were
at least nothing new ; almost everywhere men had long
been accustomed to be treated like slaves, and it signified
little in the long run whether a Carthaginian overseer, a
Syrian satrap, or a Roman proconsul acted as the local
tyrant. Their material well-being, almost the only thing
for which the provincials still cared, was far less disturbed
by those occurrences, which although numerous in pro-
portion to the many tyrants yet affected merely isolated
individuals, than by the financial exactions pressing heavily
on all, which had never previously been prosecuted with
such energy.
The Romans now gave in this domain fearful proof of
their old mastery of money -matters. We have already
endeavoured to describe the Roman system of provincial
oppression in its modest and rational foundations as well
as in its growth and corruption (iv. 157-166) ; as a matter
of course, the latter went on increasing. The ordinary
taxes became far more oppressive from the inequality of
408 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
their distribution and from the preposterous system of
levying them than from their high amount. As to the
burden of quartering troops, Roman statesmen themselves
expressed the opinion that a town suffered nearly to the
same extent when a Roman army took up winter quarters
in it as when an enemy took it by storm. While the taxa-
tion in its original character had been an indemnification
for the burden of military defence undertaken by Rome,
and the community paying tribute had thus a right to
remain exempt from ordinary service, garrison-service was
now — as is attested e.g. in the case of Sardinia — for the
most part imposed on the provincials, and even in the
ordinary armies, besides other duties, the whole heavy
burden of the cavalry-service was devolved on them. The
extraordinary contributions demanded — such as, the deli-
veries of grain for little or no compensation to benefit the
proletariate of the capital ; the frequent and costly naval
armaments and coast-defences in order to check piracy ;
the task of supplying works of art, wild beasts, or other
demands of the insane Roman luxury in the theatre and
the chase ; the military requisitions in case of war — were
just as frequent as they were oppressive and incalculable.
A single instance may show how far things were carried.
During the three years' administration of Sicily by Gaius
Verres the number of farmers in Leontini fell from 84 to
32, in Motuca from 187 to 86, in Herbita from 252 to
120, in Agyrium from 250 to 80 ; so that in four of the
most fertile districts of Sicily 59 per cent of the land-
holders preferred to let their fields lie fallow than to
cultivate them under such government. And these land-
holders were, as their small number itself shows and as
is expressly stated, by no means small farmers, but respect-
able planters and in great part Roman burgesses !
In the In the client-states the forms of taxation were somewhat
*T?"*" different, but the burdens themselves were if possible still
chap, xi THE NEW MONARCHY 409
worse, since in addition to the exactions of the Romans
there came those of the native courts. In Cappadocia
and Egypt the farmer as well as the king was bankrupt;
the former was unable to satisfy the tax-collector, the
latter was unable to satisfy his Roman creditor. Add to
these the exactions, properly so called, not merely of the
governor himself, but also of his " friends," each of whom
fancied that he had as it were a draft on the governor and
a title accordingly to come back from the province a made
man. The Roman oligarchy in this respect completely
resembled a gang of robbers, and followed out the plunder-
ing of the provincials in a professional and business-like
manner ; capable members of the gang set to work not
too nicely, for they had in fact to share the spoil with the
advocates and the jurymen, and the more they stole, they
did so the more securely. The notion of honour in theft
too was already developed ; the big robber looked down
on the little, and the latter on the mere thief, with con-
tempt ; any one, who had been once for a wonder con-
demned, boasted of the high figure of the sums which he
was proved to have exacted. Such was the behaviour
in the provinces of the successors of those men, who
had been accustomed to bring home nothing from their
administration but the thanks of the subjects and the
approbation of their fellow-citizens.
But still worse, if possible, and still less subject to any The
control was the havoc committed by the Italian men of Ro™an
/ capitalist!
business among the unhappy provincials. The most lucra- in the
tive portions of the landed property and the whole com- P1"0™1106*
mercial and monetary business in the provinces were
concentrated in their hands. The estates in the trans-
marine regions, which belonged to Italian grandees, were
exposed to all the misery of management by stewards, and
never saw their owners ; excepting possibly the hunting-
parks, which occur as early as this time in Transalpine
4io
THE OLD REPUBLIC AND
BOOK V
Robberies
and
damage
by war.
Gaul with an area amounting to nearly twenty square
miles. Usury flourished as it had never flourished before.
The small landowners in Illyricum, Asia, and Egypt man-
aged their estates even in Varro's time in great part practi-
cally as the debtor-slaves of their Roman or non-Roman
creditors, just as the plebeians in former days for their
patrician lords. Cases occurred of capital being lent even
to urban communities at four per cent per month. It was
no unusual thing for an energetic and influential man of
business to get either the title of envoy l given to him by
the senate or that of officer by the governor, and, if
possible, to have men put at his service for the better
prosecution of his affairs ; a case is narrated on credible
authority, where one of these honourable martial bankers
on account of a claim against the town of Salamis in
Cyprus kept its municipal council blockaded in the town-
house, until five of the members had died of hunger.
To these two modes of oppression, each of which by
itself was intolerable and which were always becoming
better arranged to work into each other's hands, were
added the general calamities, for which the Roman govern-
ment was also in great part, at least indirectly, responsible.
In the various wars a large amount of capital was dragged
away from the country and a larger amount destroyed
sometimes by the barbarians, sometimes by the Roman
armies. Owing to the worthlessness of the Roman land
and maritime police, brigands and pirates swarmed every
where. In Sardinia and the interior of Asia Minor brigand-
age was endemic ; in Africa and Further Spain it became
necessary to fortify all buildings constructed outside of the
city-enclosures with walls and towers. The fearful evil of
piracy has been already described in another connection
(iv. 307 /.). The panaceas of the prohibitive system, with
1 This is the so-called "free embassy" (libera legatio), namely an
embassy without any proper public commission entrusted to it.
chap, xi THE NEW MONARCHY 411
which the Roman governor was wont to interpose when
scarcity of money or dearth occurred, as under such
circumstances they could not fail to do — the prohibition
of the export of gold or grain from the province — did
not mend the matter. The communal affairs were almost
everywhere embarrassed, in addition to the general distress,
by local disorders and frauds of the public officials.
Where such grievances afflicted communities and indivi- Tne condi-
duals not temporarily but for generations with an inevitable, pr0vinces
steady and yearly-increasing oppression, the best regulated generally,
public or private economy could not but succumb to them,
and the most unspeakable misery could not but extend over
all the nations from the Tagus to the Euphrates. " All the
communities," it is said in a treatise published as early as
684, " are ruined " ; the same truth is specially attested as 70.
regards Spain and Narbonese Gaul, the very provinces
which, comparatively speaking, were still in the most
tolerable economic position. In Asia Minor even towns
like Samos and Halicarnassus stood almost empty; legal
slavery seemed here a haven of rest compared with the
torments to which the free provincial succumbed, and even
the patient Asiatic had become, according to the descrip-
tions of Roman statesmen themselves, weary of life. Any
one who desires to fathom the depths to which man can
sink in the criminal infliction, and in the no less criminal
endurance, of all conceivable injustice, may gather together
from the criminal records of this period the wrongs which
Roman grandees could perpetrate and Greeks, Syrians, and
Phoenicians could suffer. Even the statesmen of Rome
herself publicly and frankly conceded that the Roman
name was unutterably odious through all Greece and
Asia ; and, when the burgesses of the Pontic Heraclea
on one occasion put to death the whole of the Roman tax-
collectors, the only matter for regret was that such things
did not occur oftener.
412
THE OLD REPUBLIC AND
BOOK V
Caesar
and the
provinces.
The
Caesarian
magis-
trates.
The Optimates scoffed at the new master who went in
person to inspect his " farms " one after the other j in
reality the condition of the several provinces demanded all
the earnestness and all the wisdom of one of those rare
men, who redeem the name of king from being regarded
by the nations as merely a conspicuous example of human
insufficiency. The wounds inflicted had to be healed by
time ; Caesar took care that they might be so healed, and
that there should be no fresh inflictions.
The system of administration was thoroughly remodelled.
The Sullan proconsuls and propraetors had been in their
provinces essentially sovereign and practically subject to no
control; those of Caesar were the well -disciplined servants
of a stern master, who from the very unity and life-tenure
of his power sustained a more natural and more tolerable
relation to the subjects than those numerous, annually
changing, petty tyrants. The governorships were no doubt
still distributed among the annually- retiring two consuls
and sixteen praetors, but, as the Imperator directly nomi-
nated eight of the latter and the distribution of the provinces
among the competitors depended solely on him (p. 344),
they were in reality bestowed by the Imperator. The
functions also of the governors were practically restricted.
The superintendence of the administration of justice and
the administrative control of the communities remained in
their hands ; but their command was paralyzed by the new
supreme command in Rome and its adjutants associated
with the governor (p. 354), and the raising of the taxes was
probably even now committed in the provinces substantially
to imperial officials (p. 343), so that the governor was thence-
forward surrounded with an auxiliary staff which was abso-
lutely dependent on the Imperator in virtue either of the
laws of the military hierarchy or of the still stricter laws of
domestic discipline. While hitherto the proconsul and his
quaestor had appeared as if they were members of a gang
chap. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 413
of robbers despatched to levy contributions, the magistrates
of Caesar were present to protect the weak against the
strong ; and, instead of the previous worse than useless
control of the equestrian or senatorian tribunals, they had
to answer for themselves at the bar of a just and unyielding
monarch. The law as to exactions, the enactments of
which Caesar had already in his first consulate made more
stringent, was applied by him against the chief command-
ants in the provinces with an inexorable severity going
iiven beyond its letter ; and the tax-officers, if indeed they
ventured to indulge in an injustice, atoned for it to their
master, as slaves and freedmen according to the cruel
domestic law of that time were wont to atone.
The extraordinary public burdens were reduced to the Regula-
right proportion and the actual necessity; the ordinary J^j^L
burdens were materially lessened. We have already men-
tioned the comprehensive regulation of taxation (p. 362);
the extension of the exemptions from tribute, the general
lowering of the direct taxes, the limitation of the system of
decumae to Africa and Sardinia, the complete setting aside
of middlemen in the collection of the direct taxes, were
most beneficial reforms for the provincials. That Caesar
after the example of one of his greatest democratic prede-
cessors, Sertorius (iv. 285), wished to free the subjects from
the burden of quartering troops and to insist on the soldiers
erecting for themselves permanent encampments resembling
towns, cannot indeed be proved ; but he was, at least after
he had exchanged the part of pretender for that of king,
not the man to abandon the subject to the soldier; and it
was in keeping with his spirit, when the heirs of his policy
created such military camps, and then converted them into
towns which formed rallying-points for Italian civilization
amidst the barbarian frontier districts.
It was a task far more difficult than the checking of
official irregularities, to deliver the provincials from the
4I4 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
influence oppressive ascendency of Roman capital. Its power could
capitalist not ^e directly broken without applying means which were
system. still more dangerous than the evil ; the government could
for the time being abolish only isolated abuses — as when
Caesar for instance prohibited the employment of the title
of state-envoy for financial purposes — and meet manifest
acts of violence and palpable usury by a sharp application
of the general penal laws and of the laws as to usury, which
extended also to the provinces (p. 410) ; but a more radical
cure of the evil was only to be expected from the reviving
prosperity of the provincials under a better administration.
Temporary enactments, to relieve the insolvency of parti-
cular provinces, had been issued on several occasions in
60. recent times. Caesar himself had in 694 when governor
of Further Spain assigned to the creditors two thirds of the
income of their debtors in order to pay themselves from
that source. Lucius Lucullus likewise when governor of
Asia Minor had directly cancelled a portion of the arrears
of interest which had swelled beyond measure, and had
for the remaining portion assigned to the creditors a fourth
part of the produce of the lands of their debtors, as well as
a suitable proportion of the profits accruing to them from
house-rents or slave-labour. We are not expressly informed
that Caesar after the civil war instituted similar general
liquidations of debt in the provinces ; yet from what has
just been remarked and from what was done in the case of
Italy (p. 409), it can hardly be doubted that Caesar likewise
directed his efforts towards this object, or at least that it
formed part of his plan.
While thus the Imperator, as far as lav within human
power, relieved the provincials from tne oppressions of the
magistrates and capitalists of Rome, it might at the same
time be with certainty expected from the government to
which he imparted fresh vigour, that it would scare off the
wild border-peoples and disperse the freebooters by land
chap. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 415
and sea, as the rising sun chases away the mist. However
the old wounds might still smart, with Caesar there
appeared for the sorely- tortured subjects the dawn of a
more tolerable epoch, the first intelligent and humane
government that had appeared for centuries, and a policy
of peace which rested not on cowardice but on strength.
Well might the subjects above all mourn along with the
best Romans by the bier of the great liberator.
But this abolition of existing abuses was not the main The
matter in Caesar's provincial reform. In the Roman 0ffhening*
republic, according to the view of the aristocracy and Heiieno-
Itcilic
democracy alike, the provinces had been nothing but — state>
what they were frequently called — country- estates of the
Roman people, and they were employed and worked out as
such. This view had now passed away. The provinces as
such were gradually to disappear, in order to prepare for
the renovated Helleno- Italic nation a new and more
spacious home, of whose several component parts no one
existed merely for the sake of another but all for each and
each for all ; the new existence in the renovated home, the
fresher, broader, grander national life, was of itself to over-
bear the sorrows and wrongs of the nation for which there
was no help in the old Italy. These ideas, as is well
known, were not new. The emigration from Italy to the
provinces that had been regularly going on for centuries
had long since, though unconsciously on the part of the
emigrants themselves, paved the way for such an extension
of Italy. The first who in a systematic way guided the
Italians to settle beyond the bounds of Italy was Gaius
Gracchus, the creator of the Roman democratic monarchy,
the author of the Transalpine conquests, the founder of the
colonies of Carthage and Narbo. Then the second states-
man of genius produced by the Roman democracy, Quintus
Sertorius, began to introduce the barbarous Occidentals to
Latin civilization ; he gave to the Spanish yoath of rank
4i6 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
the Roman dress, and urged them to speak Latin and to
acquire the higher Italian culture at the training institute
founded by him in Osca. When Caesar entered on the
government, a large Italian population — though, in great
part, lacking stability and concentration — already existed
in all the provinces and client-states. To say nothing of
the formally Italian towns in Spain and southern Gaul, we
need only recall the numerous troops of burgesses raised
by Sertorius and Pompeius in Spain, by Caesar in Gaul,
by Juba in Numidia, by the constitutional party in Africa,
Macedonia, Greece, Asia Minor, and Crete ; the Latin lyre
— ill-tuned doubtless — on which the town-poets of Corduba
as early as the Sertorian war sang the praises of the Roman
generals ; and the translations of Greek poetry valued on
account of their very elegance of language, which the
earliest extra-Italian poet of note, the Transalpine Publius
Terentius Varro of the Aude, published shortly after
Caesar's death.
On the other hand the interpenetration of the Latin and
Hellenic character was, we might say, as old as Rome.
On occasion of the union of Italy the conquering Latin
nation had assimilated to itself all the other conquered
nationalities, excepting only the Greek, which was received
just as it stood without any attempt at external amalgama-
tion. Wherever the Roman legionary went, the Greek
schoolmaster, no less a conqueror in his own way, followed;
at an early date we find famous teachers of the Greek
language settled on the Guadalquivir, and Greek was as
well taught as Latin in the institute of Osca. The higher
Roman culture itself was in fact nothing else than the
proclamation of the great gospel of Hellenic manners and
art in the Italian idiom ; against the modest pretension of
the civilizing conquerors to proclaim it first of all in their
own language to the barbarians of the west the Hellene at
least could not loudly protest. Already the Greek every
chap. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 417
where — and, most decidedly, just where the national feeling
was purest and strongest, on the frontiers threatened by
barbaric denationalization, e.g. in Massilia, on the north
coast of the Black Sea, and on the Euphrates and Tigris —
descried the protector and avenger of Hellenism in Rome ;
and in fact the foundation of towns by Pompeius in the far
east resumed after an interruption of centuries the bene-
ficent work of Alexander.
The idea of an Italo-Hellenic empire with two languages
and a single nationality was not new — otherwise it would
have been nothing but a blunder ; but the development of
it from floating projects to a firmly -grasped conception,
from scattered initial efforts to the laying of a concentrated
foundation, was the work of the third and greatest of the
democratic statesmen of Rome.
The first and most essential condition for the political The ruling
and national levelling of the empire was the preservation na lons'
and extension of the two nations destined to joint dominion,
along with the absorption as rapidly as possible of the
barbarian races, or those termed barbarian, existing by
their side. In a certain sense we might no doubt name The Jews.
akng with Romans and Greeks a third nationality, which
vied with them in ubiquity in the world of that day, and
was destined to play no insignificant part in the new state
of Caesar. We speak of the Jews. This remarkable
people, yielding and yet tenacious, was in the ancient as in
the modern world everywhere and nowhere at home, and
everywhere and nowhere powerful. The successors of
David and Solomon were of hardly more significance for
the Jews of that age than Jerusalem for those of the present
day; the nation found doubtless for its religious and
intellectual unity a visible rallying-point in the petty
kingdom of Jerusalem, but the nation itself consisted not
merely of the subjects of the Hasmonaeans, but of the
innumerable bodies of Jews scattered through the whole
VOL. V 160
4i8 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
Parthian and the whole Roman empire. Within the cities
of Alexandria especially and of Cyrene the Jews formed
special communities administratively and even locally
distinct, not unlike the " Jews' quarters " of our towns, but
with a freer position and superintended by a " master of
the people" as superior judge and administrator. How
numerous even in Rome the Jewish population was already
before Caesar's time, and how closely at the same time the
Jews even then kept together as fellow-countrymen, is
shown by the remark of an author of this period, that it
was dangerous for a governor to offend the Jews in his
province, because he might then certainly reckon on being
hissed after his return by the populace of the capital.
Even at this time the predominant business of the Jews
was trade ; the Jewish trader moved everywhere with the
conquering Roman merchant then, in the same way as he
afterwards accompanied the Genoese and the Venetian, and
capital flowed in on all hands to the Jewish, by the side of
the Roman, merchants. At this period too we encounter
the peculiar antipathy of the Occidentals towards this so
thoroughly Oriental race and their foreign opinions and
customs. This Judaism, although not the most pleasing
feature in the nowhere pleasing picture of the mixture of
nations which then prevailed, was nevertheless a historical
element developing itself in the natural course of things,
which the statesman could neither ignore nor combat, and
which Caesar on the contrary, just like his predecessor
Alexander, with correct discernment of the circumstances,
fostered as far as possible. While Alexander, by laying the
foundation of Alexandrian Judaism, did not much less for the
nation than its own David by planning the temple of Jeru-
salem, Caesar also advanced the interests of the Jews in Alex-
andria and in Rome by special favours and privileges, and
protected in particular their peculiar worship against the
Roman as well as against the Greek local priests. The
CHAP. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 419
two great men of course did not contemplate placing the
Jewish nationality on an equal footing with the Hellenic or
Italo-Hellenic. But the Jew who has not like the Occi-
dental received the Pandora's gift of political organization,
and stands substantially in a relation of indifference to the
state ; who moreover is as reluctant to give up the essence
of his national idiosyncrasy, as he is ready to clothe it with
any nationality at pleasure and to adapt himself up to a
certain degree to foreign habits — the Jew was for this very
reason as it were made for a state, which was to be built on
the ruins of a hundred living polities and to be endowed
with a somewhat abstract and, from the outset, toned-down
nationality. Even in the ancient world Judaism was an
effective leaven of cosmopolitanism and of national decom-
position, and to that extent a specially privileged member
in the Caesarian state, the polity of which was strictly
speaking nothing but a citizenship of the world, and the
nationality of which was at bottom nothing but humanity.
But the Latin and Hellenic nationalities continued to be Hellenism,
exclusively the positive elements of the new citizenship.
The distinctively Italian state of the republic was thus at an
end ; but the rumour that Caesar was ruining Italy and
Rome on purpose to transfer the centre of the empire to
the Greek east and to make Ilion or Alexandria its capital,
was nothing but a piece of talk — very easy to be accounted
for, but also very silly — of the angry nobility. On the
contrary in Caesar's organizations the Latin nationality
always retained the preponderance ; as is indicated in the
very fact that he issued all his enactments in Latin, although
those destined for the Greek-speaking countries were at the
same time issued in Greek. In general he arranged the
relations of the two great nations in his monarchy just as
his republican predecessors had arranged them in the united
Italy ; the Hellenic nationality was protected where it ex-
isted, the Italian was extended as far as circumstances per-
420 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
mitted, and the inheritance of the races to be absorbed was
destined for it. This was necessary, because an entire
equalizing of the Greek and Latin elements in the state
would in all probability have in a very short time occasioned
that catastrophe which Byzantinism brought about several
centuries later ; for the Greek element was superior to the
Roman not merely in all intellectual aspects, but also in
the measure of its predominance, and it had within Italy
itself in the hosts of Hellenes and half- Hellenes who
migrated compulsorily or voluntarily to Italy an endless
number of apostles apparently insignificant, but whose in-
fluence could not be estimated too highly. To mention
only the most conspicuous phenomenon in this respect, the
rule of Greek lackeys over the Roman monarchs is as old
as the monarchy. The first in the equally long and repul-
sive list of these personages is the confidential servant of
Pompeius, Theophanes of Mytilene, who by his power over
his weak master contributed probably more than any one
else to the outbreak of the war between Pompeius and
Caesar. Not wholly without reason he was after his death
treated with divine honours by his countrymen j he com-
menced, forsooth, the valet de chambre government of the
imperial period, which in a certain measure was just a
dominion of the Hellenes over the Romans. The govern-
ment had accordingly every reason not to encourage by its
fostering action the spread of Hellenism at least in the west.
If Sicily was not simply relieved of the pressure of the
decumae but had its communities invested with Latin rights,
which was presumably meant to be followed in due time by
full equalization with Italy, it can only have been Caesar's
design that this glorious island, which was at that time
desolate and had as to management passed for the greater
part into Italian hands, but which nature has destined to be
not so much a neighbouring land to Italy as rather the
finest of its provinces, should become altogether merged in
chap. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 421
Italy. But otherwise the Greek element, wherever it existed,
was preserved and protected. However political crises
might suggest to the Imperator the demolition of the strong
pillars of Hellenism in the west and in Egypt, Massilia and
Alexandria were neither destroyed nor denationalized.
On the other hand the Roman element was promoted Latinizing,
by the government through colonization and Latinizing with
all vigour and at the most various points of the empire.
The principle, which originated no doubt from a bad com-
bination of formal law and brute force, but was inevitably
necessary in order to freedom in dealing with the nations
destined to destruction — that all the soil in the provinces
not ceded by special act of the government to communities
or private persons was the property of the state, and the
holder of it for the time being had merely an heritable
possession on sufferance and revocable at any time — was
retained also by Caesar and raised by him from a demo-
cratic party-theory to a fundamental principle of monarchical
law.
Gaul, of course, fell to be primarily dealt with in the Cisalpine
extension of Roman nationality. Cisalpine Gaul obtained a
throughout — what a great part of the inhabitants had long
enjoyed — political equalization with the leading country by
the admission of the Transpadane communities into the
Roman burgess-union, which had for long been assumed by
the democracy as accomplished (iv. 264, p. 131), and was now
(705) finally accomplished by Caesar. Practically this pro- 49.
vince had already completely Latinized itself during the forty
years which had elapsed since the bestowal of Latin rights.
The exclusives might ridicule the broad and gurgling accent
of the Celtic Latin, and miss " an undefined something of
the grace of the capital " in the Insubrian or Venetian, who
as Caesar's legionary had conquered for himself with his
sword a place in the Roman Forum and even in the Roman
senate-house. Nevertheless Cisalpine Gaul with its dense
422 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
chiefly agricultural population was even before Caesar's time
in reality an Italian country, and remained for centuries
the true asylum of Italian manners and Italian culture ; in-
deed the teachers of Latin literature found nowhere else
out of the capital so much encouragement and approbation.
The While Cisalpine Gaul was thus substantially merged in
Narbo.06 ° Itaty> tne place which it had hitherto occupied was taken
by the Transalpine province, which had been converted by
the conquests of Caesar from a frontier into an inland
province, and which by its vicinity as well as by its climate
was fitted beyond all other regions to become in due
course of time likewise an Italian land. Thither princi-
pally, according to the old aim of the transmarine settle-
ments of the Roman democracy, was the stream of Italian
emigration directed. There the ancient colony of Narbo
was reinforced by new settlers, and four new burgess-colonies
were instituted at Baeterrae (Beziers) not far from Narbo,
at Arelate (Aries) and Arausio (Orange) on the Rhone, and
at the new seaport Forum Julii (Fre*jus) ; while the names
assigned to them at the same time preserved the memory
of the brave legions which had annexed northern Gaul to
the empire.1 The townships not furnished with colonists
appear, at least for the most part, to have been led on
towards Romanization in the same way as Transpadane
Gaul in former times (iii. 517) by the bestowal of Latin
urban rights ; in particular Nemausus (Nimes), as the chief
1 Narbo was called the colony of the Decimani, Baeterrae of the
Septimani, Forum Julii of the Octavani, Arelate of the Sextani, Arausio of
the Secundani. The ninth legion is wanting, because it had disgraced its
number by the mutiny of Placentia (p. 246). That the colonists of these
colonies belonged to the legions from which they took their names, is not
stated and is not credible ; the veterans themselves were, at least the great
majority of them, settled in Italy (p. 358). Cicero's complaint, that Caesar
"had confiscated whole provinces and districts at a blow" (De Off. ii. 7,
27 ; comp. Philipp. xiii. 15, 31, 32) relates beyond doubt, as its close
connection with the censure of the triumph over the Massiliots proves, to
the confiscations of land made on account of these colonies in the Nar-
bonese province and primarily to the losses of territory imposed on
Massilia.
chap, xi THE NEW MONARCHY 423
place of the territory taken from the Massiliots in conse-
quence of their revolt against Caesar (p. 229), was converted
from a Massiliot village into a Latin urban community, and
endowed with a considerable territory and even with the
right of coinage.1 While Cisalpine Gaul thus advanced
from the preparatory stage to full equality with Italy, the
Narbonese province advanced at the same time into that
preparatory stage ; just as previously in Cisalpine Gaul, the
most considerable communities there had the full franchise,
the rest Latin rights.
In the other non-Greek and non-Latin regions of the
empire, which were still more remote from the influence of
Italy and the process of assimilation, Caesar confined him-
self to the establishment of several centres for Italian
civilization such as Narbo had hitherto been in Gaul, in
order by their means to pave the way for a future complete
equalization. Such initial steps can be pointed out in all
the provinces of the empire, with the exception of the
poorest and least important of all, Sardinia. How Caesar
proceeded in Northern Gaul, we have already set forth Northern
(p. 96); the Latin language there obtained throughout
official recognition, though not yet employed for all
branches of public intercourse, and the colony of Novio-
dunum (Nyon) arose on the Leman lake as the most
northerly town with an Italian constitution.
In Spain, which was presumably at that time the most Spain,
densely peopled country of the Roman empire, not merely
1 We are not expressly informed from whom the Latin rights of the
non-colonized townships of this region and especially of Nemausus pro-
ceeded. But as Caesar himself (B. C. i. 35) virtually states that Nemausus
up to 705 was a Massiliot village; as according to Livy's account (Dio, 49.
xli. 25 ; Flor. ii. 13 ; Oros. vi. 15) this very portion of territory was taken
from the Massiliots by Caesar ; and lastly as even on pre-Augustan coins
and then in Strabo the town appears as a community of Latin rights,
Caesar alone can have been the author of this bestowal of Latinity. As
to Ruscino (Roussillon near Perpignan) and other communities in Nar-
bonese Gaul which early attained a Latin urban constitution, we can only
conjecture that they received it contemporarily with Nemausus.
424 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND BOOK V
were Caesarian colonists settled in the important Helleno-
Iberian seaport town of Emporiae by the side of the old
population ; but, as recently-discovered records have shown,
a number of colonists probably taken predominantly from
the proletariate of the capital were provided for in the
town of Urso (Osuna), not far from Seville in the heart of
Andalusia, and perhaps also in several other townships of
this province. The ancient and wealthy mercantile city
of Gades, whose municipal system Caesar even when
praetor had remodelled suitably to the times, now obtained
from the Imperator the full rights of the Italian tnunicipia
49- (7°5) and became — what Tusculum had been in Italy
(i. 448) — the first extra-Italian community not founded by
Rome which was admitted into the Roman burgess-union.
45. Some years afterwards (709) similar rights were conferred
also on some other Spanish communities, and Latin rights
presumably on still more.
Carthage. In Africa the project, which Gaius Gracchus had not
been allowed to bring to an issue, was now carried out,
and on the spot where the city of the hereditary foes of
Rome had stood, 3000 Italian colonists and a great
number of the tenants on lease and sufferance resident in
the Carthaginian territory were settled; and the new
" Venus-colony," the Roman Carthage, throve with amazing
rapidity under the incomparably favourable circumstances
of the locality. Utica, hitherto the capital and first com-
mercial town in the province, had already been in some
measure compensated beforehand, apparently by the be-
stowal of Latin rights, for the revival of its superior rival.
In the Numidian territory newly annexed to the empire
the important Cirta and the other communities assigned to
the Roman condottiere Publius Sittius for himself and his
troops (p. 300) obtained the legal position of Roman military
colonies. The stately provincial towns indeed, which the
insane fury of Juba and of the desperate remnant of the
chap, xi THE NEW MONARCHY 425
constitutional party had converted into ruins, did not
revive so rapidly as they had been reduced to ashes, and
many a ruinous site recalled long afterwards this fatal
period ; but the two new Julian colonies, Carthage and
Cirta, became and continued to be the centres of Africano-
Roman civilization.
In the desolate land of Greece, Caesar, besides other Corinth,
plans such as the institution of a Roman colony in Buth-
rotum (opposite Corfu), busied himself above all with the
restoration of Corinth. Not only was a considerable
burgess-colony conducted thither, but a plan was projected
for cutting through the isthmus, so as to avoid the
dangerous circumnavigation of the Peloponnesus and to
make the whole traffic between Italy and Asia pass through
the Corintho-Saronic gulf Lastly even in the remote The east
Hellenic east the monarch called into existence Italian
settlements ; on the Black Sea, for instance, at Heraclea
and Sinope, which towns the Italian colonists shared, as
in the case of Emporiae, with the old inhabitants; on
the Syrian coast, in the important port of Berytus, which
like Sinope obtained an Italian constitution ; and even
in Egypt, where a Roman station was established on
the lighthouse -island commanding the harbour of Alex-
andria.
Through these ordinances the Italian municipal free- Extension
dom was carried into the provinces in a manner far more ?' *. e
comprehensive than had been previously the case. The municipal
communities of full burgesses — that is, all the towns of tj^toVhe
the Cisalpine province and the burgess-colonies and burgess- provinces.
municipia scattered in Transalpine Gaul and elsewhere —
were on an equal footing with the Italian, in so far as they
administered their own affairs, and even exercised a cer-
tainly limited jurisdiction ; while on the other hand the
more important processes came before the Roman authori-
ties competent to deal with them — as a rule, the governor
426 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND BOOK V
of the province.1 The formally autonomous Latin and the
other emancipated communities — thus including all those
of Sicily and of Narbonese Gaul, so far as they were not
burgess-communities, and a considerable number also in
the other provinces — had not merely free administration,
but probably unlimited jurisdiction ; so that the governor
was only entitled to interfere there by virtue of his —
certainly very arbitrary — administrative control. No doubt
even earlier there had been communities of full burgesses
within the provinces of governors, such as Aquileia, and
Narbo, and whole governors' provinces, such as Cisalpine
Gaul, had consisted of communities with Italian constitu-
tion ; but it was, if not in law, at least in a political point
of view a singularly important innovation, that there was
now a province which as well as Italy was peopled solely
by Roman burgesses,2 and that others promised to become
such.
1 That no community of full burgesses had more than limited jurisdic-
tion, is certain. But the fact, which is distinctly apparent from the
Caesarian municipal ordinance for Cisalpine Gaul, is a surprising one —
that the processes lying beyond municipal competency from this province
went not before its governor, but before the Roman praetor ; for in other
cases the governor is in his province quite as much representative of the
praetor who administers justice between burgesses as of the praetor who
administers justice between burgess and non-burgess, and is thoroughly
competent to determine all processes. Beyond doubt this is a remnant of
the arrangement before Sulla, under which in the whole continental
territory as far as the Alps the urban magistrates alone were competent,
and thus all the processes there, where they exceeded municipal competency,
necessarily came before the praetors in Rome. In Narbo again, Gades,
Carthage, Corinth, the processes in such a case went certainly to the
governor concerned ; as indeed even from practical considerations the
carrying of a suit to Rome could not well be thought of.
2 It is difficult to see why the bestowal of the Roman franchise on a
province collectively, and the continuance of a provincial administration
for it, should be usually conceived as contrasts excluding each other.
Besides, Cisalpine Gaul notoriously obtained the civitas by the Roscian
49. decree of the people of the nth March 705, while it remained a province
as long as Caesar lived and was only united with Italy after his death
43. (Dio, xlviii. 12) ; the governors also can be pointed out down to 711.
The very fact that the Caesarian municipal ordinance never designates the
country as Italy, but as Cisalpine Gaul, ought to have led to the right
view.
chap, xi THE NEW MONARCHY 427
With this disappeared the first great practical distinction Italy
that separated Italy from the provinces ; and the second — ^ovinces
that ordinarily no troops were stationed in Italy, while reduced to
they were stationed in the provinces — was likewise in the
course of disappearing; troops were now stationed only
where there was a frontier to be defended, and the com-
mandants of the provinces in which this was not the case,
such as Narbo and Sicily, were officers only in name. The
formal contrast between Italy and the provinces, which had
at all times depended on other distinctions (iii. 309), con-
tinued certainly even now to subsist, for Italy was the sphere
of civil jurisdiction and of consuls and praetors, while the
provinces were districts under the jurisdiction of martial law
and subject to proconsuls and propraetors ; but the pro-
cedure according to civil and according to martial law had
for long been practically coincident, and the different titles
of the magistrates signified little after the one Imperator
was over all.
In all these various municipal foundations and ordinances
— which are traceable at least in plan, if not perhaps all in
execution, to Caesar — a definite system is apparent. Italy
was converted from the mistress of the subject peoples into
the mother of the renovated Italo- Hellenic nation. The
Cisalpine province completely equalized with the mother-
country was a promise and a guarantee that, in the
monarchy of Caesar just as in the healthier times of the
republic, every Latinized district might expect to be placed
on an equal footing by the side of its elder sisters and of
the mother herself. On the threshold of full national and
political equalization with Italy stood the adjoining lands,
the Greek Sicily and the south of Gaul, which was rapidly
becoming Latinized. In a more remote stage of prepara-
tion stood the other provinces of the empire, in which,
just as hitherto in southern Gaul Narbo had been a Roman
colony, the great maritime cities — Emporiae, Gades, Car
428
THE OLD REPUBLIC AND
BOOK V
Organiza-
tion of
the new
empire.
thage, Corinth, Heraclea in Pontus, Sinope, Berytus,
Alexandria — now became Italian or Helleno-Italian com-
munities, the centres of an Italian civilization even in the
Greek east, the fundamental pillars of the future national
and political levelling of the empire. The rule of the
urban community of Rome over the shores of the Medi-
terranean was at an end ; in its stead came the new Medi-
terranean state, and its first act was to atone for the two
greatest outrages which that urban community had perpe-
trated on civilization. While the destruction of the two
greatest marts of commerce in the Roman dominions
marked the turning-point at which the protectorate of the
Roman community degenerated into political tyrannizing
over, and financial exaction from, the subject lands, the
prompt and brilliant restoration of Carthage and Corinth
marked the foundation of the new great commonwealth
which was to train up all the regions on the Mediterranean
to national and political equality, to union in a genuine
state. Well might Caesar bestow on the city of Corinth
in addition to its far-famed ancient name the new one of
" Honour to Julius " (Lavs Jvli).
While thus the new united empire was furnished with a
national character, which doubtless necessarily lacked indi-
viduality and was rather an inanimate product of art than
a fresh growth of nature, it further had need of unity in
those institutions which express the general life of nations
— in constitution and administration, in religion and juris-
prudence, in money, measures, and weights ; as to which, of
course, local diversities of the most varied character were
quite compatible with essential union. In all these depart-
ments we can only speak of the initial steps, for the thorough
formation of the monarchy of Caesar into an unity was the
work of the future, and all that he did was to lay the founda-
tion for the building of centuries. But of the lines, which
the great man drew in these departments, several can still
chap, xi THE NEW MONARCHY 429
be recognized ; and it is more pleasing to follow him here,
than in the task of building from the ruins of the nation-
alities.
As to constitution and administration, we have already Census
noticed elsewhere the most important elements of the new empjret
unity — the transition of the sovereignty from the municipal
council of Rome to the sole master of the Mediterranean
monarchy ; the conversion of that municipal council into
a supreme imperial council representing Italy and the
provinces; above all, the transference — now commenced
— of the Roman, and generally of the Italian, municipal
organization to the provincial communities. This latter
course — the bestowal of Latin, and thereafter of Roman,
rights on the communities ripe for full admission to the
united state- -gradually of itself brought about uniform
communal arrangements. In one respect alone this pro-
cess could not be waited for. The new empire needed
immediately an institution which should place before the
government at a glance the principal bases of administra-
tion— the proportions of population and property in the
different communities — in other words an improved census.
First the census of Italy was reformed. According to
Caesar's ordinance1 — which probably, indeed, only carried
out the arrangements which were, at least as to principle,
adopted in consequence of the Social war — in future, when
a census took place in the Roman community, there were
to be simultaneously registered by the highest authority
in each Italian community the name of every municipal
burgess and that of his father or manumitter, his district,
his age, and his property ; and these lists were to be
furnished to the Roman censor early enough to enable
1 The continued subsistence of the municipal census-authorities speaks
for the view, that the local holding of the census had already been estab-
lished for Italy in consequence of the Social war (Staatsreckt, ii.s 368) ;
but probably the carrying out of this system was Caesar's work.
43°
THE OLD REPUBLIC AND
BOOK V
Religion
of the
empire.
him to complete in proper time the general list of Roman
burgesses and of Roman property. That it was Caesar's
intention to introduce similar institutions also in the pro-
vinces is attested partly by the measurement and survey
of the whole empire ordered by him, partly by the nature
of the arrangement itself ; for it in fact furnished the
general instrument appropriate for procuring, as well in
the Italian as in the non-Italian communities of the state,
the information requisite for the central administration.
Evidently here too it was Caesar's intention to revert to
the traditions of the earlier republican times, and to
reintroduce the census of the empire, which the earlier
republic had effected — essentially in the same way as
Caesar effected the Italian — by analogous extension of
the institution of the urban censorship with its set terms
and other essential rules to all the subject communities
of Italy and Sicily (ii. 58, 211). This had been one of the
first institutions which the torpid aristocracy allowed to
drop, and in this way deprived the supreme administra-
tive authority of any view of the resources in men and
taxation at its disposal and consequently of all possibility
of an effective control (iii. 34). The indications still
extant, and the very connection of things, show irrefrag-
ably that Caesar made preparations to renew the general
census that had been obsolete for centuries.
We need scarcely say that in religion and in jurisprudence
no thorough levelling could be thought of; yet with all
toleration towards local faiths and municipal statutes the
new state needed a common worship corresponding to the
Italo-Hellenic nationality and a general code of law superior
to the municipal statutes. It needed them ; for de facto
both were already in existence. In the field of religion
men had for centuries been busied in fusing together the
Italian and Hellenic worships partly by external adoption,
partly by internal adjustment of their respective conceptions
chap. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 43*
of the gods ; and owing to the pliant formless character of
the Italian gods, there had been no great difficulty in
resolving Jupiter into Zeus, Venus into Aphrodite, and so
every essential idea of the Latin faith into its Hellenic
counterpart. The Italo- Hellenic religion stood forth in
its outlines ready-made; how much in this very depart-
ment men were conscious of having gone beyond the
specifically Roman point of view and advanced towards
an Italo- Hellenic quasi -nationality, is shown by the dis-
tinction made in the already-mentioned theology of Varro
between the " common " gods, that is, those acknowledged
by Romans and Greeks, and the special gods of the Roman
community.
So far as concerns the field of criminal and police law, Law of the
where the government more directly interferes and the ne- emPlre-
cessities of the case are substantially met by a judicious
legislation, there was no difficulty in attaining, in the way of
legislative action, that degree of material uniformity which
certainly was in this department needful for the unity of the
empire. In the civil law again, where the initiative belongs to
commercial intercourse and merely the formal shape to the
legislator, the code for the united empire, which the legis-
lator certainly could not have created, had been already long
since developed in a natural way by commercial intercourse
itself. The Roman urban law was still indeed legally based
on the embodiment of the Latin national law contained in
the Twelve Tables. Later laws had doubtless introduced
various improvements of detail suited to the times, among
which the most important was probably the abolition of the
old inconvenient mode of commencing a process through
standing forms of declaration by the parties (i. 202) and
the substitution of an instruction drawn up in writing by
the presiding magistrate for the single juryman (formu/a):
but in the main the popular legislation had only piled upon
that venerable foundation an endless chaos of special laws
432 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
long since in great part antiquated and forgotten, which
can only be compared to the English statute-law. The
attempts to impart to them scientific shape and system had
certainly rendered the tortuous paths of the old civil law
accessible, and thrown light upon them (iv. 252) ; but
no Roman Blackstone could remedy the fundamental
defect, that an urban code composed four hundred years
ago with its equally diffuse and confused supplements was
now to serve as the law of a great state.
The new Commercial intercourse provided for itself a more
or the thorough remedy. The lively intercourse between Romans
edict. and non-Romans had long ago developed in Rome an
international private law (jus gentium; i. 200), that is to
say, a body of maxims especially relating to commercial
matters, according to which Roman judges pronounced
judgment, when a cause could not be decided either
according to their own or any other national code and
they were compelled — setting aside the peculiarities of
Roman, Hellenic, Phoenician and other law — to revert to
the common views of right underlying all dealings. The
formation of the newer law attached itself to this basis. In
the first place as a standard for the legal dealings of Roman
burgesses with each other, it de facto substituted for the
old urban law, which had become practically useless, a
new code based in substance on a compromise between
the national law of the Twelve Tables and the international
law or so-called law of nations. The former was essentially
adhered to, though of course with modifications suited to
the times, in the law of marriage, family, and inheritance ;
whereas in all regulations which concerned dealings with
property, and consequently in reference to ownership and
contracts, the international law was the standard ; in these
matters indeed various important arrangements were
borrowed even from local provincial law, such as the legisla
tion as to usury (p. 401), and the institution of hypotheca.
chap. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 433
Through whom, when, and how this comprehensive innova-
tion came into existence, whether at once or gradually,
whether through one or several authors, are questions to
which we cannot furnish a satisfactory answer. We know
only that this reform, as was natural, proceeded in the first
instance from the urban court; that it first took formal
shape in the instructions annually issued by the praetor
urbanus, when entering on office, for the guidance of the
parties in reference to the most important maxims of law to be
observed in the judicial year then beginning {edictum annuum
or perpetuum praetoris urbani de iuris dictione) ; and that, al-
though various preparatory steps towards it may have been
taken in earlier times, it certainly only attained its completion
in this epoch. The new code was theoretic and abstract,
inasmuch as the Roman view of law had therein divested
itself of such of its national peculiarities as it had become
aware of; but it was at the same time practical and positive,
inasmuch as it by no means faded away into the dim
twilight of general equity or even into the pure nothingness
of the so-called law of nature, but was applied by definite
functionaries for definite concrete cases according to fixed
rules, and was not merely capable of, but had already
essentially received, a legal embodiment in the urban edict.
This code moreover corresponded in matter to the wants
of the time, in so far as it furnished the more convenient
forms required by the increase of intercourse for legal pro-
cedure, for acquisition of property, and for conclusion of
contracts. Lastly, it had already in the main become
subsidiary law throughout the compass of the Roman
empire, inasmuch as — while the manifold local statutes
were retained for those legal relations which were not
directly commercial, as well as for local transactions
between members of the same legal district — dealings
relating to property between subjects of the empire belong-
ing to different legal districts were regulated throughout
rCL. V l6l
434 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
after the model of the urban edict, though not applicable
de jure to these cases, both in Italy and in the provinces.
The law of the urban edict had thus essentially the same
position in that age which the Roman law has occupied in
our political development ; this also is, so far as such
opposites can be combined, at once abstract and positive ;
this also recommended itself by its (compared with the
earlier legal code) flexible forms of intercourse, and took
its place by the side of the local statutes as universal
subsidiary law. But the Roman legal development had an
essential advantage over ours in this, that the denationalized
legislation appeared not, as with us, prematurely and by
artificial birth, but at the right time and agreeably to
nature.
Caesar's Such was the state of the law as Caesar found it. If
codlfica-0 ^e projected the plan for a new code, it is not difficult to
tion. say what were his intentions. This code could only com-
prehend the law of Roman burgesses, and could be a
general code for the empire merely so far as a code of the
ruling nation suitable to the times could not but of itself
become general subsidiary law throughout the compass of the
empire. In criminal law, if the plan embraced this at all,
there was needed only a revision and adjustment of the
Sullan ordinances. In civil law, for a state whose nation-
ality was properly humanity, the necessary and only possible
formal shape was to invest that urban edict, which had
already spontaneously grown out of lawful commerce, with
the security and precision of statute-law. The first step
67. towards this had been taken by the Cornelian law of 687,
when it enjoined the judge to keep to the maxims set forth
at the beginning of his magistracy and not arbitrarily to
administer other law (iv. 457) — a regulation, which may
well be compared with the law of the Twelve Tables, and
which became almost as significant for the fixing of the
later urban law as that collection for the fixing of the earlier.
chap, xi THE NEW MONARCHY 435
But although after the Cornelian decree of the people the
edict was no longer subordinate to the judge, but the judge
was by law subject to the edict ; and though the new code
had practically dispossessed the old urban law in judicial
usage as in legal instruction — every urban judge was still
free at his entrance on office absolutely and arbitrarily to
alter the edict, and the law of the Twelve Tables with its
additions still always outweighed formally the urban edict,
so that in each individual case of collision the antiquated
rule had to be set aside by arbitrary interference of the
magistrates, and therefore, strictly speaking, by violation of
formal law. The subsidiary application of the urban edict
in the court of the praetor peregrinus at Rome and in the
different provincial judicatures was entirely subject to the
arbitrary pleasure of the individual presiding magistrates.
It was evidently necessary to set aside definitely the old
urban law, so far as it had not been transferred to the
newer, and in the case of the latter to set suitable limits to
its arbitrary alteration by each individual urban judge,
possibly also to regulate its subsidiary application by the
side of the local statutes. This was Caesar's design, when
he projected the plan for his code ; for it could not have
been otherwise. The plan was not executed ; and thus
that troublesome state of transition in Roman jurisprudence
was perpetuated till this necessary reform was accomplished
six centuries afterwards, and then but imperfectly, by one of
the successors of Caesar, the Emperor Justinian.
Lastly, in money, measures, and weights the substantial
equalization of the Latin and Hellenic systems had long
been in progress. It was very ancient so far as concerned
the definitions of weight and the measures of capacity and
of length indispensable for trade and commerce (i. 263/),
and in the monetary system little more recent than the
introduction of the silver coinage (iii. 87). But these older
equations were not sufficient, because in the Hellenic
436 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
world itself the most varied metrical and monetary systems
subsisted side by side ; it was necessary, and formed part
doubtless of Caesar's plan, now to introduce everywhere in
the new united empire, so far as this had not been done
already, Roman money, Roman measures, and Roman
weights in such a manner that they alone should be
reckoned by in official intercourse, and that the non-Roman
systems should be restricted to local currency or placed in
a — once for all regulated — ratio to the Roman.1 The
action of Caesar, however, can only be pointed out in two
of the most important of these departments, the monetary
system and the calendar.
Gold coin The Roman monetary system was based on the two
currency Preci°us metals circulating side by side and in a fixed
relation to each other, gold being given and taken according
to weight,2 silver in the form of coin; but practically in
consequence of the extensive transmarine intercourse the
gold far preponderated over the silver. Whether the
acceptance of Roman silver money was not even at an
earlier period obligatory throughout the empire, is uncertain ;
at any rate uncoined gold essentially supplied the place of
imperial money throughout the Roman territory, the more
so as the Romans had prohibited the coining of gold in all
the provinces and client -states, and the denarius had, in
addition to Italy, de jure or de facto naturalized itself in
Cisalpine Gaul, in Sicily, in Spain and various other
places, especially in the west (iv. 180). But the imperial
coinage begins with Caesar. Exactly like Alexander, he
1 Weights recently brought to light at Pompeii suggest the hypothesis
that at the commencement of the imperial period alongside of the Roman
pound the Attic mina (presumably in the ratio of 3 14) passed current as a
second imperial weight {Hermes, xvi. 311).
2 The gold pieces, which Sulla (iv. 179) and contemporarily Pompeius
caused to be struck, both in small quantity, do not invalidate this proposi-
tion ; for they probably came to be taken solely by weight just like the
golden Phillippei which were in circulation even down to Caesar's time.
They are certainly remarkable, because they anticipate the Caesarian
imperial gold just as Sulla's regency anticipated the new monarchy.
hap. xi THE NEW MONARCHY , 437
narked the foundation of the new monarchy embracing
he civilized world by the fact that the only metal forming
n universal medium obtained the first place in the coinage,
"he greatness of the scale on which the new Caesarian gold
iece (20s. 7d. according to the present value of the metal)
ras immediately coined, is shown by the fact that in a
ingle treasure buried seven years after Caesar's death
0,000 of these pieces were found together. It is true
tiat financial speculations may have exercised a collateral
ifluence in this respect.1 As to the silver money, the
xclusive rule of the Roman denarius in all the west, for
rhich the foundation had previously been laid, was finally
stablished by Caesar, when he definitively closed the only
)ccidental mint that still competed in silver currency with
le Roman, that of Massilia. The coining of silver or
opper small money was still permitted to a number of
)ccidental communities ; three-quarter denarii were struck
y some Latin communities of southern Gaul, half denarii
y several cantons in northern Gaul, copper small coins in
arious instances even after Caesar's time by communes of
tie west; but this small money was throughout coined
fter the Roman standard, and its acceptance moreover
ras probably obligatory only in local dealings. Caesar
ioes not seem any more than the earlier government to
iave contemplated the regulation with a view to unity of
he monetary system of the east, where great masses of
oarse silver money — much of which too easily admitted
if being debased or worn away — and to some extent even,
,s in Egypt, a copper coinage akin to our paper money
1 It appears, namely, that in earlier times the claims of the state-
reditors payable in silver could not be paid against their will in gold
ccording to its legal ratio to silver ; whereas it admits of no doubt, that
rom Caesar's time the gold piece had to be taken as a valid tender for 100
ilver sesterces. This was just at that time the more important, as in
onsequence of the great quantities of gold put into circulation by Caesar
t stood for a time in the currency of trade 25 per cent below the legal
alio.
438
THE OLD REPUBLIC AND
BOOK V
Reform
of the
calendar.
were in circulation, and the Syrian commercial cities would
have felt very severely the want of their previous national
coinage corresponding to the Mesopotamian currency. We
find here subsequently the arrangement that the denarius
has everywhere legal currency and is the only medium of
official reckoning,1 while the local coins have legal currency
within their limited range but according to a tariff unfavour-
able for them as compared with the denarius!1 This was
probably not introduced all at once, and in part perhaps
may have preceded Caesar; but it was at any rate the
essential complement of the Caesarian arrangement as to
the imperial coinage, whose new gold piece found its
immediate model in the almost equally heavy coin of
Alexander and was doubtless calculated especially for
circulation in the east.
Of a kindred nature was the reform of the calendar.
The republican calendar, which strangely enough was still
the old decemviral calendar — an imperfect adoption of the
octaeteris that preceded Meton (ii. 216) — had by a com-
bination of wretched mathematics and wretched administra-
tion come to anticipate the true time by 67 whole days, so
that e.g. the festival of Flora was celebrated on the nth
July instead of the 28th April. Caesar finally removed
this evil, and with the help of the Greek mathematician
Sosigenes introduced the Italian farmer's year regulated
according to the Egyptian calendar of Eudoxus, as well as
a rational system of intercalation, into religious and official
use ; while at the same time the beginning of the year on
1 There is probably no inscription of the Imperial period, whict
specifies sums of money otherwise than in Roman coin.
2 Thus the Attic drachma, although sensibly heavier than the denarius \
was yet reckoned equal to it ; the tetradrachmon of Antioch, weighing or
an average 15 grammes of silver, was made equal to 3 Roman denarii
which only weigh about 12 grammes ; the cistophorus of Asia Minor wa;
according to the value of silver above 3, according to the legal tariff =2J
denarii; the Rhodian half drachma according to the value of silver=J
according to the legal tariff =£ of a denarius, and so on.
:hap. XI THE NEW MONARCHY 439
he i st March of the old calendar was abolished, and the
late of the ist January — fixed at first as the official term for
:hanging the supreme magistrates and, in consequence of
his, long since prevailing in civil life — was assumed also as
he calendar- period for commencing the year. Both
hanges came into effect on the ist January 709, and 45.
long with them the use of the Julian calendar so named
fter its author, which long after the fall of the monarchy
>f Caesar remained the regulative standard of the civilized
/orld and in the main is so still. By way of explanation
here was added in a detailed edict a star-calendar derived
rom the Egyptian astronomical observations and trans-
erred — not indeed very skilfully — to Italy, which fixed
he rising and setting of the stars named according to days
>f the calendar.1 In this domain also the Roman and
ireek worlds were thus placed on a par.
Such were the foundations of the Mediterranean mon- Caesar and
rchy of Caesar. For the second time in Rome the social 1S wor
[uestion had reached a crisis, at which the antagonisms not
mly appeared to be, but actually were, in the form of their
xhibition, insoluble and, in the form of their expression,
[•reconcilable. On the former occasion Rome had been
aved by the fact that Italy was merged in Rome and Rome
1 Italy, and in the new enlarged and altered home those
Jd antagonisms were not reconciled, but fell into abeyance.
>[ow Rome was once more saved by the fact that the coun-
ties of the Mediterranean were merged in it or became
irepared for merging ; the war between the Italian poor
1 The identity of this edict drawn up perhaps by Marcus Flavius
Macrob. Sat. i. 14, 2) and the alleged treatise of Caesar, De Stellis, is
bown by the joke of Cicero (Plutarch, Caes. 59) that now the Lyre rises
ccording to edict.
We may add that it was known even before Caesar that the solar year
f 365 days 6 hours, which was the basis of the Egyptian calendar, and
rhich he made the basis of his, was somewhat too long. The most exact
alculation of the tropical year which the ancient world was acquainted
nth, that of Hipparchus, put it at 365 d. 5 h. 52' 12" ; the true length
i 365 d. 5 h. 48' 48".
440 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND book v
and rich, which in the old Italy could only end with the
destruction of the nation, had no longer a battle-field or a
meaning in the Italy of three continents. The Latin
colonies closed the gap which threatened to swallow up the
Roman community in the fifth century ; the deeper chasm
of the seventh century was filled by the Transalpine and
transmarine colonizations of Gaius Gracchus and Caesar.
For Rome alone history not merely performed miracles, but
also repeated its miracles, and twice cured the internal
crisis, which in the state itself was incurable, by regenerating
the state. There was doubtless much corruption in this
regeneration ; as the union of Italy was accomplished over
the ruins of the Samnite and Etruscan nations, so the
Mediterranean monarchy built itself on the ruins of count-
less states and tribes once living and vigorous ; but it was
a corruption out of which sprang a fresh growth, part oi
which remains green at the present day. What was pulled
down for the sake of the new building, was merely the
secondary nationalities which had long since been marked
out for destruction by the levelling hand of civilization.
Caesar, wherever he came forward as a destroyer, only
carried out the pronounced verdict of historical develop-
ment ; but he protected the germs of culture, where and as
he found them, in his own land as well as among the sistei
nation of the Hellenes. He saved and renewed the Roman
type ; and not only did he spare the Greek type, but with
the same self-relying genius with which he accomplished
the renewed foundation of Rome he undertook also the
regeneration of the Hellenes, and resumed the interrupted
work of the great Alexander, whose image, we may well
believe, never was absent from Caesar's soul. He solved
these two great tasks not merely side by side, but the
one by means of the other. The two great essentials ol
humanity — general and individual development, or state and
culture — once in embryo united in those old Graeco-Italians
chap, xi THE NEW MONARCHY 441
feeding their flocks in primeval simplicity far from the coasts
and islands of the Mediterranean, had become dissevered
when these were parted into Italians and Hellenes, and had
thenceforth remained apart for many centuries. Now the
descendant of the Trojan prince and the Latin king's
daughter created out of a state without distinctive culture
and a cosmopolitan civilization a new whole, in which state
and culture again met together at the acme of human exist-
ence in the rich fulness of blessed maturity and worthily
filled the sphere appropriate to such an union.
The outlines have thus been set forth, which Caesar
drew for this work, according to which he laboured himself,
and according to which posterity — for many centuries con-
fined to the paths which this great man marked out —
^endeavoured to prosecute the work, if not with the intellect
and energy, yet on the whole in accordance with the inten-
tions, of the illustrious master. Little was finished ; much
even was merely begun. Whether the plan was complete,
those who venture to vie in thought with such a man may
decide ; we observe no material defect in what lies before
us — every single stone of the building enough to make a
man immortal, and yet all combining to form one harmo-
nious whole. Caesar ruled as king of Rome for five years
and a half, not half as long as Alexander ; in the intervals
of seven great campaigns, which allowed him to stay not
more than fifteen months altogether l in the capital of his
empire, he regulated the destinies of the world for the
present and the future, from the establishment of the
boundary-line between civilization and barbarism down to
the removal of the pools of rain in the streets of the capital,
and yet retained time and composure enough attentively
to follow the prize-pieces in the theatre and to confer the
1 Caesar stayed in Rome in April and Dec. 705, on each occasion for a 49.
few days ; from Sept. to Dec. 707 ; some four months in the autumn of 47.
the year of fifteen months 708, and from Oct. 709 to March 710. 46. 45. 44.
442 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND NEW MONARCHY bk. v
chaplet on the victor with improvised verses. The rapidity
and self-precision with which the plan was executed prove
that it had been long meditated thoroughly and all its parts
settled in detail ; but, even thus, they remain not much less
wonderful than the plan itself. The outlines were laid
down and thereby the new state was defined for all coming
time ; the boundless future alone could complete the
structure. So far Caesar might say, that his aim was at-
tained ; and this was probably the meaning of the words
which were sometimes heard to fall from him — that he had
"lived enough." But precisely because the building was
an endless one, the master as long as he lived restlessly
added stone to stone, with always the same dexterity and
always the same elasticity busy at his work, without ever
overturning or postponing, just as if there were for him
merely a to-day and no to-morrow. Thus he worked and
created as never did any mortal before or after him ; and
as a worker and creator he still, after wellnigh two thousand
years, lives in the memory of the nations — the first, and
withal unique, Imperator Caesar.
chap, xii RELIGION, CULTURE, LITERATURE, ART 443
CHAPTER XII
RELIGION, CULTURE, LITERATURE, AND ART
In the development of religion and philosophy no new State,
element appeared during this epoch. The Romano- re glon*
Hellenic state -religion and the Stoic state -philosophy
inseparably combined with it were for every government
— oligarchy, democracy or monarchy — not merely a con-
venient instrument, but quite indispensable for the very
reason that it was just as impossible to construct the
state wholly without religious elements as to discover any
new state-religion fitted to take the place of the old. So
the besom of revolution swept doubtless at times very
roughly through the cobwebs of the augural bird-lore
(p. in); nevertheless the rotten machine creaking at every
joint survived the earthquake which swallowed up the
republic itself, and preserved its insipidity and its arrogance
without diminution for transference to the new monarchy.
As a matter of course, it fell more and more into disfavour
with all those who preserved their freedom of judgment.
Towards the state-religion indeed public opinion maintained
an attitude essentially indifferent; it was on all sides
recognized as an institution of political convenience, and
no one specially troubled himself about it with the exception
of political and antiquarian literati. But towards its philo-
sophical sister there gradually sprang up among the unpre-
judiced public that hostility, which the empty and yet per-
444 XELIGION, CULTURE, book V
fidious hypocrisy of set phrases never fails in the long run
to awaken. That a presentiment of its own worthlessness
began to dawn on the Stoa itself, is shown by its attempt
artificially to infuse into itself some fresh spirit in the way
of syncretism. Antiochus of Ascalon (flourishing about
79. 675), who professed to have patched together the Stoic and
Platonic- Aristotelian systems into one organic unity, in
reality so far succeeded that his misshapen doctrine became
the fashionable philosophy of the conservatives of his time
and was conscientiously studied by the genteel dilettanti
and literati of Rome. Every one who displayed any
intellectual vigour, opposed the Stoa or ignored it. It was
principally antipathy towards the boastful and tiresome
Roman Pharisees, coupled doubtless with the increasing
disposition to take refuge from practical life in indolent
apathy or empty irony, that occasioned during this epoch
the extension of the system of Epicurus to a larger circle
and the naturalization of the Cynic philosophy of Diogenes
in Rome. However stale and poor in thought the former
might be, a philosophy, which did not seek the way to
wisdom through an alteration of traditional terms but
contented itself with those in existence, and throughout
recognized only the perceptions of sense as true, was
always better than the terminological jingle and the hollow
conceptions of the Stoic wisdom ; and the Cynic philo-
sophy was of all the philosophical systems of the times
in so far by much the best, as its system was confined to
the having no system at all and sneering at all systems and
all systematizers. In both fields war was waged against
the Stoa with zeal and success ; for serious men, the
Epicurean Lucretius preached with the full accents of
heartfelt conviction and of holy zeal against the Stoical
faith in the gods and providence and the Stoical doctrine
of the immortality of the soul ; for the great public ready
to laugh, the Cynic Varro hit the mark still more sharply
chap, xil LITERATURE, AND ART 445
with the flying darts of his extensively-read satires. While
thus the ablest men of the older generation made war on
the Stoa, the younger generation again, such as Catullus,
stood in no inward relation to it at all, and passed a far
sharper censure on it by completely ignoring it.
But, if in the present instance a faith no longer believed The
in was maintained out of political convenience, they amply ^^^
made up for this in other respects. Unbelief and supersti-
tion, different hues of the same historical phenomenon,
went in the Roman world of that day hand in hand, and
there was no lack of individuals who in themselves com-
bined both — who denied the gods with Epicurus, and yet
prayed and sacrificed before every shrine. Of course only
the gods that came from the east were still in vogue, and,
as the men continued to flock from the Greek lands to
Italy, so the gods of the east migrated in ever-increasing
numbers to the west. The importance of the Phrygian
cultus at that time in Rome is shown both by the polemical
tone of the older men such as Varro and Lucretius, and by
the poetical glorification of it in the fashionable Catullus,
which concludes with the characteristic request that the
goddess may deign to turn the heads of others only, and
not that of the poet himself.
A fresh addition was the Persian worship, which is said Worship
to have first reached the Occidental through the medium
of the pirates who met on the Mediterranean from the east
and from the west ; the oldest seat of this cultus in the west
is stated to have been Mount Olympus in Lycia. That in
the adoption of Oriental worships in the west such higher
speculative and moral elements as they contained were
generally allowed to drop, is strikingly evinced by the fact
that Ahuramazda, the supreme god of the pure doctrine of
Zarathustra, remained virtually unknown in the west, and
adoration there was especially directed to that god who had
occupied the first place in the old Persian national religion
446 RELIGION, CULTURE, book v
and had been transferred by Zarathustra to the second — the
sun-god Mithra.
Worship But the brighter and gentler celestial forms of the
ls" Persian religion did not so rapidly gain a footing in Rome
as the wearisome mystical host of the grotesque divinities
of Egypt — Isis the mother of nature with her whole train,
the constantly dying and constantly reviving Osiris, the
gloomy Sarapis, the taciturn and grave Harpocrates, the
dog-headed Anubis. In the year when Clodius emanci-
58. pated the clubs and conventicles (696), and doubtless in
consequence of this very emancipation of the populace,
that host even prepared to make its entry into the old
stronghold of the Roman Jupiter in the Capitol, and it was
with difficulty that the invasion was prevented and the
inevitable temples were banished at least to the suburbs of
Rome. No worship was equally popular among the lower
orders of the population in the capital : when the senate
ordered the temples of Isis constructed within the ring-wall
to be pulled down, no labourer ventured to lay the first
hand on them, and the consul Lucius Paullus was himself
50. obliged to apply the first stroke of the axe (704) j a wager
might be laid, that the more loose any woman was, the
more piously she worshipped Isis. That the casting of
lots, the interpretation of dreams, and similar liberal arts
supported their professors, was a matter of course. The
casting of horoscopes was already a scientific pursuit ;
Lucius Tarutius of Firmum, a respectable and in his own
way learned man, a friend of Varro and Cicero, with all
gravity cast the nativity of kings Romulus and Numa and
of the city of Rome itself, and for the edification of the
credulous on either side confirmed by means of his
Chaldaean and Egyptian wisdom the accounts of the Roman
annals.
The new But by far the most remarkable phenomenon in this
goreanism. domain was tn^ ^rst attempt to mingle crude faith with
chap, xii LITERATURE, AND ART 447
speculative thought, the first appearance of those tendencies,
which we are accustomed to describe as Neo-Platonic, in
the Roman world. Their oldest apostle there was Publius Nigidiui
Nigidius Figulus, a Roman of rank belonging to the strictest lg us"
section of the aristocracy, who filled the praetorship in 696 58.
and died in 709 as a political exile beyond the bounds of 45.
Italy. With astonishing copiousness of learning and still
more astonishing strength of faith he created out of the
most dissimilar elements a philosophico-religious structure,
the singular outline of which he probably developed still
more in his oral discourses than in his theological and
physical writings. In philosophy, seeking deliverance from
the skeletons of the current systems and abstractions, he
recurred to the neglected fountain of the pre-Socratic
philosophy, to whose ancient sages thought had still pre-
sented itself with sensuous vividness. The researches of
physical science — which, suitably treated, afford even now
so excellent a handle for mystic delusion and pious sleight
of hand, and in antiquity with its more defective insight
into physical laws lent themselves still more easily to such
objects — played in this case, as may readily be conceived,
a considerable part. His theology was based essentially
on that strange medley, in which Greeks of a kindred
spirit had intermingled Orphic and other very old or very
new indigenous wisdom with Persian, Chaldaean, and
Egyptian secret doctrines, and with which Figulus incor-
porated the quasi-results of the Tuscan investigation into
nothingness and of the indigenous lore touching the flight
of birds, so as to produce further harmonious confusion.
