HISTORY
OP
WAR IN THE PENINSULA
AND IN THE
SOUTH OF FRANCE,
FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE
C.B.
VOL. II.
tf^ifrffiiu^^mtpm;
TABLE OF CONTENTS!
BOOK V.
CHAPTER I,
Slight effect produced in England by the result of the campaign Debates in par-
liament Treaty with Spain Napoleon receives addresses at Valladohd
Joseph outers Madrid Appointed the emperor's lieutenant Distribution of
the French army--*The duke of 'DanUig forces the bridge of Almaras Toledo
entered by the first corps Infantado and PaUdos oidered to advance upon
JVTadnd CUPBU appointed to tlio command of Galluz/o's troopfl Florida,
Blanca dies at Seville Su ceded ni the pir<nd< ncy by the marquis of Astorga
Money arrives at Cadiz from Mexico Bad conduct oi the central junta-
State of the Spanish army Constancy of the soldiers Infantado move* on
Tarancon His advanced guard defeated there French retire towards Toledo
Disputes in the Spanish army Battle of Uclea Retreat of Infantado Gar-
tonjol supersedes him, and advances to Oiudad Kaal Cuosta takes post on the
Tagus* and breaks down the bridge of Alnjamz. * * * Pag* 1
CHAPTER II.
Operations in A ragon Confusion in Xaragoaa Tho third and fifth corps invest
that city -^-Fortification dttfccribod Motito Torrero taken Attack on the suburb
repulsed* Mortior takes pout at Calatnyud The convent of 8*a Joseph taken
The bridge- bead carmd Hucrba passed Dovico of the Spanish leaders to
Bttcoorag* the besieged Maquis of Lazan takes pot on the &em de Alcu-
b4*rre*-tft*iMs *rnvw fn tie French camp Reoals Mortier Lazan defeated
Galtant oxptoi^ of Wtri*oo Gallndo The walls of the town ta3un by assault
General Laconte and cotoflfcl Saa OU sUitt 17
CHAPTBE Iir*
Hyttem of tawr **The convent of St. Monica taken Spaalaxd* utt^mpt td retake
It, but fall St. Augustln taken French change their mode of attack- Spa-
niards change their mode of d*fctice -Terrible nature of the contest Convent
of JCRUR takon on the side of the suburb A ttnck of the suburb repulied
Convent of Francisco taken Mmo exploded nnder tlie university fails, and
tfe# losiogcd are rc^pulcd Tho Cosio pawed Froth mine* worked under tho
nnivflri fcy, and in six othr places French soldiers dispirited J^sjoot eacon^
rages thoxia Tho hon**>s loading down to the quay carried by *tonn Ananor-
oiOTM mfni> tmdor tKe university bt Ing sprung^ that building it citrried by
wanult Th<j suburb U t*iw>n Bftrou Vewft^o killed, aad two tiwwwimd Sp-
' nUydf wirrcjiciw-* ^cceu^ul stttadk da the right bA< Of the J&ftOPoUfox
denuLads.termi, ^ h aro refused Flw rwtune<U*M;U*Jf aU* 0adtlon of the
y Terrible ^ ^, tud hoj^blo SuffftriLogfl of ttk bwleged Zaragozn
I* CONTENTS.
OH*****'' IV,
0p*r*tk* ta
ef tfr*
t8 lathe txywti o*rned by tfag
Martyol* of Latan, vtth six thousand men, rcadnw G^tona Ixwd Coohr&zie
tttew tli Trinity Bpulsefi several assaults Citadel surrender* 6th Decem-
ber t* Cyt tixarclieB on Barcelona Crosses tho Tor Deceives Lazan .Turns
Hostatrich Befeats Milana at San Celoni Battle of Cardadeu Caldaguoa
^rcti*e* belli ad the Ldobregat ^Nogligonce of Duhesme Battlo of Molino del
Roy ...... .,.., Page 52
CHAPTER V.
Ttuomit la Tarragona* Hiding proclaimed general Reinforcements join the
a t Brucli Lazaa advmtiao*, aad fighU at Castol Ampu-
quaatiU with Reding, and marclxe towards
t, Cyr breaks Bcdiag's Uae at Llacuua Actions at Capelswlea,
ami St. Magi Frenok gftneral, unable to take the abbey of Crouz, t
, H^aiui reaches ViUara4ona Joined by Sou ham's division, takes post at Valh
and Plar <Rading rallies bus centre and left wing Endoavoura to roacL. Tara-
gwiau Battle of y alls Weak coixditioa oi Tortosa St. Cyr blockade* Tera-
goa^MSi<5itaeM in that city- St, Oyr resolves to retne* Chabrarx forte* the
bridge of Molino del JELey Conspiracy in. Barcelona fails CoUnel Bricba
arrives with a detachment from Aragon St. Cyt retires behind tfoe Llobrcgac
PuiO defeats "Wimpfen at Tarrasa Reding dies -His character Blake IB
Bppointed captain^ general of the QwomU*-~ Changes the line of operations to
Atagou-^Evaixt* m that provmce-^-Suchet talced the command of the French
l : Kfc^aragjfta* Colonel Peva&a and Baget oblige eight French companies to
*fcTW*wieru*Blalte advances Battle of Alcanitz Suchet falls back Disorder
4 his- araay Blake loeglecte Catalonia St. Cyr marches by the vnllcy of
'Coagosto upon Yich Action at the defile of Garnga Lcccla conduct* the prf-
'sonars to the Fluvia St. Cyr hears of the Austrian war Barcelona vl4jfctt*4
iKy A- Fgrettek squadron*- Observations . . , . , t *'*,', 70
, BOOK VI.
i,
I.
TftfloJW&tions to Fortugal-vState df that country N*gl*^d, by *e 1
n^ ^* JF, rtcd6dk appointed to ocKBWI* the British.
1 ' t)orona At Oporto State of this city JDusitanian legion Slat* of J
Cradoclc endeavours to reinforce Moore Mr. Villiers arrives at J
Pikes given to the populace Dg*tiV*te fttate of the army Mr. Frerel
others, urge Ora4ock to move into Spain The reinforcements for sir J. Mo
halted at Cfeatetlo Braaco General Cameron sent to Almeida
guard rfeaehe* Merida <3radok relinquishes tha design of i
m Spa4n A and conceatnttei his- oVn troops at Saccav*m
- fc fcfebm^Drfenceless state &rr4 4j9A$e* of f^rtii^l lUUovod by sir
TABLE OF CONTEND
CHAPTER II.
French retire from Menda Send a force to Plasencia The direct intercourse
between Portugal and sir J. Moore's army interrupted Military description of
Portugal Situation of the troops Cradock again pressed, by Mr. Frere and
others, to move into Spain The ministers ignorant of the real state of affairs
Cradock hears of* Moore's advance to Sahagun Embarks two thousand men
to reinforce him Hears of the retreat to Coruna, and re-lands them Admiral
Berkely arrives at Lisbon Ministers more anxious to get possession of Cadiz
than to defend Portugal -Five thousand men, under general Sherbrooke, em*
barked at Portsmouth -Sir George Smith reaches Cadiz State of that city-
He demands troops from Lisbon General Mackenzie sails from thence,^
troops Negotiations with thejunta Mr. Frere's weak proceedings J
Cadiz Tho negotiation fails
, CHAPTER III.
"Weakness of the British army in Portugal General Cameron marches to 1
Sir R. Wilson remains near Ciudad Rodrigo Sir J. Cradock jjj*ares to
take a defensive position at Passo d'Arcos Double dealing of the regency
The populace murder foreigners, and insult tho British troops Anarchy in
Oporto British government ready to abandon Portugal Change their mten*
' tion Military system of Portugal The regency demand an English general
BorcBford is sent to them Sherbrooke's and Mackenzie's troops arrive at
Lisbon Borcsford arrives there, and takes the command of tho native force-
Change m the aspect of affair* Sir J. Cradodk encamps at Luroiar Relative
positions of tho allied and French armios Marshal Beresford desire* sir
/. Cradock to march against So ult Cradock refuses Various unwise projects
broached by different persons ....,.-. 137
CHAPTER IV.
Coruna. and Forroi surrender to Soult Ho is ordered, by the emperor, to invade
.' i*octagal' The first corps U directed to aid this operation Soult goes to St
, corp* Operations of Roman* and state
\ OHOjftttiK** hia marct Arrives m the Miaho-Occupies
Tuy, Vigo, and floatd** W frfltff l*ag> fcoatg ovee land from Guardia to Campo
Saucos Attempt* to pass the IVTuibtO--!* rtpd*d by the Portugww pus*mry
Importance of this repulse Soult clungi* h pto^5C$*oW QttrtW*^
Defeats the insurgents at Franqucra, at Ribidavia, and m th rafley of tl
AvU Lfcve his artillery and stores in Tuy Defeats the Spanish insurgents
Jn iworal places, juxd p^&par0 to invade Portugal Defenceless state of die
northern provinces of that kingdom Brnadim Frioro advances to the Cavado
river Silveira advances to Ohaves Concerts operation* : with Romana
)iiputos between the Portuguese and Spanish troops Ignorance of the
, * < , . 150
UJft
J
Jttlt
'
of the 8(>i^nls-Prtagui retreat tipcn Ch&vw Roouuw. 4% to Puebla
Senabrla Poftuju*** mutiny Thr thoiuaad thmw thjwawJra* tttto Chaves
Soalt talws that tow-Mwhfti uppu Bjt^a Forc t&* 4eftle of Ruivaeni
< *&d Vend* Kov* Tamulti and diwrden la tho ?^ngu9o oamp at
TABLE OF CONTENtffe vil
CHAPTER II.
French retire from Menda Send a force to Plasencia The direct intercourse
between Portugal and sir J. Moore's army interrupted Military description of
Portugal Situation of the troops* Cradock again pressed, by Mr. Frere and
others, to move into Spain The ministers ignorant of the real state of affairs
Cradock hears of 'Moore's advance to Sahagun Embarks two thousand men
to reinforce him Hears of the retreat to Coruna, and re-lands them Admiral
Berkely arrives at LisbonMinisters more anxious to get possession of Cadiz
than to defend Portugal Five thousand men, under general Sherbrooke, em*
barked at Portsmouth -Sir George Smith reaches Cadiz State of that city-
He demands troops from Lisbon General Mackenzie sails from thence^
troops Negotiations with the junta Mr. Frere's weak proceedings J
Cadi* The negotiation fails
CHAPTER UL
"Weakness of the British army in Portugal General Cameron marches to 'Ljpfeftn
Sir E. Wilson remains near Ciudad Rodrigo Sir J. Cradock jjj*$ares to
take a defensive position at Passo d'Arcos Double dealing of the regency
The populace murder foreigners, and insult the British troops Anarchy in
Oporto British government ready to abandon Portugal Change their mten*
' tion Military system of Portugal The regency demand an English general
Borcsford is sent to them Sherbrooke's and Mackenzie's troops arrive at
LUbon Boresford arrives there, and takes the command of the native force-
Change in the aspect of attain Sir /. Cradock encamps at Luroiar Relative
positions of tho allied and French armies Marshal Beresford desire* sir
/. Cradock to march against Soult Cradock refuses Various unwise projects
broached by different persons ....,.-. 137
CHAPTER IV.
Cortina and Forrol iarreuder to Soult Ho is ordered, by the emperor, to invade
i*ortugal' The rst corps U directed to aid this operation Soult goes to St
tetts**** fttfttd of th second co*p* Operations of Eomana and state
wawK** his *a*rcfc~* Arrives m the Mioho-Occupies
Tuy r , Vigo, and Guardht-^0fi Jaig* fcoats ove* land fwm Guardia to Campo
Buncos Attempts to pass the MiahflHfe tpd**d by th* PortugjW)** p#asantry
Importance of this repulse SouU caftng** W* pbui Ma*&w <m Owtatffe
Dofoats the insurgents at Franqucra, at Eibidavia, and m th valley of tj
Avin I^ave* hi* artillery and stores in Tuy -Defeats the Spanish insar^ents
In several places, nod prepare* to invade Portugal Defenceless state of die
northern province* of that kingdom Bmadim Frioro advances to the Cavado
river Silveira advances to ChaveflConoerts operation* : with Eomana
)iiputos between the Portuguese and Spanish troop* Ignorance of the
....... . . 156
Jolt
^ of the Span^nli-Portngudift retreat upon Chav Romww. ^ to PuebU
utiny- Thre Uicuuaiid threw tlwQiv urto Chavea
^Soolt talws that tow*-**Mwfoliti uppu
TABLE OF CONTENTS. ix
CHAPTER II.
Campaign on the Douro Relative position of the French and English armies
Sir Arthur Wellesley marches to the Vouga Sends Beresford to the Douro
A division under general Hill passes the lake of Ovar Attempt to surprise
Pranceschi fails Combat of Grijon The French re-cross the Douro and
destroy the bridge at Oporto Passage of the Douro Soult retreats upon
Amarante Beresford reaches Amarante Loison retreats from that town Sir
Arthur marches upon Braga Desperate situation of Soult His energy He
crosses the Sierra Catalina Rejoins Loison Reaches Carvalho d'Este Falls
back to Salamonde Daring action of major Dulong -The French pass the
Ponte Nova and the Sal tad or, and retreat by Montalegre Soult enters
Orense Observations Page ^11
CHAPTER III.
Rotnana surprises Villa Franca Key advances to Lugo Romans retreats to
the Asturias Reforms the government there Ney invades the Asturias by the
west Bonnet and Kellerman enter that province by the east and by the south
General Mahi flies to tho valley of the Syl Romana embarks at Gthoa
Ballasteros takes St. Andoro Defeated by Bonnet Kellennan returns to Val-
ladolid Ney marches for Coruna Carrora dofeata Maucune at St. Jago Com-
postella Mahi blockades Lugo It is relieved by Soult Jlomana rejoins his
army and marches to Orcnso Lapisse storms the bridge of Alcantara-Cuesta
advances to the Gu&diaua Lapisse retiresVictor concentrates lu army at
Torromocha - Effect of the war in Germany upon that of Spain Sir Arthur
Wellesley encamps at Abrantes The bridge of Alcantara destroyed Victor
crosses the Tagus at Almaraz~- Beresford returns to tho north of Portugal
Ney and Soult combine operations Soult scours the valleys of the Syl -
Romana cut off fnoto. Castile and thrown back upon Orense Ney advances
toward* Vigo Combat of Sun Payo Misunderstanding between him ad
SottH Ney retreat* to CorunaSoult marohw to Ziunora FranodscKi falls
tttta ifc* Iwft&f of the Caf uchino His melancholy fafca-^flFey abandons Gal-
Maria and l^lohlte * 302
State o! the British army Embarrassments of Air ArtJwnr W*Ue*>3Ni*Ut aaid
nubrs of the French armies State and numbers of the Spa^Ufe fteiefi^^
Somw aocount of ,tbe jportWw, commonly called #wrtZkwIntriguos of Mr. Fr*re
^-Conduct of Clxo central Junta Their inhuman treatment of the French pri-
soners Corruption and inoapacity State of the Portuguese army Impo-
licy of tho British government Expedition of Walchcrcn Expedition against
Italy 338
BOOK VIU.
CHAPTB&X,
Oampnign of Tilavera Choice of opmtioa Sir Arthor .Wellly Moves
into Spain Jos*ph nutrches gidnitVenegw Orders Victor to return to Ta-
Utfta^CuMtn arrivei at Ximiirtc Sir Arthur retchet PUieaci* IntwvUw
Cue*u, Plan of operatiorf arruiged Sir Arthoi, embanwed by the
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
want of provisions, detaches sir Hubert Wilson up the Vora de Pla<wncia,
passes the Tictar, and unites with Cuosta at Oroposa Skirmish at Tdlavera
Bad conduct of the SpuM^i troops Victor lakes post hohmd the ^Iborche
Cuesta's absurdity Victoi retires fiom the Alheichc -Sir .Arthur, m want of
provisions, refuses to pass thrit river Intiigues of Mr, Frere Tho junta
socretly orders Venegas not to execute his part of the operation . Page -051
CHAPTER II.
Cuesta passes the Alberche Sir Arthur Wellesloy sends two English divisions
to support himSoult is appointed to command the second, fifth, and sixth
corps He proposes to besiege Cimlad Kodnyo and threaten Lisbon He enters
Salamanca, and sends general Foy to Mndtid to concert the pl.tn of operations
The king quits Madrid Unites his whola auuy Crosses the Guadarauua
river, and attacks Cucsta Cumbnt of Al<ahon- fepauiarch fall back in confu-
sion to the Alberclie Cuusta refuses to pass that iivei Ihs dazigcious position,
The French advance Cuestu re -crosses the Tictai Ru* Ailhui Wolleslcy
draws up the combined forces on the position oi* Talavcru The kinjj, crosses
the Tictar Skirmish at Casa de Salinas- Combat on the cveniuj: of the2 7 rh~
Panic iu the Spanish army Coml.at on the morning of the 28th The king
holds a council of war Jourdan and Victoi propose different plans The King
follows that of Victor Battle of Talovcra The Fr^iuh re-cioss ihe Albeirlic
General Craufurd arrives in the English carnp Hm cxiraoidiuary inaich
Observations ......,.*,. 371
CHAPTER (II.
The king goes to Ittcseas with the fourth coips and reserve Sir R, Wilson ad-
vances to Bscalonw, Victor retires to Macjuoda Conduct of the Spaniards at
Talavcra Cuesta's cruelty The allied gnuerals har of Soult's movement
upon Banos Bassccour's division marches towards that point The pass of
Banos forced Sir A. WeUeslev. marehes against Soult Proceedings of that
marshal He cropses tho Bejar, an<l arrives at Plasenuia \\ith three cotps
d'amiC'd"- Cticsta abundous tho British hospital*}, at Taluvera, to the en<Miiy
and retreats upon Oroj/tiaa 'Dangerous position of the ;llut$ Sir Aithur
crosses tho Tagus n.t A rxobispo The French arrive near that bridge Cuosta
passes Ike Tag us Coin bat of A rssobispo- - Sonll's plans overruled by the king
Ney defeats Mr R. Wilson at Banos, und vuhmm to Fraiwo - . 404
CI1APTEU IV.
Venopjah advances to Aranjuea 8kinnihes thuie-Sclastiaiu crosses the Tagtis
at Toledo Veuc-gaf* concentrates his nriuj JlatUo of Aimonuckt Sir Arthur
Weliesloy <soutemplatfi passing the TaguH tt the I'ueiito <Iu Cardiwal^ ia pre-
vented by the ill-conduct of tho junta II IH tioujiB dtRtrrARotl for ptovisioas
He resolves to retire into Portugal Fabn charge made by Cuortta against tho
British army refuted Bercsford's proceedings Mr. Frcre superseded by lord
Welleslcy ^TIio English army abandons 111 position at Juracrijo and marches
towards Portugal Consternation, of the junta Sir A. Weltehlfsy defends his
conduct, and refuses to remain in SpainTakes a position -within the Portu-
guese frontier Sickness in thts urwy . ..... 42S
V.
General observations on the campaign Comparison btttwtfutt the opnalitms of
sir John Moore and sir A, WoHcriey .* ...... 441
TAI1LK OF CONTENTS XI
APPENDIX.
No. J. Src Sections, eonUimug the returns of the French army . Patjc 4(>5
II. Three Sections; justificatojy extracts from sir J. Moore f & and sir J.
Cradock's papeis, and fiom Parliamentary documents, illnstiatmg
the state of Spam 469
III. Seven Sections; justificatory extracts from sir J. Cradock's papers,
illustrating the state of Portugal .... 474
IV. Extracts Jtrom sn J. Crado- k's instructions . , . 485
V. Ditto from sir J, Cradock's papeis relative to a deficiency in tho sup-
ply of his troops 486
VI* Throe Sections; miscellaneous . . . 489
VII. Extiactb from Mr* Frero's correspondence . . . 4J)1
VIII Ditto hom sir JT Cradock's papery relating to Cadi/, . . 403
l\. G( neial Mackenzie's iiiurative of his proceedings *it Cadk 494
X. Tliieo Sections, extracts fronrsix J. Cradock's papers, .shewing that
Portugal w is neglected by the British cabinet . . 500
XI. State and distribution of the English troops in Portugal and Spam,
Jauuaiy 6, Apnl 6, April 22., May 1, June 25, July 25, and Sep-
tember 25, 1809 503
Till. 12 Ma^hal Beresford to sir J, Cradock 2. Sir J. Cradock to mar-
filial ttoresford 505
XIII. Justificatory extracts, relating to the conduct of marshal Moult 511
XIV, Hit Aithur Wellesley to sir J. Oradodt 513
XV. Jhtto to lord Castlereagh 514
XVI. Ditto Ditto 516
XVir. Ditto to tho marquis Wellcatey 517
XVIII. 1. General Hill to sir A. Wellealey 2. Colonel Stopford to general
Sherbrooka , . . 528
LIST OF THE PLATES,
To lw phweil toyctltw at IHUJV 40*24
No* 1 . Bicge/ of Zarago/a.
2. Operations iu Catalonia.
3. OpordtlouH of CucsLa and Victor ou the Tagus and Guadiana.
4. Pofl.sftgo of tho Oou.ro. \ ^
6, Operutiona between the Mondego and tho Mmcio.
t), Operations of marshalw Soult and Key in Gallicia.
7* Battle of Talavora,
8. Opcratioiie in tho valley of tho Tagus, August,, 1809.
NOTICE.
GENERAL SEM ELF'S journal, referred to in tins volume, is
only aft unattostod copy; the rest of the manuscript authorities
quoted or consulted are original papers belonging to, and com-
munications rcccited from, the duko of Wellington, marshal
Soultj marshal Jourdan, Mr. Stuart,* sir J. Cradock,t sir John
Moore, and other persons employed cither in the British or
French armies during the Peninsular War,
The returns of the French army arc taken from the emperor
Napoleon's original Muster-rolls,
The letter S. marks those papers received from marshal Soult.
* New lord Staart die Eothesay, t Now lord Howden.
HISTORY
OP THE
PENINSULAR WAR.
BOOK V,
CHAPTER I.
THE effect produced in England, by the unfortu- CHAP.
mite issue of sir John Moore's campaign, was not *'
in proportion with the importance of the subject
The people, trained to party politics and possessed
of no real power to rebuke the folly of the cabinet,
regarded both disasters and triumphs with factious
rather than with national feelings, and it was alike
easy to draw their attention from aifairs of weight
or to fix it upon matters of little moment. Thus,
the duke of York's conduct being at this time made
the object of parliamentary inquiry, to drag his
private frailties before the world was thought essen-
tial to the welfare of the nation, while the incapacity
which had caused England and Spain, to mourn in
tears of blood, was left unprobed. An insular peo-
ple only who are by their situation protected from
the worst evils of war would suffer themselves to be
thus deluded ; but if an unfortunate campaign were
to bring a devastating enemy into the heart of the
country, the honour of a general and the military
VOL, n. B
HISTORY OF THE
policy of the cabinet, would no longer be consi-
dered as mere subjects for a vile sophist's talent in
J09. . .
misrepresentation.
It is true that the misfortunes of the campaign
were by many orators, iu both houses of parliament
treated with great warmth, but the discussions wore
chiefly remarkable, as examples of astute eloquence
without any knowledge of facts. The opposition
speakers, eager to criminate the government, ex-
aggerated the disasters of the retreat, and compre-
hending neither the motives nor the movements of
sir John Moore, urged several untenable charges
against the ministers, who, disunited by personal
feelings, did not all adopt the same grounds of
defence. Lord Castlereagh and lord Liverpool,
passing over those errors of the cabinet which at
the outset left the general only a choice of clini-
culties, asserted, truly, that the advantages derived
from the advance to Sahagun, more than compen-
sated the loss in the subsequent retreat ; both those
statesmen also paid an honourable tribute to tlto
merits of the commander,* but Mr. Canning, unscru-
pulously resolute to screen Mr. Frcrc, assented to fcU
the erroneous statements of the opposition? a&d then
with malignant dexterity endeavoured to convert
them into charges against the fallen general. Sir
Johti BSootfc was, he said, wholly answerable lor the
campaign. Whether glorious or distressing*, whe-
ther to be admired or deplored, it was his own, he
had kept the government quite ignorant of his pro-
ceedings ! And being closely pressed on this point
by Mr. C. Hutchinson and Mr. Whitbread, Mr.
Canning deliberately repeated the assertion, yet not
long afterwards, sir John Moore's letters to the mi-
nisters, written almost daily, and furnishing exact
PKNINSULAIi WAR. ;
and copious information of all that was passing in CHAP.
the Peninsula, were laid before the house ! -
1809
While the dearest interests of the nation wore
thus treated in parliament, the ardour of the English
people for the war was somewhat abated ; yet the
Spanish cause, so rightful in itself, was still popular,
and a treaty was concluded with the supreme junta
by which the contracting powers bound themselves
to make common cause against France, and to agree
to no peace except by common consent But the
ministers although professing unbounded confidence
in the result of the struggle, already looked upon
the Peninsula as a secondary object. The warlike
preparations of Austria, and the reputation of the
archduke Charles, whose talents were foolishly said
to exceed Napoleon's, had awakened the dormant
spirit of coalitions, and it was more agreeable to the
aristocratic feelings of the English cabinet, that the
French should be defeated by a monarch in Ger-
many, than by a plebeian insurrection in Spain.
The obscure intrigues of the princess of Tour and
Taxis, and the secret societies on the continent,
emanating as they did from patrician sources, ex-
cited the sympathy of the ministers, engaged their
attention, and nourished those distempered feelings
which made them see only weakness and disafiec-
tion in France, when throughout that mighty empire,
few desired and none dared to oppose the emperor's
wishes ; when even secret discontent was confined
to some royalist chiefs, and splenetic republicans
whose influence was never felt until after Napoleon
had guttered the direst reverses.
Unable to conceive the extent of that monarch's
views, or to measure the 'grandeur of his genius,
the ministers attributed the results of his profound
B 2
HISTORY OF THE
calculations to a blind chance, his victories to trea-
son, to corruption, to any thing, but that admirable
skill, with which he wielded the most powerful
military force that ever obeyed the orders of a single
chief. Thus self-deluded, and misjudging the dif-
ficulties to be encountered, they adopted idle pro-
jects, and squandered their resources without any
great or decided effort. While negotiating with the
Spanish junta for the occupation of Cadiz, they
were planning an expedition against Italy, and
while loudly asserting their resolution to defend
Portugal reserved their principal force for a sudden
blow in Holland, their preparations being however
marked by a pomp and publicity totally unsuited to
war. With what a mortal calamity that pageant
closed, shall be noticed hereafter, at present it is
fitting, to trace the progress of those operations in
Spain, which were coincident with the retreat of
sir John Moore,
It has been already stated, that when Madrid sur-
rendered, Napoleon refused to permit Joseph to re-
turn there unless the public bodies and the heads of
families would unite to demand his restoration, and
without any mental reservation to swear fealty
to him. Registers had consequently been opened
in the different quarters of the city, and twenty-
eight thousand six hundred heads of families in-
scribed their names, and voluntarily made oath in
presence of the host, that they were sincere in their
desire to receive Joseph. After this, deputations
fr m a ^ the councils, from the junta of commerce
and money, the hall of the Alcadcs, and from the
corporation, waited on the emperor at Valladolicl,
ami being there joined by the municipality of that
town, and by deputies fvofri Astorga, Leon, and
PENINSULAR WAR
other places, presented the oath, and prayed that cH4i.
Joseph might be king. Napoleon thus entreated,
1809
consented that his brother should reassume -his Jan."
royal functions.
It would be idle to argue from this apparently
voluntary submission to the French emperor, that a
change favourable to the usurpation had been pro-
duced in the feelings of the Spanish people ; but it
is evident that Napoleon's victories and policy had
been so far effectual, that in the capital, and many
other great towns, the multitude as well as the
notables were, either from fear or conviction, sub-
missive to his will. And it is but reasonable to
suppose, that if his conquests had not been inter-
rupted by extraneous circumstances, this example
would have been generally followed, in preference
to the more glorious, but ineffectual, resistance
made by the inhabitants of those cities, whose
fortitude and whose calamities have forced from
mankind a sorrowful admiration. The cause of
Spain, at this moment, was in truth lost, if any
cause, depending upon war, which is but a suc-
cession of violent changes, can be called so ; for the
armies were dispersed, the government bewildered,
the people dismayed, the cry of resistance hushed,
and the stern voice of Napoleon, answered by the
tread of three hundred thousand French veterans,
was heard throughout the land. But the hostility
of Austria arrested the conqueror's career, and the
Spanish energy revived at the abrupt cessatipn of
his terrific warfare-
Joseph, escorted by his French guards, in num-
Jber between five and six thousand, entered Madrid
the 23d of Jaimary, He was, toweter, a king
without revenues, andlie would have been without
HISTORY OF THE
IOOK even the semblance of authority, if lie had not
been likewise nominated the emperor's lieutenant
jo/jo *
Jan.' in 'Spain, by virtue of which title he was em-
powered to move the French army at his wilL
This power was one extremely unacceptable to the
marshals, and lie would have found it difficult to
enforce it, even though he had restrained the exer-
cise to the limits prescribed by his brother ; but
disdaining to separate the general from the monarch,
l ng on- c r- k e conve y e d hi s orders to the French army, through
'nee cap- kj s Spanish ministers, and the army in its turn dis-
ictona, dained and resisted the assumed authority of men,
who, despised for their want of military knowledge,
were also suspected as favouring interests essentially
differing from those of the troops. The iron grasp,
which had compressed the pride and the ambitious
jealousy of the marshals, being thus relaxed, the
passions which ruined the patriots began to work
among their enemies, producing indeed less fatal
effects, because their scope was more circumscribed,
but sufficiently pernicious to stop the course of con-
quest. The French army, no longer a compact
body, terrible alike from its massive strength, and
its flexible activity, became a collection of inde-
pendent bands, each formidable in itself, yet, from
the disunion of the generals, slow to combine for
any great object, and plainly discovering, by irre-
gularities and insubordination, that they knew,
when a warrior, and when a voluptuous monarch
was at their head. These evils were however only
felt at a later period, and the distribution of the
troops, when Napoleon quitted Valladolid, indicated
a plan of conquest which still bore the impress of
his genius*
The first corps was quartered in La Mancha.
PENINSULAR WAR. 7
The second corps was destined to invade Portugal. CHAP.
The third and fifth corps carried on the siege of
1809*
Zaragoza. Jan.
The fourth corps remained in the valley of the
Tagus.
The sixth corps, wanting its third division, was
appointed to hold Gallicia.
The seventh corps continued always in Catalonia.
The imperial guards, halting at Vittoria, con-
tributed to the security of the great communication
with France until Zaragoza should fall, and were
yet ready when wanted for the Austrian war, because
in France they were moved in carriages.
General Dessolles, with the third division of the
sixth corps, returned to Madrid. General Bonnet,
with the fifth division of the second corps, remained
in the Montana St. Andero.
General Lapisse, with the second division of
the first corps, was sent to Salamanca, where he
was joined by Maupetit's brigade of cavalry, which
had crossed the Sierra de Bejar.
The reserve of heavy cavalry being broken up,
was distributed, by divisions, in the following
order :
Latour Maubourg's joined the first corps, Lorge's
and Lahoussaye's were attached to the second
corps. Lassalle's was sent to the fourth corps.
The sixth corps was reinforced with two brigades.
MilhaucTs division remained at Madrid, and Keller-
man's guarded the lines of communication between
Tudela, Burgos, and Palcucia.
Such therefore was the arrangement, that Madrid
being still the centre of operations, the Preach, by
a concentric movement on "that capital, could crush
every insurrection witKin the circle of their posi-
HISTORY OF THE
B P K tions ; the great masses, being kept upon the prin-
cipal roads diverging from Madrid to the extremities
of the Peninsula, intercepted all communication
between the Provinces ; and the second corps, thrust
out, as it were, beyond the circumference, and
destined, as the fourth corps had been, to sweep
round from point to point, was sure of finding a
supporting army, and a good line of retreat, at
every great route leading from Madrid to the yet
unsubdued provinces of the Peninsula. The com-
munication with France was, at the same time,
secured by the fortresses of Burgos, Pampeluna,
and St. Sebastian, and by the divisions posted at
St. Ander, Burgos, Bilbao, and Vittoria ; it was
also supported by a reserve at Bayonne. The
northern provinces were then parcelled out into
military governments the chiefs of which corre-
sponded with each other, and by the means of
moveable columns repressed every petty insurrec-
tion. The third and fifth corps, having their base
at Pampeluna, and their line of operations directed
against Zaragoza, served as an additional covering
force to the communication with France, and were
themselves exposed to no flank attacks, except from
the side of Cuen^a, where the duke of Infantado
commanded ; but that general was himself watched
by the first corps*
All the lines of correspondence, not only from
France but between the different corps, were main-
tained by fortified posts, having greater or lesser
garrisons, according to their importance. Thus
between Bayonne and Burgos there were eleven
military stations ; between Burgos and Madrid, by
road of Aranda and Somosierra, eight; eleven
MSS. O thcrs protected the more dircuitous route to the
PENINSULAR WAR. 9
capital, by Valladolid, Segovia, and the Guada-
rama, and the line between Valladolid and Zaragoza -j^
was secured by fifteen intermediate points. The
communication between Valladolid and St. Ander
contained eight posts, nino others connected the
former town with Villa Franca del Bierzo, by the
route of Benevente and Astorga, and two were
established between Benevente and Leon.
At this period, the force of the army, exclusive
of Joseph's French guards, was three hundred
and twenty-four thousand four hundred and eleven $5? v!-
men, about thirty -nine thousand being cavalry. twa **
Fifty- eight thousand men were in hospital. The
depots, governments, garrisons, posts of correspon-
dence, prisoners, and " battalions of march" com-
posed of stragglers, absorbed about twenty-five
thousand men. The remainder were tinder arms,
with their regiments, and consequently, more than
two hundred and forty thousand men were in the
field. Meanwhile the great line of communication
with France, and the military reader will do well
to mark this, the key-stone of Napoleon's system,
was protected by above fifty thousand men, whose
positions were strengthened by three fortresses and
sixty -four posts of correspondence, each more or
less fortified.
But having thus shewn the military state of the
French, it is time to proceed with the narrative of
their operations, following, as in the first volume,
a local rather than a chronological arrangement
of events.
OPERATIONS IN ESTRKMADURA AND LA MANCHA*
The defeat of Galluzio has been incidentally
touched upon before/ The duke of Dantzic ob-
HISTORY OF THE
BOOK serving, that the Spanish general pretended, with
six thousand raw levies, to defend a river line of
1809.
Jan.' forty miles, made a feint of crossing the Tagus at
Arzobispo, and then suddenly descending to Al*-
maraz, forced a passage over that bridge, on the
24th of December. He killed and wounded many
men, and captured four guns ; and so complete
was the dispersion, that for a long time after, not
a Spaniard was to be found in arms throughout Es-
tremadura. The French cavalry was following the
ons2and fugitives, when sir John Moore's advance to Sa-
hagun became known, and the pursuit ceased at
*w- Merida. The fourth corps, which had left eight
hundred men in garrison at Segovia, then occupied
Talavera and Placentia, the duke of Dantzic went
to France, and Sebastian! succeeded to his com-
mand. At this period also, the first corps, of
which Lapisse's division only had followed the
emperor to Astorga, entered Toledo without op-
position, and the French outposts were pushed
towards Cuenca, and towards the Sierra Morena.
During these events, the central junta, changing
its first design, retired to Seville, instead of Badajos,
and being continually urged, both by Mr. Stuart
and Mr. Frere, to make some effort to lighten the
pressure on the English army, ordered Palafox and
the duke of Infautado to advance; the one from
Zaragoza towards Tudela, the other from Cuenca
towards Madrid. The marquis of Palacios, who
had been removed from Catalonia, and was now,
at the head of five or six thousand levies, in the
Sierra Morena, was directed to move into La
Mancba. Meanwhile Gulluzzo, deprived of his
command, was constituted a prisoner, along with
Cuesta, Castanos, and a nutfiber of other culpable
PENINSULAR WAR.
or unfortunate officers, who, vainly demanding
judgement oa their cases, were dragged from place ^
v & 1809*
to place by the government. Cuesta was, however, Jm.
so popular in Estremadura, that the central junta,
although fearing and detesting him, were soon
forced to place him at the head of Galluzzo's fugi-
tives, part of whom had, when the pursuit ceased,
rallied behind the Guadiana, and were now, with
the aid of fresh levies, again taking the form,
rather than the consistence, of an army. This
appointment was an act of deplorable incapacity.
The moral effect was to degrade the government by
exposing its fears and weakness, and, in a military
view, it was destructive, because Cuesta was
physically and mentally incapable of command.
Obstinate, jealous, and stricken in years, he was
heedless of time, circumstances, dispositions or
fitness ; to punish with a barbarous severity, and to
rush headlong into battle, constituted, in his mind,
all the functions of a general.
The president, Florida Blanca, eighty- one years
of age, now died at Seville, and the marquis of
Astorga succeeded him, but the character of the
junta was in no manner affected by the change.
Some fleeting indications of vigour had been pro-
duced by the imminence of the danger during the
flight from Aranjuez, but a large remittance of
silver from South America having arrived at Cadi'/, N^FTa? 1 *
instantly absorbed the attention of the members, VoL l "
and the public weal was blotted from their remem-
brance ; even Mr. Frerc, ashamed of their conduct,,
appeared to acquiesce in the justness of sir John
Moore's estimate of the value of Spanish co-opera- 8CCt!0ttS *
tion.
The number of mcn'to be enrolled for the defence
2 HISTORY OF THE
BO V OK of the country had been early fixed at five hun-
dred thousand, scarcely one-third had joined their
colours. Nevertheless, considerable bodies were as-
sembling at different points, because the people,
especially those of the southern provinces, although
dismayed, were obedient, and the local authorities
at a distance from the actual scene of war, rigor-
ously enforced the law of enrolment, and sent the
recruits to the armies ; hoping thereby either to
stave the war off from their own districts, or to
have the excuse of being without fighting men,
to plead for quiet submission. The fugitive troops
also readily collected again at any given point,
partly from patriotism, partly because the French
were in possession of their native provinces, partly
that they attributed their defeats to the treachery
of their generals, and partly that, being deceived
by the gross falsehoods and boasting of the govern-
ment, they, with ready vanity, imagined that the
enemy had invariably suffered enormous losses.
In fine, for the reasons mentioned in the commence-
ment of this history, men were to be had in abun-
dance, but, beyond assembling them and appoint-
ing some incapable person to command, nothing
was done for defence. The officers, who were not
deceived, had no confidence either in their own
troops or in the government, nor were they them-
selves confided in or respected by their men : the
latter being starved, misused, and ill-handled in
the field, possessed neither the compact strength
of discipline nor the daring of enthusiasm. Under
such a system, the peasantry could not be rendered
energetic soldiers, nor were they active supporters
of the cause ; yet with a wonderful constancy they
endured for it, fatigue, sibkness, nakedness and
PENINSULAR WAK. 13
famine, displaying in all their actions, and in all
their sentiments, a distinct and powerful national
character. This constancy, although rendered Jan.'
nugatory by the vices and follies of the juntas and
leading men, hallowed the people's efforts a and
the flagitious violence of the invasion almost jus-
tified their ferocity.
Palacios, on the receipt of the orders above
mentioned, advanced, with five thousand men, to
Vilharta, in La Mancha ; the duke of Infantado,
anticipating the instructions of the junta, was
already in motion from Cuen^a, and his army, rein-
forced by the divisions of Cartoajal and Lilli, and
by fresh levies, was about twenty thousand men,
of which two thousand were cavalry. To check
the incursions of the French horsemen, the duke
had, a few days after the departure of Napoleon
from Madrid, detached general Scnra and general
Vcnegas with eight thousand infantry, and all the
horse, to scour, the country round Tarancon and
Aranjuez. The former entered Horcajacla, the
latter endeavoured to cut off a French detachment,
but was himself surprised and beaten by a very
inferior force ; nevertheless, Victor in some alarm,
withdrew his advanced posts, and, concentrating
Ruffin's and Villatte's divisions of infantry, and
Latour Maubourg's cavalry, at Villa dc Alorna, in
the vicinity of Toledo, left Vcnegas in possession
of Tarancon. But, among the Spanish generals,
mutual recriminations had succeeded this new-
failure ; the duke of Infantado possessed neither
authority nor talents to repress their disputes, and
in this untoward state of affairs, having received
the orders of the junta, 'projected a movement on
Toledo, intending to sfeize that place and Aranjuez,
4 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK to break down the bridges, and maintain the line
of the Tagus. The 10th he quitted Cuen^a, with
Jan.* ten thousand men, intending to join Venegas, who,
with the rest of the army, was at Tarancon, but
the 13th, he met a crowd of fugitives near Caras-
cosa, and heard, with equal surprise and conster-
nation, that the division under Venegas was beaten,
and the pursuers close at hand.
ROUT OF UCLES.
It appeared that Victor, ignorant of the exact
situation and intentions of the Spanish generals,
and yet uneasy at their movements, had marched
from Toledo to Ocafia the 10th, and that Venegas
then abandoned Tarancon and took post at Ucles.
The French again advanced on the 12th in two
columns, of which one, composed of Ruffin's divi-
sion and a brigade of cavalry, lost its way, and
arrived at Alcazar; the other, led by Victor
in person, arrived in front of the Spanish posi-
tion at Ucles early in the morning of the 13th.
This meeting was unexpected by either party,
but the French attacked without hesitation, and the
Spaniards, making towards Alcazar, were cut off
by Ruffin, and totally discomfited. Several thou-
sands were taken, others fled across the fields, and
one body preserving some order, marched towards
Ocana, where meeting the French pare, it received
a heavy discharge of grape, and dispersed. Of the
whole force, only one small detachment, under
general Giron, forced a passage by the road of
Carascosa, and so reached the duke of Infantado,
who immediately retreated safely to Cuen^a, as the
French cavalry was too much fatigued to pursue
him briskly. From Cuen$a the duke sent his
PENINSULAR WAR. 15
guns towards Valencia by the road of Tortola, but
marched his infantry and cavalry by Chinchilla,^
to Tobarra on the frontiers of Murcia, and then *
to Santa Cruz de Mudela, a town situated near the
entrance to the defiles of the Sierra Morena, which
he reached in the beginning of February, after a
painful and circuitous retreat of more than two
hundred miles, in a bad season ; his artillery had
been captured at Tortola, and his troops were
reduced by desertion and straggling, to a handful
of discontented officers, and a few thousand men
worn out with fatigue and misery*
Meanwhile, Victor, after scouring a part of the
province of Cuen^a and disposing of his prisoners,
made a sudden march upon Vilharta, intending to
surprise Palacios ; but that officer aware of Infan-
tado's retreat had already effected a junction with
the latter at Santa Cruz de Mudcla, wherefore the
French marshal relinquished the attempt and re-
occupied his former position at Toledo. The cap-
tives taken at Ucles were marched to Madrid,
those who were weak and unable to walk, being,
says Mr. Rocca, shot by order of Victor, because
the Spaniards had hanged some French prisoners*
If so, it was a barbarous and a shameful retaliation,
unworthy of a soldier, for what justice or propriety
is shewn in revenging the death of one innocent
person by the murder of another ?
After the French had thus withdrawn, Infantado
and Palacioa proceeded to re-organize their forces,
under the name of the Carolina Army ; and when
the levies in Grenada and other parts came up,
the duke of Albuquerque, at the head of the ca-
valry, endeavoured to surprise a French regiment
of dragoons at Mora, but the latter rallied quickly,
HISTORY OF THE
BOOK fought stoutly, and effected a retreat with scarcely
any loss. Albuquerque then retired to Consuegra,
Feb.' where he was attacked the next day by superior
numbers, and got off with difficulty. The duke
of Infantado was now displaced by the junta, and
general Urbina, Conde de Cartaojal, the new
commander, having restored some discipline, ad-
vanced to Ciudad Real and took post on the left
bank of the Upper Guadiana. From thence he
opened a communication with Cuesta, whose army
had been encreased to sixteen thousand men, of
which three thousand were cavalry : for the
Spaniards suffered more in flight than in action,
and the horsemen escaping with little damage, were
more easily rallied, and in greater relative numbers
than the infantry. With these forces, Cuesta had
advanced to the Tagus, after Moore's march upon
Sahaguu had drawn the fourth corps across that
river, the French, however, by fortifying an old
tower, still held the bridge of Arzobispo, and
Cuesta extending his line from the mountains in
front of that place, to the Puerto de Mirabete,
broke down the bridge of Almaraz, a magnificent
structure, the centre arch of which was above one
hundred and fifty feet high.
In these positions both sides remained tranquil in
La Mancha, and in Estremadura, aud so ended the
Spanish exertions to lighten the pressure upon the
British army ; two French divisions of infantry,
and as many brigades of cavalry, had more than
sufficed to baffle them, and thus it is made clear,
that the southern provinces were in very imminent
danger, and owed their safety to the vigorous
operations of sir John" Moore, which drew the
emperor to the north,
I'ENINSULAK WAR, 17
CHAPTER II.
CONTINUATION OF THE OPERATIONS IN ARAGOtf,
FROM the field of battle at Tudela, all the fugi- CHAP,
ii.
tives from O'Neil's, and a great part of those from .
Castanos's army, fled to Zaragoza, and with such
speed as to bring the first news of their own disaster.
With the troops, also, came an immense number of
carriages, and the military chests, for the roads
were wide and excellent, and the pursuit was slack.
The citizens and the neighbouring peasantry were
astounded at this quick and unexpected calamity.
They had, with a natural credulity, relied on the
boasting promises of their chiefs, and being neces-
sarily ignorant of the true state of affairs, never
doubted that their vengeance would be sated by a
speedy and complete destruction of the French,
When their hopes were thus suddenly blasted, when
they beheld troops from whom they expected nothing
but victory, come pouring into the town with all
the tumult of panic, when the peasants of all the
villages through which the fugitives passed, came
rushing into the city along with the scared multitude
of flying soldiers and camp followers, every heart
was filled with consternation, and the date of Zara*
goza's glory would have ended with the first siege,
if the success at Tudela had been followed up by
the French with that celerity and vigour which the
occasipn required.
VOL. ii.
p HISTORY OF THE
BOOK. Napoleon, foreseeing that this moment of confu-
* sion and terror would arrive, had, with his usual
pp^fdix, prudence, provided the means, and given directions
01 lt for such an instantaneous and powerful attack as
would inevitably have overthrown the bulwark of
the eastern provinces. But the sickness of marshal
Lasnes, the difficulty of communication, the conse-
quent false movements of Moncey and Ney, in fine,
the intervention of fortune, omnipotent as she is in
war, baffled the emperor's long-sighted calculations;
the Spanish leaders had time to restore order
amongst the multitude, to provide stores, to com-
plete the defensive works ; and by a ferocious exer-
cise of power, they insured implicit obedience, for
the danger of resisting the enemy appeared light
when a suspicious word or gesture was instantly
punished by death.
The third corps having missed th'e favourable
moment for a sudden assault, and being reduced by
sickness, by losses in battle, and by detachments,
Mttsterroii to seventeen thousand four hundred men, including
Reach ^ e engineers and artillery, was too weak to invest
w!a$ y ' *^ e c *ty * n f rnl an d therefore, remained in obser-
vation on the Xalon river while a battering train of
sixty guns, with well-furnished pares, which had
been by Napoleon's orders previously collected in
Pampeluna, was carried to Tudela and embarked
upon the canal leading to Zaragoza. Marshal
Mortier, with the fifth corps, being directed to
assist in the siege, marched to join Moncey, but lie
also was arrested by sir John Moore's advance
towards Burgos, so wide was the scope of that
general's operation ; but .when that was determined
by Napoleon's counter-movement, Mortier resumed
his march to re-inforce Moncey, and, on the 20th
PENINSULAR W^k. 1 9
of December, 1808, their united corps, forming CHAP.
an army of thirty-five thousand men of all arms, -
advanced against Zaragoza. At this time, however,
confidence had been restored in the town, the
preparations necessary for a vigorous defence were J^
completed, and the obstacles opposed to the French
were not like those of the first siege. The nature Mss -
of the plain in which the city is situated, the
course of the river, the peculiar construction of the
houses, and the multitude of convents remained
the same, but at that time little assistance had been
derived from science ; now instructed by experience
and inspired as it were by the greatness of their
resolution, neither the rules of art nor the resources
of genius were neglected by the defenders. Zara-
gom was on every side fortified and presented four
irregular fronts.
The first, reckoning from the right of the town,
extended from the Ebro to a convent of bare-footed
Carmelites, and was about three hundred yards
wide.
The second, twelve hundred yards in extent,
reached from the Carmelite to a bridge over the
Huerba.
The third, likewise of twelve hundred yards,
stretched from this bridge to an oil manufactory
built beyond the walls.
The fourth, on an opening of four hundred
yards, reached from the oil manufactory to the
Ebro.
The first front, consisting of an ancient wall, Rogniat
was flanked by the guns on the Carmelite, and
strengthened by new batteries and ramparts, and
by the Castle of Aljaferia, commonly called the
Castle of the Inquisition ; this was a square fort
c 2
HISTORY OF THE
BOOK which standing a little in advance had a bastion
- and tower at each corner and a good stone ditch,
DOC. and it was connected with the body of the place by
walls loopholed for musketry.
The second front was defended by a double
rampart, the exterior one of recent erection ; it
was faced with sun-dried bricks, and covered by a
ditch with perpendicular sides, fifteen feet deep
and twenty feet wide. The flanks of this front
were formed by the convent of the Carmelites, by
a large circular battery standing in the centre of
the line, by a fortified convent of the Capuchins,
called the Trinity, and by some earthen works pro-
tecting the head of the bridge over the Huerba.
The third front covered by the river Huerba, the
deep bed of which was close to the foot of the
ramparts, was then formed. Behind the stream a
double entrenchment was carried from the bridge
head to the large projecting convent of Santa
Engracia, a distance of two hundred yards ; Santa
Engracia itself was very strongly fortified and
armed, and, from thence to the oil manufactory,
the line of defence was prolonged by an ancient
Moorish wall, on which several terraced batteries
were raised, to sweep all the space between the
rampart and the Huerba. These batteries, and the
guns in the convent of Santa Engracia, likewise
overlooked some works raised to protect a second
bridge, that crossed the river, about cannon-shot
below the first.
Upon the right bank of the Huerba, and a little
below the second bridge, stood the isolated con-
vent of San Joseph the walls of which had been
strengthened and protected by a deep ditch with a
covered way and palisade. It was well placed, as
PEN1NSULAE WAR. 21
an advanced work, to impede the enemy's approach, CHAP.
and to facilitate sallies on the right bank of the . , . .,'
river, and it was open in the rear, to the fire from SBC!"
the works at the second bridge, both being over-
looked by the terraced batteries, and by the guns
of Santa Engracia.
The fourth front was protected, by the Huerba,
by the continuation of the old city wall, by new
batteries and entrenchments, and by several armed
convents and large houses.
Beyond the walls, the Monte Torrero, which
commanded all the plain of Zaragoza, was crowned
by a large ill-constructed fort, raised at the distance
of eighteen hundred yards from the convent of San
Joseph. This work was covered by the royal canal,
the sluices of which were defended by some field-
works open to the fire of the fort itself*
On the left bank of the Ebro the suburb, built
in a low marshy plain, was protected by a chain of
redoubts and fortified houses. Some gun-boats,
manned by seamen from the naval arsenal of Car-
thagena, competed the circuit of defence, but the
artillery of the place was of too small a calibre ;
there were only sixty guns carrying more than
twelve-pound balls, and there were but eight large
mortars : there was, however, no want of small
arms, and colonel Doyle had furnished many En-
glish musquets.
These were the regular external defences of
Zaragoza, most of which were constructed at the
time, according to the skill and means of the en-
gineers ; but the experience of the former siege
had taught the people not to trust to the ordinary
resources of art, and, with equal genius and reso*
J2 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK lution, they had prepared an internal system of de-
. fence infinitely more efficacious*
It has been already observed that the houses of
Zaragoza were fire-proof, and generally of only
two stories, that in all the quarters of the city the
massive convents and churches rose like castles
above the low buildings, and that the greater streets
running into the broad-way called the Cosso divided
the town into a variety of districts, unequal in size,
but each containing one or more large structures.
Now the citizens, sacrificing all personal conveni-
ence and resigning all idea of private property,
gave up their goods, their bodies, and their houses
to the war, and being promiscuously mingled with
the peasantry and the regular soldiers, the whole
formed one mighty garrison well suited to the vast
fortress into which Zaragoza was transformed. For
the doors and windows of the houses were built
up, their fronts were loop-holed, internal communi-
cations were broken through the party walls, the
streets trenched and crossed by earthen ramparts
were mounted with cannon, and every strong buil-
ding was turned into a separate fortification ; there
was no weak point, because there could be node in
a town which was all fortress, and where the space
covered by the city, was the measurement for the
thickness of the ramparts.
Nor i& this emergency were the leaders unmind-
ful of moral force. The people were cheered by a
constant reference to the former successful resist-
ance, their confidence was raised by the contem-
plation of the vast works that had been executed,
and it was recalled to their recollection that the
wet usual at that season of the year, would soon
PENINSULAR WAR, 23
spread disease among the enemy's ranks, impairing, CHAP.
if not entirely frustrating, his efforts. Neither was
the aid of superstition neglected : processions im- iL.'
posed upon the sight, false miracles bewildered the
imagination, and terrible denunciations of the divine
wrath shook the minds of men, whose former habits
and present situation rendered them peculiarly sus-
ceptible of such impressions. Finally, the leaders
were themselves so prompt and terrible in their
punishments, that the greatest cowards were likely
to show the boldest bearing in their wish to escape
suspicion.
To avoid the danger of any great explosion the
powder was made as occasion required, which was
the more easily effected, because Zaragoza con-
tained a royal depot and refinery for saltpetre and
there were powder-mills in the neighbourhood
which furnished workmen familiar with the process.
The houses and trees beyond the walls were all
demolished and cut down, and the materials carried
into the town j the public magazines contained six
months' provisions, the convents were well stocked,
and the inhabitants had laid up their own stores for
several months ; general Doyle also sent a convoy
into the town from the side of Catalonia, and there
was abundance of money, because, ia addition to
the resources of the town, the military chest of
Castanos's army, which had been filled only the
night before the battle of Tudela, was, in the
flight, carried to Zaragoza. To attend the hospitals
and to carry provisions and ammunition to the cowr Doyle's
i * j. f 11 i Corremon-
batants, some companies of women were carolled, dence,Ms.
and they were commanded by the ceunteps of
Burita, a lady of heroic miu<J, who is said to have
{4 HISTORY OF TlIE
BOOK displayed the greatest intelligence and the noblest
. character during both sieges.
