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DDD1 D3S373S 3 








Professor of the French Language and Literature 
in Harvard University 







ARY, 1871). n 

ARY, 1871, TO MAY, 1878). 3i 


MAHON (MAY, 1878, TO JANUARY, 1879). 5o 


1879, TO DECEMBER, 1887). 75 


1887, TO JUNE, 1894). 96 

(JANUARY, 1896, TO FEBRUARY, 1899). n5 


1899, T0 FEBRUARY, 1906). i34 

ARY, 1906, TO FEBRUARY, 1918). 169 

RUARY, 1918-). 176 


INETS. 187 


INDEX. 199 













Two men were largely responsible, each in his 
own way, for the third French Republic, 
Napoleon III and Bismarck. The one, endeav- 
oring partly at his wife's instigation to renew 
the prestige of a weakening Empire, and the 
other, furthering the ambitions of the Prussian 
Kingdom, set in motion the forces which cul- 
minated in the Fourth of September. 

The causes of the downfall of the Empire 
can be traced back several years. Napoleon III 
was, at heart, a man of peace and had, in all 
sincerity, soon after his accession, uttered the 
famous saying: "Uempire, c'est la paix." But 
the military glamour of the Napoleonic name 
led the nephew, like the uncle, into repeated 
wars. These had, in most cases, been success- 
ful, exceptions, such as the unfortunate Mexi- 
can expedition, seeming negligible. They had 


sometimes even resulted in territorial aggran- 
dizement. Napoleon III was, therefore, desir- 
ous of establishing once for all the so-called 
"natural" frontiers of France along the Rhine 
by the annexation of those Rhenish provinces 
which, during the First Empire and before, had 
for a score of years been part of the French 

On the other hand, though France was still 
considered the leading continental power, and 
though its military superiority seemed unas- 
sailable, the imperial regime was unquestion- 
ably growing "stale." The Emperor himself, 
alway s a mystical fatalist rather than the hewer 
of his own fortune, felt the growing inertia of 
his final malady. A lavishly luxurious court 
had been imitated by a pleasure-loving capital. 
This had brought in its train relaxed standards 
of governmental morals and had seriously 
weakened the fibre of many military com- 
manders. Outwardly the Empire seemed as 
glorious as ever, and in 1867 France invited 
the world to a gorgeous exposition in the 
"ViUe-lumiere." But Paris was more emo- 
tional year by year, and the Tuileries and 
Saint-Cloud were dominated by a narrow- 


minded and spoiled Empress. Court intrigues 
were rife and drawing-room generals were to 
be found in real life, as well as in Offenbach's 
"Grande Duchesse." But nobody, except per- 
haps Napoleon himself, realized how the 
Empire had declined. The Empress merely 
felt that it was time to do something stirring, 
and, without necessarily waging war, to assert 
again the pre-eminence in Europe of France, 
weakened in 1866 by the unexpected outcome 
of the rivalry between Austria and Prussia for 
preponderance among the German States. 

Beyond the eastern frontier of France a 
nation was growing in ambition and power. 
Prussia still remembered the warlike achieve- 
ments of Frederick the Great, although since 
those days its military efficiency had at times 
undergone a decline. But now, under the reign 
of King William, guided by a vigorous minis- 
ter, Bismarck, an example, whatever his admir- 
ers may say, of the brutal and unscrupulous 
Junker, the Prussian Government had for some 
time tried to impose its leadership on the other 
German States. Some of these were far from 
anxious to accept it. In the furtherance of 
Prussian schemes, Bismarck had, been able to 


inflict a diplomatic rebuff on Napoleon, as well 
as a severe military defeat on Austria. 

In 1866, Prussia won from Austria the im- 
portant victory of Koniggratz or Sadowa, and 
thereby asserted its leadership. The outcome 
was a check to Napoleon, who had expected a 
different result. Moreover, by it Bismarck 
was encouraged to pursue his plans for the 
consolidation of Germany under a still more 
openly acknowledged Prussian supremacy. A 
crafty and utterly unscrupulous diplomat, he 
was able to mislead Napoleon and his unskilful 

Soon after Sadowa the Emperor tried to 
obtain territorial compensation from Prussia. 
He wished, in return for recognition of Prus- 
sia's new position and of the projected union 
of North and South Germany minus Austria, 
to obtain the cession of territories on the left 
bank of the Rhine, or an alliance for the con- 
quest and annexation of Belgium to France. 
Such schemes having failed, Napoleon tried 
next to satisfy French jingoism by the acquisi- 
tion of the Duchy of Luxembourg. This move 
resulted only in securing the evacuation by its 
Prussian garrison of the Luxembourg fortress 


and the neutralization of the duchy. From 
that time on, tension increased between France 
and Prussia. Bismarck was, indeed, more 
anxious for war than Napoleon. He suspected 
the weakness of the French Empire, he de- 
spised its leaders, he realized the advance in 
military efficiency of his own country, and his 
aim was unswerving to establish a Prussianized 
German Empire at the cost, if possible, of the 
downfall of France. As a matter of fact, France, 
as now, was far from being permeated with mili- 
tarism and, a few months before the war in 
1870, the military budget was actually reduced. 
The occasion for a dispute arrived with the 
suggested candidacy of Leopold of Hohen- 
zollern-Sigmaringen, a German prince related 
to the King of Prussia, to the crown of Spain, 
As early as 1868, intrigues had begun to put a 
Prussian on the Spanish throne, but Napoleon 
had not as yet been disturbed. It was not until 
1870 that he took the matter seriously. In 
July, Prince Leopold accepted the crown, 
egged on by Bismarck, and with the fiction of 
the approval of King William as head of the 
Hohenzollerns, as distinguished from his posi- 
tion as King of Prussia. 


At that time the French Emperor was in 
precarious health and scarcely in full control of 
his powers. The French people at large were 
pacifically inclined and would have asked for 
nothing better than to remain at home instead 
of fighting about a foreigner's candidacy to an 
alien throne. But, unfortunately, the Empress 
Eugenie was for war. The Government, too, 
was in the hands of second-rate and hesitating 
diplomats. Emile Ollivier, the chief of the 
Cabinet, was an orator more than a statesman, 
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the due 
de Gramont, was a conceited mediocrity more 
and more involved in his own mistakes. In 
consequence, the attitude of the Government 
was not so much deliberate desire for war as 
provocative bluster, of which Bismarck was 
quick to take advantage. The Cabinet was 
egged on by Eugenie's adherents, the militants, 
who had been looking for an insult since 
Sadowa, and by obstreperous journalists and 
noisy boulevard mobs, whose manifestations 
were unfortunately taken, even by the Corps 
legislatif, for the voice of France. 

In consequence, blunder after blunder was 
made. The ministers worked at cross-purposes, 


without due consultation and without consid- 
eration of the effect of their actions on an in- 
flamed public opinion or on prospective Euro- 
pean alliances. Stated in terms of diplomatic 
procedure, the aim of the French Cabinet was 
to humiliate Prussia by forcing its Govern- 
ment to acknowledge a retreat. King William 
was not seeking war and was probably willing 
to make honorable concessions. Bismarck, on 
the contrary, desired war, if it could be under 
favorable diplomatic auspices, and the Hohen- 
zollern candidacy was a direct provocation. 
He wanted France to seem the aggressor, in 
view of the effect both on neutral Europe, 
and particularly on the South German States, 
which he wished to draw into alliance under 
the menace of French attack. 

The French Ambassador to the King of 
Prussia, Benedetti, was instructed to demand 
the withdrawal of Prince Leopold's candidacy. 
This demand followed a very arrogant state- 
ment to the Corps legislatif , on July 6, by the 
due de Gramont. The assumption was that 
Prince Leopold's presence on the Spanish 
throne would be dangerous to the honor and 
interests of France, by exposing the country 


on two sides to Prussian influence. King 
William was, on the whole, willing to make a 
concession to avoid international complica- 
tions, but he obviously wished not to appear 
to act under pressure. M. Benedetti went to 
Ems and, on July 9, he laid the French de- 
mands before the King. After long-drawn-out 
discussion the French Government asked for 
a categorical reply by July 12. On that day 
the father of Prince Leopold, Prince Antony 
of Hohenzollern, in a telegram to Spain, for- 
mally withdrew his son's name. The King had 
planned to give his consent to this apparently 
spontaneous action on the part of the candi- 
date's family, when officially informed. Thus 
France would obtain its ends and the King 
himself would not be involved. 

Unfortunately the thoughtlessness of the 
head of the French Ministry spoiled every- 
thing. Instead of waiting a day for the King's 
ratification, Emile Ollivier, desirous also of 
peace, hastened to make public the telegram 
from the Prince of Hohenzollern. Thereupon 
the leaders of the war party in the Corps legis- 
latif at once pointed out that the telegram was 
not accompanied by the signature of the Prus- 


sian monarch, declared that the Cabinet had 
been outwitted, and clamored for definite 
guarantees. Stung by the charge of inefficiency, 
the would-be statesman Gramont immedi- 
ately accentuated his stipulations and de- 
manded that the King of Prussia guarantee 
not to support in future the candidacy of a 
Hohenzollern to the Spanish throne. 

Matters were rapidly reaching an impasse, 
and Bismarck was correspondingly elated, be- 
cause France was appearing to Europe a 
trouble-maker. The due de Gramont and 
Emile Ollivier committed the error of dictat- 
ing a letter to the Prussian Ambassador for 
him to transmit to the King, to be in turn sent 
back as his reply. King William was offended 
by this high-handed procedure. He had al- 
ready told comte Benedetti at Ems that a 
satisfactory letter was on its way from Prince 
Antony and had promised him another inter- 
view upon its arrival. After receiving the 
dispatch from his ambassador at Paris com- 
municating Gramont's formulas, he sent 
word to Benedetti that Prince Leopold was 
no longer a candidate and that the incident 
was closed. Nor was the King willing to grant 


Benedetti's urgent requests for an interview 
(July 13). 

The King and the French Ambassador had 
remained perfectly courteous, and the next 
day, at the railway station, they took leave of 
each other with marks of respect. Things were 
not yet hopeless, until Bismarck, by a trick of 
which he afterwards bragged, caused a dis- 
patch to be published implying that Benedetti 
had been so persistent in pushing his demands 
that King William had been obliged to snub 
him. The French were led to believe that their 
representative had been insulted, and neutrals 
sided with Prussia as the aggrieved party. 
After deliberation the French Ministry decided 
on war and the decision was blindly ratified by 
the Corps legislatif on July 15. At this meet- 
ing Emile Ollivier made his famous, remark 
that the Ministry accepted responsibility for 
the war with a "clear conscience." His actual 
words, "le coeur leger," seemed, however, to 
imply "with a light heart," and thereafter 
weighed heavily against him in the minds of 



September, 1870, to February, 1871 

ON July 19 the French Embassy at Berlin de- 
clared a state of war. Paris was wild with en- 
thusiasm and eager for an advance on Berlin. 
The provinces were for the most part cool, but 
accepted the war calmly because they were 
assured of an easy victory. The leaders of the 
two nations had for each other equal contempt. 
"Ce n'est pas un homme s6rieux," Napoleon 
had once said of Bismarck, and Bismarck 
thought Napoleon "stupid and sentimental/ 7 
Meanwhile each nation had eyes on the terri- 
tory of the other: France was ready to claim 
the Rhine frontier; Prussia wanted all it could 
get, and certainly Alsace and Lorraine. The 
idea, so often repeated by the Germans since 
the war, that these provinces were annexed 
because they had once been German, was not 
in Bismarck's mind, "that is a Professor's 
reason," he said. 1 He wanted Strassburg be- 

1 Moritz Busch, Bismarck, vol. I, chap. i. 


cause its commanding position and the wedge 
of Wissembourg could cut off northern from 
southern Germany* The frontier of the Vosges 
was as desirable to the Germans as the Rhine 
to the French. 

From the beginning all went wrong in 
France. The Government found itself left in 
the lurch by the European states whose alli- 
ance it had expected. Moreover, mobilization 
proceeded slowly and in utter confusion. In 
spite of Marshal Le Bceuf s famous exclama- 
tion ("II ne manquera pas un bouton de 
guetre")> never did a nation enter on a war less 
prepared than the French. On the other hand, 
all Germany, well trained and ready, sprang to 
the side of Prussia. The whole military force 
was grouped in three armies under Stein- 
metz, Prince Frederick Charles, and the Crown 
Prince. But, meanwhile, it seemed necessary 
to the French to give a semblance of military 
achievement. The Emperor had started from 
Paris on July 28 leaving the Empress as regent. 
On August 2, a vain military display with 
largely superior forces was made across the 
frontier at Saarbriicken, a practically unpro- 
tected place was taken, and the Emperor was 


able to send home word that the Prince Im- 
perial had received his "baptism of fire" and 
that the soldiers wept at seeing him calmly 
pick up a bullet. The same day King William 
took command of the German forces at Mainz, 
and on August 4 the army of the Crown Prince 
entered Alsace and defeated at Wissembourg 
the division of about twelve thousand men of 
General Abel Douay, who was killed. On the 
6th Mac-Maion, with a larger force, met the 
still more numerous Germans somewhat farther 
back at Worth, Froschwiller, and Reichsoffen, 
and was utterly routed with a loss of over 
ten thousand in killed, wounded, and taken. 
Alsace was thus completely exposed to the 
enemy, and the road was open to Luneville 
and Nancy. On the same day, German armies 
under Steinmetz and Prince Frederick Charles 
crossed into Lorraine at Saarbriicken and 
engaged the troops of the French general 
Frossard at Forbach and Spicheren, inflicting 
on them a severe repulse. Meanwhile Fros- 
sard's superior, Bazaine, though not far away, 
did not move a finger to help him. "If Fros- 
sard wanted the baton of marshal^of France he 
could win it alone/* 


The news of these disasters was a terrible 
shock to Paris. The "liberal " Ollivier Cabinet 
was overthrown and replaced by a reactionary 
one led by General Cousin-Montauban, comte 
de Palikao. The Emperor withdrew from mili- 
tary leadership and Marshal Bazaine received 
supreme command. Bazaine was a brave sol- 
dier, but a poor general-in-chief, and withal a 
self-seeking man, incompetent to deal with the 
difficulties in which France found itself. He 
was perhaps not a conscious traitor in the great 
disaster which soon came to pass, but he 
thought more of himself than of his country. 
At the time we are concerned with he was con- 
sidered the coming man. Meanwhile Mac- 
Mahon, cut off from Bazaine's main army, fell 
back, between August 6 and August 17, to 
CMlons. Bazaine was apparently without in- 
telligent strategic plans. He professed to be 
desirous of concentrating at Verdun, but was 
afraid to get out of reach of Metz. He won 
first an indecisive battle^ at Borny (August 
14), which was unproductive of any concrete 
advantage. On August 16, he let himself be 
turned back, by an enemy only half as numer- 
ous, at Rezonville (Vionville, Mars-la-Tour). 


On the 18th, he encountered, on the contrary, 
a much larger force at Saint-Privat (Grave- 
lotte) and let himself be cooped up in Metz. 
Critics of Bazaine say that he could have 
turned both Rezonville and Gravelotte to the 
advantage of the French. 

The familiar military uncertainties now be- 
gan to show themselves in the movements 
of Mac-Mahon and his troops. The armies of 
Steinmetz and of Frederick Charles were united 
under command of the latter to beleaguer 
Metz, and a smaller force under Prince Albert 
of Saxony was thrown off to cooperate with the 
army of the Crown Prince in its advance on 
Paris. Mac-Mahon had collected about one 
hundred and twenty thousand men, and Na- 
poleon, without real authority except as a 
meddler, was with him. The plan was origi- 
nally to fall back for the protection of Paris, 
but the Empress-Regent was afraid to have a 
defeated Emperor return to the capital lest 
revolution ensue, and Palikao "urged a swift 
advance to rescue Metz, crushing Prince Al- 
bert of Saxony on the way, taking Frede- 
rick Charles between the two fires of rescuers 
and besieged, with the Crown Prince still too 


far away to be dangerous. Meanwhile Mac- 
Mahon moved to Reims, which was neither 
on the direct road to Paris nor to Metz, and at 
last started to the rescue of Bazaine by the 
roundabout route of Montmdy, continually 
hesitating and retracing his steps. On receiv- 
ing news of his progress, the armies of the 
Crown Prince and of Prince Albert converged 
northward. Mac-Mahon's right wing, under 
General de Failly, was surprised at Beaumont, 
and finally the French army in disorder drew 
up in most unfavorable positions between the 
Meuse and the Belgian frontier, to face a foe 
twice as numerous and already nearly com- 
pletely surrounding it. The battle of Sedan 
broke out on September 1. Mac-Mahon was 
wounded early in the fight and gave over the 
command to Ducrot, in turn superseded by 
Wimpffen, already designated by the Ministry 
to replace Mac-Mahon in case of accident. 
After a fierce battle it fell to General de 
Wimpffen to capitulate on September 2. By 
the disaster of Sedan the Germans captured 
the Emperor, a marshal of France, and the 
whole of one of its two armies. 
The news of the overwhelming defeat of 


Sedan struck Paris like a thunderbolt, Jules 
Favre proposed to the Corps legislatif the over- 
throw of Napoleon and of his dynasty; Thiers, 
who favored the restoration of the Orleans 
family, wished the convocation of a Constitu- 
ent Assembly; the comte de Palikao asked for 
a provisional governing commission of which 
he should be the lieutenant-general. But, be- 
fore anything was done, the Paris mob invaded 
the legislative chamber. Gambetta, with the 
majority of the Paris Deputies, went to the 
H6tel de Ville, and to prevent a more radical 
set from seizing the Government, proclaimed 
the Republic (September 4). A Government 
of National Defence was constituted of which 
General Trochu became President, Jules Favre 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Gambetta 
Minister of the Interior. Thiers was not a 
member, but gave his support. Eugenie es- 
caped from the Tuileries to the home of her 
American dentist, Dr. Evans, and then fled to 

Jules Favre was innocent enough to think 
that the Germans would be satisfied with the 
overthrow of Napoleon, and he was rash 
enough to declare that France would not yield 


"an inch of its territory or a stone of its for- 
tresses." But, in an interview with Bismarck 
at Ferrieres, on September 19, he realized the 
oppressiveness of the German demands. The 
rhetorical and emotional, even tearful, Jules 
Favre was faced by a harsh and unrelenting 
conqueror, and the meeting ended without an 
agreement. Meanwhile Paris was invested by 
the German forces of the Crown Prince and 
the Prince of Saxony after a defeat of some 
French troops at Chatillon. William, Bis- 
marck, and Moltke took up their station at 
Versailles. Europe, made suspicious by the 
numerous changes of government in France in 
the nineteenth century, and moved also by 
selfish reasons, refused its aid and looked on 
with indifference. Thiers made a fruitless 
quest through Europe for practical aid, bring- 
ing home only meaningless expressions of 

Unfortunately even a number of people in 
the provinces, relaxed by the factitious pros- 
perity of the imperial regime, were too willing 
to yield to the invaders. Where resistance was 
brave it appeared fruitless: Strassburg capit- 
ulated on September 28, after the Germans 


had burned its library and bombarded the 
cathedral. A scratch army on the Loire, 
under La Motterouge, was beaten at Artenay 
(October 10) and had to evacuate Orleans. 
On October 18, the Germans captured Cha- 
teaudun after heroic resistance by National 
Guards and sharpshooters. 

Though one of the two great French armies 
was in captivity and the other besieged in 
Metz, the idea of submission never for a mo- 
ment entered Gambetta's head. Paris was 
under the command of Trochu, patriotic and 
brave, but military critic rather than leader, 
discouraged from the beginning, and unable 
to take advantage of opportunities. A delega- 
tion of the Government of National Defence 
had established itself at Tours to avoid the 
German besiegers, but two of its members, 
Cremieux and! Glais-Bizoin, were elderly and 
weak. Admiral Fourichon was the most com- 
petent. Gambetta escaped from Paris by 
balloon on October 7, and, reaching Tours in 
safety, made himself by his energy and patri- 
otic inspiration, practically dictator and or- 
ganizer of resistance to the invaders. 

Leon Gambetta, a young lawyer politician 


of thirty-two, of inexhaustible energy and im- 
passioned eloquence, was the son of an Italian 
grocer settled at Cahors. With the help of his 
assistant Charles de Freycinet, he levied and 
armed in four months six hundred thousand 
men, an average of five thousand a day. Every- 
thing was done in haste and unsatisfactorily, 
the army of General Chanzy was equipped 
with guns of fifteen different patterns. But 
Gambetta did the task of a giant, in spite of 
another crushing blow to France, the sur- 
render of Metz. 

Bazaine had let himself be cooped up in 
Metz. Instead of being moved by patriotism, 
he thought only of his own interests and am- 
bitions. In the midst of the cataclysm which 
had fallen on France he aspired to hold the 
position of power. The Emperor gone and the 
Republic destined, Bazaine thought, to fall, 
he would be left at the head of the only army. 
His would be the task of treating for peace 
with Germany, and then he would perhaps be- 
come in France regent instead of the Empress, 
or Marshal-Lieutenant of the Empire, like 
the Spanish marshals. So he neglected favor- 
able military opportunities, and dallied over 


plans of peace, while Bismarck misled him with 
fruitless propositions or false emissaries like 
the adventurer Regnier. Finally, on October 
27, Bazaine had to surrender Metz, with three 
marshals (himself, Canrobert, and Le Bceuf), 
sixty generals, six thousand officers, and one 
hundred and seventy-three thousand men. 
France was deprived of her last trained forces, 
and the besieging army of Frederick Charles 
was set free to help in the conquest of France. 
After the war Bazaine was condemned to 
death, by court-martial, for treason. His sen- 
tence was commuted to life imprisonment, but 
he afterwards escaped from the fortress in 
which he was confined and died in obscurity 
and disgrace at Madrid. 

No sooner did the news of the capitulation 
of Metz reach Paris than a regrettable affair 
took place. There was much dissatisfaction 
with the indecision of the Provisional Govern- 
ment, and, on October 31, a mob invaded the 
H6tel de Ville and arrested the chief members 
of the commission. Fortunately they were re- 
leased later the same day and a plebiscite of 
November 3 confirmed the powers of the Gov- 
ernment of National Defence. Fortunately, 


too, within a few days came news of the first 
real success of the French during the war, the 
battle of Coulmiers (November 9). 

Gambetta had succeeded during October in 
organizing the Army of the Loire which, under 
General d'Aurelle de Paladines, defeated the 
Bavarian forces of von der Thann at Coul- 
miers and recaptured Orleans. The plan was 
to push on to Paris and the objections of 
d'Aurelle were overcome by Gambetta. But 
the fall of Metz had released German rein- 
forcements. After an unsuccessful contest by 
the right wing at Beaune-la-Rolande (Novem- 
ber 28), and a partial victory at Villepion, 
the French were defeated in turn on Decem- 
ber 2 at Loigny or Patay (left wing), on De- 
cember 3 at Artenay. The Germans reoccupied 
Orleans and the first Army of the Loire was dis- 
persed. The Government moved from Tours 
to Bordeaux. 

After Coulmiers General Trochu had 
planned a sortie from Paris to meet the Army 
of the Loire. This advance was under com- 
mand of General Ducrot, but was delayed by 
trouble with pontoon bridges. The various 
battles of the Maine (November 30-Decem- 


her 2) culminated in the terrible fight and 
repulse of Villiers and Champigny. In the 
north, a small army hastily brought together 
under temporary command of General Favre 
was defeated at Villers-Bretonneux and Amiens 
(November 27). 

The last phase of the Franco-Prussian War 
begins with the crushing of the Army of the 
Loire and the check of the advance to Cham- 
pigny. With unwearied tenacity Gambetta 
tried to reorganize the Army of the Loire. A 
portion became the second Army of the Loire 
or of the West, under Chanzy. The rest, under 
Bourbaki, became the Army of the East. 
Faidherbe tried to revive the Army of the 

To Chanzy, on the whole the most capable 
French general of the war, was assigned the 
task of trying, with a smaller force, what d' Au- 
relle had already failed in accomplishing, a 
drive on Paris. In this task Bourbaki and 
Faidherbe were expected by Gambetta to 
cooperate. Instead of succeeding, Chanzy, 
bravely fighting, was driven back, first down 
the Loire, in the long-contested battle of Josnes 
(Villorceau or Beaugency) (December 7-10), 


then up the valley of the tributary Loir to 
Vendome and Le Mans. There the army, 
reduced almost to a mob, made a new stand. 
In a battle between January 10 and 12, this 
army was again routed and what was left 
thrown back to Laval. 

Faidherbe, taking the offensive in the north, 
fought an indecisive contest at Pont-Noyelles 
(December 23) and took Bapaume (January 3). 
But his endeavor to proceed to the assistance 
of Paris was frustrated, he was unable to re- 
lieve Peronne, which fell on January 9, and was 
defeated at Saint-Quentin on January 19. 

Bourbaki, in spite of his reputation, showed 
himself inferior to Chanzy and Faidherbe. 
He let his army lose morale by his hesitation, 
and then accepted with satisfaction Freycinet's 
plan to move east upon Germany instead of 
to the rescue of Paris. On the eastern frontier 
Colonel Denfert-Rochereau was tenaciously 
holding Belfort, which was never captured by 
the Germans during the whole war. 1 Bour- 
baki's dishearteningly slow progress received 
no effective assistance from Garibaldi. This 

1 He surrendered by order of the Government. The isolated 
incident of the resistance of the town of Bitche through all the 
war is no less noteworthy. 


Italian soldier of fortune, now somewhat in his 
decline, had offered his services to France and 
was in command of a small body of guerillas 
and sharpshooters, the Army of the Vosges. 
With alternate periods of inactivity, failure, 
and success, Garibaldi perhaps did more harm 
than good to France. He monopolized the serv- 
ices of several thousand men, and yet, through 
his prestige as a distinguished foreign volun- 
teer, he could not be brought under control. 
Bourbaki won the battle of Villersexel on Jan- 
uary 9. Pushing on to Belfort he was defeated 
only a few miles from the 'town in the battle 
of Hericourt, or Montb61iard, along the river 
Lisaine. The army, now transformed into 
panic-stricken fugitives, made its way pain- 
fully through bitter cold and snow, and Bour- 
baki tried to commit suicide. He was suc- 
ceeded by General Clinchant. When Paris 
capitulated, on January 28, and an armistice 
was signed, this Army of the East was omitted. 
Jules Favre at Paris failed to notify Gambetta 
in the provinces of this exception, and the 
army, hearing of the armistice, ceased its 
flight, only to be relentlessly followed by the 
Germans. Finally, on February 1, the rem- 


nants of the army fled across the Swiss fron- 
tier and found safety on neutral soil. 

