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THE HISTORY OF THE POPES. Translated from 
the German of LUDWIG, FREIHERR VON PASTOR. Edited, as to 
Vols. I. -VI. by the late FREDERICK IGNATIUS ANTROBUS, and, 
as to Vols. VII. -XXIV. by RALPH FRANCIS KERR, of the 
London Oratory, Vols. XXV. -XXXIV. by DOM ERNEST GRAF, 
of Buckfast Abbey, and Vols. XXXV.-XXXVIII. by E. F- 

Vols. I. and II. A.D. 1305-1458 

Vols. III. and IV. A.D. 1458-1483 

Vols. V. and VI. A.D. 1484-1513 

Vols. VII. and VIII. A.D. 1513-1521 

Vols. IX. and X. A.D. 1522-1534 

Vols. XI. and XII. A.D. 1534-1549 

Vols. XIII. and XIV. A.D. 1550-1559 

Vols. XV. and XVI. A.D. 1559-1565 

Vols. XVII. and XVIII. A.D. 1566-1572 

Vols. XIX. and XX. A.D. 1572-1585 

Vols. XXI. and XXII. A.D. 1585-1591 

Vols. XXIII. and XXIV. A.D. 1592-1604 

Vols. XXV. and XXVI. A.D. 1605-1621 

Vols. XXVII. to XXIX. A.D. 1621-1644 

Vols. XXX. to XXXII. A.D. 1644-1700 

Vols. XXXIII. and XXXIV. A.D. 1700-1740 
Vols. XXXV. and XXXVI. A.D. 1740-1769 
Vols. XXXVII. and XXXVIII. A.D. 1758-1774 
The original German text of the History of the Popes is published 
by Herder & Co., Freiburg (Baden). 










PIUS V. (1566-1572) 





First published in England 1929 
Reprinted 1952 

Printed in Great Britain by 
Lowe and Brydone Printers Limited, London, 



Table of Contents ... > vii-xv^ii 

List of unpublished documents in Appendix . xix 

Pius V. and Philip II. . . . 1-26 

The Pope s struggle against Spanish cesaropapalism . 27-71 

The beginning of the rebellion in the Low Countries 72-104 
Pius V. and the civil and religious wars in France 

The beginnings of the Catholic reaction in France 105-* 55 
The state of Religion in Scotland Mary Stuart and 

Elizabeth . 156-194 

Pius V. and Elizabeth The Bull of Excommunication 

Ireland ...... . 195-243 

Pius V. and Maximilian II. Catholic reform in Ger 
many The work of Canisius .... 244-299 

Religious conditions in Poland and Switzerland 

Foreign Missions ...... 300-352 

Pius V. and the League against the Turks . . 353-399 
The Victory of Lepanto and afterwards Death of 

Pius V . 400-460 

Appendix of unpublished documents . . .461-474 

Index of Names ....... 475-486 

1 For Bibliography see Volume XVII 





Cesaropapistical aims of Spain i 
Determination of Pius V. to ensure the complete 

independence of the Church i 

1565 The nuncio in Spain, Giovanni Castagna . . 2 

1566 The questions at issue : the recurso ... 3 
Difficult position of Castagna ; his tact and ability . 4 

x The case of the Archbishop of Toledo, Carranza . 5 

The Pope demands his transference to Rome . 5 
Interference with ecclesiastical jurisdiction in Spain 

and Naples ....... 6 

The Sussidio and Cruzada ..... 7 

The Sussidio granted for five years, but the Cruzada 

refused ....... 8 

Pope continues to insist on the transference of 
Carranza to Rome . . . . . .9 

Iconoclastic atrocities in the Netherlands . 10 
The Pope urges Philip II. to go in person to the Low 

Countries ....... 10 

The mission of Camaiani to Spain . . 10 
Irritation of Philip II. . . . . . .11 

The Monarchia Sicula . . . . . 13 

Proposed league against the Turks . . 13 

1567 Philip II. promises to go to the Netherlands . . 14 
But continues to delay ; further causes of dispute . 15 
The royal placet . . . . . .16 

Controversy between Borromeo and the senate of 

Milan . . . . . . . 17 

Severe action by the archbishop . . . .19 

Indignation of the senate ; the archbishop s officer 

arrested ........ 20 

The archbishop excommunicates the offenders . 20 

*=* Pius V. summons the case to Rome ; intervention of 

Philip II 21 

1568 Edict of the governor of Milan . . . -23 
The chapter of S. Maria della Scala resists the arch 
bishop s visitation . . . . . .23 

They are supported by the senate . . .24 

Borromeo refused admission by the chapter . . 24 

^ Pius V. supports the archbishop .... 25 

Victory of Borromeo ...... 26 







Cardinal Granvelle Philip II. s chief confidant in Rome 27 

1568 The new Spanish ambassador, Juan de Zuniga . 28 
Attempts to obtain the Cruzada from the Pope . 29 
This meets with no success . . . 30 
Memorial from Castagna to Philip II., detailing the 

questions at issue ...... 32 

The reply of Philip II. -33 

~ Papal prohibition of bull-fights not published by 

the Spanish bishops . 35 
The bull In Coena Domini issued with important 

additions . . 35 
The Spanish bishops refuse to publish it without the 

royal placet . .... 36 

The txaequatur in Naples ..... 39 

Imminent danger of a breach between Rome and Spain 41 

The mission of Requesens to Rome . . 41 

The imprisonment of Don Carlos .... 42 

> Distress of the Pope . . 43 

\Letter of Philip II. to the Pope on the subject . . 43 

The death of Don Carlos ; solemn funeral offices in 

Rome . . 45 

Requesens in Rome ; renewed disputes . . 46 

Philip II. adheres to his claims ; abuses in Naples . 48 
A congregation appointed to examine the questions at 

issue . . . . . . .49 

Detailed letter from the Pope to the king . . 49 
He sets forth the abuses and usurpations on the part 
\ of Spain . . . . . . .50 

\ The Pope s remonstrances without effect . . 53 

Obstinacy of the Viceroy of Naples ... 54 

Evasive replies of Philip II. . . . . . 55 

1569 Second memorial of Castagna, setting forth the abuses 

in Naples ....... 56 

Heated discussions between Castagna and Philip II. 58 

The king refuses to give way 59 

Giustiniani sent to Spain ..... 60 

But he is able to accomplish very little. . 63 

The Turkish question leads to a rapprochement 

v between Rome and Spain . - . .63 

^ 1571 Pius V. grants the Cruzada for two years . . 64 

Cardinal Bonelli in Spain ..... 66 

Philip II. still clings to all his claims ... 68 
The great services of Castagna, who had steadily 

shielded the king from personal blame . . 69 
\ Pius V. s personal esteem for Philip II., and realization 

of the importance of the friendship of Spain . 70 



Philip II. had not the same personal ties with the 

Netherlands as his father, Charles V. 72 
Incapacity of Margaret of Parma, the Governess- 
General -73 

Unrest and discontent in the Low Countries . . 73 
Religion in the Low Countries ; the influence of 

Erasmus . . 74 

William of Orange 75 

His religion entirely dictated by political considera 
tions .... ... 76 

He becomes the centre of the disaffection . 77 

The question of the Netherland bishoprics . . 77 

Fear of the Spanish Inquisition ; hatred of Granvelle 79 

1564 Philip II. dismisses Granvelle ; a state of anarchy . 81 

1565 Conspiracy of the nobles under Orange ... 82 
They meet with general support . . 83 
Weakness of the regent ; increased boldness of the 

Calvinists . . . 84 

1566 Outbreak of rebellion 85 

Iconoclasm and destruction ..... 86 
Need for the personal presence of Philip II. in the Low 

Countries ..... 87 

\Pius V. urges the king to set out for the Netherlands . 89 
Ybilip II. declares his readiness to undertake the 

journey . . . . . . .90 

But resolves to send Alba first . . . .91 

The Pope insists that religious considerations must 

come first ; the king political ones ... 92 

1567 Philip II. finally abandons his journey ... 93 
v. The Pope declares that the king has deceived him . 94 

1568 Alba arrives with troops in the Low Countries ; the 

programme sketched for him by Philip II. . . 95 
Wholesale confiscations and executions drive the people 

to desperation ...... 96 

Alba s troops victorious, but he continues his campaign 

of terror and bloodshed ..... 97 
Queen Elizabeth congratulates the king on his victory 

over the rebels . . - 97 
^ Pius V. deceived by reports from Spanish sources into 

thinking that Alba was guided by zeal for religion 99 

Prayers and pilgrimages in Rome .... 100 

\ Pius V. urges an amnesty . . . . . 101 

The question of the bishoprics . . . 101 

The despotic government of Alba harmful to the cause 

of religion ....... 103 






1562 Continued atrocities on the part of the gueux . 104 

\The policy of Pius V. in France . . .105 

The nuncio, della Torre ..... 105 

Instructions for the nuncio ; the enforcement of the 

decrees of Trent insisted upon . . .107 

i Pius V/s doubts of Catherine de Medici . .108 

1566 Sentence pronounced upon the heretical bishops . 108 
Aims of the Huguenots . . . . .109 

1567 Outbreak of the second religious war . . .no 
\ The Pope sends financial help . . . .112 
\ A general Jubilee proclaimed . 114 

The Pope s mistrust of Catherine de Medici . .115 

1568 His fears justified by the Peace of Longjumeau . 116 
Hostilities recommenced . . . . . 117 
The third religious war ; cruelty and violence on both 

sides . . . . . . . .118 

1569" The Pope sends auxiliary troops .... 119 

The victory of Jarnac . . . . . .119 

Captured Huguenot standards sent to Rome . .120 
Congratulations of the Pope . . . . .121 

The decisive victory of Moncontour . . .123 
Thanksgiving in Rome . . . . . .124 

\The Pope warns Charles IX. against misplaced leniency 125 
Little use made of the victories . . . .126 

Rumours of peace; the Pope s renewed warning . 128 
157(1 All these warnings in vain ; the Peace of St. Germain 130 
The Pope s indignation at " the shameful peace " . 131 
Bramante sent to France to get the peace annulled 131 
But all remonstrances remain without effect . 133 

Catherine s matrimonial plans for her children bring 

the danger visibly nearer . . . 135 

1571 Coligny returns to court . . . . .136 
His far-reaching plans ; proposed marriage of the 

Princess Margaret to Henry of Navarre . .137 
The mission of Salviati to France . . . .138 

1572 He is followed by Cardinal Bonelli . . .139 
Attempts to induce France to join the league against 

the Turks ....... 140 

The marriage contract signed between Margaret and 

Henry of Navarre . . . . . .143 

France enters into an alliance with England against 

Spain 143 

Beginnings of a Catholic revival . . . .144 
Ecclesiastical abuses in France . . . .145 
The injury inflicted on the Church in -France by the 

attitude of the government . . . .146 
The Huguenot persecution had led to a Catholic 

reaction ........ 147 



Renewed veneration for the Holy See and the person 

of the Pope .... . 149 

Work of the Jesuits : Auger, Possevino and Manaraeus 150 
The lectures of Maldonatus . . I5 1 

Frangipani s encouraging report concerning the 

development of Catholic life . J 53 

Pius V. wishes strong action to be taken against the 

heretics, but not by wrongful means . 154 




1566 Religion in Scotland at the accession of Pius V. . . 156 
Mary attempts to place Catholicism on equal terms 

with Protestantism . . . J 57 

The conspiracy of Darnley . . . I 57 

The murder of Rizzio ... . I5& 
X* Bishop Chisholm sent to Rome ; the Pope s sympathy 

for Mary .1.59 

Proposal to send a nuncio to Scotland . .161 

Vincenzo Laureo chosen ; he arrives in Paris . 162 

Laureo demands the punishment of the rebels . 163 

Serious illness of Mary . . .164 

Laureo s doubts of Mary s zeal for religion . .164 

Mary s strange leniency towards her enemies . .165 

She rejects the advice of the nuncio . . .166 

Disgraceful conduct of Darnley . . .167 

Both well s influence with Mary . . . .168 

The plot against Darnley . . . . .169 

1567 The murder of Darnley . . . 1*70 
Both well accused of the crime . . . . 171 
The inquiry into the crime a farce . . .172 
Bothwell exonerated by the nobles . . 173 
Mary is married to Bothwell . . . 174 
Difficult to account for this fatal step . . 175 
The calumnies of Mary s enemies . . . .176 

The Casket Letters 177 

Mary had no complicity in the murder . . .178 
End of Laureo s mission ; he returns to Italy . 179 
Mary s marriage to Bothwell had cost her the confi 
dence of the Catholics ... .180 

And shaken the Pope s trust in her . . .181 
Mary falls into the hands of her enemies and is im 
prisoned at Lochleven . . . . .182 

1568 She escapes and gathers together an army . . 183 
She is defeated at Langside and takes refuge in 

England 183 

End of Catholic worship in Scotland . . .183 
Mary imprisoned at Bolton Castle . . . .184 
The Conference of Westminster . . . .185 



Elizabeth s determination to blacken Mary s good 

name ........ 186 

Mary s representatives duped by Elizabeth . .187 
Mary demies her complicity in the murder and accuses 

her enemies . . . . . . .188 

Vain attempt to induce Mary to resign her crown. 189 
Even as a prisoner, Mary is still a danger to Elizabeth 191 
She has many supporters in England . . .192 
Proposal that Mary should marry the Duke of Norfolk 193 
Norfolk thrown into the Tower . . . .194 




1568 The English Catholics fix their hopes upon Mary Stuart 195 
\Pius V. at first entertains hopes of Elizabeth s con 
version ... .... 196 

But soon comes to look upon her as a heretic and 

usurper . . . . . . . 196 

Renewed confidence of the Pope in Mary Stuart . 197 

^Pius V. seeks to obtain help for her from Spain . 199 

Catholic reaction in England ..... 200 

Renewed persecution of the Catholics . . .201 
The English Catholics look for action on the part of the 

Holy See ....... 202 

Plans for a Catholic rising . . . . .203 

Threatened war between England and Spain lends 

force to these plans ..... 204 

1569 But the hopes of Spanish help prove vain . 205 
The Earls of Northumberland and Westmorland take 

up arms on behalf of Mary .... 206 

Ill-success of the insurgents . . . . .207 

Failure of the Northern Rising .... 208 

Terrible reprisals of Elizabeth . . . .208 

The Catholics ask for definite guidance from Rome . 210 

^The Pope and the two Earls . . . .211 

N Pius V. opens an inquiry in Rome as to the state of 

affairs in England . . . . . .212 

1570 The Bull of Excommunication of Elizabeth . .214 
The bull not published in the customary form but 

copies make their way to England . . .215 
The bull affixed to the doors of the Bishop of London s 

palace by John Felton . . . . .217 
No idea at first of enforcing the bull by force of arms 217 
Philip II. objects to the bull ; remonstrances of Alba 218 
Effects of the bull in England . . . . 220 
Elizabeth and the bull of excommunication . .221 
A series of new laws against the Catholics . .222 
A new period of the persecution in England begun 223 
Mary Stuart derives no advantage from the bull . 224 



The Treaty of Chatsworth ; its terms not observed . 225 
The schemes of Ridolfi ; Mary appeals to the Catholic 

powers ........ 226 

1571 Plans for an invasion of England . . . .227 

Alba treats the proposals coldly; Ridolfi in Rome. 229 
Ridolfi sent by the Pope to Spain . .231 

He is supported by Castagna but not by Philip II. 

and Alba 232 

Philip II. insists that the enterprise shall be carried 

out in the name of the Pope . . . -233 
Alba continues to object to the plan . . -234 
The English government discover the conspiracy ; the 

treachery of Hawkins . . . . .236 
End of the conspiracy ; execution of Norfolk . 238 
Cecil uses the opportunity against the Pope . .238 
The position of Mary Stuart made worse . .239 
The triumph of Elizabeth ..... 240 
Violent English rule in Ireland . . . .241 
Philip II. supports the Irish rebels . . . 242 
Thomas Stukely . 242 




1566 Ambiguous religious attitude of Maximilian II. . 244 
Cardinal Commendone appointed legate to the Diet of 

Augsburg . . . . . .246 

Formation of the German Congregation . . .247 
Commendone at Augsburg . . . . .248 

The nuncio Melchior Biglia . . . . .249 

Instructions to Commendone . 249 

The question of the religious peace of Augsburg . 252 
Success of Commendone ; the Diet accepts the decrees 

of Trent . . . . . . 254 

The Emperor and the expedition against the Turks 255 
The siege and fall of Sziget ; peace concluded with the 

Turks at Adrianople ..... 256 

1567 Maximilian begins to cultivate more friendly relations 

with the Holy See 257 

1568 Financial concessions made by Pius V. . . . 258 
Maximilian suddenly makes concessions to the Pro- 

v testants ........ 259 

* The Pope s surprise and distress ; he condemns the 

concessions . . . . . . . 260 

And sends Commendone to the Emperor . .261 

Obstinacy of Maximilian II 261 

Commendone at Vienna . . . . .262 

He is supported by Albert V. and Philip II. . 263 

Maximilian apparently gives way . . . .264 
But succeeds in deceiving the legate . . . 265 

1569 Commendone sets out for Rome .... 267 



A.D.\^ PAGE 

The relations of the Pope and the Emperor again dis 
turbed by the question of Cosimo I. . . 268 
The ambitions of Cosimo I. . . . . .269 

The Duke had loyally supported Pius V. in all things . 270 

The Pope bestows upon him the title of Grand Duke 271 

^570 Protest of the Emperor . . . . .272 

The coronation of Cosimo I. in Rome . . .273 
The motives which had led the Pope to the elevation of 

Cosimo ........ 274 

The attitude of Philip II. . . . .275 

The Cardinals discuss the reply to the Emperor s 

protest . . . . . . . .276 

The question raised at the Diet of Spires . .277 
The Pope s reply to the Emperor . . . .278 

1571 Death of Melchior Biglia . . . . .279 

The new nuncio Giovanni Delfino . . .280 

His instructions . . . . . . .281 

The Emperor and the new Protestant " liturgy " . 282 
The Archduke Charles of Styria . . . .283 

Illness of Maximilian II. . . . . . 285 

Complete failure of Maximilian s religious policy . 286 
The German bishops and the Tridentine profession of 

faith . 287 

Half-hearted Catholics in Germany . . . 288 

The report of Peter Canisius on affairs in Germany . 290 
The memorial of Feliciano Ninguarda . . .291 
Diocesan synods held by Cardinals Truchsess and 

Mark Sittich . . . . . . .292 

Synods and visitations in Germany . . . 293 
The Bishops of Cologne, Treves, Mayence and Prague 294 
The visitations reveal a deplorable state of affairs . 295 
V Catholic restoration in Bavaria ; the activity of Albert 

V 296 

Reforms in the Tyrol, Lower Austria and other parts of 

the Empire ....... 297 

The work of the Jesuits, especially of Canisius . 298 




1566 The state of religion in Poland at the accession of 

Pius V. ........ 300 

The nuncio, Giulio Ruggieri ; his instructions . 301 
The stormy Diet of Lublin ; Cardinal Hosius appointed 

legate ........ 302 

1568 Ruggieri s report on the state of Poland . . 303 
Influence of the Jesuits ..... 306 
Vincenzo de Portico succeeds Ruggieri as nuncio . 307 

1569 Cardinal Hosius at the Diet of Lublin . . .308 
He returns to Rome ; his continued interest in the 

affairs of Poland . . . . . . 309 



The question of the divorce of King Sigismund 

Augustus . . . . . . .310 

Weakness of Portico . . . . . 311 

1571 Commendone sent as legate . . . . .312 

1572 Commendone and the king s divorce . . .312 
The question of the league against the Turks . -3*3 
The state of religion in Switzerland ; account of 

Borromeo . . . . . . . 314 

Catholic leaoeis in Switzerland ; Pfyffer and Lussy . 315 
The Catholic and Protestant cantons . . .316 
Cardinal Borromeo Protector of the Catholic Cantons 318 
Visitation by Borromeo of the Swiss valleys . . 319 
And of German Switzerland . . . . . 320 

His suggestions for reform . . . . .321 

The question of Geneva . . . . .323 

Visitation of the Grisons ; the Catholic and Protestant 

leagues ........ 324 

The mission in Brazil . . . . . .326 

The work of Azevedo ; he collects missionaries in 

Europe . ..... 327 

Tragic fate of the expedition . . . .328 

Protestant opposition to the missions . . 330 

%Pius V. and the missions ; his instructions to the 

nuncio in Madrid ...... 331 

He issues a whole series of briefs on the subject . 332 
Far-reaching powers of the civil authorities over the 

missions . . . . . . . 333 

These rested upon concessions made by the Holy See 335 
Upon the whole this was favourable to the Church . 336 
The mission in Peru . . . . . -337 

Cruelty of the conquerors . . . . .338 

The viceroy, Toledo, attempts to remedy the abuses 340 
On the whole the Spanish government administered 

the colonies well . . . . . . 342 

The influence of the Popes in this matter . . 343 
Pius V. and the Indian missions . . . . 344 

Louis Bertrand ....... 345 

The mission to Abyssinia ..... 346 

/ The East Indies ....... 347 

*" Pius V. far in advance of his predecessors in regard to 

the missions . . . . . . .349 

Nv His insistence on adequate instruction . . .350 
The instructions of Francis Borgia to his subjects as to 

this 351 

*x Pius V. and the Greek churches .... 352 



^566 The Pope s attention directed from the first to the 

Turkish peril ....... 353 

He gives help to the Knights of Malta . , , 354 



Successes of the Turkish fleets in the Mediterranean . 355 

A jubilee proclaimed . ... 356 

Venice averse to any breach with the Turks . . 356 

Philip II. and Maximilian II. also hold back . . 357 
The Pope s renewed efforts to form a league . -357 

1567 Steps for the defence of the Papal States and Rome . 359 

The new Sultan, Selim II. . . . . 361 

1569 Turkish designs on Cyprus and the possessions of 

Venice . ..... 362 

Venice, taken by surprise, forced to look for help 

outside ........ 363 

Her strained relations with the Pope and Philip II. . 364 

She is forced to agree to the league . . . 365 

The Porte sends an ultimatum to Venice ; its rejection 366 

Spanish mistrust of Venice ..... 367 

1570 Luis de Torres sent to Spain .... 369 

His instructions . . . . . . .370 

Torres in Spain . . . . . . .372 

Philip II. appoints representatives for the negotiations 373 
Torres and the King of Portugal . . . .374 

Attempt to draw Prance into the league ; Charles IX. 

definitely refuses his participation . . 375 

The Emperor also holds back .... 376 

Attempts to interest Poland and Russia in the league 376 

Pius V. and the Russian Czar .... 377 

Failure of these attempts . . . 378 

Everything depends upon Venice and Spain . . 378 
Mutual distrust of the two powers ; selfish attitude of 

the Republic . . . . . . 379^ 

Marcantonio Colonna appointed to command the Papal 

fleet 380 

Displeasure of Spain at this appointment . .381 
Eagerness of the Roman nobles to take part in the 

enterprise ....... 382 

The negotiations between Spain and Venice begun in 

Rome . . . . . . . 382 

The treaty of alliances drafted .... 383 

Self-interested behaviour of both powers . ,384 

Heated discussions ; the objective of the alliance . 385 

The financial question ...... 385 

The contributions of the contracting powers . . 386 

The question of the supreme command . . 387 

General agreement to the appointment of Don John 

of Austria ....... 388 

Further differences of opinion . . . .389 

The status of Ragusa ...... 389 

A combined fleet puts to sea .... 390 

Complete failure of the expedition ; disgraceful con 
duct of Andrea Doria ..... 391 

The fall of Nicosia ...... 391 

Pius V. complains of Doria to Philip II. . . 392 

The negotiations resumed ...",, 393 



Fresh controversies ... . . . . 394 

It is found impossible to arrive at an agreement . . 395 
The division of conquered territory ; the question -of 

censures ....... 396 

The lieutenancy of the supreme command . . 397 

Self-seeking of Venice and Spain .... 398 

General indignation at the conduct of Spain . . 399 



\ The Pope alone disinterested .... 400 

Fears of the withdrawal of Venice . . .401 

The two parties in Venice ..... 402 

1571 Colonna sent to Venice ..... 403 

The treaty of alliance at last signed . . . 404 
The terms of the alliance . . . . .405 

^ JY of Pius V. ; public processions ; he urges speed . 406 
Venice still delays in publishing the league . .407 
Commendone sent as legate to the Emperor and 

Poland ; Bonelli to Spain and Portugal . . 408 
The legation of Bonelli ...... 409 

Preparations in Rome . . . . . .411 

The Papal fleet leaves Civitavecchia for Messina . .412 
Arrival of the Venetians ; the Spaniards still delay . 413 
Don John reaches Genoa . . . . .414 

Don John at Naples ; the sacred standard of the 

league 415 

Philip II. s jealousy of his brother . . .416 

The fleet sails from Messina . . . . .417 

The fall of Famagosta ; Turkish atrocities . .41? 
The Turkish fleet sighted near Lepanto . . .418 
The opposing forces . . . . . .419 

Disposition of the Christian fleet . . . .419 

The battle begun 420 

Complete victory of the Christian fleet (October 7) . 421 
Prisoners and booty . . . . . .421 

The fallen ; the Roman nobility . . . . 422 

?! Anxiety of Pius V. ; his prayers and penances ; the 

Rosary ... 423 

Suspense in Rome, ...... 424 

Vpius V. receives the news ; jubilation in Rome . 425 
Letters announcing the victory sent to all the powers 426 

vl The Pope s far-reaching hopes .... 427 
The victory not followed up . . . . -427 
Disagreements among the victors .... 428 
The return of Colonna ; preparations for his reception 429 
Triumphal entry of Colonna into Rome . . . 431 
He is received by the Pope and Cardinals . . 433 
Complete absence of paganism in the celebrations . 433 
Discussion of plans for the carrying on of the campaign 435 



Divergent aims of Spain and Venice . . . 436 
Disinterested aims of the Pope . . . .437 

No help to be looked for from France and the Emperor 438 
Disgraceful quarrels of the representatives of Spain 

and Venice ....... 439 

* The Pope decides on continued action in the Levant 439 

1572 Preparations for the resumption of the campaign . 440 

Privileges granted to all who take part in the Crusade 441 

Practical value of the victory of Lepanto . . 442 

The Feast of the Rosary . . . 444 
Commemorative orations and poems . . .444 

The victory of Lepanto in art .... 446 

The Pope s vision at the moment of victory . . 449 

State of the Pope s health ..... 450 

His great vigour . . . . . . .451 

But his health begins to fail .... 452 

He is worn out by his anxieties .... 453 

His last pilgrimage to the Seven Churches . . 454 

Sudden collapse of Pius V. . . . . 454 

The dying Pope ; his last thought the league against 

the Turks ....... 455 

The death of Pius V. (May i) . . . . 456 

The great work that he had accomplished . . 457 

Provisional burial of the Pope .... 458 

1588 Translation of the body to St. Mary Major s . . 459 

1712 Canonization of Pius V. 459 

His shrine . . v . . . . . . 460 



I. Pius V. to King Charles IX. of France . . 463 

II.-III. The Bull " In Coena Domini " of 10 April, 1568 463 
IV.-V. Negotiations of A. Rucellai concerning the 
assistance to be given to France by Pius V., 
1568 . . . . . . .466 

VI. Pope Pius V. to Charles IX., King of France . 466 

VII. Nicolas Sanders to M. A. Graziani . . 468 

VI 1 1. -IX. Avvertimenti sopra li maneggi di Francia del 

Bramante [Autumn, 1570]. . . . 470 

X. Bramante to Cardinal Rusticucci . . 472 
XI. Report in cipher of Bramante to Cardinal 

Rusticucci . . . . . . 473 

XII. The captain of the guard, Jost Segesser, to the 

Council of Lucerne . . . . 473 



EVEN in the time of Pius IV. the cesaropapistical aims which 
had become so prominent in Spain ever since the end of the 
Middle Ages, had reached such a height that Figueroa, the 
President of the Royal Council, had gone so far as to assert, 
at a public session, that there was no Pope in Spain. 1 It was 
inevitable that the relations between the Holy See and the 
Catholic King should become more and more strained. Philip 
II. , and still more his advisers, looked upon their claims, 
founded as they were upon privileges and customs, to be 
supreme even in ecclesiastical matters, as the inalienable 
right of the crown, and as a thing to be yet further increased, 
while the Apostolic See saw in that same claim a grievous 
injury to the most sacred rights of the Church. The state of 
affairs was bound to be embittered when, with Pius V., a Pope 
ascended the throne of Peter who looked into and decided the 
questions which arose in this connexion much more con 
scientiously than many of his predecessors and "with mar 
vellous effect." 2 

The strong determination of Pius V. of ensuring the complete 
independence of the Church everywhere, and above all of 
setting free her jurisdiction and liberties from any interference 
on the part of the civil power, led him into serious disputes 
with the Spanish government. If these disputes never reached 
the extreme point of a complete breach this was the result, 
on the one hand, of the political situation, which now more 
than ever threw the Pope and the Catholic King into each 
other s arms, and on the other, of the personality of the man 

1 Cf. Corresp. dipl., I., 23 n. and 444. 
2 HERRE, Europ. Politik, I., 58. 


who, during the whole of the reign of Pius V., filled the difficult 
and responsible post of nuncio in Spain ; this was the Arch 
bishop of Rossano, Giovanni Battista Castagna, who by his 
disinterested zeal, his prudence, and his eminent diplomatic 
ability, was able to satisfy the demands of the Pope s zeal for 
the defence of the interests of the Church against the steps 
taken by Philip II., and yet at the same time remain in favour 
with the king, in spite of his frequent and heated disputes, 
both with him and with his ministers. 1 

Castagna had reached Madrid on November I3th, 1565, 
with the Cardinal legate, Boncompagni, and at Perpignan, 
the first place they came to in Spain, he had been a witness of 
the honourable welcome accorded to the representative of the 
Pope, with whom he made his solemn entry into the Spanish 
capital. 2 Cardinal Crivelli, his predecessor in the nunciature, 
left on November iyth. Boncompagni s labours had scarcely 
begun when they were interrupted by the news of the illness 
and death of Pius IV., in consequence of which the Cardinal 
legate returned to Rome on December 29th. 3 The news of 

1 From SERRANO, Corresp. dipl., I., xxii, xxvi seq., who in a 
very praiseworthy way published in their original text the letters 
of the years 1565-1568, we now have a clear account of the story 
of the reports of Castagna, which were first made use of by 
LAMMER (Zur Kirchengeschichte, 161 ssq.}, and then by GACHARD 
(Bibl. Corsini, 43 seq., and Bibl. de Madrid, vii seq.; 85 seq., 
435 seq.), and lastly by HINOJOSA (p. 173). 

2 See Corresp. dipl., I., 23, 25 seq., 44 seq. Interesting par 
ticulars of Boncompagni s stay in Spain are given by his com 
panion, Venanzio da Camerino, in his *notes in the Boncompagni 
Archives, Rome D. 5 ; cf. ibid. D. 7 the *notes of Musotti. 

8 On February 2, 1566, Cusano *reports that the Pope was 
annoyed with Boncompagni, first, because he had left Spain 
without orders from the Holy See (cf. as to this Bull. Hispanique, 
VII., 247, and Corresp. dipl., I., liv, 116) ; secondly, because he 
had accepted from Philip II. a gift of 5,000 ducats " e piu per una 
lettera haveva ottenuta da S.M.C. ea ai card 1 Farnese et Borromeo, 
ove lo nominava per speciale subietto suo e li pregava lo facessero 
Papa " ; lastly, because he was unwilling to return to Spain 
on the business for which he had been appointed legate. Bon- 


the election of Pius V. reached Madrid on January 25th, 1566. 
In his letter of congratulation to the new Pope Castagna did 
not fail to speak in high terms of praise of the Catholic zeal 
of the king, and again, in his letter of thanks for being con 
firmed in his nunciature, addressed to Cardinal Reumano, 
he remarks that Philip II. had spoken highly in praise of the 
new Pope. 1 

At the beginning of April Castagna asked for further 
instructions as to the tasks which Pius IV. had given him to 
perform in Spain. These specially concerned the unjust 
violation of Canon Law by means of the so-called recurso de 
fuerza, a custom corresponding to the French appel comme 
d abus, by means of which, in conjunction with the exercise 
of the placet, the Spanish government exercised a control over 
all acts of ecclesiastical jurisdiction by the holding back 
(retention) of Papal bulls. As a result of this, anybody could, 
by means of the recurso de fuerza, obtain redress from the royal 
council for any sentence of an ecclesiastical judge, whether 
bishop or nuncio, which he imagined to be unjust ; the only 
exception was the tribunal of the Inquisition. If the council 
accepted the recurso all proceedings to the contrary by the 
ecclesiastical judge were suspended, and any action which 
he might still take was declared null. Anyone who suffered, 
or feared to suffer an injury to his rights (fuerza) from a Papal 
bull could ask that it should be held back. Frequent use 
was made of the recurso ; not only clerics and laymen had 

compagm, however, was so well able to answer these accusations 
that, as Cusauo *states on February 23, he was received by 
Pius V. in a very cordial way (State Archives, Vienna). In his 
*notes, Venanzio da Camerino says that the order given by 
Pius V. for his return was impracticable because it only arrived 
when the legate had already sent off all his belongings and his 
retinue. Boncompagni Archives, Rome. 

1 Philip II. had said " di tale pontefice haviamo bisogno adesso" 
(letter of Castagna of February 20, 1566, in Corresp. dipl., I., 124). 
Castagna s confirmation had already been made on January 24, 
1566 ; see App. n. 68 in Vol. XVII. of this work, Archives of Briefs, 
Rome, and British Museum, London. 


recourse to it, but even the bishops, against the ordinances of 
Papal bulls and Apostolic commissions, which were not to 
their liking. 1 Besides this many other violations of ecclesi 
astical jurisdiction occurred in the fact that the secular 
authorities laid hands upon clerics, and arrested them, even 
in the churches. Pius IV. had already made complaints 
about this. 

These violations of the authority of the Holy See and of the 
liberties of the Church on the part of the Spanish government 
did not escape the notice of Castagna, who also clearly saw 
that it would only be with great difficulty that a complete 
remedy could be found ; they had to deal with long-established 
customs, to which the king and his ministers clung with great 
tenacity. On the other hand he built great hopes on the truly 
Catholic sentiments of the king, whom he tried as far as 
possible to excuse personally, laying the chief blame on his 
ministers. 2 

In spite of this Castagna very soon realized how thorny 
was the position of the Pope s representative at the court of 
Philip II. The difficulty of the questions themselves, which 
were often very complicated, was great enough, but that was 
not all. The nuncio, for example, 3 repeatedly complains of 
the slowness of the procedure, of the impenetrable secrecy 
in which everything was hidden, and of the custom of dealing 
fully with everything in writing as well as by word cf mouth. 
The great evil at the Spanish court, a conclusion which 
Cardinal Bonelli came to later on, was that everything was 
reduced to memorials, to which the ministers made what 

1 Cf. PHILLIPS, II., 569 seq.; FRIEDBERG, 546 seq.; PHILIPPSON, 
Philip II., 273 seq.; HINSCHIUS, VI., i, 216 seq.; ISTURIZ in 
Annuaire de I universite de Louvain, 1907/384 seq., where further 
bibliography is given. In his " Practicarum quaestionum liber," 
written in 1558, and several times printed (e.g. at Antwerp, 1627) 
the Spanish canonist Diego de Covarruvias strongly defends the 
" recursus ad principem " ; see EICHMANN, Der Recursus ab 
abusu, Berl ; n, 1903, 121 seq. 

2 See Corresp. dipl., I., 179 seq., 181, 363. 

3 See Corresp. dipl., I., 289 seq., 372. 


answer they pleased, but without giving their reasons, and 
without troubling about motives, so that it was never possible 
to grasp the difficulties and bring them out into the open. 1 
To this was added the proveVbial indecision of the king, who 
was a past master at dragging on every question interminably. 

Yet there we re many important questions which called for 
immediate settlement. In the first place there was the affair 
of the unfortunate Archbishop of Toledo, Bartolom Carranza, 
who had been kept a prisoner by the Spanish Inquisition for 
seven years, while Philip II. enjoyed the rich revenues of the 
archdiocese. With regard to this question it was Castagna s 
first duty to press the demand of the Holy See that the 
prisoner should be transferred to Rome, so that his case might 
be finally decided there, with complete impartiality and with 
all due solemnity, far away from the influence of his enemies 
in Spain. To this demand Philip II. offered an obstinate 
resistance, while Pius V., like his predecessor, persisted in 
his contention that the trial of Carranza belonged to his own 

It called for labour and skill on the part of Castagna to find 
an amicable solution of this problem. He saw very clearly 
where the root of the opposition of the Spanish government 
lay ; it was feared in Madrid that the authority of the Spanish 
Inquisition, by means of which the Catholic King kept his 
realm in subjection, would be weakened. 2 The nuncio sought 
to convince Philip II. that this would not be the case, in a 
personal interview on June 24th at which he presented to the 
king an autograph letter from Pius V. In eloquent words 
he explained that the Pope stood above the Spanish Inqui 
sition, and that the latter tribunal drew its jurisdiction from 
the Pope, so much so that in many briefs the final decision 
was expressly reserved to Rome, and that respect for the 

1 See SENTIS, 121. 

2 See Corresp. dipl., I., liv seq., 174, 223 seq., 227 seq., 243 seq. 
II., vii seq., ix seq. Cf. also the "report of Cusano of January 26, 
1566, which states that the affair of Carranza was the original 
cause of the distrust, which continued to increase between Pius V. 
and Philip II. (State Archives, Vienna). Cf. p. 344, Vol. XVII, 
of this work. 


Papal rights was to the interest of the Spanish Inquisition 
itself. The king listened courteously and attentively to 
Castagna, but was of opinion that he could not come to any 
hasty decision in a matter of such great importance, and that 
he would have to discuss the reasons adduced with the Pope 
himself. Castagna replied that such a course was both 
useless and unnecessary ; he again repeated that the Pope 
could not allow any further vacancy of the archbishopric of 
Toledo, and that he would have to declare before all the world 
that he was not responsible for the dragging on of the affair. 
The king contented himself with replying that he too was 
without blame on that score, and adhered to his contention 
that so important an affair could not be settled hastily. 1 

The Pope was much displeased, not only by the attitude 
of Philip II. in the affair of Carranza, but also by the news 
which had in the meantime been received from Spain that 
the bishops there had refused to publish the bull In coena 
Domini without the permission of the royal council. 2 But 
above all the Pope was annoyed at the violation of ecclesi 
astical jurisdiction in Spain and its dependent kingdoms, 
especially in Naples, by means of the exequatur. At the 
beginning of July he expressed himself very strongly to 
Requesens on the subject, and on August I3th Castagna 
received instructions to complain to the king of the infringe 
ments of the rights of the Church which were constantly 
occurring on account of the sovereign privileges of the Mon- 
archia Sicula, and to tell him that it seemed strange to the 
Pope that in the dominions of so pious a Catholic sovereign 
the salutary orders of the head of the Church were not carried 
out, and were even absolutely flouted by the royal authority. 3 
At a consistory held about the same time Pius V. made a 
pointed allusion to those Catholic princes who arrogated to 

1 See the report of Castagna of June 30, 1566, Corresp. dipl., I., 
270 seq. 

8 See -the *report of Arco of July 13, 1566, State Archives, 

8 See Corresp. dip., I., 285 seq. ; 318 seq. , cf 335 seq. See also 
SANTORI, Autobiografia, XII., 341. 


themselves the authority of the Holy See, a remark which 
was understood by all as referring to Spain. 1 

While these troublesome controversies were going on, 
Spain had sent to Rome extensive requests, by the granting 
of which the Pope was asked to come to the financial aid of 
Philip II. Above all he was asked to renew for another five 
years the tax levied upon the Spanish clergy known as the 
Sussidio. 2 At the same time the Spanish envoy, the Marquis 
d Aguilar, who had been sent to offer the king s congratu 
lations to Pius V., after he had paid homage on May i6th, 3 
sought to obtain as well the concession of the Bula de la Cruzada 
The ordinary Spanish ambassador, Luis de Requesens, rightly 
looked upon such a proceeding as inopportune, thinking, in 
the light of his own political experience, that the first thing 
to do was to satisfy the Pope s just complaints as to the, 
infringement of ecclesiastical rights by Spain ; Requesens 
strongly warned his colleague against conducting his business 
with such " a holy Pope " as had been done with his pre 
decessor, and still less as had been done in the time of the 
Popes of the Renaissance. 4 

Requesens preached to deaf ears. His warnings as to the 
strong ecclesiastical views of Pius V. were not listened to, nor 
was any attempt made to arrive at a speedy settlement of the 

1 See the "report of Cusano from Rome, August 17, 1566 
State Archives, Vienna. 

2 See the "reports of Arco from Rome, January 12 and March 
23, 1566, ibid. 

8 See ZuftiGA, in Colecc. de docum ined., XCVIII., 369; Vida 
de L. Requesens in Bullet. Hispanique, VII., 246 seq.; Corresp. 
dipl., I., 127, 153, 166 seq.; 173, 175, 192 seq., 214, 247 seq. For 
the making of the " obedientia " cf. CIBRARIO, Lettere ined., 
Turin, 1861, 345, as well as the "report of Arco of May 18, 1566, 
State Archives, Vienna. 

4 See the interesting letter from Requesens to Juan de Zufiiga 
in Colecc. de docum. inld., XCVII., 371 seq. The letter bears no 
date, but belongs to July, 1566, because the departure of Aguilar 
had taken place on the " i8th of last month " i.e. in June (see 
Corresp. dipl., I., 265, n. i). Cf. also Corresp. dipl., I., 253, n. 2. 


case of Carranza. Even a modest wish expressed by the 
Pope in favour of his native place, Bosco, which, as Requesens 
pointed out, would have cost the Spanish government nothing 
to grant, was refused. 1 Requesens, however, was quite wrong 
in thinking that the Pope would have granted the Cruzada 
if Spain had met his wishes in this matter. Pius V. was not 
the man to let such considerations influence his decisions. 
His refusal to grant the Cruzada was founded solely upon the 
numerous abuses connected with it. 2 What he could he 
granted. Thus on March i6th, 1566, he allowed for another 
five years the levy of the sussidio on the clergy, which brought 
in to the Spanish government 400,000 gold scudi. 3 The Pope 
did this against the advice of the Cardinals, and without 
asking for any corresponding gift to the Papal treasury in 
return for this important concession. 4 In face of this how 
miserably mean it was to see Philip II., just at that moment, 
supporting the Spanish Carthusians in their refusal to make 
a contribution to the building of the church of S. Maria degli 
Angeli in Rome, when they were ordered to do so by Pius V. 5 
Philip II. also showed himself very unbending with regard 

1 See the above mentioned letter of Requesens. As to this 
affair see Corresp. dipl., I., 109, 148, 219. Cf. ibid., IV., 41 seq., 
for the behaviour of Philip II. to the Pope s majordomo, Fr. de 

2 See the *report of Arco of May 22, 1566, State Archives, 
Vienna. See also the memorial of 1565 in Corresp. dipl., I., 
443 seq. 

8 See * " Indice de las concessiones que han hecho los Papas 
de la Cruzada, Subsidio y Escusado " in the Archives of the 
Spanish Embassy, Rome. Text of the *bull for the " Prorogatio 
subsidii," dated March 16, 1566, in Fondo Borghese, I., 145-147, 
p. 54, Papal Secret Archives. Cf. also Corresp. dipl., I., 90, 114, 
131, 149, 152, 193 seq. 

* SERRANO (I., xlvii) rightly puts this forward as a proof of 
how from the first Pius V. made every effort to maintain good 
relations with Philip II. 

5 See the reports of Castagna of May 12 and August u, 1566, 
Corresp. dipl., I., 235, 302. Cf. also Vol. XVI. of this work, p. 443, 
and Vol. XVII., p. 121. 


to those sums which the Fabbrica of St. Peter s was still 
waiting to recover from the Cnizada of the previous year. 1 
In the meantime the handing over of Carranza was put off 
from month to month. 

All that Pius V. could do was to insist more and more 
strongly upon his right of conducting the trial of Carranza in 
Rome. On July 3oth, 1566, he addressed a brief to Castagna 
to the following effect : If Carranza has been kept a prisoner 
for seven years, the Pope cannot see how he can be blamed 
for that ; but he also sees that he is laid open to more serious 
accusations than that, and he is now driven to lay a command 
upon the members of the Spanish Inquisition, under pain of 
excommunication and suspension, to allow Carranza to start 
at once for Rome, and to send the acta of his trial. 2 Before 
this brief reached Spain, Philip II., as Castagna announces 
on August 23rd, 1566, had made up his mind to comply with 
the just demand of Pius V., and to send Carranza to Rome. 3 

For the rest, however, Castagna had nothing but bad news 
to give from Spain, especially concerning many of the bishops, 
who, for their own ends, made use of the royal powers against 
the lower clergy. He had had to take action against Diego 
de Sirnancas, Bishop of Badajoz, because he had thrown into 
prison the bearer of a Papal bull concerning some just pecuni 
ary demand. On August nth the nuncio wrote : Here I find 
the authority of the Holy See impugned on every point ; all 
are opposed to it except the cathedral chapters, and even 
they are only actuated by self-interest 4 

The dissensions between Rome and Madrid were further 

1 Cf. Corresp. dipl., I., 180, 195, 233, 276, 352. 

2 See LADERCHI, 1566, n. 484 ; Corresp. dipl., I., 292 seq. The 
brief was prepared with such great secrecy that not even Cardinal 
Bonelli knew of it ; see App. n. 68, Vol. XVII. of this work, and 
the autograph letter from the Pope to Castagna of August 3 
(printed in Corresp. dipl., I., 298 seq.), in which he insists that 
the liberation of Carranza and the journey of Philip II. to the 
Low Countries must be energetically pushed forward. 

3 See Corresp. dipl., I., 330. 
Ibid. 303. 



intensified in connexion with the dangerous disturbances 
which broke out in the Low Countries. Like all well-informed 
people Pius V. saw in the personal presence of Philip II. in 
the threatened provinces " a last resource against a con 
flagration which was gaining ground every day." But the 
King of Spain, who always found it so hard to make up his 
mind, could not decide upon this course. When, in September 
1566, the news reached Rome of the horrors perpetrated by 
the Netherland iconoclasts, the Pope was so overcome that, 
even at the risk of seriously irritating Philip, he hastily 
determined on a startling step. On account of the sacrileges 
committed by the insurgents he thought it his sacred duty to 
lay before the king by means of an envoy-extraordinary the 
necessity of his going to the Low Countries. Pietro Camaiani, 
Bishop of Fiesole, who had been nuncio to Charles V. in the 
time of Julius III., 1 was entrusted with this task. 2 In his 
instructions 3 we read that he was to adjure the king by the 
Blood of Christ not to put off his journey any longer ; if he 
delayed any further the Netherlands would be lost to the 
Church, as well as to the king, and that would entail the most 
serious consequences for the Catholic religion in England and 

1 See Vol. XIII. of this work, p. 135. For Camaiani, who during 
the time of his legation became Bishop of Ascoli (October 9, 1566, 
see GULIK-EUBEL, 133), see Nuntiaturberichte, XII., xxvi seg, 
Saggio di cose Ascolane, Teramo, 1766, App. cccxcvi ; Rev. 
d hist. eocles., III., 413 seq.; CAPPONI, Mem. d. cfresa Ascolana, 
Ascoli-Piceno, 1898. By many, and recently by RACHFAHL 
(Oranien, II., 2, 839) the mission of Camaiani has been confused 
with that of Alessandro Casale. The latter, according to a *brief 
of September 12, 1566, to the Archduke Charles of Austria, was 
sent to their Spanish majesties to convey congratulation " de 
partu ipsius reginae " : see Addit., 26, 865, p. 496, British Museum, 

2 See the * brief to Philip II. of September 27, 1566, accrediting 
Camaiani. Original minute in the British Museum, London 
(cf. App. 68, Vol. XVII. of this work). 

c See Corresp. dipl., I., 356 seq. The editor has missed the 
printed version of the instructions in Compte rendu de la Commiss. 
d hist, a Bruxelles, III., 9, 276 seq. 


France. His Majesty must not let himself be deterred 
by consideration for Spain, for even if Philip were to send a 
large army to the Low Countries it would be of no avail 
without his personal presence. 

Camaiani was also to ask for the actual transfer to Rome 
of Carranza, and the Pope was prepared to allow that several 
members of the Spanish Inquisition should accompany him 
in order to give information to the Curia. Camaiani was 
further to bring up the question of the offences against eccle 
siastical jurisdiction in the Kingdom of Naples, where the 
Bishop of Gravina and even the Archbishop of Naples had been 
interfered with in the exercise of their office by the Spanish 
authorities. Finally he was to call attention to the fact that 
the sovereign privileges, known as the Monarchia Sicula, had 
been made use of, as had never been the case in Sicily, " to 
make the Catholic King a Pope " and that this had entailed 
so much confusion in ecclesiastical affairs that the Pope, unless 
a remedy was found, would find himself obliged to withdraw 
all concessions and indults. 

The mission of Camaiani, which caused a great sensation 
everywhere, and still more the tasks which had been assigned 
to him, were extremely distasteful to Philip II. When at the 
end of the last week in November, 1566, he appeared before 
the king, the unwelcome visitor met with a very cold reception. 
Philip made a grievance of the fact that doubts were felt in 
the Curia about the reality of his intention of undertaking the 
journey which was so necessary, and which he had so often 
promised to make. His anger at the tasks which had been 
entrusted to the envoy was increased when Camaiani laid 
his demands before him in ill-chosen terms, and in general 
adopted a brusque tone. 1 The irritation of the king found full 
expression in the instructions which he sent to his ambassador 
in Rome. He must give the Pope clearly to understand that 
his insistence, and his interference in the affairs of His Majesty, 

1 See Corresp. dipl., II., xlv. Pius V. disapproved (ibid. I., 
430 seq.) of the over brusque attitude adopted by Camaiani, who 
was subsequently recalled. Cf. the letter of Bonelli of February 
J 2, 1567, ibid. II., 37 seq. 


whom God was making use of as His instrument, were ill-timed 
and ill-judged ; even if he had not made up his mind, as he 
actually had done, to go to the Low Countries and to send 
Carranza to Rome, the Holy Father had chosen but a sorry 
way of inducing him to do these things I 1 

The hostility of Philip II. did not have the effect of daunting 
the courage of the Pope s representative in continuing to press 
the demands entrusted to him. Before long it was categori 
cally reported that Philip would shortly set out upon his 
journey to the Low Countries. 2 

On December I7th, I566, 3 Pius V. addressed a letter to the 
king in his own hand, in which, by way of excuse, he pointed 
out that Camaiani had been sent, not because he, the Pope, 
had any doubts that Carranza would be released, but only 
in order that this affair, which had already been postponed 
on account of the press of business at the Spanish court, might 
not be allowed to drag on any longer, and that if Camaiani 
had been given the further task of insisting on the importance 
of the king s journey, this was not because the Pope thought 
that this duty was not already clear to His Majesty, but 
merely because he feared lest, as was the case with all good 
undertakings, the devil should put obstacles in the way of 
this one. In this letter Pius V. also touched upon the offences 
committed against the ecclesiastical jurisdiction by the Spanish 
authorities, adding the warning that such a course of action 
was the first step towards estrangement from the Church, 4 
and a request that the king would give orders that the bishops 
were not in future to be interfered with in the carrying out 

1 See the report of Castagna, translated in GACHARD, Bibl. de 
Madrid, 92 seq., and the letter of Philip II. to Requesens of Novem 
ber 26, 1566, in GACHARD, Don Carlos, II., 373 seq. Cf. BUDINGER, 
73 seq. KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, II., 225 seq. and Corresp, dipl., 
L, 383 seqq., 399 seq. where the reports of Castagna and Requesens 
are printed in full. 

2 See Corresp. dipl., I., 405. 413 ; cf. 362, 376 seq. 

3 Ibid. 422 seq. 

4 " E questo e il primo passo et il primo scalirio o sii grado 
d alienarsi dalla s. chiesa cattolica." 


of their duty against simonists, concubinists and other 

Before this, on December 9th, 1566, Camaiani and Castagna 
had made representations against the interference of the 
Spanish authorities in ecclesiastical matters in the Kingdom 
of Naples, and the abuses in connexion with the Monarchia 
Sicula. Philip II. asked for a more detailed memorial as to 
these matters. At the same audience Camaiani delivered a 
Papal brief on the obstacles which the senate of Milan were 
putting in the way of the reforms of the archbishop, Borromeo. 
The king promised to inquire into this carefully. 1 

At the end of 1566 and at the beginning of the new year, 
besides these ecclesiastical matters, the nuncios conferred 
with Alba and Philip II. concerning the formation of a league 
of Christian princes against the Turks, a matter which the 
Pope looked upon as supremely important. The Spanish 
government showed itself quite averse to this plan, principally 
because the German and French Protestants would look upon 
such a league as directed against themselves, and thus the 
situation in the Low Countries would be made more difficult. 2 
Concerning the decision which was now made to send Alba, 
who was to be vested with unlimited powers, and who was to 
oppose the Netherland rebels with all rigour and without 
restraint, there now sprang up a difference of opinion, similar 
to that which had occurred between Paul III. and Charles V., 
at the time of the Schmalkaldic War. 3 While at Madrid they 
wished it to appear to the rest of the world that the interven 
tion in the Low Countries was directed solely against political 

1 See the report of Castagna of December 9, 1566, in Corresp. 
dipl., I., 414 seq. Ibid. 415 seq. the memorial. In an autograph 
letter to Philip II., dated Rome, January 8, 1567, Pius V. ex 
presses the hope that the king has examined into the obstacles 
placed in the way of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the kingdom 
of Naples. In this letter he further remarks that, as he already 
sent him word by Castagna, Philip II. had no reasonable cause 
for displeasure at the mission of Camaiani. Corresp. dipl., II., 7 seq. 

z Cf. HERRE, Europ. Polltik, I., 36, 41 seq. 

3 Cf. Vol. XII. of this work, p. 303. 


rebels, in Rome they wished, as the facts indeed warranted, 
that the religious aspect of the affair should be made clear. 1 
In February, 1567, Castagna delivered to the king a letter 
from the Pope which continued to harp upon the necessity of 
his majesty s personal appearance in the Low Countries, and 
again alluded to the difficulties placed by the Spanish govern 
ment in the way of the visitation in Naples. In the negotia 
tions that followed, Philip admitted that his anger at the 
mission of Camaiani had been caused by the connecting of 
affairs in the Netherlands with the case of Carranza. He would 
certainly undertake the journey to the Low Countries, but it 
was necessary in the first place to hasten the mission of Alba. 
As to Naples he promised to give the necessary orders to 
satisfy the Pope s demands. 2 

In March, 1567, the departure of the king was announced 
in various proclamations, 3 and Camaiani thought that he could 
return to Rome with an easy conscience. 4 The embarkation 
of Carranza was at hand ; 5 Philip intended to enter into and 
to take steps to satisfy the complaints of the Pope as to the 
obstacles put in the way of the Neapolitan bishops in the 
exercise of the duties of their office, and especially their 
visitations, 6 but he remained obdurate on the subject of the 
placet, the exequatur, the recurso de fuerza, the Monarchia 
Sicula, and other royal prerogatives. 7 At the beginning of 

1 See the extracts from the reports of Castagna in GACHARD, 
Bibl. de Madrid, 93 seqq. Cf. Corresp. dipl., II., xlvi seq., 25 seq., 
43 s ^-, 47 seq., 52 seq., 57 seq., 65 seq. 

* See the report of Castagna from Madrid, February 8, 1567, 
Corresp. dipl., II., 33 seq. 

See RANKE, Hist.-biogr. Studien, Leipzig, 1877, 521 seq. 

4 He. was recalled by a letter from Bonelli of February 12, 15^67 : 
he set out on March 22 and reached Rome on April 13. See 
Corresp. dipl., II., 83, 88. 

5 It finally took place on April 27, 1567. See LAUGWITZ, 91 ; 
Corresp. dipl., II., 97 ; cf. Vol. XVII. of this work, 344. 

6 Cf. the letters of Bonelli to Castagna from Rome, January 8 
and March 6, 1567, Corresp. dipl., II., 10 seq., 63. 

7 See the report of Castagna Of March 22, 1567, Corresp. dipl.^ 
II., 84 ; III., xlvi seq. C/. LADERCHI, 1567 n. 66 ; HINOJOSA, 185 


May he tried once more to pacify Castagna about the affair 
in the Netherlands ; the interests of religion so he maintained 
would suffer no hurt if it were declared to the world that 
they were only taking action against political rebels, though 
he well knew that heresy was the origin and breeding ground 
of the revolt. 1 

The attitude of Philip II., which led the Pope to grant him 
the excusado, but who in the end abandoned his journey to the 
Low Countries, which he had represented as being quite 
decided upon, caused fresh dissatisfaction in Rome, which, 
however, began to disappear when news came of the stern 
measures being adopted by Alba. The Pope now thought 
that he could be at rest about the cause of religion in the 
Netherlands, and, as Arco reports, he was so pleased that he 
almost entirely forgot his displeasure with the king. 2 But 
it was not long before fresh disagreements over ecclesiastical 
affairs sprang up, so that, instead of improving, relations 
between Rome and Madrid became more strained than ever. 
The responsibility for this did not rest with the Pope, who was 
always much more accommodating than Philip II. 8 While 
the latter continued to press lor the concession of the Cruzada, 
and sought to bring pressure to bear upon the Pope by means 
of opinions from the Spanish prelates, 4 the Spanish govern 
ment persisted with the utmost tenacity in the cesaropapis- 
tical claims which Pius V. considered it his sacred duty to 
resist. 5 It is beyond all question that very often these claims 

1 See Corresp. dipl., II., 99. 

2 See the "letter of Arco of September 27, 1567, State Archives, 

8 See HERRE, Papsttum, 154. 

4 For the resistance of Pius V. see the report of Granvelle of 
March 14, 1567, Corresp. de Philippe II., I., 519, and the letter 
of Requesens of September 16, 1567, in Corresp. dipl., II., 200. 
As to the opinions see Corresp, dipl., II., 137 ; some are to be 
found in the Simancas Archives, Pat. Real. leg. 20. 

6 Requesens himself recognized the purity of Pius V. s inten 
tions. On December 25, 1566, he wrote to Philip II. : " Your 
Majesty may rest assured that what he has done was not due to 


were quite unjustifiable. Even Requesens, Philip II. s repre 
sentative in Rome, did not, in his private correspondence, 
conceal his opinion that the Pope was fully justified in his 
complaints of the encroachment upon ecclesiastical jurisdic 
tion. If, he said, an appeal had been made to Pius V. con 
cerning the abuses in the Roman Curia of which Spain com 
plained, the Pope would certainly have removed them, but 
in their case one-sided measures had been taken, and in so 
doing Spain had gone too far, so much so that it might be 
said that the Germans had thrown off their allegiance to the 
Holy See in word and deed, and the Spaniards had done so 
in deed. 1 

Castagna had again and again to make complaints of the 
way in which the Papal decrees, even in purely spiritual 
matters, were made subject to the placet (pase) of a civil 
authority, such as the royal council of Castille, and were even 
rejected when they were thought to run counter to the privi 
leges and laws of the kingdom. In the Kingdom of Naples, 
the outcome of these claims, the so-called exequatur, had led 
to so grave a dispute that Pius V. threatened to excommunicate 
the Viceroy. 2 Moved by the purest intentions, the Pope 
wished, by means of a visitation, to raise the Neapolitan clergy 
to a better moral state, a thing much to be desired in the inter 
ests of the kingdom itself, but he found himself hampered on 
all sides by the royal authority, while in Spain, laymen, on 
the pretext of the privileges of the Monarchia Sicula, allowed 
themselves to interfere in the most dangerous way in the in 
ternal affairs of the Church. 3 

Things came to an even graver crisis between the spiritual 

any ill-will, nor to any private intentions, but to holy zeal, though 
without any understanding of the proper way to apply it, es 
pecially in the case of princes so powerful as Your Majesty." See 
HERRE, Papsttum, 154, now published in Corresp. dipl., II., 432. 

1 Colecc. de docum. ined., XCVIL, 379-380. 

2 With Corresp. dipl., II., 27 cf. the *report of Strozzi of January 
25 and *that of Arco of February 22, 1567, State Archives, Vienna. 

3 Cf. LADERCHI, 1566, n. 184 seq.; 1567, n. 63 seq., 67 seq.; 
Corresp. dipl., II., 251 seq., 282 seq. 


arid the temporal powers in the Duchy of Milan. 1 The first 
temporary disagreement with the governor, the Duke of 
Albuquerque, who was a man of good-will, was of but small 
importance. The latter claimed certain prerogatives of 
precedence at ecclesiastical functions, which, in the opinion of 
Cardinal Borromeo, might be taken as symbolical of the 
predominance of the civil over the spiritual power. This 
matter was settled by Philip II. giving his governor orders 
to stay away from the religious functions in question. 2 Soon 
after, however, a long controversy arose with the senate of 
Milan, which had the widest powers in the government of the 
duchy, and guarded them most jealously. Borromeo very 
soon saw that he would never put an end to certain disorders 
merely by sermons and exhortations. He therefore had 
recourse to the civil courts, which hitherto had quite failed to 
punish such offences, or had only punished them lightly, and 
obtained from them the promise that they would visit them 
with imprisonment and even graver penalties. In a special 
brief 3 the Pope quieted his scruples lest such an interference 
with the sentences of the civil courts might in some circum 
stances involve ecclesiastical irregularity. The archbishop 

1 Cf. BASCAPE, 1. 2, c. I seq., 7 seqq., p. 24 seqq., 38 seqq.; MUTI- 
NELLT, Storia d ltalia, I., 275 seqq.; M. FORMENTINI, La domin- 
azione spagnuola in Lombardia, Milan, 1881 ; BERTANI, La bolla 
" Coenae," la giurisdizione ecclesiastica in Lombardia, Milan, 
1888 ; A. GALANTE, II diritto di placitazione e 1 economato del 
benefici vacanti in Lombardia, Milan, 1884 ; HINOJOSA, 194 seq.; 
LAEMMER, Meletemata, 222 seq., 226 ; GINDELY, Rudolf II., I., 16 ; 
SERRANO in Corresp. dipl.. III., v-xl. 

1 Corresp. dipl., I., 208, 262, 267, 289 (letters of April- June, 
1566) III., x. Borromeo expressed himself in favourable terms 
of Albuquerque (SYLVAIN, I., 384). 

8 Of May 22, 1566, in SALA, I., 178. According to SERRANO, 
Corresp. dipl., III., x, Pius V. gave faculties to the Cardinal 
" para proceder contra los delinquentes e" imponerles por si 6 
con ayudo del brazo secular 6 de sus tribunates, toda clase de penas, 
incluso la capital " (the italics are mine). But in the brief there 
is no mention of the episcopal tribunal, and no authority is given 
for the death sentence. 


further took proceedings on his own account against these 
deep-rooted abuses. According to a long established custom 
it had been the right of the episcopal courts to punish certain 
offences, as for example those against the sanctity of the 
sacrament of matrimony, blasphemy, the breaking of the 
precepts of fasting and Sunday observance, the usury that 
was contrary to the Church s laws, etc. 1 Borromeo, in 
accordance with the ancient custom of the Archbishops of 
Milan, now set up a force of a small number of armed police 
for the arrest of offenders, and the carrying out of the sentences 
of his court. 

The senate of Milan raised a strong protest against this step. 
The Cardinal, they maintained, could not use his armed force 
against the laity, since that would be an infringement of the 
king s prerogative ; the police, too, were bound by the ordin 
ance which forbade the use of certain arms. They also adduced 
other points of disagreement. When Borromeo wished to 
print the acta of his provincial council, the senate thought 
fit once more to uphold the rights of the king, claiming a right 
to alter the decrees of the council where they affected the 
laity. Even Papal decrees could only be acted upon in Milan 
with the consent of the senate. 2 

The question of the placet for the synod and for Papal briefs 
was soon adjusted by the conciliatory attitude of the governor, 
and the senate had to withdraw its claims. The question of 
the archbishop s armed police, however, was not settled during 
the life-time of Borromeo. As a matter of fact the rights of 
the matter were not altogether clear. Borromeo supported 
his action by the example of his predecessors in the archi- 

1 Cf. the enumeration in the letter of Borromeo of October 19, 
1569, in SALA, III., 416. 

2 BASCAPE, 1. 2, c. i, p. 24 seqq. SYLVAIN, I., 376 seqq. SER 
RANO in Corresp. dipl., III., xi. Difficulties in the way of printing 
the provincial synod were also experienced at Genoa (SALA, II., 
261, n. 135, 262, n. 137) as well as at Venice (ibid. 274, n. 14 seyq.} ; 
for which reason Pius V. sent briefs to Genoa (ibid.) and to Milan 
(Corresp. dipl., I., 414). Cf. ibid. I., 187, the decree of the Doge, 
Priuli. for the protection of the synod, dated October 3, 1567, 


episcopal dignity. The senate, on the other hand* declared 
that such rights were obsolete for the reason that, owing to 
the continued absence of the archbishops of Milan from their 
see, they had not been exercised for the past ten years. More 
over, Milan had in the meantime come under the Spanish 
crown and the laws of Spain afforded no scope for such action 
on the part of the archbishop. 1 The senate, certainly had a 
legal foundation for its action, but it availed itself of this with 
a zeal which, even in the opinion of Philip II., went too far. 2 
The stern action taken by Borromeo against abuses and immor 
ality had made him enemies, especially among the nobility 
and men of influence, who gladly seized this opportunity of 
putting an obstacle in the way of the unwelcome reformer. 3 

Philip II., to whom the senate submitted its grievances 
against the archbishop, referred the matter to the Pope for 
decision. Borromeo had already submitted the question of 
his rights to the Holy See, while the senate was represented 
in Rome by one of its members, the future Cardinal Chiesa. 
The latter returned to Milan before the summer of 1567 ; in 
the brief 4 which he brought with him the Pope promised to 
hasten the settlement of this difficult legal question as much 
as possible. While the negotiations in Rome dragged on, 
Borromeo continued as before to make use of his police, which 

1 Serrano, loc. tit. 

* " II Re catholico cognosce 1* errore del Senate et similmente 
tutti gli consiglieri che sono qul." (Castagna to Bonelli, Septem 
ber 8, 1567, Corresp. dipl., II., 189 ; cf. 215). Espinosa told the 
nuncio : " che il Re ha pavuto per male assai del Senate che 
habbia fatto quello che fece, maxime senza darne parte prima 
.al Governatore ; et gli ha scritto che adverta che non gli occorra 
mai piu simil cosa." Castagna to Bonelli, February 14, 1568, 
ibid. 305. 

1 " Alcuni del Senate ancora, quali essendo infetti di qualche 
vicio notabile, fanno piti remori de li altri accio che [non] siano 
per aventura castigati de i loro peccati." Bonelli to Castagna, 
July 25, 1567, Corresp. dipl., II., 172 ; BASCAP, 1. 2, c. i, p. 24 

4 Printed in BASCAP&, 1. 2, c. 2, p. 29 ; an Italian version in 


according to all legal principles, he had the full right to do. 
It occasioned great excitement and indignation when he took 
action against the immoral conduct of a noble Milanese who 
" had sold the honour of his house for money." The Cardinal 
had him arrested and thrown into prison. 1 

At this the indignation of the senate burst out. Under 
the pretext that the archbishop s officer was carrying for 
bidden arms, the senate, breaking through ecclesiastical im 
munities, had him arrested at the doors of the cathedral of 
Milan, publicly tortured in the presence of a great number of 
people at the usual gibbet, and then banished from Milan 
under threat of the galleys. 2 The Cardinal demanded satis 
faction, which the senate refused ; Borromeo then excommuni 
cated the authors of the outrage, but the senate had the sen 
tence torn down from the doors of the church, and in offensive 
terms lodged an accusation against the archbishop in Rome. 3 
Thus the breach was complete ; the attempts at conciliation 
on the part of the governor, without whose knowledge the 
senate had acted, were in vain, and the only hope of a solution 

1 Bonelli to Castagna, August 2 1567, in SYLVAIN, I., 380. 

8 Bonelli to Castagna, July 25, 1567, Corresp. dipl., II., 169 
eqq. Brief of February 17, 1569, in SALA, I., 222 seq. Letter 
of the Senate, dated July 13, 1567, in SALA, III., 388. Cf. Corresp. 
dipl., III., xiii. According to Serrano (ibid, xiv) the officer had 
only suffered " un simulac/o de vapulaci6n." Bonelli (loc. cit. 
170) speaks, it is true of " tre tratti di corda," but this does not 
mean three blows with a rope, but that he was three times racked 
and three times released ; cf. the brief already cited : " publice 
tribus ictibus eculei acriter plecti et affici, cum maxima ignominia 
. . . et cum gravi eius corporis tormento." Thus too the letter 
of the Senate, loc. cit. : " poena trium funis quassuum affectus." 
Cf. BASCAP&, 1. 2, c. 2, p. 30 : " Acerrime si quis unquam alius 

* " Tanta fuit semper archiepiscopi duritia ; ,cum virum hunc 
[Borromeo] videremus nullis omnino rationibus moveri ; ,adeo 
impotenti ira exarsit ; ,ne cum homine hoc, qui a sua voluntate 
mmquam decedit, in certamen descendants etc," Letter of 
July 13, 1567, loc. cit. 


of the complicated problem lay in the negotiations between 
Rome and Madrid. 

Pius V. did not deign any reply to the letter of the senate. 
He had recourse to the governor, speaking to him of what 
had occurred in words of bitter reproach ; what had been done 
against the Cardinal must be annulled, and everything 
restored to the position in which it had been before the occur 
rence ; the question of further action against the offenders 
was reserved for further consideration. 1 At the end of 
August the president and two other members of the senate, 
together with several others involved in the affair, were 
summoned to Rome to give a personal account of their action. 2 
All the remonstrances of the governor and the Spanish ambas 
sador in Rome were unable to make the Pope go back upon 
this demand ; 3 the utmost that could be wrung from him 
was the extension of the time originally fixed from thirty to 
forty-five days. 4 

Philip II. disapproved of the ill-advised action of the 
senate ; 5 on the other hand he deemed it his duty to intervene 
once more on behalf of the authority of his government, 6 
and he was displeased that the Pope should have taken action 
without first consulting him. 7 

Philip sought before everything else to find a solution of the 
controversy by winning over Borromeo, 8 because once that 
was done he hoped the Pope would not raise any further 

1 Brief of July 28, 1567, Corresp. dipl., II., 171 n. 
2 Bonelli to Castagna, August 22, 1567, ibid. iSi and 182 n. i. 
The Papal summons is of August 19 ; ibid. 196, n. i. 

3 Bonelli to Castagna, September 24, 1567, ibid. 211. 

4 Brief to Albuquerque of September 6, 1567, printed ibid. 197. 

6 See supra, p. 19, n. 2. 

" siendo este de tanta consideracion por lo que toca a la 
reputacion de la justicia en cuya estimacion consiste la principal 
fuer9a de los estados y sefiorias temporales." Philip II. to 
Requesens, September 14, 1567, Corresp. dipl., II., 196. 

7 Castagna to Bonelli, September 28, 1567, ibid. 215. 

8 Letter of Philip II. to Borromeo of September i, 1567, ibid. 
III., xvi n. (there is a printer s error here of 1568). 


difficulties. But the governor s attempts in this direction 
were without result. Philip therefore, in October, 1567, sent 
to Rome to carry on the negotiations the Marquis de Cerralbo, 1 
who was first to go to the Cardinal at Milan to try to come 
to an arrangement with him, which the Pope could then 
approve ; if, however, Borromeo would not agree to this, 
Cerralbo was not to be afraid of threatening him, and to hold 
out to the archbishop the prospect of the king s publicly 
representing him as the disturber of the peace of the state. 

Cerralbo only reached Milan in the middle of January, 1568, 
and there put forward his proposals, which were fundamentally 
little more than a renewal of the claims of the senate. 2 Before 
he succeeded in obtaining any satisfaction from Borromeo, 
the news arrived that the Papal decision of the case was 
imminent, so that Cerralbo set off hurriedly on his way to 
Rome, where with considerable difficulty he succeeded in 
inducing the Pope to defer his decision until he had first gone 
into the explanations brought by Cerralbo. 3 The efforts of 
Cardinals Pacheco and Granvelle with the Pope, however, met 
with a certain amount of success ; Pius withdrew the summons 
to the senate on condition that they should make satisfaction 
to the Archbishop of Milan, and beg for absolution from the 
ecclesiastical censures. 4 The expected Papal decision as to 
the rights of the Archbishop of Milan did not appear, while 
Cerralbo rejected a compromise suggested by Pius V. 5 

Hitherto the governor of Milan, the Duke of Albuquerque, 
had shown himself the friend of the archbishop, but he gradu 
ally became estranged from him and began to treat him as an 
adversary, at any rate in his public acts. On the eve of 

1 The credentials dated October 12, 1567, ibid. II., 220 ; sum 
mary of the instructions for Cerralbo, ibid. n. 

* Corresp. dipl., III., xvii seq. 

8 Zufiiga to Albuquerque, February 14, 1568, ibid. II., 303, n. 2. 

4 Ibid, xix seq. Avviso di Roma of March 20, 1568, ibid. xx. 

6 Nor could the General of the Dominicans, Vincenzo Giustiniani, 
who went to Spain in the following year as Papal envoy, bring 
about an agreement on the subject. See Corresp. dipl., III., 
xxii, and infra, p. 60 seq. 


Corpus Christ! in 1568, he informed the vicar-general of the 
archbishop, who was away, that he could not take part in the 
procession on the following day if the armed guards of the 
archbishop had any part in it. 1 On August 25th he issued a 
strict edict against all who, directly or indirectly, violated the 
royal jurisdiction. This edict in all probability referred to 
the controversy with the archbishop, and was certainly 
understood in that sense in the archiepiscopal curia ; 2 all 
Borromeo s officers of justice took to flight, and thus the arch 
bishop s court was suddenly paralysed. 3 

Albuquerque s edict made its appearance just at the moment 
when the struggle between the civil and ecclesiastical powers 
in Milan had become more bitter than ever. The chapter 
of S. Maria della Scala, which was much in need of reform, 
resisted the archbishop s visitation on the gound that the 
church was under royal patronage and was independent of 
the archbishop. It was true that Clement VII. had granted 
rights of exemption to the Scala, but only on the condition 
that the Archbishop of Milan confirmed them, and the canons 
were unable to produce proof of such confirmation. Under 
these circumstances Borromeo asked in Rome what he was 
to do, and received the reply that he could make the visitation. 
The Cardinal, however, waited for another two months before 

It then happened that a cleric belonging to the Scala was 
imprisoned for some offence by the archiepiscopal courts, and 
this let loose the hatred that had so long been accumulating. 
Relying on their privileges the canons declared that two 
officers of the court were excommunicated, and demanded an 
explanation from the archbishop himself. The senate openly 
took the part of the chapter, whose claims the governor also 
supported, and it was just at that moment that he issued the 

1 Corresp. dipl., III., xxi. 

8 " Questo bando non si pu6 dir che sia st fatto per altro, che 
per la total ruina della giurisdittione et libertk ecclesiastica." 
Thus the Consider ationi on the bando in SALA, II., 13. 

* C/. the documents in SALA, II., 13 seqq. 


edict threatening the severest penalties for every infringement 
of the royal jurisdiction. 

Borromeo quickly made up his mind. He arranged for the 
visitation of the Scala to take place in a few days time, nor 
would he agree to the governor s request that he would, on 
account of the general uneasiness, wait for another three days. 
On August 3 ist, 1569, a priest notified the canons in the arch 
bishop s name, of his immediate arrival, but he was driven 
out with violence by the chapter, who had taken refuge in the 
cemetery behind the church. Soon afterwards the Cardinal 
arrived in solemn procession, and this proved the signal for 
wild scenes. The leaders of the calvacade had hardly 
arrived, one carrying the Cardinal s insignia, and another the 
archiepiscopal cross, when their horses were seized by the 
bridles and the procession forced to halt. Borromeo got 
down from his mule, took his cross, which in accordance with 
the ritual he had to hold in his hand when pronouncing the 
excommunication of the canons, and took several steps 
towards the gate of the cemetery. The canons drove him 
back ; some armed men whom they had hired came in brand 
ishing their swords, 1 and crying : Spain ! Spain ! and the 
gates were then closed in the archbishop s face. He then 
pronounced the excommunication of the chapter, and his 
vicar-general affixed to the walls a document to that effect, 
which, however, was at once torn down. Borromeo then 
returned to the cathedral, without having accomplished his 
purpose, and there again repeated the excommunication of 
the offenders. The canons, for their part, proclaimed to the 
sound of bells that the archbishop had incurred ecclesiastical 

1 According to a memorial defending the point of view of the 
Senate, which is also followed by SERRANO, Corresp. dipl., III., 
xxv seq., one of the armed servants of the archbishop was the 
first to draw his sword. In a letter to Castagna (summary in 
BASCAPE, 1. -2., c. 9, p. 44) Borromeo declares this accusation of 
his enemies to be ridiculous, as he had not gone with armed 
attendants : " eosdem crimini sibi dedisse . . . rem indignissi- 
mam, sed tainen etiam ridiculam, gladios a Caroli parte, prorsus 
semper inermi, prius deductos." 


penalties by what he had done against the Scala, and had a 
proclamation to that effect set up in large letters in various 

The archbishop now found himself in an extremely difficult 
position. His own tribunal was paralysed ; the senate and 
the governor did not raise a finger against the men who had 
drawn their swords on their archbishop. Albuquerque even 
wrote to the Pope that there would be no peace in Milan until 
the archbishop was removed. 1 For a moment even Pius V. 
seemed to be influenced by the unfavourable reports of Borro- 
meo, to whom he wrote that if it were true that he had refused 
to postpone the visitation for three days, he could not approve 
of his action. 2 The Pope nevertheless vigorously undertook 
the defence of the archbishop, and warned the governor in 
strong terms of the consequences that must be entailed by 
acts of violence against the Cardinal. 3 

In spite of the apparently hopeless position Borromeo did 
not lose courage. He defended his cause, which he was con 
vinced was the cause of the Church, in letters to Rome, to 
the Papal nuncio in Madrid, and to Philip II., and obtained 
what had seemed impossible, namely that the victory rested 
with him. A few days after the Cardinal had issued a detailed 
protest against the governor s edict on jurisdiction, 4 the 
attempt of the Humiliati on his life took place, wheri he 
escaped unharmed in so marvellous a way. 5 There then arose 
a fear of continuing to fight against a man in whose favour 
God had, in the opinion of everyone, worked a miracle, 6 and 
neither the governor nor Philip II. could allow it to be said 
that their behaviour towards the representative of the eccle- 

1 Corresp. dipl., III., xxx. SYLVAIN, II., 9, n. 

8 Brief of September 16, 1569, in LADERCHI, 1569, n. 6. 

8 Briefs of September 10 and October 8, 1569, ibid. n. 6 and 7. 
The formula of salutation in the last brief runs : " Salutem et 
apostolicam benedictionem et salubriora in Domino consilia." 

4 October 19, 1569, in SALA, II., 20 seqq.; III., 415 seqq. 

* See Vol. XVII. of this work, p. 246. 

6 " Hizo Dios milagro que no le hiziessen otro dano, etc." 
Albuquerque to Zuniga, October 26, 1569, Corresp. dipl., III., xxxv. 




siastical power had encouraged the daring of the murderer. 1 
On December 22nd, 1569, Borromeo received from the governor 
a letter from the king, in which Philip II. expressed his dis 
approval of the action of the Scala, and insisted on their sub 
mission to the archbishop. 2 A further declaration by the king 
put an end to the scruples of the senate, who were seeking to 
avoid a public act of submission to the archbishop by appealing 
to their status as representing the royal authority. 3 On the 
vigil of Christmas, 1569, the procurator and the notary of the 
senate publicly and solemnly asked at the doors of the cathe 
dral of Milan for absolution from their excommunication. 4 
The canons of the Scala did the same on February 5th, 1570. 6 
On December I2th, 1569, the governor had mitigated his 
edict on jurisdiction by a further declaration. When neither 
the Pope nor the archbishop was satisfied with this, on Decem 
ber 29th he agreed that the archbishop should use the officers 
of his tribunal as had been done in former years. 6 

It was true that this did not provide a solution of the 
greatest of the issues then at stake, but nobody except Borro 
meo himself could ever have thought that even so much could 
have been accomplished. 

1 On November 2, 1569, Bonelli gave Giustiniani instructions 
to tell the king : " che quest! sono i frutti che finalmente sono 
nati dalla poca intelligenza, anzi pifi tosto, dalla quasi manifesta 
inimicitia et dai continui disfavori che gli hanno usati et mostrati 
i ministri di S.M." etc. Corresp. dipl., III., 184. 

2 SYLVAIN, II., 30. Castagna to Bonelli, November 26, 1569, 
Corresp. dipl., III., 192. BASCAPE, 1. 2, c. n, p. 48 seq. 

3 BASCAPE, ibid. p. 49. 

4 Ibid. 

* Ibid. SYLVAIN, II., 38. 

Corresp. dipl., III., xxxv seq. Briefs to Albuquerque of 
December 21, 1569 and January 15, 1570, in LADERCHI, 1569, 
n. T8 ; 1570, n. 153. A brief of August n, 1570, to the Senate 
of Milan (ibid. 1570, n. 154) admits that the right of ecclesiastical 
sanctuary ought not to hold good in the case of great crimes, and 
that Borromeo ought to hand over an adulterer and an assassin 
to the civil courts. 


AT the end of 1567 Requesens retired from his position as 
ambassador of Philip II. in Rome. 1 The Pope regretted his 
departure, 2 and entrusted to him a memorial embodying his 
wishes concerning the disputes at Milan and Naples, and the 
Monarchia Sicula* Cardinals Pacheco and Granvelle had 
worked with Requesens in the interests of Spain. Granvelle, 
who had been in the Curia since 1566, was looked upon as 
Philip s most trusted confidant, and he exercised a great 
influence over Requesens. 4 He was a true product of the 

1 *Arco announces on December 27, 1567, that Requesens, 
who was surrounded by Cardinals seeking pensions, intended to 
start in two days. But according to the *report of Strozzi of 
January 4, 1568 (State Archives, Vienna), he was still in Rome 
on that date ; his farewell audience had already taken place. 
See the brief of December 28, 1567, in which Pius V. praises him 
on the occasion of his departure, in Corresp. dipl., II., 281 seq. 

See ibid. 281. 

3 " *Memoria al sig. commend, maggiore di Castiglia di quanto 
N.S 1 * 6 desidera che si tratti con S.M.C^ in suo nome," in Varia 
Polit., 81 (now 82), p. 426 seq., without date, and p. 488-491, 
minute ; on p. 489^ is to be seen the remark : " Aggiunta al 
Memoria ... a 29 di decembre 1567," and on p. 491 b : " Mem- 
oriale di N.S re dato al sig. comm. magg. di Castiglia in qual parti 
di Roma a 30 di decembre 1567. Papal Secret Archives. 

4 See Colecc. de docum. ined., XCVII., 386. On November 
15, 1566, Strozzi announced to Maximilian II. : *" Alcuni dicono 
haver scoperto ch el card le - Granvella e quello che ha la mente 
del re Filippo e che tratti qui tutti i negocii d importanza per esso 
in compagnia del commendator." (State Archives, Vienna). 
Granvelle had been received in consistory on February j, 1566 : 
see Corresp. dipl., I., 121 n. 3. 



Renaissance, with much practical experience of the world 
but, like Pacheco, he had no influence with the Pope, who 
knew his complete dependence upon Spain. 1 One day 
Pius V. openly told him that he was more Spaniard than Car 
dinal. How true this estimate was is clear from the relations 
between Granvelle and his sovereign, whose conception of 
ecclesiastical policy coincided with his own. The Cardinal 
could not but recognize the holy life and pure intentions of 
Pius V., but the cold-blooded politician showed how little 
he understood the position of the Pope and his great delicacy 
of conscience. He only saw in him a profound ignorance of 
politics, and an inability to deal with princes. Since Pius V., 
so Granvelle once wrote to Philip II., wishes nothing for his 
relatives, he imagines that he can push forward boldly, but he 
soon draws back if you show your teeth. 2 Even Philip II., 
in face of the difficulties which Pius V. put in the way of his 
use of the Inquisition for political purposes, was of opinion 
that the Pope was injuring the cause of religion by his scruples 
of conscience ! 3 

So long as there was such a want of grasp of the facts on 
the part of the counsellors of Philip II., there were bound to 
be conflicting views. Pius V., who clearly realized the 
importance of the Spanish king for the protection of Catholic 
interests in England and France, welcomed with all possible 
cordiality Juan de Zufiiga when he arrived in Rome on 
January i8th, 1568, as the successor of Requesens, and 
when France made objections he remarked that the King of 

1 See Corresp. de Philippe II., I., 599 ; of. HERRE, Papsttum, 
145. An excellent character sketch of Granvelle in RACHFAHL, 
Oranien, II., i, 137 seq. It would appear that his by no means 
blameless behaviour remained unknown to Pius V. (see Renom 
de France, d. PIOT, I., 26, n. i. 

1 Letter of December 23, 1566 ; see Corresp. de Philippe II., 
II., xlvii. As complete a failure to understand the character of 
Pius V. is to be found in the "report of Cusano of February 2, 1566, 
State Archives, Vienna. 

* See Colecc. de docum. ined., 341 ; FORNERON, I., 189 seq. 


Spain was the only Catholic sovereign who protected the 
Church. 1 

The first relations of Zuniga with the Pope were mutually 
satisfactory, but it was not long before difficulties arose. 
Zuniga had been instructed to obtain the definite concession 
of the Cruzada, but he did not shut his eyes to the difficulty 
he would have in overcoming the scruples of Pius V. on the 
subject, and was careful to avoid bringing the matter forward 
before the settlement of the dispute about Milan 2 which Cer- 
ralbo, who had been sent to Rome by Philip II., was engaged in 
arranging. 3 At the beginning of March 1568 it seemed as though 
a happy issue to this dispute was probable. 4 The canonist, 
Gianpaolo della Chiesa, who was highly esteemed by Philip 
II., and had been sent to Rome by the senate, had rendered 
such good service in the matter that Pius V. conferred the 
red hat on him at the creation of Cardinals of March 24th, 
1568 ; while France was only taken into consideration on 
this occasion by the nomination of Jerome Souchier, Pius V. 
also conferred the purple on the President of the Spanish 
Council of State, Espinosa, and on Antonio Carafa, who was 
the devoted adherent of Philip II. 5 The Spaniards therefore 
had every cause for satisfaction. In fact Zuniga reported on 
March 2Qth : We have a holy Pope, and if he will give us the 
Cruzada, we shall have nothing left to desire ; he would like 

1 See the report of Zuniga in Corresp. dipl., II., 294 seq., 296 seq. 
Cf. also the "report of Arco of January 24, 1568 (in Latin and 
Italian), State Archives, Vienna. 

2 See the reports of Zuniga in Colecc. de docum. ined., XCVII ., 
391 seq., 396. 

3 See ibid., 395. 

* See the *report of Arco of March 13, 1568, State Archives 

6 Cf. CIACONIUS, III., 1031 seq. ; CARDELLA, V., 114 seq. ; 
HERRE, Papsttum, 156 seq. In his ""letter to Castagna of March 
24, 1568 (Nunziat. de Spagna, VI., Papal Secret Archives) Bonelli 
brings out the consideration shown by Pius V. for Philip II. in 
the promotion. For the gratitude of Philip II. see Corresp. de 
Philippe II., II., 375. 


to reform Christendom at a single blow, but that is not possi 
ble. 1 The repeated complaints made by Zuniga that Pius V. 
was so cautious in the matter of dispensations and favours, 
and remained fixed in his ideas without letting himself be 
influenced by political considerations, 2 show that he too was 
lacking in a full appreciation of the personality of this 
supremely conscientious head of the Church. 

In spite of all his difference of opinion with him about 
ecclesiastical politics, Pius V. had a great personal regard for 
the king. Several times Zuniga was able to report the Pope s 
great solicitude for Philip s health, 3 and the French ambassa 
dor, on the occasion of the creation of Cardinals on March 
24th, openly accused him of partiality for the Spanish king. 4 
Pius, however, could not see his way to grant all that mon 
arch s wishes. When, at the beginning of April, he asked 
for the concession of the Cruzada, Zuniga met with no success, 
and the Pope gave him clearly to understand how much he 
was disgusted that he should try and make him look with 
favour upon a request which he could not grant. 6 In spite 
of this Zuniga still held out hopes to the king of being able 
to obtain this important concession. 6 In a confidential 
letter of April 26th to Cristobal de Moro, Zuniga makes much 
of the holy zeal of Pius V. and of his personal liking for Philip 
II. : The king is in very good odour with the Pope ; if every 
thing does not go in accordance with his wishes, the blame 
rests with those to whom the Holy Father has entrusted his 
affairs. On account of the disputes about jurisdiction, 
Zuniga continues, we have a thousand difficulties every day, 

1 Colecc. de docum. indd., XCVII., 413. 

See ibid. 405, 415, 417, 427, 439, 459. 

See ibid. 400, 401. 

4 See the "report of Arco of March 27, 1568, according to which 
among the Cardinals Mula had made opposition to the nomination, 
and received a sharp reply from the Pope. State Archives, 

6 See the report of Zuniga of April 7, 1568, Colecc, de docum. 
hied., XCVII., 420, 422 seq. 

See Corresp. dipl., II., 341, 


and these continue to increase in connexion with those things 
which the Pope wishes to reform. We have not yet settled 
the affair at Milan, and its decision is likely to be deferred for 
some time. As to the Cruzada, I am very doubtful, as I was 
when I came, but I have not told this to the king. 1 According 
to a report from Arco to Maximilian II. on May ist, 1568, 
Pius V. declared to Cardinals Granvelle and Paeheco that he 
insisted on the point that Borromeo should be allowed to take 
proceedings with his " armed force " even against laymen, 
in matrimonial cases and the like, but that the Spaniards saw 
in this an infringement of the sovereign rights of their king. 2 
The final settlement of the Milanese dispute also occupied 
the attention of the nuncio Castagna longer than he had 
expected from the tranquillizing assurances given by the gov 
ernment at the beginning of I568. 3 Castagna was afraid 
of a counter-stroke in Spain in the form of a prohibition to 
the bishops to inflict pecuniary or other penalties on the laity. 4 
He therefore felt it his duty all the more strongly to insist 
that in the Milanese controversy the obedience due to the 
Pope and the rights of the Church should be made quite clear. 5 
Castagna had also to fight again and again in connexion 

1 Colecc. de docum. ined., XCVII., 451. 

a *" A quelli del Re cattolico pare questa cosa troppo dura 
perch e in questo modo 1 arcivescovo sarebbe piii padrone di 
quella citta che 1 istesso Re." Arco, May i, 1568, State Archives 
Vienna. Cf. the letter of Zuniga of May i, 1568, Colecc. de 
docum. ined., XCVII., 464 seq. 

* See the reports of Castagna of January 16 and February 14, 
1568, Corresp. dipl., II., 286, 305 seq. 

*Ibid. 322. 

fc Cf. ibid. 276 seq., 278 seq., 286. On March 30, 1568, Castagna 
wrote to Bonelli, " *Delle cose di Milano si aspetta, come altre 
volte ho scritto, quello che avvisara il marchese di Ceralvo. In 
questo mezzo ho detto al Re et ad altri che Sua Santita procederi 
con li debiti termini inanzi al giudicio, perche la cosa e in tal 
termine che non pu6 fermarsi cosi in modo nissuno, ma e necessario 
che si renda a Sua Santitk la debita ubbedienza et alia chiesa la 
dovuta giustitia." Borghese I., 606, p. 356^357, Papal Secret 


with the position of the nuncio at Naples, 1 against the constant 
infringement of ecclesiastical rights which took place in that 
kingdom, and against the obstacles which were placed in the 
way of the bishops in the carrying out of their duties. Since 
the liberty of the Church was attacked in various ways, both 
there and in Spain, he drew up his complaints in the form of 
a memorial which he sent at the beginning of March to the 
king, who was accustomed himself to read all such documents, 
no matter how long. It is dated March 2nd, 1568, and in it 
Castagna tries with much skill to induce the king to change 
his ways, touching, above all, a chord which could not fail 
to appeal to Philip II. In a long historical exposition, he 
shows how heresies, beginning with that of Hus, and going 
on to the present time, all aimed at destroying the authority 
and power of the Pope. This had been the case in Bohemia, 
Germany, France and England. Happily Spain was less 
infected by heresy than those countries, and it was hoped 
that it would remain so, not only by reason of the vigilance 
of the Inquisition, but because the country had a king who 
was as Catholic-minded as could be desired, a king who stood 
out above all his fellows as a shining example of unflinching 
hostility to all religious innovations. Yet even in Spain 
there was danger, because of the usurpation of the rights of the 
Church by the civil power. It was evident that such usurpa 
tions meant grave injury both to the state and to religion. 
The authority which has been withdrawn from the Church, 
the memorial goes on to state, has not been won by the king 
for himself, but he is destroying it altogether, and not only 
gains nothing for himself, but offends God without gaining 
any advantage, and acts in such a way as to injure his own 
good name, and even against his own interests. For this 
reason it is those princes who have conferred favours on the 
Church, and not those who have taken them away, those who 
have increased them and not those who have restricted them, 
who have enjoyed the greatest power and authority, and whose 

1 See the report of Castagna of March 2, 1568, Corresp. clipl., II., 
314 ; cf. III., liv. See as to this MEISTER, Die Nuntiatur in 
Neapcl, in Hist. Jahrb., XIV., Si. 


praises are sung in history. Castagna then goes on to depict 
in vivid colours the oppression of the Church s liberties in 
Spain, the strict supervision of Apostolic bulls which is 
perpetually being exercised by the royal council and chancery, 
the obstacles which in so many ways are placed in the way of 
the enactments and sentences of the Roman court, the various 
forms of interference, under the pretext of justice, in ecclesi 
astical trials, the orders which are issued to the prelates, 
judges and other ecclesiastics to excommunicate or absolve 
according to the wishes of the royal council or the chancery. 
By means of these widespread usurpations of ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction, under various pretexts and with great cleverness, 
a kind of ecclesiastical power is given to the king and his 
ministers, and thus the two distinct jurisdictions are confused, 
to the disturbance of the order established by God, and with 
great danger of separation from the Holy See. Such vio 
lations of ecclesiastical liberty have always marked the first 
beginnings of heresy, as had been seen in the case of France. 1 

Philip II. replied to these complaints 2 by saying that he 
must, before everything else, obtain more exact information 
before arriving at any decision. On May ist, 1568, Castagna 
reported that the government had asked for information as 
to the use made of the Monarchia Sicula, so that it might 
decide whether any reform was called for in that connexion. 3 

To the perplexities which all these things occasioned for 
Castagna, fresh ones were soon added. By an edict of Novem 
ber ist, 1567, 4 Pius V. had issued a general prohibition of 

1 The memorial was first made known by Lammer (Zur Kir- 
chengesch., 134 and Melet. 220 seqq.} from the Cod. 33-E-3 of 
the Corsini Library, Rome. Lammer wrongly attributes it to 
Acquaviva, which is impossible on the score of chronology alone. 
That it was presented by Castagna is clear from the latter s report 
of March 2, 1568 ; it is also to be found among his papers. See 
HINOJOSA, 186; Corresp. dipl., II., 315. 

2 Cf. Corresp. dipl., II., 350. 

3 Ibid. 357 (with wrong date March i). 

4 See Bull. Rom., VII., 630 seq. Cf. Corresp. dipl., II., 247. 
See also Vol. XVII. of this work, p. 207. 


bull-fights, which had already been forbidden 1 in the Papal 
States ; those who took part in them were excommunicated, 
and no one who lost his life in them might receive Christian 
burial. As the forbidden sport had also spread to Portugal, 
the nuncio was called upon to publish the prohibition there 
as well, 2 but, however justifiable it was, the ordinance met 
with the greatest opposition. The Spanish grandees, as soon 
as they heard of it, at once lodged a protest, and even the 
king undertook the defence of the threatened national sport. 
In this case once more, as was his custom, he sought for 
complaisant theologians, who did not fail to provide proofs 
that bull-fights were not sinful. 3 On account of their de 
pendence on the government, the Spanish bishops did not 
dare to publish the Papal prohibition, so that Castagna had 
to publish the bull himself. 4 Unfortunately, the evil custom 
still found defenders, among them even a Franciscan, against 
whose written defence Pius V. took stern measures. 5 The 
nuncio also met with opposition when he tried, in accordance 
with a request made by Pius V. in a letter of January 25th, 
1568, to abolish the quite unchristian custom that existed 
in Spain of refusing viaticum to those condemned to death. 8 
Lastly, Castagna, acting on the express orders of the Pope, 7 

1 See Corresp. dipl., II., 30, and the collection of the Editti, I., 
191 in the Casanatense Library, Rome. 
* See Corresp. dipl., II., 272. 

3 See the reports of Castagna of January 27, and March 8, 1568, 
Corresp. dipl., II., 299, 322 seq. Cf. the letter of Zufiiga of April 
21, 1568, Colecc. de docum. ined., XCV1L, 439. In letters of 
January 24 and April 21, 1568, Cardinal Bonelli insists on Castagna 
having the bull put into force. Corresp. dipl., II., 322, n. ; 350. 

4 See the reports of Castagna of ApriL 13 and May 14, 1568. 
Corresp. dipl., II., 349, 366. 

5 See ibid. IV., Ix. Castagna hoped ( report of June 17, 1568, 
Papal Secret Archives) to be able gradually to stamp out the 

8 See LADERCHI, 1568, n. 200 ; Corresp. dipl., II., 321, 349. 
Cf. GAMS, III., 2; 197 seq. 

7 *Da parte di N.S re con mons. 1* arcivescovo di Rossano nuntio 
in Ispagna, in Varia Pojit, 82, 431-434, Papal Secret Archives. 


again and again called attention to the abuses which existed 
in the West Indian Colonies, not only by insisting on the 
respect due to ecclesiastical jurisdiction, but also on a more 
humane treatment of the natives, and their conversion to 
Christianity. Philip II. promised to issue the necessary 
orders to his officials, but neither he nor Cardinal Espinosa 
would hear of the appointment of a nuncio for the Colonies. 1 
In the meantime Pius V. had taken an important step 
towards the re-establishment of the ecclesiastical liberties, 
jurisdiction and immunities which were in various ways 
infringed or resisted, both in and out of Spain. Hitherto 
the validity of the censures inflicted on certain determinate 
and grave crimes, which were reserved to the Pope, and were 
enumerated in the bull In.coena Domini, had been dependent 
on the condition that the bull should be solemnly promulgated 
each year on Maundy Thursday. The form of the bull 
which was read on Maundy Thursday, 1568, April I5th, 
contained for the first time the clause that it was to remain 
in force until the promulgation of a new bull. Moreover, 
on this occasion the bull contained a number of additional 
clauses directly aimed against the abuses and usurpations of 
the civil authorities m ecclesiastical matters which were at 
that time to be found in many different countries. 2 For 

1 See Corresp. dipl., II., 350, 382, 390, 471 seq. 

2 For the additions of 1568 see App. nn. 2 and 3. The violent 
polemics of the Old Catholics raised by Dollinger on the occasion 
of the Vatican Council, against the bull In coena Domini, which 
is quite erroneously put forward as an ex cathedra decision, were 
tilting at a wind-mill, since the In coena, like the other disciplinary 
bulls of earlier times, entirely lost its binding force in virtue of 
the constitution Apostolicae Sedis moderations issued by Pius IX. 
on October 12, 1869. In his edition of " Janus," Friedrich 
carried on the dispute unshaken. Concerning the effect of the 
bull, and the history of the cases reserved therein, an excellent 
account is given (p. 102 seqq), in the work of HAUSMANN which 
was crowned in 1861 by the theological faculty of Munich, of 
which Dollinger was also a member, Cf. also PHILLIPS, Ver- 
mischte Schriften, II., 377 seq. 


example, excommunication was now inflicted upon all those 
who, whatever their position, appealed from the Pope to an 
ecumenical council. The clause directed against those who 
ill-used ecclesiastical dignitaries also covered the banishment 
of Cardinals, bishops, legates and nuncios. The most im 
portant addition concerned laymen of all classes who took 
criminal proceedings against ecclesiastics, it being made clear 
that all contrary Papal privileges, even if granted to kings, 
princes or other authorities, were henceforth annulled and 
revoked. Lastly, the bull laid it down that every priest 
having the care of souls must have a copy and study it dili 
gently, so that in the confessional he might well know what 
cases were reserved to the Pope for absolution. 

On April 2Oth, 1568, the bull began to be sent out to all 
the bishops, with orders to make it known solemnly, because 
many people did not know that they were excommunicated 
by acting against the prohibitions contained in the bull. 1 

It was evident that the bull, which rested entirely upon the 
medieval conception of canon law, was a condemnation of 
the cesaropapalism which had grown up, especially in Spain 
and Venice. 2 As early as 1566 it was made evident to 
what a pitch things had come in Spain when the bishops 
there refused to publish the bull In coena Domini, when it 
was issued in that year, without the permission of the royal 
council, although the Pope had definitely directed them to 
do so in a brief of April 20th. 3 A quarrel was avoided on that 

1 See Arm. 44, t. 12, n. 66 : " Compluribus episcopis," of April 
20, 1568, Papal Secret Archives. Cf. LAZZARESCHI, 13 ; Corresp. 
dipl., II., 409, n. i ; the brief of Pius V. to Charles Borromeo in 
BERTANI, 84 seq. bears the date April 28. 

2 For the state absolutism of the Venetians see Vol. IV. of this 
work, pp, 95 seqq. On April 24, 1568, Cusano "reports that 
Pius V. was specially complaining of Venice, which was not 
observing the bull and had imprisoned the abbot Lipomano. 
State Archives, Vienna. 

3 The brief of April 20, 1566, is printed in Corresp. dipl., I., 
196 seq. The Imperial ambassador Arco also deals repeatedly 
with the bull in his *reports, but he was insufficiently informed 


occasion because Philip II. realized that the bull was not 
substantially different from those which had gone before, 
and did not invalidate those " customs of Spain " which had 
hitherto been recognized by the Popes. 1 This time, however, 
principally because, in his kingdom of Naples, by appealing 2 
to the bull In coena Domini, there had been several refusals 
to pay taxes, Philip adopted another attitude, although the 
Pope repeatedly pointed out to him and his government that 
he excluded any intention of limiting the royal authority and 
jurisdiction, or of revoking former privileges by the bull ; 
all that he must avoid were unjust extensions and abuses of 
these privileges, - and thus ensure the good of souls and the 
welfare of the people. Pius V. added a warning against 
putting his trust in those persons who sought to persuade the 
princes that he had any designs against the state in publishing 
the bull. 3 

In Rome the principal exponent of such ideas was the 

on the subject. On May n, 1566, he announces that it is said 
that the Pope had sent the bull In coena to all the nuncios in 
order that they might communicate it to the princes " ma fino 
a hora ella dispiace a tutti ;" opposition was to be feared from 
the princes, especially where it was taken literally. On June 8 
Arco maintains that the Pope was putting off the publication 
of the bull out of consideration for the princes " perche senza il 
consenso loro i vescovi non ardirebbono publicarla ne in Spagna 
ne in Francia, il medesimo converrebbe che facessino gli vescovi 
di Germania essendo cosa di tanta consideratione." On June 22 
Arco wrote that the bull had been " secretly " sent to the bishops 
in Spain and Portugal. Finally on July 6 he reports that it is 
not yet known whether the bull has been published in Spain or 
even in one single city in Italy. " Molti nondimeno dubitano che 
non venga un giorno fantasia al Papa di farla publicare." In 
1567 Arco had to announce on March 29 that the Pope had pub 
lished the bull as usual and ordered that all the archbishops, 
bishops and parish priests should have a copy. State Archives, 

1 See Corresp. dipl., I., 191. 

2 Cf. ibid. III., Ivii seq. 

8 See ibid. II., 373, 444, 451, 503. 


Venetian ambassador, Paolo Tiepolo. He had promptly 
made a report to the Signoria making out that by his action 
the Pope intended to assume the decision, not only of spiritual 
and semi-spiritual matters, but also of those that were purely 
civil. Tiepolo entirely misunderstood the situation, for he 
even thought that the Pope s action was due to ill-disposed 
and unconscientious advisers who, in looking about for the 
necessary means to re-establish the authority of the Church, 
wished to embroil him in disputes with the civil authorities. 1 
At first Zuniga, the representative of Spain in Rome, adopted 
a more cautious attitude. It is true that he too held the 
erroneous view that the entourage of Pius V. were trying to 
distract the Pope s attention from reforms in Rome by involving 
him in quarrels with the princes ; 2 he wished, however, that 
Tiepolo should be the first to take steps in the matter. 
Zuniga formed a truer estimate of Pius V. in another respect. 
He realized that it was no use to deal with him by the methods 
hitherto adopted, and he therefore advised the concession of 
the privileges for Bosco, and the pension for Ghislieri in such 
a way that the Pope should not see in them an attempt to 
win him over by such acts of concession, for in that case 
everything would be hopelessly ruined. 3 The Spaniard 
chiefly had the Cruzada in view, though it did not escape him 
that under the existing circumstances it was becoming more 
and more difficult to obtain it, because to the angry disputes 
about the state of affairs at Milan, fresh quarrels had been 
added on the subject of the wide privileges granted to the 
Order of St. Lazarus. 4 All this increased Zufiiga s great 
anxiety (infinite cuidado) about the bull In coena Domini, 
and at last he came to the conclusion that the discussion of 
this thorny question had better be put off until the winter. 6 
Other views prevailed in Madrid. On July nth, 1568, 

1 P. Tiepolo, Relazioni di 1569, p. 179 seq. 
a Zum ga to Alba from Rome, May 8, 1568, Colecc. de docum, 
ined., XCVII., 467, 469. 

Zufiiga to Requesens from Rome, May 8, 1568, loc. cit. 469. 

4 Cf. Corresp. dipl., II., 138 seqq. 198 seqq. ; III., 41 seq. 

* Zufliga to Requesens from Rome, May 19, 1568, loc. cit. 477. 


Castagna was able to report that the Spanish government 
was putting every possible obstacle in the way of the publica 
tion of the new bull. The nuncio had received it on May 26th, 1 
and had sent it to the Spanish bishops with the Papal brief 
and a covering letter, asking them to publish it and to give 
the necessary instructions to confessors. But not one of the 
Spanish bishops had so far dared solemnly to promulgate the 
bull, from fear of the government. Castagna consequently 
found himself obliged to arrange himself for the publication 
of the bull, by communicating its contents to the religious 
Orders and to confessors. He received information of the 
king s attitude from Cardinal Espinosa, according to whom 
Philip was afraid that the Pope wished to deprive him of 
rights to which he had a good title, a thing which annoyed 
him all the more because he had expressly promised to remove 
the abuses in the Kingdom of Naples. Espinosa said that 
though he was being at that time pressed on every side, His 
Majesty would not recognize such " novelties " as he intended 
to stand up for his sovereign rights and not be a " dummy 
king." 2 Nor did the Spanish ministers make any secret of 
the fact that the government would not tolerate the publica 
tion of the bull in the Kingdom of Naples without its exequatur, 
because it never had been published there, but only in Rome, 
and the additions made by Pius V. were directed, not only 
against the exequatur, but were directly aimed at the Monarchia 
Sicula, against which the appointment of the nuncio Odescalchi 
to the Two Sicilies was also directed. The ministers also 
made complaint of a number of other claims which the Pope 
made, both in Spain and Naples, and especially of the brief 
directed against all those persons in Naples who had stolen 
or otherwise wrongfully alienated ecclesiastical property ; 
they also complained of the publication of the bull relating 
to physicians without its having received the exequatur, 

x The original "letter from Bonelli to Castagna, dated Rome, 
April 28, 1568, has the note " Ric. 26 maggio 1568 " Nunziat di 
Spagna, VI., Papal Secret Archives. 

*See the report of Castagna of July n. 1568, Corresp. dip!., 
II., 408 sea. 


because this affected laymen, who were the subjects of His 
Majesty ; another complaint was made of the summons 
issued against Marcello Caracciolo concerning a castle which 
his family had held for 120 years as a fief of Naples, and not 
of Benevento ; lastly they complained of the bull dealing 
with the Knights of St. Lazarus. On all these matters, 
reports Castagna, there are heated discussions, and Requesens 
will certainly be sent to Rome to lodge a complaint. 1 

Under these circumstances the nuncio thought it best to 
seek an audience of the king in person, and he frankly and 
strongly urged him not to let himself be led by his ministers 
to take any rash and dangerous action. He must not suppose 
that by giving his support to the infringements of ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction, he was in any way acting for the advantage of 
his kingdom, as at first sight he might appear to be doing ; 
such action on the contrary would be the ruin of his kingdom. 
It was for that very reason that the Pope was trying to keep 
the king from doing any such thing, because he loved and 
valued him as being almost the only one among the sovereigns 
who still defended the Catholic religion. Before allowing 
himself to be angry with the Pope, His Majesty ought to assure 
himself of the latter s real intentions, a subject on which his 
ministers imagined all manner of things, which had never 
even entered the mind of His Holiness. 2 

Philip excused himself from entering into the details of 
Castagna s explanation, but gave him clearly to understand 
that he did not think much of it. Never before, Castagna 
reported to Rome, had the king complained with such bitter 
ness as on this occasion, especially concerning affairs at 
Naples. " He had tears in his eyes whether from anger or 
grief I do not know when he said that even if the Pope had 
not interfered, he would on his own account have defended 
and maintained the rights, privileges and customs handed 
down to him by his ancestors." 3 

1 See the report of Castagna of July 28, 1568, Papal Secret 

1 See Corresp. dipl., II., 424 seq. 
3 See ibid. 425. 


Castagna could only account for the excitement of the king 
by the intrigues of his ministers, who had persuaded him that 
the bull In coena Domini would cause a revolution in the 
Spanish dominions. It was with, terror and anguish that he 
saw the imminent danger of a breach between the Pope and 
the king, a breach which could not fail to have disastrous 
consequences for the Church. My hopes at present, he wrote 
on July 28th, are centred in the Pope, rather than in the king, 
who relies too much upon his ministers. 1 

How earnestly Pius V. tried to remove the distrust of 
Philip II., and aimed at an understanding is seen from the 
instructions which he sent to Castagna on August I7th, 1568. 
In these instructions it is stated that the Pope did not in the 
least intend any innovation by the bull, nor at doing away 
with the exequatur, nor at limiting the jurisdiction of the 
king, but only at safeguarding the authority of the Holy See 
in the interests of the Church. Although it was only right 
that a prince should have knowledge of the things being done 
in his territories, the Pope nevertheless could not approve of 
the high-handed way in which the royal authorities acted in 
this respect, not only preventing the execution of salutary 
Apostolic bulls, but not even vouchsafing to give their reasons. 
Pius V. further asked that Philip II. would send a special 
envoy empowered to discuss the Monarchia Sicula, because 
in that matter the abuses had reached such a pitch that some 
thing must certainly be done about it. 2 

When these lines were written, Philip II. had already 
decided to send Requesens to Rome ; he was a persona grata 
with Pius V., and he was instructed to lay the point of view 
of the Spanish government on the matters at issue before the 
Pope. 3 Castagna, it is true, would rather have seen Cardinal 
Espinosa entrusted with this mission, as he was well versed 
in canon law, but he was not able to obtain this. 4 How little 
fruit had been borne by his own explanation of the aims of 

1 See ibid. 425-426. 
* Ibid. 445. 

3 See ibid. 428 seq. 

4 See the report of Castagna of October i, 1568, ibid. 470. 



the Pope in publishing his new version of the bull In coena 
Domini was shown by the prohibition to promulgate the bull, 
which was sent by Philip II. on July i6th, 1568, to the Spanish 
provincials of the religious Orders. 1 

While the politico-ecclesiastical situation was thus in a 
state of obscurity, a tragedy occurred in the royal family of 
Spain which in spite of all research is not yet entirely cleared 
up. 2 On January i8th, 1568, Philip II. had given orders 
for the arrest of his son, Don Carlos. The unhappy young 
man was kept in strict imprisonment, and died on the morn 
ing of July 24th. 

Philip II. preserved so mysterious a silence about the 
arrest and its reason that the most conflicting rumours sprang 
up concerning it. Don Carlos, it was said, had plotted to 
kill his father and had been in league with the rebels in the 
Netherlands. The idea also got about that the son of the 
Catholic King had embraced Protestant beliefs. 3 When the 
nuncio in Madrid, Castagna, applied for information to the 
Grand Inquisitor, Espinosa, the latter answered him in the 
king s name that he had been forced to order the arrest solely 
and entirely " for the service of God, and for the safeguarding 
of religion, his realm, and his subjects." If he had not acted 
as he had done, and sacrificed his only son, he would have 
been unfaithful to God. When the nuncio alluded to the 
rumour that the Infante had even conspired against his 
father, he received the mysterious reply that " If that had 
been the only danger, it would have been easy to avoid it, 
but there had been an even worse reason than that, if such 
were possible." For two years past the king had made 
every effort to win Don Carlos from his " evil courses." 4 
Castagna, who reported these statements to Rome on January 
24th, adds in a letter of February 4th that the Infante had 

1 See ibid. 451, n. i. 

2 Not even the latest monograph by V. BIBL, Der Tod des Don 
Carlos (Vienna, 1918) in spite of all the research employed therein, 
has arrived at any definite conclusion. 

3 Bibl, loc. cit. 265 seq., 271 seq. 

4 See GACHARD, Don Carlos, 663 seq. 


not received Communion at Christmas because the friars of 
the Hieronymite convent had refused to give him an un- 
consecrated host, and Castagna adds that he looked upon 
it as certain that the Infante would be excluded from the 
succession to the throne, and would never again be set at 
liberty 1 . 

The news of the Protestant leanings of Don Carlos, which 
had only been hinted at by the nuncio, reached Rome in a 
more definite form from other countries. 2 According to the 
report of Cardinal Delfino to Maximilian II. on March 6th, 
the Pope, when he received the news, lifted his arms to heaven, 
exclaiming, " My God ! My God ! There is but too good 
reason to believe it, for We knew that this prince had no 
love for priests or monks, and had shown no respect for any 
ecclesiastical dignity." 3 The Mantuan envoy also tells us 
that the Pope was terribly distressed by what had happened 
at Madrid, and adds that a special messenger had been sent 
to Spain. 4 

In vain did Zufiiga, the Spanish ambassador in Rome, 
seek to satisfy Pius V. by describing the rumours as to the 
Protestant leanings of Don Carlos as an invention of the 
Huguenots, but as not even the ambassador could furnish 
more exact particulars, the Pope in his anxiety demanded 
to know the truth from the king himself. 5 Philip II. could 
not refuse to comply with this demand, and did so in a letter 
of May gth. " Often," this letter states, " I have looked upon 

1 See ibid. 665 seq. 

2 See BIBL, loc. cit. 273 seq. 

3 See ibid. 274. 

4 B. Pia to C. Luzzara from Rome, March 6, 1568 : " *Questo 
gran moto delle cose di Spagna et prigionia del prencipe hanno 
infinitamente travagliata S.S tdr > la quale questi di e stata intenta 
a spedire corriere in Spagna. Fra 1 altre cose questa occasions 
par che habbi sopito ogni pensiero di promotione, parendo neces- 
sario che s habbi da star a vedere a che parerk cosi gran moto, 
et che fine havranno molte consequenze che s attendono di tante 
rivolutioni." Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. 

