Skip to main content

Full text of "History of the war in Afghanistan"

See other formats 


B^BH 

^^B   — ^TO 

"::■':'.:-:■.. 

I  '^m- 

;ux:"~ 

H 

^___|^^^^^^__| 

1! 

^^^^^^^H 

■J 

^^HH^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^I 

^^^^^^^^^1 

it 

^H 

^^^1 

: 

^^^^^^^^^^^1 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 

^^^^1 

CO 


^ 


•J 


A.    P.    THORNTON. 


Presented  to  the 
LIBRARY  of  the 

UNIVERSITY  OF  TORONTO 

from  the  library  of 
A.   P.    Ttiornton 


EDM  OND 
&    SPARK 


HISTORY 

OF 

THE  WAR  IN  AFGHANISTAK 

By  JOHN  WILLIAM  KAYE,  F.E.S. 

THIRD  EDITION. 

IN   THREE   VOLUMES. 
VOL.  I. 


LONDON: 
WM.  H.  ALLEN  &  CO.,  13,  WATEELOO  PLACE, 

^ublisljers  to  tfjc  hxHia  ©fficc. 
1874. 


LONDON . 

I-RIXTEI)    BY    W.   CLOWES   AND   S(JKS,   STAJIFORD  STREET 
AND   CHARIKG    CROSS. 


'BtVmtm. 


IF  PUBLIC  CLAIMS  ALONE  WERE  TO  BE  REGARDED,  I  KNOAV  NOT  TO 
WHOM  I  COULD  MORE  FITLY  INSCRIBE  THESE  VOLUMES,  THAN  TO  THE 
OFFICERS  OF  A  REGIMENT,  ON  THE  ROLLS  OF  WHICH  ARE  THE  NAMES 
OF  POLLOCK,  MACGREGOR,  TODD,  SHAKESPEAR,  LAWRENCE,  ABBOTT, 
ANDERSON,  AND  OTHERS,  DISTINGUISHED  IN  THE  ANNALS  OF  THE 
AFGHAN  war;  BUT  IT  IS  IN  GRATEFUL  RECOLLECTION  OF  SOME  OF 
THE  HAPPIEST  TEARS  OF  MY  LIFE  THAT  I  DEDICATE  THESE  VOLUMES 
TO   THE 

OFFICERS  OF  THE  BENGAL  ARTILLERY. 


Bletchinolev, 
Oct.  30,  1651. 


ADVERTISEMENT  TO  THIRD  EDITION. 


The  present  Edition  of  the  "  History  of  the  War  in 
Afghanistan"  is  a  reproduction  of  the  three-volumed 
Edition  of  1857,  which  was  thoroughly  revised,  and  much 
improved  by  the  kindly  aid  of  many  of  the  chief  actors 
in  the  scenes  described.  I  do  not  think  that  I  can  make 
it  any  better. 

Only  one  alleged  error  has  been  brought  to  my  notice 
since  the  last  Edition  was  published.  It  is  stated,  in 
Chapter  IV.,  page  55,  that  "  Mr.  Harford  Jones,  a  civil 
servant  of  the  Company,  who  was  made  a  Baronet  for  the 
occasion,  was  deputed  to  Teheran  to  negotiate  with  the 
Ministers  of  the  Shah."  This  was  first  published  in  1851. 
After  a  lapse  of  twenty-three  years,  I  have  recently  been 
informed  by  the  son  of  Sir  Harford  Jones,  that  his  father 
was  not  made  a  Baronet  in  consideration  of  prospective 
but  of  past  services.  It  is  certain  that  Mr.  Harford  Jones 
rendered  good  service  to  the  East  India  Company,  but  it 
is  equally  certain  that  His  Majesty's  Government  were 


VI  ADVERTISEMENT   TO    THIRD    EDITION. 

not  very  prodigal  in  their  grants  of  honours  to  the  Com- 
pany's servants.  The  Baronetcy  was  created  in  1807, 
when  the  Persian  Mission  was  under  consideration ;  but 
I  must  admit  that  there  is  a  difference  between  coin- 
cidences and  consequences — and,  therefore,  as  I  cannot 
establish  the  fact  stated,  I  am  willing  to  withdraw  the 
assertion  of  it,  whatever  may  be  my  own  convictions. 

J.  W.  K. 

liOSE-HlLL, 

March   1274. 


PREFACE  TO  SECOND  EDITION. 


The  present  Edition  of  the  History  of  tne  War  in 
Afghanistan  has  been  thoroughly  revised;  and  several 
alterations  have  been  made,  which  I  hope  raav  be  fairly 
regarded  also  as  emendations.  Some  of  the  notes  have 
been  abridged;  and  others,  when  the  importance  of 
their  subject-matter  seemed  to  warrant  it,  have  been 
incorporated  with  the  text.  I  have  freely  and  gratefully 
availed  myself  of  such  information  and  such  suggestions 
as  have  been  furnished  to  me  by  others  since  the  first 
appearance  of  the  Work,  whilst  my  own  more  recent 
historical  and  biographical  researches  have  enabled  me 
to  illustrate  more  fully  in  some  places  my  original  con- 
ceptions, and  in  others  to  modify  or  to  correct  them. 

The  material  corrections,  however,  are  not  numerous. 
As  almost  every  statement  in  the  book  was  based  upon 
copious  documentary  evidence,  I  have  now,  as  regards 
my  historical  facts,  very  little  to  withdraw  or  to  amend. 


VIU  PREFACE   TO    SECOJND   EDITION. 

4 

I  think  I  may,  without  unreasonable  self-congratula- 
tion, assert  that  few  works  of  contemporary  history 
containing  so  large  a  body  of  facts  have  been  so  little 
questioned  and  controverted.  The  numerous  communi- 
cations, which  I  have  received  alike  from  friends  and 
strangers,  have  contained  little  but  confirmatory  or 
illustrative  matter;  and,  if  they  have  cast  any  doubt 
upon  the  statements  in  the  Work,  it  has  been  mainly 
on  those  advanced  by  the  actors  in  the  events  described, 
and  which  therefore  have  appeared  only  in  a  dramatic 
sense  in  these  pages.  When,  however,  an  opportunity 
kas  beerf  afforded  me  of  placing  before  the  reader  an^ 
new  facts,  or  counter-statements,  which  may  possibly 
cause  him  to  modify  his  previous  opinions,  I  have  always 
turned  them  to  account.  As  I  have  no  other  object 
than  that  of  declaring  the  truth,  I  cannot  but  rejoice  in 
every  added  means  of  contributing  to  its  completeness. 

In  this  present  Edition,  the  History  of  the  War  in 
Afghanistan  is  divided  into  three  Volumes.  This  is  a 
change  in  the  outer  form  of  the  Work,  which  may  appear 
to  be  scarcely  worthy  of  notice ;  but  I  believe  it  to  be 
an  improvement,  and  a  suggestive  one.  I  doubt  whether 
there  is  a  series  of  events  in  all  history,  which  falls  more 
naturally  into  three  distinct  groupes,  giving  the  epic 
completeness  of  a  beginning,  a  middle,  and  an  end  to 


PREFACE   TO   SECOND   EDITION.  IX 

the  entire  Work.  It  is  true  that  some  very  generous  and 
good-natured  people  have  given  me  credit  for  the  unity 
of  design  and  of  construction  apparent  in -this;  but  in 
truth  all  the  parts  of  the  Work  fell  so  naturally  into  their 
proper  places,  that  there  was  little  left  for  art  to  accom- 
plish; and  I  am  conscious  that  I  owe  to  the  nature 
of  my  subject  the  largest  part  of  the  praise  which  has 
been  so  encouragingly  bestowed  on  myself. 

I  should  have  nothing  more  to  say  in  this  place,  if  I 
did  not  desire  to  express  my  gratitude  to  the  friends  who 
have  taken  an  interest  in  this  new  edition  of  my  History, 
and  have  aided  me  with  verbal  corrections  of  my  text,  or 
suggestions  of  greater  moment.  I  might  not  please 
them  by  any  more  special  recognition  of  their  k^jjdness; 
but  there  is  one  whom  such  praise  and  gratitude  as 
mine  can  no  longer  reach,  and  whom  I  may  therefore 
name  without  offence.  Among  others  who  were  at  the 
trouble  to  re-peruse  this  book,  for  the  purpose  of  aiding 
its  revision  for  the  present  edition,  the  appearance  of 
which  has  been  retarded  by  accidental  circumstances, 
was  the  late  Sir  Eobert  Harry  Inglis.  I  believe  that 
this,  which  he  assured  me  was  a  labour  of"  love,  was  the 
last  literary  task  which  he  ever  set  himself.  His  final 
list  of  corrigenda  was  sent  to  me,  indeed,  only  a  few  days 
before  the  occurrence  of  that  event  which,  although  there 


X  PEEFACE   TO   SECOND    EDITION. 

be  good  and  wise  and  genial  men  still  among  us,  has 
left  a  gap  in  society,  which  cannot  easily  be  filled  by  one 
so  good,  so  wise,  and  so  genial.  Of  all  the  privileges  of 
literature,  the  greatest,  perhaps,  is  that  it  makes  for  its 
followers  kind  and  indulgent  friends,  who  sometimes 
transfer  to  the  writer  the  interest  awakened  by  his  book. 
I  owe  to  this  Work  some  cherished  friendships ;  but  none 
more  cherished  than  that  which  has  now  become  both  a 
pleasing  and  a  painful  reminiscence. 

London, 
January^  18C-7. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  ORIGINAL  EDITION. 


Circumstances  having  placed  at  my  disposal  a  num- 
ber of  very  interesting  and  important  letters  and  papers, 
illustrative  of  the  History  of  the  War  in  Afghanistan,  I 
undertook  to  write  this  Work.  There  was  nothing  that 
peculiarly  qualified  me  for  the  task,  beyond  the  fact  that 
I  enjoyed  the  confidence  of  some  of  the  chief  actors  in 
the  events  to  be  narrated,  or — for  death  had  been  busy 
among  those  actors — their  surviving  relatives  and  friends. 
I  had  been  in  India,  it  is  true,  during  the  entire  period 
of  the  War ;  but  I  never  took  even  the  humblest  part  in 
its  stirring  scenes,  or  visited  the  country  in  which  they 
were  enacted. 

It  was  not,  therefore,  until  I  considered  that  no  more 
competent  person  might  be  disposed  to  undertake  the 
Work ;  that  the  materials  placed  in  my  hands  might  not 
in  the  same  number  and  variety  be  placed  in  the  hands 
of  any  other  writer ;  and  that  those  best  qualified  by  a 
fuU  knowledge  of  the  subject  to  write  the  History  of 
the  War,  were  restrained  by  the  obligations  of  official 
position  from  that  fulness  of  revelation  and  freedom  of 


XU  PREFACE. 

discussion,  which  a  work  of  this  kind  demands — that 
entered  upon  the  perilous  undertaking.  The  necessities 
of  the  subject  have  rendered  the  task  peculiarly  pain- 
ful, and,  but  for  the  encouragement  I  have  received 
in  the  progress  of  its  execution,  alike  from  strangers  and 
from  friends  who  have  freely  placed  new  materials  in 
my  hands,  and  expressed  a  lively  interest  in  my  labours, 
I  might  have  shrunk  from  its  completion.  I  now  lay 
before  the  public  the  result  of  much  anxious  thought 
and  laborious  investigation,  confident  that,  although  the 
Work  might  have  been  done  more  ably,  it  could  not 
have  been  performed  more  conscientiously,  by  another. 

I  have  been  walking,  as  it  were,  with  a  torch  in  my 
hand  over  a  floor  strewn  thickly  with  gunpowder. 
There  is  the  chance  of  an  explosion  at  every  step.  I 
have  been  treading  all  along  on  dangerous  ground.  But 
if  I  cannot  confidently  state  that  I  have  asserted  nothing 
which  I  cannot  prove,  I  can  declare  my  belief  that,  except 
upon  what  I  had  a  right  to  consider  as  good  and  sufficient 
authority,  I  have  advanced  absolutely  nothing.  It  will 
be  seen  how  careful  I  have  been  to  quote  my  authorities. 
Indeed,  I  have  an  uneasy  misgiving  in  my  mind  that 
I  have  overburdened  my  Work  with  quotations  from  the 
letters  and  documents  in  my  possession.  But  this  has 
been  done  with  design  and  deliberation.  It  was  not 
sufficient  to  refer  to  these  letters  and  documents,  for 
they  were  singly  accessible  only  to  a  few,  and  collec- 
tively, perhaps,  to  no  one  but  myself.  They  have,  there- 
fore, been  left  to  speak  for  themselves.    What  the  Work 


PREFACE.  XUl 

has  lost  by  this  mode  of  treatment  in  compactness  and 
continuity,  it  has  gained  in  trustworthiness  and  authen- 
ticity. If  the  narrative  be  less  animated,  the  history  is 
more  genuine.  I  have  had  to  deal  with  unpublished 
materials,  and  to  treat  of  very  strange  events ;  and  I 
have  not  thought  it  sufficient  to  fuse  these  materials 
into  my  text,  and  to  leave  the  reader  to  fix  or  not 
to  fix  his  faith  upon  the  unsupported  assertions  of  an 
unknown  writer.^ 

I  would  make  another  observation  regarding  the  exe- 
cution of  this  Work.  The  more  notorious  events  of  the 
War,  which  stand  fully  revealed  in  military  despatches 
and  published  blue-books,  have  not  been  elaborated 
with  the  care,  and  expanded  into  the  amplitude,  which 
their  importance  may  seem  to  demand.  These  Volumes 
may  be  thought,  perhaps,  rather  deficient  in  respect  of 
military  details.  Compelled  to  condense  somewhere,  I 
have  purposely  abstained  from  enlarging  upon  those 
events,  which  have  already  found  fitting  chroniclers. 
The  military  memoir-writers,  each  one  on  his  own 
limited  field,  have  arrayed  before  us  all  the  strategical 
operations  of  the  Campaign  from  the  assemblage  of 
Fane's  army  in  1838,  to  the  return  of  Pollock's  at  the 
close  of  1842;  but  the  political  history  of  the  War 


*  In  most  cases  I  have  had  the  original  letters  and  documents  in  my 
possession — in  the  rest,  authenticated  copies.  The  translations  are 
official  translations,  verified,  in  some  of  the  most  important  instances, 
as  in  the  treaties  in  Book  V.,  by  one  of  the  most  accomplished  Persian 
scholars  in  the  kingdom. 


PREFACE. 


has  never  been  written.  For  information  on  many 
points  of  military  interest,  not  sufficiently  dwelt  upon 
in  these  volumes,  I  would  therefore  refer  the  reader 
to  the  works  of  Havelock,  Hough,  Barr,  Eyre,  Stacf, 
Neill,  and  other  soldierly  writers.  The  progress  of 
events  in  Upper  Sindh  after  the  capture  of  Khelat, 
I  have  not  attempted  to  narrate.  The  military  opera- 
tions in  that  part  of  the  country  have  found  an  intelli- 
gent annalist  in  Dr.  Buist. 

I  need  only  now,  after  gratefully  acknowledging  my 
obligations  to  all  who  have  aided  me  with  original 
papers,  or  with  information  otherwise  conveyed  (and  I 
have  largely  taxed  the  patience  of  many  during  the 
progress  of  this  work),  offer  one  more  word  of  apology. 
I  know  that  my  scholarly  Oriental  friends  will  revolt 
against  my  spelling  of  Oriental  names.  I  have  only  to 
bow  beneath  their  correcting  hand,  and  fling  myself 
upon  their  mercy.  I  have  written  all  the  names  in  the 
old  and  vulgar  manner,  most  familiar  to  the  English 
eye,  and,  in  pronunciation,  to  the  Engljoh  ear ;  and  I 
believe  that  the  majority  of  readers  wih  thank  me  for 
the  barbarism. 

Bletchinglet, 
October,  1851. 


CONTENTS. 


BOOK  I.— INTRODUCTION. 

[1800—1837.] 

CHAPTER  I. 

[1800—1801.] 

PAGE 

Shah  Zemann  and  the  Douranee  Empire — Threatened  Afghan  Inva- 
sion— Malcolm's  First  Mission  to  Persia — Country  and  People 
of  Afghanistan — Fall  of  Zemann  Shah  ....       1 

CHAPTER  II. 

[1801—1808.] 

The  Early  Days  of  Soojah-ool-Moolk — Disastrous  Commencement 
of  his  Career — Defeat  of  Shah  Mahmoud — Reign  of  Shah 
Soojah — The  Insurrection  of  Prince  Kaysur — Tidings  of  the 
British  Mission 25 

CHAPTER  III. 

[1801—1808.] 

France  and  Russia  in  the  East — Death  of  Hadjee  Khalil  Khan — 
The  Mission  of  Condolence — Aga  Nebee  Khan — Extension  of 
Russian  Dominion  in  the  East — French  Diplomacy  in  Persia — 
The  pacification  of  Tilsit — Decline  of  French  influence  in 
Teheran 36 


XVI  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  IV. 

[1808—1809.] 

PAGE 

The  Second  Mission  to  Persia — Malcolm's  Visit  to  Busliire — 
Failure  of  the  Embassy — His  Return  to  Calcutta — Mission 
of  Sir  Harford  Jones — His  Progress  and  Success    .         .         .55 

CHAPTER  V.  ^ 

[1808—1809.] 

The  Missions  to  Lahore  and  Caubul — The  Aggressions  of  Runjeet 
Singh— Mr.  Metcalfe  at  Umritsur— Treaty  of  1809— Mr.  El- 
phinstoue's  Mission — Arrival  at  Peshawur — Reception  by 
Shah  Soojah — Withdrawal  of  the  Mission — Negotiations  with 
the  Ameers  of  Sindh 77 

CHAPTER  VI. 

[1809—1816.] 

The  Mid-Career  of  Shah  Soojah — His  Wanderings  and  Misfortunes 
— Captivity  in  Cashmere — Imprisonment  at  Lahore — Robbery 
of  the  Koh-i-noor — Reception  of  the  Shah  by  the  Rajah  of 
Kistawar — His  Escape  to  the  British  Territories  .         .         .97 


CHAPTER  VII. 

[1816—1837.] 

Dost  Mahomed  and  the  Barukzyes — Early  days  of  Dost  Mahomed 
—The  fall  of  Futteh  Khan— Defeat  of  Shah  Mahmoud— Su- 
premacy of  the  Barukzyes — Position  of  the  Empire— Dost 
Mahomed  at  Caubul — Expedition  of  Shah  Soojah — His 
Defeat —Capture  of  Peshawur  by  the  Sikhs  .         .         .         .107 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

[1810—1837.] 

Later  Events  in  Persia — The  Treaty  of  Goolistan — Arrival  of  Sir 
Gore  Ouseley — Mr.  Morier  and  Mr.  EUis — The  Definitive 
Treaty— The  War  of  1826-27— The  Treaty  of  Toorkomanchai 
— Death  of  Futteh  Ali  Shah — Accession  of  Mahomed  Shah — 
His  Projects  of  Ambition— The  Expedition  against  Herat       .  139 


CONTENTS.  XVn 

BOOK  11. 

[1835—1838.] 


CHAPTER  I. 

[1835—1837.] 

PAGE 

The  Commercial  Mission  to  Caubul — Arrival  of  Lord  Auckland — 
His  Character — Alexander  Burnes — His  Travels  in  Central 
Asia — Deputation  to  the  Court  of  Dost  Mahomed — Reception 
by  the  Ameer — Negotiations  at  Caubul — Failure  of  the 
Mission ....   166 


CHAPTER  II. 

[1837—1839.] 

The  Siege  of  Herat — Shah  Kamran  and  Yar  Mahomed — Return  of 
the  Shah — Eldred  Pottinger — Preparations  for  the  Defence — 
Advance  of  the  Persian  Army — Progress  of  the  Siege — Nego- 
tiations for  Peace — Failure  of  the  Attack — The  Siege  raised  .  211 


CHAPTER  III. 

[1837—1838.] 

Policy  of  the  British-Indian  Q-ovemment — Our  Defensive  Opera- 
tions—Excitement in  British  India — Proposed  Alliance  with 
Dost  Mahomed — Failure  of  Burnes's  Mission  considered — 
The  claims  of  the  Suddozye  Princes — The  Tripartite  Treaty — 
Invasion  of  Afghanistan  determined — Policy  of  the  Movement  300 


■  CHAPTER  lY. 

[July— October :  1838.] 

The  Simlah  Manifesto — The  Simlah  Council — Influence  of  Messrs. 
Colvin  and  Torrens — Views  of  Captains  Burnes  and  Wade — 
Opinions  of  Sir  Henry  Fane — The  Army  of  the  Indus — 
The  Governor- General's  Manifesto — Its  Policy  considered      .  350 

6 


XTlll  CONTENTS. 

BOOK  III. 

[1838—1839.] 

CHAPTER  I. 

PAGE 

The  Army  of  the  Indus — Gathering  at  Ferozepore — Resignation  of 
Sir  Henry  Fane — Route  of  the  Army  —  Passage  through 
Bahwulpore— The  Ameers  of  Sindh — The  Hyderabad  Ques- 
tion— Passage  of  the  Bolan  Pass — Arrival  at  Candahar.  .  388 

CHAPTER  II. 

[April— August :  1839.] 

Arrival  at  Candahar — The  Shah's  Entry  into  the  City  —  His 
Installation  —  Nature  of  his  Reception — Behaviour  of  the 
Douranees — The  English  at  Candahar — Mission  to  Herat — 
Difficulties  of  our  Position — Advance  to  Ghuznee  ,         .  437 

CHAPTER  III. 

[June— August :  1839.] 

The  Disunion  of  the  Barukzyes — Prospects  of  Dost  Mahomed — 
Keane's  Advance  to  Ghuznee — Massacre  of  the  Prisoners — 
Fall  of  Ghuznee— Flight  of  Dost  Mahomed — Hadjee  Khan, 
Khaukur — Escape  of  Dost  Mahomed — Restoration  of  Shah 
Soojah-^Success  of  the  Campaign 454 

Appendix       .        •        • 481 


THE   WAR   IN  AFGHANISTAN, 


BOOK  I.— INTRODUCTION. 

[1800—1837.] 


CHAPTER  I. 

[1800—1801.] 


Shah  Zemaun  and  the  Douranee  Empire — Threatened  Afghan  Invasion 
— Malcolm's  First  Mission  to  Persia — Country  and  People  of 
Afghanistan — Fall  of  Zemaun  Shah. 

At  the  dawn  of  the  present  century,  Zemaun  Shah 
reigned  over  the  Douranee  Empire.  The  son  of  Timour 
Shah,  and  the  grandson  of  the  illustrious  Ahmed  Shah, 
he  had  sought,  on  the  death  of  his  father,  the  dangerous 
privilege  of  ruling  a  divided  and  tumultuous  people. 
Attaining  by  intrigue  and  violence  what  did  not  right- 
fully descend  to  him  by  inheritance,  he  soon  began  to 
turn  his  thoughts  towards  foreign  conquest,  and  to  medi- 
tate the  invasion  of  Hindostan.  His  talents  were  not 
equal  to  his  ambition,  and  his  success  fell  far  short  of  the 
magnitude  of  his  designs.  There  was  too  little  security 
at  home  to  ensure  for  him  prosperity  abroad.  And  so  it 
happened,  that  he  was  continually  marching  an  army 
upon  the  frontier,  eager  to  extend  the  Douranee  Empire 
to  the  banks  of  the  Ganges;  and  continually  retracing 


V 


2      SHAH  ZEMAUN  AND  THE  DOURANEE  EMPIRE. 

his  steps  in  alarm,  lest  his  own  sovereignty  should  be 
wrested  from  him  in  his  absence.  For  many  years 
Zemaun  Shah's  descent  upon  Hindostan  kept  the  British 
Indian  Empire  in  a  chronic  state  of  um-est.  But  he 
never  advanced  further  than  Lahore,  and  then  was  com- 
pelled precipitately  to  retire.  Starvation  threatened  his 
troops  ;  a  brotherly  usurper  his  throne  ;  and  he  hastened 
back  lest  he  should  find  Prince  Mahmoud  reigning  at 
Caubul  in  his  stead. 

This  was  in  1797,*  when  Sir  John  Shore  was  Governor- 
General  of  India.  We  smile  now  at  the  alarm  that  was 
created  along  the  whole  line  of  country  from  the  Attock 
to  the  Hooghly,  by  the  rumoured  approach  of  this  for- 
midable invader.  But  half  a  century  ago,  the  English  in 
India  knew  little  of  the  resources  of  the  Douranee 
Empire,  of  the  national  characteristics  of  the  people,  of 
the  continually  unsettled  state  of  their  political  relations, 
or  of  the  incompetency  of  the  monarch  himself  to  conduct 
any  great  enterprise.  Distance  and  ignorance  magnified 
the  danger :  but  the  apprehensions,  which  were  then 
qjitertained,  were  not  wholly  groundless  apprehensions. 
AU  the  enemies  of  the  British  Empire  in  India  had 
turned  their  eyes  with  malicious  expectancy  upon  Caubul. 
Out  of  the  rocky  defiles  of  that  romantic  country  were  to 
stream  the  deliverers  of  Islam  from  the  yoke  of  the 
usurping  Franks.  The  blood  of  the  Mahomedan  princes 
of  India  was  at  fever  heat.  From  northern  Oude  and 
from  southern  Mysore  had  gone  forth  invitations  to  the 
Afghan  monarch.  With  large  promises  of  aid,  in  money 
and  in  men.  Vizier  Ali  and  Tippoo  Sultan  had  encouraged 

*  And  again  in  the  cold  weather  of  1798-99  he  advanced  as  far  as 
Lahore,  but  was  recalled  by  the  invasion  of  Khorassan  by  the  Persian 
troops.  Lord  Wellesley  had  by  this  time  succeeded  to  the  government 
of  India.  The  danger  was  then  considered  sufficiently  cogent  to  call 
for  an  augmentation  of  the  native  army« 


RUMOURED   AFGHAN   INVASION.  3 

him  to  move  down  upon  Hindostan  at  the  head  of  an 
army  of  true  believers.  Others,  with  whom  he  could 
claim  no  community  of  creed,  extended  to  him  the  hand 
of  fellowship.  The  Rajah  of  Jyneghur  offered  him  a  lakh 
of  rupees  a  day  as  soon  as  the  grand  army  should  enter 
liis  district.*  We,  who  in  these  times  trustingly  contem- 
plate the  settled  tranquillity  of  the  north-western  pro- 
vinces of  India,  and  remember  Zemaun  Shah  only  as  the 
old  blind  pensioner  of  Loodhianah,  can  hardly  estimate 
aright  the  real  importance  of  the  threatened  movement, 
or  appreciate  the  apprehensions  which  were  felt  by  two 
governors-general  of  such  different  personal  characters  as 
Sir  John  Shore  and  Lord  Wellesley.t 

The  new  century  had  scarcely  dawned  upon  the  English 
in  India,  when  the  perils  which  seemed  to  threaten  them 
from  beyond  the  Indus  began  to  assume  a  more  compli- 
cated and  perplexing  character.  The  ambition  of  a  semi- 
barbarous  monarch  and  the  inflammatory  zeal  of  hordes 
of  Mussulman  fanatics,  were  sources  of  danger,  which, 
however  alarming,  were  at  least  plain  and  intelligible. 
But  when  it  was  suspected  that  there  was  intrigue  of  a 
more  remote  and  insidious  character  to  be  combated — 

*  I  find  this  fact,  wliicli  however  is  to  be  referred  rather  to  dread  of 
the  Mahrattas  than  to  hatred  of  the  British,  stated,  among  other 
answers  to  queries  put  in  1800-1  by  Captain  Malcolm  to  Mahomed 
Sadik.— ilf/Sf. 

t  Of  the  two,  perhaps,  Lord  Wellesley  regarded  the  movements  of 
the  Douranee  monarch  with  the  livelier  concern.  Sir  John  Shore 
wrote  :  "Report  speaks  of  an  invasion  of  Hindostan  by  Zemaun  Shah, 
and  with  respect  to  his  intention  is  entitled  to  credit.  .  .  .  The 
execution  of  his  intentions  will  be  hazardous  unless  he  can  obtain  the 
co-operation  of  the  Sikhs  and  hostages  for  the  continuance  of  it ;  and  I 
have  great  doubt  as  to  his  success."  Lord  Wellesley,  two  or  three 
years  later,  spoke  of  the  threatened  invasion  "creating  the  liveliest 
sensation  throughout  India;"  and  added,  "Every  Mahomedan,  even 
in  the  remotest  region  of  the  Deccan,  waited  with  anxious  expectation 
for  the  advance  of  the  champion  of  Islam." 

B  2 


4      SHAH  ZEMAUN  AND  THE  DOUKANEE  EMPIRE. 

when  intelligence,  only  too  credible,  of  the  active  efforts 
of  French  diplomacy  in  Persia,  reached  the  Calcutta 
Council-Chamber,  and  it  was  believed  that  the  emissaries 
of  Napoleon  were  endeavouring  to  cement  alliances  hostile 
to  Great  Britain  in  every  quarter  of  the  Eastern  world, 
the  position  of  affairs  in  Central  Asia  was  regarded  with 
increased  anxiety,  and  their  management  demanded 
greater  wisdom  and  address.  It  was  now  no  longer  a 
question  of  mere  military  defence  against  the  inroads  of 
a  single  invader.  The  repeated  failures  of  Zemaun  Shah 
had,  in  some  degree,  mitigated  the  alarm  with  which  his 
movements  were  dimly  traced  in  Hindostan.  The 
Douranee  monarch  had  lost  something  of  his  importance 
as  an  independent  enemy  ;  but  as  the  willing  agent  of  a 
hostile  confederacy,  he  appeared  a  more  formidable  oppo- 
nent, and  might  have  become  a  more  successful  one.  An 
offensive  alliance  between  France,  Persia,  and  Caubul, 
might  have  rendered  the  dangers,  which  once  only  seemed 
to  threaten  us  from  the  north-west,  at  once  real  and 
imminent.  To  secure  the  friendship  of  Persia,  therefore, 
was  the  great  aim  of  the  British  Government.  It  was  ob- 
vious that,  whilst  threatened  with  invasion  from  the  west, 
Zemaun  Shah  could  never  conduct  to  a  successful  issue 
an  expedition  against  Hindostan;  and  that  so  long  as 
Persia  remained  true  to  Great  Britain,  there  was  nothing 
to  be  apprehended  from  French  intrigue  in  the  countries 
of  Central  Asia.  It  was  determined,  therefore,  to  despatch 
a  mission  to  the  Court  of  the  Persian  Shah,  and  Captain 
John  Malcolm  was  selected  to  conduct  it. 

The  choice  could  not  have  fallen  on  a  fitter  agent.  In 
the  fullest  vigour  of  life,  a  young  man,  but  not  a  young 
soldier — for,  bom  in  that  year  of  heroes  which  witnessed 
the  nativity  of  Wellington,  of  Napoleon,  and  of  Mehemet 
Ali,  he  had  entered  the  service  of  the  Company  at  the 
early  age  of  thirteen — Captain  Malcolm  brought  to  the 


MALCOLM  S    FIRST    MISSION    TO    PERSIA.  0 

difficult  and  responsible  duties  entrusted  to  him,  extra- 
ordinary energy  of  mind  and  activity  of  body — talents  of 
the  most  available  and  useful  character — some  experience 
of  native  courts  and  acquaintance  with  the  Oriental  lan- 
guages. He  had  been  successively  military  secretary  to 
the  commander-in-chief  of  Madras,  town-major  of  Fort 
St.  George,  assistant  to  the  Resident  at  Hyderabad,  and 
commandant  of  the  infantry  of  the  Nizam's  contingent. 
When  that  army  took  the  field  in  Mysore,  and  shared  in 
the  operations  against  Tippoo  Sultan,  Captain  Malcolm 
accompanied  it  in  the  capacity  of  political  agent,  which 
was  virtually  the  chief  command  of  the  force ;  and,  after 
the  reduction  of  Seringapatam  and  the  death  of  Tippoo, 
was  associated  with  General  Wellesley,  Colonel  Close,  and 
Captain  Munro,*  in  the  commission  that  was  then 
appointed  for  the  settlement  of  the  Mysore  country. 

This  was  in  1799.  In  that  same  year  he  was  selected 
by  Lord  Wellesley  to  fill  the  post  of  envoy  to  the  Court 
of  Persia.  With  such  address  had  he  acquitted  himself 
in  all  his  antecedent  appointments ;  so  great  had  been  the 
knowledge  of  native  character,  the  diplomatic  tact,  and 
the  sound  understanding  he  had  evinced  in  all  his  nego- 
tiations ;  that  at  an  age  when  the  greater  number  of  his 
contemporaries  were  in  the  discharge  of  no  higher  duties 
than  those  entailed  by  the  command  of  a  company  of 
sepoys.  Captain  Malcolm  was  on  his  way  to  the  presence 
of  the  great  defender  of  Islamism,  charged  with  one  of 
the  most  important  missions  that  has  ever  been  despatched 
by  the  British- Indian  Government  to  the  Court  of  a 
native  potentate. 

The  mission,  says  Captain  Malcom,  was  "completely 
successful" — a  declaration  repeated  more  emphatically  by 

*  Men  who  lived  to  occupy  a  space  in  history,  as  the  Duke  of  Wel- 
lington, Sir  Barry  Close,  and  Sir  Thomas  Munro.  Malcolm  was 
Secretary  to  the  Commission,  and  Munro  his  assistant. 


6  SHAH   ZEMAUN   AND   THE   DOURANEB   EMPIRE. 

Lord  Wellesley.*  But  time  and  circumstance  did  more 
for  us  than  diplomacy.  It  was  the  ostensible  object  of 
the  mission  to  instigate  the  Shah  of  Persia  to  move  an 
army  upon  Herat,  and  so  to  withdraw  Shah  Zemaun  from 
his  threatened  invasion  of  Hindostan.  But  the  move, 
which  was  to  do  so  much  for  our  security  in  India,  had 
been  made  before  the  British  ambassador  appeared  at  the 
Persian  Court ;  and  the  work,  which  was  thus  commenced 
by  Futteh  Ali,  was  completed  by  Prince  Mahmoud.t 
"You  may  rest  assured,"  wrote  Captain  Malcolm,  from 
Ispahan,  in  October,  1800,  ''that  Zemaun  Shah  can  do 
nothing  in  India  before  the  setting  in  of  the  rains  of  1801. 
He  has  not  time,  even  if  he  had  the  power  for  such  an 

*  "  Captain  Malcolm,"  he  wrote  to  the  Secret  Committee,  "returned 
from  his  embassy  in  the  month  of  May,  after  having  completely  suc- 
ceeded in  accomplishing  every  object  of  his  mission,  and  in  establishing 
a  connection  with  the  government  of  the  Persian  Empire,  which 
promises  to  the  interests  of  the  British  nation  in  India  political  and 
commercial  advantages  of  the  most  important  description." — [MS, 
Becords.] 

t  A  writer  in  the  Calcutta  Review,  who  betrays  an  acquaintance 
with  his  subject  such  as  could  only  have  been  acquired  in  the  countries 
of  which  he  writes,  or  by  the  examination  of  an  immense  mass  of  con- 
temporary records,  justly  observes  :  "  That  the  storm  was  dissipated 
in  the  manner  suggested  by  Lord  Wellesley  was  creditable  to  his  lord- 
ship's foresight,  but  was  entirely  independent  of  his  measures.  The 
second  expedition  of  Futteh  Ali  Khan  into  Khorassan  in  1800,  which 
drew  Shah  Zemaun  from  Candahar  to  Herat,  took  place  almost  simul- 
taneously with  Captain  Malcolm's  journey  from  the  south  of  Persia  to 
the  capital.  His  majesty  received  the  British  mission  at  Subzewar  ;  and 
the  subsequent  proceedings  of  Shah  Mahmood,  which  led,  in  the  sequel, 
to  his  dethronement,  so  far  from  originating  in  British  instigation  or 
in  Persian  support,  were  in  reality  indebted  for  their  success  to  their 
entire  independence  of  all  foreign  aid.  As  the  minion  of  Persia,  Shah 
Mahmood  could  never  have  prevailed  against  his  elder  brother.  As 
the  popular  Douranee  champion  he  was  irresistible." — [Calcutta 
Review,  vol.  xii.]  Malcolm  was  at  Shiraz  in  June,  1800,  when  he 
leceived  intelligence  of  the  Shah's  successes  in  Khorassan. 


PROGRESS   OF   THE   PERSIAN   MISSION.  7 

attempt ;  and  by  the  blessing  of  God  he  will  for  some 
years  to  come  be  too  much  engaged  in  this  quarter  to 
think  of  any  other."*  But  some  years  to  come  of  empire 
he  was  not  destined  to  see.  Even  as  Malcolm  wrote,  the 
days  of  his  sovereignty  were  numbered,  and  the  bugbear 
of  Afghan  invasion  was  passing  into  tradition. 

The  envoy  was  empowered  either  to  offer  a  subsidy  of 
from  three  to  four  lakhs  of  rupees  for  a  term  of  three 
years,  or  by  a  liberal  distribution  of  presents  to  the  king 
and  his  principal  ministers,  to  bribe  them  into  acqui- 
escence. Malcolm  chose  the  latter  course.  He  threw 
about  his  lai-gesses  with  an  unstinting  hand,  and  every- 
thing went  smoothly  with  him.  The  farther  he  advanced 
into  the  interior,  the  greater  was  the  attention  shown  to 
the  Mission,  for  the  greater  was  the  renown  of  the 
liberality  of  the  Christian  Elchee.  Every  difficulty 
melted  away  beneath  the  magic  touch  of  British  gold.t 
There  had  been  at  the  outset  some  trifling  disputes  about 
formalities — about  titles  and  designations — but  these 
were  soon  cleared  away ;  and  the  serious  business  of  the 
Mission  proceeded  in  the  midst  of  feasts  and  formalities 
to  a  satisfactory  completion.  A  commercial  and  a  political 
treaty  were  negotiated  at  Teheran  by  Malcolm  and  Hadjee 
Ibrahim ;  and  the  Shah  stamped  their  validity  by  prefix- 
ing to   each  a  firman,  or  mandate,  under  the  royal  seal, 

*  MS.  Correspondence  of  Sir  John  Malcolm, 
f  Before  Malcolm  left  Shiraz  he  began  to  have  some  misgivings  on 
the  score  of  his  lavish  expenditure.  "I  trust  I  will  not  disappoint 
your  hopes,"  he  writes  from  that  place,  under  date  July  26,  1800, 
'*  but  the  expense  I  have  incurred  is  heavy,  audit  is  on  that  score 
alone  I  am  alarmed.  Not  that  it  is  one  farthing  more  than  I  have  to 
the  best  of  my  judgment  thought  necessary  to  answer,  or  rather 
further,  the  ends  of  my  mission,  and  to  support  the  dignity  of  the 
British  Government ;  but  people  sometimes  differ  in  their  opinions 
on  such  points.  However,  *  All's  well  that  ends  well.'  " — [MS.  Corre- 
spondence of  Sir  John  Malcolm.] 


8      SHAH  ZEMAUN  AND  THE  DOURANEE  EMPIRE. 

calling  upon  all  the  officers  of  the  state  to  perform  its 
prescribed  conditions.  Of  all  the  terms  proposed  by  the 
English  envoy,  but  one  was  demurred  to  by  the  Persian 
Court.  "  And  that  even,"  writing  some  years  afterwards, 
he  said,  "  was  not  rejected."*  This  proposal  related  to  the 
occupation  by  the  English  of  the  islands  of  Kishm, 
Angani,  and  Khargh  (or  Kharrack),t  in  the  Persian  Gulf, 
on  the  expediency  of  which,  though  much  and  ably  con- 
troverted by  others,  Malcolm  never  ceased  to  expati- 
ate so  long  as  he  had  a  hand  in  the  game  of  Persian 
diplomacy. 

This  provision,  which  was  to  have  been  contained  in  the 
commercial  treaty,  was  said  to  contemplate  only  com- 
mercial objects;  but,  there  was  to  be  a  permission  to 
fortify ;  and  commerce,  with  an  occasional  permission  of 
this  kind,  had  made  India  a  British  dependency,  and 
the  Persians  were  not  unreasonably  jealous,  therefore, 
of  a  commencement  which  might  have  had  a  similar 
end. 

In  February,  1801,  Captain  Malcolm  reported  that  he 
had  accomplished  the  object  of  his  mission,  and  brought 
his  labours  to  a  close.  "  Whether  with  credit  or  not," 
he  added  in  a  private  letter,  "  it  is  the  province  of  my 
superiors  to  judge.  I  can  only  say,  in  self-defence,  that 
I  have  done  as  much  as  I  was  able  ;  and  no  man  can  do 
more.  I  am  far  from  admiring  my  own  work,  or  con- 
sidering it  (as  termed  in  one  of  the  preambles)  a  beau- 
tiful image  in  the  mirror  of  perpetuity.  It  is,  on  the 
contrary,  I  know,  a  very  incorrect  performance  ;  and  I  can 
hope  it  to  meet  with  a  favourable  consideration  only  on 
the  groimds  of  the  difficulties  I  had  to  encounter  in  a 

*  Brigadier-General  Malcolm  to  Lord  Minto,  October,  1810. 

f  Kislim  is  a  large  island,  and  Angani  a  small  one  at  the  entrance 
of  the  Persian  Gulf.  They  properly  belonged  to  the  Arabs.  Kharrack 
is  at  the  further  end  of  the  Gulf,  nearly  opposite  Bushire. 


THE   ANTI-GALLICAN   TREATY.  9 

first  negotiation  with  a  government  not  two  stages  re- 
moved from  a  state  of  barbarism."* 

The  political  treaty,  indeed,  called  for  apology;  but  not 
on  the  grounds  indicated  in  this  deprecatory  letter.  It 
stipulated  that  if  ever  again  the  Douranee  monarch  should 
be  induced  to  attempt  the  invasion  of  Hindostan,  the 
King  of  Persia  should  be  bound  to  lay  waste,  with  a 
great  army,  the  country  of  the  Afghans ;  and  conclude 
no  peace  with  its  ruler  that  was  not  accompanied 
with  a  solemn  engagement  to  abstain  from  all  aggres- 
sions upon  the  English.  But  it  was  remarkable  chiefly 
for  the  bitterness  with  which  it  proscribed  the  French. 
"Should  an  army  of  the  French  nation,"  it  stated, 
"  actuated  by  design  and  deceit,  attempt  to  settle,  with 
a  view  of  establishing  themselves  on  any  of  the  islands 
or  shores  of  Persia,  a  conjoint  force  shall  be  appointed 
by  the  two  high  contracting  parties  to  act  in  co-operation, 
and  to  destroy  and  put  an  end  to  the  foundation  of  their 
treason."  The  firman  prefixed  to  this  treaty  contained  a 
passage  addi'essed  to  the  rulers  and  officers  of  the  ports, 
sea-coasts,  and  islands  of  Fars  and  Koorgistan,  saying, 
"  Should  ever  any  persons  of  the  French  nation  attempt 
to  pass  your  boundaries,  or  desire  to  establish  themselves 
either  on  the  shores  or  frontiers  of  the  kingdom  of  Persia, 

*  MS.  Correspondence. — In  another  letter  Malcolm  says:  "Had 
I  to  do  with  men  of  sense  and  moderation  I  should  not  fear,  but  I  have 
to  deal  with  a  race  that  are  possessed  of  neither."  The  necessity  of 
adopting  in  all  his  negotiations  the  most  flowery  language,  somewhat 
puzzled  him  at  first ;  hut  in  time  he  fell  into  the  right  vein  of  dis- 
course. On  one  occasion,  wishing  to  demonstrate  the  advantages  of 
simplicity  of  style,  he  produced  a  copy  of  an  Indian  treaty,  when 
the  Meerza,  after  reading  two  articles  of  it,  declared  that  he  would 
"give  in  his  resignation  to  his  sovereign  rather  than  that  such 
a  document  should  be  copied  into  the  records  of  the  office  over  which 
he  presided." 


10     SHAH  ZEMAUN  AND  THE  DOURANEE  EMPIRE. 

you  are  at  full  liberty  to  disgrace  and  slay  them."* 
These  proceedings  have  been  severely  censured  by  French 
writers,  and  even  English  politicians  have  declared  them 
to  be  "an  eternal  disgrace  to  our  Indian  diplomacy." 
But  those  were  days  when,  even  in  India,  men's  minds 
were  unhinged  and  unsettled,  and  their  ideas  of  right 
and  wrong  confounded  by  the  monstrosities  of  the  French 
revolution.  It  would  be  unjust  to  view  these  measures 
with  the  eyes  of  to-day,  or  to  forget  the  desperate  evils 
to  which  these  desperate  remedies  were  applied.  It  was 
conceived  that  there  was  a  great  and  pressing  danger,  and 
Captain  Malcolm  was  sent  to  combat  it.  But  the  treaty 
was  never  formally  ratified  ;  and  the  Persian  Court  prac- 
tically ignored  its  obligations  as  soon  as  it  was  no  longer 
convenient  to  observe  them.  The  Embassy,  however, 
was  not  a  fruitless  one,  even  if  the  only  estimated  produce 
were  the  stores  of  information  it  amassed. 

Before  the  mission  of  Captain  Malcolm  to  the  West,  but 
little  was  known  in  India,  and  nothing  in  Great  Britain, 
about  the  Douranee  Empire,  the  nature  and  extent  of  its 
resources,  the  quality  of  its  soldiers,  and  the  character  of 
its  ruler.  The  information  which  that  officer  acquired 
was  not  of  a  very  alarming  description.  The  Douranee 
Empire  which  has  since  been  shorn  of  some  of  its  fairest 
provinces,  then  consisted  of  Afghanistan,  part  of  Kho- 
rassan.  Cashmere,  and  the  Derajat.  The  Sikh  nation  had 
not  then  acquired  the  strength  which  a  few  years  later 
enabled  it,  under  the  military  directorship  of  Runjeet 
Singh,  to  curb  the  pretensions  and  to  mutilate  the  empire 
of  its  dominant  neighbour.     That  empire  extended  from 

*  These  treaties,  which  have  never  been  officially  published,  are 
printed  for  the  first  time  I  believe  in  the  appendix  to  Vol.  I.,  "Life  of 
Sir  John  Malcolm." 


CHARACTER  OF  THE  AFGHANS.  11 

Herat  in  the  west,  to  Cashmere  in  the  east ;  from  northern 
Balkh  to  southern  Shikarpoor.  Bounded  on  the  north 
and  east  by  immense  mountain  ranges,  and  on  the  south 
and  west  by  vast  tracts  of  sandy  desert,  it  opposed  to 
external  hostility  natural  defences  of  a  formidable  cha- 
racter. The  general  aspect  of  the  country  was  wild  and 
forbidding ;  in  the  imagination  of  the  people  haunted  by 
goules  and  genii ;  but  not  unvaried  by  spots  of  gentler 
beauty  in  the  valleys  and  on  the  plains,  where  the  fields 
were  smiling  with  cultivation,  and  the  husbandman  might 
be  seen  busy  at  his  work. 

Few  and  far  between  as  were  the  towns,  the  kingdom 
was  thinly  populated.  The  people  were  a  race — or  a 
group  of  races — of  hardy,  vigorous  mountaineers.  The 
physical  character  of  the  country  had  stamped  itself  on 
the  moral  conformation  of  its  inhabitants.  Brave,  inde- 
pendent, but  of  a  turbulant  vindictive  character,  their 
very  existence  seemed  to  depend  upon  a  constant  succes- 
sion of  internal  feuds.  The  wisest  among  them  would 
probably  have  shaken  their  heads  in  negation  of  the 
adage — "  Happy  the  country  whose  annals  are  a  blank." 
They  knew  no  happiness  in  anything  but  strife.  It  was 
their  delight  to  live  in  a  state  of  chronic  warfare.  Among 
such  a  people  civil  war  has  a  natural  tendency  to  per- 
petuate itself  Blood  is  always  crying  aloud  for  blood. 
Revenge  was  a  virtue  among  them  ;  the  heritage  of  retri- 
bution passed  from  father  to  son ;  and  murder  became  a 
solemn  duty.  Living  under  a  dry,  clear,  bracing  climate, 
but  one  subject  to  considerable  alternations  of  heat  and 
cold,  the  people  were  strong  and  active ;  and  as  naviga- 
ble rivers  were  wanting,  and  the  precipitous  natm'e  of 
the  country  forbade  the  use  of  wheeled  carriages,  they 
were  for  the  most  part  good  horsemen,  and  lived  much 
in  the  saddle.  Early  trained  to  the  use  of  arms,  com- 
pelled constantly  to  wear  and  often  to  use  them  in  the 


12     SHAH  ZEMAUN  AND  THE  DOURANEE  EMPIRE. 

ordinary  intercourse  of  life,  every  man  was  more  or  less  a 
soldier  or  a  bandit.  The  very  shepherds  were  men  of 
strife.  The  pastoral  and  the  predatory  character  were 
strangely  blended;  and  the  tented  cantonments  of  the 
sheep-drivers  often  bristled  into  camps  of  war. 

But  there  was  a  brighter  side  to  the  picture.  Of  a 
cheerful,  lively  disposition,  seemingly  but  little  in  accord- 
ance with  the  outward  gravity  of  their  long  beards  and 
sober  garments,  they  might  be  seen  in  their  villages,  at 
evening  tide,  playing  or  dancing  like  children  in  their 
village  squares ;  or  assembling  in  the  Fakir's  gardens,  to 
smoke  and  talk,  retailing  the  news  gathered  in  the  shops, 
reciting  stories,  and  singing  their  simple  Afghan  ballads, 
often  expressive  of  that  tender  passion  which,  among 
them  alone  of  "all  Oriental  nations,  is  worthy  of  the  name 
of  love.  Hospitable  and  generous,  they  entertained  the 
stranger  without  stint,  and  even  his  deadliest  enemy  was 
safe  beneath  the  Afghan's  roof.  There  was  a  simple 
courtesy  in  their  manner  which  contrasted  favourably 
with  the  polished  insincerity  of  the  Persians  on  one  side, 
and  the  arrogant  ferocity  of  the  EohiUas  on  the  other. 
Judged  by  the  strict  standard  of  a  Christian  people,  they 
were  not  truthful  in  word  or  honest  in  deed,  but,  side  by 
side  with  other  Asiatic  nations,  their  truthfulness  and 
honesty  were  conspicuous.  Kindly  and  considerate  to 
their  immediate  dependents,  the  higher  classes  were  fol- 
lowed with  loyal  zeal  and  served  with  devoted  fidelity 
by  the  lower ;  and,  perhaps,  in  no  eastern  country  was 
less  of  tyranny  exercised  over  either  the  slaves  of  the 
household  or  the  inmates  of  the  zenana.  Unlettered 
were  they,  but  not  incurious ;  and  although  their  more 
polished  bretlu-en  of  Persia  looked  upon  them  as  the 
Boeotians  of  Central  Asia,  their  Spartan  simplicity  and 
manliness  more  than  compensated  for  the  absence  of 
the  Attic  wit  and  eloquence  of  their  western  neighbours. 


THE   PRODUCTS   OF   AFGHANISTAN.  13 

Soldiers,  husbandmen,  and  shepherds,  they  were  de- 
scribed as  the  very  antithesis  of  a  nation  of  shopkeepers. 
The  vocation  of  the  tradesman  they  despised.  To  Tau- 
jiks,  Hindoos,  and  other  aliens,  was  the  business  of  selling 
entrusted,  except  upon  that  large  scale  which  entitled 
the  dealer  to  be  regarded  as  a  merchant,  and  generally 
entailed  upon  him  the  necessities  of  a  wandering  and 
adventurous  life.  The  principal  commerce  of  the  country- 
was  with  the  Persian  and  Russian  states.  In  the  bazaars 
of  Herat,  Candahar,  and  Caubul  the  manufactures  of 
Ispahan,  Yezd,  and  Cashan,  the  spices  of  India,  and  the 
broad-cloths  of  Russia,  brought  by  Astrakan  and  Bokhara, 
foimd  a  ready  market.  Occasionally,  when  the  settled 
state  of  the  country  gave  encouragement  to  commercial 
enterprise,  an  adventurous  merchant  would  make  his 
way,  through  Dera  from  Bombay,  with  a  cafila  of  British 
goods,  for  the  scarlet  cloths  of  England  were  in  especial 
demand  to  deck  the  persons  of  the  body  servants  of  the 
king.  The  indigenous  products  of  the  country  were  few, 
but  important ;  for  the  rich  shawls  of  Cashmere  and  the 
gaudy  chintzes  of  Mooltan,  exported  in  large  quantities, 
were  in  good  repute  all  over  the  civilised  world.*  At 
Herat  some  velvets  and  taffetas  of  good  quality  were 
manufactured,  but  only  for  internal  consumption ;  whilst 
the  assafoetida  of  that  place,  the  madder  of  Candahar, 
and  the  indigo  of  the  Derajat,t  found  a  market  in  the 
Persian  cities,  and  the  dried  fruits  of  the  country  were 

*  There  was  a  considerable  trade  in  horses  ;  but  rather  through 
than  from  Afghanistan.  The  animals  were  brought  from  Balkh  and 
Toorkistan,  fattened  at  Caubul,  and  sold  in  India. 

t  "  Five  or  six  cafilas  of  this  indigo  leave  the  Derajat  annually, 
which  on  an  average  consist  of  seven  hundred  camels,  each  carrying 
eighty  Tabrizee  maunds.  These  come  into  Persia  by  the  route  of  Can- 
dahar and  Herat." — \Mahomed  SadilSs  Answers  to  Captain  Malcolm^ 
1800-1  (iWS.).] 


14     SHAH  ZEMAUN  AND  THE  DOUEANEE  EMPIRE. 

in  request  in  all  neighbouring  parts.  These,  a  few  other 
drugs  of  little  note,  and  some  iron  from  the  Hindoo 
Koosh  and  the  Solimanee  range,  formed  the  main  staple 
of  Afghan  commerce.  Between  the  large  towns  there 
was  a  constant  interchange  of  commodities;  and  long 
cafilas,  or  caravans,  were  ever  in  motion,  from  east  to 
west,  and  from  north  to  south,  toiling  across  the  sandy 
plains  or  struggling  through  the  precipitous  defiles, 
exposed  to  the  attacks  of  predatory  tribes,  who  levied 
their  contributions  often  not  without  strife  and  blood- 
shed. 

Such  was  the  not  very  flattering  picture  of  the  com- 
mercial wealth  of  the  Douranee  Empire,  which  was 
painted  by  Captain  Malcolm's  informants.  Nor  was  the 
military  strength  of  the  Empire  set  forth  in  any  more 
striking  colours.  Distance  and  ignorance  had  vastly 
magnified  the  true  proportions  of  that  famous  military- 
power,  which  was  to  have  overrun  Hindostan,  and  driven 
the  white  men  into  the  sea.  The  main  strength  of  the 
Afghan  army  was  in  the  Douranee  horse.  The  Doura- 
nee tribes  had  been  settled  in  Western  Afghanistan  by 
Nadir  Shah.  He  had  first  conquered,  then  taken  them 
into  his  service,  and  then  parcelled  out  amongst  them,  as 
his  military  dependents,  the  lands  which  had  before  been 
held,  by  a  motley  race  of  native  cultivators.  It  was  the 
policy  of  Ahmed  Shah  and  his  successors — a  policy  which 
was  subsequently  reversed  by  the  Barukzye  sirdars — to 
aggrandise  and  elevate  these  powerful  tribes,  by  heaping 
upon  them  privileges  and  immunities  at  the  expense  of 
their  less  favoured  countrymen.  Upon  the  misery  and 
humiliation  of  others,  the  Douranee  tribes  throve  and 
flourished.  The  chief  offices  of  the  state  were  divided 
amongst  them ;  they  held  their  lands  exempt  from  taxa- 
tion. The  only  demand  made  upon  them,  in  return  for 
the  privileges  they  enjoyed,  was  that  they  should  furnish 


THE   DOURANEE  ARMY.  15 

a  certain  contingent  of  troops.*  It  was  said  to  be  the 
principle  of  the  miUtary  tenure  by  which  they  held  their 
lands,  that  for  every  plough  used  in  cultivation  t  they 
should  contribute  a  hoi-seman  for  the  service  of  the  state. 
But  it  does  not  appear  that  the  integrity  of  this  system 
was  long  preserved.  In  a  little  time  there  ceased  to  be 
any  just  proportion  between  the  ploughs  and  the  horse- 
men ;  and  it  became  difficult  to  account  for  the  arbitrary 
manner  in  which  each  of  the  different  Douranee  clans 
furnished  its  respective  quota  of  troops.  J 

In  the  time  of  Ahmed  Shah  the  Douranee  horsemen 
mustered  about  6000  strong.  The  other  western  tribes 
and  the  Persian  stipendiaries  together  reached  about  the 
same  number.  In  the  reign  of  Timour  Shah,  the  army 
was  compiited  at  some  40,000  soldiers,  almost  entirely 
horsemen  ;  §  but  no  such  force  had  served  under  Zemaun 

*  And  even  this  obligation  ceased  to  be  recognised  by  Ahmed  Shah, 
who  paid  the  Douranee  horsemen  for  their  services,  alleging  that  their 
lands  had  been  bestowed  upon  them  as  a  free  and  unencumbered  gift. 
In  Zemaun  Shah's  time  they  held  pay-certificates,  available  when  they 
were  called  out  on  active  service,  and  realised,  if  they  could,  the 
amount  due  to  them  by  means  of  orders  on  Cashmere,  Mooltan,  and 
other  outlying  provinces. — [MS.  Records — JtawUnson  and  Malcolm.] 

t  Or,  more  strictly,  for  every  parcel  of  land  demanding  the  services 
of  a  single  Jculba,  or  plough  ;  from  which  the  division  of  land,  and  the 
assessment  founded  upon  it,  took  its  name.  c 

X  To  an  elaborate  report  on  the  revenue  system  of  Western  Afghan- 
istan, especially  as  affecting  the  Douranee  tribes,  drawn  up  by  Major 
Rawlinson  in  1842,  I  am  indebted  for  much  valuable  information, 
which  will  be  found  incorporated  with  subsequent  portions  of  the 
narrative. 

§  The  authority  for  this,  according  to  Malcolm's  informant,  was  the 
Caubul  records.  Forster,  who  travelled  in  Afghanistan  in  the  reign  of 
Timour  Shah,  says  that  his  entire  army  did  not  exceed  30, 000  men,  nor  his 
revenue  a  million  of  our  money.  How  these  men  contrived  to  pay  them- 
selves, may  be  gathered  from  a  passage  in  Forster's  Travels,  which  is 
worth  transcribing  :  "  This  day  a  body  of  Afghan  cavalry  encamped  in  the 
environs  of  Akorah,  and  overspread  the  country  like  a  swarm  of  locusts, 


16     SHAH  ZEMAUN  AND  THE  DOURANEE  EMPIRE. 

Shah,  and  they  who  had  seen  in  1799-1800,  the  muster 
of  his  troops  near  Caubul,  and  had  access  to  the  returns 
of  the  muster-masters,  reported  that  he  then  assembled 
only  some  ten  or  twelve  thousand  men,  and  all,  with  the 
exception  of  a  few  Persian  stipendiaries,  in  the  immediate 
service  of  the  Wuzeer,  very  miserably  equipped.  Even 
the  Kuzzilbashes,  when  Shah  Zemaun  took  the  field  in 
1799,  refused  to  accompany  the  projected  expedition,  on 
the  plea  that  they  wanted  arms  to  fight  their  battles,  and 
money  to  support  their  wives. 

Fighting  men,  indeed,  were  never  wanting  in  Afghan- 
istan, but  money  was  wanting  to  induce  them  to  leave 
their  homes.  It  was  said  that  Shah  Zemaun  might,  on 
any  great  national  enterprise,  have  led  200,000  men  into 
the  field,  if  he  had  had  money  to  pay  them.  But  his 
entire  revenues  were  not  equal  to  the  payment  of  a  very 
much  smaller  force.  He  was  continually  being  deserted 
by  his  soldiery,  at  critical  times,  for  want  of  the  sinews  of 
war  to  retain  them.  The  emptiness  of  his  treasury, 
indeed,  reduced  him  to  all  kinds  of  shifts  and  expedients, 
such  as  that  of  raising  the  value  of  the  current  coin  of  the 
realm.  But  no  devices  of  this  character  could  confer 
upon  him  a  really  formidable  army.  In  one  important 
branch  he  was  miserably  deficient.  The  Douranee  artillery 
consisted  of  some  twelve  brass  field-pieces  and  five  hundred 
zumboorucks,  or  camel  gims.     Even  these  were  miserably 

devouring  and  destroying  wherever  they  went.  It  seemed  as  if  the 
land  was  invaded  ;  they  entered  in  a  violent  manner  every  village 
within  their  scope,  and  fed  themselves  and  horses  at  the  expense  of  the 
inhabitants.  Such  expeditions  afford  these  hungry  creatures  almost 
the  only  means  of  subsistence  ;  for  when  inactive,  they  are  often  re- 
duced to  such  distress  by  the  blind  parsimony  of  their  prince,  that 
their  horses,  arms,  and  clothes,  are  sold  for  a  livelihood."  The  same 
writer,  speaking  generally  of  the  Afghan  army,  says  that  he  ' '  felt  a 
sensible  disappointment  at  seeing  it  composed  of  a  tumultuous  body, 
without  order  or  common  discipline." 


CHARACTER  OF  SHAH  ZEMAUN.  17 

equipped ;  the  camels  wanted  drivers,  and  the  guns  were 
often  unsendceable.  It  was  said  by  one  who  visited  the 
encampment  of  the  grand  army,  under  Zemaun  Shah,  in 
1799-1800,  that  there  were  not  above  500  good  horses  in 
camp,  and  that  these  belonged  principally  to  the  King 
and  the  Wuzeer.  The  men  were  mounted  for  the  most 
part  on  yaboos,  or  ponies,  few  of  which,  at  a  liberal 
valuation,  were  worth  a  hundred  rupees. 

Such  was  the  army  with  which  Zemaun  Shah  meditated 
the  invasion  of  Hindostan.  The  personal  character  of  the 
monarch  was  not  more  formidable  than  the  army  which 
he  commanded.  A  scholar  more  than  a  soldier,  very 
strict  in  the  observances  of  his  religion,  and  an  assiduous 
reader  of  the  Koran,  his  way  of  life,  judged  by  the 
princely  standard  of  Central  Asia,  was  sufficiently  moral 
and  decorous.  Humane  and  generous,  of  a  gentle,  plastic 
disposition ;  very  prone  to  take  for  granted  the  truth  of 
all  that  was  told  him ;  by  no  means  remarkable  for  per- 
sonal activity,  and  somewhat  wanting  in  courage,  he  was 
designed  by  nature  for  a  facile  puppet  in  the  hands  of  a 
crafty  Wuzeer.  And  such  was  Zemaun  Shah  in  the 
expert  hands  of  WufFadar  Khan.  It  was  reported  of  him 
that  he  took  no  active  part  in  the  management  of  pubHc 
affairs ;  and  that  when  it  was  politic  that  he  should  make 
a  show  of  government  and  appear  at  Durbar,  what  he  said 
was  little  more  than  a  pubhc  recital  of  a  lesson  well  learnt 
in  private.  He  was,  indeed,  the  mere  mouth-piece  of  the 
minister — of  a  worse  and  more  designing  man.  Content 
with  the  gilded  externals  of  majesty,  he  went  abroad 
sumptuously  arrayed  and  magnificently  attended;  and 
mighty  in  all  the  state  papers  of  the  time  was  the  name 
of  Zemaun  Shah.  But  it  was  shrewdly  suspected  that, 
had  the  state  of  his  domestic  relations  and  the  military 
resources  at  his  command  enabled  him  to  take  the  field, 
as  the  invader  of  Hindostan,  a  bribe  any  day  ofi'ered  to 

VOL.  I.  0 


18     SHAH  ZEMAUN  AND  THE  DOURANEE  EMPIRE. 

the  Wuzeer  might  have  broken  up  the  Douranee  anny, 
and  kept  the  invader  quietly  at  home. 

On  the  whole,  he  was  a  popular  ruler.  The  cultivating 
classes  were  happy  under  his  government.  It  recognised 
their  claims  to  remuneration  for  whatever  was  taken  from 
them  for  the  service  of  the  state,  and  no  acts  of  fraud 
and  oppression  were  ever  committed  in  his  name.  The 
merchants  and  traders  were  secure  under  his  rule.  In 
the  midst  of  much  that  was  base  and  unworthy  in  the 
character  and  conduct  of  the  minister,  he  had  a  repu- 
tation for  fair  dealing  with  these  classes,  and  they  looked 
up  to  him  for  protection.  But  far  otherwise  were  his 
relations  with  the  warlike  tribes  and  the  chief  people  of 
the  empire.  They  were  not  without  feelings  of  loyalty 
towards  the  king ;  but  it  was  rather  affection  for  his 
person,  than  satisfaction  with  the  government  of  which 
he  was  the  head.  The  grasping  character  of  the  minister, 
who  engrossed  to  himself  all  the  patronage  of  the  state, 
rendered  him,  in  spite  of  his  courteous  manners  and 
affable  demeanour,  obnoxious  to  the  principal  Sirdars ; 
and  something  of  this  disaffection  began  in  time  to  be 
directed  against  the  monarch  himself,  who  had  too  long 
abandoned  his  own  better  nature  to  the  sinister  guidance 
of  the  unprincipled  and  unpopular  Wuzeer. 

Like  many  a  monarch,  abler  and  better  than  himself, 
Zemaun  Shah  had  chosen  his  minister  unwisely,  and  was 
undone  by  the  choice.  When  he  entrusted  the  affairs  of 
his  empire  to  the  administration  of  Wuffadar  Khan,  he 
made  the  great  mistake  of  his  life.  A  base  and  designing 
man,  without  any  of  those  commanding  quahties  which 
impart  something  of  dignity  and  heroism  to  crime,  the 
Wuzeer  bent  his  sovereign,  but  could  not  bfend  circum- 
stances to  his  will.  The  loyalty  of  the  Douranee  sirdars 
he  could  extinguish,  but  their  power  he  could  not  break 
by  tis  oppressions.    Alarmed  at  their  increasing  influence, 


FUTTEH    KHAN   AND   THE   BARUKZYES.  19 

WufFadar  Khan  sought  to  encompass  them  in  the  toils  of 
destruction;  but  he  destroyed  himself  and  involved  his 
sovereign  in  the  ruin.  Prince  Mahmoud  was  in  arms 
against  his  royal  brother.  Exasperated  by  the  conduct 
of  the  minister,  the  Douranees  threw  all  the  weight  of 
their  influence  into  the  scales  in  favour  of  the  prince. 
The  rebellion  which  they  headed  acquired  streng-th  and 
swelled  into  a  revolution.  And  then  began  that  great 
strife  between  the  royal  princes  and  the  Douranee  sirdars, 
which  half  a  century  of  continued  conflict,  now  witnessing 
the  supremacy  of  the  one,  now  of  the  other,  has  scarcely 
even  yet  extinguished. 

The  two  principal  clans  or  tribes  of  the  Douranees  were 
the  Populzyes  and  the  Bai-ukzyes.  The  Suddozye,  or 
Royal  race,  was  one  of  the  branches  of  the  former.  The 
Bamezye,  in  which  the  Wuzeership  was  vested,  but  not 
by  inalienable  right,  was  another  branch  of  the  same  tribe. 
Second  in  influence  to  the  Populzyes,  and  greater  in 
extent,  was  the  tribe  of  the  Barukzyes.  To  this  tribe 
belonged  Futteh  Khan.  He  was  the  son  of  Poyndah 
Khan,  an  able  statesman  and  a  gallant  soldier,  whose 
wisdom  in  council  and  experience  in  war  had  long  sus- 
tained the  tottering  fortunes  of  Timour  Shah.  On  the 
death  of  that  feeble  monarch  he  had  supported  the  claims 
of  Zemaun  Shah.  With  as  little  wisdom  as  gratitude, 
that  prince,  it  has  been  seen,  suffered  himself  to  be 
cajoled  by  a  man  of  less  honesty  and  less  ability,  and 
became  a  tool  in  the  hands  of  Wuffadar  Khan.  The 
favourite  of  two  monarchs  was  disgraced;  and,  from  a 
powerful  friend,  became  the  resolute  enemy  of  the  reigning 
family.  He  conspired  against  the  King  and  the  Wuzeer ; 
his  designs  were  detected ;  and  he  perished  miserably  with 
his  associates  in  the  enterprise  of  treason. 

Poyndah  Khan  died,  leaving  twenty-one  sons,  of  whom 
Futteh  Khan  was  the  eldest.     They  are  said,  after  the 

c  2 


20     SHAH  ZEMAUN  AND  THE  DOURANEE  EMPIRE. 

death  of  their  father,  to  have  stooped  into  a  cloud  of 
poverty  and  humihation,  and  to  have  wandered  about 
begging  their  bread.  But  their  trials  were  only  for  a 
season.  The  Barukzye  brothers  soon  emerged  from  the 
night  of  suffering  that  surrounded  them.  There  was  no 
power  in  the  Douranee  Empire  which  could  successfully 
cope  with  these  resolute,  enterprising  spirits.  In  Afghan- 
istan revenge  is  a  virtue.  The  sons  of  Pojnidah  Khan 
had  the  murder  of  their  father  to  avenge  ;  and  they  rested 
not  till  the  bloody  obligation  had  been  faithfully  fulfilled. 
Futteh  Khan  had  fled  into  Persia,  and  there  leagued 
himself  with  Prince  Mahmoud.  Repeated  failure  had 
extinguished  the  ambition  of  this  restless  prince.  The 
accession  of  the  Barukzye  sirdar  now  inspired  him  with 
new  courage.  Upheld  by  the  strong  arm  of  the  "  king- 
maker," he  determined  to  strike  another  blow  for  the 
sovereignty  of  Caubul.  With  a  few  horsemen  they 
entered  Afghanistan,  and,  raising  the  standard  of  revolt, 
pushed  on  to  unexpected  conquest. 

There  were  not  many  in  Afghanistan,  nor  many  among 
the  disinterested  lookers-on  at  that  fraternal  strife,  who 
were  inclined  to  jeopardise  their  character  for  sagacity  by 
predicting  the  success  of  the  prince.  Everything,  indeed, 
was  against  him.  His  treasury  was  always  empty.  His 
friends  were  nut  men  of  note.  With  the  exception  of  the 
Barukzye  sirdars,*  no  chiefs  of  influence  espoused  his 
cause.  His  followers  were  described  to  Captain  Malcolm 
as  men  "  of  low  condition  and  mean  extraction."     But  in 

*  And  even  the  character  of  Futteh  Khan  was  at  that  time  very- 
little  understood  and  appreciated.  He  was  described  to  Captain 
Malcolm  as  a  man  of  influence,  but  of  low,  dissipated  habits,  who 
spent  all  his  time  in  drinking  wine  and  in  smoking  bang.  It  should  be 
mentioned  that  Prince  Ferooz,  Mahmoud' s  brother,  was  associated  in 
this  enterprise.  He  became  master  of  Herat,  whilst  Mahmoud  pushed 
on  to  Candahar. 


SUCCESSES   OF   PRINCE   MAHMOUD.  21 

spite  of  the  slender  support  which  he  received,  and  the 
strenuous  efforts  which  were  made  to  destroy  him,  the 
successes  which  from  time  to  time  he  achieved,  seemed  to 
show  that  there  was  some  vitaUty  in  his  cause.  A  divinity 
seemed  to  hedge  him  in,  and  to  protect  him  from  the 
knife  of  the  assassin.  He  escaped  as  though  by  a  miracle 
the  snares  of  his  enemies,  and  from  every  new  deliverance 
seemed  to  gather  something  of  prosperity  and  strength. 
It  was  after  one  of  these  mai'vellous  escapes,  when  the 
weapons  of  the  Kuzzilbashes  *  had  fallen  from  their  hands, 
palsied  by  the  mysterious  presence  of  the  blood  royal, 
that  Candahar  fell  before  the  insurgents.  With  two  or 
three  thousand  horsemen,  Mahmoud  invested  the  place 
for  thirty-three  days,  at  the  end  of  which  Futteh  Khan, 
with  a  handful  of  resolute  men,  escaladed  the  fort  near 
the  Shikarpoor  gate,  and  put  the  panic-struck  garrison 
to  flight.  The  Meer  Akhoor,  or  Master  of  the  Horse,  fled 
for  his  life.  The  Shah-zadah  Hyder  sought  sanctuary  at 
the  tomb  of  Ahmed  Shah;  and  Prince  Mahmoud  became 
master  of  the  place. 

It  is  not  a  peculiarity  of  Eastern  princes  alone  to 
shine  with  a  brighter  and  steadier  light  in  the  hour  of 
adversity  than  in  the  hour  of  success.  The  trials  of 
prosperity  were  too  great  for  Prince  Mahmoud,  as  they 
have  been  for  greater  men ;  and  he  soon  began  to  lose 
ground  at  Candahar.  The  marvel  is,  that  his  fortunes 
were  not  utterly  marred  by  his  own  folly.  It  was  only 
by  the  concurrence  of  greater  folly  elsewhere,  that  in  this 
conjecture  he  was  saved  from  ruin.  His  impolitic  and 
haughty  conduct  towards  the  sirdars  early  demonstrated 
his  unfitness  for  rule,  and  well-nigh  precipitated  the  enter- 
prise in  which  he  was  engaged  into  a  sea  of  disastrous 

*  The  Kuzzilbashes,  of  whom  frequent  mention  will  be  made  in  the 
course  of  this  narrative,  are  Persian  settlers  in  Afghanistan  ;  many  of 
whom  are  retained  in  the  military  service  of  the  state. 


22  SHAH  ZEMAUN  AND  THE  DOURANEE  EMPIRE. 

failure.  There  seemed,  indeed,  to  be  only  one  thing 
that  could  sustain  him,  and  that  one  thing  was  wanting. 
He  was  as  poor  as  he  was  unpopular.  But  the  days  of 
Shah  Zemaun's  sovereignty  were  numbered,  and  no  folly 
on  the  part  of  his  antagonist  could  arrest  the  doom  that 
was  brooding  over  him. 

At  this  time  Zemaun  Shah  was  on  his  way  towards 
the  borders  of  Hindostan.  He  had  advanced  as  far  as 
Peshawur,  when  intelligence  of  the  fall  of  Candahar 
reached  his  camp.  It  was  believed  that  he  had  little 
actual  design  of  advancing  beyond  the  Sutlej.  Partly 
with  a  view  of  enforcing  the  payment  of  the  Sindh  tribute 
— partly  to  overawe  the  Sikhs,  and  partly  to  abstract  his 
own  army  from  the  dangerous  vicinity  of  Candahar  and 
the  corrupting  influences  to  which  in  such  a  neighbour- 
hood it  was  exposed,  he  had  made  this  move  to  the  south- 
ward. It  was  very  obvious  that,  in  such  a  condition  of 
his  own  empire,  all  idea  of  invading  Hindostan  was 
utterly  wild  and  chimerical.  If  such  an  idea  had  ever 
been  formed,  it  was  now  speedily  abandoned.  All  other 
considerations  gave  place  to  the  one  necessity  of  saving 
his  kingdom  from  the  grasp  of  his  brother.  He  hastened 
back  to  Western  Afghanistan ;  but  an  impolitic  expedi- 
tion under  the  prince  Soojah-ool-Moolk,  who  was  soon 
destined  to  play  a  conspicuous  part  in  the  great  Central- 
Asian  drama,  had  crippled  his  military  resoiu-ces,  and 
when  he  retraced  his  steps,  he  found  that  the  strength  of 
Prince  Mahmoud  had  increased  as  his  own  had  dimi- 
nished. He  marched  against  the  rebels  only  to  be  de- 
feated. The  main  body  of  the  royal  troops  was  under 
the  command  of  one  Ahmed  Khan,  a  chief  of  the  Noor- 
zye  tribe.  Watching  his  opportunity,  Futteh  Khan 
seized  the  person  of  the  Sirdar's  brother,  and  threatened 
to  destroy  him  if  the  chief  refused  to  come  over  bodily 
with   his   troops  and  swell  the  ranks  of  the  insurgents. 


FALL    OF   ZEMAUN    SHAH.  23 

The  character  of  the  Barukzye  leader  certified  that  this 
was  no  idle  threat.  Ahmed  Khan,  already  wavering  in 
his  loyalty,  for  the  conduct  of  the  Wuzeer  had  alienated 
his  heart  from  the  royal  cause,  at  once  made  his  election. 
When  the  troops  of  Shah  Zemaun  came  up  with  the  ad- 
vance of  the  rebel  army,  he  joined  the  insurgent  force. 
From  that  time  the  cause  of  the  royalists  became  hope- 
less. Disaster  followed  disaster  till  its  ruin  was  complete. 
The  minister  and  his  master  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
enemy.  WufFadar  Khan,  with  his  brothers,  was  put  to 
death.  Death,  too,  awaited  the  king — ^but  the  man  was 
suffered  to  live.  They  doomed  him  only  to  political  ex- 
tinction. There  is  a  cruel,  but  a  sure  way  of  achieving 
this  in  all  Mahomedan  coimtries.  Between  a  blind  king 
and  a  dead  king  there  is  no  political  difference.  The 
eyes  of  a  conquered  monarch  are  punctured  with  a  lancet, 
and  he  de  facto  ceases  to  reign.  They  blinded  Shah 
Zemaun,  and  cast  him  into  prison;  and  the  Douranee 
Empire  owned  Shah  Mahmoud  as  its  head. 

So  fell  Zemaim  Shah,  the  once  dreaded  Afghan  monarch, 
whose  threatened  invasion  of  Hindostan  had  for  years  been 
a  ghastly  phantom  haunting  the  Council-Chamber  of  the 
British-Indian  Government.  He  survived  the  loss  of  his 
sight  nearly  half  a  century  \  and  as  the  neglected  pen- 
sioner of  Loodhianah,  to  the  very  few  who  could  remem- 
berer the  awe  which  his  name  once  inspired,  must  have 
presented  a  ciu-ious  spectacle  of  fallen  greatness — an  illus- 
tration of  the  mutability  of  human  affairs  scarcely  paral- 
leled in  the  history  of  the  world.  He  died  at  last  full 
of  years,  empty  of  honours,  his  death  barely  worth  a 
newspaper-record  or  a  paragraph  in  a  state  paper. 
Scarcely  identified  in  men's  minds  with  the  Zemaun 
Shah  of  the  reigns  of  Sir  John  Shore  and  Lord  Wellesley, 
he  lived  an  appendage,  alike  in  prosperity  and  adversity, 
to  his  younger  brother,  Soojah-ool-Moolk.     That  Soojah 


24     SHAH  ZEMAUN  AND  THE  DOURANEE  EMPIRE. 

had  once  been  reputed  and  described  as  an  appendage  to 
Shah  Zemaun — "his  constant  companion  at  all  times." 
They  soon  came  to  change  places,  and  in  a  country  where 
fraternal  strife  is  the  rule  and  not  the  exception,  it  is 
worthy  of  record  that  those  brothers  were  true  to  each 
other  to  the  last.* 

*  Since  this  passage  was  -written,  I  have  had  reason  to  think  that 
it  ought  to  be  accepted  with  some  qualification.  In  October,  1840, 
when  Dost  Mahomed  was  flitting  about  the  Kohistan,  and  the  greatest 
anxiety  prevailed  among  our  political  officers  at  Caubul,  Shah  Soojah 
said  to  Sir  William  Macnaghten,  just  as  he  was  takiag  leave  after  an 
excited  conference,  "  You  know  I  have  from  the  first  expressed  to  you 
a  mean  opinion  of  my  own  countrymen.  If  you  want  further  proof, 
look  at  that  from  my  own  brother."  The  Shah  then  showed  Mac- 
naghten an  intercepted  letter,  bearing  the  seal  of  Shah  Zemaun,  to  the 
address  of  Sultan  Mahomed  Barukzye,  purposing  that,  as  Shah  Soojah 
had  made  over  the  country  to  the  infidels,  the  Barukzyes  and  the  Sikhs 
united  should  make  him  (Shah  Zemaun)  King  of  Afghanistan. — [Un- 
published Correspondence  of  Sir  W.  H.  Macnaghten.]  This  story 
may  seem  to  be  at  variance  with  the  statement  in  the  preceding  page, 
— that  **  between  a  blind  king  and  a  dead  king  there  is  no  political 
difference  ; "  but  I  am  acquainted  with  no  Mahomedan  law  that  ex- 
cludes a  blind  prince  from  the  throne.  The  exclusion  is  based  upon  the 
popular  assumption  that  blindness  disqualifies  a  man  from  managing 
the  affairs  of  an  empire.  If,  however,  in  Mahomedarf  countries,  there 
have  been  no  exceptions  to  this  rule — of  which  I  am  doubtful — in  the 
regal  line,  it  is  certain  that  many  provincial  governments  have  been  in 
the  hands  of  men  who  have  been  deprived  of  their  sight.  The  case  of 
Shah  Allum,  the  blind  King  of  Delhi,  is  hardly  to  the  point ;  for  during 
the  years  of  his  darkness,  his  royalty  was  only  a  name. 


25 


CHAPTER  II.  • 

[1801—1808.] 

The  Early  Days  of  Soojah-ool-Moolk — Disastrous  Commencement  of  his 
Career — Defeat  of  Shah  Mahmoud — Reign  of  Shah  Soojah — The 
Insurrection  of  Prince  Kaysur — Tidings  of  the  British  Mission. 

From  the  fall  of  Zemaun  Shah  we  are  to  date  the  rise 
of  Soojah-ool-Moolk.  They  were  l^rothers  by  the  same 
father  and  mother.  At  the  time  of  the  political  extinc- 
tion of  the  elder,  the  younger  was  about  twenty  years 
of  age.  He  had  taken  no  part  in  the  government ;  was 
but  lightly  esteemed  for  courage  ;  and  had  little  place  in 
the  thoughts  of  the  people,  except  as  an  appendage  of 
the  reigning  monarch.  In  command  of  the  royal  troops, 
and  in  charge  of  the  family  and  property  of  the  king, 
whilst  Zemaun  Shah  was  striking  a  last  blow  for  empire 
in  the  West,  he  had  held  his  post  at  Peshawur.  There 
he  received  the  disastrous  tidings  of  the  fate  that  had 
descended  upon  his  brother  and  his  prince.  He  at  once 
proclaimed  himself  king,  began  to  levy  troops,  and  in 
September,  1801,  marched  upon  Caubul  with  an  army 
of  10,000  men.  Victorious  at  the  outset,  he  did  not 
improve  his  successes,  and  was  eventually  defeated  by 
the  Douranees  under  Futteh  Khan.  The  destmies  of 
princes  were  in  the  hands  of  the  powerful  Barukzye 
sirdar.  His  energies  and  his  influence  alone  upheld  the 
drooping  sovereignty  of  Shah  Mahmoud.  Weak  and 
unprincipled,  indolent  and  rapacious,  that  prince  had 
been  raised  to  the  throne  by  Futteh  Khan ;  and,  though 


26.  EARLY  DAYS  OF  SHAH  SOOJAH. 

it  was  not  in  the  nature  of  things  that  a  ruler  so  feeble 
and  so  corrupt  should  long  retain  his  hold  of  the  empire, 
for  a  while  the  strong  hand  of  the  minister  sustained  him 
in  his  place. 

Soojah-ool-Moolk  fled  to  the  fastnesses  of  the  Khybur 
Pass.  In  the  winter  of  1801  the  Ghilzyes  broke  out 
into  open  rebellion  against  the  Douranee  power ;  but 
were  defeated  with  great  slaughter.  The  Douranees  re- 
turned to  Caubul,  and  erected  from  the  heads  of  the 
conquered,  a  pyramid  of  human  skulls.  In  the  spring 
of  the  following  year  the  same  restless  tribe  was  again 
in  rebellion;  and  again  the  energies  of  Futteh  Khan 
were  put  forth  for  the  suppression  of  the  dangerous  spirit 
of  Ghilzye  revolt.  In  March,  1802,  the  insurgents  were 
a  second  time  chastised ;  and,  it  is  said,  on  the  same 
day,  Soojah-ool-Moolk,  who  had  raised  an  army  in  the 
Khybur  and  marched  upon  Peshawur,  sustained  a  severe 
defeat  at  the  hands  of  the  Douranee  garrison,  and  was 
driven  back  into  the  obscurity  from  which  he  had  fruit- 
lessly emerged. 

Thus  for  a  while  was  tranquillity  restored  to  the  Dou- 
ranee Empire.  Reading  and  conversing  with  learned 
men,  and  taking  council  with  his  military  adherents, 
Soojah-ool-Moolk,  from  the  time  of  his  defeat,  remained 
inactive  in  the  Afreedi  country.  Even  there  the  vigi- 
lant enmity  of  the  Wuzeer  tracked  the  unhappy  prince. 
There  was  no  security  in  such  retirement.  The  shadow 
of  Futteh  Khan  darkened  his  resting-place  and  disturbed 
his  repose.  He  fled  to  Shawl ;  and  there,  in  the  depth 
of  winter  and  on  the  verge  of  starvation,  wandered  about, 
making  vain  endeavours  to  subsist  himself  and  a  few 
followers  by  the  sale  of  the  royal  jewels.  Among  a 
people  little  understanding  the  worth  of  such  costly  arti- 
cles, purchasers  were  with  difficulty  to  be  found.  In  the 
extremity  which  then  beset  him  he  changed  the  character 


DECLINE    OF   SIIAH    MAHMOUD.  27 

of  the  pedlar  for  that  of  the  bandit,  and  levied  money 
by  plundering  caravans,  and  giving  notes  of  hand  for  the 
amount  that  he  raised.  In  this  manner  he  collected 
three  lakhs  of  rupees,  and  was  enabled  to  levy  troops  for 
an  attack  upon  Candahar.  But  Providence  did  not  smile 
upon  his  endeavours.  He  was  again  repulsed.  Again 
was  he  involved  in  a  great  ruin ;  with  little  hope  of  extri- 
cation by  the  energy  of  his  own  struggles,  or  the  inherent 
vitality  of  his  cause. 

But  in  the  mean  while  the  sovereignty  of  Shah  Mah- 
moud  was  falling  to  pieces  by  itself.  He  had  risen  upon 
the  weakness  of  his  predecessor,  and  now  by  his  own 
weakness  was  he  to  be  cast  down.  What  Shah  Zemaun 
had  done  for  him,  was  he  now  doing  for  Soojah-ool-Moolk. 
In  the  absence  of  Futteh  Khan,  the  Kuzzilbashes  were 
suffered  to  ride  roughshod  over  the  people.  The  ex- 
cesses which  they  committed  at  Caubtil,  scattered  the 
last  remnant  of  popularity  which  still  adhered  to  the 
peraon  of  the  king.  At  last  an  open  outbreak  occurred 
between  the  Sheeas  and  the  Soonees.  The  king  identified 
himself  with  the  former ;  some  of  his  chief  ministers 
with  the  latter.  In  this  conjuncture  Soojah-ool-Moolk 
was  sent  for  to  strengthen  the  hands  of  the  Shah's  oppo- 
nents. When  he  arrived,  he  found  Caubul  in  a  state  of 
siege.  Futteh  Khan  had  by  this  time  returned  to  aid  the 
royal  cause,  but  too  late  to  regain  the  gTound  that  had 
been  lost  in  his  absence.  There  was  an  engagement, 
which  lasted  from  morning  to  evening  prayer,  and  at  the 
end  of  which  Mahmoud  was  defeated.  Futteh  Khan  fled. 
Soojah-ool-Moolk  entered  Caubul  in  triumph ;  and  Mah- 
moud threw  himself  at  his  feet.*     To  him,   who  in  the 

*  This  was  in  July,  1803.  Shah  Soojah's  own  account  of  these  trans- 
actions, which  forms  part  of  the  autobiography  written  by  him  at 
Loodhianah  in  1826-27,  is  contained  in  the  following  words  : — "After 
our  arrival  at  Kazee,  we  had  scarcely  prepared  our  force,  when  Futteh 


28  .        EABLY  DAYS  OF  SHAH  SOOJAH. 

hour  of  victory  had  shown  no  mercy,  mercy  was  shown  in 
the  hour  of  defeat.  It  is  to  the  honour  of  Shah  Soojah 
that  he  forbore  to  secure  the  future  tranquillity  of  his 
empire,  by  committing  the  act  of  cruelty  which  had 
disgraced  the  accession  of  the  now  prostrate  Mahmoud. 
The  eyes  of  the  fallen  prince  were  spared :  and  years  of 
continued  intestine  strife  declared  how  impolitic  was  the 
act  of  mercy. 

For  from  this  time,  throughout  many  years,  the  strife 
between  the  royal  brothers  was  fierce  and  incessant.  In 
his  son  Kamran,  the  ex-King  Mahmoud  found  a  willing 
ally  and  an  active  auxiliary.  To  the  reigning  monarch 
it  was  a  period  of  endless  inquietude.  His  resources 
were  limited,  and  his  qualities  were  of  too  negative  a 
character   to  render  him  equal  to  the  demands  of  such 

Khan's  army  appeared  ;  our  troops  immediately  were  drawn  up  in  battle 
array,  and  an  attack  made  upon  them.  The  battle  lasted  from  the 
morning  to  the  evening  prayer,  when  the  enemy  gave  way,  and  re- 
treated in  great  disorder  to  the  valley  Advaz,  and  then  to  Kamran' s 
camp  in  Candahar,  where  the  drunkenness  of  the  Kuzzilbash  soldiery, 
and  the  ill-treatment  which  the  Soonee  doctors  received,  soon  disgusted 
all  our  subjects,  who  entirely  refused  to  give  Kamran  assistance.  On 
hearing  this  we  immediately  returned  to  our  capital.  Shah  Mahmoud 
was  so  disheartened  by  the  news'  of  our  victory,  that  after  swearing  on 
the  Koran  he  would  not  again  be  guilty  of  treachery,  he  sent  some  of 
Ms  principal  attendants  to  request  the  royal  pardon,  which  we  granted  ; 
and  had  him  conveyed  from  the  outer  to  the  inner  fort  with  all  due 
respect  to  his  rank.  We  then  entered  the  Balla  Hissar  with  regal 
pomp,  and  seated  ourselves  on  the  throne  of  Caubul."  Mr.  Elphinstone 
says  of  this  "victory,"  that  '*  Futteh  Khan  was  at  first  successful ;  he 
routed  the  party  of  the  enemy  which  was  immediately  opposed  to  him, 
and  was  advancing  to  the  city,  when  the  desertion  of  a  great  lord  to 
Soojah  threw  the  whole  into  confusion  :  his  own  party  then  fell  off  by 
degrees,  till  he  found  himself  almost  alone,  and  was  compelled  to  pro. 
vide  for  his  safety  by  a  precipitate  flight.  Next  morning  Shah  Soojah 
entered  Caubul  in  triumph.  Mooktor-ood-Dowlah  walked  on  foot  by 
the  side  of  his  horse,  and  many  other  Douranee  ameers  followed  in  his 
train." — [Elphinstone' s  *'  Caubul" — Appendix.] 


REBELLION    OF   PRINCE    KAYSUR.  29 

stirring  times.  He  wanted  vigour ;  he  wanted  activity ; 
he  wanted  judgment ;  and  above  all,  he  wanted  money. 
It  is  ever  the  fate  of  those  who  have  risen,  as  Soojah 
rose  to  monarchy,  to  be  dragged  down  by  the  weight  of 
the  obligations  incurred  and  the  promises  made  in  the 
hour  of  adversity.  The  day  of  reckoning  comes  and 
the  dangers  of  success  are  as  great  as  the  perils  of  failure. 
The  Douranee  monarch  could  not  meet  his  engagements 
without  weakening  himself,  by  making  large  assignments 
upon  the  revenues  of  different  provinces  ;  and  even  then 
many  interested  friends  were  turned  by  disappointment 
into  open  enemies.  This  was  one  element  of  weakness. 
But  the  error  of  his  life  was  committed  when  he  failed  to 
propitiate  the  loyalty  of  the  great  Barukzye,  Futteh  Khan. 
Upon  the  accession  of  Shah  Soojah,  that  chief  had  been 
freely  pardoned,  and  "  allowed  to  salute  the  step  of  the 
throne."  But  the  king  did  not  estimate  the  real  value  of 
the  aUiance,  and,  elevating  his  rival  Akrum  Khan,  refused 
the  moderate  demands  of  the  Barukzye'  chief.  Disap- 
pointed and  chagrined,  Futteh  Khan  then  deserted  the 
royal  standard.  He  chose  his  time  wisely  and  well.  The 
king  had  set  out  with  an  army  to  overawe  Peshawur 
and  Cashmere.  When  they  had  proceeded  some  way, 
Futteh  Khan,  who  accompanied  him,  excused  himself  on 
the  plea  of  some  physical  infirmity  which  disabled  him 
from  keeping  pace  with  the  royal  cortege,  and  said  that  he 
would  join  the  army,  following  it  by  easy  stages.  Thus, 
disguising  his  defection,  he  fell  in  the  rear,  and  as  the 
royal  party  advanced,  returned  to  foment  a  rebellion. 

In  this  distracted  country  there  was  at  that  time 
another  aspirant  to  the  throne.  The  son  of  Zemaun 
Shah,  Prince  Kaysur,  had  set  up  his  claims  to  the  sove- 
reignty of  Caubiil.  He  had  been  appointed  governor  of 
Candahar  by  Shah  Soojah ;  and  probably  would  have 
been  satisfied  with  this  extent  of  power,  if  Futteh  Khan 


30  EARLY  DAYS  UF  SHAH  SOOJAH. 

had  not  incited  him  to  revolt,  and  offered  to  aid  him  in 
his  attempts  upon  the  crown.  The  prince  lent  a  willing 
ear  to  the  charmings  of  the  Sirdar ;  and  so  it  happened 
that  whilst  Shah  Soojah  was  amusing  himself  on  the  way 
to  Peshawur — "enjoying  the  beautiful  scenery  and  the 
diversion  of  hunting," — his  nephew  and  the  Barukzye 
chief  were  raising  a  large  army  at  Candahar,  intent  upon 
establishing,  by  force  of  arms,  the  claims  of  the  family  of 
his  sightless  brother. 

This  iU-omened  intelligence  brought  the  Shah  back  in 
haste  to  his  capital,  whence  he  soon  marched  towards 
Candahar  to  meet  the  advancing  troops  of  the  prince. 
And  here  again,  to  the  treachery  of  his  opponents,  rather 
than  to  the  valour  of  his  own  troops,  the  Shah  owed  his 
success.  On  the  eve  of  the  expected  conflict,  the  son  of 
Ahmed  Khan,  with  other  Douranee  chiefs,  deserted  to 
the  royal  standard.  Disheartened  and  dismayed,  the  prince 
broke  up  his  army,  and  fled  to  Candahar.  In  the  mean- 
while, Shah  Soojah  returned  to  Caubul  to  find  it  occupied 
by  an  insurgent  force.  According  to  his  own  confession, 
he  was  employed  for  a  month  in  repossessing  himself  of 
the  capital.  The  insurgent  prince  and  the  Barukzye 
chief,  during  this  time,  had  in  some  measure  recovered 
themselves  at  Candahar,  and  the  king  marched  again  to 
the  westward.  Kaysur  fled  at  his  approach  ;  and  Futteh 
Khan  betook  himself  to  Herat,  to  offer  his  services  to  the 
son  of  his  old  master.  The  prince  was  brought  back  and 
conducted  to  the  royal  presence  by  Shah  Zemaunand  the 
Mooktor-ood-Dowlah,  who  besought  the  forgiveness  of  the 
king  on  the  plea  of  the  youth  and  inexperience  of  the 
offender,  and  the  evil  counsel  of  the  Barukzye  sirdar 
Against  his  better  judgment.  Shah  Soojah  forgave  him 
and  restored  him  to  the  government  of  Candahar.* 

*  "Whle  in  Candahar,"  writes  Shah  Soojah,  "we  received  letters 
■irom  oiir  b  loved  brother  Shah-zadah  Mooktor-ood-Dowlah,  requesting 


STRUGGLES   FOR  EMPIRE.  31 

The  affairs  of  Candahar  being  thus  settled  for  a  time, 
Shah  Soojah  marched  into  Sindh  to  enforce  the  payment 
of  tribute  which  had  been  due  for  some  years  to  Caubul. 
He  then  returned  to  his  capital,  and  after  giving  his 
troops  a  three  months'  furlough,  began  to  think  of  com- 
mencing operations  against  Kamran,  who  was  again  dis- 
turbing the  country  to  the  west.  In  the  meanwhile,  this 
prince  had  marched  upon  Candahar,  and  Kaysur  had  fled 
at  his  approach.  This  was  the  second  time  the  two 
princes  had  met  as  enemies — the  second  time  that  the 
scale  had  been  turned  by  the  weight  of  the  chief  of  the 
Barukzyes.  On  one  occasion,  Futteh  Khan  had  invited 
Kamran  to  Candahar,  and  engaged  to  deliver  up  the  city 
— then  suddenly  formed  an  alliance  with  Kaysur,  and, 
sword  in  hand  at  the  head  of  a  small  body  of  Douranees, 
driven  back  the  prince  with  whom  he  had  just  before 
been  in  close  alliance.     Now  he  forsook  the  son  of  Shah 


Prince  Kaysur's  pardon,  as  Ms  inexperience  and  the  advice  of  Futteh 
Khan  and  other  rebels  had  led  him  from  his  duty.  Out  of  respect  to 
our  brother  we  agreed  to  this.  Prince  Kaysur  being  in  Dehleh,  Shah 
Zemaun  and  Mooktor-ood-Dowlah  went  there  and  brought  him  into  the 
presence.  Shah  Zemaun  then  requested  that  we  would  give  him  Can- 
dahar once  more,  and  became  security  for  his  good  behaviour  in  future. 
We  agreed  to  this  in  spite  of  our  good  judgment."  It  was  whilst 
still  engaged  with  the  settlement  of  affairs  at  Candahar,  not  after  their 
complete  adjustment,  and  Soojah's  subsequent  expedition  to  Sindh  (as 
stated  by  Mr.  Elphinstone),  that  ambassadors  arrived  at  Bokhara  to 
negotiate  a  marriage  between  the  Khan's  daughter  and  the  Shah.  **  A 
suitable  answer,"  says  the  Shah,  "  being  given  to  the  royal  letter,  and 
dresses  of  honour  being  given  to  the  ambassadors,  we  dismissed  them 
with  gifts.  Our  thoughts  were  then  directed  to  the  state  of  Candahar.'' 
The  point  is  of  little  importance  in  Afghan  history  ;  and  only  worth 
noticing  in  illustration  of  the  difficulty  of  determining  with  precision, 
the  dates  of  different  events,  and  the  order  in  which  they  occurred.  No 
two  naiTatives  altogether  agree — but  except  where  Shah  Soojah  speaks 
of  his  "victories,"  we  may  regard  him  as  a  tolerably  good  authority  in 
all  that  relates  to  himself. 


32  EARLY  DAYS  OF  SHAH  SOOJAH. 

Zemaun  to  unite  himself  with  the  heir  of  Mahmoud. 
Forgetful  of  past  treachery,  Kamran  received  the  power- 
ful Barukzye ;  and  they  marched  together  upon  Candahar. 
Kaysur,  as  I  have  said,  fled  at  his  approach;  and  the 
insurgents  took  possession  of  the  city.  In  the  meanwhile, 
the  Persians  were  advancing  upon  Herat,  and  Shah  Soojah 
was  moving  up  to  Candahar.  In  this  critical  conjuncture, 
Kamran  returned  in  alarm  to  the  former  place,  and 
Kaysur  joined  the  king  at  the  latter.  "We  again,"  says 
Shah  Soojah,  "gave  him  charge  of  Candahar,  at  the 
request  of  our  queen-mother,  and  our  brother,  Shah 
Zemaun.  On  our  return  to  Caubul,  Akrum  Khan  and 
the  other  Khans  petitioned  us  to  pardon  Futteh  Khan, 
who  was  now  reduced  to  poverty.  We  assented.  He  was 
chen  brought  into  the  presence  by  Akrum  Khan.  We 
remained  some  time  in  Candahar,  in  the  charge  of  which 
we  left  Prince  Zemaun,  and  sent  Kaysur  to  Caubul." 

Again  was  it  in  the  power  of  Shah  Soojah  to  concihate 
the  great  Barukzye.  Again  was  the  opportunity  lost. 
There  was  something  in  the  temper  of  the  monarch 
adverse  to  the  formation  of  new, -and  the  retention  of  old, 
friendships.  Whilst  Futteh  Khan  was  again  made  to  feel 
the  impossibility  of  any  lasting  alliance  with  a  prince  who 
could  not  appreciate  the  value  of  his  services,  and  who 
neither  invited  nor  inspired  confidence,  the  chain  which 
boimd  the  Mooktor-ood-Dowlah  to  the  sovereign  was 
gradually  relaxing,  and  a  new  danger  began  to  threaten 
the  latter.  When  the  Shah  was  absent  in  the  Sindh 
territory,  the  minister  flung  himself  into  the  arms  of 
Prince  Kaysur,  and  publicly  proclaimed  him  king.  The 
rebels  moved  down  upon  Peshawur,  and  took  possession 
of  the  city.  Shah  Soojah  immediately  began  to  direct 
his  operations  against  that  place.  It  was  on  the  3rd  of 
March,  1808,  that  the  two  armies  came  into  collision. 
"The  sun  rising,"  says  Shah  Soojah,  who  had  halted  for 


DEFEAT    OF   SHAH    MAHMOUD.  33 

six  days  in  the  vicinity  of  Peshawur,  hoping  that  the 
rebellious  minister  might  perhaps  repent,  "  we  saw  the 
opposite  armies  in  battle-array.  Khojan  Mahommed 
Khan,  with  a  few  Khans,  followers  from  Mooktor-ood- 
Dowlah's  army,  did  great  deeds  of  valour,  and  at  last 
dispersed  our  raw  soldiers,  leaving  us  alone  in  the  field, 
protected  by  a  few  faithful  Douranees.  We  still  remained 
on  our  guard,  when  our  attendants  warned  us  of  the 
approach  of  Khojan  Mahommed  Khan.  We  rushed  on 
the  traitor  sword  in  hand,  and  cut  through  four  of  the 
iron  plates  of  his  cuirass.  Our  chief  eunuch,  Nekoo  Khan, 
brought  his  horse  and  accoutrements.  Mooktor-ood- 
Dowlah  then  attacked  our  force ;  but  he  and  his  whole 
race  perished.  Prince  Kaysur  fled  to  Caubul.  We  then 
marched  in  triumphant  pomp  to  the  Balla  Hissar  of 
Peshawur."  The  gory  head  of  the  minister,  borne  aloft 
on  a  spear,  and  carried  behind  the  conqueror,  gave  eclat 
to  the  procession,  and  declared  the  completeness  of  his 
victory. 

Prince  Kaysur,  after  a  single  night  spent  at  Caubul, 
fled  into  the  hill  country ;  but  was  brought  back  to  the 
capital  by  the  emissaries  of  the  Shah.  The  experience 
of  past  treachery  and  past  ingratitude  had  not  hardened 
the  monarch's  heart :  and  he  again  "pardoned  the  mani- 
fold offences  of  his  nephew."  In  the  meanwhile  Mah- 
moud,  who  had  been  joined  by  Futteh  Khan,  and  had 
been  endeavouring  to  raise  the  sinews  of  war  by  plunder- 
ing caravans,  obtained,  by  the  usual  process  of  treachery, 
possession  of  Candahar,  and  then  marclied  upon  Caubul. 
Shah  Soojah  went  out  to  meet  him,  and  Mahmoud,  ren- 
dered hopeless  by  disaffection  in  his  ranks,  broke  up  his 
camp  and  fled.  The  king  then  turned  his  face  towards 
the  west,  and  ordered  his  camp  to  be  pitched  on  the  road 
to  Herat.  "Hearing  of  our  approach,"  he  says,  "our 
brother,  Feroz-ood-Deen,  then  in  charge  of  the  fort  of 

VOL.  I.  D 


34  EAELY  DAYS  OF  SHAH  SOOJAH. 

Herat,  sent  a  petition,  requesting  our  orders,  proffering 
the  tribute  due,  and  offering  to  become  security  for  Mah- 
moud's  future  behaviour.  The  same  blood  flowed  in  our 
veins,  and  we  ordered  one  lakh  of  rupees  to  be  paid  him 
yearly  from  the  tribute  of  Sindh,  and  conferred  on  him 
the  government  of  Herat."  This  done,  he  proceeded  to 
Caubul,  and  thence  to  Peshawur,  where  he  ''received 
petitions  from  the  Khan  of  Bahwulpore  and  Moozuffur 
Khan,  Suddozye,  stating  that  ambassadors  from  the  Com- 
pany's territories,  by  name  Elphinstone  and  Strachey, 
had  an'ived,  and  requested  orders."  "  We  wrote  to  the 
ambassadors,"  says  the  Shah,  "  and  ordered  our  chiefs  to 
pay  them  every  attention." 

The  history  of  this  mission  will  be  embraced  in  a  sub- 
sequent chapter.  It  is  not  without  some  misgivings  that 
I  have  traced  these  early  annals  of  the  Douranee  Empire.* 
But  the  chronicle  is  not  without  its  uses.  It  illustrates, 
in  a  remarkable  manner,  both  the  general  character  of 
Afghan  politics,  and  the  extraordinary  vicissitudes  of  the 
early  career  of  the  man  whom  thirty  years  afterwards  the 
British  raised  from  the  dust  of  exile,  and  reseated  on 
the  throne  of  his  fathers.  The  history  of  the  Afghan 
monarchy  is  a  history  of  a  long  series  of  revolutions. 
Seldom  has  the  country  rested  from  strife — seldom  has 
the  sword  reposed  in  the  scabbard.  The  temper  of  the 
people   has   never   been    attuned   to   peace.      They   are 

*  The  number  of  Oriental  names  which  it  is  necessary  to  introduce 
— the  repetition  of  incidents,  greatly  resembling  each  other,  of  conquest 
and  re-conquest,  of  treachery  and  counter-treachery,  of  rebellions  raised 
and  suppressed — creates  a  confusion  in  the  mind  of  the  European 
reader.  It  is  difficult  to  interest  him  in  these  indistinct  phantas- 
magoric transitions.  The  events,  too,  which  I  have  narrated  have  been 
chronicled  before.  I  have  endeavoured,  however,  to  impart  some 
novelty  to  the  recital  by  following,  and  sometimes  quoting.  Shah 
Soojah's  autobiography,  which  was  not  accessible  to  preceding  his- 
torians. 


THE   AFGHAN   CHARACTER.  35 

impatient  of  the  restraints  of  a  settled  government,  and 
are  continually  panting  after  change.  Half-a-century 
of  turbulance  and  anarchy  has  witnessed  but  httle 
variation  in  the  national  character;  and  the  Afghan  of 
the  present  day  is  the  same  strange  mixture  of  impetu- 
osity and  cimning — of  boldness  and  treachery — of  gene- 
rosity and  selfishness — of  kindness  and  cruelty — as  he 
was  when  Zemaun  Shah  haunted  the  Council-Chamber 
of  Calcutta  with  a  phantom  of  invasion,  and  the  vision 
was  all  the  more  terrible  because  "the  shape  thereof"  no 
one  could  discern. 


]»2 


36 


CHAPTER  III. 

[1801—1808.] 

France  and  Russia  in  the  East— Death  of  Hadjee  Khalil  Khan— The 
Mission  of  Condolence — Aga  Nebee  Khan— Extension  of  Russian 
Dominion  in  the  East — French  Diplomacy  in  Persia— The  pacification 
of  Tilsit — Decline  of  French  influence  in  Teheran. 

The   intestine   wars,   which  rent    and   convulsed   the 
Afghan  Empire,  were  a  source  of  acknowledged  security 
to  the  British  power  in  the  East.     From  the  time  when 
in  the  first  year  of  the  present  century  Captain  Malcolm 
dictated  at  the  Court  of  Teheran  the  terms  of  that  early 
treaty,  which  French  writers  freely  condemn,  and  English- 
men are  slow  to  vindicate,  to  the  date  of  the  romantic 
pacification  of  Tilsit,  the  politics  of  Central  Asia  excited 
little  interest  or  alarm  in  the  Council-Chamber  of  Calcutta. 
India  had  ceased  to  bestir  itself  about  an  Afghan  invasion. 
Instead  of  a  shadowy  enemy  from  beyond  the  Indus,  the 
British  had  now  to  face,  on  the  banks  of  the  Jumna,  a 
real  and  formidable  foe.     The  genius  of  the  two  Wellesleys 
was  called  into  action  to  curb  the  insolence  and  crush  the 
power  of  the  Mahrattas ;  and  whilst  we  were  alternately 
fighting  and  negotiating  with   Scindiah   and  Holkar,  we 
scarcely  cared  to  ask  who  reigned  in  Afghanistan ;  or  if 
accident  made  us  acquainted  with  the  progress  of  events, 
viewed  with  philosophic  unconcern  the  vicissitudes  of  the 
Douranee  Empire. 

Engaged   in  the   solution   of  more   pressing   political 
questions   at   home,  Lord  Wellesley  and  his  immediate 


DEATH  OF  KHALIL  KHAN.  37 

successors  bestowed  little  thought  upon  the  Persian 
alliance.  Throughout  the  remaining  years  of  that  noble- 
man's administration,  one  event  alone  occurred  to  rouse 
the  Governor-General  to  a  consideration  of  the  temper 
of  the  Court  of  Teheran.  That  event  filled  him  with 
apprehensions  of  danger  preposterously  incommensurate 
with  its  own  importance,  and  ridiculously  falsified  by  the 
result.  An  accident,  and  a  very  untoward  one,  it  occurred 
at  a  time  when  the  Indian  Government  had  not  yet 
recovered  from  the  inquietude  engendered  by  their  dis- 
turbing dreams  of  French  and  Afghan  invasion.  The 
story  may  be  briefly  told.  On  the  return  of  Captain 
Malcolm  from  Persia,  one  Hadjee  Khalil  Khan  had  been 
despatched  to  India  to  reciprocate  assurances  of  friendship, 
and  to  ratify  and  interchange  the  treaty.  The  mission 
cost  the  Hadjee  his  life.  He  had  not  been  long  resident 
in  Bombay,*  when  the  Persian  attendants  of  the  ambas- 
sador and  the  detachment  of  Company's  sepoys  forming 
his  escort  quarrelled  with  each  other  in  the  court-yard 
before  his  house,  and  came  into  deadly  collision.  The 
Hadjee  went  out  to  quell  the  riot,  and  was  struck  dead  by 
a  chance  shot.  The  intelligence  of  this  unhappy  disaster 
was  brought  round  to  Calcutta  by  a  king's  frigate.  The 
sensation  it  created  at  the  Presidency  was  intense.  Every 
possible  demonstration  of  sorrow  was  made  by  the  Supreme 
Government.  Minute  guns  were  fired  from  the  ramparts 
of  Fort  William.  All  levees  and  public  dinners  at 
Government-House  were  suspended.  Distant  stations 
caught  the  alarm  from  the  Council-Chamber  of  Calcutta. 
The  minor  presidencies  were  scarcely  less  convulsed. 
Bombay  having  previously  thrown  itself  into  mourning, 
instructions  for  similar  observances  were  sent  round  to 


*  Hadjee  Khalil  Khan  reached  Bombay  on  the  21st  of  May,  1802, 
and  was  killed  on  the  20th  of  Jnly. 


oh  FRANCE   AND    RUSSIA    IN   THE    EAST. 

Madras  ;  and  two  days  after  the  arrival  of  the  Chiffone 
it  was  announced  in  the  Gazette  that  Major  Malcohn,  who 
was  at  that  time  acting  as  private  secretary  to  Lord 
Wellesley,  had  been  directed  to  proceed  to  Bombay,  for 
the  purpose  of  communicating  with  the  relations  of  the 
late  Hadjee  Khalil  Khan,  taking  with  him,  as  secretary, 
his  young  friend  and  relative,  Lieutenant  Pasley,  who  had 
accompanied  him  on  his  first  mission  to  Persia.  At  the 
same  time  Mr.  Lovett,  a  civilian  of  no  long  standing,  was 
ordered  to  proceed  immediately  to  Bushire,  charged  with 
an  explanatory  letter  from  Lord  Wellesley  to  the  Persian 
king,  and  instructed  to  offer  such  verbal  explanations  as 
might  be  called  for  by  the  outraged  monarch.  For  some 
days  nothing  was  thought  of  in  Calcutta  beyond  the  circle 
of  this  calamitous  affair.  In  other  directions  a  complete 
paralysis  descended  upon  the  Governor-General  and  his 
advisers.  The  paramount  emergency  bewildered  the 
strongest  understandings,  and  dismayed  the  stoutest 
hearts  at  the  Presidency.  And  yet  it  was  said,  not  long 
afterwards,  by  the  minister  of  Shiraz,  that  "the  English 
might  kill  ten  ambassadors,  if  they  would  pay  for  them  at 
the  same  rate." 

Major  Malcolm  left  Calcutta  on  the  30th  of  August, 
and  beating  down  the  Bay  of  Bengal  against  the  south- 
west monsoon,  reached  Masulipatam  on  the  19  th  of 
September.  Taking  dawk  across  the  country,  he  spent 
a  few  days  at  Hyderabad  in  the  Deccan,  transacted  some 
business  there,  and  then  pushed  on  to  Bombay.  Reaching 
that  Presidency  on  the  10th  of  October,  he  flung  himself 
into  his  work  with  characteristic  energy  and  self-reliance. 
Mr.  Lovett,  who  had  none  of  his  activity,  followed  slowly 
behind,  and  fell  sick  upon  the  road.  Jonathan  Duncan, 
the  most  benevolent  of  men,  was  at  that  time  Governor 
of  Bombay,  and  some  members  of  the  Persian  embassy 
had  presumed  upon  his  good-nature  to  assume  an  arro- 


Malcolm's  conciliatory  measures.  39 

gancG  of  demeanour  which  it  now  became  Malcolm's  duty 
to  check.  He  soon  reduced  them  to  reason.  Before  the 
end  of  the  month  every  difficulty  had  vanished.  Many 
of  the  Persians  were  personally  acquainted  with  the 
English  diplomatist.  All  were  acquainted  with  his 
character.  But  above  all,  it  was  known  that  he  was  the 
bearer  of  the  public  purse.  He  came  to  offer  the  mourners 
large  presents  and  handsome  pensions  from  the  Supreme 
Government,  and  it  is  no  matter  of  surprise,  therefore, 
that  he  had  soon,  in  his  own  words,  "  obtained  from  them 
a  confidence  which  enabled  him  to  set  aside  all  inter- 
mediate agents,  and  consequently  freed  him  from  all 
intrigues."* 

It  was  arranged  that  the  body  of  the  deceased  ambas- 
sador should  be  put  on  board  at  the  end  of  October,  and 
that,  a  day  or  two  later,  the  vessel  should  set  sail  for  the 
Persian  Gulf.  Mr.  Pasley  was  directed  to  attend  the 
Hadjee's  remains,  and  was  charged  with  the  immediate 
duties  of  the  mission,  t     When  the  vessel  reached  Bushire, 

*  MS.  Correspondence. 
+  "I  shall  send,"  wrote  Major  Malcolm,  "Mr.  Pasley  with  the 
Hadjee's  body,  which  will  not  only  be  considered  a  high  compliment, 
but  be  useful  in  a  thousand  ways.  It  will  preserve  this  transaction 
from  the  touch  of  Mr.  Manesty  and  Mr.  Jones.  It  will  enable  me  to 
convey  a  correct  state  of  the  feeling  here  on  the  subject  to  many  respect- 
able Persians,  and  I  shall  obtain  from  Mr.  P.  a  true  account  of  the 
manner  in  which  the  transaction  is  received  in  Persia.  He  will  give 
Lovett  information  which  will  secure  him  from  error  at  the  outset,  and 
be  of  the  highest  utility  to  him  during  his  residence  in  India." — {MS. 
Coirespondence.']  It  is  not  certain,  however,  that  the  high  compliment 
here  designed  was  duly  appreciated  by  the  Persians.  Sir  Harford  Jones 
(from  whose  ** touch"  the  transaction  was  to  be  preserved)  says  that 
"it  seems  to  have  escaped  Marquis  Wellesley  that  that  which  might 
be  considered  a  compliment  at  Calcutta,  might  in  Arabia,  Turkey,  and 

Persia,  be  regarded  as  so  improper  as  almost  to  become  an  insult 

The  Persian  moollahs  as  well  as  the  Persian  merchants  at  Bagdad,  were 
shocked,  and  on  my  applying  to  old  Sulemein  Pacha  for  certain  honoui-s 


40  FRANCE    AND    RUSSIA    IN    THE    EAST. 

it  "was  found  that  the  death  of  the  Hadjee  had  created 
little  sensation  in  the  Persian  territories,  and  that  before 
the  intelligence  was  ten  days  old  it  had  been  well-nigh 
forgotten.  The  Resident  at  Bushire,  a  Persian  of  good 
family,  naturalised  in  India,  and  employed  by  the  Com- 
pany— an  astute  diplomatist  and  a  great  liar — ^had 
thought  it  necessary  to  testify  his  zeal  by  circulating  a 
false  version  of  the  circumstances  attending  the  death  of 
the  Hadjee,  and  calumniating  the  memory  of  the  deceased. 

to  be  paid  to  the  corpse,  when  removed  from  Bagdad  to  be  carried  to 
Nejeef,  he  said,  *  Very  well :  as  you  desire  it  to  be  done,  it  shall  be 
done  :  but  Hadjee  Khalil  Khan  lived  an  infidel,  and  with  infidels,  and 
was,  therefore,  destined  to  hell ;  he  was,  however,  murdered  by  infidels, 
and  so  became  a  shahyde  (martyr)  ;  but  his  former  friends  have  robbed 
him  of  this  chance,  by  deputing  an  infidel  to  attend  his  corpse  to  the 
grave  ;  his  fate,  therefore,  is  now  fixed,  and  you  may  carry  him  to  the 
devil  in  any  manner  you  like  best.' " — \^Sir  Harford  Jones's  account 
of  the  transactions  of  H.  M.^s  mission  to  the  Court  of  Persia,  cfcc. 
iVb^evii.]  It  is  curious,  but  somewhat  humiliating,  to  read  the  difierent 
versions  of  the  same  transactions  put  forth  by  Jones  and  Malcolm,  and 
their  respective  adherents.  For  example,  Sir  Harford  Jones  says  that 
when  the  Hadjee's  body  reached  Bagdad,  Mr.  Day,  a  Bombay  civilian, 
who  had  been  deputed  to  accompany  it  into  the  interior,  took  fright  at 
the  plague,  and  abandoned  his  charge.  "Mr.  Day's  alarm  was  so 
great,"  he  says,  "as  to  become  most  tormenting  to  himself,  and  most 
ridiculous  and  troublesome  to  us,  who  had  stood  the  plague  the  pre- 
cediiig  year.  I,  therefore,  re-shipped  him  for  Bussorah  as  soon  as 
possible,  and  undertook  to  receive  and  execute  such  wishes  as  the 
Khan's  relatives  expressed  to  me."  Now  the  account  given  of  this  matter 
by  one  of  the  gentlemen  of  Malcolm's  mission,  sets  forth  that  "Jones 
had  frightened  away  Mr.  Day  by  alarming  accounts  of  the  plague." — 
"On  this  subject,"  it  was  added,  "I  need  make  no  remarks  to  you, 
who  know  him  so  well.  This  might  be  improper,  and  would,  I  imagine, 
be  perfectly  unnecessary."  I  have  dwelt  upon  these  personal  matters 
at  greater  length  than  they  deserve,  because  they  illustrate  the  feelings, 
on  either  side,  with  which  Jones  and  Malcolm,  at  a  later  and  more 
important  period,  were  likely  each  to  have  regarded  the  parallel  but 
antagonistic  mission  of  the  other  to  the  Persian  Court.  The  bitterness 
which  then  overflowed  was  the  accumulated  gall  of  years. 


AGA    NEBEE    KHAN.  41 

There  was  no  need,  indeed,  of  this.  The  Persian  Govern- 
ment seems  to  have  regarded  the  death  of  the  Hadjee 
with  exemplaiy  unconcern;  and  marvelled  why  the 
English  should  have  made  so  great  a  stir  about  so  small 
a  matter.  If  a  costly  British  mission  could  have  been 
extracted  out  of  the  disaster,  the  Court  would  have  been 
more  than  satisfied ;  whilst  they  who  were  most  deeply 
interested  in  the  event,  moved  by  the  same  sacra  fames, 
thought  rather  of  turning  it  to  profitable  account  than 
of  bewailing  the  death  of  their  relative  and  friend. 

The  brother-in-law  of  the  late  envoy  lost  no  time  in 
offering  his  services  to  fill  the  place  of  the  deceased.  The 
name  of  this  man  was  Aga  Nebee  Khan.  He  was  the  son, 
by  a  second  connexion,  of  the  mistress  of  Mr.  Douglas, 
chief  of  the  Bussorah  factory,  and  had  been  Mr.  Jones's 
moonshee,  on  a  monthly  salary  of  thirty  rupees.  The 
Hadjee  himself  had  been  a  person  of  no  consideration. 
Half-minister  and  half-merchant,  he  had  thought  more  of 
trading  upon  his  appointment  than  of  advancing  the 
interests  of  the  state ;  and  Nebee  Khan,  who  had 
embarked  with  him  in  his  commercial  speculations,  now 
lusted  to  succeed  his  murdered  relative  in  his  diplomatic 
office,  as  well  as  in  the  senior  partnership  of  the  mercantile 
concern.  And  he  succeeded  at  last.  It  cost  him  time, 
and  it  cost  him  money  to  accomplish  his  purpose ;  but 
partly  by  bribery,  partly  by  cqjolery,  he  eventually 
secured  the  object  of  his  ambition.*     It  was  not,  however, 

*  Especial  instructions  having  been  given  to  the  British  mission  to 
secure  the  appointment  of  a  man  of  rank  as  successor  to  Khalil  Khan, 
the  intrigues  of  Aga  Nebee  to  obtain  the  appointment  greatly  embar- 
rassed our  diplomatists  in  Persia.  But  it  was  acknowledged  that  the 
aspirant  was  a  man  of  good  temper,  good  abilities,  and  more  than 
average  respectability.  He  professed  himself  to  be  heart  and  soul  the 
friend  of  the  English ;  and,  doubtless,  was  perfectly  sincere  in  his 
attachment  to  their  wealth  and  profusion.  Like  all  his  countrymen, 
he  was  capable  of  profound  dissimulation,  and  lied  without  the  slightest 


'42  FRANCE   AND    RUSSIA    IN   THE    EAST. 

till  three  full  years  had  passed  away  since  the  death  of 
the  Hadjee,  that  his  brother-in-law  reached  Calcutta,  "not 
exactly  to  fill  his  relative's  place,  but  to  exercise  the  triple 
functions  of  minister,  merchant,  and  claimant  of  blood- 
money,  which  he  roundly  assessed  at  twenty  lakhs  of 
rupees." 

And  in  those  three  years  a  great  change  had  come  over 
the  Supreme  Government  of  India.  A  long  war,  pro- 
secuted with  extraordinary  vigour,  had  exhausted  the 
financial  resources  of  the  state.  The  reign  of  India's 
most  magnificent  satrap — the  "sultanised"  Governor- 
General — was  at  an  end.  A  new  ruler  had  been  sent 
from  England  to  carry  out  a  new  policy ;  and  that 
policy  was  fatal  to  the  pretensions  of  such  a  man  as 
Nebee  Khan. 

He  had  fallen,  indeed,  upon  evil  times.  Those  were 
not  days  when   moneyed  compensations   were   likely   to 

remorse.  Knowing  the  views  of  the  British  functionaries  with  regard 
to  the  succession,  he  sent  through  his  brother  to  Mr.  Lovett  an  account 
of  an  interview  he  had  had  with  the  Shah,  representing  that  he  had 
urged  upon  his  majesty  the  propriety  of  appointing  an  elchee  of  high 
rank  as  successor  to  Hadjee  Khalil  Khan,  but  that  the  king  had  in- 
sisted upon  appointing  him.  In  the  same  letter  an  amusing  attempt  is 
made  to  persuade  Mr.  Lovett  to  proceed  to  Teheran  as  an  ambassador 
from  the  British-Indian  Government,  "with  handsome  and  splendid 
equipments,  so  as  to  exceed  by  many  degrees  those  with  which  Major 
Malcolm  travelled  :  for  this  is  the  particular  wish  of  the  king  and  his 
ministers,  in  order  that  it  may  get  abroad  universally  that  the  English 
had,  for  the  sake  of  apologising,  made  these  new  preparations  far  ex- 
ceeding the  former,  and  that  it  is  evident  they  highly  regard  the  friend- 
ship of  the  king,  and  were  not  to  blame  for  the  death  of  Hadjee  Khalil 
Khan.  His  majesty,  too,  when  he  hears  of  the  splendour  and  greatness 
of  your  retinue,  will  be  much  pleased,  and  most  favourably  inclined. 
....  Do  not  be  sparing  in  expenditure,  or  presents,  or  largesses. 
Every  country  has  its  customs  ;  and  every  nation  may  be  won  somehow 
or  other.  The  people  of  Persia  in  the  manner  above  stated.''^  It  is 
hard  to  say  which  is  to  be  most  admired,  the  candour  or  the  craft  of 
this. — [MS.  Records.] 