There were thirteen engineer officers, eight hun-
dred sappers and miners, composed of excavators
formerly employed on the canal, and from fifteen
hundred to two thousand cannoneers. The regular
*i S agoza. troops that fled from Tudela, being joined by two
small divisions, which had retreated at the same
time from Sanguessa and Caparosa, amounted to
thirty thousand men ; these joined with the inhabi-
tants and peasantry, formed a mass of fifty thou-
sand combatants, who, with passions excited almost
to phrensy, awaited an assault amidst those mighty
entrenchments, where each man's home was a
fortress and his family a garrison. To besiege, with
only thirty-five thousand men, a city so prepared
was truly a gigantic undertaking !
SECOND SIEGE OF ZARAGOZA.
The 20th of December, Moncey and Mortier,
having established their hospitals and magazines at
ogniat. Alagon on the Xalon, advanced in three columns
against Zaragoza.
The first, composed of the infantry of the third
corps, marched by the right bank of the canal.
The second, composed of general Suchet's divi-
sion of the fifth corps, marched between the canal
and the Ebro.
The third, composed of General Gazan's division
of infantry, crossed the Ebro opposite to Tauste,
and from thence made an oblique march to the
Gallego river.
The right and centre columns arrived in front of
the town that evening, and the latter, after driving
PENINSULAR WAE. 25
back the Spanish advanced guards, halted at a dis- CHAP.
tance of a league from the Capuchin convent of the I
Trinity ; the former took post on both sides of the ^
Huerba, seized the aqueduct by which the canal is
carried over that river, and then proceeded, in*
pursuance of Napoleon's orders, to raise batteries,
and make dispositions for an immediate assault on
Monte Torrero. Meanwhile general Gazan, with
the left column, marching by Cartejon and Zuera,
reached Villa Nueva, on the Gallego river, without
encountering an enemy.
At day-break on the 2 1 st, the French attacked
the Monte Torrero, which was defended by five
thousand men under general St, Marc. The atten-
tion of the Spaniards was attracted by one column,
while a second, unseen, crossed the canal under
the aqueduct, and penetrating between the city
and the fort, entered the latter by the rear ; at the
same time a third column stormed the works pro-
tecting the grand sluices, and these sudden attacks,
together with the loss of the fort, threw the Cavalhcro >
Spaniards into such confusion, that they retired
hastily to the city, which so enraged the plebeian
leaders that the life of St. Marc was with difficulty
saved by Palafox.
It had been concerted among the French that
general Gazan should assault the suburb, simulta-
neously with the attack on the Torrero, and that
officer, having encountered a body of Spanish and
Swiss troops placed somewhat in advance drove
the former back so quickly, that the Swiss, unable
to make good their retreat, were, to the number of
three or four hundred, killed or taken. But not-
withstanding this fortunate commencement, Gazan Kogmat.
did not attack the suburb itself until after the
26 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK affair at Monte Torrero was over, and ttien only
upon a single point without any previous examina-
tion of the works ; hence the Spaniards, recovering
from their first alarm, reinforced this point, and
Gazan was forced to desist, with the loss of four
hundred men. This important failure more than
balanced the success against the Monte Torrero ; it
restored the shaken confidence of the Spaniards at
a most critical moment, and checking in the French,
at the outset, that impetuous spirit, that impulse of
victory, which great generals so carefully watch and
improve, threw them back upon the tedious and
chilling process of the engineer.
The 24th of December the investment of Zara-
goza was completed on both sides of the Ebro*
Gazan occupied the bridge over the Gallego with
his left, and covered his front from sorties, by
inundations and cuts, which the low marshy plain
where he was posted enabled him to make without
difficulty.
General Suchet occupied the space between the
Upper Ebro and the Huerba*
Morlot's division of the 3d corps encamped in
the broken hollow that formed the bed of that
stream.
Meusnier's division crowned the Monte Torrero*
General Grandjean continuing the circuit to the
Lower Ebro, communicated with Gazan's post on
the other side.
Several Spanish** detachments that haJ been sent
out to forage were thus cat off, and could never
re-enter the town, and a bridge of boats constructed
on the Upper Ebro completed the circle of invest-
raentj insuring a free intercourse between the
different quarters of the army.
PENINSULAR WAR, 27
General Lacoste, an engineer of reputation, and CHIP.
aid-de-camp to the Emperor, directed the siege.
His plan was, that one false and two real attacks
should be conducted by regular appi caches on the
right bank of the Ebro, and he still hoped to take
the suburb by a sudden assault. His trenches were
opened the night of the 29th, the 30th the place
was summoned, and, the terms dictated by Napo-
leon when he was at Aranda de Duero being offered,
the example of Madrid was cited to induce a
surrender. Palafox replied, that If Madrid had
surrendered, Madrid had been sold : Zaragoza would
neither be sold nor surrender ! On the receipt of
this haughty answer the attacks were commenced,
the right being directed against the convent of San
Joseph, the centre against the upper bridge over
t'le Huerba, the left, which was the false one,
against the castle of Aljaferia.
The 31st the Spaniards having made sorties
against all these attacks, were beaten on the right
and centre with loss, and they were likewise re-
pulsed on the left ; but some of their cavalry, gliding
between the French parallel and the Ebro, surprised
a post of infantry stationed behind the ditches that
intersected the low ground on the bank of that
river. This trifling success exalted the enthusiasm
of the besieged, and Palafox gratified his personal
vanity by boasting proclamations, some of which
bore the marks of genius, though the greater part
were ridiculous.
On the 1st of January the second parallels of the
true attacks were commenced, and the next day
Palafox causing the attention of the besiegers to be
occupied on the right bank of the Ebro by slight
skirmishes, made a serious attack from the side of
J8 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK the suburb on Gazan's lines of contrevallation,
! This sally was repulsed with loss, but that on the
Jaa?' right bank obtained some success*
Marshal Moncey being now called to Madrid,
Junot assumed the command of the third corps,
and, about the same time, marshal Mortier was
directed to take post at Calatayud, with Suchet's
division, for the purpose of securing the communi-
cation with Madrid. The gap in the circle of in-
vestment left by this draft of eight thousand men,
being but scantily stopped by extending Morlot's
division, a line of contrevallation was constructed
at that part to supply the place of numbers ; mean-
while the besieged, hoping and expecting each day
that the usual falls of rain would render the be-
siegers' situation intolerable, continued their fire
briskly, and worked counter approaches to the
right of the French attacks : but the season was
unusually dry, and a thick fog rising each morning
covered the besiegers' advances and protected their
workmen, both from the fire and from the sorties of
the Spaniards.
On the 10th of January, thirty-two pieces of
French artillery battered in breach, both the con-
vent of San Joseph and the head of the second
bridge on the Huerba, and the town also was
bombarded. San Joseph was so much injured by
this fire that the Spaniards, resolving to evacuate it,
withdrew their guns ; nevertheless, two hundred of
their men making a vigorous sally at midnight,
pushed close up to the French batteries, but being
taken in flank with a discharge of grape, retired,
with loss of half their number,
The llth, the besiegers' batteries having con-
tinued to play ou San Joseph, the breach became
PENINSULAR WAR. 29
practicable, and, at four o'clock in the evening, CTUP.
some companies of infantry, with two field-pieces, "
attacked it by the right, while a column was kept
in readiness to assail the front when this attack
should have shaken the defence ; two other com-
panies of chosen men were directed to search for
an entrance by the rear, between the fort and the
river, and the defences of the convent were now
reduced to a ditch eighteen feet deep, with a
covered way, which falling back on both flanks to
the Huerba, extended along the bank for some dis-
tance. This covered way was occupied by a con-
siderable number of men, but when some French
guns raked it from the right, the Spaniards crossed
the bed of the river in confusion, and took refuge
in the" town. At that moment the front of the
convent was assaulted, and though the depth of the
ditch and the Spanish fire checked the assailants a
moment, the chosen companies, passing round the
works, soon found a small bridge, and entered by
the rear, the next instant the front was stormed
and the defenders were all killed or taken. The
French, who had suffered but little in this assault,
immediately lodged themselves in the convent,
raised a rampart along the edge of the Huerba,
and commenced batteries, against the body of the
place and against the works at the head of the
upper bridge, from whence, as well as from the
town, they were incommoded by the fire that
played into the convent.
The 15th, the bridge-head, in front of Santa
Engracia, being carried with the loss of only three
men, the Spaniards cut the bridge itself, and sprung
a mine under the works ; but the explosion occa-
sioned no mischief, aud the third parallels being
30 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK soon completed, the trenches of the two attacks
! were united, and the defences of the besieged were
jin!' confined to the town itself; they could no longer
make sallies on the right bank of the Huerba with-
out overcoming the greatest difficulties. The pas-
sage of the Huerba was then effected by the French,
breaching and counter-batteries, mountingfifty pieces
of artillery, were constructed against the body of the
place, and as the fire also reached the bridge over
the Ebro, the communication between the suburb
and the town was interrupted.
Unshaken by this ^aspect of affairs, the Spanish
leaders, with great readiness of mind, immediately
forged intelligence of the defeat of the emperor,
and with the sound of music, amidst the shouts of
the populace, proclaimed the names of the marshals
who had been killed. They asserted, also, that Pa-
lafox's brother, the marquis of Lazan, was already
wasting France, and this intelligence, extravagant
as it was, met with implicit credence, for such was
the disposition of the Spaniards throughout this
war, that the imaginations of the chiefs were taxed
to produce absurdities proportionable to the credu-
lity of their followers* Thus the boasting of the
leaders and the confidence of the besieged, aug-
mented as the danger increased, and their anticipa-
tions of victory seemed realized when the night-
fires of a succouring force were discerned, blazing
on the hills behind Gazan's troops. The diffi-
culties of the French were indeed fast increasing,
for while enclosing Zaragoza, they were them-
selves encircled by insurrections, and their sup-
plies so straitened that famine was felt in their
camp. Disputes amongst the generals also dimi-
nished the vigour of the operations, and the bonds
PENINSULAR WAR. 31
of discipline being relaxed, the military ardour of crnp.
the troops naturally became depressed. The sol- '
diers reasoned openly upon the chances of success,
which, in times of danger, is only one degree
removed from mutiny*
Exceedingly favourable also to the Spaniards
was the country about Zaragoza, for the town,
although situated in a plain, is surrounded at some
miles' distance by high mountains, and to the south,
the fortresses of Mequinenza and Lerida afforded
a double base of operations for any forces that
might come from Catalonia and Valencia. The
besiegers drew their supplies from Pampeluna, and
their line of operation running through Alagon,
Tudela, and Caparosa, was harassed by the insur-
gents, who were in considerable numbers, on the
side of Epila and in the Sierra de Muela, threaten-
ing Alagon, while others, descending from the
mountains of Soria, menaced the important point
of Tudela, The marquis of Lazan also, anxious
to assist his brother, had drafted five thousand
men from the Catalonian army, and taking post in
the Sierra de Licifiena, or Alcubierre, on the left
of the Ebro, drew together all the armed peasantry
of the valleys as high as Sanguessa ; extending his
line from Villa Franca on the Ebro to Zuera on the
Gallego, he hemmed in the division of Gazan, and
sent detachments as far as Caparosa, to harass the
French convoys coming from Pampeluaa* Mean-
while to maintain their communications and to
procure provisions, the besiegers had placed be*
tween two or three thousand men in Tudela, Oapa*
rosa, and Tafalla, some hundreds in Alagon and at
Mo&talbarra, and between -the latter towrt and the
investing army, six huudred and fifty cavalry were
32 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK stationed ; a like number were posted at Santa Fe
! to watch the openings of the Sierra de Muela ;
January, finally sixteen hundred cavalry and twelve hundred
infantry, under the command of general Wathier,
were pushed towards the south as far as Fuentes.
Wathier, falling suddenly upon an assemblage of
four or five thousand insurgents at Belchite, dis-
persed them, and then taking the town of Alcanitz,
established himself there, in observation, for the
rest of the siege. Lazan, however, still maintained
himself in the Alcubierre, and in this state of affairs
marshal Lasnes, having recovered from his long
sickness, arrived before Zaragoza, and took the
supreme command of both corps on the 22d of
January. The influence of his firm and vigorous
character was immediately perceptible. Recalling
Suchet's division from Calatayud, where it had
been lingering without necessity, he sent it across
the Ebro, ordered Mortier to attack Lazan, and at
the same time directed a smaller detachment against
the insurgents in Zuera, meanwhile, repressing all
disputes, he restored discipline in the army, and
pressed the siege with infinite resolution.
The detachment sent to Zuera defeated the in-
surgents, and took possession of that place and of
the bridge over the Gallego. Mortier encountered
the Spanish advanced guard at Perdeguera, and
pus]i$d it back to Nuestra Senora de Vagallar,
where the main body, several thousand strong, was
posted, and where, after a short fight, he defeated
it, took four guns, and then spreading his troops
in a half circle, extending, from Huesca, to Pina
on the Ebro, awed the country between those places
and Zaragoza, and checked further insurrection.
These actions' gave the besiegers greater freedom,
PENINSULAR WAR. 33
but before Lasnes arrived, the besieged being much CHAP.
galled by a mortar battery, situated behind the
second parallel of the centre attack, one Mariano January.
Galindo undertook, with eighty volunteers, to si-
lence it. He surprised the guard of the trenches,
and entered the battery, but the French reserve
arrived in his front, the guard of the trenches
rallied, and, thus surrounded, Galindo, fighting
bfavely, was wounded and taken, and his comrades
perished, with as much glory as simple soldiers
can attain to.
After this noble action the armed vessels in the
river attempted to flank the batteries raised against
the Aljaferia, but the French guns obliged them to
retire, and the besiegers' works being carried over
the Huerba, in the nights between the 21st and
2(fth of January, the third parallels of the true
attack were completed. The oil manufactory, and
other advantageous posts, on the left bank of that
river, were then incorporated with the lines of ap-
proach, and the second parallel of the false attack
was commenced at one hundred and fifty yards
from the Aljaferia. These advantages were, how-
ever, not obtained without pain, for the Spaniards
frequently sallied, spiked two guns, and burnt a
post on the right of the besiegers' line. However,
the French fire now broke the walls rapidly ; two
practicable breaches were opened in front of the San
Joseph, a third was commenced in the Santa Augus-
tino, facing the oil manufactory, a broad way was
made into the Santa Engracia, and at twelve o'clock
on the 29th of January, four chosen columns
rushing forth from the trenches, burst upon the
ruined walls of Zaragoza. '
On the right, the assailants twice stormed an
VOL, n, u
34 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK isolated stone house that defended the breach of
Saint Augustin, and twice they were driven back
with loss. In the centre, regardless of two small
mines that exploded at the foot of the walls, they
carried the breach fronting the oil manufactory,
and then endeavoured to break into the town ; but
the Spaniards retrenched within the place, opened
such a fire, of grape and musquetry, that the
French were finally content to establish themselves
on the summit of the breach, and to connect their
lodgement with the trenches by new works. The
third column was more successful ; the breach was
carried, and the neighbouring houses also, as far
as the first large cross street ; beyond that, the
French could not penetrate, but they were enabled
to establish themselves within the walls of the town,
and immediately brought forward their trenches, so
as to comprehend the lodgement within their works.
The fourth column, composed of the Polish sol-
diers of the Vistula, vigorously stormed the San
Engracia and the convent adjoining it, and then,
unchecked by the fire from the houses, and un-
daunted by the explosion of six small mines planted
on their path, swept the ramparts to the left, as far
as the first bridge on the Huerba. The guards of
the trenches, excited by this success, rushed for-
ward tunmltuously, mounted the walls, bayonetted
the artillery men at the guns iu the Capuchin, and
then continuing their career, endeavoured, some
to reach the semicircular battery and the Mi$ori~
cordia, others to break into the city. But this wild
assault was soon checked, by grape from two guns
planted behind a traverse on the ramparts, and by
a murderous fire from the houses, and as the ranks
of the assailants were thinfied, their ardour sunk,
PENINSULAR WAR. 35
while the courage of their adversaries increased. n
The French were driven back upon the Capuchins,
and the Spaniards were already breaking into that January.
convent in pursuit, when two battalions, detached
by general Morlot from the trenches of the false
attack, arrived and secured possession of that point,
which was moreover untenable by the Spaniards,
inasmuch as the guns of the convent of Santa En-
gracia saw it in reverse. The French lost, on this
day, more than six hundred men, but La Coste
immediately abandoned the false attack against
the castle, fortified the Capuchin convent and a
house situated at an angle of the wall abutting
upon the bridge over the Huerba, and then join-
ing them to his trenches with fresh works, made
the ramparts of the town the front line of the
besiegers.
The walls of Zaragoza thus went to the ground,
but Zaragoza herself remained erect, and as the
broken girdle fell from the heroic city, the besiegers
started at the view of her naked strength. The
regular defences had, indeed, crumbled before the
skill of the assailants, but the popular resistance
was immediately called, with all its terrors, into
action; and, as if Fortune had resolved to mark
the exact moment when the ordinary calculations
of science should cease, the chief engineers on
both sides were simultaneously slain- The French
general, La Costc, a young man, intrepid, skilful,
and endowed with genius, perished like a brave
soldier. The Spanish colonel, San Geois, died,
not only with the honour of a soldier* but the glory
of a patriot. Falling in the noblest cause, his
blood stained the^ramparts' which he had himself
raised for the protection of his native place.
36 HISTORY OF THE
CHAPTER III.
BOOK rp nE war k^g, now j n the streets of Zaragoza,
~~[^ the sound of the alarm-bell was heard in every
February, quarter, the people crowded into the houses nearest
to the lodgements of the enemy, additional barricades
were constructed across the principal thoroughfares,
mines were prepared in the more open spaces, and
the internal communications from house to house
were multiplied, until they formed a vast labyrinth,
the intricate windings of which, were only to be
traced by the weapons and the clear! bodies of the
defenders. The junta, become more powerful from
the cessation of regular warfare, urged the defence
with redoubled energy, yet increased the horrors of
the siege, by a ferocity pushed to the verge of
frenzy, for every person who excited the suspicions
of these furious men, or of those immediately about
them, was instantly put to death. Amidst the
o. noble bulwarks of war, a horrid array of gibbets
was seen, on which crowds of wretches were each
night suspended, because their courage sunk under
accumulating dangers, or that some doubtful ex-
pression, some gesture of distress, had been mis-
construed by their barbarous chiefs.
From the height of the walls which he had con-
quered, Lasnes contemplated this terrific scene, and
judging that men so passionate, and so prepared,
could not be prudently encountered in open battle,
PENINSULAR WAE. 37
he resolved to proceed by the slow, certain process
of the mattock and the mine. This also was in
1809
unison with the emperor's instructions, and hence
until the 2d of February, the efforts of the French
were directed to the enlargement of their lodge-
ments on the ramparts, an object only to be effected
by severe fighting, by explosions, and by working
through the nearest houses, and they sustained
many counter-assaults, of which the most noted
and the fiercest was made by a friar on the Capu-
chins' convent.
It has been already observed, that the large
streets divided the town into certain small districts,
or islands of houses. To gain possession of these,
it was necessary not only to mine but to fight for
each house; and to cross the great intersecting streets
it was indispensable to construct traverses above, or
to work by underground galleries, for a Spanish
battery raked each street, and each house was de-
fended by a garrison that, generally speaking, had
only the option, of repelling the enemy in front or
dying on the gibbet erected behind. As long as
the convents and churches remained in possession
of the Spaniards, the progress of the French among
the islands of small houses was of little advantage
to them ; the strong garrisons in the greater build-
ings, enabled the defenders, not only to make con-
tinual and successful sallies, but to countermine
their enemies, whose superior skill in that kind of
warfare, was often frustrated by the numbers and
persevering energy of the besieged. To remedy
this inconvenience, the batteries opposite the fourth
front breached the convents of Augustin and Santa
Monica, and the latter had' been taken the 31st of
January ; for while th*e attack was hot, a part of
38 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK the wall in another direction was blown in by a
- petard, and the besiegers pouring through took the
February, main breach in rear, cleared the convent and se-
veral houses behind it. The Spaniards immediately
opened a gallery from the Augustins and worked a
mine that night under Santa Monica, but the French
discovering it stifled the miners, and the next day
the breach in the Augustin becoming practicable,
the attention of the defenders was draWn to it, while
the French springing a mine, which they had car-
ried under the wall, from the side of Santa Monica,
entered by the opening. The Spaniards thus again
unexpectedly taken in the rear were easily driven
out, yet rallying a few hours after, they attempted
to retake the structure. The besiegers then broke
into the neighbouring houses, and at one push,
reached the point where the Quemada-street joined
the Cosso, but the Spaniards renewed the combat
with such a fury, that the French were finally
beaten out of the houses, and lost more than two
hundred men. At the same time on the side of
San Engracia a contest still more severe took place ;
the houses in the vicinity were blown up, yet the
Spaniards fought so obstinately for the ruins, that
the Polish troops were scarcely able to make good
their lodgement although two successive and
powerful explosions had, with the buildings, de-
stroyed a number of the defenders.
The experience of these attacks induced a change
in the mode of fighting on both sides. Hitherto
the play of the French mines had reduced the
houses to ruins, leaving the soldiers exposed to the
fire from the next Spanish posts ; the engineers,
therefore, diminished the quantity of powder, that
the interior only might fall find the outward walls
PENINSULAR WAR. 39
stand. This method was found successful, but the C 5 ? '
Spaniards, with ready ingenuity, saturated the tim
bers of the houses with rosin and pitch, and setting
fire to those which could no longer be maintained,
interposed a burning barrier which often delayed
the assailants for two days, and always prevented
them from pushing their successes during the con-
fusion that necessarily followed the bursting of the
mines. The fighting was, however, incessant; a
constant bombardment, the explosion of mines, the
crash of falling buildings, clamorous shouts, and
the continued echo of musquetry deafened the ear,
while volumes of smoke and dust clouding the atmo-
sphere, lowered continually over the heads of the
combatants, as hour by hour, the French, with a
terrible perseverance, pushed forward their ap-
proaches to the heart of the miserable but glorious
city.
Their efforts were chiefly directed from two
points, namely, San Engracia, which may be de-
nominated the left attack, and Saint Augustin,
which constituted the right attack. At San En-
gracia they laboured on a line perpendicular to the
Cosso, from which they were only separated by the
large convent of the Daughters of Jerusalem, and
by the hospital for madmen, which was entrenched,
although in ruins, after the first siege. The line of
this attack was protected on the left by the convent
of the Capuchins, which La Coste had fortified to
repel the counter-assaults of the Spaniards. The
attack from the Augustin was more diffused, be-
cause the localities presented less prominent features
to determine the direction of the approaches, but
the French having mounted a number of light
six-inch mortars, on peculiar carriages, drew thorn
40 IIJSTORY OF THE
from street to street, and house
casion offered. On the other hand the Spaniards
BOOK from street to street, and house to house, as oc-
'. continually plied their enemies with hand grenades,
which seem to have produced a surprising effect.
In this manner the never-ceasing combat was pro-
longed until the 7th of February, when the be-
siegers, by dint of alternate mines and assaults, had
worked their perilous way at either attack to the
Cosso, yet not without several changes of fortune
and considerable loss ; and they were unable to ob-
tain a footing on that public walk, for the Spaniards
still disputed every house with undiminished reso-
lution, ^Meanwhile, Lasnes having caused trenches
to be opened on the left bank of the Ebro, played
twenty guns against an isolated structure called the
Convent of Jesus, which covered the right of thu
suburb line ; on the 7th of February the con-
vent was carried by storm, with so little difficulty,
that the French, supposing the Spaniards to be
panic-stricken, entered the suburb itself; they were
quickly driven back, but they made good their
lodgement in the convent.
On the right of the Ebro, the 8th, 9th, and 10th
were wasted by the besiegers in vain attempts to pass
the Cosso ; they then extended their flanks ; to the
right with a view to reach the quay, and so connect
this attack with that against the suburb; to the left
to obtain possession of the large and strongly built
convent of St. Francisco, in which, after exploding
an immense mine and making two assaults, they
finally established themselves.
The llth and 12th, mines, in the line of the
right attack, were exploded under the university, a
large building on the Spanish side of the Cosso, yet
their pluy was insufficient to open the walls, aud
^ 1809.
?obtuaiy.
PENINSULAR WAR. 41
the storming party was beaten, with the loss of fifty CHAP.
men. Nevertheless, the besiegers continuing their
labours during the 13th, 14th, 15th, ICth, and 17th,
passed the Cosso by means of traverses, and pre-
pared fresh mines under the university, yet deferred
their explosion until a simultaneous effort could be
combined on the side of the suburb. At the left
attack also, a number of houses, bordering on the
Cosso, being gained, a battery was established that
raked that great thoroughfare above ground, while
under it, six galleries were carried, and six mines
loaded to explode at the same moment But- the
spirit of the French army was now exhausted.
They had laboured and fought without intermission
for fifty days; they had crumbled the walls with
their bullets, burst the convents with their mines,
and carried the breaches with their bayonets;-*
fighting above and beneath the surface of the earth,
they had spared neither fire nor sword, their bravest
men were falling in the obscurity of a subterranean
warfare, famine pinched them, and Zarugoza was
still unconquered !
c * Before this siege," they exclaimed, " was it
ever known, that twenty thousand men should
besiege fifty thousand ? Scarcely a fourth of the
town is won, and we are already exhausted. We fcognfo*-
must wait for reinforcements, or we shall all perish
among these cursed ruins, which will become our
own tombs, before we can force the last of these
fanatics from the last of their dens."
Marshal Lasnes, unshaken by these murmur^
and obstinate to conquer, endeavoured td r&ise the
soldiers' hopes. He told them that the losses of the
besieged so far exceeded their own, that the Spa-
niards' strength would socm be exhausted and their
42 HISTORY OF TOE
BOOK courage sink; that the fierceness of their defence
was already abating, and if, contrary to expectation,
. they should renew the example of Numantia, their
titter destruction must quickly be effected by the
united evils of battle, pestilence, and misery. His
exhortations were successful, and on the 18th of
February, all combinations being completed, a ge-
neral assault took place.
On the right the French, having opened a party-
wall by the explosion of a petard, made a sudden
rush through some burning ruins, and then carried,
without a check, the whole island of houses lead-
ing down to the quay, with tlie exception of
two buildings ; the Spaniards were thus forced to
abandon all the external fortifications between Saint
Augustin and the Ebro, which they had preserved
until that day. During this assault the mines
under the university containing three thousand
pounds of powder were sprung, and the walls
tumbling with a terrific crash, a column of the
besiegers entered the place, and after one repulse
secured a lodgement. Meanwhile fifty pieces of
artillery thundering upon the suburb, ploughed up
the bridge over the Ebro, and by midday opened
a practicable breach in the great convent of Saint
Lazar, which was the principal defence on that
side. Lasnes, observing that the Spaniards seemed
to be shaken by this overwhelming fire, ordered an
assault there also, and Saint Lazar being carried
forthwith, the retreat to the bridge was thus inter-
cepted, and the besieged falling into confusion, and
their commander, Baron Versage, being killed, were
all destroyed or taken, with the exception of three
hundred men, who, braving the terrible fire to
which they were exposed, get back into the town.
PENINSULAR WAR. 43
General Gazan immediately occupied the abandoned CHAP.
works, and having thus cut off more than two thou
sand men that were stationed on the Ebro, above February.
the suburb, forced them also to surrender.
This important success being followed on the
19th, by another fortunate attack on the right bank
of the Ebro, and by the devastating explosion of
sixteen hundred pounds of powder, the constancy
of the besieged was at last shaken. An aid-de-
camp of Palafox came forth to demand certain
terms, before offered by the marshal, adding there-
to, that the garrison should be allowed to join
the Spanish armies, and that a certain number of
covered carriages should follow them. Lasnes re-
jected these proposals, and the fire continued, but
the hour of surrender was come ! Fifty pieces of
artillery on the left bank of the Ebro, laid the
houses on the quay in ruins ; the church of Our
Lady of the Pillar, under whose especial protection
the city was supposed to exist, was nearly effaced
by the bombardment ; and the six mines under the
Cosso loaded with many thousand pounds of powder,
were ready for a simultaneous explosion, which
would have laid a quarter of the remaining houses
in the dust. In fine, war had done its work, and
the misery of Zaragoza could no longer be endured.
The bombardment which had never ceased since
the 10th of January, had forced the women and
children to take refuge in the vaults, with which
the city abounded ; there the constant combustion
of oil, the closeness of the atmosphere, unusual
diet, and fear and restlessness of mind, had com-
bined to produce a pestilence which soon spread to
the garrison. The strong and the weak, the daring
soldier and the shrinking child, fell before it alike,
44: HISTORY OF THE
BOOK and such was the state of the atmosphere and the
predisposition to disease, that the slightest wound
cbiuwy. gangrened and became incurable. In the begin-
ning of February the daily deaths were from four
to five hundred; the living were unable to bury
the dead, and thousands of carcases, scattered about
the streets and court- yards, or piled in heaps at the
doors of the churches, were left to dissolve in their
own corruption, or to be licked up by the flames
of the burning houses as the defence became con-
tracted. The suburb, the greatest part of the walls
and one-fourth of the houses were in the hands of
the French ; sixteen thousand shells thrown during
the bombardment, and the explosion of forty-five
thousand pounds of powder in the mines had
shaken the city to its foundations; and the bones
^ more than forty thousand persons of every age
and sex, bore dreadful testimony to the constancy
of the besieged.
Palafox was sick, and of the plebeian chiefs, the
curate of St. Gil, the lemonade seller of the Cosso,
and the Tios, Jorge and Marin, having been slain
in battle, or swept away by the pestilence, the
obdurate violence of the remaining leaders was so
abated, that a fresh junta was formed, and after a
stormy consultation, the majority being for a sur-
render, a deputation waited upon Marshal Lasnes*
on the 20th of February, to negotiate a capitula-
tion. They proposed that the garrison should march
out with the honours of war; that the peasantry
should not be considered as prisoners; and at the
particular request of the clergy, they also demanded
that the latter should have their full revenues
guaranteed to them, and 'punctually paid. This last
article was rejected with indignation, and, accord-
PENINSULAR WAR. 45
ing to the French writers, the place surrendered CIUP.
at discretion ; but the Spanish writers assert, that -
Lasnes granted certain terms, drawn up by the
deputation at the moment, the name of Ferdinand
the Vllth being purposely omitted in the instru-
ment, which in substance ran thus:
The garrison to march out with the honours of
war, to be constituted prisoners, and marched to
France; the officers to retain their swords, baggage,
and horses, the men their knapsacks; persons of
either class, wishing to serve Joseph, to be imme-
diately enrolled in his ranks ; the peasants to be
sent to their homes; property and religion to be
guaranteed.
With this understanding the deputies returned to
the city, where fresh commotions had arisen during
their absence. The party for protracting the de-
fence, although the least numerous, were the most
energetic; they had before seized all the boats on
the Ebro, fearing that Palafox and others, of whom
they entertained suspicions, would endeavour to
quit the town ; and they were still so menacing and
so powerful, that the deputies not daring to pass
through the streets, retired outside the walls to
the castle of Aljaferia, and from thence scut notice
to the junta of their proceedings. The dissentient
party would, however, have fallen upon the others
the next day, if the junta had not taken prompt
measures to enforce the surrender ; the officer iu
command of the walls near the castle, by their
orders, gave up his post to the French during the,
night, and on the 21st of February, from twelve to
fifteen thousand sickly beings, laid down those arms
which they were now scarcely able to handle, and
this cruel and memorable/ siege was finished.
46 JJJSTOKY OF THE
BOOK OBSERVATIONS. 1. When the other events
of the Spanish war shall be lost in the obscurity of
time, or only traced by disconnected fragments, the
story of Zaragoza, like some ancient triumphal pillar
standing amidst ruins, will tell a tale of past glory,
and already men point to the heroic city, and call
her Spain, as if her spirit were common to the
whole nation ; yet it was not so, nor was the de-
fence of Zarugoza itself the effect of unalloyed
virtue. It was not patriotism, nor was it courage,
nor skill, nor fortitude, nor a system of terror, but
all these combined under peculiar circumstances
that upheld the defence. This combination, and
how it was brought about, should be well con-
sidered ; for it is not so much by catching at the
loading resemblances, as by studying the differences
of great aflhirs, that the exploits of one age can be
made to serve as models for another.
2. The defence of Zaragoza may be examined
under two points of view; as an isolated event, and
as a transaction bearing on the general struggle in
the Peninsula. With respect to the latter, it was
a manifest proof, that neither the Spanish people,
nor the government, partook of the Zaragozan
energy. It would be absurd to suppose that, in
the midst of eleven millions of people animated by
an ardent enthusiasm, fifty thousand armed men
could for two months be besieged, shut in, de-
stroyed, they and their works, houses and bodies,
mingled in one terrible ruin, by less than thirty-
five thousand adversaries, without one effort being
made to save them ! Deprive the transaction of
its dazzling colours, and the outline comes to
this : thirty-five thousand French, in the midst
of insurrections, did, in despite of a combination of
PENINSULAR WAR. 47
circumstances peculiarly favourable to the defence,
reduce fifty thousand of the bravest and most - -
energetic men in Spain. It is true, the latter
suffered nobly ; but was their example imitated ?
Gerona, indeed, although less celebrated, rivalled ,
and perhaps more than rivalled, the glory of
Zaragoza ; elsewhere her fate, spoke, not trumpet-
tongued to arouse, but with a wailing voice that
carried dismay to the heart of the nation.
3d. As an isolated transaction, the siege of
Zaragoza is very remarkable, yet it would be a
great error to suppose, that any town, the inhabi-
tants of which were equally resolute, might be as
well defended. Fortune and bravery will do nmch,
but the combinations of science are not to be defied
with impunity. There are no miracles in war ! If
the houses of Zaragoza had not been nearly incom-
bustible, the bombardment alone would have caused
the besieged to surrender, or to perish with their
flaming city.
4th. That the advantages offered by the peculiar
structure of the houses, and the number of convents
and churches, were ably seized by the Spaniards,
is beyond doubt. General Rogmat, Lacowtc's suc-
cessor, treats his opponents' skill in fortification
with contempt ; but colonel San Gcnis' talents are
not to be judged of by the faulty construction, of a
few outworks at a time when he was under the con-
trol of a disorderly and ferocious mob ; he knew how
to adapt his system of defence to the circumstances
of the moment, and no stronger proof of re^l geftips
can be given. " Do not consult me about a capi-
tulation," was his common exprepsion^ , ** / $hall
never be of opinion that Zaragoxa cm make no fur~
ther defence" Yet neither the talents pf San Genis,
48 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK nor the construction of the houses, would have
availed, if the people within had not been of a
temper adequate to the occasion ; and to trace the
passions by which they were animated to their true
causes is a proper subject for historical and military
research. That they did not possess any superior
courage is evident from these facts ; the besieged,
although twice the, number of the besiegers, never
made any serious impression by their sallies, and
they were unable to defend the breaches. In large
masses, the standard of courage which is estab-
lished by discipline, may be often inferior to that
produced by fanaticism or any other peculiar ex-
citement ; the latter however never lasts long, nei-
ther is it equable, because men arc of different sus-
ceptibilities, following their physical and mental
conformation. Hence a system of terror has always
been the resource of those leaders who, being en-
gaged in great undertakings, were unable to recur
to discipline. Enthusiasm stalked in front of their
bands, but punishment brought up the rear, and
Zaragoza was no exception to this practice.
5th. It may be said that the majority of the bCr
sieged, not being animated by any peculiar fury,
a system of terror could not be carried to any great
length ; a close examination explains this seeming
mystery. The defenders were composed of three
distinct parties, the regular troops, the peasantry
from the country, and the citizens ; the citizens,,
wlio had most to lose, were naturally the fiercest,
and, accordingly, amongst them, the system , of
terror was generated. The peasantry followed the
example, as all ignorant men, under no tegular qon-
trpj,' will do. The soldiers meddled but little in
the jnteripr ajrapgements, a/nd the division of the
PENINSULAR \VAR 49
town into islands of posts rendered it perfectly c Jif ? '
feasible for violent persons, already possessed of -
authority, to follow the bent of their inclinations :
there was no want of men, and the garrison of each
island found it their own interest to keep those in
front of them to their posts, that the danger might
be the longer staved off from themselves.
6th. Palafox was only the nominal chief of Za-
ragoza, the laurels gathered in both sieges should
adorn plebeian brows. But those laurels dripped
with kindred as well as foreign blood ; the energy
of the real chiefs, and the cause in which that
energy was exerted, may be admired ; the acts per-
petrated were, in themselves, atrocious, and Palafox,
although unable to arrest their savage proceedings,
can claim but little credit for his own conduct.
For more than a month preceding the surrender, he
never came forth of a vaulted building, which was
impervious to shells, and in which, there is too
much reason to believe, that he and others, of both
sexes, lived in a state of sensuality, forming a
disgusting contrast to the wretchedness that sur-
rounded them,
OBSERVATIONS ON THE FRENCH OPERATIONS.
1. Before the arrival of marshal Lasnes, these
operations were conducted with little vigour; the
want of unity, as to time, in the double attack of
the Monte Torrero and the suburb, was a flagrant
error, which was not redeemed by any subsequent
activity. After the arrival of that marshal, the
siege was pursued with singular intrepidity and
firmness; and although general Rogniat disap-
proves of Suchet's division having been sent to
Calatayud, it seems to have b^en a judicious mea-
VOL. n. E
50 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK sur e, inasmuch as it was necessary, 1. To protect
the line of correspondence with Madrid. 2, To
180 )
have a corps at hand, lest the duke of Infantado
should quit Cuen^a, and throw himself into the
Guadalaxara district, a movement that would have
been extremely embarrassing to the king, Suchet's
division, while at Calatayud, fulfilled these objects,
without losing the power of succouring Tudela, or of
intercepting the duke of Infantado if he attempted
to raise the siege of Zaragoza ; but when the Spa-
nish army at Cuen<ja was directed to Ucles, and
that the marquis of Lazan was gathering strength
on the left bank of the Ebro, it was undoubtedly
proper to recal Suchet.
2. It may not be misplaced here to point out
the errors of Infantado's operations. If, instead of
bringing on a battle with the first corps, he had
marched to the Ebro, established his depots and
places of arms at Mequinenza and Lerida, opened a
communication with Murcia, Valencia, and Cata-
lonia, and joined the marquis of Lazan's troops to
his own, he might have formed an entrenched camp
in the Sierra de Alcubierre, and from thence have
carried on a methodical war with, at least, twenty-
five thousand regular troops* The insurrections on
the French flanks and line of communication with
Pampeluna would then have become formidable,
and, in this situation, having the fortresses of Cata-
lonia behind him, with activity and prudence he
might have raised the siege.
3. From a review of all the circumstances
attending the siege of Zaragoza, we may conclude
that fortune was extremely favourable to the French.
They were brave, persevering, and skilful, and they
did not lose above four thousand men, but their
PENINSULAR WAR,. 51
success, partly resulting from the errors of their C *1 AP -
opponents, was principally due to the destruction
caused by the pestilence within the town ; for of
all that multitude, said to have fallen, six thousand
Spaniards only were slain in battle ; and although
thirteen convents and churches had been taken,
yet, when the town surrendered, forty remained to
be forced !
Such were the principal circumstances of this
memorable siege. I shall now relate the contem-
porary operations in Catalonia,
32 HISTORY OF THE
CHAPTER IV.
OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA.
BOOK IT will be remembered, that when the second
v
! siege of Gerona was raised, in August, 1808, gene-
1808 ' ral Duhesme returned to Barcelona, and general
Reille to Figueras, after which the state of affairs
obliged those generals to remain on the defensive.
Napoleon's measures to aid them were as prompt
as the occasion required- For while the siege of
Gerona was yet in progress, he had directed troops
to assemble at Perpignan in such numbers, as to
form with those already in Catalonia, an army of
more than forty thousand men, to be called the
st.cyr>$ "7th. corps" and to be commanded by general
Gouvion St. Cyr, to whom he gave this short but
emphatic order. " Preserve Barcelona for me. If
that place be lost, I cannot retake it with 80,000 mm?
The troops assembled at Perpignan were, tjbie
greatest part, raw levies; Neapolitans, Etruscans,
Romans, and Swiss; mixed, however, with some
old regiments; but as the preparations for the
grand army under the emperor absorbed the ,prm-
cipal attention of the administration in France,
general St. Cyr was straightened in the means
necessary to take the field, and his undisciplined
troops, suffering severe privations, were depressed
ia spirit, and inclined to desert. In this state they
r#c$ived Napoleon's orders dated the 1st of Novem-
ber to commence operations, St. Cyr, immediately,
PENINSULAR WAR. 53
put his divisions in motion on the 3d, and cross-
ing the frontier, established his head- quarters at -
i i 1808.
Figueras on the 5th. NOV.
Meanwhile in Catalonia, as in other parts of Spain,
lethargic vanity, and abuses of the most fatal kind,
had succeeded the first enthusiasm and withered the
energy of the people. The local junta had, indeed,
issued abundance of decrees, and despatched agents
to the supreme junta, and to the English comman-
ders in the Mediterranean and Portugal, all charged
with the same instructions, namely, to demand arms,
ammunition, and money; the central junta treated
their demands with contempt, the English authori-
ties answered them generously and freely, and lord
Collingwood lent the assistance of his fleet. From
Malta and Sicily arms were sent, and sir Hew Dal-
rymple having completely equipped the Spanish
regiments, released by the convention of Cintra,
despatched them to Catalonia in British transports.
Yet it may be doubted if the conduct of the central
junta on this occasion were not the wisest, for the
local government established at Tarragona had
already become so neglectful, and corrupt, that the . Lord Co1 ;
hngwood's
, i- i - * .
arms thus supplied were, instead or being used in
defence of the country, sold to foreign merchants !
Such being the political state of Catalonia, it natu-
rally followed that the military affairs should be ill
conducted.
The count of Caldagues, after having- relieved
Gerona, returned by Hoslalrich, and resumed the
line of the Llobregat; fifteen hundred men, drawn
from the garrison of Carthagena, readied Taimt-
gona; the marquis of Palaciosi, 'accottipatlted Hy tlie
junta, quitted the latter town, and fiited his quarters
at 1 Villa Franca, within* twenty failed of Calda^ues,
54 HISTORY OF THE
and the latter then disposed his troops, five thou-
~ sand in number, on different points between Mar-
Sept! torel and San Boy, covering a line of eighteen
miles, along the left bank of the river. Meanwhile
Duhesme who had rested but a few days, marched
in the night from Barcelona with six thousand men,
and having arrived the 2d of September at day-
break on the Llobregat, attacked Caldagues' line on
several points, but principally at San Boy and
Molino del Rey. The former post was carried,
and the Spaniards were pursued to Vegas, a dis~
tance of seven or eight miles, yet at Moliuo del Rey
the French were repulsed, and Duhesme then re-
turned to Barcelona.
It was the intention of the British ministers, that
an auxiliary force should have sailed from Sicily
about this time to aid the Catalans, and doubtless
it would have been a wise and timely effort, but
Napoleon's foresight prevented the execution* He
directed Murat to menace Sicily, and that prince,
feigning to collect forces on the coast of Calabria,
spread many reports of armaments being in prepa-
ration, while, as a preliminary measure, general
Lamarque carried the island of Caprse. It was
here sir Hudson Lowe first became known to his-
tory, by losing, in a few days, a post that, without
any pretensions to celebrity, might have been de*
fended for as many years. Murat's demonstrations
sufficed to impose upon sir John Stuart, and from
ten to twelve thousand British troops were thus
paralysed at a most critical period ; and such will
always bo the result of a policy which has no fixed,
defimte object in view. When statesmen cannot
see their own way clearly, the executive officers will
seldom act with vigour.
PENINSULAR WAR, 55
During September the Spanish army daily in- CHAP.
IV.
creased ; the tercios of Miguel etes were augmented,
and a regiment of hussars, that had been most October.
absurdly kept in Majorca ever since the beginning
of the insurrection, arrived at Tarragona. Pala-
cios however remained at Villa Franca, Caldagues
continued to guard the Llobregat, and Mariano
Alvarez commanded the advanced guard, composed
of the garrisons of Gerona and Rosas, the corps of
Juan Claros, and other paitizan chiefs. Francisco
Milans, and Milans de Bosch, with six thousand
Migueletes, kept the mountains, northward and
eastward of Barcelona ; the latter hemming in the
French right, the former covering the district of
El Valles, and watching, like a bird of prey, the
enemy's foragers in the plain of Barcelona, The
little port of Filieu de Quixols, near Palamos Bay,
was filled with privateers, and the English frigates
off the coast, besides aiding the Spanish enter-
prizes, carried on a littoral warfare in the gulf of
Lyons with great spirit and success, Many petty
skirmishes happened between the Migueletes and
the French j but on the 10th of October, Duhesmc
having attacked Milans de Bosch at St. Gerony
beyond the Besos, completely dispersed his corps.
The llth, colonel Devaux, with two thousand men,
entered Granollers, which the Spaniards deserted,
although it was their chief depot, and Devaux
having captured and destroyed a considerable
quantity of stores returned the 12th to Moilet
Here a column of equal strength was stationed
for his support, and when hq had occupied the
pass of Moncada, it proceeded under general Mil-
lossewitz to fb rage, El Yal^s. ^Mespwjiile Caldu-
gues drawing together three thousat$ infantry, two
56 HISTORY OF THE
squadrons of cavalry, and six guns, bad marched
- -- by the back of the hills towards Moncada, hoping
October, to intercept the French on their return to Barce-
lona ; thus Millossewitz and he met unexpectedly
cample at & aa Culgat, and in the confused action which
n? a c<Ual " ensued the French were beaten, and retreated
across the mountains to Barcelona, while Calda-
gues, justly proud of his soldier-like movement,
returned to his camp on the Llobregat.
The 28th of October, Palacios was ordered to
take the command of the levies then collecting in
the Sierra Morena, and general Vives who suc-
ceeded him in Catalonia, was reinforced with more
infantry from Majorca ; the Spanish troops, released
by the convention of Cintra, also arrived at Villa
Franca, and seven or eight thousand Grenadan le-
vies were brought up to Taragona by general Re-
ding; and, at the same time, six thousand men
drafted from the army of Arragon, reached Lerida,
under the command of the marquis of Lazan, This
accumulated force was organized in six divisions,
the troops in the Ampurdan forming one, and in-
cluding the garrisons of Hostulrich, Gerona, and
Rosas, the army of the right, as it was called,
amounted to thirty-six thousand men, of which
twenty-two thousand foot and twelve hundred
horse were near Barcelona or in march for it.
Vivcs seeing himself at the head of such a power
and in possession of all the hills and rivers surround-
ing Barcelona, resolved to storm that city, and all
things seemed to favour the attempt. The inhabi-
tants were ready to rise, a battalion of the Walloon
guards who hud been suffered to remain in the city
in a species of neutrality plotted to seize one of the
gates, and the French were go uneasy that Duhesme
PENINSULAR WAR. 57
actually resolved to abandon the town and confine his CHAP.
defence to the citadel and Montjouik ; a resolution-
from which he was only diverted by the remonstrances October,
of the chief engineer Lafaille. In this state of affairs,
Vives transferring his quarters to Martorel, directed
a general attack on the French outposts, but he was
repulsed at every point, and returned to the moun-
tains. The Walloon guards were then disarmed,
the inhabitants awed, the defences of the town in-
creased ; and from that period to the raising of the
blockade, the warfare of the Spanish general was
contemptible, although disputes amongst his ad-
versaries had arisen to such a height, that Duhesme
was advised to send Lecchi a prisoner to France.
Catalouia was now a prey to innumerable disor-
ders. Vives, a weak, indolent man, had been the
friend of Godoy, and was not popular ; he had,
when commanding in the islands, retained the
troops in them with such tenacity as to create
doubts of his attachment to the cause, yet the
supreme junta, while privately expressing their
suspicions and requesting lord Collingwood to force ^oni coi-
him to an avowal of his true sentiments, wrote corres
uCXXCC*
publicly to Vives in the most flattering terms, and
finally appointed him captain-general of Catalonia.
By the people, however, he and others were vq-
hemently suspected, and as the mob governed
throughout Spain, the authorities, civil and mili-
tary, were more careful to avoid giving offence to
the multitude, than anxious to molest the en,emy ;
hence although Catalonia was full of strong places,
they were neither armed nor provisioned, for ^11
persons were confident that the French only
thought of retreating.
Such was the state $>f the province and of the
58 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK armies, when Napoleon, being ready to break into
the northern parts of Spain, ordered St. Cyr to
NOV.* commence operations. His force including a Ger-
man division of six thousand men, not yet arrived
at Pe rn ig n a n amounted to more than thirty thou-
san( ^ men > ill-composed, however, and badly pro-
v *ded, and St. Cyr himself was extremely discon-
tented with his situation. The emperor had given
him discretionary powers to act as he judged fit-
ting, only bearing in mind the importance of re-
lieving Barcelona ; but marshal Berthier neglected
the equipment of the troops, and Duhesme declared
that his magazines would not hold out longer than
December. To march directly to Barcelona was
neither an easy nor an advantageous movement.
That city could only be provisioned from France,
and, until the road was cleared by the taking of
Gerona and Hostalrich, no convoys could pass ex-
cept by sea. To attack those places with prudence,
it was essential to get possession of Rosas ; not only
to secure an intermediate port for French vessels
passing with supplies to Barcelona, but to deprive
the English of a secure harbour, and the Spaniards
of a point from whence they could, in concert with
their allies, intercept the communications of the
French army and even blockade Figueras, which,
from the want of transport, could not be provisioned
at this period. These considerations determined St
Cyr to commence by the siege of Rosas* He re-
paired to Figueras, in person, the 6th of November,
and, on the 7th, general Reille being charged to
conduct the operation, after a sharp action, drove
in the Spaniards before that place and completed
the investment.
PENINSULAR WAR. 59
CHAP.
IT.
SIEGE OF ROSAS. ' lm
Nov."
This town was but a narrow slip of houses built
along the water's edge, at the head of the gulf of
the same name. The citadel, a large irregular pen-
tagon, stood on one side, and, on the other, the
mountains which skirt the flat and swampy plain
of the Ampurdan, rose, bluff and rocky, at the dis-
tance of half a mile. An old redoubt was built
at the foot of the hills, and from thence to the
citadel an entrenchment had been drawn to cover
the houses, hence Rosas, looking towards the land,
had the citadel on the left hand, the mountains on
the right, and the front covered by this entrench-
ment. The roadstead permitted ships of the line to
anchor within cannon-shot of the place, and on
the right hand, coming up the gulf, a star fort,
called the Trinity, crowned a rugged hill about a
mile and a quarter distant from the citadel ; the
communication between it and the town being by a
narrow road carried between the foot of the moun-
tain and the water's edge.
The garrison of Rosas consisted of nearly three
thousand men ; two bomb-vessels, and an English
seventy-four, the Excellent, were anchored off the
town ; and Captain West, the commodore, rein-
forced the garrisons of the Trinity and the citadel
with marines and seamen from tliese vessels. But
the damages sustained in a former siege had been
only partially repaired ; both places were ill-found
in guns and stores, and the Trinity was commanded
at the distance of pistol-shot from a point of the
mountains called the PuigrRom.
60 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK The force under Reille, consisting of his own
and Pino's Italian division, skirmished daily with
1 Q/tfi
NOV.* the garrison but the rain flooded the Ampurdan,
the roads became impassable for the artillery, and
the opening of the trenches was delayed. Mean-
while Souham's division took post, between the
Fluvia and Figueras, to cover the siege on the side
of Gerona, and general Chabot's Italian brigade
was sent to Rabos and Espollas, to keep down the
Somatenes. Before Chabot's arrival Reille had de-
tached a battalion to that side, and being uneasy
for its safety sent three more to its assistance, yet
too late, for two companies had been already cut
St. Cyr. O g* by the Somatenes. This loss proved beneficial
inasmuch as it enraged the Italians and checked a
disposition to desert ; and St. Cyr, unwilling to pur-
sue the system of burning villages, yet desirous
to repress the insidious hostility of the peasants,
seized, iu reprisal for the loss of his companies,
an equal number of villagers, whom he sent to
France*
At Rosas the inhabitants embarked or took re-
fuge in the citadel, leaving the houses and the en-
trenchment covering them, to the French ; the latter
were however prevented by the fire of the English
ships from making any permanent lodgement, and
captain in a few days, a mixed detachment of soldiers and
\Vftst*s
despatch, townsmen re-established a post there. This done,
oil the 8th captain West, in conjunction with the
governor, made a sally but was repulsed, and on
the 9th several yards of the citadel's ramparts
crumbled away* Fortunately the enemy did not
perceive the accident which was repaired in the
night, a&d on the 15th' an obstinate assault made
PENINSULAR WAR. 61
on the Trinity was repulsed, the English seamen c ^ p -
bearing a principal share in the success.
The 16th the roads became passable, and the NOV.*
French battering- train was put in motion ; the way
leading up to the Puig Rom was repaired, two
battalions were posted there, on the point com-
manding the Trinity, and on the 19th three guns
were mounted. The trenches were then opened at
the distance of four hundred yards from the cita-
del, and the 20th the fire of the French mortars
obliged the vessels of war to anchor beyond the
range of the shells. During this time, Souham
was harassed by the Migueletes from the side of
Gerona, and the French cavalry, unable to find
forage, were sent back to France. Napoleon, mean-
while, rendered uneasy by the reports of general
Duhesme, directed the seventh corps to advance to
Barcelona, so as to arrive there by the 26th ofst. c^r*
November, but St. Cyr refused to abandon the
siege of Rosas without a more positive order. On
the other side the assistance afforded to the be-
sieged by captain West was represented to the
Catalonian government as an attempt to possess
himself of the place, and the junta readily be-
lieving the tale, entered into an angry correspon-
dence with don Pedro O'Daly, the governor, rela-
tive to the supposed treachery, yet took no measures
to raise the siege. Pending the correspondence,
however, the Excellent sailed from Rosas, and was
succeeded by the Fame, captain Bennet, who im-
mediately landed some men under the Trinity, and
endeavoured, but ineffectually, to take the battery
opposed to that fort.
The 27th the besiegers "assaulted the Spaniards,
who had entrenched themselves in the deserted
C2 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK houses of the town ; a hundred and sixty were
" taken, fifty escaped into the citadel, and the rest
NOV." were slain. Breaching batteries were then com-
menced among the ruins of the houses, and the
communication with the shipping rendered so un-
safe, that Lazan, who had come from Lerida to
Gerona with six thousand men, and had collected
*" provisions and stores at the mouth of the Flu via,
with the intention of supplying Rosas by sea, aban-
doned his design*
Reille observing the dilapidated state of the ci-
tadel now sent another summons, but the governor
was firm, and meanwhile as the engineers reported
the breach in the Trinity to be practicable, an as-
sault there was ordered for the 30th of November.