5 See GACHARD, loc. cit. 551 ; BIBL, loc. cit. 274 seq. 


the burden which God has laid upon my shoulders in the states 
and kingdoms, of which He has called upon me to undertake 
the government, as being laid upon me in order that I might 
keep safe therein the true faith and subjection to the Holy 
See, that I might maintain peace and justice there, and 
after the few years that I still have to pass in this world, 
might leave these states in good order, and in that security 
which would guarantee their continuance. All depends in 
the first place on the personality of my successor. But now, 
in punishment for my sins, God has been pleased to inflict 
the prince with so many and such grave defects, both of 
prudence and of character, as to render him unfit for the 
government, and to give reason to fear in the future the gravest 
dangers to the stability of the kingdom should he succeed 
to the throne." After watching him for a long time, experience 
had convinced the king that all remedies were useless, and 
that very little or no improvement was to be looked for in 
Don Carlos, nor was there much reason to hope that time would 
remove the evils he had every reason to fear, so that the im 
prisonment of the prince had seemed necessary in order that 
he, the king, might have time carefully to consider the situa 
tion, and obtain his purpose without exposing himself to 
any kind of blame. The Pope must preserve a complete 
silence as to these confidences of the king, no matter what 
rumours might get about concerning the imprisonment of 
the prince. Don Carlos was not guilty either of revolt or 
heresy, and the truth would be made clear in course of time. 
Every provision had been made for the temporal welfare of 
the prince ; he had every comfort and amusement suitable 
to his state, and he was abundantly supplied with all that h,e 
required. At the same time nothing was left undone for the 
welfare of his soul, and his confessor would give him every 
spiritual assistance. 1 

If we may believe Zuniga s report of June 25th, this reply 

1 See GACHARD, loc. cit. 650 ; BIBL, loc. cit. 275 seq. On p. 28$ 

seq. Bibl alludes to the singular circumstance that nothing is here 

said of his Easter communion, which the prince should have 

received a. short time before. 


eased the mind of Pius V. The Pope, the ambassador re 
ported, has deeply sympathized with the difficult position 
in which the king finds himself, but admires his determination 
for the reason that the safety of Christendom makes it desir 
able that Philip s reign should be as long as possible, and that 
he should have a successor who will follow in his footsteps. 1 
After the death of Don Carlos the nuncio at Madrid re 
ported that the dead prince had himself asked for a confessor 
before his death, and had passed to the next life a Christian 
and a Catholic. 2 For this reason the Pope had no hesitation 
in giving orders for a solemn funeral service, which took 
place on September 5th. It is mentioned as a great innovation 
that he assisted in person at this function, since hitherto this 
had only been customary at the obsequies of princes who were 
kings. 3 It would appear that at first the Spanish ambassador, 
Zufiiga, did not intend to assist at the function, and that 
he only decided to do so when he heard that the Pope would 
be present. From the reports of Niccolo Cusano, the secret 
agent of Maximilian II. in Rome, it would seem that the 
most sensational rumours were current concerning the tragedy 
at Madrid, among others one that the Spaniards had " brought 
about the death " of the Infante because he was in league 
with the insurgents in France and Flanders. 4 It may be 
considered as an established fact that Giulio Aqua viva, who 
was sent to convey the Pope s condolences to Spain, was in 
structed to make further inquiries concerning the tragic event. 5 

1 See GACHARD, loc. cit. 536. 

1 See Gachard, loc. cit. 695. 

8 See the *reports of Arco of September 4 and n, 1568, State 
Archives, Vienna. Cf. BCDINGER, 109 seq. See Corresp. dipl., II., 
354* n. i. 

4 See BIBL, loc. cit. 349, 353. 

6 See the *letter of Bonelli to Castagna from Rome, September 
18, 1568, Nunz. di Spagna, VI., Papal Secret Archives. So far 
the reports of Acquaviva have not been found. The Lettere alia 
corte di Roma contained under his name in the Cod. 33-E-3 of the 
Corsini Library, Rome, are only a poor copy of the register of 
Castagna. See GACHARD, Bibl. Corsini, 46; HINOJOSA, 186. 


Aquaviva left Rome on September igth, 1568, and reached 
Madrid on October 13th. 1 As Philip II. had also lost his 
wife on October 3rd, he was able to offer the Pope s condo 
lences to the king for this second loss. 2 On December loth 
the Archduke Charles, brother of Maximilian II., arrived in 
Madrid, and Aquaviva accordingly put off his departure 
until December 3Oth, because there was reason to fear that 
the Archduke wished to persuade the king to come to terms 
with the insurgents in the Netherlands. 3 During his stay in 
Madrid Aquaviva displayed great prudence and tact, so that 
Castagna was able to send a very laudatory report of him to 

In the meantime Requesens had presented to the Curia 
a note which gave rise to great anxiety there. 4 In this note 
Philip II. complains especially of the innovations, according 
to which the bull In coena Domini had been published in 
his dominions, and especially in Naples, without the exequatur 
being asked for, the more so as the Pope had warned con 
fessors not to give absolution for violations of its enactments. 
The bull, it was pointed out, contained many additions which 
were not to be found in the previous issues, either of Julius 
III., Paul IV. and Pius IV., and which were very burdensome 
and would cause confusion among the people, on account of 
the summary condemnations which they contained, and 
the very general terms in which they were expressed. Philip 
was very angry at the prohibition, which however had been 
included in previous issues of the bull, of the introduction of 
new taxes and imposts, a thing which he said was bound to 
disturb the public peace, because several cities would be 

1 See the *report of Castagna of October 13, 1568, Papal Secret 

See Castagna in GACHARD, Bibliotheque de Madrid, 114 seqq.; 
Corresp. dipl., II., 473 seq. The funeral service for the Spanish 
queen took place in Rome on November 15, 1568 ; see Firmanus, 
*Diarium in Miscell. Arm., XII., 31, Papal Secret Archives. 

See GACHARD, Bibl. de Madrid, 116 seq.; HINOJOSA, 187. 

4 See Corresp. dipl., III., 2, n. Cf. CATENA, 87 seq. and LOPEZ,, 
Hist, de la bula In coena Domini, Madrid, 1768, 94. 


certain to refuse to pay such taxes. As to the question of 
jurisdiction, the king appealed to ancient Apostolic privileges, 
and to immemorial custom, and in the case of Sicily to the 
Monarchia Sicula. In connexion with the latter he renewed 
the complaint that when, in February, 1568, the Pope ap 
pointed Paolo Odescalchi in the place of the nuncio at Naples, 
Pallavicini, who had been sent to the Viceroy, he had ap 
pointed him for the Two Sicilies. Other complaints con 
cerned the acts of Odescalchi in affairs relating to ecclesiastical 
property at Naples, the privileges of the Order of St. Lazarus, 
and the Milanese controversy. 

Philip s words left no room for doubt that he, in common 
with the other Catholic governments, especially that of Venice, 1 
intended to hold firmly to all his claims over ecclesiastical 
political affairs, without paying any attention to the bull 
In coena Domini. The things which the Spanish king called 
customs were, as Cardinal Bonelli shrewdly pointed out, 
nothing but abuses whereby the bishops and other ecclesiasti 
cal authorities were treated in a worse manner in the Spanish 
dominions than even in Germany. 2 

With regard to the Order of St. Lazarus, Bonelli had pointed 
out on August lyth, 1568, that its privileges had not been 
added to by Pius V., as the king supposed, but rather cur 
tailed and reformed, and that there was good reason for the 
existence of a Papal military order in Spain, as well as the 
four royal ones ; as to the settlement, so long deferred, of 
the affair at Milan, he had threatened to take action in 
dependently of the Pope. 3 In a letter of September ist, 1568, 
Bonelli brings out the fact that it was entirely alien to the 
Pope s intention to attack the king s authority and juris 
diction by the bull, and that all he aimed at was the removal 
of abuses. Alluding to the usurpations of ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction on the part of the king s ministers at Naples, 

1 For the opposition of Venice and the negotiations with Pius V., 
see CECCHETTI, I., 448 seq. Cf. also MUTINELLI, I., 81 seq. and 
REUSCH, I., 79. 

2 Letter of December 20, 1568, Corresp. dip!., II., 5-23. 

3 See Corresp. dipl., II., 445. 


and to the Milanese dispute, he remarks that the Pope s 
patience is nearly exhausted. The nuncio must implore 
the king in the name of His Holiness definitely to provide 
the necessary redress, for otherwise he would be obliged to 
make use of those means which the Church is wont to employ 
against her recalcitrant sons. 1 

From a report of the nuncio, dated August 2ist, 1568, 
according to which the Viceroy claimed that the permission 
of the government must be obtained, even for the printing 
of Papal briefs dealing with purely ecclesiastical matters, 
as for example, processions, it is clear how far-reaching the 
interference had become, especially in Naples. 2 Philip II. 
clung to the exequatur all the more tenaciously because he 
saw in it the best way of keeping in check the national as 
pirations of the clergy in Naples. 3 On August 3oth, 1568, 
a royal pragmatic forbade, under grave penalties, the publi 
cation of any Papal rescript, brief, or other ordinance with 
out the customary royal exequatur.* At the beginning of 
October Philip declared that he would rather renounce his 
crown than suffer himself to be stripped of anything which 
had been possessed by his predecessors. 5 With regard to the 
abuses he did not cease to give assurances that he would 
give every consideration to the Pope s grievances as soon 
as he had sufficient information, but that the grievances 
were based upon the reports of the very people who were 
guilty of them ! fl The king would have been delighted if 
the discussion of the disputes concerning ecclesiastical political 
affairs could have been entirely dropped, because he felt on 
the one hand the justice of the Pope s complaints, and on 
the other the harm which these controversies were doing 
to his purpose of providing for his financial difficulties by 
means of the much-desired concession of the Cruzada and 

1 Corresp. dipl., II., 451 seq. 
* See ibid. 452, n. i. 

3 Cf. ibid. III., xlii. 

4 *Lett. di principi, XLII., 167, Papal Secret Archives. 
6 See Corresp. dipl., II., 470. 

See ibid. 


other ecclesiastical levies. Since Pius V. had not had time 
to consider the reply he should make to the petition pre 
sented to him by Requesens, Philip had high hopes of obtaining 
the desired concessions. His representative was instructed 
to be very careful to avoid touching upon the question of 
jurisdiction. 1 The Pope was strongly urged in many quarters, 
especially by the Spanish Cardinals and the Florentine am 
bassador, to treat the champion of the Catholic religion 
against the heretics with all possible consideration. 2 

On account of the important effect of the attitude of Spain 
upon the sorely pressed Catholics in France, England and 
Germany, Pius V. lent an ear to these exhortations. In 
order to show his good-will, at the beginning of November, 
1568, he appointed a special congregation of Cardinals to 
examine the objections which had been raised to the bull. 3 
The outcome of this was a detailed note, which deals with all 
the claims of Philip II. 4 In its introduction the Pope states 
that he has thought it his duty to reply, not because he con 
siders himself bound to give reasons to the princes for what 
he does, but in order to show the king that he has been de 
ceived in the reports of his informants, whose only object 
was to justify their own abuses. The things objected to are 
then dealt with one by one, and answered as follows : Even 
though the bull, which it had been customary, according to 

1 See ibid. 523. 

2 See Legaz. di Serristori, 456 seq. The matter is also looked 
upon as certain in the letter of Cardinal Correggio to Pius V., 
without date and printed in the 1712 edition of CATENA, p. 339, 
but is attributed to too late a date. The letter is in any case 
anterior to the mission of Giustiniani. 

3 See the letter of Bonelli to Castagna from Rome, November 7, 
1568, Corresp. dipl., II., 502. In his *report from Madrid, Decem 
ber 29, 1568, Castagna praises this decision of the Pope. Papal 
Secret Archives. 

4 *Resposta alia instruttione data al signer commendatore 
maggiore ambasciatore al Re Cattolico (no date) in Varia Polit. 
101 (now 102) p. 395-402, Papal Secret Archives, now printed 
from another copy in the same place, in Corresp. dipl., III., I seqq. 


very ancient practice, to publish on Maundy Thursdy, had 
been in the past issued only in Rome by several Popes, it 
had nevertheless, like all other universal constitutions, been 
binding upon the whole of Christendom. This is clear from 
its general tenor, and from its solemn publication on one of the 
most important festivals in the Church s year. Therefore, 
all conscientious Christians, great and small, who had acted 
in defiance of the prescriptions of the bull, had sought absolu 
tion from the Pope. In all the indulgences, jubilees, letters 
of confession, including the Cruzada, which had been at one 
time granted to the King of Spain, the bull had been spoken 
of as of obligation, not sometimes but always, and the bishops 
had received orders to publish it. Having learned that this 
had not been done in certain kingdoms, and that men had 
incurred the penalties laid down by the bull by acting in 
defiance of it, the Pope had considered it his duty, as a watch 
ful shepherd, to insist on its publication, not only in Spain, 
but in every country, even Germany, and to insist that the 
clergy who had the care of souls should be made aware of it, 
in order that confessors should know how to act. 

Additions to the bull had been made by Martin V., Clement 
VII., and Paul III., when such had been found to be necessary. 
Secular princes were accustomed to make new laws from time 
to time. If appeal is made to some royal privilege of assent 
to its publication, it can be replied that the same argument 
could be applied to the preaching of the Word of God, and 
that spiritual enactments cannot be hampered by any per 
mission on the part of the temporal authority, and that to 
ask for such is as undignified as it is unlawful. The usual 
promulgation on Maundy Thursday could not be put off 
until the answer to the Pope s demands, sent to Madrid by 
Requesens, had arrived ; four months had already elapsed 
without any reply having been received from the Spanish 

The bull contained ordinances dealing with taxes and cus 
toms duties, because these had been contravened ; they had 
been imposed by persons who had no right to do so, or had been 
demanded from those who were legally exempt, as for example 


from ecclesiastics and persons in whose case there was no 
legal claim. This by no means prevented lawfully constituted 
princes from levying just and reasonable taxes from their 
subjects. If the bull contained a general prohibition of the 
raising of new taxes, the reason was that there was no need 
for further levies ; as a matter of fact, in the case of customs 
duties there was no call for any such levies, as the matter 
had long since been regulated by ecclesiastical law. There 
was no reason therefore to fear popular disturbances or revolt 
as the result of the constitution ; these were much more 
likely to be caused by excessive taxation on the part of the 
rulers. The Pope s intention was rather to point out the way 
in which the people could be kept in a state of tranquillity and 
subjection to their prince. If he should hear of any prelate 
misinterpreting or acting contrary to his intentions, the Pope 
would at once take steps to prevent it. 

The warning given to confessors that they had no power 
to absolve from transgressions of the bull was but the duty 
of a true and lawful pastor, who was bound to see that they 
knew how to distinguish sin from sin, and to form a just 
judgment upon sins reserved to the Pope. The accusation 
that the Pope was abusing the sacrament of penance is 
answered in these severe words : Such language befits the 
new heretics. Let the king with his sound Catholic sense, 
beware of counsellors who put such ideas and such poisonous 
expressions into his mind. 1 

1 In spite of the opposition of Spain and Venice Pius V. did not 
change the form of the bull, which was published in exactly the 
same terms in 1569 and 1570 (see App. nn. 2 & 3). At Naples, where 
Philip II. forcibly prevented any further publication of the bull, 
the Pope caused it to be conveyed to regular confessors by means 
of their Generals ; in 1569 he allowed at Milan that Borromeo 
should only publish the bull in the presence of parish priests and 
confessors, for the reason that in the preceding year its publication 
had given occasion to all kinds of interpretations (see BERTANI, 
88 seq,, and REUSCH, I., 78 seq., where further information is 
given as to the fate of the bull in Catholic countries). It is clear 
from RAPICIO-SCARLICHIO, Document! in onore di Enea Silvio 


As to the controversy about jurisdiction, Pius V. asked 
to be shown the privileges to which Philip II. appealed. . The 
abuses and scandals in this matter are so obvious that the 
Pope feels himself bound in conscience to provide against 
them. To issue spiritual ordinances is what is to be looked 
for from the Pope, as Vicar of Christ, and not from princes 
and their ministers, because it was not to them that the 
words " Feed my sheep " were addressed ; nay, they too are 
sheep, and subject to the pastoral office of St. Peter, by 
whom they must be guided in all spiritual matters if they 
do not wish to be cut off from the flock, and to destroy the 
whole hierarchical organization of the Church under the pre 
text of privileges. This is all the more necessary since no 
authentic or definite privilege can be adduced by Spain. 
The Pope hopes of so Catholic a king as Philip II. that he 
will be the first to recognize this, especially in the case of 
the so-called Monarchia Sicula. Even granting the existence 
of this, such a privilege abounds in abuses. For the rest, 
no Pope could grant a privilege which would deprive future 
Popes of the power given them by God. That the legatine 
power of the Kings of Sicily does not exist is shown by the 
repeated mission of Apostolic legates to that country. Even 
granting that the Monarchia Sicula exists in the sense which 
Philip supposes, the Pope can always withdraw such a privi 
lege, since it is only a case of a favour, which in practice has 
led to many abuses. The lawfulness of the appointment of 
Odescalchi as nuncio to the Two Sicilies was beyond dispute, 
for nuncios and collectors had been sent to the island several 
times in the days of Charles V. ; if this had not been done 
since then, the Pope nevertheless has the right to do so when 
the exigencies of the care of souls make it necessary. 

With regard to the Knights of St. Lazarus, who had been 

Piccolomini, Trieste, 1862, that in 1568 even the Archduke Charles, 
in other respects a good Catholic, wished for the suspension of 
the publication of the bull. Braunsberger has been the first 
(Pius V., 46 seq.) to throw light on the notable concession made 
by Pius V. for Germany in connexion with the bujl In coena 


granted privileges by Pius IV., Pius V. appealed, not only 
to the rights of the Holy See, but also to the need of providing, 
by means of that Order, the protection for the coasts of the 
Papal States which Philip II., in spite of his obligations, 
had so far failed to give. In the Milanese controversy the 
Pope took his stand purely on his rights. 

At the end of this note Pius V. again repeats that he had 
had no end in view except the reform of the Church, and 
the removal of evident abuses, and he concludes by clearly 
emphasizing the distinction between the temporal and the 
spiritual powers : " Render therefore to Caesar the things that 
are Caesar s, and to God the things that are God s." 

The Pope s remonstrances were without effect, principally 
because the Viceroy of Naples, the Duke of Alcala, used all 
his influence to strengthen Philip II. in his opposition to the 
publication of the bull In coena Domini.* The Viceroy, like 
his advisers, Villani and Revertera, knew well that their 
tyranny in ecclesiastical matters would be broken if the bull 
should take effect -in the Kingdom of Naples. All their 
efforts, therefore, were directed to the prevention of this. 
The bishops thus found their position very difficult in Naples. 2 
Similar disputes were avoided in Spain because the canonists 
there were able by means of ingenious legal quibbles to reconcile 
the prohibition of the placet contained in the bull with its 
continued use in that country. 3 Philip II. would gladly have 
seen the dispute at Naples brought to an end, and at the 
beginning of December, 1568, an agreement seemed probable, 4 
but the attitude taken up by the Duke of Alcala very soon 
destroyed all prospect of it. In the middle of January, 1569, 
things had come to such a pitch that in Rome it was thought 

1 See GIANNONE, IV., 146 seq. 

2 See ibid. The " Relazione di pregiudizi che ha potuto recare 
il concilio di Trento alia giurisdizione temporale di S. M. Cattolica 
nel regno di Napoli per cui non fu dato il regio Exequatur," by 
Villani, in Cod. A. 6 of the Boncompagni Archives, Rome. 

8 Cf. FRIEDBERG, 545, n. 2. 

4 See the *reports of Cusano of December 2 and 6, 1568, State 
Archives, Vienna. 


that the Pope would excommunicate the Viceroy, 1 but the 
latter did not let himself be dismayed by any such threat, and 
he continued to fight against the bull by every means in his 
power. He had all the copies of it which were in the book 
shops suppressed, and confiscated the temporalities of those 
bishops who published it, punishing with the greatest severity 
all attempts to put its prescriptions into practice. 2 

The Viceroy also laboured unceasingly to prevent Philip II. 
from paying any attention to the Pope s complaints about 
the exequatur and the controversy about jurisdiction. 3 Thus 
Castagna s fourth year as nuncio became extremely difficult. 
He never ceased, however, to defend the cause of ecclesiastical 
liberty, both in word and writing. At the beginning of 
February, 1569, he summarized in a memorial intended for 
the king the principal abuses which were going on in Naples, 4 
dwelling especially on the extension of the exequatur. This 
custom, which had originally been granted by the Popes in 
order to prevent unworthy persons from obtaining bishoprics 
and benefices at a time when the kingdom was split up by 
factions, had not only been continued after the coming of 
more settled times, though the reason for it had disappeared, 
but had even been extended, so as to apply to the visitation 
of convents, and to indulgences, and had become an intolerable 
burden, as the officials demanded large payments for granting 
it. The memorial also made complaint of other usurpations 
on the part of the civil power in the Kingdom of the Two 
Sicilies. The bishops there were summoned before lay judges 
for the smallest reason, and they were forbidden to oblige the 
people to the observance of Sunday, or to punish open con- 
cubinists. The nuncio was forbidden to take proceedings 

1 See the *report of Cusano of January 15, 1569, ibid. 

1 See GIANNONE, IV., 149 seq. ; AMABILE, I., 293 seq. 

* See ibid. 166. 

4 See the *Memoriale in Fondo Borghese I., 607, pp. 14-19, 
Papal Secret Archives, attached to the report of Februrary 9, 
1569, Corresp. dipl., III., 40 seq. Cf. ibid. 64 seq. another memorial 
sobre abuses contra la jurisdiccion ecles," composed by Odes- 


against traffickers in indulgences who were using forged 
Papal bulls. A new law had been issued ordering the bishops 
to submit their spiritual ordinances to the civil power for 
examination before they printed them, thus preventing them 
from exercising the power entrusted to them by God, and 
from holding provincial synods and punishing offenders. 
The more urgently the Pope pressed iot the removal of the 
impediments placed in the way of spiritual jurisdiction in 
Naples, the more were they added to by the royal officials. 
At length Castagna declared that no notice had been taken of 
all his remonstrances, and that not even his proposal that an 
official commission should be sent to Rome to effect a settle 
ment had been considered. 

Even now Philip II. only made evasive replies, intended 
to put off a decision. It was still insisted that His Majesty 
must first receive detailed reports from the Viceroy, and that 
if there really should prove to be abuses, a remedy would be 
provided. But the Viceroy s reports denied the existence of 
any abuses. If the king at any moment showed himself 
disposed to meet the Pope s wishes, it was the Viceroy himself 
who dissuaded him. The Duke of Alcala knew very well how 
to make official play with the exequatur, making his master 
believe that it was the very foundation of his royal jurisdiction, 
and the most important privilege which he possessed in the 
kingdom, and one which he must not give up on any account. 1 
Philip II. believed in the fancied danger to the inalienable 
rights of the crown, the more so as there were not wanting 
servile canonists in Spain who made it appear that these 
controverted matters were quite lawful claims on his part. 

In Rome the situation was perfectly clearly understood. 
In February, 1569, the nuncio Odescalchi was recalled, but 
even this act of condescension on the part of Pius V. did not 
bring about any improvement. Odescalchi s successor, Cesare 
Brumano, had to fight against the same difficulties. 2 On May 

1 Cf. GIANNONE, IV., 1 66. 

* See CAPECE GALEOTA, Nunzii apost. di Napoli, 36. Cf, 
GIANNONE, IV., 172 seq. 


28th, 1569, acting on special instructions from the Pope, 

Bonelli wrote to Castagna that the daily increasing abuses at 

Naples came rather from the local officials than from any 

ill-will on the part of the king ; that the infringements of 

spiritual jurisdiction in that kingdom had reached such a 

pitch that one day the Pope would be obliged to take strong 

measures ; violent hands were even laid upon the bishops, 

and their property had been confiscated merely because they 

carried out the Pope s orders, and had published the bull 

In coena Domini without an exequatur. Some officials had 

even gone so far as to destroy the copies of the bull which had 

been posted in the churches. The nuncio was urged to make 

strong remonstrances to Philip II., because in the end the Pope 

would have to place the Kingdom of Naples under an interdict. 1 

So as not to leave anything untried, Castagna sent a second 

memorial to Philip II. on June 2oth, concerning the way in 

which the affairs of the Church were being treated in Naples, 2 

dwelling especially on three matters, for which he demanded 

immediate redress. The first was the unworthy treatment 

accorded to the prelates and even the bishops, whom the 

Viceroy received in bed, or with his head covered, or whom he 

placed after all the civil officials, and made to wait in the 

outer ante-camera among the common people. The second 

was the obstacles placed in the way of the bishops jurisdiction. 

If a bishop wished to inflict a fine upon a layman for usury, 

concubinage and the like, he was forbidden to do so ; no 

course remained open to him but the refusal of Christian 

burial and excommunication, but the latter penalty, according 

to the prescriptions of the Council of Trent, was only to be 

inflicted in extreme cases. Moreover, even the infliction of 

this form of punishment was made impossible for the bishops 

because any excommunicated layman could have recourse to 

the civil power, which, without going into the case, would 

order the cancellation of the penalty, and take the decision 

of the matter into its own hands. Bishops who refused to 

1 Corresp. dipl., III., 85 seq. 

1 In *Fondo Borghese, I., 607, p. 7i-75b, Papal Secret Archives. 


accept this were forced to do so by the confiscation of their 
property, and by other acts of violence. Castagna s third 
point dealt with the exequatur. This had formerly been 
exercised by the presentation of the Papal edicts to a compe 
tent official, the cappellano maggiore, who, having satisfied 
himself that the document contained nothing contrary to the 
royal prerogative, gave it his approval. But now the Pope s 
ordinances had to pass through the hands of a number of 
officials, a thing which not only added considerably to the 
cost, but often prevented the carrying out of the decree, by 
giving the guilty party time to escape. Formerly the exequatur 
had only applied to enactments which might be prejudicial to 
the royal prerogatives, or other rights of the government, 
but now it was made applicable to the smallest and most 
trivial orders of the Pope, and even to matters which were 
purely spiritual, such as indulgences. Even in the case of the 
nuncio himself, they were no longer satisfied with the mere 
presentation of his credentials, but he was prevented from 
exercising his office until the exequatur had been given. 

When Philip II. returned to Madrid at the beginning of 
July, 1569, Castagna sought an audience. This time he only 
brought up the affairs of Naples, namely, the three matters 
spoken of above, adding a fourth complaint concerning the 
imprisonment of the vicar-general of a bishop, which had 
been ordered by the Viceroy because he had published the 
bull In coena Domini. With all frankness Castagna declared 
that if things went as far as that, His Holiness would be 
forced to place the whole of the Kingdom of Naples under an 
interdict, a thing which would have been done already if the 
Pope had not been convinced that these acts of violence did 
not come from His Majesty, but from his representatives. 
At this Philip broke out into lamentations that by means of 
these controversies about jurisdiction, and on other pretexts, 
the devil was sowing dissension between himself and His 
Holiness. But even now, as was his wont, he did not give a 
definite reply, 1 which was only sent to the nuncio on July I7th 

1 See the report of Castagna of July 13, 1569, Corresp. dipl., 
III., no seq. 



by Cardinal Espinosa. This reply stated that the king had 
written to his Viceroy, telling him to satisfy the Pope s de 

Castagna could not feel satisfied with so vague an answer 
to complaints which had been categorically stated, and he 
therefore tried to get from Espinosa a more definite statement. 
Espinosa assured him that as far as the position of the bishops 
was concerned the Pope s demands would be completely 
satisfied, and also that the exercise of their spiritual jurisdiction 
would be in some way guaranteed, but that it was quite 
useless to think of the exequatur being done away with ; the 
most that could be done would be to remove the abuses 
connected with it. Full particulars would be sent to the 
Pope himself. The threat of an interdict had not alarmed 
the king. As far as Castagna could learn, Philip had declared 
that if the Pope took that extreme step, he, in defence of his 
ancient privileges, would do that which it was the right of 
Catholic princes to do, by which he undoubtedly meant an 
appeal to a general council. The nuncio was less anxious on 
the score of the imprisonment of the bishop s vicar-general, 
for he thought that, if it had not already been done, he would 
soon be set at liberty. As to the other matters he reported 
to Rome that Philip was obsessed by the fear that in conse 
quence of the bull In coena Domini his subjects would resist 
the payment of taxes, and might even rise in rebellion. And 
since he was determined to resist any encroachment upon the 
privileges granted to his predecessors, Philip would never 
allow the formal promulgation of the bull. 1 

Further heated discussions took place between Castagna 
and Philip II.. at the beginning of August, 1569. News of 
the protest made by the Pope when he received the feudal 
homage of Naples on the feast of St. Peter and St. Paul, 2 

1 See the report of Castagna from Madrid, July 17, 1569, 
Corresp. dipl., III., 114 seq. Cf. ibid. 115, n. i, the instructions 
of Philip II., of July 17, to the Viceroy of Naples on the treatment 
of the bishops and the use of the exequatur, with which he hoped to 
satisfy the Pope. 

* Cf. Corresp. dipl., III., 97 seq., 102. 


had thrown the king into an easily understood state of excite 
ment. Castagna tried in vain to justify the head of the 
Church by suggesting the following ideas : The king must not 
let himself be led to think that the Holy Father had any 
temporal ends in view, or that bad counsellors were inciting 
him to these disputes with the princes ; he was acting solely 
in accordance with his duty as chief pastor. The reason for 
the dispute was the order which had been sent from Madrid 
to Naples to offer a strenuous resistance to all the ordinances 
of the Hoh See which were directed against the Spanish 
" privileges and customs." This had inflamed passions at 
Naples, so that the abuses increased from day to day. The 
plain fact was that no longer was obedience paid to the Pope 
in Naples, while the whole discipline of the Church was set 
aside ; if the manifest abuses were continued, the difficulties 
could not fail to increase and become more serious. Lastly, 
Castagna once more strongly insisted that the Pope was not 
pursuing any temporal ends, but was aiming solely at main 
taining the jurisdiction conferred by God upon His Church, 
and without which it was impossible that souls could be 
properly cared for. 

The nuncio could say what he liked, but the king, who was 
in a very excited state, remained fixed in his contention that 
the Pope was to blame for the whole business, and that his 
exaggerated insistence on ecclesiastical jurisdiction was the 
cause of all these controversies. Castagna replied that the 
fault lay with whoever had allowed these usurpations, and 
not with him who was demanding what was his right. In 
the course of the conversation, which became more and more 
heated, Philip said that if the Pope persisted in his " extreme " 
views, he would know how to defend his own jurisdiction 
by the means which were at the disposal of Catholic princes. 
It was in vain for Castagna to remind him that they were 
not discussing temporal jurisdiction, but that which was 
spiritual. Philip, who could not deny this, broke off the 
audience saying that he had expressed his own point of view, 
and that was sufficient. 1 

1 See the report of Castagna of August 12, 1569, ibid. 132 seq. 


In October the king gave way, at any rate on the question 
of the status of the nuncio at Naples, and ordered that he was 
to be treated like the nuncios in all his other dominions, 
namely, given the first place, but with the express proviso 
that this was not to involve any prejudice to his own juris 
diction. 1 In all the questions of principle, Philip, acting 
on the advice of his ambassadors and ministers, 2 continued 
to hold tenaciously to his cesaropapistical claims. 

The questions at issue between Madrid and Rome, as well 
as the Milanese question, which was still unsettled, led Pius 
V., in October, 1569, to send to Spain the General of the 
Dominicans, Vincenzo Giustiniani. 3 Before the latter could 
begin hL negotiations, Philip II., in a royal pragmatic of 
November 30th, 1569, had declared in favour of retaining 
the placet,* Cardinal Bonelli had charged Giustiniani to 
point out, in the case of the Milanese controversy, that civil 
jurisdiction would be destroyed together with the spiritual. 
The ultimate object of the Milanese, so he wrote to him from 
Rome, is undoubtedly to make themselves masters of all 
ecclesiastical affairs. 5 In a memorial on the subject of the 

1 See MEISTER in Histor. Jahrb., XIV., 82. Cf. Corresp. dipl., 

HI.. 143. 

*C/. Corresp. dipl., III., 182 seq. 

The credential brief of October n. 1569 in TEDESCHIS 264 ; 
eight other *briefs of October n, relating to the mission of Gius 
tiniani in Arm. 44, t. 14, p. 25ob, Papal Secret Archives. Cf. 
Corresp. dipl., III., 162 seq. So far the reports of Giustiniani 
have not been found. The documents in the Papal Secret Archives 
contain their equivalent, Borghese I., 632 (instructions from 
Bonelli to Giustiniani) and Spagna II. (see HINOJOSA, 193) ; in 
the former codex the letters of Castagna. Cf. Corresp. dipl., III., 
xxxvii seq, Ixi, and MORTIER, Hist, des Maitres g^neraux de 
1 ordre de St. Dominique, V., 490 seq. 

4 See Tomo primero de las leyes de recapilaci6n, Madrid, 
1772, i. i, tit. 10, ley 12. 

Bonelli to Giustiniani from Rome, November 2, 1569, in 
Borghese, I., 632, p. 66b, Papal Secret Archives. Cf. HINOJOSA, 


Milanese question, 1 Giustiniani demanded the formal with 
drawal of the scandalous edict 2 of the governor of that city. 
He also presented memorials on the Monarchia Sicula and 
the abuses and acts of violence of the royal officials in the 
Two Sicilies. 3 

The memorial on the Monarchic* Sicula* showed that, in 
spite of careful inquiries, it had not been possible to produce 
a single lawful concession nor a single legal custom which 
could satisfy the conscience of the king and his ministers. 
The only thing that could be brought forward as an argument 
in its favour reduced itself to four words in a diploma at 
tributed to Urban II., which was justly suspected of being 
a forgery, and which could more easily be shown to be an 
interpolation The king, therefore, cannot rely upon that 
document, all the less so because no established custom can 
be proved which could run counter to the supreme pontifical 
power. The Holy Father too, now that he has been in 
formed of the facts, thinks that he cannot with a clear con 
science sacrifice ecclesiastical jurisdiction to the civil power, 
especially as it can be proved that the predecessors of the 
king themselves had scruples about putting forward any 
such claims. If he now brought forward the matter so 
strongly, the reason was that of late the abuses which had 
occurred on the score of the Monarchia Sicula had been in 
credibly numerous and intolerable in their scope, and had 
grown from day to day. In proof of this last assertion a 
list of the abuses and acts of violence was attached to the 

Giustiniani, who arrived in Madrid in the last week of 
November, 1569, was not wanting in zeal, 5 but he very soon 
discovered that the Spanish government had no real intention 

1 *Borghese I., 607, p. 148 seq., loc. cit. 

2 *Bonelli to Giustiniani from Rome, January 10, 1570, ibid. 
p. 102 seq. 

8 See HINOJOSA, 193, 196. 

4 Printed in TEDESCHIS, 246 seq. Cf. SENTIS, 119 seq. 

5 See the report of Castagna from Madrid, November 26, 1569, 
Corresp. dipl., III., 191 seq., which corrects HINOJOSA, 193-196, 


of settling the disputes. His complaints about the Monarchia 
Sicula were submitted to the council of state for Italian affairs 
with a request for the reports of the governors. In the mean 
time he discovered that the government was secretly and 
assiduously engaged in examining all the ancient briefs and 
bulls, in the hope of finding support for its pretensions. 1 
In the affair of Milan the declarations of Philip II. were 
such that the Pope s representatives believed, at the end of 
1569, that it would be possible to arrive at a satisfactory 
solution. 2 When, in January, 1570, the king went to Cordova, 
Giustiniani followed him first, and then Castagna. 3 Both 
of them remained in Andalusia until the summer, when they 
returned to Madrid. 4 As they continued to work loyally to 
discharge the duties entrusted to them, they were met with 
the greatest difficulties. The king s journeys and the war 
against the Moors, 5 which were occupying the attention of 

1 See the report of Castagna of January 8, 1570, Corresp. dipl., 
III., 215 seq. The king had already caused a search to be made 
in the archives in this connexion ; see *Memoria para la busca y 
remision de todas la bulas y breves concedidos a Su M. en punto 
de patronato de materias consistoriales, el origen de estos y otros 
puntos, dated Madrid, December 3, 1567, in Cod. i. 9, of the 
Archives of the Spanish embassy in Rome. 

2 See Corresp. dipl., III., 210 seq. 

3 On January 14, 1570, Castagna wrote from Madrid that 
Giustiniani had set out for Cordova and that he would follow him 
shortly (Corresp. dipl., III., 218). From February 5 onwards 
his reports are dated from Cordova. On March 2 he *announces 
that the negotiations about the affair of Milan are going well and 
that he hopes for a satisfactory result. The war against the 
Moors is going badly, and there is a great lack of funds. Papal 
Secret Archives. 

4 On June 14, 1570, Castagna *announces that he is starting 
" to-day " on his return to Madrid ; on July 6 he * writes that 
Giustiniani too had arrived there several days before. Papal 
Secret Archives. 

6 Cf. PHILIPPSON, Westeuropa, 2, 159 seq. ; LEA, The Moriscos 
of Spain, London, 1901 ; BORONAT Y BARRACHINA, Los Moriscos 
espanoles y su expulsion, 2 vols. Valencia, 1901, 


Philip in an increasing degree, were already the cause of 
anxiety to them, and still more the way in which the govern 
ment managed to drag on the negotiations without giving 
any definite reply. It became more and more evident that 
no settlement was intended. When he left the Spanish 
capital on October 5th, Giu^tiniani, who had been made a 
Cardinal on May I7th, 1570, was bound to admit to himself 
that he had accomplished very little during his six months 
legation. 1 In the affair of Milan he had only succeeded in 
getting the king to send a feeble request to the Duke of 
Albuquerque to arrange the matter amicably. 2 In the 
Neapolitan and Sicilian disputes Philip remained firm in his 
contention that he must first receive fuller information from 
his officials, to whom in the meantime he gave the advice, 
as he had done before, not to overstep the limits of their 
authority, recommending them to remove abuses in certain 
cases, which, however, only meant that his representatives 
in Italy, knowing that these general directions were only 
intended to free the king from the difficulties of the moment, 
continued their former mode of acting. 3 

At this critical moment, the attention of the Pope, who had 
been somewhat reassured by Giustiniani, 4 was distracted 
from these political-ecclesiastical controversies by the need 
of doing all he could to meet the dangers which were threaten 
ing Christianity from the east at the hands of the Turks. As 
early as March, 1570, on learning of the great preparations 
being made by the Turks, he had attempted to arrange an 
alliance between Venice and Spain, and had sent Luis de 
Torres to the latter country for that purpose. 5 The Turkish 
question led to a political rapprochement between Madrid 

1 See the "reports of Castagna of October 4, 1570, to Cardinal 
Borromeo and Cardinal Rusticucci, used by HINOJOSA, 197. 
The *Cifra which is missing in Hinojosa shows that Castagna 
could not hide his disappointment. Papal Secret Archives. 

8 See the letter of September 28, 1570, in HINOJOSA, 197, n. 2, 

8 See SENTIS, 120. Cf. GIANNONE, IV., 183. 

4 See Corresp. dipl., IV., 20, n. I. 

$ Cf. infra, Chapter IX, 


and Rome, and this in its turn exercised a favourable influence 
upon the settlement of the ecclesiastical differences. But 
however much he was occupied with the Crusade, Pius V. 
by no means lost sight of these important questions. On 
February gth, 1571, Castagna delivered to the king a mem 
orial l which was chiefly directed against the exequatur at 
Naples which had now been extended to the smallest Papal 
ordinances so much so that even the most needy beneficiary 
was not able to obtain his benefice without first paying the 
fees for the royal placet. At the end of June 1571 Cardinal 
Michele Bonelli was sent as legate to Spain. Besides the 
question of the Crusade, the marriage of the King of Portugal 
to Margaret of Valois and the question of the title of Cosimo 
de Medici he was instructed to renew the negotiations about 
the Monar cliia Sicula and the controversy about jurisdiction 
at Naples. 2 

Pius V. might have expected to meet at length with some 
satisfaction on these questions since, on May 2ist, 1571, on 
account of the alliance which had lately been made with 
Venice and Spain against the Turks, he had not only extended 
for another five years the sussidio levied upon the Spanish 
clergy, but had also granted the Cruzada for two years, and 
the so-called excusado for five. 3 This extraordinary gener 
osity on the part of the Pope, who had hitherto been so 
reluctant, was brought about by the fact that Philip II., 
who was already engaged in fighting the Calvinists in the 
Low Countries, and the Moriscos in Spain, could only be 

1 See *Cod. 33-E-I2 of the Corsini Library, Rome, whence is 
taken a passage in LAMMER, Zur Kirchengesch., 134 seq. 

8 See Corresp. dipl., IV., 355 seq. ; cf. Carte Strozz., I., I, 
224 seq. 

3 All these concessions were made on May 21, 1571 : see *Indice 
de las concessiones que han hecho los Papas de la Crusada, Sub- 
sidio y Escusado, Archives of the Spanish embassy in Rome. 
Cf. *Borghese I., 145-147, p. 35 seq. Papal Secret Archives. See 
also Corresp. dipl., IV., 295-296. For the excusado (LADERCHI, 
1571, n. 31, with a wrong date) see Annuaire de I univ, de Louvain, 
1909, 388 seq. 


drawn into the Turkish war by opening out to him fresh 
and considerable sources of money. All the doubts which 
Pius V. had entertained, especially about the Cruzada, were 
silenced by the need of saving Christendom. How little the 
Pope s magnanimity was appreciated at the Spanish court 
was shown by a disrespectful remark of the king s confessor, 
the Bishop of Cuena, to Castagna, 1 and still more by the 
conduct of the king himself. As soon as the bulls concerning 
these great financial concessions had been happily secured, 
the representative of Spain at the Curia changed his tone. 
In the first week of June he appeared before the Pope, and 
stated that he had received orders to protest in the name of 
his king against the conferring of the title on Cosimo I. ! 
Pius V. was all the more amazed because hitherto Philip II. 
had adopted a waiting attitude in that matter. Re taxed 
the ambassador with the deceitfulness with which Spain, 
on the strength of the league, had wrung great concessions 
from him, yet now was putting him into a great dilemma 
about the Duke s title. This protest, which had been in 
readiness for a long time in Madrid, was made on June Qth, 
but only in the presence of four Cardinals. 2 It was quite in 
keeping with this proceeding that Philip continued to pay 
no attention to all the complaints of the Holy See about 
Spanish cesaropapalism. Cardinal Bonelli gave expression 
to these complaints at his second audience on October nth. 3 
They were not a few : In the first place there was the Monarchia 

1 According to L. Donate (ALBERI, I., 6, 380) the words of the 
bishop which directly referred to Pius V. were : " que los estiticos 
mueren de cameras ! " 

2 See Corresp. dipl., IV., 87, 131, 223 seq., 328 seq. and BIBL, 
Erhebung, 118 seq. The text of the protest in PALANDRI, 240 seq. 
On June 16, 1571, Arco "reports on the strict secrecy about the 
protest ordered by the Pope. State Archives, Vienna. 

*Cf. the letter of Bonelli to Rusticucci of October 12, 1571 
(in TEDESCHIS, 267 seq., CARUSO, 88 seq., and also in Corresp. dipl., 
IV., 480 seq.) and the summary report of November 17, 1571, used 
by SENTIS, 121 seq., almost contemporaneously published by 
GACHARD, Bibl. Corsini, 152-161. 


Sicula, then the exequatur in the Kingdom of Naples and all 
the abuses which had crept in there, then the dispute at Milan, 
which had not yet been decided as a matter of principle, and 
lastly the confiscation of the revenues of the archbishopric 
of Toledo. Castagna, who was present at the audience, 
bears witness that Bonelli set forth his case in the ablest way, 
and that he exposed, in a detailed and intensely illuminating 
memorial, the cesaropapistical Spanish rule as shown in the 
incurable abuses which were occurring in the Kingdoms of 
Naples and Sicily. With regard to the Monarchia Sicula 
he specially made it clear that, even granting the genuineness 
of the diploma of Urban II., the legation, according to the 
very terms of the privilege, could not extend further than 
the sons of Count Roger, as even the royal officials had ad 
mitted in 1512 and 1533. The memorial also complained 
that the Council of Trent had not been respected, and that 
the carrying out of the Pope s edicts had been prevented in 
every possible way, while in the exequatur there existed an 
abuse which the king was bound to remove in virtue of the 
oath which he had taken at the time of his investiture. The 
Pope had been waiting for an answer to the memorial de 
livered by Giustiniani for more than a year ; the improve 
ments which had in the meantime been made, but which 
were very small, did not touch the kernel of the question of 
jurisdiction, namely, the non-observance of the prescriptions 
of the Council of Trent. Lastly he reminded the king that 
it was a matter for his conscience to provide a remedy, and 
that to do so would also be to his own interest, since wherever 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction and the authority of the Pope were 
set at naught, and they were almost destroyed in Sicily and 
interfered with in various ways in Naples, heresies were sure 
to spring up sooner or later. 1 

1 The memorial, which was known to CATENA (p. 171) and of 
which TEDESCHIS (p. 264) gives a passage, was published in its 
entirety by LAMMER, Melet. 226 seqq. from the Cod. 505 of the 
Corsini Library, Rome, though with the wrong date October 21 ; 
the " giovedi " in 1571 fell on October n. It also escaped the 
notice of Lammer that the document had already been published 
by Caruso (p. 86 seq.}, though with the wrong date, October 12. 


The king s reply was as before quite vague, and the decision 
now lay with the ministers. Bonelli therefore sought to 
bring pressure to bear on them through his friends, especially 
Francis Borgia. At first he hoped to be able to carry on the 
negotiations with Cardinal Espinosa and Ruy Gomez alone, 
but he very soon was forced to realize that the whole of the 
so-called Council of Italy, which looked upon it as its special 
duty to defend anything that affected the jurisdiction of the 
state, was involved. 1 The reply which he received on Novem 
ber 3rd still further damped Bonelli s hopes. This definitely 
rejected the contention that the Monarchic* Sicula no longer 
existed as a matter of right, by an appeal, not only to the 
bull of Urban II., but also to immemorial possession. With 
regard to the various matters complained of, the reply was 
partly a denial, partly an evasion, and partly an admission, 
in so far that the removal of unfitting practices was at least 
premised. 2 That Philip himself looked upon the privileges 
of the Monarchia Sicula as excessive, and that he was troubled 
with scruples of conscience on the subject, was shown by the 
strange demand which was laid before Bonelli by Cardinal 
Espinosa : with regard to the Monarchia Sicula and the 
exequatur at Naples the Pope was asked to agree to them in 
such a way that his scruples of conscience might be entirely 
removed ; in other words the Pope was asked to confirm the 
Spanish cesaropapalism ! 3 

Under these circumstances Bonelli realized that further 
negotiations gave no grounds for hope, and that his further 
stay in Madrid was impossible without loss of his authority. 

1 See the report of Bonelli of November 17, 1571, in GACHARD, 
Bibl. Corsini, 155. Cf. SENTIS, 121, and Corresp. dipl., IV., 522 

* See *Cod. N. 2, p. 6a of the Vallicella Library, Rome. Cf. 
LADERCHI, 1571, n. 261 seq., and SENTIS, 121. See also HINOJOSA, 
203, where the date of the document in Nunziat. di Spagna, II., 
150, is wanting ; it belongs to October 30, 1571. Cf. also Corresp. 
dipl., IV., 522, n. i. 

8 See the report of Bonelli of November 17, 1571, in GACHARD, 
loc. cit. 156. Cf. SENTIS, 29. 


He held a consultation with Castagna, and then drew up a 
new memorial on the Monarchia Sicula, which he sent to the 
king on November loth, 1571. In this memorial he very 
ably refuted the pretended existence of any legal title, by 
showing that not even the longest immemorial possession 
could give grounds for such a right, because, failing an express 
concession on the part of the Pope, the princes as laymen were 
incapable of possessing or exercising spiritual authority ; the 
lack of this absolutely essential concession could not be 
supplied by any actual exercise of the right, no matter how 
long this might have been done, nor could any right to its 
exercise be grounded upon it. The privileges claimed by 
the king were such as to do away with the primatial power of 
the Popes, and it was therefore impossible that the Popes 
should ever have granted them. 1 

Any lingering hopes which might have been based upon 
certain expressions used by Espinosa vanished with the final 
answer received by Bonelli on the morning of November I2th. 
On the following day he had his farewell audience, and in the 
course of it obtained something which neither Castagna nor 
Giustiniani had succeeded in getting, namely the promise of 
the king that he would at least resume the negotiations 
in Rome, especially with regard to the Monarchia 
Sicula. 2 

On November i8th Bonelli went to Portugal in connexion 
with the matrimonial question already mentioned, and he 
returned to Madrid on December 28th. On that day Philip II. 
issued rescripts to the authorities at Naples, with reference 
to certain special questions, in which he forbade them to mix 
themselves up in ecclesiastical matters. These orders, how 
ever, did not bring about any practical change, because the 

1 See the text of the * Replica in Cod. 505, p. 24 seq. of the 
Corsini Library, Rome, used by SENTIS, 121 seq. 

1 See the report of Bonelli of November 17, 1571, loc. cit. 156. 
P. Giannone (II tribunale della Monarchia di Sicilia, ed. A. PIER- 
ANTONI, Rome, 1892, 124) is also obliged to recognize the import 
ance of the promise. 


authorities knew how to evade them, 1 while Philip himself 
clung firmly to his claims in all essentials, especially the royal 
exequatur, the Monarchia Sicula, and his opposition to the 
bull In coena Domini. 2 In January, 1572, the legate con 
tinued his journey to France. On the occasion of the birth 
of Prince Ferdinand, which took place on December 4th, 
1571, he had conveyed the Pope s congratulations to Philip II., 
while Pius V. also sent a special envoy in the person of his 
chamberlain Casale, to present the Golden Rose to the queen. 
Casale was also charged to seek for a remedy for the disputes 
at Milan, where the president of the senate was trying to 
" befool the archbishop." 3 He arrived in Madrid at the 
beginning of June, where news of the death of Pius V. had 
preceded him. Castagna was still occupying his difficult 
position, and he looked upon it as a release when, in the late 
autumn, Gregory XIII. at last yielded to his requests and 
recalled him. A great deal of the credit for the fact that a 
complete breach between Madrid and Rome had been avoided 
was due to this distinguished man. He clearly saw how 
necessary this was in the interests of the whole Church, and, 
with great ability, shielding as much as possible the king 
himself, had be~en able to throw most of the blame for the 
disputes 4 of an ecclesiastical-political nature which were 
continually arising on the royal authorities. 6 

This idea, which was certainly not entirely justified, but 
which rested upon the undoubtedly sincere attachment of 

1 See TEDESCHIS, 269 seq. \ CARUSO, 283 seq. ; SENTIS, 122. 
Cf. HINOJOSA, 204. Sentis rightly remarks (he. cit.) that those 
authors who speak of a " concordat " are altogether in error. 
Cf. LADERCHI, 1571, n. 279 seq. 

*Cj. GIANNONE, IV., 185. 

* See HINOJOSA, 205 seq. 

4 This was certainly the case in many ways, but to absolve the 
king from all complicity, as Laderchi does (1566, n. 495) is not 

* Besides the more important differences mentioned there were 
several minor disputes. Giannone (IV., 175 seq., 180 seq.} speaks 
of these in a very partisan spirit, as he does in other matters. 


Philip II. to the Catholic faith, and his declared hostility to 
all religious innovators, 1 was also shared by Pius V. Both as 
a religious and as a Cardinal, Pius had taken up a favourable 
attitude towards the Spaniards. Consequently, in his sketch 
of the Sacred College in 1565, Requesens had described him 
as a desirable candidate for the tiara. 2 As an Italian Ghislieri 
would certainly rather have seen his country governed by 
Italians, but he preferred the Spanish rule to that of any 
other foreigners. No less a person than Philip s representative 
in Rome, Juan de Zuniga, testifies that at the beginning of 
his pontificate Pius was firmly resolved to maintain the good 
relations which he had hitherto had with Spain. Zuniga 
explained to the king the attitude adopted by the Pope, in an 
extremely important letter of February 23rd, 1571. 3 At the 
beginning of his pontificate Pius V. had been entirely well- 
disposed towards Spain, though he had at once shown his 
strength of character, and had given proofs of his intention 
of maintaining his own authority. Zuniga then describes 
the first disagreements, which had been specially occasioned 
by the conduct of Philip in the affair of Carranza, and he 
bears witness in favour of the Pope, thai he had entered into 
the jurisdictional controversies with a holy and a good inten 
tion, and had always shown a great personal affection for the 
king himself, 4 being convinced that it was his officials who 
were responsible for the controversies. His entourage had 
confirmed him in this view, and had painted the conduct of 
the Spanish officials in matters concerned with ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction in such dark colours that he had put forward very 
drastic demands. The reason why the negotiations had 
become so acrimonious was not only the strong character of 
Pius V., but also the fact that His Holiness was convinced 
that the ambassadors, in order to prove their zeal, had insisted 

1 How fully Pius V. appreciated this attitude of Philip is 
attested by Granvelle ; see Corresp. de Granvelle, II., 169. 

1 See DOLLINGER, Beitrage, I., 579. Cf. Vol. XVII. of this 
work, p. 13. 

8 Published in Docum. d. Arch. Alba, 261-263. 

4 This is also attested by P. TIEPOLO, Relazione, 188. 


upon some of the matters at issue more strongly than they 
had been instructed to do. At the end of his account Zufiiga 
expresses his conviction that the Pope, who had always led 
an exemplary life, was actuated by the holiest intentions, 
and was so determined to uphold his principles, and to dis 
charge his duty, that he would not have allowed any offence 
to be committed against God, even though the whole world 
were to fall in ruins. Perhaps, so Zuniga thought, this led to 
even worse disturbances than those caused by other Popes , 
who pursued more worldly ends. 

Although the grasp of the controversies concerning ecclesi 
astical politics which is revealed in these words may fall short 
of the truth, yet Zuniga s statements are a splendid testimony 
to the purity of the zeal with which Pius V. was animated. 


THE powerful movement which cut off from Spain the northern 
part of the Low Countries, and set up there the rule of Pro 
testantism, bore at first a political and national character 
rather than a religious one. If at first Philip II. followed in 
the footsteps of his father in the Low Countries, and made no 
change in the ancient privileges of the 17 provinces, his 
accession to the throne nevertheless brought about a complete 
change in the situation. While Charles V. had been looked 
upon as half a Netherlander, Philip II. was purely a Spaniard, 
and showed as little liking for his subjects in the Netherlands 
as they did for him. Their ruler was no longer the diplomatic 
Emperor, who had conversed in a friendly way with the 
Netherlanders in their own language, had favoured them, and 
treated them with great discretion, but the stern, laconic and 
inaccessible King of Spain, whose personality as well as his 
method of government was of quite another kind. Philip II. 
looked upon the Low Countries, not as a separate state, but 
merely as one of his " possessions " which, like Milan and 
Naples in the south, were to minister to the Spanish rule as a 
starting point and base of operations in the north ; his rigid 
absolutism was bound to be opposed to any aspirations on 
the part of the Netherland provinces to political individuality 
and national independence. 1 This critical state of affairs was 
made worse by Philip s habit of reflecting and taking counsel 
instead of acting at moments of crisis. Thomas Perrenot 
stigmatizes this habit of indecision in bitter words in a letter 
to Granvelle : " the only decision the king comes to is to be 
for ever undecided." 2 Aggravating circumstances were the 

1 See PIRENNE, III., 455 seqq. ; BLOCK, II., 395 seq. 

See WEISS, Papiers d etat du card. Granvelle, IX., ,568, 



incapacity of Margaret of Parma, who had been appointed 
Governess-General by Philip II., and the wretched state of 
the finances. The Low Countries, into which, on account of 
their trade and their industries, wealth flowed from all parts 
of the world, had been made, more than any other country, 
to bear the expense of Charles V. s wars in France, Italy and 
Germany ; in like manner Philip II. waged his war against 
France in a special way with Netherland money. The conse 
quences of this were shown in a complete financial exhaustion 
in that country which the Venetian Soriano had described as 
the Indies of Spain. 1 The material condition of this territory 
held by Spain on the North Sea was also far worse in other 
ways than is commonly recognized ; the frontier provinces 
especially had suffered from the devastating effects of the 
war with France. But the gravest source of danger was the 
change that had taken place in social conditions. A new 
class of great industrial magnates and capitalists had come 
into being, side by side with a large body of workers, whose 
condition grew steadily worse on account of the continual 
rise of prices. 2 

This state of affairs, added to the feeling that they were 
being drained in favour of a policy which was foreign to their 
own interests, gave rise to a deep-seated unrest among all 
classes of the liberty loving population of the Netherlands. 3 
Philip II. was well aware of the danger of the situation when, 
on August 25th, 1559, he set out for Spain after a long stay 
in the Low Countries. He realized that he could not- count 
with any certainty on the Governess and the all-powerful 
councillor, Granvelle. It was with great disquietude that 
he saw the revolutionary tendencies, which had begun to 
show themselves even in the time of Charles V., and he was 
made specially anxious by the efforts that were being made 
to secure a joint agreement of the members of the States 

1 Cf. GACHARD, Relations des ambass, Venitiens, 102 scq. ; 
MARX, Studien, 60 seqq. 

a See PIRENNE, III., 345 seqq. 
1 See MARX, loc. cit. 83 seqq, 



General, and above all by the Protestant propaganda, to 
which the country was peculiarly exposed on account of its 
position and its commercial relations. He made what arrange 
ments he could to meet the danger : above all, before he left, 
he urged the governess, the governors, the courts and the 
bishops to be very much on their guard. In taking his solemn 
farewell of the representatives of the provinces assembled at 
Ghent, he urged the strict enforcement of the severe edicts 
issued by the Emperor against the sectarians, since past 
experience had shown that no religious change could take 
place without a corresponding political revolution. 1 

Philip s anxiety concerning the state of religion in the Low 
Countries was fully justified. Even though, as far as the 
great majority was concerned, in the very mixed population of 
those provinces, mixed both in nationality and customs, 
remaining firmly attached to the ancient religion, there was 
an undeniable weakening of religious feeling. 2 The lower 
classes were still filled with genuine piety, and continued to 
frequent the churches as before, 3 but the fatal influence of the 
writings of Erasmus was making rapid strides both among 
the educated people and the clergy. Like Erasmus himself, 
those who had come under his influence sought indeed to 
avoid any external separation from the Church, but as far as 
their private opinions were concerned they had departed 
from her principles in more than one respect. 4 Such a state 
of indecision, which left them free to enjoy life happily and 
without restraint, suited the easy-going character of the 
people of the Netherlands, although it was evident that it was 

1 See MARX, loc. cit. 41 seq. ; RACHFAHL, II., i, 19 seq. 

* See PIRENNE, III., 414. 

What A. de Beatis had written on this subject in 1517 (see 
PASTOR, Reise des Kard. d Aragona, 73) was again stated by 
Badoero in 1557 ; see ALBERI, I., 3, 291. 

4 See the excellent considerations put forward by RACHFAHL, 
I., 448 seq., 464. The ideas of Erasmus had been popularized 
by G. Cassander, who was much esteemed in the Low Countries. 
For the latter cf. PASTOR, in Kirchenlexikon of Freiburg, II. 8 
2017 seq. 


not calculated to their moral advantage, and a survey of the 
moral state of the country reveals a gloomy picture indeed. 
Unrestrained lust, drunkenness, and immorality were common, 
and not least among the numerous and powerful nobles. 
Unsettled and feeble in their religion, a large part of the 
aristocracy of the Netherlands led a luxurious and immoral 
life, and squandered their property in splendid banquets, 
extravagant gambling and wild orgies. 1 

The first place among the nobility of the Netherlands in 
every sense was held by William, Prince of Orange. Gifted 
with great qualities of intellect, strong in will and firm of 
purpose, a master of the art of summing up men and winning 
their hearts, and full of ambition, this coldly calculating man 
had a keen eye for anything that could advance or interfere 
with his aims. Morally, Orange was a man of licentious life 
and made no secret of it ; at the Diet of the princes at Frank 
fort in 1558 he openly declared that adultery was no sin. 2 
He was so addicted to the national vice of drunkenness as 
even to endanger his vigorous constitution. 3 Being filled 
with purely worldly ideas, he entirely ignored the super 
natural ; it is certain that very little remained in his mind 
of the Lutheran training which he received until his eleventh 
year. When, at that age, he had to become a Catholic in 
order to receive the rich inheritance of his cousin Re ne , he 
was given an education in accordance with the views of 
Erasmus. It is no wonder then that he fell into the state of 
indifference that was prevalent among the aristocracy of the 
Netherlands. 4 How much he looked upon religion as a mere 

1 Cf. MARX, Studien, 112 seq. ; RACHFAHL, I., 273 seq. See 
also PIRENNE, III., 498 seq. 

* See RITTER in Histor. Zeitschrift, LVIIL, 410, n. 2. 

See MARX, loc. cit. 116. 

4 See RACHFAHL, I., 153 seq. PIRENNE (III., 495) well says 
that at that time Orange was " as much a Catholic as later he 
was a Lutheran, and later still a Calvin ist, that is to say without 
any enthusiasm or deep convictions. . . . His attitude towards 
religion was nothing but the expression of the political position 
which he held for the moment." 


political consideration was shown by the negotiations which 
took place in 1561 before his marriage to Anne, the daughter 
of the Protestant Elector Maurice of Saxony. While he was 
assuring Philip II. that he had made it a condition that his 
wife should profess the Catholic faith, and intended that she 
should live a good Catholic, he informed the Elector Augustus 
of Saxony of his own secret but strong leaning towards Pro 
testantism, which, however, he was unable for the time being 
to profess publicly ; his wife, however, should be free to live 
in her Lutheran faith, and his children should be brought up 
in that religion. 1 A letter from Orange to Pius IV. belongs 
to the same year, 1561 ; in this he assures the Pope that he 
desires the extirpation of the " pest of heresy " in his princi 
pality of Orange, and that he had given orders to that effect 
to his officials. 2 William retained this mask of Catholicism 
for five years longer, because it was useful to his purpose. 
Proof of this is to be found in the two letters which he ad 
dressed to Pius V. in 1566. In the first, dated May I3th, he 
declared : " It is my desire and intention to be all my life 
the very humble and obedient son of the Church and of the 
Holy See, and to persevere, as my ancestors did, in that 
intention, devotion, and obedience." In the second letter, 
dated June 8th, he promised that he would take every pains, 
as was his duty, for the preservation of the ancient Catholic 
religion in his principality of Orange, as in the past. 3 All 

1 Cf. JANSSEN-PASTOR, IV. 18 - l , 267. See also KOLLIGS, W. 
v. Oranien, Bonn, 1884, 8-20 ; RACHFAHL, II., i, 91 seq., 100 seq. 

1 See GROEN VAN PRINSTERER, Archives de la maison Orange- 
Nassau, I., 72. Cf. KOCH, Unstersuchungen liber die Emporung 
und den Abfall der Niederlande, Leipsic, 1860, 9 seq. Pius IV. 
was much comforted by the behaviour of Orange in his princi 
pality ; see A. CAUCHIE and L. VAN DER ESSEN, Invent, des 
archives Farnesiennes, Brussels, 1911, xxi., and BROM, Archi- 
valia, I., 191 seq. 

* Cf. ALLARD, Des zwijgers godsdiensten in Studien op Gods- 
dienstig, Wettenschappelijk en Letterkundig Gebied, ami 13., 
Utrecht, 1880, II., 65-90, where the oiiginal text of the letter 
preserved in the Barberini Library is given for the first time. 


through the following summer he behaved as a Catholic, but 
in November, 1566, in a confidential letter to the Lutheran 
William of Hesse, he wrote that at heart he had " always 
held and professed " the Confession of Augsburg. 1 

Such was the man who, though he was the vassal and 
councillor of state of Philip II., used all his abilities to thwart 
the policy, both at home and abroad, of his king. All the 
malcontents of the Spanish government gathered round him, 
while those who had Protestant leanings were in close league 
with him. 2 Philip II. himself assisted his plans by continuing 
to postpone the removal of the three thousand hated Spanish 
soldiers, as he had unwillingly promised to do before he left 
the Low Countries. When their withdrawal had at last been 
obtained fresh subject for discontent was at once found in 
the new delimitation and increased number of the Netherland 
bishoprics, which Paul IV., in accordance with the wishes 
of Philip II., had arranged shortly before his death. 3 

This arrangement, which had been called for by a very proper 
recognition of the insufficiency of mere measures of repression 
for the stamping out of religious innovations, in view of the 
manifest unsuitability of the old conditions, was altogether 
necessary and at the same time of great assistance to the 
spiritual needs of the population ; it also had, however, a 
political bearing. The Pope was obliged to grant the Catholic 
King the right of nomination in the case of the fourteen new 
bishoprics, as with Utrecht, Tournai and Arras. Not satisfied 
with this increase in the power of the king, the commission 
which had been appointed by Philip II. in 1559 to put into 
effect the bull relating to the new bishoprics, in order to solve 
the difficult question of the endowment of the new dioceses, 

1 See GROEN VAN PRINSTERER, loc. cit. II., 997. Cf. also BLOK, 
Willelm de eerste (Amsterdam, 1919), who believes (p. 62) that 
Orange only really became a Calvlnist after 1572. 

C/. RITTER, I., 335 seq. 

* For this, besides what has been said in Vol. XIV. of this work, 
p. 321, see also MARX, Studien, 51 seq., 194 seq., and RACHFAHL, 
II., i, 20 seq. See also CLAESSENS, Sur 1 etablissement des 
eveches dans les Pays-Bas in Rev. cathol., 1859. 


proposed to unite the abbeys situated in the neighbourhood 
to the new sees. By this expedient the government obtained 
possession of further docile votes, because in most of the 
provinces the clergy formed an important part of the assembly 
of the states. 1 Philip II. accordingly declared himself well 
satisfied with the proposal, 2 which, under the influence and 
advice of Granvelle, was decided upon. 3 Since, however, 
this involved a departure from the original scope of the bull 
of Paul IV., it was necessary to ask for the consent of his 
successor, but for some reason or other the preparation of the 
bulls of erection of the new sees met with many difficulties. 
The blame for the sudden delay lay not only with the wretched 
question of money, the payment of the customary fees, and 
the cautious procedure of the Curia, but also in the strained 
relations between Pius IV. and the Spanish ambassador, 
Vargas, and the opposition of those prelates from whose 
dioceses important territories would be cut off. The Curia 
was literally flooded with protests. Like the Bishops of 
Cambrai, Liege, Tournai, and the chapter of Utrecht, so too 
the Archbishop of Cologne and Cardinal Guise as Archbishop 
of Rheims protested against the bull which defined the new 
boundaries of the dioceses in the Netherlands, on the ground 
that it injured their material and jurisdictions! interests. 4 
In spite of the insistence of Philip II., the supreme authority of 
the Church could not refuse to make an investigation of these 
complaints. The king had every reason to be satisfied with 
the final decision ; Pius IV. upheld the proposed arrangement, 
as being fully in accordance with the interests of religion. 
In a bull of March 7th, 1561, he approved the new scheme 
for the endowments, confirmed the bishops nominated by 

1 See MARX, Studien, 203 ; RACHFAHL, II., i, 131 seq. 

* See WEISS, Papiers d e"tat du card. Granvelle, VI., 58 seq. 

* See RACHFAHL in Westdeutsche Zeitschrift, XXIX., 369. 

4 Cf. Dj2 RAM in Annuaire de I univ. de Louvain, 1851, 302 seq. ; 
Af chief van het aartsbisdom Utrecht, XII., 434 seq. ; BROM, Archi- 
valia, I., 792 ; STEINHERZ, Nuntiaturberichte, I., 320 seq. ; 
HOLZWARTH, I., 77 seq. ; Corresp. de Granvelle, e"d. PIOT, IV., 
3 n. ; MARX, Studien, 196 seqq. ; RACHFAHL, II., i, 132 seq. 


Philip, and further took steps to see that those bishops who 
had suffered any loss were indemnified. 1 

While the foreign prelates were thus forced to give up their 
opposition, this broke out with all the greater violence in the 
Low Countries themselves, starting principally with the 
nobility. To the long-standing secret dislike of the Netherland 
aristocracy for the whole scheme, and the arbitrary proceedings 
of Philip II., there was added a deep discontent with the 
solution of the problem of the endowments, which strengthened 
the royal power, and made it difficult for the sons of the 
nobility to obtain bishoprics and canonries. 2 Completely 
disregarding the true interests of the Church, and short 
sightedly thinking only of their own advantage, even the 
abbeys, where they were affected by the bull, allowed them 
selves to be drawn into the opposition raised by the nobility. 3 
By stating, which was altogether untrue, that it was intended 
by means of the erection of the new bishoprics to introduce 
the Spanish Inquisition, which was mortally hated by the 
Netherlander, they succeeded at length in drawing the 
masses of the population into the movement. Not only those 
elements which were already inclined to the new religion, and 
which had every reason to fear an increased vigilance on the 
part of the bishops, but also those who were faithful to the 
Church were rendered anxious at the supposed attempt to 
subject them to a Spanish institution at the expense of their 
own local rights. 4 The states of Brabant especially made 
violent resistance, declaring that the incorporation of the 
abbeys was aimed at their principal privilege, the joyeuse 
entree. 5 The devils of Brabant, as Philip II. called them, 
soon found imitators in the other provinces, and in many 

1 See RAYNALDUS, 1561, n. 69; Archief cit., IX., 314 seq. ; 
XII., 444 ; STEINHERZ, loc. cit. I. 321 ; RACHFAHL, II., i, 135 ; 
BROM, loc. cit. 718 seq. 

* See MARX, Studien, 207 seqq. ; RACHFAHL, II., i, 147 seq. 

* Granvelle said that Douai like Brussels had as it were fallen 
into a trap. See HOLZWARTH, I., 80 seq. 

4 See MARX, Studien, 218 seqq. 

* See RACHFAHL, II., i, 151 seq., 155. 


places they went to extremes. Granvelle himself had to 
behave with great circumspection before he could make his 
solemn entry into Malines as archbishop. Several of the new 
bishops were unable to take possession of their sees at all, 
while others could only do so after more or less prolonged 
disputes. 1 

Granvelle, who had been made a Cardinal on February 25th, 
1561, took a decisive part in the unfortunate solution of the 
question of the bishoprics. 2 This earned for him the hatred 
of the opposition party of the nobles headed by Orange, all 
the more so because the latter saw in him, quite rightly, the 
most sagacious representative of the monarchical tendencies, 
and Philip s principal supporter. The fall of Granvelle then 
became his chief aim, and the " lords " found in him a powerful 
ally in the Calvinistic movement which was spreading from 
France into the Low Countries. The people were stirred up 
in every possible way ; works in French and Flemish mocked 
at the Cardinal as " the red devil " who wanted to destroy 
the liberty of the country by means of the Inquisition and the 
new bishoprics, and hand it over to the " Spanish swine." 
Orange and his supporters among the nobles kept up the war 
against the hated Cardinal by every means in their power, 
but only attained their object when even the regent deserted 
Granvelle. 8 

Philip II. had once said that he would rather risk his 
possessions in the Netherlands than sacrifice the Cardinal. 4 
There was only one way to save Granvelle, namely 
the personal appearance of the king in the Low Countries ; 5 

1 In more than one place their lives were hardly safe, says 
HAVENSIUS, Comment, de erectione novorum in Belgio epis- 
copatuum, Cologne, 1609, 26 seq. Cf. HOLZWARTH, I., 85 seq. ; 
RACHFAHL, II., i, 235 seq. 

2 See RACHFAHL in Westdeutschen Zeitschrift, XXII., 87 seqq. ; 
XXIX., 368 seq. 

8 See PIRENNE, III., 506 seq. ; RACHFAHL, II., i, 248 seq. t 
252 seqq., 288 seqq. 

* See WEISS, Papiers d etat du card. Granvelle, VII., 102. 
4 See Corresp. de Granvelle, ed. POULLET, I., Ixvti. 


indeed, the journey to Flanders was seriously urged upon 
him by all far-seeing men, but the irresolute monarch 
could not bring himself to the point, and instead, on 
January 22nd, 1564, gave his conge to his faithful servant, 
Granvelle. The regent then fell entirely into the hands of 
the opposition nobles, who made use of their triumph in the 
most disastrous way, so much so that a state of anarchy 
prevailed. 1 

The struggle about the bishoprics grew even more furious 
when there was added to it the opposition to the acceptance of 
the Council of Trent, and the situation grew worse than ever. 2 
While Philip II. showed a certain amount of concilia toriness 
in these two matters, he remained all the more fixed in his 
resistance to tw r o further demands of the opposition, namely, 
the assembly of the States General, and the alteration of the 
edicts in force against the religious innovators. It was the 
common opinion in the Low Countries that these edicts would 
be modified, and even the Bishops of Ypres, Namur, Ghent 
and St. Omer gave expression to this view in June, I565, 3 but 
Philip would not hear of it. Royal ordinances, issued at the 
park of Segovia in the second half of" October, 1565, definitely 
rejected the demands of the opposition ; the edicts were to be 
enforced even more rigorously, the Inquisition was to remain 
unchanged, and the States General were not to be summoned. 
At first the regent did not dare to publish this decision, and 
submitted the matter to the council of state, at which Orange 
obtained the publication of the royal decrees. He himself, 
on January 8th, 1566, issued a severe edict in favour of the 

1 See PIRENNE, III., 511; RACHFAHL, II., i, 421 seq. ; II., 

2, 517- 

1 Cf. RACHFAHL, II., i, 446 seqq., 451 seq. See also HOLZ- 
WARTH, I., 215 seq. and DE RAM, De promulgatione concilii 
Tridentini in Belgio. In the Franche Comte the Archbishop of 
Besan9on who had not yet received investiture, put oft the 
publication of the decrees until 1571, for which reason Pius V. 
took proceedings against him : see Revue Hist., CIIL, 227 seq., 
238 seq. 



Inquisition to the provinces of Holland, Zeeland and Frisia 
which were subject to him. 1 Sure of his success he declared : 
Now we shall see the beginning of a tremendous tragedy." 
And indeed he very soon saw what he had hoped for come to 
pass, the outburst of a storm of revolution, which was to clear 
the way for his own schemes. 

As early as the summer of 1565, Count Louis of Nassau, the 
brother of Orange, who did not disapprove of his Protestant 
leanings, had started secret negotiations for the formation of 
a league of the nobles. At the beginning of December, 1565, 
there was drawn up in complete secrecy at Brussels the so- 
called compromise of twenty nobles, which was directed against 
the continuance of the edicts, and the introduction, which was 
stated to be intended, of the Spanish Inquisition. The draft 
of this compromise carefully avoided the use of any expression 
offensive to Catholics, and this explains the fact that, among 
the large number who joined the league, there were many 
Catholics, who had no idea of separating themselves from the 
ancient Church, and only wished to resist the system of govern 
ment pursued by the crown. 2 The authors of the compromise, 
however, had from the first much more far-reaching aims ; 
they had conceived the idea of a revolt against the sovereign. 3 
Some of the conspirators wished to make their attack at once, 
but their leader, Orange, did not think that the fitting moment 
had yet arrived. In order to bring strong pressure to bear, he 
first drew up a mass petition ; on April 5th, 1566, under the 
leadership of his brother, Louis of Nassau, and Brederode, 
400 nobles appeared at the castle of Brussels and presented to 
the regent a " petition " which, in order to prevent a revolu 
tion, demanded the suspension of the edicts and the Inquisition, 
until the States General, which the king must assemble, should 
make other arrangements. 4 The governess gave way before 

1 Published in ALLARD, Een Plakkaat des Zwijgers ten gunste 
der Inquisitie, Utrecht, 1886, 5 seq. 

See PIRENNE, III., 557 ; RACHFAHL, II., 2, 547 seqq., 560 
seq., 565. 

See RITTER in Histor. Zeitschrift, LVIIL, 426. 

4 See BLOK, III., 341 seq. 


this demonstration, and promised the modification of the 
edicts, a contributory cause of her decision being the fact that 
the demands of the nobles, or gueux, as they were called, were 
almost universally approved of. That almost the whole 
countr}^ took the part of the nobles was to a great extent the 
result of an agitation which was as skilful as it was unscrupulous, 
which by means of pamphlets and broad-sheets enormously 
exaggerated 1 the number of the victims of the Inquisition 
and, concealing the true facts, represented as certain a thing 
which threatened the well-being and liberty of the country 
the immediate forcible introduction of the Spanish Inquisition. 2 
In order to understand the general state of excitement which 
this produced we must remember that even those who were 
loyal to the ancient Church, with very few exceptions, were 
altogether opposed to any violent punishment of the religious 
innovators, some because they were indifferent on religious 
questions, some because they had adopted the ideas of Erasmus 
and Cassander, some because they feared the injury that would 
be done to the commerce of the Netherlands, and all because 
in the Inquisition, in the form given to it by Charles V., and 
as it existed in Spain, they saw a grave threat to the liberties 
and local privileges which they clung to so jealousy. In this 

1 On the basis of the data given by William of Orange in his 
apologia, and a sentence used by Hugo Grotius the number of 
those executed by the Inquisition in the Low Countries was 
estimated at 50,000 or even 100,000. Modern researches have 
rectified this to the effect that at the highest estimate not more 
than 2,000 persons were put to death for obstinacy in heresy. 
See W. WILDE, Merkwaardige cijfers betreffende de Geloofs- 
vervolgingen in Nederland tijdens de i6 e eeuw, Utrecht, 1893, 
37 seq. ; CLAESSENS, L inquisition dans les Pays-Bas, Tumhout, 
1886, 259 seq. ; v. D. HAEGHEN, Du nombre des protestants 
execute s dans les Pays-Bas, 1889 ; RUTGERS, Calvyns invloed 
op de Reformatie in de Nederlanden, 141 seq. ; HOOG, Onze 
Martelaars in Nederl. Arch, voon boekgesch., I., Leyden, 1889, 
82 seqq. 

* See RACHFAHL, II., 2, 554 seq. ; cf. ibid. 560 concerning the 
statement that Philip II. did not wish to introduce anything new 
but only to enforce rigorously the existing edicts. 


sense even the Catholics of the Netherlands were gueux, and 
these at that time formed the great majority of the population, 
but only political gueux, with political ends in view, as dis 
tinguished from the religious gueux or Calvinists, who aimed 
at absolute freedom in the practice of religion in itself, but at 
the same time at the complete suppression and extirpation of 
the Catholic religion, for which they felt a mortal hatred as 
being " Roman idolatry." If the regent had adopted a course 
of vigorous resistance, the leaders of this minority, the Calvinist 
preachers, would have been completely scattered, 1 but 
Margaret was so panic-stricken that she did not dare to offer 
any sort of resistance ; she remained entirely passive before 
the movement, which every day became more dangerous. 

The weak behaviour of the regent, who tried to win over 
the religious gueux by modifying the edicts, only spurred on 
the Calvinist preachers to bolder action. As the result of an 
assembly held at Antwerp a vigorous propaganda in favour 
of Protestantism was set on foot throughout the country. A 
favourable field for this had long been ready in those districts 
where the great merchants and traders were in the ascendant, 
namely Antwerp and other ports, and the industrial districts 
of west Flanders, where there was to be found a large body of 
workmen, who, together with a number of unemployed, vaga 
bonds and idlers, partly from a love of opposition, and partly to 
obtain alms, joined the new movement. 2 At the same time the 
doctrines of Calvin had their supporters among the upper 
classes, especially among the rich merchants, lawyers, magis 
trates and nobles, who made up by their fanaticism and daring 
for what the movement lacked in numbers. What very 
shallow roots the new religion had. was shown by the fact that 
in 1563 the mere arrival of troops was enough to restore the 

1 See BLOK, III., 46 seq. ; PIRENNE, III., 542 seq., 551, 558, 
565. In the opinion of an Italian Catholic, the architect March i, 
there were not 20 persons in the whole country who really wished 
for the continuance of the Inquisition ; see CAUCHIE in Analectes 
pour servir a 1 hist. eccles. de la Belgique, XXIII. (1892), 26. 

1 See PIRENNE, III., 530 seq. ; RACHFAHL, II., 2, 525 seq., 
53 seq. 


old order of things at Valenciennes, Tournai, and on the sea- 
coast of Flanders. 1 Those who were most deeply involved 
had then gone into exile, but now they returned in shoals, 
while many preachers came from Geneva, France, Germany 
and England in order systematically to win over the masses 
of the people. After the end of May, 1566, " savage sermons " 
against the " Roman idolatry " were preached in the open air 
in the presence of thousands of people, who were for the most 
part armed. At the same time endless pamphlets, libels and 
calumnies were distributed in the cities and villages against the 
Church and even against the king. The foreign preachers 
were joined by native ones, who were sometimes apostate 
Catholic priests, but also shoemakers and tailors, all banded 
together to stir up the people against the " imposture " of 
the ancient Church. The frightened authorities allowed this 
to go on, and even in Brussels Calvinist sermons were allowed 
in two places. Even the provinces of the north succumbed to 
the movement, the principal centres being Antwerp and the 
whole of Flanders. At Tournai the innovators tried to force 
the Catholics by threats to listen to their insulting sermons. 
Every means was made use of ; in the villages of south 
Flanders demagogues displayed letters bearing the forged 
seal of the king, inciting people to sack the churches, and 
secret lists were drawn up containing the names of those who 
were ready to join in an open warfare on behalf of the new 
doctrines. 2 

In August, 1566, the inflammable matter that was every 
where to be found, burst into open flame. On August loth, 
at the instigation and under the leadership of the preachers, 
all the horrors of iconoclasm broke loose in the industrial 
districts of west Flanders, where Calvinism had long had 
many supporters. Both in cities and villages infuriated bands 
broke into the churches in order to destroy the " idolatry " 
against which the preachers had so heatedly inveighed. The 
horror-stricken Catholics saw their churches sacked, and even 

1 See PIRENNE, III., 538. 

8 See PIRENNE, III., 559-570, and especially RACHFAHL, II., 
2, 636 seq., 643 seq. t 646 seq., 673 seq., 703 seq. 


the Most Holy Sacrament trampled under foot. Thus was 
revealed for the first time in the district between Dunkirk, 
Ypres and Armentieres, the true spirit in which the masses of 
the people had been led. The movement spread like an all- 
devouring conflagration through Flanders ; only Bruges, 
Cambrai and Douai were spared in the destruction, and that 
because the Catholics had recourse to armed resistance. From 
Flanders the hurricane spread even as far as Zeeland, Holland 
and Frisia, everywhere with the same terrible scenes of 
destruction. Artistic treasures which could never be replaced 
fell victim to the storm ; with cries of " Long live the gueux " 
the iconoclasts, among whom were to be seen educated persons, 
convinced that they were doing a work that was pleasing to 
God in destroying the " Roman idols," passed from church 
to church and from convent to convent. With mad fury 
they maltreated priests, monks and nuns, destroyed statues, 
pictures, stained glass, chalices, monstrances, and sacred 
vestments, burned books and manuscripts, and even profaned 
graves. Only a few among the confederated nobles, such as 
the journalist, Philippe de Marnix, approved of this work of 
destruction. Count Culemburg took part in it, and with his 
band of followers sat down to table in a church which had 
been " purified " at his orders, and to amuse them fed a parrot 
with consecrated hosts. Orange, who kept away with some 
anxiety from this mad exhibition of democratic Calvinism, 
with which he could not be in sympathy, but who secretly 
favoured the Lutherans, even though he still took part in 
Catholic worship, prudently kept in the background. Ant 
werp therefore remained quiet so long as he remained there ; 
it was only when he went to Brussels on August igth for a 
meeting of the Knights of the Golden Fleece, that the same 
horrors took place in Antwerp as had occurred elsewhere. 1 

1 J. KAUFMANN (tFber die Anfange des Bundes der Aderligen 
und des Bildersturmes, Bonn, 1889, 36 seq.) tries to prove that 
an assembly held at Antwerp in July, 1566, had decided upon the 
war against images, but that its execution was left to the people. 
RACHFAHL (II., 2, 713 ; cf. App. n. 74) rejects this view as not 
in accordance with the sources, but at the same time be quite 


In all the large cities not a church, or chapel, or convent or 
hospital remained unharmed. The damage done to the 
cathedral, the most beautiful and sumptuous church in the 
country, was estimated at 400,000 gold florins. By August 
27th the number of churches and convents devastated in 
Flanders alone was 400. In the greater part of the country 
Catholic worship had completely come to an end, the only 
provinces that were spared being Namur, Artois, Hainault 
and Luxemburg. 1 

The news of these atrocities and sacrileges reached Rome 
long before the court of Spain. It confirmed Pius V. in his 
absolutely correct idea, shared by all who knew the true facts 
of the case, that the only efficacious remedy for the conflagra 
tion that had broken out in the Low Countries was the personal 
appearance of the Spanish king in the disturbed provinces. 

He had scarcely been elected when he expressed this view 

definitely makes it appear that " they were the fruits of the preach 
ing against idolatry, which at that time was reaching its height, 
and thus the war against images was the result of Calvinism, and 
of the spiiit which the teaching of the Geneva reformer planted 
with irresistible force in the hearts of his followers. It was not 
the result of a decision which had long been taken and was of 
universal application, but the idea was, as it were, in the air. 
The idea had been played with for a long time, but it was only 
at the meeting at St. Trond that it had" been again discussed. 
Then it began to be put into practice seriously." 

1 See PIRENNE, III., 570 seqq. ; BLOK, III., 58 seq. ; RACHFAHL, 
II., 2, 709 ; KRONEN, Maria s Heerlijkheid in Nederland, VII., 
Amsterdam 1911, 78 seq. See also the full bibliography collected 
by PIOT in the notes to Renom de France, I., 131 seq. The sacri 
lege of the Count of Culemburg is attested by several witnesses 
(see Corresp. de Philippe II., I., 471, 480) ; it is not therefore just 
to say with RACHFAHL (II., 2, 716) that the co-operation of indi 
vidual members of the league of the nobles is not proved. A 
list of the churches and the incalculable treasures of art destroyed 
in RATHBERGER, Annalen der niederlandischen Malerei, Gotha, 
1844, 196 seqq. In Allgem. Zeitung, 1900, Beil. n. 161 Weizsacker 
brings out the loss inflicted on our knowledge of the beginnings 
of the art of Jan van Eyck. 


to Philip II. in a letter of February 2ist, 1566, and he repeated 
the same thing even more strongly to Requesens in March. 1 
In April, 1566, the distinguished Archbishop of Sorrento, 
Stefano Pavesi, a Dominican, was sent to the Low Countries, 
in order to obtain definite tidings of the state of religious affairs 
there. 2 In accordance with his habitual temporizing and 
hesitation, Philip II. at first tried to prevent this mission, but 
gave way when it was decided in Rome to make it as un 
obtrusive as possible. Pavesi s prudence and caution satisfied 
the king. The archbishop gathered exact details of the 
religious state of affairs not only from the regent and her 
adviser, Viglius, but also from Morillon, the vicar-general of 
Granvelle, the theologians of Louvain, the bishops, and other 
leading ecclesiastics. He even had a conversation with 
Orange, which appeared to be quite satisfactory, because at 
that time that political trickster was still wearing his mask 
of Catholicism. While Pavesi was at Brussels (May 2ist to 
June 1 6th) the followers of the new doctrines kept very quiet. 
The regent tried to prove to the envoy that under the cir 
cumstances she had done all that was possible for the cause of 
religion. 3 Pavesi, however, was under no illusions as to the 
gravity of the situation, and from May onwards Pius V., 

1 See Corresp. dipl., I., 131, 157. 

1 The credentials of Pavesi to the regent, of Mar. 18, 1566, in 
LADERCHI, 1566, n. 465. Similar briefs to Charles of Lorraine 
and many bishops, in the original minutes, in the British Museum 
Addit. 26865. At first Pavesi was to have gone to Maximilian II. ; 
see App. n. 68, Vol. XVII. the *briefs of March i and 21, 1566. 
The nuncio did not start till April. For his mission cf. Corresp. 
de Philippe II., I., 422 n. ; Corresp. de Granvelle, ed. POULLET, 
I., 245 n. ; HOLZWARTH, I., 328 seq., 459 ; CAUCHIE, Sources 
manuscrites de 1 hist. beige & Rome, Brussels, 1892, 43 seq. ; 
BROM, Archivalia, I., 197, 827 ; RACHFAHL, II., 2, 630 seq. ; 
Corresp. dipl., I., 149, 156, 189, 194, 229, 246, 263 seq., 280, 290, 
302, 369 ; DENGEL, V., 94. For Pavesi see CAPECE, 30 seq. and 
MALDACCA, Storia di Sorrento, II., 188. In a *letter from 
Delfino to Maximilian II., Pavesi is praised as " huomo molto 
dotto e di buona vita." State Archives, Vienna, Hofkorresp., 6. 

1 See RACHFAHL, II,, 2, 630 seq. 


through the nuncio in Spain, urged Philip to undertake the 
journey to the Netherlands, 1 and in every audience impressed 
upon Granvelle the necessity of that step. 2 Fired by the report 
from Pavesi, and the news he had received from other sources, 3 
in a conversation with Requesens in July, he declared in the 
strongest words and with all possible emphasis that the situa 
tion was far more dangerous than they imagined in Madrid, and 
that the delay in the king s departure would have the worst 
possible consequences for religion. 4 On July I2th Pius V. 
wrote a strong letter to the king himself, 5 and on August 3rd 
he wrote to the nuncio in Spain that Philip II. would one day 
have to render an account for the loss of so many souls, since 
nothing but his personal presence would be of any avail. 6 

By way of reply to this, Requesens was ordered on August 
1 2th, 1566, to explain to the Pope that his master felt himself 
quite free from blame, that as far as the journey was concerned 
His Majesty s intentions coincided with the wishes of the 
Pope, but that if a real success was to be obtained, the king 
must go there with an army, not only for the protection of his 
person, but also in order that he might show a strong front 
before the Netherland insurgents, and their friends in France, 
Germany and England. Such an armed expedition required 
time, but above all there was the lack of the necessary funds, 
which the Pope could supply by granting ecclesiastical sub 
sidies. As soon as all the necessary preparations had been 
made so Philip told Requesens to assure the Pope most 
definitely His Majesty would start for the Low Countries 

1 See Corresp. dipl., I., 233. 

1 See Corresp. de Granvelle, ed. POULLET, L, 318. 

1 See LADERCHI, 1566, n. 470. 

4 See Corresp. dipl., I., 279 seq. 

5 In LADERCHI, 1566, n. 471. Cf. Corresp. dipl., L, 279 n. 
for the date. From a comparison with the *briefs of Pius V. 
in the Papal Secret Archives, Arm. 44, t. 12, n. 96, it appears that 
in Laderchi after " illic " the words " in extreme discrimine 
versatur. Sed si religio catholica, etc.," have been omitted. 
Further instead of " perpessa " we find " oppressa." 

8 Corresp. dipl., I., 299. Cf. also BROM, Archivalia, L, 197, 



without any thought of the dangers which might threaten him. 
The Spanish king expressed himself in the same sense to 
Castagna, who for his part urged him on in every way and 
reminded him of the proverb : " While they were taking 
counsel in Rome, Saguntum fell," but he could learn nothing 
as to the date of the king s departure. 1 

There can be no possible doubt that Philip II. fell into a 
fatal error with regard to the Netherlands in not looking upon 
his personal presence there with the same urgency as did the 
Pope, who would have had him give this matter precedence 
over all others. After the news came of the iconoclastic 
horrors that had taken place, Pius V. could consider himself 
justified in declaring that he had sent his exhortations and his 
timely warning to no purpose. 2 While he was still feeling 
the effects of the terrible news he made up his mind to the 
mission of Pietro Camaiani to Spain, which occasioned such 
a stir. 

Camaiani was instructed once more to urge the king to make 
the journey, and to say that the sending of an army, no matter 
how large, would be of no avail without the personal presence 
of the king. In the instructions for the nuncio it is stated 
that Philip II. was responsible for all the evil consequences 
that would result from any further delay, since not only would 
the Low Countries be lost to the Church and to Spain, but 
there would be even worse effects upon the state of religion in 
France and England. 3 

The quarrel which ensued between Philip II. and Pius V. 
was not caused only by the brusque behaviour of Camaiani, 
but, altogether apart from other disagreements between Rome 
and Spain, by the fact that the king was deeply hurt by the 
doubts expressed by the Pope as to the insincerity of his 
intentions to undertake the journey. 4 This is proved from 
the emphatic way in which the king assured the Pope of his 
readiness to go in person to the Low Countries. The truth 

1 See Corresp. dipl., I., 301, 318 seq. 
1 See LADERCHI, 1566, n. 474. 
See Corresp. dipl., I., 357 seq. 
4 See RACHFAHL, II., 2, 839. 


was that he had no more idea of setting out than he had of 
paying any attention to the Pope s exhortations that he 
should once more try the effect of gentle methods with the 
Netherlanders before he had recourse to armed force. In 
December, 1566, a year full of great events, Philip came to the 
determination that Alba must wipe out the crimes of high 
treason against God and the king in the Netherlands with 
blood and iron, though he still kept up the pretence that he 
intended to go there himself and show mercy, and that Alba 
was merely being sent beforehand to prepare for the coming 
of the king. 1 On January nth, 1567, Requesens received 
instructions to communicate the king s intentions in this sense 
officially to the Pope. 2 

In the meantime a fear had grown up in Rome that the 
Spanish council only intended to subdue the Low Countries 
politically, and that for the time being the religious changes 
would be tolerated. Pius V. made a strong protest against 
any such mode of procedure, 3 pointing out the consequences 
which had followed upon similar action by Charles V. in Ger 
many. The Pope who, from the first, had only had the 
religious aspect of the disturbances in the Netherlands in view, 
was of the opinion that this should take precedence of every 
other consideration, that the strongest measures must be 
taken, and that this must be done by the king in person. 
Nobody else could take his place since in such undertakings 
it often happened that the most important decisions had to 
be made at a moment s notice, and since the sovereign him 
self would have to be on the spot, in order to grant pardon or 
inflict punishment, there was nothing to be gained by sending 
a representative beforehand, because in that case people would 
no longer believe that the king was coming, and the boldness 
of the insurgents would be only increased. 

The Pope clearly saw what an important effect a victory of 
the religious innovators would have upon the course of affairs 
in France, England and Germany, For this reason he never 

1 Cf. ibid. 

* See Corresp. dipl., II., 16, 

* Cf. ibid., 25 seq.^ 52 seq. 


tired of urging Philip to go in person and at once to the threat 
ened provinces, and above all, in order that he might crush the 
heretical movement, and restore Catholic worship everywhere. 
By so doing he would best serve the political interests of the 
Spanish rule in the Low Countries, since it was the religious 
changes which fed the flames of the rebellion. 1 

Philip replied that this was his view as well. He entirely 
rejected all thought of tolerating Calvinism, but at the same 
time he did not wish the religious question to be set in the 
first place in the same way as did the Pope. He also remained 
firm in his intention to sending Alba before him. He therefore 
announced that his own journey to the Low Countries was 
decided upon, though he still evaded any definite naming of a 
date. 2 Thus the whole of May, 1567, passed by, and June 
found the king still in Spain, in spite of further pressure from 
the Pope in a brief of May i7th, 1567. The preparations for 
his journey were still going on. On June 23rd Philip II. 
wrote to Granvelle in Rome that people there who did not 
believe in his journey would soon see that they were wrong, in 
spite of the reports which had so maliciously been spread about. 
In July a courier left Madrid for Rome to announce the immedi 
ate departure of the king. When the nuncio asked whether 
he should remain at Madrid or accompany the king to the 
Low Countries, Philip replied that he would be very pleased 
to have him in his company. 3 On July I5th the king renewed 
the orders to hasten the preparations for his departure, and 
six days later, in publishing the decrees of the Cortes, he 
declared that the conduct of the Netherlanders obliged him 
to go to that country. 4 

Nevertheless those people were right who from the first had 

1 See ibid. 47. 
a Cf. supra p. 14. 

3 Cf. GACHARD, Corresp. de Philippe II., I., cliv, 550, 564, and 
Bibl. de Madrid, 100 seq. ; HOLZWARTH, II., i, 31 seq. In Holz- 
warth there is also an explanation of the reasons why Philip II. 
did not wish to go to the Low Countries. Cf, on this subject 
Corresp. di^l., II., Iv. seq. 

4 See RANKE, Hist.-biogr. Studien, 522. 


doubted whether Philip would really go in person to the Low 
Countries. Even Castagna had to report on August nth, 
1567, that no one in Madrid now counted any longer on the 
king s journey, for which nevertheless all the preparations 
had been made down to the smallest detail. At the begin 
ning of September the nuncio expressed to the king, though 
with all due respect, his great disappointment at this change 
of intention, and spoke of the sorrow felt by the Pope, and the 
unfavourable impression which would be made upon the 
world. On September 2oth there came an official notification 
that the journey had been put off until the following spring, 
and instructions were sent by courier to Requesens to explain 
to the Pope the reasons which had led to this decision. Assur 
ances were given in Madrid that the king adhered to his purpose 
of undertaking the journey, and Cardinal Espinosa told the 
nuncio that in the following March nothing but his death or 
the end of the world would prevent His Majesty from 
going. 1 

The Pope who, even in August, 1567, had prayed daily at 
mass for the successful journey of the king, and had ordered 
the whole clergy of Rome to pray for the same purpose, 2 
was cut to the heart by the abandonment of the expedition, 
in which he saw the only chance of saving the Low Countries, 
as well as the hope of an improvement in the position of the 
Catholic cause in France and England. He said quite openly 
to Requesens that the king, who had written to him with his 
own hand, had deceived him ; face to face with the threat to 
religion the king ought to have put every other consideration 
on one side, because in the end it is God who guides all things. 
Requesens and Granvelle excused the king as best they could, 

1 See the reports of Castagna in GACHARD, Bibl. de Madrid 
100-105 and Corresp. dipl., II. t 177 seq., 184 seq., 189 seq., 203 seq., 
205 seq. 

2 See the *report of Arco of August 23, 1567, State Archives, 
Vienna. On August 2, Bonelli had written in cypher to Castagna 
that it was the wish of Pius V. that Philip should start as soon 
as possible, and he once again set forth the reasons. Corresp. 
dipl., II., 175 seq. 


but the Pope remained very angry. 1 On July I5th, on the 
strength of the king s promised action 2 in the Low Countries, he 
had granted him the so-called excusado. 3 Was he not therefore 
justified in thinking that Philip s promises had only been made 
in order to wring this important concession from him ? 4 The 
friends of Spain in the Curia might say what they liked, but 
Pius V. continued to believe that he had been cheated by 
Philip. Nothing but Alba s strong action in the Low Countries 
was able to pacify him, and gave him cause to hope that 
Catholic interests had not been ruined by the putting off of 
the king s journey. 5 

Pius V. clearly recognized what a mistake Philip had made, 
first in postponing, and then in definitely giving up his personal 
appearance in the Low Countries, which was so dreaded by the 
adherents of the new religion, 6 but he quite failed to see that 
the mission of Alba was a far worse one. The Duke, who 
was heart and soul a Spaniard, and had not the least under 
standing of foreign susceptibilities, was especially hated in the 
Low Countries, so much so that Philip II. himself at one time 
thought of revoking his appointment. If in the end he did 
not do so, this was to a great extent due to the party at court 

1 See the *reports of Arco of Sept. 6, 13, and 20, 1567, State 
Archives, Vienna, and the letter of Granvelle of Sept. 16,, 1567* 
Corresp. de Philippe II., I., 577. Cf. Corresp. dipl., II., 198. 

1 The bull in Corresp. dipl., II., 524 seq. PHILIPPSON, 310, must 
therefore be amended, as must GAMS, III., 2, 519. 

8 The " excusado " was an impost, by which in every parish 
the king received from every third house the tithe which other 
wise those houses would have paid to the Church, and from which 
payment to the Church they were then held exempt (excusado}. 
Cf. DESDEVISES DU DEZERT, L Espagne de 1 ancien regime : Les 
institutions, Paris, 1899, 370. 

4 In 1566 Requesens was of opinion that the " excusado val- 
dria un Peru " (Colecc. de decum. in&l, XCVIL, 376). Cf. the 
report of Dietrichstein in KOCH, Quellen zur Gesch. Maximilians. 
II., Leipsic, 1857, 200. 

6 See Corresp. dipl., II., lix seq., 191, 198, 200 seq., 204 seq., 212, 
216 seq., 253. Cf. Corresp. de Philippe II., I., 580 seq. 

e See Corresp. dipl., II., xlviii. 


that was opposed to Alba, and wanted to have him as far away 
as possible. At that time Ruy Gomez exercised a great in 
fluence over Philip II. , a thing that made itself felt in Rome 
as well as in the attitude taken up by Cardinal Pacheco. 1 

While the army of Alba was assembling in upper Italy, 
Pius V. expressed a wish that on their- march towards the 
Low Countries they should make an attack on Geneva, the 
head-quarters of Calvinism, but Philip II. refused to make 
this side attack ; 2 nor would he hear of a second proposal 
made by the Pope. Pius wished to send with Alba a pleni 
potentiary to look after ecclesiastical matters, 3 or else to send 
a nuncio to the Netherlands. 4 Neither one plan nor the other 
was approved by the king, who did not wish for any inter 
ference from Rome in his own plans, which were aimed not 
only at the punishment of the heretics but also at the destruc 
tion of the tiresome privileges of the Low Countries, and at 
making that country into a Spanish dependency. The aboli 
tion of privileges, the substitution of royal officials for the 
civic authorities, the building of fortresses at Antwerp, Valen 
ciennes, Flushing, Amsterdam and Maestricht, the confisca 
tion of property, the imposition of taxes without the consent 
of the states, such was the programme which Philip, as far 
back as May 3ist, 1567, had sketched out for the regent. 5 
Alba was the very man to carry it into effect. 

In August, 1567, Alba appeared with the picked troops of 
his army in the Low Countries, where, after the attack on the 
images, the Catholic nobles, realizing their mistake, had with 
drawn from the compromise, and where, in many of the cities, 

1 See ibid, xlvii. seq. 

a Cf. CRAMER, I., 165 seq, ; II., 208 seq. Later exhortations 
to an attack on Geneva on the part of Pius V. were equally 
unsuccessful. See ibid. II., 219 seq., 223. 

3 See the "report of Arco of July 19, 1567, State Archives, 

4 See ibid, the *report of Arco of August 23, 1567 : the nuncio, 
with the powers of a legate, must discharge all his business 

8 GACHARD, Corresp. de Philippe II., I., 542. 


a reaction against the religious innovators had set in. 1 It is 
true that even after the suppression of the Calvinist revolt 
which had broken out at the beginning of 1567, the peace of 
the country left a good deal to be desired, but a wise policy 
would have been content with the punishment of the ring 
leaders, the granting of pardon to those who had been led 
astray, and an attempt to rally the elements that were loyal 
to the king. That was why Pius V. so insistently urged 
Philip to go there in person, and, before he had recourse to 
armed force, to make one more attempt to win back the 
offenders by kindness to a better frame of mind. Alba, on 
the contrary, was sent with the object, not only of suppressing 
the religious innovations, but also of introducing a system 
of government which would destroy political liberty, and was 
bound to make everybody, even the Catholics who remained 
loyal to the king, enemies of Spain. Alba s soldiers, who 
behaved as if in a conquered country, completed the work of 
driving the people to desperation, and filling them with hatred 
of Spain. At first, it is true, every other consideration gave 
way to terror of the captain-general of the Spanish king, and 
the regent took her departure at the end of 1567. But the 
Duke surpassed the worst expectations ; on the imprisonment 
of Egmont and Hoorn there followed the setting up of an 
extraordinary tribunal, the " council of blood," and the 
opening of legal proceedings against Orange and his con 
federates who had fled to Germany and openly professed 
Lutheranism ; in February, 1568, there were wholesale exe 
cutions and confiscations ; thousands of people took to flight. 2 
Orange and his brother took up arms in defence of their cause, 
relying upon the help of the Lutheran princes of Germany, 
the leaders of the French Huguenots, and the Queen of England, 
with whom they had been in communication for a long time 
past. Alba retaliated on June 5th, 1568, by the execution of 
Counts Egmont and Hoorn. He then took the field against the 
rebels. He defeated Louis of Nassau on July 2ist at Jemgum 

1 See RACHFAHL, II., 2, 769 seq., 801 seq. 

2 See PIRENNE, IV., 10 seq. 


on the lower Ems, and then turned against William of Orange, 
who in September, as the champion of " the liberty of his 
country " made an attempt to force his way with an army 
from Treves along the Meuse into the Low Countries, but Alba 
manoeuvred so skilfully that the enemy was forced to retreat 
in wild disorder. 1 Orange fled to Dillenburg, and only the 
gueux of the sea-coasts remained under arms. Alba s triumph 
seemed to be complete ; even Elizabeth of England congratu 
lated Philip II. on his victory over the rebels. 2 Alba reported 
to Madrid that peace reigned everywhere, but he nevertheless 
continued his campaign of terror and bloodshed, as though it 
were his purpose to infuriate even the loyal supporters of the 
king and the old religion. He set himself definitely " & tout 
reduire au pied d Espagne." 3 By imposing taxes that were 
both exorbitant and unjust in form and kind, 4 he made even 
the Catholics his enemies, who were forced to realize by the 
confiscations of their property that " care for souls did not 
come into the matter at all." 5 When some of the Jesuits 
protested against the imposition of the tithe as a manifest 
injustice, Alba wanted to banish them all from the Low 
Countries. 6 He treated the bishops arrogantly when they 
took up the cause of the poor people. 7 His whole system of 
government, a military dictatorship, weighed equally heavily 
upon all ; so far from pacifying the country, he only exasper 
ated it more and more. 

It was of great importance to the Spanish government that 
the Roman court should see in the disturbances in the Nether- 

1 Cf. BOR, Lodewijk v. Nassau, 160 seq. ; FRANZ, Ostfriesland 
und die Niederlande, Emden, 1875, 24 seq. ; TEUBNER, Der 
Feldzug Wilhelms von Oranien gegen Alba im Herbst 1568, 
Halle, 1892. 

2 See BLOK, III., 96. 

3 Morillon to Granvelle, April 28, 1572, Corresp. de Granvelle, 
ed. PIOT, IV., 207. 

4 See PIRENNE, IV., 28 seq. ; BLOK, III., 101 seq. 

5 Corresp. de Granvelle, ed. PIOT, IV., 292. 

6 See ibid. 155, 157. 

7 See PIRENNE, IV., 9. 


lands nothing but a demonstration on the part of the Calvinists. 
It was easy for it to promote this idea in Rome as it was 
extremely difficult to form a just appreciation abroad of the 
complicated state of affairs in the Netherlands, or to realize 
the political and national elements which from the first had 
exercised a decisive influence upon the whole movement. 
Even Alba s actions in the Low Countries were set forth by 
the Spanish ambassador in Rome in such a way as to make 
it appear that religious considerations were of greater weight 
than political ones. In this way the Spaniards hoped that the 
Pope would give his approval to yet further ecclesiastical 
imposts, a thing that they had sought in vain so far, for so 
praiseworthy a purpose as the destruction of the Calvinists. 1 
Since Philip II. had refused the appointment of a nuncio 
for the Low Countries, Pius V., except for private information, 
could only rely upon the reports of the Spanish government ; 
Requesens, as well as Zuniga after him, kept him well supplied 
in this respect. Events in the Low Countries were treated by 
the Spaniards with so much secrecy that the wildest rumours 
were current. 2 The words of the official representatives of 
Philip II. were therefore listened to all the more eagerly in 
Rome, and their descriptions were so convincing that, in 
forming his judgment upon affairs in the Netherlands, Pius V. 
found himself entirely under the influence of Spanish ideas, 
and looked upon the expedition of Alba as a kind of crusade 
against the heretics, which would have the effect of keeping 
their co-religionists in France and Germany in check. 3 More- 

1 See Corresp. dipl., II., 437. 

2 Thus a rumour was spread of a decree of Philip II., drawn 
up on the authority of the Spanish Inquisition, and condemning 
to death the greater part of the Netherlanders. PRESCOTT, 
Philipp II., II. (1867), 105 had already expressed doubts as to 
this statement, which was taken without scruple from de 
Thou and Meier. More recently BLOK, in Bijdragen van vader- 
landsche Geschiedenis, 4th series, VI., 3, has justly pronounced 
against the genuineness of this decree. 

8 Cf. especially the report of Zuniga to Philip II. from Rome on 
July 21, 1568, Corresp. dipl., II., 414. 


over, from the reports of Johann Straetmann, a Dominican 
who was living in Brussels, and, who, on February 22nd, 1568, 
sent horrible particulars of the murder of twenty-five Catholic 
priests which had been committed by the Calvinists near 
Ypres, Pius V. was driven to the conclusion that it was a case 
of existence or non-existence for the Catholics in the Low 
Countries. 1 

Alba s report to the Pope of the execution of Egmont and 
Hoorn was explained by Zuniga and Pacheco in such a way 
that Pius V. could not but give it his entire approval. 2 He 
had no suspicions of the injustice of the punishment of Egmont ; 
in fact the sentence of death on the two counts, as reported to 
him by Alba, made it appear that they had been convicted of 
rebellion and high treason, in having supported the heretics 
and joined in the conspiracy of Orange. The Pope was further 
confirmed in this view, that they had justly paid the penalty 
of their crimes, by the fact that a sovereign who was so much 
under suspicion in religious matters* as Maximilian II. dis 
approved of Alba s action. 3 When, after this, Louis of Nassau, 
in alliance with the sea gueux, and William of Orange, who 
had now openly left the Church, took the field with his army of 
German Lutherans, French Huguenots, and Netherland 
Calvinists, Pius feared, in the event of Alba s forces being 
defeated, a butchery of the Catholics in the Low Countries. 
At their first appearance, indeed, the savage followers of 
Louis of Nassau had begun to sack the churches and kill the 
priests. News of these events, and of the composition of the 
army of Orange were bound to confirm the conviction of 
Pius V. that Alba was above all fighting against the enemies 
of God and the Church, and only secondarily against the 
rebels against his king, and that he was therefore fighting the 

1 See LADERCHI, 1568, n. 173. For the correspondence of 
Straetmann with Cardinal Bonelli see Anal. p. s. a I hist, eccles. 
de la Belgique, XXV. (1895), 55 seq. 

" See Corresp. dipl., II., 402, 403 seq. ; Legaz. di Serristori, 

3 See Corresp. dipl., II., 4^14 seq. , 498 ; Legaz. di Serristori, 


battles of Our Lord for the restoration of the Catholic 
religion. 1 

The Pope followed the course of events with an anxiety 
that can easily be understood. In the evening of August 4th, 
1568, Alba announced his victory over Louis of Nassau. The 
Pope ordered fire-works and processions, 2 to thank God and 
to implore His continued help, since the Church was still 
threatened with grave danger from Orange, whose troops were 
everywhere sacking churches and convents. On August 2qth 
Pius made the pilgrimage to the Seven Churches in supplica 
tion for the protection of religion in the Low Countries. 3 
His anxiety was increased when news came that the German 
and French Protestants were helping Orange. 4 On October 
29th he repeated this pilgrimage to the Seven Churches, and 
prayed for Alba s success. 5 On November i8th the faithful 
were summoned, by the publication of a jubilee, to pray for 
the destruction of the enemies of the Church in France and 
Flanders. 6 At length December 7th set the Pope free from 
his great anxieties ; Alba had put Orange to flight ; the joy 
in Rome was all the greater as earlier rumours of the victory 

1 In the briefs to Alba (LADERCHI, 1568, n. 179 ; BROGNOLI, 
I., 266) the matter is stated very clearly. 

2 See, besides Firmanus, Diarium in BONANNI, I., 301, the 
*report of Arco of August 7, 1568, State Archives, Vienna, the 
letter of Zufiiga of August 13, 1568, in Corresp. dipl., II., 437, 
and the "report of B. Pia from Rome on August 14, 1568 (prayers 
ordered everywhere in thanksgiving for " buoni successi di 
Fiandra contra Ugonotti) Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. The 
report of Alba to Pius V. on July 25, and the briefs of congratula 
tion from the Pope, dated August 7 and 26, 1568, in LADERCHI, 
1568, n. 178-179. 

3 * Report of B. Pia of August 30, 1568. Gonzaga Archives, 

4 See Corresp. dipl. II., 457. 

6 See FIRMANUS, *Diarium in Miscell., Arm. XII., 31, Papal 
Secret Archives. For the great anxiety of Pius V. as to the 
course of events in the Low Countries, see "report of B. Pia of 
November 6, 1568, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. 

See FIRMANUS, *Diarium, loc. cit. 


had not been confirmed. 1 In the following year the Duke 
was honoured with the bestowal of the blessed hat and sword, 
while his wife received the Golden Rose. 2 

After Alba s victory, Pius V. as well as many other persons 
had urged the granting of a general amnesty. He himself 
gave the necessary faculties to cut short all the formalities 
which might have delayed the re-admission to the Church of 
the Protestants who had repented. 3 Philip II. also recognized 
the need for an amnesty, but with his customary dilatoriness 
it was only on November i6th, 1569, that he signed the docu 
ment, which even then included several limitations. Alba 
still withheld the publication of this decree and of the Papal 
bull until July, 1570 ! 4 He was not the man to show mercy. 5 

The assistance which the Duke afforded in carrying into 
effect the complete organization of the new dioceses helped 
to maintain the good opinion of Alba which was held in Rome. 
In this matter the Pope s wishes were in full accordance with 
those of the Spanish governor. In July, 1564, Philip II. had 
yielded to the opposition so far as to give up the erection of 
a bishopric at Antwerp, and the incorporation of the abbeys of 

1 See ibid, the *report of B. Pia of December 8, 1568, according 
to which Alba announced his victory in a letter of November 
25, 1568. Pia says : " The Pope is full of joy, and does nothing 
but pray and make others pray to God " (Gonzaga Archives, 
Mantua). See also the brief to Alba of December 12, 1568, in 
Documentor del Archive Alba, Madrid, 1891, 183 seq. 

2 With LADERCHI, 1569, n. 204, and BROGNOLI, I., 271, cf. 
also FIRMANUS, *Diarium, loc. cit. p. 78b, Papal Secret Archives, 
the *Avviso di Roma of March 21, 1569, Urb. 1041, p. 38, Vatican 
Library, and an *Avviso di Roma of March 26, 1569, in the State 
Archives, Vienna. 

3 Cf. the *report of Cusano of February 19, 1569, State Archives, 

4 See GACHARD, Corresp. de Philippe II., II., 68, 680 ; HOLZ- 
WARTH, II., i, 398 seq. ; Renom de France, I., 392 seq. Cf. 
ALBERDINGK THIJM, in Histor. Jahrb., VII., 284 seq. and GOSSART, 
L etablissement du regime espagnol dans les Pays-Bas, Brussels, 
1905, 293. 

6 Cf. his letter to Pius V. in Corresp. dipl., III., 73 n.i. 


Brabant, in consideration of the payment of a fixed and per 
manent revenue. The Holy See had never given its consent 
to this forced agreement, but the matter had been put on one 
side in consequence of the disturbances which had afterwards 
broken out. After the " restoration of order " this matter 
had to be definitely settled with Alba s help. Acting in agree 
ment with Philip II. the Duke decided outwardly to support 
in Rome the petitions of the states of Brabant for the con 
firmation of the former agreement, but in secret he advised 
the Pope to the opposite effect. 1 Alba s secretary, Hernando 
Delgadillo, was entrusted with this task in October, 1568, and 
he met with all the less difficulty from Pius V. because the 
Pope, when he was a Cardinal, had belonged to the com 
mission for the formation of the new dioceses, and was per 
suaded that it was necessary to carry into effect completely 
the arrangements which had then been made. Further delay 
occurred, however, when Alba, in consequence of the excite 
ment caused by the taxes which he wished to levy, withheld 
for a time the bulls concerning the bishoprics. It was only 
after he had obtained the consent of the provincial states to 
the tenth and the twentieth, that he gave his placet to the 
bulls. The difficulties which still arose were of a secondary 
importance, and were overcome. At last, in December, 1570. 
the following arrangement was arrived at : the incorporation 
of the abbeys and the installation of the bishops was 
carried out in those cities where this had not hitherto been 
done. 2 

Great care had been taken in the choice of the new bishops. 
Their orthodoxy and manner of life left nothing to be desired, 
and all of them were ready to carry out the reform decrees of 
the Council of Trent. But most of them were men of learning 
rather than of action. Intimidated by the difficult situation 
in which they found themselves they did not dare to proceed 

1 See MARX, Studien, 405. 

1 See GACHARD, Corresp. de Philippe II., II., 40 seq., 50, 65, 
73, 79, 84, 105 seq., 122, 133, 150, 163, seq. ; BROM, Archivalia, 
I., 721 seq. 


with all the resoluteness that was called for, 1 so that on 
July 2nd, 1571, Pius V. addressed to them a letter of warning. 2 
The only exception was Lindanus, who had been labouring 
with great zeal as Bishop of Ruremonde since 1569, 3 but he 
was not in a position to fill the gap left by the departure of 
Granvelle, the natural leader of the Netherland episcopate. 
The despotic government of Alba, too, was harmful to the 
religious activity and reforming zeal of the bishops ; the 
hatred felt for the Spanish government was also aimed at them, 
for men saw in them the instruments of Philip II. and the 
Duke. 4 Yet it was the bishops especially who courageously 
urged Alba to proceed with greater leniency. The iron Duke 
paid no attention to their words, and said that the bishops 
understood nothing about the matter. 