RECEPTION    OF   NEBEE    KHAN.  43 

be  granted  even  to  ambassadors,  or  when  there  was  any- 
greater  likelihood  of  an  Indian  statesman  embarrassing 
himself  with  distant  engagements  which  might  compel 
him  to  advance  an  army  into  unknown  regions,  or  send  a 
fleet  into  foreign  seas.  So  there  was  nothing  but  dis- 
appointment in  store  for  Nebee  Khan.  In  the  month  of 
October,  1805,  the  vessel  bearing  the  ambassador  sailed 
into  the  harbour  of  Bombay.  He  was  welcomed  with  all 
the  formalities  befitting  his  station,  and  with  every 
demonstration  of  respect.  But  a  series  of  untoward 
circumstances,  like  those  which,  in  the  reign  of  our 
second  James,  delayed  the  public  audience  of  Lord 
Castlemaine  at  Rome,  postponed,  for  the  space  of  many 
months,  the  reception  of  Nebee  Khan  at  Calcutta.  At 
length,  on  the  28th  of  April,  1806,  the  ceremony  of 
presentation  took  place.  Sir  George  Barlow  was  then  at 
the  head  of  the  Indian  Government.  The  Governor- 
General  lined  the  public  way  with  soldiers,  and  sent  the 
leading  ofl&cers  of  the  state  to  conduct  the  merchant- 
minister  to  his  presence.  It  was  an  imposing  spectacle, 
and  a  solemn  farce.  The  Persian  elchee  knew  that  he  had 
come  to  Calcutta  not  to  treat  of  politics,  but  of  pice ;  and 
the  English  governor,  while  publicly  honouring  the 
Persian,  secretly  despised  him  as  a  sordid  adventurer, 
and  was  bent  upon  baffling  his  schemes.  At  the  private 
interviews  which  took  place  between  the  British  func- 
tionaries and  Nebee  Khan,  there  was  little  mention  of 
political  affairs.  There  was  a  long  outstanding  money 
account  between  the  parties,  and  the  settlement  of  the 
account-current  was  the  grand  object  of  the  mission.  The 
Persian,  who  thought  that  he  had  only  to  ask,  found  that 
times  had  changed  since  the  commencement  of  the 
century,  and  was  overwhelmed  with  dismay  when  the 
British  secretary  demonstrated  to  him  that  he  was  a 
debtor  to  our  government  of  more  than  a  lakh  of  rupees. 


44  FRANCE   AND    RUSSIA   IN   THE   EAST, 

Satisfied  with  existing  relations  of  friendship  between 
Persia  and  Great  Britain,  and  never  at  any  time  disposed 
to  embarrass  himself  with  unnecessary  treaties,  Barlow 
declined  to  enter  into  new  political  negotiations,  or  to 
satisfy  the  exorbitant  personal  claims  of  the  representative 
of  the  Persian  Court.  Nebee  Khan  left  Calcutta  a  dis- 
appointed man.  The  speculation  had  not  answered.  The 
investment  had  been  a  bad  one.  He  had  toiled  for  four 
long  years;  he  had  wasted  his  time  and  wasted  his 
money  only  to  be  told  at  last,  by  an  officious  secretary, 
that  he  owed  the  British- Indian  Government  a  lakh  and 
seven  thousand  rupees.  In  January,  1807,  carrying  back 
a  portfolio,  not  more  full  of  political  than  his  purse  of 
financial  results,  the  ambassador  left  Calcutta.  Neither 
the  merchant  nor  the  minister  had  played  a  winning  game. 
Compensation  and  treaties  were  alike  refused  him  ;  and 
he  went  back  with  empty  hands. 

In  the  mean  while,  the  French  had  succeeded  in  esta- 
blishing their  influence  at  the  Court  of  Teheran.*  They 
had  long  been  pushing  their  intrigues  in  that  quarter,  and 
now  at  last  were  beginning  to  overcome  the  difficulties 
which  had  formerly  beset  them.  The  Malcolm  treaty  of 
1800  bound  the  contracting  parties  to  a  defensive  alliance 
against  France ;  but  the  terms  of  the  treaty  had  been 

*  Some  French  agents,  under  the  feigned  character  of  botanists,  had 
visited  Teheran  before  Buonaparte  invaded  Egypt,  and  wished  Aga 
Mahomed  Khan,  the  then  ruler  of  Persia,  to  sei^e  Bussorah  and  Bagdad. 
They  also  endeavoured  to  stimulate  the  Shah  to  assist  Tippoo  Sultan 
against  the  British,  and  endeavoured  to  obtain  permission  to  re- 
establish their  footing  at  Gombroon.  Had  the  emissaries  appeared  in 
a  more  openly  diplomatic  character,  they  might  have  succeeded,  for 
Aga  Mahomed  Khan  coveted  the  territory  named,  and  might  have  been 
induced  to  co-operate  in  an  attack  upon  the  Turkish  dominions ;  but 
the  doubtful  character  of  the  agents  thwarted  their  schemes,  and  he 
gave  little  heed  to  the  representations  of  the  savans. — [See  Brigadier 
Malcolm  to  Lord  Minto :  MS.  Records.^ 


MUSCOVITE   AGGRESSION".  45 

scarcely  adjusted,  when  French  emissaries  endeavoured 
to  shake  the  fidelity  of  Persia  by  large  offers  of  assistance. 
The  offers  were  rejected.  The  French  were  told,  in  em- 
phatic language,  that  "if  Napoleon  appeared  in  person 
at  Teheran,  he  would  be  denied  admission  to  the  centre 
of  the  universe."  But,  undaunted  by  these  failures,  they 
again  returned  to  tempt  the  embarrassed  Persians.  Every 
year  increased  the  difficulties  of  the  Shah,  and  weakened 
his  reliance  on  the  British.  He  was  beset  with  danger, 
and  he  wanted  aid.  The  British-Indian  Government 
was  either  too  busy  or  too  indifferent  to  aid  him.  The 
energetic  liberality  of  the  French  contrasted  favourably 
with  our  supineness;  and  before  the  year  1805  had 
worn  to  a  close,  Persia  had  sought  the  very  alliance  and 
asked  the  very  aid,  which  before  had  been  offered  and 
rejected. 

The  assistance  that  was  sought  was  assistance  against 
Russia.  In  1805,  the  Shah  addressed  a  letter  to  Napoleon, 
then  in  the  very  zenith  of  his  triumphant  career,  seeking 
the  aid  of  the  great  western  conqueror  to  stem  the  tide 
of  Russian  encroachment.  For  years  had  that  formidable 
northern  power  been  extending  its  conquests  to  the  east- 
wards. Before  the  English  trader  had  begun  to  organise 
armies  in  Hindostan,  and  to  swallow  up  ancient  princi- 
palities, the  grand  idea  of  founding  an  Eastern  empire 
had  been  grasped  by  the  capacious  mind  of  Peter  the 
Great.  Over  the  space  of  a  century,  under  emperors  and 
empresses  of  varying  shades  of  character,  had  the  same 
undeviating  course  of  aggressive  policy  been  pursued  by 
Russia  towards  her  eastern  neighbours.  Tho  country 
which  lies  between  the  Black  Sea  and  the  Caspian 
was  the  especial  object  of  Muscovite  ambition.  A 
portion  of  it,  occupied  by  a  race  of  hardy,  vigorous 
mountaineers,  still  defies  the  tyranny  of  the  Czar,  and 
still  from  time  to  time,  as  new  efforts  are  made  to  subju- 


46  FRANCE   AND   RUSSIA   IN   THE   EAST. 

gate  it,  new  detachments  of  Russian  troops  are  buried  in 
its  formidable  defiles.  But  Georgia,  after  a  series  of  wars, 
notorious  for  the  magnitude  of  the  atrocities  which  dis- 
graced them,  had  been  wrested  from  the  Persians  before 
the  close  of  the  last  century,  and  in  1800  was  formally 
incorporated  with  the  Russian  Empire  by  the  Autocrat 
Paul. 

These  encroachments  beyond  the  Caucasus  brought 
Russia  and  Persia  into  a  proximity  as  tempting  to  the 
one  as  it  was  perilous  to  the  other.  The  first  few  years 
of  the  present  century  were  years  of  incessant  and 
sanguinary  strife.  In  the  Russian  Governor-General, 
ZizianofF,  were  combined  great  personal  energy  and  con- 
siderable military  skill,  with  a  certain  ferocity  of  character 
which  seldom  allowed  him  to  display  much  clemency 
towards  the  vanquished.  A  Georgian  by  extraction,  and 
connected  by  marriage  with  the  princes  of  that  country, 
he  never  forgot  the  cruelties  which  had  alienated  for  ever 
the  hearts  of  the  Georgian  people  from  their  old  Maho- 
medan  masters.  The  restless  aggressive  spirit  of  the 
great  Muscovite  power  was  fitly  represented  by  this  man. 
He  was  soon  actively  at  work.  He  entered  Daghistan — 
defeated  the  Lesghees  with  great  slaughter — carried 
Ganja  by  assault,  and  massacred  the  garrison — a  second 
time  defeated  the  Lesghees,  after  a  sanguinary  engage- 
ment ;  and  then  returning  to  Tiflis,  addressed  the  go- 
vernors of  Shamakhee,  Sheesha,  and  other  fortresses  to 
the  north  of  the  Aras,  threatening  them  with  the  fate  of 
Gaiya  if  they  did  not  make  instant  submission  in  com- 
pliance with  the  orders  of  the  Russian  monarch,  who 
had  instructed  him  not  to  pause  in  his  career  of  conquest 
until  he  had  encamped  his  army  on  the  borders  of  that 
river. 

In  the  spring  of  1804,  Abbas  Mirza,  the  heir-apparent 
to  the  throne  of  Persia,  took  the  field  at  the  head  of  a 


THE    CAMPAIGN   IN   ARMENIA.  47 

formidable  army,  and  marched  down  upon  Erivan,  the 
capital  of  Armenia.  The  governor  refused  to  abandon 
his  charge,  and  when  the  prince  prepared  to  attack  him, 
called  the  Russian  general  to  his  aid.  The  resrdt  was 
fatal  to  the  Persian  cause.  In  the  month  of  July,  the 
army  of  the  Crown-Prince  of  Persia  and  the  Russian  and 
Georgian  force  under  ZizianofF,  twice  encountered  each 
other,  and  twice  the  Persian  army  was  driven  back  with 
terrible  loss.  On  the  second  occasion  the  rout  was  com- 
plete. Abbas  Mirza  lost  everything.  Taking  refuge  in  a 
small  fort,  he  endeavoured  to  negotiate  terms  with 
Zizianoff;  but  the  Russian  general  told  him  haughtily, 
that  the  orders  of  his  sovereign  were,  that  he  should 
occupy  aU  the  country  along  the  Aras  River,  from  Erivan 
to  the  borders  of  the  Caspian,  and  that  he  chafed  under 
the  instructions  which  confined  his  conquests  to  a  limit  so 
far  within  the  boundaries  of  his  own  ambition. 

The  disasters  of  the  heir-apparent  brought  the  king 
himself  into  the  field.  Moving  down  with  a  large  army 
to  the  succour  of  the  prince,  he  again  encountered  the 
Russian  forces,  but  only  to  see  his  troops  sustain  another 
defeat.  Disheartened  by  these  repeated  failures,  the 
Persians  then  changed  their  tactics,  and  adopting  a  more 
predatory  style  of  warfare,  harassed  their  northern  enemy 
hj  cutting  off  his  supplies.  The  year  being  then  far 
advanced,  ZizianofF  drew  off  his  forces,  and  prepared  to 
prosecute  the  war  with  renewed  energy  in  the  following 
spring.  That  spring  was  his  last.  An  act  of  the  blackest 
treachery  cut  short  his  victorious  career.  He  was  con- 
ducting in  person  the  siege  of  Badkoo,  when  the  garrison, 
making  overtures  of  capitulation,  invited  the  Russian 
general  to  a  conference  for  the  settlement  of  the  terms. 
He  went  unattended  to  a  tent  that  had  been  pitched  for 
his  reception,  and  was  deliberately  set  upon  and  slain  by  a 
party  of  assassins  stationed  there  for  the  bloody  purpose. 


48  FRANCE   AND    RUSSIA    IN   THE    EAST. 

The  King  of  Persia,  when  the  tidings  reached  him,  grew 
wild  with  dehght.  In  an  ecstasy  of  joy  he  pubHshed  an 
inflated  proclamation,  setting  forth  that  he  had  achieved 
a  great  victory,  and  slain  the  celebrated  Russian  com- 
mander. But  other  thoughts  soon  forced  themselves 
upon  the  king  and  his  ministers.  A  black  cloud  was 
brooding  over  them — the  retribution  of  an  outraged 
natioa  A  signal  chastisement  was  expected.  New 
armies  were  looked  for ;  new  encroachments  anticipated 
from  the  North;  new  forfeitures  of  dominion  seemed 
inevitable — the  righteous  result  of  an  act  of  such 
atrocious  perfidy.  Persia  felt  her  weakness,  and,  in  an 
extremity  which  seemed  to  threaten  her  very  existence, 
trusted  to  foreign  European  aid  to  rescue  her  from  the 
jaws  of  death. 

It  was  at  this  time,  when  threatened  with  the  venge- 
ance of  Russia,  that  the  Persian  Court  addressed  a 
letter  to  Napoleon,  then  in  the  full  flush  of  unbroken 
success,  seeking  the  aid  of  that  powerful  chief.  It  was  at 
this  time,  too,  that  Aga  Nebee  Khan  commenced  his 
journey  to  India,  and  it  is  probable  that  if  the  Indian 
Government  had  shown  any  disposition  to  aid  the  Persian 
monarch  in  his  efforts  to  repel  the  aggressions  of  the 
Muscovite,  the  French  alliance  would  have  been  quietly 
but  effectually  relinquished.  But  the  supineiless  of 
England  was  the  opportunity  of  France.  The  Indian 
Government  had  left  the  settlement  of  the  Persian  ques- 
tion to  the  Cabinet  of  St.  James's,  and  the  Cabinet  had 
dawdled  over  it  as  a  matter  that  might  be  left  to  take 
care  of  itself.  In  this  extremity,  the  Persian  monarch 
forgot  the  treaty  with  the  British,  or  thought  that  the 
British,  by  deserting  him  in  his  need,  had  absolved  him 
from  all  obligations  to  observe  it,  and  openly  flung  himself 
into  the  arms  of  the  very  enemy  which  that  treaty  so 
truculently  proscribed. 


\, 


PROGRESS   OP    FRENCH   DIPLOMACY.  49 

In  the  autumn  of  1805,  an  accredited  French  agent 
arrived  at  Teheran.  The  result  of  the  Indian  mission 
was  then  unknown ;  and  Colonel  Romieu  was  received 
with  that  barren  courtesy  which  almost  amounts  to  dis- 
couragement. It  would  probably,  too,  have  been  so  re- 
garded by  the  French  envoy,  had  not  death  cut  short  his 
diplomatic  career,  after  a  few  days  spent  at  Teheran,  and 
a  single  audience  of  the  king.  But  the  following  spring 
beamed  more  favourably  on  the  diplomacy  of  France. 
The  cold  indifference  of  England  had  been  ascertained 
beyond  a  doubt,  and  the  danger  of  Russian  aggressive- 
ness, now  sharpened  by  revenge,  was  becoming  more  and 
more  imminent.  All  things  conspired  to  favour  the 
machinations  of  the  French ;  and  they  seized  the  oppor- 
tunity with  vigour  and  address.  Another  envoy  appeared 
upon  the  scene.  Monsieur  Jaubert  was  received  with 
marked  attention  and  respect.  He  came  to  pave  the  way 
for  a  splendid  embassy,  which  Napoleon  proposed  to 
despatch  to  the  Persian  Court.  Overjoyed  at  these 
assurances  of  friendship,  the  king  eagerly  grasped  the 
proflfered  alliance.  He  was  prepared  to  listen  to  any 
proposal,  so  that  his  new  allies  undertook  to  co-operate 
against  his  Russian  enemies.  He  would  join  in  an  inva- 
sion of  Hindostan,  or,  in  concert  with  the  French,  ampu- 
tate any  given  limb  from  the  body  of  the  Turkish  Empire. 
There  was  much  promise  of  aid  on  either  side,  and  for  a 
time  French  counsels  were  dominant  at  the  Persian  capi- 
tal. Two  years  passed  away,  during  which  the  emis- 
saries of  Napoleon,  in  spite  of  accidental  hindrances,  con- 
trived to  gain  the  confidence  of  the  Court  of  Teheran. 
They  declared  that  England  was  a  fallen  country — that 
although  protected  for  a  time  by  its  insular  position,  it 
must  fall  a  prey  to  the  irresistible  power  of  Napoleon — 
that,  as  nothing  was  to  be  expected  from  its  friendship, 
nothing  was  to  be  apprehended  from  its  enmity ;  and  so, 

701.  I.  E 


50  FRAKCE   AND    RUSSIA   IN    THE   EAST. 

industriously  propagating  reports  to  our  discredit,  they 
established  themselves  on  the  ruins  of  British  influence, 
and  for  a  time  their  success  was  complete. 

And  so  it  happened,  that  when  the  British  Govern- 
ments in  London  and  Calcutta  awoke  almost  simul- 
taneously to  the  necessity  of  "doing  something,"  they 
found  a  well-appointed  French  embassy  estabhshed  at 
Teheran,  under  General  Gardanne,  an  officer  of  high 
reputation,  whom  even  hostile  diplomatists  have  delighted 
to  commend ;  they  found  a  numerous  staff  of  officers,* 
civil  and  military,  with  engineers  and  artificers,  prepared 
to  instruct  and  drill  the  native  troops,  to  cast  cannon, 
and  to  strengthen  the  defences  of  the  Persian  cities ;  they 
found  French  agents,  under  the  protection  of  duly  con- 
stituted mehmendars,  visiting  Gombroon,  Bushire,  and 
other  places,  surveying  the  harbours  of  the  gulf,  and  in- 
triguing with  the  ambassadors  of  the  Ameers  of  Sindh. 
And  it  was  pretty  well  ascertained  that  the  invasion  of 
India  by  a  French  and  Persian  army  was  one  of  the 
objects  of  the  treaty,  which,  soon  after  the  arrival  of 
Gardanne  at  Teheran,  was  sent  home  for  the  approval 
of  Napoleon. 

But  a  mighty  change  had,  by  this  time,  passed  over 
the  politics  of  Europe.  It  was  in  July,  1807,  that  on  a 
raft  floating  upon  the  bosom  of  the  River  Niemen,  near 
the  city  of  Tilsit,  in  the  kingdom  of  Prussia,  the  Emperor 
Alexander  and  Napoleon  Buonaparte,  after  a  brief  and 
bloody  campaign,  embraced  each  other  like  brothers. 
In  the  short  space  of  ten  days,  fifty  thousand  of  the  best 
French  and  Russian  troops  had  been  killed  or  disabled 
on  the  field  of  battle.     Yet  so  little  had  been  the  vantage 

*  General  Gardanne' s  suite,  according  to  Colonel  Malcolm,  consisted 
of  "twenty-five  officers,  two  clergymen,  a  physician,  some  artillery  and 
engineer  officers,  thirty  European  sub-officers,  and  a  number  of  arti- 
ficers."— [MS.  Records.] 


THE    PEACE    OF   TILSIT.  51 

gained  by  either  party,  that  it  is  even  to  this  day  a  moot 
point  in  history,  as  it  was  in  the  contemporary  records  of 
the  war,  whether  the  first  peaceful  overture  was  made  by 
the  Russian  monarch  or  the  Corsican  invader.  Both 
powers  eagerly  embraced  the  opportunity  of  repose ;  and 
in  a  few  days  the  scene  was  changed,  as  by  magic,  from 
one  of  sanguinary  war  and  overwhelming  misery  to  one  of 
general  cordiality  and  rejoicing.  The  French  and  Russian 
soldiers,  who  a  few  days  before  had  broken  each  other's 
ranks  on  the  bloody  plains  of  Eylau  and  Friedland,  now 
feasted  each  other  with  overflowing  hospitality,  and 
toasted  each  other  with  noisy  delight.  Such,  indeed,  on 
both  sides  was  the  paroxysm  of  friendship,  that  they 
exchanged  uniforms  one  with  the  other,  and  paraded  the 
public  streets  of  Tilsit  in  motley  costume,  as  though  the 
reign  of  international  fraternity  had  commenced  in  that 
happy  July.  And  whilst  the  followers  of  Alexander  and 
Napoleon  were  abandoning  themselves  to  convivial  plea- 
sures, and  the  social  affections  and  kindly  charities  were 
in  full  play,  those  monarchs  were  spending  quiet  evenings 
together,  discussing  their  future  plans,  and  projecting 
joint  schemes  of  conquest.  It  was  then  that  they  medi- 
tated the  invasion  of  Hindostan  by  a  confederate  army 
uniting  on  the  plains  of  Persia.  Lucien  Buonaparte,  the 
brother  of  the  newly-styled  emperor,  was  destined  for  the 
Teheran  mission ;  and  no  secret  was  made  of  the  inten- 
tion of  the  two  great  European  potentates  to  commence, 
in  the  following  spring,  a  hostile  dejnonstration  "  centre 
les  possessions  de  la  Compagnie  des  Indes." 

But  by  this  time  both  the  British  and  the  Indian 
Governments  had  awakened  from  the  slumbers  of  indif- 
ference in  which  they  had  so  long  been  lulled.  They 
could  no  longer  encourage  theories  of  non-interference 
whilst  the  most  formidable  powers  in  Europe  were  pushing 
their  conquests  and  insinuating  their  intrigues  over  the 

£2 


52  FRANCE   AND   RUSSIA   IN   THE   EAST. 

countries  and  into  the  courts  of  Asia.     Lord  Minto  had 
succeeded  Sir  George   Barlow  as  head  of  the  Supreme 
Government  of  India.     Naturally  inclined,  as  he  was  in- 
structed, to  carry  out  a  moderate  policy,  and  to  abstain 
as   much   as   possible   from   entanglements    with  native 
rulers,  he  would  fain  have  devoted  himself  to  the  details 
of  domestic  policy,  and  the  replenishment  of  an  exhausted 
exchequer.      But  the   unsettled   state   of  our  European 
relations   compelled   him   to   look   beyond   the   frontier. 
What  he  saw  there  roused  him  into  action.     It  is  observ- 
able that  statesmen  trained  in  the  cabinets  and  courts  of 
Europe  have  ever   been   more    sensitively  alive    to    the 
dangers  of  invasion  from  the  North  than   those  whose 
experience  has  been  gathered  in  the  fields  of  Indian  diplo- 
macy.    Lord  Wellesley  and  Lord  Minto  were  ever  tremu- 
lous with  intense  apprehension  of  danger  from  without, 
whilst  Sir  John  Shore  and  Sir  George  Barlow  possessed 
themselves  in  comparative    confidence    and  tranquillity, 
and,   if  they  were  not  wholly  blind  to  the  peril,  at  aU 
events  did  not  exaggerate  it.     There  is  a  sense  of  security 
engendered  by  long  habit  and  familiarity  with  apparent 
danger,  which  renders  a  man  mistrustful  of  the  reality  of 
that  which  has  so  often  been  shown  to  be  a  counterfeit. 
The  inexperience   of  English  statesmen  suddenly  trans- 
planted to  a  new  sphere  of  action,  often  sees  in  the  most 
ordinary  political  phenomena  strange  and  alarming  por- 
tents.    It  is  easy  to  be  wise  after  the  event.     We  know 
now  that  India  has  never  been  in  any  real  danger  from 
French   intrigue   or    French   aggressiveness;    but   Lord 
Wellesley  and  Lord  Minto  saw  with  different  eyes,  and 
grappled  the  shadowy  danger  as  though  it  were  a  sub- 
stantial fact.     In  those  days  such  extraordinary  events 
were  passing  around  us,  that  to  assign  the  limits  of  poli- 
tical probability  was  beyond  the  reach  of  human  wisdom. 
The  attrition  of  great  events  had  rubbed  out  the  line 


THE    RUSSO-FRENCH    ALLIANCE.  53 

which  separates  fact  from  fiction,  and  the  march  of  a 
grand  army  under  one  of  Napoleon's  marshals  from  the 
banks  of  the  Seine  to  the  banks  of  the  Ganges  did  not 
seem  a  feat  much  above  the  level  of  the  Corsican's  tower- 
ing career. 

Rightly  understood,  the  alliance  between  the  two  great 
continental  powers  which  seemed  to  threaten  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  British  Empire  in  the  East,  was  a  source  of 
security  to  the  latter.  But  in  1807  it  was  not  so  clearly 
seen  that  Persia  was  more  easily  to  be  conciliated  by  the 
enemies,  than  by  the  friends,  of  the  Russian  Autocrat — 
that  the  confederacy  of  Alexander  and  Napoleon  was 
fatal  to  the  Persian  monarch's  cherished  hopes  of  the 
restitution  of  Georgia,  and  the  general  retrogression  of 
the  Russian  army ;  and  that,  therefore,  there  was  little 
prospect  of  the  permanency  of  French  influence  at  the 
Court  of  Teheran.  Forgetful  as  we  were  of  this,  the 
danger  seemed  imminent,  and  only  to  be  met  by  the  most 
active  measures  of  defence.  To  baffle  European  intrigue, 
and  to  stem  the  tide  of  European  invasion,  it  then  appeared 
to  the  British  Indian  Government  expedient  to  enlace  in 
one  great  network  of  diplomacy  all  the  states  lying 
between  the  frontier  of  India  and  the  eastern  points  of 
the  Russian  Empire.  Since  India  had  been  threatened 
with  invasion  at  the  close  of  the  last  centiuy,  the  Afghan 
power  had  by  disruption  ceased  to  be  formidable.  We 
had  formerly  endeavoured  to  protect  ourselves  against 
France  on  the  one  side,  and  Afghanistan  on  the  other,  by 
cementing  a  friendly  alliance  with  Persia.  It  now  became 
our  policy,  whilst  endeavouring  to  re-establish  our  in- 
fluence in  that  country,  to  prepare  ourselves  for  its 
hostility,  and  to  employ  Afghanistan  and  Sindh  as  barriers 
against  encroachments  from  the  West ;  and  at  the  same 
time  to  increase  our  security  by  enlisting  against  the 
French  and  Persian  confederacy  the  friendly  offices  of  the 


54  PRANCE    AND    RUSSIA    IN    THE   EAST. 

Sikhs.  That  strange  new  race  of  men  had  by  this  time 
erected  a  formidable  power  on  the  banks  of  the  Sutlej,  by 
the  mutilation  of  the  Douranee  Empire ;  and  it  was  seen 
at  once  that  the  friendship  of  a  people  occupying  a  tract 
of  country  so  situated,  and  inspired,  with  a  strong  hatred 
of  the  Mahomedan  faith,  must,  in  such  a  crisis  as  had 
now  arrived,  be  an  object  of  desirable  attainment.  Whilst, 
therefore,  every  effort  was  to  be  made  to  wean  the  Court 
of  Teheran  from  the  French  alliance,  preparations  were 
commenced,  in  anticipation  of  the  possible  failure  of  the 
Persian  mission,  for  the  despatch  of  British  embassies  to 
the  intervening  countries. 

The  duty  of  negotiating  with  the  Sikh  ruler  was  en- 
trusted to  Mr.  Metcalfe,  a  civil  servant  of  the  Company, 
who  subsequently  rose  to  the  highest  place  in  the  govern- 
ment of  India,  and  consummated  a  life  of  public  utility 
in  a  new  sphere  of  action,  as  Governor-General  of  our 
North  American  colonies.  Mr.  Elphinstone,  another  civil 
servant  of  the  Company,  who  still  lives,  amidst  the  fair 
hills  of  Surrey,  to  look  back  with  pride  and  contentment 
upon  a  career  little  less  distinguished  than  that  of  his 
contemporaiy,  was  selected  to  conduct  the  embassy  to  the 
Court  of  the  Douranee  monarch.  Captain  Seton  had  been 
previously  despatched  to  Sindh ;  and  Colonel  Malcolm, 
who  was  at  that  time  Resident  at  Mysore,  was  now  again 
ordered  to  proceed  to  the  Persian  Court,  charged  with 
duties  which  had  been  rendered  doubly  difficult  by  our 
own  supineness,  and  the  contrasted  activity  of  our  more 
restless  Gallic  neighbours. 


55 


CHAPTEK  IV. 

[1808—1809.] 

The  Second  Mission  to  Persia — Malcolm's  Visit  to  Bushire— Failure  of 
the  Embassy — His  Eetum  to  Calcxitta — Mission  of  Sir  Harford 
Jones — His  Progress  and  Success. 

When,  in  the  spring  of  1808,  Colonel  Malcolm  a  second 
time  steered  his  course  towards  the  Persian  Gulf,  another 
British  diplomatist  had  started,  from  another  point,  upon 
the  same  mission.  Moved  as  it  were  by  one  common 
impulse,  the  Cabinet  of  England  and  the  Supreme  Council 
of  India  had  determined  each  to  despatch  an  embassy  to 
the  Court  of  Teheran.  A  curious  and  unseemly  spectacle 
was  then  presented  to  the  eyes  of  the  world.  Two 
missions,  in  spirit  scarcely  less  antagonistic  than  if  they 
had  been  despatched  by  contending  powers,  started  for 
the  Persian  Court ;  the  one  from  London — the  other  from 
Calcutta.  The  Court  of  St.  James's  had  proposed  to  assist 
Persia  by  mediating  with  St.  Petersburgh,  and  Mr.  Har- 
ford Jones,  a  civil  servant  of  the  Company,  who  was 
made  a  baronet  for  the  occasion,  was  deputed  to  Teheran 
to  negotiate  with  the  ministers  of  the  Shah.  It  was 
originally  intended  that  he  should  proceed  to  Persia, 
taking  the  Russian  capital  in  his  route ;  but  the  pacifi- 
cation of  Tilsit  caused  a  departm-e  from  this  design,  and 
Sir  Harford  Jones  sailed  for  Bombay  with  the  mission  on 
board  one  of  his  Majesty's  ships.  He  reached  that  port 
in  the  month  of  April,  1808,  just  as  the  embassy  under 
Brigadier-General  Malcolm,  despatched  by  the  Governor- 


56  THE    SECOND    MISSION    TO    PERSIA. 

General  to  the  Court  of  Teheran,  was  putting  out  to  sea 
on  its  way  to  the  Persian  Gulf.* 

Sir  Harford  Jones,  therefore,  rested  at  Bombay, 
awaiting  the  result  of  Malcolm's  proceedings.  On  the 
10th  of  May,  the  latter  reached  Bushire,  and  on  the  18th 
wrote  to  Sir  George  Barlow,  who  had  succeeded  to  the 
governorship  of  Madras,  "  I  have  not  only  received  the 
most  uncommon  attention  from  all  here,  but  learnt  from 
the  best  authority  that  the  accounts  of  my  mission  have 
been  received  with  the  greatest  satisfaction  at  Court. 
The  great  progress  which  the  French  have  made  and  are 
daily  making  here  satisfied  me  of  the  necessity  of  bringing 
matters  to  an  early  issue.  I  have  a  chance  of  complete 
victory.  I  shall,  at  all  events,  ascertain  exactly  how  we 
stand,  and  know  what  we  ought  to  do ;  and  if  I  do  not 
awaken  the  Persian  Court  from  their  delusion,  I  shall  at 
least  excite  the  jealousy  of  their  new  friends.  I  send 
Captain  Pasley  off  to-morrow  for  Court — ostensibly,  with 
a  letter  for  the  king ;  but  he  has  secret  instructions,  and 
will  be  able  to  make  important  observations.  He  is 
charged  with  a  full  declai-ation  of  my  sentiments  and 
instructions  in  an  official  form,  and  you  will,  I  think, 
when  you  see  that  declaration  of  the  whole  proceeding, 
think  it  calculated  for  the  object.  I  have  endeavoured  to 
combine  moderation  with  spirit,  and  to  inform  the  Persian 
Court,  in  language  that  cannot  irritate,  of  all  the  danger 

*  Malcolm  wrote  from  Bombay  on  the  IStli  of  April,  stating  the 
course  of  policy  he  intended  to  pursue,  and  the  tone  of  remonstrance 
he  purposed  to  adopt,  at  the  same  time  urging  the  Govern  or- General  to 
suspend  the  mission  of  Sir  Harford  Jones.  In  this  letter  he  says  that 
he  should  despair,  ' '  from  his  knowledge  of  Sir  Harford's  character  and 
former  petty  animosities  on  the  same  scene,  of  maintaining  concord  and 
unanimity  in  the  gulf  one  hour  after  his  arrival.  Sir  Harford,"  he 
added,  "is  not  in  possession  of  that  high  local  respect  and  consider- 
ation in  the  countries  to  which  he  is  deputed  that  should  attach  to  a 
national  representative." 


MALCOLM    UNSUCCESSFUL.  57 

of  their  French  connexion.  Captain  Pasley  will  reach 
Coui-t  on  the  20tli  of  June,  and  on  the  15th  of  July  I 
may  expect  to  be  able  to  give  you  some  satisfactory- 
account  of  his  success."  * 

But  in  this  he  was  over-sanguine.  The  French  envoy 
had  established  himself  too  securely  at  Teheran  to  be 
driven  thence  by  the  appearance  of  Malcolm  at  Bushire. 
A  little  too  impetuous,  perhaps — a  little  too  dictatorial, 
that  energetic  military  diplomatist  commenced  at  the 
wrong  end  of  his  work.  He  erred  in  dictating  to  the 
Persian  Court  the  dismissal  of  the  French  embassy  as  a 
preliminary  to  further  negotiations,  when  in  reality  it 
was  the  end  and  object  of  his  negotiations.  He  erred  in 
blurting  out  all  his  designs,  in  unfolding  the  scheme  of 
policy  he  intended  to  adopt,  and  so  committing  himself 
to  a  line  of  conduct  which  after-events  might  have 
rendered  it  expedient  to  modify  or  reject.  He  erred  in 
using  the  language  of  intimidation  at  a  time  when  he 
should  have  sought  to  inspire  confidence  and  diffuse  good- 
will among  the  officers  of  the  Persian  Court.  These  may 
not  have  been  the  causes  of  his  want  of  success ;  but  it 
is  certain  that  he  was  completely  unsuccessful.  The 
large  promises  and  the  prompt  movements  of  the  French 
contrasted  favourably  with  our  more  scanty  offers  and 
more  dilatory  action  ;  and  although  Malcolm  now  came 
laden  wdth  presents,  and  intending  to  pave  his  way  to 
the  Persian  capital  with  gold,  the  British  mission  was 
received  with  frigid  indifference,  if  not  with  absolute 
disrespect.  The  despatch  of  Captain  Pasley  to  the  capital 
was  negatived  by  the  Persian  Government.  His  progress 
was  an*ested  at  Shiraz  ;  and  there,  at  that  provincial  town, 
whilst  a  French  and  a  Russian  agent  were  basking  in  the 
royal  sunshine  at  Teheran,  and  were  entertained  as  guests 

*  MS.  Correspondence  of  Sir  John  Malcolm. 


58  THE    SECOND    MISSION    TO    PERSIA. 

of  the  prime  minister,  the  representative  of  Great  Britain 
was  told  that  he  must  conduct  his  negotiations  and 
content  himself  with  the  countenance  of  lesser  dignitaries 
of  state.  Persian  officers  were  instructed  to  amuse  the 
British  envoys,  and  to  gain  time.  "  The  earnest  desire  of 
the  king,"  wrote  the  prime  minister  to  Nussur-ood- 
Dowlah,  at  Shiraz,  "is  to  procrastinate,  and  to  avoid  all 
decided  measures.  You  must,  therefore,  amuse  General 
Malcolm  by  offering  your  assistance ; "  and  in  this  and 
other  letters  the  local  officers  at  Shiraz  were  instructed  by 
every  means  in  their  power  to  detain  Captain  Pasley  at 
that  place  ;  but  he  had  departed  before  they  were  received, 
or  it  is  difficult  to  say  in  what  manner  the  imperial  man- 
date might  not  have  been  obeyed.*  "  A  consideration  of 
all  these  things,"  wrote  Captain  Pasley  to  Government, 
"induces  me  to  conclude  that  the  subsisting  alliance 
between  the  Government  of  France  and  Persia  is  more 
intimate  than  we  have  yet  imagined — that  its  nature  is 
more  actively  and  deoidedly  hostile  to  our  interests  than 
has  hitherto  been  suspected,  and  that  the  reliance  of  the 
king  on  the  promises  and  assurances  of  the  French  agents 
must  be  founded  on  better  grounds  than  have  yet  come 
to  our  knowledge."  + 

Chafed  and  indignant  at  the  conduct  of  the  Persian 
Court,  General  Malcolm  at  once  came  to  the  determina- 
tion to  return  immediately  to  Calcutta,  and  to  report  to 
the  Supreme  Government  the  mortifying    result  of  his 

*  MS.  Records. — Copies  of  these  letters  were  obtained  by  the  Mission, 
and  are  now  before  me.  I  do  not  find  in  them  anything  to  give  colour 
to  the  suspicion  that  it  was  intended  forcibly  to  detain  Pasley  at  Shiraz. 
But  such  appears  to  have  been  the  impression  at  the  time,  and  may 
have  been  the  case.  Sir  James  Mackintosh,  writing  from  Bombay  to 
his  son-in-law,  Mr.  Kich,  at  Bagdad,  counsels  him  to  be  prepared  for 
a  rapid  retreat,  and  adds,  "  Pasley  was  very  nearly  made  prisoner  at 
Shiraz." 

t  MS.  Records, 


Malcolm's  withdrawal.  59 

mission.  On  the  12th  of  July  he  sailed  from  Bushire, 
leaving  the  charge  of  the  embassy  in  the  hands  of  Captain 
Pasley,  who  remained  at  his  post  only  to  be  insulted, 
and  at  last  narrowly  escaped  being  made  prisoner  by  a 
precipitate  retreat  from  the  Persian  dominions.*  The 
failure  of  the  mission,  indeed,  was  complete.  Persia  con- 
tinued to  make  professions  of  friendship  to  the  British 
Government;  but  it  was  obvious  that  at  that  moment 
neither  British  diplomacy  nor  British  gold,  which  was 
liberally  offered,  could  make  any  way  against  the  dominant 
influence  of  the  French  mission.  Napoleon's  officers  were 
drilling  the  Persian  army,  casting  cannon,  and  strengthen- 
ing the  Persian  fortresses  by  the  application,  for  the  first 
time,  to  their  barbaric  defences,  of  that  science  which  the 
French  engineers  had  learnt  in  such  perfection  from  the 
lessons  of  Vauban  and  Cormontagne. 

Of  the  wisdom  of  Malcolm's  abrupt  departure  from 
Bushire,  different  opinions  may  be  entertained.  On  the 
day  after  he  embarked  for  Calcutta,  one  of  the  most 
sagacious  men  then  in  India  was  seated  at  his  writing- 
table  discoursing,  for  Malcolm's  especial  benefit,  on  the 
advantages  of  delay.  "As  to  the  real  question,"  wrote 
Sir  James  Mackintosh  to  the  Brigadier-General,  "which 
you  have  to  decide  in  the  cabinet  council  of  your  own 
understanding,  whether  delay  in  Persia  be  necessarily 
and  universally  against  the  interests  of  Great  Britain,  it 
is  a  question  on  which  you  have  infinitely  greater  means 
of  correct  decision  than  I  can  pretend  to,  even  if  I  were 
foolish  enough,  on  such  matters,  to  aspire  to  any  rivalship 

*  ' '  General  Malcolm  came  round  to  Calcutta  in  August  to  commu- 
nicate the  information  he  had  been  able  to  collect,  leaving  his  secretary 
at  Abushire,  who  was  obliged  subsequently  to  quit  the  place  to  prevent 
his  person  being  seized  by  the  Persian  Government,  instigated  by  the 
French  agents." — [From  letter  of  Instructions  sent  by  Supreme  Goxern- 
ment  to  Mountstuart  Elphinstone,  in  1809. — MS.  Records.] 


60  THE    SECOND    MISSION    TO    PERSIA. 

with  a  man  of  your  tried  and  exercised  sagacity.  I 
should  just  venture  in  general  to  observe,  that  delay  is 
commonly  the  interest  of  the  power  which  is  on  the 
defensive.  As  long  as  the  delay  lasts,  it  answers  the 
purpose  of  victory,  which,  in  that  case,  is  only  preserva- 
tion. It  wears  out  the  spirit  of  enterprise  necessary  for 
assailants,  especially  such  as  embark  in  very  distant  and 
perilous  attempts.  It  familiarises  those  who  are  to  be 
attacked  with  the  danger,  and  allows  the  first  panic  time 
to  subside.  It  affords  a  chance  that  circumstances  may 
become  more  favourable ;  and  to  those  who  have  nothing 
else  in  their  favour,  it  leaves  at  least  the  'chapter  of 
accidents.'"*  The  'chapter  of  accidents'  is  everyihing  in 
Oriental  diplomacy.  Malcolm,  too  impetuous  to  profit 
by  it,  left  his  successor  to  reap  the  harvest  of  altered 
circumstances.  Sir  Harford  Jones,  who  had  been  waiting 
his  opportunity  at  Bombay,  entered  the  arena  of  diplomacy 
a  few  months  later  than  Malcolm,  and  his  progress  was  a 
long  ovation.  It  was  the  'chapter  of  accidents'  that 
secured  his  success. 

On  the  first  receipt  of  intelligence  of  General  Malcolm's 
withdrawal.  Lord  Minto  despatched  a  letter  to  Sir 
Harford  Jones,  urging  him  to  proceed  to  Persia  with  the 

*  Another  passage  from  this  letter  is  worth  quoting  in  the  margin  : 
— "What  I  doubt  (for  I  presume  to  go  no  further),  is,  whether  it  be 
for  our  interest  to  force  on  the  course  of  events  in  the  present  circum- 
stances. You  are  a  man  of  frank  character  and  high  spirit,  accustomed 
to  represent  a  successful  and  triumphant  government.  You  must  from 
nature  and  habit  be  averse  to  temporise.  But  you  have  much  too 
powerful  an  understanding  to  need  to  be  told,  that  to  temporise  is 
sometimes  absolutely  necessary,  and  that  men  of  your  character  only 
can  temporise  with  effect.  When  Gentz  was  in  England,  in  1803 
(during  the  peace),  he  said  to  me,  that  'it  required  the  present 
system,  and  the  late  ministers  ; '  for  nothing  required  the  reality  and 
the  reputation  of  vigour  so  much  as  temporising." — [Mackintosh  to 
Malcolm,  July  U,  1808.] 


DEPARTURE   OF   SIR   H.    JONES.  61 

least  possible  delay.  But  he  very  soon  revoked  those 
orders,  and  addressed  to  the  English  envoy*  stringent 
communications,  desiring  him  to  remain  at  Bombay.* 
Malcolm  had  reached  Calcutta  in  the  interval;  and  set 
forth,  in  strong  colours,  the  nature  of  the  influence  that 
had  been  opposed  to  his  advance,  and  mapped  out  a  plan 
of  action  which,  in  his  estimation,  it  would  now  be 
expedient  to  adopt.  Lord  Minto  appears  to  have  fallen 
readily  into  the  views  of  the  military  diplomatist ;  but  he 
failed  altogether  to  cut  short  the  career  of  Sir  Harford 
Jones.  Letters  travelled  slowly  in  those  days  ;  and  before 
the  missive  of  the  Governor-General,  ordering  his  deten- 
tion, had  reached  Bombay,  the  vessel  which  was  to  bear 
the  representative  of  the  Court  of  London  to  the  Persian 
Gulf  had  shaken  out  its  sails  to  the  wind. 

On  the  14th  of  October  the  Mission  reached  Bushire. 
Sir  Harford  Jones  set  about  his  work  earnestly  and  con- 
scientiously. He  had  difficulties  to  contend  against  of 
no  common  order,  and  it  must  be  admitted  that  he  faced 
them  manfully.  He  found  the  Persian  authorities  but 
too  well  disposed  to  arrogance  and  insolence ;    and   he 

*  The  first  letter  appears  to  have  been  written  on  the  10th  of  August. 
On  the  22nd,  Brigadier  Malcolm  landed  at  Calcutta.  On  the  same  day 
a  letter  was  sent  to  Sir  Harford  Jones,  directing  him  to  wait  for  further 
orders,  and  on  the  29th  another  and  more  urgent  communication  was 
addressed  to  him,  with  the  intent  of  annulliag  his  mission.  It  appears 
that  in  those  days  a  letter  took  more  than  three  weeks  to  accomplish 
the  journey  between  Calcutta  and  Bombay.  The  Governor-General's 
letter  of  the  10th  of  August  must  have  reached  the  latter  place  about 
the  5th  of  September.  Jones  says,  "In  seven  days  from  receiving 
Lord  Minto' s  letter,  I  embarked  on  board  La  Nereide,  and  she,  with 
the  Sapphire,  and  a  very  small  vessel  belonging  to  the  Company,  called 
the  Sylph,  sailed  out  of  Bombay  harbour  for  Persia  on  the  12th  of 
September,  1808."  Malcolm  had  calculated  that  the  letter  of  August 
22nd  would  reach  Bombay  by  September  18th ;  and  that  in  all  pro- 
bability Jones  would  not  embark  before  that  date.  But,  as  usual,  he 
was  over-sanguine. 


62  THE    SECOND    MISSION    TO    PERSIA. 

met  their  pompous  impertinence  with  a  blustering 
bravery,  which  may  have  been  wanting  in  dignity,  but 
was  not  without  effect.  He  bulhed  and  blasphemed,  and, 
after  a  series  of  not  very  becoming  scenes,  made  his  way 
to  Teheran,  where  he  was  graciously  received  by  the 
Shah.  The  *  chapter  of  accidents'  had  worked  mightily 
in  his  favour.  The  reign  of  Gallic  influence  was  at  an 
end.  Our  enemies  had  overreached  themselves,  and  been 
caught  in  their  own  toils.  Before  Napoleon  and  the  Czar 
had  thrown  themselves  into  each  other's  arms  at  Tilsit, 
it  had  been  the  policy  of  the  French  to  persuade  the 
Persian  Court  that  the  aggressive  designs  of  Russia  could 
be  successfully  counteracted  only  by  a  power  at  enmity 
with  that  state ;  and  now  Napoleon  boasted  that  he  and 
the  Emperor  were  "  invariablement  unis  pour  la  paix 
comme  pour  la  guerre." 

Skilfully  taking  advantage  of  this.  Sir  Harford  Jones 
ever  as  he  advanced  inculcated  the  doctrine  which  had 
emanated  in  the  first  instance  from  the  French  embassy, 
and  found  every  one  he  addressed  most  willing  to 
accept  it.  There  was,  fortunately  for  us,  a  galling  fact 
ever  present  to  the  minds  of  the  Persian  ministers  to 
convince  them  of  the  truth  of  the  assertion  that  it  was 
not  by  the  friends,  but  by  the  enemies  of  Russia  that 
their  interests  were  to  be  best  promoted.  The  French 
had  undertaken  to  secure  the  evacuation  of  Georgia ;  but 
stni  the  Russian  eagles  were  planted  on  Georgian  soil. 
The  star  of  Napoleon's  destiny  was  no  longer  on  the 
ascendant.  The  "Sepoy  General,"  whom  he  had  once 
derided,  was  tearing  his  battalions  to  pieces  in  the 
Spanish  peninsula.  Moreover,  the  French  had  lost 
ground  at  Teheran,  in  their  personal  as  in  their  political 
relations.  They  had  not  accommodated  themselves  to 
the  manners  of  the  Persian  Court,  nor  conciliated,  by  a 
courteous  and  considerate  demeanour,  the   good-will   of 


DECLINE  OF  FRENCH  INFLUENCE.  63 

their  new  allies.  They  were  many  degrees  less  popular 
than  the  English,  and  their  influence  melted  away  at 
the  approach  of  the  British  envoy.  The  Shah,  too,  had 
by  this  time,  not  improbably,  become  suspicious  of  the 
designs  of  the  French.  It  was  urged  with  some  force 
that  if  the  French  invaded  India  they  would  not  leave 
Persia  alone.  Mahomed  Shereef  Khan,  who  was  sent 
by  Nussur-oolah-Khan  to  General  Malcolm  just  before 
his  departure  from  Bushu'e,  to  repeat  the  friendly 
assurances  of  the  Persian  Government,  very  sagaciously 
observed,  "  If  the  French  march  an  army  to  India,  will 
they  not  make  themselves  masters  of  Persia  as  a  necessary 
prelude  to  further  conquests,  and  who  is  to  oppose  them 
after  they  have  been  received  as  friends  1  But  our  king," 
continued  the  old  man,  "  dreams  of  the  Russians.  He 
sees  them  in  Aderbijan,  and  within  a  short  distance  of 
the  capital,  and,  despairing  of  his  own  strength,  he  is 
ready  to  make  any  sacrifice  to  obtain  a  temporary  relief 
from  his  excessive  fear.  In  short,"  he  concluded,  whilst 
strong  emotion  proved  his  sincerity,  "  affairs  have  come 
to  that  state  that  I  thank  my  God  I  am  an  old  man, 
and  have  a  chance  of  dying  before  I  see  the  disgrace 
and  ruin  of  my  country."*  Had  Malcolm  remained  a 
little  longer  at  Bushire,  he  would  have  seen  all  these 
dreams  of  French  assistance  pass  away  from  the  imagi- 
nations of  the  Persian  Court,  and  might,  imder  the 
force  of  altered  circumstances,  have  carried  everything 
before  him. 

When  Sir  Harfbrd  Jones  reached  the  Pei'sian  capital. 
General  Gardanne  had  withdrawn;  and  there  was  little 
difficulty  in  arranging  preliminaries  of  a  treaty  satis- 
factory ahke  to  the  Courts  of  Teheran  and  St.  James's. 
The  work  was  not  done  in  a  very  seemly  manner ;  but  it 

•  MS,  Correspondence. 


64  THE    SECOND   MISSION   TO   PERSIA. 

was  not  less  serviceable  when  done,  for  the  manner  of  its 
doing.  Perhaps  there  is  not  another  such  chapter  as  this 
in  the  entire  history  of  English  diplomacy.  Jones  had 
left  Bombay  under  the  impression  that  he  was  acting 
in  accordance  with  the  wishes  of  Lord  Minto  ;  but  he 
had  not  been  long  in  Persia  before  he  found  that  the 
Indian  Government  were  bent  upon  suspending  his  opera- 
tions, and,  failing  in  this,  were  resolute  to  thwart  him  at 
every  turn.  They  dishonoured  his  bills  and  ignored  his 
proceedings.  A  totally  opposite  course  of  policy  had  been 
determined  upon  in  the  Council-Chamber  of  Calcutta, 
The  proceedings  of  Brigadier  Malcolm  at  Bushire  had  not 
been  viewed  with  unmixed  approbation  by  Lord  Minto 
and  his  council ;  but  he  was  the  employe  of  the  Indian 
Government ;  they  had  confidence  in  the  general  sound- 
ness of  his  views ;  and  they  felt  that  in  the  maintenance 
of  their  dignity  it  was  expedient  to  support  him.  In  no 
very  conciliatory  mood  of  mind  had  that  eager,  energetic 
officer  returned  to  Calcutta.  Chewing  the  cud  of  bitter 
fancies  as  he  sailed  up  the  Bay  of  Bengal,  he  prepared  a 
plan  for  the  intimidation  of  Persia,  and  was  prepared 
with  all  the  details  of  it  when,  on  the  22nd  of  August,  he 
disembarked  at  Calcutta.  There  was  no  unwiUingness 
in  the  Council-Chamber  to  endorse  his  schemes.  It  was 
agreed  that  an  armament  should  be  fitted  out  to  take 
possession  of  Karrack,  an  island  in  the  Persian  Gulf,  or,  in 
the  delicate  language  of  diplomacy,  "  to  form  an  establish- 
ment" there,  as  "a  central  position  equally  well  adapted 
so  obstruct  the  designs  of  France  against  India,  as  to 
assist  the  King  of  Persia  (in  the  event  of  a  renewal  of  the 
alliance)  against  his  European  enemies." 

These  measures  were  described  as  "  entirely  defensive, 
and  intended  even  to  be  amicable."  The  command  of  the 
force  was  of  course  conferred  on  Brigadier  Malcolm.  "  I 
am  vested,"  he  wrote  to  his   Mends  at  Madras,  "with 


THE    EXPEDITION    TO    THE    GULF.  65 

supreme  military  and  political  authority  and  control  in 
the  Gulf,  to  which,  however  threatening  appearances  may 
be,  I  proceed  with  that  species  of  hope  which  fills  the 
mind  of  a  man  who  sees  a  great  and  unexpected  oppor- 
tunity afforded  him  of  proving  the  extent  of  his  devotion 
to  the  country."*  It  was  to  be  a  very  pretty  little  army, 
with  a  compact  little  staff,  all  the  details  of  which,  even 
to  the  allowances  of  its  members,  were  soon  drawn  up  and 
recorded.  An  engineer  officer  was  called  in  and  consulted 
about  the  plan  of  a  fort,  with  a  house  for  the  commandant, 
quarters  for  the  officers,  barracks  for  the  men,  a  magazine 
to  contain  five  hundred  barrels  of  gunpowder,  and  every- 
thing else  complete.  The  activity  of  the  Brigadier 
himself  at  this  time  was  truly  surprising.  He  drew  up 
elaborate  papers  of  instructions  to  himself,  to  be  adopted 
by  the  Governor-General.  One  of  these,  covering  twenty- 
six  sheets  of  foolscap,  so  bewildered  Lord  Minto  in  his 
pleasant  country  retreat  at  Barrackpore,  that  he  could 
come  to  no  other  conclusion  about  it  than  that  the 
greater  part  had  better  be  omitted.  Every  conceivable 
contingency  that  could  arise  out  of  the  movements  of 
France  or  Russia,  or  dispensations  of  Providence  in  Persia, 
was  contemplated  and  discussed,  and  instructions  were 
sought  or  suggested ;  but  a  new  series  of  contingencies 
occurred  to  the  Brigadier  after  he  had  embarked,  and  a 
new  shower  of  ifs  was  poured  forth  from  the  Sand-heads 
still  further  to  perplex  the  government.  Lord  Minto  had 
by  this  time  fully  made  up  his  mind  that  the  French  were 
coming ;  wrote  of  it,  not  as  a  possible  event,  but  as  a 
question  merely  of  time  ;  and  contemplated  the  proba- 
bility of  contending  in  Turkey  for  the  sovereignty  of 
Hindostan.t     But  the  French  had  too  much  work  to  do 

*  MS.  CoiTespondence, 
t  For  example,  in  one  of  his  minutes  written  about  this  time,  he 
says  :  "It  appears  doubtful  whether  the  partition  of  European  Turkey 

TOL.  I.  F 


66  THE   SECOND    MISSION    TO    PERSIA. 

in  Europe  to  trouble  themselves  about  operations  in  the 
remote  Asiatic  world. 

At  the  beginning  of  October,  Malcolm  started  for 
Bombay,  from  which  Presidency  the  details  of  his  army 
were  to  be  drawn.  But  before  the  vessel  on  which  he  had 
embarked  had  steered  into  the  black  water,  he  was 
recalled,  in  consequence  of  the  receipt  of  intelligence 
of  Sir  Harford  Jones's  intended  departure  for  Bushire. 
This  was,  doubtless,  very  perplexing;  but  Malcolm  did 
not  despair.  "  I  am  this  instant,"  he  wrote,  on  the  5th 
of  October,  "  recalled  to  Calcutta  in  consequence  of 
advices  from  Sir  Harford,  stating  his  intention  of  leaving 
Bombay  on  the  11th  of  September.  As  it  appears 
possible  that  he  may  not  be  ready  to  sail  before  the  13th, 
he  will,  I  think,  receive  a  letter  from  this  government  of 
the  22nd,  desiring  him  to  stay ;  and  if  that  has  the  effect 
of  stopping  him,  the  letter  of  the  Supreme  Government, 
dated  the  29th,  will  probably  put  an  end  to  the  mission."* 
Vain  hope  !  Sir  Harford  Jones  was  at  that  time  not  many 
days'  sail  from  Bushire ;  and  before  Malcolm  finally 
quitted  Calcutta,  had  started  fairly  on  his  race  to  Teheran. 

The  Supreme  Government  now  more  urgently  than 
before  addressed  instructions  to  the  nominee  of  the  British 
Cabinet,  ordering  him  to  retire  from  Persia.  The  Council 
were  aU  agreed  upon  the  subject.  Mr.  Lumsden  and  Mr. 
Colebrooke,  who  were  Members  of  Council  at  the  time, 

will  precede  tlie  French  expedition  to  India.  There  appears  to  be 
reason,  by  the  late  advices,  to  suppose  that  the  consent  of  the  Porte 
may  have  been  obtained  to  the  passage  of  the  French  army.  In  this 
case,  the  approach  of  the  army  may  be  earlier  than  on  the  former  sup- 
position, and  it  will  have  less  difficulty  to  encounter.  The  route  of 
our  divisions  must  in  this  event  be  through  the  territory  of  Bagdad. 
.  .  .  I  incline,  under  all  the  circumstances  now  known  to  me,  to 
think  that  the  force  stationed  at  Karrack  should  be  greater  than  we 
before  looked  to"— [MS.  Records.] 
*  MS.  Correspondeiice  of  Sir  John  Malcolm. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   SIR   II.    JONES.  67 

expressed  themselves  even  more  strongly  on  the  subject 
than  the  Governor-General.  All  were  certain  that  Sir 
Harford  Jones  must  either  fail  signally,  or  disgrace  and 
embaiTass  the  government  by  a  delusive  success.  He 
might  be  repulsed  at  Bushire — or  baffled  at  Shiraz — or 
drawn  into  a  treaty  favourable  to  the  French.  In  any 
case,  it  was  assumed  that  he  was  sure  to  bring  discredit 
on  the  British  Government  and  the  East  India  Company. 
Without  asserting  that  the  conduct  of  the  Persian  Court 
had  been  such  as  to  call  for  a  declaration  of  war  from  the 
rulers  of  British  India,  it  was  contended,  and  not,  perhaps, 
without  some  show  of  reason,  that  any  advances  made  at 
such  a  time  would  compromise  its  dignity,  and  that  the 
attitude  to  be  assumed  should  be  rather  one  of  reserve 
than  of  solicitation.  Both  parties  were  in  an  embarrass- 
ing position.  Whilst  Lord  Minto  was  writing  letters  to 
Sir  Harford  Jones,  teUing  him  that  if  he  did  not  imme- 
diately close  his  mission,  all  his  proceedings  would  be 
publicly  repudiated,*  Sir  Harford  Jones,  as  representative 
of  the  sovereign,  was  repudiating  the  proceedings  of  the 
Supreme  Government  of  India,  and  offering  to  answer 
with  his  fortune  and  his  life  for  any  hostile  proceedings 
on  the  part  of  the  British,  not  provoked  by  the  Persians 
themselves.  The  government  did  its  best  to  disgrace  Sir 
Harford  Jones  by  dishonouring  his  bills  and  ignoring  his 
proceedings  ;  and  Sir  Harford  Jones  lowered  the  character 
of  the  Indian  Government  by  declaring  that  it  had  no 
authority  to  revoke  his  measures  or  to  nullify  his  engage- 
ments with  the  Persian  Court. 

*  In  one  of  these  letters,  written  in  February,  1809,  it  is  said  :  "I 
cannot  venture  to  omit  acquainting  you  that,  in  the  event  of  your  not 
complying,  without  further  reference  or  delay,  with  the  instructions 
conveyed  in  this  letter,  by  closing  your  mission  and  retiring  from 
Persia,  it  has  been  determined,  and  measures  have  been  taken  accord- 
ingly, to  disavow  your  public  character  in  that  country  subsequrait  to 
your  receipt  of  my  letter  of  31st  of  October."— [if 5.  Eecords.] 

»2 


68  THE    SECOND    MISSION    TO    PERSIA, 

In  the  mean  while,  Brigadier  Malcolm  had  sailed  down 
the  Bay  of  Bengal,  and  reached  Bombay  by  the  first  day 
of  December.  His  instructions  had  preceded  him  ;  a 
select  force  of  some  two  thousand  men  was  ready  to 
receive  his  orders ;  and  by  the  18th  of  January  the 
expedition  was  prepared,  at  all  points,  to  take  ship  for  the 
Gulf,  to  pounce  upon  Karrack,  and  to  strike  a  great  panic 
into  the  rebellious  heart  of  the  Persian  nation.  "  But," 
says  Malcolm,  in  one  of  his  voluminous  narratives,  "  the 
accounts  I  heard  of  the  great  change  caused  in  the  affairs 
of  Europe  by  the  general  insurrection  of  Spain,  and  the 
consequent  improbability  of  Buonaparte  making  an  early 
attack  upon  India,  combined  with  the  advance  of  Sir 
Harford  Jones  into  Persia,  led  me  to  suspend  the  sailing 
of  the  expedition.  My  conduct  on  that  occasion  was 
honoured  by  approbation,  and  the  expedition  counter- 
manded." But  though  the  military  expedition  was 
countermanded,  the  Mission  was  not.  Malcolm,  confident 
that  the  proceedings  of  such  a  man  as  Jones,  for  whom 
he  entertained  the  profoundest  possible  contempt,  could 
be  attended  only  with  disastrous  failure,  determined  to 
proceed  to  Persia,  in  spite  of  the  civihan's  accounts  of 
his  favourable  reception.  "  I  have  private  accounts  from 
Bushire,"  he  wrote  on  Christmas-eve,  "which  state  that 
Sir  Harford  Jones  is,  or  pretends  to  be,  completely 
confident  of  a  success  which  every  child  with  him  sees  is 
unattainable  through  the  means  he  uses.  His  friends 
now  believe  he  wiU  go  on  in  spite  of  any  orders  he  may 
receive  from  the  Governor-General.  /  mean  to  go  on  too 
(there  is,  indeed,  nothing  in  these  despatches  that  can 
stop  me  for  a  moment),  so  we  shall  have  2i,fine  mess  (as  the 
sailors  say)  in  the  Gulf"*  Such,  indeed,  was  the  feeling 
between  the  two  diplomatists,  and  so  little  was  it  dis- 

*  MS.  Correspondence  of  Sir  John  Malcolm — DeccmSer  24,  1808. 


THE   TREATY   EXCHANGED.  69 

guised,  that  the  Shah,  perceiving  plainly  the  true  state 
of  the  case,  abused  Malcolm  before  Jones,  and  Jones 
before  Malcolm,  as  the  best  means,  in  his  opinion,  of 
ingratiating  himself  with  them  both. 

In  March,  1809,  the  prehminary  treaty  was  inter- 
changed, on  the  part  of  their  respective  sovereigns,  by 
Sir  Harford  Jones  and  Meerza  ShefFee.  No  treaty  before 
or  since  was  ever  interchanged  under  such  extraordinary 
and  unbecoming  circumstances.  Meerze  ShefFee,  the 
prime  minister  of  Persia,  was  an  old  and  infirm  man. 
His  age  and  rank  among  his  own  people  had  given  him  a 
sort  of  license  to  speak  with  an  amount  of  freedom  such 
as  is  not  tolerated  among  Europeans  in  social,  much  less 
in  diplomatic  converse.  There  was  an  intentional  indefi- 
niteness  in  one  of  the  articles  of  the  treaty,  which  was  to 
be  referred  to  the  British  Government  for  specific  adjust- 
ment, and  Meerza  Sheffee,  not  understanding  or  approving 
of  this,  blurted  out  that  the  British  envoy  designed  to 
"  cheat "  him.  The  figure  used  in  the  Persian  language 
is  gross  and  offensive,  and  the  word  I  have  employed  but 
faintly  expresses  the  force  of  the  insult.  Jones  had  not 
patience  to  bear  it.  He  started  up,  seized  the  comiter- 
part  treaty  lying  signed  on  the  carpet  before  him,  gave 
it  to  Mr.  Morier,  and  then  turning  to  the  astonished 
Wuzeer,  told  him  that  he  was  a  stupid  old  blockhead  to 
dare  to  use  such  words  to  the  representative  of  the  King 
of  England,  and  that  nothing  but  respect  for  the  Persian 
monarch  restrained  him  from  knocking  out  the  old  man's 
brains  against  the  wall.  "  Suiting  the  action  to  the  word, 
I  then,"  says  Jones,  in  his  own  narrative  of  his  mission, 
"  pushed  him  with  a  slight  degree  of  violence  against  the 
wall  w^hich  was  behind  him,  kicked  over  the  candles  on 
the  floor,  left  the  room  in  darkness,  and  rode  home 
without  any  one  of  the  Persians  daring  to  impede  my 
passage."     It  is  not  surprising  that,  after  such  a  scene 


70  THE    SECOND    MISSION    TO    PERSIA. 

as  this,  the  Persians  should  have  shaken  their  heads, 
and  said,  "  By  Allah !  this  Feringhee  is  either  diTink 
or  mad." 

But,  in  spite  of  this  and  other  untoward  occurrences, 
the  preliminary  treaty  was  duly  interchanged.  It  bears 
date  the  12th  of  March,  1809.  By  this  treaty,  the  Shah 
of  Persia,  declaring  all  other  engagements  void,  cove- 
nanting "  not  to  permit  any  European  force  whatever  to 
pass  through  Persia,  either  towards  India,  or  towards 
the  ports  of  that  country."  He  further  undertook,  in 
the  event  of  the  British  dominions  in  India  being  attacked 
or  invaded  by  the  Afghans  or  any  other  power,  "to 
afford  a  force  for  the  protection  of  the  said  dominions." 
On  the  part  of  the  British  Government,  it  was  stipulated 
that,  in  case  any  European  force  had  invaded,  or  should 
invade,  the  territories  of  the  King  of  Persia,  his 
Britannic  Majesty  should  afford  to  the  Shah  a  force,  or,  in 
lieu ,  of  it,  a  subsidy,  with  warhke  ammunition,  such  as 
guns,  muskets,  &c.,  and  officers,  to  the  amount  that 
might  be  to  the  advantage  of  both  parties,  for  the  expul- 
sion of  the  force  so  invading."  The  general  provisions  of 
the  treaty  were  included  in  this,  but  the  anticipated 
arrival  of  Brigadier  Malcolm  with  a  military  expedition 
in  the  Persian  Gulf  rendered  it  necessary  that  certain 
specific  articles  should  be  inserted  with  especial  reference 
to  this  movement.  It  was  provided  that  the  force  should 
on  no  account  possess  itself  of  Karrack  or  any  other 
places  in  the  Persian  Gulf ;  but  that,  unless  required  by 
the  Governor-General  for  the  defence  of  India,  it  should 
be  held  at  the  disposal  of  the  Persian  shah,  the  Shah 
undertaking  to  receive  it  in  a  friendly  manner,  and  to 
direct  his  governors  to  supply  it  with  provisions  "  at  the 
fair  prices  of  the  day."  This  preliminary  treaty  was  con- 
veyed by  Mr.  Morier,  accompanied  by  a  Persian  ambas- 
sador,  to  England,  where  it  was  duly  ratified   and   ex- 


EMBARRASSMENTS    OF   GOVERNMENT.  71 

changed;  and  Sir  Harford    Jones  was  confirmed  in  the 
post  of  Resident  Minister  at  the  Court  of  Teheran. 

The  success  of  Sir  Harford  Jones  embarrassed  the 
British-Indian  Government  even  more  than  did  the  appre- 
hension of  his  failure.  Lord  Minto  and  his  councillors 
were  sorely  perplexed.  It  was  desirable,  as  they  all 
acknowledged,  that  the  engagements  entered  into  by  the 
representative  of  the  Court  of  England  should  be  com- 
pleted ;  but  it  was  not  desirable  that  the  Indian  Govern- 
ment should  be  degraded  in  the  eyes  of  the  Persian  Court. 
Between  their  anxiety  to  accept  the  thing  done  and  to 
disgrace  the  doer,  they  were  thrown  into  a  state  of  ludi- 
crous embarrassment.*  The  resolution,  however,  at  which 
they  arrived  w^as,  under  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case, 
as  reasonable  as  could  be  expected.  It  was  determined  to 
accept  Sir  Harford  Jones's  treaty,  and  to  leave  the  dignity 
of  the  British-Indian  Government  to  be  vindicated  on  a 

*  Mr.  Lumsden  wrote  a  minute  (Jxily  10,  1809),  in  which  he  says  : 
"  We  must  either  continue  to  employ  at  the  Court  of  Persia  an  agent 
in  whom  we  have  no  confidence,  who  has  studiously  endeavoured  to 
degrade  the  authority  of  the  Government  of  India,  under  whose  orders 
he  was  placed  ;  or  by  deputing  an  agent  of  our  own  to  Teheran,  whilst 
he  continues  there  acknowledged  by  the  Persian  Government  as  the 
representative  of  his  Britannic  Majesty,  we  may  expose  the  public 
interest  to  danger  from  the  presence  in  Persia  of  two  distinct 
authorities,  who  cannot  act  in  concert,  but  will,  it  is  to  be  feared, 
necessarily  counteract  each  other,  and  occasion  great  perplexity  to  the 
Persian  minister. "  At  the  same  time,  Mr.  Colebrooke  wrote  :  * '  Our 
situation  as  regards  Sir  H.  Jones  is  certainly  difficult  and  embarrassing 
in  the  extreme.  We  are  desirous  of  fulfilling  the  engagements  he  has 
contracted,  and  of  maintaining  the  alliance  concluded  by  him.  And 
we  are  glad  that  he  should  continue  at  the  Court  of  Persia  to  watch 
the  wavering  counsels  of  that  Court,  and  to  oppose  the  revival  of  French 
influence  at  it,  until  he  can  be  replaced  by  our  own  envoy  ;  but  by 
either  re-accrediting  him  with  the  Court,  or  silently  executing  his 
engagements,  we  acquiesce  in  the  continued  degradation  of  this  govern- 
ment."— [MS.  Records.] 


72  THE    SECOND    MISSION    TO    PERSIA. 

future  occasion.  Perhaps  it  would  have  been  even  better 
quietly  to  have  lived  down  the  slight ;  for  it  cost  a  large 
sum  of  money  to  satisfy  the  British-Indian  Government 
that  it  had  re-established  its  name  at  the  Court  of  the 
Persian,  and  confounded  the  malignity  of  Jones.* 

This  is  a  curious  chapter  of  diplomatic  history.  It  is 
one,  too,  which  has  evoked  from  the  partisans  of  both 
parties  an  extraordinary  amount  of  bitterness.  It  hardly 
comes  within  the  proper  compass  of  this  history  to  narrate 
the  incidents  of  the  ambassadorial  war,  still  less  to  com- 
ment upon  them.  But  it  may  be  briefly  remarked  that 
all  parties  were  wrong.  Mistakes  were  unquestionably 
committed  by  Malcolm,  by  Jones,  and  by  the  Indian 
Government.  There  was  an  old  feud  between  the  two 
former,  which  certainly  did  not  tend  to  smooth  down  the 
difficulties  which  had  arisen ;  and  the  Government  of 
India  was  not  very  patient  of  the  home-born  interference 
with  what  it  conceived  to  be  its  rightful  diplomatic  prero- 
gative. Jones,  though  receiving  his  credentials  from  the 
Crown,  was  placed  in  subordination  to  the  local  govern- 
ment, and  ought  to  have  obeyed  its  mandates.  That  he 
would  have  done  so,  had  he  received  instructions  to  with- 
draw before  he  had  fairly  entered  upon  his  work,  it  is  only 
just  to  assume  ;  but  having  once  made  his  appearance  in 
Persia  as  the  representative  of  his -sovereign,  he  thought 
that  he  could  not  abandon  his  mission  under  orders  from 

*  On  the  details  of  Malcolm's  supplementary  mission  it  is  unneces- 
sary to  dwell.  Its  political  results  are  compressible  into  the  smallest 
possible  space.  It  was,  indeed,  a  mere  pageant ;  and  a  very  costly, 
but  not  wholly  a  profitless  one.  It  yielded  a  considerable  harvest  of 
literary  and  scientific  results,  among  the  most  important  of  which  may 
be  mentioned  Malcolm's  elaborate  and  valuable  **  History  of  Persia" 
and  the  present  Sir  Henry  Pottinger's  admirable  "Account  of  Belu- 
chistan  ;"  works  which,  it  has  been  well  said,  "not  only  filled  up  an 
important  blank  in  our  knowledge  of  the  East,  but  which  materially 
helped  to  fix  the  literary  character  of  the  Indian  services  " 


CONDUCT   OF   SIR   H.    JONES.  73 

the  Indian  Government  without  lowering  the  dignity  of 
the  Crown. 

He  did  not  commence  his  expedition  to  Persia  until 
some  time  after  Malcolm  had  retired ;  and  when  he 
went  at  last,  it  was  under  urgent  solicitations  from  the 
Governor- General  to  proceed  there  without  delay.  He 
cannot,  therefore,  be  charged  with  indelicacy  or  pre- 
cipitancy. He  went  only  when  the  coast  was  clear.  That 
he  succeeded  better  than  Malcolm  must  be  attributed 
mainly  to  the  "  chapter  of  accidents,"  for  he  was  a  man 
of  vastly  inferior  parts.  Malcolm  says  that  it  was  owing 
to  his  measures  that  Jones  was  enabled  to  advance — that 
the  rumour  of  his  military  preparations  overawed  the 
Persian  Court — and  that  all  the  rest  was  done  by  bribery. 
That  there  was  at  that  time  little  hope  of  any  mission 
succeeding  without  bribery,  no  man  know  better  than 
Malcolm.*  But  Malcolm  could  not  bribe  his  way  to 
Teheran  in  the  spring,  because  the  French  were  then 
dominant  at  Court.      Had  he  waited  till  the  autumn,  the 

*  It  is  just  to  Sir  John  Malcolm  that  his  views  of  this  question  of 
bribery,  with  reference  to  his  proceedings  and  those  of  Sir  H.  Jones, 
should  be  given  in  his  own  words  :  "Everything  then,"  he  wrote, 
**with  Jones  is  a  question  of  money.  By  cash  alone  all  political 
questions  are  decided — one  article  of  a  treaty  he  values  at  so  much, 
another  has  its  price  also.  Is  a  French  agent  to  be  removed  ?  the  price 
of  his  dismissal  is  as  regularly  settled  as  the  price  of  a  horse.  The 
dismissal  of  one  (Monsieur  Jouanin)  has  been  purchased  four  times — 
three  times  by  advances  of  subsidy,  and  once  with  50,000  piastres  to 
monsieur  himself ;  and  I  suspect  the  convenient  instrument  of  extortion 
is  not  yet  far  from  Tabruz.  This  is  a  country  in  which  one  cannot  go 
on  without  a  large  expenditure  of  money  ;  but  it  should  never  form  the 
basis  of  our  connection,  as  it  now  does ;  and  if  we  add  to  our  large 
annual  bribe  (for  a  pecuniary  subsidy  over  the  application  or  which 
we  have  no  control,  must  be  considered  such)  disbursements  on  every 
occasion  where  Persia  shows  an  inclination  towards  our  enemies,  we 
shall  lose  both  our  money  and  our  reputation." — [^Brigadier  Malcolm 
to  Mr.  Manesty,  Feb.  23,  1810.     MS.'\ 


74  THE    SECOND    MISSION    TO    PERSIA. 

road  would  have  been  lubricated  for  him.  One  thing  at 
least  is  certain.  Nothing  could  have  been  more  fortunate 
than  the  miscarriage  of  Malcolm's  mihtary  expedition.  It 
would  have  embarrassed  our  future  proceedings,  and 
entailed  a  large  waste  of  public  money.  As  to  the  ques- 
tion of  prerogative,  it  would  be  little  use  to  discuss  it.  It 
has  been  settled  long  ago.  The  Crown  ministers  have 
taken  into  their  own  hands  the  appointment  of  our 
Persian  ambassadors,  and  the  conduct  of  all  subsequent 
negotiations  with  the  Persian  Court.  Henceforth  we  shall 
have  to  regard  the  relations  subsisting  between  Persia 
and  Great  Britain  as  aiFairs  beyond  the  control  of  the 
East  India  Company  and  their  representatives,  and  to  look 
upon  the  ministers  of  the  Crown  as  responsible  for 
all  that  we  have  to  contemplate  in  that  quarter  of  the 
world.* 

*  From  1826  to  1835,  however,  the  nomination  of  the  Persian  envoy 
was  again  vested  in  the  Indian  Government  ;  but  the  diplomatic 
control  was  not  relinquished  by  the  Foreign-office. 


Note  to  New  Edition  (1856).— The  arguments  with  which  Malcolm 
Bupported  the  proposal  for  the  occupation  of  the  island  of  Karrack,  may 
be  advantageously  given  in  this  place,  as  they  are  set  forth  in  his  own 
words  in  his  "  Life  and  Correspondence  "  : — 

First.  That  in  the  event  of  an  attempt  to  invade  India  being 
made  by  an  European  State,  ifc  was  impossible  to  place  any  depend- 
ence on  the  efforts  of  the  King  of  Persia  or  the  Pacha  of  Baghdad, 
unless  we  possessed  the  immediate  power  of  punishing  their 
hostility  and  treachery. 

Secondly.  That  the  States  of  Persia,  Eastern  Turkey,  and  Arabia 
were,  from  their  actual  condition,  to  be  considered  less  in  the  light 
of  regular  Governments  than  as  countries  full  of  combustible 
materials,  which  any  nation  whose  interests  it  promoted,  might 
throw  into  a  flame. 

Thirdly.  That  though  the  French  and  Russians  might,  no  doubt, 
in  their  advance,  easily  conquer  those  States,  in  the  event  of  their 


ARGUMENTS    FOR    THE    OCCUPATION    OF    KARRACK.        75 

opposing  their  progress,  it  was  tlieir  obvious  policy  to  avoid  any 
contest  with  the  inhabitants  of  the  country  through  which  they 
passed,  as  such  must,  in  its  progress,  inevitably  diminish  the  re- 
sources of  those  countries,  and  thereby  increase  the  difiBculty  of 
supporting  their  armies— which  difficulty  formed  the  chief,  if  not 
the  sole,  obstacle  to  their  advance. 

Fourthly.  That  though  it  was  not  to  be  conceived  that  the  King 
of  Persia  or  Pacha  of  Baghdad  would  willingly  allow  any  European 
army  to  pass  through  his  country,  but  there  was  every  ground  to 
expect  that  the  fear  of  a  greater  evil  was  likely  not  only  to  make 
these  rulers  observe  a  neutrality,  but  to  dispose  them  to  aid  the 
execution  of  a  plan  which  they  could  not  resist,  and  make  them 
desire  to  indemnify  themselves  for  submission  to  a  power  they 
dreaded  by  agreeing  to  share  in  the  plunder  of  weaker  States — a 
line  of  policy  to  which  it  was  too  obvious  they  would  be  united, 
and  to  which  their  fear,  weakness,  and  avarice  made  it  probable 
that  they  would  accede. 

Fifthly.  That  under  a  contemplation  of  such  occurrences,  it  ap- 
peared of  ultimate  importance  that  the  English  Government  should 
instantly  possess  itself  of  means  to  throw  those  States  that  favoured 
the  approach  of  its  enemies,  into  complete  confusion  and  destruc- 
tion, in  order  that  it  might,  by  diminishing  their  resources,  increase, 
the  principal  natural  obstacle  that  opposed  the  advance  of  an 
European  army,  and  this  system,  when  that  Government  had  once 
established  a  firm  footing  and  a  position  situated  on  the  confines 
of  Persia  and  Turkey,  it  could  easily  pursue,  with  a  very  moderate 
force,  and  without  any  great  risk  or  expenditure. 

Sixthly,  That  with  an  established  footing  in  the  Gulf  of  Persia- 
which  must  soon  become  the  emporium  of  our  commerce,  the  seat 
of  our  political  negotiations,  and  a  d^pot  for  our  military  stores,  we 
should  be  able  to  establish  a  local  influence  and  strength  that  would 
not  only  exclude  other  European  nations  from  that  quarter,  but 
enable  us  to  carry  on  negotiations  and  military  operations  with 
honour  and  security  to  any  extent  we  desired ;  whereas,  without 
it,  we  must  continue  at  the  mercy  of  the  fluctuating  policy  of  un- 
steady, impotent,  and  faithless  Courts,  adopting  expensive  and 
useless  measures  of  defence  at  every  uncertain  alarm,  and  being 
ultimately  obliged  either  to  abandon  the  scene  altogether,  or,  when 
danger  actually  came,  to  incur  the  most  desperate  hazard  of  com- 
plete fiiilure  by  sending  a  military  expedition  which  must  trust  for 
its  subsistence  and  safety,  to  States  who  were  known,  not  only  from 
the  individual   character  of    their  rulers,   but  from  their  actual 


76  '         THE    SECOND    MISSION    TO    PERSIA. 

condition  and  character,  to  be  undeserving  of  a  moment's   con- 
fidence. 

Seventhly.  That  there  was  great  danger  in  any  delay,  as  the  plan 
recommended  could  only  be  expected  to  be  beneficial  if  adopted 
when  there  was  a  time  to  mature  it  and  to  organise  all  our  means 
of  defence  before  the  enemy  were  too  far  advanced ;  otherwise  that 
momentary  irritation  which  must  be  excited  by  its  adoption,  would 
only  add  to  the  many  other  advantages  which  our  want  of  foresight 
and  attention  to  our  interests  in  that  quarter  had  already  given  to 
our  enemies. 


77 


CHAPTER  V. 

[1808—1809.] 

The  Missions  to  Lahore  and  Caubul — The  Aggressions  of  Runjeet  Singh 
— Mr.  Metcalfe  at  Umritsur — Treaty  of  1809 — Mr.  Elphinstone's 
Mission — Arrival  at  Peshawur — Reception  by  Shah  Soojah — 
Withdrawal  of  the  Mission — Negotiations  with  the  Ameers  of 
Sindh. 

It  was  while  Sir  Harford  Jones  was  making  his  way 
from  Bombay  to  Bushire,  in  the  months  of  September 
and  October,  1808,  that  the  Missions  to  Caubul  and 
Lahore  set  out  for  their  respective  destinations.  Since 
the  time  when  the  rumoured  approach  of  an  army  of 
invasion  under  Zemaun  Shah  had  troubled  the  hearts  of 
the  English  in  India,  the  might  of  the  Douranee  rulers 
had  been  gradually  declining,  as  a  new  power,  threatening 
the  integrity  of  the  Afghan  dominions,  swelled  into  bulk 
and  significance,  and  spread  itself  over  the  country  between 
the  Sutlej  and  the  Indus.  It  was  no  longer  possible  to 
regard  with  indifference  the  growth  of  this  new  empire. 
We  had  supplanted  the  Mahrattas  on  the  banks  of  the 
Jumna,  and  brought  ourselves  into  proximity  with  the 
Sikhs.  A  group  of  petty  principalities  were  being  rapidly 
consolidated  into  a  great  empire  by  the  strong  hand  and 
capacious  intellect  of  Runjeet  Singh,  and  it  had  become 
apparent  to  the  British  that  thenceforth,  for  good  or  for 
evil,  the  will  of  the  Sikh  ruler  must  exercise  an  influence 
over  the  councils  of  the  rulers  of  Hindostan. 

It  was  part  of  Lord  Minto's  policy  at  this  time,  as  we 


78  THE    MISSIONS    TO    LAHORE    AND    CAUBUL. 

have  seen,  to  include  the  Lahore  chief  in  the  great  Anti- 
Gallican  confederacy  with  which  he  had  determined  to 
frustrate  the  magnificent  designs  of  Napoleon.  But  the 
posture  of  affairs  on  our  northern  frontier  was  such  as  to 
occasion  some  embarassment  in  the  Council-Chamber  of 
Calcutta.  The  military  power  of  the  Sikh  rajah  had 
been  put  forth,  with  almost  imvarying  success,  for  the 
subjection  of  the  petty  principalities  within  his  reach; 
and  now  it  appeared  that  he  was  desirous  of  reducing  to 
a  state  of  vassalage  all  the  chiefs  holding  the  tract  of 
country  which  lies  between  the  Sutlej  and  the  Jumna. 
There  was  much  in  this  to  perplex  and  embarrass  Lord 
Minto  and  his  colleagues.  It  was  desirable,  above  all 
things,  to  maintain  a  friendly  power  beyond  the  frontier  ; 
but  whether  this  were  to  be  done  by  supporting  the 
Sikh  chiefs  in  the  Cis-Sutlej  territories,  even  at  the  risk 
of  actual  hostilities  with  Runjeet  Singh,  or  whether,  on 
the  other  hand,  it  were  expedient  to  sacrifice  the  petty 
chieftains  to  Runjeet's  ambition,  and  enter  into  an  offen- 
sive and  defensive  alliance  against  the  Persians  and  the 
French  with  that  prince,  were  questions  which  agitated 
the  minds  of  our  Indian  statesmen,  and  found  no  very- 
satisfactory  solution  in  the  elaborate  minutes  which  they 
provoked.  Lord  Minto,  whilst  expressing  his  natural 
inclination  to  assist  a  weak  country  against  the  usurpation 
of  a  powerful  neighbour,  and  fully  recognising  the  prin- 
ciple of  non-interference,  so  consistently  inculcated  by  the 
Government  at  home,  maintained  that  the  emergency  of 
the  case  was  such  as  to  justify  a  departure  from  ordinary 
rules  of  conduct,  and  a  violation  of  general  maxims  of 
policy.  The  defence  of  India  against  the  dangers  of 
French  invasion  was  stated  to  be  the  most  pressing  object 
of  attention,  and  entitled  to  most  weight  in  the  delibera- 
tions of  the  state  ;  but  it  was  doubted  whether  the  alliance 
with  Runjeet  Singh  would  effectually  secure  that  desirable 


POLICY  OF  LORD  MINTO.  79 

end,*  whilst  it  was  certain  that  the  gradual  extension  of 
his  dominions  would  be  permanently  injurious  to  British 
interests  in  the  East.  It  was  desirable,  in  a  word,  to 
secure  his  alliance  and  to  check  his  presumption  at  the 
same  time.  Any  act  of  hostility  and  discourtesy  on  our 
part  might  throw  him  into  the  arms  of  Holkar  and  Scin- 
diah,  and  other  native  princes ;  and  a  confederacy  might  be 
formed  against  us,  that  would  disturb  the  peace  of  India 
for  years.  Starting,  however,  with  the  assumption  that 
the  French  were  undeniably  about  to  invade  Hindostan, 
it  was  contended  by  the  Governor-General,  that  whilst 
the  native  princes  would  be  inclined  to  wait  the  coming 
of  the  great  western  liberator,  it  was  our  policy  to  husband 
our  strength  for  the  grand  struggle  with  our  terrible 
European  opponent.,  "We  are,  in  reality,"  wrote  Lord 
Minto,  "  only  waiting  on  both  sides  for  a  more  convenient 
time  to  strike.  We  know  that  Holkar  and  Scindiah,  the 
Rajah  of  Bhurtpore,  and  probably  other  chiefs,  have  taken 
their  part,  and  are  sharpening  their  weapons  in  expectation 
of  a  concerted  signal." 

Thus,  oscillating  between  two  courses  of  policy,  and 
considering  the  question  solely  as  one  of  expediency — that 
kind  of  expediency,  however,  to  which  something  of  dignity 
is  imparted  by  a  great  national  crisis,  real  or  supposed — 
the  Governor-General  at  last  came  to  favour  an  opinion 
that  sound  policy  dictated  a  strenuous  effoi-t  on  the  part 
of  the  British  Government  to  curb  the  aggi'essive  spirit 
of  the  Sikh  conqueror,  and  to  set  a  limit  to  his  dominions. 

*  "I  doubt,"  ■wrote  Lord  Minto,  ''whether  his  jealousy  would 
permit  him  to  admit,  by  treaty,  our  troops  freely  into  his  country, 
and  to  consent  that  we  should  establish  such  posts  both  in  front 
against  the  enemy  and  elsewhere  for  the  purpose  of  communication,  as 
should  render  us  independent  of  his  fidelity.  If  he  does  not  accede  to 
this,  we  shall  derive  little  benefit  from  his  alliance." — [Minute  of  Lord 
Minto:  MS.  Becords.] 


80       THE  MISSIONS  TO  LAHORE  AND  CAUBUL. 

It  was  seriously  debated  by  Lord  Minto  whether  Runjeet 
should  not  at  once  be  deprived  of  all  power  to  work  us 
mischief;  but  the  recollection  of  the  advantages  of  main- 
taining, if  possible,  a  longer  peace,  and  of  the  non- 
interference system  so  strenuously  enforced  upon  him  by 
the  home  authorities,  suggested  the  expediency  of  following 
a  more  cautious  line  of  policy,  and  merely  simulating,  in 
the  first  instance,  an  intention  to  oppose  a  hostile  front 
to  the  aggressiveness  of  the  Sikhs.  "  If  it  were  not  found 
expedient,"  wrote  Lord  Minto,  "ultimately  to  pursue  or 
to  favour  these  views,  the  apprehension  alone  of  so  great 
danger  brought  home  to  him,  may  be  expected  to  render 
Runjeet  Singh  more  subservient  to  our  wishes  than  any 
concessions  or  compliances  will  ever  make  him." 

In  this  conjuncture  the  Governor-General,  harassed 
and  perplexed  by  doubts,  was  fortunate  in  the  personal 
character  of  the  officer  to  whom  had  been  entrusted  the 
conduct  of  the  mission  to  the  Sikh  ruler.  Mr.  Charles 
Metcalfe  had  early  recommended  himself  to  the  favourable 
consideration  of  Lord  Wellesley,  who  was  never  slow  to 
recognise  in  the  junior  officers  of  the  state  the  promise  of 
future  eminence.*  He  had  been  but  a  short  time  in  the 
service,  when  the  Governor-General  placed  him  in  his  own 
Office — that  best  nursery  of  Indian  statesmen — and  he 
soon  confirmed  the  expectations  that  had  been  formed 
of  his  judgment  and  intelligence  by  proving  himself,  in 

*  A  remarkably  able  paper,  on  the  disposal  of  the  subsidiary  force 
which,  under  the  provisions  of  the  defensive  alliance  with  Scindiah, 
that  prince  had  agreed  to  receive,  drawn  up  by  Mr.  Metcalfe,  in  1804, 
conduced  more,  perhaps,  than  anything  else  to  confirm  Lord  Wellesley's 
high  opinion  of  the  young  civilian's  talents.  On  a  copy  of  it  now 
before  me  is  the  following  marginal  note,  written  in  the  Governor- 
General's  fine,  bold,  characteristic  hand  : — "This  paper  is  highly 
creditable  to  Mr.  Metcalfe's  character  and  talents.  It  may  become 
very  useful.  A  copy  of  it  should  be  sent  to  the  Commander-in-Chief, 
and  another  to  Major  Malcolm. — W." 


CONDUCT   OF   RUNJEET   SINGH.  81 

^he  camp  of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  and  at  the  Court 
of  Delhi,  an  officer  of  equal  coiu-age  and  sagacity.  The 
estimate  which  Lord  Wellesley  had  formed  of  his  talents 
was  accepted  by  Lord  Minto ;  and  in  the  whole  range  of 
the  civil  service — a  service  never  wanting  in  administrative 
and  diplomatic  ability  of  the  highest  order — it  is  probable 
that  he  could  not  now  have  found  a  fitter  agent  to  carry 
out  his  pohcy  at  Lahore. 

On  the  1st  of  September,  1808,  Mr.  Metcalfe  crossed 
the  Sutlej,  and  on  the  11th  of  the  same  month  met  the 
Sikh  ruler  at  Kussoor.  The  conduct  of  the  liajah  was 
arbitrary  and  capricious.  At  one  time  courteous  and 
friendly,  at  another  querulous  and  arrogant,  he  now 
seemed  disposed  to  enter  into  our  views  and  to  aid  our 
designs ;  and  then,  complaining  bitterly  of  the  inter- 
ference of  the  British  Government,  insisted  on  his  right 
to  occupy  the  country  beyond  the  Jumna.  Nor  did  he 
confine  his  opposition  to  mere  verbal  argument,  for 
whilst  the  British  envoy  was  still  in  his  camp,  he  set 
out  to  illustrate  his  views  by  crossing  the  river,  seizing 
Furreedkote  and  Umballah,  and  otherwise  overawing  the 
petty  Sikh  chiefs  between  the  Sutlej  and  the  Jumna.* 

*  "The  Rajah  coupled  his  acquiescence  in  the  proposed  arrange- 
ments of  defence  against  an  invading  European  army  with  the  condi- 
tion of  being  permitted  to  extend  his  dominions  over  all  the  Sikh 
territories  between  the  Sutlej  and  the  Jumna.  He  also  provisionally- 
demanded  that  the  British  Government  should  not  interfere  in  favour 
of  the  King  of  Caubul  in  his  aggressions  against  that  monarch's 
dominions— at  the  same  time  shackling  the  advance  of  the  British 
troops  into  his  country,  and  the  establishment  of  the  necessary  depots, 
with  conditions  which  would  render  any  engagements  with  him  fur 
that  purpose  entirely  inefficient  and  nugatory.  Even  during  the  refer- 
ence he  made  to  government  on  these  demands,  he  crossed  the  Sutlej  to 
attack  the  Sikh  territories.  The  extreme  jealousy  and  suspicion  of  us 
evinced  by  the  Rajah,  together  with  his  own  conduct  and  ambitious 
character,  rendered  it  indispensably  necessary  to  resist  his  pretensions  to 
sovereignty  over  the  territories  on  this  side  of  the  Sutlej,  and  the  Kajah 

VOL.  I.  a 


82       THE  MISSIONS  TO  LAHORE  AND  CAUBUL. 

On  the  receipt  of  this  inteUigence  by  the  Calcutta 
Council,  it  was  debated  whether  it  would  be  .expedient 
to  adopt  the  more  dignified  course  of  ordering  Mr.  Met- 
calfe to  withdraw  at  once  from  the  Sikh  camp,  and,  re- 
garding the  conduct  of  Runjeet  Singh  as  an  outrage' 
against  the  British  Government,  to  take  measures  at  once 
to  chastise  him  ;  —  whether,  as  recommended  by  Mr, 
Edmonstone,  who  always  brought  a  sound  judgment  to 
bear  upon  such  questions,  and  whose  opinions  were  seldom 
disregarded  by  the  Governor-General,  to  limit  the  nego- 
tiations with  Runjeet  Singh  to  defensive  measures  against 
the  French,  leaving  the  question  of  the  subjugation  of  the 
Cis-Sutlej  states  for  future  adjustment ; — or  whether  it 
would  not  be  more  prudent  to  direct  Mr.  Metcalfe  to 
encumber  himself  as  little  as  possible  with  engagements 
of  any  kind — to  adopt  a  cautious  and  temporising  line  of 
policy,  so  as  to  admit  of  frequent  references  to  Calcutta  in 
the  course  of  his  negotiations,  and  to  wait  for  anything 
that  might  chance  to  be  written  down  in  our  favour  in 
that  great  "  chapter  of  accidents,"  which  so  often  enabled 
us  to  solve  the  most  perplexing  questions,  and  to  over- 
come the  most  pressing  difficulties.* 

This  was  the  course  finally  adopted.  On  one  point, 
however,  the  tone  of  Government  was  decided.  Runjeet 
Singh  had  required  the  British  Government  to  pledge 
itself  not  to  interfere  with  his  aggressions  against  Caubul ; 
and  Mr.  Metcalfe  was  now  informed,  that  "were  the 
Rajah  to  conclude  engagements  with  the  British  Govern- 

was  required  to  withdraw  liis  army." — [Statement  in  Instructions  to 
Mr  Elphinstone :  MS.  Records.} 

*  "  The  point  to  aim  at  in  our  present  transactions  with  the  Rajah 
of  Lahore,"  wrote  Lord  Minto,  "appears  to  be  that  we  should  keep 
ourselves  as  free  as  can  be  done  without  a  rupture.  I  should,  on  this 
principle,  rather  wish  to  protract  than  to  accelerate  the  treaty." — 
[Minute  of  Lord  Minto  :  MS.  Records.'] 


OUR   TEMPORISING   POLICY.  83 

ment  in  the  true  spirit  of  unanimity  and  confidence,  we 
could  not  accede  to  any  proposition  upon  the  part  of 
Caubul  injurious  to  his  interests  :  uncombined  with  such 
engagements,  that  question  (of  his  aggressions  against  the 
Caubul  territories)  cannot  possibly  form  an  article  of 
agreement  between  this  government  and  the  Rajah  of 
Lahore  ;  and  on  this  ground  the  discussion  of  it  may  be 
properly  rejected.  At  the  same  time,  if  the  occasion 
should  arise,  you  may  inform  the  Rajah  that  Mr.  Elphin- 
stone  is  not  authorised  to  conclude  with  the  State  of 
Caubul  any  engagements  injurious  to  his  interests.  You 
will  be  careful,  however,  as  you  have  hitherto  been,  to 
avoid  any  pledge  on  the  part  of  government  which  might 
preclude  any  futm-e  engagements  with  the  State  of  Caubul 
on  that  subject."  And  whilst  Mr.  Metcalfe  was  carrying 
out  this  temporising  policy  inculcated  by  the  Calcutta 
council,  troops  were  pushed  forward  to  the  frontier  to 
watch  the  movements  of  the  Punjabee  chief.  A  body 
of  King's  and  Company's  troops,  under  General  St.  Leger, 
and  another  under  Colonel  Ochterlony,  composed  entirely 
of  native  regiments,  were  posted  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Loodhianah,  ready,  at  a  moment's  notice,  to  take  the  field 
against  the  followers  of  Nanuk.  Vested  w4th  political 
authority,  the  latter  ofiicer,  on  the  9th  of  February,  1809, 
issued  a  proclamation  calling  upon  the  Sikh  ruler  to  with- 
draw his  troops  to  the  further  side  of  the  Sutlej,  and 
placing  all  the  Cis-Sutlej  principalities  under  the  protec- 
tion of  the  British  Government.  It  was  plain  that  we 
were  no  longer  to  be  tampered  with,  and  that  there  was 
nothing  left  to  Runjeet  Singh  but  to  yield  a  reluctant 
compliance  to  our  terms. 

Up  to  this  time  the  primary  object  of  the  British 
Government  had  been  the  establishment  of  such  an 
alliance  with  the  rulers  of  the  Punjab,  as  might  ensure 
a  strenuous  conjoint   opposition   to   an   European  aimy 

G   2 


84       THE  MISSIONS  TO  LAHORE  AND  CAUBUL. 

advancing  from  the  West.  But  those  were  days  when  a 
constant  succession  of  great  changes  in  the  European 
W'Orld  necessarily  induced  a  shifting  pohcy  on  the  part 
of  our  Indian  statesmen.  It  was  difficult  to  keep  pace 
with  the  mutations  which  were  passing  over  the  political 
horizon — difficult  to  keep  a  distant  mission  supplied  with 
instructions  which  were  not  likely  to  become  totally  use- 
less before  they  could  be  brought  into  effective  operation. 
With  Mr.  Metcalfe  at  Umritsur  it  was  comparatively  easy 
to  communicate.  He  had  been  ordered  to  temporise — tu 
do  nothing  in  a  hiu*ry ;  and  he  had  succeeded  so  well  as 
to  protract  his  negotiations  until  the  spring  of  1809.  The 
delay  was  most  advantageous  to  British  interests.  The 
"chapter  of  accidents"  worked  mightily  in  our  favour. 
The  war  with  Napoleon  had  now  been  carried  into  the 
Spanish  peninsula,  and  it  demanded  all  the  energies  of  the 
Emperor  to  maintain  his  position  in  Em'ope.  The  neces- 
sity of  anti-Gallican  alliances  in  India  became  less  and 
less  urgent.  The  value  of  Sikh  friendship  dwindled 
rapidly  down,  and  the  pretensions  of  the  Sikh  ruler  natu- 
rally descended  with  it.  The  sight  of  a  formidable  British 
force  on  the  frontier — the  intelligence  of  the  European 
successes  of  the  great  "  Sepoy  General "  w^ho,  a  few  years 
before,  on  the  plains  of  Berar,  had  given  the  Mahrattas 
a  foretaste  of   the   quality    of    his   mihtary   skill* — the 

*  "At  the  time  when  the  proposal  was  made  for  the  adjustment  of 
differences,  the  forces  on  both  sides  remained  quiet  in  sight  of  each 
other,  when  the  news  of  the  defeat  of  Junot  (Duke  of  Abrantes)  at 
Vtmiera,  by  the  British  army,  under  Sir  Arthur  Wellesley,  was 
received  in  the  camps  of  General  St.  Leger  and  Colonel  Ochterlony, 
and,  as  usual,  celebrated  by  royal  salutes.  The  cause  of  this  firing 
being  made  known  to  Runjeet  Singh,  the  salute  was,  by  his  special 
command,  repeated  from  all  the  artillery  in  his  camp — a  circumstance 
which,  whether  it  be  attributed  to  politeness  towards  the  British  com- 
manders, with  whom  he  was  in  treaty,  or  to  a  general  condemnation 
of  the  system  of  Buonaparte,  was  felt  equally  agreeable." — [Asiatic 
Annual  Register,] 


OUR   TEMPORISING   POLICY.  85 

declining  influence  of  the  French  in  Central  Asia, — and 
more  than  all,  perhaps,  the  wonderful  firmness  and  courage 
of  the  young  English  diplomatist — suggested  to  the  wily- 
Sikh  Rajah  the  expediency  of  ceasing  to  tamper  with  us, 
and  of  forming  at  once  a  friendly  alliance  with  the  British.* 
He  was  now  in  a  temper  to  accede  to  the  terms  proposed 
to  him  by  the  British  diplomatist ;  and  accordingly,  on 
the  25th  of  April,  1809,  a  treaty  was  executed  by  Runjeet 
Singh  in  person,  and  by  Mr.  Metcalfe  on  the  part  of  the 
British  Government,  in  which  there  was  no  more  mention 
of  the  French  than  if  the  eagles  of  Napoleon  had  never 
threatened  the  eastern  world.  It  was  stipulated  that  the 
Rajah  should  retain  possession  of  the  territories  to  the 
north  of  the  Sutlej,  but  should  abstain  from  all  encroach- 
ments on  the  possessions  or  rights  of  the  chiefs  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  river.  This  limitation  was  merely  a  prospec- 
tive one.  It  had  been  intended  to  deprive  Runjeet  of  the 
tracts  of  country  which  he  had  previously  occupied  to  the 
south  of  the  Sutlej  ;  and  the  rough  draft  of  the  treaty 
contained,  as  a  part  of  the  first  article  as  it  now  stands, 
the  words,  "  And  on  the  other  hand,  the  Rajah  renounces 
all  claim  to  sovereignty  over  the  Sikh  chiefs  to  the  south- 
ward of  that  river,  and  all  right  of  interference  in  their 
affairs  ;''t  but  this  passage  had  been  subsequently  erased 
by  Lord  Minto,  and  Runjeet  Singh  was  now  left  in  posses- 
sion of  the  tracts  he  had  originally  occupied,  though 
restrained  from  all  further  encroachments.  The  Sikh 
chiefs  between  the  Sutlej  and  the  Jumna,  not  already 
under  the   yoke   of  Runjeet   Singh,   were   taken  imder 

*  An  accidental  collision  between  some  of  the  Mahomedan  sepoys  of 
Mr.  Metcalfe's  mission,  and  a  far  superior  body  of  Sikhs,  in  which  the 
inferiority  of  the  latter  was  most  unmistakeably  demonstrated,  had  no 
inconsiderable  effect  upon  the  mind  of  Runjeet  Singh,  who  was  a  spec- 
tator of  the  discomfiture  of  his  countrymen. 

t  MS.  Records. 


86       THE  MISSIONS  TO  LAHORE  AND  CAUBUL. 

British  protection,  and  on  the  5th  of  May  a  proclamation 
was  issued  declaring  the  nature  of  the  connection  which 
was  thenceforth  to  exist  between  them  and  the  dominant 
power  on  the  south  of  the  Jumna. 

In  the  meanwhile,  Mr.  Elphinstone's  Mission  was 
making  its  way  to  the  Court  of  Shah  Soojah-ool-Moolk. 
The  envoy  had  been  originally  instructed  that  he  was 
empowered  to  receive  from  the  King  of  Caubul  proposals 
having  for  their  basis  the  employment  of  the  power  and 
resources  of  that  state  against  the  advance  of  any 
European  army.  He  was  authorised  to  express  a  con- 
viction, as  regarded  offensive  operations,  that  in  the  event 
of  Persia  being  found  decidedly  confederated  with  the 
French  in  their  projected  expedition  to  India,  the  British 
Government  "would  not  hesitate  to  adopt  any  plan  of 
hostility  against  Persia  consonant  to  the  views  of  the 
King  of  Caubul."  But  he  was  cautioned  against  entering 
into  any  permanent  arrangement,  or  pledging  his  govern- 
ment to  any  ulterior  line  of  conduct.  Everything  was  to 
be  limited  to  the  occasion.  It  was  to  be  the  policy  of  the 
envoy  rather  to  draw  the  Court  of  Caubul  into  solicita- 
tions to  the  British  Government,  than  to  make  any 
spontaneous  offers  of  assistance.  And  he  was  instructed 
especially  to  impress  upon  the  mind  of  the  King,  that 
both  as  regarded  security  from  without,  and  the  internal 
safety  and  tranquillity  of  his  own  dominions,  it  was  above 
all  things  the  interest  of  the  Douranee  monarch  to  break 
up  the  alliance  existing  between  the  Court  of  Teheran  and 
those  of  St.  Petersburgh  and  Paris. 

But  this  alliance  was  already  in  a  state  of  dissolution. 
The  spring  of  1809  brought,  as  we  have  seen,  glad 
tidings  from  Europe  to  the  Anglo-Indian  capital,  and  all 
fear  of  a  French  invasion  passed  away  from  the  minds 
of  our  rulers.  Whilst  Mr.  Metcalfe  was  bringing  to  a 
conclusion,   irrespective  of  all   reference   to  the  French, 


THE    CAUBUL    MISSION.  87 

his  long-pending  negotiations  with  Lahore,  Mr.  Elphin- 
stone  was  instructed*  that  the  important  events  which 
had  occurred  in  Europe  would  necessarily  induce  a 
modification  of  the  course  of  policy  to  be  pursued  at  the 
Court  of  Caubul.  He  was  told  that  it  was  no  longer 
necessary  to  entertain  a  thought  of  offensive  operations 
against  Persia,  but  that  the  British  Government  would 
accede  to  engagements  of  a  nature  purely  defensive 
against  that  state,  should  such  a  stipulation  appear  to  be 
an  object  of  solicitude  to  the  Afghan  monarch.  This  was 
merely  stated  as  an  admissible  course.  The  Governor- 
General  declared  that  he  would  wish,  if  possible,  to  avoid 
contracting  even  defensive  engagements  with  the  Court  of 
Caubul ;  and  added,  "  Should  the  contracting  those  engage- 
ments be  absolutely  required  by  the  King,  the  eventual  aid 
to  be  afforded  by  us  ought  to  be  limited  to  supplies  of  arms, 
ordnance,  and  military  stores,  rather  than  of  troops.'"  t 

The  Mission  proceeded  through  Bekanier,  Bahwulpore,;}: 
and  Mooltan ;  and  ever  as  they  went  the  most  marked 
civility  was  shown  to  the  British  ambassadors.     But  one 

*  Under  date  March  6,  1809. 

+  MS.  Records.  Another  paragraph  of  these  instructions  is  worth 
quoting.  "Although  there  is  not  now  the  same  immediate  exigency 
for  forming  a  friendly  connexion  with  the  Court  of  Caubul,  yet  that 
measure  is  of  importance,  and  contains  an  object  of  sound  policy,  in 
the  event,  however  remote,  of  either  the  French  or  any  other  European 
power  endeavouring  to  approach  India  by  that  route." 

X  It  is  worthy  of  remark  in  this  place,  that  Mr.  Strachey,  who 
accompanied  Mr.  Elphinstone's  Mission  in  the  capacity  of  secretary, 
and  who  on  this  as  on  other  occasions  evinced  the  possession  of  a  high 
order  of  intellect,  drew  up  a  very  able  memorandum  on  the  advantages 
of  forming  a  connexion  with  Bahwul  Khan.  In  this  paper  there  occurs 
the  following  prescient  passage: — **  Bahwul  Khun  might  also  be 
induced,  in  the  event  of  actual  hostilities,  to  invade  the  territoi-ies  of 
Runjeet  Singh  at  any  point  we  might  suggest,  and  thereby  form  an 
important  diversion,  whilst  the  British  army  would  be  advancing  from 
another  quarter  of  the  Sikh  territory." — [MS.  Records.'] 


88       THE  MISSIONS  TO  LAHORE  AND  CAUBUL. 

thing  was  wanting  to  render  the  feehng  towards  them  a 
pervading  sentiment  of  universal  respect.  They  had  not 
long  crossed  the  frontier  before  they  discovered  that  a 
more  liberal  display  of  the  facial  characteristics  of  man- 
hood would  elevate  them  greatly  in  the  eyes  of  a  people 
who  are  uniformly  bearded  and  moustached.  *  Our 
officers  have  ever  since  carefully  abstained  from  incurring 
this  reproach;  and  it  may  be  doubted  whether,  ever 
again,  any  hint  will  be  required  to  stimulate  them  to 

*  It  is  said  that  Mr.  Elphinstone's  Mission  received  this  hint  from 
an  European  deserter,  named  Pensley,  who  had  been  entertained,  in  a 
military  capacity,  by  Shah  Soojah.  They  might  have  learnt  the  lesson 
from  Mr.  Forster,  who,  twenty  years  before,  had  travelled  in  Afghan- 
istan. That  enterprising  gentleman,  a  civil  servant  of  the  Company, 
found  his  beard  of  the  greatest  service.  He  suffered  it  to  grow  for 
fifteen  months,  and  had  reason  to  regi-et  that  before  he  had  wholly 
shaken  off  Eastern  associations,  he  allowed  the  razor  to  profane  it. 
Putting  himself  on  board  a  Russian  frigate  in  the  Caspian,  he  thought 
that  he  might  reduce  his  face  to  its  old  European  aspect ;  but  he  tells 
us  that  * '  the  Ghilan  envoy,  then  proceeding  on  the  frigate,  expressed 
a  surprise  to  see  me,  whom  he  thought  a  Mahomedan,  eating  at  the 
same  board  with  the  Russian  gentlemen  ;  but  when  he  saw  a  barber 
commencing  an  operation  on  my  beard,  which  I  took  the  opportunity 
of  having  shaved,  he  evinced  great  amazement  and  indignation  ;  nor 
did  he,  until  repeatedly  informed  of  my  real  character,  cease  his 
reprehension  of  the  act ;  during  the  process  of  which  he  threw  on  me 
many  a  look  of  contempt.  When  the  barber  began  to  cut  off  the  mous- 
tachios,  he  several  times,  in  a  peremptory  manner,  required  him  to 
desist,  and,  seeing  them  gone,  'Now,'  said  he,  '  of  whatever  country 
or  sect  you  may  be,  your  disgrace  is  complete,  and  you  look  like  a 
woman.'  Thus,  after  a  growth  of  fifteen  months  fell  my  beard,  which 
in  that  period  had  increased  to  a  great  magnitude,  both  in  length  and 
breadth,  though  it  had  been  somewhat  shrivelled  by  the  severity  of 
the  late  winter.  When  you  advert  to  the  general  importance  of  an 
Asiatic  beard,  to  the  essential  services  which  mine  had  rendered,  and 
to  our  long  and  intimate  association,  I  trust  that  this  brief  introduc- 
tion of  it  to  your  notice  will  not  be  deemed  impertinent.  This 
operation  of  cutting  it  ought,  however,  to  have  been  postponed  till  my 
arrival  at  Astracan." 


RECEPTION   OF    MR,    ELPHINSTONE.  89 

encourage  an  Asiatic  development  of  hair  on  the  lower 
part  of  the  face. 

I  do  not  intend  to  trace  the  progress  of  the  Mission. 
The  story  has  been  told  with  historical  tidelity  and 
graphic  distinctness  in  a  book  which  is  still,  after  the  lapse 
of  nearly  forty  years,  the  delight  of  Anglo-Indian  readers, 
and  which  future  generations  of  writers  and  cadets  will 
turn  to  with  undiminished  interest.  On  the  2oth  of 
February,  the  Mission  entered  Peshawur.  Crow^ds  of 
wondering  inhabitants  came  out  to  gaze  at  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  nation  which  had  reduced  the  great 
Mogul  to  a  shadow,  and  seated  itself  on  the  tin-one  of 
Tippoo.  Pushing  forward  with  the  outstretched  neck  of 
eager  curiosity,  they  blocked  up  the  public  ways.  The 
royal  body-guards  rode  among  the  foot  passengers ;  lashed 
at  them  with  their  whips ;  tilted  with  their  lances  at 
gTave  spectators  sitting  quietly  in  their  own  balconies  ; 
and  cleared  the  way  as  best  they  could.  But  fast  as  they 
dispersed  the  thronging  multitude,  it  closed  again  around 
the  novel  cavalcade.  Through  this  motley  crowd  of 
excited  inhabitants,  the  British  Mission  was  with  difficulty 
conducted  to  a  house  prepared  for  them  by  royal  mandate. 
Seated  on  rich  carpets,  fed  with  sweetmeats,  and  regaled 
with  sherbet,  every  attention  was  paid  to  the  European 
strangers.  The  hospitality  of  the  King  was  profuse.  His 
fortunes  were  then  at  a  low  ebb  ;  but  he  sent  provisions 
to  the  Mission  for  two  thousand  men,  with  food  for  beasts 
of  burden  in  proportion,  and  was  with  difficulty  persuaded 
to  adopt  a  less  costly  method  of  testifying  his  regal 
cordiality  and  respect. 

Some  dispute  about  forms  of  presentation  delayed  the 
reception  of  the  English  ambassadors.  But  in  a  few  days 
everything  was  arranged  for  the  grand  ceremonial  to  take 
place  on  the  5th  of  March.  When  the  eventful  day 
arrived,  they  found  the  King,  with  that  love  of  outward 


90       THE  MISSIONS  TO  LAHORE  AND  CAUBUL. 

pomp  which  clung  to  him  to  the  last,  sitting  on  a  gilded 
throne,  crowned,  plumed,  and  arrayed  in  costly  apparel. 
The  royal  person  was  a  blaze  of  jewellery,  conspicuous 
among  which  the  mighty  diamond,  the  Koh-i-noor,  des- 
tined in  after  days  to  undergo  such  romantic  vicissitudes, 
glittered  in  a  gorgeous  bracelet  upon  the  arm  of  the  Shah. 
Welcoming  the  English  gentlemen  with  a  graceful  cordi- 
ality,- he  expressed  a  hope  that  the  King  of  England  and 
all  the  English  nation  were  well,  presented  the  officers  of 
the  embassy  with  dresses  of  honour,  and  then,  dismissing 
all  but  Mr.  Elphinstone  and  his  secretaiy,  proceeded  to 
the  business  of  the  interview.  Listening  attentively  to 
all  that  w^as  advanced  by  the  British  envoy,  he  professed 
himself  eager  to  accede  to  his  proposals,  and  declared  that 
England  and  Caubul  were  designed  by  the  Creator  to 
be  united  by  bonds  of  everlasting  friendship.  The  pre- 
sents which  Mr.  Elphinstone  had  taken  with  him  to 
Afghanistan  were  curious  and  costly  ;  and  now  that  they 
were  exposed  to  the  view  of  the  Shah,  he  turned  upon 
them  a  face  scintillating  with  pleasure,  and  eagerly  ex- 
pressed his  delight.  His  attendants,  with  a  cupidity  that 
there  was  no  attempt  to  conceal,  laid  their  rapacious 
hands  upon  everything  that  came  in  their  way,  and 
scrambled  for  the  articles  which  were  not  especially 
appropriated  by  their  royal  master.  Thirty  years  after- 
wards, the  memory  of  these  splendid  gifts  raised  longing 
expectations  in  the  minds  of  the  courtiers  of  Caubul,  and 
caused  bitter  disappointment  and  disgust,  when  Captain 
Bumes  appeared  with  his  pins  and  needles,  and  little 
articles  of  hardware,  such  as  would  have  disgraced  the 
wallet  of  a  pedlar  of  low  repute.* 

*  It  was  the  very  costliness  of  these  presents,  and  the  lavish  expen- 
diture of  the  entire  Mission,  that  gave  the  deathblow  to  the  old  system 
of  diplomatic  profusion.  When  the  accounts  of  the  Afghan  and 
Persian  Missions  came  before  the  Governor-General  in  Council,   Lord 


DEPARTURE    OF   THE  MISSION.  91 

At  subsequent  interviews  the  impression  made  by  the 
Shah  upon  the  minds  of  the  EngUsh  diplomatists  was  of  a 
description  very  favourable  to  the  character  of  the  Afghan 
ruler.  Mr.  Elphinstone  was  surprised  to  find  that  the 
Douranee  monarch  had  so  much  of  the  "  manners  of  a 
gentleman,"  and  that  he  could  be  affable  and  dignified  at 
the  same  time.  But  he  had  much  domestic  care  to  distract 
him  at  this  epoch,  and  could  not  fix  his  mind  intently 
on  foreign  politics.  His  country  was  in  a  most  unsettled 
condition.  His  throne  seemed  to  totter  under  him.  He 
was  endeavouring  to  collect  an  army,  and  was  projecting 
a  great  military  expedition.  He  hoped  to  see  more  of  the 
English  gentlemen,  he  said,  in  more  prosperous  times. 
At  present,  the  best  advice  that  he  could  give  them  was 
that  they  should  retire  beyond  the  frontier.  So  on  the 
14th  of  June  the  Mission  turned  its  back  upon  Peshawur, 
and  set  out  for  the  provinces  of  Hindostan.* 

Minto  stood  aghast  at  the  enormous  expenditure,  and,  in  a  stringent 
minute,  recorded  "his  deliberate  opinion,  that  the  actual  expenditure 
has  far  exceeded  the  necessity  of  the  occasion — that  the  personal 
expenses  of  the  envoys  might  have  been  limited  with  respect  both  to 
the  nature  and  extent  of  the  items  composing  them,  and  that  the  pro- 
vision of  articles  for  presents  to  an  extent  so  enormous  as  that  exhi- 
bited in  the  accounts  of  these  Missions  has  been  regulated  by  a  principle 
of  distribution  unnecessarily  profuse," — [MS.  Records.] 

*  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  Shah  Soojah's  own  notices  of  the  British 
Mission  are  very  scanty.  He  says,  in  his  autobiographical  narrative, 
"On  receivihg  intelligence  that  the  English  ambassadors  had  arrived 
at  Kohat,  we  sent  an  appropriate  party  to  meet  and  do  them  honour. 
On  their  arrival,  we  gave  them  suitable  dwellings,  and  ordered  their 
wants  and  wishes  to  be  attended  to.  After  a  few  days'  rest  the 
ambassadors  came  to  the  presence,  and  presented  various  articles  of 
European  and  Hindostanee  workmanship,  also  many  elephants  with 
superb  accoutrements.  Dresses  of  honour  were  conferred  on  all.  We 
gave  strict  orders  that  the  Mission  should  be  treated  with  every 
dignity,  and  our  most  confidential  Ameers  waited  on  them.  .  .  . 
"We  learned  that  Shah  Mahmoud  had  left  Caubul,  and  halted  at  Chuk- 
Dilah.    Hearing  this,  we  immediately  reflected  an  the  state  of  the 


92       THE  MISSIONS  TO  LAHORE  AND  CAUBUL. 

Three  days  after  the  Mission  commenced  its  homeward 
journey,  the  treaty  which  had  been  arranged  by  Mr. 
Elphinstone  was  formally  signed  at  Calcutta  by  Lord 
Minto.  The  first  article  set  out  with  a  mis-statement,  to 
the  effect  that  the  French  and  Persians  had  entered  into 
a  confederaxjy  against  the  State  of  Caubul.  The  two 
contracting  parties  bound  themselves  to  take  active  mea- 
sures to  repel  this  confederacy,  the  British  "holding 
themselves  liable  to  afford  the  expenses  necessary  for  the 
above-mentioned  service,  to  the  extent  of  their  ability.^' 
The  remaining  article  decreed  eternal  friendship  between 
the  two  States  :  "  The  veil  of  separation  shall  be  lifted 
up  from  between  them;  and  they  shall  in  no  manner 
interfere  in  each  other's  countries ;  and  the  King  of 
Caubul  shall  permit  no  individual  of  the  French  to  enter 
his  territories."  Three  months  before  these  articles  were 
signed  Sir  Harford  Jones  had  entered  into  a  preliminary 
treaty  with  the  Persian  Court,  stipulating  that  in  case 
of  war  between  Persia  and  Afghanistan,  his  Majesty  the 
King  of  Great  Britain  should  not  take  any  part  therein, 
unless  at  the  desire  of  both  parties.  The  confederacy  of 
the  French  and  Persians  had  been  entirely  broken  up,  and 
all  the  essentials  of  the  Caubul  treaty  rendered  utterly 
null  and  useless. 

But  before  this  rapid  sketch  of  the  diplomacy  of  1808-9 
is  brought  to  a  close,  some  mention  must  be  made  of 
another  subordinate  measure  of  d-efence  against  the  pos- 
sibility of  a  foreign  invasion.  The  low  countries  lying 
on  the  banks  of  the  river  Indus,  from  its  junction  with 
the  Punjabee  tributaries  to  the  sea,  were  known  as  Upper 
and  Lower  Sindh.     The  people  inhabiting  the  former  were 

Company's  ambassadors.  We  resolved,  first,  to  place  them  in  a  state 
and  place  of  safety ;  and  proceed  to  punish  the  rebels ;  and  then,  if 
God  would  grant  a  victory,  we  intended  to  return  to  treat  them  in  a 
proper  manner." 


THE   SINDH    MISSION.  93 

for  the  most  part  Beloochees — a  warlike  and  turbulent  race, 
of  far  greater  physical  power  and  mental  energy  than 
their  feeble,  degraded  neighbours,  the  Sindhians,  who 
occupied  the  country  from  Shikarpoor  to  the  mouths  of 
the  Indus.  The  nominal  rulers  of  these  provinces  were  the 
Talpoor  Ameers,  but  they  were  either  tributary  to,  or 
actually  dependent  upon  the  Court  of  Caubul.  The  de- 
pendence, however,  was  in  effect  but  scantily  acknowledged. 
Often  was  the  tribute  to  be  extracted  only  by  the  approach 
of  an  army  sent  for  its  collection  by  the  Douranee  monarch. 
There  was  constant  strife,  indeed,  between  Sindh  and  Cau- 
bul— the  one  ever  plotting  to  cast  off  its  allegiance,  and 
the  other  ever  putting  forth  its  strength  more  closely  to 
rivet  the  chains. 

In  July,  1808,  Captain  Seton  was  despatched  by  the 
Bombay  Government  to  the  Court  of  the  Ameers  at 
Hyderabad.  Misunderstanding  and  exceeding  his  instruc- 
tions, he  hastily  executed  a  treaty  with  the  State  of  Sindh, 
imposing,  generally  and  unconditionally,  upon  each  pai-ty 
an  obligation  to  furnish  military  aid  on  the  requisition  of 
the  other.  The  mind  of  the  envoy  was  heavy  with 
thoughts  of  a  French  invasion,  which  seem  to  have  ex- 
cluded all  considerations  of  internal  warfare  and  intiigue 
in  Central  Asia.  But  the  Ameers  were  at  that  time  intent 
upon  emancipating  themselves  from  the  yoke  of  Caubul, 
and  Captain  Seton  found  that  he  had  committed  the  British 
Government  to  assist  the  tributary  State  of  Sindh  against 
the  Lord  Paramoimt  of  the  country,  thereby  placing  us  in 
direct  hostility  with  the  very  power  whose  good  offices  we 
were  so  anxious  to  conciliate.  There  was,  indeed,  a  Persian 
ambassador  at  that  very  time  resident  at  the  Sindh  capital, 
charged  with  overtures  for  the  formation  of  a  close  alliance 
between  Persia  and  Sindh  subversive  of  the  tributary  rela- 
*-ions  of  the  latter  to  the  State  of  Caubul.*    He  was  acting, 

*  The  Ameers  had  sent  vakeels  to  Persia,  seeking  assistance  against 


94  THE   MISSION   TO    SINDH. 

too,  as  the  secret  agent  of  the  French ;  and  the  Ameers 
made  no  secret  of  the  fact,  that  but  for  the  friendly  over- 
tures of  the  British  they  would  have  allied  themselves  with 
the  Persians  and  French.  They  now  grasped  at  the 
proffered  connexion  with  the  Indian  Government,  believ- 
ing, or  professing  to  believe,  that  it  entitled  them  to 
assistance  against  the  State  of  Caubul,  and  industriously 
propagated  a  report  of  the  military  strength  which  they 
had  thus  acquired.  The  danger  of  all  this  was  obvious.* 
Captain  Seton's  treaty  was  accordingly  ignored ;  and  Mr. 
Elphinstone  was  instructed  that,  in  the  event  of  Shah  Soo- 
jah  remonstrating  against  Captain  Seton's  treaty,  he  might, 
without  hesitation,  apprise  the  Court  of  Caubul  that  the 
engagements  entered  into  were  "totally  unauthorised  and 
contrary  to  the  terms  of  the  instructions  given  him;" 
and  that,  in  consequence  of  these  errors.  Captain  Seton 
had  been  officially  recalled,  and  another  envoy  despatched 
to  Sindh  to  negotiate  the  terms  of  a  new  treaty. 

The  agent  then  appointed  was  Mr.  N.  H.  Smith,  who 
had  been  filling,  with  credit  to  himself,  the  office  of  Resi- 
dent at  Bushire.  He  was  instructed  to  annul  the  former 
treaty,  and  to  "  endeavour  to  establish  such  an  intercourse 
with  the  chiefs  of  Sindh  as  would  affi)rd  the  means  of 
watching  and  counteracting  the  intrigues  of  the  French 
in  that  and  the  neighbouring  States."  It  was  no  easy 
thing  to  establish  on  a  secure  basis  friendly  relations  with 
so  many  different  powers,  if  not  at  open  war  with  one 

Caubul ;  and  the  Persian  ambassador  bad  accompanied  tbem  on  their 
return  to  Sindb. 