The whole system obtained its consecration — political,
religious, and national — from the name of Pythagoras, the
ultra-conservative statesman whose supreme principle was
"to promote order and to check disorder," the miracle-
worker and necromancer, the primeval sage who was a
native of Italy, who was interwoven even with the legendary
448 RELIGION, CULTURE, book v
history of Rome, and whose statue was to be seen in the
Roman Forum. As birth and death are kindred with each
other, so — it seemed — Pythagoras was to stand not merely
by the cradle of the republic as friend of the wise Nuraa
and colleague of the sagacious mother Egeria, but also by
its grave as the last protector of the sacred bird-lore. But
the new system was not merely marvellous, it also worked
marvels; Nigidius announced to the father of the subse-
quent emperor Augustus, on the very day when the latter
was born, the future greatness of his son ; nay the prophets
conjured up spirits for the credulous, and, what was of
more moment, they pointed out to them the places where
their lost money lay. The new-and-old wisdom, such as it
was, made a profound impression on its contemporaries;
men of the highest rank, of the greatest learning, of the
most solid ability, belonging to very different parties — the
49. consul of 705, Appius Claudius, the learned Marcus Varro,
the brave officer Publius Vatinius — took part in the citation
of spirits, and it even appears that a police interference
was necessary against the proceedings of these societies.
These last attempts to save the Roman theology, like the
kindred efforts of Cato in the field of politics, produce at
once a comical and a melancholy impression ; we may
smile at the creed and its propagators, but still it is a grave
matter when even able men begin to addict themselves to
absurdity.
Training The training of youth followed, as may naturally be
o youth, supposed, the course of bilingual humane culture chalked
out in the previous epoch, and the general culture also of
the Roman world conformed more and more to the forms
established for that purpose by the Greeks. Even the
bodily exercises advanced from ball-playing, running, and
fencing to the more artistically-developed Greek gymnastic
contests ; though there were not yet any public institutions
for gymnastics, in the principal country-houses the palaestra
chap, xii LITERATURE, AND ART 449
was already to be found by the side of the bath-rooms.
The manner in which the cycle of general culture had Sciences of
changed in the Roman world during the course of a culture at
century, is shown by a comparison of the encyclopaedia of this period.
Cato (iii. 195) with the similar treatise of Varro "concern-
ing the school-sciences." As constituent elements of non-
professional culture, there appear in Cato the art of oratory,
the sciences of agriculture, of law, of war, and of medicine ;
in Varro — according to probable conjecture — grammar,
logic or dialectics, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy,
music, medicine, and architecture. Consequently in the
course of the seventh century the sciences of war, juris-
prudence, and agriculture had been converted from general
into professional studies. On the other hand in Varro the
Hellenic training of youth appears already in all its com-
pleteness : by the side of the course of grammar, rhetoric,
and philosophy, which had been introduced at an earlier
period into Italy, we now find the course which had longer
remained distinctively Hellenic, of geometry, arithmetic,
astronomy, and music.1 That astronomy more especially,
which ministered, in the nomenclature of the stars, to the
thoughtless erudite dilettantism of the age and, in its
relations to astrology, to the prevailing religious delusions,
was regularly and zealously studied by the youth in Italy,
can be proved also otherwise ; the astronomical didactic
poems of Aratus, among all the works of Alexandrian
literature, found earliest admittance into the instruction of
Roman youth. To this Hellenic course there was added
the study of medicine, which was retained from the older
Roman instruction, and lastly that of architecture — indispens-
able to the genteel Roman of this period, who instead of
cultivating the ground built houses and villas.
1 These form, as is well known, the so-called seven liberal arts, which,
with this distinction between the three branches of discipline earlier
naturalized in Italy and the four subsequently received, maintained their
position throughout the middle ages.
vol. v 1 6a
45°
RELIGION, CULTURE,
BOOK V
Greek in-
struction.
Alexan-
drinism.
In comparison with the previous epoch the Greek as
well as the Latin training improved in extent and in
scholastic strictness quite as much as it declined in purity
and in refinement. The increasing eagerness after Greek
lore gave to instruction of itself an erudite character. To
explain Homer or Euripides was after all no art ; teachers
and scholars found their account better in handling the
Alexandrian poems, which, besides, were in their spirit far
more congenial to the Roman world of that day than the
genuine Greek national poetry, and which, if they were not
quite so venerable as the Iliad, possessed at any rate an
age sufficiently respectable to pass as classics with school-
masters. The love-poems of Euphorion, the " Causes " of
Callimachus and his "Ibis," the comically obscure "Alex-
andra " of Lycophron contained in rich abundance rare
vocables {glossae) suitable for being extracted and interpreted,
sentences laboriously involved and difficult of analysis,
prolix digressions full of mystic combinations of antiquated
myths, and generally a store of cumbersome erudition of
all sorts. Instruction needed exercises more and more
difficult ; these productions, in great part model efforts of
schoolmasters, were excellently adapted to be lessons for
model scholars. Thus the Alexandrian poems took a
permanent place in Italian scholastic instruction, especially
as trial-themes, and certainly promoted knowledge, although
at the expense of taste and of discretion. The same un-
healthy appetite for culture moreover impelled the Roman
youths to derive their Hellenism as much as possible from
the fountain-head. The courses of the Greek masters in
Rome sufficed only for a first start ; every one who wished
to be able to converse heard lectures on Greek philosophy
at Athens, and on Greek rhetoric at Rhodes, and made a
literary and artistic tour through Asia Minor, where most
of the old art-treasures of the Hellenes were still to be
found on the spot, and the cultivation of the fine arts had
:hap. xir LITERATURE, AND ART 451
been continued, although after a mechanical fashion; whereas
Alexandria, more distant and more celebrated as the seat
of the exact sciences, was far more rarely the point whither
poung men desirous of culture directed their travels.
The advance in Latin instruction was similar to that of Latin in-
Greek. This in part resulted from the mere reflex influ-
ence of the Greek, from which it in fact essentially borrowed
its methods and its stimulants. Moreover, the relations of
politics, the impulse to mount the orators' platform in the
Forum which was imparted by the democratic doings
to an ever -widening circle, contributed not a little to
the diffusion and enhancement of oratorical exercises ;
"wherever one casts his eyes," says Cicero, "every place is
full of rhetoricians." Besides, the writings of the sixth
century, the farther they receded into the past, began to be
more decidedly regarded as classical texts of the golden
age of Latin literature, and thereby gave a greater pre-
ponderance to the instruction which was essentially concen-
trated upon them. Lastly the immigration and spreading
of barbarian elements from many quarters and the incipient
Latinizing of extensive Celtic and Spanish districts,
naturally gave to Latin grammar and Latin instruction a
higher importance than they could have had, so long as
Latium only spoke Latin ; the teacher of Latin literature
had from the outset a different position in Comum and
Narbo than he had in Praeneste and Ardea. Taken as a
whole, culture was more on the wane than on the advance.
The ruin of the Italian country towns, the extensive
intrusion of foreign elements, the political, economic, and
moral deterioration of the nation, above all, the distracting
civil wars inflicted more injury on the language than all
the schoolmasters of the world could repair. The closer
contact with the Hellenic culture of the present, the more
decided influence of the talkative Athenian wisdom and of
the rhetoric of Rhodes and Asia Minor, supplied to the
452 RELIGION, CULTURE, book v
Roman youth just the very elements that were most per*
nicious in Hellenism. The propagandist mission which
Latium undertook among the Celts, Iberians, and Libyans
— proud as the task was — could not but have the like con-
sequences for the Latin language as the Hellenizing of the
east had had for the Hellenic. The fact that the Roman
public of this period applauded the well arranged and
rhythmically balanced periods of the orator, and any offence
in language or metre cost the actor dear, doubtless shows
that the insight into the mother tongue which was the
reflection of scholastic training was becoming the common
possession of an ever- widening circle. But at the same
time contemporaries capable of judging complain that the
64. Hellenic culture in Italy about 690 was at a far lower level
than it had been a generation before ; that opportunities of
hearing pure and good Latin were but rare, and these
chiefly from the mouth of elderly cultivated ladies; that
the tradition of genuine culture, the good old Latin mother
wit, the Lucilian polish, the cultivated circle of readers of
the Scipionic age were gradually disappearing. The
circumstance that the term urbanitas, and the idea of a
polished national culture which it expressed, arose during
this period, proves, not that it was prevalent, but that it
was on the wane, and that people were keenly alive to the
absence of this urbanitas in the language and the habits of
the Latinized barbarians or barbarized Latins. Where we
still meet with the urbane tone of conversation, as in Varro's
Satires and Cicero's Letters, it is an echo of the old fashion
which was not yet so obsolete in Reate and Arpinum as in
Rome.
Germs of Thus the previous culture of youth remained substan-
sta.te. tially unchanged, except that — not so much from its own
school? deterioration as from the general decline of the nation — it
was productive of less good and more evil than in the
preceding epoch. Caesar initiated a revolution also in this
CHAP, xil LITERATURE, AND ART 453
department. While the Roman senate had first combated
and then at the most had simply tolerated culture, the
government of the new Italo-Hellenic empire, whose
essence in fact was humanitas, could not but adopt measures
to stimulate it after the Hellenic fashion. If Caesar
conferred the Roman franchise on all teachers of the
liberal sciences and all the physicians of the capital, we
may discover in this step a paving of the way in some
degree for those institutions in which subsequently the
higher bilingual culture of the youth of the empire was
provided for on the part of the state, and which form the
most significant expression of the new state of humanitas ;
and if Caesar had further resolved on the establishment of
a public Greek and Latin library in the capital and had
already nominated the most learned Roman of the age,
Marcus Varro, as principal librarian, this implied unmistake-
ably the design of connecting the cosmopolitan monarchy
with cosmopolitan literature.
The development of the language during this period Language,
turned on the distinction between the classical Latin of
cultivated society and the vulgar language of common life.
The former itself was a product of the distinctively Italian
culture ; even in the Scipionic circle " pure Latin " had
become the cue, and the mother tongue was spoken, no
longer in entire naivete, but in conscious contradistinction
to the language of the great multitude. This epoch opens The
with a remarkable reaction against the classicism which off^sm
had hitherto exclusively prevailed in the higher language of Minor,
conversation and accordingly also in literature — a reaction
which had inwardly and outwardly a close connection with
the reaction of a similar nature in the language of Greece.
Just about this time the rhetor and romance-writer Hegesias
of Magnesia and the numerous rhetors and literati of Asia
Minor who attached themselves to him began to rebel
against the orthodox Atticism. They demanded full
454 RELIGION, CULTURE, book v
recognition for the language of life, without distinction,
whether the word or the phrase originated in Attica or in
Caria and Phrygia ; they themselves spoke and wrote not
for the taste of learned cliques, but for that of the great
public. There could not be much objection to the
principle; only, it is true, the result could not be better
than was the public of Asia Minor of that day, which had
totally lost the taste for chasteness and purity of production,
and longed only after the showy and brilliant. To say
nothing of the spurious forms of art that sprang out of this
tendency — especially the romance and the history assuming
the form of romance — the very style of these Asiatics was, as
may readily be conceived, abrupt and without modulation
and finish, minced and effeminate, full of tinsel and
bombast, thoroughly vulgar and affected ; " any one who
knows Hegesias," says Cicero, "knows what silliness is."
Roman Yet this new style found its way also into the Latin
gansm. worj(j> When the Hellenic fashionable rhetoric, after
having at the close of the previous epoch obtruded into the
Latin instruction of youth (iv. 214), took at the beginning
of the present period the final step and mounted the
Roman orators' platform in the person of Quintus
Hortensius. Hortensius (640-704), the most celebrated pleader of the
' Sullan age, it adhered closely even in the Latin idiom to
the bad Greek taste of the time ; and the Roman public,
no longer having the pure and chaste culture of the
Scipionic age, naturally applauded with zeal the innovator
who knew how to give to vulgarism the semblance of an
artistic performance. This was of great importance. As
in Greece the battles of language were always waged at
first in the schools of the rhetoricians, so in Rome the
forensic oration to a certain extent even more than
literature set the standard of style, and accordingly there
was combined, as it were of right, with the leadership of
the bar the prerogative of giving the tone to the fashion-
chap, xil LITERATURE, AND ART 455
able mode of speaking and writing. The Asiatic vulgarism
of Hortensius thus dislodged classicism from the Roman
platform and partly also from literature. But the fashion Reaction,
soon changed once more in Greece and in Rome. In the
former it was the Rhodian school of rhetoricians, which, The
without reverting to all the chaste severity of the Attic style, R^od!an
attempted to strike out a middle course between it and the
modern fashion : if the Rhodian masters were not too par-
ticular as to the internal correctness of their thinking and
speaking, they at least insisted on purity of language and
style, on the careful selection of words and phrases, and the
giving thorough effect to the modulation of sentences.
In Italy it was Marcus Tullius Cicero (648-7 1 1) who, Cicero-
after having in his early youth gone along with the ?Jff^"
Hortensian manner, was brought by hearing the Rhodian
masters and by his own more matured taste to better paths,
and thenceforth addicted himself to strict purity of
language and the thorough periodic arrangement and
modulation of his discourse. The models of language,
which in this respect he followed, he found especially in
those circles of the higher Roman society which had suffered
but little or not at all from vulgarism ; and, as was already
said, there were still such, although they were beginning
to disappear. The earlier Latin and the good Greek
literature, however considerable was the influence of the
latter more especially on the rhythm of his oratory, were in
this matter only of secondary moment : this purifying of
the language was by no means a reaction of the language
of books against that of conversation, but a reaction of the
language of the really cultivated against the jargon of
spurious and partial culture. Caesar, in the department of
language also the greatest master of his time, expressed the
fundamental idea of Roman classicism, when he enjoined
that in speech and writing every foreign word should be
avoided, as rocks are avoided by the mariner ; the poetical
456
RELIGION, CULTURE,
BOOK V
The new
Roman
poetry.
and the obsolete word of the older literature was rejected
as well as the rustic phrase or that borrowed from the
language of common life, and more especially the Greek
words and phrases which, as the letters of this period show,
had to a very great extent found their way into conversa-
tional language. Nevertheless this scholastic and artificial
classicism of the Ciceronian period stood to the Scipionic
as repentance to innocence, or the French of the classicists
under Napoleon to the model French of Moliere and
Boileau ; while the former classicism had sprung out of the
full freshness of life, the latter as it were caught just in
right time the last breath of a race perishing beyond
recovery. Such as it was, it rapidly diffused itself. With
the leadership of the bar the dictatorship of language and
taste passed from Horlensius to Cicero, and the varied and
copious authorship of the latter gave to this classicism —
what it had hitherto lacked — extensive prose texts. Thus
Cicero became the creator of the modern classical Latin
prose, and Roman classicism attached itself throughout and
altogether to Cicero as a stylist ; it was to the stylist Cicero,
not to the author, still less to the statesman, that the
panegyrics — extravagant yet not made up wholly of verbiage
— applied, with which the most gifted representatives of
classicism, such as Caesar and Catullus, loaded him.
They soon went farther. What Cicero did in prose,
was carried out in poetry towards the end of the epoch by
the new Roman school of poets, which modelled itself on
the Greek fashionable poetry, and in which the man of
most considerable talent was Catullus. Here too the
higher language of conversation dislodged the archaic
reminiscences which hitherto to a large extent prevailed in
this domain, and as Latin prose submitted to the Attic
rhythm, so Latin poetry submitted gradually to the strict
or rather painful metrical laws of the Alexandrines ; e.g.
from the time of Catullus, it is no longer allowable at once
chap, xii LITERATURE, AND ART 457
to begin a verse and to close a sentence begun in the \erse
preceding with a monosyllabic word or a dissyllabic one
not specially weighty.
At length science stepped in, fixed the law of language, Grammati-
and developed its rule, which was no longer determined on science.
the basis of experience, but made the claim to determine
experience. The endings of declension, which hitherto
had in part been variable, were now to be once for all
fixed ; e.g. of the genitive and dative forms hitherto current
side by side in the so-called fourth declension (senatuis and
senatus, senatui and senatu) Caesar recognized exclusively
as valid the contracted forms {us and u). In orthography
various changes were made, to bring the written more fully
into correspondence with the spoken language ; thus the u
in the middle of words like maxumus was replaced after
Caesar's precedent by i; and of the two letters which had
become superfluous, k and q, the removal of the first was
effected, and that of the second was at least proposed.
The language was, if not yet stereotyped, in the course of
becoming so ; it was not yet indeed unthinkingly dominated
by rule, but it had already become conscious of it. That
this action in the department of Latin grammar derived
generally its spirit and method from the Greek, and not
only so, but that the Latin language was also directly
rectified in accordance with Greek precedent, is shown,
for example, by the treatment of the final s, which till
towards the close of this epoch had at pleasure passed
sometimes as a consonant, sometimes not as one, but was
treated by the new-fashioned poets throughout, as in Greek,
as a consonantal termination. This regulation of language
is the proper domain of Roman classicism ; in the most
various ways, and for that very reason all the more signifi-
cantly, the rule is inculcated and the offence against it
rebuked by the coryphaei of classicism, by Cicero, by
Caesar, even in the poems of Catullus ; whereas the older
458 RELIGION, CULTURE, book v
generation expresses itself with natural keenness of feeling
respecting the revolution which had affected the field of
language as remorselessly as the field of politics.1 But
while the new classicism — that is to say, the standard
Latin governed by rule and as far as possible placed on a
parity with the standard Greek — which arose out of a
conscious reaction against the vulgarism intruding into
higher society and even into literature, acquired literary
fixity and systematic shape, the latter by no means evacu-
ated the field. Not only do we find it naively employed
in the works of secondary personages who have drifted into
the ranks of authors merely by accident, as in the account
of Caesar's second Spanish war, but we shall meet it also
with an impress more or less distinct in literature proper,
in the mime, in the semi-romance, in the aesthetic writings
of Varro ; and it is a significant circumstance, that it
maintains itself precisely in the most national departments
of literature, and that truly conservative men, like Varro,
take it into protection. Classicism was based on the death
of the Italian language as monarchy on the decline of the
Italian nation ; it was completely consistent that the men,
in whom the republic was still living, should continue to
give to the living language its rights, and for the sake of
its comparative vitality and nationality should tolerate its
aesthetic defects. Thus then the linguistic opinions and
tendencies of this epoch are everywhere divergent ; by the
side of the old-fashioned poetry of Lucretius appears the
thoroughly modern poetry of Catullus, by the side of
Cicero's well -modulated period stands the sentence of
Varro intentionally disdaining all subdivision. In this
field likewise is mirrored the distraction of the age.
Literary In the literature of this period we are first of all struck
by the outward increase, as compared with the former
1 Thus Varro (De J?. J?, i. 2) says : ab aeditimo, ut dicere didicimus
mfatribus nostris ; ut corrigimur ab recenlibus urbanis, ab aedituo.
chap, xii LITERATURE, AND ART 459
epoch, of literary effort in Rome. It was long since the Greek
literary activity of the Greeks flourished no more in the j^^^^
free atmosphere of civic independence, but only in the
scientific institutions of the larger cities and especially of
the courts. Left to depend on the favour and protection
of the great, and dislodged from the former seats of the
Muses1 by the extinction of the dynasties of Pergamus
(621), Cyrene (658), Bithynia (679), and Syria (690) and 133. 96.
by the waning splendour of the court of the Lagids — more- '
over, since the death of Alexander the Great, necessarily
cosmopolitan and at least quite as much strangers among
the Egyptians and Syrians as among the Latins — the
Hellenic literati began more and more to turn their eyes
towards Rome. Among the host of Greek attendants with
which the Roman of quality at this time surrounded him-
self, the philosopher, the poet, and the memoir- writer
played conspicuous parts by the side of the cook, the boy-
favourite, and the jester. We meet already literati of note
in such positions ; the Epicurean Philodemus, for instance,
was installed as domestic philosopher with Lucius Piso
consul in 696, and occasionally edified the initiated with 58.
his clever epigrams on the coarse-grained Epicureanism of
1 The dedication of the poetical description of the earth which passes
under the name of Scymnus is remarkable in reference to those relations.
After the poet has declared his purpose of preparing in the favourite
Menandrian measure a sketch of geography intelligible for scholars and
easy to be learned by heart, he dedicates — as Apollodorus dedicated his
similar historical compendium to Attalus Philadelphus king of Pergamus
ddavarov bicovipovTa. bb^av 'ArTaky
•rijs ir pay fiare las iwtypa<pr]v etXrjcpbn —
his manual to Nicomedes III. king (663 7-679) of Bithynia ( 91-75.
4yw 5' aKotiuv, Si&ri tQv vvv fiacCKiwv
fi6vos /3a<n\iK7)v \pt]aTbTt)Ta ifpo<T<p4peis,
vetpav iireOviM-qcr' avrbs 4ir' iftavrov \a/3e?v
Kal irapayevtadai Kal rl fiaaikevs icr' ioelv.
Sib t-q rrpodtaei ffv/j.j3ov\ov ^eXe^d/iT/v
. . . rbv 'AirbWuva rbv Atdv/uiTj . . .
08 S^ <r%fSbv fiaXicrra Kal Treireiff/j^vof
vpbs ar\v Kara \6yov TjKa (kolv'Ijv yap o"^e53l»
rets (bCkonaOovaiv avadtdetxas) iirrlav.
46o RELIGION, CULTURE, book v
his patron. From all sides the most notable representa-
tives of Greek art and science migrated in daily-increasing
numbers to Rome, where literary gains were now more
abundant than anywhere else. Among those thus men-
tioned as settled in Rome we find the physician Asclepiades
whom king Mithradates vainly endeavoured to draw away
from it into his service; the universalist in learning,
Alexander of Miletus, termed Polyhistor; the poet Par-
thenius from Nicaea in Bithynia; Posidonius of Apamea
in Syria equally celebrated as a traveller, teacher, and
51. author, who at a great age migrated in 703 from Rhodes
to Rome ; and various others. A house like that of
Lucius Lucullus was a seat of Hellenic culture and a
rendezvous for Hellenic literati almost like the Alexandrian
Museum ; Roman resources and Hellenic connoisseurship
had gathered in these halls of wealth and science an in-
comparable collection of statues and paintings of earlier
and contemporary masters, as well as a library as carefully
selected as it was magnificently fitted up, and every person
of culture and especially every Greek was welcome there —
the master of the house himself was often seen walking up
and down the beautiful colonnade in philological or philo-
sophical conversation with one of his learned guests. No
doubt these Greeks brought along with their rich treasures
of culture their preposterousness and servility to Italy;
one of these learned wanderers for instance, the author of
54. the "Art of Flattery," Aristodemus of Nysa (about 700)
recommended himself to his masters by demonstrating that
Homer was a native of Rome !
Extent of In the same measure as the pursuits of the Greek literati
the literary prospered in Rome, literary activity and literary interest in-
of the creased among the Romans themselves. Even Greek com-
Romans. p0Siti0n, which the stricter taste of the Scipionic age had
totally set aside, now revived. The Greek language was
now universally current, and a Greek treatise found a quite
:hap. xii LITERATURE, AND ART 461
different public from a Latin one ; therefore Romans of
rank, such as Lucius Lucullus, Marcus Cicero, Titus
A.tticus, Quintus Scaevola (tribune of the people in 700), 64
;ike the kings of Armenia and Mauretania, published
Dccasionally Greek prose and even Greek verses. Such
Sreek authorship however by native Romans remained a
secondary matter and almost an amusement ; the literary
is well as the political parties of Italy all coincided in
idhering to their Italian nationality, only more or less
Dervaded by Hellenism. Nor could there be any com-
)laint at least as to want of activity in the field of Latin
mthorship. There was a flood of books and pamphlets
)f all sorts, and above all of poems, in Rome. Poets
iwarmed there, as they did only in Tarsus or Alexandria ;
poetical publications had become the standing juvenile sin
>f livelier natures, and even then the writer was reckoned
ortunate whose youthful poems compassionate oblivion
vithdrew from criticism. Any one who understood the art,
vrote without difficulty at a sitting his five hundred hexa-
neters in which no schoolmaster found anything to censure,
)ut no reader discovered anything to praise. The female
vorld also took a lively part in these literary pursuits ; the
adies did not confine themselves to dancing and music, but
>y their spirit and wit ruled conversation and talked ex-
:ellently on Greek and Latin literature ; and, when poetry
aid siege to a maiden's heart, the beleaguered fortress not
eldom surrendered likewise in graceful verses. Rhythms
>ecame more and more the fashionable plaything of the
>ig children of both sexes ; poetical epistles, joint poetical
ixercises and competitions among good friends, were of
loramon occurrence, and towards the end of this epoch
nstitutions were already opened in the capital, at which
infledged Latin poets might learn verse-making for money.
n consequence of the large consumption of books the
nachinery for the manufacture of copies was substan-
462
RELIGION, CULTURE,
BOOK V
The
classicists
and the
moderns.
t/ally perfected, and publication was effected with com-
parative rapidity and cheapness ; bookselling became a
respectable and lucrative trade, and the bookseller's shop
a usual meeting -place of men of culture. Reading had
become a fashion, nay a mania ; at table, where coarser
pastimes had not already intruded, reading was regularly
introduced, and any one who meditated a journey seldom
forgot to pack up a travelling library. The superior officer
was seen in the camp-tent with the obscene Greek romance,
the statesman in the senate with the philosophical treatise,
in his hands. Matters accordingly stood in the Roman
state as they have stood and will stand in every state
where the citizens read " from the threshold to the closet."
The Parthian vizier was not far wrong, when he pointed
out to the citizens of Seleucia the romances found in the
camp of Crassus and asked them whether they still
regarded the readers of such books as formidable op-
ponents.
The literary tendency of this age was varied and could
not be otherwise, for the age itself was divided between the
old and the new modes. The same tendencies which came
into conflict on the field of politics, the national- Italian
tendency of the conservatives, the Helleno- Italian or, if
the term be preferred, cosmopolitan tendency of the new
monarchy, fought their battles also on the field of litera-
ture. The former attached itself to the older Latin
literature, which in the theatre, in the school, and in
erudite research assumed more and more the character
of classical. With less taste and stronger party tendencies
than the Scipionic epoch showed, Ennius, Pacuvius, and
especially Plautus were now exalted to the skies. The
leaves of the Sibyl rose in price, the fewer they became ;
the relatively greater nationality and relatively greater pro-
ductiveness of the poets of the sixth century were never
more vividly felt than in this epoch of thoroughly developed
chap, xil LITERATURE, AND ART 4«3
Epigonism, which in literature as decidedly as in politics
looked up to the century of the Hannibalic warriors as
to the golden age that had now unhappily passed away
beyond recall. No doubt there was in this admiration
of the old classics no small portion of the same hollowness
and hypocrisy which are characteristic of the conservatism
of this age in general ; and here too there was no want of
trimmers. Cicero for instance, although in prose one of
the chief representatives of the modern tendency, revered
nevertheless the older national poetry nearly with the same
antiquarian respect which he paid to the aristocratic consti-
tution and the augural discipline ; " patriotism requires,"
we find him saying, "that we should rather read a notori-
ously wretched translation of Sophocles than the original."
While thus the modern literary tendency cognate to the
democratic monarchy numbered secret adherents enough
even among the orthodox admirers of Ennius, there were
not wanting already bolder judges, who treated the native
literature as disrespectfully as the senatorial politics. Not
only did they resume the strict criticism of the Scipionic
epoch and set store by Terence only in order to condemn
Ennius and still more the Ennianists, but the younger and
bolder men went much farther and ventured already —
though only as yet in heretical revolt against literary
orthodoxy — to call Plautus a rude jester and Lucilius
a bad verse-smith. This modern tendency attached itself
not to the native authorship, but rather to the more
recent Greek literature or the so-called Alexandrinism.
We cannot avoid saying at least so much respecting this The Greek
remarkable winter-garden of Hellenic language and art, as is jjjSjjjT
requisite for the understanding of the Roman literature of
this and the later epochs. The Alexandrian literature was
based on the decline of the pure Hellenic idiom, which from
the time of Alexander the Great was superseded in daily life
by an inferior jargon deriving its origin from the contact of
464 RELIGION, CULTURE, book v
the Macedonian dialect with various Greek and barbarian
tribes ; or, to speak more accurately, the Alexandrian litera-
ture sprang out of the ruin of the Hellenic nation generally,
which had to perish, and did perish, in its national indi-
viduality in order to establish the universal monarchy of
Alexander and the empire of Hellenism. Had Alexander's
universal empire continued to subsist, the former national
and popular literature would have been succeeded by a cos-
mopolitan literature Hellenic merely in name, essentially
denationalized and called into life in a certain measure by
royal patronage, but at all events ruling the world ; but, as
the state of Alexander was unhinged by his death, the germs
of the literature corresponding to it rapidly perished. Never-
theless the Greek nation with all that it had possessed — with
its nationality, its language, its art — belonged to the past.
It was only in a comparatively narrow circle not of men of
culture — for such, strictly speaking, no longer existed — but
of men of erudition that the Greek literature was still
cherished even when dead ; that the rich inheritance which
it had left was inventoried with melancholy pleasure or arid
refinement of research ; and that, possibly, the living sense
of sympathy or the dead erudition was elevated into a
semblance of productiveness. This posthumous produc-
tiveness constitutes the so-called Alexandrinism. It is
essentially similar to that literature of scholars, which,
keeping aloof from the living Romanic nationalities and
their vulgar idioms, grew up during the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries among a cosmopolitan circle of erudite
philologues — as an artificial aftergrowth of the departed
antiquity ; the contrast between the classical and the
vulgar Greek of the period of the Diadochi is doubtless
less strongly marked, but is not, properly speaking, differ-
ent from that between the Latin of Manutius and the
Italian of Macchiavelli.
Italy had hitherto been in the main disinclined towards
chap, xii LITERATURE, AND ART 465
Alexandrinism. Its season of comparative brilliance was The
the period shortly before and after the first Punic war ; yet j^™**_
Naevius, Ennius, Pacuvius and generally the whole body drinism.
of the national Roman authors down to Varro and
Lucretius in all branches of poetical production, not
excepting even the didactic poem, attached themselves, not
to their Greek contemporaries or very recent predecessors,
but without exception to Homer, Euripides, Menander and
the other masters of the living and national Greek literature.
Roman literature was never fresh and national ; but, as
long as there was a Roman people, its authors instinctively
sought for living and national models, and copied, if not
always to the best purpose or the best authors, at least such
as were original The Greek literature originating after
Alexander found its first Roman imitators — for the slight
initial attempts from the Marian age (iv. 242) can scarcely
be taken into account — among the contemporaries of
Cicero and Caesar; and now the Roman Alexandrinism
spread with singular rapidity. In part this arose from
external causes. The increased contact with the Greeks,
especially the frequent journeys of the Romans into the
Hellenic provinces and the assemblage of Greek literati in
Rome, naturally procured a public even among the Italians
for the Greek literature of the day, for the epic and elegiac
poetry, epigrams, and Milesian tales current at that time
in Greece. Moreover, as we have already stated (p. 450)
the Alexandrian poetry had its established place in the
instruction of the Italian youth ; and thus reacted on Latin
literature all the more, since the latter continued to be
essentially dependent at all times on the Hellenic school-
training. We find in this respect even a direct connection
of the new Roman with the new Greek literature; the
already- mentioned Parthenius, one of the better known
Alexandrian elegists, opened, apparently about 700, a 64.
school for literature and poetry in Rome, and the excerpts
VOL. V 163
466 RELIGION, CULTURE, book v
are still extant in which he supplied one of his pupils of rank
with materials for Latin elegies of an erotic and mythological
nature according to the well-known Alexandrian receipt.
But it was by no means simply such accidental occasions
which called into existence the Roman Alexandrinism ; it
was on the contrary a product — perhaps not pleasing, but
thoroughly inevitable — of the political and national
development of Rome. On the one hand, as Hellas
resolved itself into Hellenism, so now Latium resolved itself
into Romanism; the national development of Italy out-
grew itself, and was merged in Caesar's Mediterranean
empire, just as the Hellenic development in the eastern
empire of Alexander. On the other hand, as the new
empire rested on the fact that the mighty streams of
Greek and Latin nationality, after having flowed in parallel
channels for many centuries, now at length coalesced, the
Italian literature had not merely as hitherto to seek its
groundwork generally in the Greek, but had also to put
itself on a level with the Greek literature of the present,
or in other words with Alexandrinism. With the scholastic
Latin, with the closed number of classics, with the exclusive
circle of classic-reading urbant, the national Latin literature
was dead and at an end; there arose instead of it a
thoroughly degenerate, artificially fostered, imperial
literature, which did not rest on any definite nationality,
but proclaimed in two languages the universal gospel of
humanity, and was dependent in point of spirit throughout
and consciously on the old Hellenic, in point of language
partly on this, partly on the old Roman popular, literature.
This was no improvement. The Mediterranean monarchy
of Caesar was doubtless a grand and — what is more — a
necessary creation ; but it had been called into life by an
arbitrary superior will, and therefore there was nothing to
be found in it of the fresh popular life, of the overflowing
national vigour, which are characteristic of younger, more
chap, xii LITERATURE, AND ART 467
limited, and more natural commonwealths, and which the
Italian state of the sixth century had still been able to
exhibit. The ruin of the Italian nationality, accomplished
in the creation of Caesar, nipped the promise of literature.
Every one who has any sense of the close affinity between
art and nationality will always turn back from Cicero and
Horace to Cato and Lucretius; and nothing but the
schoolmaster's view of history and of literature — which has
acquired, it is true, in this department the sanction of
prescription — could have called the epoch of art beginning
with the new monarchy pre-eminently the golden age. But
while the Romano-Hellenic Alexandrinism of the age of
Caesar and Augustus must be deemed inferior to the older,
however imperfect, national literature, it is on the other
hand as decidedly superior to the Alexandrinism of the
age of the Diadochi as Caesar's enduring structure to the
ephemeral creation of Alexander. We shall have afterwards
to show that the Augustan literature, compared with the
kindred literature of the period of the Diadochi, was far
less a literature of philologues and far more an imperial
literature than the latter, and therefore had a far more
permanent and far more general influence in the upper
circles of society than the Greek Alexandrinism ever
had.
Nowhere was the prospect more lamentable than in Dramatic
dramatic literature. Tragedy and comedy had already Tragedy2'
before the present epoch become inwardly extinct in the and
Roman national literature. New pieces were no longer disappear,
performed. That the public still in the Sullan age
expected to see such, appears from the reproductions —
belonging to this epoch — of Plautine comedies with the
titles and names of the persons altered, with reference to
which the managers well added that it was better to see a
good old piece than a bad new one. From this the step
was not great to that entire surrender of the stage to the
468 RELIGION, CULTURE, book v
dead poets, which we find in the Ciceronian age, and to
which Alexandrinism made no opposition. Its productive-
ness in this department was worse than none. Real
dramatic composition the Alexandrian literature never
knew ; nothing but the spurious drama, which was written
primarily for reading and not for exhibition, could be
introduced by it into Italy, and soon accordingly these
dramatic iambics began to be quite as prevalent in Rome
as in Alexandria, and the writing of tragedy in particular
began to figure among the regular diseases of adolescence.
We may form a pretty accurate idea of the quality of
these productions from the fact that Quintus Cicero, in
order homoeopathically to beguile the weariness of
winter quarters in Gaul, composed four tragedies in sixteen
days.
The mime. In the " picture of life " or mime alone the last still
vigorous product of the national literature, the Atellan
farce, became engrafted with the ethological offshoots of
Greek comedy, which Alexandrinism cultivated with greater
poetical vigour and better success than any other branch
of poetry. The mime originated out of the dances in
character to the flute, which had long been usual, and
which were performed sometimes on other occasions, e.g.
for the entertainment of the guests during dinner, but more
especially in the pit of the theatre during the intervals
between the acts. It was not difficult to form out of these
dances — in which the aid of speech had doubtless long
since been occasionally employed— by means of the intro-
duction of a more organized plot and a regular dialogue
little comedies, which were yet essentially distinguished
from the earlier comedy and even from the farce by the
facts, that the dance and the lasciviousness inseparable
from such dancing continued in this case to play a chief
part, and that the mime, as belonging properly not to the
boards but to the pit, threw aside all ideal scenic effects,
chap, xii LITERATURE, AND ART 469
such as masks for the face and theatrical buskins, and —
what was specially important — admitted of the female
characters being represented by women. This new mime,
which first seems to have come on the stage of the capital
about 672, soon swallowed up the national harlequinade, 82.
with which it indeed in the most essential respects coin-
cided, and was employed as the usual interlude and
especially as afterpiece along with the other dramatic per-
formances.1 The plot was of course still more indifferent,
loose, and absurd than in the harlequinade ; if it was only
sufficiently chequered, the public did not ask why it
laughed, and did not remonstrate with the poet, who
instead of untying the knot cut it to pieces. The subjects
were chiefly of an amorous nature, mostly of the licentious
sort ; for example, poet and public without exception took
part against the husband, and poetical justice consisted in
the derision of good morals. The artistic charm depended
wholly, as in the Atellana, on the portraiture of the manners
of common and low life ; in which rural pictures are laid
aside for those of the life and doings of the capital, and
the sweet rabble of Rome — just as in the similar Greek
pieces the rabble of Alexandria — is summoned to applaud
its own likeness. Many subjects are taken from the life
of tradesmen ; there appear the — here also inevitable —
" Fuller," then the " Ropemaker," the " Dyer," the " Salt-
man," the " Female Weavers," the " Rascal " ; other pieces
1 Cicero testifies that the mime in his time had taken the place of the
Atellana (Ad Fam. ix. 16) ; with this accords the fact, that the mimi and
mimae first appear about the Sullan epoch (Ad Her. i. 14, 24 ; ii. 13, 19 ;
Atta Fr. 1 Ribbeck ; Plin. H. N. vii. 48, 158 ; Plutarch, Sull. 2, 36).
The designation mimus, however, is sometimes inaccurately applied to
the comedian generally. Thus the mimus who appeared at the festival of
Apollo in 542-543 (Festus under salva res est ; comp. Cicero, De Orat. 212-211.
ii. 59, 242) was evidently nothing but an actor of the fialliata, for there
was at this period no room in the development of the Roman theatre for
real mimes in the later sense.
With the mimus of the classical Greek period — prose dialogues, in
which genre pictures, particularly of a rural kind, were presented — the
Roman mimus had no especial relation.
47° RELIGION, CULTURE, book v
give sketches of character, as the " Forgetful," the " Brag-
gart," the "Man of 100,000 sesterces";1 or pictures of
other lands, the "Etruscan Woman," the "Gauls," the
" Cretan," " Alexandria " ; or descriptions of popular festi-
vals, as the " Compitalia," the "Saturnalia," "Anna Pe-
renna," the "Hot Baths"; or parodies of mythology, as
the "Voyage to the Underworld," the "Arvernian Lake."
Apt nicknames and short commonplaces which were easily
retained and applied were welcome ; but every piece of
nonsense was of itself privileged ; in this preposterous
world Bacchus is applied to for water and the fountain-
nymph for wine. Isolated examples even of the political
allusions formerly so strictly prohibited in the Roman
theatre are found in these mimes.2 As regards metrical
form, these poets gave themselves, as they tell us, "but
moderate trouble with the versification " ; the language
abounded, even in the pieces prepared for publication,
with vulgar expressions and low newly-coined words, The
mime was, it is plain, in substance nothing but the former
farce ; with this exception, that the character-masks and
the standing scenery of Atella as well as the rustic impress
are dropped, and in their room the life of the capital in its
boundless liberty and licence is brought on the stage.
Most pieces of this sort were doubtless of a very fugitive
nature and made no pretension to a place in literature;
1 With the possession of this sum, which constituted the qualification
for the first voting-class and subjected the inheritance to the Voconian
law, the boundary line was crossed which separated the men of slender
means (Unuiores) from respectable people. Therefore the poor client of
Catullus (xxiii. 26) beseeches the gods to help him to this fortune.
2 In the * ' Descensus ad Inferos " of Laberius all sorts of people come
forward, who have seen wonders and signs ; to one there appeared a
husband with two wives, whereupon a neighbour is of opinion that this is
still worse than the vision, recently seen by a soothsayer in a dream, of
six aediles. Caesar forsooth desired — according to the talk of the time —
to introduce polygamy in Rome (Suetonius, Caes. 82) and he nominated
in reality six aediles instead of four. One sees from this that Laberius
understood how to exercise the fool's privilege and Caesar how to permit
the fool's freedom.
chap, xil LITERATURE, AND ART 471
but the mimes of Laberius, full of pungent delineation of Laberiui.
character and in point of language and metre exhibiting
the hand of a master, maintained their ground in it ; and
even the historian must regret that we are no longer per-
mitted to compare the drama of the republican death-
struggle in Rome with its great Attic counterpart.
With the worthlessness of dramatic literature the increase Dramatic
of scenic spectacles and of scenic pomp went hand in hand. spec ac ^
Dramatic representations obtained their regular place in
the public life not only of the capital but also of the
country towns ; the former also now at length acquired by
means of Pompeius a permanent theatre (699 ; see p. 117), 55.
and the Campanian custom of stretching canvas over the
theatre for the protection of the actors and spectators
during the performance, which in ancient times always
took place in the open air, now likewise found admission
to Rome (676). As at that time in Greece it was not the 78.
— more than pale — Pleiad of the Alexandrian dramatists,
but the classic drama, above all the tragedies of Euripides,
which amidst the amplest development of scenic resources
kept the stage, so in Rome at the time of Cicero the
tragedies of Ennius, Pacuvius, and Accius, and the comedies
of Plautus were those chiefly produced. While the latter
had been in the previous period supplanted by the more
tasteful but in point of comic vigour far inferior Terence,
Roscius and Varro, or in other words the theatre and
philology, co-operated to procure for him a resurrection
similar to that which Shakespeare experienced at the hands
of Garrick and Johnson ; but even Plautus had to suffer
from the degenerate susceptibility and the impatient haste
of an audience spoilt by the short and slovenly farces, so
that the managers found themselves compelled to excuse
the length of the Plautine comedies and even perhaps to
make omissions and alterations. The more limited the
stock of plays, the more the activity of the managing and
472 RELIGION, CULTURE, book v
executive staff as well as the interest of the public was
directed to the scenic representation of the pieces. There
was hardly any more lucrative trade in Rome than that of
the actor and the dancing -girl of the first rank. The
princely estate of the tragic actor Aesopus has been already
mentioned (p. 384); his still more celebrated contem-
porary Roscius (iv. 236) estimated his annual income at
600,000 sesterces (^6000) x and Dionysia the dancer esti-
mated hers at 200,000 sesterces (^2000). At the same
time immense sums were expended on decorations and
costume; now and then trains of six hundred mules in
harness crossed the stage, and the Trojan theatrical army
was employed to present to the public a tableau of the
nations vanquished by Pompeius in Asia. The music
which accompanied the delivery of the inserted choruses
likewise obtained a greater and more independent im-
portance ; as the wind sways the waves, says Varro, so the
skilful flute-player sways the minds of the listeners with
every modulation of melody. It accustomed itself to the
use of quicker time, and thereby compelled the player to
more lively action. Musical and dramatic connoisseurship
was developed ; the habitue recognized every tune by the
first note, and knew the texts by heart ; every fault in the
music or recitation was severely censured by the audience.
The state of the Roman stage in the time of Cicero vividly
reminds us of the modern French theatre. As the Roman
mime corresponds to the loose tableaux of the pieces of
the day, nothing being too good and nothing too bad for
either the one or the other, so we find in both the same
traditionally classic tragedy and comedy, which the man of
culture is in duty bound to admire or at least to applaud.
The multitude is satisfied, when it meets its own reflection
1 He obtained from the state for every day on which he acted 1000
denarii (^40) and besides this the pay for his company. In later years
he declined the honorarium for himself.
chap, xii LITERATURE, AND ART 473
in the farce, and admires the decorative pomp and receives
the general impression of an ideal world in the drama ; the
man of higher culture concerns himself at the theatre not
with the piece, but only with its artistic representation.
Moreover the Roman histrionic art oscillated in its different
spheres, just like the French, between the cottage and the
drawing-room. It was nothing unusual for the Roman
dancing-girls to throw off at the finale the upper robe and
to give a dance in undress for the benefit of the public j
but on the other hand in the eyes of the Roman Talma
the supreme law of his art was, not the truth of nature, but
symmetry.
In recitative poetry metrical annals after the model of Metrical
those of Ennius seem not to have been wanting ; but they anna ^
were perhaps sufficiently criticised by that graceful vow of
his mistress of which Catullus sings — that the worst of the
bad heroic poems should be presented as a sacrifice to holy
Venus, if she would only bring back her lover from his vile
political poetry to her arms.
Indeed in the whole field of recitative poetry at this Lucretius
epoch the older national- Roman tendency is represented
only by a single work of note, which, however, is altogether
one of the most important poetical products of Roman
literature. It is the didactic poem of Titus Lucretius Carus
(655—699) "Concerning the Nature of Things," whose 99-55.
author, belonging to the best circles of Roman society, but
taking no part in public life whether from weakness of health
or from disinclination, died in the prime of manhood shortly
before the outbreak of the civil war. As a poet he attached
himself decidedly to Ennius and thereby to the classical
Greek literature. Indignantly he turns away from the
" hollow Hellenism " of his time, and professes himself with
his whole soul and heart to be the scholar of the " chaste
Greeks," as indeed even the sacred earnestness of Thucy-
dides has found no unworthy echo in one of the best-known
474 RELIGION, CULTURE, book v
sections of this Roman poem. As Ennius draws his wisdom
from Epicharmus and Euhemerus, so Lucretius borrows the
form of his representation from Empedocles, "the most
glorious treasure of the richly gifted Sicilian isle " ; and, as
to the matter, gathers " all the golden words together from
the rolls of Epicurus," "who outshines other wise men as
the sun obscures the stars." Like Ennius, Lucretius dis-
dains the mythological lore with which poetry was over-
loaded by Alexandrinism, and requires nothing from his
reader but a knowledge of the legends generally current.1
In spite of the modern purism which rejected foreign words
from poetry, Lucretius prefers to use, as Ennius had done,
a significant Greek word in place of a feeble and obscure
Latin one. The old Roman alliteration, the want of due
correspondence between the pauses of the verse and those
of the sentence, and generally the older modes of expression
and composition, are still frequently found in Lucretius'
rhythms, and although he handles the verse more melodi-
ously than Ennius, his hexameters move not, as those of
the modern poetical school, with a lively grace like the
rippling brook, but with a stately slowness like the stream of
liquid gold. Philosophically and practically also Lucretius
leans throughout on Ennius, the only indigenous poet whom
his poem celebrates. The confession of faith of the singer
of Rudiae (iii. 175) —
Ego deum genus esse semper dixi et dicam caelitum,
Sed eos non curare opinor, quid agat humanum genus—
describes completely the religious standpoint of Lucretius,
and not unjustly for that reason he himself terms his poem
as it were the continuation of Ennius : —
1 Such an individual apparent exception as Panchaea the land of incense
(ii. 417) is to be explained from the circumstance that this had passed from
the romance of the Travels of Euhemerus already perhaps into the poetry
of Ennius, at any rate into the poems of Lucius Manlius (iv. 242 ; Plin.
H. N. x. 2, 4) and thence was well known to the public for which
Lucretius wrote.
chap, xii LITERATURE, AND ART 475
Ennius ut noster cecinit, qui primus amoeno
Detulit ex Helicone perenni fronde coronam,
Per gentis It alas kominum quae clara clueret.
Once more — and for the last time — the poem of Lucre-
tius is resonant with the whole poetic pride and the whole
poetic earnestness of the sixth century, in which, amidst
the images of the formidable Carthaginian and the glorious
Scipiad, the imagination of the poet is more at home than
in his own degenerate age.1 To him too his own song
" gracefully welling up out of rich feeling " sounds, as com-
pared with the common poems, " like the brief song of the
swan compared with the cry of the crane " ; — with him too
the heart swells, listening to the melodies of its own inven-
tion, with the hope of illustrious honours — just as Ennius
forbids the men to whom he "gave from the depth of the
heart a foretaste of fiery song," to mourn at his, the
immortal singer's, tomb.
It is a remarkable fatality, that this man of extraordinary
talents, far superior in originality of poetic endowments to
most if not to all his contemporaries, fell upon an age in
which he felt himself strange and forlorn, and in conse-
quence of this made the most singular mistake in the
selection of a subject. The system of Epicurus, which
converts the universe into a great vortex of atoms and
undertakes to explain the origin and end of the world as
well as all the problems of nature and of life in a purely
mechanical way, was doubtless somewhat less silly than the
conversion of myths into history which was attempted by
Euhemerus and after him by Ennius ; but it was not an
ingenious or a fresh system, and the task of poetically
unfolding this mechanical view of the world was of such a
nature that never probably did poet expend life and art on
1 This naively appears in the descriptions of war, in which the sea-
storms that destroy armies, and the hosts of elephants that trample down
those who are on their own side — pictures, that is, from the Punic wars-
appear as if they belong to the immediate present. Comp. ii. 41 ; v.
1226, 1303, 1339.
476 RELIGION, CULTURE, book v
a more ungrateful theme. The philosophic reader censures
in the Lucretian didactic poem the omission of the finer
points of the system, the superficiality especially with vhich
controversies are presented, the defective division, the
frequent repetitions, with quite as good reason as *he
poetical reader frets at the mathematics put into rhythm
which makes a great part of the poem absolutely unreadable.
In spite of these incredible defects, before which every
man of mediocre talent must inevitably have succumbed,
this poet might justly boast of having carried off from the
poetic wilderness a new chaplet such as the Muses had not
yet bestowed on any ; and it was by no means merely the
occasional similitudes, and the other inserted descriptions
of mighty natural phenomena and yet mightier passions,
which acquired for the poet this chaplet. The genius
which marks the view of life as well as the poetry of
Lucretius depends on his unbelief, which came forward and
was entitled to come forward with the full victorious power
of truth, and therefore with the full vigour of poetry, in
opposition to the prevailing hypocrisy or superstition.
Humana ante oculos foede cum vita iaceret
In terris oppressa gravi sub religione,
Quae caput a caeli regionibus ostendebat
Horribili super aspectu mortalibus instans,
Primum Graius homo mortalis tendere contra
Est oculos ausus primusque obsistere contra.
Ergo vivida vis animi pervicit, et extra
Processit longe flammantia moenia mundi
Atque omne immensum peragravit mente animoqui.
The poet accordingly was zealous to overthrow the gods,
as Brutus had overthrown the kings, and " to release nature
from her stern lords." But it was not against the long
ago enfeebled throne of Jovis that these flaming words
were hurled ; just like Ennius, Lucretius fights practically
above all things against the wild foreign faiths and super-
stitions of the multitude, the worship of the Great Mother
for instance and the childish lightning-lore of the Etruscans.
:hap. xii LITERATURE, AND ART 477
Horror and antipathy towards that terrible world in general,
n which and for which the poet wrote, suggested his poem.
[t was composed in that hopeless rime when the rule of the
)ligarchy had been overthrown and that of Caesar had not
ret been established, in the sultry years during which the
>utbreak of the civil war was awaited with long and painful
uspense. If we seem to perceive in its unequal and
estless utterance that the poet daily expected to see the
did tumult of revolution break forth over himself and his
rork, we must not with reference to his view of men and
hings forget amidst what men, and in prospect of what
hings, that view had its origin. In the Hellas of the
:poch before Alexander it was a current saying, and one
wofoundly felt by all the best men, that the best thing of
.11 was not to be born, and the next best to die. Of all
iews of the world possible to a tender and poetically
►rganized mind in the kindred Caesarian age this was the
toblest and the most ennobling, that it is a benefit for man
0 be released from a belief in the immortality of the soul
nd thereby from the evil dread of death and of the gods
mich malignantly steals over men like terror creeping over
hildren in a dark room ; that, as the sleep of the night is
nore refreshing than the trouble of the day, so death,
ternal repose from all hope and fear, is better than life, as
ideed the gods A the poet themselves are nothing, and
ave nothing, but an eternal blessed rest ; that the pains
f hell torment man, not after life, but during its course, in
le wild and unruly passions of his throbbing heart ; that
lie task of man is to attune his soul to equanimity, to
steem the purple no higher than the warm dress worn at
ome, rather to remain in the ranks of those that obey than
d press int the confused crowd of candidates for the office
f ruler, rather to lie on the grass beside the brook than to
ike part under the golden ceiling of the rich in emptying
is countless dishes. This philosophico-practical tendency
478 RELIGION, CULTURE, book v
is the true ideal essence of the Lucretian poem and is only
overlaid, not choked, by all the dreariness of its physical
demonstrations. Essentially on this rests its comparative
wisdom and truth. The man who with a reverence for his
great predecessors and a vehement zeal, to which this
century elsewhere knew no parallel, preached such doctrine
and embellished it with the charm of art, may be termed
at once a good citizen and a great poet. The didactic
poem concerning the Nature of Things, however much
in it may challenge censure, has remained one of the most
brilliant stars in the poorly illuminated expanse of Roman
literature ; and with reason the greatest of German philo-
logues chose the task of making the Lucretian poem once
more readable as his last and most masterly work.
The Lucretius, although his poetical vigour as well as his art
fashionable was admhed by his cultivated contemporaries, yet remained
poetry. — of late growth as he was — a master without scholars. In
the Hellenic fashionable poetry on the other hand there
was no lack at least of scholars, who exerted themselves to
emulate the Alexandrian masters. With true tact the more
gifted of the Alexandrian poets avoided larger works and
the pure forms of poetry — the drama, the epos, the lyric ;
the most pleasing and successful performances consisted
with them, just as with the new Latin poets, in " short-
winded " tasks, and especially in such as belonged to the
domains bordering on the pure forms of art, more especially
to the wide field intervening between narrative and song.
Multifarious didactic poems were written. Small half-
heroic, half-erotic epics were great favourites, and especially
an erudite sort of love -elegy peculiar to this autumnal
summer of Greek poetry and characteristic of the philo-
logical source whence it sprang, in which the poet more or
less arbitrarily interwove the description of his own feelings,
predominantly sensuous, with epic shreds from the cycle of
Greek legend. Festal lays were diligently and artfully
chap, xil LITERATURE, AND ART 479
manufactured ; in general, owing to the want of spon-
taneous poetical invention, the occasional poem prepon-
derated and especially the epigram, of which the Alex-
andrians produced excellent specimens. The poverty of
materials and the want of freshness in language and
rhythm, which inevitably cleave to every literature not
national, men sought as much as possible to conceal under
odd themes, far-fetched phrases, rare words and artificial
versification, and generally under the whole apparatus
of philologico-antiquarian erudition and technical dexterity.
Such was the gospel which was preached to the Roman
boys of this period, and they came in crowds to hear and
to practise it; already (about 700) the love-poems of 54.
Euphorion and similar Alexandrian poetry formed the
ordinary reading and the ordinary pieces for declamation
of the cultivated youth.1 The literary revolution took
place ; but it yielded in the first instance with rare excep-
tions only premature or unripe fruits. The number of the
" new-fashioned poets " was legion, but poetry was rare and
Apollo was compelled, as always when so many throng
towards Parnassus, to make very short work. The long
poems never were worth anything, the short ones seldom.
Even in this literary age the poetry of the day had become
a public nuisance ; it sometimes happened that one's friend
would send home to him by way of mockery as a festal
present a pile of trashy verses fresh from the bookseller's
shop, whose value was at once betrayed by the elegant
binding and the smooth paper. A real public, in the
sense in which national literature has a public, was wanting
to the Roman Alexandrians as well as to the Hellenic;
1 "No doubt," says Cicero (Tusc. iii. 19, 45) in reference to Ennius,
"the glorious poet is despised by our reciters of Euphorion." "I have
safely arrived," he writes to Atticus (vii. 2 init.), "as a most favourable
north wind blew for us across from Epirus. This spondaic line you may,
if you choose, sell to one of the new-fashioned poets as your own" (ita
belle nobis Jlavit ab Epiro lenissumus Onchesmites. Hunc airovdeid^ovTa
si cui voUs tu»> vewripwv pro tuo vendito).
480 RELIGION, CULTURE, book v
it was thoroughly the poetry of a clique or rather cliques,
whose members clung closely together, abused intruders»
read and criticised among themselves the new poems,
sometimes also quite after the Alexandrian fashion cele-
brated the successful productions in fresh verses, and
variously sought to secure for themselves by clique-praises
a spurious and ephemeral renown. A notable teacher of
Latin literature, himself poetically active in this new
direction, Valerius Cato appears to have exercised a sort
of scholastic patronage over the most distinguished men
of this circle and to have pronounced final decision on the
relative value of the poems. As compared with their
Greek models, these Roman poets evince throughout a
want of freedom, sometimes a schoolboy dependence;
most of their products must have been simply the austere
fruits of a school poetry still occupied in learning and by
no means yet dismissed as mature. Inasmuch as in
language and in measure they adhered to the Greek
patterns far more closely than ever the national Latin
poetry had done, a greater correctness and consistency in
language and metre were certainly attained \ but it was at
the expense of the flexibility and fulness of the national
idiom. As respects the subject-matter, under the influence
partly of effeminate models, partly of an immoral age,
amatory themes acquired a surprising preponderance little
conducive to poetry ; but the favourite metrical compendia
of the Greeks were also in various cases translated, such
as the astronomical treatise of Aratus by Cicero, and, either
at the end of this or more probably at the commencement
of the following period, the geographical manual of
Eratosthenes by Publius Varro of the Aude and the
physico-medicinal manual of Nicander by Aemilius Macer.
It is neither to be wondered at nor regretted that of this
countless host of poets but few names have been preserved
to us; and even these are mostly mentioned merely as
chap. *u LITERATURE, AND ART 481
curiositKws or as once upon a time great ; such as the
orator Quintus Hortensius with his " five hundred thousand
lines" of tiresome obscenity, and the somewhat more
frequently mentioned Laevius, whose Erotopaegnia attracted
a certain interest only by their complicated measures and
affected phraseology. Even the small epic Smyrna by
Gaius Helvius Cinna (1710?), much as it was praised by 44.
the clique, bears both in its subject — the incestuous love
of a daughter for her father — and in the nine years' toil
bestowed on it the worst characteristics of the time.
Those poets alone of this school constitute an original
and pleasing exception, who knew how to combine with
its neatness and its versatility of form the national elements
of worth still existing in the republican life, especially in
that of the country-towns. To say nothing here of Laberius
and Varro, this description applies especially to the three
poets already mentioned above (p. 140) of the republican
opposition, Marcus Furius Bibaculus (652-691), Gaius 102-63.
Licinius Calvus (672—706) and Quintus Valerius Catullus 82-48.
(667-f. 700). Of the two former, whose writings have 87-54.
perished, we can indeed only conjecture this ; respecting
the poems of Catullus we can still form a judgment. He Catullus,
too depends in subject and form on the Alexandrians.
We find in his collection translations of pieces of Calli-
machus, and these not altogether the very good, but the
very difficult. Among the original pieces, we meet with
elaborately-turned fashionable poems, such as the over-
artificial Galliambics in praise of the Phrygian Mother;
and even the poem, otherwise so beautiful, of the marriage
of Thetis has been artistically spoiled by the truly Alex-
andrian insertion of the complaint of Ariadne in the
principal poem. But by the side of these school -pieces
we meet with the melodious lament of the genuine elegy,
the festal poem in the full pomp of individual and almost
dramatic execution, above all, the freshest miniature
VOL. V 164
482 RELIGION, CULTURE, book v
painting of cultivated social life, the pleasant and very
unreserved amatory adventures of which half the charm
consists in prattling and poetizing about the mysteries
of love, the delightful life of youth with full cups and
empty purses, the pleasures of travel and of poetry, the
Roman and still more frequently the Veronese anecdote
of the town, and the humorous jest amidst the familiar
circle of friends. But not only does Apollo touch the
lyre of the poet, he wields also the bow ; the winged dart
of sarcasm spares neither the tedious verse-maker nor the
provincial who corrupts the language, but it hits none
more frequently and more sharply than the potentates by
whom the liberty of the people is endangered. The short-
lined and merry metres, often enlivened by a graceful
refrain, are of finished art and yet free from the repulsive
smoothness of the manufactory. These poems lead us
alternately to the valleys of the Nile and the Po ; but the
poet is incomparably more at home in the latter. His
poems are based on Alexandrian art doubtless, but at the
same time on the self- consciousness of a burgess and a
burgess in fact of a rural town, on the contrast of Verona
with Rome, on the contrast of the homely municipal with
the high-born lords of the senate who usually maltreat
their humble friends — as that contrast was probably felt
more vividly than anywhere else in Catullus' home, the
flourishing and comparatively vigorous Cisalpine Gaul. The
most beautiful of his poems reflect the sweet pictures of
the Lago di Garda, and hardly at this time could any man
of the capital have written a poem like the deeply pathetic
one on his brother's death, or the excellent genuinely
homely festal hymn for the marriage of Manlius and
Aurunculeia. Catullus, although dependent on the Alex-
andrian masters and standing in the midst of the fashion-
able and clique poetry of that age, was yet not merely a
good scholar among many mediocre and bad ones, but
chap, xil LITERATURE, AND ART 483
himself as much superior to his masters as the burgess of
a free Italian community was superior to the cosmopolitan
Hellenic man of letters. Eminent creative vigour indeed
and high poetic intentions we may not look for in him ; he
is a richly gifted and graceful but not a great poet, and his
poems are, as he himself calls them, nothing but " pleas-
antries and trifles." Yet when we find not merely his con-
temporaries electrified by these fugitive songs, but the art-
critics of the Augustan age also characterizing him along
with Lucretius as the most important poet of this epoch,
his contemporaries as well as their successors were com-
pletely right. The Latin nation has produced no second
poet in whom the artistic substance and the artistic form
appear in so symmetrical perfection as in Catullus ; and in
this sense the collection of the poems of Catullus is
certainly the most perfect which Latin poetry as a whole
can show.
Lastly, poetry in a prose form begins in this epoch. Poems in
The law of genuine naive as well as conscious art, which pr<
had hitherto remained unchangeable — that the poetical
subject-matter and the metrical setting should go together
— gave way before the intermixture and disturbance of all
kinds and forms of art, which is one of the most significant
features of this period. As to romances indeed nothing Romances
farther is to be noticed, than that the most famous historian
of this epoch, Sisenna, did not esteem himself too good to
translate into Latin the much -read Milesian tales of
Aristides — licentious fashionable novels of the most stupid
sort
A more original and more pleasing phenomenon in this Varro's
debateable border-land between poetry and prose was the ^jLn
aesthetic writings of Varro, who was not merely the most
important representative of Latin philologico- historical re-
search, but one of the most fertile and most interesting
authors in belles-lettres. Descended from a plebeian gens
484 RELIGION, CULTURE, book v
which had its home in the Sabine land but had belonged
for the last two hundred years to the Roman senate, strictly
reared in antique discipline and decorum,1 and already at
the beginning of this epoch a man of maturity, Marcus
116-27. Terentius Varro of Reate (638-727) belonged in politics,
as a matter of course, to the cjnstitutional party, and bore
an honourable and energetic part in its doings and suffer-
ings. He supported it, partly in literature — as when he
combated the first coalition, the "three-headed monster," in
pamphlets ; partly in more serious warfare, where we found
him in the army of Pompeius as commandant of Further
Spain (p. 219). When the cause of the republic was lost,
Varro was destined by his conqueror to be librarian of the
library which was to be formed in the capital. The
troubles of the following period drew the old man once
more into their vortex, and it was not till seventeen years
after Caesar's death, in the eighty-ninth year of his well-
occupied life, that death called him away.
Varro's The aesthetic writings, which have made him a name,
were brief essays, some in simple prose and of graver
contents, others humorous sketches the prose groundwork
of which was inlaid with various poetical effusions. The
former were the " philosophico-historical dissertations"
{logistorici), the latter the Menippean Satires. In neither
case did he follow Latin models, and the Satura of Varro in
particular was by no means based on that of Lucilius. In
fact the Roman Satura in general was not properly a fixed
species of art, but only indicated negatively the fact that
the " multifarious poem " was not to be included under any
of the recognized forms of art ; and accordingly the Satura-
poetry assumed in the hands of every gifted poet a different
1 " For me when a boy," he somewhere says, "there sufficed a single
rough coat and a single under-garment, shoes without stockings, a horse
without a saddle ; I had no daily warm bath, and but seldom a river-
bath." On account of his personal valour he obtained in the Piratic war,
where he commanded a division of the fleet, the naval crown.
chap, xii LITERATURE, AND ART 48$
and peculiar character. It was rather in the pre-
Alexandrian Greek philosophy that Varro found the models
for his more severe as well as for his lighter aesthetic
works ; for the graver dissertations, in the dialogues of
Heraclides of Heraclea on the Black Sea (f about 450), 300.
for the satires, in the writings of Menippus of Gadara in
Syria (flourishing about 475). The choice was significant. 280.
Heraclides, stimulated as an author by Plato's philosophic
dialogues, had amidst the brilliance of their form totally lost
sight of the scientific contents and made the poetico-
fabulistic dress the main matter ; he was an agreeable and
largely-read author, but far from a philosopher. Menippus
was quite as little a philosopher, but the most genuine
literary representative of that philosophy whose wisdom
consisted in denying philosophy and ridiculing philosophers^
the cynical wisdom of Diogenes ; a comic teacher of serious
wisdom, he proved by examples and merry sayings that
except an upright life everything is vain in earth and
heaven, and nothing more vain than the disputes of so-
called sages. These were the true models for Varro, a
man full of old Roman indignation at the pitiful times and
full of old Roman humour, by no means destitute withal of
plastic talent, but as to everything which presented the
appearance not of palpable fact, but of idea or even of
system, utterly stupid, and perhaps the most unphilosophical
among the unphilosophical Romans.1 But Varro was no
slavish pupil. The impulse and in general the form he
derived from Heraclides and Menippus ; but his was a
1 There is hardly anything more childish than Varro' s scheme of all the
philosophies, which in the first place summarily declares all systems that
do not propose the happiness of man as their ultimate aim to be non-
existent, and then reckons the number of philosophies conceivable under
this supposition as two hundred and eighty-eight. The vigorous man was
unfortunately too much a scholar to confess that he neither could nor
would be a philosopher, and accordingly as such throughout life he per-
formed a blind dance — not altogether becoming — between the Stoa,
Py thagort anism, and Diogenism.
486
RELIGION, CULTURE,
BOOK V
Varro's
philo-
sophico-
historical
essays.
Varro's
Menippean
satires.
nature too individual and too decidedly Roman not to
keep his imitative creations essentially independent and
national.
For his grave dissertations, in which a moral maxim or
other subject of general interest is handled, he disdained in
his framework to approximate to the Milesian tales, ae
Heraclides had done, and so to serve up to the reader even
childish little stories like those of Abaris and of the maiden
reawakened to life after being seven days dead. But seldom
he borrowed the dress from the nobler myths of the Greeks,
as in the essay " Orestes or concerning Madness " ; history
ordinarily afforded him a worthier frame for his subjects,
more especially the contemporary history of his country, so
that these essays became, as they were called, laudationes
of esteemed Romans, above all of the Coryphaei of the
constitutional party. Thus the dissertation "concerning
Peace " was at the same time a memorial of Metellus Pius,
the last in the brilliant series of successful generals of the
senate ; that " concerning the Worship of the Gods " was at
the same time destined to preserve the memory of the
highly-respected Optimate and Pontifex Gains Curio ; the
essay " on Fate " was connected with Marius, that " on the
Writing of History " with Sisenna the first historian of
this epoch, that " on the Beginnings of the Roman Stage "
with the princely giver of scenic spectacles Scaurus, that
''on Numbers" with the highly -cultured Roman banker
Atticus. The two philosophico-historical essays "Laelius
or concerning Friendship," " Cato or concerning Old Age,"
which Cicero wrote probably after the model of those of
Varro, may give us some approximate idea of Varro's half-
didactic, half-narrative, treatment of these subjects.