Meanwhile, in Paris the tightening of the 
Prussian lines had made the food problem 
more and more difficult, and the population 
were reduced to small rations and unpalatable 
diet. After Champigny the German general 
von Moltke communicated with the besieged, 
informing them of the defeat of Orleans, and 
the means seemed opened for negotiations. 
But the opportunity was rejected, and the 
Government even refused to be represented 
at an international conference, then opening 
in London, because of its unwillingness to 
apply to Bismarck for a safe-conduct for its 
representative. A chance to bring the con- 
dition of France before the Powers was neg- 
lected. Between December 21 and 26, a sally 
to Le Bourget was driven back, and, on the 
next day, the bombardment of the forts began. 
On January 5, the Prussian batteries opened 
fire on the city itself . On January 18, the Ger- 
mans took a spectacular revenge for the con- 
quests of Louis XIV by the coronation of King 
William of Prussia as Emperor of the united 
German people. The ceremony took place in 


the great Galerie des Glaces of Louis's magni- 
ficent palace of Versailles, The very next day 
the triumph of the Germans received its con- 
secration, not only by the battle of Saint- 
Quentin (already mentioned), but by the re- 
pulse of the last offensive movement from 
Paris. To placate the Paris population an 
advance was made on Versailles with battal- 
ions largely composed of National Guards. 
At Montretout and Buzenval they were 
routed and driven back in a panic to Paris. 
General Trochu was forced to resign the mili- 
tary governorship of Paris, though by a strange 
contradiction he kept the presidency of the 
Government of National Defence, and was re- 
placed by General Vinoy. On January 22, a 
riot broke out in the capital in which blood 
was shed in civil strife. Finally, on January 28, 
'Jules Favre had to submit tcf the conqueror's 
terms. Paris capitulated and the garrison was 
disarmed, with the exception of a few thou- 
sand regulars to preserve order, and the Na- 
tional Guard; a war tribute was imposed on 
the city and an armistice of twenty-one days 
was signed to permit the election and gather- 
ing of a National Assembly to pass on terms 


of peace. With inexcusable carelessness Jules 
Favre neglected to warn Gambetta in the pro- 
vinces that this armistice began for the rest 
of France only on the thirty-first and that, as 
already stated, the Army of the East was ex- 
cepted from its provisions. 

Gambetta was furious at the surrender and 
at the presumption of Paris to decide for the 
provinces. He preached a continuation of the 
war, and the intervention of Bismarck was 
necessary to prevent him from excluding from 
the National Assembly all who had had any 
connection with the imperial regime. Jules 
Simon was sent from Paris to counteract Gam- 
betta's efforts. The latter yielded before the 
prospect of civil war, withdrew from power, 
and, on February 8, elections were held for the 
National Assembly. 

The downfall of what had been considered 
the chief military nation of Europe was due 
to many involved causes. The Empire was 
responsible for the debacle and the Govern- 
ment of National Defence was unable to cre- 
ate everything out of nothing. Many people 
were ready to be discouraged after a first 
defeat, and few realized what Germany's de- 


mands were going to be. The imperial army 
was insufficiently equipped and the majority 
of its generals were inefficient and lacking in 
initiative: there was no preparation, no sys- 
tem, little discipline. 

During the period of National Defence the 
members of the Government themselves were 
usually wanting in experience and in diplo- 
macy, and the badly trained armies made up 
of raw recruits were liable to panics or unable 
to follow up an advantage. There was jeal- 
ousy, mistrust, and frequent unwillingness to 
subordinate politics to patriotism, or, at any 
rate, to make allowances for other forms of 
patriotism than one's own. Gambetta and 
Jules Favre were primarily orators and trib- 
unes and indulged in too many wordy proc- 
lamations, in which habit they were followed 
by General Trochu. The patriotism and en- 
thusiasm of Gambetta were undeniable, but 
he was imbued with the principles and mem- 
ories of the French Revolution, including the 
efficacy of national volunteers, the ability of 
France to resist all Europe, and the subordi- 
nation of military to civil authority. Conse- 
quently, in a time of stress he nagged the gen- 


erals and interfered, and gave free rein to Frey- 
cinet to do the same. They upset plans made 
by experienced generals, and sent civilians to 
spy over them, with power to retire them from 
command* They were, moreover, trying to 
thrust a republic down the throats of a hostile 
majority of the population, for a large propor- 
tion of those not Bonapartists were in favor 
of a monarchy. The wonder is, therefore, that 
France was able to do so much. M. de Frey- 
cinet was not boasting when he wrote later, 
" Alone, without allies, without leaders, with- 
out an army, deprived for the first time of 
communication with its capital, it resisted for 
five months, with improvised resources, a for- 
midable enemy that the regular armies of the 
Empire, though made up of heroic soldiers, 
had not been able to hold back five weeks." l 

1 La guerre en province, quoted by Welschinger, La guerre de 
1870, vol. n, p. 2g5. 


February, 1871, to May, 1878 

THE elections were held in hot haste. The 
short time allowed before the convening of the 
Assembly made the usual campaign impos- 
sible. It met at Bordeaux on February 13, 
1871. The peace party was in very consider- 
able majority, and though Gambetta received 
the distinction of a multiple election in nine 
separate districts, Thiers was chosen in twen- 
ty-six. The radicals and advocates of guerilla 
warfare and of a "guerre a outrance" found 
themselves few in numbers. Many of the 
representatives had only local or rural repu- 
tation. They were new to parliamentary life, 
and in the majority of cases were averse to 
a permanent republican form of government. 
They would have preferred a monarchy, but 
they were ready to accept a provisional re- 
public which would incur the task of settling 
the war with Germany and bear the onus 
of defeat. They were especially suspicious of 


Paris, and hostile to it as the home of fick- 
leness, of irresponsibility, and of mob rule. 
They were largely provincial lawyers and rural 
landed gentry, conservative and clerical, who 
felt that too much importance had been 
usurped by the Parisian Government of Na- 
tional Defence* 

The new Assembly, therefore, gradually 
fell into several groups. On the conservative 
side came the Extreme Right, made up of 
out-and-out Legitimists, believing in absolu- 
tism and the divine right of kings; the Right, 
composed of monarchists desirous of conciliat- 
ing the old regime with the demands of mod- 
ern times and of making it a practical form 
of government; the Right Centre, consisting 
of constitutional monarchists and followers of 
the Orleans branch of the house of Bourbon. 
Among the anti-republicans the Bonapartists 
were almost negligible. Next came the Left 
Centre of conservative Republicans, the re- 
publican Left, and the radical Union republi- 
caine, partisans of Gambetta and advanced 

At the first public session of the Assembly 
Jules Gr6vy was chosen presiding officer. A 



former leader of the opposition to the Em- 
pire, he had not participated in affairs since 
the Fourth of September, and, therefore, had 
not yet identified himself with any set. Among 
the Republicans he was averse to Gambetta 
and remained so even when the latter became 
moderate. On February 17, Adolphe Thiers, 
the "peace-maker/ 5 was by an almost unani- 
mous vote elected "Chief of the Executive 
Power of the French Republic/' It was he 
who, thirty years before, had fortified Paris 
that had now fallen only by famine, who had 
opposed the war when it might yet have been 
averted, who had travelled over Europe to 
defend the interests of France, who had been 
elected representative by the choice of twen- 
ty-six departments. 

M. Thiers formed a coalition cabinet rep- 
resenting different shades of political feeling, 
and in one of his early speeches, on March 
10, he formulated a plan of party truce for the 
purpose of national reorganization. This plan 
was acquiesced in by the Assembly and bears 
in history the name of the Compact of Bor- 
deaux (pade deBordeaux). France was to con- 
tinue under a republican government, without 


injury to the later claims of any party. Thiers, 
himself, as a former Orleanist, advocated, at 
least in his relations with the monarchists, a 
Restoration, with the sine qua non that an 
attempt should be made at a fusion of the 
Legitimists and the Orleanists. Meanwhile he 
was the chief executive official of a republic. 

But, even before the formulation of the 
truce of parties, Thiers was in eager haste to 
settle the terms of peace with Germany before 
the expiration of the armistice. The prelim- 
inaries were discussed between Thiers and 
Bismarck at Versailles. The Germans were 
almost as anxious as the French to see the 
end of the war, and the objections and delays 
of Bismarck were partly tactical. Brief suc- 
cessive prolongations of the armistice were 
obtained, and finally the preliminaries were 
signed on February 26. Thiers made herculean 
efforts to keep for France Belfort, which Bis- 
mark claimed, and finally succeeded on con- 
dition that the German army should occupy 
Paris from March 1 to the ratification of the 
preliminaries by the Assembly. France was 
to give up Alsace and a part of Lorraine, in- 
cluding Metz, and pay an indemnity of five 


billion francs. German troops were to occupy 
the conquered districts and evacuate them 
progressively as the indemnity was paid. The 
peace discussions afterwards continued at 
Brussels, and the final treaty was signed at 
Frankfort on May 10, 1871. 

No sooner were the preliminaries signed 
than Thiers returned post-haste to Bordeaux, 
and obtained an almost immediate assent 
(March 1), so that the Germans were obliged 
to forego a large part of their plans for a tri- 
umphal entry into Paris and a review by the 
Emperor. Only one body of thirty thousand 
men marched in through one section and, two 
days later, evacuated the city. 

The same meeting which ratified the pre- 
liminaries of peace officially proclaimed the 
expulsion of the imperial dynasty and declared 
Napoleon III responsible for the invasion, the 
ruin and dismemberment of France. The 
same day also beheld the pathetic withdrawal 
of the representatives of Alsace and of Lor- 
raine, turned over to the conqueror. 

The misfortunes of France were far from 
ended. Paris was soon to break out into re- 
bellion under the eyes of the Germans still in 


possession of many of the suburbs. The enemy 
looked on and saw Frenchman killing French- 
man in civil war. 

It had become obvious that the division of 
administration between Bordeaux and Paris 
was making government difficult. The As- 
sembly, still suspicious of Paris, decided to 
transfer its place of meeting to Versailles. But 
Paris itself was in a state of nervous hysteria 
as a result of the long and exhausting siege 
(fievre obsidionale). The Paris proletariat were 
as jealous and suspicious of the Assembly as 
the Assembly of them. The suggestion of a 
transfer to Versailles instead of to Paris seemed 
a direct challenge. Versailles recalled too 
easily Louis XIV and the Bourbons. The 
monarchical sympathies of the Assembly 
were, moreover, well known, and the Parisians 
dreaded the restoration of royalty. The peo- 
ple were hungry and penniless, and industry 
and commerce had almost completely ceased. 
The city was full, besides, of soldiers disarmed 
through the armistice and ready for riot. On 
the other hand, the National Guards, a large 
body of semi-disciplined militia made up, at 
least in part, of the dregs of the populace, had 


been allowed to retain their weapons, and 
many of them gave their time to drunkenness, 
loafing, and listening to agitators. Some 
rather injudicious condemnations of leaders 
in the October riots merely aggravated the 
dissatisfaction* All this led to the Commune. 

The leaders of the Commune were, some 
of them, sincere though visionary reformers, 
whose hearts rankled at the sufferings of the 
poor and the inequalities of wealth and privi- 
lege. The majority were mischief-makers and 
cafe orators, loquacious but incompetent or 
inexperienced, without definite plans and un- 
fit to be leaders, some vicious and some dis- 
honest. The rank and file soon became a law- 
less mob, ready to burn and murder, imitating, 
in their ignorant cult of "liberty/ 5 the worst 
phases of the French Revolution and its Reign 
of Terror. Still, the Communards have their 
admirers to-day, and, as the world advances 
in radicalism, it is not unlikely that the Jaco- 
bin Charles Delescluze, the bloodthirsty Raoul 
Rigault, and the brilliant and scholarly Gus- 
tave Flourens will be considered heroic pre- 

The idea of the Commune was decentral- 


ization. It was an experiment aiming at a free 
and autonomous Paris serving as model for 
the other self-governing communes of France, 
united merely for their common needs. It 
amounted almost to the quasi-independence 
of each separate town. But mixed up with 
the theorists of the Commune were count- 
less anarchist revolutionaries, followers of the 
teachings of Blanqui, as well as admirers of 
the great Revolution which overthrew the old 
regime, and socialists of various types. 

The germs of the movement which was to 
culminate in the Commune were visible at an 
early hour. The dissatisfaction of the Radi- 
cals with the moderation of the Government 
of National Defence, the riots of October 31 
and January 22 were all symptoms of the dis- 
content of the proletariat. Indeed, the proc- 
lamation of the Republic, on September 4, 
was itself an object lesson in illegality to the 
malcontents. Organized dissatisfaction began 
to centre about the obstreperous and dis- 
orderly, but armed and now "federated 9 * 
National Guards. Manifestoes signed by self- 
appointed committees of plebeian patriots 
appeared on the walls of Paris. These com- 


mittees finally merged into the "Comite cen- 
tral/' or were replaced by it. This commit- 
tee advocated the trial and imprisonment of 
the members of the Government of National 
Defence, and protested against the disarma- 
ment of the National Guards and the en- 
trance of the Germans into Paris. 

The Government was almost helpless." The 
few regulars left under arms in Paris were of 
doubtful reliance, and General d'Aurelle de 
Paladines, now in command of the National 
Guards, was not obeyed. A certain number of 
artillery guns in Paris had been paid for by 
popular subscription,and the rumor spread at 
one time that these were to be turned over to 
the Germans. The populace seized them and 
dragged them to different parts of the city. 

The Government decided at last to act 
boldly and, on March 18, dispatched General 
Lecomte with some troops to seize the guns at 
Montmartre. But the mob surrounded the 
soldiers, and these mutinied and refused to 
obey orders to fire, and arrested their own 
commander. Later in the day General Le- 
comte was shot with General Clement Thomas, 
a former commander of the National Guard, 


who rather thoughtlessly and out of curiosity 
had mingled with the crowd and was recog- 

Thus armed forces in Paris were in direct 
rebellion. Other outlying quarters had also 
sprung into insurrection. M. Thiers, who had 
recently arrived from Bordeaux, and the chief 
government officials quartered in Paris, with- 
drew to Versailles. Paris had to be besieged 
again and conquered by force of arms. 

In Paris the first elections of the Commune 
were held on March 26. On April 3 an armed 
sally of the Communards towards Versailles 
was repulsed with the loss of some of their 
chief leaders, including Flourens. Meanwhile, 
the Army of Versailles had been organized 
and put under the command of Mac-Mahon. 
Discipline was restored and the advance on 
Paris began. 

As time passed in the besieged city the 
saner men were swept into the background 
and reckless counsels prevailed. Some of the 
military leaders were competent men, such as 
Cluseret, who had been a general in the Ameri- 
can army during the Civil War, or Rossel, a 
trained officer of engineers. But many were 


foreign adventurers and soldiers of fortune: 
Dombrowski, Wrobleski, La Cecilia. The 
civil administration grew into a reproduction 
of the worst phases of the Reign of Terror. 
Frenzied women egged on destruction and 
slaughter, and when at last the national 
troops fought their way into the conquered 
city, it was amid the flaming ruins of many of 
its proudest buildings and monuments. 

The siege lasted two months. On May 21, 
the Army of Versailles crossed the fortifica- 
tions and there followed the "Seven Days' 
Battle,' 5 a street-by-street advance marked 
by desperate resistance by the Communards 
and bloodthirsty reprisals by the Versaillais. 
Civil war is often the most cruel and the Ver- 
sailles troops, made up in large part of men 
recently defeated by the Germans, were glad 
to conquer somebody* Over seventeen thou- 
sand were shot down by the victors in this last 
week. The French to-day are horrified and 
ashamed at the cruel massacres of both sides 
and try to forget the Commune. Suffice it here 
to say that the last serious resistance was made 
in the cemetery of Pere-Lachaise, where those 
federes taken arms in hand were lined up 


against a wall and shot. Countless others, 
men, women, and children, herded together 
in bands, were tried summarily and either 
executed, imprisoned, or deported thousands 
of miles away to New Caledonia, until, years 
after, in 1879 and 1880, the pacification of re- 
sentments brought amnesty to the survivors. 1 
Fortunately, M. Thiers had more inspiring 
tasks to deal with than the repression of the 
Commune. One was the liberation of French 
soil from German occupation, another the 
reorganization of the army. With wonderful 
speed and energy the enormous indemnity 
was raised and progressively paid, the Ger- 
mans simultaneously evacuating sections of 
French territory. By March, 1873, France 
was in a position to agree to pay the last por- 
tion of the war tribute the following Septem- 
ber (after the fall of Thiers, as it proved), thus 

1 The fierceness of hatreds engendered by the Commune may 
be illustrated by the following untranslatable comment by Alex- 
andre Dumas fils on Gustave Courbet, a famous writer and a 
famous painter: " De quel accouplement fabuleux d'une limace et 
d'un paon, de quelles antitheses g&alsiaques, de quel suintement 
s^bace* peut avoir ete g6n4re*e cette chose qu'on appelle M. Gus- 
tave Courbet ? Sous quelle cloche, a Faide de quel fumier, par 
suite de quelle mixture de vin, de bie"re, de mucus corrosif et 
d'ced&me flatulent a pu pousser cette courge sonore et poilue, ce 
ventre esth&tique, incarnation du moi imbecile et impuissant? " 
(Quoted in Fiaux's history of the Commune, pp. 58a-83.) 


ridding its soil of the last German many 
months earlier than had been provided for 
by the Treaty of Frankfort. The recovery of 
France aroused the admiration of the civilized 
world, and the anger of Bismarck, sorry not to 
have bled the country more. He viewed also 
with suspicion the organization of the army 
and the law of July, 1872, establishing practi- 
cally universal military service* He affected 
to see in it France's desire for early revenge 
for the loss of Alsace and Lorraine. 

M. Thiers, the great leader, did not find his 
rule uncontested. Brought into power as the 
indispensable man to guide the nation out of 
war, his conceit was somewhat tickled and he 
wanted to remain necessary. Though over 
seventy he had shown the energy and entr- 
ance of a man in his prime joined to the wis- 
dom and experience of a life spent in public 
service and the study of history. Elected by 
an anti-Republican Assembly and himself 
originally a Royalist, the fonnulator also of 
the Bordeaux Compact, he began to feel, 
nevertheless, in all sincerity that a conserva- 
tive republic would be the best government, 
and his vanity made him think himself its best 


leader. This conviction was intensified for a 
while by his successful tactics in threatening 
to resign, when thwarted, and thus bringing 
the Assembly to terms. But he tried the 
scheme once too often. 

The majority in the Assembly was not, in 
fact, anxious to give free rein to Thiers, and 
it had wanted to avoid committing itself defi- 
nitely to a republic. It wanted also to insure 
its own continuation as long as possible, con- 
trary to the wishes of advanced Republicans 
like Gambetta, who declared that the National 
Assembly no longer stood for the expression 
of the popular will and should give way to a 
real constituent assembly to organize a per- 
manent republic. 

The first endeavor of the Royalists was to 
bring about a restoration of the monarchy. 
The princes of the Orleanist branch were re- 
admitted to France and restored to their privi- 
leges. A fusion between the two branches of 
the house of Bourbon was absolutely neces- 
sary to accomplish anything. The members 
of the younger or constitutionalist Orleans line, 
and notably its leader, the comte de Paris, 
were disposed to yield to the representative 


of the legitimist branch, the comte de Cham- 
bord. He was an honorable and upright man, 
yet one who in statesmanship and religion 
was unable to understand anything since the 
Revolution. He had not been in France for 
over forty years, he was permeated with a re- 
ligious mystical belief not only in the divin- 
ity of royalty, but in his own position as God- 
given (Dieudonne was one of his names) and 
the only saviour of France. Moreover, he could 
not forgive his cousins the fact that their 
great-grandfather had voted for the execution 
of Louis XVI. So he treated their advances 
haughtily, declined to receive the comte de 
Paris, and issued a manifesto to the country 
proclaiming his unwillingness to give up the 
white flag for the tricolor. Henry V could not 
let anybody tear from his hand the white 
standard of Henry IV, of Francis I, and of 
Jeanne d'Arc. 

Such medievalism dealt the monarchical 
cause a crushing blow. The Royalists had al- 
ready begun to look askance at M. Thiers and 
hinted that his readiness to go on with the Re- 
public was a tacit violation of the Bordeaux 
Compact, Under the circumstances, however, 


his sincerity need not be doubted in believing 
a republic the only outcome, and his ambition, 
or vanity may be excused for wishing to con- 
tinue its leader. By the Rivet-Vitet measure 
of August 31, 1871, M. Thiers, hitherto "chief 
of executive power," was called "President 
of the French Republic/' He was to exercise 
his functions so long as the Assembly had not 
completed its work and was to be responsible 
to the Assembly. Thus the legislative body 
elected for an emergency was taking upon 
itself constituent authority and was tending 
to perpetuate the Republic which the major- 
ity disliked. 

From this time the tension grew greater 
between Thiers and the Assembly, which be- 
grudged him the credit for the negotiations 
still proceeding, and already mentioned above, 
for the evacuation of France by the Germans. 
It thwarted the wish of the Republicans to 
transfer the seat of the executive and legis- 
lature to Paris. Thiers was, indeed, work- 
ing away from the Bordeaux Compact and 
was advocating a republic, though a conserva- 
tive one. This "treachery" the monarchists 
could not forgive, though bye-elections were 


constantly increasing the Republican mem- 
bership. Thiers did not, on the other hand, 
welcome the advanced republicanism of Gam- 
betta declaring war on clericalism, and pro- 
claiming the advent of a new "social stratum" 
(une couche sociale nouvelle) for the govern- 
ment of the nation. 

By the middle of 1872, Thiers was the open 
advocate of "la Republique conservative," 
and this gradual transformation of a transi- 
tional republic into a permanent one was what 
the monarchists could not accept. So they 
declared open war on M. Thiers. On Novem- 
ber 29, 1872, a committee of thirty was ap- 
pointed at Thiers's instigation to regulate the 
functions of public authority and the condi- 
tions of -ministerial responsibility. This was 
inevitably another step toward the affirmation 
of a permanent republic by the clearer specifi- 
cation of governmental attributes. The major- 
ity of the committee were hostile to M. Thiers 
and were determined to overthrow him. The 
Left was also growing dissatisfied with his 
opposition to a dissolution* He found it in- 
creasingly difficult to ride two horses. The 
committee of thirty wished to prevent Thiers 


from exercising pressure on the Assembly by 
intervention in debates and threats to resign. 
In February and March, 1873, it proposed 
that the President should notify the Assembly 
by message of his intention to speak, and the 
ensuing discussion was not to take place in 
his presence. M. Thiers protested in vain 
against this red tape (chinoiseries). The effect 
was to drive him more and more from the 
Assembly, where his personal influence might 
be felt. 

The crisis became acute when Jules Grevy, 
President of the Assembly, a partisan of Thiers, 
resigned his office after a disagreement on 
a parliamentary matter. His successor, M. 
Buffet, at once rigorously supported the hos- 
tile Right. In April an election in Paris 
brought into opposition Charles de R6musat, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and personal 
friend of Thiers, and Barodet, candidate of 
the advanced and disaffected Republicans. 
The governmental candidate was defeated. 
Encouraged by this the due de Broglie, leader 
of the Right, followed up the attack, declar- 
ing the Government unable to withstand radi- 
calism. In May he made an interpellation on 


the governmental policy. Thiers invoked his 
right of reply and, on May 24, gave a brilliant 
defence of his past actions, formulating his 
plans for the future organization of the Re- 
public. A resolution was introduced by M. 
Ernoul, censuring the Government and call- 
ing for a rigidly conservative policy. The 
government was put in the minority by a close 
vote and M. Thiers forthwith resigned. The 
victors at once chose as his successor the can- 
didate of the Rights, the marechal de Mac- 
Mahon, due de Magenta, the defeated general 
of Sedan, a brave and upright man, but a 
novice in politics and statecraft. He declared 
his intention of pursuing a conservative pol- 
icy and of re-establishing and maintaining 
'Tordre moral." 



May, 1876, to January, 1879 

"L'oRDRE MORAL/' such was the political 
catchword of the new administration. Just 
what it meant was not very clear. In general, 
however, it was obviously intended to imply 
resistance to radicalism (republicanism) and 
the maintenance of a strictly conservative 
policy, strongly tinged with clericalism. 1 The 
victors over M. Thiers had revived their desire 
of a monarchical restoration and many of 
them hoped that the marechal de Mac-Mahon 
would shortly make way for the comte de 
Chambord. But though an anti-republican he 
was never willing to lend himself to any really 
illegal or dishonest manoeuvres, and his sense 
of honor was of great help to him in his want 
of political competence. So he did not prove 
the pliant tool of his creators, and his term 

1 Clericalism does not imply political activity on the part of 
the clergy alone, but quite as much of laymen strongly in favor 
of the Church. 



of office saw the definite establishment of the 

The first Cabinet was led by the due de 
Broglie who took the portfolio of Foreign 
Affairs. The new Government was viewed 
askance by the conquerors at Berlin, who dis- 
liked such an orderly transmission of powers 
as an indication of national recovery and sta- 
bility. Bismarck even exacted new credentials 
from the French Ambassador. Meanwhile, 
the Minister of the Interior, Beule, proceeded 
to consolidate the authority of the new Cabi- 
net by numerous changes in the prefects of 
the departments, turning out the "rascals" 
of Thiers's administration to make room for 
appointees more amenable to new orders. 