*  Nor  was  tbis  tbe  only  error  into  wbicb  Captain  Seton  had  fallen. 
That  officer  was  instructed,  before  Mr.  Elphinstone's  Mission  had  been 
determined  upon,  to  ascertain  the  practicability  of  sending  an  embassy 
to  Candahar  or  Caubul,  by  the  route  of  Sindh  ;  and  upon  the  strength 
of  these  instructions,  had  taken  upon  himself  to  address  a  letter  to  the 
King  of  Caubul,  expressing  the  desire  of  the  British  Government  to 
form  an  alliance  with  that  monarch. 


THE    SINDH    MISSION.  95 

another,  in  that  antagonistic  state  of  conflicting  interests 
which  rendered  each  principaUty  eager  to  obtain  the 
assistance  of  the  British  to  promote  some  hostile  design 
against  its  neighbour.  But  partly  by  open  promises,  and 
partly  by  disguised  threats,  our  agents  at  this  time  suc- 
ceeded in  casting  one  great  network  of  diplomacy  over  all 
the  states  from  the  Jumna  to  the  Caspian  Sea.  The 
Ameers  of  Sindh  coveted  nothing  so  much  as  assistance 
against  the  Douranee  monarch.  The  British  envoy  was 
instnicted  to  refuse  all  promises  of  assistance,  but  to 
hint  at  the  possibility  of  assistance  being  given  to  the 
paramount  State  in  the  event  of  the  tributary  exhibiting 
any  hostility  to  the  British  Government.  It  was  dis- 
tinctly stated  that  the  object  of  Mr.  Elphinstone's  Mission 
to  Caubul  was  exclusively  connected  with  the  apprehended 
invasion  of  the  Persians  and  the  French ;  that  the  affairs 
of  Sindh  would  not  be  touched  upon  by  the  Caubul 
embassy,  and  that,  therefore,  the  affairs  of  Caubul  could 
not  with  propriety  be  discussed  by  the  ambassador  to 
Sindh;  and  it  was  adroitly  added,  that  the  relations 
between  Caubul  and  Sindh  could  only  be  taken  into 
consideration  by  the  British  Government  in  the  event 
of  the  latter  state  exhibiting  a  decided  disposition  to 
encourage  and  assist  the  projects  of  our  enemies. 

Nor  was  this  the  only  use  made  of  the  conflicting  claims 
of  Caubul  and  Sindh.  It  happened,  as  has  been  said,  that 
Persia  had  been  intriguing  with  the  Ameers,  and  had 
promised  to  assist  them  in  the  efforts  to  cast  off  the  Dou- 
ranee yoke.  The  French  had  favoured  and  assisted  these 
intrigues ;  and  Mr.  Elphinstone  was  accordingly  instructed 
to  instigate  the  resentment  of  the  Afghan  monarch  against 
the  French  and  Persian  allies,  and  to  demonstrate  to  him 
that  the  veiy  integrity  of  his  empire  was  threatened  by 
the  confederacy.  It  was  the  policy  of  the  British-Indian 
Goverament  to  keep  Sindli  in  check  by  hinting  at  the 


96  T«HE    MISSION    TO    SINDH. 

possibility  of  British  assistance  rendered  to  Caubul  for  its 
coercion ;  and,  at  the  same  time,  to  alarm  Caubul  by 
demonstrating  the  probability  of  Sindh  being  assisted  by 
Persia  to  shake  off  the  Douranee  yoke.  Operating  upon 
the  fears  of  both  parties,  our  diplomatists  found  little 
difficulty  in  bringing  their  negotiations  to  a  successful 
termination.  The  Ameers  of  Sindh  entered  readily  into 
engagements  of  general  amity,  and  especially  stipulated 
never  to  allow  the  tribe  of  the  French  to  settle  in  their 
country.  But  before  these  treaties  were  executed,  France 
had  ceased  to  be  formidable,  and  Persia  had  become  a 
friend.  The  Sindh  and  Caubul  treaties  were  directed 
against  exigencies  which  had  ceased  to  exist ;  but  they 
were  not  without  their  uses.  If  the  embassies  resulted 
in  nothing  else,  they  gave  birth  to  two  standard  works 
on  the  countries  to  which  they  were  despatched;  and 
brought  prominently  before  the  \^orld  the  names  of  two 
servants  of  the  Company,  who  have  lived  to  occupy  no 
small  space  in  the  world's  regard,  and  to  prove  themselves 
as  well  fitted,  by  nature  and  education,  to  act  history  as 
to  write  it.* 

*  I  need  scarcely  write  the  names  of  Elphinstone  and  Pottinger — or 
allude  to  their  respective  works.  Of  the  former  statesman  I  have 
already  spoken.  The  Lieutenant  Henry  Pottinger,  who,  early  in  the 
century,  accompanied  the  Sindh  Mission,  and  was  attached  to  General 
Malcolm's  staff  on  his  second  visit  to  Persia,  after  passing,  at  a  later 
stage  of  his  career,  from  the  management  of  the  wild  tribes  of  Belooch- 
istan  to  play  an  intricate  game  of  diplomacy  with  the  flowery  courtiers 
of  the  Celestial  Empii*e,  and  thence  to  the  control  of  the  Caffre  savages 
of  Southern  Africa,  closed  his  public  life  in  the  more  commonplace 
government  of  Madras. 


97 


CHAPTER  yi. 

[1809—1816 ' 

The  Mid-Career  of  Shah  Soojah — His  Wanderings  and  Misfortunes — 
Captivity  in  Cashmere — Imprisonment  at  Lahore — Robbery  of  the 
Koh-i-noor — Reception  of  the  Shah  by  the  Rajah  of  Kistawar — 
His  Escape  to  the  Britisli  Territories. 

Before  Mr.  Elphinstone's  Mission  had  cleared  the  Hmits 
of  the  Douranee  Empire,  Shah  Soojah  had  given  battle  to 
his  enemies,  and  been  disastrously  defeated.  The  month 
of  June,  1809,  had  not  worn  to  a  close,  before  it  was  evident 
that  his  cause  was  hopeless.  Still  he  did  not  abandon  the 
contest.  Despatching  his  Zenana,  with  which  was  his 
blind  brother,  to  Eawul  Pindee,  he  made  new  efforts  to 
splinter  up  his  broken  fortunes.  But  sustaining  several 
defeats,  and  narrowly  escaping,  on  more  than  one  occa- 
sion, with  his  life,  he  desisted  for  a  time  from  operations, 
of  which  every  new  struggle  demonstrated  more  painfully 
the  utter  fruitlessness.  He  wanted  mihtary  genius,  and 
he  wanted  the  art  to  inspire  confidence  and  to  win  affec 
tion.  Deserted  by  the  chiefs  and  the  people,  he  withdrew 
beyond  the  frontier,  and  there  entered  upon  new  pre- 
parations for  the  renewal  of  the  contest  under  circum- 
stances more  favourable  to  success.  Entertaining  and 
drilling  troops,  he  spent  a  year  at  Rawul  Pindee.  Some 
defections  from  his  brother's  party  inspiring  him  with 
new  hopes,  he  marched  thence  to  Peshawur,  and  took 
possession  of  the  Balla  Hissar,  or  royal  fortress.  But 
here  the  treachery  of  his  friends  was  likely  to  have  proved 

VOL.  I.  H 


9«  THE    MID-CAREER   OF   SHAH    SOOJAH. 

more  fatal  to  him  than  the  malice  of  his  enemies.  The 
chiefs  on  whom  he  most  relied  were  bribed  over  by  the 
Governor  of  Cashmere  to  seize  the  person  of  the  King. 
Persuading  him,  before  he  commenced  the  expedition  to 
Caubul,  to  send  out  the  horses  of  his  troopers  to  graze  in 
the  neighbom-ing  villages,  and  thus  stripping  him  of  his 
only  defence,  they  escaladed  the  Balla  Hissar,  seized  the 
royal  person,  and  carried  the  unfortunate  monarch  to  the 
valley  of  Cashmere.  Here  he  was  offered  his  release  at 
the  price  of  the  Koh-i-noor ;  but  he  refused  to  surrender 
this  magnificent  appendage  to  the  Crown  of  Caubul,  and 
rescued  it  from  the  hands  of  one  plunderer  only  to  suffer 
it  to  fall  into  the  gripe  of  another. 

It  was  in  1812  that  Shah  Soojah  was  carried  off  a 
prisoner  to  Cashmere.  He  appears  to  have  remained 
there  about  a  year,  and,  during  that  time,  to  have  been 
treated  with  little  kindness  and  respect.  Mahmoud  was 
then  in  comparative  quiet  and  security  at  Caubul,  and, 
in  his  good  fortune,  seems  to  have  regarded  with  com- 
passion the  fate  of  his  unhappy  brother.  "When  Shah 
Mahmoud  heard  of  the  way  in  which  we  were  treated," 
writes  the  royal  autobiographer,  "the  latent  feelings  of 
fraternal  affection  were  aroused  within  him,  and  he  im- 
mediately sent  a  force  into  the  Barukzye  country.  After 
plundering  the  whole  tribe  of  Atta  Mahmoud  Khan,  he 
carried  men,  women,  and  children  into  captivity.  Find- 
ing that  this  had  not  the  desired  effect,  viz.,  our  release 
from  bondage,  he  sent  a  force  to  Cashmere,  under  Futteh 
Khan."  Atta  Mahmoud  advanced  to  give  him  battle; 
but  his  followers  deserted  to  the  standard  of  the  Barukzye 
Wuzeer,  and  he  fled  homewards  to  Cashmere.  Here, 
threatened  by  Futteh  Khan,  he  implored  the  assistance 
of  his  captive.  "  Seeing  his  escape  could  not  be  effected 
without  our  aid,  he  came,"  says  Shah  Soojah,  "to  our 
Dlace   of   confinement,  bare-headed,  with   the   Koran  in 


TflE   KOH-I-NOOR.  99 

one  hand,  a  naked  sword  in  the  other,  and  a  rope  about 
his  neck,  and  requested  our  forgiveness  for  the  sake  of 
the  sacred  volume."  The  Shah,  who,  according  to  his 
own  statements,  was  never  wanting  in  that  most  kingly 
(juality  of  forgiveness,  forgave  him  on  his  own  account, 
and  recommended  him  to  make  submission  to  Futteh 
Khan.  The  Wuzeer  was  advancing  Upon  Cashmere  from 
one  direction,  and  the  Sikhs  from  another;  and  it  was 
plain  that  the  rebellious  Nazim  had  nothing  before  him 
but  to  submit. 

I  wish  to  believe  Shah  Soojah's  history  of  the  amiable 
fraternal  impulses  which  dictated  the  expedition  to  Cash- 
mere. But  it  is  difficult  to  entertain  a  conviction  that  it 
was  not  directed  towards  other  objects  than  the  release  of 
the  exiled  monarch.  The  result  was,  that  Atta  Mahmoud, 
the  rebellious  Nazim,  made  submission  to  Futteh  Khan  ; 
— that  Mokhum  Chund,  the  leader  of  the  Sikh  expedition, 
met  the  Douranee  minister  about  the  same  time,  and  that 
both  recommended  Shah  Soojah  to  proceed  on  a  visit  to 
Runjeet  Singh.*  The  Maharajah,  it  soon  became  very- 
clear,  coveted  the  possession  of  the  great  Douranee  dia- 
mond. On  the  second  day  after  Shah  Soojah  entered 
Lahore,  he  was  waited  on  by  an  emissary  from  Runjeet, 
who  demanded  the  jewel  in  the  name  of  his  master. 
The  fugitive  monarch  asked  for  time  to  consider  the 
request,  and  hinted  that,  after  he  had  partaken  of  Run- 
jeet's  hospitality,  he  might  be  in  a  temper  to  grant  it. 
On  the  following  day,  the  same  messenger  presented  him- 

*  The  Shah  says:  "Mokhum  Chund,  on  the  part  of  Runjeet 
Singh,  informed  us,  that  his  master  was  anxious  that  we  should 
proceed  to  Lahore  as  soon  as  at  liberty,  and  visit  the  residence  of  our 
seraglio  in  that  city  ;  he  also  mentioned  that  his  master's  fame  would 
be  increased  by  our  going.  According  to  Futteh  Khan's  petition,  we 
agreed  to  this,  and  marched  towards  Lahore  with  Mokhum  Chund 
and  other  Singhs,  whilst  Futteh  Khan  returned  to  Shah  Mahmoud  in 
Caubul." 

u  2 


100  THE    MID-CAKEER   OF    SHAH    SOOJAH. 

self  again,  and  received  a  similar  rep.y.  Runjeet  Singh 
was  in  no  mood  to  brook  this  delay.  Determined  to  pos- 
sess himself  of  the  Koh-i-noor,  he  now  resorted  to  other 
measm-es  to  extort  it  from  the  luckless  owner.  "We 
then,"  says  Shah  Soojah,  "  experienced  privations  of  the 
necessaries  of  life,  and  sentinels  were  placed  over  our 
dwelling.  A  month  passed  in  this  way.  Confidential 
servants  of  Runjeet  Singh  then  waited  on  us,  and  inquired 
if  we  wanted  ready  cash,  and  would  enter  into  an  agree- 
ment and  treaty  for  the  above-mentioned  jewel.  We 
answered  in  the  affirmative,  and  next  day.  Ram  Singh 
brought  40,000  or  50,000  rupees,  and  asked  again  for  the 
Koh-i-noor,  which  we  promised  to  procure  when  some 
treaty  was  agreed  upon.  Two  days  after  this,  Runjeet 
Singh  came  in  person,  and,  after  friendly  protestations, 
he  stained  a  paper  with  safflower,  and  swearing  by  the 
Grunth  of  Baba  Nanuck  and  his  own  sword,  he  wrote 
the  following  security  and  compact : — That  he  delivered 
over  the  provinces  of  Kote  Cumaleeh,  Jung  Shawl,  and 
Khuleh  Noor,  to  us  and  our  heirs  for  ever  j  also  offering 
assistance  in  troops  and  treasure  for  the  purpose  of  again 
recovering  our  throne.  We  also  agreed,  if  we  should 
ever  ascend  the  throne,  to  consider  Ruryeet  Singh  always 
in  the  light  of  an  ally.  He  then  proposed  himself  that 
we  should  exchange  turbans,  which  is  among  the  Sikhs 
a  pledge  of  eternal  friendship,  and  we  then  gave  him  the 
Koh-i-noor." 

Having  thus  obtained  possession  of  the  great  diamond, 
Runjeet  Singh,  who  at  no  time  of  his  life  had  very  high 
ideas  of  honour,  was  unwilling  to  give  up  the  jagheer 
which  he  had  promised  as  the  price  of  it.  Whilst  Shah 
Soojah  was  still  thinking  over  the  non-performance  of  the 
contract,  Runjeet  invited  him  to  accompany  an  expe- 
dition which  was  proceeding  under  the  Maharajah  to 
Peshawur,  and  held  out  to  him  hopes  of  the  recovery  of 


SPOLIATION    OF    THE    SHAH.  101 

his  lost  dominions.  The  Shah  joined  Runjeet  at  Rotas, 
and  they  proceeded  together  to  Rawul  Pindee.  There 
the  Maharajah,  seeing  little  chance  of  success,  abandoned 
the  expedition,  and,  according  to  the  account  given  by 
Shah  Soojah,  desired  him  to  proceed  onward  in  the  company 
of  Ram  Singh.  Left  alone  with  that  chief,  he  was  shame- 
lessly plundered  by  robbers  of  higher  note  than  the  Sikh 
chiefs  would  willingly  admit.  All  thought  of  proceeding 
to  Peshawur  was  now  abandoned,  and,  accompanied  by 
Ram  Singh  and  the  heir-apparent.  Shah  Soojah  returned 
to  Lahore. 

At  the  capital  his  property  was  not  more  secure  thaiv 
on  the  line  of  njarch.  There  was  something  yet  left  to  be 
plundered,  and  the  plunderers  were  of  still  higher  rank. 
Runjeet  Singh  stripped  the  wretched  monarch  of  every- 
thing that  was  worth  taking,  and  "  even  after  this,"  says 
Shah  Soojah,  "  he  did  not  perform  one  of  his  promises." 
Instead  of  bestowing  new  favours  upon  the  man  who  had 
yielded  up  his  treasures  so  unsparingly,  the  Maharajah 
began  to  heap  new  indignities  upon  him.  Spies  were  set 
over  him,  and  guards  surrounded  his  dwelling.  Five  months 
passed  in  this  way ;  and  as  time  advanced,  the  condition 
of  the  wretched  Douranee  Prince  became  more  hopeless  ; 
his  escape  from  this  wretched  thraldom  more  to  be  coveted, 
and  yet  more  difficult  to  encompass.  He  remembered  the 
friendly  overtures  of  the  British  Government,  and  sighed 
for  a  peaceful  asylum  under  the  shelter  of  the  wings  of  the 
great  power  beyond  the  Sutlej.  "We  thought,"  he  says, 
"  of  the  proffered  friendship  of  the  British  Government, 
and  hoped  for  an  asylum  in  Loodhianah.  Several  Mussul- 
mans and  Hindoos  had  formerly  offered  their  services,  and 
we  now  engaged  them  and  purchased  several  of  the 
covered  hackeries  of  the  country.  Every  stratagem  was 
defeated  by  the  spies,  until  at  last  we  found  that  Abdool 
Hussan  had  disclosed  our  plans  to  Runjeet  Singh.     At 


102  THF    MID-CAREER    OF   SHAH    SOOJAH, 

last,  being  hopeless,  we  called  Abdool  Hussan  and  Moollah 
Jaffier  into  the  presence,  and  after  offering  them  bribes, 
and  giving  expectations  of  reward,  we  bought  them  to  our 
purpose ;  and  the  members  of  the  seraglio,  with  their 
attendants,  all  dressed  in  the  costume  of  the  country, 
found  a  safe  conveyance  in  the  hackeries  above  mentioned 
to  the  cantonments  of  Loodhianah.  When  we  received 
accounts  of  their  safe  arrival,  we  gave  sincere  thanks  to 
Almighty  God ! " 

But  his  own  escape  was  yet  to  be  effected.  Outwitted 
to  this  extent,  Runjeet  Singh  redoubled  his  precautions, 
and  in  no  very  conciliatory  mood  of  mind  hemmed  in  the 
ex-King  with  guards,  and  watched  him  day  and  night  with 
the  keenest  vigilance.  "  Seven  ranges  of  guards,"  says  the 
royal  autobiographer,  "  were  put  upon  our  person,  and 
armed  men  with  lighted  torches  watched  our  bed.  When 
we  went  as  far  as  the  banks  of  the  river  at  night,  the 
sentinels  upon  the  ramparts  lighted  flambeaux  until  we 
returned.  Several  months  passed  in  this  manner,  and  our 
own  attendants  were  with  difficulty  allowed  to  come  into 
the  presence.  No  relief  was  left  but  that  of  our  holy 
religion,  and  God  alone  could  give  us  assistance."  And 
assistance  was  given,  in  the  shape  of  unwonted  resolution 
and  ingenuity.  In  this  critical  hour  the  resources  of  the 
Shah  seem  to  have  developed  themselves  in  an  unexampled 
manner.  He  foiled  all  Runjeet' s  efforts  to  secure  his 
prisoner,  and  baffled  the  vigilance  of  his  guards.  A  few 
faithful  attendants  aided  his  endeavours,  and  he  escaped 
from  the  cruel  walls  of  Lahore.  "  We  ordered,"  he  says, 
"  the  roof  of  the  apartment  containing  our  camp  equipage 
to  be  opened,  so  as  to  admit  of  a  person  passing  through  ; 
apertures  were  formed  by  mining  through  seven  other 
chambers  to  the  outside  of  the  building."  Everything 
being  thus  prepared,  the  unhappy  King  disguised  himself 
as  a  mendicant,    and   leaving  one  of  his  attendants  to 


THE    RAJAH    OF    KISTAWAR.  103 

simulate  the  royal  person  on  his  bed,  crept  through  the 
fissures  in  the  walls,  escaped  with  two  followers  into  the 
street,  and  emerged  thence  through  the  main  sewer  which 
ran  beneath  the  city  wall. 

Outside  Lahore  he  was  joined  by  his  remaining  followers. 
He  had  been  thinking,  in  confinement,  of  the  blessings  of 
a  safe  retreat  at  Loodhianah  ;  but  no  sooner  did  he  find 
himself  abroad  than  he  courted  new  adventures,  and 
meditated  new  enterprises.  Instead  of  hastening  to  the 
British  provinces,  he  turned  his  face  towards  the  hills  of 
Jummoo.  Wandering  about  in  this  direction  without 
seemingly  any  fixed  object,  he  received  friendly  overtures 
from  the  Rajah  of  Kistawar,  and  was  easily  persuaded  to 
enter  his  dominions. 

The  Rajah  went  out  to  meet  him,  loaded  him  with 
kindness,  conducted  him  to  his  capital,  and  made  the 
kingly  fugitive  happy  with  rich  gifts  and  public  honours. 
Offering  up  sacrifices,  and  distributing  large  sums  of 
money  in  honour  of  his  royal  guest,  the  Rajah  spared  no- 
thing that  could  soothe  the  grief  or  pamper  the  vanity  of 
the  exiled  monarch.  But  the  novelty  of  this  pleasant 
hospitality  soon  began  to  wear  away,  and  the  restless 
wanderer  sighed  for  a  life  of  more  enterprise  and  excite- 
ment. "  Tired  of  an  idle  life,"  he  says,  "  we  laid  plans 
for  an  attack  on  Cashmere."  The  Rajah  of  KistaWar  was 
well  pleased  with  the  project,  and  placed  his  troops  and 
his  treasury  at  the  command  of  his  royal  guest.  The 
Shah  himself,  though  robbed  of  all  his  jewels,  had  a  lakh 
of  rupees  remaining  at  Lahore,  but  as  soon  as  he  began  to 
possess  himself  of  it,  the  ^laharajah  stretched  out  his  hand, 
and  swept  it  into  his  own  treasury.  Nothing  daunted  by 
this  accident,  the  Kistawar  chief,  who  was  "  ready  to  sacri- 
fice his  territory  for  the  weal "  of  the  Shah,  freely  supplied 
the  sinews  of  war;  troops  were  levied,  and  operations 
commenced. 


104  THE    MID-CAREER    OF    SHAH    SOOJAH. 

But  it  was  not  written  in  the  Shah's  book  of  life  that  his 
enterprises  should  result  in  anything  but  failure.  The 
outset  of  the  expedition  was  marked  by  some  temporary 
successes  ;  but  it  closed  in  disaster  and  defeat.  The 
Shah's  levies  charged  the  stockaded  positions  of  the  enemy 
sword  in  hand,  and  were  pushing  into  the  heart  of  the 
country,  when  the  same  inexorable  enemy  that  has  baffled 
the  efforts  of  the  greatest  European  states  raised  its 
barriers  against  the  advance  of  the  invading  army.  "  We 
were  only  three  coss,"  relates  Shah  Soojah,  "  from  Azim 
Khan's  camp,  with  the  picturesque  city  of  Cashmere  full 
in  view,  when  the  snow  began  again  to  fall,  and  the  storm 
continued  with  violence,  and  without  intermission,  for  two 
days.  Our  Hindostanees  were  benumbed  with  a  cold 
unfelt  in  their  sultry  regions  ;  the  road  to  our  rear  was 
blocked  up  with  snow,  and  the  supplies  still  far  distant. 
For  three  days  our  troops  were  almost  famished,  and  many 
Hindostanees  died.  We  could  not  advance,  and  retreat 
was  hazardous.  Many  lost  their  hands  and  feet  from 
being  frost-bitten,  before  we  determined  to  retreat." 

These  calamities,  which  seemed  to  strengthen  the 
devotion  of  the  Rajah  of  Kistawar  to  the  unfortunate  Shah, 
and  which  were  borne  by  him  with  the  most  manly  forti- 
tude, sobered  the  fugitive  Afghan  monarch,  and  made  him 
again  turn  his  thoughts  longingly  towards  a  tranquil 
asylum  in  the  Company's  dominions.  At  the  earnest 
request  of  his  new  friend,  he  remained  during  nine  months 
beneath  the  hospitable  roof  of  the  Rajah,  and  then  pre- 
pared for  a  journey  to  Loodhianah.*     Avoiding  the  Lahore 

*  Shah  Soojah  records  that  the  faithful  Rajah,  on  the  King  an- 
nouncing his  determination  to  depart,  "burst  into  tears.  He  urged 
the  dangers  of  the  road,  his  wish  to  sacrifice  his  wealth  for  us,  and 
every  excuse  which  affection  could  dictate,  to  prolong  our  stay."  "  The 
Rajah,"  he  adds,  "accompanied  us  two  marches,  and  at  parting,  which 
took  place  in  silence,  tears  stood  in  the  eyes  of  both  parties.     We  had 


MISFORTUNES   OP   THE   SHAH,  105 

teiTitory,  lest  he  should  fall  into  the  hands  of  Runjeet 
Singh,  willing  rather  to  encounter  the  eternal  snows  of  the 
hill  regions  than  his  ruthless  enemies  on  the  plains,  he 
tracked  along  the  inhospitable  mountains  of  Thibet,  where 
for  days  and  days  no  signs  of  human  life  or  vegetation 
appeared  to  cheer  his  heart  and  encourage  his  efforts. 
"The  depth  of  the  eternal  snows,"  he  says,  "was  immense. 
Underneath  the  large  bodies  of  ice  the  mountain  torrents 
had  formed  themselves  channels.  The  five  rivers  watering 
the  Punjaub  have  their  rise  here  from  fountains  amid  the 
snows  of  ages.  We  passed  mountains,  the  snows  of  which 
varied  in  colour,  and  at  last  reached  the  confines  of  Thibet, 
after  experiencing  the  extremes  of  cold,  hunger,  and 
fatigue." 

His  trials  were  not  yet  over.  He  had  still  to  encounter 
dangers  and  difficulties  among  the  hill  tribes.  The  people 
of  Kulloo  insulted  and  ill-treated  him  ;  but  the  Rajah 
came  to  his  relief,  and,  after  a  few  days  of  onward  travel- 
ling, to  the  inexpressible  joy  of  the  fugitive  monarch  the 
red  houses  of  the  British  residents  at  one  of  our  hill 
stations  appeared  in  sight.  "  Our  cares  and  fatigues  were 
now,"  says  the  Shah,  "forgotten,   and  giving  thanks  to 

no  dress  of  honour,  no  khillaut  worth  his  acceptance,  but  he  accepted 
our  thanks  and  blessing,  and  departed  with  every  mark  of  grief." 
Amidst  so  much  of  selfish  rapacity  and  dark  ingratitude  as  marks  these 
annals  of  the  Douranee  Empire,  it  is  a  pleasure  to  chronicle  such  an 
episode  as  this  in  the  history  of  Shah  Soojah's  fortunes.  I  am  too  will- 
ing to  believe  the  whole  story  to  encourage  any  doubt  of  its  authenticity. 
The  free  use,  indeed,  which  I  have  made  of  Shah  Soojah's  auto- 
biography is  sufficient  proof  of  my  belief  in  the  general  fidelity  of  the 
narrative.  It  was  written  by  the  Shah's  Moonshee,  imder  his  Majesty's 
superintendence.  I  have  quoted  Lieutenant  Bennett's  translation,  as 
published  in  the  Calcutta  Monthly  Journal.  It  supplies,  at  the  same 
time,  more  interesting  and  more  authentic  materials  of  Afghan  history 
than  are  to  be  found  elsewhere,  and  to  the  majority  of  readers  is  pro- 
bably as  fresh  as  manuscript. 


106  THE    MID-CAREER    OF    SHAH    SOOJaH. 

Almighty  God,  who,  having  freed  us  from  the  hands  of 
our  enemies,  and  led  us  through  the  snows  and  over  the 
trackless  mountains,  had  now  safely  conducted  us  to  the 
land  of  friends,  we  passed  a  night,  for  the  first  time,  with 
comfort  and  without  dread.  Signs  of  civihsation  showed 
themselves  as  we  proceeded,  and  we  soon  entered  a  fine 
broad  road.  A  chuprassie  from  Captain  Ross  attended  us ; 
the  hill  ranas  paid  us  every  attention ;  and  we  soon 
reached  Loodhianah,  where  we  found  our  family  treated 
with  marked  respect,  and  enjoying  every  comfort  after 
their  perilous  march  from  Lahore." 

It  was  in  the  month  of  September,  1816,  that  Shah 
Soojah  joined  his  family  at  Loodhianah.  He  sought  a 
resting-place,  and  he  found  one  in  the  British  dominions. 
Two  years  of  quietude  and  peace  were  his.  But  quietude 
and  peace  are  afflictions  grievoug  and  intolerable  to  an 
Afghan  nature.  The  Shah  gratefully  acknowledged  the 
friendly  hospitality  of  the  British,  but  the  burden  of  a  life 
of  inactivity  was  not  to  be  borne.  The  Douranee  Empire 
was  still  rent  by  intestine  convulsions.  The  Barukzye 
sirdars  were  dominant  at  Caubul ;  but  their  sovereignty 
was  threatened  by  Shah  Mahmoud  and  the  Princes  of 
Herat,  and  not,  at  that  time,  professing  to  conquer  for 
themselves,  for  the  spirit  of  legitimacy  was  not  extinct  in 
Afghanistan,  they  looked  abroad  for  a  royal  puppet,  and 
found  one  at  Loodhianah.  Azim  Khan  invited  Shah 
Soojah  to  re-assert  his  claims  to  the  throne ;  and  the  Shah, 
weary  of  repose,  unwarned  by  past  experience,  flung  him- 
self into  this  new  enterprise,  only  to  add  another  to  that 
long  list  of  failures  which  it  took  nearly  a  quarter  of  a 
century  more  to  render  complete. 


107 


CHAPTEK  VII. 

[1816—1837.] 

Dost  Mahomed  and  the  Barukzyes — Early  days  of  Dost  Mahomed — 
The  fall  of  Futteh  Khan— Defeat  of  Shah  Mahmoud— Supremacy 
of  the  Barukzyes — Position  of  the  Empire— Dost  Mahomed  at 
Caubul— Expedition  of  Shah  Soojah — His  Defeat —Capture  of 
Peshawur  by  the  Sikhs. 

Among  the  twenty  brothers  of  Futteh  Khan  was  one 
many  years  his  junior,  whose  infancy  was  wholly  dis- 
regarded by  the  great  Barukzye  Sirdar.  The  son  of  a 
woman  of  the  Kuzzilbash  tribe,  looked  down  upon  by  the 
high-bred  Douranee  ladies  of  his  father's  household,  the 
boy  had  begun  life  in  the  degrading  office  of  a  sweeper  at 
the  sacred  cenotaph  of  Lamech.*  Permitted,  at  a  later 
period,  to  hold  a  menial  office  about  the  person  of  the 
powerful  Wuzeer,  he  served  the  great  man  with  water,  or 
bore  his  pipe ;  was  very  zealous  in  his  ministrations ;  kept 
long  and  painful  vigils ;  saw  everything,  heard  everything 

*  "By  an  honorary  or  devotional  vow  of  his  mother  he  was  con- 
secrated to  the  lowest  menial  service  of  the  sacred  cenotaph  of  Laraech. 
.  .  .  .  This  cenotaph  is  known  in  the  colloquial  dialect  of  the 
country  by  the  appellation  of  Meiter  Lam.  In  conformity  with  the 
maternal  vow,  when  the  young  aspirant  became  capable  of  wielding  a 
brush,  he  was  carried  to  Meiter  Lam  by  his  mother,  and  instructed  to 
exonerate  her  from  the  consequences  of  a  sacred  obligation,  by  sweeping, 
for  the  period  of  a  whole  day,  the  votive  area  included  within  the  pre- 
cincts of  the  holy  place  inclosing  the  alleged  tomb  of  the  antediluvian, 
the  father  as  he  is  termed  of  the  prophet  Noah." — [General  Halan.} 


108       DOST  MAHOMED  AND  THE  BARUKZYES. 

in  silence  ;  bided  his  time  patiently,  and  when  the  hour 
came,  trod  the  stage  of  active  life  as  no  irresolute  novice. 
A  stripling  of  fourteen,  in  the  crowded  streets  of  Pesha- 
wur  in  broad  day,  as  the  buyers  and  the  sellers  thronged 
the  thoroughfares  of  the  city,  he  slew  one  of  the  enemies 
of  Futteh  Khan,  and  galloped  home  to  report  the  achieve- 
ment to  the  Wuzeer.  From  that  time  his  rise  was  rapid. 
The  neglected  younger  brother  of  Futteh  Khan  became 
the  favourite  of  the  powerful  chief,  and  following  the  for- 
tunes of  the  warlike  minister,  soon  took  his  place  among 
the  chivalry  of  the  Douranee  Empire. 

The  name  of  this  young  warrior  was  Dost  Mahomed 
Khan.  Nature  seems  to  have  designed  him  for  a  hero 
of  the  true  Afghan  stamp  and  character.  Of  a  graceful 
person,  a  prepossessing  countenance,  a  bold  frank  manner, 
he  was  outwardly  endowed  with  all  those  gifts  which  most 
inspire  confidence  and  attract  affection  ;  whilst  undoubted 
courage,  enterprise,  activity,  somewhat  of  the  recklessness 
and  unscrupulousness  of  his  race,  combined  with  a  more 
than  common  measure  of  intelligence  and  sagacity,  gave 
him  a  command  over  his  fellows  and  a  mastery  over  cir- 
cumstances, which  raised  him  at  length  to  the  chief  seat 
in  the  empire.  His  youth  was  stained  with  many  crimes, 
which  he  lived  to  deplore.  It  is  the  glory  of  Dost  Ma- 
homed that  in  the  vigour  of  his  years  he  looked  back  with 
contrition  upon  the  excesses  of  his  early  life,  and  lived 
down  many  of  the  besetting  infirmities  which  had  over- 
shadowed the  dawn  of  his  career.  The  waste  of  a  deserted 
childhood  and  the  deficiencies  of  a  neglected  education  he 
struggled  manfully  to  remedy  and  repair.  At  the  zenith 
of  his  reputation  there  was  not,  perhaps,  in  all  Central 
Asia  a  chief  so  remarkable  for  the  exercise  of  self-dis- 
cipline and  self-control ;  but  he  emerged  out  of  a  cloudy 
morn  of  vice,  and  sunk  into  a  gloomy  night  of  folly. 

As  the  lieutenant  of  his  able  and  powerful  brother,  the 


FUTTEH    KHAN.  109 

young  Dost  Mahomed  Khan  displayed  in  all  the  contests 
which  rent  the  Douranee  Empire  a  daring  and  heroic 
spirit,  and  considerable  militaiy  address.  Early  acquiring 
the  power  of  handling  large  bodies  of  troops,  he  was 
regarded,  whilst  yet  scarcely  a  man,  as  a  dashing,  fearless 
soldier,  and  a  leader  of  good  repute.  But,  in  those  early 
days,  his  scruples  were  few  ;  his  excesses  were  many.  It 
was  one  of  those  excesses,  it  is  supposed,  which  cost  the 
life  of  Futteh  Khan,  and  built  up  his  own  reputation  on 
the  ruin  of  his  distinguished  brother. 

It  was  shortly  after  the  retirement  of  Shah  Soojah  to 
the  British  possessions  that  Futteh  Khan  set  out,  at  the 
head  of  an  army,  to  the  western  boundary  of  Afghanistan. 
Persia  had  long  been  encroaching  upon  the  limits  of  the 
Douranee  Empire,  and  it  was  now  to  stem  the  tide  of 
Kujjar  invasion  that  the  Afghan  Wuzeer  set  out  for  Kho- 
rassan.  At  this  time  he  was  the  virtual  ruler  of  the 
country.  Weak,  indolent,  and  debauched.  Shah  Mahmoud, 
retaining  the  name  and  the  pomp  of  royalty,  had  yielded 
the  actual  government  of  the  country  into  the  hands  of 
Futteh  Khan  and  his  brothers.  The  Princes  of  the  blood 
royal  quailed  before  the  Barukzye  Sirdars.  Ferooz-ood- 
Deen,  brother  of  the  reigning  monarch,  was  at  that  time 
governor  of  Herat.  Whether  actuated  by  motives  of  per- 
sonal resentment  or  ambition,  or  instigated  by  Shah  Mah- 
moud himself,  Futteh  Khan  determined  to  turn  the  Per- 
sian expedition  to  other  account,  and  to  throw  Herat  into 
the  hands  of  the  Barukzyes.  The  execution  of  this 
design  was  entrusted  to  Dost  Mahomed.  He  entered 
Herat  with  his  Kohistanee  followers  as  a  friend;  and 
when  the  chiefs  of  the  city  were  beyond  its  gates,  in 
attendance  upon  the  Wuzeer,  with  characteristic  Afghan 
treacheiy  and  violence  he  massacred  the  palace  guards, 
seized  the  person  of  the  Prince,  spoiled  the  treasury,  and 
violated  the  harem.     Setting  the  cro\\Ti  upon  this  last  act 


110       DOST  MAHOMED  AND  THE  BARUKZYES. 

of  violence,  he  tore  the  jewelled  waistband  from  the  person 
of  the  royal  wife  of  one  of  the  royal  Princes.*  The  out- 
raged lady  is  said  to  have  sent  her  profaned  garment  to 
Prince  Kamran,  and  to  have  drawn  from  him  an  oath  that 
he  would  avenge  the  injury.  He  was  true  to  his  vow. 
The  blow  was  struck ;  but  it  fell  not  on  the  perpetrator 
of  the  outrage  :  it  fell  upon  Futteh  Khan. 

Dost  Mahomed  had  fled  for  safety  to  Cashmere.  The 
Wuzeer,  returning  from  the  Persian  expedition,  fell  into 
the  hands  of  Prince  Kamran,  who  punctured  his  eyes 
with  the  point  of  a  dagger,  t  What  followed  is  well 
known.  Enraged  by  so  gross  an  outrage  on  a  member 
of  the  Suddozye  family,  alarmed  at  the  growing  power 
of  the  Barukzyes,  and  further  irritated  by  the  resolute 
refusal  of  Futteh  Khan  to  betray  his  brothers,  who 
had  effected  their  escape  from  Herat,  Kamran  and  his 
father.  Shah  Mahmoud,  agreed  to  put  their  noble  prisoner 
to  death.  They  were  then  on  their  way  from  Candahar 
to  Caubul.  The  ex-minister  was  brought  into  their  pre- 
sence, and  again  called  upon  to  write  to  his  brothers, 
ordering    them  to   surrender  themselves  to   the    Shah. 

*  There  are  varying  accounts  respecting  the  identity  of  this  lady. 
Mr.  Vigne  says  that  she  was  daughter  of  Timour  Shah,  and  sister  to 
Shah  Mahmoud.  Mohun  Lall,  probably  with  more  correctness,  places 
her  in  a  lower  generation — asserting  that  she  was  the  sister  of  Prince 
Kamran,  and  the  wife  of  Prince  Malik  Quasim,  son  of  Ferooz-ood- 
Deen.  There  is  something  rather  perplexing  in  these  relationships. 
As  Ferooz-ood-Deen  was  the  brother  of  Shah  Mahmoud,  if  Mr.  Vigne's 
account  be  correct,  his  son  was  the  nephew  of  the  lady  in  question. 

+  So  Shah  Soojah — who,  however,  does  not  allude  to  the  outrage 
committed  by  Dost  Mahomed.  He  merely  says,  "After  the  Kujjar 
campaign,  Futteh  Khan  grew  ambitious,  and  determined  to  take  into 
his  own  hands  the  reins  of  government,  and  for  this  purpose  resolved 
to  ensnare  Prince  Kamran,  who,  hearing  of  the  plot,  seized  Futteh 
Khan,  put  out  his  eyes  with  the  point  of  a  sharp  dagger,  and  after 
performing  on  him  an  operation  similar  to  the  African  mode  of  scalping, 
placed  him  in  con^nement."—[AiUobiography.] 


MURDER   OF   FUTTEH    KHAN.  Ill 

Again  he  refused,  alleging  that  he  was  but  a  poor  blind 
captive  ;  that  his  career  was  run ;  that  he  had  no  longer 
any  influence ;  and  that  he  could  not  consent  to  betray 
his  brethren.  Exasperated  by  the  resolute  bearing  of  his 
prisoner,  Mahmoud  Shah  ordered  the  unfortunate  minister 
— the  king-maker  to  whom  he  owed  his  crown — to  be  put 
to  death  before  him ;  and  there,  in  the  presence  of  the 
feeble  father  and  the  cruel  son,  Futteh  Khan  was  by  the 
attendant  courtiers  literally  hacked  to  pieces.  His  nose, 
ears,  and  lips  were  cut  off;  his  fingers  severed  from  his 
hands,  his  hands  from  his  arms,  his  arms  from  his  body. 
Limb  followed  limb,  and  long  was  the  horrid  butchery 
continued  before  the  life  of  the  victim  was  extinct. 
Futteh  Khan  raised  no  cry,  offered  no  prayer  for  mercy. 
His  fortitude  was  unshaken  to  the  last.  He  died  as  he 
had  lived,  the  bravest  and  most  resolute  of  men — like  his 
noble  father,  a  victim  to  the  perfidy  and  ingi:atitude  of 
princes.  The  murder  of  Poyndah  Khan  shook  the  Sud- 
dozye  dynasty  to  its  base.  The  assassination  of  Futteh 
Khan  soon  made  it  a  heap  of  ruins.* 

*  Calcutta  Review.  This  passage,  with  many  others  of  the  present 
chapter,  is  taken,  with  some  additions  and  curtailments,  from  a  bio- 
graphy of  Dost  Mahomed  Khan,  written  a  few  years  ago  by  the  author 
of  this  work.  As  the  article  was  the  result  of  much  research,  and 
written  at  least  with  the  greatest  care,  I  do  not  know  that  I  can  much 
improve  upon  it.  Of  the  circumstances  attending  the  death  of  Futteh 
Khan,  an  elaborate  account  is  given  by  Captain  James  Abbott  in  his 
"Journey  to  Khiva."  He  received  the  story  from  Sumund  Khan, 
*'  who  had  been  much  about  the  person  of  Shah  Kamran."  I  subjoin 
the  closing  scene  of  this  tragic  episode: — "Futteh  Khan  was  brought 
into  a  tent,  pitched  between  Herat  and  the  river,  (?)  in  which  sat  a 
circle  of  his  mortal  foes.  They  commenced  by  each  in  turn  accusing 
him  of  the  injuries  received  at  his  hands,  and  heaping  upon  him  the 
most  opprobrious  epithets.  Atta  Mahmoud  Khan  then  stepped  up  to 
him,  and  seizing  one  of  his  ears,  cut  it  off  with  his  knife,  saying, 
'  This  is  for  such  and  such  an  injury  done  to  such  an  one  of  my  rela- 
tives.'    Shahagaussie  Newaub  cut   off  the  other  ear.      Each,  as  he 


112       DOST  MAHOMED  AND  THE  BARUKZYES. 

From  this  time,  the  rise  of  Dost  Mahomed  was  rapid. 
He  had  the  blood  of  kindred  to  avenge.  The  cruelty 
and  ingratitude  of  Mahmoud  and  his  son  were  now  to  be 
signally  punished  by  the  brother  of  the  illustrious  sufferer. 
Azim  Khan,  who  ruled  in  Cashmere,  counselled  a  course 
of  forbearance ;  but  Dost  Mahomed  indignantly  rejected 
the  proposal ;  and  declaring  that  it  would  be  an  eternal 
disgrace  to  the  Barukzyes  not  to  chastise  the  murderers 
of  their  chief,  swore  that  he  would  march  upon  Caubul, 
at  the  head  of  an  army  of  retribution.  Inclined  neither 
to  enter  personally  upon  so  perilous  an  undertaking,  nor 
to  appear,  in  such  a  juncture,  wholly  supine,  Azim  Khan 
presented  his  brother  with  three  or  four  lakhs  of  rupees  to 
defray  the  charges  of  the  expedition — a  sum  which  was 
exhausted  long  before  the  Sirdar  neared  Caubul.  But  in 
spite  of  every  obstacle.  Dost  Mahomed  reached  Koord- 
Caubul,  two  marches  from  the  capital,  and  there  encamped 
his  army. 

wreaked  this  unmanly  vengeance  upon  the  victim,  whom  he  would 
have  crouched  to  the  day  before,  named  the  wrong  of  which  it  was  the 
recompence  ;  thus  depriving  him  of  the  highest  consolation  the  mind  of 
man  can  possess  under  torment — the  conscience  void  of  ofience. 
Another  of  the  barbarians  cut  off  his  nose ;  Khana  Moolla  Khan  severed 
his  right  hand  ;  Khalook  Dad  Khan  his  left  hand,  the  blood  gushing 
copiously  from  each  new  wound.  Summurdar  Khan  cut  off  his  beard, 
saying,  *  This  is  for  dishonouring  my  wife. '  Hitherto  the  high-spirited 
chief  had  borne  his  sufferings  without  either  weakness  or  any  ebullition 
of  his  excitable  temper.  He  had  only  once  condescended,  in  a  calm 
voice,  to  beg  them  to  hasten  his  death.  The  mutilation  of  ears  and 
nose,  a  punishment  reserved  for  the  meanest  offences  of  slaves,  had  not 
been  able  to  shake  his  fortitude  ;  but  the  beard  of  a  Mahomedan  is  a 
member  so  sacred,  that  honour  itself  becomes  confounded  with  it ;  and 
he  who  had  borne  with  the  constancy  of  a  hero  the  taunts  and  tortures 
heaped  upon  him,  seemed  to  lose  his  manhood  with  his  beard,  and 
burst  into  a  passion  of  tears.  His  torments  were  now  drawing  to  a 
close.  Gool  Mahomed  Khan,  with  a  blow  of  his  sabre,  cut  off  his  right 
foot,  and  a  man  of  the  Populzye  tribe  severed  the  left.  Attah 
Mahomed  Khan  finished  his  torments  by  cutting  his  throat." 


MURDER   OF   ATTA   MAHOMED.  113 

The  youthful  son  of  Kamran,  Prince  Jehangire,  was 
then  the  nominal  ruler  of  Caubul.  But  the  actual  adminis- 
tration of  affairs  was  in  the  hands  of  Atta  Mahomed. 
A  Sirdar  of  the  Bamezye  tribe,  a  man  of  considerable  ability, 
but  no  match  for  Dost  Mahomed,  he  was  now  guilty  of 
the  grand  eiTor  of  underrating  such  an  adversary.  He  had 
acted  a  conspicuous  part  in  the  recent  intestine  struggles 
between  the  Suddozye  brothers ;  but  he  had  no  love  for 
the  royal  family — none  for  the  Barukzyes.  He  it  was 
who  had  instigated  Kamran  to  the  cruel  murder  of  Futteh 
Khan,  and  had  with  his  own  hands  commenced  the  inhu- 
man butchery.  Now  to  advance  ambitious  projects  of 
his  own,  he  was  ready  to  betray  his  masters.  Simulating 
a  fi'iendship  which  he  did  not  feel,  he  leagued  himself 
with  their  enemies,  and  covenanted  to  betray  the  capi- 
tal into  the  hands  of  the  Barukzye  Sirdars.  But  Dost 
Mahomed  and  his  brethren  had  not  forgotten  the  terrible 
tragedy  which  had  cut  short  the  great  career  of  the  chief 
of  their  tribe.  In  a  garden-house  which  had  once  be- 
longed to  the  murdered  minister,  they  met  Atta  Mahomed, 
there  to  complete  the  covenant  for  the  surrender  of  the 
city.  A  signal  was  given,  when  one — the  youngest — of 
the  brothers  rushed  upon  the  Bamezye  chief,  threw  him 
to  the  ground,  and  subjected  him  to  the  cruel  process 
which  had  preceded  the  murder  of  Futteh  Khan.  They 
spared  his  life ;  but  sent  him  blind  and  helpless  into  the 
world,  with  the  mark  of  Barukzye  vengeance  upon  him — 
an  object  less  of  compassion  than  of  scorn. 

The  seizure  of  the  Balla  Hissar  was  now  speedily 
effected.  The  Shah-zadah  was  surrounded  by  treachery. 
Young  and  beautiful,  he  was  the  delight  of  the  women  of 
Caubul;  but  he  had  few  friends  among  the  chivalry  of 
the  empire.  Too  weak  to  distinguish  the  true  from  the 
false,  he  was  easily  betrayed.  Persuaded  to  withdraw 
himself  into  the  upper  citadel,  he  left  the  lower  fortress 


114       DOST  MAHOMED  AND  THE  BARUKZYES. 

at  the  mercy  of  Dost  Mahomed.  The  Sirdar  made  the 
most  of  the  opportunity;  ran  a  mine  under  the  upper 
works,  and  blew  up  a  portion  of  them.  Death  stared  the 
Shah-zadah  in  the  face.  The  women  of  Caubul  offered 
up  prayers  for  the  safety  of  the  beautiful  Prince.  The 
night  was  dark ;  the  rain  descended  in  torrents.  To  re- 
main in  the  citadel  was  to  court  destruction.  Under 
cover  of  the  pitchy  darkness,  it  was  possible  that  he  might 
effect  his  escape.  Attended  by  a  few  followers,  he  made  the 
effort,  and  succeeded.  He  fled  so  Ghuzni,  and  was  saved. 
Dost  Mahomed  was  now  in  possession  of  Caubul.  But 
threatened  from  two  different  quarters,  his  tenure  was 
most  inseciu'e.  Shah  Mahmoud  and  Prince  Kamran  were 
marching  down  from  Herat,  and  Azim  Khan  was  coming 
from  Cashmere  to  assert  his  claims,  as  the  representative 
of  the  Barukzye  family.  But  the  spirit  of  legitimacy 
was  not  wholly  extinct  in  Afghanistan.  The  Barukzyes, 
did  not  profess  to  conquer  for  themselves.  It  was  neces- 
sary to  put  forward  some  scion  of  the  royal  family,  and  to 
fight  and  conquer  in  his  name.  Dost  Mahomed  pro- 
claimed Sultan  Ali,  whilst  Azim  Khaii  invited  Shah 
Soojah  to  emerge  from  the  obscurity  of  Loodhianah  and 
re-assert  his  claims  to  the  throne.* 

*  This  was  in  1818.  See  close  of  the  last  chapter.  "  Azim  Khan," 
says  Shah  Soojah,  in  his  autobiography,  "sent  us  a  fawning  petition, 
informing  us  that  he  had  collected  all  Futteh  Khan's  relations,  com- 
prehending the  whole  of  the  Barukzye  tribe,  and  swearing,  by  every- 
thing sacred,  that  he  and  the  other  chiefs  had  taken  an  oath  of  fidelity 
to  us  their  lawful  king,  entreated  that  we  would  march  immediately 
to  Peshawur,  where  he  would  join  the  royal  standard  with  all  the 
troops  and  the  treasury  of  Cashmere.  We  sent  for  Mr.  Murray,  and 
ordered  him  to  make  the  Kesident  of  Delhi  acquainted  with  this,  and 
inform  us  of  their  opinion.  This  opinion  he  gave  us,  some  days  after- 
wards, namely,  '  That  for  political  reasons  no  assistance  could  be^ 
given,  but  that  we  were  at  liberty  either  to  depart  or  remain  in  the 
asylum  allotted  to  us.'  Two  years  had  been  passed  in  ease,  and  we 
now  determined  to  make  an  attempt  to  reascend  our  throne." 


DEFEAT    OF   THE    SUDDOZYES.  11/) 

Weary  of  retirement  and  inactivity,  the  Shah  con- 
sented, and  an  expedition  was  planned.  But  the  covenant 
was  but  of  short  duration.  The  contracting  parties  fell  out 
upon  the  road,  and,  instead  of  fighting  a  common  enemy, 
got  up  a  battle  among  themselves.  The  Shah,  who  never 
lived  to  grow  wiser,  gave  himself  such  airs,  and  asserted 
such  ridiculous  pretentions,  that  Azim  Khan  deserted  his 
new  master,  and  let  loose  his  troops  upon  the  royal  cortege. 
Defeated  in  the  conflict  which  ensued,*  Shah  Soojah  fled 
to  the  Khybur  hills,  and  thence  betook  himself  to  Sindh. 
Another  puppet  being  called  for,  Prince  Ayoob,  for  want 
of  a  better,  was  elevated  to  that  dignity,  and  the  new 
friends  set  out  for  Caubul. 

In  the  meanwhile  the  royal  army,  which  had  marched 
from  Herat  under  Shah  Mahmoud  and  Prince  Kamran 
approached  the  capital  of  Afghanistan.  Unprepared  to 
receive  so  formidable  an  enemy,  weak  in  numbers,  and 
ill-supplied  with  money  and  materials.  Dost  Mahomed 
could  not,  with  any  hope  of  success,  have  given  battle  to 
Mahmoud's  forces.  The  danger  was  imminent.  The 
royal  troops  were  within  six  miles  of  the  capital.  Dost 
Mahomed  and  his  followers  prepared  for  flight.  With  the 
bridles  of  their  horses  in  their  hands,  they  stood  waiting 
the  approach  of  the  enemy.  But  their  fears  were  ground- 
less. A  flight  ensued ;  but  it  was  not  Dost  Mahomed's, 
but  Mahmoud's  army  that  fled.  At  the  very  threshold 
of  victory,   the   Suddozye   Prince,  either   believing  that 

*  Shah  Soojah  attributes  his  defeat  to  an  accidental  explosion  of 
gunpowder.  *'Our  attendants,"  he  says,  "  only  amounted  to  300, 
with  two  guns,  hut  they  had  taken  up  an  advantageous  position  on  a 
bridge,  near  the  garden.  The  Meer  Akhor  charged  us  with  his  horse  ; 
but  the  first  fire  from  the  cannon  made  him  bite  the  dust,  when  an 
unfortunate  accident  happened.  A  large  quantity  of  powder  had  been 
brought  to  be  divided  among  the  matchlock  men.  This  caught  fire,  bj 
which  fifty  men  were  blown  up  and  others  wounded.  Resistance  waa 
now  in  vain,  and  we  escaped  with  difi&culty  to  the  Khybur  hills." 

I  2 


116  DOST    MAHOMED    AND    THE    BARUKZYES. 

there  was  treachery  in  his  ranks,  or  apprehending  that 
the  Barukzyes  would  seize  Herat  in  his  absence,  turned 
suddenly  back,  and  flung  himself  into  the  arms  of  defeat. 

The  Barukzyes  were  now  dominant  throughout  Afghan- 
istan. The  sovereignty,  indeed,  of  Azim  Khan's  puppet, 
Ayoob,  was  proclaimed;  but,  Herat  alone  excepted,  the 
country  was  in  reality  parcelled  out  among  the  Barukzye 
brothers.  By  them  the  superior  claims  of  Azim  Khan 
were  generally  acknowledged.  Caubul,  therefore,  fell  to 
his  share.  Dost  Mahomed  took  possession  of  Ghuzni 
Pur  Dil  Khan,  Kohan  Dil  Khan,  and  their  brothers, 
occupied  Candahar.  Jubbar  Khan,  a  brother  of  Dost 
Mahomed,  was  put  in  charge  of  the  Ghilji  coimtry.  Sul- 
tan Mahomed  and  his  brothers  succeeded  to  the  govern- 
ment of  Peshawur,  and  the  Shah-zadah  Sultan  Ali,  Dost 
Mahomed's  puppet,  sunk  quietly  into  the  insignificance 
of  private  life. 

But  this  did  not  last  long.  Shah  Soojah  had  begun 
again  to  dream  of  sovereignty.  He  was  organising  an 
army  at  Shikarpoor.  Against  this  force  marched  Azim 
Khan,  accompanied  by  the  new  King,  Ayoob.  Recalled 
to  the  capital  by  the  intrigues  of  Dost  Mahomed,  and 
delayed  by  one  of  those  complicated  plots  which  display 
at  once  the  recklessness  and  the  treachery  of  the  Afghan 
character,*  the  Wuzeer  was  compelled  for  a  while  to  post- 
pone the  southern  expedition.     The  internal  strife  sub- 

*  The  story  is  wortli  giving  in  a  note,  as  eminently  characteristic  of 
Afghan  history.  Dost  Mahomed,  who  had  proclaimed  Sultan  Ali  king, 
advised  that  prince  to  murder  Shah  Ayoob  ;  and  Azim  Khan  advised 
Shah  Ayoob  to  mui-der  Sultan  Ali.  Sultan  Ali  indignantly  rejected  the 
proposal ;  Shah  Ayoob  consented,  on  condition  that  Azim  Khan  would 
return  the  compliment,  by  assassinating  Dost  Mahomed.  This  was 
agreed  upon.  Sultan  Ali  was  strangled  in  his  sleep.  Shah  Ayoob 
then  called  upon  Azim  Khan  to  perform  his  part  of  the  tragedy  ;  but 
the  minister  coolly  asked,  "  How  can  I  slay  my  brother  ?"  and  recom- 
mended a  renewal  of  the  expedition  to  Shikarpoor. 


WAR   WITH   THE    SIKHS.  117 

sided,  the  march  was  renewned,  and  Azim  Khan  moved 
down  on  Shikarpoor.  But  the  army  of  Shah  Soojah  melted 
away  at  his  approach. 

Then  Azim  Khan  planned  an  expedition  against  the 
Sikhs.  He  had  no  fear  of  Kunjeet  Singh,  whom  he  had 
once  beaten  in  battle.  Dost  Mahomed  accompanied  his 
brother,  and  they  marched  upon  the  frontier,  by  Jella- 
labad  and  the  Karapa  Pass.  But  the  watchful  eye  of 
Runjeet  was  upon  them,  and  he  at  once  took  measures 
for  their  discomfiture.  He  well  knew  the  character  of 
the  Barukzye  brothers — knew  them  to  be  avaricious,  ambi- 
tious, treacherous ;  the  hand  of  each  against  his  brethren. 
He  thought  bribery  better  than  battle,  and  sent  agents 
to  tamper  with  Sultan  Mahomed  and  the  other  Peshawur 
chiefs.  Hoping  to  be  enabled,  in  the  end,  to  throw  off 
the  supremacy  of  Azim  Khan,  they  gladly  listened  to  his 
overtures.  Dost  Mahomed  received  intelligence  of  the 
plot,  and  signified  his  willingness  to  join  the  confederacy. 
His  offer  was  accepted.  This  important  accession  to  his 
party  communicated  new  courage  to  Runjeet "  Singh. 
Everything  was  soon  in  train.  Azim  Khan  was  at  Min- 
chini  with  his  treasure  and  his  Harem,  neither  of  which,  in 
so  troubled  a  state  of  affairs,  could  he  venture  to  abandon. 
Sultan  Mahomed  wrote  to  him  from  the  Sikh  camp  that 
there  was  a  design  upon  both.  The  intelligence  filled  the 
Sirdar  with  grief  and  consternation.  He  beheld  plainly 
the  treachery  of  his  brothers,  shed  many  bitter  tears, 
looked  with  fear  and  trembling  into  the  future  ;  saw  dis- 
gTace  on  one  side,  the  sacrifice  of  his  armies  and  treasure 
on  the  other;  now  resolved  to  march  down  upon  the 
enemy,  now  to  break  up  his  encampment  and  retire. 
Night  closed  in  upon  him  whilst  in  this  state  of  painful 
agitation  and  perplexity.  Rumours  of  a  disastrous  some- 
thing soon  spread  through  the  whole  camp.  What  it  was, 
few  could  declare  beyond  the  Sirdar's  own  tent ;  but  his 


118       DOST  MAHOMED  AND  THE  BARUKZYES. 

followers  lost  confidence  in  their  chief.  They  knew  that 
some  evil  had  'befallen  him  ;  that  he  had  lost  heart ;  that 
his  spirit  was  broken.  The  nameless  fear  seized  upon  the 
whole  army,  and  morning  dawned  upon  the  wreck  of  a 
once  formidable  force.  His  troops  had  deserted  him,  and 
he  prepared  to  follow,  with  his  treasure  and  his  Harem,  to 
Jellalabad.  Runjeet  Singh  entered  Peshawur  in  triumph  ; 
but  thought  it  more  prudent  to  divide  the  territory  be- 
tween Dost  Mahomed  and  Sultan  Mahomed,  than  to 
occupy  it  on  his  own  account,  and  rule  in  his  own  name. 
The  division  was  accordingly  made.  In  the  mean  while 
Azim  Khan,  disappointed  and  broken-spirited,  w^as  seized 
with  a  violent  disorder,  the  effect  of  anxiety  and  sorrow, 
and  never  quitted  the  bed  of  sickness  until  he  was  carried 
to  the  tomb.* 

This  was  in  1823.  The  death  of  Azim  Khan  precipi- 
tated the  downfal  of  the  Suddozye  monarchy,  and  raised 
Dost  Mahomed  to  the  chief  seat  in  the  Douranee  Empire. 
The  last  wretched  remnant  of  legitimacy  was  now  about 
to  perish  by  the  innate  force  of  its  own  corruption.  The 
royal  puppet,  Ayoob,  and  his  son  attempted  to  seize  the 
property  of  the  deceased  minister.  Tidings  of  this  design 
reached  Candahar,  and  Shere  Dil  Khan,  with  a  party  of 
Barukzye  adherents,  hastened  to  Caubulto  rescue  the  wealth 
of  his  brother  and  to  chastise  the  spoliators.  The  Prince 
was  murdered  in  the  presence  of  his  father,  and  the  un- 
happy King  carried  off  a  prisoner  to   that   ill-omended 

*  Azim  Khan  does  not  appear  to  have  recognised  the  strength  of 
Dost  Mahomed's  character,;  and  to  this  grand  error  must  he  attributed 
his  premature  death.  Shortly  before  the  expedition  to  the  Sikh 
frontier,  he  had  not  only  contemptuously  declared  that  he  did  not 
require  the  services  of  his  brother,  but  had  actually  laid  siege  to 
Ghuzni.  Azim  Khan's  batteries  caused  great  slaughter ;  but  Dost 
Mahomed  could  not  be  persuaded  to  open  the  gates  of  the  fortress.  A 
negotiation  took  place  ;  and  the  brothers  embraced.  But  they  never 
forgave  each  other. 


FALL    OF   HABIB-OOLLAH.  119 

garden-house  of  Futteh  Khau,  which  had  witnessed  the 
destruction  of  another  who  had  done  stiU  fouler  wrong  to 
the  gi-eat  Barukzye  brotherhood.* 

In  the  mean  while,  Habib-oolah-Khan,  son  of  Azim 
Khan,  had  succeeded  nominally  to  the  power  possessed  by 
his  deceased  parent.  But  he  had  inherited  none  of  the 
late  minister's  intellect  and  energy,  and  none  of  his  per- 
sonal influence.  Beside  the  deathbed  of  his  father  he  had 
been  entrusted  to  the  guidance  of  Jubbar  Khan,  but  he 
had  not  the  good  sense  to  perceive  the  advantages  of  such 
a  connexion.  He  plunged  into  a  slough  of  dissipation, 
and,  when  he  needed  advice,  betook  himself  to  the  coun- 
sels of  men  little  better  and  wiser  than  himself.  The 
ablest  of  his  advisers  was  Ameen-oolah-Khan,  the  Loghur 
chief — ^known  to  a  later  generation  of  Englishmen  as 
"the  infamous  Ameen-oolah."  This  man's  support  was 
worth  retaining ;  but  Habib-oolah,  having  deprived 
Jubbar  Khan  of  his  government,  attempted  to  destroy 
Ameen-oolah-Khan ;  and  thus,  with  the  most  consummate 
addi'ess,  paved  the  way  to  his  own  destruction.  Dost 
Mahomed,  ever  on  the  alert,  appeared  on  the  stage  at  the 
fitting  moment.  Alone,  he  had  not  sufficient  resources 
to  compete  with  the  son  of  Azim  Khan ;  but  the  Newab 
speedily  joined  him ;  and  soon  afterwards,  in  the  midst 

*  *'  One  Haji  Ali,"  says  Mr.  Masson,  "who  is  reported  to  have  shot 
the  Prince,  despoiled  the  Shah  of  his  rai&ents  and  clad  him  in  his 
own  ;  then  by  the  Sirdar's  orders,  placed  him  behind  himself  on  a 
horse  and  carried  him  oiF  to  the  Burj  Vazir.  A  singular  spectacle  was 
offered  to  the  people  of  the  city  as  Haji  Ali  bore  the  degraded  monarch 
along  the  streets  ;  but  they  had  become  familiar  with  extraordinary 
events,  and  regarded  them  with  apathy.  The  Sirdars,  when  they  had 
given  the  orders  consequent  on  the  feat  they  had  performed,  returned 
to  their  dwellings  in  the  city  with  the  same  composure  after  the  depo- 
sition of  a  monarch,  as  if  they  had  been  enjoying  a  morning  ride." 
The  unfortunate  puppet  subsequently  found  his  way  to  Lahore,  where 
Eunjeet  Singh  allowed  him  a  monthly  pension  of  1000  rupees. 


120       DOST  MAHOMED  AND  THE  BAEUKZYES. 

of  an  engagement  in  the  near  neighbourhood  of  Caiibul, 
the  troops  of  Ameen-oolah-Khan  went  over  bodily  to  Dost 
Mahomed  j  and  the  son  of  Azim  Khan  sought  safety 
within  the  walls  of  the  Balla  Hissar. 

Dost  Mahomed,  having  occupied  the  city,  invested  the 
citadel,  and  would,  in  all  probability,  have  carried  every- 
thing before  him,  if  the  Candahar  chiefs,  alarmed  by  the 
successes  of  their  brother,  and  dreading  the  growth  of  a 
power  which  threatened  their  own  extinction,  had  not 
moved  out  to  the  ostensible  assistance  of  their  nephew. 
Dost  Mahomed  retreated  into  the  Kohistan,  but  the  unfor- 
tunate Habib-oolah  soon  found  that  he  had  gained  nothing 
by  such  an  alliance.  His  uncles  enticed  him  to  a  meeting 
outside  the  city,  seized  him,  carried  him  off  to  the  Loghur 
country.;  then  took  possession  of  the  Balla  Hissar,  and 
appropriated  all  his  treasure.  Dost  Mahomed,  however, 
was  soon  in  arms  again,  and  the  Peshawur  brothers  were 
before  Caubul.  The  affairs  of  the  empire  were  then 
thrown  into  a  state  of  terrible  confusion.  The  Barukzye 
brothers  were  all  fighting  among  themselves  for  the 
'largest  share  of  sovereignty ;  but  it  is  said  that  "their  fol- 
lowers have  been  engaged  in  deadly  strife  when  the  rival 
leaders  were  sitting  together  over  a  plate  of  cherries." 
To  this  fraternal  cherry-eating,  it  would  appear  that  Dost 
Mahomed  was  not  admitted.*  Sitting  over  their  fruit, 
his  brothers  came  to  the  determination  of  alluring  him 
to  an  interview,  and  then  either  blinding  or  miu-dering 
him.  The  plot  was  laid;  everything  was  arranged  for  the 
destruction  of  the  Sirdar ;  but  Hadjee  Khan  Kakur,  who 
subsequently  distinguished  himself  as  a  traitor  of  no  slight 
accomplishments,  having  discovered  in  time  that  Dost 
Mahomed  was  backed  by  the  strongest  pai-ty  in  Caubul, 

*  Masson. — Mr,  Vigne  says,  that  Dost  Mahomed  and  Shere  Dil 
Khan  were  the  cherry-eaters.  We  do  not  pretend  to  determine  the 
point. 


SUPREMACY   OF   DOST   MAHOMED.  121 

gave  him  a  significant  hint,  at  the  proper  moment,  and 
the .  Sirdar  escaped  with  his  life.  After  a  few  more 
fraternal  schemes  of  mutual  extermination,  the  brothers 
entered  into  a  compact  by  which  the  government  of 
Ghuzni  and  the  Kohistan  was  secured  to  Dost  Mahomed, 
whilst  Sultan  Mahomed  of  Peshawur  succeeded  to  the 
sovereignty  of  Caubul. 

The  truce  was  but  of  short  duration.  Shere  Dil  Khan, 
the  most  influential  of  the  Candahar  brothers,  died.  A 
dangerous  rival  was  thus  swept  away  from  the  path  of 
Dost  Mahomed.  The  Kuzzilbashes,  soon  afterwards,  gave 
in  their  adherence  to  him  ;  and  thus  aided,  he  felt  himself 
in  a  position  to  strike  another  blow  for  the  recovery  of 
Caubul.  Sultan  Mahomed  had  done  nothing  to  strengthen 
himself  at  the  capital.  Summoned  either  to  surrender  or 
to  defend  himself,  he  deemed  it  more  prudent  to  nego- 
tiate. Consenting  to  retire  on  Peshawur,  he  marched  out 
of  one  gate  of  Caubul  whilst  Dost  Mahomed  marched  in 
at  another,  and  the  followers  of  the  latter  shouted  out  a 
derisive  adieu  to  the  departing  chief. 

From  this  time  (1826)  to  the  day  on  which  his  followers 
deserted  him  at  Urghandi,  after  the  captm*e  of  Ghuzni  by 
the  British  troops.  Dost  Mahomed  was  supreme  at  Caubul. 
His  brothers  saw  that  it  was  useless  to  contest  the 
supremacy;  and  at  last  they  acknowledged  the  unequalled 
power  of  one  whom  they  had  once  slighted  and  despised. 
And  now  was  it  that  Dost  Mahomed  began  fully  to 
understand  the  responsibilities  of  high  command,  and  the 
obligations  of  a  ruler  both  to  himself  and  his  subjects. 
He  had  hitherto  lived  the  life  of  a  dissolute  soldier.  His 
education  had  been  neglected,  and  in  his  very  boyhood  he 
had  been  thrown  in  the  way  of  pollution  of  the  foulest 
kind.  From  his  youth  he  had  been  greatly  addicted  to 
wine,  and  was  often  to  be  seen  in  public  reeling  along  in 
a  state  of  degrading  intoxication,  or  scarcely  able  to  keep 


122  DOST    MAHOMED    AND    THE    BARUKZYES. 

his  place  in  the  saddle.  All  this  was  now  to  be  reformed. 
He  taught  himself  to  read  and  to  write,  accomplishments 
which  he  had  before,  if  at  all,  scantily  possessed.  He 
studied  the  Koran,  abandoned  the  use  of  strong  hquors, 
became  scrupulously  abstemious,  plain  in  his  attire, 
assiduous  in  his  attention  to  business,  urbane,  and 
courteous  to  all.  He  made  a  public  acknowledgment 
of  his  past  errors  and  a  profession  of  reformation,  and 
did  not  belie  by  his  life  the  promises  which  he  openly 
made.* 

It  is  not  to  be  questioned  that  there  was,  at  this  time, 
in  the  conduct  of  Dost  Mahomed,  as  a  ruler,  much  that 
may  be  regai-ded  with  admiration  and  respect  even  by 
Christian  men.  Success  did  not  distm-b  the  balance  of 
his  mind,  nor  power  harden  his  heart.  Simple  in  his  habits, 
and  remarkably  affable  in  his  manner,  he  was  accessible 
to  the  meanest  of  his  subjects.     Ever  ready  to  listen  to 

*  ''The  days,"  says  General  Harlan — and  the  truth  of  the  state- 
ment is  not  to  be  questioned — "That  Dost  Mahomed  ascended  the 
musnud,  he  performed  the  *Toba,'  which  is  a  solemn  and  sacred 
formula  of  reformation,  in  reference  to  any  accustomed  moral  crime  or 
depravity  of  habit.  He  was  followed  in  the  Toba  by  all  his  chiefs,  who 
found  themselves  obliged  to  keep  pace  with  the  march  of  mind — to 
prepare  for  the  defensive  system  of  policy,  this  assumption  of  purity, 
on  the  part  of  the  Prince,  suggested.  The  Toba  was  a  sort  of  declara- 
tion of  principleB  ;  and  the  chiefs,  viewing  it  in  that  light,  beheld  their 
hopes  of  supremacy  in  imminent  hazard.  ...  In  later  life  the 
Ameer  became  sensible  of  the  advantages  arising  from  learning. 
Although  knowledge  of  literature  among  Mahomedan  nations  is  con- 
fined to  a  contracted  sphere,  at  least  the  reputation  of  theological 
science  was  essential  to  the  chief,  on  whom  had  been  conferred  the  title 
of  Ameer-ul-Mominin,  or  Commander  of  the  Faithful.  To  escape  the 
humility  of  dependence  upon  subordinate  agents,  more  especially  the 
secretaries  necessarily  employed  in  all  revenue  and  judicial  transac- 
tions, he  tasked  his  mind  with  the  acquisition  of  letters,  and  became 
worthy,  by  his  industry  and  success  in  the  pursuit,  of  the  greatest 
respect  of  the  great,  as  he  commanded  the  admiration  of  the  vulgar, 
who  are  ever  accustomed  to  venerate  the  divinity  of  wisdom." 


DOST  MAHOMED  AS  A  RULER.  123 

their  complaints  and  to  redress  their  grievances,  he  seldom 
rode  abroad  without  being  accosted  in  the  public  streets 
or  highways  by  citizen  or  by  peasant  waiting  to  lay  before 
the  Sirdar  a  history  of  his  grievances  or  his  sufferings,  and 
to  ask  for  assistance  or  redress.  And  he  never  passed  the 
petitioner — never  rode  on,  but  would  rein  in  his  horse, 
listen  patiently  to  the  complaints  of  the  meanest  of  his 
subjects,  and  give  directions  to  his  attendants  to  take  the 
necessary  steps  to  render  justice  to  the  injured,  or  to 
alleviate  the  sufferings  of  the  distressed.  Such  was  his 
love  of  equity,  indeed,  that  people  asked,  "Is  Dost 
Mahomed  dead  that  there  is  no  justice  ? " 

He  is  even  said,  by  those  who  knew  him  well,  to  have 
been  kindly  and  humane — an  assertion  which  many  who 
have  read  the  history  of  his  early  career  will  receive  with 
an  incredulous  smile.  But  no  one  who  fairly  estimates  the 
charaxjter  of  Afghan  history  and  Afghan  morals,  and  the 
necessities,  personal  and  political,  of  iall  who  take  part  in 
such  stirring  scenes,  can  fail  to  perceive  that  his  vices 
were  rather  the  growth  of  circumstances  than  of  any  ex- 
traordinaiy  badness  of  heart.  Dost  Mahomed  was  not  by 
nature  cruel ;  but  once  embarked  in  the  strife  of  Afghan 
politics,  a  man  must  fight  it  out  or  die.  Every  man's 
hand  is  against  him,  and  he  must  turn  his  hand  against 
every  man.  There  is  no  middle  coiu-se  open  to  him.  If 
he  would  save  himself,  he  must  cast  his  scruples  to  the 
winds.  Even  when  seated  most  securely  on  the  musnud, 
an  Afghan  ruler  must  commit  many  acts  abhorrent  to  our 
ideas  of  humanity.  He  must  rule  with  vigour,  or  not  at 
all.  That  Dost  Mahomed,  during  the  twelve  years  of 
supremacy  which  he  enjoyed  at  Caubul,  often  resorted, 
for  the  due  maintenance  of  his  power,  to  measures  of 
severity  incompatible  with  the  character  of  a  humane 
ruler,  is  only  to  say  that  for  twelve  years  he  retained  his 
place  at  the  head  of  affairs.     Sucn  rigour  is  inseparable 


124       DOST  MAHOMED  AND  THE  BARUEZYES. 

from  the  government  of  such  a  people.  We  cannot  rein 
wild  horses  with  silken  braids. 

Upon  one  particular  phase  of  Barukzye  policy  it  is 
necessary  to  speak  more  in  detail.  Under  the  Suddozye 
Kings,  pampered  and  privileged,  the  Douranee  tribes 
had  waxed  arrogant  and  overbearing,  and  had,  in  time, 
erected  themselves  into  a  power  capable  of  shaping  the 
destinies  of  the  empire.  With  one  hand  they  held  down 
the  people,  and  with  the  other  menaced  the  throne. 
Their  sudden  change  of  fortune  seems  to  have  unhinged 
and  excited  them.  Bearing  their  new  honours  with  little 
meekness,  and  exercising  their  new  powers  with  little 
moderation,  they  revenged  their  past  sufferings  on  the 
unhappy  people  whom  they  had  supplanted,  and,  partly 
by  fraud,  partly  by  extortion,  stripped  the  native  culti- 
vators of  the  last  remnant  of  property  left  to  them  on 
the  new  allocation  of  the  lands.  In  the  revolutions 
which  had  rent  the  country  throughout  the  early  years 
of  the  century,  it  had  been  the  weight  of  Douranee  in- 
fluence which  had  ever  turned  the  scale.  They  held, 
indeed,  the  crown  at  their  disposal,  and,  seeking  their 
own  aggrandisement,  were  sure  to  array  themselves  on 
the  side  of  the  prince  who  was  most  liberal  of  his  pro- 
mises to  the  tribes.  The  danger  of  nourishing  such  a 
power  as  this  was  not  overlooked  by  the  sagacious  minds 
of  the  Barukzye  rulers.  They  saw  clearly  the  policy  of 
treading  down  the  Douranees,  and  soon  began  to  exe- 
cute it. 

In  the  revolution  which  had  overthrown  the  Suddozye 
dynasty,  the  tribes  had  taken  no  active  part,  and  the 
Barukzye  Sirdars  had  risen  to  power  neither  by  their  aid 
nor  in  spite  of  their  opposition.  A  long  succession  of 
sanguinary  civil  wars,  which  had  deprived  them,  one  by 
one,  of  the  leaders  to  whom  they  looked  for  guidance  and 
support,  had  so  enfeeble  and  prostrated  them,  that  but 


THE   DOUEANEE   TRIBES.  125 

a  remnant  of  their  former  power  was  left.  No  immediate 
apprehension  of  danger  from  such  a  source  darkened  the 
dawn  of  the  Barukzye  brethren's  career.  But  to  be  cast 
down  was  not  to  be  broken — to  be  enfeebled  was  not  to 
be  extinct.  There  was  too  much  elasticity  and  vitality 
in  the  order  for  such  accidents  as  this  to  subject  it  to 
more  than  temporary  decline.  The  Douranees  were  still 
a  privileged  class ;  still  were  they  fattening  upon  the 
immunities  granted  them  by  the  Suddozye  Kings.  To 
curtail  these  privileges  and  immunities  would  be  to  strike 
at  the  source  of  their  dominant  influence  and  command- 
ing strength ;  and  the  Barukzye  Sirdars,  less  chivalrous 
than  wise,  determined  to  strike  the  blow,  whilst  the  Dou- 
ranees, crippled  and  exhausted,  had  little  power  to  resist 
the  attack.  Even  then  they  did  not  venture  openly  and 
directly  to  assail  the  privileges  of  the  tribes  by  imposing 
an  assessment  on  their  lands  in  lieu  of  the  obligation  to 
supply  horsemen  for  the  service  of  the  state — an  obligation 
which  had  for  some  time  past  been  practically  relaxed — 
but  they  began  cautiously  and  insidiously  to  introduce 
"  the  small  end  of  the  wedge,"  by  taxing  the  Kyots,  or 
Humsayehs  of  the  Douranees,  whose  various  services,  not 
only  as  cultivators  but  as  artificers,  had  rendered  them 
in  the  estimation  of  their  powerful  masters  a  valuable 
kind  of  property,  to  be  protected  from  foreign  tyranny 
that  they  might  better  bear  their  burdens  at  home. 
These  taxes  were  enforced  with  a  rigour  intended  to 
offend  the  Douranee  chiefs ;  but  the  trials  to  which  they 
were  then  subjected  but  faintly  foreshadowed  the  greater 
trials  to  come. 

Little  by  little,  the  Barukzye  Sirdars  began  to  attach 
such  vexatious  conditions  to  the  privileges  of  the  Doura- 
nees— so  to  make  them  run  the  gauntlet  of  all  kinds  of 
exactions  short  of  the  direct  assessment  of  their  lands — 
that  in  time,  harassed,  oppressed,  impoverished  by  these 


126       DOST  MAHOMED  AND  THE  BARUKZYES. 

more  irregular  imposts,  and  anticipating  every  day  the 
development  of  some  new  form  of  tyranny  and  extortion, 
they  were  glad  to  exchange  them  for  an  assessment  of  a 
more  fixed  and  definite  character.  From  a  minute  detail 
of  the  measures  adopted  by  the  Barukzye  Sirdars,  with 
the  double  object  of  raising  revenue  and  breaking  down 
the  remaining  strength  of  the  Douranees,  the  reader 
would  turn  away  with  weariness  and  impatience ;  but 
this  matter  of  Douranee  taxation  has  too  much  to  do 
with  the  after-history  of  the  war  in  Afghanistan,  for  me 
to  pass  it  by  without  at  least  this  slight  recognition  of 
its  importance. 

In  the  heyday  of  their  prosperity,  the  Douranees  had 
been  too  arrogant  and  unscrupulous  to  claim  from  us 
commiseration  in  the  hour  of  their  decline.  The  Baruk- 
zye Sirdars  held  them  down  with  a  strong  hand  ;  and  the 
policy  was  at  least  successful.  It  was  mainly  the  humi- 
liation of  these  once  dominant  tribes  that  secured  to  Dost 
Mahomed  and  his  brothers  so  many  years  of  comparative 
security  and  rest.  Slight  disorders,  such  as  are  insepa- 
rable from  the  constitution  of  Afghan  society — a  rebel- 
lion in  one  part  of  the  country,  the  necessity  of  coercing 
a  recusant  governor  in  another — occasionally  distracted 
the  mind  of  the  Sirdar  from  the  civil  administration  of 
Caubul.  But  it  was  not  until  the  year  1834  that  he  was 
called  upon  to  face  a  more  pressing  danger,  and  to  pre- 
pare himself  for  a  more  vigorous  contest.  The  exiled 
Suddozye  Prince,  Shah  Soojah,  weary  again  of  inactivity, 
and  undaunted  by  past  failure,  was  about  to  make  another 
effort  to  re-establish  himself  in  the  Douranee  Empire ; 
and,  with  this  object,  was  organising  an  army  in  Sindh. 

Had  there  been  any  sort  of  unanimity  among  the  Ba- 
rukzye brothers,  this  invasion  might  have  been  laughed 
to  scorn ;  but  Dost  Mahomed  felt  that  there  was  trea- 
chery within,  no  less  than  hostility  without,   and  that 


'  STRUGGLES  OF  SHAH  SOOJAH.  127 

the  open  enemy  was  not  more  dangerous  than  the  con- 
cealed one.  Jubbar  Khan,  Zemaim  Khan,  and  others, 
were  known  to  be  intriguing  with  the  Shah.  The  Newab, 
indeed,  had  gone  so  far  as  to  assure  Dost  Mahomed  that 
it  was  useless  to  oppose  the  Suddozye  invasion,  as  Soojah- 
ool-Moolk  was  assisted  by  the  British  Government,  and 
would  certainly  be  victorious.  He  implored  the  Sirdar  to 
pause  before  he  brought  down  upon  himself  certain 
destruction,  alleging  that  it  would  be  better  to  make 
terms  with  the  Shah — to  secure  something  rather  than 
to  lose  everything.  But  Dost  Mahomed  knew  his  man — 
knew  that  Jubbar  Khan  had  thrown  himself  into  the 
arms  of  the  Suddozye,  laughed  significantly,  and  said, 
"  Lala,  it  will  be  time  enough  to  talk  about  terms  when 
I  have  been  beaten."  This  was  unanswerable.  The 
Newab  retired ;  and  preparations  for  war  were  carried  on 
with  renewed  activity. 

In  the  mean  while,  Shah  Soojah  was  girding  himself 
up  for  the  coming  struggle  with  the  Barukzye  Sirdars. 
In  1831  he  had  sought  the  assistance  of  Runjeet  Singh 
towards  the  recovery  of  his  lost  dominions  ;  but  the 
Maharajah  had  set  such  an  extravagant  price  upon  his 
alliance,  that  the  negotiations  fell  to  the  ground  without 
any  results.*     The  language  of  the  Sikh  ruler  had  been 

*  Among  other  stipulations  was  one,  that  *'  the  heir-apparent  of  the 
Shah  shall  always  attend  his  highness  with  a  force,  having  also  his 
family  along  with  him  ;  that  he  shall  be  treated  with  distinction,  and 
expected  to  accompany  the  Maharajah  in  all  his  journeys."  Another 
demand  put  forth  by  Runjeet  Avas  for  the  delivery  to  him  of  the  sandal- 
wood gates  of  Somnauth  (or  Juggernauth,  as  the  Maharajah  called 
them),  destined  afterwards  to  confer  such  celebrity  upon  the  Indian 
administration  of  Lord  Ellenborough.  Shah  Soojah's  answer  to  the 
demand  is  worth  quoting  : — *'  Regarding  the  demand  of  the  portals  of 
sandal  at  Ghiznee,  a  compliance  with  it  is  inadmissible  in  two  ways  : 
firstly,  a  real  friend  is  he  who  is  interested  in  the  good  name  of  his 
friend.     The  Maharajah  being  my  friend,  how  can  he  find  satisfaction 


128  DOST   MAHOMED   AND    THE   BARUKZYES. 

insolent  and  dictatorial.  He  had  treated  the  Shah  as  a 
fallen  prince,  and  endeavoured,  in  the  event  of  his  resto- 
ration, to  reduce  him  to  a  state  of  vassalage  so  complete, 
that  even  the  prostrate  Suddozye  resented  the  humiliating 
attempt.  The  idea  of  making  another  effort  to  regain  his 
lost  dominions  had,  however,  taken  such  shape  in  his 
mind,  that  it  was  not  to  be  lightly  abandoned.  But 
empires  are  not  to  be  won  without  money,  and  the  Shah 
was  lamentably  poor.  Jewels  he  had  to  the  value  of  two 
or  three  lakhs  of  rupees :  and  he  was  eager  to  pledge  them. 
But  the  up-country  bankers  were  slow  to  make  the  required 
advances.  "If  1000  rupees  be  required,"  said  the  Shah, 
"  these  persons  will  ask  a  pledge  in  property  of  a  lakh  of 
rupees."  From  the  obdurate  bankers  he  turned,  in  his 
distress,  to  the  British  Government ;  but  the  British 
Government  was  equally  obdurate. 

In  vain  the  exiled  Shah  pleaded  that  the  people  of 
Afghanistan  were  anxious  for  his  arrival ;  and  that  those 
of  Khorassan  would  flock  to  his  standard  and  acknowledge 
no  other  chief  In  vain  he  declared  that  the  Barukzye 
Sirdars  were  "not  people  around  whom  the  Afghans  would 
rally" — that  they  had  no  authority  beyond  the  streets 
and  bazaars  of  Caubul,  and  no  power  to  resist  an  enemy 
advancing  from  the  northward.  Neither  up-country 
bankers  nor  British  functionaries  would  advance  him  the 
requisite  funds.  "  My  impatience,"  he  said,  "  exceeds  all 
bounds  ;  and  if  I  caA  raise  a  loan  of  two  or  three  lakhs  of 
rupees  from  any  banker,  I  entertain  every  expectation  that, 

in  my  eternal  disgrace  ?  To  desire  the  disgrace  of  one's  friend  is  not 
consistent  with  the  dictates  of  wisdom.  Secondly,  there  is  a  tradition 
among  all  classes  of  people  that  the  forefathers  of  the  Sikhs  have  said 
that  their  nation  shall,  in  the  attempt  to  bring  away  the  portals  of 
sandal,  advance  to  Ghiznee ;  but  having  arrived  there,  the  foundation 
of  their  empire  shall  be  overthrown.  I  am  not  desirous  of  that  event. 
I  wish  for  the  permanence  of  his  highness's  dominion," 


NEW    EFFORTS    OF   THE    SHAH.  129 

with  the  favour  of  God,  my  object  will  be  accomplished." 
But  although  the  Persians  were  at  that  time  pushing  their 
(Conquests  in  Khorassan,  and  the  Shah  continued  to 
declare  that  the  Douranee,  Ghilzye,  and  other  tribes,  were 
sighing  for  his  advent,  which  was  to  relieve  them  from  the 
tyranny  and  oppression  of  the  Barukzyes,  and  to  secure 
them  against  foreign  invasion.  Lord  William  Bentinck,  too 
intent  upon  domestic  reforms  to  busy  himself  with  schemes 
of  distant  defence,  quietly  smiled  down  the  solicitations  of 
the  Shah,  and  told  him  to  do  what  he  liked  on  his  own 
account,  but  that  the  British  Government  would  not  help 
him  to  do  it.  "  My  friend,"  he  wrote,  "  I  deem  it  my 
duty  to  apprise  you  distinctly,  that  the  British  Government 
religiously  abstains  from  intermeddling  with  the  affairs  of 
its  neighbours  when  this  can  be  avoided.  Your  Majesty 
is,  of  course,  master  of  your  own  actions ;  but  to  afford  you 
assistance  for  the  purpose  which  you  have  in  contemplation, 
would  not  consist  with  that  neutrality  which  on  such 
occasions  is  the  rule  of  guidance  adopted  by  the  British 
Government."  But,  in  spite  of  these  discouragements, 
before  the  year  1832  had  worn  to  a  close,  Shah  Soojah 
"  had  resolved  on  quitting  his  asylum  at  Loodhianah  for 
the  purpose  of  making  another  attempt  to  regain  his 
throne." 

The  British  agent  on  the  north-western  frontier.  Captain 
Wade,  officially  reported  this  to  Mr.  Macnaghten,  who 
then  held  the  office  of  Political  Secretary ;  and  with  the 
announcement  went  a  request,  on  the  part  of  the  Shah, 
for  three  months  of  his  stipend  in  advance.  The  request, 
at  a  later  period,  rose  to  a  six  months'  advance  ;  and  a 
compromise  was  eventually  effected  for  four.  So,  with 
16,000  rupees  extracted  as  a  forestalment  of  the  allowance 
granted  to  his  family  in  his  absence,  he  set  out  for  the  re- 
conquest  of  the  Douranee  Empire. 

On  the  28th  of  January,  1833,  he  quitted  his  residence 


130       DOST  MAHOMED  AND  THE  BARUKZYES. 

at  Loodhianah,  and  endeavouring,  as  he  went,  to  raise 
money  and  to  enlist  troops  for  his  projected  expedition, 
moved  his  camp  slowly  to  Bahwulpore,  and  thence,  across 
the  Indus,  to  Shikarpoor,  where  he  had  determined  to 
rendezvous. 

But  having  thus  entered  the  territory  of  the  Ameers  of 
Sindh  as  a  friend,  he  did  not  quit  it  before  he  had  shown 
his  quality  as  an  enemy,  by  fighting  a  hard  battle  with  the 
Sindhians,  and  effectually  beating  them.  The  pecuniary 
demands  which  he  had  made  upon  them  they  had  resisted ; 
and  the  Shah  having  a  considerable  army  at  his  command, 
deeply  interested  in  the  event,  thought  fit  to  enforce 
obedience.  Early  in  January,  1834,  an  engagement  took 
place  near  Rori,  and  the  pride  of  the  Ameers  having  been 
humbled  by  defeat,  they  consented  to  the  terms  he 
demanded,  and  acknowledged  the  supremacy  of  the  Shah.* 

Having  arranged  this  matter  to  his  satisfaction,  Shah 
Soojah  marched  upon  Candahar,  and  in  the  early  summer 
was  before  the  walls  of  the  city.  He  invested  the  place, 
and  endeavoured  ineffectually  to  carry  it  by  assault.  The 
Candahar  chiefs  held  out  with  much  resolution,  but  it  was 
not  until  the  arrival  of  Dost  Mahomed  from  Caubul  that 
a  general  action  was  risked.  The  Sirdar  lost  no  time  in 
commencing  the  attack.  Akbar  Khan,  the  chiefs  son, 
who,  at  a  later  period,  stood  out  so  prominently  from  the 
canvas  of  his  country's  history,  was  at  the  head  of  the 
Barukzye  horse  ;  Abdul  Samat  Khant  commanded  the 

*  '*The  Sindhians  have  agreed  to  pay  a  contribution  of  either  five 
or  seven  lakhs  of  rupees  to  farm  the  Shikarpoor  territory  for  a  settled 
annual  sum  from  Shah  Soojah,  and  to  provide  him  with  an  auxiliary 
force,  the  Shah  taking  hostages  from  them  for  the  entire  execution 
of  these  articles." — [Captain  Wade  to  Mr.  Macnaghten,  March  5, 
1834.] 

t  Not  the  minister — but  a  Persian  adventurer  of  the  same  name,  who 
afterwards  obtained  service  in  Bokhara. 


WEAKNESS  OF  THE  DOURANEES.  131 

foot.  No  great  amount  of  military  skill  appeai-s  to  have 
been  displayed  on  either  side.  Akbar  Khan's  horsemen 
charged  the  enemy  with  a  dashing  gallantry  worthy  of 
their  impetuous  leader ;  but  a  battalion  of  the  Shah's 
troops,  under  an  Indo-Briton,  named  Campbell,  fought 
with  such  uncommon  energy,  that  at  one  time  the  forces 
of  the  Barukzye  chiefs  were  driven  back,  and  victory 
appeared  to  be  in  the  reach  of  the  Shah.  But  Dost 
Mahomed,  who  had  intently  watched  the  conflict,  and 
kept  a  handful  of  chosen  troops  in  reserve,  now  let  them 
slip,  rallied  the  battalions  which  were  falling  back,  called 
upon  Akbar  Khan  to  make  one  more  struggle,  and,  well 
responded  to  by  his  gallant  son,  rolled  back  the  tide  of 
victory.  Shah  Soojah,  who  on  the  first  appearance  of  Dost 
Mahomed  had  lost  all  heart,  and  actually  given  orders 
to  prepare  for  flight,  called  out  in  his  desperation  to 
Campbell,  "Chupao-chupao,"*  then  ordered  his  elephant 
to  be  wheeled  round,  and  turned  his  back  upon  the  field 
of  battle.  His  irresolution  and  the  unsteadfastness  of  the 
Douranees  proved  fatal  to  his  cause. 

The  Douranee  tribes  had  looked  upon  the  advance  of 
the  King  with  evident  satisfaction.  Trodden  down  and 
crushed  as  they  had  been  by  the  Bainikzyes,  they  would 
have  rejoiced  in  the  success  of  the  royal  cause.  But  they 
had  not  the  power  to  secure  it.  Depressed  and  enfeebled 
by  long  years  of  tyranny,  they  brought  only  the  shadow 
of  their  former  selves  to  the  standard  of  the  Suddozye 
monarch.  Without  horses,  without  arms,  without  dis- 
cipline, without  heart  to  sustain  them  upon  any  great 
enterprise,  and  without  leaders  to  inspire  them  with  the 
courage  they  lacked  themselves,  the  Douranees  went  into 
the  field  a  feeble,  broken-spirited  rabble.     Had  they  been 

*  Mr.  Vigne  says  that  lie  had  this  from  Campbell  himself.  The 
word  indicates  more  properly  a  plundering  attack;  but  is  employed  here 
to  signify  an  irregular  descent,  or  rush,  upon  the  enemy. 

K  2 


132       DOST  MAHOMED  AND  THE  BARUKZYES. 

assured  of  the  success  of  the  enterprise,  they  would  at 
least  have  assumed  a  bold  front,  and  flung  all  their 
influence,  such  as  it  was,  into  the  scales  on  the  side  of 
the  returned  Suddozve ;  but  remembering  the  iron  rule 
and  the  unsparing  vengeance  of  the  Barukzye  Sirdars, 
they  dreaded  the  consequences  of  failure,  and  w^hen  the 
crisis  arrived,  either  stood  aloof  from  the  contest,  or 
shamefully  apostatised  at  the  last. 

The  few,  indeed,  who  really  joined  the  royal  standard 
contrived  to  defeat  the  enterprise  ;  for  whilst  the  Shah's 
Hindostanees  were  engaging  the  enemy  in  front,  the 
Douranees,  moved  by  an  irrepressible  avidity  for  plunder, 
fell  upon  the  baggage  in  the  rear,  and  created  such  a  panic 
in  the  ranks  that  the  whole  army  turned  and  fled.  It  was 
not  possible  to  rally  them.  The  battle  was  lost.  The 
Barukzye  troops  pushed  forward.  Campbell,  who  had 
falleii  like  a  brave  man,  covered  with  wounds,  was  taken 
prisoner,  with  others  of  the  Shah's  principal  ofiicers  j  and 
all  the  guns,  stores,  and  camp-equippage  of  the  Suddozye 
Prince  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  victors.  The  scenes  of 
plunder  and  carnage  which  ensued  are  said  to  have  been 
terrible.  The  Shah  fled  to  Furrah,  and  thence  by  the 
route  of  Seistan  and  Shorawuk  to  Kelat.  The  Candahar 
chiefs  urged  the  pursuit  of  the  fugitive,  but  Dost  Maho- 
med opposed  the  measure,  and  the  unfortunate  Prince 
was  suffered  to  escape. 

But  scarcely  had  the  Sirdar  returned  to  Caubul  when 
he  found  himself  compelled  to  prepare  for  a  new  and  more 
formidable  enterprise.  Runjeet  Singh  was  in  possession 
of  Peshawur.  The  treachery  of  Sultan  Mahomed  Khan 
and  his  brothers  had  rebounded  upon  themselves,  .and 
they  had  lost  the  province  which  had  been  the  object  of 
so  much  intrigue  and  contention.  In  their  anxiety  to 
destroy  Dost  Mahomed,  they  opened  a  communication 
with  the  Sikhs,  who  advanced  to  Peshawur  ostensibly  as 


LOSS   OF   PESHAWUR.  133 

friends,  and  then  took  possession  of  the  city.*  Sultan 
Mahomed  Khan  ignominiously  fled.  The  Sikh  army 
under  Hurree  Singh  consisted  only  of  9000  men,  and  had 
the  Afghans  been  commanded  by  a  competent  leader  they 
might  have  driven  back  a  far  stronger  force,  and  retained 
possession  of  the  place.  The  Peshawur  chiefs  were  ever- 
lastingly disgraced,  and  Peshawur  lost  to  the  Afghans  for 
ever. 

But  Dost  Mahomed  could  not  submit  patiently  to  this. 
Exasperated  against  Runjeet  Singh,  and  indignant  at  the 
fatuous  conduct  of  his  brothers,  he  determined  on  declar- 
ing a  religious  war  against  the  Sikhs,  and  began  with 
characteristic  energy  to  organise  a  force  sufficiently  strong 
to  wrest  Peshawur  from  the  hands  of  the  usurpers.  To 
strengthen  his  influence  he  assumed,  at  this  time,  the  title 
of  Ameer-al-Mominin  (commander  of  the  faithful  t ),  and 
exerted  himself  to  inflame  the  breasts  of  his  followers  with 
that  burning  Mahomedan  zeal  which  has  so  often  impelled 
the  disciples  of  the  Prophet  to  deeds  of  the  most  con- 
summate daring  and  most  heroic  self-abandonment.  Money 
was  now  to  be  obtained,  and  to  obtain  it  much  extortion 
was,  doubtless,  practised.  An  Afghan  chief  has  a  rude 
and  somewhat  arbitrary  manner  of  levying  rates  and  taxes. 
Dost  Mahomed  made  no  exception  in  his  conduct  to  "  the 
good  old  rule,"  which  had  so  long,  in  critical  conjunctures, 

*  Shah  Soojah,  when  on  his  way  to  Shikarpoor,  in  1833,  had  entered 
into  a  treaty  with  Runjeet  Singh,  by  one  of  the  articles  of  which  he 
ceded  Peshawur  to  the  Sikhs.  But  Runjeet  Singh  was  by  no  means 
inclined  to  wait  until  the  Shah  had  established  his  title  to  give  away 
any  portion  of  the  Afghan  dominions  ;  so  he  sent  his  grandson,  Nao 
Nehal  Singh,  a  boy,  who  then  "  took  the  spear  into  his  hand  "  for  the 
first  time,  to  take  possession  of  the  place. 

+  He  had  been  recommended  by  some  to  assume  the  titles  of  royalty, 
but  he  replied,  that  as  he  was  too  poor  to  support  his  dignity  as  a 
Sirdar,  it  would  be  preposterous  to  think  of  converting  himself  into 
a  King. 


134  DOST   MAHOMED   AND    THE   BARUKZYES. 

been  observed  in  that  part  of  the  world.  He  took  all 
that  he  could  get,  raised  a  very  respectable  force,  coined 
money  in  his  own  name,  and  then  prepared  for  battle. 

At  the  head  of  an  imposing  array  of  fighting  men,  the 
Ameer  marched  out  of  Caubul.  He  had  judged  wisely. 
The  declaration  of  war  against  the  infidel — ^war  proclaimed 
in  the  name  of  the  Prophet — ^had  brought  thousands  to 
his  banner ;  and  ever  as  he  marched  the  great  stream  of 
humanity  seemed  to  swell  and  swell,  as  new  tributaries 
came  pouring  in  from  every  part,  and  the  thousands 
became  tens  of  thousands.  From  the  Kohistan,  from  the 
hills  beyond,  from  the  regions  of  the  Hindoo-Koosh,  from 
the  remoter  fastnesses  of  Toorkistan,  multitudes  of  various 
tribes  and  denominations,  moved  by  various  impulses,  but 
all  noisily  boasting  their  true  Mahomedan  zeal,  came 
flocking  in  to  the  Ameer's  standard.  Ghilzyes  and  Kohis- 
tanees,  sleek  Kuzzilbashes  and  rugged  Oosbegs,  horsemen 
and  foot-men,  all  who  could  wield  a  sword  or  lift  a 
matchlock,  obeyed  the  call  in  the  name  of  the  Prophet. 
"  Savages  from  the  remotest  recesses  of  the  mountainous 
districts,"  wrote  one,  who  saw  this  strange  congeries  of 
Mussulman  humanity,*  "who  were  dignified  with  the 
profession  of  the  Mahomedan  faith,  many  of  them  giants 
in  form  and  strength,  promiscuously  armed  with  sword 
and  shield,  bows  and  arrows,  matchlocks,  rifles,  spears 
and  blunderbusses,  concentrated  themselves  around  the 
standard  of  religion,  and  were  prepared  to  slay,  plunder, 
and  destroy,  for  the  sake  of  God  and  the  Prophet,  the 
unenlighted  infidels  of  the  Punjab." 

The  Mussulman  force  reached  Peshawur.  The  brave 
heart  of  Runjeet  Singh  quailed  before  this  immense 
assemblage,  and  he  at  once  determined  not  to  meet  it 
openly  in  the  field.     There  was  in  his  camp  a  man  named 

*  General  Harlan. 


INTRIGUES    OF   GENERAL    HARLAN.  135 

Harlan,  an  American  adventurer,  now  a  doctor  and  now 
a  general,  who  was  ready  to  take  any  kind  of  service 
with  any  one  disposed  to  pay  him,  and  to  do  any  kind 
of  work  at  the  instance  of  his  master.*  Clever  and  un- 
scrupulous, he  was  a  fit  agent  to  do  the  Maharajah's 
bidding.  Runjeet  despatched  him  as  an  envoy  to  the 
Afghan  camp.  He  went  ostensibly  to  negotiate  with  Dost 
Mahomed  ;  in  reality  to  corrupt  his  supporters.  "  On  the 
occasion,"  he  says,  with  as  little  sense  of  shame  as  though 
he  had  been  performing  an  exploit  of  the  highest  merit, 
"of  Dost  Mahomed's  visit  to  Peshawur,  which  occurred 
during  the  period  of  my  service  with  Eunjeet  Singh,  I  was 
despatched  by  the  Prince  as  ambassador  to  the  Ameer. 
I  divided  his  brothers  against  him,  exciting  their  jealousy 
of  his  growing  power,  and  exasperating  the  family  feuds 
with  which,  from  my  previous  acquaintance,  I  was  familiar, 
and  stirred  up  the  feudal  lords  of  his  durbar,  with  the 
prospects  of  pecuniary  advantages.  I  induced  his  brother, 
Sultan  Mahomed  Khan,  the  lately  deposed  chief  of  Pes- 
hawur, with  10,000  retainers,  to  withdraw  suddenly  from 
his  camp  about  nightfall.  The  chief  accompanied  me 
towards  the  Sikh  camp,  whilst  his  followers  fled  to  their 
mountain  fastnesses.  So  large  a  body  retiring  from  the 
Ameer's  control,  in  opposition  to  his  will  and  without 
previous  intimation,  threw  the  general  camp  into  inextri- 
cable confusion,  which  terminated  in  the  clandestine  rout 
of  his  forces,  without  beat  of  drum,  or  sound  of  bugle,  or 

*  Harlan  originally  went  out  to  China  and  India  as  supercargo  of  a 
merchant  vessel.  He  left  his  ship  at  Calcutta,  and  obtained  service, 
as  a  supernumerary,  on  the  medical  establishment  of  the  Company. 
He  was  posted  to  the  artillery  at  Dum-Dum,  and  afterwards  accom- 
panied Major  (now  Sir  George)  Pollock  to  Rangoon.  He  does  not 
appear  to  have  earned  a  very  good  name  during  his  connexion  with 
the  Company's  army,  which  he  soon  quitted,  and  obtained  service  with 
Runjeet  Singh — afterwards  to  seek  the  patronage  of  Dost  Mahomed, 
whom  he  had  so  foully  betrayed. 


136       DOST  MAHOMED  AND  THE  BARUKZYES. 

the  trumpet's  blast,  in  the  quiet  stillness  of  midnight.  At 
daybreak  no  vestige  of  the  Afghan  camp  was  seen,  where 
six  hours  before  50,000  men  and  10,000  horses,  with  all 
the  busy  host  of  attendants,  were  rife  with  the  tumult  of 
wild  emotion."  * 

Thus  was  this  great  expedition,  so  promising  at  the  out- 
set, brought  prematurely  to  a  disastrous  close.  Treachery 
broke  up,  in  a  single  night,  a  vast  army  which  Runjeet 
Singh  had  contemplated  with  dismay.  The  Ameer,  with 
the  debris  of  his  force,  preserving  his  guns,  but  sacrificing 
much  of  his  camp-equipage,  fell  back  upon  Caubul,  re- 
seated himself  quietly  in  the  Balla  Hissar,  and,  in  bitter- 
ness of  spirit,  declaiming  against  the  emptiness  of  military 
renown,  plunged  deeply  into  the  study  of  the  Koran. 

From  this  pleasant  abstraction  from  warlike  pursuits, 
the  Ameer  was,  after  a  time,  aroused  by  a  well  grounded 
report  to  the  eflfect  that  Sultan  Mahomed  had  been  again 
intriguing  with  the  Sikhs,  and  that  a  plan  had  been 
arranged  for  the  passage  of  a  Punjabee  force  through  the 

*  It  would  appear  that  Dost  Mahomed,  instigated  by  Meerza  Samad 
Khan,  seized  Mr.  Harlan,  as  well  as  the  Fakir  Azizoodeen,  who  was 
also  sent  as  an  ambassador  into  the  Ameer's  camp.  The  Ameer  endea- 
voured to  throw  the  odium  of  the  act  upon  Sultan  Mahomed,  hoping 
thereby  to  ruin  him  utterly  in  the  opinion  of  the  Sikhs  ;  but  Sultan 
Mahomed,  after  having  t§,ken  a  number  of  oaths  on  the  Koran, 
pledging  himself  to  compliance  with  the  Ameer's  wishes,  sent  back 
the  prisoners  (or  hostages^  as  Dost  Mahomed  called  them)  to  the 
Maharajah's  camp.  Mr.  Harlan  himself,  however,  says  nothing  about 
this.  Mohun  Lai  says  that  "the  appalling  news  (of  the  treachery  of 
Sultan  Mahomed)  wounded  the  feelings  of  the  Ameer  most  bitterly. 
There  were  no  bounds  to  the  sweat  of  shame  and  folly  which  flowed 
over  his  face,  and  there  was  no  limit  to  the  laughter  of  the  people  at 
his  being  deceived  and  ridiculed.  His  minister,  Meerza  Samad  Khan, 
was  so  much  distressed  by  this  sad  exposure  of  his  own  trick,  and  still 
more  by  the  failure  of  his  plan  in  losing  the  Fakir,  that  he  hung  down 
his  head  with  great  remorse  and  shame,  and  then,  throwing  away  his 
state  papers,  he  exclaimed,  that  he  would  avoid  all  interference  in  the 
government  affairs  hereafter." 


BATTLE   OF  JUMROOD.  137 

Khybur  Pass,  with  the  ultimate  intention  of  moving  upon 
Caubul.  An  expedition  was  accordingly  fitted  out,  in  the 
spring  of  1837  ;  but  the  Ameer,  having  sufficient  con- 
fidence in  his  sons  Afzul  Khan  and  Mahomed  Abkar,  sent 
the  Sirdars  in  charge  of  the  troops  with  Meerza  Samad 
Khan,  his  minister,  as  their  adviser.  The  Afghan  forces 
laid  siege  to  Jumrood,  and  on  the  30th  of  April  Hurree 
Singh  came  from  Peshawur  to  its  relief.  An  action  took 
place,  in  which  both  the  young  Sirdars  greatly  distin- 
guished themselves,  and  Shumshoodeen  Khan's  conduct 
was  equally  conspicuous.  The  Sikh  chieftain,  Hurree 
Singh,  was  slain,  and  his  disheartened  troops  fell  back  and 
entrenched  themselves  under  the  walls  of  Jumrood.  Akbar 
Khan  proposed  to  follow  up  the  victory  by  dashing  on 
to  Peshawur;  but  the  Meerza,  who,  according  to  Mr. 
Masson,  had,  during  the  action,  "  secreted  himself  in  some 
cave  or  sheltered  recess,  where,  in  despair,  he  sobbed,  beat ' 
his  breast,  tore  his  beard,  and  knocked  his  head  upon  the 
ground,"  now  made  his  appearance,  declaring  that  his 
prayers  had  been  accepted,  and  "  entreated  the  boasting 
young  man  to  be  satisfied  with  what  he  had  done."  The 
advice  was  sufficiently  sound,  whatever  may  have  been  the 
motives  which  dictated  it.  Strong  Sikh 'reinforcements 
soon  appeared  in  sight,  and  the  Afghan  an*y  was  com- 
pelled to  retire.  The  battle  of  Jumrood  was  long  a  theme 
of  national  exultation.  Akbar  Khan  plimaed  himself 
greatly  on  the  victory,  and  was  unwilling  to  share  the 
honours  of  the  day  with  his  less  boastful  brother.  But 
it  was  not  a  very  glorious  achievement,  and  it  may  be 
doubted  whether  Afzul  Khan  did  not  really  distinguish 
himself  even  more  than  his  associate.  In  one  respect,  how- 
ever, it  was  a  heavy  blow  to  the  Maharajah.  Runjeet 
Singh  had  lost  one  of  his  best  officers  and  dearest  friends. 
The  death  of  Hurree  Singh  was  never  forgotten  or  forgiven. 
The  loss  of  Peshawur  rankled  deeply  in  the  mind  of 


138       DOST  MAHOMED  AND  THE  BARUKZYES. 

Dost  Mahomed.  The  empire  of  Ahmed  Shah  had  been 
rapidly  falling  to  pieces  beneath  the  heavy  blows  of  the 
Sikh  spoliator.  The  wealthy  provinces  of  Cashmere  and 
Mooltan  had  been  wrested  from  the  Douranees  in  the 
time  of  the  Suddozye  Princes,  and  now  the  same  unsparing 
hand  had  amputated  another  tract  of  country,  to  the 
humihation  of  the  Barukzye  Sirdars.  The  Ameer,  in 
bitterness  of  spirit,  bewailed  the  loss  of  territory,  and 
burned  to  resent  the  affront.  In  spite,  however,  of  the 
boasted  victory  of  Jumrood,  he  had  little  inclination  to 
endeavour  to  wrest  the  lost  territory,  by  force  of  arms, 
from  the  grasp  of  the  Sikh  usurpers.  Mistrusting  his  own 
strength,  in  this  conjuncture  he  turned  his  thoughts  to- 
wards foreign  aid.  Willing  to  form  almost  any  alliance 
so  long  as  this  great  end  was  to  be  gained,  he  now  looked 
towards  Persia  for  assistance,  and  now  invited  the  friendly 
aid  of  the  British.  It  was  in  the  autumn  of  this  year, 
1837,  that  two  events,  which  mightily  affected  the  future 
destinies  of  Dost  Mahomed,  were  canvassed  in  the  bazaars 
of  Caubul.  A  British  emissary  was  about  to  arrive  at  the 
Afghan  capital ;  and  a  Persian  army  was  advancing  upon 
the  Afghan  frontier.  Before  the  first  snows  had  fallen, 
Captain  Burnes  was  residing  at  Caubul,  and  Mahomed 
Shah  was  laying  siege  to  Herat.* 

*  The  authorities  consulted  in  the  preparation  of  this  chapter  are 
the  published  works  of  Burnes,  ConoUy,  Vigne,  Masson,  Mohun  Lai, 
Harlan,  &c.  ;  the  autobiography  of  Shah  Soojah  ;  and  the  manuscript 
reports  of  Colonel  Rawlinson.  To  the  latter  I  am  indebted  for  much 
valuable  information  relative  to  the  Douranee  tribes. 


139 


CHAPTEK  VIII. 

[1810—1837.] 

Later  Events  in  Persia— The  Treaty  of  Goolistan— Arrival  of  Sir  Gore 
Ouseley— Mr.  Morier  and  Mr.  Ellis —The  Definitive  Treaty— The  War 
of  1826-27— The  Treaty  of  Toorkomanchai— Death  of  Futteh  Ali 
Shah — Accession  of  Mahomed  Shah — His  Projects  of  Ambition — The 
Expedition  against  Herat. 

It  is  necessary  now  to  revert,  for  a  little  space,  to  the 
progress  of  affairs  in  Western  Asia.  Whilst  the  Suddozye 
Princes  in  Afghanistan  had  been  gradually  relaxing  their 
hold  of  the  Douranee  Empire,  Persia  had  been  still  strug- 
gling against  Russian  encroachment — still  entangled  in 
the  meshes  of  a  long  and  harassing  war.  Though  en- 
feebled by  the  paramount  necessity  of  concentrating  the 
resources  of  the  empire  on  the  great  European  contest, 
which  demanded  the  assertion  of  all  her  military  strength, 
the  aggressive  tendencies  of  the  great  northern  power 
were  not  to  be  entirely  controlled.  Little  could  she  think 
of  remote  acquisitions  of  teiTitory  in  Georgia,  whilst  the 
eagles  of  Napoleon  were  threatening  her  very  existence 
at  the  gates  of  Moscow  itself  Still  with  little  inter- 
mission, up  to  the  year  1813,  the  war  dragged  languidly 
on.  Then  the  good  offices  of  Great  Britain  were  success- 
fully employed  for  the  re-estabhshment  of  friendly  rela- 
tions between  the  two  contending  powers ;  *  and  a  treaty, 
known  as  the  treaty  of  Goolistan,  was  negotiated  between 

*  Russia  refused  to  accept  the  formal  mediation  of  Great  Britain  ; 
but  the  good  ofiices  of  the  ambassador  were  employed  with  success. 


140  LATER   EVENTS    IN    PERSIA. 

them.  By  this  treaty  Persia  ceded  to  Russia  all  her  ac- 
quisitions on  the  south  of  the  Caucasus,  and  agreed  to 
maintain  no  naval  force  on  the  Caspian  sea;  whilst  Russia 
entered  into  a  vague  engagement  to  support,  in  the  event 
of  a  disputed  succession,  the  claims  of  the  heir-apparent 
against  all  competitors  for  the  throne. 

During  these  wars,  which  were  caiTied  on  with  varying 
success,  the  Persian  troops  upon  more  than  one  occasion 
had  been  led  to  the  charge  by  English  officers  of  approved 
gallantry  and  skill.  Accompanying  General  Malcolm  to 
Persia  in  1810,  they  were  retained  in  the  country  by  Sir 
Harford  Jones ;  and  were  very  soon  busily  employed  in 
drilling  and  disciplining  the  infantry  and  artillery  of  the 
Persian  Prince.*  Of  these  officers,  the  most  conspicuous 
were  Captain  Christie  and  Lieutenant  Lindsay,  who  led 
into  the  field  the  battalions  which  they  had  instructed,  and 
more  than  once  turned  the  tide  of  victoiy  against  their 
formidable  European  opponents,  f 

*  "  Poor  Captain  Christie  and  Lieutenant  Lindsay,"  says  Sir  Har- 
ford Jones,  "  by  their  indefatigable  perseverance  had  brought,  when  I 
left  Persia,  the  one,  several  of  the  regiments  of  the  Prince's  infantry, 
and  the  other,  the  corps  of  horse  artillery,  considering  the  shortness 
of  the  time  they  had  been  employed,  to  a  state  of  perfection  that  was 
quite  astonishing.  •  And  what  is  equally  to  the  credit  of  these  gallant 
officers,  they  were  both  adored  by  the  officers  and  men  under  their 
tuition  ;  though  in  the  beginning  they  had  often  been  obliged  to  treat 
the  latter  with  a  degree  of  severity  that  could  not  then  have  been  prac- 
tised with  safety  at  Constantinople.  The  Prince  Royal,  however,  had 
much  merit  in  this  respect,  for  whenever  a  punishment  was  inflicted 
and  complained  of  to  him,  he  invariably  gave  the  offender  a  double 
portion  of  it,  and  by  this  means  soon  put  an  end  to  complaint." — [Sir 
Harford  Joneses  Account  of  the  Transactions  of  His  Majesty's  Mission 
to  the  Court  of  Persia,  1807-1811.]  Malcolm  took  with  him  to 
Persia,  as  a  present  from  the  Indian  Grovemment  to  the  Shah,  twelve 
field-pieces,  with  harness  and  all  necessary  equipments  for  horse 
artillery. 

+  Captain  Christie  was  an  officer  of  the  Bombay  army,  selected  for 
employment  in  Persia,  by  General  Malcolm,   on  account  of  his  high 


CHRISTIE    AND    LINDSAY.  141 

In  the  mean  while,  Sir  Haiford  Jones  had  been  suc- 
ceeded in  the  Persian  embassy  by  Sir  Gore  Ouseley,  who 
in  the  summer  of  1811  reached  Teheran  in  the  character 

reputation  for  gallantry  and  personal  activity,  and  his  thorough  ac- 
quaintance with  the  native  character.  Associated  with  Pottinger,  on 
their  first  entry  into  Beloochistan,  he  afterwards  diverged  to  the  north- 
ward, and,  in  the  guise  of  a  horse-dealer,  penetrated  through  Seistan 
to  Herat,  and  thence,  by  the  way  of  Yezd  and  Ispahan,  reached 
the  northern  regions  of  Persia.  A  great  part  of  the  line  which  he 
thus  traversed  had  never  before,  and  has  never,  I  believe,  since  been 
explored  by  an  European  traveller.  Stories  of  Christie's  extraordinary 
personal  strength  and  prowess,  are  current  to  the  present  day  in  the 
north  of  India  and  in  Persia.  In  the  latter  country,  indeed,  he  was 
adored  by  the  soldiery,  and  his  name  is  still  a  household  word  among 
the  old  ofl&cers  of  the  Azerbijan  army.  He  was  killed  at  the  head 
of  his  famous  Shegaughee  brigade,  in  the  night  attack  which  was 
made  by  the  Russians  on  the  Persian  camp  at  Aslandooz,  in  November, 
1812. 

Lieutenant  Lindsay  was  an  officer  of  the  Madras  Horse  Artillery, 
and,  to  scientific  attainments  of  no  ordinary  extent,  added  the  most 
imposing  personal  appearance.  He  was  six  feet  eight  inches  in  height 
(without  his  shoes),  and  thus  realised,  in  the  minds  of  the  Persians, 
their  ideas  of  the  old  heroes  of  romance.  After  many  years'  service 
in  Persia,  he  resigned  his  appointment  in  the  Indian  service,  and, 
succeeding  to  the  estate  of  Kincolquhair,  settled  in  Scotland  as  Lindsay 
Bethune.  In  1834  he  was  again  sent  to  Persia  by  the  British  Govern- 
ment, with  a  view  to  his  employment  in  the  expected  war  of  the 
succession,  and  was  thus  enabled,  in  the  following  year,  to  add  to  his 
former  laurels,  by  leading  (on  the  death  of  Futteh  Ali  Shah)  the  ad- 
vanced division  of  the  Persian  army  from  Tabreez  to  Teheran,  and 
subsequently  quelling  a  very  serious  rebellion  against  the  authority  of 
Mahomed  Shah,  that  was  set  afoot  in  the  south  of  Persia  by  the  Prince 
of  Shiraz  and  his  sons.  For  this  service,  on  his  return  to  England,  he 
was  rewarded  with  a  baronetcy,  and  in  1836  he  was  a  third  time  sent 
out  with  a  Major- General's  commission,  to  take  command  of  the  Persian 
army.  Owing,  however,  to  the  misunderstanding  which  arose  out  of 
the  advance  upon  Herat,  the  Persian  Government  on  this  occasion 
declined  to  employ  him,  and  he  finally  retired  from  military  life  in 
1839.  He  lived  more  than  ten  years  after  this ;  and  at  the  close  of 
his  life,  again  travelled  in  Persia,  revisiting  the  scenes  of  his  former 
exploits.     But  death  overtook  him  before  he  could  return. 


142  LATER   EVENTS   IN   PERSIA. 

of  Ambassador  Extraordinary  from  the  King  of  England. 
The  preliminary  treaty  which  Jones  had  negotiated,  was 
now  to  be  wrought  into  a  definitive  one.  It  was  somewhat 
modified  in  the  process.  The  new  treaty  was  more  liberal 
than  the  old.  In  the  preliminary  articles  relating  to  the 
subsidy,  it  had  been  set  down  that  the  amount  should  be 
regulated  in  the  definitive  treaty  ;  but  it  was  understood 
between  the  British  and  the  Persian  plenipotentiary,  that 
the  amount  was  on  no  account  to  exceed  160,000  tomauns, 
and  that  the  manner  in  which  it  was  to  be  afforded  should 
be  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  British  Government.  But 
in  the  definitive  treaty  the  amount  was  fixed  at  200,000 
tomauns  (or  about  150,000Z.) ;  and  a  special  article  was 
introduced,  setting  forth  that  "  since  it  is  the  custom  of 
Persia  to  pay  her  troops  six  months  in  advance,  the  English 
ambassador  shall  do  all  in  his  power  to  pay  the  subsidy 
granted  in  lieu  of  troops,  in  as  early  instalments  as  may  be 
convenient  and  practicable," — a  pleasant  fiction,  of  which 
it  has  been  said,  with  truth,  that  it  might  "  well  be  taken 
for  a  burlesque." 

On  the  14th  of  March,  1812,  this  treaty  was  signed  by 
Sir  Gore  Ouseley,  Mahomed  Shefi,  and  Mahomed  Hassan ; 
and  a  week  afterwards,  the  British  ambassador  wi'ote  to 
inform  the  Court  of  Directors  of  the  East  India  Company 
that  "  the  good  effects  of  the  definitive  treaty,  and  the 
proofs  of  the  confidence  with  which  it  has  inspired  the 
Shah,  are  already  manifest."  The  Persian  monarch,  having 
declared  his  fixed  determination  to  strengthen  Abbas 
Meerza  to  the  utmost  of  his  ability,  by  raising  for  him  a 
disciplined  army  of  50,000  men,  requested  Sir  Gore 
Ouseley  to  obtain  for  him,  with  the  utmost  possible 
despatch,  30,000  stands  of  English  muskets  and  accou- 
trements, the  price  of  which  was  to  be  deducted  from  the 
subsidy.  "  The  Shah,"  wrote  the  envoy,  "  has  further  pro- 
mised me,  that  this  large  deduction  from  the  subsidy  shall 


THE   DEFINITIVE    TREATY.  143 

be  made  up,  through  me,  to  Abbas  Meerza's  army  from 
the  royal  coffers,  so  that  we  may  congratulate  ourselves  on 
having  worked  a  wonderful  (and,  by  many,  unexpected) 
alteration  in  the  Shah's  general  sentiments."* 

Sir  Gore  Ouseley  returned  to  England,  leaving  his  secre- 
tary, Mr.  Morier,  in  charge  of  the  Mission  ;  but  before  the 
treaty  was  finally  accepted,  it  was  modified  by  the  British 
Government,  and  Mr.  Henry  Ellis  was  despatched  to 
Persia,  in  1814,  to  negotiate  these  alterations  at  the  Per- 
sian Court.  A  comparison  of  the  treaty,  signed  by  Sir 
Gore  Ouseley,  with  that  which  was  subsequently  accepted, 
wiU  show  that  the  alterations,  which  were  very  consider- 
able in  respect  of  words,  were  less  so  in  respect  of  sub- 
stance. The  most  important  conditions  of  the  treaty  are 
to  be  found  in  both  documents.  But  the  progress  of 
events  had  rendered  it  necessary  to  expunge  certain  pas- 
sages from  the  treaty  negotiated  by  Sir  Gore  Ouseley. 
For  example,  the  7th  article  of  that  treaty  provided,  that 
"  should  the  King  of  Persia  form  magazines  of  materials 
for  ship-building  on  the  coast  of  the  Caspian  Sea,  and 
resolve  to  establish  a  naval  force,  the  King  of  England 
shall  grant  permission  to  naval  officers,  seamen,  ship- 
wrights, carpenters,  &c.,  to  proceed  to  Persia  from  London 
and  Bombay,  and  to  enter  the  service  of  the  King  of  Persia 
— the  pay  of  such  officers,  artificers,  &c.,  shall  be  given  by 
his  Persian  Majesty  at  the  rates  which  may  be  agreed 
upon  with  the  English  ambassador."  f  But  by  the  treaty 
of  Goolistan,   Persia   engaged   not  to   maintain   a  naval 

*  Sir  Gore  Ouseley  to  the  Court  of  Directors :  March  21,  1812. — 
[MS.  Records.] 

t  MS.  Records.  Sir  Gore  Ouseley's  treaty  is  not  given  in  the  col- 
lection of  treaties  in  the  published  "Papers  relating  to  Persia  and 
Afghanistan."  In  another  article  of  this,  which  does  not  appear  in  the 
subsequent  treaty,  the  amount  of  the  allowances  to  be  granted  by  the 
Shah  to  the  British  officers  serving  in  Persia  is  laid  down. 