The Menippean satire was handled by Varro with equal
originality of form and contents ; the bold mixture of prose
and verse is foreign to the Greek original, and the whole
intellectual contents are pervaded by Roman idiosyncrasy
chap, xil LITERATURE, AND ART 487
— one might say, by a savour of the Sabine soil. These
satires like the philosophico- historical essays handle some
moral or other theme adapted to the larger public, as is
shown by the several titles — Columnae Herculis, -Kf.pl 8o^s;
Evpev rj Ao7ras rb IlaJ/ia, irepl yeya/^KOTwv ; Est Modus
Matulae, irepi fieOrjs ', Papiapapae, irepl eyKw/xtwi'. The
plastic dress, which in this case might not be wanting, is of
course but seldom borrowed from the history of his native
country, as in the satire Serramis, -jrepl apxatpeo-itov. The
Cynic-world of Diogenes on the other hand plays, as might
be expected, a great part j we meet with the Kwkttw/j, the
K.wopprJT(i>p, the iTnroKvwv, the YSpoKvoiv, the KwoSiSao"-
kclXikov and others of a like kind. Mythology is also laid
under contribution for comic purposes ; we find a Prometheus
Liber, an Ajax Stramenticius, a Hercules Socraticus, a
Sesqueulixes who had spent not merely ten but fifteen years
in wanderings. The outline of the dramatic or romantic
framework is still discoverable from the fragments in some
pieces, such as the Prometheus Liber, the Sexagessis, Manius ;
it appears that Varro frequently, perhaps regularly, narrated
the tale as his own experience; e.g. in the Manius the
dramatis personae go to Varro and discourse to him
"because he was known to them as a maker of books."
As to the poetical value of this dress we are no longer
allowed to form any certain judgment ; there still occur in
our fragments several very charming sketches full of wit
and liveliness — thus in the Prometheus Liber the hero after
the loosing of his chains opens a manufactory of men, in
which Goldshoe the rich (Chrysosandatos) bespeaks for
himself a maiden, of milk and finest wax, such as the
Milesian bees gather from various flowers, a maiden without
bones and sinews, without skin or hair, pure and polished,
slim, smooth, tender, charming. The life-breath of this
poetry is polemics — not so much the political warfare of
party, such as Lucilius and Catullus practised, but the
488 RELIGION, CULTURE, book v
general moral antagonism of the stern elderly man to the
unbridled and perverse youth, of the scholar living in the
midst of his classics to the loose and slovenly, or at any
rate in point of tendency reprobate, modern poetry,1 of the
good burgess of the ancient type to the new Rome in which
the Forum, to use Varro's language, was a pigsty and Numa,
if he turned his eyes towards his city, would see no longer
a trace of his wise regulations. In the constitutional
struggle Varro did what seemed to him the duty of a
citizen ; but his heart was not in such party-doings — "why/'
he complains on one occasion, "do ye call me from my
pure life into the filth of your senate-house ? " He belonged
to the good old time, when the talk savoured of onions and
garlic, but the heart was sound. His polemic against the
hereditary foes of the genuine Roman spirit, the Greek
philosophers, was only a single aspect of this old-fashioned
opposition to the spirit of the new times ; but it resulted
both from the nature of the Cynical philosophy and from
the temperament of Varro, that the Menippean lash was
very specially plied round the cars of the philosophers and
put them accordingly into proportional alarm — it was not
without palpitation that the philosophic scribes of the time
transmitted to the " severe man " their newly-issued treatises.
Philosophizing is truly no art. With the tenth part of the
trouble with which a master rears his slave to be a pro-
1 On one occasion he writes, " Quintiporis Clodii foria acpoemata ejus
gargaridians dices ; O for tuna, O fors fortuna I" And elsewhere, "Cum
Quintipor Clodius tot comoedias sine ulla fecerit Musa, ego unum libellum
rum ' edolem ' ut ait Ennius f" This not otherwise known Clodius must have
been in all probability a wretched imitator of Terence, as those words
sarcastically laid at his door ' ' O fortuna, O fors fortuna J ' ' are found
occurring in a Terentian comedy.
The following description of himself by a poet in Varro's "Oos Avpas,
Pacuvi discipulus dicor, porro isfuit Enni,
Ennius Musarum ; Pompilius clueor
might aptly parody the introduction of Lucretius (p. 474), to whom Varro as
a declared enemy of the Epicurean system cannot have been well disposed,
and whom he never quotes.
chap, xn LITERATURE, AND ART 489
fessional baker, he trains himself to be a philosopher ; no
doubt, when the baker and the philosopher both come
under the hammer, the artist of pastry goes off a hundred
times dearer than the sage. Singular people, these philo-
sophers ! One enjoins that corpses be buried in honey —
it is a fortunate circumstance that his desire is not complied
with, otherwise where would any honey -wine be left?
Another thinks that men grow out of the earth like cresses.
A third has invented a world-borer (Koa-fLoropvvrj) by which
the earth will some day be destroyed.
Postremo, nemo aegrotus quicquam somniat
Tarn infandum, quod non aliquis dicat fhilosophus.
It is ludicrous to observe how a Long-beard — by which
is meant an etymologizing Stoic — cautiously weighs every
word in goldsmith's scales ; but there is nothing that sur-
passes the genuine philosophers' quarrel — a Stoic boxing-
match far excels any encounter of athletes. In the satire
Marcopolis, irepl dpxrjs, when Marcus created for himself a
Cloud-Cuckoo-Home after his own heart, matters fared,
just as in the Attic comedy, well with the peasant, but ill
with the philosopher ; the Ce/er-Si'-h'bs-X-q/JL/j.aTos-Xoyo's, son
of Antipater the Stoic, beats in the skull of his opponent —
evidently the philosophic Dilemma — with the mattock.
With this morally polemic tendency and this talent for
embodying it in caustic and picturesque expression, which,
as the dress of dialogue given to the books on Husbandry
written in his eightieth year shows, never forsook him down
to extreme old age, Varro most happily combined an incom-
parable knowledge of the national manners and language,
which is embodied in the philological writings of his old
age after the manner of a commonplace-book, but displays
itself in his Satires in all its direct fulness and freshness.
Varro was in the best and fullest sense of the term a local
antiquarian, who from the personal observation of many
49° RELIGION, CULTURE, book v
years knew his nation in its former idiosyncrasy and secli*
sion as well as in its modern state of transition and dis-
persion, and had supplemented and deepened his direct
knowledge of the national manners and national language
by the most comprehensive research in historical and literary
archives. His partial deficiency in rational judgment and
learning — in our sense of the words — was compensated for
by his clear intuition and the poetry which lived within
him. He sought neither after antiquarian notices nor after
rare antiquated or poetical words j1 but he was himself an
old and old-fashioned man and almost a rustic, the classics
of his nation were his favourite and long-familiar com-
panions ; how could it fail that many details of the manners
of his forefathers, which he loved above all and especially
knew, should be narrated in his writings, and that his dis-
course should abound with proverbial Greek and Latin
phrases, with good old words preserved in the Sabine
conversational language, with reminiscences of Ennius,
Lucilius, and above all of Plautus ? We should not judge
as to the prose style of these aesthetic writings of Varro's
earlier period by the standard of his work on Language
written in his old age and probably published in an un-
finished state, in which certainly the clauses of the sentence
are arranged on the thread of the relative like thrushes on
a string ; but we have already observed that Varro rejected
on principle the effort after a chaste style and Attic periods
(p. 458), and his aesthetic essays, while destitute of the
mean bombast and the spurious tinsel of vulgarism, were
yet written after an unclassic and even slovenly fashion,
in sentences rather directly joined on to each other than
regularly subdivided. The poetical pieces inserted on the
other hand show not merely that their author knew how to
1 He himself once aptly says, that he had no special fondness for
•ntiquated words, but frequently used them, and that he was very fond of
poetical words, but did not use them.
chap, xii LITERATURE, AND ART 49*
mould the most varied measures with as much mastery as
any of the fashionable poets, but that he had a right to
include himself among those to whom a god has granted
the gift of " banishing cares from the heart by song and
sacred poesy."1 The sketches of Varro no more created a
school than the didactic poem of Lucretius ; to the more
general causes which prevented this there falls to be added
their thoroughly individual stamp, which was inseparable
from the greater age, from the rusticity, and even from the
peculiar erudition of their author. But the grace and
humour of the Menippean satires above all, which seem to
have been in number and importance far superior to Varro's
graver works, captivated his contemporaries as well as those
in after times who had any relish for originality and national
1 The following description is taken from the Marcipor ("Slave of
Marcus ") : —
Repente noctis circiter meridie
Cum pictus aer fervidis late ignibus
Caeli chorean astricen ostenderet,
Nubes aquali, frigido velo leves
Caeli cavemas aureas subduxerant,
Aquam vomentes inferam mortalibus.
Ventique frigido se at axe erupcrant,
Phrenetici septentrionum Jilii,
Secum ferentes tegulas, ramos, syrus.
At nos caduci, naufragi, ut ciconiae
Quarum bipennis fulminis plumas vapor
Perussit, alte maesti in terrain cecidimus.
In the 'Av$p(i)Tr6iro\is we find the lines :
Non Jit thesauris, non auro pectu' solutum ;
Non demunt animis curas ac relligiones
Persarum monies, non atria diviii' Crassi.
But the poet was successful also in a lighter vein. In the Est Modus
Matulae there stood the following elegant commendation of wine : —
Vino nihil iucundius quisquam bibit.
Hoc aegritudinem ad medendam invenerunt,
Hoc hilaritatis dulce seminarium,
Hoc continet coagulum convivia.
And in the Koj/ioropiivT] the wanderer returning home thus concludes
his address to the sailors :
Delis habenas animae lent,
Dum nos ventus Jlamine sudo
Suavetn ad patriam perducit.
492 RELIGION, CULTURE, book v
spirit ; and even we, who are no longer permitted to read
them, may still from the fragments preserved discern in
some measure that the writer " knew how to laugh and how
to jest in moderation." And as the last breath of the good
spirit of the old burgess-times ere it departed, as the latest
fresh growth which the national Latin poetry put forth, the
Satires of Varro deserved that the poet in his poetical
testament should commend these his Menippean children
to every one "who had at heart the prosperity of Rome
and of Latium "; and they accordingly retain an honourable
place in the literature as in the history of the Italian people.1
1 The sketches of Varro have so uncommon historical and even
poetical significance, and are yet, in consequence of the fragmentary
shape in which information regarding them has reached us, known to so
few and so irksome to study, that we may be allowed to give in this place
a rfoumt of some of them with the few restorations indispensable for
making them readable.
The satire Manius (Early Up!) describes the management of a rural
household. "Manius summons his people to rise with the sun, and in
person conducts them to the scene of their work. The youths make their
own bed, which labour renders soft to them, and supply themselves with
water-jar and lamp. Their drink is the clear fresh spring, their fare bread,
and onions as relish. Everything prospers in house and field. The
house is no work of art ; but an architect might learn symmetry from it.
Care is taken of the field, that it shall not be left disorderly and waste, 01
go to ruin through slovenliness and neglect ; in return the grateful Ceres
wards off damage from the produce, that the high-piled sheaves may
gladden the heart of the husbandman. Here hospitality still holds good ;
every one who has but imbibed mother's milk is welcome. The bread-
pantry and wine -vat and the store of sausages on the rafters, lock and
key are at the sendee of the traveller, and piles of food are set before
him ; contented sits the sated guest, looking neither before nor behind,
dozing by the hearth in the kitchen. The warmest double -wool sheep-
skin is spread as a couch for him. Here people still as good burgesses
obey the righteous law, which neither out of envy injures the innocent,
nor out of favour pardons the guilty. Here they speak no evil agains*.
their neighbours. Here they trespass not with their feet on the sacred
hearth, but honour the gods with devotion and with sacrifices, throw for
the house-spirit his little bit of flesh into his appointed little dish, and
when the master of the household dies, accompany the bier with the same
prayer with which those of his father and of his grandfather were borne
forth."
In another satire there appears a ' ' Teacher of the Old "
(TepovTodiSd<TKa\os), of whom the degenerate age seems to stand more
urgently in need than of the teacher of youth, and he explains how " once
everything in Rome was chaste and pious," and now all things are so
entirely changed. ' ' Do my eyes deceive me, or do I see slaves in arms
chap, xil LITERATURE, AND ART 493
The critical writing of history, after the manner in which Historical
the Attic authors wrote the national history in their classic ^0^>p0SI"
period and in which Polybius wrote the history of the world,
was never properly developed in Rome. Even in the field
most adapted for it — the representation of contemporary
and of recently past events — there was nothing, on the
whole, but more or less inadequate attempts ; in the epoch
especially from Sulla to Caesar the not very important con-
tributions, which the previous epoch had to show in this
field — the labours of Antipater and Asellius — were barely
even equalled. The only work of note belonging to this Sisenn*
field, which arose in the present epoch, was the history of
the Social and Civil Wars by Lucius Cornelius Sisenna
against their masters ? — Formerly every one who did not present himself
for the levy, was sold on the part of the state into slavery abroad ; now
the censor who allows cowardice and everything to pass is called [by the
aristocracy, iii. 10; iv. 125, 380; p. 148] a great citizen, and earns praise
because he does not seek to make himself a name by annoying his fellow-
citizens. — Formerly the Roman husbandman had his beard shaven once
every week ; now the rural slave cannot have it fine enough. — Formerly one
saw on the estates a corn-granary, which held ten harvests, spacious cellars
for the wine-vats and corresponding wine-presses ; now the master keeps
flocks of peacocks, and causes his doors to be inlaid with African cypress-
wood. — Formerly the housewife turned the spindle with the hand and kept
at the same time the pot on the hearth in her eye, that the pottage might
not be singed ; now," it is said in another satire, " the daughter begs her
father for a pound of precious stones, and the wife her husband for a bushel
of pearls. — Formerly a newly-married husband was silent and bashful ; now
the wife surrenders herself to the first coachman that comes. — Formerly the
blessing of children was woman's pride ; now if her husband desires for
himself children, she replies : Knowest thou not what Ennius says ?
Ter sub armis malim vitam cernere
Quam semel modo parere. —
Formerly the wife was quite content, when the husband once or twice
in the year gave her a trip to the country in the uncushioned waggon ; "
now, he could add (comp. Cicero, Pro Mil. 21, 55), the wife sulks if her
husband goes to his country estate without her, and the travelling lady
is attended to the villa by the fashionable host of Greek menials and the
choir. — In a treatise of a graver kind, ' ' Catus or the Training of
Children," Varro not only instructs the friend who had asked him for
advice on that point, regarding the gods who were according to old usage
to be sacrificed to for the children's welfare, but, referring to the more
judicious mode of rearing children among the Persians and to his own
strictly spent youth, he warns against over-feeding and over-sleeping,
against sweet bread and fine fare — the whelps, the old man thinks, are
494 RELIGION, CULTURE, . book v
78. (praetor in 676). Those who had read it testify that it far
excelled in liveliness and readableness the old dry
chronicles, but was written withal in a style thoroughly
impure and even degenerating into puerility ; as indeed the
few remaining fragments exhibit a paltry painting of
horrible details,1 and a number of words newly coined or
derived from the language of conversation. When it is
added that the author's model and, so to speak, the only
Greek historian familiar to him was Clitarchus, the author
of a biography of Alexander the Great oscillating between
history and fiction in the manner of the semi-romance
which bears the name of Curtius, we shall not hesitate to
recognize in Sisenna's celebrated historical work, not a
now fed more judiciously than the children — and likewise against the
enchantresses' charms and blessings, which in cases of sickness so often
take the place of the physician's counsel. He advises to keep the girls at
embroidery, that they may afterwards understand how to judge properly
of embroidered and textile work, and not to allow them to put off the
child's dress too early ; he warns against carrying boys to the gladiatorial
games, in which the heart is early hardened and cruelty learned. — In the
"Man of Sixty Years" Varro appears as a Roman Epimenides who had
fallen asleep when a boy of ten and waked up again after half a century.
He is astonished to find instead of his smooth-shorn boy's head an old
bald pate with an ugly snout and savage bristles like a hedgehog ; but he
is still more astonished at the change in Rome. Lucrine oysters, formerly
a wedding dish, are now everyday fare ; for which, accordingly, the
bankrupt glutton silently prepares the incendiary torch. While formerly
the father disposed of his boy, now the disposal is transferred to the
latter : he disposes, forsooth, of his father by poison. The comitium had
become an exchange, the criminal trial a mine of gold for the jurymen.
No law is any longer obeyed save only this one, that nothing is given for
nothing. All virtues have vanished ; in their stead the awakened man is
saluted by impiety, perfidy, lewdness, as new denizens. "Alas for thee,
Marcus, with such a sleep and such an awakening I " — The sketch
S7. resembles the Catilinarian epoch, shortly after which (about 697) the old
man must have written it, and there lay a truth in the bitter turn at the
close ; where Marcus, properly reproved for his unseasonable accusations
and antiquarian reminiscences, is — with a mock application of a primitive
Roman custom — dragged as a useless old man to the bridge and thrown
into the Tiber. There was certainly no longer room for such men in
Rome.
1 "The innocent," so ran a speech, "thou draggest forth, trembling
in every limb, and on the high margin of the river's Lank in the dawn of
the morning" [thou causest them to be slaughtered]. Several such
phrases, that might be inserted without difficulty in a commonplace novel,
occur.
chap. XII LITERATURE, AND ART 495
product of genuine historical criticism and art, but the
first Roman essay in that hybrid mixture of history and
romance so much a favourite with the Greeks, which desires
to make the groundwork of facts life-like and interesting by
means of fictitious details and thereby makes it insipid and
untrue ; and it will no longer excite surprise that we meet
with the same Sisenna also as translator of Greek fashion-
able romances (p. 483).
That the prospect should be still more lamentable in the Annals oi
field of the general annals of the city and even of the world, l e Clty"
was implied in the nature of the case. The increasing
activity of antiquarian research induced the expectation that
the current narrative would be rectified from documents
and other trustworthy sources ; but this hope was not ful-
filled. The more and the deeper men investigated, the
more clearly it became apparent what a task it was to write
a critical history of Rome. The difficulties even, which
opposed themselves to investigation and narration, were
immense ; but the most dangerous obstacles were not those
of a literary kind. The conventional early history of Rome,
as it had now been narrated and believed for at least ten
generations, was most intimately mixed up with the civil
life of the nation ; and yet in any thorough and honest
inquiry not only had details to be modified here and there,
but the whole building had to be overturned as much as
the Franconian primitive history of king Pharamund or the
British of king Arthur. An inquirer of conservative views,
such as was Varro for instance, could have no wish to put his
hand to such a work; and if a daring freethinker had
undertaken it, an outcry would have been raised by all good
citizens against this worst of all revolutionaries, who was
preparing to deprive the constitutional party even of their
past Thus philological and antiquarian research deterred
from the writing of history rather than conduced towards it
Varro and the more sagacious men in general evidently gave
496 RELIGION, CULTURE, book \
up the task of annals as hopeless; at the most they
arranged, as did Titus Pomponius Atticus, the official and
gentile lists in unpretending tabular shape — a work by
which the synchronistic Graeco- Roman chronology was
finally brought into the shape in which it was conventionally
fixed for posterity. But the manufacture of city-chronicles
of course did not suspend its activity; it continued to
supply its contributions both in prose and verse to the
great library written by ennui for ennui, while the makers
of the books, in part already freedmen, did not trouble
themselves at all about research properly so called. Such
of these writings as are mentioned to us — not one of them
is preserved — seem to have been not only of a wholly
secondary character, but in great part even pervaded by
interested falsification. It is true that the chronicle of
78! Quintus Claudius Quadrigarius (about 676?) was written
in an old-fashioned but good style, and studied at least a
commendable brevity in the representation of the fabulous
66. period. Gaius Licinius Macer (f as late praetor in 688),
father of the poet Calvus (p. 481), and a zealous democrat,
laid claim more than any other chronicler to documentary
research and criticism, but his libri lintei and other matters
peculiar to him are in the highest degree suspicious, and an
interpolation of the whole annals in the interest of demo-
cratic tendencies — an interpolalion of a very extensive kind,
and which has passed over in part to the later annalists —
is probably traceable to him.
Valerius Lastly, Valerius Antias excelled all his predecessors in
Antlas. ... 11 •
prolixity as well as in puerile story-telling. The falsification
of numbers was here systematically carried out down even to
contemporary history, and the primitive history of Rome was
elaborated once more from one form of insipidity to another •
for instance the narrative of the way in which the wise Numa
according to the instructions of the nymph Egeria caught
the gods Faunus and Picus with wine, and the beautiful
chap. XII LITERATURE, AND ART 497
conversation thereupon held by the same Numa with the
god Jupiter, cannot be too urgently recommended to all
worshippers of the so-called legendary history of Rome in
order that, if possible, they may believe these things — of
course, in substance. It would have been a marvel if the
Greek novel-writers of this period had allowed such
materials, made as if for their use, to escape them. In fact
there were not wanting Greek literati, who worked up the
Roman history into romances ; such a composition, for
instance, was the Five Books " Concerning Rome " of the
Alexander Polyhistor already mentioned among the Greek
literati living in Rome (p. 460), a preposterous mixture of
vapid historical tradition and trivial, principally erotic, fiction.
He, it may be presumed, took the first steps towards fill-
ing up the five hundred years, which were wanting to bring
the destruction of Troy and the origin of Rome into the
chronological connection required by the fables on either
side, with one of those lists of kings without achievements
which are unhappily familiar to the Egyptian and Greek
chroniclers ; for, to all appearance, it was he that launched
into the world the kings Aventinus and Tiberinus and the
Alban gens of the Silvii, whom the following times accord-
ingly did not neglect to furnish in detail with name, period
of reigning, and, for the sake of greater definiteness, also
a portrait.
Thus from various sides the historical romance of the
Greeks finds its way into Roman historiography ; and it is
more than probable that not the least portion of what we
are accustomed nowadays to call tradition of the Roman
primitive times proceeds from sources of the stamp of
Amadis of Gaul and the chivalrous romances of Fouque* —
an edifying consideration, at least for those who have a
relish for the humour of history and who know how to
appreciate the comical aspect of the piety still cherished in
certain circles of the nineteenth century for king Numa,
VOL. V 165
100-30.
498 RELIGION, CULTURE, book v
Universal A novelty in the Roman literature of this period is the
story. appearance of universal history or, to speak more correctly,
of Roman and Greek history conjoined, alongside of the
Nepos. native annals. Cornelius Nepos from Ticinum (c. 650— c.
725) first supplied an universal chronicle (published before
54. 700) and a general collection of biographies — arranged
according to certain categories — of Romans and Greeks
distinguished in politics or literature or of men at any rate
who exercised influence on the Roman or Greek history.
These works are of a kindred nature with the universal
histories which the Greeks had for a considerable time been
composing ; and these very Greek world-chronicles, such as
that of Kastor son-in-law of the Galatian king Deiotarus,
66. concluded in 698, now began to include in their range the
Roman history which previously they had neglected.
These works certainly attempted, just like Polybius, to
substitute the history of the Mediterranean world for the
more local one ; but that which in Polybius was the result
of a grand and clear conception and deep historical feeling
was in these chronicles rather the product of the practical
exigencies of school and self- instruction. These general
chronicles, text-books for scholastic instruction or manuals
for reference, and the whole literature therewith connected
which subsequently became very copious in the Latin
language also, can hardly be reckoned as belonging to
artistic historical composition ; and Nepos himself in
particular was a pure compiler distinguished neither by
spirit nor even merely by symmetrical plan.
The historiography of this period is certainly remarkable
and in a high degree characteristic, but it is as far from
pleasing as the age itself. The interpenetration of Greek
and Latin literature is in no field so clearly apparent as in
that of history ; here the respective literatures become
earliest equalized in matter and form, and the conception
of Helleno-Italic history as an unity, in which Polybius
HAP. xii LITERATURE, AND ART 499
ras so far in advance of his age, was now learned even
y Greek and Roman boys at school. But while the
lediterranean state had found a historian before it had
ecome conscious of its own existence, now, when that
onsciousness had been attained, there did not arise either
tnong the Greeks or among the Romans any man who
as able to give to it adequate expression. " There is no
jch thing," says Cicero, "as Roman historical composi-
on " ; and, so far as we can judge, this is no more than
le simple truth. The man of research turns away from
riting history, the writer of history turns away from
isearch ; historical literature oscillates between the
moolbook and the romance. All the species of pure art
-epos, drama, lyric poetry, history — are worthless in this
orthless world ; but in no species is the intellectual
scay of the Ciceronian age reflected with so terrible a
earness as in its historiography.
The minor historical literature of this period displays on Literature
le other hand, amidst many insignificant and forgotten toi^f17
roductions, one treatise of the first rank — the Memoirs of
aesar, or rather the Military Report of the democratic Caesar's
meral to the people from whom he had received his ePOIt•
>mmission. The finished section, and that which alone
as published by the author himself, describing the Celtic
impaigns down to 702, is evidently designed to justify as 52.
ell as possible before the public the formally unconstitu-
anal enterprise of Caesar in conquering a great country
id constantly increasing his army for that object without
structions from the competent authority ; it was written
id given forth in 703, when the storm broke out against 61.
aesar in Rome and he was summoned to dismiss his
my and answer for his conduct.1 The author of this
1 That the treatise on the Gallic war was published all at once, has
en long conjectured ; the distinct proof that it was so, is furnished by the
ention of the equalization of the Boii and the Haedui already in the first
10k (c. 28) whereas the Boii still occur in the seventh (c. 10) as tributary
500 RELIGION, CULTURE, book v
vindication writes, as he himself says, entirely as an officer
and carefully avoids extending his military report to the
hazardous departments of political organization and adminis-
tration. His incidental and partisan treatise cast in the
form of a military report is itself a piece of history like the
bulletins of Napoleon, but it is not, and was not intended
to be, a historical work in the true sense of the word ; the
objective form which the narrative assumes is that of the
magistrate, not that of the historian. But in this modest
character the work is masterly and finished, more than any
other in all Roman literature. The narrative is always
terse and never scanty, always simple and never careless,
always of transparent vividness and never strained or
affected. The language is completely pure from archaisms
and from vulgarisms — the type of the modern urbanitas.
In the Books concerning the Civil War we seem to feel
that the author had desired to avoid war and could not
avoid it, and perhaps also that in Caesar's soul, as in every
other, the period of hope was a purer and fresher one than
that of fulfilment ; but over the treatise on the Gallic war
there is diffused a bright serenity, a simple charm, which
are no less unique in literature than Caesar is in history.
subjects of the Haedui, and evidently only obtained equal rights with their
former masters on account of their conduct and that of the Haedui in the
war against Vercingetorix. On the other hand any one who attentively
follows the history of the time will find in the expression as to the Milonian
crisis (vii. 6) a proof that the treatise was published before the outbreak
of the civil war ; not because Pompeius is there praised, but because
62. Caesar there approves the exceptional laws of 702 (p. 146). This he
might and could not but do, so long as he sought to bring about a
peaceful accommodation with Pompeius (p. 175), but not after the rupture,
when he reversed the condemnations that took place on the basis of those
laws injurious for him (p. 316). Accordingly the publication of this
SI. treatise has been quite rightly placed in 703.
The tendency of the work we discern most distinctly in the constant,
often — most decidedly, doubtless, in the case of the Aquitanian expedition
iii. 1 1 — not successful, justification of every single act of war as a defensive
measure which the state of things had rendered inevitable. That the
adversaries of Caesar censured his attacks on the Celts and Germans
above all as unprovoked, is well known (Sueton. Caes. 24).
iap. xii LITERATURE, AND ART 501
Of a kindred nature were the letters interchanged Corre-
:tween the statesmen and literati of this period, which spoR ence*
ire carefully collected and published in the following
>och; such as the correspondence of Caesar himself, of
icero, Calvus and others. They can still less be numbered
aong strictly literary performances ; but this literature of
irrespondence was a rich store-house for historical as for
1 other research, and the most faithful mirror of an epoch
which so much of the worth of past times and so much
irit, cleverness, and talent were evaporated and dissipated
trifling.
A journalist literature in the modern sense was never
:med in Rome ; literary warfare continued to be confined
the writing of pamphlets and, along with this, to the
stom generally diffused at that time of annotating the
tices destined Lr the public in places of resort with the
ncil or the pen. On the other hand subordinate persons
:re employed to note down the events of the day and
ws of the city for the absent men of quality ; and Caesar
early as his first consulship took fitting measures for the
mediate publication of an extract from the transactions
the senate. From the private journals of those Roman
nny-a-liners and these official current reports there arose
;ort of news-sheet for the capital {acta diurna), in which News-
sheet
1 resume of the business discussed before the people and
the senate, and births, deaths, and such like were
:orded. This became a not unimportant source for
itory, but remained without proper political as without
srary significance.
To subsidiary historical literature belongs of right also Speeches
; composition of orations. The speech, whether written
wn or not, is in its nature ephemeral and does not
long to literature; but it may, like the report and the
ter, and indeed still more readily than these, come to be
:luded, through the significance of the moment and the
5Q2 RELIGION, CULTURE, book v
power of the mind from which it springs, among the
permanent treasures of the national literature. Thus in
Rome the records of orations of a political tenor delivered
before the burgesses or the jurymen had for long played a
great part in public life ; and not only so, but the speeches
of Gaius Gracchus in particular were justly reckoned among
Decline of the classical Roman writings. But in this epoch a singular
oratory. change occurred on all hands. The composition of
political speeches was on the decline like political speaking
itself. The political speech in Rome, as generally in the
ancient polities, reached its culminating point in the
discussions before the burgesses ; here the orator was not
fettered, as in the senate, by collegiate considerations and
burdensome forms, nor, as in the judicial addresses, by the
interests — in themselves foreign to politics — of the
accusation and defence; here alone his heart swelled
proudly before the whole great and mighty Roman people
hanging on his lips. But all this was now gone. Not as
though there was any lack of orators or of the publishing
of speeches delivered before the burgesses ; on the contrary
political authorship only now waxed copious, and it began
to become a standing complaint at table that the host
incommoded his guests by reading before them his latest
orations. Publius Clodius had his speeches to the people
issued as pamphlets, just like Gaius Gracchus; but two
men may do the same thing without producing the same
effect. The more important leaders even of the opposition,
especially Caesar himself, did not often address the
burgesses, and no longer published the speeches which
they delivered ; indeed they partly sought for their political
fugitive writings another form than the traditional one of
contiones, in which respect more especially the writings
praising and censuring Cato (p. 321) are remarkable.
This is easily explained. Gaius Gracchus had addressed
the burgesses ; now men addressed the populace ; and as
iap. xii LITERATURE, AND ART 503
ie audience, so was the speech. No wonder that the
putable political author shunned a dress which implied
lat he had directed his words to the crowd assembled in
ie market-place of the capital.
While the composition of orations thus declined from Rise of a
ljtp r* 1 til t* f*
5 former literary and political value in the same way as 0fpiead-
1 branches of literature which were the natural growth of inSs-
te national life, there began at the same time a singular,
Dn-political, literature of pleadings. Hitherto the Romans
id known nothing of the idea that the address of an
Ivocate as such was destined not only for the judges and
ie parties, but also for the literary edification of contem-
Draries and posterity ; no advocate had written down and
jblished his pleadings, unless they were possibly at the
irae time political orations and in so far were fitted to be
rculated as party writings, and this had not occurred very
equently. Even Quintus Hortensius (640-704), the 114-50.
lost celebrated Roman advocate in the first years of this
sriod, published but few speeches and these apparently
nly such as were wholly or half political. It was his Cicero.
lccessor in the leadership of the Roman bar, Marcus
ullius Cicero (648-711) who was from the outset quite 106-43.
5 much author as forensic orator; he published his
leadings regularly, even when they were not at all or but
miotely connected with politics. This was a token, not
f progress, but of an unnatural and degenerate state of
lings. Even in Athens the appearance of non-political
leadings among the forms of literature was a sign of
ebility ; and it was doubly so in Rome, which did not like
Lthens by a sort of necessity produce this malformation
om the exaggerated pursuit of rhetoric, but borrowed it
om abroad arbitrarily and in antagonism to the better
raditions of the nation. Yet this new species of literature
ame rapidly into vogue, partly because it had various
oints of contact and coincidence with the earlier authorship
504 RELIGION, CULTURE, book v
of political orations, partly because the unpoetic, dog-
matical, rhetorizing temperament of the Romans offered a
favourable soil for the new seed, as indeed at the present
day the speeches of advocates and even a sort of literature
of law-proceedings are of some importance in Italy.
Hi* Thus oratorical authorship emancipated from politics
cll3.r3.CtGr.
was naturalized in the Roman literary world by Cicero
We have already had occasion several times to mention
this many-sided man. As a statesman without insight,
idea, or purpose, he figured successively as democrat, as
aristocrat, and as a tool of the monarchs, and was never
more than a short-sighted egotist. Where he exhibited
the semblance of action, the questions to which his action
applied had, as a rule, just reached their solution ; thus
he came forward in the trial of Verres against the senatorial
courts when they were already set aside ; thus he was silent
at the discussion on the Gabinian, and acted as a champion
of the Manilian, law ; thus he thundered against Catilina
when his departure was already settled, and so forth. He
was valiant in opposition to sham attacks, and he knocked
down many walls of pasteboard with a loud din ; no serious
matter was ever, either in good or evil, decided by him, and
the execution of the Catilinarians in particular was far more
due to his acquiescence than to his instigation. In a liter-
ary point of view we have already noticed that he was the
creator of the modern Latin prose (p. 456) ; his importance
rests on his mastery of style, and it is only as a stylist that
he shows confidence in himself. In the character of an
author, on the other hand, he stands quite as low as in
that of a statesman. He essayed the most varied tasks,
sang the great deeds of Marius and his own petty achieve-
ments in endless hexameters, beat Demosthenes off the
field with his speeches, and Plato with his philosophic
dialogues; and time alone was wanting for him to vanquish
also- Thucydides. He was in fact so thoroughly a dabbler,
jap. xii LITERATURE, AND ART 505
iat it was pretty much a matter of indifference to what
ork he applied his hand. By nature a journalist in the
orst sense of that term — abounding, as he himself says, in
ords, poor beyond all conception in ideas — there was no
epartment in which he could not with the help of a few
ooks have rapidly got up by translation or compilation a
jadable essay. His correspondence mirrors most faithfully
is character. People are in the habit of calling it interest-
ig and clever ; and it is so, as long as it reflects the urban
r villa life of the world of quality ; but where the writer is
irown on his own resources, as in exile, in Cilicia, and
fter the battle of Pharsalus, it is stale and empty as was
ver the soul of a feuilletonist banished from his familiar
ircles. It is scarcely needful to add that such a states-
lan and such a litterateur could not, as a man, exhibit
tight else than a thinly varnished superficiality and heart-
sssness. Must we still describe the orator ? The great
uthor is also a great man ; and in the great orator more
specially conviction or passion flows forth with a clearer
nd more impetuous stream from the depths of the breast
lan in the scantily-gifted many who merely count and are
othing. Cicero had no conviction and no passion ; he was
othing but an advocate, and not a good one. He under-
tood how to set forth his narrative of the case with
iquancy of anecdote, to excite, if not the feeling, at any
ite the sentimentality of his hearers, and to enliven the
ry business of legal pleading by cleverness or witticisms
lostly of a personal sort ; his better orations, though they
re far from coming up to the free gracefulness and the
are point of the most excellent compositions of this sort,
)r instance the Memoirs of Beaumarchais, yet form easy and
greeable reading. But while the very advantages just
idicated will appear to the serious judge as advantages of
ery dubious value, the absolute want of political discern-
lent in the orations on constitutional questions and of
506 RELIGION, CULTURE, book v
juristic deduction in the forensic addresses, the egotism
forgetful of its duty and constantly losing sight of the cause
while thinking of the advocate, the dreadful barrenness of
thought in the Ciceronian orations must revolt every reader
of feeling and judgment.
Jcco- If there is anything wonderful in the case, it is in truth
nianism. not ^e orationSj Dut the admiration which they excited.
As to Cicero every unbiassed person will soon make up
his mind : Ciceronianism is a problem, which in fact
cannot be properly solved, but can only be resolved into
that greater mystery of human nature — language and the
effect of language on the mind. Inasmuch as the noble
Latin language, just before it perished as a national idiom,
was once more as it were comprehensively grasped by that
dexterous stylist and deposited in his copious writings,
something of the power which language exercises, and of
the piety which it awakens, was transferred to the unworthy
vessel. The Romans possessed no great Latin prose-
writer ; for Caesar was, like Napoleon, only incidentally an
author. Was it to be wondered at that, in the absence of
such an one, they should at least honour the genius of the
language in the great stylist ? and that, like Cicero himself,
Cicero's readers also should accustom themselves to ask not
what, but how he had written ? Custom and the school-
master then completed what the power of language had
begun.
Opposition Cicero's contemporaries however were, as may readily
be conceived, far less involved in this strange idolatry than
many of their successors. The Ciceronian manner ruled no
doubt throughout a generation the Roman advocate-world,
just as the far worse manner of Hortensius had done ; but
the most considerable men, such as Caesar, kept themselves
always aloof from it, and among the younger generation
there arose in all men of fresh and living talent the most
decided opposition to that hybrid and feeble rhetoric
nianism.
chap, xil LITERATURE, AND ART 507
They found Cicero's language deficient in precision and
chasteness, his jests deficient in liveliness, his arrangement
deficient in clearness and articulate division, and above all
his whole eloquence wanting in the fire which makes the
orator. Instead of the Rhodian eclectics men began to
recur to the genuine Attic orators, especially to Lysias and Calvus
Demosthenes, and sought to naturalize a more vigorous and and his
3SSOC13.tCS
masculine eloquence in Rome. Representatives of this
tendency were, the solemn but stiff Marcus Junius Brutus
(669-712); the two political partisans Marcus Caelius 85-42.
Rufus (672-706; p. 317) and Gaius Scribonius Curio 82-48.
(t 705; p. 183, 233) — both as orators full of spirit and 49.
life; Calvus well known also as a poet (672 — 706), the 82-48.
literary coryphaeus of this younger group of orators ; and
the earnest and conscientious Gaius Asinius Pollio (678- 76-4 a.d.
757). Undeniably there was more taste and more spirit in
this younger oratorical literature than in the Hortensian
and Ciceronian put together ; but we are not able to judge
how far, amidst the storms of the revolution which rapidly
swept away the whole of this richly-gifted group with the
single exception of Pollio, those better germs attained
development. The time allotted to them was but too brief.
The new monarchy began by making war on freedom of
speech, and soon wholly suppressed the political oration.
Thenceforth the subordinate species of the pure advocate-
pleading was doubtless still retained in literature ; but the
higher art and literature of oratory, which thoroughly
depend on political excitement, perished with the latter of
necessity and for ever.
Lastly there sprang up in the aesthetic literature of this The
period the artistic treatment of subjects of professional a^dal
. . dialogue
science in the form of the stylistic dialogue, which had been applied to
very extensively in use among the Greeks and had been ^j^
already employed also in isolated cases among the Romans sciences
(iv. 251). Cicero especially made various attempts at pre-
5°8 RELIGION, CULTURE, book V
Cicero's senting rhetorical and philosophical subjects in this form and
ogues- making the professional manual a suitable book for reading.
65. His chief writings are the De Oratore (written in 699), to
which the history of Roman eloquence (the dialogue Brutus,
46. written in 708) and other minor rhetorical essays were
added by way of supplement ; and the treatise De Republicct
64. (written in 700), with which the treatise De Legibus (written
52? in 702 ?) after the model of Plato is brought into connec-
tion. They are no great works of art, but undoubtedly
they are the works in which the excellences of the author
are most, and his defects least, conspicuous. The rhetorical
writings are far from coming up to the didactic chasteness
of form and precision of thought of the Rhetoric dedicated
to Herennius, but they contain instead a store of practical
forensic experience and forensic anecdotes of all sorts
easily and tastefully set forth, and in fact solve the
problem of combining didactic instruction with amuse-
ment. The treatise De Republic^, carries out, in a singular
mongrel compound of history and philosophy, the leading
idea that the existing constitution of Rome is substantially
the ideal state-organization sought for by the philosophers ;
an idea indeed just as unphilosophical as unhistorical, and
besides not even peculiar to the author, but which, as may
readily be conceived, became and remained popular. The
scientific groundwork of these rhetorical and political writings
of Cicero belongs of course entirely to the Greeks, and many
of the details also, such as the grand concluding effect in
the treatise De Republic^ the Dream of Scipio, are directly
borrowed from them ; yet they possess comparative origin-
ality, inasmuch as the elaboration shows throughout Roman
local colouring, and the proud consciousness of political life,
which the Roman was certainly entitled to feel as compared
with the Greeks, makes the author even confront his Greek
instructors with a certain independence. The form of
Cicero's dialogue is doubtless neither the genuine inter-
chap, xii LITERATURE, AND ART 509
rogative dialectics of the best Greek artificial dialogue nor
the genuine conversational tone of Diderot or Lessing ; but
the great groups of advocates gathering around Crassus and
Antonius and of the older and younger statesmen of the
Scipionic circle furnish a lively and effective framework,
fitting channels for the introduction of historical references
and anecdotes, and convenient resting-points for the scien-
tific discussion. The style is quite as elaborate and
polished as in the best- written orations, and so far more
pleasing than these, since the author does not often in this
field make a vain attempt at pathos.
While these rhetorical and political writings of Cicero
with a philosophic colouring are not devoid of merit, the
compiler on the other hand completely failed, when in the
involuntary leisure of the last years of his life (709-710) 45-44.
he applied himself to philosophy proper, and with equal
peevishness and precipitation composed in a couple of
months a philosophical library. The receipt was very
simple. In rude imitation of the popular writings of
Aristotle, in which the form of dialogue was employed
chiefly for the setting forth and criticising of the different
older systems, Cicero stitched together the Epicurean,
Stoic, and Syncretist writings handling the same problem,
as they came or were given to his hand, into a so-called
dialogue. And all that he did on his own part was, to
supply an introduction prefixed to the new book from the
ample collection of prefaces for future works which he had
beside him ; to impart a certain popular character, inasmuch
as he interwove Roman examples and references, and
sometimes digressed to subjects irrelevant but more familiar
to the writer and the reader, such as the treatment of the
deportment of the orator in the De Officii s ; and to exhibit
that sort of bungling, which a man of letters, who has not
attained to philosophic thinking or even to philosophic
knowledge and who works rapidly and boldly, shows in the
5i°
RELIGION, CULTURE,
BOOK V
Profes-
sional
sciences.
Latin
philology,
Varro.
67.
reproduction of dialectic trains of thought. In this way
no doubt a multitude of thick tomes might very quickly
come into existence — "They are copies," wrote the author
himself to a friend who wondered at his fertility; "they
give me little trouble, for I supply only the words and
these I have in abundance." Against this nothing further
could be said ; but any one who seeks classical productions
in works so written can only be advised to study in literary
matters a becoming silence.
Of the sciences only a single one manifested vigorous
life, that of Latin philology. The scheme of linguistic and
antiquarian research within the domain of the Latin race,
planned by Silo, was carried out especially by his disciple
Varro on the grandest scale. There appeared compre-
hensive elaborations of the whole stores of the language,
more especially the extensive grammatical commentaries of
Figulus and the great work of Varro De Lingua Latina ;
monographs on grammar and the history of the language,
such as Varro's writings on the usage of the Latin language,
on synonyms, on the age of the letters, on the origin of the
Latin tongue ; scholia on the older literature, especially on
Plautus; works of literary history, biographies of poets,
investigations into the earlier drama, into the scenic division
of the comedies of Plautus, and into their genuineness.
Latin archaeology, which embraced the whole older history
and the ritual law apart from practical jurisprudence, was
comprehended in Varro's "Antiquities of Things Human
and Divine," which was and for all times remained the
fundamental treatise on the subject (published between
45. 687 and 709). The first portion, "Of Things Human,"
described the primeval age of Rome, the divisions of city
and country, the sciences of the years, months, and days,
lastly, the public transactions at home and in war ; in the
second half, "Of Things Divine," the state -theology, the
nature and significance of the colleges of experts, of the
chap, xii LITERATURE, AND ART 511
holy places, of the religious festivals, of sacrificial and
votive gifts, and lastly of the gods themselves were
summarily unfolded. Moreover, besides a number of
monographs — e.g. on the descent of the Roman people,
on the Roman gentes descended from Troy, on the tribes — ■
there was added, as a larger and more independent
supplement, the treatise " Of the Life of the Roman People "
— a remarkable attempt at a history of Roman manners,
which sketched a picture of the state of domestic life,
finance, and culture in the regal, the early republican, the
Hannibalic, and the most recent period. These labours
of Varro were based on an empiric knowledge of the
Roman world and its adjacent Hellenic domain more
various and greater in its kind than any other Roman
either before or after him possessed — a knowledge to
which living observation and the study of literature alike
contributed. The eulogy of his contemporaries was well
deserved, that Varro had enabled his countrymen — strangers
in their own world — to know their position in their native
land, and had taught the Romans who and where they
were. But criticism and system will be sought for in vain.
His Greek information seems to have come from somewhat
confused sources, and there are traces that even in the
Roman field the writer was not free from the influence
of the historical romance of his time. The matter is
doubtless inserted in a convenient and symmetrical frame-
work, but not classified or treated methodically ; and with
all his efforts to bring tradition and personal observation
into harmony, the scientific labours of Varro are not to be
acquitted of a certain implicit faith in tradition or of an
unpractical scholasticism.1 The connection with Greek
1 A remarkable example is the general exposition regarding cattle in
the treatise on Husbandry (ii. 1) with the nine time3 nine subdivisions of
the doctrine of cattle-rearing, with the " incredible but true " fact that the
mares at Olisipo (Lisbon) become pregnant by the wind, and generally
512
RELIGION, CULTURE,
BOOK V
68. 50.
The other
profes-
sional
sciences.
philology consists in the imitation of its defects more than
of its excellences ; for instance, the basing of etymologies
on mere similarity of sound both in Varro himself and in
the other philologues of this epoch runs into pure guess-
work and often into downright absurdity.1 In its empiric
confidence and copiousness as well as in its empiric in-
adequacy and want of method the Varronian vividly re-
minds us of the English national philology, and just like
the latter, finds its centre in the study of the older drama.
We have already observed that the monarchical literature
developed the rules of language in contradistinction to this
linguistic empiricism (p. 457). It is in a high degree signi-
ficant that there stands at the head of the modern gram-
marians no less a man than Caesar himself, who in his
treatise on Analogy (given forth between 696 and 704)
first undertook to bring free language under the power of
law.
Alongside of this extraordinary stir in the field of philo-
logy the small amount of activity in the other sciences is
surprising. What appeared of importance in philosophy —
such as Lucretius' representation of the Epicurean system
in the poetical child- dress of the pre-Socratic philosophy,
and the better writings of Cicero — produced its effect and
found its audience not through its philosophic contents,
but in spite of such contents solely through its aesthetic
form ; the numerous translations of Epicurean writings
and the Pythagorean works, such as Varro's great treatise
with its singular mixture of philosophical, historical, and agricultural
notices.
1 Thus Varro derives facere from fades, because he who makes any-
thing gives to it an appearance, volpes, the fox, after Stilo from volare
fedibus as the flying - footed ; Gaius Trebatius, a philosophical jurist of
this age, derives sacellum from sacra cella, Figulus frafer from fere alter
and so forth. This practice, which appears not merely in isolated instances
but as a main element of the philological literature of this age, presents a
▼ery great resemblance to the mode in which till recently comparative
philology was prosecuted, before insight into the organism of language
put a stop to the occupation of the empirics.
CHAP. XII LITERATURE, AND ART 513
on the Elements of Numbers and the still more copious
one of Figulus concerning the Gods, had beyond doubt
neither scientific nor formal value.
Even the professional sciences were but feebly cultivated.
Varro's Books on Husbandry written in the form of dialogue
are no doubt more methodical than those of his predecessors
Cato and Saserna — on which accordingly he drops many a
side glance of censure — but have on the whole proceeded
more from the study than, like those earlier works, from
living experience. Of the juristic labours of Varro and of
Servius Sulpicius Rufus (consul in 703) hardly aught more 51
can be said, than that they contributed to the dialectic
and philosophical embellishment of Roman jurisprudence.
And there is nothing farther here to be mentioned, except
perhaps the three books of Gaius Matius on cooking,
pickling, and making preserves — so far as we know, the
earliest Roman cookery-book, and, as the work of a man of
rank, certainly a phenomenon deserving of notice. That
mathematics and physics were stimulated by the increased
Hellenistic and utilitarian tendencies of the monarchy, is
apparent from their growing importance in the instruction
of youth (p. 449) and from various practical applications ;
under which, besides the reform of the calendar (p. 438),
may perhaps be included the appearance of wall-maps at
this period, the technical improvements in shipbuilding and
in musical instruments, designs and buildings like the aviary
specified by Varro, the bridge of piles over the Rhine
executed by the engineers of Caesar, and even two semi-
circular stages of boards arranged for being pushed
together, and employed first separately as two theatres and
then jointly as an amphitheatre. The public exhibition of
foreign natural curiosities at the popular festivals was not
unusual ; and the descriptions of remarkable animals, which
Caesar has embodied in the reports of his campaigns, show
that, had an Aristotle appeared, he would have again found
VOL. V 166
5i4 RELIGION, CULTURE, book v
his patron-prince. But such literary performances as are
mentioned in this department are essentially associated with
Neopythagoreanism, such as the comparison of Greek and
Barbarian, i.e. Egyptian, celestial observations by Figulus,
and his writings concerning animals, winds, and generative
organs. After Greek physical research generally had
swerved from the Aristotelian effort to find amidst individual
facts the law, and had more and more passed into an
empiric and mostly uncritical observation of the external
and surprising in nature, natural science when coming
forward as a mystical philosophy of nature, instead of en-
lightening and stimulating, could only still more stupefy and
paralyze ; and in presence of such a method it was better
to rest satisfied with the platitude which Cicero delivers as
Socratic wisdom, that the investigation of nature either
seeks after things which nobody can know, or after such
things as nobody needs to know.
Art If, in fine, we cast a glance at art, we discover here the
same unpleasing phenomena which pervade the whole
Architect- mental life of this period. Building on the part of the
ure* state was virtually brought to a total stand amidst the
scarcity of money that marked the last age of the republic.
We have already spoken of the luxury in building of the
Roman grandees ; the architects learned in consequence of
this to be lavish of marble — the coloured sorts such as the
yellow Numidian (Giallo antico) and others came into
vogue at this time, and the marble -quarries of Luna
(Carrara) were now employed for the first time — and
began to inlay the floors of the rooms with mosaic work, to
panel the walls with slabs of marble, or to paint the com-
partments in imitation of marble — the first steps towards
the subsequent fresco-painting. But art was not a gainer
by this lavish magnificence.
Arts of In the arts of design connoisseurship and collecting
design. were aiwavs on the increase. It was a mere affectation of
chap, xii LITERATURE, AND ART 515
Catonian simplicity, when an advocate spoke before the
jurymen of the works of art " of a certain Praxiteles " ;
every one travelled and inspected, and the trade of the art-
ciceroni, or, as they were then called, the exegetae, was
none of the worst. Ancient works of art were formally
hunted after — statues and pictures less, it is true, than,
in accordance with the rude character of Roman luxury,
artistically wrought furniture and ornaments of all sorts for
the room and the table. As early as that age the old
Greek tombs of Capua and Corinth were ransacked for the
sake of the bronze and earthenware vessels which had been
placed in the tomb along with the dead. For a small
statuette of bronze 40,000 sesterces (^400) were paid, and
200,000 (^2000) for a pair of costly carpets; a well-
wrought bronze cooking machine came to cost more than an
estate. In this barbaric hunting after art the rich amateur
was, as might be expected, frequently cheated by those
who supplied him ; but the economic ruin of Asia Minor
in particular so exceedingly rich in artistic products brought
many really ancient and rare ornaments and works of art
into the market, and from Athens, Syracuse, Cyzicus,
Pergamus, Chios, Samos, and other ancient seats of art,
everything that was for sale and very much that was not
migrated to the palaces and villas of the Roman grandees.
We have already mentioned what treasures of art were to
be found within the house of Lucullus, who indeed was
accused, perhaps not unjustly, of having gratified his
interest in the fine arts at the expense of his duties as a
general. The amateurs of art crowded thither as they
crowd at present to the Villa Borghese, and complained
even then of such treasures being confined to the palaces
and country-houses of the men of quality, where they could
be seen only with difficulty and after special permission
from the possessor. The public buildings on the other
hand were far from filled in like proportion with famous
516 RELIGION, CULTURE, book v
works of Greek masters, and in many cases there still stood
in the temples of the capital nothing but the old images of
the gods carved in wood. As to the exercise of art there
is virtually nothing to report ; there is hardly mentioned by
name from this period any Roman sculptor or painter
except a certain Arellius, whose pictures rapidly went off
not on account of their artistic value, but because the
cunning reprobate furnished in his pictures of the goddesses
faithful portraits of his mistresses for the time being.
Dancing The importance of music and dancing increased in public
as in domestic life. We have already set forth how theatri-
cal music and the dancing-piece attained to an independent
standing in the development of the stage at this period
(p. 472); we may add that now in Rome itself representa-
tions were very frequently given by Greek musicians, dancers,
and declaimers on the public stage — such as were usual in
Asia Minor and generally in the whole Hellenic and Hel-
lenizing world.1 To these fell to be added the musicians
1 Such ' ' Greek entertainments " were very frequent not merely in the
Greek cities of Italy, especially in Naples (Cic. pro Arch. 5, 10 ; Plut.
Brut. 21), but even now also in Rome (iv. 192 ; Cic. Ad Fam. vii. 1, 3 ;
Ad Att. xvi. 5, 1 ; Sueton. Caes. 39 ; Plut. Brut. 21). When the well-
known epitaph of Licinia Eucharis fourteen years of age, which probably
belongs to the end of this period, makes this "girl well instructed and
taught in all arts by the Muses themselves" shine as a dancer in the
private exhibitions of noble houses and appear first in public on the Greek
stage (modo nobilium ludos decoravi choro, et Graeca in scaena prima
populo apparui), this doubtless can only mean that she was the first girl
that appeared on the public Greek stage in Rome ; as generally indeed it
was not till this epoch that women began to come forward publicly in
Rome (p. 469).
These "Greek entertainments" in Rome seem not to have been
properly scenic, but rather to have belonged to the category of composite
exhibitions — primarily musical and declamatory — such as were not of rare
occurrence in subsequent times also in Greece (Welcker, Griech. Traa.,
p. 1277). This view is supported by the prominence of flute-playing in
Polybius (xxx. 13) and of dancing in the account of Suetonius regarding
the armed dances from Asia Minor performed at Caesar's games and in
the epitaph of Eucharis ; the description also of the citharoedus {Ad Her.
iv. 47, 60 ; comp. Vitruv. v. 5, 7) must have been derived from such
"Greek entertainments." The combinations of these representations in
Rome with Greek athletic combats is significant (Polyb. /. c. ; Liv. xxxix.
22). Dramatic recitations were by no means excluded from these mixed
chap, xii LITERATURE, AND ART 517
and dancing-girls who exhibited their arts to order at table
and elsewhere, and the special choirs of stringed and wind
instruments and singers which were no longer rare in noble
houses. But that even the world of quality itself played
and sang with diligence, is shown by the very adoption of
music into the cycle of the generally recognized subjects of
instruction (p. 449) ; as to dancing, it was, to say nothing
of women, made matter of reproach even against consulars
that they exhibited themselves in dancing performances
amidst a small circle.
Towards the end of this period, however, there appears Incipient
with the commencement of the monarchy the beginning of ™j! ^ce
a better time also in art. We have already mentioned the monarchy.
mighty stimulus which building in the capital received, and
building throughout the empire was destined to receive,
through Caesar. Even in the cutting of the dies of the
coins there appears about 700 a remarkable change; the 64.
stamping, hitherto for the most part rude and negligent, is
thenceforward managed with more delicacy and care.
We have reached the end of the Roman republic. We Conclusion,
have seen it rule for five hundred years in Italy and in the
countries on the Mediterranean ; we have seen it brought
to ruin in politics and morals, religion and literature, not
through outward violence but through inward decay, and
thereby making room for the new monarchy of Caesar.
There was in the world, as Caesar found it, much of the
entertainments, since among the players whom Lucius Anicius caused to
appear in 587 in Rome, tragedians are expressly mentioned ; there was 167.
however no exhibition of plays in the strict sense, but either whole dramas,
or perhaps still more frequently pieces taken from them, were declaimed
or sung to the flute by single artists. This must accordingly have been
done also in Rome ; but to all appearance for the Roman public the main
matter in these Greek games was the music and dancing, and the text
probably had little more significance for them than the texts of the Italian
opera for the Londoners and Parisians of the present day. Those composite
entertainments with their confused medley were far better suited for the
Ionian public, and especially for exhibitions in private houses, than
proper scenic performances in the Greek language ; the view that the latter
also took place in Rome cannot be refuted, but can as little be proved.
518 RELIGION, CULTURE, LITERATURE, ART book v
noble heritage of past centuries and an infinite abundance
of pomp and glory, but little spirit, still less taste, and least
of all true delight in life. It was indeed an old world j and
even the richly-gifted patriotism of Caesar could not make
it young again. The dawn does not return till after
the night has fully set in and run its course. But yet
with him there came to the sorely harassed peoples on the
Mediterranean a tolerable evening after the sultry noon ;
and when at length after a long historical night the new day
dawned once more for the peoples, and fresh nations in free
self-movement commenced their race towards new and
higher goals, there were found among them not a few, in
which the seed sown by Caesar had sprung up, and which
owed, as they still owe, to him their national individuality.
INDEX
lln thi« Index the names of persons are given under the gentile nomen, and an
arranged in the alphabetic order of the praenomina, and, under this, in the chromv
logical order of holding the consulate or other official position. Thus Cicero will ba
found under M. Tullius Cicero, and Caesar under C. Julius Caesar. The letter f.
as in 102 yC, denotes that the subject is continued in the following page ; the letter *,
as in 10a »., refers to the note either by itself, or in addition to matter in the texuj
Abbreviations, Roman, i. 379
Abdera, ii. 503 ; iv. 44
Abella burnt, iv. 63
Abgarus, Arab prince, iv. 422. Allied
with the Parthians against Crassus, v.
153. 154. 155
Aborigines, ii. 106 ; iii. 187
Abrupolis, ii. 493, 496
Abruzzi, i. 5, 6, 147, 434 ; iii. 501. 5°8
Abydus, ii. 406, 417, 413, 447, 461
Academy, the Newer, iv. 197-200
Acarnania and the Acarnanians, ii. 216,
217, 3i8. 397. 4°3. 4i8, 421, 429, 432, 43s,
438, 457. 476. 501, 517
Acca Larentia, i. 209
L. Accius, tragic poet, iv. 222, 223./C, 252
Acco, Carnutic knight, beheaded, v. 74
Accusers, professional, iv. 104
Acerrae, ii. 304. Victory over the
Italians, iii. 510, 515; iv. 66
Achaeans, ii. 215, 217, 318, 405, 431, 423,
427, 430, 43s, 437, 439, 456, 476-480, 497,
498/., 517/; »>• 234/, 261; iv. 35.
Waragainst them, iii. 264-270. Achaean
league dissolved, iii. 271. Province of
Achaia, iii. 270-272. Taxation of, iv.
158
Achaeans on the Caucasus, iv. 416
Achaean colonies in Italy and Sicily, i.
165./C Their distinctive character, 170^
League of the cities, i. 170-173 ; recon-
structed against the Lucanians, i. 454.
Agricultural towns, i. 173. Coins, i. 171.
Alphabet, i. 173.A Decay, i. 172
Achaeus, Syrian satrap, ii. 444
Achaeus, general of the slaves in first
Sicilian war, iii. 310
Achaia, province of, iii. 370-273
Achillas, general of Ptolemaeus Dionysua,
v. 271, 276
Achilles, ancestor of Pyrrhus, ii. 3
Achradina, ii. 311./C
Achulla, iii. 244. Exempt from taxea,
iii. 259
C. Acilius, chronicler, iv. 248
M'. Acilius Glabrio [consul, 563], ii. 457.
Attempts to rectify the calendar, iii. 194
M'. Acilius Glabrio [consul, 687], iv. 349/!
388, 395/
Acrae, Syracusan, ii. 304
Acta diurna, iv. 379 n.
Actus, i. 265
Adcensivelati, i. 117
Adherbal, iii. 389-393
Adiabene, iv. 315, 343
Adoption, i. 73
Adramytium, ii. 462 ; iii. 260^ ; hr. 46
Adriatic Sea, origin of the name, i. 4x8
Adrogatio, i. 95
Adsidui, i. 115
Adsignatio viritana, L 340 n.
Aduatuca, v. 73
Aduatuci, origin of, iii. 445 ; v. 33. Con-
flicts with them, v. 52, 54
Aeacides, father of Pyrrhus, ii. 6
Aeacus, ancestor of Pyrrhus, ii. 3
Aeca, ii. 280
Aeclanum, town of the Hirpini, iii. 50a,
523
Aedicula, L 335
Aediles Ceriales, v. 346, 374
Aediles curules, their institution, !. 383.
Original functions : market-supervision
and police, and celebration of the city
520
HISTORY OF ROME
festival, i. 383 ; ii. 97 ; iii. 41. Plebeians
eligible, i. 383. Police duties in Rome,
ii. 84. Jurisdiction, ii. 66 ; iv. 128. In-
cluded among curule magistracies, iii.
6.7
Aediles plelis, founded on model of the
quaestors, i. 354 n. Original functions :
charge of the archives, i. 349, 354 ». ;
support of the tribunes in their judicial
functions, i. 351 ; decrees of the senate
deposited in their charge, i. 369. Juris-
diction, iv. 127
Aediles in the Municipia, founded on the
model of the curule aedileship in Rome,
1. 451
Aegates Insulae, Phoenician, ii. 143.
Battle at the, ii. 195
Aegina, i. 308 ; ii. 319, 402, 417, 423, 437,
478. Beetle-stone found there, i. 307
Aegium, iii. 267
Sex. Aelius Paetus [consul, 556], his legal
treatise ("Tripartita"), iii. 195
L. Aelius Praeconinus Stilo, of Lanuviurr.,
teacher of Roman literature, iv. 216, 252
Aemilii, clan-village, i. 45. Their descent,
ii. 107
Aemilius Lepidus, a Sullan, iv. 90
Aemilius Macer, poet, v. 480
L. Aemilius Papus [consul, 529], ii. 224/;
L. Aemilius Paullus [consul, 538], ii. 220,
286-290
L. Aemilius Paullus [consul, 572, 586], ii.
390 «. Opposed to Perseus, ii. 505 f.
His incorruptibility, iii. 31. His de-
meanour to the provincials, iii. 33.
Carries Greek art-treasures to Rome, iii.
208. His austerity, iii. 18, 42. His
estate, iii. 89. Augur, iii. 112. His
Hellenic culture, iii. 209 ; iv. 212
L. Aemilius Regillus [praetor, 564], ii. 462
Mamercus Aemilius, Roman commander
in the Social war, iii. 526
Mamercus Aemilius Lepidus Livianus
[consul, 677], iv. 269
M. Aemilius Lepidus [consul, 567, 579],
ii. 416, 418
M. Aemilius Lepidus Forcina [consul,
617], defeated by the Vaccaei, iii. 229.
Orator, iv. 215
M. Aemilius Lepidus [consul, 676], his
party-position, iv. 280./C Preparations
for civil war, iv. 287-290. Insurrection,
iv. 2gof. Defeat and death, iv. 291
M. Aemilius Lepidus, Caesar's city-
prefect, v. 218
M. Aemilius Scaurus [consul, 639 ; censor,
645], leader of the aristocracy, iii. 376,
393/. 47S. 484. 503- His character,
iii, 379. Sent as envoy to Jugurtha, iii.
392. Commander in Jugurthine war,
iii. 393 f. Against the Taurisci, iii.
428. Tried for extortion, iii. 482. At-
titude to the proposals of Drusus, iii.
483. His roads, bridges, and drainage,
iv. 167, 170
M. Aemilius Scaurus, adjutant of Pom-
peius, iv. 429/, 432
Q. Aemilius Papus [consul, 476], ii. 30
Aenaria, i. 175, 178 ; iii. 541. Syracusan,
i. 416. Withdrawn by Sulla from
Neapolis, iv. 107
Aeneas in Homer, ii. 108. Legend of
Aeneas in Italy, ii. 108-111. Invented
by Stesichorus, ii. 108. First occurs
in the current form with Timaeus, ii.
no. In the Roman chroniclers, iv.
249
Aenus, ii. 417, 465, 486, 51a
Aeolus, i. 117
Aepulo, ii. 372
Aequi, settlements of, L 444 n. Their
conflicts with Rome, i. 135. Subdued
by the Romans, i. 444 /. The league
dissolved, i. 484
Aequiculi, i. 47 ; 444 n.
Aerarii, settlers paying tribute for pro-
tection, i. 121
Aerarium, i. 137. After the abolition of
the monarchy legally under the contro'
of the quaestors nominated by, and re
presenting, the consuls, i. 323, 338
Aeropus, ii. 428
Aeschylus, iii. 167
Aesculanus, god of copper, it. 70
Aesculapius, early worshipped in Rome,
i. 230 f. Brought thither from Epi-
daurus, ii. 71. Temple of, in Carthage,
iii. 248, 257 ; at Epidautus, iv. 40 ; at
Pergamus, iv. 53
Aesepus, river, iv. 328
Aesernia, colonized, ii. 39. lusof, ii. 52 ».
Remained faithful to the Romans in the
Social war, iii. 502-509. Conquered, iii.
510 ; and held by the Samnites, iii.
524. Conquered by Sulla (?), iv. 91 ». ;
and laid desolate, iv. 108
Aesis, iv. 85. Boundary of Italy, ii. aao;
iv. 122 ».
Aesopus, actor, v. 384
Aestimatio, derived from aes, i. 259
Aes uxorium, ii. 66
Aethalia, occupied by the Hellenes, J. 178,
416. Wrested from them by the Etrus-
cans, i. 181. Iron of, i. 182
Aetna, ii. 162
Aetolians, i. 169 n. ; ii. 215, 217, 397.
INDEX
5«
Attitude to Rome in second Punic war,
ii. 215-219. Position thereafter, ii. 404.
Share in the war with Philip, ii. 409,
410, 420, 421, 426-430, 433, 435. Treat-
ment by the Romans, ii. 437./C Quar-
rel with Rome, and share in the war
with Antiochus, ii. 451, 452, 456, 457,
764, 765. Attitude during the war
with Perseus, ii. 495-498, 501 f., 517.
Aetolia, a recruiting-ground, ii. 162
L. Afranius, poet, iv. 230.
L. Afranius, lieutenant of Pompeius in the
Sertorian war, iv. 296. Subdues the
Arabs, iv. 429. Triumph, as governor
of Cisalpine Gaul, v. 103. In Spain,
v. 219. Slain by Caesar's soldiers, v.
300
T. Afranius. See Lafrenius.
A/ri, j. 185 ft.