An Italian officer, who had formerly served in the
fort, being appointed to lead the storming party,
asserted that the breach was a false one ; his re-
monstrance was unheeded, and indeed the Spanish
commandant thought the post so untenable, that
two days before, the marines of the Fame had been
withdrawn by captain Bennet. But at this moment
lord Cochrane, a man of infinite talent in his pro*
fession, and of surpassing courage and enterprise,
threw himself with eighty seamen into the fort.
He found the breach really practicable, but only
broken into an old gallery, which he immediately
filled with earth and hammocks, and so cut off the
opening ; hence the unfortunate Italian could do
nothing, and fell with all his followers, except two
who escaped to their own side, and two others,
who being spared by the seamen, were drawn up
with ropes, A second assault, made a few days
after, was likewise repulsed.
While this passed at the-Trinity, the breaching
PENINSULAR WAIt. 63
batteries opened against the citadel, and a false CHAP.
attack was commenced on the opposite side; the
1808
next night the garrison made a sally with some Dec.'
success, but the walls were completely broken by
the French fire, and the 5th of December O'Daly,
hopeless of relief, surrendered with two thousand
fouf hundred men ; lord Cochrane then abandoned
the Trinity, first blowing up the magazine.
St. Cyr observes that the garrison of Rosas might
have been easily carried off, at night, by the British
shipping* To embark two thousand five hundred
men, in the boats of two ships, and under a heavy
fire, whether by night or day, is not an easy ope-
ration, yet the censure seems well founded, because
sufficient preparation might have been previously
made. Nor can the defence of the place with the
exception of lord Cochrane's exploit be deemed
brilliant, whether with relation to the importance
of the place, the assistance that might have been
rendered from the sea, or the number of the garri-
son compared with that of the besiegers. It held
out, however, thirty days, and, if that time had
been well employed by the Spaniards outside, the
loss of the garrison would have been amply repaid;
but Vives, wholly occupied with Barcelona, was
indifferent to the fate of Rosas ; a fruitless attack
on Souham's posts, by Mariano Alvarez, was the
only effort made to interrupt the siege, or to impede
the farther progress of the enemy : Lazan, although
at the head of six or seven thousand men, could ,
9 m Doyle s
not rely upon more than three thousand, and his
applications to Vives for a reinforcement were urn- MS -
heeded.
The fall of Rosas enablfed St Cyr to march to
relief of Barcelona, and he resolved to do so,
04 HISTORY OF THE
although the project, at first sight, appeared rather
insane than hardy ; for the roads, by which Gerona
and Hostalrich were to be turned, being mere paths
impervious to carriages, no artillery, and little am-
munition, could be carried, and the country was
full of strong positions. The Germans had not yet
arrived at Perpignan, it was indispensable to leave
Reille in the Ampurdan, to protect Rosas and
Figueras, and these deductions being made, less
than eighteen thousand men, including the cavalry,
which had been recalled from France, remained
disposable for the operation, whence, on the Spanish
side. Reding having come up, there were twenty-
five thousand men in the camp before Barcelona,
and ten thousand others, under Lazan and Alvarez,
at Gerona. The Spanish troops were, however,
exceedingly ill organized. Two -thirds of the Mi-
g ue letes carried pikes, and many were without any
arms at all ; there was no sound military system ; the
Spanish generals were ignorant of the French move-
ments and strength, and their own indolence and
want of vigilance drew upon them the contempt
and suspicion of the people.
The 8th of December St. Cyr united his army
on the left bank of the Fluvia. The 9th he passed
that river, and driving the Spaniards over the Ter,
established the head- quarters at Medinya, ten miles
from Gerona. He wished, before pursuing his own
march, to defeat Lazan, lest the latter should harass
the rear of the army, but finding that the marquis
wduld not engage in a serious affair he made a
show of sitting down before Gerona on the 10th,
yr * hoping thereby to mislead Vives, and render him
s l w to break up the blockade of Barcelona : this
succeeded, the Spaniard remained in his camp,
PENINSULAR WAli. 65
irresolute and helpless, while his enemy was rapidly
passing the defiles and rivers between Gerona and
r , _ to 1808
the Besos. Dec.
The nature of the country between Figueras and
Barcelona has been described in. the first volume,
and referring to that description, the reader will
find that the only carriage routes by which St. Cyr
could march were, one by the sea-coast, and one
leading through Gerona and Hostalrich. The first,
exposed to the fire of the English vessels, had
been broken up by lord Cochrane in August ; and
to use the second, it was necessary either, to take
the fortresses, or to turn them by marching for three
days through the mountains. St. Cyr adopted the
last plan, trusting that rapidity and superior know-
ledge of war would enable him to separate Lazan
and Alvarez from Vives, and so defeat them all in
succession.
On the 1 1th of December he crossed the Ter and
reached La Bisbal ; here he left the last of his car-
riages, delivered out four days' biscuit and fifty
rounds of ammunition to the soldiers, and with this
provision, a drove of cattle, and a reserve of only ten
rounds of ammunition for each man, he commenced
his hardy march, making for Palamos. On the
route he encountered and beat some Migueletes that
Juan Claros had brought to oppose him, and, when
near Palamos, he suffered a little from the fire of
the English ships, but he had gained a first step,
and his hopes were high. The 13th, he turned his
back upon the coast, and, by a forced march,
rea^ch^d Vidreras and Llagostera, thus placing him-
self Between Vives and Lazan, for the latter had
not yet passed the heights of (Casa de Selva.
'The 14th, marching b.y Mazanet de Selva and
VOL. II- F
16 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK Martorel, he reached the heights above Hostalrich,
and encamped at Grions and Masanas. During
Dec.' this day's journey, his rear was slightly harassed
by Lazan and Claros, but he was well content to
find the strong banks of the Tordera undefended
by Vives. His situation was, however, extremely
critical; Lazan and Claros had, the one on the
llth, the other on the 12th, informed Vives of the
movement, hence the bulk of the Spanish force
before Barcelona might be expected, at any moment,
in some of the strong positions in which the coun-
try abounded ; the troops from Gerona were, as we
have seen, close in the rear, the Somatenes were
gathering thickly on the flanks, Hostalrich was in
front, and the French soldiers had only sixteen
rounds of ammunition.
St. Cyr's design was to turn Hostalrich, and get
into the main road again behind that fortress. The
smugglers of Perpignan had affirmed that there
was no pathway, but a shepherd assured him that
there was a track by which it could be effected,
and, when the efforts of the staff-officers to trace
it failed, St. Cyr himself discovered it, yet nearly
fell into the hands of the Somatenes during the
search. However, at day break, the 15th, the
troops being put in motion, turned the fortress and
gained the main road, and the garrison of the
place, endeavouring to harass their rear, was re-
pulsed ; yet the Somatenes on the flanks, embold-
ened, because the French, to save ammunition, did
did not return their fire, became exceedingly trou-
blesome, and near San Celoni, the head of the
column encountered some battalions of Miguel ctes,
^hich Francisco Mi'lans had brought up from
Arenas de Mar, by the pass of Villa Gorguin.
PENINSULAR WAR. 67
Milans, not being aware of St. Cyr's approach , CHAP.
was soon beaten, and his men fell back, part to '
IftOfi
Villa Gorguin, part to the heights of Nuestra Se- Dec.'
nora de Cordera : the French thus gained the defile
of Treintapasos, but they were now so fatigued
that all desired to halt, save the general who insisted
upon the troops clearing that defile, and reaching a
plain on the other side, which was not effected be-
fore ten o'clock. Lazan's troops did not appear
during the day, but Vives' army was in front, and
its fires were seen on the hills between Cardadeu
and Llinas.
Information of Cyr's march, as I have already
observed, had been transmitted to Vives on the
llth, and there was time for hjm to have carried
'the bulk of his forces to the Tordera, before the
French could pass that river ; but intelligence of
the battle of Tudela, and of the appearance of the
French near Zaragoza, arrived at the same moment,
and the Spanish general betrayed the greatest
weakness and indecision, at one moment resolving
to continue before Barcelona, at another designing
to march against St Cyr. He had, on the 9th,
sent Reding with six guns, six hundred cavalry,
and one thousand infantry, to take the command in
the Ampurdan, and, the 12th, after receiving Lazan's
report, he reinforced Reding, who was still at Gra-
nollers, and directed him upon Cardadeu. The
14th, he ordered Francisco Milans to march by
Mattaro and Arenas de Mar, to examine the coast
road, and, if the enemy was not in that line, to
repair also to Cardadeu. The 15th, Milans, as
we have seen, was beaten at St. Celoni, but, iti
the night, he rallied his whole division on the
F2
HISTORY OF THE
heights of Cordera, thus flanking the left of the
French forces at Llinas.
Bee." A Spanish council of war had been held on the
13th. Caldagues advised that four thousand Mi-
gueletes should be left to observe Duhesme, and
that the rest of the army should march at once to
fight St. Cyr ; good and soldier-like counsel ; but
Vives was loth to abandon the siege of Barcelona,
and adopting half-measures, left Caldagues, with
the right wing of the army, to watch Duhesme,
and carried the centre and the left, by the route
of Granollers, to the heights between Cardadeu
and LlinaSj where, exclusive of Milans' division, he
united in the night of the 15th about eight thousand
regulars besides several thousand Somatenes* Du-
hesme immediately occupied the posts abandoned by
Vives, and thus separated him from Caldagues, yet
St. Cyr's position, on the morning of the 16th, would
have been very dangerous, if he had been opposed
by any but Spanish generals and Spanish troops.
Vives and those about him, irresolute and weak
as they were in action, were not deficient in boasting
words ; they called the French army, in derision,
"the succour;" and, in allusion to the battle of
t- Cyr. Baylen, announced that a second " bull-jight? in
which Reding was again the " matador" would be
exhibited. Dupont and St. Cyr were, however,
men of a different stamp: the latter knowing
that the Spaniards were not troops to stand the
shock of a good column, united his army in one
solid mass at day-break on the 16th, and without
hesitation marched against the centre of the enemy,
ordering the head of the column to go headlong on,
without either firing or 'forming line.
PENINSULAR WAR. 69
BATTLE OF CARDADEU.
The hills occupied by the Spanish army were CHAP.
high and wooded. Vives, in person, commanded '
on the left, the other wing was under Reding ; the
Somatenes clustered upon a lofty ridge which was
separated from the right of the position by the
little river Mogent. The main road from Llinas led
through the centre of the line, and a second road
branching off from the first, and running between
the Mogent and Reding's ground, went to Mattaro.
The flank of the French attacking column was
galled by the Somatenes, and halted, general Pino,
who led it, instead of falling on briskly sent for
fresh instructions, and meanwhile extended his first
brigade in a line to his left. St. Cyr reiterated the
order to fight in column, but he was sorely trou-
bled at Pino's error ; for Reding advancing against
the front and flank of the extended brigade, obliged
it to commence a fire, which it could not nourish
from the want of ammunition.
In this difficulty the French general acted with
great ability and vigour; Pino's second brigade was
directed to do that which the first should have
done, two companies were sent to menace the left
of the Spaniards, and St. Cyr himself rapidly car-
ried Souham's division, by the Mattaro road, against
Reding's extreme right. The effect was instan-
taneous and complete, the Spaniards overthrown
on their centre and right, and charged by the
cavalry, were beaten, and dispersed in every direc-
tion, leaving their artillery, ammunition, and 'two
thousand prisoners behind. Vives escaped to foot
across the mountain to Mattaro, wherfc hfe was
taken on board an English vessel, but Reding fled
HISTORY Of THE
on horseback by the main road, and the next day,
having rallied some of the fugitives at Monmalo,
Dec." retreated by the route of San Culgat to Molino del
Rey. The loss of the French was only six hundred
men, and the battle, which lasted one hour, was so
decisive, that St. Cyr resolved to push on to Barce-
lona immediately, without seeking to defeat Milans
or Lazan, whom he judged too timid to venture an
action : moreover, he hoped that Duhesme, who
had been informed, on the 7th, of the intended
march, and who could hear the sound of the ar-
tillery, would intercept and turn back the flying
troops.
The French had scarcely quitted the field of
battle when Milans arrived, and, finding how mat-
ters stood, retired to Arenas de Mar, giving notice
to Lazan, who retreated to Gerona. St. Cyr's rear
was thus cleared, but meanwhile Duhesme, heed-
less of what was passing at Cardadeu, instead of
intercepting the beaten army, sent Lecchi to attack
Caldagues, who had concentrated his division on
the evening of the 16th, and repulsed Lecchi, but
then retired behind the Llobregat, leaving behind
some artillery and the large magazines which Vives
had collected for the siege. Thus St, Cyr reached
Barcelona without encountering any of Duhesme's
troops, and, in his Memoirs of this campaign, he
represents that general as astonishingly negligent ;
seeking neither to molest the enemy nor to meet
the French army, treating every thing belonging to
the service with indifference, making false returns,
and conniving at gross malversation in his generals,
Duhesme, however, has not wanted defenders.
$!t Cyr, now reflecting upon the facility with
which his. opponents could be defeated, and the
PENINSULAR WAR. 71
difficulty of pursuing them, resolved to rest a few CHAP.
days at Barcelona, in hopes that the Spaniards, if
unmolested, would re-assemble in numbers behind Dec,*
the Llobregat, and enable him to strike an effectual
blow; for his design was to disperse their forces so
as they should not be able to interrupt the sieges
which he meditated, nor was he deceived in his
calculations. Reding having joined Caldagues, ral-
lied from twelve to fifteen thousand men behind the
Llobregat, and Yives who had relanded at Sitjes,
sent orders to Lazan and Milans to join him there
by the way of Valles; the arrival of the latter
was, however, so uncertain that the French gene-
ral, who knew of these orders, judging it better
to attack Reding at once, united Chabran's division
to his own, and on the 20th, advanced to St. Felieu
de Llobregat.
The Spaniards were drawn up on the heights be-
hind the village of San Vincente, and their position
lofty and rugged, commanded a free view of the
approaches from Barcelona ; the Llobregat covered
the front, and the left was secured from attack,
except at the bridge of Molino del Rey, which
was entrenched, guarded by a strong detachment,
and protected by heavy guns. Reding's cavalry
amounted to one thousand, and he had fifty pieces
of artillery, the greatest part of which were in bat-
tery at the bridge of Molino del Rcy; his right
was, however, accessible, because the river was
fordable in several places. The main road to Villa
Franca led through this position, and, at the dis-
tance of ten or twelve miles in the rear, the pass of
Ordal offered another post of great strength.
Vives was 9-t San Vincente pn the 19th, but re-
turned to Villa Franca the same day; hence when the
HISTORY OF THE
French appeared on the 20th the camp was thrown
into confusion, and a council of war being held,
Dec." one party was for fighting, another for retreating to
Ordal, finally an officer was sent to Vives for orders,
and he returned with a message, that Reding might
retreat if he could not defend his post; but the
latter fearing that he should be accused, and per-
haps sacrificed for returning without reason, re-
solved to fight, although he anticipated nothing but
disaster. The season was extremely severe, snow
was falling, and both armies suffered from cold and
wet; the Spanish soldiers were, however, dispirited
by past defeats, and the despondency and irresolu-
tion of their generals could not escape observation,
while the French and Italian troops were confident
in their commander, and flushed with success. In
these dispositions the two armies passed the night.
BATTLE OF MOLING DEL REV.
St. Cyr observing that Reding's attention was
principally directed to the bridge of Molino, ordered
Chabran's division to that side, with instructions to
create a diversion by opening a fire from some ar-
tillery, and then retiring as if his guns could not
resist the weight of the Spanish metal ; in short, to
persuade the enemy that a powerful effort would be
made there ; but when the centre and right of the
Spaniards should be attacked, Chabran was to force
the passage of the bridge, and assail the heights
beyond it. This stratagem succeeded, Reding ac-
cumulated troops on his left, and neglected his
other flank, which was the real point of attack,
For Pino's division crossing the Llobregat at day-
light on the 2 1st, by a ford in front of St. Felieu,
PENINSULAR WAR. 73
marched against the right of the Spanish position ; c ^ p -
Chabot's division followed; Souham's, which had
passed at a ford lower down and then ascended by Dec.
the right bank, covered Pino's passage; the light
cavalry were held in reserve behind Chabof s divi-
sion, and a regiment of cuirassiers was sent to
support Chabran at Molino del Rey.
The Spanish position consisted of two mountain
heads, separated by a narrow ravine and a torrent.
The troops of the right wing being exceedingly
weakened, were immediately chased off their head-
land by the leading brigade of Pine's division, and
Reding then seeing his error, changed his front,
drawing up on the other mountain, on a new line,
nearly perpendicular to the Llobregat, but he still
kept a strong detachment at the bridge of Molino,
which was thus in rear of his left. The French divi-
sion formed rapidly for a fresh effort, Souham was
on the right, Pino in the centre, Chabot on the
left ; and the latter gained ground in the direction
of Villa Franca, endeavouring to turn the Spaniards 7
right, and cut off their retreat, while the light
cavalry making way between the mountain and the
river, sought to connect themselves with Chabran
at Molino. The other two columns, having crossed
the ravine that separated them from the Spaniards,
ascended the opposite mountain. The Catalans
forming quickly, opposed their enemies with an
orderly but ill directed fire, and their front line
advancing, offered to charge with an appearance of
great intrepidity, but their courage sinkings they
turned as the hostile masses approached, and the re-
serve immediately opened a confused volley upoti
both parties; in this disorder, the road to Vilk
HISTORY OF THE
:>OK Franca being intercepted by Chabot, the right was
forced upon the centre, the centre upon the left, and
>ec.' the whole pushed back in confusion upon Molino del
Rey. Meantime a detachment from Chabran's di-
vision, passing the Llobregat above Molino, blocked
the road to Martorel, and in this miserable situation
the Spaniards being charged by the light cavalry,
scarcely a man would have escaped if Chabran had
obeyed his orders, by pushing across the bridge of
Molino upon their rear. But that general, at all
times feeble in execution, remained a tranquil spec-
tator of the action until the right of Souham's
division reached the bridge ; thus the routed troops
escaped by dispersion, throwing- away every thing
that could impede their flight across the mountains.
Vives reached the field of battle just as the route
was complete, and was forced to fly with the rest.
The victorious army pursued in three columns ;
Chabran's in the direction of Igualada; Chabot's
by the road of San Sadurni, which turned the pass
of Ordal; Souham's by the royal route of Villa
Franca, at which place the head-quarters were
established on the 22d. The posts of Villa Nueva
and Sitjes were immediately occupied by Pino,
while Souham pushed the fugitives to the gates of
Tarragona; but the loss of the Spaniards, owing
to their swiftness, was less than might have been
expected. Not more than twelve hundred fell into
the hands of the French, yet many superior officers
were killed or wounded, and, on the 22d, was taken
the count de Caldagues, a man apparently pedantic
in military affairs, and wanting in modesty, but
evidently possessed of both courage and talent.
The whole of the artillery, vast quantities of pow-
PENINSULAR WAR. 75
der, and a magazine of English muskets, quite
new, were captured ; yet many of the Migueletes
were unarmed, and the junta were unceasing in J>ec.
their demands for succours of this nature ! but the
history of any one province was the history of all
Spain .
HISTORY OF THE
CHAPTER V.
BARCELONA was now completely relieved, and
^ the Spanish magazines supplied it for several
mary. mon ths; there was no longer a Catalan army in the
field, and in Tarragona, where some eight or nine
thousand of the fugitives, from this and the former
battle, had taken refuge, there was terrible disorder.
anes. The people rose tumultuously, broke open the pub-
lic stores, and laying hands on all the weapons they
could find, rushed from place to place, as if search-
ing for something to vent their fury upon; they
called aloud for the head of Vives, and to save his
life he was cast into prison by Reding, who was
proclaimed general-in-chief. The regular officers
were insulted by the populace, and there was as
usual a general cry to defend the city, mixed with
furious menaces against traitors ; but there were
neither guns, nor ammunition, nor provisions, and
2y. during the first moment of anarchy, St. Cyr might
certainly have rendered himself master of Tarragona
by a vigorous effort. The opportunity soon passed
away; the French general seeking only to procure
subsistence, occupied himself in forming a train of
field artillery, while Reding, who had been almost
without hope, proceeded to rally the army, and
place the town in a state of defence,
le's The 1st of January eleven thousand infantry and
? pon ~eigkt hundred cavalry re-assembled at Tarragona
Reus; a Swiss regiment from Majorca, and two
PENINSULAR WAR. 77
Spanish regiments from Grenada, increased this CHAP.
force ; and the 5th three thousand four hundred
men arrived from Valencia ; from thence also five Jan.uiy.
thousand muskets, ammunition in proportion, and
ten thousand pikes, fresh from England, were for-
warded to Tarragona, and a supply of money, ob-
tained from the British agents at Seville, completed
the list of fortuitous events following the disaster of
Molino del Rey. These fortunate circumstances
and in the inactivity of St. Cyr, who seemed para-
lyzed, restored the confidence of the Catalans, yet
their system remained unchanged, for in Spain
confidence often led to insubordination, but never
to victory.
A part of the fugitives from Molino had taken
refuge at Bruch, and being joined by the Soma-
tenes, chose major Green, an English military
agent, for their general, thinking to hold that post
which was considered impregnable ever since the
defeats of Chabran and Swartz, St. Cyr, glad of
this opportunity to retrieve the honour of the French
arms, detached Chabran himself the lith January
to take his own revenge ; but as that general was
still depressed by the recollection of his former de-
feat, to encourage him, Chabot was directed from
San Sadurni upon Igualada, by which the defile
Bruch was turned, and a permanent defence ren-
dered impossible. Green made little or no resist-
ance, eight guns were taken, a considerable number
of men were killed, the French pursued to Igualada,
and a detachment, without orders, even assailed and
took Montserrat itself, and rejoined the main body
without loss. Chabot was theft recalled to San
Sadurni, tod Chabran was quartered at Martorel.
While these events, were passing beyond the
HISTORY OF THE
Llobregat, the marquis of Lazan had advanced,
with seven or eight thousand men, towards Cas-
tellon de Ampurias. The 1st of January he drove
back a battalion of infantry upon Rosas with consi-
derable loss, but the next day general Reille, having
assembled about three thousand men, intercepted
his communications, and attacked him in his po-
sition behind the Muga \ the victory seems to have
been undecided, and in the night, Lazan regaining
his communications, returned to Gerona.
The battle of Molino del Rey having abated
for a time the ardour of the Catalans, Reding was
enabled to avoid serious actions, while the Soma-
tenes harassed the enemy; and this plan being fol-
lowed during the months of January and February,
was exceedingly troublesome to St. Cyr, because he
was obliged to send small parties continually to
seek for provision, which the country people hid
with great care, striving hard to protect their scanty
stores. In the beginning of February the district
between the Llobregat and Tarragona was almost
exhausted of food; the English ships continued to
vex the coast-line; and the French, besides de-
serters, lost many men, killed and wounded, in the
innumerable petty skirmishes sustained by the ma-
rauding parties. Still St. Cyr maintained his posi-
tions, until the country people, tired of a warfare
in which they were the chief sufferers, clamoured
against Reding, that he, with a large regular force,
should look calmly on, until the last morsel of food
was discovered, and torn from their starving fami-
lies; the townspeople, also feeling the burden of
supporting the troops, impatiently urged the general
to fight, nor was this insubordination confined to
the rude multitude. Lazan, .although at the head of
PENINSULAR \VAR. 79
nine thousand men, remained perfectly inactive
after the skirmish at Castellon de Ampurias ; but
. 1809.
when Reding required him to leave a suitable gar- January.
rison in Gerona, and bring the rest of his troops
to Igualada, he would not obey, and their dispute
was only terminated by Lazan's marching, with five
thousand men, to the assistance of Zaragoza. His
operations there have been related in the narrative
of that siege.
The army immediately under Reding was very
considerable, the Swiss battalions were numerous
and good, and some of the most experienced of the
Spanish regiments were in Catalonia. Eveiy fifth
man of the robust population had been called out
after the defeat of Molino del Rey, and, although
the people, averse to serve as regular soldiers, did
not readily answer the call, the force under Reeling
was, in the beginning of February, not less than
twenty-eight thousand men. The urban guards
were also put in activity, and above fifteen thou-
sand Somatenes assisted the regular troops; but
there was more show than real power, for Reding
was incapable of wielding the regular troops skil-
fully, and the Migucletes being ill armed, without
clothing, and insubordinate, devastated the country
equally with the enemy* The Somatenes, who only
took arms for local interests, would not fight, except
at the times, in the manner, and in the place that
suited themselves ; they neglected the advice of the
regular officers, reviled all who would not adopt
their own views, and caused many to be removed
from their commands. The Spanish generals never
obtained from them good information of the enemy's
movements ; yet their ovra plans were always made
known to the French,* for at Reding's head-quar*
HISTORY OF THE
BOOK ters, as at those of Castanos before the battle of
Tudela, every project was openly and ostentatiously
ebmaiy. discussed. Reding himself was a man of no mili-
tary talent, his activity was of body, not of mind ;
but he was brave and honourable; and popular,
because, being without system, arrangement, or
deep design, and easy in his nature, he thwarted no
man's humours, and thus gently floated in the trou-
bled waters until their sudden reflux left him on
the rocks.
The Catalonian army was now divided into four
distinct corps.
Alvarez, with four thousand men, held Gerona
and the Ampurdan,
Lazan, with five thousand, was near Zaragoza.
Don Juan Castro, an officer accused by the
Spaniards of treachery and who afterwards did
attach himself to Joseph's party, occupied, with
sixteen thousand men, a line extending from Olesa
on the upper Llobregat, to the pass of San r tina,
near Tarragona ; this line running through "X ch,
Igualada, and Llacuna, was above sixty miles lon^.
The remainder of the army, amounting to ten or
twelve thousand men under Reding himself, was
quartered at Tarragona, Reus, and the vicinity of
those places. The troops were fed from Valencia
and Aragon, the convoys from the former being
conveyed in vessels along the coast ; but the maga-
zines being accumulated on one or two points of
the line, and chosen without judgement, fettered
Reding's movements and regulated those of the
French, whose only difficulty, in fact, was to pro-
cure food.
Early in February, St. Cyr, having exhausted
the country about him, and .finding his communica-
PENINSULAR WAR. 81
tions much vexed by the Somatenes and by descents
from the English ships, concentrated his divisions
in masses at Vendril, Villa Franca, San Sadurni,
and MartoreL His corps having been reinforced
by the German division, and by some conscripts,
amounted at this period to forty-eight thousand $*
men, of which forty-one thousand were under arms, scctioa6 -
but the force immediately with himself did not ex-
ceed twenty-three thousand combatants. The rela-
tive position of the two armies was, however, en-
tirely in favour of the French general ; his line
extending from Vendril, by Villa Franca, to Mar-
torel, was not more than thirty miles, and he had
a royal road by which to retreat on Barcelona;
whereas the Spanish posts covering an extent of
above sixty miles, formed a half-circle round the
French line, and their communications were more
rugged than those of St. Cyr. Nevertheless, it is
not to be doubted that, by avoiding any serious
action, the Catalans might have obliged the French
to abandon the country between the Llobrcgat and
Tarragona; famine and the continued drain of men,
in a mountain warfare, would have forced the latter
away, nor could they have struck any formidable
blow to relieve themselves, seeing that all the im-
portant places were fortified towns requiring a re-
gular siege. The never-failing arrogance of the
Spanish character, and the unstable judgement of
Reding, induced him to forego these advantages.
The closing of the French posts and some success
in a few petty skirmishes were magnified, the last
into victories, and the first into a design on the part
of the enemy to fly; and an intercourse opened
with some of the inhabitants of Barcelona gave
hopes of regaining that oity by means of a conapi-
vor,. ii. o
82 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK rac y w ithin the walls. The Catalans had before
made proposals to general Lecchi to deliver up the
February, citadel of that place ; nor is there any thing that
more strongly marks the absurd self-sufficiency of
the Spaniards during this war than the repeated
attempts they made to corrupt the French comman-
ders. As late as the year 1810, Martin Carrera,
being at the head of about two thousand ragged
peasants, half- armed, and only existing under the
protection of the English outposts, offered to Mar-
shal Ney, then investing Ciudad Rodrigo, rank and
honours in the Spanish army if he would desert !
Reding, swayed by the popular clamour, which
this state of affairs produced, resolved to attack, and
in this view directed Castro to collect his sixteen
thousand men to fall upon the right flank and rear of
St. Cyr, by the routes of Llacuna and Igualada; and
to send a detachment to seize the pass of Ordal,
to cut off the French line of retreat to Barcelona ;
meanwhile, advancing with eight thousand by the
roads of Vendril and St. Cristina, he, himself, was
to attack the enemy in front. All the Migueletes
and Somatenes between Gerona and the Besos were
to aid in these operations, the object being to sur-
round the French, a favourite project with the
Spaniards at all times; and as they publicly an-
nounced this intention, the joy was universal, the
destruction of the hostile army being as usual anti-
cipated with the utmost confidence.
The Catalans were in motion on, the 14th of
February, but St. Cyr had kept his army well in
hand and seeing the Spaniards were ready to break
in upon him, resolved to strike first. Wherefore
leaving Souham's division at Vendril, to hold
Reding in check, on the 16th St. Cyr marched from
PENINSULAR WAR. 83
Villa Franca, with Pino's division, and overthrew
Castro's advanced posts which were at Lacuna and
Saint Quinti. The Spanish centre was thus pierced, Febmaiy
their wings completely separated, and Castro's right
was thrown back upon Capellades.
The 17th, the French general continuing his
movement with Pino's division, reached Capellades,
where he expected to unite with Chabot and Cha-
bran, who had orders to concentrate there, the one
from San Sadurni, the other from MartoreL By
this skilful movement he avoided the pass of Bruch,
and concentrated three divisions on the extreme
right of Castro's left wing and close to his maga-
zines, which were at Igualada* Chabot arrived
the first, and, being for a little time unsupported,
was attacked and driven back with loss, but when
the other divisions came up, the action was restored,
and the Spaniards put to flight. They rallied again
at Pobla de Claramunt, between Capellades and
Igualada, a circumstance agreeable to St. Cyr, be-
cause he had sent Mazzuchelli's brigade from Llacuna st. Cyr.
direct upon Igualada, and if Chabot had not been
so hard pressed, the action at Capellades was to
have been delayed until Mazzuchelli had got into
the rear; scarcely however was the head of that
general's column descried, when Castro, who was
at Igualada with his reserves, recalled the troops
from Pobla de Claramunt The French were close
at their heels, and the whole passed through Igua-
lada, fighting and in disorder, after which, losing
all courage, the Spaniards threw away their arms,
and fled by the three routs of Cervera, Calaf, and
Manresa. They were pursued all the 17th, yet the
French returned the next day with few prisoners,
84 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK because, says St. Cyr, " the Catalans are endowed
by nature with strong knees"
Having thus broken through the centre of the
Spanish line, defeated a part of the left wing 1 and
taken the magazines, St. Cyr posted Chabot and
Chabran at Igualada, to keep the beaten troops in
check, while himself, with Pino's division, marched
on the 18th to fight Reding, whose extreme left
was now at St. Magi. Souham also had been in-
structed, when by preconcerted signals he should
know that the attack at Igualada had succeeded,
to force the pass of Cristina, and push forward to
Villa Radona, upon which town St, Cyr was now
marching.
The position of St Magi was attacked at four
o'clock in the evening of the 1 8th, and carried with-
out difficulty, but it was impossible to find a single
peasant to guide the troops, on the next day's march
to the ahbey of Santa Creus. In this perplexity, a
wounded Spanish captain, who was prisoner, having
demanded to be allowed to go to Tarragona, St. Cyr
assented, offering to carry him to the Creus, and
thus the prisoner unconsciously acted as a guide to
his enemies* The march was long and difficult,
and it was late ere they reached the abbey, which
was a strong point occupied in force by the troops
that had been beaten from San Magi the evening
before, wherefore the French, after a fruitless de-
monstration of assaulting it, took a position for the
night. Meanwhile, Reding hearing of Castro's de-
feat, made a draft of men and guns from the right
wing and was marching by Pla and the pass of
Ctbra, intending to rally his left, and as his road
run just behind St. Creus, he was passing at the
PENINSULAR WAR, 85
he French appeared before that
place, but as neither general was aware of the-
moment when the French appeared before that CHAP
V
1809
other's presence, each continued his particular February,
movement.
The 20th St. Cyr crossing the Gaya river under
a fire from the abbey, continued his rapid march
upon Villa Radofia, near which place he dispersed
a small corps, but finding that Souham was not
come up, he sent an officer, escorted by a battalion,
to hasten that general, whose non-arrival gave rea-
son to believe that the staff-officers and spies, sent
with the previous instructions, had all been inter-
cepted. This caused the delay of a day and a
half, which might otherwise have sufficed to crush
Red ing's right wing, surprised as it would have
been, without a chief, in the plain of Tarragona.
While the French rested at Villa Radona, Reding
pursued his march to St. Coloma dc Querault,
where he rallied many of Castro's fugitives, and
thus the aspect of affairs was totally changed ; for
Souham, after forcing the pass of San Cristina,
reached Villa Radofia the 2 1st, and, at the same
time, the weakly men, who had been left at Villa
Franca, also arrived ; hence more than two-thirds of
the whole French army were concentrated at Villa
Radona at the moment when the Spanish comman-
der, being joined by the detachment beaten from
San Cristina, and by the troops from the abbey of
Crcus, had also rallied the greatest part of his
forces, at St. Coloma do Querault. Each general
could now, by a rapid march, overwhelm his adver-
sary's right wing, but the troops left by Reding, in
the plain of Tarragona, could retire upon that for-
tress, while those left by St. Cyr at Igualada, were
without support. When, therefore, the French ge~
HISTORY OF THE
JOOK neral, who, continuing his movement on Tarragona,
had reached Vails the 22d, heard of Reding's march,
he immediately returned with Pino's division to Pla,
resolved, if the Spanish general should advance to-
wards Igualada, to follow him with a sharp spur.
The 23d the French halted ; Souham at Vails to
watch the Spanish troops in the plain of Tarra-
gona ; Pino's division at Pla, but sending detach-
ments to the abbey of Creus and towards Santa
Colorna to feel for Reding. In the evening these
detachments returned with some prisoners ; the one
reported that the abbey was abandoned ; the other
that the Spanish general was making his way back
to Tarragona, by the route of Sarrcal and Mom-
blanch. St. Cyr ? therefore, retaining Pino's division
at Pla, pushed his advanced posts on the right to
the abbey, and in front to the defile of Cabra, de-
signing to encounter the Spaniards, if they returned
by either of these roads ; and he ordered Souham
to take post in front of Vails, with his left on the
Francoli river, his right towards Pla, and his ad-
vanced guard at Pixa Moxons, to watch for Reding
by the road of Momblanch.
The 24th the Spanish general, being in, St.
Coloma, called a council of war, at which colonel
Doyle, the British military agent, assisted. One
party was for fighting St. Cyr, another for retreating
to Lerida, a third for attacking Chabran at Igua-
lada, a fourth for regaining the plain of Tarragona*
There were many opinions, but neither wisdom nor
resolution, and finally, Reding, leaving general
Wimpfen, with four thousand men, at San Coloma,
decided to regain Tarragona, and took the route of
Momblanch, with ten thousand of his best troops,
following the Spanish accounts, but St. Cyr says
PENINSULAR WAR. 87
with fifteen thousand. The Catalan general knew CHAP.
that Vails was occupied, and his line of march in--
tercepted ; but he imagined the French to be only
five or six thousand, for the exact situation and
strength of an enemy were particulars that seldom
troubled Spanish commanders.
BATTLE OF VALLS.
While in full march without any scouts, at day-
break on the 25th of February, the head of Re-
ding's column was suddenly fired upon at Pixa
Moxons by Souham's detachment, which was im-
mediately driven in upon the main body, and this
attack being vigorously followed, the whole of that
general's division gave way. Under cover of this
fight the Spanish baggage and artillery passed the
Francoli river, and the road to Tarragona being
thus opened, Reding might have effected his retreat
without difficulty ; but he continued to press Sou-
ham until St. Cyr, who had early intelligence of
what was passing, came down from Pla upon the
left flank of the Spanish army. When the French
dragoons, which preceded their infantry, appeared
in Souham's line, Reding re-crossed the Francoli
and took a position behind that river intending to
retreat from thence in the evening, but his able
opponent obliged him again to fight, and at three
o'clock the action recommenced. The banks of the
Francoli were steep aud rugged, and the position
beyond strong and difficult of access, yet the
French general wishing, as he himself states, to
increase the moral ascendency of his soldiers,
forbad the artillery, although well placed for exe-
cution, to play on Reding's battalions, lest they
should fly before the infantry could reach them !
88 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK Under this curious arrangement the battle was
begun by the light troops.
Fobrudiy. The French, or rather Italian infantry, were su-
perior in number to the Spaniards, and the columns,
covered by the skirmishers, passed the river with
great alacrity, and ascended the heights under an
exceedingly regular fire, which was continued until
the attacking troops had nearly reached the summit
of the position ; then both Swiss and Catalans wa-
vered, and breaking ere the infantry could close
with them, were instantly charged by the French
cavalry. Reding, after receiving several sabre
wounds, saved himself at Tarragona, where the
. greatest number of the vanquished also took re-
fuge, while the remainder fled in the greatest dis-
order by the routes of Tortosa and . Lerida. The
count of Castel d'Orius and many other superior
officers, the artillery and the baggage were taken,
four thousand men were killed or wounded, and
during all these movements and actions, Reding
received no assistance from the Somatenes : nor is
this surprising, for it may be received as an axiom
in war, that armed peasants are only formidable
to stragglers and small detachments ; when the
regular forces engage, the poor countryman, sen-
sible of his own weakness, wisely quits the field.
St. Cyr lost only a thousand men, and on the
26th Souham entered the rich town of Rcus,
where, contrary to the general custom, the inhabi-
tants remained. Pino then occupied Pla, Alcover,
and Vails, detachments were sent to Salou and
Villa Seca, on the sea-coast west of Tarragona, and
Chabot, recalled from Igualada, was posted at the
Santa Creuz, to watch Wimpfen, who still remained
at Santa Coloma de Querault.
PENINSULAR WAIL 89
This battle of Vails finished the regular warfare CHAP.
in Catalonia for the time. Those detachments,
which by the previous movements had been cut
from the main body of the army, joined the Soma-
tenes, and as partizan corps, troubled the commu-
nications of the French, but St. Cyr had no longer
a regular army to deal with in the field ; and Tor-
tosa, which was in a miserably defenceless condi-
tion, without provisions, must have fallen, if after
the battle any attempt had been made against it
Lazan, indeed, after his defeat near Zaragoza, car-
ried a few men to Tortosa, where he declared him-
self independent of Reding's command, but this
battle and the fall of Zaragoza had stricken terror
far and wide, the neighbouring provinces fearing
and acting each for its own safety, had no regard to
any general plan, and the confusion was universal.
Meanwhile, the fugitives from Vails, joined to
the troops already in Tarragona, crowded the latter
place, and an infectious disorder breaking out, a
great mortality ensued ; wherefore, St. Cyr, satis-
fied that sickness should do the work of the sword,
begirt the city with a resolution to hold his posi-
tions while food could be procured. In this policy
he remained stedfast until the middle of March,
although Wimpfcn attacked and drove Chabran in
succession from Igualada, Llacuna, and St. Quiuti,
to Villa Franca ; and although the two Milans and
Claros, acting between the Bcsos and the Llobregat,
had cut his communication with Barcelona, and in
conjunction with the English squadron, renewed the
blockade of that city. This plan appears injudi-
cious ; the sickness in Tarragona did not cause it to
surrender, and the subjugation of Catalonia was
certainly retarded by the cessation of offensive ope-
90 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK rations. The object of the French general should
have been to seize some strong place, such as Tor-
March, tosa, Tarragona, Gerona, or Lerida, while the terror
of defeat was fresh ; his inactivity after the battle
of Molino del Rey and at this period, enabled the
Catalonians to recover confidence, and to put those
towns in a state of defence; thus he gained nothing
but the barren glory of victory.
Towards the middle of March the resources of
the country being all exhausted, he at last deter-
mined to abandon the plains of Tarragona, and
take some position where he could feed his troops,
cover the projected siege of Gerona, and yet be at
hand to relieve Barcelona. The valleys about Vich
alone offered all these advantages, but as Claros
and the Milans were in force at Molino del Rey, he
ordered Chabran to drive them from that point,
that the sick and wounded men might be first
transferred from Vails to Barcelona. On the 10th
Chabran sent a battalion with one piece of artillery
on that service, and the Miguelctes thinking it was
the advanced guard of a greater force, abandoned
the post, but being undeceived, returned, beat the
battalion, and took the gun. The 12th, Chabran
received orders to march with his whole division,
consisting of eight battalions and three squadrons,
and he reached the bridge, yet returned without
st. cyr. daring to attack. St. Cyr repeated his orders, and
on the 1 4th the troops, apparently ashamed of their
general's irresolution, fell on vigorously, carried the
bridge and established themselves on the heights
at both sides of the river*
The communication being thus opened, it was
found that Duhesme, pressed by the Migueletes
without, was also extremely fearful of conspiracies
PENINSULAH WAR. 91
within the walls ; his fears, and the villainous con- CHAP,
duct of his police, had at last excited the inhabi-
1809
tants to attempt that which their enemies seemed March.
so much to dread. In March, an insurrection was St - y r -
planned in concert with the Migueletes and the
English squadron, and the latter coming close in
had cannonaded the town on the 10th, expecting
that Wimpfen, the Milans, and Claros would have
assaulted the gates, which was to have been the
signal for the insurrection. The inhabitants were
sanguine of success, because there were above two
thousand Spanish prisoners in the city, and outside
the walls there were two tercios secretly recruited
and maintained by the citizens ; and these last
being without uniforms, constantly passed in and
out of the town, yet Duhesme was never able to
discover or to prevent them. This curious circum-
stance is illustrative of the peculiar genius of the
Spaniards, which in all matters of surprise and
stratagem is unrivalled. The project against the
city was, however, baffled by Chabran's actions at
Molino del Rey, which occupied the partizan corps
outside the walls, arid the British squadron exposed
to a heavy gale, and disappointed in the co-opera-
tion from the land-side, sailed away the 1 1th.
St. Cyr intended to commence his retrograde
movement the 18th, but the 17th a cannonade was
heard on the side of Momblanch, which was ascer-
tained to proceed from a detachment of six: hundred
men, with two guns, under the command of colonel
Briche. This officer being sent by Mortier to open
the communication after the fall of Zaragoza, had
forced his way through the Spanish partizan corps,
and to favour his return the army halted two days ;
but the enterprise, after a trial, appeared so clan-
92 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK gerous, that he relinquished it, and attached him-
self to the seventh corps. Meanwhile the inactivity
that succeeded the battle of Vails, and the timidity
displayed by Chabran in the subsequent skirmishes,
had depressed the spirits of the troops ; they con-
templated the approaching retreat with great unea-
siness, and many officers infected with fear advised
the general to hide his movements from the enemy.
But he, anxious to restore their confidence, took
the part of giving the Spaniards a formal notice of
his intentions, desiring Reding to send proper offi-
cers to take over the hospitals which had been
fitted up at Vails, as well as some French, wounded,
that could not be moved. This done, the army
commenced its retreat, reached Villa Franca the
21st of March, and the 22d passed the Llobregat,
followed, but not molested, by some feeble Spanish
detachments* The 23d Wimpfen, who had rallied
the Migueletes of Claros and the Milans, at Tar-
rasa after the affair of the 24th, was beaten by
general Pino, who pursued him to near Manresa,
and then foraging the country, returned with pro-
visions sufficient to feed the army without drawing
on the magazines of Barcelona,
During these proceedings, Reding died in Tarra-
gona of his wounds. He had been received there
with such dissatisfaction after the battle of Vails,
that the interference of the British consul was ne-
cessary to save him from the first fury of the popu-
lace, who were always ready to attribute a defeat to
the treachery of the general. His military conduct
was, by his own officers, generally and justly con-
demned, for his skill in war was slight, but his cou-
rage and honesty were unquestionable, and he was
of distinguished humanity* At this unhappy pe-
PENINSULAR WAR. 93
riod, when the French prisoners in every part of CETAP.
Spain were tortured with the most savage cruelty,
and when to refrain from such deeds was to incur March.
suspicion, Reding had the manliness, not only to st. cyr.
repress all barbarities within the range of his com-
mand, but even to conclude a convention with St.
Cyr, under which the wounded men on both sides
received decent treatment, and were exchanged as
soon as their hurts were cured. In his last mo-
ments he complained that he had been ill-served as
a general ; that the Somatenes had not supported
him ; that his orders were neglected, and his plans
disclosed to the enemy, while he could never get true
intelligence ; complaints which the experience of
Moore, Baird, Cradock, Murray, and, above all, of
Wellington, proved to be applicable to every part of
Spain, at every period of the war. Coupigny suc-
ceeded Reding, but was soon superseded by Blake,
who was appointed captain general of the Coronilla,
or little crown, a title given to the union of Valen-
cia, Aragon, and Catalonia. The warfare in Ara-
gon being thus ultimately connected with that in
Catalonia, a short account of what was passing in
the former province will be useful.
When Zaragoza fell, Lasnes returned to France,
and Mortier, who succeeded him, sent detachments
against Monzon, Jaca, Mequinenza and Lerida*
The fort of Monzon commanding a passage over
the Cinca river, was abandoned by the Spaniards,
and Jaca surrendered, by which a new and im-
portant line of communication was opened with
France ; but the demonstration against Mequinenza
failed, and the summons to Lerida was fruitless.
Mortier then quartered his troops on both sides of
the Ebro, from Barbastro to Alcamtz, and sent
94 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK colonel Briche, as we have seen, to open a commu-
nication with, the seventh corps. This was in
March, and in April Mortier moved with the fifth
corps to Castile, leaving Junot with the third
corps to hold Aragon ; but that officer being sick,
soon returned to France, and was replaced by ge-
neral Suchet. The third corps was now very much
reduced, one brigade was employed to protect the
communication with Navarre, another was escorting
the prisoners from Zaragoza to Bayonne, and many
artillery-men and non-commissioned officers had
been withdrawn to serve in Germany : thus the
number of disposable troops in Aragon did not
exceed twelve thousand men under arms.
The weakness of the army gave the new general
great uneasiness, which was not allayed when he
found that men and officers were discontented and
dispirited. Suchet was, however, no ordinary man.
With equal vigour and prudence he commenced a
system of discipline in his corps, and of order in
his government, that afterwards carried him, with
scarcely a check, from one success to another, until
he obtained for himself the rank of a marshal, and
for his troops the honour of belonging to the only
French army in Spain that never suffered any signal
reverse. He at first hoped that the battle of Vails,
and other defeats sustained by the Spaniards at this
period, wduld give him time to re-organize his corps
in tranquillity but this hope soon vanished. The
peasantry, observing the weakness of the third
corps, only waited for a favourable opportunity to
rise, and the Migueletes and Somatenes of the
mountains about Lerida and Mequinenza, were,
under the command of Pereiia and Baget, already
in activity.
PENINSULAR WAR.
While Junot still held the command, Blake draw-
ing troops from Valencia and Tarragona, had joined
Lazan, and fixed his quarters at Morella, on the Ma y-
frontier of Aragon. Designing to operate in that
province rather than in Catalonia, he endeavoured
to re-kindle the fire of insurrection ; nor was for-
tune adverse to him, for a part of the garrison of
Monzon having made an unsuccessful marauding
excursion beyond the Cinca, the citizens fell upon
those who remained, and obliged them to abandon
that post, which was immediately occupied by Pe-
rena. The duke of Abrantcs then sent eight com-
panies of infantry and thirty cuirassiers to retake
the place, but Baget having reinforced Perena the
French were repulsed, and the Cinca suddenly over-
flowing behind them, cut off their retreat ; the ca-
valry, plunging with their horses into the river,
escaped by swimming, but the infantry finding the
lower passages guarded by the garrison of Lerida,
and the upper cut off by the partisan corps, after
three days marching and skirmishing surrendered*
The prisoners were carried to Tarragona, and soon
afterwards exchanged, in pursuance of the conven-
tion made by Reding and St. Cyr.
This slight success excited the most extravagant
hopes, and the garrison of Mequinenza having con-
trived to burn the bridge of boats which the French
had thrown over the Ebro at Caspe, Blake drove
the French from Beccyta and Val do Ajorfa, and
entered Alcanitz. The beaten troops retired with
loss to Samper and Ixar ; and it was at this moment
when* the quarters on both sides of the Ebro were
harassed, and the wings of the third corps separated
by the destruction of the bridge at Caspe, that
Suchet arrived to take the command of the third
96 HISTORY OF THE
corps. Finding his troops spread over a great tract
of country, and in danger of being beaten in detail,
Ma y- he immediately ordered general Habert to abandon
the left bank of the Ebro, cross that river at Fu-
entes, and follow in reserve upon Ixar, where Sa-
chet himself rallied all the rest of the troops, with
the exception of a small garrison left in Zaragoza.
The French battalions were fearful and disorderly :
but the general, anxious to raise their spirits,
Sachet's marched towards Blake on the 23d of May. The lat-
Memoirs. . er wag j n p OS ^ion in front of Alcanitz, and a bridge
over the Guadalupe was immediately behind his
centre, which was covered by a hill ; his left was
well posted near some pools of water, but his right
was rather exposed. The French had about eight
thousand infantry and seven hundred cavalry in the
field, and the Spaniards about twelve thousand of
all arms.
BATTLE OF ALCANITZ.
Suchet observing Blake's dispositions, judged,
that if he could carry the hill in the centre, and so
separate the Spanish wings, the latter would be cut
off from the bridge of Alcanitz, and obliged to sur-
render. In this design he directed a column against
each wing, to draw Blake's attention to his flanks,
and when the skirmishers were well engaged, three
thousand men, pushing rapidly along the main road
attacked the hillock ; but' a brisk fire of musketry
and artillery checked their progress, the Spaniards
stood firm, and the French, after a feeble effort to
ascend the hill, began to waver, and finally fled out-
right. Suchet, who was himself slightly wounded,
rallied them in the plain, and remained there for
the rest of the day, without daring to renew the
PENINSULAR WAR. 97
action. In the night, he retreated, but, although Cl ^ p
not pursued, his troops were seized with panic,
and, at day light, came pouring into Samper with M<iy.*
all the tumult and disorder of a rout. However,
Blake's inactivity enabled the French general to
restore order, and he caused the man who first
commenced the alarm to be shot ; then encouraging
the troops, that they might not seem to fly, he
rested in position two whole days, after which he
retreated to Zaragoza. This action at Alcanitz was
a subject of triumph and rejoicing all over Spain ;
the supreme junta conferred an estate upon Blake,
the kingdom of Murcta was added to his command,
his army rapidly augmented, and ho, greatly elated,
and confirmed in a design he had formed to retake
Zaragoza, turned his whole attention to Aragon and
totally neglected Catalonia. To the affairs of that
province it is now time to return.
St. Cyr remained in Barcelona for a considerable
period, during which he endeavoured to remedy
the evils of Duhesme's government, and to make
himself acquainted with the political disposition of
the inhabitants. He also filled the magazines with
three months' provisions, and, as the prisoners within
the walls were an incumbrance on account of their
subsistence, and a source of uneasiness from their
numbers, he resolved to send them to France. The
15th of April, having transferred his sick and
weakly men to the charge of Duhcsmc, and ex-
changed Chabran's for Lccchi's division, he marched
to Granollers, giving out that he was returning to
the frontier of France, lest the Catalans should
remove their provisions .from Vich, and thus frus-
trate his principal object. The Migueletes, under
Milans and Claros, had taken post on each side of
VOL* II. II
98 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK the long and narrow defile of Garriga, in the valley
of the Congosto, which they barricadoed with trees
and pieces of rock, and mined in several places.
Wimpfen with his corps was also at a little distance,
ready to join them at the first alarm, and hence,
when on the 16th Lecchi's division, escorting two
thousand prisoners, appeared at the head of the
defile, an action commenced ; but in an hour the
Migueletes fled on all sides ; for St. Cyr, fully
aware of the strength of the position, had secretly
detached Pino to attack Wimpfen, and, while Lecchi
was engaged at the entrance, Souham and Chabot,
traversing the mountains, arrived, the one upon
the flank, the other at the further end of this for-
midable pass. Thus on the 18th, the French were
established at Vich, and the inhabitants took to the
hills with their effects, but left their provisions
behind.
Chabot's and Pino's division were immediately
posted at Centellas, San Martin, Tona, and Col de
Sespino, to guard the entrances into the valley, but
Souham's division remained near the town, his right
being at Roda and Manlieu on the Ter, and his
advanced posts at Gurp, St. Sebastian, and St.
Eularia General Lecchi then marched with the
prisoners by Filieu de Pallerols to Besalu, and
although he was attacked several times on the
march, delivered his charge to general Reille, and
returned without loss, bringing news of Napoleon's
return to Paris, and of the approaching war with
Austria, On the other side, a moveable column
sent to Barcelona brought back the pleasing intel-
ligence that admiral Cosmao's squadron, baffling
the extreme vigilance of Lord Collingwood, had
reached that city with ample supplies. Thus, in
PENINSULAR WAR. 99
May, what may be called the irregular movements <^ p -
in Catalonia terminated, and the more methodical
1609
warfare of sieges commenced ,* but this part was May!
committed to other hands; general Verdier had
succeeded Reille in the Ampurdan, and marshal
Augereau was on the road to supersede St. Cyr.
OBSERVATIONS. 1. Although his marches
were hardy, his battles vigorous, and delivered in
right time and place, St. Cyr's campaign may be
characterised as one of great efforts without corres-
ponding advantages. He himself attributes this to
the condition of the seventh corps, destitute and
neglected because the emperor disliked ami wished
to ruin its chief; a strange accusation, and unsus-
tained by reason or facts. What ! Napoleon wil-
fully destroy his own armies ! sacrifice forty thou-
sand men, to disgrace a general, whom he was not
obliged to employ at all. St. Cyr acknowledges,
that when he received his instructions from the
emperor, he observed the affliction of the latter at
the recent loss of Dupont's force, yet ho would
have it believed, that, in the midst of this regret,
that monarch, with a singular malice, was preparing
greater disasters for himself, merely to disgrace the
commander* he was talking to, and why ? because
the latter had formerly served with the army of the
Rhine ! Yet St. Cyr met with no reverses in Cata-
lonia, and was afterwards made a marshal by this
implacable enemy.