144  LATER  EVENTS  IN  PERSIA. 

force  on  the  Caspian.     The  article,  therefore,  was  neces- 
sarily expunged. 

On  the  25th  of  November,  the  definitive  treaty,  which 
was  finally  accepted,  was  concluded  at  Teheran  by  Messrs. 
Morier  and  Ellis.  It  was  declared  to  be  strictly  defensive. 
The  plan  of  defence  thus  marked  out  was  more  extensive 
than  practicable.  It  bound  the  Persian  Government  to 
engage  "  not  to  allow  any  European  army  to  enter  the 
Persian  territory,  nor  to  proceed  towards  India,  nor  to  any 
of  the  ports  of  that  country ;  and  also  to  engage  not  to 
allow  any  individuals  of  such  European  nations,  enter- 
taining a  design  of  invading  India,  or  being  at  enmity  with 
Great  Britain,  whatever,  to  enter  Persia."  "  Should  any 
European  powers,"  it  was  added,  "  wish  to  invade  India 
by  the  road  of  Khorassan,  Tartaristan,  Bokhara,  Samar- 
cand,  or  other  routes,  his  Persian  Majesty  engages  to 
induce  the  kings  and  governors  of  those  countries  to  oppose 
such  invasion  as  much  as  is  in  his  power,  either  by  the 
fear  of  his  arms  or  by  conciliatory  measures."  In  the 
third  article  it  is  laid  down,  that  "  the  limits  of  the  terri- 
tories of  the  two  states  of  Russia  and  Persia  shall  be 
determined  according  to  the  admission  of  Great  Britain, 
Persia,  and  Russia" — a  stipulation  of  an  extraordinary 
and,  perhaps,  unexampled  character,  inasmuch  as  Russia 
had  not  consented  to  this  mode  of  adjudication.  The 
eighth  and  ninth  articles  related  to  Afghanistan,  and  are 
contained  in  the  following  words  : 

VIII.  "  Should  the  Afghans  be  at  war  with  the  British 
nation,  his  Persian  Majesty  engages  to  send  an  army 
against  them,  in  such  manner,  and  of  such  force,  as  may 
be  concerted  with  the  Enghsh  Government.  The  expenses 
of  such  an  army  shall  be  defrayed  by  the  British  Govern- 
ment, in  such  manner  as  may  be  agreed  upon  at  the 
period  of  its  being  required. 

IX.  "  If  war  should  be  declared  between  the  Afghans 


THE    DEFINITIVE    TREATY.  145 

and  Persians,  the  English  Government  shall  not  interfere 
with  either  party,  unless  their  mediation  to  effect  a  peace 
shall  be  solicited  by  both  parties."  * 

One  more  clause  of  the  definitive  treaty  calls  for 
notice  in  this  place.  In  Article  VI.,  it  is  covenanted 
that  "  should  any  European  power  be  engaged  in  war 
with  Persia,  when  at  peace  with  England,  his  Britannic 
Majesty  engages  to  use  his  best  endeavours  to  bring 
Persia  and  such  European  power  to  a  friendly  understand- 
ing." "If  however,"  it  is  added,  "his  Majesty's  cordial 
interference  should  fail  of  success,  England  shall  still,  if 
required,  in  conformity  with  the  stipulations  in  the  pre- 
ceding articles,  send  a  force  from  India,  or,  in  lieu  thereof, 
pay  an  annual  subsidy  (200,000  tomauns)  for  the  support 
of  a  Persian  army,  so  long  as  a  war  in  the  supposed  case 
shall  continue,  and  until  Persia  shall  make  peace  with 
such  nation."  By  this  article  we,  in  effect,  pledged  our- 
selves to  support  Persia  in  her  wars  with  Russia,  even 
though  we  should  be  at  peace  with  the  latter  state.  By 
the  convention  of  Goolistan,  it  is  true  that  amicable  rela- 
tions had  been  re-established  between  the  Russian  and 
Persian  Governments  ;  but  these  relations  were  likely  at 
any  time  to  be  interrupted ;  and  it  was  not  difficult  to 
perceive,  that,  before  long,  the  aggressive  policy  of  Russia 
would  again  bring  that  state  into  collision  with  its  Persian 
neighbour.  The  article,  in  reality,  exposed  us  at  least 
to  the  probability  of  a  war  with  Russia ;  and  laid  down 

*  Of  this  article  it  has  been  said  by  an  experienced  writer:  **The 
obligation  which  we  contracted  in  the  9th  article,  to  abstain  from 
interference  in  the  event  of  a  possible  contest  between  the  Afghans  and 
Persians,  is  haidly  intelligible.  Such  a  proposal  could  not  have  pro- 
ceeded from  Great  Britain  ;  and  if  proceeding  from  Persia,  it  indicated 
that  desire  of  territorial  extension  which  was  more  fully  developed  in 
the  sequel,  and  which,  when  developed,  compelled  us  on  general 
grounds  to  repudiate  the  treaty  altogether."  —  [Calcutta  Review, 
vol.  xii.] 

VOL.  I.  '  L 


146  LATER    EVENTS    IN    PERSIA. 

the  doctrine  that  every  future  aggi-ession  of  the  latter 
against  the  dominions  of  the  Persian  Shah  was  to  be 
regarded  in  the  light  of  a  hostile  demonstration  against 
our  Indian  possessions. 

For  some  time  there  was  little  to  disturb  the  even  cur- 
rent of  affairs,  or  to  change  the  character  of  our  relations 
towards  the  Persian  state.  It  was  the  policy  of  Great 
Britain,  by  strengthening  the  military  resources  of  the 
country,  to  render  Persia  an  insurmountable  barrier 
against  the  invasion  of  India  by  any  European  army.  But 
by  this  time  France  had  ceased  to  be  formidable ;  and 
what  was  ostensibly  defence  against  the  powers  of  Europe, 
was,  in  reality,  defence  against  the  ambition  of  the  Czar. 
It  is  doubtful,  however,  how  far  our  policy  was  successful. 
We  supplied  the  Persian  army  with  English  arms  and 
English  discipline ;  our  officers  drilled  the  native  troops 
after  the  newest  European  fashions,  and  for  some  time 
the  Crown  Prince,  Abbas  Meerza,  was  delighted  with  his 
new  plaything.  But  the  best-informed  authorities  concur 
in  opinion  that  the  experiment  was  a  failure ;  and  that  the 
real  military  strength  of  the  empire  was  not  augmented 
by  this  infusion  of  English  discipline  into  the  raw  material 
of  the  Persian  army.*     It  has  been  said,  indeed,  and  with 

*  The  explanation  of  this  failure,  given  by  the  same  experienced 
writer,  is  worth  quoting  : — "If  it  be  remembered  that  when  the  system 
is  affected  with  chronic  paralysis,  the  attempt  is  vain  to  restore  any 
particular  member  to  a  healthy  action,  it  will  be  understood  that,  to 
a  nation  devoid  of  organisation  in  every  other  department  of  govern- 
ment, a  regular  army  was  impossible.  It  thus  happened  that,  notwith- 
standing the  admirable  material  for  soldiery  which  were  offered  by  the 
hardy  peasantry  of  Azerbijan,  and  the  still  hardier  mountaineers  of 
Kermanshah — notwithstanding  the  aptitude  of  the  officers  to  receive 
instruction — notwithstanding  that  a  due  portion  of  physical  courage 
appertained  generally  to  the  men — the  disciplined  forces  of  Persia, 
considered  as  an  army,  and  for  the  purpose  of  national  defence,  were, 
from  the  epoch  of  their  first  creation,  contemptible.     Beyond  drill  and 


WAR   WITH    RUSSIA.  147 

undeniable  truth,  by  one  who  was  himself  for  many  years 
among  the  instructors  of  the  Persian  army,  that  "when 
Persia  again  came  into  collision  with  Russia  in  1826,  her 
means  and  power  as  a  military  nation  were  positively 
inferior  to  those  which  she  possessed  at  the  close  of  her 
former  struggle." 

From  the  date  of  the  convention  of  Goolistan,  up  to 
the  year  1826,  there  was  at  least  an  outward  observance 
of  peace  between  the  Russian  and  Persian  states.  The 
peace,  however,  was  but  a  hollow  one,  destined  soon  to  be 
broken.  The  irritation  of  a  disputed  boundary  had  ever 
since  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  of  Goolistan  kept  the 
two  states  in  a  restless,  unsettled  condition  of  ill-disguised 
animosity  ;  and  now  it  broke  out  at  last  into  acts  of  mu- 
tual defiance.  It  is  hard  to  say  whether  Russia  or  Persia 
struck  the  first  unpardonable  blow.  The  conduct  of  the 
former  had  been  insolent  and  offensive — designed  perhaps 
to  goad  the  weaker  state  into  open  resentment,  and  to 
furnish  a  pretext  for  new  wars,  to  be  followed  by  new 

exercise,  they  never  had  anything  in  common  with  the  regular  armies 
of  Europe  and  India.  System  was  entirely  wanting,  whether  in  regard 
to  pay,  clothing,  food,  carriage,  equipage,  commissariat,  promotion,  or 
command  ;  and  under  a  lath-and-plaster  government  like  that  of  Persia, 
such  must  have  been  inevitably  the  case.  At  the  same  time,  however, 
a  false  confidence  arose  of  a  most  exaggerated  and  dangerous  character  ; 
the  resources  of  the  country  were  lavished  on  the  army  to  an  exteut 
which  grievously  impoverished  it  at  the  time,  and  which  has  brought 
about  at  the  present  day  a  state  of  affairs  that,  in  any  other  quarter  of 
the  world,  would  be  termed  a  national  bankruptcy;  above  all,  the 
tribes — the  chivalry  of  the  empire,  the  forces  with  which  Nadir  overran 
the  East  from  Bagdad  to  Delhi,  and  which,  ever  yielding  but  ever 
present,  surrounded,  under  Aga  Mahomed  Khan,  the  Russian  armies 
with  a  desert — were  destroyed.  Truly  then  it  may  be  said  that  in 
presenting  Persia  with  the  boon  of  a  so-called  regular  army,  in  order  to 
reclaim  her  from  her  unlawful  loves  with  France,  we  clothed  her  io 
the  robe  of  Nessus." — [Calcutta  Review,  vol.  xii.]  See  also  Con-espond- 
ence  of  Sir  John  Malcolm. 

L  2 


148  LATER   EVENTS    IN    PERSIA. 

acquisitions  of  Eastern  territory.  Both  parties  were  pre- 
pared, by  a  long  series  of  mutual  provocations,  for  the  now 
inevitable  contest.  It  needed  very  little  to  bring  them 
into  open  collision. 

In  Georgia  there  had  been  frightful  misrule.  The  offi- 
cers of  the  Christian  government  had  wantonly  and  in- 
sanely outraged  the  religious  feelings  of  its  Mussulman 
subjects ;  and  now  an  outburst  of  fierce  Mahomedan  zeal 
in  the  adjoining  kingdom  declared  how  dangerous  had  been 
the  interference.  The  MooUahs  of  Persia  rose  as  one  man. 
Under  pain  of  everlasting  infamy  and  everlasting  perdi- 
tion, they  called  upon  the  Shah  to  resent  the  insults  which 
had  been  put  upon  their  religion.  The  mosques  rang  with 
excited  appeals  to  the  feelings  of  all  true  believers  ;  and 
every  effort  was  made  by  the  excited  ecclesiastics  to  stimu- 
late the  temporal  authorities  to  the  declaration  of  a  holy 
war. 

The  King,  however,  shrank  from  the  contest.  He  had 
no  ambition  to  face  again  in  the  field  the  formidable 
European  enemy  who  had  so  often  scattered  the  flower  of 
the  Persian  army,  and  trodden  over  the  necks  of  the  van- 
quished to  the  acquisition  of  new  dominions.  But  the 
importunity  of  the  Moollahs  was  not  to  be  withstood.  He 
pledged  himself  that  if  Gokchah — one  of  the  disputed 
tracts  of  country  occupied  by  the  Russians — ^were  not 
restored,  he  would  declare  war  against  the  Muscovite 
power.  Convinced  that  the  Russian  Government  would 
yield  this  strip  of  land,  acquired  as  it  was  without  justice, 
and  retained  without  profit,  the  Shah  believed  that  the 
condition  was,  in  effect,  an  evasion  of  the  pledge.  The 
error  was  soon  manifest.  It  was  not  in  the  nature  of 
Russia  to  yield  an  inch  of  country  righteously  or  un- 
righteously acquired — profitably  or  unprofitably  retained. 
Gokchah  was  not  restored.  The  Moollahs  became  more 
and  more  clamorous.     The  Shah  was  threatened  with  the 


WAR   WITH    RUSSIA.  149 

forfeiture  of  all  claims  to  paradisaical  bliss  :  and  the  war     / 
was  commenced. 

Excited  by  the  appeals  of  the  MooUahs,  the  Persians 
flung  themselves  into  the  contest  with  all  the  ardour  and 
ferocity  of  men  burning  to  wipe  out  in  the  blood  of  their 
enemies  the  insults  and  indignities  that  had  been  heaped 
upon  them.  They  rose  up  and  massacred  all  the  isolated 
Russian  garrisons  and  outposts  in  their  reach.  Abbas 
Meerza  took  the  field  at  the  head  of  an  army  of  40,000 
men ;  and  at  the  opening  of  the  campaign  the  disputed 
territory  of  Gokchah,  with  Balikloo  and  Aberan,  were 
recovered  by  their  old  masters. 

These  successes,  however,  were  but  short-lived.  The 
son  of  the  Prince  Royal,  Mahomed  Meerza,  a  youth  more 
impetuous  than  skilful  in  the  field,  soon  plunged  the  divi- 
sions he  commanded  into  a  sea  of  overwhelming  disaster. 
The  Prince  himself,  not  more  fortunate,  was  in  the  same 
month  of  September,  1826,  beaten  by  the  Russian  General, 
Paskewitch,  in  open  battle,  with  a  loss  of  1200  men.  The 
war  was  resumed  in  the  following  spring,  and  continued 
throughout  the  year  with  varying  success ;  but  the  close 
of  it  witnessed  the  triumph  of  the  Russians.  Erivan  and 
Tabreez  fell  into  their  hands.*  Enfeebled  and  dispirited, 
the  Persians  shrunk  from  the  continuance  of  the  struggle. 

*  The  characteristic  words  of  the  Russian  manifesto,  announcing 
these  events,  are  worth  quoting: — "Obliged  to  pursue  the  enemy- 
through  a  country  without  roads,  laid  waste  by  the  troops  which  were  to 
have  defended  it  ;  often  opposed  by  nature  itself;  exposed  to  the  burn- 
ing sun  of  summer,  and  the  rigour  of  winter  ;  oxir  brave  army,  after 
unparalleled  efforts,  succeeded  in  conquering  Erivan,  which  was  re- 
puted impregnable.  It  passed  the  Araxes,  planted  its  standards  on  the 
top  of  Ararat,  and  penetrating  further  and  further  into  the  interior  of 
Persia,  it  occupied  Tabreez  itself,  with  the  country  depending  on  it. 
The  Khanate  of  Erivan,  on  both  sides  of  the  Araxes,  and  the  Khanate 
of  Nakhichevan,  a  part  of  the  ancient  Armenia,  fell  into  the  hands  of 
the  conquerors." 


150  LATER   EVENTS    IN    PERSIA. 

The  intervention  of  Great  Britain  was  gladly  accepted, 
and  Persia  submitted  to  the  terms  of  a  humiliating  peace. 

After  some  protracted  negotiations,  a  new  treaty,  super- 
seding that  of  Goolistan,  was  signed  at  Toorkomanchai,  in 
February,  1828,  by  General  Paskewitch  and  Abbas  Meerza. 
By  this  treaty,  Persia  ceded  to  the  Czar  the  Khanates  of 
Erivan  and  Nakhichevan ;  and  consented  to  the  recogni- 
tion of  the  line  of  frontier  dictated  by  the  Russian 
Government.  The  frontier  line  between  the  two  empires, 
laid  down  in  the  fourth  article  of  the  treaty,  commenced 
at  the  first  of  the  Ottoman  States  nearest  to  the  little 
Ararat  mountain,  which  it  crossed  to  the  south  of  the 
Lower  Karasson,  following  the  course  of  that  river  till  it 
falls  into  the  Araxes  opposite  Sheroiu*,  and  then  extending 
along  the  latter  river  as  far  as  Abbas- Abad.*  The  line  of 
frontier  then  followed  the  course  of  the  Araxes  to  a  point 
twenty-one  wersts  beyond  the  ford  of  Ledl-boulak,  when 
it  struck  off  in  a  straight  line  drawn  across  the  plain  of 
Moghan,  to  the  bed  of  the  river  Bolgaron,  twenty-one 
wersts  above  the  point  of  confluence  of  the  two  Rivers 
Adinabazar  and  Sarakamyshe  ;  then  passing  over  the  sum- 
mit of  Ojilkoir  and  other  mountains,  it  extended  to  the 
source  of  the  River  Atara,  and  followed  the  stream  until 
it  falls  into  the  Caspian  Sea. 

Such  was  the  boundary  laid  down  in  the  treaty  of 
Toorkomanchai.  The  other  articles  granted  an  indemnity 
to  Russia  of  eighty  millions  of  roubles  for  the  expenses  of 
the  war — yielded  to  that  state  the  sole  right  of  having 
armed  vessels  on  the  Caspian — ^recognised  the  inheritance 
of  Abbas  Meerza — and  granted  an  amnesty  to  the  inhabit- 
ants of  Aderbijan.  To  Persia  this  treaty  was  deeply 
humiliating ;  but  the  manifestoes  of  the  Emperor,  with 
characteristic  mendacity,  boasted  of  its  moderation,   and 

*  This  fortress,  together  with  the  surrounding  country,  to  the  extent 
of  three  wersts  and  a  half,  was  ceded  to  Russia. 


THE  TREATY  OF  TOORKOMANCHAI.         151 

declared  that  its  ends  were  merely  the  preservation  of 
peace  and  the  promotion  of  commerce.  "  For  us,"  it  was 
jsaid,  "  one  of  the  principal  results  of  this  peace  consists 
in  the  security  which  it  gives  to  one  part  of  our  frontiers. 
It  is  solely  in  this  light  that  we  consider  the  utility  of  the 
new  countries  which  Russia  has  just  acquired.  Every  part 
of  our  conquests  that  did  not  tend  to  this  end  was  restored 
by  our  orders,  as  soon  as  the  conditions  of  the  treaty  were 
published.  Other  essential  advantages  result  from  the 
stipulations  in  favour  of  commerce,  the  free  development 
of  which  we  have  always  considered  as  one  of  the  most 
influential  causes  of  industry,  and  at  the  same  time  as  the 
true  guarantee  of  solid  peace,  founded  on  an  entire 
reciprocity  of  wants  and  interests." 

The  hypocrisy  of  all  this  is  too  transparent  to  call  for 
comment.  Russia  had  thus  extended  her  frontier  largely 
to  the  eastward  ;  and  England  had  not  interfered  to  pre- 
vent the  completion  of  an  act,  by  which  it  has  been  said 
that  Persia  was  "  deUvered,  bound  hand  and  foot,  to  the 
Court  of  St.  Petersburgh."  *  How  far  the  British  Govern- 
ment was  bound  to  assist  Persia  in  the  war  of  1826-27, 
still  remains  an  open  question.  The  treaty  of  Teheran 
pledged  Great  Britain,  in  the  event  of  a  war  between 
Persia  and  any  European  State,  either  to  send  an  army 
from  India  to  assist  the  Shah,  or  to  grant  an  annual  sub- 
sidy of  200,000  tomauns  during  the  continuance  of  the 
war  ;  but  this  article  was  saddled  with  the  condition  that 
the  war  was  to  be  one  in  nowise  provoked  by  any  act  of 
Persian  aggression.  A  question,  therefore,  arose,  as  to 
whether  the  war  of  1826-27  was  provoked  by  the  aggres- 
sions  of  Persia  or  of  Russia.  Each  party  pronounced  the 
other  the  aggressor.  The  Persian  Government  maintained 
that  the  unjust  and  violent  occupation  of  Gokchah  by  a 

*  Sir  Harford  Jones. 


152  LATER    EVENTS   IN    PERSIA. 

Russian  force  furnished  a  legitimate  casus  belli ;  but  the 
Russian  manifestoes  declared  that,  "in  the  midst  of 
friendly  negotiations,  and  when  positive  assurances  gave 
us  the  hope  of  preserving  the  relations  of  good  neighbour- 
hood with  Persia,  the  tranquillity  of  our  people  was  dis- 
turbed on  the  frontiers  of  the  Caucasus,  and  a  sudden 
invasion  violated  the  territory  of  the  Emperor  in  con- 
tempt of  solemn  treaties."  Russian  statesmen  have  never 
been  wanting  in  ability  to  make  the  worse  appear  the 
better  reason.  Whatever  overt  acts  may  have  been  com- 
mitted, it  is  certain  that  the  real  provocation  came  not  from 
the  Mahomedan,  but  from  the  Christian  State.*  The 
backwardness  of  England  at  such  a  time  was  of  dubious 
honesty,  as  it  doubtless  was  of  dubious  expediency.  A 
more  forward  policy  might  have  been  more  successful. 
Had  Russia  been  as  well  disposed  to  neutrality  as  Great 
Britain,  it  would  have  been  to  the  advantage  of  the  latter 
to  maintain  the  most  friendly  relations  with  the  Muscovite 
State  ;  but  the  unscrupulousness  of  Russia  placed  England 
at  a  disadvantage.  The  game  was  one  in  which  the  more 
honourable  player  was  sure  to  be  foully  beaten.  Russia 
made  new  acquisitions  of  Eastern  territory,  and  England 
remained  a  passive  spectator  of  the  spoliation. 

*  The  Duke  of  "Wellington  wrote  to  Mr.  Canning,  in  Nov.,  1826, 
"  It  will  not  answer  to  allow  the  Persian  monarchy  to  be  destroyed, 
particul' rly  upon  a  case  of  which  the  injustice  and  aggression  are  un- 
doubtedly on  the  side  of  the  Russians."  Sir  John  Malcolm,  to  whom 
the  Duke  sent  a  copy  of  this  letter,  wrote,  "You  certainly  are  right. 
There  is  a  positive  claim  in  faith  for  mediation."  Mr.  Canning,  how- 
ever, affected  to  doubt  whether  there  had  been  any  aggression  against 
Persia.  "Does  not  the  article,"  he  asked,  "  which  defines  the  casus 
foederis  to  be  aggression  against  Persia,  limit  the  effect  of  the  whole 
treaty,  and  the  aim  of  the  sixth  article,  which  promises  our  mediation? 
Are  we  bound  even  to  mediate  in  a  case  in  which  Persia  was  the 
aggressor." — [Life  and  Correspondence  of  Sir  John  Malcolm,  vol.  ii. 
pp.  452-455.] 


THE   SUBSIDY   ARTICLES.  153 

It  is  doubtful  whether  our  statesmen  were  ever  satisfied 
that,  in  refusing  the  subsidy  and  hesitating  to  mediate,  they 
acted  up  to  the  spirit  of  the  treaty  of  Teheran.*  Certain 
it  is,  that  the  claim  of  the  Persian  Government,  at  this 
time,  awakened  our  British  diplomatists  to  a  re-consider- 
ation of  those  subsidy  articles  which  had  involved,  and 
might  again  involve  us  in  difficulties,  not  only  of  an  em- 
baiTassing,  but  of  a  somewhat  discreditable,  character.  It 
was  desirable  to  get  rid  of  these  perplexing  stipulations. 
The  time  was  opportune  ;  the  occasion  was  at  hand.  The 
large  indemnity  insisted  upon  by  Russia  drove  the  Persian 
financiers  to  extremities,  and  reduced  them  to  all  kinds  of 
petty  shifts  to  meet  the  extortionate  demand.  In  this 
conjucture,  England,  like  an  expert  money-lender,  was 
ready  to  take  advantage  of  the  embarrassments  of  the 
Persian  State,  and  to  make  its  own  terms  with  the  im- 
poverished creditor  of  the  unyielding  Muscovite.  The 
bargain  was  struck.  Sir  John  Macdonald,  on  the  part  of 
the  British  Government,  passed  a  bond  to  the  Shah  for 
250,000  tomauns  as  the  price  of  the  amendment  of  the 
subsidy  articles,  and  subsequently  obtained  the  required 
erasures  by  the  payment  of  four-fifths  of  the  amount. 

*  A  writer  in  the  Foreign  Quartei'ly  Review,  who,  if  not  Sir  John 
M'Neill  himself,  has  unblushingly  appropriated,  without  acknowledg- 
ment, a  large  portion  of  the  pamphlet  on  the  "Progress  and  present 
position  of  Russia  in  the  East,"  published  some  three  or  four  years 
before,  says :  '  'Assuredly  Prince  Abbas  Meerza  relied  strongly  upon 
this  (the  4th  article  of  the  treaty),  and  without  it  would  never  have 
engaged  in  the  contest  he  provoked  ;  we  axe  bound  in  justice  to  say, 
and  we  say  it  on  good  authority,  wantonly  and  in  defiance  of  the  feel- 
ings of  the  Persian  Government  and  King.  But  though  Persia  had 
fairly  executed  all  her  share  of  the  treaty  in  question,  the  English 
minister,  when  called  upon  to  fulfil  this  condition,  hesitated,  hung 
back,  negotiated,  and  delayed  under  every  possible  pretext,  while  he 
could  not  deny  the  faith  or  the  claim  of  Persia.  It  was  clear,  however, 
to  all  the  parties  that  ]\Ir.  Canning  only  sought  a  means  of  escaping  the 


154  LATEE  EVENTS  IN  PERSIA. 

A  season  of  outward  tranquillity  succeeded  the  comple- 
tion of  the  treaty  of  Toorkomanchai.  But  the  great 
northern  power  did  not  slumber.  Though,  during  those 
years  it  added  little  outwardly  to  its  dominions,  it  was 
obtaining  more  and  more  that  great  moral  ascendancy 
which,  perhaps,  was  better  calculated  to  secure  its  ends 
than  an  ostentatious  extension  of  territory.  The  game  of 
quiet  intimidation  was  now  to  be  tried.  The  experiment 
succeeded  to  the  utmost.  Obtaining  such  an  ascendancy 
over  its  counsels  as  enabled  it  to  induce  Persia  to  trans- 
gress its  legitimate  boundaries,  and  adopt  an  aggressive 
policy  towards  the  countries  on  its  eastern  frontier,  the 
European  power  overawed  its  Asiatic  neighbour.  It  was 
the  object  of  Russia  to  use  the  resources  of  the  Persian 
State  in  furtherance  of  its  own  ends,  without  overtly 
taking  possession  of  them,  and  thus  bringing  itself  into 
collision  with  other  powers.  To  secure  this  ascendancy  it 
was  necessary  to  assume  a  commanding — indeed,  an 
offensive — attitude  of  superiority,  and,  whilst  abstaining 
from  acts  of  aggression,  sufficiently  momentous  to  awaken 
the  jealousy  of  other  European  States,  to  keep  alive  the 
apprehensions  of  its  Eastern  neighbour  by  an  irritating, 

fulfilment  of  tlie  stipulations.  He  was  hard  pressed  by  the  reluctance 
to  engaging  in  a  war  with  Russia,  represented  as  too  probable  by  the 
minister  of  that  power  at  the  British  Cotirt,  and  by  the  dexterity  of  a 
first-rate  female  diplomatist,  to  whom,  indeed,  the  management  of  the 
matter  was  fairly  confided  by  the  Russian  Court,  and  whose  influence 
was  fatally  effective  in  this  and  the  Turkish  questions.  In  affecting  to 
adhere  simply  to  the  policy  of  his  predecessors,  Mr.  Canning  forgot  the 
immense  difference  and  disgrace  of  refusing  the  fulfilment  only  at  the 
time  when,  and  because,  the  need  was  urgent.  He  could  not  foresee 
that  Persia  must  become,  if  further  humbled,  the  tool  of  Russia  against 
the  East ;  if  he  had,  no  earthly  power  would  have  balanced  against  his 
duty.  He  did  not  even  perceive  that  the  crisis  to  Persia  had  arrived  ; 
and  contented  himself  with  a  double  sacrifice  to  vanity,  in  assuming  to 
arbitrate  against  a  sovereign  prince,  and  hearing  his  praises  resounded 
by  the  lips  of  successful  beauty." 


THE   SUBSIDY   ABTICLES.  155 

dictatorial  demeanour,  often  implying  threats  of  renewed 
hostility.  Conscious  of  weakness,  Persia  yielded  to  the 
influence  thus  sought  to  be  established  ;  and  in  due  coiu"se 
became,  as  was  intended,  a  facile  tool  in  the  hands  of  the 
Russian  minister. 

Such,  briefly  stated  in  a  few  sentences,  is  the  history  of 
the  relations  subsisting  between  Russia  and  Persia  since 
the  treaty  of  Toorkomanchai.  It  need  not  be  added  that, 
during  this  time,  English  influence  declined  sensibly  at 
the  Persian  Court.  Little  pains,  indeed,  were  taken  to 
preserve  it,  until  it  became  apparent  that  the  encroach- 
ments of  Persia  upon  the  countries  between  its  frontier 
and  India,  instigated  as  they  were  by  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment, were  calculated  to  threaten  the  seciu-ity  of  our 
Indian  Empire.  In  1831,  Abbas  Meerza,  the  Prince 
Royal,  against  the  advice  of  the  Shah,  determined  on 
sending  an  army  into  Khorassan ;  and  then  projected  an 
expedition  against  Khiva,  for  the  chastisement  of  that 
marauding  state,  which  had  so  often  invaded  the  Persian 
frontier,  and  carried  off*  into  slavery  so  many  Persian 
subjects.  The  Russian  agent  encouraged,  if  he  did  not 
actually  instigate,  these  movements.  It  was  said,  indeed, 
that  the  active  co-operation  of  Russia  would  soon  be 
apparent  in  both  enterprises — that  it  was  her  policy  to 
seek  the  assistance  of  Persia  in  a  movement  upon  Khiva, 
and  to  aid  that  state  in  the  subjugation  of  Khorassan. 
Not  only  in  Khorassan  itself,  in  Afghanistan  and  Toor- 
kistan,  but  in  the  bazaars  of  Bombay,*  was  the  advance  of 

*  "A  letter  has  been  received  in  town  from  Persia,  which  has  excited 
a  good  deal  of  talk  in  the  bazaar,  and  the  substance  of  which  we  give 
merely  as  a  rumour  of  the  clay.  It  states  that  Prince  Abbas  Meerza 
has  ordered  30,000  men  to  march  upon  Herat,  and  that  this  movement 
is  only  preparatory  to  an  advance  upon  India  in  conjunction  with  Russia. 
This  is  probably  a  mere  rumour  or  the  echo  of  a  lie — but  'coming 
events  cast  their  shadows  before, '  and  many  of  these  rumours,  combined 
with  the  tone  which  now  and  then  breaks  out  in  the  Russian  journals. 


156  LATER  EVENTS   IN   PERSIA. 

the  confederate  armies  of  the  two  states  into  Khorassan, 
and  thence  upon  Herat  and  India,  generally  discussed  and 
believed.  Such,  indeed,  at  this  time,  was  the  ascendancy 
of  Muscovite  inflaence  over  the  mind  of  Abbas  Meerza, 
that  it  was  reported  he  had  married  a  Russian  Princess, 
and  adopted  the  Christian  faith. 

There  was  a  British  officer  in  the  Persian  camp,  Captain 
Shee,  whose  interference  brought  about  the  postponement 
of  the  Khivan  expedition,  and  in  the  following  year  it  was 
determined  to  abandon  the  Oosbeg  enterprise  for  the  time, 
and  to  punish  the  offending  Afghans.  An  expedition 
against  Herat  was  then  planned  ;  but  British  interference, 
this  time  directed  by  the  sagacity  of  Mr.  M'Neill,  was 
again  successfully  put  forth,  and  the  movement  was  sus- 
pended. In  the  mean  while  the  Khorassan  campaign  was 
prosecuted  with  vigour.  The  arms  of  Abbas  Meerza  were 
triumphant.  The  independence  which  the  province  had 
endeavoured  to  assert  could  not  be  maintained  in  the  face 

show  but  too  well  the  turn  of  men's  thoughts  and  wishes,  and  should 
warn  us  to  be  prepared." — [Bombay  Gazette,  August  25,  1832.] 
About  the  same  time,  Dr.  Wolff,  who  was  then  travelling  in  Central 
Asia,  wrote  :  "  It  is  remarkable  that  there  is  a  current  belief,  not  only 
throughout  Khorassan,  but,  as  I  found  it  afterwards,  throughout  Toor- 
kistan  even  to  Caubul,  that  Abbas  Meerza  had  married  a  Russian 
Princess,  and  adopted  the  Russian  religion  ;  and  that  50,000  Rus- 
sians would  come  to  Khorassan  by  way  of  Khiva,  and  assist  Abbas 
Meerza  in  conquering  Khorassan.  So  much  is  true  that  Russia  has 
written  to  Futteh  Ali  Shah,  offering  him  5000  men  for  taking  Khorassan, 
and  putting  down  the  chupow — i.e.,  plundering  system  of  the  Toorko- 
mans ;  and  I  hope  to  prove  it  to  a  certainty  that  Russia  will  be  very 
soon  the  mistress  of  Khiva,  under  the  pretext  that  the  King  of  Khiva 
has  8000  Russian  slaves,  whilst  I  know  by  the  most  authentic  reports 
that  there  are  not  above  200  Russian  slaves  and  60  Russian  deserters 
at  Khiva," — [Calcutta  Christian  Observer,  September,  1832.]  It  was 
stated  at  one  time  that  Russia  had  consented  to  yield  her  claim  to  the 
balance  of  the  indemnity  money  remaining  then  due  by  Persia,  on  con- 
dition of  the  latter  joining  in  an  expedition  against  Khiva. 


EXPEDITIONS   AGAINST   HERAT.  157 

of  the  battalions  of  the  Prince  Royal,  aided,  as  they  were, 
by  European  courage  and  skill.*  Ameerabad  and  Koochan 
fell  before  him.  The  recusant  chiefs  made  their  submis- 
sion; and  before  the  close  of  1832  all  the  objects  of  the 
campaign  had  been  accomplished,  and  the  subjugation  of 
Khorassan  was  complete. 

Emboldened  by  success,  Abbas  Meerza  now  contem- 
plated new  enterprises.  The  project  of  an  expedition 
against  Khiva,  to  be  subsequently  extended  to  Bokhara, 
was  then  revived ;  and  the  reduction  of  Herat,  a  design 
favoured  alike  by  the  ambition  of  the  Prince  and  the  insi- 
dious policy  of  Russia,  was  again  brought  under  review. 
Herat,  which  lies  on  the  western  frontier  of  Afghanistan, 
had,  on  the  partition  of  the  Douranee  Empire  among  the 
Barukzye  Sirdars,  afforded  an  asylum  to  Shah  Mahmoud, 
and  had  ever  since  remained  in  the  hands  of  that  Prince 
and  Kamran,  his  successor.  To  subjugate  this  tract  of 
country  was  to  open  the  gate  to  further  Eastern  conquest. 
The  Russian  agent  was  eager,  therefore,  to  promote  a 
movement  which  squared  so  well  with  the  designs  of  his 
own  Government.  The  expedition  against  Herat  was  no 
longer  to  be  postponed.  In  1833  it  was  actually  put  into 
execution;  and  the  command  of  the  invading  force  was 
entrusted  to  Mahomed  Meerza,  the  son  of  the  Prince 
Royal. 

In  the  autumn  of  1833  Abbas  Meerza  died  at  Meshed. 
Arrested  in  the  prosecution  of  the  siege  of  Herat  by  the 
tidings  of  his  father's  death,  Mahomed  Meerza  returned, 
in  no  enviable  frame  of  mind,  and  withdrew  within  the 
Persian  frontier.     There  were  some  doubts,  too,  at  that 

*  Abbas  Meerza  gratefully  acknowledged  the  assistance  he  received 
from  Captain  Shee,  Mr.  Beek,  and  M.  Berowski,  the  Pole,  of  whom 
subsequent  mention  will  be  made.  At  the  siege  of  Koochan  a  sergeant 
of  the  Bombay  Horse  Artillery,  named  Washbrook,  directed  the  mortar 
batteries,  which  mainly  conduced  to  the  reduction  of  the  place. 


158  LATER   EVENTS    IN   PERSIA. 

time,  regarding  the  succession ;  but  these  were  soon  set 
at  rest.  The  Shah  nominated  Mahomed  Meerza  as  his 
heir,  and  both  the  British  and  the  Russian  Governments 
gave  their  cordial  assent  to  the  choice. 

A  few  months  afterwards,  in  the  autumn  of  1834, 
Futteh  AH  Shah  died  at  Ispahan  ;  and  Mahomed  Meerza 
ascended  the  throne.  The  change  was  not  favourable  to 
British  interests.  Futteh  Ali  had  ever  been  our  friend. 
From  him  the  Russians  had  received  little  encouragement 
— ^but  his  son  and  his  grandson  had  thrown  themselves 
into  the  arms  of  the  Muscovite  ;  and  now  that  the  latter 
had  ascended  the  throne,  there  was  every  prospect  of 
Russian  influence  becoming  paramount  at  the  Persian 
Court.  Great  Britain  had  done  for  the  young  King  all 
that  he  required.  He  believed  that  those  good  offices, 
which  mainly  had  secured  for  him  the  succession  to  the 
throne,  were  employed  only  for  the  purpose  of  counter- 
acting the  dreaded  ascendancy  of  Russia ;  and  he  was  in 
no  humour  to  display  his  gratitude  towards  a  nation, 
the  character  and  the  resources  of  which  he  so  little 
understood. 

The  thought  of  breaking  down  the  monarchy  of  Herat 
still  held  possession  of  the  mind  of  Mahomed  Shah.  Ever 
since,  in  the  autumn  of  1833,  he  had  been  arrested  in  his 
first  expedition  against  that  place  by  the  death  of  his 
father,  he  had  brooded  over  his  disappointment,  and  medi- 
tated a  renewal  of  the  hostile  undertaking.  It  is  said, 
indeed,  that  he  swore  a  solemn  oath,  sooner  or  later  to 
retrace  his  steps  to  the  eastward,  and  to  wipe  out  his 
disgrace  in  Afghan  blood.  Seated  on  the  throne  of  his 
grandfather,  and  upheld  there  by  British  influence,  he 
dreamt  of  Eastern  conquest,  openly  talked  of  it  in  durbar, 
and  delighted  to  dwell  upon  his  prospective  triumphs  over 
Oosbeg  and  Afghan  hosts.  He  needed  little  prompting  to 
push  his  armies  across  the  Eastern  frontier      But  there 


RUSSIAN   ASCENDANCY.  159 

were  promptings  from  without  as  well  as  from  within. 
Russia  was  at  the  elbow  of  the  Shah,  ever  ready  to  drop 
tempting  suggestions  into  the  young  monarch's  ear,  and 
to  keep  alive  within  him  the  fire  both  of  his  ambition  and 
his  revenge.  It  was  the  policy  of  Russia  at  this  time  to 
compensate  for  its  own  encroachments  on  the  Western 
frontier  of  Persia,  by  helping  that  country  to  new  acqui- 
sitions of  territory  on  the  East.  Mahomed  Shah  had  little 
real  love  for  his  great  Northern  neighbour ;  but  he  pro- 
foundly reverenced  the  gigantic  power  of  the  Czar,  and, 
mistaking  quiescence  for  weakness,  aggressiveness  for 
strength,  contrasted  the  resources  of  Russia  and  England 
in  a  manner  very  unfavourable  to  the  pretensions  of  the 
latter.*  The  enormous  wings  of  the  Russian  eagle  seemed 
to  overshadow  the  whole  land  of  Iran  ;  and  the  Shah  was 
eager  that  they  should  be  stretched  over  him  in  protection, 
and  not  descend  upon  him  in  wrath.  He  knew,  by  bitter 
experience,  what  was  the  might  of  the  Northern  army ;  he 
had  fled  before  the  Cossacks  on  the  field  of  Ganjah,  and 
narrowly  escaped  with  his  life.  But  of  the  English  he 
knew  little  more  than  that  some  courteous  and  accom- 
plished gentlemen  were  drilling  his  native  troops,  and 
doing  their  best  to  create  for  him  a  well-disciplined  army 
out  of  the  raw  materials  placed  at  their  disposal. 

And  so  it  happened,  that  in  1835,  when  Lord  Palmerston 
wrote  to  Mr.  Ellis,  who  had  been  sent  out  from  London  to 

*  Nor  did  he  scruple  outwardly  to  evince  the  relative  degrees  of 
respect  which  he  entertained  for  the  two  nations  in  the  persons  of  their 
representatives.  On  one  occasion,  for  example,  when  the  Russian 
envoy,  Count  Simonich,  was  returning  from  an  excursion,  the  foreign 
minister  went  out  to  meet  him,  but  demurred  to  paying  the  same  com- 
pliment to  the  British  ambassador. — [MS.  Records.]  This  incident, 
however,  which  created  some  sensation  in  the  Calcutta  Council-Chamber, 
may  have  had  its  source  in  the  private  feelings  of  Meerza  Massoud,  the 
foreign  minister,  who,  having  long  resided  at  St.  Petersburgh,  was  a 
mere  creature  of  the  Russian  State. 


160  LATER  EVENTS  IN  PERSIA. 

assume  charge  of  the  Mission  on  the  part  of  the  Crown, 
that  he  was  "  especially  to  warn  the  Persian  Government 
against  allowing  themselves  to  be  pushed  on  to  make  war 
against  the  Afghans,"  he  could  obtain  no  more  satisfactory 
reply  from  the  ambassador  than  that  the  Shah  had  "  very 
extended  schemes  of  conquest  in  the  direction  of  Afghan- 
istan." "  In  common  with  all  his  subjects,"  added  Mr. 
Ellis,  "he  conceives  that  the  right  of  sovereignty  over 
Herat  and  Candahar  is  as  complete  now  as  in  the  reign  of 
the  SufFarean  dynasty."  "  This  pretension,"  it  was  added, 
"is  much  sustained  by  the  success  of  his  father  Abbas 
Meerza,  in  the  Khorassan  campaign,  and  the  suggestions 
of  General  Berowski."*  The  Persian  ministers  declared 
that  the  rightful  dominions  of  the  Shah  extended  to 
Ghuzni ;  that  an  expedition  against  Herat  would  be 
undertaken  in  the  following  spring ;  that  the  capture  of 
Candahar  would  shortly  follow  ;  and  that  then  he  would 
launch  into  new  fields  of  enterprise  among-  the  Beloochees 
and  the  Toorkomans. 

The  Heratee  campaign,  however,  was  the  most  che- 
rished, as  it  was  the  proximate  of  all  these  undertakings ; 
and  the  Russian  minister  was  ever  ready  with  suggestions 
for  the  immediate  march  of  the  Persian  army,  lest  the 
British  Government  should  step  in  to  discoiu-age  the  un- 
dertaking, or  take  measures  to  thwart  its  success.  It  was 
urged,  too,  that  the  expedition  would  be  rendered  more 
difficult  by  delay,  and  at  a  later  period  more  extensive 
military  resources  would  be  required  to  prosecute  the  war 
with  success. 

The  British  minister  watched  all  these  proceedings  with 
interest  and  anxiety.  It  seemed  to  him,  that  whilst  the 
restlessness  of  Russian  intrigue  was  constantly  threatening 
to  educe  a  state  of  things  in  Central  Asia,  embarrassing  to 

Mr.  EUis  to  Lord  Palmerston :  Teheran,  November  13,  1835. — 
[Published  Papers  relating  to  Persia  and  Afghanistan.]       ^ 


THE   HERAT    CAMPAIGN.  161 

the  British-Indian  Government,  it  became  the  British,  on 
their  parts,  to  make  a  counter-move  that  would  keep  her 
dangerous  ally  fairly  in  check.  It  had  been  seen,  long 
before  this,  that  the  experiment  of  drilling  the  Persian 
army  was  nothing  better  than  an  expensive  failure.  It 
had,  to  some  extent,  the  effect  of  excluding  other  European 
disciplinarians ;  but,  beyond  this,  it  did  not  increase  our 
influence  in  the  Persian  dominions,  or  the  security  of  our 
Indian  frontier.  It  was  advisable,  therefore,  to  do  some- 
thing more.  Never  doubting  that  the  network  of  Russian 
intrigue  would  soon  extend  itself  beyond  the  Persian 
frontier,  it  appeared  to  the  British  minister  expedient 
that  we  should  anticipate  the  designs  of  Russia  in 
Afghanistan  by  sending  an  envoy  to  Dost  Mahomed,  and 
offering  to  despatch  British  officers  to  Caubul  to  discipline 
the  Ameer's  army.*  It  was  obvious  that  a  decided  move- 
ment was  becoming  every  day  more  and  more  necessary. 
A  mere  conciliatory  course  of  policy,  dictating  offers  of 
quiet  intervention,  was  found  of  no  avail  in  such  a  con- 
juncture. The  British  minister  offered  to  use  his  influence 
with  Shah  Kamran  to  induce  that  ruler  to  abstain  from 
the  commission  of  those  acts  which  had  offended  the 
Shah-in-Shah  of  Persia,  but  the  offer  had  been  coldly 
received.  It  was  evident  that  the  aggressive  designs  of 
Mahomed  Shah  were  largely  promoted  by  the  Russian 
minister,  and  that  no  peaceful  mediation  would  induce  the 
young  King  to  abandon  his  projects  of  Eastern  conquest. 

In  the  spring  of  1836  the  plan  of  the  campaign  was 
laid  down,  but  it  was  doubtful  whether  the  Shah  possessed 
the  means  of  immediately  reducing  it  to  practice.  An 
unhappy  expedition  against  the  Toorkomans  in  the  course 
of  the  summer  somewhat  cooled  his  military  ardour  ;  and 

*  The  ofl&cer  whom  he  proposed  to  send  was  Lieutenant  Todd,  of  the 
Bengal  Artillery,  who  held  the  local  rank  of  Major  in  Persia,  and  who 
had  long  been  employed  in  instructing  the  artillery  of  the  Persian  army. 


162  LATER    EVENTS    IN    PERSIA. 

before  the  year  had  worn  to  a  close,  he  opened  negotia- 
tions with  Herat.  A  gallant  answer  was  sent  back  to 
his  demands.  "  You  demand  hostages,"  said  the  Heratee 
minister.  "  We  gave  no  hostages  during  the  reign  of  the 
late  Shah ;  and  we  will  give  none  now.  You  demand  a 
present ;  we  are  ready  to  give  as  large  a  present  as  we  can 
afford.  If  the  Shah  is  not  satisfied  with  this,  and  is  deter- 
mined to  attack  us,  let  him  come.  We  will  defend  our 
city  as  long  as  we  can ;  and  if  we  are  driven  from  it,  it 
will  of  course  remain  in  your  hands  till  we  can  find  means 
to  take  it  back  again  from  you."  The  Shah  was,  at  this  time, 
on  the  way  back  to  his  capital.  He  at  once  summoned  a 
council  of  war,  laid  the  offensive  answer  of  Yar  Mahomed 
before  the  chief  officers  who  attended  him  in  his  tent,  and 
sought  their  advice.  The  result  was  a  determination  to 
return  to  Teheran  for  the  winter  months,  and  to  com- 
mence the  expedition  against  Herat  early  in  the  following 
spring.* 

But  the  spring  of  1837,  like  the  spring  of  1836,  passed 
by,  and  the  expedition  was  not  commenced.  There  ap- 
peared to  be  some  hope  of  bringing  matters  to  an  issue 
by  peaceable  negotiation.  But  the  demands  of  Persia 
involved  the  sacrifice  of  the  independence  of  the  state  of 
Herat,  and  Shah  Kamran  could  not  be  persuaded  to 
reduce  himself  to  a  state  of  vassalage.  He  had  great 
respect  for  the  Shah  of  Persia,  he  said  ;  but  he  could  not 
acknowledge  him  as  his  sovereign — could  not  coin  money 
or  suffer  prayers  to  be  read  in  his  name.  He  consented 
that  hostages  should  reside  for  two  years  at  Meshed,  as 
guarantees  for  the  fulfilment  of  the  terms  of  the  proposed 

*  The  Russian  minister  had  urged  the  King  to  undertake  a  winter 
campaign  against  Herat.  But  Count  Nesselrode  always  resolutely 
maintained  that  Simonich  had  endeavoured  to  persuade  the  Shah  not 
to  proceed  against  Herat  at  all ;  and  Simonich  told  the  same  story  in 
his  letters  to  hia  own  gorernment. 


THE    HERAT    CAMPAIGN.  163 

treaty.  He  consented  that  certain  sums  of  money,  in  the 
way  of  tribute,  should  be  paid  annually  to  the  Persian 
Government.  He  consented  to  furnish  troops  in  aid  of 
any  Persian  expedition  against  Toorkistan.  He  consented 
to  restrain  his  subjects  from  marauding  and  plundering, 
and  capturing  slaves  on  the  Persian  frontier.  But  he 
could  not  consent  to  relinquish  the  title  of  Shah,  and 
acknowledge  himself  a  dependant  of  Persia.  The  propo- 
sitions submitted  by  Herat  were  moderate  and  reasonable ; 
they  called  fot  nothing  from  the  Persian  Government 
beyond  a  pledge  of  non-interference  in  the  internal  affairs 
of  Herat.  But  the  pretensions  of  the  King  of  Kings  to 
the  sovereignty  of  Western  Afghanistan  w^ere  not  to  be 
sobered  down,  even  by  the  representations  of  the  British 
minister,  who  endeavoured  to  reconcile  conflicting  interests, 
and  to  cement  a  friendly  alliance  between  the  contending 
parties.  Mahomed  Shah  was  determined,  either  to  break 
down  the  independence  of  Herat,  or  to  batter  down  its 
walls.  So  the  enterprise,  long  projected — long  brooded 
over,  was  undertalien  in  earnest  at  last.* 

The  Barukzye  Sirdars  of  Candahar  watched  the  ad- 
vance of  the  Persians  with  evident  satisfaction.  They 
had  never  ceased  to  see  in  Shah  Kamran  the  murderer 
of  Futteh  Khan.     They  had  never  ceased  to  regard  with 

*  Though  we  need  not  seek  the  causes  of  this  expedition  in  anything 
either  nearer  or  more  remote  than  the  ambition  of  the  young  Shah  and 
the  intrigues  of  the  Russian  Government,  a  pretext  was  put  forth  by,  or 
for  Persia,  of  a  more  plausible  kind.  It  was  urged  that  the  Heratees 
had  carried  off  and  sold  into  slavery  the  subjects  of  the  Persian  Shah. 
There  is  no  doubt  of  the  fact.  But  it  was  never  put  prominently  for- 
ward by  the  Shah,  who  always  urged  that  Herat  had  no  right  to  be 
independent.  Another  pretext,  but  a  weak  one,  for  undertaking  the 
war  was  also  alleged.  Hulakoo,  son  of  the  Prince  of  Kerman,  after  his 
father  was  taken  and  blinded,  and  Kerman  occupied  by  the  Shah's 
troops,  fled  to  Herat,  and  from  thence  endeavoured  to  excite  dis- 
turbances in  Kain,  Khaf,  and  Eastern  Kerman. 

M  2 


164  LATER    EVENTS    IN    PERSIA. 

impatience  and  irritation  that  last  remnant  of  Suddozye 
supremacy  which  marred  the  completeness  of  Barukzje 
rule,  and  at  times  even  threatened  to  extend  itself  towards 
the  East  in  an  effort  to  restore  the  old  dynasty  of  the 
successors  of  Ahmed  Shah.  The  approach  of  the  Persian 
army  seemed  now  to  promise  at  least  the  overthrow  of 
Shah  Kamran ;  and  the  Candahar  brothers  looked  eagerly 
for  the  transfer  of  the  Heratee  principality  to  themselves.* 
To  cement  the  alliance  with  Mahomed  Shah,  and  to 
secure  the  most  advantageous  terms  for  himself  and  his 
brothers,  Kohun  Dil  Khan  determined  to  send  one  of  his 
own  sons  to  the  Persian  camp.  Dost  Mahomed  disapproved 
of  the  movement.  "  If  you  look  upon  me,"  he  wrote  to 
the  Candahar  chief,  "  as  greater  than  yourself,  do  not  send 
your  son  to  Persia.  In  the  event  of  your  not  attending  to 
my  advice,  such  circumstances  will  happen  as  will  make 
you  bite  the  finger  of  repentance."  But  the  Candahar 
chief  was  not  to  be  turned  from  his  purpose  by  the 
remonstrances  of  the  Ameer.  The  bait  held  out  by 
Persia  was  too  tempting  to  be  resisted ;  and  Russia  was 
standing  by,  ready  to  guarantee  the  alluring  promises  of 
Mahomed  Shah.  M.  Goutte,  the  Russian  agent  with  the 
Persian  army,  wrote  letters  of  encouragement  to  Kohun 
Dil  Khan,  and  General  Berowski  endorsed  the  flattering 
assurances  they  contained.  "It  is  better,"  wrote  the 
former,  "  to  despatch  Omar  Khan  without  apprehension, 
and  I  will  write  to  the  Persian  Government  to  remove  all 
apprehensions  at  your  sending  your  son.  He  will  be 
treated  with  great  distinction  by  the  Shah  and  his  nobles." 

*  Kamran  had  threatened  Candahar  on  more  than  one  occasion  ;  and 
at  the  end  of  1835,  Mr.  Masson  reported  to  the  Supreme  Government 
that  the  Sirdars  of  that  place,  despairing  of  obtaining  any  assistance 
from  Dost  Mahomed,  had  sent  an  emissary  to  the  Bombay  Government, 
offering  to  cede  their  country  to  the  British  ! — [MS.  Records.]  I 
merely  give  this  as  a  report  sent  down  by  the  English  news-writer. 


I 


SEEDS   OF   THE   AFGHAN    WAR.  165 

"  Nothing  but  good,"  said  the  latter,  "  will  result  from 
this  your  connexionwith  the  Shah;  so  much  good,  indeed, 
that  I  cannot  put  it  to  paper.  Be  convinced  that  your 
serving  the  Shah  will  turn  out  every  way  to  your  advan- 
tage." The  Candahar  chief  was  easily  convinced.  He  had 
fixed  his  eye  upon  Herat,  and  he  fell  readily  into  an 
alliance  which  he  hoped  would  place  that  principality 
securely  in  his  hands. 

With  very  different  feelings  Dost  Mahomed  Khan 
viewed  the  advance  of  the  Persian  army.  He  wished 
Mahomed  Shah  to  assist  him  in  a  religious  war  against 
the  Sikhs  ;  but  even  an  alliance  based  upon  these  grounds 
he  was  willing  to  forego,  if  he  could  secure  the  friendly 
offices  of  the  British.  A  new  actor  was  by  this  time  upon 
the  scene,  and  new  schemes  of  policy  were  beginning  to 
unfold  themselves  before  the  Ameer.  Little  did  he  think, 
when  he  received  with  honour,  and  took  friendly  counsel 
with  a  British  officer  sent  to  his  Court  to  discuss  matters 
of  commerce,  how  soon  that  officer  would  again  enter  the 
Afghan  capital,  accompanied  by  a  British  army.  Bumes 
appeared  at  Caubul — Mahomed  Shah  at  Herat ;  and  the 
seeds  of  the  Afghan  war  were  sown. 


The  various  treaties  referred  to  in  this  Introductory  Book  vrill  be 
found  in  an  Appendix  aJt  the  end  of  the  volume. 


166 


BOOK   11. 

[1835—1838.] 
CHAPTEK  I. 

[1835—1837.] 

The  Commercial  Mission  to  Caubul — Arrival  of  Lord  Auckland — His 
Character — Alexander  Burnes — His  Travels  in  Central  Asia — 
Deputation  to  the  Court  of  Dost  Mahomed — Reception  by  the 
Ameer — Negotiations  at  Caubul — Failure  of  the  Mission. 

In  the  autum  of  1835,  Lord  Auckland  was  appointed 
Governor-General  of  India.  The  Whigs  had  just  returned 
to  power.  The  brief  Tory  interregnum  which  had  pre- 
ceded the  restoration  to  olB&ce  of  Lord  Melbourne  and  his 
associates,  had  been  marked  by  the  appointment  to  the 
Indian  Viceroyship  of  Lord  Heytesbury — a  nobleman  of 
high  character  and  approved  diplomatic  skiU.  His  official 
friends  boasted  largely  of  the  excellence  of  the  choice, 
and  prophesied  that  the  most  beneficial  results  would 
flow  from  his  government  of  India.  But  nothing  of  the 
Governor-Generalship  ever  devolved  upon  him,  except  the 
outfit.  The  Whig  ministers  cancelled  the  appointment, 
and,  after  a  time,  selected  Lord  Auckland  to  fill  the 
rudely  vacated  place. 

The  appointment  occasioned  some  surprise,  but  raised 


LORD   AUCKLAND.  167 

little  indignation.  In  India,  the  current  knowledge  of 
Lord  Auckland  and  his  antecedents  was  of  the  smallest 
possible  amount.  In  England,  the  general  impression 
was,  that  if  not  a  brilliant  or  a  profound  man,  he  was  at 
least  a  safe  one.  The  son  of  an  eminent  diplomatist,  who 
had  been  won  over  to  the  support  of  Pitt's  administra- 
tion, and  had  been  raised  to  the  peerage  in  reward  for 
his  semces,  he  was  generally  regarded  as  one  of  the 
steadiest  and  most  moderate  of  the  Whig  party.  As 
an  industrious  and  conscientious  pubhc  servant,  assi- 
duous in  his  attention  to  business  and  anxious  to  com- 
pensate by  increased  application  for  the  deficiencies  of 
native  genius,  he  was  held  in  good  esteem  by  his  col- 
leagues and  respected  by  all  who  had  official  intercourse 
with  him.  India  did  not,  it  was  supposed,  at  that  time 
demand  for  the  administration  of  her  affairs,  any  large 
amount  of  masculine  vigour  or  fertility  of  resource.  The 
country  was  in  a  state  of  profound  tranquillity.  The 
treasury  was  overflowing.  The  quietest  ruler  was  likely 
to  be  the  best.  There  was  abundant  work  to  be  done ; 
but  it  was  all  of  a  pacific  character.  In  entrusting  that 
work  to  Lord  Auckland,  the  ministry  thought  that  they 
entrusted  it  to  safe  hands.  The  new  Governor-General 
had  everything  to  learn ;  buf  he  was  a  man  of  methodical 
habits  of  business,  apt  in  the  acquisition  of  knowledge, 
with  no  overweening  confidence  in  himself,  and  no  arro- 
gant contempt  for  others.  His  ambition  was  all  of  the 
most  laudable  kind.  It  was  an  ambition  to  do  good. 
When  he  declared,  at  the  farewell  banquet  given  to  him 
by  the  Directors  of  the  East-India  Company,  that  he 
"looked  with  exultation  to  the  new  prospects  opening 
out  before  him,  affording  him  an  opportunity  of  doing 
good  to  his  fellow-creatiu-es — of  promoting  education  and 
knowledge — of  improving  the  administration  of  justice 
in  India — of  extending  the  blessings  of  good  government 


1^8  THE    "commercial"    MISSION   TO    CAUBUL. 

and  happiness  to  millions  in  India,"  it  was  felt  by  all  who 
knew  him,  that  the  words  were  uttered  with  a  grave  sin- 
cerity, and  expressed  the  genuine  aspirations  of  the  man. 

Nor  did  the  early  days  of  his  government  disappoint 
the  expectations  of  those  who  had  looked  for  a  pains- 
taking, laborious  administrator,  zealous  in  the  persecution 
of  measures  calculated  to  develope  the  resources  of  the 
country,  and  to  advance  the  happiness  of  the  people. 
It  appeared,  indeed,  that  with  something  less  of  the 
uncompromising  energy  and  self-denying  honesty  of  Lord 
William  Bentinck,  but  with  an  equal  purity  of  benevo- 
lence, he  was  treading  in  the  footsteps  of  his  predecessor. 
The  promotion  of  native  education,  and  the  expansion 
of  the  industrial  resources  of  the  country,  were  pursuits 
far  more  congenial  to  his  nature  than  the  assembling  of 
armies  and  the  invasion  of  empires.  He  had  no  taste  for 
the  din  and  confusion  of  the  camp  ;  no  appetite  for  foreign 
conquest.  Quiet  and  unobtrusive  in  his  manners,  of  a 
somewhat  cold  and  impassive  temperament,  and  alto- 
gether of  a  reserved  and  retiring  nature,  he  was  not  one 
to  court  excitement  or  to  desire  notoriety.  He  would 
fain  have  passed  his  allotted  years  of  office,  in  the  prose- 
cution of  those  small  measures  of  domestic  reform  which, 
individually,  attract  little  attention,  but,  in  the  aggregate, 
affect  mightily  the  happiness  of  the  people.  He  belonged, 
indeed,  to  that  respectable  class  of  governors  whose  merits 
are  not  sufficiently  prominent  to  demand  ample  recogni- 
tion by  their  contemporaries,  but  whose  noiseless,  im- 
applauded  achievements  entitled  them  to  the  praise  of 
the  historian  and  the  gratitude  of  after  ages. 

It  was  not  possible,  however  intently  his  mind  might 
have  been  fixed  upon  the  details  of  internal  administra- 
tion, that  he  should  have  wholly  disregarded  the  aggres- 
sive designs  of  Persia  and  the  obvious  intrigues  of  the 
Russian  Government.     The  letters  written  from  time  to 


THE    LITERATURE    OF   THE    CENTRAL- ASIAN    QUESTION.   169 

time  by  the  British  minister  at  the  Persian  Court,  were 
read  at  first,  in  the  Calcutta  Council-Chamber,  with 
a  vague  interest  rather  than  with  any  excited  appre- 
hensions. It  was  little  anticipated  that  a  British  army 
would  soon  be  encamped  before  the  capital  of  Afghan- 
istan, but  it  was  plain  that  events  were  taking  shape  in 
Central  Asia,  over  which  the  British- Indian  Government 
could  not  afford  to  slumber.  At  all  events,  it  was  neces- 
sary in  such  a  conjuncture  to  get  together  some  little  body 
of  facts,  to  acquire  some  historical  and  geographical  infor- 
mation relating  to  the  countries  lying  between  the  Indian 
frontier  and  the  eastern  boundaries  of  the  Russian  Empire. 
Secretaries  then  began  to  write  "notes,"  and  members 
of  Council  to  study  them.  Summaries  of  political  events, 
genealogical  trees,  tables  of  routes  and  distances,  were  all 
in  great  requisition,  during  the  first  years  of  Lord  Auck- 
land's administration.  The  printed  works  of  Elphinstone, 
ConoUy,  and  Bumes ;  of  Malcolm,  Pottinger,  and  Fraser, 
were  to  be  seen  on  the  breakfast-tables  of  our  Indian 
statesmen,  or  in  their  hands  as  they  were  driven  to  Coun- 
cil. Then  came  Sir  John  McNeill's  startling  pamphlet 
on  the  "  Progress  and  Present  Position  of  Russia  in  the 
East."  M'Neill,  Urquhart,  and  others  were  writing  up 
the  Eastern  question  at  home ;  reviewers  and  pamphleteers 
of  smaller  note  were  rushing  into  the  field  with  their 
small  collections  of  facts  and  arguments.  It  was  demon- 
strated past  contradiction,  that  if  Russia  were  not  herself 
advancing  by  stealthy  steps  towards  India,  she  was  push- 
ing Persia  forward  in  the  same  easterly  direction.  If  all 
this  was  not  very  alarming,  it  was,  at  least,  worth  think- 
ing about.  It  was  plainly  the  duty  of  Indian  statesmen 
to  acquaint  themselves  with  the  politics  of  Central  Asia, 
and  the  geography  of  the  countries  through  which  the 
invasion  of  India  must  be  attempted.  It  was  only  right 
that   they  should   have   been  seen  tracing  on   incorrect 


170  THE    "commercial"    MISSION   TO    CAUBUL. 

maps  the  march  of  a  Russian  army  from  St.  Petersburgh 
to  Calcutta,  by  every  possible  and  impossible  route,  now 
floundering  among  the  inhospitable  steppes,  now  parching 
on  the  desert  of  Merve.  The  Russian  army  might  not 
come  at  last ;  but  it  was  clearly  the  duty  of  an  Indian 
statesman  to  know  how  it  would  endeavour  to  come. 

It  was  in  the  spring  of  1836  that  Dost  Mahomed 
addressed  a  letter  of  congratulation  to  Lord  Auckland, 
on  his  assumption  of  the  office  of  Governor-General. 
"  The  field  of  my  hopes,"  he  wrote,  "  which  had  before 
been  chilled  by  the  cold  blast  of  wintry  times,  has  by 
the  happy  tidings  of  your  Lordship's  arrival  become  the 
envy  of  the  garden  of  paradise."  Then  adverting  to  the 
unhappy  state  of  his  relations  with  the  Sikhs,  he  said  : 
"  The  late  transactions  in  this  quarter,  the  conduct  of 
reckless  and  misguided  Sikhs,  and  their  breach  of  treaty, 
are  well  known  to  your  Lordship.  Communicate  to  me 
whatever  may  suggest  itself  to  your  wisdom  for  the 
settlement  of  the  affairs  of  this  country,  that  it  may 
serve  as  a  rule  for  my  g-uidance.  I  hope,"  said  the 
Ameer,  in  conclusion,  "  that  your  Lordship  will  consider 
me  and  my  country  as  your  own ;"  but  he  little  thought 
how  in  effect  this  Oriental  compliment  would  be  accepted 
as  a  solemn  invitation,  and  the  hope  be  literally  fulfilled. 
Three  years  afterwards  Lord  Auckland,  considering  Dost 
Mahomed's  country  his  own,  had  given  it  away  to  Shah 
Soojah. 

To  this  friendly  letter  the  Governor-General  returned 
a  friendly  reply.  It  was  his  wish,  he  said,  that  the 
Afghans  "  should  be  a  flourishing  and  united  nation  ;"  it 
was  his  wish,  too,  that  Dost  Mahomed  should  encourage 
a  just  idea  of  the  expediency  of  promoting  the  navigation 
of  the  Indus.  He  hinted  that  he  should  probably  soon 
"  depute  some  gentlemen"  to  the  Ameer's  Court  to  dis- 
cuss  with  him  certain   commercial   topics;    and   added, 


^         ORIGIN    OF   THE    MISSION.  ^  171 

with  reference  to  Dost  Mahomed's  unhappy  relations 
with  the  Sikhs,  and  his  eagerness  to  obtain  assistance 
from  any  quarter  :  "  My  friend,  you  are  aware  that  it  is 
not  the  practice  of  the  British  Government  to  interfere 
with  the  affairs  of  other  independent  states."  With  what 
feehngs  three  years  afterwards,  when  a  British  ai-my  was 
marching  upon  his  capital,  the  Ameer  muLst  have  remem- 
bered these  words,  it  is  not  difficult  to  conjecture. 

This  project  of  a  commercial  mission  to  Afghanistan 
was  no  new  conception  of  which  Lord  Auckland  was  the 
parent.  It  had  at  least  been  thought  of  by  Lord  William 
Bentick — and,  certainly,  with  no  ulterior  desigTis.  It  was 
suggested,  I  believe,  to  Lord  William  Bentinck  by  Sir 
John  Malcolm.  That  Lord  Auckland,  when  he  wrote  to 
Dost  Mahomed  about  "  deputing  some  gentlemen"  to 
Caubul  to  talk  over  commercial  matters  with  the  Ameer, 
had  much  more  intention  than  his  predecessor  of  diiving 
the  Barukzye  Sirdars  into  exile,  is  not  to  be  asserted  or 
believed.  He  may  have  seen  that  such  a  mission  might 
be  turned  to  other  than  commercial  uses ;  he  may  have 
thought  it  desirable  that  the  gentlemen  employed  should 
collect  as  much  information  at  the  Ameer's  Court  as  the 
advantages  of  their  position  would  enable  them  to  acquire. 
But  at  this  time  he  would  have  started  back  at  the 
barest  mention  of  a  military  expedition  beyond  the  Indus, 
and  would  have  scouted  a  proposal  to  substitute  for  the 
able  and  energetic  ruler  of  Caubul,  that  luckless  Suddozye 
Prince — the  pensioner  of  Loodhianah, — ^whose  whole  career 
had  been  such  a  series  of  disasters  as  had  never  before 
been  written  down  against  the  name  of  any  one  man. 

Apart  from  the  commercial  bearings  of  the  case,  he 
had  little  more  than  a  dim  notion  of  obtaining  a  clearer 
insight  into  the  politics  of  Central  Asia.  But  vagaie  and 
indefinite  as  were  his  conceptions,  he  was  haunted,  even 
at  the  commencement  of  his  Indian  career,  by  a  feeling 


172        THE  "commercial"  mission  to  caubul. 

of  insecurity,  engendered  by  the  aspect  of  affairs  beyond 
the  British  frontier.  There  was  a  shadow  of  danger,  but 
he  knew  not  what  the  substance  might  be.  Any  one  of  the 
strange  combinations  which  he  was  called  upon  to  consider, 
might  evolve  a  war  ;*  so  at  least  it  behoved  him  to  pre- 
pare for  the  possible  contest,  by  obtaining  all  the  know- 
ledge that  could  be  acquired,  and  securing  the  services  of 
men  competent  to  aid  him  in  such  a  conjimcture. 

Since  distant  rumours  of  an  Afghan  invasion  had 
disturbed  the  strong  mind  of  Lord  Wellesley,  much  had 
been  learnt  both  in  India  and  in  England  concerning  the 
countries  between  the  Indus  and  the  Oxus.  The  civil  and 
military  services  of  the  East  India  Company,  numbering 
in  their  ranks,  as  they  ever  have  done,  men  of  lofty  enter- 
prise and  great  ability,  had,  since  the  commencement  of 
the  century,  brought,  by  their  graphic  writings,  the 
countries  and  the  people  of  Central  Asia  visibly  before 

*  "I  share  with  you,"  he  wrote  to  Sir  Charles  Metcalfe,  in  Sep- 
tember, 1836,  "the  apprehension  of  our  being  at  no  distant  date 
involved  in  political,  and  possibly  military  operations  upon  our  western 
frontier ;  and  even  since  I  have  been  here,  more  than  one  event  has 
occurred,  which  has  led  me  to  think  that  the  period  of  disturbance  is 
nearer  than  I  had  either  wished  or  expected.  The  constitutional  restless- 
ness of  the  old  man  of  Lahore  seems  to  increase  with  his  age.  His  growing 
appetite  for  the  treasures  and  jimgles  of  Sindh — the  obvious  impolicy 
of  allowing  him  to  extend  his  dominions  in  that  direction — the  import- 
ance which  is  attached  to  the  free  navigation  of  the  Indus,  most  justly 
I  think,  and  yet  perhaps  with  some  exaggeration  from  its  value  not 
having  been  tried — the  advance  of  the  Persians  towards  Herat,  and  the 
link  which  may  in  consequence  be  formed  between  Indian  and 
European  politics, — all  lead  me  to  fear  that  the  wish  which  I  have  had 
to  confine  my  administration  to  objects  of  commerce,  and  finance,  and 
improved  institutions,  and  domestic  policy,  will  be  far  indeed  from 
being  accomplished.  But  as  you  say,  we  must  fulfil  our  destiny  ;  and 
in  the  mean  while  I  have  entreated  Runjeet  Singh  to  be  quiet,  and  in 
regard  to  his  two  last  requests  have  refused  to  give  him  50, 000  mus- 
quets,  and  am  ready  to  send  him  a  doctor  and  a  dentist." — [MS. 
CorrespondeTice.  ] 


EARLY  TRAVELS  IN  AFGHANISTAN.         173 

their  home-staying  countrymen.  Before  the  close  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  but  one  English  traveller — a  Bengal 
civilian,  named  Forster — ^had  made  his  way  from  the  banks 
of  the  Ganges  across  the  rivers  of  the  Punjab  to  the  lakes 
of  Cashmere,  and  thence  descending  into  the  country 
below,  had  entered  the  formidable  pass  of  the  Khybur, 
and  penetrated  through  the  defiles  of  JugduUuck  and 
Koord-Caubul  to  the  Afghan  capital,  whence  he  had 
journeyed  on,  by  Ghuznee,  Candahar,  and  Herat,  to  the 
borders  of  the  Caspian  Sea.  The  journey  was  undertaken 
in  1783  and  the  following  year  ;  but  it  was  not  until  some 
fifteen  years  afterwards,  that  the  account  of  his  travels  was 
given  to  the  world.  Honourable  alike  to  his  enterprise 
and  his  intelligence,  the  book  exhibits  at  once  how  much, 
during  the  last  seventy  years,  the  Afghan  Empire,  and 
how  little  the  Afghan  character,  is  changed. 

The  great  work  of  Mountstuart  Elphinstone,  published 
some  fifteen  years  after  the  appearance  of  Mr.  Forster's 
volume,  soon  became  the  text-book  of  all  who  sought  for 
information  relating  to  the  history  and  geography  of  the 
Douranee  Empire.  But  Elphinstone  saw  little  of  the 
country  or  the  people  of  Afghanistan;  he  acquired  in- 
formation, and  he  reproduced  it  with  marvellous  fidelity 
and  distinctness,  and  would  probably  not  have  written  a 
better  book  if  he  had  travelled  and  had  seen  more.  It 
was  left  for  a  later  generation  to  explore  the  tracts  of 
country  which  were  unvisited  by  the  ambassador  ;  and  for 
a  later  still  to  elicit  encouragement  and  reward. 

Years  passed  away  before  government  began  to  recognise 
the  value  of  such  inquiries.  When  Mr.  Moorcroft,  of  the 
Company's  Stud-Department,  a  man  of  high  courage  and 
enterprise,  accompanied  by  Mr.  Trebeck,  the  son  of  a 
Calcutta  lawyer,  set  out  in  1819,  in  the  mixed  character  of 
a  horse-dealer  and  a  merchant,  upon  his  long  and  perilous 
journey ;  spent  the  last  six  years  of  his  life  in  exploring 


174         THE  "commercial"  mission  to  caubul. 

the  countries  of  Ladakh,  Cashmere,  Afghanistan,  Balkh, 
and  Bokhara  ;  and  died  at  last  in  the  inhospitable  regions 
beyond  the  Hindoo-Koosh,  nothing  but  absolute  discou- 
ragement and  opposition  emanated  from  a  government 
that  had  not  the  prescience  to  see  the  importance  of  such 
investigations.* 

In  1828  Mr.  Edward  StirHng,  an  officer  of  the  Bengal 
civil  service,  being  in  England  on  furlough,  undertook  to 
return  to  India  by  the  route  of  Khorassan  and  Afghanistan. 
From  Sir  John  Macdonald,  the  Resident  Minister  at 
Teheran,  he  received  every  encouragement  and  assistance ; 
but  the  Indian  Government  looked  slightingly  upon  his 
labours,  and  neglected  the  man.  The  information  he  had 
acquired  was  not  wanted  ;  and  he  was  put  out  of  employ- 
ment, because  he  had  over-stayed,  by  a  few  weeks,  the 
period  of  his  leave  of  absence.  Those  were  days  when  no 
thought  of  an  invasion  from  the  westward  overshadowed 
the  minds  of  our  Indian  statesmen,  t     But  when,  a  few 

*  Moorcrofb  seems  to  have  been  upheld  only  by  the  kindly  encou- 
ragement of  Sir  Charles  (then  Mr.)  Metcalfe,  who,  as  Resident  at 
Delhi,  took  the  greatest  interest  in  his  enterprise,  and  afforded  him  all 
possible  assistance.  He  attributed  the  unwillingness  of  our  Government 
to  explore  the  countries  beyond  our  frontier,  to  some  vague  apprehension 
of  alarming  the  Sikhs.  "It  is  somewhat  humiliating,"  he  wrote  to 
Metcalfe,  "that  we  should  know  so  little  of  countries  which  touch  upon 
our  frontier  ;  and  this  in  a  great  measure  out  of  respect  for  a  nation 
that  is  as  despicable  as  insolent,  whose  origin  was  founded  upon  rapine, 
and  which  exists  by  acquiring  conquests  it  only  retains  by  depopulating 
the  territory." — [MS.  Correspondence.] 

+  "The  greatest  apathy,"  says  Mr.  Sterling,  "prevailed,  and  the 
members  of  the  government  could  not  be  roused  to  take  an  interest  in 
the  subject.  The  knowledge  that  I  had  been  in  these  interesting 
countries  produced  no  desire  for  intelligence  regarding  them,  and  my 
reception  gave  no  encouragement  for  the  production  of  it.  Neglect  had 
been  preceded  by  the  deprivation  of  my  appointment.  I  was  no  longer 
collector  of  Agra ;  that  situation  had  been  disposed  of  nearly  two 
months  prior  to  my  reaching  the  Presidency  :  my  return  was  deemed 
hopeless,  and  my  death  anticipated." 


COiTOLLY   AND   BUENES.  175 

years  afterwards,  a  young  officer  of  the  Bengal  cavalry, 
named  Arthur  ConoUy — a  man  of  an  earnest  and  noble 
nature,  running  over  with  the  most  benevolent  enthusiasm, 
and  ever  suffering  his  generous  impulses  to  shoot  far  in 
advance  of  his  prudence  and  discretion — set  out  from 
London,  proceeded,  through  Russia,  across  the  Caucasus, 
and  thence  through  Persia  and  Khorassan,  accompanying 
an  Afghan  army  from  Meshed  to  Herat,  and  journeyed  on 
from  the  latter  place  to  Candahar,  and,  southward,  through 
Beloochistan  and  Sindh  to  India,  there  was  little  chance  of 
the  information  which  he  collected  on  his  travels  being 
received  with  ingratitude  and  neglect.  The  period  which 
elapsed  between  the  time  when  those  travels  were  completed 
and  the  date  at  which  their  written  results  were  given  to 
the  world,  deprived  Arthur  ConoUy  of  some  portion  of  the 
credit  which  he  might  otherwise  have  received,  and  of  the 
interest  which  attached  to  his  publication.  Another  officer 
had  by  this  time  made  his  way  by  another  route,  through 
the  unexplored  regions  of  Central  Asia,  and  laid  before  the 
government  and  the  country  an  account  of  his  wanderings. 
On  him,  when  Lord  Auckland  bethought  himself  of  de- 
spatching a  commercial  agent  to  Caubul,  the  choice  of  the 
Governor-General  fell. 

Bom  in  the  year  1805,  at  Montrose,  and  educated  in 
the  academy  of  that  town,  Alexander  Bumes  proceeded 
to  Bombay  at  the  early  age  of  sixteen,  and,  at  a  period  of 
his  career  when  the  majority  of  young  men  are  mastering 
tbe  details  of  company-drill,  and  wasting  their  time  in  the 
strenuous  idleness  of  cantonment  life,  had  recommended 
himself,  by  his  proficiency  in  the  native  languages,  to  the 
government  under  which  he  served.  Whilst  yet  in  his 
teens,  he  was  employed  to  translate  the  Persian  documents 
of  the  Suddur  Court,  and,  at  the  age  of  twenty,  was 
appointed  Persian  interpreter  to  a  force  assembled  for  a 
hostile  demonstration  against  Sindh,  rendered  necessary  by 


176         THE  "commercial"  mission  to  caubul. 

the  continued  border  feuds  which  were  disturbing  the  peace 
of  our  frontier.  In  a  little  while  he  became  distinguished 
as  a  topographer  no  less  than  as  a  linguist ;  and  as  a  writer 
of  memoirs,  and  designer  of  maps  of  little-known  tracts  of 
country,  soon  rose  into  favour  and  repute.  Attached  to 
the  department  of  the  Quartermaster-General,  he  was 
employed  upon  the  survey  of  the  north-western  frontier 
of  the  Bombay  Presidency,  and  shortly  afterwards  was 
appointed  Assistant  Political  Agent  in  Cutch,  a  province 
with  which  he  had  made  himself  intimately  acquainted. 
In  the  young  officer  a  spirit  of  enterprise  was  largely 
blended  with  the  love  of  scientific  research.  He  was  eager 
to  push  his  inquiries  and  to  extend  his  travels  into  the 
countries  watered  by  the  Indus  and  its  tributaries — the 
fabulous  rivers  on  the  banks  of  which  the  Macedonian  had 
encamped  his  victorious  legions.  It  was  not  long  before 
occasion  offered  for  the  gTatification  of  his  cherished  desires. 
A  batch  of  splendid  English  horses  had  been  despatched, 
in  1830,  to  Bombay,  as  a  present  to  Runjeet  Singh  ;  and 
Sir  John  Malcolm,  then  Governor  of  that  Presidency, 
selected  Alexander  Bumes  to  conduct  the  compHmentary 
mission  to  Lahore.*     Instructed,   at  the   same  time,  to 

*  Sir  William  Napier  says,  that  "an  enlightened  desire  to  ascertain 
the  commercial  capabilities  of  the  Indus  induced  Lord  Ellenborough, 
then  President  of  the  India  Board  of  Control,  to  employ  the  late  Sir 
Alexander  Bumes  to  explore  the  river  in  1831,  under  pretence  of  con- 
veying presents  to  Eunjeet  Singh."  But  the  enlightenment  of  this 
measure  was  questioned  at  the  time  by  some  of  the  ablest  and  most 
experienced  of  our  Indian  administrators.  At  the  head  of  these  Sir 
Charles  Metcalfe  emphatically  protested  against  it.  In  October,  1810, 
he  recorded  a  minute  in  Council,  declaring  * '  the  scheme  of  surveying 
the  Indus,  under  the  pretence  of  conveying  a  present  to  Runjeet  Singh," 
to  be  "a  trick  unworthy  of  our  government,  which  cannot  fail  when 
detected,  as  most  probably  it  will  be,  to  excite  the  jealousy  and 
indignation  of  the  powers  on  whom  we  play  it."  "It  is  not  impos- 
sible," he  added,  "that  it  may  lead  to  war." — [MS.  Eecords.] 
These  opinions  were  repeated  privately  in  letters  to  Lord  William 


BURNBS   AT   LAHORE.  177 

neglect  no  opportunity  of  acquiring  information  relative  to 
the  geography  of  the  Indus,  he  proceeded  through  the 
country  of  the  Ameers  of  Sindh,  though  not  without  some 
obstruction,  from  the  jealousy  and  suspicion  of  the  Talpoor 
rulers.*  At  the  Sikh  capital  he  was  received  with  be- 
coming courtesy  and  consideration.  The  old  lion  of  the 
Punjab  flung  himself  into  the  arms  of  the  young  British 
officer,  and  retained  him  as  an  honoured  guest  for  a  month. 
Leaving  Lahore,  Burnes  crossed  the  Sutlej,  and  visited 
Loodhianah,  where,  little  dreaming  of  the  closer  connexion 
which  would  one  day  exist  between  them,  he  made  the 
acquaintance  of  the  ex-King,  Soojah-ool-Moolk,  and  his 
blind  brother,  Zemaun  Shah.  "  Had  I  but  my  kingdom," 
said  the  former  to  Burnes,  "  how  glad  I  should  be  to  see 
an  Englishman  at  Caubul,  and  to  open  the  road  between 
Europe  and  India." 

From  Loodhianah  the  traveller  proceeded  to  Simlah, 
to  lay  an  account  of  his  jomneying  and  its  results  at  the 
feet  of  the  Governor-General.  Lord  William  Bentinck 
was  then  recruiting  his  exhausted  energies  in  the  bracing 

Bentinck,  and,  at  a  later  date,  to  Lord  Auckland.  Metcalfe,  indeed, 
as  long  as  he  remained  in  India,  never  ceased  to  point  out  the  inex- 
pediency of  interfering  with  the  states  beyond  the  Indus. 

*  And  doubtless,  very  absurd  and  uncalled  for  the  jealousy  was 
considered  in  those  days.  As  Burnes  ascended  the  Indus,  a  Syud  on 
the  water's  edge  lifted  up  his  hands,  and  exclaimed,  * '  Sindh  is  now- 
gone,  since  the  English  have  seen  the  river,  which  is  the  road  to  its 
conquest."  Nearly  twenty  years  before,  Sir  James  Maqfeintosh  had 
written  in  his  journal  :  "A  Hindoo  merchant,  named  Derryana,  under 
the  mask  of  friendship,  had  been  continually  alarming  the  Sindh  Go- 
vernment against  the  English  mission.  On  being  reproved,  he  said 
that  although  some  of  his  reports  respecting  their  immediate  designs 
might  not  be  quite  correct,  yet  this  tribe  never  began  as  friends  with- 
out ending  as  enemies,  by  seizing  the  country  which  they  entered  with 
the  most  amicable  professions."  *'  A  shrewd  dog,"  said  Mackintosh; 
but  he  did  not  live  to  see  the  depths  of  the  man's  shrewdness, 

VOL.  I.  N 


178        THE  "commercial"  mission  to  caubul. 

climate  of  that  hiU  station.  He  received  the  traveller 
with  kindly  consideration,  and  listened  to  his  narrations 
with  interest  and  attention.  Full  of  enthusiasm,  with 
his  appetite  for  enterprise  stimulated  by  his  recent  adven- 
tures, Bumes  pressed  upon  the  Governor-General  the 
expediency  of  extending  the  fields  of  geographical  and 
commercial  inquiry  upon  which  he  had  entered,  and 
succeeded  in  obtaining  the  sanction  of  the  Governor- 
General  to  an  expedition  into  Central  Asia,  to  be  under- 
taken under  the  patronage  of  Government,  but  not 
avowedly  in  connection  with  any  public  objects.  He  set 
out  on  his  overland  journey  to  England  ostensibly  as  a 
private  traveller,  but  protected  by  passports  designed  to 
show  that  he  was  travelling  under  the  countenance  of  the 
government  which  he  served. 

Accompanied  by  Dr.  Gerard,  an  assistant-surgeon  on  the 
Bengal  establishment ;  by  a  young  native  surveyor,  named 
Mahomed  Ali ;  and  by  Mohun  Lai,  a  Hindoo  youth  of 
Cashmerian  descent,  who  had  been  educated  at  the  Delhi 
College,  and  patronised  by  Mr.  Trevelyan,  Burnes  set  out 
on  his  long  and  perilous  journey.  Starting  at  the  com- 
mencement of  the  new  year  of  1832,  the  travellers  crossed 
the  Punjab,  and  proceeded  by  the  route  of  Peshawur  and 
Jellalabad  to  Caubul.  Here  they  were  hospitably  received 
by  Dost  Mahomed.  The  character  of  the  Caubul  chief 
and  of  the  Afghan  nation  impressed  themselves  favourably 
upon  the  mind  of  Alexander  Burnes.  Of  the  latter  he 
spoke  as  a  simple-minded,  sober  people,  of  frank,  open 
manners,  impulsive  and  variable  almost  to  childishness. 
He  had  seen  and  conversed  with  Shah  Soojah  at  Lood- 
hianah,  and  declared  his  conviction  that  the  exiled  Prince 
had  not  energy  sufficient  to  empower  him  to  regain  his 
throne,  or  tact  sufficient  to  enable  him  to  keep  it.  The 
character  of  the  Barukzye  Sirdar  now  presented,  in  the 
eyes  of  the  English  officer,  a  favourable  contrast  to  that  of 


BURNES    IN   ENGLAND.  179 

the  Suddozye  Prince.  Bumes  saw  before  him  a  man  of  no 
common  ability,  with  a  well-disciplined  mind,  a  high  sense 
of  justice,  and  a  general  appreciation  of  his  duties  and 
responsibilities,  as  a  ruler  of  the  people,  not  unworthy  of 
a  Christian  potentate.  And  I  do  not  believe  that  from 
that  time  he  ever  changed  his  opinion. 

Leaving  Caubul,  Burnes  and  his  fellow-travellers 
ascended  the  mountain-paths  of  the  Hindoo-Koosh,  and 
journeying  onward  by  the  route  of  Syghan  and  Koon- 
dooz,  debouched  into  the  valley  of  the  Oxus,  followed 
the  course  of  that  river  for  many  days,  and  then  made 
their  way  to  Bokhara.  After  two  months  spent  in  that 
city,  they  re-crossed  the  Oxus  and  journeyed  westward  to 
the  Persian  frontier.  Visiting  Meshed,  Teheran,  Ispahan, 
and  Shiraz,  and  making  the  acquaintance  on  the  way  both 
of  Abbas  Meerza  and  the  Shah-i-Shah,  they  proceeded  to 
Bushire  and  Bombay.  From  Bombay,  Bumes  pushed  on 
to  Calcutta,  and  early  in  1833  had  laid  before  the  Governor- 
General  the  results  of  his  Central-Asian  travels.  Lord 
William  Bentinck  received  him  with  marked  attention  and 
respect,  and  sent  him  to  England,  that  he  might  impart, 
in  person,  to  the  home  authorities  the  information  with 
which  he  was  laden. 

His  reception  in  England  was  of  the  most  flattering 
character.  The  commendations  of  the  East  India  Com- 
pany and  the  Board  of  Control  were  endorsed  by  the 
commendations  of  the  public.  He  published  his  book. 
It  was  read  with  avidity.  In  the  coteries  of  London, 
"  Bokhara  Bumes "  became  one  of  the  celebrities  of  the 
season.  Learned  societies  did  him  honour.  Fashionable 
dames  sent  him  cards  of  invitation.  Statesmen  and 
savans  sought  his  acquaintance.  At  Holland  House  and 
Bowood  he  was  a  favoured  guest.  He  was  no  niggard 
of  his  information  ;  he  talked  freely ;  arid  he  had  "  some 
new  thing"  whereof  to  discourse.     His  fine  talents  nnd 

IT  2 


180  THE    "commercial"    MISSION   TO    CAUBUL. 

his  genial  social  qualities  recommended  him  to  many; 
and  there  was  more  than  enough  in  the  overflowings  of 
English  hospitality  to  satisfy  a  vainer  man. 

These,  however,  were  but  unsubstantial  rewards.  He 
looked  for  promotion  in  the  paths  of  Oriental  diplomacy ; 
and  Lord  EUenborough,  who  then  presided  at  the  India 
Board,  recommended  him  for  the  appointment  of  Secre- 
tary of  Legation  at  the  Persian  Court.*  This  offer  he  was 
recommended  to  decline;  and  he  returned  to  India,  in 
the  spring  of  1835,  to  resume  his  duties  as  Assistant  to 
the  Resident  at  Cutch.  Rescued  in  the  autumn  from 
the  obscurity  of  this  appointment,  he  was  despatched  to 
the  Court  of  the  Ameers  of  Sindh.  The  duties  of  the 
Mission  were  performed  with  judgment  and  ability.  The 
Ameers  consented  to  the  proposal  for  the  survey  of  the 
Indus,  and  would  gladly  have  entered  into  more  intimate 
relations  with  the  British  Government  had  it  been  con- 
sidered, upon  our  part,  desirable  to  strengthen  the 
elliance. 

Whilst  still  in  the  Sindh  country,  Burnes  received 
instructions  from  the  Supreme  Government  of  India  to 
hold  himself  in  readiness  to  undertake  the  charge  of  the 
"commercial"  mission  which  it  had  been  determined  to 
despatch  to  Afghanistan,  and  to  proceed  to  Bombay  to 
make  preparations  for  the  journey. t     He  reached  that 

*  He  was  promised,  too,  tte  reversion  of  the  office  of  minister. 

+  Burnes,  when  in  England,  had  endeavoured  to  impress  the  Court 
of  Directors  with  an  idea  of  the  expediency  of  sending  him  out  as 
commercial  agent  to  Caulml ;  but  Mr.  Tucker,  who  was  then  in  the 
chair,  could  see  only  the  evils  of  such  a  measure.  "The  late  Sir 
Alexander  Burnes,"  he  wrote  some  years  afterwards,  "  was  introduced 
to  me  in  1834  as  a  talented  and  enterprising  young  officer,  and  it  was 
suggested  that  he  might  be  usefully  employed  as  a  commercial  agent 
at  Caubul,  to  encourage  our  commerce  with  that  country  and  to  aid  in 
opening  the  river  Indus  to  British  industry  and  enterprise.  .  ,  . 
I  declined  then  to  propose  or  to  concur  in  the  appointment  of  Lieu- 


BURNES   AT   HYDERABAD.  181 

Presidency  in  the  course  of  October,  1836,  and  on  the 
26th  of  November,  accompanied  by  Lieutenant  Leech,  of 
the  Bombay  Engineers,  and  Lieutenant  Wood,  of  the 
Indian  Navy,*  Bunies  sailed  from  Bombay  to  "  work  out 
the  policy  of  opening  the  Kiver  Indus  to  commerce " — 
that  poUcy,  the  splendid  results  of  which,  years  after- 
wards, when  our  army,  our  treasury,  and  om*  reputation, 
had  been  buried  in  the  passes  of  Afghanistan,  Lord 
Palmerston  openly  boasted  in  Parliament  amidst  the 
derisive  cheers  of  the  House. 

Taking  the  Sindh  route,  Biu-nes  presented  himself  at 
the  Court  of  the  Ameers,  and  was  hospitably  received. 
The  English  officer  explained  the  object  of  his  mission ; 
talked  about  the  navigation  of  the  Indus ;  and  dwelt 
encouragingly  upon  the  instructions  which  he  had  re- 
ceived, "  to  endeavour  to  infuse  confidence  into  all  classes 
by  a  declaration  of  the  happy  and  close  friendship  which 
subsisted  between  the  British  and  the  powers  on  the 
Indus."  From  Hyderabad  he  proceeded  to  Bahwulpore  ; 
and  thence  to  Dehra  Gazee  Khan.  At  the  latter  place 
he  received  intelligence  of  the  battle  of  Jumrood ;  and, 
pushing  on  to  the  neighbourhood  of  Peshawur,  soon 
found  himself  near  the  theatre  of  war.  From  Peshawur 
to  Jumrood,  Avitabile  t  drove  the  British  officers  in  his 
carriage.      The   deputation   that   was   to   conduct   them 

tenant  Burnes  to  a  commercial  agency  in  Caubul,  feeling  perfectly 
assured  that  it  must  soon  degenerate  into  a  political  agency,  and  that 
■we  should  as  a  necessary  consequence  be  involved  in  all  the  entangle- 
ment of  Afghan  politics." —  [Memoirs  of  II.  St.  George  Tucker. "[ 
Mr.  Grant,  who  was  then  at  the  Board  of  Control,  concurred  in  opinion 
with  Mr.  Tucker ;  Sir  Charles  Metcalfe  also  wrote  a  minute  in  council, 
emphatically  pointing  out  the  evils  of  this  commercial  agency. 

*  Mr.  Percival  Lord  of  the  Bombay  Medical  Establishment,  joined 
the  Mission  in  transitu.     Mohun  Lai  also  accompanied  it. 

+  Avitabile,  an  Italian  by  birth,  was  a  General  in  the  service  of 
Eunjeet  Singh,  and  at  that  time  Governor  of  Peshawur, 


182        THE  "commercial"  mission  to  caubul. 

through  the  Khybur  Pass  had  not  made  its  appearance. 
They  were  suffering  martyrdom  from  the  effluvia  of  the 
putrifying  corpses  of  the  Afghan  and  Sikh  soldiers  who 
had  fallen  in  the  recent  conflict ;  and,  at  all  hazards,  they 
determined  to  push  on.  The  Khybur  was  cleared  without 
accident  or  Obstruction.  Friendly  deputations  from  the 
Ameer  greeted  the  British  officers  as  they  advanced.  On 
the  20th  of  September,  they  entered  Caubul. 

They  were  received  "  with  great  pomp  and  splendour." 
At  the  head  of  a  fine  body  of  Afghan  cavalry  Akbar  Khan 
came  out  to  meet  them.  Placing  Bumes  on  an  elephant 
beside  him,  he  conducted  the  British  officers  to  his  father's 
Court.  Nothing  could  have  been  more  honourable  than 
the  reception  of  the  British  Mission.  A  spacious  and 
beautiful  garden  within  the  Balla  Hissar,  and  near  the 
palace,  was  allotted  as  the  residence  of  Burnes  and  his 
companions. 

On  the  following  day,  "  with  many  expressions  of  his 
high  sense  of  the  great  honour  conferred  upon  him,"  Dost 
Mahomed  formally  received  the  representatives  of  the 
British  Government.  Burnes  submitted  his  credentials. 
The  letters  were  opened  by  the  Ameer  himself,  and  read 
by  his  minister,  Meerza  Samee  Khan.  They  introduced 
Burnes  to  his  Highness  solely  as  a  commercial  agent.  The 
flimsy  veil  was  soon  dropped.  It  was  evident  from  the 
first  that  whatever  might  have  been  his  instructions — 
whatever  might  have  been  the  proximate,  or  rather  the 
ostensible  object  of  the  mission,  Bumes  had  ulterior  de- 
signs, and  that  he,  in  reality,  went  to  Caubul  either  as  a 
spy  or  a  political  diplomatist.  He  had  not  been  three  days 
at  the  Afghan  capital,  before  he  wrote  to  Mr.  Macnaghten, 
that  he  should  take  an  early  opportunity  of  reporting 
what  transpired  at  the  Ameer's  Court ;  and  ten  days  after- 
wards we  find  him  announcing  "  the  result  of  his  inquiries 
on  the  subject  of  Persian  influence   in  Caubul,  and  the 


-     INTERVIEW   WITH   DOST   MAHOMED.  183 

exact  power  which  the  Kuzzilbash,  or  Persian  party  resi- 
dent in  this  city,  have  over  the  politics  of  Afghanistan." 
To  a  private  friend  he  wrote  more  distinctly  :  "  I  came  tO' 
look  after  commerce,  to  superintend  surveys  and  examine 
passes  of  mountains,  and  likewise  certainly  to  see  into  affairs 
and  judge  of  wliat  was  to  he  done  liereaHer  ;  but  the  here- 
after has  already  arrived."*  It  is  hard  to  say  what  our 
Oriental  diplomatists  would  do  if  they  were  forbidden 
the  use  of  the  word  "  commerce."  It  launched  Bumes 
fairly  into  the  sea  of  Afghan  politics ;  and  then  he  cut 
it  adrift. 

On  the  24th  of  September,  Bumes  was  invited  to  a  pri- 
vate conference  with  the  Ameer.  It  took  place  in  "  the 
interior  of  the  Harem"  of  the  Balla  Hissar,  and  in  the 
presence  only  of  Akbar  Khan.  Dinner  was  served  ;  and 
"  the  interview  lasted  till  midnight."  The  Ameer  listened 
attentively  to  all  that  Burnes  advanced  relative  to  the 
navigation  of  the  Indus  and  the  trade  of  Afghanistan,  but 
replied,  that  his  resources  were  so  crippled  by  his  war  with 
the  Sikhs,  that  he  was  compelled  to  adopt  measures  inju- 
rious to  commerce,  for  the  mere  purpose  of  raising  revenue. 
He  spoke  with  much  warmth  of  the  loss  of  Peshawur, 
which,  he  alleged,  had  been  basely  wrested  from  him, 
whilst  he  was  engaged  in  war  with  Shah  Soojah.  Burnes 
replied  with  a  number  of  cut-and-dried  sentences  about  the 
ability  and  resources  of  Runjeet  Singh.  To  all  this  the 
Ameer  cheerfully  assented.  He  acknowledged  that  he  was 
not  strong  enough  to  cope  with  so  powerful  an  adversary 
as  the  ruler  of  Lahore.  "  Instead  of  renewing  the  con- 
flict," he  said,  "  it  would  be  a  source  of  real  gratification 
if  the  British  Government  would  counsel  me  how  to  act : 
none  of  our  other  neighbours  can  avail  me  ;  and  in  return 
I  would  pledge  myself  to  forward  its  commercial  and  its 

*  Un'published  Correspondence  of  Sir  Alexander  Bumes. 


184        THE  "commercial"  mission  to  caubul. 

political  views."  Remarking  that  he  heard  with  pleasure 
this  acknowledgment,  Bumes  assured  him  that  the  British 
Government  would  exert  itself  to  secure  peace  between  the 
Punjab  and  Afghanistan ;  and  added,  that  although  he 
could  not  hold  out  any  promise  of  interference  for  the 
restoration  of  Peshawur,  which  had  been  won  and  pre- 
served by  the  sword,  he  believed  that  the  "  Maharajah 
intended  to  make  some  change  in  its  management,  but 
that  it  sprung  from  himself,  and  not  from  the  British 
Government."  The  Ameer  could  not  repress  his  eagerness 
to  learn  the  precise  character  of  these  contemplated 
arrangements ;  but  all  that  Bumes  could  offer  was  a  con- 
jecture that  the  Maharajah  might  be  induced  to  restore 
the  coimtry,  under  certain  restrictions,  to  Sultan  Mahomed 
Khan  and  his  brothers,  to  whom,  and  not  to  the  Ameer, 
it  had  formerly  belonged. 

On  the  evening  of  the  4th  of  October,  Bumes  was  again 
invited  to  the  Balla  Hissar.  The  Ameer, had  in  the  mean 
time  waited  upon  him  in  his  own  quarters.  At  this  second 
conference  in  the  palace,  the  Newab  Jubbar  Khan  was 
present.  On  this  occasion,  to  the  surprise  of  the  British 
envoy,  the  Ameer  carried  his  moderation  and  humility  to 
an  excess  which  might  almost  have  aroused  suspicion.  He 
declared  that  if  the  representative  of  Great  Britain  recom- 
mended him  to  do  so,  he  would  express  to  Runjeet  Singh 
his  contrition  for  the  past,  and  ask  forgiveness  ;  and  that 
if  the  Maharajah  "  would  consent  to  give  up  Peshawur  to 
him,  he  would  hold  it  tributary  to  Lahore;  send  the 
requisite  presents  of  horses  and  rice  ;  and  in  all  things 
consider  himself,  in  that  part  of  his  dominions,  as  holding 
under  Lahore."  Burnes  suggested  that  such  an  arrange- 
ment would  be  destructive  to  the  hopes  of  Sultan 
Mahomed,  who  ought  to  be  regarded  with  compassion ; 
and  asked  whether  it  would  not  be  equally  advantageous 
to  the  reputation  of  the  Ameer  that  Peshawur  should  be 


THE   CANDAHAR   SIRDARS.  185 

restored  to  his  brother.  To 'this  the  Ameer  replied,  that 
the  country  might  as  well  be  in  the  hands  of  the  Sikhs  as 
in  those  of  "Sultan  Mahomed,  who  had  been  to  him  both 
a  treacherous  friend  and  a  bitter  enemy.  Little  more 
passed  at  this  meeting.  Burnes  retired  to  speculate  upon 
the  conduct  of  the  Ameer  and  write  letters  to  the  political 
Secretary,  Mr.  Macnaghten,  who  was  destined  soon  to  play 
so  conspicuous  a  part  in  the  great  drama,  of  which  this 
"  Commercial "  mission  was  the  prologue. 

In  the  meanwhile  the  attention  of  the  Mission  was 
directed  to  the  state  of  affairs  at  Candahar.  The  chief  of 
that  place,  Kohun  Dil  Khan,  had  not  only  declared  his 
willingness  to  embrace  the  Persian  alliance,  but  had,  as 
we  have  seen,  determined  on  sending  his  second  son,  with 
the  Persian  agent,  to  Mahomed  Shah,  as  the  bearer  of 
presents  to  the  Shah  and  the  Russian  embassy.  Against 
this  course  of  procedure  Dost  Mahomed  had  protested. 
"  Oh  !  my  brother,"  he  wrote,  "  if  you  will  do  these  things 
without  my  concurrence,  what  will  the  world  say  to  it  *? " 
There  can  be  no  doubt  of  the  Ameer's  sincerity.  Indeed, 
it  was  the  conviction  that  the  Caubul  chief  was  entering 
with  his  whole  soul  into  the  British  alliance,  to  the  exclu- 
sion, as  it  was  believed,  of  the  Candahar  Sirdars,  that  drove 
the  latter  to  strengthen  their  alliance  with  the  Persian 
Court.  Burnes  himself  had  no  doubt  that  the  Ameer  was 
at  this  time  acting  a  straightforward  part.  On  the  30th 
of  October  he  wrote  to  a  private  friend :  "  Here  a  hundred 

things  are  passing  of  the  highest  interest Dost 

Mahomed  Khan  has  fallen  into  all  our  views,  and  in  so 
doing  has  either  thought  for  himself  or  followed  my 
counsel,  but  for  doing  the  former  I  give  him  every  credit, 
and  things  now  stand  so  that  I  think  we  are  on  the 
threshold  of  a  negotiation  with  King  Runjeet,  the  basis 
of  which  will  be  his  withdrawal  from  Peshawur,  and  a 
Barukzye  receiving  it  as  a  tributary  of  Lahore,  the  chief 


186        THE  "commercial"  mission  to  caubul. 

of  Caubul  sending  his  son  to  ask  pardon.  What  say  you 
to  this  after  all  that  has  been  urged  of  Dost  Mahomed 
Khan's  putting  forth  extravagant  pretensions  1     Runjeet 

will  accede  to  the  plan,  I  am  certain I  have,  in 

behalf  of  Government,  agreed  to  stand  as  mediator  with 
the  parties,  and  Dost  Mahomed  has  cut  asunder  all  his 
connexion  with  Russia  and  Persia,  and  refused  to  receive 
the  ambassador  from  the  Shah  now  at  Candahar.  His 
brothers  at  that  city  have,  however,  caressed  the  Persian 
Elchee  all  the  more  for  this,  and  I  have  sent  them  such  a 
Junius  as,  I  believe,  will  astonish  them.  I  had,  indeed, 
reason  to  act  promptly,  for  they  have  a  son  setting  out 
for  Teheran  with  presents  to  the  Shah  and  the  Russian 
ambassador  ;  and  I  hope  I  shall  be  in  time  to  explain  our 
hostility  to  such  conduct.  Everything  here  has,  indeed, 
run  well ;  and  but  for  our  deputation  at  the  time  it  hap- 
pened, the  house  we  occupy  would  have  been  tenanted  by 
a  Russian  Agent  and  a  Persian  Elchee."  * 

On  the  31st  of  October,  Burnes  wrote  to  Mr.  Macnaghten 
that  another  conference  had  taken  place  on  the  24th 
between  himself  and  the  Ameer,  and  that  what  passed  on 
that  occasion  "set  Dost  Mahomed's  conduct  in  alight  that 
must  prove,  as  I  believe,  very  gratifying  to  Government." 
On  the  British  Envoy  expressing  the  regret  which  he  felt 
on  being  made  acquainted  with  the  misguided  conduct  of 
the  Candahar  Sirdars,  the  Ameer  had  declared  that  if  such 
conduct  was  distressing  to  the  British  agent,  it  was  much 
more  distressing  to  him  ;  that  he  himself  repented  of 
having  ever  listened  to  the  overtures  of  Persia ;  that  he 
would  take  care  publicly  to  manifest  his  desire  to 
strengthen  his  relations  with  the  British  Government,  and 
do  everything  in  his  power  to  induce  his  Candahar  brothers 
to  adopt  a  wiser  course  of  policy.    Burnes  replied  that  he 

*  Unpublished  Correspondence  of  Sir  A .  Burnes. 


DISCOURAGEMENT    FROM    CALCUTTA.  187 

was  delighted  to  hear  the  expression  of  such  sentiments  ; 
but  distinctly  stated  "  that  neither  he  nor  his  brothers 
were  to  found  hopes  of  receiving  aid  from  the  British 
Government;"  that  so  long  as  they  conducted  themselves 
with  propriety  they  might  rely  upon  the  sympathy  of  the 
British  Government,  but  that  they  must,  by  no  means, 
expect  to  derive  anything  more  substantial  from  the 
alliance.*  Discouraging  as  this  was,  the  Ameer  still 
courted  the  British  alliance — still  declared  that  he  would 
exert  himself  to  the  utmost  to  detach  his  Candahar 
brothers  from  their  connexion  with  Persia,  and  even,  if 
desired  by  the  British  agent,  would  commence  active  opera- 
tions against  them.  Discountenancing  the  idea  of  an  active 
movement  against  Candahar,  Burnes  commended  the  good 
feeling  of  the  Ameer,  and  exhorted  him  to  do  his  best,  by 
pacific  means,  to  break  down  Kohun  Dil's  connexion  with 
Persia — an  effort  which  "  could  not  fail  to  be  received  by 
the  British  Government  as  a  strong  mark  of  his  desire  for 
our  friendship,  and  of  great  good  sense." 

Burnes,  who  had  gone  to  Caubul,  as  a  commercial 
agent,  was  at  this  time  without  any  political  instructions. 

*  And,  on  the  30tli  December,  Burnes,  with  reference  to  this 
promised  sympathy,  wrote,  in  the  following  words,  to  Mr.  Macnaghten. 
The  passage  was  not  published  in  the  official  correspondence.  It  was 
thought  better  to  suppress  it : — "The  present  position  of  the  British 
Government  at  this  capital  appears  to  me  a  most  gratifying  proof  of 
the  estimation  in  which  it  is  held  by  the  Afghan  nation.  Russia  has 
come  forward  with  oflFers  which  are  certainly  substantial.  Persia  has 
been  lavish  in  her  promises,  and  Bokhara  and  other  States  have  not 
been  backward.  Yet,  in  all  that  has  passed  or  is  daily  transpiring, 
the  chief  of  Caubul  declares  that  he  prefers  the  sympathy  and  friendly 
offices  of  the  British  to  all  these  offers,  however  alluring  they  may 
seem,  from  Persia  or  from  the  Emperor — which  certainly  places  his 
good  sense  in  a  light  more  than  prominent,  and,  in  my  humble  judg- 
ment, proves  that,  by  an  earlier  attention  to  these  countries,  we  might 
haAC  escaped  the  whole  of  these  intrigues,  and  held  long  since  a  stable 
influence  in  Caubul." — [Ungarbled  Correspondence  of  Sir  A.  Bv,rnes.^ 


188        THE  "commercial"  mission  to  caubul. 

As  he  ascended  the  Indus,  he  had  received  letters  from 
Government,  somewhat  modifying  the  character  of  his 
mission,  and  placing  a  larger  amount  of  discretion  in  his 
hands.*  But  he  did  not  feel  that  he  was  in  a  position  to 
deal  with  the  Peshawur  question  without  positive  instruc- 
tions from  the  Supreme  Government ;  so  all  that  he  could 
now  do  was  to  temporise,  to  amuse  Dost  Mahomed  with 
vague  assurances  of  sympathy  and  good-will,  until  the 
wishes  of  the  Governor-General  were  conveyed  to  him  in  a 
specific  shape.  He  could  promise  nothing  substantial. 
He  could  only  wi'ite  for  instructions,  and  await  patiently 
the  receipt  of  letters  from  Hindostan. 

But  Burnes,  though  he  shrunk  from  compromising  his 
government  in  the  direction  of  Lahore,  had  no  such 
scruples  with  regard  to  the  proceedings  of  the  Barukzye 
Sirdars  in  the  countries  to  the  westward.  He  thought 
that  some  latitude  having  been  allowed  him,  he  might 
take  prompt  measures  to  meet  a  pressing  difficulty  threat- 
ening us  from  a  quarter  so  far  removed  from  the  ordinary 
circle  embraced  by  the  deliberations  of  the  Calcutta 
Council.  Before  he  entered  Afghanistan  the  conduct  of 
the  Candahar  chiefs  had  engaged  his  serious  attention, 

*  "As  I  approached  Caubul,"  he  wrote  to  a  private  friend,  on  the 
5th  of  July,  "war  broke  out  with  the  Afghans  and  Sikhs,  and  my 
position  became  embarrassing.  I  was  even  ordered  by  express  to 
pause,  and  while  hanging  on  my  oars  another  express  still  cries  pame, 
but  places  a  vast  latitude  in  my  hands,  and  *  forward '  is  my  motto — 
forward  to  the  scene  of  carnage,  where,  instead  of  embarrassing  my 
government,  I  feel  myself  in  a  situation  to  do  good.  It  is  this  latitude 
throughout  life  that  has  made  me  what  I  am,  if  I  am  anything,  and 

I  can  hardly  say  how  grateful  I  feel  to  Lord  Auckland 

I  have  not  as  yet  got  the  replies  to  my  recommendation  on  our  line  of 
policy  in  Caubul,  consequent  on  a  discovered  intrigue  of  Russia,  and 
on  the  Caubul  chief  throwing  himself  in  despair  on  Perso-Russian 
arms.  I  have  at  last  something  to  do,  and  I  hope  to  do  it  well." — 
[Private  Correspondence  of  Sir  A.  Burnes.'\ 


BURNES  AND    THE   CANDAHAR   SIRDARS.  189 

and  he  had  written  to  the  British  minister  at  the  Persian 
Court,  saying  that  he  should  leave  nothing  undone  to  try 
and  put  a  stop  to  their  intercourse  with  the  Russian 
mission.  "  If  matters  go  rightly,"  he  added,  "  we  shall  be 
able  to  neutrahse  the  power  of  the  Candahar  chiefs,  or  at 
all  events  place  them  in  complete  subjection  to  Dost 
Mahomed  Khan,  whose  influence  increases  daily."  Bumes, 
as  has  been  seen,*  had  despatched  in  October  a  letter  to 
Kohun  Dil  Khan,  threatening  him  with  the  displeasure  of 
the  British  Government  if  he  continued  his  intrig-ues  with 
the  Persian  and  Russian  Court ;  and  the  measures  taken 
at  this  time  were  so  far  successful,  that,  encouraged  by 
their  result,  the  British  agent  determined  to  take  further 
steps  to  secure  the  alliance  of  the  chiefs  of  Candahar.  On 
the  22nd  of  December,  Bumes  became  convinced  of  the 
improved  temper  of  Kohun  Dil  Khan,  who  declared  that 
he  had  dismissed  the  Persian  Elchee,  had  determined  not 
to  send  his  son  to  the  Persian  Coijirt,  and  was  anxious, 
above  all  things,  for  the  counsel  and  assistance  of  the 
British  Government,  and  of  his  brother,  Dost  Mahomed 
Khan.  Mahomed  Shah  had  by  this  time  begun  to  cool 
down  in  his  zeal  for  the  Afghan  alliance  ;  and  it  appeared 

*  Ante,  page  186.  In  a  letter  to  another  correspondent,  written 
about  the  same  time,  Bumes  says:  "With  war  came  intrigues,  and 
I  have  had  the  good  fortune  to  find  out  all  the  doings  of  the  Czar  and 
his  emissaries  here,  where  they  have  sent  letters  and  presents.  After 
proving  this,  I  plainly  asked  the  Governor-General  if  such  things  were 
to  be  allowed,  and  I  got  a  reply  a  week  ago,  altering  all  my  instruc- 
tions, giving  me  power  to  go  on  to  Herat,  and  anywhere,  indeed,  I 
could  do  good.  The  first  exercise  of  the  authority  has  been  to  despatch 
a  messenger  to  Candahar,  to  tell  them  to  discontinue  their  intercourse 
with  Persia  and  Russia,  on  pain  of  displeasure^and  not  before  it  was 
time,  for  a  son  of  the  chief  of  that  city,  with  presents  for  the  Russian 
ambassador,  is  ready  to  set  out  for  Teheran." — [Sir  A.  Bumes  to 
Captain  Jacob — Caubul,  29th  of  October,  1837  :  MS.  CorrC' 
»pondeMe.] 


190  THE    "commercial       MISSION   TO    CAUBUL. 

to  be  at  least  possible  that  the  Sirdar,  instead  of  receiving 
Herat  from  the  Shah,  would,  after  the  capture  of  that 
place,  be  threatened  with  the  loss  of  Candahar.  Seizing 
the  opportunity  afforded  him  by  this  favorable  change  in 
the  aspect  of  affairs,  Bumes  wrote  at  once  to  Kohun  Dil 
Khan,  stating  that  if  the  Persian  monarch  threatened  to 
subdue  his  chiefship,  he  would  go  at  once  to  Candahar, 
accompanied  by  Dost  Mahomed,  and  assist  him  by  every 
means  in  his  power,  even  to  the  extent  of  paying  his  troops. 

In  the  meanwhile  he  determined  to  despatch  at  once 
an  officer  of  the  British  Mission  to  Candahar.  That 
officer  was  Lieutenant  Leech.  On  Christmas-day,  Burnes 
sat  down  and  wrote  him  a  long  and  clearly- worded  letter 
of  instructions.  It  was  hoped  that  the  presence  of  a 
British  agent  at  Candahar  would  keep  Persia  in  check, 
and  if  not,  he  could  despatch  to  Caubul  the  earliest 
intelligence  of  the  advance  of  the  Persian  army,  and  so 
enable  Bumes  to  counteract  the  movement  with  the  least 
possible  delay.* 

Burnes  exceeded  his  instructions,  and  was  severely 
censured  by  the  Governor-General.  Lord  Auckland  was 
then  on  his  way  to  Simlah ;  and  from  Bareilly  Mr. 
Secretary  Macnaghten  wrote  a  long  letter  to  the  Caubul 
agent,    at   the    close    of  which    he    touched    upon    the 

*  "The  chiefs  of  Candahar,"  he  wrote  a  few  days  afterwards,  to  a 
private  friend,  ' '  had  gone  over  to  Persia.  I  have  detached  them  and 
offere  them  British  protection  and  cash  if  they  would  recede,  and  if 
Persia  attacked  them,  t  have  no  authority  to  do  so  ;  but  am  I  to 
stand  by  and  see  us  ruined  at  Candahar,  when  the  Government  tell  me 
an  attack  on  Herat  would  be  most  unpalatable.  Herat  has  been  be- 
sieged fifty  days,  and  if  the  Persians  move  on  Candahar,  I  am  off  there 
with  the  Ameer  and  his  forces,  and  mean  to  pay  the  piper  myself. 
We  have  good  stuff — forty-six  guns  and  stout  Afghans,  as  brave  as 
.  rregular  troops  need  be.  am  on  stirring  g»ound,  and  I  am  glad  to 
say  I  am  up  to  it  in  health  and  all  that,  and  was  never  more  braced  in 
my  life." — {Correspondence  of  Sir  A.  Bu7'nes— privately  printed.] 


DISAVOWAL    OF   BURNES'    MEASURES.  191 

promises  made  to  the  Candahar  chiefs.  "  It  is  with  great 
pain,"  he  said,  "  that  his  Lordship  must  next  proceed  to 
advert  to  the  subject  of  the  promises  which  you  have 
held  out  to  the  chiefs  of  Candahar.  These  promises^ 
w^ere  entirely  unauthorised  by  any  part  of  your  instruc- 
tions. They  are  most  unnecessarily  made  in  unqualified 
terms,  and  they  would,  if  supported,  commit  the  Govern- 
ment upon  the  gravest  questions  of  general  policy.  His 
Lordship  is  compelled,  therefore,  decidedly  to  disapprove 
them.  He  is  only  withheld  from  a  direct  disavowal  of 
these  engagements  to  the  chiefs  of  Candahar,  because 
such  disavowal  would  carry  with  it  the  declaration  of  a 
difference  between  you  and  your  Government,  and  might 
weaken  your,  personal  influence,  and  because  events 
might,  in  this  interval,  have  occurred  which  would  render 
such  a  coui-se  unnecessary.  But  the  rulers  of  Candahar 
must  not  be  allowed  to  rest  in  confidence  upon  promises 
so  given,  and  should  affairs  continue  in  the  same  uncer- 
tainty as  that  which  prevailed  at  the  date  of  your  last 
despatches,  you  will  endeavour  to  set  yourself  right  with 
the  chiefs,  and  will  feel  yourself  bound  in  good  faith  to 
admit  that  you  have  exceeded  your  instructions  and  held 
out  hopes,  which  you  find,  upon  communication  with  your 
Government,  cannot  be  realised.  After  what  has  been 
stated,  his  Lordship  feels  that  he  need  not  enlarge  on  his 
strict  injunction  that  you  in  future  conform  punctually 
on  all  points  to  the  orders  issued  for  your  guidance."* 

*  Mr.  W.  H.  Macnaghten  to  Captain  A.  Burnes — Camp,  Bareilly, 
20th  JanuavTj,  1838.  The  letter  from  which  this  passage  is  taken 
consists  of  twenty-four  paragraphs,  of  which  three  only  appear  in  the 
published  correspondence.  There  seems,  indeed,  to  have  been  a 
studious  suppression  of  the  entire  history  of  the  oflFers  made  to  the 
Candahar  chiefs,  and  of  the  censure  which  they  called  down  upon 
Captain  Burnes.  Lord  Auckland  subsequently,  with  praiseworthy 
candour,  admitted  that  the  best  authorities  at  home  were  of  opinion 


192        THE  "commercial"  mission  to  caubul. 

And  so  Bumes  was  censured  for  a  measure  which,  under 
all  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  was  the  very  best  that 
could  have  been  adopted ;  and  the  Candahar  chiefs  threw 
themselves  again  into  the  Persian  alHance,  and  entered 
into  a  formal  treaty  with  the  Shah — under  a  Russian 
guarantee. 

In  the  mean  while  a  new  actor  had  appeared  on  the 
political  stage,  ready  to  pick  up  the  leavings  of  the  British 
agent,  and  to  appreciate  what  the  British  Government  had 
been  pleased  to  reject.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  19th  of 
December,  a  Russian  officer  named  Vickovich,*  entered 
the  city  of  Caubul.  Bom  of  a  good  family  in  Lithuania, 
and  educated  in  the  national  university  of  Wilna,  he  had 
attracted  attention,  whilst  yet  a  student,  by  the  liberality 
of  his  sentiments  and  the  fearlessness  with  which  he 
expressed  them.  Associated  with  others  of  kindred 
opinions  and  equal  enthusiasm,  he  took  part  in  a  demon- 
stration in  favour  of  the  Polish  cause,  which  well-nigh 
ended  in  the  suppression  of  the  institution ;  and,  whilst 
other  more  formidable  conspirators  were  condemned  to 
end  their  days  in  Siberia,  he  and  his  immediate  colleagues 
in  the  university  were  sent  to  Orenburgh,  as  a  kind  of 
honourable  exile,  to  be  employed  in  the  military  colony  of 
the  Ural.  Here  the  general  intelligence,  the  aptitude  for 
instruction,  the  love  of  adventure,  and  the  daring  character 
of  young  Vickovich,  soon  distinguished  him  above  his 
associates.  Attached  to  the  expeditions  sent  out  for  the 
survey  of  the  Desht-i-Kipchak,  he  lived  for  some  years 
among  the  Calmucks,  gaining  an  acquaintance  with  the 
Nogai  and  Jaghatai  dialects  of  the   Turkish  language, 

that  tlie  measure  whicli  had  evoked  these  expressions  of  the  severe 
displeasure  of  his  Lordship,  was  the  very  best  that  could  have  been 
adopted. 

*  I  have  given  the  vulgar  orthography  of  the  name.  His  real  name 
was  Yiktevitch,  or  Wiktewitch. 