Africa, before the time of the Gracchi,
Hi. 237-260. Made a province, iii. 258./C
Relations after the battle of Pharsalus,
v. 269. In the hands of the Pompeians,
▼. 285-290. Its regulation by Caesar,
v. 301
Agatha, iii. 415
Agathocles, of Syracuse, i. 418, 478, 491 ;
ii. 18, 28, 145, 161. Takes the Mamer-
tines into his pay, ii. 18. His armies of
mercenaries, ii. 163
Agedincum, v. 79, 86, 87
Agelaus, of Naupactus, ii. 315
Agepolis, Rhodian envoy, ii. 514
Ager Gallicus, i. 434 ; iii. 99
Agtr publicus. See Domains
Agesipolis, ii. 438
Agis, commander in Tarentum before
arrival of Pyrrhus, ii. 16
Agnati and Gentiles, distinction between,
i. 78
Agnone, i. 146
Agonalia, L 207
Agonia, i. 209
Agrarian Laws. See Domains, Leges
Agrariae
Agriculture, its original home, i. 81.
More recent than the Indo-Germanic
culture, i. 19, 20. Known to the Graeco-
Italians, i. 23-27. Basis of the whole
Italian economy, i. 61, 236. Priestly
supervision, i. 226. Kinds of produce,
iii. 64 «., (Af. (compare Spelt ; Wheat).
Defective management, but unwearied
diligence, i. 243. Employment of slaves
(see Slaves). Free labourers, iii. 70.
Later estate-farming, iii. 65-82. Hus-
bandry of the petty farmers, iii. 74. In-
solvency of the landholders and diminu-
tion of the farmer-class, i. 245, 343-346.
Improvement in the relations of credit,
i- 389-393. Recurrence of the old evils,
iii. 79, 82, 97-100. Condition of, before
and at the time of the Gracchi, iii. 304./,
312/; ; iv. 171./ Revival by the Grac-
chi, iii. 335./C ; iv. 172. Condition after
the Gracchan revolution, iii. 380 f.
Colonizations of Sulla, iv. 172. In the
time of Caesar, v. 377/, 382/., 403.
Differences in different parts of Italy,
iii. 490 f., 501. Differences in the
provinces, iii. 304-308 ; iv. 172. Esti-
mated produce, iii. 8r n. Carthaginian
estate - farming, ii. 138. Writings on
agriculture, iii. 194. Compare Soil,
division of; Grain.
Agrigentum founded, ii. 28, 145, 156. Oc-
cupied by the Carthaginians in second
Punic war, ii. 311. Colonized afresh by
the Romans, ii. 314. Occupied by Cleon,
iii. 310. Conquered by the Carthagin-
ians, i. 166, 183. Besieged and occu-
pied by the Romans in the first Punic
war, ii. 171./C
Agrius, son of Ulysses and Circe, L 177
Agron, ii. 218.
Agylla, Phoenician name of Caere, i. 163
Aiax, name, whence derived, i. 258
Aiorix, iii. 276 «.
Akragas. See Agrigentum
A lae sociorum, i. 440 n.
Alaesa, ii. 171, 211 »., 213
Alalia, Etruscan, i. 187. Battle at, J. 184 jC,
413 ;^ ii. 134
Alba, i. 48. Oldest canton-community in
Latium, i. 49. President of the Latin
league, i. 50, 51. Subdued by Rome,
i. 125 f. Semblance of existence after
destruction, i. 128. Dictator there, i.
442 n. At the time of its fall, under
annual dictators, i. 442 «. Oppose*
Rome, iii 242
Alba, on the Fucine Lake, ii. 507 : iii. 261 ;
iv, 291. Colonized, i. 484. Surprised
by the Aequi, i. 486. Adheres to Rome
in Social war, iii. 502, 509.
Alban Lake, i. 48. Outfall of, i. 49, 30*
Alban Mount, i. 48, 50
Albanians, i. 12 ». ; iii. 425
Albanians in the Caucasus, iv. 4x3-416
Albino van us, iv. 87
Albinus. See Postumius
Statius Albius Oppianicus, iv. X04
T. Albucius, Epicurean, iv. 201
Album, i. 280.
Alcamenes, Achaean general, iii. 369
Alchaudonius, Arab prince, iv. 4*3
522
HISTORY OF ROME
Alcibiades, ii. 87, 92, 144
Aleria conquered, ii. 177
Alesia besieged by Caesar, v. 86-91
Aletrium, i. 485
Alexamenus, ii. 452
Alexander the Great, his relations to the
west, ii. if., 43 ft. Political value of
his enterprises in the east, ii. 45, 396,
399; v. 100/
Alexander I., of Egypt, iv. 4
Alexander II., of Egypt, his will, iv. 316,
Alexander Jannaeus, iv. 316
Alexander the Molossian, general of
Tarentum, conquers the Lucanians,
Samnites, Daunians, and Messapians,
L 465./T Breaks with the Tarentines, i.
4(56. His plan to unite all the Italian
Greeks, i. 466. Death, i. 466
Alexander, the pretended son of Perseus,
iii. 263.
Alexander, son of King Aristobulus, iv.
448
Alexander, son of Pyrrhus, ii. 31
Alexander Polyhistor, v. 460
Alexandria in Egypt, ii. 400, 516; iii. 121.
Insurrection against Caesar, v. 275-281
Alexandria Troas, ii. 260, 446, 453
Alexandrinism, Greek, v. 463/;, 479
Alexandrinism, Roman, iv. 259 ; v. 465-
467, 479
Sex. Alfenus, Roman knight, proscribed
by Sulla, iv. 104 n.
C. Alfius [praetor, 698], v. 123
Allia, battle on the, i. 428
Allies, Italian, bound to furnish naval or
military contingents, ii. 53, 54. In the
Hannibalic war, ii. 345 f. Diminution
of their rights thereafter, iii. 24, f. And
Increasing oppression, iii. 25. Acquisi-
tion of Roman franchise made more
difficult, iii. 27. Relations to Rome in
time of Gracchi, iii. 361./C Later, iii.
485-489. Their war with Rome, iii.
490-520 ; iv. 62. Bestowal of franchise
after it, set Civitas. Italians abroad,
iv. 177, 190; v. 394 ,/C Compare Latin
League
Allobroges, ii. 259/-; Iii- A*lf-, 443- Be-
tray the Catilinarians, iv. 480. Insur-
rection and subjugation, v. 8, 10. Their
towns, v. 14
Almonds, iii. 65 n.
Aloe, iii. 65 «.
Alphabet, whether a Phoenician invention,
ii. 133. Aramaean consonantal writing
vocalized in the west, i. 273. Phoenician,
adopted by the Libyans, ii. 141 n.
History of the Greek alphabet, i. 274 n.
Its older form among the Italian
Achaeans, i. 170. More recent in the
Iono-Doric colonies, i. 173 n. Etruscan
and Latin alphabets both derived from
the Greek, i. 258, 272-277. Develop-
ment of, in Italy, i. 277-283. Latin,
regulated with the progress of culture,
ii. 114/. Adjusted by Carvilius, adopt-
ing the "g," and rejecting the "z," iii.
igi. Ennins introduces the double
writing of double consonants, iii. 192.
Carried by the Etruscans to the Celts
and Alpine peoples, i. 435. Libyan, ii.
141 n. Iberian, ii. 235
Alps, passes from Gaul to Italy, i. 423 n. •
ii. 257-259. Passage by Hannibal, ii.
259-264. Peoples of the, before Caesar's
time, iii. 425 /. ; attacked by the
Romans, v. 103
Alsium, i. 178. Primitive tombs there, i.
252, 302
Amanus, v. 288
Amasia, iv. 332
Amastris, iv. 26, 333
Ambacti, derivation of the word, v. 90,
21 ».
Amber-route from Baltic to Mediterranean,
i. 162
Ambiatus, king of the Bituriges, i. 423
Ambiorix, king of the Eburones, v. 68 /.,
73
Ambitus, law against, i. 377 ; iii. 302
Ambracia, ii. 476, 501. Captured by
Pyrrhus, ii. 7
Ambrani, iv. 469 «.
Ambrones, iii. 445, 446
Ameria, city chronicle ot, ti. 103
Atnici, iii. 91
Amida, iv. 338
Aminean wine, iv. 17a
Amisus, iv. 12, 330, 331, 333. Burnt by
the inhabitants, iv. 333. Rebuilt and
enlarged by Lucullus, iv. 440
Amiternum, Sabine town, obtains ciziia-s
sine suffragio, i. 492. See Sabines.
Amnias, tributary of the Halys, iv. 29
Amphipolis, ii. 493, 508, 509 »., 517 ; iv. 39
Amynander, ii. 421, 438, 456, 476
Anagnia, i. 481, 4847c ; ii. 23
Anaitis, temple of, in Elymais, iv. 343
Anapus, ii. 311
Anares, ii. 221, 226
Anas, iii. 224 ; iv. 284
Anaxilas of Rhegium and Zancle, I. 415
Ancestral lays, i. 288, 289
Ancona, i. 176, 417; ii. 60, 220; iv. 74
Ancus Marcius. See Marcius
INDEX
523
Vndetrium, Hi. 427
indriscus. See Philippus, pseudo-
Indronicus. See Livius
Indros, ii. 417, 426, 460
* je.-oestus, ii. 223, 226
S%-^eronalia, i. 208
L. AbScws [praetor, 587], ii. 508
Anio, i. .os. Settlement of the Claudii on
the, i. 4S
A nnales, i. ms, 104. Character of official
Roman, iv( 248 ' Compare Historical
Composition
C. Annius, Sulla's '** utenant in Further
Spain, iv. 93
M. Annius [quaestoi in ifacedonia, 636],
iii. 428 n.
T. Annius Milo, v. 114, 144 ', 148, 316,
3!7i 389
Annus, i. 268
Anquisitio, ii. 68
Antemnae, i. 58, 125 ; iv. 89
Anticyra, ii. 319, 430
Antigonus, general of Alexander ti<Gs, it,
ii. 6
Antigonus Doson, ii. 220, 246
Antigonus Gonatas, ii. 236
Antioch in Syria, iv. 316, 341, 427. Be-
comes a residence of Tigranes, iv. 317
Antiochus I., Soter, ii. 402
Antiochus III., the Great, ii. 314. War
with Egypt, ii. 410, 444 f. Conduct
during Roman intervention in Mace-
donia, ii. 416-418, 427. Breach with
Rome, ii. 443-450. War, ii. 450-468.
Peace, ii. 465-468. Death, ii. 468
Antiochus IV., Epiphanes, of Syria, ii.
499 ; iii. 275, 282, 285, 286, 287. War
with Egypt, and Roman intervention,
ii. 499, 515 f. Introduces Roman
gladiatorial games into Syria, iii. 127.
Levelling policy, iii. 285
Antiochus Eupator, recognized hy the
Romans as the successor of Antiochus
Epiphanes, iii. 282
Antiochus the Asiatic, Syrian prince, iv.
335. 34i. 437
Antiochus of Commagene, iv. 41, 427, 437
Antiochus of Cyzicus, iv. 4
Antiochus Grypus, iv. 4
Antiochus of Syracuse, ii. 108
Antiochus of Ascalon, Stoic, v. 444
Antiochus, king of the slaves. ■ See Eunus
Antipater of Idumaea, iv. 432
Antipatria, ii. 422
Antipolis, iii. 415
P. Antistius, murdered hy order of Marius,
iv. 84
Antium,i.459»., 460 n. ; ii. 42, 43 «., 67 n.;
iv. 64. Legend of foundation, ii. in.
Navigation and piracy, i. 181, 416 ; H.
41. Mentioned in treaty of Rome with
Carthage, i. 452. Temporarily a Latin
colony ; finally subdued, L 446, 447.
Revolts, i. 461. Colonized as a Roman
burgess-community, i. 462. Orators'
platform in Rome adorned with beaks
of Antiate galleys, i. 462 f. Antiate
galleys brought to Rome, ii. 42. Pro-
hibited from maritime traffic, ii. 43 n.
C. Antonius [consul, 691], iv. 373, 380,
469-471, 479, 484 /.
C. Antonius, Caesar's lieutenant in Illyria,
v. 235
M. Antonius, the orator [praetor, 652 ;
consul, 655], iv. 66, 67, 102 «., 215.
Suppresses piracy, iii. 381
M. Antonius, murderer of Sertorius, iv.
302
M. Antonius, admiral in Mithradatic war,
>v. 324. 3Si /, 386
M. Antonius, Caesar's lieutenant, after-
wards triumvir, v. 188, 235, 249/, 335,
36s, 389
">. Antonius [Marian governor in Sardinia,
672], iv. 92
Q. \ntullius, lictor of L. Opimius, slain
by *he Gracchans, iii. 366^
Aou.% he river, ii. 428
Apamcia^ iii. 276 «., 310; iv. 30, 329
Apennines i. 5, 6, 41
Aperantiu, ii. 459
Aphrodite, temple in Rome, ii. 71 ; It.
89. Identified with the old Roman
Venus, ii. 71
Apicius, iii. 482
Apollo = ApelIo = A -». la, i. 230, 258. God
of oracles, i. 230. Increasing worship
of, in Rome, ii. 70 ; iii. <,x
Apollonia, i. 176 ; ii. 218, ^16, 422, 426,
433. 497i 5°o J iv. 168. Founded, i. 176.
Treaty with Rome, ii. 46. Becomes
Roman, ii. 2177C United w» h Mace-
donia, iii. 262. Mint of, Hi. 87 ; iv. 181
Apollonis in Lydia, iii. 279
Appeal (provocatio), pardon of tk« «n-
demned criminal on an appeal U> tke
people allowed by the king, i. 82, gy
192 ; ii. 69. In capital sentences, after
abolition of the monarchy, no longer
dependent on the pleasure of the magis-
trates, i. 320 ; iii. 348. Except the dic-
tator, i. 320, 325. Allowed even against
the dictator, i. 368 ; also in fines, i.
320, 342 ; ii. 63. Transferred to the
centuries, i. 327^ After appointment
of plebeian tribune?, might be addressed
$24
HISTORY OF ROME
to the plebeian assembly, i. 351 f.
Procedure in cases of, ii. 69. Prob-
ably allowed by C Gracchus even
against the general in camp, iii. 347, 491;
not for the allies, iii. 347, 491. Right
violated in the case of the Catilinarians,
iv. 482. The symbolic view of its
origin, ii. 105
Appellate jurisdiction of the Imperator,
introduced by Caesar, v. 348./C
Apple-tree, iii. 67
C Appuleius Decianus [tribune of the
people, 655], iii. 478
L. Appuleius Saturninus [tribune of the
people, 651, 654], iii. 440, 441 «., 466-
476
Apricots, iii. 65 n.
Apsus, river, ii. 423, 426
Apuani, ii. 374 ; iii. 313
Apulia, Hellenized, i. 12 ; ii. 89 f. ; iii.
109. Position during Samnite wars, i.
468, 474. Colonists sent thither, ii. 365.
After the Hannibalic war, iii. ioo, 102.
In the Social war, iii. 521 /. Depopu-
lation of, v. 394. Coinage, ii. 280
L. Apustius, ii. 425
Aquae, town in Africa, iii. 259
Aquae Sextiae, foundation of, iii. 420 ; iv.
168. Battle of, iii. 446 ; v. 7. Import-
ance of, v. II
Aqueducts, Anio, ii. 85 ; iv. 168. Aqua
Appia, iv. 168. Marcia,.iv. 169, 173.
Tepula {not Calida), iv. 168
Aquileia, iii. 416, 421; iv. 167. Colonized,
"• 372> 37S. 493 ', "»• 27, M9- Ius of>
ii. 52 «., 518
M'. Aquillius the elder [consul, 625], erects
the province of Asia, iii. 279, 358 n.
His trafficking laid bare by C. Gracchus,
iii. 358 ; iv. 6
M'. Aquillius the younger [consul, 653],
fights in the Cimbrian and Sicilian
war, iii. 387 ; iv. 24. Envoy to Mithra-
dates, iv. 24-26. Stirs up Nicomedes
to war, iv. 26 f. Defeated, iv. 30.
Death, iv. 31, 101 «.
Aquilonia, battle at, i. 490
Aquitania subdued, v. 59, 60
Ara maxima, i. 230
Arabs in the army of Antiochus, ii. 466.
In the third Mithradatic war, iv. 339,
341. Arab princes in Syria, iv. 422./C
Aratus, ii. 404, 421
Aratus, astronomical didactic poems, v.
449
Arausio, battle at, iii. 436
Arcadia, iii. 269
Arcesilaus, hr. 197
Archaeanactidae, rulers in Panticapaenm,
iv. 15
Archagathus, first physician in Rome, iit.
193
Archelaus, general of Mithradates, iv. 28,
3°. 34. 35. 37, 41-44. 5°. 5*. 95
Archelaus, high priest of Comana, t*
439, 45_i
Archers in earliest Roman army, i. 91
Arches, building of, i. 309 ; ii. 119
Archestratus, of Gela, iii. 179
Archias, the poet, iv. 193
Archidamus of Sparta, i. 465, 466 n.
Archilochus, i. 169 «.
Archimedes, ii. 310, 312
Architecture, Italian, earliest undet
Greek influence, i. 301-306. First de-
veloped in Etruria, i. 304 f., probably
from Attic models, i. 308, 309. Its
later development, ii. 1 18-120; iii. 206^;
iv. 256/:; v. 514/
Archytas, i. 172
Arcobarzanes, grandson of Syphax, iii.
239
Ardea founds Saguntum, i. 185. In the
Aricine league, i. 451. Dispute with
Aricia, i. 447. Assigned as a Latin
colony, i. 378, 445 n. Supports Rome
against the Celts, i. 430. About 370,
member of the Latin league, i. 448 «.,
450. Mentioned in treaty with Car-
thage, i. 452. City-chronicle, ii. 80, 103.
Legend of foundation linked toOdyssean
cycle, ii. 111. Frescoes of, ii. 124, 127
Ardyaei, in Illyria, ii. 218 ; iii. 427 ; iv.
67
Area Capitolina, L 137
Arellius, v. 516
Aretas, king of the Nabataeans, Jv. 316,
426, 430, 432, 438
Arethusa, Arabian fortress, iv. 423
Arevacae defeat the Romans, iii. 217.
Peace with, iii. i\%f. Revolt to Viria-
thus, iii. 226, 231
Argean chapels, i. 66, 118
Argcntarius (money-changer), ii. 86; iii.
83
Argentinus, god of silver, ii. 70
Argentum Oscense, ii. 386
Argonauts, legend of the, ii. 108
Argos in Macedonia, iii. 428
Argos in the Peloponnesus, ii. 430, 431,
438, 439 j iii- 266. Emporium for the
Romans, iii. 274
Aria cattiva, i. 44
Ariarathes V., Philopator, of Cappadocia,
ii. 450, 473, 499 ; iii. 279, 280
Ariarathes VI., iii. 280. Killed, iv. 19
INDEX
525
Ariarathes, son of Ariarathes VI., iv. 19
Ariarathes, son of Mithradates Eupator,
>v. 34. 4i
Ariarathes, the pseudo-, iv. 20, 24
Aricia, i. 48, 442 «. ; iv. 64. Aricine
league, i. 451. Battle at, L 414. Dis-
pute with Ardea, i. 447. About 370, a
member of the Latin league, i. 448 n.,
450. A Roman burgess-community, i.
462. Dictator there, i. 442 «.
Ariminum, i. 180; ii. 60, 215 «., 229, 274,
279 /. ; iv. 63, 85, 87, 166 f. King
Arimnus in early intercourse with the
shrine at Olympia, i. 180. Occupied by
the Umbrian Sassinates, ii. 39. Latin
colony, ii. 39, 42, 220. Bulwark against
the Celts, ii. 203, 222. Seat of a naval
quaestor, ii. 45. < us of, ii. 52 «.
Ariobarzanes, of Cappadocia, iv. 25, 26,
54. 330. 35°
Ariobarzanes, son of Mithradates the
Great, iv. 27
Ariovistus, v. 34-37, 4S-48
Aristarchus, prince of the Colchians, iv.
438
Aristion, tyrant of Athens, iv. 35, 37, 39
Aristo, of Tyre, ii. 380
Aristobulus, king of the Jews, iv. 425 f.,
43°. 448
Aristodemus, i. 149, 158
Aristonicus, pretender to the Attalid
kingdom, iii. 278./!, 281, 309
Aristonicus, Pontic admiral, iv. 324
Aristophanes, iii. 143 ; v. 141
Aristotle, i. 432; ii. 109, 112, 147; iv. 140,
197
Aristus, ii. a n.
Armenia, ii. 401, 473 ; iii. 279, 281, 285,
287; iv. 5, 344, 345 (compare Arta-
vasdes, Tigranes). Language, iv. n
Armenia, Lesser, earlier a dependency of
Pontus, iii. 281. Acquired by Mithra-
dates, iv. 12, 18
Armenian tradition as to first Mithra-
datic war, iv. 51 n.
Army, its earliest organization : the
burgesses at the same time the war-
riors, i. 90. Legion of 3000 foot and
300 horse, i. <)of. High estimation of
the cavalry, i. 89. After the accession
of the Collini, number of cavalry, and
probably also that of infantry, doubled,
i. 1077C Servian arrangement : all free-
hold burgesses and non-burgesses, from
17 to 60, liable to serve, i. \\Zf. Two
legions of the first levy regularly
called out for service in the field, and
two legions of the second levy for
garrison service, each legion having
3000 hoplites and 1200 light troops,
i. 119. Phalangite arrangement after
Doric model, i. 118. The five classes of
infantry, L 116. Levy districts: Pala-
tine, Subura, Esquiline, Colline, i. 117.
Burgess - cavalry amounting to 1800
men, i. 119. But only 600 take the
field with the legion, i. 119. Free
places in the cavalry, i. 117. Classes
according to age, instead of according
to property, ii. 74. Reduction of the
qualification for army and fleet, iii. 350.
Advantages of the Roman military
system, ii. 75. Traces of Greek in-
fluence, i. 255 k. ; ii. 75. Commence-
ment of standing army in Spain, ii.
388/1 Decay, ii. 501/. Falling off of
the legionary cavalry : close aristo-
cratic corps, iii. 9. No advancement
from the place of a subaltern to that of
tribune, iii. 13. Decay of martial
spirit, iii. 43. Decline of, iii. 295 _/C,
302. Reforms in Cato's time, iii. 49^
Reorganized by Marius, iii. 413, 456-
460. Relaxation of discipline in Sulla's
time, iii. 529 ; iv. 135-137. Reorgan-
ized by Caesar, v. 353-356. Burgess-
cavalry abolished, iii. 457. Mercenaries
in Caesar's cavalry, v. 353. Difference
between Roman and Parthian war-
fare, v. 155-158. Raising of costs for
the army, iv. 162, 165. Burden of
quartering in the provinces, iv. 162./C,
285, 298 ; v. 408, 413
Armilustrium, i. 207
Arnus, i. 157
Arpi, ii. 90, 280. Feuds between Sam-
nites and Iapygians about Apri, i. 164.
Lends help to the Romans in the second
Samnite war, i. 473. Its conflicts with
the Samnites, i. 453. Its fate in the
second Punic war, ii. 293, 305, 333, 334,
365
Arpinum, i. 481, 485. Obtains full bur-
gess-rights, iii. 23. Gates in the Greek
style, i. 302
Arretium, ii. 374 ; iv. 167 ; v. 207. In-
ternal troubles ; aid of Rome in-
voked, i. 437. Peace with Rome, L
479, 490. Highways to Arretium, i,
486 n. Remains faithful to the Romans
in the Pyrrhic war, ii. 10. Attitude in
second Punic war, ii. 346, 354. Ar-
retines persecuted by Sulla, iv. 108, 265,
Sullan colony, iv. 108
Arrest can only take place out of doors,
ii. 68
526
HISTORY OF ROME
Q. Arrius [praetor, 682] fights against
the gladiatorial slaves, iv. 359./C
Arsacidae, iii. 287 ; iv. 5
Arsinoe, daughter of Ptolemaeus Auletes,
v. 275, 281
Art, plastic and delineative, in the earliest
times, i. 306-309. Etruscan, ii. 120./;,
124-126. Campanian and Sabellian, ii.
ratf. Latin, ii. 122^, 127^ In the
fifth and sixth centuries, iii. 207 f. In
the seventh century, iv. 256-258. In the
age of Caesar, v. 514-516
Artavasdes, king of Armenia, v. 151 «.,
153. 16*
Artaxata, ii. 482 n. ; iv. 338, 345, 410
Artaxiads, iii. 285 ; iv. 5
Artaxias, ii. 473, 482 11.
Artemis, Ephesi2.11, i. 231
Arthetaurus, ii. 493
Artichokes, iii. 66 n.
Artisans concentrate themselves in Rome,
ii. 82. Chiefly slaves, ii. 82
Artoces, king of the Iberians, iv. 414
Arvales, i. 215. Arval chant, i. 287
Arverni, iii. 416 /., 438; iv. 469 ».; v. 13,
17, 24/. 34. 74-<3<>
Arx, i. 47i 137
Ascanius, iii. 186
Asclepiades, physician, v. 460
Asclepiades {ap. Arrian.), ii. 2 ».
Asculum, iii. 507, 509 »., 513, 521; iv.
78 ; v. 209
Asia Minor, nationalities of, iv. 11 f.
Before the time of the Gracchi, iii. 275-
281. Made a province, iii. 277 _/. En-
larged by addition of Great Phrygia, iv.
21 «. Oppression of Roman rule, iv.
6. Administration withdrawn from
Lucullus, iv. 386-395. Regulated afresh
by Pompeius, iv. 436-442. Subdued
and regulated by Caesar, v. 283 f.
Roman taxation, iii. 280, 351 /., 355,
372; iv. 6, in «., 126, 158, 160, 162,
165, 170^, 323, 380, 447; v. 364. A
closed customs district, iv. 160
Asia (Syria), first contact with Rome, ii.
216. Position in second Punic war,
ii. 315. Extent and character of the
kingdom : claims to represent the uni-
versal empire of Alexander, ii. 397 /.
Its political position after the war
with Antiochus, ii. 463-472. In seventh
century, iii. 235 /., 276 - 280, 284 ;
iv. 5 f. Occupied by Tigranes, iv.
316 /. Made a Roman province by
Pompeius, iv. 421, 428. Slaves chiefly
drawn from Asia, iii. 306 ; iv. 174.
Compare Antiochus
C. Asinius Pollio, v. 139, 507
Herius Asinius, Marrucinian commander
in the Social war, iii. 513
Asnaus, ii. 428
Aspendus, ii. 463
Assd voce canere, i. 288
Assignations. See Domains, Leges agra-
riae
Association, right of, ii. 65
Associations, iii. 92^
Astapa, ii. 320
Astolpa, father-in-law of Viriathus, iii.
222
Astrologers in Rome, iv. 209^
Asturians, ii. 389
Asylum in Rome, i. 137
Atarbas, ii. 188
Atax, river, iii. 420
Atella, ii. 204, 340. In Roman comedy,
ii. 369
A tellanaefabulae, Latin character-masks,
i. 291, 300 «. ; iii. 165 n. ; iv. 231 «.-
234. Supplanted by mime, iv. 233 n. ;
v. 468-470, 469 «.
Athamanes, ii. 318, 421, 423, 425, 426,
4=9. 433, 456, 4S7. 458, 476, 477. 4?5
Athenaeus, brother of Attalus of Per-
gamus, iii. 276 n.
Athenagoras, ii. 426
Athenians, commercial intercourse with
Etruria, i. 257 ; with Lower Italy and
Etruria, ii. 79 f. Seem to have fur-
nished the models for Etruscan
artists, i. 308. Resolve to found a
colony in the Adriatic against the
Etruscan pirates, i. 435. Sicilian ex-
peditions of, i. 416 f. ; ii. 144. In
second Punic war side with Rome
against Macedonia, ii. 317 f. Attitude
during the war with Philip, ii. 404, 414
/., 418, 441. During the war against
Antiochus, ii. 456. During the war
with Perseus, ii. 495, 517. Financial
distress, ii. 495 ; iii. 265. Plunder the
neighbouring places, iii. 265. Share in
the first Mithradatic war, iv. 35, 38, 39.
Siege by Sulla, iv. 38 f. Occupy
Oropus, iv. 199. Athens, place of
philosophic training, iv. 199. Silver
mines, iii. 309, 383
Athenion, leader in Servile war, iii. 385-
387
Athenodorus, pirate, iv. 354
Athletes, Greek, in Rome, iii. 126
A. Atilius Serranus [praetor, 562], ii. 453
C. Atilius Regulus [consul, 529], ii. 224,
225
L. Atilius [praeto' 536], ii. 367
INDEX
527
M. AtUius [consul, 460], i. 490
M. Atilius Regulus [consul, 498], ii. 178-
183, 201
M. Atilius Regulus, [consul, 537], «• =87
M. Atilius [praetor, 602], iii. 218
Atintanes, ii. 218, 220, 319, 427
Atis, ii. 222
Atrax, ii. 429
Atria on the Po, i. 143, 156, 186, 278; ii.
12 ; iv. 167. Commercial connection
with Corcyra and Corinth, i. 176, 257.
Syracusan, i. 417 ». Etruscan traces,
»■ 435
Atria in the Ahruzzi, Latin colony, i. 493
A trium, i. 27, 301 ; iii. 207
Atropatene, ii. 401
Attaiia in Pamphylia, fortress of Zenicetes,
iv. 313
Attalidae, iii. 234, 264. Foundation of
the dynasty, ii. 469. Their policy, iii.
275, 277. Become extinct, iii. 277
Attalus, of Pergamus ; his kingdom
and government, ii. 402 f. In second
Punic war sides with Rome against
Macedonia, ii. 318. Share in the war
with Philip, ii. 411, 412, 413, 414, 416,
417, 420, 423, 437. Antiochus violates his
territory, ii. 446/. Death, ii. 450, 474
Attalus, brother of Eumenes, ii. 511./C
Attalus II., Philadelphus, iii. 275, 276 «.,
377
Attalus III., Philometor, iii. 277
Attalus, of Paphlagonia, iv. 438
Attis, priest of Pessinus, iii. 276 n.
P. Attius Varus, lieutenant of Pompeius,
v. 209. Pompeian governor in Africa,
v. 230
Auctores iuris, ii. 112
Auctoritas scnatus, i. 330
Audas, confidant of Viriathus, iii. 225
Cn. Aufidius [tribune of the people, 584],
reintroduces the import of wild beasts
from Africa, iv. 183
Cn. Aufidius, historian (about 66b), ii.
248 n.
Aufidus, iii. 522
Augurs, Latin, i. 218 j. A college of
experts for interpreting the flight of
birds, i. 219. Their number, i. 219.
Increased to nine, i. 385. Increased to
fifteen, iv. 126. Detect flaws in the
election of plebeian magistrates, i. 384.
Plebeians made eligible, i. 383. Chosen
by the burgesses, iii. 463. Co-optation
reintroduced by Sulla, iv. 115. In the
municipia, iv. 133. Augural discipline,
iv. 205. Lore neglected, iii. 112
Aurelia, Caesar's mother, v. 306
C. Aurelius Cotta [consul, 502], iii. 10, 18
C. Aurelius Cotta [consul, 679], friend of
Drusus, iii. 503; iv. 112, 278, 374/:
L. Aurelius Cotta [consul, 635], iii. 427
L. Aurelius Cotta [praetor, 684], iv. 380
L. Aurelius Orestes [consul, 597], "'• 266
M. Aurelius Cotta [consul, 680], iv. 325-389
M. Aurelius Scaurus [consul, 646], iii.
436, 466
L. Aurunculeius Cotta, Caesar's lieu-
tenant in Gaul, v. 68 «.
Aurunci, war with the, i. 361
Ausculum, battle of, ii. 25-27
Auson, son of Ulysses and Calypso, L 177
Ausones, the, i. 475
Auspicia publico., i. 81 ; iv. 206, 511
P. Autronius Paetus, Catilinarian, iv.
466, 477
A uxilium, i. 403
Auximum, iv. 78 ; v. 209 ; colonized, iii
313
Avaricum besieged by Caesar, v. 79, 80
Aventine, i. 136, 141, 216, 231, 250; ii.
84 ; iii. 368. Fortified, i. 138. As-
signed to the Plebs, i. 363. Temple of
Diana on, see Diana
Avernus, lake of, i. 168
Aviaries, v. 378
Azizus, Arab prince, iv. 423, 427
Babylonia severed from Syria, iii. 288
Bacchanalian conspiracy, iii. 115./I
Bacchides, commander in Sinope, iv. 353
Bachelors, tax on, ii. 66
Bactrians, ii. 398 ; iii. 284, 287, 289
M. Baebius [praetor, 562], ii. 454
Baecula, battles at, ii. 329./^
Baetis, iii. 224, 226 ; iv. 283
Bagradas, ii. 359, 383 ; iii. 240, 258, 393,
402
Baiae, iv. 175, 184
Bakers in Rome, of late introduction, i.
249; iii. 123. Pistor= miller, iii. 124 «.
Ballad singers, ii. 98
Balearic isles, Carthaginian, ii. 143, 144,
330. Roman, iii. 233, 291, 382 n. Under
a praefectus pro legato, ii. 219 ».
Balearic slingers in the Roman army,
iii. 458
Bankruptcy ordinance of Caesar, v. 400
Banquets in Rome, v. 387 n.
Barbers in Latium, ii. 280
Barbosthenian mountains, battle at the,
ii. 452
Bar-Cochba, iii. 286 n.
Bargylia, ii. 413
Basilicas in Rome, iii. 124 «., 206. Bat.
Porcia, iii. 207
5a8
HISTORY OF ROME
Bastarnae, ii. 492 ; iv. 14, 20, 324, 416
Bastulopboenicians, iii. 215
Baths, warm, in Spain, ii. 385. In Rome,
improved by Caesar, v. 375
Bato, ii. 422
Battaces, high priest of Pessinus, iv. 210
Beer (barley wine), ii. 385
Belgae, iii. 416, 444; v. 24/, 34, 50, 54,
84/
Belli, Celtiberian people, iii. 216 ; iv. 210
Bellona, temple of, ii. 91 ; iv. 490
Bellovaci, v. 12 «., 52, 85, qif.
Bellovesus, i. 423 n.
Beneventum, ii. 333, 335, 336; iv. 166.
Colonized, ii. 39. Ins of, ii. 52 n.
Beneventane consuls, ii. 51. Battle
near, ii. 36
Berenice, ii. 7
Berenice (town), iv. 4
Bernard, pass of the Great St., v. 59 ; i.
424
Bernard, road over the Little St., i. 423
«.; ii. 258./C
Beroea, iv. 316
Bessi made subject to the Romans, iv.
307
Betrothal, its enforcement by action-
at-law early abolished at Rome, but
retained in the Latin communities, i.
»3X.> I05 .
Betuitus, king of the Arverni, iii. 417
Bias, i. 186
Bibracte (Autun), battle of, v. 43./C
Bilbilis in Spain, iv. 301
Bithyas, Numidian sheik, iii. 252./C, 257
Bithynia, ii. 401, 455, 471, 473, 492 ; ii.
234, 276, 277, 306 ; iv. 6, 19, 24, 25, 29,
44. 54. 95, 322, 323. 326- Pontic satrapy,
iv. 33. Ceded by Mithradates, iv. 49.
Roman province, iv. 322, 436
Bithynians akin to the Thracians, iv. 11
Bituriges, i. 423 ; iii. 416
Blood-revenge, traces of, i. i9o_/I; ii. 105
C. Blossius of Cumae, rhetorician, iii. 320
Boarding-bridges, ii. 174^
Bocchar, ii. 382
Bocchus, king of Mauretania, iv. 92, 94
Boeotians, ii. 402, 421, 429, 432, 441, 443,
456, 459, 498, 498 n. With Critolaus
against Rome, iii. 268. With Mithra-
dates, iv. 35
Bogud. See Mauretania
Boii on the Platten See, ii. 373 n.
Boii, Italian, i. 423 «., 424, 434; ii. 11,
221/., 224, 226, 250, 268, 369, 370. De-
struction of, ii. 372 ; iii. 313
Boii in Bavaria and Bohemia, iii. 423,
430. Dislodged by the Germans, v. 32,
39. Settled by Caesar in the territory
of the Haedui, v. 79
Boiorix, iii. 436, 449
Bomilcar, Carthaginian admiral, ii. 306,
312
Bomilcar, the confidant of Jugurtha, iii.
395. 400, 401/:
Bona Dea, i. 231
Bononia, formerly Felsina, Celtic, i. 424.
A Latin colony, ii. 374 ; iii. 49. lus of,
ii. 52 ft.
Bookselling, v. 562
Booty falls to the state, not to the
soldier, i. iggf. Given in largesses to
the troops, iii. 42. Revenue from,
iii. 20
Bosporan kingdom, iv. 15 f. Taken by
Mithradates, iv. 16-18. Under Phar-
naces, iv. 19 f. ; v. 264. Given by
Caesar to Mithradates of Pergamus, v.
283
Bosporus, ii. 405
Bostar, ii. 337
Bovianum, i. 146, 475, 481. Sulla's vic-
tory at, iii. 523. Capitulation, iii. 523.
Temporarily retaken, iii. 526
Bovillae takes the place of Alba, i. 129 n.
About 370, a member of the Latin
league, i. 448 «., 450. Shrine of the
gev.s of the Julii, i. 128
Boys accompanying their fathers to the
senate, ii. 95
Braccati, ii. 59 ; v. 10
Brachyllas, ii. 441
Bradanus, river in Lower Italy, i. 171
Brennus = king of the army, i. 428
Bridge-building, i. 219, 309 ; iv. 167, 169
Brigands in Italy, after the second Punic
war, ii. 367. In the seventh century,
iv. 169. Aid of, invoked by Catilina,
iv. 476. Formed from the remains of
the armies of Catilina and Spartacus,
iv. 486. In the provinces, iv. 169 ; v.
410/
Britain, origin of the name, v. n «. Tin
trade, iii. 420. Caesar in, v. 62-66
Britomaris, ii. 10
Brittany, iv. 251, 252
Brixia, i. 423 ; iii. 424
Brundisium, i. 176, 294, 29s, 308, 317,
333 : iv- 55. i°7> J<56, 177, 193 ; v. 211.
A Latin colony, ii. 39, 42, 215. Sur-
renders to Sulla, iv. 77. Surprised by
the pirates, iv. 355. lus of, ii. 52 »•
Bruttians, origin, i. 454. Name very
ancient, i. 434 n. Bilingual, i. 456.
Under Greek influence, i. 457 ./C Art,
ii. 122. Attitude during the Samnite
INDEX
529
war, i. 468. Share in the war with
Pyrrhus, ii. 21, 25. Submit to the
Romans, ii. 38. Alliance with Hanni-
bal, ii. 294, 334, 33s, 342, 349. Treat-
ment after second Punic war, ii. 364^ ;
iii. 24, 28. Pastoral husbandry, iii. 100.
Coins, ii. 79
Bruttius Sura, lieutenant of the governor
of Macedonia, defeats the fleet of Mith-
radates, iv. 35
Brutulus Papius, i. 470
Bubentani, about 370, member of Latin
league, i. 448 «.
Building in Rome : impulse given to it in
fifth century, ii. 86 /. Stagnation in
the sixth century, iii. 22 f. In the
seventh century, iv. 166 - 168, 184.
Under Caesar, v. 117, 375./C Budget for
public buildings, iii. 22./C
Bulla, amulet-case, iii. 5 «., 16, 45
Bulla, Numidian, iii. 259
Burgess-body, its primitive Latin divisions
and normal number, i. 85 f. This
normal number tripled in the earliest
Roman body composed of three com-
munities, i. 86. Practical value of these
normal numbers, i. 86 f. Equality of
rights in the earliest times, i. S7-89.
Equality among patricio-plebeian bur-
gesses, i. 392 f. Division, i. 86. Rights,
i. 93^ Burdens, i. 89-92. Extension,
iii. 36 f. Clients and city rabble, iii.
38 f. General character, iii. 35-40.
Incipient corruption, iii. 39-42. Num-
bers, see Census, Population
Burgess-cavalry. See Army
Burgess -colony. See Ccloniae civium
Romanorum
Burgess-rights. See Civitas
Butchers' booths in the Forum, ii. 86
Byrsa, citadel of Carthage, iii. 247 «., 248
Byzantium, ii. 318, 405, 410, 420, 450,455,
493. 496 ; »y- 47. 328
Byzes, Thracian chieftain, iii. 262
Cabani (Cabenses), about 370, member
of Latin league, i. 448 «.
Cabira, battle of, iv. 331./, 347. Founded
anew by Pompeius, iv. 441
Cacus, i. 22, 231
Caecilia Metella. wife of Sulla, iv. 105
C. Caecilius Metellus Caprarius [consul,
641], iii. 429
L. Caecilius [praetor, 470], ii. 10
L. Caecilius Metellus [consul, 503], ii.
186.
L. Caecilius Dalmaticus [consul, 635], iii.
427
VOL. V
Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer, lieutenant of
Pompeius, iv. 413, 429
Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus [con-
sul, 611], iii. 226, 233, 262, 268, 319, 324,
338, 367. Builds the colonnade in the
Campus Martius, iv. 257 ; and the
temple of Jupiter Statoron the Capitol,
iv. 257. Private life, iv. 187
Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos [consul, 697],
iv. 495, 497, 502
Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus [consul,
645], character, iii. 397./C Commander
against Jugurtha, iii. 397-405. Censor-
ship, iii. 466-468. Opposed to Satur-
ninus, and goes into exile, iii. 471.
Death, iii. 479 ; iv. 102 n.
Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius [consul, 674J,
lieutenant of Strabo in the Social war,
iii. 522, 526, 547 ; iv. 61, 63, 64, 65, 72,
79, 81, 83, 847:, 87, 88, 138. Related
by marriage to Sulla, iv. 98. His char-
acter, iv. 269 f. Spanish campaigns,
iv. 283, 292-301. Subdues Crete, iv.
352 f. Collision with Pompeius, iv.
37S> 453^ Leader of the aristocracy,
iv. 402-414
Q. Caecilius Metellus Scipio [consul, 702],
v. 166, 255, 2877, 300
Caecilius (Statius), Roman poet, ii. 371 ;
iii. 162
A. Caecina, v. 321
Caelian Mount, i. 136, 159
Caelius Vivenna, i. 158^
L. Caelius Antipater, historian, iv. 250
M. Caelius Rufus, v. 189, 507. Brings
in a law of debt, v. 317/^, 390
Caenina, i. 58, 125. Semblance of exist-
ence after destruction, i. 128.
Caere, the first Italian town mentioned by
the Greeks, i. 160. Etruscan, i. 158.
Punic factory, i. 163. Relations with
the Greeks, i. 179./C Relations with the
Phocaeans, i. 184. Stoning of Phocaean
captives, i. 185. Embassy sent to Del-
phi, i. 185. Treasury at Delphi, i. 180.
The Tarquins at, i. 159, 316. Primitive
neighbourly relations with Rome, i. 144,
158. War with Rome, i. 432 f. Un-
favourable terms of peace, i. 398, 433 ;
ii. 49, 55 n. Ius of, i. 433. Roman
praefect at, ii. 49. Frescoes of, ii. 124,
126. Art at, i. 258 ; ii. 126. Com-
merce, i. 258, 262. Tombs of Caere, i.
252. 277. 3°2
Caesar. See Julius.
Caiatia, i. 476, 481 ; ii. 304
Caieta, i. 177. Surprised by the pirates,
»v. 355
167
53°
HISTORY OF ROME
Calagurris, iv. 300, 301, 304
Calatia, i. 470 ; ii. 294, 338, 340
Calendar, oldest Roman table of festivals,
i. 207-210. Based at first solely on the
synodic lunar month and its multiplica-
tion by ten, the circle or year, i. 267,
268. The lunar month determined by
immediate observation, i. 267. This
mode of reckoning time subsequently
long retained, i. 271. Oldest Italian
solar year, i. 267 /. Oldest Roman
year, 269 ./C Publicly promulgated by
Appius Claudius, ii. 113. Reformed by
the Decemvirs, ii. n6_/C Confusion of,
ii. 278 n. Reform of, by Caesar, v.
438/
Cales, i. 475 ; ii. 79, 295, 304, 340 ; iii.
492. A Latin colony, i. 463, 472. The
colony reinforced, ii. 366. Station of a
naval quaestor, ii. 75. Art, ii. 122
M. Calidius, v. 189
Callaeci, i. 389 ; ii. 225, 23*. Subdued by
Caesar, v. 6
Callatis, iv. 307
Callias, ii. 106, no
Callicrates, ii. 481, 517
Callidromus, ii. 458
Callimachus, v. 450
Calpurnii, ii. 107
C. Calpurnius Piso [praetor, 569 ; con-
sul, 574], ii. 391 ; iii. i2i
C. Calpurnius Piso [consul, 687], iv. 393-
395
Cn. Calpurnius Piso, the Catilinarian, iv.
465, 468, 471
L. Calpurnius Bestia [consul, 643], iii.
393. 396
L. Calpurnius Piso [consul, 621], iii.
252, 299, 310. Chronicle of, iv. 248
L. (not C.) Calpurnius Piso [consul, 642],
as legate against the Cimbri, iii. 435
L. Calpurnius Piso, Caesar's father-in-
law, iv. 513
M. Calpurnius Bibulus [consul, 695], iv.
508, 510./C ; v. 129, 164
M. Calpurnius Flamma, i. 460 n.
Q. (not C.) Calpurnius Piso [consul, 619],
iii. 229
Calpus, alleged son of Numa, and ancestor
of the Calpurnii, ii. X07
Calycadnus, ii. 472
Calypso, i. 177
Camarina, ii. 190
Camars = Clusium, i. 143
Camenae, i. 298
Cameria, i. 125
Camerinum, v. 209
Camilii, clan-village, i. 45
Camillus. See Furius
Campanians in Sicily, ii. 162. See Capua
Camps, entrenchment of, ii. 73 ; watch-
service in the camp, i. 255 n.
Canaan, ii. 131
Canary islands, Etruscan colonizing pre-
vented by Carthage, i. 187
Cane, ii. 461./C
C. Caninius Rebilus, lieutenant of Curio
in Sicily and Africa, v. 230
Cannae, battle of, ii. 287-291 ; taken by
the Romans in the Social war, iii. 521
Cantabrians, ii. 389 ; iii. 228
Cantonal constitution in Gaul, v. 19, 21,
24
Canusium, i. 474 ; ii. 287, 291, 298, 303,
347. In the Social war, iii. 513, 522
Capacity, measures of, i. 265 f.
Capena supports Veii against Rome, i.
425, 426. Makes peace, i. 426. Colon-
ized, i. 432
Capital punishment, i. 192. Limited, ii. 68;
by Gaius Gracchus, iii. 348. Abolished
by Sulla for political offences, iv. 130
Capitolini, guild of the, i. 138 n.
Capitolium, i. 47, 66, 138. Temple of the,
ii. 100. Capitoline era, ii. 102
Cappadocia, ii. 401, 455, 473 ; iii. 234,
f 75. 277, 279. 280, 285, 287, 288, 382 ». ;
iv. jj, 11, 19, 30, 46 «., 49, 54, 330. Ac-
quired by Mithradates, iv. 19 f,, 32.
Restored, iv. 24,/, 49, 95. Subdued
by Tigranes, iv. 315 f. Enlarged by
Pompeius, iv. 446. Exempt from
taxation, iv. 157. Language, iv. 11
Capsa, iii. 406
Capua, i. 40, 256 ; ii. 80 ; iv. 166. Men-
tioned in Hecataeus as a Trojan colony,
ii. 109 «. Wrested from the Etrus-
cans by the Samnites, i. 419, 454. Under
Greek influence, i. 457 ; ii. 90. Wealth
and luxury of the city, i. 457 ; ii. 80, 82,
162. Medix tuticus there, i. 315. Seeks
aid from Rome and submits to her
supremacy, i. 458, 459 n. Revolts, i.
459 »., 461. The nobility adhere to
Rome, i. 461. Their cavalry decide
the battle of Sentinum, i. 4S9./C Posi-
tion in Pyrrhic war, ii. 23. Capuan
nobility favoured by the Romans, ii.
567C Becomes a dependent community
with self-administration, i. 463 ; ii. 49 ;
and legions of its own, ii. 55 «. A re-
cruiting field, ii. 162. Hannibal at-
tempts to get possession of it, ii. 281.
Passes over to Hannibal, ii. 294, 300,
303. Roman party at, ii. 294. Hanni-
bal at, ii. 303, 336 - 340. Besieged and
INDEX
S3i
taken, ii. 339 /. Loses its municipal
constitution, ii. 340, 364 ; iii. 23.
Ruined by the Hannibalic war, iii.
108. Campanian domain, iii. 20, 312 ;
iv. 156 ; occupied by private per-
sons, resumed by the state, iii. 328 f.
Remains unaffected by the agrarian
law of Ti. Gracchus, iii. 20. Coloniza-
tion by C. Gracchus, iii. 346, 374. In
the Social war, iii. 509/., 521; and in the
following Civil war, iv. 60, 80 f., 91.
Colonization renewed in 671, iv. 70, 79,
134. Abolished by Sulla, iv. 107, 126.
Affected by Servilian law, iv. 472.
. Colonized anew by Caesar, 508, 514.
Revolt of slaves, iii. 380. Gladiatorial
school at, iv. 357. Mint, ii. 87. Art,
ii. 122. In Roman comedy, ii. 366 ;
iii. 148./C
Caralis, ii. 143
Career, Roman and Sicilian, i. 201
Caria, ii. 434, 474 ; iii. 279 ; iv. xi.
Carian city-league, iv. 33
Carinae, i. 63, 117
Carmen, i. 286
Carmentalia, i. 209
Carmentis, i. 298
Carneades, iv. 193, 197-200
Carni, ii. 371 ; iii. 424
Carnutes, v. 72, 74, 81, 92
Carpenters, i. 249
Carpetania, iii. 222
Carrhae, battle of, v. 158-163
Carrinas, lieutenant of Carbo in the
Social war, iv. 79, 85, 88, 90
Carsioli colonized, i. 484. Attacked by
the Marsi, i. 486
Carteia in Spain, iii. 214./C, 222, 232 ; iv.
190
Carthage, name, i. 185 «. Situation, ii.
*35 /• ! 'ii- 245-249. Fortifications, ii.
159 ; iii. 245, 249. Rome and Carthage
compared, ii. 152, 160. Constitution, ii.
146-149, 154. Council, ii. 146. Magis-
trates, ii. 147, 154. Hundred-men or
judges, 147 f., 154. Citizens, ii. 148 ./C
Their numbers, ii. 157. War and peace
parties, ii. 232-234, 306.A 357./C Oppo-
sition party, ii. 150. Democratic reform
of constitution by Hannibal, ii. 378.
Rigour of its government, ii 154.
Position of the subjects, ii 155./C Army
and fleet, ii. 157-160, 236 f. Wealth
and its sources, ii. 150-154. State-
finances, ii. 150/;, 156. Token-money,
ii. 153 ; iv. 180. Science and art, ii.
152. Interweaving of the foundation-
legend of Carthage with that of Rome,
ii. no. Leads the Phoenician nation
in the struggle against the Hellenes for
the dominion of the sea, i. 183 /. ; ii.
*37 '/• Changes the character of the
Phoenician occupation, and establishes
its dominion over North Africa, i. 183./! ;
ii. 138 f. Close alliance of the Phoe-
nicians with the Siculi, the Latins, and
especially the Etruscans, i. 184 f. ; ii.
143./ Early relations to Rome, i. 185./C
Western Sicily held against the Hel-
lenes, i. 186; ii. 143/I Sardinia sub-
dued, i. 186 ; ii. 143. Carthaginians in
Spain, ii. 142. Excludes the Hellenes
from the Western Mediterranean and
the Atlantic, i. 184 ; ii. 138, 144. Com-
pelled by its relations with Persia to a
decisive attack on the Sicilian Greeks,
i. 415. Defeat of the Carthaginians at
Himera, i. 415 ; ii. 135. Subsequent
conflicts with Syracuse, ii. 144-146, 156.
Maintains naval ascendency in the
Tyrrhene Sea : breaking up of the
alliance with the Etruscans, i. 417/:
Position in Sicily : league with Rome
against Pyrrhus, ii. 29-31. Almost ex-
pelled by Pyrrhus from Sicily, ii. 32./C
Designs on Rhegium, ii. 12, 146. On
Tarentum, ii. 38, 146. Commands the
Italian seas in the fourth and fifth
centuries, ii. 39 f. Navigation of the
Romans restricted : commercial treaties,
i. 130, 452 ; ii. 41 n. [and Appendix to
vol. ii.], 44, 146. Quarrels with Rome,
partly from maritime jealousy, ii. 45.
First occupies Messana, then dislodged
from it by the Romans, ii. 169, 170.
First Punic war, ii. 161-195. Peace,
ii. 195-200. Mercenary war, ii. 205-208.
Second Punic war, causes of, ii. 230-
234. Carthaginian preparations, ii. 236-
243. Breach with Rome, ii. 245. War,
ii. 247-361. After second Punic war,
ii. 376 f. Alliance with Macedonia, ii.
292 /., 492. Attitude in the war with
Perseus, ii. 499. War with Massinissa,
iii. 237-240. Third war with Rome, iii.
241-258. Destroyed, iii. 257./C Colony
sent thither by Gracchus, iii. 346, 366 ;
cancelled by the senate, iii. 366, 374.
Its territory distributed, iii. 346, 366,
374, 468 ; iv. 157. New colony sent by
Caesar, v. 424 yC
Carthage, New or Spanish (Cartagena),
ii. 39, 251, 384; iv. 93. Taken by
Scipio, ii. 327/
Carthalo, Carthaginian vice-admiral in
Sicily in the first Punic war, ii. 190
532
HISTORY OF ROME
Carthalo, with Hasdrubal, leader of the
patriot party in Carthage, iii. 239, 241
Cams, general of the Segedani, iii. 217
Carventani, about 370, member of Latin
league, i. 448 n.
Sp. Carvilius [consul, 461], i. 490 ; ii. 124
Sp. Carvilius, teacher of writing : regulates
the Latin alphabet, iii. 191
Carystus, ii. 430, 452 ; iii. 507 n.
Casilinum, ii. 282, 303, 304, 335, 337
C. Cassius [consul, 681], iv. 360
C Cassius, lieutenant of Crassus, v. 160-
164
L. Cassius [tribune of the people, 617],
iii. 300, 316
L. Cassius Longinus [consul, 647], de-
feated by the Helvetii, iii. 435
L. Cassius, governor of Asia Minor, iv.
24. 29. 3°. 33
L. Cassius [tribune of the people, 665], iii.
53°
L. Cassius Hemina, chronicler, iv. 248.
" On the Censors," iv. 252
Q. Cassius Longinus [tribune of the
people, 705], v. 188. Governor in South-
ern Spain, v. 290
Sp. Cassius [consul, 252, 261, 268], i. 361,
438 ; ii. 85 ; iii. 59
Cassivellaunus, v. 64^
Castor and Pollux early worshipped by
the Romans, i. 230. Temple of, ii. 70 ;
iii. 367
Castra, custom-house at, iii. 19
Castrum Amerinum, i. 143
Castrum Novum, a burgess colony, ii. 39,
42
Castus, leader in gladiatorial war, iv. 363
Catana, i. 166
Cataonia, iii. 382 n.
Catilina. See Sergius
Cato. See Porcius
Cattle and sheep, the earliest medium of
exchange, i. 238. Rearing of, in Italy,
i. 243, 248. Dependent on agriculture,
iii. 67. Increase of cattle-rearing, iii.
68, 74, 80-82, 97 «., 305
Cauca, iii. 219, 233
Caucaenus, chieftain of Lusitanians, iii.
216
Caudine Forks, i. 471./C
Caudium, peace of, 472./C
Caulonia, i. 170. In the Pyrrhic war
pillaged by mutineers, ii. 19
Caunus, ii. 446
Cavalry. See Army
Cavea, iii. 138
Cavutn aedium, i. 301 ; iii. 207
Celeres, i. 90
Celetrum, ii. 426
Cella, i. 304
Celtiberians, ii. 322, 355, 356, 388, 391
iii. 216, 219, 444, 479, 493
Celtici, iii. 216
Celts, character of the nation, i. 419.
422. Migrations, i. 422 f. Cross the
Alps to Italy, i. 423^ Cross the Po,
i. 424. Attack Etruria and capture
Rome, i. 424-430. Subsequent incur-
sions into Latium, i. 431./I End of their
migrations, and results, i. 432. Take
part in the last Samnite war, i. 488^
Effect of the Celtic wars on the union
of Italy, ii. 59. Subdued by the
Romans in the course of the sixth
century, ii. 222-228, 369-374. Attitude
in second Punic war, ii. 26S-273. For-
bidden to acquire Roman citizenship,
ii. 370 ; iii. 24. Gallia Cisalpina in the
sixth century not yet a province, ii.
215 «.; erected as such only by Sulla,
ii. 215 «.; iv. 122 n. Italian Celts in
Roman army during the Social war,
iii. 507
Celts of Asia Minor, ii. 398, 401^,512 ; iii.
280. War with, ii. 469-471, 473. War
against Eumenes II. of Pergamus,
iii. 276. See Galatia
Celts, Transalpine, ii. 222, 223 »., 2a6-
228. Their tribes, i. 423 ; iv. 423 f.
Their advance into Italy checked, ii.
370 f. Conflicts in seventh century,
iii. 423-426
Celts, alleged, in Southern Ru»sia, iv. 16
Cenchreae, ii. 430
Cenomani, i. 423, 434 ; ii. 221, 223, 224, 227,
228, 270, 369^; iii. 424
Censorship instituted, i. 375. Impor-
tance of the office for the governing
aristocracy, i. 375 ; iii. 11. Plebeians
eligible, i. 383. Patricians excluded
from one censorship, i. 383. Moral
jurisdiction over the burgesses, i. 397,
406 n. ; ii. 63. Rendered thereby the
first of the magistracies, ii. 64. Superior
in rank to the consulate, i. 400. Might
not be held twice, i. 402. Not a curule
office, iii. 6 ». Limitations, iii. 10 /.
Set aside by Sulla, iv. 113. Renewed,
and term of office extended to five years
by Pompeius, iv. 380 ; v. 147 /. Re-
stricted by Clodius, v. in. Remodelled
by C*esar, v. 429, 430. Insignia, iii. 45
Censors in the Italian towns (quinquen-
nales), ii. 58 »., 59
Census arose out of the Servian military
arrangements, L 119 /. Every fourth
INDEX
533
year, i. 331. Extended to Italy, ii. 58
n. Extended to Sicily, ii. 211. But
not to the more recently added pro-
vinces, iii. 34. Rating originally in
land, i. 115 f. In money, i. 396 f.
Later modifications, iii. 50 n. Num-
bers of, when introduced into the
Annals, ii. 102. Those of the first
four centuries probably all fictitious,
ii- 54> 55 "• Compare Population
C. Centenius, ii. 279
M. Centenius, ii. 337
Centumviri, a Latin senate, i. 86
Centumviral court, iv. 128, 255 ; v. 348
Centuripa, ii. 171, 211 ft., 213. Exempt
from taxation, iv. 158
Cephallenia, ii. 476, 477
Cephaloedium, ii. 185
Cephissus, iv. 44
Cercina, iii. 541
Cereatae Marianae, iii. 452
Ceres, i. 207. Festival of, iii. 40. Temple
of, in Rome, i. 355 n. ; ii. 85, 118, 123,
127
Cerialia, i. 207
Cermalus, i. 63, 64
Cervesia, v. 13
Cestrus, river in Pamphylia, ii. 472
Ceutrones, ii. 260^
Chaeronea, battles at, iii. 269 ; iv. 35, \\f.
Chalcedon, ii. 410 ; iv. 47. Siege in
Mithradatic war, iv. 326
Chalcidian colonies in Italy and Sicily,
i. 166, 172, 175
Chalcis, ii. 396, 421, 422, 430, 431, 442,
45*i 454. 456. 457» 459> 499. 5°3 '» >V. 38,
42. Sides with Critolaus against Rome,
iii. 268. Punishment, iii. 270, 272
Chaldaeans in Rome, iv. 210
Chaonians in Pyrrhus' army, ii. 16.
Chaplet, as prize of victory, i. 294, 295 ;
iii. 5
Chariot races, i. 294, 295 ; iii. 124, 133
Charondas, laws of, i. 175
Charops, the Epirot, ii. 429 ; iii. 264
Chatti, v. 31 *., 72, 73
Chelidonian islands, ii. 446
Cherry, the wild, native in Italy, iii. 65
n. From Asia Minor, transplanted to
Italy in Caesar's time, iii. 65 «.
Chersonese, Tauric, iv. 15, 334. Free
city, iv. 15, 17. Inscription, iv. 13 ».,
17 n.
Chersonese, Thracian, ii. 400, 474, 477,
486; iii. 423
Chilo, slave of Cato the elder, iii. 132 ft.
(/..ios, ii. 318, 406, 411 /., 417, 460, 473.
Treatment of, by Mithradates, iv. 46.
Occupied by Lucullus, iv. 47 ; and in-
demnified by Sulla, iv. 49, 54
Chlorus, iii. 276 n.
Chrematas the Acarnanian, iii. 264
Cicero. See Tullius
Cilicia, ii. 398, 445, 472, 474 ; iii. 275, 281,
385; iv. 11, 317, 324, 325. Seat of
pirates, iii. 292, 306; iv. 2, 5, 311. A
Roman province, iii 382 ; iv. $/., 313/.
Taxation, iv. 158, r.59 ». Province en-
larged by Servilius, iv. 314. Partly
occupied by Tigranes, iv. 316. Enlarged
by Pompeius, iv. 436
Cimbri, iii. 386, 430-438, 444-449
Ciminian Forest, i. 157,432; ii. 79. March
of Q. Fabius Rullianus through it, L
479
Cincinnati^. See Quinctius
L. Cincius Alimentus, historical work
under his name, iii. 185 n.
Cineas, ii. 15, 22, 30
Cinna. See Cornelius
Cinyras, ruler of Byblus, iv. 430
Ciphers, earliest in general use through-
out Italy, i. 252, 264. Greek aspirates
afterwards adopted as signs for 50, 100,
and 1000, i. 267. Etruscan, i. 267, 282
Circe, i. 177
Circeii, Latin colony, i. 446. Rises against
Rome, i. 447. About 370, a member of
Latin league, i. 448 ft., 450, 451. Men-
tioned in treaty with Carthage, i. 452.
Not Roman burgess-community, ii. 49.
Circeian promontory, i. 177
Circus, i. 141. Flaminian, iii. 40
Cirta, ii. 354, 384 : iii. 391, 392, 402, 407 ;
iv. 177. And surrounding district, given
by Caesar to P. Sittius, v. 301, 424
Cispius, L 63
Cistophorus, iv. 182 ; v. 438 ft.
Citrons, iii. 65 ft.
Cius, ii. 407, 410, 411, 415, 421, 447
Cives sine suffragio, protected burgesses,
i. 121. Burgesses without right of
electing or being elected : origin of
this category, i. 433. Their position :
subject to Roman civic burdens and
Roman tribunals, but with administra-
tion of their own, ii. 49-54, 55 /. Their
number, ii. 53 n. Disappearance of
this class, iii. 23, 26, 54. Right pre-
served, with limited self-administration :
Tusculum, i. 448 ; ii. 248 n. ; and the
Sabines, i. 492. Without self-administra-
tion : Caere, i. 433 ; Capua and other
places, i. 463 ; Anagnia, i. 484./.
Civitas (citizenship), originally coinci-
dent with patriciate, i. 80. Could not
534
HISTORY OF ROME
be lost within the state, i. ryif., 198 f.
Within Latium, i. 131 f. Sparingly
conferred in very early times, i. 112.
Given to the Alban clans, i. 128. Later
civitas of plebeians, i. 333. Burgess-
rights formerly forced upon the holders,
then coveted and conferred as a favour,
ii. 52 f. After subjugation of Italy,
less frequently bestowed, iii. 26, 493 f.
Its assumption forbidden, iii. 496. After
the Social war, bestowed, with limita-
tions, on the Italians, iii. 516./:, 527 f. ;
iv. 62 f. The Sulpician law equalizing
old and new burgesses, iii. 531-535.
The same confirmed by Cinna, iv. 58,
70 f. By Sulla, iv. 106, 114 f. Ex-
tensively conferred by Caesar on non-
Italians, v. 425/
Civitates foederatae, iv. 157
Civitates immunes, iv. 158
Civic community. See Urban
Clanis, iv. 86
Clans form the community, i. 80. Clan
consists often households, 1. 85. Clan-
villages, the oldest form of settlements
in Latium, i. 44 f. Without political
independence, parts of the canton, L 46.
Getites maiorcs et minores, i. 108.
Significance of gentile ties even at the
time of the abolition of the monarchy,
i. 3*6'
Classes, L lis/"-, 118
C/assici, i. 118
Clastidium, battle of, ii. 228, 270, 272 «.
Claudia [sister to the consul of 505], iii.
102
Claudii, the patrician (Appendix), i. 495-
508
Claudius [decemvir, 303, 304], L 365, 498-
500
Ap. Claudius Caecus [censor, 442 ; consul,
447, 458]. His character, L 395 ; ii. 93.
His censorship, i. 396 ; iii. 50 «. De-
meanour in reference to Pyrrhus, ii. 22.
Founds the system of useful public
works and buildings, i. 476 ; ii. 85. 94.
And of honorary memorials of private
persons, ii. 91. His poems, ii. 94, 100.
His calendar and formulae for actions,
ii. 113. Introduces r instead of s, ii.
"5
Ap. Claudius Caudex [consul, 490], ii. 170
Ap. Claudius [consul, 495], i. 347
Ap. Claudius Pulcher [mil. tribune, 538 ;
consul, 542], ii. 298, 336, 337, 340. Fights
against the Salassi, iii. 415
Ap. Claudius [officer in the war with
Antiochus, 562), ii. 457
Ap. Claudius [officer in the war with
Perseus, 585], ii. 502, 505
Ap. Claudius [consul, 611 ; censor, 618], a
friend of the Gracchi, iii. 319, 323
Ap. Claudius, propraetor before Nola, iii.
547. Outlawed, iv. 72
Ap. Claudius [consul, 675], iv. 138, 306
Ap. Claudius, lieutenant in third Mithra-
datic war, iv. 336, 338
C. Claudius [mil. tribune, 490], ii. 168 /.
C. Claudius Cento [commands the fleet,
554], ii. 422, 423
C. Claudius Nero [censor, 550 ; consul,
547], propraetor in Spain, ii. 324, 330,
337. 347-348/, 351/
C. Claudius Marcellus [consul, 704], v.
185, 186
C. Claudius Marcellus [consul, 705], v.
188 n.
C. Claudius Pulcher [aedile, 655], im-
proves the stage-decorations, iv. 236
Claudius Unimanus [governor of Spain,
608], iii. 223
M. Claudius Marcellus [consul, 532, 539,
540, 544, 546], his character, ii. 301 /.
Defeats the Celts, ii. 228. Takes the
command after Cannae, ii. 298, 303, 304,
305, 310; iii. 51/ War in Sicily, ii.
310-313. Charges against him, iii. 57/
His Treatment of the Syracusans, iii. 33.
The first to bring art-treasures from
conquered Greek cities to Rome, iii.
208. His death, ii 343
M. Claudius Marcellus [consul, 588, 599,
602], iii. 217./C, 299 n.