2. That the seventh corps was not well sup-
plied, and its commander thereby placed in a diffi-
cult situation, is not to be disputed in the faoe of
the facts stated by St. Cyt ; but if war were a state
of ease and smoothness, the fame which attends
successful generals would kxe unmerited. Napoleon.
H 2
100 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK selected St Cyr because he thought him a capable
^ commander; in feeble hands, he knew the seventh
corps would be weak ; but, with St, Cyr at its
head, he judged it sufficient to overcome the Cata-
Ibniaus, nor was he much mistaken. Barcelona, the
great object of solicitude, was saved ; Rosas was
taken ; and if Tarragona and Tortosa did not also
fall, the one after the battle of Molino del Rey, the
other after that of Vails, it was because the French
general did not choose to attack them. Those
towns were without the slightest preparation for
defence, moral or physical, and must have surren-
dered ; nor can the unexpected and stubborn re-
sistance of Gerona, Zaragoza, and Valencia be cited
against this opinion ; these cities were previously
prepared and expectant of a siege, yet, in two in-
stances, there was a moment of dismay and confu-
sion, not fatal, only because the besieging generals
wanted that ready vigour which is the characteristic
of great captains.
3. St. Cyr, aware that a mere calculation of
numbers and equipment, is but a poor measure of
the strength of armies, exalts the enthusiasm and
the courage of the Catalans, and seems to tremble
at the danger which, owing to Napoleon's suicidal
jealousy, menaced at that period, not only the
seventh corps .but even the south of France. In
answer to this, vit may be observed that M. de St.
Cyr did not hesitate, with eighteen thousand men,
having no artillery and carrying only sixty rounds
of musket-ammunition, to plunge into the midst of
those terrible armies ; to march through the moun-
tains for whole weeks ; to attack the strongest posi-
tions with the bayonet alone, nay, even to dispense
with the use of his artillery, when he did bring it
PENINSULAR WAR. 101
into action, lest his men should not have a sufficient OHAP.
contempt for their enemies. And who were these '
undaunted soldiers, so high in courage, so confi-
dent, so regardless of the great weapon of modern
warfare ? Not the select of the imperial guards,
the conquerors in a hundred battles, but raw levies,
the dregs and scrapings of Italy, the refuse of Na-
ples and of Rome ; states which to name as military
was to ridicule. With such soldiers, the battles of
Cardadeu, Molino, Igualada, and Vails, were gained,
yet St. Cyr does not hesitate to call the Migueletes,
who were beaten at those places, the best light
troops in the world. The best light troops are nei-
ther more nor less than the best troops in the world ;
but if, instead of fifteen thousand Migueletes, the
four thousand men composing Wellington's light
division had been on the heights of Cardudeu, St.
Cyr's sixty rounds of ammunition would scarcely
have carried him to Barcelona. The injurious force
with which personal feelings act upon the judge-
ment are well known, or it might excite wonder,
that so good a writer and so able a soldier should
advance such fallacies.
4. St. Cyr's work, admirable iu many res*
pacts, bears, nevertheless, the stamp of carelessness.
Thus, he affirms that Duponfs march to Andalusia
encouraged the tumults of Aranjues ; but the tu-
mults of Aranjucs happened in the month of March*
nearly three months previous to Dupont's move-
ment, which took place in May and June ! Again,
he says, that, Napoleon, to make a solid couqtuest
in the Peninsula, should have commenced with Ca-
talonia, instead of overrunning Spain by the nor-
thern line of operations; an opinion quite unsustain-
able. The progress of the seventh corps was impeded
102 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK by the want of provisions, not by the enemy's force;
twenty thousand men could beat the Spaniards in
the field, but they could not subsist. To have in-
creased the number would only have increased the
difficulty. Would it have given a just idea of Na-
poleon's power, to employ the strength of his empire
against the fortified towns in Catalonia ? In what
would the greater solidity of this plan have con-
sisted? While the French were thus engaged, the
patriots would have been organizing their armies ;
England would have had time to bring all her
troops into line ; and two hundred thousand men
placed between Zaragoza and Tortosa, or breaking
into France by the western Pyrenees, while the
Austrians were advancing to the Rhine, would have
sorely shaken the solidity of general St. Cyr's plan.
5. The French emperor better understood what
he was about. He saw a nation intrinsically power-
ful and vehemently excited, yet ignorant of war and
wanting the aid which England was eager to give.
All the elements of power existed in the Peninsula,
and they were fast approximating to a centre, when
Napoleon burst upon that country, and as the
gathering of a water-spout is said to be sometimes
prevented by the explosion of a gun, so the rising
strength of Spain was dissipated by his sudden and
dreadful assault ; if the war was not then finished,
it was because his lieutenants were tardy and
jealous of each other. St. Cyr also appears to have
fallen into an error, common enough in all times,
and one very prevalent among the French generals
in Spain. He considered his task as a whole in
itself, instead of a constituent part of a greater
system. He judged very well what was wanting
for the seventh corps to subjugate Catalonia in a
PENINSULAR WAR. 103
solid manner ; but he did not discern that it was CHAP.
fitting that the seventh corps should forget Cata
Ionia, to aid the general plan, against the Peninsula.
Rosas surrendered at the very moment when Na-
poleon, after the victories of Baylen, Espinosa,
Tudela, and the Somosierra, was entering Madrid
as a conqueror ; the battles of Cardadeu and Mo-
lino del Rey may, therefore, be said to have com-
pletely prostrated Spain, because the English army
was isolated, the Spanish armies destroyed, and
Zaragoza invested. Was that a time to calculate
the weight of powder and the number of pick-axes
required for a formal siege of Tarragona? The
whole Peninsula was shaken to the centre, the
proud hearts of the Spaniards sunk with terror,
and in that great consternation, to be daring, was,
on the part of the French generals, to be prudent*
St. Cyr was not in a condition to besiege Tarragona
formally, but he might have assaulted it with less
danger than he incurred by his march to Barcelona.
The battle of Vails was another epoch of the same
kind ; the English army had then re-embarked, and
the route of Ucles had taken place, Portugal was
invaded and Zaragoza had just fallen. That was a
time to render victory fruitful, yet no attempt was
made against Tortosa.
6. St. Cyr, who justly blames Palacios and
Vives for remaining before Barcelona instead of
carrying their army to the Ter and the Fluvia,
seems inclined to applaud Reding for conduct
equally at variance with the true principles of war.
It was his own inactivity after the battle of Molino
that produced the army of Reding, and the impa-
tient folly of that army, and of the people, produced
HISTORY OF TOE
O<?K the plan .which led to the route of Igualada and
- the battle o Vails, Instead of disseminating thirty
thousand men on a line of sixty miles, from Tarra-
gona to the Upper Llobregat, Reding should have
put Tarragona and Tortosa into a state of defence,
and leaving a small corps of observation near the
former, Lave made Lerida the base of his operations.
In that position, keeping the bulk of his force in
one mass, he might have acted on St. Cyr's flanks
and rear effectually, by the lines of Cervera and
Momblanch and without danger to himself; nor
could the French general have attempted aught
against Tarragona.
But it is not with reference to the seventh corps
alone that Lerida was the proper base of the
Spanish army. Let us suppose that the supreme
junta had acted for a moment upon a rational
system ; that the Valencian troops, instead of re*
maining at Morella, had been directed on Lerida,
and that the duke of Infantado's force had been
carried from Cuemja to the same place instead
of being routed at Ucles. Then, in the beginning
of February, more than fifty thousand regular troops
would have been assembled at Lerida, encircled by
the fortresses of Monzon, Balaguer, Mequinenza,
Tarragona, and Tortosa, Its lines of operations
would have been as numerous as the roads. The
Seu d'Urgel, called the granary of Catalonia, would
have supplied corn, and the communication with
Valencia would have been direct and open. From
this central and menacing position, such a force
might have held the seventh corps in check, and
even raised the siege of Zaragoza ; nor could the
first corps have followed Infantado's movements
PENINSULAR WAR. 105
without .uncovering Madrid and abandoning
system of the emperor's operations against
and Andalusia.
70. The French general praises Reding's project
for surrounding the French, and very gravely ob-
serves that the only method of defeating it was by
taking the offensive himself. Nothing can be juster ;
but he should have added that it was a certain
method; and, until we find a great commander acting
upon Reding's principles, this praise can only be
taken as an expression of civility towards a brave
adversary. His own movements were very different ;
he disliked Napoleon personally, but lie did not
dislike his manner of making war ; Buonaparte's
campaign in the Alps against Beaulieu, was not
unheeded by his lieutenant. For one proceeding of
St. Cyr's, however, there is no precedent, nor is it
likely that it will ever be imitated. He stopped the
fire of his artillery, when it was doing infinite exe-
cution, the better to establish the moral ascendancy
of his troops. What a sarcasm on the courage of
his enemies ! What a complete answer to his own
complaints that Napoleon had maliciously given
him a hopeless task ! But, he says, his adversaries
were numerous and fought bravely ! Surely he
could not have commanded so long without know-
ing that there is in all battles a decisive moment,
when every weapon, every man, every combination
of force that can be brought to hear, is necessary to
gain the victory. Wilfully to neglect the means of
reducing the enemy's strength, previous to that cri-
tical period of an action, is a gross folly,
8. If general St. Cyr's own marc!he& aind bat-
tles did not sufficiently expose the fallacy of his
opinion** relative to the vigour of the Catalans,
106 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK lord CollingwoocTs correspondence would supply
the deficiency. That able and sagacious man,
writing at this period, says,
" In Catalonia, every thing seems to have gone
wrong since the fall of Rosas. The Spaniards are
in considerable force, yet are dispersed and panic-
struck whenever the enemy appears." " The ap-
plications for supplies are unlimited ; they want
money, arms, and ammunition, of which no use
appears to be made when they get them." " In
the English papers, I see accounts of successes,
and convoys cut off, and waggons destroyed, which
are not true. What has been done in that way has
been by the boats of our frigates, which have, in
two or three instances, landed men and attacked
the enemy with great gallantry. The Somatenes
range the hills in a disorderly way, and fire at a
distance, but retire on being approached." " The
multitudes of men do not make a force."
Add to this the Spanish historian Cabanes' state-
ments that the Migueletes were always insubordi-
nate, detested the service of the line, and were
many of tkern armed only with staves, and we
have the full measure of the Catalans* resistance.
It was not the vigour of the Catalans* but of the
English, that in this province, as in every part
of the Peninsula, retarded the progress of the
French. Would St. Cyr have wasted a month be^
fore Rosas ? ^V ould he have been hampered in his
movements by his fears for the safety of Barcelona ?
Would he have failed to besiege and take Tarra-
gona and Tortosa, if a French fleet had attended
his progress by the coast, or if it could even have
made two runs in safety ? To lord Collingwoocl,
who, like the Roman Bibulus, perished of sickness
PENINSULAR WAR. 107
on his decks rather than relax in his watching, to C1 * AP '
his keen judgement, his unceasing vigilance, the
resistance made by the Catalans was due. His
fleet it was, that interdicted the coast-line to the
French, protected the transport of the Spanish
supplies from Valencia, assisted in the defence of
the towns, aided the retreat of the beaten armies, in
short, did that which the Spanish fleets in Cadiz
and Carthagena should have done. But the su-
preme junta, equally disregarding the remonstrances
of lord Collingwood, the good of their own coun-
try, and the treaty with England, by which they
were bound to prevent their ships from falling into
the hands of the enemy, left their fleets to rot in
harbour, although money was advanced, and the
assistance of the British seamen offered to fit them
out for sea.
But having now related the principal operations
that took place in the eastern and central provinces
of Spain, so suddenly overrun by the French em-
peror; having shown that, however restless the
Spaniards were under the yoke imposed upon them
they were unable to throw it oft*, I must turn to
Portugal, where the tide of invasion still flowing
onward, although with diminished volume, was
first stayed and finally forced back by a counter
flood of mightier strength.
108 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK VI.
CHAPTER I.
TRANSACTIONS IN PORTUGAL.
BOOK WHEN sir John Moore marched from Lisbon,
1808 'the regency, established by sir Hew Dalrymple,
nominally governed that country ; but the weak
characters of the members, the listless habits en-
gendered by the ancient system of misrule, the
intrigues of the Oporto faction, and the general
turbulence of the people soon produced an alarming
state of anarchy. Private persons usurped the
functions of government, justice was disregarded,
insubordination and murder were hailed as indica-
tions of patriotism, and war was the universal cry j
yet military preparations were wholly neglected,
Appendix, for the nation, in its foolish pride, believed that
section i. the enemy had neither strength nor spirit for a
second invasion.
In Lisbon there was a French faction, the mer-
chants were apprehensive, the regency unpopular,
and the public mind unsettled ; in Oporto, the
violence of both people and soldiers was such; that
sir Harry Burrard sent two British regiments there,
by sea, to preserve tranquillity ; in fine, the seeds
of disorder were widely cast and sprouting vigor-
ously, before the English cabinet thought fit to
accredit a responsible diplomatist near the govern-
PENINSULAR WAR. 101
ment, or to place a permanent chief at the head of CHAP.
t^ forces left by sir John Moore. The convention
IftflA
oF Cintra was known in England in September ;
the regency was established and the frontier for-
tresses occupied by British troops in the same
month ; yet it was not until the middle of Decem-
ber that Mr. Villiers and sir John Cradock, charged
with the conduct of the political and military affairs
in Portugal, reached Lisbon ; thus the important
interval between the departure of Junot and their
arrival was totally neglected by the English cabinet.
Sir Hew Dalrymple, who had nominated the
regency; sir Arthur Well esley, wlio, to local know-
ledge ami powerful talents, added the influence of
a victorious commander ; Burrurcl, Spencer, all
were removed from Portugal on account of the
convention of Cintra at the very moment when the
presence of persons acquainted with the real state
of affairs, was essential to the well-being of the
British interests in that country. And this error
was the offspring of passion and incapacity ; for if
the treaty with Junot had been rightly understood,
the ministers, appreciating the advantages of it ?
would have resisted the clamour of the moment,
and the generals would not have been withdrawn
from the public service abroad, to meet unjust and
groundless charges at home,
It may be disputed whether Portugal was the
fittest theatre for the first operations of a British
army; but when that country was actually freed
from the presence of an enemy, when the capital
and the frontier fortresses were occupied by English
troops, when sir John Moore leaving his hospitals,
baggage, and magazines there, as m a place of
arms, had marched to Spain, the question was no
110 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK longer doubtful. The ancient relations between
England and Portugal, the greatness of the port of
Dec.' Lisbon, the warlike disposition of the Portuguese,
and, above all, the singularly happy circumstance,
that there was neither court nor monarch to balance
the English influence, and that even the nomination
of the regency was the work of an English general,
offered such great and obvious advantages as could
no where else be obtained. It was a miserable
policy that, neglecting such an occasion, retained
sir Arthur Wellesley in England, while Portugal,
like a drunken man, at once weak and turbulent,
was reeling on the edge of a precipice.
The 5th of December, 1808, sir John Cradock,
being on his voyage to Lisbon, touched at Coruna,
Fifteen hundred thousand dollars had just arrived
there in the Lavinia frigate, but sir John Moore's
intention to retreat upon Portugal being known,
Cradock divided this sum, and carried away eight
hundred thousand dollars ; proposing to leave a
portion at Oporto, and to take the remainder to
Lisbon, that Moore might find, on whatever line
he retreated, a supply of money.
From Coruna he proceeded to Oporto, where he
found that sir Robert Wilson had succeeded in
organizing, under the title of the Lusitanian Legion,
about thirteen hundred men, and that others were
on their way to reinforce him ; but this excepted,
nothing, civil or military, bespoke either arrange-
ment or common sense. The bishop, still intent
upon acquiring supreme rule, was deeply engaged
with secret intrigues, and, under him, a number
of factious and designing persons, instigated the
populace to violent actions with a view to profit
from their excesses. The formation of this Lusi-
PENINSULAR WAR. 1 1 1
tanian Legion was originally a project of the che- CHAP.
valier da Souza, Portuguese minister in London ;
he was one of the bishop's faction, and the legion Dec.'
was raised not so much to repel the enemy as to
support that party against the government; the
men were promised higher pay than any other
Portuguese soldiers, to the great discontent of the
latter, and they were clad in uniforms differing in
colour from the national troops* The regency, who
dreaded the machinations of the turbulent priest,
entertained the utmost jealousy of this legion,
which, in truth, was a most anomalous force, and
as might be expected from its peculiar constitution,
was afterwards productive of much embarrassment.
Sir John Cradock left three hundred thousand
dollars at Oporto, and directed the two British bat-
talions which were in that neighbourhood to march
to Almeida, then taking on board a small detach-
ment of German troops, he set sail for Lisbon.
Before his departure, he strongly advised sir Robert
Wilson to move such of his legionaries as were suffi-
ciently organized, to Villa Real, in Tras os Montes,
a place appointed by the regency for the assembly
of the forces in the north ; sir Robert, tired of the
folly and disgusted with the insolence and excesses
of the ruling mob, readily adopted this advice, so
far as to quit Oporto, but having views of his own,
went to Almeida instead of Villa Real.
The state of Lisbon was little better than that of
Oporto ; there was arrangement neither for present
nor for future defence, and the populace, albeit leas
openly encouraged to commit excesses, were quite
uncontrolled by the government* The regeacy had
a keener dread of domestic insurrection than of the PPS<UX,
JNO $
return of the French, whose operations they re- section 6 *
112 HISTORY OF THE
B V? K garded with even less anxiety than the bishop did,
as being further removed than he was from the im-
mediate theatre of war. Their want of system and
vigilance was evinced by the following fact. Sattaro
and another person, having contracted for the sup-
ply of the British troops, demanded in the name of
the English general, all the provisions in the public
stores of Portugal, and then sold them to the Eng-
lish commissaries for his own profit.
Sir John Cradock's instructions directed him to
reinforce Moore's army, and not to interfere with
that general's command if the course of events
brought him back to Portugal. In fact, his opera-
tions were limited to the holding of Elvas, Almeida,
and the capital ; for, although he was directed to
ippendix, enco -Q ra ge the formation of a native army upon a
i. g OOC [ au j regular system and even to act in concert
with it on the frontier, he was debarred from poli-
tical interference ; even his relative situation as to
rank, was left unsettled until the arrival of Mr.
Villiers, to whose direction all political and many
military arrangements were entrusted.
It is evident that the influence of a general thus
fettered, and commanding only a small scattered
force, must be feeble and insufficient to produce any
real amelioration in the military situation of the
country ; yet the English ministers, attentive only
to the false information obtained from interested
agents, still imagined that not only the Spanish,
but the Portuguese armies were numerous, and to
be relied upon ; and they confidently expected, that
the latter would be able to take an active- part in
the Spanish campaign. Cradock, feeling the dan-
ger of this illusion, made it big first object to trans-
mit home exact information of the real strength and
PENINSULAR WAR. 113
efficiency of the native regular troops. They were CHAP.
nominally twenty thousand. But Miguel Pereira
Forjas, military secretary to the regency and the Dec*
ablest public man Portugal possessed, acknowledged
that this force was a nullity, and that there were
not more than ten thousand stand of serviceable cradock'n
- i / Correspond
arms in the kingdom, the greatest part of which dence,
were English. The soldiers of the line were undis-
ciplined and unruly; the militia and the " ordenanza"
or armed peasantry, were animated by a spirit
of outrage rather than of enthusiasm, and evinced
no disposition to submit to regulation* Neither was
there any branch of administration free from the
grossest disorders, but especially the finances.
The Spanish dollar had a general acceptance hi
Portugal. The regency, under the pretence that a
debased foreign coin would drive the Portuguese
coin out of circulation, deprived the dollar of its
current value* This regulation being founded on a
falsehood though true in principle and applicable as
far as the Portuguese gold coin, which is of pecu-
liar fineness, was concerned, had a most injurious
effect. For the Spanish dollar was in reality finer
than the Portuguese silver cruzado-nova, and would
finally have maintained its value, notwithstanding
this decree, if the slur thus thrown upon it by the
government, had not enabled the money-changers
to run its value down for the moment ; a matter of
infinite importance, because the English soldiers
and sailors being all paid in these dollars, at four
shillings and sixpence which was the true value,
were thus suddenly mulcted fourpcuce in each, by
the artificial depreciation of the moment The 'men
attributed this to fraud in the shopkeepers, the
retail trade of Lisbon was interrupted, arid quarrels
VOL, [I. r
114 HISTOKY OF THE
BOOK between the tradesmen and the soldiers took place
hourly. To calm this effervescence, a second decree
Dec* was promulgated, directing that the dollar should
be received at the mint, and in the public offices, at
its real value; it then appeared that the govern-
ment could profit by coining the dollar of four shil-
lings and sixpence into cruzado-novas, a circum-
stance which gave the whole affair the appearance
of an unworthy trick to recruit the treasury. This
happened in October, and as all the financial affairs
were ill managed, and the regency destitute of
vigour or capacity, the taxes were unpaid, the hard
cash exhausted, and the treasury paper at a heavy
discount when Cradock arrived. Upon the scroll
thus unfolded he could only read confusion, danger
and misfortune ; and such being the fruits of vic-
tory, what could be expected from disaster ? yet at
this period, the middle of December, sir John Moore
was supposed to be in full retreat upon Portugal,
followed by the emperor with one French army,
while another threatened Lisbon by the line of the
Tagus.
The English troops in the kingdom did not
amount to ten thousand men, including the sick,
and they were ill equipped and scattered ; moreover,
the capital was crowded with women and children,
with baggage and non-combatants, belonging as
well to the army in Spain as to that in Portugal.
There were in the river three Portuguese ships of
the line, two frigates, and eight other smaller vessels
of war, but none were in a state for sea, and the
whole were likely to fall into the hands of the enemy,
for in the midst of this confusion the English admi-
ral sir Charles Cotton was recalled, without a suc-
cessor being appointed. The zeal and talents of
PENINSULAR WAR. 1 1 5
captain Halket, the senior officer on the station, C HA*-
amply compensated indeed for the departure of the
admiral as far as professional duties were concerned, Dec-'
but he could not aid the general, in dealing with the
regency as vigorously as an officer of higher rank,
and formally accredited, could have done*
Sir John Cradock, although fully sensible of his
own difficulties, with a very disinterested zeal, re-
solved to make the reinforcing of sir John Moore's
army his first care, but his force at this time was,
as I have already said, less than ten thousand men
of all arms. It consisted of eight British and four
German battalions of infantry, four troops of dra-
goons, and thirty pieces of artillery, of which, how-
ever, only six were horsed so as to take the field.
There was, also, a battalion of the 60th regiment,
composed principally of Frenchmen recruited from
the prison ships, but it had been sent back from
Spain, as the soldiers could not be trusted near their
countrymen. Of these thirteen battalions two were
in Abrantes, one in Elvas, three at Lamego on the
Duero, one in Almeida, and the remaining six at
Lisbon. Three of the four battalions iu the north
were immediately directed to join sir John Moore
by the route of Salamanca, and of those in the
south, two, accompanied by a demi-brigade of artil-
lery, were sent to him from Abrantes, by the road of
Castello Branco and Ciudad Rodrigo. Meanwhile
Mr. Villiers arrived, and sir John Cradock for-
warded to the regency a strong representation of
the dangerous state of Portugal.
He observed that there was neither activity in thfc
government nor enthusiasm among the people; that
the army, deficient in numbers, and still more so in
discipline, was scattered and neglected, and, not-
i 2
ll(j HISTORY OF THE
BOOK withstanding the aspect of affairs was so threaten-
- ing, the regency were apparently without any system,
D*C.' or fixed principle of action. He proposed, there-
dock's cor" fore, that a general enrolment of all the people
should take place, and from the British stores he
MSS
offered a supply of a thousand muskets and ten
thousand pikes. This giving of pikes to the people,
which appears to have been in compliance with Mr.
"Villiers' wishes, betrayed more zeal than prudence ;
a general levy, and arming with pikes of the turbu-
lent populace of a capital city, at such a conjunc-
ture, was more likely to lead to confusion and mis-
chief than to any effectual defence : the main objects
pressing upon the general's attention were however
sufficiently numerous and contradictory, to render
it difficult for him to avoid errors.
It was a part of his instructions, and of manifest
importance, to send reinforcements to sir John
Moore ; yet it was equally necessary to keep a
force towards the frontier on the line of the Tagus,
seeing that the fourth French corps had just passed
Appendix, tk a f. r ; ver a t Almaraz, had defeated Galluzzo's army
section i. an( j menaced Badajos, which was without arms,
ammunition, or provisions ; moreover, the populace
there, were in commotion and slaying the chief per-
sons. Now, sir John Cradock's instructions directed
him to keep his troops in a position that would
enable him to abandon Portugal, if a very superior
force should press him ; but as, in such a case, he
was to carry off the British army, and the Portu-
guese navy and stores, destroying what he could
not remove, and to receive on board his vessels all
the natives who might be desirous of escaping, it
was of pressing necessity to ship the women, chil-
dren, baggage, and other encumbrances belonging
PENINSULAR WAft. 117
to Moore's army, immediately, that his own rear CHAP.
might be clear for a sudden embarkation. In short,
1808
he was to send his troops to Spain, and yet defend Dec."
Portugal: to excite confidence in the Portuguese, NO. 4,
, , i - A scctioal.
and yet openly to carry on the preparations tor
abandoning that country. The populace of Lisbon
were, however, already uneasy at the rumours of an
embarkation, and it was doubtful if they would per-
mit even the British non-combatants to get on board
quietly, much less suffer the forts to be dismantled,
and the ships of war to be carried off, without a
tumult, which, at such a conjuncture, would have
been fatal to all parties* Hence it was imperative
to maintain a strong garrison in Lisbon and in the
forts commanding the mouth of the river; and this
draft, together with the troops absorbed by the
fortresses of Almeida and Elvas, reduced the fight-
ing men in the field to insignificance.
The regency, knowing the temper of the people,
and fearing to arm them, were not very eager to
enforce the levy ; anxious, however, to hide their
weakness, they promised, at the urgent solicitations
of the English general, to send six thousand troops
to Alcantara, on the Spanish frontier, with a view to
observe the march of the fourth corps, a promise
which they never intended, and were unable to per-
form. Indeed Forjas, who was supposed to be very
inimical to the British influence, frankly declared
that they neither could nor would move without an
advance of money, and sir John Cradock, although
he recommended that this aid should be given, had
no power to grant it himself.
Letters from sir John Moore, dated at Salamanca,
now reached Lisbon, and increased ih6 anxiety
to reinforce the army in Spain ; but as they clearly
118 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK showed that reverses were to be expected., Cradock,
although resolved to maintain himself in Portugal
Bee.* as long as it was possible to do so without a breach
of his instructions, felt more strongly that timely
preparation for an embarkation should be made;
especially as the rainy season, in which south-west
winds prevail, had set in, and rendered the depar-
ture of vessels from the Tagus very uncertain.
Meanwhile the internal state of Portugal was in no
wise amended, or likely to amend. The government
had, indeed, issued a decree, on the 23d of Decem-
ber, for organizing the population of Lisbon in six-
teen legions, but only one battalion of each was to
parade at the same moment for exercise, and those
only on Sundays ; nor were the legions at any time
to assemble without the order of the general com-
manding the province ; this regulation, which ren-
dered the whole measure absurd, was dictated by
the fears of the regency. A proposal to prepare
the Portuguese vessels for sea was acceded to, with-
out any apparent dissatisfaction, but the govern-
ment secretly jealous of their allies, fomented or
-encouraged discontent and suspicion among the
people. No efforts were made to improve the re-
gular force, none to forward the march of troops to
Alcantara, and so inactive or so callous were the
regency to the rights of humanity, that a number of
Appendix, French prisoners, captured at various periods by
the Portuguese, and accumulated at Lisbon* were
denied subsistence : sir John Cradock, after many
fruitless representations, was finally forced to charge
himself with their supply, to avert the horror of
seeing them starved to death. The provisions ne-
x, cessary for Fort La Lippe were also withheld, and
ection 5. general Leite, acting upon the authority of the re-
PENINSULAR WAR. ] 19
gency, strenuously urged that the British troops CHAP.
should evacuate that fortress.
The march of the reinforcements for sir John J>ec.'
Moore left only three hundred dragoons and seven
battalions available for the defence of Portugal ;
four of these battalions were necessarily in garrison,
and the remainder were unable to take the field
in default of mules, of which animal the country
seemed bereft ; yet, at this moment, as if in derision,
Mr. Frere, the central junta, the junta of Badajos,
and the regency of Portugal, were, with common
and characteristic foolishness, pressing sir John
Cradock to march into the south of Spain, although
there was scarcely a Spanish soldier there in arms
to assist him; and such a movement, if it had been MSS
either prudent or practicable, was directly against
his instructions.
Towards the end of December, the communica-
tion with sir John Moore was suddenly interrupted,
and the line of the Tagiis being menaced by the
fourth French corps acquired great importance.
The troops going from Eivas to the army in Spain
were therefore directed to halt at Castello Branco,
and general Richard Stewart, who commanded
them, being reinforced with two hundred cavalry,
was ordered, for the moment, to watch the roads
by Salvatierra ad the two Idanhas, and to protect
the flying bridges at Abrantes atkl Vilha Velha
from the enemy's incursions. At the same time, a
promise was obtained from the regency that all the
Portoguese troops in the Alemtejo should be col*
lected at Campo Mayor and Portalegre.
Sir John Cradock fixed trpofl Saeavew* a& the
position in which his main body should be concen-
trated, intending to defend that point as long as he MSS!'
120 HISTORY 6F THE
B <JOK could with so few troops. And as he knew that
Almeida, although full of British stores, and im-
1808. , . _ .
Dec. portant m every way, was, with respect to its own
defence, utterly neglected by the regency, who
regarded with jealousy even the presence of a
British force there, he sent brigadier-general A.
Cameron, with instructions to collect the conva-
lescents of Moore's army, to unite them with the
two battalions still at Almeida, and then to make
his way to the army in Spain ; but if that should
be judged too dangerous, he was to return to
Lisbon. In either case, the stores and the sick
men lying at Almeida were to be directed upon
Oporto. The paucity of cavalry was now severely
felt on the frontier, as it prevented the general from
ascertaining the real strength and objects of the
enemy's parties, and the Portuguese reports were
notoriously contradictory and false. The 14th dra-
goons, seven hundred strong, commanded by major-
general Cotton, had been disembarked since the
22d of December, and were destined for the army
in Spain ; but the commissary doubted if he could
forward that small body even by detachments, such
was the penury of the country or rather the diffi-
culty of drawing forth its resources, and as many
debts of sir John Moore's army were also still
unpaid, a want of confidence prevented the country
people from bringing in supplies upon credit.
In the midst of these difficulties, rumours of re-
verses in Spain became rife, and acquired import-
ance, when it became known that four thousand
infantry, and two thousand cavalry, the advanced
guard of thirty thousand French troops, were ac-
tually at Merida, on the road to Badajos, and this
latter town was, not only in a state of anarchy,
PENINSULAR WAR. 121
but destitute of provisions, arms, and ammunition. CHAP.
Had the Portuguese force been assembled at Alcan--
1808
tara, sir John Gradock would have supported it Dec."
with the British brigades, from Abrantes and Cas-
tello Branco, but not a man had been put in motion,
and he, feeling no confidence either in the troops
or promises of the regency, resolved to concentrate
his own army near Lisbon. General Stewart was,
therefore, directed to destroy the bridges of Vilha
Velba and Abrantes, ancl fall back to Sacavem.
Meanwhile, the Lisbon populace, supposing that
the English general designed to abandon them
without necessity, were violently excited; the
regency, either from fear or folly, made no effort
to preserve tranquillity, and the people proceeded
from one excess to another, until it became evident
that, in a forced embarkation, the British would
have to fight their allies as well as their enemies.
It was at this gloomy period, when ten marches
would have brought the French to Lisbon, when a
stamp of Napoleon's foot would have extinguished
that spark of war which afterwards blazed over the
Peninsula, that sir John Moore made his daring
movement upon Sahagun, and Portugal then gasp-
ing as in a mortal agony was instantly relieved*
122 HISTORY OF THE
CHAPTER II.
IT was the advanced guard of the fourth corps
" 77; that had approached Merida with the intention of
1808. i TI i
Dec. proceeding to Badajos, and the emperor was, as we
have seen, preparing to follow; but, in the night
of the 26th of December, an officer carrying the
N^Csec- * nte Mig enc e f Moore's movement, reached Merida,
uons i and anc j nex tnorning the French marching hastily to
the Tagus crossed it, and rejoined their main body
from which another powerful detachment was im-
mediately directed upon Placentia, This retrograde
movement having obviated the immediate danger,
sir John Cradock endeavoured to pacify the people
of Lisbon. Ordering Stewart's brigade, which had
been strengthened by two German battalions, to halt
at Santarem, he explained his own motives to the
Portuguese, and urged the regency to adopt a more
frank and vigorous system than they had hitherto
followed; for like the Spanish juntas, they promised
every thing, and performed nothing; neither would
they, although consenting verbally to all the mea-
sures proposed, ever commit themselves by writing,
No p | n se k av * n *k e despicable intention of afterwards dis-
tion5. claiming that which might prove disagreeable to
the populace, or even to the French. Sir John
Cradock, however, had no power beyond his own
personal influence to enforce attention to his wishes;
no successor to sir Charles Cotton had yet arrived,
and Mr* Villiers seems to have wanted the decision
PENINSULAR WAR. 123
and judgement required to meet such a momentous CHAP.
crisis.
In the north, general Cameron, having sent the
sick men and part of the stores from Almeida to-
wards Oporto, gave up that fortress to sir Robert
Wilson, and on the 5th of January, marched, with
two British battalions and a detachment of conva-
lescents by the Tras os Montes to join the army in
Spain. On the 9th, hearing of sir John Moore's
retreat to Coruna, he would have returned to Al*
meida, but Lapisse, who had taken Zamora, threat-
ened to intercept his line of march, whereupon he
made for Lamego and advised sir R, Wilson to re-
tire to the same place. Colonel Blunt, with seven
companies, escorting a convoy for Moore's army,
was likewise forced to take the road to Oporto, and
on that city all the British stores and detachments
were now directed. But notwithstanding the ge-
neral dismay, sir R. Wilson, who had been rein-
forced by some Spanish troops, Portuguese volun-
teers, and straggling convalescents of the British
army, rejected Cameron's advice, and proceeded to
practise all the arts of an able partisan that is to
say, enticing the French to desert, spreading false
reports of his own numbers, euid, by petty enter-
prizes and great activity, arousing a spirit of resist-
ance throughout the Ciudad Rodrigo country.
The continued influx of sick men and stores
at Oporto, together with the prospect of general
Cameron's arrival there, became a source of uneasi-
ness to sir John Cradock, Oporto, with a shifting*
bar and shoal water, is the worst possible h^fbtmr
for vessels to clear out> and one of the most dan*
gerous for vessels to lie off of at th&t season of the
year; wherefore, if the eaeroy advanced in force, a
124 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK great loss, both of men and stores, was to be anti-
- - cipated. The departure of sir Charles Cotton had
January, diminished the naval means, and for seventeen Suo
cessive days, such was the state of the wind, no
vessel could leave the Tagus. Captain Halket,
however, contrived at last to send to Oporto ton-
nage for two thousand persons, and undertook to
keep a sloop of war off that place; sir Samuel Hood
also despatched some vessels from Vigo ; but the
weather continued for a long time so unfavourable
that the transports could not enter the harbour, and
the encumbrances hourly increasing, at last pro-
duced the most serious embarrassments.
Sir John Moore having now relinquished his
communications with Portugal, sir John Cradock
had to consider how, relying on his own resources,
he could best fulfil his instructions and maintain
his hold of that country, without risking the utter
destruction of the troops intrusted to his care.
For an inferior army Portugal has no defensible
frontier. The rivers, generally running east and
west, are fordable in most places, subject to sudden
rises and falls, offering but weak lines of resistance,
and with the exception of the Zezere, presenting no
obstacles to the advance of an enemy penetrating
by the eastern frontier. The mountains, indeed,
afford many fine and some impregnable positions ;
but such is the length of the frontier line and the
difficulty of lateral communications, that a general
who should attempt to defend it against superior
forces would risk to be cut off from the capital if
he concentrated his troops; and if he extended
them his line would be immediately broken. The
possession of Lisbon constitutes, in fact, the pos-
session of Portugal, south of the Douro, and an
PENINSULAR WAR. 125
inferior army can only protect Lisbon by keeping CHAP.
close to the capital.
1 AOQ
Sensible of this truth, sir John Cradock adopted janua.'y.
the French colonel Vincente's views for the defence
of Lisbon, and proceeded, on the 4th of January,
with seventeen hundred men, to occupy the heights
behind the creek of Sacavem leaving, however,
three thousand men in the forts and batteries at
Lisbon. At the earnest request of the regency, who
in return promised to assemble the native troops at
Thomar, Abrantes, and Villa Velha, he ordered
general Stewart's, brigade, two thousand seven hun-
dred strong:, to halt at Santarem ; but the men had sirjoha
&\ , . Ciadock's
been marching: for a month under incessant rain, Correspon-
11 i - dcnce >
their clothes were worn out, their equipments
ruined, and in common with the rest of the army
they wanted shoes. Cameron was now on the
Douro, Kemmis with the 40th regiment at Elvas,
and the main body under Cradock being between
Santarem and Lisbon, the army not exceeding ten
thousand men, but with the encumbrances of an
<0
army of forty thousand, was placed on the three
points of a triangle, the shortest side of which was
above a hundred and fifty miles. The general
commanding could not bring into the field above
five thousand men, nor could that number be as?
sembled in a condition for service at any one point
of the frontier under three weeks or a month ;
moreover, the uncertainty of remaining in the
country at all rendered it difficult to feed the
troops, for the commissioners being unatyle to make
large contracts for a fixed time, were forced to carry
on, as it were, a retail system of supply.
It was at this moment of extreme weakness, that
Mr, Frere, with indefatigable folly, wfcs urging sir
126 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK John Cradock to make a diversion in Spain, by the
' line of the Tagus, and Mr. Villiers was as earnest
that he should send a force by sea to Vigo; but his
instructions prescribed the preservation of Lisbon,
Elvas, and Almeida, the assembling, in concert with
the native government, of an Anglo-Portuguese
army on the frontier, and the sending of succours
to sir John Moore. Cradock's means were so scanty
that the attainments of any one of those objects
was scarcely possible, yet Mr. Canning writing
officially to Mr. Villiers at this epoch, as if a mighty
and well furnished army was in Portugal, enforced
the " necessity of continuing to maintain possession
of Portugal, as long as could be done with the force
intrusted to sir John Cradock's command, remember-
ing always that not the defence of Portugal alone,
but the employment of the enemy's military force,
and the diversion which would be thus created in
favour of the south of Spain, were objects not to be
abandoned^ except in case of the most extreme neces*
sity? The enemy's military force ! It was three
hundred thousand men, and this 'despatch was a
pompous absurdity. The ministers and their agents
eternally haunted by the phantoms of Spanish and
Portuguese armies, were incapable of perceiving
the palpable bulk and substance of the French
hosts ; the whole system of the cabinet was one of
shifts and expedients; every week produced a fresh
project, and minister and agent alike followed his
own views without reference to any fixed principle;
the generals were the only persons not empowered
to arrange military operations.
The number of officers employed to discover the
French movements soon enabled Cradock, although
his direct communications were interrupted, to ob-
PENINSULAR WAR. 127
tain intelligence of Moore's advance towards Saha- n
gun ; wherefore, he again endeavoured to send a -
reinforcement into Spain by the way of Almeida. Jauuaiy.
The difficulty of getting supplies, however, finally
induced him to accede to Mr. Villiers* wishes, and
on the 12th of January he shipped six hundred sir John
cavalry and thirteen hundred infantry, meaning to Corre$pon-
send them to Vigo; but while they were still in the MSS!'
Tagus, intelligence of the retreat upon Coruna was
received, and these troops were again disembarked.
The 14th of January the Conqueror line-of-
battle-ship, having admiral Berkeley on board,
reached Lisbon, and for the first time since sir : ra c
John Cradock took the command of the troops in
Portugal, he received a communication from the
ministers in England. It now appeared that their
thoughts were less intently fixed upon the defence
of Portugal than upon getting possession of Cadiz.
Their anxiety upon this subject had somewhat sub-
sided after the battle of Vimeira, but it revived
with greater vigour when sir John Moore, con-
templating a movement in the south, suggested the
propriety of securing Cadiz as a place of arms ;
wherefore in January an expedition was prepared
to sail for that town, with the design of establishing
a new base of operations for the English army : the
project failed, but the following particulars of the
transaction afford ample proof of the perplexed
unstable nature of the minister's policy,
NEGOTIATION" FOR THE OCCUPATION OF CA0I55.
While it was still unknown in England that the
supreme junta had fled from Aranjuez, sir George __
Smith, who had conducted Spencer's negotiation ^
in 1808, was again sent to Cadia to prepare the
128 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK way for the reception of an English garrison. Four
- thousand men destined for this service were then
1809
embarked at Portsmouth and general Sherbrooke
who commanded them, was first directed to touch
at Lisbon on his way to Cadiz ; he was afterwards
desired to make for Coruna to be at the order of
sir J. Moore, yet finally, his force being increased
to five thousand men, he sailed on the 14th of
January for Cadiz, under his first instructions.
Mr. Frere was then directed to negotiate for the
admission of these troops into Cadiz, as the only
condition upon which a British army could be em-
ployed to aid the Spanish cause in that part of the
Peninsula.
As the reverses in the north of Spain became
known, the importance of Cadiz increased, $nd
the importance of Portugal decreased in the eyes
of the English ministers. Sir John Cradock was
Appendix, ma( j e ac q ua i n ted with Sherbrooke's destination, an4
was himself commanded to obey any requisition for
that naight be made by the Spanish junta ;
so independent of the real state of affairs were
the ministerial arrangements, that Cradock, whose
despatches had been one continued complaint of his
inability to procure horses for his own artillery, was
directed to furnish them for Sherbrooke's.
Sir George Smith, a man somewhat hasty, but
pf remarkable , seal and acuteness, left England
about the middle of December. On his arrival at
Cadiz, he at once discovered that there, as in every
other part of the Peninsula, all persons being en-
gaged ia theories or intrigues, nothing useful for
defence was executed ; the ramparts of the city
were, in tolerable condition, but scarcely any guns
were mounted, while, two miles in front of the
PENINSULAR WAR. 129
town, an outwork had been commenced upon such CHAP.
a scale that it could not possibly be finished under
four months, and, after the slow mode of Spanish February,
proceedings, would have taken as many years to
complete. For a solid defence of all the fortifica-
tions, sir George Smith judged that twenty thou-
sand good troops would be requisite, but that ten
thousand would suffice for the city ; there were,
however, only five thousand militia and volunteers
in the place, and not a regular soldier tinder arms,
neither any within reach. The number of guns
mounted and to be mounted exceeded four hundred,
and to serve them, two hundred and fifty peasants
and volunteers, who being enrolled, and clothed
in uniforms were called artillery-men.
Knowing nothing of sir John Moore's march to
Sahagun, sir George Smith naturally calculated
upon the immediate approach of the French ; where-
fore seeing the helpless state of Cadiz, and being
assured that the people would willingly admit an
English garrison, he wrote to sir John Cradock for
troops. The latter, little thinking that, at such
a conjuncture, the supreme junta would be more
jealous of their allies than fearful of their enemies ;
judging also, from the tenor of his latest instruc-
tions, that obedience to this requisition would be Mss *
consonant to the minister's wishes, immediately
ordered colonel Kemmis to proceed from Elvas with
the fortieth regiment, by the route of Seville ; at
the same time, embarking three thousand of the
best troops at Lisbon, he sent them also direct to
Cadiz, This force, commanded by major-general
Mackenzie, sailed the 2d February, and reached
their destination the 5th of the same month. Mean-
while, Mr. Frere, although acquainted with
VOL, II* K
130 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK sailing of Mackenzie's armament was ignorant that
sir George Smith had applied to the governor of
y. Cadiz for permission to take military possession of
that town ; for Smith had no instructions to cor-
respond with Mr. Frere, and the latter had opened
a separate negotiation with the central junta at
Seville, in which he endeavoured to pave the way
for the occupation by proposing to have the troops
admitted as guests, and he sent Mr. Stuart to
arrange this with the local authorities.
Mr. Frere had meddled much with the personal
intrigues of the day, and he was, moreover, of
too slender a capacity to uphold the dignity and
just influence of a great power on such an occasion.
The flimsy thread of his negotiation soon snapped
under the hasty touch of sir George Smith. For
the supreme junta, averse to every thing that threat-
ened to interrupt their course of sluggish indolence,
had sent the marquis de Villel, a member of their
own body, to Cadiz, avowedly to prepare the way
for the admission of the troops, but, in reality, to
thwart that measure, and the circumstance of Mac-
kenzie's arrival, with an object different from that
announced by Mr* Frere, was instantly taken ad-
vantage of to charge England with treachery. The
pe^ 1 ; isio. junta, knowing Mr. Frere to be their own dupe,
believed, or affected to believe, that he was also
the dupe of the English minister, and that the
whole transaction was an arti6ce, on the part of
the latter, to get possession of the city with a
Appendix, felonious intent. The admission of the British
No * 9 - troops was nevertheless earnestly desired by the
inhabitants of Cadiz, and of the neighbouring
towns ; and this feeling was so well understood by
Mr, Stuart and sir George Smith, that they would,
PENINSULAR WAR. 131
the reluctance of the supreme junta,
have brought the affair to a good conclusion ; but,
notwithstanding the reluctance of the supreme junta, CHAP,
"IQfjQ
at the most critical period of the negotiation, the
former was sent on a secret mission to Vienna by
the way of Trieste, and the latter who was in bad
health died about the same period ; thus the nego-
tiation failed for want of a head to conduct it.
General Mackenzie, like sir George Smith,
thought that the object might be attained. He
observed, indeed, that the people, far from sus-
pecting any danger, were ignorant cf, or incredulous
of the reverses in the north, that nothing had been
done towards equipping the fleet for sea, and that,
notwithstanding the earnest remonstrances of ad-
miral Purvis and Mr. Stuart, the Spaniards would
neither work themselves nor permit the English
sailors to work for them ; but he also saw that the
public feeling was favourable to the British troops
and the good will of the people was openly ex-
pressed. The affair was, however, now entirely in
the hands of Mr. Frere.
In the course of the negotiations carried on by
that minister, the supreme junta had proposed,
1. That the troops should land at Port St.
Mary's, to be quartered there and in the neighbour-
ing towns. 2. That they should join Cuesta's
army .-^-3. That they should go to Catalonia,
4. That they should be parcelled out in small
divisions, to be attached to the different Spanish
armies. Nay, untaught by their repeated disasters,
and pretending to hold the English soldiery cheap,
those self-sufficient men proposed that the British
should garrison the minor fortresses on the, coast,
in order to release an equal *mmber of Spaniards
for the field,
K2
]32 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK Mr Frere wished to accept the first of these
' proposals, but general Mackenzie, sir George Smith,
and Mr. Stuart agreed that it would be injurious
for many reasons, not the least urgent of which
was, that as the troops could not have been em-
barked again without some national dishonour, they
must have marched towards Cuesta, and thus have
been involved in the campaign without obtaining
that which was their sole object, the possession of
Cadiz as a place of arms.
Mr. Frere then suggested a modification of the
second proposal, namely, to leave a small garrison
in Cadiz, and to join Cuesta with the remainder of
the troops. At this time sir G. Smith was dead ;
Mr. Stuart had embarked for Trieste, and general
Mackenzie, reluctant to oppose Mr. Frere's wishes,
consented to march, if the necessary equipments
for his force could be procured ; but he observed,
that the plan was contrary to his instructions, and
fto the known wishes of the English government,
and liable, in part, to the same objections as the
first proposition. This was on the 18th of Feb-
ruary, and on the 22d, a popular tumult com-
menced in Cadiz, For the supreme junta, desirous
to shew that the city did not require an English
garrison, to protect it, had sent there two regiments,
composed of Poles, Germans, and Swiss, deserters
or prisoners, and the people, aware that the juqta
disliked and intended to disarm the volunteers
of Cadiz, were justly offended that deserters should
be trusted in preference to themselves. They
stopped the couriers, opened the despatches from
Seville, and imprisoned the marquis of Villel, who
was obnoxious, because, while mild to persons
suspected of favouring the French, he had harshly
PENINSULAR WAR. 13!
or rather brutally punished some ladies of rank*
Proceeding from one violence to another, the popu
lace then endeavoured to kill the state prisoners, February
and being prevented in that, committed other ex-
cesses, and murdered don Joseph Heredia, the
collector of public rents. During the tumult, which
lasted two days, the disembarkation of the English
troops was repeatedly called for by the mob, and
two British officers being sent on shore as mediators,
were received with enthusiasm, and obeyed with
respect, a manifest proof of the correct view taken
by sir George Smith.
The 24th, tranquillity was restored, and on the
25th, general Mackenzie, not having received from
Mr. Frere an answer to his letter of the 18th, sug-
gested that of the three English battalions then 'in Append,,,
the harbour, two should be placed in Oadiz, aixd No * 9 '
that the third, proceeding to Seville, should there
unite with the 40tb regiment, and both together
riiarch to join Cuesta. Mr. Frcrc, however, instead
of addressing the junta with an authority and dig-
nity becoming the representative of a great nation
on whose support the independence of the whole
Peninsula rested, had been endeavouring to gain
his end by subtlety. The object was one tliat
England had a right to seek, the Spanish rulers no
right to refuse, for the people wished to further it,
and the threat of an appeal to them would soon
have silenced the feeble negative of such a despi-
cable and suspected government; Mr. Frere/ i'n-
capable of taking a single and enlarge^ view,
pressed a variety of trifling points, and discussed
them with the secretary of the junta, with more
regard to epistolary dexterity than useful diplo-
macy. And when hi opponent conceded the great
134 HISTORY OF THE
B $i K P* nt of admitting troops at all, he broke off the
negotiation, upon the question whether the number
to be admitted should be one or two thousand men ;
as if the way to drive a wedge was with the broad
end foremost.
Self-baffled in that quarter, the British plenipo-
tentiary, turning towards Cuesta, the avowed enemy
of the junta and one much feared by them, sought
to secure his assistance by holding out the lure of
having a British force added to his command, but
the sarcastic old general derided the diplomatist.
u Although I do not," said he, " discover any great
difficulty in the actual state of things, which should
prevent his British majesty's troops from garrisoning
Cadiz under such terms, and for the purpose which
your excellency proposes, I am far from supposing
that the supreme junta, which is fully persuaded of
the importance of our union with England, is not
grounded in its objections ; and your excellency
knows that it is sufficient that they should have
them, to prevent my giving any opinion on so im-
portant a measure, unless they should consult me.
With regard to the 4 } 300 men, which your excel-
lency is pleased to mention, there is no doubt that
I stand in need of them ; but I flatter myself, Eng-
land, sensible of the importance of Estremadura,
will even lend me much greater assistance, particu-
larly if from any change of circumstances the
supreme junta should no longer manifest the repug-
nance we speak of."
This answer having frustrated the projected in-
trigue, Mr. Frere, conscious perhaps of diplomatic
incapacity, returned with renewed ardour to the
task of directing the military affairs, in every part
of the Peninsula. He had seen an intercepted letter
PENINSULAR WAR, 135
of Soult"s, addressed to the king, in which the
project of penetrating into Portugal was mentioned, --
and immediately concluding that general Macken- February.
zie's troops would be wanted for the defence of
that kingdom, counselled him to abandon Cadiz
and return to Lisbon; but the general, who knew
that, even should he return, a successful defence of
Portugal with so few troops would be impossible,
and that every precaution was already taken for an
embarkation in the last extremity, observed, that
" the danger of Lisbon rendered the occupation of
Cadiz more important/'
General Mackenzie's reply was written the 26th
of February. On the 3d of March he received
another despatch from Mi% Frere. Cadiz, and the
danger of Portugal, seemed to have passed from
the writer's mind, and were unnoticed ; entering
into a minutely inaccurate statement of the situation
of the French and Spanish armies, he observed, that
Soult having failed in an attempt to penetrate Por-
tugal by the Minho, it was impossible from the po-
sition of the Spanish forces > assisted as they wtre by
the Portuguese, that he could persevere in his plan,
Wherefore, he proposed that the British force then
in the harbour of Cadiz should proceed immediately
to Tarragona to aid Reding, and this wild scheme
was only frustrated by an unexpected despatch from
sir John Cradock, recalling the troops to Lisbon. No ' 8 "
They arrived there on the 12th of March, and thus
ended a transaction clearly indicating an unsettled
policy, shallow combinations, a bad choice of agents
on the part of the English cabinet, and a most un-
wise and unworthy disposition in the supreme junta.
General Mackenzie attributed the jealousy of the
latter to French influence ; Mr. Frere to the abrupt
136 HISTORY OF THE
proceedings of sir George Smith, and to fear 5 lest
the junta of Seville, who were continually on the
watch to recover their ancient power, should repre-
sent the admission of the British troops as a trea-
sonable proceeding on the part of the supreme go-
vernment. It is ? however^ evident that the true
cause was the false position in which the English
ministers had originally placed themselves, by in-
undating Spain with arms and money, without
asserting their just influence, and making their as-
sistance the price of good order and useful exertion.
PENINSULA!! WAR. 137
CHAPTER III.
THE effort made to secure Cadiz was an act of CHAP.
disinterested zeal on the part of sir John Cradock ; ' ,
for the absence of his best troops exposed him to January.
the most galling peevishness from the regency, and
to the grossest insults from the populace. Nor
with his reduced force, could he expect to hold
even a contracted position at the extremity of the
rock of Lisbon against the weakest army likely to
invade Portugal; and as there was neither a native
force nor a government to be depended upon, there
remained for him only the prospect of a forced
and, consequently, disgraceful embarkation, and
the undeserved obloquy that never fails to follow
disaster.
In this disagreeable situation, as Elvas and Al-
meida no longer contained British troops, his atten-
tion was necessarily fixed upon Lisbon, and upon
Oporto which the violence of the gales had rendered
a sealed port ; meanwhile, the hospitals and maga-
zines of Almeida, and even those of Salamanca
being sent to Lamego, had crowded that place with
fifteen hundred sick men, besides escorts and hourly
accumulating stores ; and as the Douro had over-
flowed, the craft could not ply ; one large boat
attempting to descend was overset, when eighty
persons, soldiers and others, perished. General
Cameron also, hearing of this confusion, relin-
quished the idea of embarking at Oporto, and re-
crossing the Douro made for Lisbon, where he
arrived the beginning of February with two thou-
138 HISTORY OF THE
sand men, worn with fatigue by a march of eight
hundred miles under continued rains. Sir Robert
Wilson had sent his guns to Abrantes, by the road
of Idanha Nova, but partly from a spirit of ad-
venture, partly from an erroneous idea that sir John
Cradock wished him to defend the frontier, he re-
' ect ' l * mained with his infantry in the neighbourhood of
Ciudad Rodrigo. His force had been increased by
a Spanish detachment under Don Carlos d'Espana,
and by some volunteers, yet it was still weak, and
his operations were necessarily confined to a few
trifling skirmishes : however his imagination so far
outstripped his judgment, that when he had only
Lppcndix, felt the advanced post of a single division, he ex-
ect. i. pressed his conviction that the French were going
to abandon Spain altogether.