The time now seemed ripe for another effort 
to establish the monarchy under the comte 
de Chambord. It culminated in the "monar- 
chical campaign 9 * of October, 1873. The mo- 
narchical sympathizers were hand-in-glove 
with the Clericals and for the most part coin- 
cided with them. The Royalists were inevita- 
bly clerical if for no other reason than that 
monarchy and religion both seemed to involve 
continuity, and the legitimacy of the mon- 


archy had always been blessed by the Church. 
The revolutionary Rights of Man were held 
to be inconsistent with the traditional Rights 
of God and the monarchy. Moreover, the 
founders of the third republic had, with note- 
worthy exceptions like the devout Trochu, 
been mildly anti-clerical. They were for the 
most part religious liberals and deists, rarely 
atheists, but that was enough to array the 
bishops, like monseignetir Pie of Poitiers, 
against them. Indeed, a quick religious re- 
vival swept over the land, as was shown by 
numerous pilgrimages, including one to Paray- 
le-Monial, home of the cult of the Sacred 
Heart. France herself should be consecrated 
to the Sacred Heart, and the idea was evolved, 
afterwards carried out, of the erection of the 
great votive basilica of the Sacre Coeur on the 
heights of Montmartre. 

The first step toward the restoration of 
"Henry V" was to persuade the comte de 
Paris to make new efforts for a fusion of 
the two branches. Swallowing his pride, the 
comte de Paris generously went to the home 
of the comte de Chambord at Frohsdorf, in 
Austria, in August, and paid his respects to 


_him as head of the family. As the comte de 
Chambord had no children, it was expected 
that the comte de Paris would be his successor. 
But the old difficulty about the white flag 
cropped up, and the comte de Chambord 
stubbornly refused to rule over a country 
above which waved the revolutionary tricolor. 
Matters dragged on through the summer, 
during the parliamentary recess, and the con- 
servative leaders were outspoken as to their 
plans to overthrow the Republic. It was 
hoped that some compromise might be reached 
by which could be reconciled, as to the flag, 
the desires of the Assembly which was ex- 
pected to recall the pretender and those of the 
comte de Chambord who considered his di- 
vinely inspired will superior to that of the 
representatives of the people. It was suggested 
that the question of the flag might be settled 
after his accession to the throne. The embassy 
to Salzburg, in October, of M. Chesnelong, 
an emissary of a committee of nine of the 
Royalist leaders, achieved only a half-success, 
but left matters sufficiently indeterminate to 
encourage them in continuing their plans. 
Matters seemed progressing swimmingly when, 


on October 27, an unexpected letter from 
the pretender to M. Chesnelong categorically 
declared that nothing would induce him to 
sacrifice the white banner. 

The effect of this letter was to make all 
hopes of a restoration impossible. Every- 
body knew that the majority of Frenchmen 
would never give up their flag for the white 
one, whether this were dignified by the name 
of "standard of Arques and Ivry," or whether 
one called it irreverently a "towel/* as did 
Pope Pius IX, impatient at the obstinacy 
of the comte de Chambord. In the midst of 
the general confusion only one thing seemed 
feasible if governmental anarchy were to be 
avoided, namely, the prorogation of Mac- 
Mahon's authority, as a rampart against ris- 
ing democracy and a permanent republic. 
This condition the Orleanist Right Centre 
turned to their advantage. By a vote of No- 
vember 20, the executive power was conferred 
for a definite period of seven years on the 
marechal de Mac-Mahon. Thus a head of the 
nation was provided who might perhaps out- 
last the Assembly. The vote might be inter- 
preted either as the beginning of a permanent 


republican regime, as it proved to be, or as the 
establishment of a definite interlude in antici- 
pation of a new attempt to set up a mon- 
archy, this time to the advantage of the 
younger branch. Many hoped that the comte 
de Chambord would soon be dead, his white 
flag forgotten, and the way open to the comte 
de Paris. The Orleanists were pleased by this 
latter idea, the Republicans were glad to have 
the republican regime recognized for, at any 
rate, seven years to come, accompanied by 
the promise of a constitutional commission of 
thirty members. The Legitimists alone were 
disappointed, and, oblivious of the fact that 
the comte de Chambord had lost through his 
folly, they were before long ready to vent their 
wrath on Mac-Mahon and his adviser, the 
due de Broglie, who was responsible for the 
presidential prorogation. 

The pretender had been completely taken 
aback at the impression produced by his let- 
ter. Convinced of his divinely inspired omni- 
science, and certain that he was the foreor- 
dained ruler of France, he had thought that 
the Assembly would give way on the question 
of the flag, or that the army would follow him, 


or that Mac-Mahon would yield. His state 
coach had been made ready and a military 
uniform awaited him at a tailor's. He has- 
tened in secret to Versailles, where he re- 
mained for a while in retirement to watch 
events, and where Mac-Mahon refused to see 
him. Then, after the vote on the presidency, 
he sadly returned into exile forever. 

Never was a greater service done to France 
than when the comte de Chambord refused to 
give up his flag. Completely out of touch with 
the country through a life spent in exile, in- 
spired with the feeling of his divine rights and 
their superiority to the will of democracy, he 
would scarcely have ascended the throne be- 
fore some conflict would have broken out and 
the history of France would have registered 
one revolution more. 

The due de Broglie had considered it good 
form to resign after the vote of November 20, 
but Mac-Mahon immediately entrusted to 
him the selection of a second Cabinet. In this 
Cabinet the portfolio of Foreign Affairs was 
given to the due Decazes, a skilled diplomat, 
but the Legitimists were offended by some of 
the cabinet changes and their dislike of the 


due de Broglie gradually became more acute. 
Finally, after several months of parliamen- 
tary skirmishing the second Broglie Cabinet 
fell before a coalition vote of Republicans and 
extreme Royalists with a few Bonapartists, 
on May 16, 1874. The Right Centre and Left 
Centre had unsuccessfully joined in support 
of the Cabinet. The nation was taking an- 
other step toward republican control and the 
overthrow of the conservatives. 

From now on, Mac-Mahon's task became 
increasingly difficult. After the split in the 
conservative majority it was necessary to rely 
on combination ministries, representing differ- 
ent sets and harder to reconcile or to propitiate. 
The result of Mac-Mahon's first efforts was a 
Cabinet led by a soldier, General de Cissey, 
and having no pronounced political tendencies. 

Party differences were becoming accentu- 
ated. The downfall of the Broglie Cabinet had 
been largely due to the extreme Royalists and 
the Orleanists could not forgive them. The 
situation was made worse by differences in 
interpretation of the law of November 20, 
establishing the "septennat" of the marechal 
de Mac-Mahon. Some of the Monarchists 


maintained the "septennat personnel," namely, 
the election of one specific person to hold office 
for seven years, with the idea that he could 
withdraw at any time in favor of a king. 
Others interpreted the law as establishing a 
"septennat impersonnel," a definite truce of 
seven years, which should still hold even if 
Mac-Mahon had to be replaced before the 
expiration of the time by another President. 
Then, they hoped, their enemy Thiers would 
be dead. The Republicans were, of course, 
desirous of making the impersonal "septen- 
nat" lead to a permanent republic, and de- 
clared that Mac-Mahon was not the President 
of a seven years' republic, but President, for 
seven years, of the Republic. 

In this state of affairs the Bonapartists now 
became somewhat active again. Strangely 
enough, the disasters of 1870 were already 
growing sufficiently remote for some of the 
anti-Republicans to turn again to the prospect 
of empire. This menace frightened the mod- 
erate Royalists into what they had kept hesi- 
tating to do; that is to say, into spurring to 
activity the purposely inactive and dilatory 
constitutional commission. 


The stumbling-block was the recognition of 
the Republic itself and the admission that the 
form of government existing in France was to 
be permanent. There was much parliamentary 
skirmishing over various plans, rejected one 
after the other, inclining in turn toward the 
Republic and a monarchy. Finally, some of 
the Monarchists, discouraged by the rising 
tide of "radicalism/ 5 and frightened lest un- 
willingness to accept a conservative republic 
now might result still worse for them in the 
future, rallied in support of the motion of IVL 
Wallon, known as the "amendement "Wallon," 
which was adopted by a vote of 353 to 352 
(January, 1875): "The President of the Re- 
public is elected by absolute majority of votes 
by the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies 
united as a National Assembly. He is chosen 
for seven years and is re-eligible/* 

In this vote the fateful statement was made 
concerning the election of a President other 
than Mac-Mahon and the transmission of 
power in a republic. The third Republic re- 
ceived its definite consecration by a majority 
of one vote. 

The vote on the Wallon amendment dealt 


with only one article of a project not yet voted 
as a whole, but it was the crossing of the Rub- 
icon. The other articles were adopted by in- 
creased majorities. 

The Ministry of General de Cissey had al- 
ready resigned upon a minor question, but had 
held over at the President's request. Mac- 
Mahon now asked the Monarchist M. Buffet 
to form a conservative conciliation Cabinet, 
which was made up almost entirely from the 
Right Centre (Orleanists) and the Left Centre 
(moderate Republicans) and accepted at first 
by the Republican Left. By this Cabinet still 
one more step was taken toward Republican 

During the Buffet Ministry three impor- 
tant matters occupied public attention. One 
was the completion of the new constitution. 
A second was the creation of "free" universi- 
ties, not under control of the State. This 
step was advocated in the name of intellectual 
freedom, but the whole scheme was backed 
by the Catholics and merely resulted in the 
creation of Catholic faculties in several great 
cities. A third matter was the intense anxiety 
over the prospect of a rupture with Germany. 


Bismarck was renewing his policy of pin-pricks. 
The French army had been strengthened by 
a battalion to every regiment, and so Bismarck 
complained of the strictures of French and Bel- 
gian bishops on his anti-papal policy. Whether 
he only meant to humiliate France still more, 
or whether he actually desired a new rupture 
so as to crush the country finally, is not clear. 
At any rate, with the aid of England and es- 
pecially of Russia, France showed that she 
was not helpless, and Bismarck protested that 
he was absolutely friendly. 

By the close of 1875, the measures consti- 
tuting the new Government had been voted 
and, on December 31, the Assembly, which 
had governed France since the Franco-Prus- 
sian War, was dissolved to make way for the 
new legislature. During the succeeding elec- 
tions M. Buffet's Cabinet, antagonized by the 
Republicans and rent by internal dissensions, 
went to pieces. M. Buffet personally suffered 
disastrously at the polls. The slate was clear 
for a totally new organization. The Assembly 
had done many a good service,*but its dilatori- 
ness in establishing a permanent government, 
its ingratitude to M. Thiers, its clericalism, 


and its stubbornness in trying to foist a king 
on the people made it pass away unregretted 
by a country which had far outstripped it in 

The "Constitution of 1875," under which, 
with some modifications, France is still gov- 
erned, is not a single document constructed 
a priori, like the Constitution of the United 
States* It was partly the result of the evolu- 
tion of the National Assembly itself, partly 
the result of compromises and dickerings be- 
tween hostile groups. Particularly, it expressed 
the jealousy of a monarchical assembly for a 
President of a republic, and the desire, there- 
fore, to keep power in the hands of its own leg- 
islative successor. The Assembly took it for 
granted that the Chamber of Deputies would 
have the same opinions as itself. As a matter 
of fact, the political complexion, of the legis- 
lature has been consistently toward radical- 
ism, and the result has hindered a strong exec- 
utive and promoted legislative demagogy. 

The Constitution of 1875 may be considered 
as consisting of the Constitutional Law of 
February 25, relating to the organization of 
the public powers (President, Senate, Cham- 


her of Deputies, Ministers, etc.); the Con- 
stitutional Law of the previous day, Febru- 
ary 24, relating to the organization of the 
Senate; the Constitutional Law of July 16, 
on the relations of the public powers. Subsi- 
diary "organic laws" voted later determined 
the procedure for the election of Senators and 
Deputies. The vote of February 25 was the 
crucial one in the definite establishment of 
the Republican regime. The Constitution has 
undergone certain slight modifications since 
its adoption. 

By the Constitution of 1875 the government 
of the French Republic was vested in a Sen- 
ate and a Chamber of Deputies. The Senate 
consisted of 300 members, of whom 75 were 
chosen for life by the expiring Assembly, their 
successors to be elected by co-optation in the 
Senate itself. The other 225, chosen for nine 
years and renewable by thirds, were to be 
elected by a method of indirect selection. In 
1884, the choice of life Senators ceased and 
the seats, as they fell vacant, have been dis- 
tributed among the Departments of the coun- 
try. The Deputies were elected by universal 
suffrage for a period of four years. Unless a 


candidate obtained an absolute majority of 
the votes cast, the election was void, and a 
new one was necessary. Except during the 
period from 1885 to 1889, the Deputies have 
represented districts determined, unless for 
densely populated ones, by the administra- 
tive arrondissements. From 1885 to 1889, the 
scrutin de liste was in operation: the whole 
Department voted on a ticket containing as 
many names as there were arrondissements. 
The prerogatives of the two houses were iden- 
tical except that financial measures were to 
originate in the Chamber of Deputies. As a 
matter of fact, the Senate has fallen into the 
background, and the habit of considering the 
vote of the Chamber rather than that of the 
Senate as important in a change of Ministry 
has made it the true source of government 
in France. The two houses met at Versailles 
until 1879; since then Paris has been the cap- 
ital, except for the election of a President. 
After separate decision by each house to do 
so, or the request of the President, they could 
meet in joint assembly as a Constitutional 
Convention to revise the constitution. 
The Senate and Chamber, united in joint 


session as a National Assembly, were to choose 
a President for a definite term of seven years, 
not to fill out an incomplete term vacated 
by another President. The President could be 
re-elected. With the consent of the Senate 
he could dissolve the Chamber, but this re- 
striction made the privilege almost inopera- 
tive in practice. He was irresponsible, the 
nominal executive and figurehead of the State, 
but all his acts had to be countersigned by 
a responsible Minister, by which his initiative 
was greatly reduced. In fact the President 
had really less power than a constitutional 

The real executive authority was in the 
hands of the Cabinet, headed by a Premier or 
President du conseil 1 The Ministry was re- 
sponsible to the Senate and Chamber (in 
practice, as we have seen, to the Chamber), 
and was expected to resign as a whole if put 
by a vote in the minority. By custom the 
President selects the Premier from the major- 
ity and the latter selects his colleagues in the 
Cabinet, trying to make them representatives 

i Before the Constitution of i8?5, Hie Premier was only vice- 
president du conseil. 


of the wishes of the Parliament. The French 
Republic is therefore managed by a parlia- 
mentary government. 

The first elections under the new constitu- 
tion resulted very much as might be expected : 
the Senate became in personnel the true suc- 
cessor of the Assembly, the Chamber of 
Deputies contained most of the new men. The 
Senate was conservative and monarchical, 
the Chamber was republican. Therefore, the 
President of the Republic entrusted the for- 
mation of a Ministry to M. Jules Dufaure, of 
the Left Centre, the views of which group 
differed hardly at all from those of the Right 
Centre, except in a full acceptance of the new 
conditions. Unfortunately, M. Dufaure found 
it impossible to ride two horses at once and to 
satisfy both the conservative Senate and the 
majority in the Chamber of more advanced 
Republicans than himself. He mistrusted the 
Republican leader Gambetta, though the 
latter was now far more moderate, and he 
sympathized too much with the Clericals to 
suit the new order of things. So his Cabinet 
resigned (December 2, 1876), less than nine 
months after its appointment, and the mare- 


chal de Mac-Mahon felt it necessary, very 
much against his will, to call to power Jules 
Simon. He had previously tried unsuccess- 
fully to form a Cabinet from the Right Centre 
under the due de Broglie. 

The due de Broglie remained, however, the 
power behind the throne. The President was 
under the political advice of the conservative 
set, whose firm conviction he shared, that the 
new Republic was advancing headlong into 
irreligion. The course of political events now 
took on a strong religious flavor. Jules Simon 
was a liberal, which was considered a misfor- 
tune, though he announced himself now as 
"deeply republican and deeply conservative." 
But people knew his unfriendly relations with 
Gambetta, which dated from 1871, when he 
checkmated the dictator at Bordeaux. It was 
hoped that open dissension might break out 
in the Republican party which would justify 
measures tending to a conservative reaction, 
and help tide over the time until 1880. Then 
the constitution might be revised at the ex- 
piration of Mac-Mahon 5 term and the mon- 
archy perhaps restored. 

Gambetta was, however, now a very differ- 


ent man. Discarding his former unbending 
radicalism, he was now the advocate of the 
"political policy of results," or opportunism, a 
method of conciliation, of compromise, and 
of waiting for the favorable opportunity. 
This was to be, henceforth, the policy closely 
connected with his name and fame. So Jules 
Simon soon was sacrificed* 

The efforts of the Clerical party bore chiefly 
in two directions: control of education and 
advocacy of increased papal authority, par- 
ticularly of the temporal power of the Pope, 
dispossessed of his states a few years before 
by the Government of Victor EmmanueL 
This latter course could only tend to embroil 
France with Italy. So convinced was Gam- 
betta of the unwise and disloyal activities 
of the Ultramontanes that on May 4, in a 
speech to the Chamber, he uttered his famous 
cry: "Le clericalisme, voila Tennemi!" 

Jules Simon found himself in a very difficult 
position. Desirous of conciliating Mac-Mahon 
and his clique, he adopted a policy somewhat 
at variance with his former liberal religious 
views. On the other hand, he could not satis- 
fy the President, who had always disliked him, 


or those who had determined upon his over- 
throw. The crisis came on May 16, 1877, 
when Mac-Mahon, taking advantage of some 
very minor measures, wrote a haughty and 
indignant letter to Jules Simon, to say that 
the Minister no longer had his confidence. 
Jules Simon, backed up by a majority in the 
Chamber, could very well have engaged in a 
constitutional struggle with Mac-Mahon, but 
he rather weakly resigned the next day. 1 Thus 
was opened the famous conflict known in 
French history, from its date, as the "Seize- 

No sooner was Jules Simon out of the way 
than Mac-Mahon appointed a reactionary 
^coalition Ministry of Orl6anists and Imperial- 
ists headed by the due de Broglie, and held 
apparently ready in waiting. The Ministers 
were at variance on many political questions, 
but united as to clericalism. The plan was to 
dissolve the Republican Chamber with the 
co-operation of the anti-Republican Senate, 
in the hope that a new election, under official 

1 The Chamber, on May 12, had expressed itself in favor of the 
publicity of meetings of municipal councils, during the absence 
of the Minister of the Interior. On May i5, it had passed the 
second reading of a law, opposed by Jules Simon, on the freedom 
of the press. 


pressure, would result in a monarchical lower 
house also. The Chamber of Deputies was 
therefore prorogued until June 16 and then 
dissolved. At the meeting of May 18, the 
Republicans presented a solid front of 363 in 
their protest against the high-handed action 
of the marechal de Mac-Mahon. 

The new Cabinet began by a wholesale re- 
vocation of administrative officials throughout 
the country, and spent the summer in unblush- 
ing advocacy of its candidates. Those favored 
by the Government were so indicated and 
their campaign manifestoes were printed on 
official white paper. 1 The Republicans united 
their forces to support the re-election of the 
363 and gave charge of their campaign to a 
committee of eighteen under the inspiring 
leadership of Gambetta. In a great speech at 
Lille, Gambetta declared that the President 
would have to "give in or give up"(se sou- 
mettre ou se demettre), for which crime of lese- 
majeste he was condemned by default to fine 
and imprisonment. In September, Thiers, 
the great leader of the early Republic, died, 
and his funeral was made the occasion of 

1 In France only official posters may be printed on white paper. 



a great manifestation of Republican unity. 
Finally, in spite of governmental pressure and 
the pulpit exhortations of the clergy, the elec- 
tions in October resulted in a new Republican 
Chamber. The reactionary Cabinet was face 
to face with as firm an opposition as before. 

The due de Broglie, in view of this crushing 
defeat, was ready to withdraw, and Mac- 
Mahon, after some hesitation, accepted his 
resignation. Mac-Mahon's own fighting blood 
was up, however, and he tried the experiment 
of an extra-parliamentary Ministry led by 
General de Rochebouet, the members of 
which were conservatives without seats in 
Parliament. But the Chamber refused to enter 
into relations with it, and as the budget was 
pressing and the Senate was not disposed to 
support a second dissolution, Mac-Mahon 
had to submit and the Rochebouet Cabinet 

Thus ended Mac-Mahon's unsuccessful 
attempt to exert his personal power. The 
Seize-Mai has sometimes been likened to an 
abortive coup d'etat. The parallel is hardly 
justifiable. Mac-Mahon would have welcomed 
a return of the monarchy at the end of his term 


of office, but he intended to remain faithful 
to the constitution, however much he might 
strain it or interpret it under the advice of his 
Clerical managers, and though he might have 
been willing to use troops to enforce his wishes. 
One unfortunate result ensued: the crisis left 
the Presidency still more weak. Any repeti- 
tion of Mac-Mahon's experiment of dissolv- 
ing the Chamber would revive accusations 
against one of his successors of attempting a 
coup d'etat There have been times when the 
country would have welcomed the dissolu- 
tion by a strong President of an incompe- 
tent Chamber. Unfortunately, Mac-Mahon 
stood for the reactionaries against the Repub- 
lic. His course of action would be a dangerous 

The new order of things was marked by the 
advent of another Dufaure Ministry, very 
moderate in tendency, but acceptable to the 
majority. Most of the high-handed doings 
of the Broglie Cabinet were revoked, much 
to the disgust of Mac-Mahon, who frequently 
lost his temper when obliged to sign documents 
of which he disapproved. Finally, in Janu- 
ary, 1879, in a controversy with his Cabinet 


over some military transfers, Mac-Mahon re- 
signed, over a year before the expiration of 
his term of office. Moreover, at the recent 
elections to the Senate the Republicans had 
obtained control of even that body. Thus he 
was alone, with both houses and the Minis- 
try against him. 

In spite of the unfortunate endless internal 
dissensions, France made great strides in 
national recovery during the Presidency of 
Mac-Mahon. His rank and military title gave 
prestige to the Republic in presence of the dip- 
lomats of European monarchies, the German 
crisis of 1875 showed that Bismarck was not 
to have a free hand in crushing France, the 
participation of France in the Congress of 
Berlin enabled the country to take a place 
again among the European Powers. Finally, 
the International Exhibition of 1878 was an 
invitation to the world to witness the recovery 
of France from her disasters and to testify to 
her right to lead again in art and industry. 

The Presidency of Mac-Mahon shows the 
desperate efforts of the Monarchists to over- 
throw the Republic, and then to control it 
in view of an ultimate Restoration, either 


by obstructing the vote of a constitution or 
by hindering its operation. Throughout, the 
Monarchists and the Clericals work together 
or are identical. The end of his term of office 
found the whole Government in the hands of 
the Republicans. 


January, 1879, to December, 1887 

THE resignation of the marechal de Mac- 
Mahon was followed by the immediate gath- 
ering, in accordance with the constitution, of 
the National Assembly, which chose as Presi- 
dent for seven years Jules Grevy. The new 
chief magistrate, elected without a competitor, 
was already seventy-two, and had in his long 
career won the reputation of a dignified and 
sound statesman, in whose hands public 
affairs might be entrusted with absolute 
safety. He represented a step beyond the 
military and aristocratic regime which had 
preceded him. The embodiment of the old 
bourgeoisie, he had, along with its qualities, 
some of its defects. Eminently cautious, his 
statesmanship had been at times a non-com- 
mittal reserve more than constructive genius. 
His parsimony soon caused people to accuse 
him of unduly saving his salary and state al- 
lowances, while his personal dislikes led him 


to err grievously in his choice of advisers, or 
rather in his elimination of Gambetta, to whom 
circumstances now pointed. 

Jules Grevy hated Gambetta, undeniably 
the leading figure in the Republican party 
since the death of Thiers, and neglected to 
entrust to him the formation of a Cabinet. 
Thiers himself had shown greater wisdom. He, 
too, had disliked the raging and apparently 
futile volubility of the young tribune during 
the Franco-Prussian War, but Thiers got over 
calling Gambetta a "fou furieux." On the 
contrary, just after the Seize-Mai and before 
his own death, when Thiers was expecting to 
return to the Presidency as successor to a dis- 
credited Mac-Mahon, he had intended to make 
Gambetta the head of his Cabinet. For Gam- 
betta with maturity had become more mod- 
erate. Instead of drastic political remedies 
he was gradually evolving, as already stated, 
the policy of "Opportunism" so closely linked 
with his name, the method of gradual advance 
by concessions and compromises, by taking ad- 
vantage of occasions and making one's general 
policy conform with opportunity. 

If Gambetta, as leader of the majority group 


in the Republican party, which had evicted 
Mac-Mahon, had become Prime Minister, it 
is conceded that the precedent would have 
been set by the new administration for parlia- 
mentary government with a true party leader- 
ship, as in Great Britain. Instead, Grevy en- 
trusted the task of forming a Ministry to an 
upright'but colorless leader named Wadding- 
ton, at the head of a composite Cabinet, more 
moderate in policy than Gambetta, who became 
presiding officer of the Chamber of Deputies. 
The consequence was that, after lasting less 
than a year, it gave way to another Cabinet 
led by the great political trimmer Freycinet, 1 
until in due time it was in turn succeeded by 
the Ministry of Jules Ferry in September, 1880. 
It must not be inferred that nothing was 
accomplished by the Waddington and Frey- 
cinet Ministries. Indeed, Jules Ferry, the 
chief Republican next to Gambetta, was him- 
self a member of these two Cabinets before 
leading his own. 

1 Gambetta's farmer assistant during the national defence 
after the first disasters; a hrilliant organizer, but in general pol- 
icy a natonfe, to use the term Gambetta coined about him on the 
basis of the word votontt* As Minister of Public Works be ini- 
tiated at this period great improvements in the internal develop- 
ment of France, especially in the railways. 


The lining-up of Republican groups, as 
opposed to the Monarchists, under the new 
administration was: the Left Centre, com- 
posed as in the past of ultra-conservative 
Republicans, constantly diminishing numeri- 
cally; the Republican Left, which followed 
Jules Ferry; the Republican Union of Gam- 
betta; and, finally, the radical Extreme Left, 
which had taken for itself many of the ad- 
vanced measures advocated by Gambetta 
when he had been a radical. One of its leaders 
was Georges Clemenceau. Between the two 
large groups of Ferry and Gambetta there was 
little difference in ideals, but Gambetta was 
now the Opportunist and Ferry made his own 
Gambetta's old battle-cry against clericalism. 