M. Claudius Marcellus in the Social war
iii. s°9
M. Claudius Marcellus [consul, 703], v.
173. 179. 32°
P. Claudius Pulcher [consul, 505], defeated
at Drepana, ii. 188/ Mocks the aus
pices, iii. 112
Q. Claudius Quadrigarius, chronicler, v
496
Clauzus, Attus, migrates to Rome, i. 55
Clavus, iii. 5 «., 16, 45
Clazomenae, ii. 461, 473. Supports tht
Romans in the Social war, iii. 507 n.
Pillaged by the pirates, iv. 308.
Cleonymus of Sparta, i. 482/
Cleopatra, daughter of Antiochus ii. 445,
448 »., 450, 515/
Cleopatra, daughter of Mithradates, iv
406
Cleopatra, daughter of Ptolemaetu
Auletes, v. 272, v]&f., 281
Cleopatra, wife of Ptolemaeus Euergetet
II., iv. 4
INDEX
535
Clientship, meaning of the word, i. 109.
A state of protected freedom, i. 78 /.
Earliest position in the community, i.
79. A curse rests on its violation, i.
226. Based on assignation of land by
protector to protected, i. 245^ Referred
originally to the clan, not to the indi-
vidual patron, i. 246. Growth and sig-
nificance of, iii. 38 f. Not applied
officially to relations of state law, ii.
47 n. Of towns, originating out of hon-
orary citizenship, i. 88 ; iii. 33
Clitarchus, ii. 2 «., 112
Clitomachus, philosopher, iv. 19a
Cloaca maxima, i. 141 ; ii. 119
Cloacae, construction of, iii. 22
P. Clodius, iv. 345, 517 ; ▼. iii-ii6, 126,
144/
Clodius Glaber, general in the Gladiator-
ial war, iv. 358
Cloelii, from Alba, i. 128
Cloelius, iv. 79
Clondicus, Celtic leader, ii. 505
A. Cluentius, v. 390
L. Cluentius, Samnite leader in Social
war, iii. 522
Cluilia fossa, i. 58
Clunia in Spain, iv. 297, 304
Clupea, i. 180, 182, 183, 184 ; iii 252
Clupeus, ii. 76 n.
Clusium = Camars, L 143, 414, 428; ii.
224 ; iv. 167
Cnidus, iv. 47. Pillaged by the pirates,
iv. 308
Cnossus, iv. 353
Coelesyria, conflict between Syria and
Egypt about, ii. 515, 517
Coelius. See Caelius
Cohors amicorum, iii. 460
Cohorts. See Legion
Coinage. See Money
Colchis, iv. 13, 20, 94, 41 4-4i6
Collatia, i. 123, 130
Collegia (clubs) in Rome, v. Ill, 370.
First forbidden by decree of senate in
690, iv. 267 f. Allowed again by
Clodius, v. in. Restricted by Caesar,
v. 373./
Collini, i. 68 «., 6g
Colline Gate, i. 68. Battle at the, iii. 89
Collis, i. 68
Collis agonalis, i. 68 n.
Colonnades occur, iii. 206
Colonies, Italian, their salutary effect on
the social state of Rome, i. 391. Be-
tween the Apennines and the Po, iii.
99 /. Stoppage of colonization in Italy
since end of sixth century, iii. 312 /.
Colonies of C. Gracchus, iii. 346, 374.
Proposal of the elder Drusus, iii, 364 f.
Of the younger Drusus, iii. 485. Of
Sulla, iii. 541 f. ; iv. 109, 265. Of the
Servilian agrarian law, iv. \]tf. Com-
pare Capua
Coloniae civium Romanorum, i. 127 tu
At first all on the sea-coast, i. 42, 48.
Inland, iii. 26. All established in Italy
after Aquileia, burgess-colonies, ii. 52 ».
The Transpadane towns designated as
such, v. 131 /. Rise of municipal
system, iv. 131-134
Coloniae Latinae, oldest,!. 135. Founded
by Romano-Latin league, and received
into it as new independent members, i.
439. Colonists at first a mixture of
Romans and Latins ; subsequent pre-
dominance of Romans, i. 440, 441.
Compare Latin league
Colonies, non - Italian, projects of T.
Gracchus, iii. 312. Of C Gracchus, iii.
346. Founding of Narbo, iii. 374, 419;
iv. 191 ; v. 422. Proposals of Saturni-
nus, iii. 468, 476. Of the younger
Drusus, iii. 485. Colonies of Caesar in
Cisalpine Gaul, v. 131. In Transalpine
Gaul, v. 98, 422. At various points, r.
423-43S
Colophon, ii. 473 ; iii. 279 ; iv. 47. Pillaged
by the pirates, iv. 308
Columns, building of, iii. 207
Comana, iv. 95, 332. High priest of, rr.
438
Comedy, newer Attic, iii. 141-146
Comedy, Roman ; Hellenism and political
indifference, iii. 147-151. Dramatis
personae and situations, iii. 151 f.
Composition of, iii. 153 f. Roman
barbarism, iii. 154. Metres, iii. 155.
Scenic arrangements, iii. 155 f.
Comitia, non-freehold burgesses admitted
generally by Appius Claudius, i. 396 f.
In a more limited sense by Fabius Rul-
lianus, i. 396. Gradual extension of
their functions, i. 397 /. First step to-
wards consulting them on administrative
affairs, i. 397 f. Demagogic enlarge-
ment of their functions, iii. st/- Vot-
ing districts disorganized, iii. 37, 38.
Decreasing importance, i. 398 /. Nul-
lity of later comitia, iii. 59 f. Intro-
duction of voting by ballot, iii. 300,
316, 340. Better control aimed at by
Marius, iii. 454. Condition in the time
of the Gracchi, iii. 300 f., 329-333. In
the time of Sulla, iii. 541-545 ; iv. ii6j/C
In the time of Caesar, v. 338. Appoint
536
HISTORY OF ROME
directly to military commands, iv. 389/;
Their corruption, iii. 302 ; iv. 268 ; v. 385
Cotnitia ctnturiaia, earliest, i. 120 f.
On the abolition of the monarchy, ob-
tain the right of annually designating the
consuls, of judging in appeals, and mak-
ing new laws in concert with presiding
magistrates, i. 327, 328. Priority in
voting of equestrian centuries, i. 329.
Assembly of the centuries in the camp,
L 328. Reform of: each of the five
classes has equal number of votes ;
equestrian priority of vote abolished,
iii. 50-54. Order of voting fixed by lot
by C. Gracchus, iii. 345. Servian order
of voting restored by Sulla, iii. 542,
compare iv. 115. Position after the
Sullan restoration, iv. 114, 115
Comitia curiata, summoned by the king
to do homage, and to sanction changes
in, or exceptions from, the existing
legal order, i. 93-96. Ordinary, twice
* year (March 24 and May 24), i. 93.
Vote taken by heads, i. 360. After
admission of plebeians restricted to
legislative formal acts and decrees in
matters affecting the clans, i. 327 f.
Plebeian curiate assembly, i. 328, 360.
Compare Burgess-body
Comitia triiuta, originally assembly of
plebeian landholders, i. 360. Introduc-
tion of, i. 360. Patricio - plebeian, i.
368. Predominance in later times, iii.
52./C After Sulla's time, nominate new
senators, iv. 1137C Nominate quaestors,
iv. 113
Comitium, i. 140
Commagene. See Antiochus and Ptole-
maeus
Commerce, oldest Italian inland, its
fairs, i. 250. Media of exchange : oxen
and sheep, i. 251 ; and copper, i. 252.
Subsequent development, ii. 787^
Commerce, earliest Italian transmarine,
especially on the west coast ; import
chiefly of Greek and Oriental articles
of luxury, i. 252 - 255. Export or
Italian raw produce, i. 255. Etruscan,
Attic, and Latino -Sicilian, i. 257 /.
Subsequent development of transmarine
commerce, ii. 79-81; iii. 84. Latin
commerce passive, Etruscan active, i.
255. Roman wholesale, i. 261 ; iv.
'73 /• African, centres at Utica, iii.
860. Greek, at Argos and Delos, iii.
174. Gallic and British, at Narbo, iii.
431. Roman, penetrates to Northern
Gaul, v. 30
Commercial i terests, their influence on
Roman politics, iii. 238, 274, 295, 415,
421 ; iv. 175, 176
Commercium withdrawn from the Ita-
lian communities, ii. 52. From the
Sicilians, ii. 210
Commius, king of the Atrebates, v, 85,
92, 94
Commodatum, iii. 91
Common tillage by the clanships, i. 46,
238 _
Compitum, dictator at, i. 442 w.
Complega, ii. 386
Compulteria, ii. 305
Comum, ii. 228, 370 ; iii. 305, 425 ; v. 132
Concilium withdrawn from the Italian
communities, ii. 53
Concilium plebis, i. 360
Concolitanus, ii. 223, 226
Concord, temple of, in the Capitol, i. 382.
New temple erected by L. Opimius,
iii. 369
Confarreatio, relation to the earliest con-
stitution of ten curies, i. 85 «. Sym-
bolic act, i. 202
Confiscations by Sulla, iv. 103^
Confiscations by Caesar, v. 365
Congonnetiacus, iii. 418
Conistorgis, town of the Celtici, iii. 220
Consensual contracts, actionable, iii. 92 n.
Consentia, i. 466. Attitude in second
Punic war, ii. 294. Stormed by the
gladiators, iv. 359
Consilium, i. 330
Cousualia, i. 208
Consuls, meaning of name, i. 318 n.
Their earliest appellations, i. 318.
Supreme administrators, judges, and
generals, i. 318. Each of them pos-
sessing the whole regal power : in case
of collision, the imperia neutralize each
other, i. 318 f. Authority dormant
during a dictatorship, i. 325. Bound
to resign office after the expiry of a
year, i. 319. No fixed day for entering
on their year of office, i. 319 n. Power
similar to the royal, i. 317^ But differ-
ing from it, by the introduction of
responsibility : consul impeachable after
the expiry of his term for a crime per-
petrated while in office, i. 319 ; by the
abolition of royal taskwork and client-
ship, i. 319 f.\ by the legal establish-
ment of the right of the community to
judge on appeal in capital sentences
other than those of martial law, i. 320 ;
by restrictions on right to delegate hit
powers, i. 321, or to nominate his sac-
INDEX
537
cessor, i. 324 ; by the loss of the nomina-
tion of priests, and by the abolition of
the more striking insignia, i. 324.
Their position in reference to senate, i.
336-338. Choose senators at pleasure,
i. 331. Conduct quaestorial elections,
i. 368. Restricted by the intercessio
and jurisdiction of the tribunes, i. 350-
354. Their power weakened in conse-
quence of the conflicts between the
orders, i. 400. Limited to the main-
land, ii. 209. Receive a quasi -dicta-
torial power by decree of the senate,
iiL 56. The consul conducting a con-
sular election might propose list of, and
reject, candidates, i. 324. One consul
must be a plebeian, i. 380. Re-elec-
tion restricted, ii. 402 ; iii. 14. Ex-
clusion of the poorer citizens, iii. 14.
Right of proposal, but not of deposition,
vested in the community, i. 323. Re-
election forbidden, iii. 299; iv. 72 n.
This repealed by Sulla, iv. 116. Con-
sular spheres of duty regulated by C.
Gracchus, iii. 355, 405. By Sulla, iv.
121 f. Decline of consulate under
Caesar, iv. 453 ; v. 329, 343 f. Consul
suffectus in the earlier time, i. 319 n, ;
in Caesar's time, v. 344. Consuls in
Beneventum, ii. 51. Opposition-consuls
of the Italians, iii. 505.
Cflnsus, i. 208
Contio, i. 93 ; iii. 331
Contracts under earliest law not action-
able, with the exception of betrothal,
purchase, and loan, i. 195. Of the
state with a burgess need no form, i.
195. Defaulter and his property could
be sold, i. 196 ./C Consensual contracts
and obligatio litteris, iii. 91 n.
Contrebia, iii. 226 ; iv. 293
Conubium between Romans and Latins,
i. 132 ; ii. 52 »., 210. Withdrawn from
the Italian communities, ii. 52, and
from the Sicilian (?), ii. 210
Conventui civiutn Romanorum, iv.
190
Cookery, art of, iii. 123
Co-optation. See Priestly Colleges
Copia. See Thurii
Copper, the second oldest medium of
exchange, i. 251 /. Copper money in
Rome, iv. 179
Coppersmiths, guild of, i. 249, 307
Cora, originally Latin, i. 445 n. In the
Aricine league, i. 445 «., 450. About
370, a member of the Latin league, i.
448 «M 45°
Corbio, about 370, a member of Latin
league, i. 448 «., 450
Corcyra, ii. 422, 425. Commercial con-
nections with Italy, i. 176. Occupied
by Agathocles, Cleonymus, Demetrius,
and Pyrrhus, i. 4$-$/., 491 ; ii. 7. Ro-
man, under a praefect, ii. 218 «., 403
Corduene, iv. 317, 341
Corfinium, headquarters of the insur-
gents in Social war, iii. 504, 522.
Siege and capture by Caesar, v. 2ogf.
Corinth, ii. 396, 430, 431, 432, 434, 437,
438, 442; iii. 266./C, 268. Its commer-
cial connections with Italy, i. 176.
Colonies from, i. 166. Occupied by
Mummius, iii. 370. Art - treasures
carried ofF, iii. 270 f. Destruction of,
iii. 272-274 ; iv. 173, 175. Roman
domain, iii. 271 ».; iv. 157. Restored
by Caesar, v. 425. "Copper" of, iiL
274 n.
Corioli, about 370, a member of the Latin
league, i. 448 »., 450
Cornelia, mother of the Gracchi, iii. 318,
333. 309/; >v- l84. 25°
Cornelia, wife of Caesar, iv. 279
Cornelians, frcedmen of Sulla, iv. no
Cornelii, clan-village, i. 45
Cornelius Nepos, v. 498
A. Cornelius Cossus [consul, 326], i. 425
A. Cornelius Cossus [consul, 411], i. 459 «.
C. Cornelius Cinna, Strabo's lieutenant in
the Social war, iii. 522
Cn. Cornelius Scipio Asina [consul, 494],
ii. 177
Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus [consul, 532],
conquers the Celts, ii. 228. In Spanish
campaign, ii. 291, 309, 321-323
Cn. Cornelius Dolabella [governor in
Cilicia, 674], iii. 382 «.
Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Clodianus [consul,
682], defeated by Spartacus, iv. 360,
380
Cn. (?) Cornelius Scipio. See L. Cor-
nelius Scipio
L. Cornelius Balbus maior, iv. 89
L. Cornelius Balbus of Gades, Caesar's
confidant, v. 342
L. Cornelius Scipio [consul, 456], epitaph
on, ii. 91, 93, 103 »., 115 «•> I23
L. Cornelius Scipio [consul, 495] takes
Aleria, ii. 177. Epitaph on, ii. 115 n.,
177
L. Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus [consul,
564], general in war with Antiochus, ii.
464, 470. Originator of special collec-
tions, iii. 39. Erased from the roll of
the equites, iii. 48 . Takes the sur*
53«
HISTORY OF ROME
name of Asiagenus, ii. 483 n. ; iii.
44
L. Cornelius Cinna [consul, 667-670], iii.
S4S I iv- S7-6i, 64. 65, 68, 69-71, 73, 74,
102 n.
L. Cornelius Cinna, son of the preceding,
iv. 288
L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus [consul, 705],
v. 188
L. Cornelius Merula [consul, 666], iv. 59,
66/:
L. (Cn. ?) Cornelius Scipio [praetor, 580],
captive with Antiochus, ii. 466
L. Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus [consul,
671], iv. 74, 80/:, 101, 102 »., 103
L> Cornelius Sisenna [praetor, 676],
lieutenant of Pompeius, iv. 403. His-
torian of the Social and Civil wars, v.
493 /•
L. Cornelius Sulla, surnamed Felix, iv.
142. Character, iii. 537/; iv. 139-142.
Superstition, iv. 141, 209. Political
career, iv. 142-145. Serves against
Jugurtha, iii. 407-409. Against the
Teutones, iii. 443. Governor of Ciiicia,
iv. 82. General in Social war, iii. 504,
SiOf 5i3» 520, 522, 524A 525i 5*9-
Quarrels with Sulpicius, iii. 535 f.
Marches on and occupies Rome, iii.
538, 539- First legislation, iii. 54I-S45-
Mithradatic campaign, iii. 545, 547.
Conquers Greece, iv. 36-42. At Athens,
iv. 38, 39. Victorious at Chaeronea, iv.
41-43. At Orchomenus, iv. 44. Crosses
to Asia, iv. $of. Makes peace at Dar-
danus, iv. 52. Against Fimbria, iv.
52 f. Regulates Asiatic affairs, iv.
53./; Returns to Italy, iv. 55, 77. In
conflict with the Marian party, iv. 79-
92. Dictator, iv. 98-100. His execu-
tions, iv. 100 /., 106 f. Proscriptions
and confiscations, iv. 102-106. Assig-
nations to the soldiers, iv. 108/ Treat-
ment of the Italians, iv. 107 - no.
Abolishes the Gracchan institutions,
iv. no f. Reorganizes the senate, iv.
mf. Regulations as to the burgesses,
iv. 114./C As to the priestly colleges, iv.
115. Regulates qualifications for office
and magistracies, iv. 116-121. Erects
Cisalpine Gaul as a province, ii. 215 n.,
iv. 122/; His finance, iv. 126. Judicial
system, iv. 127-130. Quaestiones, iv.
128/ Police laws, iv. 130/ Resigns
the dictatorship, iv. 138. After his re-
tirement, iv. 150. Death and burial, iv.
X51 f. His opinion of Caesar, iv. 279.
Political results of his death, iv. 287.
Vengeance of democrats on Sullans by
legal process, iv. 458-460.
P. Cornelius Dolabella [consul, 471], ii. It
P. Cornelius Lentulus besieges Haliartus,
ii. 498
P. Cornelius Rufinus [consul, 464, 477], i.
395 ; ii. 64, 86 «.
P. Cornelius Scipio [consul, 536], com-
mands against Hannibal in Gaul and
Upper Italy, ii. 254-257, 268-272, 291.
In Spain, ii. 308, 321-323
P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, his charac-
ter, ii. 324-327. Saves his father's life at
the Ticino, ii. 269. His conduct after the
battle of Cannae, ii. 298. His Spanish
campaigns, ii. 327331. His African
expedition, ii. 352-361. Triumph, ii.
368. Opposed to Antiochus, ii. 464-468.
Separates the orders in the theatre, iii.
10. At enmity with Cato, iii. 42, 47,
76. His political position, iii. 61. Ne-
potism, iii. 17. Early rise of, iii. 17.
Introduces honorary surnames, ii. 483 «. ;
iii. 44. Largesses of foreign grain at
nominal prices, iii. 76. Ridiculed by
Naevius, iii. 150. His trial and death,
ii. 483/
P. Cornelius Scipio, son of Africanus,
writes Roman history in Greek, iii.
185
P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica commands at
Pydna, ii. 506
P. Cornelius Cethegus, a Marian, goes
over to Sulla, iv. 78. His influence, iv.
269, 351
P. Cornelius Dolabella, Caesar's admiral
in Illyricum, v. 235. Tribune of the
people, v. 318
P. Cornelius Lentulus [praetor urianus,
c. 589], iii. 329
P. Cornelius Lentulus Sura [consul, 683],
Catilinarian, iv. 477, 479, 480
P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther, a Pom-
peian, v. 209
P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus,
his character, iii. 314-317, 339. Incor-
ruptibility, iii. 295. Military tribune in
Spain, iii. 219 /., 241. In Africa, iii.
250 f. In Macedonia, iii. 260. De-
stroys Carthage, iii. 252-258. Restores
discipline in the camp before Numan-
tia, iii. 230 ; iv. 210. Destroys Nu-
mantia, iii. 231 /." Mission to the east,
iii. 292. Bearing towards the populace,
iii. 33t. Attitude in reference to Sem-
pronian agrarian law, iii. 320, 331, 334,
337. Judgment on the killing of Ti.
Gracchus, iii. 327. Death, iii. 338.
INDEX
539
Scipionic circle, iv. 192, 203, 239, 243.
Speeches, iv. 251.
P. Cornelius Sulla, Catilinarian, iv. 466
Corniculum, i. 125
Q. Cornuicius, lieutenant of Caesar, v.
284
Corona chrica, ii. 358 ; iii. 315
Coronea, ii. 441, 498, 501, 503
Correspondence published, v. 501
Correus, Bellovacian, v. 92./I
Corsica, Phocaeans settle in, i. 184. Etrus-
can, i. 186, 413, 416. Carthaginian,
ii. 40. Roman fleet sent thither to found
colony, ii. 44. Roman, ii. 177, 209.
War with, ii. 376. Marian settlement
in, iii. 479
Cortona, ii. ux. Peace with Rome, L 479
C Coruncanius, ii. 217
L. Coruncanius, ii. 217
Tib. Coruncanius, ii. 23, 113
Cos, ii. 412; iv. 32, 33
Cosa in Etruria, i. 304 ; iv. 291. In
Lucania, ii. 295. A Latin colony, ii.
39, 42. Reinforced, ii. 366
C. Cosconius [praetor, 664, 691], in the
Social war, iii. 521. Against the Dalma-
tians, iv. 306
Coses, iv. 416
Cossyra, ii. 143 ; iv. 92
Cothon, inner harbour of Carthage, iii.
248, 256
Cotta. See Aurelius, Aurunculeius
Cottian Alps, road over the, iv. 293
Cotys, iv. 93, 500, 501, 510
Crates Mallotes, grammarian, iv. 214
Crathis, river in Bruttium, i. 171
Credit, earliest Roman system of: no
landed security, hut guaranteed right
of personal arrest, i. 204. Effects of, i.
346/; Demand of legal abatement during
the Social war, iii. 53o_/I Remission of
debt by the law of L. Valerius Flaccus,
iv. 70. Projects of Catilina, iv. 474.
Position of debtors in Caesar's time, v.
388-390. Caesar's measures, v. 398-402.
Laws of M. Caelius and P. Dolabella,
v> 3*7 /• Caesar's bankruptcy ordin-
ance, v. ifiof. Compare Agriculture
Cremera, battle on the, i. 359
Cremona, ii. 267, 273 ; iv. 167. Battle at,
ii. 370. Reorganized as fortress, ii. 373.
A Latin colony, ii. 229 ; iii. 49. /us of,
ii. 52 «. ; i»i. 518
Crete, ii. 405, 433, 439, 475, 514, 515 ; iii.
234, 442. The Phoenicians dislodged
thence by the Hellenes, i. 183. Recruit-
ing field, ii. 162. Seat of pirates, iii. 291
/, 306 ; iv. 310, 314. Made by Metellus
and Pompeius a Roman province, iv.
3Sr-354, 402/;, 436. League of Cretan
towns, iv. 27^
Cri/aen, i. 32
Criminal procedure : fundamental ideas,
i. 32. Interference of the king, even
without appeal of the injured person,
in breaches of the public peace, i. 191
f. Imprisonment during investigation
the rule, i. 191./C Capital punishment,
i. 192. Pardon by the community, or
by the gods, i. 192. Later development,
ii. 66-70. Changes by C. Gracchus, iii.
346^. 352./ Under Sulla, iv. 127-129.
See Jury-Courts
Critolaus, iii. 267, 268, 269
Crixus, leader of the Celts in the gladia-
torial war, iv. 357-360
Croton, i. 170/:, 173, 456; ii. 29s, 358.
Repulses the Bruttians with help of the
Syracusans, i. 466. Occupied by the
Romans, ii. 12, 31. Burgess-colony, ii.
365. Pillaged by mutineers in Pyrrhic
war, ii. 18. Surprised by the pirates,
iv. 354
Crustumeria, i. 125, 348. Crustuminian
tribe, i. 360
Culture, in Caesar's time, v. 449-453
Cumae or " Cyme," in Asia Minor, ii. 461,
473 ; iii. 278
Cumae in Campania, ii. 303. Oldest
Greek settlement in Italy, i. 165, 166,
167. Transferred to mainland, i. 175.
Its constitution, i. 175. Dorism of
language, i. 174 n. Attacked by
Tyrrhenians, 230 u.c, i. 148, 158.
Checks the Etruscans in Aricia, i. 414.
Helps to defeat Tyrrhene fleet, i. 415 •
ii. 134. Conquered by Sabellians, i. 419,
454. 456. Obtains Caerite rights, i.
463 ; iii. 24. Sibylline oracles brought
thence to Rome, i. 229. Old relation*
with Rome, i. 260 ; ii. 80
Cumulation of offices, i. 402
Cures, Sabine town, i. 69 n. Obtains
civitas sine suffragio, i. 492. Set
Sabines
Curia consisted of 10 gentes, or 100
households, i. 85. Fundamental part of
the community, i. 86 /. Compare
Comitia curiata
Curia Saliorum, i. 62
Curiae ve teres, i. 62
Curiatii, from Alba, i. 128 ; ii. 105
Curicta, v. 235
Curio, i. 87. Curio maxitnus elected by
the burgesses, iii. 57. AH the curiones
elected by the burgesses, iii. 463; iv.
540
HISTORY OF ROME
206 ./C Election by the college reintro-
duced by Sulla, iv. zi$f., 307
Curio. See Scribonius
M*. Curius Dentatus [consul, 464, 479,
480 ; censor, 482], i. 393, 395, 491 ; ii.
36, 85 ; iii. 46
Cursor. See Papirius
Curule magistracies, iii. 4, 5 »., 6f.
Customs, Sicilian, ii. 212 ; iv. 160. Ex-
tension of Italian, iii. iqf. In the seventh
century, iv. 159 ,/C Customs -districts
within the Roman state, iv. 160.
Officers, iv. 166
Cybele, worship in Rome, iii. 117
Cyclades, the, ii. 400, 410, 412
Cycliades; ii. 430
Cyclopean walls. See Walls
Cydonia, iv. 351/, 353
Cynics, v. 444
Cynoscephalae, battle of, ii. 433 /,
Cyprus, ii. 400, 410 ; iv. n, 47. The
Phoenicians dislodged thence by the
Hellenes, i. 183. Separated from
Egypt, iii. 235, 236. Falls to Rome,
»v- 3191/50, 3'7
Cypsela, iv. 52
Cyrene, ii. 137, 400, 410, 414 ; iv. 40.
Phoenicians dislodged thence by Hel-
lenes, i. 183. Separated from Egypt,
iii. 234, 236, 283, 410 n. ; iv. 4. Roman,
iv. 4, 322. Free city, iv. 4. Roman
domains there, iv. 157. Taxation, iv.
158
Cyssus, battle, ii. 460
Cythnos, ii. 417
Cyzicus, ii. 406, 430. Free city, iii. 280.
Treatment by Fimbria, iv. 47. Be-
sieged by Mithradates, iv. 327/I En-
largement of city-domain by Lucullus,
iv. 440
Dacian kingdom founded, v. 105./C
Dadasa, iv. 348
Dahae in army of Antiochus, ii. 466
Dalmatia. See Illyricum.
Damareta, i. 415
Damascus, iv. 316, 427
Damasippus at Phacus, iii. 260
Damium, i. 231
Damocritus, Achaean strategus, iii. 266
Damophilus, Sicilian planter, iii. 309
Damophilus of Himera. See Demophilus
Danala, iv. 407
Dancing, its early religious and artistic
significance, i. 285 f. Accompanying
the saturae, ii. 98./C Greek influence,
iv. 258. On the stage, v. 472^, 517.
In private life, v. 516./
Daorsi, iii. 423
Dardani, ii. 42a, 423, 435, 49«, 493, 5°* .'
iii. 263, 429 ; iv. 50. Subdued by
Romans, iv. 307
Dardanus, ii. 473. Peace at, iv. 53, 54
Darius, king of the Medes, said to have
been defeated by Pompeius, iv. 434 tu
Dassaretae, ii. 423, 426, 499
Daunii, i. 453 ; ii. ai, 89. With th»
Etruscans surprise Cumae, i. 148. Sub-
dued by Alexander the Molossian, i
466
Day late in being divided into hours, i
268. Different times of its commence-
ment among Italian races, i. 269^
Dca dia, i. 215
Debt, procedure for, altered by the Lex
Poetelia, i. 389/! See Credit
Decemviri consulari imperio legihus scri-
buttdis, institution and overthrow, i.
361-367. Introduction of money by
them, ii. -j%f. Attempt a regulation of
the calendar, ii. 116,/!
Decemviri litibus iitdicandis, i. 352 ; iv.
128
Decemviri sacrisfaciundis. See Duovin
Decietae, iii. 415
Decimal system, its origin, i. 263,/ Oldei
than the duodecimal system, L 264,/
At first exclusively prevalent in Italy,
i. 264. But the duodecimal system
early acquired preponderance, i. 265
Decius, Campanian captain, ii. 18
P. Decius Mus [military tribune, 411 ;
consul, 414], i. 459 n. Self-sacrifice
probably false, i. 460 n.
P. Decius Mus [consul, 457, 459], i. 459
«., 489 ^
Declamations, iv. 315-218
Decurioues turmarum, i. 440 n.
Dediticii, communities of, iii. 24, 36-28.
Definition of, iii. 528 «. ; iv. 107 n.
Deiotarus, iv. 325, 437
Delian bronze, iii. 274 n.
Delium, ii. 457. Peace-conferences with
Mithradates at, iv. ^f.
Delminium, iii. 421
Delos, free port, ii. 515. Emporium of
the Romans, iii. 274, 293, 306, 309 ; iv.
34, 175. Occupied by Mithradates, iv.
34. Given to Athens, ii. 517; iv. 39.
Surprised by the pirates, iv. 354
Delphic oracle, embassy to, from the
Romans, i. 230 ; ii. 46. From the
Caerites, i. 185. Delphic temple, ii.
495, 496. Receives gifts from Mum
mius, iii. 271. Emptied by Sulla, iv.
40. Celtic expedition to Delphi, iii. 425
INDEX
541
Demeter, secret worship, iii. 117
Demetrias, ii. 306, 423, 425, 431, 442, 452,
459> 477i 504. 5°9 ; jv. 35
Demetrius Nicator, iii. 286
Demetrius Poliorcetes, i. 491 ; ii. 6, 7,
43 n. Changes in siege-warfare, ii. 32
Demetrius, son of Philip of Macedonia,
ii. 43s, 488
Demetrius of Pharos, ii. 218, 220, 250,
285, 292 ; iii. 421
Demetrius Soter, of Syria, iii. 260, 282,
283, 285
Democrates, ii. 412
Democritns regarded as inventor of
the arch, ii. 119. Atomic doctrine, iv.
197
Demophilus of Himera, ii. 123
Denarius, ii. 87
Dentatus. See Curius
Dentheletae, Thracian tribe, iv. 34
Depositum, iii. 91
Dertona, iv. 167
Desultor, i. 294
Deus fidius, i. 214, 230. Sabine and
Latin deity, i. 69 «.
Diaeus, president of the Achaean league,
iii. 265, 266, 269
Dialogue in the professional sciences, v.
507-509
Diana, temple of, on the Aventine, i. 133,
216, 280 ; ii. 84 ; iii. 368. Sanctuary of
the league, i. 142. After a Greek
model, i. 231. Festival probably com-
bined with a fair, i. 250. Effigy formed
after that of Ephesus, and the oldest
image of the gods in Rome, i. 306 /.,
308
Diana's temple in Aricia, Federal sanctu-
ary, i. 445 «.
Diana, temple of, on Mount Tifata, re-
ceives gifts from Sulla, iv. 108
Dianium promontorium, pirate station
instituted by Sertorius, iv. 286
Dicaearchus, ii. 408, 412
Dicaearchia. See Puteoli
Dice-playing in Rome, iii. 123
Dictator : relation of his power to the
regal and consular, i. 325 ,/C Originally
general, i. 325. Nomination by the
consul, 1. 325. Appeals against him, i.
358. Plebeians eligible, i. 382. Dicta-
torship set aside, ii. 284, 297 ; iii. 56.
Latin municipal authority, as regards
ritual, throughout not collegiate, i.
442 f., 442 n. Sulla's dictatorship, iv.
98_/C Caesar's dictatorship, v. 327./C
M. Didius [praetor, 640], iii. 429
T. Didius {consul, 656] defeats the Lusi-
tanians, iii. 479, 508 ; iv. 282. In th«
Social war, iii. 508, 523 ; iv. 102 n.
Dido (Elisa), ii. no
Dies fasti, i. 189
Digitus, i. 266
Dii inferi, i. 214
Diodorus, philosopher and lieutenant of
Mithradates, iv. 46
Diogenes, Carthaginian commander, iii.
_ZSS
Diomedes, fable of, ii. 108
Dionysia, dancer, v. 472
Dionysius of Syracuse, i. 417, 418, 435;
ii. 144. Helps the Sabellians to ruin
the towns of Magna Graecia, i. 454
Dionysius, ruler of Tripolis, iv. 430
Diophanes, lieutenant of Eumenes, ii. 46*
Diophanes of Mytilene, rhetorician, iii.
320
Diophantus, general of Mithradates, i»
13 «., 17 »., 321, 331
Diopos, i. 307
Dioscurias, iv. 13, 413, 417
Diphilus, comic poet, iv. 221
Disciplinae septem liberates, v. 449 n,
Dis pater, i. 231
Ditalco, confidant of Viriathus, iii. aaj
Dium, ii. 432
Divalia, i. 208
Divico, iii. 435
Divisores tribuum, iv. 268
Divitiacus, v. 35
Documents, earliest Roman, i. 280
Dolabella. See Cornelius
Dolopia, ii. 459, 477
Domains, property of the state, not of the
king, i. 92. Still vested in the clans, i.
245-248. Originally perhaps not very
extensive, i. 248. Use of them regularly
granted only to the burgess, i. 248.
Change in their treatment under the
rule of the senate : reserved substan-
tially for the patricians, and possibly for
such plebeians as sat in the senate, i.
343/. Assignations of land restricted,
i. 344. Formation of the system of
occupation : usufruct of portions of
public land, until further notice, for
payment of a proportion of the produce,
>• 344./ Vain attempt of Cassius to set
aside the system of occupation, i. 361.
Increasing distress of the farmers, i.
379 f. New regulation by the Licinio-
Sextian laws ; occupation and the right
of pasturing cattle restricted by maxi-
mum rates, i. 381, 387 f. Leasing of
the domains acquired in the Hannibalic
war, iii. 20. Extension of the posses-
542
HISTORY OF ROME
sioas, iii. 48 f. Large assignation in
the sixth century, iii. 49. Decision as
to assignations falls to the burgesses, iii.
58 _/T Occupation of Italian domains,
iii. 312, 319, 321, 373-376 ; iv. 108 f.
Distribution attempted by C. Laelius
Sapiens, iii. 317, 319. Distribution by
Ti. Gracchus, iii. 320 /., 327-33°> 332i
485-488. Suspended, iii. 336. Resumed
by C. Gracchus, iii. 345 f. After his
death, iii. 373 f. Intended by Drusus,
iii. 485-488. To Sulla's soldiers, iv.
109 /. To Pompeius' soldiers after the
Spanish war, iv. 376, 378. After the
Mithradatic war, iv. 502. Attempted
by the Servilian law, iv. 472 /. Under
Caesar, v. 358, 403 f. Produce of the
extra-Italian domains, iv. 156. Corn-
fare Capua
Cn. Domitius, in command against Antio-
chus, ii. 466
Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbns [consul, 632]
fights against the Allobroges, iii. 417 /.
Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, son-in-law of
Cinna, iv. 92
Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus [tribune of the
people, 650 ; consul, 658], iii. 463
Cn. Domitius Calvinus [dictator, 474], ii.
23
Cn. Domitius Calvinus [praetor, 698], v.
255
L. Domitius Ahenobarbns [consul, 660],
iv. 84, 102 n.
L. Domitius Ahenobarbus [consul, 700],
v. 123, 210, 214, 220, 229, 267, 384
M. Domitius Calvinus, against Sertorius,
iv. 283
Doric colonies in Italy and Sicily, i. 166./C,
168, 172
Doris, ii. 396
Dorylaus, general of Mithradates, iv. 44
Drachmae, Attic, v. 438 «. Standard of
the, iv. 182^
Drama. See Stage
Drepana, ii. 178, 187, 193, 194. Battle of,
ii. 188/
Dress, iv. 185
Dromichaetes, Pontic general, iv. 38, 41
Druids, v. 23
Drunemetum, ii. 40a
Drusus. See Livius
Duel replaced by money - wager and
action at law, iii. 91. Celtic, i. 421.
In Spain, ii. 386
C. Duilius [consul, 494], ii. 176. Demon-
strations of honour to, iii. 44
M. Duilius [tribune of the people, 283,
305]» i- 3*7
Dumnorix, v. 41 /., (7
Duodecimal system in Italy, early in use
as well for the measurement of time as
for measures of length and surface and
for weight, i. 265^
Duoviri iuri dicundo in the municipia,
iv. 132./C
Duoviri navales, ii. 44
Duoviri perduellionis, t. 191
Duoviri sacris faciundis, custodiers of
oracles, i. 230. Increased to ten and
opened up toplebeians, i. 381. Increased
to fifteen, iv. 126. Chosen by the
burgesses, iii. 463 ; iv. 106/. Co-opta-
tion reintroduced by Sulla, iv. 115, 207
Dyers, guild of, i. 249, 253
Dyme, ii. 319, 430
Dyrrhachium. See Epidamnus
Eagle introduced as a standard, iii. 460
Ebur, i. 260 ».
Eburones, v. 54, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73./;
Ebusus, ii. 143
Echetla, ii. 170
Echinus, ii. 421
Ecnomus, battle of, ii. 179^
Edessa. See Osrhoene
E dictum praetoris urbani, v. 433
Education, its rise, i. 296 f., 299 f. ; ii.
115,/. ; iii. 130-132. In Latin in seventh
and eighth centuries, iv. 212, 214-218 ;
v. 451-453. In Greek, iv. 212 /.; v.
450. In Caesar's time, v. 449^ His
germs of state-training schools, v. 452./C
Egeria, ii. 107
Egesta. See Segesta
Gellius Egnatius, i. 488, 490
Marius Egnatius, Samnite, leader in
Social war, iii. 511, 522
Egypt, character of the kingdom, ii. 399./C
First contact with Rome, ii. 61. Its
relations to Rome, ii. 215 ./C Position
in the second Punic war, ii. 315, 318,
344. Before the time of the Gracchi,
iii. 236, 281-284, 286. After the time of
the Graoehi, iv. 4, 27, 40. Financial
character of the Ptolemaic government,
iv. 164. Discussions as to its annexa-
tion after the death of Alexander II.,
iv. 318 f. Ptolemaeus XL recognized
by the Romans and conducted back by
Gabinius, iv. $%of. Intervention given
up, v. 122/". State at the time of the
battle of Pharsalus, v. 268 /. State
under Caesar, v. 272-282, 343
Egyptian objects of luxury in Italian
tombs, i. 253
Elaea, ii. 462, 466
INDEX
543
Elaeus, ii. 417
Elatea, ii. 430
Elea. See Velia
Elephants, use of, in battle, ii. 19, 35, 36,
434. Carthaginian, ii. 159, 183, 185,
i86y:, 251, 255, 258, 262, 422
Elephants, the first seen in Rome, ii. 36
Eleusinian mysteries, admission of the
Romans to, ii. 219
Eleusis, ii. 423 ; iv. 38
Eleuthera, iv. 353
Eleuthero-Lacones, ii. 439, 451
Elis, ii. 317, 403, 421, 456, 459, 478
Elorus, Syracusan, ii. 204
Elpenor, his tomb shown at Terracina,
i. 177 _
Elpius, ii. 504, 506
Elymaea, ii. 426
Elymais, ii. 468. Temple of Nanaea at,
iv. 343. Elymaeans in army of Anti-
ochus, ii. 466
Elymi, ii. 143
Emancipation allowed, ii. 65. More
recent than manumission, i. 76, 198^
Emigrants, Roman, in Spain, iv. 281-285,
300-303. With Mithradates, iv. 270,
318, 322, 329
Emporiae [or Emporia] in Africa, ii. 377 ;
iii. 238, 258
Emporiae in Spain, ii. 241, 291, 375, 384,
387
Endowments, religious, iii. no
Engraving on stone in Etruria, i. 306,
307 ; ii. 121. On metal, ii. 121
Enna, ii. 311 ; iii. 309, 310, 384
Q. Ennius, Roman poet, iii. 27 «., 173-
177, 204 ; iv. 214 f. Introduces the
hexameter, iii. 175. His Praetextatae,
iii. 177. His Saturae, iii. 179. His
Annates, iii. 181-184. His translation
of Epicharmus and Euhemerus, iii. 113.
Changes in orthography, iii. 192. Re-
ligious position, iii. 111 f. Influence
on Pacuvius, iv. 220, 223
Entella, ii. 162
Eordaea, ii. 425
Epetium, iii. 422
Ephesus, ii. 453, 459, 461, 474; iii. 278;
iv. 46 ft. Luxury, iii. 122. Massacre
at, iv. 31/.
Ephorus, i. 177 n. ; ii. 108
Epicharmus of Megara, iii. 113. Edited
by Ennius, iii. 179
Epicurus and his school, iv. 197-200; v.
444
Epicydes, ii. 310, 311, 313
Epidamnus (Dyrrhachium), founded, i.
176. Roman, ii. 318 ; iii. 262. At-
tached to Macedonia, iii. 262, 272 n.
Highway to, iv. 168. Caesar's conflicts
at, 250-254. Mint, iii. 87 ; iv. 181
Epidaurus, Aesculapius brought thence
to Rome, ii. 71. Temple of Aescula-
pius emptied by Sulla, iv. 40
Epirots (or Epirus), ii. 403, 421, 429, 456,
459. 476. 499i 502, 518; iii. 262, 421,
422 ; iv. 34, 36, 43 ; v. 245
Epitaphs, imitation of a Greek custom,
ii. 91
Eporedia (Ivrea), colony in 654 at, iii.
416. 518
Epos, Roman, iv. 236 ./C ; v. 465./C
Epuiones. See Tres viri epulones
Equestrian centuries: 6 centuries = 600
horses, 18 centuries =1800 horses, iii.
8 «., 9. Priority in voting withdrawn,
iii. 50./C Proposed increase of, by Cato,
iii. 9 n. £guites equo publico, equites
equo privato, iii. 9 n. The nobility in
possession of the, iii. 8-10. Surrender
of the state-horses, iii. 9
Equestrian order, beginning of, iii. 94 f.
Elevated by Gracchus, iii. 349 f. In-
signia of the, iii. 351. Restriction of,
by Sulla, iv. in, i2gyC Compare Jury-
courts
Equirria, i. 207
Eratosthenes, ii. 146
Ercte, ii. 193
Eretria, ii. 430, 452
Ergastulum, iii. 70 «., 307 n.
Erisane, iii. 224
Erythrae, ii. 412, 461, 473
Eryx, ii. 187, 193
Esquilzae =Kxqui\ia.e, i. 63, 65
Etruria, boundaries, i. 156 /. In the
southern portion many traces of Urn-
brians who were probably only dislodged
at a late period, L 156. Southern part
conquered by the Romans, i. 432.
Husbandry in, iii. 99 ; iv. 17. Slavery
in, iii. 102, 308, 313
Etruscans, different in figure and language
from the Italian race, i. 150. Earlier
period of the language with complete
vocalization, i. 151. Later period with
rejection of vowels and blunting of the
pronunciation, i. 151 f. Such affinity
as subsists between Latin and Etruscan
may be traced to borrowing, i. 152.
Not otherwise demonstrably related to
any known race, i. 152. May be pre-
sumed Indo-Germanic, i. 153. Came
probably from Raetia to Italy, i. 154.
Not from Asia Minor, i. 155. Settled
up to the Celtic invasion between Alps
544
HISTORY OF ROME
and Po, i. 156. Also, south of the Po,
L 156. Lastly, and more especially, in
Etruria named after them, as far as the
Tiber, i. 156/! Conflicts with the Celts,
i. 160. Urban life early developed in
Etruria, i. 160 f. Constitution of the
communities, and of the league, i. itof.
Antagonism to the Greek navigators
along their coasts develops among
them piracy and a commerce of their
own, i. 181. Establish themselves on
the Latin and Campanian coasts, i. 181.
League of the twelve Campanian towns,
L i8i_/C Surprise Cumae, i. 148. Active
commerce, i. 182, 257-260. Wealth and
luxury, i. 257; ii. 8o_/C Conduct the
carrying trade of the Sybarites, L 171.
Commercial intercourse with Attica and
Carthage, i. 237 /• \ ii. 80. Their
fellowship in arms with the Phoenicians,
i. 184./C Rule in consequence of it the
Italian seas, i. 1S6, 413. Kept aloof
from the Atlantic by the Phoenicians,
i. 187. Culmination of their power, i.
413. War with Rome after expulsion
of the kings, i. 317. Attack on Latium ;
victory over Rome, i. 414. Defeat at
Aricia, i. 414. Naval supremacy broken
by the united exertions of the Italians,
Greeks, and Syracusans, i. 414-418.
Their naval power thenceforth gone, ii.
40. Destructive conflicts with Dionysius
of Syracuse, i. 417^ Changed position
towards Carthage, i. 418. Dislodged
by the Samnites from Campania, i. 419,
4537c Dislodged by the Celts from
northern Italy, i. 424./C Contemporary
wars of Veii with Rome, i. 418, 425./^
Veii conquered, i. 426. Sudden collapse
of the Etruscan power under these
united attacks, i. 427. South Etruria
Roman, i. 432 f. Position after the
conflicts with Celts and Romans, i. 433-
435. Position during the Samnite wars,
i. 468. Support the Samnites, i. 479.
Lay down arms, i. 479. Rise afresh
against Rome, i. 487 f. Peace, i. 490.
In combination with the Lucanians,
Celts, and Pyrrhus against Rome, ii.
gf., 16, 18. Conclusion of peace with
Rome, ii. 93. Conduct in the second
Punic war, ii. 345. Join with the equites
against Drusus, iii. 487. Faithful to
Rome in the Social war, iii. 501. In-
cipient rising quieted, iii. 513, 519 f.
Obtain burgess-rights through the Julian
law, iii. 518./C Struggles against Sulla,
hr. 60, 877c Punishment for, iv. 108.
After Sulla's death, iv. 264, 288-291
Not the source of Latin civilization, i.
281,/C Etruscan culture of the Roman
boys a fable, i. 292 «. Religion, ii. 71.
Lore of lightning, i. 234. National
festival, i. 234; iii. 112 f. Art, i. 306-
309; ii. n8, 120, 124 f. Diversity be-
tween Northern and Southern Etruscans,
i. 126. Relation to Latin art, ii. 127 f.
Tragedy, iii. 196. Architecture, i. 303,
305. Writing, i. 275-282. Hellenism,
ii. 90
Etymologies of the Stoics, iv. 203. Of
Varro, v. 512 «.
Euboea, ii. 396, 422, 457; iv. 34, 38.
Roman domains there, iii. 272 n.
Eucheir, i. 307
Eudamus, ii. 463
Eudoxus, ii. 117
Euganei, iii. 424
Eugrammos, i. 307
Euhemerism, iv. 197, 200^
Euhemerus of Messene, iii. 113. Edited
by Ennius, iii. 179
Eumenes I. of Pergamus, ii. 450, 455, 469,
474. 475. 478, 482, 485, 486, 492, 494,
497. 499, 510-512
Eumenes II. of Pergamus, iii. 264, 275,
276 «., 281
Eunus, slave-king in first Sicilian war, iii.
310 ; iv. 209
Eupatoria, town in Pontus, iv. 330, 332
Eupatorion, town in the Crimea, iv. 17 n.
Euphenes, Thracian pretender to Mace-
donia, iv. 34
Euphorion, iv. 450, 479 ».
Euporus, slave of C. Gracchus, iii. 369
Euripides, iii. 166-171
Euripus, iv. 42-44
Euromus, ii. 413
Euryalus, ii. 311
Eurylochus, ii. 452
Eurymedon, battle of, ii. 463
Evander of Crete, ii. 507
Exarare, i. 280
Exegetae, v. 515
Exile, right of, ii. 68 /. Refusal of it
legally possible, iii. 348. Is sometimes
actually refused, iii. 348. Exile intro-
duced as a punishment, probably by C.
Gracchus, iii. 348
Exports, Italian, iv. 174. Of wine and
oil, iii. 415 «. Of grain, i. 171
Exposure of children, i. 75
Exul, i. 318 n.
Fabii, clan-village, i. 45. Celebrate the
Lupercalia, L 67 »., 315. Ascendency is
INDEX
545
the first times of senatorial rule, i. 359.
Destruction at the Cremera, i. 359, 418./C
Prominence of their family-tradition in
the Roman annals, ii. 105
C. Fahius Pictor, the painter, ii. 124, 148
C. Fabius Hadrianus, Marian governor
in Africa, iv. 72, 92
M. Fabius Hadrianus, lieutenant of
Lucullus, iv. 331. Commandant in
Pontus, iii. 347
Q. Fabius Labeo [consul, 571], poet, iii.
178 n. ; iv. 229 ».
Q. Fabius Maximus [dictator, 537 ; consul,
521, 526, 539, 540, 545], ii. 280-285, 297.
298, 3°4i 333. 342. 35i> 358 ;_ iii. 56, 208.
Pronounces the funeral oration over his
sen, iii. 189. His knowledge of history,
iii. 189
Q. Fabius Pictor first writes Roman
history in the Greek language, iii. 1847c,
1 85. Latin annals under his name, iii.
184 n.
Q. Fabius Rullianus, named Maximus
[censor, 450; consul, 432, 444, 446, 457,
459]. }■ 396^, 403, 479. 480, 488, 489
Q. Fabius Maximus Aemilianus [consul,
609], in conflict with the Lusitanians,
iii. 223, 226, 230
Q. Fabius Maximus Allobrogicus [consul,
633], iii. 418 ; iv. 186
Q. Fabius Maximus Eburnus [consul, 638],
iii. 428 «.
Q. Fabius Maximus Servilianus [consul,
612], iii. 185 «. In conflict with the
Lusitanians, iii. 224
Fabrateria, town of the Volsci, i. 464
Fabrateria,icolony of, founded on Fregellan
territory, iii. 341
C. Fabricius Luscinus [consul, 472, 476 ;
censor, 478], i. 394./C ; ii. 12, 30. Em-
bassy to Pyrrhus, ii. 24
1 alula. Atellana, i. 291, 300 ».; iii. i6s».;
iv. 231-234, 231 »., 232 w. Displaced
by the mime, iv. 233 «. ; v. 469 »., 470
Fabula palliata, iki. 147, 164 n. ; iv. 229,/C
Fabula praetextata, iii. 177; iv. 222
Fabula togata, iii. 164 «., 165 ; iv. 229/;
Faesulae, ii. 224. Sullan confiscations and
colony, iv. 108. Rising after Sulla's
death, iv. 289. Rendezvous of the Cati-
linarians, iv. 474, 476
Fagutal, i. 63
Falernian wine, iv. 172
Falerii, i. 157, 256. Supports Veii against
Rome, L 426. Wars with Rome, i. 425,
432, 488 ; ii. 20. Colonized, i. 433.
Makes peace with the invading Celts,
L 436
VOL. V
Falemus ager, in Campania, given in
allotments, i. 463. Full franchise, ii. 49
Faliscan alphabet, i. 144, 282
Familia pecuniaque, \. 193, 238
Family among the Romans, i. 72-77.
Relaxation of family life, iii. 121 f.
Family life in Caesar's time, v. 390-393
C. Fannius [consul, 632] opposes C.
Gracchus, iii. 362
L. Fannius, a commander in the Mithra-
datic war, iv. 323, 328, 334, 347, 348
Fanum, ii. 229, 348 ; iv. 166
Fasti, origin of, ii. 101
Faunian measure (versus Faum'us), L
2897c
Faunus, i. 208, 215, 286
Faventia, iv. 85, 87
Felsina=Bononia, i. 156, 4*4
Fenerator, iii. 83
Fenus nauticum, iii. 92
Fenus unciarium. See Interest
Feralia, i. 209
Ferentinum, i. 50, 455, 492. Not a Roman
burgess-community, iii. 36
Feriae Latinae, i. 50, 51 »., 298
Feriae publicae, i. 207
Feriae sementivae, i. 243 ; iii. 72 «.
Feronia, Grove of, fair at, i. 250./C
Fescennium, village in Etruria, iv. 232 n,
Carmina Fescennina, i. 289, 300 n. ; iv.
231 n.
Fetiales, keepers of state-treaties and of
state-law, twenty in number, i. 202, 220
Ficoroni casket, i. 279 ». ; ii. 82, 92, 124 n.
Ficulnea, i. 125
Ficus ruminalis, ii. 106, 123
Fidenae, i. 58. Conflicts between Romans
and Etruscans for its possession, i. 125,
134, 158. Formula of accursing for, i.
125 n. Roman, i. 419. Revolts and is
reconquered, i. 425. Dictators there,
i. 442 n
Fidentia, town in Cisalpine Gaul, iv. 87
Fides= strings, i. 292 ; ii. 76 n.
Fides, temple of, iii. 326
Fiducia, no mortgage, but transference
of property, i. 194
Fig-tree, indigenous in Italy, i. 242 ; iii.
.67
Fimbria. See Flavius
Financial position during second Punic
war, ii. 334, 343 /. ; iv. 170 f. In the
sixth century, iii. 19-23. In seventh
century, iv. 82, 155-168. Under Sulla,
iv. 126. Under Caesar, v. 362-367
Fine-processes, i. 192, 342 ; ii. 62 /., 86.
Chiefly instituted by the aediles, ii. 66.
Application of the ntultae, ii. 86. At
168
546
HISTORY OF ROME
what time introduced into the Annals,
ii. 102/. Compare Provocatio
Finger-rings, golden, iii. 545
Fire-kindling, i. 28
Firmum, ii. 24. Latin colony, ii. 39.
In the Social war, iii. 513. lut of, ii.
52 n.
Fish-ponds, iii. 378
Flaccus. See Fulvius
Flamen curialis, i. 87, 217^
Flamen Dialis, i. 192, 216, 241 ; iii. Ill
Flamen Martialis, i. 106, 108, 216
Flamen Quirinalis, i. 87, 89, 175
Flamines maiores, i. 217. Always patri-
cian, i. 384
Flamines minores, i. v&f.
Flamininus. See Quinctius
C. Flaminius [consul, 531, 537 ; censor,
534] makes war on the Celts, ii. 226.
Fights with Hannibal, ii. 273-276, 297 ;
iii. 19. Suggests the Lex Claudia, iii.
94. Originator of the Flaminian circus
and of the plebeian games, iii. 41.
Distributes the Picenian possessions,
iii. 48, 58 f. Does away with the
equalization of the freedmen and the
freeborn, iii. 53. Founder of Roman
demagogism, iii. 61
C. Flavius Fimbria, active in the Marian
reign of terror, iv. 69. Conquers at
Miletopolis, iv. 47 f. Death of, iv. 53.
Burial, iv. 101
Cn. Flavius, ii. 113
M. Flavius draws up edict for Caesar's
reform of the calendar, v. 439 n.
Fleet. See Maritime affairs
Flexuntes, i. 90
wlora, Sabine and Latin goddess, i. 69 «. ;
iii. 41. Flamen of, i. 216
Flute, i. 35. Latin, i. 288
Flute-blowers, guild of, i. 249, 286
Fodder-plants, iii. 66
Foedus and deditio, iii. 528 «.
Folium, i. 280
Following, personal, among Celts and
Germans, iv. 285
M. Fonteius subdues the Vocontii, v. 8
T. Fonteius [legate in Spain, 543], ii.
323. 5i7
Fonteius [legate, 663] slain at Asculum,
iii. 500
Fontinalia, i. 208
Fora et conciliabula, ii. 48 ; iii. 36
Fordicidia, i. 207
Foreigners had no rights in Rome except
by state - treaties, i. 199 f. These
treaties the basis of the Jus gentium,
Formiae, i. 177, 461. Obtains Caerite
rights, i. 463. Full franchise, iii. 23
Formula, v. 431
Formula togatorunt, ii. 54 ; iii. 164 ».
Fors/ortuna, i. 214
Fortes sanates, i. 128 ft.
Fortinei, about 370, member of Latin
league, i. 448 ».
Forum boarium, i. 141
Forum cupedinis, v. 379
Forum Flaminii, ii. 229
Forum Julium, v. 373
Forum Romanuvi, i. 140. Embellished,
i. 480 ; ii. 86
Free labourers in Sicily placed among
the slaves, iii. 383
Freedmen. See Manumission
Fregellae, Latin colony, i. 464, 468, 472 ;
iii. 24. Stormed by the Samnites after
the Caudine victory, i. 472, 474. Re-
occupied, i. 475 f. Conquered by
Pyrrhus, ii. 23. Attitude of, in second
Punic war, ii. 345. Revolt, iii. 341,
362. Destruction of, iii. 341 f. Ac-
cursing of the soil, i. 125 n.
Frentani, i. 146, 467, 482; ii. 382; iii.
501
Fruit, v. 378./C
Frusino, i. 485
Fucine lake, i. 146
Fullers, guild of, i. 249, 253 ; iii. 85 «.
Cn. Fulvius Centumalus [consul, 543], ii
342
Cn. Fulvius Flaccus [praetor, 542), ii.
337
M. Fulvius [consul, 449], i. 481
M. . Fulvius Nobilior [consul, 565] con-
quers the Aetolians, ii. 476^ Publicly
exhibits the Roman calendar, iii. 194.
Introduces Greek art - treasures into
Rome, iii. 208
M. Fulvius Flaccus, a friend of the
Gracchi, iii. 335, 338, 340, 342, 362, 365,
367. 368, 374. 416/
Q. Fulvius Flaccus [consul, 517, 530, 542,
545], »• 337. 34°. 342, 35i
Q. Fulvius Flaccus, son of the Gracchan
M. Fulvius Flaccus, iii. 367, 369
Q. Fulvius Flaccus [governor in Spain,
5731. ii; 39i
Q. Fulvius Nobilior [triumvir coloniat
deducendae, 570] gives burgess-rights to
Ennius, iii. 27 «.
Q. Fulvius Nobilior [consul, 6oi], in
Celtiberian war, iii. 215 f., 228
Functions first defined in the case of
secondary offices, especially the quaes-
torship, i. 400 f> Then in that of the
INDEX
547
supreme magistrates, and even of the
dictator, i. 400, 403
Funda, ii. 76 n.
Fundi, i. 461. Obtains Caerite rights, i.
463. Obtains full burgess -rights, iii.
23
Funeral rites, i. 295 ; iii. 104-106. En-
actments of the Twelve Tables thereon,
ii. 63. Gladiatorial games, iii. 126.
Orations at, ii. 104. Burning of the
dead, ii. 226
A. Furius, epic poet, iv. 237
L. Furius Camillus [dictator, 404], i. 432
L. Furius Philus [consul, 618], against
Numantia, iii. 229. In the Scipionic
circle, iv. 220
M. Furius Bibaculus, poet, v. 140, 481
M. Furius Camillus [dictator, 358, 364,
365, 386, 387], his party -position, i.
379. Founds Temple of Concord, i.
384. Conquers Veii, i. 426. Defeats
the Gauls at Alba, i. 431. A military
reformer, ii. 76. Taxes bachelors, ii.
66
Furrina, i. 209. Grove of, iii. 369
Gabii, i. 49, 58, 125, 130, 157. Form of
accursing for, i. 125 n. Treaty with
Rome, i. 280. About 370, member of
Latin league, i. 448 n., 450
A. Gabinius [legate, 665] falls in the
Social war, iii. 526
A. Gabinius [tribune of the people, 687],
iv. 392-395, 429, 430, 451, 456, 513 ; v.
143. iSii 2g4 /■
Gades, ii. 142, 239, 331, 332, 384, 393.
Free from taxation, iv. 157. Obtains
Italian municipal rights, v. 424
Gaditanum /return, iii. 220
Gaesatae, ii. 223 n.
Gaetulia, iii. 404, 406, 410 ; iv. 94.
Roman merchants in, iii. 260
Gala, ii. 322
Galatas, ii. 222
Galba. See Sulpicius
Galatia, ii. 450, 512 ; iii. 234, 276, 281 ;
iv. 6, 25, 29, 46. Ceded by Mithradates,
iv. 49
Galerii, clan-village, i. 45
Gallaeci. See Callaeci
Galleys in Gaul, v. 15 n.
Galli, priests of Cybele, iii. 115
Gallia braccata, ii. 59 ; v. 10
Gallia comata, v. 10
Gallia togata, iii. 164 «. ; v. 10
Games. See Ludi
Gannicus, leader in Gladiatorial war, iv.
30a
Garganus, I. 6 ; ii. 333. Battle in Gladia-
torial war, iv. 359./C
Gauda, king of Mauretania, iii. 388 n~,
410
Gaul, south coast (Province of Narbo),
occupied by the Romans, iii. 415-420 ;
iv. 191. Close customs-district, iv. 160.
Disturbances during Sertcrian war, iv.
286, 293, 298. Gaul in Caesar's time,
v. 7-31. Its boundaries, v. 9 /. Re-
lations to Rome, v. gf., 29/". To the
Germans, v. 31-33. Population, v. 12/C
Urban life, v. 14. Agriculture and
cattle-breeding, v. 13, 14. Commerce
and manufactures, v. 15, 16. Mining,
art, and science, v. 17, 18. Political
organization, v. 18-22. Religion, v.
23 f. Army, v. 26 f. Civilization, v.
27, 28. External relations, v. 29-32.
Struggles against Caesar, v. 44-57, 67-
95. Subdued by the Romans, v. 94 yC
Taxation of, v. 96, 364 /. Latin lan-
guage and coins introduced, v. 97.
Colonies in, v. 422/; Celtic inscription
found in, v. 10 n. Co»tJ>are Celts and
C. Julius Caesar
Gaulos, ii. 143
Gaurus, battle at Mount, i. 459 n.
Gaza., iv. 316
Gaziura, iv. 348
Geganii, from Alba, i. 128
Gela, i. 166 ; ii. 145, 190
L. Gellius [consul, 682] defeated by
Spartacus, iv. 359, 380
Statius Gellius, i. 4S1
Gelo, king of Syracuse, i. 415
Genava, v. 8
Gens. See Clan
Genthius, ii. 493, 499, 501, 502, 508, 509 ;
iii. 421
Gentiles. See Agnati
Genua, iv. 167. Culture of the vine, iii.
81 n., 415 n.
Cn. Genucius, tribune of the plebs, L 359
L. Genucius [consul, 392], i. 448
Gergovia, v. 81-87
Germans, origin of the word, v. 20 »., 21.
First emergence in Roman history, ii.
223 «. ; iii. 430. Relations with the
Celts, v. 31 /. Relations with the
Romans, v. 33-36. Movements on the
Rhine, v. 32-35. Settlements on the
left bank of the Rhine, v. 33-36. la
conflict with Caesar, v. 60-62
Gerunium, ii. 283, 285, 287
Getae, ii. 373 n. ; iii. 424 n. ; iv. 14 v.
103^
Glabrio. See Acilius
548
HISTORY OF ROME
Gladiatorial games come into vogue in
Etruria, i. 436. Capuan, i. 457. In
Rome, iii. 42, 126 ; iv. 184, 357 ; v. 384
Gladiatorial war, iv. 357.364
Goat, expiatory, i. 203
Gold takes the first place in dealings, iii.
88. Its relative value to silver, iv. 178
/. In the Roman coinage, ii. 343 ; iii.
88 ; iv. 177./C Depreciated by the con-
quest of Gaul, v. 96. Seams of, at
Noreia, iii. 424 ; iv. 179. Washings in
Gaul, v. 17
Gold ornaments introduced into Italy, i.
253
Goldsmiths, guild of, i. 249, 253, 307
Gordius, Pontic satrap, iv. 20, 23, 95
Gorgasus, ii. 123
Gortyna, iv. 353
Gracchus. See Sempronius
Graccurris, ii. 392
Graeco- Italians, state of culture, hus-
bandry, i. 22 - 25. Field - measuring,
L 26 f. House, i. 25 f. Meals, fire-
kindling, clothing, weapons, i. 28.
Family, i. 30. State -organization, i.
30-32. Religion, i. 32-35. Art, i. 35
Graeco more bibcre,pergraecari, congrat-
care, iii. 123
Graecostasis, ii. 90. Originally intended
for the Massiliots, ii. 46
Graecus, Graicus, Grains, i. 15, 169 ».
Grain, kinds of, iii. 64 n., 65, 66. Prices
of, ii. 344 f. ; iii. 80-82. Transmarine,
ii. 367 ; iii. 77 f. Hence bad effect on
Italian agriculture, iii. 78-80. Grain-
revenues of the state, i. 342^ Requisi-
tions on the provincials, iii. 31. In
Spain, ii. 393. Distributions of grain,
iiL 40. Public stores, iii. 344. Distribu-
tion introduced by C. Gracchus, iii. 344.
Continued after his fall, iii. 373, 375.
Increased by Saturninus, iii. 470. By
Drusus the younger, iii. 485. Restricted
in the Social war, iii. 504. Renewed
by Cinna, iv. 70. Abolished by Sulla,
iv. no. Re-established partially in 681,
iv. 371. Completely in 691 ; iv. 490.
Revived by Caesar, v. 363 f. Compare
Agriculture
Grammar, Latin, iii. 191 f, ; iv. 214 f.,
252 ; v. 457^. 510/
Grammatica, ii. 116 n.
Granicus, river, iv. 328
Granius Licinianus explained, iv. 288
Grapnels, Etruscan invention, i. 181
Grassatores, ii. 98
Greece, relations with Macedonia, ii.
396 /. Declared free, ii. 436. The
patriot party, ii. 494 f. In the first
Mithradatic war, iv. 35-44. When did
Greece become a Roman province? iiL
271. See Achaean league
Greek legends early diffused in Latium,
i. 293. Foundation of Rome inter-
woven with the cycle of Greek legend,
ii. 107-111
Greek language, knowledge of, in Italy,
i. 291/, 457; ii. 90/, 116; iiL 129,
130/. 132
Greeks known to the Italians, before the
later general name of Hellenes came
into vogue and replaced the older one
of Graeci, i. 169. At first in Italy and
Sicily Ionians and Aeolians from Asia
Minor, L 165 f. Then colonists of
almost all Hellenic stocks, i. 165 /.
Constantly in close connection with
the mother -country, i. 170. Achaean,
Ionian, Doric settlements in Italy, i.
170-176. Oldest Greek influence : in
measures and weights, i. 266 /. In the
alphabet, i. 272-278. In the calendar,
i. 269-272. In the fine arts, i. 291-296 ;
ii. 96. In architecture, ii. 302-306. In
sculpture and design, i. 306/;; ii. 120-
125. In forming myths and writing
history, ii. 107-112. Slight intercourse
with the Greeks over the Adriatic, i.
x75 /• Voyages of the Greeks to the
west coast of Italy north of Vesuvius,
i. 177 f. Colonies not tolerated there
by the natives, i. 178 /. Wars of the
Greeks with the Phoenicians and the
natives joining the latter for the com-
mand of the sea, i. 182-186. Excluded
from the western Mediterranean and
the Atlantic, i. 186. In Lower Italy,
struggles with the Sabellian stocks, L
419, 454 f. Hellenizing of these, i. 456
f. ; ii. 91 f. Adhere to Rome in the
Hannibalic war, ii. 293^
Ground and water rate, iii. 31
Grumentum, ii. 347 ; iii. 510
Guardianship, i. 78, 197./C
Gulussa, iii. 240, 251, 388
Guras, brother of Tigranes, iv. 341
Gutta, Italian commander in the Social
war, iv. 86
Gyaros, amount of tribute from, iiL 271
«.; iv. 158
Gythium, ii. 451, 453
Hadrumetum, ii. 139, 359; iii. 244. Ex-
empt from tribute, iii. 259.