In ecclesiastical matters as well as political Alba was the 
uncompromising supporter of the system of Philip II., which 
made ecclesiastics the employe s of the state rather than the 
servants of the Church. He made ruthless use of the placet 
for Papal bulls without paying any attention to the fact that 
he was thus putting obstacles in the way of the salutary efforts 
of Pius V. to reform the clergy of the Netherlands. 5 A char 
acteristic instance of Alba s cesaropapistical ideas was the 
demand which he made in 1570 that a member of the grand 
council should assist as royal commissary at the discussions 
of the first provincial synod held at Malines. 6 Alba s open 

1 See PIRENNE, IV., 483 ; HOLZWARTH (II., I., 536 seqq.) 
gives minute particulars of each of the bishops and their reforming 

8 See LADERCHI, 1571, n. 34. An earlier letter, of July 5, 
1568, calling for reform, in GOUBAU 91 seq. 

8 See A. HAVENSIUS, Vita Lindani, Cologne, 1609 ; FOPPENS, 
Bibl. Belgica, I., 410 seq. ; Annuaire de I univ. de Louvain, 1871 ; 
Katholik, 1871, I., 702 seq. ; II., 89 seqq., 442 seqq., 659 seqq. 

* See PIRENNE, IV., 33, 484. 

5 See HOLZWARTH, II., i, 368. 

6 Cf. DE RAM, Synodicon Belg., I., Malines, 1828 ; HOLZWARTH, 
II., i, 368 seqq. When the Archibishop of TreVes wished to make 
a visitation of the archidiaconal district of Longuyon in I57 


hostility for the Jesuits came from the same cesaropapistical 
system, 1 as did a decree of Philip II. in 1571, which inflicted 
the penalty of banishment for the publication of Papal bulls 
without the permission of the governor. 2 

Alba and his master were blind, not only to the injuries 
which their cesaropapalism was inflicting on the Catholic 
cause, but also to the fact that their system of government by 
violence was the best weapon they could put into the hands of 
Orange and all rebels. On April ist, 1572, the sea gueux, 
who were in close touch with Orange, succeeded in obtaining 
an important base of operations, by the capture of the strong 
city of Briel in south Holland. In accordance with true 
Calvinist principles, the churches of Brielle were sacked, and 
the priests murdered. The sea gueux committed similar 
crimes wherever they could. 3 

Nothing but Alba s armed forces afforded any protection 
against such atrocities. Without heeding the usurpations 
which he and his master allowed themselves in ecclesiastical 
matters, Pius V. found himself forced by stern necessity to 
rely upon Spanish arms. The ecclesiastical levy granted to 
Philip II. in May, 1571, was expressly given on account of the 
king s expenses for the maintenance of the Catholic religion 
in the Low Countries and " in other places " 4 an expression 
which referred to France and England. 

a representative of Alba intervened at a meeting of the visitation 
commission ; see HEYDINGER, Archidiaconatus tit. S. Agathes 
in Longuiono descriptio, Treves, 1884. 

1 See Imag. primi saec. Soc. lesu, Antwerp, 1640, 745 ; PIRENNE, 
IV., 496. Cf. CAPPELLETTI, I Gesuiti e Venezia, Venice, 1873, 
40. Alba was confirmed in this dislike by his confessor ; see 
Corresp. de Granvelle, ed. PIOT, IV., 604. 

2 See VAN ESPEN, Opera Omnia Canonica, VI., 86. 

3 See ALTMEYER, Les Gueux de mer et la prise de la Brielle, 
Brussels, 1863 ; HOLZWARTH, II., i, 497, 505 seq. ; JANSSEN- 
PASTOR, IV., lft - 16 , 337 ; GAUDENTIUS, 152 ; Corresp. de Gran 
velle, 6d. PIOT, IV., 603. 

4 See LADERCHI, 1571, n. 31 (in placa of May n read May 21). 



Pius V. saw the salvation of France in opposing heresy with 
the extremity of rigour, in the removal of the soil which 
nourished it by the reform of ecclesiastical abuses, and in 
giving renewed vigour to the Catholics. The objects of 
Catherine de Medici were exactly the reverse. Indifferent 
herself to the religion which she professed, she endeavoured, 
according to her wont, to play off, one against the other, the 
interests of the bitterly opposed parties, and to use them both 
in turn in order to secure her own rule and that of her -son, 
Charles IX. 1 

Such a policy was bound to be most displeasing to a Pope 
like Pius V. who was all on fire with zeal for the preservation 
of the Catholic religion. His point of view appears clearly 
and concisely in the instructions which he drew up for the 
new nuncio to France, Count Michele della Torre, Bishop 
of Ceneda, on April 6th, 1566. In these he gives expression 
in heartfelt words to his anxiety concerning the turn of events 
in France. The nuncio must strongly urge the king and his 
mother to put aside all human considerations in order to safe 
guard the purity of their subjects faith. He was especially 
charged to urge the publication and enforcement of the decrees 
of Trent, and to press for the removal of the scandal being given 
by Cardinal Odet de Chatillon, who had been deposed on 
account of heresy, but who, although he was married, still 
wore the purple. In doing this the Pope told him to intimate 
that he would not confer the dignity of Cardinal on any French 
prelate until this demand was satisfied. Delia Torre was 

1 See BAUMGARTEN, Bartholomausnacht, 25, and v. BEZOLD 
in Histor.-Zeitschrift, XLVII., 561 seq. Cf. Vol. XVI. of this work, 
p. 203. 

VOL. XVIII. . 105 


further instructed to remind the king that before he could 
exercise his right of patronage in Provence and Brittany he 
must ask for a fresh privilege from the Holy See, and give up 
the abuses in the granting of offices and ecclesiastical bene 
fices. 1 Special instructions contained injunctions with regard 
to Avignon, where the legate, Cardinal Bourbon, left a good 
deal to be desired in the matter of zeal in preventing the 
introduction of heresy ; if things were not improved there, the 
nuncio must give the king to understand that the Pope would 
have to deprive the Cardinal of his legation. 2 

There is no doubt that the appointment of della Torre as 
nuncio in France was principally determined by the fact 
that he had already occupied that position under Paul III. 
and at the beginning of the reign of Julius III., 3 and was 

1 *Instruttione per il nuntio di Francia (the Bishop of Ceneda) in 
Varia Polit., 81 (now 82), 319 seq., p. 322, and again p. 510-513, 
Papal Secret Archives. Cf. CATENA, 58 seq. and BROGNOLI, II., 
27 seq. The controversy about the right of nomination in Brit 
tany was not yet settled in 1571 ; see the *report of A. Zibra- 
monti from Rome, September 29, 1571. Gonzaga Archives, 
Mantua. Arco announces the appointment of a new nuncio 
in France as early as his *report of January 19, 1566. State 
Archives, Vienna ; this took place on March 25, 1566 ; see 
BIAUDET, 119. 

2 See in Varia Polit., 81 (now 82) in the Papal Secret Archives, 
p. 32213-327 and again p. 514-518 ; *Instruttione per il medesimo 
nuntio intorno alle cose d Avignone. The danger was stated to 
be especially due to the " principato d Orangeo " which was 
surrounded by the Papal territory. Moreover, the attention 
of Cardinals Bourbon and Armagnac was to be called to the fact 
that " alcuni ministri loro " favoured the heretics, special cases 
being mentioned. From his report of July 24, 1566, in Mel. 
d archeol., XXII., 116 seq., it appears that Cardinal Armagnac, 
as co-legate with Bourbon, tried to meet the Pope s complaints. 
For Armagnac cf. Revue des quest, hist., XVI., 566 seq. His 
letters in Revue hist., II., 529 seqq. 

3 See Vol. XIII. of this work, p. 85. Cf. the "brief to Charles 
IX. of March 25, 1566, in App. n. 68, Vol. XVII, Archives of 
Briefs, Rome. 


therefore familiar with the state of affairs in that country. 
A further reason lay in his friendly relations with Catherine 
de Medici. 

The new nuncio was preceded by urgent letters of 
exhortation from the Pope ; others, addressed to Charles IX., 
Catherine, and the bishops, followed him. In these Pius V. 
above all pressed for the publication and enforcement of the 
decrees of the Council, especially the observance of the duty 
of residence, the erection of seminaries by the bishops, and 
the removal of the great abuses in the conferring of eccles 
iastical benefices, which, owing to the unscrupulous behaviour 
of the government, had frequently fallen into the hands of 
women and Protestants. These exhortations were not with 
out effect, and many of the bishops tried to put into force 
the reform decrees of the Council. The government, however, 
refused to accept the decrees officially, though it encouraged 
the publication of the Roman Catechism, which was trans 
lated into French, and also issued a circular on the observance 
of episcopal residence. 1 On the other hand further exhorta 
tions were necessary in order to remove the scandal given by 
Chatillon. 2 

Many other reasons for complaint were given to the Pope, 
especially by Catherine cle Medici. In a letter to the nuncio 
on August I7th, 1566, Pius complains that Catherine had 
surrounded herself almost entirely by heretics, that she even 
conferred ecclesiastical benefices upon them, and helped them 
in many other ways. In a brief which he addressed to her, 
he begged her no longer to justify herself by words alone, but 
by her Catholic behaviour. 3 In spite of these disagreements, 
externally, at any rate, friendly relations were still main 
tained with the French court ; Cardinal Tournon, who was 
sent to Rome in the autumn to pacify the Pope and make the 

1 See CATENA, 59 seq. Spain too urged the acceptance of the 
decrees of the Council ; see Corresp. dipl., I., 150, 181. 

2 See the *report of Arco from Rome, August 17, 1566, State 
Archives, Vienna. 

3 Cf. PHILLIPPSON, Die romische Kurie, in. 


obedientia, was received very courteously, 1 and at the end of 
November the Pope sent presents to the French royal family, 2 
though his private conversation s showed how greatly he 
doubted the orthodoxy of the queen-mother, whose council 
was three-quarter Huguenot. In the spring of 1567 great 
fear was felt in Rome lest the feeble Charles IX. should 
embrace Protestantism and marry a German Lutheran 
princess. 3 

Pius V. especially grieved at the attitude adopted by the 
French government in support of the bishops who had been 
proved guilty of heresy, against whom Pius IV. had already 
taken proceedings. 4 Without paying any attention to the 
fact that in this matter the French court was aiming at up 
holding Gallican liberties, Pius V., at a consistory held on 
December nth, 1566, pronounced the definite sentence which 
deprived of all their dignities as proved heretics six of the 
accused bishops : Jean de Chaumont of Aix, Jean de Montluc 
of Valence, Louis d Albret of Lescar, Charles Guillart of 
Chartres, Jean de St-Gelais of Uzes, and Claude Regin of 

x With the Lettres de Cath. de Medicis, II., 388, 392, cf. the 
"report of Fr. Strozzi to Maximilian II. from Rome, September 
28, 1566, State Archives, Vienna. The * reply to the speech of 
Tournon for the " obedientia," composed by A. Fiordibello, 
dated October 10, 1566, in Arm. 44, t. n, n. 118; ibid. n. 119, 
a *brief to Charles IX. of October 17, 1566, concerning the 
" obedientia." Papal Secret Archives. 

* The presents consisted of splendid rosaries in lapis lazuli 
see the *report of Strozzi, November 29, 1566, State Archives, 

* Cf. Legaz. di Serristori, 431; HERRE, Papsttum 148; 
PHILIPPSON, loc. cit. Cardinal Santa Croce, who returned to Rome 
on August 28, 1566, made a detailed report on the state of affairs 
in France (see *letter of C. Luzzara from Rome, August 28, 
1566, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). How displeased the Pope 
was from the first at the attitude of the French government 
towards religious matters, is clear irom the reports of Requesens in 
Corresp. dipl., I., 325, 370 ; II., 191. 

4 Cf. Vol. XVI. of this work, p. 189 segq. 


Oloron. 1 Only the Bishop of Aix resigned his office ; in the 
case of the others the sentence remained without effect because 
the French government, and of course the Queen of Navarre, 
treated it as non-existent, so that there was no question of its 
being carried out. The deposed bishops showed by their 
subsequent conduct how fully justified the sentence of Pius V. 
had been. 2 

The great indulgence shown by the French government 
to the Huguenots was far from satisfying them. They com 
plained of the non-observance of the edict of Amboise, which 
they did not themselves respect, and perfected their strong 
political-military organization. 3 Their ultimate purpose 
aimed at something much more than toleration or equality. 
They intended that the royal power should become subject 
to them, and that thus their own supremacy should be defin 
itely established. A favourable opportunity seemed to offer 
itself when the French government lent its assistance to the 
Huguenots in their precautionary measures on the occasion 
of the march of Alba towards the Low Countries. The Hugue 
nots hoped that this time the supreme command of the army 
would fall into their hands, so that they could then declare 

1 See LADERCHI, 1566, n. 425 ; Corresp. dipl., L, 435 seq. ; 
DEGERT, 99 seq. Cf. the "report of Strozzi of November 30, 
1566, State Archives, Vienna, and *that of Luzzara of December 
n, 1566. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. A draft of a brief bearing 
on this question, " *Capitulis quibusdam Franciae : Deposito 
propter nefandum haereticae pravitatis crimen eo, qui vester 
quidem episcopus dicebatur, sed commissi sibi gregis erat desertor 
et proditor " we exhort you to devote yourselves at once to the 
administration of the diocese. Arm. 44, t. 12, n. 97, Papal 
Secret Archives. 

2 See DEGERT, 101 seq., where there are fuller details of each 
of the deposed. Degert has failed to notice two briefs on this 
subject. The *first, to the Archbishop of Sens, July 30, 1567, 
asks him to take proceedings against the heretical Bishop of 
Chartres (Archives of Briefs, Rome,) the *second, of November 
*9, 1569, see in App. n. 6, Papal Secret Archives. 

3 Cf. CORRERO, 183 seq. 


war upon the King of Spain, even though Philip II. should 
not allow himself to be drawn into any act of hostility or 
interference with the domestic affairs of France. 1 But 
Catherine de Medici, who did not intend to be dominated by 
anyone, thwarted their plans. Thereupon, seeing their hopes 
disappointed, and fearing an alliance between the govern 
ment and Spain, the Huguenots tried to attain their end in 
another way, by joining with Orange and England. At the 
end of September, 1567, they formed the plan of taking the 
court by surprise at its place of residence at Monceaux near 
Meaux by means of a coup de main, such as had been attempted 
many years before against Francis II., of getting possession 
of the persons of the queen and the king, and of making their 
enemies, especially Cardinal Guise, powerless. The whole 
plan was carefully thought out, and was kept absolutely 
secret. 2 No one at the royal court had any suspicion that a 
rising of the Huguenots all over the country was imminent, 
least of all Catherine, who had spurned all warnings to that 
effect ; she was completely taken by surprise. Not even the 
chancellor, L Hopital, would believe in a rising of the Hugue 
nots. It was therefore almost a miracle that, at the last 
moment, the royal family succeeded in escaping to Meaux and, 
guarded by six thousand Swiss who had been summoned to 
their aid, in reaching Paris on September 29th, i$6j. 3 

It was now that the religious and civil war in France broke 
out for the second time. The king was shut up in his capital, 
and the Huguenots rose in revolt throughout the provinces. 
The fate that awaited the Catholics was shown in the horrible 
occurrence at Nimes, known as the michelade, when the 
Huguenots, on St. Michael s Day (September 29th, 1567) 

1 See SEGESSER, Pfyffer I., 420. Cf. MARCKS, Bayonne, 290. 

2 Cf. CORRERO, 183. 

3 Cf. ibid. 182 seq. ; Lettres de Cath. cle Medicis, III., ix. seq., 
61 seq. ; SEGESSER, Pfyffer, I., 421 seq., 436 seq., 447 seq., 472 
seq. ; SOLDAN, II., 257 seq. Cf. MARCKS, Bayonne, 291 seq., 
294 ; GEUER, M. de L H6pital, 49 seq. ; H. DE LA FERRIERE, 
La seconde guerre civile, in Rev. des quest, hist., XXXVII., 125 
seq. ; THOMPSON, 319 seq. 


killed out of hand eighty of the most prominent Catholics 
there, and threw their bodies down a well. 1 

Both parties sought allies and friends outside France. In 
its straits the court sent Annibale Rucellai to Rome to ask for 
immediate help. The tidings brought by Rucellai were 
received with horror by the Curia, 2 and in view of the grave 
danger of the French Catholics, Pius V., as can easily be 
understood, promptly offered his assistance, though he could 
not refrain from making strong remonstrances through the 
nuncio. He reminded him that he had foretold this action 
on the part of the rebels, and had pointed out that they must 
be met with unflinching courage. If now they were again 
to put any trust in men who had betrayed their God, they 
would soon witness the passing of the royal house and the 
ruin of the kingdom. In a letter to the queen he declared 
that the time was now come to remove from the court all the 
Huguenots, who were nothing but spies and rebels. She 
must not trust either the chancellor, L Hopital, nor the two 
Montmorency, and he said that those who had advised her 
to send away Cardinal Guise had advised her badly. 3 

But however frankly he condemned the policy hitherto 
followed by the French government, Pius V., now that open 
war had broken out, was very ready to give ample help him 
self, and obtain it from others. In his letters to the queen he 

1 A terrible model for the assassinations of September, 1792, 
says SOLDAN, (II., 275). Cf. POLENZ, III., 705 seq. ; MESNARD, 
Hist, de Nimes, vol. V. ; ROUQUETTE, Les Saint Barthelemy 
calvinistes, Paris [1906]. See also GRATIANI Epist., 309. 

8 According to Firmanus (*Diarium p. 197, Papal Secret 
Archives) Rucellai reached Rome " die sabbati n dicti mensis " 
(October, not September, as states LAMMER, Zur Kirchengesch., 
141) and made a report of the conspiracy of Amboise. " Ex 
isto malo novo maximus terror fuit incussus omnibus in curia." 
Prayers were at once ordered. According to GRATIANI Epist., 
312, Rucellai only arrived on the I3th ; the remarks of BONELLI, 
injra p. 112, n. 2, agree with this, as does Corresp. dipl., II., 226 seq. 

3 Cf, PHILIPPSON, Die romische Kurie, in, seq. , Corresp. 
dipl., II., 225 ; CATENA, 65 seq 


promised to place at once at her disposal 3,000 infantry, 
and on October i6th, 1567, he wrote to the nuncio that he 
was endeavouring to double that number. 1 

The French government needed above all things financial 
help. Rucellai asked for no less than 300,000 scudi. The 
Pope was ready to give all possible help, but only on the 
condition that they should not at once come to terms with 
the insurgent heretics. 2 It was very difficult for him to get 
together the money, as his treasury was already greatly 
drained by the preparations for the Turkish war, 3 and he was 

1 See the "letter quoted in following note, translated in PHILIPP- 
SON, loc. cit. 112. 

* In an ""instruction from Bonelli to M. della Torre on October 
1 6, 1567 (" per corriere espresso ") we read : in letters which 
came from Lyons on the nth, the Pope received news cf the 
general plot against the Catholics and the king ; he had been in 
a state of the greatest anxiety until the arrival of Rucellai on 
the 1 3th " con lettere di loro Maesta," announcing the safety 
of Charles IX. "A richiesta di esso A. Rucellai havemo concesso 
che si possino essigere la meta de frutti di tutti i benefici etiandio 
di cardinal! ; ne adimandava anchora di potere alienare parte de 
beni mobili delle chiese, ma ricordandosi che per 1 altra risolu- 
tione furono alienati in notabile somma e parso di non concederlo 
se prima non vediamo che S. M. Christ 01 * facci da dovero perch e 
in tale caso venderessimo anco la propria persona." Papal 
Secret Archives, Nunciat, di Francia, 282, p. 4 seq. ; ibid. *letter 
of October 18, 1567, with which was sent the " bolla della meta 
de frutti di tutti i benefici ecc ci , and with an addition made by 
the Pope himself : " *V. S. sia ben avvertita d intendere se vi 
fusse speranza d accordo dico di S. M tdi con i ri belli et in tale 
caso ne espidirete un corriero a posta ne gli darete essa bolla ; 
ma quando siate chiaro, che si facci da dovero non solo li darete 
la bolla, ma riscuoterete 25 m scudi." Cf. further Corresp. dipl., 
II., 229 seq. Rucellai started back on October 19. He vainly 
sought for help from Venice (see Corresp. dipl., II., 239 seq.). 
On October 25, 1567, Arco reported that the Pope had given 
Rucellai a letter of exchange for 50,000 scudi " per quanto 
s intende." 

3 Cf. the brief to L. Gonzaga of October 16, 1567, in GOUBAU, 
54, and LADERCHI, 1567, n. 139. 


most reluctant to impose taxes upon his subjects. He was, 
however, resolved to get together the necessary sum, and 
to do everything in his power to help. During October and 
November he sought to raise money by means of a special 
tax in the Papal States, and by contributions from the religious 
houses in Italy, 1 while at the same time he tried to get help 
elsewhere. He addressed pressing letters to Philip II., the 
Duke of Nevers, to Ludovico Gonzaga, who was in Piedmont, 
and to Duke Emanuele Filiberto of Savoy. 2 Piersanti was 
sent as special envoy to Lorraine to ask that the frontier 
should be closed against the troops of the Calvinist Elector 
Palatine, John Casimir, who was coming to the assistance 
of the Huguenots. 3 Pietro Dona to Cesi, Bishop of Narni, 
went by the Pope s orders to the governments of the Italian 
states to urge them strongly to give immediate and effective 
assistance. His instructions described the rebellion of the 
Huguenots, their sacrileges and ill-treatment of the Catholics, 
the dangerous position of Charles IX., and the peril which 
would be the consequence of a Calvinist victory in the king 
dom of France. The very geographical position of France, 
surrounded by Spain, England, the Low Countries, Germany 
and Italy, showed that it was there that the fate of Europe 
would be decided, not only from the religious point of view, 
but also politically. Should the Calvinists with their revolu 
tionary aims attain to the supreme power, then political 

1 See *Avvisi di Roma of October 19 and 25, Nov. i and 8, 
1567, Urb. 1040, p. 452, 454, 458b. Vatican Library. Cf. the 
"report of Serristori of October 17, 1567, State Archives, Florence, 
Medic. 3287. 

2 See GOUBAU, 50 seq. Cf. Corresp. dipl., II., 243, 252. 

3 Cf. the *Instructio data d. Petrosancto iur. utr. dr. a S.D.N. 
ad ill. princip. Carolum ducem Lotharingiae destinato, dated 
Rome, November 8, 1567, in Varia Polit., 81 (now 82), p. 398- 
401, and again p. 564-567. Papal Secret Archives. On the back 
of p. 567 we read : *Instruttione consignata a m. Piersanti . . . 
a 10 di Novembre, 1567 ; on p. 568 an *Aggiunto : if the Cardinal 
of Lorraine is in the neighbourhood, he is to visit him and com 
municate the instructions to him. Cf. LADERCHI, 1567, n. 156. 


subversion of the neighbouring states would follow. Even 
Italy was threatened, and therefore the Italian states were 
bound to lend their assistance in a matter of such great 
importance. 1 

It was entirely characteristic of Pius V. that he sought 
refuge in prayer, and on October i6th, 1567, he ordered a 
universal jubilee, 2 which opened in Rome in the last week of 
October with three great processions in which he himself took 
part on foot. These processions started from St. Peter s, 
going on the first day to S. Maria sopra Minerva, on the second 
to S. Girolamo degli Spagnuoli, and on the third to S. Luigi 
de Francesi. 3 But that, side by side with this spiritual help, 
the Pope did not omit the temporal, is clear from the steps 
which he took at the same time. Thus, at a congregation of 
Cardinals he decided upon a general impost upon the Papal 
States. 4 At the beginning of December the annual payment 
of 2,000 scudi which had hitherto been made to the poorer 
Cardinals was suspended, with the exception of five Cardinals 
who were absolutely poor. 5 Of the money which was hastily 
collected 25,000 scudi were assigned to Ludovico Gonzaga 

1 See CATENA, 68 seq. ; LADERCHI, 1567, n. 144 ; BROGNOLI, 
II., 39 seq., 46 seq., 49 seq., 54 seq. The Venetian Correro (p. 193 
seq.) and A. Contarini (p. 252) formed an exactly similar opinion 
of the dangers involved by the Calvinist victory in France. For 
Cesi see GARAMPI, 298. 

1 See the bull " In eminent! " in *Editti, Casanatense Library, 
Rome. p. 222. Cf. BONANNI, I., 301. 

8 See the "reports of B. Pia from Rome, October 19 and 25, 
1567, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. In his *report of November 
I (he. cit.) Pia speaks of the great concourse of people at these 
pious exercises. Cf. GRATIANI Epist., 313. 

4 With the *report of B. Pia of November I (loc. cit.) see the 
*Avviso di Roma of the same date, Urb. 1040, p. 4566, Vatican 
Library, and the brief of October 28, 1567, to Barthol. Barrottus 
Thesaur., in *Editti, Casanatense Library, Rome, loo. cit. Cf. 
also GRATIANI Epist., 322 seq. ; LADERCHI, 1567, n. 141. 

5 See *Avviso di Roma of December 6, 1567, Urb. 1040, p. 
457b, Vatican Library. 


and 10,000 to the Duke of Savoy. 1 From the first the nuncio 
della Torre was ordered to pay over the subsidies to the 
French government only when he was sure that there was no 
underhand attempt being made to come to an arrangement 
with the Huguenots. 2 This anxiety, which haunted the Pope 
as early as October, increased to such an extent that on 
December 25th Pius wrote to the nuncio to be on his guard 
against any conciliatory move on the part of the French 
government, because Catherine never acted loyally to God 
and the Catholic religion, and put her trust rather in her own 
cleverness than in the divine help. 3 The same view of the 
situation was also held in Madrid, as Castagna reported on 
December 2ist. 4 

It was soon made clear how much justification there was for 
Pius V. s hesitation 5 about paying a subsidy to the French 
government, and his distrust of its policy. 6 On March 23rd, 

1 See CATENA, 65 ; GOUBAU, 56. 

2 See supra, p. 1 1 1 . 

3 See the "instructions of Bonelli to M. della Torre of December 
22, 1567, as well as those of October 18, 1567, Nunziat. 
di Francia, 282, p. 9. Papal Secret Archives. The instruction^ 
of December 25, 1567, is translated in PHILIPPSON, Die romische 
Kurie, 113. 

4 See Corresp. dipl., II., 279. 

5 Cf. the *report of Arco from Rome, January 3, 1568, State 
Archives, Vienna, and Corresp. dipl., II., 304. On November 
10, 1567, Charles IX. had written from Paris to Cardinal Ricci : 
*" Vi prego di fare le piu vive istanze presso il S. Padre afin che 
il soccorso promesso non sia solo in parole, ma in effetto." Cather 
ine de Medici also wrote on November 10, 1567, in similar terms 
to Cardinal Ricci ; both letters in Ricci Archives, Rome. 

6 *jri Papa ha cosi poca buona opinione del governo delle 
cose di Francia ch essendo entrato 1 ambasciatore nelle due 
ultime audienze che ha havute in voler giustificare le actioni 
et il procedere del Re et della Regina con lunghe et spetiose 
parole S. S 1 ^ non gli ha da to mai altra risposta se non che ha 
sorriso sempre." The Pope refused a small favour to the king s 
sister. " L ambasciatore sta mezzo disperato " (report of 
Cipriano Saracinello to Cardinal Farnese, Rome, March 6} 1567, 
State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes, 763). Cf. Corresp. dipl., 

n. t 309, 326, 


1568, at Longjumeau, after a war that had been carried on 
very half-heartedly, for the second time a peace was concluded 
which sacrificed a situation which, from the military point of 
view, was far from unsatisfactory. 1 The truth was that 
Catherine did not wish for a decided victory of the Guise and 
the Catholic party. Short-sightedly seeking her own interests, 
she aimed at a balance of power between the parties. By the 
peace of Longjumeau, which she concluded in spite of the 
opposition of the nuncio and the Spanish ambassador, the 
Huguenots obtained the renewal of the edict of Amboise, 
which was so much in their favour, binding themselves in 
return to restore to the king the cities which they held, a 
condition which in the end was never complied with. The 
Huguenots had just as little intention of giving up their under 
standing with England and the rebels in the Low Countries. 
On the other side too the government infringed the treaty in 
various ways, and were able to do so because they were sup 
ported by popular opinion. The Huguenots indeed, by their 
rebellion and their continued acts of violence had so roused 
the masses of the people against themselves that at last the 
supporters of Protestantism became visibly less, while the 
Catholics roused themselves to a vigorous resistance. As had 
already happened in 1562-1563, and again in 1567, so now new 
confederations were formed by the nobles and the clergy for 
the preservation of the Catholic religion. 2 

1 The official news of the peace, which was not yet to hand on 
April ii (see GRATIANI Epist., 382), arrived on the following 
night see FIRMANUS, *Diarium in Miscell., Arm. XII., on April 
12, 1567, Papal Secret Archives. For the sorrow and anxiety 
of the Pope at the possibility of a Huguenot invasion of Italy 
see Colecc. de docum. ined., XCVII., 426 ; Corresp. dipl., II., 
337 seq., 351. 

2 See Serment des associes de la ligue chrestienne et royale 
de la Champagne " of January 25, 1568, in Journal de Henry 
III., III. (1744), 31. Cf. CAPEFIGUE, Ligue, II., 374 seq. ; PHILIPP- 
SON in Weltegschichte of Flathe, VII., 372 ; RANKE, Franzos. 
Geschichte, I., 276 seq. ; LAVISSE-MARIEJOL, VI., i, 101 seq. ; 
THOMPSON, 354 seq. (cf. 212 seq. and 352 seq. on earlier agreements 
of this kind, which were forerunners of the league). 


A decisive factor was that both Catherine de Medici and 
Charles IX., who had not forgotten the attempted surprise 
of 1567, henceforward showed themselves openly hostile to 
the Huguenots. Cardinal Guise regained his influence, while 
on the other hand the chancellor, L Hopital, who had always 
been the champion of compromise, was dismissed. 1 His fall 
was connected with the conditions which Pius V. had attached 
to the granting of permission for the sale of ecclesiastical 
property which the French government had obtained by 
means of Annibale Rucellai and Charles d Angenrtes, Bishop 
of Le Mans, who had succeeded Tournon as French ambassador. 
When the Pope, by a bull of August ist, 1568, gave his consent 
to such sales, to the annual amount of 150,000 francs, he laid 
it down that this money should only be used for the defence 
of the king and the Catholic religion, and until it was effectively 
applied to that purpose should remain in the hands of some 
trustworthy person. 2 

The recommencement of hostilities took place in August 
with the attempted capture of Conde and Coligny at Noyers, 
where they weie trying to set up a headquarters of Protestant 
ism in order to help Orange. They both fled to the safety of 
La Rochelle, where they gathered together a strong force ; 
the Huguenots soon rose in their support in many parts of 
the country. The court retaliated with the edict of September, 
which enacted that since the Huguenots had not availed 
themselves of the favours granted to them, henceforth all 
worship except the Catholic was forbidden, under pain of 
death and confiscation ; the Protestant preachers were given 
fourteen days in which to leave France. 3 

1 Cf. ANQUETIL, 183 seq. ; D AUMALE, Hist, des princes de Conde, 
II., Pieces et docum., 349 seq. ; SEGESSER, Pfyffer, I., 499 seq. 

2 Cf. Legaz. di Serristori, 451 seq. and CHARRIERE, III., 34. 
The bull of August i, 1568, in LADERCHI, 1568, n. 165. An 
*Avviso di Roma of July 17, 1568, Urb. 1040, p. 459, Vatican 
Library, announces the departure of Rucellai from Rome. For 
his negotiations see the *documents in the Papal Secret Archives, 
in App. nn. 4 and 5. 

8 See SERRANUS, IX., 222 ; THUANUS, i, 44 ; THOMPSON, 366. 


The joy of Pius V. at this definite stand was all the greater 
since the weakness displayed by the French government at 
the Peace of Longjumeau had left little hopes of any such 
development. 1 The Bishop of Cajazzo, Fabio Mirto Frangi- 
pani, who was to succeed della Torre as nuncio, was entrusted 
with the delivery of the bull of August ist, 1568. 2 

The third civil and religious war, 3 which was carried on by 
both sides with the greatest cruelty and violence, 4 was waged 
at first without any important engagement, because the oppos 
ing forces were of approximately equal strength, and each of 
them only wished to give battle in circumstances favourable 
to themselves. The position of the Huguenots was soon 
improved in consequence of the help that was sent to them. 
Elizabeth of England sent large sums of money as well as 
ships of war, while on the Rhine Duke Wolfgang of Deux- 
Ponts got together a strong auxiliary force. Under these 
circumstances it was highly characteristic of the French 
government and of its constant fear of the influence of 
Philip II., that, in spite of the difficulties in which it found 
itself, it was only willing to accept Spanish help in a very 
limited degree, and instead, besides the 10,000 Swiss who 
were in its pay, obtained the help of 5,000 German cavalry. 5 

After a short interval occasioned by the extraordinary 
cold of that winter, the war was recommenced at the end of 
January, 1569, by Henry of Anjou and the Marshal de 
Tavannes. Probably no one realized how much depended 
upon the result of the war as Pius V., but after his experiences 

1 Cf. Legaz. di Serristori, 448 seq. ; TIEPOLO, 188. 

2 See LADERCHI, 1568, n. 166. *Brief recommending Frangi- 
pani to Cosimo I., whom he was to visit, dated August 2, 1568, 
in State Archives, Florence. The * brief recalling della Torre, 
August 12, 1568, in Arm. 44, t. 13, p. 24yb, Papal Secret Archives. 

8 See the detailed account in GIGON, La troisieme guerre de 
religion, Paris, 1911. Cf. also Mel. d Archeol., XXXIII., 245 

4 Cf. ANQUETIL, 223 seq. 

6 See SEGESSER, Pfyffer, I., 529 seq., 548 seq. Cf. JANSSEN- 
PASTOR, IV. i*- 1 *, 292 seq. 


with the French government, he was very cautious about 
giving his assistance. The money, which he had the greatest 
difficulty in collecting, 1 was to be actually used for the war, 2 
and not, as had been the case before, devoted to other pur 
poses. A body of auxiliary troops was also raised for service 
in France, 3 , and the Pope would not let himself be distracted 
from this task even when a courier brought news of the victory 
which had been won by the Catholics at Jarnac on March I3th. 4 
In his opinion these auxiliary troops should now be used 
against the Duke of Deux-Ponts. 5 The young Count Sforza 

1 Cf. *Avviso di Roma of Sept. 4, 1568, Urb. 1040, p. 574, 
Vatican Library. 

8 See Legaz. di Serristori, 454, and CORRERO 208. An *Avviso 
di Roma of November 6, 1568, announces the sending of 100,000 
scudi to France (Urb. 1040, p. $9jb, Vatican Library). Another 
50,000 were taken from the treasury in the Castle of St. Angelo 
at the end of Feb., 1569, of the pay for the auxiliary troops 
(ibid.). Cf. the facsimile of the Pope s order in LICHATSCHEV, 
Una lettera di papa Pio V. allo Zar Iwan il terribile, St. Peters 
burg, 1906 (in Russian), tav. 5. For the continued distrust of 
Pius V. see CHARRIERE, III., 35, n. 

3 Besides the *report of Cusano of January 22, 1569 (State 
Archives Vienna) see the *Avvisi di Roma of January I and 29, 
February 5 and 26, 1569, Urb. 1041, p. ib, n, i8b, 22, Vatican 
Library. See also the letter of Pius V. of January 30, 1569, in 
LICHATSCHEV, loc. cit. tav. 12. 

4 The news arrived in Rome on March 27, " hora 17 " ; see 
FIRMANUS, *Diarium in Miscell., Arm. XII., 32, p. 79b ; ibid. 
p. 81, the " Orationes dictae pro gratiarum actione pro victoria 
regis Franciae " (Papal Secret Archives). Cf. LADERCHI, 1569, 
n. 102 ; CHARRIERE, III., 43. See also the *report of B. Pia 
from Rome, Apr. i, 1569 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). For the 
battle of Jarnac see WHITEHEAD, G. de Coligny, 204 seq. and the 
monograph by GIGON in Bullet, de la Soo. hist, de la Charente, 1896. 

6 See *Avviso di Roma of April 2, 1569, Urb. 1041, p. 49b, 
Vatican Library, and Lettres de Cath. de Medicis, III., 232. 
See also the letter of M. Soriano of April 2, 1569, which mentions 
the rumour that Pius V. was meditating an expedition against 
Geneva (CRAMER, II., 223). In April, 1569, Anjou was sent a 
blessed hat by the Pope ; see Lettres de Cath. de Medicis, X., 254. 


di Santa Flora was placed in command of them ; there were 
4,000 infantry and 500 cavalry. 1 In the middle of April, 
after the Duke of Savoy had given permission for them to pass 
through his territory, Pius V. gave orders for their immediate 
departure ; 2 they were to be joined in Tuscany by another 
1,000 infantry and 100 cavalry, furnished by Cosimo I. at the 
request of the Pope. 3 

In the meantime, on April 23rd, there arrived in Rome 
twelve Huguenot standards which had been captured at 
Jarnac, and among them the two white ones of Cond6 and 
Navarre. Pius V., surrounded by the whole College of Cardi 
nals, received these trophies of victory in the Hall of Con- 
stantine, and weeping with joy declared that the gift of the 
Most Christian King was the most precious that he could have 
made to religion, the Holy See, and to himself ; he prayed to 
God that in a short time the remaining standards might be 
sent as well, and that all the enemies of His Majesty might be 

1 See Corresp. dipl., III., 38 (where 1568 should be 1569) and 
*Avviso di Roma of February 26, 1569, Urb. 1041, p. 22, Vatican 
Library. From a "letter " ex Urbe 5 martii " we learn the 
reason for the delay in sending the troops : " Expectatur adhuc 
responsio ducis Mantuae et gubernatoris Mediolanensis status 
circa concessionem loci in quo milites mittendi in Galliam con- 
gregari debeant, qua habita mox sonabunt timpanae." Archives 
at Wittingau, Hist. 4751. 

2 *Avviso di Roma of April 16, 1569, Urb. 1041, p. 54, Vatican 
Library. A brief of March 6, 1569, announced to Charles IX. 
the dispatch of an auxiliary force, and at the same time exhorting 
him to punish the Huguenots most severely (see GOUBAU, 148 
seq.}. On receipt of the news of the victory, further briefs to 
the same effect were sent on March 28 to Charles IX. and Catherine 
(in GOUBAU, 151 seq.} as well as *briefs " duci Andegav." and 
" duci Nivern." (Arm. 44, t. 14, p. 48^49, Papal Secret Archives), 
followed on April 13 by briefs to Catherine, Henry of Anjou, 
the Cardinal of Lorraine, Charles IX. (in GOUBAU, 156 seq.} 
and various nobles who had taken part in the victory. These 
latter briefs, which are still unpublished, are in Arm. 44, t. 14, 
p. 60 seqq. Papal Secret Archives. 

3 See ADRIANI, XX., 4 ; PALANDRI, 120. 


brought back to their obedience and to the Catholic faith. 
The standards were then taken to St. Peter s, where the 
Patriarch of Jerusalem, after a service of thanksgiving, placed 
them in the chapel of the Kings of France. 1 

Pius V. had already, on receiving the first news of the 
victory near Jarnac, sent his congratulations to the French 
king, urging him to seize the fortified places in the Kingdom 
of Navarre, and to carry on the war until the Huguenots 
were destroyed. It was his duty, so this letter stated, to 
destroy the roots, and even the offshoots of the roots of evil. 
Similar exhortations to fight boldly and freely against the 
enemy until he was destroyed were addressed to Catherine de 
Medici, the two Guises, the Duke of Montpensier, and the 
Duke of Nevers. 2 When the nuncio had sent him further 
particulars of the victory, 3 fresh letters were sent on April I3th 
to Charles IX., Catherine de Medici, Henry of Anjou, the 
two Guises, and the Duke of Montpensier. 4 They contained 
exhortations to execute strict justice on the rebels and heretics 
in prison, and to carry on the work until they were completely 
destroyed. Again and again these letters contain the warning 
that they must not follow the example of Saul who, despite 
the command of God, spared the Amalakites, arid therefore 
was deprived by Samuel of his kingdom, and at last lost his 
life. 5 

It is clear with what bitterness the war was carried on ; 

1 Besides Firmanus in BONANNI, I., 302, and in LAMMER, Zur 
Kirchengesch, 142, see the reports of the French ambassador 
in CHARRIERE, III., 44 seq., ZUNIGA in Corresp. dipl., III., 61 
seq., the two *Avvisi of April 23, 1569 (Urb. 1041, p. 6ob, 66b, 
Vatican Library, where there is a list of the " insegne " cap 
tured), and the *letter of Cusano, April 23, 1569, State Archives, 

2 See GOUBAU, 151 seq., 154 ; LADERCHI, 1569, n. 103 seq. 
Cf. as to this the description of TURKE, 17. 

* See the report of the nuncio in BROGNOLI, II., 60 seq., where, 
however, the date is wrong. 

4 See GOUBAU, 156 seq. ; LADERCHI, 1569, n. no seq. 

* See the passeges in GOUBAU, 152 seqq., 157 seqq., 168. 



on neither side was there any question of mercy. 1 In Rome 
it was seriously feared many times that the Huguenots would 
turn upon Italy, 2 and to this fear was added indignation at the 
sacrileges and atrocities which the followers of Calvin were 
guilty of everywhere, for wherever they could they destroyed 
the images, crucifixes, altars, churches and convents, they even 
dug up the bodies from the graves, and killed with all the refine- 

1 See CATENA, 75. Cf. RANKE, Papste, II. 1 , 43. 

* The fear of a Huguenot invasion of Italy was specially great 
in the spring of 1568. On March 13 Arco reported : *since, in 
consequence of the recent peace with the Huguenots, the latter 
are in a position to turn against Rome, they are proposing to 
complete the fortifications of the Castle of St. Angelo and the 
Borgo (State Archives, Vienna). Cf. the report of Arco of March 
20, 1568, in SCHWARZ, Brief wechsel, 105, the letter of Zufiiga of 
April 7, 1568, in Corresp. dipl., II., 337, and the report of B. Con- 
cini from Rome, April n, 1568, in PALANDRI, 117 seqq. Rome 
had been in a state of anxiety at an earlier date, in consequence 
of other designs on the part of the Huguenots. An *Avviso di 
Roma of January 10, 1566, speaks of the imprisonment of two 
Huguenots who had confessed under torture that they had in 
tended to kill the Pope (Urb. 1040, p. 167, Vatican Library). 
In March 1568, Pius V. was again on his guard against a plot 
of the Huguenots (see Corresp. dipl., II., 316). An *Avviso di 
Roma of January i, 1569, announces that at the Casaletto, the 
villa of Pius V., a " fuoruscitc " had been arrested with two 
" archibugi " ; it was thought that this was connected with a 
Huguenot plot (Urb. 1041, p. i, Vatican Library). It was also 
thought that the baker s boy, who had tried to make profit by 
declaring himself to be the son of Pius V., had been urged to 
this course by the Huguenots. The youth was convicted of 
calumny and condemned to the galleys for life (see CATENA, 139 
seqq., and the Ricordi di Filippo Edoardo Fugger, extract from 
Archivio stor. ItaL, 5 ser., XLIL, 10). For the fears felt in Rome 
of Huguenot plots during the summer of 1568 see Corresp. dipl., 
II., 367 seq., 369, 374, 376, 379, 392, 411. Correro expressly 
states (p. 194) that the Huguenots themselves boasted of their 
friends in Italy. A. Zibramonti *reports on January 10, 1571, 
that the " ribelli di Montorio " were in league with the Huguenots. 
Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. 


ments of cruelty, the priests, monks and even defenceless 
nuns. x 

The Papal auxiliary forces had, on May I4th, 1569, joined 
the Florentine troops in the neighbourhood of Massa, and 
marched by way of Turin to the Gulf of Lyons, which was 
reached on June and. They pushed on on the 4th, but the 
troops made but slow progress owing to the scarcity of pro 
visions in that war-stricken country ; soon sickness relaxed 
their discipline, while no sight of the enemy was obtained. 2 
After the auxiliary force had joined up with the royal army 
near Tours, it took part with success in the defence of Poitiers, 
and on October 3rd in the decisive battle near Moncontour. 
This great battle, in which the Papal-Florentine troops especi 
ally distinguished themselves, ended in the complete rout 
of the Huguenots, who left about 10,000 dead upon the 
field. 3 

Pius V., who had watched the course of the war in France 
with all the more anxiety 4 because Avignon was threatened by 

1 In the briefs to Henry of Anjou, Cardinal Bourbon, and 
Charles IX. (GouBAU, 160, 163, 166) Pius V. expressly mentions 
these atrocities, as to which cf. GRATIANI Epist., 314, 332, 357 ; 
PICOT, I., 15 seqq. ; GAUDENTIUS, 108 seqq,, 119 seqq. 

2 The information contained in the letters from the Jesuits who 
accompanied the troops as military chaplains, in FOUQUERAY, 
I., 625 seq., is substantially completed by the *Narratione della 
guerra di Francia 1569, in the Cod. Barber. 5040, p. 77 seq., 
which has not hitherto been made use of ; in this the march of 
the auxiliary troops is described in diary form. This codex 
contains, at p. i. seq. and 15 seq., two *Vite di Sforza conte di 
S. Fiora. Vatican Library, 

3 See DAVILA, i, 5. THUANUS, i, 45 ; SEGESSER, Pfyffer, 
I., 580 seq. ; 585 seq. ; THOMPSON, 388 seq. ; for the behaviour 
of the Italians, see, besides ADRIANI, XX., 4, Petrucci in DES- 
JARDINS, III., 603, and Amodei in FOUQUERAY, I., 627 ; see also 
SERENO, 45. Guzzo di Guzzi of Faenza distinguished himself ; 
see BERNARDINO AZZURINI, *Libro de fatti moderni occorsi nella 
citta di Faenza dal 1546. Library at Faenza. 

4 Cf. CHARRIERE, III., 48 seq., 50. seq. ; Corresp. dipl., III., 


the Huguenots, 1 and because he feared a fresh volte face on 
the part of the French court, 2 breathe more freely when the 
first news of this splendid victory reached Rome. At first 
he refused to believe the news, until it was confirmed by further 
reports, but on October iyth, 1569, a secretary of the nuncio 
arrived with circumstantial reports. The Pope went at once 
with the Cardinals to St. Peter s to give thanks to God. For 
three days he caused all the bells of Rome to be rung, 
the cannon resounded from the Castle of St. Angelo, and 
bonfires were lit everywhere. On October 22nd a great 
procession passed from S. Maria sopra Minerva to S. 
Maria Maggiore, on the 23rd from the Aracoeli to St. John 
Lateran, and on the 24th from St. Peter s to S. Luigi de 
Francesi. 3 As visible proofs of the effects of the Pope s 

1 The fears for Avignon, which had already caused the Pope 
great anxiety in the preceding year (see LADERCHI, 1568, n. 
171), increased in 1569 (see ibid. 1569, n. 176 seq.}. In his *in 
structions of March 9, 1569, Santa Fiora received the special 
charge to protect Avignon. A * brief " communitatibus comit. 
Venaissini " of May 2, 1569, exhdrts them to persevere in the 
Catholic faith ; their loyalty is being tested like gold in the 
furnace, but the dangers are great ; let them take heed lest 
heresy enter. We think always of the salvation of your souls. 
and prav for you. Arm. 44, t. 14, p. 88, Papal Secret Archives. 

* See the report of A. Medici from Rome, August 3, 1569, in 
PALANDRI, 121. This explains the briefs of August i, in LADERCHI 
1569, n. 145 seq. refusing further aid. 

8 See the *letter of A. Medici from Rome, October 18, 1569, 
State Archives, Florence, and the *reports of B. Pia from Rome, 
October 17, 18, 22 and 29, 1569, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. In 
the report of October 18 we read : *" JL allegrezza in che S.S. tA 
si trova e tale che confessa di non haverla mai piu havuta simile 
et tutta questa corte giubila." Cf. also Firmanus in LADERCHI, 
1569, n. 166 ; BONANNI, I., 302 ; Corresp. dipl., III., 175 seq. 
and the *Avvisi di Roma of October 19 and 22, 1569, Urb. 1041, 
p. 167 and 179, Vatican Library. The defeat of the Huguenots* 
was also celebrated elsewhere, e.g. at Venice ; see the letter in 
the congratulatory publication of the people of Breslau to the 
University of Basle (i86c ), p. n. 


prayers 1 and of the bravery of his soldiers there were 37 
standards captured from the Huguenots ; these were sent 
to the Lateran and placed on the walls under a marble 
tablet with a commemorative inscription. 2 

In the letter of congratulation which he sent to Charles IX. 
on October 2oth, 1569, Pius V. warned him that he must not 
again find place for misplaced compassion, or waver between 
the two sides, for nothing was more cruel than compassion 
for the wicked and for those who had deserved death. On 
November 5th the Pope sent congratulations to the king and 
sent him the necessary dispensation for his marriage with the 
daughter of the Emperor Maximilian II. 3 He thought the 
occasion an opportune one for warning Charles IX. that he 
must no longer interest himself on behalf of the heretical 
bishops of Chartres, Valence and Lescar, but rather nominate 
to their sees men who were sound Catholics ; this exhortation, 
however, had no result. 4 

It had already been evident after the battle of Jarnac how 

1 The Pope, reports an *Avviso di Roma of July 23, 1569, 
has for some days past, recited special prayers for France after 
Mass. Urb. 1041, p. Ti8, Vatican Library. 

2 See Avviso di Roma of January 7, 1570, in LANCIANI, IV., 
28. Cf. Firmanus in LADERCHI, 1570, n. 165 seq. and BONANNI, 
I., 32 ; CATENA, 74 seq. ; FORCELLA, VIII., 37. The inscrip 
tion, which is still preserved, in SPEZI, 78. One of the standards 
is still to be seen in the transept of the Lateran. Cf. C. MAES, 
Le bandiere degli ugonotti a S. Giovanni in Laterano, Rome, 

3 See the text in GOUBAU, 240 seqq., 247 seq. A *brief of 
November 7 to the Duke of Anjou is the reply to the congratu 
lations which he had sent on the victory. A * brief of November 
9 praises the Duke of Guise for his bravery against the Huguenots 
besieging Poitiers, and exhorting him to continue. A similar 
*exhortation was sent on the same day to the Archbishop of 
Sens, Nicolas de Pelleve, whose zeal and prudence in advising 
the king during the war are praised. Arm. 44, t. 14, p. 283 b- 
285, Papal Secret Archives. 

4 See the * brief of November 19, 1569, in A pp. n. 6, Papal 
Secret Archives. 


little intention the French government had of making real 
use of the victories which it had gained, and now it allowed 
the great day of Moncontour to pass without making real use 
of it. When they made urgent representations to the queen- 
mother that she should profit by the favourable circumstances, 
the representatives of Pius V. received the reply that her 
son was old enough not to need the advice of foreign princes. 1 
So what did Charles IX. do when some of his own advisers 
urged him after the victory of Moncontour to carry on the war 
vigorously ? Jealous of his brother Anjou, who had held the 
chief command at Moncontour, instead of destroying the 
remains of Coligny s army, he decided on a policy of blockade, 
and on December 3rd he surrendered St.-Jean-d Angely to 
him, and dispersed his own forces. 2 The Italian troops, 
which had had much to endure from the jealousy of the French 
from the first, 3 and had been greatly reduced in numbers 
both in battle and from sickness, had been ordered to return 
at the end of October by Pius V., but they started back home 
before that date. 4 Charles IX. could look for no further help. 

1 " Quanclo dopo la battaglia ultima di Moncontor essendo il 
tempo apparito proprio del venire a dar castigo a chi lo meritava, 
come ricordavano li ministri di N. S re per parte sua che era tempo 
di fare et ne mostravano il modo, fu risposto loro dalla Reina 
propria con parole assai espresse, come il Re si ritrovava in eta 
d autorita et con forze et prudentia di sapere governare lo stato 
suo da se senza havere a pigliare consiglio ne legge da principi 
esterni, onde meritamente da quel tempo in qua e parso a S. S^ 
di volerc andare un poco piu consideratamente non giudicando 
che se li convenisse di dovcrsi ingerirc in cosa di altri piu oltre 
cli quel che fosse grato alii padroni." Thus Frangipani in the 
memorial quoted infra, p. 135, n. I. 

" See SEGESSER, Pfyffer, I., 607. 

3 See the report of Petrucci in DESJARDINS, III., 60 1. 

4 The Count di Santa Flora had sent a message to Charles IX. 
on October 6, asking to be allowed to let th e troops go, now that 
the victory was won. The king wished still to retain them, 
but Santa Fiora personally pointed out to him that the auxiliary 
force was obliged to return by reason of its losses and disease. 
On this occasion Charles IX. expressed his hope of receiving 


In his memorial the nuncio Frangipani states that after 
Catherine s reply the Pope could only adopt an attitude of 

further help from the Pope, at the same time acknowledging 
that the auxiliary force had been of great assistance to him. 
Santa Fiora, who was himself suffering from fever, then took 
his leave " Malissimo sodisfatto della natura de Francesi, onde 
dipoi diceva spesso che mai piu tornarebbe in Francia con gente, 
perche il proceder de Francesi e stravagante tanto in le osser- 
vationi militari, che conosceva che 1 huomo che li serve corre 
del continue grosso pericolo in la dignita et in 1 honore, perche, 
se le cose succedono bene, vogliono esser stati loro li essecutori, 
et se male, ogni cosa buttano volentiere adosso al compagno, 
et in somma guerreggiano di maniera, almeno di presente, che 
del continue si sta piu per perdere che guadagnare ; et se 1 ammir- 
aglio fosse stato soldato di altra natione che francese, Dio sa 
come le cose fossero passate. . . . Quando il sig r conte si cognobbe 
in stato col male che non posseva caminar con la gente, ordino al 
vescovo di Fermo comissario generate che, condotta la gente a 
Lione, la pagasse del mese di novembre, et in tanto desse aviso 
al Papa per corrier proprio in diligenza [di] quanto che passava, 
et chiedesse ordine a Sua S tA di quel che s havesse per ] inanzi 
da far con la gente, la qual si condurebbe per il Delfinato alle 
spese del re. Ma inteso poi il sig r conte dal detto suo segretario 
come il Papa intendeva pagar la gente sino fosse condotta in 
Italia, scrisse al vescovo non ispedisse piu al Papa, et che lo at- 
tendesse in Lione et sollecitasse il far pagar la gente di gia con- 
dutta in Lione, dove ne moriva assai et di dove ne partiva assai 
per la strada diritta della Savoia, non curando d aspettar paga 
alcuna ; talmente a molti fra venuto a noia il tardar piu in quelle 
bande, dove non si vedeva che mallatia e morte." On account 
of his illness Santa Fiora was not able to carry out the command 
to protect Avignon. On the last day of February, 1570, he in 
formed Pius V. by word of mouth of all that he had witnessed. 
I gather all these particulars, hitherto unknown, from the *Narra- 
tione della guerra di Francia, in Cod. Barb., 5040, p. 167 seqq. 
Vatican Library. From the account in FOUQUERAY, I., 627 seq. 
it appears that the Pope looked after the troops on their return, 
and the Jesuits of the sick who remained at Lyons. According 
to ADRIANI, XX., 4, only a third part of the auxiliary force 
returned home. 


great caution, and that many people had long since told him 
that the help which he had bestowed on France in money 
and troops had been thrown away. 1 While Guise and 
Tavannes retired from the court and the army, the influence 
fell back into the hands of the " cautious and cold politicians, 
who, devoid of either principle or conviction, lived only for the 
exigencies of the moment." 2 Thanks to them, proposals for 
peace were already being made at La Rochelle by the end of 
1569. The Catholics once more found themselves in danger 
of seeing their interests sacrificed to the advantages of the 
moment, without any guarantee as to the future. In theory 
the court seemed to have the conditions of peace in its own 
hands because the battle of Moncontour had made a lasting 
impression, and at that time the Huguenots had not much 
hope of help from abroad. This was especially the case from 
Germany, where only the reformers were in favour of armed 
intervention, while the Lutherans held back. In more than 
one place, as for example Ernestine Saxony, the people were 
told from Lutheran pulpits that the Huguenots, like thegueux, 
were rebels, sacramentarians and iconoclasts, who deserved 
to be extirpated. 3 

When the rumours that a peace was at hand grew more and 
more insistent, the Pope had recourse to the king himself 
in a letter of January 2Qth, 1570, in which he says : Our duty 
and our paternal solicitude do not allow us to fail to give 
warning to Your Majesty ; give heed to it then and think well 
concerning that which is about to be done. Whereas we see 
well that between Your Majesty and your enemies there can 
never be a peace which will be favourable to the cause of the 
Catholic religion, or which, however it be expressed, will secure 
tranquillity to your country which is so exhausted by long 
wars, we, for our part, shall certainly not forget the office which 
we hold, nor shall we be so blind to our duty as to fail to use 

1 Cf. the memorial already quoted. 

2 Opinion of BAUMGARTEN, Bartholomausnacht, 26. 

3 So reported William of Orange to Louis of Nassau on December 
29, 1569. GROEN v. PRINSTERER, III., 334 ; SOLDAN, I., 380. 


all our zeal and all our authority to bring it about that peace 
shall be concluded as soon as possible. But since we are well 
aware, and Your Majesty has experienced the same a thousand 
times, that there can be no harmony between light and dark 
ness, and that in matters of this sort there can be no agreement 
but such as is illusory and full of dangers, we must of necessity 
tremble for your own person as well as for the general good of 
Christian society, and the preservation of the Catholic faith. 
Similar letters were sent to Catherine de Medici and Henry 
of Anjou. 1 

So as to leave no means untried, Pius V., in April, 1570, 
sent to Henry of Anjou, the favourite son of the French queen, 
the blessed sword and hat on Laetare Sunday, by the hands of 
Count Jerome de Rozdrazow. 2 Rozdrazow was instructed to 
express, either by himself or together with the nuncio, the 
Pope s sorrow at the continued negotiations for peace with 
persons who were in open rebellion against God and the French 
crown. If the king were to be willing to share his kingdom 
with rebels he would expose himself to ruin and personal 
contempt. Lastly Rozdrazow was ordered to dissuade the 
king from any sort of agreement with the Turks, and to re 
mind him of his duty in the matter of filling the vacant 
bishoprics. 3 

When it was reported at the end of April that peace had 
been concluded with the Huguenots, Pius V. addressed a 

1 See GOUBAU, 266 seqq., 269 seq., 272 seq. ; LADERCHI, 1570, 
n. 168 seq. Cf. in Lettres de Cath. de Medicis, III., 306 seq. how 
Catherine sought to ease the Pope s mind. 

2 See the "brief to Henry of Anjou of March 30, 1570, Arm. 
44, t. 15, p. 50, Papal Secret Archives; ibid. p. 48b-49b *briefs 
on this subject of the same date to Charles IX. and Catherine 
de Medici. Cf. GRATIANI Epist., 459. For G. Rozdrazow (the 
same as the Rasdrakhoif in SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 77) see 
JUNGNITZ, M. Gerstmann, Berlin, 1898, 41 seqq., 60 seq., 65 ; 
CANISII Epist., IV., 367. 

8 *Instruttione per Francia al conte Hieronimo Rosreshof 
[sic] a 27 di Marzo, 1570, in Varia polit., 81 (now 82), p. 463 
seqq., Papal Secret Archives. 


severe letter to the king, putting him on his guard 
against evil counsellors. 1 Catherine de Medici and Car 
dinals Guise and Bourbon also received briefs to the same 
effect. 2 

All these efforts were as ineffectual as those made by 
Philip II. for the same purpose. The French court persevered 
in the way upon which it had embarked, not only because 
financial straits and a military situation which had now 
become unfavourable pointed to peace, even on unworthy 
terms, but also because such an agreement was the only one 
suited to the policy of compromise which Catherine de Medici 
continued to pursue, while an additional reason was her old 
fear of the King of Spain, who was interesting himself so much 
on behalf of the French Catholics, and to whom the continua 
tion of the war would have been advantageous. If the actual 
conclusion of the peace was still delayed for some time, the 
reason was that the more impatient the court became, the 
more obstinately the Huguenots held out. 3 

On August 8th, 1570, Charles IX. laid down his arms before 
his enemies at St. Germain. The conditions of peace were 
more favourable than ever for the Huguenots, who obtained 
full amnesty and liberty of conscience, the free exercise of 
their religion in the territories of the nobles and a number of 
cities, with the exception of Paris and wherever the court 
happened to be from time to time ; they further obtained 
the right to fill all the offices of state, as well as the right to 
object to six judges in each parliament ; finally, they were 
given four places of safety for two years, La Rochelle, La 
Charite*, Montauban and Cognac. In this way a veritable 
state within a state was formed. 4 In a secret article Charles IX. 
promised compensation for the two million livres expended by 

1 Brief of April 23, 1570, in GOUBAU, 274 seq, and LADERCHI, 
1570, n, 177. 

"All dated April 23. Arm. 44, t. 15, p. 94b, 96b, 98, Papal 
Secret Archives. 

3 See BAUMGARTEN, Bartholomausnacht, 16. 

4 See SOLD AN, I., 396 seqq. 


the Huguenots and Germany in the hire of their mercenaries ! l 
Pius V. was convinced that this " shameful peace which had 
been dictated to the French king by the conquered enemies 
of God " would bring about in France even worse disturbances 
than those which had gone before. 2 His grief was all the 
greater because he at that time looked upon Avignon as being 
threatened. 3 The nuncio was instructed to make strong 
remonstrances. 4 Moreover, Pius V. resolved to send at once 
to France a special envoy in the person of the Papal notary, 
Francesco Bramante, to make an attempt to get the recent 
events annulled. 5 The instructions for Bramante were 
dictated by the Pope himself on August i4th, while he was 
still under the impression created by the news of the peace ; 
they were afterwards recast on September iQth, and were only 
handed to the nuncio on the 25th. By these instructions 
Bramante was, with all proper moderation and prudence, to 
remind the king of the glorious age of his ancestors, who en 
joyed the obedience of their subjects, the tranquillity of their 
country, and the glory and power of their realm so long as 

1 KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, II., 209. A. Contarini well brings 
out the disgraceful side of the peace (p. 249 seqq.). Cf. the views 
of the French and German nuncios in Corresp. dipl., IV., 4, n. i. 

8 Besides the ""instructions for Bramante (infra p. 132, n. i) 
and Lettres de Cath. de Medicis, III., 330 n., cf. the briefs of 
complaint to Cardinals Guise and Bourbon of August 17 and 
September 23, 1570, in GOUBAU, 276 seqq., 282 seqq. See also 
the *brief to Cardinal Guise of September n, 1570, Arm. 44, 
t. 15, p. 2i2b, Papal Secret Archives; ibid, similar *briefs of 
September 23, 1570, to Cardinals Strozzi, Pelleve and Armagnac. 
Cusano *reports on November 8, 1570, how the Pope deplored 
the peace as " damnosa et vituperosa " for Charles IX. State 
Archives, Vienna. 

8 Cf. Corresp. dipl., IV., 41. 

4 Cf. the *notice in Cod. Barber. 4698, p. 205, Vatican Library. 

8 The mission of Bramante has remained unknown to all 
historians until now. The * briefs accrediting him to Charles 
IX. and other personages in France in Arm. 44, t. 15, p. 23ob, 
237-251, Papal Secret Archives. 


religious unity was unbroken. The arrangement arrived at 
at St. Germain, which bore the beautiful name of peace, had 
destroyed that unity, and would therefore soon bring about 
the ruin of France, because the treaty had no regard for 
religion, weakened the power of the king, and increased the 
boldness of his enemies, who, before long, would only return 
with greater zeal than ever to their former schemes. It was 
inconceivable that people who wished to deprive their king 
of his life and authority could ever be his friends, or that men 
who had hitherto always broken faith could keep it in the 
future. The Pope who on account of his youth did not wish 
to blame the king for what had happened, was still of opinion 
that he had only agreed to the peace in order to disarm the 
rebels, and in order that later on he might proceed against 
them at his discretion. If this should turn out to be 
Charles IX. s plan Bramante was to encourage him in it, 
reminding him of the example of his father and his predeces 
sors in their treatment of heretics who were a danger to the 
state, and assuring him of the help of the Pope. Everyone 
knew, so the instructions went on, that the Huguenots, who 
pretended to be the reformers of religion, had in view the ruin, 
not only of religion but of the state as well. At the present 
moment they were despoiling the churches of France in order 
to enrich their adherents. Since their object was the destruc 
tion of religion and the monarchy, they must be opposed in 
every way, in order that the king might still be king. 1 

A special duty that was laid upon Bramante concerned the 
troops who had been sent in the previous spring under the 

1 The *Instruttione prima a Mon r Bramanti a 14 d Agosto 
1570 dettata da N. S 1 " 6 , consegnata a 25 di Settembre 1570 in 
den Varia polit. 81 (now 82) p. 264 to 269. And p. 266 : *Instrut- 
tione seconda a Mons. Bramanti dettata da N. S 76 , consignata a 
25 di Settembre, and p. 267-268 "changes and additions to this 
ordinance ; p. 269 : *Instruttione terza a Mons. Bramanti a di 
19 di Settembre, rescritta et consignata a 25 Settembre 1570 ; 
p. 269 b : *Aggiunta alia terza Instruttione. Papal Secret 


command of Torquato Conti for the defence of Avignon. 1 He 
was to explain that, as the danger had been so pressing, it 
had not been possible to give the king warning of this, and 
that therefore the latter s desire that the troops, who had only 
been sent for purposes of defence, should now be withdrawn, 
was as impracticable as was the toleration of the religious 
innovations at Avignon. Lastly, the envoy was to express 
the hope that France would join the projected league against 
the Turks. 2 

The remonstrances of the Pope, his nuncio, 3 and Bramante 4 
were absolutely without effect, principally because after the 
Peace of St. Germain the anti-Spanish attitude of the French 
court developed more and more. As early as July this frame 
of mind, which rested upon various causes, had almost led to 
an open breach, and Charles IX. and Catherine de Medici 
-had made the most violent attacks upon Philip II. The 
reasons for this attitude were dynastic ambition, hurt feelings 
and French hopes of splendid conquests. 5 Estrangement 
from Spain inevitably led to a rapprochement with the leaders 
of the Huguenots, the rebels in the Netherlands, and Elizabeth 

1 Cf. as fo this *Avviso di Roma of April 8, 1570, Urb. 1041, 
p. 257b, Vatican Library,; LADERCHI, 1570, n. 195 seq. ; CATENA, 
64. See also Arch. d. Soc. Rom., XXXI., 481 ; MAROCCO, XL, 
35. For the Pope s anxiety see CHARRIERE, III., 54 seq. The 
*Instruttione al S. Torquato Conti, Aprile, 1570, in Varia polit., 
81 (now 82), p. 270 seq. Papal Secret Archives. 

* See Varia polit., 81 (now 82), p. 419 seq. Papal Secret 

8 See the *Ultimi ragionamenti (undated) havuti con le MM tA 
Crist me in Cod. Barber., 4698, p. 205-212 (cf. PHILIPPSON, loc. 
cit. 113) and the **Cifra di Francia di 30 Agosto 1570, in Nunziat. 
di Francia, IV., 33, Papal Secret Archives. Cf. in DESJARDINS, 
III., 637, how Catherine deluded the nuncio into thinking that 
the Catholic religion could not fail to gain by the peace. See 
also the Venetian reports in Histor. Zeitschrift, L., 386 seq. 

* For the negotiations of Bramante see the * notices from the 
Papal Secret Archives in App. nn. 8 and 9. 

5 See BAUMGARTEN, Bartholamausnacht, 27 seqq. 


of England. Scruples on this subject had no place in the mind 
of Catherine de Medici, who even allowed herself to make 
disparaging remarks to the Papal nuncio. " What would you 
say," she said to the Pope s representative in October, " if you 
were soon to see Cardinal Chatillon here in his Cardinal s 
dress ? " Such talk about an apostate, who had been deprived 
of his dignity by the Pope on account of his open apostasy, 
was bound to destroy all hopes of Catherine in the mind of 
the nuncio. This queen, he said, does not believe in God, 
nor do any of those who are her friends or those of the king. 1 
It was about this time that Frangipani drew up a memorial 
on the state of affairs in France, which is noteworthy in several 
respects. He was of opinion that some attempt must be made 
to open at least the eyes of the king ; the Huguenots would 
always be his enemies, because the offender never pardons. 
They were only trying to hoodwink the king, and at the first 
favourable opportunity would try to stir up a conspiracy or a 
revolt. There was still time to anticipate their action ; the 
forces of the Catholics were larger than those of the Huguenots ; 
the king could get as much military help as he liked from 
.Switzerland and Italy. The first thing to be done, however, 
was to remove from his entourage the traitors who wished 
to involve him in a war with Catholic Spain. Should this take 
place the Pope would have to do his duty and form a league 
against Huguenot France. It was quite obvious that no con 
fidence could be placed in Catherine de Medici, who was a 
foreigner and a woman. Should the king prove a broken reed 

1 Report of the Spanish ambassador Alava of October n, 
1570, in BAUMGARTEN, loc. cit. 33 seq. Cf. the Cifra di Francia 
of September 30, 1570, which states : " Per mio giuditio excettuato 
solamente il re, che io lo ho per un buon giovane, se bene hoggi 
non ha ne discorso ne valore ne cuore di re, tutti li altri sono a un 
modo pieni di ogni sorte di passione et intcresse del mondp et 
vacui di ogni religione, della quale io per me credo, che cosi li 
heretici, come quelli che si dicono cattolici, dico de nobili, se ne 
servano solamente per pretesto, ma che in verita non hanno 
religione." Nunziat. d Francia, IV., 52, Secret Archives of the 


they would have to fall back on the Catholic nobles, who were 
in a position to force the king to see the error of his ways. 
The Catholic nobles could, just as the Huguenots had done, 
form a league among themselves, and alliances between the 
governors of the provinces, who would be controlled by some 
trustworthy leader, dependent upon the Pope. If this were 
not done, the Huguenots would certainly attract the whole 
kingdom of France to themselves. 1 

The danger grew visibly nearer with the matrimonial projects 
which Catherine was forming at that time for her children. 
Her favourite son, Henry of Anjou, was to marry Elizabeth of 
England ; her daughter Margaret, contrary to the Pope s 
wishes, was to marry, not the King of Portugal, but the Hugue 
not prince, Henry of Navarre. 2 The Protestants attached 
great importance to the marriage of Elizabeth with Anjou. 
The English minister, Cecil, already foresaw the fall of the 
Papacy, and the English ambassador in Paris was counting on 
the conversion of Charles IX. to Protestantism. 3 In any case, 

1 The memorial, at the end of which Frangipani suggests 
the sending of confidential agents to Charles IX. and to Philip 
II., bears the title " Discorso sopra gli humori di Francia di 
Monsignor Nazaret." RANKE ^Franzos. Gesch., I. a , 301 seq.) 
only extracted one passage from this dealing with the Catholic 
associations. He made use of a codex in the Barberini Library, 
and rightly gives 1570 as the date of its composition. The copy, 
however, must be later, since Frangipani only received the bishop 
ric of Nazareth on November 5th, 1572. Ranke dpes not give, 
as is often the case, the designation of the codex ; I at last found 
it after long research in Cod. Barber. 5269, p. 63 seq., Vatican 
Library. There is another *copy in the Library at Karlsruhe, 
Cod. Durl. 44, p. 173 seq. I am aware that later on Thompson 
published the memorial in Appendix p. 548 seq. according to the 
Barberini codex, but without establishing its authorship more 
exactly ; moreover, in his text he only makes use of the passage 
in Ranke already mentioned. 

* Cf. SOLDAN, I., 408 seq., 413 seq. ; BAUMGARTEN, loc. cit. 
41 seqq., 60 seqq. ; TANZIN, Le mariage de Marguerite de Valois 
in Rev. des quest, histor., LXXX., 446 seq. 



if this marriage should take place, Mary Stuart and the English 
Catholics would be at the mercy of their mortal enemies. 

No less serious injury to Catholic interests was threatened 
by the mixed marriage with the son of the Queen of Navarre, 
who had distinguished herself by her violent persecution of 
the Catholics. 1 To all this was added the fact that on Septem 
ber I2th, 1571, Coligny, who a year before had been banished 
as guilty of high treason, and had been hanged upon the 
gallows in effigy, 2 made his appearance at the residence of the 
royal court at Blois, and very soon regained a greater influence 
than ever. 3 

It is no wonder that these events gave rise to the gravest 
anxiety. The Pope declared that so long as Henry of Navarre 
was a Huguenot he would under no circumstances grant him a 
dispensation from consanguinity for his marriage with the 
Princess Margaret. It now seemed that the fears he had long 
entertained, lest the young king, surrounded as he was by 
Huguenots, should be wavering in his faith, had become a 
certainty. 4 It had been reported to the Pope that the man 
to whom Catherine wished to give her daughter had threatened 
with death all opposition to Protestant preaching, 5 and had 
profaned the^ Most Holy Sacrament and the crucifix in the 
most opprobrious way. 6 Of Coligny it was said that he had 

1 Cf. the remarks in DUBARAT, Le protestantisme en Beam, 
Pau, 1893. 

1 See SOLDAN, I., 365. The strongly worded briefs of Pius V. 
of October 12, 1569, in GOUBAU, 231 seqq. refer to this. 

* Cf. SOLDAN, I., 420 seq. \ I^AUMGARTEN, loc. cit., 87 seqq. ; 

4 See TIEPOLO, 188 ; CATENA, 176; PALANDRI, 153 seq.; 
cf. Arch. d. miss, scientif., 2 series, II., 444 seq. 

6 Cf. Intermediaire des chercheurs, December 15, 1901 ; MERKI, 
Coilgny, 390, n. i. 

* *" E bene stato affermato per vero a S.S A chel figlio della 
regina di Navarra ha fatto gettare per terra il santo sacramento 
dell Eucharistia e ha fatto strascinare per terra un crocifisso 
con la corda all collo." *Report of Arco from Rome, May i, 
1568, State Archives, Vienna. 


quite recently at Angouleme gone to the horrible lengths of 
copying the living torches of Nero. 1 Yet this man was loaded 
by the king with gifts, and even with ecclesiastical benefices, 
and taken back into the royal council. He had a great in 
fluence over the young king, who eagerly listened to his 
grandiose plans. These aims were an alliance with England 
and war with Spain. For this purpose he had emissaries 
in England, in Protestant Switzerland, and in Germany, as 
well as at Constantinople and among the leaders of the Moors 
in Spain. He not only planned to give help to the enemies of 
Philip IT. in the Low Countries, but also to tap the sources of 
Spanish wealth in the West Indies. Charles IX. was already 
dreaming of great conquests ; it is no wonder then that under 
these circumstances the news of the great victory of Lepanto 
was but coldly received at the French court. 2 

For Pius V. his great success against the Turks was a fresh 
incentive to leave no stone unturned to save the Catholic 
cause in France from further loss. He redoubled the efforts 
which he had hitherto made to prevent the marriage with 
Navarre. For her part Catherine used every artifice to obtain 
the Papal dispensation for the marriage, but Pius V. remained 
firm even when he was threatened with the total apostasy of 
France from the Church. He would, he said, in some sense 
cease to be Pope if he were to ,show favour to an obstinate 
heretic. He would not grant the dispensation even though a 
French army were in Rome, and if in spite of everything the 
marriage took place, he would pronounce the children of it 
illegitimate. In spite of this, Catherine still flattered her 
self with the hope of being able to induce the Pope to change 
liis mind by holding out the prospect of the accession of France 
to the league against the Turks if the Pope would grant the 
dispensation. 3 In doing this she knew well how much at heart 
the noble Pope had the defence of Christendom. 

1 See Corresp. dipl., II., 372. 

2 See SOLDAN, I., 423 ; KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, II., 326, 
331 seq. ; BAUMGARTEN, loc. cit. 96 seqq. ; BLOK, III., 116 seq. ; 
JANSSEN-PASTOR, IV. 16 -i 6 . 331 seqq. 

3 See the reports of Petrucci in DESJARDINS, III., 695, 702 seqq., 



In the middle of December, 1571, Pius V. had sent to France 
as nuncio extraordinary 1 Antonio Maria Salviati, who was 
related to the French royal house on the side of Medici, and had 
already stayed at the French court in the spring of 1571 in 
connexion with the imprisonment of Giovan Galeazzo San- 
severino, who had been accused before the Inquisition. 2 
Salviati was instructed in the first place to induce Charles IX. 
to join the league against the Turks. 3 At the same time he 
was to express the great displeasure of the Pope at the fact 
that the king had just at that moment sent the Bishop of Aix, 
who had been disposed for heresy, to Constantinople, to the 
enemy of the Christian name, a thing which destroyed the 
hopes of the poor Christians in the Turkish Empire of being 
delivered from its insupportable tyranny as a consequence of 
the victory at Lepanto. The nuncio was also to make com 
plaint of the continued attempts to marry Henry of Navarre 
to Margaret, on the plea that he might be brought back to 
the Church, which was certainly an empty hope. Lastly he 

714 seqq., 719 seqq., 723 seqq., 730, 735 seqq., 740 ; BAUMGARTEN, 
loc. cit. 113 seqq. ; PALANDRI, 162 seqq. Cf. also Histor. Zeit- 
schrift, L., 389 seq. After the night of St. Bartholomew, Catherine 
joked about their having believed in Rome in her accession to 
the league against the Turks. See THEINER, Annales, eccl., 

I-. 332. 

1 See LADERCHI, 1571, n. 135 ; GARAMPI, Osservaz., 315. 

2 See the *Instruttione per Mons. Salviati, dated Rome, Feb 
ruary 5, 1571, in Varia polit., 81 (now 82), p. 117 seq. ; cf. ibid. 
277 seq., 638 seq., 640 seq., apal Secret Archives. For the 
successful efforts of Chailes IX. and Cardinal Rambouillet (then 
Bishop of Le Mans and ambassador in Rome) to set free Count 
G. G. Sanseverino, who had been imprisoned by the Inquisition 
while in the service of France, see the *report of Arco, February 
17, 1571, State Archives, Vienna. Jean de Vivonne, who was 
sent at that time to Rome, played an essential part in this suc 
cess ; cf. GUY DE BREMOND, J. de Vivonne, Paris, 1884, 27 
aseq. ; Iso AMABILE, I., 303 seq. 

3 F. Bramante had already negotiated about this ; see his 
*Cifra of November 8, 1570, Nunziat. de Francia, IV., 73, Papal 
Secret Archives. 


was to say that the Pope was very much surprised that Coligny 
had been again given so much power, and that Charles IX. 
had allowed the Huguenots to propagate their errors in the 
Marquisate of Saluzzo, since this was contrary to the Peace 
of St. Germain. 1 

On his way to France Salviati visited Florence, Lucca, 
Genoa, and the Duke of Savoy, in which places, by the Pope s 
orders, he treated of the holy league. 2 In January, 1572, he 
reached the French court, which was then at Blois ; he was 
assisted in his mission by briefs of exhortation to Charles IX., 
which, in spite of all that had happened, were expressed in 
terms of paternal kindness. 3 A little later, on February 7th, 4 
he was followed by the Cardinal legate, Bonelli, who in Dec 
ember had obtained in Lisbon promises from King Sebastian 
with regard to his entry into the league and his marriage 
to Margaret of Valois. 5 

1 See the "Instructions for Salviati, dated Rome, December 
15, 1571, in Varia polit., 33 (now 34), p. 49 seq. See ibid. 81 
(now 82), p. 283 seq. the first draft cf. ibid. 116 (now 117), p. 49 
seq. Papal Secret Archives. See also the letter from Pius V. 
to Catherine of December 15, 1571, in CATENA, 301 seq. and 
Corresp. dipl., IV., 549 seq., 551 seq. In his *report of November 
3, 1571 (State Archives, Vienna) Arco mentions an earlier letter : 
*" II Papa si duole grandemente della regina madre del re come 
quella che principalmente favorisse 1 ammiraglio et ha 1 animo 
volto del continuo a diverse novita et perci6 Sua Sanita gl ha 
scritto un breve in colera." 

1 See the letter of the Doge of Genoa to Pius V. in GOUBAU, 
436 seqq. Cf. the important remarks of LADERCHI, 1571, n. 
135, as against GRAZIANI (Epist., 465). 

8 Brief of January 25, 1572, in GOUBAU, 439 seq. (cf. as to this 
TURKE, 22) and of February 6, 1572, in CATENA, 298 seq. 

4 See the *letter of Bonelli to Cardinal Rusticucci, dated Blois, 
February 9, 1572, Cod. 33-0-24, p. 576, Corsini Library, Rome. 

6 Cardinal Bonelli, who made his entry into Lisbon on Decem 
ber 3, 1571, reported thence on December 5 and 13, 1571, con 
cerning the general promises made by the king as to the league 
(see the *letter of Bonelli in Cod. 33-0-24, p. 34 seq., Corsini 
Library, Rome). In the *letter of December 13 he speaks of 


The Cardinal, who, as he travelled across France, had every 
where seen the ruins of the churches which had been destroyed 
by the Huguenots, had no illusions as to the difficulties which 
lay in the way of his being able to arrange those matters with 
which he was charged to deal at the French court ; these were, 
to ask for the marriage of Margaret to the King of Portugal, 
the entry of France into the league against the Turks, and the 
prevention of the defensive alliance which Elizabeth of Eng 
land had recently proposed to the French government. On 
February gth there also arrived at Blois the General of the 
Jesuits, Francis Borgia, who, armed with special instructions 
from Philip II., was to support the legate. Neither the one 
nor the other left any room for doubt that the Pope would 
never grant the dispensation for the marriage with Navarre. 
They fought against that match just as strongly as they urged 
the Portuguese marriage, but all their efforts remained with 
out any measure of success. With regard to the league against 
the Turks all that Bonelli could obtain was a promise that 
France would not hinder the crusade. With regard to the 
alliance with England he received the assurance that this was 
only aimed at the maintenance of friendly relations with that 
kingdom, and that there was no idea of any hostile action 
against Spain. 1 

the " buona dispositione " of the king concerning the marriage 
with Margaret of Valois which Pius V. so much desired : " mi 
disse voler per dote dal Re di Francia ch entri ancor esso in lega ! 
Bonelli, who presented a memorial to the king on December n 
(in LAMMER, Zur Kirchengesch., 135), left for Madrid on the i4th, 
and thence for France. At Miranda he received a letter from the 
Portuguese king for Pius V., dated December 20, 1571, con 
taining the purely general promise that the king intended to 
fight against the Turks, Saracens and Lutherans (Corpo dipl. 
Portug., X., 427). 

1 See the *letters of Bonelli addressed to Cardinal Rusticucci 
from Blois on February 9, 19 and 22, 1572, followed by one from 
Rome to Philip II., March 30, 1572, in Cod. 33-0-24, p. 57b, 
Corsini Library, Rome ; extracts given in GACHARD, Bibl. 
Corsini, 52 seqq. Cf. BAUMGARTEN, Bartholomausnacht, 118 


seqq., 126, and PHILIPPSON, Rom. Kurie, 116 seq., where use is 
also made of the statements of the Spanish, Florentine, and 
Venetian ambassadors, and of Francis Borgia. A long contro 
versy arose out of a passage in the letter of Bonelli to Cardinal 
Rusticucci from Lyons on March 6, 1572, where Tie says that he 
has not been able to meet with any success with regard to the 
league 01 the marriage with Navarre, but " con alcuni particolari 
ch io porto, dei quali ragguaglier6 Nostro Signore a bocca, posso 
dire di non partirmi affatto mal expedito." 

RANKE, who was the first to bring this passage to light, in his 
Histor. -polit. Zeitschrift, II., 598, very precipitately concludes 
from this that " even if it was not absolutely told him, at least 
hints were given " to the legate " of a secret scheme in favour of 
the Catholics." SOLDAN (Histor. Taschenbuch, 1854, 219) says 
on the other hand : " All that can be admitted is that this does 
not refer, as Ranke supposes, to the night of St. Bartholomew. 
What could be more natural than that as Gabutius states, the 
legate should have been led on by hopes of the conversion of the 
bridegroom ? The Pope himself had already spoken in this 
sense." In spite of this Ranke maintained his view (Franzos. 
Geschichte, I.* [1856] 320). On the Catholic side in 1856 GANDY 
in the Revue des questions histor. and again in the Civilth Cattolica 
(6 series, vols. 8-n) made a definite protest against the assertion 
that the massacre of the Huguenots on St. Bartholomew s eve 
had been a long predetermined act, and that Pius V. had been 
informed of it in advance. Instead of refuting these solid and 
learned researches, an intimate friend of Dollinger, Lord Acton, 
when the controversy concerning the definition of Papal infalli 
bility had become acute, revived the accusation which, a year 
earlier Michelet (Hist, de la revolut. franc. I. 36) had represented 
as being proved, and tried to bolster it up with full authorities 
(North British Review, October, 1869, n. 101, trans, by GAR, 
La Strage di S. Bartolomeo, Venice, 1870). In his vehement 
excitement Acton swept aside all the arguments on the other 
side. Another friend of Dollinger, Giov. Huber, did the same. 
HERGENROTHER (Kirche und Staat, 656) protested against both. 
Nor were contradictions on the part of learned Catholics wanting 
(see FUNK in Literar. Rundschau, 1880, 169) when WUTTKE 
(Vorgeschichte der Bartholomausnacht [1879], 177) tried to 
represent as " incontestable " the complicity of Pius V. in the 
massacre of St. Bartholomew. Two years later a strongly Pro- 


testant scholar, BAUMGARTEN (Bartholamausnacht 130 seqq. ; 
cf. the supplement in Histor. Zeitschrift, L., 396 seq.}, in a calm 
and objective account of the affair, showed the untenability of 
the case established by Acton and Wuttke ; he was supported by 
v. BEZOLD (Hist. Zeitschrift, XLVII., 563), SCHOTT (Allgem. 
Zeitung, 1882, Beil. n. 67), PHILIPPSON (Rom. Kurie, 116 seqq.}, 
and ALFRED STERN (Der Ursprung der Bartholomausnacht in 
Monatshefte of Westermann, 5 series, vol. 4). 

But Baumgarten, as well as Philippson and Stern, have com 
pletely overlooked the fact that at the end of 1880 another Pro 
testant scholar, Karl Tiirke, in a dissertation published at Chem 
nitz, had gone into the questions under discussion in a way that 
was as thorough as it was accurate. The conclusion arrived at 
by Tiirke is that Pius V. " must in any case be acquitted of any 
direct participation in any treacherous plan for a massacre of 
the Huguenots, even supposing that any such thing had been 
planned in a definite form." (p. 15). The remarks of Tiirke, 
with which Schott in Zeitschrift fur Kirchengeschichte, V., 114 
seq., agrees, retain their authority even by the side of those of 
Baumgarten, as for example the following conclusion : " even 
though the hatred which Pius V. felt for the heretics left nothing 
to be desired " his very character excludes " participation in 
intrigues which were entirely idealistic and pertaining to the realm 
of fiction." Equally pertinent is the remark that the strained 
relations between Pius V. and the French court, especially in the 
time that followed, are quite incompatible with so important 
a secret agreement between them (p. 15-22). As to the " alcuni 
particolari " of which Bonelli, according to his letter of March 
6, 1572, intended to give fuller details by word of mouth, Tiirke 
thinks that these refer to the acceptance of the Tridentine decrees 
and similar matters ; that they certainly do not refer to important 
secrets, and that the exceedingly leisurely return journey of the 
legate is quite inconsistent with any such theory (p. 23-25). 
Other considerations put forward by Tiirke (p. 26 seq.} concerning 
the mission of Bonelli, the letter from Cardinal d Ossat of Septem 
ber 22, 1599, the codex 164 of the Marchese Capponi, used without 
any attempt at criticism by Acton, all complete and confirm the 
conclusions of Baumgarten against the supporters of the theory 
of premeditation. Concerning the things stated in the Capponi 
codex Alfred Maury remarked as early as 1871 (Journal des 
Savants, 422) that, even if they were the work of the man who 


All this, however, was nothing but empty words, as were the 
assurances of devotion to thePope contained in the letters sent 
to Pius V. by the king and the queen on February 22nd, 1572. l 
By April iQth the alliance between England and Charles IX. 
had been concluded ; a little earlier the marriage contract 
between Margaret and Henry of Navarre had been signed 
without taking into consideration whether the Pope gave 
the dispensation or not. At the same time there were rumours 
of secret preparations which pointed to an enterprise against 
Philip II. 2 While he was trying to deceive the Spanish king 
by assurances of friendship, and to pacify the Papal nuncio 
when he showed signs of distrust, Charles IX. was writing on 
May nth to his representative at the Porte : " All my thoughts 
are turned to resisting the might of Spain ... I have fitted 
out in my ports a good number of ships with a force of from 
12,000 to 15,000 men, which by the end of this month will be 
ready to take the offensive, nominally to protect my coasts 
against the pirates, but in reality to harass the Catholic King 
and to encourage the gueux in the Low Countries to advance, 
as indeed they have already done, and have seized the whole 
of Zeeland, -and greatly shaken Holland. I have concluded 
an alliance with the Queen of England, and have sent thither 

later on became Clement VIII., who accompanied Bonelli on 
his journey, it must be remembered that the French court was 
aiming by its promises and mysterious hints at winning over the 
Pope to the dispensation (cf. what we have said supra p. 136). In 
other ways too there are no safe grounds for the assertion put 
forward by Acton and his disciples. Cf. TURKE, 34 seq., where 
the accounts of Catena and Gabutius are critically examined. 
It must be added that in 1884 KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE (Hugue 
nots, II., 43) brought to light a dispatch from the Spanish am 
bassador in Rome, of May 19, 1568 (cf. infra, p. 154, n. 4), which 
shows how wrong was the estimate formed by Acton, and how 
true that of Tiirke, of the Pope s character, and his attitude 
towards such projects as the massacre of St. Bartholomew. 

1 Printed in the second edition of CATENA, 1587, p. 343 seq. 

* See KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, II., 364, 366 seq. ; BAUM- 
GARTEN, loc. cit. 144 seq., 146 seq. 


my cousin the Duke of Montmorency, a thing which has 
filled the Spandiards with wonder and jealousy, as have my 
friendly relations with the princes of Germany." 1 

The tendency of French policy towards the Huguenots 
and their allies involved serious danger to the Catholics of 
France. At the same time they had no cause for despair, since 
during the desperate struggle which they had had to carry 
on for their very existence, the foundations of their spiritual 
renewal had been laid. 

Pius V. had intervened in this matter as well with apostolic 
zeal. Not only was he unceasingly careful for the maintenance 
of purity of faith in France, 2 but also for the renewal of 
Catholic life, and the removal of ecclesiastical abuses. From 
the beginning of his pontificate he had urged the carrying out 
of the Tridentine decrees, and the conscientious use of the 
right of nomination to episcopal sees granted to the French 
government by the concordat. At Avignon he himself gave 
an example of the way in which the reforms of the Council of 
Trent should be enforced. 3 In common with all well-informed 
persons he recognized that in the end violence and bloodshed 
would be useless without the removal of the hopeless con 
ditions which were above all the result of the abuse of the 

Henri de Valois, I., Paris, 1867, 9. 

* With regaid to the action taken against the heretical bishops, 
of which we have spoken on p. 108, besides the briefs given by 
LADERCHI (see especially 1567, n. 160, 169), there must be taken 
into the consideration the *following unpublished briefs : Card 1 
Crequy of July 17, 1566 (Arm. 44, t. 12, n. 96), Honorato de 
Sabaudia, comiti Tendae of August 7, 1566 : against heresy in 
French Savoy (ibid. n. 99), Card, de Armeniaco of February 10, 
1568 (ibid. t. 13, p. 147), Communit. cornet. Venaissini of May 2, 
1569, Episc. Vertudonesi of May 7, 1569 (ibid. t. 14, p. 107), 
Comiti Tendae of December 30, 1569 (ibid. p. 320), Papal Secret 
Archives. In February, 1572, A. Contarini gives the following 
summary of the spread of heresy in France (p. 242) : " the most 
infected districts are Guienne, Gascony and Poitou, the least 
are Champagne and He de France." 

See CIACONIUS, III., 1020. 


powers granted by the concordat. 1 In order to extirpate 
heresy, the Pope wrote to Charles IX. and Catherine de Medici 
on March 8th, 1566, it is above all necessary that the episcopal 
sees should be wisely filled, and that their holders as well as 
all others having the care of souls should observe the duty of 
residence in conformity with the decrees of the Council of 
Trent. 2 It seemed for the moment that Charles IX. had 
taken to heart the words of the Pope, but it soon became 
evident that, in spite of further exhortations, he was short 
sightedly persevering in the old way which was so convenient 
and offered so many material advantages. In his report for 
June, 1569, the Venetian ambassador, Giovanni Correro, 
described with biting sarcasm how the offices and property 
of the Church were left at the disposal of the king s cupidity. 
It is very pleasant to His Majesty, he says, to be able to dis 
pose of 1 06 bishoprics, 17 archbishoprics, from 600 to 700 
abbeys and as many priories, and in this way, without opening 
his purse, to pay his debts, reward his grandees and dower his 
daughters. The abuse has become such and has reached such 
a pitch that at the French court they deal in bishoprics and 
abbeys as they do elsewhere in pepper and cinnamon. The 
evil is so obvious that everyone is writing about it and owns 
that here is the root of all the trouble. All the promises made 
by the queen to do away with the abuse are shown to be mere 
empty words. 3 

Similar promises were again made in 1572 to Cardinal 
Bonelli, but no change was effected. As he was bound by the 
concordat, and as the situation could hardly grow worse, the 

1 Cf. especially the views of G. Correro (p. 189 seqq., 192), who 
makes it clear that in this respect things were as bad as ever 
(see Vol. XI I L of this work, p. 168). Correro rightly remarks that 
if they did not see to having good bishops, who would teach 
reform by word and example, everything would be useless, even 
though they were to proceed with fire and sword. See also 

* See the *brief from the Papal Secret Archives in App. n. i. 

8 See CORRERO, 192 seq. 


Pope could do nothing but wait. 1 When, however, he could 
make a protest with any prospect of success, he refused to 
confirm some nominee of the king. 2 

That no help was to be expected from the French court 
for the interior renewal of the Church of France, was shown 
even more clearly by the protection it afforded to the bishops 
who had been disposed for heresy, as well as the former Cardinal 
Chatillon, who had openly joined the Calviiiists and taken 
a wife on December ist, 1564. 3 The Pope s action against 
these prelates who were so forgetful of their duty was so fully 
justified from the Catholic point of view that he had every 
right to expect the assistance of the eldest son of the Church. 4 
But to the king the so-called liberties of the Gallican Church 
and his own political aims were of far greater importance, and 
he ignored all the Pope s remonstrances. Pius V., however, 
did not relax his efforts. Again in a brief of October I4th, 
1570, he deplored the " opprobrium " that Jean de Montluc, 
who had been deposed in 1566, should still be holding his 
bishopric of Valence. 5 The nuncio Frangipani plainly told 
Charles IX., in reference to the part he played in favour of 
Chatillon, that he was running the risk of being known as the 
schismatic king. 6 

To the terrible injury inflicted on the Catholic Church in 
France by this attitude of the government were to be added 
the enormous material losses which it had incurred in the 
religious wars. In the opinion of an ambassador, it would not 
be possible to restore in ten years the great number of churches 

1 Cf. A. CONTARINI, 251, 267 ; TtfRKE, 24. 

* An example in LADERCHI, 1569, n. 149. 

8 Cf. MERKI, Coligny, 342. 

4 Opinion of POLENZ (II., 301). 

This ** brief, which is in the Papal Secret Archives, escaped 
the notice of DEGERT (p. 105). 

9 *" In quel di Ciattiglione mi sono aperto a dime amore- 
volmente al Re insino al pericolo che incorre di acquistarsi nome 
di Re scismatico in vece di quel che ha di Christianissimo." 
Letter from Paris, September 30, 1570, Nunziat. di Francia, 
IV., 48. Papal Secret Archives. 


that had been destroyed, and which still excited wonder in 
their ruins. According to Correro the clergy were ruined, 
because, apart from the ecclesiastical property which had been 
sold by the order of the Pope, since 1561 they had had to pay 
more than twelve million scudi, and that this was nothing 
compared to the losses which had been inflicted on them by 
the soldiery, whether friends or enemies. 1 

Nevertheless these terrible experiences had had their advan 
tage for the French Catholics. Even during the first religious 
war the acts of violence and misdeeds of the Huguenots had 
brought about a change ; the sight of the ruined churches 
and the dismantled altars, the spoliations and murders, carried 
out in the name of the new religion, of helpless priests, monks, 
and nuns, had driven many into resistance who had allowed 
themselves to be blinded by the appearance of greater strict- 
ness and piety in Calvinism, and had opened out to them the 
way of return to the Catholic Church. The second religious 
war had had the consequence that, in spite of the conventions 
of the Peace of Longjumeau, the more important cities would 
no longer tolerate the Calvinist preachers. The Catholics 
were beginning to take up their own defence vigorously. 2 
Before this, says Correro, they had been full of fears, not 

1 See CORRERO, 186. Cf. H. FURGEOT, L alienation des biens du 
clerge sous Charles IX. in Revue des quest, histor., XXIX., 448 seq. 

8 Cf. the memorial of Frangipani mentioned on p. 135, n. I ; 
A. CONTARINI, 244 ; BAUER, Th. Beza, II., Leipsic, 1851, 611 ; 
PICOT, I., 15 seq. 19. To this day traces may still be seen of 
the devastation, to which innumerable works of art fell victim. 
Among the libraries that were destroyed, the most valuable 
was undoubtedly that of Cluny. For the changed mood of the 
people cf. Chanson populaire centre les Huguenots (1566) in 
Bullet, de la soc. d hist. de France, I., 2 (1834), 165 seqq. Of the 
Franciscan Order alone about 200 martyrs are mentioned by 
name in France for the years 1560 to 1580 (see GAUDENTIUS, 
no). In reality the number was far greater, since whole con 
vents were frequently destroyed there were about 100 and 
their inmates put to death without their names being recorded 
(see HOLZAPFEL, 480). 


because they were fewer in number, since of the common 
people only a thirtieth part at the outside were Huguenots, 
and a third part of the nobility, but because the Huguenots 
were splendidly organized and united, while the Catholics 
were divided and carelessly left everything to the government. 
Now that they had been disillusioned by the deplorable attitude 
of the court, they had begun, like men roused from sleep, to 
unite and show a bold front to the enemy. The conduct of 
the war itself had deprived the Huguenots of their moral 
preponderance, apart from their loss of Conde*, Andelot, 
Wolfgang of Deux- Fonts, and other leaders. 1 The Huguenots, 
too, who even in civil matters were cut off from the national 
life, stood instinctively opposed to that tendency to unity 
which is so deeply rooted in the French character. 2 The 
change in public opinion, too, was profoundly affected by the 
fact that Pierre de Ronsard, the founder of French classicism, 
definitely took the part of the ancient Church, and in his 
writings openly opposed the Huguenots as the destroyers of 
Christianity and the enemies of the state. 3 

The shrewd Correro also made another observation with 
regard to the changed attitude of the French Catholics towards 

1 CORRERO, 186 seq. The numerical data ot Correro naturally 
have only a relative importance. However, Frangipani also 
states (memorial quoted supra p. 135, n. i) : " Per due Ugonotti 
che siano nel regno si ode calcolare che si ha da contrapoire 
piii di otto cattolici." 

1 Cf. ELKAN Die Publizistik der Bartholomausnacht, Heidel 
berg, 1905, 141 seq it and PLATZHOFF in Preuss. Jahrb., CL., 54 

9 See specially his Remonstrance au peuple de France, 1563. 
BAUMGARTNER, Gesch. der Weltliteratur, V. 265, ; PERDRIZET, 
R. et la r^forme, Paris, 1903. There is a celebrated passage in 
which Ronsard makes Beza responsible for the terrible devasta 
tion asking him how he dares to preach : 
Un Christ tout noircy de fumee 
Portant un morion en teste et dans la main 
Un large coutelas rouge de sang humain. 


the Pope, who, he said, had gained more than he had lost 
during the recent disturbances, because, before the schism 
in religion, attachment to Rome was but weak among the 
French people, who looked upon the Pope rather as a great 
Italian prince than as the head of the Church and the universal 
pastor, but no sooner had the Huguenots come to the fore 
than the Catholics began again to venerate him and recognize 
him as the true Vicar of Christ, and this feeling had become 
stronger and stronger the more violently they were harassed 
and attacked by the Calvinists. Even that vast number who 
did not give much thought to religion, but only wished to be 
counted loyal servants of the king, now honoured the Pope 
much more than of old, in order to show their hostility to 
the Huguenots. The life and conduct of the reigning Pope, too, 
had contributed in an extraordinary way to the increased 
authority of the Holy See. The reforms which had been intro 
duced in Rome gave more than ordinary satisfaction ; Pius V. s 
reserve towards his relations was admired as something un 
heard of for many years, and men were delighted when he would 
not make them counts, or marquises or dukes, but left them in 
their lowly state. This alone was enough to make him appear 
to the people as a saint, who was not aiming at his private ends, 
but only at the common good, and whose thoughts were fixed 
exclusively on the extirpation of heresy, the removal of abuses 
from the Church, and at bringing back priests to a simple and 
praiseworthy manner of life. Even the Huguenots could 
find nothing to condemn in such a Pope, and were wont to say 
that His Holiness had a good conscience. The impression 
made by his purity of life was so great that he won the praises 
even of his enemies. 1 

This revival of Papal authority, as well as the slow renewal 
of life in the Catholic Church in France, was closely linked 
with the quiet but efficacious labours of the new Orders. 2 

1 CORRERO, 207. 

2 RANKE (Papste II. 8 , 95 seq.) and POLENZ (II., 287 seq.) 
have already called attention to this. Cf. also BAUDRILLART 
in La France chret., Paris, 1895, 363. Of the older Orders Pius 


Together with the Capuchins, who were trying to get a footing 
in France in 1568, l this was true above all of the Jesuits, who 
had the great advantage of possessing in Edmond Auger, 
Antonio Possevino and Olivier Manaraeus men who devoted 
themselves with extraordinary success to missionary work. 
The accounts of their labours show that even many of those 
who had most strongly fallen under the influence of the 
religious innovations, flocked to their sermons and were easily 
led to place themselves under instruction. Auger was in 
vited by the authorities to Toulouse in 1566 ; the most dis 
tinguished men of that city and about 1,000 students of the 
university, who all leaned in various degrees towards Calvin 
ism, followed his conferences with rapt attention ; the univer 
sity wished to make him a doctor, and the civic authorities 
invited him to return for the following Lent. 2 He met with a 
similar success in Paris ; the churches were crowded at his 
sermons ; he was invited to preach before the court, and the 
most exalted personages in the country accepted the dedica 
tion of his works. 3 By the help of English influence Protest 
antism had obtained the complete mastery of Dieppe. All 
the churches there had been ruined with the exception of 
one, in which the altars, crucifixes and images of the saints 
had been broken in pieces. In spite of this, as the result of 
the sermons of Possevino in 1570, 2,500 Huguenots within a 
few days pressed to be received into the ancient Church, while 
Possevino s successor, Manaraeus, was able to receive 4,000 

V. specially sought to reform and renew the Dominicans ; see 
his *brief to Charles IX., in which he begs him to give his assist 
ance to the General of the Dominicans in his activities in France. 
Arm. 44, t. 16, p. 183, Papal Secret Archives. 

1 See Documents pour servir a 1 hist. de 1 etablissement des 
Capucins en France, 1568-1858, Paris, 1894, i seqq. The Titre 
de fondation du couvent des Capucins de la rue St. Honore" de 
Paris, dated September 4, 1568, in Bullet, de la Soc. d hist. de 
Paris, November-December, 1889. 

8 FOUQUERAY, I., 533 seqq. 

.Ibid. 535. 


Calvinists ; within a few months these two preachers had 
entirely changed the religious aspect of the city. 1 

A thing which contributed a great deal to this success was 
the fact that Posse vino and Auger not only possessed a pro 
found theological training and a knowledge of the classical 
languages, which was so much appreciated at that time, but 
also that their whole conduct and their zeal for religion 
gave great edification, and especially that their care for the 
poor and sick and desolate showed that they were filled with 
the true spirit of Christianity. At Paris Auger preached for 
choice in the prisons and hospitals. 2 At Lyons, where he 
converted about 2,000 Huguenots, he founded a body of 
two hundred ladies who went twice a week to the hospitals 
to serve the poor. 3 A little later he undertook the office of 
military chaplain with the troops of the Duke of Anjou. 4 
Possevino, who preached in the Cathedral at Marseilles in 
1568, at the same time visited the orphanages and instructed 
the children in the elements of religion. It also gave special 
edification when he there took charge of those condemned to 
the galleys, who were entirely neglected. 5 Auger rendered a 
lasting service to Catholic France by his two catechisms, 
which attained in his own country an importance similar to 
that of Canisius in Germany. 6 

The learned Maldonatus also left his chair in the Jesuit 
college in Paris in order to preach and catechize with five 
companions in Poitou, one of the principal centres of the 
Huguenots. We have special accounts of his labours, 7 which 

1 Ibid. 545 seqq. 
1 Ibid. 535- 
Ibid. 536- 

Ibid. 537. 

5 Ibid. 543 seq. 

See F. J. BRAND, P. Edm. Augerius, Cleves, 1903 ; Idem, 
Die Katechismen des Edm. Augerius, S. J. Freiburg, 1917. 

Maldonatus to Borgia, March 29, 157. in P RAT > Maldonat, 
577 ; to the college of Clermont, April i, I57 ibid - (5 82 se <W- > 
to the Cardinal of Lorraine, April 18, 1570. #w* 5 8 5 seqq. i to 
Possevino (?), May 10, 1570, ibid. 588 seqq. 


give a surprising insight into the spiritual state of the great 
Protestant organizations. In the opinion of Maldonatus 
Calvinism was so wide-spread in the capital of Poitou, simply 
because, owing to the neglect of the clergy, religious instruction 
was almost wanting ; the people were Huguenots because 
they knew nothing about either religion. 1 It was looked upon 
as a proof of Catholicism to be present at mass, but while they 
were there they said the prayers which were taught them by a 
Calvinist preacher in the dress of a Catholic priest. The 
religious conferences which two of the Jesuits gave every 
morning and evening at Poitiers, as well as the two daily 
lectures of Maldonatus for the more learned and for the 
students, attracted great crowds, and produced an " incredible 
effect " on the opinion of the whole city. Often the preachers 
heard it said that the churches had not been so full for ten 
years past. In Holy Week so many people crowded to con 
fession that the Jesuits could not have dealt with them even 
if there had been fifty of them. Many returned to the ancient 
Church, several of them with such good will that it was quite 
clear that they had only been heretics for lack of instruction. 2 
The commandant at Poitiers helped the general good will by 
certain ordinances in favour of the ancient religion, but, in the 
opinion of Maldonatus, many of the Huguenots were so weary 
after the wars that, especially among the common people, 
many of them were only waiting to be forcibly commanded 
to become Catholics. 3 

Of even greater importance than the labours of the Jesuits 
to the revival of Catholic life in France would have been the 
carrying out of the reform decrees of Trent, but it was out of 
the question to think of this on account of the attitude of the 

1 " Son hugonotes porque no entienden la una religion, ni lo 
otra." To Borgia, loc. cit. 578. 

2 " que se vee claramente que eran herejes por falta de aver 
quien les enseflase." Ibid. 

* " ut omnes haeretici, praesertim populares, nihil aliud optare 
videantur, quam ut compellantur intrarc," to the Card, of 
Lorraine, 18 April, 1870, ibid. 586. 


government. Where Pius V. had only to issue his orders, 
as at Avignon and in the Venaissin, he set to work with all 
zeal to introduce the Tridentine decrees. By his wish the 
archbishop, Feliciano Capitone, held provincial councils at 
Avignon in 1567 and 1569, 1 and made a visitation of the whole 
district. 2 In order to reform ecclesiastical abuses the Pope 
,even threw himself into the midst of the disturbances of war. 3 
The war had hardly ended in 1570 when the Papal nuncio 
demanded the summoning of provincial councils in accordance 
with the Council of Trent, pointing to the example of Italy 
and Spain. 4 By the autumn of 1570 Frangipani could send 
encouraging reports to Rome from Paris concerning the 
development of Catholic life, and the much greater zeal of 
preachers and theologians for the defence of the Catholic 
religion and the repression of heresy ; 5 the people too attended 
the churches in much greater numbers, as had been clearly seen 
on the feast of St. Denis. 6 When the jubilee was celebrated at 
Paris at the beginning of November, the churches had never 
been so full. The number of those who received the sacra 
ments of penance and of the altar was so large as to make it 
seem like Easter. Parish priests declared that the people 

1 Copy of the *Atti in the municipal Library, Avignon. 

2 Cf. the *brief to the Archbishop of Avignon of July 17, 1569, 
Arm. 44, t. 14, p. 150, Papal Secret Archives. 

8 Cf, the briefs in LADERCHI, 1567, n. 161 seq. ; 1569, n. 192. 

4 Cf. the *report of Frangipani to Cardinal Rusticucci from 
Paris, August 16, 1570, Nunziat. di Francia, IV., 18, Papal Secret 

5 " *Si vedde hoggidi nei nostri padri et predicatori et theologi 
tutti un zelo et un animo grande nella difesa della religione 
catholica et in detestatione di heretici, non solo della dottrina, 
ma della pace et commertio con essi, tanto che per esperienze, 
che n ho fatto in alcuni contrarii, che vi son occorsi, che per 
gratia di Dio sin qui si son superati tutti, io vi ho trovato tanta 
constanza, che dico certo, che se il re istesso, volesse, non bastar- 
ebbe superarla che veramente si vede esser opra di Dio." Letter 
from Paris, October 3, 1570, loo. cit. 54. 

* See the *letter of Frangipani of October 8, 1570, loc. cit. 



had never shown so great piety in the memory of man. 1 The 
same was seen in other places as well, as for example at Soissons. 
On a journey which he made in November from Paris to 
Me*zieres, Francesco Bramante observed everywhere the 
reduction in the number of the Huguenots ; for every thou 
sand Catholics there were at that time, he thought, only four 
heretics. 2 Bramante s hopes increased when Cardinal Pelleve* 
told him in secret that Charles IX. was thinking of putting to 
death Coligny and certain other Huguenot leaders, and that 
the consequence of this would be the disappearance of all 
their followers within three days ! This remark, he wrote on 
November 28th, pleases me much, but I shall not rest until the 
shameful Peace of St. Germain is revoked, and the heretics 
have been burned as was done in the days of the ancient kings 
of France. 3 

Pius V. too wished that the strongest action should be taken 
against the heretics, but he did not desire the removal of their 
leaders by wrongful means. The Spanish ambassador Zum ga 
reported in May, 1568, that he had heard from the Pope that 
the rulers of France were proposing the perfidious assassination 
of Conde* and Coligny, and that the Pope had made no secret 
of the fact that he could neither approve nor advise this, nor 
find it in his conscience to do so. 4 

1 " *Et per fare un poco di piu dolce fine, non voglio di mancare 
di dire a N.S. per sua consolatione che nell altra settimana, che 
si e fatto qui il giubileo, si e visto una devotione et una frequenza 
di popolo cosi grande in tutte le chiese in processione et oratione 
et confessarsi et communicarsi che e parse veramente la settimana 
santa e il di di Pasqua, et i preti parochiali mi ban detto di non 
haver di cento anni memoria di una frequenza et divotione cosi 
grande di popolo." Letter from Paris, November 6, 1570, 
loc. cit. 72. 

1 See in App. n. u, Papal Secret Archives. 

* See the *report in cypher in App. n. u, Papal Secret Archives. 

4 " Una cosa que el no podia aprovar ni aconsejar, ni aun le 
parecia que en consciencia se podia hacer." Report of Zum ga 
from Rome, May 19, 1568. Corresp. dipl., II., 372 (in KERVYN 
PE LETTENHOVE, II.. 43, an in Lettres de Cath. de 


IV., xxvi., wrongly assigned to 1567). Without paying any 
attention to the evidence of Zuniga printed in 1884, and com 
pletely ignoring the bibliography given supra p. 140, n. i, the ex- 
Jesuit HOENSBROECH in his book Das Papsttum (I., Leipsic, 
1901, 204), writes : " Pius V., who had included assassination 
among the proper instruments of the Papacy, had already taken 
a great part in the preparations for the Paris massacre [St. Bart 
holomew]." By way of proof Hoensbroech refers to the letters 
which we have mentioned in describing the third religious war, 
from Pius V. to Charles IX. and Catherine de Medici, on March 
6, April 3, and October 20, 1569, concerning the destruction of 
the French heretics. But to these letters there also belongs 
one to Catherine of March 28, 1569, in which Pius V. exhorts 
her to an open and free opposition to the Huguenots (" apertei 
et libere " ; GOUBAU, 155), so that all idea of a plot is excluded. 
The Protestant Tiirke had already called attention to this in his 
dissertation which was naturally quite ignored by Hoensbroech, 
saying very rightly : " finesse and diplomatic subterfuges were 
evidently not his [Pius V. s] bent ; he was wont to attain his 
ends by direct means." (p. 17). It is a consolation to know that 
Hoensbroech met with no support among serious Protestant 
scholars. G. Kriiger, for example, speaking of the dissertation 
by VACANDARD, Les papes et la Saint-Barthelemy (printed in 
Etudes de critique et d hist. relig., Paris, 1905, 217-292) in the 
Theolog. Literaturzeitung of Harnack, 1906, 382) writes : " I 
do not know if it is necessary once more to refute the accusation 
that the Popes had anything to do with the preparations for the 
massacre of St. Bartholomew. Vacandard himself adduces the 
view of Soldan, that the sources show that the events of August 
24 took place quite independently of the influence of the Curia, 
and it will be difficult for him to ignore an histoiian who must be 
reckoned with so seriously, and who is in a position to contradict 




A VIVID light is thrown upon the state of oppression under 
which the Catholics of Scotland were living by an event that 
occurred at the last Easter before Pius V. ascended the throne. 
A priest was seized at Edinburgh while he was saying mass ; 
dressed in the sacred vestments, and with the chalice in his 
hands, he was fastened to the cross in the public market place, 
and pelted by the people with mud and other " Easter eggs." 
It was not until the following day that he was interrogated 
and sentenced. The prisoner was then made to stand again 
at the market cross for four hours ; again he " was given ten 
thousand eggs " and when at last he was taken to prison, a 
band of three or four hundred men would have killed him 
with cudgels had not the provost interfered by force. The 
infuriated populace were filled with indignation when Mary 
ordered that the two Catholics who had assisted at the mass 
should be pardoned, and they were in consequence condemned 
to the forfeiture of their property. 1 

After her victory over the insurgents Mary had resolved 
to put an end to this state of things, and to restore to the old 
religion its former position, at anyrate to the extent of giving 
it equal rights with Protestantism. When Pius V. ascended 
the throne he thought that she had already restored the 
Catholic religion throughout the kingdom, and in the letter 
in which he announced his election to the Scottish royal couple, 

1 Alexander Clerk to Randolph, April 22, and Bedford to 
Cecil, April 28, 1565, in STEVENSON, VII., n. mi, i ; n. 1123, 2 ; 
FLEMING, 350 seq. " There is now greater rage amongst the 
faithful than ever the writer has seen since her Grace came into 
Scotland." Clerk, he. cit. p. 341. Cf. BAIN, n. 169, 171- 



he exhorted them to carry on the work they had begun. 1 
Before this letter reached Mary s hands, an envoy from the 
Cardinal of Lorraine arrived on January 27th, 1566, who ad 
vised her to confiscate the property of the rebels and once 
more to have recourse to the Pope with a request for financial 
help. 2 The queen then charged her former envoy, Chisholm, 
Bishop of Dunblane, to go to the Eternal City. In the creden 
tials which were given to Chisholm 3 it was stated that the 
conditions in Scotland were not desperate, but very danger 
ous, and that the queen s enemies were in exile or in her power, 
though anger and poverty were driving them to extremes. 