Sir John Cradock entertained no such false ex-
pectations, he was informed of the battle of Coruna
and the death of Moore, and he knew too well the
vigour and talent of that general to doubt that he
had been oppressed by an overwhelming force. He
knew that Zaragoza had fallen, and that twenty-
five thousand French troops were thus free to act
in other quarters ; that Soult with at least twenty
thousand men was on the Minho ; that Romana
was incapable of making any head ; that Portugal
was one wide scene of helpless confusion ; that a
French army was again in the neighbourhood of
Merida threatening Lisbon by the line of the Tagus ;
in fine, that his own embarrassments were hourly
increasing, and that the moment was arrived when
the safety of his troops was the chief consideration.
The tenor of the few despatches he had received
?iof *' fr m England led him to suppose that the ministers
ct ' * designed to abandon Portugal ; but, as their inton-
PENINSULAR WAtt 139
tions on that head were never clearly explained, he
resolved to abide by the literal interpretation of his -
first instructions, and to keep his hold of the coun- February.
try as long as it was possible to do so without
risking the utter destruction of his army. To avoid
that danger, he put every incumbrance at Lisbon
on board the transports in the Tagus, dismantled
the batteries at the mouth of the river, and in con-
cert with the admiral, made preparations for carry-
ing away or destroying the military and naval stores
in the arsenal. At the same time he renewed his
efforts to embark the sick men and stores at Oporto,
but the weather continued so unfavourable that he
was finally obliged to remove the invalids and stores
by land ; yet he could not procure carriages for the
whole.
After the arrival of Cameron's detachment, the
effective British force under arms, including con-
valescents and fifteen hundred stragglers from sir
John Moore's army, was about eight thousand men ;
and when the security of the forts and magazines,
and the tranquillity of Lisbon, was provided for,
only five thbusand men, and those not in the best
order, could be brought into the field. As this
force was infinitely too weak to cover such a town
as Lisbon, the general judged that it would be
unwise to take up a position in advance, whence
lie should be obliged to retreat through the midst
of a turbulent and excited population, which had
already given too many indications of ill-temper to
leave any doubt of its hostility under such circum-
stances. He, therefore, came to the resolution of
withdrawing from Saccavem and Lisbon, to concen-
trate his whole force on a position at Passa D'Arcos
near the mouth of the river, where he could embark sect. 2^3.
140 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK with least danger, and where he had the best chance
> O f defending himself, if necessary, against superior
Febma'ry. numbers.
This reasoning was sound, and Cradock's inten-
tion was, undoubtedly, not to quit Portugal, unless
driven from it by force or in pursuance of orders
from England ; his arrangements, however, seem to
have carried more the appearance of alarm than
was either politic or necessary; the position of
Passa D'Arcos might have been prepared, and the
means necessary for an embarkation secured, and
yet the bulk of the troops kept in advance until the
last moment. To display a bold and confident front
in war is, of all things, the most essential, as well
to impose upon friends as upon enemies, and sir
John Cradock did not fail to experience the truth
of this maxim. The population of Lisbon, alarmed
by the reverses in Spain, yet, like all the people in
the Peninsula, confident in their own prowess and
resolution until the very moment of attack, became
extremely exasperated; the regency, partly from
their natural folly and insincerity but more from
the dread of the lower orders, countenanced, if thfcy
did not instigate, the latter to commit excesses, and
to interrupt the proceedings of the British naval
Appendix, and military authorities. The measures of precau-
ticm 6.' scc "tion relative to the forts had originated with the
regency, yet they now formally protested against
them, and with a view to hamper the general, en-
couraged their subalterns to make many false and
even ridiculous charges against the British execu-
tive officers ; and it would appear that the remon-
strances of the admiral and generals were but im-
perfectly supported by Mr. Villiers.
In this manner the people's violence was nourished
PENINSULAR WAR. 141
until the city was filled with tumult ; mobs armed CHAP.
with English pikes and muskets collected night and
day in the streets and on the high-roads, and under February.
the pretext of seeking for and killing Frenchmen,
attacked indiscriminately all foreigners, even those ^2*^^'
in the British service wearing the British uniform/ 10116 "
The guards who endeavoured to protect the victims
of this ferocity were insulted ; couriers passing
with despatches were intercepted and deprived of
their papers ; English officers were outraged in the
streets, and such was the audacity of the people that
the artillery was placed in the squares in expecta-
tion of an affray. The state of Lisbon was similar
to what it had been at the period of Junot's con-
vention, and if the British had abandoned the
country at this time, they would have been assailed
with as much obloquy by the Portuguese ; for such
has been, and will be, the fate of all unsuccessful
auxiliaries : a reflection that should render histo-
rians cautious of adopting accusations upon the
authority of native writers on the like occasions.
This spirit wa& not confined to Lisbon. In
Oporto the disposition to insult the British was
more openly encouraged than in the capital ; the
government of the multitude was more decidedly
pronounced and from the cities it spread to the vil-
lages. The people of the Alemtejo frontier were
indeed remarkably apathetic, but from the Minh
to the Tagus the country was in horrible confusion ;
the soldiers were scattered without regard to mill-
-I -i i / * *
tary system, and being unpaid lived at free qijaiv **<>* &
ters ; the peasantry of the country assembling in
bands, and the populace of the towns in wjobs,
intercepted the communications, appointed or dis-
placed the generals at their pleasure, and massacred
142 TIISTOHY OF THE
BOOK all persons of whom they were suspicious ; the
ammunition which had been supplied from Eng-
February. land was wasted by constant firing in token of
insubordination, and as if the very genius of con-
fusion was abroad, some of the British troops,
principally malingerers* of sir John Moore's army,
Appendix, added their quota of misconduct, to increase the
No. 6, sec- A
general distress.
The leading instigator of the excesses at Oporto
was one Raymundo, a coadjutor and creature of
the bishop's, a turbulent and cruel fellow, who by
taking a share in the first insurrection against the
French obtained a momentary influence, and has
since been elevated, by a very credulous English
writer, into a patriotic hero. He was, however, a
worthless coward, fitted for secret villany, incapable
of a noble action, and only suited to this state of
anarchy, which being productive of so much misery
and danger, caused many of the upper classes to
despair of their country's safety by war, and in-
creased the number of those who, wishing to attach
themselves to the fortune of France, were ready to
accept of a foreign prince for their sovereign, if
with him they could obtain tranquillity and an ame-
liorated constitution. When soon afterwards, the
edge of the enemy's sword falling upon the sense-
less multitude filled the streets of Oporto with
blood, there was a powerful French party IB Por-
tugal. Nevertheless the bulk of the people were
stanch in their country's cause ; they were furious
and disorderly but imbued with hatred of the
French, ready at the call of honour, and suscep-
tible of discipline, without any loss of energy.
* A name given by the soldiers to mcu who, under pretence of sick-
ness, shrink from the performance of their dutievS in the field.
PENINSULA71 WAR. 143
The turbulence of the citizens, the remonstrances CHAP.
of the regency, and the representations of Mr. '
Villiers, who was in doubt for the personal safety March,
of the British subjects residing in Lisbon, convinced
sir John Cradock that political circumspection and
adroitness, were as important as military arrange-
ments to prevent a catastrophe at this critical pe-
'riod; hence, as contrary to what might have been
expected the enemy had not yet made any actual
movement across the frontier, he suspended his
design of falling back to Passa D'Arcos. In this
unsettled state, affairs remained until March, when
intelligence arrived that the French fleet was at
sea, whereupon two of the line-of-battle ships in
the Tagus were despatched to reinforce sir Thomas
Duckworth's squadron, and the batteries at the
mouth of the river were again armed. Meanwhile,
Soult was making progress in the north, the anarchy
at Oporto was continually increasing, and the En-
glish government had certainly come to the resolu-
tion of abandoning Portugal if the enemy advanced;
for, although sir John Cradock was not informed of
their views, an officer in England, well acquainted
with Portuguese customs, had actually received
orders, and even embarked, to aid the execution of
this measure, when suddenly the policy of the
cabinet once more changed, and it was resolved to
reinforce the army. This resolution, which may
be attributed partly to the Austrian war, partly to
the failure at Cadiz, partly to the necessity of
satisfying public opinion in England, was however
accompanied by a measure, which laid the first
solid basis on which to build a reasonable hope of
success.
The Portuguese government, either spontane-
144 HISTORY OP THE
BOOK ously, or brought thereto by previous negotiation,
had offered the command of their troops with the
Ifl09
March, title of marshal, to an English general ; and the
No. p 6? 1X ' British ministers accepting this offer, promised sup-
plies of arms, ammunition, clothing, and a subsidy
for the payment of a certain number of regular
soldiers, thus obtaining a firm hold of the military
resources of Portugal, and gaining for the first time
a position in the Peninsula suitable to the dignity of
England and the contest in which she was engaged.
The Portuguese desired to have sir Arthur Wel-
lesley, but he refused the offer, and it is said that
sir John Murray, he who afterwards failed at
Taragona, sir John Doyle, and even the marquis
of Hastings, a man undoubtedly well qualified,
sought for the office ; but powerful parliamentary
interest prevailing, major-general Beresford was
finally chosen, and at the same time received the
local rank of lieutenant-general, to the great discon-
tent of several officers of superior rank, who were
displeased that a man without any visible claim to
superiority should be placed over their heads.
Information of this change was immediately sent
to sir John Cradock, and general Sherbrookc was
ordered to repair to Lisbon, The latter was close
to Cadiz harbour when the orders overtook him,
and his and Mackenzie's divisions arrived together
in the Tagus on the 12th of March. Thus the fete
of Portugal was again fixed by England* But if
Mr. Frere's plan had been followed if Mackenzie
had proceeded to Taragona, and nothing but foul
weather prevented him, if Sherbrooke's voyage
had not been delayed by storms, and that sailing
about from port to port, he had, as is most pro-
bable, been engaged in some other enterprise if
PENINSULAR WAU. 145
Victor, obeying his orders, had marched to Abrantes &*AI\
if any of these events had happened, sir John
Cradock must have abandoned Portugal, and then Maici.
how infinitely absurd the proceedings of the En-
glish ministers would have appeared, and how
justly their puerile combinations would have ex-
cited the scorn of Europe.
Marshal Beresford reached Lisbon early in March,
and after some negotiation, received from the re-
gency power to appoint British officers to the com-
mand of regiments, and to act without control in
any manner he should judge fitting to ameliorate
the condition and discipline of the Portuguese
forces; and this was the more important as the
military polity of Portugal, although fallen into
disuse, was severe, precise, and admirably calcu-
lated to draw forth the whole strength of the nation.
The army could be completed by coercion ; the
militia were bound to assemble by regiments, and
liable to any service within the frontiers ; and the
whole of the remaining male population could be
enrolled under the name of ordtmangas, numbered
by battalions in their different districts, and obliged
under very severe penalties to assemble, at the
orders of the local magistrates, either to work, to
fight, to escort convoys, or in any manner to aid
the operations of the army.
This affair arranged, Beresford fixed his quarters
at Thomar and collected the Portuguese troops in
masses. He then proceeded to recast their system
on the model of the British army and commenced,
with stern but wholesome rigour a reform that in
process of time, raised out of chaos an obedient,
well disciplined, and gallant force, worthy of a
high place among the best in Europe : for the Par-
venu n. i,
146 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK tuguese people, though easily misled and excited
1 ,to wrath, are of a docile orderly disposition, and
very sensible of just and honourable conduct in
their officers. This reform was however not effected
at once, nor without many crosses and difficulties
being raised by the higher orders and by the go-
vernmentdifficulties that general Beresford could
never have overcome, if he had not been directed,
sustained, and shielded, by the master spirit under
whom he was destined to work. The plan of giving
to English officers the command of the Portuguese
troops was at first proceeded on with caution ; but
after a time, the ground being supposed safe, it
was gradually enlarged, until almost all the military
situations of importance were held by Englishmen,
which combined with other causes, gave rise to
numerous intrigues, not confined to the natives,
and, as we shall find, in after times seriously
threatening the power of the marshal, the ex-
istence of the British influence, and even the suc-
cess of the war.
Sir John Cradock's situation was now materially
alleviated. The certainty of the Austrian war had
produced a marked change in the disposition of the
regency; the arrival of Sherbrooke's and Macken-
zie's divisions increased the British force to four-
teen thousand men, and the populace became more
cautious of offering insults. About the middle of
March, two thousand men being left to maintain
tranquillity in Lisbon, the remainder of the army
was encamped at Lumiar and Saccavem, and while
these things were passing at Lisbon, the aspect of
affairs changed also in pther parts of the kingdom.
For the bulk of the Portuguese regular troops,
amounting to ten or twelve thousand men, was col-
PENINSULAR WAR. J47
lected by marshal Beresford, between the Tagus c *^ p *
and the Mondego ; and beyond the valley of the -
Mondego, colonel Trant had assembled a small
corps of volunteers, students from the university,
and general Vittoria was at the head of two regular
battalions in Upper Beira. The bishop of Oporto
was preparing to defend that town, with a mixed,
but ferocious and insubordinate multitude; gene-
ral Silveira, with four or five thousand men, had
taken post in the Tras o$ Montes, and Romana,
who had collected seven or eight thousand at Mon-
terey, was in communication with him. Sir Robert
Wilson, who was at the head of about three thou-
sand men, had withdrawn the legion from Almeida,
and sent a detachment to Bejar, but remained him-
self on the Agueda, watching the advanced posts
of Lapisse. A few Portuguese regiments were ex-
tended from Salvatierra and Idanha to Alcantara;
a permanent bridge of boats was laid over the
Tagus at Abrantes, and there were small garrisons
in that town and at Elvas.
All these forces united would not, however, with
the exception of the British, have been capable of
sustaining the shock of ten thousand French soldiers
for half an hour, and the whole mass of the latter,
then hanging on the frontier of Portugal, was above
fifty thousand ; gathering like clouds on the hori-
zon, they threatened many points, but gave no cer-
tain indication of where the storm would break*
Soult, indeed, with about twenty thousand men,
was endeavouring to pass the Minho ; but Lapisse,
although constantly menacing Ciudad Rodrigo, ke^t
his principal masses at Salamanca and Ledesma,
and Victor had concentrated his betWeen the Al-
L 2
148 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK berclie and the Tietar. Hence Lapisse might join
' either Soult or Victor, and the latter could march
by Placentia against Ciudad Rodrigo, while the
former attacked Oporto ; or he might draw Lapisse
to him, and penetrate Portugal by Alcantara; he
might pass the Tagus, attack Cuesta, and after de-
feating him pursue him to Seville, or, turning short
to the right, enter the Alemtejo.
In this uncertainty, sir John Cradock, keeping
the British concentrated at Lumiar and Saccavem,
waited for the enemy to develope his plans, and in
the mean time endeavoured to procure the necessary
equipments for an active campaign* He directed
magazines to be formed at Coimbra and Abrantes,
urged the regency to exertion, took measures to
raise money, and despatched officers to Barbary to
procure mules. But while thus engaged, came in-
telligence that Victor having suddenly forced the
passage of the Tagus at Almarax was in pursuit
of Cuesta on tho road to Merida ; that Soult,
having crossed the Minlio and defeated Romana
and Silveira, was within a few leagues of Oporto ;
that Lapisse had made a demonstration of assault-
ing Ciudad Rodrigo. The junta of Oporto vehe-
mently demanded aid from the regency, and the
latter, although not much inclined to the bishop's
party, proposed that sir John Cradock uniting a
pa*t of the British forces to the Portuguese troops
under marshal Beresford, should march to the suc-
cour of Oporto, Bercsford was averse to trust the
Portuguese under his immediate command, among
the disorderly multitude of that city; but he
thought the whole of the British army should move
in a body to Leiria, and from thence cither push 00
PENINSULAR WAR. 149
to Oporto or return according to the events that CHAP.
might occur in the latter town, and he endeavoured -
to persuade Cradock to follow this plan. March.
It was doubtful, he said, if Victor and Soult in-
tended to co-operate in a single plan, but on the
supposition that it was so, he considered it essen- Appendix,
tial to drive back or overcome one before the other section'i.
could come to his assistance. Victor was then in
pursuit of Cuesta ; if he continued that pursuit, it
must be to enter Seville or to cripple his opponent
previous to the invasion of Portugal ; in either case
he would be in the Sierra Morena before he could
hear of the march from Leiria, and as Cradock had
daily intelligence of his movements, there would
be full time to relieve Oporto and return again to
the defence of Lisbon. If however Soult depended
on the co-operation of Victor, he would probably
remain on the right of the Douro until the other was
on the Tagus; and Lapisse also would be contented
for the present with capturing Ciudad Rodrigo and
Almeida.
This unsound reasoning did not weigh with sir
John Cradock, who resolved to preserve his central
position, covering the capital at such a distance as
to preclude the danger of being cut off from it
by one army while he was engaged with another,
Portugal, he observed, was in a state of anarchy
equally incompatible with firm resistance and rapid
movements; the peasantry were tumultuous and
formidable to everybody but the enemy; Beresford
himself acknowledged that the regular forces were
mutinous, disregarding their officers, chosing when
and where to rest, when to fight, when to remain in
quarters, and altogether unfit to be trusted within
the circle of the Oporto mischief. The British
150 HISTORY OF THE
WOK troops, therefore, were the only solid resource;
but they were too few to divide, and must act in a
1809.
March, body, or not at all. Lisbon and Oporto were the
enemy's objects; which was it most desirable to
protect? the former was of incomparably greater
importance than the latter ; the first was near, the
second two hundred miles off; and, although the
utmost exertions had been made, the army was not
yet equipped for an active compaign. The troops
were ill-clothed and wanted shoes ; the artillery
was unhorsed, the commissariat possessed only a
fourth part of the transport necessary for the con-
veyance of provisions and ammunition ; and no ac-
tivity could immediately supply these deficiencies,
inasmuch as some of the articles required were not
to be had in the country, and to obtain others the
interference of the regency was necessary, but
hitherto all applications to that quarter had been
without any effect. Was it wise then to commence
offensive operations in the north? The troops of
Soult and Lapisse united, were estimated at thirty
thousand men, of which above five thousand were
cavalry; the British could only bring fifteen guns
and twelve thousand men, of all arms, into the
field ; yet if they marched with the avowed inten-
tion of relieving Oporto they must accomplish it, or
be dishonoured !
But was it consistent with reason to march two
hundred miles in search of a combat, which the
very state of Oporto would render it almost impos-
sible to gain, and for an object perhaps already lost?
Suspicion was alive every where > if Oporto was
already taken the army must come back and that
would be the signal for fresh tumults for renewed
cries that the country was to be abandoned; Lisbon
PENINSULAR WAR. 1 5 1
would instantly be in a state of insurrection, and c ^ r p -
would be even more favourable to the British than
the enemy; besides, it was impossible to reckon .Maicb.
upon Cuesta's aid in keeping Victor employed. He
was personally inimical to the English, and his
principal object was to gain time for the increase
and discipline of his own force. Victor was ap-
parently pursuing Cuesta, but his parties had al-
ready appeared in the neighbourhood of Badajos,
and there was nothing but a weak Portuguese gar-
rison in Elvas to impede his march through the
Alemtejo. To cover Lisbon and the Tagus was
the wisest plan. Fixed in some favourable posi-
tion, at a prudent distance from that capital, he
could wait for the reinforcements he expected from
England, and he invited the Portuguese troops to
unite with him ; a short time would suffice to esta-
blish subordination ; and then the certainty that the
capital could not be approached, except in the face
of a really formidable army, would not only keep
the enemy m check, but, by obliging him to collect
in greater numbers for the attempt, would operate
as a diversion in favour of Spain.
The general soundness of this reasoning is appa-
rent ; and it must not be objected to sir John Cra-
dock that he disregarded the value of a central
position, which might enable him to forestall the
enemy. If the latter should march on his flank
against Lisbon, the difficulty of obtaining true in-
telligence from the natives, and his own want of
cavalry, rendered it utterly unsafe for him to divide
his army, or to trust it any distance from the ca-
pital. Marshal Beresford's plan, founded on the
supposition that Cradock coxtld engage Soult at
Oporto, and yet quit him and return at his pleasure
152 HISTORY OF TI1E
to Lisbon if Victor advanced, was certainly falla-
cums; the advantages rested on conjectural, the
jrcii. disadvantages on positive data : it was conjectural
that they could relieve Oporto, it was positive that
they would endanger Lisbon. The proposition was
however not made upon partial views and insomuch
was advantageously contrasted with the projects of
other men, less qualified to advise, who at this
period pestered sir John Cradock with projects of
a different stamp, and only deserving of notice, as
showing that the mania for grand operations, which
I have before marked as the malady of the time,
was still raging.
To make a suitable use of the British army was
the object of all these projectors but there was a
marvellous variety in their plans. The regency
desired that the Portuguese and British troops
should co-operate for the relief of Oporto, and yet
protect Lisbon, objects which were incompatible.
Beresford advised that only the English army should
march. The bishop was importunate to have some
British soldiers placed under his command, and he
recalled sir Robert Wilson to the defence of Oporto.
It appeared reasonable that the legion should defend
the city in which it was raised, but Mr. Frere wrote
from Seville, that sir Robert would do better to
remain; he therefore accepted Spanish rank, and
refusing obedience to the prelate's orders, retained
his troops. The regency, glad of the opportunity,
approved of this proceeding, and adopted the le-
as a national corps. Meanwhile Romana was
Correspon- i ^ -i i /* t
aenco, earnest with Cradock for money, and wanted to
have a thousand British soldiers sent to aid the in-
surrection at Vigo; but at the same time, Mr. Frerc,
and colonel D'Urban, a corresponding officer, placed
PENINSULAR VVAE. 153
by Cradock at Cuesta's head-quarters, proposed
other plans of higher pretensions. ^
Zaragoza, said he, has fallen, and ten thousand March.
French troops being thus released, are marching
towards Toledo, this is the moment to give a fatal
blow to marshal Victor ! It is one of those critical
occasions that seldom recur in war ! In a day or
two sir Robert Wilson will be on the Tietar with
two thousand five hundred men ; augment his force
with a like number of Portuguese, who may be
drawn from Sobreira, Idanha, and Salvatierra, he
shall thus turn the right and rear of Victor's army ;
and his movement cannot be interrupted by the
French force now at Salamanca and Alva, because
the communication from thence to the Tagus by
the passes of Banos and Tornevecas is sealed up.
While sir Robert Wilson thus gets in the rear of
Victor with five thousand men, Cuesta, with twelve
thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, shall
attack the latter in front ; a matter of easy execu-
tion, because Cuesta can throw a pontoon bridge
over the Tagus near Almaraz, in an hour and a
half, and the Conde de Cartoajal, who is at Man-
zanares in La Mancha, with ten thousand infantry
and two thousand horse, will keep Sebastiani in
check. The hope is great, the danger small, and
if a few British troops can be added to the force
on the Tietar, the success will be infallible !
There were, however, some grave objections to
this infallible plan. General Cuesta was near Al-
maraz, sir John Cradock was at Lisbon, and sir
Robert Wilson was at Ciudad Rodrigo. Their cir-
cuitous line of correspondence was thus above four
hundred miles long, and it is not very clear how the
combination was to be effected with that rapidity,
which was said to be essential to the success ; nei-
154 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK ther is it very evident, that operations to be com-
bined at such a distance, and executed by soldiers
March, of different nations, would have been successful at
all. On the one side, twenty thousand raw Portu-
guese and Spanish levies were to act on double
external lines of operation ; on the other, twenty-
five thousand French veterans waited in a central
position, with their front and flanks covered by the
Tagus and the Tietar. In such a contest it is pos-
sible to conceive a different result from that anti-
cipated by colonel D'Urban.
Mr. Frere's plans were not less extensive, nor
less sanguine. When his project for assisting Ca-
talonia had been frustrated, by the recal of general
Mackenzie from Cadiz, he turned his attention to
' ^ ie nort h- Soult, he wrote to sir John Cradock,
tired of the resistance he has met with, will pro-
bably desist from his " unaccountable project of
entering Portugal, and occupying Gallicia at the
same time'' Let the British army, therefore, make
a push to drive the enemy out of Salamanca and
the neighbouring towns, while the Asturians, on
their side shall take possession of Leon and As-
torga, and thus open the communication between the
northern and southern provinces. Fearing, however,
that if this proposal should not be adopted, the
English general might be at a loss for some enter-
prise, Mr. Frere also recommended that the British
army should march to Alcantara, and that the
fortieth regiment, which hitherto he had retained
at Seville, contrary to sir John Cradock's wishes,
should join it at that place ; and then, said he, the
whole operating by the northern bank of the Tagus,
may, in concert with Cuesta, " beat the French out
of Toledo, and consequently out of Madrid"
Now, with respect to the first of these plans,
PENINSULAR WAR. 155
Soult never had the intention of holding Gallieia,
which was marshal Ney's province; but he did -
propose to penetrate into Portugal, and he was not March.
likely to abandon his purpose because the only
army capable of opposing him was quitting that
kingdom, and making a " push ? * of four hundred
miles to drive Lapisse out of Salamanca; moreover,
the Asturians were watched by general Bonnet's
division on one side, and by Kellerman on the ^
J Ar
other ; and the fifth corps, not ten but fifteen thou-
sand strong, having quitted Zaragoza, were at this
time in the Valladolid country, close to Leon and
Astorga.
With respect to the operations by the line of the
Tagus, which were to drive Joseph out of Madrid,
and consequently to attract the attention of all the
French corps, it is to be observed, that sir John
Cradock could command about twelve thousand men,
Cuesta sixteen thousand, Cartoajal twelve thousand,
making a total of forty thousand. But Soult had
twenty-three thousand, Lapisse nine thousand, Vic-
tor was at the head of twenty-five thousand, Sebas-
tiani could dispose of fifteen thousand, Mortier of a
like number, the king's guards and the garrison of
Madrid were twelve thousand, making a total of
nearly a hundred thousand men. Hence while Mr.
Frere and colonel D'Urban, confiding in Soulf s in-
activity, were thus plotting the destruction of Victor
and Sebastiani, the first marshal stormed Oporto ;
the second, unconscious of his danger, crossed the
Tagus, and defeated Cuosta's army at Medellm,
and at the same moment Sebastiani routed Cartoa-
jal's at Ciudad Real.
J56 HISTORY OF THE
CHAPTER IV.
BOOK HAVING described the unhappy condition of
Portugal and given a general view of the transac-
i Jan." tions in Spain, I shall now resume the narrative of
Soult's operations, thus following the main stream
of action ; for the other marshals were appointed to
tranquillize the provinces already overrun by the
emperor, or to war down the remnants of the
Spanish armies, but the dulce of Dalmatia's task
was to push onward in the course of conquest. Nor
is it difficult to trace him through the remainder of
a campaign, in which, traversing all the northern
provinces, fighting in succession the armies of three
different nations, and enduring every vicissitude of
war, he left broad marks of his career, and certain
proofs that he was an able commander and of a
haughty resolution in adversity.
It has been observed, in a former part of this
work, that the inhabitants of Coruiia honourably
maintained their town until the safety of the fleet
which carried sir John Moore's army from the Spa-
nish shores was secure ; they were less faithful to
their own cause. Coruna might have defied irre-
gular operations, and several weeks must have
elapsed before a sufficient battering train could have
been brought up to that comer of the Peninsula ;
yet a short negotiation sufficed to put the French
in possession of the place on the 1 9th of January,
aad the means of attacking Ferrol were immediately
organized from the, resources of Coruna.
PENINSULAR WAR. 157
The harbour of Ferrol contained eight sail of the
line and some smaller ships of war ; the fortifica
tions were regular, with an abundance of artillery Jan.
and ammunition ; the garrison was seven or eight
thousand strong, consisting of soldiers, sailors, ci-
tizens, and armed countrymen, willing to fight, but
the chiefs were treacherous. After a commotion in
which the admiral, Obregon, was arrested, his suc-
cessor, Melgarejo, surrendered upon somewhat bet-
ter terms than those granted to Coruna, and thus in
ten days were reduced two regular fortresses, which
with more resolution might have occupied thirty
thousand men for several months.
While yet before Ferrol the duke of Dalmatia
*
received the following despatch, prescribing the
immediate invasion of Portugal :
" Before his departure from this place, (Valla-
dolid,) the emperor foreseeing the embarkation of
the English army, drew up instructions for the
ultimate operations of the duke of Elchingen and
yourself. He orders that when the English army
shall be* embarked you will march upon Oporto
with your four divisions, that is to say, the divi-
sions of Merle, Mermet, Delaborde, and Heudelet,
the dragoons of Lorge, and La Houssaye, and
Franceschi's light cavalry, with the exception of
two regiments that his majesty desires you to turn
over to the duke of Elchingen, in order to make up
his cavalry to four regiments."
" Your ' corps (Farm&e? composed of seventeen
regiments of infantry and ten regiments of cavalry,
is destined for the expedition of Portugal, in- com*
bination with a movement the duke of Belluno is
going to effect General Loison, some engineers,
staff and commissiarat officers, and thirteen Portu-
158 HISTORY OF THE
all of whom belonged to the army formerly
in Portugal under the duke of Abrantes, have re-
1809. . , . . - - - i* \ i i
Jan. ceived instructions to join you immediately, and
you can transmit your orders for them to Lugo.
This is the 21st of January, and it is supposed you
cannot be at Oporto before the 5th of February, or
at Lisbon before the 16th. Thus, at that time,
namely, when you shall be near Lisbon, the * corps
(farmed of the duke of Belluno, composed of his
own three divisions, of the division Lcval, and of
ten or twelve regiments of cavalry, forming a body
of thirty thousand men, will be at Merida, to make
a strong diversion in favour of your movement, and
in such a mode,, as that lie can push the hand of a
column upon Lisbon if you find any great obstacles
to your entrance, which it is, however, presumed
will not be the case."
" General Lapisse's division of infantry, which
is at this moment in Salamanca, and general Mau*
petit's brigade of cavalry, will, when you shall be
at Oporto, receive the duke of Istria's orders to
march upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Abrantcs, where
this division will again be under the command of
the duke of Belluno, who will send it instructions
to join him at Mcrida : I let you know this that you
may be aware of the march of Lupisse, on your
left flank, as far as Abrantes* Such are the last
orders I am charged to give you in the name of the
emperor : you will have to report to the king and
to receive his orders for your ulterior operations*
The emperor has unlimited confidence in your
talents for the fine expedition that he has charged
you with,"
ALEXANDER,
Prince of Ntttfchatel, $c*
PENINSULAR WAR. 159
It was further intended, by Napoleon, that when CHAP.
Lisbon fell, marshal Victor should invade Anda
lusia, upon the same line as Dupont had moved Jan."
the year before ; and like Dupont, he was to have
been assisted by a division of the second corps,
which was to cross the Guadiana and march on
Seville. Meanwhile, the duke of Elchingen, whose
corps, reinforced by two regiments of cavalry and by
the arrival of stragglers, amounted to near twenty
thousand men, was to maintain Gallicia, confine the
Asturians within their own frontier line, and keep
open the communication with the second corps.
Thus, nominally eighty thousand, and in reality
sixty thousand men, wiere disposed for the conquest
of Lisbon ; and in such a manner that forty thou-
sand would, after that had been accomplished, have
poured down upon Seville and Cadiz, at a time
when neither Portugal nor Andalusia were capable
of making any resistance* It remains to shew from
what causes this mighty preparation failed.
The gross numbers of the second corps amounted Waste*.
/> i -i i T\ , T * rolls of the
to forty-seven thousand; but general Bonnets dm- French ar-
sion remained always at St. Ander, in observation
of the eastern Asturian frontier, eight thousand
were detached for the service of the general com-
munications, and the remainder had, since the 9th
of November, been fighting and marching inces-
santly among barren and snowy mountains ; hence,
stragglers were numerous, and twelve thousand men
were in hospital The force, actually under arms,
did not exceed twenty-five thousand men, worn
down with fatigue, barefooted, and without ammu-
nition* They had outstripped their commissariat, Journal of
,, ., , , , ,, , * Operations
the military chest was not come up, the draft am*
mals were reduced in number, and extenuated by
160 HISTORY OF THE
fatigue, the gun-carriages were shaken by conti-
- nual usage, the artillery pare was still in the rear;
Jan.* and as the sixth corps had not yet passed Lugo,
two divisions of the second corps were required
to hold Coruna and Ferrol. Literally to obey the
emperor's orders was consequently impossible,
wherefore Soult taking quarters at St. Jago di
Compostella, proceeded to re-organize his army.
Ammunition was fabricated from the loose powder
found in Coruna; shoes were obtained partly by re-
quisition, partly from the Spanish magazines, filled
as they were with stores supplied by England ; the
artillery were soon refitted and the greatest part of
the stragglers were rallied. In six days, the mar-
shal thought himself in a condition to obey his
orders, and, although his troops were still suffering
from fatigue and privation, he marched, on the 1st
of February, with nineteen thousand infantry, four
thousand cavalry, and fifty-eight pieces of artillery;
but, to understand his operations, the state of Gal-
licia and the previous movements of Romana must
be described.
When the Spanish army, on the 2d of January,
crossed the line of sir John Moore's march, it was
already in a state of disorganization. Romana,
with the cavalry, plunged at once into the deep
valleys of the Syl and the Minho; the artillery and
apart of the infantry were overtaken and cut up
by Franceschi's cavalry, the remainder wandered in
bands from one place to another, or dispersed to
seek food and shelter among the villages in the
mountains. General Mendizabcl, with a small body,
halted in the Val des Orres, and placing guards at
^ e ^ uerl ^ e ^ e Bibey, a point of singular strength
for defence, he purposed to cover the approaches
PENINSULAR WAR. 161
to Orense on that side ; but Romana himself, after CHAP.
wandering for a time, collected two or three thou
sand men, and took post, on the 1 5th, at Toabado, Jan.'
a village about twenty miles from Lugo. Mean-
while Ney arrived at that place, having previously
detached some cavalry from Villa Franca to scour
the valleys on his left, and he had also sent Mar-
chand's division by the road of Orense to St. Jago
and Coruna. Marchand dispersed MendizabeTs
troops on the 17th, and after halting some days at
Orense, where he established an hospital, continued
his march to St. Jago. Now this defeat of Mendi-
zabel and the subsequent movements of Marchand's
division completed the dispersion of Romanes army ;
the greatest part throwing away their arms, returned
to their homes, and he himself, with his cavalry,
and the few infantry that would follow him, crossed
the Minho, passed the mountains, and descending
into the valley of the Tamega, took refuge on the
21st, at Oimbra, a place on the frontier of Portu-
gal, close to Monterey where there was a small
magazine, collected for the use of sir John Moore's
army.
In this obscure situation, unheeded by the French,
he entered into communication with the Portuguese
general Silveira, and with sir John Cradock, de-
manding money and arms from the latter; he endea-
voured also to reassemble a respectable body of
troops, but Blake and other officers deserted him,
and these events and the general want of patriotic
spirit drew from him the following observation:
" I know not wherein the patriotism, so loudly
" vaunted, consists; any reverse, any mishap
" prostrates the minds of these people, and,
" thinking only of saving their own persons, they
VOL. II. M
\2 HISTORY OF THE
LOOK sacrifice their country and compromise their
" commander."
Jan/ The people of Gallicia, poor, scattered, living
hardly, and, like all mountaineers, very tenacious
of the little property they possess, disregarded poli-
tical events which did not immediately and visibly
affect their interests. They were therefore with the
exception of those in the sea-port towns, but slightly
moved by the aggression of the French, as long as
that aggression did not extend to their valleys, and
hence, at first, they treated the English and French
armies alike. Sir David Baird's division in its
advance paid generously for supplies, yet it was
regarded with jealousy and defrauded. So alt's and
Moore's armies, passing like a whirlwind, were
beheld with terror and the people fled from both.
The British and German troops that marched to
Vigo being conducted without judgment, were li-
centious, and as their number was small, the people
murdered stragglers, and showed without disguise
their natural hatred of strangers. On several occa-
sions, parties sent to collect cars for the convey-
ance of the sick, had to sustain a skirmish before
the object could be obtained, and five officers, mis-
led by a treacherous guide, were scarcely saved
from death by the interference of an old man,
whose exertions, however, were not successful until
one of the officers had been severely wounded iu
the head. On the other hand, general Marchand
discovered so little symptoms of hostility, during
his march to Orense, that he left his hospital at
that town without a guard, under the joint care of
Spanish and French surgeons, and the duties of
humanity were faithfully discharged by the former
without hindrance from the people.
PENINSULAR WAR. 163
However this quiescence did not last long; the
French generals were obliged to subsist their troops --
by requisitions extremely onerous to a people whose Jan."
property chiefly consisted of cattle. The many
abuses and excesses which always attend this mode
of supplying an army soon created a spirit of ha-
tred that Romana laboured incessantly to increase,
and he was successful ; for though a bad general,
he possessed intelligence and dexterity suited to the
task of exciting a population. Moreover the monks
and friars laboured to the same purpose; and while
Romana denounced death to those who refused to Romans
take arms, the clergy menaced eternal perdition ; Manifesto "
and all this was necessary, for the authority of the
supreme junta was only acknowledged as a matter
of necessity not of liking. Gallicia, although ap-
parently calm, was therefore ripe for a general
insurrection at the moment when the duke of
Dalmatia commenced his march from St. Jago di
Compostella.
From that town several roads lead to the Minho.
The principal one, running by the coast line, crosses
the Ulla, the Umia, the Vedra, and the Octaven,
and passes by Pontevedra and Redondela to Tuy,
a dilapidated fortress situated on the Spanish side
of the Minho. The second, crossing the same rivers
nearer to their sources, passes by the Monte de
Tenteyros, and entering the valley of the Avia,
follows the course of that river to Ribidavia, a
considerable town, situated at the confluence of the
Avia with the Minho and having a stone bridge
over the former, and a barque ferry on the latter
river. The third, turning the sources of the Avia,
connects St. Jago with Orense, and from Orense
another road passes along the right bank of the
M 2
164 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK Minho, and connects the towns of Ribidavia, Sal-
'- vatierra, and Tuy, ending at Guardia, a small for-
.Feb." tress 3ft the mouth of the Minho. , -
As the shortest route to Oporto, and the only one
convenient for the artillery, was that leading by
Redondela and Tuy and from thence by the coast,
the duke of Dalmatia formed the plan of passing the
s> Minho between Sal vatierra and Guardia; wherefore
options 011 ^ e lst of February, Franceschi, followed by the
MSS * other divisions in succession, took the Pontevedra
road, and at Redondela defeating a small body of
insurgents, captured four pieces of cannon; Vigo
then surrendered to one of his detachments, while
he himself marched upon Tuy, and took possession
of that town and Guardia. During these operations
La Houssaye's dragoons, quitting Mellid, crossed
the Monte de Tenteyro, passed through Ribidavia,
and took possession of Salvatierra on the Minho ;
and general Soult, the marshal's brother, who had
assembled three thousand stragglers and convales-
cents, between Astorga and Carrion, received orders
to enter Portugal by Puebla de Senabria and thus
join the main body.
But the rainy season was now in full torrent,
every stream overflowed its banks, the roads were
deep, the difficulty of procuring provisions great,
and the delay thus occasioned was increased by the
necessity of waiting to put marshal Ney in posses-
sion of the administration of Ferrol and Corufia;
for Soult had not oaly retained but paid the Spanish
authorities and garrisons of those places. Thus it
was the 16th before the whole of the divisions
could be assembled ou the Minho, between Salva-
tierra, Guardia, and Redondela, That river, from
Melga^o to the mouth, forms the frontier of Por-
PENINSULAR WAR. 165
tugal, and the banks on both sides were guarded
by a number of fortresses, originally of consider-
able strength, but at this time all in a dilapidated
condition. The Spanish fort of Guardia fronted
the Portuguese fort of Caminha ; Tuy was opposed
by Valenza, which was garrisoned, and the works
in somewhat a better condition than the rest La-
pella, Moncao, and Melga^o, completed the Por-
tuguese line. But the best defence at this moment
was the Minho itself, which, at all times a consi-
derable river, was now a broad and raging flood,
and the Portuguese ordenanzas and militia who
were in arms on the other side had removed all
the boats. Nevertheless Soult, after examining the
banks with care, resolved, though all his troops had
not yet arrived, to pass at Campo Saucos, a little
village where the ground was flatter, more favour-
able, and so close to Caminha that the army once
across, could easily seize that place, and the same
day reach Viana on the Lima, from whence to
Oporto was only three marches.
To attract the attention of the Portuguese, La
Houssaye, who was at Salvatierra, spread his dra-*
goons along the Minho, and attempted to push
small parties across that river, above Melga^o; but
the bulk of the army was concentrated in the
neighbourhood of Campo Saucos, and a detach-
ment seized the small sea-port of Bayona, in the
rear. A division of infantry, and three hundred
French marines released at Corufia and attached to
the second corps, were then employed to transport
some large fishing boats and heavy guns froftx the
harbour and fort of Guardia overland to Campo
Saucos, and by the help of Tollers they were car-:
ried oVer more than two miks of ragged ground ;
166 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK ft was a wor k O f infinite labour, but from the llth
1 to the 15th the troops toiled unceasingly, and the
Feb. craft were finally launched in a small lake at the
confluence of the Tamuga river with the Minho.
In the night of the 15th the heavy guns were
placed in battery, and three hundred soldiers being
embarked, the boats manned by the marines, drop-
ped silently down the Tamuga into the Minho, and
endeavoured to reach the Portuguese side of the
latter river during the darkness ; yet whether from
the violence of the flood, or want of skill in the
men, the landing was not effected before day-break,
and the ordenan^a falling with great fury upon the
first who got on shore, killed the foremost, where-
upon the others pulled back, and regained their
own side with great difficulty. This action was in-
finitely creditable to the Portuguese, and it had a
surprising influence on the issue of the campaign.
It was a gallant action, because it might reasonably
have been expected that a tumultuous assemblage
of half-armed peasants collected on the instant,
would have been dismayed at the sight of many
boats filled with soldiers, some pulling across and
others landing under the protection of a heavy
battery that thundered from the midst of a multi-
tude of troops, clustering on the heights, or throng-
ing to the edge of the opposite bank. It was an
event of leading importance, inasmuch as it baffled
an attempt that being successful would have en-
sured the fall of Oporto by the 21st of February,
which was precisely the period when general Mac-
kenzie's division being at Cadiz, sir John Cradock's
troops were reduced to almost nothing; when the
English ministers only waited for an excuse to
abandon Portugal; when the people of that country
PENINSULAR WAR. 167
were in the very extremity of disorder ; when the
Portuguese army was a nullity, and when the re -- -
gency was evidently preparing to receive the French Feb.'
with submission. It was the period also, when
Soult was expected to be at Lisbon, following the
emperor's orders, and, consequently, Lapisse and
Victor could not have avoided to fulfil their part of
the plan for the subjugation of Portugal.
The duke of Dalmatia's situation was now, al- Seepian4.
though not one of imminent danger, extremely em-
barrassing, and more than ordinary quickness and
vigour were required to conduct the operations with
success. Posted in a narrow, contracted position,
he was hemmed in on the left by the Spanish in-
surgents, who had assembled immediately after La
Houssaye passed Orense, and being possessed of a
very rugged and difficult country, were moreover
supported by the army of Romana, which was said
though erroneously to be at Orense and Ribidavia.
In the French general's front was the Minho, broad,
raging, and at the moment impassable, while heavy
rains forbad the hope that its waters would decrease.
To collect sufficient means for forcing a passage
would have required sixteen days, but long before
that period, the subsistence for the army would
have entirely failed, and the Portuguese, being
alarmed, would have greatly augmented their forces
on the opposite bank. There remained then only
to retrace his steps to St. Jago, or breaking through
the Spanish" insurgents, to ascend the Minho, aud
open a way into Portugal by some other route,
Soult's attempt to pass the river had been baffled
on the 15th of February, and on the 16th he was in
full march towards Ribidavia upon a new line of
operations, and this promptitude of decision was
168 HISTORY OF THE
supported by an equally prompt execution ; for La
" Houssaye's dragoons, quitting Salvatierra, and,
keeping the edge of the Minho, though galled by
the fire of the Portuguese from the opposite bank,
twice in the day broke the insurgent bands, and,
in revenge for some previous excesses of the pea-
santry, burnt the villages of Morentan and Cobreira :
meanwhile the main body of the army, passing the
Tea river, at Salvatierra and Puente d'Arcos, moved,
by successive divisions, along the main road from
Tuy to Ribidavia.
Between Franquera and Canizar the route was
cut by the streams of the Morenta and Noguera
rivers, and, behind those torrents, eight hundred
Gallicians, having barricadoed the bridges and re-
pulsed the advanced parties of cavalry, stood upon
their defence. The passage was forced on the
17th, at daybreak, by a brigade of Heudelet's di-
vision, which pursued the Spaniards briskly, but
when within a short distance of Ribidavia, the lat-
ter suddenly rallied upon eight or ten thousand
insurgents, arrayed in order of battle on a strong
hill, covering the approaches to that town. At this
sight the advanced guard halted until the remainder
of the division and a brigade of cavalry came up,
and then under the personal direction of Soult, the
French assailed and drove the Gallicians, fighting,
through the town and across the Avia. The loss of
the vanquished was very considerable and the bodies
of twenty priests were found amongst the slain.
Whether from fear or patriotism, every inhabitant
had quitted Ribidavia, and the 18th, a brigade of
infantry scouring the valley of the Avia, discovered
and dispersed three or four thousand of the insur-
gents, who were disposed to make a second stand
PENINSULAR WAR. 169
on that side ; a second brigade, pushing on to Bar-
bantes, seized a ferry-boat on the Minho, close to
that place, and being joined the same evening by
the infantry who had scoured the valley of the A via,
and by Franceschi's cavalry, entered Orense in time
to prevent the bridge over the Minho from being
cut. La Houssaye's dragoons then took post at
Maside, while the remainder of the horse and
Laborde's infantiy united at Ribidavia ; the artillery
were however still between Tuy and Salvatierra,
under the protection of Merle's and Mermet's di-
visions. Thus in three days the duke of Dalmatia
with admirable celerity and vigour extricated his
army from a contracted unfavourable country,
strangled a formidable insurrection in its birth, and
at the same time opened a fresh line of communi-
cation with St. Jago, and an easy passage into
Portugal.
The 20th, a regiment sent across the Minho by
the ferries of Barbantes and Ribidavia, defeated
the insurgents of the left bank, advanced to the
Arroyo river, and took post on the heights of Merea,
while the rest of the army with the exception of
a division guarding the guns was concentrated at
Orense. But the efforts of the artillery had been
baffled by the difficulties of the road from Tuy to
Ribidavia, and this circumstance viewed in con*
junction with the precarious state of the commum*
cation, a daily increasing sick-list, arid the number
of small detachments required to protect the rear,
seemed to forbid the invasion of Portugal. A fldan
of ordinary genius would have failed. The duk&fcf
Dalmatia with ready boldness resolved to throw the
greatest part of his artillery and tfe^ whole , of his
other incumbrances into Tuy, as st place of arms, and
70 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK then relinquishing all communication with Gallicia
for the moment, to march in one mass directly upon
Feb." Oporto ; from whence, if successful, he proposed to
re-open his communication with Tuy by the coast-
line, and so recovering his artillery to re-establish a
regular system of operations.
In pursuance of this resolution, sixteen of the
lightest guns and six howitzers, with a proportion
of ammunition-waggons, were, with infinite labour
and difficulty, transported to Ribidavia ; the remain-
ing thirty-six pieces, and a vast pare of carriages
carrying ammunition, hospital, and commissariat
stores, were put into Tuy, where general La Marti-
n j ere wag i e f t ^k an establishment of artillery and
engineer officers, a garrison of five hundred men
fit to carry arms, and nine hundred sick. All the
stragglers, convalescents, and detachments, coming
from St. Jago, together with the military chest,
which was still in the rear and guarded by six hun-
dred infantry, were likewise directed upon Tuy, the
gates were then shut, and La Martiniere was aban-
doned to his own resources.
The men in hospital at Ribidavia were now for-
warded to Orense, and the marshal's quarters were
established in that town the 24th, but other obsta-
cles were to be vanquished before the army could
commence the march into Portugal. The gun-
carriages had been so shaken in the transit from
Tuy to Ribidavia that three days were required to
repair them ; it was extremely difficult to obtain
provisions, and numerous bands of the peasants
were still in arms, nor were they quelled until
combats had taken place at Gurzo, on. the Monte
Blanco, in the Val d'Ornes, and up the valley of
the Avia. The French thus lost time and men,
PENINSULAR WAR. 1 7 1
and expended ammunition that could not be re- C ^P.
placed. Soult endeavoured to soften the people's -
feelings by kindness and soothing proclamations; Febi
and as he enforced a strict discipline among his Appendix,
troops, his humane and politic demeanour, joined
to the activity of his moveable columns, abated the
fierceness of the peasantry ; the inhabitants of
Ribidavia soon returned to their houses, those of
Orense had never been very violent, and now be-
coming friendly, even lent assistance to procure
provisions. It was not, however, an easy task to
restrain the soldiers within the bounds of humanity ;
the frequent combats, the assassination, the tor-
turing of isolated men, and the privations endured,
had so exasperated the French troops, that the
utmost exertions of their general's authority could
not always control their revenge.
While the duke of Dalmatia was thus preparing
for a formidable inroad, his adversaries were a prey
to the most horrible anarchy. The bishop always
intent to increase his own power, had assembled
little short of fifty thousand armed persons in
Oporto, and commenced a gigantic line of entrench-
ment on the hills to the northward of that city.
This worse than useless labour so completely oc-
cupied all persons, that the defence of the strong
country lying between the Douro and the Minho
was totally neglected, and when Soxxlt appeared on
the bank of the latter river the northern provinces
were struck with terror ; then it was that the people
for the first time understood the extent of their
danger ; then it was that the bishop aroused from
his intrigues, became sensible that the French were
more terrible enemies than the regency. Once
impressed with this truth, he became clamorous for
] 72 HISTORY OF THE
EOOK succour; lie recalled sir Robert Wilson from the
Agueda, he hurried on the labour of the entrench-
Feb,* ments, and he earnestly pressed sir John Cradock
for assistance, demanding arms, ammunition, and
a reinforcement of British soldiers. Sir Robert
Wilson, as I have already related, disregarded his
Appendix, orders : but the British general, although he refused
No* Vf 86C~
tion6. to furnish him with troops, supplied him with arms
and very ample stores of powder, and sent artillery
and engineer officers to superintend the construction
of the defensive works, and to aid in the arrange-
ments for a reasonable system of operations.
The people were, however, become too headstrong
and licentious to be controlled, or even advised, and
the soldiers being drawn into the vortex of insubor-
dination, universal and hopeless confusion prevailed.
Don Bernardim Freire was the legal commander-in-
, chief of the Entre Minho e Douro, but all the
c-
generals claimed equal and independent authority,
each over his own force ; and this was perhaps a
matter of self-preservation, for general and traitor
were at that period almost synonymous ; to obey
the orders of a superior against the momentary
wishes of the multitude was to incur instant death.
Nor were there men wanting who found it profitable
to .inflame the passions of the mob, and direct its
blind vengeance against innocent persons adverse
to the prelate's faction, , which was not without
opponents even in Oporto*
Such was the unhappy state of affairs, when the
undisciplined gallantry of the peasants, baffling the
efforts of the French Jo cross the Minho at Campo
Saucos, obliged Soult to march by Orense. A part
of, the regular troops were immediately sent forward
to the Cavado river, where they were joined by the
PENINSULAR WAE. 173
onknanzas and the militia of the district ; but all c ^ p -
were in a state of fearful insubordination, and there
1809
was no arrangement made for the regular distribu- Feb.*
tion of provisions, or any necessary supply. Among
the troops despatched from Oporto was the second
battalion of the Lusitanian legion, nine hundred
strong, well armed, well equipped, and commanded
by baron Eben, a native of Prussia, who without
any known services to recommend him had suddenly
attained the rank of major in the British service.
This man destined to act a conspicuous part in Por-
tuguese tragedy, had been left at Oporto when sir
Robert Wilson marched to Almeida, and his orders
were to follow with the second battalion of the
legion, when its clothing and equipment should be
completed j but he retained the troops to push his
own fortune under the prelate's auspices.
General Freire having reached the Cavado, was
joined by fourteen or fifteen thousand militia and
ordenanzas and fixed his head-quarters at Braga ;
from thence he sent detachments to occupy the
posts of Salamonde and Ruivaens in his front, and,
unfortunately for himself, endeavoured to restrain
his troops from wasting their ammunition by wanton Appendix,
firing in the streets and on the roads. This exertion tion6.' 8CC "
of command was heinously resented, for Freire was
inclined to uphold the authority of the regency, and
had been for some time obnoxious to the bishop's
faction, who pointed to him as a suspected person,
and rendered the multitude inimical towards him.
Meanwhile, general Silveira, assuming the com-
mand of the Tras os Montes, advanced to Chaves,
and put himself in communication with the marqui
of Romania, who having remained tranquil at
Oimbra and Monterey since the 21st of January,
174 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK had been joined by his dispersed troops, and was
again at the head of nine or ten thousand men.
1809
Feb.* Silveira's force was about four thousand, half regu-
lars half militia, and he was accompanied by many
of the ordenan^as ; but here, as elsewhere, all were
licentious, insubordinate, and disdainful of their
general ; moreover the national enmity between them
and the Spaniards having overcome their sense of a
common cause and common danger, the latter were
Appendix, evilly treated, and a deadly feud subsisted between
the two armies. The generals, indeed, agreed to
act in concert, offensively and defensively, yet
neither of them were the least acquainted with the
numbers, intention, or even the position of their
antagonists : and it is a proof of Romana's unfitness
for command that he, having the whole population
at his disposal, was yet ignorant of every thitig
relating to his enemy that it behoved him to know.
The whole of the French force in Gallicia at this
period was about forty-five thousand men, Romana
estimated it at twenty-one thousand; the number
under Soult was above twenty-four thousand, Ro-
mana supposed it to be twelve thousand; and
among these he included general Marchand's di-
vision of the sixth corps, which he always imagined
to be a part of the duke of Dalmatia'a army.