Haedui, iii. 416 ; v. 13, 16, 19, 35, 4*, 77,
82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 92
INDEX
549
Halaesa. See Alaesa
Haliartus, ii. 498, 501, 517
H alicarnassus, ii. 406, 446
Halicyae, ii. 213
Halycus, ii. 145
Halys, ii. 471 ; iii. 280, 281 ; iv. 95, 330,
33i
Hamae, ii. 304
Hamilcar, Carthaginian general in Sicily,
ii. 172, 177
Hamilcar, Carthaginian officer, ii. 369./C
Hamilcar Barcas, war in Sicily, ii. 192-
196. Mercenary war, ii. 205 _/"., 208,
233 /• War in Spain, ii. 238 f. Com-
mander-in-chief, ii. 235. His plans, ii.
236^ Party-position, ii. 237 f.
Hannibal, youth of, ii. 238. Character,
ii. 243-245. Conquers Saguntum, ii.
246 f. Forces and plans of war, ii.
248 /. System of warfare, ii. 273 f.
March from Spain to Italy, ii. 251-264.
Allies himself with the Italian Celts, ii.
266. Italian war : first campaign, ii.
267-274. Conflict on the Ticino, ii.
268./C On the Trebia, ii. 270./C Second
campaign, ii. 273-284. Crosses the
Apennines, ii. 275. Battle at the
Trasimene lake, ii. 278. Reorganization
of the Carthaginian infantry after the
Roman model, ii. 279 f. Marches and
conflicts of Fabius, ii. 280-285. Third
campaign, ii. 285-299. Battle at Cannae,
ii. 287-291. Fourth campaign, ii. 300-
304. Alliance with Philip of Macedonia,
ii. 315. Following years of the war, i:.
333-35°' Takes Tarentum, ii. 335.
Marches on Rome, ii. 338. Returns to
Africa, ii. 357^ Battle at Zama, ii.
359./C Reforms the Carthaginian con-
stitution after the second Punic war, ii.
378. Is compelled by the Romans to
become an exile, ii. 379. Residence
with Antiochus, ii. 449, 451, 454/m 459-
Death, ii. 482/I
Hannibal, son of Gisgo, ii. 171, 176
Hannibal Monomachus, ii. 244
Hanno [Carthaginian general, 490], ii.
169
Hanno [Carthaginian general, 492], ii. 170
Hanno [Carthaginian general, 540], i. 333,
335
Hanno [Carthaginian general, 542], ii.
313/
Hanno [Carthaginian general, 547], ii. 330
Hanno, son of Bomilcar, ii. 256
Hanno the Great, ii. 233, 235
Hanno, son of Hannibal, ii. 176
Harmozica, iv. 414
Harp-players, Asiatic female, in Rome,
iii. 123
Hasdrubal, ii. 233, 243
Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo, ii. 322, 327, 330,
355i 356
Hasdrubal, brother of Hannibal, ii. 238,
248, 290, 308, 322 /., 324, 327-331.
Marches to Italy, ii. 346, 347. Death,
«• 349
Hasdrubal, brother-in-law of Hannibal, ii.
239, 241, 243
Hasdrubal, son of Hanno, ii. 185
Hasdrubal, leader of the patriot-party in
Carthage, iii. 240. Under the influence
of the Roman party, condemned to
death, iii. 241./C Escapes by flight, iii.
243. Collects an army, iii. 244. Oc-
cupies the Carthaginian territory, iii.
245. Causes Hasdrubal, son-in-law of
Massinissa, to be put to death, iii. 252.
Commander-in-chief in the city, iii.
254, 256. Surrenders, iii. 257. State-
prisoner in Italy, iii. 257
Hasdrubal, Massinissa's grandson, iii.
244, 249, 252. Put to death, iii. 252
Hasmonaei. See Jews
Hasta. See Centumviral court
Hastati, iii. 458
Hatria. See Atria
Hebrus, river, ii. 493 ; iii. 263
Hecataeus, i. 108
Hegesianax, ii. 453
Hegesias of Magnesia, v. 453
Heliopolites, iii. 278 «.
Hellanicus, ii. 109
Hellenism, iii. 107-109; iv. 191 -195; ▼.
419 f. Compare Alexandrinism,
Comedy, Culture, Education, Litera-
ture
Helvetii, ii. 371 ; iii. 423 «., 435, 444, 447 ;
v. 19. State of population, v. 47. In-
vade Gaul, v. yj/., 41-43. Defeated by
Caesar at Bibracte, v. 43 f. Driven
back, v. 44^
Helvii, iv. 293 ; v. 8
C. Helvius Cinna, epic poet, v. 481
Heniochi, iv. 417
Hera, Lacinian, in Croton, iv. 355
Heraea, ii. 396
Heraclea in Italy, i. 167, 456 ; ii. 336.
Conquered by Alexander the Molossian,
i. 466. Battle of, ii. 19 /. Makes
peace with Rome, ii. 31. Attitude in
relation to Rome, ii. 43, 53 ; iii. 24
Heraclea Minoa, ii. 145, 161, 311
Heraclea Pontica, ii. 406. Supports the
Romans in the Social war, iii. 507 n.
Besieged in the Mithradatic war, iv.
550
HISTORY OF ROME
33°i 333i 44°- Colony of Caesar, v.
4=5
Heraclea in Trachinia (near Oeta), ii.
458, 510 ; iii. 266, 268
Heracleon, piratic chief, iv. 354
Heracles, legend of, ii. 108
Heraclides, ii. 412, 425, 426
Heraclides of Pontus, ii. 112
Heraclitus, iv. 198
Herba pura, i. 202
Herculaneum, ii. 510. Position of, during
the Samnite wars, i. 469. Taken and
destroyed in the Social war, iii. 522
Hercules, i. 230. Temple of, built by
Mummius, iii. 270
Hercynian Forest, iii. 423 «.
Herdoneae, ii. 342
Ap. Herdonius, i. 358
Heredium, garden land, i. 239
C. Herennius, lieutenant of Sertorius, iv.
294, 296
Herennius, Rhetorica. ad Herennium, iv.
253
Hermaean Promontory, battle at, ii. 184
Hermaeus, Pontic general, iv. 328
Hermes. See Mercurius
Hermocrates, Pontic general, iv. 324
Hermodorus of Cyprus, architect, iv. 257
Hermus, river, ii. 466
Hernici in alliance with Rome and
Latium, i. 135. Join the Romano-
Latin league and help to subdue the
Aequi and Volsci, i. 4457C Rise against
Rome, i. 447 f. Abstain from taking
part in the Latin insurrection, i. 461.
Share in the Samnite war, i. 480 f.
Position towards Rome, ii. 53. League
of the Hernici dissolved, i. 484 f. In-
dividual communities obtain Latin
rights, ii. 25
Herodes Antipater, v. 164
Herodotus, tales of, inserted in the early
history of Rome, iii. 187 n.
Hero-worship un-Roman, i. 214
Hesiod, his knowledge of Italy, 1. 167.
Graeci mentioned in his Eoai, i. 169 ».
Hexameter introduced by Ennius, iii. 175
Hiarbas, pretender of Numidia, iv. 92, 93
Hide of land, size of the Roman, i. 1217C,
239, 240 n.
Hiempsal I., son of King Micipsa, iii.
388 *., 389
Hiempsal II., king of Numidia, iii. 388 «.,
54i
Hiero I. of Syracuse, i. 415./.
Hiero II. of Syracuse, war against the
Mamertines, ii. 38, 163 /. War with
Room, ii. ijo f. Peace and alliance
with Rome, ii. 171. Position after th«
first Punic war, ii. 204. Conduct in the
second Punic war, ii. 285, 293. Death
of, ii. 293
Hieroglyphs on a jug found in Italy, L
253 n.
Hieronymus of Cardia, ii. 112
Hieronymus of Syracuse, ii. 293, 3097C
Himera, river, ii. 313
Himera (Thermae), i. 168 ; ii. 143, 161,
186. Battle at, i. 415 ; ii. 155
Himilco [Carthaginian general, 358], ii.
.I5q
Himilco [Carthaginian general, 505], "■
187
Himilco [Carthaginian general, 542], ii.
3ii» 312
Himilco Phameas, cavalry - general at
Carthage, iii. 250. Goes over to the
Romans, iii. 231
Hippo Diarrhytus, ii. 194 ; iii. 251
Hippo Regius, ii. 139 ; iii. 388
Hippocrates, ii. 310, 311, 312
Hipponium, i. 166, 456
Hirpini, i. 146 ; ii. 282, 294, 305, 342 ; iiL
5°2. S23
L. Hirtuleius, lieutenant of Sertorius, iv.
283, 2S6, 293, 2947c
Historical composition, its beginnings in
the records of the pontifical college, i.
2197C ; ii. 102-108. First treated metric-
ally by Naevius and Ennius, iii. 184.
In prose, but in the Greek language, by
Q. Fabius Pictor and P. Scipio, iii. 185.
The oldest Latin prose written by Cato,
iii. 186. Character of the earliest
historical compositions, i. 281 f. ; iii.
186-190. Conventional primitive history,
origin of the Roman view of it, ii. 104-
107. Of the Greek view, ii. 107-110.
Mixture of the two, ii. 109 f. ; iii. 1877c
In the sixth and seventh centuries, iv.
242-250; v. 492-500. Chronicles, iv.
2487c Metrical, v. 472
Histri, histriones, i. 300
Holidays kept sacred, i. 225, 2417?.
Holophernes, brother of Ariarathes V. of
Cappadocia, iii. 280
Homer, his knowledge of Italy, i. 169.
Data for determining when he lived, i
169 «., 280 ».
Homicide, involuntary, i. 203
Honorary monuments become common,
iii. 44
Honorary surnames, iii. 44
H onos et Virtus, ii. 302
Honour, questions of, how settled, iii.
9*
INDEX
SSi
Horatii, clan-village, L 45. Horatii and
Curiatii, ii. 105
Horatius Codes, ii. 105 n.
M. Horatius [consul, 305], i. 398
L. Hortensius [admiral, 584], ii. 501
L. Hortensius, iii. 332
L. Hortensius, lieutenant of Sulla in
Greece, iv. 37
Q. Hortensius, the orator, iv. 78, 207, 269 ;
v. 454 /; 481, 5°3
Q. Hortensius, son of the orator of that
name, v. 234/;
A. Hostilius Mancinus [consul, 584], ii.
501
C. Hostilius Mancinus [consul, 617], iii.
228/?, 319. Statue of, iii. 296
L. Hostilius Mancinus [consul, 609], iii.
252
C. Hostilius Tubulus [praetor, 547], ii. 347
L. Hostilius Tubulus [praetor, 6x2], iii. 348
Tullus Hostilius, ii. 105
Hostius, epic poet, iv. 237
House-architecture, Graeco-Italian, i. 27.
Oldest Italian, i. 27, 301 f. Revolution
in, iii. 207
House-father among the Romans, i. 72-77.
Power of, i. 73-76
Household tribunals, i. 73./C, 76; iii. \i\j.
Household government over freedmen and
clients, iii. 39
House-searching lance et licio, i. 201 f.
Human sacrifices in Latium, no proof of,
i. 222. In Rome, ii. 223 f. Forbidden,
iv. 210. In Gaul, v. 28
Hydrus, L 176
Hyele. See Velia
Hyrcanus, King of the Jews, iv. 425, 430,
448
Iapygians, language of, and affinity with
the Greeks, i. 11 /. The oldest immi-
grants into Italy, i. 13. Maintained
their ground in Apulia against the
Samnites, i. 146. Defeat the Tarentines,
i. 416
Iassus, ii. 413. Pillaged by the pirates,
iv. 308
Iberians in Georgia, iv. 20, 412-414
Iberians in Spain, ii. 385
Ibycus, i. 172
L. Icilius Ruga [tribune of the people, 298,
299], i. 366
Idus, i. 207, 271
Iguvium, v. 207. Tablets of, i. 145
Ilerda, iv. 283, 300; v. 221-226
I Hans, the senate intercedes for them as
of kindred lineage, ii. m. Become
free, ii. 473. Favours bestowed by
Sulla, iv. 54. Exempt from taxation,
v. 364, 382 n.
Illiturgi, ii. 308
Illyrians, piratical expeditions of the
rulers of Scodra, ii. 216./C Subdued by
the Romans, ii. 218, 286, 499, 508. In
the Hannibalic war take part with Rome
against Macedonia, ii. 317. Against
the Aetolians, ii. 476. Dalmatians
subdued, iii. 264, 290/., 421 yC, 426^ ;
iv. 307. Wars in Caesar's time, v. 103,
284./; Roman speculators in lllyria, iii.
307. Taxation by Rome, iii. 509 f. ; v.
364. Compare Genthius
Ilva, i. 143
Images of the gods foreign to the earliest
Roman worship, i. 225, 306 f. Van©
places their introduction after 176 u.c.,
i. 307 «.
Imbros, ii. 437
Imperator, meaning of word, iii. 505 ; ▼.
330-335
Imperium, i. 82. Only divisible territori-
ally, not functionally, and thus essenti-
ally always at once military and juris-
dictional, i. 371 ».
Imports, Italian, iv. 174
Incendiarism, i. 19a
India, iii. 284
Indigetes, iv. 293
Indigitare, i. 213
Indo-Germans, original seats of, t. 38^
Language, i. 18 /. Culture: pastoral
life, house -building, boats with oars,
chariots, clothing, cooking and salting,
working in metals, political, religious,
and scientific fundamental ideas, i. 18-
22. Measuring and numbering, i. 263^
Inheritance, law of; all equally entitled
received equal shares, the widow taking
a child's part, i. 198. Compare Wills
Inheritance, tax on, iii. 90. Abolished,
iv. 156
Iniuria, damage to body or property, L
193
Insubres, i. 423, 434 ; ii. 221, 226, 227,
259, 263, 268, 357, 369, 370, 372
Insula, i. 318 n.
Interamna on the Liris, Latin colony, L
476, 490
Interamna on the Nar, city-chronicle of
ii. 103
Intercalary system, i. 270
Intercatia, ii. 386 ; iii. 219
Interest, originally 10 per cent for a year
of ten months, i. 196 *., 364. Lawt
regulating, iii. 389, 530, 541 ; iv. xao,
176 ; v. 401./:
552
HISTORY OF ROME
Interrex, i. 99. After abolition of the
monarchy, i. 319
Intibili, ii. 308
Ionian gulf, older name of the Adriatic
sea, i. 165
Ionian islands, Roman, ii. 218 f., 477.
Joined to province of Macedonia, iii.
262
Ionian sea, origin of the name, i. 165
Ipsus, battle of, ii. 6
Iron mines at Noreia, iii. 424
Iron, workers in, not known at Rome till
late, i. 249. Taken over from the
Greeks, i. 304
Isara, battle on the, iii. 448
Isaurians, subdued, iv. 313^ Revolt, iv.
325
Isidorus, Pontic admiral, iv. 329
Isis, worship of, iv. 210 ; v. 446
Issa, i. 417 ; ii. 217, 218 «., 493 ; iii. 422.
Standing commandant there, ii. 218 n.
Isthmian games, admission of Romans to,
ii. 219. Entrusted to Sicyon, iii. 273
Isthmian temple receives gifts from
Mummius, iii. 271
Isthmus, iii. 269
Istrians, ii. 229, 372, 425 ; iii. 43, 431
Istropolis, iv. 307
Italia (Corfinium), iii. 504, 522
Italica, iii. 214, 271 n. ; iv. 295
Italy, its physical conformation and
character, i. 5-7. Primitive races, i.
g/. Union under the leading of Rome,
ii. 46-58. Original restricted import of
the name, i. 169. Transference of the
name to the territory from the Sicilian
Straits to the Arnus and Aesis, ii. 59.
Denoted after the acquisition of Sicily
the continental territory administered
by the consuls, from the Sicilian Straits
to the Alps, ii. 213 _/., 215 «., 219 n.
How far this geographical distinction
becomes a political one, ii. 213 f.
Northern Italy separated and first con-
stituted by Sulla a special province,
Gallia Cisalpina, ii. 215 n. ; iv. 121 f.
The possessions on the east coast of the
Adriatic included, ii. 218 «. Italian
communities beyond Italy : Ariminum,
ii- 205, 220. Messana, ii. 203'. Ravenna,
ii. sai. Sena Gallica, ii. 12, 220.
Practically bounded by the Po, iii.
518. Legal boundary of, changed by
Sulla to the Rubico; and all Italians
mac Roman citizens, iv. 122 /., 132.
Nortii Italy united with Italy, v. 421./!
See Celts, Transpadane
Italians nutated into the peninsula from
the north, i. 13, 39. Indo-Germani :
stock, i. 14 f. Language of, L 14 /.
Their near affinity with the Greeks, i.
15. Contrast to the Greeks in family,
state, religion, and art, i. 28-36. Artistic
endowments of, i. 283^
Italus, laws of, i. 26, 31
Ityraeans, iv. 430
C. Iudacilius from Asculum, commander
in the Social war, iii. 513, 520
Indices = consules, i. 318
Indices decemviri, i. 352
Indicium legitimum and quod imperii
continetur, i. 335 n.
Iugerum, i. 265 n.
lus, i. 189. lus and indicium separated,
i. 322 ; ii. 68
lus gentium, i. 200 ; v. 432
/us imaginum, hereditary distinction
connected with the obtaining of a
curule office, i. 373 ; iii. 4, 103
Janiculum, i. 59, 134, 137 ; iv. 169
Jannaeu«, iv. 423, 425, 426
Janus, i. 209, 2ia. Effigy of, ii. 123
Jzpydes, iii. 425, 437
Jazyges, iv. 14
Jews under the Maccabees, iii. 285./C ; it.
5, 316, 423-426. Treasures in Cos carried
offby Mithradates, iv. 33. Send envoys
to Lucullus, iv. 341. Subdued by
Pompeius, iv. 430 f. Placed under
high priests, iv. 439. Revolts under
Aristobulus, and breaking up of the
land, iv. 448 /. Taxation, iv. 158 «.,
162 n. Their position in Caesar's state,
v. 417-419. Jews in Alexandria, v. 281,
418. In Rome, iv. 210; v. yjif,, 418
Juba, king of Numidia, v. 203, 230, 331,
264, 269, 288, 300,/C
Judges, Carthaginian, ii. 147./C
Jugurtha at Numantia, iii. 230, 389.
Jugurthine war, iii. 388-408. Put to
death in Rome, iii. 409
Julia, Caesar's daughter, iv. 514. Death
of, v. 166
Julia, wife of Marius, iii. 453
Julii from Alba, i. 128. Family shrine at
Bovillae, i. 128
C. Julius Caesar, candidate for the consul-
ship in 667, iii. 532 ; iv. 66, 67
C. Julius Caesar, his character, iv. vjlf',
v. 305-314. Year of his birth, iv. 278 ft.
His conduct after Sulla's death and
during Lepidus' revolt, iv. 288. Sup-
ports the Plotian law, iv. 303. Serves
in Mithradatic war, iv. 325. Brings
Sullan partisans to trial, iv. 373. Sup-
INDEX
553
ports the Lex Gabinia, iv. 393. His
gladiatorial games, iv. 399, 456. Ponti-
fex Maximus, iv. 460, 491. Conspires
with Catilina, iv. 466, 467, 482, 486, 487,
488. An opponent of Pompeius, iv. 493.
Praetor, iv. 497, 498. Governor in
Spain, iv. 503 ; v. 6, 7. Allied with
Pompeius and Crassus, iv. 504^ Con-
sul, iv. 508. Governor of the two Gauls,
iv. 512 f. ; v. 200 f. Conflicts with the
Gauls, v. 38-94. Crosses the Rhine, v.
67 /•> 73- Invades Britain, v. 63-66.
Makes Gaul a Roman province, v. 94-
98. At Luca, v. 124 f. Asks for the
hand of Pompeius' daughter, v. 166.
Differences between him and Pompeius,
v. 175.A 178./C, 180./C Recalled, v. 184.
His ultimatum, v. 186./C Marches into
Italy, v. 190-192. His army, v. 195-199.
Conquers Italy, v. 206-212. Pacifies
and regulates Italy, v. 212-218. Spanish
campaign, v. 219-227. Takes Massilia,
v. 227 f. Plan of his campaign against
Pompeius, v. 244. Crosses to Greece, v.
247. Operations round Dyrrhachium,
v. 250-254. In Thessaly, v. 256 f.
Battle of Pharsalus, v. 258-264. Pursues
Pompeius to Egypt, v. 271./C Regulates
Egypt, v. 274. Conflicts at Alexandria,
v. 275-282. Conquers Pharnaces, v.
282 f. Goes to Africa, v. 293. Battle of
Thapsus, v. 298./C His attitude towards
the old parties, v. 315-324. The new
monarchy takes legal shape, v. 326-336.
Regulates the state, v. 336-350. Re-
organizes the army, v. 351-359. Regu-
lates the finances, v. 361-367. Regulates
economic relations, v. 367-374, 397-406.
Arranges the provinces, v. 406, 412 ./C
Position towards the Jews, v. 417 f.
Towards Hellenism, v. 418,/C Latinizes
the provinces, v. 421-428. Census of
the Empire, v. 429 f. Religion of the
Empire, v. 430./C Law of the Empire,
v. 43I"435- Coinage, v. 435-438. Re-
forms the calendar, v. 438 /. His
Memoirs, v. 499 f. As grammarian, v.
437/
L. Julius Caesar [consul, 664], in the
Social war, iii. 508, 509, 510, 515, 517,
532 ; iv. 66, 102 «., 222
Sex. Julius Caesar, Roman envoy to the
Achaeans, iii. 267
Dec Junius Brutus [consul, 616], iii. 232,
367, 437. Builds the temple of Mars in
the Flaminian circus, iv. 257
Dec. Junius Brutus [consul, 677J, iv.
369
Dec. Junius Brutus, Caesar's lieutenant,
v. 55. 217/
L. Junius Pullus [consul, 505], ii. 190
L. Junius Brutus Damasippus, Marian
praetor in the Social war, iv. 79, 83, 88,
90
M. Junius Pera [dictator, 538], ii. 303
M. Junius Silanus [propraetor, 544], ii.
327. 33i
M. Junius Brutus [plebeian tribune, 671^
iv. 70, 79
M. Junius Brutus, orator, v. 507
M. Junius Brutus, Lepidus' lieutenant,
iv. 291
M. Junius Pennus [praetor, 628], iii. 340
M. Junius Silanus [consul, 645] defeated
by the Cimbri, iii. 434
M. Junius Brutus, collection of juristic
opinions by, iv. 251, 255
M. Junius Gracchanus, treatise on Magis-
tracies, iv. 252
Juno Moneta, i. 281
Junonia, iii. 346, 366. See Carthage
Jupiter Capitolinus, i. 141, 208, 293. His
statue on the Capitol, i. 306 ; ii. 124.
Temple of, i. 100 ; iv. 97
Jupiter Latiaris, i. 50
Jupiter Stator, temple on the Capitol, iv.
257
Jurisprudence, rudiments of, i. 219/ ; ii.
112; iii. 195. In the seventh century,
iv. 254 f. Position of jurists towards
Sulla's laws, iv. 263
Jury-courts transferred by C. Gracchus
from the senate to the Equites, iii. 52 /.,
373> 377> 48l.A 484/- Proposition to
restore the right to the senate, iii. 485^
Plautian law, iii. 516. Restored by
Sulla to the senate, iv. m, 129 /.
Attempt to repeal this alteration, iv.
372 f. Mixed courts under Aurelian
law, iv. 379 J. New enactments of
Pompeius, v. 146 f. Of Caesar, v.
347/
Juturna, i. 40. Fountain of, ii. 70
Juventius, praetor, against the pseudo-
Philip, iii. 261
Kalendae, i. 271
King, modelled on the father of the
household, i. 8i f. Represents the
community before the gods and foreign
countries, i. 81 f. His command un-
limited, i. 82. His jurisdiction, i. 82/
King is irresponsible, inasmuch as the
supreme judge cannot be accused at his
own bar, i. 319. Leader of the army,
i. 82, 91. Delegation of his authority,
554
HISTORY OF ROME
L 82 /. Insignia, i. 83, 99. Limitation
of the regal power, i. 84. Manages
the finances, i. 92. Judge, i. 1S9 /.
Change of the existing legal order
possible only by co-operation of the
king and the burgesses, i. 94/ Aboli-
tion of the tenure for life, and intro-
duction of the consulate, i. 315-319.
Vow of the burgesses never to endure a
king, i. 316. Similar changes of con-
stitution in the Italian and Greek
communities, i. 375
Labeo. See Fabius
Laberius, composer of mimes, v. 312 «.,
470 «., 471
Labici, i. 49, 130. Assignations at, i.
378. About 370, a member of Latin
league, i. 448 »., 450. Not a colony,
i. 450 ».
T. Labienus, v. 39, 53, 55. 194/
Labourers from without employed in
agriculture, iii. 70
Lacedaemonians, ii. 405, 421, 452, $of.
Lacinian promontory, i. 177
Laconia, recruiting ground, ii. 162
Lacus, iii. 206
Lade, island of, ii. 412
C. Laelius [consul, 564], ii. 327. A novus
homo, iii. 15
C. Laelius Sapiens [consul, 614], iii. 253,
2561 3J7> 3X9> 327> 329- In tce Scipionic
circle, iv. 220. Speeches, iv. 251
Laestrygones, i. 177, 181
P. Laetorius, friend of C. Gracchus, iii.
368
Laevinus. See Valerius
T. Lafrenius (Afranius), Italian com-
mander in the Social war, iii. 513
Laletani, iv. 293
Lamia, ii. 459
M. Lamponius, Lucanian leader in Social
war, iii. 510, 526 ; iv. 86, 88
Lampoons, i. 288 ; and incantations for-
bidden, ii. 98
Lampsacus, ii. 406, 411, 447 «., 453,
469*., 495; iv. 326, 328
Lance.i, i. 28 n.
Land, division of, at the time of the
Servian reform : one -half of land-
holders having an entire hide, the other
half J, J, J, and J respectively, i. 116.
The greater landholders, i. 116, 245-248
Land-distribution. See Domains
Landholders in Latium also merchants,
i. 261 n.
Land-measuring, iii. 335. Graeco-Italian,
Lao/.
Language, Latin, already substantially
formed at the time of the Twelve
Tables, ii. 113. Its extension, iv. 189/;
v. 4x6/, 421-428, 453/ In Gaul, v
9 /•> 3°> 48 f. In Spain, iv. 190. By
Sertorius, iv. 285/
Lanuvium, i. 40 ; iv. 64. In the Aricine
league, i. 445 «., 447. Revolts against
Rome, i. 450. About 370, member of
Latin league, i. 448 »., 450. Roman
burgess-community, i. 462. Conquered
by Marius, iv. 64. Frescoes of, ii. 124,
127. Dictator there, i. 442 «. Lanuvini
ridiculed by Naevius, iii. 149 «.
Laodice, alleged mother of the pseudo-
Philip, iii. 260
Laodicea, iii. 28 ; iv. 30, 31
Lapathus, pass at Tempe, ii. 503
Larentalia, i. 209
Lares, number of, i. 107. Character of
this worship, I. 213 f. Their worship
connected with sanitary police, i. 225.
Lares Permarini, their temple, ii. 463.
Lases = Lares, borrowed by the Etrus-
cans from Latium, i. 229
Larinum, town of the Frentani, Sullan
government there, iv. 104
Larisa on the Peneius, ii. 434, 457, 499,
500
Larisa Cremaste, ii. 421
Lasthenes, Cretan general, iv. 351, 352
Latins, a branch of the Italians, i. Z3/
Language, i. 14, 281 ; ii. 113. Relation
to the Umbrians and Samnites, i. 14,
16. Direction of their migration, i.
39/ Oldest inhabitants of Campania,
Lucania, the Bruttian country, i. 40;
and East Sicily, i. 40 /. Settlements
of the, i. 42 /., 44 f. Passive traffic, i.
256. With Sicily, i. 258/
Latini prisci cives Romani, i. 128 n.
Latin communities, their position in refer-
ence to the domain-question, iii. 336/
Their right of migration curtailed, iii.
493. Faithful to Rome in the Social
war, iii. 502. Acquire burgess -rights
in consequence, iii. 516/. Lowest form
of Latin rights given by Sulla to the
insurgent communities, iv. 107. lus
Latinunt granted to towns in Cisalpine
Gaul, iii. 517 f. Latin urban com-
munities in Transalpine Gaul, iv. 422,
423 «. In Sicily, v. 364
Latin league, of 30 cantons under the
presidency of Alba, i. 50. Federal
festival, i. 50. Place of assembly for
the league, i. 50. Community of rights
and of marriage among the members of
INDEX
555
the cantons, t. $of. Military constitu-
tion of the league, i. 51. Sacred truce,
i. 51. After the fall of Alba, Rome pre-
sides in its room, i. 129. Original
constitution of the Romano - Latin
league ; Rome not a member of the
league, like Alba, but occupying an
independent position with reference to
the independent league of the 30 com-
munities, i. 130./C ; and prohibited from
separate alliance with any single Latin
community, i. 133. Double army fur-
nished in equal proportions by the two
parties, with a single command alternat-
ing between them, i. 133 /., 439. Equal
partition of the spoil, i. 439 ./• Repre-
sentation before other nations, if not
de jure, at least practically in the
hands of Rome, i. 440. Equal alliance
and equality of rights in private inter-
course between Rome and Latium, i.
131. In consequence of this, a general
right of settlement on the part of any
burgess of a Latin community anywhere
in Latium, i. 132. Document of treaty,
i. 280. War between Rome and Latium,
and renewal of the league, i. 438.
Later constitution of the league ; the
Latins lose the right of making war
and treaties with foreign nations, i.
439./C Commandership-in-chief reserved
to the Romans, and the staff-officers of
the Latin and Roman contingents
nominated accordingly by the Roman
commander, i. 440. Does not furnish
more troops than the Romans, i. 440.
The contingents of the communities
remain together under their own leader,
L 440. The right to share in the spoil
continued at least formally to subsist, i.
440. Position of the Latins as to
private rights not changed, i. 441.
Revolt against Rome, i. 446 f. The
league remained open till 370, so that
every community newly invested with
Latin rights was admitted ; thereafter
closed, i. 448 /. At that time 47 com-
munities, of which, however, only 30
entitled to vote, i. 450. List of the
towns belonging to it, i. 448 n. Isola-
tion of the communities furnished with
Latin rights after 370 by the withdrawal
of the commerciutn et conubium with
the other Latin communities, i. 451.
Separate leagues of particular groups
forbidden, i. 451. Remodelling of the
municipal constitution after the pattern
of that of Rome, i. 441 A, 452- Ex-
asperation against Rome, i. 452. Re-
volt after subjugation of Capua, i. 460./C
The league politically dissolved and
converted into a religious festal associa-
tion, i. 461. In lieu of it, treaties
between Rome and the several com-
munities ; their isolation carried out, i.
461 f. Position during the war with
Pyrrhus, ii. 21, 23. Position after the
Pyrrhic war ; inferior rights of Ari-
minum and the other Latin communities
founded thereafter, ii. 50, 52. Admission
of the Latins to the senate during the
Hannibalic war refused, ii. 298. In-
creased oppression after the Hannibalic
war, iii. 24-26. Restriction of freedom
of movement also as to the older Latin
communities, iii. 25 /. Compart
Coloniae Latinae
Latinizing of Italy, ii. 60 /., %&f. Of the
country between the Alps and the Po,
ii. 371 ; iv. 189 f. ; v. 415 ./C See Lan-
guage, Latin
Latinus, name occurs even in the Theo-
gony of Hesiod, i. 177 «.
Latinus, king of the Aborigines, ii. no n.
As son of Odysseus and Circe, i. 177
Latium, physical character and earliest
boundaries, i. 6, 41-44. Extended ori-
ginally by the founding of new Latin
communities ; afterwards geographically
fixed, i. 451./C
Laurentum, i. 49, 459 n. In the Aricine
league, i. 445 «. , 447. About 370, mem-
ber of Latin league, i. 448 «., 450. Ad-
heres to Rome, i. 461. Later federal
relation, i. 462
Lauro in Spain, iv. 295
Laus, i. 40, 170, 171. Occupied by the
Lucanians, i. 454, 456
Lautumiae, origin of the word, i. 201
Lavema, i. 212
Lavinium, i. 49. About 370, member of
Latin league, i. 448 ». Trojan Penates
there, ii. no
Law, Roman, same as in Latium, i. 131.
Even in its oldest form known to us, of
comparatively modern character, i. 189.
No symbols therein, i. 201./C Ultimate
basis of, in the state, i. 203. Its subse-
quent development under Greek influ-
ence, ii. 62-70. Codified, ii. 66. Be-
ginnings of a regular administratinn of
law in the municipia and colonies, ii.
49, (&f. ; iii. 38^ Its regulation >n the
time of Sulla, iv. 132^ Scipio Aemilia-
nus attempts improvement of;1': ,J«'un-
istration, iii. 316. Military !-w, ,'j. 7^
55«
HISTORY OF ROME
Law, its codification projected by Caesar,
v. 434. Re-establishment of the regal
jurisdiction by Caesar, v. 347./ Ap-
peals, v. 348. Municipal jurisdiction,
iv. 131 / ; v. 425 f. Compare Jury-
courts; Quaestiones
Lad, iv. 334
Leases in Italy not usual, iii. 657^
Legal style, technical, ii. 114
Legati legionis pro praetore, v. 354
Legatio libera, v. 410 tu
Leges—
Acilia de repetundis, iii. 353 n.
Aemilia [M. Scauri] de suffragiis
libertinorum, iii. 379
Appuleia agraria, iii. 468 »., 469, 471,
480
Appuleia de maiestate, iii. 440, 441 ».,
468 »., 476
Appuleia frument aria, iii. 468 »., 470,
480
Aufidia allows the import of wild
beasts from Africa, iv. 183
Aurelia, on the composition of the
jury-courts, iv. 379
Baebia, ii. 392
Caecilia, abolition of Italian tolls, iv. 502
Canuleia, i. 371
Cassia agraria, i. 361
Cassia tabellaria, iii. 300, 316
Claudia, iii. 81./C, 94, 349
Cornelia de edict is praetoriis, v. 434
Comeliae. See L. Cornelius Sulla
Domitia de sacerdotiis, iii. 463. Set
aside by Sulla, iv. 115
Fabia de plagiariis, iv. 356
Flaminia agraria, iii. 58, 99, 332
Fulvia de civitate sociis danda, iii. 362
Gabinia, iv. 388-395
HorUnsia, i. 385, 390, 396, 398
/cilia as to the right of the tribunes
to assemble the people, i. 353
/cilia as to the Aventine, i. 362
Julia, giving Latin rights to the Ital-
ians, iii. 517
Julia agraria of Caesar, iv. 508 /., 510
f. ; v. 124
Junia de peregrinis, iii. 340
Labiena, on the election of priests, iv.
457
Licinia Mucia, against usurpation of
burgess-rights, iii. 496
Liciniae Sextiae, i. 3807C, 387, 393; ii.
77 tu; iii. 312/
Liviat (of the elder Drusus), iii. 3637C,
372. 374/
Livuu (of the younger Drusus), iii.
,8^.489
Maecilia agraria, i. 378
Maenia, i. 384
Mamilia, iii. 396, 441 tu
Manilia, iv, 396-400
Mucia de civitate, iv. 496
Mucia [of 613] on bribery, iii. 441 «.
Octaviafrumentaria, iv. 289 n.
Ogulnia, i. 385
Ovinia, i. 406 »., 407; iii. 7; iv. 112
Peducaea, iii. 441 «.; iv. 209
Plautia iudiciaria (?), iii. 516, 528 n.
Plautia Papiria de civitate, iii. 517,
524 ; iv. 62 «.
Poetelia, i. 389^
Plotia, as to the proscribed, iv. 303
Pompeia de iudiciis, v. 138
Pompeia as to bestowing Latin rights
on the Transpadanes, iii. 518
Publilia [of 383], i. 359, 360
Publilia [of 415], i. 384, 396
regiae, i. 112
Roscia, theatre-law [687], iv. in n.
sacratae, as to appointment of the
plebeian tribunes and aediles, i. 349
Semproniafrumentaria, iii. 345./C
Semproniae, iii. 320 f.t 329-333
Servilia, iv. 472
Sulpiciae, iii. 531-536
sumpluariae, iv. 172, 185. Aemilia
[M. Scauri], iii. 379. Of Caesar, v.
397. Compare ii. 63 f.
tabellariae (Gabinia, Cassia, Papiria),
iii. 300, 3167C, 340
Terentia Cassia frttmentaria, iv. 289*.
Terentilia, i. 362
Thoria agraria, iii. 375 tu
Titia agraria, iii. 480
Valeria de provocatione, i. 320
Valeria, on Sulla's dictatorship, iv. 99,
109
Valeriae Horatiae, i. 354 »., 366./C, 396
Villia annalis, iii. 14
Voconia, iii. 50 n.
Legion, phalangitis i. 90 ; ii. 7a. Origin
of the manipular legion, ii. 72-76.
Manipular arrangement imitated by
Pyrrhus, ii. 25. Divided into cohorts,
iii. 459. Of half its former number
after the Social war, iv. 36 tu
Legis actio Sacramento, i. 92, 196. Sa-
cramentum raised, ii. 68. Per manus
inuctionem, i. 197. Actiones pub-
licly promulgated by Ap. Claudius, ii.
113
Legislation by decree of the community,
i. 95. Acquired practically by tha
senate, i. 408
Lemnos, ii. 438, 477, 517; iv. 329
INDEX
557
Lemonii, clan-village, i. 45
Lemures, i. 312
Lemuria, i. 209
Lending money, business of, iii. 83. Public
opinion thereon, iii. 96
Length, measures of, origin of, i. 263.
Early introduction of the duodecimal
system, i. 265 /. Afterwards, under
Greek influence, the foot divided into
four handbreadths and sixteen finger-
breadths, i. 265, 266
Lentulus. See Cornelius
Leontini, i. 166; ii. 310; iii. 384. Syra-
cusan, ii. 204. Domain of, ii. 313 ; iii.
20, 308 ; iv. 157, 158 it.
Lepidus. See Aemilius
Leptis magna, ii. 140, 384
Leptis minor, ii. 139; iii. 244; v. 364.
Exempt from taxation, iii. 259
Lesbians, treatment of, after war with
Perseus, ii. 517
Lete, town in Macedonia, iii. 428 n.
Leucae, iii. 278,/C
Leucas, ii. 432, 435i 5*7
Leuci, v. 48, 85
Leucopetra, iii. 269
Levy remodelled, iii. 295./C, 303.
Lex, primarily contract, i. 94. Lex and
edictum, i. 334. Interval between the
introduction and passing of a, iii. 480
Liber, i. 280
Liberalia, i. 209
Liber pater, i. 231
Liberti Latini Iuniani, iii. 527 n.
Libra, etymology, i. 263. Division of,
i. 265. Relation to Sicilian mina,
L259
Libumae, ii. 217
Libyans, agriculture of the, ii. 138 f.
Position towards Carthage, ii. 1407^
Libyphoenicians, ii. 139, 140 n.
C. Licinius Stolo, i. 380, 388
C Licinius Calvus, v. 139, 140, 481, 507
C. Licinius Macer seeks to restore the
tribunician power, iv. 372. Chronicler,
ii. 67 n. ; v. 496
L. Licinius Crassus [consul, 659], the
orator, iii. 426, 441 «., 465, 484, 488,
497 ; iv. 184, 186, 215, 218, 257
L. Licinius Lucullus [consul, 603], iii.
219
L. Licinius Lucullus [praetor, 651], iii.
386
L. Licinius Lucullus, his character, iv.
337, 444.447. Sulla's lieutenant, iv.
40, 46, 48, 54, 94, 269, 271. Commands
against Mithradates, iv. 324-335. War
with Tigranes, iv. 334-340. Advances
into Armenia, iv. 345 f. Retreats to
Mesopotamia, iv. 346. Retreats to
Pontus, iv. 348. Character of bis
operations in Asia, iv. 443-448. Super-
seded in the chief command by
Pompeius, iv. 407. Opponent of Pom-
peius, iv. 501. Humbles himself before
Caesar, and retires from public life, iv.
454, 516. His improvements in stage-
decorations, iv. 236. His library and
art-collections, v. 460, 515
L. Licinius Murena, iv. 38, 53, 94, 95,
3°5. 3i3i 320
M. Licinius Crassus, his character, iv.
275-278. Takes part in the Social war,
iv. 72, 77, 88, 89, 91. In Sulla's con-
fiscations, iv. 105. Finishes the Servile
war, iv. 362, 363. Allied with Pom-
peius and the democrats, ii. 378^, 382^
Joins the democrats against Pompeius,
iv. 4617C In the conspiracy of Catilina,
iv. 485-488. At Luca, v. 124 /. Goes
to Syria, v. 150. Conflicts with the
Parthians, v. 151-160. Put to death,
v. 161. His wealth, v. 384. Influence
thence arising, v. 389
M. Licinius Lucullus, quaestor, and
lieutenant to Sulla, iv. 85, 87, 269, 270.
Fights in the east, iv. 307. Suggests
the sharper punishment of outrages on
property perpetrated by armed bands,
iv. 356. His improvements in stage-
decorations, iv. 236
P. Licinius Crassus [consul, 583], ii. 500/^
P. Licinius Crassus Mucianus [consul,
623], Pontifex maximus, iii. 279, 293,
319, 334 ; iv. 192. His estate, iv. 176
P. Licinius Crassus [consul, 657], iii. 479,
508, 509 ; iv. 67, 102 n.
P. Licinius Crassus, lieutenant under
Caesar, v. 39, 48, 55, 63, 154, 158, 159
P. Licinius Nerva, governor of Sicily in
650, iii. 383
Lictores, i. 82, 94, 190. Lay aside their
axes in appeal cases, i. 320
Ligurians, i. 156, 157, 434; ii. 221, 228,
35i. 3691 374-375; »i- 214. 2911 313.
382 «., 414, 415, 417, 443>_446. 458
Ligurians of Lower Italy, ii. 374
Lilybaeum, ii. 143, 185, 187, 205, 249, 266 ;
iii. 243. Greek settlement there frus-
trated, i. 184. Held by the Cartha-
ginians against Pyrrhus, ii. 32. Be-
sieged by the Romans, ii. 18 7 /., 190,
191, 195
Lhnitatio, Graeco-Italian, i. 27
Linen comes from Egypt to Italy, iii. 85
Linerc, i. 280
558
HISTORY OF ROME
Lingones, Italian, ii. 221, 226
Lingones, Gallic, v. 85
Lipara, i. 177 ; ii. 176 ; iv. 354. A Greek
colony, i. 1S6. Roman, ii. 186, 198
Liris, i. 444
Lissus, i. 417 ; ii. 218
Liternum, ii. 304
Literati, Greek, in Rome, v. 459^
Literature, origin of Roman, iii. 134 f.
Its desructtive influences on religion,
iii. wif. Tn the seventh century, iv.
22Q-254. In Caesar's time, v. 453-510
Littera, i. 280
Litterat', iv. 215
Litteris ouligatio, iii. 90 n.
Litteratores, ii. 116
Livius Andronicus, iii. X35 /., 156 ; iv.
214, 232 n. Publicly read his own
poems, iii. 178
C. Livius [admiral, 563, 564], ii. 457, 460,
462
M. Livius Salinator [consul, 535, 547 ;
censor, 550], ii. 347, 3487C, 352 ; iii. 136
M. Livius Drusus, the elder, iii. 363, 364,
365. 429
M. Livius Drusus, the younger, iii. 483-
489, 497./ ; iv. 180, 186
Livy corrected, iii. 444 n. ; iv. 91 n.
Locri occupied by the Romans, ii. 12.
Its fortunes in the Pyrrhic war, ii. 21,
30, 31, 35. In the Hannibalic war, ii.
295, 350. Exempted from land-service,
ii. 43. Remains unaffected by the
general Latinizing, iv. 191./C
Locris, ii. 396
Locupletes, i. 115
M. Lollius Palicanus [tribune of the
people, 683], iv. 379 ^
Longobriga, iv. 284 ; iii. 499
Lorum, iii. 5 n.
Luca, a Volscian town, i. 464
Luca, conference at, v. 124/.
Lucanians, constitution, i. 315. First
appearance, i. 454 f. Under Greek
influence, i. 456, 465 /. ; ii. 79, 90.
Fight against Archidamus and Alex-
ander the Molossian, i. 463. Their
attitude during the Samnite wars, i.
466, 468. In the third Samnite war, i.
486./I The Romans abandon the Greek
towns in Lucania to them, ii. gf. In-
tervention of the Romans contrary to
treaty during the Lucanian siege of
Thurii, ii. 10. War with Rome, ii. io,
12. Take part in the Pyrrhic war, ii.
19, 21, 22. Left in the lurch by
Pyrrhus, ii. 30 f. Submit to the
Romans, ii. 38. Dissolution of the
confederacy, or its subsistence without
political significance, ii. 53. Their
conduct in the Hannibalic war, ii. 294,
300, 305, 342, 365. State after it, iii,
100, 101. In the Social war, iii. 510,
524
Luc aria, i. 208
Luceres, i. $■$/., 56
'.uceria, i. 472 ; ii. 280, 282, 283, 287, 294,
3°5> 333 > v- 2°8, 211. Conflicts be-
tween Iapygians and Samnites about, i.
146. Occupied by the Samnites after
the Claudine victory, i. 471. Taken by
the Romans, i. 474. Latin colony, i.
493
C. Lucilius, poet, iv. 193, 194, 215, 237-
241, 252. In the Scipionic circle, iv. 220
C. Lucilius Hirrus, v. 209
C. Lucretius [admiral, 583], ii. 500, 501,
5°3
Q. Lucretius Ofella goes over to Sulla,
iv. 78, 84, 87, 89, 137, 140
T. Lucretius Carus, v. 444, 473-478
Lucullus. See Licinius
Ludi, increase oi, iii. 340^, 124-127, 133^
Provincials burdened for their cost, iii.
31 f. Distinction of the senatorial
places, iii. 10. In Sulla's time, iv. i83_/C
In Caesar's time, v. 471. Greek, iv. 192 ;
v. 516 «.
Lui'; Apollinares, iii. 41, 125
Lua Atellani, ii. 231. Compare Fabula
Ludi Cereales, iii. 40, 125
Ludi Floralss, iii. 40, 125
Ludi maximi, ii. 96 n.
Ludi Mcgalenses, iii. 41, 135
Ludi Osci, iv. 231
Ludi phbeii, iii. 40 «., 125
Ludi RoDiani, original nature of, i. 293.
Probably modelled after the Olympic
festival, i. 295. Changed from com-
petitions of the burgesses to competi-
tions of professional riders and prize-
fighters, i. 297. A day added after the
expulsion of the kings, i. 342. Last for
four days, ii. 97. For six days, ii. 124.
Provided by the curule aediles, i. 383 ;
iii. 41. "Sale of Veientes," i. 426. In-
troduction of dramatic representations,
ii. 98. Cost of the festival, ii. 97. Palm
branches distributed at, ii. 91
Ludii, ludiones, i. 286
Luerius, king of Arverni, iii. 416, 417
Lugudunum Convenarum, iv. 304 ; v. 8
Luna, ii. 377 ; iv. 167. Burgess-colony,
ii. 375 ; iii. 26, 49, 312
Lupercal, i. 62. Luperci, Lupercalia, L
54. 56. 67 «•. 106, 108, 208, 215
INDEX
559
Lupus. See Rutilios
Lusitanians, ii. 389, 391
Lusitanian war, iii. 216. Banditti in, iii.
233 f. Revolt, iii. 479. Subdued by
Caesar, v. 7
Lusones, iii. 227
Lustrum up to 474 could not be presented
by the plebeian censor, i. 384. Usual
prayeron presenting it, iii. 317. Changed
by Scipio Aemilianus, iii. 317
C. Lutatius Catulus [consul, 512], ii.
194 f.
Q. Lutatius Catulus [consul, 652], iii.
447-459, 508 ; iv. 67, 102 «., 103. Poet,
iv. 236 »., 242. Memoirs, iv. 250
Q. Lutatius Catulus [consul, 676], iv. 269,
288, 289 «., 290, 291, 394 /., 453, 460,
483. 493. 497
Lutetia, v. 84
Lutia, town of the Arevacae, iii. 231
Lyaeus, i. 231
Lycaonia, ii. 474 ; iii. 281
Lycia, ii. 474, 513 ; iii. 280 ; iv. 54, 313.
Language, iv. nyC
Lycian cities, league of, iv. 33, 311
Lyciscus, ii. 498, 517, 518 ; iii. 264
Lycophron, v. 450
Lycortas, ii. 479
Lyctus, iv. 353
Lycus, river, iv. 331
Lydia, ii. 398, 474 ; iv. 11. Language,
iv. 11 f.
Lyncestis, ii. 424, 425
Lyra, i. 292 «.
Lysimachia, ii. 410, 421, 435, 448, 465, 474
Ma, Cappadocian goddess ( = Bellona), iv.
210
Maccabees. See Jews
T. Maccius Plautus, Roman poet, iii.
142, 145, 152, 160 f.\ iv. 220. Com-
pared with Terence, iv. 224-229
Macedonia, land and people, ii. 395-397.
Claims to continue the universal empire
of Alexander, ii. 399. Its relation to
Rome, ii. 215, 250, 252. Description
of the country before the beginning of
the third war with Rome, ii. 490 /.
Broken up into four confederacies, ii.
508 f. Becomes a province, iii. 262 /.
In the Sertorian times, iv. 299. Greece
placed under the Macedonian governor,
iii. 271. Struggles in the mountains,
iii. 414. Overrun by the Thracians, iv.
34. Occupied by Mithradates, iv. 34.
In the Mithradatic war, iv. 38, 50. In
Caesar's time, v. xo^f. Roman domain-
land in Macedonia, iv. 156, 157. Mines,
tv. 156. Taxation, ii. 509 n. ; iii. 263,
Compare Perseus, Philip
Machanidas of Sparta ii. 317,405
Machares, son of Mithradates, iv. 318,
334. 4"i 42°
Madytus, ii. 448
Maeander, ii. 474 ; iv. 38
Maecenas, i. 302
Maedi, iii. 428, 429 ; iv. 50
Sp. Maelius, i. 376
C. Maenius [consul, 416], L 462
Magaba, mountain in Asia Minor, ii. 471
Magadates, Armenian satrap, iv. 317,
34i
Magalia, iii. 247 »., 249, 253, 257
Magi among the Parthians, iii. 288
Magic, i. 191. Incantations, i. 286./!
Magister equitum, i. 317 «., 325. Not
originating out of the tribuni celerum,
i. 91 n. Plebeians ehgiLL, ". 383
Magister populi, i. 325. Compare Dic-
tator
Magistrates, not paid, iii. 91, 94. Cannot
be impeached during tenure of office,
iii. 32. Edicts of, while in office,
equivalent to law, i. 335. Military
authority distinguished from the civil,
after expulsion of the kings, i. 335 f.
General and army as such might not
enter the city, i. 335. Deputy-magis-
trates (pro magistrate, pro consule,
pro praetore, pro quaestor e) admissible
only in military, not in civil government,
i. 323. Deputies appointed by senate,
i. 409. Order of succession, limits of
age, intervals prescribed by law, i. 375 ;
iii. 13 f. Division into curule and
lower, iii. 6. Decline of the magistracy,
iii. 18. Sulla's regulations as to quali-
fication, iv. 116. Caesar's regulations,
v. 412 f. Filling up of the governor-
ships in the provinces, iv. 390 n. ; v.
147, 178./, 343/
Decius Magius, ii. 294
L. Magius, commander in Mithradatic
war, iv. 323, 334
Minatus Magius of Aeclanum forms in
the Social war a loyalist corps of Hir-
pini, iii. 502
Magnesia on the Maeander, ii. 413, 474 ;
iv. 54
Magnesia near Mount Sipylus, battle at,
ii. 466/ ; iii. 285 ; iv. 33
Magnesia, Thessalian peninsula, ii. 396,
452. 453, 454, 477, 485
Magnopolis, iv. 441
Mago, Carthaginian admiral in 476, ii. 39
Mago conquers at Kronion, ii. 145. Hb
56o
HISTORY OF ROME
book on agriculture, ii. 151 ; ill. 312 ;
iv. 172 n. His clan, i. 413 ; ii. 147
Mago the Samnite, ii. 244
Mago, Hannibal's brother, ii. 238, 271,
376. Fights in Spain against the
Scipios, ii. 322, 327, 328, 330^ 331.
Landing and struggle in Italy, ii. 350,
351, 357. Called to Africa, ii. 357
Maiestatem popui ' Rontani comiter con-
servare, ii. 47 n.
Maize, iii. 64 n.
Malaca, ii. 384
Maichus [Carthaginian general about 200],
i. 186
Malea, ii. 405
Cn. Mallius Maximus [consul, 649], de-
feated by the Helvotii, iii. 436
Mamercus, alleged son of Numa and
ancestor of the Aemilii, ii. 107
Mamercus Haemylus, alleged son of
Pythagoras and ancestor of the Aemilii,
ii. 107
Mamers, ii. 249
Mamertines. See Messana
C. Mamilius Limetanus [pleb. tribune,
64s]. «»• 396
Mamuralia, i. 207
Mamurius, the armourer, i. 249
Mamurra of Formiae, Caesar's favourite,
v. 142 n.
Mancaeus, commandant of Tigranocerta,
»v. 339
Mancinus. See Hostilius.
Mancipatio belongs not merely to Ro-
man, but generally to Latin law, i.
200. Is purchase with immediate and
simultaneous delivery and payment, i.
195. Thus originally not a formal act,
L 200. Refers originally to moveables,
L 195 »., 238/; Rearranged for agri-
cultural property in consequence of the
Servian regulation of freehold-relations,
i. 195 n. The other objects of property
excluded from mancipatio by a sub-
sequent misunderstanding, i. 195 «.
Obligatory consequences of, i. 196
Manes, i. 214
C. Manilius [pleb. tribune, 688], iv. 396
M'. Manilius conducts siege of Carthage
by land, iii. 249./C
Manipular organization. See Legion
C. Manlius, a Catilinarian, iv. 474
Cn. Manlius Volso [consul, 565], ii. 470 ;
iii. 32
Cn. Manlius [praetor, 682] fights against
ihe gladiators, iv. 360
L. Manlius Volso [consul, 498], ii. 178
L. Manlius fights against Sertorius, iv. 283
L. Manlius, poet, iv. 242
M. Manlius Capitolinus saves the Capi-
tol, ii. 430. Condemned, i. 379
T. Manlius Imperiosus Torquatus [consul,
414], i. 459 «., 461
T. Manlius Torquatus [praetor, 539], ii.
308
Mantua, i. 156. Etruscan, i. 434
Manumission, foreign to the old law, i.
198. Yindicta censu testamento, i. 199.
Freedmen among the clients, i. 79 f.
Tax on manumissions, i. 389 ; ii. 83 ; iv.
156. Freedmen in the comitia tributa
restricted to the four urban tribes, i.
396 /.; ii. 82; iii. 53. Deprived of the
suffrage in the comitia centuriata, i.
396. Iheir economic relation to the
manumitter, K. 82. Social and political
position in general, v. 369. Increasing
importance of, iii. 39. Share in military
service, i. 488 ; iii. 50 ; and in the suf-
frage, iii. 52 f. In the reform of the
centuries, equalized with the freeborn,
iii. 52 f. This equalization cancelled
again by C. Flaminius, iii. 53. Be-
stowal of unrestricted suffrage in-
tended by Sulpicius, iii. 531, 534. By
Cinna, iv. 58, 6g_/C Cancelled by Sulla,
iv. 106. Striving after equalization of
political rights, iv. 264, 458. Freedmen
with the rights of Latins and Dediticii,
iii. 527 ».; iv. 107 «.
Manus iniectio. See Legis actiones
Marble begins to be used for building, iv.
257. From Luna, v. 514. Numidian,
v. 514
Marcellus. See Claudius
Marcius, prophecies of, iii. 41
Marcius, Ancus, i. 104. Fortification of
Janiculum and foundation of Ostia
referred to him, i. 58^
C. Marcius [officer in Spain, 544], ii. 323,
33°
C. Marcius Censorinus, lieutenant of
Carbo in the first civil war, iv. 86
C. Marcius Rutilus [dictator, 398], i. 398
C. Marcius Rutilus [consul, 444], i. 480
C. Marcius Figulus [consul, 598], iii. 422
Cn. Marcius Coriolanus, i. 358
L. Marcius Censorinus [consul, 605]
besieges Carthage, iii. 243, 249
L. Marcius Philippus [consul, 663], iii.
380, 484, 487, 498 «.; iv. 70, 78, 92, 98 ;
iv. 269, 289 «., 2g6y.
Q. Marcius Philippus [consul, 568, 585],
ii. 497, 503, 514
Q. Marcius Rex [consul, 686], iv. 34s,
349. 350
INDEX
561
Marcomani, ill. 422 ».; v. 31 n.
Mariana, colony in Corsica, iii. 479
Maritime affairs, Rome's original mari-
time importance, i. 59 /. Plundering
of the Latin coasts by pirates, ii. 40 /.
Their commerce limited by unfavourable
treaties with Carthage and Tarentum,
ii. 41, 42. Roman fortification and
securing of the Italian coast-towns, ii.
42. Gradual decline of the Roman
fleet, ii. 40. Efforts to revive it, ii. 43
f. Fleets in first Punic war, ii. 173-
'75> 'Ss, 186, 194 /., 199, 200. Fleet
neglected by the Romans, iv. 169 ; v.
361. In the Social war, formed with
the help of the maritime cities of Asia
Minor, iii. 507. Sailing ships, i. 254 «. ;
v. 15, 16. Compare Piracy.
C. Marius, his character and career, iii.
452-454- Superstition, iii. 47S ; iv.
208 f. Political position, iii. 454 f.
Compared with Pompeius, iv. 204. His
relationship with Caesar, iv. 279. Tri-
bune of the people [635], iii. 375. In
the Jugurthine war, iii. 39S, 400 /. 404-
409. Consul, iii. 404 f. In Teutonic
war, iii. 441-446. In Cimbric war, iii.
448-450. His military reforms, iii. 413,
443) 456-462. Political projects, iii.
462 /. For the sixth time consul, iii.
467 - 476. Politically annihilated, iii.
477. Goes to the east, iii. 477 ; iv.
19 «. Returns, iii. 477. In Social war,
iii. 504, 508, 511, 512, 520. Discon-
tented, iii. 529. Nominated commander-
in-chief against Mithradates, iii. 536.
Driven from Rome by Sulla, iii. 539.
Flight, iii. 539. Returns, iv. 60 /.
His reign of terror, iv. 66 /. Seventh
time consul, iv. 68. Death, iv. 69,
102 n. His ashes scattered, iv. 103.
Rehabilitation of his memory, iv. 460^
C. Marius the younger [consul, 672], iii.
530 ; iv. 81, 83, 84, 90, 102 n.
M. Marius, lieutenant of Sertorius, iv.
324, 329. Death, iv. 329
M. Marius Gratidianus, adopted nephew
of Marius, iv. 103
Marius Egnatius. See Egnatius
Marl used in Gaul, v. 13
Maronea, ii. 417, 465, 486, 488, 511,/
Marriage, religious and civil marriage, i.
73 «., in. Marital power, i. 30. The
connection without manus admitted in
lieu of marriage, ii. 65. Between patri-
cians and plebeians null, i. 334, 364.
Between patricians and plebeians de-
clared valid by the Canuleian law, i.
VOL. V
371. Between patricians and plebeians,
how regarded in aristocratic circles, i.
386. Relaxation of, iii. 121. Celibacy
and divorces increase, iii. 121 /. Mar-
riage in Sulla's time, iv. 186 /. Id
Caesar's time, v. 392
Marrucini, t. 146, 467, 482 ; iii. 501, 521
Mars, oldest chief god of the Italian
burgess -community, i. 67, 207, 210 /.
Temple in the Flaminian circus, iv.
257. Dance-chant in honour of, i. 287
Mars quirinus, i. 68 ». Sabine and Latin
deity, i. 69 n.
Marshes, draining of, iv. 168
Marsians, i. 146 ; iii. 100. Offshoots of
the Umbrians, i. n. Take part in the
Samnite war, i. 468, 480 f. Organiza-
tion in later times, iii. 501. In the
Social war, iii. 501, 511, 521
Martha, Cimbrian prophetess in the
Cimbrian war, iii. 454 ; iv. 208
Masks on the stage, iii. 156. Masks in
the Atellana, i. 191
Massaesylians, ii. 354, 382
Massilia, ii. 375 ; iv. 174 ; v. 16. Founded,
i. 183, 185 ; ii. 137. Naval power, ii.
40. Maritime stations on Mediter-
ranean coast, iii. 415, 419. Rela-
tions to Rome, i. 260 ; ii. 45, 384 ;
iii. 415 /., 419, 443; iv. 293, 509,
511. To Lampsacus, ii. 447 »., 469 n.
How far belonging to the province of
Narbo, iii. 272 «. Competition of
Roman merchants after Narbo was
founded, iv. 175. Its conflicts with
Carthage, ii. 143. Its position in second
Punic war, ii. 255, 292. Conquered
by Caesar, v. 227, 228. Its mint, ii.
387 ; iv. 181. Exempt from taxation,
iv. 158. Remains unaffected by the
general Latinizing, iv. 192 ; v. 10
Massinissa, character of, ii. 382./. Takes
part in second Punic war, ii. 322, 330,
33i, 3S4> 355, 356, 360. His conduct
after second Punic war, ii. 356, 360, 457,
492, 518 /. ; iii. 237 f. Death, iii. 251.
Table of his descendants, iii. 388 n.
Massiva, iii. 388 »., 395, 402
Massylians, ii. 354, 382
Mastanabal, iii. 251, 388
Mastarna, i. 159
Materis, Cimbric weapon, iii. 43a
Mater magna in Rome, iii. 41, 115; it.
209./ ; v. 445
Mater matuta, i. 209 ft.
C. Matius, author of a cookery book, v.
513
Matralia, i. aoo
I69
562
HISTORY OF ROME
Mauretania (Mauri), ii. 3S2 ; iii. 393, 404-
408 ; iv. 92 ; v. 291 n. Haunt of the
pirates, iv. 3ioyC
Maxitani, or Maxyes, ii. 137
Mazaca, iv. 316
Medama, i. 166
Medes in the army of Mithradates, iv. 28
Media, ii. 444. Independent, iii. 287,
288. Falsely said to be conquered by
Pompeius, iv. 437 n.
Media Atropatene, iv. 313
Medicine in Rome, iii. 193 ; iv. 254
Mediolanum, i. 423 ; ii. 228
Mediterranean, its significance in ancient
history, i. ■$/.
Mcditrinalia, i. 208
Medix tuticus, i. 315
Medullia, i. 125
Megacles, i. 19
Megalopolis, ii. 430, 480; iv. 242. In
Pontus, iv. 441
Megara in Greece, iii. 269 ; iv. 38. Sends
out colonies, i. 166
Megara in Sicily, Syracusan, ii. 206
Megaravicus defends Numantia, iii. 226
Melita, ii. 143
Melitaea, iv. 43
Melitene, iv. 315, 338
Melpum, i. 423, 427
C Memmius, iii. 393, 394, 465, 475 _
L. Memmius, quaestor of Pompeius in
Spain, iv. 296
Memoir-literature, iv. 250
Menagenes, iii. 276 n.
Menander of Athens, Attic comedian, iii.
141-147
Menapii, v. 37, 54, 58, 7a
Mende, ii. 426
Menenii, clan-village, i. 45
Menippus, ii. 453
Mercantile dealings, extent of the Roman,
iii. 86
Mercatus, i. 250
Mercedonius, L 370
Mercenaries, ii. 138.
Merchants, proper, why none in Rome, i.
261. Strive to acquire a freehold settle-
ment, ii. 82./C Mercantile spirit of the
Romans, iii. 89-93
Mercuriales, i. 138 ».
Mercurius, i. 214, 230, 255
Merula. See Cornelius
Mesembria, iv. 307
Mesopotamia, iii. 289 ; iv. 5, 315. Con-
firmed to the Parthians, iv. 406
Messana, i. 167 ; ii. 145, 203, 205, 213 ;
iii. 386. Campanians or Mamertines
there, ii. 18, 162, 163 /. ; iii. 309. Al-
liance with Rome and Carthage against
P5'rrhus, ii. 29. Maintain themselves
against him, ii. 32. War with Hiero of
Syracuse, ii. 38, 164 f. Surrender to
the Romans, ii. 165. Received into the
Italian confederacy, ii. 165 /., 167 n.
The city occupied by the Carthaginians,
ii. 169. These dislodged by the Romans,
ii. 169 f. Exempted from taxation, iv.
157. Mint of the Mamertines restricted
to copper, ii. 211 n.
Messapians, i. 455, 465, 466
Messene, ii. 317, 403, 439, 456, 459, 478
C. Messius [pleb. tribune, 697], v. 121
Metapontum, i. 170, 171, 173, 456, 465,
482; ii. 294, 336, 349. Stormed by the
gladiators, iv. 359
Metaurus, ii. 348
Metellus. See Caecilius
Metilii, from Alba, i. 128
Sp. Metilius [tribune of the people, 337],
i- 378
Metrodorus of Athens, painter and philo-
sopher, iv. 258
Metrophanes, Pontic general, iv. 338
Mezentius, i. 158
Micipsa, iii. 251, 258, 388 «., 389. His
son Micipsa, iii. 388 n.
Miles, foot-soldier, i. 91
Milestones, iv. 167
Miletopolis, victory of Fimbria at, iv. 47
Miletus, i. 174 ; ii. 412, 473; iii. 260, 507
n. ; iv. 15. Carrier for the commerce
of the Sybarites, i. 171
Milev, colonia Samensis, v. 303 n.
Milo, general of Pyrrhus, ii. 16, 17, 31, 37
Military service, length of, iii. 346./C
Milyas, district of, ii. 474
Mimus, v. 468-471
Mincius, battle on the, ii. 370
Minerva borrowed by the Etruscans from
Latium, i. 229. Temple of, at Rome,
iii. 136, 368
Mines, Spanish, iii. 20, 307. Macedonian,
iii. 21
Minturnae, naval colony, i. 493 ; ii. 4?,
49. Slave - rising, iii. 309. Marh;s
there, iii. 540_/C
C. Minucius \_praefectus annonae, 315], i.
376 _
M. Minucius Rufus [magister equitum,
537], ii- 283, 284/
M. (Q. ?) Minucius Rufus [consul, 644)
fights in Macedonia, iii. 429
Q. Minucius [praetor in Spain, 558], ii.
59°
Q. Minucius Thermus [piaetor, 705], v
207
INDEX
563
Minucius, confidant of Viriathus, iii. 225
Mirror -designing, Etruscan, i. 308; ii.