Chisholm had gone but a little way upon his journey when 
news reached him of further terrible events in Scotland. On 
March 7th, Mary had opened the Parliament, and had laid 
before it two proposals ; the one to permit the bishops and 
parish priests the full exercise of the old religion, and the other 
demanding the punishment of the rebels. 4 The rebel lords 
sought to prevent the threatened loss of their possessions by a 
fresh conspiracy to overthrow the queen, and they found a 
ready tool among those nearest to Mary. The youthful, 
incapable and quite inexperienced Darnley had been severely 
touched in his pride because Mary had not bestowed upon 
him the so-called matrimonial crown, which would have made 
him the equal of his wife in the exercise of the royal power. 5 
This headstrong youth allowed himself to be induced by a 
promise of the conspirators to make him their hereditary king, 
to ally himself with the very men who had recently taken up 

1 Letter of January 10, 1566, in PHILIPPSON, Regne de Marie 
Stuart, III., 483 ; cf. POLLEN, 232 seq. 

2 POLLEN, ci. 

8 Of January 30, 1566, in LADERCHI, 1566, n. 366 ; LABANOFF, 
VII., 8. 

4 " One allowing the bishops and rectors of churches the full 
exercise of their ancient religion, and the other punishing the 
leaders of conspiracy." Leslie in FORBES-LEITH, 108. 

6 For the importance of the matrimonial crown see BROSCH, 
VI., 508. 


arms against him. The first step in the crime they had planned 
was the murder of the queen s secretary, David Rizzio, to 
whom they attributed the queen s friendly attitude towards 
the Catholics. 1 Without thought for his wife or the son 
whom she had borne in her womb for six months, the un 
natural father and husband on the evening of March gth, 
1566, introduced the conspirators into the queen s chamber, 
where she was sitting at table with Rizzio and several friends. 
There the conspirators seized the secretary, who had taken 
refuge behind his sovereign, and struck at him with their 
swords over Mary s shoulder, while one of the ruffians levelled 
his pistol at the breast of the queen herself. Rizzio was 
carried outside and killed, and Mary was made a prisoner 
in her own apartments. The exiled lords returned to 

As was her custom in moments of danger, the queen now 
displayed great courage and sagacity. Immediately after 
this bloody crime Darnley found himself in danger from his 
savage accomplices, and returned to the queen whom he had 
betrayed, and she, with his help, succeeded in evading the 
guards and escaping. Once free her cause was saved, and 
the conspirators again took to flight. 

What had really happened was sufficiently terrible, but it 
was inevitable that the rumours which got abroad should be 
far worse. It was said that Darnley had killed the queen 

1 It has not been proved and it is very improbable that Rizzio 
was an " agent of the Pope " (BEKKER, Maria, 12) ; the Vatican 
Archives contain no letter from him or to him (POLLEN, ciii). 
Certainly " it :s unquestionable that . . . the Protestant lords 
longed for Rizzio s murder as Mary s zealous adviser in her 
efforts to restore the old religion " (BAIN, II., xv.). Among 
the accomplices in the murder there appear Knox and the preacher 
Craig (BAIN, loc. cit. and n. 363, p. 270). One cannot speak of 
" the fine singer Rizzio." According to all the accounts he was 
ugly, and according to almost all the single exception, LABANOFF, 
VII., 86, may be attributed to a copyist s error was already 
well advariced in years. Particulars of the conspiracy in 
CARDAUNS, 5-19. 


and had become a Protestant. 1 Therefore Bishop Chisholm 
stopped for some days on his way to Rome at Lyons, until 
he received authentic news of the safety of the queen. He 
reached Rome at the end of April, and in a long interview 
informed Pius V. of the dangers in which his sovereign was 
placed, begging him to send her substantial help. 2 

In Rome Chisholm found the ground prepared for his 
mission by the recent events. 3 Pius V. shed tears when he 
heard of the queen s pitiful position, which he himself had 
not the means to relieve. 4 Yet he did all he could ; he cut 
down the expenses of his own household, and even his table , 
in order that he might have the consolation of helping Mary 
by his personal sacrifice. 5 On May 2nd and 5th he wrote to 
the kings of Spain and France to obtain assistance for Mary. 6 

1 Alava to Philip II., dated from Moulins, March 26, 1566, 
in POLLEN 473. Requesens to Philip II., April 18, 1566, Corresp. 
dipl., I., 1 88. C. Luzzara also reports from Rome to Mantua 
concerning the apostasy of Darnley, April 17, 1566, Gonzaga 
Archives, Mantua. 

* POLLEN, civ. The speech in BELLESHEIM, II., 448 seqq, 
(with wrong date April n). Cf. also Corresp. dipl., I., 253 
and the *report of Arco (with Avviso attached) dated Rome, 
April 27, 1566, State Archives, Vienna. 

3 According to a "report of Arco of May 18, 1566, his efforts were 
supported by the Cardinal of Lorraine. State Archives, Vienna. 

4 " . . . dicen que suspiraba y le salian las lagrimas de los 
ojos, y diciendole alguno que Su Santidad no se fatigase 
tanto, respondiole, como quereis que no me fatigue viendo en 
tal estado aquel reyno y no teniendo la manera que querria para 
poderle ayudar." Polanco from Rome, April 30, 1566, in Anal. 
Bolland., VII. (1888), 55 ; cf. Requesens to Philip II., May 31 
and July 4, 1566, Corresp. dipl., I., 254, 281. 

6 Polanco, June 17, 1566, in Anal. Bolland, VII., 59. 

LADERCHI, 1566, n. 369. The letter to Philip II. has the 
wrong date in the reprint of Laderchi (POLLEN, 236). On April 
1 8, 1566, Pius V. had caused the Spanish ambassador Requesens 
to write to Philip II. in the same sense. The brief of May 2 
was sent to the nuncio Castagna at Madrid with a covering 
letter from Bonelli (ibid. 228). It arrived there on May 2\ 


If they had complied with his wishes the two great Catholic 
powers would have joined together against Elizabeth, or at 
least have forbidden their subjects to trade with England, 
and thus struck at the life of the northern kingdom. 1 In 
a brief of May I2th, 1566, he told Mary of what he had done 
with regard to Charles IX. and Philip II., adding that he 
would shortly follow this up with financial assistance, which, 
however, could not be so large as he would like because, since 
the Turks were about to attack the Emperor by land, and 
Malta by sea during the coming summer, he had been obliged 
to utilize his financial resources to meet these dangers. 2 

(ibid. 258) and as he announces on that day (ibid. 261) was de 
livered by Castagna on June 7. Philip promised to do all that 
he could (ibid.). 

1 Tiepolo to the Doge, May 4, 1566, in POLLEN, 236. Already 
for a long time past there had been spread " by general report 
in all Europe " rumours of the existence of a league of the Catholic 
powers against Protestantism (USTA, I., 255). The only truth 
in this was that both Pius IV. and Pius V. had wished for such a 
league. Under Pius IV. it fell to the French nuncio Gualterio 
to propose on September 8, 1561, a league for the defence of the 
Catholic religion in France (ibid. 252, 255 seq.}. Pius IV. also 
at one time spoke of holding out the hope of the crowns of both 
kingdoms to the Spanish king in the event of the excommunica 
tion and deposition of the sovereigns of France and England 
becoming necessary (ibid. 280). For the attempt of Pius V. 
to unite the Catholic princes against the French Protestants, 
cf. CATENA, 68 seq. Anything more than such desires and sug 
gestions, however, is not to be found in the political corres 
pondence of that time, and since this correspondence is now 
published so extensively it may be looked upon as certain that 
at that time they never arrived at any definite conclusion of a 
Catholic league, and that the acceptance of any such thing on 
the part of several recent historians is based upon an error. 
Cf. POLLEN, xxxviii.-xliii., and The Month, XCVII. (1898), 
258 seqq. ; RACHFAHL, II., i, 190. There is no trace existing 
of the accession of Mary to any such league. HOSACK, I., 124- 
129; PHILIPPSON, loc. cit. t III., 117 ; cf. FLEMING, 124, 379. 

* LADERCHJ, 1566, n. 370. 


It was soon seen, however, that the danger from the Turks 
was not so great as had been thought, whereupon Pius V. 
at once promised to send to Mary the whole sum that had been 
destined for Maximilian II. and the Knights of St. John. 1 

At the end of May Chisholm returned to Paris. 2 In the 
expectation that a great dignitary of the Church would be 
more likely to receive considerable sums of money, he had 
suggested the sending of a nuncio to Scotland, and Pius V. 
had held out hopes of this to the queen in his letter of 
May 1 2th. 3 In her reply 4 Mary expressed her joy at the 
Pope s decision, but it is permissible to doubt whether, in 
view of the disturbed condition of Scotland, a Papal envoy 
would have been quite pleasing to her. Even Manaraeus, 
the provincial of the Jesuits, whose subjects, Edmund Hay 
and Thomas Darbishire, were destined to accompany the 
nuncio, ventured to send his doubts to Rome. 5 In his 
opinion Mary had great need of wise and deeply religious men 
as her advisers, but they must be men of Scottish birth and 
not foreigners, and least of all men sent from the Holy See, 
which was hated like the devil in Scotland. He thought that 
it would be well to send back to Scotland Mary s ambassador 
in Paris, Beaton, Archbishop of Glasgow, who would be able 

1 The Emperor complained of this : cf. LADERCHI, 1566, n. 
275 seqq. ; SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 23, 30. The reply of the 
Pope, July 12, 1566, ibid. 33. 

J POLLEN, 239. 

* LADERCHI, 1566, n. 370. Arco *wrote to Vienna on June 
15, 1566, that Laureo would start for Scotland on the I7th " piu 
per mostrare chel Papa tien conto di quella Regina, che per 
aiutarla con effetti contra gli ribelli." Another reason for his 
mission was the news that the queen had pardoned a great num 
ber of the rebels. State Archives, Vienna. 

4 From Edinburgh, July 17, 1566, in LABANOFF, I., 356. On 
July 21, 1566, Darnley and Mary wrote together to the Pope to 
propose Alexander Campbell for the bishopric of Brechin. BAIN, 
II., n. 414. POLLEN, 262. 

MATSTARAEUS to Francis Borgia from Paris, June 26, 1566, in 
POLLEN, 497 seq. 


to exhort the bishops and Catholic nobles to loyalty to God, 
the Church and the queen ; some Jesuits could be sent- with 
him as companions and counsellors until the time came for 
wider activities. About the same time 1 Hay too expressed 
his fear that the Papal intervention would cause but little 
satisfaction in Scotland on account of the discouragement and 
weakness of the Catholic party ; it was to be feared that the 
money would fall into wrong hands and that the nuncio would 
be kept in France or would return to Rome without having 
accomplished anything. 

The promised nuncio, Vincenzo Laureo, Bishop of Mondovi, 
arrived in Paris on August loth, 1566, where a letter from 
the Queen of Scotland was awaiting him. In this letter Mary 
expressed her desire that the nuncio should not come until 
after the baptism of her son, who had been born on June igth. 
It was her intention that the sacrament should be administered 
to the future successor to the throne solemnly and with the 
full Catholic ritual, and if the nobles and people agreed to this, 
then the coming of the nuncio could hardly meet with further 
opposition. At the same time the queen urgently asked that 
either the whole or part of the Pope s subsidy should be sent : 
Beaton and Chisholm proposed that part of the sum should 
be paid, but Laureo replied that according to the instructions 
which he had received, he could only hand over the whole sum 
in a case of necessity, but that otherwise the payment was to 
be made in five monthly sums. The necessity was already in 
existence, he was told, but Laureo thought it best first to ask 
the advice of the Cardinal of Lorraine before he gave a definite 
promise. 2 

In a note attached to the account which he gave the Secretary 
of State of his conference with Beaton and Chisholm, Laureo 
describes the difficult position of the queen. 3 Elizabeth of 
England, he says, is more suspicious of her than ever since 
the birth of an heir to the throne, and will in future give her 

4 Hay to Borgia from Paris, July 2, 1566, in POLLEN, 499. 

* Laureo to Cardinal Bonelli, August 21, 1566, in POLLEN, 269. 

3 Ibid. 270 seq. 


assistance to the Scottish rebels more willingly than ever ; 
the queen is at variance with Darnley, who is aiming at the 
independent possession of the crown, and this forces her to 
seek for support from the Protestants. An improvement in 
the situation might be brought about if Philip II. were to go 
to Flanders with a large military force, and if Mary were to 
proceed with stern justice against the leaders of the insurgents ; 
if six of these were to be condemned to the death which they 
had deserved, the Catholic religion would very soon and with 
out difficulty be re-established. It would seem that Laureo 
had been led to this view by the Scottish exiles in Paris, who 
were not sufficiently acquainted with the true state of affairs 
in their native land. 1 The six whose punishment Laureo 
demanded were Murray, Argyll, Morton, Lethington and the 
influential government officials, Bellenden and MacGill ; not 
one of the preachers is included, not even Knox. 

Since the Cardinal of Lorraine favoured the payment of 
part of the money which the Pope had sent to the assistance 
of Scotland, Laureo gave the Scottish ambassador 4000 ducats, 
with which his brother left Paris on September gth, reaching 
Stirling on the 2ist. 2 The departure of the nuncio himself 
for Scotland, however, was continually delayed. The baptism 
of the young prince, for the added solemnity of which it was 
thought desirable to await the arrival of the foreign ambassa - 
dors, had not yet taken place. On October 6th the Privy 
Council of Scotland voted the necessary sum for its being 
celebrated with all possible solemnity ; the the same time 
the nobles declared their willingness that the nuncio should 
come, 3 and shortly after this the queen ordered Stephen 

1 Cf. ibid. ex. 

2 Laureo to Cardinal Bonelli from Paris, September 9, 1566, 
in POLLEN, 279. On the same date *the Pope recommended 
his nuncio to Charles IX. " Vincentium Montisregalis episcopum 
negotiis reginae Scotiae deputatum, quern et secum de eiusdem 
reginae angustiis fortiter sublevandis oretenus acturum fore 
indicat et orat sub faveat," British Museum, Additional 26865, 
p. 421. 

8 Instructions for Wilson n. 2, in POLLEN, 327 ; cf. ibid. 324. 


Wilson, who had accompanied Chisholm on his journey to 
Rome, to go to Paris and Rome, to invite the nuncio to Scot 
land, -to thank the Pope, and to make apologies to him for the 
delay in announcing the birth of the heir to the throne, 1 but 
Wilson s departure was delayed, and towards the end of the 
month the queen fell seriously ill at Jedburgh, which made 
everything once more uncertain. 2 

Faced with death, Mary received the sacraments of the 
Catholic Church, expressed her inviolable attachment to the 
faith of her youth, and her regret that she had not done more 
for the service of God and religion. Laureo s belief in Mary s 
good intentions then revived, whereas before this, on account 
of the long delays in his journey, it had been not a little shaken. 
The nuncio too had entertained the suspicion that the advice 
to invite him to Scotland had been given to the queen with 
the purpose of supplying the great penury in the royal 
treasury. 3 In order to obtain further light upon the true 
state of affairs, as soon as news had arrived of Mary s recovery, 
Bishop Chisholm and the Jesuit Hay were sent to her, the 
latter being instructed to return as soon as possible and make 
a report as to the real sentiments of the queen. 4 

The idea had also gained ground in Rome that Mary s 
religious zeal had been rated too high. On September i6th, 
1566, Pius V. had had a letter written to the nuncio to say 
that if his departure was delayed any longer, he was not to go 
on paying the subsidy, and if, on his arrival in Scotland he 
should learn that the money that had already been sent had 
not been employed for the service of religion, Laureo was to 
stop the payments altogether. 5 Later, on September 3oth, 
he wrote to him that if his departure was put off indefinitely 
he was to return in the meantime to his diocese of Mondovt 6 

1 Ibid. A letter from Mary to Morone of October 9, 1566, 
ibid. 324 seq. 

* POLLEN, 328. FLEMING, 539. 

8 Laureo, November 12, 1566, in POLLEN, 311. 

* Ibid. 313. 

Ibid. 284 

Ibid. 286. 


Before these last instructions reached the nuncio, Laureo 
had an interview with the Cardinal of Lorraine. 1 He sub 
mitted that the favourable moment had now come to under 
take something on a large scale for the betterment of religion in 
Scotland, and that Pius V. could do a great deal with Philip II., 
while the help which the Pope had given of itself afforded 
in the opinion of Beaton and Chisholm, sufficient grounds for 
taking more decisive action. The Cardinal at length agreed 
with Laureo, and the two decided that a noble, chosen from 
among those who were most in the Cardinal s confidence, 
should be sent to the Queen of Scotland to try and persuade 
her to re-establish the Catholic Church. 2 In the opinion of 
the Cardinal himself, of Bishop Chisholm and of Edmund 
Hay, the best course to pursue would be to take rigorous steps 
against the leaders of the rebels, as the nuncio had already 
advised. The noble who was to be sent, would arrive in 
Scotland before Wilson started ; if then the queen summoned 
the nuncio to Scotland for other motives than real for religion, 
there would still be reason to hope that his arrival and the 
recollection of the illness from which she had just recovered, 
would make her more ready to listen to the salutary and 
prudent advice of the Cardinal. 

There was indeed something strange in Mary s leniency, 
which gave so much scandal to Laureo and the Scots who were 
living in Paris. While she was still in the hands of the murder 
ers of Rizzio, Mary skilfully evaded the demand for an immedi 
ate pardon of the guilty parties. 3 On March igth, 1566, 
Morton, Ruth of Lindsay, and 67 others were summoned to 
appear within six days before the king and queen, to answer 
for the murder of Rizzio and the imprisonment of the queen. 4 
But one by one all the guilty parties received a pardon. By 
the end of April Murray and Argyll were already back at court, 
while decrees in the case of other rebels were issued on May nth 

1 Laureo, November 12, 1566, in POLLEN, 312. 
1 Nothing further is known about this mission. 
* NAU, 25 seqq. FLEMING, 392 seqq., 403 seq. 
4 FLEMING, 131. 


and June 8th. During June, July, September and October 
further pardons were granted, 1 followed on Christmas Eve, 
1566, by a general pardon for Morton and 75 others. 2 By 
the end of the year half the queen s Privy Council was com 
posed of pardoned conspirators, and it was easy to foresee 
that at the first opportunity these people would use the power 
she had given them against herself. However strange this 
may seem, the position is to some extent explained by the 
insistence of Elizabeth on the pardon of those who were guilty 
of high treason, 3 by Mary s purpose of working for peace 
and conciliation above all things, and of putting an end to 
the disturbances which were so sorely wounding the country. 4 
Moreover, Mary had no one among those about her who com 
bined political experience with loyalty to the sovereign. She 
therefore was obliged as best she could to manage the con 
spirators so that they might not turn their schemes against 
their sovereign. 

It was therefore natural that Mary should have rejected 
the advice of the nuncio, which was also impracticable for 
other reasons ; 5 she declared that she would not stain her 
hands with the blood of her subjects. 6 The nuncio for his 
part remained all the more firmly fixed in his ideas because 
it seemed to him that the terrible events of the last few months 
lent weight to his contention. As a result of her too great 
goodness and kindness, he wrote, the queen is in the greatest 
danger of becoming the slave and prey of the heretics, and 
of losing her life. 7 

1 Pollen in the Month, XCVI. (1900), 243. FLEMING, 406, n. 19. 

* Printed in FLEMING, 502-504. 
8 FLEMING, 131, 403. 

4 " I hear she seeks now all means to quiet her country and 
will irabrace such as are fitted for her council. It is thought 
she will rot deal so hardly with these noblemen as she was 
minded." Randolph, April 2, 1566, in BAIN, II., n. 368. Thus 
she reconciled Murray with Bothwell, Murray with Huntly, 
Atholl with Argyll. HOSACK, I., 147. 

8 Laureo, December 3, 1566, in POLLEN, 321. 

G. Thomson, in POLLEN, 406. 

7 Laureo, March 12, 1567, in POLLEN, 363. 


The men in power, whose punishment Laureo was demand 
ing, .were not only at heart filled with hostility towards the 
queen, but they were also highly incensed against her husband, 
the discredited Darnley, to whom they attributed the fact 
that after the murder of Rizzio the attempt on Mary had 
failed. It had been he. who after that bloody deed had pre 
vented the pardon of the assassins which Mary had at once 
suggested, and he had continued to oppose it. He had again 
incurred the hatred of the murderers in exile when with in 
conceivable short-sightedness he had taken the mad risk of 
solemnly disclaiming before the Privy Council any respon 
sibility for the murder of Rizzio, a statement which was 
publicly promulgated at the market-cross of Edinburgh on 
March 2ist, 1566. In view of the savage and unrestrained 
habits of the Scottish nobles it was only to be expected that 
the allied lords would take a bloody vengeance upon him 
at the first opportunity. In the meantime they replied to 
Darnley s declaration of his innocence by sending the queen 
the document in which her husband had allied himself with 
the conspirators, and which he had signed with his own hand. 
Mary was quick to realize the vile treachery of the man to 
whom she had so short a time before given her love. 1 

Even at the time of their escape from the murderers of 
Rizzio Darnley had behaved most disgracefully and un- 
chivalrously towards the queen, 2 and the information now 
furnished by the conspirators was not calculated to dispel 
her distrust of him. 3 It was true that she had forgiven him, 
and reconciliations between the two had been of frequent 
occurrence, 4 but Darnley had never given up his hopes of 
possessing the crown independently of her, and when this 
ambition had not been satisfied the discontent of the foolish 
young man had shown itself in a way that recalls the sulks 
of a spoilt boy. He did not attend the opening of Parlia- 

1 HOSACK, I., 145. FLEMING, 128. 

1 NAU, 29. 

8 Examples of her distrust in FLEMING, 132, 

4 Ibid. 132, 134, 135, 137. 


ment in 1566, he even kept away from the baptism of his son, 
and at last he declared that he would leave Scotland altogether. 
Mary then, on September 3oth, 1566, in the presence of the 
French ambassador, Ducroc, and her Privy Council, asked 
Darnley to give an account of his conduct. Ducroc describes 
what happened : she took him by the hand and implored 
him in God s name to say whether she had given him any cause 
for acting as he proposed to do ; let him speak openly and 
not spare her feelings. Darnley replied that she had given 
him no cause whatever, but nevertheless took his leave with 
the following words : " Farewell, Madam, you shall not see 
my face again for a long time to come." He did not, how 
ever, for all that, leave Scotland. 1 

Darnley s confession that he had no fault to find with the 
conduct of his wife throws some light upon Mary s relations 
at that time with a man 2 who had already attained to great 
influence at the royal court, and was soon to take a most un 
happy part in the destinies of the queen. James Hepburn, 
Earl of Bothwell, had left Scotland in 1562 under an accusa 
tion of the attempted assassination of Murray, 3 but after the 
rebellion of the nobles in 1565 he had obtained permission to 
return, 4 and had taken a leading part in the suppression of 
the revolt. 5 Since he was the only Scottish noble who, in 
spite of his profession of Protestantism, had always been loyal 
to the king, it is easy to understand Mary s partiality for a 

1 HOSACK, I., 153. FLEMING, 138. On the same day, Septem 
ber 30, the lords of the Privy Council exhorted Darnley to thank 
God for having given him so wise and virtuous a wife (FLEMING, 
J 37 seq.). On October 15, 1566, Ducroc wrote that he had 
never seen Mary so much loved, valued and honoured as now, 
and that thanks to her wise attitude there was complete harmony 
among her subjects. HOSACK, I., 157. 

* Fleming too (loc, cit.) recognizes that the Lords of the Privy 
Council at that time knew and believed nothing of certain scan 
dalous stories of the Book of Articles. 

8 HOSACK, I., 82. 

4 Ibid. 104, 1 20, 143. 

9 LABANOFF, II., 33. FLEMING, 115, 118, 369, 


man, who, however rough, headstrong, violent and immoral, 
was at anyrate not a hypocrite or a traitor. 1 In a short time 
Bothwell s influence had become so great that he was the 
most hated man in Scotland, and a conspiracy had been formed 
for his destruction. 2 

The plot was not carried out at that time ; on the con 
trary a fresh conspiracy was formed, this time, to all appear 
ances, in Bothwell s favour. By the invitation of Huntly, 
Argyll and Lethington, hitherto his enemies, Bothwell allied 
himself with them for the destruction of " that young cox 
comb and haughty tyrant " Darnley, who was to be removed 
at all costs. 3 Bothwell had allowed himself to be drawn into 
this alliance with his enemies by the promise that he himself 
should take the place of Darnley and become the husband of 
the queen. 4 It would seem that Bothwell did not perceive the 
trap that was being laid for him, since, as the murderer of 
the king, he could not hope long to retain his place on the 
throne he had usurped. It was easy to foresee that he must 
involve the queen in his own ruin, and that thus the attempt 
already twice made to dethrone Mary would at last be crowned 
with success. 

While the net was thus being spread for Darnley, that 
" young coxcomb and haughty tyrant " under the influence 
of his ambitious and imprudent father, Lennox, was forming 

1 HOSACK, I., 152. 

1 Bedford, August 12, 1566, ibid. 

8 This conspiracy was only known from the memorial of the 
queen of June, 1568 (LABANOFF, VII., 315 seqq.) and by the 
confession made by Lord Ormiston on December 13, 1573, before 
he was executed ; he had been invited to take part in it. HOSACK, 
162 seq. ; FLEMING, 423, n. 90. 

4 They (the repatriated exiles) retained the strongest resent 
ment against Darnley for having betrayed their plans to the 
Queen, and they anxiously sought an opportunity of vengeance. 
In a short time they disclosed their design to Bothwell, urging 
him to murder the King, and promising that if he consented 
they would persuade or compel the Queen to give her hand to 
him. Leslie to Forbes-Leith 117. Cf. BEKKER, 28, 99 seq. 

VOL. XVIH. 13 


fresh plans for obtaining that matrimonial crown which he 
had so long aspired to. 1 At the end of December he left his 
wife, and soon afterwards news reached Edinburgh that he 
was lying sick of small-pox at Glasgow. At the end of January , 
1567, Mary visited him, and persuaded her sick husband to 
return with her to Edinburgh, where he was removed from 
the influence of the Earl of Lennox. Contrary to the original 
plan of the queen he took up his abode in a private house, 
situated in a healthy district outside the city, but adjoining 
the southern part of the city walls. 2 

It was not long before the nuncio received terrible news 
from Scotland. The French ambassador in Edinburgh, Ducroc, 
had arrived in the capital of France on February igth, 1567 ; 
before he embarked at Dover a courier from the French am 
bassador in London sent him the terrible news that on the 
morning of Quinquagesima Sunday Darnley and his father 
Lennox had been found dead and stripped in the public street. 3 
This first communication was soon amended and amplified 
by further news. Messages from the Scottish queen reached 
Beaton and the French court, and lastly one for Laureo him 
self. According to the later reports the queen had visited 
her husband incognito in the evening of Quinquagesima 
Sunday, and had bidden him farewell a little before midnight 
in order to attend the wedding of one of her courtiers. Two 
hours later the sound of an explosion had brought the citizens 
of Edinburgh who lived near the city walls from their beds. 
Darnley s house had been blown up ; the body of the king 
was found in a garden near the house ; one of his ribs was 
broken and his body torn and crushed by the violence of the 
fall. At the same time an unsuccessful attempt was made 
on Darnley s father at Glasgow. 4 

1 RIESS in Hist. Zeitschrift, 3rd series, XIV. (1913), 272 seq. 

* Description of the house in BEKKER, 377-380. 

Letter of February 22, 1567, in POLLEN, 348 seq. 

4 Letters of Laureo of Feb. 23 and 27, Mar. 8, 12 and 27, 1567, 
in POLLEN, 352-371. These reports of the nuncio are among the 
earliest notices of the murder. Some of the particulars given in 
the text are to be found only in Laureo. Cf. POLLEN, cxx. 


Scotland was accustomed to regicide ; of 105 Scottish kings, 
according to a contemporary estimate, 1 56 had been killed. 
But this last crime, carried out as it had been in so horrible 
and disgraceful a way, and which became the universal subject 
of talk throughout Europe, 2 was looked upon as an outrage 
by the whole country. At the same time the authors and 
instruments of the terrible deed were hidden in absolute dark 
ness. It was little guessed that all the most powerful officers 
of state, the chief justice Argyll, the secretary of state, Lething- 
ton, and the chancellor of the kingdom, Huntly, were all con 
cerned in it. It was therefore natural that suspicion, especi 
ally abroad, should fall upon the ill-fated queen, 3 and that 
she should bear the blame if the inquiry into and the dis 
cussion of the affair became the merest farce. 

On February I2th, 1567, the Privy Council announced that 
the queen had offered a reward of two thousand pounds sterling 
and other great inducements to anyone who would reveal 
the name of the author of the crime. 4 In spite of this no 
public denunciation was made, but on the i6th papers were 
found affixed to the principal buildings of Edinburgh naming 
Bothwell and three others as the murderers and accusing the 
queen of connivance in the crime ; during the night angry 
cries resounded through the streets accusing Bothwell. Pic 
tures of Bothwell were circulated bearing the inscription : 
This is the murderer of the king. 5 Darnley s father, Lennox, 
took up the matter, and in a letter of March I7th, he declared 
that Bothwell and three others were the authors of the crime. 8 

The case could hardly have been placed in less suitable 
hands. On March 28th, after Lennox s accusation, April i2th 
was fixed by the Privy Council for the inquiry into Bothwell s 
guilt, but instead of any inquiry being held into the crime 

1 Diary of Birrel, in HOSACK, I., 280 n. 

Beaton to Mary, March n, 1567, in HOSACK, I., 280 seq. ; 
FLEMING, 151. 
8 Beaton, loc. cit. 
4 FLEMING, 439. 
FLEMING, 153. 
HOSACK, I., 283. 


at the place where it had been committed, Lennox gathered 
together 3000 armed men in lieu of proof, and set out with 
them towards Edinburgh. At Stirling, however, his courage 
failed him, and on April nth he wrote to the queen that he 
was ill, and requested that the guilty men should be im 
prisoned until his arrival, and that he should be given a free 
hand to arrest suspects. At the request of Lennox Elizabeth 
supported these strange demands, which, however, were not 
granted. 1 

On the following day the comedy of the inquiry was begun. 
The foreman of the jury was a close relation of the accused, 
and the president of the court was Argyll, BothwelTs fellow 
conspirator ; accompanied by another accomplice, the secre 
tary of state, Lethington, and many of his adherents, the 
accused man repaired in great pomp to the place of the inquiry, 
which, however, in spite of everything, he faced with con 
siderable qualms. As not even one witness was produced by 
the unskilful prosecutor, it seemed clear that the inquiry 
must end in his acquittal. The suggestion put forward by 
the other side that the inquiry should be put off was negatived, 
on the ground that Lennox himself had wished that the trial 
should be made as short as possible. 2 Four days later Parlia 
ment was opened ; "on account of his great and various 
services " the representatives of the country confirmed Both- 
well in his office of commandant of the castle of Dunbar, thus 
indirectly acknowledging his innocence. 3 Moreover, the 
same Parliament took active steps to secure to the members 
of the great nobility, such as Huntly, Morton and Murray, 
their possession of the rich properties which the queen had 
already bestowed upon them. It must be remembered that 
in the coming December Mary was to complete her twenty- 
fifth year, and that before she reached that age she had the 
power to revoke such gifts, unless a parliamentary decree 
had confirmed them. The lengthy documents in which this 

1 Ibid. 283, 285, 288. 
1 Ibid. 291 seq. 
* FLEMING, J55. 


confirmation was given throw much light upon the motives 
for the murder of the king, since Darnley, if he had still been 
alive, would certainly not have given his consent to the granting 
of such rich possessions to those nobles, who were his mortal 
enemies. 1 The same Parliament also abolished all those legal 
disabilities which were still in existence against the Protest 
ants, and secured to every Scotsman the freedom to live 
according to his own religion. 2 In order that the Catholics 
might not draw any profit from this " liberty," all the royal 
permits in favour of any particular form of religion were 
annulled on May 23rd, when Bothwell was already married 
to the queen. 3 

The evening alter the closing of the Parliament, April igth, 
1567, Bothwell gave a banquet to the great nobles at the inn 
of Ainslie, and there induced nine earls and twelve barons to 
sign a document in which these nobles declared that they con 
sidered Bothwell innocent of the murder of the king, and their 
readiness to defend him against all such calumnies. If Mary, 
it went on to state, should choose him for her husband, they 
were resolved to defend him against anyone who sought to 
prevent or impede his marriage. 4 On the very next day 
Bothwell made the queen an offer of marriage, which, how 
ever, was definitely rejected. 5 

Then the events which were to drag down Mary to her ruin 
followed fast upon each other. On April 2ist the queen 
went to Stirling to visit her son ; on her return, on April 24th, 
she was carried off by Bothwell and pressed by him until she 
consented to marry him, although he was already married. 
Thereupon the first marriage of the future king had to be 
hurriedly dissolved. His first wife, who was a Catholic, 
pressed her case before the Protestant assembly, while the 
Protestant Bothwell did the same with the Catholic arch 
bishop. The marriage was dissolved by the Protestant 

1 HOSACK, I v 294 seq. 

3 Ibid. 83. Pollen 395 n. 

4 BAIN, II., n. 492. Cf. FLEMING, 155 ; BEKKER, 97 seq. 
8 LABANOFF, II., 37. NAU, 45 seq. BEKKER, 101. 


consistory on the ground of the adultery of Both well, while 
it was declared invalid by the archbishop s court on the 
ground of the close relationship of the parties, although the 
archbishop himself had granted the dispensation from any 
such impediment. 1 On May I5th, three months after the 
assassination of Darnley, Mary gave her hand to her violent 
suitor in that unhappy union, which was contracted before 
the apostate bishop of the Orkneys. 2 The better part of the 

1 The document of the dispensation of February 17, 1566, 
was discovered by John Stuart (A lost chapter in the history of 
Mary Queen of Scots recovered, Edinburgh, 1874). The question 
may be raised whether at the process of the divorce it was pre 
sented or suppressed, and if the suppression took place with the 
knowledge of the archbishop, whether the dispensation was 
valid, if Mary knew of its existence. In the brief by which 
Pius V. ordered a fresh trial of the case (July 15, 1571), it is 
stated that the dispensation was suppressed ; that Bothwell 
dared " violenter aggredi " his sovereign " eamque rapere in- 
vitam et nihil minus cogitantem et captivam ... in arcem de 
Dumbar in carcerem detrudere, eamque ibi ac deinde in arce 
Edimburgensi per aliquod temporis spatium invitam similiter 
ac reluctantem retinere, donee processum quendam praetensi 
divortii inter ipsum comitem lacobum eiusque uxorem praedictam 
instituit, ac subtracta furtive dispensations apostolica supra 
narrata iniquissimam desuper sentemtiam dicti matrimonii 
rescissoriam omni iuris ordine ac dictamine postposito praeci- 
pitanter fulminare curavit . . . et in continenti omni mora 
postposita praedictam Mariam reginam lugentem ac renitentem ad 
comparendum coram schismatico, ut dicitur, episcopo Orchadensi 
et apostata ad consensum praetenso matrimonio cum eo tune 
de facto contrahendo praestandum per vim et metum iniuriose 
compulit." (Hist. Jahrbuch, VI. [1885], 157). The statements 
in the brief are naturally founded upon the account sent by 
Mary. But if the brief is valid, the substantial account of the 
facts must be based upon the truth. The distinguished canonist 
Bellesheim in his history of the Catholic Church in Scotland, 
II. (1883), 127 seq., speaks in favour of, and in Hist.-polit. Blatter, 
CXII. (1893), 579, against the validity of the marriage of Both- 
well with Jane Gordon. 



kingdom, that is to say, all the great nobles, approved the 
marriage, either by acclamation, or at least by silence. 1 

How Mary was led to take this fatal step will perhaps always 
remain an unsolved mystery for history. According to the 
declaration of her enemies, Mary had had adulterous relations 
with Bothwell, while her second husband was still living, and 
it wa$ she who was principally responsible for the death of 
Darnley. However, not only was Mary s youth stainless, 
but from the very first years of her sojourn in Scotland not 
even the hate-sharpened eyes of Knox and his followers had 
been able to find any fault with her on the score of morals. 
Moreover, she was of high and noble character ; this was 
shown by her courage in danger, her fortitude in sorrow, and 
the loyalty with which she clung to her religion, even when 
to do so was opposed to all her own interests. It seems quite 
impossible to explain the psychology of her sudden fall to the 
very depths of moral turpitude. The Dominican, Roch 
Mamerot, her confessor, assured the Spanish ambassador in 
London in July, 1567, that, until the events which led to her 
marriage with Bothwell, he had never seen a lady of greater 
virtue, courage and honour, and that he was prepared to 
affirm this on his solemn oath. 2 

On the other hand it cannot be denied that at anyrate 
appearances were against Mary. Her quarrel with Darnley 
was known to all, as well as the favour enjoyed by Bothwell, 
and in marrying him she seemed to give grounds for the 
gravest suspicions. Still, not even this justified the gravest 
of those suspicions. Her quarrel with Darnley had been very 
far removed from mortal hatred, she always remembered 
that she was his wife, and continually held out the hand of 
reconciliation to him, while there is no certain proof that 
she had any erotic passion for Bothwell. Her marriage with 
the latter was certainly a tremendous mistake, but her act, 
even though it cannot be justified, can nevertheless to some 

1 Words of the preacher Craig, who openly disapproved of the 
marriage. Ibid. Si. 

* Guzm&n de Silva to Philip II., July 26, 1567, Corresp. de 
Felipe II., II., 518 ; cf. POLLEN, 520. 


extent be understood in a woman who found herself com 
pletely in the hands of a violent man, and who saw no chance 
of help anywhere, to say nothing of the fact that she was 
broken in body and spirit by her troubles. 1 

A judgment is made all the more difficult by the campaign 
of calumny which was ruthlessly carried on against Mary by 
her enemies ; it is beyond dispute that they fought against 
her, so to speak systematically, with lies and falsehoods. 2 

1 HOSACK, I., 275 seq. On March 15, 1567, Alava, the Spanish 
ambassador in Paris, wrote to Philip II. that Mary was thinking 
of leaving Scotland and taking up her residence in France. Ibid. 
276. POLLEN, 477. 

"The accusatory document brought forward against Mary 
at the Conference of Westminster in 1568, the Book of Articles 
(in HOSACK, I., 522-548) is full of the grossest calumnies (ibid. 
426 seqq. ; cf. also FLEMING, 137), to which the Detectio of Buchanan 
gave the widest publicity. At Westminster there were also 
brought forward the depositions of Nelson, the only one of 
Darnley s servants who saved his life in the explosion, and that 
of Crawford. Nelson tried to create the impression that in his 
last illness Darnley was badly looked after, but he is confuted by 
the inventory of his house which is still preserved (HOSACK, I., 
2 53 seq. ; an insufficient observation to the contrary in Fleming 
434) and Darnley himself attests the good treatment he received 
from his wife (m RIESS in Histor. Zeitschrift, 3rd series, XIV., 
[1913] 283). The deposition of Crawford on the interview be 
tween Darnley and Mary at Glasgow is in such close agreement 
with one of the Casket Letters, that one of the two documents 
must have been copied from the other (BEKKER, 360 seq.). Some, 
who look upon the Casket Letter as the original, cf. as to this 
B. SEPP, Tagebuch der ungliicklichen Schottenkonigin Maria 
Stuart, II., Munich, 1883, 19 seqq. ; RIESS, loc. cit. 258 seq. 
think to excuse Crawford by saying that he saw the letter " in 
order to refresh his memory" (RiESS, loc. cit. 256). But any 
such " refreshment " would obviously be a dishonest act, and 
Crawford did not refresh his memory but copied. Among the 
depositions made in the years 1568 and 1569 at the inquiry into 
the death of Darnley, the evidence of Hay, Hepburn and Paris 
is falsified at anyrate in the matter that they are made to agree 
in saying that the powder, by which the king was to be blown 


This fact gives ground for thinking that they were unable to 
do her much harm by telling the simple truth, so that it is 
necessary to accept with a great deal of caution all that her 
enemies adduced in the way of proof or of documentary evi 
dence. This applies to the so-called casket letters, or letters 
without address or signature which Mary is supposed to have 
sent to Both well from Glasgow before the murder of Darnley, 
and from Stirling before she was carried off. If they are 
genuine these letters would put Mary s guilt beyond doubt, 
but there are such good reasons for doubting their genuineness 
and authenticity, and the people who adduced them are 
proved so guilty of falsehood, that the conscientious historian 
cannot take them by themselves as proof of her guilt, 1 in spite 

into the air, was stored immediately under his room, in the 
queen s room, whereas none was found except in the cellar. 
This falsification was necessary in the first place in order to 
blacken Mary s name, and also in order to put the responsibility 
for the explosion and the murder of Darnley upon Both well, 
by making it out that Bothwell directed the explosion inside 
the wall of the city by a door leading through the wall in the 
cellar, but the body of Darnley was found outside the city (BEKKER, 
54 seqq.). For the deposition of Paris, which was not used even 
by Buchanan, cf. HOSACK, I., 246 seqq. ; II., 82. Forgeries too 
are the two contracts (HOSACK, I., 555 seqq.} in which Mary, a 
few weeks after the death of Darnley, promised Bothwell marriage 
(ibid, 278). The consprators had already transferred the assault 
on Rizzio to Mary s room in order to spread the I 4 e that Darnley 
had surprised Rizzio in adultery and had therefore killed him 
(memorial to Cosimo de Medici, in LABANOFF, VII., 72). After 
the fact Cecil spread the calumny in the foreign courts (letter 
of the French ambassador Paul de Foix to Cecil, of March 23, 
1565, in HOSACK, II., 79), although he very well Tmew the true 
motives (ibid. Preface p. ix. seqq.}. For the evidence offered 
by Murray cf. BELLESHEIM, II., 108. 

1 Fleming too, who is a declared enemy of the Scottish queen, 
and of the " Mariolater," in his book which we have frequently 
cited, completely leaves on one side the Casket Letters. A 
second volume on Mary Stuart which is promised by him, 
and in which he may have made up his mind as to those letters, 


of all the attempts made to show the genuineness of the casket 
letters. 1 

Probably the question of her guilt may be answered by 
saying that Mary can be acquitted of all connivance in the 
murder of Darnley, but that the marriage with Bothwell must 
be looked upon not only as a blunder, but as a false and blame 
worthy step. Apart from her deadly enemies, the party of 
the nobles, this was the opinion of Catholics of the time, who 
certainly were well acquainted with the facts. Her con 
fessor, Mamerot, who explicitly acquitted her of any share 
in the murder of Darnley, left her, after having vainly pro 
tested against the marriage with Bothwell. 2 Similar un 
favourable judgments of her third marriage came from 
Moretta, the ambassador of Savoy, from Ducroc, the French 
ambassador, and from others. 3 It must, however, in fairness 
be remembered that the marriage which was condemned by 
Mary s confessor, was approved by three bishops. 4 At Pente 
cost, May i8th, a few days after the marriage, the queen, in 
order to remove the scandal which had been given by her 
Protestant marriage, publicly received the sacraments accord 
ing to the Catholic rites. 6 If she had looked upon her marriage 
with Bothwell as invalid, such an act would have been an open 
outrage to all Catholic ideas. 

Knowledge of all the terrible events in Scotland was not 

has not yet appeared. Morton s declaration on December 9, 
1568, on the discovery of the Casket Letters (published by 
Henderson in 1889, and reproduced in Histor. Jahrbuch, XX. 
[1891] 778 seqq.} does not decide the question and is also itself 
liable to suspicion of being a forgery. Cf. B. SEPP, Die Losung 
der Kassettenbrieffrage (against Riess), Ratisbon, 1914, 8 seq. 
Reprint of the Casket Letters in BAIN, App. II., p. 722 seqq., 
and of Morton s declaration, ibid. p. 730 seqq. 

1 The last attempt to prove the complete genuineness of the 
Casket Letters was made by RIESS, loc. cit. 237 seqq. 

2 Pollen 519, 521. 

8 Ibid, cxxix. seqq. 


6 Leslie in FORBES-LEITH, 123. 


needed in order to settle the fate of Laureo s nunciature. At 
the first news of Darnley s death, the nuncio had still thought 
it possible that Mary would at least now follow his advice, and 
hand over the leaders of the Protestant party to justice. 1 
But it was soon evident that it was not even worth his while 
to await the return of the envoys he had sent to Scotland, 
Bishop Chisholm and the Jesuit Hay. Four days after Easter 
he thought it best in any case to obey the Pope s orders to 
return home. 2 A little while after he had announced this 
intention to Rome, however, Hay returned to Paris with the 
Savoyard ambassador, Moretta, bearing conflicting tidings. 
Both were of opinion that, in view of the power exercised by 
the Protestants, and the terrible state of excitement in Scot 
land, the nuncio could do no good there. The queen, how 
ever, had the idea of sending the Catholic Lord Seton with 
three ships to fetch the nuncio, and had promised the bishops 
that she would be guided by the advice of Laureo ; the bishops 
were ready to bear the expense of the voyage and the reception 
of the nuncio, but for all that the journey was by no means 
advisable. 3 

In Rome the nuncio s mission was looked upon as doomed 
after the death of Darnley. 4 In deference to Beaton s in 
sistence that he should at least await the return of Chisholm , 
Laureo again postponed his departure, but the reports of 
fresh arrivals from Scotland dissipated his last hopes. In 
the middle of April he set out for Italy, but not before he had 
once more, before he started, put in a word with the Pope 
in favour of Mary, saying that she was a woman and had 
allowed herself to be guided by political considerations, but 
that she was a Catholic and wished to be considered as such, 
and that perhaps at some future time she might be able to 
restore the Catholic religion in Scotland. 5 

1 Laureo, March 8, 1567, in POLLEN, 360. 

2 Laureo, March 12, 1567, ibid. 362. Laureo received the 
Pope s orders of February 17 on March 10 ; ibid. 348. 

3 Laureo, March 16, 1567, ibid. 367 seq. 

4 Letter of Bonelli to Laureo of March 17, 1567, which reached 
Paris on April 7, ibid. 372. 

5 Laureo, April 8, 1567, in POLLEN, 378. 


In her difficulties after the death of Darnley Mary showed 
much greater anxiety to have Laureo by her side, than ever 
she had done in the days of her greatest power. Upon her 
plan of summoning the nuncio to Scotland, there followed, 
after he had gone, a request, sent by the hands of Ducroc, 
that Laureo would send her someone who was in his con 
fidence, who could advise her. 1 After her unhappy marriage 
with Both well she complained to the Cardinal of Lorraine 
that the nuncio had gone back to Italy too soon ; if only he 
had come to Scotland she would have been saved from many 
disasters. 2 

It was natural, seeing how slowly news travelled in those 
days, that the marriage with Bothwell should only have been 
known in Italy long after the event. Hay received the sad 
tidings in Paris on June 5th, and at once sent it on to Laureo 
at Mondovi, 3 and the latter in his turn immediately reported 
to Rome on July ist that the queen in the end had not been 
able to refrain from showing her undue affection for Bothwell, 
and that thus things had come to this pass, which was so 
contrary to God s honour and her own. 4 On June i8th, when 
Laureo thought it well to satisfy Mary s request for an adviser, 
he had no less characteristically written to her that though 
he was sending Edmund Hay, if the queen found her 
self spurned by the Pope, she should bear in mind that she 
had married Bothwell, a thing which it seemed implied apostasy 
from the Catholic faith, since Bothwell was a married man. 5 

1 Laureo, June 18, 1567, ibid. 387. 

* Instructions of Chisholm for his mission to Lorraine, ibid. 

Ibid. 394- 

4 " La Regina finalmente non s e potuta contenere di mostrare 
la troppa affettione che porta al conte di Boduel con questo ultimo 
atto contrario al honor di Dio et di Sua Maiesta." Laureo, July 
I, 1567, ibid. 392. 

" S aggionge a questo ch ella per molti respetti potria dubitare 
di non essere in buona opinione di Nostro Signore, talche entrando 
forse in sospetto d essere disprezzata et abbandonata da Sua 
Santita pigliasse qualche strana delibberatione, verbi gratia, in 


Although Laureo sent at the same time an autograph letter 
from the queen, which ended with the assurance that she 
wished to die in the Catholic faith, and for the good of the 
Church, the Pope s reply to Laureo was extremely short. So 
far, he caused the Secretary of State to write, His Holiness 
has not shut his eyes to the truth, and thinks it well at present 
not to mix himself up in so important a religious question. 
As far as the Queen of Scotland herself is concerned, his wish 
is to have no relations with her at all, unless in the future 
she gives more satisfactory evidence than she has done in the 
past of her conduct and religion. 1 Thus all relations between 
Rome and Scotland were broken off. Even after Mary s fall, 
Pius V. did not wish to charge his nuncio at Madrid with taking 
any steps on her behalf, as he was not clear in his mind which 
of the two queens was the better, Mary or Elizabeth. 2 Some 
time elapsed before Mary recovered the confidence of Cath 
olics. On January 2ist, 1569, Edmund Hay wrote to Francis 
Borgia to order prayers for Mary, in order that the circum 
stances of that sinful woman might change for the better, 
so that she might in the end accomplish a good work, even 
though she had not so far listened to good advisers. 3 

maritarsi con il Conte di Boduel ; et massime che questo stimolo 
pu6 troppo nelle donne giovani et libere, il qual matrimonio non 
si potria eseguire senza dispreggio et forse abbandono (quod 
absit) della Santa Religione Cattolica etc." POLLEN, 387. 

1 Bonelli to Laureo, July 2, 1567, in POLLEN, 396. " Toda 
la buena voluntad que el Papa tenia & la Reyna de Scocia se 
le ha pasado, y est della muy mal satisfecho, pareciendole que 
despues de la muerte de su marido ha contemporizado mucho 
con los herejes." Requesens to Philip II., May 31, 1567. Corresp. 
dipl., II. , 122 ; cf. 192 ; " La tiene agora aborres9ida." Cf. 
also Tiepolo in ALBERI, II., 4, 188. 

* Bonelli to Castagna, August 17, 1568, Corresp. dipl., IL, 444- 
Moreover, Pius at that time hoped for the conversion of Elizabeth. 
POLLEN, English Catholics, 125. 

8 " Fieri enim protest, ut illi peccatrici omnia in bonum ali- 
quando cooperentur, et fiat postea magnorum operum effectrix, 
quae olim noluit sanis consillis acquiescere." In POLLEN 507. 


Though she had erred, Mary Stuart was soon given the 
opportunity for a bitter atonement. The least part of this 
was that from the very day of her marriage, 1 and during the 
whole time that that marriage endured, she was profoundly 
unhappy. 2 The nobles who had so long plotted her ruin, now 
thought that their time was come. Under the pretext of 
rescuing their queen from the hands of Bothwell, they got 
together an army and met the troops of Bothwell and Mary 
near Carberry Hill. No battle was fought. Probably because 
she considered her own army too weak, and wished to avoid 
bloodshed, Mary decided to disband her troops on condition 
of their being allowed to withdraw unmolested, and to come 
to terms with the rebels. 3 Bothwell was allowed to escape 
unharmed ; the leaders of the nobles, Hume and Morton, were 
in fact his accomplices, and their pretended motive for the 
campaign, the punishment of the murderer of the king, was 
nothing but a pretence. 

Once in the hands of her enemies, the queen was nothing 
but a prisoner, and cut off from all help. On her arrival, 
she was met with the cry, as though from a single voice, of 
the angry army : " Burn the adulteress ! " 4 She was then 
taken to Edinburgh ; on a banner, carried before her, was 
shown her murdered husband, and with him her son, with the 
prayer on his lips : " Judge and avenge my cause, O Lord ! " 5 
In her capital Mary was again met by the crowds with savage 
cries, demanding her death at the stake or by drowning. 6 
During the night between June i6th and lyth, 1567, she was 
transferred to the castle of Lochleven, strongly built in the 
middle of a lake, and on July 24th she was made to resign 

1 This is attested by Ducroc, to whom she said on that day 
that she only wished to die (in HOSACK, I., 322), and by the 
memoirs of Melvil (ibid.) and Leslie, who on the day of the 
marriage found her weeping bitterly (FORBES-LEITH, 123). 

1 FLEMING, 463, n. 21. 

8 HOSACK, I., 331. 

4 " Burn the whore ! " FLEMING, 164. 

* Ibid. BAIN, II., n. 519. 

FLEMING, 466, n. 37. 


her throne in favour of her thirteen months old son, who was 
crowned on the agth. In the sermon which he preached on 
this occasion Knox demanded Mary s execution for adultery 
and the murder of her husband. 1 

The enemies of the unhappy queen had won a sweeping 
victory. During the minority of James V. and his daughter 
Mary the nobles had been able greatly to increase their power, 
and now the reign of an infant opened before them the alluring 
prospect of two decades of undisturbed development of that 

In spite of the strict watch kept over her at Lochleven, 
Mary, with the help of good friends, was successful in escaping 
on May 2nd, 1568, and in getting together an army. But on 
May i6th, the fortune of war was against her at Langside. 
While Mary was in prison, Elizabeth of England had whole 
heartedly and with surprising decision embraced her cause. 2 
Trusting in the help of her " good sister " Mary crossed the 
Solway Firth on May i6th, and set foot on English soil ; 
she thus entered upon a new phase of her life of sorrow. 

With the imprisonment of Mary at Lochleven, Catholic 
worship in Scotland lost the last place where it could be 
publicly carried on. Accompanied by armed retainers Lord 
Glencairn burst into the chapel of Holyrood Castle and broke 
to pieces everything he found ; not even the furniture, dresses 
and jewellery of the queen were spared. 3 Murray had not 
been regent for three weeks before he began to persecute 
the Catholics. On September 8th, 1567, Chisholm, the Bishop 
of Dunblane, was put on trial for having administered the 

Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Ser., 1566-1568, p. 291, 


3 BROSCH, VI., 516-522. Lethington understood this zeal so 
little as to give expression to the suspicion that by her exhorta 
tions and threats Elizabeth was aiming at nothing else than to 
irritate the Scottish nobles to such a degree that they would 
relieve her of all further trouble by killing Mary (ibid. 521). 
But perhaps Elizabeth s aversion for all rebellious behaviour is 
sufficient tc explain her conduct. 

8 BELLESHEIM, II., 86. HOSACK, I., 348. 


sacraments and for his relations with the Pope, and on Novem 
ber 22nd he was deposed and his revenues were forfeited. 1 
Moreover the Privy Council summoned before itself all the 
leading Catholic ecclesiastics on the charge of having cele 
brated mass or assisted thereat ; those who could not purchase 
their liberty or find a place of refuge, had to leave the country. 2 
In 1569 four priests who had said mass were condemned to 
death; the regent commuted the death sentence to exile, 
but all four had to stand at the market -cross in their vest 
ments and with the chalice in their hands, where they were 
pelted with filth by the people for an hour. Similar scenes 
were enacted in other cities of Scotland/ 3 

At first Elizabeth made a pretence of intending to intervene 
on behalf of the fugitive queen, 4 but about a month after 
Mary s arrival in England a decision was arrived at by the 
Privy Council, 5 according to which the Scottish queen was 
to be removed from Carlisle, which had so far been her place of 
residence, to Bolton Castle, that is to say, much further into 
England : Elizabeth was to go more fully into the matters at 
issue between the Scots and their queen. Until her cause 
had been thoroughly gone into there must be no question of 
assistance, restoration, personal interview with the English 
queen, or of departure from England. Mary for her part 
must submit to a kind of judicial inquiry, and it was but an 
apparent withdrawal of this strange demand when at length 
the object of the proposed inquiry was stated to be, not that 
the Queen of Scotland, but that her enemies should justify 
their proceedings, since even in that case, the regicide and 
the complicity therein of Mary were bound to be the principal 
points at issue.* 

1 BELLESHEIM, II., 92, 94. 
1 Ibid. 92 seq 

* Ibid. 121 seq. HOSACK, I., 477. 

* HOSACK (I. 383 seq.) believes in the loyalty of Elizabeth, but 
ef. BEKKER, Maria, 194. 

Of June 20, 1568; see HOSACK, I., 384; LINGARD, VIII., 
20 ; of. BAIN, II., 708, 709. 


After her removal to Bolton Mary could no longer flatter 
herself with any illusions as to the hostile intentions of Eliza 
beth. 1 In spite of this, however, she yielded to the force of 
circumstances and agreed to the proposed conferences, which 
were begun at York on October 8th, 1568, and transferred to 
Westminster at the end of November. 2 

From the purely legal point of view Mary s position before 
her accusers was a favourable one. The matter adduced as 
proof by her enemies, such as the two pretended matrimonial 
pacts with Bothwell, the so-called book of the articles, and 
the casket letters, to a great extent, at anyrate, rested upon 
false statements, or lay under the grave suspicion of being 
forgeries. 3 She could, moreover, turn the charge of regicide 
against her accusers, who beyond all doubt had been deeply 
involved in the murder of Darnley. Although Murray was 
himself present in York, he was in no hurry to present his 
proofs. Before the discussion began, he sent a copy of the 
casket letters to the English government, and asked in con 
fidence whether they were of any value as a proof of Mary s 
guilt. 4 When, at the beginning of October, the conference 
at York was opened with the charge brought by Mary against 
her half-brother and his party of having imprisoned their 
sovereign and usurped the government, Murray replied evas 
ively, defending his conduct, not upon Mary s share in the 
murder, but upon her obstinate attachment to Bothwell, and 

1 BEKKER, 211. Already in a letter which she sent to the 
Spanish ambassador in London on June 4, 1568, she says : " No 
dubdo que si ellos me meten adentro en este reyno contra mi 
voluntad, me podran quidar la vita." In KERVYN DE LETTEN- 
HOVE, Relations, V., 725. 

1 In the interval between the two conferences an attempt 
was made to induce Mary to renounce her throne voluntarily. 
BEKKER, 246. 

8 Cf. supra, p. 1 77. Two other documents were presented at 
York only, but afterwards they disappeared altogether. HOSACK, 
I., 401 seq., 413. 

4 June 22, 1568; see BAIN, II., n. 711; HOSACK, I., 389; 
BEKKER, 205, 244. 



endeavouring surreptitiously to learn the opinion of the judges 
as to the probable value of the casket letters. 1 Since Mary s 
guilt would have been proved beyond doubt if these letters 
had really been written by her and addressed to Bothwell, by 
this secret inquiry he was admitting that the genuineness 
of the letters was not above suspicion. As for her attachment 
to Bothwell, the queen could easily justify herself, since it 
was her accusers themselves who had urged the marriage upon 

If Murray at that time was not averse to coming to a friendly 
arrangement with his royal half-sister, Elizabeth held quite 
other views. The representatives of the captive queen might 
it is true have got the impression that in this conference she 
had nothing in view but Mary s restoration, 2 but in reality 
the inquiry was intended to blacken the good name of Mary, 
and to furnish the Queen of England with a weapon against 
her hated rival. 3 For a time Mary behaved towards Elizabeth 
as though she was unaware of her ill-will, but at the same time 
she was secretly exposing the manoeuvres of Murray to the 
foreign princes, 4 and trying to secure their intervention on 
her own behalf. 5 It was only when, after the conference had 
been transferred to Westminster, 6 Murray was publicly received 
by Elizabeth, while the Scottish queen was not allowed to 
come near the capital, that she changed her attitude. She 
at once wrote to her representatives that she wished to have 

1 HOSACK, I., 394 seqq. Later on Murray himself admitted 
that his reply had not been serious (LINGARD, VIII., 23 n.). 
For the conference of York cf. BAIN, II., n. 839 seqq. 

f Instructions to the ambassadors of Elizabeth, in HOSACK, 
I., 404. 

3 " Pensaba [Elizabeth] en lo de la justificaci6n hacer de 
manera que aquello quedase en dubio." De Silva, August 9, 
1568, in BEKKER, 207. 

4 Memorial to all the Christian princes, in LABANOFF, VII., 

6 Mary to Charles IX., July 27, to Elizabeth of Spain, Septem 
ber 24, 1568, in LABANOFF, II., 138, BEKKER, 212 seq. 

6 BAIN, II,, n, 895 seqq. 


the opportunity of justifying herself in public in the presence 
of the queen, the whole of the nobility, and the foreign am 
bassadors. If Elizabeth would not accede to this request, 
it was her intention that all negotiations should be at once 
broken off. 1 

But at this point Mary s representatives, Bishop Leslie and 
Lord Herries, made a grave mistake. Instead of insisting 
upon an immediate and clear reply from the English govern 
ment, and, in the event of a refusal, of at once and with all 
possible publicity declaring the conference at an end, they 
allowed themselves to be kept in suspense by the equivocal 
statements of Elizabeth, 2 and discussed with Cecil and 
Leicester proposals for settling the matter amicably, 3 although, 
only a short time before, on November 26th, Murray had 
finally and explicitly accused his sister of the assassination of 
her husband, as well as of the attempted murder of her only 
son. 4 On December 6th they made a protest against the 
discussions, but Cecil rejected this on the ground of some pre 
tended error in its form, 5 and when, on December gth, Leslie and 
Herries returned with the protest in an amended form, the 
crafty secretary of state had had time to persuade Murray 
to present his proofs, namely, the book of the articles, the 
deposition of Mary by the Scottish Parliament, the casket 
letters, and the various depositions of the witnesses. 6 Then 
Mary s representatives withdrew from the discussions, which, 
however, were continued in their absence, just as though noth 
ing had happened. 

The final sentence was reserved to a meeting of six of the 
greatest nobles at Hampton Court. 7 The proofs were again 

1 Letter of November 22, 1568, to Leslie, Boyd, Herries and 
the Abbot of Killwinning, in LABANOFF, II., 232-237 ; HOSACK, 
L, 415 ; BEKKER, 239. 

a HOSACK, L, 416 seq. 

8 Ibid. 419. BEKKER, 242. 

4 BAIN, II., n. 913. HOSACK, L, 418. 

8 HOSACK, L, 420 seq. 

HOSACK, L, 422-443. 

7 Jbid. 447 seqq. BAIN, II., n. 921, 


subjected to examination for two days, but on this occasion 
not in that careful manner which is absolutely necessary in 
order to detect skilful forgeries. 1 The final sentence of the 
judges did not concern itself with Mary s guilt or innocence, 
but merely stated that as things stood at present it could 
not be considered fitting that Elizabeth should allow the 
Queen of Scots to appear in her presence. 2 It would seem 
that the judges were not aware that Mary had claimed to 
present herself solemnly before the queen, the nobles and the 

Although, at Bolton Castle, she was far away from the place 
of the conference, and cut off from all her friends, Mary was 
nevertheless able to hit upon the proper reply to the behaviour 
of her enemies. From the defensive she took the offensive. 
A reply to the accusations of Murray and his associates which 
Mary sent to her representatives on December igth, 3 not 
only denies in the clearest terms all knowledge of the murder 
of Darnley or any complicity therein, but makes the same 
terrible charge against her accusers. 4 In consequence of this 
Murray and Morton were publicly accused of regicide before 
the queen s council on December 24th, 1568. In a further 
letter 5 Mary approved this step on the part of her defenders, 
whom she charged to obtain copies of the documents ad 
duced against their sovereign, so as to be able to refute them 
in detail. Elizabeth declared that she thought this request 

1 Description of the examination held by Cecil, in HOSACK, 
I., 448 ; BEKKER, 253 seqq. 

1 BAIN, II., n. 921, p. 581 seq. 

LABANOFF, II., 257-261. 

4 " They have falselie, traitourouslie, and meschantlie lyed ; 
imputing unto us maliciouslie the cryme quhairof thameselfis 
ar authouris, inventeris, doaris, and sum of thame proper execu- 
teris " (LABANOFF II., 258 ; HOSACK, I., 928). To the charge 
that she had intended her son to follow his father Mary replied 
that such an accusation was sufficient in itself to pass judgment 
on all the other accusations made against her, since the natural 
love of a mother for her son refuted it (ibid.). 

LABANOFF II., 262-264. 


" very reasonable " and expressed her joy that her " dear 
sister " was willing to defend herself, but at the same time 
she took very good care not to accede to this very reasonable 

Mary s case, however, had to be settled in some way, and 
Elizabeth tried to do this by means of a compromise. 1 Sir 
Francis Knollys, to whom the custody of the royal prisoner 
had been entrusted, had, together with Lord Scrope, won her 
confidence. A plan was formed according to which Knollys, 
as a friend who wished her well, was to induce her to recognize 
Murray as regent, whereupon all the accusations which had 
been brought against her were to be buried in perpetual 
oblivion. Should she ask for further advice Lord Scrope was 
to speak in the same sense, and in the third place Bishop 
Leslie, who had allowed himself to be won over, was to throw 
all the weight of his authority into the balance in favour of 
the proposal, 2 which was then to be further recommended 
in an autograph letter from Elizabeth. But Mary s clear 
judgment saw through the wicked subterfuge which was 
intended to inveigle her, oppressed and deserted by all her 
friends as she was, into the sacrifice of her good name. The 
last words she would ever speak in this life, she wrote after two 
days reflection, would be as Queen of Scotland, 3 and a re 
newed attempt to induce her to resign the crown was definitely 
rejected by Leslie, since Mary had spoken her last word on 
the subject. 4 

The embarrassment of the English politicians thus became 
very considerable, as Mary still had many friends even in 
England, who were very resentful of the violence which had 
been offered to her. Thus the conferences came to a quite 
unexpected end. On January loth, 1569, Murray was 

1 HOSACK, I., 454 seqq. BEKKER, 260 seqq. 

1 It had already been said to Leslie that Mary would be found 
guilty, whether she were or not (BEKKER, 244). This perhaps 
explains why he allowed himself to be won over. 

8 " La derniere parole que je ferai en ma vie sera d un Royne 
d Ecosse." January 9, 1569, HOSACK, I., 460 ; BAIN, II., n. 946. 

4 HOSACK, I., 463. 


summoned to Hampton Court, and was there told that no 
charge had been proved against him which was prejudicial 
to his honour, but that on the other hand there was no charge 
against Mary which could lead Elizabeth to form an unfavour 
able opinion of her good sister ; Murray therefore could retire 
in peace to Scotland. 1 On the following day Mary s repre 
sentatives were also summoned, and asked whether they wished 
to accuse the opposing party of the murder of Darnley. They 
replied in the affirmative, because they had an express com 
mand to that effect from their sovereign, and they further 
declared that they were charged to reply to the calumnies of 
Murray ; this reply was hardly likely to lead to their being 
given copies of his documentary evidence. 2 

On January I2th, 1569, Murray received formal permission 
to depart ; 5,000 pounds sterling were assigned to him as a 
reward. 3 Mary s representatives, for their part, made 
various other attempts to obtain a sight of the casket letters 
and the other documentary proofs. They worked for this end 
until January 7th, 4 and renewed their demand on the nth of 
the same month, the day after Murray s departure, com- 

1 " On the other part, there had been nothing sufficiently pro 
duced nor shown by them against the queen their sovereign, 
whereby the queen of England should conceive or take any evil 
opinion cf the queen her good sister for anything yet seen." 
HOSACK, I., 465. 

1 Ibid. 467 seq. Already in the instructions of September 
29, 1568, which Mary gave to her representatives who went to 
York, it is stated (n. VII) : "If they maintain that they have 
writings of mine, which contain things harmful to me, you must 
ask to have the original produced, and that I myself may see 
them, and be able to justify myself. You must therefore in 
my name give the assurance that I have never written anything 
to anyone on this subject ; and that if there be any such writings 
they are false and forged, contrived and invented by themselves 
in order to disgrace and calumniate me. There are many persons 
in Scotland, men and women, who can imitate my hand." 
LABANOFF, II., 202 seq. 
1 HOSACK, I., 467, 468. 
4 Ibid. 462. 


plaining at the same time that the Scottish regent had been 

allowed to go at the very moment when he was accused of 

regicide. 1 Cecil replied with evasions, whereupon Mary, on 

January 2oth, made a fresh and final attempt with Elizabeth 

herself, through the French ambassador, de la Mothe Fe nelon. 

In reply to the latter s remonstrances Elizabeth actually 

promised that she would send the wished for papers on the 

following day, but when on the 3oth of the month Fe"ne"lon 

reminded her of her promise, Elizabeth replied by expressing 

her anger at the fact that Mary, in a letter written to Scotland, 

had accused the English queen of partisanship. 2 The English 

government itself, however, had justified for all time the 

suspicions entertained of the genuineness of these documents. 

After the conferences at York and Westminster, Cecil and 

his sovereign could feel a sense of triumph in the consciousness 

of having carried out a masterly move. Elizabeth s rival, 

whom she feared so much, and had so long fought against, 

was a prisoner in an English fortress, and in the conferences 

which had just come to an end she had ready to her hand 

plentiful materials for destroying everywhere and for ever 

Mary s authority and influence. But it soon became clear 

that even as a prisoner Mary was a very dangerous enemy. In 

Scotland there was a powerful party devoted to her cause, 3 

and this party gained strength more and more 4 in proportion 

as the government of the regent Murray made itself hated. 5 

As for England, Mary s presence was a constantly recurring 

danger. Among the great masses of the people there was still 

too strong a sense of justice to make it possible for them to 

put up with the ill-treatment of an anointed and crowned 

queen without a feeling of irritation. The nobles were still 

in varying degrees animated by the chivalrous feelings of the 

Middle Ages, to which it was natural to hazard both life and 

property on behalf of a queen and a defenceless woman. 

1 Ibid. 468. 
8 Ibid. 469 seq. 

3 Ibid. 382 seq. 

4 Ibid. 479 seqq. 
6 Ibid. 379 seq. 


Moreover, besides the fact that, in the opinion of many people, 
Mary should have been wearing the crown instead of Elizabeth, 
in any case she was, after Elizabeth, the lawful heir to the 
English throne, and far-seeing patriots looked to her for the 
union of the two kingdoms of Great Britain, a thing long seen 
to be necessary and ardently desired, while the many who were 
discontented on the score of religion looked to her for the 
restoration of the old religion. Mary s hereditary rights, as 
well as her attachment to the ancient faith were the very 
reasons why her return to Scotland was being prevented by 
force, 1 but this tyranny proved itself to be by its consequences 
a grave political error. For nineteen years conspiracy after 
conspiracy, and revolt after revolt on behalf of Mary followed 
in quick succession, for nineteen years the original act of in 
justice against a helpless princess constrained the authorities 
to further acts of violence, until at last no other way out of 
an intolerable state of affairs could be found than the murder 
of the defenceless prisoner. 

It was especially in the northern counties of England, which 
were still for the most part Catholic, that Mary could count 
upon many supporters. There her escape from Lochleven 
was celebrated with bon-fires ; after she had set foot on English 
soil the nobles flocked to Carlisle to offer her their homage. 2 
After the conference at Westminster, Mary s chief enemy, 
Murray, judged it to be dangerous to his life to dare to pass 
through northern England on his way back to Scotland. 3 
He knew, however, where to look for help. Towards the end 
of the conferences at York, Lethington had put forward a 
proposal for the marriage of the Queen oi Scotland to the 
greatest of the English nobles, the Duke of Norfolk. 4 The 
Duke, who was one of Elizabeth s representatives at the 
York conferences, eagerly welcomed the proposal, and through 
him Murray obtained a letter from Mary warning her friends 

1 POLLEN, English Catholics, 120 seq. 

* BEKKER, 195. BAIN, II., n. 668, 670. 

* HOSACK, I., 473. 
4 Ibid. 410. 


in the north of England to allow Murray to pass unmolested. 1 
Murray had hardly reached the border when he informed Cecil 
that his sister was in no sense his friend, and that it was 
never so necessary as now to take care that she was kept 
safely in prison. 2 

But if Murray did not seriously entertain thoughts of the 
fresh marriage of his sister, the project was all the more 
ardently put forward by the other side. 3 Cecil s behaviour 
towards the Queen of Scotland, which was so little in keeping 
with all ideas of honour, had caused much scandal among many 
of the greater nobles, by whom the Secretary of State was 
regarded with much dislike as an upstart. Now the Duke of 
Norfolk and the Earls of Arundel, Pembroke, and Leicester 
joined together to withstand him and to arrive at a final 
settlement of the burning question of the succession to the 
English throne ; they aimed at seeing Queen Mary restored 
to her own throne, and at having her hereditary right of suc 
cession to that of England assured to her ; since, however, 
the marriage of the exiled queen to a foreign prince would 
have meant danger to England, she was to be betrothed to 
Norfolk. The preparations for this marriage were already 
well advanced. A decision of the Privy Council had urged 
the marriage of the Queen of Scotland " with an English 
noble," the Earls of Bedford and Shrewsbury, as well as the 
two Catholic Earls of Northumberland and Westmoreland, 
had agreed to the plan, and not even Cecil dared openly to 
oppose it. For her part, Mary had replied in a dignified but 
satisfactory sense to the proposal ; the breaking off of her 
ties to Both well did not appear to offer any serious difficulties, 
and only awaited the assent of the Scottish Parliament and 
the approval of the English queen ; it was hoped that this 
would be obtained by the influence of the crafty Lethington, 

* So Murray himself relates. HOSACK, I., 473 seq. ; cf. LINGARD, 
VIII.. 35. 

2 Leslie in HOSACK, I., 475. 

3 Cf. for what follows HOSACK, I., 479 seqq. ; LINGARD, VIII., 
35 seqq. ; POLLEN in The Month, 1C (1902), 135 seqq. 


who had already begun to identify himself with the party of 
Queen Mary. 

But the plan met with a skilful adversary in Murray. By 
his influence the Scottish Parliament rejected the English 
proposals, and the very men who, a short time, before, had 
taken up arms to separate Mary from Bothwell, now would 
not hear of the breaking off of the marriage with Bothwell 
when Mary asked the opinion of the Parliament on the subject. 
The regent prevented his enemy Lethington from taking action 
on behalf of Mary by accusing him of the murder of Darnley , 
and Lethington was obliged to withdraw for the time being ; 
the commandant of Edinburgh Castle, the Laird of Grange, 
who had also joined Mary s party, saved him by force from 

In the meantime the whole plan had been made known to 
Elizabeth. Norfolk had to submit to a sharp reprimand from 
the English queen, and when, a little time afterwards, his 
conduct appeared to be suspicious, and Murray who, a short 
time before, had offered his assistance to the duke in favour 
of the marriage, furnished the English government with 
materials for a charge against him, Norfolk was thrown into 
the Tower on October gth, and his three friends, among them 
the Earl of Leicester, were forbidden to appear at court, while 
the Bishop of Ross was thrown into prison. The inquiry into 
the case, however, showed no grounds for accusing Norfolk 
of high treason. 

Even before the imprisonment of Norfolk a further move 
ment on behalf of the captive queen had been set on foot, which 
was fraught with all the more danger because it rested to a 
great extent upon the religious discontent which was so widely 
spread in England. 




IT was perfectly natural that the oppressed English Catholics 
should turn their eyes with hope to Mary, as their fellow- 
Catholic and the lawful heir of Elizabeth. It was true that 
it was not very likely that, the rights of a Catholic to the 
throne would meet with much consideration, 1 but in March, 
1563, de la Quadra was of opinion that the Catholic party, 
which wished for Mary s succession, was stronger than the 
Protestant party opposed to it ; her marriage to Darnley, 
who had so direct an hereditary right to the English throne, 
could not but increase the probability of her accession. The 
enthusiasm for the Scottish queen was, it is true, damped 
after the murder of Darnley and her marriage to Bothwell, 
but it revived again when, in spite of several apparent defec 
tions, Mary did not change her religious convictions, 2 and when 
in the opinion of her friends, the conferences at York and 
Westminster had ended in her acquittal. 

Before long the attitude of Pius V. towards the English 
question threw new weight into the scales in Mary s favour. 

1 When in October, 1562, it was feared that Elizabeth would 
die, the name of Mary was not mentioned among the heirs to 
the throne who were seriously considered (KERVYN DE LETTEN- 
HOVE, Relations, III., xxiv. ; cf. Quadra to Margaret of Parma, 
October 17, 1562, ibid. 167). For the attitude of the English 
Catholics towards Mary up to the time of her flight to England, 
cf. POLLEN in The Month 1C. (1902), 54-57 ; English Catholics, 
in seqq. 

* BEKKER, 212, 215. Cf. the letters of Mary to Queen Elizabeth 
of Spain, of September 24, 1568 (LABANOFF, II., 185) and to 
Philip II., of November 30, 1568 (ibid. 239 seq.). 



Like his predecessor, 1 it would seem that at first Pius V. had 
cherished some hopes of Elizabeth s conversion ; he gave his 
full encouragement to the plans and proposals made to him 
for that end, 2 but it was not long before he found himself 
unable to pursue any longer this hopeless quest. Moreover, 
as a consequence of her continued attacks upon the liberty 
of conscience of her subjects, and upon the peace of other 
countries, Elizabeth had become in his eyes nothing better 
than a crowned criminal, who had usurped the throne. On 
May 2nd, 1566, he spoke of her in a public brief as one " who 
pretended to be Queen of England," 3 and a little later he 
described her in the plainest terms as the author of the wicked 
conspiracies against the life and throne of the Queen of Scot 
land. 4 Moreover, it was notorious that the English queen 
could no longer be looked upon as a member of the Catholic 
Church ; according to the medieval idea none but a member of 
the Church of Christ could rule over a Christian people, and 
in those days of transition medieval ideas still swayed many 
people even in England. Under these circumstances Pius V. 
was more and more inclined to follow that course which had 
long been feared in London, and long expected by the Catholics, 
and to declare by a public bull that Elizabeth had incurred 
excommunication and had forfeited the throne. 5 Alba, whose 
genius as a soldier was held in great admiration by the Pope, 
seemed to be the very man to carry out the Papal sentence. 
But the condemnation of Elizabeth was very far from imply 
ing in the eyes of Pius V. that the cause of her rival of Scotland 
was worthy of his support, especially after the marriage with 

1 Cf. Vol. XVI. of this work, p. 218. 

2 POLLEN, English Catholics, 143 seq. 

3 " quae se pro regina Angliae gerit." Letter to Philip II., 
in LADERCHI, 1566, n. 369. 

4 To Mary Stuart, May 12, 1566, ibid. n. 370. 

5 What sort of things the Pope looked for from Elizabeth is 
shown by the fact that he imprisoned the colonel, Megliorino 
Ubaldini, on the ground that the queen had sent him to oppose 
the Catholic religion. *Avviso di Roma of October 2, 1568, 
Urb. 1040, p. 590, Vatican Library. 


Bothwell, and even after Mary had set foot as a fugitive on 
English soil, the Pope, in spite of her influential advocates, 1 
maintained at first a very cold and reserved attitude in her 
regard. 2 Her firm adherence to the Catholic faith, however, 
gradually won back for her her former good repute, even in 
Rome. In December, 1568, Pius V. still expressed himself 
rather doubtfully about her ; Mary s ambassador in Paris 
was urged to strengthen his sovereign in the faith, as the 
Pope was at times haunted by the idea that under the pressure 
of acts of violence she might become weakened in her former 
attachment to the Apostolic See. 3 But on May gth, 1569, 
a letter was sent from Rome to Archbishop Beaton saying 
that Mary was in as high favour with the Pope as she herself 
could have wished. 4 Her good relations with Rome were 
comp etely restored when, in a brief of January gth, 1570* 
the Pope replied to a letter from the Scottish queen, dated 
October I5th, 1569, holding out hopes of his being able to 
work on her behalf with the kings of Spain and France, and of 
affording her help in other ways as well. He stated that he was 
convinced that her misfortunes had come upon the queen 
simply because -she maintained and protected the Catholic 
faith ; let her then take comfort, because Christ says that 
they are blessed who suffer persecution for justice sake. 5 

1 Queen Elizabeth of Spain, Mary s playfellow in her child 
hood, when she heard of the latter s escape from Lochleven, as 
sured the nuncio in Madrid that Mary " aveva riconosciuto il 
suo erroce ed era diventata pia e cattolica " (Castagna to Bonelli, 
June 5, 1568, Corresp. dipl., II., 383). Already, on February 6, 
1568, Archbishop Beaton had written to Lorraine that (at Loch 
leven) Mary had begun to serve God better, with more devotion 
and greater diligence than she had been wont to do for some time 
previously, which is a great joy to me." In POLLEN, Negotiations 
cxxxiii. and The Month, XCL (1898), 588 seq. 

2 Cf. supra p. 181. 

3 Bonelli to Beaton, December 4 (?) 1568, in LADERCHI, 1569, 
n. 284. The letter certainly belongs to 1568. 

4 POLLEN, Negotiations , cxxxiii. seq. 

5 GOUBAU, 263 seq. 


In the meantime Mary had again written to the Pope on 
November 3Oth, 1569, professing herself once more to be the 
devoted and obedient daughter of the Catholic Church, and 
again asking for his intervention with the Christian princes, 
so that by their means the Queen of England might be induced 
to restore to her her liberty, and allow the free exercise of the 
Catholic religion. There was no truth, Mary remarks, in the 
report that had been written to Philip II. that she was wavering 
in the Catholic religion. 1 It was true, since she was not 
allowed to attend Catholic worship, that she had, thinking 
it no wrong, listened to the prayers said by a Protestant 
preacher ; if she had sinned in so doing, she was ready to 
receive the penance assigned to her by the Pope. 2 Even 
though, immediately after the marriage with Both well, such 
protestations no longer met with full credence in Rome, now 
every reason for distrust had disappeared. On July I3th, 
1570, Pius V. wrote to Mary that he was certain that no 
threats or inducements would be able to detach her from the 
communion and obedience of the Catholic Church. 3 In his 
last letter to her, dated May 8th, 1571, he expressed himself 
in the same sense. 4 

Now that the Pope s confidence in Mary s Catholic senti 
ments was restored, his plans for bringing back England into 
the bosom of the Church could take a tangible form. When, 
on March 2ist, 1569, he sent Alba the blessed hat, together 
with a brief, he at the same time consulted him as to whether, 
with the help of an alliance between France and Spain, it 
would not be possible to effect an invasion of England. Alba 
replied that it was no use to hope for the co-operation of France, 
and that the only way would be for Philip II. either to conquer 

1 Knollys, for example, had on July 28 and September 21, 
1568, expressed to Cecil the hope that Mary had changed her 
faith. BAIN, II., n. 743, p. 466; n. 821, p. 510. C/. POLLEN, 
English Catholics, 122 seq. 

2 LABANOFF, VII., 16 seq. 

9 GOUBAU, 366. Here Pius V. was replying to a letter from 
Mary of April 30, 1570. 

4 POLLEN in The Month XC1. (1898), 576. 


England for himself, or else to confer that kingdom upon a 
Catholic noble, who should marry Mary Stuart. 1 Pius V. 
expressed to the Spanish ambassador the opinion that the 
campaign could be carried out in the name of the Pope, who 
had ancient feudal rights over England. 2 

Pius V. s enthusiasm received a fresh incentive when, at 
the beginning of November, vague rumours reached the 
Eternal City concerning the attempts of the Duke of Norfolk 
to secure for the captive Queen of Scotland the succession to 
the English throne. This movement was taken as meaning a 
revival of activity on the part of the Catholic party, and 
on the strength of Venetian reports it was supposed that the 
whole of England would rise against Elizabeth. 3 Thereupon 
Pius V. at once wrote to Alba (November 3rd) that he ought 
to protect the Catholic religion in England with all his might, 
and if possible help the captive Queen of Scotland to recover 
her throne ; the Duke could do nothing more pleasing to 
God than to free Mary from the hands of the heretics. 4 On 
the same date the nuncio in Madrid received instructions to 
obtain from Philip II. assistance for England, 5 and the 
Spanish ambassador in Rome was also ordered to have 
recourse to his royal master in the same sense. It was 
incumbent on them, the Pope pointed out, to help with both 
money and troops a noble English Catholic who might perhaps 
marry Mary Stuart, and then receive England as a fief from 
the hands of the Pope. 8 

Philip, who at first was angry that Pius should have written 
to Alba without mention of the king, was appeased by the 
diplomatic skill of the nuncio, 7 and replied in a friendly way, 

1 Zufiiga to Philip II., June 13, 1569, Corresp. dipl., III., 91. 

2 Ibid. 

3 Ibid. November 4, 1569, III., 188. 

4 In LADERCHI, 1569, n. 285 ; Colecc. de docum. ined., IV., 
514 ; KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, Huguenots, II., 386. 

6 Bonelli to Castagna, November 3, 1569, Corresp. dipl., III., 186. 
6 Zufiiga to Philip II., November 4, 1569, ibid. 188. 
Castagna to Bonelli, January 14, 1570, ibid. 218. Bonelli (to 
Castagna, March L 1570 ibid. 258 seq.) justifies the brief to Alba. 


but his letter contained nothing more than a decision to leave 
the whole affair to the judgment of Alba. 1 The latter had 
already in a letter sent to Rome excused himself on the ground 
of the alleged want of money, and his consideration for 
France. 2 Pius V. comforted himself for this reply by saying 
that in such matters he must trust to the judgment of Alba, 
and that he had confidence in the Christian feeling and pru 
dence of the Duke that he would not let this opportunity slip 
of winning back England. 3 

It is difficult to attribute much importance to the activities 
of Norfolk s party in estimating the efforts of the English 
Catholics ; already for some time past a really Catholic move 
ment, which had taken its origin in nothing but religious 
motives had been in preparation. The adherents of the 
ancient faith in England were beginning, not without the help 
of the Pope, to rouse themselves from the inactivity which 
they had hitherto preserved. While he was still Inquisitor 
General, Pius V. had in the time of his predecessor armed four 
priests, among them Sanders and Harding, with faculties to 
readmit the English schismatics to the Church, 4 and thereafter 
the care of souls among the Catholics of England had been 
carried on with greater effect and care. Before this, no other 
condition had been demanded for the admission of laymen to 
the sacraments of the Church than that they should abstain 

1 Philip II. to the Pope, January 20, 1570, ibid. 226. Cf. 
Philip II. to Zuniga December 18, 1569, and Castagna to Bonelli, 
December 22, 1569, ibid. 205, 208. 

* Alba to Zuniga, December 5, 1569, in MJGNET, II., 508 seq. 

8 Zuniga to Alba, January 7, 1570, Corresp. dipl., III., 214. 

4 Harding and Sanders to Morone, June n, 1567, in MEYER, 
412 scqq. Similar faculties were granted by a * brief of May, 
1 8, 1570, to William Allen, John Marshall and Nicholas 
Sanders for England and Scotland (Archives of Briefs, Rome). 
On June 9, 1568, Bonelli wrote to Castagna that except for the 
faculties to absolve granted at the request of certain Jesuits 
and the alms which were sent each year to Lou vain for the English 
Catholics, there were no relations between the Pope and the 
English. Corresp. dipl., II., 387. 


from the Protestant Eucharist ; now it was further required 
of them that they should not attend heretical worship at all. 
The effects of this greater strictness were very good. On 
June nth, 1567, Harding and Sanders wrote from Louvain 
to Morone 1 that the confusion and wavering had been put a 
stop to, that men refused to attend the Anglican services more 
than before, that the faith was openly professed even before 
the judges, and that men endured imprisonment and chains 
with joy. It was true that certain Catholics still maintained 
that so long as the aforesaid four priests appealed to faculties 
which had only been orally given, they were not obliged to be 
lieve them on that point, and might therefore continue with the 
usage which they had formerly adopted, 2 but Harding and 
Sanders obtained a Papal brief of August I4th, 1567, which 
put an end to all such doubts. 3 

Disquieting news soon reached the Protestant commissioners 
for the visitation of churches. Many members of the lesser no 
bility, so men wrote from Chester in Dec., 1567, have bound 
themselves by oath not to receive the Protestant communion 
any more so long as Elizabeth reigns. 4 In January, 1568, a 
number of letters drew the attention of the Protestant com 
missioners for the visitation of churches to attempts to alienate 
the people " from loyalty to the queen and from unity of 
worship " ; a month later an order was issued for the imprison 
ment of certain deprived priests who still carried on their 
ministrations in private house, among them being Vaux and 
Allen. 5 At the end of 1567 private houses were searched and 
those who dwelt there were called upon to give an account of 
their religion and of their participation in Anglican worship, 
while those who had heard mass at the Spanish embassy were 

1 In MEYER, loc. cit. 

2 Ibid. 

8 FRERE, 140. At that time Laurence Vaux was especially 
active in England itself in the interests of the Pope ; Dictionary 
of National Biography, LVIIL, 191. 

4 FRERE, 141. 

5 Ibid. 142. 

VOL. xviii 15 


forced to take the oath of supremacy. l From that time the 
number of those imprisoned for hearing mass continued to 
increase ; in February, 1569, the prisons were filled with 
Catholics, 2 and at the end of May the persecution was more 
violent than ever. 3 

If under these circumstances the Catholics of the older 
generation could flatter themselves that as far as they them 
selves were concerned they would always remain true to the 
faith of their fathers, no one could fail to see that, granted 
the suppression of regular Catholic instruction, their children 
must little by little fall under the influence of the heretical 
teaching. Moreover, after May , 1568, they could not fail 
to see how unjustly the lawful heir to the throne was being 
treated, and that a principal motive for this was her firm 
attachment to the Catholic faith. They did not dare to rebel 
openly, after the example of the French and Scottish insur 
gents, but little by little the grievous evils under which they 
lay brought them face to face with the question whether 
in conscience and before God they were bound to remain 
silent spectators of such acts of oppression, which called to 
heaven for vengeance, and whether further passive inaction 
was altogether compatible with their ideas of honour and 
chivalry. " We can bear witness," later on wrote Nicholas 
Sanders from Lou vain, 4 "how eagerly the English nobles turned 
to us to know whether the Apostolic See had not yet issued 

1 Thus wrote de Silva to Philip II., Corresp. de Felipe II., II., 
564 ; MEYER, 104. 

2 " Sicel . . . afflige bravamente a los cat6licos, encarcelando 
a muchos, y casi tiene todas les carceles llenas." Guerau de 
Spes to Alba, February 29, 1569 (according to KERVYN DE LETTEN- 
HOVE, Relations, VI., 301, February 20), Corresp. de Felipe II., 
III., 191 ; cf. 232. 

3 Spes to Philip II., May 23, 1569, ibid. 239. The increased 
severity of the persecution was anterior to the rising of 1569, 
and cannot be looked upon as its consequence, as it is by MEYER 

4 *A. M. A. Graziani, 15 Cal. martii 1570, Graziani Archives, 
Citta di Castello, Instrutt. ,1., 26. 


some decree against the queen, and further whether, even in 
the absence of any such decree, they might not with a clear 
conscience dare to take steps to free themselves from such 
tyranny. To the first question we made answer that, as 
far as we here were aware, nothing of the kind had been made 
public, while as to the other question the best theologians 
were not of one mind. Some had no doubt whatever that, 
even without any authority from the Roman See, it was lawful 
to defend the Catholic religion in those doctrines which are 
the common Christian inheritance, while others thought 
it necessary, or at any rate safer, to wait for a Papal 

Recent times had shown plenty of instances of religious 
risings in France and Scotland which had been crowned with 
success. The English Catholics certainly did not lack the 
necessary number of malcontents for success, even though they 
had not the unscrupulous determination of their Scottish 
neighbours. The carrying into effect of a rising was much 
discussed, but they could not arrive at any working plan. 
In the course of 1568 Ridolfi, a Florentine banker resident in 
London, conferred with the Spanish ambassador, Guerau dc 
Spes, on the subject of obtaining help from Philip II. The 
ambassador was favourably disposed towards the Florentine s 
request, but Alba did not agree with him and the negotiations 
came to nothing. 1 In the spring of 1569, Nicholas Morton, a 
former prebendary of York, and at that time penitentiary of 
St. Peter s in Rome, who had been sent by tl. : Pope, arrived 
in England ; 2 he was charged to find out what sort of reception 
the excommunication of Elizabeth would be likely to meet 
with in England. From him the malcontents learned Pius V. s 
views of the queen, but he was not able to inform them of 
any Papal decision which would have removed the objections 
to an armed rising, though his report of the state of feeling 

1 LEE in Dictionary of National Biography, XLVIII., 290. 
LADERCHI, 1569, n. 270. 

2 The brief recommending him to Alba, February 13, 1569, 
in LADERCHI, 1569, n. 270. 


in England on his return confirmed Pius V. in his determina 
tion to take proceedings against Elizabeth. 1 

There can be no doubt that at the beginning of 1569 the 
circumstances were very favourable for a rising, in that since 
December, 1568, Elizabeth had been involved in a serious 
quarrel with Spain. Spanish ships, carrying a rich cargo of 
gold for Alba s troops in the Low Countries, had taken refuge 
in the harbour of Southampton, in order to escape from 
pirates, and the English vice-admiral, Arthur Champernowne, 
had at once informed the secretary of state that the treasure 
amounted to no less than 400,000 pounds sterling, and was 
therefore " very convenient for His Majesty." 2 It meant 
nothing to the queen that she was in the eyes of the world 
incurring the stigma of theft : anything that could be stolen 
from the cursed Spaniards was to the advantage of England. 3 
It seemed therefore that war with Philip II. was imminent, 
and in the opinion of the Spanish ambassador in London its 
result could hardly be doubted. Now, he thought, Elizabeth 
could be driven from her throne by making use of the adherents 
of Mary Stuart, 4 and the favourable moment had come for 
restoring the Catholic religion in England, and thus bringing 
about peace in Flanders. 5 Many anonymous letters expressed 

1 LINGARD, VIII. , 44. Pollen in The Month, 1C. (1902), 140, 
and English Catholics, 143 seqq. Sanders in SPILLMANN, II., 
94. For the relations of Morton with Northumberland of. the 
interrogatory of the latter in GREEN, Addenda, 1566-1579, p. 
408, and F. Norton to Leicester and Burghley, April 2, 1572 
ibid. 390. 

* " therefore most fytt for Her Majestic " (letter of December 
19, 1568 ; cf. KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, Relations, V., 197). The 
amount of the money is variously estimated. BROSCH, VI., 535. 

8 KERVYN DE LEITENHOVE, Relations, V., x. The vice-admiral 
wrote on January I, 1569, to the Privy Council that the money 
had been sent by the Pope for the war against the Protestants ; 
ibid. 205. 

4 To Alba, December 30, 1568 ; ibid. 

6 " Agora ay muy buen forma de reduzir este reyno a la fee 
cat61ica." To Alba, January 9, 1569, KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, 
Relations, V., 228. 


the conviction that as soon as the standard of Spain was raised 
all the Catholics would rise in rebellion. 1 

Mary Stuart herself at the end of 1568 thought she could 
safely say that if Philip II. would lend his aid, she could at the 
end of three months be Queen of England ; 2 in July, 1569, the 
enthusiasm for her as the lawful heir to the throne had grown 
to such an extent that Elizabeth jealously complained that 
it reminded her of the revolt of Absalom against David. 3 
In the north of England some parts of the community had 
already begun to drive out the Protestant preachers. 4 

Very soon, however, all these high hopes were shattered. 
The forces of Spain were entirely occupied with the revolts 
of the Moors and of the Low Countries, and although English 
privateers, with the secret approval of Elizabeth, were harrass- 
ing the Spanish trading vessels, and the correspondence of 
the Spanish ambassador was confiscated and his house in 
London kept under surveillance, 5 Spain did not dare to draw 
the sword against England. In the Low Countries Alba, to 
whom Philip II. had left the decision, was definitely opposed 
to a war with England, and refused to hear of any encourage 
ment being given to Elizabeth s Catholic subjects. 6 Guerau 
de Spes, moreover, had counted too highly on the feelings of 
the English Catholics ; many of them openly said that they 
had no intention of taking up arms in order to conquer England 
for the King of Spain, nor, speaking generally, did they wish 
to have anything to do with that country. 7 

x To Alba, April 2, 1569, ibid. 536. Cf. Spes to Philip II., 
April 2, 1569, ibid. 358 : " Muchos cat6licos me escriven cartas 
secretamente, que, en viendo banderas de V. M. en este reyno, 
se lebantaran todos." 

* Spes to Philip II., January 8, 1569, Corresp. de Felipe II., 
III., 171 ; of. 280. 

8 Spes to Philip II., July 25, 1569, ibid. 266. 

4 Spes to Philip II., July 14, 1569, ibid. 259. 

8 Spes to Alba, January 9, 1569, in KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, 
Relations, V., 227 seq. 

6 Cf. ibid. xv. seq. 

7 " Car ne veulent, a ce qu ils disent, combattre pour con- 
que"rir ce royaulme au roy d Espagne, ny rien avoir a faire avec 
ceste nation la." De la Mothe Fenelon, August 17, 1569, ibid. xxi. 


In spite of this, however, during the summer of 1569 Mary 
Stuart received many offers from the English nobles who were 
ready to sacrifice their property and their lives to regain for 
her her freedom. By the advice of Norfolk she refused these 
offers, but when the Duke had been thrown into the Tower, 
and she herself feared for her life, Mary secretly sent word to 
the Earl of Westmoreland, whose wife was Norfolk s sister, 
and the Earl of Northumberland, and through these two to all 
those who had already placed themselves at her disposal. 1 

If, instead of submitting to the queen, Norfolk had called 
them to arms, the nobles would certainly have obeyed his 
summons, and thus strengthened the band of his adherents. 
But the summons did not come, and very soon, before the 
preparations for a rising had been made, the leading Catholic 
nobles, the Earls of Northumberland and Westmoreland, 
found themselves suddenly faced with the necessity of coming 
to a definite decision. 2 The Earl of Sussex was actually 
ordered by the government to summon them to York, to 
imprison them and to send them to the court. Thus Northum 
berland and Westmoreland had to decide whether they in 
tended to share the fate of Norfolk or to take up arms. On 
November yth they turned to the Pope for assistance, and on 
the I4th they once more unfurled the ancient standard 
bearing the cross and five wounds which had already been 
displayed in 1536 under Henry VIII. in the so-called Pil 
grimage of Grace, and on the following day an appeal to the 
people was issued. Northumberland, who was highly re 
spected and a man of deep religious feeling, a typical noble of 
the olden times and ideas, who had hitherto spent his life far 
from the court among his vassals and tenants, and who was 
not in the least fitted to be an agitator or political intriguer, 3 
had from the first discouraged the idea of open hostilities. 

1 LINGARD, VIII., 43 seq. 

2 For the Northern Rising see CUTHBERT SHARPE, Memorials 
of the Rebellion of 1569, London, 1840 ; GREEN, Addenda 
1566-1579, passim ; LINGARD, VIII., 44 seqq. ; POLLEN in The 
Month, 1C. (1902), 136 seqq., and English Catholics, 118-141. 

3 For a character sketch of him see HOSACK, II., 124 seq. 


The real leader of the rising was Richard Norton, named by 
the people the father of the revolt. It would seem that it 
was to a great extent due to a woman and a Protestant, the 
Countess of Westmoreland, that the inflammable material 
of discontent which had been so long smouldering at last 
broke into flame. 1 

On November I5th the Earls issued an appeal to the people, 
in which they began by asserting their loyalty to Elizabeth, 
and declaring that they had taken up arms for the honour and 
safety of the queen, the nobles and the kingdom, and that their 
undertaking was aimed only against the queen s counsellors, 
who were plotting the destruction of the ancient nobility, we re 
urging the queen to a false policy, and had introduced a new 
made religion which was contrary to the word of God. 2 This 
appeal, however, produced the desired effect as little as did 
several others which followed it, and many of the Catholic 
nobles oven joined the royal army under the command of the 
Earl of Sussex. 3 In other ways too the insurgents were 
dogged by ill-success. It would have been a great advantage 
to them if they could have set Mary Stuart free and taken her 
to their head-quarters ; her liberation was the principal 
object of the rising, yet the Earls could not make mention of 
this in their appeal, nor refer to it without endangering Mary s 
life. When, on their march southwards, they sent eight 
hundred horsemen to Tutbury, where Mary was at that time 
imprisoned, they learned on the way that the Queen of Scots 
had been removed to Coventry. 

Everything pointed to the necessity of the quick delivery 
of a master stroke, the success of which would have brought 
many supporters to the standard of the insurgents ; it was 
probably for that reason that Sussex avoided a pitched battle. 
When, however, the rising had failed to spread during the first 

1 Pollen in The Month, 1C., 136 seq. 

2 LINGARD, VIII., 45 seq. GREEN, in. Cf. the proclamation 
of November 19, 1569, to the same effect, in SPILLMANN, II., 
97 seq. ; GONZALEZ, 343. 

3 Sadler, November 26, 1569, in GREEN, 123 ; LINGARD, 
VIII., 47^ 


eight days, and the hope of receiving the expected assistance 
from Alba had almost disappeared, while the Earl of Warwick 
was advancing from the south with an army, Northumberland 
and Westmoreland fell back to their fortresses and territory 
in the north. In the new appeals which they then issued 
they no longer spoke of restoring the old religion, but dwelt 
only on the need of settling the succession to the throne ; 
they declared that the efforts of the old nobility were directed 
to this end, and that their efforts were being opposed by certain 
upstarts in the queen s Council ; therefore they were obliged 
to take forcible measures. 1 The studied inaction of the Earl 
of Sussex made it possible for the two Earls to win some small 
successes. But when Warwick and his army were not more 
than a day s march away, Sussex also pushed forward, where 
upon the insurgents began to disperse. Disagreement between 
the two leaders completed the breaking up of the whole force, 
and Northumberland and Westmoreland sought safety over 
the Scottish border. Sussex had reinforced his army in the 
Catholic north, so that the Catholics were scattered by their 
own co-religionists. Cecil could boast that the queen had 
found supporters among all classes of her subjects, without 
any distinction of religion. 2 

The suppression of the rising had cost no bloodshed, but 
all the greater was the toll of human life taken by Elizabeth 
in revenge after her victory. In ordei to strike terror into 
the people the queen proceeded with the extremity of rigour. 
All those of the insurgents who were possessers of property 
were brought to judgment, while the poorer folk were hanged 
wholesale. About 900 persons were thus put to death during 
the course of the judicial proceedings ; in the county of 
Durham alone Sussex condemned three hundred and fourteen 
persons to the gallows. Elizabeth wished to employ the ordin 
ary tribunals against others who had shared in the rising, but 
she gave way before the objection raised by the crown lawyers 
that if she did so there were some places which would be 
depleted of the whole of their population. Those who were. 

LlNGARD, VIII., 48. 
2 HOSACK, I., 494. 


spared, however, were forced to take, not only the oath of 
loyalty, but also that of supremacy. 1 In spite of this terror 
ism, however, the rising still had an after effect. In February, 
1570, Leonard Dacre, a scion of a noble family, called to arms 
the wild inhabitants of the Border, but his three thousanp 
followers were defeated in a bloody battle ; Dacre fled to 
Scotland, and afterwards to Flanders. 2 

Dacre s attempt was on the point of being crushed, the rising 
of 1569 had long been suppressed, and yet it would seem that 
the news of events of the last few months had not even reached 
Flanders, so that on February I4th, 1570, Nicholas Sanders 
had recourse to Rome from Louvain for help for the insurgents. 3 
Two Catholic Earls, Jie wrote, 4 together with a number of the 
nobility, have taken up arms in the Catholic cause, in the 
expectation that Rome will not abandon them. The help 

1 LINGARD, VIII., 51. SPILLMANN, 11., 99 seqq. On February 
9, 1570, Spes wrote to Philip II. that the number of those who 
had been hanged was certainly more than 700 ; on the 25th of 
the same month he reported that the executions were still going 
on (Corresp. de Felipe II., III., 333, 337). On December 28, 
1569, the Earl of Sussex wrote to Cecil : " I guess the number 
will be 600 or 700 that shall be executed of the common sort, 
besides the prisoners taken in the field. I trust to use such 
discretion as that no sort shall escape from example, and that 
the example shall be very great." (GREEN, Addenda, 1566- 
I 5.79 P- J 69). BROSCH, (VI., 554) gives the following opinion : 
this " act of repression, carried out by the express orders of the 
queen " must " be considered as the darkest stain upon her 
character, and the most shameful of all her acts." On March 
31, 1570, in pardoning some of the more prominent insurgents, 
Elizabeth wrote that she was only sparing four of them because 
their lives might be useful to her. GREEN, 266 ; cf. 183, 188. 

2 LINGARD, VIII., 52 seq. 

8 At that time " the English ports were so strictly watched 
that the English Catholics in the Low Countries for a time were 
quite out of touch with their country." MEYER, 105. 

4 *A. M. A. Graziani, Lovanii 15 Cal. mart. 1570, Graziani 
Archives, Cittk di Castello, Istrutt. I. 26. See the text in App. 
n. 7. 


that they look for to Rome consists only in this, that they may 
be released from their obedience to the queen, and may thus 
be able to convince everyone that they have taken up arms, 
not as rebels, but as loyal sons of the Church. No reply had 
come from Rome as to this, and in consequence many questions 
had reached Louvain as to the lawfulness of armed resistance. 1 
In this state of doubt 4,000 had gone to Scotland, and were 
there awaiting the Pope s decision ; for three months they 
had been waiting there for the Pope to take action against 
Elizabeth. Many of the English were prepared to follow 
their example. If the Pope would allow them to retain posses 
sion of the Church property which they had obtained unlaw 
fully, then the whole of the nobility, with very few exceptions, 
would take up the Catholic cause, because nothing was holding 
them back but the fear that the restoration of the Papal 
authority would involve the loss of their possessions ; other 
wise they were almost all Catholics. Six or seven of the great 
earls and barons could be safely counted upon, and more than 
a thousand of the gentry. Heresy had only infected five or 
six of the earls, and for the rest, the heretical party was made 
up of a few effeminate courtiers and of artisans ; the peasants, 
by far the greater part of the populations, were all Catholics. 
Two things then had to be done in Rome ; the Pope must 
openly take part against Elizabeth, and encourage the English 
nobility to stand up for the faith, promising them that they 
would not have to restore the Church property. Then, in the 
opinion of the far-seeing, not only all the Catholics to a man, 
but also all those who were wavering, and even some of the 
schismatics themselves, would take up arms. The Pope had 
made a good beginning by sending Nicholas Morton to England, 
but he must not desert the Catholics now. A letter had arrived 
from Spain, from the Duchess of Feria, stating that Philip II. 
intended to help the English Catholics. 

Sanders letter reached Rome on March 2ist ; Graziani s 
reply, dated March 29th, 2 shows that there too they were 
not fully informed as to recent events in England. As a 

1 See supra p. 203. 

2 In MAI, Spicel. Rom., VIII. 456 seq. 


matter of fact, the appeal for help sent to Rome on November 
7th, 1569, by Northumberland and Westmoreland, a week 
before the rising, only arrived there on February i6th, 1570, 
and had not been answered until February 22nd. 1 In his 
letter the Pope exhorted the two earls to be constant and 
loyal, because it might be that God had chosen them to restore 
unity between England and the Apostolic See. If they were 
called upon to shed their blood for the defence of the faith and 
the authority of the Pope, it would be better for them to pass 
to eternal life by means of a glorious death, than to continue to 
serve in a shameful life the caprices of a woman who was the 
slave of her passions, and forfeit the salvation of their souls. 2 
Pius V. had already made an attempt to support the English 
rising. On February 3rd, 1570, he had recommended to the 
Duke of Alba those English nobles who, for the restoration of 
the Catholic religion, had taken up arms in a war which was as 
religious as it was just, and were prepared to sacrifice both 
property and life for the cause of God. 3 He had recourse to 
Philip II, in the same sense before he issued the bull of ex 
communication. 4 He further gave orders to Ridolfi to assist 
the earls with money. 5 

1 LADERCHI, 1570, n. 384. GOUBAU, 590 (with date February 
20). News reached Rome in the middle of January of a rising 
of the Catholics, and fervent prayers were made to God for the 
success of the insurgents : *" Per 1 aviso della solevatione delli 
catholici in Inghilterra so fanno qui di continue oration! accio 
Idd\o augment! le forze a quelli buoni spiriti." Avviso di Roma 
of January 14, 1570, Urb. 1041, p. 2iyb, Vatican Library. 

2 LADERCHI, 1570, n. 384. 

3 LADERCHI, 1570, n. 383. GOUBAU, 373 seq. (with date 
February 4). 

4 February 21, 1570, LADERCHI, 1570, n. 316. 

5 Letter to the two earls of February 20, 1570, in GOUBAU, 293. 
Pius V. had promised the English Catholics a sum of 100,000 
ducats (Zuniga to Philip II., March 7, 1570, Corresp. dip!., III., 
249) : he sent them 12,000 scudi as an instalment by Ridolfi 
(Zuniga to Philip II., February 28, 1570, ibid. 246). On May 
I 3> I 57> Ridolfi inquired of Spes how he could send the Pope s 
money to the two earls (KERVYN DE LF.TTENHOVE, Relations. 


As had been the case with Sanders, the Pope also received 
advice as to the best way to bring back England to the Church 
from other English exiles, 1 some of whom, like Goldwell, 
Bishop of St. Asaph, and Richard Shelley, Prior of the Knights 
of St. John, were resident in the Eternal City, and were asked 
for their advice on English affairs. 2 But all these had been 
out of touch with their country for over ten years, and Pius V. 
would not let himself be decided by their advice alone to take 
steps against Elizabeth. When, however, Morton, whom he 
had himself sent to England, declared on his return that the 
moment for action had come, and when letters received from 
England stated that the Catholics there were only refraining 
from taking up arms against Elizabeth because she had not 
as yet been declared a heretic and deposed by the sentence of 
the Apostolic See, 3 Pius no longer delayed in opening the 
proceedings in due form against the " pretended " Queen of 
England (February 5th, I57o). 4 Twelve refugees who were 

V., 653 seq. : cf. Spes to Philip II., on the same date, Corresp. 
de Felipe II., III., 352). Alba replied to the question of Spes 
(KERVYN DK LETTENHOVE, loc. oil., 655), that he was writing 
on the subject to Philip II. and that in the meantime the am 
bassador must not mix himself up in the affair (ibid. 657). 

1 Thus "Caligari wrote to Commendone from Pieve on Decem 
ber 6, 1567, that a young Englishman had sent him a document 
in which he had explained what the Pope could do for England. 
Someone must be sent quite secretly to England (Papal Secret 
.Archives). Cf. *Discorso fatto a Pio V. dal priore d Inghilterra 
Cav. Hierosolymitano [Shelley] sopra la riduttione di quel regno 
in Cod. Ottob., 2432, p. 160-178, Vatican Library, Shelley s 
discourse is also in Cod. 6820, p. 199 seq., Court Library, Vienna. 

1 Graziani to Sanders, March 29, 1569, in MAI, Spicil., VIII., 
457 seq. A Scottish noble who had been exiled on account of 
the faith was also in Rome in 1569, and received 300 scudi from 
the Pope as well as recommendations. *Avviso di Roma of 
June 29, 1569, Urb. 1041, p. 102, Vatican Library. 

8 On several occasions Pius V. stated that he had been led to 
issue his bull of excommunication by the insistence of the English 
Catholics. Cf. infra p. 214. 

4 In LAPERCHI, 1570, n. 332-345- 


living in Rome wore summoned and questioned as to whether 
they could testify that Elizabeth had assumed the position 
of he ad of the Church of England, 1 that she had deposed and 
imprisoned Catholic bishops and given their office to schis 
matics and laymen, exercised the right of making the visitation 
of churches, and introduced an oath and laws directed against 
the Apostolic See ; further, whether by her authority heresy 
was preached, and she herself lived as a heretic, and had it 
in her power to suppress heresy. These questions, related to 
things which were known to all, but the obtaining of proofs 

1 " Utrum regina Angliae usurpaverit auctoritatem capitis 
ecclesiae Anglicanae " In the acta of the inquiry it is main 
tained that Elizabeth had taken upon herself the title of " head 
of the church." In the deposition of Shelley it is stated that 
the oath of supremacy insisted on the recognition of Elizabeth 
as " principem et gubernatricem rerum tarn ecclesiasticarum 
quam profanarum " (LADERCHI, 1570, n. 329). Bishop Goldwell 
was only asked whether Elizabeth had assumed the " authority " 
of head of the church and he testified that the Catholic bishops 
would not agree to her being called " gubernatricem summam 
ecclesiae particularis " and that they had accordingly been 
deposed (ibid. n. 332). In the Pope s final sentence it was stated 
that the oath of supremacy insisted that no one should be accepted 
except the queen as " supremam gubernatricem tarn in spirituali- 
bus et ecclesiasticis quam in temporalibus, " and this is the exact 
expression of the title claimed by Elizabeth (cf. Vol. XIV. of this 
work, p. 407). It cannot therefore be said (with MEYER, 68) 
that they did not know in Rome what ecclesiastical title was borne 
by the Queen of England, and Protestant polemics go too far 
(MEYER, 69) when they take as a usurpation of the title of " head 
of the church " the passage in the bull of excommunication : 
" supremi Ecclesiae capitis locum in omni Anglia eiusque praeci- 
puam auctoritatem atque iurisdictionem monstruose sibi usurpans." 
They had the formula of the oath of supremacy in Rome 
(LADERCHI, 1570, n. 325). Elsewhere, in a letter to Philip II. 
of March 8, 1570 (in GOUBAU, 305) it is stated of Elizabeth : 
" Ipsa se . . . Anglicanae ecclesiae caput appellavit." It was 
maintained at that time (June, 1571) even by the Protestant 
party, that Elizabeth had the same power as the Pope ; see 
GREEN, Addenda, 1566-1579, p. 353. 


was carried out in full accordance with the requirements of 
the law. On February I2th the inquiry came to an end, and 
on the 25th a bull solemnly pronounced sentence on Elizabeth . 
In this bull, on the ground of his duty of preserving from cor 
ruption all those who belonged to the one true Church and of 
punishing apostates, and in virtue of the supreme powers 
conferred upon him, the Pope declared Elizabeth to be guilty 
of heresy, and of encouraging heresy, to have incurred ex 
communication, and therefore to have forfeited her " pretended 
right " to the English crown ; her subjects were no longer 
bound by any oath of loyalty to her, and under pain of ex 
communication could no longer yield her obedience. 1 

Pius V. frequently assured the Spanish ambassador that he 
had issued the bull of excommunication in response to the 
requests of the English Catholics, who had scrupled about 
taking up arms against Elizabeth so long as she was not 
declared to be a heretic and deposed by the Pope ; that his 
intention had been to encourage them, and that since the 
English Catholics had asked for sentence against Elizabeth, he 
could not in conscience refuse it. 2 

1 Bull. Rom., VII., 810 seq. A photograph of the bull in 
POLLEN, English Catholics, p. 150. 

8 Thus in many letters from Zuftiga to PhiJip II. : " Dixome 
que ellos mismos se lo pedian porque estavan en escrupulo de 
no tomar las armas contra ella hasta que S.S. la huviesse declarado 
y privado de su reyno." (April 10, 1570, Corresp. dipl. III., 
291). " Esta confiado de que los catholicos de Inglaterra han 
de hazer grande levantarmiento este verano ; y para darles 
animo ha ya declarado a la Reyna de Inglaterra y pribadola 
del reyno, aunque no lo ha publicado aqui. . . . No le pare$i6 
que podria dexar de hazer [the declarations against Elizabeth] por 
la instancia que los ca tholicos de aquel reyno le hazian, afirmandole 
que havia muchos que tenian escrupulo de levantarse contra la 
reyna no estando declarada por S.S." (April 28, 1570, ibid 307 
seq.). " Assegur6me mucho . . . que solamente se havia movido 
por una carta firmada de muchos catholicos de Inglaterra, los 

quales le prometian, etc." (June 10, 1570, ibid. 397) 

" que havia hecho esta declara9ion a instan9ia de muchos catholicos 
de Inglaterra . . . y que no le pare9ia que con su cons9ien9ia 


This makes it easy to understand why the Pope did not 
publish the bull in the customary form, but only took steps 
to have it made known in England. By a brief of March 
3oth, 1570, copies of the bull were sent to Alba, in order that 
he might have it displayed in Flanders, especially in the 
sea-ports ; l on account of the great trade carried on by English 
merchants in the Flemish ports the news of the Papal sentence 
would be bound very soon to make its way across the channel. 
For the same reason the bull was also sent to France ;* other 
reasons led to the fact that the nuncio in Poland also received 
orders to publish it on April 29th. 3 In order to make the bull 
known in England the banker Ridolfi was used as an inter 
mediary, and about eighty copies of the bull were sent to him 
to distribute. 4 In Rome itself, on the other hand, the bull 

podia dexar de hacer justicia pidiendosela los catholicos . . ." 
(August n, 1570, ibid. 499). Cf. Arco to Maximilian II., May 
6, 1570, in SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 160. 