The Chamber elected after the Seize-Mai 
was by reaction markedly anti-Clerical, and 
the Waddington Cabinet, to begin with, con- 
tained three Protestants and a freethinker. 
Obviously steps would soon be taken to defeat 
the "enemy." In this movement Jules Ferry 
was from the beginning a leader, by direct 
action as well as by the educational reforms 
which he carried out as Minister of Public 
Instruction* Jules Ferry became, more than 



Gambetta, the great bugbear of the Clericals 
and the author of the "lois scelerates." 

During the Waddington Ministry Jules 
Ferry began his efforts for the reorganization 
of superior instruction, and among his meas- 
ures carried through the Chamber of Deputies 
the notorious "Article 7" indirectly aimed at 
Jesuit influence in secondary teaching as well: 
"No person can direct any public or private 
establishment whatsoever or teach therein if 
he belongs to an unauthorized order." The 
Jesuits had at that time no legal footing in 
France, but were openly tolerated. The Sen- 
ate rejected this article under the Freycinet 
Ministry and the law was finally adopted 
thus apparently weakened. But Jules Ferry, 
nothing daunted, immediately put into opera- 
tion the no less notorious decrees of March, 
1880, reviving older laws going back even to 
1762, which had long since fallen into disuse. 
By these decrees the Jesuit establishments 
were to be closed and the members dispersed 
within three months. Moreover, every un- 
authorized order was, under penalty of ex- 
pulsion, to apply for authorization within a 
like limit of time. The expulsion of the Jesuits 


was carried out with a certain spectacular dis- 
play of passive resistance on the part of those 
evicted. Later in the year similar steps were 
taken against many other organizations. 

It is evident from the above that the promo- 
tion of educational reform under Republican 
control was definitely connected with meas- 
ures directed against clerical domination. The 
French Catholic Church, on its part, treated 
every attempt toward laicization as a form of 
persecution. But Jules Ferry unhesitatingly 
extended his policy when he became Prime 
Minister. His measures were genuinely neu- 
tral, but his reputation as a Voltairian free- 
thinker and a freemason inevitably afforded 
Ms opponents an excuse for their charges. 

Jules Ferry's reforms in education, extend- 
ing over several Cabinet periods as late as 
1882, included secondary education for girls, 
and free, obligatory, lay, primary instruction. 
To Americans accustomed to such methods of 
education it is difficult to conceive the strug- 
gles of Jules Ferry and his assistant on the 
floor of the House, Paul Bert, in carrying 
through these measures for the training of the 


In foreign affairs Jules Ferry inaugurated a 
more active policy symptomatic of the return 
of France to participation in international 
matters. At the Congress of Berlin, France 
had avoided entanglements, but, even at that 
early period, Lord Salisbury had hinted to 
M. Waddington, present as French delegate, 
that no interference would be made by Eng- 
land, were France to advance claims in Tunis* 
This suggestion came, perhaps, originally from 
Bismarck, who was not averse to embroiling 
France with Italy. That country longed for 
Tunis so conveniently situated near Sicily. 
England, moreover, was probably not desirous 
of seeing the Italians thus strategically en- 
sconced in the Mediterranean. 

In 1881, financial manoeuvres and the plun- 
dering expeditions into Algeria of border 
tribes called Kroumirs afforded a pretext for 
intervention, to the indignation of Italy, which 
was thus more than ever inclined to seek al- 
liances against France, even with Germany. 
Here, indeed, was the germ of the Triple 
Alliance. An easy advance to Tunis forced the 
Bey to accept a French protectorate by the 
Treaty of the Bardo on May 12, 1881. Later in 


the year the situation became rather serious, 
and new and rather costly military operations 
became necessary, including the occupation 
of Sfax, Gabes, and Kairouan. 

Thus France came into possession of valu- 
able territories, but at the cost of Italian in- 
dignation. Moreover, Jules Ferry, who was 
always one of the most hated of party leaders 
in his own country, reaped no advantage to 
himself. His enemies affected to believe that 
the whole Tunisian war was a game of capi- 
talists, or was planned for effect upon elections 
to the new Chamber. The boulevards refused 
to take the Kroumirs seriously and joked about 
"Cherchez le Kroumir." Finally, on Novem- 
ber 9, 1881, the personal intervention of Gam- 
betta before the newly elected Chamber of 
Deputies saved the Cabinet on a vote of con- 
fidence. Jules Ferry none the less determined 
to resign, and Gambetta, in spite of Grevy's 
aversion, was the inevitable man for the for- 
mation of a new Cabinet. 

Gambetta's great opportunity had come 
too late to be effective. The undoubted leader 
of the Republic, he had grown in statesman- 
ship since his early days, but was still hated 


by men like Grevy who could not get over their 
old prejudices. Then the advanced radicals, 
or intransigeants, thought him a traitor to his 
old platforms or programmes.' 1 They blamed 
his Opportunism and said that he wanted 
power without responsibility. Gambetta's ene- 
mies, whether the due de Broglie or Clemen- 
ceau, talked of his secret influence (pouvoir 
occulte), and accused him of aspiring to a dic- 
tatorship, in fact if not in name. Their sus- 
picions were somewhat deepened by Gam- 
betta's ardent advocacy of the scrutin de liste 
instead of the existing scrutin d'arrondisse- 

It was asserted that Gambetta wanted to 
diminish the independence of local represen- 
tation and marshal behind himself a subser- 
vient majority. To Gambetta the scrutin de 
liste was the truly republican form of repre- 
sentation, the one existing under the Na- 

' * Especially as to the unlimited revision of the constitution and 
the immediate separation of Church and State. 

2 Gambetta's contempt for the parochialism of the elections 
by district was great. He felt that departmental tickets would 
favor the choice of better men. One must remember how large a 
proportion of the French Deputies are physicians to appreciate 
the scorn of Gambetta's saying that the scrutin d'arrondissement 
produced a lot of soas-v&frinaires, that is, men who were not even 
decent " horse-doctors." 


tional Assembly and abolished by the reac- 
tionaries under the new constitution. 

Thus, Gambetta had against him, during 
the campaign for renewal of the Chamber of 
Deputies in the summer of 1881, not only the 
anti-Republicans but also timid liberals like 
Jules Simon, the influence of President Grevy, 
and the intransigeants. The Senate was averse 
to the scrutin de liste and rejected, in the spring 
of 1881, the measure which Gambetta carried 
through the Chamber* Gambetta, formerly 
the idol of the working classes of Paris, met 
with opposition, was hooted in one of his own 
political rallies, and was re-elected on the first 
ballot in one only of the two districts in which 
he was a candidate. 

The elections of the Chamber of 1881 re- 
sulted in a strongly Republican body, in which, 
however, the majority subdivided into groups. 
Gambetta's "Union republicaine" was the 
most numerous, followed by Ferry's "Gauche 
republicaine," and the extremists. A certain 
fraction of Gambetta's group, including Henri 
Brisson and Charles Floquet, also tended to 
stick together. They were the germ of what 
became in time the great Radical party. 


It had been hoped that Gambetta would 
bring into his Cabinet all the other leaders of 
his party, and at last form a great governing 
ministry. But men like Leon Say and Frey- 
cinet refused their collaboration because of 
divergence of views or personal pride. Gam- 
betta then decided to pick his collaborators 
from his immediate friends and partisans, 
some of whom had yet a reputation to make. 
The anticipated "Great Ministry" turned 
out to be, its opponents said, a "ministere 
de commis," a cabinet of clerks. The fact that 
it contained men like Waldeck-Rousseau, 
Raynal, and Rouvier showed, however, that 
Gambetta could discover ability in others. 
But it was declared that the "dictator" was 
marshalling his henchmen. The extremists, 
especially, were furious because Gambetta 
also magnanimously gave important posts to 
non-Republicans like General de Miribel and 
the journalist J.-J. Weiss. 

The "Great Ministry" remained in office 
two months and a half and came to grief on 
the proposed revision of the constitution, in 
which Gambetta wished to incorporate the 
scmtin de lisle. In Janizary, 1882, it had to 


resign and Gambetta died on the last day of 
the same year. Thus, the third Republic lost 
its leading statesman since the death of Thiers. 

The year 1882 was filled by the two ineffec- 
tive Cabinets of Freycinet (second time) and 
of Duclerc. Under the former, France made 
the mistake, injurious to her interests and 
prestige, of withdrawing from the Egyptian 
condominium with Great Britain and allowing 
the latter country free play for the conquest 
and occupation of Egypt. Thus the fruits of 
De Lesseps* piercing of the Isthmus of Suez 
went definitely to England. The death of 
Gambetta under the Duclerc-Fallieres Min- 
istry x seemed to reawaken the hopes of the 
anti-Republicans, and Jerome Napoleon, chief 
Bonapartist pretender since the decease of the 
Prince Imperial, issued a manifesto against 
the Republic. Parliament fell into ,a ludicrous 
panic, various contradictory measures were 
proposed, and in the general confusion the 
Cabinet fell after an adverse vote. 

In this contingency President Grevy did 
what he should have done before, and called 
to office the leading statesman. This was now 

* M. FaBBres took the place of Dudere as President of the 
Council during the last days. 


Jules Ferry. At last France had an adminis- 
tration which lasted a little over two years. 
But Ferry was still intensely unpopular. He 
had become the successor of Gambetta and 
the exponent of the policy of Opportunism, 
which he tried to carry out with even more 
constructive statesmanship. But he was to- 
tally wanting in Gambetta's magnetism, and 
his domineering ways made him hated the 
more. The Clericals opposed him as the "per- 
secutor" of the Catholic religion, and the Rad- 
icals thought he did not go far enough in his 
hostility to the Church. For Jules Ferry saw 
that the times were not ripe for disestablish- 
ment, and that the system of the Concordat, in 
vogue since Napoleon I, really gave the State 
more control over the Clergy than it would have 
in case of separation. The State would lose 
its power in appointments and salaries. Jules 
Ferry knew that the Church could be useful 
to him, and the politic Leo XIII, very differ- 
ent from Pius IX, was ready to meet him part- 
way, though the Pope himself had to humor 
to a certain extent the hostility to the Repub- 
lic of the French Monarchists and Clericals. 
Jules Ferry, like Gambetta, also had to put 


up with the veiled hostility of President Grevy, 
working in Parliament through the intrigues 
of his son-in-law Wilson. Moreover, Ferry 
was made to bear the odium for a long period 
of financial depression, which had lasted 
since 1882, starting with the sensational fail- 
ure (kracK) of a large bank, the Union generale. 
So his career was made a torture and he was 
vilified perhaps more than any man of the 
third Republic. 

The extremists had in time another griev- 
ance against Jules Ferry in his opposition to 
a radical revision of the constitution. The 
enemies of the Republic still feigned to believe, 
especially when the death of the comte de 
Chambord in 1883 had fused the Legitimists 
and Orleanists, that an integral revision would 
pave the way for a monarchical restoration. 
The Radicals demanded the suppression of 
the power of the Senate, whose consent was 
necessary to summon a constitutional conven- 
tion. A Congress was summoned in 1884 at 
which the very limited programme of the 
Ministry was put through. The changes 
merely eliminated from the constitution the 
prescriptions for senatorial elections. After 


this, by an ordinary statute, life-senatorships 
were abolished for the future, and some 
changes were made in the choice of senatorial 

Jules Ferry was what would to-day be called 
an imperialist. In this he may have been un- 
wise, for the French, though intrepid explorers, 
do not care to settle permanently far from the 
motherland. The north coast of Africa might 
have been a sufficient field for enterprise. But 
Jules Ferry thought that the Triple Alliance 
of Germany, Austria, and Italy, formed in 
1882, was going to isolate France permanently 
in Europe. So she was to regain her prestige 
by territorial annexations in the Sudan, the 
Congo, Madagascar, Annam, and Tonkin. 

The French had some nominal rights on 
Tonkin since 1874, and disturbances there 
had caused a revival of activities. When the 
French officer Riviere was killed in an ambus- 
cade in May, 1883, Jules Ferry sent heavy 
reinforcements and forced the King of Annam 
to acknowledge a French protectorate. This 
stirred up the Chinese, who also claimed An- 
nam, and who caused the invasion of Tonkin 
by guerillas supported by their own troops. 


After various operations in Tonkin the Treaty 
of Tien-tsin was signed with China in May, 
1884, by which China made the concessions 
called for by the French, Within a month 
Chinese troops ambuscaded a French column 
at Bac-Le and the Government decided on 
a punitive expedition. Thus France was en- 
gaged in troublesome warfare with China, 
without direct parliamentary authorization. 
The bombardment of Foo-chow, the attack on 
the island of Formosa, and the blockade of the 
coast dragged along unsatisfactorily through 
1884 and 1885. 

While Jules Ferry in the spring of 1885 was 
actually negotiating a final peace with China 
on terms satisfactory to the French, the ces- 
sion of Annam and Tonkin with a commercial 
treaty, and while he was categorically affirm- 
ing in the Chamber of Deputies the success of 
military operations in Tonkin, a sudden dis- 
patch from the East threw everything into a 
turmoil. General Briere de Tlsle telegraphed 
from Tonkin that the French had been disas- 
trously defeated at Lang-son and General de 
Negrier severely wounded. The news proved 
to be a grievous exaggeration which was con- 


tradicted by a later dispatch some hours after, 
but the damage was done. On March 30, in 
the Chamber of Deputies, Jules Ferry was 
insulted and abused by the leaders of a coali- 
tion of anti-Republicans and Radicals. The 
"Tonkinois," as his vilifiers called him, dis- 
gusted and discouraged, made little attempt 
to defend himself, and his Cabinet fell by a 
vote of 306 to 149. On April 4, the prelimi- 
naries of a victorious treaty of peace were 
signed with China. 

The fall of Jules Ferry was a severe blow to 
efficient government. It marked the end, for a 
long time, of any effort to construct satisfac- 
tory united Cabinets led by a strong man. It 
set a precedent for innumerable short-lived 
Ministries built on the treacherous sands of 
shifting groups. It paved the way for a deteri- 
oration in parliamentary management. It ac- 
centuated the bitter hatred now existing be- 
tween the Union des gauches, as the united 
Gambetta and Ferry Opportunist groups 
called themselves, on the one hand, and the 
Radicals and the Extreme Left on the other. 
The Radicals, in particular, were influential, 
and one of their more moderate members, 


Henri Brisson, became the head of the next 
Cabinet. Brisson's name testified to an ad- 
vance toward radicalism, but the Cabinet con- 
tained all sorts of moderate and nondescript 
elements, dubbed a "concentration" Cabinet. 
Its chief function was to tide over the elec- 
tions of 1885, for a new Chamber of Deputies. 
In anticipation of this election Gambetta's 
long-desired scrutin de liste had been rather 
unexpectedly voted. 

The workings of the new method of voting 
were less satisfactory than had been antici- 
pated. Republican dissensions and a greater 
union of the opposition caused a tremendous 
reactionary landslide on the first ballot. This 
was greatly reduced on the second ballot, so 
that the Republicans emerged with a large 
though diminished majority. But the old Left 
Centre had practically disappeared and the 
Radicals were vastly more numerous. The 
great divisions were now the Right, the mod- 
erate Union des gauches, the Radicals, and 
the revolutionary Extreme Left. The Brisson 
Cabinet was blamed for not "working" the 
elections more successfully and it resigned at 
the time of President Grevy's re-election. He 


had reached the end of his 1 seven years' term 
and was chosen again on December 28, 1885. 
He was to have troublesome experiences during 
the short time he remained in the Presidency. 

The Freycinet, Goblet, and Rouvier Cabi- 
nets, which fill the rest of Grevy's Presidency, 
were largely engrossed with a new danger 
in the person of General Boulanger. He first 
appeared in a prominent position as Minister 
of War in the Freycinet Cabinet. A young, 
brilliant, and popular though unprincipled 
officer, he soon devoted himself to demagogy 
and put himself at the head of the jingoes who 
called Ferry the slave of Bismarck. The ex- 
peditions of Tunis and Tonkin had, moreover, 
thrown a glamour over the flag and the army. 

Boulanger began at once to play politics and 
catered to the advanced parties, who adopted 
him as their own. He backed up the spectacular 
expulsion of the princes, which, as an answer 
to the monarchical progress, drove from 
France the heads of formerly reigning families 
and their direct heirs in line of primogeniture, 
and carried out their radiation from the army. 
The populace cheered the gallant general on 
his black horse, and when Bismarck com- 


plained that he was a menace to the peace of 
Europe Boulanger's fortune seemed made. 
At a certain moment France and Germany 
were on the brink of war in the so-called 
Schnaebele affair. 1 So, when Boulanger was 
left out of the Rouvier Cabinet combination in 
May, 1887, as dangerous, he played more than 
ever to the gallery as the persecuted saviour of 
France and, on being sent to take command 
of an army corps in the provinces at Clermont- 
Ferrand, he was escorted to the train by thou- 
sands of enthusiastic manifestants. 

Meanwhile, President Grevy was nearing a 
disaster. In October, 1887, General Caffarel, 
an important member of the General Staff, was 
arrested for participating in the sale of deco- 
rations. When Boulanger declared that the 
arrest of Caffarel was an indirect assault on 
himself, originally responsible for Caffarers 
appointment to the General Staff, the affair 
got greater notoriety. . The scandal assumed 
national proportions when it was found to 
involve the President's own son-in-law Daniel 
Wilson, well known to be a shady and tricky 

1 The French claimed that a government official had been lured 
over the frontier and illegally arrested. 


politician, who had the octogenarian Presi- 
dent under his thumb. The matter reached 
the scale of a Cabinet crisis, since it was by an 
overthrow of the Ministry that the President 
could best be reached. Unfortunately, Grevy 
could not see that the most dignified thing for 
him to do was to resign, even though he was 
in no way involved in Wilson's misdemeanors. 
For days he tried to persuade prominent men 
to form a Cabinet; he tried to argue his right 
and duty to remain. But finally the Chamber 
and Senate brought actual pressure upon him 
by voting to adjourn to specific hours in the 
expectation of a presidential communication. 
He bowed to the inevitable and retired from 
the Presidency with the reputation of a dis- 
credited old miser, instead of the great states- 
man he had appeared on beginning his term of 



December, 1887, to June, i8g4 

THE successor of Jules Grevy was SadI Garnet, 
in many ways the best choice. As has been 
seen, the transition was less easy than the 
two ballots of the National Assembly seemed 
to indicate (December 3, 1887). The intrigues 
of the so-called "nuits Mstoriques" (Novem- 
ber 28-30) had been an endeavor of the Radi- 
cals to keep Grevy, in order to ward off Jules 
Ferry as his successor. Finally, Carnot was 
a compromise candidate, or "dark horse/' a 
Moderate acceptable to the Radicals still un- 
willing to endure the leading candidate Ferry. 
President Carnot, hitherto known chiefly as 
a capable civil engineer and a successful Cabi- 
net officer, was the heir to the name and tradi- 
tions of a great republican family.. His integ- 
rity was a guarantee of honesty in office, and 
his personal dignity was bound to heighten 
the prestige of the chief magistracy, somewhat 
weakened by his predecessor Grevy. On the 



other hand, Carnofs conception of the consti- 
tutional responsibility or neutrality of his 
office was an insufficient bulwark to the State 
against the intrigues of petty politicians and 
the inefficiencies of the parliamentary regime. 
Consequently his term of office saw the Repub- 
lic exposed to two of the worst crises in its 
history, the Boulanger campaign and the Pan- 
ama scandals, while the legislative history re- 
cords the overthrow of successive cabinets. 
These followed each other without definite 
constructive policy, and aimed chiefly at keep- 
ing power by constant dickerings and playing 
off group against group. 

The demoralization of parliamentary life 
had reached a climax* The Republicans were 
divided into the Moderates, former followers 
of Gambetta, the Radicals with Floquet and 
Brisson, the Extreme Left with Clemenceau and 
Pelletan, the Socialists with Millerand, Basly, 
and Clovis Hugues. The Royalists and Bona- 
partists worked against the Government and 
the Boulangists took advantage of the chaos to 
push their cause. The Socialists, in particular, 
were a new group in the Chamber, destined in 
later years to hold the centre of the stage. In 


their manifesto of December, 1887, signed by 
seventeen Deputies, they advocated, in addi- 
tion to innumerable specific reforms or practi- 
cal innovations, schemes for the reorganization 
of society: state monopolies, nationalization of 
property, progressive taxation, and the like. 

The year 1888, characterized by intense 
political and social unrest, was critical. The 
trial and conviction of Grevy's son-in-law Wil- 
son involved washing dirty linen in public. 
The steady growth of Boulangism testified to 
dissatisfaction, even though, as it proved, the 
enemies of the established order had united on 
a worthless adventurer as their leader. 

General Boulanger had been first "invented " 
as a leader by the extreme Radicals, and es- 
pecially by Clemenceau, the demolisseur or 
destroyer of ministries. Then, being gradually 
abandoned by them, he went over to the anti- 
Republicans and took heavy subsidies from 
the Monarchists, while continuing to advocate, 
at least openly, an anti-parliamentary, plebis- 
citary Republic* 

Early in 1888, in February, the candidacy of 
Boulanger to the Chamber was started in sev- 
eral departments. The electioneering activities 


of a general in regular service and sundry deeds 
of insubordination on his part finally caused 
the Government, as a disciplinary measure, 
to retire him. The result was that his partisans 
raised a cry of persecution, and his actual 
retirement gave him the liberty to engage in 
politics which his service on the active list had 
prevented. In April Boulanger was elected 
Deputy in the southern department of la 
Dordogne and the northern le Nord. His plan 
of campaign was to be candidate for Deputy 
in each department successively in which a 
vacancy occurred, thus indirectly and gradu- 
ally obtaining a plebiscite of approval from the 
country. At the same time he raised the cry in 
favor of militarism, not for the sake of war, he 
said, but for defence. He attacked the impo- 
tence of Parliament and, as a remedy, called 
for the dissolution of the Chamber and the con- 
vocation of a Constituent Assembly to revise 
the constitution. His opponents raised the 
answering cry of dictatorship and* Caesarism. 
The election in the Nord was particularly 
alarming because of Boulanger's majority. 

Boulanger now had both Moderates and 
many Radicals against him, including the 


Prime Minister Floquet, and was, on the other 
hand, supported openly or secretly by the Im- 
perialists and Monarchists, advocates for vary- 
ing purposes of the plebiscite. The Royalists, 
who thought their chances of success the most 
hopeful, wanted to use Boulanger as a tool to 
further their designs for the overthrow of the 
Republic. Not only did he receive funds from 
the pretender, the comte de Paris, but an 
ardent Royalist lady of rank, the duchesse 
d'Uzes, squandered millions of francs in fur- 
thering Boulanger's political schemes as leader 
of the Boulangists: the "National Party' 9 or 

In June, 1888, Boulanger brought forward in 
the Chamber a project for a revision of the con- 
stitution. He advocated a single Chamber, or, 
if a Senate were conceded, demanded that it 
be chosen by popular vote. The power of the 
Chamber was to be diminished, that of the 
President increased, and laws were to be sub- 
ject to ratification by plebiscite or referendum. 
The measure was naturally rejected, but Bou- 
langer renewed the attack in July by demand- 
ing the dissolution of the Chamber. In the 
excitement of the debate the lie was passed be- 


tween Boulanger and the President of the Coun- 
cil of Ministers, Floquet. Boulanger resigned 
his seat and in a duel, a few days later, between 
Floquet and Boulanger, the dashing general, 
the warrior of the black horse, and the hero of 
the popular song "En rev'nant d'la revue," 
was ignominiously wounded by the civilian 

But Boulanger's star was not yet on the 
wane. He continued to be elected Deputy in 
different departments, and the efforts of the 
Ministry to cut the ground from under his feet 
by bringing in a separate revisionary project 
did not undermine his popularity with the 
rabble, the jingo Ligue des Patriotes of Paul 
Deroulede, and the anti-Republican malcon- 
tents. In January, 1889, after a fiercely con- 
tested and spectacular campaign, he was elected 
Deputy for the department of the Seine, con- 
taining the city of Paris, nerve-centre of France. 
It is generally, conceded that if Boulanger had 
gone to the Elysee, the presidential mansion, 
on the evening of his election, and turned out 
Carnot, he would have had the Parisian popu- 
lace and the police with him in carrying out a 
coup d'etat. Luckily for the country his judg- 


ment or Ms nerve failed him at the crucial mo- 
ment, and from that time his influence dimin- 
ished. The panic-stricken Government was 
able to thwart his plebiscitary appeals by re- 
establishing the scrutin d'arrondissement, or 
election by small districts instead of by whole 
departments. Moreover, when the Floquet 
Cabinet fell soon after on its own revisionary 
project, the succeeding Tirard Ministry was 
able to pass a law preventing simultaneous 
multiple candidacies, and impeached Bou- 
langer, with some of his followers, before the 
Senate as High Court of Justice. Instead of 
facing trial, Boulanger and his satellites Dil- 
lon and Henri Rochef ort fled from France- In 
August they were condemned in absence to 
imprisonment. Boulanger never returned to 
France, and with diminishing subsidies his 
following waned. The elections of 1889 resulted 
in the return of only thirty-eight Boulangists 
and, when in September, 1891, Boulanger com- 
mitted suicide in Brussels at the grave of his 
mistress, most Frenchmen merely gave a sigh 
of relief at the memory of the dangers they had 
experienced not so long before. 
The International Exposition of 1889 af- 


forded a breathing spell in the midst of political 
anxieties, and helped, by its evidence of the 
Republic's prosperity, to weaken Boulanger's 
cause. But unsettled social and religious prob- 
lems remained troublesome. The successive 
cabinets after the Floquet Ministry, and fol- 
lowing the general election of 1889, pursued a 
policy of "Republican concentration/' com- 
bining Moderate and Radical elements, disap- 
pearing often without important motives, and 
replaced by cabinets of approximately the same 
coloring. The Clerical Party was hand-in- 
glove with the Royalists and the Boulangists. 
It took advantage of governmental instability 
to try to undermine the Republic, but its own 
harmony of purpose was in due time diminished 
by the new policy of Leo XIII. That astute 
Italian diplomat was himself temperamentally 
an Opportunist. He conceived the idea of con- 
trolling France by advances to the Republic 
and by feigning to accept it in order to get 
hold of its policies, especially the educational 
and military laws. He realized, too, the harm 
done to the Vatican by the stubbornness of 
many French Catholics. He felt the necessity 
of making amends for the behavior of the 


Catholic Royalists in the Boulanger affair. 
Certain prelates, including the Archbishop of 
Aix, Monseigneur Gouthe-Soulard, attacked 
the Government violently at the end of 1891 
in connection with disturbances by French 
pilgrims to Rome who had manifested in favor 
of the Pope and written "Vive le Pape-Roi!" 
at the tomb of Victor Emmanuel. The French 
Catholics tended to resent the interference 
of the Pope, but the latter, who had for some 
months received the support of Cardinal La- 
vigerie, Archbishop of Algiers and Primate of 
Africa, tried to bring pressure on the leaders 
of the French clergy. In February, 1892, as a 
rejoinder to a manifesto by five French cardi- 
nals, came his famous encyclical letter advo- 
cating the established order of things. "The 
civil power considered as such is from God 
and always from God. . . . Consequently, when 
new governments representing this new power 
are constituted, to accept them is not only 
permitted but demanded, or even imposed, 
by the needs of the social good." This en- 
cyclical was followed by a letter to the French 
cardinals in May and by other manifestations 
of his wishes. Thus a certain number of Cath- 


olics, among whom the comte de Mun and 
Jacques Piou were leaders, cut adrift from the 
Right and adhered to the Republic, forming 
the small group of "Rallies/* They were never 
very numerous or powerful, and the Dreyfus 
affair, a few years later, showed how the Pope's 
desire to rally the Catholics to the Republic 
was thwarted by the French clergy and the 

The procedure of Leo XIII was thus a proof 
that the Vatican wanted to be on good terms 
with the Republic. The rapprochement with 
Russia was another proof that France, in spite 
of its troubles, was to be reckoned with in Eu- 
rope. France and Russia felt it necessary to 
draw together in answer to the noisy renewal 
of the Triple Alliance. There had been tension 
in the spring of 1891, in which the French were 
not wholly blameless, as a result of the private 
visit to Paris of the dowager empress of Ger- 
many, the Empress Frederick. In the summer 
of 1891 a French fleet under Admiral Ger~ 
vais was invited to Russian waters. It visited 
Cronstadt; and the Czar and the President 
exchanged telegrams of sympathy. On the 
return to France the same fleet visited Ports- 


mouth by invitation, and was welcomed by the 
Queen and the authorities. The visit to Eng- 
land did not, however, have the same meaning 
as the Russian one. "Portsmouth" meant an 
expression of England's freedom of action face- 
to-face with the Triple Alliance, and an en- 
deavor to smooth French susceptibilities re- 
cently ruffled by Lord Salisbury. After an 
Anglo-French compact, in August, 1890, for 
the partition of protectorates and zones of 
influence in Africa, the British Prime Minister 
alluded rather scoffingly in the House of Lords 
to the lack of value of the Sahara assigned to 
the French. "Cronstadt," as opposed to " Ports- 
mouth/' meant an active understanding, to 
be followed in 1892 by a military defensive 
compact negotiated in St. Petersburg by 
General de Boisdeffre, head of the French 
General Staff. 