124
Misenum surprised by the pirates, iv.
355. Misenian Cape, i. 177
Mithra, worship of, v. 445.X
Mithradates of Media, son-in-law of
Tigranes, in the Armenian war, iv. 349
Mithradates I., the Arsacid, iii. 287
Mithradates II., the Arsacid, iv. 5
Mithradates of Pergamus, v. 279/!, 283
Mithradates V., Euergetes, iii. 281; iv.
6, 19, 20
Mithradates VI., Eupator, king of Pontus,
his character, iv. 6-10. Extends his
kingdom, iv. 12 /., 16-20. Allied with
Tigranes, iv. 18. Difficulties with the
Romans, iv. 21 f. First war with Rome,
iii. 523, 536 ; iv. 26-52. Orders a mas-
sacre of all Italians, iv. 31 f. Occupies
Asia Minor, iv. 29./C Occupies Thrace,
Macedonia, Greece, iv. 34-37. Loses
them again, iv. 42-49. Sues for peace,
iv. 48^ Peace with Sulla at Dardanus,
iv. 52, 305. Chronology of first Mithra-
datic war, iv. 19 «., 45 n. Armenian
tradition about it, iv. $if. Vanquishes
Murena, iv. 94 ./C Extends his empire
on the Black Sea, iv. 318. Alliance
with the pirates and with Sertorius, iv.
300, 314, 322 f. Organizes his army
after Roman model, iv. 318. Second
war with Rome, iv. 320 f. Victorious
near Chalcedon, iv. 326. Besieges
Cyzicus in vain, iv. 327./C Driven back
to Pontus, iv. 330. Defeated near
Cabira, iv. 331./ Flight to Armenia, iv.
332 f. Induces Tigranes to continue
the war, iv. 343. Forms a new army,
iy- 343 /• Defeats the Romans at Ziela
and regains Pontus, iv. 349^ Variance
with Tigranes, iv. 406. War with
Pompeius, iv. 407 ./C Defeated at Nico-
polis, iv. 409. Breach with Tigranes,
iv. 410 f. Crosses the Phasis, iv. 411.
Goes to Panticapaeum, iv. 417. Revolt
against him, iv. 418./C Death, iv. 420.
His gold coinage, iv. 181
Mithradates, son of Mithradates VI.,
Eupator, iv. 32, 47, 95
Mithradates, king of Parthia, v. 151
Mithrobarzanes, Armenian general, iv.
339
Mnasippus the Boeotian, iii. 264
Moenici, meaning of the word, i. 91
Molochath, ii. 282 ; iii. 387, 406, 410
Molottians, ii. 502, 517
Money of the Greek colonies in Italy
and Sicily, i. 166. Cast copper money
appears in Rome at the time of the
Decemvirs, and spreads thence over
Italy, ii. 78, 79. Etrusco-Umbrian and
East-Italian cast copper money, ii. 79.
Etruscan silver money of the oldest
times, i. 306. Proportional ratio of
copper to silver, ii. 79. Silver money
of Lower Italy, ii. 79. Artistic value of
the cast copper coinage, ii. 124. Mone-
tary unity of Italy, ii. 87. System of
the denarius, ii. 87. Debasing of the
coin during second Punic war, ii. 343.
Later coinage, iii. 87 f.\ iv. 178-183.
Copper money restricted to small change,
iv. 179. Diffusion of the Roman money,
iii. 88 f. In Sicily, ii. ■zio/. ; iii. 87./C
In Spain, ii. 385^, 393 ; iii. 87. In the
territory of the Po, iii. 87. Local, v.
436,/C Traffic in gold bars, iv. 179 ; ▼.
435. Coinage of gold not permitted in
the provinces, iv. i8» f. Caesar intro-
duces a gold currency, v. 437. Token
money (plated denarii), iii. 485 ; iv. 180.
Denarii of Scaurus, iv. 432. Of Pom-
peius, iv. 444. Money dealings mono-
polized by the capital, iv. 173 /. ; y.
380, 409,/C Coins of the Italians in the
Social war, iii. 505, 524 n.
Money-changers. See Argentarius
Moneyed aristocracy, iii. 93 f.
Mons sacer, i. 348
Montani, i. 68, 139
Months, names of, everywhere come into
use only after the introduction of the
solar year, and thence recent in Italy, L
269 f. Roman, i. 269, 270
Morgantia, iii. 384
Morges, i. 40
Morimene, iv. 439
Morini, v. 54, 58
Mortgage, unknown in early times, L 204
Motya, ii. 143. Punic, i. 186
Mourning, time of, abridged after the
battle of Cannae, ii. 298. After the
battle of Arausio, iii. 438
P. Mucius Scaevola [consul, 621], iii. 319,
320, 325, 327, 334, 338. Private life, iv.
258. Historian, iv. 248
Q. Mucius Scaevola [consul, 659], iii.
481, 497 ; iv. 69, 84, 102 »., 205. Juri-
dical writer, iv. 205, 251, 256
Mu/ta, origin of the designation, i, 19a
Muivius/cns, iv. 167
L. Mummius [consul, 608], iii. 215 f,, 268
/., 270, 271 «., 274; iv. 257. His plays,
»v- 235 /-, 236 "•
Sp. Mummius, brother of Lucius, in the
$64
HISTORY OF ROME
Scipionic circle, iv. 420. His Epistles,
iv. 337
Mundus, i, 63
Munatius, legate of Sulla, iv. 38
Municeps, passive burgess, i. 121, 441.
Active right of election in the comitia
tributa, i. 441 n.
Municipal constitution, Latin, remodelled
after the pattern of the Roman consular
constitution, i. 442 f., 452
Municipal system, originally no closer
municipal union allowed within the
Roman burgess - body ; such a system
initiated when the Roman franchise was
forced on whole communities, as on
Tusculum, i. 448 ; ii. 48 n. • iii. 36.
Developed in Italy, iv, 130-135. Re-
gulated by Caesar, v. 405. Extended
to the provinces, v. 427^ Compare lus
Murder, i. 191
Music, Etruscan predominates in Rome,
i. 99. In later times, Greek, iv. 258. On
the stage, v. 472, 516 f. In domestic
life, v. 516 f. As a subject of instruc-
tion, v. 449, 517
Muthul, battle on the, iii. 399 f.
Mutina, burgess-colony, ii. 230, 267, 373 ;
iii. 26, 49, 291. Battle of, ii. 373
Muttines, ii. 313
Mutuum, i. 200
Mycenae, i. 302
Mylae, battle of, ii. 175.A
Mylasa, ii. 412, 413
Myndus, ii. 412, 446 ; iii. 279
Myonnesus, ii. 463
Myrina, ii. 413, 447
Mysia, ii. 473. Language of, iv. 11.
Mysians in army of Antiochus, ii. 466
Mysteries, systematic dealings in, iv. 208-
211
Mytilene, ii. 318, 406, 462 ; iv. 31, 48, 93,
94
N ABATAEAN State, IV. 316, 422, 426, 432
«. Petra, capital of the, iv. 426
Nabis, ii. 405, 431, 433. ^/- 45*. 480
Cn. Naevius, his comedies, iii. 150 /., 157-
160; iv. 219, 222. His fraetextatae,
iii. 177. His saturae, iii. 178 f. His
"Punic War," iii. 179./C, 184, 186; iv.
215
Nails fastened in the Capitoline temple,
ii. 100
Names, proper, Roman, i. 31, 78, 210.
fttruscan, i. 151 /. Greek cognomina
come into use, ii. 91
Nanaea, temple of, in Elymais, iv. 343
Naraggara, ii. 359
Narbo, iii. 374, 419 ; iv. 168, 176, 191 ; v
11, 16, 422. Exempt from taxation, iv.
158. See Gaul
Narnia, ii. 348. A Latin colony, i. 485.
Reinforced, ii. 366
Nasica. See Cornelius
Natural philosophy, influence on the
Roman religion, iii. 112 /.
Naupactus, ii. 459
Nautical loan = bottomry, iii. 92. Not a
branch of usury legally forbidden, iii.
97 «.
Naval warfare, ancient, ii. 173 f.
Navigation, oar-boats already known in
Indo-Germanic period, i. 20, 27. Sailing
ships probably derived by the Italians
from the Greeks, i. 179. Developed
earliest among the Gauls, v. 15. Earli-
est nautical terms of Latin, later ones
of Greek origin, i. 254 «.
Naxos, i. 165, 166
Neae, iv. 329
Neapolis, i. 175 ; ii. 173, 294, 303/ Old
relations with Rome, i. 260. Holds
out against the Samnites, i. 419, 455
456. Palaeopolis and Neapolis threat-
ened by the Romans, and therefore
occupied by the Samnites, i. 469. Siege
of the city by the Romans, and treaty
of the Campanian Greeks with Rome
i. 469. Attitude towards Rome, ii. 43,
53 ; iii. 24. In the Social war, iii. 502.
In the first Civil war, iv. 80, 91. De-
prived of Aenaria (Ischia), iv. 107, 126.
Rights of, in later times, iii. 519. Re-
mains unaffected by the general Latin-
izing, iii. 519; iv. 191 /.
Neapolis, the Carthaginian, iii. 25a
Neetum, ii. 313. Syracusan, i. 204
C. Negidius defeated by Viriathus, iii.
223
Nemausus, v. 423
Nemetum, iii. 416 n.
Neniae, i. 288, 293 n.
Neoptolemus, general of Mithradates, iv.
i7i a8i 3°, 38
Nepete, Etruscan, i. 157. Latin colony,
i- 432
Nepheris, fortress at Carthage, iii. 249,
251, 254, 255
Neptunalia, i. 208
Neptunia, colony at Tarentum, iii. 374
Nequinum, i. 485
Nervii, v. 14, 27, 30, 32. Contest of,
with Caesar, v. 51-54
Nestus, river, iii. 263
Nexum, loan, i. 195, 196. Originally not
a formal act, i. 200
INDEX
56S
Nicaea in Bithynia, iv. 329
Nicaea in Corsica, Etruscan, i. 186
Nicaea in Liguria, iii. 415
Nicaea on the Maliac gulf, ii. 431
Nicanor, ii. 418, 433 /.
Nicomedes II., of Bithynia, allied with
Mithradates, iv. 19, 21, 22. Death of,
iv. 24
Nicomedes III., Philopator, of Bithynia,
in the Mithradatic war, iv. 24, 25, 26/!,
29, 53. Dies, iv. 322. Scymnus dedi-
cates his book to him, v. 459 n.
Nicomedia, near Chalcedon, iv. 47, 329,
33'
Nicopolis, battles near, iv. 409/! ; v. 282.
Established as a city by Pompeius, iv.
441
Nicostratus, ii. 435
Night, fourfold division of, among Greeks
and Romans, i. 255 ».
P. Nigidius Figulus, v. 321, 448
Nile, iii. 213, 282. Battle at the, v. 280
Nisibis, iv. 315, 341, 348
Nitiobroges, iii. 435
Nobility developed from the equalization
of the patricians and plebeians, and the
successive admission of plebeian gentes
among the consular houses, i. 339 _/".,
393 /• '• i'i- 4"8- In possession of the
senate, iii. 7. In possession of the
equestrian centuries, iii. 8-10. Closing
of the circle, novi homines, iii. 14 /.,
298, 299. Hereditary character of, iii.
16. At the same time an aristocracy of
wealth, iii. 41 f.
Nola, i. 40 ; ii. 304, 305. Attitude during
the Samnite wars, i. 469, 475. Alliance
with Rome, i. 475. Attitude towards
Rome, i. 475 ; ii. 53 ; iii. 241. Under
Greek influence, i. 436 ; ii. 79, 90. Re-
mains faithful in the Social war, iii. 502.
Compelled to surrender, iii. 510. Be-
sieged by the Romans, iii. 522, 523,
536, 547 '» iv- 6°. 6l> 63- Taken, iv. 91.
Stormed by the gladiators, iii. 359
Nomentum, i. 49. Long time independent,
i. 125. About 370, member of Latin
league, i. 448 «., 450. Roman burgess-
community, i. 462. Dictator there, i.
442 ft.
Nonae, i. 243, 271
Norba, Latin colony, i. 445 ; ii. 49 ; iii.
36. About 370, member of Latin league,
i. 448 n., 450. Not a Roman burgess-
community, ii. 49. In the first Civil
war, iv. 84, 90 f. Treatment by Sulla,
iv. 107
C. Norbanus [pleb, tribune, 651], iii. 440,
441 «., 442. 478. 526. S3* ; >v. 74, 79i
80, 81, 87, 102 »., 340
Noreia, iii. 424. Battle near, iii. 434
Norici, iii. 424
Novi homines, iii. 15, 299
Noviodunum (Nyon), v. 45
Novius, composer of Atellan plays, hr.
231 «., 233, 234 n.
Nuceria, ii. 303. Position during the
Samnite wars, i. 469, 475. Peace with
Rome, i. 492. Under Greek influence,
i. 456. Slave rising, iii. 380. Remains
faithful in the Social war, iii. 502, 510.
Obtains burgess-rights, iii. 519. Stormed
by the gladiators, iv. 359
Numana, Syracusan, i. 417
Numantia, iii. 217, 219, 216-232, 396
Numa Pompilius, ii. 104, 107. Discovery
of his pretended writings, iii. 114
Numbers, odd, i. 271
Numidians, people and kingdom, ii. 381-
384. War with Rome under Jugurtha,
iii. 389-409. Internal feuds, iv. 93 f.
Numidians in the Roman army during
the Social war, iii. 507, 510. In the
first Civil war, iv. 93 f. Roman
merchants in Numidia, iii. 260. Exempt
from taxation, iv. 157. Numidian
marble, v. 514. Compare Massinissa
Q. Numitorius Pullus betrays Fregellae,
iii. 341
Nundinae, i. 250
Q. Nunnius [candidate for the tribuneship
of the people, 653] slain, iii. 467
Nursia, Sabine town, obtains civitas sine
suffragio, i. 492. Birthplace of Ser-
torius, iv. 281. See Sahines
Oats, iii. 64 n,
Ocilis, iii. 218
Ocriculum, i. 485
Cn. Octavius, guardian of Antiochus
Eupator, iii. 282 ./C Put to death, iii.
283, 296. Monument, iii. 284
Cn. Octavius [consul, 589, not 626],
builder of the porticus Octavia, iv. 257
Cn. Octavius [consul, 667], iii. 545 ; iv.
58./C, 62, 64, 65, 66, T02 «.
L. Octavius, legate of Pompeius, iv. 403
M. Octavius [pleb. tribune], colleague of
Tib. Gracchus, iii. 322, 356. Supersti-
tion of, iv. 209
M. Octavius, admiral of Pompeius, t.
235, 284, 285, 286, 289
October horse, the, i. 647C, tie
Octolophus, ii. 434
Odessus, iv. 307
Odomantice, iii. 361
566
HISTORY 01 ROME
Odrysians, ii. 493. Subdued by the
Romans, iv. 307
Odysseus, legend of, localized on the
west coast of Italy, i. 177 ; ii. 107-m
Odyssey, oldest Roman school-book, iii.
136
Oenia (Oeniadae), ii. 476
Oenomaus, leader in Gladiatorial war, iv.
357. 360
Oenotria, i. 24, 171
Ofella. See Lucretius
Officers, emergence of marked distinc-
tion between subaltern and staff-
officers, ii. 73 f. Part of the officers
chosen, after 392, by the people, i. 397 ;
ii. 74
Oil, supply of, for the baths of the capital,
introduced by Caesar, v. 365
Olbia in Narbonese Gaul, iii. 415
Olbia on the Black Sea, iv. 16
Olive, culture of, first brought by the
Greeks to Italy, i. 242. Its increase,
iii. 67, 80, 305, 307. Prohibited for the
Transalpine territory dependent on
Massilia, iii. 415 ».; iv. 171./C
Olympia, King Arimnus in primitive inter-
course with the Olympian Zeus, i. 180.
Temple presented with gifts by Mum-
mius, iii. 271. Emptied by Sulla, iv. 40
Olympus in Greece, ii. 396
Olympus in Lycia, stronghold of pirates,
iv. 313
Olympus, mountain in Asia Minor, ii.
471
Opalia, i. 208
Opici, earliest name given to the Italians
by the Greeks, i. 15, 27, 40, 168
Opiconsiva, i. 208
Opimian wine, iv. 17a
L. Opimius [consul, 633] takes Fregellae,
iii. 341. Opposes C. Gracchus, iii. 366,
3°9i 37*i 39°. 396^
Oppius, i. 63
Q. Oppius, against Mithradates in Cap-
padocia, iv. 29, 31
Sp. Oppius Cornicen, decemvir, i. 367
Ops, i. 2o3, 213
Optimatesand Populares, iii. 303./C After
Sulla's death, iv. 263 - 280. Under
Caesar, v. 315-324
Oracles, i. 222; iii. 41, 114. See Sibyl-
line oracles
Oranges, iii. 65 n.
Orchomenus, i. 303 ; ii. 396 ; iii. 266.
Battle of, iv. 44
Orestis, ii. 426, 436, 499
Oreus, |i, 3IQl 426, 430
Oticom, ii. 316
Oriental objects of luxury found in
Italian tombs, i. 253./C, 255^.
Oriental religions in Italy, iv. 208 /.
Oringis, ii. 331
Oroanda, stronghold of pirates,'iv. 314
Orodes, brother of Mithradates II. the
Arsacid, iv. 5
Oroizes, prince of the Albanians, iv. 413,
416
Orontes, iii. 213
Oropus occupied by the Athenians, it.
495 ; iv. 199
Orthography, long fluctuation of Roman,
ii. 114, us "• Development of a more
settled orthography by Sp. Carvilius
and Ennius, ii. 191 /. By Accius and
Lucilius, iv. 252. See Alphabet
Osaces, Parthian prince, v. 163, 164
Osca, iv. 300, 302, 304. Training institute
erected there by Sertorius, iv. 285 ; v.
416. So-called " silver of Osca," ii. 386
Osiris, iv. 210 ; v. 446
Osrhoene, iii. 287 ; iv. 315
Ostia, i. 60, 173. Not an urban com-
munity, but a burgess -colony, i. 124.
Seat of a naval quaestor, ii. 45. Em-
porium of transmarine traffic, iv. 174^,
177, 193, 209. Surprised by the pirates,
iv- 355- Roadstead sanded up, iv. 169^
Oxus, iii. 284, 288
Oxybii, iii. 415
Oxyntas, son of Jugurtha, iii. 510
Pacciaecus, iv. 282
Pacorus, son of the Parthian king Orodes,
v. 162
M. Pacuvius, Roman painter and poet,
iii. 2077C Tragedian, iv. 222, 223
Paelignians, i. 146 ; ii. 282 ; iii. 24. Take
part in Samnite wars, i. 480-482. Or-
ganization in later times, iii. 499. Share
in Social war, iii. 501, 504, 512, 522
Paerisadae, ruling family in Panti-
capaeum, iv. 15
Paestum, i. 455 ; ii. 295. Latin colony,
ii. 39, 42. Battle at, i. 46S
Pagani Aventinenses, L 138 n. ; fagi
laniculensis, i. 138 n.
Pagus, i. 45
Painting, ii. 121, 12a, 207 f.\ iv. 357; ».
515/
Palaeopolis. See Neapolis
Palaestina, conflict between Syria and
Egypt about, ii. 515. Assailed by
Antiochus, ii. 445. See Jews
Palatine, i. 62-65, 68 /., 137, 139. R#-
mains of the citadel-wall, i. 303 a.
Pales, i. 307^
INDEX
5«7
Pallantia, iii. 220, 229, 294, 301
Palliata. See Fabula
Palma in the Baleares, iii. 233 ; iv. 191
Palms in Italy, iii. 65. Frenches of, in
the games, ii. 91
Palmiis, i. 266
Pamphylia, ii. 471, 472,513; iii. 275, 280;
iv. 3C» 47, 3". 3T4, 323
Panaetius of Rhodes, iv. 203, 204, 214.
In the Scipionic circle, iv. 192, 220
Panares, Cretan general, iv. 351, 352
Pandataria, governor of, ii. 219 ».
Pandosia, i. 170, 466 ; ii. 19
Panium, Mount, battle of, ii. 445
Panormus, ii. 143, i78> lg6, 205, 211 n.,
213. Punic, i. 186. Battle of, ii. 186,
194. Mint restricted to copper, ii. 211
n. Exempt from taxation, ii. 213.
Capital of Roman Sicily, ii. 213
Panticapaeum, iv. 15, 17, 420
Paphlagonia, ii. 401, 471 '■> »'• 279, 280;
iv. 6, 24, 29, 33. Acquired by Mithra-
dates, iv. 19/, 21. Evacuated by him,
iv. 22, 49.
Papirii, clan -village, i. 45. Substituted
this form of the name for "Papisii"
after the consul of 418, ii. 115
C. Papirius Carbo, friend of the Gracchi,
>»• 335, 338, 34o, 34'. 342, 372
C. Papirius Carbo Arvina [praetor, 669],
proscribed by Marius the younger and
put to death, iv. 84
C. Papirius Carbo, brother of the demo-
cratic consul, a Sullan, besieges Vola-
terrae, iv. 91
C. Papirius Carbo [tribune of the people,
665], iii. 517, 524
Cn. Papirius Carbo [consul, 641], iii. 434./
Cn. Papirius Carbo [consul, 669, 670, 672],
iv. 58, 61, 74, 76, 81, 83, 85, 86, 87, 92,
102 n.
L. Papirius Cursor [consul, 438], i. 474,
480
L. Papirius Cursor [consul, 461], i. 490
Papius Brutulus. See Brutulus
C Papius Mutilus, leader in the Social
war, iii. 508, 509, 510, 523, 524 ; iv. 91
Partita, i. 208
Parma, Celtic population of, ii. 221.
Burgess-colony, ii. 374 ; iii. 26, 49, 271
».; iv. 168
Paros, ii. 417, 437
Parricida, i. 191
Parthenius, poet, v. 460, 465
Parthians, ii. 398. Foundation of the
kingdom, iii. 286 f. In the seventh
century of Rome, iii. 288./C ; iv. 5, 314
/■< 343* First contact with Romans, iv.
23. Allied with Pompeins against
Mithradates and Tigranes, rv. 405.
Differences with Pompeius, iv. 433,
435, 445 /• Expedition of Crassus
against, v. 151-160. Further conflicts
with, v. 160 f. Allied with the Pom-
peian party, v. 270. Their mode of
warfare, v. 155-158. Slave-recruiting,
iii. 316
Parthini, ii. 218
Parthyene, ii. 444
Pasiteles, iv. iyif.
Pastoral husbandry, iii. 74./, 307^ } V.
379/ _
Patara, ii. 462
Paternal authority, L 30. Restricted,
ii. 65
Pater patriae, iv. 483
Patrae, iii. 269 ; iv. 55
Patres conscrijiti, i. 281, 330
Patricians, the Roman burgesses, i. 8a.
Disappearing of the old burgesses, i.
112./C After abolition of the monarchy,
a privileged clan-nobility, i. 333./ Ac-
quire the government upon the abolition
of the monarchy, i. 336-338. Their
privileges as an order set aside, i. 370-
384. Their subsequent continuance as
an aristocratic class, i. 381-385. De-
prived by law of a number of political
rights, i. 385. Stability of the patri-
ciate, ii. 14, 15 «. Patriciate conferred
by Caesar, v. 337
Patronus, i. 79 ; iii. 38./: See Clientship
Paullus. See Aemilius
Pausistratus, ii. 461
Pay, paid first from the districts after-
wards from the state - chest, L 380.
Raised by Caesar, v. 366
Peaches, iii. 65 n.
Pear trees, iii. 67
Peculium, i. 75, 238
Pecunia, i. 238
Pedarii in the senate, i. 330
Pedasa, ii. 413
Pedigrees, family, ii. 104, 107
Sex. Peducaeus [tribune of the people,
641]. See Lex Peducaea
Pedum, about 370, member of Latin
league, i. 448 »., 450. A Roman bur-
gess-community, i. 462
Pelagonia, ii. 425, 508
Pelasgi, iii. 187
Pelium, ii. 426
Pella, ii. 508
Pelops, king of Sparta, it 317
Pelorus, river in the country of the Asiatic
Iberians, iv. 414
568
HISTORY OF ROME
Penates, i. 81, 209, 213, 216 ; iii. 186.
Their names kept secret, i. an, 212.
Temple of, i. 140. Inventions of
Timaeus as to the Penates, ii. no
Peneius, ii. 426, 427
Pentri, ii. 294
Peparethus, ii. 425
Perdueltio, i. 191
Peregrini. See Foreigners
Peregrini dediticii, iii. 24
Pergamus, town of, ii. 411, 462. Pontic
residency, iv. 30 _/C, 32, 47. Perga-
mene art-monuments, ii. 469
Pergamus, kingdom of, ii. 411-413, 461.X,
4691 474 /., 510-512; iii. 261,274-279,
288, 324. Roman domains, iv. 157
Perinthus, ii. 410; iv. 328
Peristylium, iii. 207
C. Perpenna, commander in Social war,
iii. 511
M. Perpenna, his conflict with the Thra-
cians, iii. 279
M. Perpenna, governor of Sicily in
Cinna's time, iv. 86, 92, 93, 287. Goes
to Spain to join the Sertorians, iv. 291,
294, 296. Assassinates Sertorius, iv.
302. Takes command of the army, iv.
303. Is taken prisoner and executed,
iv. 303
Perrhaebians, ii. 456, 486, 495
Persepolis, iii. 289
Perseus, king of Macedonia, ii. 488, 489,
490, 492-507. His library, iv. 213
Persians, relation to Carthage and the
state of things in the west, i. 415.
Persia severed from Syria, iii. iZZ_f.
Persius, i. 301
Perusia, one of the twelve towns of
Etruria, i. 161. Peace with Rome, i.
479i 49°.
Pesongi, iii. 276 n.
Pessinus, the high -priest of, iii. 276 «.;
iv. 438. Worship of Cybele at, iii. 115
Petelia, ii. 294, 300 ; iv. 363
Petra, capital of the Nabataeans, iv. 426
Cn. Petreius, centurion in the army of
Catulus, iii. 447
M. Petreius defeats Catilina at Pistoria,
iv. 485. Pompeian leader in Spain, v.
219, 220, 226. Goes to Africa, v. 286.
His death, v. 301
Peucini, iv. 14
fhacus, iii. 260
Phalanna, town in Thessaly, ii. 501
Phalaris, bull of, iii. 257
Phanagoria, iv. 15 ; iv. 419 ; v. 264
Pharisees, iv. 424y.
Pharnacea, iv. 332
Pharnaces I., of Pontus, iii. 277, 281
Pharnaces, son of Mithradates, iv. 31 «.,
419 ; v. 264, 282, 283
Pharos, ii. 217
Pharsalus, ii. 421. Position of, v. 258 *.,
259. Battle of, v. 261-263
Phaselis, stronghold of pirates, iv. 313
Phasis, iv. 13, 411, 414, 415
Pherae, ii. 429, 457
Philemon of Soli, Attic comic poet, iii.
T4T. i43 5 iv. 221
Philinus, ii. 156
Philippi, iv. 34, 44
Philippus V. of Macedonia : character of,
ii. 407-409, 487 /. Commencement of
reign, ii. 220. Alliance with Hannibal,
ii. 285, 292 /., 308, 316, 319. Aetolian
war, ii. 315. First war with Rome, and
peace, ii. 316-319. Carthaginian in-
trigues with, ii. 350, 354. His plan for
invading Italy, ii. 372. Expedition to
Asia Minor; war with Rhodes and
Pergamus, ii. 411 -413, 417/: Roman
intervention, ii. 413-419. Second war
with Rome ; landing of the Romans, ii.
417, 422./C Naval war, ii. 422/; Cam-
paigns of Galba, ii. 422-426 ; and Flami-
ninus, ii. 428-435. Peace, ii. 435. His
attitude during and after the war with
Antiochus, ii. 455/, 457 j^. 464. 477/-.
His fresh preparations against Rome,
ii. 485-487. Death, ii. 488
Philippus, the pseudo-, iii. i(>of.
Philistus, canal of, i. 417
Philocles, ii. 418, 430
Philodemus, the Epicurean, v. 459
Philology, germs of, ii. 114./C Developed
into grammar, iii. 191./I
Philopoemen, ii. 421, 452, 479, 482; iii.
270
Philosophy at Rome, iii. 192 f. ; iv. 254
Philosophy, Greek, iv. 196-204
Phocaea, ii. 461, 473 ; iii. 278
Phocaeans discover Italy, i. 165. Found
Massilia. i. 183. Are driven from Cor-
sica, i. 184. Settle in Lucania, i. i84_/C
Relations of, with Rome, i. 185, 260
Phocis, ii. 396, 430, 431, 437 ; iii. 269
Phoenice, ii. 217
Phoenicians, home of, ii. 131. National
character, ii. 131-134. Commerce, ii.
134 /. Contest command of the sea
with the Greeks, i. 183 f. In Italy, i.
163./C See Carthage
Phoenix, officer of Mithradates, iv. 419
Phraates, king of the Parthians, iv. 343,
406, 433-435 ; v. 151
Phrygia, ii. 398, 401, 471, 474; iv. 25.
INDEX
5*9
Given to Mithradates, iii. 281, 358 «.
Pontic satrapy, iv. 32./ Great Phrygia
united to the province of Asia, iv. 21.
Language of, iv. 16
Phthiriasis, iv. 151
Physicians in Rome, unknown till a late
period, i. 249. At first only Greeks, iii.
193. Low state of medical knowledge
in Rome, iv. 254
Picentes, Picenum, i. 146, 482; iii. 24,
36, 48, 58 /, 99 ; v. 207 / War with
Rene, ii. 39. Share in the Social war,
Hi 514, 521/ ; iv. 78/, 81, 85. Coin-
age, ii. 80
Picentes, Campanian, ii. 294, 365
Picentia, iv. 358
Pictones, v. 15
PiZum, ii. 72
Pilumnus poplus, L 90
Pinarii, ii. 107
Pinna, town of the Vestini, remains faith-
ful in the Social war, iii. 501/;
Pinnes, ii. 218
Pinus, said to be son of Numa, and ances-
tor of the Pinarii, ii. 107
Pipers, guild of, i. 286
Piracy, ii. 216-218. In the first half of
the seventh century of Rome, iii. 233,
290-292, 381/, 421 /; iv. 3, 4, 169.
Supported by Mithradates against the
Romans, iv. 28. In concert with Ser-
torius, iv. 282, 286, 298, 299. Increase
of, iv. 306, 307-309. Organization, iv.
309-312. Conflicts of Servilius with
the pirates, iv. 313/., 351 f. Share in
second Mithradatic war, iv. 322 /., 351
f. Campaign of Metellus against, iv.
353/ Pompeius sent under the Gabin-
ian law to suppress it, iv. 388-395. Suc-
cesses of Pompeius, iv. 395-399. Pom-
peius settles the pirates in towns, iv.
440. Subsequent regulations against
piracy, iv. 400-402. Revival after the
battle of Pharsalus, v. 2697C
Piraeeus, ii. 422, 427. Siege by Sulla, iv.
38, 39. 4i
Pirustae, iii. 422 «.
Pisae, ii. 374. Road from, to the mouth
of the Po, i. 162, 182. Road to Rome,
iv. 167
Pisaurum, a burgess-colony, ii. 374 ; iii.
25.49
Pisidians, ii. 450 ; iii. 275^ ; iv. 325
Piso. See Calpurnius
Pistoria, iv. 484, 486
Pitane, iv. 48
Placentia, ii. 267, 268, 269, 270, 272, 273,
347. 369. 37°. 372, 373 ; »v. 87, 167, j68.
Latin colony, ii. 230; iii. 49. Its Ius,
ii. 52 n.
Plastic art, its rise in Italy, i. 306 f.
Etruscan, ii. 120 f. Campanian and
Sabellian, L 121 /. Latin, ii. 122-124;
iii. 207./C
Plato, iv. 197
Plautius, legate, in Social war, iv. 63
C. Plautius Decianus [consul, 425], i. 460 «.
C. Plautius [praetor, 608 ?], iii. 222
L. Plautius Hypsaeus [praetor], iii. 310
M. Plautius Silvanus [tribune of the
people, 665], iii. 516, 517 »., 524
M. Plautius Lyco, Roman painter, iii.
208
Novius Plautius, ii. 82 n., 124 *.
Plautus. See Maccius
Plebeians, Plebes, meaning of word, i.
109. Arose out of the body of clients,
i. 109/1 Rapid growth in number and
importance, i. in, 113/1, 132. Weaken-
ing of the tie of clientship, and forma-
tion of a plebs, dependent only on the
king, as a second Roman community,
i. 114. Made eligible for military com*
mands, i. 121. Relation of clientship
to the kings not transferred to the
consuls, i. 319/ Position towards the
old burgesses after expulsion of the
kings, i. 327 /. Admitted to the curiae
thereafter, i. 328 /., 333. Also to the
senate, i. 329 f. Position in senate, L
330/1, 339. Acquire burgess-rights, i.
333. Importance of rights so acquired,
*• 339-/- Archives and treasury, i. 354 m.
Compare Patricii and Tribuni plebis
Plebiscitum, originally without legal force,
i. 353. Equal to law by Lex Pttblilia,
if previously assented to by the senate,
i- 360, 361. Unconditionally equal by
Lex Hortensia, i. 385
C. Pleminius, ii. 352
Pleraei or Paralii, iii. 427
Pleuron in Aetolia, ii. 478
Pleuratus of Scodra, ii. 422, 437
A. Plotius fights the Umbrians in Social
war, iii. 514
L. Plotius Gallus, teacher of Latin rhetoric,
iv. 216
Poediculi, i. 465 ; ii. 89
Poena, i. 32, 193
Poeni. See Phoenicians
Poeta, iii. 197 «.
Poetry, Latin, beginnings of, i. 284/ It*
slight success, i. 296-298. Oldest poems,
ii. 100
Police, urban, ii. 84
Pollentia in the Baleares, iii. 233 ; iv. 190
57o
HISTORY OF ROME
Pollii, clan-village, L 45
Pollux, i. 258
Polybius in the Scipionic circle, iv. 192,
220. His views, iv. 204^, 212. Char-
acter, iv. 242-247
Polyxenidas, ii. 460, 461, 462
Pomerium, its advance, i. 128. Its legal
significance, iv. 122. Extended by
Sulla, iv. 122 n.
Pomona, Flamen of, i. 216
Q. Pompaedius Silo, leader in Social war,
iii. 500, 501, 508, 509, 512, 524, 526
Pompeii, i. 469. Medix tuticus there, i.
315. During Social war, iii. 510, 522,
529. A Sullan colony, iv. 108, 109, 265
Pompeiopolis, iv. 441
Cn. Pompeius, his character, iv. 271-275,
384/, 444-44S ; v. 166/ Vainglory of,
434 «., 441 f. Surname of " Magnus,"
iv. 94. In Sulla's army, iv. 79 /., 85.
Propraetor in Sicily and Africa, iv. 95
y. He opposes Sulla, iv. 136 f. Yet
honoured by him, iv. 94, 137, 150. His
attitude after Sulla's death, iv. 287.
Conflict with Brutus and Lepidus, iv.
291. Compels the senate to send him
to Spain, iv. 292. Lays out a road over
the Alps, iv. 293. Contest in Spain, iv.
293-304. Returns from Spain, iv. 375.
Coalesces with the democrats and with
Crassus, iv. 377, 378. In Piratic war,
*v> 395-/- In Mithradatic war, iv. 404-
412. Makes peace with Tigranes, iv.
411. Defeats the Caucasian tribes, iv.
412-416. Makes Syria a Roman pro-
vince, iv. 428 f. Regulates Asiatic
affairs, iv. 436-441. His triumph, iv.
444. Attitude to the parties after his
Asiatic expedition, iv. 490-502. Coa-
lesces with Caesar and Crassus, iv. 504
f.\ v. 107-110. Marries Julia, daughter
of Caesar, iv. 514. Relations with
Caesar, v. 114./C Quarrels with Clodius,
v. 112 f. Administration of corn sup-
plies, v. via f. At Luca, v. 124-126.
Sole consul, v. 146. His second mar-
riage, v. 166. Dictatorship, v. 167.
Difference with Caesar, v. 167 /., 173-
190. Power and army of, v. 201-205.
Embarks for Greece, v. 211. Plan of
his campaign, v. 234 f. Organizes his
army in Macedonia, v. 237-244. Con-
flicts around Dyrrhachium, v. 250-254.
Battle of Pharsalus, v. 258-262. Flight
to Egypt, v. 262./C, 271. His death, v.
272 /. His wealth, v. 365
Cn. Pompeius, son of Pompeius the Great,
V. 266, 274
Cn. Pompeius Strabo [consul, 665], iii.
5", 5*3> 5i6, 520, 521, 522, 526, 535,
546 ; iv. 36, 61, 62, 64
M. Pompeius, lieutenant in third Mithra-
datic war, iv. 332
Q. Pompeius [consul, 613], against Nu-
mantia, iii. 227
Q. Pompeius, son of the consul of the
same name, of 613 [tribune of the people,
620], opponent of Ti. Gracchus, iii.
323/
Q. Pompeius Rufus [consul, 666], iii. 535,
546 ; iv. 102 «.
Q. Pompeius, son of Q. Pompeius Rufus,
»"• 535
Sex. Pompeius [praetor, 636], iii. 428
Sex. Pompeius, son of Cn. Pompeius
Magnus, v. 271, 274
Pompo, said to be son of Numa and
ancestor of the Pompilii, ii. 107
Pomponii, ii. 107
L. Pomponius, Atellan poet, iv. 231 n. ;
233
M. Pomponius, friend of the Gracchi, iii.
368
T. Pomponius Atticus, v. 382
Pomptine marshes, drying of, iv. 169.
Canal planned by Caesar, v. 376
Pons sublicius, i. 65, 137 ; ii. 105
Pontiae, a Latin colony, i. 476 ; ii. 42
Pontifex Maximus instituted, i. 324.
Chosen by the burgesses, iii. 57. The
choice re-committed to the pontifical
colleges by Sulla, iv. 115, 206^
Pontifices, a Latin institution, i. 218 ft.
A college of experts for making roads
and the Tiber - bridge ; entrusted also
with all public measurements and cal-
culations, especially the calendar, and
the relative superintendence of admin-
istration of justice and worship ; origin-
ally five in number, i. 218 «., 219.
Their number increased to eight ;
plebeians eligible, i. 385. Increased to
fifteen, iv. 126. Keep the roll of
magistrates and public records, ii. ioo-
102. Their edicts or so-called Leges
rcgiae, ii. 112. Chosen by the bur-
gesses, iii. 463. Co-optation reintro-
duced by Sulla, iv. 45, 206 f. In the
Municipia, iv. 133
Gavius Pontius, i. 470, 472, 491
Pontius of Telesia, iv. 86, 88, 90. His
son kills himself in Praeneste, iv. 90
Pontus, earlier history of, ii. 401 ; iii. 279 ;
iv. 6. Its condition under Mithradates,
iv. 12. Conquered by the Romans, iv.
332 /■> 347 /• * province, iv. 436.
INDEX
571
Anchovies from Pontus come to Rome,
iii. 123
C. Popillius, made to pass under the yoke
by the Helvetii, iii. 435
C. Popillius Laenas [consul, 582, 5S6J, ii.
5i6
M. Popillius Laenas [consul, 581, 582, 596],
a poet, iii. 178 n. ; iv. 229 «.
M. Popillius Laenas [consul, 615], iii. 227,
338
P. Popillius Laenas [consul, 622], iii. 326,
335. 356, 372 ; iv. 166 /.
Poplicola, ii. 105
Poplifugia, i. 209
Populares. See Optimates.
Population of the oldest Roman territory,
i. 61. At the time of Servius Tullius'
reforms, i. 122 /. Decrease of, caused
by the war with Pyrrhus, ii. 31, 55 «.
And by second Punic war, ii. 191.
Falling off in sixth century, iii. 101 f.
In the seventh century, iii. 314, 393-395.
In consequence of the Civil wars, iv. 177;
v. 392 f. Increase after the Gracchan
distribution of land, iii. 335, 345.
Numbers of burgesses and allies, iii.
493 /•> 495 *■ In Caesar's time, v. 368
f. Compare Census
Populonia, i. 154, 181, 357. Coins of, i.
182, 257, 306 ; ii. 78. The Greeks dis-
lodged thence, i. 181. Battle near, ii.
71. In first Civil war, iv. 91
Populus, originally the burgess-army, i.
90
Populus Romanus guirites, or quiritium,
i. 90 n.
C. Porcius Cato Censorius [consul, 640],
iii. 429
L. Porcius Cato [consul, 665], iii. 514,
520, 530 ; iv. 103 «.
M. Porcius Cato [consul, 559 ; censor,
570], character, iii. 45-47. Political
tendencies, iii. 48-55. A novus homo,
iii. 18. In Spanish war, ii. 390. Share
in war with Antiochus, ii. 457 f. As
consular military tribune, iii. 43, 43.
As governor, iii. 30. His strict admin-
istration of justice, iii. 30, 31. Protects
the Spaniards, iii. 33. Censorship, iii.
zx, 19, 206. Taxes luxury-slaves and
other articles of luxury, iii. 122. Builds
the first Roman Basilica, iii. 207. Pro-
poses an increase of the horses of the
equites, iii. 9 «., 49. Reprimands the
equites, iii. 10. Breach with Scipio,
iii. 43. Opposes distribution of corn in
Rome, iii. 76. Impeaches Galba, iii.
320. Commissioner to Carthage, iii.
238. His death, iii. 251. His estimate
of Hamilcar, ii. 237./! ; of Scipio Aemi-
lianus, iii. 251. Opinior-s respecting
farmers and the mercantile classes, iii.
97. On woman, iii. 118. On Socrates,
iii. 114, 192. On the Istrian war, iii.
43. As to the Rhodians, ii. 515. Re-
specting the Celts, i. 420. On the
acquisition of wealth, iii. 89. On wills,
iii. 90. On money-lending, iii. 96.
Other sayings of, ii. 200 ; iii. 21, 40, 55,
93, 124, 398. His private life, iii. 117.
120, 152. Reads Thucydides and other
Greek historians, iii. 189. A poet, iii.
179. The first Latin prose historian,
iii. 185, 186, 187; iv. 250. Collects his
speeches and letters, iii. 250, 315.
Manuals by, iii. 37 n., 192 ./C, 194, 195 ;
iv. 3ii. Cato and Hellenism, iii. 213,
218. Cato and new worships, iii. 116.
Judgment on the Greek philosophers, i.
192 /., 199. On Greek rhetoric, iii.
199, 218. Upon medicine, iii. 193.
On Greek literature, iii. 196. On the
Roman poets, ii. 98
M. Porcius Cato Licinianus [t about
600], author of juristic works, iv. 255
M. Porcius Cato Uticensis, his character,
iv. 454 f. Opponent of Pompeius, iv.
493) 497, 498> 511) 5l6 /■ Leader of
the aristocracy, v. 134 f. Attitude in
reference to Catilina's conspiracy, iv.
482. Re - establishment of the Sem-
pronian corn-largesses on his proposal,
iv. 490; v. 361. Mission to Cyprus, iv.
45°> 5*7 ./• Return to Rome, v. 129 «.,
134. Fights against the Caesarians,
v. 230, 240 /. After the battle of Phar-
salus, v. 266, 267. In Africa, v. 287,
288, 289, 296. Death, v. 299, 300
Porsena, king of Clusium, i. 414, 424
Port dues, i. 60, 92. Lowered, i. 343.
Abolished by Metellus Nepos, iv. 502.
Re-established by Caesar, iv. 503
Portunalia, i. 208
Posidonia, i. 170, 171, 173, 456
Possession only protected by law at a
later period, ii. 68
Possessiones. See Domains
A. Postumius [dictator or consul, 255 (?),
258 (?) ], victor at Lake Regillus, i. 438
A. Postumius Albinus [consul, 603], iii.
204 ; iv. 193, 248
A. Postumius Albinus [consul, 655J
defeated by Jugurtha, iii. 395, 399, 412.
Put to death at Pompeii by his soldiers,
who believed themselves betrayed, iii.
529 ; iv. 102 n.
572
HISTORY OF ROME
Sp. Postumius Albinus [consul, 433], i.
47°
Sp. Postumius Albinus [consul, 644], iii.
395. I96f-
Postumius, Tyrrhene corsair, ii. 41
Potatoes, iii. 64 n.
Potentia, burgess -colony, ii. yj%f.% iii.
26, 49
Potters, guild of, i. 249, 253, 307
Pottery, early Etruscan, L 306. Articles
of, in Italian tombs, i. 253, 256 f.
Apulian, iii. 109. Clay vase from the
Quirinal, L 277 »., 287 n. From the
Esquiline, ii. 123. In Cales, ii. 123.
Imported from Greece to Italy, ii. Zof.
Praecia, iv. 269
Prae/ecti of the Roman isles, ii. 219 n.
Praefecti annonae, i. 377
Praefecti cokortium ', i. 440 «.
Praefecti inri dicundo in subject com-
munities, ii. 49, 67, 210 ; iv. 131
Praefecti sociorum, i. 440 n.
Praefecti urii, i. 83, 108, 321. Under
Caesar, v. 342
Praeficae, i. 299
Praeneste, L 49, 126. Legends as to its
foundation, i. no «., in. Rebels
against Rome, i. 447. About 370, a
member of the Latin league, i. 448 «.,
450. Must cede part of territory, but
remains in federal relation to Rome, i.
462. Execution of senators in Pyrrhic
war, ii. 18. Not a Roman burgess-
community, ii. 49, 50 ; iii. 25, 36. Art
at, i. 257 ; ii. 124, 127. Bracelet of, i.
277 «., 279 n. Sepulchral chambers, i.
253 "•> 3°2» "• 81. Obtains burgess-
rights though the Lex fulia, iii. 519.
Besieged by Sulla, iv. 84, 90. Terri-
tory confiscated, iv. 107, 126. Sullan
colony, iv. 108. Lot-oracle of, iii. 114.
Forbidden to be consulted, iii. 117.
Strained relations with Rome ; men-
tioned in Roman comedy, iii. 149
Praes, i. 195
Praesu/, i. 318 n.
Praetexta, iii. 5, 16, 45. Comp. Fabula
Praetores, older name of the consuls, i.
318. Afterwards as auxiliaries to the
consuls, with definite functions for
jurisdiction, i. 383 ; ii. 49, 66. Praetor
peregrinus, iii. 12. For administration
of the transmarine districts, Sicily, Sar-
dinia, and Corsica, ii. 209 f. ; iii. 12.
Two for Spain, ii. 392 ; iii. 12. Plebeians
eligible for the office, i. 383. Proposal
to extend their tenure of office to two
years, ii. 392. The increase in their
number insufficient, iii. 12. Functions
regulated by Sulla, iv. 118./C, 126 ; and
by Caesar, v. 343 f.
Praetors of the Latin towns, i. 440 «., 442
«-. 452
Praetors of the Italians in the Social war,
iii. 5°5
Praetoriani, their origin, iii. 460
Praetorium, iii. 460
Praetuttii, i. 146
Prandium, iii. 123
Precarium, i. 245. Applied to the state
domains, i. 345
Priapus, iv. 328
Priests nominated by the king, i. 81.
But not by the consuls, i. 324. Ex-
tension of their right to cancel state
acts on the ground of religious infor-
malities, i. 377 ; ii. 71 ; iv. 206. Colleges
of, partly for officiating in acts of wor-
ship, i. 21$ f. ; partly as skilled advisers
of the magistrates, i. 217, ■ziZf. Chosen
by the community, iii. 56 f Again
filled up by co-optation after Sulla, iv.
115, 206, 381. Special : see Flamines.
Primitive races in Italy, no trace of, i. 9
Princeps senatus, i. 331:
Principes, iii. 458
Prisci Latini, i. 42
Private life of the Romans, iii. 1 17-127
Private process. King interferes only on
appeal of injured party, i. 192. Settled
regularly by compromise, which the
magistrate interfered supplementarily
to enforce, i. 192 f, as in the case of
theft and iniuria, i. 193. In the form
of wager, i. 196, 197. Procedure in
execution, i. 197
Privernum, i. 453, 459 «., 463
Pro consule, pro praetore, pro quaestor*.
See Magistrate
Procuratio, iii. 91
Prodigality, declaration of, L 194
Proditio, i. 191
Proletarii, i. 115, 247. Admitted by
Marius to enlistment, iii. 459
Promercale, i. 60
Property is that which the state assigns
to the individual burgess, i. I93./C Idea
developed primarily as to moveables, L
193, 194. Free transferability, i. 194.
Of restrictions on property, servitudes
alone known to the earlier law, L 194
Propontis, ii. 405 f.
Proscaeniii7ii or fiulpitum, iii. 138
Proscriptions, Sullan, the first, iii. 540^,
543 ; the second, iv. 102 f. The de-
mocrats attempt the rehabilitation of
INDEX
573
the proscribed and of their children, iv.
4607:
Proserpina, i. 231
Provincial, at first the consular depart-
ments of duty, i. 401 ; ii. 215 «. ; iii.
271 «., 382 n. ; iv. 122 »., 289 «. ; v.
426./C Originally settled by free agree-
ment between the consuls themselves,
later by the senate, more rarely by the
community, i. 400./; Distribution of
the provinces by the senate, iv. 119 f.
Number of, in Sulla's time, iv. 120.
Number of, in Caesar's time, v. 406.
Provincial constitution, originally the
arrangement established for the trans-
marine possessions, ii. 209 ./C; iii. 30 f.
Provincial diets, ii. 210 n. Provincial
territory not regarded as domain, ii.
211. No commerchim and conubiuin
between provincial communities, ii. 210.
Autonomous communities in, ii. 211.
General census, ii. 211. Tenths and
customs, ii. 211,/C Spanish, government
of the, ii. 392-304. Position of the
governors, iii. 30-35. Jurisdiction, iv.
131. Presents and requisitions, iii. ^\f.
Controlled by the courts of law, iii. 32
f. By the senate, iii. 34. Provincial
quaestors, iii. 35. Relation of the pro-
vinces to Rome, iii. 361. State in time
of the Gracchi, iii. 381 /. Management
of the soil, iv. 172. Impoverishment
and depopulation, iv. 1767C Provincial
coinage, iv. 181./C; mostly copper small
money, iv. 181
Provocatio. See Appeal
Prusias, of Bithynia, ii. 318, 410, 455, 464,
473, 482 /, 486
Prusias II., of Bithynia, the "Hunter,"
ii. 499, 519 ; iii. 276, 277
Prusias on Olympus, iv. 329
Prusias on the sea, iv. 329
Pteleum, ii. 454, 458
Ptolemaeus Apion, iv. 4
Ptolemaeus XL, Auletes, iv. 319, 322,
452
Ptolemaeus Epiphanes, ii. 410. War with
Macedonia, ii. 410, 414-420. With
Syria and Macedonia, ii. 444^ Peace,
ii. 444, 445, 448. Betrothal with the
Syrian Cleopatra, ii. 445, 448 n. Mar-
riage, ii. 448 «., 450. Attitude during
the war with Antiochus, ii. 455
Ptolemaeus Euergetes, ii. 215, 399
Ptolemaeus Euergetes II., the Fat, ii.
516 ; iii. 234, 282 ; iv. 4
Ptolemaeus, the Cyprian, iv. 319, 322
Ptolemaeus, son of Lagus, ii. 6, 399
Ptolemaeus Mennaeus, ruler of Chalcis on
the Libanus, iv. 438
Ptolemaeus VI., Philometor, ii. 450 n.
War with Syria, and Roman interven-
tion, ii. 515, 516. Dispute with Ptole-
maeus Euergetes, the Fat, ii. 516 ; iii.
282. Roman intervention, iii. 234.
Death, iii. 284
Ptolemaeus Philopator, ii. 315, 318, 444
Ptolemaeus Soter II., Lathyrus, iv. 4, 313
Ptolemaeus of Commagene, iii. 287
Ptolemais, iv. 4, 316, 317
Pubiicani, origin of, i. 343. Favoured by
C. Gracchus, iii. 351,/C
Pudicitia patricia, plebeia, i. 386
Pulpitum. See Proscaenium
Punians. See Phoenicians
Punicum, near Caere, i. 163
Punicus, chieftain of the Lusitani, Hi. 215
Punic war, first, ii. 170-202. Second,
causes of, ii. 231-235. Carthaginian
preparations, ii. 232-245. Rupture be-
tween Rome and Carthage, ii. 245 f.
Carthaginian forces and plans, ii. 247-
251. Hannibal's march from Spain to
Italy, ii. 257-264. Italian war, ii. 266-
350. Conflict on the Ticino, ii. 268 /.
Battle on the Trebia, ii. 270-273. At
the Trasimene lake, ii. 277 ./C Marches
and conflicts of Fabius, ii. 281 - 286.
Battle of Cannae, ii. 287-291. War in
Sicily, ii. 310-314. War in Macedonia,
ii. 315-320. War in Spain, ii. 320-331.
War in Italy, ii. 333-351. Tarentum
taken by Hannibal, ii. 335^ His march
on Rome, ii. 338 /. Capua taken by
the Romans, ii. 339. Tarentum taken
by the Romans, ii. 342. Hasdrubal's
approach, ii. 346. Battle of Sena, ii.
348. Hannibal retires, ii. 349. African
expedition of Scipio, ii. 351-361. Battle
of Zama, ii. 359./ Peace, ii. 360./C, 362.
Results of the war, ii. 363-368
Punic war, third, iii. 241-245
Pupinii, clan-village, i. 45
M. Pupius Piso [consul, 693] unsuccessful
in Thrace, v. 104 /.
Purple brought from Tyre to Italy; iii. 85
Puteal, ii. 120 n.
Puteoli, i. 175 ; ii. 337. A burgess-colony,
ii. 365. Its custom-house, iii. 19. Em-
porium of transmarine commerce, iv.
174/. 177, 193. 209
Pydna, battle of, ii. 506 ; iii. 262. Its
historical significance, ii. 519./C
Pylaemenes, the pseudo-, iv. 19, 21, 22
Pylaemenids, royal family of Paphls*
gonia, die out, iv. igf.
574
HISTORY OF ROME
Pyrganion, piratic captain, iv. 354
Pyrgi, i. 178, 179. Its walls, L 304.
Stormed by Dionysius, i. 418. Burgess-
colony, ii. 42
Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, historical position
of, ii. 3-6. Character and early history
of, ii. 6-9. Seizes Corcyra, i. 401.
Tarentum submits to, ii. 15. His re-
iources for war, ii. 16 /. Difficulties
with Tarentum, ii. 17. War with Rome,
ii. 18 /. Battle near Heraclea, ii. 19 f.
Attempts at peace, ii. 21 /. March to
Campania and Latium, ii. 23. Second
Italian campaign, ii. 24-28. Battle near
Ausculum, ii. 2S_/C Sicilian expedition,
ii. 28-34. Renewal of the war in Italy,
ii. 35. Battle near Beneventum, ii. 36-
Returns to Greece, ii. 36. Death, ii. 37
Pythagoras, ii. 87, 91, 100, 107. Is
reckoned as friend of Numa, iii. 190.
Pythagorean league of friends, i. 172.
Influence of his doctrines on the Roman
calendar, i. 271
Pythagoreanism, New, v. 447./C
Pytheas the Boeotian, iii. 270
Pytheas, geographer, iii. 430
Pyt hium, pass of, ii. 506
Pyx us, i. 170
Quadrats, iv. 1 80
Qnaertio, ii. 68
Quaestiottes perpetvae, repetundarutn,
iii. 300. Organized in general by
Gracchus, iii. 348, 353. Reorganized
by Sulla, iv. 128-130. Under Caesar, v.
347^ Compare Jury-courts
Quaestors, oldest (pam'cidit), i. 191.
After abolition of monarchy, became
standing annual office, i. 321. Have
charge [as urbani] of state treasure and
archives, i. 322. Two new ones, to
manage the military chest, chosen from
the nobility, but nominated by the tribes
under the presidency of the consuls, i.
368. After 333, all the four nominated
by the comitia tributa, i. 375. In 333,
the plebeians eligible for all the quaes-
torships, i. 37s. Increased to eight, iv,
112 ft. By Sulla to twenty, iv. 112, 123.
Their functions, iv. 123 «. Raised by
Caesar to forty, v. 339. Quaestores
ciassici, four ; their appointment and
functions, ii. 45, 58, 207 ; iv. 112 «.,
123 ft. Provincial, iii. 34 ; iv. 123 ».
Quaestors in the Municipia,.iv. 133
Quaestus, iii. 94
Querquetulani, about 370, member of the
Latin league, i. 448 tu
Quinctii celebrate the Lupercalia, 67 «.,
215/
Quinctilii from Alba, i. 128
Quinctius [praetor, 611], iii. 223
L. Quinctius Cincinnatus [dictator, 315],
i- 376
L. Quinctius Flamininus [consul, 562], iii.
L. Quinctius [pleb. tribune, 680], iv. 371,
393 _
T. Quinctius, leader of the military revolt
of 412 (?), i. 460 n.
T. Quinctius Capitolinus [consul, 315], i.
376
T. Quinctius Flamininus [consul, 556:
censor, 565], character, ii. 428. Com-
mands against Philip, ii. 428-435. Re-
gulates Macedonia and Greece, ii. 436-
443; iii. 271. Negotiates with Antiochus,
ii. 449/;, 451, 453/ Visits Greece, ii.
453 /•< 459 /1 478, 480, 481. His share
in Hannibal's death, ii. 482. Conduct
towards Philip, ii. 488. Nepotism, iii.
17, 19. Early rise, iii. 17. Hellenism,
iii. 130./; Brings Greek art treasures
to Rome, iii. 10% f.
T. Quinctius Pennus [dictator, 393], i. 431
T. Quinctius Pennus Capitolinus Cris-
pinus [consul, 546], ii. 343
Quinquatrus, i. 207
Quindeceftiviri sacris faciuttdis. See
Duoviri
Qtiinquennalitas in Italian communities,
ii. 58/ 58 n. ; iv. 133
Quirinal city, i. 66-71. Vase, i. 277, 287 ft.
Quirinalia, i. 207
Quirinus, i. 207
Quirites, i. 68 ft., 69 n. Meaning of the
word, i. 90 rt., 93
C. Rabirius, iv. 458^
Racing, i. 294
Raeti, iii. 424. Etruscan, i. 154, 434
Ragae, iii. 289
Raia, mother of Sertorius, iv. 281
Ramnes, i. 53, 55, 56
Raphia, ii. 444
Ras-ennae, i. 150 rt.
Raudine Plain, battle of the, iii. 448 /.
Site of, iii. 448 «.
Ravenna, i. 156 ; ii. 220 ; iii. 517 ; v. 207
Readministration of the same office re-
stricted, i. 402
Reate, Sabine town, receives civitas sin*
suffragio, i. 492. See Sabines
Reatini penetrate into Latium, i. 14s
Rcciperatores, mixed Romano-Latin court
for commercial cases, i. 200
INDEX
575
Recruiting in Campania, i. 457
Recruiting system of Marius, iii. 457, 458
Rediculus Tutanus, ii. 339
Regia, i. 140, 141 n.
Regi/ugium, i. 209
Regillus, lake, battle at, i. 438 ; ii. 50, 70
Regulus. See Atilius
Ret, i. 190
Religion of the Etruscans gloomy and
tiresome mysticism, i. 232-235. Pre-
dominance of malignant and cruel gods,
i. 233. Interpretation of signs and por-
tents, i. 233^ Rudiments of speculation,
t- 234/
Religion of the Italians, its fundamental
principles, i. 32-33
Religion, Roman, abstraction and per-
sonification, i. 206, 2ii -214. At first
unaffected by the influence of Greek
ideas, i. 212, 214. Systematic classifi-
cation and ranking of the gods essential,
i. 212 f. Practical tendency of Roman
worship, i. 214, 225. Its character of
festal joy, i. 221 ; modified by the
frugality and sobriety of the people, i.
221./C Tendency to insipid ceremonial,
i. 222 f. Opposed to all artistic effort
and speculative apprehension of the
religious idea, i. 224^ But intelligible
to all, and preserving the simplicity of
faith, i. 227. From the practical ten-
dency of worship the priests develop
the moral law, i. 225 f., 227. Foreign
worships, i. 228-231 ; ii. ^o/. Oriental
■ 'igions in Italy, iv. 408 f. ; v. 445 /.
Faith becomes torpid owing to Hellen-
ism, iii. 109, \\\ f.\ iv. 195. Public
worship becomes more costly, ii. 71 ;
iii. 109 /. Superstitions, iii. 114 /.
Later state-religion, iv. 204-206. Under
Caesar, v. 346^, 430/:, 443"445
Religion, Sabellian and Umbrian, essen-
tially agreeing with the Latin, i. 23i_/C
Religious chants, i. 286/;
Remi, v. 50, 54, 85
Remus, ii. 105
Rents in Rome, iv. 184 «.; v. 385./C
Representative institutions unknown to
antiquity, iii. 330, 332, 506 ; iv. 135 ; v.
yitf.
Responsa, literature of juristic opinions,
iv. 255
Retogenes, Numantine, iii. 231
Reuxinales. See Roxolani
Rex, i. 81
Rex sacrorum, i. 316, 324. Always
patrician, i. 385
Rhegium, i. 6, 266, 456 ; ii. 294, 333, 350,
365 ; iv. 362. Occupied by Romans,
ii. 12. Mutiny of garrison, ii. 18. Its
attitude towards Pyrrhus, ii. 18, 21.
Captured by the Romans, ii. 38. Ex-
empted from land service, ii. 43. Re-
mained faithful in Social war, iii. 502.
Retained, even after admission to
Roman citizenship, its communal con-
stitution, iii. 24, 519. Remained un-
affected by the general Latinizing, iii.
519 ; iv. 191/
Rhetoric in Rome, iii. 192 f.\ iv. 216^,
253/; v- 451./:
Rhine, the, German frontier of Rome,
v. 49 _
Rhoda in Spain founded, i. 186. Mas-
silian maritime station, iii. 415
Rhodes, ii. 319 ; iii. 234, 280, 292 ; iv.
16, 103. Its treaty with Rome, ii. 3,
46. Its position after the second Punic
war, ii. 406^ War with Philip, ii. 411,
412, 414, 416, 418, 420, 422, 438. Joins
in the war with Antiochus, ii. 446 f.,
45°> 435i 474- Its attitude during the
war with Perseus, ii. 494, 499. Hu-
miliated, ii. 513-515 ; iii. 274. Its wars
against the pirates, iii. 292. Resists
Mithradates, iv. 33, 40, 47. Rewarded
by Sulla, iv. 54. Exempt from taxation,
iv. 157. Seat of philosophic training,
iv. 199, 325. Rhodian school of rhetori-
cians, v. 455
Rhone, passage of, by Hannibal, ii. 255./C
Rhyndacus, battle on the river, iv. 328
Rice, iii. 64 n.
Road from Arretium to Bononia, ii. 374.
From Italy, through Gaul, to Spain, ii.
375. From Rome to Luna, ii. 375.
From Luca to Arretium, ii. 375. Com-
pare Via
Roads, construction of, ii. 85, 120. Pav-
ing of streets under Caesar, v. 374
Robber bands. See Brigands
Robigalia, i. 208
Robigus, i. 208
Rogatio, i. 94
Roma quadrata, L 69
Romances, v. 483
Rome, legends as to its foundation, i. 107-
iii. Attempts to fix the year of its
foundation, iii. 190. Site of, i. 53, 57^
Originally centre of an agricultural
community, i. 261. At the same time
emporium of Latium, i. 56-60. Gradual
rise of the city, i. 60 f. The Seven
ring - walls cr septimontium, i. 63 f.
Amalgamation of the Palatine and
Quirinal regions, i. 106 • 109. The
576
HISTORY OF ROME
united city walled in by Servius, i. 71,
136^ The seven hills, i. 139 n. Taken
and burnt by the Gauls, i. 429 f.
Threatened by Pyrrhus, ii. 23. Threat-
ened by Hannibal, ii. 338./ Occupied
by Sulla, iii. 539. Regained by the
Marians, iv. 65 f. Occupied by Sulla,
iv. 84 ; and maintained in the battle at
the Colline gate, iv. 89
Rome, ii. no «.
Romilii, clan-village, i. 45, 62
Romulus, the acquisition of the septem
pagi referred to him, i. 59
Romus and Romylus, ii. no n,
Rorarii, ii. 74
Q. Roscius, the actor, iv. 140, 236 ; v. 472
Sex. Roscius, v. 38s
Rostra, Roman orators' platform, i. 140.
So called as decorated with the beaks of
the Antiate galleys, i. 462./C
Round temple, ii. 120 «.
Roxolani (Reuxinales), iv. 14, 17, 18 n.
Rubi, iii. 522
Rubicon. See Italy
Ruiinus. See Cornelius
Rufus. See Caecilius, Minucius, Pom-
peius, Rutilius
P. Rupilius [consul, 621], iii. 310, 311
Rusicade, harbour of Cirta, iii. 391
Ruspina, battle at, v. 294 /.
P. Rutilius Nudus, lieutenant in the
Mithradatic war, iv. 326
P. Rutilius Lupus [consul, 664], iii. 503,
508, 511, 512 ; iv. 102 «.
P. Rutilius Rufus [consul, 649], iii. 398,
400, 401, 459, 481, 482, 483; iv. 112.
Memoirs, iv. 250
Rutuli, abodes, i. 444. Conflicts with
Rome, i. 135. Subdued, i. 445. Dis-
pute with Aricia, i. 447
Rye, iii. 64 n.
Sabellians, iii. 100. Have little inter-
course with foreign nations, i. 252, 283.
Position during the Samnite wars, i.
468. Art, i. 300; ii. 121./C
Sabine and Latin goddess, i. 69 «.
Sabines, ii. 224. Influence upon Rome,
i. 54 yC Penetrate into Latium, i. 143,
145. Fight with Rome, i. 134. Subse-
quently in but slight intercourse with
Rome, i. 444. Subdued by Rome, and
become civet tine suffmgio, i. 492.
Acquire full burgess-rights, ii. 48, 89.
Writing, i. 281
Saburra, general of King Juba, v. 232
Sacer, meaning of, i. 226
Sacramentum. Ste Actions at law
Sacrificial animals, how procured, i. 92
Sacriportus in Latium, battle at, iv. 83
Sadalas; king of the Odrysians, iv. 307
Sadducees, iv. 244 f.
Saecular games, iii. 125
Saepta Julia, v. 375
Saeturnus, i. 208, 213, 290 «.
M. Saevius Nicanor Postumus, teacher of
Roman literature, iv. 216
Sagaei, ii. 493
Sagras, battle on the river, ii. 70
Saguntum, iii. 226 ; iv. 294, 296. Founded,
i. 185. Allied with Rome, ii. 241. At
war with Hannibal, and is stormed, ii.
246, 247. Regained by Rome, ii. 320,
321, 384, 393. Lusitanians settled at
Saguntum, iii. 232
Salapia, ii. 341 ; iii. 521
Salassi, ii. 253, 258 ; iii. 416
Saldae, iii. 410
Salernum, a burgess -colony, ii. 39, 365.