1 LADERCHI, 1570, n. 377. BROM (Archiv., I., 207) dated 
the brief March 3. 

1 Zuniga to Philip II., June 10, 1570, Corresp. dipl., III., 396. 
From Ridolfi Spes received a copy sent by the French nuncio 
(Spes to Alba, May 10, 1570, in KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, Rela 
tions, V., 652). Alba gave Spes instructions to deny, if neces 
sary, all knowledge of the bull (May 25, 1570, ibid. 657). 

* *Nunziatura di Polonia, I., 64, Papal Secret Archives. 

4 " *Affine che li catholici con maggior fervor dessino aiuto 
all impresa di detto duca ""[Norfolk] e Regina di Scotia ; e a 
questo effetto spedi corriero a me Ridolfi con forse ottanta di 
dette bolle parte in stampa e parte in penna, con ordine espresso 
che per quanto desiderano il servitio suo e della Sede Apostolica 
e di tutta la cristianita facessi opera che subito le dette bolle si 
spargessino e publicassino in Inghilterra senza haver rispetto. 
a qualsi fussi raio interesse, perch e mi prometteva che la Sede 
Apostolica mi ricompensarebbe, e che del continue tutta la cris 
tianita, come diceva, faceva orazione per me, accioche conducessi 
a perfettione cotanta impresa ; il che da me [sic !] con quel zelo 
maggiore che fusse possibile, fu esegiuto, havendone di notte 
appicata una alia porta del vescovo di Londra et altra lassata 
a casa di un gentilhomo Inglese, quali la mattina riempiernono 


of excommunication was kept almost entirely secret. As late 
as April the Pope spoke of proceedings against Elizabeth as 
being only imminent, 1 and on April I5th the Imperial ambassa 
dor, Arco, reported it as being a matter of hearsay. 2 It was 
only in May that the bull appeared in Rome in printed form, 
but was at once withdrawn from sale. 3 The usual formalities 
which in other cases were looked upon as essential for the 
promulgation of pontifical enactments, were never complied 
with in the case of the bull of excommunication. 4 

la detta citta et tutta la corte con le copie che ne furono fatte di 
tanto spavento e romore, che con le altre appresso che havevo 
che furono lassate cadere in diversi luoghi del Regno, che poco 
manc6 che non seguisse de fatto una gran sollevazione. II che 
intesosi per detto duca di Northfolch e Regina di Scotia solleci- 
torno per mezzo mio la conclusione de le pratiche, e cosi in pochi 
giorni convennono e del parentado infra di loro e de la lega, della 
quale desiderandone per li aiuti che si promettevano la confer- 
matione, e dal Papa e dal Re catholico, parve a detta Regina 
di Scotia e al duca di spedire me medesimo a S. S t6> e Maesta 
cattolica." Ridolfi to the Pope (Gregory XIII.) s.d. Chigi 
Library, Rome, Miscell., t. 48, p. 39 seqq. 

1 Zufiiga to Philip II., April 10, 1570, Corresp. dipl., III., 291. 

2 * State Archives, Vienna. 

3 SCHWARZ, Brief wechsel, 160. 

1 A document containing questions and answers concerning 
doubts of conscience felt by English Catholics, drawn up in Rome 
in the time of Gregory XIII., mentions in the first place that 
several maintained, against the validity of the bull, the difficulty : 
" quod non fuerit hie [in Rome] more aliarum in Campo Florae 
et alibi promulgata." (English Historical Review, VII., 1892, 
84). Objections to the legal validity of the bull were raised by 
Protestants like Camden, and by de Thou (see LADERCHI, 1570, 
n. 366 seqq.), by Gallicans, like Noel Alexander, and recently by 
Meyer (p. 66 seqq.). But there is no force in the objection that 
according to canon law a prince can only be excummunicated 
after previous warning, and that between the excommunication 
and the deposition a year must elapse, and that consequently 
the bull against Elizabeth was contrary to law, since in no case 
would the omission of such formalities render the excommunica 
tion invalid. According to Catholic principles the Pope can 


The means chosen by Pius V. for the promulgation of the 
bull did not serve their intended purpose. Through the 
Spanish ambassador in Rome Alba protested strongly against 
its publication, 1 and the King of France as well could not be 
induced to publish it. 2 In spite of this, however, the bull 
found its way to England. 3 On the morning of May 25th, 
1570, it was found affixed to the doors of the Bishop of Lon 
don s palace. Suspicion for this bold act fell upon John 
Felton, a respected and wealthy gentleman of South wark, 
who at once confessed to it, and until his terrible death at the 
hands of the hangman he continued to recognize the validity 
of the Papal sentence. 4 

That the bull was intended merely to enlighten the English 
Catholics, and that there was at first no thought of enforcing 
it by the arms of a foreign power is especially proved by the 
fact that the King of Spain, to whom the execution of the sen 
tence would obviously fall, was not informed of the Papal 
sentence. It is true that Arco wrote on April I5th, 1570, 
to Vienna that, according to the common report, the Pope 
had sent the bull only to Spain, 5 but even on July I7th the 

either completely annul and change the law prescribing or recom 
mending such formalities, or dispense them in any particular 
case. Moreover, any such law refers to an excommunication 
which is to be inflicted in the future, whereas Elizabeth had for 
a long time past, and quite manifestly, incurred excommunica 
tion. How, for that matter, could a warning be given to her 
if a Papal nuncio was not to be received in England ? Cf. against 
N. Alexander DOM. BERNINO, Historia di tutte 1 heresie, VII., 
Venice, 1724, 524 seq. 

1 Alba to Zuniga, May 18, 1570, in GONZALEZ, 415-419; cf. 
MIGNET, II., 509 seq. ; Corresp. dipl., III., 396. 

2 Rusticucci to Castagna, August u, 1570, Corresp. dipl., 
III., 509- 

3 An Irish bishop and abbot who came to Rome had copies 
(Spes to Philip II., May 13, 1570, Corresp. de Felipe II., III., 
352). A month after the issue of the bull Mary Stuart had a 
printed copy. LABANOFF, IV., 52 ; cf. SPILLMANN, II., 109. 

4 SPILLMANN, II., 109 seqq. 

5 *State Archives, Vienna. 




nuncio at Madrid only knew by hearsay that a decree against 
Elizabeth was in existence, and that a copy had reached Spain 
from England. 1 The Spanish ambassador, whom the Pope 
informed of his plans against Elizabeth in April, at once 
raised serious difficulties : they must not dare to attempt 
any such thing until everything was in readiness for the carry 
ing into effect of the Papal sentence, since otherwise all that 
they would obtain would be the stirring up of the queen to 
the destruction of her Catholic subjects. He repeated the 
same thing on a subsequent occasion. 2 Philip himself was 
very angry that he, who knew more about English affairs 
than anyone else, had not first been asked for his advice, and 
he remarked : It would seem that the Pope thinks that his 
own zeal is a guarantee of success, but it is to be feared that 
this hasty step will make the position of the Catholics in 
England very much worse. 3 On July I5th Zufiiga was told 
to protest to the Pope ; the fact that no mention was made in 
the bull of Philip s name would be taken as a sign of favouritism 
for France, but the King of Spain would never allow France 
to set foot in England. 4 Philip wrote to Elizabeth that no 
act of the Pope had caused him so much displeasure as the 
bull of excommunication ; 5 and he did not even recall his 
ambassador from London, though the latter was soon after 
wards forcibly driven out by Elizabeth. 

1 Castagna to Bonelli, July 17, 1570, Corresp. dipl., III., 465. 
MEYER, 415. 

* Zufiiga to Philip II., Apr. 10 and 24, 1570, Corresp. dipl., 
III., 291, 308- 

3 Philip II. to Spes, June 30, 1570, Corresp. de Felipe II., 
III., 367. The copies sent to him by Spes of the bull and of the 
brief to Northumberland and Westmoreland, are, as he states, 
the first which he has seen " porque, en efecto, Su San ti tad ha 
tornado esta deliberacion sin decirme ni comunicarme cosa 
alguna." Philip attributed the bull to the influence of the 
Caidinal of Lorraine. KRETZSCHMAR, Invasionsprojekte, 27. 

4 Zuniga to Philip II., August u, 1570, Corresp. dipl., III., 
499 ; cf. ibid, 493, the report of Castagna to Bonelli of August 
4, 1570, concerning his audience with Philip II. 

6 MEYER, 64. 


In June, 1570, Zuniga began to try and get the Pope to 
mitigate or withdraw the bull of excommunication. Pius V. 
went so far as to approve of Alba s withholding its publication 
and in view of the reluctance shown by Alba and France, 
he seemed to be not altogether sorry if the Papal sentence 
did not come to the knowledge of Elizabeth. The Pope, 
however, would not agree to Zuniga s other proposals, the 
suspension of the bull, and merely releasing Elizabeth s 
subjects from their oath of allegiance to her by means of a 
brief, saying that at the utmost they might omit the words 
in the bull which inflicted excommunication upon those who 
obeyed the English queen. l 

Alba s remonstrances in August, 1570, were just as in 
effectual. Experience had shown, so the Duke wrote, that the 
excommunication of the queen had not had the desired result, 
but had even brought grave injuries upon the Catholics. A 
solid reason had been given for the persecution, and since 
loyalty to Elizabeth was threatened with excommunication 
the Catholics had no other course open to them than to 
abandon their country, which of itself implied the end of the 
Catholic religion in England. It seemed to the Pope, however, 
that not even these reasons justified him in withdrawing the 
bull once it had been issued. Nor could he approve of Alba s 
other proposal of at least suspending the penalties inflicted 
on the Catholics by means of a brief, it being sufficient, in his 
opinion, that Alba should make it known to the English 
Catholics that if they remained in their own country they 
would not be held to be excommunicated by the Pope. Alba 
retorted that he did not consider this expedient satisfactory, 
since he could not get into touch with the whole of the English 
Catholics and that no one in England would be bound to believe 
his statement. 2 

About this time a proposal was put forward by an Italian 
merchant as to how the bull of excommunication could be put 

1 Zuniga to Philip II., June 10, 1570, Corresp. dipl., III., 
396 seq. 

2 Zufiiga to Philip II., August n, 1570, ibid. 500. 


into force without having recourse to arms. Let it be pub 
lished in Spain, Flanders arid France, and then, on the strength 
of the Papal sentence, let the kings of France and Spain be 
forbidden all trade with England ; this maritime blockade 
would force Elizabeth to give way. It would seem that this 
suggestion recommended itself to Pius V., and he ordered the 
Spanish ambassador to write to Philip II. Zuniga considered 
the plan quite impracticable, 1 and Philip II., to whom it was 
submitted by Castagna, was of the same opinion. 2 

The bull was not without its dangers for the English govern 
ment. Even though, politically speaking, it had hardly any 
effect, yet, after the rising of the previous year, there was still 
much unrest among the people. It is true that externally 
but little resistance was offered to an order issued to the 
magistrates obliging them to the rigorous enforcement of the 
law compelling attendance at worship, but the Protestant 
Bishop of Durham, after his visitation of the summer of 1570, 
had to report that the greater part of the people was secretly 
and eagerly seeking an opportunity for fresh disturbances. 3 
Grindal of York made the same complaint : in his opinion the 
greater part of the nobility did not entertain friendly feelings 
towards the true (Protestant) religion. 4 In Lancashire the 
people were very hostile towards Protestantism, and as a 
result of the bull, the leading men of the county had abandoned 
the Anglican divine worship and had openly welcomed priests 
from Lou vain. 6 Henceforward the bull awakened among the 

1 Ibid. 500 seq. Cf. *Avviso di Roma of July i, 1570, Varia 
polit., 100, p. 175-177, Papal Seciet Archives. 
* MEYER, 72, 417. 

3 FRERE, 151. 

4 " The greatest part of our gentlemen are not well affected 
to godly religion." (FRERE, 151). Cf. the opinion of Sadler 
of December 6, 1569 (in GREEN, 139 ; LINGARD, VIII., 46) : 
in northern England there are not ten nobles " that do favour 
and allow of her majesty s proceeding in the cause of religion." 

6 " All things in Lancashire savoured of open rebellion ... in 
most places the people fell from their obedience and utterly 
refused to attend divine service in the English tongue. . . . Since 


Catholics the consciousness that they could not be excused 
for attendance at Protestant worship on the plea of obedience 
to the queen. 

Although she pretended to despise the Papal sentence, 
Elizabeth nevertheless brought pressure to bear on the Pope 
through the Emperor Maximilian II. for the withdrawal of 
the bull. 1 But not even now would Pius V. agree to this. If, 
he replied, the queen attributes any importance to the bull, 
why does she not return to the Church ? If she attaches no 
importance to it, why does she make an uproar about it ? 
Elizabeth s threats could do him no harm : if he could ex 
tinguish her hatred by shedding his own blood, he would 
find greater joy in so doing than he found in the possession 
of the Papal dignity. 2 Elizabeth therefore was forced to 
reply in some other way to the Papal sentence. Above 
all, she tried to win over public opinion ; pamphlets, to a 
great extent " in the coarsest and most vulgar tone," did their 
best to drag the Pope and his sentence through the mire of 
ridicule. 3 Next there came from the Parliament, which had 

Felton set up the bull, etc., the greatest there never came to any 
service, nor suffered any to be said in their houses, but openly 
entertained Louvanists massers with their bulls." (Bishop 
Barnes of Carlisle to the Earl of Sussex, October 16, 1570, in 
GREEN, 321 ; cf. FRERE, 152). Cf. the letter of the Countess of 
Northumberland to Alba (end of October, 1570 ?), in KERVYN 
DE LETTENHOVE, Relations, VI., 8 ; especially in Lancashire 
some " apres qu ils ont eu congnoissance de l excomniunication 
faicte contre la personne de la Royne d Angleterre " have restored 
the Catholic worship in their houses and parishes. 

1 Maximilian II. to Pius V., September 28, 1570, in SCHWARZ, 
Briefwechsel, 159 seq. 

* January 5, 1571, in LADERCHI, 1570, n. 381 ; SPILLMANN, 
II., 132-134- 

3 MEYER, 69 seqq. On June 12, 1570, Spes wrote to Philip 
II. that the Protestants were providing themselves with arms 
against their enemies and with books against the bull. (Corresp. 
de Felipe II., III., 353). Bullinger s confutation. A Confuta 
tion of the Pope s Bull, London, 1572, which Burghley, Parker, 
Grindal and Cox caused to be printed, deals in part with the 


assembled on April 2nd, 1571, a series of laws, which were 
partly aimed against the risings of recent years, but partly 
also against Catholics as such. 1 Henceforward he must be 
held guilty of high treason who, while the queen lived, claimed 
any right to the crown, or who asserted that the crown 
belonged to anyone but the queen, or that she was a heretic, 
schismatic, tyrant or infidel, or that she had usurped the 
throne ; the same thing applied to those who denied that the 
succession to the throne was settled by the decision of Parlia 
ment. One year s imprisonment was to be the punishment 
for the first offence, and the penalties of the statute of prae- 
munire for the second, for anyone who in writing or in print 
spoke of any definite person as the heir to the throne, even 
though he should be the natural successor of the queen. 
The penalties of high treason applied to anyone who obtained 
or made use of a Papal bull or the like, or who on the strength 
of such documents gave or asked for absolution, with the 
penalties of praemunire for his accomplices and for anyone 
who introduced into the country or received objects blessed 
by the Pope. A further projected law, making it obligatory 
to receive the Protestant communion, was allowed to drop. 

Seventy years later, when the Spaniards demanded of 
Urban VIII. that he should inflict excommunication on Riche- 

question whether the deposed Catholic bishops were treated kindly 
or cruelly by Elizabeth (cf. Vol. XVI. of this work, p. 235 seq.}. 
On p. 60 of Bullinger we actually read : " Moreover it is impudently 
and untruthfully asserted that the Catholic bishops were worn 
out by their sufferings in prison and ended their days in misery. 
. . . On the contrary the papist bishops were treated kindly and 
far better than they deserved." On p. 47 on the other hand it is 
admitted that the bishops " ended their days miserably in prison," 
though this was entirely owing to their perversity. In the 
first-named passage (p. 60) the printed version is due to the fact 
that Bullinger s manuscript was altered in England, whereas 
they forgot or omitted to alter the second passage on p. 47 in 
the same sense. Cf. BELLESHEIM in Histor polit. Blatter, 
CXXXVI., (1905), 894. 
1 LINGARD, VIII., 69 seq. 


lieu and Louis XIII. on account of their alliance with the 
Protestants, the Pope rejected the demand by pointing to the 
uselessness of such proceedings in the case of Henry VIII. 
and Elizabeth. 1 Since then the Holy See has never again 
pronounced a sentence of deposition against a reigning 

While Catholic writers defended the bull as being in accord 
ance with ancient law, 2 Protestants waged a violent war 
against it. These polemical writers did much to sharpen 
and embitter for many centuries to come the religious differ 
ences between the members of the same nation ; it was only 
too easy to represent as a claim, the renewal of which even 
under the totally different conditions of later times was a thing 
to be feared, and as importing a continued menace to the 
safety of princes, a right which the Pope possessed in the Middle 
Ages with the full consent of the nations, and which he thought 
it his duty to exercise once more in the transition period of 
the XVIth century. For more than a century the struggle 
against the bull of excommunication formed a stock part of 
Protestant polemics, and an excuse by which to justify any 
violation of justice at the expense of Catholic subjects and 
fellow-countrymen. 3 

As far as the English Catholics were concerned, the bull, 
with its prohibition of obedience to the queen, led to doubts 
and scruples, and consequently to various interpretations of 
the Papal prescriptions, as well as to divisions and disagree 
ments. 4 Even worse was the fact that with the bull of ex 
communication and the laws which followed it there opened 
a new period in the story of the persecution of the English 
Catholics. Felton and Storey, who was especially hated by 

1 PIEPER in Histor. polit. Blatter, XCIV. (1884), 481. CAUCHIE 
ET MAERE, 237. 

2 See HERGENROTHER, Staat und Kirche, 679. 

3 Cf. MEYER, 70 seq. 

4 Cf. English Historical Review, VII. (1892), 84 seqq., for the 
questions and answers published by " Petriburg." (i.e. Creighton, 
Bishop of Peterborough), 


Cecil, had already become its victims. 1 Several left their 
country and thus forfeited all their property, which was either 
given or sold for a large sum to the queen s adherents. Of 
those who stayed, the so-called " recusants," that is to say 
those who refused to take part in Protestant worship, were in 
daily and hourly expectation of the moment when the denun 
ciation of some ill- wisher would drag them before the courts, 
with the inevitable consequence of large fines and imprison 
ment, or, in the case of converts, with the loss of their pro 
perty and imprisonment for life. During the reign of Eliza 
beth, both secret and public ordinances, often repeated, and 
urging their strict enforcement, ensured that the laws should 
not fall into abeyance. 2 A proclamation of July ist, 1570, 
had made the profession of priest-hunter and spy a profitable 
undertaking. 3 In England as elsewhere the XVIth century 
stands out as a time of the worst possible religious tyranny. 
The watchful care of the Pope and the fear of his punishments 
were things of the past, while on the other hand the excessive 
tyranny had not yet taught the oppressed to unite together 
to defend themselves by legal methods, and thus bring pressure 
to bear on the caprice of the oppressor. Looked at from this 
point of view the bull of excommunication of Pius V. throws 
a strong light upon the religious conditions of the XVIth 

Mary Stuart, for whose sake the nobles had risen, and on 
whose behalf to some extent the Pope had issued the bull, did 
not derive the smallest advantage from it. John Knox, who 
as early as August, 1569, had accused " mad Scotland " of not 

1 SPILLMANN, II., 109. On July 31, 1570, Antonio de Guaras 
wrote from London that many persons were, persecuted on account 
of the excommunication (Corresp. de Felipe II., III., 381). On 
August 12 he describes the zeal with which those who had re 
ceived notice of the excommunication were being proceeded 
against as marvellous : many were in prison and some in danger 
of sharing the fate of Felton (ibid. 393). 

2 LINGARD, VIII., 138 seq, 

3 MEYER, 74 seq. 


obeying the " mouth of God," and of having failed to punish 
as she deserved the " wicked adulteress and cruel murderess 
of her husband," 1 after the victory over the two Catholic earls 
exhorted the secretary of state to strike a blow " at the roots," 
for otherwise " the branches " would very soon and very 
vigorously begin to shoot again. 2 On the same day Murray 
also wrote to the English secretary of state concerning " the 
dangerous branches of the rebellion " : since Elizabeth had the 
origin of all the disturbances in her power, it would be her own 
fault if she now failed to deal with the evil. 3 As a matter of 
fact negotiations for the handing over of Mary to her half- 
brother in Scotland were already being carried on, 4 when 
Murray himself fell a victim to the private revenge of a noble 
whom he had offended. 5 

After the death of the regent Mary s party in Scotland was 
once more in the ascendant. Elizabeth therefore sent troops 
across the Border on the pretext of punishing the wild in 
habitants of that district for their crimes, but in reality to 
hamper and paralyse Mary s supporters ; once again fire and 
sword were let loose over the unhappy country ; 500 villages 
were burned in the valley of the Tevipt and the countryside 
was laid waste. Further military expeditions against Scotland 
followed, until at length the strong protests made by Mary 
in France and Spain caused Elizabeth to abandon the enter 
prise. 6 Moreover, when the negotiations for the marriage of 
the English queen to the Duke of Anjou were in progress in 
1570, Cecil, at a personal interview with Mary, concluded with 
her on October i6th, 1570, the Treaty of Chatsworth, by the 
terms of which the Queen of Scotland was to be restored to her 
throne. Naturally, hard terms were imposed : among others 
she had to agree that her son should be educated in England 

1 HOSACK, I., 503. 

* Knox to Cecil, January 2, 1570, ibid. 500. 

8 Murray to Cecil, January 2, 1570, ibid. 501. 

4 Ibid. 502. 

8 January 23, 1570. Cf. LINGARD, VIII., 53. 

HOSACK, II., 3 seqq. LINGARD, VIII., 54. 


until his fifteenth year. 1 In a letter to Pius V. 2 Mary excused 
herself by saying that owing to the pressure of necessity she 
could not act otherwise, and that in spite of everything James 
would receive a Catholic education. 

The agreement with Mary Stuart was not kept ; even before 
all hopes of its being observed had vanished Mary informed 
Elizabeth through Leslie that she intended to ask for the help 
of the foreign princes to effect her restoration. 3 

Probably at this time Mary had already lent an ear to the 
proposals of the Florentine banker, Ridolfo Ridolfi, who even 
before this time, when the Catholic rising was in preparation, 
had taken a hand in the affair 4 and who, in the autumn of 
1569, had fallen under suspicion of having assisted the rising, 
but had been taken back into the favour of Cecil and Walsing- 
ham after a short term of imprisonment. When the negotia 
tions about the Treaty of Chatsworth had disappeared in 
smoke, he persuaded Mary no longer to put any confidence in 
Elizabeth, and to turn for help to the Catholic princes. 6 By 
the advice of her trusted minister, Leslie, Bishop of Ross, and 
the Spanish ambassador, Guerau de Spes, Mary accepted this 
suggestion and tried to win over to its support Norfolk, who had 
been released from the Tower in the previous autumn. The 
duke had then been made to promise that he would no longer 
think of a marriage with Mary without the consent of Elizabeth, 
but in spite of this he eventually consented to a secret meeting 
with Ridolfi. The Florentine told him that Spanish troops 

1 HOSACK, II., 17 seqq. 

1 Of October 31, 1570, in LADERCHI, 1570, n. 403 ; cf. LABANOFF, 
VII., 19-23. 

8 " Quherfor our said good sister must aperdone ws, if we se 
na furtheiaunce to be had at her hand, nether for our restitution 
nor for the relief of our saidis good subjects, that we solicit and 
ayde thame to procure thair support at other princes our frendis 
allyes " (Mary to Leslie, February 6, 1571, in LABANOFF, III., 
175). Mary was already thinking of sending Leslie to the Pope 
in 1570 ; her instructions in LABANOFF, III., 57 seq. 

* See supra, pp. 203, 215. 

* HOSACK, II.. 34. 


under the command of Federigo di Toledo, Alba s son, were 
to be landed in England, and that with their help Mary was 
to be set at liberty. Norfolk did not give a formal consent to 
the plan, but Ridolfi left him with the impression that the duke 
intended to put himself at the head of the troops in order to 
set Mary free. 

It was probably Leslie and the Spanish ambassador who gave 
currency to a detailed document, 1 in which Norfolk charged the 
Florentine to get into touch with Philip II., the Pope and Alba. 
They were to send from six to ten thousand men to England, 
whereupon Norfolk would furnish 20,000 infantry and 3,000 
cavalry. If Mary were still kept in captivity, the duke would 
offer battle, and make an attempt to liberate Mary by force, 
and at the same time get possession of the person of the English 
queen, so as to have in her a hostage for the Queen of Scotland. 2 
In this document the duke avowed himself a secret Catholic 
who had been obliged to conceal his real convictions solely 
in order that he might the better serve his country and the 
whole of Christendom. He declared that his principal object 
was not so much his marriage to the captive queen as the 
union of the whole island under one ruler, and the restoration 
of the old religion ; for the rest, he had always been the 
defender of the Catholics, and his servants and the tutors of 
his children were Catholics. 3 A list of the English nobles was 

1 March, 1571, in LABANOFF, III., 234-239 ; a short epitome 
in GONZALES, 463. 

2 " Sorio risoluto di voler tentare la fortuna di una battaglia, 
et far forza di cavarla di qua per forza, et insignorirmi a un 
tempo della propria persona della Regina d lnghilterra per 
assicurarmi di quella della Regina di Scotia." LABANOFF, III., 245. 

8 " E. dove N.S re et il Re Catholico fino a hora havessino 
havuto alcun dubbio di me per non mi essere dichiarato, anzi 
piu presto mostromi protestante, gli significehrete, che non e 
stato per mala volunta che io habbia havuto verso quella S.Sede, 
ma per potere quando il tempo et la occasione si appresentassi 
. . . fare quel relevato servitio a tutta questa isola et general- 
mente a tutta la christianitk che lo effetto stesso dimostrera." 
Ibid. 238. 


attached, with a description of each one s opinions ; l according 
to this list forty of the nobles were ready to unsheathe their 
swords with Norfolk. Mary Stuart also gave the Florentine 
special instructions for his visit to the foreign courts. 2 In 
these Mary explains the difficult postition of the English 
Catholics, whose only hope lay in her ascending the throne, 
and she goes on to describe her own situation, which compelled 
her to appeal for help to the foreign princes, especially the Pope 
and Philip II. No fears need be entertained about Norfolk 
on account of the attitude which he had hitherto adopted with 
regard to religion ; this had been inevitable in the face of his 
wicked adversaries ; when the Protestants had advised her 
to change her religion he had urged her to stand firm ; Norfolk 
enjoyed the confidence of the Catholics, but in the meantime 
he could not disclose his real sentiments. Finally she begged 
the Pope to examine and to annul her marriage with Both- 
well. 3 

Armed with these instructions, Ridolfi, in the spring of 
1571, first repaired to Brussels to the Duke of Alba. 

Mary had for a long time past been in treaty with Alba in 
order to obtain his help against her enemies in Scotland. 4 
On November 3rd, 1569, when the gueux in Flanders seemed to 
be permanently broken up, when the Huguenots in France 
had been defeated, and after the seizure of the Spanish treasure 5 
had afforded just cause for a war with England, a call to 
intervene in English affairs had also reached him from the 
Pope. 8 But Alba remained inactive. He sent the Scottish 
queen some subsidies in money, but for the rest his reply to 
Mary s entreaties took the form of a warning not to trust too 

1 Ibid. 251-253. 

* Ibid. 222-233 GONZALES, 463-467 (Spanish translation). 

9 Cf. supra, p. 173 seq. 

4 Cf. her letters to Alba of April 23 and 30, May 16 and July 
8, 1569, in KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, Relations, V., 371, 377, 
385, 426. 

*See supra, p. 204. 

See supra pp. 211, 219. 


much in her advisers. 1 Mary replied that she hoped soon to 
be able to submit to Alba definite proposals, the carrying out 
of which would involve in everlasting gratitude to the King of 
Spain -and the duke, not only herself, but the whole island, 
and that she was making these proposals not in her own name 
alone. 2 Thus was heralded the mission of Ridolfi, whom 
Norfolk as well provided with a letter for the King of Spain of 
the same date. 3 

A short time afterwards the Italian presented himself in 
person to the duke at Brussels , Alba received him and his 
proposals somewhat coldty. The Florentine banker, with his 
lack of experience of military matters seemed to the expert 
soldier " a great babbler " 4 and his plan for conquering 
England a castle in the air. 

From Brussels Ridolfi went to Rome. His name was not 
unknown in the Curia ; he had already laid the designs of 
Norfolk before the Holy See, 5 and had rendered important 

1 Letter of February n, 1571, in KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, 
loc. cit., VI., 55. Cf. Alba to Spes, July 14, 1569, ibid. V., 429 : 
" De Francia me han hoy avisado que se destruye enteramente 
la Reina de Escocia con las platicas que sus criados tienen con 
Vuestra Merced, los quales jamas entran en su posada que no 
sea espiandolos, y podriale costar a la Reina la vida. ..." 

* Mary to Alba, March 20, 1571, ibid, go ; LABANOFF, III., 216. 

8 Letter of Norfolk in KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, loc. cit., 
90 seq. Kervyn doubts its authenticity (ibid. p. iv.) and looks 
upon Ridolfi in general as a charlatan (Huguenots, II., 387, 
n. 5). LINGARD (VIII., 81) has the same opinion of him. POLLEN 
(The Month, 1C., -1902, 147 n.) looks upon this view as exag 
gerated, and thinks that Ridolfi was substantially honest, and his 
papers reliable on the whole. 

4 " un gran parlanchin (GONZALEZ, 359) ; un hombre muy 
vacio " who did not know how to keep a secret, is what Alba 
calls him, September 5, 1571 (GACHARD, Corresp. de Felipe II., 
II.. 198). 

Three letters from Ridolfi (of April 18, 1569, July i, and 
September i, 1570) are preserved in the Papal Secret Archives ; 
their contents are in POLLEN, loc. cit. 144. A memorial of Ridolfi, 
of February 6, 1571, concerning the Pope s inclination to help 
Mary, in HOSACK, II., 502 seq. 


services to the Pope. A letter from Alba to Zuniga, the 
Spanish ambassador in Rome, had put the latter very much on 
his guard against the Florentine, and had also wrung from the 
Pope the declaration that nothing could be done in the matter 
against the opinion of Alba, but Zuniga rightly thought that 
the letters from Mary and Norfolk might win the Pope over 
to their point of view. 1 

Pius V., who flattered himself that he might now see the 
bull of deposition carried into effect, gave the intermediary a 
letter of recommendation to Philip II. ; in this letter it was 
stated that Ridolfi wished to lay before the king certain matters 
which were closely connected with the honour of God and the 
good of the Church : he urgently begged the king to trust him, 
and to lend him his assistance for the carrying out of his plans 
in every possible way. 2 As he wrote on the same day to Mary, 
the Pope had received Ridolfi with joy, and his mission with 
even greater joy ; he must, however, leave the rest to the 
prudent judgment of the Spanish king and his greater experi 
ence of such matters. For his part he would support the 
plan with all his power. He exhorted the queen to patience 

1 Zuftiga to Philip II., April 30, 1571, Corresp. dipl., IV., 258 
seq. The letter of Alba was of April 8 (ibid. 259 n.). In a con 
versation with Zuniga on April 30 Ridolfi represented the enter 
prise as being easy " como suelen hazer los que vienen con seme- 
jantes invenciones " (ibid. 258). 

1 Letter of May 5, 1571, in LADERCHI, 1571, n. 6 ; cf. Bonelli 
to the nuncio in Madrid, Castagna, May n, 1571, Corresp. dipl., 
IV., 274 seq. " II Sommo Pontifice ha gradito ed accettato tutto 
ci6 che e state concluso tra V.M. e rillustrissimo signor Duca 
di Norfolk ed altri nobili del regno, ha lodato le istruzioni che 
gli ho mostrate, e comprovato il loro disegno ; e siccome sa che 
ogni grazia e bene precede da Dio, non si puo dire con quanta 
calde orazioni questo Santo Pastore favorisce i loro desideri ed 
il buon fine dell impresa, ed e meraviglia con quanta inclinazione 
e veramente paterno animo, abbraccia e desidera il bene e il 
comando di V. M. e dei suoi amici confederati." Ridolfi to 
Mary, in FRANCESCO FABERI, S. Pio V. Studio storico, Siena, 
1893, 107. 


if during the summer it should still be necessary to wait before 
any steps were taken. 1 

At the end of June Ridolfi reached Madrid, and on the 28th 
he presented to the king the Pope s brief, together with the 
latters of receommendation from Mary, Norfolk, and the 
Spanish ambassador in London. 2 

Ridolfi found a zealous supporter of his plans in the Spanish 
nuncio, Castagna, who had already sought Philip s inter 
vention in English affairs. In Castagna s opinion, Ridolfi 
had come at exactly the right moment ; he at once spoke 
to the king on the subject, and through his influence the 
Florentine was able to lay his proposals before the sovereign 
on July 3rd, 1571, and to all appearances met with a favourable 
reception. 3 It seemed indeed that at that moment Philip 
was willing to strike a blow at England. He spoke at greater 
length on the subject with the nuncio, and with more warmth 
than was usual with him, declaring that it seemed to him that 
the moment had come to bring back England to the true 
faith for the second time, that the Pope had promised all 
possible help, and that the hesitation of France would be 
removed once the enterprise was embarked upon in the Pope s 
name, and on the ground of the bull of excommunication 
against Elizabeth. Ridolfi assured him that the Pope would 
agree to this, and accordingly Philip even took the preliminary 
steps. On July I2th a courier set out -to Alba and to the 
Spanish ambassador in London, to convey the news to Norfolk 
and the Queen of Scots, while the king repeatedly sent for 
Ridolfi in order to learn fuller details. 4 On August 23rd 

1 LADERCHI, 1571, n. 9. Ridolfi also presented a letter from 
Norfolk; ibid. 

* Philip II. to Spes, July 13, 1571, Corresp. de Felipe II., 
III., 477. The recommendations from Spes for Ridolfi to Philip 
II. and Zayas, of March 25, 1571, ibid. 444 seq. Ridolfi left Rome 
on May 20. Corresp. dipl., IV., 338 n. 

* Castagna to Ruscticucci, July 3, 1571, Corresp. dipl., IV., 

4 Castagna to Rusticucci, July 9, 1571, ibid. 381 seq. Zayas to 
Zufiiga, July 17, 1571, ibid. 389. 


Castagna wrote : all are in favour of the English enterprise, 
with one exception 1 but this one exception has much of 
importance to say. The nuncio had already hinted at this 
when he wrote that the affair would certainly have been 
carried out if Alba had not held the king back. 2 

Long before Ridolfi s arrival in Madrid a detailed statement 
ef his plan had been received from Alba. 3 The experienced 
commander looked upon the proposals of the amateur soldier 
as impracticable in their present form. Spain could not land 
troops in England without bringing both France and Germany 
into the field against herself. The Florentine s plans were 
only practicable supposing one condition were fulfilled. At 
that time Elizabeth was suffering from an ulcer in the leg, 
which was thought to be cancer. 4 Alba wrote that if the 
Queen of England were to die " by a natural death or in some 
other way," or if she were to fall into the hands of the Duke 
of Norfolk, 5 the jealousy of the other nations would not be 
aroused if Mary Stuart s claims to the English throne were 
supported by armed force. 

At the bottom of his heart Philip II. himself did not attach 
great weight to Ridolfi s original proposals, and on July 7th 
a conference was held on the suggestions of Alba, and especially 
on the question whether an attempt ought to be made " to 
kill " the queen, "or to capture her." 6 The outcome of this 

1 To Rusticucci, ibid. 413. 

2 Corresp. dipl., IV., 390 n. : " Se de la parte del Duca d Alba 
non viene raffredato, io tengo per certo che la impresa serk posta 
in opera." 

8 Of May 7, 1571 (reached Madrid May 22), in A. TEULET, 
Relations politiques de la France et de 1 Espagne avec 1 Ecosse, 
V., Paris, 1862, 74-87 ; MIGNET, II., 510-518. 

4 POLLEN in The Month, XCIX. (1902), 145. 

* " Pero en caso que la reina de Inglaterra huviesse muerta o 
de muerte natural o de otra, o que ellos se apoderassen de su 
persona, sin que V. M d se huviesse entremetido en esto, entonces 
no hallaria yo difficultad." In MIGNET, II., 516. 

6 We only have meagre accounts of this consultation, in MIGNET, 
II., 518-521, which for the most part are so difficult to understand 


discussion is furnished in a memorial drawn up by Ridolfi : 
the whole enterprise is left in the hands of the Duke of Alba ; 
he will decide the favourable moment for putting it into 
execution, and he will come to an arrangement with Nor 
folk and Spes for simultaneously obtaining possession of 
the queen, the Tower of London and the English fleet at 
Rochester. 1 

The condition which the king asked for, and which Ridolfi 
had declared to be satisfactory to the Pope, namely that the 
campaign against England should be carried on in the name 
of the Pope, and on the ground of the bull of excommunication, 
had in the meantime spontaneously been suggested to the king 
by Pius V. The entire direction of the enterprise, however, 
was to remain in the hands of the king, but if it were thought 
to be desirable the Pope was ready to confer upon the corn- 
that, e.g., the purpose of Velasco is understood by MIGNET (II., 
162) and KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE (Relations, VI., 5) in quite 
a contrary sense. The accounts begin with the proposition : 
" Que convenia comenzar por ellos y matar 6 prender la reina. 
Que de otra manera luego se casaria y mataria a la de Escocia." 
GONZALEZ (p. 361) understands " matar 6 prender " as capture 
and kill. Several later historians followed him. But according 
to the sources published so far, more cannot be stated as to the 
Spanish plan than is stated by HERGENROTHER (Kirche und 
Staat, 680) : " there was an intention of obtaining possession, 
in any case, of her person, and only in the case of extreme emer 
gency of killing her." Cf. POLLEN, English Catholics, 176. 
If it was intended to capture Elizabeth by a coup de main the 
possibility of her losing her life mast have been taken into con 

1 KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, Relations, VI., v. On June 12, 
1571, Spes had written to Philip II. : " if on the landing of I2,ootf 
to 15,000 soldiers, with a corresponding force of cavalry, the 
English should obtain possession of the queen, the enterprise 
would have half succeeded. It would also be well at once to 
capture Cecil, Leicester and Bedford, as well as the fleet at 
Rochester." This bold but visionary undertaking seemed to the 
ambassador quite easy : " todo lo qual es harto facil." Corresp. 
4e Felipe II., III., 354. 



mander appointed by Philip the title of pontifical general. 1 
At the same time Pius V. regretted the fact that the actual 
help which the Pope could give would be but small ; the under 
taking was of the greatest importance for the service of God 
and the welfare of the Church ; in spite of his poverty he 
would do all that he could, and if necessary would not grudge 
even the chalices from the altars and the pontifical vestments. 2 
The Pope would allow him to employ against England a part 
of the ecclesiastical revenues which had been set aside for the 
enterprise against the Turks. 3 

The royal council, however, rejected the proposal to under 
take the expedition in the name of the Pope, from a reluctance 
to acquiesce in the slightest degree in the claims of the Apos 
tolic See over the crowns of England and Ireland. 4 

The Duke of Alba showed himself but little pleased with 
the fresh task laid upon him by his sovereign, and made 
serious objections. 5 In the event of ill-success, he remarked, 
Philip s intervention would make enemies of England, France 
and Germany, would perhaps lead to a war with France, and 
inflict serious injury in the Low Countries on the very religion 
he was trying to protect in England ; the Venetians too might 
lose confidence in the king and withdraw from the league 
against the Turks. 6 The undertaking, moreover, was in very 
untrustworthy hands. Norfolk had neither resolution nor 
courage, 7 Guerau de Spes was blinded by his enmity for 

1 Rusticucci to Castagna, August 12, 1571, ibid. 409. Philip 
II. to Alba, July 14, 1571, in Gachard, Corresp. de Felipe II., 
II., 187. 

1 Ibid. 185. 

* Rusticucci to Castagna, September 24, 1571, Corresp. dipl., 
IV., 441. 

4 Philip II. to Alba, July 14, 1571, in GACHARD, loc. cit., 187. 
The Grand Inquisitor spoke at the council on July 7, in 
favour of the Pope s proposal, and Feria against it. MIGNET, 
II., 162. 

6 KRETZSCHMAR, Invasionsprojekte, 37 seqq. 
August 3, 1571, in GACHARD, loc. cit. 188. 

7 " Tengole por flaco y de poco animo " ; ibid. 189. 


Elizabeth, 1 Ridolfi was a frivolous man, who knew so little 
how to keep a secret that the merchants at Antwerp were 
openly discussing his plans, 2 and lastly, the national pride 
of the English would not easily put up with succour which 
came from abroad. 3 Alba scoffed at Ridolfi s idea that it 
would be possible to launch an expedition to capture Elizabeth, 
and another at the same time to seize the Tower and burn the 
English ships in the Thames ; even if Elizabeth herself were 
in alliance with Philip all this could not be carried out as 
Ridolfi suggested. 4 For these reasons Alba was of the opinion 
that help could only be given to the conspirators after they 
had secured possession of the person of the queen. 5 The king, 
for his part, adhered to his view that Alba should declare 
himself for the conspirators, and go to their assistance as soon 
as the force which he was to raise should be sufficiently large. 6 
He took the view that for higher motives, especially those of 
religion, it was possible to make light of these difficulties, 7 
and he remained of the same opinion even when he learned 
that Elizabeth had received information of Ridolfi s plans, 8 
and news had come of Norfolk s imprisonment. 9 In his letter 
of September I4th, however, he at last left the decision of the 
whole question to the judgment of Alba. The Spanish ambas 
sador in London had received, on August 4th, and again on 
the 3oth, instructions to act in the matter only in accordance 
with the orders of Alba. 10 

At length orders did come from Alba, but they were to the 
effect that the Spanish ambassador was not to let the world 

1 August 27, 1571 ; ibid. 193. 
1 September 5, 1571 ; ibid. 198. 
1 August 27, 1571 ; ibid. 193. 

4 Ibid. 194. 

5 August 3, 1571, ibid. 188 ; August 27, ibid. 194. 

To Alba, August 4, and 30, and September 14, 1571, ibid. 
191, 196, 200. 

7 To Alba, September 14, 1571, ibid. 198 seqq. 

8 To Alba, August 4, 1571, ibid. 191. 
To Alba, October 17, 1571, ibid. 205. 

10 Corresp. de Felipe II., III., 482, 494. 


know in any way, either directly or indirectly, that he was in 
possession of letters to Mary, Norfolk and Leslie. 1 A few 
weeks later Alba urgently recommended him to burn every 
thing he possessed bearing on Ridolfi s mission. 2 Towards 
the end of the year he wrote that he must leave the English 
Catholics and their sufferings to God. 3 

While Alba v/as hesitating, the English government had 
gathered all the threads of the conspiracy into its hands. 
The story of its discovery 4 affords a characteristic picture in 
miniature of the low morality of political life at that time. 
First of all there fell into the hands of the government a packet 
of letters from Ridolfi to Leslie with the address in cypher, but 
by means of his agents Leslie was able to substitute innocent 
letters for the incriminating ones. Torture, however, wrung 
from the bearer the confession that a landing in England was 
intended, and that Alba had approved of the plan. Soon 
afterwards Philip II., who was generally so cautious, betrayed 
himself. One of the founders of England s maritime power, 
the buccaneer John Hawkins, who has won for himself an ill 
name as being the first Englishman who, with the connivance 
and help of Elizabeth, carried on the slave-trade, 5 had lost 
some of his men as prisoners of war to the Spaniards. In 
order to liberate them from their prison in Seville, he hit upon 
a cunning scheme. With Cecil s approval, he went to the. 
Spanish ambassador in London, declaring himself to be a 
Catholic 6 and a partisan of Mary Stuart, and that he was ready 

1 Alba to Spes, July 30, 1571, in KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, 
Relations, VI., 157. 

* August 19, 1571, ibid. 163. 

* Alba to Spes, November 12 and 15, 1571, ibid. 216, 218. 
In the meantime Ridolfi had by Alba s wish started for Flanders 
on September 9 (Castagna to Rusticucci, September 9, 1571, 
Corresp. dipl., IV., 435). On November 19 he reappeared in 
Rome (Zufiiga to Philip II., November 27, 1571, ibid. 542). 

4 HOSACK, II., 55-56 ; BROSCH, VI., 565-568 ; LINGARD, VIIL, 
78 seq. 

6 LINGARD, VIII., 259. 

* KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, loc. cit. t 434. 


to hand over the ships he commanded to the Spaniards. In 
return for this he demanded a sum of money and the liberation 
of his imprisoned comrades. The Spanish ambassador 
referred Hawkins to Alba, but when the latter refused to have 
aynthing to do with the matter, Hawkins sent one of his 
officers, Fitzwilliams, direct to the King of Spain, with a letter 
from the Spanish ambassador. Philip received the envoy 
kindly, but before he would enter into any negotiations he 
wished for a letter of recommendation from Mary Stuart. 
Thereupon Fitzwilliams obtained from the Duke of Feria, 
whose wife was an Englishwoman, a letter to Mary, and on 
the strength of Feria s letter the queen, who suspected no 
treachery, was induced to write to the King of Spain begging 
him to release the English prisoners. Philip s doubts were 
thus dispelled and he informed Fitzwilliams that it was 
intended to effect a landing in England in the autumn, and 
that Hawkins would assist in this enterprise with his ships. 
An agreement to this effect was signed on August loth by 
Feria and Fitzwilliams as the representatives of Philip and 
Hawkins. Fitzwilliams returned to England bearing the 
title of Grandee of Spain for Hawkins and 50,000 pounds 

The Spanish plan was thus for the most part disclosed to 
the English government, and the only thing that was still 
uncertain was the identity of the Englishmen who were pre 
pared to assist the Spaniards in their undertaking ; and as 
to this an imprudent act served to put the secretary of state 
on their track. Mary Stuart wished to assign part of her 
allowance as a widow of France to the garrison of Edinburgh 
Castle, which had always remained loyal to her, and she sent 
the sum by the hands of a retainer of Norfolk named Higford 
to Bannister, who was in touch with Norfolk as his adminis 
trator. The messenger, who had been told that he was carry 
ing silver, surprised at the weight of his package, opened it, 
found gold and a letter in cypher, and at once reported the 
matter to Burghley. Higford was made to interpret the 
cypher, and Bannister and Barker, Norfolk s secretary, were 
arrested and confessed all they knew ; Barker knew a great 


deal, because it was he who had been the intermediary between 
Leslie, Ridolfi and Norfolk. 

Thus the conspiracy was brought to an end ; Ridolfi took 
good care not to set foot again in England ; Norfolk was again 
thrown into the Tower on September 7th, 1571, and ended 
his days on the scaffold on June 2nd in the following year. 
In vain did Leslie appeal to the privileges of an ambassador 
in order to escape imprisonment, and he only escaped torture 
by making a full confession. The Spanish ambassador was 
driven out of the country, and Burghley in mockery caused 
him, while still quite unsuspicious, to be escorted to Calais by 
Hawkins. 1 During the whole journey the crafty buccaneer 
took a cruel pleasure in amusing himself at the expense of 
the victim of his schemes by assuring him of his boundless 
devotion to the Spanish king. 2 

It was natural that the man who directed English political 
affairs should not let slip the opportunity of dragging the good 
name of the Pope in the dust. Cecil, on whom at the beginning 
of the year the title of Lord Burghley had been conferred, saw 
to it that the news of what had happened should be spread 
as widely as possible, with all the needful embellishments. 
On October i3th the news was communicated to the Lord 
Mayor and aldermen of London, who then assembled the 
masters of the city corporations, and they in their turn spread 
the news among the citizens. In order to excite the populace 
still more the whole affair was published in printed sheets, so 
that the streets rang 3 with the story of the schemes of Alba 
and the Pope against the city of London and the queen. 

1 Documents relating to this in KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, 
Relations, VI., 226 seqq., 242, 258, 260, 275, 283, 288, 294, 298, 337. 

1 HOSACK, II., 88. 

8 " de sorte que les rues ne re"sonnent ici autre matiere " (M. 
de Sweveghem to Alba, October 16, 1571, in KERVYN DE LETTEN 
HOVE, VI., 187). It has recently been maintained that Pius V. 
also knew of " the proposals to murder Queen Elizabeth " and 
the conspiracy of Ridolfi (DOLLINGER-REUSCH, Die Selbstbio- 
graphie des Kardinals Bellarmin, Bonn, 1887, 307; cf. ibid, in 
the summary on p. vi. : " The plan to murder Elizabeth of Eng- 


It was probably Mary Stuart who suffered most bitterly 
from the consequences of the failure of the conspiracy. 1 Her 
very life was in extreme danger. All her servants, at first 
with the exception of sixteen, and then of ten, had to leave 
her service, and the princess, who had been accustomed to ride 
abroad freely and continually, found herself confined to her 
own apartment, and when she was ill was not even allowed to 
see a doctor. She herself looked upon this treatment as fore 
shadowing her execution and asked for a priest, which request, 
however, was refused. 

For the moment, however, Burghley was content with dis- 

land, approved by Pius V." LORD ACTON, letter to the Times, 
November 24, 1874, in GLADSTONE, The Vatican Decrees, 1875). 
But there is no proof that Ridolfi spoke to the Pope about any 
plan to kill Elizabeth. The instructions for Ridolfi (supra p. 
227 seq.) contain no mention of this. To Norfolk and Mary 
Ridolfi proposed that Elizabeth be left on the throne (HOSACK, 
II., 53 seq.). See supra p. 154, how Pius V. rejected political 
assassination as unlawful. MEYER (p. 228) says : " there is 
nothing to show that he [Pius V.] approved of or even spoke of 
the assassination [of Elizabeth] as a praiseworthy act." The 
passage in GACHARD, Corresp. de Philippe II., II., 185 (from 
the letter of Philip to Alba of July 14, 1571) : " the progress of 
Elizabeth to her cities in August and September serait une 
occasion de se saisir de sa personne ET de la tuer " (DOLLINGER- 
REUSCH, p. 310) proves no more against Philip than the passage 
quoted supra p. 232, n. 6, because the progress actually offered 
an occasion for either. Cf. in the same letter (loc. cit. 186) : 
" de tuer OU de prendre." An ambiguous passage in the life 
of Pius V. by GABUTIUS (Acta Sanct., Maii I., 661), to which 
Acton appeals, is taken from Catena, and is in his opinion quite 
harmless (POLLEN, English Catholics, 125). The French am 
bassador at Brussels, Mondoucet, reports on December 26, 1571, 
that two Italians had been sent to poison Elizabeth or otherwise 
take per life (Bulletin de la Commission d hist., 3rd ser., XIV., 
341). Kervyn de Lettenhove, who seems to attach importance 
to this in Les Huguenots, II., 388, speaks quite otherwise in 
Relations, VI., vi. 

1 HOSACK, II., 66 seqq. 


gracing his enemy in the eyes of the world. At the end of 
1571 Mary received, as a birthday gift, a little book, the book 
which later on became celebrated under the title of the 
Detectio, by the humanist Buchanan, who had once been in 
Mary s service, and had sung her virtues. 1 In this book there 
appeared, clothed in classical Latin, the calumnies contained 
in the Book of the Articles, which had been presented at 
Westminster. Burghley saw to it that the book was trans 
lated and spread abroad. For centuries to come, and down 
to our own days, Buchanan s calumnies have coloured men s 
judgment of the unhappy Queen of Scots. 2 

Just a year before Elizabeth too had received a precious 
gift from her favourite, Leicester. This was a small picture 
showing Elizabeth seated in sadness upon a lofty throne, with 
Mary Stuart in chains before her, and begging for pardon, 
while the neighbouring kingdoms of Spain and France were 
covered by the waves of the sea, and Neptune and other gods 
paid homage to the Queen of England. 3 It was true that so 
far Elizabeth had defeated her rival both in power and in 
cunning ; the future was to decide with which of them the 
moral victory would lie. 

Although, in spite of the bull of excommunication of 1570, 
no military expedition was launched against the Queen of 

1 Ibid. 80 seq. Six months before Leslie had published a 
defence of Mary in which, as HOSACK (II., 82) remarks, two 
statements are specially worthy of attention : in the first place 
that the casket letters are false, and in the second place that 
Paris, who had conveyed the letters to Bothwell and is the only 
witness who directly accuses Mary of the murder of her husband, 
declared to the people immediately before his execution that he 
had never carried any such letters and that Mary was innocent : 
" that he never carried such letters, nor that the queen was par 
ticipant." Buchanan made no reply to these two statements. 

" BEKKER, 276 seqq. 

* Spes to Zayas, January 9, 1571, Corresp. de Felipe II., III., 
428. Spes did not fail to add that it was thus they flattered a 
princess " que fuera dello vive en harta mos soltura que las Jonas 
de Napoles, ni otras tales." 


England, either from Rome or Madrid, attempts te withdraw 
the neighbouring island of Ireland from Elizabeth s yoke were 
not laid aside during the pontificate of Pius V. 1 

The violence of the English rule in Ireland had gradually 
brought about there an intolerable state of affairs. In 1569 
the southern Irish had sent to Philip II. the Archbishop of 
Cashel, Maurice O Gibbon, with a memorial signed by four 
archbishops, eight bishops, and twenty-five Irish nobles, in 
the name of the bishops, gentry and cities, showing how for 
more than a thousand years the Irish had been devotedly loyal 
to the Apostolic See, and filled with the deepest hatred of 
their English rulers, who, ever since the time of Henry VIII., 
had sacked the churches and convents, banished the bishops 
and religious, and thrown everything into confusion. They 
begged the King of Spain to send them a sovereign of his own 
house. 2 On March ist, 1570, O Gibbon also wrote to the 
Pope, who did not show himself averse to the plan, but at once 
insisted on the view, which became a fundamental part of 
the Papal policy with regard to Irish affairs, that Ireland 
was a Papal fief, and that the Irish could only therefore 
obtain a new feudal lord with the previous consent of the 
Holy See. 3 

So far Philip s policy had been friendly towards Elizabeth 
and rather the reverse towards her rival, Mary Stuart, because 
the accession of the francophile Queen of Scots seemed to him 
to mean an increase in the power of France, and consequently 

1 POLLEN in The Month, CI. (1905), 69-85. BELLESHEIM, 
Irland, II., 161 seqq., 697 seqq. KRETZSCHMAR, Invasionspro- 
jekte, 52 seq. ; report of Sega ibid. 194-212. 

1 MORAN, Spicil., I., 59 seq. BELLESHEIM, II., 158. 

8 BELLESHEIM, II., 160. Both Philip II. and Mary had recog 
nized the rights of the Holy See over Ireland, since they had 
accepted the bull of Paul IV. of June 7, 1555, in which the Pope 
says of Ireland : " . . . illius dominium per Sedem praedictam 
[the Apostolic See] adepti sunt reges Angliae " and then raises 
Ireland to be a kingdom " sine praeiudicio iurium ipsius Romana 
ecclesiae." Bull. Rom., VI., 489 seq. 


a danger to Spain. 1 But now France was weakened by in 
ternal wars ; England had roused Philip to fury with her 
buccaneers and her seizure of Spanish gold, 2 and his policy 
was gradually taking another direction. He did not fall in 
with the proposals of O Gibbon, although the archbishop on 
July 26th, 1570, urged him to haste, pointing out to the king 
that later on he would not be able to accomplish with 100,000 
men what he could now easily do with io,ooo, 3 but at the 
same time a sign of his changed attitude was to be seen in 
the favour shown by Philip to an adventurer at the Spanish 
court, with whom O Gibbon as well had relations, but whose 
fantastic schemes proved fatal, not indeed in the time of Pius 
V., but later on, to Ireland, and indirectly to the Catholics 
in England. 

Thomas Stukely, the son of a Devonshire knight, a man 
without morals or religious principles, had up to this time 
wandered about the world, travelling and seeking adventures ; 
he had placed his services at the disposal of almost all the 
Christian princes, he had accommodated himself to all the 
changes of religion in England, and had always been able in 
the cleverest way to obtain money for his extravagances and 
excesses, for Stukely was a man who had the gift of winning 
people over at sight. For a time he carried on the profitable 
business of a pirate on the coasts of America ; he was captured, 
but escaped the hanging he had deserved by the intercession 
of Shane O Neill, and, backed by recommendations from Cecil, 
Leicester and Pembroke, resumed his former manner of life 
in Ireland. At first Elizabeth showed him favour, but when 
she ceased to patronize him, Stukely at once made up his mind 
to set sail for Spain in order to devote his sword to the liberation 
of Catholic Ireland in the service of Philip. 

Philip had no idea of conquering Ireland, but Elizabeth s 
continued outrages were like so many pin-pricks to him, and 
he was therefore much inclined by way of retaliation to kindle 
a small or a great conflagration in Ireland. He therefore 

1 Cf. Vol. XVI. of this work, p. 223. 
8 Cf. supra, p. 204. 
* BELLESHEIM, II., 159. 


summoned Stukely to Madrid and loaded him with money 
and favours. It was not long before they began to feel the 
effects of this in London, so much so that Philip thought it 
well to pacify the queen by a letter from his secretary Zayas, 
and to send Stukely with Don Juan against the Turks. There 
the hot-headed adventurer was in his element ; he distin 
guished himself at the battle of Lepanto, and thus won himself 
a good name in ecclesiastical circles. Thereupon Rome 
seemed to him to be a place where he could turn his talents to 
advantage ; he there made a pilgrimage bare-footed to all the 
principal sanctuaries, and whereas before he had vainly 
attempted to obtain from Pius V. absolution from the ex 
communication which he had richly deserved for his earlier 
life, he now soon found himself in as high favour as he had 
previously been with Elizabeth and Philip. On December 
ist, 1571, the Cardinal Secretary of State wrote to Bonelli 
at Madrid that the Pope had looked with favour upon Stukely s 
schemes, but that the responsibility for the undertaking must 
be left entirely to the King of Spain ; that the Pope would raise 
no objections, if anyone should undertake it in his name, if 
the king did not wish to be called its author. 1 Philip rejected 
the proposal. As previously, in the reassuring letter from 
Zayas to Elizabeth, he had questioned the capacity and the 
knowledge of the adventurer for the Irish undertaking, 2 so 
he now described the schemes of Stukely as impracticable. 3 
For the rest of the life of Pius V, the Irish undertaking lay 
dormant, only, to be renewed seven years later in a most 
unfortunate way. 

1 POLLEN, loc. cit., 74, and English Catholics, 192 seqq. 

* POLLEN in The Month, 1905, 72 seq. 

* Castagna, January TI, 1572, ibid. 74. 



Pius V/s attitude towards religion, as well as his whole 
character, were radically opposed to those of the Emperor, 
Maximilian II. A man of clear and definite views, the sworn 
enemy of all pretence and disloyalty, and profoundly convinced 
of the truth of the Catholic religion, the Pope looked for 
salvation solely from that faith, and he therefore watched with 
unbending sternness over the preservation in all its purity 
of that supreme good. A convinced Catholic, any kind of 
compromise in matters of dogma was impossible in his eyes. 
The Emperor on the other hand, a skilled politician and 
experienced in all the arts of a shifty diplomcy, had very 
confused ideas on religious matters, and was vacillating and 
undecided. 1 In his anxiety for the pacification of his domin 
ions he completely lost sight of the fact that a man who rejects 
even one single doctrine of the Church ceases to be a Catholic. 
It was true that Maximilian assisted at mass, and for a time 
retained the good Catholic Martin Eisengrein as the court 
preacher, but when the latter ended a sermon with an invo 
cation of the Mother of God and the Saints the Emperor 
rebuked him, saying that such things were not in keeping with 
the spirit of the times. 2 It is certain that Maximilian had as 
little respect for the binding force of the dogmas defined at 
Trent as he had for the consequences of the oath which he 
had taken at his coronation. He entirely departed from the 
Catholic stand-point when he dreamed of being able to reconcile 

1 Cf. JANSSEN-PASTOR, IV. 15 * 16 , 210 seq,, where the recent 
bibliography concerning the religious attitude of Maximilian II. 
is collected and criticized. 

See PFLEGER, Eisenfrein, 63. 



opposing doctrines, in the vain hope of wearing down and at 
last putting an end to religious strife by such expedients. If 
in political questions affecting the Empire he made more 
than one concession to the Catholic states, this was merely 
a matter of policy. This monarch, who was not greatly gifted 
intellectually, 1 had no grasp of dogmatic truth ; to him all 
religious questions seemed to be useless. Strict Catholics 
were as unwelcome to him as the most rigid Calvinists. His 
ideal continued to be a " religion " built up of Lutheran 
and Catholic principles, the acceptance of which would put 
an end to the disputes which were so harmful to the welfare 
of the various states. But the times in which he lived were 
particularly unsuited for any such schemes of reunion after 
the promulgation of the decrees of Trent, while equally hope 
less was the Emperor s other plan of satisfying the Protestants 
in his dominions without openly offending the Catholics by 
granting them under certain conditions the freedom to profess 
the Confession of Augsburg of 1530. According to his own 
statements, in so doing he was only aiming at reunion in the 
same way as Charles V. had done a generation earlier. But 
what had been in some ways comprehensible then, was now 
doomed from the first to be ineffectual, when the Council had 
definitely stamped as Catholic the controverted doctrines, 
and the schism had taken permanent root among the Pro 

It was evident that a man like the new Pope could never 
be won over to the confused and fantastic schemes of the 
Emperor, for Pius V. had ever fought in the most uncom 
promising way for the purity and inviolability of the Catholic 
faith. 2 Maximilian, therefore, was far from pleased at the 

1 See Goxz in Histor. Zeitschrift, LXXVII., 198, who very 
rightly rejects the name of " Catholicism by compromise/ and 
passes^as severe a judgment as Janssen on the hypocrisy of Maxi 

* How different Pius V. s point of view was from that of Maxi 
milian appears clearly among other things from the discussions 
in the consistory of June 81, 1571, concerning Madruzzo s pro 
posal to invite the Protestants to join the league against the 


election of Pius, 1 but realizing how important the Pope s 
good-will was for obtaining help against the Turks, he bought 
to keep on good terms with him. In his first letter to Pius V., 
dated January 24th, 1566, and sent to Rome by a special 
messenger, Maximilian makes the following protestation : 
There shall never be wanting on our part filial obedience 
towards Your Holiness, nor those services which are to be 
looked for from the protector and defender of the Church ; 
we shall omit none of those things which are due from us in 
virtue of our imperial office, or which can be done for the advan 
tage and welfare of Christendom." 2 

Such words could only be of practical value when backed 
up by corresponding acts. There was already good ground 
for suspicion in the fact that Maximilian up to the last moment 
tried to prevent the mission of Cardinal Commendone, who had 
already been appointed legate for the Diet of Augsburg in 
I566. 3 

Commendone was a distinguished personality in every 
respect. All contemporaries agree in praising his great 
qualities of intellect and character. He had a full knowledge, 
from his own personal experience, of the ecclesiastical and 
political conditions of Germany, he was a personal friend of 
the house of Hapsburg, and "he was deeply convinced of the 

Turks, a thing against which Pius V. definitely declared : " et 
quantum ad eos qui sunt Confessionis Augustanae, Sanctitas 
Sua credit cum b. Augustino esse magis vitandos et periculosos, 
qui in aliquibus nobiscum conveniunt, ut in fide Trinitatis et 
similibus, et in ceteris dissentiunt, quam qui in omnibus dissentiunt 
veluti infideles seu haeretici perditissimi, ut est Palatinus, sacra- 
mentarii, impii trinitarii et anabaptistae. Nam isti non tantum 
nocere possunt, cum ab omnibus vitentur veluti qui impii et 
manifeste infideles existimantur ; sed illi, qui in aliquibus sunt 
haeretici, plus nocere possunt, ex eo quod nobiscum in pluribus 
ritibus conveniant." Studi e docum. XXIII., 339. 

1 See SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 2-3 ; HILLIGER, 151 ; BIBL, 
Erhebung, 21 ; DENGEL, V., 33, 34, 35. 

See SCHWARZ, loc. cit. 41. 

8 See ibid. vii. ; HOPFEN, 131, 232 seq. ; DENGEL, V., 413. 


necessity of the maintenance of good relations between the 
Emperor and the Pope j at the same time he was a man of 
strict ecclesiastical views, and moreover was not one of those 
ambitious men who might set their own ends before those of 
the Church. 1 

From the very beginning of his pontificate Pius V. had turned 
his attention to German affairs, and on January i2th, 1566, 
had charged Cardinals Morone, Farnese, Borromeo and Delfino 
to examine them. On the igth he decided to form a special 
congregation, composed of these Cardinals, together with 
Galli, Mark Sittich, Madruzzo and Reumano, as well as 
Truchsess, who had arrived in Rome on the i6th. This con 
gregation decided upon the renewed appointment of Commen- 
done as legate for the Diet of Augsburg, and Pius confirmed 
this at the consistory of January 23rd. 2 A brief to Maximilian 
two days later pointed out as Commendone s special duty that 
of seeing that in the Diet nothing should be done concerning 
matters the decision of which belonged to the Apostolic See 
alone, and that moreover no steps should be taken with regard 
to the decrees of the Council of Trent, which were binding upon 
all Catholics. On the other hand he was to negotiate concern^ 
ing a league against the Turks, which the Pope promised to 
promote and help in every possible way. 3 

On January 25th Pius V. sent urgent letters to the Arch 
bishops of Mayence and Treves, inviting them to go in person 
to the Diet, and to prevent ecclesiastical matters being dis- 

*A biography of Commendone would be a very valuable 
work. Plentiful materials for this are to be found in the Papal 
Secret Archives, and especially in the Graziani Archives at Citta 
di Castello. It is upon the material there that is based the Vita 
Commendoni of A. M. GRATIANI, Paris, 1569 (translated into 
French by FLECHIER, Paris, 1694, and Lyons, 1702), which, 
though a noteworthy publication for the time, is not sufficient 
for modern requirements. A *version of the Vita Commendoni 
of Gratianus, which is different from the printed edition, is in the 
Graziani Archives. 

* See SCHWARZ, loc. cit., 4 ; .DENGEL, V., 40 seq. 

8 See SCHWARZ, loc. cit. 6 seqq. ; DENGEL, V., 36 seq. 


cussed there, or any other attack being made upon the rights 
of the Pope or the bishops. Similar letters were sent to the 
whole of the German episcopate. 1 

Though he had but little liking for the difficult and responsi 
ble mission assigned to him, Commendone at once obeyed the 
Pope s command, which was awaiting him on his return from 
his legation in Poland. On February i;th, 1566, he reached 
Augsburg, where the Emperor had been since January 2Oth, 
and was awaiting the arrival of the States of the Empire, who 
only arrived by slow degrees. 2 On February 2oth he had an 
audience with Maximilian II., and the latter gave him satis 
factory assurances as to the religious questions. It was very 
useful to the legate that the Emperor desired as much help 
as possible for the Turkish war, a matter of which Johann 
Khevenhuller, who had been sent to Rome to convey the 
Emperor s congratulations, was to treat.* Commendone at 
once realized how useful this question of assistance against 
the Turks would be for gaining influence over the Emperor 
in religious matters. 4 Even more than the exhortations of 
the legate, and the indifference of the Protestant princes, did 
this consideration cause Maximilian to abstain from any 
discussion of a religious compromise when this was put forward 
as a subject for consideration at the assembly of the Diet. 
The tenor of the proposals laid before the Diet on March 23rd 
shows that Maximilian had let this matter drop ; nothing 
further was asked for than the discussion of the detestable 

1 See LADERCHI, 1566, n. 222 and 223. 

1 Cf. ROBSAM, N. Mameranus iiber den Reichstag von 1566 
in Histor. Jahrbuch, X. t 356. The *original register of the reports 
of Commendone of his legation of 1566 was found in the Graziani 
Archives at Citta di Castello by Professor Dengel, who has begun 
its publication with a full commentary in the Vth vol. of the 
Nuntiatuvbtrichte of Pius V. To Dengel belongs the credit of 
having opened to historical examination the hitherto inaccessible 
Graziani Archives. 

See SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, p. xji., 14, 20; DENQEL, V., 

$3 W 
4 See DENGEL, V., 74, 


fecti which were opposed both to the Catholic and the Lutheran 
religion, which everybody understood to refer to -Calvinism, 
which the Emperor hated. 

In the meantime Commendone had received detailed in 
structions as to his mission on March I3th, 1566. The bearer 
of thee wai Scipione Lancellotti, who was to assist him as his 
canonist. Count Melchior Biglia, whom Pius IV. had 
appointed nuncio to the Imperial court on August 3ist, 1565, 
and whom Pius V. had confirmed in that office, 1 also now 
appeared at Augsburg. The Pope had also seen to it that 
the legate should have experienced theologians to help him 
as his advisers in ecclesiastical questions, such as the Jesuits 
Nadal, Ledesma, and Peter Canisius, and the Englishman 
Sanders. 2 

The instructions for Commendone, which had been decided 
upon in the cardinalitial congregation appointed by Pius V., 
had been drawn up by the man in Rome who was best 
acquainted with German conditions, Cardinal Morone, who had 
availed himself of an opinion drawn up by Truchsess. 3 These 
instructions kid down as his principal duties the exclusion of 
all religious discussion at the Diet, the publication and carrying 
out of the decrees of Trent, a radical reform of ecclesiastical 
conditions in Germany, and finally the promotion of a league 
against the Turks. 

As to the first point the Pope s instructions were very clear. 
Commendone was fearlessly to oppose any attempt at the 
Diet to treat of religious questions, either directly or in 
directly ; it was not the province of the laity to do so, and 
experience had shown that such discussions did not lead to 
unity, and thus things were made worse than before. The 
legate was to be equally zealous in obtaining the assistance of 
tii" Kmpcroi for the publication and ob iervan< c of the Tridcn 
tine decrees. If he should not be able to secure this for the 

1 See ibid, i seq., 50 seq. 

See BRAUNSBERGER, Pius V., 6. 

See SCHWARZ, he. cit. 6. The instructions, dated February 
27, 1566, in DENC;EL, V., 56 seq. For the faculties of Commendone 
ee ibid. 42 seq, Cf. CANISII Epist., V., 576. 



whole of the Empire, Commendone was to insist that the 
decrees should at any rate be published in the dioceses of 
Salzburg, Constance, Eichstatt, Augsburg, Freising, Passau, 
Brixen and Trent, and to induce all the ecclesiastical princes 
to observe them. 

Further instructions were added to the effect that he must 
obtain from Frederick von Wied, the archbishop-elect of 
Cologne, the oath and profession of faith prescribed at Trent. 
Commendone was further charged to see that if, as was ex 
pected, a vacancy occurred in the episcopal sees of Magdeburg 
and Strasbourg, these should not fall into the hands of the 

The remainder of the instructions show what far-reaching 
plans Pius V. had in mind for the renewal of ecclesiastical life 
in Germany. All the bishops were to be urged to the reform 
of the clergy, both secular and regular ; those who were not 
yet consecrated must repair this defect. The bishops were to 
be asked to make a personal visitation at least once a year 
of their dioceses, to prevent the introduction of heretical 
books, to promote in every way the spread of Catholic litera 
ture, and to establish seminaries for the clergy. 

In order to carry out these tasks, which formed, as it were, 
the Pope s programme for dealing with the ecclesiastical 
situation in Germany, the legate was advised to win over the 
Emperor s advisers, and to enter into close relations with the 
Catholic Duke of Bavaria and the Spanish ambassador. 

Commendone accordingly treated the Catholic princes and 
the bishops with the greatest courtesy ; this he did especially 
in the case of Albert V. of Bavaria, who was a fervent Catholic. 1 
In other ways, too, the legate let no opportunity slip of carrying 
out the Pope s commands. It was natural that his principal 
care should, before everything else, be devoted to the dis 
cussions at the Diet. 

In consequence of the latest form of the proposals laid 
before the Diet useless discussions of the Catholic faith and a 
mixture of religions had been, it is true, excluded, but even 

1 See BRAUNSBERGER, Pius V., 8. 


so the danger had not been entirely removed. It did not 
escape Commendone that this time too the Protestants were 
seeking to obtain concessions in religious matters on the 
strength of the help which they were asked to give against 
the Turks. Vigilance and circumspection, qualities in which 
the legate was not lacking, were called for, and he entered 
into close relations with the Catholics, especially the Arch 
bishop of Treves and the Duke of Bavaria. 1 

In spite of the great differences which existed between the 
Lutherans and the Calvinists, in the memorial, at once a peti 
tion and a complaint, which was presented by the Protestants 
to the Emperor, they made a pretence of being united in faith ; 
in their territories those sects which the Emperor wished to 
see abolished had no weight ; all such sects were the work of 
the devil and the Papists. In order to do away with the 
" abominations and idolatries of the Papacy " they demanded 
the convocation of a national council under the presidency 
of the Emperor ; until such a council was held Maximilian 
should grant to those subjects of Catholic states who were 
willing to accept the Confession of Augsburg the free exercise 
of their religion and the abolition of the ecclesiastical reser- 
vatum. 2 If this latter, by which an ecclesiastical prince who 
should pass from the Catholic religion to Lutheranism for 
feited his office and his revenues, were to be removed, the 
followers of the new doctrines might reasonably hope to be 
able to take further steps for the complete extermination of 
the " abominations and idolatries of the Papacy " in the 
Empire. 3 

1 Commendone showed prudent foresight in abstaining from 
delivering the brief of February 13, 1566, addressed to the Em 
peror and all the states of the Empire, including the Protestant 
ones, which exhorted them to unity of faith on the basis of the 
Tridentine decrees (see SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 7-9 ; HOPFEN, 
241). The legate was also successful in averting the danger of 
the affair of the oath of the Archbishop of Cologne being brought 
before the Diet. Cf. POGIANI Epist., IV., 301. 

1 See JANSSEN-PASTOR, IV., 15 16 ; 224 seqq. 

1 Cf. KLUCKHORN, Briefs, I., 520, 529 seq. 


In the meantime such disquieting news of the Emperor s 
religious attitude had reached Rome that it was feared there 
that he would adopt the Confession of Augsburg. For this 
reason on April 6th orders were sent to Commendone that, 
should this occur, he was to leave the Diet after making a 
protest. Commendone did not share these fears of Maxi 
milian s apostasy, but he had from the first clearly foreseen 
the likelihood of a general confirmation of the so-called 
religious peace of Augsburg of 1555 which, being re 
jected by the Calvin ist states, was for that reason all the 
more ardently supported by the Emperor, as well as by the 
ecclesiastical princes, who feared fresh spoliations if the 
agreement were broken. 1 Commendone s position was thus 
extremely difficult, and he asked for furthei instructions as to 
the course which he should follow. When these instructions 
arrived at the end of April he found himself in a position of 
even greater embarrassment, for the Pope ordered him to 
lodge a protest and leave the city if in the Diet any decision 
of any kind were arrived at which was contrary to the dogmatic 
decrees of the Council of Trent. 2 

Pius V. condemned the religious peace of Augsburg as 
decisively as Paul IV., his predecessor, and a man of close 
spiritual affinity with himself, 3 but undei the existing circum 
stances it was inevitable that that peace should be confirmed, 
since even the Catholics at Augsburg supported it in order to 
save themselves from fresh dangers. A protest on the part 
of the legate would have led, to the great joy of his enemies, 
not only to a quarrel with the Emperor, but also with the 
Catholic states. 

In this difficult situation Commendone had recourse to his 
ecclesiastical advisers, especially Canisius. To the principal 
question which he addressed to them, whether the peace of 
1555 and its confirmation was in contradiction to the dogmatic 

1 See the "report of Commendone of April 22, 1566, Graziani 
Archives, Cittk di Castello. 

* Cf. NADAL, III., 99 ; CANISII Epist., V., 252 ; BROGNOLI, 
II., 190. 

* Cf. Vol, XIV. of this work, p. 343. 


decrees of the Council of Trent, the Jesuits answered that it 
was not, as it was a peace that was concerned with political 
affairs and not with dogma ; it had been nothing but an ex 
pedient and a provisional armistice. The Holy See it was true 
could not openly approve it, but it could tolerate it until better 
times should come. The legate therefore was not obliged to 
lodge a protest. Since, however desirable it might be, it 
was not to be expected that at the present Diet the Catholic 
states would make a profession of the Council and its decrees, 
the said states should at least, in some way or other, declare 
their acceptance of the Tridentine decrees. 1 Sanders agreed 
with the views expressed by the Jesuits. Lancellotti on the 
other hand declared that the religious peace of Augsburg and 
its renewed confirmation were irreconcilable with the Council, 
and insisted on a protest being made by the legate. 2 Cardinal 
Truchsess and the Spanish ambassador, as well as Biglia, 
feared that in that case the Diet would be dissolved and a war 
begun, which would destroy all that still remained of Catholic 
ism in Germany. 3 

Under these circumstances Commendone, who realized 
Pius V. s strictness in all that concerned the faith, resolved 
to do nothing without making further inquiries in Rome, 4 and 
he sent thither his auditor, Caligari, to make a verbal report 
and obtain further instructions. 5 If in the end these took the 

1 See LADERCHI, 1566, n. 233-235 ; NADAL, III., 88-104 * 
CANISII Epist., V., 229 and 253 ; DUHR. I., 828, n. i. 

* See LADERCHI, 1566, n. 232, 233 ; BRAUNSBERGER, Pius 
V., 10. 

3 See LADERCHI, 1566, n. 230. Truchsess had gone, with finan 
cial help from Pius V. from Rome to Augsburg on February 23, 
1566 ; see *Avviso di Roma of March 2, 1566, Urb. 1040, p. 188, 
Vatican Library. 

4 See the *letter of Commendone to Pius V. of May i, 1566, 
and the report of Biglia of May 3, 1566, which are to be printed 
by Dengel in his Vth volume. A letter addressed by H. Corboli 
to Sirleto, dated Augsburg, April 27, 1566, describes the dangerous 
state of affairs on all sides ; see LAEMMER, Analecta, 57, 125 seq. 

6 See BROGNOLI, II., 191 seq. 


form of the Pope s leaving everything to the judgment of the 
legate, who was thus able to avoid making a protest, much 
of the credit for this belongs to the General of the Jesuits, 
Francis Borgia, whom the Jesuits at Augsburg had begged 
to intervene. 1 

In the meantime at Augsburg the Catholic states toad calmly 
but definitely rejected the memorial presented by the Pro 
testants, declaring with regard to the demand for the abolition 
of the reservation, and for freedom in religious matters, that 
they intended to adhere literally to the terms of the religious 
peace of 1555.2 

Commendone then proceeded to devote his attention to the 
other two tasks laid upon him by Pius V., the one that the 
Catholic states should bind themselves expressly and openly 
to the decrees of Trent, and the other the removal of ecclesi 
astical abuses. On May 23rd he held a conference at his 
lodgings, at which there assisted Cardinals Truchsess and Mark 
Sittich, the three ecclesiastical Electors, the Dukes of Bavaria, 
Cleves and Brunswick, and the representatives of the Catholic 
states. In accordance with the instructions which he had 
received, Commendone urged in eloquent terms the publication 
of the decrees of the Council and the carrying out of the 
necessary reforms. The answer made in the name of those 
present by Daniel von Brendel, Archbishop of Mayence and 
arch-chancellor of the Empire, was to the following effect : 
the Catholic states accept the decrees of the Council of Trent 
in all that concerns dogma and divine worship ; as to dis 
ciplinary matters they would like certain facilities suited to 
their peculiar circumstances, especially with regard to pro 
vincial synods. 3 

Commendone had every reason to be pleased with his success. 
Even if this declaration did not comply, with all he had 
asked for, both with regard to its limitation and its form, 

1 Cf. NADAL, III., 96 seqq., 130 seqq. ; BROGNOLI, II., 197 
BRAUNSBERGER, Pius V., 10 seq. 

See JANSSEN-PASTOR, IV. 11 - 56 , 228 seqq 

8 See GRATIANUS, III., 2. Cf. NADAL, III., 147, 152. See 
also SCHWARZ, Visitation, p. xxxiii. 


it was nevertheless a distinct advance upon the state of affairs 
in the time of Pius IV., who had never been able to obtain 
a satisfactory answer from the ecclesiastical princes in this 
matter. 1 It was a further triumph that at the dissolution of the 
Diet on May 3oth no mention was made of further conferences, 
of a national council, or of religious freedom. Thus for the 
first time for many years a Diet came to an end without any 
loss to the Catholics, who on this occasion left Augsburg with 
renewed courage and hopes. The Pope was especially gratified 
at the acceptance of the Council on the part of the Catholic 
states ot Germany, and declared that his expectations had 
been surpassed. 2 

By the advice of Commendone, who did not trust the 
Emperor, the subsidy granted by the Pope against the Turks 
in April, to the amount of 50,000 scudi, was not paid until after 
the close of the Diet, whereupon, on July loth, 1566, the 
legate started back for Rome. 3 

The Diet had granted to the Emperor 24 Roman " mesi," 
that is about 1,700,000 florins, and eight " mesi " for each of 
the following three years. Philip II. contributed 200,000 
crowns. 4 Under these circumstances Pius V., whose finances 
were already deeply involved in other directions, did not comply 
with the request made to him by the Emperor for further sums. 5 
As a matter of fact Maximilian had a sufficient sum in hand 
to enrol 14,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry in Germany. 
Help also reached him from other sources, especially from the 
Italian princes ; moreover, he had 12,000 men from Lower 
Austria and Croatia, 6,000 from Hungary, 5,000 from the 
commander-in-chief Schwendi, so that altogether there were 
more than 60,000 men under arms. It was only after all these 
troops had been gathered together that Maximilian joined the 
expedition in the middle of August. 6 In September there 

1 Cf. RITTER, I., 289. 

2 Cf. NADAL, III., 159; BRAUNSBERGER, Pius V., n. 

* See GRATIANUS, III., 3 ; SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 20, 23 seqq. 

4 HUBER, IV., 256. 

6 SCHWARZ, loc. cit. 23 seqq., 30, 33 seqq. 

6 See HUBER, IV., 256 seqq. ; TURBA, III., 334 seq. 


also arrived at the head-quarters of the Emperor the nuncio, 
Biglia, who, during the Diet at Augsburg, had been quite 
thrust into the background by the personality of Commendone, 
who overshadowed everybody else. 1 

The aged Sultan Suleiman who, accompanied by the prayers 
of his court poets, assuring him that " cypress-branches would 
wave him on to victory/ 2 had in the meantime advanced as 
far as Sziget, which was bravely defended by Nicholas Zriny. 
In spite of this the fortress, which was indeed little more than 
a mass of smoking ruins, fell into the hands of the Turks on 
September yth, Zriny himself meeting with an heroic death. 3 

During the siege of Sziget the Imperial army had remained 
completely inactive. Like his brother, the Archduke Ferdin 
and, Maximilian was no soldier ; he was full of good intentions, 
but committed fatal blunders. The fear felt for the Turks was 
so great that any serious engagement was avoided. While 
the army was maintaining a mere policy of observation, 
Hungarian marsh fever broke out among the troops to which 
thousands succumbed. Bad food, want of money, and deser 
tions completed the work, and when the Turks retired the 
Imperial army also broke up at the end of October. 4 For 
tunately the spirit of the Turks was completely paralysed by 
the death of the Sultan, which occurred on September 4th, 
and the beginning of winter interrupted the war, which was 
continued in the following year with varied success. As 
early as the end of June, 1567, the Emperor had begun negotia 
tions for peace, which, however, did not reach a formal 
conclusion until February lyth, 1568. On that date a peace 
of eight years was concluded at Adrianople, on the basis of 
the status quo and the continuation of a payment of a " present 
of honour " by the Emperor to the amount of 30,000 ducats. 5 

1 Reports of Biglia in THEINER, Monum. Slavor. merid., vol. II. 
1 See HAMMER, III., 751. 

1 See ibid. 447 ; HUBER, IV., 260 seqq. ; TURBA, III., 350 seq. 
* See WERTHEIMER in Archiv fur osterr. Gesch., LIU., 84 seqq. ; 
HIRN, II., 291 seqq. 

6 See HUBER, IV., 263 seq 


After the Diet of Augsburg, in addition to the Turkish war, 
the Emperor keenly interested himself in religious questions; 
both in the Empire and in his hereditary territories. The 
Pope s representative, Melehior Biglia, did not cease to address 
exhortations to him, so that he might, in his conduct, take 
into consideration the wishes of the Catholics, 1 and it was of 
great advantage to the nuncio that political considerations, 
especially the hope of obtaining great help from the Pope in 
securing his country against the Turks, showed the Emperor 
the desirability of cultivating friendly relations with the Holy 
See. Consequently the nuncio was able to report not only 
fair words on the part of the Emperor, but also reassuring 
acts : for example, in March and July, 1567, action was taken 
against the heretical preachers, and in September there was 
an edict against the Calvinists in Hungary. Biglia was also 
quite satisfied with the behaviour of Maximilian in the affair 
of Cologne. He was also rejoiced at the efforts made by the 
Emperor to prevent the rebels in the Netherlands from receiv 
ing help from German troops. The hopeful reports which 
Biglia sent to Rome, where Morone and Commendone were 
endeavouring to cultivate friendly relations between the 
Emperor and the Pope, aroused the highest hopes there, which 
were shared by Pius V., 2 who could not fail to be filled with joy 
at the fact that, on December 5th, 1567, Maximilian warmly 

1 In the Papal Secret Archives there is preserved only a small 
part of the ""reports of Biglia (Nunziat. di Germania, 66 and 67). 
For the full reports of the nuncio search must therefore be 
be made elsewhere. In 1847 SCARABELLI showed in Arch. stor. 
Ital., App. IV., n. 17, p. 61 seq., that the Alfieri Archives at Asti 
contained reports of the nunciature of Biglia for the years 1568 
and 1569. Mgr. Ratti [now Pope Pius XI.] and Prof. Dengel 
found those of 1565 and 1567 in the Trotti Archives, Milan (now 
in the Ambrosiana), so that the greater part are in readiness 
for Dengel s edition. 

2 See the ""instructions of the secretariate of State for Biglia, 
dated Rome, February 8, March i, 8, and 22, April 5, June 14, 
July 19, 26, September 6, 12, December 6, Nunziat. di Germania 
67, Papal Secret Archives. 


supported a request made by the Jesuits in Vienna. 1 For 
the Emperor s sake he forgave Cardinal Delfino, who had been 
deprived of his right to vote on account of grave disobedience, 2 
and he overlooked the arbitrary action taken by the Emperor 
in the reform of the monasteries and chapters of Austria which 
had fallen into a very bad state. 3 

The Pope, however, was not disposed to satisfy all Maxi 
milian s demands, because, in his eyes, ecclesiastical principles 
always came before all political considerations. 4 But in that 
matter which was Maximilian s chief preoccupation, namely, 
help against the Turks, he showed himself willing to do all 
that lay in his power. He did not adhere to the arrangement 
originally made of setting aside for this purpose large sums 
of money only in the case of actual war ; in April. 1568, in 
spite ot his many other expenses, he promised a contribution 
for the fortification of the border territory, though he insisted 
that the money should be used for that purpose alone. In 
July he allowed the Emperor to levy a subsidy of 45,000 
florins from the abbots and priors of Lower Austria, and in 
August he gave his consent to the payment in Venice during 
the following month of 20,000 scudi for the fortification of 
the border territories which were threatened by the Turks. 
In September he increased this sum to 30,000 scudi and pro 
mised to do even more in the future. 5 He also complied with 
the Emperor s request that he would help his brother, the 

1 See LADERCHI, 1566, n. 205 ; SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 77 
seq. ; BRAUNSBERGER, Pius V., 37. 

1 See SCHWARZ, loc. cit. 45, 56. Cf. ibid. 176 for the subsequent 
quarrel of Delfino with Pius V. 

8 Cf. WlEDEMANN, I., 187-202 ; SCHWARZ, IOC. tit. 96-99. 

4 Cf. SCHWARZ, loc. tit. 63-73, 88 ; BRAUNSBERGER, Pius V., 
42 seq. 

6 See SCARABELLI, loc. tit. 65 ; SCHWARZ, loc. tit., 101, 104, 
107 seq. ; TURBA, III., 403, 458, n. ; HOPFEN, 266 seq. In Arm. 
64, t. 6, p. 84 seq., the Papal Secret Archives contain a memorial 
of 1568 with the title *Nonnulla media quibus Germania hoc 
tempore invari possit, with proposals for the protection of Hun 
gary against the Turks. 


Archduke Charles, in assuring the safety of the boundary of 
Styria. The Archduke received permission to levy for five 
years a half of all the ecclesiastical revenues of his territory, 
with the promise that this permission would later on be ex 
tended for another five years. 1 

After all this condescension on the part of the Pope, and the 
news received in Rome in July, 1568, of the steps which had 
been taken by Maximilian against the heretics in his domin 
ions, 2 an absolutely paralysing effect was produced by the 
receipt from the Imperial ambassador Arco on September 
I3th of a letter dated September 3rd from Maximilian to 
Pius V., authorizing the ambassador to disclose the great 
concession of August i8th which allowed the Protestant 
nobles and gentry of Lower Austria the free exercise of their 
religious beliefs in accordance with the Confession of Augsburg 
of I53O. 3 The validity of this religious concession was, it 
is true, limited by certain conditions : in the first place the 
Catholics were no longer to be attacked or interfered with, 
and in the second place a commission which was to be ap 
pointed, halt by the Emperor and half by the States of the 
Empire, was to draw up for the adherents of the Confession 
of Augsburg fixed rules concerning divine worship, ecclesias 
tical organization and teaching. 4 

This surprising step on the part of Maximilian came entirely 
from his own initiative immediately after the opening of the 
Diet at Vienna, which was asked to deal in a favourable way 
with the Emperor s heavy debts. Besides Maximilian s own 
confused ideas on religion, a decisive contributory cause was 
his consideration for and his fear of Protestant opposition. 
To the nuncio Biglia, who made a strong protest, Maximilian 
appealed expressly to his own constrained position, saying 

1 SCHWARZ, Brief wechsel, 113-115. 

2 See the letter of Cardinal Mula of July 24, 1568, in HOPFEN, 

8 SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 116 seqq. Cf. SUDENDORF, Regis- 
trum, III., 297. 

4 Cf. HOPFEN, 144 ; OTTO, 23 seq., 43 seq. ; BIBL, Organisation, 
123 seqq., 125 seqq. 


that in his dominions there were so many sects that the only 
remedy was to tolerate the Confession of Augsburg ; that if 
a revolution should break out, as had been the case in the Low 
Countries, he would find himself without any means of defence 
against the States ; that he had six sons, and how were they 
to live if the hereditary provinces were ruined P 1 

When, on September I3th, 1568, the information was 
received from the Imperial ambassador that Maximilian was 
on the point of giving way to his Protestant nobles, and of 
granting them a territorial church system within their own 
provinces, Pius V. was deeply stirred. His grief was so great 
that he could not restrain his tears. In his complaints to 
the ambassador he said that he saw clearly that God intended 
to punish Christendom, and that religion was falling into ruin 
because the Emperor was so light-heartedly giving way before 
the claims of the Protestants, and setting the worst possible 
example to France and the Low Countries ; he did not know 
how, under these circumstances, he could maintain his friendly 
relations with the Emperor. At a second audience on Sep 
tember 1 5th Arco tried to persuade him to give a less uncom 
promising reply, but, as was only to be expected, the Pope 
persisted in his condemnation of the concession that had been 
made. In a brief which was drawn up on the same day he 
adjured Maximilian to give up his purpose, which was the 
cause of so great scandal. Cardinals Morone, Truchsess and 
Colonna, who were all adherents of the Emperor, and the 
Spanish ambassador, expressed themselves in similar terms. 
It was thought in the Curia that Biglia would be recalled, 
because he had not been able to prevent this step on the part 
of Maximilian. 2 

When the Imperial courier who had brought Maximilian s 

1 Venez, Depeschen, III., 459 seq. Bibl (p. 141) is wrong in 
saying that the Emperor laid his ideas before Commendone. 

See the report of Arco of September 17, 1568, in HOPFEN 
276 seqq. Cf. Corresp. dip]., II., 462 seq. The brief of September 
15, 1568, in SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 119 seqq. Cf. also SCHWARZ 
in Festschrift zum Jubildum des Camposanto of Ehses, Freiburg, 
1897, 238 seqq. 


letter of September 3rd left on the lyth, he took with him 
the Pope s reply and a detailed report from Arco on the situa 
tion. The courier had hardly started when the Pope took 
definite action. In a suddenly assembled consistory on 
September iyth he appointed Commendone, who, with Morone, 
was the best acquainted with German affairs, as legate extra 
ordinary to Maximilian, with instructions to induce him to 
turn back from the extremely dangerous course upon which 
he had embarked. 1 

The mission of the very man who had proved his power at 
the Diet of Augsburg was extremely unwelcome to the 
Emperor. If a Cardinal was to be sent, a thing which he would 
most gladly have avoided, he would have been far better 
pleased with an ambitious and accommodating man like 
Delfino. 2 His indignation was so great that he spoke of this 
sudden and determined action on the part of the Pope as 
" mad monkish zeal " ; he was resolved, he told the Venetian 
ambassador, that as far as he was concerned, he would make no 
change ; he then broke out into those expressions which have 
ever been used by those who have known themselves to be 
unmasked by Rome : the Pope is ill-informed ; he would 
inform him better and show him that what had been done 
had been done with the intention of bringing back the Pro 
testants to the Church. 3 

The Emperor was gravely deluding himself in thinking that 
they were not well informed in Rome and perfectly aware of 
the gravity of the situation ; what had been granted to the 
nobility of Lower Austria could not be for long refused to the 
cities and marts ; in a word, the final result must be the 
destruction of the Catholic religion. All efforts therefore to 
prevent the mission of Commendone were in vain. 4 

1 See the report of Arco of September 18, 1568, in HOPFEN, 
282 seq. and Corresp. dipl., II., 463. 

2 See the report of Eisengrein of October 9, 1568, in HOPFEN, 

1 See Venez. Depeschen, III., 461, n. i. 

4 See SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 123. Corresp. dipl., II., 464. 


When Commendone received the Pope s commands he was 
at his abbey of S. Zeno at Verona. Accompanied by his 
secretary, Anton Maria Graziani, and by Giovanni Delfino, 
Bishop of Torcello, he at once set out for the north. On the 
Brenner pass, the legate, who was not properly equipped, was 
overtaken by a snowstorm which lasted three days ; in spite 
of this, Innsbruck was reached as early as October I3th. 
There Commendone met Albert V. of Bavaria, who was staying 
with the Archduke Ferdinand, and went carefully into the 
situation with him. 1 The remainder of the journey, which 
was carried out on the river Inn, could not be undertaken until 
the i6th, through want of boats, and took him by Passau and 
Linz to Vienna, which the legate reached in the evening of 
October 28th. The nuncio Biglia, who had been made ill 
by the excitement of the discussions, had not been able to 
carry out his plan of going as far as Passau to meet the 
Cardinal. 2 

Commendone had a first audience with the Emperor on 
October 3ist and a second on November 3rd. 3 Maximilian 
sought to justify as far as possible the concession made to the 
nobles of the free exercise of their religion in accordance with 
the Confession of Augsburg, by pleading his good intention 
of preventing on the one hand the spread of the Protestant 
sects, and on the other of bringing back the Lutherans to the 
Church, as Charles V. and Ferdinand I. had already aimed at 
doing, adding that it seemed to him that the Confession of 
Augsburg, which was in many points in accordance with 
Catholic doctrine, was the best means to this end. 

Commendone replied that the Emperor s intentions were 

1 Cf. GRATIANI Epist., 390 seqq. ; CANISII Epist., VI., 223 seq., 
588 seq. Schwarz has published in the Festschrift mentioned on 
p. 260 the advice of the Bavarian chancellor, S. Eck, against the 
official toleration of Protestantism in Austria, which took its 
origin in the conferences held at Innsbruck. 

1 Cf. GRATIANI, Epist., 390 seqq., Colecc. de docum. ined., 
CIII., 23, and the letters of Biglia in the account given by MAYR, 
p. 391, quoted infra, p. 268, n. i. 

8 See Venez. Depeschen, III., 461. Cf. GRATIANUS, III., 4. 


no doubt very praiseworthy, but that it was certain that he 
would not gain his end because the means he was using were 
unlawful and harmful. The profession of the Catholic faith 
must be maintained in all its purity and integrity ; the ex 
periments of Charles V. and Ferdinand I. with the adherents 
of the Confession of Augsburg had shown how vain were all 
hopes of reconciling them with the Church. Moreover, they 
had been dealing with powerful princes, whereas now the 
Emperor proposed to allow his subjects to impose upon him 
shameful conditions. Further, it was never lawful to do 
evil that good might come. The followers of the new doc 
trines would never be led back to the Church by the way of 
concessions, but only confirmed in their opinions. Commendone 
frankly pointed out how dangerous to the good name of the 
Emperor was the statement which the Lutherans were -making 
that they had bought religious liberty for money, but worst 
of all was the fact that in making a concession in a matter of 
religion the Emperor was taking upon himself a power which 
belonged to the Pope alone ; such audacity was bound to 
draw down upon him the punishments of God. 1 

The lengthy and weighty remarks of Commendone were 
backed up by a strong letter from Albert V. to Maximilian, 
which the legate had brought with him from Innsbruck. A 
decisive factor was the intervention, brought about by Pius V., 
of the Spanish king, who, in an autograph letter of 
October ijih, and again later on, adjured the Emperor to 
give up the course he had entered upon in defiance of God 
and religion. The remonstrances of Philip II. made all the 
greater impression upon Maximilian because he was proposing 
to marry his eldest daughter to the King of Spain. Philip 
insisted, as a preliminary step towards such an arrangement 
that there should be a cessation of all signs of favour towards 
the Netherland insurgents and the Austrian Protestants. 

1 See GRATIANI Epist., 390 seqq. The "reports of Commendone 
on his legation of 1568-1569 are in the Graziani Archives, Cittk 
di Castello. Den gel is to publish these in his edition of the 


Commendone at once realized the importance of this dynastic 
question. By his advice the Spanish ambassador warned the 
Emperor that a Papal dispensation in the matter of relation 
ship would be necessary for the proposed marriage, and that 
Pius V. certainly would not grant this so long as Maximilian 
remained at the beck and call of the Austrian Protestants. 1 

The Emperor could not resist the united attack of the Pope, 
Spain, and Bavaria, the more so as he, in whose eyes Protest 
ants and Catholics were of equal importance, 2 had no idea of 
exposing the interests of his house to serious dangers for the 
sake of religion. He very quickly gave way, and in a most un 
dignified manner, in reality as far as the Netherland rebels 
were concerned, but only in appearance in the case of the 
Austrian Protestants. 3 

After the long and heated discussions which had taken 
place 4 Commendone was as surprised as he was rejoiced when, 
at an audience lasting two hours on November 1 8th he received 
from the Emperor a completely satisfactory declaration, 
which he at once reported to Rome and Munich. My in 
tention, so Maximilian declared, has always been to further 
the Catholic religion, and especially after the urgent and 
paternal exhortations of the Pope have I prayed God to 
enlighten me, and the day before yesterday I decided to give 
up all further meetings of the religious commission, and not 
allow any religious discussion at the Diet at Linz. In support 
of this declaration he informed the legate that he had com 
municated this decision to the members of the commission, 
that he had dismissed them, and had sent word to those who 
had been summoned from other places not to come, because 
there would be no further negotiations. He then said that 
he wished Commendone to be made aware of all this in order 
that he might send the news to Rome, and bear witness there 

1 See RITTER, I., 402 seq. ; HOPFEN, 289 ; Venez. Depeschen, 
III., 464, n. i. Colecc. de docum. ined.., CHI., 28 seq. ; Corresp. 
dipl., II., 464 seq., 492. 

* The opinion of Huber (IV., 229). 

* See RITTER, I., 403. 

4 Cf. GRATIANI Epist., 396, 


that as a loyal son he wished to comply absolutely with the 
wishes of so good a Pope, w r hom he sincerely loved. When 
Commendone asked whether it would now be necessary for 
him to go to Linz, Maximilian replied that it was not neces 
sary, since there would certainly be no discussion of religious 
matters there ; he could assure the Pope that the Emperor 
was resolved to serve God and the Catholic religion whole 
heartedly. 1 

One who was well acquainted with the court of Vienna, 
Martin Eisengrein, had, a short time after the arrival of 
Commendone, expressed the fear that an attempt would be 
made to deceive the eminent diplomatist " with fair words, 
until they succeeded in sending him away." 2 Eisengrein s 
view was fully justified ; the Emperor had no real intention 
of meeting the wishes of the Pope, and adhered firmly to his 
resolve to abide by the promise which he had made on August 
i8th to the adherents of the Confession of Augsburg, though 
he did not intend to make any concessions beyond that. He 
deceived the legate in that he concealed from him the fact 
that before he dissolved the Diet he had promised the nobles 
that until the conclusion of the religious discussions they 
should not be disturbed in their profession of the Confession of 
Augsburg within their dominions. The Diet of Upper Austria 
next received from the Emperor on December 7th information 
that they as well were entitled to the religious liberty allowed 
in Lower Austria, and that in the meantime they were not 
to be disturbed so long as they did not go beyond the limits 
of the Confession of Augsburg. The meetings of the com 
mission for drawing up a new ecclesiastical liturgy and 
constitution were not entirely suspended, as the Emperor 

1 So much does Commendone announce in a *letter of November 
1 8, 1568, to Cardinal Bonelli (Graziani Archives). Cf. further 
the *report of Biglia of November 18, 1568 (Aliieri Library, Asti, 
now in the State Archives, Turin). Prof. Dengel will publish 
both accounts. The letter to Albert V. of November 20, 1568, 
in HOPFEN, 300 seq. See also that to Hosius in CYPRIANUS, 
485 seq, Cf. also Venez. Depeschen, III., 461 seq. 

* Letter of November 5, 1568, in HOPFEN, 296. 

VOL. xvin. 19 


led the legate to suppose, for Maximilian had merely dis 
missed Camerarius, who was not to the liking of the 
States, and had summoned in his place from Mecklenburg the 
Lutheran theologian David Chytreus. When the latter arrived 
in January, 1569, Maximilian was careful to keep his presence 
hidden from the legate, and in the retirement of the little 
city of Spitz on the Danube Chytreus was able to devote him 
self quietly to the drawing up of the new ecclesiastical pro 
gramme and constitution. 1 

In a brief to the Emperor on December ist, 1568, Pius V. 
had expressed his joy at the fact that Maximilian, according 
to the statements of Arco and Commendone s reports, was 
willing to make no further concessions as far as the Confession 
of Augsburg was concerned, and had forbidden the religious 
discussions which had been begun, to which steps he was 
indeed bound in virtue of his Imperial office and the oath 
which he had taken. 2 On January 2oth, 1569, at the very 
moment when he was keeping the Protestant theologian 
Cytreus concealed at Spitz, Maximilian replied to this brief 
in an obsequious letter saying how glad he was that the Pope 
had so cordially welcomed the prohibition of the religious 
discussions arranged for St. Martin s Day, upon which the 
whole of his policy of agreement with the nobility had rested ; 
he said that he had never wanted to offend the paternal heart 
of the Pope, that he felt the greatest filial affection for him, 
and that in conformity with his duty as Emperor he would 
leave nothing undone " for the maintenance of the Catholic 
faith, and the defence of the dignity of the Church." 3 

The presence of Commendone was very inconvenient for 
the dishonest double game which the shifty Emperor was 

1 See RITTER, I., 404; OTTO, 22 seq. ; WIEDEMANN, I., 361. 
Cf. Colecc. de docum. ine"d., CIII., 33, 64 ; Venez. Depeschen, 
HI., 465. 

1 See LADERCHI, 1568, n. 86. For the discussion on the oath 
of Maximilian cf. the report of Arco of October 2, 1568, in HOPFEN, 

* See SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 130 seq. 


playing at that time ; l he breathed more freely when, at 
the end of January, 1569, the legate started on his journey 
for Rome. 2 As the Venetian ambassador bore witness, 
Commendone left a splendid reputation behind him in Vienna, 
and had left nothing undone which could contribute to the 
edification of the people. 3 His departure had been delayed 
because he had received from the Pope the further charge of 
taking advantage of his presence to make a visitation of the 
churches and convents of Austria. When the necessary 
faculties for this had arrived at the beginning of January, and 
the Emperor had given his consent, the legate began his 
visitation with the city and dioceses of Vienna. On his re 
turn journey he continued his work in spite of the inclement 
weather. In addition to the churches and convents on the 
great military road, he also visited others lying at a consider- 

1 It would appear from his *report to the Pope of November 
24, 1568, for which I am indebted to the courtesy of Prof. Dengel, 
that Commendone was not quite free from anxiety as to the 
carrying out of the Emperor s decisions. He mentions that 
while the Catholics at Augsburg were rejoicing over the part 
played by the Emperor, the Protestants looked upon it as a mere 
postponement, and remained fixed in their hopes of attaining 
their end in time. Before he set out for Linz the Emperor had 
definitely promised that the religious question should not be 
treated of there. Under the actual circumstances they must be 
content with what had been accomplished. His mission had 
been to prevent the actual concessions of religious freedom, or 
the discussion of the question by the commission. This much 
had been granted. If for greater security a written promise, 
signed by the Emperor, should be desired in Rome, namely that 
he would not in future grant any similar demands by his subjects, 
they must wait for a suitable moment, namely, when the dispensa 
tion for the marriage of the Emperor s daughter to Philip II. 
was asked for. Graziani Archives, Citta di Castello. 

1 See GRATIANI Epist., 434 seq. ; Venez. Depeschen, III., 465. 
Cf. HOPFEN, 146 seq. for an opinion as to the double game being 
played by Maximilian. Ritter too (I., 406) says that Maximilian 
was " playing with " the Catholic powers. 

* See Venez. Depeschen, III., 465. 


able distance, such as Gaming and Kremsmunster. Com- 
mendone devoted particular care to the visitation of Upper 
Austria. In the last week of February he was at Passau, 
and then visited several convents in the district of Salzburg. 
Everywhere he laboured to enforce and inculcate the decrees 
of the Council of Trent. If he did not obtain more lasting 
results,, this was principally because of the short time at his 
disposal. It could only have been by long and continued 
labours that the abuses which had crept in in the course of 
centuries could have been removed. 1 

With the departure of Commendone, the relations with the 
Holy See were once more in the hands of the ordinary nuncio, 
Biglia. The efforts of this diplomatist to maintain reasonably 
good relations between the Emperor and the Pope were 
rendered all the more difficult because the attitude of Maxi 
milian towards the States of Lower Austria was in direct 
contradiction to the declarations made on November i8th, 
1568, to Commendone. Pius V/s annoyance at this was so 
great that he regretted the help he had given Maximilian 
against the Turks. 2 

The relations between the Emperor and the Pope were 
again seriously disturbed when, in August, 1569, Pius V. 
suffered himself to be persuaded to make Cosimo I. Grand 
Duke of Tuscany. At first the Medici prince, with the help 
of Pius IV., who was under great obligations to him, had tried 
in 1560 to obtain the title of king, but, as at that time Philip II. 

1 For the visitation of the monasteries and churches made by 
Commendone in Lower Austria see STARZER in Blatter dcs Verein 
fiir Landeskunde fiir Niederosterreich, XXVI. (1892), 156 seqq. ; 
for the visitation in the dioceses of Passau and Salzburg see MAYR 
in Studien und Mitteil. aus dem Benediktiner-und Zisterzienser- 
orden, 1893, 385 seqq. Cf. also HOPFEN, 312 seqq. 

* Cf. TIEPOLO, 187. From his report of July 2, 1569, in HOPFEN, 
323 seq., it may be seen how Arco sought to pacify the Curia. 
Cf. ibid. 152, 154 seq. for the deceit practised by the Emperoi 
on the Catholic princes and the Pope. From the report of Zuniga 
of July 28, 1569, Corresp. dipl., III., 118, it is clear what judgment 
Pius V. had formed of Maximilian. 


had resolutely opposed this, the plan had been abandoned. 1 
A second attempt to obtain the title of Archduke or Grand 
Duke had been made five years later, and this time the cir 
cumstances had seemed to be more favourable. -The negotia 
tions, which had been carried on with the greatest secrecy 
on account of Spain, had already made great progress when the 
death of Pius IV. had brought the whole affair to a standstill. 2 

This second shipwreck of his plans did not discourage 
Cosimo from further attempts, to which he was urged, not 
only by ambition, but also by the wish to end in his own favour 
the controversy about precedence which had long been pending 
between himself and the Duke of Ferrara. 3 When at length, 
after many difficult negotiations, the Medici prince realized 
that he could look for no favourable decision of this contro 
versy from the Emperor, he transferred the negotiations to 
Rome in June, 1569. The task of carrying out this task in 
favour of Cosimo was entrusted to the lawyer, Domenico 
Bonsi, who at once got into touch with Onofrio Camaiani, 
Cosimo s trusted agent. There did riot seem to be any likeli 
hood of a decision in Cosimo s favour because in the College of 
Cardinals Ferrara had as strong a following as Florence. 4 

As far as the Pope was concerned, however, things were 
very different. Ferrara s relations with Pius V. were very 
strained, both on account of quarrels of a temporal nature, 
such as the importation of salt, and on account of Ferrara s 
attitude towards religious questions. In this respect it would 
seem that Alfonso had inherited some of the opinions of his 
mother, Re* nee, the friend of Calvin ; he had absolutely refused 
to admit the Inquisition in his territories, or to comply with 

1 See MAFFEI, n seq. Cf. Vol. XV. of this work, p. 100. 

Cf. MAFFEI, 29 seq. ; BIBL, Erhebung Cosimos, 1 1 seq. 

3 BIBL, loc. cit., 15, rightly brings this out. For the con 
troversy about precedence cf. Arch, star, Ital., 2nd ser., VII., 
2, 93 seq. ; Atti d. deput. Ferrarese di storia patria, IX., Ferrara, 
1-897 ; MONDANI, La questione di precedenza fra il d. Cosimo 
I. e Alfonso, II., Florence, 1898 ; GRIBANDI in Riv. di scienze 
stor., 1904-1905 ; PALANDRI, 122 seq. 

* See BIBL, loc. cit. 43 seq. 


the Pope s request that he should help the French Catholics. 
The Duke s uncle, moreover, Cardinal Este, was especially 
in bad odour with Pius V. on account of his schemes to obtain 
the tiara. In the spring of 1569 the Venetian ambassador, 
Paolo Tiepolo, considered the relations between the House of 
Este and the Vatican as being so strained, that he feared a 
complete breach. 1 

Cosimo I., on the other hand, had in every possible way 
shown his loyalty to the Pope during the whole period of the 
latter s reign. He had carried into effect all the promises 
he had made at the beginning of the pontificate concerning the 
support of the Inquisition and ecclesiastical reform. 2 The 
handing over of Carnesecchi to the Roman Inquisition, the 
assistance he had given the Emperor in the Turkish War of 
1566 and the great help he had recently given to the French 
Catholics in the third Huguenot War, were all things cal 
culated to win for the Medici prince in a high degree the con 
fidence and love of Pius V. 3 Camaiani and Cardinal Ferdin 
and de Medici, who was working with him, therefore met 
with no great difficulties when they proposed that, as a reward, 
the question of precedence, which had now been pending 
for a generation, should be settled in favour of Cosimo by his 
elevation to the rank of Grand Duke, as had already been the 
intention of Pius IV. Such a proposal was all the more pleas 
ing to Pius V. since, saturated as he was with medieval ideas, 
he could thus argue with himself : if a Pope could confer on 
Charlemagne the title of Emperor, all the more fittingly can 

1 TIEPOLO, 189. Cf. E. Manolesso in ALBERI, II., 2, 415; 
BIBL, loc. cit. 26. 

* Cf. Legaz. di Serristori, 419. 

* See TIEPOLO, 189 ; GALLUZZI, 66 seq., 95 seq. ; MAFFEI, 
60 seq. ; HERRE, Papstwahlen 159, seq. ; PALANDRI, 124 seq. 
In 1568 Pius V. had undertaken the office of god-father at the 
birth of the daughter of Cosimo ; cf. the * brief to " Johanna 
principessa Florentiae " of Jan. 28, 1568 (mission of Cardinal 
Ricci), State Archives, Florence. A little later the wife of 
Cosimo was honoured with the Golden Rose ; see LADERCHI, 
1568, n. 59. 


I bestow the title of Grand Duke on a prince who has deserved 
so well of the Church. 1 

On August 27th, 1569 a bull -was drawn up in the following 
terms : 2 the Pope, who has been placed by God over the 
nations of the kingdoms, and invested with the supreme power 
in the Church militant, is in duty bound to turn his eyes upon 
those who, more than others, have rendered faithful service 
to the Holy See and the Catholic faith. In this respect the 
sovereign prince of Tuscany has especially distinguished him 
self. But recently he has magnanimously assisted the Catho 
lics of France and has founded the Order of the Knights of 
St. Stephen lor the honour of God and the propagation of the 
true religion. Since these services call for some recognition 
the Pope, in virtue of his Apostolic power, declares him here 
ditary Grand Duke of Tuscany in so far as that country is 
subject to him as sovereign, without thereby infringing 
the rights of the Emperor or other kings. As a precedent 
for this grant of a title the bull appeals to similar acts by 
Popes Alexander III., Innocent III. and Paul IV., in the 
case of the rulers of Portugal, Bulgaria and Walachia, as well 
as of Ireland.. 3 As an external mark of the title now con 
ferred upon him Cosimo was given the right to bear the royal 
crown heraldically described in the bull. Thus was his right 
of precedence over Este assured to him. The arrival of the 
news of the victory over the French Huguenots to which 
Cosimo had so materially contributed, 4 seemed to Pius V. to 
afford a favourable opportunity for promulgating the bull 
which had hitherto been kept secret. On December 7th, 
1569, he sent his nephew Michele Bonelli to Florence, where 

1 See GALLUZZI, 89 seq. ; BIBL, loc. cit. 45 seq. For the work 
by Laurentius Belus, *De summa pontificia potestate creandi et 
destruendi saeculares potestates, etc., see Vol. XVII., p. 131, n. i. 

* Bull. Rom., VII., 763 seq. 

* In his negotiations with Maximilian II. Commendone also 
adduced other examples drawn from the medieval ideas, but 
which to some extent will not stand the light of historical criti 
cism ; see GRATIANUS, Vita Commendoni. 