The return visit of the Russians took place 
at Toulon in 1893, and Admiral Avellan with 
his staff visited Paris, which went wild with 
enthusiasm. At that moment French relations 
with Italy were strained, partly because the 
Italian Government was jealous of the cor- 
diality between the Pope and the Republic. 


The Franco-Russian manifestation was a new 
veiled warning. 

In 1892, under the leadership of Jules Meline, 
the Chamber adopted aprotective tariff policy, 
This resulted in several tariff disputes and en- 
gendered bad feeling with various countries, 
including Italy, 

The desperate attack of the Royalists, en- 
gineered mainly against the Republic in the 
Panama scandals, helped to bring the Pope 
and the State still closer together, so that at 
certain times the Rallies or Republican Cath- 
olics and the Royalists fought each other vio- 
lently. The Panama scandal was planned in 
view of the elections of 1893. During the decade 
following 1880 Ferdinand de Lesseps, the suc- 
cessful builder of the Suez Canal, had organized 
and tried to finance a company to construct a 
canal at Panama. The prestige of Lesseps's 
name and the memory of his previous achieve- 
ment made countless Frenchmen invest huge 
sums in the company. But the expenses were 
enormous and the financial maladministration 
apparently extraordinary, for the directors 
of the company were led into illegal steps 
in order to influence legislation, or pay hush 


money to the press to hide the condition of af- 
fairs, and then were blackmailed into further 
outlays. The company failed in 1888, and ef- 
forts to put it on its feet proved abortive. Hints 
of the scandals leaked out, and the Government 
played into the hands of its opponents by trying 
to conceal matters. 

In November, 1892, some Royalist members 
of the Chamber brought matters to a head 
and the Government was obliged to do some- 
thing. It was decided to proceed against Fer- 
dinand de Lesseps, his son Charles de Lesseps, 
Henri Cottu, Marius Fontane, members of 
the board of directors, and G. Eiffel, an en- 
gineer and contractor and the builder of the 
famous Eiffel Tower. At this juncture a well- 
known Jewish banker of Paris, Baron Jacques 
de Reinach, died suddenly and most mysteri- 
ously on November 20. He was openly charged 
with being the bribery agent of the company, 
and his sudden death was by some called sui- 
cide, while others hinted that he had been put 
out of the way because of his dangerous knowl- 

Under these exciting conditions a Boulang- 
ist Deputy named Delahaye made an inter- 


pellation in the Chamber hinting at the cam- 
paign of corruption carried on by the company 
through the agency of Reinach and two other 
Jews of German origin, Arton and Cornelius 
Herz, the latter a naturalized American citizen. 
By this campaign it was charged that three 
million francs had been used to corrupt more 
than a hundred and fifty Deputies, and much 
more had been spent in other ways. 

A commission of thirty-three was appointed 
under the chairmanship of Henri Brisson. The 
Royalists and Radicals were having their in- 
nings against the Government, and their news- 
papers continued to publish rumors and " revel- 
ations." The commission called for the autopsy 
of Reinach. The Loubet Cabinet, refusing to 
grant it, was voted down and resigned. The 
Ribot Ministry was then constituted, but at 
intervals lost successively two of its most 
prominent members, Rouvier and Freycinet, 
accused of complicity in the scandals. Even 
the leaders of the Radicals, Clemenceau and 
Floquet, in time found themselves involved. 
The former was charged with tricky dealings 
with Cornelius Herz, the latter was shown to 
have demanded money from the company. 


when Minister, in order to use it for political 

In December the Cabinet decided to arrest 
Charles de Lesseps, Marius Fontane, Henri 
Cottu, and a former Deputy, Sans-Leroy, ac- 
cused of having accepted a bribe of two hun- 
dred thousand francs. At the same time, on 
the basis of the seizure of twenty-six cheque 
stubs at the bank used by the baron de Rein- 
ach, the Minister of Justice proceeded against 
ten prominent Deputies and Senators, among 
whom was Albert Grevy, former Governor- 
General of Algeria, and brother of Jules Grevy. 
The Government seemed panic-stricken in its 
readiness to sacrifice, on mere suspicion, promi- 
nent members of its party. All the parliament- 
aries accused were, in due time, exonerated. 

The directors of the company came up for 
trial twice* The first time, with M. Eiffel, in 
January-February, 1893, and the second time, 
with other defendants, in March, before dif- 
ferent jurisdictions on varying charges, they 
were condemned to fine and imprisonment. 
On appeal, in April, these condemnations were 
revised or annulled* One person became the 
scapegoat, a former Minister of Public Works 


named Ba'ihaut, condemned to civil degrada- 
tion, five years 5 imprisonment, and a heavy 

Scandal was, however, not satisfied with these 
names. There was also talk of a mysterious 
list of one hundred and four Deputies charged 
with accepting bribes from Arton. Moreover, 
it was felt that quashing the indictments 
against prominent men like Rouvier and Albert 
Grevy was poor policy. If they were innocent 
they could prove their innocence. Under the 
circumstances suspicion would still be rife. 
The state of general anarchy was also revealed 
by the evidence of the wife of Henri Cottu, 
who testified that agents of the Government 
had offered her husband immunity if he would 
implicate a member of the Opposition. 1 

The Panama scandal was largely the work 

1 The Panama affair was a violent shock to the Republic. Peo- 
ple were amazed at the charges of widespread corruption and the 
tendency on the part of the Government to smooth things over. 
Suspicions aroused were not fully satisfied because Reinach was 
dead and Herz and Arton in flight. Cornelius Herz successfully 
fought extradition from England on the plea of illness. Arton was 
arrested in 1896 and extradited. His arrest caused a renewal of 
talk about Panama and the newspaper la France undertook to 
print the famous list of one hundred and four Deputies. This 
publication was recognized to be a case of blackmail and its pro- 
moters were punished, Alton was also condemned to a term of hard 
labor, but his trial did not bring out the longed-for revelations. 


of the Monarchists angry at the failure of the 
Boulanger campaign. It did them no good, as 
the elections to the new Chamber proved. On 
the other hand, it worked havoc among the 
leaders of the Moderates, who, innocent or 
blameworthy, fell under popular suspicion, and 
were in many cases relegated to the background 
in favor of new leaders. Moreover, it helped 
the Socialists, and even, by throwing discredit 
on parliamentarism, it encouraged lawless out- 
breaks of anarchists. 

New men in party leaderships came in the 
composite Cabinet of Moderate leanings led by 
Charles Dupuy in April, 1893. He seemed at 
first to incline toward the Conservatives and 
treated with considerable severity some street 
disturbances. A prank of art students at their 
annual ball (Bal des quaf-z-arts) was mag- 
nified into a street riot and was not quelled 
until after the loss of a life. The Bourse da 
travail (Workmen's Exchange) was closed by 
the Government after other disturbances. 

The elections in August and September re- 
sulted in a large Republican majority and a 
corresponding decline in the anti-Republican 
Right On the other hand, the Radicals rose to 


about a hundred and fifty, and the Socialists 
were about fifty, forming for the first time a 
large party able to make its influence felt. 
The "Socialistic-Radicals" represented an 
effort toward a compromise between the ad- 
vanced groups. 

The desire of the Moderate leaders of the 
Republic to meet the Pope halfway in his pol- 
icy of conciliation was expressed in a note- 
worthy speech made in the Chamber in March, 
1894, by the then Minister of Public Worship, 
Eugene Spuller. Answering the query of a 
Royalist Deputy, the Minister declared that 
the time had come to put an end to fanaticism 
and sectarianism, and that the country could 
count on the vigilance of the Government to 
maintain its rights, and on the new frame of 
mind (esprit noweau) which inspired it, which 
tended to reconcile all French citizens and 
bring about a revival of common sense, jus- 
tice, and charity. 

But the anarchists were not moved by any 
spirit of conciliation. Borrowing methods of 
violence from the Russian nihilists, they used 
bomb-throwing to draw attention to the vices 
of social organization and to themselves. Dm> 


ing 1892, 1893, and 1894 they tried to terrorize 
Paris. The deeds of various criminals, including 
Ravachol, Vaillant (who threw a bomb in the 
Chamber of Deputies), 1 Emile Henry, among 
others, culminated at last in the cruel murder 
of President Carnot, On June 24, 1894, while 
at Lyons, whither he had gone to pay a state 
visit to an international exhibition, President 
Carnot was fatally stabbed by an underwitted 
Italian anarchist named Caserio Santo, and 
died within a few hours. Never were more 
futile and abominable crimes committed than 
those which sacrificed Carnot and McKinley. 

1 M. Dupuy, then President of the Chamber, got much credit 
for his calmness and his remark, as the smoke of the bomb cleared 
away, "La stance continue." 


June, 1894, to January, 1896 

January, i8g5, to February, 1890 

THE customary promptness in the choice of 
a President, so unfamiliar to American cam- 
paigns, was observed in the election of Carnot's 
successor. The historic name and the social 
and financial position of the new chief mag- 
istrate, Jean Casimir-Perier, seemed to the 
monarchical sister-nations a guarantee of na- 
tional stability and dignity. In reality the elec- 
tion brought about a more definite cleavage 
between rival political tendencies* Casimir- 
Perier, grandson of Louis-Philippe's great 
minister, obviously represented the Moderates, 
most of whom tried in all sincerity to carry out 
the esprit nouveau and a policy of good-will 
toward the Catholic Church. The Radicals said 
that this was playing into the hands of the 
Clericals, and to the Socialists Casimir-Perier 
was merely a hated capitalist. He was, more- 


over, unfortunately unfit for the acrimonies 
of political life. High-strung and emotional, 
he writhed under misinterpretation and abuse, 
and rebelled against the constitutional power- 
lessness of his office. He had never really 
wanted the Presidency and had accepted it 
chiefly through the personal persuasion of his 
friend the statesman Burdeau, who unfortun- 
ately died soon after his election. The brief 
Presidency of Casimir-Perier, lasting less than 
a year, was destined to see the beginning of the 
worst trial the French Republic had yet ex- 
perienced, the famous Dreyfus case, 
i. The Administration, in which Dupuy re- 
mained Prime Minister, began by repressive 
measures, laws directed against the anarchists 
and the trial en masse of thirty defendants 
ranging from Utopian theorists to actual crimi- 
nals. Most of them were acquitted, but the 
procedure did not ingratiate the Government 
with the advanced parties. Toward the end 
of 1894 the Dreyfus case began to be talked of, 
an affair which was destined to develop into a 
tremendous struggle of the leaders of the army 
and the Church to obtain control of the nation. 
In September, 1894, an officer named Henry, 


of the spy service of the French army, came 
into possession of a document pieced together 
from fragments stolen from a waste-paper 
basket in the German Embassy. This docu- 
ment, containing a bordereau or memorandum 
of information largely about the French artil- 
lery offered to the German military attache, 
Schwartzkoppen, was anonymous, but Henry 
undoubtedly recognized, sooner or later, the 
handwriting' of a friend, Major Esterhazy, a 
soldier of fortune in the French army, of bad 
reputation and shady character. Unable to de- 
stroy the document, which had been seen by 
others, Henry tried to fasten it on somebody 
else. Indeed, many people believe that Henry- 
was an accomplice of Esterhazy in German 
pay. By a strange coincidence it happened that 
the handwriting of the bordereau somewhat re- 
sembled that of a brilliant young Jewish officer 
of the General Staff named Alfred Dreyfus. He 
belonged to a wealthy Alsatian family, and 
from antecedent probability would not seem 
to need to play a traitor's part, but he was 
intensely unpopular among his fellows because 
of many disagreeable traits of character. More- 
over, anti-Semitism, formerly non-existent in 


France, was now rife. It had been largely fo- 
mented by the anti-Jewish agitator Edouard 
Drumont, with his book la France juive (1886) 
and his newspaper the Libre Parole (1892). 
Prejudice against the Jews as tricky financiers 
had been prepared and encouraged by the sen- 
sational failure of the great bank, the Union 
generate, a Catholic rival of the Rothschilds, 
in 1882, and by the Panama scandals with 
the doings of Jacques de Reinach, Cornelius 
Herz, and Arton, The Libre Parole had worked 
against Jewish officers in the army, an activity 
which culminated in some sensational duels, 
particularly one between Captain Mayer and 
the marquis de Mores (1892), in which the Jew 
was killed, 

sL^So, in the present instance, the Minister of 
War, General Mercier, who had recently com- 
mitted some much-criticized administrative 
blunders, and who now wished to show his 
efficiency, caused the arrest of Dreyfus. Then, 
egged on by anti-Semitic newspapers which 
had got hold of Dreyfus's name, Mercier 
brought him before a court-martial. The trial 
was held in secret, and the War Department 
sent to the officers constituting the tribunal, 


without the knowledge of the prisoner or his 
counsel Maitre Demange, a secret dossier, a 
collection of trumped-up incriminating docu- 
ments. Demange devoted himself to proving 
that Dreyfus was not the author of the border- 
eau, but the members of the court-martial, be- 
lieving in' the genuineness of the additional 
documents, unhesitatingly convicted him of 
treason. Consequently, in spite of his pro- 
testations of innocence /Dreyfus was publicly 
degraded on January 5, 1895, and hustled 
off to solitary confinement on the unhealthy 
Devil's Isle, of! the coast of French Guiana. 
Meanwhile the whole French people sincerely 
believed that a vile traitor had been justly 
condemned and that the secrecy of the case 
was due to the advisability of avoiding dip- 
lomatic complications with Germany. With 
dramatic unexpectedness, only ten days later 
(January 15), Casimir-Perier resigned the 

During the whole Dreyfus affair Casimir- 
Perierhad chafed because his ministers had con- 
stantly actedrwithout keeping him informed, 
particularly when he was called upon by the 
German Government to acknowledge that it 


had had nothing to do with Dreyfus. He had 
lost by death the support of his friend Burdeau; 
he was discouraged by the campaign of abuse 
against him, especially the election as Deputy 
in Paris of Gerault-Richard, one of his most ac- 
tive vilifiers. In particular he felt that his own 
Cabinet, and above all its leader Dupuy, were 
false to him. A discussion in the Chamber 
concerning the duration of the state guar- 
antees to certain of the great railway com- 
panies ended in a vote unfavorable to the Cabi- 
net, which resigned, whereupon Casimir-Perier 
seized the opportunity to go too. The Social- 
ists declared that Dupuy had provoked his 
own defeat in order to embarrass the Presi- 
dent by the difficulty of forming a new Cabinet, 
and make him resign as well. 

Two days later the electoral Congress met 
at Versailles. The Radicals supported Henri 
Brisson. The Moderates and the Conserva- 
tives were divided between Waldeck-Rous- 
seau and Felix Faure, but Waldeck-Rousseau 
having thrown his strength on the second 
ballot to Faure, the latter was elected. 

The new President, recently Minister of the 
Navy, was a well-meaning man, but full of 


vanity and naively delighted with his own rise 
in the world from a humble position to that of 
chief magistrate. The extent to which his judg- 
ment was warped by his temperament is shown 
by the later developments of the Dreyfus case. 

Felix Faure's first Cabinet was led by the 
Republican Moderate Alexandre Ribot. It 
lasted less than a year and its history was 
chiefly noteworthy, at least in foreign affairs, 
by the increasing openness of the Franco-Rus- 
sian rapprochement at the ceremonies of the 
inauguration of the Kiel Canal. In internal 
affairs there were some violent industrial dis- 
turbances and strikes. 

In October, 1895, the Moderates gave way 
to the Radical Cabinet of Leon Bourgeois. It 
was viewed with suspicion by the moneyed in- 
terests, who accused it of gravitating toward the 
Socialists. The cleavage between the two ten- 
dencies of the Republican Party became more 
marked. The Moderates joined forces with the 
Conservatives to oppose the schemes for so- 
cial and financial reforms of the Radicals and 
of the representatives of the working classes. 
Prominent among these was the proposal for 
a progressive income tax. The Senate, natu- 


rally a more conservative body, was opposed to 
the Bourgeois Cabinet, which had a majority, 
though not a very steadfast one, in the Cham- 
ber of Deputies. The Senate, usually a nonen- 
tity in determining the fall of a cabinet, for 
once successfully asserted its power and, by 
refusing to vote the credits asked for by the 
Ministry for the Madagascar campaign, caused 
it to resign in April, 1896. The enemies of the 
Senate maintained that the Chamber of Depu- 
ties, elected by direct suffrage, was the only 
judge of the fate of a cabinet. But Bourgeois's 
hold was at best precarious and he seized the 
opportunity to withdraw. 

The Meline Cabinet which followed was 
a return to the Moderates supported by the 
Conservatives. Its opponents accused it of 
following what in American political parlance 
is called a "stand-pat" policy, but it remained 
in office longer than any ministry up to its 
time, a little over two years. ^It afforded, at 
any rate, an opportunity for the adversaries 
of the Republic lo strengthen their posi- 
tions and encouraged^ the transformation of 
the Dreyfus case into a political instead of a 
purely judicial matter* 


In foreign affairs the most spectacular events 
were the visit of the Czar and Czarina to 
France in 1896 and the return visit of the 
French President to Russia in 1897. At the 
banquet of leave-taking on the French war- 
ship Pothuau, in their prepared speeches, the 
Czar and the President made use of the same 
expression "friendly and allied nations/ 5 thus 
publicly proclaiming to Europe the alliance 
suspected since 1891. 

X In spite of the unanimous feeling of Drey- 
fus' s guilt, his family did not lose faith in him, 
and his brother Mathieu set about the appa- 
rently impossible task of rehabilitation. But it 
chanced that one other person began to have 
doubts of the justice of Dreyfus's condemna- 
tion. This was lieutenant-Colonel Picquart, 
who had been present at the court-martial as 
representative of the War Department, and 
who had since become chief of the espionage 
service, and Henry's superior. Another docu- 
ment stolen from a waste-paper basket at the 
German Embassy, an unf orwarded pneumatic 
despatch (petit bleu), was brought to him, and 
directed his suspicions to Esterhazy, to whom 
it was addressed. At first he did not connect 


Esterhazy and Dreyfus, but on obtaining speci- 
mens of Esterhazy's handwriting he was struck 
by the likeness with that of the bordereau. 
Then, examining the secret dossier, to which 
he now had access, he was stupefied to see its 

From this time on, Picquart worked, with 
extraordinary tenacity of purpose and against 
all obstacles, for the rehabilitation of a stranger. 
Everybody was against 'him. His chief subor- 
dinate Henry dreaded revelations above all 
things, and set his colleagues against him. His 
superiors disliked any suggestion that an army 
court could have made a mistake, the remedy- 
ing of which would help a Jew. 

Gradually, however, the agitation started 
by Mathieu Dreyfus was becoming stronger. 
He had won the help of a skilled writer Bernard 
Lazare; a daily paper succeeded in obtaining 
and publishing a facsimile of the bordereau. 
But Picquart was sent away from Paris on a 
tour of inspection, and when the matter came 
up in the Chamber, through an interpellation, 
the Minister of War, General Billot, declared 
that the judgment of 1894 was absolutely legal 
and just. Matters thus seemed settled again. 



a prominent Alsatian member of Parlia- 
ment, Scheurer-Kestner, one of the Vice-Presi- 
dents of the Senate, was half-persuaded by 
Mathieu and Bernard Lazare. WhenPicquart's 
friend and legal adviser, Leblois, rather inju- 
diciously, from a professional point of view, 
confided to him his client's suspicions, he was 
thoroughly convinced and the two separate cur- 
rents of activity now coalesced. Yet the greater 
the agitation in favor of Dreyfus, the greater 
grew the opposition. The anti-Semites shrieked 
with rage against Judas, the "traitor/ 5 The 
upper ranks of the army were honeycombed by 
Clerical influences. An enormous proportion 
of the officers belonged to reactionary fami- 
lies and the Chief of Staff himself, General de 
Boisdeffre, was under the thumb of the Pere 
Du Lac, one of the most prominent Jesuits 
in France. The Clericals and anti-Semites, 
therefore, joined forces, and, by calling the 
Dreyfus agitation an attack on the honor of 
the army and a play into the hands of Ger- 
l many, they won over all the jingoes and former 
Boulangists, who formed the new party of 
Nationalists. This was the so-called alliance 
of "the sword and the holy-water sprinkler 5 * 


(le sabre et le goupillori). Above all, certain re- 
ligious associations, particularly the Assump- 
tionists, under the name of religion, organized 
a campaign of slander and abuse against all 
who ventured to speak for Dreyfus. By a 
ludicrous counter-play the scoundrel Ester- 
hazy had defenders as an injured innocent, the 
more so that Henry and the clique at the War 
Office found it to their interest to support him. 
4-Matters reached a crisis when, on Novem- 
ber 15, 1897, Mathieu Dreyfus denounced 
Esterhazy to the Minister of War as author of 
the bordereau and as guilty of the treason for 
which his brother had been condemned. This 
was partly a tactical mistake, because, even if 
Esterhazy were proved to have written the 
bordereau, it would still be necessary to show 
him guilty of actual treason. It made it pos- 
sible to swerve the discussion from the con- 
viction of Dreyfus as a res adjudicata (chose 
jugee) to vague charges against Esterhazy. 
The later called for a vindication, he was tri- 
umphantly acquitted by a court-martial early 
in January, 1898, and Picquart was put under 
arrest on various charges of indiscipline in con- 
nection with the whole affair. 


Few and far between as they now seemed, 
the lovers of justice were still to be counted 
with. They consisted at first of a small num- 
ber of much-derided intellectuels, scholars and 
trained thinkers, who used their judgment and 
not their prejudices. One of these was the 
famous novelist Emile Zola, who, to keep the 
case under discussion, published in the Aurore 
on January 13, a few days after Esterhazy's 
acquittal, his famous letter, J'accuse. In 
this article Zola denounced the guilty mach- 
inations of Dreyfus's adversaries seriatim, 
blamed the Dreyfus court-martial for convict- 
ing on secret evidence and the Esterhazy court 
for acquitting a guilty man in obedience to or- 
ders. Zola was not in possession of all the facts, 
since his precise aim was to have them brought 
out, and in his charges against the Esterha2y 
court he was technically and legally at fault. 
But he courted prosecution and got it. 

On February 7 Zola was brought to trial. 
The crafty authorities eliminated all references 
to the trial of 1894 as a chose jugee and prose- 
cuted Zola for having declared that Esterhazy 
was acquitted by order. Their tool, the pre- 
siding magistrate Delegorgue, seconded their 


efforts by ruling out every question which 
might throw light on the Dreyfus case, in spite 
of the attempts of Zola's chief lawyer LaborL 
Party passion was at its height, hired gangs of 
men were posted about the court-house to hoot 
and attack the Dreyfusites, members of the 
General Staff appeared in full uniform to inter- 
rupt the trial and bulldoze the jury by myste- 
rious hints of war with Germany. Finally Zola 
was condemned to fine and imprisonment. 
At this trial for the first time mention was 
mysteriously but openly made of a new docu- 
ment, understood to be a communication al- 
luding to Dreyfus between the Italian and the 
German military attaches at Paris. Zola ap- 
pealed, the higher court broke the verdict on 
the ground that the prosecution should have 
been instigated by the offended court-martial 
and not by the Government, he was brought to 
trial again on a change of venue at Versailles, 
was unsuccessful in interposing obstacles to an 
inevitable condemnation, and so fled to Eng- 
land (July). 