So elated was the Spanish general at the spirit
of the peasants about Ribidavia, that he anticipated
nothing but victory, he knew also that on the
Arosa, an estuary running up towards St. Jago de
Compostella, the inhabitants of Villa Garcia had
risen and being joined by all the neighbouring
districts were preparing to attack Vigo and Tuy ;
hence, partly from his Spanish temperament, partly
from his extreme ignorance of war, he was con-
PENINSULAR WAR. 175
vinced that the French only thought of making c ?^ p *
their escape out of Gallicia 3 and that even in that
they would be disappointed. To effect their de- March.
i. * j. l -L 1 T~ Appendix,
struction more certainly, he also, as we have seen, NO. 6, sec-
pestered sir John Cradock for succours in money
and ammunition, and desired that the insurgents on
the Arosa might be assisted with a thousand British
soldiers ; and Cradock anxious to support the cause,
although he refused the troops, sent ammunition,
and five thousand pounds in money, but before it
arrived Romana was beaten and in flight.
The combined Spanish and Portuguese forces,
amounting to sixteen thousand regulars and militia,
besides ordenan$a$, were posted in a straggling
unconnected manner along the valley of the Tamega,
extending from Monterey, Verim, and Villaza, to
near Chaves, a distance of more than fifteen miles.
This was the first line of defence for Portugal,
Freire and Eben, with fourteen guns and twenty-
five thousand men, were at Braga, in second line,
their outposts being on the Cavado, and at the
strong passes of Ruivaens and Venda Nova ; but
of these twenty-five thousand only six thou-
sand were armed with muskets : and it is to be
observed that the militia and troops of the line
differed from the armed peasantry only in name,
save that their faulty discipline and mutinous dis-
position rendered them less active and intelligent
as skirmishers, without making them fitter for
battle. The bishop, with his disorderly and furious
rabble, formed the third line, occupying the en-
trenchments that covered Oporto. Such was the
state of affairs, and such were the dispositions made
to resist the duke of Dalmatia ; but his army,
although galled and wearied by continual toil, and
176 HISTOEY OF THE
B OK when halted, disturbed and vexed by the multi-
tude of insurrections, was when in motion, of a
power to overthrow and disperse these numerous
bands, even as a great ship feeling the wind, breaks
through and scatters the gun-boats that have ga-
thered round her in the calm.
PENINSULAR WAR. 177
CHAPTER V.
SECOND INVASION OF PORTUGAL.
THE Entre Minho e Douro and the Tras os CHAP.
y^
Monies, lying together, form the northern part of
Portugal, and the extreme breadth of either, when
measured from the frontier to the Douro, does not
exceed seventy miles. The river Tamega, running
north and south, and discharging itself into the
Douro, forms the boundary line between them ; but
there is, to the west of this river, a succession of
rugged mountain ridges, which, under the names of
Sierra de Gerez, Sierra de Cabrera, and Sierra de
Santa Catalina, form a second barrier nearly pa-
rallel to the Tamega, and across some part of these
ridges, an invader coming from the eastward must
pass to arrive at Oporto.
Other Sierras, running also in a parallel direction
with the Tamega, cut the Tras os Montes in such
a manner that all the considerable rivers flowing
north and south tumble into the Douro. But as
the western ramifications of the Sierras de Gerez
and Cabrera shoot down towards the sea, the rivers
of the Entre Douro e Minho discharge their waters
into the ocean, and consequently flow at right angles
to those of the Tras os Monies. Hence it follows,
th^t an enemy penetrating to Oporto, from the
north, would have to pass the Lima, the Cavado,
and the Ave, to reach Oporto ; axxd if, coining from
the east, he invaded the Tras os Montes, all the
VOL n. N
178 HISTORY OF THE
rivers and intervening ridges of that province must
be crossed before the Entre Minho e Douro could
be reached*
The duke of Dalmatia was however now in such
a position, near the sources of the Lima and the
Tamega rivers, that he could choose whether to
penetrate by the valley of the first into the Entre
Minho e Douro, or by the valley of the second into
the Tras os Montes; and there was also a third
road leading between those rivers through Monta-
legre upon Braga; but this latter route, passing
over the Sierra de Gerez, was impracticable for
artillery,
The French general had, therefore, to consider
1. If, following the course of the Lima, he
should disperse the insurgents between that river
and the Minho, and then recovering his artillery
from Tuy, proceed against O'porto by the main
road leading along the sea-coast.
2. If he should descend the Tamega, take
CMves, and then continuing his route to Villa
Real, near the Douro, assail the defences of the
Tras os Montes in reverse ; or turning to the right,
cross the Sierra de Cabrera by the pass of Ruivaens,
enter Braga and so go against Oporto.
The first project was irregular, and hazardous,
inasmuch as Romana and Silveira could have
fallen upon the flank and rear of the French during
their march through a difficult country ; but as the
position of those generals covered Chaves, to attack
them was a preliminary measure to either plan, and
with this object Soult moved on the 4th of Mar$h.
The 5th, his vanguard being at Villa Real and
Penaverde, he sent a letter, by a flag of truce, to
Romana, in which after exposing all the danger of
PENINSULAR WAR. 179
the latters situation, he advised him to submit. CHAP.
No answer was returned, nor would the bearer
1809
have been suffered to pass the outposts, but that March.
Romana himself was in the rear ; for he dreaded dick's pa-
that such an occurrence would breed a jealousy of pers '
his conduct, and perhaps cause his patriotism to be
undervalued.
This attempt failing, three divisions of infantry
and one of cavalry marched the next morning
against Monterey, while La Houssaye's dragoons,
taking the road of Laza, covered the left flank, and
pushed parties as far La Gudina, on the route to
Puebla de Senabria. The fourth division of infantry
meanwhile remained at Villa del Rey, to cover the
passage of the sick and wounded men from Orensc,
for the duke of Dalmatia, having no base of opera-
tions, transported his hospitals, and other incum-
brances, from place to place as the army moved ;
acting in this respect after the manner of the Roman
generals when invading a barbarous country,
,As the French advanced the Spaniards aban-
doned their positions in succession, spiked the guns
in the dilapidated works of Montery, and after a s .
slight skirmish at Verim, took the road to Puebla o^SSw
de Senabria; but Franceschi followed close, and MSS *
overtaking two or three thousand as they were pass-
ing a rugged mountain, assailed their rear with a
battalion of infantry, and at the same time leading
his horsemen round both flanks, headed the column,
and obliged it to halt. The Spaniards, trusting to
the rough ground, drew up in one large square to
receive the charge ; but Franceschi bad four regi-
ments of cavalry, each regiment settled itself against
the face of a square, and then the whole, with loud
cries, bore down swiftly upoft their opponents ; the
N 2
/8Q HISTORY ^OF THE
? irresolute, dismayed, shrunk frojn
tlie fierce assault, and were instantly trampled down
in heaps. Those who escaped the horses" hoofs
and the edge of the sword became prisoners, but
twelve hundred bodies were stretched lifeless on the
field of battle, and Franceschi continued his move-
tjients on La Gudina.
. Romana was at Semadems, several miles in the
rear of Verim, when his vanguard was thus attacked,
ajjid. there was nothing to prevent him from falling
fosujk to Chaves with his pain body according to a
plan before agreed upon between him and Silveira;
but either from fear, or indignation at the treatment
lon3 ' his soldiers had received at the hands of the Portu-
guese he left Silveira to his fate, and made off with
six or seven thousand men towards Bragan^a ; from
thence passing by Puebla de Senabria, he regained
the valley of the Syl. Meanwhile, two thousand
Portuguese infantry with some guns, issuing froiri
the side of Villaza, cut the French line of march
at the moment when Franceschi and Heudelet hacji
passed Monterey and Laborde was approaching
that place ; a slight combat ensued, the Portuguese
lost their guns, and were driven down the valley
Journal of of the Tamega as far as the village of Outeiro*
Operations . ^ , . 5 s '*
MSS. within their own frontier. I his defeat, and the
flight of Romana, had such an effect upon the
surrounding districts that the Spanish insurgepfcs
returned it* crowds to their habitations and delivere<jl
up tjaeir arps., Some of the clergy, also, changing
their, opinions, exhorted the people to peace, and
the prisoners taken on the 6th, beir^g dissatisfied
Tyith Romana's conduct^ and moved by ttjeir hatred
of the Portuguese, entered the French service.
affairs occupied Soult until the 9th, during
PENTNSULAR WAR. 1 8 1 1
, j
which period his outposts were pushed towards CHAP.
Chaves, Montalegre, and La Gudina ; but the main n -
body remained at Verim to cover the arrival of the March.
sick at Monterey, while Silveira, thus beaten at
Villaza and deserted by Romana, fell back to a
strong mountain position, one league behind Chaves,
from whence he could command a view of all the
French movements as far as Monterey. This ground
was advantageous, but his military talents l were
moderate, his men, always insubordinate, were notr
mutinous, and many of the officers were disposed
to join the French. He wished to abandon Chaves,'
his troops resolved to defend it, and three thousand
five hundred men threw themselves into that town
in defiance of him ; he was already, according to
the custom of the day, pronounced a traitor and
declared worthy of that death which he woulcl
inevitably have suffered but that some of his sol-tionS.'
diers still continued to respect his orders.
The 10th, the convoy of French sick was close to journal of
Monterey, and as Romana's movement was known SBsf tioni
to 'be a real flight, and not made with a design to
create fresh insurrections in the rear, the French
troops were again put in motion towards Chaves.
Merle's division however remained at Verim to
protect the hospital, and Franceschi's took the iroad
of La Gudina, as if he had been going towards
Salamanca ; a report that he had actually entered
that town reached Lisbon, and was taken as an
indication that Soult would not pass the 'JPortug'uedp
frontier at Chaves* But Franceschi qufckly retarget;'
by Osonio and Feces de Abaia,, arid ' being 'a^t^d
1>y Heudelet's division, ifiyested'''(^av^arf';die 4 yert
bank of the Tamega, while Labor&e, Mermet, La
Houssaye, and Lorgo, descending the right bank,
82 HISTORY OF THE
beat the Portuguese outposts, and getting possession
of a fort close under the walls, completed the
auh. investment of the town. The place was summoned
to surrender, but no answer was returned, and the
garrison, like men bereft of their wits and fighting
with the air, kept up a continual fire of musketry
and artillery until the 12th, when they surrendered
on receiving a second summons, more menacing
than the first. The 13th the French entered the
town, and Silveira retired to Villa Real.
The works of Chaves were in a bad state ; few
of the fifty guns mounted on the ramparts were fit
for service, but there was a stone-bridge, and the
town was in many respects more suitable for a
place of arms than Monterey ; wherefore the sick
were brought down from the latter place, and an
hospital was established for twelve hundred men,
the number now unfit to carry arms. The fighting
men were reduced to twenty-one thousand, and
Soult, partly from the difficulty of guarding his
prisoners, partly from a desire to abate the hostility
of the Portuguese, permitted the militia and orde-
nanpas his prisoners to return to their homes, after
taking an oath not to resume their arms ; to some
of the poorest he also gave money and clothes, and
he enrolled, at their own request, the few regular
* ro P s taken in Chaves. This wise and gentle
de GaUc S e n P rocce ^^& was rouch blamed by some of his offi-
cers, especially by those who had served under
Junot. They desired that Chaves might be as-
saulted, and the garrison put to the sword, for they
were cmbued with a personal hatred of the Portu-
guese, and being averse to serve in the present ex-
pedition, endeavoured, as it would appear, to thwart
their general ; but the prudence of his conduct was
1809
PENINSULAR WAR. 183
immediately visible in the softened feelings of the
country people, and the scouting parties- being no
longer molested spread themselves, some on the
side of Bragan^a and Villa Real, others in the journal of
Entre Minho e Douro. The former reported that :
there was no enemy in a condition to make head
in the Tras os Montes, the latter fell in with the
advanced guard of Freire's army at Riiivaens, on
the road to Braga.
From Chaves Soult could operate against Oporto,
either by the Tras os Montes or the Entre Minho e
Douro ; the latter presented the strongest position,
but the road was shorter and more practicable for
guns than that by the valley of the Tamega, and the
communication with Tuy could be sooner recovered;
, hence, when the scouts brought intelligence that a
Portuguese army was at Braga, the French general
decided to penetrate by that line. Now the road
'from Chaves to Braga entered a deep and dangerous
defile, or rather a ^uccession of defiles, which ex-
tended from Venda, Nova to Ruivaens, and re-com-
menced after passing the Cabado river, and Freire's
advanced guards 9 composed of ordenangas^ occupied
those places ; he had also a detachment under Ebcn
on the road of Montalegre but recalled it on the
14th. The 16th, Eranceschi forced the defile of
Nova and the remainder of the French army being
formed in alternate masses of cavalry and infantry,
began to pass the Sierra de Cabrera; meanwhile
Lorge's dragoons descending the Tamega, ordered
rations for the whole army along the road fa YUIa
Real, and then, suddenly retracing theip st,eps, re-
joined the main body. The 17th, Franc$$<?lii, being
reinforced with some infajitry, wojx the bridge of
Ruivaens, and entered Salamondc j the Portuguese,
HISTORY OF THE
covered by 1 Eben's detachment, which had arrived
at St. Joa de Campo, then fell back on the Pico
March, de Pugalados, close to Braga, and Franceschi took
post at Carvalho Este, two leagues in front of that
city. Soult expecting to reach Braga without fur-
ther opposition, now caused his artillery, guarded
by Laborde's division, to enter the pass of Venda
Nova j but the ordenan$a$> reinforced by some men
from the side of Guimaraens, immediately re-as*
sembled, and clustering on the mountains to the
left of the column of march, attacked it with great
fierceness and subtlety.
The peasants of the northern provinces of Po^
tugal, unlike the squalid miserable population of
Lisbon and Oporto, are robust, handsome, and ex-
ceedingly* brave; their natural disposition is open
and obliging, and they are, when rightly handled
as soldiers, docile, intelligent, and hardy. They
are, however, vehement in their anger, and being
now excited by the exhortations and personal ex-
ample of their priests, they came rushing clown
the sides of the hills, like men deprived of reason,
and many of them breaking furiously into the French
battalions were there killed. The others, finding
their efforts unavailing, fled, and were pursued a
leagufe tip the mountain by some battalions sent out
against them ; yfct they were not abashed, but
making a circuit behind the hills, fell upon the
rear of the line of march, killed fifty of the strag-
glers, and plundered the baggage. Thus galled,
the French slowly, and with much trouble, passed
s. the long defiles of Venda Nova, Ruivaens, and
Salamonde, and gathered by degrees in front of
Freiffe's position.
That general was no more, and his troops, reek-
PENINSULAR WAR. 185
ing from the slaughter of their commander, were
raging, like savage beasts, at one moment congre- - -
gating near the prisons to murder some wretch MATCK
within, at another rushing tumultuously to the out-
posts, with a design to engage the enemy. The Ebea's
ordenanqas of the distant districts also came pouring MSS. *
into the camp, dragging with them suspected per- clock'
sons, and adding to the general distraction. Whe&
Soult advanced* the unfortunate Freire, uaabl& to
establish* order in his array, resolved to retreat, aisd
in pursuance of that design, had recalled Eben on
the 14th, giving directions to the officers at the
different outposts in front of Braga to retire at the
approach of the enemy. This and his endeavour
to prevent the waste of ammunition, gave effect to
a plan which had been long prepared by the bishop's
faction for his destruction. In passing through
Braga, be was openly reviled in the streets by some
of, the ordenanqas, and as the latter planily dis-
covered their murderous intention, he left the army ;
he was however seized on the 17th, at a village
.behind Braga, and brought back : what followed is
thus described by baron Eben, in his official report
to sir John Cradock :
" I did not reach Braga until nine o'clock in the
morning of the 17th. I found every thing in the
greatest disorder ; the houses shut, the people flying
in all directions, and part of the populace armed
with guns and pikes. Passing through the streets,
I was greeted with loud vivas. Though the people
knew me, I could not guess the, meaning, of ;th*$.
At the market-place* 1 was detained by. the rapidly
-increasing populace, who took the reias x>f my
horse, crying out loudly, that they were ready to
do any thing to defend the, city ; requesting me to
8,6 HISTORY OF THE
assist them, and speaking in the lowest terms of
their general. I promised them to do all in my
March, power to aid their patriotic zeal, but said that I
must first speak to him. Upon this, they suffered
me to proceed, accompanied by about a hundred
of them : but I had not got far on my way to his
quarters, when I saw him on foot, conducted by a
great armed multitude, who suffered no one to pass,
and on my attempting it threatened to fire. I was,
therefore, obliged to turn my horse, and this the
people applauded. Two men had hold of the gene-
ral's arms, his sword was taken from him, and the
people abused him most vehemently. On my way
back to the rnarket-place, they wanted to shoot
me, taking me for general Freire ; but I was saved
by a soldier of the legion, who explained the
mistake* When I reached the market-place, I
found about a thousand men drawn up: I commu-
nicated to them my determination to assist them in
their laudable endeavours to defend themselves,
provided they would first permit me to speak to
the general, for whose actions I promised to be
answerable as long as I should be with him. I had
ordered a bouse to be got ready for my reception,
where the general arrived, accompanied as before;
I saluted him with respect, at which they plainly
Discovered their disapprobation, I repeated my
proposal, but they would not listen to it, I per-
ceived the danger of the general, and proposed to
take him to my quarters* My adjutant offered him
his arm: when I spoke to him, he only replied,
* save me !'
" At the entrance of my house, I was surrounded
by thousands, and heard the loud cry of ' kill ! kill V
I now took hold of him and attempted to force
PENINSULAR WAR. 187
my way into the house, and a gentleman slightly CHAP.
wounded him with the point of his sword under
1ROQ
my arm. He collected all his strength, rushed March.
through them, and hid himself behind the door of
the house. The people surrounded me and forced
me from the house. To draw the attention of the
people from the general I ordered the drummers
to beat the alarm, and formed the ordenangas in
ranks ; but they kept a constant fire upon my house,
where the general still was* As a last attempt to
save him, I now proposed that he should be con-
ducted to prison in order to take a legal trial ;
this was agreed to, and he was conducted there in
safety. I now hoped that I had succeeded, as the
people demanded to be led against the enemy, now
rapidly advancing, in number about two thousand.
I again formed them, and advanced with them;
but soon after, I heard the firing again, and was
informed that the people had put the general to
death with pikes and guns* I was now proclaimed
general."
When this murder was perpetrated the people
seemed satisfied, and Eben, announcing the approach
of a British force from Oporto, sent orders to the
outposts to stand fast as he intended to fight ; bttt
another tumult arose when it was discovered that
an officer of Freire's staff, onei Villaboas, was in
Eben's quarters. Several thousand orden&n$a$ in- men'sRe-
stantly gathered about the house and the unhappy por '
man was haled forth and stabbed to death at the
door, the mob all the time shouting and firing roi-
leys in at the windows. Yet, when their fttry^as
somewhat abated, they obliged thfeif f ri#TG r general to
come out and show that he had toot beeft wounded,
and expressed great affection for him.
88 HISTORY OF THE
VI In the course of the night the legion marched in
from Pico de Pugalados, and the following morning
March, a reinforcement of six thousand ordenan$as came up
in one mass. Fifty thousand dollars also arrived in
the camp from Oporto; for the Portuguese, like
the Spaniards, commonly reversed the order of mili-
tary arrangements, leaving their weapons in store,
and bringing their encumbrances to the field of
battle. In the evening the corregidor and two
officers of rank, together with many persons of a
meaner class, were brought to the town as prisoners
and put in jail, the armed mob being with difficulty
restrained from slaying them on the way thither.
In this distracted manner they were proceeding
when Franceschi arrived at Carvalho on the 17th,
and surely if that bold and enterprising soldier
could have obtained a glimpse of what was passing,
or known the real state of affairs, he would have
broke into the midst of them with his cavalry ; for,
of the twenty-five thousand men composing the
radock's whole of the Portuguese force, eighteen thousand
t?sT* were only armed with pikes, the remainder had
ournai of wasted the greatest part of their ammunition, and
Operations - i , , T J i
iss. the powder in store was not made up in cartridges.
But Braga, situated in a deep hollow, was hidden
from him, and the rocky and wooded hills surround-
ing it were occupied by what appeared a formidable
multitude; hence Franceschi, although reinforced
by a brigade of infantry, was satisfied by feints and
slight skirmishes to alarm his opponents, and to
keep them in play until the other divisions of the
French army could arrive.
While these events were passing at ' Braga, Sil-
veira again collected a considerable force of militia
and ordenangas in the Tras os Moutos, and captain
PENINSULAR WAfl.. 19
Arentschilcl one of the officers sent by sir John CHAP.
Cradock to aid the bishop, also rallied a number - -
i * IftftQ
of fugitives at Guimaraens and Amarante. In March.
Oporto, however, the multitude, obeying no
mand, were more intent upon murder than upon
defence. Eben's posts extended from Falperra, on
the route of Guimaraens to the Ponte Porto, on
the Cavado river ; but his principal force was
stationed on a lofty ridge called the Monte Adaufe,
which, at the distance of six or seven miles from
Braga, crossed the road to Chaves. The left, or
western end, overhung the river Cavado and covered
the detachment guarding the Ponte Porto. The
right was wooded and masked by the head of a deep
ravine; but beyond this wood, the ridge, taking a
curved and forward direction, was called the Monte
Vallonga, and a second mass of men was posted
there, separated from those on the Monte Adaufe by
an interval of two miles, and by the ravine and wood
before mentioned. A third body, being pushed still
more in advance, crowned an isolated hill, flanking
the Chaves road, being intended to take the French in
rear when the latter should attack the Monte A^dauf&
Behind the Monte Vallonga, and separated from
it by a valley three miles wide, the ridge of Falperm
was guarded by detachments from Guimaraens and
from Braga. The road to Braga, leading directly
over the centre of the Monte Adauf, was flanked
on the left, by the ridge, shooting perpendicularly
out from that mountain and ending in a lofty mass
of rocks which overhangs Carvalho Este. But th$
Portuguese had neglected to occupy either these
rocks pr the connecting ridge, and Fraac0schi seized
the former on the ,17tb. < * , *
18t]b, Soult f arrived in person, and, wishing
)0 HISTORY OF TOE
*v? K to P revcnt a Battle, released twenty prisoners and
- sent them in with a proclamation couched in conci-
1809. .. ^ _
liatory language offering a capitulation ; the trum-
peter who accompanied them was however detained,
and the prisoners were immediately slain. The next
day Eben brought tip all his reserves to the Adaufd,
and the Portuguese on the isolated hill in front of
Monte Vallonga took possession of Lanhoza, a vil-
lage half-way between that hill and the rocky height
occupied by Franceschi on the 17th. But two
divisions of French infantry were now up, and
Soult caused one of them and the cavalry to attack
Lanhoia, from whence the Portuguese were imme-
diately driven, and being followed closely lost their
own hill also. The other French division took post,
part in Carvalho, part on the rocky headland, and
six guns were carried to the latter during the night ;
in this position the French columns were close to
the centre of the Portuguese, and could, by a
slight movement in advance, separate Eben's wings.
The rest of the army was at hand, and a general
attack was arranged for the next morning.
BATTLE OF BRAGA.
At nine o'clock on the 20th, the French were in
motion* Franceschi and Mermet, leaving a detach-
ment on the hill they had carried the night before,
endeavoured to turn the right of the people on the
Monte Vallonga. Laborde, supported by La Hous-
s. saye's dragoons, advanced against the centre by the
ridge connecting Carvalho with the Monte Adauf.
Heudelet, with a part of his division and a squadron
of cavalry, attacked Eben's left, with the view of
seizing the Ponte Porto.
The Portuguese opened a straggling fire of mus-
PENINSULAR WAR. 191
ketry and artillery in the centre, but after a few CHAP.
rounds, the bursting of a gun created a confusion
from which Laborde's rapidly advancing masses March,
i , - T> j_ -> i i ^1 Eben's Re-
gave them no time to recover. Uy ten o clock the port, MS.
whole of the centre was flying in disorder down a
narrow wooded valley leading from the Adaufe to
Braga ; the French followed hard, and having dis-
covered one of their men, who had been a prisoner,
mutilated in a dreadful manner and still alive, they
gave no quarter. Braga was abandoned, and the
victorious infantry passing through, took post on
the other side, while the cavalry continued the
havoc for some distance on the road to Oporto ;
yet so savage was the temper of the fugitives, that
in passing through Braga they stopped to murder
the corregidor and other prisoners in the jail, and
casting the mangled bodies into the street con-
tinued their flight. Meanwhile the centre was
forced, and Heudelet breaking over the loft of the
Monte Adaufe descended upon Ponte Porto, and
with a sharp skirmish carried that bridge and the
village on the other side of the Cavado*
Franceschi and Mermet found considerable diffi-
culty in ascending the rugged sides of the Monte
Vallonga, but when they attained the crest, the
whole of their enemies fled, and the two generals
crossed the valley to gain the road of Guimaraens,
and cut off that line of retreat ; on the way they
fell in with the three thousand Portuguese posted
above Falperra, who, seeing the cavalry approach,
drew up with their backs to some high rocks and
opened a fire of artillery. Franceschi immediately
placed his horsemen on either flanjc, a brigade of
infantry against the front, and, a$ et Verim, making
all charge together, strewed the ground witl,i the
192 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK dead. Nevertheless, the Portuguese fought valiantly
- at this point, and Franceschi acknowledged it. The
March, vanquished lost all their artillery and above four
thousand men, of which four hundred only were
made prisoners. Some of the fugitives crossing
the Cavado river, made for the Ponte de Lima,
others retired to Oporto, the greatest number took
the road of Guimaraens during the fight at Fal-
j. era- perra ; Eben appears, by his own official report, to
P eis,Mss. have been at Braga when the action commenced,
and to have fled among the first, for he makes no
mention of the fight at Falperra, nor of the skir-
mish at Ponte Porto, and his narrative bears every
mark of inaccuracy.
Braga was at first abandoned by the inhabitants,
they returned however the next day, and when the
French outposts were established, general Lorge,
crossing the Cavado entered Bacellos ; he was well
received by the corregidor, for which the latter was
a few days afterwards hanged by the Portuguese
general, Botilho, who commanded between the Lima
and the Minho. At Braga provisions were found,
and a large store of powder which was immediately
made up into cartridges for the use of the French ;
the gun-carriages and ammunition- waggons, which
had been very much damaged, were again repaired,
and an hospital was established for eight hundred
sick and wounded : hence it may be judged, that
the loss sustained in action since the 15th, was not
less than six hundred men.
The French general having thus broken through
the second Portuguese line of defence could either
march directly upon Oporto, or recover his commu-'
nication with Tuy. He resolved upon the former,
I- because he knew through his spies and inter-
PENINSULAR WAR. 193
cepted letters, that Tuy, although besieged was in CB ^P
no distress; that its guns overpowered those of
the Portuguese fortress of Valen^a on the opposite
bank of the Minho, and that the garrison made suc-
cessful sallies. 2. Because information reached
him that sixty thousand men, troops of the line,
militia, and ordenanfa, were assembled in the en-
trenched camp covering Oporto ; and his scouts
reported also that the Portuguese were in force at
Guimaraens, and had broken the bridges along the
whole course of the Ave. It was essential to crush
these large bodies before they could acquire any
formidable consistency ; wherefore Soult put his
army again in march, leaving Heudelet's division
at Braga to protect his hospitals against Botilho.
Meanwhile Silveira struck a great blow, for being
reinforced from the side of Beira he remounted the
Tamega, invested Chaves on the day of battle at
Braga, and the 28th, forced the garrison, consisting
of one hundred fighting men and twelve hundred
sick, to capitulate, after which he took post at
Amarante, while Soult, ignorant of the event, con-
tinued his march against Oporto in three columns.
The first, composed of Franceschi's and Mermet's
divisions, marched by the road of Guimaraens and
San Justo, with orders to force the passage of the
Upper Ave, and scour the country towards Pom-
beiro. The second, consisting of Merle's, Laborde's
and La Houssaye's divisions, was commanded by
Soult in person, and moved upon Barca de Trofa,
the third, under general Lorge, quitting Bacellos,
made way by the Ponte d'Ave.
The passage of the Ave was fiercely disputed,
the left column was fought with in front of Guima-
raens> at Pombeiro, and at Pueate Negrellos, and
VOL. II, O
[<M HISTORY OF THE
BOOK in the last combat which was rough, the French
general Jardcn was killed. The inarch of the centre
column was arrested at Barca de Trofa by the cut-
ting* of the bridge, but the marshal, observing the
numbers of the enemy, ascended the right bank,
and forced the passage at San Justo ; not however
without the help of Franceschi, who came down
the opposite side of the river after the fight at
Ponte Negrellos.
When the left and centre had thus crossed, co-
lonel Lallemand was detached with a regiment of
dragoons to assist Lorge, who was still held in
check at the Ponte Ave; Lallemand was at first
beaten back, but when reinforced with some in-
fantry, succeeded, and the Portuguese enraged at
their defeat brutally murdered their commander,
general Vallonga, and dispersed The whole French
army was now in communication on the left bank
of the Ave, the way to Oporto was opened, and,
on the 27th, the troops were finally concentrated
in front of the entrenchments covering that city.
The action of Monterey, the taking of Chaves,
and the defeat at Braga, had so damped the bishop's
ardour that he was, at one time, inclined to abandon
the defence of Oporto ; but this idea was relin-
quished when he considered the multitudes he had
drawn together, and that the English army was
stronger than it had been at any previous period
since Cradock's arrival ; Beresford also was at the
head of a considerable native force behind the
Mondego, and with the hope of their support, the
bishop resolved to stand the brunt. He had col-
lected in the entrenched camp, little short of forty
thousand men, and among them were many regular
troops, of which two thousand had lately arrived
PENINSULAR WAR. 195
under the command of general Vittoria. This offi- CHAP.
cer had been sent by Beresford to aid Silveira but
when Chaves surrendered he entered Oporto. The March.
hopes of the people were high, for they could not be-
lieve that the French were a match for them, and the
preceding defeats being attributed, each to its par-
ticular case of treason, the murder of many inno-
cent persons followed as an expiation. No man but
the bishop durst thwart the slightest caprice of the
mob, and he was little disposed to do so, while
Raymundo, and others of his stamp, fomented their
fury and directed it to gratify personal enmities.
Thus the defeat of Braga being known in Oporto
caused a tumult on the 22d, in which Louis D'OH-
vera, a man of high rank who had been cast into
prison, was with fourteen other persons haled forth
and despatched with many stabs ; the bodies were
then mutilated, and dragged in triumph through
the streets.
The entrenchments extending, as 1 have said,
from the Douro to the coast, were complete, and
armed with two hundred guns. They consisted of
a number of forts of different sizes, placed on the
top of a succession of rounded hills, and where the
hills failed, the defences were continued by earthen
ramparts, loopholed houses, ditches, and felled trees.
Oporto itself is built in a hollow, and a bridge of
boats, nearly three hundred yards in length, formed
the only communication between the city and the
suburb of Villa Nova ; this bridge was completely
commanded by fifty guns planted on a bluff and
craggy height, which overhung the river above
Villa Nova, afcd overlooked, not only the city, but
a great part of the entrenched camp beyond it.
Within the lines, tents were pitched for even
o 2
[96 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK greater numbers than were assembled, and the
people running to arms, manned tlieir works with
great noise and tumult when the French columns,
gathering like heavy thunder clouds, settled in
front of the camp.
The duke of Dalmatia arrived on the 27th. While
at Braga he had written to the bishop, calling on
him to calm the popular effervescence; now be-
holding the extended works in his front and reading
their weakness even in the multitudes that guarded
them, he renewed his call upon the prelate to
spare this great and commercial city the horrors of
a storm. A prisoner, employed to carry this sum-
mons, would have been killed, but that it was
pretended he came with an offer from Son It to
surrender his army ; and notwithstanding this in-
genious device, and that the bishop commenced a
negotiation, which was prolonged until evening, the
firing from the entrenchments was constant and
general during the whole of the 28th. However
the parley was finally broken off and Soult made
dispositions for a general action on the 29th. To
facilitate this, he caused Merle's division to ap-
proach the left of the entrenchments in the evening
of the 28th, intending thereby to divert attention
from the true point of attack ; a prodigious fire was
immediately opened from the works, but Merle,
having pushed close up, got into some hollow roads
and enclosures, where he maintained his footing.
At another part of the line, some of the Portuguese
pretending a wish to surrender induced general Foy
to approach them, with a single companion, the
latter was immediately killed, and Foy himself
being made prisoner, was carried into the town.
He was mistaken for Loison, and the people called
PENINSULAR WAR. 197
out to kill " Maneta? but with great presence of
mind lie held up his hands, and the crowd thus -
convinced of their error, suffered him to be cast March.
into the jail.
Having brought affairs to this awful crisis, the
bishop had not resolution to brave the danger him-
self. Leaving generals Lima and Pareiras to com-
mand the army, he, with an escort of troops, quitted
the city in the evening, and crossing the river, took
his station in the Sarea convent, built on the top of
the rugged hill which overhung the suburb of Villa
Nova ; from thence he beheld in safety the horrors
of the next day. In Oporto the tumult was dread*
ful. The bells were rung incessantly during the
night, and about twelve o'clock a violent thunder
storm arising, the sound of the winds was mistaken
in the camp for the approach of enemies ; at once
the whole line blazed with a fire of musketry, the
roar of two hundred pieces of artillery was heard
above the noise of the tempest, and the Portuguese
calling to one another with loud cries, were agitated
at once with fury and with terror. The morning,
however, broke serenely, and a little before seven
o'clock the sound of trumpets and drums and the
glitter of arms gave notice that the French army
was in motion for the attack.
BATTLE AND STORMING OF OPORTO.
The feint made the evening* before against the s *
left, which was the weakest part of the line* had ope
perfectly succeeded, the Porttiguese generals placed
their principal masses on that side; but the duke of
Dalmatia was intent upon the strongest points of
the works, being resolved to force his way through
the town, and sei/e the bridges during the fight, that
) HISTORY OF THE
*<J.OK he might secure the passage of the river. His army
was divided into three columns; the first, under
1809
Merle, attacked the left of the Portuguese centre;
the second, tinder Franceschi and Laborde, assailed
their extreme right ; the third, composed of Mer-
met's division, sustained by a brigade of dragoons,
was in the centre. General Lorge was appointed
to cut off a body of ordenan^a, who were posted
with some guns in front of the Portuguese left,
but beyond the works on the road of Villa de Conde.
The battle was commenced by the wings; for
Mermet's division was withheld, until the enemy's
generals, believing the whole of the attack was de-
veloped, had weakened their centre to strengthen
their flanks. Then the French reserves, rushing
violently forwards, broke through the entrench-
ments and took the two principal forts, entering
by the embrasures and killing or dispersing all
within them. Soult instantly rallied his troops in
fresh masses and sent two battalions to take the
Portuguese left wing in the rear, while two other
battalions were ordered to march straight into the
town, and make for the bridge. The Portuguese
army, thus cut in two, was soon beaten on all
points. Laborde carried in succession a number of
forts, took fifty pieces of artillery, and reached the
edge of the city where he halted until Franceschi,
who was engaged still more to the left, could join
him. By this movement a large body of the Por-
tuguese being driven off from the town, were forced
back to the Douro, and followed by a brigade
under general Arnaud.
Merle seeing that the success of the centre was
complete, brought up his left flank, carried all the
forts to his right in succession, killed a great num-
PENINSULAR WAR. 199
her of the defenders, and drove the rest towards the
sea. These last dividing, fled for refuge, one part
to the fort of St Joa, the other towards the mouth March.
of the Douro, where, maddened by terror as the
French came pouring down upon them, they strove,
some to swim across, others to get over in small
boats ; their general, Lima, called out against this
hopeless attempt, but they turned and murdered
him within musket-shot of the approaching enemy,
and then renewing the attempt to cross, per,ished.
The victory was now certain, for Lorge had dis-
persed the people on the side of Villa de Conde,
and general Arnaud hemming in those above the
town prevented them from plunging into the river
also, as in their desperate mood they were going
to do.
Nevertheless the battle continued within Oporto,
for the two battalions sent from the centre having
burst the barricades at the entrance of the streets,
penetrated, fighting, to the bridge; there all the
horrid circumstances of war seemed to be accumu-
lated and the calamities of an age compressed into
one doleful hour. More than four thousand per*
sons, old and young, and of both sexes, were
seen pressing forward with wild tumult, some
already on the bridge others striving to gain it, and
all in a state of phrenzy* The batteries on the op-
posite bank opened their fire when the French ap-
peared, and at that moment a troop of Portuguese
cavalry flying from the fight, came down one of the
streets and remorseless in their fears bore at full
gallop into the midst of the miserable helpless
crowd, trampling a bloody pathway to the riven
Suddenly the nearest boats, ufcable to Sustain the
increasing weight, sunk, emd the foremost wretches
200 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK still tumbling into the river as they were pressed
" from behind, perished, until the heaped bodies
March, rising above the surface of the waters, filled all the
space left by the sinking of the vessels.
The first of the French that arrived, amazed at
this fearful spectacle, forgot the battle, and has-
tened to save those who still struggled for life
and while some were thus nobly employed, others
by the help of planks, getting on to the firmer parts
of the bridge, crossed the river and carried the bat-
teries on the heights of Villa Nova. The passage
was thus secured, but this terrible destruction did
not complete the measure of the city's calamities ;
two hundred men, who occupied the bishop's pa-
lace continued to fire from the windows, and main-
tained that post until the French gathering round
them in strength burst the doors and put all to the
sword. Every street and house then rung with the
noise of the combatants and the shrieks of distress ;
for the French soldiers, exasperated by long hard-
ships, and prone, like all soldiers, to ferocity and
violence during an assault, became frantic with fury
when, in one of the principal squares they found
several of their comrades who had been made pri-
soners fastened upright and living, but with their
eyes burst, their tongues torn out, and their other
members mutilated and gashed. Those that beheld
the sight spared none who fell in their way. It
was in vain that Soult strove to stop the slaughter,
it was in vain that hundreds of officers and soldiers
opposed, at the risk of their lives, the vengeance
of their comrades, and by their generous exertions
rescued vast numbers that would otherwise have
fallen victims to the anger and brutality of the
moment. The frightful scene of rape, pillage, and
PENINSULAR WAR. 201
murder, closed not for many hours, and what with
those who fell in battle, those who were drowned, - -
1809.
and those sacrificed to revenge, it is said that ten March,
thousand Portuguese died on that unhappy day ! Journal of
The loss of the French did not exceed five hundred Ms? aions
men.
202 HISTORY OF THE
CHAP. VI.
THE dire slaughter at Oporto was followed up by a
j^ variety of important operations, but before these are
Jan. treated of, it is essential to narrate the contempora-
neous events on the Tagus and the Guadiana ; for
the war was wide and complicated, and the result
depended more upon the general combinations than
upon any particular movements.
OPERATIONS OF THE FIRST AND FOURTH CORPS.
Page 15. It has been already related that Marshal Victor,
after making a futile attempt to surprise the mar-
quis of Palacios, had retired to his former quarters
at Toledo ; that the conde de Cartoajal, who suc-
ceeded the duke of Infantado, had advanced to
Ciudad Real with about fourteen thousand men ;
that Cuesta having broken the bridge of Almaraz,
guarded the line of the Tagus with fourteen thousand
infantry and two thousand five hundred cavalry. The
fourth corps remained at Talavera and Placentia, but
held the bridge of Arzobispo by a detachment.
The remainder of the French army was in Cata-
lonia, at Zaragoza, or on the communication. The
imperial reserve of heavy cavalry had been suppressed, and
S, er the regiments dispersed among the corps ffarmie;
MSS< and the whole army, exclusive of the king's guards,
was about two hundred and seventy thousand men,
with forty thousand horses, shewing a decrease of
sixty-five thousand men since the 15th of Novem-
ber. But this decrease included the imperial guards,
PENINSULAR WAR. 203
the reserve of infantry, and many detachments
drafted from the corps, in all forty thousand men,
who had been struck off the rolls of the army in ***
Spain, with a view to the war in Germany. The real
loss of the French by sword, sickness, and captivity,
in the four months succeeding Napoleon's arrival
in the Peninsula, was therefore about twenty-five
thousand a vast number, but not incredible, when
it is considered that two sieges, twelve pitched
battles, and innumerable combats had taken place
during that period.
Such was the state of affairs when the duke of
Belluno, having received orders to aid Soult in the
invasion of Portugal, changed places with the fourth
corps. Sebastiani was then opposed to Cartoajal,
and Victor stood against Cucsta. The former fixed
his head-quarters at Toledo, the latter at Talavera
de la Reyna, the communication between them
being kept up by Montbrun's division of cavalry,
and the garrison of Madrid, composed of the king's
guards, and Dessolle's division, equally supported
both. But to understand the connection between
the first, second, and fourth corps, and Lapisse's
division, it is necessary to have a clear idea of the
nature of the country on both sides of the Tagus.
That river, after passing Toledo, runs through a
deep and long valley, walled up on either hand by
lofty mountains. Those on the right bank are
always capped with snow, and ranging nearly
parallel with the course of the stream, divide the
valley of the Tagus from Old Castile and the
Salamanca country ; the highest parts being known
by the names of the Sierra de Gredos, Sierra de
Bejar, and Sierra de Grata* In these sierras the
Alberche, the Tietar, and the Alagon, take their
204 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK rise, and ploughing the valley in a slanting direc-
tion fall into the Tagus. On the left bank the
Jaa." principal mountain is called the Sierra de Guada-
lupe, and it extends in a southward direction from
the river, dividing the upper part of La Mancha
from Spanish Estremadura.
Now the communications leading from the Sala-
manca country into this valley of the Tagus are nei-
ther many nor good ; but the principal passes are
1st. The way of Horcajada, an old Roman road,
which, running through Pedrahita and Villa Franca,
crosses the Sierra de Gredos at the Puerto de Pico,
and then descends by Montbeltran to Talavera.
2d. The pass of Arenas, leading nearly parallel
to, and a short distance from, the first.
3d. The pass of Tornevecas, leading upon
Placentia.
4th. The route of Bejar, which, crossing the
Sierra de Bejar at the pass of Banos, descends
likewise upon Placentia.
5th. The route of Payo or Gata, which crosses
the Sierra de Gata by the Pass of Perales, and
afterwards dividing, sends one branch to Alcantara,
the other to Coria and Placcntia. Of these five
passes the two last only are, generally speaking,
practicable for artillery*
The royal roads leading from Toledo and Madrid
to Badajos, unite near Talavera and follow the course
of the Tagus by the right bank as far as Naval
Moral, and then, turning to the left, cross the river
at the bridge of Almaraz. But, from Toledo, west-
ward, to the bridge of Almaraz, a distance of above
fifty miles, the left bank of the Tagus is so crowded
by the rugged shoots of the Sierra de Guadalupe,
that it may be broadly stated as impassable for an
PENINSULAR WAR*
army, and tins peculiarity of ground gives the key
to the operations on both sides. For Cuesta and
Cartoajal, by reason of this impassable Sierra de Feb.*
Guadalupe, had no direct military communication ;
but Victor and Sebastiani, occupying Toledo and
Talavera, could unite on either line of operations by
the royal loads above mentioned, or by a secondary
road which running near Yebenes crosses the Tagus
by a stone bridge near Puebla de Montalvan, half
way between Toledo and Talavera.
The rallying point of the French was Madrid,
and their parallel lines of defence were the Tagus,
the Alberche, and the Guadarama, The base of
CartoajaPs operations was the Sierra de Morena.
Cuesta's first line was the Tagus, and his second
the Guardiana, from whence he could retreat by a
flank march to Badajos, or by a direct one to the
defiles of Monasterio in the Sierra Morena. But
the two Spanish armies, if they had been united,
would not have furnished more than twenty-six
thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry, and
they had no reserve; whereas the two French corps,
united, would have exceeded thirty-five thousand
fighting-men, supported by the reserve under the
king. The French, therefore, had the advantage
of numbers, position, and discipline.
Following the orders of Napoleon, marshal Victor
should have been at Merida before the middle of
February. In that position he would have con-
fined Cuesta to the Sierra Morena, and with his
twelve regiments of cavalry he could easily have
kept all the flat country, as far as Badajos, in sub-
jection. That fortress itself had no means of resist-
ance, and, certainly, there was no Spanish force in
the field capable of impeding the full execution of
206 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK the emperor's instructions, which were also reiterated
by the king. Nevertheless, the duke of Belluno
Feb.' remained inert at this critical period, and the
Spaniards attributing his inactivity to weakness,
endeavoured to provoke the blow so unaccountably
withheld ; for Cuesta was projecting offensive move-
ments against Victor, and the duke of Albuquerque
was extremely anxious to attack Toledo from the
side of La Mancha* Cartoajal opposed Albu-
querque's plans, but offered him a small force with
which to act independently. The duke complained
to the junta of Cartoajal's proceedings, and Mr.
Frere, whose traces are to be found in every in-
trigue and every absurd project broached at this
period, having supported Albuquerque's complaints,
Cartoajal was directed by the junta to follow the
duke's plans ; but the latter was himself ordered
to join Cuesta with a detachment of four or five
thousand men.
ROUT OF CIUDAD BE.AL.
Cartoajal, in pursuance of his instructions,
marched with twelve thousand men and twenty
guns towards Toledo and his advanced guard at-
tacked a regiment of Polish lancers near Consuegra
but the latter retired without loss. Sebastiani, with
about ten thousand men, immediately came up
against him, and the leading divisions encountering
at Yebenes, the Spaniards were pushed back to
Ciudad Real, where they halted leaving guards on
the river in front of that town. The French imme-
diately forced the passage, and a tumultuary action
ensuing, Cartoajal was totally routed with the loss
of his guns, a thousand slain, and several thousand
prisoners ; the vanquished fled by Almagro, and
PENINSULAR WAH. 207
the French cavalry pursued even to the foot of the
Sierra Morena. The importance of this action, -
fought on the 27th of March, and commonly called March.
the battle of Ciudad Real is said to have been
greatly exaggerated by Sebastiani, and was certainly
not followed up with any great profit to the victors.
The French general having gathered up the spoils,
sent his prisoners to the rear, and held his troops
concentrated on the Upper Guadiana, to await the
result of Victor's operations ; thus enabling the
Spanish fugitives to rally at Carolina, where they
were reinforced by levies from Granada and Cordova.
While these events were passing in La Mancha,
Estremadura was also invaded, for the king having
received a despatch from Soult, dated Orense and
giving notice that the second corps would be at
Oporto about the 1 5th of March, had reiterated the
order for Lapisse to move on Abrantes, and for the
duke of Belluno to pass the Tagus and drive Cuesta
beyond the Guadiana. Marshal Victor, who appears
to have been, for some reason unknown, averse to
aiding the operations of the second corps at all,
remonstrated, and especially urged that the order
to Lapisse should be withdrawn, lest his division
should arrive too soon, and without support, at
Abrantes ; but this time the king was firm, and,
on the 14th of March, the duke of Belluno, having
collected five days' provisions, made the necessary
dispositions to pass the Tagus.
The amount of the Spanish force immediately on
that river was about sixteen thousand men, and^|*J s
Cuesta had also several detachments and irregular J
bands in his rear, which may be calculated at eight tions
thousand more. The duke of Belluno, however,
estimated the troops in position before him at thirty
208 HISTORY OF THE
JJ ( > K thousand, a great error for so experienced a com-
mander to make. On the other hand, Cuesta was
March, as ill informed ; for this was the moment when,
with his approbation, colonel D'Urban proposed to
sir John Cradock, that curiously combined attack
against Victor already noticed, in which the Spa-
niards were to cross the Tagus and sir Robert Wil-
son was to come down upon the Tietar. This, also
was the period that Mr. Frere, apparently ignorant
that there were at least twenty-five thousand fighting
men in the valley of the Tagus without reckoning
the king's or Sebastiani's troops, proposed that the
twelve thousand British under sir John Cradock
should march from Lisbon to " drive the fourth
French corps from Toledo," and " consequently,"
as he phrased it, " from Madrid." The first move-
ment of Marshal Victor awakened Cuesta from these
dreams.
The bridges of Talavera and Arzobispo were, as
we have seen, held by the French, and their ad-
vanced posts were pushed into the valley of the
Tagus, as far as the Barca de Bazagona. The
Spanish position .extended from Garbin, near the
bridge of Arzobispo, to the bridge of Almaraz, the
centre being at Meza d'Ibor, a position of surprising
strength, running at right angles from the Tagus to
the . Guadalupe. The head- quarters and reserves
were at Deleytosa, and a road, cut by the troops,
afforded a communication between that place and
,Meza d'Ibor. Now on the right bank of the Tagus
there was easy access to the bridges of Talavera,
Arzobispo, and Almaraz j but on the left bank no
road existed, by which artillery could pass the
mountains except that of Almaraz, which was
crossed at the distance of four or five miles from
PENINSULAR WAR. 209
the river by the almost impregnable ridge of Mira-
bete. The duke of Belluno's plan was therefore to
pass the Tagus, at the bridges of Talavera and March.
Arzobispo, with his infantry and part of his cavalry,
and to operate in the Sierra de Guadalupe against
the Spanish right ; while the artillery and grand
pare, protected by the remainder of the cavalry. Journal of
r r , A i - i Operations
were to be united opposite Almaraz, having with ot the First
them a raft bridge to throw across at that point. MS. '
This project is, however, scarcely to be reconciled
with the estimate made of Cuesta's force ; for surely
nothing could be more rash than to expose the
whole of the guns and field stores of the army,
with no other guard than some cavalry and one
battalion of infantry, close to a powerful enemy,
who possessed a good pontoon train, and who
might, consequently, pass the river at pleasure.
The 15th, Laval's division of German infantry,
and Lasalle's cavalry, crossed at Talavera and,
turning to the right worked a march through the
rocky hills ; the infantry gaining Aldea Nueva, on a
line somewhat short of the bridge of Arzobispo, the
cavalry higher up the mountain towards Estrella.
The 16th,, when those troops had advanced a few
miles to the front, the head-quarters and the other
divisions of infantry, passed the bridge of Arzo-
bispo ; the artillery and the pares, accompanied by
a battalion of grenadiers and the escorting cavalry,
moved to Almaraz, with orders to watch, on the
17th and 18th, for the appearance of the army on
the heights at the other side, and then to move
down to the point before indicated for launching
the raft bridge-
Alarmed by these movements, Cuesta hastened
in person to Mirabete, and directing general Henes-
VOL, II. P
10 HISTORY OF THE
trosa to defend the bridge of Almaraz with eight
- thousand men, sent a detachment to reinforce his
T<uch. own right wing, which was posted behind the Ibor,
a small river but at this season running with a full
torrent from the Guadalupe to the Tagus.
On the 17th, the Spanish advanced guards were
driven, with some loss, across the Ibor ; they at-
tempted to re-form on the high rocky banks of that
river, but being closely followed, retreated to the
camp of Meza d'Ibor the great natural strength of
which was increased by some field-works. Here
their position could only be attacked in front, and
this being apparent at the first glance, LavalV
division was instantly formed into columns of attack,
which pushed rapidly up the mountain, the ine-
qualities of ground covering them in some sort from
the effects of the enemy's artillery. As they arrived
near the summit, the fire of musketry and grape
became murderous, but at this instant the Spaniards,
who should have displayed all their vigour, broke
and fled to Campillo, leaving behind them baggage,
magazines, seven guns, and a thousand prisoners,
besides eight hundred killed and wounded. The
French had only seventy killed, and five hundred
wounded ; and while this action was taking place
at Meza dlbor, Villatte's division, being higher up
the Sierra, to the left, overthrew a smaller body of
Spaniards at Frenedoso, making three hundred pri-
soners and capturing a large store of arms.
The 18th, at day-break, the duke of Belluno,
who had superintended in person the attack at
Meza d'Ibor, examined from that high ground all
the remaining position of the Spaniards. Cuesta,
he saw in full retreat to Truxillo, but Henostrosa
was still posted in front of Almaraz; wherefore
PENINSULAR WAR. 211
Villatte's division was detached after Cuesta, to CHAP.
Deleytosa, and Laval's Germans were led against
Henestrosa, and the latter, aware of his danger and
already preparing to retire, was driven hastily over
the ridge of Mirabete.
In the course of the night, the raft bridge was
thrown across the Tagus and the next day the
French dragoons passed to the left bank j the artil-
lery followed, and the cavalry immediately pushed
forward to Truxillo, from which town Cuesta had
already fallen back to Santa Cruz, leaving Henes-
trosa to cover the retreat, The 20th, after a slight
skirmish, the latter was forced over the Mazarna,
the whole French army, with the exception of a
regiment of dragoons left to guard the raft bridge
was poured along the road to Merida, and the
advanced guard, consisting of a regiment of light
cavalry, under general Bordesoult, arrived the 21st
in front of Miajadas. Here the road dividing,
sends one branch to Merida, the other to Medellin,
and a party of Spanish horsemen posted near the
town, appeared in great alarm, and by their hesi-
tating movements between the two roads invited a
charge. The French incautiously galloped forward,
but in a moment, twelve or fourteen hundred Spa-
nish cavalry, 'placed in ambush, came up at speed
on the flanks and charged home. General Lasalle,
who from a distance had observed the movements
of both sides, immediately rode forward with a
second regiment, and arrived just as Bordeaoult
had extricated himself from a great peril, by his
own valour, but with the loss of seventy killed iBUid
a hundred wounded.
After this well-managed combat, Cuesta retired
to Medellin without being molested, and Victor
12 HISTORY OF THE
**$*. spreading his cavalry posts on the different routes
- to gain intelligence and to collect provisions, esta-
Mfarch. blished his own quarters at Truxillo, a town of
umai of some trade and advantageously situated for a place
ss. Ionfl of arms. It had been deserted by the inhabitants
and pillaged by the first French troops that entered,
yet it still offered great resources for the army, and
there was an ancient citadel, capable of being
rendered defensible, which was immediately armed
with the Spanish guns, and provisioned from the
magazines taken at Meza d'Ibor. During these
events, the flooding of the Tagus and the rocky
nature of its bed had injured the raft-bridge near
Almaraz and delayed the passage of the artillery
and stores ; wherefore directions were given to have
a boat-bridge prepared, and a field-fort constructed
on the left bank of the Tagus, to be armed with
three guns, and garrisoned with a hundred and fifty
men to protect the bridge.
These arrangements and the establishment of an
hospital, for two thousand men, at Truxillo, de-
layed the first corps until the 24th of March.