VICKOVICH.  193 

and  subsequently,  during  a  residence  of  some  months  in 
Bokhai-a,  whither  he  was  sent  with  the  Caravan  from 
Orcuburgh,  acquired  a  sufficient  knowledge  of  the  Persian 
Umguage  to  enable  him  to  converse  intelligibly,  if  not 
fluently,  in  it.  When,  therefore,  the  Russian  Government 
began  to  meditate  a  mission  to  Caubul,  and  to  cast  about 
for  a  competent  agent,  there  seemed  to  be  no  likelier  man 
than  Vickovich  to  perform,  with  advantage  to  the  state, 
the  dubious  service  required  of  him.  He  was  at  this  time 
aide-de-camp  to  the  Governor  of  Orenburgh.  The  Caubul 
agency  was  enti-usted  to  him  without  hesitation.  He  was 
despatched  at  once  to  Astrakan,  whence  he  crossed  over 
to  Resht,  in  Ghilan,  and  received  his  final  instructions 
from  Count  Simonich,  at  Tehenm,  in  September,  1837. 
Before  the  end  of  December  he  was  at  Caubul.* 

*  The  first  information  relative  to  the  fact  of  Vickovich's  xnission  to 
Caubul  was  accidentally  obtained  by  Major  Rawlinson,  when  on  his 
way  to  the  camp  of  Mahomed  Shah,  who  was  then  marching  upon 
Herat.  The  circumstances,  as  set  forth  in  a  private  letter,  from 
that  officer  himself,  are  not  unworthy  of  narration: — ^^  Teheran, 
November  1,  1837.  I  have  just  returned  from  a  journey  of  much 
interest.  M'Neill  had  some  business  in  the  Persian  camp  which  he 
thought  I  might  help  to  arrange,  and  I  was  bid  accordingly  to  make 
my  way  to  the  'Eoyal  Stirrup,'  with  all  convenient  despatch.  I  was 
obliged  to  ride  day  and  night,  as  the  post-horses  on  the  road,  owing  to 
the  constant  passage  of  couriers,  were  almost  unserviceable,  and  yet 
I  was  only  able,  after  all,  to  accomplish  the  distance  of  something 
more  than  700  miles  in  a  week.  The  last  morning  of  my  ride  I  had 
an  adventure.  Our  whole  party  were  pretty  well  knocked  up,  and  in 
the  dark,  between  sleeping  and  waking,  we  had  managed  to  lose  the 
road.  As  morning  dawned,  we  found  ourselves  wandering  about  on 
the  broken  plain  which  stretches  up  from  Subzewar  to  the  range  con- 
taining the  Turquoise  mines,  and  shortly  afterwards  we  perceived  that 
we  were  close  to  another  party  of  horsemen,  who  were  also,  apparently, 
trying  to  regain  the  high  road.  I  was  not  anxious  to  accost  these 
strangers,  but  on  cantering  past  them,  I  saw,  to  my  astonishment, 
men  in  Cossack  dresses,  and  one  of  my  attendants  recognised  among 
the  party  a  servant  of  the  Russian  Mission.     My  curiosity  was,   of 

VOL.  I.  0 


194        THE  "commercial     mission  to  caubul. 

On  the  day  after  the  anival  of  Vickovich  at  Caubul, 
Bumes  reported  the  incident  to  the  supreme  Government, 

course,  excited,  and  on  reaching  the  stage  I  told  one  of  my  men  to 
watch  for  the  arrival  of  the  travellers,  and  find  out  who  they  were. 
Shortly  afterwards  the  Russian  party  rode  up,  inquired  who  I  was, 
and  finding  I  was  a  British  ofiicer,  declined  to  enter  the  Khan,  but 
held  on  their  road.  In  such  a  state  of  aifairs  as  preceded  the  siege  of 
Herat,  the  mere  fact  of  a  Russian  gentleman  travelling  in  Khorassan 
was  suspicious.  In  the  present  case,  however,  there  was  evidently  a 
desire  for  concealment.  Nothing  had  been  heard  of  this  traveller  by 
our  Mission  at  Teheran.  I  had  been  told,  indeed,  absurd  stories  on 
the  road,*  of  a  Muscovite  Prince  having  been  sent  from  Petersburgh  to 
announce  that  10,000  Russians  would  be  landed  at  Asterabad,  to  co- 
operate with  the  Shah  in  reducing  Herat ;  and  this  was  evidently  the 
man  alluded  to,  but  I  knew  not  what  to  believe,  and  I  thought  it  my 
duty,  therefore,  to  try  and  unravel  the  mystery.  Following  the  party, 
I  tracked  them  for  some  distance  along  the  high  road,  and  then  found 
that  they  had  turned  off  to  a  gorge  in  the  hills.  There  at  length  I 
came  upon  the  group  seated  at  breakfast  by  the  side  of  a  clear  spark- 
ling rivulet.  The  officer,  for  such  he  evidently  was,  was  a  young  man 
of  light  make,  very  fair  complexion,  with  bright  eyes  and  a  look  of 
great  animation.  He  rose  and  bowed  to  me  as  I  rode  up,  but  said 
nothing.  I  addressed  him  in  French — the  general  language  of  com- 
munication between  Europeans  in  tLe  East,  but  he  shook  his  head.  I 
then  spoke  English,  and  he  answered  in  Russian.  When  I  tried 
Persian,  he  seemed  not  to  understand  a  word  ;  at  last  he  expressed 
himself  hesitatingly  in  Turcoman,  or  Uzbeg  Turkish.  I  knew  just 
sufficient  of  this  language  to  carry  on  a  simple  conversation,  but  not 
enough  to  be  inquisitive.  This  was  evidently  what  my  friend  wanted, 
for  when  he  found  I  was  not  strong  enough  in  Jaghatai  to  proceed  very 
rapidly,  he  rattled  on  with  his  rough  Turkish  as  glibly  as  possible. 
All  I  could  find  out  was,  that  he  was  a  bond  fide  Russian  officer, 
carrying  presents  from  the  Emperor  to  Mahomed  Shah.  More  he 
would  not  admit ;  so,  after  smoking  another  pipe  with  him,  I  re- 
mounted, and  reached  the  Royal  Camp  beyond  Nishapoor  before  dark. 
I  had  an  immediate  audience  of  the  Shah,  and  in  the  course  of  con- 
versation, mentioning  to  his  Majesty  my  adventure  of  the  morning,  he 
replied,  *  Bringing  presents  to  me  !  why,  I  have  nothing  to  do  with 
him  ;  he  is  sent  direct  from  the  Emperor  to  Dost  Mahomed,  of  Caubul, 
and  I  am  merely  asked  to  help  him  on  his  journey.'     This  is  the  first 


CONDUCT   OF   DOST   MxVHOMED.  195 

and  detailed  the  circumstances  of  his  reception.  Like 
almost  everything  in  Bumes's  public  letters,  which  places 
the  conduct  of  Dost  Mahomed  in  a  favourable  light,  the 
following  passages  were  cut  out  of  the  correspondence  be- 
fore it  was  placed  in  the  printer's  hands  ; — "  On  the  morn- 
ing of  the  19th,"  wrote  Bumes,  "that  is,  yesterday,  the 
Ameer  came  over  from  the  Balla  Hissar  early  in  tlie  morn- 
ing with  a  letter  from  his  son,  the  Governor  of  Ghuznee, 
reporting  that  the  Russian  agent  had  amved  at  that  city 
on  his  way  to  Caubul.  Dost  Mahomed  Khan  said  that 
he  had  come  for  my  coimsel  on  the  occasion ;  that  he 
wished  to  have  nothing  to  do  with  any  other  power  than 
the  British  ;  that  he  did  not  wish  to  receive  any  agent  of 
any  power  whatever  so  long  as  he  had  a  hope  of  sym- 
pathy from  us ;  and  that  he  would  order  the  Russian 
agent  to  be  turned  out,  detained  on  the  road,  or  act  in 
any  way  I  desired  him.  I  asked  the  Ameer  if  he  knew 
on  what  business  the  agent  had  come,  and  if  he  were 
really  an  agent  from  Russia.  He  replied  that  I  had  read 
all  his  letters  from  Candahar,  and  that  he  knew  nothing 
more.  I  then  stated  that  it  was  a  sacred  rule  among 
civilised  nations  not  to  refuse  to  receive  emissaries  in 
time  of  peace,  and  that  I  could  not  take  iipon  myself  to 
advise  him  to  refuse  any  one  who  declared  himself  duly 
accredited,  but  that  the  Ameer  had  it  in  his  power  to 

information  we  have  ever  had  of  a  direct  communication  between 
Petersburgh  and  Caubul,  and  it  may  be  of  great  importance.  The 
gentleman  made  his  appearance  in  camp  two  days  after  my  arrival,  and 
I  was  then  introduced  to  him  by  Mons.  Goutte,  as  Captain  Vitkavitch. 
He  addressed  me  at  once  in  good  French,  and  in  allusion  to  our  former 
meeting,  merely  observed,  with  a  smile,  that  '  It  would  not  do  to  be 
too  familiar  with  strangers  in  the  desert.'  I  was  so  anxious  to  bring 
back  to  M'Neill  intelligence  of  this  Russian  Mission  to  Caubul,  that  I 
remained  but  a  very  few  days  in  camp  ;  and  here  I  am  again  in 
Teheran,  after  a  second  gallop  of  750  miles,  accomplished  this  time  in 
about  150  consecutive  hours." — [MS.  Correspondence.] 

0  2 


196         THE  "commercial"  mission  to  caubul, 

show  his  feeling  on  the  occasion  by  making  a  full  dis- 
closure to  the  British  Government  of  the  errand  on  which 
the  individual  had  come ;  to  which  he  most  readily 
assented.  After  this  the  Ameer  despatched  a  servant  on 
the  road  to  Ghuznee  to  prevent  the  agent's  entering  Cau- 
bul without  notice  ;  but  so  rapid  has  been  his  journey,  that 
he  met  him  a  few  miles  from  the  city,  which  he  entered 
in  the  afternoon,  attended  by  two  of  the  Ameer's  people. 
He  has  not  yet  seen  the  Ameer.  He  has  sent  a  letter 
from  Count  Simonich,  which  I  have  seen,  and  states  that 
he  is  the  bearer  of  letters  from  Mahomed  Shah  and  tlie 
Emperor  of  Russia.  I  shall  take  an  early  opportunity  of 
reporting  on  the  proceedings  of  the  Russian  agent,  if  he  be 
so  in  reality  ;  for,  if  not  an  impostor,  it  is  a  most  uncalled- 
for  proceeding,  after  the  disavowal  of  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment, conveyed  through  Comit  Nesselrode,  alluded  to  in 
Mr.  M'Neill's  letter  of  19th  of  June  last."* 

*  A  few  days  afterwards,  in  one  of  those  undress  communications 
from  which  we  often  gather  more  significant  truth  than  from  the  more 
formal  official  documents,  Burnes  wrote  to  a  private  friend  :  *  *  We  are  in 
a  mess  here.  Herat  is  besieged,  and  may  fall  ;  and  the  Emperor  of 
Russia  has  sent  an  envoy  to  Caubul,  to  offer  Dost  Mahomed  Khan  money 
to  fight  Runjeet  Singh  !  I  !  !  !  I  could  not  believe  my  eyes  or  ears  ;  but 
Captain  Vickovich — for  that  is  the  agent's  name — arrived  here  with  a 
blazing  letter,  three  feet  long,  and  sent  immediately  to  pay  his  respects 
to  myself.  I,  of  course,  received  him,  and  asked  him  to  dinner.  This 
is  not  the  best  of  it.  The  Ameer  came  over  to  me  sharp,  and  offered 
to  do  as  I  liked,  kick  him  out,  or  anything  :  but  I  stood  too  much  in 
fear  of  Vattel  to  do  any  such  thing  :  and  since  he  was  so  friendly  to  us, 
said  I,  give  me  the  letters  the  agent  has  brought ;  all  of  which  he  sur- 
rendered sharp;  and  I  sent  an  express  at  once  to  my  Lord  A.,  with  a 
confidential  letter  to  the  Governor-General  himself,  bidding  him  look 
what  his  predecessors  had  brought  upon  him,  and  telling  him  that  after 
this  I  knew  not  what  might  happen,  and  it  was  now  a  neck-and-neck 
race  between  Russia  and  us  ;  and  if  his  Lordship  would  hear  reason, 
he  would  forthwith  send  agents  to  Bokhara,  Herat,  Candahar,  and 
Koondooz,   not  forgetting  Sindh.     How  all  this  pill  will  go  down  I 


LETTER    OF    THE    CZAR.  197 

The  letters  of  which  Vickovich  was  the  bearer,  hke 
those  broiiglit  by  Burnes,  were  purely  of  a  commercial 
tendency.  One  was  from  the  Emperor  himself;  the 
other  from  Count  Simonich — wi'itten  in  the  Russian  and 
the  Persian  languages.  The  authenticity  of  the  letter 
from  the  Emperor  has  been  questioned.*     The  fact  is,  that 

know  not,  but  I  know  my  duty  too  well  to  be  silent." — [Private  Cor- 
respondence of  Si?'  A.  Burnes.l 

*  Moh.ua  Lai  says  that  he  translated  the  Persian  copy  of  the  letter 
from  the  Emperor,  but  that  he  lost  the  translation  during  the  insur- 
rection of  1841-42.  *'It  plainly  acknowledged,"  lie  states,  "the 
receipt  of  the  Ameer's  letter,  and  assured  him  that  all  the  Afghan 
merchants  shall  be  well  received  in  the  empire  of  Russia,  justice  and 
protection  shall  be  extended  towards  them,  and  their  intercourse  will 
cause  to  flourish  the  respective  states." — [Life  of  Dost  Mahomed, 
vol.  i.  p.  300.]  Masson  declares  that  it  was  a  forgery,  seal  and  all, 
alleging  in  proof,  that  it  bore  no  signature.  To  this  Mohun  Lai  re- 
plies, that  the  absence  of  the  royal  signature  is  a  proof  rather  of  the 
genuine  than  the  counterfeit  character  of  the  document.  The  reasons 
given  are  not  very  conclusive,  as  regards  the  general  usage  of  the 
Czar ;  but,  under  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  he  would  have  been 
more  inclined  to  omit  than  to  attach  the  signature.  The  following  is 
the  translated  letter ;  it  was  excluded  from  the  published  papers  : 

"A.C.  In  a  happy  moment,  the  messenger  of  your  Highness, 
Meerza  Hosan,  reached  my  Court,  with  your  friendly  letter.  I 
was  very  much  delighted  to  receive  it,  and  highly  gratified  by  its 
perusal.  The  contents  of  the  letter  prove  that  you  are  my  well-wisher, 
and  have  friendly  opinions  towards  me.  It  flattered  me  very  much, 
and  I  was  satisfied  of  your  friendship  to  my  everlasting  government. 
In  consequence  of  this,  and  preserving  the  terms  of  friendship  (which 
are  now  commenced  between  you  and  myself)  in  my  heart,  I  will  feel 
always  happy  to  assist  the  people  of  Caubul  who  may  come  to  trade 
into  my  kingdom.  On  the  arrival  of  your  messenger  I  have  ordered 
him  to  make  preparations  for  his  long  journey  back  to  you,  and  also 
appointed  a  man  of  dignity  to  accompany  him  on  the  part  of  my  govern- 
ment. If  it  pleases  Grod,  and  he  reaches  safe,  he  will  present  to  you 
the  rarities  of  my  country,  which  I  have  sent  through  him.  By  the 
grace  of  God,  may  your  days  be  prolonged. — SeM  from  St.  Petersburgh, 
the  capital  of  Russia,  on  the  27th  of  April,  1837  ^.i>.,  and  in  the 
V2th  year  of  my  rei(jn.*^ 


198         THE  "commercial     mission  to  caubul. 

it  was  one  to  be  acknowledged  or  repudiated,  as  most  con- 
venient. It  was  intended  to  satisfy  Dost  Mahomed  on 
the  one  hand,  and  to  be  suspected  by  the  European  allies 
of  Russia  upon  the  other.  That  it  came  from  the  Cabi- 
net of  St.  Petersburgh  there  is  now  little  room  to  doubt. 

Burnes,  however,  for  some  time,  was  doubtful  of  the 
real  character  of  the  agent  and  his  credentials ;  but  after 
some  weeks  of  hesitation,  he  wi'ote  to  Mr.  Macnaghten, 
"  Though  a  month  and  upwards  has  elapsed  since  Mr. 
Vickovich  reached  Caubul,  and  my  suspicions  were  from 
the  first  excited  regarding  his  real  character,  I  have  been 
unable  to  discover  anything  to  invalidate  the  credentials 
which  he  brought,  or  to  cast  a  doubt  on  his  being  other 
than  he  gives  himself  out,  and  this,  too,  after  much  vigi- 
lance and  inquiry." 

This  was  written  on  the  22nd  of  January.  In  the 
same  letter  Burnes  writes  :  "  Mr.  Vickovich  himself  has 
experienced  but  little  attention  from  the  Ameer,  and  has 
yet  received  no  reply  to  his  communications.  He  has 
been  accommodated  in  a  part  of  a  house  belonging  to 
Meerza  Samee  Khan,  and  is  entertained  at  the  public 
expense.  He  paid  his  respects  to  the  Ameer  on  the  12th 
of  January,  and  has  had  no  other  personal  intercourse 
with  him.  He  has  been  urging  the  Ameer  to  send  an 
agent  to  Count  Simonich  to  receive  the  presents  of  the 
Emperor."  Nothing,  indeed,  could  have  been  more  dis- 
couraging than  the  reception  of  the  Russian  agent.  Dost 
Mahomed  still  clung  to  the  belief  that  the  British  Govern- 
ment would  look  favourably  upon  his  case,  and  was  will- 
ing to  receive  a  little  from  England,  rather  than  much 
from  any  other  state.  But  he  soon  began  to  perceive 
that  even  that  little  was  not  to  be  obtained.  Before  the 
close  of  the  month  of  January,  Burnes  had  received 
specific  instructions  from  the  Governor-General,  and  was 
compelled,  with  the  strongest  feelings  of  reluctance  and 


THE    PESIIAWUR    QUESTION.  199. 

mortification,  to  strangle  the  hopes  Dost  Mahomed  had 
encouraged  of  the  friendly  mediation  of  the  British  Go- 
vernment between  the  Ameer  and  Runjeet  Singh. 

The  whole  question  of  Peshawur  was  now  fully  dis- 
cussed. Barnes,  with  his  instructions  in  his  hand,  mise- 
rably fettered  and  restrained,  enunciated  the  opinions  of 
his  govenunent,  from  which  he  inwardly  dissented,  and 
strove,  in  obedience  to  the  orders  he  had  received,  to 
make  the  worse  appear  the  better  reason.  Dost  Mahomed 
was  moderate  and  reasonable;  and  Bumes  must  have 
felt  that  the  argument  was  all  in  favour  of  the  Ameer. 
That  others,  in  higher  place,  thought  so  too,  is  clearly 
indicated  by  the  fact  that  pains  have  been  taken  to  keep 
the  world  in  ignorance  of  what  Dost  Mahomed,  on  this 
occasion,  advanced  with  so  much  reason  and  moderation 
in  reply  to  the  official  arguments  of  the  British  agent, 
who  was  compelled  to  utter  words  which  were  dictated 
neither  by  the  feelings  nor  the  judgment  of  the  man. 

In  a  letter  of  the  26th  of  January,  which  I  now  have 
before  me  in  an  ungarbled  state,  Bumes  forwarded  to 
the  Governor- General  a  full  account  of  the  important 
conference  between  the  Ameer  and  himself,  held  after  the 
receipt,  by  the  latter,  of  instructions  from  the  Governor- 
General.*  At  this  meeting  Burnes  communicated  to  Dost 
Mahomed  the  sentiments  of  the  Governor-General,  and 
recommended  the  Ameer,  in  accordance  with  the  opinions 

*  Au  attempt,  in  the  published  Blue  Book,  was  made  to  conceal  the 
fact  of  the  receipt  of  these  letters,  and  to  make  it  appear  that  Burnes 
acted  entirely  upon  his  own  responsibility.  The  genuine  letter  com- 
menced with  the  following  words: — "I  have  now  the  honour  to 
acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  (the  Political  Secretary's)  letters  of 
the  25th  of  November  and  2nd  of  December  last,  which  reached  me 
about  the  same  time,  and  conveyed  the  views  of  the  Right  Honourable 
the  Governor-General  regarding  the  overtures  made  by  Dost  Mahomed, 
kc,  &c."  In  the  published  version  the  letter  commences  with  the 
word  "regarding.*' 


200  THE    "  COMMERCIAL "    MISSION    TO    CAUBUL. 

expressed  by  Lord  Auckland,  to  waive  his  own  claims  to 
Peshawur,  and  be  content  with  such  arrangements  as 
Runjeet  Singh  might  be  inclined  to  enter  into  with  Sultan 
Mahomed.  The  Ameer  replied  that  he  bore  no  enmity 
against  his  brother,  though  his  brother  was  full  of  rancour 
against  him,  and  would  gladly  compass  his  destruction ; 
but  that  with  Sultan  Mahomed,  at  Peshawiu-,  he  would 
not  be  safe  for  a  day ;  and  that  it  would  be  less  injurious 
to  him  to  leave  it  directly  in'  the  hands  of  the  Sikhs,  than 
in  the  hands  of  an  enemy  ever  ready  to  intrigue  with  the 
Sikhs  for  his  overthrow. 

"  Peshawur,"  said  he,  "  has  been  conquered  by  the 
Sikhs  ;  it  belongs  to  them  ;  they  may  give  it  to  whom- 
soever they  please  ;  if  to  Sultan  Mahomed  Khan,  they 
place  it  in  the  hands  of  one  who  is  bent  on  injuring  me ; 
and  I  cannot  therefore  acknowledge  any  degTce  of  grati- 
tude for  your  interference,  or  take  upon  myself  to  render 
services  in  return."  And  then  follow  these  mollifying 
sentences,  which  it  was  a  gross  injustice  to  Dost  Maho- 
med to  omit  from  the  published  letter :  "  I  admit," 
said  the  Ameer,  "that  it  will  be  highly  beneficial  in 
many  ways  to  see  the  Sikhs  once  more  eastward  of 
the  Indus,  but  I  still  can  dispense  with  none  of  my 
troops  or  relax  in  my  precautionary  measures,  as  equal 
if  not  greater  anxieties  will  attach  to  me.  I  have  un- 
bosomed myself  to  you,  and  laid  bare,  without  any  sup- 
pression, my  difficulties.  I  shall  bear  in  lively  remem- 
brance the  intended  good  offices  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment, and  I  shall  deplore  that  my  interest  did  not  per- 
mit me  to  accept  that  which  was  tendered  in  a  spirit  so 
friendly,  but  which  to  me  and  my  advisers  has  only 
seemed  hastening  my  ruin.  To  Runjeet  Singh  your 
interference  is  beneficial,  as  he  finds  himself  involved  in 
serious  difficulties  by  the  possession  of  Pesha^vrir,  and  he 
is  too  glad  of  your  good  offices  to  escape  from  a  place 


THE   PESHAWUR   QUESTION.  201 

which  is  a  burden  to  his  finances,  but  by  that  escape  a 
debt  of  gratitude  is  exactiblc  from  him  and  not  from  me ; 
and  if  your  government  will  look  into  this  matter,  they 
will  soon  discover  my  opinions  to  be  far  from  groundless, 
and  my  conclusions  the  only  safe  policy  I  can  pursue." 

The  Ameer  ceased  to  speak,  and  Jubbar  Khan  followed, 
proposing  a  compromise.  He  suggested  that  it  might  be 
found  advisable  to  deliver  over  Peshawur  conjointly  to  the 
iN.meer  and  Sultan  Mahomed — Runjeet  Singh  receiving 
from  the  two  chiefs  the  value  which  he  might  fix  as  the 
terms  of  surrender.  The  Ameer  observed  that  such  an 
arrangement*  would  remove  his  fears,  and  that  if  he 
appointed  Jubbar  Khan  to  represent  him  at  Peshaw^ir  he 
would  be  sure  of  an  equitable  adjustment  of  affairs. 
Burnes  replied  in  general  tenns  that  the  withdrawal  of  the 
Sikhs  to  the  eastward  of  the  Indus  would  be  a  vast  benefit 
to  the  Afghan  nation  ;  and  asked  Dost  Mahomed  w^hether 
he  would  rather  see  the  Sikhs  or  Sultan  Mahomed  in 
Peshawur.  The  Ameer  replied  that  the  question  put  in 
plain  w^ords  was  a  startling  one  ;  but  he  asked  in  return 
if  that  could  be  considered  beneficial  to  the  Afghan  nation 

*  Burnes,  commenting  on  the  Newab's  proposal,  observes  :  "The 
observations  coming  from  the  Newab  Jubbar  Khan  are  the  more  re- 
markable, since  he  is  devoted  to  his  brothei',  Sultan  Mahomed  Khan, 
and  would  rejoice  to  see  him  restored  to  Peshawur.  They  consequently- 
carried  with  me  a  conviction  that  the  Ameer's  fears  are  not  groundless, 
and  that  they  will  deserve  all  due  consideration  before  government 
entered  upon  any  measures  for  attaching  this  chief  to  its  interests." 
This  passage  was,  of  course,  suppressed.  Whether  any  attempt  was 
made  to  bring  about  a  settlement  of  the  Peshawur  question  on  the 
basis  of  this  proposal,  I  have  not  been  able  to  ascertain.  But  Cap- 
tain Wade,  considering  it  by  no  means  unreasonable,  declared  his 
willingness,  with  the  consent  of  the  Supreme  Government,  to  urge  it 
upon  the  acceptance  of  Runjeet.  It  is  doubtful,  however,  whether, 
even  if  Rimjeet  had  consented  to  it,  Sultan  Mahomed  would  have  fallen 
ijito  the  arrangement,  although  Jubbar  Khan  declared  his  ability  to 
reconcile  the  brothers. 


202        THE  "commercial"  mission  to  caubul. 

which  was  especially  injurious  to  him  who  possessed  the 
largest  share  of  sovereignty  in  Afghanistan.  He  then 
observed,  in  evidence  of  the  truth  of  his  assertions  rela- 
tive to  the  dangers*  to  which  he  was  exposed  from  the 
supremacy  of  Sultan  Mahomed  at  Peshawur  :  "  Sultan 
Mahomed  Khan  has  just  sent  an  agent  to  the  ex-King  at 
Loodhianah  (Shah  Soojah)  to  offer  his  services  to  combine 
against  me  and  to  secure  my  brothers  at  Candahar,  in  sup- 
port of  this  coalition."  "  What  security,"  asked  the  Ameer, 
"  am  I  to  receive  against  a  recurrence  of  such  practices  1" 
He  then  continued  :  "  As  for  the  ex-King  himself,  I  fear 
him  not ;  he  has  been  too  often  worsted  to  make  head, 
unless  he  has  aid  from  the  British  Government,  which  I  am 
now  pretty  certain  he  will  never  receive.  If  my  brother 
at  Peshawur,  however,  under  a  promise  of  being  made  his 
minister,  and  assisted  with  Sikh  agents  and  money,  appears 
in  the  field,  I  may  find  that  in  expressing  my  satisfaction 
at  his  restoration  to  Peshawur,  I  have  been  placing  a 
snake  in  my  bosom — and  I  may  then,  when  too  late, 
lament  that  I  did  not  let  the  Sikhs  do  their  worst,  instead 
of  replacing  them  by  another  description  of  enemies." 

All  this  was  carefully  erased  from  the  letter  before  it 
was  allowed  to  form  a  pai-t  of  the  published  Blue  Book ; 
and  the  following  just  observations  of  Captain  Burnes 
shared  no  better  fate  :  "  It  has  appeared  to  me  that  they  " 
(the  opinions  and  views  of  the  ruler  of  Caubul)  "  call  for 
much  deliberation.  It  will  be  seen  that  the  chief  is  not 
bent  on  possessing  Peshawur,  or  on  gratifying  an  enmity 
towards  his  brothers,  but  simply  pursuing  the  worldly 
maxim  of  securing  himself  from  injury;  the  arguments 
which  he  has  adduced  seem  desei^ing  of  every  considera- 
tion, and  the  more  so  when  an  avowed  partisan  of  Sultan 
Mahomed  does  not  deny  the  justice  of  the  Ameer's  objec- 
tion." And  further  on,  our  agent  observes :  "  Since  an-iving 
here,  I  have  seen  an  agent  of  Persia  with  alluring  pro- 


GARBLED   CORRESPONDENCE.  203 

mises,  after  penetrating  as  far  as  Candahar,  compelled  to 
quit  the  country  because  no  one  has  sent  to  invite  him  to 
Caubul.  Following  him,  an  agent  of  Russia  with  letters 
highly  complimentaiy,  and  promises  more  than  substan- 
tial, has  experienced  no  more  civility  than  is  due  by  the 
laws  of  hospitality  and  nations.  It  maybe  urged  by  some 
that  the  offers  of  one  or  both  were  fallacious,  but  such  a 
dictum  is  certainly  premature  ;  the  Ameer  of  Caubul  has 
sought  no  aid  in  his  arguments  from  such  offers,  but  de- 
clared that  his  interests  are  bound  up  in  an  alliance  with 
the  British  Government,  which  he  never  will  desert  as  long 
as  there  is  a  hope  of  securing  one."  There  is  much  more 
in  a  similar  strain  —  much  more  cancelled  from  the 
published  correspondence — ^with  the  deliberate  intention 
of  injuring  the*  character  and  misrepresenting  the  conduct 
of  Dost  Mahomed,  and  so  justifying  their  after-conduct 
towards  him — but  enough  has  already  been  given  to  prove 
how  mightily  the  Ameer  has  been  wronged. 

I  cannot,  indeed,  suppress  the  utterance  of  my  abhor- 
rence of  this  system  of  garbling  the  official  correspondence 
of  public  men — sending  the  letters  of  a  statesman  or  diplo- 
matist into  the  world  mutilated,  emasculated — the  veiy 
pith  and  substance  of  them  cut  out  by  the  unsparing  hand 
of  the  state-anatomist.  The  dishonesty  by  which  lie  upon 
lie  is  palmed  upon  the  world  has  not  one  redeeming  feature. 
If  public  men  are,  without  reprehension,  to  be  permitted 
to  lie  in  the  face  of  nations — wilfully,  elaborately,  and 
maliciously  to  bear  false-witness  against  their  neighbours, 
what  hope  is  there  for  private  veracity?  In  the  case  before 
us,  the  suppressio  veri  is  virtually  the  assertio  falsi.  The 
chai-acter  of  Dost  Mahomed  has  been  lied  away  ;  the  cha- 
racter of  Burnes  has  been  lied  away.  Both,  by  the  muti- 
lation of  the  correspondence  of  the  latter,  have  been 
fearfully  misrepresented — both  have  been  set  forth  as  doing 
what  they  did  not,  and  omitting  to  do  what  they  did,     I 


204         THE  "commercial"  mission  to  caubul. 

care  not  whose  knife — whose  hand  did  the  work  of  muti- 
lation. And,  indeed,  I  do  not  know.  I  deal  with  prin- 
ciples, not  with  persons  ;  and  have  no  party  ends  to  sei-ve. 
The  cause  of  truth  must  be  upheld.  Official  documents 
are  the  sheet-anchors  of  historians — the  last  courts  of 
appeal  to  which  the  public  resort.  If  these  documents 
are  tampered  with  ;  if  they  are  made  to  misrepresent  the 
words  and  actions  of  public  men,  the  grave  of  truth  is  dug, 
and  there  is  seldom  a  resiu-rection.  It  is  not  always  that 
an  afflicted  parent  is  ready  to  step  forward  on  behalf  of  an 
injured  child,  and  to  lay  a  memorial  at  the  feet  of  his  sove- 
reign, exposing  the  cruelty  by  which  an  honourable  man 
has  been  represented  in  state  documents,  as  doing  that 
which  w^as  abhorrent  to  his  nature.  In  most  cases  the  lie 
goes  dow^i,  unassailed  and  often  unsuspected,  to  posterity; 
and  in  place  of  sober  history,  we  have  a  florid  romance. 

I  ask  j)ardon  for  this  digression — In  spite  of  the  decla- 
rations of  Burnes  that  Dost  Mahomed  had  little  to  hope 
from  the  co-operation  of  the  British  Government,  the 
Russian  Mission  made  scant  progress  at  the  Afghan  capital. 
Alluding  to  the  negotiations  of  our  agent,  Vickovich  wrote 
some  time  afterwards  :  "  All  this  has  occasioned  Dost 
Mahomed  Khan  to  conduct  himself  very  coldly  towards 
me ;  and  then,  as  he  daily  converses  with  Burnes,  from  my 
arrival  here  to  the  20th  of  Februaiy  I  have  hardly  been 
two  or  three  times  in  his  presence."  The  fact  is,  that  up  to 
this  time,  as  we  are  assured  on  the  concurrent  testimony  of 
the  British  and  the  Russian  agent,  the  latter  was  received 
in  a  scurvy  and  discouraging  manner.  But  on  the  2 1st  of 
February  letters  were  opened  from  the  Governor- General, 
stating,  in  the  most  decisive  language,  that  there  was  no 
intention  to  accede  to  the  proposals  of  the  Ameer,  and  that 
Peshawur  must  be  left  to  the  Sikhs.  Then,  but  not  till 
then,  a  change  came  over  the  conduct  of  Dost  Mahomed, 
and  the  Russian  Mission  began  to  rise  in  importance. 


LAST   EFFORTS    OF    THE   AMEER.  205 

But  still  another  effort  was  to  be  made  by  the  Bai-uk- 
zycs  to  secure  the  friendship  of  the  British  Government. 
On  the  1st  of  March,  Jubbar  Khan  came  in  from  his 
countiy-seat,  and  next  morning  called  upon  Bunies.  He 
had  read  Lord  Auckland's  discouraging  letter ;  but  he 
still  believed  that,  through  his  agency,  for  he  was 
notoriously  friendly  to  the  British,  something  might  yet 
be  done.  His  efforts,  however,  were  fruitless.  Burnes, 
tied  down  by  his  instructions,  could  give  the  Newab 
no  encouragement.  The  British  Government  called  upon 
Dost  Mahomed  to  abstain  from  connecting  himself  with 
every  other  state  ;  and  promised,  as  the  price  of  this 
isolation,  that  they  would  restrain  Runjeet  Singh  from 
attacking  his  dominions  ;  "  And  that,"  said  Jubbar  Khan, 
"amounts  to  nothing,  for  we  are  not  under  the  appre- 
hension of  any  aggi-essions  from  the  side  of  Lahore."* 
Tlie  Peshawur  difficulty,  he  said,  might  be  got  over; 
but  the  offer  of  so  little,  in  return  for  so  much  that  was 
asked  from  the  Ameer,  placed  him  in  a  most  humiliating 

*  Lord  Auckland's  offers  to  restrain  Runjeet  from  attacking  the 
country  of  the  Sirdars  were  laughed  at  by  them.  Jubbar  Khan  said 
that  they  indicated  very  little  knowledge  of  the  state  of  Afghanistan  ; 
for  that,  * '  so  far  from  the  proffered  protection  from  Runjeet  being  of 
the  value  stated,  the  Maharajah  never  sought  to  attack  Caubul,  and 
that  hitherto  all  the  aggression  had  been  on  the  part  of  the  Ameer,  and 
not  the  ruler  of  Lahore."  He  added  with  undeniable  truth,  that  "it 
appeared  we  valued  our  offers  at  a  very  high  rate,  since  we  expected,  in 
return,  that  the  Afghans  would  desist  from  all  intercourse  with  Persia, 
Russia,  Toorkistan,"  &c.  *'Were  the  Afghans,"  he  asked,  "to  make 
all  these  powers  hostile,  and  receive  no  protection  against  the  enmity 
raised  for  their  adhering  to  the  British?"  "As  for  Peshawur,"  he 
added,  * '  being  withheld  from  the  Ameer,  it  might  be  got  over  ;  and  he 
believed  he  did  not  overrate  his  influence  with  Sultan  Mahomed  Khan, 
when  he  stated  that  he  might  bring  about  a  reconciliation  between 
him  and  the  Ameer  ;  but  he  must  say  that  the  value  of  the  Afghans 
had  indeed  been  depressed,  and  he  did  not  wonder  at  the  Ameer's  dis- 
appointment."— [UngarUed  Correspondence  of  Sir  A.  Burnes.] 


206        THE  "commercial"  mission  to  caubul, 

position,  and  would,  if  accepted,  lower  him  in  the  eyes  of 
the  world.  Meerza  Samee  Khan,  next  day,  told  the  same 
stoiy;*  but  fettered  by  the  orders  of  the  Supreme 
Government,  Bumes  could  give  him  no  hope. 

On  the  5th  of  March,  Jubbar  Khan  again  appeared 
before  Burnes  with  a  string  of  specific  demands,  dictated 
by  the  Ameer.  "  These  consisted  of  a  promise  to  protect 
Caubul  and  Candahar  from  Persia;  of  the  surrender  of 
Peshawur  by  Runjeet  Singh ;  of  the  interference  of  our 
government  to  protect,  at  that  city,  those  who  might  return 
to  it  from  Caubul,  supposing  it  to  be  restored  to  Sultan 
Mahomed  Khan  ;  with  several  other  proposals."  Upon 
this  Bm-nes,  with  an  expression  of  astonishment,  declared 
that,  on  the  part  of  the  British  Government,  he  could 
accede  to  none  of  these  propositions  ;  and  added,  that  as 
he  saw  no  hope  of  a  satisfactory  adjustment,  he  should 
request  his  dismissal.  "  The  Newab,"  said  Bumes,  "  left 
me  in  sorrow." 

The  British  agent  then  sat  dowm,  and  drew  up  a  formal 
letter  to  the  Ameer,  requesting  leave  to  depart  for 
Hindostan.  In  spite  of  what  had  taken  place,  the  letter 
somewhat  startled  the  Ameer,  who  summoned  a  meeting  of 
his  principal  advisers,  "  which  lasted  till  past  midnight."t 

*  "The  Meerza  made  nearly  the  same  observation  as  the  Newab 
about  the  expectations  which  the  Ameer  had  cherished  of  doing  service 
for  the  British,  and  devoting  himself  to  it ;  that  it  was  not  the  adjust- 
ment of  Peshawur  affairs  that  dissipated  his  hopes,  but  the  indifference 
to  his  sufferings  and  station,  which  it  was  now  clear  we  felt."  The 
Meerza  truly  said  that  Dost  Mahomed  had  often  written  to  the  British 
Government  about  his  affairs,  and  that  in  reply  they  answered  him 
about  their  own. — [Un  garbled  Correspondence  of  Sir  A.  Burnes.] 

f  It  is  probably  of  this  meeting,  or  one  shortly  preceding  it,  of  which 
General  Harlan,  who  has  not  much  regard  for  dates,  speaks  in  the 
following  passage.  Harlan  had  by  this  time  quitted  Runjeet  Singh's 
camp,  and  taken  service  with  Dost  Mahomed  : — "The  document  (Lord 
Auckland's  ultimatum)  was  handed  to  me  amongst  others.  I  satisfied 
•  myself,   by  the  Governor-General's  signature,  of  its  authenticity,   sur- 


FAILURE    OP   NEGOTIATIONS.  207 

On  the  following  morning  the  conference  was  resumed  ; 
and  about  mid-day  Meerza  Samee  Khan  waited  on  Bnmes, 
and  invited  him  to  a,ttend  the  Ameer  in  the  Balla  Hissar. 
Gracious  and  friendly  even  beyond  his  ordinaiy  courtesy 
and  urbanity,  Dost  Mahomed  expressed  his  regi'et  that  the 
Governor-General  had  shown  so  little  inclination  to  meet 
his  wishes  ;  but  added,  that  he  did  not  even  then  despair 
of  forming  an  alliance  advantageous  both  to  England  and 
Afghanistan.  A  long  argument  then  ensued  ;  but  it  led 
to  nothing.  The  old  ground  was  travelled  over  again  and 
again.  Bumes  asked  for  eveiything  ;  but  promised  no- 
thing. He  had  no  power  to  make  any  concessions.  The 
meeting,  though  it  ended  amicably,  was  productive  of  no 
good  results.  Bumes  took  his  departure  from  the  Balla 
Hissar.     He  might  as  well  have  departed  from  Caubul. 

veying  the  contents  with  extreme  surprise  and  disappointment.  Dost 
Mahomed  was  mortified,  but  not  terrified The  Governor-Gene- 
ral's ultimatum  was  handed  round,  and  an  embarrassing  silence  en- 
sued. A  few  minutes  elapsed,  when  Abdul  Sami  Khan  recalled  the 
party  from  abstraction He  proclaimed  that  the  Governor-Gene- 
ral's ultimatum  left  no  other  alternative  than  the  dismission  of  the 
English  agent,  for  the  spirit  of  the  Kuzzilbash  party  was  supercilious 

and  unyielding,  though  full  of  duplicity Nieb  Mahomed  Ameer 

Khan,  Akhondzadeh,  openly  opposed  the  Kuzzilbash  party,  and  urged 
many  weighty  arguments  iu  favour  of  a  pacific  settlement  of  the  Ameer's 
relations  with  the  British  Government,  which  had  now  assumed  a 
position  so  inauspicious.  He  concluded  his  oration  with  these  words, 
addressing  the  Ameer :  '  There  is  no  other  recourse  for  you  but  to 
introduce  Mr.  Harlan  in  the  negotiations  with  Mr.  Bumes,  and  he, 
through  his  own  facilities  and  wisdom,  will  arrange  a  treaty  according 
to  their  European  usage,  for  the  pacific  and  advantageous  settlement  of 
yourafiairs  ;'  and  to  this  proposition  the  council  it/iajimoits^T/ assented." 
The  proposition,  it  appears,  was  made  to  Burnes  ;  but  Bumes  declined 
the  honour  of  negotiating  with  the  doctor-general.  Harland  says  that 
he  then  wrote  to  the  British  envoy,  ofiering  to  "negotiate  upon  his  own 
terms  ;"  but  Burnes  sent  "a  reply  personally  friendly,"  but  "evincing 
a  deficiency  of  knowledge  of  first  principles  concerning  the  rights  ot 
independent  powers  in»  political  negotiations."  Burnes  says  nothing 
about  this  in  his  ofiicial  or  private  letters. 


208        THE  "commercial"  mission  to  caubul. 

Oil  the  21st  of  March,  the  Ameer  wrote  a  friendly 
letter  to  Lord  Auckland,  imploring  him,  in  language 
almost  of  humihty,  to  "  remedy  the  grievances  of  the 
Afghans;"  to  "give  them  a  little  encouragement  and 
power."  It  was  the  last  despairing  effort  of  the  Afghan 
chief  to  conciliate  the  good-will  of  the  British  Government, 
It  failed.  The  fiat  had  gone  forth.  The  judgment  against 
him  was  not  to  be  reversed.  Other  meetings  took  place  ; 
but  Bumes  knew  them  to  be  mere  formalities.  He  re- 
mained at  Caubul  with  no  hope  of  bringing  matters  to  a 
favourable  issue  ;  but  because  it  was  convenient  to  remain. 
He  was  awaiting  the  return  from  Koondooz  of  Dr.  Lord 
and  Lieutenant  Wood.  The  month  of  March  passed  away, 
and  the  greater  part  of  April.  These  officers  did  not 
rejoin  the  Mission.  But  one  of  the  Candahar  Sirdars, 
Mehr  Dil  Khan,  appeared  at  Caubul,  with  the  object  of 
winning  over  the  Ameer  to  the  Persian  alliance.  The 
"  do-nothing  policy,"  as  Burnes  subsequently  characterised 
it,  had  done  its  work.  The  Russians,  as  he  said,  had 
given  us  the  coup-de-grace.  Vickovich  was  publicly  sent 
for,  and  paraded  through  the  streets  of  Caubul.  So 
Bumes  determined  to  depart.  Accordingly,  on  the  26th 
of  April,  he  turned  his  back  upon  the  Afghan  capital.* 

Bumes  went ;  and  Vickovich,  who  had  risen  greatly  in 
fccvour,  soon  took  his  departure  for  Herat,  promising  every- 
thing that  Dost  Mahomed  wanted — engaging  to  furnish 
money  to  the  Barukzye  chiefs,  and  undertaking  to  pro- 
pitiate Runjeet  Singh,  t     The    Russian   quitted  Caubul, 

*  Mr.  Masson  says,  that  before  its  departure  the  IMission  had  fallen 
into  contempt,  and  that  the  assassination  of  Burnes  was  talked  of  in 
Caubul.  He  explains  too,  what,  according  to  his  account,  were  the 
real  causes  of  Barnes's  departure  without  his  companions  ;  but  it  does 
not  come  within  our  province  to  investigate  Masson  s  charges  against 
the  envoy. 

+  Ovei-tures  had  been  made  to  Runjeet  by  Vickovich,  who  offered  to 


FATE    OF   VICKOVICH.  209 

accompanied  by  Aboo  Khan  Barukzye,  a  confidential 
friend  of  Dost  Mahomed.  It  had  been  arranged  that  Azim 
Khan,  the  Ameer's  son,  accompanied  by  the  minister, 
should  be  despatched  to  the  Shah  ;  but  this  arrangement 
being  set  aside,  in  consequence  of  the  scruples  of  the 
Meerza,  Aboo  Khan  was  sent  in  their  place.  There  were 
now  no  half  measures  to  be  pursued.  Dost  Mahomed  had 
flung  himself  into  the  arms  of  the  Persian  King. 

Vickovich  was  received  with  all  honour  in  Western 
Afghanistan.*     Russian    promises    now    began  to   carry 

visit  the  Maharajah's  Court.  But  British  influence  at  this  time  was 
too  strong  at  Lahore  for  the  Russian  to  make  way  against  it.  Runjeet, 
however,  who  was  not  ignorant  of  the  Russo-phohia  then  rampant 
amongst  us,  turned  the  Cossack's  overtures  to  some  account,  and  pro- 
bably pretended  more  uncertainty  on  the  score  of  the  answer  to  be 
returned  to  him  than  he  in  reality  felt.  Mackeson,  to  whom  the  busi- 
ness of  counteracting  the  designs  of  Vickovich  was  entrusted,  managed 
it  with  great  address,  and  won  from  the  Maharajah  a  promise  to  have 
nothing  to  do  with  the  Muscovite  agent.  But  the  knowledge  that  the 
Russian  agent  was,  as  it  were,  knocking  at  the  gates  of  Lahore,  made 
our  authorities  especially  anxious  to  conciliate  the  Maharajah,  by  re- 
fraining from  entering  into  any  negotiations  with  Caubul  which  might 
possibly  give  umbrage  to  Runjeet. 

*  What  befel  the  unhappy  agent  after  this,  it  is  painful  to  relate. 
When  he  returned  to  Persia,  in  1839,  after  giving  a  full  report  of  his 
mission  to  M.  Duhamel,  the  new  minister  at  Teheran,  he  was  instructed 
to  proceed  direct  to  St.  Petersburgh.  On  his  arrival  there,  full  of  hope, 
for  he  had  discharged  the  duty  entrusted  to  him  with  admirable 
address,  he  reported  himself,  after  the  customary  formality,  to  Count 
Nesselrode  ;  but  the  minister  refused  to  see  him.  Instead  of  a  flatter- 
ing welcome,  the  unhappy  envoy  was  received  with  a  crushing  message, 
to  the  efiect  that  Count  Nesselrode  "knew  no  Captain  Vickovich,  ex- 
cept an  adventurer  of  that  name,  who,  it  was  reported,  had  been 
lately  engaged  in  some  unauthorised  intrigues  at  Caubul  and  Canda- 
har."  Vickovich  understood  at  once  the  dire  portent  of  this  message. 
He  knew  the  character  of  his  government.  He  was  aware  of  the 
recent  expostulations  of  Great  Britain.  And  he  saw  clearly  that 
he  was  to  be  sacrificed.  He  went  back  to  his  hotel,  wrote  a  few 
bitter  reproachful  lines,  burnt  all  his  other  papers,  and  blew  out  his 
brains. 


210  THE    "commercial"    MISSION   TO    CAUBUL. 

everything  before  them.  A  treaty  between  the  Candahar 
brothers  and  the  Shah  was  drawn  up  and  signed  by  the 
latter.  The  Russian  ambassador  to  whom  it  was  forwarded 
sent  it  back  to  the  Sirdars,  saying,  "  Mahomed  Shah  has 
promised  to  give  you  the  possession  of  Herat :  I  sincerely 
tell  you  that  you  will  also  get  Ghorian,  on  my  account, 

from    the    Shah When   Mahomed   Omar  Khan 

anives  here  I  will  ask  the  Shah  to  quit  Herat,  and  I  will 
remain  here  with  12,000  troops,  and,  when  you  join,  we 
will  take  Herat,  which  will  afterwards  be  delivered  to 
you," — magnificent  promises,  most  refreshing  to  the  souls 
of  the  Candahar  chiefs.  The  letter  was  sent  on  to  Dost 
Mahomed ;  but  it  did  not  fill  the  heart  of  the  Ameer 
with  an  equal  measure  of  delight.  The  Russian  alliance 
was  unpopular  at  Caubul.  It  had  "  ruined  him  in  the 
eyes  of  all  Mahomedans."  It  soon  became  obvious,  too, 
in  spite  of  the  fair  beginning,  that  whilst  he  was  losing 
everything  by  the  dissolution  of  his  friendship  with  the 
British,  the  Russians  could  really  do  nothing  to  assist 
him.  Mahomed  Shah  was  wasting  his  strength  before 
Herat.  The  Persian  army,  under  the  command  of  the 
Sovereign  himself,  moved  by  Russian  diplomacy  and  di- 
rected by  Russian  skill,  was  only  precipitating  itself  into 
an  abyss  of  failure,  and  the  Candahar  brethren,  who  had 
been  promised  so  much,  were  linking  themselves  with 
a  decrepit  cause,  from  which  they  were  likely  to  gain 
nothing.  Soon  other  tidings  came  to  alarm  him.  The 
Russian  game  was  nearly  played  out;  and  the  resent- 
ment of  the  British  was  about  to  break  forth  in  a  manner 
which  threatened  the  total  extinction  of  Barukzye  supre- 
macy in  Afghanistan.  He  looked  out  towards  the  "West, 
and  he  could  plainly  see  that,  in  flinging  himself  upon  Russo- 
Persian  support,  he  had  trusted  to  a  foundation  of  sand. 
The  ground  was  shifting  under  his  feet.  His  new  friends 
were  not  able  to  assist  him.  A  subaltern  of  the  British 
army  within  the  walls  of  Herat  was  setting  them  at  defiance. 


211 


CHAPTER  11. 

[1837— 1S39.] 

The  Siege  of  Herat — Shah  Kamran  and  Yar  Mahomed — Return  of  the 
Shah— Eldred  Pottinger — Preparations  for  the  Defence — Advance  ot 
the  Persian  Army — Progress  of  the  Siege — Negotiations  for  Peace — 
Failure  of  the  Attack — The  Siege  raised. 

Surrounded  by  a  fair  expanse  of  country,  where  alter- 
nating corn-fields,  vineyards,  and  gardens  varied  the  rich- 
ness and  beauty  of  the  scene ;  where  little  fortified  villages 
studded  the  plain,  and  the  bright  waters  of  small  running 
streams  lightened  the  pleasant  landscape,  lay  the  city  of 
Herat.*  The  beauty  of  the  place  was  beyond  the  walls. 
Within,  all  was  dirt  and  desolation.  Strongly  fortified  on 
every  side  by  a  wet  ditch  and  a  solid  outer  wall,  with  five 
gates,  each  defended  by  a  small  outwork,  the  city  presented 
but  few  claims  to  the  admiration  of  the  traveller.  Four 
long  bazaars,  roofed  with  arched  brickwork,  meeting  in  a 
small  domed  quadrangle  in  the  centre  of  the  city,  divided 
it  into  four  quarters,  t     In  each  of  these  there  may  have 

*  Arthur  Conolly.  The  correctness  of  this  description  is  confirmed 
by  Eldred  Pottinger,  in  his  unpublished  journal.  I  have  been  obliged 
to  write  it  in  the  past  tense.  "The  late  war,"  says  Pottinger,  "and 
its  consequences  have  so  changed  the  entire  neighbourhood  of  the 
city,  that,  under  its  present  appearance,  it  would  not  he  recognised  by 
its  former  visitants.  Moreover,  the  city  and  its  surrounding  places 
have  been  so  well  described  by  Lieut.  A.  Conolly,  that  I  need  not  re- 
peat the  description." — [Eldred  Pottinger' s  MS.  Journal.] 

t  Of  these  bazaars  Pottinger  writes:  **^-The  interior  of  the  city  is 
divided  into  four  nearly  equal  divisions,  by  two  streets  which,  at  right 

p  2 


212  THE   SIEGE   OF  HERAT. 

been  about  a  thousand  dwelling-houses  and  ten  thousands 
of  inhabitants.  Mosques  and  caravanserais,  public  baths 
and  public  reservoirs,  varied  the  wretched  unifoi-mity  of 
the  narrow  dirty  streets,  which,  roofed  across,  were  often 
little  better  than  dark  tunnels  or  conduits,  where  every 
conceivable  description  of  filth  was  suffered  to  collect  and 
putrify.  When  Arthur  Conolly  expressed  his  wonder  how 
the  people  could  live  in  the  midst  of  so  much  filth,  he 
was  answered,  "  The  climate  is  fine ;  and  if  dirt  killed 
people  where  would  the  Afghans  be  ? "  * 

Such  to  the  eye  of  an  ordinary  traveller,  in  search  of 
the  picturesque,  was  the  aspect  of  the  city  and  its  environs 
at  the  time  when  the  ai-my  of  Mahomed  Shah  was  march- 
ing upon  Herat.  To  the  mind  of  the  military  observer 
both  the  position  and  construction  of  the  place  were 
suggestive  of  much  interesting  speculation.  Situated  at 
that  point  of  the  great  mountain-range  which  alone  pre- 
sents facilities  to  the  transport  of  a  train  of  heavy  artillery, 

angles,  cross  each  other  in  the  centre  of  the  city.  The  principal  one 
joins  the  gate  of  Candahar  to  the  Pay-i-Hissar,  and  was  formerly  covered 
by  a  succession  of  small  domes,  springing  from  arches  which  cross  the 
streets.  About  two-thirds  of  this  magnificent  bazaar  still  remain  ;  but 
so  choked  up  with  rubbish,  and  so  ruinous,  that  it  has  lost  much  of  its 
attraction  to  the  eye.  This  bazaar  was  about  1300  yards  long  and  6 
in  width.  The  solidity  of  the  masonry  of  this  work  should  have  in- 
sured its  stability  ;  but  unfortunately  the  arches  are  all  defective — not 
one  has  a  keystone.  They  are  built,  as  all  others  in  this  country  are, 
with  a  vacancy  at  the  apex,  filled  merely  with  bits  of  broken  bricks, 
....  The  whole  of  the  lower  floors  on  each  side  are  used  as  shops." — 
[Eldred  Pottinger''s  MS.  JournaL"] 

*  Conolly  says  :   "  The  town  itself  is,  I  should  imagine,  one  of  the 

dirtiest  in  the  world No  drains  having  been  contrived  to  carry 

off  the  rain  which  falls  within  the  walls,  it  collects  and  stagnates  in 
ponds  which  are  dug  in  different  parts  of  the  city.  The  residents  cast 
out  the  refuse  of  their  houses  into  the  streets,  and  dead  cats  and  dogs 
are  commonly  seen  lying  upon  heaps  of  the  vilest  filth." — [ConoUy's 
Journey  to  the  North  of  India.] 


THE    aiY    OF   HERAT.  2 13 

Herat  has,  with  no  impropriety  of  designation,  been 
described  as  the  "  Gate  of  India."  Within  the  limits  of 
the  Heratee  temtory  all  the  great  roads  leading  on  India 
converge.  At  other  points,  between  Herat  and  Caubul,  a 
body  of  troops  unencumbered  with  guns,  or  having  only  a 
light  field  artillery,  might  make  good  its  passage,  if  not 
actively  opposed,  across  the  stupendous  mountain-ranges , 
of  the  Hindoo-Koosh ;  but  it  is  only  by  the  Herat  route  j 
that  a  really  formidable  well-equipped  army  could  make  ■ 
its  way  upon  the  Indian  frontier  from  the  regions  on  the 
north-west.  Both  the  nature  and  the  resources  of  the 
country  are  such  as  to  favour  the  success  of  the  invader. 
All  the  materials  necessaiy  for  the  organisation  of  a  great 
army,  and  the  formation  of  his  depots,  are  to  be  found  in 
the  neighbourhood  of  Herat.  The  extraordinaiy  fertility 
of  the  plain  has  fairly  entitled  it  to  be  called  the 
"  Granaiy  of  Central  Asia."  Its  mines  supply  lead,  iron, 
and  sulphur ;  the  surface  of  the  country,  in  almost  every 
direction,  is  laden  with  saltpetre ;  the  willow  and  poplar 
trees,  which  furnish  the  best  charcoal,  flourish  in  all  parts 
of  the  country ;  whilst  from  the  population  might  at  any 
time  be  drawn  hardy  and  docile  soldiers  to  recruit  the 
ranks  of  an  invading  army.*  Upon  the  possession  of  such 
countiy  would  depend,  in  no  small  measure,  the  success 
of  operations  undertaken  for  the  invasion  or  the  defence 
of  Hindostan. 

The  city  of  Herat,  it  has  been  said,  stood  within  solid 
earthen  walls,  sun-ounded  by  a  wet  ditch.  The  four 
sides  were  of  nearly  equal  length,  a  little  less  than  a  mile 
in  extent,  facing  towards  the  four  points  of  the  compass. 
The  most  elevated  quarter  of  the  city  was  the  north-east, 
from  which  it  gradually  sloped  do^vn  to  the  south-west 

*  Report  of  Major  Eldred  Pottinger  to  the  Supreme  Goveitiment  of 
India  on  the  defences  of  Herat.  Calcutta:  July,  1840. — [MS.  Re- 
cords.} 


214  THE   SIEGE   OF  HERAT. 

corner,  where  it  attained  its  lowest  descent.*  The  real 
defences  of  the  place  were  two  covered  ways,  or  fausse- 
hraies,  on  the  exterior  slope  of  the  embankments,  one 
within  and  the  other  without  the  ditch.  The  lower  one 
was  on  the  level  of  the  surrounding  country,  its  parapet 
"partly  covered  by  a  mound  of  earth  on  the  counter- 
scarp, the  accumulation  of  rubbish  from  the  cleansings  of 
the  ditch."  On  the  northern  side,  surrounded  by  a  wet 
ditch,  the  citadel,  once  known  as  the  Kella-i-Aktyar- 
Aldyn,  but  now  as  the  Ark,  overlooked  the  city.  Built 
entirely  of  good  brick  masonry,  with  lofty  ramparts  and 
numerous  towers,  it  was  a  place  of  considerable  strength  ; 
but  now  its  defences,  long  neglected,  were  in  a  wretched 
state  of  repair.  Indeed,  when,  in  1837,  tidings  of  the 
advance  of  the  Persian  army  reached  Herat,  the  whole 
extent  of  the  fortifications  was  crumbling  into  decay. 

The  population  of  Herat  was  estimated  at  about 
45,000  inhabitants.  A  large  majority  of  these  were 
Sheeahs.  It  was  said  that  there  might  have  been  1000 
Hindoos,  of  various  callings,  in  the  city;  there  were 
several  families  of  Armenians,  and  a  few  families  of 
Jews.  The  general  appearance  of  the  inhabitants  was 
that  of  a  poor  and  an  oppressed  people.  Dirty  and  ill- 
clad,  they  went  about  in  a  hurried,  anxious  manner, 
each  man  looking  with  suspicion  into  his  neighbour's 
face.  Few  women  were  to  be  seen  in  the  streets.  It 
was  hardly  safe  for  a  stranger  to  be  abroad  after  sunset. 
Unless  protected  by  an  armed  escort,  there  was  too  gi-eat 
a  likelihood  of  his  being  seized  and  sold  into  slavery. 
There  was  no  protection  for  life,  liberty,  or  property. 
They  who  should  have  protected  the  people  were  the 
foremost  of  their  oppressors.  During  t|^e  absence  of  the 
King,  in  1837,  such  was  the  frightful  misrule — such  the 
reign  of  terror  that  had  been  established  by  the  ohaj- 

*  Eldred  Pottinger^s  MS.  Jowfidl.  ^ 


% 

OPPRESSION  OF  THE  PEOPLE.  215 

tered  violence  of  the  rulers  of  the  city,  that  the  shops 
were  closed  before  sunset,  and  all  through  the  night 
the  noise  and  uproar,  the  challengings  and  the  cries  for 
help  were  such  as  could  scarcely  have  been  exceeded  if 
the  place  had  been  actually  besieged.  A  son  of  Yar 
Mahomed  Khan,  the  Wuzeer,  was  then  governor  of  the 
city.  Compelled  to  hold  office  upon  a  small  salary,  he 
enriched  himself  by  plundering  the  houses  of  the  inha- 
bitants, and  selling  the  people  into  slavery.  All  who 
were  strong  enough  followed  his  example,  and  when 
detected,  secured  immunity  for  themselves  by  giving 
him  a  portion  of  the  spoil*  So  remorseless,  indeed,  was 
the  tyranny  exercised  over  the  unhappy  Sheeahs  by 
their  Afghan  masters,  that  many  of  the  inhabitants  of 
Herat  looked  forward  to  the  coming  of  the  Persian  King 
as  to  the  advent  of  a  deliverer,  and  would  gladly  have 
seen  the  city  given  over  to  the  governance  of  one  who, 
whatever  may  have  been  his  political  claims,  was  not  an 
alien  in  his  religious  faith,  t 

*  Eldred  Pottinger,  from  whose  manuscript  journal  the  materials  of 
this  chapter  are  mainly  drawn,  gives  a  remarkable  illustration  of  the 
manner  in  which  justice  was  then  administered.  "  During  this 
period,"  he  says,  "a  Heratee  detected  a  noted  robber  in  his  outhouse, 
and  with  the  aid  of  his  neighbours  arrested  him.  In  the  morning, 
when  taken  before  the  Sirdar  by  the  cutwal,  to  request  the  order  for 
punishment  might  be  given  as  the  case  was  proved,  the  robber  declared, 
that  on  hearing  the  citizen  call  for  aid,  he  had  run  to  his  help, 
and,  being  immediately  laid  hold  of,  made  prisoner  and  accused.  He 
also  accused  the  cutwal  of  being  a  partner  in  the  plan.  The  young 
Sirdar,  with  an  acumen  to  be  wondered  at  but  not  described,  decided 
that  his  was  the  truth  of  the  story — sold  tlie  accuser,  and  so  severely 
fined  the  witnesses,  that  they  were  reduced  to  poverty  and  debt  to 
the  soldiers — the  sure  precursor  of  slavery.  He  then  gave  the  thief, 
who  was  his  own  servant,  a  khelat  (or  dress  of  honour)  and  released 
him.  Under  such  a  governor  the  misery  of  the  people  would  require  a 
more  eloquent  pen  than  mine  to  narrate." 

t  It  need  scarcely  be  said  that  the  Persians  are  generally  of  the 


216  THE   SIEGE   OF   HERAT. 

Such  was  the  last  remnant  of  the  old  Afghan  monarchy 
in  the  hands  of  Shah  Kamran — the  only  one  of  the  Sud- 
dozye  Princes  who  had  retained  his  hold  of  the  country 
he  had  governed.  His  government  was  at  this  time  a 
pageant  and  a  name.  An  old  and  a  feeble  man,  broken 
down  by  long  years  of  debauchery,  he  had  resigned  the 
active  duties  of  administration  into  the  hands  of  his 
Wuzeer,  He  was,  perhaps,  the  worst  of  the  royal  princes 
— ^the  worst  of  a  bad  race.  His  youth  had  been  stained 
by  the  commission  of  every  kind  of  Oriental  crime  ;  and 
now  in  his  old  age,  if  the  evil  passions  of  his  nature  were 
less  prominently  developed,  it  was  only  because  physical 
decay  had  limited  his  power  to  indulge  them.  In  his 
younger  days  he  had  set  no  restraint  upon  himself,  and 
now  it  was  nature  only  that  restrained  him.  The  violent 
gusts  of  passion,  which  had  once  threatened  all  who  were 
within  his  influence,  had  given  place  to  an  almost  incessant 
peevishness  and  petulance  of  manner,  more  pitiable  to 
behold  than  it  was  dangerous  to  encounter.  He  had  once 
played  openly  the  part  of  the  bandit — placing  himself  at 
the  head  of  gangs  of  armed  retainers,  plundering  houses  by 
night  and  slaying  all  who  opposed  him ;  now  he  suffered 
others  to  commit  the  violence  which  he  had  before  per- 
sonally enacted,  and  oppressed,  by  deputy,  the  weakness 
which  he  could  not  see  smitten  before  his  face.  He  had  once 
been  immoderately  addicted  to  sensual  pleasure,  and  in  the 
pursuit  of  such  gratification — arrested  by  no  feelings  of  com- 
passion, by  no  visitings  of  remorse — had  violently  seized  the 
objects  of  his  desires,  to  whomsoever  they  belonged,  and 
cast  them  adrift  when  his  appetite  was  sated ;  now  he 

Sheeah,  and  the  Afghans  of  the  Soonee  sect.  At  Herat  the  rulers  and 
the  soldiery  were  Soonees,  whilst  the  shopkeepers  and  other  peaceful 
citizens  were  Sheeahs.  The  oppression  of  the  Sheeahs  by  their 
Afghan  masters  was  one  of  the  circumstances  by  a  reference  to  which 
Mahomed  Shah  sought  to  justify  his  invasion  of  Herat. 


SHAH    KAMRAN.  217 

sought  excitement  of  another  kind,  to  which  age  and 
feebleness  were  no  impediments,  and  turned  from  the 
caresses  of  women  to  seek  solace  from  the  stimulants  of 
wine.  Unfaithful  to  his  friends  and  unmerciful  to  his 
enemies,  ingratitude  and  cruelty  were  conspicuous  in  his 
nature,  and  these  darker  features  of  his  character  there 
was  little  to  lighten  or  relieve.  Among  his  countrymen 
he  was  esteemed  for  a  certain  kind  of  courage,  and  in  his 
younger  days  he  had  not  been  wanting  in  activity  and 
address.*  Though  naturally  haughty  and  aiTogant,  there 
were  times  when  he  could  assume,  for  his  own  ends,  a 
becoming  courtesy  of  demeanour ;  and,  as  by  assiduous 
attention  to  costume,  he  endeavoured  to  compensate  for  the 
deficiencies  of  an  unattractive  person,  there  was  something 
of  a  high  and  princely  aspect  about  the  outward  bearing 
even  of  this  degraded  man.  Short  and  thickset,  with  mis- 
shapen limbs  and  an  unseemly  gait,  his  appearance  was 
more  comely  in  repose  than  in  action.  His  face  was  pitted 
with  the  small-pox,  and  there  was  a  harshness  in  his  coun- 
tenance stamped  by  the  long  possession  of  arbitrary 
power  and  the  indulgence  of  unbridled  passions ;  but  he 
had  a  finer,  more  massive,  more  upright  forehead,  than 
the  majority  of  his  countrymen,  with  more  of  intellect 
impressed  upon  it.  His  voice  had  once  been  loud  and 
deep  ;  but  the  feebleness  of  age,  much  sickness,  and  much 
suffering,  had  given  a  querulousness  to  its  tones  which  was 
equally  undignified  and  impleasing. 

If  in  the  character  and  the  person  of  Shah  Kammn 
there  was  little  that  was  estimable  or  attractive,  there 
was  less  in  the  person  and  character  of  his  Wuzeer.     Yar 

*  Pottinger  says  tliat  "he  was  much  devoted  to  field-sports,  and 
spent  the  greater  part  of  his  time  in  their  pursuit.  He  was  an  unerring 
shot  with  a  matchlock  ;  he  could  divide  a  sheep  in  two  by  a  single  cut 
of  his  sabre,  and  with  a  Lahore  bow  send  an  arrow  through  a  cow."  — 
[MS.  Journal.] 


218  THE    SIEGE    OF   HERAT. 

Mahomed  Khan  was  a  stout,  square-built  man,  of  middle 
height,  with  a  heavy,  stem  countenance,  thick  negro-like 
lips,  bad  straggling  teeth,  an  overhanging  brow,  and  an 
abruptly  receding  forehead.  His  face  was  redeemed  from 
utter  repulsiveness  by  the  fineness  of  his  eyes  and  the 
comeliness  of  his  beard.  Like  his  master  he  attired  him- 
self with  care  and  propriety ;  but  his  manner  was  more 
attractive  than  his  appearance.  Affable  in  his  demeanour, 
outwardly  courteous  and  serene,  he  seldom  gave  the  rein 
to  his  temper,  but  held  it  in  habitual  control.  He  talked 
freely  and  well,  had  a  fund  of  anecdote  at  his  command, 
was  said  to  be  well  read  in  Mahomedan  divinity,  and  was 
strict  in  his  attention  to  the  external  formalities  of  his 
religion.  His  courage  was  never  questioned ;  and  his 
ability  was  as  undoubted  as  his  courage.  Both  were  turned 
to  the  worst  possible  account.  Of  all  the  unscrupulous 
miscreants  in  Central  Asia,  Yar  Mahomed  was  the  most 
unscrupulous.  His  avarice  and  his  ambition  knew  no 
bounds,  and  nothing  was  suffered  to  stand  in  the  way  of 
their  gratification.  Utterly  without  tenderness  or  com- 
passion, he  had  no  regard  for  the  sufferings  of  others. 
Sparing  neither  sex  nor  age,  he  trod  down  the  weak  with 
an  iron  heel;  and,  a  tyrant  himself,  encoiu-aged  the 
tyranny  of  his  retainers.  As  faithless  as  he  was  cruel, 
there  was  no  obligation  which  he  had  not  violated,  no 
treachery  that  had  not  stained  his  career.  If  there  was 
an  abler  or  a  worse  man  in  Central  Asia,  I  have  not  yet 
heard  his  name.* 

In   the  summer  of    1837   the  bazaars  of  Herat  were 

*  Yar  Mahomed  was  the  nephew  of  Atta  Mahomed,  an  influential 
Sirdar  of  the  Alekozye  tribe,  who  was  Minister  to  Shah  Mahmoud  and 
Hadjee  Feroz,  and  afterwards  of  Shah  Kamran.  This  man  left  two 
sons,  Deen  Mahomed  and  Sultan  Mahomed  ;  but  neither  possessed  the 
same  capacious  mind  and  energetic  character  which  distinguished  their 
cousin  Yar  Mahomed,  who  was  always,  more  or  less,  at  enmity  with 
them,  and  at  last  drove  them  out  of  Herat,  in  1841. 


EXPECTED  RETURN  OF  THE  KING.         219 

a-stir  with  rumours  of  the  movements  of  the  royal  army. 
The  King  and  the  Wuzeer  were  absent  from  the  city  on  a 
campaign  in  Seistan.  To  gratify  the  personal  rancour  of 
the  latter  they  had  laid  siege  to  the  fortress  of  Jowayn, 
and  in  the  vain  attempt  to  reduce  a  place  of  no  political 
importance,  had  crippled  their  own  military  resources  in  a 
manner  which  they  soon  began  bitterly  to  lament.  The 
v/aste  of  so  much  strength  on  so  small  an  entei-prise  was 
unworthy  of  a  man  so  able  and  so  astute  as  Yar  Mahomed ; 
but  the  feeling  of  personal  resentment  was  stronger  in  him 
than  either  avarice  or  ambition.  He  had  a  larger  game  in 
hand  at  that  time ;  and  he  should  have  husbanded  aU  his 
resources  for  the  great  struggle  by  which  he  sought  to  re- 
store to  the  Suddozye  Princes  the  sovereignty  of  Caubul 
and  Candahar.* 

It  was  soon  buzzed  abroad  in  Herat  that  the  army  was 
about  to  return — that  it  had  broken  off  from  the  siege  of 
Jowayn — and  was  coming  back  to  gird  itself  up  for  stir- 
ring work  at  home.  Cossids  were  coming  in  daily  from 
the  royal  camp  with  instnictions  for  the  collection  of  gi'ain 
and  the  repair  of  the  defences  of  the  city.  The  meaning 
of  this  was  involved  in  no  obscurity.  The  ambassador 
who  had  been  sent  to  Teheran  to  seek,  among  other 
objects,  the  assistance  of  Mahomed  Shah  in  the  projected 
enterprise  for  the  recovery  of  Candahar  and   Caubult  had 

*  Pottinger  says,  with  reference  to  this  ill-judged  movement,  that 
"the  Wuzeer  played  away  the  last  stake  of  his  master  by  which  he 
could  have  hoped  to  recover  his  former  dominions  or  to  defend  his  pre- 
sent. Indeed,  after-events  have  shown  that  the  body  of  cavalry  which 
he  thus  frittered  away  and  destroyed  was  strong  enough  to  have  pre- 
vented the  Persian  army  leaving  its  own  frontier."  There  was,  how- 
ever, some  compensation  which,  whether  the  result  of  the  siege  or  not, 
is  worth  mentioning,  in  the  fact  that  when  Herat  was  attacked  by 
the  Persians,  many  of  the  old  garrison  of  Jowayn  came  to  the  assistance 
of  their  former  enemies. 

+  It  is  doubted  by  some,  whose  opinions  are  entitled  to  the  highest 


220  THE   SIEGE    OF   HERAT. 

brought  back  an  answer  to  the  effect  that  the  Persian 
monarch  claimed  both  principahties  for  himself,  and  in- 
tended to  take  possession  of  Herat  as  a  preliminary  to 
further  operations.  It  was  said  to  be  the  intention  of  the 
King  of  Kings  to  proceed  to  Caubul,  and,  receiving  as  the 
price  of  his  assistance  the  submission  of  the  Ameer,  to 
join  Dost  Mahomed  in  a  religious  war  against  the  Sikhs. 
Herat  was  to  be  reduced  on  the  road.  Kamran  was  to  be 
deprived  of  his  regal  titles.  Prayers  were  to  be  said  and 
coin  struck  in  the  name  of  the  Persian  King ;  and  a 
Persian  garrison  was  to  be  received  into  the  city.  These 
were  the  terms  dictated  by  Mahomed  Shah,  and  thrown 
back  by  Shah  Kamran  with  defiance. 

The  greatest  excitement  now  prevailed  throughout  the 
city.  There  was  but  one  topic  of  discoui-se.  Every  man 
met  his  neighbour  with  a  word  about  the  coming  of  the 
Persian  army.  The  Sheealis,  smarting  under  the  tyranny 
to  which  they  had  long  been  subjected,  spoke  of  the 
advent  of  the  Persian  monarch  as  of  the  coming  of  a 
deliverer,  whilst  the  Soonee  Afghans,  whom  they  taunted 
with  predictions  of  the  success  of  the  invading  force,  swore 
that  they  would  defend,  to  the  last  drop  of  their  blood, 
the  only  remnant  of  the  old  Afghan  monarchy  which  had 
not  been  violently  wrested  from  the  hands  of  its  legitimate 
possessors. 

respect,  whether  either  Kamran  or  Yar  Mahomed  ever  really  contem- 
plated an  expedition  for  the  recovery  of  Candahar  and  Caubul ;  but 
it  is  certain  that  they  talked  about  it.  In  the  letter  which  Kamran 
sent  to  Mahomed  Shah,  by  Futteh  Mahomed  Khan,  he  expressed  a 
"hope  of  obtaining  the  favour  of  his  Majesty,  so  that  with  the  aid  of 
the  well-wishers  of  Persia  he  might  subdue  his  hereditary  dominions, 
and  overwhelm  his  rebellious  enemies;"  and  in  a  message  which 
Pottinger  was  commissioned  to  deliver  to  the  Persian  monarch,  it  was 
distinctly  declared  that  Futteh  Mahomed  Khan  had  been  sent  to 
Teheran  to  beg  for  aid  towards  the  recovery  of  Kamran's  paternal 
kingdom. 


BETURN    OF   THE   KING.  221 

On  the  17th  of  September  the  King  returned  to  Herat. 
Moved  by  one  common  impulse  of  curiosity,  the  people 
went  forth  to  meet  him.  The  streets  were  lined  with 
eager  thousands,  and  the  house-tops  were  alive  with  gazers. 
A  procession  of  the  true  Oriental  type,  it  presented,  in 
vivid  contrasts,  strange  alternations  of  the  shabby  and  the 
superb.  First  came  a  few  strong  baggage-mules,  and 
a  few  straggling  horsemen,  mounted  on  fine  well-built 
animals,  but  lean,  and  often  lame  and  wounded.  Then,  in 
their  high  red-cloth  caps,  appeared  the  criers  and  the 
executioners,  bearing  aloft  the  instruments  of  their  calling ; 
and,  in  spite  of  the  grim  suggestiveness  of  the  large  knives 
and  tiger-headed  brazen  maces,  presenting  an  appearance 
less  solemn  than  grotesque.  Next  came  a  string  of  horses 
led  by  armed  grooms,  their  fine  stag-like  heads  telling  the 
purity  of  their  blood,  and  their  handsome  equipments  the 
royal  ownership  they  boasted.  Then  followed,  close  behind, 
in  a  covered  litter  of  red  cloth,  carried  by  Hindostanee 
bearers,  Shah  Kamran  himself.  Very  plainly,  but  taste- 
fully attired,  the  golden  bosses  on  his  sword-belt,  and  the 
jewels  on  his  dagger-hilt,  being  the  only  ornaments  about 
the  royal  person,  he  returned,  through  the  open  curtains 
of  his  litter,  with  a  kingly  and  a  graceful  courtesy,  the 
salutations  of  the  people.  Next  came  the  Royal  Princes, 
with  the  eunuchs,  and  other  personal  attendants  of  the 
Shah  ;  *  and  then,  but  at  a  long  intei^al,  a  motley  crowd 
of  ai-med  foot-men,  the  regular  infantry  of  Herat,  in  all 
sorts  of  irregular  costumes.  These  preceded  the  cavalcade 
of  the  Wuzeer,  Yar  Mahomed,  who,  with  all  the  chiefs  of 
note  around  him,  headed  the  main  body  of  the  Afghan 
cavalry,  whose  low  sheepskin  caps  and  uniform  attire 
made  up  a  very  soldierly  appearance.  Another  body  of 
infantry  closed  the  procession.  The  guns  had  been  left 
behind. 

*  Among  these  was  M.  Euler,  the  Shah's  European  physician. 


222  THE    SIEGE   OF   HERAT. 

Among  the  many  who  went  forth  on  that  September 
morning  to  witness  the  entrance  of  Shah  Kamran  into  his 
capital,  was  a  young  Em-opean  officer.  Riding  out  a  mile 
beyond  the  city  walls,  he  picketed  his  horse  in  the  court- 
yard of  a  deserted  house,  and  joined  a  party  of  Afghans, 
who,  sitting  on  the  domed  roof  of  the  building,  were 
watching  the  procession  as  it  passed.  He  had  entered 
Herat  about  a  month  before,  after  an  adventurous  journey 
from  Caubul,  through  the  Imauk  and  Hazareh  coun- 
tries. The  name  of  this  young  officer  was  Eldred  Pottin- 
ger.  He  was  a  Lieutenant  in  the  Bombay  Artillery ;  and 
had  been  despatched  by  his  uncle,  Colonel  Pottinger,  who 
was  then  Resident  in  Sindh,  for  the  purpose  of  exploring 
the  countries  of  Afghanistan,  and  collecting  materials  for 
a  full  report  to  be  drawn  up  on  his  return.  He  started  in 
no  recognised  official  capacity,  but  travelled  onward  in  the 
most  unostentatious  manner,  assuming  the  disguise  of  a 
Cutch  horse-dealer,  and  attracting  little  attention  on  his 
route.  Journeying  upwards  by  Shikai*poor  and  Dehra 
Ismael  Khan  to  Peshawur,  he  proceeded  thence  to  Caubul, 
and  there  changing  his  disguise  for  that  of  an  Indian 
Syud,  made  his  way  through  the  rude  country  of  the 
Imauks  and  Hazarehs  to  Herat.  Though  at  this  period 
he  was  but  slightly  acquainted  with  the  Persian  language, 
and  was  ignorant  of  the  Mahomedan  prayers,  of  their 
genuflexions,  modes  of  worship,  and  similar  observances, 
he  passed  on  almost  unquestioned  by  the  credulous 
Afghans.  In  Herat  itself,  though  he  seems  to  have  taken 
little  pains  to  conceal  his  real  character,  he  remained,  for 
some  time,*  lodging  in  a  caravanserai,  and  mixing  freely 


*  "I  have  heard  him,"  writes  one  who  knew  Pottinger  well, 
"describe how  on  two  occasions,  when  challenged  about  not  praying  or 
turning  towards  Mecca,  he  silenced  all  questioning  by  appealing  to  the 
usage  of  India." — [Private  Correspondence.} 


POTTINGER   AND    YAR    MAHOMED.  223 

with  its  inmates,  but  seldom  recognised  as  an  European 
by  those  with  whom  he  associated. 

The  King  and  the  Wuzeer  returned  to  Herat ;  and 
Eldred  Pottinger  soon  sent  a  message  to  the  latter,  offer- 
ing, as  a  stranger  and  a  traveller,  to  wait  upon  him,  if  he 
desired  to  see  him.  To  the  surprise  of  the  English  officer, 
Yar  Mahomed  sent  a  messenger  to  him  intimating  that, 
early  on  the  following  morning,  he  would  be  happy  to 
receive  him.  Pottinger  went.  The  minister,  who  was 
seated  in  an  alcove  in  the  dressing-room  of  his  bath,  rose 
as  the  stranger  entered,  invited  him  to  take  a  seat  beside 
himself,  and  welcomed  him  with  becoming  courtesy.  As 
the  only  articles  he  possessed  worthy  of  the  acceptance  of 
the  cliief,  Pottinger  presented  his  detonating  pistols ;  and 
the  gift  was  gi'aciously  received.  A  few  days  afterw^ards 
he  paid,  "  by  desire,"  a  visit  to  the  King.*     Little  did 

*  Pottinger,  who  is  provokingly  chary,  in  his  journal,  of  information 
about  himself,  does  not  say  whether  he  appeared  at  these  interviews  in 
his  true  character  of  a  British  officer  ;  but  I  conclude  that  he  did  not, 
on  these  occasions,  attempt  to  conceal  his  nationality.  Nor  does  it 
seem  that,  in  his  intercourse  with  the  higher  class  of  Heratees, 
he  wore  any  disguise  ;  for  we  soon  find  him  taking  part  in  a  con- 
versation about  Arthur  Conolly,  and  addressed  as  a  countryman  of 
that  fine-hearted  young  Englishman.  I  cannot  transcribe,  without  a 
glow  of  pleasure,  the  following  passage  in  Pottinger's  journal  : — "I 
fell  in  with  a  number  of  Captain  Conolly' s  acquaintances.  Every 
person  asked  after  him,  and  appeared  disappointed  when  I  told  them  I 
did  not  know  him.  In  two  places  I  crossed  Mr.  Conolly's  route,  and 
on  his  account  received  the  greatest  hospitality  and  attention — indeed, 
more  than  was  pleasant,  for  such  liberality  required  corresponding 
upon  my  part ;  and  my  funds  were  not  well  adapted  for  any  extra- 
ordinary demand  upon  them.  In  Herat,  Mr.  Conolly's  fame  was  great. 
In  a  large  party,  where  the  subject  of  the  Europeans  who  had  visited 
Herat  was  mooted,  Conolly's  name  being  mentioned,  I  was  asked  if  I 
knew  him,  and  on  replying,  'Merely  by  report,'  Moollah  Mahomed,  a 
Sheeah  Moollah  of  eminence,  calling  to  me  across  the  room,  said,  *  You 
have  a  great  pleasure  awaiting  you.  When  you  see  him,  give  him  my 
salutation,  and  tell  him  that  I  say  he  has  done  as  much  to  give  the 


224  THE    SIEGE   OF   HERAT. 

Shah  Kamran  and  Yar  Mahomed,  when  they  received  that 
unassuming  traveller,  think  how  much,  under  Providence, 
the  future  destinies  of  Herat  were  in  the  hands  of  the 
young  Englishman. 

The  spirit  of  adventure  was  strong  in  Eldred  Pottinger. 
It  had  brought  him  to  the  gates  of  Herat,  and  now  it 
kept  him  there,  eager  to  take  a  part  in  the  coming  struggle 
between  the  Heratees  and  their  Persian  invaders.  And 
when  the  day  of  trial  came — when  the  enemy  were  under 
the  walls  of  the  city — ^he  threw  himself  into  the  contest, 
not  merely  in  a  spirit  of  adventure,  as  a  young  soldier 
rejoicing  in  the  opportunity  thus  afforded  him  of  taking 
part  in  the  stirring  scenes  of  active  warfare,  but  as  one 
profoundly  impressed  with  the  conviction  that  his  duty  to 
his  country  called  upon  him,  in  such  a  crisis,  to  put  forth 
all  his  energies  in  aid  of  those  who  were  striving  to  arrest  a 
movement  threatening  not  only  the  independence  of  Herat, 
but  the  stability  of  the  British  Empire  in  the  East. 

Scarcely  had  the  King  returned  to  Herat,  when  a  pro- 
clamation went  forth  into  the  smrounding  villages,  decree- 
ing that  all  the  grain  and  forage  should  be  brought  into 
the  city,  and  that  the  villagers  should  abide  within  its 
walls,  on  pain  of  the  Shah's  resentment.  The  danger 
seemed  something  dim  and  remote,  and  the  order,  at  first, 
was  little  heeded.  But  when,  towards  the  close  of  October, 
intelligence  reached  Herat  that  the  Persian  army  had 
arrived  at  Toorbut,  another  more  imperative  edict  was 
issued,  commanding  all  the  outstanding  crops,  grain,  and 
forage,  to  be  destroyed,  and  the  fruit-trees  to  be  cut 
down  in  the  surrounding  gardens.  The  soldiery  were  let 
loose  upon  the  country  to  carry  out  the  royal  decree. 
The  policy  of  this  measure  is  apparent ;  but  there  was 

English  nation  fame  in  Herat,  as  your  ambassador,  Mr.  Elphinstone, 
did  at  Peshawur ; '  and  in  this  he  was  seconded  by  the  great  mass 
present." — [Eldred  Pottinger's  MS.  Journal] 


AI)VA^'CE    OF   THE    PERSIANS.  225 

unlooked-for  evil  in  the  result.  It  was  the  object  of  the 
Heratee  Government  to  keep  all  the  available" grain,  forage, 
and  firewood  outside  the  city  from  falling  into  the  hands 
of  the  invading  armj.  If  these  necessaries  could  not  be 
stored  in  Herat,  the  ""next' best  thing  was  to  destroy  them. 
But  the  licence  thus  given  to  the  soldiery  completely 
unhinged  the  little  discipline  that  had  before  kept  them 
together.  They  were,  indeed,  from  that  time  so  com- 
pletely disorganised,  that  it  was  never  afterwards  found 
practicable  to  reduce  them  to  order. 

In  the  mean  while,  the  city  was  alive  with  rumours  of 
the  progress  of  the  Persian  army.  It  was  ascertained  that 
they  were  moving  foi'ward  in  three  bodies,  the  advance  of 
which  was  a  force  of  10,000  or  12,000  men,  under  Alayar 
Khan.*  Every  now  and  then  a  prisoner  was  brought  in  ; 
but  the  people,  who  seized  them,  bitterly  complained 
that  they  could  not  make  more  captures.  The  Persian 
army,  they  loudly  declared,  was  composed  of  a  set  of  the 
most  contemptible  cowards,  because  they  marched  in  com- 
pact bodies,  defended  by  their  guns,  instead  of  straggling 
boldly  about  on  purpose  to  be  cut  off  by  marauding 
Afghans,  t 

Early  in  November  there  was  a   hard  frost,  and  the 

*  Better  known  by  his  title  of  Asoof-ood-dowlah.  He  was  the  head 
of  the  Yuhhaw-hash  division  of  the  Kajjar  tribe,  and,  according  to 
the  heraldry  of  the  clans,  was  thus  of  higher  rank  than  the  Shah,  who 
was  merely  the  chief  of  the  Ashagha-bash,  or  younger  branch.  Futteh 
All  Shah,  to  stanch  an  old  tribe  feud,  had  married  his  son  and  heir- 
apparent,  Abbas  Meerza,  to  the  heiress  of  the  rival  branch,  and 
Mahomed  Shah  being  the  issue  of  this  marriage,  the  Asoof-ood-dowlah 
was  his  maternal  uncle.  The  Asoof  was  Governor  of  Khorassan,  with 
almost  independent  powers,  from  1835  to  1847.  He  is  now  in  exile  at 
Baghdad. 

+  As  the  army  approached  Herat  some  important  captures  were 
made.  Among  others,  the  secretary  of  the  Asoof-ood-dowlah  was 
carried  off,  with  all  his  papers. 

VOL.  I.  Q 


226  THE   SIEGE   OP   HERAT. 

Heratees  began  hopefully  to  speculate  on  the  chances  of 
a  severe  winter.  Never  were  the  predictions  of  the 
weather-wise  so  cruelly  falsified ;  but  the  hope  buoyed 
them  up  for  a  time.  Another  cheering  anticipation  was 
belied  in  the  same  mortifying  manner.  It  was  long  a 
matter  of  anxious  conjecture  whether  the  Persians  would 
attack  Ghorian.  In  1834-35  they  had  left  it  untouched  ; 
and  it  was  believed  that  now  again  they  would  mask  it, 
for  its  reputed  strength  was  greater  than  that  of  Herat, 
and  it  was  defended  by  a  picked  garrison,  under  the  com- 
mand of  the  brother  of  Yar  Mahomed.  But  these  hopes 
were  soon  dispersed  by  the  arrival  of  couriers  from 
Ghorian,  with  tidings  that  the  place  was  besieged.  On 
the  15th  of  November  it  was  announced  that  Ghorian  had 
fallen. 

Matters  now  began  to  wear  a  more  alarming  aspect. 
Cursing  with  his  whole  heart  the  cowardice  or  treachery 
of  his  brother,  who,  almost  without  a  struggle,  had  shame- 
fully surrendered  Ijis  charge,*  Yar  Mahomed,  with 
increased  vigour,  addressed  himself  to  the  defence  of  the 
city.  The  gates  were  closed  against  all  egress.  The 
people  poured  into  Herat  in  floods  from  the  surround- 
ing country.  In  every  house  were  huddled  together  the 
members  of  five  or  six  families.  The  very  ruins  were  thickly 
tenanted.  But  still  the  streets  were  alive  with  throngs 
of  people  seeking  habitations  in  the  city.  Everywhere 
excitement  and  alarm  were  visible  in  the  countenances  and 
the  gestures  of  the  Heratees.  It  was  a  strange  and  fearful 

*  This  was  Yar  M0,liomed's  first  angry  view  of  the  case  ;  but  it  may 
be  doubted  whether  Shere  Mahomed  Khan  was  fairly  to  be  censured 
for  the  loss  of  Ghorian.  Of  small  dimensions,  and  unfurnished  with 
bomb-proofs,  the  place  was  ill  calculated  to  sustain  the  heavy  vertical 
fire  of  shot  and  shell  which  the  Persian  artillery  poured  into  it.  A 
magazine  and  storehouse  took  fire  ;  and  at  the  time  of  its  surrender 
Colonel  Stoddart  pronounced  it  to  be  quite  untenable. 


MEASURES  OF  DEFENCE.  227 

conjuncture,  and  no  man  felt  himself  secure.  A  fiat  had 
gone  forth  for  the  apprehension  of  all  persons  of  doubtful 
loyalty.  Many  suspected  of  infidelity  were  seized,  their 
persons  imprisoned,  and  their  property  confiscated,  whilst 
others,  in  whom  the  spirit  of  rebellion  had  been  more 
clearly  evidenced,  were  plimged,  with  all  their  family  and 
dependents,  into  one  great  sea  of  ruin.  When  it  was 
known  that  Shums-ood-deen  Khan,*  an  Afghan  chief  of 
note,  had  thrown  off  his  allegiance  to  Herat,  his  Persian 
dependents  were  seized  and  stripped  of  all  they  possessed. 
Some  were  tortured,  some  were  sent  into  slavery,  and 
some  were  condemned  to  death.  The  women  and  children 
were  sold  or  given  away.  Those  of  the  Afghan  tribes 
were  more  mercifully  treated  ;  but  few  escaped  imprison- 
ment and  fine.  Nor  were  even  the  priesthood  spared. 
The  MooUahs  of  the  Sheeah  sect  were  .  arrested  and  con- 
fined, lest  they  should  stir  up  intrigue  and  disaffection 
among  the  people. 

Whilst  these  precautions  against  internal  revolt  were 
taken  by  the  Shah  and  his  unscrupulous  minister,  actively 
and  unceasingly  they  laboured  to  defend  the  city  against 
the  enemy  advancing  from  without.  The  fortifications 
now  began  to  bristle  with  armed  soldiers.  The  hammer 
of  the  artificer  rang  upon  the  guns  in  the  embrasures. 
The  spade  of  the-  workman  was  busy  upon  the  ramparts. 

*  Shxuns-ood-deen  Khan  of  Herat  was  a  Populzye  nobleman  of  very 
good  family,  and  in  great  favour  with  Shah  Kamran  before  the  com- 
mencement of  the  siege  of  Herat.  His  sister  was  the  Shah's  favourite 
wife,  and  he  was  entirely  in  his  Majesty's  confidence.  A  position  of  so 
much  power,  however,  made  Yar  Mahomed  his  enemy,  and  it  was  to 
escape  the  minister's  persecution  that  he  deserted  to  the  Persian  camp 
on  the  approach  of  the  invading  army.  Had  he  remained  in  the  city, 
he  would  certainly  have  been  imprisoned  or  assassinated,  for  the  Shah 
was  powerless  to  protect  him.  It  was  surmised,  indeed,  that  his 
Majesty  counselled,  or  at  any  rate  connived  at,  his  flight,  as  his  only 
means  of  escape. 

<i2 


228  THE    SIEGE    OF    HERAT. 

Eager  for  the  foray,  the  trooper  mounted  his  horse  and 
scoured  the  countr}'-  to  cut  off  stragglers.  But  still  the 
Persian  army  moved  forward  in  that  compact  and  well- 
ordered  mass  which  had  baffled  the  efforts  and  kindled  the 
indignation  of  marauders  along  their  whole  line  of  march. 
Soon  the  contest  actually  commenced.  On  the  22nd  of 
November,  the  advanced  guard  of  the  Persian  army  took 
up  its  position  on  the  plain  to  the  north-west  of  the  city. 
Watching  its  opportunity,  the  Afghan  horse  charged  the 
enemy's  cavalry  with  success,  and  then  fell  upon  an 
infantry  regiment,  which  stood  firm,  and  repulsed  the 
attack.  The  Persian  field  artillery  opened  briskly  upon 
the  Afghan  force.  A  couple  of  guns  in  the  city  replied  to 
them  ;  whilst  a  party  of  Afghan  horsemen,  dismounted, 
crept  under  cover,  and  with  their  long  rifle-barrelled 
matchlocks,  fired  on  the  Persian  gunners.  Upon  this, 
skirmishers  were  sent  out  by  the  Persians,  who  turned 
the  flank  of  the  Afghans,  and  forced  them  back  to  the 
position  which  they  had  taken  up  before.  No  advantage 
was  gained  by  either  party.  But  the  contest  was  now 
fairly  commenced. 

The  following  day  witnessed  the  opening  of  the  siege  of 
Herat — one,  whether  we  regard  the  protracted  nature  of 
the  operations,  the  vigour  of  the  resistance,  the  gallantry 
of  the  chief  actors  concerned  in  it,  or  the  magnitude  of  the 
political  results,  of  the  most  remarkable  in  modem  history. 
It  was  on  the  23rd  of  November  that  the  siege  actually 
commenced.  Taking  possession  of  all  the  gardens  and 
enclosures  to  the  west  of  the  city,  and  establishing  them- 
selves in  considerable  force  among  a  cluster  of  ruins  that 
afforded  them  good  shelter,  the  Persians  began  to  make 
their  preparations  for  the  attack.  The  garrison  sallied  out 
as  they  advanced.  The  Afghan  infantry  disputed  every 
inch  of  ground,  and  the  cavalry  hung  on  the  flanks  of  the 
Persian  army.     But  they  could  not  dislodge  the  enemy 


BARBARITIES    OF   THE   AFGHANS.  229 

from  the  position  they  had  taken  up  ;  and  after  carry- 
ing off  a  few  prisoners,  were  compelled  at  last  to 
retire. 

From  the  events,  however,  of  that  day,  two  significant 
facts  were  to  be  deduced.  The  Persians  had  tried  their 
artilleiy  upon  the  walls  of  Herat  in  answer  to  the  guns 
which  the  garrison  had  fired  in  support  of  their  skirmishers ; 
and  the  rotten  parapets  had  fallen  like  tinder  even  to  the 
light  shot  that  was  poured  upon  them.  It  was  plain  that 
little  reliance  was  to  be  placed  upon  the  strength  of  the 
defences.  It  was  plain,  too,  that  the  war  thus  commenced 
would  be  carried  on  in  a  spirit  of  unsparing  hatred  and 
savage  inhumanity  —  that  what  was  wanting,  on  either 
side,  in  science  or  in  courage,  would  be  made  up  for  in 
cruelty  and  vindictiveness.  The  Afghan  skirmishers  that 
evening  brought  in  some  prisoners  and  some  heads.  The 
latter  were  paraded  about  the  ramparts.*  The  former 
bartered  for  horses  with  the  Toorkomans,  and  sent  off  to 
the  slave-markets  of  Merve. 

*  Of  this  barbarous  custom  of  bringing  in  the  heads  of  the  enemy, 
Pottinger  speaks  with  becoming  indignation.  **  I  have  not  thought  it 
necessary,"  he  writes  in  his  journal,  "  to  recount  the  number  of  heads 
that  were  brought  in  daily,  nor  indeed  do  I  know.  I  never  could  speak 
of  this  barbarous,  disgusting,  and  inhuman  conduct  with  any  temper. 
The  number,  however,  in  these  sorties  was  always  insignificant,  and 
the  collecting  them  invariably  broke  the  vigour  of  the  pursuit,  and 
prevented  the  destruction  of  the  trenches.  There  is  no  doubt  great 
terror  was  inspired  by  the  mutilation  of  the  bodies  amongst  their  com- 
rades. But  there  must  have  been,  at  least,  equal  indignation — and 
that  a  corresponding  exaltation  was  felt  by  the  victors  at  the  sight  of 
these  barbarous  trophies,  and  the  spoils  brought  in." — [MS.  Journal.] 
As  rewards  were  always  given  for  these  bloody  trophies,  the  garrison 
were  naturally  very  active  in  their  endeavours  to  obtain  them.  Some- 
times their  avarice  outstripped  both  their  honesty  and  their  nationality. 
On  one  occasion,  after  an  unsuccessful  sortie,  an  Afghan  brought  in  a 
pair  of  ears.  A  cloak  and  some  ducats  were  given  him  as  a  reward  for 
his  butchery.     Before  any  questions  could  be  put  to  the  fellow,  he 


230  THE    SIEGE    OF   HERAT. 

The  siege  was  soon  in  full  operation.  Whilst  the 
Heratees  were  busily  at  work  strengthening  their  defences, 
the  Persians  were  entrenching  themselves,  throwing  up 
their  batteries,  planting  their  guns,  and  trying  their  effect 
upon  the  walls  of  the  city.  After  a  day  or  two,  guns, 
mortars,  and  rocket  batteries  were  all  in  full  play  upon 
Herat.  The  rockets  ranged  too  widely  to  work  any 
serious  mischief  to  the  besieged ;  but  their  grand  fiery 
flight  as  they  passed  over  the  city  struck  terror  into  the 
hearts  of  the  people,  who  clustered  upon  the  roofs  of  the 
houses,  praying  and  crying  by  turns.  "  The  uproar  and 
confusion  inside  was  tremendous,  whilst  not  a  sound  was 
heard  from  the  ramparts  which  a  few  nights  before  had 
been  shaken  by  clamour."*  The  defenders  of  the  city  had 
too  much  serious  occupation  on  hand  to  expend  them- 
selves in  much  noise.  It  was  no  easy  thing  to  repair 
the  defences  which  were  crumbling  to  pieces  under  the 
fire  of  the  Persian  batteries.  Silently,  but  resolutely, 
they  set  about  their  work,  repairing  the  mischief  as  it 
arose,  and  giving  a  new  character  of  defence  to  the 
battered  fortifications,  t 

suddenly  vanished.  About  half  an  hour  afterwards,  another  man, 
covered  with  mud,  made  his  appearance  with  a  head  in  his  hand.  The 
Wuzeer,  thinking  it  looked  as  though  it  had  no  ears,  ordered  one  of 
his  retainers  to  examine  it.  On  this  the  bearer  of  the  ghastly  trophy 
thrfew  it  down,  and  ran  away  with  all  the  speed  he  could  command. 
The  head  was  picked  up  by  one  of  the  Wuzeer's  retainers,  and  found 
to  be  that  of  a  comrade,  who  had  fallen  during  a  sortie  of  the  pre- 
ceding night.  The  fellow  was  pursued,  and  soundly  beaten  and 
kicked — but  the  more  successful  bringer-in  of  tbe  ears  was  not  to  be 
found,  though  several  rough  unscrupulous  fellows  were  told  by  the 
Wuzeer- that  they  might  possess  themselves  of  both  cloak  and  ducats  if 
they  could. 

*■  MS.  Journal  of  Eldred  Pottinger. 

t  ' '  The  enemy's  fire  being  directed  to  the  parapet  at  all  points,  the 
rubbish  began  to  shelter  the  foot  of  the  escarp.  Strong  working 
parties  commenced  building  up  backs  to  the  rampart  at  the  point  fired 


PROGRESS   OF   THE    STEGE.  231 

Day  after  day,  with  little  change  of  circumstance  and 
little  gain  to  either  party,  the  siege  continued  throughout 
the  months  of  November  and  December.  At  the  end  of 
the  former,  Pottinger  wTote  in  his  journal,  "  The  Persians 
have  wasted  some  thousand  rounds  of  ammunition,  and 
are  not  more  advanced  than  when  the  firing  commenced." 
The  dreaded  artillery  of  Mahomed  Shah  was  less  for- 
midable in  reality  than  in  the  excited  imaginations  of  the 
Heratees  ;  and  the  besieged  gathered  new  corn-age  from 
the  success  of  their  resistance.  The  fire  from  the  Persian 
batteries  was  irregular  and  spasmodic ;  sometimes  main- 
tained with  exceeding  spirit,  and  at  others  languid  and 
uncertain.  The  round  shot  from  the  guns  went  over  the 
batteries,  often  clearing  the  entire  city,  but  sometimes 
falling  within  it.  The  vertical  firing  from  the  mortars 
told  with  better  effect.  The  shells*  were  thrown  less  at 
random,  and  many  houses  were  destroyed.  The  loss  of 
life  was  not  great  in  the  city ;  but  those  domestic  episodes 
of  war,  which  give  so  painful  an  interest  to  the  annals  of 
an  attack  upon  a  fortified  town,  were  not  absent  from  the 
siege  of  Herat.  In  the  next  house  to  that  in  which  Eldred 
Pottinger  resided,  a  shell  descended  close  to  the  spot  on 
which  an  infant  was  sleeping.  The  terrified  mother  rushed 
between  the  deadly  missile  and  her  child.  The  shell 
exploding  carried  off  her  head;  and  the  corpse  of  the 
mother  fell  upon  the  babe,  and  suffocated  it. 

In  the  mean  while,  with  a  vigour  and  a  constancy 
worthy  of  any  garrison,  in  ancient  or  in  modem  times, 

at,  so  that  the  body  of  the  old  rampart  may  become  a  parapet,  and 
the  summit  of  the  new  back  a  terre-pleine  from  which  to  defend  the 
breaches  when  formed." — [MS.  Journal  of  Eldred  Pottinger.] 

*  "A  great  number  of  these  shells  are  carved  out  of  slate-rock,  and 
their  chamber  contains  little  more  than  a  bursting  charge.  Hence 
they  are  unable  to  do  much  execution." — [MS.  Journal  of  Eldred 
Poitinger.] 


232  THE    SIEGE   OF   HERAT. 

the  besieged  continued  to  conduct  their  defensive  opera- 
tions. Three  of  the  five  gates  of  the  city  were  kept  open, 
and  the  communications  with  the  surrounding  country 
were  preserved.  The  cattle  were  sent  out  to  graze.  Fire- 
wood and  other  commodities  were  brought  into  the  city. 
Every  night  the  garrison  salhed  out,  attacked  the  working 
parties,  carried  off  their  tools,  often  destroyed  their  en- 
trenchments, wounded  and  sometimes  killed  the  workmen, 
and  carried  their  bleeding  heads,  with  barbarous  triumph, 
into  the  city. 

Whilst  the  activity  of  the  garrison  thus  sensibly 
increased,  that  of  the  besiegers  was  plainly  declining. 
Throughout  the  month  of  December  little  progress  was 
made.  The  fire  of  the  Persian  batteries  slackened — some- 
times altogether  ceased.  When  it  was  most  lively,  it  was 
wild  and  eccentric — so  slovenly,  indeed,  as  to  warrant  the 
belief  that  eveiy  gun  was  pointed  in  a  different  direction, 
and  every  gunner  firing  at  some  particular  mark  of  his 
own.  At  last,  on  Christmas  Day,  when  the  siege  had 
been  continued  for  more  than  a  month,  Eldred  Pottinger 
wrote  in  his  journal,  "  I  could  not  help  recollecting  the 
three  shots  a  day  which  the  Spanish  army  before  Gibraltar 
fired  for  some  time,  and  which  the  ganison  called  after 
the  Trinity." 

The  following  day  was  one  of  barbarous  retaliation. 
All  the  Persian  prisoners  in  Herat  were  sent  off  for  sale  to 
Kurookh.  There  were  Afghan  prisoners,  at  this  time,  in 
the  Persian  camp ;  and  Mahomed  Shah  had  no  refined 
Christian  notions  on  the  score  of  returning  good  for  evil. 
He  ripped  up  the  bellies,  or  destroyed  after  some  cruel 
fashion,  all  the  prisoners  who  fell  into  his  hands.  After 
this,  in  spite  of  the  heavy  rains  that  fell  during  the  two 
succeeding  days,  there  were  some  demonstrations  of  in- 
creased vigour  in  the  conduct  of  the  siege.  A  mine  was 
sprung,  and  a  practicable  breach  effected ;  but  the  storming 


FESTIVAL    OF   THE   EYD.  233 

party  was  driven  back  with  considerable  loss.  Hadjee 
Khan,  who  commanded  the  party,  was  severely  wounded, 
and  one  Mahomed  Sheriff,  a  deserter  from  Herat,  and  a 
soldier  of  very  formidable  reputation,  was  killed  in  the 
breach.  So  much  was  this  man  dreaded,  and  such 
throughout  the  city  was  the  opinion  of  his  prowess,  that 
when  intelligence  of  his  death  was  conveyed  to  Kamran, 
the  Shah  exclaimed,  with  eager  delight,  "  Mahomed  Shah, 
I  am  well  satisfied,  will  never  take  Herat  nowy 

The  30th  of  December  was  the  great  day  of  the  festival 
of  the  Eyd-i-Ramzan.  On  this  day  the  long  Mahomedan 
fast  terminates  ;  and  it  is  ordinarily  one  of  feasting  and 
rejoicing.  Even  now,  with  becoming  festivity,  was  it 
observed  both  by  besiegers  and  besieged.  On  either  side 
there  was  a  tacit  suspension  of  hostilities.  Accompanied 
by  the  royal  family.  Shah  Kamran  w^ent  in  procession  to 
the  Juma  Musjid,  or  great  mosque;*  and,  after  offering 
up  the  accustomed  prayers,  distributed  sweetmeats  among 
tlie  MooUahs.  Tlie  holy  men  scrambled  for  the  delicacies 
with  surprising  activity  ;  but  they  were  deprived  of  their 
accustomed  banquet  of  more  substantial  food.  The  libe- 
mlity  of  his  Majesty,  on  this  occasion,  flowed  in  a  different 
channel.  It  was  not  a  time  in  which  to  distribute  valuable 
provender  among  such  unsei-viceable  people  as  priests, 
nobles,  and  courtiers.  The  customary  entertainment  to 
these  worthies  gave  place,  therefore,  to  a  distribution  of 
all  the  disposable  provisions  to  the  fighting  men  and 
opei-atives  on  the  works. 

The  new  year  opened  with  some  increase  of  activity  on 
the  part  of  the  besiegers.  Their  mining  operations  alarmed 
the  garrison ;  and  vigorous  efforts  were  made  by  a  corre- 
sponding activity  in  the  works,  to  frustrate  the  designs  of 
the  assailants.     All  true  Maliomedans  were  called  upon, 

*   "They  made,"  says  Pottinger,  " but  a  beggarly  appeai-ance." 


234  THE   SIEGE   OF   HERAT. 

by  proclamation,  to  aid  in  the  defence  of  the  city,  as  the 
danger  was  very  pressing.  The  assistance  of  the  MooUahs 
was  called  in  to  organise  working  parties  from  among  the 
people ;  and  the  houses  of  the  Sheeahs  and  all  suspected 
persons  were  again  searched  for  arms.  In  the  midst  of 
these  preparations,  an  emissary  from  the  Persian  camp 
made  his  appearance  in  the  trenches  opposite  to  the  south- 
west bastion,  and  demanded  to  speak  with  the  Wuzeer. 
This  was  the  brother  of  Yar  Mahomed,  Shere  Mahomed 
Khan,  who  had  delivered  up  Ghorian  to  the  Persians, 
The  Wuzeer  refused  to  see  him  ;  but  the  Sirdar  implored 
the  soldiers  at  the  post  to  tell  his  brother  that  if  Herat 
were  not  surrendered  to  Mahomed  Shah,  the  Persian 
monarch  would  put  him  to  death,  storm  the  city,  hang 
Yar  Mahomed  like  a  dog,  and  give  his  women  and  children 
to  be  publicly  dishonoured  by  the  muleteers. 

The  Afghans  replied  with  a  volley  of  abuse,  cursing  the 
Sirdar  and  the  Persians ;  but  the  message  was  delivered 
to  the  Wuzeer.  It  found  the  minister  in  no  very  gentle 
mood.  The  mention  of  his  brother's  name  exasperated 
him  beyond  control.  "  Tell  the  Sirdar,"  he  said,  "  I  am 
glad  that  Mahomed  Shah  intends  to  save  me  the  trouble 
of  putting  the  traitor  to  death.  He  is  no  brother  of  mine. 
I  disown  him.  He  is  not  my  father's  son.  He  is  not  an 
Afghan,  but  a  Cashmerian,  after  his  mother.  As  for 
myself,  when  Mahomed  Shah  takes  the  city,  he  is  at 
liberty  to  do  with  me  what  he  likes.  In  all  other 
respects,  I  am  his  Majesty's  most  obedient  seivant ; 
but  I  cannot  obey  him  in  this  matter,  for  the  Afghans 
will  not  hear  of  smTender."  *     And  with  this  messiige 

*  The  Wuzeer  was  too  crafty  a  man  to  do  anything  to  exasperate  the 
Shah  of  Persia  whilst  there  was  the  least  prospect  of  his  success 
Pottinger's  opinion  on  the  subject  is  worth  quoting  : — "  The  minister 
throughout  all  the  negotiations  constantly  addressed  Mahomed  Shah  as 
his  sovereign,  and  called  both  Hadjee  Akasy  (the  Persian  prime  minis- 


CONDUCT    OF   YAR   MAHOMED.  235 

Shere  Mahomed  returned,  crest-fallen,  to  the  Persian 
camp.* 

ter)  and  Alayar  Khan  (Asoof-ood-dowlah)  his  father.  He  also  invari- 
ably threw  the  blame  of  the  defence  on  some  one  else,  and  regretted 
being  obliged  to  fight.  He  constantly  talked  of  his  being  bound  in 
honour  to  serve  his  master,  Kamran,  but  in  inclination  to  serve 
Mahomed  Shah.  He  also  invariably  avoided  mixing  himself  up  indi- 
vidually in  any  act  decidedly  hostile  to  Persian  feelings  or  prejudices  ; 
allowing  some  of  his  friends  to  act,  and  then,  under  (to  the  Persians) 
a  show  of  inquiry,  sharing  the  advantages  ;  so  that  in  reality  very  few 
tangible  instances  could  be  mentioned  of  his  hostility,  and  none  but 
what,  as  a  good  talker,  he  could  easily  assert  were  not  so ;  and  that  he 
had  taken  the  Persian  side.  He  knew  that  the  King  was  aware  that 
all  the  chiefs  of  the  Persian  army  supported  themselves  by  the  same 
means  as  he  did  ;  and  in  many  instances  without  adding  the  lip- 
loyalty  which  he  always  gave  vent  to — that,  moreover,  he  could  say 
that  he  did  not  oppress  the  Persian  people — that  it  was  the  other  chiefs 
who  did  so — that  without  aid,  he  could  not  check  it  in  his  equals,  who 
would  otherwise  join  to  overthrow  him — that  the  aylayats  (wandering 
tribes)  always  acted  so — that  he  would  not  desert  the  cause  of  his 
patron  and  benefactor.  In  a  despot,  who  only  looks  in  his  followers 
for  personal  attachment,  and  prefers  the  hardiest  and  most  unscru- 
pulous, less  than  this  would  have  secxired  favour  ;  nay,  more,  among 
chiefs  who  support  themselves  in  the  same  way,  such  arguments  would 
have  secured  popularity  ;  and  as  parties  also  ran  high  in  the  Persian 
camp,  and  he  had  secured  the  favour  of  the  two  chiefs,  both  sides 
would  have  been  anxious  to  secure  so  knowing  and  powerful  an  assistant 
by  exertions  in  procuring  his  liberty.  Yar  Mahomed,  with  that  shrewd- 
ness which  characterises  the  Afghan  nation,  saw  the  favourable  position 
he  was  in,  and  availed  himself  of  it  to  the  utmost.  He  had  an  over- 
weening idea  of  the  valour  of  his  countrymen  in  arms,  and  a  corre- 
sponding low  one  of  that  of  the  Persians.  From  having  failed  in  a  siege 
with  his  own  people,  he  thought  no  other  army  could  succeed  against 
his  nation  ;  and  in  the  event  of  being  taken,  his  eyes,  overlooking  the 
danger  to  which  the  Persian  wrath  might  expose  him,  were  dazzled 
with  visions  of  the  wealth,  the  power,  and  glory  he  might  acquire  ia 


*  On  the  10th  of  January,  "  money  being  wanted,  the  houses  of  the 
Persian  followers  of  Shere  Mahomed  were  confiscated  on  a  charge  of 
treason,  in  giving  up  Ghorian." — [Pottingei's  Journal:  MS.I 


236  THE   SIEGE    OF    HERAT. 

The  siege  operations  were  continued;  but  with  little 
access  of  vigour.  The  Persians  were  conducting  no  less 
than  five  several  attacks  on  different  points  of  the  fortifi- 
cations. The  work  was  not  carried  forward  in  a  manner 
that  would  have  gladdened  the  heart  of  the  commanding 
officer  of  a  corps  of  English  sappers  ;  but  the  real  nature 
of  the  enemy's  movements  was  so  little  understood,  that 
the  garrison  often  exaggerated  the  danger,  and  gave  the 
Persians  credit  for  stratagems  that  had  never  entered 
their  minds.  One  example  of  this  will  suffice.  From 
beneath  the  rampart  opposite  the  attack,  conducted  by- 
General  Samson  and  the  Russian  regiment,  a  mysterious 
noise,  as  of  mining,  was  heard  to  proceed.  It  was  audible 
to  very  few,  and  then  only  from  a  particular  point ;  but 
abundant  confirmation  of  the  worst  apprehensions  of  the 
gari'ison  was  derived  from  the  fact  that  there  was  a 
working  party  in  constant  activity,  throwing  out  black 
mud  from  the  trench  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  spot 
whence  the  mysterious  sounds  were  heard  to  issue.  The 
greatest  alarm  was  occasioned  by  this  intelligence  ;  and 
the  Heratees  began  at  once  to  take  counsel  as  to  the  best 
means  of  counteracting  the  stratagems  of  the  besiegers. 

In  this  crisis,  the  advice  of  Eldred  Pottinger  was  sought 
by  the  garrison.  His  activity  was  unfailing ;  he  was 
always  on  the  ramparts ;  always  ready  to  assist  with  his 

the  service  of  what  he  thought  a  rich  and  ill-managed  government.  I 
do  not  mean  to  say  that  any  persons  had  recommended  this  plan  to  Yar 
Mahomed,  or  that  it  had  been  [obscure  in  MS.]  ;  but  that  from  the 
multitude  of  his  counsellors,  some  recommending  war,  some  submis- 
sion, this  must  have  been  the  mean  opinion  ;  and,  added  to  the  know- 
ledge that,  whether  he  defended  himself  or  not,  his  life  was  in  the  same 
danger,  and.that  the  promise  of  a  Kajar  was  only  to  be  trusted  as  a 
last  resource.  He,  therefore,  addressed  himself  to  the  task  of  defence ; 
but,  at  the  same  time,  took  steps  to  secure  his  interest  in  case  of  a 
reverse.  I  do  not  think  that  he  could  have  succeeded  in  the  latter 
point*  but  he,  doubtless,  had  hopes  of  succeeding." — [MS.  Journal.} 


ELDRED    POTTINGER.  237 

counsel — the  counsel  of  an  educated  English  officer — the 
ruder  science  of  the  responsible  conductors  of  the  defence, 
and  to  inspire  with  his  animating  presence  new  heart  into 
the  Afghan  soldiery.  They  asked  him  now  if  it  were 
possible  to  mine  below  the  ditch.  His  answer  was  in  the 
affirmative  ;  but  he  represented  at  the  same  time  how 
much  more  feasible  it  was  to  fill  up  the  ditch  and  sap 
across  it.  "The  fear  of  stratagem,  however,"  he  says, 
"  was  predominant ;  and  they  took  stronger  measures  to 
counteract  the  supposed  danger,  and  went  to  greater 
trouble  about  it  than  they  did  with  actions  of  vital  im- 
portance to  their  preservation.  I  recommended  that  a 
gallery  of  envelope  under  the  lower  fausse-hraie  should  be 
completed,  and  in  it  a  few  shafts  sunk  a  little  below  the 
floor  of  the  gallery.  This  did  not  satisfy  them ;  so  they 
sunk  shafts  on  both  sides  of  the  wall  and  connected  them 
by  galleries  ;  and  dug  a  ditch  inside  the  city,  at  the  foot 
of  the  mound,  till  the  water  stood  several  feet  deep  in  it." 
The  sequel  of  all  this  is  sufficiently  diverting.  It  was  not 
until  some  months  afterwards,  when  these  extensive  and 
laborious  works  were  nearly  completed,  that  it  was  dis- 
covered that  the  mysterious  noise,  which  had  struck  so 
great  a  terror  into  the  hearts  of  the  garrison,  arose  from 
nothing  more  formidable  than  "  a  poor  woman,  who  was  in 
the  habit  of  using  a  hand-mill  to  grind  her  wheat,  in  an 
excavation  at  the  back  of  the  mound."* 

On  the  18th  of  January,  Yar  Mahomed  besought  Eldred 
Pottinger  to  proceed  as  an  envoy,  on  the  part  of  the 

*  *'  The  digging  a  gallery,"  writes  Pottinger,  *'  under  the  wall,  and 
entering  in  the  midst  of  the  town,  appeared  a  most  capital  plan,  an(^ 
suited  much  better  their  cunning  than  any  other.  Consequently,  they 
were  seriously  alarmed,  and  for  a  time  serious  consequences  resulted  to 
the  Sheeah  inhabitants' ;  and  many  domiciliary  visits  were  paid  in 
search  of  the  gallery,  whilst  the  ruins  and  empty  houses  were  particu- 
larly patrolled  for  many  nights." — [MS.  Journal.'] 


238  THE   SIEGE    OF   HERAT. 

Afghans,  to  the  Persian  camp.  The  young  Enghsh  officer 
readily  assented  to  the  proposal ;  and  it  was  arranged  that 
on  the  morrow  he  should  have  an  audience  of  Shah 
Kamran,  and  receive  instructions  for  the  conduct  of  his 
mission.  Accordingly,  on  the  following  day,  he  was  con- 
ducted to  the  residence  of  the  Shah.  As  he  went  along, 
he  observed  with  pain,  in  the  interior  of  the  city,  the 
desolating  effects  of  the  siege.  "Scarcely  a  shop  had 
escaped  destruction.  The  shutters,  seats,  shelves — nay, 
even  the  very  beams  and  door-posts — ^had  in  general  been 
torn  out  for  firewood.  Scarcely  any  business  was  going 
on.  Here  and  there  were  gathered  knots  of  the  pale 
and  anxious  citizens,  whispering  their  condolences  and 
grievances — anxious  that  they  might  escape  the  notice  of 
the  rude  Afghans,  who  were  swaggering  about  the  streets."* 
The  room  in  which  the  Shah  received  the  English  officer 
was  a  dreary,  comfortless  place.  "  I  have  seen  nothing  I 
can  compare  to  it,"  wrote  Pottinger,  "  but  an  empty  store- 
room carpeted."  Plainly,  but  richly  attir6d,  attended  only 
by  his  eunuchs,  the  Shah  welcomed  the  young  English- 
man. But  he  appeared  ill  at  ease — unhappy  about  him- 
self— ^peevish,  and  lost  in  thought ;  for  he  was  sick.  It 
was  plain,  indeed,  that  he  was  more  concerned  about  his 
health  than  about  the  safety  of  the  city.  Sending  for  his 
chief  physician,  he  consulted  him  about  the  royal  symptoms, 
and  in  the  intervals  of  this  interesting  personal  conversa- 
tion, coughed  out,  with  considerable  energy  and  warmth, 
his  instructions  to  the  British  officer.     His  cough,  indeed, 

*  Eldred  Pottingei's  MS.  Journal.  "No  matter,"  he  adds,  "how 
the  cowardice  and  meanness  of  these  men  might  be  despised,  no  one 
could  help  pitying  the  wretchedness  they  were  suffering.  Even  the 
better  class  of  the  Afghans  used  to  say,  *  Afsoos  ast,  Igkin  ehi  koonym ' 
— '  It  is  a  pity,  but  what  can  we  do  ? '  In  the  Pay  "Hissar  (esplanade 
in  front  of  the  drawbridge)  were  lying  half  a  dozen  Persian  heads  lately 
brought  in." 


PROPOSED    MISSION   OF   POTTINGER.  239 

in  all  probability,  saved  him  from  something  more  seriouB. 
For  when  he  had  worked  himself  into  a  passion,  it  com- 
pelled him  to  pause,  and  whilst  he  was  applying  himself 
to  the  restoratives  at  hand,  he  cooled  down  till  the  next 
paroxysm  of  rage  and  coughing  brought  him  to  a  full 
stop. 

The  interview  was  long  and  tedious.  Much  was  said  in 
a  very  wordy  language  by  the  Shah,  about  his  own  merits 
and  his  own  wrongs,  and  the  ingratitude  and  injustice  of 
his  enemies.  Then  Pottinger  received  his  instructions 
regarding  the  message  which  he  was  to  deliver  in  the 
Persian  camp.  It  commenced  with  a  string  of  reproaches, 
and  ended  in  a  strain  of  mingled  invective  and  entreaty. 

"  How  generous  !"  ran  the  message,  after  much  more  in 
the  same  style.  "  You  look  round  to  see  who  your  neigh- 
bours are.  I  am  your  weakest  one.  You,  therefore, 
assemble  all  your  force  to  rob  me  of  my  last  of  eighty 
cities.  You  answer  my  supplication  for  aid  by  the  roar  of 
your  cannon  and  bombs.  Raise  the  siege ;  retire  and 
give  me  the  troops  and  guns  I  want  to  recover  my  king- 
dom ;  and  I  will  give  you  Herat  on  my  return.  Send  the 
Afghan  traitors  out  of  your  camp.  If  you  persist  in  your 
present  puipose,  future  ages  will  call  you  a  robber,  who 
preyed  upon  the  aged  and  helpless.  If  you  do  not  act 
generously,  God  is  great ;  and  on  him  we  rely.  We  have 
still  got  our  swords." 

Such  was  the  pith  of  the  message  which  Pottinger  was 
commissioned  to  deliver  to  the  Shah  of  Persia.  It  came 
out  by  snatches,  in  an  excited  spasmodic  manner ;  but  was 
understood  by  the  British  officer.  Having  heard  all  that 
was  to  be  said,  he  took  his  departure,  and  joined  the 
Wuzeer  upon  the  works.  But,  for  some  time,  the  pro- 
jected negotiations  never  advanced  beyond  the  threshold. 
It  occurred  to  Shah  Kamran  that  it  would  be  well  to 
strike  a  blow,  and  to  achieve  some  demonstrable  success, 


240  THE    SIEGE    OF   HERAT. 

before  despatching  an  emissary  to  the  Persian  camp,  lest 
the  overtures  should  be  attributed  to  conscious  weakness, 
and  rather  increase  than  lower  the  pretensions  of  the 
Shah. 

An  attempt  was  soon  made  to  strike  an  important  blow, 
but  it  was  singularly  unsuccessful.  On  the  21st  of  January, 
the  Afghans  determined  to  make  a  night  attack,  in  consi- 
derable force,  upon  the  camp  of  Sirdar  Mahomed  Khan  at 
Karta.  Nearly  the  whole  garrison  turned  out,  and  was 
reviewed  by  the  Wuzeer,  The  King  himself,  looking  out 
from  a  tower  of  the  citadel,  surveyed  in  secret  the  gather- 
ing below,  as  Yar  Mahomed,  on  the  terre-pleine  of  the 
rampart,  surrounded  by  all  the  principal  chiefs  not  abso- 
lutely on  duty  elsewhere,  mustered  the  fighting  men  on  the 
lower  part  of  the  works.  Twelve  hundred  men  were  se- 
lected for  the  sortie,  and  told  off  in  detachments,  under 
the  command  of  different  chiefs.  Divesting  themselves  of 
whatever  could,  in  any  way,  encumber  their  movements — 
of  everything,  indeed,  but  their  shirts,  drawers,  skull-caps, 
and  swords — they  filed  out  of  the  Kootoobchak  gate,  the 
chief  of  each  party  naming  his  men,  one  by  one,  as  they 
crossed  the  drawbridge.  Futteh  Mahomed  Khan,  to  whom 
the  command  of  the  entire  party  had  been  entrusted,  fol- 
lowed last,  upon  foot.  But  of  all  these  great  preparations 
nothing  came  at  last.  "  The  business  failed  ;  no  attack 
was  made  ;  and  every  one  was  blamed  by  his  neighbour."* 

This  lamentable  failure  determined  the  Shah  to  post- 
pone Pottinger's  departure  for  the  Persian  camp.  To 
commence  negotiations  immediately  after  a  miscarriage  of 
so  formidable  a  nature,  would  have  been  a  confession  of 
weakness,  very  impolitic  in  such  a  conjuncture.  The 
King,  therefore,  imperatively  arrested  the  movements  of 
the  young  English  ambassador,  whilst  the  Wuzeer  began 

*  MS.  Journal  of  Eldred  Pottinger. 


ACTION    ON    THE    PLAIN.  241 

to  bethink  himself  of  the  best  means  of  removing  the  im- 
pediment which  loomed  so  largely  before  the  eyes  of  the 
King.  Accordingly  it  was  determined  that,  on  the  26th  of 
January,  both  the  cavalry  and  the  infantry  should  be  sent 
out  to  draw  the  Persians  into  action.  It  was  a  fine,  bright 
morning.  The  whole  city  was  in  an  unusual  state  of  ex- 
citement. Partly  impelled  by  curiosity,  partly  moved  by 
a  more  laudable  ambition  to  fill  the  places  of  those  whose 
services  were  required  beyond  the  walls,  the  citizens  fliocked 
to  the  ramparts.  Along  the  whole  eastern  face  of  the 
fortifications  the  parapets  and  towers  were  alive  with  men. 
"  The  old  Afghans  and  relatives  of  the  military,"  writes 
Pottinger,  "  in  like  manner  crowded  the  fausse-hraies.  I 
do  not  think  that  less  than  7000  men  were  assembled  on 
one  side  in  view  of  the  enemy."  The  scene  on  which  they 
looked  down,  was  a  most  exciting  one.  It  stirred  the 
hearts  of  that  eager  multitude  as  the  heart  of  one  man. 
The  Afghan  cavalry,  on  issuing  from  the  city,  had  spread 
themselves  over  the  open  country  to  the  east,  and  the 
foot-men  had  taken  possession  of  a  neighbouring  village 
and  its  surrounding  gardens.  The  Persian  videttes  had 
fallen  back ;  the  trenches  and  batteries  had  been  manned; 
and  the  reserves  had  stood  to  their  ai-ms,  when,  looking 
down  from  the  ramparts,  the  excited  Heratees  saw  the 
Persian  Sirdar,  Mahomed  Khan,  with  a  large  body  of 
troops,  prepare  himself  for  an  offensive  movement,  and 
push  onward  to  the  attack.  At  the  head  of  the  column 
were  the  Persian  cavalry.  As  soon  as  they  appeared  in 
sight,  the  Afghan  horse  streamed  across  the  plain,  and 
poured  themselves  full  upon  the  enemy. 