Meanwhile, public opinion was becoming 
yet more violently excited. France was divided 
into two great camps, the line of cleavage often 


estranging the closest friends and relatives. On 
the one side was a vast majority consisting 
of the Clericals, the jingoes or Nationalists, 
the anti-Semites, and the unreflecting mass of 
the population. On the other were ranged the 
" intellectuals/' the Socialists who were now 
rallying to the cause of tolerance, the Jews, and 
the few French Protestants. The League of the 
Rights of Man stood opposed to the associa- 
tion of the Patrie Fran$aise. In the midst of 
this turmoil were held the elections of May, 
1898, for the renewal of the Chamber of Depu- 
ties. The political coloring of the new body was 
not sensibly changed, but the open Dreyfus- 
ites were all excluded. The Moderates now 
generally dubbed themselves " Progressists." 
None the less at the first session the now long- 
lived Meline Cabinet resigned after a vote re- 
questing it to govern with fewer concessions 
to the Right. 

The next Cabinet was Radical, headed by 
Henri Brisson. His mind was not yet definitely 
made up on the matter of revision, and he gave 
concessions to the Nationalists by appointing 
as Minister of War Godefroy Cavaignac. This 
headstrong personage, proud of an historic 


name, undertook to manage the Cabinet and to 
prove once for all to the Chamber the guilt of 
Dreyfus, In his speech he relied mainly on the 
letter mentioned at the Zola trial as written by 
the Italian to the German attache. 

Once more the Dreyfus affair seemed per- 
manently settled, and once more the con- 
trary proved to be the case. In August Cav- 
aignac discovered, to his dismay, that the 
document he had sent to the Chamber, with 
such emphasis on its importance, was an out- 
and-out forgery of Henry. The latter was put 
under arrest and committed suicide. Discus- 
sion followed between Brisson, now converted 
to revision, and Cavaignac, still too stubborn 
to change his mind with regard to Dreyfus, 
in spite of his recent discovery. Cavaignac 
resigned as Minister of War, was replaced by 
General Zurlinden, who withdrew in a few 
days and was in turn succeeded by another 
general, Chanoine, thought to be in sym- 
pathy with the Cabinet. He in turn played his 
colleagues false and resigned unexpectedly 
during a meeting of the Chamber. Weakened 
by these successive blows the Brisson Cabinet 
itself had to resign, but its leader had now 


forwarded to the supreme court of the land, the 
Cour de Cassation, the petition of Dreyfus' s 
wife for a revision of his sentence. The first 
step had at last been taken. The Criminal 
Chamber accepted the request and proceeded 
to a further detailed investigation. 

The Brisson Ministry was followed by a third 
Cabinet of the unabashed Dupuy. It became 
evident that the Criminal Chamber of the 
Court of Cassation was inclining to decide on 
revision. Wishing to play to both sides and, 
yielding in this case to the anti-revisionists, 
early in 1899 Dupuy brought in a bill to take 
the Dreyfus affair away from the Criminal 
Chamber in the very midst of its deliberations 
and submit it to the Court as a whole, where 
it was hoped a majority of judges would reject 
revision. Between the dates of the passage 
of this bill by the Chamber and by the 
Senate, President Faure died suddenly and 
under mysterious circumstances on February 
16, 1899. He had opposed revision and his 
death, attributed to apoplexy, was a gain to the 
revisionists who were accused by his friends of 
having caused his murder. On the other hand, 
stories, which it is unnecessary to repeat here, 


found an echo some years later in the scandals 
repeated at the sensational trial of Madame 

During the turmoil over the Dreyfus affair, 
France underwent a humiliating experience 
with England. The colonial rivalry of the two 
countries had of late gone on unchecked, 
embittered as it had been by the ousting of 
France from the Suez Canal and Egypt. To 
many Frenchmen "Perfidious Albion 55 was, far 
more than Germany, the secular foe. In 1896 
a French expedition under Captain Marchand 
was sent from the Congo in the direction of the 
Nile, The English afterwards argued that its 
purpose was to cut their sphere of influence and 
hinder the Cape-to-Cairo project; the French 
declared they merely wished to occupy a post 
which should afford a basis for general diplo- 
matic negotiations for the partition of Africa. 
The mission was numerically insufficient; it 
struggled painfully for two years through the 
heart of the continent, and at last the small 
handful of intrepid Frenchmen established 
themselves at Fashoda on the upper waters 
of the Nile in July, 1898. At once General 
Kitchener arriving from the victory of Omdur- 


man appeared on the scene to occupy Fashoda 
for the Egyptian Government. England as- 
sumed a viciously aggressive attitude and, 
under veiled threats of war, France was obliged 
to recall Marchand (November 4). The out- 
burst of fury in France against England at this 
humiliation was tremendous. No sane man 
would have then ventured to predict that in a 
few years the hands of the two countries would 
be joined in the clasp of the Entente cordiale. 


February, 1899, to February, 1906 

THE successor of Felix Faure, Emile Loubet, 
was elected on February 18, 1899, by a good 
majority over Jules Meline, the candidate of 
the larger number of the Moderates or "Pro- 
gressists" and of the Conservatives. "Loubet 
was himself a man of Moderate views, but he 
was thought to favor a revisibn of the Dreyfus 
case. Among the charges of his enemies was 
that, as Minister of the Interior in 1892, he 
had held, but had kept secret, the famous list 
of the "Hundred and Four " and had prevented 
the seizure of the papers of Baron de Reinach 
and the arrest of Arton, So Loubet's return to 
Paris from Versailles was amid hostile cries of 
"Loubet-Panama" and "Vive Tannee!" 

On February 23, after the state funeral of 
President Faure, a detachment of troops led 
by General Roget was returning to its bar- 
racks in an outlying quarter of Paris. Sud- 
denly the Nationalist and quondam Boulangist 


Paul Deroulede, now chief of the Ligue des Pa- 
triotes and vigorous opponent of parliamen- 
tary government, though a Deputy himself, 
rushed to General Roget, and, grasping the 
bridle of his horse, tried to persuade him to 
lead his troops to the Elysee, the presidential 
residence, and overthrow the Government. 
Deroulede had expected to encounter General 
de Pellieux, a more amenable leader, and one 
of the noisy generals at the Zola trial. General 
Roget, who had been substituted at the last 
moment, refused to accede and caused the 
arrest of Deroulede, with his fellow Deputy 
and conspirator Marcel Habert. 

Meanwhile the Dreyfus case had been taken 
out of the hands of the Criminal Chamber and 
given to the whole Court. To the dismay of 
the anti-Dreyfusites the Court, as a body, an- 
nulled, on June 3, the verdict of the court- 
martial of 1894, and decided that Dreyfus 
should appear before a second military court 
at Rennes for another trial. 

Thus party antagonisms were becoming 
more and more acute. In addition Dupuy, the 
head of the Cabinet, seemed to be spiting the 
new President. On the day after the verdict 


of the Cour de Cassation, at the Auteuil races, 
President Loubet was roughly jostled by a 
band of fashionable young Royalists and struck 
with a cane by Baron de Christian!. A week 
later, at the Grand Prize races at Longchamps, 
on June 11, Dupuy, as though to atone for his 
previous carelessness, brought out a large 
array of troops, so obviously over-numerous as 
to cause new disturbances among the crowd 
desirous of manifesting its sympathy with the 
chief magistrate. More arrests were made and, 
at the meeting of the Chamber of Deputies the 
next day, the Cabinet was overthrown by an 
adverse vote. 

The ministerial crisis brought about by the 
fall of Dupuy was as important as any under 
the Third Republic because of its consequences 
in the redistribution of parties. For about ten 
days President Loubet was unable to find a 
leader who could in turn form a cabinet. At 
last public opinion was astounded by the mas- 
terly combination made by Waldeck-Rousseau, 
Gambetta's former lieutenant, who of recent 
years had kept somewhat aloof from active 
participation in politics. He brought together 
a ministry of "defense republicaine," which its 



opponents, however, called a cabinet for the 
"liquidation" of the Dreyfus case. The old 
policy of "Republican concentration ** of Op- 
portunists and Radicals was given up in 
favor of a mass formation of the various 
advanced groups of the Left, including the 

Waldeck-Rousseau was a Moderate Repub- 
lican, whose legal practice of recent years had 
been mainly that of a corporation lawyer, but 
he was a cool-headed Opportunist. He real- 
ized the ill-success of the policy of the "esprit 
nouveau," and saw the necessity of making 
advances to the Socialists, who more and more 
held the balance of power. He succeeded in 
uniting in his Cabinet Moderates like himself, 
Radicals, and, for the first time in French par- 
liamentary history, an out-and-out Socialist, 
Alexandre Millerand, author of the famous 
"Programme of Saint-Mand6" of 1896, or 
declaration of faith of Socialism. Still more as- 
tounding was the presence as Minister of War, 
in the same Cabinet with Millerand, of Gen- 
eral de Galliffet, a bluff, outspoken, and dash- 
ing aristocratic officer, a favorite with the 
whole army, but fiercely 'hated by the prole- 


tariat because of his part in the repression of 
the Commune. 

The first days of the new Cabinet were 
stormy and its outlook was dubious. The task 
of reconciling such divergent elements, even 
against a common foe, seemed an impossibil- 
ity, until at last the Radicals under Brisson 
swung into line. Such was the beginning of a 
Republican grouping which later, during the 
anti-Clerical campaign, was known as le Bloc, 
the united band of Republicans. 

The Waldeck-Rousseau Ministry took up 
the Dreyfus case with a queer combination of 
courage and weakness. Insubordinate army 
officers were summarily punished for injudi- 
cious remarks, but in order to appear neutral 
and to avoid criticism, the Cabinet held so 
much aloof that the anti-Dreyfusites were able 
to bring their full forces to bear on the court- 
martial. For a month at Rennes, beginning 
August 7, an extraordinary trial was carried on 
before the eyes of an impassioned France and 
angry onlooking nations. Witnesses had full 
latitude to indulge in rhetorical addresses and 
air their prejudices ; military officers like Roget, 
who had had nothing to do with the original 


trial, were allowed to take up the time of the 
court. Galliff et, though convinced of the inno- 
cence of Dreyfus, was unwilling to exert as 
much pressure as his colleagues in the Cabinet 
desired. It soon became evident that, regard- 
less of the question involved, the issue was one 
between an insignificant Jewish officer on the 
one hand and General Mercier, ex-Minister of 
War, on the other. The judges were army offi- 
cers full of caste-feeling and timorous of offend- 
ing their superiors. Thus, on September 9, 
Dreyfus was a second time convicted, though 
with extenuating circumstances, by a vote of 
5 to 2, and condemned to ten years' detention. 
This verdict was a travesty of justice, and a 
punishment fitting no crime of Dreyfus, since 
he was either innocent or guilty of treason be- 
yond extenuation. The Ministry, perhaps re- 
gretting too late its excessive inertia, immedi- 
ately caused, the President to pardon Dreyfus, 
partly on the ostensible grounds that Dreyfus 
by his previous harsher condemnation had al- 
ready purged his new one. This act of clem- 
ency was, however, not a legal clearing of the 
victim's honor, which was achieved only some 
years later. 


During the turmoil of the Dreyfus affair the 
Cabinet was, it seemed to many, unduly anx- 
ious over certain conspirators against the 
Republic. The symptoms of insubordination 
in high ranks in the army, linked with the 
Clerical manoeuvres, had encouraged the other 
foes of the Republic (spurred on by the Royal- 
ists), whether sincere opponents of the parlia- 
mentary regime like Paul Deroulede, or venal 
agitators such as the anti-Semitic Jules Guerin. 
But, certainly, above all objectionable were the 
proceedings of the Assumptionists, a religious 
order which had amassed enormous wealth, 
and which, by the various local editions of its 
paper la Croix, had organized a campaign of 
venomous slander and abuse of the Republic 
and its leaders. 

The Government, having got wind of a proj- 
ect of the conspirators to seize the reins of 
power during the Rennes court-martial, antici- 
pated the act by wholesale arrests on August 
12. Jules Gurin barricaded himself with some 
friends in a house in the rue de Chabrol in 
Paris, and defied the Government to arrest 
him without perpetrating murder. The gro- 
tesque incident of the "Fort Chabrol" came to 


an end after thirty-seven days when the author- 
ities had surrounded the house with troops 
to starve Guerin out and stopped the drains. 

In November a motley array of conspirators, 
ranging from Andre Buffet, representative of 
the pretender the Duke of Orleans, to butchers 
from the slaughter-houses of La Villette, were 
brought to trial before the Senate acting as a 
High Court of Justice, on the charge of con- 
spiracy against the State. After a long trial 
lasting nearly two months, during which the 
prisoners outdid each other in declamatory 
insults to their enemies, the majority were 
acquitted. Paul D6roulede and Andre Buffet 
were condemned to banishment for ten years 
and Jules Guerin to imprisonment for the same 
term. Two others, Marcel Habert and the 
comte de Lur-Saluces, who had taken flight, 
gave themselves up later and were condemned 
in 1900 and 1901, respectively, amid a public 
indifference which was far from their liking. 

Thus the year 1899 had proved itself one of 
the most dramatically eventful in the history 
of the Republic. It was also to be one of the 
most significant in its consequences. For the 
new grouping of mutually jealous factions 


against a common danger had, in spite of the 
fiasco of the second Dreyfus case, shown a way 
to victory. And exasperation against the in- 
trigues of the Clericals and the army officers 
was going to turn the former toleration of the 
"esprit nouveau" into active persecution, espe- 
cially as the Socialists and Radicals formed the 
majority of the new combination. 

In November, 1899, Waldeck-Rousseau laid 
before Parliament an Associations bill to regu- 
late the organization of societies, which was 
intended indirectly to control religious bodies. 
The leniency of the Government hitherto and 
the commercial energy of many religious or- 
ders, manufacturers of articles varying from 
chartreuse to hair-restorers and dentifrice, had 
enabled them to amass enormous sums held 
in mortmain. The power of this money was 
great in politics and the anti-Clericals cast 
envious eyes on these vague and mysterious 
fortunes. There were in France at the time 
almost seven hundred unauthorized " congrega- 
tions. 9 * Against the Assumptionists in particu- 
lar the Government took direct measures early 
in 1900, such as legal perquisitions, arrests, 
and prosecution as an illegal association. 


The campaign went on through the year 
1900, the Exposition of that year helping to 
act as a partial truce. The expedition of the 
Allies to China to put down the Boxer rebellion 
also diverted attention. Waldeck-Rousseau 
was sincerely desirous of bringing about a 
pacification of feeling in the country, and he 
felt bitter practically only against the Jesuits 
and the Assumptionists. He even succeeded in 
carrying through Parliament an amnesty bill 
dealing with the Dreyfus case and destined to 
quash all criminal actions in process, whether 
of Dreyfusites or anti-Dreyfusites. The former 
fought the project vigorously on the ground 
that it opposed a new obstacle to ultimate dis- 
covery of the truth, but they were unsuccess- 
ful. Waldeck-Rousseau remained at heart, 
none the less, a believer in Dreyfus's innocence 
and in spite of his amnesty project, he could 
not always hide his true feelings. In conse- 
quence he offended his Minister of War, Gen- 
eral de Galliffet, Dreyfusite as well, but tired 
of the struggle now that the Rennes trial had 
made the task of rehabilitation apparently 
hopeless. Galliffet resigned his office and was 
succeeded by General Andre, a politician sol- 


dier, who started out at once to purge the army 
drastically of its Clericalism. 

Waldeck-Rousseau's Associations project 
was fairly mild. He had no desire for a violent 
break with the Vatican, and the wily and diplo- 
matic Leo XIII probably so understood well 
enough in spite of his protests. But, as debate 
and discussion went on, the measure became 
more severe. Waldeck-Rousseau had origi- 
nally planned a bill dealing with authorization 
and incorporation of associations in general, 
in which he refrained from any specific allusion 
to religious bodies of monks and nuns, thereby 
assimilating them with other groups. As fi- 
nally voted and promulgated in July, 1901, the 
law made provisions for the privilege of asso- 
ciation in general, but made the important 
additional stipulations that no religious order 
or "congregation" could be formed without 
specific authorization by law, that a religious 
order could be dissolved by ministerial decree, 
and that no one belonging to an unauthorized 
order could direct personally, or by proxy, an 
educational establishment, or even teach in 
one. Thus the enemies of the lay Republic 
who, under cover of the "esprit nouveau," and 


by years of manipulation of the feeding sources 
of army and navy officers, had hoped to grasp 
power, and had made a supreme effort at the 
time of the Dreyfus agitation, now saw them- 
selves thwarted, and faced the prospect of 
severer treatment. 

Matters had progressed even further than 
Waldeck-Rousseau himself perhaps desired. In 
the spring of 1902, new legislative elections 
took place for the renewal of the Chamber of 
Deputies. The policy of the Waldeck-Rousseau 
Ministry was endorsed by a sound majority, 
and yet at this moment of triumph, after the 
longest rule as Prime Minister of any hith- 
erto in the history of the Republic, Waldeck- 
Rousseau resigned his post without an adverse 
vote. Undoubtedly the state of his personal 
health was partly responsible for his departure 
from office and he was destined not to live 
beyond 1904. The last important events of his 
administration were a visit of the Czar to 
France and a return visit of President Loubet 
to Russia. 

Waldeck-Rousseau's successor as Prime 
Minister was Emile Combes, a strong foe of 
the Church. Combes had himself been a foimer 


theological student and had, in his youth, writ- 
ten a thesis on the philosophy of St. Thomas 
Aquinas. He now had all the vindictiveness of 
one who burns what he formerly worshipped. 
Encouraged by the recent elections, he turned 
more and more against the Vatican and im- 
pelled by the more violent members of the 
Bloc, he drifted toward the rupture which his 
predecessor had tried to avoid. A committee 
of the different groups supporting the Cabinet, 
called the "delegation des gaudies," had in 
time been instituted to formulate policies with 
the Prime Minister, who often had to obey it 
instead of guiding. Waldeck-Rousseau had 
intended not to apply his law retroactively. 
He had planned to spare educational establish- 
ments already in existence before July, 1901, 
when his measure went into operation, and 
had winked at lack of compliance on the part 
of many others. Combes applied the letter of 
the law ruthlessly. Amid public protestations 
and disturbances he closed a large number of 
these unauthorized schools; firstly, those which 
had actually been opened without permission 
since the promulgation of the law, then the 
many schools which were older than the law. 


In so doing he was called a persecutor, because 
the directors of the schools declared that they 
had allowed the time limit of application for 
authorization to go by, only through the under- 
standing with the previous Administration that 
they were not to be interfered with. Now they 
could not help themselves. 

Emboldened by success Combes next took 
up the applications of the congregations which 
had duly followed the law and were seeking 
authorization. By decree, as was his right, he 
first promptly closed unlicensed schools of 
recognized orders. Then came the applica- 
tions of orders seeking authorization. Legal 
procedure demanded laws to reject as well as 
laws to accept applications. A recommenda- 
tion favored by the Government but rejected by 
the Chamber of Deputies would not go before 
the Senate. On the other hand, an unfavorable 
opinion of the Government ratified by the 
House would still have to go before the Senate. 
A way would thus be open for prolonged 

. Combes cut matters short. He lumped fifty- 
four individual applications into three batches, 
teaching orders, preaching orders, and the com- 


mercial order of the Chartreux, manufacturers 
of the liqueur called " chartreuse/* Then, pre- 
senting these batches of applications collec- 
tively instead of individually to the Chamber, 
he caused their rejection and proceeded to 
dissolve the orders and close their fifteen hun- 
dred establishments. Through the spring of 
1903 there were turbulent scenes in conse- 
quence in various parts of France, the monks 
trying sometimes passive resistance, some- 
times actual violence. In the reactionary dis- 
tricts the population attempted to stir up riots. 
Occasionally, even, a military officer whose 
duty it was to evict the monks refused to obey 
orders. But, nothing daunted, Combes went 
on, with the support of the Chambers, to reject 
a large mass of applications from teaching 
orders of women. Even Waldeck-Rousseau 
was led in time publicly to declare that he had 
never contemplated the transformation of his 
Associations law of 1901 from a measure of 
regulation to one of exclusion, nor the assump- 
tion by the State of expensive educational 
charges hitherto carried on by religious orders. 
At last the law of July, 1904, put a complete 
end to all kinds of instruction by religious 


bodies, thereby insuring, after a lapse of time 
for liquidation, the disappearance of all teach- 
ing orders. 

These measures against the religious groups 
were, in spite of outcries of persecution, after 
all matters of internal administration. But, 
meanwhile, causes for direct dissension with 
the Vatican had arisen over questions involv- 
ing the Concordat regulating the relations of 
Church and State. 

The first dispute was about the method of 
appointing bishops. The Concordat gave to 
the Government the right of appointing bish- 
ops, subject to the papal ratification of the 
appointee's moral and theological qualifica- 
tions. During the Third Republic the habit 
had grown up of mutual consultation before 
appointments were made, a practice which led 
the Vatican to assume that its initial influence 
was as great as that of the Government, and 
finally to make use of the formula nobis nomi- 
navit, or nominaverit, as though the Govern- 
ment merely proposed a candidate subject to 
the Vatican's free right to accept or to reject. 
The keen-scented Combes took an early oppor- 
tunity to raise this issue by making certain 


appointments to bishoprics without previously 
consulting the Vatican. In the midst of the 
discussions Leo XIII died in July, 1903, and 
was succeeded by Pius X, whose character was 
utterly different from that of his predecessor. 
His primitive faith saw in France the home of 
heretics like the Modernist, the Abbe Loisy; 
and his Secretary of State, the ultramontane 
Cardinal Merry del Val, was as hostile to 
France, as his predecessor Cardinal Rampolla 
had, on the whole, been well disposed to the 
"eldest daughter of the Church/* Between 
Merry del Val and Combes no agreement was 
possible. So matters went from bad to worse. 
In the autumn of 1903 the King of Italy 
made a visit to France, and in 1904 it was 
deemed advisable to have President Loubet re- 
turn this visit to emphasize the new cordiality 
between France and Italy, the settlement of 
long-standing difficulties, and to cultivate as 
much as possible one member of the Triple 
Alliance. The Pope protested violently against 
this visit to his enemy in Rome and made it 
clear that he would refuse to see Loubet. The 
diplomatic crisis became acute and the French 
Ambassador to the Vatican was recalled. 


Soon came a complete rupture over the 
treatment by the pontifical authorities of two 
French bishops, Geay of Laval and Le Nordez 
of Dijon. They had shown themselves loyal 
Republicans and had become the object of 
attack in their own dioceses until personal 
scandals were imagined or raked up against 
them. Combes took the part of the bishops 
and, to punish the Vatican for interfering with 
the French prelates, definitely broke off diplo- 
matic relations in July, 1904, withdrawing even 
the charge d'affaires who had been left after 
the departure of the ambassador. 

For some time, plans for the separation of 
Church and State had been under discussion 
in a somewhat academic way by a committee 
or Commission of the Chamber, under the gen- 
eral guidance of Ferdinand Buisson and Aris- 
tide Briand. The latter had even drawn up a 
preliminary project. But Combes, in spite of 
his vehemence in words against the Church, 
hesitated to involve the Ministry. He knew 
that the country at large was fully satisfied 
with the maintenance of the Concordat and 
that some of his own colleagues in the Cabinet, 
as well as Loubet, preferred not to disturb it. 


Suddenly a great scandal broke out. The 
enemies of the Ministry got hold of the fact 
that General Andre, through some of his sub- 
ordinates in the War Office, was carrying on a 
regular system of espionage upon army officers 
suspected of luke-warm republicanism or of 
Clerical sympathies, and was using as spies 
members of Masonic lodges or even subordi- 
nate Masonic army officers throughout France. 1 
These spies had filed innumerable notes or 
memoranda known as fiches, containing infor- 
mation, rumor, or scandal concerning the per- 
sons involved, their families and intimacies. 
The discovery that leading members of the 
Cabinet had been countenancing methods as 
reprehensible as those of the worst of their 
opponents, caused an uproar. The Cabinet 
seemed on the point of being overthrown when 
one of its enemies did it a great service. A wild 
and blatant anti-Ministerialist named Syveton 
rushed up to the Minister of War and struck 
him two blows in the face during a meeting of 
the Chamber. The effect of this deed was to 
cause a temporary reaction in favor of the 

1 It should be remembered that, in France, the Freemasons 
are an anti-religious political quite as much as a benevolent order. 


Ministry, but also to draw Combes more to the 
Radicals, and he promptly brought forward 
his own governmental separation plan, which 
was considerably at variance with the Briand 
project. The respite was, however, only mo- 
mentary, and, after sacrificing General Andre, 
Combes gave up the struggle and resigned in 
January, 1905, without being actually put in 
the minority. 

It cannot be denied that there was a con- 
siderable deterioration in government dur- 
ing the regime of Combes. In attempting to 
thwart the Clerical Party he let himself lapse 
into methods as objectionable as theirs. His 
anti-clericalism breathed the spirit of persecu- 
tion, as much as did the intrigues of the clergy 
during the early days of the Republic. He 
transformed Waldeck-Rousseau's plans for the 
regulation of religious orders into a measure of 
proscription. He countenanced underhanded 
intrigues, and allowed his Minister of War to 
undermine army discipline by his methods of 
political espionage almost as much as it had 
been undermined in the days of the supremacy 
of the Clericals. The concessions of the Min- 
isters of War and of Marine to the Socialists 


and pacifists considerably weakened the effi- 
ciency of both army and navy. Combes's 
administration was pre-eminently one of self- 
seeking politicians. 