Meanwhile the light cavalry reinforced by twelve
hundred infantry being posted at Miajadas, had
covered all the roads branching from that central
point with their scouting parties, and now reported
that a few of Cuesta's people had retired to Me-
dellin; that from five to six thousand men were
thrown into the Sierra de Guadalupe on the left of
the French ; that fopr thousand infantry and two
thoi^sand cavalry were behind the river Garganza,
in, front of Medellin, and that every thing else was
over the Guadiana. Thus the line of retreat chosen
by Cuesta uncovered Merida, and, consequently
the, great road between Badajos and Seville was
PENINSULAR WAR. 2 1 3
open to the French. But Victor was not disposed
to profit from this, for he was aware that Albu
querque was coming from La Mancha to Cuesta, March.
and believed that he brought nine thousand infantry
and two thousand cavalry ; he therefore feared that
Cuesta's intention was either to draw him into a
difficult country by making a flank march to join
Cartoajal in La Mancha ; or by crossing the Gua-
diana above Naval Villar, where the fords are al-
ways practicable, to rejoin his detachments' in the
Sierra de Guadalupe, and so establish a new base
of operations on the left flank of the French army.
This reasoning was misplaced ; neither Cuesta nor
his army were capable of such operations ; his line
of retreat was solely directed by a desire to join
Albuquerque, and to save his troops by taking to a
rugged instead of an open country. The duke of
Belluno therefore lost the fruits of his previous
success by thus over-rating his adversary's skill ;
instead of following Cuesta with a resolution to
break up the Spanish army, he contented himself
after leaving a brigade at Truxillo and Almaraz
to protect the communications, with advancing a
few leagues on the road to Medellin with his main
body ; sending his light cavalry to Merida ; and
pushing on detachments towards Badajos and Se-
ville, while other parties explored the roads leading
into the Guadalupe.
The 27th, however, he marched in person to
Medellin, at the head of two divisions of infantry,
and a brigade of heavy cavalry. Eight hundred
Spanish horse posted on the right batik of the Oua-
diana, retired at his approach, and crossing that
river halted at Don Benito, where they were rein-
forced by other squadrons, but no infantry were to
14 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK j^ discovered. The duke of Belluno then passing
the river took post on the road leading to Mingabril
March, and Don Benito, and the situation of the French
army in the evening was as follows :
The main body, consisting of two divisions of
infantry, and one incomplete brigade of heavy ca-
valry in position on the road leading from Medellin
to Don Benito and Mingabril.
The remainder of the dragoons, under Latour
Maubourg, at Zorita, fifteen miles on the left,
watching the Spaniards in the Guadalupe.
The light cavalry at Merida, eighteen miles to
the right, having patrolled all that day on the roads
to Badajos, Seville, and Medellin.
Ruffin's division at Miajadas eighteen miles in
the rear.
But in the course of the evening intelligence
arrived that Albuquerque was just come up with
eight thousand men; that the combined troops,
amounting to twenty-eight thousand infantry and
seven thousand cavalry, were in position on the
table laud of Don Benito, and that Cuesta aware
of the scattered state of the French army was pre-
paring to attack the two divisions on their march
the next day. Upon this Victor, notwithstanding
the strength of the Spanish army, resolved to fight,
and immediately sent orders to Lasalle, to Ruffin,
and to Latour Maubourg, to bring their divisions
down to Medellin ; the latter was also directed to
leave a detachment at Miajadas to protect the route
of Merida, and a brigade at Zorita, to observe the
Spaniards in the Sierra de Guadalupe.
This account of Cuesta's numbers was exag-
gerated. That general, blaming every body but
himself for his failure on the Tagus, had fallen
PENINSULAR WAli. 215
back to Campanarios, rallied all his scattered de-
tachments, and then returned to Villa Nueva de -
Serena, where he was joined on the 27th by Albu- March.
querque, who brought up, not a great body of
infantry and cavalry as supposed, but less than
three thousand infantry and a few hundred horse.
This reinforcement, added to some battalions drawn
from Andalusia, increased Cuesta's army to about
twenty-five thousand foot, four thousand horse, and
eighteen or twenty pieces of artillery ; and with
this force, he, fearing for the safety of Badajos,
retraced his steps and rushed headlong to de-
struction.
BATTLE OF MEDELLIN.
This town, possessing a fine stone-bridge, is situ-
ated in a hollow on the left bank of the Guadianu,
and just beyond the town is a vast plain, or table
land, the edge of which, breaking abruptly down,
forms the bed of that river. The Orligosa cuts
this plain and is a rapid torrent, rushing perpendi-
cularly to the Guadiana, with steep and rugged
banks, yet in parts passable for artillery* Two
roads branch out from Medellin, the one leading to
Mingrabil on the right, the other to Don Bcnito on
the left; those places are about five miles apart,
and the French army, with the exception of the
troops left to cover the communications and those at
Zorita, being concentrated in the town at ten o'clock
had the command of both these routes. At one,
about fourteen thousand infantry, two thousand
five hundred cavalry, and forty-two pieces of artil-
lery, went forth to fight. Now the plain was on
the side of Don Benito bounded by a high ridge of
land, . behind which Cuesta kept the Spanish infan-
216 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK try concealed, showing only his cavalry and some
guns in advance ; but to make him display his lines
i oOy
March, of infantry the French general sent Lasalle's light
cavalry, with a battery of six guns and two batta-
lions of German infantry, towards Don Benito,
while Latour Maubourg, with five squadrons of
dragoons, eight guns, and two other battalions,
keeping close to the Ortigosa, advanced towards a
point of the enemy's ridge called the Retamosa.
The rest of the army were kept in reserve, the
division of Villatte and the remainder of the Ger-
mans, being, one-half on the road of Don Benito,
the other half on the road of MingabriL Ruffin's
division was a little way in rear, and a battalion
was left to guard the baggage at the bridge of
Medellin.
As the French squadrons advanced the artillery
on both sides opened, and the Spanish cavalry
guards in the plain retired slowly to the higher
ground. Lasalle and Latour Maubourg then pressed
forward, but just as the latter, who had the shortest
distance to traverse, approached the enemy's posi-
tion, the whole Spanish line of battle was suddenly
descried in full march over the edge of the ridge,
and stretching from the Ortigosa to within a mile of
the Guadiana, a menacing but glorious apparition.
Cuesta Henestrosa and the duke del Parque with
the mass of cavalry were on the left ; Francisco
Frias with the main body of infantry, in the centre;
Eguia and Portazgo were on the right, which
was prolonged to the Guadiana by some scattered
squadrons under Albuquerque, who flanked the
march of the host as- it descended with a rapid pace
into the plain.
Cuestas plan was now disclosed ; his line over-
PENINSULAR WAR. 217
lapped the French left, and he was hastening to cut
their array off from Medellin but his order of battle
1 OAQ
was on a front of three miles, and he had no re- March.
serve. The duke of Belluno seeing this instantly
brought his centre a little forward, and then rein-
forcing Latour Maubourg with ten guns and a bat-
talion of grenadiers while a brigade of infantry
advanced as a support, ordered him to fall boldly
on the advancing enemy ; at the same time Lasalle,,
who was giving way under the pressure of hig
antagonist, was directed to retire towards Medellin,
always refusing his left.
The Spaniards marched briskly forward into the
plain, and a special body of cavalry with three
thousand infantry, running out from their left, met
Latour Maubourg in front, while a regiment of hus-
sars fell upon the French columns of grenadiers
and guns in his rear. The hussars being received
with grape, a pelting fire of musketry, and a charge
in flank by some dragoons, were beaten at once ;
but the Spanish infantry, closely followed by the
rest of their own cavalry, came boldly up to Latour
Maubourg's horsemen and with a rough discharge,
forced them back in disorder. The French how-
ever soon rallied, and smashing the Spanish ranks
with artillery, and fighting all together, broke
in and overthrew their enemies man and horse.
Cuesta was wounded and fell but being quickly
remounted escaped*
While this was. passing on the French right, La-
salle's cavalry, continually refusing its leffy was
driven, fighting, close up to the main body of the
French infantry, which was now disposed on a new
front having a reserve behind the centre. Mean-
while , Latour <Maubourg's division was being re-
218 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK formed on the ridge from whence the Spaniards had
first descended, and the whole face of the battle
1809
March, was changed; for the Spanish left being put to
flight, the French right wing overlapped the centre
of their antagonist, and the long attenuated line
of the latter wavering, disjointed, and disclosing
wide chasms, was still advancing without an object.
The duke of Belluno, aware that the decisive
moment of the battle had arrived, was on the point
of commanding a general attack, when his attention
was arrested by the appearance of a column coming
down on the rear of his right wing from the side of
Mingabril. A brigade from the reserve, with four
guns, was immediately sent to keep this body
in check, while Lasalle's cavalry, taking ground
to its left, unmasked the infantry in the centre,
and the latter advancing poured a heavy fire into
the Spanish ranks ; Latour Maubourg, sweeping
round their left flank, fell on the rear, and at the
same moment Lasalle also galloped in upon the
dismayed and broken bands. A horrible carnage
ensued, for the French soldiers, while their strength
would permit, continued to follow and strike, until
three-fifths of the Spanish army wallowed in blood.
Six guns and several thousand prisoners were
taken ; General Frias, deeply wounded, fell into
the hands of the victors; and so utter was the
discomfiture, that for several days after, Cuesta
could not rally a single battalion of infantry, and
his cavalry was only saved by the speed of the
horses.
Following general Semele's journal, of which,
however, I only possess an unauthenticated copy,
the French loss did not exceed three hundred men ;
a number so utterly disproportionate to that of the
PENINSULAR WAR 219
vanquished as to be scarcely credible ; and if cor- CHAP.
rect, discovering a savage rigour in the pursuit by -
no means commendable ; for it does not appear Much.
that any previous cruelties were perpetrated by the
Spaniards to irritate the French soldiers. The right
to slaughter an enemy in battle can neither be dis-
puted nor limited ; but a brave soldier should always
have regard to the character of his country, and be
sparing of the sword towards beaten men.
The main body of the French army passed the
night of the 28th near the field of battle ; Latour
Maubourg marched with the dragoons by the
left bank of the Guadiana to Merida, leaving a
detachment at Torre Mexia to watch the roads of
Almcndralejo and Villa Franca, and to give notice
if the remains of Cuesta's army should attempt to
gain Badajos, in which case the dragoons had orders
to intercept them at Loboa* The 29th, Villatte's
division advanced as far as Villa Nucva de Serena,
and the light cavalry were pushed on to Campana-
rios; yet, as all the reports agreed* that Cucsta
and a few horsemen had taken refuge in the Sierra
Morena, and that the remnants of his army were
dispersed and wandering through the fields and
along the bye-roads, without any power of re-
uniting, the duke of Belluno relinquished the pur-
suit. Having fixed his head-quarters at Merida,
and occupied that place and Medellin with his
infantry, he formed with his cavalry a belt extend-
ing from Loboa on the right to Mingrabil on the
left ; but from all this tract of country the people
had fled, and even the great towns were deserted.
Merida, situated in a richly^cultivated basin, pos-
sessed a fine bridge and many magnificent remains
of antiquity, Roman and Moorish ; amongst others,
220 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK a castle built on the right bank of the river close to
the bridge, was so perfect, that, in eight days, it was
rendered capable of resisting any sudden assault; six
guns were mounted on the walls, an hospital for a
thousand men was established there, and a garrison
of three hundred men, with two months' stores and
provisions for eight hundred, was put into it.
The king now repeated his orders, that the duke
of Belluno should enter Portugal, and that general
Lapisse should march upon Abrantes, the former
again remonstrated ; saying that he could not
make such a movement and defend his commu-
nications with Almaraz, unless the division of
Lapisse was permitted to join him by the route of
Alcantara. Nevertheless as Badajos, although more
capable of defence than it had been in December,
when the fourth corps was at Merida, was still far
from being secure ; and as many of the richer
inhabitants, disgusted and fatigued with the violence
of the mob government, were more inclined to be-
tray the gates to the French than to risk a siege ;
Victor, whose battering train, only twelve pieces,
badly horsed and provided, was still at Truxillo,
opened a secret communication with the malcon-
tents. The parties met at the village of Albuera,
and every thing was arranged for the surrender,
when the peasants giving notice to the junta that
some treason was in progress, the latter arrested
all the persons supposed to be implicated, and the
project was baffled. The duke of Belluno then
resigned all further thoughts of Badajos, and con-
tented himself with sending detachments to Alcan-
tara to get intelligence of Lapisse, whose proceed-
ings it is now time to notice.
PENINSULAR WAR. 221
CHAP.
OPERATIONS OF GENERAL LAPISSE. VI.
This general, after taking Zamora in January, had
occupied Ledesma and Salamanca, where he was Apnl *
joined by general Maupetit's brigade of cavalry.
Sir Robert Wilson's legion and the feeble garri-
sons in Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida were the only
bodies in his front, and universal terror prevailed ;
yet he, although at the head of ten thousand men,
with a powerful artillery, remained inactive from
January to the end of March, and suffered sir
Robert, with a few hundred Portuguese, to vex his
outposts, to intercept his provisions, to restrain his
patroles, and even to disturb his infantry in their
quarters. This conduct brought him into contempt,
and enabled Wilson to infuse a spirit into the people
which they were far from feeling when the enemy
first appeared.
Don Carlos d'Espana, with a small Spanish force,
being then placed under sir Robert's command, two
battalions were sent to occupy the pass of Banos,
and Lapisse was thus deprived of any direct com-
munication with Victor. In this situation the
French general remained without mating any vi-
gorous effort, either to clear his front or to get
intelligence of the duke of Dalmatia's march upon
Oporto, until the beginning of April, when he
advanced towards Bejar; but finding the passes
occupied, turned suddenly to his right, dissipated
Wilson's posts on the Ecla, and forced the legioa,
then commanded by colonel Grant, to take refuge
tinder the guns of Ciudad Rodrigo. L&pis#e sum-
moned that town to surrender on the 6th, &ftd after
a slight skirmish close to the walls took a position
between the Agueda and Ledesma ; but this event
>22 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK wa $ followed by a genet 1 al insurrection, from Ciudad
Rodrigo to Alcantara, and from Tamames to Bejar;
for Lapisse, who had been again ordered by the
king to fulfil the emperor's instructions, and ad-
vance to Abrantes, instead of obeying, suddenly
quitted his positions on the Agueda, and without
regarding his connexion with the second corps,
abandoned Leon, and made a rapid march, through
the pass of Perales, upon Alcantara. He was fol-
lowed closely by Wilson, by Carlos d'Espana, by
the two battalions from Bejar, and a multitude of
peasants both Portuguese and Spanish,
At Alcantara, a corps of Spanish insurgents en-
deavoured to defend the passage of the river, but
the French broke through the entrenchments on
the bridge, and, with a full encounter carried the
town, which they pillaged and then joined the first
corps at Merida on the 19th of April.
This false movement greatly injured the French
cause. From that moment the conquering impulse
given by Napoleon was at an end, and his armies,
ceasing to act on the offensive, became stationary
or retrograded, while the British, Spanish, and
Portuguese once more assumed the lead. The
duke of Dalmatia, abandoned to his own resources,
and in total ignorance of the situation of the corps
by which his movements should have been sup-
ported, was forced to remain in Oporto ; and at the
moment when the French combinations were thus
paralyzed, the arrival of English reinforcements at
Lisbon and the advance of sir John Cradock towards
Leiria, gave a sudden and violent impetus both to
the Spaniards and Portuguese along the Beira fron-
tier. The insurrection, no longer kept down by the
presence of an intermediate French corps connect-
PENINSULAR WAR. 223
ing Victor's and Soult's forces, was thus put into ciup
full activity from Alcantara on the Tagus to Ama
,t m 1809.
rante on the lamega. A P ui.
During this time Cuesta was gathering another
host in the Morena. The simultaneous defeat of
the armies in Estremadura and La Mancha had at
first produced the greatest dismay in Andalusia; yet
the Spaniards, when they found such victories as
Ciudad Real and Medellin only leading to a stag-
nant inactivity on the part of the French, concluded
that extreme weakness was the cause, and that the
Austrian war had, or would, oblige Napoleon to
abandon his projects against the Peninsula* This
idea which was general, upheld both the people's
spirit and the central junta's authority, which could
not otherwise have been maintained after such a
succession of follies and disasters. Their conduct
however did not mend. The misfortunes of the
two Spanish generals had been equal, but Cartoajal,
having no popular influence, was dismissed, while
Cuesta was appointed to command what remained
of both armies ; and the junta, stimulated for a
moment by the imminent danger in which they were
placed, drew together all the scattered troops and
levies in Andalusia, to reinforce him.
To cover Seville, Cuesta took post in the defiles
of Monasterio, and was there joined by eight hun-
dred horse and two thousand three hundred infan-
try, drafted from the garrison of Seville ; these
were followed by thirteen hundred old troops from
Cadiz, and by three thousand five hundred Grena-
dian levies; finally, eight thousand foot, and two
thousand five hundred horsemen, taken from the
army of La Mancha, contributed to swell his num-
bers, until, in the latter end of April, they amounted
224 HISTORY OF THE
B ^ K to twenty-five thousand infantry and six thousand
cavalry. General Venegas, also, being recalled
April, from Valencia, repaired to La Carolina, and pro-
ceeded to organize another army of La Mancha.
Meanwhile Joseph, justly displeased at the false
disposition made of Lapisse's division, directed that
Alcantara should be immediately re-occupied. This
however could not be done without an action, which
belongs to another combination to be noticed here-
after ; it is now proper to return to the operations
on the Douro, which were intimately connected
with those on the Guadiana.
PENINSULAR WAR. 225
CHAPTER VII.
WHEN the bishop of Oporto beheld, from his sta- CHAP*
tion at the Serra, the final overthrow of his ambi
tious schemes in the north of Portugal, he fled to
Lisbon. There he reconciled himself to the regen-
cy, became a member of that body, was soon after
created patriarch, and, as I shall have occasion to
shew, used his great influence in the most mis-
chievous manner; discovering, on every occasion,
the untamed violence and inherent falseness of his
disposition.
Meanwhile the fall of Oporto enabled Soult to
establish a solid base of operations, and to com-
mence a regular system of warfare. The immediate
fruit of his victory was the capture of immense ma-
gazines of powder, of a hundred and ninety-seven
pieces of artillery, every gun of which had been
used in the action, and of thirty English vessels
loaded with wine and provisions which were wind-
bound in the river.- Having repressed the disor-
ders attendant on the battle, he adopted the same
conciliatory policy which had marked his conduct
at Chaves and Braga, and endeavoured to remedy,
as far as it was possible, the deplorable results of
the soldiers' fury. Recovering and restoring a
part of the plunder, he caused the inhabitants
remaining in the town to be treated with respect;
VOL. n. Q
6 HISTORY OF THE
he invited, by proclamation, all those who had fled
1809 * return > an d he demanded no contribution; but
restraining with a firm hand the violence of his
men, he contrived, from the captured public pro-
perty, to support the army and even to succour the
poorest and most distressed of the population.
His ability in the civil and political administra-
tion of the Entre Minho e Douro produced an
effect which he was not prepared for. The prince
regent's desertion of the country was not forgotten",
and the national feeling was as adverse to Portugal
being a dependency on the Brazils, as it was to the
usurpation of the French. A comparison between
Soult's government and the horrible anarchy which
preceded it, was all in favour of the former, while
his victories, and the evident vigour of his charac-
ter, contrasted with the apparent supineness of the
English, promised permanency for the French power.
Wherefore the party, formerly noticed as being ini-
mical to the house of Braganza, revived ; and the
leaders, thinking this a favourable opportunity to
execute their intention, waited upon the duke of
Dalmatia, and expressed their desire for a French
prince and an independent government. They even
intimated their good wishes towards the duke him-
self, and demanded his concurrence and protection,
while, in the name of the people, they declared
that the Braganza dynasty was at an end,
Although unauthorized by the emperor to accede
to this proposition, Soult was yet unwilling to re-
ject a plan from which he could draw such imme-
diate and important military advantages. Napoleon
was not a man to be lightly dealt with on such an
occasion; but the marshal, trusting that circum-
stances would justify him, encouraged the design,
PENINSULAR WAR. 227
appointed men to civil employments and raised a
Portuguese legion of five battalions. He acted with -
so much dexterity that in fifteen days, the cities of April.
Oporto and Braga, and the towns of Bacellos, Viana, Appendix,
Villa de Conde, Povoa de Barcirn, Feira, and Ovar,
sent addresses, containing the expression of their
sentiments, and bearing the signatures of thirty
thousand persons, as well of the nobles clergy and
merchants, as of the people. These addresses were
burned when the French retreated from Oporto, but
the fact that such a project was in agitation has
never been denied ; the regency even caused in-
quest to be made on the matter, and it was then
asserted that very few persons were found to be
implicated. That many of the signatures were
forged by the leaders may readily be believed ; but
the policy of lessening the importance of the affair
is also evident, and the inquisitors, if willing, could
not have probed it to the bottom.
This transaction formed the ground-work of a
tale, generally credited even by his own officers,
that Soult perfidiously aimed at an independent
crown. The circumstances were certainly such as
might create suspicion ; but that the conclusion
was false, is shewn, by the mode in which Napo-
leon treated both the rumour and the subject of it.
Slighting the former, he yet made known to his lieu- Memoir*.
tenant that it had reached his ears, adding with a
delicate allusion to the marshal's former brilliant
conduct " I remember nothing but Austerlite" at
the same time he largely increased the duke of Dal-
matia's command. On the other hand, the policy of
Soult's conduct on this occasion, and the great in- j ou
fluence, if not the numbers of the Portuguese ma
contents, were abundantly proved by the ameliorated
28 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK relations between the army and the peasantry. The
' fierceness of the latter subsided, and in the Entre
1809
April* Minlio e Douro even the priests abated of their
hostility. The French soldiers were no longer as-
,sassinated in that province, whereas, previous to
this intrigue, that cruel species of warfare had been
carried on with infinite activity, and the most ma-
lignant passions had been called forth on both sides.
Among other instances of Portuguese ferocity, and
of the truculent violence of the French soldiers, the
death of colonel Lameth and the retaliation which
followed, may be cited. That young officer, when
returning from the marshal's quarters to his own,
was waylaid and murdered near the village of Arri-
fana ; his body was then stripped, and mutilated in
a shocking manner. This assassination, committed
within the French lines, and at a time when Soult
enforced the strictest discipline, was justifiable nei-
ther by the laws of war nor by those of humanity.
No general could neglect to punish such a pro-
ceeding. The protection due to the army, and
even the welfare of the Portuguese within the
French jurisdiction, demanded a severe example.
For the violence of the troops had hitherto been
with difficulty restrained by their commander, and
if at such a moment he had appeared indifferent
to their individual safety, his authority would have
been set at nought, and the unmeasured indiscri-
minating vengeance of an insubordinate army
executed.
Impressed with this feeling, and afflicted at the
unhappy death of a personal friend, Soult directed
general Thomieres to march, with a brigade of in-
fantry, to Arrifapa, and punish the criminals. Tho-
mieres was accompanied by a Portuguese civilian.
PENINSULAR WAR. 229
and, after a judicial inquiry, shot five or six per-
sons whose guilt was said to have been proved; -
but it is certain' that the principal actor, a Portu-
guese major of militia, and some of his accom-
plices, escaped across the Vouga to colonel Trant,
who, disgusted at their conduct, sent them to mar-
shal Beresford. It would also appear, from the
statement of a peasant, that Thomiercs, or those
under him, exceeded Soult's orders; for in that
statement, attested by oath, it is said that twenty-
four innocent persons were killed, and that the
soldiers, after committing many atrocious excesses,
burned the village. These details have been related
partly because they throw a light upon the direful
nature of this contest, but chiefly because the
transaction has been adduced by other writers as
proof of cruelty in Soult ; a charge not to be sus-
tained by the facts of this case, and belied by the No " 13 "
general 'tenor of his conduct, which even his
enemies, while they attributed it to an insidious
policy, acknowledged, at the time, to be mild and
humane. And now, having finished this digres-
sion, in which the chronological order of events
has been anticipated, I shall resume the narrative
of military operations at that part where the dis-
orders attendant on the battle of Oporto having
been repressed, a fresh series of combinations were
commenced, not less important than those which
brought the French army down to the Douro.
The heavy blow struck on the 29th of March
was followed ftp with activity. The boat-bridge
was restored during the night; the forts of Maziriho
and St. Joa de Foz surrendered ; Frauceschi's ca-
valry crossed the Douro, and taking post ten miles
in advanca on the Coimbra road, pushed patrolcs
J30 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK as far as the Vouga river. To support this cavalry,
" general Mermet's division occupied a position some-
what beyond the suburb of Villa Nova ; Oporto
itself was held by three brigades, and the dragoons
of Lorge were sent to Villa da Conde, a walled
town situated at the mouth of the Ave. General
Caulaincourt was sent with a brigade of cavalry
up the Douro to Penafiel, having orders to clear
the valley of the Tamega ; another brigade of ca-
valry was posted on the road leading to Barca de
Trofa, to protect the rear of the army ; and general
Heudelet was directed to forward the hospitals
from Braga to Oporto, but to hold his troops in
readiness to open the communication with Tuy.
These dispositions being made, Soult had leisure
to consider his general position. The flight of the
bishop had not much abated the hostility of the
people, nor relieved the French from their diffi-
culties. The communication with the Minho was
still intercepted, the Tras os Montes was again in
a state of insurrection, and Silveira, witji a corps
of eight thousand men, not only commanded the
valley of the Tamega, but had advanced, after re-
taking Chaves, into the Entre Minho e Douro,
posting himself between the Sierra de Catalina and
the Douro. Lisbon, the ultimate object of the cam-
paign, was two hundred miles distant, and covered
by a British army, whose valour was to be dreaded,
and whose numbers were daily increasing. A con-
siderable body of natives were with Trant upon the
Vouga, and Beresford's force between the Tagus
and the Mondego, its disorderly and weak con-
dition being unknown, appeared formidable at a
distance* The day on which the second corps,
following the emperor's instructions, should have
PENINSULAR WAR. 231
reached Lisbon was overpassed by six weeks, the CHAP.
line of correspondence with Victor was uncertain, ^
and his co-operation could scarcely be calculated April".
upon. Lapisse's division was yet unfelt as an
aiding force, nor was it even known to Soult that
he still remained at Salamanca : finally, the three
thousand men expected from the Astorga country,
under the conduct of the marshal's brother, had not
yet been heard of. On the other hand, the duke
of Dalmatia had conquered a large and rich city ;
he had gained the military command of a very
fertile country, from whence the principal supplies
of the British army and of Lisbon were derived ;
he had obtained a secure base of operations and
a prominent station in the kingdom ; and if the
people's fierceness was not yet quelled, they had
learned to dread his talents, and to be sensible
of their own inferiority in battle. In this state of
affairs, judging that the most important objects were
to relieve the garrison of Tuy and to obtain intelli-
gence of Lapisse's division, Soult entrusted the first
to Heudelet, and the second to Franceschi.
This last-named general had occupied Feira and
Oliveira, and spread his posts along the Vouga,
but the inhabitants fled to the other side of that
river, and the rich valleys beyond were protected
by colonel Trant, an officer, well known to the
Portuguese as having commanded their troops at
Rori^a and Viraiero. He was at Coimbra when
intelligence of the defeat at Braga arrived, and
immediately took the command of all the arm$d
men in that town, among which was a small body
of volunteers, students at the university. The gsr
Kieral dismay and confusion being .greatly increased
by the subsequent catastrophe at Oporto, the fugi-
232 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK tives from that town and other places, accustomed
- to violence, and attributing every misfortune to
* treachery in the native generals, flocked to Trant's
standard; and he as a foreigner, was enabled to
assume an authority that no Portuguese of rank
could either have accepted or refused without im-
minent danger. He soon advanced with eight hun-
dred men to Sardao and Aveiro, where Eben and
general Vittoria joined him, and the conde de Bar-
bacena brought him some cavalry. But as the
people regarded these officers with suspicion Trant
retained the command, and his force was daily
increased by the arrival of ordenan^a, and even
regular troops who abandoned Beresford's army to
join him.
When Franceschi advanced, Trant sent a detach-
ment by Castanheira to occupy the bridge of the
Vougaj but the men, seized with a panic, dispersed,
and this was followed by the desertion of many
thousand ordtnan^ a happy circumstance, for
the numbers that had at first collected behind the
Vouga exceeded twelve thousand men, and their
extreme violence and insubordination exciting the
utmost terror, impeded the measures necessary for
defence. Trant, finally, retained about three thou-
sand men, with which, imposing upon the French,
he preserved a fruitful country from their incur-
sions ; he was however greatly distressed for money,
because the bishop of Oporto in his flight laid
hands on all that was at Coimbra and carried it to
Lisbon.
Franceschi, although reinforced with a brigade
of infantry, contented himself with chasing some
insurgents that infested his left flank, while his
&<xwts, sent forward on the side of Viseu, eudea-
PENINSULAR WAR. 233
voured to obtain information of Lapisse's division ;
but that general, as we have seen, was still beyond
the Agueda ; and while Franceschi was thus em- A P ni.
ployed in front of the French army, Caulaincourt's
cavalry on the Tamega was pressed by Silveira.
Loison marched with a brigade of infantry to his
assistance on the 9th of April, but Silveira was
too strong for both, and on the 12th, advancing
from Canavezes, obliged Loison, after a slight
action, to take post behind the Souza.
Meanwhile, Heudelet was hastening towards Tuy
to recover the artillery and depots, from which the
army had now been separated forty days. He was
joined on the 6th of April, at Bacellos, by Lorge,
who had taken Villa de Conde and cleared the
coast line. The 7th they marched to Ponte de
Lima, but the Portuguese resisted the passage vigo-
rously, and it was not forced until the 8th, The
10th the French arrived in front of Valen^a, on the
Minho. This fortress had been maltreated by the
fire from Tuy, and the garrison, amounting to two
hundred men, having only two days' provisions left,
capitulated, on condition of being allowed to retire
to their homes, and before the French could take
possession, deserted the town. The garrison in
Tuy, never having received the slightest intelli-
gence of the army since the separation at Ribidavia,
marvelled that the fire from Valen^a was discon-
tinued; and their surprise was extreme when they
beheld the French colours flying in that fort, and
observed French videttes on the left bank of the
Minho.
La Martiniere's garrison, by the arrival of strag-
glers and a battalion of detachme&ts which followed
the army from St. Jago, had been increased to three
34 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK thousand four hundred men, but twelve hundred
* were in hospital, two-thirds of the artillery-horses
had been eaten in default of other food ; the Por-
tuguese had passed the Minho, and, in conjunction
with the Spaniards, attacked the place on the 15th
of March. However the French general, by fre-
quent sallies, obliged them to keep up a distant
blockade, and the 22d of March, the defeat at
Braga being known, the Portuguese repassed the
Minho, the Spaniards dispersed, and La Martiniere
immediately sent three hundred men to bring off
the garrison of Vigo. It was too late, that place
was taken, and the detachment with difficulty re-
gained Tuy.
The peasants on the Arosa Estuary had, as I
have before noticed, risen, the 27th of February,
while Soult was still at Orense ; they were headed,
at first, by general Silva and by the count de Me-
zeda, and, finally, a colonel Barrois, sent by the
central junta, took the command. As their num-
bers were very considerable, Barrois with one part
attacked Tuy, and Silva assisted by the Lively and
Venus, British frigates on that station, invested
Vigo. The garrison of the latter place was at first
small, but the paymaster-general of the second
corps, instead of proceeding to Tuy, entered Vigo,
with the military chest and an escort of eight hun-
dred men ; and the governor after some slight at-
tacks had been repulsed, negotiated for a capitti-
lation. Distrustful however of the peasantry, he
protracted the surrender. Meanwhile, some of Ro-
mana's stragglers, coming from the Val des Orres,
collected between Tuy and Vigo ; and Pablo Mu-
rillo, a regular officer, assembling fifteen hundred
retired soldiers, joined the blockading force. These
PENINSULAR WAR. 235
troops acting in concert with captain Mackinley,
of the Lively, finally obliged the garrison to sur
render on terms. The 27th of March, thirteen A P ni.
hundred men and officers, including three him-
dred sick, marching out with the honours of war,
laid down their arms on the glacis, and were
embarked for an English port, according to the
articles agreed upon. Four hundred and forty-
seven horses, sixty-two covered waggons, some
stores, and the military chest, containing five thou-
sand pounds, fell into the victor's hands, and the
Spaniards then renewed their attack on Tuy ; the
Portuguese once more crossed the Minho, and the
siege continued until the 10th of April, when the
place was relieved as we have seen by Heudelet.
The dep6ts and the artillery were immediately
transported across the river, and directed upon
Oporto. The following day general Maucune, with
a division of the sixth corps, arrived at Tuy, with
the intention of carrying off the garrison, but seeing
that the place was relieved, returned. Heudelet,
after taking Viana, and the fort of Insoa, at the
mouth of the Minho, placed a small garrison in the
former, and blowing up the works of Valeria*
retired to Braga and Bacellos, sending Lorge again
to Villa de Conde. The French sick were trans-
ported in boats along shore, from the mouth of the
Minho to Viana, Villa de Conde, and thence to
Oporto ; and while these transactions were taking
place on the Minho, La Houssaye, with a brigade
of dragoons and one of infantry, scoured the coim*
try between the Lima and the Cavado, and ao
protected the rear of Heudelet,
All resistance in the Exrtre Mi&b.o $ Douro had
now ceased, because the influence of the
236 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK ganza party was exerted in favour of the French ;
but on the Tras os Montes side, Silveira was ad-
1809
vancing, and being joined by Botilho, from the
Lima, boasted that he would be in Oporto the 15th,
This unexpected boldness was explained by the
news of Chaves having fallen, which now, for the
first time, reached Soult* He then perceived that
while Silveira was in arms, the tranquillity of the
Entre Minho e Douro could only be momentary,
and therefore directed Laborde with a brigade of
infantry, to join Loison and attack the Portuguese
general by Amarante, while La Houssaye crossing
the Cavado, should push through Guimaraens for
the same point.
The 15th, Laborde reached Penafiel, and Sil-
veira, hearing of La Houssaye's march, retired to
Villamea. The 18th, Laborde drove back the Por-
tuguese without difficulty, and their retreat soon
became a flight. Silveira himself passed the Tamega
at Amarante, and was making for the mountains,
without a thought of defending that town, when
colonel Patrick, a British officer in the Portuguese
service, encouraging his battalion, faced about, and
rallying the fugitives, beat back the foremost of the
enemy. This becoming act obliged Silveira to
return, and while Patrick defended the approaches
to the bridge on the right bank with obstinate
valour, the former took a position, on the left bank,
on the heights overhanging the suburb of Villa
Real* The 19th, La Houssaye arrived, the French
renewed their attack on the town, and Patrick
again baffled their efforts ; but when that gallant
man, being mortally wounded, was carried across the
bridge, the defence slackened, and the Portuguese
weal over the Tamega: the passage* of the river
PENINSULAR WAR. 237
was, however, still to be effected. The bridges of CHAP.
Mondin and Cavez above, and that of Canavezas
below Amarante, were destroyed, and the Tamega
was in full flood, with a deep rocky bed; the
bridge in front of the French was mined and barred
with three rows of pallisades, and commanded by
a battery of ten guns; the Portuguese were in
position on the heights beyond, and could from
thence discern all that passed on the bridge, and
reinforce their advanced guard which was posted in
the suburb.
PASSAGE OF THE TAMEGA, AT AMARANTE.
Laborde at first endeavoured to work a way over
by the flying sap, and he reached the barricade
the 20th of April ; but the Portuguese fire was so
deadly that he soon relinquished this method and
sought to construct a bridge of tressels half a mile
below. This also failed, and the efforts against the
stone bridge being renewed, on the 27th the centre
barricade was burned by captain Brochard, an
engineer, who then devised a method of forcing a
passage so singularly bold, that all the generals
and especially Foy, were opposed to it. Neverthe-
less the plan being transmitted to Oporto, Soult
despatched general Hulot to examine its merits on
the spot, and that general having approved of it
the execution was commenced.
It appeared that the Portuguese mine was so
constructed, that while the muzzle of a loaded
musket was in the chamber, a string, tied to the
trigger, passed over the trenches and thus secured
the greatest precision in the explosion* Brochard
therefore proceeded in the following' manner. In
the night of the 2d of May, the French troops
238 HISTORY OF THE
B v?. K were Conveniently disposed as near the head of the
bridge as the necessity of keeping them hidden
would permit. At eight o'clock, the moon shining
bright, twenty men were sent a little below the
bridge to open an oblique fire against the entrench-
ments ; and when this was replied to and the atten-
tion of the Portuguese diverted to that side, a
sapper dressed in dark grey crawled out, pushing
with his head a barrel of powder, likewise enve-
loped in grey cloth to deaden the sound, along that
side of the bridge which was darkened by the
shadow of the parapet ; when he had placed his
barrel against the entrenchment covering the Por-
tuguese mine, he retired in the same manner. Two
others followed in succession, and retired without
being discovered, but the fourth, after placing his
barrel, rose to run back, and was immediately shot
at and wounded. The fire of the Portuguese was
then directed on the bridge itself, but as the barrels
were not discovered, it soon ceased, and a fifth
sapper, advancing like the others, attached a sausage
seventy yards long to the barrels. At two o'clock
in the morning the whole was completed, the French
kept very quiet, and the Portuguese remained tran-
quil and unsuspicious,
Brochard had calculated that the effect of four
barrels exploding together would destroy the Por-
tuguese entrenchments, and burn the cord attached
to their mine. The event proved that he was right,
for a thick fog arising about three o'clock in the
morning, the sausage was fired, and the explosion
made a large breach ; the engineer with his sappers,
instantly jumped on to the bridge, threw water into
the mine, cut away all obstacles, and being followed
by a column of grenadiers, was at the other side
PENINSULAR WAR. 239
before the smoke cleared away. The grenadiers
were then supported by other troops, the suburb,
the camp on the height behind were carried without May*
a check, and the Portuguese troops dispersing, fled
over the mountains. The execution of this bold,
ingenious, and successful project, cost only seven
or eight men killed, while in the former futile
attempts above a hundred and eighty men, besides
many engineer and artillery officers, had fallen.
It is however a singular fact that there was a prac-
ticable ford near the bridge, unguarded, and appa-
rently unknown to both sides.
A short time after the passage of the Tamega,
Heudelet, marching from Braga by Guimaraens,
entered Amarante ; Laborde occupied the position
abandoned by Silveira, and sent detachments up
the left bank of the river to Mondin, while Loison
pursued the fugitives. The Portuguese, at the
bridge of Canavesas, hearing of the action, de-
stroyed the ammunition, and retired across the
Douro; over that river also went the inhabitants
of Mezamfrio and Villa Real, when Loison, on the
6th of May, appeared in their vicinity. This being
made known to Soult, he reinforced Loison, and
directed him to scour the right bank of the Douro
as high as Pezo de Ragoa ; to complete the destruc-
tion of Silveira's army ; and with a view to the
reduction of the Tras os Montes, to patrole towards
Braganza, on which side Bessieres had been asked
to co-operate. That marshal was however, gone to
France, and the reply of his successor Kellermaa
being intercepted, it appeared that he was unable
or unwilling to afford any aid.
.Laborde was now recalled to Oporto, with two
regiments of infantry, another regiment and a bri-
240 HISTORY OF THE
B Y? K g&fa of dragoons were left to guard the communi-
. cations with Amarante, and meanwhile Loison, meet-
May." ing with resistance at Peso de Ragoa, and observing
3, considerable movement on the opposite bank of
the Douro, became alarmed, and fell back to Me-
zamfrio. The 8th he returned to Amarante, but
his march was harassed by the peasantry, with
a vigour and boldness that indicated the vicinity
of some powerful support ; and in truth a new actor
had appeared, the whole country was in commotion,
and the duke of Dalmatia felt himself suddenly
pushed backward by a strong and eager hand.
OBSERVATIONS. SPANISH OPERATIONS.
1, The great pervading error of the Spaniards
in this campaign was the notion that their armies
were capable of taking the lead in offensive move-
ments, and fighting the French in open countries,
whereas, to avoid general actions, should have been
with them a vital principle.
2. The resolution to fight the French having
been unfortunately adopted, the second great error
was the attaching equal importance to the lines of
operation in La Mancha and Estremadura ; the one
should have been considered only as an accessory.
It is evident that the first rank belonged to La
Mancha, .because it was in a more open country;
^because it more immediately threatened Madrid ;
and because a defeat there endangered Seville more
than a defeat in Estremadura would have done. In
La Mancha the beaten Spanish army must have
fallen back upon Seville, in Estremadura it might
have retired upon Badajos. But the latter place
hejng defensible, anjd to the Spaniards of infinitely
les^ importance than Madrid was to their opponents,
PENINSULAR WAR. 241
the lead in the campaign must always have belonged CHAP.
to the army of La Mancha, which could at any "
time have obliged the French to fight a battle for
the capital. The army of Estremadura might,
therefore, have been safely reduced to fifteen thou-
sand men, provided the &rmy of La Mancha had
been increased to forty or fifty thousand, and it
would appear that, with a very little energy, the
junta could have provided a larger force. It is true
that they would have been beaten just the same,
but that is only an argument against fighting great
battles, which was certainly the worst possible plan
for the Spaniards to pursue.
3. The third great error was the inertness of
Valencia and Murcia, or rather their hostility, for
they were upon the verge of civil war with the
supreme junta. Those provinces, so rich and
populous, had been unmolested for eight months ;
they had suffered nothing from Moncey's irrup-
tion, they had received large succours from the
English government, and Valencia had written her
pretensions to patriotism in the bloody characters
of assassination ; yet, were it not for the force under
Llamas which after the defeat of Tudcla, helped
to defend Zaragoza, Valencia and Murcia might
have been swallowed up by the ocean without any
sensible effect upon the general cause. Those coun-
tries were however admirably situated to serve as a
support to Aragon, Catalonia, Andalusia, and La
Mancha, and they could, at this time, have paralyzed
a large French force, by marching an army to San
Clemente. It was the dread of their doing so that
made the king restrain Sebastiani from pursuing pari. Pa-
his victory at*Ciudad Real; and assuredly, the ?ei "' 181 '
Valencians should have moved; for it is not so
VOL. TK li
242 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK much in their numbers as in the variety of their
lines of operation that a whole people find their
advantage in opposing regular armies. This, the
observation of that profound and original writer,
general Lloyd, was confirmed by the practice of
Napoleon, in Spain.
FRENCH OPERATIONS.
1. To get possession of Seville and Cadiz was
certainly as great an object with Napoleon as to seize
Lisbon ; but the truth of the maxim quoted above
regulated the emperor's proceedings. If Victor
had been directed at once upon Andalusia, the
Portuguese and Valencians could have earned their
lines of operations upon his flanks and rear ; if
Badajos and Lisbon had been the objects of his
march, the Andalusians could have fallen on his
left flank and cut his communications* Now all
such dangers were avoided by the march of Soult
and Lapissc, the direction being not only concen-
tric, but a regular prolongation of the great line of
communication with France. Ney protected the
rear of one, Bcssieres the rear of the other, and
those two marshals also separated and cut off
the Asturias from the rest of Spain ; thus all that
was formidable was confined to the south of the
Tagus* For the same reason the course of con-
quest was to have proceeded from Portugal to
Andalusia, which would then have been assailed
both in front and flauk, while the fourth corps held
the Valencians in check. By this plan the French
would never have lost their central position, nor
exposed their grand line of communication to a
serious attack*
2. That this plan, so wisely conceived in its
PENINSULAR WAR. 243
general bearing, should fail, without any of the difife- CHAP.
rent corps employed having suffered a defeat, nay, -
when they were victorious in all quarters, is surpri-
sing but not inexplicable. It is clear that Napo-
leon's orders were given at a time when he did not
expect that a battle would have been fought at Co-
runa, or that the second corps would have suffered so
much from the severity of the weather and the length
of the marches ; neither did he anticipate the resis-
tance, made by the Portuguese, between the Minho
and the Douro. The last error was a consequence
of the first, for his plans were calculated upon the
supposition that the rapidity of Soult's movements
would forestal all defence ; yet the delay cannot be
charged as a fault to that marshal, his energy was
conspicuous.
3. Napoleon's attention, divided between As-
turia and Spain, must have been somewhat distracted
by the multiplicity of his affairs. He docs not seem
to have made allowance for the very rugged country
through which Soult had to march, at a season when
all the rivers and streams were overflowing ; and as
the combinations of war are continually changing,
the delay thus occasioned rendered Lapissc's in-
structions faulty ; for, although it be true, that if
the latter had marched by Guarda upon Abrantes
while Soult advanced to Lisbon by Coimbra and
Victor entered the Alemtejo, Portugal would have '
been conquered without difficulty ; yet the combi-
nation was so wide, and the communications so tin*-
certain, that unity of action could not be insured.
Soult, weakened by the obstacles he encountered,
required reinforcements after the taking of Oporto ;
and if Lapisse attaching himself to Soult's instead
R 2
,244 HISTORY OF TIIE
POCK of to Victor's incursion, had then inarched upon
" Viseu, the duke of Dalmatia would have been
ipng
enabled to win his way without regard to the co-
operation in the Alemtejo.
4. The first error of the French, if the facts are
correctly shewn, must therefore be attributed to
Napoleon, because he overlooked the probable
chances of delay, combined the operations on too
wide a scale, and gave Ciudad Rodrigo and Abran-
tes, instead of Lamego and Viseu, for the direction
of Xapisse's march. I say, if the facts are cor-
rectly, shewn, ,fo,r it is scarcely discreet to censure
Napoleon's military dispositions however erroneous
they may appear to have been ; and it is certain that,
ui'tibig case, <hi$ errors, if errors they were, although
sufficient to embarrass his lieutenants, will not ac-
count for their entire failure. Above sixty thousand
men were put in motion by him, upon good military
'principles, for the subjugation of Lisbon; we must
therefore search in the particular conduct of the
generals for the reason why a project of Napoleon's,
to be executed by sivty thousand French veterans^
should have ended as idly and ineffectually as if it had
been concocted by the Spanish junta.
OBSERVATIONS ON THE SEPARATE OPERATIONS
OF LAPISSE, VICTOR, SOULT, ROMAN A, SIL-
VEIRA, AND CUESTA,,
LAPISSE.
r 1. A# intercepted letter of general Maupetit,
shews the small pains taken by Lapisse to commu-
nicate with Soult. He directs that even so many as
thrqe hundred men should patrole towards Tras os
Moutes, to obtain information of the second corps,
PENINSULAR WAR. 245
at a time when the object was so important that his ^P-
whole force should have moved in mass rather than "
have failed of intelligence.
2. The manner in which he suffered sir Robert
Wilson to gather strength and to insult his outposts
was inexcusable. He might have marched straight
upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and dispersed
every thing in his front ; one of those fortresses
would probably have fallen, if not both, and from
thence a strong detachment pushed towards La-
mego, would not only have ascertained the situation
of the second corps, but would have greatly aided
its progress by threatening Oporto and Braga. It
cannot be urged that Salamanca required the pre-
sence of a large force, because, in that open country,
the people were at the mercy of Bessieres' cavalry,
and so sensible were the local junta of this, that
both Salamanca and Lcclesma refused assistance
from Ciudad Rodrigo when it was offered, and
preferred a quiet submission*
3. When, at last, the king's reiterated orders
obliged Lapisse to put his troops in motion, he made
a demonstration against Ciudad Rodrigo, so feeble
that it scarcely called the garrison to the ramparts,
and then as if all chance of success in Portugal was
at an end, he broke through the pass of Perales,
reached Alcantara and rejoined the first corps, a
movement equally at variance with Napoleon's
orders and with good military discretion ; for the
first directed him upon Abrantes, attd the second
would have carried him upon Viseu. The mardi
to the latter place, while it insured a junction with
Soult, would not have prevented an after jtnovement
upon Abrantes ; the obstacles were by 'nor hearts
so great as those which awaited him on the march
246 mSTOKY OF THE
BOOK to Alcantara, and the great error of abandoning the
whole country, between the Tagus and the Douro,
to the insurgents, would have been avoided. Here
then was one direct cause of failure ; yet the error,
although great, was not irreparable. If Soult was
abandoned to his own resources, he had also ob-
tained a firm and important position in the north,
while Victor, reinforced by ten thousand men, was
enabled to operate against Lisbon by the Alemtejo,
more efficaciously than before ; he, however, seems
to have been even less disposed than Lapisse to
execute his instructions,
VICTOK.
]. The inactivity of this marshal after the rout
of Ucles has been already mentioned. It IB certain
that if the fourth and first corps had been well
handled, neither Cuesta nor Cartoajal could have
ventured beyond the defiles of the Sierra Morena,
much less have bearded the French generals and
established - a line of defence along the Tagus.
Fifty thousand French troops should in two months
have done something more than maintain fifty miles
of country on one side of Madrid.
2, The passage of the Tagus was successful,
but can hardly be called a skilful operation, unless
the duke of Belluno calculated upon the ignorance
of his adversary* Before an able general, with an
active army possessing a pontoon train, it would
have scarcely answered to separate the troops in
three divisions on an extent of fifty miles, leaving
the artillery and pare of ammunition, protected only
by some cavalry and one battalion of infantry,
within two hours' march of the enemy for throe
days. If Cuesta had brought up all hi$ detach-
PENINSULAR WAR. 247
ments, the Meza (Tiber might have been effectually C y^ p *
manned, and ten thousand infantry and all the
Spanish cavalry spared to cross the Tagus at
Almaraz on the 17th; in this case Victor's artillery
would probably have been captured, and his pro-
ject certainly baffled.
3. When the passage of the Tagus was effected,
Victor not only permitted Cuesta to escape, but
actually lost all traces of his army; an evident
fault, and not to be excused by pleading the impe-
diments arising from the swelling of the river, the
necessity of securing the communications, &c. If
Cuesta's power was despised before the passage of
the river, when his army was whole and his posi-
tion strong, there could be no reason for such great
circumspection after his defeat; a circumspection
not Supported by skill, as the dispersed state of the
French army the evening before the battle of Me-
dellin proves.
4. That Victor was enabled to fight Cuesta, on
the morning of the 28th, with any prospect of
success, must be attributed rather to fortune than
to talent. It was a fault to permit the Spaniards to
retake the offensive after the defeat on the Tugus*
nor can the first movement of the duke of Bclluno
in the action be praised ; he should have marched'
into the plain in a compact order of battle. The-
danger of sending Lasalle and Latour Maubourg
to such a distance from tho main body I shall li^ve
occasion to show in my observations on Cucstafc
operations, but the after-movements of the
in this battle were well and rapidly combined
vigorously executed, and the success was propoiv
tionatc to the ability displayed.
5. The battles of Medellm and Ciudad Real,
248 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK whicli utterly destroyed the Spanish armies and laid
Seville and Badajos open ; those battles, in which
im blood was spilt like water, produced no result to
the victors, for the French generals, as if they had
touched a torpedo, never stretched forth their hands
a second time. Sebastiani, indeed, wished to pene-
trate the Sierra Morena, but the king, fearful of
the Valencians, restrained him. On the other hand
Joseph urged Victor to invade the Alemtejo, and
the latter would not obey, even when reinforced by
Lapissc's division This last was the great and
fatal error of the whole campaign, for nearly all
the disposable British and Portuguese troops were
thus enabled to move against the duke of Dalmatia,
while the duke of Bclluno contrived neither to
fulfil the instructions of Napoleon, nor the orders
of the king, nor yet to perform any useful achieve-
ment himself. He did not assist the invasion of
Portugal, he did not maintain Estremadura, he did
not take Seville, nor even prevent Cucsta from twice
renewing the offensive ; yet he remained in an mv
healthy situation until he lost more men, by sick*
ness, than would have furnished throe such battles
as Medellin. TVYO months so unprofitably wasted
by a general, at the head of thirty thousand good
troops^ can scarcely be cited. The duke of Bel-
luno's reputation has been too hardly earned to
attribute this inactivity to want of talent* That he
was avqrse to aid the operations of marshal Soult
is evident, and, most happily for Portugal, it was
so ; but whether this aversion avose from personal
jealousy, from indisposition to obey the king,* or 1
from a mistaken view of affairs, 1 have no means of
judging, ,
PENINSULAR WAIt. 249
CHAP.
VII,
CUESTA. -
1809.
jo. Cuesta's peculiar unfitness for the lead of
an army has been remarked more than once. It
remains to shew that his proceedings, on this occa-
sion, continued to justify those remarks.
To defend a river, on a long line, is generally
hopeless, and especially when the defenders have
not the means of passing freely, in several places,
to the opposite bank. Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar,
Gustavus, Turenne, Napoleon, Wellington, and
hundreds of others have shown how the passage
of rivers may be won. Eumenes, who prevented
Antigonus from passing the Coprates, is, perhaps,
the only example of a general baffling the efforts
of a skilful and enterprising enemy in such an
attempt.
2, The defence of rivers having nearly always
proved fruitless, it follows that no general should
calculate upon success, and that he should exert
the greatest energy, activity, and vigilance to avoid
a heavy disaster; that all his lines of retreat should
be kept free and open, and be concentric, and that
to bring his magazines and dep6ts close up to the
army, in such a situation, is rashness itself. Now
Cuesta was inactive, and disregarding the znd&ktt
which forbids the establishment of magazines in the'
first line of defence brought up the whole of hi&
to Deleytosa and Truxillo. His combinations were
ill-arranged, he abandoned Mirabete without &ri
effort, his depots fell into the hands of the en&my 1 :
his retreat was confused, and eccentric itmsmfodb 'as
part of- his army retired into the Gtiadftldpg while
others went to Merida and he himself to Med^Hin:
3. The line of retreat upon Mcdellin and Cam-
250 HISTORY OF THE
B v? K panarios, instead of Badajos, being determined by
the necessity of uniting with Albuquerque, cannot
be blamed ; the immediate return to Medellin was
bold and worthy of praise ; but its merit consisted
in recovering the offensive immediately after a
defeat, wherefore Cuesta should not have halted at
Medellin, thus giving the lead again to the French
general ; he should have continued to advance, and
falling upon the scattered divisions of the French
army, endeavoured to beat them in detail, and rally
his own detachments in the Sierra de Guadalupe.
The error of stopping short at Medellin would have
been apparent, if Victor, placing a rear-guard to
amuse the Spanish general, had taken the road to
Seville by Almendralejos and Zafra.
4. Cuesta's general design for the battle of
Medellin was well imagined; that is, it was right
to hide his army behind the ridge, and to defer the
attack until the enemy had developed his force and
order of battle in the plain ; but the execution was
on the lowest scale. If, instead of advancing in
one long and weak line without a reserve, Cuesta
had held the greatest part of his troops in solid
columns, and thrust them between Lassalle and
Latour Maubourg's divisions, which were pushed
out like horns from the main body of the French,
those generals would have been cut off, and the
battle commenced by dividing the French army
into three unconnected masses, while the Spaniards
would have been compact, well in hand, and masters
of the general movements. Nothing could then have
saved Victor, except hard fighting, whereas Cuesta's
dispositions rendered it impossible for the Spaniards
to win the battle by courage, or to escape the pur-
suit by swiftness.