The  charge  of  the  Afghans  was  a  gallant  and  a  successful 
one.  Whilst  the  ramparts  of  Herat  rang  with  the  excited 
acclamation  of  "  Shabdsh  !  Shabdsh  !  Chi  Roostumdny  r 
("Bravo  1  Bravo  !  conduct  worthy  of  Roostum  himself !") 
the  Persian  column  gave  way  before  its  impetuous  assail- 


242  THE    SIEGE    OF   HERAT. 

ants,  and  retreated  amongst  the  buildings  from  which  it 
had  debouched.  For  a  short  time  the  progress  of  the 
struggle  was  lost  sight  of  by  the  gazers  on  the  ramparts  ; 
but  the  sharp,  quick  rattle  of  the  musketry,  the  loud 
booming  of  the  guns,  and  the  columns  of  dust  that  rose 
against  the  clear  sky,  told  that  the  infantry  and  artillery 
had  covered  the  retreat  of  the  Persian  horsemen.  The 
tide  of  victory  now  turned  against  the  Afghan  force.  The 
Heratees,  who  before  had  driven  back  the  Persian  cavalry, 
were  now  in  turn  driven  back  by  the  enemy.  The  squadrons 
in  the  rear,  instead  of  closing  up,  wheeled  about,  and  the 
whole  column  was  soon  in  flight.  Recovering  themselves, 
however,  for  a  short  time,  the  struggle  was  briefly  renewed 
on  the  plain  ;  but  the  Persian  horse  being  well  supported 
by  the  infantry  planted  in  the  gardens  on  both  sides, 
whilst  the  rear  of  the  Afghan  cavaliy  afforded  no  support 
to  the  troops  in  front,  the  flight  of  the  Heratees  was 
renewed,  and  a  gun  was  brought  to  bear  upon  their 
retreating  columns.  With  varying  success  the  battle  was 
continued  throughout  the  day.  Towards  evening  the 
Afghans  regained  the  advantage  which  they  had  lost  at 
an  earlier  period  of  the  engagement ;  and  as  the  shades  of 
evening  fell  over  the  scene,  the  Persians  evacuated  the 
posts  they  had  occupied,  and  the  Afghans  were  left  in 
possession  of  the  field. 

The  engagement,  though  a  long,  was  not  a  sanguinary 
one.  The  loss  on  the  side  of  the  Afghans  was  not  estimated 
at  more  than  twenty-five  or  thirty  killed.  The  Heratees, 
of  course,  claimed  the  victory;  but  the  Sheeah  inhabi- 
tants, who  had  made  their  way  to  the  walls  of  the  city, 
and  were  among  the  spectators  of  the  fight,  could  not 
repress  their  inclination  to  sneer  at  a  success  of  so  dubious 
a  character.*      To  the  young    English  oflicer  who    had 

*  Contending  emotions  of  sympathy,  now  with  their  co-religionists, 


I 


RESULT    OF   THE   ACTIOX.  243 

watched  the  events  of  the  day,  it  was  very  clear  that 
neither  army  was  of  a  very  formidable  character.  The 
Afghan  cavalry  made  a  better  show  than  that  of  the 
enemy,  but  in  the  infantry  branch  the  advantage  was 
greatly  on  the  side  of  the  Persians.  The  whole  affair 
was  nothing  better  than  a  series  of  skirmishes,  now  re- 
sulting in  favour  of  one  party,  now  of  the  other.  But 
the  crafty  Wuzeer  boasted  of  it  as  a  great  triumph ;  and 
on  the  following  morning  went  round  to  all  those  parts 
of  the  works  from  which  the  scene  below  could  not  be 
observed,  rendering  a  highly  embellished  account  of  the 
events  of  that  memorable  day.  "Though  so  changed," 
says  Pottinger,  "  that  scarcely  any  one  could  recognise  it, 
those  who  had  been  present  in  the  fight,  finding  them- 
selves such  heroes,  commenced  swelling  and  vapouring. 
The  soldiery  gathered  round  in  the  greatest  excitement, 
and  their  opinion  of  their  own  superiority  to  the  Per- 
sians was  greatly  increased.  Many  of  them  would  say, 
"  If  we  had  but  guns  !"  Others,  evidently  disliking  the 
Persian  cannon,  would  improve  on  this,  and  say,  "  Ah  !  if 
the  infidels  had  no  guns,  we  would  soon  send  them  away." 
On  the  8th  of  February,  Pottinger  received  permission 
to  visit  the  Persian  camp.  In  the  public  baths  of  the 
city,  where  Yar  Mahomed,  with  other  men  of  note,  in 
a  state  of  almost  entire  nudity,  was  sitting  at  breakfast 
on  the  floor — his  officers  and  servants  standing  around 

and  now  with  their  fellow-citizens,  agitated  the  breasts  of  the  Heratees. 
**I  went,"  writes  Pottinger,  on  the  2nd  of  February,  "  to  see  a  Sheeah  : 
he  was  grieving  over  the  fate  which  hung  over  him  ;  one  moment 
cursiug  Mahomed  Shah's  pusillanimity — the  next,  the  Afghan  tyranny. 
But  through  the  whole  of  his  discontent,  I  observed  be  felt  a  sort  of 
pride  and  satisfaction  in  being  the  countryman  of  those  who  set  the 
Persians  at  defiance.  But  he  appeared  fully  impressed  with  the  idea 
that  the  city  must  fall,  whilst  the  Afghans  I  had  just  left  were  talking 
of  plundering  Teheran  with  the  aid  of  our  artillery  and  infantry." — 
[MS.  lie  cords.] 

R  2 


244  THE   SIEGE    OF   HERAT. 

him  armed  to  the  teeth — the  English  officer  took  leave  of 
the  Wuzeer.  "  Tell  Hadjee  Meerza  Aghassi"  (the  Persian 
minister),  said  Yar  Mahomed,  "that  ever  since  he  has 
honoured  me  with  the  title  of  son,  and  the  Hadjee  has 
assumed  that  of  my  father,  I  have  been  most  desirous  of 
showing  him  filial  affection,  and  have  endeavoured  to  do 
so.  But  the  Hadjee,  in  a  most  unpaternal  manner,  has 
brought  the  Shah-in-Shah  with  an  army  to  besiege  Herat ; 
and  I  am  bound,  by  the  salt  I  am  eating,  to  stand  by  my 
old  master.  If,  however,  they  will  return  to  Persia,  I 
will  follow  and  show  my  obedience  as  the  son  of  the 
Hadjee  and  the  servant  of  the  Shah-in-Shah.  Further, 
tell  him,  that  whatever  may  be  my  own  wish,  the  Afghans 
would  never  surrender  the  city,  nor  dare  I  propose  it  to 
them.  And  you  may  tell  him,  too,  that  we  have  all 
Heard  of  the  bad  treatment  received  by  the  Afghans  who 
have  joined  the  camp  of  Mahomed  Shah,  and  are  thereby 
deterred  from  joining  his  Persian  Majesty." 

Carrying  this  message  with  him,  Pottinger  left  the 
city,  accompanied  by  a  small  party  of  Afghans.  They 
attended  him  some  distance  beyond  the  walls ;  and  then 
shouting  out  their  good  wishes,  left  him  to  pursue  his 
journey.  A  single  attendant,  Syud  Ahmed,  and  a  cossid 
went  with  him.  Pushing  on  through  narrow,  tortuous 
lanes,  bounded  by  high  mud  walls,  and  every  moment 
expecting  to  be  saluted  by  a  bullet  from  some  zealous 
sentinel  posted  on  his  line  of  road,  the  young  English 
officer  pushed  on  towards  the  Persian  camp.  "  I  kept  a 
good  look-out,"  he  wrote  in  his  journal ;  "  and  fortunately  I 
did  so,  as,  through  one  of  the  gaps  in  the  wall,  I  observed 
the  Persians  running  to  occupy  the  road  we  were  fol- 
lowing. I  therefore  stopped  and  made  Syud  Ahmed 
wave  his  turban,  for  want  of  a  better  flag  of  truce.  The 
Persians,  on  this,  came  towards  us  in  a  most  irregular 
manner — so  much  so  that,  if  twenty  horsemen  had  beeh 


POTTINGER   IN   THE    PERSIAN    CAMP.  245 

with  me,  the  whole  Persian  picket  might  have  been  cut 
off.  Some  were  loading  as  they  ran ;  and  one  valiant 
hero,  who  came  up  in  the  rear  after  he  had  ascertained 
who  we  were,  to  prevent  danger,  I  suppose,  loaded  his 
musket  and  fixed  his  bayonet.  They  were  a  most  ragged- 
looking  set,  and,  from  their  dress  and  want  of  beard, 
looked  inferior  to  the  Afghans.  They  were  delighted  at 
my  coming  ;  and  the  English  appeared  great  favourites 
among  them.  A  fancy  got  abroad  that  I  was  come  with 
proposals  to  surrender,  which  made  the  great  majority 
lose  all  command  over  themselves,  at  the  prospect  of  re- 
visiting their  country  so  soon.  They  crowded  round ; 
some  patting  my  legs,  and  others  my  horse,  whilst  those 
who  were  not  successful  in  getting  near  enough,  con- 
tented themselves  with  Syud  Ahmed  and  the  cossid — the 
whole,  however,  shouting,  "  Afreen !  Afreen !  Khoosh 
amedeed !  Anglish  hameshah  dostan-i  Shah-in-Shah." 
("  Bravo  !  Bravo  !  Welcome  !  The  English  were  always 
friends  of  the  King-of-Kings.")* 

The  officer  who  commanded  the  picket,  a  major  in  the 
Persian  army  who  had  served  under  Major  Hart,  who 
knew  all  the  English  officers  recently  connected  with  the 
Persian  Court  or  the  Persian  army,  and  who  had,  more- 
over, been  the  custodian  of  Yar  Mahomed  when  the 
Wuzeer  was  a  prisoner  at  Meshid,  conducted  Pottinger 
to  the  guard-room.  Apologising,  on  the  plea  of  military 
necessity,  for  any  interference  with  his  free  progress,  he 
stated  that  discipline  required  that  the  emissary  should 
be  taken  to  the  Major-General  commanding  the  attack. 
It  happened  that  General  Samson,t  of  the  Russian 
regiment,  was  the  officer  in  command.  The  way  to  the 
General's  quarters  was  "  through  gardens  and  vineyards, 

*  Eldred  Pottinger'' s  MS.  Journal. 
+  Samson  was  a  Russian  in  the  Persian  service,  commanding  a  corps 
of  Russian  refugees. 


246  THE    SIEGE    OF   HERAT. 

in  which  not  even  the  roots  of  the  trees  and  shrubs  were 
left."  The  General  received  the  British  oflficer  with  much 
courtesy,  conceiving  him  at  first  to  be  an  Afghan  ;  and  was 
greatly  surprised  to  find  that  he  was  in  the  presence  of  an 
European  soldier.  Sending  for  tea  and  kalyans  (pipes), 
he  regaled  his  guest  with  becoming  courtesy,  and  then 
sent  him  on  in  safety  to  the  Persian  camp. 

Intelligence  of  Pottinger's  arrival  had  preceded  him, 
and  the  whole  camp  came  out  to  meet  the  ambassador. 
None  knew  who  or  what  he  was.  A  report  had  gone 
forth  that  he  was  some  great  Afghan  dignitary  from 
Herat,  who  brought  the  submission  of  Kamran  to  the 
terms  of  Mahomed  Shah.  As  he  advanced,  the  torrent 
of  people  swelled  and  swelled,  until  in  the  main  street  of 
the  camp  the  crowd  was  so  dense  that,  if  the  escort  had 
not  plied  their  iron  ramrods  with  good  effect,  it  is  doubt- 
ful whether  the  embassy  would  ever  have  reached  the 
tent  of  the  Persian  Wuzeer.  The  quarters  of  the  great 
man  were  gained  at  last,  and  the  envoy  was  graciously 
received.  The  interview  was  a  brief  one.  Readily  ob- 
taining permission  to  visit  the  tent  of  Colonel  Stoddart, 
and  to  deliver  the  letters  of  which  he  was  the  bearer  from 
the  Government  of  India,  the  question  of  admission  to  the 
presence  of  Mahomed  Shah  was  left  to  be  decided  by  the 
monarch  himself.  It  is  easy  to  imagine  the  delight  of  the 
two  English  oj6&cers  on  finding  themselves,  in  so  strange  a 
place  and  under  such  strange  circumstances,  in  the  presence 
of  one  another.*  It  was  cruel  to  interrupt  such  a  meeting ; 

*  "I  then  proceeded  to  Colonel  Stoddart's  tent,  whom  I  found  in  the 
greatest  astonishment  possible,  as  his  servants,  taking  up  the  general 
report  of  my  rank,  had  announced  me  as  the  Mooshtehid  of  Herat.  He 
had  been  undressed  ;  and  putting  on  his  coat  to  do  honour  to  the  high 
dignitary,  gave  me  time  to  enter  his  tent  before  he  could  get  out,  so  we 
met  at  the  door,  where  he  overwhelmed  me  with  a  most  affectionate 
Persian  welcome,  to  which  I,  to  his  great  surprise,  replied  in  English. 


DISCUSSIONS   WITH   THE    PERSIAN   MINISTER.  247 

but  before  Stoddart  andPottinger  had  exchanged  many- 
words,  and  partaken  of  a  cup  of  coffee  in  the  former's  tent,  a 
peremptory  message  came  from  the  minister  to  summon 
the  latter  to  his  presence.  The  two  officers  went  together 
to  Hadjee  Meerza  Aghassi's  tent,  where  the  Wuzeer,  after 
the  usual  courtesies,  asked  what  was  the  message  brought 
by  Pottinger  from  "  Prince"  Kamran  to  the  King-of-Kings, 
and  what  was  that  which  Yar  Mahomed  had  sent  to  him- 
self "  I  replied,"  says  Pottinger,  "  that  the  message 
from  the  Afghan  King  was  to  the  Persian  King,  and  that 
I  could  not  deliver  it  to  any  one  else  ;  that  regarding  his 
own  message,  probably  a  smaller  number  of  auditors 
would  be  desirable."  The  tent  accordingly  was  cleared ; 
and  the  Hadjee,  a  small,  thin  man  apparently  in  a  very 
bilious  and  excitable  state,  twisted  himself  into  all  kinds 
of  undignified  contortions,  and  prepared  himself  to  receive 
the  message  of  the  Afghan  Wuzeer. 

Pottinger  delivered  his  message.  A  long,  animated, 
but  profitless  discussion  then  arose.  The  Hadjee  refused 
to  listen  to  the  Afghan  proposals,  and  declared  that  the 
English  had  themselves  set  down  Herat  on  their  maps 
as  a  part  of  the  Persian  dominions.  In  proof  of  the 
assertion,  Bumes's  map  was  produced,  and,  to  his  inex- 
pressible chagrin,  the  Hadjee  was  shown  to  be  wrong. 
Colonel  Stoddart  was  then  appealed  to  ;  but  his  answers 
were  shaped  in  true  diplomatic  fashion,  tie  had  no  in- 
structions on  the  subject — he  would  refer  the  case  to  the 
envoy  at  Teheran — he  was  not  aware  that  the  British 
Government  had  ever  received  official  information  from 
the  Persian  Government,  of  Herat  being  annexed  to  that 
state,  whilst  a  branch  of  the  Suddozye  family,  which  the 

No  one  who  has  not  experienced  it,  can  understand  the  pleasure  which 
countrymen  enjoy  when  they  thus  meet — particularly  when  of  the  same 
profession,  and  pursijing  the  same  object." — [Eldred  Pottinger' s  MS. 
Jovmal.] 


248  THE    SIEGE    OF   HERAT. 

British  Government,  in  conjunction  with  Futteh  Ali  Shah, 
had  acknowledged  as  sovereign  in  Afghanistan,  still  held 
possession  of  the  place.  The  difficulty  was  not  to  be 
solved;  and  the  English  officers  took  their  departure 
from  the  tent  of  the  Wuzeer,  to  be  summoned  shortly  to 
the  presence  of  the  Shah. 

Under  a  tent,  surrounded  on  all  «ides  by  an  outer  wall 
of  red  canvas,  Mahomed  Shah,  plainly  attired  in  a  shawl 
vest,  with  a  black  Persian  cap  on  his  head,  received 
with  becoming  courtesy  the  British  officers.  At  the  op- 
posite end  of  the  tent,  in  posture  of  profound  reverence, 
heads  bent,  and  arms  folded,  stood  the  personal  attend- 
ants of  the  King.  The  message  of  Shah  Kamran  was 
delivered  ;  and  the  Persian  monarch,  speaking  at  first 
with  much  dignity  and  calmness,  stated  in  a  clear  and 
forcible  manner,  his  complaints  against  Herat  and  its 
ruler.  But,  warming  as  he  proceeded,  he  lashed  himself 
into  a  passion  ;  denounced  Shah  Kamran  as  a  treacherous 
liar ;  and  declared  that  he  would  not  rest  satisfied  until 
he  had  planted  a  Persian  garrison  in  the  citadel  of  Herat. 
There  was  nothing  more  to  be  said  upon  the  subject ;  and 
the  British  officers  were  formally  dismissed. 

A  violent  storm,  which  broke  over  Herat  on  the  fol- 
lowing day,  prevented  Pottinger's  return  to  the  city. 
But  on  the  10th  of  February,  he  turned  his  back  upon 
the  Persian  camp.  "  I  mounted,"  he  writes,  "  and  riding 
o-ut  by  the  flank  of  the  Persian  line,  I  returned  to  the 
city  by  the  gate  I  come  out  at;  and  so  avoided' the 
points  where  hostilities  were  going  on.  On  my  coming 
back  the  whole  town  was  in  a  feraaent.  "What  they 
had  expected  I  do  not  pretend  to  know;  but  from  the 
instant  I  entered  the  gate,  I  was  surrounded  by  messen- 
gers requesting  information.  I,  however,  referred  them 
all  to  the  Wuzeer,  and  went  there  myself  After  a  short 
interview,    I  was  summoned   by  a  messenger  from   the 


PROGRESS   OF   THE    SIEGE.  249 

Shah.  His  Majesty  having  seen  my  return  with  his  glass, 
was  awaiting  my  arrival,  anxious  to  hear  Mahomed  Shah's 
message.  When  he  had  heard  it,  he  replied  by  a  gascon- 
ading speech,  abusing  every  one."  And  so  terminated 
these  first  negotiations  for  a  suspension  of  hostilities,  in  an 
utter  and  mortifying  failure. 

With  little  variation  from  the  procedure  of  the  two 
previous  months,  the  siege  operations  were  continued. 
The  Persians  had  expected  much  from  the  addition  to 
their  siege  train  of  an  immense  sixty-eight  pounder,  which 
was  to  batter  down  the  defences  of  Herat  as  easily  as 
though  they  had  been  walls  of  glass.*  But  the  gun  was 
so  badly  mounted  that,  after  the  fifth  or  sixth  roimd,  the 
light  carriage  gave  way,  and  this  formidable  new  enemy, 
that  was  to  have  done  such  great  things,  sank  into  an 
useless  incmnbrance. 

The  siege  continued  without  intermission ;  but  it  was 
evident  that  both  parties  were  anxious  to  conclude  a 
peace.  Not  many  days  after  Pottinger's  return  to  Herat, 
a  Persian  ofiicerf  came  into  the  city  with  instructions 
from  General  Samson,  privately  endorsed  by  the  Wuzeer, 
to  endeavour  to  persuade  the  Afghans  to  consent  to  the 
terms  ofi'ered  by  Mahomed  Shah.  It  was  better,  he  said, 
for  them  to  settle  their  differences  among  themselves,  than 
to  employ  the  mediation  of  infidels.:}:  At  the  same  time, 
he  assured  the  Afghans  that  Mahomed  Shah  had  no 
desire  to  interfere  in  the  internal  administration  of  Herat. 

*  They  fired  from  this  piece  eight-inch  shells  full  of  lead,  or  twelve 
or  eighteen-pound  shot,  with  an  outer  case  of  copper.  These  were  of 
so  much  value,  that  the  garrison  fought  for  them. 

+  The  same  man,  a  major  in  the  army,  whom  Pottinger  had  first 
met  in  the  Persian  camp, 

t  "The  man,"  says  Pottinger,  "was  also  instructed  to  say  that 
warning  should  be  taken  fi'om  our  conduct  in  India,  where  we  had 
pretended  friendship  and  trade  to  cover  our  ambition,  and  finally,  by 
such  deceit,  had  mastered  all  India." — [MS.  Jownal.'} 


250  THE    SIEGE    OF   HERAT. 

What  he  required  them  to  do  was,  to  supply  his  army  with 
soldiers,  as  they  had,  in  times  past,  supplied  the  armies  of 
Nadir  Shah.  The  present  movement,  he  said,  was  not  an 
expedition  against  Herat,  but  an  expedition  against  Hin- 
dostan,  and  that  it  behoved,  therefore,  all  true  Mahomedans 
to  join  the  army  of  the  King-of-Kings.  Let  them  only 
unite  themselves  under  the  banner  of  the  great  defender 
of  the  faith,  and  he  would  lead  them  to  the  conquest  and 
the  plunder  of  India  and  Toorkistan. 

The  Persian  emissary  returned,  on  the  following  day, 
bearing  promises  of  a  vague  and  delusive  kind,  and  sug- 
gestions that,  if  the  Persians  were  really  inclined  for 
peace,  the  best  proof  they  could  give  of  the  sincerity  of 
their  inclinations  would  be  the  retirement  of  the  besieg- 
ing force.  Great  was  the  excitement  after  his  departure, 
and  various  the  views  taken  of  his  mission.  By  some, 
the  young  and  thoughtless,  it  was  conjectured  that  his 
visit  betokened  a  consciousness  of  weakness  on  the  part 
of  the  enemy ;  and  they  already  began  to  picture  to 
themselves  the  flight  and  plunder  of  the  Persian  army. 
But  the  elder  and  more  sensible  shook  their  heads,  and 
began,  with  manifest  anxiety,  to  canvass  the  Persian 
terms.  It  mattered  little,  they  said,  whether  Kamran 
were  designated  Prince  or  King — whether  the  supremacy 
of  the  Persian  Shah  were,  or  were  not,  acknowledged  in 
Herat,  so  long  as  they  did  not  endeavour  to  plant  a  Per- 
sian garrison  in  the  city.  But  the  Wuzeer  declared  that 
he  had  no  confidence  in  the  Persians — that  he  desired  to 
be  guided  by  the  advice,  and  to  be  aided  by  the  medi- 
ation of  the  English  ;  and  that  if  the  Shah  would  place 
the  conduct  of  negotiations  in  the  hands  of  Colonel 
Stoddart,  he  on  his  part  would  trust  everything  to  Lieu- 
tenant Pottinger,  and  agree  to  whatever  was  decided 
upon  by  the  two  English  officers.  ''  This,"  wrote  the 
latter,   "  was  a  most  politic  measure.     It  threw  all  the 


PROGRESS    OF   THE    SIEGE.  251 

odium  of  continuing  the  war  off  the  shoulders  of  the 
Afghan  war  party  on  those  of  the  Persians,  whom  every 
one  would  blame,  if  they  declined  to  trust  their  guest, 
Colonel  Stoddart ;  and  it  would  tend  to  make  the  Afghans 
believe  that  nothing  but  their  destruction  would  satisfy 
Mahomed  Shah." 

On  the  20th  of  February,  the  Persian  emissary  again 
appeared  with  a  letter  from  the  camp  of  the  besiegers. 
It  stated  that  the  Shah  had  no  desire  to  possess  himself 
of  Herat ;  he  only  claimed  that  his  sovereignty  should  be 
acknowledged.  The  answer,  sent  back  on  the  following 
day,  was  full  of  compliments  and  promises.  Everything 
asked  for  would  be  done,  if  the  Persian  army  would 
only  retire.  On  the  24th,  the  negotiations  were  con- 
tinued— ^but  with  no  result.  The  siege,  in  the  mean  while, 
proceeded.  The  garrison  continued  their  sallies  and 
sorties — sent  out  foraging  parties — carried  off  large  quan- 
tities of  wood — and  generally  contrived  to  return  to  the 
city  without  suffering  any  injury  from  the  activity  of  the 
investing  force. 

On  the  part  of  the  latter,  as  time  advanced,  the  firing 
became  more  steady;  but  the  severity  and  uncertainty 
of  the  weather,  and  the  scarcity  of  food,  which  was 
now  beginning  to  be  painfully  felt,  damped  the  energy  of 
the  besiegers.  Continuing,  however,  to  push  on  their 
approaches,  they  did  at  least  mischief  enough  to  keep  the 
garrison  in  a  constant  state  of  activity.  Some  unimpor- 
tant outworks  were  carried ;  and  on  the  8th  of  March,  to 
the  great  mortification  of  the  Wuzeer,  the  enemy  gained 
possession  of  a  fortified  post  about  300  yards  from  the 
north-east  angle  of  the  fort.  The  Afghans  who  manned 
the  post  were  found  wanting  in  the  hour  of  danger,  and 
were  visited  with  summary  punishment  for  this  cowardly 
offence.  Their  faces  were  daubed  with  mud,  and  they 
were  sent  round  the  works  and  through  the  streets  of 


252  THE   SIEGE    OF   HERAT. 

tlie  city,  accompanied  by  a  crier,  commissioned  to  pro- 
claim their  cowardice  to  the  world. 

From  the  moment  that  this  post  fell  into  the  hands  of 
the  enemy,  "  the  investment,"  says  Pottinger,  "  began  to 
be  really  felt."  The  operations  of  the  besiegers  were 
pushed  forward  with  some  vigour,  but  the  constancy  of 
the  garrison  was  not  to  be  shaken.*  Towards  the  end  of 
March,  the  Asoof-ood-dowlah,  whose  force  had  encamped 
on  the  plain  to  the  north-west  of  the  city,  sent  in  a  mes- 
sage to  the  Afghan  minister,  offering  to  be  the  medium 
of  negotiations  for  the  suspension  of  hostilities.  The 
Afghans  sent  word  back  that  they  were  prepared  to 
listen  to  any  reasonable  overtures  ;  but  that  if  peace  were 
to  be  made,  it  must  be  made  quickly.  Seed-time,  it  was 
said,  was  passing  ;  and  once  passed,  peace  was  impos- 
sible. Their  subsistence  would  then  depend  upon  their 
plunder.  After  a  few  days,  an  interview  was  arranged 
between  Yar  Mahomed  and  the  Asoof-ood-dowlah,  and 
on  the  2nd  of  April  it  was  held  on  the  edge  of  the  ditch 
opposite  the  north-east  tower.  But  the  Wuzeer  re- 
turned, hopeless  of  any  arrangement. t  On  the  following 
day  a  grand  meeting  of  chiefs  was  held ;  but  there  was 
an  end  of  all  thought  of  peace. 

On  the  6th  of  April,  Mr.  McNeill,  the  British  minister 
at  the  Persian  Court,  arrived  in  the  camp  of  Mahomed 
Shah.      He   had  left  Teheran  on   the    10th  of   March  ; 

*  It  would  be  tedious  to  narrate  all  the  details  of  tlie  siege,  and 
difficult  to  render  them  intelligible,  even  to  the  scientific  reader,  with- 
out the  aid  of  a  series  of  elaborate  plans. 

+  "  The  point,"  says  Mr.  M'Neill,  "  on  which  the  negotiation  broke 
off  was,  I  believe,  the  demand  of  the  Shah,  that  Shah  Kamran  and  Yar 
Mahomed  should  wait  upon  him  in  his  camp,  and  there  make  their 
submission  to  him.  I  learn  that  the  Persians  did  not,  as  on  a  former 
occasion,  require  that  a  garrison  of  their  troops  should  be  admitted 
into  the  to^vn." — [M7\  M'Neill  to  Lord  Auckland,  April  11,  1838. 
Published  Correspondence.] 


ARRIVAL    OF   MR.    M'NEILL.  253 

and,  in  spite  of  efforts  made  by  the  Persian  ministers  to 
arrest  his  progi-ess  at  Ghorian,  had  pushed  on  with  all 
possible  rapidity  to  the  Persian  camp.  It  was  urged 
that  his  presence  could  not  fail  to  encourage  the  Heratees 
in  their  resistance.  But  the  British  minister  pleaded  his 
duty  to  his  sovereign,  and  was  not  to  be  detained.  He 
was  coldly  received  in  the  Persian  camp ;  but  he  de- 
manded and  obtained  admittance  to  the  Shah,  and  having 
exacted  the  customary  formalities  of  reception,  presented 
his  credentials  recently  received  from  the  Queen.  The 
impression  made  upon  the  King,  and  subsequently  upon 
the  minister,  was  favourable  to  the  British  envoy,  and 
soon  his  discreet  and  conciliatoiy  bearing  smoothed  down 
the  irritation  which  had  been  engendered  by  his  advance. 
But  the  Russian  minister,  Count  Simonich,  was  also  on 
his  way  from  Teheran;  and  Mr.  M'Neill  felt  that  the 
approach  of  this  man  might  be  fatal  to  his  success.* 

On  the  13th  of  April,  Mr.  M'Neill  had  an  audience  of 
the  Persian  monarch,  in  the  course  of  which  he  stated 
that  the  proceedings  of  Persia  in  Afghanistan  were  an 
obvious  violation  of  the  treaty  between  Great  Britain 
and  the  former  state ;  and  that  the  British  Government 
would  be  justified,  therefore,  in  declaring  it  to  be  at  an 
end,  and  in  taking  active  measures  to  compel  the  with- 
drawal of  the  Persian  army  from  Herat.  The  audience 
lasted  two  hours.  The  Shah  solemnly  protested  that  he 
had  never  meditated  anything  injurious  to  the  interests 
of  Great  Britain ;  and  the  minister,  with  still  stronger 
emphasis,  repeated  the  declaration.  At  a  subsequent 
interview,  the  Shah  consented  to  accept  the  mediation 
of  the  British  mission  ;  and  on  the  16th  of  April,  the 
Persian    soldiers    proclaimed    from    the    trenches    that 

*  Mr.  M'Neill  to  Lord  Auckland,  Ajyril  11,  1838.  Papers  relating 
to  Persia  and  Afghanistan. 


264  THE   SIEGE   OF   HEEAT. 

Mahomed  Shah  had  determined  to  send  Shere  Mahomed 
Khan  into  Herat,  accompanied  by  the  British  minister. 
But  it  was  not  Mr.  M'Neill,  but  an  inferior  officer  of  the 
embassy,  who  was  about  to  present  himself  on  the  mor- 
row, in  the  character  of  a  mediator,  beneath  the  walls  of 
the  beleagured  city. 

The  18th  of  April  was  one  of  the  most  memorable 
days  of  the  siege.  The  Persian  batteries  opened  before 
noon,  with  unwonted  activity,  against  the  ramparts  be- 
hind the  great  mosque.  The  walls  soon  began  to  crum- 
ble beneath  the  heavy  fire  of  the  enemy.  First  the  thin 
parapets  fell ;  then  the  terre-plein  came  down  ;  "  the  old 
walls  sliding  into  masses  at  every  round."*  Before 
'evening,  on  the  eastern  and  northern  sides,  the  breaches 
were  practicable,  and  that  on  the  west  was  greatly  en- 
larged. But  the  Afghans  were  in  no  way  disheartened. 
They  saw  their  walls  crumbling  beneath  the  heavy  fire 
of  the  Persian  batteries,  and  were  neither  alarmed  nor 
discouraged  by  the  spectacle.  They  had  never  trusted, 
they  said,  to  their  walls.  The  real  defence,  they  de- 
clared, was  the  fausse-hraie.  About  noon  the  Persians, 
having  pushed  on  a  gallery  at  this  point,  the  garrison 
exploded  it  with  a  mine,  and  taking  advantage  of  the 
alarm  occasioned  by  the  explosion,  the  Afghans  rushed 
upon  the  besiegers,  and  at  first  carried  everything  be- 
fore them.'  But  in  a  short  time  the  trenches  of  the 
enemy  were  lined  with  musketeers.  The  small-arm 
fire  of  the  Persians  overwhelmed  that  of  the  garrison, 
whilst  the  breaching  batteries  resumed  their  fire  against 
the  wall.  Yar  Mahomed  and  Pottinger  were  both  upon 
the  works.  The  Wuzeer  ordered  the  men  to  cease  firing, 
and  to  sit  down,  that  they  might  be  sheltered  from  the 
storm   of  musket-balls ;   but  instead  of  this  they  drew 

*  Eldred  Pottmger's  MS.  Journal. 


APPEARANCE   OP   MAJOR   TODD.  ?i55 

their  swords,  brandished  them  over  their  heads,  and 
calling  to  the  Persians  to  come  on,  rushed  down  to  the 
attack.  They  paid  dearly  for  this  bravado.*  Pottinger 
himself  narrowly  escaped  a  bullet,  which  entered  the 
lungs  of  Aga  Ruhem,  a  favourite  and  devoted  eunuch  of 
Yar  Mahomed,  and  sent  him  to  his  grave. 

In  the  evening,  the  Persians  in  the  trenches  announced 
that  an  Englishman  in  their  camp  sought  admittance  to 
the  city.  The  announcement  was  received  with  peals 
of  derisive  laughter  and  abuse.  The  Englishman  was 
Major  Todd,  an  officer  of  the  Bengal  artillery,  who  had 
been  for  many  years  employed  with  the  Persian  army, 
and  whose  great  attainments  and  estimable  personal 
qualities  had  won  for  him  the  respect  of  all  with  whom 
he  had  been  associated.  When  a  note  was  conveyed  to 
the  Wuzeer  stating  that  the  officer  who  sought  admit- 

*  "Several  men,"  says  Pottinger,  "received  bullets  through  the 
hands  and  arms.  One  fellow,  more  fool-hardy  than  the  rest,  kept 
brandishing  his  huge  Afghan  knife,  after  the  others  had  complied  with 
the  repeated  orders  to  sheath  their  weapons,  and  had  the  knife  destroyed 
by  a  bullet,  which  struck  it  just  above  his  hand.  I  had  gone  down  to 
the  spot  to  see  the  mine  sprung,  and  was  sitting  on  the  banquette  with 
the  Wuzeer  and  a  party  of  chiefs,  who,  whilst  tea  was  preparing,  were 
bantering  the  man  whose  knife  was  broken,  and  who  came  to  beg  a  sword 
instead,  when  a  bullet  came  in  through  a  loophole  over  my  head,  and, 
smashing  a  brick  used  for  stopping  it,  lodged  in  Aga  Ruhem' s  lungs, 
who  was  standing  opposite — one  of  the  splinters  of  the  -brick  at  the 
same  time  wounding  him  in  the  face.  The  poor  follow  was  an  eunuch 
of  Yar  Mahomed's,  and  was  always  to  be  seen  wherever  any  danger  was. 
He  died  in  two  or  three  days.  I  had  been  but  the  moment  before  look- 
ing through  the  top  of  the  parapet,  with  my  breast  resting  against  the 
loophole,  watching  the  Persians,  who  were  trying  to  establish  them- 
selves in  the  crater  of  the  mine,  and  the  Afghans  on  the  counterscarp, 
who  were  trying  to  grapple  the  gabions  and  overset  them,  so  that  the 
scene  was  very  interesting  ;  and  I  had  not  sat  down  with  the  chiefs 
until  Deen  Mahomed  Khan  actually  pulled  me  down  by  my  cloak  to 
listen  to  the  jokes  passed  on  the  man  who  had  his  knife  destroyed  ;  and 
I  thus  escaped  Aga  Ruhem's  bullet." — [MS.  Journal.] 


256  THE    felEGE    OF   HERAT. 

tance  was  the  naib  of  the  English  ambassador,  Yar 
Mahomed  sent  for  his  young  Enghsh  ally.  Pottinger 
immediately  joined  him.  The  Wuzeer  and  many  other 
chiefs  were  sitting  on  the  fausse-hraie  near  the  breach. 
Making  room  for  him  on  the  charpoy  on  which  he  was 
seated,  Yar  Mahomed  laughingly  remarked,  "  Don't  be 
angry  with  me.  I  have  thrown  ashes  on  it  (the  offered 
mediation),  and  blackened  its  face  myself."  Pottinger 
asked  for  an  explanation,  and  was  told  that  the  Wuzeer 
had  sent  back  word  to  the  Persian  camp  that  the  Af- 
ghans wanted  neither  the  Turks,  the  Russians,  nor  the 
English  to  interfere — that  they  trusted  to  their  good 
swords  ;  that  at  that  hour  of  the  evening  they  would  not 
allow  the  Shah-in-Shah  himself  to  enter ;  and  that  no 
one  should  be  allowed  to  enter  at  that  point.  But  if, 
they  added,  the  English  naib  would  present  himself  on 
the  morrow  at  the  south-east  angle,  he  would  be  granted 
admittance  to  the  city.  Much  of  this  was  mere  bravado. 
Yar  Mahomed  acknowledged  that  he  only  wished  to 
impress  the  Persians  with  the  belief  that  he  was  careless 
about  British  mediation.* 

On  the  following  day.  Major  Todd  made  his  appear- 
ance. A  vast  crowd  went  out  to  gaze  at  him.  He  was 
the  first  European  who  had  ever  appeared  in  Herat  in 
full  regimentals;  and  now  the  tight-fitting  coat,  the 
glittering  epaulettes,  and  the  cocked  hat,  all  excited  un- 
bounded admiration.  The  narrow  streets  were  crowded, 
and  the  house-tops  were  swarming  with  curious  spectators. 
The  bearer  as  he  was  of  a  message  from  Mahomed  Shah, 
announcing  that  the  Persian  sovereign  was  willing  to 
accept  the  mediation  of  the  British  Government,  he  was 

*  "I  was  much  annoyed,"  says  Pottinger,  "and  told  him  he  had 
probably  prevented  the  English  ambassador  interfering,  and  he 
excused  himseK  by  saying  that  he  acted  so  to  make  the  Persians  think 
he  was  not  solicitous  for  the  English  to  interfere."— [if 5.  Journal.'^ 


todd's  mission.  257 

received  with  becoming  courtesy  by  Shah  Kamran, 
who,  after  the  intendew,  took  the  cloak  from  his  own 
shoulders,  and  sent  it  by  the  Wuzeer  to  Major  Todd,  as 
a  mark  of  the  highest  distinction  he  could  confer  upon 
him.*  The  English  officer  returned  to  the  Persian  camp 
with  assurances  of  Kamran's  desire  to  accept  the  media- 
tion of  the  British  minister.  But  there  was  no  suspen- 
sion of  hostilities.  That  evening  the  aspect  of  affairs  was 
more  warlike  than  ever.  "The  Persian  trenches  were 
filled  with  men.  The  parties  of  horse  and  guards  of  the 
line  of  investment  appeared  stronger  than  usual ;  and 
everything  betokened  an  assault  of  which  at  dusk  the 
ganison  received  intelligence.  The  Afghans  made  all 
arrangements  to  meet  it ;  the  different  chiefs  were  sent 
off  to  different  points  either  to  strengthen  the  posts  or 
form  reserves.  Yar  Mahomed's  post  was  at  the  gate  of 
Mulik,  as  the  breach  close  to  it  was  the  most  dangerous, 

*  "A  horse,"  says  Pottinger,  "was  also  given;  but  Major  Todd 
was  as  anxious  not  to  accept  presents,  as  the  Afghans  were  to  make 
them — so  he  would  not  wait  for  the  horse,  notwithstanding  they  set 
about  cutting  away  the  parapet  of  the  fausse-braie,  and  making  a 
ramp  up  the  counterscarp  to  get  tlie  nag  out.  The  Wuzeer  was  ob- 
stinately bent  upon  sending  out  the  horse  ;  but  as  there  was  no  use 
in  destroying  a  parapet  in  the  only  entire  work  left,  or  making  an  easy 
road  across  the  ditch,  when  there  were  four  practicable  breaches. 
*  *  *  As  soon  as  the  Persians  were  gone,  my  people  led 
the  horses  off  in  another  direction,  and  I  told  the  workmen  to  stop  and 
repair  the  damage  done,  so  that  the  Wuzeer  did  not  know  of  the  ruse 
till  late  in  the  afternoon,  when  his  master  of  the  horse  reported  the 
return  of  the  horses.  Hs  immediately  sent  them  to  me,  saying  he  had 
given  them  to  the  English  and  would  not  take  them.  I  told  him  I  had 
not  enough  of  grain  to  keep  them  :  and  suggested  that  if  he  did  not  like 
to  keep  them,  they  might  be  eaten.  The  people  present,  on  the  re- 
ceipt of  the  message,  highly  approved  of  the  latter  part;  and  Yar 
Mahomed  gave  to  the  most  clamorous  the  horse  intended  for  the 
Persian,  which  was  duly  roasted.  I  believe  the  other  one  underwent 
the  same  fate  a  few  weeks  subsequently." — [MS.  Joitrnal.] 

VOL.  I.  3 


258  THE    SIEGE   OF   HERAT. 

and  the  point  was  defended  by  the  worst  troops."  It 
was  agreed  among  the  different  chiefs  that  not  a  shot 
should  be  fired  until  the  enemy  reached  the  counter- 
scarp, on  pain  of  the  immediate  loss  of  the  delinquent's 
ears. 

The  assembly  had  scarcely  broken  up  when  intelli- 
gence arrived  that  the  British  minister,  Mr.  M'Neill,  had 
arrived  at  the  edge  of  the  ditch  and  sought  entrance 
to  the  city.  The  report  was  presently  confirmed  by  a 
messenger  who  brought  letters  from  the  envoy  to  Yar 
Mahomed  and  Lieutenant  Pottinger.  Pottinger,  who 
was  just  composing  himself  to  sleep,  started  up  and 
proceeded  with  all  haste  to  the  Wuzeer's  post.  Yai* 
Mahomed  mustered  the  chiefs  to  receive  the  Envoy  with 
becoming  respect,  and  conducted  him  to  his  quarters. 
The  greater  part  of  the  night  was  spent  in  discussion. 
It  was  nearly  dawn  when  M'Neill  accompanied  Pottinger 
to  his  residence,  and  they  lay  down  to  sleep. 

Pottinger  rose  before  seven  o'clock,  and  found  M'Neill 
engaged  in  writing.  The  Wuzeer,  having  been  sent  for 
by  the  former  officer,  soon  made  his  appearance  grum- 
bling at,  but  still  honestly  commending  the  vigilance 
of  the  British  minister,*  whom  he  conducted  to  the 
presence  of  Shah  Kamran.     The  Shah,  with  the  utmost 

*  "I  was  a  good  deal  surprised  on  awaking  at  half-past  six  to  see 
the  Envoy  already  up  and  busy  writing.  At  seven,  according  to  en- 
gagement, I  sent  to  let  the  Wuzeer  know  that  his  Excellency  was  ready 
to  receive  him.  Yar  Mahomed  was  asleep  when  the  message  arrived ; 
but  they  awoke  him,  and  he  joined  us  in  a  short  time  with  a  whole 
posse  of  chiefs.  On  my  meeting  him  at  the  door  he  asked  me  was  it 
customary  for  our  ministers  not  to  sleep  at  night,  declaring  that  he  had 
scarcely  closed  his  eyes  when  he  was  told  that  Mr.  M'Neill  was  waiting 
for  him  ;  and  further  remarked,  "  I  do  not  wonder  your  affairs  prosper 
when  men  of  such  high  rank  as  your  minister  plenipotentiary  work 
harder  than  an.  Afghan  private  soldier  would  do  even  under  the  eye  of 
the  Shah." — [Mdred  Pottinger's  MS.  Journal.'] 


FAILURE   OF   NEGOCIATIONS.  259 

frankness  and  unreserve,  placed  the  negotiations  in  the 
hands  of  Mr.  M'Neill,  and  said  that  he  would  gladly 
consent  to  any  terms  agreed  upon  by  that  officer.  After 
partaking  of  some  refreshment,  the  British  minister  took 
his  departure  ;  and  the  armistice  ceased. 

This  was  on  the  21st  of  April.  On  the  23rd,  Major 
Todd  was  despatched  from  the  Persian  camp  with  intel- 
ligence no  less  surprising  than  discouraging.  Mahomed 
Shah  had  resolutely  refused  to  submit  to  British  arbitra- 
tion the  disputes  between  the  states  of  Persia  and  Herat. 
In  an  abrupt  and  peremptory  manner  he  had  "  refused 
the  proposed  agreement  and  spoke  of  prosecuting  the 
siege."  "Either,"  he  said,  "the  whole  people  of  Herat 
shall  make  their  submission,  and  acknowledge  themselves 
my  subjects,  or  I  will  take  possession  of  the  fortress  by 
force  of  arms,  and  make  them  obedient  and  submissive."* 
The  British  minister  was  deeply  mortified  at  the  result. 
He  had  been,  however  unwittingly,  a  party  to  the  de- 
ception of  the  Government  of  Herat.  He  had  told  Yar 
Mahomed  that  the  Shah  would  accept  his  intervention 
and  abide  his  decision ;  and  now  his  overtures  had 
been  peremptorily  declined,  t  It  was  suggested  by  some 
whether  it  would  be  expedient  to  send  any  reply  to  the 
hostile  declaration  of  Mahomed  Shah ;  but  as  it  had  been 
forwarded  by  the  British  minister,  etiquette  demanded 
that  an  answer  should  be  returned.  J     That  answer  was 

*  Mr.  McNeill  to  Yar  Mahomed — Published  CorrespoTidence. 

+  Pottinger  explained  to  Kamran  the  manner  in  which  Mr.  M'Neill 
had  been  deceived.  "On  the  24th,"  he  says,  "I  had  an  audience  of 
Shah  Kamran  to  explain  the  manner  in  which  the  Persians  had 
deceived  the  British  Envoy.  His  Majesty  said  that  he  never  expected 
anything  else — that  the  Kajars  have  been  noted  for  their  want  of 
faith  ever  since  they  have  been  heard  of — ^that  his  father  and  himself  had 
several  times  tried  their  promises,  but  always  been  miserably  deceived." 
— [MS.  Joumal.'\ 

X  Pottinger's  MS.  Journal. 

82 


260  THE    SIEGE    OF   HERAT. 

grave  and  dignified.  "  If  the  Persians,"  wrote  Yar  Ma- 
homed, "  will  not  attend  to  your  words,  we  must  answer 
with  our  bodies  and  leave  the  result  to  God.  Be  not 
distressed.  Now  that  we  have  suffered  so  many  injuries, 
and  have  been  kept  back  from  our  tillage  and  cultivation, 
and  have  suffered  that  loss  which  should  not  have  befallen 
us,  what  have  we  now  to  care  for  ?"  * 

And  now  the  siege  was  prosecuted  with  increased 
activity.  A  new  actor  had  appeared  on  the  stage.  On 
the  morning  of  the  day  which  witnessed  Mr.  M'Neill's 
visit  to  the  city  of  Shah  Kamran,  Count  Simonich  appeared 
in  camp.  He  was  not  one  to  remain  even  for  a  day  a 
passive  spectator  of  the  contest.  Freely  giving  advice 
and  rendering  assistance,  he  soon  began,  in  effect,  to  con- 
duct the  operations  of  the  siege ;  whilst  the  officers  of  his 
suite  were  teaching  the  Persian  soldiers  how  to  construct 
more  effective  batteries.  Nor  was  Russian  skill  all  that 
was  supplied,  in  this  conjuncture,  to  raise  the  drooping 
spirits  of  Mahomed  Shah.  Russian  money  was  freely 
distributed  among  the  Persian  soldiers ;  and  a  new  im- 
pulse was  given  to  them  at  a  time  when  their  energies 
were  well-nigh  exhausted,  and  their  activity  was  begin- 
ning to  fail.t 

Mr.  M'Neill  remained  in  the  Persian  camp,  and  in 
spite  of  the  failure  of  his  endeavours  to  reconcile  the 
contending  parties,  determined  not  to  cease  from  his 
efforts,  though  all  hope  had  well  nigh  departed  of  bringing 


*  Yar  Mahomed  to  Mr.  M  ^Neill — Published  Correspondence. 

f  Mr.  McNeill  to  Lord  Palmerston — Pvhlished  Correspondence. 
Intelligence  of  Simonicli's  movements  soon  reached  the  beleaguered 
garrison.  '*We  were  told,"  says  Pottinger,  "  that  Connt  Simonich  had 
reconnoitred  the  city,  and  had  examined  with  a  telescope  from  the 
top  of  the  Masula,  and  given  his  opinion  that  all  the  points  attacked 
were  too  strong  to  be  taken ;  and  that  the  only  vulnerable  side  was 
the  eastern  side," 


RUSSIAN  INFLUENCE.  261 

about  a  satisfactory  arrangement.  A  strongly  worded 
letter  was  addressed  to  the  Persian  ministers ;  and  at  one 
time  it  seemed  likely  that  the  Shah-in-Shah  would  accede 
to  the  terms  offered  by  the  Government  of  Herat ;  but 
the  arrival  of  friendly  letters  from  Kohun-dil  Khan,  the 
Candahar  chief,  offering  to  aid  him  in  the  prosecution  of 
the  siege,  inflated  him  with  new  courage,  and  caused  him 
to  rise  in  his  demands.  He  demanded  compensation  for 
the  losses  he  had  sustained  ;  and  the  negotiations  were 
again  broken  off  at  a  time  when  they  seemed  likely,  at 
last,  to  reach  a  favourable  termination. 

Nor  was  it  only  in  the  Persian  camp  that  at  this  time 
Russian  influence  was  making  its  way.  The  garrison 
was  beginning  to  think  whether  it  would  not  be  expe- 
dient for  Herat  to  fling  itself  into  the  arms  of  the  great 
northern  power.  On  the  night  of  the  23rd  of  May,  there 
was  a  consultation  among  the  chiefs,  when  it  was  pro- 
posed that  an  envoy  should  be  sent  to  the  Russian  ambas- 
sador, acknowledging  the  dependence  of  Herat  upon  that 
State.  It  was  asserted,  at  the  suggestion  of  M.  Euler, 
Kamran's  physician,  that  if  such  a  step  as  this  were 
taken  the  Persians  dare  not  continue  the  siege,  and  that 
the  English  dare  not  interfere.  The  proposal  was  favour- 
ably received.  It  was  with  difficulty  that  the  chiefs 
could  be  induced  to  listen  to  a  suggestion  for  delay ;  but 
on  the  following  day  intelligence  of  the  energetic  course 
pursued  by  Mr.  M'NeiU  found  its  way  into  the  city.  It 
was  announced  that  the  British  minister  had  threatened 
Persia  with  hostilities  if  Herat  should  fall  into  its  hands  ; 
that  the  city  would  be  retaken,  at  any  cost,  by  the  British, 
army  ;  and  that  Major  Todd  had  been  sent  to  India  to 
make  arrangements  with  the  Governor-General  for  the 
sustenance  of  the  people  of  Herat  after  the  siege. 

This  intelligence,  which  was  ■  not  wholly  correct, 
changed  at  once  the  complexion  of  aflairs.     It  was  plain 


262  THE    SIEGE    OF   HERAT. 

that  the  British  were,  after  all,  the  best  friends  of  the 
Afghans,  and  that  it  would  be  folly  to  reject  their  good 
offices  for  the  sake  of  the  problematical  friendship  and 
good  faith  of  the  Russian  Government.  The  announce- 
ment, indeed,  raised  the  spirits  of  the  garrison,  and  in- 
spired them  with  new  courage.  Even  those  who,  the  day 
before,  had  been  loudest  in  their  support  of  the  Russian 
alliance,  now  abandoned  it  without  reserve. 

This  feeling,  how^ever,  was  but  short-lived.  It  soon 
appeared  that  the  intentions  of  the  British  Government, 
as  reported  to  have  been  set  forth  by  Mr.  McNeill,  had 
been  over-stated ;  and  again  the  chiefs  began  to  bethink 
themselves  of  the  advantages  of  a  Russian  alliance. 
Many  meetings  were  held,  at  which  the  terms  to  be 
offered  and  accepted  were  warmly  debated.  At  all  of 
these  Pottinger  was  present.  Sometimes  he  was  received 
and  listened  to  with  respect ;  at  others  he  was  treated 
with  marked  discourtesy.  Now  the  value  of  the  British 
alliance  outweighed  that  of  the  Russian  in  the  estima- 
tion of  the  chiefs  ;  now  it  was  held  of  far  lighter  account ; 
and  as  the  scale  of  their  opinions  turned,  so  varied  with 
intelligible  capriciousness  their  bearing  towards  the  Eng- 
lish officer.  A  man  of  temper  and  firmness,  he  was  little 
disconcerted.  The  whole  assembly  might  be  against  him ; 
but  he  was  not  to  be  overawed. 

On  the  evening  of  the  27th  of  May,  Pottinger  sought 
a  private  interview  with  Yar  Mahomed.  Telling  the 
Wuzeer  that  his  conduct  towards  the  Persians  had  caused 
him  to  be  suspected  by  the  British  ambassador,  he  in- 
sisted upon  the  necessity  of  acting  decidedly  upon  two 
points — Kamran,  he  said,  must  never  submit  to  be  called 
the  servant  of  Persia  ;  nor  must  he  on  any  account  admit 
the  interference  of  the  Russians.  Yar  Mahomed  assented 
to  these  conditions — declared  that  he  would  never  sacri- 
fice the  independence  of  Herat,  and,  finally,  with  Pottin- 


pottinger's  difficulties.  263 

ger's  approval,  despatched  a  letter  into  the  Persian  camp, 
intimating  that  "  he  agreed  to  the  suppression  of  slavery, 
and  would  aid  in  its  extinction ;  that  he  would  release 
from  bondage,  and  send  back  the  people  of  Jam  and 
Bakhiu-s  if  possible,  and  he  would  try  to  make  the  Soonee 
Hazarehs  serve  Persia ;  that  he  would  pay  a  yearly  pre- 
sent after  the  current  year,  and  would  also  give  his  son 
and  one  of  the  King's  sons  as  hostages.  Persia  should, 
on  her  part,  restore  Ghorian,  and  when  his  son  joined  the 
Persian  camp,  his  brother,  Shere  Mahomed  Khan,  should 
be  sent  back,  and  that  Mahomed  Shah  should  give  them 
an  order  for  five  or  six  thousand  kurwars  of  grain  on 
the  Governor  of  Khorassan."  "  If  these  terms  be  not 
accepted,"  it  was  added,  "  nothing  but  the  possession  of 
Herat  will  satisfy  you." 

Pottinger  had  no  easy  part  to  play,  at  the  best ;  but 
now  his  difficulties  began  to  thicken  around  him.  He 
could  only  hope  to  counteract  Russian  influence  by  im- 
pressing Yar  Mahomed  with  a  conviction  that  the  British 
Government  would  do  great  things  for  Herat.  But  on 
the  29th  of  May  he  received  instructions  from  Mr.  McNeill 
on  no  accoimt  to  commit  the  government  by  any  offers 
of  aid  to  Herat  as  he  had  received  no  authority  to  make 
them.  Startled  and  embarrassed  by  these  injunctions, 
for,  seeing  that  without  such  promises  Yar  Mahomed 
would  have  accepted  the  mediation  of  Russia,  he  had 
already  committed  the  government,  Pottinger  went  at 
once  to  the  Tukht-i-pool,  where  the  chiefs  were  assembled, 
and  honestly  stated  that  in  his  anxiety  to  bring  afFaii's  to 
a  satisfactoiy  adjustment,  he  had  exceeded  his  powers. 
Exasperated  by  this  announcement,  the  chiefs  broke  out 
into  violent  reproaches  against  Pottinger,  M'Neill,  and 
the  whole  British  nation,  and  then  began  to  discuss 
the  advantages  of  the  Russian  alliance.  Finn  in  the 
midst  of  all  this  storm  of  invective,  the  3"0ung  British 


264  THE   SIEGE    OF   HERAT. 

officer  declared  that  he  had  only  spoken  the  truth — that 
such  were  the  instructions  of  the  British  minister — that 
he  had  no  power  to  disobey  them ;  but  that  a  represen- 
tation to  Mr.  M'Neill  of  the  disappointment  they  had  occa- 
sioned might  induce  him  to  depart  from  this'  cautious 
policy.  To  this  the  chiefs  were  induced  to  listen  ;  and  it 
was  finally  resolved  to  await  the  results  of  another  refe- 
rence to  the  British  Envoy.* 

But  the  influence  of  Mr.  M'Neill  at  the  Persian  Court 
was  now  rapidly  declining ;  and  his  departure  was  at 
hand.  His  position,  ever  since  his  arrival  in  the  camp 
of  Mahomed  Shah,  had  been  one  of  no  little  difficulty 
and  embarrassment.  Unhappily,  at  that  time,  one  of 
those  petty  perplexities,  which,  arising  between  state  and 
state,  often  evolve  more  serious  misunderstandings  than 
affairs  of  far  higher  moment,  was  constantly  obtruding, 
in  the  way  of  a  satisfactory  adjustment  of  differences, 
an  obstruction  of  a  very  annoying  and  irritating  kind. 
A  courier  of  the  British  minister,  Ali  Mahomed  Beg 
by  name,  had  been  making  his  way  from  Herat  to 
Teheran,  bearing  some  letters  from  Yar  Mahomed,  Pot- 
tinger,  and  others,  to  Mr.  M'Neill,  and  escorting  some 
horses,  sent  by  Futteh  Mahomed  Khan,  the  Herat  agent, 
as  presents  to  the  same  officer.  Without  any  interrup- 
tion he  had  passed  the  Persian  camp  and  was  within 
three  stages  of  Meshed,  when  Berowski  recognised  the 
man  and  officiously  reported  him  at  head-quarters.  Im- 
mediately, horsemen  were  despatched  to  carry  him  to 
the  Persian  camp.  What  followed  could  not  be  nar- 
rated better  or  more  briefly  than  in  the  language  of  Mr. 
M'Neill : — i^He  was  forced,"  wi'ote  the  minister  to  Lord 


*  ** Notwithstanding,"  says  Pottinger,  "that  I  might  then  be  con- 
sidered a  doubtful  friend,  it  was  never  contemplated  that  I  should  be 
kept  out  of  their  assembly." — [MS,  Journal.] 


THE  AFFAIR  OF  THE  COURIER.  265 

Palmerston,  "  to  return  with  them  ;  a  part  of  his  clothes 
were  taken  ft-om  him  ;  the  horses  which  he  was  bringing 
for  me  from  Herat  were  seized  ;  he  was  dragged  to  camp, 
and  there  placed  in  custody.  He  succeeded,  however,  in 
making  his  way  to  the  tent  of  Colonel  Stoddart,  and  was 
by  that  officer  conducted  to  the  prime  minister,  who, 
after  he  had  been  informed  by  Colonel  Stoddart  that  the 
man  was  in  the  service  of  this  Mission,  again  placed  him 
in  custody,  while  Hadjee  Khan,  an  officer  of  the  rank  of 
Brigadier  in  the  sei*vice  of  the  Shah,  not  only  used  offen- 
sive language  in  addressing  Colonel  Stoddart  in  presence 
of  the  prime  minister,  but  after  the  messenger  had  been 
released  by  order  of  his  Excellency,  seized  him  again  in  the 
midst  of  the  camp ;  stripped  him  to  search  for  any  letters 
he  might  have  concealed  about  his  person  ;*  took  from 
him  Lieutenant  Pottinger's  letter,  which  was  sent  to  the 
prime  minister ;  used  to  the  messenger  the  most  violent 
threats  and  the  most  disgusting  and  opprobrious  language, 
and  took  from  him  a  portion  of  his  accoutrements."  t 

*  Published  Correspondence  relating  to  Persia  and  Afghanistan. 

f  The  Gholam's  own  account  of  'the  treatment  he  received  from 
Hadjee  Khan  is  worth  quoting: — "Hadjee  Khan  then  turned  to  me, 
and  threatened  me  with  instant  death.  I  demanded  the  reason,  but 
he  gave  me  no  other  answer  than  abuse,  calling  me  a  traitor  and  a 
rascal,  and  said  that  he  himself  would  be  my  executioner.  He  then 
began  to  unbutton  his  coat  sleeves,  threatening  me  all  the  while,  and 
every  now  and  then  half  unsheathing  his  dagger,  '  I  will  be  your 
executioner  myself,'  said  the  Khan.  *  If  there  be  an  enemy  to  the 
English,  I  am  the  man — you  are  a  traitor  and  a  rascal — your  eyes 
shall  be  plucked  out  ;  the  Shah  has  ordered  me  to  kill  you  ;  I  will 
first  cut  off  your  hands.  You  must  have  papers  from  Herat,  and 
unless  you  instantly  deliver  them  up,  you  shall  be  cut  to  pieces.' 
Hadjee  Khan  went  on  in  this  strain  for  a  long  time,  during  which  I 
was  stripped  nearly  to  my  skin,  the  air  being  so  cold  that  water,  on 
being  exposed,  instantly  froze.  I  was  silent  under  all  these  threats 
and  demonstrations,  merely  observing  that,  having  such  a  noble  execu- 
tioner as  Hadjee  Khan,  I  was  content  to  die,  and  I  hoped  the  office 


^QQ  THE    SIEGE    OF   HERAT. 

This  was,  doubtless,  a  grievous  insult ;  and  Mr.  M'Neill 
believed  that  it  was  intended  to  be  one.  It  was  designed, 
he  thought,  "  to  exhibit  to  the  Afghans  and  to  the  Persian 
army  an  apparent  contempt  for  the  English,  with  a  view 
to  diminish  the  moral  effect  which  might  have  been 
produced  on  either  party,  by  the  general  belief  that  we 
were  opposed  to  the  conquest  of  Herat  by  the  Persians." 
It  was  an  insult  for  which  reparation,  if  not  offered  by  one 
state,  might  be  rightfully  exacted  by  the  other ;  and  Mr. 
M'Neill  was  not  a  man  to  sit  down  tamely  under  such  an 
outrage  as  this.  But  the  incident  had  taken  place  in 
October,  and  now,  in  May,  though  the  subject  had  been 
repeatedly  forced  upon  the  attention  of  Mahomed  Shah 
and  his  ministers,  no  fitting  reparation  had  been  offered  to 
the  British  Government.  The  Persian  Government  had, 
indeed,  asserted  their  right  to  seize,  punish,  or  put  to 
death,  without  reference  to  the  British  minister,  the  Persian 
servants  in  his  employment.  The  breach  was  thus  palpably 
widening.  The  Governor  of  Bushire,  too,  had  used  offen- 
sive language  towards  the  British  Eesident  in  the  Persian 
Gulf;  and  the  redress,  which  had  been  sought  by  Mr. 
McNeill,  had  not  been  granted  by  the  Persian  Government. 
Then  there  was  another  grievance  of  which  the  British 
minister  complained.  The  Persian  Government  had  con- 
tinued to  evade  the  conclusion  of  the  commercial  treaty, 
which  was  guaranteed  to  us  in  the  general  treaty  of  friend- 
ship between  the  two  states. 

All  these  cumulative  offences,  added  to  the  great  subject 
of  complaint — the  conduct  of  Persia  towards  Herat — 
made  up  such  an  amount  of  provocation,  that  Mr.  M'Neill 
felt  his  position  at  the  Persian  Court  was  little  likely  to 
be   one   of  much  longer   continuance.      The    Shah  had 


would  remain  in  his  fsimily.^^^— Statement  of  Ali  Mahomed  Beg.— 
Published  Correspondence  relating  to  Persia  and  Afghanistan.] 


RUPTURE    WITH   THE    PERSIAN   COURT.  267 

declared  that  he  would  raise  the  siege,  if  the  British 
minister  would  afford  him  a  pretext  for  the  retrograde 
movement,  satisfactory  in  the  eyes  of  his  countrymen,  by 
threatening,  on  the  part  of  his  government,  to  attack 
Persia  if  she  continued  her  offensive  operations  against 
Herat ;  but  from  this  promise  he  had  receded,  or  thrown 
such  difficulties  in  the  way  of  its  fulfilment,  as  practi- 
cally to  nullify  the  pledge.  Mr.  M'Neill  massed  all  his 
demands  upon  the  Persian  Government.  The  Shah  re- 
quired that  he  should  keep  the  question  of  Herat  distinct 
from  the  others,  and,  on  the  British  minister  refusing  to 
do  so  on  his  own  responsibility,  declared  that  he  would  do 
it  himself,  by  acceding  to  all  the  demands  except  that 
which  related  to  Herat.  "The  Shah  then,"  says  Mr. 
M'Neill,  in  his  report  of  these  proceedings  to  the  Foreign 
Secretary,  "  immediately  dismissed  me,  with  an  assurance 
that  he  should  adopt  that  course ;  but  before  I  had  left 
the  area  on  which  the  royal  tent  was  pitched,  he  called 
after  me,  that  on  his  agreeing  to  the  other  demands,  he 
should  expect  me  to  avoid  all  further  discussion  of  the 
affairs  of  Herat,  and  to  order  Mr.  Pottinger  to  quit  that 
city.  In  answer,  I  represented  that  I  could  not  tie  up 
the  hands  of  my  own  government  in  respect  to  the  ques- 
tion of  Herat,  and  that  Mr.  Pottinger  was  not  under  my 
orders." 

There  was  obviously  now  little  hope  of  bringing  these 
long-protracted  negotiations  to  a  favourable  conclusion. 
The  British  Mission  was  fast  falling  into  contempt.  The 
Russians  were  exalted  at  the  Persian  Court.  The  British 
were  slighted  and  humiliated.  There  was  not  a  tent-pitcher 
in  camp  who  did  not  know  that  the  British  Mission  was 
treated  with  intentional  disrespect.  It  was  time,  there- 
fore, to  bring  matters  to  a  crisis.     So,  on  the  3rd  of  June, 

*  Mr. McNeill  to  Lord  P aimer ston :  Meshed,  June  25,  1838. 


268  THE   SIEGE    OF   HERAT. 

Mr.  M'Neill  addressed  a  letter  to  the  Foreign  minister  in 
the  Persian  camp,  announcing  his  intention  to  depart  for 
the  frontier  on  the  following  day.  "  I  feel  myself  called 
upon,"  he  concluded,  "to  inform  you  that,  until  the 
reparation  and  satisfaction  I  have  demanded,  for  the 
indignities  already  offered,  shall  have  been  fully  given, 
the  Queen  of  England  cannot  receive  at  her  Court  any 
minister  who  may  be  sent  thither  by  the  Shah  of  Persia." 
The  decisive  language  of  the  British  minister  called  forth 
an  evasive  reply  from  the  Persian  Government.  The 
Shah  professed  not  to  understand  "  his  Excellency's  object 
in  all  these  writings,"  and  declared  that  there  had  been  no 
indignity  or  disrespect  ever  offered  to  him.  But  M'Neill 
was  not  to  be  thus  appeased.  He  sent  back,  in  a  few  plain 
words,  a  statement  of  his  demands.  He  demanded  that 
Hadjee  Khan,  who  had  outraged  the  sei-vant  of  the  British 
minister,  should  be  removed  from  office ;  that  Hadjee 
Meerza  Aghassy,  who  had  connived  at  the  outrage,  should 
go  to  the  British  minister's  tent,  and  apologise  for  the 
insult ;  that  a  firman  should  be  issued,  commanding  the 
servants  of  the  Persian  Government  not  to  interfere  with 
the  dependants  of  the  British  Mission ;  that  the  Governor 
of  Bushire  should  be  removed  from  office  for  his  insults 
to  the  British  Kesident ;  and  that  the  commercial  treaty 
should  be  forthwith  concluded  and  ratified.  All  these 
demands  but  the  last  were  to  be  carried  into  efiect  within 
three  days  of  the  date  of  the  letter. 

Again  the  Persian  minister  declared,  on  the  part  of 
the  Shah,  that  no  indignities  had  ever  been  offered  to  the 
British  Mission ;  and  again  Mr.  M'Neill  requested  his 
dismissal.  The  Shah  was  not  ready  to  grant  it.  "  No," 
he  said ;  "  never  shall  we  consent  to  the  departure  of  his 
Excellency.  Let  him  by  all  means  lay  aside  his  inten- 
tion, and  let  him  not  allow  this  idea  to  enter  his  mind." 
But  he  was  not  to  be  persuaded  to  lay  aside  his  inten- 


SUFFERINGS   OF   THE    GARRISON.  269 

tions.  The  Persian  ministers  continued  to  declare  that 
no  insults  had  been  offered  the  British  Mission.  So, 
reluctant  as  he  was  abruptly  to  terminate  our  diplomatic 
intercourse  with  Persia,  Mr.  M'Neill,  on  the  7th  of  June, 
took  his  departure  from  the  Persian  camp.  From  the 
ramparts  of  Herat  they  looked  out  upon  the  striking 
of  the  English  ambassador's  tents,  and  a  large  party  of 
horsemen  were  seen  making  their  way  across  the  plain. 
The  rupture  was  now  complete.  Persia  was  no  longer  an 
ally  of  Great  Britain. 

In  the  mean  while,  as  the  year  advanced,  the  miseries 
and  privations  of  the  siege  were  more  and  more  severely 
felt  by  the  inhabitants.  The  wonder  is,  that  at  a  still 
earlier  period  they  had  not  become  wholly  unendurable. 
Houses  were  pulled  down  to  supply  fuel.*  Horses  were 
killed  for  food.  The  vast  number  of  people  assembled 
within  the  walls  had  not  only  created  an  extreme  scarcity 
of  provisions,  but  was  in  a  fair  way  to  generate  a  pesti- 
lence. The  city  was  altogether  without  sewers  or  other 
means  of  drainage.  The  accumulations  of  filth  had  there- 
fore become  inconceivable,  and  the  stench  hardly  to  be 
borne.  The  decaying  bodies  of  the  dead  had  polluted  the 
air  to  a  still  more  horrible  extent ;  so  that  there  was  every 
probability  of  some  fearful  epidemic  breaking  out  among 
the  people.  +     Indeed,  at  the  beginning  of  May,  famine 

*  The  Jew's  synagogue  had  been  devoted  to  this  unholy  use ;  but 
they  had  contrived  to  accomplish  its  redemption. 

+  An  amusing  illustration  of  the  unsavoury  condition  of  the  city  at 
this  time  is  given  in  Pottinger's  Journal.  He  had  made  the  acquaint- 
ance of  a  magician,  and  wished  to  have  a  specimen  of  his  art.  '*  People 
of  his  class,"  he  writes,  "are  very  careful  of  exposing  themselves  ; 
and  are  excessively  suspicious  and  bigoted.  It  was  therefore  a  long 
time  before  I  could  venture  to  request  a  turn  of  his  art.  However,  I 
at  last  did  so,  but  was  disappointed  at  finding  he  was  not  a  regular 
practitioner  ;  and  as  we  had  got  now  intimate  he  told  me  that  he  as 
yet  had  not  commenced  the  practice ;  that  he  wanted  to  pursue  the 


270  THE    SIEGE    OF   HERAT. 

and  sickness  pressed  so  severely  upon  the  inhabitants,  that 
it  was  debated  whether  it  would  not  be  expedient  to  suffer 
a  number  of  them  to  depart  out  of  the  city.  Fever  and 
scurvy  were  rife  among  them ;  and  it  appeared  that  the 
enemies  outside  the  gates  were  less  terrible  than  the  view- 
less ones  within.  In  this  extremity  they  mustered  in  large 
numbers,  and  petitioned  the  Shah  to  suffer  them  to 
depart.  The  Shah  referred  the  matter  to  the  Wuzeer ; 
and  the  Wuseer  consulted  the  chiefs.  The  discussion  was 
long  and  animated.  The  decision  was  against  the  depar- 
ture of  the  people.  The  petitioners  were  mainly  women 
and  children ;  and  to  suffer  them  to  depart  would  be  to 
throw  them  into  the  hands  of  the  licentious  Persian 
soldiery,  and  to  expose  them  to  a  fate  more  terrible  than 
famine  and  death.* 

science  allowed  by  the  Hudyth  ;  not  the  accursed  magic — SiJir  Malovm; 
that  he  wished  but  for  power  to  summon  the  gins  and  angels  to  his  aid. 
Though  this  was  not  exactly  what  I  wanted,  I  should  have  been  most 
happy  of  an  introduction  to  either  of  these  classes  ;  and,  therefore,  not 
to  lose  my  labour,  I  used  my  utmost  endeavours  to  get  my  friend  to 
commence  his  incantations  at  once.  He  made  many  excuses.  First, 
he  had  not  got  clean  clothes  to  change,  as  the  scarcity  had  obliged  him 
to  part  with  everything  extra  to  buy  grain  whilst  it  was  tolerably 
cheap.  This  and  sundry  other  excuses  were  easily  overcome  ;  but  he 
evidently  wished  to  avoid  the  employment,  or  to  make  excuses  for  use 
when  he  failed.  As  soon  as  one  objection  was  overruled  another  was 
raised  ;  but  I  overcame  all  except  that  the  stench  of  the  dead  bodies 
from  the  city  would  prevent  these  spirits  from  venturing,  except  imder 
extraordinary  strong  incantations,  within  its  walls ;  as  angels  and  gins  are 
said  to  be  particularly  fond  of  sweet  odours,  and  excessively  angered  by  the 
contrary.  The  argument  was  a  clencher,  and  no  ingenuity  could  over- 
turn it,  for  certainly  the  smell  was  abominable,  and  in  a  calm,  or  when 
the  wind  came  from  the  southward,  in  which  direction  the  greatest 
number  had  been  buried,  the  human  kind  could  scarcely  withstand 
thehorrible  effluvia  of  putrid  flesh." — [Eldred  Pottinger''  s  MS.  Jowmal.'\ 
*  A  few  days  afterwards,  however,  a  party  of  some  600  or  700, 
mostly  old  men,  women,  and  children,  were  put  out  of  the  gates. 
"The  enemy,"  says  Pottinger,    "opened  a  heavy  fire  on  them  until 


FAILURES   OP   THE   BESIEGERS.  27 1 

The  Persians  now,  under  Russian  direction,  continued 
to  prosecute  the  siege  with  increased  vigour  and  judg- 
ment. The  whole  of  the  investing  force,  some  portion 
of  which  had  before  been  scattered  over  the  great  plain, 
was  now  drawn  in  more  closely  round  the  city. 

On  the  13th  of  June  an  assault  was  attempted  at  the 
south-west  angle,  but  gallantly  repulsed  by  the  garrison. 
Informed  by  some  deserters  from  Herat  that  the  defence 
of  the  famse-braie  was  comparatively  neglected  during 
the  mid-day  heats,  the  Persians  surprised  the  guards  at 
the  outer  works,  and  pushed  on  towards  the  fausse-hraie. 
But  a  little  party  of  Afghans — not  more  than  three  or 
four  in  number — stood  at  bay  in  the  passages  of  the 
traverses,  and  heroically  defended  the  post  until  assist- 
ance was  at  hand.  The  relieving  party  came  down 
gallantly  to  the  defence.  Headed  by  Sultan  Mahomed 
Omar,  they  flung  themselves  over  the  parapet  of  the 
upper  fausse-hraie,  and  pouring  themselves  down  the 
exterior  slope  overwhelmed  the  assailants  and  dislodged 
them  with  great  slaughter.* 

Another  attempt,  made  at  the  same  time,  to  effect  a 
lodgment  at  the  south-east  angle,  was  equally  unsuccess- 
ful. Twice  the  storming  column  advanced,  and  twice  it 
was  repulsed.  The  fortune  of  the  day  was  against  the 
Persians. 

In  nowise  disheartened  by  these  failures,  the  besiegers 

they  found  out  who  they  were,  when  they  tried  to  drive  them  back 
with  sticks  and  stones ;  but  Naib  Dustoo,  to  whom  the  business  was 
entrusted,  liker  a  fiend  than  a  man,  opened  a  fire  upon  the  wretched 
citizens  from  the  works,  and  the  Persians  thus  let  them  pass.  From 
the  besiegers'  fire  no  one  suffered,  as  a  rising  ground  was  between,  but 
from  that  of  the  garrison  it  is  said  several  fell." 

*  It  was  said  that  Mahomed  Shah  had  come  down  in  person  to 
witness  the  assault ;  but  the  Royal  amateur  was  only  the  Shah's 
brother,  who,  attended  by  a  party  of  idlers,  and  a  small  body  of  horse, 
was  a  spectator  of  the  defeat  of  his  countrymen. 


272  THE   SIEGE    OF   liEHAT. 

now  redoubled  their  exertions,  and  pursued  their  mining 
operations  with  a  vigour  and  an  activity  which  the  gar- 
rison could  not  match.  The  Afghans  were  now  becoming 
dispirited  and  inert ;  even  the  chiefs  began  to  despond, 
and  the  wonted  constancy  of  the  Wuzeer  forsook  him. 
Everywhere  Pottinger  saw  with  uneasiness  signs  of  failing 
courage  and  impaired  activity.  He  had  been  deputed  by 
Mr.  M'Neillto  act  as  British  Agent  at  Herat,  and  now,  in 
his  official  capacity,  he  redoubled  his  exertions.  There 
was  need,  indeed,  of  his  best  efforts.  The  siege  was  being 
pushed  forward,  not  only  with  an  energy,  but  with  an  intel- 
ligence that  had  not  marked  the  earlier  stages  of  the 
attack.  The  breaches  had  become  more  practicable.  The 
Persians  were  filling  up  the  ditch  at  some  parts,  and  con- 
structing bridges  to  span  it  at  others.  Another  assault  of 
a  more  formidable  character  than  any  before  attempted 
was  said  to  be  in  contemplation ;  and  as  these  rumours 
were  circulated  through  the  works,  and  the  obscure  terms 
of  the  future  were  magnified  by  the  palpable  dangers  of 
the  present,  the  defenders  scarcely  strove  to  conceal  the 
fear  which  had  crept  into  their  hearts. 

The  threatened  assault  was  at  hand.  The  24th  of  June 
was  a  memorable  day  in  the  annals  of  the  siege.  It  opened 
with  a  heavy  fire  from  the  Persian  batteries  on  all  the  four 
sides  of  the  city.  Then  there  was  a  perfect  lull,  more 
ominous  than  the  uproar  that  preceded  it.  The  signs 
of  the  coming  assault  were  plain  and  intelligible ;  but 
strangely  were  they  disregarded.  The  Wuzeer  was  at  his 
quarters.  The  garrison  were  off  their  guard.  Many, 
indeed,  had  composed  themselves  to  sleep.  The  enemy 
had  been  seen  assembling  in  great  force ;  but  no  heed 
was  taken  of  the  movement.  Suddenly  the  stillness  was 
broken  by  the  booming  of  a  gun  and  the  flight  of  a 
rocket ;  another  gun — then  another — and  presently  a 
heavy  fire  of  ordnance  from  all  sides,  supported  by  a  dis- 


REPULSE  OF  THE  PERSIANS.  273 

charge  of  musketry,  which,  feeble  at  first,  grew  presently- 
more  vigorous  and  sustained.  There  was  no  longer  any 
doubt  of  the  intentions  of  the  besieging  force.  The  enemy 
bad  braced  themselves  up  for  a  general  assault  upon  the 
city,  and  were  moving  to  the  attack  of  five  different  points 
of  the  works. 

At  four  of  these  points  they  were  repulsed.*  At  the 
fifth,  gallantly  headed  by  their  officers,  the  storming 
column  threw  itself  into  the  trench  of  the  lower  faiisse- 
braie.  The  stiTiggle  was  brief,  but  bloody.  The  defenders 
fell  at  their  post  to  a  man,  and  the  work  was  carried  by 
the  besiegers.  Encouraged  by  this  first  success,  the  storm- 
ing party  pushed  up  the  slope.  A  galling  fire  from  the 
garrison  met  them  as  they  advanced.  The  officers  and 
leading  men  of  the  column  were  mown  down  ;  there  was 
a  second  brief  and  bloody  struggle,  and  the  upper  fausse- 

*  **The  assault  on  the  gate  of  Candahar  was  repulsed,  and  the 
Persians  chased  back  into  their  trenches ;  but  the  danger  at  the 
south-east  angle  prevented  them  following  up  the  advantage.  At  the 
south-west  angle,  or  Pay-in-ab,  the  Persians  can  scarcely  be  said  to 
have  attacked,  as  they  never  advanced  beyond  the  parapet  of  their 
own  trenches.  It  was  evidently  a  mere  feint.  At  the  western,  or 
Arak  gate,  a  column  composed  of  the  Russian  regiment,  and  other 
troops  under  Samson,  and  those  under  WuUy  Khan,  marched  up  to 
the  counterscarp  ;  but  WuUy  Khan  being  killed,  and  Samson  carried 
off  the  field  wounded,  the  men  broke  and  fled,  leaving  an  immense 
number  killed  and  wounded.  The  latter  were  nearly  all  shot  by  idlers 
on  the  ramparts,  or  murdered  by  the  plunderers,  who  crept  out  to  strip 
the  slain.  The  other  attack,  on  the  centre  of  the  north-west  face,  was 
repulsed  in  like  manner,  after  reaching  the  counterscarp." — [Eldred 
Pottinger's  MS.  Journal,]  WuUy  Khan's  body  was  found  on  the 
following  day,  and  his  head  was  brought  into  the  city.  On  his  person 
were  found  several  letters  relating  to  the  plan  of  assault,  which  satis- 
factorily proved  that  it  had  been  designed  by  the  Russian  officers  in 
the  Persian  camp.  There  were  two  letters  among  them  from  Mahomed 
Shah  himself — one  addressed  to  Wully  Khan,  ordering  him  to  conform 
to  the  plan  of  the  Russian  ambassador,  and  another  to  Hadjee  Meerza 
Aghassy,  directing  him  to  give  similar  instructions  to  Wully  Khan. 

VOL.  I.  I 


274  THE    SIEGE   OF   HERAT. 

hraie  was  carried.  A  few  of  the  most  daring  of  the 
assailants  pushing  on  in  advance  of  their  comrades  gained 
the  head  of  the  breach.  But  now  Deen  Mahomed  came 
down  with  the  Afghan  reserve.  Thus  recruited,  the 
defenders  gathered  new  heart.  The  Persians  on  the 
breach  were  driven  back.  Again  and  again,  with  desperate 
courage,  they  struggled  to  effect  a  lodgment,  only  to  be 
repulsed  and  thrown  back  in  confusion  upon  their  com- 
rades who  were  pressing  on  behind.  The  conflict  was 
fierce;  the  issue  was  doubtful.  Now  the  breach  was  well- 
nigh  carried ;  and  now  the  stormers,  recoiling  from  the 
shock  of  the  defence,  fell  back  upon  the  exterior  slope 
of  the  fausse-hraie.  It  was  an  hour  of  intense  excitement. 
The  fate  of  Herat  was  trembling  in  the  balance. 

Startled  by  the  first  noise  of  the  assault,  Yar  Mahomed 
had  risen  up,  left  his  quarters,  and  ridden  down  to  the 
works.  Pottinger  went  forth  at  the  same  time,  and  on 
the  same  errand.  There  was  a  profound  conviction  in 
his  mind  that  there  was  desperate  work  in  hand,  of  which 
he  might  not  live  to  see  the  end.  Giving  instructions  to 
his  dependents,  -to  be  carried  out  in  thfe  event  of  his 
falling  in  the  defence,  he  hastened  to  join  the  Wuzeer. 
It  was  a  crises  that  demanded  all  the  energy  and  courage 
of  those  two  resolute  spirits.  The  English  ofiicer  was  equal 
to  the  occasion.     The  Afghan  Sirdar  was  not 

As  they  neared  the  point  of  attack,  the  garrison  were 
seen  retreating  by  twos  and  threes  ;  others  were  quitting 
the  works  on  the  pretext  of  carrying  ojff  the  wounded. 
These  signs  of  the  waning  courage  of  the  defenders 
wrought  differently  on  the  minds  of  the  two  men  who 
had  hitherto  seemed  to  be  cast  in  the  same  heroic  mould 
— soldiers  of  strong  nei-ves  and  unfailing  resolution. 
They  saw  that  the  garrison  were  giving  way.  Pottinger 
was  eager  to  push  on  to  the  breach.  Yar  Mahomed 
sat  himself  down.      The  Wuzeer  had  lost  heart.      His 


GALLANTRY    OF   ELDRED   POTTINGER.  275 

wonted  high  courage  and  collectedness  had  deserted 
him  in  this  emergency.  Astonished  and  indignant  at 
the  pusillanimity  of  his  companion,  the  English  officer 
called  upon  the  Wuzeer  again  and  again  to  rouse  him- 
self— either  to  move  down  to  the  breach  or  to  send  his 
son,  to  inspire  new  heart  into  the  yielding  garrison. 
The  energetic  appeal  of  the  young  Englishman  was  not 
lost  upon  the  Afghan  chief.  He  rose  up ;  advanced  fur- 
ther into  the  works  ;  and  neared  the  breach  where  the 
contest  was  raging.  Encouraged  by  the  diminished 
opposition,  the  enemy  were  pushing  on  with  renewed 
vigour.  Yar  Mahomed  called  upon  his  men,  in  God's 
name,  to  fight ;  but  they  wavered  and  stood  still.  Then 
his  heart  failed  him  again.  He  turned  back;  said  he 
would  go  for  aid ;  sought  the  place  where  he  had  before 
sat  down,  and  looked  around,  irresolute  and  unnerved. 
Pointing  to  the  men,  who,  alarmed  by  the  backwardness 
of  their  chief,  were  now  retreating  in  every  direction, 
Pottinger  in  vehement  language  insisted  upon  the  abso- 
lute ruin  of  all  their  hopes  that  must  result  from  want 
of  energy  in  such  a  conjuncture.  Yar  Mahomed  roused 
himself ;  again  advanced,  but  again  waivered ;  and  a 
third  time  the  young  English  officer  was  compelled,  by 
words  and  deeds  alike,  to  shame  the  unmanned  Wuzeer. 
The  language  of  entreaty  was  powerless;  he  used  the 
language  of  reproach.  He  reviled ;  he  threatened ;  he 
seized  him  by  the  arm  and  dragged  him  forward  to  the 
breach.  Such  appeals  were  not  to  be  resisted.  The  noble 
example  of  the  young  Englishman  could  not  infuse  any 
real  courage  into  the  Afghan  chief;  but  it  at  least 
roused  him  into  action.  The  men  were  retreating  from 
the  breach.  The  game  was  almost  up.  The  irresolution 
of  the  Wuzeer  had  well-nigh  played  away  the  last  stake. 
Had  Yar  Mahomed  not  been  roused  out  of  the  paralysis 
that  had  descended  upon  him,  Herat  would  have  been 

t2 


276  THE   SIEGE    OF   HERAT. 

carried  by  assault.  But  the  indomitable  courage  of 
Eldred  Pottinger  saved  the  beleaguered  city.  He  com- 
pelled the  Wuzeer  to  appear  before  his  men  as  one  not 
utterly  prostrate  and  helpless.  The  chief  called  upon 
the  soldiery  to  fight ;  but  they  continued  to  fall  back 
in  dismay.  Then  seizing  a  large  staff,  Yar  Mahomed 
rushed  like  a  madman  upon  the  hindmost  of  the  party, 
and  drove  them  forward  under  a  shower  of  heavy 
blows.  The  nature  of  the  works  was  such  as  to  forbid 
their  falling  back  in  a  body.  Cooped  up  in  a  narrow 
passage,  and  seeing  no  other  outlet  of  escape,  many  of 
them  leapt  wildly  over  the  parapet,  and  rushed  down 
the  exterior  slope  full  upon  the  Persian  stormers.  The 
effect  of  this  sudden  movement  was  magical.  The  Per- 
sians, seized  with  a  panic,  abandoned  their  position  and 
fled.     The  crisis  was  over;  Herat  was  saved.* 

*  There  is  nothing  finer  in  the  annals  of  the  war  in  Afghanistan  than 
the  heroic  conduct  of  Eldred  Pottinger  on  this  24th  of  June.  But  I 
should  as  little  discharge  my  duty  as  an  historian,  as  I  should  gratify 
my  inclinations  as  a  man,  if  I  were  not  to  say  that  I  have  extracted, 
with  some  difficulty,  from  Pottinger's  manuscript  journal,  the  real  his- 
tory of  the  service  that  he  rendered  to  his  country  on  this  memorable 
day.  The  young  Bombay  artilleryman  was  endowed  with  a  rare 
modesty,  which  made  him  unwilling  to  speak  or  to  write  about  himself. 
In  the  copy  of  the  journal  before  me  he  has  erased,  throughout  the  entire 
record  of  this  day,  every  entrance  made  in  the  first  person  ;  and  only 
by  giving  rein  to  a  curiosity,  which  I  should  not  have  indulged,  or 
considered  pardonable  in  any  ordinary  case,  have  I  succeeded  in  ex- 
tracting the  real  history  of  an  incident  which  has  already,  in  one  or 
two  incorrect  shapes,  been  given  to  the  world.  Wherever  Pottinger 
had  written  in  the  original  copy  of  his  journal  "I,"  he  had  erased  the 
egotistical  monosyllable,  and  substituted  the  words,  "  the  people  about 
the  Wuzeer,"  or  had  otherwise  disguised  the  record  of  his  own  achieve- 
ments. For  example,  the  words,  *  *  I  had  several  times  to  lay  hold  of 
the  Vizier,  and  point  to  him  the  men,  who  turned  as  soon  as  he  did," 
are  altered  into,  "the  people  about  abused,  and  several  times  had  to 
lay  hold  of  the  Vizier,  &c.  &c."  What  was  thought  of  Pottinger's 
conduct  beyond  the  walls  of  Herat,  may  be  gathered  from  the  fact,  that 


I 


AFTER   THE   VICTORY.  277 

But  no  exultation  followed  a  victory  so  achieved.  The 
bearing  of  the  Afghans  was  that  of  men  who  had  sustained 
a  crushing  defeat.  The  garrison  were  crest-fallen  and 
dispirited.  A  general  gloom  seemed  to  hang  over  the 
city.  Yar  Mahomed,  long  after  the  danger  was  past, 
moved  about  as  one  confused  and  bewildered.  There  were 
few  of  the  chiefs  whose  minds  were  not  so  wholly  unhinged 
by  the  terrors  of  that  great  crisis  as  to  be  unable,  for  days 
afterwards,  to  perform  calmly  their  wonted  duties.  A 
complete  paralysis,  indeed,  descended  upon  men  of  all 
ranks.  The  loss  on  both  sides  had  been  severe ;  but  if 
half  the  garrison  had  fallen  in  the  defence  of  the  breach, 
Herat  could  not  have  been  more  stunned  and  prostrated 
by  the  blow.  The  Persian  camp  was  equally  dispirited  ; 
and  a  week  of  inaction  supervened.*  Even  the  work  of 
repairing  the  damaged  fortifications  was  slowly  recom- 
menced by  the  garrison ;  and  when  at  last  the  men  re- 
turned to  their  accustomed  duties  it  was  plain  that  they 

a  few  days  afterwards  a  man  came  in  from  Kurookh,  bringing  some  im- 
portant intelligence,  who  immediately  on  his  arrival,  went  up  to  Pot- 
tinger,  seized  his  hands,  kissed  them,  said  he  was  indeed  "rejoiced 
that  he  had  made  so  great  a  pilgrimage,"  and  spoke  with  enthusiastic 
praise  of  the  repulse  of  the  Persian  stormers. 

*  The  loss  upon  the  Persian  side  was  very  heavy.  A  large  number 
of  officers,  including  several  chiefs  of  note,  were  killed  and  wounded. 
Mr.  M'Neill  wrote  from  camp  near  Teheran,  to  Lord  Palmerston  : 
"The  number  of  the  killed  and  wounded  of  the  Persian  army  is 
variously  stated  ;  but  the  best  information  I  have  been  able  to  obtain 
leads  me  to  believe  that  it  cannot  be  less  than  1700  or  1800  men. 
The  loss  in  officers,  and  especially  those  of  the  higher  ranks,  has  been 
vei-y  great  in  proportion  to  the  whole  number  killed  and  wounded. 
Major-General  Berowski  and  Sirteps  Wully  Khan  and  Nebbee  Khan, 
have  been  killed ;  Sirteps  Samson  Khan,  Hossein  Pasha  Khan,  and 
Jaffier  Kooli  Khan,  have  been  wounded;  and  almost  all  the  field- 
officers  of  these  brigades  have  been  killed  or  wounded."  There  is  little 
doubt,  however,  that  the  entire  number  of  casualties  is  greatly  over- 
stated in  this  passage. 


278  THE   SIEGE   OP   HERAT. 

had  no  heart.  Nor  was  there  anything  strange  and  un- 
accountable in  this.  The  Afghans  had  repulsed  the  Per- 
sians on  the  24th  of  June  ;  but  they  felt  that  nothing  but 
a  miracle  could  enable  them  to  withstand  another  such 
assault.  The  resources  of  the  government  had  failed  them. 
Food  was  scarce ;  money  was  scarce.  The  citizens  could 
not  be  fed.     The  soldiers  could  not  be  paid. 

In  all  of  this  there  was  much  to  disquiet  with  painful 
doubts  and  misgivings  the  mind  of  Eldred  Pottinger.  To 
protract  the  siege  was  to  protract  the  sufferings  of  the 
Heratees.  The  misery  of  the  people  was  past  counting. 
The  poor  were  perishing  for  want  of  food  ;  the  rich  were 
dying  under  the  hands  of  the  torturers.  The  soldiers 
clamoured  for  their  pay  ;  and  wherever  money  was  known 
or  suspected  to  be,  there  went  the  ruthless  myrmidons  of 
Yar  Mahomed  to  demand  it  for  their  master,  or  to  wTing 
from  the  agonised  victim  the  treasure  which  he  sought  to 
conceal.  To  tear  from  a  wretched  man,  at  the  last  gasp 
of  life,  all  that  he  possessed ;  then,  demanding  more,  to 
torture  him  anew,  until,  sinking  imder  the  accumulated 
agony,  the  miserable  victim  was  released  by  death ;  and 
then  to  fling  his  emaciated  corpse,  wrapped  in  an  old  shawl 
or  blanket  down  at  the  threshold  of  his  desolated  home, 
w^as  no  solitary  achievement  of  the  Wuzeer.  Even  ladies 
of  rank  were  given  over  to  the  torturers.  The  very  in- 
mates of  the  Shah's  Zenana  were  threatened.  A  reign  of 
terror  was  established  such  as  it  sickened  Pottinger  to 
contemplate.  He  felt  that  he  was  the  cause  of  this. 
Many  reproached  him  openly.  The  despairing  looks  and 
gaunt  fig-ures  of  others  reproached  him  more  painfully  still. 
All  that  he  could  do  to  redress  the  wrongs  of  the  injured 
and  alleviate  the  sufferings  of  the  distressed  he  did  in  this 
fearful  conjuncture.  Men  of  all  kinds  came  to  him  im- 
ploring his  aid  and  importuning  him  for  protection.  Some 
he  was  able  to  save,  stepping  between  the  wrong-doer  and 


PERSIAN   ESTIMATE   OF   POTTINGER.  279 

the  wronged  ;  but  from  others  he  was  powerless  to  avert 
by  his  intervention  the  ruin  that  was  impending  over 
them.  Every  day  brought  palpably  before  him  new  illus- 
trations of  the  unsparing  cruelty  of  the  Wuzeer.  But 
dire  political  necessity  compelled  him  to  protract  a  con- 
juncture laden  with  these  tenible  results.  It  is  impossible 
to  read  the  entrances  in  his  journal  at  this  time  without 
feeling  how  great  was  the  conflict  within  him  between  the 
soldier  and  the  man. 

The  events  of  the  24th  of  June,  though  they  had  raised 
Pottinger's  character,  as  a  w^arrior,  in  the  Afghan  city,  in 
the  Persian  camp,  and  in  the  surrounding  country,  had, 
gi-eatly  indeed,  diminished  his  popularity  in  Herat  and 
increased  the  difficulties  of  his  position.  In  the  negotia- 
tions which  followed,  Mahomed  Shah  insisted  upon  Pottin- 
ger's dismissal.  The  young  English  officer  had  excited  the 
measureless  indignation  of  the  Persian  King;  and  the 
Afghan  Wuzeer  was  not  disinclined  to  reproach  him  with 
presenting  a  new  obstacle  to  the  adjustment  of  the  differ- 
ences between  the  two  states.  The  Afghan  envoys  said 
that  they  had  always  thought  Pottinger  was  one  man,  but 
that  the  importance  the  Persians  attached  to  his  departure 
showed  that  he  was  equal  to  an  army.*     Pottinger  was 

*  "The  Wuzeer  told  me  the  whole  business  hung  upon  me  ;  that 
the  Persians  made  a  point  of  obtaining  my  dismissal,  without  which 
they  would  not  treat.  They  were  so  pressing,  that  he  said  he  never 
before  guessed  my  importance,  and  that  the  Afghan  envoys  who  had 
gone  to  camp  had  told  him  they  had  always  thought  me  one  man,  but 
the  importance  the  Persians  attached  to  my  departure  showed  that 
I  was  equal  to  an  army.  The  Afghans  were  very  complimentary,  and 
expressed  loudly  their  gratitude  to  the  British  Government,  to  the 
exertions  of  which  they  attributed  the  change  in  the  tone  of  the  Per- 
sians. They,  however,  did  not  give  the  decided  answers  they  should 
have  done,  but  put  the  question  off  by  saying  I  was  a  guest.  The 
Persians  offered  to  be  security  for  my  safe  passage  to  any  place  I  chose 
to  go  to." — [Eldred  Pottinger's  MS.  JournaL] 


280  THE    SIEGE    OF   HERAT. 

always  ready  with  a  declaration  that  no  thoughts  of  per- 
sonal safety  or  convenience  should  ever  suffer  him  to  stand 
in  the  way  of  an  arrangement  conducive  to  the  safety  of 
Herat  and  the  welfare  of  his  country,  and  that  if  these 
objects  were  to  be  gained  by  his  departure,  he  was  willing 
to  depart.  But  Yar  Mahomed,  whilst  unwilling  to  retain 
him,  was  unwilling  to  persuade  him  to  go.  The  dismissal 
of  the  man  who  had  saved  Herat  from  the  grasp  of  the 
Persians,  would  have  been  an  act  that  might  have  fixed  a 
stain  upon  the  character  of  the  Wuzeer,  prejudicial  to  the 
success  of  his  after-cai-eer.  Moreover,  it  was  possible  that 
Pottinger's  assistance  might  be  wanted  at  some  future 
time — that  the  Persians,  having  obtained  his  dismissal, 
might  hesitate  to  perform  their  promises,  and  rise  in  their 
demands  on  the  strength  of  the  advantage  which  they  had 
thus  gained. 

The  month  of  July  was  not  distinguished  by  any  gTeat 
activity  on  the  part  of  the  besiegers.  The  siege,  indeed, 
now  began  to  assume  the  character  of  a  blockade.  The 
question  of  surrender  had  become  a  mere  question  of  time. 
It  seemed  impossible  much  longer  to  protract  the  defence. 
Yar  Mahomed,  with  all  the  resources  of  unscrupulous 
cruelty  at  his  command,  could  not  extort  sufficient  money 
from  his  victims  to  enable  him  to  continue  his  defensive 
operations  with  any  prospect  of  success.  But  it  appeared 
to  him,  as  it  did  to  Pottinger,  expedient  to  postpone  the 
inevitable  day  of  capitulation,  in  the  hope  that  something 
might  yet  be  written  down  in  their  favour  in  the  "  chapter 
of  accidents,"  out  of  which  so  often  had  come  unexpected 
aid.  Yar  Mahomed  looked  for  the  coming  of  an  Oosbeg 
army.  He  had  long  anxiously  expected  the  arrival  of  a 
relieving  force  from  Toorkistan  ;  and  scarcely  a  day  had 
passed  without  some  tidings,  either  to  elevate  or  depress 
him,  of  the  advent  or  delay  of  the  looked-for  succours. 
Pottinger,  though  unwilling  to  encourage  in  others  expec- 


FIRMNESS    OF   THE   AFGHANS.  281 

tations  which  might  not  be  realised,  was  inwardly  con- 
vinced that  something  of  a  decisive  character  respecting 
the  intentions  of  his  own  government  must  soon  be  heard, 
and  that  the  knowledge  of  those  intentions  would  have  an 
effect'  upon  the  Afghan  garrison  and  the  Persian  camp 
very  advantageous  to  the  former.  With  the  object,  there- 
fore, of  gaining  time,  the  Wuzeer  renewed  his  exertions  to 
raise  money  for  the  payment  of  the  troops.  Assemblies 
of  the  chiefs  were  held,  at  which  every  practicable  method 
of  recruiting  their  exhausted  finances  was  discussed.  The 
Sirdars  addressed  themselves  to  the  discussion  as  men 
wholly  in-  earnest,  deteimined  to  do  their  best.*  The 
resolutions  of  the  chiefs  in  this  conjuncture  surprised  and 
delighted  Pottinger,  who  was  little  prepared  for  the  unan- 
imity with  which  they  determined  on  protracting  the 
defence.  "  With  open  breaches,  trembling  soldiery,  and  a 
disaffected  populace,  they  determined  to  stand  to  the  last. 
How  I  wished,"  exclaimed  Pottinger,  "  to  have  the  power 
of  producing  the  money  !  " 

The  plan  which  was  at  last  resolved  upon — one  which 
thi^ew  into  the  hands  of  a  single  chief  the  power  of 
seizing  the  property  of  whomsoever  he  thought  fit  to 
mulct  for  the  service  of  the  state — under  a  written  pledge 

*  Atone  of  these  consultations,  held  on  the  1 8th  of  July,  "Deen 
Mahomed,"  said  Pottinger,  '* proposed  that  each  chief  should  bring 
what  he  had  to  the  Wuzeer.  The  Wuzeer  proposed  that  each  chief 
should  retain  his  own  men.  The  Topshee-Bashee  said  :  'As  the  Shah 
has  money,  and  won't  give  it,  we  cannot  force  him  ;  but  if  you  allow 
me  to  seize  whom  I  like,  and  the  chiefs  give  me  their  promise  that 
they  will  not  interfere  in  favour  of  any  one,  I  will  undertake  to  pro- 
vide the  expense  of  the  men  for  two  months.'  The  chiefs  immediately 
said  '  Done  ! '  and  had  an  agreement  made   out,    and  those  present 

sealed  it They  were,   or  appeared  well  satisfied  with  me  ;  and 

the  Wuzeer  quoted  my  anxiety  and  efforts  as  an  example  to  those  who 
had  flieir  women  and  children  to  defend." — [Eldred  Pottinger' s  MS. 
Journal.] 


282  THE    SIEGE    OF   HERAT. 

from  the  other  chiefs .  not  to  interfere,  as  had  been  their 
wont,  for  the  protection  of  their  own  friends,  threw  the 
city  into  such  confusion,  and  produced  so  many  appeals 
to  the  assembly  of  chiefs,  that  Pottinger,  anxious  to 
establish  a  less  arbitrary  system  of  levying  contributions, 
suggested  that  all  who  volimtarily  brought  their  money 
would  be  reimbursed,  at  his  recommendation,  by  the 
British  Government.  But  money  came  in  slowly.  The 
difficulties  of  the  garrison  seemed  to  thicken  around 
them.  Negotiations  were,  therefore,  again  resumed,  with 
a  determination  at  last  to  bring  them  to  an  issue  ;  and 
messengers  were  constantly  passing  and  repassing  between 
the  city  and  the  Persian  camp. 

But  in  the  mean  while,  far  beyond  the  walls  of  Herat, 
events  were  taking  shape  mightily  affecting  the  issue  of 
the  contest.  Lord  Auckland,  who  had  watched  with 
much  anxiety  the  progress  of  affairs  in  the  West,  had,  in 
the  course  of  the  spring,  determined  on  despatching  an 
expedition  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  to  hold  itself  in  readiness 
for  any  service  which  Mr.  M'Neill  might  deem  it  expedient 
to  employ  it  upon,  "  with  a  view  to  the  maintenance  of 
our  interests  in  Persia."  Instructions  to  this  effect  were 
forwarded  to  Bombay.  In  conjunction  with  Sir  Charles 
Malcolm,  the  chief  of  the  Indian  navy,  the  Bombay  Go- 
vernment despatched  the  Semiramis  and  Hugh  Lindsay 
steamers,  and  some  vessels  of  war,  with  detachments  of  the 
15th,  23rd,  and  24th  Regiments,  and  the  Marine  battalion, 
to  the  Persian  Gulf ;  and  instructed  the  resident.  Captain 
Hennell,  to  land  the  troops  on  the  island  of  Karrack,  and 
concentrate  the  squadron  before  it.  On  the  4th  of  June, 
the  Semiramis  steamed  out  of  the  Bombay  harbour,  and 
on  the  19th  anchored  off  Karrack.  The  troops- were 
immediately  landed.  The  governor  of  the  island,  greatly 
alarmed  by  the  coming  of  the  steamer  and  the  fighting 
men,  but  somewhat  reassured  by  the  appearance  of  Captain 


DEMONSTRATION    IN   THE    PERSIAN    GULF.  283 

Hennell,  said  that  the  island  and  everything  it  contained, 
himself  and  its  inhabitants,  were  at  the  disposal  of  the 
British  Eesident ;  and  at  once  began  to  assist  in  the  dis- 
embarkation of  the  troops. 

The  demonstration  was  an  insignificant  one  in  itself; 
but  by  the  time  that  intelligence  of  the  movement  had 
reached  the  Persian  camp,  the  expedition,  gathering  new 
dimensions  at  every  stage,  had  swollen  into  bulk  and 
significance.  The  most  exaggerated  reports  of  the  doings 
and  intentions  of  the  British  soon  forced  themselves  into 
currency.  The  Persian  camp  was  all  alive  with  stories  of 
the  powerful  British  fleet  that  had  sailed  into  the  gulf, 
destroyed  Bunder- Abassy  and  all  the  other  ports  on  the 
coast,  taken  Bushire,  and  landed  there  a  mighty  army, 
which  was  advancing  upon  Shiraz,  and  had  already  taken 
divers  towns  in,  the  province  of  Fars.  Nothing  could  have 
been  more  opportune  than  the  arrival  of  these  reports. 
Mr.  M'Neill  was  making  his  way  towards  the  frontier, 
when  intelligence  of  the  Karrack  expedition  met  him  on 
the  road.  About  the  same  time  he  received  letters  of  in- 
struction from  the  Foreign-office,  issued  in  anticipation  of 
the  refusal  of  Mahomed  Shah  to  desist  from  his  operations 
against  Herat ;  and  thinking  the  hour  was  favourable,  he 
resolved  to  make  another  eflfort  to  secure  the  withdrawal 
of  the  Persian  army,  and  to  regain  for  the  British  Mission 
the  ascendancy  it  had  lost  at  the  Persian  Court. 

Fortified  by  these  instructions  from  the  Foreign-office, 
Mr.  M'Neill  despatched  Colonel  Stoddart  to  the  Persian 
camp,  with  a  message  to  the  Shah.  The  language  of  this 
message  was  very  intelligible  and  very  decided.  The  Shah 
was  informed  that  the  occupation  of  Herat  or  any  part  of 
Afghanistan  by  the  Persians  would  be  considered  in  the 
light  of  a  hostile  demonstration  against  England ;  and 
that  he  could  not  persist  in  his  present  course  without 
immediate  danger  and  injury  to  Persia.     It  was  stated. 


284  THE    SIEGE    OF   HERAT. 

that  already  had  a  naval  armament  arrived  in  the  Persian 
Gulf,  and  troops  been  landed  on  the  island  of  Karrack, 
and  that  if  the  Shah  desired  the  British  Government  to 
suspend  the  measures  in  progress  for  the  vindication  of 
its  honour,  he  must  at  once  retire  from  Herat,  and  make 
reparation  for  the  injuries  which  had  been  inflicted  upon 
the  British  Mission. 

On  the  11th  of  August,  Colonel  Stoddart  arrived  in 
the  Persian  camp.  Repairing  at  once  to  the  quarters  of 
the  minister,  he  found  the  son  of  the  Candahar  chief 
and  a  party  of  Afghans  waiting  in  the  tent.  The  Hadjee, 
on  his  return,  received  him  with  courtesy  and  friend- 
liness, and  fixed  the  following  day  for  an  interview  with 
the  Shah.  Stoddart  went  at  the  appointed  hour.  The 
King  was  sitting  in  a  raised  room,  up  six  or  seven  steps. 
Beckoning  to  the  English  officer  to  come  up  more  closely  to 
him,  he  welcomed  him  with  much  cordiality,  and  listened 
to  the  message  from  the  British  Government.  Taking 
advantage  of  a  pause  in  the  recital,  the  King  said  :  "  The 
fact  is,  if  I  don't  leave  Herat,  there  will  be  war,  is  not 
that  it  ?"  "  It  is  war,"  returned  Stoddart ;  "  all  depends 
upon  your  Majesty's  answer — God  preserve  your  Majesty  !" 
The  message,  written  in  the  original  English,  was  then 
given  to  the  King.  "  It  is  aU  I  wished  for,"  he  said.  "  I 
asked  the  minister  plenipotentiary  for  it ;  but  he  would 
not  give  it  to  me.  He  said  he  was  not  authorized."  "  He 
was  not  authorized  then,"  returned  Stoddart ;  "  but  now 
he  has  been  ordered  to  do  it.  No  one  could  give  such  a 
message  without  especial  authority  from  his  Sovereign." 
The  Shah  complained  that  the  paper  was  in  English, 
which  he  could  not  understand ;  but  said  that  his  Meerzas 
should  translate  it  for  him,  and  then  that  he  would  give 
a  positive  answer  to  its  demands.  Two  days  afterwards 
Stoddart  was  again  summoned  to  the  royal  presence. 
"  We  consent  to  the  whole  of  the  demands  of  the  British 


RUSSIAN   INTRIGUE.  285 

Government,"  said  the  Shah.  "  We  will  not  go  to  war. 
Were  it  not  for  the  sake  of  their  friendship,  we  should 
not  return  from  before  Herat.  Had  we  known  that  our 
coming  here  might  risk  the  loss  of  their  friendship,  we 
certainly  would  not  have  come  at  all."*  The  English 
officer  thanked  God  that  his  Majesty  had  taken  so  wise  a 
view  of  the  real  interests  of  Persia ;  but  hinted  to  the 
Foreign  Minister  as  he  went  out,  that  although  the  Shah's 
answer  was  very  satisfactory,  it  would  be  more  satisfactory 
still  to  see  it  at  once  reduced  to  practice. 

Whilst,  in  the  Persian  camp,  Mahomed  Shah  was 
promising  the  Enghsh  diplomatists  to  withdraw  his  army 
from  Herat,  an  officer  of  the  Russian  Mission — M. 
Goutte,  who  had  approved  himself  an  adept  in  intrigue 
— was  busying  himself  in  Herat  to  bring  about  an 
arrangement  that  would  give  a  colour  of  victory  to  the 
achievements  of  the  investing  force.  If  Kamran  could 
have  been  persuaded  to  come  out  and  wait  upon  Mahomed 
Shah  in  token  of  submission,  the  army  might  have  been 
withdrawn  with  some  show  of  credit,  and  the  Russian 
Mission  might  have  claimed  a  diplomatic  victory.  The 
Afghans  were  not,  in  their  present  reduced  state,  disin- 
clined to  acknowledge  the  supremacy  of  Mahomed  Shah, 
and  to  consent  that  Kamran  should  visit  the  Persian 
monarch  at  Ghorian :  but  the  Russian  envoy  demanded 
that  he  should  come  out  of  Herat,  and  make  his  obeisance 
to  the  King  of  Kings,  as  a  preliminary  to  the  withdrawal 
of  the  Persian  army.f 

This  was  on  the  17th  of  August.  On  the  morning  of 
the  18th,  Yar  Mahomed  sent  a  messenger  to  Pottinger, 
requesting  his  attendance  at  the  Wuzeer's  quarters.  The 
English  officer  was  received  with  coldness  almost  amount- 

*  Colonel  Stoddart  to  Mr.  McNeill.  Con'espondence  relating  to 
Pei'sia  and  Afghanistan. 

t  Eldred  Pottin(jcr''s  MS.  Journal. 


286  THE    SIEGE    OF   HERAT. 

ing  to  discourtesy.  Scarcely  a  word  was  spoken  to  him 
whilst  the  levee  lasted  ;  but  when  the  assembly  broke  up, 
Pottinger,  in  a  tone  of  voice  that  showed  he  was  not 
to  be  trifled  with,  asked  him  why  he  had  sent  for  him 
if  he  had  nothing  to  communicate  and  nothing  to  ask. 
The  Wuzeer  took  him  by  the  hand  and  was  about  to 
leave  the  room ;  when  Pottinger,  arresting  his  progress, 
demanded  a  private  interview.  The  room  was  cleared. 
The  young  English  officer  and  the  Afghan  Sirdar  sate 
down  together,  and  were  soon  in  friendly  discourse.  Yar 
Mahomed,  the  most  plausible  and  persuasive  of  men,* 
soon  stilled  the  tempest  that  was  rising  in  Pottinger's 
breast.  All  patience  and  gentleness  now,  he  was  ready 
to  submit  to  any  rebuke,  and  to  utter  any  apolog}\ 
They  were  soon  in  earnest  conversation,  as  friends  and 
brothers,  regarding  the  general  condition  of  the  garrison 
and  its  available  resources.  The  Wuzeer  declared  that 
"  he  regretted  much  the  step  he  was  obliged  to  take,  but 
that  indeed  no  alternative  was  left  him — ^that  every 
resource  which  even  tyranny  commanded  was  exhausted — 
that  he  dared  not  lay  hands  on  the  property  of  the  com- 
batants, though  many  of  them  had  large  funds."  The 
chiefs,  he  declared,  were  misers.  The  eunuch,  Hadjee 
Ferooz,  he  said,  could  easily  contribute  two  lakhs  of 
rupees  towards  the  expenses  of  the  war,  and  the  Shah 
might   contribute   ten;  but    neither  would    advance    a 


*  **  Yax  Mahomed  is  one  of  the  most  persuasive  talkers  I  have  met. 
It  is  scarcely  possible  to  talk  with  him  and  retain  anger.  He  is  ready 
in  a  surprising  degree,  and  is  so  patient  under  rebuke,  that  I  never 
saw  him  fail  to  quiet  the  most  violent  of  his  countrymen,  when  he 
thought  it  worth  his  while.  A  person  who  disregards  truth,  and 
thinks  nothing  of  denying  what  he  has  asserted  a  few  minutes  before, 
is  a  most  puzzling  person  to  argue  with.  Until  you  have  thought 
over  what  has  been  said,  you  cannot  understand  the  changeable  colours 
which  pass  before  you." — [Eld/red  Pottinger's  MS.  Journal.] 


FINANCIAL   TROUBLES.  .  287 

farthing.  "They  are  all,"  he  said,  "equally  niggardly. 
They  have  money,  but  they  will  not  advance  it.  When 
their  wives  are  being  ravished  before  their  faces,  they 
will  repent  of  their  avarice ;  but  now  it  is  impossible  to 
convince  them  of  the  folly  and  the  danger  of  the  course 
they  are  pursuing.  With  such  people  to  deal  with,  and 
the  soldiery  crying  out  for  pay  and  subsistence,  how  can 
I  hold  out  longer  by  force  1 "  He  consented,  however,  to 
protract  the  negotiations  to  the  utmost — to  amuse  the 
Persians — and  to  gain  time.  And  in  the  mean  while,  he 
extracted  from  the  weak  and  unresisting  all  that  he  could 
wring  from  them  by  torture.  On  the  night  after  this 
conference  with  Pottinger,  the  Moonshee-Bashee  died  under 
the  hands  of  the  torturers. 

The  struggle,  however,  was  now  nearly  at  an  end. 
The  movements  in  the  Persian  camp  appear,  at  this 
time,  to  have  been  but  imperfectly  known  within  the 
walls  of  Herat.  Whilst  Mahomed  Shah  was  making- 
preparations  for  the  withdrawal  of  his  army,  Yar  Ma- 
homed and  the  Afghan  Sirdars  were  busy  with  their 
financial  operations  for  the  continuance  of  the  defence. 
A  Finance  Committee  was  appointed.  Kamran  was 
told  that  he  must  either  provide  money  for  the  payment 
of  the  soldiery,  or  authorise  the  Committee  to  set  about 
their  work  after  their  own  manner.  Eager  to  save  his 
money,  he  sacrificed  his  people,  and  armed  the  Com- 
mittee with  full  powers  to  search  the  houses  of  the 
inhabitants,  to  order  the  expulsion  of  all  who  had  less 
than  three  months'  provisions,  and  to  take  from  those 
who  had  more  all  that  they  could  find  in  excess.  The 
Topshee-Bashee,  or  chief  artilleryman,  to  whom  the 
executive  duties  of  the  Committee  were  entrusted,  con- 
trived to  extort  from  the  inhabitants  several  days'  food, 
and  a  large  supply  of  jewels,  with  which  he  enriched 
the  Wuzeer   and   himself.     It  was  always  believed  that 


288  THE    SIEGE    OF   HERAT. 

the  former  had  amassed  large  sums  of  money  during 
the  siege;  that  he  had  turned  the  scarcity  to  good 
account,  by  retaining  in  his  own  coffers  no  small  portion 
of  the  coin  which  he  had  wrung  by  torture  from  the 
wretched  inhabitants.  Now  when  the  soldiery,  lacking 
the  means  of  subsistence,  entered  upon  a  course  of  plun- 
dering that  threw  the  whole  city  into  confusion,  the 
Wuzeer,  whilst  issuing  a  proclamation  forbidding  such 
irregularities,  and  declaring  severe  penalties  for  the 
offence,  allowed  a  continuation  of  the  license  to  his  own 
people,  that  he  might  avoid  the  necessity  of  paying  them 
at  his  own  cost.  It  is  not  strange,  therefore,  that  when 
reports  were  circulated  throughout  the  city  that  the 
Persian  army  was  about  to  move,  the  Soonee  Parsewans, 
scarcely  less  than  the  Sheeahs,  should  have  received  the 
intelligence,  some  with  sorrow,  and  some  with  a  forced 
incredulity,  "preferring  the  miseries  of  the  siege  with 
the  ultimate  prospect  of  the  city  being  taken  and  sacked, 
to  the  raising  of  the  siege  and  the  prospect  of  Kamran's 
and  Yar  Mahomed's  paternal  government."  "All  I 
wonder,"  said  Pottinger,  recording  this  fact,  "is,  that  not 
a  man  is  to  be  found  among  them  bold  enough  to  termi- 
nate their  miseries  by  the  death  of  their  oppressors."* 

But  it  was  now  becoming  every  day  more  obvious  that 
Mahomed  Shah  was  about  to  break  up  his  camp.  Some 
countrymen  came  into  Herat  and  reported  that  the 
Persians  were  collecting  their  guns  and  mortars,  and 
parking  them  as  though  in  preparation  for  an  immediate 
march.  Parties  of  horsemen  also  had  been  seen  moving 
out  of  camp.  Others  brought  in  word  that  the  enemy 
had  destroyed  their  68-pounders,  were  assembling  their 
carriage-cattle,  and  were  about  to  raise  the  siege.  The 
English,  it  was  said,  had  taken  Shiraz ;  but  the  Persians 

*  Eldred  Pottinger'' s  MS.  Journal. 


THE   SIEGE   RAISED.  289 

in  the  trenches,  declaring  that  they  were  ready  for 
another  assault,  cried  out,  that  though  the  English  army 
had  advanced  upon  that  city,  the  Prince-Governor  had 
defeated  it.  All  kinds  of  preposterous  rumours  were 
rife.  Some  asserted  that  the  Russians  had  attacked  and 
captured  Tabreez  ;  others  that  the  Russians  and  English 
had  formed  an  alliance  for  the  overthrow  of  Mahomed- 
anism,  and  the  partition  of  the  countries  of  the  East 
between  the  two  great  European  powers.  But  amidst  all 
these  rumours  indicating  the  intended  retrogression  of  the 
Persian  army,  the  garrison  was  kept  continually  on  the 
alert  by  alarming  reports  of  another  attack ;  and  it 
was  hard  to  say  whether  all  these  seeming  preparations 
in  Mahomed  Shah's  camp  were  nor  designed  to  lull  the 
Heratees  into  a  sleep  of  delusive  security,  and  render 
them  an  easier  prey. 

But  the  month  of  September  brought  with  it  intelli- 
gence of  a  more  decided  character.  There  was  no 
longer  any  doubt  in  Herat,  that  Mahomed  Shah  was 
breaking  up  his  camp.  Letters  came  in  from  the  Per- 
sian authorities  intimating  the  probability  of  the  "  King- 
of-Kings"  forgiving  the  rebellion  of  Prince  Kamran  on 
certain  conditions  which  would  give  a  better  gi-ace  to 
the  withdrawal  of  the  Persian  monarch.  To  some  of 
these,  mainly  at  *Pottinger  s  suggestion,  the  Heratees 
demurred ;  but  on  the  4th  of  September,  the  Persian 
prisoners  were  sent  into  camp  ;  and  the  Shah-in-Shah 
promised  Colonel  Stoddart  that  the  march  of  the  army 
should  commence  in  a  few  days.  There  was,  indeed,  a 
pressing  necessity  for  the  immediate  departure  of  the 
force.  "  The  forage  in  camp,"  wrote  Colonel  Stoc\dart 
to  Mr.  M'Neill,  "  will  only  last  for  five  or  six  days  more, 
and  as  messengers  have  been  sent  to  turn  back  all  cafilas, 
no  more  flour  or  grain  will  arrive.  The  advanced  guard 
under  Humza  Meerza  leaves  camp  on  Friday  evening." 

VOL.  I.  u 


290  THE   SIEGE   OP   HERAT. 

Everything  was  now  ready  for  the  retreat.  The  guns 
had  been  withdrawn  from  their  advanced  positions,  and 
were  now  Umbered  up  for  the  march.  The  baggage-cattle 
had  been  collected.  The  tents  were  being  struck.  The 
garrison  of  Herat  looked  out  upon  the  stir  in  the  Persian 
camp,  and  could  no  longer  be  doubtful  of  its  import. 
The  siege  was  now  raised.  The  danger  was  at  an  end. 
Before  the  9  th  of  September,  the  Persian  army  had 
commenced  its  retrograde  march  to  Teheran  ;  and  on  the 
morning  of  that  day  the  Shah  mounted  his  horse  "  Ameerj," 
and  set  his  face  towards  his  capital. 

To  Mahomed  Shah  this  failure  was  mortifying  indeed  ; 
but  the  interests  at  stake  were  too  large  for  him  to 
sacrifice  them  at  the  shrine  of  his  ambition.  He  had 
spent  ten  months  before  the  walls  of  Herat,  exhausting  his 
soldiery  in  a  vain  endeavour  to  carry  by  assault  a  place 
of  no  real  or  reputed  strength.  He  had  succeeded  only 
in  reducing  the  garrison  to  very  painful  straits  ;  and  had 
retired  at  last,  not  as  one  well-disposed  to  peaceful 
negotiation  and  reasonable  concession,  submitting  to  the 
friendly  intervention  of  a  neutral  power,  and  willing  to 
wave  the  chances  of  success  ;  but  as  one  who  saw  before 
him  no  chance  of  success,  and  was  moved  by  no  feeling  of 
moderation  and  forbearance,  but  by  a  cogent  fear  of 
the  consequences  resulting  from  the  longer  prosecution  of 
the  siege.  On  the  whole,  it  had  been  little  better  than 
a  lamentable  demonstration  of  weakness.  The  Persian 
army  under  the  eye  of  the  sovereign  himself,  aided  by  the 
fekill  of  Russian  engineers  and  the  wisdom  of  Russian 
statesmen,  had  failed,  in  ten  months,  to  reduce  a  place 
which  I  believe,  in  no  spirit  of  nationial  self-love,  a  well- 
equipped  English  force,  under  a  competent  commander, 
would  have  reduced  in  as  many  days. 