Yet, on the other hand, certain very praise- 
worthy achievements may be registered to its 
credit. One of these was the act of General 
Andre, in 1903, instituting a new private in- 
vestigation of the Dreyfus case. It resulted in 
the discovery of material sufficient to justify a 
new demand for revision, which the Cour de 
Cassation admitted in March, 1904. Another 
achievement was the rapprochement with Eng- 
land known as the Entente cordiale or friendly 
understanding, which following the new amity 
with Italy greatly strengthened France face- 
to-face with Germany. The Russian alliance 
had given France one definite European ally, 
and the cordiality with Italy, a member of 
the Triple Alliance, cleared the situation in 
the Mediterranean and on the frontier of the 
Alps. The Entente cordiale was engineered by 
Edward VII as a result of his visit to Paris in 
1903. The accord of April, 1904, was really due 
to English as well as French fear of German 
aggression. It liquidated all the old conten- 


tions between England and France, one of 
which, the French Shore Dispute over New- 
foundland fishing rights, dated back to the 
Treaty of Utrecht in the early eighteenth cen- 
tury. But, above all, France definitely gave 
up her Egyptian claims in return for freedom 
of action in Morocco guaranteed by England. 
For France was anxious to add Morocco to her 
African sphere of influence. A secret arrange- 
ment with Spain gave that country reversion- 
ary claims to certain parts of Morocco. By the 
agreement with England the bad blood caused 
by the Fashoda incident was wiped away, a 
new intimacy sprang up between "Perfidi- 
ous Albion" and "Froggy," and through the 
natural drawing together of England and 
France's ally Russia, the Triple Entente came 
into being some years later, which was destined 
to face Germany and Austria in the Great 
European War. 

Combes's successor as Prime Minister was a 
member of Ms own Cabinet, Maurice Rouvier* 
More moderate in views than Combes, he 
would have been content to let the Separation 
bill rest, but the Radicals were in the saddle 
and he let things take their course. The dis- 


cussions over the project went on through most 
of the year 1905, under the guidance of the 
Minister of Worship, Bienvenu-Martin, and 
particularly of Aristide Briand, the rapporteur 
or spokesman for the Commission in the Cham- 
ber. The bill, again and again modified in a 
spirit of conciliation and leniency under the 
guidance of Briand, finally resulted, as pro- 
mulgated on December 9, in a sincere effort 
for a compromise between different views on 
religion. It showed a desire, since Church and 
State were to be divorced, to treat the former 
fairly. Provision was made, when the budget 
for religious purposes should be suppressed, 
for the legal inventory of ecclesiastical prop- 
erty, the pension of superannuated clergy, and 
the formation of legal corporations to insure 
public worship (associations cultuelles) . It must 
be remembered that the new measure applied 
quite as much to the Protestants and to the 
Jews as to the Catholics. Before the separation 
the Protestant pastors and the Jewish rabbis 
were maintained by the State no less than the 
Catholic clergy. Their numerical insignificance 
made them of little importance in the general 
combat over the Clerical question. Nor could 


they fairly be accused of intrigue against the 

The year 1905 is noteworthy for two other 
important events. One was the reduction of 
the term of compulsory military service from 
three to two years. This measure was carried 
through largely under the auspices of General 
Andre and proved an over-dangerous conces- 
sion to the anti-militarists and pacifists, since 
it was destined so soon to be repealed. The 
other was the sensational diplomatic dispute 
with Germany over Morocco, which resulted 
at first for France in a worse humiliation than 

Germany under Bismarck had encouraged 
the numerous French colonial schemes, as a 
way of keeping her busy abroad and of divert- 
ing her thoughts from Alsace-Lorraine. But 
as the Empire began to develop its Pan- 
Germanism and its aspirations to world-power 
under William II, it grew jealous of England 
and France and of their arrangement of 1904 
to settle the interests of Morocco. Forthwith 
Germany began to intrigue with the Sultan of 
Morocco against the French, and declared 
that, as it had not been officially informed of 


the agreements between England, France, and 
Spain, it intended to disregard them. The de- 
feat of Russia by Japan, in particular, encour- 
aged Germany to feel that France, deprived of 
its ally, could be bullied with impunity. On 
March 31, Emperor William landed at Tangier 
and proclaimed that his visit was to the Sultan 
as an "independent sovereign." Germany also 
called for the convocation of an international 
meeting to regulate the Moroccan question. 
The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Delcasse, objected to the thwarting of his 
plans, but because of the deterioration of the 
army and navy and the lack of hoped-for 
Russian support, Rouvier was obliged under 
German threats to drop him from his Cabinet 
and to agree to the convocation of the Confer- 
ence of Algeciras. 1 

1 The pro-German position, expressed in such works as E. D. 
Morel's Morocco nj Diplomacy (1912), is that Sir Edward Grey 
and M. Delcass6 were engaged in tricky schemes to dispose of 
Morocco without regard for German interests; that Germany 
was not officially notified by France of the public agreements 
with England (April, igo4) and with Spain (October, igo4); that 
these two agreements were both accompanied by secret ones which 
nullified their effect; that M, Delcass6 resigned, not under Ger- 
man pressure, but at M. Rouvier's wish, for having unduly in- 
volved and compromised France. 


February, 1906, to February, 1918 

THE international conference for the regula- 
tion of the Moroccan question met at Algeciras 
in southern Spain, in January, 1906. Twelve 
powers participated, including the United 
States. The negotiations were prolonged until 
the end of March owing to the unconciliatory 
German attitude, and resulted in an arrange- 
ment which the Germans looked upon as 
totally unsatisfactory to themselves. In the 
shaping of the general results the United States 
had considerable influence. The agreement 
put out of discussion the sovereignty of the 
Sultan, the integrity of the empire, and the 
principle of commercial freedom, and was 
largely devoted to the question of the estab- 
lishment of a state bank and the organization 
of the police in international ports of entry. In 
the bank France was to have special privileges, 
and the police was to be under the supervision 
of France and Spain. Germany was eliminated. 


In the midst of the uncertainty over the 
outcome of the Conference two important 
events took place in France, the second of 
which came near seriously weakening the 
French position. These were the election of a 
successor to President Loubet and the down- 
fall of the Rouvier Ministry. 

M. Loubet's term expired in February and 
he did not desire re-election. The two chief 
candidates were Armand Fallieres and Paul 
Doumer. M. Fallieres was an easy-going, good- 
natured, and well-meaning but second-rate 
statesman. Doumer was far more brilliant and 
vigorous, but was accused of self-seeking and 
was thought a less safe person to l? elect. Unfor- 
tunately, M. Fallieres, when chosen, had his 
master, and was largely under the control of 

Meanwhile the almost unprincipled vacilla- 
tion of M. Rouvier and his spineless policy 
caused increased dissatisfaction to the Cham- 
ber. During the discussion of a riotous episode 
connected with the enforcement of the Separa- 
tion law, which had resulted in the death of a 
man, Rouvier was overthrown. He was suc- 
ceeded by a colorless person, Sarrien, who in- 


eluded Clemenceau in Ms Cabinet as Minister 
of the Interior. The latter gradually pushed 
his chief aside and finally replaced him before 
the end of the year as Prime Minister. 

Clemenceau showed himself during his 
lengthy control of power an astute politician. 
In the public eye ever since the days of the 
Commune, he had had success during the 
eighties as a destroyer of cabinets. Driven into 
the background by the Panama scandals, he 
now came forward again to try his fortune in 
holding the power from which he had often 
driven others. With a Cabinet thoroughly 
under his dictatorial control, he announced a 
programme which was to depend for success 
on the Radicals, rather than on the Moderates 
or the Socialists. It was a departure from the 
policy of the Bloc, though to conciliate the ad- 
vanced parties he created the new Ministry of 
Labor and put M. Viviani, a Socialist, in charge 
of it. In practice, Clemenceau's policy was that 
of one determined to stay in office, showing 
alternately conciliation and severity, explain- 
ing his actions to the Chamber often with a 
flippancy which seemed out of place and did not 
help the prestige of parliamentary government. 


Apart from the diplomatic tension with Ger- 
many, which was not settled by the Act of 
Algeciras, the history of the Fallieres Adminis- 
tration is largely taken up with the final dispo- 
sition of the religious controversy and with 
labor questions. The constant advance toward 
radicalism and socialism, the lack of great 
statesmen in Parliament and the presence of 
professional politicians, the progress of anti- 
militarism and the relegation of the question 
of Alsace-Lorraine to the background, left a 
free field for the growth of social unrest. The 
tendency was encouraged by the elections for 
the renewal of the Chamber of Deputies in 
May, 1906. To the religious disturbances and 
the efforts of the Conservatives to prove them- 
selves persecuted, the country answered at the 
polls by an increased anti-Clerical majority. 

In 1906 the Dreyfus case was at last settled. 
The Cour de Cassation finally annulled the 
verdict of the Rennes court-martial. In conse- 
quence Dreyfus was restored to the army with 
the rank of Major which he would normally 
have reached had it not been for his great 
ordeal. Colonel Picquart, to whom more than 
to any one he owed his rehabilitation, who 


had been driven from the army in 1898, was 
now made Brigadier-General. Promoted a few 
weeks later to Major-General, he became Min- 
ister of War in Clemenceau's Cabinet. The 
remains of Emile Zola were also transferred to 
the Pantheon. Such were the dramatic changes 
wrought in half a dozen years. 

The troubles over the application of the law 
for the disestablishment of the Church lasted 
more than two years. The Vatican was deter- 
mined to make itself a martyr. It would un- 
doubtedly have been glad to see a forcible 
closing of the churches in order to cause a reac- 
tion in its favor. Moreover, it objected to the 
diminution of priestly power and the participa- 
tion of the laity as prescribed in the forma- 
tion of the new associations cultuelles. The 
Ministry, and particularly Briand, were just 
as determined not to give it an opportunity to 
raise the cry of persecution. 

The first opportunity for a conflict came 
when the Government tried to make inven- 
tories of religious property, including valua- 
bles. This measure was for the protection of 
the Church, but the Clericals chose to call it 
inquisitorial and a first step to confiscation. 


In some parts of France armed resistance, 
often systematically prepared, was made to 
the authorities, army officers again occasion- 
ally refused to carry out orders, and on March 
6, at Boeschepe, a man was killed. It was this 
incident which caused the downfall of the 
Rouvier Cabinet. 

It was the policy of M. Briand, entrusted 
with the application of the new law, to employ 
the most conciliatory means face to face with 
the Vatican, determined to be persecuted. As 
a matter of fact the French bishops, after plen- 
ary consultation, had decided by a consider- 
able majority, to accept the law in a good spirit, 
with reservations as to its justice, and to or- 
ganize the associations cultuelles. Suddenly the 
Pope intervened by an encyclical directed 
against any such acceptance, and prescribed a 
continuation of the contest. These orders the 
bishops felt constrained to obey. 

Therefore, at the advent of the Clemenceau 
Cabinet in October, 1906, M. Briand had 
achieved nothing but compulsory inventories. 
He got Parliament to allow the legality of the 
proposed religious organizations under the 
Associations Law of 1901 or under the general 


law of 1881 on public meetings, as well as under 
the special legislation of 1905. Again the Holy 
See refused to obey, and ordered the clergy to 
continue their occupancy of the churches, but 
to refrain from any legal declaration or regis- 
tration whatsoever. Then M. Briand did away 
with the declaration. So the contest went on 
without agreement until it finally lapsed. The 
clergy continued to occupy the churches, but 
without legal claim to them, under the law of 
1881 on public meetings, amended by the law 
of March 28, 1907, suppressing the formality 
of a declaration. The Catholic Church was 
stripped, by its own unwillingness to help 
organize holding bodies, of all its possessions. 
By the good-will of the Government it con- 
tinued to occupy the religious edifices, but the 
maintenance and repair of these was depend- 
ent on the good-will of the commune or admin- 
istrative division in which the churches were 
situated. On the other hand, nothing has 
materialized of the prophesied religious perse- 
cutions, civil war, and martyrdoms. 

Apart from the annoyances caused by the 
separation of Church and State, the history of 
the Clemenceau Ministry deals largely with 


labor disturbances and social unrest. This was 
partly due to parliamentary demagogy. A suc- 
cession of weak and ineffective ministries had 
been followed by Clemenceau's incoherencies 
and alterations of policy, though it remained 
consistently Radical and not socialistic. The 
Ministers were often at loggerheads (even 
Clemenceau and Briand over the Separation 
bill), and the Deputies were often mediocre 
politicians, quick to vote themselves an in- 
crease of salary, but dilatory in other achieve- 
ments* The growth of socialism, with its 
theories of pacifism and international brother- 
hood, encouraged the anti-militarists. The 
brilliant leader Jaures openly advocated the 
abolition of the army and the creation of a 
national militia. Some anti-militarists, like 
Herve, carried their theories beyond all bounds 
and rhetorically talked of dragging the na- 
tional flag in the mire. Meanwhile the political 
methods in the past of men like Andr6 in the 
War Department and Camille Pelletan in the 
Navy had weakened those services, as Del- 
cassS had found to his cost in the controversy 
with Germany, The battleship Una blew up 
in March, 1907, there was a suspicious fire at 


the Toulon Arsenal, and many other things 
disquieted people. 

The Government tried to cater to the labor 
parties, brought forward plans for an income 
tax and for old-age pensions, and carried 
through a law making compulsory one day of 
rest out of seven for workingmen. Especially 
active were the efforts of the syndicalists and 
the organizers of the anarchistic Confederation 
generate du travail, or "C.G.T.," to promote 
every contest between capital and labor and to 
bring about, if possible, a general strike of all 
labor. There were strikes of miners, longshore- 
men, sailors, electricians among others. Even 
more alarming was the formation of unions, 
affiliated with the C.G.T., among state em- 
ployees such as school teachers and postmen, 
and efforts to disorganize the public service. 
These different movements Clemenceau met 
with his customary seesaw of friendliness and 
harshness, and the Government was usually 
victorious. Not less troublesome but some- 
what more picturesque was the quasi-revolu- 
tionary movement, in 1907, of the wine-makers 
of the South, driven to desperation by over- 
production and low prices, attributed to the 


competition of adulterated wines. The muni- 
cipalities where these disturbances occurred 
were often in sympathy with the creators of 
disturbance, not only in small towns, but in 
large places like Beziers, Perpignan, Narbonne, 
and Carcassonne. Municipal officials resigned 
or refused to carry out their duties, and some 
regiments, made up of men recruited from 
one of the districts, mutinied. The troubles at 
last quieted down. 

In the beginning of 1909 an important agree- 
ment was signed with Germany which seemed 
to promise an end to the long disputes over 
Morocco. The Moroccan question had con- 
tinued to dominate French foreign policy even 
after Algeciras and that conference had not 
ended the commercial rivalries of the two 
countries. In March, 1907, a Frenchman, 
Dr. Mauchamp, was murdered by natives at 
Marrakesh and the French in reply occupied 
Ujda near the Algerian frontier. In July, after 
the murder of some European workmen at 
Casablanca, the French sent a landing corps. 
In 1908 the Sultan Abd-el-Aziz, a friend of the 
French, was overthrown by a rival, Muley- 
Hafid, egged on by the Germans. These also 


raised a dispute over some deserters from the 
French Foreign Legion at Casablanca, who 
had taken refuge at the German Consulate 
and whom the Germans claimed as their sub- 
jects. For a moment war clouds seemed to 
appear on the horizon until dissipated by mu- 
tual expressions of regret and after a refer- 
ence to the Hague Tribunal, which, on the 
whole, justified the French. It was, therefore, 
good news for Europe to hear of the agreement 
of February, 1909, which acknowledged the 
predominance of French political claims, and 
tried to facilitate economic co-operation in- 
stead of rivalry between France and Germany. 
Unfortunately, this agreement was destined to 
prove ineffective. 

The Clemenceau Cabinet lasted until July, 
1909. During a discussion on the Navy, Cle- 
menceau and Delcasse had an altercation as to 
their relative responsibilities for the French 
surrender to Germany in 1905 when Delcasse 
was driven from the Rouvier Ministry. The 
Chamber sided with Delcasse and Clemenceau 
discovered that his sarcasm had overreached 
itself. The new Premier was Briand, the So- 
cialist and former bugbear of the moneyed 


classes, who had shown by his management of 
the Separation bill the abilities of a true states- 
man and who became more and more moderate 
in his views under the increasing responsibili- 
ties of power. 

The history of the Briand Ministry was 
largely taken up by internal questions and the 
elections of May, 1910, for the renewal of the 
Chamber of Deputies. To propitiate the elec- 
torate the expiring Parliament passed a law 
providing old-age pensions for workingmen. 
The elections left the Radicals and the Social- 
istic Radicals (as opposed to the Socialists) on 
the whole masters of the situation, but the 
general parliamentary instability continued to 
prevail. The country felt the reaction. In the 
autumn of 1910 far-reaching railway strikes 
broke out, resulting in violence and injury 
to railway property or sabotage. Briand met 
the difficulty energetically by mobilizing the 
employees still subject to military duty, and 
making them perform their work under mili- 
tary orders. The act of "dictatorship 5 * was 
approved by the Chamber, but Briand went 
through the ceremony of resigning and ac- 
cepting the mission to form a new Cabinet. It 


proved not very homogeneous and withdrew 
in February, 1911. The Monis Cabinet, of 
more advanced Socialistic-Radical principles, 
lasted only a few months and faced new dis- 
turbances with wine-producers. This time the 
trouble was in the East, where many were 
dissatisfied with the artificial limitation of 
districts entitled to produce wines labelled 
"champagne." The Socialistic-Radical Min- 
istry of Joseph Caillaux (June, 1911) en- 
countered a new and dangerous crisis in the 
relations with Germany. 

The mutual agreement between the two 
countries for the economic development of 
Morocco had, through financial rivalries, not 
worked well. There was also friction over 
similar attempts for the development of the 
French Congo. In this state of affairs, the 
French sent a military expedition to Fez in the 
early summer of 1911 for the ostensible purpose 
of protecting the Sultan from attack by rebels 
and of relieving the French military mission. 
The Germans, backed up, indeed, by the 
French anti-militarist press, declared that 
this was a mere pretext for encroachment* 
Spain also took the opportunity of asserting 


its rights to parts of the North in accordance 
with its reversionary claims by the Treaty of 
1904. Thereupon Germany declared that the 
agreements of Algeciras and of 1909 had 
been nullified by France and demanded com- 
pensations. The gunboat Panther suddenly 
appeared in the port of Agadir (July 1) and 
the Germans began to call for their share in 
the partition of Morocco. 

Difficult negotiations were carried on be- 
tween France and Germany through the sum- 
mer of 1911, and at moments the two countries 
were on the very brink of war. The English 
Government backed up France. Lloyd George 
and Premier Asquith made public declara- 
tions to that effect. French capitalists also 
began calling in their funds invested in Ger- 
many and a financial crisis threatened that 

Thus brought to terms the Germans be- 
came more moderate in their demands, and it 
was finally possible to reach a compromise, 
unsatisfactory to both parties. Germany def- 
initely gave up all political claim to Morocco 
and acknowledged France as paramount there. 
On the other hand, a territorial readjustment 


was made in the Congo by which Germany 
added to the Cameroons about two hundred 
and thirty thousand square kilometres of land 
with a million people, and the new frontiers 
made annoying salients into the French Congo. 
The treaty was signed in November, 1911, but 
the Pan-Germanists were angry at any conces- 
sions to France, the Colonial Minister resigned, 
and the Emperor, who had thrown his influ- 
ence on the side of peace, lost much prestige 
for a while. On the other hand, the French 
were correspondingly dissatisfied at the losses 
in the Congo. The opponents of the Prime 
Minister, Caillaux, had often taunted him with 
too close a relation between his official acts and 
his private financial interests. They now ac- 
cused him of tricky concessions to Germany in 
connection with the Congo adjustments. M. 
Caillaux denied in the Chamber that he had 
ever entered into any private dealings apart 
from the negotiations of the ministry of For- 
eign Affairs. However, Clemenceau asked the 
Foreign Minister, M. de Selves, point-blank 
if the French Ambassador at Berlin had not 
complained of interference in the diplomatic 
negotiations. M. de Selves refused to answer, 


thus implicitly giving the lie to M. CaiUaux. 
The consequence was a cabinet crisis and the 
resignation of the Ministry (January, 1912). 

The upshot of the Agadir crisis was in- 
creased irritation between France and Ger- 
many and the feeling in each country that the 
other was seeking trouble* The French were 
now convinced that, some day or other, war 
would inevitably result and the nation dropped 
its strong pacifist tendencies and rallied to the 
army. The Germans were, above all, furious 
against the English, whom they considered 
responsible for their humiliation. 

So far as Morocco was immediately con- 
cerned, the French took steps to develop their 
new privileges. In March, 1912, they imposed 
a definite protectorate on the Sultan Muley- 
Hafid and soon replaced him by his brother 
Muley-Yussef . They came to an agreement 
with Spain as to the latter's claims in the North 
and entrusted to General Lyautey the ad- 
ministrative and military reorganization of the 
country. The pacification of the hostile tribes 
was not an easy task and went on laboriously 
through 1912 and 1913. 
k After the downfall of M. Caillaux, Raymond 


Poincare became head of a Cabinet more 
moderate than its predecessor, the Socialistic 
Radicals seeming somewhat discredited in 
public opinion. M. Poincare was a strong 
partisan of proportional representation, and 
a measure for the modification of the method of 
voting was, under his auspices, passed by the 
Chamber, though it failed the following year 
in the Senate. 

In foreign affairs, Morocco having dropped 
into the background, the Eastern question 
became acute. Fear lest the conflict in the 
Orient should involve the rest of Europe led 
France to draw again closer to Russia and 


February, 19 13 

M. FALLIERES' term expired on February 18, 
1913. The two leading candidates were Ray- 
mond Poincare, head of the Ministry, and 
Jules Pams, who was supported by the ad- 
vanced Radicals. M. Poincare's election was 
looked upon, because of his personal vigor, as 
a triumph of sound conservative republican- 
ism, and it was predicted that he would prove 
a strong leader, able to give prestige to the 
Presidency and to bring order out of chaos. 
The early months of his Administration were 
less productive of results than had been hoped, 
but the European War came too soon to make 
definitive judgment safe. 
: After M. Poincare's election, M. Fallieres 
made M. Briand President of the Council dur- 
ing the last weeks of his term, and M. Poin- 
car6 kept the same Cabinet. M. Briand, like 
M. Poincare, advocated proportional repre- 
sentation. As the Chamber failed to take a 


vigorous position in support of the measure, 
and defeated the Ministry on a vote of con- 
fidence, the latter withdrew (March, 1913). 

Louis Barthou next became Prime Minister, 
and the important legislative measure of the 
year was the new military law. The Germans 
having largely increased their army, it was 
deemed necessary, in spite of the violent op- 
position of the Socialistic Radicals and the 
Socialists and the attempts of the syndicalists 
of the Confederation generate du travail to work 
up a general strike, to abrogate the Law of 
1905 and to return to three years of military 
service without exemption. M. Barthou pushed 
the three-years bill already supported by the 
Briand Cabinet* France took upon herself an 
enormous financial burden, coupled with a 
corresponding loss of productive labor, yet 
events soon proved the wisdom of the step. 

The opposition to the Cabinet was virulent. 
There were now two great groupings of the 
chief political parties. 1 The Radicals and 

1 It must be obvious to the reader, after following all the 
changes in nomenclature recorded in this volume, that in France 
party-names give little hint of party-views: " In French political 
parlance * Progresses' ar retrograde, * Liberals* ar conservativ, 
* Conservativs* ar revolutionary in aim and methods, * Radicals ' 
ar trimmers and time-servers, whilst one of the most reactionary 


Socialistic Radicals, under the name of "Uni- 
fied Radicals" waged war against the Presi- 
dent and the Ministry. They were under the 
inspiration of men like Clemenceau and the 
active leadership of Joseph Gaillaux and tried 
to revive the methods of the old Bloc of 
Combes. They declared their intention of re- 
pealing the three-years law and proclaimed the 
tenets of their faith at the Congress of Pau. 
The Briand-Barthou-Millerand group, sup- 
porters of Poincar6, soon formed a Moder- 
ate Party with a programme of conciliation 
and reform known as the "Federation of the 

The Barthou Cabinet had been overthrown 
early in December, 1913, after a vote on a 
government loan. President Poincare had to 
call in a Radical Cabinet led by Gaston Dou- 
mergue, the programme of which Ministry was, 

administrations of recent years was heded by three * Socialists.' " 
A.-L. Guerard in Pub. Mod. Lang. Assoc. of America, vol. xxx, 
p. 624. Compare also the following: " Suivant les regions de la 
France, o'est-a-dire selon la moyenne de ropinion locale et les 
termes de comparaison on les traditions propres a chaque prov- 
ince, les mots changent de signification. Dans le Var un radical 
passe pour un modere 1 , dans Fouest un rSpublicain est consider^ 
par certains comme un reVolutionnaire, ailleurs les candidate qui 
ne sont pas au moins radicaux-socialistes ne sont pas tenus pour 
de bons r6publicains." L. Jacques, Les partis politiques sous la 
trois&me ripublique, p. 4ac> 


after all, less "advanced" than the Pau pro- 
gramme, especially as to the three-years bill. 
M. Caillaux, the master-spirit of the Radicals, 
was the Minister of Finance and the object of 
the hostility of the Moderates. They claimed 
that he used his position to cause speculation 
at the Stock Exchange, and accused him of 
"selling out" to Germany in the settlement 
after Agadir. The Figaro, edited by Gaston 
Calmette, began a violent campaign. Among 
the charges was that during the prosecution in 
1911 of Rochette, a swindling promoter, the 
then Prime Minister Moms, now Minister of 
Marine, had, at Caillaux's instigation, held up 
the prosecution for fraud, during which delay 
Rochette had been able to put through other 

In the midst of the public turmoil over these 
charges Caillaux's wife went to Calmette's 
editorial offices and killed him with a revolver. 
Gaillaux resigned and, the Rochette case hav- 
ing come up for discussion in the Chamber, 
when Monis denied that he had ever influ- 
enced the law, Barthou produced a most 
damaging letter. A parliamentary commis- 
sion later decided that the Monis Cabinet 


had interfered to save Rochette from prose- 

It was under such circumstances that the 
Deputies separated for the general elections. 
Three chief questions came before the vot- 
ers, the three-years law, the income tax, and 
proportional representation. The results of 
the elections were inconclusive and the new 
Chamber promised to be as ineffective as its 
predecessor. On the second ballots the Social- 
ists made a good many gains. 