PENINSULAR WAR. 251
5. It is remarkable that the Spanish general CHAP -
seems never to have thought of putting Truxillo, '
Guadalupe, Merida, Estrella, or Medellin in a state
of defence, although most if not all of those places
had some castle or walls capable of resisting a
sudden assault There was time to do it, for Cuesta
remained unmolested, on the Tagus, from January
to the middle of March, and every additional point
of support thus obtained for an undisciplined army
would have diminished the advantages derived by
the French from their superior facility of move-
ment ; the places themselves might have been gar-
risoned by the citizens and peasantry, and a week's,
a day's, nay, even an hour's delay was of importance
to a force like Cuesta's, which from its inexperience
must have always been liable to confusion.
SOULT.
3. The march of this general in one column,
upon Tuy, was made under the impression that re-
sistance would not be offered ; otherwise, it is pro-
bable that a division of infantry and a brigade of ca-
valry would h?ve been sent from St, Jago or Mellid
direct upon Orense, to insure the passage of the
Minho; it seems to have been also an error in Ney,
arising probably from the same cause, not to have
kept Marchand's division of the sixth corps at-Orense
until the second corps had effected an entrance into
Portugal
2* Soult's resolution to place the artillery and
stores in Tuy, and march into Portugal, trusting to,
victory for re-openmg the communication, would
increase the reputation of any general. Three times
before he reached Oporto he wa& obliged to halt, in
order to fabricate cartridges for the infantry from
252 HISTORY OF THE
B K the powder taken in battle, and his whole progress
. from Tuy to that city was energetic and able in the
1809.
extreme.
3. The military proceedings, after the taking
of Oporto, do not all bear the same stamp. The
administration of the civil affairs appears to have
engrossed the marshal's attention, and his absence
from the immediate scene of action sensibly affected
the operations* Franceschi shewed too much respect
for Trant's corps ; Loison's movements were timid
and slow; even Laborde's genius seems to have
been asleep. The importance of crushing Silveira
was obvious, and there is nothing more necessary
in war than to strike with all the force you can at
once; but here Caulaincourt was first sent, and
being too weak Loison reinforced him, Laborde re-
inforced Loison, and all were scarcely sufficient at
last to do that which half would have done at first.
But the whole of these transactions are obscure.
The great delay that took place before the bridge of
Amarante, and the hesitation and frequent recur-
rence for orders to the marshal, indicate want of
zeal, or a desire to procrastinate, in opposition to
Soult's wishes* Judging from Mr. Noble's history
of the campaign, this must be traced to a conspi-
racy in the French army, which shall be touched
upon hereafter.
4. The resistance made by the Portuguese pea-
santry was infinitely creditable to their courage,
but there cannot be a stronger proof of the ineffi^
cacy of a like defence, when unsupported, by good
troops. No country is more favourable to such a
warfare than the northern provinces of Portugal ;
the people were brave, they had the assistance of
the organized forcee under Romany Silveira, Ebea,
PENINSULAR WAR. 253
and the bishop; yet Soult, in the very worst season CHAP.
of the year, overcoming all resistance, penetrated to -
OportQ, without an actual loss, in killed, wounded,
and prisoners, of more than two thousand five hun-
dred men, including the twelve hundred sick, cap-
tured at Chaves.
ROMAN A.
1. Romana remained at Oimbra and Monterey,
unmolested, from the 21st of January to the 6th of
March ; he had therefore time to reorganise his
forces, and he had, in fact, ten thousand regular
troops in tolerable order. He knew on the llth or
12th that Soult was preparing to pass the Minko,
between Tuy and Guardia, He knew also that the
people of Ribidavia and Orense were in arms; that
those on the Arosa were preparing to rise; and
that consequently the French muut, were it only
from want of food, break out of the contracted
position they occupied either by Ribidavia and
Orense, or by crossing the Minho, or by retreating
to St. Jago. With these guides, the path of the
Spanish general was as plain as the writing on the
wall ; he was at the head of ten thousand regular
troops, and two marches would have brought him
to Ribidavia; in front of that town ho might have
occupied a position close on the left flank of the
French, rallied all the insurgents about him, and
organized a formidable warfare* The French dared
not have attempted the passage of the Minho while
he was in front of Ribidavia, and if they turned
against him, the place was favourable for battle*
the retreat open by Orense and Monterey j and > the
difficulty of bridging up artillery Wttld have ham-
pered the pursuit. On the other hand, if Soult had
254 HISTORY OF THE
retreated, that alone would have b<
a victory, and Romana would have been well placed
BOOK retreated, that alone would have been tantamount to
1809
to follow, connecting himself with the English ves-
sels of war upon that coast as he advanced.
2. So far from contemplating operations of this
nature, Romana did not even concentrate his force;
but keeping it extended, in small parties, along fif-
teen miles of country, indulged himself in specula-
tions about his enemy's weakness, and the prospect
of their retreating altogether from the Peninsula.
He was only roused from his reveries, by finding his
divisions beaten in detail, and himself forced either
to join the Portuguese with whom he was quarrel-
ling, or to break his promises to Silveira and fly
by cross roads over the mountain on his right:
he adopted the latter, thus proving, that whatever
might be his resources for raising an insurrection,
he could not direct one, and that he was, although
brave and active, totally destitute of military talent.
At a later period of the war, the duke of Welling-
ton, after a long and fruitless military discussion,
drily observed, that either Romana or himself had
mistaken their profession !
SILVEIRA.
1. This Portuguese general's first operations
were as ill conducted as Romana's ; his posts were
too extended, he made no attempt to repair the
works of Chaves, none to aid the important insur-
rection of Ribidavia ; but these errors cannot be
fairly charged upon him, as his officers were so
unruly, that they held a council of war per force,
where thirty voted for fighting at Chaves, and
twenty-nine against it; the casting voice being
given by the voter calling on the troops to follow
PENINSULAR WAR, 255
him. The after-movement, by which Chaves was CHAP.
recaptured, whether devised by Silveira himself,
or directed by marshal Beresford, was bold and
skilful; but the advance to Pefiafiel, while La
Houssaye and Heudelet could from Braga pass by
Guimaraens 9 and cut him off from AmaraBte ? was as
rash as his subsequent flight was disgraceful : yet,
thanks to the heroic courage of colonel Patrick,
Silveira's reputation as a general was established
among his countrymen, by the very action which
should have ruined him in their estimation.
250 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK VIL
CHAPTER I.
IT will be remembered that the narrative of sir
John Cradock's proceedings was discontinued, at
March, the moment when that general, nothing shaken by
the importunities of the regency the representations
of marshal Beresford or the advice of Mr. Frere,
resolved to await at Lumiar for the arrival of the
promised reinforcements from England. While in
this position, he made every exertion to obtain
transport for the supplies, remounts for the cavalry,
and draught animals for the artillery ; but the Por-
tuguese government gave him no assistance, and an
attempt to procure horses and mules in Morocco
proving unsuccessful, the army was so scantily fur*
nished that, other reasons failing, this alone would
have prevented any advance towards the frontier.
The singular inactivity of Victor surprised Cra-
dock, but did not alter his resolution; yet, being
continually importuned to advance, he, when as-
sured that five thousand men of the promised rein-
forcements were actually off the rock of Lisbon,
held a council of war on the subject. All the ge-
pondcncc, s\ >
MSS. nerals were averse to marching on Oporto except
Beresford, and he admitted that its propriety de-
pended on Victor's movements : meanwhile, that
marshal approached Badajos, Lapisse came down
upon the Agueda, and Sou It after storming Oporto,
pushed his advanced posts to the Vouga, A cry
PENINSULAR WAR. 257
of treason was instantly heard throughout Portugal, CH IP,
and both the people and the soldiers evinced a
spirit truly alarming. The latter, disregarding
the authority of Beresford, and menacing their
own officers, declared that it was necessary to slay sectlon "
a thousand traitors in Lisbon ; and the regiments in
Abrantes even abandoned that post, and inarched
to join Trant upon the Vouga. But when these
disorders were at the worst, and when a vigorous
movement of Victor and Lapisse would have pro-
duced fatal consequences, general Hill landed with
about five thousand men and three hundred artillery
horses. Cradock then resolved to advance, moved
thereto chiefly by the representations of Beresford,
who thought such a measure absolutely necessary sir John
/ i , A i i T i Cr<ido<k*
to restore contidence, to ensure the obedience ol c<>rrcs-
_ , ITT- i nondencc.
the native troops, and to enable him to take mea- MSS.
sures for the safety of Abrantes. Thus, about the
time that Tuy was relieved by the French, and that
Silveira was attacked at Penafiel by Laborde, the
English army was put in motion, part upon Caldas
and Obidos, part upon Rio Mayor ; the campaign
was therefore actually commenced by Cradock,
when that general, although his measures had been
all approved of by his government, was suddenly
and unexpectedly required to surrender his com-
mand to sir Arthur Wellesley, and proceed himself
to Gibraltar. It would appear that this arrange- Lord
ment was adopted after a struggle in the cabinet,
and certainly neither the particular choice nor the
general principle of employing men of talent with-
out regard to seniority can be censured { neverthe-
less, sir John Cradock was used unworthily. A
general of his rank would never have accepted a
command on such terms, and it was neither just
VOL. II. S
258 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK nor decent to expose him to an unmerited morti-
fication.
180&
Before the arrival of his successor, Cradock had
assembled the army at Leiria, and established his
magazines at Abrantes, Santarem, and Peniche ;
but as the admiral, fearing the difficult navigation
at that season, would not send victuallers to the
latter place, the magazines there were but scantily
supplied. Meanwhile Lapisse made way by Alcan-
tara to Merida, the re-capture of Chaves became
known, and the insurrection in Beira and Tras os
Monfes took its full spring. Trant's force also
increased on the Vouga, and Beresford, who had
succeeded in restoring order among the Portuguese
battalions, was more than ever urgent for an attack
upon Soult; nevertheless Cradock, unprovided with
a due proportion of cavalry, unable to procure pro-
visions or forage, and fearful for the safety of Lis-
bon, refused, and the 24th of April, hearing that
his successor had arrived, resigned the command
and repaired to Gibraltar.
Sir Arthur Wellesley landed^ the 22d of April.
On the 24th he signified to the British ministers
*k at affairs being in the condition contemplated by
them it was his intention to assume the command
of the army ; a circumstance worthy of attention,
as indicating that the defence of Portugal was even
then considered a secondary object, and of uncer-
tain promise. The deliverance of the Peninsula
was never due to the foresight and perseverance of
the English ministers, but to the firmness and skill
of the British generals, and to the courage of troops
whom no dangers could daunt and no hardships
dishearten, while they remedied the eternal errors
of the cabinet.
PENINSULAR WAR. 259
The unexpected arrival of a man known only as CHAP.
a victorious commander created the greatest enthu
siasm in Portugal. The regency immediately nomi- Api.
nated him marshal-general of their troops ; the
people, always fond of novelty, hailed his presence
with enthusiasm; and all those persons, whether
Portuguese or British, who had blamed sir John
Cradock's prudent caution, now anticipating a
change of system, spake largely and confidently of
the future operations : in truth, all classes were
greatly excited, and an undefined yet powerful sen-
timent that something great would soon be achieved
pervaded the public mind. Sir Arthur's plans
were, however, neither hastily adopted nor reck-
lessly hurried forward ; like Cradock, he felt the
danger of removing far from Lisbon while Victor
was on the Alemtejo frontier, and he anxiously
weighed his own resources against those at the
enemy's disposal. Not that he wavered between
offensive and defensive movements ; a general of
his discernment could not fail to perceive, that if
the French were acting upon any concerted plan,
the false inarch of Lapisse to Merida had marred
their combinations, by placing a whole nation, with
all its fortresses and all it$ forces, whether insuiv
gents, regular troops, or auxiliaries, between the
armies of Victor and Soult , and that neither con-
cert nor communication could longer exist between
those marshals.
Soult's offensive strength was also evidently ex-
hausted ; he might establish himself firmly in the
provinces beyond the Douro, but he could notj
alone, force his way to Lisbon, a distance of two
hundred miles, in a season when the waters were
full, and through a country tangled with rivers,
$2
60 HISTORY OF THE
mountains, and defiles. He could not hope, with
-twenty-four thousand men, to beat a whole people
in arms, assisted by an auxiliary army of as high
Teputatioti, and nearly as numerous as his own ;
$nd, moreover, there were discontents and con-
spiracy in his camp, and of this sir Arthur was
aware* Soult alone, then, was no longer formida-
ble ,to the capital ; but that which weakened him
increased the offensive power of Victor, who was
^Q,W at the head of thirty thousand men, and might
march straight upon Lisbon, and through an open
Country, the only barrier being the Tagus a river
fordable in almost all seasons. Such a -movement,
top-even the semblance of it, must perforce draw
the> British and native armies to that side, and then
Soult, coming down to the Mondego, might from
thence connect his operations with Victor's by the
line of the Zezere, or advance at once on Lisbon as
: pc0asion offered.
Now, to meet the exigencies of the campaign,
the military resources of the English general
lo. His central position.
2, The British and German troops, about
twenty-six thousand in number ; of which those
present under arms, including sergeants, amounted
&to twenty-two thousand, with three thousand seven
jbuntdred horses and mules. But in the British army
corporals and privates only are understood in the
present under arms, whereas in the French army
that term includes all military persons, officers,
npn-commissioned officers, soldiers, drummers, com-
batants and non-combatants, a distinction to be
<bt>rae in mind when comparing the forces on each
PENINSULAR WAR. '261
3.~The Portuguese troops of the line ; of which
there might be organised and armed about sixteen - ^
thousand.
Nearly all these troops were already collected, or
capable of being collected in a short time, between
the Tagus and Mondego ; and beyond the latter
river, Trant and Silveira commanded separate
corps ; the one upon the Vouga, the other on the
Tamega.
4. The militia and the ordenenfas, which may
be denominated the insurgent force.
5. The fortresses of Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo,
Elvas, Abrantes, Peniche, and Badajos.
6. The English fleet, the Portuguese craft, and
the free use of the coast and river navigation for
his supplies*
7. The assistance of Cuesta, who had six tho1*<-
sand cavalry and thirty thousand infantry of which
twenty- five thousand were actually about the defiles
of Monasterio in front of Victor's posts.
, Sir Arthur Weltasley's moral resources were the
high courage of his own troops ; his personal popu-
larity ; the energy of an excited people ; a favour-
able moment ; the presentiment of victory, and a
mind equal to the occasion. < '
In a strategic point of view, to fall upon Victor
was best, because he was the most dangeroufc
neighbour to Portugal ; because his defeat would
prove most detrimental to the French, most adyaii^
tageous to the Spaniards ; and because the greatest
body of troops could be brought to- beatf agsiiiikt
him. On the other hand, Soult held a *rf<&r pro^
vince, from whence the chief supply of cattle *for
the army was derived ; he was in posses&ion of the
second city in the kingdom and was there forming
262 HISTORY OF THE
B vn K a Drench party ; finally the feelings of the regency
and the people were greatly troubled by the loss of
AP*A. Oporto, and their desire to regain it was strongly
expressed. To attack Victor, It was indispensable
to concert operations with Cuesta j but that general
was ill disposed towards the British, and to insure
his co-operation would have required time, which
could be better employed in expelling Soult. For
these reasons, sir Arthur Wellesley determined to
attack the last-named marshal without delay; in-
tending, if successful, to establish a good system
of defence in the northern provinces, and then, in
conjunction with Cuesta, to turn his arms against
Victor, hoping thus to relieve Gallicia more effec-
tually than by following the French into that pro-
vince.
The security of Lisbon being the pivot of the
operations against Soult, time was the principal
object to be gained* If Victor came fiercely on,
he could not be stopped, but his course might be
impeded ; his path could not be blocked, but it
might be planted with thorns. To effect this, seven
thousand Portuguese troops were immediately di-
rected upon Abrantes and Santarem, whither two
British battalions and two regiments of cavalry-
just disembarked, also marched, and were there
joined by three other battalions drafted from the
army at Leiria. A body of two thousand men,
composed of a militia regiment, and the Lusitanian
legion which remained near Castello Branco after
Lapisse had crossed the Tagus, were placed under
the command of colonel Mayjie, and directed to
take post at the bridge of Alcantara, having orders
to defend the passage of the river, and, if neces-
sary, to blow up the structure. At the same time,
PENINSULAR WAR. 263.
the flying bridges at Villa Velha und Abrantes
were removed, the garrison of the latter place was
reinforced, and general Mackenzie was appointed *
to command all the troops, whether Portuguese or
British, thus distributed along the right bank of
the Tagus. These precautions appeared sufficient,
especially as there was a general disposition to be-
lieve the French weaker than they really were;
Victor could not by a mere demonstration shake
this line of defence ; and if he forced the bridge of
Alcantara, and penetrated by the sterile and diffi-
cult route formerly followed by Junot, it would
bring him, without guns, upon Abrantes 4 ; but
Abrantes was already capable of a short resistance,
and Mackenzie would have had time to line the
rugged banks of the Zezere.
If, however, Victor, leaving Badajos and Blvas be-
hind him, should pass through the Alemtejo and cross
the Tagus between Abrantes and Lisbon, he was to
be feared ; but Cuesta had promised to follow closely
in the French general's rear, and it was reasonable
to suppose that Mackenzie, although he might be
unable to prevent the passage of the river, would
not suffer himself to be cut off from the capital,
where, having the assistance of the fleet, the aid
of the citizens, and the chance of reinforcements
from England, he might defend himself until the
army could return from the Douro. Moreover Victor
was eighteen marches from Lisbon, it was only by
accident that he and Soult could act in concert,
and the allied army, having a sure and rapid mode
of correspondence with Cuesta, was already within
four marches of Oporto,
These matters being arranged the main body of
the allies was directed upon Coijabra and four of
264 HISTORY OF THE
*g K the best Portuguese battalions were incorporated
in the British brigades. Beresford retained under
May! his personal command, about six thousand native
droops ; Trant remained stedfast on the Vouga ;
Silveira on the Tamega ; and sir Robert Wilson,
quitting the command of the legion, was detached,
with a small Portuguese force, to Viseu, to hang
upon Franceschi's left flank, and to communicate
with Silveira's corps by the way of Lamego, The
difficulty of bringing up forage and provisions,
which had pressed so sorely on sir John Cradock,
was now somewhat lessened j but the land trans-
port was still scanty, and the admiral, dreading
the long shore navigation for large vessels, was
without the small craft necessary for victualling the
troops by the coast. However the magazines at
Caldas were partly filled, and twenty large country-
boats loaded with provisions, the owners being in-
duced by premiums to make the run, had got safely
into Peniche and the Mondego. In short, the
obstacles to a foreward movement, although great,
were not insurmountable.
Sir Arthur Wellesley reached Coimbra the 2d of
May. His army was concentrated there on the
5th, in number about twenty-five thousand sabres
and bayonets, of which nine thousand were Portu-
guese, three thousand Germans, the remainder Bri-
tish. The duke of Dalmatia was ignorant that the
allies were thus assembled in force upon the Mon-
dego ; but many French officers knew it, and were
silent, for they were engaged in a plot of a very
extraordinary nature, which was probably a part of
the conspiracy alluded to in the first volume of this
work, as being conducted through the medium of
the princess of Tour and Taxis. The Freuch sol-
PENINSULAR WAR. 265
diers were impatient of their toils, their attachment OHAP.
to Napoleon himself was unshaken, but hunrau
nature shrinks from perpetual contact with death, . May.
and they were tired of war. This feeling induced
some officers of high rank, serving in Spain, to
form a plan for changing the French government.
Generally speaking, these men were friendly to
Napoleon personally, but they were republicans in
their politics, and earnest to reduce the power of
the emperor. Their project, founded upon the dis-
content of the troops in the Peninsula, was to make
a truce with the English army, to elect a chief,
and march into France with the resolution to abate
the pride of Napoleon, or to pull him from his
throne* At first they turned their eyes upon mar-
shal Ney, but finally resolved to choose Gouvion
St. Cyr for their leader, yet it was easier to resolve
than to execute ; Napoleon's ascendancy, supported
by the love and admiration of millions, was not to
be shaken by the conspiracy of a few discontented
men. And although their plots were not entirely
relinquished until after Massena's retreat from Por*
tugal in 1810, long before that period they dis-
covered that the soldiers, tired as they were of war,
were faithful to their great monarch, and would
have slain any who openly stirred against him.
The foregoing facts are stated on the authority
of a principal mover in the sedition, but many
minor plots had contemporary existence, for this was
the spring-time of folly. In the second corps the
conspirators were numerous, and by their discourses
and their slow sullen execution of orders, had con-
tinually thwarted the operations of marshal Soult,
without exciting his suspicious; but ^ as he pene-
trated into Porttigal, their counteract ions increased,
266 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK and, by the time he arrived at Oporto, their design
was ripe for execution.
May! In the middle of April, John Viana, the son of an
Oporto merchant, had appeared at marshal Beres-
ford's head-quarters, with proposals from the French
malcontents, who desired to have an English officer
sent to them, to arrange the execution of a plan,
which was to be commenced by seizing their general,
and giving him over to the British outposts. This
was a detestable project, for it is not in the field,
and with a foreign enemy, that soldiers should
concert the overthrow of their country's institu-
tions. It would be idle and impertinent in a
foreigner to say how much and how long men shall
bear with what they deem an oppressive govern-
ment, yet there is a distinct and especial loyalty
due from a soldier to his general in the field ; a
compact of honour, which it is singularly base to
violate, and so it has in all ages been considered.
When the Macedonian Argyraspides delivered their
general, Eumenes 3 in bonds to Antigonus, the latter,
although he had tempted them to the deed and
scrupled not to slay the hero, reproached the trea-
cherous soldiers for their conduct, and with the
approbation of all men destroyed them : yet Anti-
gonus was not a foreign enemy, but of their own
kin and blood.
An English lieutenant-colonel attached to the
Portuguese service reluctantly undertook the duty
of meeting these French conspirators, and penetra-
ted, by night, in uniform, behind the French out-
posts, by the lake of Aveiro or Ovar. He had pre-
viously arranged that one of the malcontents should
meet him on the water, but the boats unknowingly
passed each other in the dark, and when the En-
PENINSULAR WAR. 267
glishman returned to Aveiro, he found John Viana, CHAP.
in company with the French adjutant-major, D'Ar-
gentou. The latter confirmed what Viana had May."
declared at Thomar, and he expressed great respect
for Soult, yet dwelt upon the necessity of removing
him before an appeal could be made to the soldiers ;
he readily agreed to wait in person upon Beresford,
saying he was himself too strongly supported in
the French army to be afraid* Marshal Beresford
was then at Lisbon, thither D'Argentou followed,
and having seen him and sir Arthur Wellesley, re-
mained five days in that capital, and then returned
to Oporto. While at Lisbon, in addition to his
former reasons for this conspiracy, he stated that
Soult wished to make himself king of Portugal ;
an error into which many persons naturally fell,
from the circumstances I have already noticed.
When sir Arthur Wellesley arrived at Coimbra,
D'Argentou appeared again at the English bead-
quarters ; this time however by the order of sir
Arthur, he was conducted through bye-paths, and
returned convinced, from what he had seen and
heard, that although the allies were in force on the
Mondego, many days must elapse before they could
be in a condition to attack Oporto. During his
absence, he had been denounced by general Lefebre,
who was falsely imagined to be favourable to the
conspiracy, and being arrested, passports signed by
admiral Berkeley, which this unfortunate man,
contrary to sir A. Wellesley's urgent recommenda*
tion, had insisted upon having, completely proved
his guilt Soult, until that moment without suspi-
cion, beheld with amazement the abyss that yawned
beneath his feet, but his firmness did not desert
him. He offered D'Argentou pardon, and even
268 HISTOKY OF THE
*v$* reward, if he would disclose the names of the
1 other conspirators and relate truly what he had
May/ seen, of the English and Portuguese armies. The
prisoner to save his life readily told all he knew of
the British, but sir Arthur Wellesley's foresight had
rendered that tale useless ; and with respect to his
French accomplices D'Argentou was at first firm.
Exaggerating the importance of the conspiracy, he
even defied the marshal's power, and advised him,
as the safest course, to adopt the conspirators' sen-
timents ; nor was his boldness fatal to him at the
moment, for Soult, anxious to ascertain the extent
of the danger, delayed executing him, and he
effected his escape during the subsequent opera-
tions. He was not the only person who commu-
nicated secretly with the British general ; colonel
Donadieu and colonel Lafitte were also engaged in
the conspiracy ; and the latter is said to have had
an interview with sir Arthur, between the outposts
of the two armies, and from the first the malcon-
tents were urgent that the movements of the allied
forces should be so regulated as to favour their pro-
ceedings: sir Arthur Wellesley, however, having
little dependence upon intrigue, sternly intimated
that his operations could not be regulated by their
plots, and hastened his military measures.
Under the impression that Silveira was success-
fully defending the line of the Tamega, the British
general at first resolved to reinforce him by sending
Beresford's and Wilson's corps across the Douro at
Lamego, by which he hoped to cut Soult off from
Tras os Montes; intending, when their junction was
effected, to march with his own army direct upon
Oporto, and to cross the Douro near that town, by
the aid of Beresford's corps, which would then be
PENINSULAR WAR. 269
on the right bank. This measure, if executed, CHAP*
would, including Trant's, Wilson's, and Silveira's - ^
people, have placed a masS of thirty thousand
troops, regulars and irregulars, between the Tras os
Montes and Soult ; the latter must then have fought
a battle under very unfavourable circumstances, or
have fallen back on the Minho, which he could
scarcely have passed at that season while pressed
by the pursuing army. But the plan was neces-
sarily abandoned when intelligence arrived that the
bridge of Amarante was forced, and that Silveira,
pursued by the enemy, was driven over the Douro.
The news of this disaster only reached Coimbra
the 4th of May, and, on the 6th, a part of the army
was already in motion to execute a fresh project,
adapted to the change of affairs. But as this eager-
ness to fall on Soult may appear to justify those
who censured sir J. Cradock's caution, it may here
be well to shew how far the circumstances were
changed. When Cradock refused to advance, the
Portuguese troops were insubordinate and disor-
ganized ; they were now obedient and improved in
discipline. Sir John Cradock had scarcely any
cavalry ; but four regiments had since been added*
In the middle of April, Cuesta was only gather-
ing the wrecks of his forces after Medellin ; he was
now at the head of thirty-five thousand men. The
intentions of the British government had been
doubtful, they were no longer so. Sir John Cra-
dock's influence had been restricted, the new gene-
ral came out with enlarged powers, the full confi-
dence of the ministers, and with Portuguese rank.
His reputation, his popularity, and the disposition
of mankind, always prone to magnify the future,
for good or bad, combined to give an
270 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK unusual impulse to public feeling, and enabled him
to dictate at once to the regency, the diplomatists,
May! the generals, and the people; to disregard all petty
jealousies and intrigues, and to calculate upon re-
sources from which his predecessor was debarred*
Sir Arthur Wellesley, habituated to the command
of armies, was moreover endowed by nature with
a lofty geniuSj and a mind capacious of warlike
affairs*
PENINSULAR WAR 271
CHAPTER II.
CAMPAIGN ON THE DOURO.
AFTER the action of Amarante, Laborde's troops CHAP.
were recalled to Oporto, a brigade of cavalry and a
regiment of infantry being left to keep up the com-
munication with Loison ; general Botilho, however,
soon reappeared upon the Lima, Lorge's dragoons
were detached to watch him, and meanwhile Mer-
met's division was pushed towards the Vouga. The
French army was thus extended in detachments
from that river to the Tamega, occupying two
sides of a triangle, its flanks were presented to the
enemy, the wjngs separated by the Douro and
without communication, except by the boat-bridge
of Oporto. It required three days to unite on
the centre, and five days to concentrate on either
extremity.
The situation of the allies was very different;
sir Arthur Wellesley having assembled the bulk of
his troops at Coimbra, had the choice of two lines
of operation ; the one, through Viseu and Lamego,
by which, in four or five marches, he could turn
the French left and cut them off from Tras os
Montes ; the other leading upon Oporto, whereby,
in two marches, he could throw himself unex-
pectedly and in very superior numbers, upon the
enemy's right, with a prospect of crushing it be-
tween the Vouga and the Douro. On the first of
these two lines, which were separated by the lofty
272 HISTORY OP THE
BOOK ridges of the Sierra de Caramula, the march could
' be covered by Wilson's corps which was at Viseu,
May! and by Silveira's which was near Lamego. Along
the second, the movement could be screened by
Trant's corps on the Vouga.
The duke of Dalmatia's dispositions were made
in ignorance of sir Arthur Wellesley's position,
numbers, and intentions. He was not even aware
of the vicinity of such an antagonist, but sensible
that to advance directly upon Lisbon was beyond
his own strength, he meditated to cross the Tamega,
and then, covered by that river and the Douro, to
journal of fH ow ^ ie great route of Bragan^a, and so enter
Salamanca country. It was in this view that
Loison had been directed to get possession of Me-
zamfrio and Pezo de Ragoa, Mermet's advance
towards the Vouga being only to support Frances-
chi's retreat, when the army should commence its
movement towards the Tamega. The 9th of May,
D'Argentou was arrested, the film fell from Soult's
eyes, and all the perils of his position broke at
once upon his view. Treason in his camp which
he could not probe ; a powerful enemy close in his
front ; the insurgents again active in his rear ; the
French troops scattered from the Vouga to the
Tamega, from the Douro to the Lima, and com-
manded by officers, whose fidelity was necessarily
suspected, while the extent of the conspiracy was
unknown*
Appalling as this prospect was, the duke of
Dalmatia did not quail at the sight. The general
officers having assured him of the fidelity of the
troops, he ordered Loison to keep Mezamfrio and
Ragoa, if he could, but under any circumstances
to hold Amarante fast ; the greatest part of the
PENINSULAR WAR 273
*s at Oporto were then directed
upon the Tamega ; the ammunition was, part
guns and stores at Oporto were then directed CHAP,
removed, part destroyed, and Lorge was directed May',
to withdraw the garrison of Viana and make for
Amarante; D'Argentou was then closely and suc-
cessfully pressed to discover his accomplices, and
all the arrangements necessary for a movement
upon the Tras os Montes were actively followed up.
But the war was coming on with a full and swift
tide, Loison, upon whose vigour the success of
the operation depended, was giving way, Wellesley
was already across the Vouga, and Franceschi was
struggling in his grasp.
The English general had resolved to operate
along both the routes before spoken of, but the
greater facility of supplying the troops by the coast-
line, and, above all, the exposed position of the
French right wing, so near the allies and so distant
from succour, induced him to make the principal
attack by the high road leading to Oporto. He
had one division of cavalry and three of infantry,
exclusive of Beresford's corps. The first division,
composed of two brigades of infantry and twelve
guns, was commanded by lieutenant-general Paget.
The second, of three brigades of infantry and six
guns, by lieutenant-general Sherbrooke. The third,
of two brigades of infantry and six guns, by major-
general Hill. The cavalry by lieutenant-general
Payne. The whole amounted to about fourteen
thousand five hundred infantry, fifteen hundred
cavalry, and twenty-four guns, of which six were
only three-pounders.
The 6th of May, Beresford, with six thousand
Portuguese, two British battalions, five companies
of rifiemen, and a squadron of heavy cavalry,
VOL. n. r
274 HISTORY OF THE
marched upon Lamego by the road of Viseu. On the
7th, the light cavalry, and Paget's division, advanced
May. towards the Vouga by the Oporto road, but halted,
on the 8th, to give Beresford time to reach the
Upper Douro before the attack on the French right
should commence. The 9th, they resumed their
march for the bridge of Vouga, Hill's division took
the Aveiro road, and the whole reached the line of
the Vouga river that evening; but Paget's division
was not brought up until after dark, and then with
caution, to prevent the enemy's guard from seeing
the columns, the intent being to surprise Franceschi
the next morning.
That general, with all his cavalry, a regiment of
Merrnet's division, and six guns, occupied a village,
eight miles beyond Vouga bridge, called Albergaria
Nova ; the remainder of Mermet's infantry were at
Grijon, one march in the rear on the main road
to Oporto. Franceschi had that day informed Soult
that the allied forces were collecting on the Mon-
dego, and that Trant's posts had closed upon the
Vouga; he was, however, far from suspecting that
the whole army was upon the last river, although,
from the imprudent conversation of an English
officer bearing a flag of truce, he had reason to
expect an attack of some kind.
Sir Arthur Wellesley's plan was partly arranged
upon the suggestion of the field-officer who had
met D'Argentou, and who had observed, during his
intercourse with the conspirators, that the lake of
Ovar was unguarded by the French, although it
extended twenty miles behind their outposts, and
all the boats were at Aveiro, which was in pos-
session of the allies* On this information it was
decided to turn the enemy's right by the lake*
PENINSULAR WAR 275
Accordingly, general Hill embarked on the evening CHAP.
of the 9th, with one brigade, the other being to
follow him as quickly as possible. The fishermen May."
looked on at first with surprise, but, soon compre-
hending the object, voluntarily rushed in crowds
to the boats, and worked with such a will, that the
whole flotilla arrived at Ovar precisely at sunrise
on the 10th, when the troops immediately disem-
barked. That day, also, Beresford, having rallied
Wilson's corps upon his own, reached Pezo de
Ragoa, and he it was, that had repulsed Loison and
pursued him to Amarante.
Both flanks of the French army were now turned,
and at the same moment sir Arthur fell with the
main body upon Franceschi ; for while the flotilla
was navigating the lake of Ovar the attempt to
surprise that general at Albergaria Nova was in
progress. Sherbrooke's division was not yet up ;
but general Cotton, with the light cavalry, crossing
the Vouga a little after midnight, endeavoured to
turn the enemy's left, and get behind him, while
the head of Paget's division, marching a little later,
passed througli the defiles of Vouga, directly upon
Albergaria. Trant's corps was to make way be-
tween Paget's division and the lake of Aveiro, but
this enterprise, so well conceived, was baffled by
petty events, such as always abound in war. Sir
Arthur Wellesley did not perfectly know the ground
beyond the Vouga, and late in the evening of the
9th, colonel Trant, having ascertained that an im-
practicable ravine, extending from the lake to OK-
vcra dc Azemiz, would prevent him from obeying
his orders, parsed the bridge of Vouga and carried
his own guns beyond the defiles, thinking thus to
leave the bridge clear for tho British artillery, ami for
r2
J76 HISTORY OF THE
B vn K R^ard Stewart's brigade, which had been charged
- ' to conduct the British cannon; but this last task
1809
Ma/. was difficult ; several carriages broke down, and
Trant's corps took the lead of Paget's column, the
march of which was impeded by the broken gun-
carriages. Meanwhile the cavalry under Cotton
were misled by the guides, and came, in broad
day- light, upon Franceschi, who, with his flank
resting upon a wood garnished with infantry,
boldly offered a battle that Cotton dared not under
such circumstances accept. Thus an hour's delay
produced by a few trifling accidents, marred a com-
bination that would have shorn Soult of a third of
his infantry, and all his light cavalry ; for it is not
to be supposed that when Franceschi's horsemen
were cut off, and general Hill at Ovar, Mermet's
division could have escaped across the Douro.
When sir Arthur Wellesley came up to Alber-
garia with Paget's infantry, Franceschi was still in
position skirmishing with Trant's corps ; and evi-
dently ignorant of what a force was advancing
against him. Being immediately attacked, and his
foot dislodged from the wood, he retreated along
the road to Oliveira de Azemis, briskly pursued
by the allied infantry. Nevertheless, valiantly ex-
tricating himself from this perilous situation, he
reached Oliveira without any serious loss, and con-
tinuing his march during the night by Feria, joined
Mermet next morning at Grijon. Franceschi, in
the course of the 10th ? could have seen the whole
of the English army, including the troops with
Hill, and it may create surprise that he should
pass so near the latter general without being at-
tacked, but Hill was strictly obedient to his orders,
which forbade him to act on the enemy's rear ; and
PENINSULAR WAK, 277
those orders were wise and prudent, because the
principle of operating with small bodies on the
flanks and rear of an enemy is vicious. While the May!
number of men on the left of the Douro was un-
known, it would have been rash to interpose a
single brigade between the advanced guard and the
main body of the French. The object of Hill's being
sent to Ovar was, 1. that the line of march might
be eased, and the enemy's attention distracted ;
2. that a division of fresh soldiers might be at
hand to follow the pursuit, so as to arrive on the
bridge of Oporto pell-mell with the flying enemy;
and it was the soldier-like retreat of Franccschi that
prevented the last object from being attained,
COMBAT OF GRIJON.
General Paget's division and the cavalry halted
the night of the 10th at Olivcira; Sherbrooke's
division passed the Vouga later in the day, and
remained in Albergaria, The next morning the pur-
suit was renewed, and the men, marching strongly,
came up with the enemy about eight o'clock in the
morning. The French were posted across the road
on a range of steep hills, a wood, occupied with in-
fantry, covered their right flank, and their front was
protected by a village and broken ground, but their
left was ill placed. The British troops came up
briskly in one column, the head of which was in-
stantly and sharply engaged. The 16th Portu-
guese regiment, quitting the line of march, drove
the enemy out of the wood covering his right, and
at the same time the Germans, who were in the
rear, bringing their left shoulders forward, without
any halt or check, turned the other flank of the
French: the latter immediately abandoned the posi*
278 HISTORY OF THE
tion, and, being pressed in the rear by two squa-
drons of cavalry, lost a few killed and about a
May! hundred prisoners, The heights of Carvalho gave
them an opportunity to turn and check the pursuing
squadrons, yet, when the British infantry advancing
with an impetuous pace, again drew near, they fell
back, and thus fighting and retreating, a blow and a
race, wore the day away. During this combat, Hill
was to have marched by the coast- road towards
Oporto to intercept the enemy's retreat, but by some
error in the transmission of orders, that general,
taking the route of Feyra, crossed Trant's line of
march, and the time thus lost could not be regained.
The British halted at dark. The French passed
the Douro in the night, and destroyed the bridge,
and all the heavy artillery and baggage still in
Oporto were immediately sent off by this road to
Amarante. Mermet, without halting, followed the
same route as far as Vallonga and Baltar, having
orders to secure all the boats and vigilantly to pa-
trole up the right bank of the river. Loison, his
retreat from Pezo de Ragoa being unknown, was
again warned to hold the Tamega as he valued the
safety of the army. Soult then directed all the
craft in the Douro in his front to be secured, and
having placed guards at convenient points, resolved
to hold Oporto during the 12th, that Lorge's dra-
goons and the different detachments might have
time to concentrate at Amarante. But the duke of
Dalmatia's attention was now principally directed
to the river below the city, for the reports of his
cavalry led him to believe that Hill's division had
been disembarked at Ovar from the ocean, and he
expected that the empty vessels would come round
to effect a passage at the mouth of the Douro. Ne-
PENINSULAR WAR 279
vertheless, thinking that Loison still held Mesam- CHAP.
frio and Pezo with six thousand men, and knowing
that three brigades occupied intermediate posts May!
between Amaraute and Oporto, he was satisfied
that his retreat was secure, and thought there was
no rashness in maintaining his position for another
day. The conspirators were however busy. His
orders were neglected or only half obeyed, and false
reports of their execution were made to him.
In this state of affairs the heads of the British
columns arrived at Villa Nova, and before eight
o'clock in the morning of the 1 2th, the whole army
was concentrated there, yet hidden from Soult by
the height upon which the convent of the Serra
stood. The Douro rolled between the hostile forces.
The French who had suffered nothing from the pre-
vious operations, could in two days take post be-
hind the Tamega, from whence the retreat upon
Bragan^a would be certain ; and they might, in
passing, defeat Beresford, for his force was fee-
ble as to numbers, and in infancy as to organi-
zation. The utmost sir Arthur expected from it
was, that, vexing the French line of march and
infesting the road of Villa Real, it would oblige
Soult to take the less accessible route of Chaves,
and retire to Gallicia instead of Leon. This how-
ever could not happen unless the main body of the
allies followed the French closely from Oporto ;
and as Soult at Salamanca would have been more
formidable than ever, the ultimate object of the
campaign and the immediate safety of Bcresford's
corps, alike demanded, that the Douro should be
quickly passed. But how force the passage of a
river, deep, swift, more than three hundred yardn
wide, and with ten thousand veterans guarding the
280 HISTORY OF T11JE
B yn K opposite bank ! Alexander the Great might have
turned from it without shame !
May! The Serra rock, round which the Douro came
with a sharp elbow, prevented any view of the
tipper river from the town, and the duke of Dal-
matia, confident that all above the city was secure,
took his station in a house westward of Oporto,
whence he could discern the whole course of the
lower river to its mouth. Meanwhile, from the
summit of the Serra, sir Arthur Wellesley, with an
eagle's glance, searched all the opposite bank, and
the city and country beyond it ; he saw horses and
baggage moving on the road to Vallonga, and the
dust of columns in retreat, 'but no large body of
troops near the river ; the enemy's guards were few
and distant from each other, his patroles were nei-
ther numerous nor vigilant, and an auspicious neg-
ligence seemed to pervade his camp. Suddenly
a large unfinished building, called the Seminary,
caught the English general's eye. This isolated
structure, having a short easy access from the river,
was surrounded by a high wall, which, extending
to the water on either side, enclosed an area suffi-
cient for two battalions in order of battle ; the only
egress was by an iron gate opening on the Vallonga
road, and the building itself commanded every
thing in its vicinity, except one mound, which was
within cannon-shot, but too pointed to hold a gun.
There were no French posts near, and the direct
line of passage from the Serra, across the river to
the building, being to the right hand, was hidden
from the troops in the town. Here, then, with a
marvellous hardihood, sir Arthur resolved, if he
could find but one boat, to make his way, in the
face of a veteran army and a renowned general.
PENINSULAR WAR. 28 I
CHAP.
PASSAGE OF THE DOURO. '
A poor barber, evading the French patroles, had May!
during the night come over the water in a small
skiff. Colonel Waters, a staff officer, a quick
daring man, discovered this, and aided by the
barber, and by the prior of Amarante, who gallantly
offered his services, immediately passed the river,
and in half an hour returned unperceived with
three large barges. Meanwhile eighteen pieces of
artillery were got up to the convent of the Serra,
and major-general John Murray was directed to
move, with the German brigade, some squadrons of
the 14th dragoons, and two guns, to the Barca de
Avintas, three miles above. He had orders to seek
for boats and effect a passage there also if possible,
and when Waters returned, some of the English
troops were pushed towards Murray in support,
while others cautiously approached the brink of the
river under the Serra.
It was now ten o'clock, the French were still
tranquil and unsuspicious, the British wondering
and expectant, when sir Arthur was informed that
one boat was brought up to the point of passage,
" Welly let the mtn cross" was his reply, and with
this simple order, an officer with twenty-five sol-
diers of the Buffs embarked, and in a quarter of an
hour afterwards were silently placed in the midst of
the enemy's army. The Seminary was thus gained,
all was quiet in Oporto, and a second boat followed
the first ; still no hostile movement was seen, no
sound heard, and a third boat pasned higher up
the river ; but scarcely had the men from this last
sot foot on shore, when a tumultuous noise arose in
the city, the drums beat to anus, shouts arose from
582 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK all parts, and the people were seen, vehemently
' gesticulating and making signals from the houses,
Juy,' whil e confused masses of French troops, hurrying
forth from the streets by the higher grounds, threw
out swarms of skirmishers who came furiously
down against the Seminary. The British army in-
stantly crowded to the bank of the river, Pagef s
a nd Hill's divisions at the point of passage, and
Sherbrooke's division where the boat bridge had
been cut away from Villa Nova, Paget himself
had passed in the third boat, and having mounted
the roof of the Seminary was struck down with a
dangerous wound. Hill took his place. The mus-
ketry was sharp, voluble, and encreasing as the
numbers on both sides accumulated ; but the French
attack was eager and constant, their fire augmented
faster than that of the English, and their artillery
also began to play upon the building. The British
guns from the Serra commanded indeed the whole
enclosure round the Seminary, and swept the left
of the wall in such a manner as to confine the
French assault to the side of the iron gate ; but
Murray did not appear, and the struggle was so
violent, and the moment so critical, that sir Arthur
himself was only prevented from crossing, by the
earnest representations of those about him, and the
just confidence he had in general Hill.
At this period some citizens came over to Villa
Nova with several great boats, and Sherbrooke's
people began to cross iu large bodies ; at the same
time, a long loud shout in the town, and the waving
O f handkerchiefs from the windows, gave notice
that the enemy had abandoned the lower part of
the city. Murray's troops were now seen descending
the right bank from Avintas, three battalions were
PENINSULAR WAR. 283
in the Seminary, and Hill, advancing to the enclo-
sure wall, opened a destructive fire upon the French
columns, as they passed, in haste and confusion, May."
along his front by the Vallonga road. Five pieces
of French artillery came galloping out from the
town on the left, but appalled by the terrible line
of musketry to be passed, the drivers suddenly
pulled up; while thus hesitating, a volley from
behind stretched most of the artillery-men on the
ground, and the rest, dispersing among the enclo-
sures, left their guns on the road. This volley
was given by a part of Sherbrooke's people, who,
having forced their way through the streets, thus
came upon the rear ; in fine the passage was won,
and the allies were in considerable force on the
French side of the river. On the left, general Slier-
brooko, with the brigade of guards and the 29th
regiment, had seized the town, and was pressing
the rear of the enemy as it quitted the streets ;
in the centre, general Hill, holding the Seminary
and the wall of the enclosure with the Buffs the
48th the 66th the 16th Portuguese and a battalion
of detachments, sent a damaging fire into the
French masses as they passed him ; and this line was
prolonged on the right, although with a considera-
ble interval, by general Murray's Germans, and two
squadrons of the 14th dragoons. The remainder of
the army kept passing the river at different points,
and the artillery, from the Serra, still searched
the enemy's columns as they hurried along the line
of retreat,
If general Murray had then fallen boldly in upon
the disordered crowds, their discomfiture would
have been complete ; but he suffered column after
column to pass him, without even a cannon-shot^
234 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK and seemed fearful lest they should turn and push
. him into the river. General Charles Stewart and
M^" major Hervey, impatient of this timidity, charged
with the two squadrons of dragoons, and riding
over the enemy's rear-guard, as it was pushing
through a narrow road to gain an open space
beyond, unhorsed Laborde and wounded Foy ; but
on the English side Hervey lost an arm, and his
gallant horsemen, receiving no support from Murray,
had to fight their way back with loss. This
finished the action, the French continued their re-
treat, and the British remained on the ground they
had gained. The latter lost twenty killed, a general
and ninety-five men wounded ; the former had about
five hundred men killed and wounded, and five pieces
of artillery were taken in the fight ; a considerable
quantity of ammunition, and fifty guns, the carriages
of which had been burnt, were afterwards found in
the arsenal, and several hundred men were cap-
tured in the hospitals.
Napoleon's veterans were so experienced, so
inured to warfare, that no troops in the world could
more readily recover from such a surprise, hence,
before they reached Vallonga, their columns were
again in order with a regular rear-guard cover-
ing the retreat; a small garrison at the mouth of the
Douro which had been cut off, being guided by
some friendly Portuguese, also rejoined the army
in the night, and Soult, believing that Loison was
at Amarante, thought he had happily escaped the
danger.
Sir Arthur Wellesley employed the remainder of
the 12th, and the next day, in bringing over the
rear-guard of the army, the baggage, the stores,
and the artillery. Murray's Germans indeed pur-
PENINSULAR WAR. 285
sued, on the morning of the 13th, but not further CHAP.
than about two leagues on the road of Amarante, and
this delay has been blamed as an error in sir Arthur.
It is argued that an enemy once surprised should
never be allowed to recover, and that Soult should
have been followed up, even while a single regi-
ment was left to pursue. But the reasons for halting
were, first, that a part of the army was still on the
left bank of the Douro ; secondly, that the troops
had outmarched provisions, baggage, and ammuni-
tion ; and having passed over above eighty miles of
difficult country in four days, during three of which
they were constantly fighting, both men and ani-
mals required rest; thirdly, that nothing was known
of Bcrcsford, whose contemporary operations it is
time to relate*
The moment of his arrival on the Douro was
marked by the repulse of Loiaou's division, which
immediately fell back, as I have already related, to
Mezamfrio; it was followed by the Portuguese
patroles only, for Bercsford halted on the left bunk
of the river, because the British regiments were
still in the rear* This was on the 10th. Silveira,
who was at Villa Real, had orders to feel towards
Mezamfrio for the enemy, and the marshal's force
was thus, with the assistance of the insurgents, iu
readiness to turn Soult from the route of Villa Real
to Bragan^a* The llth Loison continued his re-
treat, and Bcrcsford finding him so timid, followed
and skirmished with his rear-guard. Silveira now
advanced from Villa Real, and on the 12th, the
French outposts in front of Amaratite were driven
in ; the i 3th Loison abandoned that town, and took
the route of Guimaraens. These events were un-
known to sir Arthur Wellesley on the evening of
286 HISTORY OF THE
BOOK the 13th, but he heard that Soult, after destroying
" his artillery and ammunition, near Penafiel, had
May.* passed over the mountains towards Braga, and
judging this to arise from Beresford's operations on
the Tamega, he reinforced Murray with some ca-
valry, ordering him to proceed by Penafiel, and if
Loison still lingered near Amarante, to open a com-
munication with Beresford. The latter was at the
same time directed to ascend the Tamega, and in-
tercept the enemy at Chaves. Meanwhile, the main
body of the army marched in two columns upon
the Minho, the one by the route of Barca de Troffa
and Braga, the other by the Ponte d'Ave and
Bacellos.
On the evening of the 14th, the movements of
the enemy about Braga gave certain proofs, that,
not Valen^a and Tuy, but Chaves or Montalcgre,
would be the point of his retreat, whereupon the
left column was drawn off from the Bacellos road
and directed upon Braga, and Beresford was in-
structed to move by Monterey, upon Villa del Rcy,
if Soult should take the line of Montalegre. The
15th, sir Arthur reached Braga* Murray was at
Guimaraens on bis right, and Beresford, who had
anticipated bis orders, was near Chaves, having
sent Silveira towards Salamonde, with instructions
to occupy the passes of Ruivaens and Mclgasso.
At this time, however, Soult was fifteen miles in
advance of Braga, having, by a surprising effort,,
extricated himself from one of the most dangerous
situations that a general ever escaped from ; but to
understand this, it is necessary to describe the
country through which his retreat was effected,
I have already stated, that the Sierra dc Ca-
breira and the Sierra de Catalina, line tho right
PENINSULAR WAR. 287
bank of the Tamega; but in approaching the CHAP.
Douro, the latter slants off towards Oporto, leaving
a rough but practicable slip of land, through which May,'
the road leads from Oporto to Amarante. Hence,
the French, in retreating to the latter town, had the
Douro on their right hand, and the Sierra de Cata-
lina on their left, both supposed impassable ; and
although between Amarante and Braga which is on
the other side of the Catalina, a route practicable
for artillery runs through Guimaraens, it was ne-
cessary to reach Amarante to fall into this road.
Soult, therefore, as he advanced along the narrow
pass between the mountains and the Douro, rested
his hopes of safety entirely upon Loison's holding
Amarante ; several days, however, had elapsed since
that general had communicated with the army, and
an aide-de-camp had been sent, on the morning of
the 1 2th, to ascertain his exact position. Colonel
Tholos6, the officer employed, found Loison at Ama-
rante, but neither his remonstrances, nor the after-
coming intelligence, that Oporto was evacuated and
the army in full retreat upon the Tamega, could in-
duce that general to remain there ; he marched as
we have seen towards Guimaraens on the 13th, aban-
doning the bridge of Amarante, without a blow,
and leaving his commander and two-thirds of
the army to what must have appeared inevitable
destruction.
The news of this unexpected calamity reached
Soult at one o'clock on the morning of the 13th, just
after he had passed the rugged banks of the Souza
river. The weather was very boisterous, the men
were fatigued, voices were heard calling for a capi-
tulation, aud the whole army waa stricken with
dismay. Then it was that the duke of Dalmatia
288 HISTORY OF THE
justified, by his energy, that fortune which had
- - raised him to his high rank in the world. Being
May", informed by a Spanish pedlar, that a path, moun-
ting the right bank of the Souza, led over the
Sierra de Catalina to Guimaraens, he, on the in-
stant, silenced the murmurs of the treacherous or
fearful in the ranks, destroyed his artillery, aban-
doned the military chest and baggage, loaded the
animals with sick men and musket ammunition, and
repassing the Souza, followed his Spanish guide
with a hardy resolution. The rain was falling in
torrents, and the path was such as might be ex-
pected in those wild regions, yet the troops made
good their passage over the mountains to Pombeira,
and at Guimaraens, happily fell in with Loison.
During the night they were joined by Lorge's dra-
goons from Braga, and thus, almost beyond hope,
the whole army was concentrated,
If Soult's energy in command was conspicuous
on this occasion, his sagacity and judgement were
not less remarkably displayed in what followed.
Most generals would have moved by the direct
route upon Guimaraens to Braga. But he, with a
long reach of mind, calculated, from the slackness
of pursuit after lie passed Vallonga, that the bulk
of the English army must be on the road to Braga,
and would be there before him ; or that, at best, he
should be obliged to retreat fighting, and must
sacrifice the guns and baggage of Loison's and
Lorge's corps in the face of an enemy a circum-
stance that might operate fatally on the spirit of his
soldiers, and would certainly give opportunities to
&& malcontents. And already one of the generals,
a pp aren tly Loison, was urging a convention like
Cintra. But, with a firmness worthy of the highest
PENINSULAR WAR. 289
admiration, Soult destroyed all the guns and the CHAP.
greatest part of the baggage and ammunition of-
1809
Loison's and Lorge's divisions, and then, leaving the May*.
high road to Braga on his left, once more took to the
mountain paths, making for the heights of Carvalho
d'Este, where he arrived late in the evening of the
14th, thus gaining a day's march, in point of time.
On the morning of the 15th he drew up his troops
in the position he had occupied two months be-
fore, at the battle of Braga, and by this spectacle,
twenty thousand men being collected upon the the-
atre of a former victory and so disposed as to pro-
duce the greatest effect, he aroused all the sinking
pride of the French soldiers. It was a happy reach
of generalship, an inspiration of real genius !
He now re-organised his army, taking the com-
mand of the rear- guard himself, and giving that of
the advanced guard to general Loison. Noble, the
French historian of this campaign, says, ** the
whole army was astonished;" as if it were not a
stroke of consummate policy, that the rear, which
was pursued by the British, should be under the
general-in-chief, and that the front, which was to
fight its way through the native forces, should 