The  real  cause  of  the  failure  is  not  generally  understood. 
The  fact  is,  that  there  was  no  unity  in  the  conduct  of  the 


CAUSES   OF    FAILURE.  291 

siege.  Instead  of  devising  and  adhering  to  some  combined 
plan  of  operations,  the  Sirdars,  or  Generals,  under  Maho- 
med Shah,  to  whom  the  prosecution  of  the  siege  was 
entrusted,  acted  as  so  many  independent  commanders,  and 
each  followed  his  own  plan  of  attack.  The  jealousy  of 
the  chiefs  prevented  them  from  acting  in  concert  with  each 
other.  Each  had  his  own  independent  point  of  attack, 
and  they  would  not  even  move  to  the  assistance  of  each 
other  when  attacked  by  the  Heratees  in  the  trenches. 
Except  when  Mahomed  Shah  insisted  on  a  combined 
assault,  as  on  the  24th  of  June,  and  the  Kussian  minister 
directed  it,  there  was  no  union  among  them.  Each  had 
his  own  game  to  follow  up  ;  his  own  laurels  to  win  ;  and 
was  rather  pleased  than  disappointed  by  the  failures  of  his 
brethren.  It  was  not  possible  that  operations  so  conducted 
should  have  resulted  in  anything  but  failure.  But  it 
was  the  deliber8.te  opinion  of  Eldred  Pottinger,  expressed 
nearly  two  years  after  the  withdrawal  of  the  Persian  army, 
that  Mahomed  Shah  might  have  taken  Herat  by  assault, 
within  four- and- twenty  hours  after  his  appearance  before 
its  walls,  if  his  troops  had  been  efficiently  commanded.* 
Whether  Mahomed  Shah  ever  rightly  understood  this 

*  "  It  is  my  firm  belief  that  Mahomed  Shah  might  have  carried  the 
city  by  assault  the  very  first  day  that  he  reached  Herat,  and  that  even 
■when  the  garrison  gained  confidence,  and  were  flushed  with  the  success 
of  their  sorties,  he  might  have,  by  a  proper  use  of  the  means  at  his 
disposal,  taken  the  place  in  twenty-four  hours.  His  troops  were  ll-u- 
nitely  better  soldiers,  and  quite  as  brave  men,  as  the  Afghans.  The 
non-success  of  their  efforts  was  the  fault  of  their  generals.  We  can 
never  again  calciJate  on  such,  and  if  the  Persians  again  return,  they 
will  do  so  properly  commanded  and  enlightened  as  to  the  causes  of  their 
former  failure.  Their  material  was  on  a  scale  suflScient  to  have  reduced 
a  powerful  fortress.  The  men  worked  very  well  at  the  trenches,  con- 
sidering they  were  not  trained  sappers,  and  the  practice  of  the  artillery 
was  really  superb.  They  simply  wanted  engineers,  and  a  general,  to 
have  proved  a  most  formidable  force." — [Eldred  Pottinger' s  Report  on 
Herat:  Calcutta,  July,  1840.     MS.  Records.] 

u2 


292  THE    SIEGE    OF   HERAT. 

matter  I  do  not  pretend  to  know,  but  he  felt  that  it  was 
necessary  to  make  an  efFert  to  patch  up  the  rents  which 
this  grievous  failure  had  made  in  his  reputation.  So  he 
i^ued  a  firman,  setting  forth  all  the  gTeat  results  of  his 
expedition  to  the  eastward,  and  attempted  to  demonstrate, 
after  the  following  fashion,  that  he  gained  a  victory,  even 
at  Herat : — "  At  last,"  so  ran  the  royal  proclamation, 
"  when  the  city  of  Herat  existed  but  in  name,  and  the 
reality  of  the  government  of  Kamran  was  reduced  to  four 
bare  walls,  the  noble  ambassadors  of  the  illustrious  British 
Government,  notwithstanding  that  three  separate  treaties 
of  peace  between  the  two  governments  of  England  and 
Persia,  negotiated  respectively  by  Sir  Harford  Jones,  Sir 
Gore  Ouseley,  and  Mr.  Ellis,  were  still  in  force,  disre- 
garding the  observance  of  the  conditions  of  these  treaties, 
prepared  to  imdertake  hostilities,  and  as  a  warlike  demon- 
stration, despatched  a  naval  armament  with  troops  and 
forces  to  the  Gulf  of  Persia.  The  winter  season  was  now 
approaching,  and  if  we  protracted  to  a  longer  period  our 
stay  at  Herat,  there  appeared  a  possibility  that  our  victo- 
rious army  might  suffer  from  a  scarcity  of  provisions,  and 
that  the  maintenance  of  our  troops  might  not  be  unaccom- 
panied with  difficulty ;  the  tranquillity  of  our  provinces 
was  also  a  matter  of  serious  attention  to  our  benevolent 
thoughts  ;  and  thus,  in  sole  consideration  of  the  interest 
of  our  faith  and  country,  and  from  a  due  regard  to  the 
welfare  of  our  troops  and  subjects,  we  set  in  motion  our 
world-subduing  army  upon  the  19  th  of  Jumady-al-Akher, 

and  prepared  to  return  to  our  capital Dxu-ing  the 

protracted  siege  of  Herat,  a  vast  number  of  the  troops 
and  inhabitants  had  perished,  as  well  from  the  fire  of  our 
cannon  and  musketry  as  from  constant  hardship  and 
starvation ;  the  remainder  of  the  people,  amounting  to 
about  50,000  families,  with  a  large  proportion  of  the 
Afghan  and  Persian  chiefs,  who  had  been  treated  with  the 


CAUSES   OF   FAILURE.  293 

most  liberal  kindness  by  the  officers  of  our  goverment, 
and  who  being  compromised,  could  not  possibly,  therefore, 
hold  any  further  intercourse  with  Yar  Mahomed  Khan, 
marched  away  with  us,  with  zealous  eagerness,  to  the 
regions  of  Khain  and  Khorassan,  and  there  was  no  vestige 
of  an  inhabited  spot  left  around  Herat." 

But  although  the  failure  of  Mahomed  Shah  is  mainly 
to  be  attributed  to  the  jealousy,  and  consequent  disunion, 
of  his  generals,  it  would  be  an  injustice  to  the  garrison  of 
Herat  not  to  acknowledge  that  they  owed  their  safety,  in 
some  measure,  to  their  own  exertions.  Their  gallantry 
and  perseverance,  however,  were  not  of  the  most  sus- 
tained character,  and  might  have  yielded  to  the  assaults 
of  the  Persians  if  there  had  been  any  union  among  the 
assailants.  They  gathered  courage  from  the  languid 
movements  of  the  besiegers ;  and,  surprised  at  the  little 
progress  made  by  the  once  dreaded  army  of  Mahomed 
Shah,  they  came  in  time  to  regard  themselves  as  heroes, 
and  their  successful  sorties  as  great  victories.  When,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  Persians  really  attempted  anything  like 
a  combined  movement  against  their  works,  the  garrison 
began  to  lose  heart,  and  were  with  difficulty  brought  to 
repulse  them.  To  what  extent  they  were  indebted  to  the 
unfailing  constancy  and  courage  of  Eldred  Pottinger,  has 
been  set  forth,  but  I  believe  very  imperfectly,  in  this  nar- 
rative of  the  siege.  Enough,  however,  has  been  shown  to 
demonstrate  that,  but  for  the  heroism  of  this  young  Bombay 
artilleryman,  Herat  would  have  fallen  into  the  hands  of 
Mahomed  Shah.  The  garrison  were  fast  breaking  down, 
not  so  much  under  the  pressure  from  without  as  the  pres- 
sure from  within.  The  chiefs  were  desponding  —  the 
people  were  starving.  But  still  the  continued  cry  of 
Eldred  Pottinger  was,  "  A  little  longer — a  little  longer 
yet."  When  the  chiefs  talked  of  surrender — when  they 
set  forth  the  hopelessness  of  further  efforts  of  defence — 


294  THE    SIEGE    OF   HERAT. 

he  counselled  still  a  little  further  delay.  His  voice  was 
ever  for  the  manlier  course  ;  and  what  he  recommended  in 
speech  he  was  ever  eager  to  demonstrate  in  action.  Yar 
Mahomed  did  great  things  at  Herat.  It  would  be  un- 
just to  deny  him  the  praise  due  to  his  energetic  exertions 
in  the  prosecution  of  the  defence,  however  unscrupulous 
the  means  he  employed  to  sustain  it.  But  his  energies 
failed  him  at  last ;  and  it  was  only  by  the  powerful  stimu- 
lants applied  by  his  young  European  associate  that  he  was 
supported  and  invigorated  in  the  great  crisis,  when  the 
fate  of  Herat  was  trembling  in  the  balance.  There  was 
one  true  soldier  in  Herat,  whose  energies  never  failed  him  ; 
and  History  delights  to  record  the  fact  that  that  one  true 
soldier,  young  and  inexperienced  as  he  was,  with  no  know- 
ledge of  active  warfare  that  he  had  not  derived  from 
books,  rescued  Herat  from  the  grasp  of  the  Persian 
monarch,  and  baffled  the  intrigues  of  his  great  northern 
abettor.* 

About  these  intrigues  something  more  should  be  said. 
No  sane  man  ever  questions  the  assertion  that  Russian 
diplomatists  encouraged  Mahomed  Shah  to  undertake  the 
expedition  against  Herat,  and  that  Russian  officers  aided 
the  operations  of  the  siege.  No  reasonable  man  doubts 
that,  so  encouraging  and  so  aiding  Persia  in  aggressive 
measures  against  the  frontier  of  Afghanistan,  Russia  har- 
boured   ulterior    designs  not   wholly   unassociated   with 

*  It  will  have  been  perceived  that  I  have  described  the  operations 
of  the  siege  of  Herat,  almost  entirely  as  from  within  the  walls.  I  have 
done  this  partly,  because  I  believe  that  the  interest  of  such  descriptions 
is  greatly  enhanced  when  the  reader  is  led  to  identify  himself  more 
particularly  with  one  contending  party  ;  and  partly  because  the  out- 
side movements  of  the  Persian  army  have  been  already  detailed  in  the 
published  letters  of  Colonel  Stoddartand  Mr.  M'Neill,  whilst  no  account 
has  ever  yet  been  given  to  the  public  of  the  defensive  operations  of  the 
Hei-atees.  I  have  already  stated  that  my  information  has  been,  for  the 
most  part,  derived  from  the  Manuscript  Journals  of  Eldred  Pottinger. 


DESIGNS    OF   RUSSIA.  295 

thoughts  of  the  position  of  the  British  in  Hindostan.  At 
all  events,  it  is  certain  that  the  first  word,  spoken  or  wTitten 
in  encouragement  of  the  expedition  against  Herat,  placed 
Russia  in  direct  antagonism  with  Great  Britain.  "  The 
British  minister  at  Teheran  was  instructed  to  dissuade  the 
Shah  from  such  an  enterprise ;  urging  reasons  of  indis- 
putable force,  and  founded  upon  the  interests  of  the  Shah 
himself  But  the  advice  given  by  the  Russian  ambassador 
was  all  of  an  opposite  tendency.  For  while  Mr.  M'Neill 
was  appealing  to  the  prudence  and  the  reason  of  the  Shah, 
Count  Simonich  was  exciting  the  ambition  and  inflaming 
the  passions  of  that  Sovereign  ;  whilst  the  one  was  preach- 
ing moderation  and  peace,  the  other  was  inciting  to  war 
and  conqiiest ;  and  whilst  the  one  pointed  out  the  diffi- 
culties and  expense  of  the  enterprise,  the  other  inspired 
hopes  of  money  and  assistance.  "  * 

Such,  very  plainly  stated,  in  grave,  official  language,  had 
been  the  relative  positions  of  Russia  and  Great  Britain, 
But  when  Lord  Durham,  in  1837,  was  directed  to  seek 
from  the  Russian  minister  an  explanation  of  conduct  so 
much  at  variance  with  the  declarations  of  the  Muscovite 
Government,  the  answer  was,  that  if  Count  Simonich  had 
encouraged  Mahomed  Shah  to  proceed  against  Herat,  he 
acted  in  direct  violation  of  his  instructions. 

But  for  a  man  disobeying  the  instructions  of  an  arbi- 
trary government,  Simonich  acted  with  uncommon  bold- 
ness. He  advanced  to  the  Persian  ruler  50,000  tomauns, 
and  promised,  that  if  Mahomed  Shah  took  Herat,  the 
balance  of  the  debt  due  by  Persia  to  Russia  should  be 
remitted.  Thus  encouraged,  Mahomed  Shah  advanced 
upon  Herat.  How  Simonich  followed  M'Neill  to  the 
Persian  camp,  and  how  he  thwarted  the  effi^rts  of  the 

*  Draft  of  a  Note  to  be  presented  hy  the  Marquis  of  Clanricarde 
to  Count  Nesselrode.     Published  Papers. 


296  THE   SIEGE   OP   HERAT. 

British  diplomatist  to  bring  about  an  accommodation 
of  the  diiFerences  between  the  two  contending  states, 
and  how  Russian  officers  subsequently  directed  the  siege, 
has  been  already  shown.  It  has  been  shown,  how  a 
Russian  agent  guaranteed  a  treaty  injurious  to  British 
interests,  between  Mahomed  Shah  and  the  Sirdars  of 
Candahar.  It  has  been  shown,  too,  how  a  Russian  agent 
appeared  at  Caubul,  and  how  he  endeavoured  to  detach 
Dost  Mahomed  from  an  alliance  with  the  British,  and  to 
encourage  him  to  look  for  support  from  the  Persian  King 
and  his  Muscovite  supporters. 

Considering  these  things,  the  British  Government  asked 
whether  the  intentions  of  Russia  towards  Persia  and 
Afghanistan  were  to  be  judged  from  Count  Nesselrode's  de- 
clarations, or  from  the  actions  of  Simonich  and  Vickovich. 
The  answer  was,  that  Vickovich  had  been  despatched  to 
Caubul  on  a  "  Commercial  Mission,"  and  that,  if  he  had 
treated  of  anything  but  commerce,  he  had  exceeded  his 
instructions  ;  and  that  Simonich  had  been  instructed,  not 
only  to  discourage  Mahomed  Shah  from  prosecuting  the 
expedition  against  Herat,  but  to.  withdraw  the  Russian- 
deserter  regiment,  which  formed  no  insignificant  portion 
of  the  invading  army.  "  Not  upon  the  cabinet  of  Russia," 
it  was  said,  "  can  fall  the  reproach  of  having  encouraged 
or  suggested  that  fatal  enterprise."*     The  proceedings  of 

*  It  is  not  very  clear,  however,  that  the  Russian  Government,  though 
doubtless  discredited  by  the  failure,  regarded  it  as  "a  fatal  enterprise." 
Russia  had  a  double  game  to  play.  In  the  familiar  language  of  the 
turf,  she  "hedged."  Whether  the  Persians  won  or  lost,  she  was  sure 
to  gain  something.  The  views  of  Russian  statesmen  have  been  thus 
set  forth,  not  improbably  in  the  very  language  of  one  of  them  : 

"  Russia,"  it  is  stated,  "  has  played  a  very  successful,  as  well  as  a 
very  safe,  game  in  the  late  proceedings.  When  she  prompted  the  Shah 
to  undertake  the  siege  of  Herat,  she  was  certain  of  carrying  an 
important  point,  however  the  expedition  terminated.  If  Herat  fell, 
which  there  was  every  reason  to  expect,  then  Candahar  and  Caubul 


THE   COSSACK   AND   THE   SEPOY.  297 

the  agents  were  repudiated.  Vickovich,  being  a  person  of 
no  account,  was  remorselessly  sacrificed,  and  he  blew  out 
his  brains.  But  an  apology  was  found  for  Count  Simonich. 
It  was  said  that  he  only  assisted  a  friendly  state  when  in 
extreme  difficulty,  and  that  any  English  officer  would  have 
done  the  same.* 

There  was  some  truth  in  this.  At  all  events,  when  it 
was  added  by  the  Russian  minister  that  his  government* 
had  more  reason  to  be  alarmed  by  the  movements  of 
Great  Britain,  than  Great  Britain  by  the  movements  of 
Russia ;  and  that  England  sought  to  monopolise  the  pri- 
vilege of  intrigue  in  Central  Asia,  it  was  difficult  for  any 
candid  and  unprejudiced  observer  of  events  to  comment 
harshly  upon  the  injustice  of  the  imputation.  When,  too, 
some  time  afterwards.  Baron  Brunow  said  to  Sir  John 
Hobhouse,  "  If  we  go  on  at  this  rate,  the  Cossack  and  the 
Sepoy  will  soon  meet  on  the  banks  of  the  Oxus,"  t  it  would 
have  been  hard  to  have  laid  the  contemplated  collision 
wholly  to  the  account  of  the  restlessness  of  the  Czar. 

would  certainly  have  made  their  submission.  Russian  influence  would 
thus  have  been  brought  to  the  threshold  of  India  ;  and  England,  how- 
ever much  she  might  desire  peace,  could  not  avoid  being  involved  in  a 
difficult  and  expensive  war,  in  order  to  avert  more  serious  dangers.  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  England  interfered  to  save  Herat,  she  was  compro- 
mised— not  with  the  mere  court  of  Mahomed  Shah,  but  with  Persia  as 
a  nation.  Russia  had  contrived  to  bring  all  Persia  to  Herat,  and  to 
identify  all  Persia  with  the  success  or  failure  of  the  campaign  ;  and 
she  had  thus  gravelled  the  old  system  of  partisanship,  which  would 
have  linked  Azerbijan  with  herself,  and  the  rest  of  the  bation  with  her 
rival." — [Calcutta  Review.] 

*  Count  Nesselrode's  Instructions  to  Count  Pozzo  di  Borgo:  Novem- 
ber 1,  1839. 

+  Sir  John  Hobhouse's  answer  is  worth  giving.  **  Very  probably, 
Baron  ;  but  however  much  I  should  regret  the  collision,  I  should  have 
no  fear  of  the  result."  I  give  this  on  the  authority  of  a  distinguished 
writer  on  "  Our  Political  Relations  with  Persia,"  in  the  Calcutta 
Review. 


298  THE   SIEGE   OP  HERAT. 

True  it  is,  that  the  pohcy  of  Russia  in  the  East  had  been 
distinguished  for  its  aggressive  tendencies;*  and  it  is 
equally  true,  that  in  the  plenitude  of  our  national  self- 
love,  we  encouraged  the  conviction  that  Great  Britain  had 
conquered  the  entire  continent  of  Hindostan  by  a  series  of 
purely  defensive  measures.  Looking  merely  at  the  recog- 
nised policy  of  the  East  India  Company,  the  distinction 
may  be  admitted.  For  a  century  have  this  great  body 
been  steadfastly  setting  their  face  against  the  extension  of 
their  empire  ;  but  their  empire  has  been  extended  in  spite 
of  them,  and  their  agents  have  been  less  pacific  than 
themselves.  The  general  tendency  of  the  Eastern  policy 
worked  out  by  the  English  in  India,  has  not  been  purely 
defensive,  and  they  are,  perhaps,  the  last  people  in  the 
world  entitled  to  complain  of  the  encroachments  of  their 
allies.  England  and  Russia  seemed  at  one  time  to  be — 
and,  perhaps,  they  are  still — approaching  each  other  on 
the  vast  Central-Asia  battle-field  ;  but  when  the  account 
between  the  two  great  European  states  comes  to  be  struck, 
it  is  doubtful  whether  History  will  set  down  against  the 
Muscovite  power  any  greater  transgression  than  that  which 
it  is  the  object  of  these  volumes  to  record. f 

*  For  a  very  interesting  and  ably  written  summary  of  the  progress 
of  Russia  in  the  East,  and  an  elaborate  investigation  of  the  question  of 
the  possibility  of  a  Russian  invasion  of  India,  see  Mr.  Robert  Bell's 
excellent  "History  of  Russia."  It  was  written  before  the  British 
crossed  the  Indus — before  Russia  entangled  herself  in  the  steppes,  and 
England  in  the  defiles  of  Central  Asia.  Neither  country  now,  remem- 
bering these  disasters,  thinks  of  the  meeting  of  the  Sepoy  and  the  Cossack 
without  a  shudder. 

+  I  may  as  well  mention  here  that  the  chasm  between  Persia  and 
Great  Britain,  created  by  the  events  narrated  in  this  chapter,  was  not 
bridged  over  until  the  spring  of  1841,  when  Ghorian  was  given  back  to 
the  Heratees.  Before  the  close  of  that  year,  Mahomed  Shah  was  col- 
lecting a  great  army,  and  contemplating  extensive  operations,  the  object 
of  which,  according  to  Sir  John  M'Neill,  though  disguised  under  the 
name  of  operations  against  Khiva,  was  another  assault  upon  Herat. — 


NEW   DESIGNS    UPON   HERAT.  299 

[Sir  John  McNeill  to  Sir  Alexander  BxLrnes :  January  5,  1842.  MS."] 
This  letter  was  written  more  than  two  months  after  Burnes  had  fallen 
a  victim  to  the  policy  which  I  am  now  about  to  elucidate.  Sir  John 
M'Neill  wrote  :  "I  have  now  to  inform  you,  that  since  the  arrival  of 
Count  Medem,  the  new  Russian  Minister,  about  a  month  ago,  the  Shah 
has  given  orders  for  collecting  an  army  in  the  spring,  about  two  months 
hence,  which  is  intended  to  be  numerous,  and  to  be  accompanied  by 
two  hundred  pieces  of  Artillery ;  and  he  announces  his  intention  to 
march  in  the  direction  of  Meshed,  for  the  purpose  of  attacking  Khiva. 
The  advance  of  the  Shah  with  such  an  army  to  Meshed,  may  produce 
some  commotion  in  Afghanistan,  as  you  will  no  doubt  hear  of  his  pro- 
posing to  go  to  Herat ;  and  I  conclude,  therefore,  that  you  will  be  pre- 
pared to  put  down  any  movements  that  may  be  caused  by  the  rumour 
of  his  approach,  and  for  any  ulterior  measures  that  may  be  necessary." 
But  in  a  postscript,  dated  January  6,  the  very  day  on  which  the  British 
commenced  their  lamentable  retreat  from  Caubul,  he  added  :  "Since 
writing  the  preceding  lines,  some  circumstances  which  have  come  to 
my  knowledge,  lead  me  to  think  it  quite  possible  that  the  Shah  may 
not  follow  out  his  intention  of  going  with  an  army  into  Khorassan,  and 
it  is  even  possible  that  no  army  may  be  sent  in  that  direction  ;  but  I 
am  still  of  opinion,  that  it  is  considerably  more  probable  that  a  force 
will  be  sent,  than  that  it  will  not ;  and  if  a  large  army  should  march 
to  Meshed,  its  objects  will,  I  think,  have  reference  rather  to  Herat 
than  to  Khiva." — [MS.  Correspondence.] 


300 


CHAPTER  III. 

[1837—1838.] 

Policy  of  the  British -Indian  Government — Our  Defensive  Operations — 
Excitement  in  British  India — Proposed  Alliance  with  Dost  Mahomed 
— Failure  of  Burnes's  Mission  considered — The  claims  of  the  Suddozye 
Princes — The  Tripartite  Treaty — Invasion  of  Afghanistan  determined 
— Policy  of  the  Movement. 

Whilst  the  Persians  were  pushing  on  the  siege  of  Herat 
to  an  unsuccessful  termination,  and  the  Russians  were 
extending  over  them  the  wings  of  encouragement  and 
assistance,  the  Enghsh  in  India  were  devising  measures  for 
the  security  of  their  own  dominions,  which  seemed  to  be 
threatened  by  these  movements  on  the  frontier  of  Af- 
ghanistan. 

•  But  what  these  measures  were  to  be  it  was  not  easy  to 
determine.  It  was  beUeved  that  the  danger  was  great 
and  imminent.  There  was  a  Persian  army,  under  the 
command  of  the  "  King-of- Kings "  himself,  investing 
Herat,  and  threatening  to  march  upon  Candahar  and 
Caubul.  There  were  Russian  diplomatists  and  Russian 
engineers  in  his  camp,  directing  the  counsels  of  the  Shah 
and  the  operations  of  the  siege.  The  Barukzye  Sirdars 
of  Afghanistan  were  intriguing  with  the  Persian  Court ; 
and  far  out  in  the  distance,  beyond  the  mountains  of  the 
Hindoo-Koosh,  there  was  the  shadow  of  a  great  northern 
army,  tremendous  in  its  indistinctness,  sweeping  across 
the  wilds  and  deserts  of  Central  Asia,  towards  the  fron- 
tiers of  Hindostan. 


MUSSULMAN    INQUIETUDE.  301 

The  remoteness  of  the  countries  in  which  these  inci- 
dents were  passing,  might  have  reconciled  our  Anglo- 
Indian  statesmen  to  dangers  of  a  character  so  vague,  and 
an  origin  so  distant ;  but  the  result  of  all  these  disturbing 
nimours  was  an  after-growth  of  new  perils  springing  up 
almost  at  our  very  doors.  The  Native  States  on  our  own 
borders  were  beginning  to  evince  signs  of  feverish  unrest. 
From  the  hills  of  Nepaul  and  the  jungles  of  Burmah 
came  mutterings  of  threatened  invasion,  which  compelled 
the  British-Indian  Government  to  look  well  to  their  lines 
of  frontier.  Even  in  our  own  provinces,  these  rumours  of 
mighty  movements  in  the  countries  of  the  north-west 
disquieted  the  native  mind  ;  there  was  an  uneasy,  restless 
feeling  among  all  classes,  scarcely  amounting  to  actual 
disaffection,  and  perhaps  best  to  be  described  as  a  state 
of  ignorant  expectancy — a  looking  outwards  in  the  belief 
of  some  coming  change,  the  nature  of  which  no  one  clearly 
understood.  Among  our  Mussulman  subjects  the  feeling 
was  somewhat  akin  to  that  which  had  unsettled  their 
minds  at  the  time  when  the  rumoured  advent  of  Zemaun 
Shah  made  them  look  for  the  speedy  restoration  of  Maho- 
medan  supremacy  in  Hindostan.  In  their  eyes,  indeed, 
the  movement  beyond  the  Afghan  frontier  took  the  shape 
of  a  Mahomedan  invasion,  and  it  was  believed  that  count- 
less thousands  of  true  believers  were  about  to  pour  them- 
selves over  the  plains  of  the  Punjab  and  Hindostan,  and 
to  wrest  all  the  country  between  the  Indus  and  the  sea 
from  the  hands  of  the  infidel  usurpers.  The  Mahomedan 
journals,  at  this  time,  teemed  with  the  utterances  of  un- 
disguised sedition.  There  was  a  decline  in  the  value  of 
public  securities ;  and  it  went  openly  from  mouth  to 
mouth,  in  the  streets  and  the  bazaars,  that  the  Company's 
Raj  was  nearly  at  an  end. 

The  dangers  which  threatened  the  security  of  our 
Anglo-Indian  Empire,  in  1837-38,  were  seen  through  the 


302  POLICY    OP   THE    INDIAN   GOVERNMENT. 

magnifying  medium  of  ignorance,  and  greatly  exaggerated 
in  the  recital.  But  the  appearance  of  the  Persian  army 
before  Herat ;  the  presence  of  the  Russian  officers  in  the 
Persian  camp  ;  and  the  intrigues  of  the  Barukzye  Sirdars 
of  Afghanistan,  were,  at  all  events,  substantial  facts.  It 
was  little  doubted  that  Herat  would  fall.  There  seemed, 
indeed,  no  possibility  of  escape.  The  character  of  Mahomed 
Shah  was  well  known;  and  it  was  not  believed  that,  having 
conquered  Herat,  he  would  there  stop  short  in  his  career 
of  conquest.  It  had  been  long  officially  reported,  by  Mr. 
Ellis  and  others,  to  the  Anglo-Indian  Government,  that 
Mahomed  Shah  encouraged  very  extensive  ideas  of  Afghan 
conquest,  and  that  the  Russian  officers  about  his  Court 
were  continually  exerting  themselves  to  foster  the  flame  of 
his  ambition.  It  seemed  probable,  therefore,  that  Herat, 
having  fallen  into  the  hands  of  Mahomed  Shah,  the  Per- 
sian monarch  would  either  push  on  his  conquests  to 
Candahar  and  Caubul,  or,  having  transferred  the  Heratee 
principality  to  the  hands  of  the  Candahar  Sirdars,  and 
rendered  Dost  Mahomed  such  assistance  in  his  wars 
against  the  Sikhs  as  would  make  him,  in  effect,  the  vassal 
of  Persia,  would  erect,  in  Afghanistan,  a  platform  of 
observation  which  might  serve  as  the  basis  of  future 
operations  to  be  undertaken,  not  only  by  the  Persians 
themselves,  but  also  by  their  great  northern  allies. 

It  was  plainly  the  policy  of  the  British  Government 
to  preserve  the  independence  of  Afghanistan,  and  to 
cement  a  friendly  alliance  with  the  ruler  or  rulers  of  that 
country.  But  it  was  not  veiy  easy  to  discern  how  this 
was  to  be  effected.  Our  Indian  statesmen  had  never 
exhibited  any  very  violent  friendship  for  the  Barukzye 
Sirdars.  Lord  WiUiam  Bentinck  had  refused  to  connect 
himself  in  any  way  with  the  politics  of  Afghanistan  ;  but 
he  had  suffered  Shah  Soojah  to  raise,  in  1833-34,  an  army 
of  invasion  under  the  shadow  of  the  British  flag,  and  had 


EARLY    VIEWS    OF  AFGHAN   POLICY.  303 

done  everything  but  openly  assist  the  enterprise  he  was 
undertaking  for  the  recovery  of  his  lost  dominions.  Some 
nice  ideas  of  legitimacy  and  usurpation,  suggested  by  our 
own  position  in  India,  may  have  closed  the  sympathies  of 
our  Anglo-Indian  rulers  against  men  who  were  simply  the 
de  facto  rulers  of  Afghanistan,  and  who  laboured  under 
•the  imputation  of  having  rather  acquired  their  dominions 
by  right  of  conquest  than  possessed  them  by  right  of  birth. 
The  British- Indian  Government  had  not  concerned  itself 
for  a  quarter  of  a  century  about  the  government  of  the 
Douranee  Empire ;  but  it  now  appeared  that,  because 
Zemaun  Shah  had  threatened  to  invade  India,  and  Shah 
Soojah  had  demonstrated  his  incapacity  to  maintain  him- 
self in  security  on  the  throne,  and  to  preserve  the  integrity 
of  his  dominions,  the  English  in  India,  when  they  thought 
of  establishing  a  friendly  and  a  permanent  power  in  the 
country  beyond  the  Indus,  turned  to  the  Suddozye  Princes 
as  the  fittest  instruments  for  the  furtherance  of  these 
ends.  Even  in  1833-34  it  was  plain  that  the  success  of 
Shah  Soojah  would  have  delighted  our  Indian  statesmen. 
Though  we  declined  to  aid  him  in  a  very  substantial 
manner;  our  sympathies  went  with  him ;  and  now  again 
it  was  obvious  that  we  had  very  little  desire  to  con- 
ciliate the  friendship  of  the  Barukzye  Sirdars,  who  had 
long  been  eager  for  a  closer  alliance  with  the  great 
European  power  beyond  the  waters  of  the  Sutlej,  but  who 
had  always  been  condemned  to  have  their  advances  coldly 
received. 

Before  Mahomed  Shah  had  advanced  upon  Herat,  the 
British  ISIinister  at  the  Court  of  Teheran,  well  acquainted 
with  the  ambitious  projects  of  the  Persian  monarch,  had 
earnestly  pressed  upon  the  attention  of  the  British 
Government  the  expediency  of  some  counteracting  move- 
ment in  the  country  between  Persia  and  Hindostan.  And 
when  it  was  known  to  Mr.  M'Neill  that  Lord  Auckland 


304       POLICY  OF  THE  INDIAN  GOVERNMENT, 

had  despatched  Captain  Bumes  upon  a  mission  to  the 
Court  of  Dost  Mahomed,  he  wrote  a  long  confidential 
letter  to  that  officer,  setting  forth  the  advantages  of 
subsidising  the  Ameer,  and  placing  both  Herat  and  Can- 
dahar  under  his  rule.  The  letter  was  dated  March  1 3th, 
1837.  "I  sincerely  wish,"  wrote  Mr.  M'Neill,  "if  the 
Ameer  Dost  Mahomed  Khan  and  you  come  to  a  good* 
understanding,  that  he  were  in  possession  of  both  Can- 
dahar  and  Herat."  * 

.  And  again,  in  the  same  communication,  he  wrote  more 
explicitly  :  "  Dost  Mahomed  Khan,  with  a  little  aid  from 
us,  could  be  put  in  possession  of  both  Candahar  and 
Herat.  I  anxiously  hope  that  aid  will  not  be  withheld. 
A  loan  of  money  would  possibly  enable  him  to  do  this, 
and  would  give  us  a  great  hold  upon  him.  He  ought  to 
be  precluded  from  receiving  any  other  foreign  represen- 
tative or  agent  of  any  kind  at  his  Court,  and  should  agree 
to  transact  all  business  with  foreign  powers  through  the 
British  agent.  Unless  something  of  this  kind  should  be 
done,  we  shall  never  be  secure ;  and  until  Dost  Mahomed 
Khan  or  some  other  Afghan  shall  have  got  both  Can- 
dahar and  Herat  into  his  hands,  our  position  here  must 
continue  to  be  a  false  one."  t 

At  this  time,  the  Envoy  in  Persia,  though  profoundly 
convinced  that  the  Candahar  Sirdars  were  not  to  be 
trusted,  and  that  the  game  they  were  playing  was  one 
injurious  to  the  interests  of  Great  Britain,  seemed  to 
repose  confidence  in  the  good  feeling  of  Dost  Mahomed, 
and  to  believe  that  it  would  be  easy  to  secure  his  alliance. 
Of  the  intrigues  of  the  former  he  wrote  :  "  Kohun  Dil 
Khan  is  playing  a  double  game,  and  trying  to  strengthen 
himself  by  the  alliance  with  Persia  against  both  Caubul 


*  Mr.  M'Neill  to  Captain  BuvTies.     MS.  Records. 
t  Id.  ibid. 


OPINIONS   OF   M'NEILL   AND    WADE.  305 

and  Herat.  He  has  put  himself  in  communication  with 
the  Russian  minister  here,  who  has  sent  by  the  return 
envoy,  Tej  Mahomed  Khan,  Barukzye,  a  letter  and  pre- 
sents. The  letter  will  not  find  its  way  to  the  Khan,*  for 
I  am  sending  it  to  Lord  Palmerston ;  but  the  presents 
have  been  forwarded,  and  it  appears  that  Kohun  Dil  was 
the  first  to  open  the  correspondence,  and  I  think  it  not 
improbable  that  he  had  been  advised  to  do  so  by  Aziz 
Mahomed  Khan,  the  agent  formerly  sent  hither,  who 
found  the  Court  apparently  devoted  to  Russia.  I  hope 
you  will  be  able  to  put  a  stop  to  the  intercom'se,  which  I 
have  only  been  able  to  impede  and  interrupt  for  a  time." 
Such  were  the  views  and  recommendations  of  Mr. 
M'NeilL  Among  the  few  officers  in  the  Company's  ser- 
vice who  at  that  time  had  any  knowledge  of  the  politics 
of  Central  Asia,  not  one  was  more  conspicuous  than 
Captain  Claude  Wade,  who  had  held  for  some  years 
the  delicate  and  responsible  office  of  Governor-General's 
agent  on  the  North-Westem  Frontier.  It  was  natural  that, 
in  such  a  coiyuncture,  the  opinions  of  so  well-informed 
and  experienced  an  officer  should  have  been  sought  by 
the  Supreme  Government.  Captain  Wade,  through  whose 
office  the  Trans-Indian  correspondence  passed,  now  there- 
fore, on  forwarding  to  government  a  copy  of  Mr.  McNeill's 
letter,  freely  expressed  his  opinion  against  the  proposal  to 
consolidate  the  Afghan  Empire  under  the  rule  of  the 
Caubul  Ameer.  '•'  In  my  opinion,"  he  wrote  to  Mr.  Colvin, 
the  private  secretary  of  the  Governor-General,  "  such  an 
experiment  on  the  part  of  our  government  would  be  to 
play  into  the  hands  of  our  rivals,  and  to  deprive  our- 
selves, as  it  were  by  a  felo-de-se,  of  the  powerful  means 
which  we  have  in  resei-ve  of  controlling  the  piesent  rulers 

*  Count  Simonicli's  letter  was  intercepted,  and  taken  to  M'Neill  by 
one  Meer  Mahomed,  whom  M'Neill  subsequently  placed  at  the  disposal 
of  Burnes. 

VOL.  I.  X 


306       POLICY  OF  THE  INDIAN  GOVERNMENT. 

of  Afghanistan.  The  attempt  to  reduce  the  country  to 
the  sway  of  one  of  them  would  be  an  arduous  enterprise. 
The  chief  obstacle  in  the  way  of  Dost  Mahomed  would  be 
in  the  opposition  of  those  who  are  inimical  to  him  and  his 
family,  and  these  include  every  other  Douranee  tribe  in 
the  country,  to  whom,  therefore,  the  knowledge  of  such  a 
design  would  render  our  name  generally  odious — whilst 
the  attempt  itself  would  undoubtedly  lead  the  Toorkomans 
and  other  great  bordering  tribes  to  view  with  jealousy  the 
powers  of  a  chief  whose  interests  they  would  soon  have 
the  sagacity  to  discover  we  had  adopted  for  the  purpose  of 
serving  our  own  interests  at  their  expense." 

"Our  policy,"  continued  Captain  Wade,  "ought  not 
to  be  to  destroy,  but  to  use  our  endea,vours  to  preserve 
and  strengthen  the  different  governments  of  Afghanistan 
as  they  at  present  stand ;  to  promote  among  themselves 
a  social  compact,  and  to  conduce,  by  our  influence,  to  the 
establishment  of  that  peace  with  their  neighbours,  which 
we  are  now  endeavouring  to  produce  between  them  and 
the  Sikhs  on  one  side,  and  the  Sikhs  and  Sindhians  on 
the  other.  Whilst  distributed  into  several  states,  the 
Afghans  are,  in  my  opinion,  more  likely  to  subserve  the 
views  and  interests  of  the  British  Government  than  if  we 
attempted  to  impose  on  them  the  yoke  of  a  ruler  to  whose 
authority  they  can  never  be  expected  to  yield  a  passive 
obedience.  Though  undoubtedly  weak,  they  would  col- 
lectively be  fully  adequate  to  the  defence  of  their  country, 
when  they  have  derived  the  advantages  of  a  more  decided 
intercourse  with  our  government  than  at  present  exists. 
.  .  .  Supposing  that  we  were  to  aid  Dost  Mahomed 
to  overthrow  in  the  first  place  his  brother  at  Candahar, 
and  then  his  Suddozye  rival  at  Herat,  what  would  be  the 
consequence  ?  As  the  system,  of  which  it  is  intended 
to  be  a  part,  would  not  go  to  gratify  the  longing  wish 
of  Mahomed  Shah  for  the  annexation  of  Herat  to  his 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OP  HERAT.         307 

dominions,  the  first  results  would  be,  that  the  Shah-zadah 
Kamran  would  apply  to  Persia,  and  offer,  on  the  condition 
of  her  assistance  to  save  him  from  the  fate  which  impended 
over  his  head,  to  submit  to  all  the  demands  of  that  general, 
which  Kamran  has  hitherto  so  resolutely  and  successfully 
resisted,  and  between  his  fears  and  the  attempts  of  Dost 
Mahomed  Khan  to  take  it  (Herat),  which  is  regarded  by 
every  one  who  has  studied  its  situation  as  the  key  to 
Afghanistan,  would  inevitably  fall  prostrate  before  the 
arms  of  Persia,  by  the  effect  of  the  very  measures  which 
we  had  designed  for  her  security  from  Persian  thraldom."* 
The  expediency  of  maintaining  the  integrity  of  Herat 
was  not  at  this  time  more  palpable  than  the  injustice 
of  destroying  it.  But  it  hardly  seems  to  have  entered 
into  the  consideration  of  our  Indian  statesmen,  that  to 
transfer  Herat,  or  any  other  unoffending  principality  from 
the  hands  of  one  ruler  to  those  of  another,  was  to  per- 
petrate an  act  of  political  tyranny  not  to  be  justified  by 
any  reference  to  the  advantages  resulting  from  such  a 
course.  We  had  not,  at  that  time,  the  shadow  of  a 
pretext  for  breaking  down  the  independence  of  Herat. 
Kamran,  indeed,  was  at  this  time  about  to  play  the  very 
game  that  tended  most  to  the  advancement  of  British 
interests.  Had  he  formed  an  alliance  with  Persia,  having 
for  its  end  the  recovery  of  his  father's  dominions — had  he 
advanced,  with  a  confederate  Persian  army,  upon  Caubul 
and  Candahar,  and  consented  to  abandon  Herat  as  the 
price  of  Kujjur  assistance — some  pretext  might  have  been 
found  in  these  aggressive  measures  for  the  confiscation  of 
the  principality.  But  Herat  was  now  about  to  erect  itself 
into  a  barrier  against  Russo-Persian  invasion,  and  to  fight 
single-handed  the  first  great  battle  of  resistance  at  the 
gates  of  Afghanistan. 

*  Captain    Wade  to  J.  R.   Colvin,  Esq.,  Jime  27,  1837.      MS. 
Records. 

x2 


308       POLICY  OF  THE  INDIAN  GOVERNMENT. 

Mr.  M'Neill's  project  for  the  consolidation  of  the 
Afghan  Empire  found  little  favour  in  the  eyes  of  our 
Indian  statesmen ;  but  there  were  many  who  thought 
that,  without  any  acts  of  spoliation  and  oppression,  the 
de  facto  rulers  of  Afghanistan  might  be  so  encouraged 
and  conciliated  by  small  offers  of  assistance,  as  to  secure 
their  friendly  co-operation  in  the  great  work  of  resisting 
invasion  from  the  westward.  But  when  Captain  Bumes 
was  despatched  to  Caubul,  his  powers  were  so  limited, 
that,  although  he  was  profuse  in  his  expressions  of  sym- 
pathy, he  had  not  the  authority  to  offer  substantial 
assistance ;  and  when  he  ventured  to  exceed  the  instruc- 
tions of  government,  he  was  severely  censured  for  his 
unauthorised  proceedings. 

His  mission  failed.  What  wonder?  It  could  by  no 
possibility  have  succeeded.  If  utter  failure  had  been  the 
great  end  sought  to  be  accomplished,  the  whole  business 
could  not  have  been  more  cunningly  devised.  Bumes 
asked  everything ;  and  promised  nothing.  He  was  tied 
hand  and  foot.  He  had  no  power  to  treat  with  Dost 
Mahomed.  All  that  he  could  do  was  to  demand  on 
one  hand  and  refuse  on  the  other.  He  talked  about  the 
friendship  of  the  British  Government.  Dost  Mahomed 
asked  for  some  proof  of  it ;  and  no  proof  was  forthcoming. 
The  wonder  is,  not  that  the  Ameer  at  last  listened  to 
the  overtures  of  others,  but  that  he  did  not  seek  other 
assistance  before. 

No  better  proof  of  his  earnest  desire  to  cement  an 
alliance  with  the  British  Government  need  be  sought  for 
than  that  involved  in  the  fact  of  his  extreme  reluctance 
to  abandon  all  hope  of  assistance  from  the  British,  and 
to  turn  his  eyes  in  another  direction.  It  was  not  until 
he  was  driven  to  despair  by  resolute  refusals  from  the 
quarter  whence  he  looked  for  aid,  that  he  accepted  the 
offers  so  freely  made  to  him  by  other  States,  and  set  the 


CONDUCT   OF   DOST   MAHOMED.  309 

seal  upon  his  own  destruction.  "  Our  government,"  said 
Bumes,  "  would  do  nothing ;  but  the  Secretary  of  the 
Russian  Legation  came  with  the  most  direct  offers  of 
assistance  and  money,  and  as  I  had  no  power  to  counter- 
act him  by  a  similar  offer,  and  got  wigged  for  talking  of  it 
at  a  time  when  it  would  have  been  merely  a  dead  letter  to 
say  Afghanistan  was  under  our  protection,  I  was  obliged 
of  course  to  give  in."*  What  better  result  Lord  Auckland 
could  have  anticipated,  it  is  hard  to  say.  If  the  failure 
of  the  Mission  astonished  him,  he  must  have  been  the 
most  sanguine  of  men. 

I  am  unable  to  perceive  that  there  was  anything  unrea- 
sonable or  unfriendly  in  the  conduct  of  Dost  Mahomed  at 
this  time.  That,  from  the  very  first,  he  was  disappointed, 
there  is  no  doubt.  He  had  formed  exaggerated  ideas  of 
the  generosity  and  munificence  of  the  British  Government 
in  the  East,  and,  doubtless,  expected  great  things  from 
the  contemplated  alliance.  The  Mission  had  scarcely 
been  a  day  in  Caubul,  when  the  feelings  of  the  Ameer 
were  shocked,  the  exuberance  of  his  hopes  somewhat 
straitened,  and  his  dignity  greatly  offended,  by  the  paltry- 
character  of  the  presents  of  which  Burnes  was  the  bearer. 
No  one  ignorant  of  the  childish  eagerness  with  which 
Oriental  Princes  examine  the  ceremonial  gifts  presented  to 
them  by  foreign  potentates,  and  the  importance  which 
they  attach  to  the  value  of  these  presents,  as  indications 
of  a  gi-eater  or  less  degree  of  friendship  and  respect  on  the 
part  of  the  donor,  can  appreciate  the  mortification  of  Dost 
Mahomed  on  discovering  that  the  British  Government, 
of  whose  immense  resources  and  boundless  liberality  he 
had  so  exalted  a  notion,  had  sent  him  nothing  but  a  few 
trumpery  toys.  Burnes  had  been  directed  to  "procure 
from  Bombay  such  articles  as  would  be  required  to  be 

*  Private  Correspondence  of  Sir  A.  Burnes. 


310       POLICY  OF  THE  INDIAN  GOVERNMENT. 

given  in  presents  to  the  different  chiefs."  And  it  had 
been  characteristically  added:  "They  ought  not  to  be  of  a 
costly  nature,  but  should  be  chosen  particularly  with  a 
view  to  exhibit  the  superiority  of  British  manufacturers." 
Accordingly  the  envoy  had  provided  himself  with  a  pistol 
and  a  telescope  for  Dost  Mahomed,  and  a  few  trifles  for  the 
inmates  of  the  Zenana — such  as  pins,  needles,  and  play- 
things.* The  costliness  of  the  presents  lavished  upon 
Shah  Soojah,  when  the  Mission  under  Mountstuart 
Elphinstone  had  entered  Afghanistan,  was  stiU  a  tradition 
throughout  the  country.  The  Ameer  was  disappointed. 
He  thought  that  the  niggardliness  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment, in  this  instance  portended  no  good.  Nor  was  he 
mistaken.  He  soon  found  that  the  intention  to  give  little 
was  manifest  in  all  the  proceedings  of  the  Mission. 

It  has  been  said  that  the  Ameer  asked  more  than 
could  reasonably  be  granted ;  that  he  had  no  right  to  look 
for  the  restoration  of  Peshawur,  as  that  tract  of  country, 
since  the  dismemberment  of  the  Douranee  Empire,  had 
fallen  to  the  share  of  Sultan  Mahomed.  It  is  very  true 
that  the  country  had  once  been  governed  by  Sultan 
Mahomed.  Now  to  have  re-established  him  at  Peshawur 
would  have  been  to  have  paved  the  way  for  the  march  of 
Bunjeet  Singh's  army  to  Caubul.-  So  thought  Dost 
Mahomed.  It  was  better  to  submit  quietly  to  the  unas- 
sisted enmity  of  the  Maharajah,  than  to  have  an  insidious 
enemy  on  the  frontier,  by  whose  agency  Bunjeet  Singh 
might  have  accomplished  that  which  he  could  not  have 
achieved  alone.  It  was  the  treachery  of  Sultan  Mahomed 
that  had  lost  Peshawur  to  the  Afghans.  It  was  the 
personal  energy,  the  martial  prowess,  of  Dost  Mahomed 
that  had  secured  the  supremacy    of   the   Barukzyes   in 

*  See  Harlan's  account  of  the  reception  of  these  presents.  I  see  no 
reason  to  question  its  veracity. 


CONDUCT    OF   DOST   MAHOMED.  311 

Afghanistan  ;  and  as  Sultan  Mahomed  Khan  wanted  the 
ability,  or  the  honesty,  to  hold  his  own  at  Peshawur,  it 
was  but  natural  and  fitting  that  the  chief  of  the  Banik- 
zyes  should  endeavour  to  enter  into  arrangements  better 
calculated  to  preserve  the  integrity  of  the  Afghan  frontier. 
He  desired,  in  the  first  instance,  the  absolute  jDOssession 
of  Peshawur  on  his  own  account.  He  subsequently  con- 
sented to  hold  it,  conjointly  with  Sultan  Mahomed,  in 
vassalage  to  Runjeet  Singh.  Had  the  British  Govern- 
ment endeavoured  to  effect  an  amicable  arrangement 
between  the  Ameer  and  the  Maharajah,  there  is  no  room 
to  doubt  that  Dost  Mahomed  would  have  rejected  all 
overtures  from  the  westward,  and  proved  to  us  a  firm  and 
faithful  ally.  But,  instead  of  this,  we  offered  him  nothing 
but  our  sympathy ;  and  Dost  Mahomed,  with  all  respect 
for  the  British  Government,  looked  for  something  more 
substantial  than  mere  meaningless  words. 

That  his  conduct  throughout  the  long  negotiations  with 
Burnes  was  characterised  by  on  entire  singleness  of  pur- 
pose and  straightfoi-wardness  of  action  is  not  to  be  main- 
tained; but  it  may  with  truth  be  said  that  it  evinced 
somewhat  less  than  the  ordinaiy  amount  of  Afghan  dupli- 
city and  deceit.  Singleness  and  straightforwardness  do 
not  flourish  in  the  near  neighbourhood  either  of  Eastern 
or  Western  diplomacy ;  and  perhaps  it  is  not  wise,  on  our 
own  account,  to  look  too  closely  into  these  matters.  The 
wonder  is,  not  that  the  Ameer  was  so  deceitful,  so  tortu- 
ous, so  arrogant,  and  so  exacting,  but  that  he  was  so 
sincere,  so  straightforward,  so  patient,  and  so  moderate. 
He  might  have  possessed  all  these  qualities  in  much 
scantier  measure,  and  yet  have  been  a  very  respectable 
Afghan  chief. 

It  was,  however,  decreed  that  Dost  Mahomed  was  a 
hostile  chief;  and  the  policy  of  the  British  Government 
soon  made  him  one.     Had  Burnes  been  left  to  obey  the 


312       POLICY  OF  THE  INDIAN  GOVERNMENT. 

dictates  of  his  own  reason  and  to  use  the  light  of  his  own 
experience,  he  would  have  conciliated  both  the  Candahar 
Sirdars  and  the  Caubul  Ameer,  and  raised  up  an  effective 
bulwark  in  Afghanistan  against  Persian  invasion  and 
Russian  intrigue.  We  refused  to  detach  Kohun  Dil  Khau 
from  the  Persian  aUiance,  and  we  deliberately  drove  Dost 
Mahomed  Khan  into  it.  In  fact,  our  pohcy,  at  this  time, 
seems  to  have  been  directed  to  the  creation  of  those  very- 
difficulties  to  encounter  which  the  British  Government 
launched  into  the  Afghan  war. 

Unfortunately,  at  this  time.  Lord  Auckland  was  sepa- 
rated from  his  Council.  He  was  on  his  way  to  that 
pleasant  hill  Sanitarium,  at  Simlah,  where  our  Governors- 
General,  surrounded  by  irresponsible  advisers,  settle  the 
destinies  of  empires  without  the  aid  of  their  legitimate 
fellow-counsellors,  and  which  has  been  the  cradle  of  more 
political  insanity  than  any  place  within  the  limits  of 
Hindostan.  Just  as  Mahomed  Shah  was  beginning  to 
open  his  batteries  upon  Herat,  and  Captain  Bumes  was 
entering  Caubul,  Lord  Auckland,  taking  with  him  three 
civilians,  all  men  of  ability  and  repute — Mr.  William  Mac- 
naghten,  Mr.  Henry  Torrens,  and  Mr.  John  Colvin  — 
turned  his  back  upon  Calcutta. 

Mr.  Macnaghten  was  at  this  time  chief  secretary  to 
Government.  He  had  originally  entered  the  service  of 
the  East  India  Company  in  the  year  1809,  as  a  cadet  of 
cavalry  on  the  Madras  establishment ;  and  whilst  yet  a 
boy  acquired  considerable  reputation  by  the  extent  of  his 
acquirements  as  an  Oriental  linguist.  Transferred  in 
1814  to  the  Bengal  civil  service,  he  landed  at  Calcutta 
as  the  bearer  of  the  highest  testimonials  from  the  govern- 
ment under  which  he  had  served ;  and  soon  justified  by 
his  distinguished  scholarship  in  the  college  of  Fort  William 
the  praises  and  recommendations  of  the  authorities  of 
Madras.     It  was  publicly  said  of  the  young  civilian  by 


WILLIAM    MACNAGHTEX.  313 

Lord  Hastings,  that  "there  was  not  a  language  taught 
in  the  college  in  which  he  had  not  earned  the  highest 
distinctions  which  the  Government  or  the  College  could 
bestow."  On  leaving  college  he  was  appointed  an 
assistant  in  the  office  of  the  Register  of  the  Sudder 
Dewany  Adawlut,  or  High  Court  of  Appeal ;  and  in  1818 
he  quitted  Calcutta  to  enter  upon  the  practical  duties  of 
the  magistracy,  but  after  a  few  years  was  recalled  to  the 
Presidency  and  to  his  old  office,  and  in  a  little  while  was  at 
the  head  of  the  department  in  which  he  had  commenced 
his  career.  During  a  period  of  eight  years  and  a  half, 
Mr.  Macnaghten  continued  to  occupy  the  responsible  post 
of  Register  of  the  Sudder  Dewany  Adawlut,  and  was  only 
removed  thence  to  accompany  Lord  William  Bentinck, 
in  the  capacity  of  secretary,  on  the  tour  which  that 
benevolent  statesman  was  about  to  commence,  at  the 
close  of  1830,  through  the  Upper  and  Western  Provinces 
of  India.  The  objects  of  this  journey  were  connected 
entirely  with  measm-es  of  internal  reform;  but  having 
approached  the  territories  of  Runjeet  Singh,  the  Governor- 
General  met  the  old  Sikh  chief  at  Roopur,  and  there 
Macnaghten,  who  had  up  to  this  time  been  almost  wholly 
associated  with  affairs  of  domestic  administration,  gradu- 
ated in  foreign  politics,  and  began  to  fathom  the  secrets 
of  the  Lahore  Durbar.  Returning  early  in  1833  to  Cal- 
cutta, with  his  experience  greatly  enlai'ged  and  his  judg- 
ment matured  by  the  opportunities  affi)rded  him  on  his 
journey,  as  well  as  by  his  intimate  relationship  with  so 
enlightened  and  liberal  a  statesman  as  Lord  William 
Bentinck,  Macnaghten  now  took  charge  of  the  Secret  and 
Political  Department  of  the  Government  Secretariat,  and 
remained  in  that  office  diu-ing  the  interregnmn  of  Sir 
Charles  Metcalfe,  and  the  first  yeai*  of  Lord  Auckland's 
admiuisti-ation,  until  summoned  by  the  latter  to  accom- 
pany him  on  his  tour  to  the  North- Western  Provinces. 


314       POLICY  OF  THE  INDIAN  GOVERNMENT. 

Such,  briefly  narrated,  were  the  antecedents  of  Mac- 
naghten's  official  life.  That  he  was  one  of  the  ablest 
and  most  assiduous  of  the  many  able  and  assiduous  civil 
servants  of  the  East  India  Company  all  men  were  ready 
to  admit.  With  a  profound  knowledge  of  Oriental  lan- 
guages and  Oriental  customs,  he  combined  an  extensive 
acquaintance  with  all  the  practical  details  of  government, 
and  was  scarcely  more  distinguished  as  an  erudite  scholar 
than  as  an  expert  secretary.  In  his  colleague  and  assis- 
tant, Mr,  Henry  Torrens,  there  were  some  points  of  resem- 
blance to  Macnaghten;  for  the  younger  officer  was  also 
an  accomplished  linguist  and  a  ready  writer,  but  he  was 
distinguished  by  a  more  mercurial  temperament  and  more 
varied  attainments.  Perhaps  there  was  not  in  all  the 
presidencies  of  Iridia  a  man — certainly  not  so  young  a 
man — with  the  lustre  of  so  many  accomplishments  upon 
him.  The  facility  with  which  he  acquired  every  kind  of 
information  was  scarcely  more  remarkable  than  the  tena- 
city with  which  he  retained  it.  With  the  languages  of 
the  East  and  the  West  he  was  equally  familiar.  He  had 
read  books  of  all  kinds  and  in  all  tongues,  and  the  airy 
grace  with  which  he  could  throw  off  a  French  canzonet 
was  something  as  perfect  of  its  kind  as  the  military  genius 
with  which  he  could  sketch  out  the  plan  of  a  campaign, 
or  the  official  pomp  with  which  he  could  inflate  a  state 
paper.  His  gaiety  and  vivacity  made  him  a  welcome 
addition  to  the  Governor-General's  vice-regal  court;  and 
perhaps  not  the  least  of  his  recommendations  as  a  travel- 
ling companion  was  that  he  could  amuse  the  ladies  of  Lord 
Auckland's  family  with  as  much  felicity  as  he  could  assist 
the  labours  of  that  nobleman  himself 

Mr.  John  Colvin  was  the  private  secretary  of  the  Go- 
vernor-General, and  his  confidential  adviser.  Of  all  the 
men  about  Lord  Auckland,  he  was  believed  to  exercise 
the   most   direct  influence  over  that   statesman's   mind. 


JOHN    COLVIN.  315 

Less  versatile  than  Toirens,  and  less  gifted  with  the 
lighter  accomplishments  of  literature  and  art,  he  possessed 
a  stronger  will  and  a  more  powerful  understanding.  He 
was  a  man  of  much  decision  and  resolution  of  character ; 
not  troubled  with  doubts  and  misgivings ;  and  sometimes, 
perhaps,  hasty  in  his  judgments.  But  there  was  some- 
thing noble  and  generous  in  his  ambition.  He  never 
forgot  either  the  claims  of  his  country  or  the  reputation 
of  his  chief.  And  if  he  were  vain,  his  vanity  was  of  the 
higher,  but  not  the  less  dangerous  class,  which  seeks 
rather  to  mould  the  measures  and  establish  the  fame  of 
others  than  to  acquire  distinction  for  self. 

Such  were  the  men  who  accompanied  Lord  Auckland 
to  the  Upper  Provinces  of  India.  About  him  also  clus- 
tered the  common  smaller  staff  of  military  aides-de-camp; 
and  not  very  far  in  the  back-ground  were  the  two  sisters 
of  his  lordship  — ladies  of  remarkable  intelligence  and 
varied  accomplishments,  who  are  supposed  to  have  exer- 
cised an  influence  not  wholly  confined  to  the  social  ameni- 
ties of  the  vice-regal  camp.  Lord  Auckland  was  not 
wanting  in  judgment  or  sagacity,  and  his  integrity  of 
purpose  is  undoubted  ;  but  he  lacked  decision  of  character; 
he  too  often  mistrusted  his  own  opinions,  and  yielded  his 
assent  to  those  of  irresponsible  advisers  less  single-minded 
and  sagacious  than  himself.  The  men  by  whom  he  was  sur- 
rounded were  among  the  ablest  and  most  accomplished  in 
the  country ;  but  it  was  for  the  most  part  a  dangerous  kind 
of  cleverness  that  they  possessed;  there  was  too  much 
presumption  in  it.  These  secretaries,  especially  the  two 
younger  ones,  were  too  ardent  and  impulsive — they  were 
of  too  bold  and  ambitious  a  nature  to  be  regarded  as  any- 
thing better  than  perilous  and  delusive  guides.  But  Lord 
Auckland  entrusted  himself  to  their  guidance.  Perhaps, 
he  scarcely  knew  to  what  extent  he  was  swayed  by  their 
counsels ;  but  it  is  my  deliberate  conviction,  that  if  he 


316    ^  POLICY  OP  THE  INDIAN  GOVERNMENT. 

had  not  quitted  Calcutta,  or  if  he  had  been  surrounded 
by  older  and  more  experienced  advisers,  he  would  have 
followed  a  line  of  policy  more  in  accordance  with  his  own 
feelings  and  opinions,  and  less  destructive  to  the  interests 
of  the  empire. 

But,  so  surrounded.  Lord  Auckland  journeyed  by  easy 
stages  towards  the  cool  mountain-ranges  of  the  Himalayah ; 
and  as  he  advanced,  there  came  to  the  vice-regal  camp 
tidings,  from  time  to  time,  of  the  progress  or  no-progress 
of  Mahomed  Shah's  army  before  Herat,  and  of  Biu-nes's 
diplomatic  movements  at  the  Court  of  the  Caubul  Ameer. 
There  was  much  in  all  this  to  perplex  Lord  Auckland. 
He  was  in  all  sincerity  a  man  of  peace.  They  who  best 
knew  his  character  and  that  of  his  chief  secretary,*  pre- 
dicted that  if  war  could,  in  any  way,  be  avoided,  there 
would  be  no  war.  But  from  all  quarters  came  disturbing 
hints  and  dangerous  promptings ;  and  Lord  Auckland  thus 
assailed,  had  not  resolution  enough  to  be  true  to  his  own 
moderate  and  cautious  character,  t  Mr.  M'Neill  had 
despatched  Major  Todd  from  Herat  to  the  camp  of  the 
Governor-General ;  and  had  urgently  solicited  Lord  Auck- 
land to  adopt  vigorous  measures  for  the  intimidation  of 

*  Lord  William  Bentinck  is  said  to  have  exclaimed,  "What!  Lord 
Auckland  and  Macnaghten  gone  to  war  !  The  very  last  men  in  the 
world  I  should  have  suspected  of  such  folly  ! " 

+  In  the  preceding  year  he  had  written  to  Sir  Charles  Metcalfe, 
*' You  are  quite  right  in  believing  that  I  have  not  a  thought  of  inter- 
ference between  the  Afghans  and  the  Sikhs.  I  should  not  be  sorry  to 
see  strong,  independent,  and  commercial  powers  established  in  Afghan- 
istan ;  but  short  of  Persian  or  Russian  occupation,  their  present  state 
is  as  unsatisfactory  as  possible,  with  national,  family,  and  religious 
feuds  so  inveterate  as  almost  to  make  one  party  ready  to  join  any 
invader  against  another.  It  is  out  of  the  question  that  we  can  ever 
gain  direct  power  or  influence  amongst  them." — [Life  of  Lord  Metcalfe, 
vol.  ii,  p.  307.]  It  was  upon  the  basis  of  this  assumption  that  he  sub- 
sequently reared  the  delusive  project  of  re-establishing  "  the  integrity 
of  the  Douranee  Empire." 


VIEWS   OF   LORD   AUCKLAND.  317 

Persia  and  the  defence  of  Herat,  which,  it  was  alleged, 
could  not  much  longer  resist  the  efforts  of  the  investing 
force.  Nothing  short  of  the  march  of  a  British  aiiny 
upon  Herat  was  thought  by  some  sufficient  to  stem  the 
tide  of  Russo-Persian  invasion.  The  British  Government, 
seeing  everywhere  signs  of  the  restless  aggressive  spirit  of 
Russia,  and  the  evident  tendency  of  all  her  movements 
towards  the  East,  had  written  strong  letters  to  the 
Governor- General,  urging  him  to  adopt  vigorous  measures 
of  defence.  His  own  immediate  advisers  were  at  hand  to 
second  the  suggestions  both  of  Mr.  M'Neill  and  the  British 
Minister ;  and  so  Lord  Auckland,  though  he  hesitated  to 
undertake  a  grand  military  expedition  across  the  Indus, 
was  persuaded  to  enter  upon  defensive  measures  of  a 
dubious  character,  affecting  the  whole  question  of  the 
sovereignty  of  the  Douranee  Empire. 
^  The  open,  acknowledged  danger,  to  be  met  by  vigorous 
measures  on  the  part  of  our  x4.nglo-Indian  statesmen,  was 
the  attempt  of  Mahomed  Shah  to  destroy  the  integrity  of 
Herat,  and  his  asserted  claims  to  the  sovereignty  of 
Ghuznee  and  Candahar.  It  is  true  that  by  the  ninth 
article  of  the  treaty  with  Persia,  England  was  especially 
bound  not  to  interfere  in  any  quarrels  between  the  Afghans 
and  the  Persians;  but  our  statesmen  both  in  the  East  and 
the  West,  saw  a  ready  means  of  escape  from  these  conditions 
in  the  circumstances  of  the  assault  on  Mr.  M'Neill's 
courier,  which,  however  contemptible  in  themselves,  were 
sufficient  to  bring  about  a  temporary  rupture  between 
Persia  and  Great  Britain.  Lord  Auckland  was  slow  to 
encourage  an  idea  of  the  expediency  of  such  direct  inter- 
ference as  would  be  involved  in  the  passage  of  a  British 
army  across  the  great  boundary  line  of  the  Indus.  But 
he  saw  the  necessity  of  so  establishing  our  influence  in 
Afghanistan  as  to  erect  a  secure  barrier  against  invasion 
from  the  westward ;  and  now  that  he  had  abandoned  all 


318      POLICY  OF  THE  INDIAN  GOVERNMENT. 

desire  to  propitiate  Dost  Mahomed  and  the  Barukzye 
chiefs,  and  had  begun  to  think  of  carrying  out  his  objects 
through  other  agency,  it  was  only  natural  that  he  should 
have  turned  his  thoughts,  in  the  first  instance,  to  the 
Suddozye  pensioner  of  Loodhianah,  who  had  made  so  many 
unsuccessful  efforts  to  reseat  himself  upon  the  throne  of 
the  Douranee  Empire. 

Shah  Soojah  had  lived  so  long  upon  the  bounty  of  the 
British  Government,  that  it  was  only  reasonable  to  beheve 
that  we  should  find  in  him  a  fast  friend  and  a  faithful 
ally.  But  when  in  the  month  of  May,  1838,  Lord  Auck- 
land, then  at  Simlah,  wrote  an  elaborate  minute,  setting 
forth  his  opinions  regarding  the  measures  best  calculated 
to  secure  the  integrity  of  the  western  frontier  of  Afghan- 
istan, and  suggesting  the  restoration  of  the  exiled 
Suddozye  Prince,  it  was  evident  that  he  had  not,  at  that 
time,  grasped  the  grand,  but  perilous  idea,  of  sending  a 
British  army  into  the  fastnesses  of  Afghanistan  to  break 
down  the  dynasty  of  the  Barukzyes,  to  set  up  a  monarch 
of  our  own,  and  so  to  roll  back  for  ever  the  tide  of  western 
invasion.  He  meditated  nothing  more  at  this  time  than 
the  encouragement  of  an  expedition  to  be  undertaken  by 
Shah  Soojah  and  Eunjeet  Singh,  the  British  Government 
supplying  money,  appointing  an  accredited  agent  to  accom- 
pany the  Shah's  camp,  and  furnishing  a  certain  number  of 
British  officers  to  direct  the  movements  of  the  Shah's 
army.*     It  appeared  to  him  that  there  were  but  three 

*  "Of  plans,  of  this  nature,  that  of  granting  our  aid  or  countenance 
in  concert  with  Runjeet  Singh,  to  enable  Shah  Soojah-ool-Moolk  to  re- 
establish his  sovereignty  in  the  Eastern  division  of  Afghanistan,  under 
engagements  which  shall  conciliate  the  feeling  of  the  Sikh  ruler,  and 
bind  the  restored  monarch  to  the  support  of  our  interests,  appears  to 
me  to  be  decidedly  the  most  deserving  of  attention.  Shah  Soojah-ool- 
Moolk  and  Maharajah  Runjeet  Singh  would  probably  act  readily  upon 
such  a  plan,  it  being  similar  to  that  in  which  they  were  before  en- 
gaged, but  which  failed  principally  from  the  want  of  pecuniary  aid,  and 


VIEWS   OF   LORD   AUCKLAND.  319 

courses  open  to  him;  "the  first  to  confine  our  defen- 
sive measures  to  the  Hue  of  the  Indus,  and  to  leave 
Afghanistan  to  its  fate  ;  the  second,  to  attempt  to  save 
Afghanistan,  by  granting  succour  to  the  existing  chief- 
ships  of  Caubul  and  Candahar ;  the  third,  to  permit  or  to 
encourage  the  advance  of  Runjeet  Singh's  armies  upon 
Caubul,  under  counsel  and  restriction,  and  as  subsidiary 
to  his  advance  to  organise  an  expedition  headed  by  Shah 
Soojah,  such  as  I  have  above  explained."  "The  first 
course,"  argued  Lord  Auckland,  ''would  be  absolute  defeat, 
and  would  leave  a  free  opening  to  Russian  and  Persian 
intrigue  upon  our  frontiers.  The  second  would  be  only  to 
give  power  to  those  who  feel  greater  animosity  against  the 
Sikhs,  than  they  do  against  the  Persians,  and  who  would 
probably  use  against  the  former  the  means  placed  at 
their  disposal ;  and  the  third  course,  which  in  the  event 
of  the  successful  resistance  of  Herat,  would  appear  to  be 
most  expedient,  would,  if  the  state  were  to  fall  into  the 
hands  of  the  Persians,  have  yet  more  to  recommend  it,  and 
I  cannot  hesitate  to  say,  that  the  inclination  of  my  opinion 
is,  for  the  reasons  which  will  be  gathered  from  this  paper, 
very  strongly  in  favour  of  it."* 

All  this  is  suflSciently  moderate,  if  it  is  not  sufficiently 

the  absence  of  our  active  sanction  and  support.  In  such  an  enterprise 
(which  both  from  past  experience,  and  from  the  circumstance  that  it 
would  be  undertaken  in  resistance  of  an  attempt  to  establish  Sheeah 
supremacy  in  the  country,  would,  we  believe,  have  many  partisans  in 
Afghanistan)  Runjeet  Singh  would  assist  by  the  employment  of  a  por- 
tion of  his  troops,  and  we  by  some  contribution  in  money,  and  the 
presence  of  an  accredited  agent  of  the  government,  and  of  a  sufficient 
number  of  officers  for  the  direction  of  the  Shah's  army." — [MiniUe  of 
Lord  Auckland's,  Simlah,'May  12,  18Z8— MS.  Records.]  A  portion 
of  this  minute  is  given  in  the  published  correspondence.  The  passage 
quoted,  and  indeed,  all  the  latter  and  more  practical  portion  of  it,  is 
omitted. 

*  MwAUe  of  Lord  Auckland — UnpuhlisJied  portion:  MS.  Records. 


320      POLICY  OF  THE  INDIAN  GOVERNMENT. 

just.  The  whole  question  is  argued  simply  as  one  of 
expediency.  It  appeared  to  Lord  Auckland  to  be  most 
expedient  to  construct  an  alliance  between  Runjeet  Singh 
and  Shah  Soojah  for  the  recovery  of  the  lost  dominions 
of  the  latter.  England  was  to  remain  in  the  back-ground 
jingling  the  money-bag.  At  this  time,  it  had  been 
arranged  that  Macnaghten  should  proceed,  with  little 
delay,  to  the  Court  of  Lahore.  It  had  been  intended,  in 
the  first  instance,  that  the  mission  should  be  merely  a 
complimentary  one.  But  as  events  began  to  thicken  in 
the  north-west,  it  appeared  impossible  to  confine  to  such 
narrow  limits  the  commmiications  which  he  was  instructed 
to  make  to  the  Maharajah.  He  was  now  enjoined  to  sound 
Runjeet  Singh  on  the  subject  of  the  proposed  confederate 
expedition  against  the  Barukzye  Sirdars  of  Afghanistan. 
These  instructions  were  written  three  days  after  the  minute 
of  the  12th  of  May.  It  seems  that  in  this  brief  interval 
some  idea  of  the  employment  of  British  troops  in  support 
of  the  Suddozye  prince  had  dawned  upon  the  under- 
standing of  the  Governor-General.  It  is  certain,  at  least, 
that  the  letter  written  by  Mr.  Torrens  speaks  of  a  demon- 
stration to  be  made  "  by  a  division  of  the  British  army 
occupying  Shikarpoor."  *  This  was  a  step  in  advance. 
The  great  project  to  which  Lord  Auckland  subsequently 
lent  himself  was  only  then  beginning  to  take  shape  in 
his  mind. 

*  It  is  worth  while  to  quote  some  passages  from  this  letter  of 
instnictions  ;  only  a  grandiloquent  passage  setting  forth  generally  the 
pacific  views  of  Lord  Auckland,  and  the  power  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment having  been  inserted  in  the  Blue  Book.  *'  You  can  then,  as  you 
observe  the  disposition  of  the  Maharajah,  listen  to  all  he  has  to  say, 
or,  in  the  event  of  his  showing  no  disposition  to  commence  the  con- 
ference, you  can  state  to  him  the  views  of  your  own  government — that 
two  courses  of  proceeding  had  occurred  to  his  lordship — the  one  that 
the  treaty  formerly  executed  between  his  Highness  and  Shah  Soojah 
should  be  recognised  by  the  British  Government — that   whilst  the 


RECEPTION    OF   THE    MISSION.  321 

The  Mission  crossed  the  Siitlej,  and  on  the  31st  of 
May  were  presented  to  Runjeet  Singh  at  Adeena-nuggur. 
In .  a  mango-grove — each  under  the  shadow  of  its  own 
tree — the  Sikh  ruler  had  ordered  a  number  of  mud-huts 
to  be  erected  for  the  accommodation  of  Macnaghten  and 
his  companions.  Small  and  comfortless  as  were  these 
abodes,  the  officers  of  the  Mission  joyfully  resorted  to 
them  for  shelter  from  the  intolerable  summer-sun  and  the 
burning'  winds,  which  had  scorched  them  in  their  own 
tents.  Even  now  something  horrible  in  the  retrospect 
to  the  sui-vivors  of  the  Mission  is  the  fiery  heat  of  that 
June  weather. 

In  the  midst  of  much  pomp  and  splendour,  surrounded 
by  his  courtiers,  the  Maharajah  received  the  Enghsh 
gentlemen*  with   befitting   cordiality  and  respect.      As 

Sikhs  advanced  cautiously  on  Caubul,  accompanied  by  British  agents, 
a  demonstration  should  be  made  by  a  division  of  the  British  army 
occupying  Shikarpoor  with  Shah  Soojah  in  their  company,  to  whom  the 
British  Government  would  advance  money  to  enable  him  to  levy  troops 
and  purchase  arms,  and  to  whom  also  the  services  of  British  officers 
should  be  lent,  that  the  same  opportunity  should  be  taken  of  securing 
to  the  Maharajah  what  it  had  been  customary  for  him  to  receive  from 
the  Scindhians,  and  that  with  regard  to  Shikarpoor,  the  supplementary 
article  in  the  treaty  now  proposed  (and  which  with  a  second  supplemen- 
tary article  relating  to  Herat  is  annexed  to  this  despatch)  should  be 
substituted  for  Article  IV.  in  the  former  treaty — that  in  the  event  of 
his  Highness  agreeing  to  this  convention,  the  Governor-Greneral  would 
be  prepared  to  ratify  it,  unless  circumstances  should  intermediately 
have  occurred  to  induce  his  Lordship  to  alter  his  views  as  to  its  expe- 
diency, and  that  in  the  event  of  the  convention  being  ratified  by  his 
Lordship,  the  descent  on  Shikarpoor,  for  temporary  occupation,  should  be 
directed  as  soon  as  due  preparations  could  be  made,  and  the  season 


*  Captain  Osborne,  Lord  Auckland's  nephew  and  military  secretary 
Captain  George  Macgregor,  of  the  artillery,  one  of  his  aides-de-camp, 
whose  name  has  since  become  associated  with  some  of  the  most  honour- 
able incidents  of  the  Afghan  war  ;  and  Dr.  Drmnmond,  accompanied 
Macnaghten. 


322  POLICY  OF  THE  INDIAN  GOVERNMENT. 

Macnaghten  entered  the  hall,  the  aged  Prince  rose  from 

will  permit.  If  his  Highness  also  approved  of  this  convention,  and 
agreed  that  the  operations  of  the  allies  should  be  conducted  in  concert 
with  each  other,  by  means  of  British  agents  in  the  camp  of  each,  the 
Governor- General  would  be  prepared  to  enter  into  a  general  defensive 
alliance  with  his  Highness  against  the  attacks  of  all  enemies  from  the 
westward, 

"  You  will,  at  the  same  time,  propound  the  only  other  course  of 
proceedings  which,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Governor- General,  the  case 
admits  of,  which  is  to  allow  the  Maharajah  to  take  his  own  course 
against  Dost  Mahomed  Khan  without  any  reference  to  us.  Should  his 
Highness  show  a  decided  preference  for  this  course,  you  are  authorised 
to  tell  him  at  once,  that  he  is  at  liberty  to  follow  it  ;  but  you  should 
point  out  to  him  the  possibility  of  defeat,  by  the  combined  army  of 
the  Persians  and  Afghans,  and  you  will,  as  far  as  you  can  consistently 
with  propriety,  impress  upon  him  the  necessity  of  caution,  and  of 
using  Afghan  rather  than  Sikh  influence  or  agency.  Should  he  wish 
to  make  an  instrument  of  Shah  Soojah,  you  will  apprise  him  that  the 
Governor-General  attaches  too  much  importance  to  the  person  of  the 
ex-King  to  admit  of  his  going  forth,  otherwise  than  with  the  almost 
assured  certainty  of  success  ;  but  that  the  ex-King  will  be  permitted 
to  proceed  to  Caubul  with  a  view  of  being  re-instated  in  his  sovereignty, 
should  the  Sikhs  succeed  in  taking  Caubul,  and  that  arrangement  be 
desired  by  his  Highness. 

**  Of  the  relative  advantages  which  may  be  derived  from  these  two 
plans,  you  will  be  better  able  to  judge  after  you  shall  have  fully  opened 
them,  with  the  consideration  which  each  has  to  recommend  it  to  the 
Maharajah.  His  Highness  may  possibly  be  unwilling  to  commit  his 
troops  in  the  passes  of  the  Khybur,  and  he  may  strongly  feel  the  dif- 
ficulty which  religious  and  natural  animosity  will  oppose  to  any  mea- 
sure mainly  resting  on  Sikh  power  and  Sikh  influence.  He  may 
not,  therefore,  reject  the  plan  that  stands  first  in  this  paper  ;  and  there 
can  be  little  doubt  that,  for  ultimate  efficiency,  and  for  bringing 
greater  weight  and  greater  strength  to  bear  in  concert  upon  the  objects 
in  view,  that  this  plan  should  have  the  preference  ;  but  it  is  cumbrous, 
and  a  considerable  time  may  elapse  before  it  can  be  set  in  motion ; 
and  if  it  might  conciliate  Afghan  opinion  on  one  hand,  on  the  other  it 
might  impair  with  the  Sikhs  that  cordiality  which  would  be  so  essential 
to  the  success  of  co-operation.  His  Lordship,  on  the  whole,  is  disposed 
to  think  that  the  plan  which  is  second  in  order  is  that  which  will  be 
found  most  expedient." — [MS.  Eecords,] 


INTERVIEW    WITH    RUNJEET   SINGH.  323 

his  seat,  and  tottering  along  the  whole  length  of  the 
presence-chamber,  warmly  embraced  the  British  minister, 
and  welcomed  the  other  gentlemen  of  the  Mission. 
After  the  usual  compliments  had  been  exchanged,  and 
the  presents  sent  by  the  British  Government  had  been 
examined  by  the  Maliarajah  with  curious  minuteness,  a 
conversation  ensued  on  an  infinite  variety  of  topics. 
"The  Maharajah,"  wrote  Macnaghten  to  the  Governor- 
General,  "passed  from  war  to  wine,  and  from  learning 
to  hunting,  with  breathless  rapidity.  He  was  particularly 
anxious  to  know  how  much  each  member  of  the  Mission 
had  drunk  of  some  ardent  liquor  he  had  sent  them  the 
night  before.  He  was  equally  anxious  to  know  the  dis- 
tance at  which  a  shrapnel  shot  could  do  execution.  It  is 
impossible  to  say  on  which  of  these  subjects  his  inter- 
rogatives  were  most  minute.  He  asked  me  if  I  was  a 
good  huntsman,  and  on  replying  in  the  negative,  he  asked 
me  if  I  knew  Arabic  and  Sanscrit.  On  receiving  a  reply 
in  the  affirmative,  as  if  doubtful  of  what  I  had  said,  he 
insisted  on  my  reciting  a  couplet  of  the  former  language. 
He  asked  about  Herat — about  Dost  Mahomed  Khan, 
about  the  Persian  army  and  their  connection  with  the 
Russians,  and  the  possibility  of  their  invading  India."* 
It  was  not  prudent  to  enter  too  minutely  into  this  matter 
in  open  Durbar!  Macnaghten  replied,  briefly  and  gene- 
rally, to  the  questions  about  Russo-Persian  invasion,  and 
laughed  the  idea  to  scorn.  "  I  can  enter  more  fully  into 
the  question,"  he  added,  "  at  a  private  interview." 

On  the  morning  of  the  3rd  of  June,  Macnaghten  and 
the  other  members  of  the  Mission,  accompanied  also  by 
Captain  Wade  and  Lieutenant  Mackeson,t  appeared  by 

*  MS.  Records. 

f  Lieutenant  (since  Colonel)  Mackeson  was  one  of  the  assistants  to 
the  Govemor-Generars  agent  on  the  north-west  frontier.  Whilst 
Bumes  was  at  Caubul  he  was  directed  to  remain  at  Peshawur  ;  a  place 

y2 


324       POLICY  OF  THE  INDIAN  GOVERNMENT. 

invitation  at  Durbar.  There  was  some  general  conver- 
sation about  the  relations  between  Russia  and  Persia; 
and  then  a  signal  was  made  to  the  British  officers  to 
retire  into  an  inner  apartment.  There  the  business  of 
the  conference  was  now  to  be  transacted.  On  the  part 
of  the  Lahore  government  there  were  present — Dhyan 
Singh,  the  minister ;  his  son  Heerat  Singh,  the  favourite 
of  the  Maharajah  ;  Lehna  Singh,  Adjeet  Singh,  and  other 
Sirdars,  with  the  doctor-secretary,  the  Fakir  Aziz-ood- 
deen.  On  the  part  of  the  Mission,  there  were  present 
with  Macnaghten,  Captains  Osborne  and  Wade.  Mac- 
gregor,  Mackeson,  and  Dr.  Drummond  remained  outside 
with  some  other  officers  of  the  Maharajah's  Court. 

Runjeet  Singh  commenced  the  conference.  The  letter 
of  the  Governor-General,  he  said,  had  been  read  to  him, 
and  he  fully  understood  its  contents.  He  desired  that 
all  present  should  hear  it ;  and  accordingly  the  Fakir 
Aziz-ood-deen,  whose  polished  manners  and  admirable 
address  presented  a  striking  contrast  to  the  ruder  bear- 
ing of  the  Sikh  chiefs  by  whom  he  was  surrounded,  read 
the  letter  aloud,  and,  with  that  unequalled  power  of 
interpretation  of  which  he  was  the  master,  distinctly  ex- 
plained every  sentence.  Macnaghten  was  then  requested 
to  state  what  he  had  to  say  on  the  part  of  the  British 
Government.     This  he  did  fluently  and  well     Whether 

with  "vrhicli  his  name  has  since  become  historically,  and  now  most  pain- 
fully, associated.  Some  two  months  before  the  arrival  of  Macnaghten' s 
Mission,  he  joined  Runjeet  Singh's  camp  and  travelled  with  the  Maha- 
rajah through  different  parts  of  the  Sikh  Empire.  Runjeet  conversed 
freely  with  the  young  officer  regarding  the  progress  of  Burnes's  nego- 
tiations at  Caubul,  the  mission  of  Vickovich,  and  other  matters  con- 
nected with  the  politics  of  Afghanistan.  Rumours  had  then  reached 
him  of  the  designs  of  the  British  Grovernment  to  invite  him  to  co-operate 
in  measures  for  the  overthrow  of  the  Barukzye  Sirdars.  He  discussed 
the  subject  with  little  reserve  ;  and  it  was  evident  that  the  project  had 
little  attraction  for  him. 


macnaghten's  address.  325 

all  he  advanced  was  strictly  true  it  is  hardly  necessary 
to  inquire.  Diplomacy  is  not  intended  to  be  subjected 
to  such  a  test.  The  tender  interest  taken  in  the  honour 
and  dignity  of  the  Maharajah  were  descanted  upon,  on 
the  one  side,  and  the  unreasonableness  of  Dost  Mahomed 
on  the  other.  The  failure  of  Burnes's  Mission  was  spoken 
of  as  the  result  of  the  unwillingness  of  the  Caubul  Ameer 
to  break  off  negotiations  with  other  foreign  agents, 
though  even  at  that  time  Dost  Mohamed,  after  Burnes's 
departure,  was  making  a  last  despairing  effort  to  win 
back  the  friendship  of  the  British  Government.*  Then 
came  a  somewhat  inflated  eulogium  on  the  resources  of 
the  British  Government,  and  the  200,000  soldiers  who 
could  at  any  time  be  brought  into  the  field  to  resist 
a  simultaneous  invasion  from  all  the  four  sides  of  India. 
If  then,  urged  Macnaghten,  such  were  the  unaided 
power  of  the  British  Government,  what  must  that  power 
be  when  united  with  the  strength  of  the  Sikh  Empire  1 
There  was  nothing,  indeed,  of  a  palpable  character  to  be 
apprehended  from  the  movements  of  the  Russians  and 
Persians,  or  the  hostility  of  the  Barukzye  Sirdars,  but  as 

*  I  should  not  have  thought  that  the  drift  of  this  passage  could  be 
misunderstood.  And  yet  it  has  been  said  with  reference  to  it  {Hunters 
Memoir  of  Henry  Torrens]  that  although  I  have  "emphatically  de- 
nounced the  disgraceful  act  of  mutilating  official  papers,"  I  have  **  no 
single  word  of  censure  for  diplomatic  falsehoods,"  but  have  declared 
that  "  diplomacy  should  not  be  subjected  to  the  test  of  truth."  I  said 
that  it  "is  not  intended  to  be,"  not  that  "it  should  not  be,"  subjected 
to  such  a  test.  Every  writer  must  be  permitted  to  choose  his  own 
weapons  of  attack.  At  one  time  he  may  employ  invective  ;  at  another, 
sarcasm  ;  and  the  latter  may  express  as  strong  a  detestation  of  false- 
hood and  baseness  as  the  former.  Both  in  a  previous  and  a  subsequent 
chapter  I  have  expressed  my  opinion  of  the  manner  in  which  Lord  Auck- 
land and  his  ministers  misrepresented  the  conduct  of  Dost  Mahomed  ; 
and  in  the  present  passage  I  do  not  seek  to  exculpate  Macnaghten,  by 
insinuating  my  belief  that  diplomacy  is,  in  its  general  intent  and 
practice,  shamefully  destitute  of  honesty  and  truth. 


326       POLICY  OF  THE  INDIAN  GOVERNMENT. 

their  intrigues,  it  was  said,  must  have  the  effect  of  un- 
settling men's  minds,  both  in  the  British  and  the  Sikh 
dominions,  it  was  desirable  to  concert  measures  for  the 
future  suppression  of  all  these  disturbing  influences.  He 
had,  therefore,  been  despatched  by  the  Governor-General 
of  India  to  the  Court  of  the  Maharajah,  to  ascertain  the 
wishes  of  his  Highness. 

Runjeet  listened  very  patiently  to  this  address,  only 
interrupting  the  speaker  now  and  then  to  express  his 
assent  to  Macnaghten's  statements;  and  when  asked  what 
were  his  wishes,  replied  that  they  were  the  wishes  of 
the  British  Government.  After  some  further  interchange 
of  compliments,  Runjeet  asked  what  were  the  wishes 
of  the  British  Government ;  and  the  British  Envoy  then 
began  guardedly  to  state  them  after  the  manner  of  the 
instructions  he  had  received.  There  were  two  courses, 
he  said,  open  to  the  Maharajah — the  one  was,  to  act 
independently ;  the  other  was,  to  act  in  concert  with  the 
British  Government.  A  murmur  of  approbation  arose 
from  the  assembled  chiefs,  when  Runjeet  broke  in  with 
the  assertion  that  it  was  his  wish  to  act  in  concert  with 
the  British  Government.  Entreating  him  not  to  decide 
hastily,  but  to  weigh  well  the  details  of  the  two  schemes, 
Macnaghten  then  said,  "Your  Highness  some  time  ago 
formed  a  treaty  with  Shah  Soojah-ool-Moolk.  Do  you 
think  it  would  be  still  for  your  benefit  that  the  treaty 
should  stand  good,  and  would  it  be  agreeable  to  your 
wishes  that  the  British  Government  should  become  a 
party  to  that  treaty  1 "  "  This,"  replied  Runjeet,  "  would 
be  adding  sugar  to  milk."  "  If  such,"  said  Macnaghten, 
"  be  decidedly  the  wish  of  your  Highness,  I  do  not  think 
that  the  Governor-General  would  object  to  supply  Shah 
Soojah  with  money  and  officers  to  enable  him  to  recover 
his  throne."  He  then  proceeded  to  state  what  were  the 
views  of  the  Governor-General — that   the   Shah  should 


INTERVIEW    WITH    RUNJEET    SINGH.  327 

advance  by  the  route  of  Candahar,  whilst  the  Sikh  troops 
should  advance  upon  Caubul  through  the  Khybur  Pass. 
"  Circiunstances,"  it  was  added,  "  might  arise  to  render  it 
necessary  for  the  British  Government  to  send  some  of  its 
own  troops  down  the  Indus,  to  repel  any  threat  of  aggres- 
sion in  that  direction."  "How  many?"  asked  Runjeet. 
The  answer  was,  "  As  many  as  the  exigency  of  the  occa- 
sion may  require  ;  but  their  employment  in  that  direction 
will  only  be  temporary." 

Macnaghten  next  launched  into  a  panegyric  on  the 
general  moderation  of  the  British  Government ;  and  then 
having  entered  into  some  particulars  relating  to  the 
necessary  modification  and  extension  of  the  treaty  be- 
tween Shah  Soojah  and  Runjeet  Singh,*  proceeded  to 
call  the  attention  of  the  Maharajah  to  the  second  plan 
suggested  by  the  Governor-General — the  plan  of  inde- 
pendent action  on  the  part  of  the  Sikh  ruler,  which 
Lord  Auckland  declared  that  he  was  more  inclined  to 
favour  than  the  other  project.  But  it  was  with  diffi- 
culty that  Runjeet  Singh  could  be  induced  to  listen  to 
this  proposal.  His  impatience  broke  out  openly.  His 
mind,  he  said,  was  made  up  on  the  subject.  He  would 
have  nothing  to  do  with  the  independent  expedition. 
The  plan  first  set  forth  by  the  British  Envoy  was  the 
one  which  he  purposed  to  accept ;  and  so  Macnaghten 
could  only  say  in  reply,  that  though  the  Govenior-General 
approved  of  the  course  last  stated,  his  Lordship  set  too 
much  value  on  the  friendship  of  the  Maharajah  to  wish 
to  force  it  upon  him. 

*  The  greater  part  of  the  proposed  treaty  was  substantially  and 
literally  the  same  as  that  negotiated  in  1833 — but  some  supplementary 
articles  were  added  to  it.  One  of  these  recognised  the  independence  of 
the  Ameers  of  Sindh  (Runjeet  thereby  withdrawing  all  claims  on 
Shikarpoor),  in  consideration  of  the  payment  by  them  of  compensation- 
money  to  the  amount  of  twenty  lakhs  of  rupees ;  and  another  recog- 
nised the  integrity  of  Herat. 


328      POLICY  OF  THE  INDIAN  GOVERNMENT. 

It  now  only  remained  to  settle  the  details  of  the  project 
for  the  subversion  of  Barukzye  ascendancy  in  Afghanistan. 
So  little  at  this  time  was  it  in  contemplation  that  the 
brunt  of  the  expedition  should  fall  upon  the  British  army, 
that  Runjeet,  who  soon  began  to  have  his  misgivings 
regarding  the  success  of  an  undertaking  in  which  his  own 
troops  and  the  raw  levies  of  Shah  Soojah  were  to  be  the 
main  actors,  sent  the  Fakir  Aziz-ood-een  to  ask  Macnaghten 
whether,  in  the  event  of  the  alhes  sustaining  a  reverse, 
the  British  Government  were  prepared  to  support  them. 
The  affirmative  reply  hardly  seemed  to  satisfy  the  Sikh 
agent,  who  spoke  of  the  remoteness  of  our  resourses  from 
the  scene  of  action ;  and  it  was  obviously  then  the  desire 
of  his  master  that  the  British  troops  should  take  a  more 
prominent  part  in  the  coming  expedition.  He  seemed, 
indeed,  to  think  that  too  large  a  share  of  the  danger*  de- 
volved upon  him,  and  that  he  was  to  be  allowed  too  little 

*  Runjeet  was  always  doubtful  whether  his  soldiers  would  not 
shrink  from  attempting  to  force  the  Khybur  Pass.  He  told  Mackeson, 
before  the  arrival  of  Macnaghten' s  Mission,  that  the  Khalsa  entertained 
very  strong  prejudices  against  that  kind  of  warfare,  of  which  it  may  be 
added,  both  he  and  his  chiefs  had  the  vaguest  possible  idea.  He 
believed  that  to  force  the  Khybur  Pass  was  to  push  a  column  of  troops 
into  it,  somewhat  as  you  would  push  them  over  a  narrow  bridge,  the 
men  in  the  rear  stepping  over  the  bodies  of  their  slaughtered  comrades. 
He  had  no  notion  of  turning  the  pass  by  flank  movements — of  crowning 
the  heights  on  each  side — and  accomplishing  by  skilful  dispositions 
what  could  not  be  done  by  brute  force  without  a  dreadful  sacrifice 
of  life.  Subsequently,  at  his  interviews  with  the  officers  of  the 
British  Mission,  he  reverted  to  this  subject.  He  said  that  he  had  never 
tried  the  Khalsa  at  such  work  ;  that  he  doubted  whether  they  could  be 
induced  to  march  over  the  corpses  of  their  countrymen  ;  and  asked 
whether  British  troops  could  be  depended  on  for  such  service.  He 
added,  that  the  Sirdars  whom  he  had  sent  to  command  his  troops  at 
Peshawur,  had  often  urged  him  to  suffer  them  to  move  through  the! 
Khybur  upon  Jellalabad  ;  but  that  he  had  uniformly  refused  to  listen] 
to  their  proposals. — [MS.  Notes.] 


DISSATISFACTION    OP   EUNJEET.  329 

of  the  spoil.*  The  advantages  to  be  derived  from  the 
alUance  with  Shah  Soojah  were  not,  he  said,  so  great  that 
he  might  not  reasonably  ask  for  something  beyond  what 
had  been  set  forth  in  the  proposals  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment ;  and  it  is  not  to  be  denied  that  there  was  at  this 
time  some  show  of  truth  in  the  assertion.  Macnaghten 
continued  to  reply  that  the  Maharajah,  if  he  were  not 
satisfied  with  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  was  at  liberty  to 
act  independently,  and  that  it  would  be  no  offence  to  the 
British  Government  if  he  preferred  that  scheme  to  the 
other.  But  he  took  the  opportunity,  in  the  course  of  one 
of  his  conferences  with  the  Sikh  agents,  to  hint  that  it 
was  possible  that  "  circumstances  might  occur  to  render  it 
necessary  for  us  to  counteract  danger,  and  that  if  it 
seriously  threatened  us,  we  might  be  compelled  to  arrest 
the  advance  of  the  Persians  by  the  advance  of  our  own 
troops ;  and  in  this  case  we  might  find  it  expedient  to 
support  the  cause  of  Shah  Soojah."  This,  however,  was 
uttered  in  a  precautionary  spirit,  "in  order  to  guard 
against  the  possibility  of  its  being  supposed  hereafter  that 
we  designedly  concealed  our  intentions  from  his  High- 
ness, and  that  we  had  sinister  and  exclusive  views  of  our 
own."t 

*  Runjeet  put  in  a  claim  for  more  than  a  moiety  of  the  tribute- 
money  of  twenty  lakhs  of  rupees  that  was  to  be  wrung  from  the 
Ameers  of  Sindh  and  divided  between  him  and  the  Shah  ;  and  he 
ssked  also  for  the  transfer  of  Jellalabad  to  his  own  rule.  The  latter 
demand  was  steadfastly  refused  ;  but  an  arrangement  was  effected 
with  regard  to  the  former,  at  the  expense  of  the  Ameers  of  Sindh ; 
Runjeet  receiving  a  larger  amount  without  detriment  to  the  Shah. 

+  Mr.  Macncbghten  to  Government.  Camp,  near  Lahore,  June  20 
1838  :  MS.  Records.  Captain  Cunniughame  [Hitstwy  of  the  Sihhs^ 
says  that  Runjeet  was  informed  that  the  expedition  for  the  restoration 
of  Shah  Soojah  would  be  undertaken,  whether  the  Maharajah  chose  to 
shave  in  it  or  not.  *'  That  Runjeet  Singh,"  the  author  adds  in  a  note, 
"  was  told  he  would  be  left  out  if  he  did  not  choose  to  come  in,  does  not 
appeax  on  public  record.     It  was,  however,  the  only  convincing  argu- 


330       POLICY  OF  THE  INDIAN  GOVERNMENT. 

On  the  23rd  of  June,  by  which  time  the  Mission  had 
followed  the  camp  of  the  Maharajah  to  Lahore,  and  the 

ment  used  during  the  long  discussions,  and  I  think  Major  Mackeson 
was  made  the  bearer  of  the  message  to  that  effect."  But  this  is  stated 
somewhat  too  broadly.  Runjeet  Singh  was  not  told  that  the  British, 
in  the  event  of  his  refusing  to  co-operate  with  the  Shah,  would 
undertake  by  themselves  the  restoration  of  Shah  Soojah,  but  that  they 
might  be  compelled  to  do  so  in  self-defence.  Mackeson  told  Runjeet, 
as  Macnaghten  had  before  told  the  Fakir  Aziz-ood-een,  that  in  order  "to 
guard  against  any  reproach  of  reserve  or  concealment,  hereafter,"  it 
was  right  **to  inform  him  now  of  the  possibility  that  might  occur  of 
our  being  compelled,  in  self-defence,  to  take  our  own  measures  to  ward 
off  approaching  danger,  and  use  our  own  troops  to  restore  Shah  Soojah 
to  the  throne."  The  Maharajah,  receiving  this  communication  as 
though  he  had  not  been  prepared  for  it  by  the  Fakir  Aziz-ood-een,  told 
Mackeson  at  once  to  prepare  the  treaty.  "Not  immediately  under- 
standing, "  says  Mackeson,  in  his  memorandum  of  this  interview,  * '  to 
what  treaty  he  might  allude,  I  asked  the  Fakir  whether  that  with  the 
supplementary  articles  presented  by  Mr.  Macnaghten  to  the  Maharajah's 
approval  was  the  one  alluded  to.  The  Maharajah  observed,  '  That 
one ;'  and  the  Fakir  recalled  his  attention  to  the  point  by  asking  how 
the  question  of  Jellalabad  was  to  be  settled ;  to  which  his  Highness 
replied,  that  if  the  Sikhs  could  not  be  allowed  to  hold  possession  of 
Jellalabad,  some  other  arrangement  could  be  made,  which  would  have 
the  effect  of  making  the  Khalsa-jee  act  in  cordial  co-operation — that  the 
friendship  between  the  Sikhs  and  the  British  was  great,  and  had 
lasted  many  years — that  the  British  and  Sikh  Grovemments  had  no 
care,  and  were  both  able  to  act  independently,  but  that  they  had  a 
care  for  the  mutual  friendship  which  had  lasted  so  long.  The  Fakir 
hinted  to  me  to  suggest  some  other  mode  to  supersede  that  of  the 
Sikhs  holding  possession  of  Jellalabad.  I  observed  that  it  now  rested 
with  the  Maharajah  to  suggest  any  plan  that  might  have  occurred  to  his 
mind.  After  some  further  conversation,  Runjeet  Singh  said  that  an 
annual  tribute  of  two  lakhs  of  rupees  from  Shah  Soojah  would  satisfy 
him  for  the  non-possession  of  Jellalabad;  and  this  granted,  he  was 
willing  to  co-operate  for  the  restoration  of  the  Shah.  The  British 
agents  objected  to  the  payment  of  tribute,  as  it  would  be  an  acknow- 
ledgment of  inferiority  on  the  part  of  the  Shah  ;  but  they  consented 
that  the  two  lakhs  should  be  paid,  in  the  shape  of  a  subsidy,  Runjeet 
Singh  undertaking  to  keep  up  a  force  on  the  frontier,  at  the  call  of  the 
Afghan  monarch." — \^Lievienant  Mackeson  s  Memorandum  of  a  con- 


ACCEPTANCE  OF  THE  TEEATY.  331 

patience  of  the  British  negotiators  had  been  well-nigh 
exhausted  by  the  vexatious  claims  and  frivolous  objections 
of  the  Sikh  party,  a  statement  to  the  same  eflfect  was 
made  on  Macnaghten's  authority  by  Lieutenant  Mackeson* 
to  Runjeet  Singh  himself;  and  the  Maharajah  told  the 
British  officer  at  once,  in  his  hurried,  emphatic  manner,  to 
prepare  the  treaty.  It  seemed  as  though  the  many  objec- 
tions which  had  been  started,  had  originated  from  the 
Maharajah's  advisejs  rather  than  from  himself,  and  that 
they  had  kept  out  of  his  way  the  probability  of  the  British 
Government  acting  for  themselves  independently  in  the 
matter  before  him.  But  now  that  the  case  had  been 
plainly  stated  in  his  own  hearing,  Runjeet  at  once  grasped 
the  whole  question ;  fully  comprehended  his  own  position  ; 
and  resolutely  decided  for  himself.  Bnt,  never  forgetful 
of  his  own  interests,  he  clamoured  still  for  the  cession  of 
Jellalabad ;  t  and,  with  seeming  coquettishness  consented 
to  receive  two  lakhs  of  rupees  in  the  shape  of  an  annual 
subsidy,  instead  of  the  territorial  accession,  which  the 
British  agent  had  resolutely  refused. 

On  the  26th  of  June,  the  treaty  was  formally  signed  by 
the  Maharajah.  It  had  been  slightly  modified  since  the 
original  draft  was  prepared;  but,  with  the  exception  of 
the  introduction  of  the  subsidy  article,  had  undergone  no 

versation  icith  the  Maharajah,  Runjeet  Singh,  at  Lahore,  2Sd  of  June, 
18:58  :  MS.  Records.] 

*  Mackeson  was  the  general  messenger  on  the  part  of  the  British 
agent,  as  was  the  Fakir  Aziz-ood-een,  or  Kishen  Chund,  on  the  part  of 
the  Maharajah.  These  functionaries  were  constantly  going  backwards 
and  forwards,  in  the  frightful  heat,  to  communicate  the  suggestions  or 
replies  of  their  respective  chiefs, 

t  It  is  probable  that  the  demand  for  Jellalabad  was  intended  to  be 
refused,  in  order  that  the  refusal  might  strengthen  Runjeet's  claims 
to  increased  pecuniary  compensation  ;  for  before  the  arrival  of  the 
Mission  he  was  in  the  habit  of  speaking  of  Jellalabad  as  a  possession 
not  to  be  coveted  by  the  Khalsa. 


332       POLICY  OF  THE  INDIAN  GOVERNMENT. 

essential  alterations.  It  was,  in  effect,  a  treaty  between 
Runjeet  Singh  and  Shah  Soojah,  guaranteed  by  the  British 
Government ;  and  it  ran  in  the  following  words  : 

Treaty  of  alliance  and  friendship  executed  between  Maharajah  Runjeet 
Singh  and  Shah  Soojah-ool-Moolh,  with  the  approbation  of,  and  in 
concert  with,  the  British  Oovemment. 

Whereas  a  treaty  was  formerly  concluded  between  Maharajah 
Runjeet  Singh  and  Soojah-ool-Moolk,  consisting  of  fourteen  articles, 
exclusive  of  the  preamble  and  the  conclusion  ;  and  whereas  the 
execution  of  the  provisions  of  the  said  treaty  was  suspended  for 
certain  reasons ;  and  whereas  at  this  time  Mr.  W.  H.  Macnaghten, 
having  been  deputed  by  the  Right  Honourable  George  Lord 
Auckland,  Governor-General  of  India,  to  the  presence  of  Maharajah 
Runjeet  Singh,  and  vested  with  full  powers  to  form  a  treaty  in  a 
manner  consistent  with  the  friendly  engagements  subsisting  be- 
tween the  two  states,  the  treaty  aforesaid  is  revived  and  concluded 
with  certain  modifications,  and  four  new  articles  have  been  added 
thereto,  with  the  approbation  of,  and  in  concert  with,  the  British 
Government,  the  provisions  whereof  as  contained  in  the  following 
eighteen  articles,  will  be  duly  and  faithfully  observed. 

1st.  Shah  Soojah-ool-Moolk  disclaims  all  title  on  the  part  of  him- 
self, his  heirs,  successors,  and  all  .the  Suddozyes,  to  whatever  terri- 
tories lying  on  either  bank  of  the  River  Indus  that  may  be  pos- 
sessed by  the  Maharajah — viz.,  Cashmere,  including  its  limits,  east, 
west,  north,  and  south,  together  with  the  Fort  of  Attock,  Chuch 
Hazara,  Khebel,  Amb,  with  its  dependencies  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
aforesaid  river ;  and  on  the  right  bank  Peshawur,  with  the  Eusafzae 
territory,  Kheteks,  Husht  Nagger,  Mechnee,  Kohat,  Himgoo,  and 
all  places  dependent  on  Peshawur,  as  far  as  the  Khybur  Pass ; 
Bunnoo,  the  Vezeree  territory.  Dour  Tuwk,  Goraug  Kulabagh,  and 
Kushulgher,  with  their  dependent  districts;  Dera  Ishmael  Khan, 
and  its  dependency,  together  with  Dera  Ghazee  Khan,  Kut,  Methen, 
Omerkoth,  and  their  dependent  territory ;  Secughur,  Heren  Dajel, 
Hajeepore,  Rajenpore,  and  the  three  Ketchees,  as  well  as  Mankeera, 
with  its  districts,  and  the  province  of  Mooltan,  situated  on  the  left 
bank.  These  countries  and  places  are  considered  to  be  the  pro- 
perty and  to  form  the  estate  of  the  Maharajah ;  the  Shah  neither 
has,  nor  will  have,  any  concern  with  them.  They  belong  to  the 
Maharajah  and  his  posterity  from  generaticn  to  generation. 

2nd.  The  people  of  the  country  on  the  other  side  of  Khybur  will 


THE   TRIPARTITE   TREATY.  333 

not  be  suffered  to  commit  robberies,  or  aggressions,  or  any  disturb- 
ances on  this  side.  If  any  defaulter  of  either  state  who  has  em- 
bezzled the  revenue  take  refuge  in  the  territory  of  the  other,  each 
party  engages  to  surrender  him,  and  no  person  shall  obstruct  the 
passage  of  the  stream  which  issues  out  of  the  Khybur  defile,  and 
ST'.pplies  the  fort  of  Futtehgurh  with  water  according  to  ancient 
usage. 

3rd.  As  agreeably  to  the  treaty  established  between  the  British 
Government  and  the  Maharajah,  no  one  can  cross  from  the  left  to 
the  right  bank  of  the  Sutlej  without  a  passport  from  the  Maharajah  ; 
the  same  rule  shall  be  observed  regarding  the  passage  of  the  Indus 
whose  waters  join  the  Sutlej ;  and  no  one  shall  be  allowed  to  cross 
the  Indus  without  the  Maharajah's  permission. 

4th.  Regarding  Shikarpoor  and  the  territory  of  Sindh  lying  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  Indus,  the  Shah  will  agree  to  abide  by  what- 
ever may  be  settled  as  right  and  proper,  in  conformity  with  the 
happy  relations  of  friendship  subsisting  between  the  British 
Government  and  the  Maharajah,  through  Captain  Wade. 

5th.  When  the  Shah  shall  have  established  his  authority  in 
Caubul  and  Candahar,  he  will  annually  send  the  Maharajah  the  fol- 
lowing articles — viz.,  55  high-bred  horses  of  approved  colour  and 
pleasant  paces,  11  Persian  cimeters,  7  Persian  poniards,  25  good 
mules ;  fruits  of  various  kinds,  both  dry  and  fresh,  and  surdees  or 
musk  melons  of  a  sweet  and  delicate  flavour  (to  be  sent  throughout 
the  year),  by  the  way  of  Caubul  River  to  Peshawur;  grapes,  pome- 
granates, apples,  quinces,  almonds,  raisins,  pistales  or  chronuts,  an 
abundant  supply  of  each ;  as  well  as  pieces  of  satin  of  every  colour, 
choghas  of  fur,  kimkhobs  wrought  with  gold  and  silver,  and  Persian 
carpets  altogether  to  the  number  of  101  pieces ;  all  these  articles 
the  Shah  will  continue  to  send  every  year  to  the  Maharajah. 

6th.  Each  party  shall  address  the  other  in  terms  of  equality. 

7th.  Merchants  of  Afghanistan,  who  will  be  desirous  of  trading 
to  Lahore,  Umritsur,  or  any  other  parts  of  the  Maharajah's  posses- 
sions, shall  not  be  stopped  or  molested  on  their  way.  On  the  con- 
trary, strict  orders  shall  be  issued  to  facilitate  their  intercourse,  and 
the  Maharajah  engages  to  observe  the  same  line  of  conduct  on  his 
part  in  respect  to  traders  who  may  wish  to  proceed  to  Afghanistan. 

8th.  The  Maharajah  will  yearly  send  to  the  Shah  the  following 
articles  in  the  way  of  friendship  :  55  pieces  of  shawls,  25  pieces  of 
muslin,  11  dooputtas,  5  pieces  of  kinkhob,  6  scarves,  55  tinbuns,  55 
loads  of  Bara  rice  (peculiar  to  Peshawur). 

9th.  Any  of  the   Maharajah's   officers  who  may   be  deputed  to 


334       POLICY  OF  THE  INDIAN  GOVBKNMENT. 

Afghanistan  to  purchase  horses,  or  on  any  other  business,  as  well  as 
those  who  may  be  sent  by  the  Shah  into  the  Punjab  for  the  pur- 
pose of  purchasing  piece  goods  or  shawls,  &c.,  to  the  amount  of 
11,000  rupees,  will  be  treated  by  both  sides  with  due  attention,  and 
every  facility  will  be  afforded  to  them  in  the  execution  of  their 
commission. 

10th.  Whenever  the  armies  of  the  two  states  may  happen  to  be 
assembled  at  the  same  place,  on  no  account  shall  the  slaughter  of 
kine  be  permitted  to  take  place. 

11th.  In  the  event  of  the  Shah  taking  an  auxiliary  force  from  the 
Maharajah,  whatever  booty  may  be  acquired  from  the  Barukzyes  in 
jewels,  horses,  and  arms  great  and  small,  shall  be  equally  divided  be- 
tween the  two  contracting  parties.  If  the  Shah  should  succeed  in 
obtaining  possession  of  their  property  without  the  assistance  of  the 
Maharajah's  troops,  the  Shah  agrees  to  send  a  portion  of  it  by  his 
own  agents  to  the  Maharajah,  in  the  way  of  friendship. 

12th.  An  exchange  of  missions,  charged  with  letters  and  presents, 
shall  constantly  take  place  between  the  two  parties. 

13th.  Should  the  Maharajah  require  the  aid  of  any  of  the  Shah's 
troops  in  furtherance  of  the  object  contemplated  by  this  treaty,  the 
Shah  engages  to  send  a  force  commanded  by  one  of  his  principal 
officers  ;  in  like  manner,  the  Maharajah  will  furnish  the  Shah,  when 
required,  with  an  auxiliary  force  composed  of  Mahomedans,  and 
commanded  by  one  of  his  principal  officers  as  far  as  Caubul,  in  fur- 
therance of  the  objects  contemplated  by  this  treaty.  When  the 
Maharajah  may  go  to  Peshawur,  the  Shah  will  depute  a  Shah-zadah 
to  visit  him;  on  which  occasions  the  Maharajah  will  receive  and 
dismiss  him  with  the  honour  and  consideration  due  to  his  rank  and 
dignity. 

14th.  The  friends  and  enemies  of  each  of  the  three  high  powers 
— that  is  to  say,  the  British  and  Sikh  Governments  and  Shah 
Soojah-ool-Moolk,  shall  be  the  friends  and  enemies  of  all. 

15th.  Shah  Soojah-ool-Moolk  agrees  to  relinquish  for  himself,  his 
heirs,  and  successors,  all  claims  of  supremacy  and  arrears  of  tribute 
over  the  country  now  held  by  the  Ameers  of  Sindh  (which  will  con- 
tinue to  belong  to  the  Ameers  and  their  successors  in  perpetuity),  on 
condition  of  the  payment  to  him  by  the  Ameers  of  such  a  sum  as  may 
be  determined,  under  the  mediation  of  the  British  Government,  of 
such  payment  being  made  over  by  him  to  Maharajah  Runjeet 
Singh.  On  these  payments  being  completed,  article  4  of  the  treaty 
of  the  12th  of  March,  1833,  will  be  considered  cancelled,  and  the 
customary  interchange  of  letters  and  suitable  presents  between  the 


THE    TRIPARTITE   TREATY.  335 

Maharajah  and  the  Ameers  of  Sindh  shall  be  maintaiued  as 
heretofore. 

16th.  Shah  Soojah  engages,  after  the  attainment  of  his  object,  to 
pay  without  fiiil  to  the  Maharajah  the  sum  of  two  lakhs  of  rupees  of 
the  Nanukshahee  or  Kuldar  currency,  calculating  from  the  date  on 
which  the  Sikh  troops  may  be  despatched  for  the  purpose  of  re- 
instating his  Majesty  in  Caubul,  in  consideration  of  the  Maharajah 
stationing  a  force  of  not  less  than  5000  men — cavalry  and  infantry 
— of  the  Mohamedan  persuasion,  within  the  limits  of  the  Peshawur 
territory  for  the  support  of  the  Shah,  and  to  be  sent  to  the  aid  of 
his  Majesty  whenever  the  British  Government,  in  concert  and 
counsel  with  the  Maharajah,  shall  deem  the  aid  necessary ;  and  when 
any  matter  of  great  importance  may  arise  to  the  westward,  such 
measures  will  be  adopted  with  regard  to  it  as  may  seem  expedient 
and  proper  at  the  time  to  the  British  and  Sikh  Governments.  In 
the  event  of  the  Maharajah  requiring  the  aid  of  the  Shah'a  troops,  a 
deduction  shall  be  made  from  the  subsidy  proportioned  to  the 
period  for  which  such  aid  may  be  afforded ;  and  the  British 
Government  holds  itself  responsible  for  the  punctual  payment  of 
the  above  sum  annually  to  the  Maharajah,  so  long  as  the  provisions 
of  this  treaty  are  duly  observed. 

17th.  When  Shah  Soojah-ool-Moolk  shall  have  succeeded  in 
establishing  his  authority  in  Afghanistan,  he  shall  not  attack  or 
molest  his  nephew,  the  ruler  of  Herat,  in  the  possession  of  his  terri- 
tories, now  subject  to  his  government. 

18th.  Shah  Soojah-ool-Moolk  binds  himself,  his  heirs,  and  succes- 
sors, to  refrain  from  entering  into  negotiations  with  any  foreign 
state,  without  the  knowledge  and  consent  of  the  British  and  Sikh 
Governments,  and  to  oppose  any  power  having  the  design  to  invade 
the  British  and  Sikh  territories  by  force  of  arms,  to  the  utmost  of 
his  ability. 

The  three  powers  parties  to  this  treaty — namely,  the  British 
Government,  Maharajah  Runjeet  Singh,  and  Shah  Soojah-ool- 
Moolk — cordially  agree  to  the  foregoing  articles.  There  shall  be 
no  deviation  from  them,  and  in  that  case  the  present  treaty  shall  be 
considered  as  binding  for  ever ;  and  this  treaty  shall  come  into 
operation  from  and  after  the  date  on  which  the  seals  and  signatures 
of  the  three  contracting  parties  shall  have  been  affixed  thereto. 
Done  at  Lahore,  this  26th  day  of  June,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord 
1838,  corresponding  with  the  15th  of  the  month  of  Assar,  1895. 
Aera  of  Bekramajeet. 


336  POLICY    OF   THE    INDIAN    GOVERNMENT. 

The  treaty  was  despatched  to  Simlah  for  the  signature 
of  the  Governor-General,  which  Runjeet  Singh  expressed 
some  anxiety  to  obtain  with  the  least  possible  delay.  But 
Lord  Auckland  at  once  decided  that  he  could  with  no 
propriety  attach  his  name  to  the  treaty  until  it  had  been 
santioned  and  signed  by  Shah  Soojah.  Anxious  as  he  was 
to  conclude  the  negotiation,  Runjeet  Singh  could  not 
demur  to  this  decision.  His  patience,  however,  was  not 
to  be  severely  taxed  Macnaghten  was  directed  to  pro- 
ceed with  all  possible  expedition  to  obtain  the  consent  of 
the  Shah ;  and  so,  on  the  13th  of  July,  the  Maharajah 
gave  the  English  gentlemen  their  audience  of  leave  ;  and, 
amidst  the  most  profuse  expressions  of  friendship  and 
attachment,  they  took  their  departure  from  Runjeet's 
Court. 

They  turned  their  faces  towards  Loodhianah.  A  pen- 
sioner on  the  bounty  of  the  British  Government,  Shah 
Soojah,  ever  since  his  last  disastrous  attempt  to  regain 
his  empire,  had  dwelt  there  in  the  midst  of  his  family  as 
one  not  yet  reconciled  to  a  life  of  peaceful  obscurity,  but 
somewhat  sobered  down  by  the  repeated  failures  which 
had  beset  his  unfortunate  career.  It  is  probable  that  no 
political  vicissitudes  in  Afghanistan,  however  favourable  to 
the  restoration  of  the  monarchy,  would  have  tempted  him 
to  head  another  expedition  for  the  recovery  of  Caubul  and 
Candahar.  But  when  reports  reached  him  of  the  designs 
of  the  British  Government,  and  the  probability  that  he 
would  be  supplied  with  British  money  and  British  skill  for 
the  support  and  conduct  of  the  army  which  he  was  to  lead 
against  the  Barukzye  Sirdars,  he  saw  more  clearly  his  way 
to  his  old  place  in  the  Balla  Hissar  of  Caubul ;  and  long 
dormant  hopes  and  expectations  began  to  revive  within  him. 
But  he  could  not  wholly  suppress  his  suspicions  of  the  sin- 
cerity both  of  the  British  and  the  Sikhs  ;  and  his  delight 
was  straitened  by  the  thought  that  he  would,  in  effect,  be 


VISIT   TO   SHAH  300JAH.  337 

little  more  than  a  passive  instrument  in  the  hands  of  his 
powerful  and  ambitious  allies. 

On  the  evening  of  the  15th  of  July,  accompanied  by 
Captain  Wade  and  Lieutenant  Mackeson,  Mr.  Macnaghten 
waited  on  Shah  Soojah  at  Loodhianah.  Seated  on  a 
musnud  slightly  elevated  above  the  level  of  the  room,  the 
Shah  received  the  British  gentlemen  with  becoming  cor- 
diality, and  desired  them  to  seat  themselves  on  a  carpet 
beside  him.  Macnaghten  commenced  the  conference.  He 
spoke  of  the  friendly  feeling  that  had  always  existed 
between  the  British  Government  and  the  Suddozye 
Princes,  since  Mr.  Elphinstone's  mission  to  Afghanistan. 
He  said  that,  although  unable  actively  to  co-opei-ate  with 
the  Shah  in  his  first  attempts  to  regain  his  kingdom,  the 
British  Government  had  always  desired  the  success  of  his 
undertakings.  He  explained  the  circumstances  under 
which  a  mission  had  been  sent  to  the  Court  of  Dost 
Mahomed.  And  then,  with  as  little  truth  as  had  marked 
his  previous  communications  to  Kunjeet,  commented 
upon  the  unfriendly  manner  in  which  the  Mission  had 
been  received,  and  the  conduct  of  the  Ameer  in  "rejecting 
our  good  offices  ; "  conduct  which  had  rendered  it  neces- 
sary to  counteract  his  hostile  designs  by  establishing  a 
friendly  power  in  the  territories  of  Afghanistan. 

To  all  of  this  the  Shah  listened  attentively,  and  then 
said  that  he  had  always  foretold  the  result  of  the  mission 
to  the  Court  of  Dost  Mahomed — (which  was  a  piece  of 
good  luck  the  Ameer  was  not  able  to  appreciate) — tfiat 
he  who  had  not  been  true  to  his  own  master  was  little 
likely  to  be  true  to  a  foreign  power ;  but  that  now  he 
would  see  the  result  of  his  folly,  and  be  baffled  in  his 
attempt  to  betray  his  country  into  the  hands  of  the  Per- 
sian invaders. 

Upon  this  Macnaghten  at  once  announced  the  intention 
of  the  British  Government  to  restore  Shah  Soojah  to  his 


338       POLICY  OF  THE  INDIAN  GOVERNMENT. 

hereditary  dominions.  It  would  have  been  more  agree- 
able, he  said,  to  his  government  to  act  in  such  a  matter 
without  consulting  any  other  state  ;  but  that  the  Sikhs 
were  now  in  actual  possession  of  so  many  of  the  provinces 
of  the  old  Douranee  Empire,  and  their  interests  so  inti- 
mately associated  with  those  of  the  British  in  that  part  of 
the  country,  that  it  was  impossible  to  omit  them  from 
the  compact — that,  consequently,  the  Governor-General 
had  instructed  him  to  wait  on  Runjeet  Singh,  and  that 
the  result  had  been  the  formation  of  a  treaty  which  was 
now  to  be  submitted  for  his  Majesty's  approval,  together 
with  a  letter  from  Lord  Auckland.  The  letter  was  then 
read ;  and  Macnaghten  reverting  first  to  the  old  treaty 
between  Shah  Soojah  and  Runjeet  Singh,  said  that  it  was 
the  intention  of  the  British  Government  to  become  a  party 
to  its  stipulations  under  certain  alterations  and  additions. 
With  the  utmost  unconcern  the  Shah  said  that  a  paper 
of  some  kind  had  been  exchanged  with  Runjeet  Singh, 
but  that  it  was  merely  to  the  effect  that  if  he  regained 
his  dominions  there  should  be  an  interchange  of  friendly 
letters,  presents,  and  missions  between  the  two  Courts. 

Whether  Macnaghten  smiled  at  this  version  of  the  old 
alliance  is  not  on  record.  But  he  began  now  to  read  and 
explain  the  articles  of  the  amended  treaty.  The  Shah's 
comments  were  frequent  and  emphatic.  Sneering  at  the 
minuteness  with  which  the  possessions  of  Runjeet  Singh 
were  defined  in  the  first  article,  he  declared  that  Peshawur 
was  only  a  burden  to  the  Sikh  government,  and  that 
Runjeet  would  willingly  hand  it  over  to  any  one  but  Dost 
Mahomed.  Indeed,  he  said,  that  the  Maharajah's  vakeel 
had  often  pledged  his  word  to  him  that,  in  the  event  of 
his  recovering  his  throne,  Peshawur  should  be  reannexed 
to  his  dominions.  But  when  Captain  Wade  and  Moollah 
Shikore*  recalled,  to  his  Majesty's  recollection  that  Pesha- 

*  Moollah  Shikore  was  at  this  time  the  Shah's  agent  and  confidential 


INTERVIEW    WITH    THE    SHAH.  339 

wur  had  been  expressly  named  in  the  old  treaty  among 
the  possessions  of  Runjeet  Singh,  the  Shah  acknowledged 
that  it  was  so,  and  yielded  the  point. 

Other  articles  were  then  commented  on  by  the  Shah  and 
his  agent ;  but  that  which  seemed  most  to  stagger  them 
was  the  stipulation  for  the  annual  payment  by  Caubul 
of  two  lakhs  to  the  state  of  Lahore.  Little  advantage, 
obseiwed  the  Shah,  could  the  British  Government  ex- 
pect to  derive  from  his  restoration,  if  they  placed  him 
in  a  position  inferior  to  that  held  by  the  present  ruler 
of  Caubul,  who  paid  no  tribute  to  the  Sikhs.  "  He  had 
long,"  he  said,  "indulged  a  hope  that  the  day  would 
come  when  the  British  Government,  whose  honoiu"ed 
guest  he  had  been  for  more  than  twenty  years,  would 
restore  him  to  the  throne  and  possessions  of  his  ancestors 
— that  the  British  Government  must  be  aware  that,  after 
such  a  period  of  dependence  on  them,  in  whatever  man- 
ner they  chose  to  send  him  forth,  his  fair  name  was 
identijfied  with  their  own — that  in  this  world  a  good 
name  alone  deserved  to  be  prized — that  half  a  loaf  with 
a  good  name  were  better  than  abundance  without  it.  He 
then  alluded  to  the  small  revenues  of  Afghanistan — said 
that  Caubul  and  Candahar  yielded  nothing — that  when 
Shikarpoor  paid  its  revenues  regularly,  the  amount  rea- 
lised was  only  three  lakhs — ^that  to  enable  him  to  establish 
his  government,  and  keep  it,  he  would  require  to  maintain 
15,000  troops  ;  and  how  were  they  to  be  paid  ? — that  it 
would  be  less  irksome  if  the  money  were  only  required  to 
be  paid  whenever  he  had  occasion  to  make  use  of  the  ser- 
vices of  Runjeet  Singh's  troops."*    To  all  this  Macnaghten 

adviser  in  exile.     Further  mention  will  be  made  of  him  in  a  subsequent 
poi'tion  of  the  narrative. 

*  Memorandum,  by  Lieut.  MacJceson,  of  Mr.  MacnagJiterCs  Inicr- 
view  with  Shah  Soojah-ool-Moolk,  at  Loodhianah,  on  the  i5th  qf  Jxdy, 
1838;  MS.  Records. 

z  2 


3iO       POLICY  OF  THE  INDIAN  GOVERNMENT. 

replied,  that  the  payment  was  not  by  any  means,  to  be 
regarded  in  the  light  of  tribute  from  a  weaker  to  a  more 
powerful  state,  but  simply  as  remuneration  for  services 
performed.  Adroitly  alluding  to  the  subsidy  recently  paid 
by  the  British  Government  to  the  Persian  state,  the  English 
Envoy  said  that  a  powerful  government  often  subsidised, 
for  its  own  uses,  a  weaker  one  ;  and  that  if  Eunjeet  did 
not  furnish  the  troops,  the  Shah  would  be  exempted  from 
paying  the  money  ;  but  that  as  the  former  was  bound  to 
hold  them  always  in  readiness  for  service,  it  would  not  be 
reasonable  to  pay  them  only  when  they  were  called  into 
the  field.  Indeed,  he  urged,  Runjeet  Singh  had  with 
difficulty  been  persuaded  to  consent  to  the  terms  of  this 
very  article,  which  imposed  upon  him  no  light  conditions, 
and  had,  moreover,  been  substituted  as  a  compensation  to 
the  Maharajah  for  withdrawing  the  demands  he  had  made 
for  actual  territorial  concessions  both  at  Shikarpoor  and 
Jellalabad. 