*Cf. Corresp. dipl., III., 228, n. i. 


five days later the delivery and reading of the bull took place 
with great solemnity in the Palazzo Vecchio. 1 

While Florence was keeping high festival, Cosimo set all 
the devices of his diplomatic skill to work, gradually to recon 
cile the powers, and especially the Emperor, to this occurrence, 
and prevent them from taking any steps to oppose it. In 
flagrant contradiction to the truth he assured them that he 
had never taken any steps to obtain the dignity which the 
Pope had conferred upon him of his own initiative, and added 
that he intended to go to Rome at the beginning of the follow 
ing year in order to express his gratitude in person. He care 
fully concealed from the Emperor that the real object of this 
journey was that he might be crowned by the Pope. When, 
however, as the result of rumours which reached him, Maxi 
milian learned the truth, he abandoned the attitude of reserve 
which he had hitherto maintained, and demanded to be in 
formed in the first place of the terms of the bull. 2 

On February I3th, 1570, Arco received by special courier 
from the Emperor orders to make in the first place private 
remonstrances to the Pope against the proposed solemn 
coronation of Cosimo, and if this was not sufficient, to make 
formal protest against such a step, as being injurious to the 
rights of the Emperor. Arco had an audience on February 
I4th. When, in the course of the discussion, Pius V. re 
marked that the Duke of Florence was free and acknowledged 
no overlord, and that moreover on many occasions the Popes 
had appointed men as kings, as for example the Kings of 
Portugal and Navarre, Arco replied that those cases had not 
affected the Empire. This touched the real point at issue : 
the Emperor looked upon Florence as a fief of the Empire, and 
even though this might be open to question, it was certain that 
Siena had been received as a fief from the Spanish king, and 
was indirectly a fief of the Empire. It would seem that the 
Pope already realized that Cosimo had put him in a false 

1 See GALLUZZI, 103 seq. ; LAPINI, Diario Florentine, ed. 
Corazzini, Florence, 1900. 
* See BIBL, loc. cit. 47 seq. 


position. In spite of this, he did not consider himself justified, 
for the sake of his own authority, in withdrawing the distinc 
tion as Arco demanded, 1 and as a matter of fact the question 
had already gone too far. 2 On February I5th, 1570, Cosimo 
arrived at the gates of Rome with a splendid retinue, and 
dismounted at the villa of Julius III. On the i8th he made 
his entry with great pomp and was received in the consistory. 
Even Arco was present at this ceremony, which took place in 
the Sala Regia. When the consistorial advocate proclaimed 
the new title of Cosimo, Arco declared to the Pope that he 
protested against this infringement of the rights of the Em 
peror, and that he reserved a more formal protest. Then, 
when Cosimo was introduced with great pomp, he left the 
Sala in an ostentatious way. All the attempts of both the 
Pope and Cosimo to induce the Imperial ambassador to 
change his attitude failed. 3 

On March 5th, Laetare Sunday, Arco renewed his solemn 
protest in the Pope s private apartments, in the presence of 
Cardinals Morone, Chiesa and Bonelli. While he was leaving 
the Vatican Pius V. repaired to the Sistine Chapel for the 
coronation mass. Cosimo took his place between the two 
junior Cardinal-Priests. He was attired in a long robe em 
broidered with gold, and over it a red mantle, trimmed with 
ermine, and he wore the ducal cap. After the epistle he took 

1 See ibid. 53 seqq. 

* For the preparations in Rome for the arrival of Cosimo, 
see *Avvisi di Roma of January 25, February 8 and IT, 1570 ; 
mention is there made of a present from Cosimo to Pius V., 
" un calamaro d argento dorato con un horiolo dentro " of the 
value of 250 scudi. Urb. 1041, p. 223, 223b, 224b, Vatican 

3 See SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 156 ; BIBL, loc. cit, 55 seq. Cf. 
also MUTINELLI, I., 88 seq. ; DE MAGISTRIS, 13 seq. ; Corresp. 
dipl., III., 234 seqq. Interesting particulars on the arrival and 
entry of the new Grand Duke in the *Avvisi di Roma of February 
15 and 1 8, 1570 (Cosimo was lodged in the aparUnents of Car 
dinal Bonelli " parate di velluto cremesino con broccato d oro "}, 
Urb. 1041, p. 226b, 22gb, Vatican Library. 


the oath of fealty, and then the Pope placed on his head the 
precious gold crown which had been made in Florence, and 
handed him the silver sceptre. At the conclusion of the 
ceremony the new Grand Duke offered as gifts a golden chalice, 
and rich vessels and liturgical vestments ; when the Pope 
returned to his apartment he carried his train. Lastly, 
Cosimo was honoured with the golden rose which had been 
blessed on that day. 1 

It is quite certain that it was very far from the wishes of 
Pius V. to do anything prejudicial to the rights of any prince 
by the extraordinary honour which he had conferred on 
Cosimo ; his declaration that it was merely his intention 
to reward the great services of the Medici prince to the Holy 
See may be taken quite literally. 2 All the more painful then 
was his surprise when he saw what wrong motives were attri 
buted to him and what strong opposition his action had 
aroused among almost all the powers. 3 The only exception 
was the French government, which hailed Cosimo s elevation 
with joy, knowing well that the Hapsburgs had done all they 

1 There are various accounts of the events of March 5, that of 
Arco, with his protest, in SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 156 seq. t BIBL, 
60 seq. the report of the Venetian ambassador in MUTINELLI, 
I., 89 seq., that of the French ambassador in DE MAGISTRIS, 15 
seq., that of the ambassador of Savoy in SAGGIATORE, IV. (1845), 
33 seq. Firmanus gives a very detailed account of the ceremony 
of the coronation, in MORENI, Delia solenne incoronazione del 
duca Cosimo Medici in granduca, Florence, 1819. Cf. also the 
*Avviso di Roma of March 5, 1570, where, among the presents, 
special mention is made of a gold " bacile " weighing 9 pounds, 
with 7 figures " con miracolosa arte ; fede, speranza e carita " 
supporting the vase at the foot of which are the four Evangelists 
with the arms of Pius V. and Cosimo. Urb. 1041, p. 242b, Vatican 

* HERRE (I., 59) rightly brings this out. 

3 Besides Ferrara, Savoy, Mantua and Venice, amoner the 
Italian states, refused to recognize the title. See BIBL, 70, Cf. 
Arch. ster. Ital., App. III., 158 seq. ; Venez. Depeschen, III., 
498 n. 


could to prevent it taking place. 1 It was indeed true that 
they had been continually urged to do so by the Duke of 
Ferrara. 2 

From the first Philip II. of Spain had maintained an attitude 
of reserve. From the point of view of principle his view was 
the same as that of the Emperor ; he saw in this act of the 
Pope an extremely serious and dangerous interference in 
temporal affairs, and he looked upon it as an insult that he, 
Cosimo s feudal lord as far as Siena was concerned, had not 
been informed of it beforehand. An additional motive for 
indignation lay in the fact that the King of Spain could not 
willingly allow the Duke of Florence to become more powerful 
than he already was. At the same time, for various reasons 
Philip was not at first inclined to adopt so brusque an attitude 
towards the Pope as was done by Maximilian, who, under the 
influence of Arco, had become the close friend of the Este. 3 

On March 29th, 1570, the Emperor once again solemnly 
repeated his protest, and sent for this purpose his three coun 
cillors, Gabriel Strein, Baron von Schwarzenau and Dr. 
Andreas Gail, who arrived in Rome on April loth, and had a 
private audience on the i6th, followed by a public one on the 
24th. On the latter occasion the protest was read, and a 
copy of it delivered. The Pope promised to give his reply 
after he had maturely considered the matter. 4 

1 See DE MAGISTRIS, u seq. ; HERRE, I., 60. Cf. PALANDRI, 

1 Cf. BIBL, 79 seq., 89 seqq. 

* See HERRE, I., 60, 77 ; MAFFEI, 81 seq., 89 seq. ; BIBL, 70, 
78, 87 seq. Philip II. only made his protest against Cosimo s 
new title after the conclusion of the league against the Turks, 
which brought Spain the Cruzada (see infra, Cap. IX., and supra 
p. 64). In consequence of the Spanish protest the Pope gave 
way so far as to give Cosimo secret powers to enter upon negotia 
tions for a compromise upon the basis proposed by the Emperor, 
which the Medici prince at once did. BIBL, 119. 

4 See the *report of B. Pia of April 25, 1570, Gonzaga Archives, 
Mantua ; Avvisi di Roma of April 19 and 26, 1570, Urb. 1041, 
p. 265b, 267, Vatican Library ; LADERCHI, 1570, n. 115 ; Corresp. 


That in the face of this unexpected opposition, and in view 
of the doubly unfortunate consequences to the much desired 
league against the Turks of the conferring of the title, Pius V. 
to some extent repented of having satisfied the desires of the 
crafty Cosimo, and that he would like to have acted other 
wise, is shown by the fact that at the great creation of Cardi 
nals on May I7th, 1570, he passed over Camaiani, though he 
was warmly recommended by Florence. Such an attitude 
was also urged upon him by the fact that Cosimo did not 
hesitate to throw the responsibility for the whole affair upon 
the Pope. 1 

In Rome a special congregation of Cardinals discussed from 
the end of April the reply that should be made to the Emperor s 
protest. Opinions were very divided. Some thought that a 
reply of any kind was undesirable, because an exchange of 
letters would only add fuel to the flames. On the other hand 
it was rightly urged that to refuse to reply at all would be 
taken as an insult by the Emperor. 2 A decision was made 
all the more difficult by the fact that there was reason to look 
forward with some anxiety to the Diet which had been sum 
moned to Spires for May 22nd. 3 It seemed certain that the 
question would be raised there, 4 since, in spite of the attempts 

dipl., III., 311 seq. ; GRATIANI Epist., 466 seq. Cf. Venez. 
Depeschen, III., 497 ; SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 157 ; BIBL, 63 
seq. ; DE MAGISTRIS, 17 seq., 20 seq. Cf. also CARCERERI, Cosimo 
dei Medici e il titolo di Granduca di Toscana, Venice, 1906, 12 
seq. The *Oratio habita in consistorio Sanct mi coram 19 car- 
dinalibus ab oratore Caesaris et copia instrumenti protesta- 
tinis S. Caes. M tte , in Varia polit., 85 (now 86), 99 seq. ; ibid. 
112 seq. ; *Responsio S. D. N. ad oratores Caesaris, Papal Secret 

1 See BIBL, 76 seq. 

1 See ibid. 85. 

* The * Imperial convocation, dated Prague, February i, 1570 
(not at the beginning of the year, as in HABERLIN, VII., 145), in 
Reichstagshandlung de anno 1570, II., 181 seq., City Archives, 
Frankfort a/M. 

4 For this reason Biglia had advised the sending of a legate 
even before the opening of the Diet (see BIBL, 80). It was 


of the nuncio to dissuade him, Maximilian had submitted 
all the business of the grand-ducal title to the Electors, and 
had asked an opinion from them for the safe-guarding of the 
sovereignty of the Empire. 1 In view of the opinions of the 
greater part of the Lutherans and Calvinists of Germany, it 
was beyond doubt that they would support the Emperor in 
his quarrel with the Pope, and that they would be ready " to 
give the coup de grace to Antichrist " even in open war. 2 
Under these circumstances a middle course was adopted in 
Rome, by withholding the reply at least until the proposal 
had been laid before the Diet. Pius V. s reply, which was 
dated July 24th, reached Spires in the middle of August, and 
aimed at keeping the question open and gaining time so 
that Cosimo might in the meantime come to an understanding 
with the Emperor. 3 

The state of affairs at Spires remained for a long time very 
threatening. A breach with Rome on the part of the Emperor 
seemed to be imminent, and many of the Protestants would 
have joyfully joined in this. The Pope therefore in August 
sent the knight, Jost Segesser, the captain of his Swiss guard, 
to the Catholic cantons, in order to obtain from them the 
promise of the assistance of four or five thousand men in the 
event of attack being made upon the Holy See. 4 On Septem 
ber I7th, 1570, the English ambassador reported irom Spires 
that Maximilian had spoken to him of the rash interference 

already being said in Rome that either Commendone or Orsini 
had been chosen for this purpose (see the *report of B. Pia from 
Rome, April 5, 1570, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). On June 
24, 1570, B. Pia says : *" Madruzzo parti due di sono per la dieta 
di Spira, qualche effetto potra fare nelle cose che bollono essendo 
prudentissimo et destrissimo." The Emperor was opposed to 
the sending of a legate, because it would give rise to too much 
talk in Germany ; see Venez. Depeschen, III., 496 n. i. 

1 See Venez. Depeschen, III., 498, n. i. ; BIBL, 80. 

1 See JANNSEN-PASTOR, IV. 15 - 1(} , 316 seq. ; BIBI,, 98 seq. 

8 See BIBL, 84 seq., 86 seq. 

4 See Schweizer Abschiede, IV., 2, n. 364, p. 454; LUTOLF, 
Schweizergarde, 76. For the fear in Rome, of. SERENO, 52 seq^ 


of the Bishop of Rome, and had also said that things would 
never be any better with the clergy until the} made up their 
minds to live as the Apostles had done ; that if he decided to 
march against Rome he knew of many who would go with him, 
and that the German princes had told him that Rome was the 
lawful and original capital of the Emperor, and that they 
wished to take him there. 1 Under these circumstances it was 
very difficult for the nuncio Biglia to discharge his office, but 
fortunately he had the Spanish ambassador to stand by him 
in his efforts to moderate the Emperor s conduct, and to 
prevent the Electors from interfering in the controversy. In 
Florence they were of opinion that Biglia did not take a strong 
enough line of action, and that he was better fitted to inspire 
love than respect. 2 

At length in the middle of December Biglia was set free 
from his perplexities ; he was able to report to Rome that 
the matter would remain in the hands of the Electors, and 
that the Emperor would make known his claims to the Pope. 3 
In the Curia they were congratulating themselves that the 
worst had been averted when the Emperor, after the close 
of the Diet, resumed his attack. On December 26th he for 
bade the Cardinals and German princes, as well as those 
Italian states which were subject to the Empire to give 
Cosimo I. his new title. At the same time he sent his reply 
to the Pope s last communication, and in a letter to Pius V. 
demanded a settlement of the controversy which would satisfy 
his own rights and those of the Empire. Arco made it quite 
plain that what his master demanded was the withdrawal of 
the title. 4 On February 24th, 1571, Pius V. made his reply ; 
this was very restrained in its form, while in its matter it 
was in no way derogatory to his dignity ; he said that his 
conscience told him that he had in no way intentionally in- 

1 See Calendar of State Papers. Foreign. Elizabeth. 1569- 
1571, ed. by A. J. Crosby, London, 1874, n. 1267. 
1 See BIBL, 88 seq., 91 seq., 93 seq. 
9 See ibid. 96. 
4 See SCHWAFZ, Briefwechsel, 163 seq. ; J3iBL, 100 seq. 


fringed upon the rights of the Empire and the Emperor in 
conferring this title upon Cosimo, but that he intended to 
submit the question to a thorough and impartial examination 
in the light of Maximilian s remarks, and to settle the dispute 
in a way that would be acceptable to the Emperor. In order 
to lead Maximilian to a conciliatory frame of mind he pointed 
out to him that the attack of the Turks which was at that 
moment threatening Venice might become dangerous to him 
as well ; all disunion and discord was therefore to be avoided. 
Biglia was warned to speak in the same sense, 1 but the action 
taken by the nuncio satisfied neither party. In Rome they 
found fault with him because he had made too favourable a 
report in December, while ifi Florence they thought he had 
not been sufficiently resolute, and, since in the matter of the 
Turkish war as well, with regard to which the Pope had held 
out hopes to the Emperor of a monthly subsidy of 40,000 
ducats so long as Italy itself was left undisturbed, he was 
unable to obtain any success, his position was looked upon as 
being considerably undermined. 2 It was generally thought 
that his recall had been decided upon when, at the end of 
April, 1571, he succumbed to a malignant disease, the spotted 
fever which was at that time raging at Prague. 3 

In Florence they would have been glad to have seen Arch 
bishop Verallo appointed as his successor, whereas the Em 
peror s chief care was that no partisan of Cosimo s should be 

1 See SCHWARZ, loc. cit. 169 seq, ; BIBL 105 seq. How deeply 
anxious the Curia was about the controversy is shown among 
other things by the letters and views sent to the Pope on the 
conferring of the title in Varia polit. 79 (now 80), p. 7 seqq. Papal 
Secret Archives. Very full is the manuscript entitled : *Discorso 
sopra 1 autoritk del Papa fatto in tempo che P. Pio insignl col 
titolo de Granduca di Toscana Cosimo de Medici, in Cod. Urb., 
852, p. 219 of the Vatican Library, and Inf. polit., XII., p. 244 
seq. of the Berlin Library. In Carte Strozz., I., i, 250 seq. there 
is a list of the writings on the subject in the State Archives, 

2 See BIBL, 106 seq. 

8 See SCHWARZ, Brief wechsel, 171, 


sent. 1 The Pope s choice fell upon the Bishop of Torcello, 
Giovanni Delfino, who had accompanied Cardinal Commendone 
upon his legation to the Emperor in 1568, and who was now 
recommended by that Cardinal. Before Delfino started for 
his new duties, Pius wished to see him personally in order to 
explain to him by word of mouth the task that lay before 
him. 2 The written instructions, which are dated June 5th, 
1571, command Delfino above all to persuade the Emperor 
of the importance and value of his coming to a decision to 
favour the Catholic religion frankly and openly, and to protect 
the churches and convents, with special reference to the 
question at issue between the Archduke Ferdinand and the 
chapter of Trent concerning temporalities. 3 With regard to 

1 See BIBL, 114, n. 5 ; SCHWARZ, loc. cit. 177. 

See SCHWARZ, loc. cit. 177; ibid, the credential briefs to 
Maximilian II., the Archdukes Ferdinand and Charles, and Duke 
Albert of Bavaria, dated May 24, 1571. The *credentials to 
Johann Jakob Khuen, Archbishop of Salzburg, Rome, June i, 
1571, recommend Delfino as " virum ab egregiam suam pro- 
bitatem doctrinamque suam valde nobis probatum." Original 
in the Consistorial Archives, Salzburg. 

* Cf. the detailed account of HIRN : Der Temporalienstreit des 
Erzherzogs Ferdinand von Tirol mit dem Stift Trient, Vienna, 
1882, and Erzherzog Ferdinand I., 292 seq. On account of his 
encroachments in ecclesiastical matters, Pius V., on December 
31, 1568, threatened the Archduke with excommunication 
(LADERCHI, 1568, n. 77), which caused a great stir; see CANISII 
Epist., VI., 245. The only reason why they remained calm in the 
Curia was that a settlement was shortly expected through the 
mediation of the Emperor (cf. the brief in GOUBAU, 122 seq.} ; see 
HIRN, 124. A counterpart to this was the dispute about tem 
poralities with the monastery of Neustift ; see HIRN, I., 316 
seq. In a *brief of May u, 1570, to the " Praeposit. S. Mariae 
de Novacella O.S.A." Pius V. praises the resistance and the 
defence of their rights and ecclesiastical liberties offered by the 
monastery to the officers of the Archduke Ferdinand, and ex 
horts them to persevere (Arm. 44, t. 15, p. 107, Papal Secret 
Archives). In this controversy the civil power was victorious, 
but in the end had to give way over its plans for secularization 
as far as Trent was concerned, 


the two burning questions of the moment, Cosimo s title 
and the league against the Turks, the instructions gave de 
tailed directions. With regard to the Florentine question 
Delfino was to act in agreement with the Tuscan ambassador, 
Lodovico Antinori, Bishop of Vol terra, and to urge a policy 
of conciliation by calling attention to Cosimo s services to 
religion, and to his relationship with and loyalty to the Em 
peror. If the absence of any reply to the Emperor s demands 
was raised, the nuncio was to say that after carefully examin 
ing the statements drawn up by the theologians and lawyers 
the Pope had refrained from making any written reply because 
this could not have been satisfactory to Maximilian, and 
would only have led to a further exchange of correspondence, 
and that this would only have afforded pleasure to those who 
would be glad to see discord between the two heads of Christen 
dom. The Pope hoped that a settlement of the dispute would 
result from the sending of a legate, which was intended as soon 
as possible. With regard to the league against the Turks 
the nuncio was instructed formally to invite the Emperor to 
join the league which had been formed with Spain and Venice. 1 
Delfino, who had started from his episcopal see for Rome 
on May lyth, 1571, left the Eternal City on June 5th, travel 
ling slowly and stopping at Florence, and for a few days with 
Commendone at Verona in order to get further particulars 
concerning the mission with which he had been entrusted ; 
he did not reach Vienna until July 22nd. 2 His first audience 
with the Emperor passed in an exchange of compliments. 
At the second, on July 3oth, the nuncio brought forward a 
definite request, by granting which the Emperor would be 

1 See SCHWA RZ, Brief wechsel, 177 seq ; Ibid. 180 seq. the letter 
of Pius V. to Maximilian of June 17, 1571, saying that Delfino 
would communicate to the Emperor the reply to his complaints 
about the Papal brief to the Duke of Ferrara of April 9 (main 
taining that he, as a feudatory of the Holy See could never call 
upon the Emperor to settle the dispute about precedence ; 
LADERCHI, 1571, n. 64) as well as the reply to the proposal of 

* See SCHWARZ, loc. cit, 179. 
VOL. xviii. 20 


bound to show that he took his office of protector of the 
Church seriously ; Delfino asked him to prohibit a certain 
Protestant liturgy, in the German language, which was being 
sold to the nobility in Vienna, on the understanding that 
Maximilian had approved of it. Since it was also being main 
tained that the Emperor had granted the nobles the use of 
the Confession of Augsburg, Delfino was of opinion that 
His Majesty could not better prove his real sentiments than 
by a prohibition of the said liturgy. 1 

The Emperor, who had listened very calmly to the nuncio, 
first praised in the highest terms the Holy Father s zeal for 
religion, and then went on to deplore the sad religious state 
of Germany, assuring him that in the future, as in the past, 
he would leave nothing undone to remedy this state of affairs. 
The evil, however, was so deeply rooted that it was necessary 
to proceed with the greatest circumspection, and to implore 
the assistance of God. As to the liturgy in question 
Maximilian declared that he had already prohibited it, and 
that it would no longer be sold ; for the rest it was out of the 
question in that country to have recourse to punishment so 
easily as was desirable, but that he would nevertheless take 
other steps to prevent the sale of prohibited books in Vienna. 2 

At first Delfino had no suspicion that that very programme 
had been approved by the Emperor after long negotiations 
which had carefully been kept secret, and had been printed 
with his permission ; 3 nor had he had the least idea that on 
January I4th, 1571, Maximilian had given the nobles and 
knights of Lower Austria a written " assurance " concerning 
the religious freedom promised to them in I568. 4 Delfino 

1 See the "report of Delfino from Vienna, July 30, 1571, Nun- 
ziat. di Germania, 64, Papal Secret Archives. 

1 " "Circa al libro dell Agenda mi ha detto havendo prohibito 
et che piu non si vendera, ma che in questi luochi non si poteva 
procedere cosi facilmente al castigo, come sarebbe conveniente, 
et di piii promise di far provisione, che in Vienna non si venderanno 
libn prohibiti." Nunziat. di Germania 64, Papal Secret Archives, 

* See BIBL, Organisation, 143 seqq., 149 seqq., 180. 

4 See ibid. 161 seqq. 


must also have been confirmed in his belief in the Emperor s 
good faith by the fact that he found confirmation of another 
assurance which he had given at the beginning of August ; l 
at the Diet of Bohemia, Maximilian, appealing to his corona 
tion oath, had rejected the demand of the Protestant states 
for the free use of the Confession of Augsburg, to which the 
archbishop, the cathedral chapter, and the Utraquist con 
sistory were opposed. 2 

When, at the end of August, 1571, Delfino learned the true 
state of affairs with regard to the liturgy, he tried to 
bring pressure to bear on the Emperor by means of the Duke 
of Bavaria, Albert V., who had come to Vienna for the marriage 
of his daughter Mary to the Archduke Charles, at the same time 
taking the opportunity .of begging Albert to make sure that 
his son-in-law should remain true to the Catholic party. 3 
To the Archduke Charles himself Delfino delivered two briefs 
from the Pope, and in giving them to him set him on his 
guard against allowing to the Protestants those concessions 
which the Emperor had made in the case of the archduchy Of 
Austria. The Archduke gave him the fullest assurances, 4 
but Delfino did not conceal from himself the fact that the 

1 " "Circa le cose di Boemia S. M td> mi discorse lungamente 
della petitione che le fu fatta della confessione Augustana et 
della negativa data con parole molto vehementi et piene di 
religione, dicendo che non era per conceder mai cosa alcuna con 
gl Hussiti, ma bene per i capitoli giurati, quando fu eletto re 
di Boemia, era astretto a lasciarli vivere nella sua vecchia heresia. 
Ho parlato poi con molti di questa corte et Giesuiti et altri, 
quali tutti m hanno afifermato, che in Praga S. M tA nelle cose 
della religione s ha portato tanto bene, quanto si puo desiderare." 
Report from Vienna, August 6, 1571, loc. cit. 

1 Cf. HUBER, IV., 240. 

* See the "report of Delfino from Vienna, September 3, 1571, 
in Nunziat. di Germania, 64, Papal Secret Archives. For the 
marriage of the Archduke Charles see HURTER, I., 174 seqq. 

4 See the "reports of Delfino of September 3 and 7, 1571, 
loc. cit. For the briefs to the Archduke Charles see LADERCHI, 
1571, n. 55-57, 


danger was not thereby entirely removed. 1 It was true that 
the Archduke Charles loyally entertained true Catholic opin 
ions, 2 as had been shown among other things by his behaviour 
when, in 1568, Pius V. had withdrawn the concession of the 
chalice to the laity, because it had entirely failed to have the 
desired effect, 3 while in other ways as well Charles had sup 
ported the Pope s efforts for reform, 4 but on account of his 
financial straits he was bound to take the states into con 
sideration, and these, in Styria, as well as in Carniola and 
Carinthia, were for the most part inclined to Protestantism. 
When he was faced, therefore, with their request for the free 
exercise of their religion, the Archduke found himself in a 
difficult position. It did not satisfy the Protestant majority 
in the Styrian states that he was prepared not to interfere 
with the nobles in questions of religion, and in November, 
1571, they asked the Archduke to allow the preachers of the 
new doctrine into the cities and marts, for the abolition of 
" idolatry," for otherwise he would have done nothing for 
them. In the end the Protestants had to remain content 
with the vague assurance of the Archduke that he would 

1 On November i, 1571, Delfino reported from Vienna : *" In 
Gratz ho dato ordine alle Giesuiti at alii padri di S. Domenico 
che intendendo essi alcuna novita nella religione me ne debbano 
dare immediate avviso anco per huomo a posta." Nunziat. 
di Germania, 64, Papal Secret Archives. 

* See the report of Girol. Lippomano of 1567 (Relaz. al Senate 
Veneto, published by V. JOPPI, Udine, 1882, Nozze publication), 
Steiermdrkische Geschichtsblatter of ZAHN, III. (1882), 194. 

8 See the brief to the Patriarch of Aquileia in RUBEIS, Monum. 
eccl. Aquil., 1091. Cf. HURTER, I., 66 seqq. The expressions 
he used to the Venetian ambassador (in TURBA, III., 443 seq.) 
show Maximilian s annoyance at this withdrawal. 

4 On August 9, 1568, Pius V. thanked the Archduke Charles 
for his readiness to help in the reform of the clergy in his part 
of the diocese of Aquileia, and recommended to him Bartolomeo 
a Porzia, who had been appointed visitor ; see Steiermdrkische 
Geschichtsblatter of ZAHN, I. (1880), 69 seq. Cf. LADERCHI, 1568. 
n. 82 seq. ; 1569, n. 222. 


leave religious matters as they were and promote Christian 
mildness and gentleness. 1 

In the meantime, on September i6th, 1571, Commendone 
had come to Vienna on the business of the league against the 
Turks. He was also charged to come to some arrangement 
concerning the title conferred on Cosimo I. 2 During his stay 
of two months at the Imperial court Commendone showed no 
want of zeal, but he was not destined to meet with success in 
either matter. He did not however give up all hopes of 
accomplishing something on his return from Poland, for which 
country he set out on November 22nd. 3 

Soon after the departure of Commendone the Emperor was 
seized with a grave attack of his former ilhiess, gout and heart- 
disease. In a report of December I2th, 1571, Delfino ex 
pressed the view that God had sent this illness to Maximilian 
in order to lead him to live, as far as his religion was con 
cerned, in a manner befitting a Christian Emperor ; 4 he also 
expressed the hope that this would be the case, though the 
future had quite another tale to tell ; the Emperor continued 
to the end very vacillating in religious matters, so that no 
one really knew for certain whether he was a Catholic or a 
Protestant. 6 

In the meantime the state of the Catholic Church in Austria, 

1 See HURTER, I., 127 seqq. ; LOSERTH, Reformation, 158 seq. 
The * briefs of Pius V. to the Bishop of Gurk, and the Archbishop 
of Salzburg of September 15, 1571, are directed against the 
demands of the Styrian states. Archives of Briefs, Rome. 

2 The instructions for Commendone, of June 15, I57 1 * in 
SCHWARZ, Brief wechsel, 184. 

* See BIBL, Erhebung Cosimos, 123 seqq., 126. Cf. TORNE, 
Gallic, TO 2. 

4 See "Cifra del Nuntio di Germania di 12 di Dicembre, 1571. 
in Nunziat. di Germania, 64, Papal Secret Archives. 

6 See JANSSEN-PASTOR, IV. 15 16 , 496. The discussion of the 
Grand Duke s title continued. Again on March 15, 1572, Maxi 
milian charged his ambassador in Rome to demand satisfaction, 
in the matter in accordance with the rights of the Emperor and 
Empire. SUDENDORF, Registrum, III., 351. 


which Delfino endeavoured to help to the best of his ability 
by promoting reform in accordance with the prescriptions of 
the Council of Trent, 1 was going from bad to worse, because 
the Protestant nobles, without the least restraint, went far 
beyond the limits fixed for them by the Emperor s " assur 
ance." Not content with the free exercise of their religion 
granted to them and their subjects, they also tried in every 
way, even by violence, to extirpate " papistical idolatry " 
and did not shrink from revolting acts of cruelty. The 
Catholics were so intimidated that many of them no longer 
dared to express their opinions. 2 How far the truculence of 
the Protestants at the expense of the Catholic minority went 
may still be gathered to-day from the caricatures which they 
caused to be executed in 1571 in the palace of the States of 
Lower Austria, where there may still be seen a hog with a 
rosary in its mouth ! 3 

Not even the Protestants, however, were quite satisfied 
with the Emperor s ecclesiastical policy. Many preachers 
drew up memorials and polemical writings against the new 
ritual, and every preacher exercised his talents in this way. 
Maximilian s religious policy was therefore a complete failure ; 
all that he had obtained was the incurable disturbance oi his 
dominions. 4 

While, in the Emperor s hereditary possessions, to use his 
own expression, everything threatened to go to rack and ruin, 
in the Empire the efforts on behalf of reform and a Catholic 
restoration were making slow but steady progress. These 
efforts were inspired and supported in every way by Pius V. 

A short time after he had assumed the reins of government, 
the Pope had exhorted the German bishops to carry out the 
reform decrees of Trent, and above ah 1 to see to the establish- 

1 Information on this subject is given in the *reports of Delfino 
in the Papal Secret Archives, which will be published in the Nun- 
tiaturberichte of Prof. Dengel. 

See HUBER, IV., 238. 

3 MAYER, Niederosterr. Standehaus, 38. 

4 See HUBER, IV., 240; JANSSEN-PASTOR, IV. 15 - 16 , 452 seqq. 


ment of seminaries, 1 urging them in June, 1566, to undertake 
a far-reaching reform ot morals among the clergy by means of 
visitations of their dioceses. 2 Cardinal Commendone had also 
received special instructions to this effect. It was this dis 
tinguished representative of the Holy See who, at the Diet 
of Augsburg in 1566, had organized the Catholic party for 
the purpose of the acceptance of the decrees of the Council 
by the Catholic states of the Empire, 3 and had thus laid the 
solid foundations of the reform of Germany in the Catholic 
sense, though it was soon seen how far removed the acceptance 
of the decrees in principle was from their being carried into 

One of the first difficulties was connected with the making of 
the Tridentine profession of faith, which the Pope demanded 
of the new bishops. On account of the unhappy financial 
straits in which they found themselves Pius V. at once made 
concessions in the matter of the annates ; subordinating all 
temporal considerations to the spiritual, he contented him 
self in the case of Treves with a fifth, while it would seem that 
he was willing to condone them entirely in the case of the 
church of Cologne. But it was Frederick von Wied, the 
archbishop-elect of Cologne, who refused to take the oath, 
even after the Archbishop of Treves, Jakob von Eltz, and 
Frederick s suffragans, Johann von Hoya, Bishop of Osna- 
briick and Miinster, and Gerard Groesbeck of Liege, had taken 

1 See LADERCHI 1566, n. 222. In Laderchi the brief to the 
Bishop of Wiirzburg is dated January 23, 1566, but in Arm. 44, 
t. 12, n. 14 of the Papal Secret Archives, it is dated January 22, 
and this fits in with the fact that the original of the corresponding 
brief to the Bishop of Bamberg is also dated January 22. On 
February n, 1566, a similar brief was also sent to the primate 
of Hungary ; see GOUBAU, 6 seq. 

* See LADERCHI, 1566, n. 252 ; REMLING, Urkunden der 
Speirer Bischofe, Mayence, 1853, 615 seq. ; KELLER, 359 seq. ; 
SCHWARZ, Visitation, p. xxix. The *original of the letter to the 
Bishop of Strasbourg is in the Departmental archives at Stras 
bourg, G. 149. 

3 See supra p. 254. 


it. In the end Frederick preferred to resign his see. 1 At 
the election of his successor, Count Salentin of Isenburg, 
the cathedral chapter of Cologne included in the election 
capitulation a resolution that the archibshop must make the 
profession of faith of the Council of Trent if the Pope required 
it. When, in spite of this, Salentin refused to comply, the 
Holy See withheld its confirmation. 2 

Pius V. was equally determined in insisting that; in con 
formity with the decree of his predecessor, the Tridentine 
profession of faith should also be made by Catholic professors. 3 
The severity with which the Pope acted in this -matter shows 
how well he understood German conditions. There the 
Church was threatened with the gravest danger on the part 
of those waverers who, although they retained a certain 
attachment for old Catholic practices, were -nevertheless 
alienated from the true spirit of the Church and from many 
of her doctrines. It was from these feeble half-Catholics 
that arose those complaints of the imprudence and excessive 
zeal of the Pope, of which Maximilian II. made himself the 
spokesman, when he said that this Pope was starting some 
thing fresh every day, and turning everything upside down. 4 
Catholics of this kind were specially numerous at Cleves, at 
the court of Duke William. They watched Pius V. in a spirit 
of criticism and ill-will, saying that his reforms were not 
suited to Germany. With the good intention of saving the 
Church in Germany, they went to extremes in yielding Cath 
olic principles and institutions to the innovators. " If these 
men had succeeded in getting the direction of affairs into 
their own hands, German Catholics would have remained for 
a long time what they had already been for ten years as far 
as the majority of them was concerned : united by the slender 
est of ties to the centre of Catholic unity, and therefore weak 
and without energy." 5 

1 See Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte, XIII., 358 seq. ; 
LOSSEN, 4 seq. 

2 See LOSSEN, 27 seq. ; SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 143 seq. 

3 See BRAUNSBERGER, Pius V., 13 seq. 

4 See Venez. Depeschen, III., 443. 

6 See BRAUNSBERGER, loc. cit., 105 seq. 


How wide-spread discouragement was among the German 
bishops, and what difficulties were met with in the attempt to 
enforce the Trfdentine reforms, has been related in a striking 
way by Peter Canisius. In a letter of July 23rd, 1567, the 
second apostle of Germany describes the state of affairs in that 
country to the General of his Order. This letter was occas 
ioned by a visit paid by him to Erasmus von Limburg, Bishop 
of Strasbourg, an infirm prelate, very anxious about his own 
health, who indeed recognized the necessity of at once nomi 
nating a capable co-ad jutor, but was unable to make up his 
mind to act. It was in vain that Canisius told him of many 
of the canons of Strasbourg who were inclined to the new 
doctrines, and who could not be entrusted with so important an 
affair, and promised him help from Rome. It was in vain that 
he reminded him of the fate of the bishoprics in Saxony, and 
called his attention to his avaricious neighbours who were only 
waiting for his death in order to take possession of the diocese. 

As the same conditions prevailed in other cathedral chapters 
besides Strasbourg, Canisius drafted a number of reform 
proposals. He was quite right in seeing the principal reason 
for the great increase in the number of heretical and suspected 
canons in the education of the German nobles, who formed 
the greater part of the chapters, which was adapted for the 
profession of arms rather than for ecclesiastical office, while 
what this man who was so filled with the zeal for the faith 
has to say in his letter on the subject of the monasteries and 
the secular clergy is equally distressing. At the end of the 
letter he deals with the reasons on the strength of which the 
German bishops excused themselves for their failure to carry 
out the decrees of Trent. It is fear, he says, which they dis 
play : " our pastors lack confidence and firmness because 
they consider the fate of the Catholic Church in Germany to 
be hopeless, and they can see hardly any, or perhaps no single 
prince upon whom they can rely." He concludes his gloomy 
account with these words : "we are in a state of sore distress, 
and we cannot bear our sorrows any longer ; yet we shrink 
from the remedy." 1 

1 See CANISII Epist., V., 515 seq. 


It is clear that such a state of affairs could not be remedied 
in the course of a single pontificate, but it is beyond question 
that Pius V. did all that he could to evoke and further 
among the Catholics a movement of reform and self-defence, 
so as to remove the worst evils, and above all to set up a barrier 
against the further intrusion of the followers of the new religion 
into the great offices of the Church. It was he who charged 
the Jesuits Hoffaeus and Canisius to translate the Roman 
catechism into German, and who urged Canisius to combat the 
centuriators of Magdeburg. 1 In 1568, being seriously anxious 
to work for the welfare of Germany, he ordered the formation 
of a special congregation of Cardinals to deal with German 
affairs ; this was bound to put an end to such mistaken ideas 
as had been current at the beginning of the pontificate with 
regard to the religious attitude of Duke William of Cleves. 2 

The most recent research has shown how baseless is the 
accusation that Pius V. interfered in German affairs with 
excessive severity. It is true that in certain matters, as for 
example, the celibacy of the clergy and the chalice for the 
laity, 3 he was quite inflexible, and rightly so, but with regard 
to several other ecclesiastical duties he showed a wise modera 
tion. Even with regard to the bull In coena Domini he made 
a great concession orally, which seemed to be called for by the 

1 See BRAUNSBERGER, Pius V., 20 seq., 57, 62 seq. On August 
24, 1570, the nuncio Biglia received "orders to see that the 
cathedral chapters were purged of evil members : see Nunziat. 
di Germania, 67, p. 148, Papal Secret Archives. 

* See SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, p. xii. ; Hist. Jahrbuch, XVIII., 
404 seq. BRAUNSBERGER, Pius V., 27 seq. ; CANISII Epist., 
VI.. 582. 

Cf. the letter of Pius V. to the Bishop of Passau, Urban von 
Trennbach, May 26, 1568 ; in no case were those who asked for 
the chalice for the laity given what they wanted (see GOUBAU, 
83 seq. ; of. App. Vol. XVII., n. 68). Cf. WIEDEMANN, I., 316 
seq. and WIDMANN, Gesch. Salzburgs, III., 97, for the conse 
quences of this controversy. The experience of the granting of 
the chalice to the laity so far was all in favour of the decision 
of Pius V, See also BRAUNSBERGER, Pius V., 53 seq. 


desperate position of the Catholics in Germany. 1 Moreover, 
taking into consideration the special conditions of that country, 
he in some cases departed from the strict letter of the Tri- 
dentine decrees. The Council had forbidden the accumulation 
of benefices, but now, in order to prevent the spread of Protest 
antism among the chapters of northern Germany, Pius V. 
allowed the holding of several capitular benefices. 2 In con 
sideration of the assistance which Albert V. of Bavaria had 
given to the Church he allowed the appointment of his not 
yet twelve year old son Ernest as administrator of Freising ; 
he would not, however, entertain the proposal that Ernest 
should be appointed co-adjutor of Hildesheim in order to 
make that chapter safe against the Protestants. 3 

But, gloomy though the general religious situation in 
Germany was, there were not wanting gleams of light nor 
the seeds of better things in the future. As early as 1567 
Pius V. had the satisfaction of seeing two provincial synods 
held in Germany as the result of his efforts. His attention 
had especially been called to the need of these by the Domini 
can, Feliciano Ninguarda, who, having been summoned to 
Rome by the Pope, had passed the winter between 1566 and 
1567 there, and had drawn up a memorial upon the conditions 
of the Church in Germany, and the steps that must be taken 
to improve them. In this memorial, besides the importance 
of provincial synods, he had pointed out that capable theolo 
gians and commissaries should be attached to the weak bishops 
in order to enforce the Tridentine decrees as soon as possible. 4 
In 1567 Ninguarda was sent by the Pope to act as commissary 
at Salzburg in order that the decrees of Trent might be accepted 
in that important ecclesiastical centre by means of a pro- 

1 See BRAUNSBERGER, loc. cii. t 41 seq., 46 seq., 53 seq. Cf. 
KRATZ in Hist. Jahrbuch, XXXIV., 360. 

* See BRAUNSBERGER, loc. oit., 45 seq. 

8 See LOSSEN, 69 seq., 124, 130 seq. ; GOETZ, Beitrage zur Gesch. 
Albrechts V., 621, n. i. TIEPOLO (p. 187) brings out the importance 
of the concession made as to Freising. 

4 See *Istruzione per la Germania, in Miscell., Arm. I., t. 2, 
p. 60-74, with supplement p. 55-58, Papal Secret Archives. 


vincial synod. In the meantime two German bishops who 
were Cardinals had already in that same year held diocesan 
synods, at which it was decided to adopt the decrees of the 
Council, both as to dogma and reform ; these were Otto von 
Truchsess at Dillingen, 1 and Mark Sittich von Hohenems at 
Constance. 2 

But what was this when compared with the many other 
bishops and archbishops, who continued to delay ? Canisius, 
who deplored the fact in a report to his General on April 5th, 
1568, further states that those bishops who were filled with 
good intentions, such as those of Augsburg and Eichstatt, 
met with difficulties instead of help, from the chapters when 
they tried to set their hands to the much needed establish 
ment of seminaries. 3 A typical example of the canons who 
were thus animated by worldly ideas was Gebhard, the nephew 
of Otto Truchsess, the zealous reforming Cardinal, who, in spite 
of all exhortations, attended neither church nor chapter, and 
gave serious scandal by his drunkenness and immorality. 4 

The metropolitan of the great ecclesiastical province of 
Salzburg, Johann Jakob von Khuen-Belasy, had in 1566 
suggested to Commendone the idea of promulgating the de 
crees of Trent in a provincial synod, and the suggestion had 
been approved by the Pope. 5 It was not however until 

1 See Decreta synodalia dioecesis Augustanae Dilmgae mense 
Iimii A 1567 promulgata, Dillingen, s.a. Cf. Kirchenlexikon 
of Freiburg I.*, 1653 seq. ; CANISII, Epist., V., 635 seq. ; SPECHT, 
63 seq. 

8 C/. HARTZHEIM, Cone. Germ., VII., 419 seq. ; Freib. Diozesan- 
Archiv, XXI. (1890), 49 seqq. ; Zeitschrift fur Gesch des Ober- 
rheins, N.S. XXIV., 553 seq. ; WYMANN, 74 seq. 

8 See CANISII Epist., VI., 181. 

4 See ibid. 365 seq., 379 seq. 

* In the * brief of May 24, 1560, we read : " Quamvis autem 
non admodum necessarium existimemus sponte currentem 
incitare, nostri tamen officii partes esse duximus, te ita egregie 
animatum ad ipsum adeo eximium omnipotentique Deo accepta- 
bile opus primo quoque tempore aggrediendum atque percifiendum 
accendere, prout te omni nostri animi aflfectu ut id quamprimum 


March 1569 that a synod was held at Salzburg, which afforded 
a solid basis for ecclesiastical reform in accordance with the 
decrees of Trent. 1 Pius V. gave high praise to the Arch 
bishop of Salzburg, and also addressed himself to his suffragan 
bishops, of Brixen, Chiemsee, Freising, Gurk, Lavant, Passau, 
Ratisbon and Seckau, and to many of the chapters urging 
them all to the carrying into effect of the salutary decrees. 
At the same time he implored the secular princes in whose 
territories these bishoprics were situated, to afford all the 
help they could to this work, which was as necessary as it was 
useful. 2 At the beginning of 1572 he exhorted Daniel Brendel, 
Archbishop of Mayence, to hold a synod of his huge ecclesi 
astical province. 3 

Besides this revival of synodal activity, the carrying out of 
visitations in the parishes was also due to the exhortations 
of Pius V., who, in his ardent zeal for reform, left no means 
untried in order to remove the great evils that existed by 
bringing strong pressure to bear upon the prelates who were 
responsible. 4 In June 1568 the Archbishop of Salzburg and 
all his suffragans were asked to make a visitation of their 
dioceses, and in July the Archbishop of Prague was urged to 
give effect to the decrees of Trent by means of a provincial 
synod and visitations. 5 When, in the autumn of the same 

divino fretus auxilio efficias, etiam atque etiam suademus ac 
studiose adhortamur." Original in the Consistorial Archives, 
Salzburg, where there is also much correspondence on the subject 
of the synod of 1569. The brief exhorting to a reform of morals, 
dated June 17, 1566, which was read at the synod, is in Arm. 44, 
t. 12, n. 76, Papal Secret Archives. 

1 See HARTZHEIM, Cone. Germ., VII., 290 seq. Cf. WIEDE- 
MANN, I., 258 seq. SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 169 ; HUBNER in 
Deutsche Geschichtsbldtter, XII., 112 seq. For the examination 
and confirmation of the decrees on the part of the Holy See see 
SCHELLHASS, Nuntiaturberichte, sect. 3, Vol. III., xv. 

8 See LADERCHI, 1571, n. 66 seq. 

3 See THEINER, Annales eccl., I., 1572, n. 6. 

4 See SCHWARZ, Akten der Visitation, xxxiii. 
8 See LADERCHI, 1568, n. 92, 95. 


year, he asked for the help of the Spanish king to hold Maxi 
milian II. back from capitulating to the Protestant nobles, 
the Pope also had recourse to the three ecclesiastical Electors. 
In briefs addressed to them he not only urged the erection 
of seminaries according to the prescriptions of the Council of 
Trent, but also the carrying out of a visitation of the parishes. 1 
In the visitations which he had himself made in Austria, Passau 
and Salzburg, 2 Commendone had shown the procedure to be 
adopted in such matters. The first of the bishops of western 
Germany to reply to the Pope s request was the Elector of 
Cologne in 1569 ; 3 he probably wished in so doing to placate 
the Pope, who was thinking of taking stern measures because 
Salentin was refusing to make the Tridentine profession of 
faith or to receive priest s orders. 4 At the same time Jakob 
von Eltz, Archbishop of Treves, held a visitation of all the 
parishes in his principality ; 5 like the Archbishops of Mayence 
and Prague, 6 he earned high praise both from the Pope and 
the nuncio Biglia on account of his strictly ecclesiastical 

1 See SCHWARZ, loc. tit., xxxiv. 
*C/. supra, p. 268. 

8 See SCHWARZ, Die Kirchliche Visitation des Westes Reck- 
linghausen in Westfdl. Zeiischrift, XX., Miinster, 1911. 

* See LOSSEN, 53 seq. ; SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 166 seq. 

* See HCLLEN, Erste tridentin. Visitation im Erzstift Trier 
in Trier er Archiv 9 and 10. The protocols of the visitation in 
the archdeaconry of Longuyon (1570) in HEYDINGER, Archi- 
diaconatus tit. S. Agathes in Longuiono, TreVes, 1884. Briefs 
of praise and encouragement to Eltz, September 23, 1569, in 
LADERCHI, 1569, n. 226. 

8 See the *letter from the Secretary of State to Biglia of August 
16, 1570, Nunziat. di Germania, 67, p. 129, Papal Secret Archives ; 
the Pope s joy at the action taken by the Archbishops of TreVes 
and Mayence ; ibid. *report of Biglia from Spires on August 17, 
1570, concerning the intention of the Archbishop of Prague to 
reform the convents. In a * brief of June 24, 1570, Pius V. 
praised the pastoral zeal of the Archbishop of Prague and ex 
horted him to persevere (Arm. 44, t. 15, p. I57b, Papal Secret 
Archives). The Pope had urged action in Prague as early 
as 1568 ; see LADERCHI, 1568, n. 95. 


conduct in the matter of the Tridentine reforms. 1 His ex 
ample soon found imitators in the north-west of Germany ; 
on July ist, 1571, Johann von Hoya, Prince-Bishop of Minister, 
who was loyally attached to the Church, arranged for the 
visitation of all the clergy in his diocese. 2 It was about the 
same time that the visitation of the diocese of Constance 
which had been ordered by Cardinal Mark Sittich was begun. 3 

All this was undoubtedly a beginning of great promise, 
but how much hard work still remained to be done is best 
shown by the deplorable state of affairs which these visita 
tions revealed. A whole ten years was to elapse, and a new 
generation had to spring up before the ideals which Pius V. 
had before his eyes could be realized. Knowing well that 
everything depended upon the formation of a good clergy, 
the Pope never ceased to urge the establishment of seminaries, 
a necessity which was particularly well understood by Otto 
Truchsess and William Russinowsky, Bishop of Olmutz ; 
Russinowsky placed the seminaries which he set up in Olmutz 
and Briinn under the cares of the Jesuits. 4 In some places 
the colleges of that Order served as preparatory schools, and 
in others, under certain conditions, were equivalent to 

The Jesuits were supported and recommended by the Pope 
in every possible way. 5 On many occasions he praised the 

1 See *Nunziat di Germania, 67, p. 129, 179, 233, Papal Secret 
Archives. For the reforming activity of the archbishop and his 
action against Protestantism in his archdiocese see MARX, Gesch. 
des Erzstift Trier, I., Troves, 1858, 388 seq. 

1 See SCHWARZ, p. xxxvi. seq. of the introduction to his ex 
cellent edition of the acta of the visitation of the diocese of Miinster 
in 1571-1573. For Hoya see SCHWARZ in Westfdl. Zeitschrift, 
LXIX., 1 6 seq. 

8 See Zeitschrift fiir Gesch. des Oberrheins, N.S. XXV., 129 seq. 

* See THEINER, Bildungsanstalten, 146. 

5 See BRAUNSBERGER, Pius V., 35 seq., 82 seq. For the spread 
and activity of the Order of the Jesuits in Germany see JANNSEN- 
PASTOR, IV. 15 16 , 414 seq. and DUHR, I. When we treat of 
Gregory XIII. we shall return to the revival of Catholic life in 


services which they were rendering to the Church in those 
stormy times, not only by their educational work, but also by 
their piety, their charity and their blameless lives. 1 

The Society of Jesus found its greatest development in 
Bavaria, upon the Duke of which country the Pope had every 
reason to look with special love. 2 Even in the time of Pius IV. 
Albert V. of Bavaria had slowly entered upon the ways of 
Catholic reform, and he proceeded more and more definitely 
along the same way during the pontificate ol Pius V., and in 
so doing he found great help in the concessions which had been 
made by the Holy See to the Bavarian government in the 
XVth century, by means of which the civil power was able 
to exercise great influence even in ecclesiastical matters, 
especially in the matter of particular visitations. Such visi 
tations, as well as special missions and mandates were now 
employed in order to purge the duchy of all religious suspects. 
Anyone who proved obstinate was forced to go into banish 
ment ; this was actually in conformity with the religious 
peace of Augsburg, from which hitherto hardly any but the 
Protestant princes had profited. The penalty of banishment 
also fell upon ecclesiastical concubinists, a thing which the 
Catholic reforming activity of Albert V. made to serve a 
double purpose ; not only was Protestantism to be stamped 
out in Bavaria, but at the same time abuses within the Church 
were to be removed, and new life infused into the almost ex 
hausted Catholic spirit. Since experience had shown that 
the concession of the chalice to the laity had brought various 
difficulties in its train, it was abolished in 1571. The efforts 
of the government to bring back unity of faith and to reform 
the clergy were crowned by a rigorous censorship of books 

south Germany, a subject as to which plentiful material is to be 
found in the correspondence of Peter Canisius, so splendidly 
edited by Braunsberger. 

1 See LADERCHI, 1568 n. 106. 

2 Pius V. praised Albert V. as early as 1566 ; see PFLEGER, 
Eisengrein, 50. The powerful chancellor of the Duke received 
a brief of praise in 1567 ; see GOUBAU, 24 seq. 


and zealous care for ensuring sound Catholic instruction. 
At the head of this great system of Catholic restoration there 
was placed a special vigilance committee, a commission of 
ecclesiastics, to which many theological advisers were at 
tached. 1 The victory of Catholic restoration in Bavaria was 
practically ensured even in the life time of Pius V. 

The Archduke Ferdinand II. in the Tyrol 2 and Lower 
Austria 3 acted in a similar way to Albert V., as did several 
bishops of south Germany such as Otto Truchsess of Augs 
burg, 4 Urban of Passau, 5 Martin of Eichstatt, 6 and Frederick 
of Wiirzburg. 7 At the beginning of the seventh decade of the 
century a change in favour of Catholicism was also to be seen 
at the court of Cleves. 8 It was of great importance when, 
stirred by the example of Albert V., the Prince- Abbot of 
Fulda, Balthasar von Dernbach, immediately after his election 
on January 25th, 1570, resolutely proclaimed himself a cham 
pion of Catholic reform. 9 About the same time, with the 

1 See RITTER, I., 300 seq. ; RIEZLER, IV., 544 seq. ; JANNSEN- 
PASTOR, IV. 15 16 , 464 seq. 

* Cf. HIRN. Erzherzog Ferdinand I., 159 seq., 210 seq., 262 seq. 
Additions in Vol. VI. of Canisii Epist. In 1568 Pius V. honoured 
Ferdinand by sending him the blessed hat still preserved in the 
Court Museum, Vienna ; see BOHEIM, Album der Waffensammlung 
des Kaiserhauses, Vienna, 1894, 7, tav. 27, i. 

9 Cf. GFRORER, Die kathol. Kirche im osterreich. Elsass unter 
Erzeherzog Ferdinand II., in Zeitschrift fur Gesch. des Oberrheins, 
N.S. X., 481 seqq. 

4 Cf. BRAUN, Gesch. der Bischofe von Augsburg, III., 469 seq. ; 
SPECHT, 63 seq., 68 seq. ; Allgem. deutsche Biographic, XXIV., 
634 seq. By a "bull of July 9, 1560, Otto was appointed " legatus 
in ecclesia et dioec. August." : Cod. Vatic. 7160, p. 230 seq. ; 
Vatican Library. 

6 See SCHMIDLIN, 191 seq. 

6 Sec ibid. 263 seq. 

7 See BRAUN, Gesch. der Heranbildung des Klerus in Wiirzburg 
I., Mayence, 1897, 124 seq., 151 seq. 

8 See KELLER, 36 seq. 

9 For B. von Dernbach see a future volume of this work, 



direct co-operation of the Duke of Bavaria, 1 the restoration 
of the Catholic Church in the margravate of Baden was also 
brought about. 2 

As had been the case in Bavaria, so in Fulda and Baden as 
well, an essential part in the work of carrying out Catholic 
reform fell to the Society of Jesus, the members of which dis 
played a truly Catholic activity in every way, especially in the 
pastoral office and in giving instruction. 3 They had a great 
share in restoring the authority of the Papacy which had been 
so seriously shaken in Germany ; as the archduchesses Mag 
dalen, Margaret and Helena reported to Pius V. from Inns 
bruck, the Jesuits were entirely devoted to the Holy See. 4 
In this respect no one did more than the humble religious, 
Canisius, who had firmly established the Society of Jesus at 
Prague and Ingolstadt in 1556, at Munich in 1559, at Inns 
bruck in 1562, at Wiirzburg in 1567, at Halle in 1569, and had 
also arranged in 1563 that the university at Dillingen should 
be entrusted to it. His catechism was in itself a bulwark 
against all the enemies of the Papacy. The letters, discourses 
and sermons of this holy priest, who, fully conscious of the 
gravity of the situation, devoted all his strength to unwearied 
apostolic labours, all breathe the deepest love and reverence 
for the Holy See. " That power," Canisius wrote, " which, 
Christ in unmistakable words conferred on the Apostle Peter 
is the greatest that can be given to anyone on earth. It is our 
intention to recognize this, and to hold this power in great 
honour. He who does not take his stand upon this rock, may 
be a reed, but he is not a true Christian." 5 

1 See the * brief of Pius V. to the Bishop of Spires, dated Febru 
ary 2, 1572, Archives of Briefs, Rome. 

* Cf. ScHftpFMN, Hist. Zahringo-Badensis, III., 53 seq. ; 
THEINER, Annales eccles., I., 1572, n. 5 ; VIERORDT, Gesch. der 
evangel. Kirche in Baden, II. (1856), 45 seq. ; DUHR, I., 402 seq. 

3 Cf. especially DUHR, I. See also RIEZLER, IV., 561 seq. ; 
VI., 254, 285 seq. 

4 See LADERCHI, 1566, n. 317. 

5 See CANISII Epist., III., 331. For the sermons of Canisius 
about the Pope see BRAUNSBERGER, Pius V., 54 seq. 


In 1568 Pius V. had the intention of rewarding the loyalty 
and self-denial with which Canisius had worked for so many 
years, by conferring upon him the purple, but he abandoned 
the idea at the request of the humble religious. From a record 
found later on it is clear that if he had been granted longer life 
the Pope would certainly have obliged " the apostle of Ger 
many " to accept the high dignity. 1 In many documents 
Pius V. gave recognition to the services which the Society of 
Jesus had rendered by its unwearied zeal to the salvation of 
souls. In a brief of May 2ist, 1568 he declares that in those 
stormy times he looked upon the Order as a work of the 
special providence of God. 2 

1 See BRAUNSBERGER, loc. cit. 100 seq. Cf. CANISII Epist., VI., 
73-1 seq. 

1 See LADERCHI, 1568, n. 74. Cf. DUHR, I., 843 seq. 



HOWEVER much the state of religion in Germany and France 
occupied the attention of Pius V., he did not, in his pastoral 
care, lose sight of the dangers threatening the Church in the 
eastern part of Europe. 

In the great kingdom of Poland separation from the Church 
and the establishment of a national Polish church had been 
averted by the acceptance by the king of the decrees of the 
Council and the temporary prevention of the divorce of Sigis- 
mund Augustus, but the religious crisis had by no means been 
averted. While the followers of the new beliefs were stirring 
up a strong agitation, many of the bishops and priests con 
tinued in their policy of inaction, and many of them were 
leading lives that were not only unspiritual, but also un- 
ecclesiastical. In many places there was a scarcity of priests. 
The possibility of the king s divorce still hung like a threaten 
ing cloud over the Polish Catholics, who, owing to the weak 
ness of the government, found themselves as much exposed 
as ever to every kind of insult and attack. 1 Thus the task 

1 Cf. EICHHORN, II., 237 seqq., 337 seqq. ; BERGA, Skarga, 141. 
For M. Cromer cf. EICHHORN in Zeitschriftfur Gesch. Ermlands, IV. 
(1868), i seqq. and THIELUI Kirchenlex. of Freiburg, III., 1195 seqq. 
The Polish envoy for the obedientia (cf. GRATIANI Epist., 254, 259) 
did not dare to bring forward the question of the divorce. Pius V. 
mentioned this circumstance to Arco, saying that otherwise he 
would have given him an answer " che mai piii il Re havrebbe 
avuto ardire di muoverne parola." (*letter of A/co of February 
22, 1567, State Archives, Vienna). M. A. Mureti Oratio ad 
Pium V. nomine Sigismundi Augusti Poloniae regis, made on 
January 15, 1567, was printed in Rome in 1567. 



which fell to the lot of the distinguished Giulio Ruggieri, 1 
who had been appointed nuncio in Poland by Pius IV., and 
immediately confirmed by Pius V., was no light one. Rug 
gieri had first to go to Augsburg to consult with the Cardinal 
legate, Commendone, who was so well informed in Polish 
affairs, concerning the questions at issue, especially the king s 
divorce. 2 

The instructions given to Ruggieri in March, 1566, warned 
him to bear in mind always how many enemies the Pope had 
in Poland ; his representative must therefore be very careful 
to behave very prudently himself, and to see to the exemplary 
conduct of his suite. The principal duties entrusted to the 
nuncio by Pius V. were : to remind the king of the promise 
he had made to Commendone to take action against the 
heretics at the end of the war, and to revoke the decree of 
1563 restricting the liberties of the Church ; to see to the carry 
ing out of the decrees of Trent, and lastly to undertake a 
reform of the monasteries. In everything Ruggieri was to take 
counsel, not only with Commendone, but also with Cardinal 
Hosius and the learned Martin Cromer. Pius V. s zeal for 
ecclesiastical reform runs through the whole of the instructions. 
The nuncio was ordered very particularly to urge the bishops 
to adopt the reform decrees of Trent, and to induce them 
personally to visit their dioceses, and to take action against 
heretical books ; with regard to the duty of residence they 
must not overstep the two years limit which had been allowed 
by Pius IV. Ruggieri must always bear in mind that, sent 
as he was to help the Catholic religion, he was bound to see 
that the decrees of Trent were carried out, and not to allow 
the introduction of the least change in religion, or in ritual 
and ceremonial. Pius V. expressly declared that he would 
never allow communion under both kinds or the marriage of 

1 Cardinal Madruzzo praises him as " virtuoso et buono " in a 
letter to Commendone of March 25, 1566, Lett, di princ., XXV. 
67, Papal Secret Archives. Confirmation of his appointment 
followed on March 2, 1568 ; see Vol. XVII. App., n. 68. 

* Cf. ElCHHORN, II., 247; BlAUDET, 112. 


priests. The nuncio was further exhorted to get into touch 
with all personages of distinction and with learned Catholics, 
whom the Pope would gladly recompense. 1 

Ruggieri, who reached Poland in the middle of June, 1566, 
was a witness of the deplorable want of unity among the 
Polish episcopate at the stormy Diet of Lublin. It was not to 
be wondered at that no advantage was taken of the divisions 
among the Protestants, and that the Diet came to an end 
without any gain to the Catholic cause. 2 In consequence of 
this Ruggieri and Hosius first devoted themselves to healing 
the acrimonious dispute between Archbishop Uchanski of 
Gnesen and Bishop Wolski of Cujavia, as well as to the holding 
of a provincial synod for the carrying out of the reform decrees 
of Trent. 

Both these questions were matters of great concern to 
Pius V. Since, in view of the shifty character of Uchanski, 
there was reason to fear that the provincial synod might 
develop into a national council, the Pope, in December, 1566. 
appointed Hosius his legatus de latere for that assembly and 
for the whole kingdom of Poland. 3 The dispute between the 
two prelates was eventually settled, but the holding of the 
synod had to be postponed. 4 

In the summer of 1567 an event occurred which caused much 
harm to the Catholic cause in Poland. The Bishop of Funf- 
kirchen, Andreas Dudith, who had been appointed Imperial 
ambassador at the court of Sigismund Augustus, and had 
already drawn attention to himself at the Council of Trent 

1 The terms of the instructions in the Papal Secret Archives, 
Varia polit., 81 (now 82), p. 295-301, and in the Graziani Archives 
at Citt& di Castello. 

See EICHHORN, II., 241 seqq. t 247, 249, 251. The briefs of 
Pius V. to the Polish bishops in relation to the Diet in THEINER, 
Mon. Pol., II., 723 seq. 

3 See LADERCHI, 1566, n. 342 ; EHRENBERG, 231 seq. ; EICH 
HORN, II., 279 seq. ; cf. 289 seq. for the plenary powers of Hosius, 
and the difficulties he met with. 

* Cf. LADERCHI, 1566, n. 342 ; THEINER, Mon. Pol., II., 726 
seq. ; EICHHORN, II., 251, 254. 


by his great eloquence, and his unecclesiastical views, broke 
his vows, married one of the court ladies of the Queen of 
Poland, and embraced Protestantism. Pius V. did not delay in 
taking action : he issued a monitorium, pronounced excommuni 
cation on the apostate, and demanded his recall from Poland. 
The nuncio Ruggieri, whose duty it was to present and press 
this just demand of the Pope, found himself involved thereby 
in many difficulties and anxieties. When he was recalled at 
the beginning of 1568, he drew up for the Pope s information 
a full report, which, after the manner of the Venetian reports, 
contains a detailed description of the kingdom of Poland, 
and an interesting account of its political, economic and 
religious condition. 2 

1 Cf. the "instructions for Ruggieri of August 23 and 30, 1567, 
Nunziat. di Polonia, I. k 31, 34 seqq., Papal Secret Archives ; 
POGIANI, Epist., IV., 199 seqq., 249 seqq. ; EICHHORN, II., 255 seqq. 
See also STIEFF, Versuch einer Geschichte vom Leben und den 
Glaubensmeinungen A. Dudiths, Breslau, 1756. 

8 *Relatione data al S.S.N.P. Pio V. da Mons. Giulio Ruggieri 
prot. apost. etc. 1568, Corsini Library, Rome, 35 B. 9, p. 165^225 
(cf. LAMMER, Zur Kirchengeschichte, 145) ; the manuscript is 
also to be found fairly frequently elsewhere, as in the Vatican 
Library, Vatic. 5914, p. 275 seq., Ottob. 2433, p. 178 seq., and 
3184, p. 40 seq., Urb. 823, p. 247 seq. and 855, p. 326 seq. ; Casana- 
tense Library, Rome (see FABISZA, 161) ; National Library, 
Florence, Bibl. Magliabecchiana (see CIAMPI, II., 37) ; Ambrosiana 
Library, Milan, Q. 120, p. i seq. ; National Library, Naples, 
X.G. 15, p. I seq. ; Court Library, Vienna, 6519, p. no seq. 
(extract) ; Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris (see MARSAND, I., 
664 seq.) , ibid. (St. Germain, 280) a *Discorso di Msgr. G. 
Ruggieri intorno agli aiuti di Poloma a favore della s. lega contro 
il Turco, addressed to Pius V. The Polish translation of Rug- 
gieri s report in Relacye, I., 165 seq. is incomplete : the clause is 
missing in which Ruggieri says that he will report other matters 
to Pius V. orally, which shows that Pierling s statement (Rome 
et Moscou, 64), that the report was written in Rome after his 
return, is erroneous. There is also an extract from the report in 
JORGA, Actes relat. a 1 hist. des Roumains, I., Bucarest, 1895, 14. 
Cf. also GRATIANUS, De scriptis invita Minerva, II., 172. 


Ruggieri s opinion of the king s attitude towards religion 
is anything but favourable. It was true that Sigismund 
Augustus had not departed in any single point from the 
Church, but at the same time he left a good deal to be desired 
in the matter of his reception of the sacraments, and his 
attendance at sermons and mass ; a greater zeal on his part 
for the honour of God and the salvation of his subjects would 
have been well in his case. 

In his minute account of the religious conditions in the 
Polish kingdom Ruggieri shows that only one province, that 
of Masowien, had been kept free from heresy, and was indeed 
as Catholic as Italy. In all the other provinces the new religion 
had made headway, although, especially in the case of the 
common people, the number of the Catholics was greater than 
that of the Protestants. Nor were there wanting among the 
Catholics many who remained firmly attached to the old faith 
with the loyalty for which at one time Poland had been dis 
tinguished. Ruggieri compared the varied conglomeration 
of sects in Poland to the confusion of tongues in Babel. Every 
error in the world was being preached there, the fugitives from 
Italy, Germany and Geneva all found refuge there. Lutheran- 
ism was specially rife in Greater Poland and Prussia, but was 
now beginning to wane ; Calvinism had always been most 
widely spread in Little Poland and Lithuania, although both 
Lutherans and Calvinists were being driven out by other sects, 
especially the Antitrinitarians and Anabaptists. 

In accounting for the reasons for the religious changes 
Ruggieri puts in the first place those which had also opened 
the way to Protestantism in other countries. Besides the 
greed of the laity for Church property, he names above all 
the negligence and bad example of the higher clergy, and the 
decline of monastic discipline. Ruggieri refuses to accept the 
excuse offered by the king that he had not sufficient authority 
to deal with the powerful nobles, because, in Lithuania, where 
this was certainly not the case, things were even worse than in 
Poland. The nuncio rightly attaches the greatest importance 
to the habitual inobservance throughout the kingdom of the 
existing laws, so much so that there was a proverb to the effect 


that they only lasted for three days. To this were to be added 
the continual wars with Russia, which completely absorbed 
the king s energies, his political consideration for the nobles 
who had adopted the new religion, and his natural disinclina 
tion for any kind of severity. 

Ruggieri s suggestions as to the means to be adopted to 
restore the Catholic Church in Poland are very interesting. 
In the first place he shows how necessary it was that there 
should always be at the court a representative of the Pope, 
who should exhort the king to do his duty for his own ad 
vantage. It was because this had not been the case that 
the religious innovations had made such rapid strides. When 
Paul IV. had remedied this by sending Lippomano, the move 
ment towards apostasy had gradually come to a standstill. 
It was therefore very necessary that there should always be a 
nuncio in Poland, and to fill that office only the best men 
should be chosen, men who, themselves completely disinter 
ested and upright, could stand forth as solid walls of the house 
of God, reminding the king and the prelates of their duty, 
and promoting the Catholic religion in every way. With 
regard to benefices, Ruggieri warns the Pope to be very carefu 
only to give them in future to worthy and deserving men 
this applied especially to the canonries of Cracow, since the 
greater number of the bishops were drawn from that chapter. 
In this connection Ruggieri urged that the greater number of 
the sons of the nobles should be taken to Rome to be educated, 
so that they might afterwards become a leaven in their own 

Ruggieri did not fail to realize how much the restoration of 
the Catholic Church depended upon the king. It was there 
fore necessary, he thought, to insist that Sigismund Augustus 
should nominate as candidates for the episcopal sees men 
who were not only Catholics, but also zealous Catholics, and 
in every way suitable for the office, and that he should bestow 
all the great offices of the kingdom on men of proved Catholic 
views, and at the same time remove from among his entourage 
all the adherents of the reformed religion. The bishops, more 
over, must in quite a special degree be a light to their flocks 


by their good example ; it was in their power to exercise an 
infinitely great influence by the formation of a new generation 
of young and worthy ecclesiastics, 1 and by giving their help 
to zealous pastors, preachers, teachers and writers. 

Ruggieri was convinced that in this way a complete revival 
of the Catholic Church was possible, and that this would lead 
to the complete suppression of heresy, since the movement 
towards apostasy had passed its zenith, even though it had not 
as yet come to an end. During the period of his nunciature, 
which had only lasted a year and six months, at least ten 
thousand persons had returned to the Catholic faith, 2 while 
the breaking up of the Protestants into sects, all quarrelling 
with each other, was increasing from day to day. It was with 
satisfaction that Ruggieri could point to the restoration of the 
Catholic religion at Elbing and Dantzig which had been 
effected during his nunciature with the king s help. The 
sermons of the Dominicans were in great request at Dantzig, 
while the Jesuits were very active at Elbing. In other places 
as well the Jesuits were exercising a useful influence, as for 
example at Braunsberg, where the first Jesuit college in the 
kingdom of Poland had been established in 1565, which had 
been followed, besides that at Elbing, by those at Pultusk 
(1566), Jaroslaw (1568) and Wilna (isyo). 3 The activities of 
so extraordinarily vigorous an Order filled the nuncio with 
joyful expectations. He mentioned the fact, which is also 
confirmed from other sources, that even Protestant parents 
entrusted their sons to the educational establishments of the 
Jesuits, and he very rightly built great hopes for the future 
on the youth who were there being educated in a strictly 

1 Hosius had already established a seminary at Braunsberg 
in 1567 ; see EICHHORN, II., 297. 

* Among those who were rescued for the Church were the four 
sons of Nicholas Radziwill, in which conversion the famous 
preacher Peter Skarga had a great part ; the latter entered the 
Jesuit Order in 1568. See Kirchenlexikon of Freiburg, XI. 2 , 388, 
and Rom. Ouartalschrift, XXV., 57* seq. ; cf. BERGA, Skarga, 
163 seq. 

8 See ZALESKI, I., i, 150 . r : ., 169 seq., 175 seq., 212 seq. 


Catholic spirit. Negotiations were even going on, he adds, for 
the establishment of another college at Posen, and it was to 
be hoped that other cities would follow this example, to the 
salvation of the kingdom and the Catholic faith, which would 
certainly have a brighter future, if only the necessary steps 
were taken. 1 

Ruggieri s suggestions entirely coincided with the ideas of 
Pius V., who never wearied of encouraging the Polish bishops 
to the observance of the decrees of Trent, and especially to the 
reform of the clergy, the holding of provincial synods, and the 
establishment of ecclesiastical seminaries. 2 

Vincenzo de Portico was appointed nuncio to Poland in 
succession to Ruggieri. 3 This diplomatist, who reached 
Cracow at the beginning of July, 1568, had been specially 
instructed to press for the assembly of a provincial synod in 
accordance, with the prescriptions of Trent ; he soon, however, 
found himself obliged to desist from his efforts owing to the 
shifty behaviour of Uchanski. 4 As representative of the Pope, 

1 *Relatione etc., see supra p. 303, -n. 2. For the activity 
of the Jesuits see SACCHINI, P. III., i, i, n. 106 seqq., i. 4, in 
176 seq., I, 6, n 101 seqq. ; DUHR, I., 179 seqq., 434 seqq. ; ZIVIER, 
I., 770 seq. ; ZALESKI, I., i, 375 seq. 

2 See the briefs in GOUBAU, 123 seq., 214 seq. and THEINER, 
Mon. Pol. II., 725, 726, 730, 735. The letter of Stanislaus Carri- 
covius, Bishop of Cujavia, to Pius V. concerning the acceptance 
of the Tridentine decrees by his clergy, and the erection of a 
diocesan seminary, in LADERCHI, 1568, n. 19. On June 12, 1570 
*instructions were sent to the nuncio in Poland to take care that 
the bishops of the kingdom observed the decrees of the Council 
of Trent ; see Nunziat. di Polonia, I., 72, Papal Secret Archives. 

3 Cf. LADERCHI, 1568, n. 148 ; THEINER, Mon. Pol., II., 728 
seq. ; EICHHORN, II., 343. Ruggieri had already asked for his 
recall in April 1567 ; see Relacye, I., 216 seq. Reports of Portico 
in THEINER loc. cit. 770 seqq. He too drew up a report of his 
nunciature ; see PIERLING, Rome et Moscou, 64. Ibid, his 
instructions. A letter from Pius V. to Hosius, of February 18, 
1568, says that he had told Portico to trust the advice of Hosius ; 
see EHRENBERG, Ostpreussen, 39 seq. 

4 See LADERCHI, 1568, n. 148. 


Portico was present at the Diet of Lublin, which was opened 
in December, 1568, and at which, by the request of the Pope, 1 
Hosius also was present in February, 1569. The Pope had 
spared no efforts in seriously exhorting the king and the 
bishops not to make any concessions to the Protestants, and 
to defend the cause of the Church. 2 Cardinal Hosius took a 
leading part in the discussions of the Diet, and as long as he 
was present the Protestants did not dare to make any move. 
It was only after his departure that they put forward their 
demands, but even then they did not meet with any success. 3 
On August i8th, 1569, Portico was able to report to Morone 
the results of the Diet, at which the union of Lithuania to 
the crown of Poland had been brought about. 4 Nothing had 
been said about ecclesiastical matters at the Diet, so that no 
decision had been come to, either by way of concession to the in 
novators, or with regard to the holding of a national council. 5 
Cardinal Hosius left the Diet before its close, in order to 
go once more to Rome. After placing the administration of 
his diocese in the hands of his learned and energetic friend 
Cromer, in August, 1569, he began his journey to the Eternal 
City, where he arrived on November 8th. 6 The Cardinal was 

1 THEINER, Mon. Pol., II., 735. 

* See LADERCHI, 1569, n. 235 seq., 245 seq. ; THEINER, Mon. 
Pol., II., 732, 735 seq, 

8 See EICHHORN, II., 343 seq., 347. 

4 Pius V. s congratulatory letter on this event, of July 22, 1569, 
in LADERCHI, 1569, n. 264 ; ibid. 266 seq. briefs concerning the 
conversion of two eminent Poles. The protest made by the 
nuncio by command of Pius V. against the investiture of Prussia 
which had been conferred on the son of Albert of Brandenburg, 
in THEINER, loc. cit. 470; cf. CATENA, no. 

6 Relayce, I., 218-219. 

See EICHHORN, II., 360 seq., 366. On November 15, 1569, 
Hosius was received in the consistory ; cf. KORZENIOWSKI, 115. 
The unaccustomed climate of Rome did not suit the Cardinal ; 
in the summer of 1570 he suffered much from fever. Cf. the 
*letters from Hosius to Commendone, dated Rome, July 12, 
August 12 and 24, and September 23, 1570. Graziani Archives, 
Citt& di Castello. 


not destined to see his diocese again, but even at a distance he 
had every care for its welfare. The principal object of his 
journey to Rome had been to arrange, at the request of King 
Sigismund Augustus, the disputes of the latter with Philip II. 
concerning the rich inheritance in south Italy of his mother, 
Bona Sforza, a matter which had already engaged the atten 
tion of Pius V. 1 Hosius was no diplomatist, and so it is not 
surprising that he did not meet with much success in that 
difficult business. 2 

His letters show what a lively interest Hosius took in the 
religious condition of the Polish kingdom while he was in 
Rome. As the Lutherans, Calvinists and Bohemian Brothers 
had joined together in a federal union at Sandomir in April, 
1570, the Catholic party were awaiting with the greatest 
anxiety the coming Diet at Warsaw, and indeed that assembly 
resulted in stormy discussions. 3 The Protestants claimed 
religious liberty for all, but were met by the strong opposition 
of the senate, which was for the most part Catholic. No 
decision was therefore arrived at. 4 The danger, however, 
was not removed, since the dissolution of the Diet, after 
arriving at an ambiguous resolution, left the way open for 
iurther demands. Hosius bitterly condemned this ambiguity 
in a letter to Uchanski. Why not openly declare, he said, 
that they intended to remain true to the faith of their fathers, 
and that they were ready to sacrifice their blood and their 
lives, rather than deviate by a finger s breadth from it ? Such 
language on the part of the king and the Catholic senators 
would stifle all disturbances in a moment. Instead of that 
they preferred to talk about religious concord, as though it 
were possible to come to an agreement with men who were 
quarrelling among themselves like the heroes of Homer. 
Uchanski should therefore advise the king openly to profess 

1 See Corresp. dipl., II., 30, 146 seq., 466. For the Sforza 
inheritance cf. BIAUDET, Le Saint-Siege et la Suede, L, Paris, 
1907, 5n seq. ; EICHHORN, I., 315. 

* Cf. EICHHORN, II., 369 seq., 403 seq., 407 seq. 

See ZIVIER, I., 766 seq. ; BERGA, Skarga, 175. 

4 ZIVIER, I., 767 seq. 


the faith of his fathers, and give his representatives at the 
Diet instructions to allow no discussion of religious questions, 
since the decision of such matters belonged to the Pope alone. J 

Hosius also had recourse on this subject to the magnates 
of the Kingdom of Poland and to the king himself, adjuring 
them to defend the Catholic religion. His letter to Sigismund 
Augustus is certainly not wanting in courage. In it he com 
ments on the king s inclination to hold a national council, and 
tries to dissuade him from this by pointing to events in France. 
Then he goes on to urge the king again and again to entrust 
the great offices of state to none but tried Catholics. On 
September gth, 1571, in grave words, he calls the king s atten 
tion to the harm which a policy of concession to the religious 
innovators had done in France, and points out how signs 
of a similar revolt against the royal authority had already 
made their appearance in Poland. 2 

The anxiety and fears for the future of the kingdom which 
comes out in these letters were more than justified in the event. 
Affairs in Poland were visibly taking a more and more 
dangerous direction. From the spring of 1571 onwards in 
creasingly definite rumours were spread in Italy to the effect 
that King Sigismund Augustus had again taken up his former 
design of breaking off his marriage with Queen Catherine, who 
was said to be suffering from epilepsy. Later it was stated 
that the king intended to have his marriage declared null by 
the coming Diet, and then, in order to give his declaration the 
appearance of legality, to change his religion. According to 
other accounts the King of Poland flattered himself with the 
vain hope that the Pope would dissolve his marriage. Where 
as hitherto the Catholic Poles had maintained an attitude 
of hostility towards the project of a divorce, they now dared 
make no opposition. The nobility, however, who were 
adherents of the new religion, in the hope of obtaining religious 
liberty, promised the king not only their own support but 
also that of the Protestant princes of Germany. It was 

1 See EICHHORN, II., 411 seq., 414. 
Ibid. 418 seq. 


uncertain how far the king had already compromised in this 
matter. In any case there was the greatest possible danger 
that, thanks to the divorce, he would rush headlong into 
Protestantism. 1 

The state of affairs was made even worse by the conduct of 
Portico, who was by no means fit for his difficult office, and 
sought to cover up his own weakness by sending optimistic 
reports. By his easy-going courtiership he had succeeded in 
winning the favour of the king to such an extent that the 
latter on several occasions endeavoured to obtain the purple 
for his favourite. The same thing was aimed at in Portico s 
accounts of the improved state of affairs in Poland, accounts 
which were by no means in accordance with the truth. The 
king s interposition was of no use to Portico ; their informa 
tion was good in Rome and they were well aware how danger 
ous the state of the kingdom was, and that the king was leading 
an immoral life, and was pressing forward his divorce plans 
more than ever. 2 

Under these circumstances it was fortunate that the Pope 
should have been able to entrust the care of matters in Poland 
to a man of such experience and with such a knowledge of 

1 Nicholas Cromer had already pointed out grave causes for 
anxiety on April 20 and May 27 in letters to Martin Cromer 
(EICHHORN, II., 420). These were confirmed in a *letter from 
M. A. Graziani to Commendone, dated Padua, May 21, 1571, 
Graziani Archives, Citta di Castello. Other and more definite 
information in the Venez. Depeschen, III., 519 seq., where there 
are also particulars of the mission of the Jesuit L. Maggio, who 
prudently kept back the brief published in CATENA, 309 seq. 
See further the *reports of Commendone to the Bishop of Torcello 
and to Cardinal Rusticucci, both dated November 27, 1571, 
Graziani Archives, Citta di Castello. 

2 Cf. EICHHORN, II., 421 seq. Portico had on his own initiative 
entered into negotiations with Sweden, where Queen Catherine 
was a Catholic. A Jesuit was to have been sent there ; of. 
LADERCHI, 1570, n. 273 seq. But Pius V., knowing that the 
queen communicated " sub utraque," ordered Portico to break 
off all relations ; see BIAUDET, 27. 


conditions in that country as Commendone. 1 On November 
27th, 1571, the legate crossed the Polish frontier. Travelling 
through districts that were plague stricken, and by frozen 
roads, he hastened at once to Warsaw, which he reached on 
January 7th, 1572. 2 The king, who was suffering from gout, 
received him honourably and graciously. The legate at once 
brought forward the question, not only of the league against 
the Turks, but also of the rumours that were current about 
the divorce. In eloquent words he set before Sigismund 
Augustus the sanctity of the marriage bond, and told him 
how impossible it was that the Pope should agree to the 
divorce. The author of the whole business, as Commendone 
quickly realized, was the faithless Archbishop of Gnesen, 
Uchanski, who had not changed his character. 3 

At Commendone s request Portico, who had great influence 
with the king, endeavoured to move the sovereign from his 
fatal purpose, but in vain. On March 3rd, 1572, Commendone 
reported to Rome that, although he had several times spoken 
with all possible frankness to the king about the divorce, the 
latter adhered to his plan, and that as the time of the Diet 
was now at hand, when the matter would in all probability 
be discussed, he had renewed his remonstrances and had en 
deavoured especially to deprive the king of any excuse for 
saying that he did not know that the Pope could not grant 
the divorce. In clear words he told the king to his face that 
his marriage was a true sacrament and was quite indissoluble, 
and that neither the Pope nor anyone else could alter that 
fact. He must give up the idea of the divorce as something 
unattainable, and must not plunge his kingdom into incalcul 
able difficulties. In his interview Commendone reminded 
the king of the case of Henry VIII. of England, who after 
his divorce had never had an hour s peace, nor children in 

1 Cf. BERGA, Skarga, 177. 

*See Venez. Depeschen, III., 501, n. 2 ; GRATIANUS, III., 9. 

* See the "reports of Commendone to Cardinal Rusricucci, 
dated Warsaw, January 16 and 24, 1572 (the latter in cypher). 
Graziani Archives, Citta di Castello. For the conduct of Uchanski 
cf. also ZIVIER, I., 781 seq. 


spite of all his wives. Sigismund Augustus replied that he did 
not wish to become a Henry VIII., and still less a heretic, and 
that in all probability the matter would not be brought up 
for discussion at the Diet ; to this Commendone objected that 
it was not in His Majesty s power to prevent it. 1 The nuncio 
united his remonstrances to those of the legate. Suddenly 
and unexpectedly the whole state of affairs was changed by 
the news that Queen Catherine had died at Linz on February 
29th, I572. 2 Even more surprising than the grief shown by 
Sigismund Augustus at this news was the fact that hence 
forward he said no more about his second marriage, which had 
now become possible. It still remain* uncertain whether this 
change of view was due to his own inconstancy, or to his 
attachment for a young lady of the court. 3 

The negotiations concerning the league against the Turks, 
which at first Commendone pressed forward with the greatest 
zeal, were referred by the king to the Diet, where opinion 
was most unfavourable to it. Commendone, however, still 
hoped for success. He employed all his eloquence in personal 
interviews with the members of the senate, but received the 
reply that so long as neither the Emperor nor the Empire 
were disturbed, Poland could not declare herself against the 
Turks without exposing herself to the greatest possible danger. 4 
During the discussions at the Diet, anti-Catholic views came 
to the front again, and if things did not come to a crisis, this 
was principally due to the prudent conduct of Commendone. 5 

In the meantime the condition of the king, who was suffer 
ing from a wasting fever and arthritis, became steadily worse. 
Ths unhappy man was himself shortening his life by riotous 
living. All true patriots, and Commendone with them, looked 

1 See the cypher "report of Cardinal Commendone to Rusticucci 
of March 3, 1572, Graziani Archives, Cittk di Castello. 

* See Colecc. de docum, in&L, CX., 418 seq. 

8 See Venez. Depeschen, III., 520, n. ; GRATIANUS, III., 9. 
4 See Venez. Depeschen, III., 501, n. 2 ; GRATIANUS, III., 10 ; 
cf. THEINER, Mon. Pol., II., 763 seq. 

* Cf. the draft referring to May, 1572, *Negotii di Polonia, 
Miscell., Arm. II., 117, p. 384, Papal Secret Archives. 



with anxiety to the future, for since Sigismund Augustus was 
the last of the Jagellon stock, it was to be feared that the 
various parties which had already for many years past threat 
ened the peace of the kingdom, would come to open hostilities 
over the election of the new king. 1 

Just as in Poland, in spite of all the defects of the clergy, 
the great mass of the population remained firmly attached 
to the Catholic faith, so also was this the case, according to the 
testimony of Borromeo, 2 in those parts of Switzerland which 
had remained Catholic. It is true that the Cardinal has many 
faults to find with the laity ; that they are obstinate in their 
feuds, that the administration of justice is venal, that ecclesi 
astical jurisdiction is almost ignored, that usury is common, 
that the frequentation of the sacraments is neglected, that 
people eat all day and drink at all hours, but that nevertheless 
the majority of the people are good and worthy. The Swiss 
are honest in business and moral in conduct, and are loyal 
and easy to lead if they are treated in a friendly spirit. It is 
safe to pass through the streets without danger of being robbed ; 
blasphemy is visited with severe punishments ; the people do 
not give themselves up to gaming, but on festival days amuse 
themselves with shooting matches. The feasts of the Church 
are carefully observed ; no matter how much money is offered 
no one will be found on those days to cany a traveller s bag 
gage ; great importance is attached to divine worship ; if 
anyone has missed mass once, he is looked upon as lost and 
no longer a Christian. The people assist at the sacred offices 
with great devotion, the men separate from the women, while 
their devotion to the dead is unparalleled ; sacred images 
may be seen everywhere about the streets ; they are so much 
attached to the Catholic religion that they would gladly 
embark upon a new war against the Protestant Cantons in 
order to purge them of heresy. No one who has failed to 
receive the sacraments at Easter, or is living in open concubin- 

1 See EICHHORN, II., 425. For the king s concubinage see 
ZIVIER, I., 781 seq. 

1 Report of September 30, 1570, in REINHARDT-STEFFENS, 
Nuntiatur von Bonhomini, Dokumente, I., 6-17. 


age, is tolerated among them, while the modesty and decorum 
of the dress of the women is specially worthy of praise. 1 

It was also a great advantage to the Catholics of Switzer 
land in their resistance to the Protestant party that many men 
of tried capacity both in political and military matters, men, 
too, who were endowed with wealth and were of weight both 
at home and abroad, had devoted themselves to the Catholic 
cause with a devotion and zeal that seemed miraculous when 
compared with bye-gone times. 2 At their head was a man 
who must be considered the organizer of Catholic Switzerland, 
Ludwig Pfyffer, the syndic and chief magistrate of Lucerne, 
who in 1567 had had the good fortune to rescue the French 
king when he was on the point of being taken prisoner, and 
had taken him to Paris through the midst of the Huguenot 
forces, and who, in several of the battles of the religious wars 
that followed, had greatly distinguished himself, and had even 
dealt the decisive blow. From 1569 he had devoted the whole 
weight of " his great energies to the cause of his country, and 
to the Catholic party in the Swiss Confederation." 3 Another 
who also contributed in a marked degree to the revival of 
Catholic Switzerland, was Melchior Lussy of Unterwalden, 4 

1 Cf. Borromeo to Ormaneto, November 5, 1567 ; " Non voglio 
lasciar di dire, d haver rice vu to grandissima consolatione in trovar 
li popolo tanto catholici divoti et semplici, che se in proportione 
fussero tali li sacerdoti, ce ne potremmo contentare. " In WYMANN 
161, n. 3. 

8 Opinion of DANDLIKER (II. 3 647). " It was the obvious and 
great advantage of this party, that they had at their disposal 
men who, while they in every way made the Catholic reaction a 
powerful factor, had military experience, personal influence, and 
experience in dealing with worldly matters." DiERAUER t III., 330. 

* DlERAUER, III., 330. Cf. HURBIN, II., 225, 26 I , DANDLIKER, 

II. 8 , 649, and especially SEGESSER, Ludwig Pfyffer, two vols, 
1880-1883. See also MEYER VON KRONAU in Allg. Deutsche 
Biographie, XXV., 727 seqq. 

4 DIERAUER, III., 330. G. v. WYSS in Allg. Deutsche Biographie, 
XIX., 637 seqq. Cf. RICHARD FELLER, Ritter Melchior von 
Lussy von Unterwalden. Seine Beziehungen zu Italien un sein 
Anteil an der Gegenreformation, two vols, Stans, 1906 and 1909. 


who, as his country s representative at the Council of Trent, 1 
as her ambassador in Rome, Venice, Milan, Turin and Madrid, 
and as provincial landammann of his own canton, devoted 
his energies for forty-eight years to the affairs of state, and 
stood out as the confidant of the Holy See. Love for the 
Church and deep piety were the principal motives of all his 
thoughts and actions. 2 Other men of a similar stamp were 
the prudent Walter Roll of Uri, who had relations with almost 
all the courts of Italy, 3 Hans Zumbrunnen of Altdorf, a man 
" of strong character and the most noble sentiments " 4 
Christopher Schorno of Schwyz, and others. 

In virtue of the permanent constitution of December I7th, 
1533, the Catholic cantons were closely bound to each other, 
to the Bishop of Sion, and to the Confederation of the Valais, 
while there was no such bond of union among the Protestants. 6 
Moreover, the Swiss Catholics commanded a majority of the 
votes in the Confederation, since, when Soleure had joined 
them, there were seven Catholic cantons against the two mixed 
ones and the four entirely Protestant ones. On the other 
hand, however, the reformed cantons had a larger population ; 
Berne alone was able to place 32,000 armed men in the field, 
or more than the Four Cantons together. 6 

The Bernese made use of their preponderant strength in 
order to spread the new beliefs, and the success of the religious 
changes in western Switzerland was due to them. Without 
the support of the Bernese, William Farel would never have 
been able to introduce the new religion into the cantons of 
Vaud and Neuchatel. 7 It was the intervention of Berne in 
the struggle between Savoy and Geneva which made possible 
the establishment of Calvinism, and those far-reaching con 
sequences for the whole of Europe which followed upon the 

1 See Vol. XV. of this work, p. 271 ; XVI., p. 206. 
C/. DANDLIKER, II. 3 , 648. 
*WYMANN, Borromeo, 174. 

* DIERAUER, III., 333. 

* Ibid., 205 seq. 
Ibid., 278. 

7 Ibid., 219, 220 seq. 


rise of Calvin. 1 In the territory of the upper Saane, which 
Freiburg and Berne had bought from the creditors of the 
Count of Greyerz, who was overwhelmed with debt, the 
Protestant republic had at once obliged the reluctant popula 
tion to embrace the new religion. 2 The same thing occurred 
in the Canton of Vaud ; in 1536 the republic on the Aar had 
made an attack on Vaud and annexed it ; at the treaty of 
Lausanne in 1564, Savoy had been obliged to accept an ar 
rangement, in spite of the peace of Cateau-Cambre sis, abandon 
ing the territory to the Bernese, and therefore to the new 
doctrines. 3 

Although the Catholic cantons were very far from acting 
with the same decision as the followers of the new religion, 
they were nevertheless able, on account of their close unity, 
to exercise a great influence upon the new religious movement 
in Switzerland. After the success of the Catholic arms at the 
battle of Kappel in 1532 a restoration of the old religion took 
place at Bremgarten and Mellingen in Aargau, in certain dis 
tricts on the Linth, and in the prefecture of Sargans, 4 while in 
the lordship of Rheintal in Thurgau, at St. Gall and Toggenburg 
the Protestants only partly returned to the old Church. 6 
The Protestant community at Locarno, alone of the Ticino, 
was broken up by the pressure of the Catholic cantons in 1555, 
and the 116 who remained obdurate departed for Zurich.* 
The rights of the old religion were also safeguarded at Glarus 
by a treaty which was confirmed in 1564. 7 The independent 

1 Ibid., 228 seqq. 

* Ibid., 296 seq. 

1 Ibid., 236 seqq., 315 seqq., 322. 
4 Ibid., 189 seqq. 

* Ibid., 193 seqq. 

6 Ibid., 298 seqq. Cf. FERD. MEYER, Die evangel. Gemeinde 
in Locarno, Zurich, 1836. 

DIERAUER, III., 309. MAYER, Konzil, L, 6, 126. If things 
did not come to armed intervention on the part of the Catholic 
cantons over the affair of Glarus, this was due to the Pope, who 
was ready to help them if they acted in self-defence, but not if 
they were attacking. FELLER, I., 42. 


magistracy in the canton of Aargau was forced by a treaty in 
1568 to obey the five cantons and never again to abandon the 
faith. 1 The resolute attitude of the historian Gilg Tschudi 
had especially contributed to the success won at Sargans, 
Locarno and Glarus . 2 " if we only had in the confederation 
another two or three Tschudis " wrote his master Glareanus, 
" its cancer, heresy, would be healed." 3 

After the affair at Glarus Tschudi retired from political life in 
order to give himself up entirely to study. A greater man than 
he then took upon himself the office of adviser and promoter 
of the Catholic confederation, Cardinal Borromeo, though the 
activities of this champion were not directed so much to 
politics as to the real religious revival of Catholic Switzerland. 4 
By his appointment to the archbishopric of Milan Borromeo 
had become not only the near neighbour of Switzerland, but 
bishop of three of the Swiss valleys, Livina, Riviera and 
Blenio. Moreover the Catholic cantons had, in their first 
embassy to the newly -elected Pius IV., asked for the new 
secretary of state and powerful nephew of the Pope as their 
Cardinal Protector. 5 It fell to Melchior Lussy, as the repre 
sentative of his country, to make this request, and he might 
well feel sure of its being accepted, for the Swiss, in spite of the 
smallness of their country, were looked upon as people of 
importance as the guardian of the Alpine passes, and on 
account of their acknowledged skill in war. 8 Moreover, the 

1 DIERAUER, III., 313. What is said, ibid., 312, concerning 
the Valais, is incorrect ; cf. MAYER, I., 105-117. 

1 DIERAUER, III., 193, 301, 309. 

9 Ibid., 301. 

4 Cf. DIERAUER, III., 332 seq. ; ED. WYMANN, Kardinal Karl 
Borromeo in seinen Beziehungen zur alten Eidgenossenschaft, 
Stans, 1910 ; PAOLO D ALESSANDRI, Atti di S. Carlo riguardanti 
la Svizzera e suoi territorii, Locarno, 1909 ; ROSETTI in Bollett, 
star, della Svizzera ital., 1882 (acta of the Swiss visitation by 
Borromeo in 1567-1571) ; cf. ibid., 1895 (acta of 1571-1580) ; 
SALA, Docum. II., 306 seqq. 

REINHARDT-STEFFENS, Einleitung xxvii. ; WYMANN, loo. cit., 
77 seqq. 

WYMANN, loc. cit. t 81. 


friendship of the new Pope for the Swiss was so well known 
that even some of the Protestant cantons joined in the letter 
of congratulation on his election. 1 

On the occasion of his first pastoral visitation of the three 
valleys Borromeo found things in a very bad state, especially 
among the clergy. 2 There was no educational establishment 
for the young clerics, and therefore the priests combined a 
great lack of learning with considerable moral laxity. 3 The 
benefices in the mountain districts were very poor, while in 
addition in many cases half the first year s revenues had to be 
paid over to the civil governor, and the whole of it at Locarno. 
The result of this state of affairs was that ecclesiastics gladly 
accepted invitations to banquets, joined in the hunt, and 
tried to make money by means of trading or by acting as inn 
keepers. 4 The conferring of ecclesiastical offices belonged, in 
accordance with an old custom, not directly to the archbishop, 
but to four canons of Milan ; as time went on ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction had been reduced to a mere shadow, and had 
been almost entirely usurped by the civil authorities. 5 

In view of the great importance of the civil power, the 
Cardinal had asked for its co-operation in his pastoral visita 
tion. Uri accordingly sent its treasurer, Hans Zumbrunnen, 
Nidvvalden, Melchior Lussy, and Schwyz a certain Johann 
Gasser. 6 Accompanied by these men, Borromeo travelled 
through the three valleys during the month of October making 
inquiries, issuing exhortations and inflicting punishments. 
After the visitation was finished, he called the whole ol the 
clergy together at Cresciano and strongly reminded them of 
their duties ; then Hans Zumbrunnen also made a powerful 
speech, and assured him that no one would get any support 
from the civil power against the ordinances of the archbishop. 
Then there followed the acceptance of the decrees of Trent 

REINHARDT-STEFFENS, Einleitung xxvii. 

WYMANN, loc. cit., 155-173. BASCAPE, i. 2, c. 3, 32-34. 

WYMANN, loc. tit., 166. 

Ibid., 162 seqq. 

Ibid., 155 seqq. 

Ibid., 170. 


and of the profession of faith laid down by the Council. 1 So 
as clearly to separate the ecclesiastical and civil powers, 
Borromeo later on sent a scheme for an agreement, which was 
discussed at Brunnen on December 29th, 1567. The Cardinal, 
however, did not accomplish very much by this scheme ; on 
account of his holy life, and his paternal regard for them, they 
were prepared to agree to his demands so long as he lived, but 
the Cardinal was not satisfied with this. 2 He had more reason 
to be satisfied with his success in another matter. As early 
as September 8th, 1568, Bartholomew Bedra, the bishop s 
vicar-general at Chiggiogna, was able to boast that the 
people of the Livina were at one in saying that for two hundred 
years past they had never had so excellent a body of clergy 
as they now had. 3 

Borromeo visited the Ticino at least ten times altogether. 4 
He combined his second visit, in August, 1570, with a visita 
tion of German Switzerland. 6 His protectorate extended to 
the whole of the Swiss nation, and he thought that he might 
be able to arrange a solution of the question of jurisdiction in 
the three valleys by means of personal interviews with those 
who were responsible for the government of the Catholic 
cantons. In order that his journey might attract less atten 
tion, he combined it w.ith a visit to his sister Hortensia at the 
castle of Hohenems in the Vorarlberg. On August 2ist, 1570, 
Borromeo stopped at the home of Walter Roll at Altdorf, and 
on the following day with Melchior Lussy at Stans ; the room 
which he occupied is still shown in the so-called house of 
Winkelreid. After a visit to the tomb of the venerated hermit, 
Nicholas of Flue, he visited Lucerne, Zug, Einsiedeln and St. 

1 Ibid., 190. BASCAP, i. 2, c. 3, p. 33. 

1 WYMANN, loc. cit. t 171 ; cf. 185. 

WYMANN, loc. sit., 170. " Omnino spatio mensis adeo 
profecit, ut eius ecclesiae tota pene facies immutaretur." (BAS- 
CAPE, i, 2, c. 3, p. 33). Another favourable account in WYMANN, 
loc. cit., 170, n. 

Ibid., 169. 

6 REINHARDT-STEFFENS, Einl. cccx seqq. ; WYMANN, loc. tit. 


Gall, where he delivered a discourse to the abbot, Othmar 
Kunz, and his monks. On his way back from Hohenems he 
visited Schwyz, and at the invitation of Egidius Tschudi, 
went to Altdorf. On September 6th the Cardinal returned 
to Milan. 

Borromeo sent a detailed report to Rome, by Cardinal 
Burali, of his journey, 1 which can best be described as a 
reconnaissance of the country, 2 in which he gives an account 
of the conditions in Switzerland, and of the best means of 
remedying the evils in the Church there. In the first place, 
he says, the Pope should send a nuncio to Switzerland, who 
should not occupy himself with political matters, but devote 
himself entirely to spiritual affairs. He ought skilfully to 
remind the Swiss nobility that, in spite of their reiterated 
expressions of respect for the Council they were not observing 
its decrees as far as benefices were concerned ; perhaps he 
might be able to bring it about that they should content them 
selves with the right of nomination to benefices and recognize 
that the right of conferring them belonged to the ecclesiastical 
authorities. As far as the clergy was concerned it was only 
from the younger ecclesiastics that any radical change could 
be looked for though it should be easy to put an end to such 
disorders as were externally manifest. 3 A uniform method 
of procedure in all parts of Switzerland was absolutely essential, 
since, so long as a reform was only introduced in individual 
districts, incorrigibles could always escape it by taking refuge 
in some other part of the country. It was, however, necessary 
to take strong action, even at the risk of some going over in 
desperation to the heretics, because it was best in the end for 
the sake of the common good to be quit of such people. An 
other means of paving the way for a better state of affairs 

1 Of September 30, 1570, in REINHARDT-STEFFENS, Dokumente, 
6-17 ; cf. Einl. cccxxiii. seqq. 

2 HURBIN, II., 228. 

3 A year before Borromeo s visitation the council of Lucerne 
had sent to the Franciscans of that place a *reproof for their 
scandalous life ; see Ratsprotokolle, xxvii., 493b, State Archives, 


would be the establishment of a seminary for Switzerland 
which could easily be maintained by the rich abbeys, and 
should be entrusted to the Jesuits : the best place for this 
would be Lucerne. Lastly, a college under the direction of 
the Jesuits should be set up at Constance. 

These proposals were proved in the future to be of the 
greatest importance, but for the time being there were in 
superable difficulties in the way of their being carried into 
effect. 1 In the first place the Pope could not find anyone 
suited for the post of nuncio in Switzerland. In April, 1571, 
Lussy proposed to Cardinal Borromeo that Pius V. should 
address a brief to the seven Catholic cantons on the subject of 
the sending of a nuncio, in order to learn their views. The 
brief was sent, 2 but the seven Catholic cantons made no reply, 
though in November, 1571, they sent an envoy to Rome, in 
consequence of whose statements Pius V. gave up the idea 
of sending a nuncio. 3 In the same way the negotiations 
for the establishment of an institute for German Switzerland 
were very protracted. 4 The Pope had to be satisfied for the 
moment in having a certain number of young Swiss educated 
in Italian seminaries at the request of the Catholic cantons. 6 

Bishop Laureo of Hondo vi was interesting himself at the 
same time as Borromeo in the question of a nuncio for Switzer- 

1 REINHARDT-STEFFENS, Einl. cccxxx. seqq. 

* Of June 9, 1571, ibid., Dokum. 49. 

Alciati to Borromeo, February 9, 1572, in REINHARDT- 
STEFFENS, ibid., 53 ; " S.S tA essendosi avveduto molto bene 
della loro intrinseca voluntci et del fine, al quale tendono, m ha 
detto essersi risoluta di non mandarli per hora Nuntio alcuno " 
because if there were a nuncio in Switzerland, it would no longer 
be possible to pass over the usurpations of the Swiss. 

4 REINHARDT-STEFFENS, Einl. cccxxxvii. 

6 Cf. the briefs to Borromeo of May 9, 1566, to the five cantons 
of July 12, to the Swiss bishops of June 12, to Cardinal Mark 
Sittich of May 18, 1566, in LADERCHI, 1566, n. 204-208 ; brief of 
August 23, 1566, in WIRZ, 386, of May 17 and June 12, 1566, to 
Borromeo, in SALA, Docum. I., 175, 180 ; Abschiede, IV., 2, 348, 
350 ; REINHARDT-STEFFENS, Einl. clxxix. 


land, whose mission, however, on this occasion, was to be 
primarily for political purposes ; above all, he was to prevent 
the admission of the Genevese into the confederation. Geneva, 
after it had shaken off the authority of its bishop and of the 
Duke of Savoy, was inevitably bound to seek union with the 
Swiss cantons for purposes of defence against Savoy. But 
since the city of Calvin had bectime more and more the centre 
ol a wide-spread religious movement, the Popes had been 
driven to support the cause of Savoy with all their power, and 
to seek to alienate Switzerland from Geneva. Paul IV. 
promised his assistance to Duke Emanuele Filiberto, the 
victor of St. Quentin, when the latter, in accordance with the 
terms of the peace of Cateau-Cambre sis, sought to get back the 
territory occupied by the French and Bernese, and at the 
same time his rights over Geneva. 1 Pius IV. made every 
effort to induce the Kings of France and Spain to support 
the Duke. 2 There was nothing more to be hoped for from 
France after the outbreak of the Huguenot wars, but the 
Pope repeatedly urged Philip II. to order Alba, after he had 
subdued the Low Countries, to march against Geneva, the 
place of refuge of all the rebels in the dominions of the Catholic 
King, as well as from France, Savoy, and Germany. 3 Savoy 
obtained from Pius V. money concessions levied upon ecclesi 
astical property, 4 while the nuncio in Savoy worked for the 

1 DIERAUER, III., 317. 

2 Briefs of June 14, 1560 (to Francis II.) in Raynaldus, 1560, 
n. 29, WIRZ, 376 (with date June n) and of June 13, 1561 (to 
Philip II.) in WIRZ, 377. Brief to the Swiss nuncio of June 14, 
1560, in RAYNALDUS, 1560, n. 29, WIRZ, 379 (with date July 13). 
In the brief of June 14, Geneva is held responsible for the con 
spiracy of Amboise : "id est fons, unde perditissima baud dubie 
consilia superioribus diebus manarunt, ad tumultus et seditiones 
in regno tuo excitandas." 

8 Bonelli to Castagna, April 29, 1567, Corresp. dipl., II., 95 se( l- 
cf. 132 n., 133, 166 ; Zuniga to Philip II., August 17, 1568, ibid., 

4 The ambassador of Savoy in Rome, Vincenzo Parpaglia, to 
the Duke, June 17, 1569, in CRAMER, 229. 


formation of a league between the Duke and the Swiss Catho 
lics. 1 The Pope could not expressly declare himself against 
an agreement with Geneva on the part of the Swiss who re 
mained firm in the ancient faith, because this was rejected 
by the Catholic cantons, but in 1571 the news of a rapproche 
ment between Geneva and Savoy was received with much 
anxiety in Rome. 2 

The friendly offices of Borromeo proved far more effective 
than these fruitless negotiations, even in the case of those 
parts of Switzerland which he did not visit in person. This 
was the case in the Grisons. On his journey to Hohenems, 
as well as on his way back, Borromeo had an interview with 
the most zealous champion of the old religion in the Grisons, 
Christian von Castelberg, the abbot of Disentis. 3 Castelberg 
had brought back new life to his monastery, when it had fallen 
into complete decay, by admitting young and worthy monks, 
and had also restored it from an economic point of view, by his 
energetic administration. Castelberg also worked with great 
zeal for the consolidation of the old religion : " with unwearied 
zeal, he preached missions in the various villages of the region, 
passing from one mountain district to another, celebrating 
mass and exhorting the people to persevere in the faith of 
their fathers." 4 

The religious state of the Catholics in the Grisons was lament 
able. Even before the appearance of the reform there had 
been difficulties with the Bishop of Chur, whose civil rights 
they wished to restrict. For this reason the Grisons had 
proved a favourable soil for the new doctrines ; this was 
especially the case in the episcopal city, which aimed at becom 
ing the bishop s heir. On the other hand, in spite of having 
been stripped of its exterior splendour, the episcopal residence 

1 Laureo to Rome on April 21, 1571, ibid., 264. 

* Rusticucci to Laureo, July 16, 1571, ibid., 269. For the 
proposals made by Geneva cf. the discussions of March 25, June 
24, and September 30, 1571, in Abschiede, IV., 2, 467, 476, 483. 

* Cf. IOH. CAHANNES in Studien und Mitteilungen aus dem 
Benediktiner-und Zisterzienserorden, XX. (1899), 89-101 ; 212-234. 

* REINHARDT-STEFFENS, Einl. p. cccix. 


of Chur remained a desirable possession for the ambitions of 
the nobles of the district, many of whom for this reason wished 
for the preservation of the bishopric. At the moment of the 
election of Pius V. the party of the arch-priest of Sondrio, 
Bartholomeo Salis, was engaged in a struggle with the canoni- 
cally-elected bishop, Beato a Porta, and after he had been 
obliged to evacuate the episcopal residence by the intervention 
of the Pope, the Emperor, and the Catholic cantons, he 
harassed his bishop by putting every possible obstacle in his 
way, so that at length the latter might resign. 1 On the other 
hand the exceedingly democratic constitution of the Grisons 
had a favourable side for the Catholics. Whereas at Zurich 
and Berne all subjects were forced, whether they liked it or no, 
to adopt the religion prescribed by the government, in the 
Grisons the decision was left to each community. It thus 
came about that there belief varied from one district to an 
other, and that of the three leagues of the territory, the 
principal league, or Grey League, was still to a great extent 
Catholic, while the League of God s House and the League of 
the Ten Jurisdictions followed the new doctrines. 2 

Bishop Beato a Porta and the judge of the Grey League 
also took part in the second meeting between Borromeo and 
Christian von Castelberg. The Cardinal found in Bishop 
Beato plenty of good- will, but even more of fear and hesitation. 
He endeavoured to encourage him to make a tour of visitations, 
and to reform the clergy, all the more so as the judge of the 
province promised him the help of the secular power ; he 
did not, however, succeed in accomplishing very much, or in 
dispelling the bishop s fear of a popular rising, and the loss of 
his revenues and his episcopal see. 3 

How easily the Protestants in the Grisons were stirred up 
against the Catholics was shown in these very times by the 

1 Detailed account, ibid., Ixxxvii-xcviii, cclxxvii-cccix. Cf. 
LADERCHI, 1566, n. 261 seq. 

2 For the constitution of the Grisons and its influence upon 
religious conditions cf. SCHIESS, xlii seq. 

8 Cf. the information sent by Borromeo on September 30, 1570, 
in REINHARDT-STEFFENS, Dokumente 15 seq. 


sad fate of the most powerful of the lay representatives of the 
ancient Church, Giovanni Planta. In two briefs of September 
9th and I5th, 1570, Pius V. had authorized him to recover 
for the Church two provostships in the Valtellina belonging 
to the suppressed Order of the Humiliati : a bull of February 
28th, 1571, extended this faculty to all the unlawfully alienated 
benefices in the dioceses of Chur and Como. In one solitary 
instance Planta made use of this authorization in favour of 
one of his sons. But the preachers at once stirred up the 
people to such an extent that Planta was dragged before the 
courts and executed in 1572. l 

A mortal hatred for the ancient Church, and above all for 
those who tried to defend and propagate its doctrines was 
the special mark of Calvinism in the days of Pius V. Even in 
the case of the missionaries, who left the comforts of their 
native land in order to carry the first rudiments of Christianity 
to degraded savages in the countries beyond the seas, their 
undertaking was looked upon as a crime deserving of death. 

A promising field of labour for the missions lay among the 
Indians of the forests of Brazil, who were, it is true, a degraded 
race, but docile and receptive of instruction ; this field had 
been cultivated with much success by the Jesuits since I549- 2 
When in 1566 the General of the Order, Francis Borgia, ap 
pointed visitors for the various provinces of his Order, 3 he 
sent to South America the zealous Portuguese, Ignazio di 
Azevedo, who was definitely to introduce among the mis 
sionaries the constitutions and laws of the Order, hitherto 
unknown out there, and to report to Rome concerning the 
progress of their labours. 

In his reports to Borgia 4 Azevedo points out in the first place 

1 M. VALAER, Johann von Planta, Zurich, 1888; SCHIESS, 
xcviii-cxii. Excuses for the preachers and for the capital sentence, 
ibid., ex seq. 

*Cf. Vol. XIII. of this work, p. 184. 

3 SACCHINI P. III., i. 2, n. 18. Cf. G. CORDARA, Istoria della 
vita e della Gloriosa morte del b. Ignazio de Azevedo, Rome, 1854. 

4 Of November g, 1566, and March 2, 1569, S. FRANCISCUS 
BORGIA, IV., 341 seqq. ; V., 27 seqq. 


that the principal need of the mission, which was very flourish 
ing and promising, was that they should have greater working 
power, and that the small number of the Jesuits in Brazil, 
and their isolated and scattered condition, involved danger 
to the missionaries themselves. It was, however, impossible 
to supply this need from the Indians and Mestizos, for it was 
a proved fact that the latter were not suited to the ecclesiastical 
and religious state. In the same way little could be hoped 
for from the Portuguese immigrants, whose thoughts were 
entirely occupied with their plantations and commercial 
interests. Several of the missionaries, moreover, who had 
been sent from Portugal had not fulfilled expectations. There 
was, therefore, only one remedy : to enlist young men 
in Europe and train them in Brazil itself in knowledge of the 
Indian tongue and the work of the missionary. Artisans, 
too, such as sculptors and carpenters, would be very welcome 
in a country which was extremely lacking in workers of that 

At the same time Azevedo had confidence in the enthusiasm 
of the Portuguese youth for the missions, nor was he dis 
appointed. At the beginning of 1569 he returned to Europe 
and went to Rome, where Pius V. at once issued briefs in 
favour of the Brazilian mission to the Bishop of Bahia, and 
to the viceroy-elect, Fernan de Vasconcellos. 1 When, after 
that, Azevedo, armed with a letter of recommendation from 
Borgia, 2 visited the Jesuit colleges in the Iberian peninsula, 
his burning words stirred up a storm of enthusiasm. 3 From 
the number who placed themselves at his disposal for the 
Brazilian mission he was able to recommend about thirty 

1 Both of July 6, 1569, in LADERCHI, 1569, n. 340 seq. The 
bishop was " revocare (the Indians) a ferino victn atque cultu ad 
mitiores mores civilemque vitae rationem." They must specially 
be urged to dress decently, and for this purpose the bishop must 
get into touch with the civil authorities. 