Share in the Social war, iii. 514
Salii, Collini and Palatini, i. 68, 106 /.,
108, 217, 286, 287 ./C Always patrician,
i. 384^ __
Sallentini, ii. 89. Join Tarentum against
the Lucanians, i. 483. War with Rome,
ii- 39
C. Sallustius Crispus, iv. 489 n. ; v. 145.
His erroneous chronology of the Jugur-
thine war, iii. 398 n. Character of this
book, iii. 410 n. Fragment of the His-
tories, its date determined, iv. 297 n.
Salona, iii. 427 ; iv. 168, 306
Salt known to the primeval Indo-Germans,
i. 21. State monopoly of, i. 342 ; iii. 20;
iv. 156
Saltus, iii. 74
Salus, temple on the Capitol, ii. 122
Saluvians. See Salyes
Salvius, king of the slaves in the second
Sicilian slave-war (Tryphon), iii. 384
Salyes, iii. 417 ; v. 7
Same, ii. 476
Samnites, ii. 80, 280, 36s ; iii. 24. A
branch of the Umbrians, i. 14. Lan-
guage of, i. 14 f. Writing, i. 278,
282. Settle in the mountains of Central
Italy, i. 146. Legend of their wander-
ings, i. 146. Seclusion, i. 147. Absence
of sepulchral decorations, ii. 81. Federal
constitution without centralization, i.
148. Without effort after conquest, i.
148./C First treaty with Rome, i. 453.
Unaffected by Greek influences, i. 458.
Contrast with the Hellenizing Sabellian
stocks, i. 457 f. Samnite wars, i. 465-
481, 486-493. Share in the war with
INDEX
577
Pyrrhus, ii. 21, 25, 30. Submit to
Rome, ii. ■&/. Their league dissolved,
it. 53. Remain still associated, though
politically insignificant, iii. 499. Alli-
ance with Hannibal, ii. 29s, 300 f.
Their country desolate after the second
Punic war, iii. 24, 100. Acquainted
with Greek literature, iii. 196. Share
in Social war, iii. 501, 522, 523, 524.
Coins from that period, iii. 524 «. Their
demands after it, iv. 63, 64. Fight with
Sulla, iv. 63/., 82, &&f. Their punish-
ment, iv. 91, 108./;
Samos, ii. 406, 411, 446, 461, 462, 463 ; iii.
279; iv. 47. Pillaged by the pirates,
iv. 308
Samosata, iv. 341, 437
Samothrace, ii. 495, 507. Pillaged by the
pirates, iv. 308
Sampsiceramus, emir in Hemesa, iv. 438
Sancus. See Semo
Sangarius, river in Bithynia, iv. 30, 327
Sanigae, iv. 334
Santones, v. 15
Sarama, i. 23
Sarapis, iv. 446
Sardinia, Carthaginian, i. 186, 413 ; ii.
143. Assailed by the Romans, ii. 177.
Roman, ii. 205, 207. Carthage endea-
vours to regain it, ii. 308. Wars in, ii.
376 ; iii. 214. Lepidus' expedition to,
iv. 291. Occupied by Caesar, v. 230.
Taxation, iv. 158
Sardis, ii. 446, 474 ; iv. 45
Sarmatae, iv. 14
Sarnus, Nucerian river-god, v. 302 n.
Sarranus, i. 185 ».
Sassinates, war with Rome, ii. 39
Saticula, Latin colony, i. 475, 476
Satricum near Antium, Latin colony, i.
446. About 370, member of the Latin
league, i. 448 «., 450
Satricum near Arpinum, Roman burgess-
community sine suffiragio, different
from Satricum near Antium, i. 474 «.
Passes over to the Samnites, i. 474.
Punished, i. 474 /.
Saturn, i. 35 ; ii. 98. Led to alternative
chants, and thereby, in some measure,
to comedy, i. 288^ ; iii. 178./. After
Naevius' time = miscellaneous poems,
iii. 179. In the seventh century, iv.
237-242. Development independent of
the Atellanae, iv. 231 n.
P. Satureius, murderer of Ti. Gracchus,
iii. 326
Saturnalia, i. 208, 389 «. ; ii. 24 ; iii.
135
VOL. ▼
Saturnia, town in Etruria, i. 304. Battle
at, iv. 85/
Saturnian metre {versus Satumius), L
289, 290
Saturnus, i. 208, 290 «.
Saumacus, Scythian prince, iv. 17 ft.
Sauromatae, iv. 14, 20
Savage state, no trace of, in Italy, i. 9, 10
Scaena, ii. 97 ; iii. 138
Scaevola. See Mucius
Scaptia, about 370, a member of the Latin
league, i. 448 »., 450
Scaraiaez, Etruscan, i. 307
Scarpheia in Locris, iii. 269
Scaurus. See Aemilius, Aurelitu
Sceptics, iv. 197 /., 199
Sciathus, ii. 425, 426 ; iv. 35
Scilurus, Scythian king, iv. 17, 18 m.
Scipio. See Cornelius
Scodra, kingdom of, its war with Rome,
ii. 217 /., 508. Made tributary to
Rome, ii. 218 ; iii. 422. Annexed to
province of Macedonia, iii. 262
Scolacium, colony, iii. 375
Scopas, ii. 445
Scordisci, iii. 427, 428, 439
Scotussa, ii. 433
Scribere, i. 280
C. Scribonius Curio [consul, 678], iv. 307,
371. Lieutenant of Sulla in Asia, iv. 54
C. Scribonius Curio, partisan of Caesar, v.
183, 184, 187, 188, 230-233, 389, 507
L. Scribonius Libo, admiral under Pom-
peius, v. 235
Scriptura, i. 92, 248, 281. Subsequently
not demanded, i. 344. In the provinces,
iv. 158
Scutum, ii. 76 «. A Greek word, i. 254
Scylax, i. 435 ; ii. 108. Description of
the coast under his name, i. 177 <*.,
435. 455 } i>- 109 »•
Scymnus, i. 177 n. ; v. 459 n.
Scyros, ii. 437 ; iv. 329
Scythians, in what is now Southern Russia,
iv. 13 ft., 14, 17, 18. In the army of
Mithradates, iv. 20
Secession to the Sacred Mount, first, L
347 ; second, i. 366
Segeda, iii. 216
Segesta, ii. 145, 211 ft., 313
Segestica, or Siscia, iii. 427
Segobriga, iv. 301
Segusiavi, Roman estates in their territory,
v. 30
Seleucia on the Orontes, iv. 317
Seleucia on the Tigris, iii. 287
Seleucus, son of Antiochus the Great, 1L
448/, 463
I70
578
HISTORY OF ROME
Seleucus II., Callinicus, ii. 215
Seleucus, piratic captain, iv. 333
Selgians, iii. 275
Selinus, i. 183 ; ii. 145
Sella curulis, chariot-seat, i. 83, 189
Sellasia, battle of, ii. 220
Serao Sanctis, Sabine and Latin deity, i.
69 n. Temple on the Quirinal, i. 280
Sempronia, the sister of the Gracchi, iii.
463
A. Sempronius Asellio [praetor, 665] mur-
dered, iii. 530 /.
C. Sempronius Gracchus, iii. 326, 338.
Character, iii. 342-344. Member of the
land commission, iii. 323, 335. Quaes-
tor, iii. 341. Plebeian tribune, iii. 342-
370. Speeches of, iv. 251. Improves
the Italian roads, iv. 167. His fall and
death, iii. 366-370. Contrast between
the Sullan and Gracchan legislation, iv.
noyC
C. Sempronius Tuditanus [consul, 625],
chronicler, iv. 24S. " On the Magis-
trates," iv. 252
P. Sempronius Sophus [consul, 450], ii.
113. Subdues the Aequi, i. 484
P. Sempronius Sophus [consul, 486], iii.
126
.P. Sempronius Asellio, historian, iv. 250
Ti. Sempronius Gracchus [consul, 539,
541], ii. 304, 305, 333, 33s, 339/
Ti. Sempronius Gracchus [consul, 577,
591 ; censor, 585], iii. 31, 130. Sardinian
wars, ii. 376. In Spanish war, ii. 391
f. ; iii. 215, 318. Interference against
the freedmen, iii. 53
Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, character, iii.
317 - 320, 333. Quaestor, iii. 228.
Plebeian tribune, iii. 320-325. Agrarian
law, iii. 320 /. Death, iii. 325-327
Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, the spurious,
463,473/
Ti. Sempronius Longus [consul, 536], ii.
266, 270, 273
Ti. Sempronius Longus [consul, 560], iii.
44
Sena Gallica, maritime colony, ii. 12, 42,
49, 220. Battle of, ii. 348 /. In the
first Civil war, iv. 85
Senate originates in the clan-constitution,
and represents it, i. 96, 97/ Number
of members fixed, i. 97 f. Membership
for life, i. 98. Chosen by the king, i.
98. Its prerogatives : office of interrex,
i. 98 f. ; confirmation of the resolutions
of the community, i. 100 f. ; as state
council, i. 101 f. Had originally no
share in election of the king, i. 83.
Not legislating, but guardian of the
law, i. 101. Increase of its functions
on abolition of the monarchy, i. 329^
Of its political power, i. 337, 33E. Dis-
tinction, after abolition of the monarchy,
between the narrower patrician senate
(/aires), for the exercise of the aucto-
ritas, and the wider patricio - plebeian
body (patres conscripti) for giving their
consilium, i. 330. Right of consulars
to vote first, i. 330 f. The reference to
the clan-organization falls into abeyance,
i. 331. Number of senators, i. 331.
Chosen by consul, i. 331. Right of
former magistrates to be admitted to
the senate, i. 331. Acting magistrates
have a seat, but no vott, ', 331. Re-
vision of roll every fourth year, i. 331.
Plebeian senators excluded from debate,
i. 374. Their admission, i. 3S0-382.
Conducts the government after equal-
ization of the orders, i. 406. Right of
the magistrate to reject senators from
the list limited, i. 406 /. Establish-
ment of the right of past curule magis-
trates to a provisional seat and vote,
and to enrolment at next census, i. 407 ;
iii. 7. Exclusion of non-curule senators
from debating, i. 381, 407 ; iii. 7. Later
de facto powers of the senate : initiative
in legislation, i. 408 ; right of dispensing
from the laws, i. 408 ; nomination of
dictator, i. 402, 409; right of prolonging
tenure of office of magistrates, i. 409.
Its absolute control of the administra-
tion, especially of finance, i. 409 f. ; iii.
•jf. Political value of this institution,
i. 410/I Gradations of rank in, iii. 7 f.
Preponderance of the nobility in the
senate, iii. 8. Special seats in the
theatre, iii. 10. Insignia of senators,
i. 99 ; iii. 4, 5 ft. Its numbers accord-
ing to Sulla's arrangements, iv. 112;
and according to Caesar's arrangements,
v- 349/ Extraordinary supplement to,
by Sulla, iii. 541 ; iv. 112, 113 n. ; and
by Caesar, v. 339. Admission to, con-
nected by Sulla with the quaestorship,
and not with the aedileship, iv. 112.
Number before and after Sulla, iv. 113 ».
Censorial lectio abolished by Sulla, iv.
112, 125. But restored, iv. 380. Sena-
tors excluded from the equestrian cen-
turies, iii. 300, 350. Powers of ; its ini-
tiative in legislation formally confirmed
by Sulla, iii. 542; iv. 114. But again
abolished, iv. 380. Its right to give
dispensation from laws restricted, iv.
INDEX
579
456. Its supremacy limited by C.
Gracchus, iii. 352. Senatorial courts.
See Jury-courts. Decline and corrup-
tion of the senate, iii. 293, 294 f.
Legal enactments against the graver
abuses, iv. 456. Coteries or "cliques"
in, iii.293_/C, 298, 533- Arrangements of
Caesar, v. 339, 340. Opposition -senate
of the Italians, iii. 505, 506 «. ; as also of
Sertorius, iv. 284 ; and of Pompeius, v.
238 «., 289
Senones, i. 424, 427, 434. War with
Rome, ii. 10. Conquered by the
Romans and expelled from Italy, ii.
10, 11, 220
Sentinum, battle of, i. 489 ./C
C Sentius [praetor, 665?], iv. 34
Septem pagi, i. 58
Septetnviri epulones. See Tres viri
L. Septimius. assassin of Pompeius, v. 272
Septimontium, i. 63, 209
L. Septumuleius, iii. 369
Sequani, iii. 434, 443 ; v. 19, 25, 34
Sergii, clan-village, i. 45
L. Sergius Catilina, character, iv. 465 f.
Conspiracy of, iv. 466-482. Death, iv.
48s
Q. Sertorius, character of, iv. 281 f. In
the Marian revolution, iv. 58, 60, 61,
62, 67, 69. In the war against Sulla,
iv. 80, 81. In Spain, iv. 91 f. In
Mauretania, iv. 93, 103, 282. Becomes
general of the Lusitanians, iv. 282. His
struggle in Spain, iv. 283./C, 285/; His
organizations there, iv. 284 /. His
treaty with Mithradates, iv. 299, 324.
His contest with Pompeius, iv. 294-301.
His death, iv. 302
Servian constitution, a military reform by
equalizing the burgesses and meioeci as
to army-service and tributum, and trans-
ferring these obligations to all the free-
holders in the state who were capable
of bearing arms, i. 114-122. The work
of a reforming legislator, probably after
the model of the Greeks of Lower
Italy, i. 123
Servian wall, remains of, i. 303 n.
Servilii, from Alba, i. 128
C. Servilius Ahala [magister equitum,
315], i. 376
C. Servilius, commander in second Sicilian
Servile war, iii. 386
C. Servilius [praetor, 663] murdered at
Asculum, iii. 500
C. Servilius Glaucia, associate of Satur-
ninus, iii. 465, 466, 467, 472, 474, 475,
476
Cn. Servilius Geminus [consul, 537], ii.
273. 274. 279. 287, 289, 290
P. Servilius Priscus Structus [consul, 259,
278], i. 347
P. Servilius Vatia Isauricus [consul, 675],
iii. 382 n.\ iv. 138, 313
P. Servilius Rullus [pleb. tribune, 690],
iv. 472
Q. Servilius Ahala [dictator, 394], i. 431
Q. Servilius Caepio [consul, 614], iii.
224
Q. Servilius Caepio [consul, 648], iii. 376,
436, 437. 439. 440 «., 466, 471 n.
Q. Servilius Caepio [quaestor, 651 or 654],
iii. 471 «., 484. Falls in the Social
war, iii. 512
Servius Tullius. See Mastarna
Sestus, ii. 417, 448, 461
Setia, a Latin colony, i. 446. About 370,
a member of the Latin league, i. 448 ».,
45°
Settlement, right of, unrestricted in
Rome, i. in
Seusamora, iv. 414
Sextilius, lieutenant of Lucullus in third
Mithradatic war, iv. 339
C. Sextius Calvinus [consul, 630], iii. 417
L. Sextius Lateranus [plebeian tribune,
377. 378 ; consul, 387], i. 380, 383
Shingle roofs in Rome, ii. 86
Shoemakers, guild of, i. 249
Shofetes, ii. 147
Sibylline oracles, i. 229^, 291 ; iii. 41 f.\
v. 122./C
Sicani, ii. 143
L. Siccius Dentatus murdered, i. 366 f.
Siceli, ii. 143
Sicily, position of, i. 6. Its early trade
with Rome, i. 200./C, 258 /.; ii. 80, 210.
Its condition after the death of Aga-
thocles, ii. 28. Pyrrhus in, ii. 28-35.
Carthaginian rule in, ii. 137, 143.
Phoenician party in, ii. 156. Condition
of, before first Punic war, ii. 161. Sur-
rendered to Rome by Carthage, ii. 196,
204. Completely Roman, ii. 314. Sends
grain to Rome, ii. 344 ; iii. 77. Slavery
in, iii. 307-310. Occupied by Caesar,
v. 230. Communities of, obtain lus
Latinum, v. 364. Forms a closed
customs-district, iv. 160. Taxation of,
iv. 158, 161 «., 164 /. Two quaestors,
iv. 123 n. Privilege in judicial pro-
cedure, iv. 132. Coining, iv. 181.
Compare Slaves
Cn. Sicinius [praetor, 582], ii. 497, 499
L. Sicinius [pleb. tribune, 678], iv. 371
Siculi or Sicani, Latin, i. 26
58o
HISTORY OF ROME
Sicyon undertakes the Isthmian games,
iii. 273
Side in Pamphylia, iv. 311
Sidicini in Teanum, i. 458
Stdon, its decline, ii. 142
Siga, ii. 354
Signia, a Latin colony, i. 445 ; ii. 49 ; iii.
36. Perhaps about 370, a member of
the Latin league, i. 448 «., 450. Not
Roman burgess-community, ii. 49
Sigovesus, i. 423
Sila, forest of, ii. 38
Silarus, ii. 365
Silas, ruler of Lysias, iv. 430
Silo. See Pompaedius
Silvani, t. 208, 213
Silver supplanted in commerce by gold,
iii. 88. Etruscan silver coins of earliest
period, i. 306. Mines, Spanish, ii. 239,
393. Silver in the Roman coinage, ii.
87 f.\ iv. 178./C Its export to the Celtic
territory prohibited, iii. 95. Articles of,
in Roman households, i. 392 ; ii. 85,
153/ ; >v. 185./:
Simon Maccabaeus, iii. 286. Coins of,
iii. 286 «.
Sindi on the Caucasus, dependent on
Panticapaeum, iv. 15
Sinnaca, surprise at, v. 160^
Sinope, town, ii. 407, 408 ; iv. 6, 12, 16,
ao» 333. 334. 44°, 447- Pontic resi-
dency, iii 281. Colonized by Caesar, v.
425
Sinope, Pontic governorship, iv. 32
Sinti, iv. 50
Sinuessa, maritime colony, i. 492 ; ii. 42,
49. Slave-rising, iii. 309
Siphnus pillaged by the pirates, iii. 292
Sipontum, burgess-colony, ii. 365
Sirens, i. 177
Siris, i. 170
Siscia or Segestica, iii. 425, 427
P. Sittius, iv. 488 ; v. 295, 301, 424
Slaves, i. 30. At first not numerous, i.
247. Their increase ; Licinio-Sextian
laws enact that a certain proportion of
free labourers be employed by land-
lords, i. 381, 387 ; ii. 77 ; iii. 312. Stern
domestic discipline among, iii. 118.
Employed in rural labour, i. 345 ; ii.
77 ; iii. 68-71. Management of business
by, iii. 85 /. Increase of, iii. 313; iv.
177 /■'• v- 368/, 393./ Trade in, iii.
292, 306 /. ; iv. 174. Result of the
system, iii. 3°S /'. »v. 174 ; v. 341 /.,
394. Conspiracies and insurrections of,
in Italy, ii. 83; iii. 102, 309-311, 380/.,
36a /. Gladiatorial war, iv. 357-364.
In Sicily, first, iii. 309-311 ; second, iii
383-387
Slings, ii. 76 «. ; iii. 458
Smyrna, ii. 406, 446, 4S3, 461, 473 ; iv. 4s
Soani, iv. 416
Socii navahs, ii. 174
Socrates, Bithynian pretender, iv. 34
Sodalicia, See Collegia
Sodomy, i. igi
Sol, Sabine and Latin deity, i. 69 n.
Soli, in Cilicia, ii. 475
Solon, laws of, ii. 86. Their influence on
the Laws of the Twelve Tables, i. 362
f. ; ii. 65. Roman coinage from Solonian
pattern, ii. 79
Soluntum, i. 186 ; ii. 143, 185
Sopater, ii. 182, 422
Sophene, iii. 281, 285 ; iv. 5, 316
Sophocles, iii. 167
Sora, in the Samnite wars sometimes
Roman, sometimes Samnite, i. 453, 463,
475. 476. A Latin colony, i. 485
Soracte, i. 250
Sors, i. 229 «.
Sosander, iii. 276 «.
Sosigenes, Greek mathematician, aids
Caesar in his reform of the calendar,
v. 438
Sosilus of Sparta, ii. 244
Spain, Phoenicians in, ii. 142, 144. Under
Hamilcar, ii. 238, 239. Silver mines of,
ii. 239 ; iii. 214 ; iv. 157. A Roman
province, ii. 331. Culture after second
Punic war, ii. 384-387. Constant war-
fare in, ii. 387-391. Divided into two
provinces, Further and Hither Spain,
ii. 389. Conflicts there in the first half
of seventh century, iii. 215-232 ; in the
second half, iii. 415 /., 479. In the
first Civil war, iv. 92/. In the Sertorian
war, iv. 281-286, 293-302. Caesar as
praetor there, v. 6. Caesar and the
Pompeians in Spain, v. 219-227. Taxa-
tion, iv. 158./C Urban rights in, iii. 214,
232, 233 ; iv. 190. Coinage, iv. 181
Sparta, ii. 3, 318, 438-440, 451/. 480, 481 ;
iii. 265 f., 267, 268; iv. 38. Compare
Lacedaemonians
Spartacus, iv. 357-364
Spartocidae, ruling family in Pantica-
paeum, iv. 15
Spatium, i. 296
Speeches, literature of, its beginnings, iii.
189. In the seventh and eighth centuries,
iv. 250 ; v. 501-506
Spelt (far), chiefly cultivated in Italy,
i. 240
Spercheius, ii. 396
INDEX
58l
Spina, i. 143, 156, 278. Its traffic with
Corcyra and Corinth, i. 176, 179. Its
intercourse wirh Delphi, i. 180
Spoletium, a Latin colony, ii. 129, 279.
Jus of, ii. 52 n. Treatment by Sulla,
iv. 107 /.
Staberius Eros, teacher of literature, iv.
265 «.
Stnbiae shares in the Social war, iii. 510.
Taken and destroyed by Sulla, iii. 522
Standards, military, iii. 460
Stage, origin of the Roman, ii. 97^ ; iii.
138 f. At first for musicians, etc., of
all sorts, ii. 97 f. Censured, ii. 98 f.
Livius Andronicus substitutes Greek
drama for the old lyrical stage poem,
iii. 135 f. Comedy predominates, iii.
141. Under Greek influence, iii. 1417^,
147/?, 170, i76_/C Stage in the seventh and
eighth centuries, iv. 22i_/"; v. 471./C Dra-
matic literature, iii. 220-242 ; v. 471 f.
Tragedy, iii. 171-177. Graeco-Roman
comedy, iv. 222 f. National Roman
comedy, iv. 224 ,/C, 229 ./C The mime,
v. 4087C Compare Fabula
State loans, ii. 153
State treasure, iii. 20, 23, 88
State treaties at later period considered
invalid unless ratified by the people,
iii. 58
Statius Caecilius, ii. 371 ; iii. 162
Statues in the Forum, ii. Zdf.
Stenius Statilius, general of Lucanians,
ii. 9
Stesichorus, ii. 108 f., 109 «.
Stilo. See Aelius
Stipem cogere, iii. m
Stifendiinit in the provinces, iii. 259
Stoeni, iii. 426
Stoics, etymologies of the, iv. 203. Sto-
icism, iv. 1977C, 201-204 > iv- 442-/^
Stratonicea, ii. 434
Straton's Tower, iv. 316
Subulones, i. 300
Subura, i. 63, 64, 66, 68
Sucro, battle on the river, iv. 295., .
Suebi, v. 31
Suessa Aurunca, a Latin colony, i. 476
Suessa Pometia, i. 135, 445. In the
Aricine league, i. 445 «., 451. A Latin
colony, i. 445. Destroyed before 372,
i. 449 n.
Suessiones, iii. 416 ; v. 14, 24, 50, 51, 85
Suessula, i. 459 n. ; ii. 304
Suetonius, emendation of, iv. 469 h.
Sugambri, v. 31, 62
Sulci, v. 364
Sulla. See Cornelius
Sulmo, town of the Paeligni, v. an.
Razed under Sulla, iv. 108
C. Sulpicius Gallus [consul, 588] con-
versant with astronomy, iii. 194
C. Sulpicius Peticus [dictator, 396], i. 432
P. Sulpicius Galba [consul, 543, 554] ; ii.
3r8, 339. 4'9> 422, 423, 424, 425, 432, 453
P. Sulpicius Rufus, his political position
and character, iii. 531 f. First political
activity, iii. 442 «., 531. In the Social
war, iii. 504. His laws, iii. 531-534.
His death, iii. 540
Servius Sulpicius, general in the Social
war, iii. 512, 513, 521
Servius Sulpicius Galba [praetor] defeated
by the Lusitanians, iii. 220
Sun-dial, first in Rome, iii. 194
Sun, eclipses of, when recorded from
observation in the city annals, ii. 102
Sunium, ii. 396 ; iii. 383
Surface, measures of, i. 265
Surrentum, i. 181
Suthul, iii. 395
Sutrium, iv. 167. Etruscan, i. 157. A
Latin colony, i. 432, 479, 486
Swinging, i. 296
Sybaris, i. 166, 168, 170, 173, 416
Syphax, ii. 321, 331, 354, 355, 356, 382
Syracuse, i. 166 ; iii. 383. Heads the
Sicilian Greeks in the struggle with
Carthage, i. 416 /. Aspires to sove-
reignty over Sicily and Lower Italy ;
conflicts with Carthage, i. 417^ Seeks
the aid of Pyrrhus against Carthage, ii.
28. Besieged by Carthaginians, ii. 30./C
Relieved by Pyrrhus, ii. 32. Results
of these wars, ii. yjf- Its first relations
with Rome, ii. 40 f., 46. Its position
between Rome and Carthage, ii. mf.
Its territory after first Punic war, ii.
204. Siege by Marcellus, ii. 309-313.
Port dominated by the pirates, iv. 354,
362. See Asia.
Syrtis major, iii. 387
Table, Greek customs at, ii. 91. Luxury
at, iii. 122-124; iv. 185 /., 271; v. 378
/, 387/ ,
Tablinum, iii. 90, 207
Tabula, i. 28, 280
Tactics, Roman and modern, v. 198
Celtic, v. 26, 27, 65, 77y Parthian, v.
i55-i58_
Talaura, iv. 332, 349
Talio, i. 32
Tanners, i. 253
Tarentum or Taras, i. 166, 168 ; iv. 166.
Its rapid rise, i. 416. First aristocratic,
J82
HISTORY OF ROME
then democratic, i. 477. The most
flourishing seat of commerce and manu-
factures in Magna Graecia, i. 174. Its
commerce with Eastern Italy, i. 176./I,
252 ; ii. 80. By treaty closes the Adri-
atic to Rome, ii. 12, 42. Its resources
for war, ii. 17. Its mercenaries, i. 465
f.\ ii. 3. Its burgess-army, ii. 31.
Makes head against the Samnites, i.
455, 460, 466. Attitude during the
Samnite war, i. 468, 491. Supports (in-
directly) the Samnites against Rome, i.
478. Peace with Rome, i. 482/; Hesi-
tates to join the Lucanians, ii. 10, 12.
Attack of its mob on the Roman fleet,
ii. xif. Attack on Thurii, ii. i3_/C At-
tempts at peace of the Romans, ii. 14.
Submits itself to Pyrrhus, ii. 15. Re-
mains occupied during Pyrrhus' Sicilian
expedition, ii. 30 f. After Pyrrhus'
death handed over to the Romans, ii.
37 f. Its fate, ii. 38. Its relation to
Rome, ii. 53. Faithful to Rome in
second Punic war, ii. 294, 333. Taken
by Hannibal, ii. 317, 335. Retaken by
Rome, ii. 342. Ruined by the war, iii.
100. As the colony of Neptunia, iii.
374. Remains unaffected by the general
Latinizing, iv. 191^
Tarcondimotus, Cilician tetrarch, iv. 438
Tarpeian Hill, the, i. 137 «.
Tarquinii, home of the, i. 159. Banish-
ment of the whole clan, i. 316 ; ii. 105
Tarquinii, one of the twelve Etruscan
towns, i. \b\f. Aids Veii against
Rome, i. 426. War with Rome, i. 432
y. Treaties of peace with Rome, i.
433, 479- Art at, ii. 126
Tarracina (Terracina), v. 211. Tempor-
arily Latin colony, i. 446. Mentioned
in treaty of Rome with Carthage, i.
346 »., 450 /. Revolts from Rome, i.
461. Roman burgess-colony, i. 462 ; ii.
42. The tomb of Elpenor shown there,
i. 177
Tarraco, ii. 321, 329, 393
L. Tarutius, astrologer, v. 446
Task-work, i. 91, 316 ; iii. 22
Tatius, story of his death, i. 190 ». ; ii. 105
Taulantii, ii. 6
Taurians in the Crimea, iv. 17, 2a
Taurini, ii. 259, 268
Taurisci, ii. 226 ; iii. 424-428
Tauroentium (Tauroeis), iii. 415. Battle
off", v. 228
Tauromenium, ii. 161, 313 ; iii. 310.
Syracusan, ii. 204. Exempt from taxa-
tion, iv. 157
Taurus, ii. 472 ; iii. 275, 28a ; iv. 23
Tautamus, successor of Viriathus, iii. 226
Taxation, direct, unknown, i. 91. Priests
compelled to pay taxes, iii. no. Laid
on the provinces, iii. 295 ; iv. 1ST J. > v-
560 f. System of, iv. 164-170; v. 360
f. Employment of slaves in, iii. 307 /.
Compare Asia, Gaul, Africa, Macedonia,
tributum
Taxiles, Mithradatic general, iv. 41, 324,
33i. 339
Teanum Apulum, i. 474
Teanum Sidicinum, ii. 303, 340 ; iii. 492 ;
iv. 91 ; v. 208. Under Greek influence,
i. 456. Seeks aid from Rome, i. 458.
Left by Rome to the Samnites, i. 459 n.
Occupied by the latter, i. 464. Passive
burgess-rights, iii. 23 /.
Teate, town of the Marrucini, battle in
Social war at, iii. 521
Technical style, Roman, ii. 114
Tectosages in Asia Minor, ii. 401, 471
Tectosages in Gaul, iii. 443
Tegea, iii. 267
Telamon, battle of, ii. 225 f.
Telegonus, ii. won.
Telesia, ii. 281
Tellenii, about 370, member of Latin
league, i. 448 «.
Tellus, i. 207, 213
Telmissus, ii. 474 ; iii. 280
Temesa, i. 170
Tempe, pass of, ii. 429, 503
Temple, none in earliest Roman religion,
i. 224 f., 305. Tuscanic, originating
under Greek influence, i. 304, 305.
Wooden, not stone, i. 234. Relation to
Doric and Ionic forms, i. 308
Templum, i. 27, 225
Tempsa seized by robbers, iv. 364
Tencteri, v. 31, 37, 60
Tenedos, ii. 417 ; iv. 48, 329, 334
Tenths, Sicilian, ii. 212 ; iv. 158. In Sar-
dinia and elsewhere, iv. 158. Distinction
between tax -tenth and the proprietor's
tenth, iv. 158 «,
Terebra, i. 28
Tergeste, v. 103
C. Terentius Varro [consul, 538], ii. 284,
287-291, 296, 297, 298
M. Terentius Varro Lucullus regulates
as Sullan officer the northern boundary
of Italy, iv. 122 ».
M. Terentius Varro, v. 219, 227, 444, 483
492, 492 «.-494, 510-513
P. Terentius Afer, the poet, iv. 221, 324
229. In the Scipionic circle, iv. 220
P. Terentius Varro Atacinus, v. 416, 480
INDEX
583
Terina, i. 170, 454
Termantia, iii. 226, 227
Terminalia, i. 208
Termini Gracchani, iii. 33s ; iv. 167
Terminus, i. 127, 213
Territory of Rome, original limits, i. 58,
125. Boundary of the Tiber, i. 131 f.
Subjection of the towns between the
Tiber and the Anio, i. 125 f. Exten-
sion after the fall of Alba, i. 125 f., 134
f. Possessions on right bank of Tiber
lost, i. 414. Recovered, i. 419. Veii
conquered, i. 418, 425^ South Etruria
conquered, i. 432. Extension of terri-
tory east and southwards, i. 443-446.
Extent of, at end of Samnite wars, i.
492 f. After the Pyrrhic war, ii. 39,
46-49. Practically extended to the Po,
>«• 372/
Tesserae, tokens at first for the four
"night-watches," i. 255 n.
Testament. See Will
Teucer, son of Ajax, iv. 439
Teuta, ii. 218 ; iii. 421
Teutobod, iii. 444, 446
Teutones, iii. 430, 444-447
Thaenae, iii. 258
Thala, iii. 402
Thapsus, ii. 39,/C ; iii. 244. Exempt from
taxation, iii. 259. Battle of, v. 298.
Thasos.ii. 411, 415, 425, 438, 478. Thasian
wine, iv. 172
Thaumaci, ii. 427
Theatre, no permanent, in Rome, iii. 138.
Free admission to, iii. 139. In the
seventh and eighth centuries, iv. 235./T ;
v. 471./C Seats in, separate for the sena-
tors, iii. 10, 138 ; for the equites, iii.
351 ; iv. in, 386 ; v. 117. Building of
a stone theatre by Pompeius, v. 117, 471
Thebes, the Boeotian, ii. 432. Financial
distress of, iii. 265. Pillages the neigh-
bouring communities, iii. 265. Joins
with Critolaus against Rome, iii. 268.
Punishment, iii. 272
Thebes, Phthiotic, ii. 421
Theft, i. 192, 193. Its punishment miti-
gated, ii. 65. Of field produce, i.
191/
Themiscyra, iv. 33*
Theodosia, iv. 15
Theodotus, Roman painter, iii. 207
Theophanes of Mkylene, confidant of
Pompeius, v. 420
Theophiliscus of Rhodes, ii. 411
Theophrastus, ii. 44, 112
Theopompus, i. 436 ; ii. ua
Thermae. See Himera
Thermopylae, ii. 457 ; iii. 268 ; iv. 41.
Battle at, ii. 458
Thesaurus, i. 230, 260 n,
Thespiae, art-treasures carried off by
Mummius, iii. 270. In the first Mithra-
datic war, iv. 35
Thessalonica, ii. 500, 508 ; iii. 263. In-
scription of, iii. 428
Thessaly, ii. 396, 429, 438, 436, 457, 438,
476, 477i 48s. 498. 5°°i 5°2| 5°4. 5*7 i
iii. 261, 266; iv. 35, 41
Theudalis in Africa, tax-free, iii. 259
Theveste, ii. 139, 236
Thisbae, town in Boeotia, ii. 498, 501,
503 «.
C. Thoranius [quaestor, 681], lieutenant in
the Gladiatorial war, iv. 359
Thorius fights against Sertorius, iv. 284
Thracians, ii. 317, 43s, 448, 453, 475, 477.
Invade Macedonia and Epirus, iii. 426 ;
iv. 34. Invade Asia, iii. 423. In the
army of Mithradates, iv. 20. In the
Roman army, iii. 458. Thrace, iii. 260,
261, 262, 279, 414. Subdued by the
Romans, iv. 307
Three, the number, in oldest priestly
colleges, i. 54
Thurii (Copia), at war with the Lucanians
i. 454, 455, 466. Assailed by the Lucan-
ians, applies to Rome for aid, ii. 9, 10,
11. Captured by the Tarentines, ii. 13.
Fate of, in second Punic war, ii. 294,
336, 350. Exempted from land-service,
ii. 43. A Latin colony, ii. 52 «., 365.
Slave-rising, iii. 380. Stormed by the
gladiators, iv. 359. Chariot-races thence
derived, i. 296
Thyatira in Lydia, iii. 279 ; iv. 52
Tiber, i. 42, 56, 59 f. Its regulation
neglected, iv. 169. Caesar's project
for altering its course, v. 376
Tibur, i. 49, 126. In the Aricine league,
i. 445 «., 451. Revolts from Rome, i.
447. About 370, a member of the Latin
league, i. 448 »., 450. Obliged to cede
part of its territory, but remains in
federal relation with Rome, i. 462. Not
a Roman burgess -community, ii. 49;
iii. 25, 36. Obtains burgess-rights by
the Julian law, iii. 519
Ticinus, fight on the, ii. 268^
Tifata, Mount, ii. 338. Battle on, iv. 79
f. Temple of Diana at, iv. 308
Tigorini, iii. 435 »., 445, 449
Tigranes of Armenia, iv. 5, 23, 24, 49.
Alliance with Mithradates, iv. 18. Joins
him against Rome, iv. 27. His relations
with Rome, iv. 305./C Conquers several
5«4
HISTORY OF ROME
Parthian satrapies, Cappadocia, Syria,
and Cilicia, iv. 311, 315-318. His part
as " great-king," iv. 318. His complica-
tions with Rome, iv. 320 /., 323, 334-
338. His contest with Lucullus and
Pompeius, iv. 338-347, 404/ Variance
with Mithradates, iv. 406^ Open rup-
ture, iv. 410./C Suppliant to Pompeius,
iv. 411/
Tigranes, son of foregoing, iv. 406, 433
Tigranocerta, iv. 338 «. Founded, iv.
317. Battle of, iv. 339/
Tilphossian Mount, battle at, iv. 37
Timaeus, i. 435; ii. 1107C ; iii. 186, 189
Timarchus, satrap of Media, makes him-
self independent, iii. 287
Timarchus, Syrian envoy, bribes the sen-
ate, iii. 294
Time, basis for measurement of, i. 263
Timoleon, ii. 41, 161
Tin, trade in British, iii. 420 ; v. 17
Tingis, Greek, i. 187. Besieged by Ser-
torius, iv. 282
Tipas, king of the Maedi, iii. 428
Tisaean promontory, iv. 41
Tities (sodales Titii), i. 53, 53, S6> 2IS
Titinius, writer of comedies, iii. 164 /. ;
iv. 230
C. Titius, orator about 593, iv. 251. Ex-
cites in 665 mutiny against Cato, iii.
530. Drastic description taken from
his speeches, iv. 187 f.
Sex. Titius [tribune of the people, 655], iii.
480
Title -hunting in republican Rome, iii.
43
Titthi, Celtiberian tribe, iii. 216
Q. Titurius Sabinus, Caesar's lieutenant,
v. 55, 68, 69, 70
Tius, iii. 281 ; iv. 333
Toga, i. 89
Togata. See Fabula
Togati, oldest legal designation of the
Italians as opposed to the Celtic brae-
cati, ii. 59 ; iii. 164 «. ; v. 10
Tolenus, river in Latium, iii. 511
Tolerini, about 370, member of the Latin
league, i. 448 n.
Tolistobogi (or Tolistoagii), ii. 401, 469*1.,
471; iv. 325
Tolosa, iii. 409, 436 ; v. 8. Spoil of, iii.
436, 439. 44° «•
Tolummius, king of Veii, i. 425
Tomatoes, iii. 64 n.
Tombs, Etruscan painting of, L 308.
Ornaments of, ii. 81
Tomi, iv. 307
Torboletes, ii. 346
Torrhebi in Lydia confounded with the
Italian Etruscans, i. 155
Torture only applied to slaves, L 192, aos ,
Tota = community, i. 85
Tougeni, iii. 435 «., 444
Town-life in Asia Minor stimulated by
Pompeius, iv. 439-442
Trades in Rome, at first important and
honoured, i. 248. Guilds, i. 249. Ex-
clusion of artisans from serving in the
army by the Servian reform, i. 249 ,/C
Subsequent position of, iii. 84. Decay
of, in later times, iv. 173
Tragyrium, iii. 422
Trajan, the Emperor, treatment of the
Greeks, iii. 273 /.
Tralles, ii. 474 ; iv. 45
Transpadani claim burgess • rights, iv.
264, 457./, 469. 474. 512/; v« 131 »•.
421
Trapezus, iv. 12, 332
Trasimene Lake, battle at the, ii. 278 f.
Travels, scientific, iv. 245 n.
Trebia, battle on the, ii. 270 f.
L. Trebellius [pleb. tribune, 687], iv. 394,
398
C. Trebonius, Caesar's lieutenant, v. 228
L. Tremellius [quaestor, 612], iii. 263
Tres viri epulones, iii. no, Increased to
seven, iv. 126
Tres mensarii, ii. 343
Tres noctumi or capitales, ii. 66
Treveri, v. 32, 37, 72./C
C. Triarius, lieutenant of Lucullus, hr.
347. 348 _
Triarii, iii. 458
Triballi, iii. 425
Tribes of the clans (Ramnians, Tities,
Luceres), i. 53-56. Formerly communi-
ties, i. 85. Of little practical signi-
ficance, i. $6f.
Tribes, Servian, levy districts, i. 117.
Three of the Palatine, one (collind) of
the Quirinal city, i. 64 f., 106, 107.
Their order of precedence, i. 108 /.
Number increased to twenty-one : their
voting, i. 359 f. These new districts
(tribus rusticae) arose out of the clan-
villages, i. 45. Four new ones added
in the year 367, i. 432. Two others in
the year 422, i. 462. Two more in the
year 436, i. 463. Two more in the
year 455, i. 485. Increased to thirty-
five : the four urban ranking last, i.
396/ Intimate union of the respective
rural tribes, i. 399. Disorganization,
»»• 37-39
Tribunal, i. 140, 189
INDEX
585
Tribuni cehrum, i. 83, 90 ft., 317 n. Prob-
ably increased to six, i. 107^
Tribuni militum, i. 83, 90, 439, 440 n.
Why six in number, i. 107 f. Part
chosen by the community, i. 397.
Twenty-four nominated by the comitia,
iii. 13, 57. Qualification for the office
by proof of many years' service, iii. 13
Tribuni jnilitum consulari potestate ap-
pointed, eligible from both orders, i. 371-
374. Their authority equal, whether
patrician or plebeian, i. 371 n. Honour
of a triumph and ius imaginum refused
to them, i. 373./C Abolished, i. 380
Tribuni plebis, their institution, i. 349.
Arise out of the military tribunes, and
named after them, i. 354. Comparison
between consular and tribunician power,
*• 354 /• Not magistrates, and without
a seat in the senate, i. 355. Political
value of the office, i. 355 /. At first
two, i. 349. Subsequently four, i. 361.
Then ten, i. 362. Their right of inter-
cessio, i. 350 f. Criminal jurisdiction,
i. 350-352 ; iv. 127. Acquire the right
of consulting the people and procuring
"resolves," i. 353. Inviolable, i. 353^
Suspension of the office during the de-
cemvirate, and its abolition aimed at, i.
362. Restored, i. 368. Share in the
discussions of the senate : seated on a
bench near the door, i. 369. Obtain, after
equalization of the orders, the distinc-
tive prerogative of supreme magistracy —
the right of convoking the senate and
transacting business with it — and be-
come the usual organ of the senate, i.
403-405. Political value of this measure,
L 405./. Their re-election permitted by
C. Papirius Carbo, iii. 340 «., 344. Their
initiative in legislation restricted by
Sulla, iii. 542 ; iv. 116-118, 264. Restora-
tion of the tribunician power, iv. 371, 381
Tribuni at Venusia, ii. 51
Tributum, i. 92, 380 ; iii. 21. Laid upon
the freeholders, i. 115. Ceases to be
levied in Italy, iii. 303; iv. 156. In the
provinces, iv. 157 ./C
Trifanum, battle of, 459 «., 461
Trigemina porta, iii. 368
Triocala, iii. 386
Triphylia, ii. 396
Triumph, meaning of, i. 35, 296. Refused
by senate, granted by burgesses, i. 398.
Becomes common, iii, 43 f. On the
Alban Mount, iii. 43
Triumvirate, first, of Pompeius, Crassus,
and Caesar, iv. 378. Second, iv. 504^
Trocmi, ii. 401, 471
Troia, game of, i. 294 *.
Tryphon, king of Syria, iii. 286, 292
Tryphon, leader in the Sicilian slave-
rising, iii. 384, 385, 386
Tubilustrium, i. 209
Tuder, town in Umbria, iv. 91
Tullianum, i. 137, 302 ; ii. 119 ; iii. 409
M. Tullius Cicero, father of the orator,
iv. 194
M. Tullius Cicero, his character, iv. 470,
$16/. ; v. 132./C, 504/I His birthplace,
iv. 266. Opposes Sulla, iv. 266. Im-
peaches Verres, iv. 373. Defends the
Manilian law, iv. 397 f. Consul, iv.
470. Opposes the Servilian agrarian
law, iv. 474. Conduct during Catilina's
conspiracy, iv. 475, 478 /., 481-484.
Banished for his conduct therein, iv.
516-518. Recalled, v. 112, 118. Sup-
ports the corn-distribution of Pompeius,
v. 121. Opposes Caesar's agrarian law,
v. 124. Goes to the camp of Pompeius,
v. 237. After the battle of Pharsalus,
v. 265, 288. Submits to Caesar, v. 129,
132 f. Creator of classical Latin,
v- 455 / Asa forensic orator, v. 503-
506. Writes dialogues, v. 507-510.
Literary opposition to, v. 50(1 f.
Q. Tullius Cicero, v. 70./C
Tunes, iii. 249. Battle of, ii. 182,/T, 201
Tunes, Lake of, iii. 248, 254
Turdetani, ii. 385 ; iii. 220, 221 ; iv. 174
S. Turpilius, comic poet, iv. 229
T. Turpilius Silanus commands the
garrison of Vaga, iii. 402. Executed
by court martial, iii. 403
Turia, river, iv. 296
Turs-ennae, i. 155
Tusca, river, iii. 258
Tusca, town, iii. 238
Tuscan Sea, i. 181
Tusculum, i. 48, 58. Legends as to its
foundation, i. no »., in. In the Ari-
cine league, i. 445 »., 451. Helps the
Roman government amidst internal
troubles, i. 358. Revolts, i. 447./, 460.
About 370, a member of Latin league,
i. 448 «., 450. Forced to enter the
Roman burgess-union, i. 451. Obtains
full burgess-rights, ii. 48 n. Dictator
there, i. 442 n. Architecture, i. 302.
Tutela, i. 78
Tutomotulus, king of the Salyes, iii. 417
Twelve Tables, laws of the : their origin,
i. 361 f. Essentially a written em-
bodiment of the existing public and
private law, i. 363, 364. Restrict luxury,
586
HISTORY OF ROME
ii. 63, 81 f. Literal/ significance, ii.
112, 116
Tyndaris, ii. 184
Tyndaris, promontory of, battle off the,
ii. 178
Tyre, ii. 142
Tyrrheno-Pelasgians, their relation to the
Etruscans, i. 155
Ubii, v. 31, 61
Ulbia, ii. 177
Ulixes, whence derived, i. 258
Umbrians, ii. 224. A branch of the
Italians, i. 13 f. Language of, i. 12 f.,
16 /., 282; ii. 115. Writing, i. 278,
282. Migration, i. 39 /., 143 /. Their
original district, i 143-147, 158, 434.
Join Etruscans in surprising Cumae, i.
158. Share in the Samnite war, i. 480
f. Their attitude in the second Punic
war, ii. 347. Their agriculture, iii.
99. Position towards proposals of the
younger Drusus, iii. 486. Remain
faithful in the Social war, iii. 501.
Incipient insurrection, iii. 513 _/C, 519.
Repressed by Sulla, iv. 91
Vrban community contrasted with a
state, iii. 330 /C, 505./C ; iv. 132-134
Vrbanitas, v. 452
Uris, i. 47
TJrso, iii. 223
Usalis in Africa, tax-free, iii. 259
Uscudama (Adrianople), town of the
Bessi, iv. 307
Usipetes, v. 31, 37, 60
Usuarium, i. 60
Usury, i. 364, 389, 390. See Interest
l/sus in marriage, i. 113 n.
Utica, iii. 249, 392. Its relations with
Carthage, ii. 136, 140 /., 155. Offers
itself to Rome, ii. 207. Scipio's con-
flicts at, ii. 354, 355. Holds firm to
Rome, iii. 242, 243, 244, 245, 253, 259 ;
v. 287. Curio's victory at, v. 231.
Seat of the governor of Africa, iii. 259./C
Uxama, iv. 304
Uxentum, ii. 293
Vacca. See Vaga
Vaccaei, iii. 219, 220, 228, 229, 230, 232 ;
iv. 190, 297
Vadimonian Lake, battle at the, i. 479
Vaga (Vacca), ii. 383 ; iii. 402 ; v. 286
Valentia in Bruttium. See Vibo
Valentia in Spain, iv. 295, 296. Obtains
Italian municipal constitution, iii. 232 ;
Iv. 190
Valerius Antias, historian, v. 496^
Valerius Cato, teacher of Latin literature,
v. 480
C. Valerius Flaccus, Sullan governor in
Spain, iv. 93 ; v. 7
C. Valerius Triarius, Lucullus' lieutenant,
iv. 329, 334, 348
L. Valerius Poplicola [consul, 305], i. 398
L. Valerius Flaccus [consul, 559 ; censor,
570], ii. 4S7 ; iii. 47 /
L. Valerius Flaccus [consul, 654], iii. 467
f. ; iv. 72 n.
L. Valerius Flaccus [consul, 668], iv. 40,
43. 47. 7°> 72 «•> 98> I02 «•
L. Valerius Flaccus, lieutenant of Pom-
peius in Asia, iv. 413
L. Valerius Flaccus [praetor, 691] de-
fended by Cicero, iv, 73 «.
M'. Valerius Maximus [dictator, 260], i.
348
M\ Valerius Maximus Messalla [consul,
491 ; censor, 502], ii. 170 ; iii. 44 ».
Orders the first frescoes to be painted
in Rome, iii. 207
M. Valerius Corvus [consul, 406, 408, 411,
4I9» 454> 455]. >- 4°3. 459 «• i «H. 17.
Not called Calenus, iii. 44 n.
M. Valerius Laevinus [consul, 544], ii.
3°5» 314. 317. 4r5
P. Valerius Falto [praetor, 513], ii. 195
P. Valerius Laevinus [consul, 474]. ii. 19,
2i> 23
P. Valerius Poplicola, ii. 105
Q. Valerius Catullus, v. 140 /., 445, 481-
483
Vardaei. See Ardyaei
P. Varinius [praetor, 681], general in
Gladiatorial war, iv. 358, 359
Q. Varius [pleb. tribune, 663 ?], iii. 503,
516 ; iv. 67
Varro. See Terentius
Vascones, iv. 297
Vates, i. 286, 298 n.
P. Vatinius [pleb. tribune, 696], iv. 519 ;
v. 138, 285
Vectigo.Ua, i. 92
Vediovis, i. 137, 207, 212
Veii, i. 157. Rome's nearest neighbour
and chief opponent in Etruria, i. 157 f.
Contest with Rome, i. 134. Taken by
Rome, i. 425-457. Assignment of terri-
tory, i. 378. Colonized, i. 432. Art at,
i. 306 ; ii. 126
Velabrum, i. 63
Vclia, ridge between Palatine and Esqui-
line, i. 63
Velia (Elea), Phocaean colony, i. 166. Itt
old relations with Rome, i. 260
INDEX
587
elino, the, widened, ii. 85
'elites, i. 90 »., 118
elitrae, a Latin colony, i. 44s n. Op-
position to Rome, i. 447. About 370, a
member of the Latin league, i. 448 *».,
450. Revolts from Rome, i. 461. Severe
punishment, i. 462. Presumably re-
tained passive burgess - rights, iii. 23.
Terra-cottas, ii. 122. Volscian language
maintains itself there, ii. 122
ellocassi, iii. 444
enafrum, town in Samnium, iii. 509
eneti, in Italy, i. 156, 434; ii. 221, 224,
228, 371 ; iii. 424. Veneti in Gaul, v.
15. 16. 55-57
enus, ii. 71
enusia, iii. 492 ; iv. 166. A Latin colony,
i. 493. Reinforced, ii. 366. Popular
tribunes at, ii. 51. Attitude of, in Pyr-
rhic war, ii. 21. In second Punic war,
ii. 190, 295, 343. In Social war, iii. 510,
513. 523i 526
ercellae, near the scene of the battle of
the Raudine Plain, iii. 448 n.
ercingetorix, v. 75-91
■. Verginius, i. 366
'ermina, son of Syphax, ii. 383
'erona, i. 423 ; iv. 167
I. Verres, iv. 373 ; v. 408
reru, ii. 76 ».
rerulae, i. 485
esontio, capital of Sequani, v. 46 /.
resta, i. 26, 81, 209, 213, 216. Temple of,
Servian, i. 140. After Greek model, i.
142
'tstalia, i. 209
restals, i. 106, 192, 217 ; iv. 207
restibulum, i. 302
restini, i. 146, 482. Share in Social war,
iii. 501, 512, 522
resuvius, battle at, i. 459 ft.
'eterans of Marius, allotments of land to,
iii. 468. Of Sulla, iv. 108 /.
'.. Vetilius, against Viriathus, iii. 221
>. Vettius Scato, Italian leader in Social
war, iii. 509, 512, 513
\ Vettius, at the head of a slave-revolt,
iii. 381
rettones, share in Lusitanian war, iii. 315,
218, 225
fetulonium, one of the twelve Etruscan
towns, i. 161
feturii, clan-village, i. 45
r. Veturius Calvinus [consul, 432J, i. 470
'ia A emilia, from Ariminum to Placentia,
ii. 374 ; iv. 167
?ia Aemilia from Luna to Genua, ii.
374
Via Appia, i. 471. Continued to Capua,
i. 476. To Venusia, i. 493. To the
Ionian Sea, ii. 39 ; iv. 166
Via Aurelia, ii. 375 ; iv. 167
Via Cassia, i. 486 ft. ; ii. 274, 374 ; iv.
167
Via Domitia, iii. 416 ; iv. 168
Via Egnatia, iii. 263 ; iv. 168
Via Flaminia, i. 485 ; ii. 274 ; iv. 166,
167
Via Gabinia, iii. 427 ; iv. 167
Via Postumia, iv. 167
Via sacra, i. 138 ft.
Via Valeria, i. 485. Compare Road
C Vibius Pansa [pleb. tribune, 703], v.
180
Vibo (Valentia), a Latin colony, ii. 52 «.,
365 ; iii. 100
L. Vibullius Rufus, v. 209, 210
Victor, emendation of, iii. 428 n.
Victoriatus, iii. 87
Victumulae, gold washings at, iii. 381, 415
Vicus, i. 45. Tuscus, L 159
Vienna, v. 8
Vigiliae, i. 255 ft.
P. Villius [consul, 555], ii. 428, 432. 451
Vinalia, i. 208
Vindalium, battle of, iii. 418, 419 *.
Vindelici, i. 423 m.
V index, i. 197
Vindiciae, i. 196
Vindicius, ii. 105
Vine, culture of the : its original home, L
38. Very ancient in Italy, i. 23, 158,
171. Before the Greek immigration, L
241. Priestly supervision, i. 225, 241 /.
Increase of, i. 80, 305 ; iv. 172^ Man-
agement, iii. 67 n. Outlay and returns,
iii. 80 ft. Prohibited to the Transalpines
(round Massilia), iii. 415 ; iv. 171 /.
Virdumarus, ii. 228
Viriathus, iii. 220-226, 267
Vitruvius Vaccus, i. 463
Caelius Vivenna, i. 158
Voconius, lieutenant of Lucullus in the
Mithradatic war, iv. 329
Vocontii, iii. 417 ; v. 8
Volaterrae, siege by Sulla, iv. 91. Con-
fiscation, iv. 108, 265. Obtains from
Sulla the ins of Ariminum, ii. 52 «.
Volcae-Arecomici, iv. 293 ; v. 8
Volcanalia, i. 209 ; iii. 217
Volcanus, i. 209, 249
Volci, one of the twelve Etruscan towns,
L 161. Sepulchral chambers, i. 25>
Art, i. 126
Volsci, their settlements, i. 444. Their
wars with Rome, i. 135. Clients of the
588
HISTORY OF ROME
Etruscans, i. 181. Subdued by Rome,
i. 444-446. Revolt against Rome, i.
461. Received, in great part, into the
Roman burgess-union, ii. 48 ; iii. 33
Volsinii, chief town of Etruria, i. 161,
250 ; ii. 121. Wars with Rome, i. 426./C,
400. Roman intervention in favour of
the civic aristocracy, i. 436^ ; ii. 57
Voltinii, clan-village, i. 45
Voltumna, temple of, in Etruria, as-
sembly and fair at, L 350
Volturnalia, i. 208
Volturnum, ii. 337
Volturnus, i. 40
Volux, son of Bocchus, iii. 408
Vote by ballot, iii. 73. Controlled by
Marius, iii. 198
Vow, i. 223
Walls, so-called Cyclopean, arose under
Greek influence in Italy, i. 302
War, declaration of, Roman, i. 101. Re-
quired, in the case of aggressive wars,
the consent of the burgesses, i. 96.
Formula of, i. 202. Commencement of,
signified by singed bloody staff, i. 203.
War-chariots, i. 294./C, 296. Celtic, i. 431.
Employed against Pyrrhus' elephants,
ii. 26
Waxen masks, iii. 105
Wealth, Roman, iii. %%f.
Week, Roman, i. 267
Weights, starting-point, L 363 .A Duo-
decimal system, i. 365. Afterwards
modelled on the Attico-Sicilian, i. 266
Wheat, cultivation of, in Italy, ii. 77 ; iii.
66
Wild animals, fights of, in Rome, iii. 126 ;
iv. 183, 184
Wills, foreign to the primitive law, and
requiring sanction by decree of the
people, i. 95, 194. Private, arise from
the transfer of all property to a friend
during the owner's lifetime, L 198 ; ii.
Winds, names of the, how far borrowed,
i. 254 n.
Wine, Greek, imported to Rome, iii 133.
When drunk unmixed, iii. 123
Wine presented to the governor, iii. 31
Witness, false, i. 191
Wolf, She-, of the Capitol, ii. 93, 106, 133,
128
Woman, position of, in the Roman family,
i. 73-77. Her emancipation, iii. 131 f.
Women in Caesar's time, v. 391./C Act
in the mimes, v. 469, 516 n.
Wonders and prodigies, when recorded
in the Annals, ii. iosyC
Wool-spinning by women, L 73 f. Men-
tioned in epitaphs, i. 74 n.
Words borrowed from Greek in Latin, i.
342 «., 1254, 366. Bear throughout Doric
forms, i. 260
Words borrowed from Latin in Sicilian
Greek, i. 254, 359
Words borrowed from Oriental languages
reach the Latin only through the
medium of the Greeks, i. 260 ».
Writing materials, oldest, i. 280
Xanthipfcs of Sparta, ii. 18a n., 187
Year, oldest Roman, i. *68. Beginning
of, fixed at January i, iii. 3x5
Zacynthus, ii. 477, 478
Zama regia, battle of, li. 359 «., 36a
Numidian, iii. 359. Siege in Jugurthine
war, iii. 398 »., 401
Zamolxis, v. 105
Zancle. See Messana
Zariadrids, iv. 5
Zariadris, ii. 473
Zenicetes, pirate prince, Iv. 313
Zeno, the Stoic, iv. 197, 198
Zeus, Venasian, iv. 439
Zeuxis of Lydia, ii. 419
Ziela, battle of, v. 983
Zygi, iv. 41*
COLLATION OF EDITIONS
[It is hoped that this collation will facilitate the use of the present
edition for the verifying of references made to the last form of the
original, or to the earlier English and American forms of the book.]
Present
Edition.
Earlier
American
Edition.
German
(8th edition.)
First English
(Crown 8vo,
1862-66).
Second English
(Demy 8vo.
1868).
Vol. I. 10
Vol. I. 30
Vol. I. 9
Vol.I. 9
Vol. I. 9
20
39
16
17
17
30
49
24
25
26
40
58
3i
34
35
50
67
39
41
43
60
76
47
5o
52
70
86
55
58
60
80
95
62
66
69
90
106
69
78
79
IOO
117
77
82
87
no
127
85
90
96
120
138
92
IOO
106
130
148
IOI
109
H5
140
157
108
117
123
150
166
116
125
132
160
175
123
133
140
170
184
131
141
148
180
194
138
149
157
190
203
146
158
166
200
212
154
166
174
210
222
162
175
182
220
231
169
179
191
230
240
177
187
199
240
250
184
195
207
250
260
192
203
216
260
269
200
211
224
270
277
207
218
232
280
287
216
224
239
290
297
224
233
248
300
306
231
242
256
310
317
240
250
266
320
326
248
259
275
590
HISTORY OF ROME
Present
Earlier
German
First English
Second English
Edition.
American
Edition.
(8th edition).
(Crown 8vo,
1862-66).
(Demy 8vo,
1868).
Vol. I. 330
Vol. I. 334
Vol. I. 256
Vol. I. 266
Vol. I. 283
340
344
263
272
291
35o
353
271
281
301
360
362
278
288
308
37o
372
287
296
317
380
382
295
304
325
390
39i
302
3"
334
400
401
310
320
343
410
410
3i8
327
351
420
420
325
335
359
43°
430
333
343
367
440
439
34i
35i
376
45o
448
349
358
383
460
458
357
367
392
470
468
365
375
400
480
478
372
383
408
490
487
380
390
417
500
—
—
—
—
Vol. II. 10
499
390
401
428
20
509
398
409
436
30
518
405
417
444
40
528
413
425
453
5o
536
421
432
460
60
547
429
441
470
70
557
437
451
479
80
567
445
459
487
90
576
453
467
495
100
586
461
475
504
no
595
469
483
513
120
605
476
491
521
130
Vol. II. 8
484
Vol. II. 2
Vol. II. 2
140
17
492
10
n
150
27
499
18
19
160
36
507
26
28
170
46
515
35
37
180
56
522
43
45
190
65
530
51
54
200
74
537
59
62
210
84
545
68
71
220
93
553
76
79
230
102
560
83
87
240
112
568
91
96
250
121
575
99
104
260
130
583
107
"3
270
139
590
"5
121
280
148
598
123
130
190
157
605
131
138
300
166
613
130
146
310
175
620
147
154
320
184
628
155
163
COLLATION OF EDITIONS 591
P resent
Earlier
Gcrrnsn
First English
Second English
Edition,
American
Edition.
(8th edition).
(Crown 8vo,
1862-66).
(Demy 8vo,
1868).
Vol. II. 330
Vol. II. 194
Vol. I. 636
Vol. II. 163
Vol. II. 171
34°
203
643
171
180
35o
213
651
179
1 88
360
222
658
187
197
37o
231
666
195
206
380
240
673
203
214
39o
250
681
211
223
400
258
689
218
231
410
268
696
226
240
420
277
704
234
248
430
286
711
242
257
440
296
719
250
265
450
305
727
257
274
460
3H
735
265
282
470
323
742
273
290
480
33i
750
280
298
490
341
758
288
306
500
35°
765
296
314
510
359
773
304
323
520
368
780
312
331
Vol. III. 10
380
789
321
340
20
389
796
329
348
30
398
804
337
357
40
408
811
345
365
5o
417
819
353
374
60
427
827
359
382
70
436
835
367
390
80
446
842
375
398
90
455
850
383
406
100
465
858
39i
415
no
473
866
399
423
120
483
873
407
43i
130
492
881
415
440
140
502
889
423
448
150
512
897
43i
456
160
521
905
439
464
170
531
912
447
473
180
54i
921
455
481
190
55°
929
464
490
200
560
937
472
498
210
Vol.111. 10
944
480
507
220
19
Vol. II. 8
Vol. III. 8
Vol. III. 9
230
29
15
16
17
240
38
23
25
26
250
48
31
33
34
260
57
39
4i
43
270
66
47
49
5i
280
76
55
57
59
290
85
62
65
68
300
95
70
73
76
592
HISTORY OF ROME
Present
Earlier
German
First English
Second English
Edition.
American
Edition.
(8th edition).
(Crown 8vo,
1862-66).
(Demy 8vo,
1868).
Voi.1n.310 '
i/ol. III. 104
Vol. II. 78
Vol. III. 81
Vol. III. 85
320
114
86
90
94
330
I23
93
98
I02
340
132
102
106
III
350
142
109
114
I20
360
ISI
117
122
128
370
l6o
124
130
136
380
I70
132
138
145
390
179
140
146
153
400
188
148
155
162
410
I98
155
162
170
420
208
164
171
179
430
2l6
172
178
187
440
226
179
186
I96
450
236
187
194
204
460
245
195
202
212
470
255
203
210
220
480
264
210
218
229
490
274
218
226
237
500
284
226
234
246
510
293
234
242
254
520
302
242
250
263
530
312
249
258
27I
540
321
257
266
280
Vol. IV. 10
335
268
278
292
20
344
276
285
3OO
30
354
284
293
308
40
363
292
301
317
5o
373
299
309
325
60
383
307
317
333
70
392
315
325
342
80
402
322
333
35o
90
411
33°
341
359
100
421
338
35°
368
110
43i
345
358
376
120
441
353
366
385
130
45o
361
373
392
140
458
368
38i
401
150
468
376
389
409
1 60
478
384
398
418
170
487
39 1
406
426
180
496
499
413
435
190
506
407
422
443
200
5i5
415
430
45i
210
524
422
438
460
220
534
43°
446
469
230
543
438
454
477
240
553
446
462
485
250
562
455
470
494
260
571
463
478
502
COLLATION OF EDITIONS 593
Present
Edition.
Earlier
American
Edition.
German
(8th edition).
First English
(Crown 8vo,
1862-66.)
Second English
(Demy 8vo,
1868.)
Vol. IV. 270
Vol. IV. 19
Vol. III. 9
Vol. IV. 9
Vol. IV. 9
280
30
18
17
18
29O
39
27
25
26
3OO
49
35
33
35
3IO
57
44
41
43
320
66
53
49
5i
33°
76
61
57
60
340
85
70
65
68
35°
94
78
73
77
360
104
86
81
85
37o
"3
94
88
93
380
122
102
96
IOI
390
132
in
104
no
400
142
120
"3
118
410
151
128
121
126
420
160
137
129
135
430
169
145
137
143
440
179
154
145
151
45o
188
162
152
160
460
198
171
161
169
470
208
180
169
177
480
217
188
176
186
490
227
196
184
194
500
237
205
193
203
510
246
213
201
211
Vol.V. 10
261
226
215
225
20
271
234
223
233
3°
281
242
231
242
40
290
251
239
250
5°
300
259
247
259
60
309
267
255
267
70
319
275
263
275
80
329
283
271
284
90
338
291
279
292
100
347
300
287
301
no
356
307
295
309
120
366
315
303
318
130
375
324
3"
326
140
385
332
319
334
150
395
34i
328
344
160
404
349
336
352
170
413
356
344
361
1 80
422
364
351
369
190
432
372
359
378
200
440
379
367
386
210
45°
387
375
394
220
459
395
383
402
230
468
402
39i
411
240
478
410
399
419
250
487
418
406
427
594 HISTORY OF ROME,
German
(8th Edit
Vol. III.
Present
Earlier
Edition.
American
Edition.
Vol. V. 260
Vol. IV. 496
270
506
280
515
290
524
300
533
310
542
320
552
33°
56i
340
57o
35o
579
360
588
37°
597
380
606
390
616
400
625
410
635
420
644
43°
654
440
666
450
672
460
682
470
692
480
701
490
710
500
720
5io
ro
518
738
in
First English
Second English
ion).
(Crown 8vo,
(Demy 8vo,
1862-66).
1868).
426
Vol. IV. 415
Vol. IV. 436
434
422
444
441
430
453
449
438
461
457
446
469
465
454
478
473
462
486
481
469
495
489
477
503
496
485
5ii
504
493
520
512
50I
528
520
509
536
528
517
545
536
525
553
544
533
562
551
54o
57o
559
548
578
568
556
587
575
564
596
583
573
604
591
580
612
599
589
621
608
597
630
616
605
938
624
613
646
630
619
653
THE END.
00205319099
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209
1905
v.5
Mommsen , The odor
The history of Rome
A new ed, rev.
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