The Doumergue Ministry resigned soon 
after the elections which it had carried through. 
President Poincare offered the leadership to 
the veteran statesman Ribot,-who with the 
co-operation of Leon Bourgeois, formed a 
Moderate Cabinet with an inclination toward 
the Left. This Ministry was above the aver- 
age, but its leaders were insulted and brow- 
beaten and overthrown on the very first day 
they met the Chamber of Deputies. So then 
a Cabinet was formed, led by the Socialist 
Rene Viviani, who was willing, however, to 
accept the three-years law, though he had 
previously opposed it. But this victory for 
national defence was weakened by parlia- 


mentary revelations of military unprepared- 

In mid- July President Poincare and M. 
Viviani left France for a round of state visits 
to Russia and Scandinavia. Paris was en- 
grossed by the sensational trial of Madame 
Caillaux, which resulted in her acquittal, but 
this excitement was suddenly replaced by the 
European crisis, and President Poincare cut 
short his foreign trip and hastened home* 
France loyally supported her ally Russia, and, 
on August 3, Baron von Schoen, the German 
Ambassador, notified M. Viviani of a state of 
war between Germany and France. 

Indeed, no sooner had the Moroccan ques- 
tion been settled than danger had loomed in 
the Orient, in which France was likely to be 
involved through her alliance with Russia. 
Moreover, Germany had not got over the 
Agadir fiasco and was furious with England as 
well as France. Thus the European balance 
of power had long been in danger through the 
hostility of the Triple Alliance and the Triple 
Entente. It is beyond the scope of the present 
volume to analyze in detail the Balkan ques- 
tion. The r61e of France was consistent in the 


interest of peace by helping to maintain the 
balance of power, but obviously she was loyal 
toward her partners of the Triple Entente and 
acted in solidarity with them. 

So far as the outbreak of the war in 1914 is 
concerned, France stands with a clear con- 
science. She had nothing to do with the dis- 
putes between Austria and Serbia, or between 
Austria, Germany, and Russia. Once war 
proved inevitable France faithfully accepted 
the responsibilities of the Russian alliance. 
Against France, Germany was an open ag- 
gressor. Germany's strategic plans for the 
quick annihilation of France, before attacking 
Russia, are well known to the world. Every- 
body is aware how scrupulously France 
avoided every hostile measure, and, during the 
critical days preceding the war, withdrew all 
troops ten kilometres from the frontier to pre- 
vent a clash. The Germans were obliged, in or- 
der to justify their advance, to invent prepos- 
terous tales of bombs dropped by aeroplanes 
near Nuremberg or of. the violation of Belgium 
neutrality by French officers in automobiles. 
France had no idea of invading Belgium. All 
the French strategic plans aimed at the protec- 


tion of the direct frontier, and they were dis- 
located by the dishonest move of Germany 
through Belgium. 

.In 1914 France was not even prepared for 
war. The pacification of Morocco immobi- 
lized thousands of her troops. Revelations in 
Parliament as late as July 13 showed, as men- 
tioned above, great deficiencies in equipment 
Public attention was taken up by the CaiHaux 
trial and by political strife apparently reaching 
the proportions of national weakness. 

Since Agadir it is true that France, con- 
scious of the constantly provocative attitude 
of Germany, had seen the folly of plans for 
disarmament. Love for the army had grown 
again, through realization of its necessity. 
But no nation ever looked forward with more 
horror and dread to military conflict than the 
French. They had been the last victims of a 
great European war, of which the memories 
were still alive. However much the loss of 
Alsace-Lorraine rankled in their hearts, they 
knew too well the madness of war to seek it 
again. A new generation had grown up rec- 
onciled to fate and willing to let bygones be 


But Germany would not. The new Em- 
pire, a Bourgeois gentilhomme among nations, 
but without even the breeding of the parvenu, 
dreamed of world-supremacy. As the boor in 
society makes himself conspicuous, so it was 
one of the tenets of Pan-Germanism to let no 
international agreement take place without 
German interference. 

Some people, reading the annals of forty- 
four years since the Franco-Prussian War, 
have been disposed to sneer at France. Some 
have called the country degenerate because 
of its small birth-rate, its fiction sometimes 
brutal, sometimes neurotic, its inefficient 
Parliament, its vindictive political and reli- 
gious contests. Such critics should remember 
that the French Government is the result of 
tactical compromise in presence of the Mon- 
archical Party. Nobody denies that it might 
be improved. As to religious persecution, 
Americans might remember their own right- 
eous feelings toward fellow citizens with "hy- 
phenated" allegiance, when they rebuke the 
French for fighting vast organizations work- 
ing against their Government under foreign 


In 1914 France, bearing on her shoulders 
proportionally the greatest burden of all the 
Allies, presented to the world a spirit of firm- 
ness, unity, and national resolve that won 
the admiration of neutral nations. Religious 
persecution and clerical manoeuvre were alike 
put aside. France forgot all lassitude and dis- 
couragement. Atheist, Protestant, and Catho- 
lic felt a great wave of spiritual as well as of 
patriotic fervor, and took as symbol of love of 
country the heroic peasant girl of Lorraine, 
Jeanne d'Arc, who, coming from the people 
and leading the nation's army, sought to drive 
from the soil its foes and invaders. 






Administration of Thiers 
Feb. 19, 1871, Jules Dufaure. 
May 18, 1873, Jules Dufaure. 

Administration of Mac-Motion 
May 25, 1873, Due de Broglie. 
Nov. 26, 1873, Due de Broglie. 
May 22, 1874, General de Cissey, 

-L-.,^ iorre (L.OU1S Buffet. 

March - 10 ' 1875 'j Jules Dufaure. 

Administration of Mac-Mahon (continued) 
March 9, 1876, Jules Dufaure. 
Dec. 12, 1876, Jules Simon. 
May 17, 1877, Due de Broglie. 
Nov. 23, 1877, General de Rochebouet. 
Dec. 13, 1877, Jules Dufaure. 

Administration of Jules Grivg 
Feb. 4, 1879, William-Henry Waddington. 

Dec. 28, 1879, Charles de Freycinet. 

Sept. 23, 1880, Jules Ferry. 

Nov. 14, 1881, Lon Gambetta. 
Jan. 30, 1882, Charles de Freycinet. 



Aug. 7, 1882, Eugene Duclerc. 

Jan. 29, 1883, Armand Fallieres. 
Feb. 21, 1883, Jules Ferry. 
April 6, 1885, Henri Biisson. 

Jan. 7, 1886, Charles de Freycinet. 
Dec. 11, 1886, Ren6 Goblet. 
May 30, 1887. Maurice Rouvier. 

Administration of Carnot 
Dec. 12, 1887, Pierre-Emmanuel Tirard. 
April 3, 1888, Charles Floquet. 
Feb. 22, 1889, Pierre-Emmanuel Tirard. 
March 17, 1890, Charles de Freycinet. 
Feb. 27, 1892, Emile Loubet. 
Dec. 6, 1892, Alexandre Ribot. 
Jan. 11, 1893, Alexandre Ribot, 
April 4, 1893, Charles Dupuy. 
Dec. 3, 1893, Jean Casimir-Perier. 
May 30, 1894. Charles Dupuy. 

Administration of Casimir-Perier 
July 1, 1894, Charles Dupuy. 

Administration of Filix Faure 
Jan. 26, 1895, Alexandre Ribot. 
Nov. 1, 1895, L6on Bourgeois* 
April 29, 1896, Jules Meline. 
June 28, 1898, Henri Brisson. 
Nov. 1, 1898, Charles Dupuy. 

Administration of Emile Loubet 
Feb. 18, 1899, Charles Dupuy. 
June 22, 1899, Rene Waldeck-Rousseau."* 
June 7, 1902, Emile Combes. 
Jan. 24, 1905, Maurice Rouvier. 


Administration of Armand Failures 

Feb. 18, 1906, Maurice Rouvier. 
March 14, 1906, Ferdinand Sarrien. 

Oct. 25, 1906, Georges Clemenceau. 

July 23, 1909, Aristide Briand. 
March 2, 1911, Ernest Mortis, 
. July 27, 1911, Joseph Caillaux. 

Jan. 13, 1912, Raymond PoincarS. 

Jan. 21, 1913, Aristide Briand. 

Administration of Raymond Poincari 
Feb. 18, 1913, Aristide Briand. 
March 21, 1913, Louis Barthou. 
Dec. 2, 1913, Gaston Doumergue. 
June 9, 1914, Alexandre Ribot. 
June 13, 1914, Rene VivianL 
Aug. 26, 1914, Rene Viviani. 
Oct. 29, 1915, Aristide Briand. 



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BEYENS, BARON. UAllemagne avant la guerre. Les 

causes et les responsabilites. 1915. 
BODLEY, J. E. C. The Church in France. 1906. 
BODLEY, J. E. C. France. 2 vols. 1898. 
BRISSON, H. Souvenirs. 1908. 
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troisieme republique. 1896. 
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DEBIDOUR, A. L'Eglise catholique et rEtat sous la 

troisieme Republique. 2 vols. 1909. 
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DIMNET, E. France Herself Again. 1914. 
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GEORGE, W. L. France in the Twentieth Century. 1908. 


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Abd-el-Aziz, 168. 

Africa, 89, 104, 106, 132. 

Agadir, 172, 174, 179, 181, 183. 

Aix, 104. 

Albert of Saxony, 15, 16, 18. 

Alexander III, Czar, 105. 

Algeciras, 158, 159, 162, 168, 


Algeria, 81, 110, 168. 
Algiers, 104. 
Alsace, 11, 13, 34, 35, 43, 157, 

162, 183. 
Amiens, 23. 
Andre", General, 143, 152, 153, 

Annam, 89, 90. 
Antony of HohenzoIIern, 8, 9. 
Argues, 54. 

Arton, 109, 111, 118, 134. 
Artenay, 19, 22. 
Asquith, 172. 
Aurelle de Paladines, General 

d', 22, 23, 39. 

Austria, 3, 4, 52, 89, 155, 182. 
Auteuil, 136. 
Avellan, Admiral, 106. 

Bac-Le, 90. 

Baihaut, 111. 

Bapaume, 24, 

Barthou, Louis, 177, 178, 179. 


Bazaine, 13, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21. 

Beaugency, 23. 

Beaumont, 16. 

Beaune-la-RoIande, 22. 

Belfort, 24, 25, 34, 

Belgium, 4, 16, 182, 183. 

Benedetti, 7, 8, 9, 10. 

Berlin, 11, 51, 73, 81, 

Bert, Paul, 80. j 

Beul6, 51. i 

BSziers, 168. 
Bienvenu-Martin, 156. 
Billot, General, 124, 126. 
Bismarck, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 

11, 18, 21, 26, 28, 34, 51, 61 

Bitche, 24. 
Blanqui, 38. 
Boeschepe, 164. 

Boisdeffre, General de, 106, 125. 
Bordeaux, 22, 31, 35, 36, 40, 43, 

45, 46. 
Borny, 14, 
Boulanger, General, 93, 94, 98, 

99, 100, 101, 102, 103. 
BourbaM, General, 23, 24, 25. 
Bourgeois, Leon, 121, 122, 180. 
Briand, Aristide, 151, 153, 156, 

163, 164, 165, 166, 169, 170, 

176, 177, 178. 
Bri&rede 1'Isle, 90. 
Brisson, Henri, 84, 92, 97, 109, 

120, 129, 130, 131, 138. 
Broglie, due de, 48, 51, 55, 56, 

57, 67, 69, 71, 72, 83. 
Brussels, 35, 102. 
Buffet, Andr6, 141. 
Buffet, Louis, 48, 60, 61. 
Buisson, Ferdinand, 151. 
Burdeau, 116, 120. 
Busch, Moritz, 11, 
Buzenval, 27. 

Caffarel, General, 94. 

Cahors, 20. 

Caillaux, Joseph, 171, 173, 174, 

178, 179. 
CaiUaux, Madame, 179, 181, 


Calmette, Gaston, 179. 
Cameroons, 173. 
Canrobert, Marshal, 21. 



Carcassonne, 168. 
Carnot, President, 96-114. 
Casablanca, 168, 169. 
Caserip Santo, 114. 
Casimir-Perier, President, 115- 


Cavaignac, Godefroy, 129, 130. 
Chalons, 14. 
Chambord, comte de, 45, 50, 51, 

52, 53, 55, 56, 88. 
Champigny, 23, 26. 
Chanoine, General, 130. 
Chanzy, General, 20, 23, 24. 
Ch&teaudun, 19. 
Chatillon, 18. 
Chesnelong, 53, 54. 
China, 90, 91, 143. 
Christiani, Baron de, 136. 
Cissey, General de, 57, 60. 
Clemenceau, Georges, 78, 83, 

97, 98, 109, 160, 161, 163, 

164, 165, 166, 167, 169, 178. 
Clermont-Ferrand, 94. 
Clinchant, 25. 
Cluseret, 40, 
Combes, Emile, 145, 146, 147, 

148, 150, 151, 153, 154, 155, 


Congo, 132, 171, 173. 
Cottu, Henri, 108, 110, 111. 
Coulmiers, 22. 
Courbet, Gustave, 42. 
Cremieux, 19. 
Cronstadt, 105, 106. 
Crown Prince of Prussia, 12, 

13, 15, 16, 18. 

Decazes, due, 56. 
Delahaye, 108. 
Delcasse, 158, 166, 169. 
Delegorgue, 127. 
Delescluze, Charles, 37. 
Demange, Maitre, 119. 
Denfert-Rochereau, 24. 
Deroulede, Paul, 101, 135, 140, 


Devil's Isle, 119. 
Dijon, 151. 
Dillon, 102. 
Dombrowski, 41. 

Dordogne, 99. 

Douay, Abel, 13. 

Doumer; Paul, 160- \ 

Doumergue, Gaston, 178, 180. 

Dreyfus, Alfred, 1Q&, 116, 117,- 
118, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124, 
125, 126, 127, 128, 130, 134, 
135, 137, 138, 139, 140, 142, 
143, 145, 154, 162. 

Dreyfus, Madame, 131. 

Dreyfus, Mathieu, 123, 124, 
125, 126. 

Drumont, Edouard, 118. 

Duclerc, 86. 

Ducrot, 16, 22. 

Dufaure, Jules, 66, 72. 

Du Lac, P&re, 125. 

Dumas fils, Alexandra, 42. 

Dupuy, Charles, 112, 114, 116, 
120, 131, 135, 136. 

Edward VII, 154. 

Egypt, 86, 132, 155. 

Eiffel, G., 108, 110. 

Ems, 8, 9. 

England, 17, 61, 86, 106, 111, 

128, 132, 133, 154, 155, 157, 

158, 174, 181. 
Ernoul, 49. 
Esterhazy, 117, 123, 124, 126, 

Eugenie, Empress, 1, 3, 6, 12, 

15, 17, 20. 
Evans, Dr., 17. 

Faidherbe, General, 23, 24. 
Failly, General de, 16. 
Fallieres, Annand, 86, 159-175, 


Fashoda, 132, 133, 155, 157. 
Faure, Felix, 115-133, 134. 
Favre, General, 23. 
Favre, Jules, 17, 18, 25, 27, 28, 


Ferri&res, 18. 
Ferry, Jules, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 

82, 84, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 93, 


Fez, 171. 
Fiaux, 42. 



Floquet, Charles, 84, 97, 100, 

101, 102, 103, 109. 
Flourens, Gustave, 37, 40. 
Fontane, Marius, 108, 110. 
Foo-chow, 90. 
Forbach, 13. 
Formosa, 90. 
Fourichon, Admiral, 19. 
Francis I, 45. 
Frankfort, 35, 43. 
Frederick, Empress, 105. 
Frederick the Great, 3. 
Frederick Charles, 12, 13, 15, 

Freycinet, Charles de, 20, 24, 

30, 77, 79, 85, 86, 93, 109. 
Frohsdorf, 52. 
Froschwiller, 13. 
Frossard, 13. 

Gabes, 82. 

Galliffet, General de, 137, 139, 

Gambetta, Leon, 17, 19, 20, 22, 
23, 25, 28, 29, 31, 33, 44, 47, 
66, 67, 68, 70, 76, 77, 78, 79, 
82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 91, 92, 
97, 136. 

Garibaldi, 24, 25. 

Geay, Monseigneur, 151. 

G6rault-Richard, 120. 

Germany, 31, 34, 48, 60, 81, 89, 
94, 119, 128, 132, 154, 155, 
157, 158, 159, 162, 166, 168, 
169, 171, 172, 173, 174, 179, 
182, 183, 184. 

Gervais, Admiral, 105. 

Glais-Bizoin, 19. 

Goblet, 93. 

Gouthe-Soulard, 104. 

Gramont, due de, 6, 7, 9. 

Gravelotte, 15. 

Grevy, Albert, 110, 111. 

Gre>y, Jules, 32, 75-95, 96, 110. 

Grey, Sir Edward, 158. 

Guerard, A.-L., 178. 

Gurin, Jules, 140, 141 

Habert, Marcel, 135, 141. 
Henry IV, 45. 

Henry, Colonel, 116, 117, 123, 

124, 126, 130. 
Henry, Emile, 114. 
Hericourt, 25. 
Herve*, Gustave, 166. 
Herz, Cornelius, 109, 111, 118. 
Hugues, Clovis, 97. 

Italy, 81, 89, 106, 107, 150, 154. 
Ivry, 54. 

Jacques, L., 178. 
Japan, 158. 
Jaures, Jean, 166. 
Jeanne d'Arc, 45, 185. 
Jerome Napoleon, 86. 
Josnes, 23. 

Kairouan, 82. 
Kiel Canal, 121. 
Kitchener, 132. | 
Koniggratz, 4. 
Kroumirs, 81, 82. 

Labori, 128. 

La Cecilia, 41. 

La Motterouge, 19. 

Lang-son, 90. 

Laval, 24, 151. 

Lavigerie, Cardinal, 104. 

La ViUette, 141. 

Lazare, Bernard, 124, 125. 

Leblois, Maitre, 125. 

Le Bceuf, Marshal, 12, 21. 

Le Bourget, 26. 

Lecomte, General, 39. 

Le Mans, 24. 

Le Nordez, Monseigneur, 151. 

Leo XIII, 87, 103, 104, 105, 

106, 107, 113, 144, 150. 
Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sig- 

maringen, 5, 7, 8, 9. 
Lesseps, Charles de, 108, 110. 
Lesseps, Ferdinand de, 86, 107, 


Lille, 70. 
Lisaine, 25. 
Lloyd George, 172. 
Loigny, 22. 
Loir, 24. 



Loire, 19, 22, 23. 

Loisy, Abbe, 150. 

London, 26. 

Longchamps, 136. 

Lorraine, 11, 13, 34, 35, 43, 157, 

162, 183, 185. 
Loubet, Emile, 109, 134-158, 


Louis XIV, 26, 36. 
Louis XVI, 45. 
Louis-Philippe, 115. 
Luneville, 13. 

Lur-Saluces, comte de, 141. 
Luxembourg, Duchy of, 4. 
Lyautey, General, 174. 
Lyons, 114. 

McKinley, 114. 

Mac-Mahon, mare'chal de, 13, 

14, 15, 16, 40, 49, 50-74, 75, 


Madagascar, 89, 122. 
Madrid, 21. 
Mainz, 13. 

Marchand, Captain, 132, 133. 
Maine, 22. 
Marrakesh, 168. 
Mars-la-Tour, 14. 
Mauchamp, Dr., 168. 
Mayer, Captain, 118. 
Mediterranean, 81. 
Meline, Jules, 107, 122, 129, 


Mercier, General, 118, 139. 
Merry del Val, Cardinal, 150. 
Metz, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 


Meuse, 16. 

Mexican expedition, 1. 
Millerand, Alexandre, 97, 137, 


Miribel, General de, 85. 
Moltke, 18, 26. 
Monis, Ernest, 171, 179. 
Montbeliard, 25. 
Montmartre, 39, 52. 
Montmedy, 16. 
Montretout, 27. 
Morel, E. D., 158. 
MorSs, marquis de, 118. 

Morocco, 155, 157, 158, 159, 
168, 171, 172, 174, 181, 183. 
Muley-Hafid, 168, 174. 
Muley-Yussef, 174. 
Mun, comte de, 105. 

Nancy, 13. 

Napoleon 1, 1, 87. 

Napoleon III, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 

12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 35. 
Narbonne, 168. 
NSgrier, General de, 90. 
New Caledonia, 42. 
Newfoundland, 155. 
Nicholas II, Czar, 123, 145. 
Nile, 132. 
Nord, 99. 

North Germany, 4, 12. 
Nuremberg, 182. 

Offenbach, 3. 
Ollivier, Emile, 6, 8, 9. 
Omdurman, 132. 
Orleans, 19, 22, 26. 
Orleans, Duke of, 141. 

Palikao, comte de, 14, 15, 17. 

Pams, Jules, 176. 

Panama, 97, 107, 111, 134, 161. 

Paray-le-Monial, 52. 

Paris, 2, 9, 12, 14, 15, 16,17, 19, 
21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 32, 
33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 46, 
64, 84, 101, 105, 106, 120, 
128, 134, 140, 154, 181. 

Paris, comte de, 44, 52, 53, 55, 

Patay, 22. 

Pau, 178, 179. 

Pelletan, Camille, 97, 166. 

Pellieux, General de, 135. 

Pere-Lachaise, 41. 

Pe'ronne, 24. 

Perpignan, 168. 

Picquart, General, 123, 124, 
125, 126, 162, 163. 

Pie, Monseigneur, 52. 

Piou, Jacques, 105. 

Pius IX, 54, 68, 87. 

Pius X, 150, 164. a 



PoincarS, Raymond, 175, 176- 


Poitiers, 52. 
Pont-Noyelles, 24. 
Portsmouth, 105, 106. 
Prince Imperial, 13, 86. 
Prussia, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 12. 

Rampolla, Cardinal, 150. 

Ravachol, 114. 

Raynal, 85. 

Regnier, 21. 

Reichsoffen, 13. 

Reims, 16. 

Reinach, Jacques de, 108, 109, 

110, 111, 118, 134. 
Remusat, Charles de, 48. 
Rennes, 135, 138, 140, 143, 162. 
Rezonville, 14, 15. 
Rhenish provinces, 2. 
Rhine, 2, 4. 

Ribot, Alexandre, 109, 121, 180. 
Rigault, Raoul, 37. 
Riviere, 89. 

Rochebouet, General de, 71. 
Rochefort, Henri, 102. 
Rochette, 179, 180. 
Roget, General, 134, 135, 138. 
Rome, 150. 
Rossel, 40. 
Rouvier, 85, 93, 94, 109, 111, 

155, 158, 160, 164, 169. 
Russia, 61, 105, 121, 123, 145, 

154, 155, 158, 181, 182. 

Saarbriicken, 12, 13, 
Sadowa, 4, 6. 
Saint-Cloud, 2. 
Saint-Mande, 137. 
Saint-Privat, 15. 
Saint-Quentin, 24, 27. 
St. Petersburg, 106. 
Salisbury, Lord, 81, 106. 
Salzburg, 53. 
Sans-Leroy, 110. 
Sarrien, Ferdinand, 160. 
Say, Leon, 85. 
Scandinavia, 181. 
Scheurer-Kestner, 125. 
Schnaebele, 94. 

Schoen, Baron von, 181. 
Schwartzkoppen, Colonel, 117, 

128, 130. 
Sedan, 16, 17, 49. 
Selves, M. de, 173. 
Serbia, 182. 
Sfax, 82. 
Sicily, 81. 
Simon, Jules, 28, 67, 68, 69, 


South Germany, 4, 7, 12. 
Spain, 5, 8, 155, 158, 159, 171, 


Spicheren, 13. 
Spuller, Eugene, 113. 
Steinheil, Madame, 132. 
Steinmetz, 12, 13, 15. 
Strassburg, 11, 18. 
Sudan, 89. 
Suez, 86, 107, 132. 
Switzerland, 26. 
Syveton, 152. 

Tangier, 158. 

Thiers, Adolphe, 17, 18, 31-49, 

50, 51, 58, 61, 70, 76, 86. 
Thomas, General Clement, 39. 
Tien-tsin, 90. 
Tirard, 102. 
Tonkin, 89, 90, 93. 
Toulon, 106, 167. 
Tours, 19, 22. 
Trochu, General, 17, 19, 22, 27, 

29, 52. 

Tnfleries, 2, 17. 
Tunis, 81, 93. 

Ujda, 168. 

United States, 62, 159. 

Uzes, duchesse d', 100. 

Vafflant, 114. 

Var, 178. 

Vend6me, 24. 

Verdun, 14. 

Versailles, 18, 27, 34, 36, 40, 41, 

56, 64, 120, 128, 134. 
Victor-Emmanuel II, 68, 104. 
Victor-Emmanuel III, 150. 
Victoria, 106. 



Villepion, 22. 

Villers-Bretonneux, 23. 

Villersexel, 25. 

Villiers, 23. 

Villorceau, 23. 

Vinoy, General, 27. 

Vionvffle, 14. 

Viviani, Rene, 161, 180, 181. 

Von der Thann, 22. 

Vosges, 12, 25. 

Waddington, 77, 78, 79, 81. 
Waldeck-Rousseau, 85, 120,136, 

137, 138, 142, 143, 144, 145, 

146, 148, 153. 

Walton, 59. 

Weiss, J.-J., 85. 

Welschinger, 30. 

William I, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 

18, 26, 35. 

William II, 157, 158, 173. 
Wilson, Daniel, 88, 94, 98. 
Wimpffen, General de, 16. 
Wissembourg, 12, 13. 
Worth, 13. 
Wrobleski, 41. 

Zola, Emile, 127, 128, 130, 135, 

Zurlinden, General, 130. 

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