2 To the Spanish provincials, July 4, 1569, S. FRANCISCUS 
BORGIA, V., 115. 

8 SACCHINI P. III., i. 6, n. 295 seq. 


for reception into the Jesuit Order ; thirteen Jesuits from the 
Spanish colleges, and twenty-seven from the Portuguese 
province obtained permission to join him, while many artisans 
offered to accompany him, from whom Azevedo chose six 
teen. 1 Embarking in three ships, they weighed anchor on 
June yth together with the small fleet which was taking 
to his destination the new governor of Brazil, Fernan de 
Vasconcellos. 2 

Until now the Jesuit Order had never sent out so imposing 
a body of missionaries. 3 But of the sixty or so Jesuits only 
one reached Brazil, and he merely because he fell sick on the 
way and was forced to remain behind for the time being. 4 
Near Madeira the fleet was forced to make a long stay in order 
to wait for favourable winds. The ship in which Azevedo 
and about forty of his companions were, made a detour for 
trading purposes to one of the Canary Islands, and there fell 
into the hands of the Huguenot vice-admiral, Jean Sore. 5 The 
crew of the captured vessel, even those who had just been 
fighting against the enemy, were spared by Sore, but he con 
demned the Jesuits to death as heralds of Papist superstitions. 
After being ill-treated in various ways they were thrown into 
the sea alive or dead. Only one was spared, and he it would 
seem, had volunteered to act as cook ; the son of the Portu 
guese captain voluntarily took his place, put on the habit of 

1 Azevedo to Borgia, March 16, 1570, S. FRANCISCUS, BORGIA V., 
319; cf. 155, 1 88, 191, 236. 

1 SACCHINI P. III., i. 6, n. 220. Azevedo to Borgia, Belem, 
June 2, 1570, S. FRANCISCUS BORGIA, V., 410. 

8 SACCHINI P. III., i. 6, n. 219. 

4 Ibid., i. 7, n. 201. 

6 Ibid., i. 6, n. 222 seqq. IAC. AUG. THUANI Historiarum sui 
temporis, i. 47, Leyden, 1626, II., 659. Sacchini calls the Hugue 
not " lacobus Soria, perduellium ex factione Admiralii [Coligny] 
vicarius ; " in de Thou he is called " loannes Sora, praefecti 
maris legatus," which in the register (Nominum propriorum 
. . . index, Coloniae Allobrcgum, 1634, s.v.) is reproduced 
as " Sore, Viceamiral." In de Thou Coligny is " praefectus 


one of the murdered Jesuits, and joyfully underwent death 
for the Catholic faith with the rest. 1 

The remaining ships failed to reach Brazil owing to con 
trary winds. After an Odyssey of fifteen months the fleet 
was so reduced by death or desertion, that one ship was suffi 
cient for their return to Europe ; of the thirty companions of 
Azevedo still remaining, half were released to return home. 
Near Terceira, one of the Azores, this last ship was captured 
on September I2th, 1571, by the Huguenot, Cadaville. Vas- 
concellos fell in the battle, while of the fifteen Jesuits three 
were killed immediately, and the eleven others thrown into 
the sea. Owing to a lack of provisions the corsairs also threw 
into the sea some of the captured crew, and among them the 
last of the Jesuits, who had taken off his habit in order to 
escape notice. 2 

Not all of the Huguenots approved of the conduct of Sore 
and Cadaville in the case of the unfortunate priests and youths, 
many of whom were not more than sixteen or seventeen years 
of age, and some only fourteen or fifteen. On the arrival of 
Sore at La Rochelle, the Queen of Navarre caused the crew of 
the captured Portuguese ship to be set at liberty, including 
the one Jesuit still surviving, though without giving them any 
money for their journey. 3 Of the victims of Cadaville, two 
of the Jesuits, thanks to a calm that befell, were able to make 
their way by swimming to the ships of their enemies, and 
under cover of the darkness were even at length taken on 

1 SACCHINI P. III., i. 6, n. 235 seqq. DESJARDINS, III., 605. 
Two of the Jesuits who had remained at Madeira wrote a report 
of the occurrence from information they had received : Pedro 
Diaz on August 18, and Miguel Aragones on August 19, 1570 ; 
cf. SOMMERVOGEL, Bibliotheque de la Comp. de Jesus, I., 495 ; 
III., 40. AUG. CARAYON gives a list of the other writings about 
Azevedo, Bibliographic historique de la Comp. de Jesus, Paris, 
1864, 212, n. 1492-1500. 

2 SACCHINI P. III., i. 7, n. 187 seqq. The earliest report of 
these events is that of Fr. Henrique^, of December 5, 1571 ; see 

3 SACCHINI P. III., i. 6, n. 263. 

VOL. xvin. ?q 


board and concealed by compassionate foes. 1 Such events as 
the death of Azevedo bring out in the clearest way how, after 
the rise of Luther and Calvin, there were to be found in Europe, 
two fundamentally different and bitterly opposed ideas of 
Christianity, and that not only from the doctrinal point of view. 
That it was the duty of Christianity to take the gospel to the 
pagan world was for the time being an idea completely foreign 
to the scheme of the followers of the new religion, and the 
attempt to do so in Brazil could not be taken seriously by them. 
In the old Church, on the other hand, this idea still lived on, 
and spurred men again and again to new and greater sacrifices. 
In all his efforts and schemes for obtaining new missionaries 
for Brazil, the fear that none would offer themselves for a 
purpose involving such great sacrifices, was the least of 
Azevedo s anxieties. Many, he wrote to Borgia, 2 would 
gladly get together, by their own efforts, the cost of the long 
sea voyage, so long as they had the prospect of admission 
to the Order beyond the seas. In the then growing city of 
Rio de Janeiro Azevedo was able in 1567 to lay the founda 
tions of a great Jesuit college at the expense of King Sebastian, 3 
since the rulers of the Spanish and Portuguese possessions 
watched over the missions with zealous care, and looked upon 
the spread of the gospel in the pagan world as the duty of a 
king, and one to which they were constantly being urged 
by the Popes. 

In this connexion Pius V., not long after his elevation to 
the throne, had sent to his nuncio in Madrid instructions con 
cerning the treatment of the Indians of America. 4 In these 

1 Ibid., i. 7, n. 200. 

1 On October 19, 1566, S. FRANCISCUS BORGIA, IV., 342. 

3 SACCHINI, P. III., i. 3, n. 263. Cf. Azevedo to Borgia, 
February 20, 1567, S. FRANCISCUS BORGIA, IV., 411. 

4 Corresp. dipl., I., 437 seqq. ; cf. CATENA, 93. Serrano places 
these instructions in 1566, but they contain mention and praise 
of the missionary work in Florida, concerning which nothing 
could have been known in Rome in 1566. Most probably the 
document is identical with the instructions, concerning which 
Castagna wrote to Mula on November 20, 1568 : " Ha dado la 


he says that the Spanish kings had been granted the right 
to conquer the lands beyond the seas, on the condition of 
their planting the Christian faith there. It was therefore 
the duty of the king to see that there were good preachers and 
priests in those countries, and that the civil authorities sup 
ported them by means of taxes. Baptism must only be con 
ferred on the natives after they had received sufficient in 
struction in the Christian religion. For those who had already 
been baptized, and especially the children, teachers must be 
provided, who should form them into good Christians and 
citizens, and not undo by their example what they were teach 
ing them in word. The centres of instruction must be spread 
about in such a way as to be convenient for the Indians. 
Where the natives lived scattered about in the mountains, 
they should be united in villages for that purpose. In this 
way, moreover, justice would be more easily administered, 
and crimes could be punished with that gentleness which the 
weakness of the new converts demanded. 

In cases where Christians and pagans dwelt together, the 
pagan sanctuaries should be destroyed on account of the 
danger to the former, and so as not to allow anything which 
should be a hindrance to Christian worship. The older 
Christians should be exhorted to give a good example to the 
neophytes and live in peace, with them, and for the sake of 
peace all feastings where the drinking of wine was concerned 
should be prudently done away with. Even the pagan 
Indians should at least be taught to reverence the sanctity 
of marriage so far as to give up polyandry. The Indians were 
not slaves, and must not be oppressed by excessive taxation ; 
even the officials and gentry must show respect to the priests 
and missionaries ; the Spaniards in the New World must set 
a good example, and visitors should be sent from time to time 
to inspect the judges and officials. Wars against the pagans 

instruccion sobre Indias al Rey " (Corresp. dipl., II., 472 n.). A 
review of the decrees of Pius V. concerning the missions (accord 
ing to CYRIACUS MOREL S.J., Fasti novi orbis Venice, 1776) in 
STREIT, 505, n. 113-136. 


must not be lightly undertaken, and must never be carried 
on in a cruel way. The way in which an attempt was being 
made to introduce the gospel into Florida, might be taken 
as an example by other countries. 

All that was thus detailed in these instructions Pius V. 
also repeated from time to time in letters to the Spanish and 
Portuguese governments. When in 1567 and 1568 Kings 
Sebastian and Philip II. sent out new officials to the colonies, 
a whole series of briefs was issued in this sense, in order to 
remind the kings and their officials of their duty. 1 King 
Sebastian, so the Pope wrote to Cardinal Henry of Portugal, 2 
should instruct the viceroy and the council of the Indies to 
protect the neophytes from the tyranny of the soldiers, and 
to remove scandals which might stand in the way of their 
conversion. The honour of Portugal and the consolidation 
of their dominion in the Indies was involved, he told the 
council of the Indies. 3 He therefore exhorted the Portuguese 
viceroy to protect the missionaries, to deal in a friendly spirit 
with the new converts, and to admit them to public office 
and status. 4 The letters to the King of Spain and his officials 
are to the same effect. The Pope desires the avoidance of 
all violence ; with a good government, and good example 
on the part of the priests, the yoke of Christ can be rendered 
light to those Indians who have already been converted, 
while the tribes that are still pagan can be attracted to the 
faith in a loving and skilful way. 5 The exhortation to admit 

1 To Cardinal Henry of Portugal, October 9, 1567, in LADERCHI, 

1567, n. 252 ; to the Council of the Indies, October u, 1567, 
ibid., n. 253 ; to the Portuguese viceroy, December 25, 1567, 
ibid., n. 254 ; to the viceroy of Mexico, Marchese de Falces, 
October 8, 1567, to Philip II., August 17, 1568, ibid., 1568, n. 206 ; 
three briefs to Cardinal Espinosa, the viceroy of Peru, Francisco 
di Toledo, and the Spanish council of the Indies, all of August 18, 

1568, ibid., n. 206. Cf. MARGRAF, Kirche und Sklaverei, Tubingen, 
1865, 146 seq. 

2 LADERCHI, 1567, n. 252. 

3 Ibid., n. 253. 

4 Ibid., n. 254. 

6 To Philip II., ibid., 1568, n. 206. 


tne natives into public employment occurs again in 1571 in a 
brief to the King of Portugal, in which the Pope, far in ad 
vance of his times, recommends the taking of steps for the 
formation of a native priesthood, since Europe could not for 
long provide the necessary supply for the missions. 1 

It is not surprising that the Papal letters on behalf of the 
missionary territories were specially directed to the civil 
authorities. The Church of the Indies had been placed 
entirely in their hands by the bull of Julius II. of July 
28th, 1508. 2 " It is difficult to imagine," says of Mexico 
one who is well acquainted with the ecclesiastical history 
of that country, 3 " a system of control more absolute than 

1 " *. . . non enim fieri potest, ut aliunde semper illuc mittan- 
tur, qui populis illis spiritualia ministrent ; sed sicut nascentis 
ecclesiae temporibus apostoli ex eorum numero, qui fidem christ- 
ianam receperant, aptiores et magis idoneos ministros eligebant, 
sic etiam nunc dare operam oportet, ut fides ipsa Christiana apud 
eas nationes sic radices agat ac propagetur, ut recedentibus vel 
decedentibus eius auctoribus non continue exarescat, sed habeat 
illic natives cultores, quorum piis laboribus atque industria niti 
atque augescere possit. Non enim tantum est in hominibus ad 
Christum convertendis lucri, quantum in eisdem, postquam 
christiani facti sunt, negligendis detriment!." To King Sebastian, 
January 4, 1571, Arm. 44, t. 15, p. 28ob, Papal Secret Archives. 
* Printed from Colecc. de docum. ined. de Indias, XXXV., 25, 
in G. BERCHET, Fonti italiane per la storia della scoperta del 
nuovo mondo, I., Rome, 1892, 24 seq. For the pontifical docu 
ments concerning the two Indies cf. J. PEREIRA DE SOLORZANO, 
De Indiarum iure, Madrid, 1629 (STREIT, n. 443). Cf. also Vol. 
VI. of this work, p. 441. 

8 C. CRIVELLI in The Catholic Encyclopedia, X., New York, s.a. 
(1911), 260 seq. Cf. A. FREYTAG in Zeitschrift fiir Missionswis- 
senschaft, III. (1913), n seqq. " Probably in no European state 
was the Placetum regium used so widely, or so strictly and for so 
long a time, as in Portugal and its colonies. . . . Without the 
exequatur of the cabinet, neither ordinance of bishop nor decree 
of Pope, whether dogmatic or disciplinary, had any validity in 
law which was recognized by the state within the Portuguese 
dominions. The publication of any act which was not pleasing 


that which the kings of Spain, either in person, or through 
the council of the Indies, and the viceroy or governor, exercised 
in all ecclesiastical matters," and what is true of Mexico 
applied even more fully to the Indies. No church could be 
built, no religious Order could be set up, no religious founda 
tion take place, without the consent of the king. He had the 
right of nomination to all the bishoprics. Ten days after 
the king s wishes had been made known to the bishops, they 
were bound to see to the conferring of ecclesiastical benefices : 
if they refused without some lawful reason, some other bishop, 
chosen by the candidate, was to see to the benefice being 
conferred. The right of presentation to all abbacies and 
regular prelacies as well as to every ecclesiastical benefice 
belonged to the king. 1 He fixed the boundaries of all the new 
bishoprics, sent the religious where he liked, and decided 
when they were to be transferred from one province to an 
other. Religious establishments were under the superin 
tendence of the Council of the Indies, and in order that this 
superintendence might be properly carried out, the office of 
commissary -general was established. The religious pro 
vincials were nominated by the General of the Order, . but 
they had then to inform the commissary-general of his choice, 
and until the council of the Indies had given its approval, 
the appointment remained in suspense. All decrees by which 
religious provinces were abolished, or new ones founded, 
as well as the sending of visitors, etc., had to be submitted to the 
council of the Indies. All Papal bulls and briefs, and all 
instructions from Generals of Orders or other superiors, passed 
through the hands of the council of the Indies, without whose 
seal they could not be put into force ; the same thing applied 
to the decrees of provincial councils in the colonies, and the 
decrees of the chapters of religious orders. If there were a 
question of the foundation of new missions, or of religious 

to the authorities became physically impossible." A. JANN, 
Die katholischen Missionen in Indien, Cina und Japan, Paderborn, 
1915, 112 seq, 

1 Julius II. had already granted all this. BERCHET, loc. cit., I., 24. 


provinces or seminaries, a commissary had first of all to be 
appointed, who had to submit the matter to the viceroy or 
governor, to the audiencia of the district, and to the bishop. 
Armed with their opinions the commissary then set out for 
Spain and laid his petition before the commissary-general 
of the Indies. The latter then took the matter, together with 
all the opinions, before the council of the Indies, whereupon 
the council or the commissary-general decided upon the pro 
vinces from which the necessary religious were to be drawn. 
Accompanied by these he could then return to the Indies 
where, after further reports to the officials who had sent him, 
the matter was at length brought to a conclusion. If he 
wished to leave the Indies again, a regular could not, according 
to a royal decree of July 29th, 1564, even appeal to permission 
from the Pope ; he must obtain permission from the council 
of the Indies, though, in certain definite cases, the approval 
of the bishop was enough. 

The Spanish government had assumed some of these rights 
on its own authority, but most of them rested upon conces 
sions granted by the Holy See. The kings had endowed 
almost all the churches of the New World with revenues : 
they bore the travelling expenses of the missionaries and 
bishops, and they provided the churches with wax, oil, and 
all the things necessary for divine worship. The building of 
new churches and the foundation of new missions depended 
to a great extent upon the support of the king ; if repairs were 
necessary in any church, they had to be made at the charge 
of the royal taxes. Alexander VI. had granted the king the 
right of receiving tithes in the Indies on condition of his 
equipping the churches and bearing the expenses of divine 
worship. 1 The kings, however, but rarely made use of this 
right, but made over the tithes to the bishops, the clergy, the 
churches or the hospitals. For the most part the bishops 

1 By a bull of September 25, 1493, printed from SOLORZANO, I., 
613, in BERCHET, I., 15 seq. Cf. the brief of Julius II. of April 8, 
1510 (published by F. FITA in the Boletin de la R. Academia de la 
historia, 1892, 261 seqq.) ibid. 230 seq. 


nominated by the king, such as Giuliano Carets of Tlaxcala, 
Zumarraga of Mexico, or Vasco de Quiras of Michoacan, were 
learned and capable men. In spite of the endless delays in 
setting up monasteries, there was a large number of them, 
while the hospitals and the churches could hardly be counted. 
On the whole, therefore, owing to the deep religious feeling 
of the Spanish people, the royal right of superintendence was 
favourable to the Church. 

In the time of Pius V., however, it once happened that in 
the Mexican diocese of Oaxaca the seminary, which had al 
ready been established, had to be closed, because the revenues 
had been withheld from the bishop ; the Pope made complaint 
of this to the King of Spain. 1 For the rest, however, even at 
that time the colonies and missions were liberally assisted by 
the Spanish government. An example of this occurred during 
the reign of Pius V. in the foundation of the religious province 
of the Jesuits in Peru. Philip II. had himself in 1567 asked 
for missionaries for the Indians of that country, and Francis 
Borgia had allowed him two from each of the four Spanish 
provinces of the Order, who were so abundantly provided by 
the king with all that was necessary that they were able to 
refuse many generous offers made to them privately. 2 The 
royal instructions concerning the provision made for the Jesuits 
who were sent to Mexico to found a province of the Order in 
1571 are still preserved, 3 and give details of what was to be 
given to each one. 

King Sebastian of Portugal did not fall behind the Spanish 
sovereign in this respect. In accordance with his proposal for 
establishing several seminaries for the training of missionaries, 
Pius V. allowed him to make over monasteries which had 
fallen into a state of decay to the mendicant Orders, as for 

1 Three letters, to Castagna, Philip II., and the Bishop of 
Oaxaca (Antequera), all of April 2, 1570, in LADERCHI, 1570, 
n. 424, 426, 427. 

2 ASTRAIN, II., 307. SACCHINI P. III., i. 3, n. 280. For the 
call of the Jesuits to Peru cf. S. FRANCISCUS BORGIA, IV., 619, 
631, 641, 658, 678 seqq. ; ASTRAIN, II., 304 seqq. 

3 Of August 6, 1571, in ASTRAIN, II., 300 seq. 


example the Dominicans and the Jesuits, on the condition 
that they should every year send some missionaries to the 
Indies. 1 The king further wished that houses should be 
established in the Indies for the catechumens, where those 
pagans who wished to embrace Christianity could be in 
structed for a time before their baptism. 2 Pius V. gave his 
support to this plan by granting indulgences to those who 
contributed to such foundations, and those who gave them 
selves to the service of the catechumens in these houses. 3 

The Pope s exhortations to the King of Spain had immedi 
ate results in the Spanish part of South America, the vice- 
royalty of Peru. When in 1568 Philip II. sent Francisco 
Toledo there as his new viceroy, he specially recommended 
him to look after the spiritual well-being of the Indians, 4 
and the matters in which Toledo brought about an improve 
ment were almost identical with those which Pius V. had in 
sisted upon in his instructions to Castagna. 

At the time of the conquest of Peru the country had been 
divided up into a number of small districts, and in each district 
the duty of seeing to the conversion of the Indians had been 
entrusted to a Spaniard, together with that of the civil ad 
ministration. It was the function of this so-called commenda 
tory to appoint a parish priest from among the secular or 
regular clergy, whose maintenance was provided for by an 
annual payment in money from the commendatory, together 

1 Brief of October 27, 1567, in LADERCHI, 1567, n. 248. 

2 Brief of October 4, 1567, ibid. n. 251. 

8 Cf. a report from Toledo immediately after his arrival in 
Peru, from which a Relation sumaria is printed in Cotecc. de 
docum. iried. para la historia de Espana, XCIV., 255-298 aCnd the 
Memorial which he drew up thirteen years later on his return 
to Europe, ibid., XXVI., 122-161. A short review of the state 
of affairs in SACCHINI P. III., i. 8, n. 315 seqq. 

* " Una de las casas que principalmente por V.M. me fu< 
manda y dada instruxion para ello cuando V.M. me mand6 que 
fuese al gobierno de aquella tierra, fu la doctrina y conversion 
de los naturales della y su gobierno y sustentacion." Toledo in 
the Memorial, loc. cit., 134. 


with gifts in kind and service from the natives. If on the one 
hand the commendatory was often unwilling to pay the parish 
priest his stipend, on the other it was not infrequently the 
case that the Indians could only be induced by force to make 
their contributions. Relations were rendered more strained 
owing to the fact that the parish priest also had judicial autho 
rity over the Indians even in civil matters, with the result 
that he himself, as well as the commendatory and Christianity 
itself became objects of hatred. 1 

The cruelty with which the conquerors repressed all revolts 
on the part of the Indians, and the harshness with which 
they employed their power, were by no means calculated to 
induce the natives to accept the situation. The Dominican, 
Gil Gonzalez, himself an eye-witness, in a memorial drawn 
up in defence of the Indies, expressed the view that they were 
treated far worse than slaves, because, loaded as they were 
with regulations and other burdens, they had to make a road 
of twenty or thirty leagues in length before they arrived at the 
place where they were to work : from their youth they were 
burdened with toil, so that from the time of their birth to that 
of their death they never knew a happy hour. 2 Another monk, 
Rodrigo de Loaisa, who had been a witness of the state of 
affairs in Peru for thirty years, wrote in 1586 that many of 
the Indians took their own lives in order to escape their 
troubles, and that if the priests told them that suicide was a 
sin that would take them to hell, they replied that they did not 
wish to go to heaven if there were any Spaniards there, be 
cause even there they would torment them worse than the 
devils in hell. 3 There was but one feeble excuse for the op- 

1 SACCHINI, P. III., i. 8, n. 315. 

f " Relaci6n de los agravios que los Indies de las provincias 
de Chile padecen," in Colecc. de docum. ine"d,. XCIV., 77. 

* " Memorial de las cosas del Pirti tocantes los Indies " c. 48, 
in Colecc. de docum. ine"d., XCIV., 589. It would seem that the 
author was an Augustinian, since, according to p. 571 c "7- the 
Order to which he belonged was " la mas moderna en aquellas 
partes " and of the four earliest Orders in Peru, the Franciscans, 
Dominicans, Mercedarii, and Augustinians (Memorial, c. 21, 


pressors, that the Indians were possibly even worse treated by 
their own caciques than by the foreigners. 1 

The instructions in Christianity which the Peruvians re 
ceived were in many ways quite insufficient. There was a 
great scarcity of priests, and where they had any they had 
no knowledge of the language of the Indians, or looked upon 
their office principally as a means of enriching themselves. 
Of the stations which the viceroy, Toledo, visited in his first 
tour of inspection, seventeen were without a priest at all ; 2 
in the diocese of Quito, in a district forty-two miles in length, 
there was only one priest. 3 In the archdiocese of Lima forty 
Indian parishes were vacant. 4 Several Indians complained 
with tears to the viceroy that they could not understand their 
masters, and were not understood by them ; 5 they knew the 
Christian prayers, but only so as to say them like parrots 
without understanding them ; 6 the interpreters of whom the 
parish priests of the Indians made use, were very inaccurate. 7 
The reasons why the Pope had insisted so strongly with the 
Spanish government upon the necessity of instructing the 
Indians were only too clearly illustrated by statements such 
as these ; the Indians in Peru were Christians in name, but 
not at heart ; often it happened that even those who had 
been baptized fell back into the secret practice of their former 
worship of idols. 8 

To the honour of the Spanish government in the colonies it 
must be said that it set itself seriously to remove or reduce 
the abuses. Toledo ordered that from that time forward no 

P- 569) the three former had already sent missionaries to Peru 
with the first conquerors. Cf. the Relation of Pedro Ruiz Naharro 
in the Colecc. de docum. ined., XXVI., 248, 255. 

1 LOAISA, Memorial, c. 47, loc. tit., 587. 

1 TOLEDO, Relaci6n sumaria, n. 9, p. 256. 

* Ibid., n. 10, p. 256. 

4 Ibid., n. 30, p. 263. 

TOLEDO, Memorial, n. 3, loc. tit., XXVI., 126. 

TOLEDO, Relaci6n n. 15, p. 258. 

7 Ibid. 

8 Ibid, and Memorial, n. 4, p. 127. 


monk or priest should be appointed to an Indian parish unless 
he knew the language of his future flock ; those priests who 
were already in office were not to receive their full stipend 
until they had given proofs of their knowledge in this respect. 
A special chair was set up in the University of Lima for the 
study of the language most widely used in the Indies, and 
those who sought appointments to Indian parishes had to pass 
an examination before this faculty. 1 Toledo could also boast 
that during the time of his government the number of those 
in charge of souls among the Indians had been increased by 
more than four hundred, whose maintenance was provided from 
the taxes. 2 Toledo saw in a measure which had already been 
recommended by Pius V. the principal means of providing 
organized spiritual care of the Indians : this was to gather 
together into settlements those natives who were scattered 
far and wide in the mountain districts, and who were often 
quite inaccessible, and to assign a priest to each group of four 
or five hundred natives. These settlements were to be placed 
in the best situations in the territory, and provided with public 
buildings, such as hospitals, prisons and municipal offices ; the 
Indians themselves were to have a seat on the council of each 
colony, and to have a voice in the decision of their own affairs. 3 
Before the Peruvians who were not yet baptized were made 
Christians, care must be taken that they should first become 
men of good behaviour, and for this purpose he began at 
Cuzco and Lima the erection of two colleges, where the sons 
of the caciques and curaques could be instructed and educated, 
with the idea that the other Indians would be guided in all 
things by the example of their chiefs. 4 Toledo took special 
credit to himself for his reorganization of justice among the 
natives ; 5 he boasted that now every Indian had the courage 
to ask for justice against the Spaniards, against the priests 

1 TOLEDO, Memorial, n. 3, p. 126. 

* Ibid., n. 1 8, p. 142. 

8 Ibid., n. 18-19, P- 141 seqq. 

4 Ibid., n. 4, p. 127. 

6 Ibid., n. 8 and 20, p. 129 and 143 seqq. 


and the commendatories, and even against their own caciques. 1 
He also boasted that by his orders the Indians had been repaid 
a million and a half of goods of which they had been defrauded, 2 
that hospitals had been erected and endowed for them at 
Guamanga, Cuzco, La Paz, Chuquisaca, Potosi and Arequipa, 3 
and steps taken to protect them from the pillaging and ravag 
ing of their territories. 4 

Fray Loaisa says in forcible terms that the viceroy and the 
great officials of Peru had done all they could to heal the many 
evils, but that the same thing had happened in their case 
as in that of the tinker who, in stopping up one hole had made 
four new ones. 5 Loaisa also passes an unfavourable judg 
ment in many ways upon the steps which had been taken by 
Toledo. Thus, it was quite proper that on account of the 
abuses involved, the parish priests among the Indians should 
no longer have the right of inflicting whippings and similar 
punishments, but in several places the corregidor did not 
perhaps put in an appearance for more than two days in a 
whole year, so that if the priest was unable to take any action 
against drunkenness or concubinage, these offences could 
prevail unpunished and unrestrained. 6 Many evil results 
also" flowed from the fact that the priests in charge of the 
natives could no longer obtain their maintenance, as far as 
contributions in kind were concerned. 7 Above all, the taxes 
which Toledo imposed upon the Indians were too heavy : 
they had to work all through the year, or go to Potosi to work 
in the mines in order to earn no more than the money which 
they had to pay in taxes. 8 

In spite of all his complaints Loaisa had to admit that some 
of the priests among the Indians were capable and conscien- 

1 Ibid., n. 8, p. 130. 

2 Ibid., n. 17, p. 140. 

3 Ibid., n. 14, p. 138. 

* Ibid., n. 21-22, p. 146 seqq. 

5 Memorial, c. 27, p. 573 seq. 

6 Ibid., c. 20, p. 658. 
Ibid., c. 13, p. 564 seq. 

8 Ibid., c. 49 seqq., p. 590 seqq. 


tious men, who did not impose arbitrary taxes upon their 
subjects, and did much good. 1 At Quito the Franciscans 
distinguished themselves by their missionary labours, and 
among their number the founder of that mission, Josse Ricke 
of Marselaer died in 1570 in the odour of sanctity.* In spite 
of this, however, there was a danger of the Indian settlements 
being taken away from the Franciscans ; 3 in other districts 
the regulars themselves were anxious, an account of the many 
inconveniences involved, to be allowed to hand over their 
work to secular priests ; 4 the Jesuits, who arrived in Peru in 
1568 and 1569, hesitated for a long time before they would 
undertake parishes among the Indians, and their refusal at 
first was a constant source of trouble to them. 5 

Although the Spanish conquerors and their immediate 
successors cannot escape the blame of harshness and cruelty 
towards the natives, it would nevertheless be unjust to make 
the Spanish government responsible for their excesses, or 
to speak of the abuses of those early days as typical of the 
whole Spanish administration of the colonies. On the con 
trary, no European nation has shown on the whole greater 
care and anxiety for the welfare of the native populations than 
the Spaniards. Whereas under English rule the Indians of 
North America were left in their savagery, and attempts were 
even made to drive them out and destroy them, in the Spanish 
possessions in America the principle had been accepted, even 
in the time of Isabella of Castille, of treating the Indians as 

1 " Otros hay de gran virtud y verdad entre los Indies que 
tienen gran cuenta con sus conciencias y con no agraviar a estos 
miserables " ^Memorial c. 13, p. 565). " Es verdad que hay 
grandes siervos entre ellos [among the curates who came from 
the monastic orders], y hacen gran provecho entre aquellos (ibid., 
c. 24, p. 571)- 

MARCELLING DA, CIVEZZA, Storia universale delle Missioni 
Francescane,, VII., 2 Prato, 1891, 87 seqq. 

* Ibid., 89. 

4 E.g. the Augustinians and the Franciscans. LOAISA, Mem 
orial, c. 24, p. 571 seq. 

ASTRAJN, II., 313 seqq. 


free subjects, enjoying the same rights as Europeans. 1 "A 
system of legislation for the Indians was in force, the profound 
humanity and penetrating foresight of which far surpassed 
the treatment accorded to the Indians by France, to say 
nothing of that of England ; and it was a significant fact that, 
at the end of the eighteenth century the Creoles complained 
that the government did everything for the Indians, but very 
little for them." 2 Moreover, there were Las Casas and the 
religious already mentioned to make grave remonstrances in 
the case of various abuses, and the very fact that they were 
able to speak in words of such bitter blame is a striking proof 
of the goodwill of the government, and of the state of public 
opinion in Spain. What the viceroy Toledo did for the 
Indians of Peru was certainly deserving of all praise, but he 
was by no means alone in his efforts, and it may be said that 
the whole of the Spanish legislation for the colonies was 
animated by the same spirit. 

That matters did not turn out differently was due in large 
measure to the Papacy. The Popes had consented to the 
subjection of the Indians on the condition that they should 
be brought to a knowledge of Christianity, and again and 
again they reminded the rulers of Spain of the obligation 
which they had undertaken in conquering the New World. 
But the conversion of the nomadic Indians was impossible 
unless they were gathered together in permanent settlements, 
and raised to a higher degree of civilization. The exhorta- 

1 DAENELL, 73. 

8 DAENELL, 75. "If the colonial administration of Spain is 
looked at from the point of view of its laws, these display in 
every sense an extraordinary degree of prudence and care. Some 
of them, such as the special legislation for the Indians, have 
never so far been equalled by any other nation which possesses 
colonies. Everywhere we find deep moral motives, which have 
given rise to the laws." (ibid., 78). " The singular fact of the 
rapid expansion and the secure government shown in the case 
of the Spanish colonial empire, proves in a high degree the capacity 
of the Spanish race, and the sagacity and humanity of the Spanish 
rule." (ibid. t Si). 


tions of Pius V. to Philip II. are an example of the way in 
which the efforts of the Popes for the civilization of America 
were not without success, and if, even after several centuries, 
all that was to be desired had not yet been attained, the 
difficulties of the undertaking must not be lost sight of. 1 

The Pope himself was certainly not satisfied with the 
progress made with the work which he had encouraged in Peru, 
but consoling reports reached him from several other missions. 
On March 2ist, 1569, the Bishop of Michoacan in Mexico 
wrote that the Indians there had embraced the faith, and 
that moreover some of them were preaching to their fellow- 
countrymen in their native tongue ; 2 about the same time the 
archbishop of the capital 3 announced that he had baptized 
five thousand pagans with his own hands. Pius V. replied 
to the archbishop expressing his joy and urging him to instruct 
the Indians well in the faith before baptizing them. 4 The 
necessary precautions with regard to this matter were taken 
in the provincial council of Mexico in I57O. 5 Pius V. had 
previously recommended to the Archbishop of Mexico the pro 
tection of the Indians against the violence of the soldiers. 6 

The territory adjoining Mexico, Florida, at that time pos- 

1 " If the progress which they [the Indians] made under Spanish 
influence in a work of civilization extending over three centuries, 
seems to be but small in the end, we must not forget that it was 
a case of lifting up hundreds of thousands from the deepest 
paganism, the most primitive organization, from sloth and the 
civilization of the stone age to Christianity, autonomy, thrift and 
individualism based upon a pecuniary economic system. The 
task was in itself an enormous one, and the spiritual and bodily 
feebleness of the race helped to make the task more difficult." 

2 Cf. the brief to the bishop, April 2, 1570, in LADERCHI, 1570, 
n. 428. 

3 March 30, 1569 ; cf. the brief to the archbishop, April 2, 1570 ; 
ibid., n. 416. 

4 Ibid. 

* Ibid., n. 420. 

6 Brief of October 7, 1567, in LADERCHI, 1567, n. 262. 


sessed in Menendez de Aviles a governor after Pius V. s own 
heart. Menendez looked upon his office, not as an opportunity 
for enriching himself, but as a definite call to look after the 
well-being of the Indians, by making them good Christians. 
In March, 1565, he applied to Francis Borgia for mission 
aries. 1 The labours of the Jesuits among the rude Indians, 
however, were almost fruitless. Believing that the harshness 
and bad example of the Spaniards were the causes of their ill- 
success, eight missionaries tried to found a settlement in the 
midst of the savages and far away from all Europeans, but 
they were all killed in February, 1571, and in consequence 
gave up their fruitless work in Florida. 2 The Jesuits founded 
instead a province of the Order in Mexico in 1571. 3 

In New Granada the Dominican Louis Bertrand (Beltran) 
preached the gospel to the Indians with extraordinary success 
from 1562 to I56Q. 4 He, too, was much hampered in his good 
work by the bad example of the whites, and their cruelty to 
the natives. He was able, however,, to win a great name for 
himself, above all by his almost incredible austerity of life. 

1 S. FRANCISCUS BORGIA, III., 762 seq. The letter also shows 
how very imperfect the geographical ideas of America still were, 
almost half a century after the discovery of the Pacific Ocean. 
Aviles thought that Florida was joined on to China, or was only 
separated from it by an arm of the sea. A letter of Aviles of 
August 6, 1568, loc. cit., IV., 697 ; a letter to him of March 7, 1568, 
ibid., 577. For Menendez cf. DAENELL, 47 seq. 

2 AsTRAiN, II., 284-298. 

3 Ibid., 298-303. 

4 The Dominican, Vincenzo Giustiniani, Antist., described the 
life of Bertrand, partly from personal knowledge, in 1581, and the 
Dominican, Bartolomeo Avinones, in 1623, on the basis of the 
acta of his canonization ; both are printed in Acta Sanct., October 
5, 292 seqq., 366 seqq. BERTRAND WILBERFORCE wrote a new life, 
London, 1882, which was translated into German by M. v. WIDEK, 
Graz, 1888. Bertrand (died 1581) was canonized on April 12, 
1671. For the missionary labours of the Franciscans in New 
Granada at that time, cf. MARCELLING DA CIVEZZA, loc. cit. 27. 
The Franciscans made an attempt to establish themselves per 
manently jn the island of Trinidad in 1571 ; ibid., 36. 

VOL. xvill. 


Armed with nothing but the Holy Scriptures and his breviary, 
bare-footed and without provisions, sometimes even without 
guides, who would not stay with him, he made his long mission 
ary journeys through impassable forests or under a burning 
sun, adding to the scarcely bearable hardships of this life 
voluntary fasts and hard penances. It was the belief of all 
that he had the gift of miracles ; he must have won for the 
Church more than twenty thousand Indians, all well instructed 
in Christianity. 

A more detailed description of the labours and successes 
of this great missionary is rendered impossible by that same 
difficulty which so often confronts the historian of the pro 
pagation of the faith. While Ignatius of Loyola laid upon his 
subjects the duty of making regular reports of their labours, 
because he saw in this a means of exciting fervour and advanc 
ing the work, 1 the opposite was the case with the other Orders. 
The earliest biographer of Louis Bertrand 2 relates that he 
highly praised the zeal of the Jesuits in this respect and blamed 
the neglect of his own brethren, but that he was nevertheless 
unwilling to follow the example of the Jesuits, and made 
evasive replies when he was asked about his own work. The 
result is that we have not even one letter belonging to the 
time of his missionary labours. 

In Africa all the hopes of the mission to Abyssinia which 
had been undertaken with such high expectations seemed 
to have vanished in the time of Pius V. The patriarch, 

1 Constitutiones, P. VIII., c. i, n. 9 (Inst. S. J., II., Florence, 
1893, 115, 117). 

* " Utque laudabat ille plurimum diligentiam patrum lesui- 
tarum, qui memoriae prodiderunt labores, quos sui subierunt in 
Japonia, China, aliisque oris, in quibus Evangelium praedicarunt, 
ita improbabat negligentiam nostrorum, qui cum sui in Indiis 
occidentalibus et orientalibus, Taprobana multisque aliis in 
regnis tantopere laboraverint hactenus a Pontificatu Alexandri 
VI., ac in multis oris Guineae iam inde a tempore Innocentii 
VII . . ., vix ullus repertus fuerit, qui curaverit litteris consignare 
afflictiones ac martyrium nostrorum patrum." ANTIST, Vita 
n. 8 1 : Acta Sanct. V., 324 ; cf. n. 62, p. 320. 


Nunez Barreto, had died at Goa in 1562 without having ever 
set foot in his diocese Pius V. hoped to make better use in 
Japan of Oviedo, who had been hitherto his coadjutor, and of 
whose presence in Abyssinia Pius IV. had made use in 1561 
to invite the Negus Minas to the Council of Trent. 1 Oviedo, 
however, begged to be allowed to remain with the few Catho 
lics of Abyssinia. 2 Pius V. also gave orders to the second 
coadjutor of the patriarch Barreto to go to Japan and China, 3 
but he never reached those countries and died at Macao in 
I 595- 4 Other attempts by the Jesuits to penetrate into 
Africa in 1560 also remained without result, both on the west 
coast in Angola, and on the east coast among the negroes 
south of the Zambesi. 5 No renewal of these attempts took 
place in the time of Pius V. In order to protect the Abys 
sinian mission the Pope tried to obtain the armed intervention 
of Portugal against the Turks, whose fleet in the Red Sea 
was devastating that country. 6 

The Pope received more consoling news from the East 
Indies. From King Sebastian he received tidings that the 
Franciscans, Dominicans and Jesuits were preaching the 
gospel to the Indians, both courageously and successfully. 7 

1 Brief of August 20, 1561, in BECCARI, X., 125 ; covering 
letter of August 23, ibid., 130. 

1 Brief to Oviedo, February 2, 1566 (Portuguese translation), 
ibid., V., 424 ; Oviedo s reply, June 15, 1567, ibid., X., 215. 

8 Brief to Melchoir Carneiro, February 3, 1566, ibid., 187. 

4 Ibid., 331, n. i. 

5 L. KILGER, Die erste Mission unter den Bantustammen 
Ostafrikas, Miinster, 1917. For Angola (1560) cf. SACCHINI, P. 
II., i. 4, n. 203 ; for the expedition on the Zambesi, ibid., 210 seqq., 
i. 5, n. 219 seqq., i. 6, n. 158. What Sacchini reports concerning 
the principal rivers of Africa (i. 4, n. 224) is not without interest. 
He knew that the White Nile flowed out of a lake and that the 
Congo (Zaires) flowed first to the north, and then turned to the west. 

6 Briefs to King Sebastian and Cardinal Henry, both of Decem 
ber 17, 1569, in LADERCHI, 1569, n. 337 seq. 

7 Brief to the Archbishop of Goa, January i, 1570, ibid., 157. 
n. 429, 


All the neighbourhood of Goa had gradually become Christian, 
and in 1560 the Jesuits alone counted 12,967 baptisms. 1 
Among the bishops, the Dominican, Enrico Tavera of Cochin, 
distinguished himself especially by his zeal in instructing 
and converting the natives ; Pius V. praised him in a special 
brief. 2 The native priest too, Andrea Vaz, who was the son 
of a Brahmin, worked with great success among his fellow- 
country-men. 3 The viceroys, Constantino di Braganza and 
Antonio di Noronha, supported the missionaries with all their 
power. 4 The council which met at Goa in 1567 in order to 
promulgate the decrees of Trent, also made regulations con 
cerning the Indian missions. 5 On October 7th, 1567, the 
Pope addressed to the Archbishop of Goa, Gaspare de Leao 
Pereira, who had held this council, a brief of encouragement, 
in which he dissuaded him from his plan of laying down the 
burden of the episcopate, and gave him faculties to dispense 
from matrimonial impediments of a merely ecclesiastical 
nature in the case of the neophytes. Leao nevertheless re 
signed after the council. 6 In those districts where access 
to a bishop was difficult, the Jesuits were given in December, 
1567, the same faculties to dispense, and at the same time 
received a splendid tribute to their missionary activity. 7 

1 MULLBAUER, 82. SACCHINI, P., II., i. 4, n. 255. 
3 Of January 7, 1570, in LADERCHI, 1570, n. 430. 


4 Ibid., 79, 86. 

5 Cf. Bullarium Patronatus Portugalliae in ecclesiis Africae, 
Asiae atque Oceaniae curante Levi Maria Jordao de Pavia Manso, 
Lisbon, 1868 seqq., App. I. ; SACCHINI, P., III., i. 3, n. 225. 

LADERCHI, 1567, n. 247. 

7 " Cum gratiarum omnium largitor Altissimus vestris cordibus 
tantum honoris sui amorem tantumque salutis animarum studii 
impresserit, ut ex Societate vestra plurimi propagandae religionis 
christianae et homines gentiles idolorumque cultores ad sui 
Creatoris ac Salvatoris cognitionem adducendi cupiditate flag- 
rantes, non itinerum, non navigation um laboribus aut periculis 
territi ex his Europae parti bus in Aethiopiam, Persidem, Indiana, 
usque ad Moluccas ct Japoniam ac alias Orientis insulas et regiones 


Christianity also made satisfactory progress in Japan, as was 
shown in the pontificates of the successors of Pius V. 1 

As may be seen from the facts here mentioned, Pius V. 
devoted incomparably greater activity to the missions than 
his immediate predecessors. Whereas, for example, Paul IV. 
or Pius IV. had occasionally addressed a brief of exhortation 
or instruction to the heralds of the faith or sent briefs in their 
favour to the kings and bishops, their successor hardly ever 
let an opportunity pass of doing so. Pius V., moreover, 
aimed at bringing the missions into more immediate relations 
with the Holy See, and at making them more independent of 
the influence of the secular princes. At first he thought of 
sending to the Indies some suitable person, who should be 
dependent upon the Holy See alone, and could intervene with 
all the authority of a nuncio. 2 This plan, however, was 
allowed to lapse, because Philip II. did not wish for a nuncio 
overseas. 3 On the other hand, a second plan was carried 
into effect, with happy results : at the end of July, 1568, the 
Pope set up two congregations of Cardinals in order to promote 
and propagate the faith ; one was to take for its sphere of 
activity the countries inhabited by heretics, the other the 
countries overseas and the missions ; 4 the first beginnings of 

alias a nobis remotissimas et in extreme orbe terrarum positas 
adire non debitent, etc." (Litterae apost., quibus institutio, 
confirmatio et varia privilegia continentur Societatis lesu, Romae, 
1606, 13). 

1 A more detailed account in volume xix. of this work. 

2 Bonelli to Castagna, April 21, 1568, Corresp. dipl., II., 350 seqq. 
3 Castagna to Bonelli, June n, 1568, ibid., 390 ; of. 392. On 

October i, 1568, Castagna reported to Bonelli, that the king had 
caused a discussion to be held as to the best way to prevent 
cruelty to the Indians and as to whether a hereditary viceroy should 
be appointed and a patriarch (once more) nominated for the 
Indies. This latter question was decided in the negative as the 
patriarch might be tempted to rebel against the king and the 
Roman Church. Ibid., 472. 

*CANISII Epist., VI., 581 seqq. Borgia to Nadal, August 2, 
1568, NADAL, III., 625. SACCHINI, P., III., i. 4, n. 129, whence 
js drawn LADERCHI, 1568, n. 206. 


the Congregation of Propaganda, which afterwards developed 
activities of such extraordinary usefulness, may thus be 
traced back to Pius V. It was Francis Borgia who, at an 
audience of May 2oth, 1568, suggested the congregation for 
the conversion of the infidels. 1 The Pope appointed as its 
first members the four Cardinals, Mula, Crivelli, Sirleto and 
Carafa ; several of the papal briefs mentioned above were the 
result of their zeal. 

It is very significant that in all these briefs it is insisted 
again and again that the missionaries must labour to give as 
full an instruction as possible to the converts. Hitherto it 
had been thought sufficient to have only wandering mission 
aries. The few heralds of the faith who, for example, found 
themselves faced in South America by a population like the 
sands of the sea, directed their efforts to bringing no more than 
the most essential Christian ideas to the knowledge of the 
greatest possible number of persons ; thus we often hear of 
thousands and tens of thousands of baptisms, but, except in 
certain exceptional cases, such as Mexico, there is no mention of 
real Christian communities under the care of permanent pastors 
of souls. Moreover, in their great zeal, several of the mission 
aries looked upon their office too much from the point ot view 
of their own sanctification. According to the maxims of the 
gospel there could be no greater work of charity towards our 
fellow men and God than to care for the spiritual salvation of 
one s neighbour, especially if this was accomplished at the cost 
of heroic personal sacrifice. But for souls ot a generous nature 
there was a danger of the missions being looked upon principally 
as an opportunity for self-sacrifice, and for extraordinary 
sufferings and even martyrdom, as the supreme proof of the 
love of God ; the self-sacrificing activity of the wandering 
missionary was more attractive to such souls than the quiet 
work of a permanent priest in a small community of converts. 
These facts must be kept in mind if we would form a true 
judgment of the insistence of Pius V. upon making the work 
as solid as possible. 

1 Testimony of Polanco, who was present at the audience. 
NADAL, III., 626 n. ; cf. SACCHINI, loc. ctt. 


It was of great importance for the future that one of the 
recently established Orders which had from the first included 
the propagation of the faith in the pagan world among its 
objects, put the maxims of Pius V. into practice in every 
respect. The instructions of Francis Borgia to his subjects 
are drawn up entirely in this sense. Wherever our members 
go, he wrote in March, 1567,! their first care must be for the 
Christians who have already been converted, and they must 
use every means to preserve them in the faith, and to further 
the salvation of their souls. Only when that is done should 
they turn their attention to the conversation of others who are 
not yet baptized, but even then let them proceed prudently 
and not take upon themselves more than they can accomplish. 
They must not think it a gain to wander about here and there 
in order to convert pagans whom they cannot afterwards 
watch over ; let them rather proceed by degrees, and con 
solidating their gains, since it is the wish of His Holiness, as he 
has told our people, that more should not be baptized than 
can be maintained in the faith. 2 They should not expose 
themselves to great risk of life among peoples not yet won over, 
since, although it may be for themselves an advantage to give 
up their lives in the service of God, this is not serving the 
common good, when we have so few labourers in the vineyard, 
and the Company can with difficulty send others to take their 
place. The same exhortation to maintain in the first place 
what had already been won, and only then to proceed further, 
is again repeated to the visitor of the Indies, with a further 
appeal to the wishes of Pius V. " This is the will of the Pope : 
it does not seem to him to be any good to make Christians who 
cannot be preserved in the faith ; in his opinion what has 
been gained must be consolidated, and only then a further 
advance made." 3 

x To P. Ruiz del Portillo and his companions, S. FRANCISCUS 
BORGIA, IV., 420. 

2 " La intenci6n de S. S., como a nosotros lo ha dicho, es que 
no se bapticen mas de los que se puedan sostener en la fe." Ibid. 

3 " Y. esta es la mente del Papa, al qual no pare9e se hagan 
xpianos los que no se pueden conservar, y aconseja fortificar lo 


The same bre.idth of view which is expressed in these in 
structions for the welfare of the pagan world, was shown by 
the great Pope no less in his relations with the eastern peoples 
nearer home. He knew what deep roots had been taken there 
by attachment to those forms of worship which had been 
retained from time immemorial as a sacred heritage from 
antiquity, and that nothing would prevent reunion with Rome 
so much as the suspicion that the Popes were endeavouring 
to abolish those rites. Pius V. therefore expressly forbade 
what in certain cases some of his predecessors, Papal legates, 
or Grand Penitentiaries had allowed : namely that Greek 
priests should celebrate according to the Latin rite, or Latin 
priests in the Greek rite, 1 since this was contrary to the ancient 
constitutions of the Church and the decrees of the Fathers. 2 
Proof of his love for the Slav peoples was given by his order 
that twelve youths of Illyrian stock should be sent to Rome, 
to be educated there for the priesthood. 3 

ganado, y despues pasar adelante." Indiarum inspectori, on 
January TO, 1567, S. Franciscus Borgia, IV., 386. 

1 " ne deinceps presbyteri graeci, praecipue uxorati, latino 
more, vel latini graeco ritu . . . missas et alia divina officia 
celebrare vel celebraii facere praesumant." Brief of August 20, 
1566, Bull. Rom. VII 473, Collectio Lacensis, II 450. 

2 " hoc ab antiquo catholicae Ecclesiae institute et SS. Patrum 
decretis deviare considerantes " (Coll. Lac., loc. cit.}. Cf. Gregory 
the Great to Augustine (Ep. 64, n. 3, MIGNE, Patr. Lat., LXXVII., 
n87-can. 10 dist. 12) ; Leo IX. to the patriarch Michael (Ep. 
100, n. 29, ibid., CXLIII., 764). 

3 *Avviso di Roma of June 14, 1567, Urb. 1040, p. 406, Vatican 



Pius V. shrank from nothing so much as taking up arms, yet 
strangely enough, it fell to his lot to be frequently engaged in 
wars. This was forced upon him in the first place by the 
unsettled conditions of the Papal States, secondly by the 
oppression of the French Catholics by the Huguenots, and 
lastly by the pressing danger from the Turks. To meet this 
danger became for Pius V. a principal object of his anxieties 
and efforts during the whole of his pontificate, and in this 
question he was from the first guided by the true principle 
that a decisive success was to be obtained, not by means of 
attacks delivered by individual powers, but only at their being 
united together in a common league. 

At the very beginning of his reign Pius V. wrote to Philip II. 
to this effect, while to the Imperial ambassador he spoke of 
his intention of forming a league of the Christian princes 
against the Turks. 1 His idea that the Ottoman power could 
only be broken by means of a common crusade was shared by 
the Grand-Master of the Knights of St. John, La .Valet te, 
who had so heroically defended Malta in the time of Pius IV. 2 
Pius V. at once took in hand the safe-guarding of this advance- 
post of the Christian world in the Mediterranean, which was of 
the utmost strategic importance. 3 In February and March, 
1566, he exhorted the King of Spain and the governess of the 
Low Countries to assist in the rebuilding of the fortifications 
which had been destroyed during the siege of 1565, and to 

1 See HERRE, Europ. Politik, I., 36 ; SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 38. 

2 See Vol. XVI. of this work, p. 367. Cf. JURIEN DE LA 
GRAVIERE, La guerre de Chypre et la bataille de Le"pante, Paris, 
1888, 4. 

8 Cf. SERRANO, Liga, I., 29 seq. 



help the Knights with money and troops. 1 A bull describing 
in clear terms the Turkish peril, which had become doubly 
dangerous in view of the religious dissensions of Christendom, 
is dated March gth, 1566. It was only, he said, by the faithful 
doing penance that the anger of God could be appeased, and 
His strong help looked for. For this end the Pope had pub 
lished a jubilee indulgence, for the gaining of which, in addi 
tion to prayer and fasting, the reception of the sacraments 
was enjoined and the giving of alms for the purposes of the 
war against the Turks. 2 

The Pope was not a little dismayed by the news that the 
Grand Master of the Knights of St. John, on account of the 
imminent danger of an attack by the Turks, intended to take 
refuge in Sicily and to leave Malta, which did not seem to him 
sufficiently secure. In a letter of March 22nd, 1566, he ad 
jured La Valette to give up this idea. Pointing out the 
danger of southern Italy being laid open to the depradations 
of the enemy, and of his own Order being destroyed if he were 
to carry out his design, he exhorted him to go on courageously, 
and promised him his own support. 3 In accordance with this 
promise he sent 15,000 ducats to Malta, as well as some troops 
to assist the Knights, and begged Philip II. and the viceroy 
of Sicily to give them help. 4 At a consistory on April 2nd, 

J The "brief to the " gubernatrix Flandriae " of February n, 
1566, in Arm. 44, t. 12, n. 27, Papal Secret Archives ; ibid., n. 44 
the brief to Philip II. of March 22, 1566, printed in LADERCHI, 
1566, n. 176, and n. 58 the ""brief to the same of March 27, 1566 ; 
this last concerns the plan of employing floating capital for Malta 
from the Papal monopoly on lights, for which purpose Ces. 
Fontana was sent to the Low Countries. 

2 The bull " Cum gravissima " in Arm. 44, t. 12, n. 33, Papal 
Secret Archives, printed in LADERCHI, 1566, n. 171 (with the wrong 
date, March 8), and in Bull. Rom., 431 seq. 

3 See GOUBAU, 8 seq. 

4 See CATENA, 44. Mention is made by C. Luzzara of the 3,000 
men whom Pius V. wished to enlist for Malta, in his *report of 
March 30, 1566, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. See also the *letter 
of Carlo Stuerdo to the Duke of Parma from Rome, April 20, 


1566, he spoke strongly of his desire to employ all his powers 
for the protection of Christendom. 1 How much this thought 
filled his mind is also shown by the fact that it is mentioned 
even in briefs dealing with the reform of morals among the 
clergy. " I am taking up arms against the Turks," he says, 
" but the only thing that can help me in that is the prayers 
of priests of pure life." 2 

The failure of the attack by the Turks on Malta in 1565, 
led the Sultan to attempt in the following year to conquer 
the Greek archipelago. Since not only Venice, which was 
directly threatened, but Spain as well, 3 had made evasive 
replies to the Pope s exhortations, the enemy found this an 
easy task. On April I5th, 1566, the Turkish admiral, Piali, 
captured the island of Chios, bringing the rule of the Giustin- 
iani to a bloody end. In the same year the duchies of Naxos, 
Andros and Ceos also fell into the hands of the insatiable 
enemy. 4 In May, 1566, Turkish ships made their appearance 
in the Adriatic, and threatened Ancona, to which place Pius V. 
at once sent troops and artillery. 5 Later on he not only under 
took the strengthening of the fortifications there, but in the 
short space of twenty days formed a mobile force of four 
thousand men for the defence of the coast. 6 

Besides such temporal measures Pius V. never ceased to 
implore the aid of heaven for the protection of Christendom. 

1566, State Archives, Naples, C. Fames. 763, and the *Avviso 
di Roma of April 27, 1566, Urb. 1040, p. 2i7b, Vatican Library. 
See also POLANCI Epist. in Anal. Bolland., VII., 49, 54. 

1 See the *report of C. Luzzara from Rome, April 3, 1566, 
Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. 

* See LADERCHI, 1566, n. 251. 

3 See SERRANO, Liga, I., 34. 

4 Cf. ibid., 159 seq. ; HOPF in Enzyklopddie of Ersch, I. 3 , 
sect. 86, p. 171 seq. JORGA, III., 109 ; Byzant. Zeitschrift, VIII., 
365 seq. 

6 See *Avvisi di Roma of May n and 18, 1566, Urb. 1040, 
p. 225, 229, Vatican Library. 

6 See the "report of Firmanus (under August 3, 1566), Papal 
Secret Archives, Miscell., Arm. XII., 31 ; CATENA, 46. 


On July 2ist, 1566, the jubilee for the success of the war 
against the Turks was published. 1 Eight days later, on 
July 28th, the Pope was seen taking part in person in the first 
procession which was made in Rome to avert the Turkish 
peril. He had tears in his eyes as he walked along, praying 
fervently all the while. A second procession was made on 
July 3ist, and a third on August 2nd, in which four thousand 
people took part. 2 Pius V. was successful in dissuading 
La Valette from his purpose of abandoning Malta, and in 
obtaining abundant means for the Knights for the fortifica 
tions of the island. 3 On the other hand insurmountable 
difficulties stood in the way of his plans for the formation of 
an anti-Turkish league. Venice, which was so strong at sea, 
had adhered strictly to a policy of armed neutrality after the 
unfortunate peace of 1540,* On account of her commerce in 
the Levant and her distrust of the Hapsburgs, the Signoria 
had held firmly to this policy, which was so costly and so 
embarrassing, even at the time of the threat to Malta in 1565. 
Even now she nervously avoided any disturbance of her 
relations w.ith the Turks. When their fleet appeared near 
Ragusa dur l ng the summer of 1566, she withdrew her ships 
in all haste. 5 Nor did the King of Spain at that time show 
himself at all inclined to the league suggested by the Pope. 

1 *Bando of July 21, 1566, Bandi, V., T, p. 159, Papal Secret 

* See FIRMANUS, *Diarium, loc. cit., p. loyb, Papal Secret 
Archives. Cf. LADERCHI, 1566, n. 291 (with wrong date, July 14). 

8 The King of Portugal sent a fairly large sum of money (satis 
magnam pecuniam), as Pius V. mentions with words of praise 
in a *brief sent to him on August 17, 1566, pointing out that with 
the erection of the new fort on the heights of S. Elmo there would 
be " Oportunuissimum ad versus Turcos et predones Afros totius 
Christiani populi propugnaculum ; " Arm. 42, t. 12, n. 98, Papal 
Secret Archives. There also is a brief of August 19 to La Valette, 
which allows work for that purpose on Sundays and festival days 
(printed in LADERCHI, 1566, n. 178). 

4 See Vol. XI. of this work, p. 296. 

5 See HERRE, Europ. Politik, I., 37, 


In this Philip II. was guided by consideration for the Low 
Countries and his fear of the German Protestants. 1 In Ger 
many the religious disputes in the Empire stood in the way 
of the plan for a great international league, towards which 
Maximilian II. seemed to be seriously inclined in the spring 
of 1566. 2 The Papal legate, Commendone, was forced to 
realize at the Diet of Augsburg that Maximilian thought before 
all else of obtaining assistance for the protection of Hungary, 
for which purpose the Diet voted a large sum of money, while 
the Pope gave 50,000 scudi and obtained military help for 
the Emperor from the small Italian states. 3 

At the end of autumn, 1566, the Pope, who had been 
seriously perturbed by the fall of Sziget, 4 made fresh efforts 
to form a great anti-Turkish league. In order to bring this 
about he appointed a commission, of which Cardinals Morone, 
Farnese, Granvelle, Commendone and Mula were members. 
On November 4th he recommended the matter in a pressing 
letter to the Emperor, the Spanish sovereigns, Charles IX. 
and the regent of France. 5 But the state of political affairs 
was then even less favourable than at the time of the first 
attempt. Very little was to be hoped for from the Emperor, 
or from the intriguing woman who was controlling the destinies 
of France. The renewed outbreak of religious wars in France 
then completely paralysed the resources of that kingdom. 
At the same time Philip II. saw all his strength absorbed by the 
disturbances in the Low Countries and by his war against the 

1 See ibid., 37 seq. ; SERRANO, Liga, I., 36 seq. 

2 Cf. BIBL, Korrespondenz Maximilians II., I., 448 seq. 

3 Cf. supra pp. 247, 255. 

4 " *I1 Papa ha sentito tanto dispiacere della perdita di Seghetto 
che subito havuto la nuova si retir6 in Araceli et per tutto quel 
giorno non attese ad altro che a deplorare la mala fortuna de 
christiani alia quale se potesse col sangue suo remediar la faria 
volentieri," thus reports an Avviso di Roma of September 28, 
1566, Urb. 1040, p. 291, Vatican Library. Cf. the *report of 
Strozzi of September 29, 1566, State Archives, Vienna. 

5 See SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 37 seq. ; HERRE, loc. cit., I., 
38 seq. The briefs in LADERCHI, 1566, n. 309 seq. 


Moors, and it was not without some bitterness that the King 
of Spain pointed out at what an inopportune moment the 
Pope s suggestion had come. It was quite true that Philip II. 
could not think of any foreign expedition while there was an 
understanding between the rebels in the Low Countries and 
the Huguenots, and his finances were completely exhausted. 1 
Although the plans for the league had to remain in almost 
complete abeyance for two years, 2 the Pope nevertheless did 
all that he could to support the Emperor while the war in 
Hungary lasted, 3 to help the Knights of Malta, 4 and to protect 
the coasts of the States of the Church from attacks by the 
Turks and by pirates. 

1 See HERRE, loc. cit., 40 seq. 

1 Cf. SERRANO, loc. cit., 38 seq. 

9 Cf. supra, p. 255. 

4 On October 12, 1566, *Strozzi reports that the Cardinals had 
been summoned to take counsel to obtain help for Malta (State 
Archives, Vienna). In February, 1567, Pius V. enlisted 3,000 
men who were intended for Malta under the command of Pompeo 
Colonna and Ascanio della Corgna (*report of B. Pia, dated Rome, 
February 15, 1567, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). At the end of 
1567 the island was again threatened by the Turks. La Vale tte 
then sought help from the Duke of Anjou (see his letter of Novem 
ber 3, 1567, in FILLON, n. 2499) ; France did nothing, but Pius V. 
ordered a jubilee on October 28, 1567 (Bandi, V., i, p. 160, Papal 
Secret Archives), and even before the messenger from the Knights 
reached Rome on December 19 (*report of B. Pia of December 20, 
J 567, loc. cit.) provided for their help in various ways (see the 
*report of B. Pia, dated Rome, November 29, 1567, Gonzaga 
Archives, Mantua, and the *bull of December 18, 1567, Arm. 44, 
t. 13, p. i lib, cf. p. 113 seq., Papal Secret Archives ; also the 
briefs to Philip II., Charles IX. and the Doge of Venice, of Decem 
ber 8, 12, and 19, 1567, in GOUBAU, 59 seq., 61 seq., 63 seq.). An 
*Avviso di Roma of February 28, 1568, announces that the Pope 
has authorized the enrolment of 1,500 men in the States of the 
Church, and is providing part of their pay (Urb. 1040, p. 483^ 
Vatican Library). For the new fortification of S. Elmo in Malta 
Pius V. gave 3,000 scudi in the following year (*Avviso di Roma 
of July 30, 1569, Urb. 1041, p. I25b, loc. cit.). 


Special provisions in the latter respect were all the more 
necessary since the Papal fleet had been destroyed in the time 
of Pius IV. at the battle of Jerbeh. As early as August, 1566, 
steps had been taken for the protection of the coasts of the 
Marches and Paolo Giordano Orsini had been placed in com 
mand of four thousand men. 1 The then imminent danger 
from the Turkish fleet once again decreased, but Pius V. did 
not discontinue his precautions. In June, 1567, he acquired 
three galleys from Andrea Doria, as the one that remained was 
obviously not enough to defend the coast. 2 Besides this the 
Pope planned to strengthen the fortresses of Ancona 3 and 
Civitavecchia, 4 and to hurry forward the construction of watch 
towers along the coast, 5 which had already been begun under 

1 See Corresp. dipl., I., 321, and GNOLI, Vitt. Accoramboni, 54. 
8 See the "report of B. Pia, dated Rome, June 4, 1567, Gonzaga 
Archives, Mantua. 

3 *" Si da ordine di fortificare Ancona e Civitavecchia " (Avviso 
di Roma of April 3, 1568, Urb. 1040, p. 499, Vatican Library). 
M. A. Colonna inspected the fortifications of Ancona and gave a 
good report of them ("Avviso di Roma of April 23, 1568, ibid., 511). 
"Assignation of 50,000 scudi for the fortification of Ancona 
(ibid., 526b). Cf. also MAROCCO, XII., 77 ; LEONI, Ancona ill., 296 
seq. Payments to Giacomo della Porta for fortification works at 
Ancona and Camerino in "Deposit., a. 1570, State Archives, Rome. 

4 Cf. ANNOVAZZI, 280 seq., 298 seq. ; CALISSE, Storia di Civitavec 
chia, Florence, 1898, 422 seq. The arms of Pius V. are still to be 
seen on the gate. 

6 Cf. GUGLIELMOTTI; Fortificazioni, 433, 441 seq., 472 seq.; 
SCHRADER, Campagna, Leipzig, 1910, 148 seq. ; TOMASSETTI, 
Campagna, I., Rome, 1910, 181 seq. ; the same, Le torri della 
spiaggia romana nel a 1567, in Scritti di storia, di fil. e d arte, 
Naples, 1908. The plan for building the tower at Porto is men 
tioned in the "Avviso di Roma of October u, 1567, Urb. 1040, 
p. 448b ; ibid., 1041, p. 66, an "Avviso of April 23, 1569 : "La 
tone che S.S td fa fabbricare alia foce del Tevere sopra le ruine 
della Mole Traiana e reduta a buon termine per diffender la 
spiaggia da Corsari dove presto se mandera artiglieria." In 
Vatic. 6533, p. 145 seq. : "Offerta a Pio V. per la fabrica della 
torre a Ostia. Vatican Library. 


Pius IV. These served to watch for the Turks and pirates 
and to give the alarm to the inhabitants in the neighbourhood 
of a threatened attack. The largest of these buildings, the 
tower of S. Michele at the mouth of the Tiber at Ostia, the 
design for which had been sketched by Michelangelo, still bears 
the inscription of Pius V. 1 The part which the Pope took in 
all these works may be seen from the fact that he visited them 
in person. 2 

The building of these towers, which to-day form so pictur 
esque a feature of the shores of the Roman coast, involved 
considerable expense, and the provision of the necessary funds 
led to no small difficulties. How dangerous the situation was 
was shown by an attack by pirates on Nettuno, which took 
place in May, I568. 3 On several occasions it was feared 
that the enemy would appear before Rome itself, where, 
especially in the Borgo, Pius V. undertook considerable fortifi 
cation works. Here too the Pope assured himself of the 
progress of the works by making personal inspections. 4 

The Ottoman Empire had reached the height of its splendour 
and power under Suleiman the Magnificent ; the death of the 
sultan, which occurred in September, 1566, during the siege of 
Sziget, was the beginning of it decline. Christendom and its 
supreme head breathed again. 5 As is often the case in history, 
so now it was seen how limits are set to the triumphs of every 
conquering state by the fact that great capacity for rule is 

1 See GUGLIELMOTTI, Colonna, 153 seq. 

2 See the "report of C. Luzzara of November 19, 1566, Gonzaga 
Archives, Mantua, and *that of Strozzi of November 23, 1568, 
State Archives, Vienna. 

* As to this cf. the *Avviso di Roma of May 22, 1568, in the 
" Romana " of the State Archives, Vienna. An *Avviso of 
July 6, 1569, reports the capture by corsairs of several vessels on 
their way to Rome. Urb. 1041, p. io5b, Vatican Library. 

4 The inspection of the works in the Borgo and at the Castle of 
St. Angelo (cf. supra Vol. XVII. , p. 126) is announced in an 
*Avviso di Roma of May 8, 1568, Urb. 1040, p. 5i4b, Vatican 

6 See the *report of Strozzi of October 26, 1566, State Archives, 


not always hereditary. The decline of the Turkish power 
would have been even more evident if the capable grand 
vizier, Mohammed Sokolli, had not acted as a counter-poise 
to the unworthy and foolish sovereign who now ascended the 

Contemporaries draw a repulsive picture of the coarse, 
undersized and corpulent Sultan, Selim II., whose red face 
betrayed the drunkard. 1 Long before his accession to the 
throne a Jew named Jose Miquez, who had come from Portu 
gal, and had become very wealthy by means of financial 
speculations, had succeeded in getting great influence over 
Selim by encouraging the debauchery of the prince in every 
way, and his fondness for choice wines and food. Immedi 
ately after his succession to the throne the Sultan conferred 
on his favourite the duchy of Naxos, in return for a small 
tribute. 2 Hoping to get Cyprus into his hands in the same 
way, the avaricious Jew urged the Sultan to make an expedi 
tion against that island, which, on account of its natural riches 
and its important stragetic position, was one of the most 
treasured possessions of the Republic of St. Mark. 3 After the 
conclusion of peace with the Emperor and the conquest of 
Arabia nothing st<_ xi in the way of this plan except the grand 
vizier Sokolli, who was opposed to any breaking off of relations 
with Venice, and who would have preferred to give support to 
his co-religionists in Spain, the Moorish rebels. 4 Jose Miquez, 
or, as the Turks called him, Josef Nassi, found powerful support 
for his designs in the admiral, Piah-Pasha, and the vizier 

1 See A. BADOERO in Alberi, I., 360 seq. ; ZINKEISEN, III., 55 
seq. ; JORGA, III., 163. 

2 Cf. BADOERO, loc. cit. ; CHARRIERE, III., 86, 88 n., 646 n. ; 
ROMANIN, VI., 270 seq. \ ZINKEISEN, III., 56 seq., 373 seq. ; 
BALAN, VI., 530 ; HERRE, Europ, Politik, I., 12 seq. ; Rev. hist., 
LXXVII., 310 seq. ; see also LEVY, Don Josef Nasi, Herzog von 
Naxos, Breslau, 1859. 

8 See the report of Bernardo Sagredo in MAS LATRIE, III., 
540 seq., 555 seq. Cf. HAMMER, II., 405 ; HERRE, I., 10. 

4 Cf. BROSCH, Geschichten aus dem Leben dreier Grosswesire, 
Gotha, 1889, 7 seq. ; HERRE, I., 14 seq. 

VOL. xvili. 25 


Lala Mustafa, Selim s tutor. The Mufti associated himself 
with them, and told the Sultan that he would be able to recover 
from the Venetians the money required for the great mosque 
at Adrianople, which was being built, and that Selim, as the 
heir of the rulers of Egypt, had a right to the possession of 
Cyprus. Venice, so he said in the hearing of the Sultan, had 
been guilty of a breach of faith by favouring the piracies of 
the brigands of Uscocchi, on the borders of Dalmatia, and by 
offering shelter to the Maltese corsairs in the harbours of 
Cyprus. 1 

The party which had raised the standard of war against 
Venice had everything its own way when news reached Con 
stantinople that the arsenal of Venice had been destroyed by 
fire on September I3th, 1569, 2 and that Italy was threatened 
with famine in consequence of a bad harvest. Rumour exag 
gerated the damage done to the Republic, and Selim II., 
thinking that Venice had lost her fleet, 3 resolved to break the 
peace which had been concluded with the Republic in 1540. 
Knowing full well that the great Christian powers were ham 
pered by internal difficulties and were in a state of discord 
among themselves, he only waited for the most favourable 
moment to launch his attack and rob the Venetians of their 
" jewel, Cyprus, the last bulwark of Christendom in the 
Levant." 4 On February ist, 1570, a Turkish plenipotentiary, 
named Cubat, was sent from Constantinople to Venice, to 
deliver the ultimatum to the Signoria : the surrender of 
Cyprus or war. The Porte had already on January I3th, on 

1 See HAMMER, II., 401 seq. ; BROSCH, loc. cit., 17 seq. ; HERRE, 
I., 12 seq. 

2 Cf. ROMANIN, VI., 267 seq. ; BALAN, VI., 531 ; HERRE, I., 15 
seq. ; Tosi, Dell incenclio dell arsenale di Venezia, Florence, 1906. 

3 In a *Lettera di Roma of December 23, 1569, it is stated : 
it is reported from Venice that the Turk, who is harassed by the 
" Tartari " and the " Son," cannot send any fleet against us. 
Doria-Pamnli Archives, Rome. 

4 HERRE, Mittlemeerpolitik im 16. Jahrhundert, in Deutsche 
Zeitschrift fur Geschichtswissenschafl, IX. (1906), 358. For the 
importance of Cyprus to Venice see also SERRANO, Liga, I., 42 seq. 


flimsy pretexts, confiscated all Venetian property, together 
with the merchant vessels of the Republic which were in the 
harbour of Constantinople. 1 

The Republic of St. Mark, which for a generation had main 
tained friendly relations with the Porte with the greatest self- 
restraint and caution, and even at the expense of its political 
good name, 2 and which had schooled itself, for the sake of 
its commercial interests, to cling to the hem of the Sultan s 
garment, 3 restricting itself to a defensive attitude, was not a 
little taken by surprise by the attack which was now suddenly 
threatened. Trusting to the benevolent attitude of the grand 
vizier, it had too long brushed aside the warnings of its am 
bassadors. 4 Since they were all aware in Venice of the strength 
of their enemy and his almost inexhaustible resources, they 
were under no illusion as to the gravity of the danger, and took 
precautions on a grand scale. It was but natural that they 
should turn their thoughts towards help from outside. As 
France and Germany were completely occupied with internal 
disturbances, they could for the moment only turn to Spain 
and the Pope ; with these two powers, however, Venice was 
not on very good terms. Spain, the greatest power in Europe, 
had such great influence in Italy that the States of the Church 
and the Republic of Venice could only with difficulty maintain 
their independence. Spanish viceroys ruled at Naples, in 
Sicily, in Sardinia, at Milan and in Lombardy. Savoy, Genoa 
and Tuscany were dependent upon Madrid. It had been 
made evident in many ways that in Spain they looked with a 
jealous eye on the freedom and power of the Republic of 
St. Mark, as well as upon that of the Holy See. The arbitrary 
way in which Venice had been accustomed to act in ecclesiasti 
cal questions, and the scant courtesy she had shown in matters 
of ecclesiastical politics in connexion with the Roman In 
quisition, a thing which was very near to the heart of Pius V., 

1 Cf. BROSCH, loc. cil., 14 ; CHARRIERE, III., 102. 

2 The Venetian diplomatists themselves recognized this ; see 
ALBERI, III., i, 83, 160. 

3 See ALBERI, XIII., 95 ; cf. JORGA, III., 248. 

4 See HERRE, I., 19. 


had led to various misunderstandings, 1 but the common danger 
which threatened Christendom caused the noble-hearted Pope 
to put all such considerations into the background, since from 
the moment of his election he had never lost sight of the 
dangers hanging over Christendom on the part of Islam. 

Far more difficult was it for Venice to find common ground 
with Spain, whose interest in the Turkish question centred 
rather in the north of Africa than in the east. How great was 
the jealousy between Venice and Spain was made clear when 
the Papal nuncio in Venice, Antonio Facchinetti, who, in 
accordance with the wishes of the Pope, had always pressed for 
a Christian coalition against the Turks, urged the Signoria 
to form an alliance with Philip II. On February 22nd, 1570, 
Facchinetti had to report to Rome that he plainly saw that the 
Signoria still shrank from the idea of the league, because they 
did not wish to bind themselves to protect the property of 
Spain when the Turkish fleet was attacking, not the posses 
sions of Venice, but those of Philip II. 2 The Venetians there- 

1 With regard to the Inquisition see Vol. XVII., p. 316, and GRATI- 
ANUS, De bello Cyprio, 51 seq., and especially TIEPOLO, 191 seq., 
and GOTHEIN, 526 seq. See also Corresp. dipl., I., 128. For the 
opposition of Venice to the bull " In coena Domini " see CEC- 
CHETTI, I., 448 ; cf. GOTHEIN, 538 seq. ; Corresp. dipl., III., 242. 
The disgraceful disputes occasioned by the brief of June 27, 1566, 
on the union of the parish of Desenzano with the monastery of 
S. Salvatore at Brescia, to which Venice refused its exequatur," 
are described in detail, but in a partisan spirit, by U. PAPA (Un 
dissidio tra Venezia e Pio V., Venice, 1895). Cf. also Corresp. 
dipl., II., 161. For the mistrust felt by Venice for Pius V. see 
ALBERT, II., 4, 239. For Pius V. s opinion of the Venetians and 
their pride see the note of the Papal Secretary of State in 1572, 
in Varia polit., 117, p. 385 seq. ; **Negotii di Venezia, Papal 
Secret Archives. 

2 Facchinetti s letter is published in VALENSISE, 40-41. This 
edition, made in 1898, of the important and interesting reports 
from the nuncio at Venice concerning the league escaped the 
notice of HERRE (Europ. politik im Cyprischen Krieg, I., 1902), 
who in other respects had made very complete use of the vast 
amount of literature on the subject. 


fore sought to obtain from the Pope, not a league, but money, 
provisions and troops, because they still deluded themselves 
with the hope that the news of their extensive military prepara 
tions would at the last moment prevent the Turks from attack 
ing their possessions in the Levant. 1 The Signoria was quite 
prepared, indeed, that the Pope should give military assistance 
to Venice with the help of the other Catholic powers, and 
especially of Spain, but it would very much rathe r have had 
that help without being bound by any strict alliance with its 
rival, Spain, and thus finding itself committed to undertakings 
which could not serve any directly useful purpose for itself. 2 

Pius V. was very ready to give direct help to the Republic, 
but at the same time he insisted that the Signoria must ally 
itself with Philip II. and the small Italian states against the 
Turks. Thus, after her first hesitation, Venice found herself 
at length obliged to agree to the league urged by the Pope 
and his nuncio, since she could not in other ways count upon 
the help of the other Christian states. 3 

On March 8th, 1570, the nuncio Facchinetti sent to Rome the 
following significant report : in view of the apparent inevit 
ability of war the Venetians are now desirous of joining the 
league, but if the Turks should leave them in peace they would 
not be displeased ; His Holiness, therefore, must try and 
bind them as closely as possible to the league. He, the nuncio, 
would work for the same end, in such a way that the Signoria 
would find itself so tied that it would be unable to withdraw 
without incurring the deepest disgrace. 4 

In the meantime Cubat, the bearer of the ultimatum, was 
nearing the city of the lagoons, where lively discussions were 

1 See the report of Facchinetti, dated Venice, February 25, 1570, 
in VALENSISE, 43 seq. 

* See the excellent account by HERRE, I., 49 seq. Cf. SERRANO, 
Liga, I., 48 seq. 

* See HERRE, I., 50. As early as March 13, 1568, Facchinetti, 
in a letter to the Secretary of State of Pius V. had expressed the 
hope that Venice would in the end seek safety in the league. 

4 See VALENSISE, 46. 


being held as to the attitude they should take up. At the 
council of the Pregadi three views had been put forward : 
the first, that Cubat should be received in secret, was nega 
tived ; the second, that he should not be allowed to enter 
Venice at all, but should be at once sent back, also failed to 
secure a majority ; it was resolved in the end to accord the 
envoy a public reception, but to refuse his ultimatum uncon 
ditionally. 1 In conformity with this decision, instructions 
were also drawn up and sent to Ragusa, to the Venetian 
representative, Aloisio Bonrizzo, who was accompanying 
Cubat. 2 

When the Turkish ambassador arrived in the harbour of 
Venice on March 27 th, 1570, he was forbidden to land in the 
city. Guards accompanied him on the following morning to a 
full assembly of the Signoria, which was held with closed doors, 
and lasted only a quarter of an hour. Cubat there delivered 
his ultimatum ; the reply which had been already prepared 
was a definite rejection " in cold and dignified terms/ It 
pointed out that without any reasonable excuse the Porte 
wished to break the peace which had been ratified by oath 
only a short time before. The Republic would defend itself 
against the attack which was now to be expected, trusting 
in the justice of God, and would defend Cyprus, its lawful 
possession, by force of arms. 3 

Although at that moment Venice seemed to be firmly 
resolved to engage in a struggle with the Turks, trusting in 

1 See the report of Facchinetti of March 17, 1570, in VALENSISE, 

4 8. 

* See YRIARTE, La vie d un patricien de Venise au i6 e siecle, 
Paris, 1874, 171. 

8 The above is in accordance with the report of Facchinetti of 
March 29, 1570, in VALENSISE, 50 seq. The later historians, 
PARUTA (Hist-Venet., II. ; Guerra di Cipro, I., 50 seq.}, FOLIETA 
(De sacro foedere, I., i), and GRATIANUS (De bello Cyprio, 40 seq.) 
have described in detail the events of those days, but as HERRE, I., 
22, n. i, points out, in some cases embellishing their accounts 
with legendary matter. For the reply that was prepared see 
LONGO, Guerra, 13 seq., 14, and YRIARTE, 152. 


its sea power, nevertheless doubts were freely entertained as 
to the sincerity of the Signoria, and it was thought that the 
skilful diplomatists of the Republic were only trying to 
frighten the enemy, and to come to an understanding with the 
Porte favourable to themselves, by which the allied Christian 
powers would be left empty handed. It is easy to understand 
this mistrust in the light of previous events ; above all, the 
representatives of Philip II. in the Curia, Zufiiga and Gran- 
velle, were led by it to hold back, as well as by political con 
siderations. In order to enhance as much as possible the 
value of the accession of the power of Spain, these diplomatists 
made it appear that the king had no idea of joining the league. 1 
That the Spaniards were dealing in subterfuges had already 
been made clear when the Pope in his enthusiasm for the 
protection of Christendom spoke of the Turkish peril at a 
consistory of February 27th, 1570, and in burning words 
urged Venice to rise in all her might. Among the Cardinals 
there was but one opinion as to the reality and imminence of 
the danger, and no one was blind to the fact that Cyprus must 
fall into the hands of the Sultan before the princes cf Europe 
could respond to the Pope s appeal for help. The best way to 
prevent such a disaster seemed to be the immediate inter 
vention of Philip II. 

It was true that the King of Spain was in a position at once 
to send from his Sicilan harbours sufficient help to hold back 
the first attack of the Turks, but Cardinal Granvelle declared 
himself so strongly against any such course that he adjured 
the Pope and the College of Cardinals not to precipitate his 
king and the Church into so dangerous and hazardous an 
undertaking. Granvelle did not hesitate to declare openly 
that the faithless Republic of St. Mark was not deserving of 
immediate help, that for the time being it could be left to 
its fate, and that it would be time enough to come to its 
assistance when disaster had forced it to realize that it could 

1 See the fully justified remarks of HERRE, I., 67 seq., who was 
the first to make use of the reports of Granvelle and Zufiiga in the 
Archives at Simancas. 


not do without its neighbours ; he, the Cardinal, believed that 
God had exposed that proud state to the attack of the infidels 
for the purpose of punishing its selfishness, and forcing it to 
realize that even the Signoria might find itself in the position 
of having to beg for protection and help. 

Cardinal Commendone, who was held in great esteem by 
Pius V., vigorously opposed this declaration of Granvelle. 1 
He recalled the services of Venice to Christendom and the 
Holy See, and sought to defend the Signoria from the charges 
of faithlessness and selfishness as far as he could. With bitter 
reference to the Spaniards he remarked that he marvelled 
at mention being made of the late war, and the peace that had 
then been concluded with the Turks, since the Venetians 
had then been treated by their allies in such a way that they 
preferred not to speak of it. Commendone called attention to 
the proposal which the Pope had had in his mind from the first, 
namely that they should send help as quickly as possible, 
since it was not only Venice, but the whole of Italy that was 
involved, as well as the good name and well-being of Christen 
dom. The majority of the Cardinals then decided in the sense 
suggested. 2 

While the Pope, after this consistory, made provision for a 
large subsidy in money by granting a tenth upon the Venetian 
clergy up to 100,000 gold scudi, which was intended to be used 
only for the defence of Cyprus, 3 he at the same time took 

i Cf. Vol. XVII. of this work, p. 81. 

8 For the consistory of February 27, 1570, which strangely 
enough is not mentioned in the *Acta concistorialia in the Con- 
sistorial Archives at the Vatican (now included in the Papal 
Secret Archives), see the report of Facchinetti of March i, 1570 
(VALENSISE. 44) the letters of Granvelle and Zufliga to Philip II. 
of February 28, 1570 (State Archives, Simancas), used by HERRE, 
I., 48, as well as FOLIETA, I., 996 seq., and GRATIANUS, De bello 
Cyprio, 52 seq., which, for purposes of criticism, should be com 
pared with LADERCHI. 1570, n. n. 

8 The money was therefore " venire in mano dei ministri di 
S.S tA ;" see VALENSISE, 44. Cf. for the concession the ""report 
of B. Pia, dated Rome, March, 4, 1570, Gonzaga Archives Mantua., 


definite steps to induce Philip II. to come to the assistance 
of Venice, and to enter into an alliance with the Republic. 

When the Venetian government placed in his hands the 
carrying out of the negotiations, 1 Pius V. entrusted the con 
duct of this most difficult business to one of his most skilful 
and capable officials in political affairs, and one who by his 
Spanish descent was bound to be in sympathy with Philip II. ; 
this was Luis de Torres, a cleric of the Apostolic Camera. 2 

The *bull concerning the Venetian tithe (the effective value of the 
100,000 gold scudi was 180,000 ; see CECCHETTI, II., 74), dated 
Rome, April 10, 1570, is in Archives of Briefs, Rome. On the 
same date Pius V. published a " iubilaeum ad divinum auxilium 
implorandum contra infideles " ; BANDI, V., i, p. 162, Papal 
Secret Archives. 

1 *" A 27 di Febraro del 1570 rendendo conto alia S t&l di Pio V. 
il cl. Michele Suriano, ambasciatore de Venetian! appresso S.S t& 
degli apparati di guerra che faveva il Turco " the Pope begged the 
ambassador to write home to stipulate for a league with Philip II. 
Soriano sent a messenger to Venice the same day. The reply of 
the Signoria to this placed the matter in the hands of the Pope, 
" accio che con I autorita sua si trattasse et concludesse et data 
questa risposta sabbato 4 di Marzo lunedi a sei mand6 a chiamare 
me D. Luis de Torres, chierico di sua Camera Apostolica et mi 
disse di volermi mandar in Spagna per tal effetto raggionandomi 
nella forma seguente : Monsignore, vi havemo mandate a chia 
mare per dirvi che siamo risoluti mandarvi in Ispagna et la causa 
vi diremo : " league between Venice and Spain, refer to instruc 
tions. There is further another business to be treated of, which 
the nuncio had already opened with Philip 1 1., " che abbracci le 
cose d Inghilterra aiutando li sollevati " (cf. supra, p. 209 seq.). 
Torres declared his readiness to accept the mission. Thus the 
*Giornale de trattati segreti et pubblici di diversi ministri con 
il S. P. Papa Pio V. (ex bibl. card. los. Renati card 118 , Imperialis), 
Add. Ms. 20052, p. 2, British Museum, London. Cf. also the 
accounts drawn from the Spanish reports in HERRE, I., 70. 

2 For L. de Torres, who was Archbishop of Monreale from 1573, 
and died December 31, 1584, see LELLQ, Hist. d. chiesa di Mon 
reale, Rome, 1596, 122 seq. ; SERENO, 383 seq. ; GARAMPI, Osser- 
vaz., 304 ; FORCELLA, IV., 335. The Archives of the Marchese 
de Torres (Dragonetti) at Aquila contain important documents 


The two duties imposed upon him are clearly and definitely 
expressed both in his instructions and in the brief accrediting 
him to Philip II., dated March 8th, 1570. After a vivid 
description of the danger to Christendom, and the expression 
of his own sorrow, the Pope said that he was convinced that 
no monarch in Christendom could by his own power resist 
that of the Turks, but that the Christian princes united to 
gether could do so. It was however absolutely necessary that 
they should ally themselves together in order to fight the 
common enemy, and the first place in this glorious under 
taking belonged to the King of Spain, both on account of his 
great piety, and of the might of his empire. The Pope would 
joyfully support his efforts and was prepared to drain the 
resources of his own dominions. At the same time the letter 
pointed out the necessity for immediate military help. The 
King of Spain was adjured in the name of God s mercy at once 
to send a strong fleet to Sicily in order to protect Malta, should 
the Turks launch an attack there, as well as to keep the seas 
free for the Christian troops which were to be sent to the 
assistance of Cyprus. In this way the plans of the Turks 
would be completely foiled. 1 

In the three instructions which were given to Torres his 
duties were detailed and explained even more fully. 2 The 
alliance between Venice and Spain must be both defensive 
and offensive, and should be concluded either permanently 
or for a definite period as should appear most advisable 

from those left by Torres. I went to Aquila in October, 1903, 
to see them, but could not do so owing to the absence of the 

1 See GOUBAU, 202 seq. ; LADERCHI, 1570, n. 21. 

* The three instructions taken from the Archives of the Marchese 
de Torres (Dragonetti) at Aquila by SERENO, 427-431, have the 
dates March 12, 5, 12, 1570, while the copies in the Papal Secret 
Archives and in the Chigi Library, Rome (see HINOJOSA, 188 ; 
HERRE, I., 89) as well as Cod. 6334, p. 342 seq. of the Court Library, 
Vienna, have March 15 instead of 5. In the codex in the British 
Museum, London, cited on p. 369 n. i, the instructions are dated 
(P- 5b, 7 and 10) as in Sereno. 


Above all, the king should be induced, as Venice already had 
done, to entrust the negotiation of the question to the Pope, 
and at once to send full powers for this purpose to Rome, 
where everything would be done with the fullest justice, and 
in such a way that no one could feel injured. Torres was 
specially instructed to point out that Venice was quite unable 
by herself to withstand an attack by the Turks, 1 while the 
two powers together would be quite strong enough at sea 
both for the defensive and the offensive. Torres was more 
over to explain more fully the manifest advantages of the 
alliance, and to insist that it should be both definite and firm. 
The King of Spain must therefore entertain no suspicions of 
Venice, nor Venice of the king. All the suspicions which had 
hitherto existed must disappear before the common danger. 
It was obvious that neither power without the help of the other 
could withstand the Turks, and therefore in their own interests 
they must not break the alliance. Granted good- will, it 
ought not to be difficult to arrange the terms of the league, 
especially as the Pope was an impartial mediator and arbitra 
tor. But before there could be any question of the division of 
the funds contributed and the territory conquered, or of the 
admission of x>ther powers, it was the duty of the King of 
Spain, in view of the pressing nature of the danger, to send help 
at once by immediately ordering his fleet to Sicily to help the 
Venetians, as the Pope requested. 

After Torres had also been given letters of recommendation 

J The correspondence of Torres has not been lost, as Herre 
supposed (i., 93, n. 7), but is preserved in *Add. Ms. 20052, p. 2ob, 
of the British Museum, London ; the first letter to Cardinal 
Bonelli is dated from Siena, March 18, 1570, the second from 
Barcelona, April 8. There also are to be found the replies of 
Cardinal Bonelli, the letter of Torres to the " segretario " of 
Pius V., Girol. Rusticucci, and his replies, as well as the corres 
pondence of Torres with other Cardinals, and finally his reports 
from Portugal. The study of these documents must be kept for 
a special publication. SERRANO (Corresp. dipl., I., xxv.) does 
not know of them, but quotes instead the *copy of the letters of 
Torres in Cod. Urb. 841 of the Vatican Library. 


to Cardinal Espinosa, the chief minister of Spain, to Rtiy 
Gomez and other Spanish grandees and nobles, as well as to 
Don John of Austria, 1 further instructions were given to him 
orally by the Pope at a farewell audience on March I5th, 1570. 
He set out on the following day. 2 With the means of trans 
port then available a whole month elapsed before he reached 
the Spanish court at Cordova. His reception by Philip II. 
left nothing to be desired as far as marks of honour were con 
cerned, but on account of the strained relations between 
Madrid and Rome the negotiations were carried on with diffi 
culty. Torres understood very well how to justify the attitude 
of the Pope towards Philip II. ; as he was a Spaniard by birth, 
certain outspoken expressions were accepted from him, which 
the haughty grandees would never have taken from a foreigner. 
Any definite reply on the subject of the league was at first, 
in keeping with the Spanish habit of mind, postponed. On 
the other hand, the king promised, when Torres pressed him, 
to order Doria to sail at once for Sicily, and there await further 
orders ; in the meantime the Spanish authorities in Naples 
were to assist the Venetians with provisions and munitions. 
Torres next followed the court to Seville, but there too, at an 
audience on May 4th, the only reply that he could get con 
cerning the league was framed in the vaguest possible terms. 3 

1 The brief to Cardinal Espinosa in LADERCHI, 1570, n. 24 
the date March 2, in Laderchi is wrong ; it should be 12 ; see 
*Brevia Pii V. in Arm 44, t. 15, p. 36b, Papal Secret Archives. 
Ibid., p. 37b seqq., similar *letters to " Gomez princ. Ebuli," to 
" Johanna principessa Portugaliae " (see LADERCHI, 1570, n. 25), 
to the " dux Feriae," to the " episc. Conchensis, Ant. de Toledo." 
According to *Varia Polit., 100, p. 8 seq., these letters were sent 
on March 8 ; Don John is also named in them. According to the 
above mentioned (p. 369, n. i) *codex in the British Museum 
the briefs were dated March 12. 

* See *Giornale de trattati segreti, loc. cit., British Museum. 
Cf. Facchinetti in VALENSISE, 57. 

* See the report of Torres to Cardinal Bonelli, dated from 
Seville, May 16, 1570, Lettere dei princ., III., 260-264 ( on P- 2 ^ 
4 lines from the bottom read 26 instead of 16 ; on p. 264, 10 lines 


Nevertheless the Spanish council of state weighed the pros and 
cons of the matter in no less than eleven meetings. 

What greatly influenced Philip II. and his advisers in decid 
ing to enter into the negotiations for a league, in spite of their 
deep distrust of Venice, and to appoint Granvelle, Pacheco 
and Zuniga as their representatives, was the hope of at last 
obtaining what Spanish diplomacy had hitherto vainly tried 
to extort from the strict Pope : the concession of the cruzada 
and excusado, and the continuance of the sussidio. 1 Besides 
appointing his representatives for the negotiations concerning 
the league in Rome, Philip II. renewed the promise which he 
had made at Cordova, to assist Venice with provisions and 
munitions, so that if the league were decided upon, the fleet 
could immediately set sail. 2 On May i6th, 1570, the full 
powers for Granvelle, Pacheco and Zuniga were drawn up. 3 

With this a notable step forward had been taken. Luis de 
Torres was able to leave the Spanish court and proceed to 
Portugal, where he was to urge King Sebastian to a marriage 
with Margaret of Valois, and to work for the accession to the 
league oi that kingdom, which was small indeed, but of great 
importance on account of its colonial empire. A Papal letter 

from the bottom read 1570 instead of 1571). Cf. HERRE, L, 101. 
See also Corresp. dipl., III., 295 seqq., where, on p. 297 seq. two 
reports from Torres to Rome, of April 24, 1570, are published, 
and on p. 324 seq. his memorial addressed to Philip II. about the 
league against the Turks, of May 4, 1570. 

1 See the letters of Philip II. to Zuniga and his plenipotentiaries, 
May 1 6, 1570, Corresp. dipl., II., 335 seq., 350 seq. Cf. SERRANO, 
Liga, I., 58 seq. 

* See the report of Torres of May 16, 1570, loc. cit., 263 seq. 
Cf. HERRE, L, 105 seq. See also HABLER in Histor. Zeitschrift, 
XCIL, 496. For the efforts of Spain to obtain the concession of 
the " Cruzada " see supra, pp. 8, 29. FOLIETA also states that 
this question was at that time very acute (I., 967). 

8 Philip II. announced this to the Pope on the same day ; 
see GOUBAU, 312 seq. The Spanish original of the authority in 
Corresp. dipl., III., 330 seq. ; ibid., 339, 346 seq., the secret in 
structions of the king concerning the negotiations of the league. 


of March I3th, which had been entrusted to Torres, urgently 
begged the King of Portugal to attach his ten galleys to the 
Spanish fleet. The king declared that any immediate assist 
ance was out of the question, but promised it for the following 
year. 1 Torres was even less successful in the matter of the 
king s marriage, which was all the more painful to Pius V. 
because he was growing more and more anxious about the 
danger of the marriage of Margaret with the Protestant Henry 
of Navarre. 2 How much he had this danger in his mind was 
shown by the fact that on August 6th he again had recourse 
to the Portuguese king, and sent back Torres once more to 
Portugal after he had returned to Madrid ; but on this occasion 
the Pope s representative was even less successful than before. 
The king not only absolutely declined, though in the most 
courteous terms, to marry Margaret, but also declared that it 
was impossible for him just then to give any assistance at sea 
against the Turks, as he had to protect the coasts of his own 
kingdom against the Huguenot corsairs, and defend himself 
from the threatened attack of the King of Morocco ; in the 
following year, however, he would attack the Turkish empire 
from India. 3 

Pius V. was anxious to draw, not only Spain and Portugal, 
but also France, into the war against the Turks, concerning 
which matter he held discussions lasting many hours with the 
Capuchin, Girolamo da Pistoia, whom he held in the highest 
esteem. 4 In view of the state of affairs in the kingdom of 
France, and the long standing friendly relations between that 
country and the Porte, there was, it is true, very little likeli- 

1 See GOUBAU, 337 seq., 339 seq. ; LADERCHI, 1570, n. 45 seq. ; 
Corho dipl. Portug., X., 364 seq., 370 seq. ; HERRE, I., 132 seq. 
Pius V. had already in 1567 sent the King of Portugal the blessed 
hat and sword ; see MACSWINEY, Le Portugal et le St. Siege, I., 
Paris, 1898, 46 seq. 

8 See supra, p. 135. 

8 See GOUBAU, 342 seq. ; LADERCHI, 1570, n. 50 seq. ; Corpo 
dipl. Portug., X., 391 seq. ; HERRE, I., 134 seq. 

4 Cf. the report of Tiepolo in MUTINELLI, I., 92 seq. For G. da 
Pistoia see Rocco DA CESINALE, I., 76 seq. 


hood of success. Nevertheless Pius V. made an attempt to 
enter upon the subject personally with the young king, 
Charles IX., employing all authority, and sending him on 
March I3th, 1570, a letter expressed in burning words. In 
this letter he deplored in touching terms the sorrows of 
Christendom which were now coming to a climax with the 
danger from the Turks. The king was therefore implored 
to join the league against the common enmey. To the cold 
and terse refusal of Charles IX. the Pope replied on June i8th 
by another and very serious letter. If the king, this letter 
says, will not give up his old friendly relations with the Porte, 
in order that he may be able to render services to Constanti 
nople in other ways, he will find himself upon an entirely 
false road, as it is not lawful to do evil that good may come. 
Besides this, the king is deceiving himself if he thinks that he 
will be able alone to maintain his friendship with the enemy 
of all Christian princes, whom he ought rather to avoid like 
the plague. But lately, Venice has experienced the true 
value of the Sultan s friendship. The letter ended with an 
exhortation to follow the example which France had given 
in the former days of her glory and greatness. 1 But the words 
rf Pius V. fell on deaf ears. French diplomacy did not even 
shrink from directly opposing the league by attempting to 
bring about an agreement between Venice and the Porte. 2 
Truly those days were far distant, when zeal for the Crusades 
filled the whole of Christendom ! This was also shown in the 
fact that Pius V., though he was urged to do so from many 
quarters, did not dare to have recourse by letter to the man, 
to whom at one time the eyes of the Popes had turned first of 
all in similar circumstances ; this was the Emperor. The latter 
had no idea of withdrawing from the peace which his ambassa 
dors had purchased for him in 1568 for a period of eight years. 3 

1 GOUBAU, 295 seq., 298 seq. LADERCHI, 1570, n. 61-62. The 
date " Mar. 14 " in Laderchi is wrong ; see *Brevia Pii V. in 
Arm. 44, t. 15, p. 44b, Papal Secret Archives. 

2 See HERRE, I., 161. 
8 Cf. supra, p. 256. 


Besides this, the relations of the Pope with the holder of the 
supreme secular dignity in Christendom had been seriously 
impaired, not only by the attitude of Maximilian II. towards 
religious questions, but also by the elevation of Cosimo to the 
grand dukedom of Tuscany. 1 At the same time the relations 
between Philip II. and the Emperor were very strained. 2 
To the Venetian ambassador, when news first arrived of the 
threat to Cyprus by the Turks, Maximilian had, it is true, 
declared that a league could easily be formed, not only bet 
ween himself, the German Empire, the King of Spain and 
Venice, but also with the Muscovites and the Persians, but 
it very soon became known that the grandiloquent monarch 
had made up his mind to go on paying his tribute to the Sultan, 
and all the efforts of the Venetian ambassador to prevent the 
sending of his " gift of honour " were in vain. 3 

The same fate befell the attempts of the Pope and Venice 
to interest Poland and Russia in the common struggle against 
the Turks. The rivalry existing between these two powers of 
itself stood in the way of any such plan, and this became 
apparent at the first attempt of the Venetians to win them 
over to the league. 4 Pius V., however, did not give up all 
hopes of attaining his end. The optimism which he felt 
with regard to Russia is explained on the one hand by the 
ignorance which prevailed throughout the whole of the west of 
conditions in that immense empire, which was still sunk in the 
deepest barbarism, and of its cruel and despotic ruler, and on 
the other by the hope which still lingered on the Curia, that 
the Muscovite empire would accept the Catholic faith, and join 
with the other nations in the common struggle against the 
Turks. Pius V. was still so strongly under the impression 
made by the negotiations which had been carried on in the 

1 Cf. supra, p. 271 seq. *B. Pia reported from Rome on August 
5, 1570, that the Emperor would only be drawn into the league 
after the disputes about the question of Tuscany had been settled. 
Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. 

2 See HERRE, I., 141, 149 seq. 

3 See TURBA, III., 490, n. 2. Cf. supra p. 256. 

4 See HERRE, I., 155 seq. 


time of Julius III., and by the hopes held out by Ruggieri, at 
that time nuncio in Poland, that Ivan IV., as the enemy of 
the Lutherans, would not be averse to reunion with Rome, 
that the participation of the Muscovite empire in the war 
against the Turks seemed to him to be quite practicable. 1 
He was also encouraged in his hopes of being able to draw the 
powers of eastern Europe into the struggle against the infidels 
by the nuncio in Venice. 2 

In August, 1570, Portico, the nuncio in Poland, received 
orders to go to Moscow to make an attempt to bring this about. 
The instructions which he received are characteristic of the 
Pope s idealism and energy. Pius V. refers to the negotiations 
which Ivan IV. had entered into with Julius III. in order to 
obtain the title of king, in return for the promise to submit 
to Rome as far as the Church was concerned. The nuncio 
was instructed to find out how far these negotiations, which 
had then been interrupted, had been meant seriously. If a 
favourable disposition still prevailed, the Pope was ready to 
send priests and bishops to Moscow. Portico was advised 
only to enter into religious controversy if Ivan himself touched 
upon the subject. He was to point out in the first place the 
danger from the Turks, and to urge the Czar to oppose them 
together with the Emperor and the King of Poland, and by 
this attack by land to support that of the Christian fleet in the 
Mediterranean. In an appendix in cypher, the title of king, 
which Ivan so much desired, is expressly dealt with. 3 A 
letter from the Pope to Ivan which was sent to the nuncio, 

1 See CATENA, 183 seq. and PIERLING, Russie, I., 383 seq. For 
the negotiations in the time of Julius III. see Vol. XIII. of this 
work, p. 236, n. I. 

2 See VALENSISE, 71 seq. In an *Avviso di Roma of June 2, 
1571, it is said that the Jesuits stated that the Muscovites had 
asked for some " patres " from them (Urb. 1042, p. 71, Vatican 
Library). An *Avviso of June 8, 1571, in the State Archives, 
Vienna, makes the same announcement, but with the addition 
" which, if it is true, is of great importance." 

3 See the text of the instructions of September, 1570, in PIER- 
LING, Rome et Moscou, 140 seq. 

VOL. XVIII. 2 6 


and dated from Rome, August gth, 1570, contained, in addi 
tion to a vivid description of the danger from the Turks 
which threatened all the princes, a fervent appeal to join in 
the war against the infidels. If the Czar, he says at the end, 
will put into practice his ideas of reunion, the Pope will prove 
his gratitude in every possible way. 1 

Ivan was not blind to the dangers which threatened the 
Russian empire from the Turks, but he hoped to avert them, 
not by any warlike enterprise, but rather by peaceful means ; 
but Portico never obtained an inkling of this. It was taken 
for granted from the fact of his mission that the King of 
Poland had already given his consent, whereas the latter had 
made conditions which ill concealed his dislike for the Pope s 
proposals. 2 

The more hopeless the efforts of the Pope to organize a 
grand crusade became, the more warmly did he insist upon 
an alliance between Venice and Spain. But even in this he 
was met by almost insuperable difficulties. As had often been 
the case before, so now it seemed that it was only the Holy See 
which fully realized the danger which threatened Christendom 
and the whole civilization of the west, and was really pursuing 
a disinterested policy in promoting the league with all its 
power, whereas those in whose interests it was being formed, 
allowed themselves to be guided by nothing but their own 
individual interests, and haggled over the conditions of their 
common undertaking like traders bargaining about their 
merchandize. 3 

To the selfishness which was paramount on both sides was 

1 See GOUBAU, 360 seq. ; LADERCHI, 1570, n. 64 ; THEINER, 
Mon. Pol., II., 748 seq. A reprint of the Papal letter from the 
original in N. LICHATSCHEV, Una lettera di Papa Pio V. allo 
zar Iwan il terribile : Studio sulla diplomazia pontificia. Peters 
burg, 1906 (in Russian), p. 2-5 and Tav. I. ; cf. as to this R. G. 
SALOMON in Archiv fur dltere deutsche Geschichte, XXXII. (1907) 
461 seq. 

2 See PIERLING, Russie, I., 389 seq. 

8 See the opinion of Cardinal Rambouillet in his letter of Novem 
ber 5, 1570, in CHARRIERE, III., 126 ; cf. HERRE, I., 69, 71. 


added a mutual distrust, it was above all Philip II. who 
feared that Venice had a secret understanding with the Porte, 
and that Spain would be left alone to face a Turkish attack. 
He was strengthened in his mistrust, which at times attacked 
even the Pope, by the obstinacy with which Venice tried to 
draw advantages for itself from the situation. Not satisfied 
with Pius V. having granted the Republic a tithe, and other 
help in money, troops and provisions, 1 she wanted the Pope 
further to take part in the naval expedition by placing a 
certain number of galleys at her disposal. The Spanish am 
bassador not unreasonably concluded from this that they 
wished to prevent the supreme command of the fleet from 
being given to a Spanish admiral. 2 So as not to offend the 
Spaniards, Cardinals Morone, Farnese, Orsini and Madruzzo, 
when they were consulted by the Pope, advised the formation 
of an independent Papal fleet, and recommended further 
money subsidies. Since Venice in the meantime had declared 
that she would only agree to a common expedition if it con 
tained Papal ships and a Papal admiral, the Pope had to agree 
to this, although it was very difficult for him to raise the money 
and the troops for the promised fleet of twenty-four galleys. 3 
Encouraged by this success the Signoria then sought to have 
the supreme command entrusted to a man who was wholly 

1 See the *report of B. Pia, dated Rome, April 5, 1570, Gonzaga 
Archives, Mantua, Cf. *Avviso di Roma of April 5, 1570, 
Urb. 1041, p. 255b, Vatican Library. 

* See the report of Zuniga of April 10, 1570, in HERRE, L, 75. 
According to Granvelle (ibid. 78, n. 2) Venice had at first asked 
for 30 galleys ; they then contented themselves with sending 
24 empty ones to Ancona, where the Pope was to arm and equip 
them ; see the *report of B. Pia of April 25, 1570, Gonzaga 
Archives, Mantua, and the *Avviso di Roma of May 3, 1570. 
Urb. 1041, p. 269, Vatican Library. Cf. also Corresp. dipl., 
III., 288 seq., 376, n. 2. 

8 See FOLIETA, I., 969 seq. ; HERRE, I., 78 ; cf. also POMETTI, 
67 seq. BIBL, Erhebung, 69 seq., 72 seq. shows how Cosimo I. 
made use of the prosecution of the Turkish war to further his 
schemes for obtaining a higher dignity. 


devoted to their interests, Cardinal Cornaro. Pius V. skil 
fully evaded this proposal on the ground that an ecclestiastic 
was not suited to such a position. 1 If attention were only 
paid to the number of ships the supreme command would fall 
to the Venetians, but it was certain that the powerful master 
of Spain would never place himself under their orders. As 
the Papal ships formed a link between the two rivals, Pius V. 
thought of solving the problem of the supreme command by 
appointing for them an admiral who would be above all sus 
picion. 2 With great cleverness he chose for this office a man 
whose capacity for, war was beyond question and who would be 
acceptable, not only to Venice but also to the Spanish king ; 
this was Marcantonio Colonna. He was the most prominent 
among the Roman barons, and though barely thirty-five years 
of age, had already fought with three galleys of his own on 
the coasts of Africa, and had helped in the capture of Pen6*n 
de Velez. 3 

At the end of May, 1570, a courier sent by Torres arrived in 
Rome with the news that Philip II. was prepared to go at once 
to the assistance of Venice, as well as to begin negotiations 
for an alliance. The Pope was filled with delight. 4 On June 
3rd he made public the appointment of Colonna as generalissimo 
of the Papal auxiliary fleet. 6 On Sunday, June nth, Marcan 
tonio Colonna, clad in splendid armour, and surrounded by 
Roman nobles, went on horseback to the Vatican, where he 
took his oath in the Papal chapel after a Mass of the Holy 

1 See VALENSISE, 59. It is clear from the *Avviso di Roma 
of April 29, 1570, Urb. 1041, p. zbgb, Vatican Library, that 
Commendone was suggested as well as Cornaro. 

1 See the important report of Fachinetti of March 29, 1570, in 
VALENSISE, 51 seq. 

8 See GUGLIELMOTTI, M. A. Colonna, i i seq. Additions to 
the biography by Guglielmotti are given in L. VICCHI, M. A. 
Colonna : Appunti biografici con doc. rari. Faenza, 1890, and 
TOMASSETTI, Su M. A. Colonna il Grande, Rome, 1909. 

4 See the report of F. Gondola in VOINOVICH, 560. 

5 See *Avviso di Roma of June 3, 1570, Urb. 1041, p. 283, 
Vatican Library. Cf. Corresp. dipl., III., 376. 


Ghost. Conducted by Paolo Giordano Orsini and Michele 
Bonelli, he then approached the steps of the Pope s 
throne in order to receive from the hands of Pius V. 
the baton of command and the standard of red silk, on 
which was to be seen the Crucified between the Princes 
of the Apostles, the arms of Pius V., and the motto : In hoc 
signo vinces. 1 

In Rome as well as in Venice there was general satisfaction 
at the appointment of Colonna. Only the Spaniards were 
displeased, although they had every reason for satisfaction, 
since Colonna had always been loyally devoted to the cause of 
Spain. lie had proved this by his conduct in the time of 
Paul IV. The noble-hearted Pius V. had completely passed 
over the part played at that time by Colonna in the war of 
Spain against the Holy See. How deeply hurt he must then 
have been to learn that such a man did not seem to be accept 
able to the representatives of Philip II. in the Curia ! Zuniga 
told Colonna to his face that he need not suppose himself to be 
generalissimo, and that there was no such thing as a league. 
Granvelle openly blamed him for having accepted the com 
mand of the Papal galleys without having first consulted 
Philip II. 2 

That Pius V. had chosen the right man in Marcantonio 
Colonna was shown by the energy with which he took in hand 
the preparation of the galleys, the number of which, owing 
to the impossibility of providing any more, had been reduced 

1 See Firmanus in GENNARI 61 seq. ; *Avvisi di Roma of 
June 14 and 17, 1570, Urb. 1041, p. agob, 293b, Vatican Library. 
The date (May n) in SERENO, 46 and CATENA, 153, is wrong. 
The brief to Colonna, of June n, 1570, in GUGLIELMOTTI, Colonna, 
8 seq. The standard given by Pius V. to M. A. Colonna was 
made over by him to the cathedral of Gaeta ; there it serves as 
the picture of the High Altar, and is still well preserved ; see 
P. FEDELE, Lo stendardo di M. A. Colonna a Lepanto (Nozze 
Hermanin-Haussmann), Perugia, 1903 ; S. FERRARO, Mem. 
religiose e civili di Gaeta, Naples, 1903, 193, and the pictures in 
Cosmos illustr., 1904, So. 

* See the reports of Zufiiga and Granvelle in HERRE, I., 82, 


to twelve. Colonna found among the Roman nobles the 
greatest eagerness to take part in the glorious enterprise. 
The first under whose command galleys were fitted out were 
Fabio Saritacroce and Domenico de Massimi ; he appointed 
Pompeo Colonna, the Duke of Zagarolo, as his lieutenant. 
Paolo Francesco Baglioni was named commissary general, 
while the artillery was placed under the care of the architect, 
Jacopo Fontana. 1 Special chaplains were also appointed to 
look after the soldiers. 2 The camerlengo at once -paid over 
to Colonna 10,000 scudi, and he was to receive 12,000 more 
from Venice, for which place he set out on June i6th. 3 
At Loreto Colonna recommended himself and his fleet 
to the protection of the Madonna, and then went on to 
Ancona and Venice for the fitting out of the twelve 
Papal galleys, a task in which he had to overcome serious 
obstacles. 4 

In the meantime the negotiations for the alliance between 
Spain and Venice had been begun in Rome, after a courier 
sent on June I4th had brought to the representative of the 
Republic in Rome, Michele Soriano, the authority from the 
Signoria. 5 After several preliminary conferences 6 the real 
negotiations were begun on July ist, 1570, by an allocution 

1 See GUGLIELMOTTI, Colonna, 13 seq., 16 seq. In a * brief 
of August 3, 1570, Pius V. recommended Pompeo Colonna to the 
" General! classis Venetae," Arm. 44, t. 15, p. 184^ Papal Secret 

2 Venice had proposed for this purpose from 8 to 10 Jesuits : 
the Pope wished that there should be an ecclesiastic in every 
galley (see VALENSISE, 52, 57) ; at length he chose the Capuchins ; 
see *Avvisi di Roma of June 17 and 24, 1570, Urb. 1041, p. 
293b, 2Q8b, Vatican Library. Cf. Rocco DA CESENALE, I., 
77 seq., 475 seq. 

3 See *Avviso di Roma of June 17, 1570, loc. cit. The "brief 
to the Doge, accrediting M. A. Colonna, is dated June 8, 1570 ; 
Arm. 44, t. 15, p. I36b, Papal Secret Archives. 

4 See GUGLIELMOTTI, Colonna, 22. 

6 See HERRE, I., 164 ; cf. VALENSISE, 61. 
* See Corresp. dipl., III., 404 seq. 


from the Pope, which was full of burning zeal for the crusade. 1 
Among the replies made by the ambassadors that of Soriano 
was noteworthy, as dwelling upon the necessity of at once 
taking the offensive against the Turks. When the ambassa 
dors left the Vatican Soriano proposed that they should act 
as had been done in 1538, and immediately, at the first meet 
ing, declare the league formed and begin to put it into force, 
afterwards proceeding to discuss the various points. Gran- 
velle on the other hand declared that he wished first to hear 
the various proposals. 2 

On July 2nd the representatives of Spain and Venice 
received from the Pope the draft of a treaty of alliance, 
modelled upon that of the league of I538, 3 so that they might 
discuss it with Cardinals Bonelli, Morone, Cesi, Grassi and 
Aldobrandini, who had been appointed for that purpose. 
On July 4th the representatives met for the first conference at 
the Papal secretariate of State. The discussions, which after 

1 See CATENA, 155 seq. ; FOLIETA, II., 1000 ; PARUTA, 122 
seq. ; LADERCHI, 1570, n. 90 seq., where, however, the date is 

2 Cf. the protocol of the negotiations drafted by M. Soriano, 
first in Tesoro Politico, I., Milan, 1600, 510 seq., and then in an 
" old copy " in Du MONT, V., i, 184 seq., and in LUNIG, Cod. Ital. 
dipl., VI., 262 seqq. and incompletely in the appendix to SERENO, 
393 seq. The dates and figures are very faulty in these editions, 
therefore two copies in the Papal Secret Archives have been 
consulted, Leghe contro il Turco and Varia polit. 115, n. 16 
(cf. POMETTI, 70, n. i). Copies of this protocol are also frequently 
to be found elsewhere, as in the Court and State Library, Munich 
Ital. 6, p. 24 seq. ; in the Library at Berlin, Inf. polit. 17, p. i. seq. 
in the Vatican, cod. 7484, p. 132 seq., and Barb. lat. 5367, n. 15 
in the Classense Library, Ravenna ; in the Library at Siena 
and in the Addit. Ms. 18173, British Museum, London. The 
reports of the representatives of Philip II., which complete 
Soriano s work, are in Corresp. dipl., III., 404 seq., 417 seq., 
421 seq., 435 seq., 439 seq., 444 seq., 466 seq., 474 seq., 486 seq., 
495 seq. ; ibid. 501 seq. the comprehensive report of Rusticucci 
to Castagna of August u, 1570. 

8 See Corresp. dipl., III., 414 seq. 


that were held almost every day, and at which Cardinal 
Rusticucci represented Bonelli, who was ill, were by the Pope s 
command, kept absolutely secret. 1 As a matter of fact the 
negotiations were from the first rendered very difficult by the 
mutual mistrust and the divergent interests of the Spaniards 
and Venetians. 2 That they did not altogether fail was due 
to Pius V., who never wearied of calming their passions and 
smoothing over their differences, and curbing with much 
strength of will his own ardent disposition. 3 

Both the Spaniards and the Venetians were determined to 
look after their own interests and to gain as much advantage 
for themselves from the alliance as possible. The greatest 
determination in this respect was shown by the representatives 
of Spain, and especially by Granvelle, who, paying no attention 
to the reduced resources of Venice, insisted upon demands 
which a great and powerful empire like that of Spain could 
easily have foregone. 4 It was therefore supposed in Venice 
that Philip II. did not so much wish to deal a decisive blow at 
the Turks, as to obtain a lasting defensive alliance in order to 
find support in the good opinion of his allies, to bind the 

1 See *Avvisi di Roma of July 8 and 15, 1570, Urb. 1041, 
P- 37 39 Vatican Library, and ibid. 294 and 296 the *Avvisi 
of June 17 and 28, 1570. For the Cardinals chosen and the 
removal of Santa Croce from the commission by the influence 
of the Spaniards, see Corresp. dipl., III., 401 seq. Cf. also the 
*report of B. Pia, dated Rome, July i, 1570, Gonzaga Archives, 
Mantua. Morone took the place of Santa Croce (Corresp. dipl., 
III., 404 seq.), and Rusticucci acted as substitute for Bonelli 
(cf. CHARRIERE, III., 115). After della Chiesa s death his place 
was taken by Grassi (see FOLIETA, II., 1001). For the secrecy 
cf. Gondola in VOINOVICH, 569 and CHARRIERE, III., 116. 

a As early as July 15, 1570, an *Avviso di Roma announces that 
a happy issue of the negotiations is earnestly hoped for ; another 
of July 26 says that the " lega " must come to " buonissimo 
termine " (Urb. 1041, p. 309, 312, Vatican Library). B. Pia 
*announced from Rome on August 5, 1570 : " La lega s ha per 
conclusa." (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). 

8 This is rightly brought out by HAVEMANN (p. 123). 

4 $ee SERRANO, Liga, I., 93, 


Republic of St. Mark to himself, and make it dependent upon 
him, and lastly to tap a permanent source of revenue from 
the Pope by means of the cruzada and tithes. 1 In Madrid, 
however, they feared that the peace party in the city of the 
lagoons would be ultimately victorious and would enter into 
an agreement with the Porte. Such mutual mistrust was 
bound to render the negotiations in Rome for a league against 
the Turks very difficult. 

At the very first meeting on July 4th Cardinal Granvelle 
raised a number of objections to the proposals for an alliance 
put forward by the Pope. At the discussion of the objective, 
towards which the alliance was to be directed, he maintained 
the view of Philip II., that the league should not be aimed at 
the Turks alone, but at all infidels. Soriano replied : " We 
have been summoned hither and authorized to treat of nothing 
but a league against the Turks ; anyone who wishes to include 
other infidels is departing from our main purpose ; instead o 
quarrelling with them, we should rather seek to attach them 
to ourselves in our struggle with the Turks." Morone agreed 
with him, mentioning in particular Persia. Granville, how 
ever, held firmly to his opinion, maintaining that the Persians 
and the Moors were but tools in the hands of the Turks. The 
league must also be directed against the Moorish rebels in 
Spain, and the occupation of Tunis, and not made to serve 
only the interests of Venice. The discussion became very 
heated and protracted, as Soriano defended his opinion with 
much energy. Morone then proposed, by way of compromise, 
that neither the Persians nor the Moors should be mentioned, 
nor Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli, so as to avoid the appearance 
of Venice being unwilling to help Spain. But Soriano would 
not agree to this, so that the decision of this question had to 
be postponed. 

The meeting on July 5th was devoted to the division of the 
expenses ; Granvelle regretted the financial exhaustion of his 
king, but said that Philip II. was nevertheless willing to bear 
half the cost ; Soriano spoke to the same effect ; his declara- 

1 Cf. PARUTA, 126 seq. ; LE BRET, Gcschichte Venedigs, III., 
1380 seq. 


tion that the Signoria could only bear a fourth part of the cost 
caused general dismay. Morone refused to accept this state 
ment of the financial exhaustion of the Republic, saying that 
financially speaking it was in a better condition than the other 
states. The outcome of the long discussion that followed was 
that Soriano declared that Venice would bear a third part of 
the cost. Further difficulties arose with regard to the share 
to be taken by the Holy See, which in 1538 had undertaken a 
sixth part of the expenditure, which, however, was now out 
of the question since the revenues of the Church were now less 
by 400,000 scudi. Cardinal Aldobrandini estimated that, of 
the 600,000 monthly cost of the war the Pope could only make 
himself responsible for 30,000 or 35,000 at the utmost, and that 
the rest would have to be shared by Spain and Venice. Soriano 
refused to accept this, while Granvelle made his consent 
dependent on the condition that the Pope should grant to 
Spain the cruzada and other taxes upon the clergy, without 
which his king would be unable to make any contribution 
towards the league. 

Soriano was not present at the meeting on July 7th, as he 
had a private audience with the Pope in order to justify the 
attitude which he had so far taken up, and was successful in 
so doing. In the meantime the Pope s representatives treated 
with the Spaniards concerning the cruzada and the other 
demands of Philip II. Pius V. still resisted the concession of 
the cruzada, but was inclined to grant the excusado and the 
continuance of the sussidio. The Venetians accordingly put 
forward further demands concerning the taxation of their 
own clergy. They would have liked to have made this a 
permanent arrangement, but the nuncio in Venice would not 
hear of this, maintaining that the concession should only be 
made for a year, so that its removal might "be made dependent 
upon the energy with which they carried on the war. 1 

The rivalry between Spain and Venice came to a head at the 
meeting on July 8th, when the question of how many ships 
Venice and Philip II. should respectively contribute to the 
enterprise was discussed. As no agreement could be reached, 

See VALENSISE, 62, 68. 


the decision of this matter had to be postponed. The same 
fate befell the discussion on July loth. The Spaniards 
proposed that the league should at any rate be directed against 
Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli ; Soriano, however, was of opinion 
that it should be merely stated to be against the Turks and 
their tributary states, as otherwise it would be necessary to 
draw up a list of all the Turkish possessions. The Spaniards 
on the other hand pointed out that by their instructions they 
had been expressly told to insist that their king should be 
helped by the league in his undertakings against Algiers and 
other places in Barbary. If this was not agreed to Spain could 
not take part in the league. 

At the meeting on July nth, the difficult question was 
raised of the supreme command, which Spain claimed for 
herself. Soriano argued against this that in eastern waters 
the Venetian fleet would have a greater influence, especially 
in inducing the Christians in those parts to revolt against the 
Turks. It was decided to refer the matter to the Pope, and 
in the meantime to postpone any decision. Morone remarked 
on this occasion to Soriano that Don John of Austria, the 
half brother of Philip II., 1 who had made a name for himself 
in the war against the Moors, was likely to be appointed gen 
eralissimo. It was also unanimously decided at this meeting 
that the Pope should invite the other princes to join the 
league, especially the Emperor, and that none of the allies 
should make peace or come to any arrangement with the Turks 
without the consent of the others, and lastly that the Pope, 
as supreme arbiter, should decide all questions connected 
with the league. 

On July I3th it was first discussed what share should be 
taken by Spain and Venice of the contribution which had been 
asked for from the Pope. Opinions were so violently opposed 
as to this that the negotiations almost came to an end. Gran- 

1 Cf. for him, besides the monographs by HAVEMANN (1865) 
and STIRLING-MAXWELL (2 vols., London, 1883) the older work, 
only recently edited by PORRENO : Hist, del ser. S. Don Juan 
d Austria, Madrid, 1899. 


velle permitted himself to speak in such a way as to provoke 
even so moderate a man as Morone to a bitter retort. Then 
a fresh dispute arose, as to whether the conquest of Algiers, 
Tunis and Tripoli was to be counted as one of the objects of 
the league. Soriano insisted that the proposed league was 
not only for the advantage of Venice, but for the protection 
of the whole Christian world. The Spaniards on the contrary 
contended that what they were doing was principally for 
the advantage of the Republic, and demanded something by 
way of compensation. At length Soriano declared his readi 
ness to make greater concessions than were authorized by his 
instructions. All seemed to agree to the appointment of 
Don John of Austria as generalissimo, though they insisted 
that he should act in connection with the commanders of the 
Venetian and Papal forces. 

On July iyth the Pope s representatives laid before them 
a detailed draft of the terms of the alliance, with regard to 
which Morone pointed out that these were definitely what the 
Pope desired. The Spaniards wished first to send the scheme 
to their king in order to receive his instructions, and when 
Soriano objected that in view of the Turkish preparations any 
further delay was dangerous, and that the whole world was 
expecting from them a definite decision, they replied to him 
that they had only been meeting for fourteen days, whereas 
the negotiations concerning the league in the time of Paul III. 
had lasted from October, 1537, to February, 1538. 

During the course of the negotiations Soriano had several 
times insisted on the junction of the Spanish fleet with those 
of the Pope and Venice. The Spaniards replied that as to 
that they must await the orders of Philip II., which, however, 
would have arrived before the feast of St. James. The 
negotiations were therefore postponed until that date. On 
July 22nd it was learned that the Venetians had consented to 
the appointment of Don John of Austria as generalissimo of 
the armada, 1 and on the 26th they were able to lay before the 

1 See the "report of Arco of July 22, 1570, State Archives, 


Pope his scheme for the league modified in several respects. 
Pius V. had not given up hopes of a successful issue, although 
even now a number of difficulties still remained unsolved. 
For example the Spaniards insisted that in the following years 
they should meet in the autumn and decide whether the war 
was to be continued in the coming spring, and what forces 
were to be employed. The Republic opposed this because 
it was suspected that in this Philip II. was aiming at keeping 
an eye upon Venetian policy. Moreover an agreement had 
not been reached as to the sum to be contributed by the Pope, 
nor as to how much of this sum was to be taken by Venice and 
Spain respectively. Another question which still remained 
undecided was whether the league was to be merely an offensive 
one, or whether the allies were to count in general upon the 
help of the others in each one s undertakings. The Spaniards 
too were still awaiting definite orders from their king as to 
who was to represent the generalissimo at sea in his absence. 
For the land forces Soriano had suggested Sforza Pallavicini 
as commander in chief, but the Spaniards were also waiting 
for definite instructions as to this. They also asked for time 
to consider how conquered territory should be divided. 
Lastly, there was a difference of opinion as to whether ecclesi 
astical censures were to be incurred by those who betrayed 
the league. Soriano wished first to discuss this matter with 
the Pope, remarking that the man who had no sense of honour 
and deserted the league would certainly not be afraid of 
censures. By his opposition in this matter he encouraged the 
distrust felt by the Spaniards. The nuncio was of opinion 
that in the end the Signoria would give way on the question 
of censures ; at the same time he reported how firmly it was 
believed at Venice that Philip II. was opposed to any attack 
upon the Turks. 1 

The status of Ragusa caused special difficulties with regard 
to the league. This little republic, which was much in favour 
with Pius V. on account of its strong Catholicism, had suffered 
a great deal in the war of the league in the days of Paul III., 
because the allies had not bound themselves to guarantee the 

1 See VALENSISE, 71. 


neutrality of Ragusa by the terms of the treaty. The republic 
therefore now wished for a guarantee of its neutrality and 
the integrity of its territory. Venice, which was jealous of 
the commerce of Ragusa, sought to avoid this ; the republic, 
she said, must be forced to join the league so that it could be 
occupied by troops on the pretext of protecting it against the 
Turks. In the diplomatic contest as to this matter which 
ensued between Venice and Ragusa, not only the Pope, but the 
representative of Spain as well, were on the side of the little 
republic. 1 

On July 2yth a Spanish courier at last arrived with the 
decision of Philip II. that Doria s fleet should be united to that 
of Vencie and placed under the command of Colonna. 2 Great 
was the joy of the Pope, who at once held out definite hopes 
of the concession of the cruzada, the excusado, and the con 
tinuance of the sussidio* since he could now hope that his 
unceasing prayers for the success of the expedition would be 
realized. 4 

But what a bitter disillusionment the Pope was now to 
experience ! The Venetian fleet under the command of 
Girolamo Zane numbered 137 galleys, to which were added 
the 49 of Gian Andrea Doria and the 12 of the Pope under 
Marcantonio Colonna. The artillery amounted to 1,300 

1 Cf. VOINOVICH, 504 seq., 514 seq., 535 seq. The " Confir- 
matio litt. praedecess. vigore quarum Ragusei possint libere 
et licite mercari aim infidelibus," issued on December 17, 1566, 
by Pius V., in MAKUSCEV, Mon. Slav, inerid., I., Warsaw, 1874, 
501 seq. 

"See Soriano in Du MONT, V., i, 192; cf. CHARRIERE, ir8; 
VALENSISE, 69 seq. 

3 See Corresp. dipl., III., 479. 

4 See CATENA, 154. The jubilee bull, dated April 6 (in LADERCH, 
1570, n. 15) did not at first seem to the Pope to have been ex 
pressed in sufficiently clear terms : it was corrected ; see *Avvisi 
di Roma of April 15 and 22, 1570, Urb. 1041, p. 263b, 26yb, 
Vatican Library. Jbid. 273b *Avviso of May 13 on the extra 
ordinary part taken by the people in the jubilee. Cf. also 
Firmanus, *Diarium in Miscell. Arm., XII., 32, p. 124 seq. 


cannon, and the soldiers were as many as 16,000. This large 
military force, however, succeeded in accomplishing nothing. 
The reason for the complete failure of this first attempt at 
concerted action by Venice, Spain and the Holy See, must 
undoubtedly be found, in addition to a lack of preparation, in 
the inexcusable behaviour of Andrea Doria, who had been 
appointed by Philip II. to the command of his forces. Dis 
pleased from the first at the appointment of Colonna and the 
formation of a separate Papal fleet, and anxious to spare his 
own ships, Doria could not be induced to take any decisive 
action. His procrastination was doubly disastrous : not only 
was no advantage taken of a favourable position of affairs, 
but the capital of Cyprus, which had been besieged by the 
Turks since July 22nd, was not relieved. Doria would not 
hear of making any* attack. 1 

While Doria was holding back the Venetians and Colonna on 
various pretexts, the heroic defenders of Nicosia had been 
obliged to capitulate on September Qth. The Turks broke 
the terms of the capitulation and twenty thousand men fell 
victims to their lust for blood. 2 The defenders of Famagosta 
may well have been dismayed at this orgy of bloodshed. The 
place was commanded by the noble Marcantonio Bragadino, 
who was determined to defend it to the last. There were none 
found to come to his assistance, as the Venetians, at first 
hindered by Doria, and then disgracefully deserted by him, 

1 See SERRANO, Liga, I., 68-84. Cf. MANFRONI, Marina, 
462 seq. ; POMETTI, 71. 

8 See *Nestore Martinengo, Relazione della perdita di Nicosia, 
1570, Capilupi Library, Mantua. Cf. *Particolare ragguaglio 
della perdita di Nicosia, in Varia polit., 62 (now 63), p. 199 seq- 
Papal Secret Archives. Cf. *Cod. F. 18 of the Boncompagni 
Archives, Rome, and the *reports in the State Archives, Florence, 
which FULIN quotes (Una visita all Archivio di Stato in Fjrenze, 
Venice, 1865, 10). Of recent authors see HAMMER, II., 412 seq. ; 
ZINKEISEN, II., 926, 929 ; BIANCONI, Piccolo Archivio storico- 
artistico Umbro, a. 1866-1867, Perugia, 1867. See also G. 
CASTELLAN i, Una lettera di Franc. Palazzo, colonello dei Vene- 
ziani a Nicosia, Venice, 1916 (nozze publication). 


did not dare to launch an attack. Marcantonio Colonna also 
retired with them to Corfu. Storms destroyed some of the 
ships and Colonna reached Ancona with but four galleys. 1 He 
sent Pompeo Colonna to Rome to break the news to the Pope. 

The sorrow and anger of Pius V. at the ineffectual return of 
so great a fleet were beyond words. 2 Cyprus was abandoned to 
its own resources until the spring of 1571, and it was very 
doubtful whether Famagosta could hold out till then. 3 

Although the Spaniards did all they could to justify the 
action of Doria, 4 the true state of affairs was soon realized in 
Rome. While Pompeo Colonna received an honourable 
welcome, Marcello Doria, who had been sent to justify Andrea 
Doria, did not succeed in obtaining an audience. 5 The facts 
of the case were too obvious. Even the moderate Cardinal 
Morone publicly complained, saying that it would have been 
better if Doria had never joined the Venetians, since he had 
hindered them far more than he had helped them. 6 At the 
end of October the Pope sent Pompeo Colonna to Madrid to 
make complaint to Philip II., and at the same time to urge 
him to conclude the alliance. 7 Pius V. had laboured for four 
hours, together with Cardinal Rusticucci, on the letter which 
Colonna took with him. 8 

It was inevitable that the behaviour of Doria should 

1 See GUGLIELMOTTI, 101 seq., 104 seq. Cf. BALAN, VI., 540. 

8 Cf. Gondola in VOINOVICH, 583 ; VALENSISE, 86 seq. 

* See the report of the French ambassador of November 5, 
1570, in CHARRIERE, III., 124 seq. 

4 See Corresp. dipl., IV., 63 seq. 

6 See the *Avvisi di Roma of November 4 and u, 1570, Urb. 
1041, p. 365b, 368b, Vatican Library. In the latter Avviso 
it is stated that the audience was refused " per il sdegno che 
ha S.S. td> che una tanta armata sia ritornata senza haver fatto 
alcun profitto." Cf. Gondola, loc. cit. 

6 FR. LONGO, Guerra, 20. 

7 See Corresp. dipl., IV., 66 seq. ; cf. Gondola, loc. cit. 584. 

8 See *Avviso di Roma of October 28, 1570, Urb. 1041, p. 
3&3b, Vatican Library. Cf. the *report of Cusano of November 
4, 1570, State Archives, Vienna. 


have the worst possible effect on the negotiations about the 
league in Rome. 1 These were resumed on July 26th, but were 
suspended on August 4th, it having been decided to wait for 
further instructions from Venice and Madrid. 2 

While Pius V. was redoubling his prayers and on several 
occasions making processions in Rome, 3 his nuncio in Venice 
was making every effort to break down the opposition being 
made by the Signoria to the imposition of ecclesiastical 
censures on those who should violate the alliance, but all the 
remonstrances of Facchinetti were in vain. 4 The Signoria 
refused even to hear such a thing spoken of. As the attitude 
of Soriano in this and other questions did not seem to them 
to be sufficiently firm, his recall was discussed. Facchinetti 
strongly defended Soriano, but was unable to prevent Giovanni 
Soranzo being associated with him as second ambassador, and 
orders being given that neither could decide anything without 
the other. Fearing lest the Signoria should withdraw entirely 
from the negotiations, Pius V. promised the Venetians to use 
his influence with Philip II. to persuade him not to insist any 
longer on the infliction of censures. 5 

1 See the report in CHARRIERE, III., 125 seq. 
* See Tiepolo in MUTINELLI, I., 93 ; cf. Corresp. dipl., III., 
474 seq., 486 seq., 495. 

3 Firmanus gives an account of the processions on August 
15 and September 13-16 (*Diarium in Miscell., Arm. XII., 32, 
p. I25b, Papal Secret Archives). Cf. the *report of Arco of 
September 16, 1570 (State Archives, Vienna) and the *Avviso 
di Roma of the same date for the great concourse of people at 
the processions : " orando S.S ts< quando disse quelle parole : 
Ne tradas bestiis animas confitentes Tibi, venne in tanta devotione 
et compuntione di cuore che due volte coram populo lacrimava " 
(Urb. 1041, p. 346b, Vatican Library). According to an *Avviso 
di Roma of September 2, 1570, Michele Bonelli started on the 
Wednesday to inspect all the fortifications near Rome (ibid. 

4 See his reports in VALENSISE, 73 seq. 

5 See VALENSISE, 80 seq. The mandate for Soriano and Sor 
anzo, of September 8, 1570, in LADERCHI, 1571, n. 230. The 
charge laid on Soranzo in Arch. Veneto, 1901, 376. 



Soranzo had arrived in Rome on September 2oth. Nothing 
was now wanting but the arrival of the Spanish courier, who 
brought the instructions of Philip II. to his representatives 
on October 17th, 1 in order to resume the discussions, which 
was done on October 2oth, though without Soriano, who was 
absent through ill-health. Both parties protested their 
willingness to conclude the alliance, but this was not borne out 
by the opening scenes of the conference. Soranzo begged the 
Spaniards to inform them of the king s decision in his own 
words, but Granvelle replied that it was rather the duty of the 
Venetians to put forward their difficulties and doubts. To 
this Soranzo made answer that as they had awaited for three 
months the king s reply, they had the right to know the terms 
of that document now that it had arrived. Granvelle then 
rebuked the Venetians for having in the meantime treated 
directly with Philip II. and complained of some of the terms 
arranged. After a stormy discussion the Spaniards read the 
memorandum which the Republic had sent to its ambassador 
at the court of Philip. 2 In this memorandum complaint was 
made of the proposal that the campaign for the following 
spring should only be decided upon every autumn, of the 
article dealing with the help to be given to a Spanish expedition 
to north Africa, of the ecclesiastical censures, of the status of 
Ragusa, and of the contribution of the Pope towards the 
expenditure. Further the Republic expressed a wish to 
appoint the generalissimo for the land forces. Granvelle 
then declared that the Spanish representatives had sufficient 
authority to settle all these matters ; let the Venetians then 
obtain similar powers. 

Then there came, on November 2nd, the news of the fall of 
Nicosia and of the strange behaviour of Doria. The blow at 

1 According to the "report of B. Pia from Rome, October 21, 
1570 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua) the Spanish messenger had 
arrived four days earlier, i.e. on the 17. The date in the report 
of Soriano in Du MONT, V., i, 194 (October 28), must therefore 
be altered. The instructions of Philip II. of September 24, 
1570, in Corresp. dipl., IV., 21 seq. 

*Now published in Corresp. dipl., IV., 22 seq. 


once had its effect upon the attitude of the Venetian envoys. 
Soranzo reminded the meeting of the disloyal conduct of Spain 
in the )^ear 1538. x Fortunately there came on November 4th 
the instructions from the Signoria to press forward the negotia 
tions, which had at last been obtained owing to the remon 
strances of Facchinetti, 2 and were dated October 28th. With 
out any further difficulties an agreement was arrived at con 
cerning the military force that was to be prepared. It was 
definitely decided that by March they were to have ready 200 
galleys, 100 transports, 50,000 infantry, and 4,500 cavalry, 
together with artillery and munitions. A long disc ussion 
followed on the article providing that every autumn the 
campaign for the following spring was to be decided upon in 
Rome in the presence of the Pope. The discussion of this 
matter was continued on the following day, Granvelle declaring 
that he had express orders from the king to uphold this pro 
posal. The Venetians asked for another ten days to make 
up their minds, and in the meantime to go on to the other 
articles. Their offer to fit out 24 galleys, of which the Pope 
was to bear the expense of eight, and Spain of sixteen, was 
accepted, as was the decision that each of the allies who should 
do something over and above what he was bound to do should 
receive compensation in some form from the other side. 
Such violent altercations arose over the question of the supply 
of grain from Naples for Sicily and Venice that it was feared 
that the negotiations would have to be broken off. The 
Spaniards at first demanded a sum considerably greater than 
was usual in years of an average harvest, but at last agreed to 
accept a lower price ; as, however, no agreement could be 
come to it was decided to abandon it. 

At the meeting on November 8th the Pope s representatives 
made large concessions in order to obtain Sicilian grain. The 
Spaniards asked for twice or three times the Papal price, and 
once again the discussions were without result. At length 
the Spaniards said that they would ask for further information 
from the viceroy of Naples as to this. In the meantime they 

1 Cf. Vol. XI. of this work, p. 295. 
* See VALENSISE, 88 seq. 


discussed a future expedition against Algiers, Tunis and 
Tripoli, for which the Spaniards demanded fifty Venetian 
galleys to assist them. Soriano and Soranzo demanded 
similar help for their own future enterprises. After a long 
discussion this was agreed to, with the condition that the 
Venetians should first help the king, and then Philip the 
the Venetians. The proposal to appoint Don John of Austria 
as generalissimo met with general approval. But there was a 
difference of opinion as to the proposal that the Papal com 
mander was to take his place in his absence. The Venetians 
made no objections to this, but the Spaniards thought that 
Don John ought to appoint his own lieutenant. Sforza 
Pallavicini was again proposed by the Venetians as commander 
of the land forces. Entry into the league was always to be 
open to the Emperor and the other princes ; it was to be the 
Pope s duty to urge them to do so. With regard to conquered 
territory an agreement was arrived at : Spain was to have 
Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli, as well as anything that had 
previously belonged to her ; Venice in the same way was to 
have her own former possessions, as well as Castelnuovo, 
Valona and Durazzo. Captured artillery and munitions were 
to be divided among the three allies in proportion to their 
contribution to the expenditure. With regard to the decision 
to prohibit under pain of censure all negotiations for peace 
or any agreement with the Turks without the knowledge and 
consent of the other allies, the Pope s representatives declared 
that they would agree to whatever should be decided by the 
others. The Spaniards still insisted upon their demand for 
the censures, while the Venetians wished this to be entirely 
omitted. From what was said by Soriano, however, it was 
still thought possible to induce the Spaniards not to persist 
in their demand. And this was actually the case ; at the 
request of the Venetian ambassador in Madrid Philip II. 
consented to withdraw the demand for censures. 1 

When the expected reply from Naples had arrived on 
November 2oth Morone was able to arrange an agreement 
concerning the supply of grain by means of mutual conces- 

1 Cf. the letter of Morone in Corresp. dipl., IV., 314. 


sions. On the following day the price to be paid for the grain 
from Naples was definitely fixed. 1 In Rome it was now hoped 
that an end of the negotiations for the league would soon be 
reached, 2 and the Pope pushed them forward energetically. 3 
The Venetians had, at the Pope s request, given way to the 
Spaniards on so many points, that the Pope felt sure of a 
happy issue to the negotiations. But the question of who 
was to supply the place of the generalissimo in his absence 
led, on account of the attitude of the Spaniards, to so many 
complications and differences of opinion that the attainment 
of the wished for end was once more postponed. 4 

The Venetians, on account of the great position of Philip II. 
and the great reputation of the Emperor s son, Don John, had 
agreed that the latter should have the supreme command of 
the forces of the league ; but with regard to the question who 
was to take his place, it did not seem right to them that in the 
absence of Don John, the Venetian and Papal leaders should 
be placed under the orders of the Spaniards. At last they 
decided that in such a case the Papal commander, Marcantonio 
Colonna, should assume the supreme command. Pius V. 
had with difficulty induced the Venetians to agree to this 

1 Here the notes of Soriano come to an end. We have in their 
place for the negotiations that followed not only the reports of 
the Spanish representatives (Corresp. dipl., IV., 76 seqq., 83 seq., 
88 seq. f 121 seq., 125 seq.), but also the very important letter 
of Morone to Ruy Gomez of December 15, 1570 (ibid. 134 seq.}. 

*C/. the *reports of B. Pia of November 18 and 22, 1570, 
Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. See also the *Avvisi di Roma 
of November n and 25, 1570, Urb. 1041, pp. 368b, 369b, 
Vatican Library. 

8 See *Avviso di Roma of November 22, 1570, ibid. 374. 

4 C/. the letter of Morone cited above, n. i. An *Avviso 
di Roma of December 5, 1570, Urb. 1041, p. 377, Vatican Library, 
states that the negotiations were being kept strictly secret. On 
December 6, 1570, B. Pia "reports that " La lega e sul fine." 
(Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). An *Avviso of December 9, 
1570, announces that on the day before there had been a great 
dispute on the question whether Colonna or Doria should be 
Don John s lieutenant. (Urb. 1041, p. 380, loc. cit.}. 


proposal when suddenly, just when it was thought that the 
negotiations were completed, the Spaniards entered a protest. 1 
At Venice they now thought that the faithless Doria might 
be appointed as lieutenant, but the Pope took up the cause of 
the Venetians, and many distinguished Cardinals declared that 
Marcantonio Colonna was the man best suited for the office. 2 
The disputes on this matter became more and more em 
bittered, and many harsh things were said. Cardinals Gran- 
velle and Pacheco thought that the Venetians were behaving 
as though it was the Spaniards who were being besieged at 
Famagosta- The French ambassador, on the other hand, 
declared openly that the representatives of Philip II. were 
trying to make as much profit as possible out of the difficulties 
of the Republic of St. Mark, and were therefore keeping every 
thing in suspense. 3 Pius V., who followed the negotiations 
with infinite patience, and had frequently intervened with 
success, was deeply grieved. On December gth he addressed 
an autograph letter to Philip II. 4 In this he made bitter 
complaints : scarcely had the more serious difficulties 
with the Venetians been overcome, when lo ! the Spanish 
representatives declared that they could not come to any 
decision until they received instructions as to the lieutenancy 
of the supreme command. The Pope characterized such 
procedure as both strange and suspicious. Threatening to 
break off the negotiations he asked for an immediate decision 
from the king, leaving no room for doubt as to his own firm 

1 Besides the reports of Facchinetti of November 27 and Decem 
ber 6, 1570, in VALENSISE, 95 seq., see the letter of Morone of 
December 15, 1570, cited supra 397, n. I. Cosimo I. would have 
been very glad to have obtained the command for his son, and 
had recourse for that purpose to Cardinals Morone and Pacheco ; 
see *Medic. 616, fasc. 33, State Archives, Florence. 

* See Corresp. de Granvelle, 6d. POULLET, IV., 51 ; *Avviso 
di Roma of December 20, 1570, Urb. 1041, p. 385, Vatican Library. 
Cf. FOLIETA, II., looi seq. ; Corresp. dipl., IV., 127. 

8 See CHARRIERE, III., 128. 

4 See the letter of Bonelli to Facchinetti on December 9, 1570, 
in VALENSISE, 97 seq. Cf. Gondola in VOINOVICH, 587 seq. 


determination to help Venice against the Turks with all his 
power. 1 

The nuncio in Madrid, who was to deliver this letter, 
received instructions to make the following declaration in the 
event of Philip still hesitating : the king, in consequence of 
the concession of the sussidio, was bound to place sixteen 
galleys at the Pope s disposal, and any attempt to evade this 
obligation would constrain the Pope to withdraw the con 
cession. 2 It was in vain that Zufiiga tried to pacify the Pope, 
who complained bitterly of the conduct of the Spanish repre 
sentatives, and who was specially indignant with Granvelle. 3 

Indignation at the behaviour of the representatives of 
Philip II. was very great in other quarters as well. Facchinetti 
feared that the negotiations about the league would break 
down altogether, and that the Venetians would come to terms 
with the Turks. 4 Fears of the same sort also took possession 
of Pius V., and even when the Spanish representatives showed 
themselves more accommodating, he no longer trusted them. 
The general view of Philip II. was that he really cared for 
nothing but to obtain the cruzada. 5 

While the negotiations were thus suspended, they were 
anxiously awaiting in Rome the reply of the King of Spain, 6 
and thus the year came to an end with but gloomy prospects, 
after the negotiations had been going on for six whole months. 

1 Corresp. dipl., IV., 118 seq. Cf. VALENSISE, 97 seq. ; Gondola, 
loc. cit. 

1 See Corresp. dipl., IV., 119 seq. 

* See ibid. 138 seq. Cf. SERRANO, Liga, I., 94. 
4 Cf. his reports in VALENSISE, 99 seq. 

1 See the report of the Spanish representatives of December 
29, 1570, Corresp. dipl., IV., 153. *Arco also gives similar 
information on the same date. (State Archives, Vienna). 

* The decision of Philip II., which was expected on December 
20 (*Avviso di Roma of December 20, 1570, Urb. 1041, p. 385, 
Vatican Library), had not arrived even on December 30 ; see 
the *report of B. Pia of December 30 1570, Gonzaga Archives, 
Mantua, Cf. Corresp. de Granvelle, ed. POULLET, IV., 59. 



Pius V. 

IT was Pius V. who had begun the negotiations for a league ; 
he alone had pushed them forward in a disinterested spirit, 1 
and he had carried them on in spite of all the difficulties 
arising from the selfishness and distrust of the Spaniards and 
Venetians. Keeping his eyes steadily fixed upon the great 
end he had in view, he had displayed the most admirable 

While the Pope was awaiting month after month the 
decision of Philip II., 2 the Turks were besieging Famagosta, 
and threatening Corfu and Ragusa. 3 If the alliance is not 
soon concluded, the Papal nuncio Facchinetti reported from 
Venice on February 2ist, 1571, there is a danger of the Signoria 
making peace with the Porte, even at the cost of losing 
Cyprus. 4 

In the meantime Philip II. s reply, which they had been 
waiting for ever since the December of the previous year, had 
at last arrived in Rome on March 2nd, I57I, 5 where the whole 
extent of the danger threatening the whole of Europe from 
Islam was alone fully understood. 6 It seemed likely to 

1 Cf. the opinion of Gondola in VOINOVICH, 527. See also 
ADRIANI, XXL, 2, 3. 

* See Corresp. dipl., IV., 172 seq., 194. Cf. the *report of 
Cusano of February 23, 1571, State Archives, Vienna. 

8 See the reports in VOINOVICH, 589. 

4 See VALENSISE, 107. The troubles of Facchinetti coincided 
with the mission of Giacomo Ragazzoni, for whose work cf. 
DALLA SANTA in Archivio Veneto, 1901, 376. 

5 Corresp. dipl., IV., 213. 

6 *" In gens enim ingruit bellum atque is hostis quocum nobis 
non de dignitate coritentio, sed pro communi salute, pro libertate , 



facilitate the successful conclusion of the negotiations. On 
March 7th Cardinal Bonelli wrote to the nuncio at Venice that 
the discussions which had been held on that day, the feast of 
St. Thomas Aquinas, after a High Mass in the Church of the 
Minerva, in the monastery adjoining, and under the presidency 
of the Pope, had gone so smoothly that there was reason to 
believe that in three or four days it would be possible to con 
clude the business and proceed to the solemn promulgation 
of the league. 1 On March i6th Cardinal Bonelli ordered the 
nuncio at Madrid to ask the king to make ready his galleys 
and troops, as the Pope looked upon the league as settled, and 
was only waiting for the decision of Venice. This arrived two 
days later. What its tenor was could plainly be seen from the 
sad and indignant look of the Pope when he appeared at the 
consistory on March igth. 2 

The fact was that such serious disagreements had arisen 
between Venice and Spain concerning the help they were to 
give each other as to cause Facchinetti to fear that the Republic 
of St. Mark would agree to a peace with the enemy of Christen 
dom. The Pope s representative Employed all the resources 
of his eloquence to prevent that. From the vague and involved 
reply which- was handed to him on March I5th he felt that he 
could only conclude that Venice had already made up her mind 
to come to terms with the Porte, and that she wished to force 
Philip to concur in this. Venice could not, so the Signoria 
declared, put any trust in the promises of Spain for an offensive 
and defensive war, nor, since Crete was being threatened by 
the Turks, could she furnish the ships asked for by Philip. 3 

At a meeting held in the presence of the Pope on March 
2oth an attempt was made to find a way out of the difficulty. 4 

pro religione, pro incolumitate omnium djmicatio est " wrote M. 
A. Graziani to Nic. Tomicio, dated Romae 1571, xhi. Cal. febr. 
Graziani Archives, Citt& di Castello. 

1 See Corresp. dipl. IV. 219, n. i. 

2 See ibid. 224. 

2 See VALENSISE, 117 seq. 

* See the letter of Bonelli to Facchinetti of March 20, 1571, 
in VALENSISE, 120 seq. Cf. CHARRIERE, III., 145. 


Facchinetti at once and with great urgency laid before the 
Signoria the suggestions made at this meeting, which he had 
received on March 23rd. The attitude of the Venetian govern 
ment on this occasion showed only too clearly how they wished 
to put off coming to a decision. Every day there were fresh 
difficulties and fresh excuses. One day there would be a 
festival which prevented any meeting being held, on the next 
day perhaps the doge would be ill. There could be no doubt 
about it that there was a strong party, guided principally by 
commercial considerations, which was working with all its 
might against the league, and urging the government to accept 
the proposals for peace which had been put forward by a 
French agent in the sultan s name. 1 The same party also 
made quite baseless complaints against the Pope. Under 
these circumstances, thought Facchinetti on March 28th, he 
could do nothing but to continue to insist, exhort and accuse. 
He advised that the Republic should be won over by means of 
further concessions. When on March 3oth he asked the doge 
firmly for a definite reply, the latter answered that since the 
Spaniards had discussed the matter at such length, it was only 
right that Venice too should maturely consider so important 
a question. In the course of the conversation Facchinetti 
frankly remarked that the behaviour of Venice was bound to 
give rise to the suspicion that they were trying to profit by 
the negotiations in order to bring pressure to bear on the 
Turks to obtain more favourable terms. 2 

There were two parties in Venice ; one aimed at an agree 
ment with the Porte, the other at the conclusion of the 
alliance, but without the conditions demanded by Spain. 
Facchinetti reported to Rome on April 4th, 1571, that if 
Spain would not give way there was reason to fear that the 
Signoria would come to terms with the Turks, to the great 
harm of Christendom, as well as to that of the Republic 
itself. 8 

1 Cf. SERRANO, Liga, I., 95. 

* See the reports of Facchinetti of March 24 and 28, 1571, in 
VALENSISE, 122 seq., 128 seq. 

* See ibid. 134 ; Corresp. dipl., IV., 244. 


Great despondency took possession of the Pope at this 
state of affairs. 1 But he did not lose heart, nor did Morone, 
who now became the guiding spirit of the negotiations. 2 
In order to back up the remonstrances of Facchinetti, on 
April 6th, by the advice of Commendone, he sent a special 
envoy to the city of the lagoons in the person of Marcantonio 
Colonna, who was much loved in Venice. 3 Colonna reached 
Venice on April nth, 4 and set to work with all his energy, 
but he met with the same difficulties as the nuncio. 5 Both 
were unwearied in their efforts, while the Pope in Rome 
was exercising all his authority, and threatened the Republic 
with the recall of Colonna if the Signoria did not make up 
its mind before May 8th. 6 

An attempt on the part of the French ambassador in Venice 
to bring about a further delay was frustrated. 7 On the other 
hand, the remonstrances of Colonna and Facchinetti, sup 
ported by Paolo Tiepolo, at length proved effectual. Their 
efforts were successful in removing the principal difficulties, 
and Venice was to receive guarantees of the indemnification 
of her expenses. 8 On May nth Colonna returned to Rome, 

1 See the *report of A. Zibramonti, dated Rome, April 14, 
1571, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. 

8 See CHARRIERE, III., 147 ; cf. Corresp. dipl., IV., 256. 

8 See *Avviso di Roma of April 7, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 46, 
Vatican Library. Cf. GRATIANUS, 118 ; PARUTA, 147 seq. ; 
LADERCHI, 1571, n. 221 ; CHARRIERE, III., 147 ; Corresp. dipl., 
IV., 240, 244. For the reputation of Colonna see the report in 

4 See the report of Facchinetti in VALENSISE, 141. 

5 See the reports of Facchinetti, ibid. 141 seqq., and Corresp. 
dipl., IV., 250. Cf. GRATIANUS, 118 seq.; SERENO, 93 seq. ; 
GUGLIELMOTTI, Colonna, 134 seq. 

6 Thus *reports Arco from Rome, May 5, 1571, State Archives, 

7 See VALENSISE, 147 seq. 

8 See GUGLIELMOTTI, Colonna, 144 seq. Cf. GRATIANUS, 123 
seq. ; BROSCH, Gesch. aus dem Leben dreier Grosswesire (1899), 


where he was at once received by the Pope. 1 The subsequent 
negotiations 2 were, like those that had gone before, kept 
absolutely secret, but in spite of that the rumour spread 
through the city that the igih of May had been decided upon 
for the definite conclusion of the alliance ; particulars were 
even known as to the names of those who were to command 
the Papal galleys. 3 

This rumour had a basis of truth. The evening of the day 
mentioned actually witnessed the coming into existence of 
the triple alliance, after, even to the last moment, the whole 
thing had been in danger of shipwreck because the Venetians, 
to the great anger of Pius V., insisted upon the quite secondary 
condition of the league being obliged to pay the increased 
garrisons in Venetian territory, a thing which the Spaniards 
refused to accept, though an agreement was eventually 
come to, that this and all other questions which might un 
expectedly arise, should be referred to the decision of the 
Pope. After that, on the following morning, the ambassadors 
of Spain and Venice signed the treaty. 4 The price which 
Pius V. had to pay took the form of large financial concessions 
to Philip II. ; on May 2ist, 1571, Spain obtained the con 
tinuance of the sussidio levied on the clergy for another five 

1 See *Avviso di Roma of May 12, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 6ib, 
Vatican Library. 

8 Cf. the reports of the Spanish representatives of May 1 7 and 
21, 1571, Corresp. dipl., IV., 277 seq., 285 seq. 

8 *" Dicono che sabbato fu conclusa la pratica della lega, 
la quale conclusione non e successa senza voler divino et molta 
consolazione di S,S. et di tutta la gorte." The terms nevertheless 
are kept secret. Then are enumerated the " ministri dell armati 
ecclesiastic! " (Avviso di Roma of May 23, 1571, Urb. 1042, 
p. 64^65 Vatican Library). Cf. the *report of A. Zibramonti 
of May 19, 1571, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. 

* See LADERCHI, 1571, n. 232 seq. ; GENNARI, 65 ; BROSCH, 
loc. cit. 16 ; VOINOVICH, 531, 591 ; CHARRIERE, III., 149 seq. ; 
VALENSISE, 150, 152 ; POMETTI, 69 seq. ; Corresp. dipl., IV., 
283 seq. Severe expressions used by Pius V. about Venice, 
May 18, 1371, in Carte Stroz., I., i, 159. 


years, the so-called excuspdo for -a like period, and lastly, 
the long desired cruzada for six years. 1 

At a consistory on May 25th the articles of the treaty were 
read, approved by all the Cardinals, and then sworn to by 
the Pope and the ambassadors of Spain and Venice. 2 On 
Sunday, May 27th, the solemn announcement of the happy 
event was made in St. Peter s. 3 After a High Mass celebrated 
by Cardinal Truchsess, Monsignor Aragoriia preached a sermon 
and published the details of the league. 4 This, which had 
been formed between the Pope, the King of Spain and the 
Republic of Venice, was to be lasting, was to be both offensive 
and defensive, and was to be directed, not only against the 
sultan, but also against the states of Algiers, Tunis and 
Tripoli, his vassals. The triple alliance was to furnish 200 
galleys, 100 transports, 50,000 Spanish, Italian and German 
infantry, and 4,500 cavalry, as well as the necessary number 
of cannon. The fighting forces were to be ready each year 
at the latest in March and April. Every year an agreement 
was to be come to in Rome as to the campaign for the follow 
ing year. If nothing were then decided each power was to 
be free to act as it chose, but in that case Venice must help 
the King of Spain with 50 galleys against Tunis, Algiers and 
Tripoli, unless they were prevented from doing so by a strong 
Turkish fleet ; Philip II. was bound to give similar help 
in the event of Venice being attacked in the Adriatic. The 

1 Cf. supra, p. 64. From the Corresp. de Granvelle, ed. PIOT, 
IV., 40, it is clear how much the Spaniards made their entry 
into the league dependent upon financial concessions. 

8 See Firmanus and Acta consist, card, S. Severinae in LADERCHI, 
1571, n. 225-226 (see also Studi e docum., XXIII., 334 seq.). Cf. 
GENNARI, 65 seq. ; SERENO, 417 seq., and the *report of Arco of 
May 26, 1571, State Archives, Vienna. 

8 See *Avviso di Roma of May 31, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 68b, 
Vatican Library, Cf. LADERCHI, 1571, n. 236, and the *report 
of A. Zibramonti of June 28, 1571, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. 

4 See LADERCHI, 1571, n. 227 seq. Cf. Du MONT, V., i, 203 
seq. : LtfNiG, Cod. dipl., IV., 305 seq. ; POMETTI, 69 seq. ; Corresp. 
dipl., IV., 299 seq. 


Pope made himself responsible for a sixth, Spain for three 
sixths, and Venice for two sixths, of the cost of the war. 
If the Pope should find himself unable to fulfil in their entirety 
the obligations which he had taken upon himself, Spain and 
Venice were to make up that which was wanting. Venice 
was to supply the 12 galleys which the Pope was to fit out 
with their equipment and provisions. If the Turks attacked 
one of the allies, the others were bound to come to his assist 
ance. The generalissimo Don John was to take counsel with 
the captains of the Venetian and Papal ships, and the majority 
of their votes was to be decisive. Don John s lieutenant 
was to be Marcantonio Colonna. Entry into the league was 
open to the Emperor and the other Christian princes, and the 
Pope was to invite them to do so. The division of conquered 
territory, with the exception of the African possessions of 
Philip II., was to proportionate to the expenses borne by 
each of the allies, and the Pope was to adjust their differences ; 
none of them might of himself conclude a peace or armistice 
with the Turks. In a special article the allies guaranteed 
the neutrality and integrity of the republic of Ragusa. 1 

The joy of Pius V. at the final realization of the triple 
alliance was very great. He caused a medal to be struck 
to commemorate the important event, 2 and published a 
universal jubilee in order to draw down the blessing of the 
God of battles on the Christian armies. 3 He took part in 
person in the processions, the first of which was made in 
Rome on May 28th, the second on May 3oth, and the third 
on June ist. 4 

On May 23rd and 24th Pius V. had expressed to the King 
of Spain and Don John his satisfaction at the conclusion of 

1 Its neutrality was afterwards placed under the control of 
the Holy See ; cf. VOINOVICH, 497 seq. 

* See BONANNI, I., 295 ; VENUTI, 124 seq. 

1 Cf. LADERCHI, 1571, n. 237; *Avviso di Roma of May 23, 
1571, Urb. 1042, p. 64b, Vatican Library. 

4 Cf. *Avvisi di Roma of May 30 and June 2, 1571, ibid. 68, 
7ob, and the *report of A. Zibramonti, June 2, 1571, Gonzaga 


the alliance, exhorting them to carry it into effect as soon as 
possible. Three days later they both received from the 
Pope further letters begging them to send the auxiliary 
Spanish fleet with all possible speed. 1 

Since it was impossible to make the preparations to the 
extent agreed upon in the treaty during the current year, 
it had been arranged on May 2oth that Spain should furnish 
only 80 galleys and 20 other troop ships, and that the Venetians 
should be indemnified by Philip II. for the additional ex 
pense which they would incur ; at the same time a definite 
arrangement had been come to as to the powers to be exercised 
by Marcantonio Colonna as Don John s lieutenant, powers 
which he was only to have as the Pope s commander. These 
decisions were ratified in the room of Pius V., on June nth, 
whereupon the Pope urged them to carry their decisions into 
effect quickly. 2 

Yet once more Venice put the patience of Pius V. to a 
hard test by needlessly postponing the solemn publication 
of the league. The nuncio Facchinetti insisted in every 
possible way, but they put him off week after week. He 
very soon saw that the Signoria did not trust Spain and 
wished to make use of the favourable opportunity in order 
to extort further financial concessions. It was only after 
the Pope had granted the Republic an annual contribution 
of 100,000 gold scudi from the revenues of the clergy for 
five years and the duration of the war, that the solemn publi 
cation of the league took place in Venice on July 2nd. 3 

1 See Corresp. dipl., IV., 297 seq. ; LADERCHI, 1571, n. 240. 

* Corresp. dipl., IV., 281 seq., 312, 343. Cf. POMETTI, 70 
n. i. ; Libri commemoriali, VI., 325 ; JORGA, III., 150. 

1 Cf. VALENSISE, 153 seq., 155, 157, 159, 160, 162, 163 ; LONGO, 
Guerra, 24. The brief concerning the financial concessions to 
Venice is dated June 7, 1571 ; see Miscell. di Clemente XI., 
t. 213, p. 227, Papal Secret Archives; Libri commem., VI., 324. 
In consequence of the delay of Venice the instrument of the 
league was only sent at this time by the ambassadors ; see the 
*letter of A. Zibramonti from Rome, July 7, 1571, Gonzaga 
Archives, Mantua. On June 9, 1571, Cusano *reports concerning 


Very characteristic of Pius V. s zeal for the crusade were 
his efforts for the extension and strengthening of the barely 
concluded league between Spain and Venice by obtaining 
the accession thereto of other great powers. For this end 
the Pope had recourse on May 3ist by means of special letters, 
to the Emperor and the Kings of France and Poland. 1 At a 
secret consistory on June i8th he appointed Cardinal Com- 
mendone as legate to the Emperor, the Catholic princes of 
Germany and the King of Poland, with the object of winning 
them over to the league ; at the same time Cardinal Bonelli 
was sent as legate to Spain and Portugal. 2 As far as Philip 
II. was concerned, Bonelli, in addition to the settlement of 
political and ecclesiastical controversies, was to press for the 
opening of the league s campaign for the following year, and 
to seek the assistance of Spanish diplomacy to induce the 
Emperor and the King of France to join the league. His 
mission to Portugal had as its object, besides the question of the 
league, the marriage of King Sebastian to Margaret of Valois. 3 

a disgraceful incident with Cardinal Comaro. There had come 
into the hands of the Pope a letter from this Cardinal, in which 
Cornaro urged the Venetians to make peace with the Turks 
and abandon the league. Pius V. was very indignant " et gli 
ha detto che non e degno di esser cardinale " (State Archives, 
Vienna). The ratification of the league, which was completed 
by Philip II. on August 25, 1571, did not take place at Venice 
until October 15, and the exchange of ratifications at Rome on 
November 19; see Corresp. dipl., IV., 309, 311, 313; Libri 
comment., VI., 327. 

1 See LADERCHI, 1571, n. 245 seq. ; SCHWARZ, Brief wechsel, 
179 seq. ; the legations had been decided on May 25, 1571 ; 
see Corresp. dipl., IV., 315. 

8 See Acta consist, card. S. Severinae in LADERCHI, 1571, n. 
251, and better in Studi e docum., XXIII., 338 seq., with character 
istic expressions used by Pius V. concerning negotiations with 
the German Protestant princes. Cf. also SCHWARZ, loc. cit. 
183 seq. For the consistory see also the *report of A. Zibramonti 
of June 23, 1571, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. 

*The instructions for Bonelli, of June 25, in Corresp. dipl., IV., 
355 seqq. Cf. supra, p. 64 for the duties entrusted to Bonelli. 


The two Cardinal legates set out at the end of June ; 
Commendone from Verona, 1 and Bonelli from Rome. 2 As 
the nephew of the Pope and until now head of the secretariate 
of state, Bonelli had a suite in keeping with his dignity, to 
which, however, Pius V. attached strict religious and ecclesi 
astics drawn from the entourage of Borromeo. 3 The in- 

The credential briefs of June 20 and 21, 1571, in LADERCHI, 
1571, n. 254, and TEDESCHIS, 263 seq. Cf. also HINOJOSA, 198 
seq. ; Corresp. dipl., IV., 357 n. 

1 In a *letter dated Verona, June 27, 1571, Commendone an 
nounces his legation to the Doge, saying that he is ready to go 
much further and to sacrifice his life for the Church and for his 
country (Letter de card. n. 5, State Archives, Venice). For 
the proposal that Cropper should accompany the legate see 
SCHWARZ, Brief wechsel, 183. According to an *Avviso di Roma 
of July 7, 1571, it was said that P. Toledo was also to accompany 
the legate (State Archives, Naples, Carte Fames, 763). 

2 See the *letter of A. Zibramonti from Rome, June 30, 1571, 
Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. Cf. *Avviso di Roma of June 30, 
1571, Urb. 10, 1042, p. 82, Vatican Library, and Firmanus, 
*Diarium in Miscell. Arm. XII., 32, Papal Secret Archives. 

8 See *Avviso di Roma of June 22, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 77, 
Vatican Library, and Corresp. dipl., IV., 373 seq. For the 
part taken by Francis Borgia in the embassy see S. FRANCISCUS 
BORGIA, V., 581 seqq., 665 seqq., 684 seq., 691. Cardinal Rusti- 
cucci was charged with the direction of the secretariate of state ; 
besides TORNE, 50 seq. see the *Avvisi di Roma of July 20 (" Nel 
card. Rusticucci si riposa hora summa rerum del Pontificato nel 
quale con maniera incredibile satisfa al universale et monstra 
di non far cosa alcuna facendo il tutto "), August 8 (Rusticucci 
is very slow to make any change in the arrangements of Bonelli), 
and October 6, 1571 (the Pope had ordered Rusticucci to assist 
at all the audiences of the ambassadors ; Urb. 1042, p. 87b, 
96b, 129, loc. cit.) a thing which displeased them (see Corresp. 
dipl., IV., 465 seq.). Rusticucci had previously taken Bonelli s 
place during the latter s absence in June, and also during the 
illness of the nephew from August to December, 1570 ; see 
*Avvisi di Roma of June 21, July 12, August 16, September 6, 
and December 9 and 20, 1570, Urb. 1041, p. 292b, 304, 327, 
337 38 3&5b, loc. cit. Cusano, who reports all the gossip of 

VOL. XVIII. 2 $ 


structions given to Bonelli with regard to his behaviour on 
the journey and. at foreign courts are very characteristic of 
the ideas of Pius V. Neither the Cardinal himself nor the 
members of his suite were to accept any presents ; they were 
to limit their visits to what was strictly necessary, they 
were to have no part in banquets, hunting parties or plays, 
they were to dress simply and eat simply, they were to ask 
for nothing fc>r themselves, and were to grant freely the 
favours that were granted freely in Rome. So as to edify 
men by his example, the Cardinal was to say mass every day, 
and his suite were to communicate. 1 

Bonelli left Rome on the last day of June ; after passing 
through Savoy he went by Barcelona and Valencia to Madrid, 
where his solemn entry took place on September 30 th, and 
the negotiations concerning the war against the Turks were 
at once begun. 2 

Rome, repeatedly (July 7 and 15, 1570, June 23, 1571) reports 
that Bonelli was leading an immoral life. It is extremely doubtful 
whether there is any justification for this, as in the first place 
Bonelli was much hated by the Imperialists on account of his 
partisanship for Cosimo I; (see the *report of Arco of June 2, 
1571, State Archives, Vienna) and in the second place Bonelli 
left behind him in Spain, where he had been removed from the 
strict supervision of Pius V., a very good name on account of 
his " sainte vie " (see DOUAIS, Depeches de M. de Fourquevaux, 

II, 413). 

1 See the text of the " Ricordo " for Bonelli in Corresp. dipl., 
IV., 357 seq. ; cf. *Avvisi di Roma of June 20 and 30, 1571, 
Urb. 1042, p. 73, 82. Vatican Library. 

1 *Lettere et negotiati del sig. card. Alessandrino, legato in 
Spagna, in Portogallo et in Francia scritte al card. Rusticucci 
et ad altri negli anni 1571 et 1572, in Cod. 33 G 24 of the 
Corsini Library, Rome, used by LAMMER, Zur Kirchengesch., 
164 seq. in GACHARD, Bibl. Corsini, 46 seq., 152 seq., and HINOJOSA, 
199 seq. The *Viaggio del card. Alessandrino in Spagna, men 
tioned by the latter, in Cod. 336 16 of the Corsini Library, 
is, as GACHARD (loc. cit. 55 seq.} shows, a later compilation. 
Hinojosa has completely overlooked the *contemporary descrip 
tion, which is of great interest for the history of culture, of the 


Even before the departure of the legate the Pope had done 
all he could to hasten his own preparations for the coming 
war at sea, in which task he was effectually assisted by Cosimo 
I. 1 Although he met with the greatest difficulties when the 
time came to get together the necessary money and to find 
and fit out the galleys, his energy enabled him to overcome 
them. A special congregation dealt with the provisions that 
were necessary. 2 A report from Rome on May 30th, 1571, 
tells us that the Pope had taken 40,000 scudi from the treasury 
of the Castle of St. Angelo for the war, and that in the city 
there was nothing to be seen but soldiers. 3 Other sums were 
raised by taxing the benefices of the Cardinals and by the 
formation of the Mom religionis on June I2th. 4 Cosimo de 

journey of Cardinal Bonelli, composed by his secretary G. B. 
Venturino of Fabriano, in Cod. F. 128, p. 299 seq., of the Library 
at Dresden, of which use has been made in Corpus Inscr. lat., 
II., Suppl. Ixxxi. seq., in NUNZIANTE, Spigolature sopra una 
relazione inedita di G. B. V. da Fabriano, Florence, 1884, and in 
Vol. V. of the Panorama Portuguez (see Rev. Hisp., III. [1896], 
31). This *Narrazione del viaggio fatto dal card. Alessanchino 
is also in Cod. Urb. 1697 f the Vatican Library. Cf. also, 
FARINELLI in Rivista critica de historia y literatura espanolas, 
III., Madrid, 1898, 174 ; D. SANTAMBROGIO, Di un epigrafe poco 
nota della Certosa di Pa via, in Boll. d. Soc. Pavese, I., 2 (1901) ; 
SERRANO, Liga, I., 165. For the departure of Bonelli from Rome 
and his arrival at Madrid see also Corresp. dipl., IV., 372 seq., 
447 seq. 

1 See MANFRONI, Marina, 471 seq. 

2 See *Avviso di Roma of June 16, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 75, 
76b, Vatican Library. Cf. Acta consist, card. S. Severinae, in 
Studi e docum. XXIII. 323, 324, 330. 

8 See *Avviso di Roma of May 30, 1571, loo. cit. 69. 

4 For the imposition of taxes on the Cardinals see the article 
by HEWEL in the English Hist. Review, 1915, July. The decree 
on the " Mons religionis " (see Vol. XVII., p. 106) was printed by 
A. Bladus in 1571. An *Avviso di Roma of July 7, 1571, announces 
that every day meetings were held at the house of Cardinal 
Ricci for the purpose of raising more money : as it is difficult 
to obtain this without laying a heavy burden on the people, it 


Medici and Marcantonio Colonna gave effectual assistance 
in the equipment of the twelve galleys. 1 On June I3th 
Colonna went to Civitavecchia to make the final preparations, 
and on June 2ist the Papal fleet was able to weigh anchor. 2 
It sailed first to Naples, where it was to await the arrival 
of the Spanish ships under Don John. As early as May 2yth, 
1571, Pius V. had, in a letter written in his own hand, im 
pressed upon Philip II. the necessity of Don John s coming 
as soon as possible, as otherwise a favourable opportunity 
would be lost, and there would inevitably be complaints from 
the Venetians. 3 The Spanish ambassador in Rome, Zufriga, 
sent similar advice. 4 It was all the more unfortunate, there 
fore, that Don John s arrival was long deferred, and Pius V. 
ordered Colonna to sail alone to Messina, which was the 
appointed place of assembly for the whole of the fighting 
forces of the league. 8 He arrived there on July 2oth. 6 

The Papal fleet was thus the first to arrive at the rendez 
vous : it had reached Naples on June 23rd, and had proceeded 

is possible that the Pope might " ad tempus " set his hand to 
" regressi " (Urb. 1042, p. 85, Vatican Library). See also the 
*Avviso di Roma of July 7, 1571, in Carte Fames., 763 of the 
State Archives, Naples. The *Avviso di Roma of August 8, 
1571, Urb. 1042, p. 96, he. cit., mentions further consultations 
for the purpose of raising money. Cf. also ADRIANI, XXL, 4. 

1 Cf. LE BRET, VIII., 237 ; GUGLIEI.MOTTI, Colonna, 148 seq., 
151 seq. The *pact with Cosimo I. concerning galleys for the 
Turkish war, of March, 1571, in Varia polit., 81 (now 82), p. 642 
seq., Papal Secret Archives. 

8 See *Avvisi di Roma of June 16 and 22, 1571, Urb. 1042, 
p. 75, 77b, Vatican Library, Cf. CARINCI, 17 seq. 

8 Corresp. dipl., IV., 320. 

4 Ibid. 315 seq., 317. 

6 See ibid. 349. The Grand Master of the Knights of St. John, 
who had already, in a *brief of March 16, 1571, been urged to 
lend his galleys, received, in a *brief of May 24, 1571, orders to 
take them to Messina by June 20. Arm. 44, t. 16, pp. 36b, 104, 
Papal Secret Archives. 

SEPENO, 117. The date in MOLMENTI, Veniero, 81 (July 
30) is wrong. 


thence to Messina. On July 23rd the Venetian fleet arrived 
under the command of the aged Sebastiano Venier. But the 
Spaniards were still being waited for, when there was no time 
to be lost in attacking the Turks, who were besieging Fama- 
gosta, and menacing Crete, Cythera, Zante and Cephalonia. 1 
Pius V., greatly alarmed at the news of efforts being made 
by the Turks, 2 and suspicious of the delay on the part of the 
Spaniards, did all he could to induce Don John to sail at once 
for Messina. After having, on June 2gth, 1571, even before 
he had received a reply to his letter of May 27th, 3 sent a 
pressing summons by means of a special envoy, 4 he sent 
another messenger to the same effect on July 7th. 5 A con 
sistory on July 2oth was occupied solely with the question 
of what was to be done 6 in view of the delay of the Spaniards, 
which was universally deplored. 7 On July 26th a pressing 
brief was sent to Don John, 8 and this was followed on August 
4th by a courier bearing yet another brief. 9 

1 See SERENO, 122 scq., 125 seq. ; GUGLIELMOTTI, Colonna, 
163 ; BALAN, VI., 551 ; MANFRONI, Marina, 472. 

2 Cf. the "report of A. Zibramonti from Rome, July 7.. 1571, 
Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. 

8 In his reply of June 18, 1571, Don John tried to excuse his 
delay ; see Corresp. dipl., IV., 345 seq. 

4 See LADERCHI, 1571, n. 358. 

5 *" La S ta> di N S re hoggi ha spedito un corriere a Geneva, 
credesi per sollecitare il passaggio di D. Giovanni ch aspetta 
d hora in hora a Geneva acci6 che con 1 armata sua vadi a trovare 
la Venetiana." The Papal fleet was waiting at Naples (letter 
of Stuerdo to G. B. Pia from Rome, July 7, 1571, Carte Fames. 
763, State Archives, Naples). Cf. also the brief to Don John 
in LADERCHI, 1571, n. 363. See also Corresp. dipl., IV., 384 seq. 

6 See Corresp. dipl. IV., 395. 

7 *" Luni nel concistoro non si fece altro che pailare della 
Tardanza del S or Don Giovanni." Avviso di Roma of July 20, 
1571, Doria-Pamfili Archives, Rome. 

8 *Brief to " Joh. ab Austria," Rome, July 26, 1571, Archives 
of Briefs, Rome. 

9 See * Avviso di Roma of August 4, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 93b, 
Vatican Library. The *brief for Don John of August I, 1571* 


Don John had left Madrid for Barcelona on June 6th, 
arriving there on the i6th. As had been the case with the 
nobles of Rome, so the greatest enthusiasm for the crusade 
prevailed among the grandees of Spain, and many of the 
Spanish nobles had taken ship at the beginning of June. 1 
Don John was detained for a longer period by the preparations 
which he had to make ; in consequence of the war against 
the Moors, added to the proverbial diJatoriness of the Span 
iards, he had great difficulty in getting together the required 
squadron. 2 It was only on July i6th that he set sail with 46 
galleys for Genoa, where he stayed at the palace of Gian 
Andrea Doria, and received a visit from Cosimo I., who 
thus assured himself of the baselessness of the report spread 
abroad by the French that the Spanish force was really directed 
against Tuscany. 3 

From Genoa Don John sent Moncada to Venice and Her- 
nando de Carillo to Rome ; the former was to assure the 
Venetians that he would very soon be at Messina, while 
Carillo was to convey to the Pope his thanks for his appoint 
ment, and his excuses for the delay in his coming. 4 When, 
on August 7th, Carillo took his leave of the Pope, the latter 
charged him to tell Don John that he was setting out upon a 
war for the Catholic faith, and that God would give him 
victory. At the same time Pius V. gave to the envoy the 
sacred standard of the league. 5 

in the Archives of Briefs, Rome. Ibid. *briefs for Granvelle, 
the Viceroy of Sicily, Marcantonio Colonna, and others, all of 
August i " ut curent omnia parata ad instruendam classem." 

1 See CHARRIERE, III., 158, n. 

* SERENO, 131. Corresp. dipl., IV., 384 seq. Cf. ADRIANI, 
XXL, 4. In the Library at Basle, Cod. AA. VI., 30, there is a 
"Relatione fatta alia M tA Catt 01 in Madrid alii 15 di luglio, 1571, 
di tutta la spesa ordinaria die occorria per la lega. For this 
detailed reckoning, which is also preserved in vol. 62, p. 9, of the 
Collect. Faure in the Library at Geneva, cf. POMETTI, 72, n. 7. 

8 See ADRIANI, XXL, 5. 

4 See HAVEMANN, Don. Juan, 129; GUGLIELMOTTI, 171. 

6 See *Avviso di Roma of August 7, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 96, 
Vatican Library. Cf. the *report of A. Zibramonti from Rome, 


Don John, who remained at Genoa until the end of July, 1 
reached Naples on August 8th, where the viceroy, Cardinal 
Granvelle, gave him a solemn reception on the following day. 2 
On August I4th there took place in the church of S. Chiara 
the delivery to Don John of his commander s baton and the 
sacred standard. Tne latter was of blue silk damask, having 
embroidered at the top in the centre a large representation 
of the crucified Saviour, at whose feet were the arms of Pius 
V., with those of Spain and Venice on the right and left. 
These shields were linked by gold chains, from which hung the 
arms of Don John. In the presence of a large number of 
nobles, and the princes of Parma and Urbino, Granvelle 
delivered it to Don John before the high altar. The people, 
who were deeply moved, answered : Amen, Amen. 3 

While Don John was thus tarrying at Naples, the impatience 
of the Pope, who was deeply troubled by the news of the 
advance of the Turkish fleet, became greater and greater. 
On August I7th he sent Paolo Odescalchi to Don John with 

August ii, 1571, which describes the banner minutely (Gonzaga 
Archives, Mantua). Cf. also Corresp. dipl., IV., 402, n. 2. 

1 From thence he again wrote on July 30, and on August I 
from Portofino ; see Lett ere di D. Juan d Austria a Giovan A. 
Doria, Rome, 1896, 18 seq. 

2 See CHARRIERE, III., 159; HAVEMANN, Don Juan, 130. 

3 See Colecc. de docum. ined., XXXIII. , 237 ; CARACCIOLO, 
I comment, d. guerre fatte co Turclii da D. Giovanni d Austria, 
Florence, 1581, IT. The Latin *report of Granvelle to Pius 
V., dated Naples August 14, 1571, which Guglielmotti (p. 173 
seq.} saw in the Gaetani Archives, Rome, and published in an 
Italian translation, must have been removed from thence, because 
in 1900 the firm of dealers in antiquities, Gilhofer-Ranschburg of 
Vienna, put just such a document on the market. The great 
standard of the league, which is often confused with the banner 
of Colonna (see supra, p. 381), which is equally important in 
itself and because of its historical interest, is now in the cathedral 
of Toledo ; see F. DURO, L e"tendard de la Sainte-Ligue a la 
bataille de Le"pante, in Revue de I art chret., 1889, 411 seq. (with 
picture) and FEDELE in Arch. stor. Napolit., XXXIV., 547 seq, 
The standard was evidently copied from an ancient model. 


a letter in his own hand, in which he again implored him to 
set out at once, 1 which he at length did on August 23rd. On 
the following day he arrived in the straits of Messina, where 
he had been so long eagerly expected by the admirals of the 
Pope and Venice, Colonna and Venier. Messina gave a 
splendid welcome to the son of the Emperor, who was then 
scarcely 24 years of age. A type of manly beauty, Don 
John, with his blue eyes and fair hair, won the hearts of the 
excitable Sicilians. 2 

At the first council Don John excused his delay, which 
had been caused by the necessary preparations, at the same 
time giving proofs of his warlike spirit and his confidence of 
success. Philip II., in his caution and jealousy, had from 
the first viewed with ill-will the youthful ardour of his young 
and ambitious brother, and had therefore sent with him in 
Requesens a man who was instructed to curb his zeal as much 
as possible, and in the event Requesens proved himself a 
master at raising captious difficulties with the object of 
preventing a bold attack. 3 To the opposing interests and 
the old mistrust between the Spaniards and Venetians, were 
now added the inadequate equipment of the Venetians, 4 
the very varied composition of the forces, and the deeply 

1 See *Lettera di Roma of August 17, 1571, in the Doria- 
Pamfili Archives, Rome. Cf. also LADERCHI, 1571, n. 370, 
and Corresp. dipl., IV., 410, 420. The *instructions for Odes- 
calchi in Miscell. Clemente XL, t. 21 1, p. 15, Papal Secret Ar 
chives ; cf. P&METTI, 71. The characteristic head of Odescalchi 
on his tomb in S. Girolamo della Carita is reproduced in Cosmos 
illustr., 1904, 87. The " istruzione data dal card. Farnese ad 
un suo mandato a Civita Vecchia a visitare il sig. D. Giov. 
d Austria quando pass6 con 1 armata " was printed in Rome in 
1888 per nozze Ferrata-Faiella. 

2 See CARINCI, 43 seq, ; HAVEMANN, 130 seq. ; GUGLIELMOTTI, 
174 seq. 

3 See BALAN, VI., 556 seq. ; HAVEMANN, 133 ; GUGLIELMOTTI, 
176 seq. 

* Cf. Colecc. de docum. ined., III., 15 seq, ; Corresp. dipl., 
IV., 420, n. SERRANO, Liga, I., 113, 


rooted fear of the invincible Turkish navy. All this for a long 
time quite paralysed any decisive action. Even when, on 
September 2nd, the fleet was reinforced by 60 Venetian 
ships and the twelve galleys of Doria, 1 the disputes still 
continued. At a review of the three fleets which was held 
on September 8th, it was clearly seen that the Venetian ships 
were not sufficiently equipped with sailors and rowers. This 
defect had to be made good from the Spanish fleet ; Venier 
objected to this, but Colonna was successful in making him 
give way. 2 

After the discussions had been carried on for more than 
three weeks, the departure of the fleet from Messina at last 
took place on September * i6th. Divergent opinions and 
quarrels still made themselves felt among the commanders, 
but all felt that a decisive battle was at hand, and the fleet 
prepared itself by receiving the sacraments from the Capuchins 
and Jesuits who were attached to the expedition. 3 

Divided into four squadrons, the fleet sailed towards Corfu, 
and then reassembled in the harbour of Gomenitsa on the coast 
of Albania. There, as the result of the arbitrary action 
taken by Venier against one of the Spaniards, a quarrel 
broke out with Don John, which, but for the wise intervention 
of Colonna might have had the most serious consequences. 
It was settled that Agostino Barbarigo should take the place 
of Venier. In the meantime scouts had brought information 
that the Turkish fleet was in the harbour of Lepanto, the 
ancient Naupacto, and the following days were spent in 
watchfulness. Then there came the news of the fall of Fama- 
gosta, which had taken place on August ist, of the shameful 
breach of their promises by the Turks, and their cruel murder 
of the heroic Bragadino. The Turks had flayed the un 
fortunate man alive, stuffed his skin, and dressing it in the 

1 Doria had left Civitavecchia on August 24 ; see the *letter 
of A. Zibramonti from Rome, August 25, 1571, Gonzaga Archives, 

8 See GUGLIELMOTTI, 179 seq., 185 seq. ; BALAN, VI., 557 seq. ; 
MOLMENTI, Veniero, 150 seq. 

3 See SERENO, 191 ; HAVEMANN, 134 ; GUGLTEMOTTI, 190. 


Venetian uniform of his office, dragged it through the city ! 
The news of these atrocities spread quickly, and the whole 
fleet thirsted for revenge. 

Having made all ready for battle, the fleet set sail in the 
night of October 6th, in spite of an unfavourable wind, and 
hugging the rocky shores of the islands of the Curzolari, 
known to the ancients as the Echinades, made towards the 
open gulf of Patras. When, on the following morning, it 
had entered the gulf by way of the narrow straits between 
the island of Oxia and Cape Scrofa, Don John, after a hurried 
consultation with Venier, 2 gave the signal to prepare to attack 
by firing a cannon, at the same time hoisting to the mast 
head of his own ship the standard of the Holy League. 3 The 

1 Cf. SERENO, 250 seq. ; HAMMER, II., 414 seq. ; BALAN, VI., 
555 se( l- GUGLIELMOTTI, 1 95 seq. ; A. PODOCATARO, Relazione 
de successi di Famagosta p.p. A. Tessier, Venice, 1876 ; 
AGOSTINO, La perdita di Famagosta, Venice, 1891 ; CATIZZANI, 
Narrazione del terribile assedio e della resa di Famagosta da 
un ms. del capitano Angelo Gatto da Orvieto, Florence, 1887. 
See also the monograph on the life of Bragadino by Rio trans 
lated by K. Zell, 2nd ed. Freiburg, 1874. His country erected 
a monument in its Pantheon of great men, SS. Giovanni e Paolo, 
to the hero, who had borne his martyrdom with Christian forti 
tude. For the siege money coined by Bragadino to pay the 
defenders of Famagosta see LAZARI, Monete de possedimenti 
Veneziani di oltramare e di terrafirma, Venice, 1851. 

1 Cf. MOLMENTI, Veniero, 311. 

8 There is for tne battle of Lepanto plentiful material in original 
documents, TV imphlets and various narratives ; cf. the biblio 
graphy in CICOGNA, Bibl. Venez., Venice, 1847, 118 seqq. ; 
SORANZO, Bibl. Venez., ibid. 1885 seq., 81 seq. ; MANFRONI, 
Marina, 438 seq. ; MOLMENTI, Veniero, 163 seq. ; D AYALA, 
Bibl. milit., 312 ; DURO, Tradiciones infundadas, Madrid, 1888, 
6 33 seq. ; STIRLING-MAXWELL, Don Juan II., App. n. 6, sec. 3a, 
completed in Zeitschrift fur Bucherfreunde, IV. (1900-1901), 
191 seqq. Concerning a hitherto unknown pamphlet on Lepanto 
see Katalog 500, 2nd and 3rd part, Frankfurt, 1907-08, by J. BAR. 
The richest collection of contemporary writings on Lepanto is 
to be found in the Library of the Museo Correr at Venice ; cf. 


priests attached to the fleet gave the general absolution ; 
there followed a short and fervent prayer, and then the cry 
was heard from thousands of voices : Vittoria I Vittoria ! 
Viva Christo ! l 

The opposing forces were very considerable, and approxi 
mately equal. The Turks had 222 galleys, 60 other vessels, 
750 cannon, 34,000 soldiers, 13,000 sailors, and 41,000 slaves 
as rowers ; the Christians had 207 galleys (105 Venetian, 
8 1 Spanish, 12 Papal, and 3 each from Malta, Genoa and 
Savoy), 30 other vessels, 6 great galleys or galleons which 
" seemed like castles," 1,800 cannon, 30,000 soldiers, 12,900 
sailors and 43,000 rowers. 2 

In accordance with the tactics of the time Don John had 
divided his fleet into four squadrons, approximately equal, 
and distinguished by the colour of their standards. The six 
Venetian galleons, which were commanded by Francesco 

Serapeum., 1858, 275. Among recent works the following are 
outstanding : HAMMER, II., 420 seq. ; ROSELL, Hist, del combate 
naval de Lepanto, Madrid, 1853 ; GUGLIELMOTTI, 213 seq. ; 
JURIEN DE LA GRAVIERE, La guerre de Chypre et la bataille de 
Lepante, II., Paris, 1888 (cf. GOTTLOB in Liter. Rundschau, 1889, 
49 seq.) ; MANFRONI, Marina (1897), 487 seq. (cf. Riv. stor., 1898, 
346 seq.} ; DURO, Armada espanola desde la union de los reinos 
de Castilla y Arag6n, II., Madrid, 1898 ; MOLMENTI, Veniero, 
and in Riv. Marittima, 1898 and 1899 ; JAHNS, Handb. der 
Gesch. des Kriegswesen, Leipsic, 1880, 1281 seq. ; SERRANO, 
Liga, I., 133 seq. Cf. also GAVOTTI, La tattica nelle grandi 
battaglie navali, I., Rome, 1898, 182 seq., and NORMANN- 
FRIEDENFELS in Mitteilungen aus dem Gebiet bes Seewesens, 
XXX., Pola, 1902, i seqq. Among the curiosities in the State 
Archives at Simancas is a chart with a plan of the battle from 
the hand of Don John. 

1 See SERENO, 191 ; *Lettera mandata dall armata christ. 
sotto di 8 di ottobre 1571, Doria-Pamfili Archives, Rome ; 

2 Just as the estimates of contemporaries were very various, 
so are the statements of later writers ; see GUGLIEMOTTI, Colonna, 
211 seqq. ; MANFRONI, Marina, 478 seq. ; SERRANO, Liga, I,, 
119 seq., 130 seq. 


Duodo, formed the advance guard, and were intended, with 
their superior artillery to frighten the Turks and throw 
them into disorder. 1 Behind them in line abreast came the 
three first squadrons, the left wing under the command of the 
Venetian admiral Agostino Barbarigo, the right under the 
Spanish admiral Doria, and the centre under Don John. 
On either side of his flagship came Colonna and Venier. The 
fourth squadron, under Alvaro de Bazan, Marquis of Santa 
Cruz, 2 formed the rear-guard. 

The left wing of the Turkish fleet was under the command 
of the Calabrian renegade Uluds AH (Occhiali), 3 Pasha of 
Algiers, the right wing was commanded by Mohammed 
Saulak, governor of Alexandria, and the centre by the com- 
mander-in-chief, the Grand Admiral, Muesinsade Ali. 

About noon the wind, which had been favourable to the 
Turks, dropped. While the sun shone out of a cloudless 
sky, the two fleets met, the one under the standard of the 
Crucified, the other under the purple standard of the sultan, 
with the name of Allah embroidered in letters of gold. The 
Turks endeavoured to outflank the enemy at both ends of the 
line. In order to prevent this, Doria extended his line in 
such a way as to leave a gap between the right wing and the 
centre, through which the enemy could easily pass. While 
at this point the battle took a dangerous turn, and Doria, 
by the skilful seamanship of the Turks, was driven with 50 
galleys towards the open sea, on the left wing it was developing 
more successfully, There the Venetians were fighting 
against a superior force with equal bravery and success, 
although their leader, Barbarigo, was struck in the eye by an 
arrow, and fell mortally wounded. 

In the centre the fight was more evenly contested. There 
Don John, who had on board his ship 300 veteran Spanish 

1 Each galleon had 36 large cannon and 64 smaller pieces to 
throw balls of stone ; see G. MOLLI, Le navi di Lepanto, in Cosmos 
illust. 1904, 179. 

Revista general de la Marina, special number, Madrid, 1888. 

8 For Occhiali cf. JORGA, III., 226, and POMETTI, 19, n. i. 


soldiers, 1 made straight for the flagship of AH, which carried 
400 janissaries. Close to him the galleys of Colonna, Re- 
quesens, Venier, and the Princes of Parma and Urbino, took 
a vigorous part in the bloody struggle, which for a long time 
hung in the balance. The death of the Turkish Grand Ad 
miral Ali, whose rich galley was carried by storm by the 
soldiers of Don John and Colonna, decided the battle at about 
four in the afternoon. When the Turks realized that their 
centre was broken, their left wing also gave way, and in con 
sequence Uluds had to break off his struggle with Doria, and 
think of his own safety, managing to retire, though with heavy 
losses, towards Santa Maura and Lepanto with 40 galleys. 2 

Although the exhaustion of the rowers, and the springing 
up of a violent storm, prevented a protracted pursuit of the 
enemy, the victory, of the Christians was nevertheless com 
plete. Debris of ships and dead bodies covered the sea 
far and wide. About 8,000 Turks were killed and 10,000 
taken prisoners ; 117 of their galleys fell into the hands of the 
Christians, and 50 were sunk or burned. The victors lost 
12 galleys and had 7,500 killed, and as many more wounded. 
Numerous trophies, such as purple standards with inscrip 
tions in gold and silver, and stars and the moon, and a great 

1 For the galley of Don John at Lepanto see BEER in Jahrbuch 
der kunsthistor. Samml. des osterr. Kaiser hauses, XV., I seqq. 

8 In the Christian fleet the right wing had suffered the most, a 
thing which the Venetians attributed to the leadership of Doria, 
nor would they accept his justification of himself, seeing in him 
a traitor, Among modern writers GUGLIELMOTTI (p. 228 seq.) 
and BALAN (VI., 561 seq.) pass judgment on Doria with great, 
and excessive, harshness. Nevertheless, the apologia for Doria 
made by B. VEROGGIO (Gianandrea Doria alia battaglia di 
Lepanto, Genoa, 1886) is not convincing (cf. NERI in Arch. stor. 
Ital. 5th Series, I., 273 seq. ; see also MANFRONI, Lega, 355 seq. 
and Marina, 494 seq.) ; the same holds good of the defence (see 
MANFRONI in Rassegna naz., CXX. [1901], July l) attempted by 
GAVOTTI (Le battaglie navali della republ. di Geneva, Rome, 
1900). Even though Doria s conduct was not actually traitorous, 
it nevertheless did great harm to the Christian armada. 


part of the enemy s artillery, fell into the hands of the 
Christians : 42 of the prisoners belonged to the most dis 
tinguished Turkish families, among them the governor of 
Negropont and two sons of the Grand Admiral Ali. The 
most valuable prize was 12,000 Christian slaves who had 
been forced to serve in the galleys, among the number 2,000 
Spaniards, who owed their freedom to the victory. 1 

Much noble blood had been spilt. While the Spaniards 
had to grieve the loss of Juan de Cordova, Alfonso de Cardena, 
and Juan Ponce de Leon, the Venetians had lost twenty 
members of the first families of the Republic. Fabiano 
Graziani, the brother of the historian of the war, had fallen 
by Colonna s side on one of the Papal galleys. Among the 
wounded were Venier, and a genius as yet unknown to the 
world, the poet, Cervantes. 2 

As was the case with Spain and Venice, the nobles of Naples, 
Calabria, Sicily, and above all, the Papal States, had covered 
themselves with glory. Together with Alessandro Farnese, 
Prince of Parma, and Francesco Maria della Rovere, Prince 
of Urbino, there were among the combatants Sforza, Count of 
Santa Fiora, Ascanio della Corgna, Paolo Giordano Orsini 
of Bracciano, Virginio Orsini of Vicovaro, Orazio Orsini of 
Bomarzo, Pompeo Colonna, Gabrio Serbelloni, Troilo Savelli, 
Onorato Caetani, Lelio de Massimi, Michele Bonelli, and the 
Frangipani, Santa Croce, Capizuchi, Ruspoli, Gabrielli, 
Malvezzi, Oddi, and Berardi. 3 It is with justifiable pride 
that Italian history recalls the glorious part taken by repre- 

1 When certain avaricious men wished to treat these Christian 
prisoners as slaves, Pius V. forbade it under pain of excom 
munication ; see BERTOLOTTI, La schiavitu in Roma, 42 seq. ; 
cf. MARGRAF, 209. 

Marina, 4^8 seq. The names of the more "distinguished prisoners 
in THEINER, Annal. eccl., I., 462. Cf. Rosi in Arch. d. Soc. 
Rom., XXL, 141 seq. 

8 The account of Guglielmotti (loc. cit.) has been completed in 
various respects by recent researches : see MONTECHIARO, La 
Sicilia nella battaglia di Lepanto, Pisa, 1886 ; MULAS, I Sardi 


sentatives of every part of the Appenine peninsula in that naval 
battle which was the greatest in the memory of man. 1 

Pius V. had kept his eyes fixed on the east with indescrib 
able anxiety. His thoughts were ever with the Christian 
fleet, while his hopes far outstripped it. Day and night 
he recommended it to the protection of the Almighty in 
fervent prayer. As soon as he had received news of the 
arrival of Don John at Messina, the Pope redoubled his 
penances and alms. He had a firm belief in the power of 
prayer, and especially of the Rosary. 2 At a consistory on 
August 27th the Pope asked the Cardinals to fast one day 
in the week, and to give extraordinary alms, as it was only 
by penance that they could hope to obtain the mercy of God 
in such a time of anxiety. 3 His Holiness, so the Spanish 

a Lepanto, Cagliari, 1887 ; FOSSATI, La Riviera e la battaglia 
di Lepanto, Sal6, 1890 ; CONFORTI, I Napolitani a Lepanto, 
Naples, 1880 ; ARENAPRIMO, La Sicilia nella battaglia di Lepanto, 
Messina, 1892 (cf. Arch. stor. SiciL, XVIII., 157 seq.) ; DE 
LORENZO, Monografie Reggione e Calabresi, Siena, 1 896 ; TOMAS- 
SETTI, I Romani a Lepanto, in Cosmos illustr., II., Bergamo, 
1908, 78 seq. ; MOLMENTI, I Veneziani a Lepanto, ibid. 93 seq. ; 
CONFORTI, I Napolitani a Lepanto, ibid. 109 seq. ; POMETTI, 
I Calabresi a Lepanto, ibid. 133 seq. ; for the part taken by 
Lucca see LAZZARESCHI, 14 seq. ; for that of A. Farnese see 
Tosi in Arte e Storia, XXIX., Florence, 1910, and CAPELLI in 
Arch. Farm., II., 1-2; cf. Quellen und Forsch., XVI., 182. For 
O. Caetani, besides CARINCI, Lettere, cf. GIANNELLI in Rassegna 
naz., 1913, June. A new weapon, a kind of Greek fire invented 
by Gabrio Serbelloni, did good service in the battle ; see the 
"report of C. Capilupi concerning the fleet of the league, which 
he sent to his brother Alessandro on October 3, 1571, in Cod. 
105 of the Capilupi Library, Mantua. 

1 See Adriani XXL, 5. 

1 Cf. GRATIANUS, 230 ; CATENA, 34 ; Corresp. dipl., IV., 415 ; 
FALLOUX, Pie V., chapt. 22. 

8 See Ada consist, card. S. Severinae in LADERCHI, 1571, n. 379, 
and in Studi e docum., XXIV., 87 seq. Cf. the "report of A. 
Zibramonti from Rome, September i, 1571, according to which 
the Pope desired the Cardinals to say at least two masses a week 
for victory. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. 


ambassador reported on September 26th, 1571, fasts three 
days a week, and spends many hours every day in prayer ; 
he has also ordered prayers in all the churches. 1 In order 
to make Rome safe from an unexpected attack by Turkish 
corsairs, the Pope had ordered, at the beginning of 
September, that the fortifications of the Borgo should be 
completed. 2 

It was but rarely that any news was received of the Christian 
armada, and the Curia all the time remained in painful sus 
pense. It came, therefore, as a relief when they heard at 
last at the beginning of October of the arrival of the fleet 
of the league at Corfu. 3 When the news came, on October 
I3th, that the Turkish fleet was at Lepanto, and that that of 
the league had sailed on September 3oth, 4 there could be no 
doubt that the encounter was at hand. The Pope, although 
he had the strongest confidence in the victory of the Christian 
arms, 5 ordered that extraordinary prayer should be made 
day and night in all the monasteries of Rome, and himself 
set the example to all by doing so himself. 6 His prayer was 
at last to be heard. In the night between October 2ist and 
22nd, there arrived a courier who had been sent by the nuncio 
in Venice, Facchinetti, who brought to Cardinal Rusticucci, 
who was in charge of the secretariate of state, a letter from 
the nuncio containing the news brought to Venice on October 
1 9th by Gioffre Giustiniani of the great victory that had been 

1 Corresp. dipl., IV., 442. 

1 *" S.S t& ha dato ordine che sia finita la fortificazione di Borgo." 
Report of A. Zibramonti from Rome, September 5, 1571, Gonzaga 
Archives, Mantua. Cf. Vol. XVII., p. 126. 

8 See *Avviso di Roma of October 6, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. I28b, 
Vatican Library. Cf. Corresp. dipl., IV., 450. 

4 See *Avviso di Roma of October 13, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. I32b, 
Vatican Library. 

5 See the report of Gondola in VOINOVICH, 598. 

6 See I. A. GUARNERIUS, De bello Cyprio, in LADERCHI, 1571, 
n. 420 ; WERRO in Zeitschrift fiir schtveis. Kirchengesch., 1907, 


won at Lepanto under the skilful command of Don John. 1 
The Cardinal had the Pope woken at once, who broke out 
into tears of joy, saying the words of the aged Simeon : Nunc 
dimittis servum tuum in pace. He at once got up to thank 
God on his knees, and then returned to bed, but could not 
sleep from excitement and joy. 2 On the following morning 
he went to St. Peter s for renewed prayers of gratitude, and 
then received the ambassadors and Cardinals, to whom he 
said that they must now strain every nerve during the coming 
year to carry on the war against the Turks. 3 On this occasion, 
in allusion to the name of Don John, he cited the words 
of Holy Scripture : Fuit homo missus a Deo, cui nomen erat 

All Rome shared the jubilation of Pius V. The holy 
Pope was in a state of exaltation. 4 The Romans were not 
slow to celebrate the victory with salvos of artillery and 
fire-works, even though Pius V. thought that the expenditure 
might have been better employed in having masses said for 
the souls of the fallen ; instead he granted a special indul 
gence. On October 23rd a courier from the Venetian govern 
ment brought detailed reports of the great battle. 5 " The 
Turks " Cardinal Mula wrote in jubilation, " will not get 

1 See the *report of Vine. Matuliani of October 24, 1571, State 
Archives, Bologna, the *report of Arco of October 27, 1571, 
State Archives, Vienna, the letter of Facchinetti in VALENSISE, 
171, and that of Zuniga in Corresp. dipl., IV., 488. 

2 See the *Avvisi di Roma of October 24 and 27, 1571, Urb. 
1042, p. 137, I37b, Vatican Library. Cf. Tiepolo in MUTINELLI, 
I., 98 seg. 

8 Corresp. dipl., IV., 489. 

4 See GRATIANUS, 230. 

5 See *Avvisi di Roma of October 24 and 27, 1571, loc. cit. 
*" To-morrow morning the Pope will celebrate a mass of thanks 
giving," A. Zibramonti announces on October 27, 1571, Gonzaga 
Archives, Mantua. An *Avviso dated Venice, October 22, 
1571, which deals solely with Lepanto, is in the Doria-Pamfili 
Archives, Rome, together with a full collection of Avvisi dealing 
with the Turkish war, 1560-1571 (Cod. 76, 21). 



over this blow, and the Christian fleet is mistress of the seas." 1 
On October 28th Pius V. celebrated a solemn High Mass of 
thanksgiving in St. Peter s. He had intended also to ponti 
ficate at a requiem for the fallen or the following day, but 
was so exhaustied that he had to leave it to Cardinal Otto 
Truchsess. 2 

On October 22nd the Papal chancery had begun to send 
news to all parts of the world of the great event. The three 
admirals of the Christian fleet received enthusiastic letters of 
congratulation, while, by the express command of Pius V., 3 
the Catholic powers were urgently implored to profit in every 
way from " the greatest victory ever won against the in 
fidels " ; all must have a share in it. Letters in this sense 
were sent to the Emperor, the Kings of Spain, France, and 
Poland, to the Italian states, and to the ecclesiastical and 
secular princes of the German Empire. 4 The Emperor received 

1 *" Si pu6 dire che il Turco non restaurera mai piu armata 
marittima et ha perduti li migliori soldati . . . L armata 
Christiana e padrona di tutto il mare." Mula to Maximilian 
II., from Rome, October 27, 1571, State Archives, Vienna, Hof- 
korresp., fasc. 7. 

1 See the *letter of a Jesuit in Rome to one of his colleagues in 
Germany, December n, 1571, in Cod. 1237, P- IO 5> of the Muni 
cipal Library, Troves, which says : " Sequenti vero die illustris- 
simus cardinalis Augustanus cecinit missam pro defunctis classis 
christianae cum magna solemnitate, eamque cantaturus fuisset 
Pontifex, sed forte senio et fatigatione praepeditus facere non 
potuit, ut et alias Pontifex, quandocunque impeditur, sacri 
cantandi munus illustrissimo cardinali Augustano committere 
solet, indicium certe amoris ac benevolentiae singular! illustr. 
cardinalis pietati ac religioni debitae." 

* See Tiepolo in MUTINELLI, I., 100. 

4 The *briefs to Philip II. and Charles IX. in vol. 26 of the 
Archives of Briefs, Rome, are dated October 22, 1571, and those 
to the Italian states October 23 ; ibid, the *brief to Venice of 
October 24. The original of the brief to Philip II. in the Archives 
at Simancas bears the date October 25 ; see Corresp. dipl., IV., 
492 ; ibid. 493 seq. another, autograph, brief to Philip II., in 
Italian, dated October 28. The brief to the King of Portugal, 


three ; the first dated October 24th, and the second and 
third November ist and loth. In these letters Maximilian 
was directly invited to join the league, a matter which 
Fernando Mendoza was sent to discuss with him in a special 
mission. 1 What far-reaching plans filled the mind of Pius 
V. may be seen from the fact that on November I7th he sent 
to the King of Portugal letters to be forwarded to the Shah 
of Persia, the King of Ethiopia, and the sheik Mutahat, 
prince of Arabia Felix. 2 If he could but succeed in winning 
over these rivals of the Ottoman Empire, there seemed to be 
a possibility, not only of entirely driving the hereditary enemy 
of Christendom out of Europe, but even of winning back the 
Holy Sepulchre. 

A necessary preliminary to such action on the part of the 
eastern nations, however, was the complete unity of the 
Christian west, and especially of the nations which had 
entered the league. After all that had gone before, it was 
easy to foresee serious difficulties in this respect. 

While fresh particulars of the battle continued to arrive, 3 
the Pope was waiting, with an impatience that can well be 
understood, for exact details of the fruits of the victory 
won by the fleets of the league on October yth. At first it 
was reported that the fleet would go on to the Morea, where 
it was said that the Christian population was ripe for rebellion. 
Others thought that an attack would be made on the fortresses 
near Lepanto, or on the important island of Negroponte, 
which was not well defended. On November 5th, it was 
learned that none of these things had been done. Letters 

of October 26, 1571, in LADERCHI, 1571, n. 459. According to 
t. 26 of the Archives of Briefs, Rome, on the same date "letters 
were sent to Don John, Venier, M. A. Colonna, and Genoa, and 
on the 27 to the German princes. For the brief to Albert V. 
of Bavaria see JANNSEN-PASTOR, IV. 15 " 1(i , 327. 

1 See SCHWARZ, Brief wechsel, 187 seq., 189 seq. 

2 See GOUBAU, 414-426; LADERCHI, 1571, n. 462 seq. ; Corpo 
dipl. Portug., X., 424. 

8 Cf. the "report of A. Zibramonti of November 3, 1571, Gon- 
zaga Archives, Mantua. 


dated October 2yth from Corfu announced that the fleet of 
the league was on the point of dispersing ; Don John was going 
to Sicily, the Venetians, partly home and partly to Crete, 
and Colonna to Rome, where the allies intended to make their 
plans for the campaign of the following year. This, it was 
said, was due to the fact that it had been found impossible 
to come to an agreement about the division of the future 
spoils of war, and especially of the Morea. The French am 
bassador in Rome spoke scoffingly of the division of the bear s 
skin which had not yet been won. 1 

Soon afterwards it was learned in Rome that Don John 
and the Venetians had not been able to come to terms even 
about the Turkish nobles captured at Lepanto, a question 
which involved the payment of large ransoms, and that they 
had decided to refer the matter to the Pope for arbitration ; 
Marcantonio Colonna would shortly arrive in the Eternal City. 2 

The arrival of the Papal admiral was still delayed for a 
time. He had first sent to the Pope, in order to give him a 
full report, Pompeo Colonna and the knight, Romegasso, 
who were received at a long audience on November ist. 3 On 
the I4th there arrived Alessandro Farnese and Santa Fiora, 
and on the following day many others who had taken part 
in the battle ; Michele Bonelli arrived on the 2oth. 4 

1 See CHARRIERE, III., 191 seq., 193. Later on Marcantonio 
Colonna described to the Venetian ambassador in Rome the 
disgraceful quarrels after the victory ; see the latter s report 
of November 26, 1571, in MUTINELLI, I., 103. Cf. BROSCH, 
Drei Grosswesire, 22 seq. ; SERRANO, Liga, I., 139 seq. 

* See CHARRIERE, III., 194. The more distinguished Turkish 
prisoners came to Rome on March 8, 1572 ; see Rosi in Arch. d. 
Soc. Rom., XXI., 141 seq. ; XXIV., 7. For the plans made by 
Venice to kill the prisoners and the Sultan see LAMANSKY, Secrets 
d e"tat de Venise, Petersburg, 1884, 83 seq., go. Cf. GRATIANUS, 226. 

8 See *Avviso di Roma of November 7, 1571, Urb 1042, p. 
i46b, Vatican Library. 

4 Cf. *Avvisi di Roma of November 14, 17 and 24, 1571, ibid. 
I43b, 149, I54b. Michele Bonelli had been appointed "capitaneus 
generalis omnium legionar. status eccles." by a *brief of September 
J 5 *570 (Editti in the Casanatense Library, Rome). 


The coming of Colonna, which was definitely expected on 
the iyth was put off, principally because, in spite of his 
refusal, 1 the Romans insisted upon according him a solemn 
triumph, to prepare for which time was required. 2 This 
desire of the Romans was very understandable, for the noblest 
youth of the city had taken a glorious part in the battle, 
and a scion of one of its most famous families had commanded 
the Papal fleet at Lepanto, and had contributed materially 
to the victory ; 3 such things brought strongly to their minds 
the glories of ancient Rome. It was suggested that Colonna 
should make his entry in the guise of an Emperor of ancient 
times, in a gilt chariot, and crowned with laurel, but this 
roused the jealousy of certain persons who pointed out that 
such an honour could only belong to the commander-in-chief, 
Don John. At the same time it did not commend itself to a 
Pope like Pius V. and to others of similar views that there 
should be this revival of an ancient triumph, and this led 
to the alteration of the original programme, 4 which never 
theless remained a very splendid affair, as Pius V. hoped 
that the honour paid to Colonna would incite his other feuda 
tories to equally loyal and chivalrous service of the Church. 5 

1 See *Avviso di Roma of November 21, 1571, loc. cit. 145, 
and the "report of Arco of November 24, 1571, State Archives, 

2 For the consultations and deliberations see the acta in tne 
Historical Archives of the Capitol, used by GNOLI in Cosmos 
illustr., 1904, 147 seq. See also RODOCANACHI, Capitole 115. 

8 In a *letter to Pius V. of November 3, 1571, Don John praised 
the bravery of Colonna. Varia polit., 89 (now 90), p. 107, Papal 
Secret Archives. 

4 Cf. GRATIANUS, 231 ; SERENO, 229 seq. ; CHARRIEUE, III., 
195 ; LADERCHI, 1571, n. 449 ; GNOLI, loc. cit. See also the 
*Avvisi di Roma of November 22 and 24, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 
I55b seq., 160, Vatican Library, the *Avviso of November 30, 
1571, in the Doria-Pamfili Archives, Rome, and the "reports 
of Arco of November 24 and December i, 1571, State Archives, 

5 See *Avviso di Roma of November 22, 1571, loc. cit. 


Since, on account of the necessary preparations, Colonna s 
entry had been postponed until December 4th, on November 
22nd the Pope caused his commander to come from Marino 
to Rome, where he took up his abode in the Vatican until 
the next day. 1 There was much excitement and stir in the 
Eternal City at that time ; every day more of those who had 
fought in the battle of Lepanto were arriving with prisoners 
and booty, especially Turkish standards, pieces of which 
were exposed as relics. 2 

1 See *Avviso di Roma of November 24, 1571, loc. cit., and the 
*report of Arco of the same date, State Archives, Vienna. 

1 See the *Avvisi di Roma of November 3 and 22, 1571, Urb. 
1042, p. 146, i59b, Vatican Library. In several places in Rome 
there are still preserved Turkish standards captured at the battle 
of Lepanto, e.g. in the choir of S. Maria Maggiore, the choir of 
S. M. Araceli, and near the High Altar of S. M. della Vittoria 
(the latter has since the restorations of 1888 been enclosed with 
five Christian standards in a case) ; cf. Mem. stor. d. mirac. imag. 
d. Mad. d. Vittoria, Rome, 1881. One of the captured standards 
was sent by Pius V. to Sutri to the church of S. Tolomeo (at one 
time the church of the Dominicans, but now that of the seminary). 
Standards captured by the Venetians adorn the " Sala delle 
armi " at the Arsenal in Venice (cf. G. DE LUCIA, La sala d armi 
nel Museo dell arsenale di Venezia, in Riv. Maritt., 1908). The 
banner of the contingent of the Duke of Savoy at Lepanto is to 
be found in the church of the convent of S. Domenico at Turin 
(see dell Acqua, 82), that of the " archibugieri " of Sardinia at 
Cagliari (see Arch. stor. Napolit., XXXIV., 544.) For the standard 
of M.A. Colonna at Gaeta see supra, p. 381. According to GRE- 
GOROVIUS (Wanderjahre, IV., 362) M. A. Colonna placed trophies 
of the Turkish war in the castle of the Orsini at Avezzano. The 
beautiful cross given by Pius V. to Don John when he set out for 
the war is now in the sacristy of S. Severino at Naples. The 
church of S. Pietro a Maiella at Naples has the picture " S. Maria 
succurre miseris " to which Don John had recourse during the 
battle. This picture is to be seen in the sky in the interesting 
representation of the battle which is there, and shows the moment 
when Don John sank the ship of Ali Pasha (see the illustrations 
in Cosmos illustr., 1904, 125-130). The Knights of St. Stephen 
(whose archives are now in the State Archives, Pisa) adorned with 


All Rome was in a stir when the bright and sunny day of 
December 4th dawned. 1 Thousands of people had gathered 

Turkish trophies and a painting of the battle of Lepanto, the 
roof of their church of S. Stefano ai Cavalieri, which was built at 
Pisa, 1565-1596. The battle of Lepanto in the convent of the 
Dominicans at Mondovl is reproduced in LAZZARESCHI, 17. In 
the Court Museum, Vienna, may be seen the state sword of Don 
John and the cuirass of A. Barbarigo, and in the naval arsenal 
at Pola several Turkish banners captured at Lepanto. The best 
relics of the great naval battle are to be found in Spain ; cf. 
ROSELL, Combate (passim] and DURO, Tradiciones infundadas, 
Madrid, 1888. The standard of the league at Toledo has been 
described on p. 415 ; until 1616 it was at the Escorial, where in 
the church is still shown the private door, by means of which 
according to tradition a messenger announced the victory to 
Philip II. while he was assisting at vespers. Among the relics 
of Don John preserved in the palace of the Escorial, some repre 
sentations of the battle which are important both from the point 
of view of naval matters and of costume, are specially noteworthy. 
Of the same kind is the picture which came from the Dominican 
convent at Malaga, and is now in the Sala de la marina hist6rica 
of the Museo Naval at Madrid. Other relics are preserved in the 
Santa Cruz palace at Madrid. In the principal hall of the armoury 
at Madrid may be seen several Spanish standards from the battle 
of Lepanto, together with the arms and garments of the Turkish 
Grand Admiral, Ali Pasha, with a Turkish banner and other 
trophies. A Turkish banner captured at Lepanto is still in the 
church of the monastery at Montserrat. An ancient fresco 
representing the battle is on the great staircase of the archbishop s 
palace at Alcala (now the archivium). Six standards from the 
galleys of Don John came to the Czartoryski Museum at Cracow, 
from the possessions of the Duke of Osuna. For the Turkish 
banners at Lucerne see App. n. 12 (January 10, 1572). 

1 For the triumphal entry of Colonna cf. FRANC. ALBERTONIO, 
L entrata che fece 1 ecc. sig. M. A. Colonna in Roma, Viterbo, s.a. 
[1571], with variants and an addition in CANCELLIERI, Possessi, 
112 seq. See also Tiepolo in MUTINELLI, I., 104, and the full 
*Avviso di Roma of December 5, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 1570-158, 
Vatican Library, with the remark, which can be accounted for 
by the curtailment of the original programme : " Questo spetta- 


along the Via Appia, where, near the basilica of St. Sebastian, 
Girolamo Bonelli and the Swiss Guard, the Senator and the 
Conservatori, awaited the arrival of Colonna, who was to 
come from Marino. Unarmed, and with no decoration but 
the Golden Fleece, Marcantonio rode upon a white horse 
given him by the Pope ; a black silk mantle lined with fur 
covered his tunic of cloth of gold, and on his head he wore 
a black velvet cap, with a white plume fastened with a pearl 

Amid scenes of extraordinary rejoicing, the clash of trum 
pets, and the firing of guns, the cortege was formed, in which 
were to be seen the gaily coloured banners of all the city 
corporations, and the 13 Rioni of Rome. As can easily be 
understood, the chief interest was excited by the 170 Turkish 
prisoners, dressed in red and yellow, in chains, and guarded 
by halbardiers. In front of them rode a Roman in Turkish 
dress dragging the standard of the sultan in the dust. At 
the side of the prisoners walked a hermit, who had taken part 
in the battle, and whom the people, by whom he was greatly 
loved, called Fate bene per voi, from the words which he was 
always saying. 1 The standard of the Church was borne by 
Romegasso, and that of the city of Rome by Giovan Giorgio 
Cesarini, with whom rode Pompeo Colonna and Onorato 
Caetani, and the two nephews of the Pope, Michele and 
Girolamo Bonelli ; then came Marcantonio Colonna, who was 
rapturously acclaimed by all, and was followed by the Senator 
of Rome and the Conservatori, and a large number of his 
friends and comrades. The Papal light cavalry brought 
the procession to an end. 

As Charles V. had done 35 years before, so Marcantonio 
Colonna, entering the city by the Porta S. Sebastiano, and 

colo era piu in opinione che non e riuscito infatti." Cf. BERTO- 
LOTTI, La schiavitu, 7. Among recent writers see GUGLIELMOTTI, 
Colonna, 265 seq. ; RODOCANACHI, Capitole, 115 seq. 

1 An *Avviso di Roma of December i, 1571, loc. cit., p. 154, 
informs us that on the previous day " il fate bene per voi " with 
a turban on his head, had taken to the Pope some " pezzi delli 
stendardi " taken at Lepanto. 


passing the Baths of Caracalla, and under the triumphal 
arches of Constantine and Titus, climbed the hill of the 
Capitol, and came to S. Marco, passing thence along the Via 
Papale to the Bridge of St. Angelo. On the way he came 
to the statue of Pasquino, which was gaily decorated ; in 
the left hand was the head of a Turk, with blood pouring 
from the mouth, and in the right a drawn sword. 1 

After praying in St. Peter s at the tomb of the Prince of 
the Apostles, and offering, in allusion to his own name, a 
column of silver, Colonna proceeded to the Vatican, where 
the Pope received him, accompanied by 25 Cardinals, with 
the greatest honour. He exhorted the victor of Lepanto 
to give the glory to God, Who, despite our sins, had been so 
kind and merciful. 2 

When in the evening Colonna returned to his palace near 
SS. Apostoli, the streets of the city, which were illuminated 
as for a festa, were thronged with exultant crowds. During 
the day the Romans had read with pride and hope the highly 
significant inscriptions which had been placed on the Arches 
of Constantine and Titus, those ancient memorials of the 
subjection of the east by the west. The inscription on the 
Arch of Titus, the monument of the subjection of Palestine, 
called Jerusalem to rejoice because a Roman Pope had freed 
the city which a Roman Emperor had placed in fetters. 
Of the three inscriptions at the Arch of Constantine, that on 
the right recorded the victory at Ponte Milvio, that on the 
left the victory won af Lepanto by the Pope in conjunction 
with Philip II. and Venice, while that in the centre expressed 
the hope that now the way lay open to the conquest of Con 

On this occasion there was a complete absence of all traces 
of pagan antiquity, such as had been used on similar occasions 
in Rome throughout the period of the Renaissance down 
to the time of Julius III. How different was the spirit which 
now prevailed in the Eternal City was also shown on the 

1 See *Avviso di Roma of December 5, 1571, loc. cit., pp. I57b- 
158, Vatican Library. 

2 See ibid. 


occasion of the reception which was given to the victor of 
Lepanto by the senate at the Capitol nine days later. This 
was entirely confined to the church of S. Maria Araceli, on 
the great door of which, all decorated with Turkish standards, 
could be seen the following inscription, composed entirely 
in accordance with the spirit of the Catholic restoration : 
The thanksgiving for their successes which of old the pagan 
sages offered in their madness on the Capitol to the idols, 
the Christian hero who to-day comes to the Araceli, now gives 
with pious devotion in return for his splendid victory, to the 
true God, to Christ the Redeemer, and to His most glorious 
Mother." 1 The one trace of Renaissance days were the 
magnificent tapestries of Cardinal Este in the church, repre 
senting the victory of Scipio over Hannibal. At the mass 
of thanksgiving Colonna offered as an ex voto Christo victori 
a silver rostral column about four feet in height. At the close 
of the celebrations dowries were given to 75 poor girls. This 
had been asked for by Colonna in accordance with the wishes 
of the Pope. The money which would have been expended 
on the customary banquet was to be devoted to works of 
Christian charity. 2 

The celebrated latinist Marc Antoine Muret, in the sermon 
which he preached in S. Maria Araceli on December I3th, 
described the victory of Lepanto as the result of the tears 
and prayers of the Pope, adding that while the Holy Father 
like Moses had been imploring the assistance of heaven, an 
other Josue had overcome the Amalakites. Muret called 

1 " Quas olim gentiles doctores idolis pro re bene gesta in 
Capitolio stulte agebant, eas nunc ad Coeli aram Christianas 
victor ascendens vero Deo Christo Redemptori eiusque gloriosis- 
simae matri pro gloriosa religiose et pie agit haberque gratias." 

* See *Avvisi di Roma of December 12 and 15, 1571, Urb. 1042, 
pp. 162, i62b, 436, Vatican Library. A picture of the rostral 
column in CASIMIRO, Aracoeli, 329, and MAES, II primo trofeo 
della croce eretto da Costantino nel Foro Romano, Rome, 1901, 58. 
Cf. L. CENTURIONI, Columna rostrata seu plausus triumphales 
M. A. Columnae, Rome, 1633. For the Este tapestries see 
Kunsthistor. Jahrbuch des osterreich Kaiserhauses, XXII., 195. 


upon Colonna to liberate Greece, Constantinople and Jeru 
salem from the yoke of the Turks, so that Rome, the centre 
of the empire of the world and of the faith, might under the 
pontificate of Pius V., and by the help of a Roman hero, add 
new laurels to its standards. 1 

Both Colonna and the Pope were well aware how far off 
they were as yet from the attainment of their grand purpose 
of the destruction of the Ottoman power, and both of them 
were so closely in agreement as to the steps to be undertaken, 
that Pius V. associated his experienced admiral with the 
Cardinals who had been appointed to deal with the question 
of the league, who, from December loth onwards almost 
every day held two meetings 2 with the representatives of 
Spain, Requesens and Pacheco, and the envoys of Venice, 
often lasting five hours. 3 Under pain of excommunication 
reserved to the Pope everything was kept absolutely secret, 
as the sultan had sent Italian speaking spies to Rome. 4 

In the course of the consultations held by the Pope s orders 
during the months of October and November, the problem of 
providing the necessary funds had been all-important ; 6 

1 The discourse was often reprinted ; e.g. it is in MAFFEI, Vita 
di Pio V., Rome, 1712, 360 seq. 

2 Cf. the *Avvisi di Roma of December 12, 15, 22 and 29, 1571 
(loc. cit. p. 162, i62b, i64b, 169, 462b), which bring out the secrecy 
of the discussions. See also POMETTI, 73. 

8 See *Avvisi di Roma of December 17, 1571, and January 30, 
1572, Urb. 1042, p. 437b ; 1043, p. 17, Vatican Library. 

4 See the *report of A. Zibramonti from Rome, January 27, 
1572, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. Cf. the *Avviso di Roma of 
January 30, 1572, loc. cit. 

6 These conferences as well were kept as secret as possible ; 
sometimes the Pope presided at them ; they were held very 
frequently, for the most part at the house of Morone. Cf. *Avvisi 
di Roma of October 20, November 10, December I and 8, 1571, 
LTrb. 1042, pp. I35b, 140, 151, I53b, loc. cit. ; *report of Arco 
of December i, 1571, State Archives Vienna. The outcome of 
the conferences was the bull of December 3 1571 (in LADERCHI, 
1571, n. 469), and the mission of Odescalchi to the Italian princes 
(see CATENA, 210), who, in *briefs dated December 27, 1571, 


but now they were concerned principally with the extent of 
the campaign to be undertaken in the following spring ; 
and with regard to this the representatives, both of Spain 
and Venice, made little attempt to conceal the jealousy and 
dislike which they entertained for each other. The private 
interests of the two allies came out so strongly that almost 
any concerted action became problematical. The Venetians 
wished to make use of the league, not only to recover Cyprus, 
but also to make fresh conquests in the Levant. Philip 
II., on the other hand, who was averse to any strengthening 
of the Republic of St. Mark, ordered Requesens to declare 
that the first duty of the league was to take action against 
the Berber states of Africa, in order that these might come 
into the possession of Spain. The Venetians saw in this 
proposal a trap to prevent them from recovering Cyprus, 
as well as to expose them to the risk of losing Corfu as well, 
while their fleet was engaged in fighting against the Berber 
states on behalf of the King of Spain. 1 At Venice it was 
looked upon as certain that Philip II. intended to get as much 
use as possible out of the league for his own ends. It cannot 
be decided with any certainty how far the complaints which 
they made to this effect were justified. In order to pass a 
just judgment on the King of Spain we must not lose sight 
of the attitude of France, whose government had been shame 
less enough, immediately after the battle of Lepanto, to 
propose to the sultan a direct alliance against Spain. Philip 
II. was well informed of the negotiations which France was 
carrying on, not only with the sultan, but also with the 

were invited to give their assistance against the Turks ; see 
Arm. 49, t. 19, p. 583 seq., Papal Secret Archives. A * Brief to 
Lucca, of December 3, 1571, in the Archives of Briefs, Rome ; 
another, of December 16, 1571, is mentioned by LAZZARESCIII, 19. 
1 See GRATIANUS, 243 seq., who is very well informed on this 
point. Cf. Tiepolo in ALBERI, II., 4, 234 ; GUGLIELMOTTI, 
297 seq. ; MANFRONI, Lega, 356 seq. The " Commissione data 
dal doge A. Mocenigo a P. Tiepolo, ambasc. straord. a Roma li 
15 November, 1571, in proposito della lega " was published by. 
Cicogna at Venice in 1845. 


Huguenots, the leaders of the revolt in the Netherlands, 
and Elizabeth of England. He had therefore to take into 
account the possibility of a simultaneous attack on the part 
of a French, Netherland, English and Turkish alliance. It 
certainly was not only jealousy of Venice which influenced 
the Catholic King. 1 At the same time Don John admitted 
that it was contrary to the terms of the league that they 
should give up the war against the sultan in favour of an 
expedition in Africa. 2 

In contrast to the opposing interests of the Spaniards 
and Venetians, Pius V. continued to keep before him