There  was  little  to  be  said  in  reply  to  this.  The  Shah 
yielded  a  reluctant  assent.  The  remaining  articles  of  the 
treaty  were  read,  and  called  forth  but  slight  comment. 
Macnaghten  then  invited  the  Shah  to  state  unreservedly 
his  opinions  on  the  whole  question.  Thus  appealed  to, 
the  exiled  King  spoke  out  cordially  and  unrestrainedly, 
but  with  a  full  sense  of  what  was  due  to  himself.  "  He 
spoke  of  his  long  connexion  with  the  British  Government, 
of  his  fortune  being  entirely  in  their  hands — said  that  he 
had  entertained  the  hope,  in  his  long  exile,  that  it  would 
sooner  or  later  stretch  out  its  arm  to  restore  him  to  all 
the  possessions  and  powers  of  his  ancestors ;  but  that  if 
this  hope  could  not  at  once  be  fulfilled,  he  must  content 
himself  with  what  now  remained  of  the  disjointed  kingdom 
of  Afghanistan;  that  in  the  event  of  the  straitened 
revenue  of  Candahar  and  Caubul  being  further  reduced  by 
the  payment  of  two  lakhs  of  rupees  annually  to  the  Sikhs, 


INTERVIEW   WITH   THE   SHAH.  341 

he  must  look  to  support  from  the  British  Government  to 
meet  and  oppose  any  increased  danger  from  the  approach 
of  more  powerful  enemies  from  the  westward.  On  this 
point  full  assurance  was  given  him.  He  then  observed 
that  there  were  one  or  two  other  points  in  which  he  wished 
to  have  assurance  given  him,  and  that,  in  other  respects, 
he  was  at  the  disposal  of  the  British  Government: — 1st- 
That  no  interference  should  be  exercised  with  his  autho- 
rity over  those  of  his  tribe  and  household  ;  2ndly.  That 
he  should  be  allowed  to  raise  forces  of  his  own  to  go  with 
some  show  of  power,  and  not  as  though  he  were  a  mere 
puppet  in  the  hands  of  the  British  Government  to  work 
out  their  views.  He  then  dwelt  on  the  importance  of  this 
in  the  eyes  of  his  people  who  would  come  to  join  his  stand- 
ard ;  said  that  if  they  found  he  was  no  longer  the  source 
of  honour  and  reward,  they  would  desert  him  and  retmn 
to  their  homes,  as  they  would  have  no  object  in  connect- 
ing themselves  with  the  schemes  of  foreigners — that  he 
should  therefore  be  allowed  to  commence  recruiting  men, 
as  many  were  waiting  to  enter  his  service — that  when  his 
adherents  flocked  to  his  standard,  he  should  be  able  to  give 
them  hopes  of  reward  for  their  services."  * 

On  all  these  points  the  fullest  assurances  were  given  to 
the  Shah.  Then  Macnaghten  began  to  set  forth  how  it 
was  the  desire  of  the  British  Government  that  one  of  their 
own  functionaries  should  be  stationed  at  the  Shah's 
Court ;  t  and  that  British  officers  should  be  furnished  to 
discipline  the  Shah's  levies,  to  command  them  during  the 
expedition,  and  to  remain  with  him  after  his  restoration. 
To  all  of  this  the  Shah  readily  assented.  Declaring  him- 
self confident  of  success,  he  then  expressed  an  eager  hope 
that  no  delay  would  be  permitted,  but  that  the  expedition 

*  Lieutenant  Mackeson^s  Memorandum :  MS.  Records. 
+  "Who  would,  however,"  it  was  added,   "not  interfere  with  the 
full  exercise  of  his  authority  over  his  subjects." 


342  POLICY    OF   THE    INDIxVN    GOVEENMENT. 

would  set  out  as  soon  as  ever  the  troops  could  be  raised 
for  the  purpose.  When  the  beginnmg  of  the  ensuing  cold 
weather  was  named  as  the  time  for  commencing  opera- 
lions,  the  Shah  expressed  surprise  and  regi'et  that  the 
movement  should  be  so  long  delayed ;  and  urged  the 
expediency  of  moving  whilst  Herat  was  still  holding  out. 
His  appearance  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Candahar,  he 
said,  would  doubtless  compel  Mahomed  Shah  to  withdraw 
his  investing  army,  and  secure  the  frontier  against  all 
future  attacks.* 

Then  Macnaghten  asked  the  King  whether  it  were  his 
desire  to  advance  by  the  Khybur  Pass,  or  the  route  of 
Sindh.  To  this  Shah  Soojah  replied  that  the  Khyburees 
were  his  slaves — that  they  were  willing  to  sacrifice  them- 
selves at  his  bidding — that  he  frequently  received  im- 
ploring letters  from  the  Momunds,  the  Eusofzyes,  and 
other  tribes  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Peshawur,  but  that 
there  were  so  many  solid  advantages  in  the  combined 
movement  by  Candahar  and  Peshawur,  which  would 
completely  paralyse  the  movements  of  Dost  Mahomed, 
that  he  gave  it  the  preference.  His  own  force,  he  said, 
should  advance  by  Candahar,  whilst  his  eldest  son,  Prince 
Timour,  might  accompany  the  Sikh  army  through  the 
Khybur  Pass.t 

Little  more  now  remained  to  be  said.  But  before  taking 
his  leave  of  the  Shah,  Macnaghten  invited  him  to  state 
in  wilting  the  points  on  which  he  required  the  assurances 
of  the  British  Government,  and  expressed  a  hope  that,  as 

*  "He  mentioned  having  a  few  days  before  sent  an  emissary  to 
Kamram  to  conjure  him,  for  the  honour  of  the  Afghans,  to  hold  out 
for  two  short  months,  and  he  would  hear  of  miracles  worked  in  his 
favour." — [Lieutenant Mackeson's  Memorandum:  MS.  Records.'] 

t  Some  anxiety  was  expressed  by  the  Shah  lest  Prince  Timour 
should  be  consigned  entirely  to  the  guidance  of  the  Sikhs,  but  he  was 
assured  that  the  presence  of  British  officers  in  his  camp  would  eflfec- 
fcually  prevent  this. 


PEELINGS    OF   THE    SHAH.  343 

the  Mission  had  received  instructions  to  return  imme- 
diately to  Simlah,  his  Majesty's  wishes  might  be  laid 
before  him  with  the  least  possible  delay.  Desiring  the 
British  Envoy  to  call  upon  him  again  on  the  following 
evening,  after  leisure  had  been  allowed  him  to  study  well 
the  contents  of  the  proposed  treaty,  the  Shah  then  bade 
liim  adieu  ;  and  the  English  officers  took  their  departure; 
It  did  not  appear  to  those  present,  on  this  occasion,  when 
the  sovereignty  of  Afghanistan  was  offered  to  the  long- 
exiled  monarch,  and  now,  for  the  first  time  since  his 
dethronement,  there  dawned  upon  him  something  like  a 
certainty  of  recovering  his  lost  dominions,  that  he  received 
the  announcements  of  the  English  Mission  with  feelings 
of  very  earnest  exultation  and  delight.  There  were  evi- 
dently some  misgivings  in  the  mind  of  the  Shah,  who 
mistrusted  both  Runjeet  Singh  and  the  British  Govern- 
ment. Everything  seemed  to  have  been  already  arranged 
between  the  two  parties,  whilst  he  himself,  it  appeared,  was 
designed  to  be  a  passive  instrument  for  the  furtherance  of 
their  ends — a  puppet  in  their  hands,  to  give  grace  to  the 
show  and  character  to  the  expedition. 

An  hour  before  the  time  appointed  for  the  second  meet- 
ing between  Shah  Soojah  and  the  British  Emissary, 
Moollah  Shikore  waited  upon  the  latter  with  a  paper, 
setting  forth  the  points  upon  which  the  Shah  especially 
desired  to  have  the  assurances  of  the  British  Government. 
They  ran  to  the  following  effect : 

Firstly.  That  as  regards  the  descendants  of  the  King  of  the 
Douranees  (Alimed  Shah),  and  the  sons  and  relations  of  myself, 
whoever  they  may  be,  the  right  of  providing  for  them  or  not,  and 
the  direction  of  all  that  concerns  them,  belong  to  me  alone ;  in 
this  matter  neither  the  British  Government  nor  other  shall  exercise 
any  interference.* 


*  It  will  be  more  convenient  for  purposes  of  reference  to  append,  as 
a  note  to  each  article,  Macnaghten's  replies  to  these  several  points,  as 


344  POLICY    OF    THE    INDIAN    GOVERNMENT. 

Secondly.  After  I  have  been  reinstated  in  Caubul  and  Candahar, 
if,  in  consequence  of  the  smallness  of  my  possessions,  I  should 
desire  to  send  an  army  against  Balkh,  Seistan,  Beloochistan,  and 
the  neighbourhood  and  dependencies  of  Caubul  and  Candahar,  and 
take  possession  of  them,  no  hindrance  shall  be  oflPered.* 

Thirdly.  When  Caubul  and  Candahar  become  mine,  the  depen- 
dencies of  those  places,  as  they  existed  in  the  time  of  the 
monarchy,  ought  to  belong  to  me.f 

Fourthly.  When  I  have  been  reinstated  at  Caubul,  and  the 
of&cers  of  the  Biitish  Government  prepare  to  return,  should  I 
desire  to  retain  one  of  them  as  an  envoy,  and  some  others  for  the 
purpose  of  forming  and  disciplining  my  army,  they  will  not  be 
refused.  J 

Fifthly.  The  British  officers  shall  exercise  no  authority  over  the 
people  of  Afghanistan,  whether  soldiers  or  subjects,  without  my 
approbation  and  concurrence.  § 

Sixthly,  With  respect  to  giving  two  lakhs  of  rupees,  and  some- 
thing besides  from  Shikarpoor,  it  appears  to  me  very  hard  and 
difficult ;  firstly,  because  my  country  will  not  afford  means  suffi- 
cient for  the  expenses  of  my  government  and  the  maintenance  of 
my  troops  ;  and  secondly,  because  the  measure  will  be  considered 
by  the  world  as  payment  of  tribute.     It  rests,  however,  with  the 


given  at  the  subsequent  interview  :  ''With  regard  to  the  first  article," 
he  writes,  "I  told  the  Shah  that  he  might  make  his  mind  perfectly 
at  ease,  as  the  British  Grovemment  had  no  intention  or  wish  to  inter- 
fere between  his  Majesty  and  his  family  and  dependents." — [Mr. 
Macnaghten  to  Government,  July  17,  1838;  MS.  Fecords.] 

*  "With  regard  to  the  second  article,  I  pointed  out  to  the  Shah, 
that  the  conquest  of  Shikarpoor  would  be  directly  opposed  to  one  of 
the  articles  of  the  treaty.  To  the  rest  of  the  article  I  could  only 
say  that  it  would  be  naturally  the  wish  of  the  British  Government  to 
witness  the  consolidation  and  extension,  to  their  proper  limits,  of  his 
Majesty's  dominions." — [MS.  Records.] 

+  "On  the  subject  of  the  third  article,  I  observed  that,  of  course, 
the  Shah  did  not  mean  to  include  the  territories  ceded  to  Runjeet  Singh 
by  the  new  treaty,  and  that  the  mention  of  Shikarpoor  was  inadmis- 
sible."— [MS.  Fecords.] 

X  "The  fourth  ai-ticle  I  stated  would  doubtless  be  approved  by  the 
Governor- Greneral. " — [MS.  Fecords.  ] 

§  "  The  wish,  I  said,  expressed  in  the  fifth  axticle  would  be  scru- 
pulously attended  to.'*— [MS.  Fecords.} 


DEMANDS   OF   SUAE.   SOOJAH.  345 

British  Government,  and  if  it  is  of  opinion  that  the  country  has 
the  m^ans,  and  that  the  measure  is  a  proper  one,  I  do  not 
object.  The  conduct  of  my  affairs  is  in  the  hands  of  the  British 
Government.* 

Seventhly.  After  the  decay  of  the  monarchy,  in  the  same  manner 
as  my  servants  rebelling  usurped  the  country,  so  did  the  Sindhians 
place  officers  in  possession  of  Shikarpoor ;  now  that  I  shall  regain 
possession  of  my  kingdom,  the  Sindhians  must  release  Shikarpoor. 
It  is  a  royal  possession,  and  must  belong  to  me.  + 

Eighthly.  "With  respect  to  slave-girls  who  ran  away  from  their 
masters,  although  to  deliver  them  up  may  be  against  the  regula- 
tions, yet  it  is  a  matter  of  necessity,  for  respectable  people  (females) 
cannot  dispense  with  servants,  however  the  regulations  may  be 
enforced  with   other  people,  it  is  not  right  to  apply  them  to  a 


*  ''With  respect  to  the  objection  urged  in  the  sixth  article,  to 
making  money-payments  to  Maharajah  Runjeet  Singh,  I  reiterated  the 
arguments  formerly  used,  to  show  the  distinctions  between  a  tributary 
and  a  subsidiary  obligation.  These  arguments,  it  will  be  observed, 
had  due  weight  with  his  Majesty,  for  in  the  written  article  he  bi-ings 
forward  the  objection  as  one  that  may  occur  to  the  world,  not  as  one 
to  which  he  himself  attaches  any  importance.  Ultimately,  however, 
his  Majesty  admitted  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  satisfy  all  imrea- 
sonable  objections,  and  that  to  those  who  understood  the  subject,  and 
whose  opinions  alone  were  to  be  valued,  the  reciprocal  nature  of  the 
subsidiary  obligation  would  be  sufficiently  obvious.  With  regard  to 
the  objection  specified  in  this  article,  founded  on  the  anticipated  want 
of  means,  I  gave  his  Majesty  encouragement  to  hope  that  the  British 
Government  would  not  permit  him  to  be  in  distress  for  the  means  of 
discharging  his  necessary  pecuniary  obligations." — [MS.  Records.'\ 

+  * '  The  seventh  article,  I  observed,  was  at  variance  with  the  pro- 
posed provisions  in  the  new  treaty  regarding  Shikarpoor.  His  Ma- 
jesty, after  some  conversation,  agreed  to  expimge  the  article,  as  well  as 
to  exclude  the  mention  of  Shikarpoor  in  other  places  where  it  had  been 
introduced  from  his  paper  of  requests  ;  but  he  seemed  to  set  great  value 
on  his  claim  to  Shikarpoor  and  the  Sindh  possessions  generally.  The 
Ameers,  he  observed,  had  no  legitimate  title  to  their  dominions  but 
what  they  derived  from  him.  Shikarpoor,  he  said,  he  was  particularly 
desirous  to  obtain  possession  of,  as  being  an  appropriate  place  of 
refuge  and  escape  for  his  family  in  case  of  reverses  ;  but  he  ultimately 
admitted  that  the  object  would  be  sufficiently  secured  to  him  so  long  as 
the  British  influence  prevailed  with  the  Ameers." — [MS.  Jtecords.] 


346  POLICY    OP   THE    INDIAN   GOVERNMENT. 

guest,  it  is  proper  that  the  slave-girls  of  the  Vilaitis  (native  of 
Afghanistan)  attached  to  me,  who  may  run  away  from  their  masters, 
be  made  to  return.* 

Having  mastered  the  contents  of  this  paper,  Mac- 
naghten  proceeded  to  the  audience,  and  after  the  first 
salutations,  began,  with  his  Majesty's  permission,  to  read 
over  the  several  articles,  and  comment  on  them  as  he  pro- 
ceeded. He  then  went  on  to  say  that  it  was  now  plaiii 
that  the  Shah's  mind  had  been  set  at  rest  on  all  the 
points  which  had  before  occasioned  him  doubt,  and  as  his 
Majesty  was  now  prepared  without  scruple  to  ratify  the 
treaty,  he  hoped  that  he  would  furnish  him  with  a  written 
paper  to  this  effect.  To  this  the  Shah  readily  assented, 
and  the  following  postscript  was  then  appended  to  the 
document : 

After  a  reperusal  of  the  treaty,  and  hearing  the  representations 
made  by  the  British  oflScers  of  high  rank,  it  appeared  to  me  right 
that,  in  the  foregoing  enumeration  of  the  objects  to  be  desired, 
the  mention  of  Shikarpoor  should  not  be  introduced,  and  with 
respect  to  the  objections  which  I  have  stated,  to  giving  two  lakhs  of 
rupees  to  Runjeet  Singh,  in  exchange  for  the  services  of  his  troops, 
as  it  does  not  appear  to  me  injurious  to  my  dignity,  I  have 
omitted  all  mention  of  that  also,  and  am  now  prepared  with  willing- 
ness and  satisfaction  to  sign  the  treaty,  f 

The  negotiation  now  at  an  end ;  the  Shah  expressed  his 
eagerness  to  commence  work  without  delay;  and  was 
urgent  in  his  solicitations  for  an  immediate  supply  of 
money,  arms,  and  ammunition.     He  again,  too,  expressed 

*  *' On  the  very  delicate  subject  introduced  into  the  last  article,  I 
observed  to  his  Majesty  that  its  connexion  with  the  treaty  generally 
did  not  seem  to  me  to  be  obvious,  but  that  I  would  nevertheless  bring 
it  to  the  notice  of  the  Grovemor-General,  who  would,  I  felt  persuaded, 
take  it  into  consideration  with  the  same  anxious  desire  to  gratify  his 
Majesty  in  this  as  in  all  other  matters." — [MS.  Records.] 

t  MS.  Records. 


THE  shah's  correspondence,  347 

his  desire  to  conduct  the  expedition  for  the  recovery  of  liis 
dominions,  as  one  relying  mainly  upon  the  strength  of  his 
ovm  army.  He  wished  to  obtain  the  assistance  of  British 
officers  in  raising  and  disciplining  his  troops,  but  he  hoped 
'Hhat  the  immediate  operations  for  regaining  his  throne 
might  be  conducted "  by  those  troops.  Such  reliance  on 
his  own  arms  would  raise,  he  said,  his  character  in  the 
estimation  of  the  people,  "  while  the  fact  of  his  being  up- 
held by  foreign  force  alone  could  not  fail  to  detract,  in  a 
great  measure,  from  his  dignity  and  consequence."  *  He  ■ 
had  already,  he  declared,  in  reply  to  a  suggestion  from  the 
British  Envoy,  sent  letters  to  many  persons  of  influence  in 
Afghanistan,  calling  upon  them  to  join  his  standard,  and 
he  was  certain  that  thousands  would  flock  to  it  from  all 
parts  of  the  country,  t     He  appeared  to  be  in  the  highest 

*  Ml'.  MacnagUen  to  Governmemt,  July  17, 1838  .•  MS.  Records. 
+  Many  of  these  letters  were  promptly  responded  to,  and  in  some 
instances  voluntary  tenders  of  service  were  made  ty  chiefs  discontented 
with  the  Barukzye  rule.  Among  others,  Khan  Shereen  Khan,  chief  of 
the  Kuzzilbashes,  wrote  to  Shah  Soojah  declaring  his  intention  to  join 
his  standard.  *'  Since  we  have  been  so  unfortunate,"  said  the  chief, 
"as  to  be  far  from  your  royal  household,  it  is  only  known  to  God 
how  wretchedly  we  pass  our  days.  We  have  now  resolved,  as  soon  as 
the  troops  of  your  Majesty  arrive  on  the  frontier,  to  lose  no  time  in 
waiting  upon  your  Majesty  and  proving  our  fidelity  by  sacrificing  our- 
selves in  your  service.  For  God's  sake  do  not  make  this  letter  public." 
Even  before  it  was  known  that  there  was  any  intention  on  the  part 
of  the  Shah  to  attempt  to  regain  his  kingdom,  many  of  the  chiefs,  either 
offended  by  Dost  Mahomed's  alliance  with  the  Persians,  or  warned 
by  the  failure  of  Bumes's  Mission  of  the  danger  of  clinging  any  longer  to 
a  falling  house,  wrote  to  the  Shah,  beseeching  him  to  return.  ' '  The 
faggots,"  it  was  said,  "are  ready.  It  merely  requires  the  lighted  torch 
to  be  applied."  It  is  remarkable  that  one  of  the  first  to  tender  his 
services  to  the  Suddozye  Prince  was  that  very  Abdoollah  Khan, 
Achetzkye,  who  was  the  prime  mover  of  the  insurrection  at  Caubul, 
which  brought  about  the  restoration  of  the  Barukzyes. — [Captain 
Wade  to  Mr.  Macnaghten,  June  5th,  1838  :  MS.  Records.]  At  this 
time  the  Shah  was  restricted  from   corresponding  with   his   Afghan 


348       POLICY  OF  THE  INDIAN  GOVERNMENT. 

spirits,  and  spoke  strongly  of  the  debt  of  gratitude  which 
he  owed  to  the  British  Government,  both  for  the  protec- 
tion that  had  been  yielded  him  during  past  years,  and  for 
the  more  active  assistance  which  was  about  to  confer  upon 
him  so  much  power  and  grandeur. 

Macnaghten  now  took  his  leave  of  the  Shah,  and  pro- 
ceeded with  the  officers  of  the  Mission  to  pay  a  visit  to 
Zemaun  Shah,  who,  blind  and  powerless,  had  remained 
since  his  dethronement  an  appendage  to  the  faded  Court  of 
his  younger  brother,  dreaming  over  the  past  grandeur  of 
his  magnificent  reign,  and  sighing  to  revisit  the  scene  of 
his  by-gone  glories.  Vague  rumours  of  the  intention 
of  the  British  Government  to  restore  the  Suddozye  Princes 
to  the  sovereignty  of  Afghanistan  had  reached  him  in  his 
dreary  exile ;  and  now  that  the  British  Envoy  was  at  his 
door,  so  eager  was  he  to  learn  the  whole  truth,  that 
almost  before  the  ordinary  salutations  had  been  exchanged, 
he  pressed  Macnaghten  for  a  full  revelation  of  the  glad 
tidings  of  which  he  was  the  bearer.  The  intelligence, 
which  the  English  gentleman  imparted  to  him,  stirred  the 
heart  of  the  old  blind  Prince  with  joy  and  exultation. 
"  He  seemed  filled  with  delight  at  the  prospect  of  being 
permitted  to  revisit  the  land  of  his  ancestors."*  This 
was  the  first  gleam  of  good  fortune  that  had  burst  upon 
him  for  many  years ;  and  it  was  a  curious  and  affecting 
sight  to  mark  the  effect  which  the  announcement  of  the 
good  offices  of  the  British  wrought  upon  one,  who,  forty 
years  before,  had  threatened  vast  expeditions  to  the  south- 
ward, which  had  filled  the  British  in  India  with  anxiety 
and  alarm. 

friends  ;  but  Captain  Wade,  whilst  reporting  to  government  the  receipt 
of  the  letters  from  Abdoollah  Khan  and  others,  recommended  that  the 
restriction  should  be  removed.  The  Shah  seems  to  have  laid  before 
the  British  agent,  in  perfect  good  faith,  all  the  letters  he  received  from 
Afghanistan  whilst  a  pensioner  on  the  British  Grovernment. 

*  Mr.  Macnaghten  to  Government^  July  17,  1838  :  MS.  Records. 


RETURN   OF   THE    MISSION.  349 

On  the  17  th  of  July,  Macnaghten  and  his  suite  turned 
their  backs  upon  Loodhianah,  and  repaired,  with  all  pos- 
sible haste,  to  Simlah,  there  to  discuss  with  Lord  Auck- 
land and  the  secretaries  who  had  remained  with  him,  the 
measures  now  to  be  adopted  for  the  restoration  of  Shah 
Soojah-ool-Moolk  to  the  long-lost  empire  of  Ahmed  Shah. 


350 


CHAPTEK  IV. 

[July— October,  1838.] 

The  Simlah  Manifesto — The  Simlah  Council— Influence  of  Messrs.  Colvin 
and  Torrens — Views  of  Captains  Burnes  and  Wade — Opinions  of 
Sir  Henry  Fane— The  Army  of  the  Indus — The  Governor- General's 
Manifesto*^Its  Policy  considered. 

It  is-  obvious  that,  in  all  the  negotiations  detailed  in  the 
preceding  chapter,  the  paramount  idea  was  that  of  an 
alliance  between  Runjeet  Singh  and  Shah  Soojah,  guaran- 
teed by  the  British  Government,  and  a  conjoint  expedition 
into  Afghanistan  from  the  two  sides  of  Peshawur  and 
Shikai-poor,  to  be  undertaken  by  the  armies  of  the  Lahore 
ruler  and  the  Suddozye  Prince.  It  was  hinted  to  Runjeet 
Singh  that  events  might  be  developed,  which  would 
render  necessary  the  more  active  co-operation  of  the 
British  army ;  but  Shah  Soojah,  who  was  desirous  above 
all  things  that  the  British  should  not  take  the  foremost 
part  in  the  coming  expedition,  was  led  to  believe  that, 
assisted  by  a  few  British  officers,  he  would  be  left  to 
recover  for  himself  his  old  dominions,  and  that  he  would 
by  no  means  become  a  puppet  in  the  hands  of  his  Fering- 
hee  alUes.* 

*  It  was,  as  I  have  shown,  the  first  wish  of  the  Governor-General 
that  the  Sikhs  should  undertake,  single-handed,  the  invasion  of 
Afghanistan  (see  .Lord  Auckland's  Minute  and  instructions  to  Mr. 
Macnaghten  in  the  preceding  chapter).  Macnaghten,  on  his  way  to 
Runjeet's  Court,  wrote  to  Mr.  Masson  :  *'  You  will  have  heard  that  I 
am  proceeding  on  a  mission  to  Runjeet  Singh  ;  and  as  at  my  interview 
with  his  Highness  it  is  probable  that  the  question  of  his  relations  with 


LORD   AUCKLAND   AND    HIS   SECRETARIES.  351 

But  these  moderate  views  were  about  now  to  be  ex- 
panded into  a  political  scheme  of  far  wider  scope  and 
significance.  Whilst  Macnaghten  was  negotiating  the  tri- 
partite treaty  at  Lahore  and  Loodhianah,  John  Colvin  and 
Henry  Torrens  remained  at  Simlah,  as .  the  scribes  and 
counsellors  of  the  Governor-General.  To  what  extent 
their  bolder  speculations  wrought  upon  the  plastic  mind 
of  Lord  Auckland  it  is  not  easy,  with  due  historical  accu- 
racy, to  determine.  But  it  is  generally  conjectured  that 
the  influences .  then  set  at  work  overcame  the  scruples  of 
the  cautious  and  peace-loving  statesman,  and  induced  him 
to  sanction  an  enterprise  of  a  magnitude  coriimensurate 
with  the  bold  and  ambitious  views  of  his  irresponsible 
advisers.  The  direct  influence  mainly  emanated  from  John 
Colvin.  It  is  probable,  indeed,  that  the  counsels  of  a  man 
so  young  and  so  en-atic  as  Henry  ToiTcns  would  have  met 
with  no  acceptance  from  the  sober-minded  nobleman  at 
the  head  of  the  government,  but  for  a  circumstance  which 
gave  weight  to  his  opinions  and  cogency  to  his  advice. 
By  all  the  accidents  of  birth  and  early  associations,  as 
well  as  by  the  bent  of  his  own  genius,  the  young  civilian 
was  a  ti-ue  soldier.  The  son  of  a  distinguished  officer  and 
an  approved  military  teacher,  he  had  graduated,  whilst 
yet  a  boy,  in  the  learning  of  the  camp,  and  his  after 
studies  had  done  much  to  perfect  his  acquaintance  with 

the  Afghans  will  come  on  the  tapis,  I  am  naturally  desirous  of  obtain- 
ing the  opinion  of  the  best-informed  men  with  respect  to  them.  Would 
you  oblige  me,  therefore,  by  stating  what  means  of  counteraction  to  the 
policy  of  Dost  Mahomed  Khan  you  would  recommend  for  adoption  ;  and 
whether  you  think  that  the  Sikhs,  using  any  (and  what  ?)  instrument 
of  Afghan  agency,  could  establish  themselves  in  Caubul  ?" — [Massori's 
Narrative,  vol.  iii.]  A  letter,  with  a  similar  suggestion,  was  sent  to 
Captain  Burnes,  of  whose  reception  of  the  project  I  shall  speak  more 
in  detail.  The  matter  is  further  noticeable  as  an  indication  of  the'im- 
willingness  of  Lord  Auckland  to  interfere  more  actively  in  the  politics 
of  Afghanistan. 


352  THE   SIMLAH   MANIFESTO. 

the  tactics  and  strategy  of  modem  warfare.  He  possessed, 
indeed,  the  very  knowledge  which  the  other  members  of 
the  Simlah  Council  most  wanted ;  and  hence  it  was  that 
he  came  to  exercise  considerable  influence  over  Lord  Auck- 
land, more  perhaps  through  his  brother  secretaries  than 
directly  brought  to  bear  upon  the  mind  of  the  Governor- 
General  himself.  It  was  urged  that  the  expedition,  if 
entrusted  entirely  to  Shah  Soojah  and  the  Sikhs,  would 
set  in  disastrous  failure  ;  and  there  was  at  least  some  pro- 
bability in  this.  Runjeet  Singh  was  no  more  than  luke- 
warm in  the  cause  ;  and  the  Sikhs  were  detested  in 
Afghanistan.  Lord  Auckland  shrunk  from  the  responsi- 
bility of  despatching  a  British  army  across  the  Indus ; 
but,  warned  of  the  danger  of  identifying  himself  with  a 
slighter  measure  promising  little  certainty  of  success,  he 
halted,  for  a  time,  between  two  opinions,  and  slowly 
yielded  to  the  assaults  of  his  scribes.* 

There  were  two  other  men  then  on  the  frontier  whose 
opinions  Lord  Auckland  had  been  naturally  desirous  to 
obtain.  Captain  Burnes  and  Captain  Wade  were  at  least 
acquainted  with  the  history  and  politics  of  Afghanistan, 
and  they  had  freely  placed  their  sentiments  on  record.  It 
has  been  advanced  that  the  course  of  policy  eventually 
pursued  was  in  accordance  with  the  views  of  these  two 
officers.  It  is  important,  therefore,  that  it  should  be 
clearly  ascertained  what  those  views  actually  were. 

On  the  20th  of  July  Captain  Burnes  joined  the  Simlah 

*  In  this  revised  edition  of  the  present  work,  I  am  bound  to  state 
that  Mr.  Henry  Torrens,  whose  early  death,  in  1852,  is  an  event  to  be 
deplored  far  beyond  the  circle  of  his  own  private  friends,  emphatically 
denied,  on  reading  these  statements,  and  the  comments  made  upon 
them  by  the  local  press  of  India,  his  participation  in  the  evil  counsels 
which  led  Lord  Auckland  astray.  I  am  bound  to  give  currency  to 
Mr.  Torrens's  explanations,  which  will  be  found  in  the  Appendix  to  the 
present  volume,  with  such  comments  of  my  own  as  they  seem  to 
demand. 


BURNES   IN   COUNCIL.  353 

Council.  On  the  29th  of  May,  whilst  halting  at  Peshawur, 
he  had  received  a  letter  from  Mr.  Macnaghten,  instructing 
him  to  proceed  at  once  to  join  the  British  Mission,  and  in 
obedience  to  the  summons  had  started  at  once  on  his 
downward  journey.  In  the  middle  of  June  he  had  joined 
the  camp  of  the  British  Envoy  at  Lahore,  and  taken  part 
in  the  later  deliberations  which  had  preceded  the  accept- 
ance by  Runjeet  Singh  of  the  terms  proposed  by  the 
British  Government ;  and  on  the  departure  of  the  Mission 
for  Loodhianah  had  proceeded  to  join  Lord  Auckland  and 
his  advisers  at  Simlah.* 

Burnes  had  already  placed  his  opinions  on  record.  At 
Hussan  Abdool  he  had  received  Macnaghten's  letter  calling 
upon  him  for  his  views  regarding  the  best  means  of  coun- 
teracting the  hostile  influence  of  the  Barukzye  chiefs,  and 
on  the  2nd  of  June  he  had  despatched  a  long  demi-official 
letter,  stating  the  policy  which,  under  the  then  existing 
circumstances,  he  conceived  it  expedient  to  adopt,  "  not," 
in  his  own  emphatic  words,  "  what  was  best ;  but  what 
was  best  under  the  circumstances,  which  a  series  of 
blunders  had  produced." 

It  is  plain  that  no  advice  offered  by  Burnes  could  have 
had  any  effect  upon  the  question  of  the  restoration  of 
Shah  Soojah.  Macnaghten,  on  reaching  Adeenanuggur, 
had  determined  not  to  await  the  arrival  of  the  agent  from 
Caubul  before  stating  the  views  of  the  British  Government 

*  Mr.  Masson  says  (Narrative,  vol.  iii.,  p.  495)  that  Burnes  told 
him  that  the  expedition  across  the  Indus  "had  been  arranged  before 
he  reached  Simlah,  and  that  when  he  arrived  Torrens  and  Colvin  came 
running  to  him  and  prayed  him  to  say  nothing  to  unsettle  his  Lordship ; 
that  they  had  all  the  trouble  in  the  world  to  get  him  into  the  business, 
and  that  even  now  he  would  be  glad  of  any  pretext  to  retire  from  it." 
I  was  for  a  long  time,  very  sceptical  of  the  truth  of  this  story  ;  and  I 
do  not  now  vouch  for  it.  But  I  know  that  some  men,  with  far  better 
opportunities  than  my  own  of  determining  the  authenticity  of  the 
anecdote,  are  inclined  to  believe  it. 

VOL.  I.  A  A 


354  THE   SIMLAH   MANIFESTO. 

to  Kunjeet  Singh.  He  had,  indeed,  given  the  Maharajah 
the  option  of  participating  in  an  expedition  for  the  resto- 
ration of  Shah  Soojah  before  he  had  received,  either  orally 
or  by  letter,  the  recommendations  of  Captain  Bumes. 
When  Burnes  joined  the  Briti>sh  Mission,  our  Government 
was  irretrievably  committed  to  a  course  of  policy  which  he 
either  might  or  might  not  have  supported.  If  he  had  any 
influence  on  the  future  out-turn  of  events,  it  was  rather 
as  the  adviser  of  Runjeet  Singh*  than  as  the  adviser  of 
the  British  Mission.  The  fatal  offer  had  been  made  to  the 
Maharajah  before  Bumes  joined  the  Mission  camp. 

What  Bumes  really  recommended,  as  the  growth  of  his 
owQ  free  and  unfettered  opinion  was,  that  the  case  of  DOst 
Mahomed  should  be  reconsidered,  and  that  the  British 
Government  should  act  with  him  and  not  against  him. 
"It  remains  to  be  reconsidered,"  he  wrote, t  "why  we 
cannot  act  with  Dost  Mahomed.  He  is  a  man  of  un- 
doubted ability,  and  has  at  heart  a  high  opinion  of  the 
British  nation  ;  and  if  half  you  must  do  for  others  were 
done  for  him,  and  offers  made  which  he  could  see  conduced 

*  Runjeet  was  very  anxious  to  obtain  Burnes' s  private  opinion  re- 
garding the  state  of  politics  in  Afghanistan,  and  the  course  which  it 
Avas  expedient  for  the  Maharajah  to  adopt.  The  Fakir  Noor-ood-deen 
had  two  or  three  conferences  with  Burnes  upon  these  points.  The 
whole  history  of  the  negotiations  with  Dost  Mahomed  were  gone  over 
and  reported,  from  notes  taken  down  at  the  time,  by  the  Fakir  to  the 
Maharajah.  Runjeet  declared  himself  very  grateful  for  this  informa- 
tion ;  and  sent  again  to  ask  Burnes  to  tell  him,  not  as  a  public  func- 
tionary, but  as  a  private  friend,  whether  the  restoration  of  Shah  Soojah 
would  be  really  to  his  advantage.  Burnes' s  answer  was  in  the  affirma- 
tive ;  and  Runjeet  seems  to  have  been,  to  some  extent,  influenced  by  it. 
— [Captain  Burnes  to  Mr.  Macnaghten,  Lahore,  June  20tk,  1888  : 
MS.  Mecords.}  I  do  not  know  whether  this  letter  has  ever  been  made 
public  from  any  private  source.  Like  almost  everything  else  relating 
to  the  proceedings  at  Lahore  and  Loodhianah  in  June  and  July,  1830, 
it  was  studiously  suppressed  by  government. 

t  To  Mr.  MacnagUen,  June  2,  1838. 


OPINIONS   OF  BURNES.  355 

to  his  interests,  he  would  abandon  Russia  and  Persia  to- 
morrow. It  may  be  said  that  opportunity  has  been  given 
him  ;  but  I  would  rather  discuss  this  in  person  with  you, 
for. I  think  there  is  much  to  be  said  for  him.  Government 
have  admitted  that  he  had  at  best  a  choice  of  difficulties  ; 
and  it  should  not  be  forgotten  that^we  promised  nothing, 
and  Persia  and  Russia  held  out  a  great  deal."  But  Biunes 
had  been  asked  for  his  advice,  not  regarding  the  best 
means  of  counteracting  Persian  or  Russian  influence  in 
Afghanistan,  but  the  best  means  of  counteracting  Dost 
Mahomed  ;  and  he  gave  it  as  his  opinion,  that  if  Dost 
Mahomed  were  to  be  counteracted,  the  restoration  of  Shah 
Soojah  was  a  more  feasible  project  than  the  establishment 
of  Sikh  influence  at  Caubul.  Oaptain  Wade  had  declared 
his  conviction  that  the  disunion  of  the  Afghan  chiefs  was 
an  element  of  security  to  the  British ;  but  this  opinion 
Bunies  controverted,  and  pronounced  himself  in  favour  of 
the  consolidation  of  the  Afghan  Empire.  "  As  things 
stand,"  he  wrote,  "  I  maintain  that  it  is  the  best  of  all 
ix>licy  to  make  Caubul  in  itself  as  strong  as  we  can  make 
it,  and  not  weaken  it  by  divided  forces.  It  has  already 
been  too  long  divided.  Caubul  owed  its  strength  in 
bygone. days  to  the  tribute  of  Cashmere  and  Sindh.  Both 
are  iiTcvocably  gone,  and  while  we  do  all  we  can  to  keep 
up  the  Sikhs,  as  a  power  east  of  the  Indus,  during  the 
Maliarajah's  life  or  afterwards,  we  •  should  consolidate 
Afghan  power  west  of  the  Indus,  and  have  a  king,  and 
not  a  collection  of  chiefs.  Divide  et  impera  is  a  temporising 
creed  at  any  time  ;  and  if  the  Afghans  are  united,  we  and 
they  bid  defiance  to  Persia,  and  instead  of  distant  relations 
we  have  everything  under  our  eye,  and  a  steadily  pro- 
gi'essing  influence  all  along  the  Indus." 

Such  were  the  general  views  that  Bumes  enunciated, 
in  the  knowledge  that  the  Simlah  Cabinet  had  determined 
on  the  deposition  of  Dost  Mahomed.    In  fulfilment  of  the 

aa2 


356  THE   SIMLAH  MANIFESTO. 

object  thus  contemplated,  he  recommended  that  the  empire 
should  be  consolidated  under  Shah  Soojah,  rather  than 
under  Sultan  Mahomed  or  any  other  chief.  He  believed 
that  the  restoration  of  the  ex-King  could  be  accomplished 
with  the  greatest  facility,  at  a  very  trifling  expenditure  of 
the  resources  and  display  of  the  power  of  the  British 
Government.  "  As  for  Shah  Soojah-ool-Moolk,  personally,"* 
he  wrote,  "  the  British  Government  have  only  to  send  him 
to  Peshawur  with  an  agent,  and  two  of  its  own  regiments 
as  an  honorary  escort,  and  an  avowal  to  the  Afghans  that 
we  have  taken  up  his  cause,  to  ensure  his  being  fixed  for 
ever  on  the  throne.  The  present  time  is  perhaps  better 
than  any  previous  to  it,  for  the  Afghans,  as  a  nation, 
detest  Persia,  and  Dost  Mahomed  having  gone  over  to  the 
Court  of  Teheran,  though  he  believes  it  to  be  from  dire 
necessity,  converts  many  a  doubting  Afghan  into  a  bitter 
enemy.  The  Maharajah's  opinion  has  only,  therefore, 
to  be  asked  for  the  ex-King's  advance  on  Peshawur, 
granting  him,  at  the  same  time,  some  four  or  five 
of  the  regiments  which  have  no  Sikhs  in  their  ranks,  and 
Soojah  becomes  King.  He  need  not  move  from  Peshawur, 
but  address  the  Khyburrees,  Kohistanees  of  Caubul,  and 
all  the  Afghans  from  that  city,  (stating)  that  he  has  the 
co-operation  of  the  British  and  the  Maharajah,  and  with 
but  a  little  distribution  of  ready  money — say,  two  or 
three  lakhs  of  rupees — he  will  find  himself  the  real  King 
of  the  Afghans  in  a  couple  of  months.     It  is,  however, 

*  Burnes  had  originally  written,  "  Of  Shah  Soojah-ool-Moolk,  per- 
Bonally,  I  have,  that  is  as  ex-King  of  the  Afghans,  no  very  high  opinion;" 
but  he  had  scored  out  the  words.  I  quote  the  passages  in  the  text 
from  a  copy,  the  accuracy  of  which  is  certified  by  two  Justices  of  the 
Peace  at  Bombay.  This  letter  was  cited  by  Sir  John  Hobhouse  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  in  verification  of  the  assertion  that  Burnes  had 
recommended  the  course  adopted  by  Lord  Auckland.  That  I  may  not 
be  myself  accused  of  garbling,  I  give  the  letter  entire  in  the  Appendix. 


OPINIONS    OF   CAPTAIN    WADE.  357 

to  be  remembered  always,  that  we  must  appear  directly, 
for  the  Afghans  are  a  superstitious  people,  and  believe 
Shah  Soojah  to  have  no  fortune — but  our  name  will 
invest  him  with  it," 

Such  were  the  sanguine  expectations  of  Captain  Bumes, 
and  the  very  moderate  policy  which  he  was  inclined  to 
recommend,  on  the  presumption  that  all  amicable  relations 
with  Dost  Mahomed  had  now  teen  repudiated  by  the 
British  Government.  The  opinions  of  Captain  Wade 
were  scarcely  less  in  accordance  with  those  which  found 
favour  in  the  Simlah  Council-Chamber.  It  had  ever 
been  the  belief  of  this  officer  that  the  consolidation  of 
Afghanistan  would  prove  injurious  to  British  interests. 
He  had  insisted  that  it  was  the  wisest  poKcy  to  sup- 
port the  existing  rulers,  and  to  encourage  the  disunion 
among  them.  Of  Dost  Mahomed,  personally,  Captain 
Wade  entertained  no  favourable  opinion.  He  underrated 
both  the  character  of  the  man  and  his  influence  over 
his  countrymen ;  but  so  little  was  he  disposed  to  counsel 
the  subversion  of  the  existing  rule  in  Afghanistan,  that 
he  was  always  willing  to  endeavour  to  bring  about  an 
arrangement  with  Dost  Mahomed,  by  recommending 
Runjeet  Singh  to  accept  the  overtures   of  the   Ameer.* 

*  With  reference  to  the  final  offers  of  Dost  Mahomed  to  hold 
Peshawur,  conjointly  with  Sultan  Mahomed,  tributary  to  Lahore  (Jebbar 
Khan  acting  as  the  Ameer's  representative),  Captain  Wade  wrote  : 
"They  seem  to  be  in  some  accordance  with  the  overture  made  by 
Runjeet  Singh  to  Dost  Mahomed  before  Captain  Burnes's  arrival  at 
Caubul,  as  reported  in  my  despatch  of  the  8th  of  August  last,  and 
appear,  as  far  as  I  can  judge  of  them  at  present,  to  be.  more  reasonable 
than  his  former  overtures,  though  the  Maharajah's  opinion  of  their 
operation  on  the  Peshawur  branch  of  the  family  remains  to  be  disclosed. 
I  am  ready,  with  the  sanction  of  the  Governor-General,  to  commuuicate 
the  proposition  now  made  to  Runjeet  Singh,  and  to  support  by  every 
argument  that  I  can  use  the  expediency  of  its  acceptance  by  him." — 
[Caj^tain  Wade  to  Mr.  Macnaghten,  March  3,  1838.] 


358  THE    SIMLAH   MANIFESTO. 

It  was  his  opinion,  that  if  the  consohdation  of  the 
country  were  to  be  attempted  at  all,  it  would  be  more 
expedient  to  support  the  claims  of  Shah  Soojah  than  of 
Dost  Mahomed ;  but  he  regarded  the  restoration  of  the 
Shah  only  as  a  last  resort,  and  would  rather  have  seen 
the  Barukzye  chiefe  left  quietly  in  their  own  possessions. 
Indeed,  in  the  very  letter  of  the  1st  of  January,  1838, 
on  which  so  much  stress  has  been  laid.  Captain  Wade, 
even  in  the  printed  version,  says  :  "  Shah  Soojah's  recog- 
nition could  only,  however,  be  justified  or  demanded 
of  us,  in  the  event  of  the  prostration  of  Herat  to  the 
Persian  Govermnent ; "  and  in  the  unprinted  portion  of 
this  letter  the  writer  says  :  "I  can  see  nothing  in  the 
state  of  parties  at  present  in  the  Punjab  to  deter  us 
from  pursuing  a  line  of  policy "  (in  Afghanistan),  "  eveiy 
way  consistent  with  our  engagements,  our  reputation, 
and  our  interests — ^viz.,  that  of  recognising  the  present 
holders  of  power,  and  discouraging  any  ambitious  schemes 
of  one  party  to  the  detriment  of  another."  And  in 
conclusion.  Captain  Wade  sums  up  what  he  believes  to 
be  the  true  policy  of  the  British,  declaring  that  "if 
Dost  Mahomed  is  kept,  as  he  now  is,  at  Caubul,  whether 
as  a  Governor  of  the  province,  under  Shah  Soojah,  or 
in  independence  of  him,  and  Peshawur  be  restored  to 
Sultan  Mahomed,  or  remain  as  at  present,  we  might 
not  only  be  safe  from  disturbances,  or  any  sudden  inroads 
from  the  western  powers,  but  be  enabled  to  secure  the 
integrity  of  the  Sikh  nation  as  far  as  the  Indus,  and 
would  mould  these  people  and  their  already  more  than 
half-disciplined  troops  to  our  wishes."*  Captain  Wade 
over-estimated  the  popularity  of  Shah  Soojah.  He  was 
in  constant  receipt  of  information  to  the  effect  that  the 

*  Captain  Wade  to  Mr.  Macnaghten :  MS.  Records.  Captain 
Wade's  letters  have  been  garbled  almost  as  shamelessly  as  Captain 
Burnes's. 


SIR    HENRY    FANE.  359 

Douranees  and  other  tribes  were  eager  for  his  return  ; 
and  he  did  not,  perhaps,  sufficiently  consider  that  the 
Afghans  always  long  for  what  they  have  not,  and  are 
seldom  unripe  for  revolution.  But  although  he  believed 
it  would  be  safer  to  attempt  to  re-establish  the  integrity 
of  Afghanistan  under  Shah  Soojah  than  under  Dost 
Mahomed,  he  thought  that  it  would  be  better  policy  still 
to  leave  untouched  the  disunion  and  antagonism  of  the 
Barukzye  Sirdars. 

Such,  read  by  the  light  of  their  unmutilated  despatches, 
were  the  genuine  opinions  of  Bumes  and  "Wade.  But 
the  Simlah  Council  had  more  ambitious  views,  and  were 
disposed  towards  more  extensive  plans  of  operation.  First 
one  project,  then  another,  had  been  discussed.  It  had 
been  debated,  firstly,  whether  the  movement  on  Can- 
dahar  could  be  undertaken  by  the  Shah's  raw  levies, 
supported  only,  as  originally  intended,  by  a  British  army 
of  reserve  at  Shikarpoor ;  and  secondly,  whether  some 
two  or  three  regiments  of  British  troops  would  not  be 
sufficient  to  escort  the  Shah's  army  into  the  heart  of 
his  old  dominions.  Both  of  these  projects  were  aban- 
doned. 

Sir  Henry  Fane  was  at  this  time  commander-in-chief 
of  the  British  forces  in  India.  He  had  pitched  his  tent 
at  Simlah,  and  was  in  frequent  consultation  with  the 
Governor-General.  He  was  a  fine  old  soldier  of  the  Tory 
school,  with  very  strong  opinions  regarding  the  general 
"shabbiness"  of  all  Whig  doings,  and  a  strenuous  dis- 
like of  half-measures,  especially  in  military  affiiirs.  It  is 
believed  that  he  did  not  approve  of  the  genei*al  policy 
of  British  interference  in  the  affairs  of  Afghanistan,*  but 

*  In  1837,  he  had  written  to  Sir  Charles  Metcalfe,  "Every  advance 
you  might  make  beyond  the  Sutlej  to  the  Westward,  in  my  opinion  adds 

to  your  military  weakness If  you  want  your  empire  to  expand, 

expand  it  over  Oude  or  over  Gwalior,  and  the  remains  of  the  Mahratta 


360  THE   SIMLAH  MANIFESTO. 

he  was  entirely  of  opinion  that  it  was  the  duty  of 
government,  in  the  conjuncture  that  had  arisen,  either 
not  to  interfere  at  all,  or  to  interfere  in  such  a  manner 
as  to  secure  the  success  of  our  operations.  Always  by 
nature  inclined  towards  moderate  measures,  the  Governor- 
General  for  some  time  resisted  the  urgent  recommendations 
of  those  who  spoke  of  the  formation  of  a  grand  army, 
drawTi  from  our  own  regular  establishment,  to  be  headed 
by  the  commander-in-chief  in  person,  and  marched  upon 
Candahar,  perhaps  upon  Herat  itself  But  Lord  Auckland 
was  never  the  most  resolute  of  men.  His  own  confidential 
advisers  had  long  been  endeavouring  to  convince  him  of 
the  necessity  of  adopting  more  vigorous  measures.  The 
commander-in-chief  was  not  only  recommending  such 
measures,  but  insisting  upon  his  right,  as  the  first  military 
authority  in  the  country,  to  determine  the  number  of 
British  troops  to  be  employed,  and  the  manner  of  their 
employment.  And  the  ministers  of  the  Crown,  fortified 
by  the  knowledge  that  the  expenses  of  the  war  would  fall 
upon  the  treasury  of  the  East  India  Company,  and  that 
they  would  not  be  called  by  the  British  people  to  account 
for  any  expenditure,  however  lavish,  upon  remote  warlike 
operations,  which  the  public  might  easily  be  persuaded  to 
regard  as  the  growth  of  the  most  consummate  wisdom, 
were  exhorting  Lord  Auckland  to  adopt  effectual  measures 
for  the  counteraction  of  Russian  intrigue  and  Persian 
hostility  in  the  countries  of  Afghanistan.  So,  after  some 
weeks  of  painful  oscillation,  Lord  Auckland  yielded  his 
own  judgment  to  the  judgment  of  others,  and  an  order 
went  forth  for  the  assembling  of  a  grand  armj  on  the 
frontier,  to  be  set  in  motion  early  in  the  coming  col^ 


empire.  Make  yourselves  complete  sovereigns  of  all  within  your 
bounds.  But  let  alone  the  Far  West." — [Life  of  Lord  MetcalfCf 
Vol.  ii.  p.  306.] 


ASSEMBLING   OF   THE  ARMY.  361 

weather,  in  support  of  Shah  Soojah  and  his  levies;  to 
cross  the  Indus ;  and  to  march  upon  Candahar. 

In  August,  the  regiments  selected  by  the  commander- 
in-chief  were  warned  for  field-service,  and  on  the  13th 
of  September  he  published  a  general  order,  brigading 
the  different  components  of  the  force,  naming  the  staff- 
officers  appointed,  and  ordering  the  whole  to  rendezvous 
at  Kumaul.  The  reports,  which  all  through  the  dry 
summer  months  had  been  flitting  about  from  cantonment 
to  cantonment,  and  making  the  pulses  of  military  aspirants, 
old  and  young,  beat  rapidly  with  the  fever  of  expectancy, 
now  took  substantial  shape ;  and  everywhere  the  approach- 
ing expedition  became  the  one  topic  of  conversation.  Peace 
had  reigned  over  India  for  so  many  years,  that  the  excite- 
ment of  the  coming  contest  was  as  novel  as  it  was  inspirit- 
ing. There  was  not  an  officer  in  the  army  who  did  not 
long  to  join  the  invading  force  ;  and  many  from  the 
distant  Presidency,  or  from  remote  provincial  stations, 
leaving  the  quiet  staff-appointments  which  had  lapped 
them  long  in  ease  and  luxury,  rushed  upwards  to  join 
their  regiments.  Even  in  that  unpropitious  season  of 
the  year,  when  the  country  was  flooded  by  the  periodical 
rains,  corps  were  set  in  motion  towards  Kurnaul,  from 
stations  as  low  down  as  Benares,  and  struggled  manfully, 
often  through  wide  sheets  of  water,  to  their  destination 
at  the  gi'eat  northern  rallying  point.  There  had  been  no 
such  excitement  in  military  circles  since  the  grand  army 
assembled  for  the  reduction  of  Bhurtpore ;  and  though 
the  cause  was  not  a  popular  one,  and  there  was  scarcely  a 
mess-table  in  the  country  at  which  the  political  bearings 
of  the  invasion  of  Afghanistan  were  discussed  without 
eliciting  the  plainest  possible  indications  that  the  sym- 
pathies of  om:  officers  were  rather  with  the  Barukzye 
chief  than  the  Suddozye  monarch,  there  was  everywhere 
the  liveliest  desire  to  join  the  ranks  of  an  army  that  was 


362  THE   SIMLAH   MANIFESTO. 

to  traverse  new  and  almost  fabulous  regions,  and  visit  the 
scenes  rendered  famous  bj  the  exploits  of  Mahmoud  of 
Ghuzni  and  Nadir  Shah, 

The  army  now  warned  for  field-service  consisted  of 
a  brigade  of  artillery,  a  brigade  of  cavalry,  and  five 
brigades  of  infantry.  Colonel  Graham  was  to  command 
the  artillery ;  Colonel  Arnold  the  cavalry ;  whilst  the 
brigades  of  infantry  were  assigned  respectively  to  Colonels 
Sale  and  Dennis,  of  the  Queen's ;  and  Colonels  Nott, 
Roberts,  and  Worseley,  of  the  Company's  service.  The 
infantry  brigades  were  told  off  into  two  divisions  under 
Sir  Willoughby  Cotton,  an  old  and  distinguished  officer 
of  the  Queen's  army,  who  had  rendered  good  service 
in  the  Burmese  war,  and  was  now  commanding  the 
Presidency  division  of  the  Bengal  army,  and  Major- 
General  Duncan,  an  esteemed  officer  of  the  Company's 
service,  who  was  then  in  command  of  the  Sirhind  division 
of  the  army,  and  was  therefore  on  the  spot  to  take  the 
immediate  management  of  details. 

The  regiments  now  ordered  to  assemble  were  her 
Majesty's  16th  Lancers,  13th  Infantry,  and  3rd  Buffs; 
the  Company's  European  regiment ;  two  regiments  of 
Native  light  cavalry,  and  twelve  picked  Sepoy  corps.* 
Two  troops  of  horse  artillery  and  three  companies  of 
foot,  constituted  the  artillery  brigade  ;  and  some  details 
of  sappers  and  miners,  under  Captain  Thomson,  com- 
pleted the  Bengal  force.  The  usual  staff'-departments 
were   formed  to   accompany   the   army,t   the    heads   of 

*  The  2nd,  5tli,  16tli,  27tli,  28tli,  31st,  35th,  37th,  42nd,  43rd, 
48  th,  and  53rd  regiments. 

+  The  principal  staff-officers  were  Major  P,  Craigie,  Deputy  Adju- 
tant-General ;  Major  W.  Garden,  Deputy  Quartermaster-General  ; 
Major  J.  D.  Parsons,  Deputy  Commissary-General  ;  Major  Hough, 
Deputy  Advocate-General ;  and  Major  T.  Byrne,  Assistant  Adjutant- 
General  of  Queen's  Troops. 


COMPONENTS   OP   THE   ARMY.  363 

departments  remaining  in  the  Presidency  whilst  their 
deputies  accompanied  the  forces  into  the  field. 

Whilst  the  Bengal  army  was  assembling  "iDn  the  northern 
frontier  of  India,  under  the  personal  command  of  Sir 
Henry  Fane,  another  force  was  being  collected  at  Bombay. 
It  was  composed  of  a  brigade  of  cavalry,  including  her 
Majesty's  4th  Dragoons,  a  brigade  of  artillery,  and  a 
brigade  of  foot,  consisting  of  two  Queen's  regiments 
(the  2nd  Royals  and  17th  Foot)  and  one  Sepoy  coi-ps. 
Major-General  Thackwell  commanded  the  cavalry ;  Major- 
General  Wiltshire  the  infantry ;  and  Colonel  Stevenson 
the  artillery  brigade.  Sir  John  Keane,  the  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  Bombay  army,  took  command  of  the 
whole. 

Such  was  the  extent  of  the  British  force  w^amed  for 
field-service  in  the  autumn  of  1838.  At  the  same  time 
another  force  was  being  raised  for  service  across  the 
Indus — the  force  that  was  to  be  led  by  Shah  Soojah  into 
Afghanistan  ;  that  was  to  be  known  distinctively  as  his 
force ;  but  to  be  raised  in  the  Company's  territories,  to  be 
commanded  by  the  Company's  officers,  and  to  be  paid  by 
the  Company's  coin. 

To  this  army  was  to  have  been  entrusted  the  wtjrk  of 
re-establishing  the  authority  of  the  Suddozye  Princes  in 
Western  Afghanistan  ;  but  it  had  now  sunk  into  a  mere 
appendage  to  the  regular  army  which  the  British-Indian 
Government  was  about  to  despatch  across  the  Indus  ;  and 
it  was  plain  that,  whatever  opposition  was  to  be  encoun- 
tered, the  weight  of  it  would  faU,  not  upon  Shah  Soojah's 
raw  levies,  but  upon  the  disciplined  troops  of  the  Indian 
army  that  were  to  be  sent  with  them,  to  secure  the  suc- 
cess of  the  otherwise  doubtful  campaign.  Whatever  work 
there  might  be  in  store  for  them,  the  recruiting  went  on 
bravely.  For  this  new  service  there  was  no  lack  of  candi- 
dates in  the  Upper  Provinces  of  India.     The  Shah  himself 


364  THE   SIMLAH   MANIFESTO. 

watched  with  eager  pride  the  formation  of  the  army  which 
was  to  surround  him  on  his  return  to  his  own  dominions, 
but  was  fearful  lest  the  undisguised  assumption  of  entire 
control  by  the  British  officers  appointed  to  raise  his  new 
regiments  should  deprive  him  of  all  the  eclat  of  indepen- 
dence with  which  he  was  so  anxious  to  invest  his  move- 
ments. It  was,  indeed,  no  easy  matter,  at  this  time,  to 
shape  our  measures  in  accordance  with  the  conflicting 
desires  of  the  old  king,  who  wished  to  have  everything 
done  for  him,  and  yet  to  appear  as  though  he  did  it 
himself.  To  Captain  Wade  was  entrusted  the  difficult 
and  delicate  duty  of  managing  one  who,  by  nature  not 
the  most  reasonable  of  men,  was  rendered  doubly  unrea- 
sonable by  the  anomalous  position  in  which  he  found 
himself  after  the  ratification  of  the  tripartite  treaty.  It 
was  difficult,  indeed,  to  say  what  he  was  at  this  time. 
At  Loodhianah  he  had  hitherto  been  simply  a  private 
individual.  He  had  held  no  recognised  position.  He 
had  been  received  with  no  public  honours.  He  had 
gone  hither  and  thither,  almost  unnoticed.  He  had  ex- 
cited little  interest,  and  met  with  little  attention.  Some, 
perhaps,  knew  that  he  had  once  been  an  Afghan  monarch, 
and  that  he  received  four  thousand  rupees  a  month  from 
the  British  Government  as  a  reward  for  his  incapacity  and 
a  compensation  for  his  bad  fortune.  Beyond  this  little  was 
known  and  nothing  was  cared.  But  now,  suddenly  he, 
had  risen  up  from  the  dust  of  Loodhianah  as  a  recog- 
nised sovereign  and  framer  of  treaties — a  potentate  meet- 
ing on  equal  terms  with  the  British  Government  and 
the  Maharajah  of  the  Punjab.  He  could  not  any  longer 
be  regarded  as  a  mere  tradition.  He  had  been  brought 
prominently  forward  into  the  light  of  the  Present ;  and 
it  was  necessary  that  he  should  now  assume  in  men's 
eyes  something  of 'the  form  of  royalty  and  the  substance 
of  power. 


POSITION    OF   SHAH   SOOJAH.  365 

It  was  natural  that,  thus  strangely  and  embarrassingly 
situated,  the  Shah  should  have  earnestly  desired  to  bring 
his  sojourn  at  Loodhianah  to  a  close,  and  to  launch  him- 
self fairly  upon  his  new  enterprise.  The  interval  between 
the  signing  of  the  treaty  and  the  actual  commencement 
of  the  expedition  was  irksome  in  the  extreme  to  the 
expectant  monarch.  It  was  plain  that  he  could  not  move 
without  his  army  ;  he  therefore  did  his  best  to  expedite 
its  information.  Constantly  attending  the  parade  where 
the  work  of  recruiting  was  going  on,  he  desired  personally 
to  superintend  both  the  payment  and  the  enlistment  of 
his  men  ;  and  was  fearful  lest  a  belief  should  become  rooted 
in  the  public  mind  that  he  was  not  about  to  return  to  Af- 
ghanistan as  an  independent  Prince,  ruling  his  own  people 
on  his  own  account.  The  tact  and  discretion  of  Captain 
Wade  smoothed  down  all  difficulties.  Whilst  preventing 
such  interference  on  the  part  of  Shah  Soojah  as  might  em- 
ban-ass  the  movements  of  the  British  officers  appointed 
to  raise  and  discipline  his  regiments,  he  contrived  to 
reconcile  the  mind  of  the  King  to  the  system  in  force  by 
directing  that  certain  reports  should  be  made  to  him  on 
parade,  and  at  other  times  through  an  appointed  agent, 
of  the  number  of  men  enlisted  into  his  service,  and  the 
amount  of  pay  that  was  due  to  each.*  At  the  same  time, 
it  was  suggested  to  the  commanding  officer  of  the  station 
that,  as  one  entitled  to  the  recognitions  due  to  royalty, 
the  Shah  should  be  saluted  by  the  troops  when  he  ap- 
peared in  public.  The  suggestion  was  promptly  acted 
upon ;  and  the  King,  whose  inveterate  love  of  forais  and 
ceremonies  clung  to  him  to  the  end  of  his  days,  rejoiced 
in  these  new  demonstrations  of  respect,  and  bore  up  till 
his  time  of  trial  was  over. 

In  the  meanwhile  Lord  Auckland,  having  thus  mapped 

*  Captain  Wade  to  Mr.  Macnagkten,  Loodhianah,  September  2Brd, 
1838  :  MS.  Records. 


366  THE   SIMLAH   MANIFESTO.  « 

out  a  far  more  extensive  scheme  of  invasion  than  had  ever 
been  dreamt  of,  a  few  months  before,  in  his  most  specula- 
tive moments,  was  thinking  of  the  agency  w^hich  it  was 
most  desirable  to  employ  for  the  political  management  of 
the  ensuing  campaign.  It  had  been  determined  that  a 
British  Envoy  should  accompany  Runjeet  Singh's  army 
by  the  Peshawur  route,  and  that  another  should  accom- 
pany Shah  Soojah's  camp  on  its  march  towards  the  western 
provinces  of  Afghanistan.  There  was  no  difficulty  in 
naming  the  officer  who  was  to  superintend  the  demon- 
stration to  be  made  by  the  Sikh  troops  through  the  for- 
midable passes  of  the  Khybur.  Captain  Wade  was 
nominated  to  this  office.  He  was  to  be  accompanied  by 
the  eldest  son  of  Shah  Soojah,  the  Prince  Timour,  a  man 
of  respectable  character,  but  not  very  brilliant  parts, 
whose  presence  was  to  identify  the  Sikh  movement  with 
the  immediate  objects  of  his  father's  restoration,  and  to 
make  obvious  to  the  understandings  of  all  men  that 
Runjeet  Singh  was  acting  only  as  Shah  Soojah's  ally. 

But  it  was  not  so  easy  to  determine  to  whom  should  be 
entrusted  the  difficult  and  responsible  duty  of  directing 
the  mind  of  Shah  Soojah,  and  shaping,  in  all  beyond  the 
immediate  line  of  military  operations,  the  course  of  this 
great  campaign.  It  seemed  at  first  that  the  claims  of 
Alexander  Burnes  could  not  be  set  aside.  No  man  knew 
the  country  and  the  people  so  well ;  no  man  had  so  fairly 
earned  the  right  to  be  thus  employed.  But  it  soon 
appeared  to  Burnes  himself,  sanguine  as  he  was,  that  Lord 
Auckland  designed  to  place  him  in  a  subordinate  position; 
and  chafing  under  what  appeared  to  him  a  slight  and  an 
injustice,  he  declared  that  he  would  either  take  the  chief 
place  in  the  British  Mission,  or  go  home  to  England  in 
disgust.*     But  these  feelings  soon  passed  away.     It  had 

*  "We  are  now  planning  a  grand  campaign,"  he  wrote  on  the  22nd 
of  July,  "to  restore  the  Shah  to  the  throne  of  Caubul —Russia  having 


CHOICE    OF   AN   ENVOY.  367 

been  debated  whether  the  chief  pohtical  control  should 
not  be  placed  m  the  hands  of  the  commander-in-chief; 
and  Sir  Henry  Fane,  natiu-ally  favouring  an  arrangement 
which  would  have  left  him  free  to  act  as  his  own  judgment 
or  his  own  impulses  might  dictate,  wished  to  take  Burnes 
with  him  as  his  confidential  adviser.  But  this  plan  met 
with  little  or  no  encouragement.  The  Governor- General 
appreciated  Burnes's  talents,  but  mistrusted  his  discretion. 
He  thought  it  advisable  to  place  at  the  stirrup  of  Shah 
Soojah  an  older  head  and  a  steadier  hand.  Men,  who  at 
this  time  watched  calmly  the  progress  of  events,  and  had 
no  prejudices  and  predilections  to  gratify,  and  no  personal 
objects  to  serve,  thought  that  the  choice  of  the  Governor- 
come  down  upon  us.  What  exact  part  I  am  to  play  I  know  not,  but 
if  full  confidence  and  hourly  consultation  be  any  pledge,  I  am  to  be 
chief.  I  can  plainly  telL  them  that  it  is  aut  Coesar  aut  nullus,  and  if  I 
get  not  what  I  have  a  right  to,  you  will  soon  see  me  en  route  to  England." 
On  the  23rd  of  August  he  wrote  :  "  Of  myself  I  cannot  tell  you  what  is  to 
become.  The  commander-in-chief  wants  to  go  and  to  take  me — but  this 
will  not  be,  and  I  believe  the  chief  and  Macnaghten  will  be  made  a  com- 
mission— Wade  and  myself  political  agents  under  them.  I  plainly  told 
Lord  Auckland  that  this  does  not  please,  and  I  am  disappointed.  He 
replied  that  I  could  scarcely  be  appointed  with  the  chief  in  equality, 
and  pledged  himself  to  leave  me  independent  quickly,  and  in  the  highest 
appointment.  What  can  I  do  when  he  tells  me  I  am  a  man  he  cannol 
spare.  It  is  an  honour,  not  a  disgrace  to  go  under  Sir  Henry  ;  and  as 
for  Macnaghten,  he  is  secretary  for  all  India,  and  goes  pi'o  tern.  Be- 
sides, I  am  not  sorry  to  see  Dost  Mahomed  ousted  by  another  hand 
than  mine." — [Private  Correspondence  of  Sir  A.  Burnes.]  These 
letters  were  written  to  his  brother.  In  another  letter  addressed  to 
Captain  Duncan,  also  on  the  23rd  of  August,  Burnes  wrote  :  "Of  my 
own  destinies,  even,  I  cannot  as  yet  give  an  account.  I  go  as  a  Po- 
litical Agent  with  the  Shah,  but  whether  as  tJie  Political  Agent  remains 
to  be  seen.  I  find  I  bask  in  favour,  but  Sir  Henry  Fane  is  to  go,  and 
he  must  be  the  Agent ;  but  it  is  even  hinted  that  they  will  place  a 
civilian  with  him,  and  employ  me  in  advance.     Be  it  so.     I  succeed  to 

the  permanent  employ  after  all  is  over The  chief  wishes  to  go, 

and  to  take  me  with  him,  and  I  am  highly  obliged  for  his  appreciation." 
— [Pnvate  Correspondence  of  Sir  A.  Burnes  :  MS.'[ 


368  THE   SIMLAH  MANIFESTO. 

General  would  fall  upon  Colonel  Henry  Pottinger,  who 
had  been  familiar  from  early  youth  with  the  countries 
beyond  the  Indus,  and  was  now  in  charge  of  our  political 
relations  with  the  Court  of  Hyderabad,  in  Sindh.  But 
Lord  Auckland  had  no  personal  knowledge  of  Colonel 
Pottinger.  There  was  little  identity  of  opinion  between 
them;  and  the  Governor- General  recognised  the  expediency 
of  appointing  to  such  an  office  a  functionary  with  whom 
he  had  been  in  habitual  intercourse,  who  was  necessarily, 
therefore,  conversant  with  his  views,  and  who  would  not 
scruple  to  carry  them  out  to  the  utmost. 

The  choice  fell  on  Mr.  Macnaghten.  It  seems,  at  one 
time,  to  have  been  the  design  of  the  Governor-General  to 
associate  this  gentleman  with  the  Commander-in-Chief,  in 
a  kind  of  Commission  for  the  management  of  our  political 
relations  throughout  the  coming  expedition;*  but  this 
idea  seems  to  have  been  abandoned.  It  was  finally  deter- 
mined that  Mr.  W.  H.  Macnaghten  should  be  gazetted  as 
"  Envoy  and  Minister  on  the  part  of  the  Government  of 
India  at  the  Court  of  Shah  Soojah-ool-Moolk."  And  at 
the  same  time  it  was  resolved  that  Captain  Bumes  should 
be  employed,  "under  Mr.  Macnaghten' s  directions,  as 
Envoy  to  the  chief  of  Kelat  or  other  states."  It  was 
believed,  at  this  time,  that  Shah  Soojah  having  been 
reseated  on  the  throne,  Macnaghten  would  return  to 
Hindostan,  leaving  Bumes  at  Caubul,  as  the  permanent 
representative  of  the  British-Indian  Government  at  the 
Court  of  the  Shah.  It  was  this  belief  that  reconciled 
Burnes  to  the  subordinate  office  which  was  conferred  upon 
him  in  the  first  instance,  and  made  him  set  about  the 
work  entrusted  to  his  charge  with  all  the  zeal  and  enthu- 
siasm which  were  so  conspicuous  in  his  character.! 

*  See  Bumes' s  correspondence,  quoted  in  a  preceding  note. 
+  Lord  Auckland,  with  characteristic  bindliness,  exerted  himself  to 
allay  any  feelings  of  mortification  that  may  have  welled  up  in  Burnes'a 


THE   SIMLAH   MANIFESTO.  369 

And  so  Biirnes  was  sent  on  in  advance  to  smooth  the 
way  for  the  progi-ess  of  the  Shah  through  Sindh,  whilst 
Macnaghten  remained  at  Simlah  to  assist  the  Governor- 
General  in  the  preparation  of  the  great  official  manifesto 
which  was  to  declare  to  all  the  nations  of  the  East  and  of 
the  West  the  grounds  upon  which  the  British  Government 
had  determined  to  destroy  the  power  of  the  Barukzye 
Sirdars,  and  to  restore  Shah  Soojah-ool-Moolk  to  the 
throne  of  his  ancestors. 

On  the  1st  of  October  the  manifesto,  long  and  anxiously 
pondered  over  in  the  bureau  of  the  Governor-General, 
received  the  official  signature  and  was  sent  to  the  press. 
Never,  since  the  English  in  India  first  began  the  work 
of  King-making,  had  a  more  remarkable  document  issued 
from  the  council-chamber  of  an  Anglo-Indian  viceroy.  It 
ran  in  the  following  words,  not  one  of  which  should  be 
omitted  from  such  a  narrative  as  this  : 

DECLARATION  ON  THE  PART  OF  THE  RIGHT 
HONOURABLE  THE  GOVERNOR-GENERAL  OF  INDIA. 

Simlah,  October y  1,  1838. 
The  Right  Hon.  the  Governor-General  of  India  having,  with  the 
concurrence  of  the  Supreme  Council,  directed  the  assemblage  of  a 
British  force  for  service  across  the  Indus,  his  Lordship  deems  it 


mind  ;  and  the  latter  wisely  revoked  his  determination  to  be  aut  Ccesar 
aut  nullus.  The  extracts  from  Burnes's  letters,  given  in  a  preceding 
note,  explain  the  motives  that  induced  him  to  forego  his  original  re- 
solve ;  and  the  following  passage,  from  another  private  letter,  shows 
still  more  plainly  the  feelings  with  which  he  regarded  the  considerate 
conduct  of  the  Governor- General,  of  whom  he  writes  :  '  *  '  I  mean, 
therefore,'  continued  he  (Lord  Auckland),  'to  gazette  you  as  a  Political 
Commissioner  to  Kelat,  and  when  the  army  crosses,  to  regard  you  as 
an  independent  political  officer  to  co-operate  with  Macnaghten.'  Nothing 
could  be  more  delicately  kind,  for  I  have  permission,  if  I  like,  to  send 
an  assistant  to  Kelat.  I  start  in  a  week,  and  drop  doMm  the  Indus  to 
Shikarpoor,  where,  with  a  brace  of  Commissaries,  I  prepare  for  the 
advance  of  the  army  and  the  disbursement  of  many  lakhs  of  rupees.     I 

VOL.  I.  B  B 


370  -THE   SIMLAH   MANIFESTO, 

proper  to  publish  the  following  exposition  of  the  reasons  which  have 
led  to  this  important  measure. 

It  is  a  matter  of  notoriety  that  the  treaties  entered  into  by  the 
British  Government  in  the  year  1832,  with  the  Ameers  of  Sindh,  the 
Newab  of  Bhawalpore,  and  Maharajah  Runjeet  Singh,  had  for  their 
object,  by  opening  the  navigation  of  the  Indus,  to  facilitate  the 
extension  of  commercce,  and  to  gain  for  the  British  nation  in 
Central  Asia  that  legitimate  influence  which  an  interchange  of 
benefits  would  naturally  produce. 

With  a  view  to  invite  the  aid  of  the  de  facto  rulers  of  Afghanistan 
to  the  measures  necessary  for  giving  full  effect  to  those  treaties, 
Captain  Burnes  was  deputed,  towards  the  close  of  the  year  1836,  on 
a  mission  to  Dost  Mahomed  Khan,  the  chief  of  Caubul.  The 
original  objects  of  that  officer's  mission  were  purely  of  a  commercial 
nature.  Whilst  Captain  Burnes,  however,  was  on  his  journey  to 
Caubul,  information  was  received  by  the  Governor-General  that  the 
troops  of  Dost  Mahomed  Khan  had  made  a  sudden  and  unprovoked 
attack  on  those  of  our  ancient  ally,  Maharajah  Runjeet  Singh.  It 
was  naturally  to  be  apprehended  that  his  Highness  the  Maharajah 
would  not  be  slow  to  avenge  the  aggression  ;  and  it  was  to  be  feai'ed 
that,  the  flames  of  war  being  once  kindled  in  the  very  regions  into 
which  we  were  endeavouring  to  extend  our  commerce,  the  peaceful 
and  beneficial  purposes  of  the  British  Government  would  be  alto- 
gether frustrated.  In  order  to  avert  a  result  so  calamitous,  the 
Governor-General  resolved  on  authorising  Captain  Burnes  to  intimate 
to  Dost  Mahomed  Khan,  that  if  he  should  evince  a  disposition  to 
come  to  just  and  reasonable  terms  with  the  Maharajah,  his  Lordship 
would  exert  his  good  offices  with  his  Highness  for  the  restoration  of 
an  amicable  understanding  between  the  two  powers.  The  Maha- 
rajah, with  the  characteristic  confidence  which  he  has  uniformly 
placed  in  the  faith  and  friendship  of  the  British  nation,  at  once 
assented  to  the  proposition  of  the  Governor-General,  to  the  efiect 
that,  in  the  mean  time,  hostilities  on  his  part  should  be  suspended. 

It  subsequently  came  to  the  knowledge  of  the  Governor-Genei-al 
that  a  Persian  army  was  besieging  Herat;  that  intrigues  were 
actively  prosecuted  throughout  Afghanistan,  for  the  purpose  of 
extending  Persian  influence  and  authority  to  the  banks  of,  and  even 


care  not  for  the  responsibility  ;  I  am  firm  in  the  saddle,  and  have  all 
confidence.  I  think  you  will  hear  the  result  of  my  negotiation  to  be, 
that  the  British  flag  flies  at  Bukkur." — [^Private  Coirrespoivdence  of 
Sir  A.  Burries.] 


THE    SIMLAH   MANIFESTO.  371 

beyond,  the  Indus  ;  and  that  the  Court  of  Persia  had  not  only  com- 
menced a  course  of  injuiy  and  insult  to  the  officers  of  her  Majesty's 
Mission  in  the  Persian  territory,  but  had  afforded  evidence  of  being 
engaged  in  designs  wholly  at  variance  with  the  principles  and 
objects  of  its  alliance  with  Great  Britain. 

After  much  time  spent  by  Captain  Barnes  in  fruitless  negotiation 
at  Caubul,  it  appeared  that  Dost  Mahomed  Khan,  chiefly  in  con- 
sequence of  his  reliance  upon  Persian  encouragement  and  assistance, 
persisted,  as  respected  his  misundei'standing  vsdth  the  Sikhs,  in 
urging  the  most  unreasonable  pretensions,  such  as  the  Governor- 
General  could  not,  consistently  with  justice  and  his  regard  for  the 
friendship  of  Mahai-ajah  Runjeet  Singh,  be  the  channel  of  submitting 
to  the  consideration  of  his  Highness;  that  he  avowed  schemes  of 
aggrandisement  and  ambition  injurious  to  the  security  and  peace  of 
the  frontiers  of  India ;  and  that  he  openly  threatened,  in  further- 
ance of  those  schemes,  to  call  in  every  foreign  aid  which  he  coixld 
command.  Ultimately  he  gave  his  undisguised  support  to  the 
Persian  designs  in  Afghanistan,  of  the  unfriendly  and  injurious  cha- 
racter of  which,  as  concerned  the  British  power  in  India,  he 
was  well  apprised,  and  by  his  utter  disregard  of  the  views  and 
interests  of  the  British  Government,  compelled  Captain  Burnes 
to  leave  Caubul  without  having  effected  any  of  the  objects  of  his 
mission. 

It  was  now  evident  that  no  further  interference  could  be  exer- 
cised by  the  British  Government  to  bring  about  a  good  under- 
standing between  the  Sikh  ruler  and  Dost  Mahomed  Khan,  and  the 
hostile  policy  of  the  latter  chief  showed  too  plainly  that,  so  long  as 
Caubul  remained  under  his  government,  we  could  never  hope  that 
the  tranquillity  of  our  neighbourhood  would  be  secured,  or  that  the 
interests  of  our  Indian  Empire  would  be  preserved  inviolate. 

The  Governor-General  deems  it  in  this  place  necessary  to  revert 
to  the  siege  of  Herat,  and  the  conduct  of  the  Persian  nation.  The 
siege  of  that  city  has  now  been  carried  on  by  the  Persian  army  for 
many  months.  The  attack  upon  it  was  a  most  unjustifiable  and 
cruel  aggression,  perpetrated  and  continued,  notwithstanding  the 
solemn  and  repeated  remonstrances  of  the  British  Envoy  at  the 
Court  of  Pei'sia,  and  after  every  just  and  becoming  offer  of  accom- 
modation had  been  made  and  rejected.  The  besieged  have  behaved 
with  a  gallantry  and  fortitude  worthy  of  the  justice  of  their  cause ; 
and  the  Governor-General  would  yet  indulge  the  hope  that  their 
heroism  may  enable  them  to  maintain  a  successful  defence,  until 
succours  shall  reach  them  from  British  India.    In  the  meantime, 


S72  THE   SIMLAH   MANIFESTO. 

the  ulterior  designs  of  Persia,  affecting  the  interests  of  the  British 
Government,  have  been,  by  a  succession  of  events,  more  and  more 
openly  manifested.  The  Governor-General  has  recently  ascertained 
by  an  official  despatch  from  Mr.  M'lSTeill,  her  Majesty's  Envoy,  that 
his  Excellency  has  been  compelled,  by  a  refusal  of  his  just  demands, 
and  by  a  systematic  course  of  disrespect  adopted  towards  him  by 
the  Persian  Government,  to  quit  the  Court  of  the  Shah,  and  to  make 
a  public  declaration  of  the  cessation  of  all  intercourse  between  the 
two  Governments.  The  necessity  under  which  Great  Britain  is 
placed  of  regarding  the  present  advance  of  the  Persian  arms  into 
Afghanistan  as  an  act  of  hostility  towards  herself,  has  also  been  offi- 
cially communicated  to  the  Shah,  under  the  express  order  of  her 
Majesty's  Government. 

The  chiefs  of  Candahar  (brothers  of  Dost  Mahomed  Khan  of 
Caubul)  have  avowed  their  adherence  to  the  Persian  policy,  with  the 
same  full  knowledge  of  its  opposition  to  the  rights  and  interests  of 
the  British  nation  in  India,  and  have  been  openly  assisting  in  the 
operations  against  Herat. 

In  the  crisis  of  affairs  consequent  upon  the  retirement  of  our 
Envoy  from  Caubul,  the  Governor-General  felt  the  importance  of 
taking  immediate  measures  for  arresting  the  rapid  progress  of  foreign 
intrigue  and  aggression  towards  our  own  territories. 

His  attention  was  naturally  drawn  at  this  conjuncture  to  the  posi- 
tion and  claims  of  Shah  Soojah-ool-Moolk,  a  monarch  who,  when  in 
power,  had  cordially  acceded  to  the  measures  of  united  resistance 
to  external  enmity,  which  were  at  that  time  judged  necessary  by 
the  British  Government,  and  who,  on  his  empire  being  usurped  by 
its  present  rulers,  had  found  an  honourable  asylum  in  the  British 
dominions. 

It  had  been  clearly  ascertained,  from  the  information  furnished 
by  the  various  officers  who  have  visited  Afghanistan,  that  the 
Barukzye  chiefs,  from  their  disunion  and  unpopularity,  were  ill 
fitted,  under  any  circumstances,  to  be  useful  allies  to  the  British 
Government,  and  to  aid  us  in  our  just  and  necessary  measures  of 
national  defence.  Yet  so  long  as  they  refrained  from  proceedings 
injurious  to  our  interests  and  security,  the  British  Government 
acknowledged  and  respected  their  authority ;  but  a  different  policy 
appeared  to  be  now  more  than  justified  by  the  conduct  of  those 
chiefs,  and  to  be  indispensable  to  our  own  safety.  The  welfare  of 
our  possessions  in  the  East  requires  that  we  should  have  on  our 
western  frontier  an  ally  who  is  interested  in  resisting  aggression,  and 
establishing  tranquillity,  in  the  place  of  chiefs  ranging  themselves  in 


THE    SIMLAH   MANIFESTO.  373 

Bub8ei*vience  to  a  hostile  power,  and  seeking  to  promote  schemes  of 
conquest  and  aggrandisement. 

After  serious  and  mature  deliberation,  the  Governor-Genei-al  was 
satisfied  that  a  pressing  necessity,  as  well  as  every  consideration  of 
policy  and  justice,  warranted  us  in  espousing  the  cause  of  Shah 
Soojah-ool-Moolk,  whose  popularity  throughout  Afghanistan  had 
been  proved  to  his  Lordship  by  the  strong  and  unanimous  testi- 
mony of  the  best  authorities.  Having  arrived  at  this  determination, 
the  Governor-General  was  further  of  opinion  that  it  was  just  and 
proper,  no  less  from  the  position  of  Maharajah  Runjeet  Singh,  than 
from  his  undeviating  friendship  towards  the  British  Government, 
that  his  Highness  should  have  the  offer  of  becoming  a  party  to  the 
contemplated  operations. 

Mr.  Macnaghten  was  accordingly  deputed  in  June  last  to  the 
Court  of  his  Highness,  and  the  result  of  his  mission  has  been  the 
conclusion  of  a  triplicate  treaty  by  the  British  Government,  the 
Maharajah,  and  Shah  Soojah-ool-Moolk,  whereby  his  Highness  is 
guaranteed  in  his  present  possessions,  and  has  bound  himself  to 
co-operate  for  the  restoration  of  the  Shah  to  the  throne  of  his 
ancestors.  The  friends  and  enemies  of  any  one  of  the  contracting 
parties  have  been  declared  to  be  the  friends  and  enemies  of  all. 

Various  points  have  been  adjusted,  which  had  been  the  subjects 
of  discussion  between  the  British  Government  and  his  Highness  the 
Maharajah,  the  identity  of  whose  interests  with  those  of  the 
Honourable  Company  has  now  been  made  apparent  to  all  the  sur- 
rounding States.  A  guaranteed  independence  will,  upon  favourable 
conditions,  be  tendered  to  the  Ameers  of  Sindh,  and  the  integrity 
of  Herat,  in  the  possession  of  its  present  ruler,  will  be  fully  re- 
spected ;  while  by  the  measures  completed,  or  in  progress,  it  may 
reasonably  be  hoped  that  the  general  freedom  and  security  of  com- 
merce will  be  promoted  ;  that  the  name  and  just  influence  of  the 
British  Government  will  gain  their  proper  footing  among  the 
nations  of  Central  Asia  ;  that  tranquillity  will  be  established  upon 
the  most  important  frontier  of  India ;  and  that  a  lasting  barrier 
will  be  raised  against  hostile  intrigue  and  encroachment. 

His  Majesty,  Shah  Soojah-ool-Moolk  will  enter  Afghanistan,  sur- 
rounded by  his  own  troops,  and  will  be  supported  against  foreign 
interference  and  factious  opposition  by  a  British  army.  The 
Governor-General  confidently  hopes  that  the  Shah  will  be  speedily 
replaced  on  his  throne  by  his  own  subjects  and  adherents;  and 
when  once  he  shall  be  secured  in  power,  and  the  independence  and 
integrity  of  Afghanistan  established,  the  British  army  will  be  with- 


374  THE    SIMLAH   MANIFESTO. 

drawn.  The  Governor-General  has  been  led  to  these  measures  by 
the  duty  which  is  imposed  upon  him  of  providing  for  the  security 
of  the  possessions  of  the  British  Crown ;  but,  he  rejoices  that,  in 
the  discharge  of  his  duty,  he  will  be  enabled  to  assist  in  restoring 
the  union  and  prosperity  of  the  Afghan  people.  Throughout  tlie 
approaching  operations,  British  influence  will  be  sedulously  em- 
ployed to  further  every  measure  of  general  benefit,  to  reconcile 
differences,  to  secure  oblivion  of  injuries,  and  to  put  an  end  to  the 
distractions  by  which,  for  so  many  years,  the  welfare  and  happi- 
ness of  the  Afghans  have  been  impaired.  Even  to  the  chiefs, 
whose  hostile  proceedings  have  given  just  cause  of  offence  to  the 
British  Government,  it  will  seek  to  secure  liberal  and  honoui-able 
treatment,  on  their  tendering  early  submission,  and  ceasing  from 
opposition  to  that  course  of  measures  which  may  be  judged  the 
most  suitable  for  the  general  advantage  of  their  country. 
By  order  of  the  Right  Hon.  Governor-General  of  India. 

W.  H.  Macnaghten, 
Secretary  to  the  Government  of  India,  with  the 
Governor- General . 


NOTIFICATION. 

With  reference  to  the  preceding  Declaration,  the  following  ap- 
pointments are  made : — Mr.  W.  H.  Macnaghten,  Secretary  to 
Government,  will  assume  the  functions  of  Envoy  and  Minister  on 
the  part  of  the  Government  of  India  at  the  Court  of  Shah  Soojah- 
ool-Moolk.  Mr.  Macnaghten  will  be  assisted  by  the  following 
officers  : — Captain  A.  Burnes,  of  the  Bombay  establishment,  who 
will  be  employed,  under  Mr.  Macnaghten's  directions,  as  Envoy  to 
the  Chief  of  Kelat,  or  other  States ;  Lieutenant  E.  d'Arcy  Todd, 
Bengal  Artillery,  to  be  Political  Assistant  and  Military  Secretary 
to  the  Envoy  and  Minister ;  Lieutenant  Eldred  Pottinger,  Bombay 
Artillery ;  Lieutenant  R.  Leech,  of  the  Bombay  Engineers ;  Mr. 
P.  B.  Lord,  of  the  Bombay  Medical  Establishment,  to  be  Political 
Assistants  to  ditto,  ditto ;  Lieutenant  E.  B,  Conolly,  6th  Bengal 
Cavalry,  to  command  the  escort  of  the  Envoy  and  Minister,  and 
to  be  Military  Assistant  to  ditto,  ditto;  Mr.  G.  J.  Berwick,  of  the 
Bengal  Medical  Establishment,  to  be  Surgeon  to  ditto,  ditto. 

W.  H.  Macnaghten, 
Secretary  to  the  Government  of  India,  with  the 
Governor-General. 


OPINIONS   OF   THE   MANIFESTO.  375 

It  was  not  to  be  supposed  that  such  a  manifesto  as 
this  could  be  published  in  every  newspaper  in  India  and 
in  Europe,  and  circulated,  in  an  Oriental  dress,  throughout 
all  the  states  of  Hindostan  and  the  adjoining  countries, 
without  provoking  the  keenest  and  the  most  searching 
criticism.  In  India  there  is,  in  reality,  no  Public ;  but  if 
such  a  name  can  be  given  to  the  handful  of  English 
gentlemen  who  discuss  with  little  reserve  the  affairs  of 
the  government  under  which  they  live,  the  public  looked 
askance  at  it — doubting  and  questioning  its  truth.  The 
Press  seized  upon  it  and  tore  it  to.  pieces.*  There  was 
not  a  sentence  in  it  that  was  not  dissected  with  an 
unsparing  hand.  If  it  were  not  pronounced  to  be  a 
collection  of  absolute  falsehoods,  it  was  described  as  a 
most  disingenuous  distortion  of  the  truth.  In  India 
every  war  is  more  or  less  popidar.  The  constitution  of 
Anglo- Indian  society  renders  it  almost  impossible  that  it 
should  be  otherwise.  But  many  wished  that  they  were 
about  to  draw  their  swords  in  a  better  cause  ;  and  openly 
criticised  the  Governor-General's  declaration,  whilst  they 
inwardly  rejoiced  that  it  had  been  issued. 

Had  the  relief  of  Herat  been  the  one  avowed  object  of 
the  expedition,  a  war  now  to  be  undertaken  for  that 
purpose  would  have  had  many  supporters,  t  The  move- 
ment might  have  been  a  wise,  or  it  might  have  been 
an  unwise  one ;  but  it  would  have  been  an  intelligible, 
straightforward  movement,  with  nothing  equivocal  about 

*  I  do  not  mean  that  the  entire  Press  of  India  and  England  con- 
demned it ;  but  I  believe  that,  at  the  time  it  had  very  few  genuine  sup- 
porters :  aad  I  know  that  now  it  has  fewer  still. 

+  Among  others  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  who  wrote  to  Mr.  Tucker : 
**I  don't  know  that  while  the  siege  of  Herat  continued,  particularly  by 
the  aid  of  Russian  officers  and  troops,  even  in  the  form  of  desertei-s,  the 
Government  of  India  could  have  done  otherwise  than  prepare  for  its  de- 
fence."— \_Life  and  Correspondence  of  Henry  St.  George  Tucker.'] 


376  THE   SIMLAH   MANIFESTO. 

it.  It  would  have  been  addressed  to  the  counteraction 
of  a  real,  or  supposed  danger,  and  would  have  been 
plainly  justifiable  as  a  measure  of  self-defence.  But  it 
was  not  equally  clear  that  because  Mahomed  Shah  made 
war  upon  Herat,  England  was  justified  in  making  war 
upon  Dost  Mahomed.  The  siege  of  Herat  and  the 
failure  of  the  Caubul  Mission  were  mixed  up  together  in 
Lord  Auckland's  manifesto  ;  but  with  all  his  own  and  his 
secretary's  ingenuity,  his  Lordship  could  not  contrive, 
any  more  than  I  have  contrived  in  this  narrative,  to  make 
the  two  events  hang  together  by  any  other  than  the 
slenderest  thread.  It  was  believed  at  this  time  that 
Herat  would  fall ;  and  that  Candahar  and  Caubul  would 
then  make  their  obeisance  to  Mahomed  Shah.  But  we 
had  ourselves  alienated  the  friendship  of  the  Barukzye 
Sirdars.  They  had  thrown  themselves  into  the  arms  of 
the  Persian  King,  only  because  we  had  thrust  them  off. 
We  had  forced  them  into  an  attitude  of  hostility  which 
they  were  unwilling  to  assume  ;  and  had  ourselves  aggra- 
vated the  dangers  which  we  were  now  about  to  face 
on  the  western  frontier  of  Afghanistan.  That  in  the 
summer  of  1838,  there  existed  a  state  of  things  calling 
for  active  measures  on  the  part  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment is  not  to  be  denied ;  but  I  believe  it  to  be  equally 
undeniable  that  this  state  of  things  was  mainly  induced 
by  the  feebleness  of  our  own  policy  towards  the  Barukzye 
Sirdars. 

The  comments  which  might  be  made  in  this  place  on 
Lord  Auckland's  Simlah  manifesto  have  been,  for  the 
most  part,  anticipated.  How  far  Dost  Mahomed  "per- 
sisted in  using  the  most  unreasonable  pretensions,"  and 
"avowed  schemes  of  aggrandisement  and  ambition,  in- 
jurious to  the  security  and  peace  of  the  frontiers  of 
India,"  I  have  shown  in  a  former  chapter.  I  have 
shown,  too,  how  far  the  best  authorities  were  of  opinion 


AUTHORSHIP    OF   THE    WAR.  377 

that  the  Banikzye  Sirdars  were  "ill-fitted,  under  any 
circumstances,  to  be  useful  allies  to  the  British."  *  Little 
comment  is  called  for  beyond  that  involved  in  the  recital 
of  facts,  the  studious  suppression  of  which  by  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  day  is  the  best  proof  of  the  importance 
attached  to  them.t 

*  The  facts  may  be  briefly  repeated  in  a  note.  M'Neill  recommended 
the  consolidation  of  Afghanistan  under  Dost  Mahomed.  Bumes  recom- 
mended the  same  course.  Wade  recommended  the  government  to  rely 
upon  the  disunion  of  the  Barukzye  Sirdars,  and  was  opposed  to  consoli- 
dation of  any  kind. 

t  The  responsibility  of  this  famous  manifesto  belongs  to  Lord  Auck- 
land, though  some  of  his  colleagues  in  the  government  at  home  have 
declared  themselves  willing  to  share  it  with  him.  Sir  John  Hobhouse, 
in  1850,  told  the  Official  Salaries  Committee,  in  reply  to  a  question  on 
the  subject  of  the  Afghan  war,  that  he  "did  it  himself ;"  and  so  far  as 
the  announcement  went  entirely  to  acquit  the  East  India  Company  of 
taking  part  in  the  origination  of  the  war,  it  is  to  be  accepted  as  a 
laudable  revelation  of  the  truth ;  but  although  Lord  Palmerston  and 
Sir  John  Hobhouse  saw  the  expediency  of  extricating  the  British  Gro- 
vernment  from  the  difficulties  into  which  the  conduct  of  Mahomed  Shah 
had  thrown  them,  by  encouraging  a  demonstration  from  the  side  of 
India,  the  expenses  of  which  would  be  thrown  upon  the  Indian  ex- 
chequer, they  are  to  be  regarded  rather  as  accessories  after,  than  before, 
the  fact.  The  truth  is,  that  Lord  Auckland  had  determined  on  the 
course  of  policy  to  be  pursued,  not  before  the  India  Board  despatches 
were  written,  but  before  they  were  received.  Sir  John  Hobhouse 
stated  in  the  House  of  Commons  (June  23,  1842)  that  Lord  Auckland 
•*  must  not  bear  the  blame  of  the  measure  ;  it  was  the  policy  of  govern- 
ment ;  and  he  might  mention  that  the  despatch  which  he  wrote, 
stating  his  opinion  of  the  course  that  ought  to  be  taken  in  order  to 
meet  expected  emergencies,  and  that  written  by  Lord  Auckland,  in- 
forming him  that  the  expedition  had  already  been  undertaken, 
crossed  each  other  on  the  way."  When  the  Whig  ministry  went  out  of 
office  in  the  spring  of  1839,  it  was  believed  that  the  Peel  cabinet  would 
repudiate  the  Simlah  manifesto,  and  direct  a  considerable  modification 
of  the  measures  which  were  to  follow  the  declaration  of  war.  The 
bedchamber  4meute  arrested  the  formation  of  the  Peel  ministry ;  and 
it  was  at  least  surmised,  that  it  was  in  no  small  measure  to  save 
Lord  Auckland,  and  to  escape  the  disgrace  of  a  public  reversal  of  their 


378  THE   SIMLAH   MANIFESTO. 

The  oldest,  the  most  experienced,  and  the  most  sagacious 
Indian  poUticians  were  of  opinion  that  the  expedition, 
though  it  might  be  attended  at  the  outset  with  some 
delusive  success,  would  close  in  disaster  and  disgrace. 
Among  those,  who  most  emphatically  disapproved  of  the 
movement  and  predicted  its  failure,  were  the  Duke  of 
Wellington,  Lord  Wellesley,  Sir  Charles  Metcalfe,  Mr. 
Edmonstone,  Mountstuart  Elphinstone,  Sir  Henry  Willock, 
and  Mr.  Tucker. 

The  Duke  of  Wellington  said  that  our  difficulties  would 
commence  where  our  military  successes  ended.  "  The  con- 
sequence of  crossing  the  Indus,"  he  wrote  to  Mr.  Tucker, 
"once  to  settle  a  government  in  Afghanistan,  will  be  a 
perennial  march  into  that  country."  Lord  Wellesley 
always  spoke  contemptuously  of  the  folly  of  occupying  a 
land  of  "rocks,  sands,  deserts,  ice  and  snow."  Sir  Charles 
Metcalfe  from  the  first  protested  against  Lord  Auckland's 
measures  with  respect  to  the  trade  of  the  Indus ;  and  in 
1835-36,  when  Mr.  Ellis's  proposal  to  assist  Dost  Mahomed 
with  British  officers  and  drill-instructors  to  discipline  his 
army,  came  down  to  Calcutta,  said,  one  day  after  council, 
"  Depend  upon  it,  the  sm-est  way  to  bring  Russia  down 
upon  ourselves  is  for  us  to  cross  the  Indus  and  meddle 
with  the  countries  beyond  it."  Mr.  Edmonstone  always 
hung  down  his  head,  and  almost  groaned  aloud,  when  the 
Afghan  expedition  was  named.  Mr.  Elphinstone  wrote  in 
a  private  letter  to  Sir  A.  Burnes  :  "  You  will  guess  what 
I  think  of  affairs  in  Caubul.  You  remember  when  I  used 
to  dispute  with  you  against  having  even  an  agent  in 
Caubul,  and  now  we  have  assumed  the  protection  of  the 

Indian  policy,  that  the  Whigs  again  took  the  reins  of  government.  After 
this,  Sir  John  Hobhouse  never  neglected  an  opportunity  of  publicly 
identifying  himself  with  Lord  Auckland's  policy,  and  was  not  deterred, 
even  by  the  disastrous  termination  of  the  war,  from  bravely  declaring 
that  he  was  the  author  of  it. 


OPINION   OF   MR.    ELPHINSTONE.  379 

state,  as  much  as  if  it  were  one  of  the  subsidiary  aUies  in 
India.  If  you  send  27,000  men  up  the  Durra-i-Bolan  to 
Candahar  (as  we  hear  is  intended),  and  can  feed  them,  I 
have  no  doubt  you  will  take  Candahar  and  Caubul  and 
set  up  Soojah ;  but  for  maintaining  him  in  a  poor,  cold, 
strong,  and  remote  country,  among  a  turbulent  people 
like  the  Afghans,  I  own  it  seems  to  me  to  be  hopeless. 
If  you  succeed,  I  fear  you  will  weaken  the  position  against 
Russia.  The  Afghans  were  neutral,  and  would  have 
received  your  aid  against  invaders  with  gratitude — ^they 
will  now  be  disaffected  and  glad  to  join  any  invader  to 
drive  you  out.  I  never  knew  a  close  alliance  between  a 
civilised  and  an  uncivilised  state  that  did  not  end  in 
mutual  hatred  in  three  years.  If  the  restraint  of  a  close 
connection  with  us  were  not  enough  to  make  us  unpopular, 
the  connection  with  Runjeet  and  our  guarantee  of  his  con- 
quests must  make  us  detested.  These  opinions  formed  at 
a  distance  may  seem  absurd  on  the  spot ;  but  I  still  retain 
them  notwithstanding  all  I  have  yet  heard."  Sir  Henry 
Willock,  whose  extensive  local  knowledge  and  long  expe- 
rience entitled  his  opinions  to  respect,  addressed  a  long 
letter  to  the  Foreign  Secretary,  in  which  he  elaborately 
reviewed  the  mistake  which  had  been  committed.  And 
Mr.  Tucker,  in  the  Court  of  Directors,  and  out  of  the 
Court,  lost  no  opportunity  of  protesting  against  the 
expedition  in  his  manly  uncompromising  way.  "  We  have 
contracted  an  alliance  with  Shah  Soojah,"  he  wrote  to  the 
Duke  of  Wellington,  "  and  have  appointed  a  minister  to 
his  Court,  although  he  does  not  possess  a  rood  of  ground 
in  Afghanistan,  nor  a  rupee  which  he  does  not  derive  from 
our  bounty,  as  a  quondam  pensioner.  We  thus  embroil 
ourselves  in  all  the  intricate  and  pei-plexed  concerns  of 
the  Afghan  tribes.  We  place  Dost  Mahomed,  the  de 
facto  sovereign  in  open  hostility  against  us  j  we  alienate 
the  Prince  Kamran  of  Herat,  who  is  nearer  than  Shah 


380  THE   SIMLAH   MANIFESTO. 

Soojah  in  the  line  of  succession  of  the  Douranee  Family ; 
and  even  if  we  succeed  in  ousting  Dost  Mahomed  and 
placing  Shah  Soojah  on  the  throne  of  Caubul,  we  must 
maintain  him  in  the  government  by  a  large  military  force> 
at  the  distance  of  800  miles  from  our  frontier  and  our 
resources." 

As  a  body  the  Court  of  Directors  of  the  East  India 
Company  were  strongly  opposed  to  the  war,  and  had  no 
part  in  its  initiation  beyond  the  performance  of  such 
mechanical  duties  as  are  prescribed  by  act  of  Parliament. 
The  members  of  the  Secret  Committee  are  compelled  to 
sign  the  despatches  laid  before  them  by  the  Board  of 
Control ;  and  the  President  of  the  Board  of  Control  has 
unreservedly  admitted  that,  beyond  the  mere  mechanical 
act  of  signing  the  papers  laid  before  them,  they  had  no 
part  in  the  recommendation  or  authorisation  of  the  war. 
The  policy  of  the  East  India  Company  is  a  policy  of  non- 
interference. They  had  seldom  lost  an  opportunity  of 
inculcating  upon  their  governors  the  expediency  of  refrain- 
ing from  intermeddling  with  the  Trans-Indian  states.  * 
The  temper,  indeed,  of  this  great  body  is  essentially 
pacific ;  all  the  instructions  which  emanate  from  them 
have  a  tendency  towards  the  preservation  of  peace  and 
the  non-extension  of  empire ;  and  when  the  merits  and 
demerits  of  their  government  come  to  be  weighed  in  the 
balance,  it  can  never  be  imputed  to  them  that  they  have 
been  eager  to  draw  the  sword  from  the  scabbard,  or  have 
willingly  squandered  the  resources  of  India  upon  unjust 
and  unprofitable  wars. 

*  In  a  despatch  from  the  Court  of  Directors  to  the  Grovernor-Gene- 
ral,  dated  September  20,  1837,  there  occurs  this  remarkable  passage  : 
—  "With  respect  to  the  states  west  of  the  Indus,  you  have  uniformly 
observed  the  proper  course,  which  is  to  have  no  political  connection 
with  any  state  or  party  in  those  regions,  to  take  no  part  in  their  quar- 
rels, but  to  maintain  so  far  as  possible  a  friendly  connection  with  all  of 
them." 


VIEWS   OF   THE   SUPREME    COUNCIL.  381 

But  it  is  stated  in  the  manifesto  itself  that  the  war 
was  undertaken  "with  the  concurrence  of  the  Supreme 
Council  of  India."  It  would  be  presumptuous  to  affirm 
the  absolute  untruth  of  a  statement  thus  publicly  made 
in  the  face  of  the  world  by  a  nobleman  of  Lord  Auck- 
land's unquestionable  integrity ;  but  so  certain  is  it  that 
the  manifesto  was  not  issued  with  the  concurrence  of  the 
Supreme  Council,  that  when  the  document  was  sent  down 
to  Calcutta  to  take  its  place  among  the  records  of  the 
empire,  there  issued  from  the  Council-Chamber  a  respect- 
ful remonstrance  against  the  consummation  of  a  measure 
of  such  grave  importance,  without  an  opportunity  being 
afforded  to  the  counsellors  of  recording  their  opinions 
upon  it.  The  remonstrance  went  to  England,  and  ehcited 
an  assiu-ance  to  the  effect  that  the  Governor-General 
could  have  intended  no  personal  slight  to  the  members 
of  the  Supreme  Council ;  but  those  members  w^ere  far 
too  high-minded  to  have  thought  for  a  moment  about 
the  personalities  of  the  case ;  they  thought  only  of  the 
great  national  interests  at  stake,  and  regretted  that  they 
should  ever  be  jeopardised  by  such  disregard  of  the 
opinions  of  the  Governor-General's  legitimate  advisers. 
Such  a  manifesto  as  this  would  never  have  been  cradled 
in  Calcutta. 

It  would  not  be  just,  however,  to  scrutinise  the  policy 
of  Lord  Auckland  at  this  time  by  the  light  of  our  after 
experience.  We  know  now,  that  before  the  Simlah  mani- 
festo was  issued,  the  Persians  had  raised  the  siege  of 
Herat, — ^that,  for  all  purposes  of  defence  against  encroach- 
ments from  the  westward,  the  expedition  to  Kurrack, 
contemptible  as  it  was  in  itself,  had  sufficed.  We  know 
that  the  handful  of  "  rotten  Hindoos,"  as  Mahomed  Shah 
subsequently  designated  them,  magnified  by  report  into 
an  immense  armament,  had  caused  that  monarch  to  strike 
his  camp  before  Herat,  and  march  back  his  baffled  army 


382  THE    SIMLAH   MANIFESTO. 

to  Teheran.  But,  on  th-e  1st  of  October,  1838,  Lord 
Auckland  believed,  and  had  good  grounds  for  believing, 
that  the  fall  of  Herat  was  inevitable.  At  this  time  it 
may  have  been  questioned  whether  the  restoration  of  Shah 
Soojah  to  the  sovereignty  of  the  Douranee  Empire  were 
the  best  means  of  resisting  Persian  aggression  and  com- 
bating Russian  intrigue,  but  few  doubted  the  propriety  of 
doing  something  to  meet  the  dangers  that  thi-eatened  us 
from  those  sources.  Had  Herat  fallen  to  the  Persian 
arms,  the  Barukzye  Sirdars,  without  some  intervention  on 
our  part,  would  have  prostrated  themselves  at  the  feet  of 
the  Persian  monarch  ;  and  Russia  would  have  established 
an  influence  in  Afghanistan  which  we  should  have  striven 
in  vain  to  counteract.  There  was  a  real  danger,  therefore, 
to  be  feared.  Though  the  means  employed  were  of  doubt- 
ful justice  and  expediency,  the  end  to  be  accomplished  was 
one  of  legitimate  attainment. 

But  before  the  Simlah  proclamation  had  obtained 
general  currency  throughgut  India,  authentic  intelligence 
of  the  retrograde  movement  of  the  Persian  army  had 
reached  the  camp  of  the  Governor-General.  The  tidings 
which  arrived,  in  the  first  instance,  from  various  native 
sources,  and  had  been  conveyed  to  Lord  Auckland  by  the 
political  officers  on  the  frontier,  were  now  officially  con- 
firmed. The  siege  of  Herat  had  been  raised.  Mahomed 
Shah  had  "  mounted  his  horse,  Ameerj,"  and  turned  his 
face  towards  his  own  capital.  The  legitimate  object  of 
the  expedition  across  the  Indus  was  gone.  All  that 
remained  was  usurpation  and  aggression.  It  was  believed, 
therefore,  that  the  army  assembling  on  the  north-western 
frontier  would  be  broken  up ;  and  Shah  Soojah  and  Run- 
jeet  Singh  left  to  pursue  their  own  policy,  as  might  seem 
most  expedient  to  them.  The  Simlah  proclamation  had 
placed  the  siege  of  Herat  in  the  foreground  as  the  main 
cause  of  the  contemplated  expedition ;  and  now  that  the 


AFTER-ORDERS.  383 

pretext  for  the  invasion  of  Afghanistan  was  removed, 
political  consistency  seemed  to  require  that  the  sword 
should  be  returned  to  the  scabbard.  With  no  common 
anxiety,  therefore,  was  the  result  of  this  unexpected 
intelligence  from  Herat  awaited  by  the  regiments  which 
had  been  warned  for  active  service,  and  were  now  in  all 
the  excitement  of  preparation  for  a  long  and  adventurous 
march.  The  disappointment  anticipated  by  many  de- 
scended only  upon  a  few.  On  the  8th  of  November,  all 
doubts  were  set  at  rest,  and  all  anxieties  removed  by  the 
publication  of  an  order  by  the  Governor-General,  setting 
forth  that,  although  the  siege  of  Herat  had  been  raised, 
the  expedition  across  the  Indus  would  not  be  abandoned  : 


ORDERS  BY  THE  RIGHT  HONOURABLE  THE  GOVERNOR- 
GENERAL  OF  INDIA.    SECRET  DEPARTMENT. 

Camp  de  Buddee,  Sth  November. 

The  Right  Honourable  the  Governor-General  of  India  is  pleased 
to  publish,  for  general  information,  the  subjoined  extract  of  a 
letter  from  Lieutenant-Colonel  Stoddart,  dated  Herat,  the  10th 
September,  1838,  and  addressed  to  the  Secretary  to  the  Govern- 
ment of  India. 

"I  have  the  honour,  by  direction  of  her  Britannic  Majesty's 
Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minister  Plenipotentiary,  and  the  Hon. 
East  India  Company's  Envoy  at  the  Court  of  Persia,  to  acquaint 
you,  for  the  information  of  the  Right  Hon.  the  Governor-General 
of  India  in  Council,  that  his  Majesty  the  Shah  of  Persia  yesterday 
raised  the  siege  of  this  city,  and  with  the  whole  of  the  royal  camp 
marched  to  Sangbust,  about  twelve  miles,  on  his  return  to  his 
own  dominions.  His  Majesty  proceeds  witliout  delay,  by  Torrbut 
Sheki  Jaum  and  Meshid,  to  Teheran. 

"  This  is  in  fulfilment  of  his  Majesty's  compliance  with  the 
demands  of  the  British  Government,  which  I  had  the  honour  of 
delivering  on  the  12th  inst.,  and  of  the  whole  of  which  his  Majesty 
announced  his  acceptance  on  the  14th  of  August. 

*'  His  Majesty  Shah  Kamran  and  his  Vuzeer,  Yar  Mahomed 
Khan,  and  the  whole  city,  feel  sensible  of  the  sincerity  of  the 
friendship   of  the    British   Government,   and   Mr.   Pottinger  and 


3.84  THE   SIMLAH   MANIFESTO. 

myself  fully  participate  in  their  gratitude  to  Providence  for  the 
happy  event  I  have  now  the  honour  to  report." 

In  giving  publicity  to  this  important  intelligence,  the  Governor- 
General  deems  it  proper  at  the  same  time  to  notify,  that  while  he 
regards  the  relinquishment  by  the  Shah  of  Persia  of  his  hostile 
designs  upon  Herat  as  a  just  cause  of  congratulation  to  the  Govern- 
ment of  British  India  and  its  allies,  he  will  continue  to  prosecute 
with  vigour  the  measures  which  have  been  announced,  with  a 
view  to  the  substitution  of  a  friendly  for  a  hostile  power  in  the 
eastern  provinces  of  Afghanistan,  and  to  the  establishment  of  a 
permanent  barrier  against  schemes  of  aggression  upon  our  north- 
west frontier. 

The  Right  Hon.  the  Goyemor-General  ia  pleased  to  appoint 
Lieutenant  Eldred  Pottinger,  of  the  Bombay  Artillery,  to  be 
Political  Agent  at  Herat,  subject  to  the  orders  of  the  Envoy  and 
Minister  at  the  Court  of  Shah  Soojah-ool-Moolk.  This  appoint- 
ment is  to  have  effect  from  the  9th  of  September  last,  the  date  on 
which  the  siege  of  Herat  was  raised  by  the  Shah  of  Persia. 

In  conferring  the  above  appointment  upon  Lieutenant  Pottinger, 
the  Governor-General  is  glad  of  the  opportunity  afforded  him  of 
bestowing  the  high  applause  which  is  due  to  the  signal  merits 
of  that  ofi&cer,  who  was  present  in  Herat  during  the  whole  period 
of  its  protracted  siege,  and  who,  imder  circumstances  of  peculiar 
danger  and  difiBculty,  has,  by  his  fortitude,  ability,  and  judgment, 
honourably  sustained  the  reputation  and  interests  of  his  country. 

By  order  of  the  Right  Hon.  the  Governor-General  of  India, 

W.  H.  Macnaghten, 
Secretary  to  the  Government  of  India,  with  the 
Governor-General. 

When  the  Persian  army  was  before  Herat — ^when  the 
Afghan  garrison  was  on  the  eve  of  surrender — when 
the  chiefs  of  Caubul  and  Candahar  were  prostrating 
themselves  at  the  feet  of  Mahomed  Shah,  the  expedition 
for  the  restoration  of  Shah  Soojah  was  one  of  doubtful 
honesty  and  doubtful  expediency.  The  retrogression  of 
the  Persian  army  removed  it  at  once  from  the  category 
of  questionable  acts.  There  was  no  longer  any  question 
about  it.  The  failure  of  Mahomed  Shah  cut  from  under 
the  feet  of  Lord  Auckland  all  ground   of  justification, 


POLICY    OF   THE    WAR.  385 

and  rendered  the  expedition  across  the  Indus  at  once  a 
folly  and  a  crime.  The  tripartite  treaty  did  not  pledge 
the  British  Government  to  send  a  single  soldier  beyond 
the  frontier.  The  despatch  of  a  British  army  into  the 
heart  of  Afghanistan  was  no  part  of  the  covenant  either 
with  Rimjeet  Singh  or  Shah  Soojah.  It  was  wholly  an 
after  thought.  When  Macnaghten,  after  his  conferences 
with  the  Maharajah  of  the  Punjab  and  the  ex-King  of 
XJaubul,  returned  to  Simlah  to  lay  the  result  of  his  mission 
before  the  Governor-General,  the  British  Government  had 
pledged  itself  only  to  furnish  a  handful  of  European 
officers  to  raise  and  discipline  the  Shah's  regiments ;  and 
so  little  had  any  obligation  been  imposed  upon  us  to 
surround  the  ex-King  with  our  battalions,  on  his  restora- 
tion to  his  old  dominions,  that  he  himself  expressed  an  eager 
hope  that  he  would  be  suffered  to  advance  as  an  inde- 
pendent prince,  and  not  as  a  mere  puppet  in  our  hands.* 

To  march  a  British  army  into  Afghanistan  was  not, 
therefore,  an  obligation  upon  the  Indian  Government ;  it 
was  their  deliberate  choice.  The  avowed  object  of  the 
expedition,  as  set  forth  in  the  November  declaration,  was 
the  establishment  of  a  friendly  power  in  Afghanistan. 
But  the  subversion  of  an  existing  dynasty  could  only  be 
justified  on  the  ground  that  its  hostility  tlireatened  to 
distirrb  the  peace  and  tranquillity  of  our  own  dominions. 
Whatever  the  hostility  of  the  Barukzye  Sh'dahs  may  have 
been  when  Mahomed  Shah  was  before  the  gates  of 
Herat,  it  had  now  ceased  to  be  formidable.  It  was 
obvious  that  the  chiefs  of  Caubul  and  Candahar  were 
little  likely  to  exaggerate  the  power  of  a  Prince  that 
had  brought  all  his  military  resom-ces  to  bear  upon  the 

*  A  general  assurance  liad  been  given  to  Runjeet  Singh,  in  reply  to 
a  difficulty  started  by  himself,  that  if  the  allies  met  with  any  reverses, 
the  British  Government  would  advance  to  their  aid  ;  but  he  had  failed  to 
elicit  from  Macnaghten  any  more  specific  promise  of  co-operation. 

VOL.   L  CO 


386  THE   SIMLAH   MANIFESTO. 

reduction  of  a  place  of  no  reputed  strength,  and,  after 
an  ineffectual  struggle  of  nine  months'  duration,  had 
retreated,  either  because  he  was  unequal  to  the  longer 
continuance  of  the  contest,  or  because  the  British  Govern- 
ment had  landed  500  Sepoys  on  an  island  in  the  Persian 
Gulf.  It  was  only  in  connection  with  the  Russo-Persian 
movement  that  an  alliance  with  the  rulers  of  Afghanistan 
had  become  a  matter  of  concernment  to  the  British 
Government.  It  was  only  by  a  reference  to  the  crisis 
which  had  thus  arisen  that  the  Indian  Government  could 
in  any  way  justify  their  departure  from  the  com'se  of  non- 
interference laid  down  by  the  Court  of  Directors,  and 
recognised  by  Lord  Auckland  and  his  predecessors.  But 
now  that  the  danger,  to  the  counteraction  of  which  the 
expedition  across  the  Indus  was  directed,  had  passed 
away,  the  expedition  was  still  to  be  undertaken.  A 
measure  so  hazardous,  and  so  costly  as  the  march  of  a 
British  army  to  the  foot  of  the  Hindoo-Koosh,  was  only 
justifiable  so  long  as  it  was  absolutely  indispensable  to  the 
defence  of  our  Indian  possessions ;  but  if  so  extreme  a 
measure  had  ever  been,  it  was  no  longer  necessary  to 
the  security  of  India,  now  that  the  army  of  Mahomed 
Shah,  defeated  and  disgraced,  was  on  its  way  back  to  the 
capital  of  Persia.  The  expedition  now  to  be  undertaken 
had  no  longer  any  other  ostensible  object  than  the  sub- 
stitution of  a  monarch,  whom  the  people  of  Afghanistan 
had  repeatedly,  in  emphatic,  scriptural  language,  spued 
out,  for  those  Barukzye  chiefs  who,  whatever  may  have 
been  the  defects  of  their  government,  had  contrived  to 
maintain  themselves  in  security,  and  their  country  in 
peace,  with  a  vigour  and  a  constancy  unknown  to  the 
luckless  Suddozye  Princes.  Had  we  started  with  the 
certainty  of  establishing  a  friendly  power  and  a  strong 
government  in  Afghanistan,  the  importance  of  the  end 
would  have  borne  no  just  relation  to  the  magnitude  of 


INIQUITY   OF   THE    WAR.  387 

the  means  to  be  employed  for  its  accomplishment.  But 
at  the  best  it  was  a  mere  experiment.  There  were  more 
reasons  why  it  should  fail  than  why  it  should  succeed.* 
It  was  commenced  in  defiance  of  every  consideration  of 
political  and  military  expediency ;  and  there  were  those 
who,  arguing  the  matter  on  higher  grounds  than  those  of 
mere  expediency,  pronounced  the  certainty  of  its  failure, 
because  there  was  a  canker  of  injustice  at  the  core.  It 
was,  indeed,  an  experiment  on  the  forbearance  alike  of 
God  and  of  man  ;  and  therefore,  though  it  might  dawn 
in  success  and  triumph,  it  was  sure  to  set  in  failure  and 
disgrace. 

*  Shah  Soojah  himself  said  that  there  would  be  little  chance  of  his 
becoming  popular  in  Afghanistan,  if  he  returned  to  the  country  openly 
and  avowedly  supported,  not  by  his  own  troops,  but  by  those  of  the 
Feringhees.  Even  the  less  overt  assistance  of  an  infidel  government 
was  likely  to  cast  discredit  upon  the  undertaking  in  the  eyes  of  "true 
believers."  The  Shah  talked  about  the  bigotry  of  the  Mahomedans  ; 
but  it  was  plain  that  he  had  his  misgivings  on  the  subject.  "During  a 
visit,"  says  Captain  Wade,  "which  I  paid  to  the  Shah,  the  day  before 
yesterday,  he  informed  me  that  some  Mahomedans  of  Delhi  had  been 
writing  to  him,  to  inquire  how  he  could  reconcile  it  to  his  conscience, 
as  a  true  believer  in  the  Koran,  to  accept  the  assistance  of  a  Christian 
people  to  recover  his  kingdom.  The  Shah  said  that  he  contemplated 
with  pity  the  bigotry  of  these  people,  and  began  to  quote  a  passage  of 
the  Koran  to  prove  their  ignorance  of  its  doctrines  with  reference  to 
the  subject  on  which  they  had  presumed  to  address  him.  Having  a 
day  or  two  previously  received  information  that  the  Newab  of  Bhopal 
had  made  a  particular  request  of  his  Lordship  to  be  permitted  to  place 
a  party  of  his  kinsmen  and  i-etainers  at  the  service  of  the  British  Go- 
vernment on  the  present  occasion,  from  the  desire  which  he  had  to 
testify  his  deep  sense  of  gratitude  to  it  for  the  manner  in  which  it  had 
watched  and  protected  the  interests  of  their  family  in  every  necessitude 
of  their  political  existence,  I  mentioned  the  cirum^tance  to  his  Majesty, 
to  show  the  different  views  that  prevailed  among  the  followers  of  the 
faith,  both  with  regard  to  their  duty  to  the  state  and  to  their  reli- 
gion."— [Captain  Wade  to  Mr.  Maenad/htm,  October  5,  1838  :  MS. 
Mecords.] 

oo2 


388 


BOOK   III. 

[1838—1839.] 

CHAPTER  I. 

The  Army  of  the  Indus — Gathering  at  Ferozepore — Resignation  of  Sir 
Henry  Fane — Route  of  the  Army — Passage  through  Bahwulpore — 
The  Ameers  of  Sindh — The  Hyderabad  Question — Passage  of  the 
Bolan  Pass — Arrival  at  Candahar. 

The  army  destined  for  the  occupation  of  Afghanistan 
assembled  at  Ferozepore,  on  the  north-western  frontier  of 
the  British  dominions,  in  the  latter  part  of  the  month  of 
November.  It  had  been  agreed  that  the  expedition  across 
the  Indus  should  be  inaugurated  by  a  grand  ceremonial 
meeting  between  Lord  Auckland  and  Runjeet  Singh  ;  * 
and  that  the  troops  of  the  two  nations  should  be  paraded 
before  the  illustrious  personages  then  reciprocating  hos- 
pitalities and  interchanging  marks  of  friendship  and 
respect. 

The  Governor-General  reached  Ferozepore  on  the  27th 

*  The  meeting  was  agreed  upon  before  the  British  Government  had 
determined  to  cross  the  Indus  ;  and  Runjeet  complained  of  its  tardy 
accomplishment,  on  the  ground  of  the  expense  that  he  was  obliged  to 
incur  in  keeping  his  troops  together. 


MEETING    OF    RUNJEET   AND    THE  GOVERNOR-GENERAL.    389 

of  November.  The  Commander-in-Chief  and  the  infantry 
of  the  Army  of  the  Indus  had  arrived  a  day  or  two  before ; 
and  on  the  following  day  the  main  body  of  the  cavalry 
and  artilleiy  took  up  their  ground  on  the  plain.*  On  the- 
29th,  t  the  first  meeting  between  Lord  Auckland  and 
Runjeet  Singh  took  place  amidst  a  scene  of  indescribable 
uproar  and  confusion.  The  camp  of  the  Governor-General 
was  pitched  at  the  distance  of  some  four  miles  from  the 
river  Gliarra.  In  the  centre  of  a  wide  street  of  tents 
were  those  set  apart  for  the  purposes  of  the  Durbar.  A 
noble  guard  of  honour  lined  the  way,  as  amidst  the  roar 
of  artillery  and  the  clang  of  military  music,  Runjeet 
Singh,  escorted  by  the  English  secretaries  and  some  of 
the  principal  political  and  military  officers  in  camp,  rode 
up,  in  the  centre  of  a  line  of  elephants  to  the  Durbar 
tent.  The  Governor-General  and  the  Commander-in-Chief 
came  forth  to  meet  them.  Then  came  the  crush  of  the 
two  lines  of  elephants,  urged  forward  by  the  goads  of  their 
drivers,  and  meeting  with  a  terrific  shock — the  clangour 
of  a  tumultuous  crowd  of  Sikh  horsemen  and  footmen — a 
iiish  of  English  officers  eager  to  see  the  show ;  and  pre- 
sently, amidst  such  tumult  and  such  noise  as  had  seldom 
before  been  seen  or  heard,  the  elephants  of  the  Governor- 
General  and  the  Maharajah  were  brought  side  by  side,, 
and  Lord  Auckland,  in  his  uniform  of  diplomatic  blue, 
was  seen  to  take  a  bundle  of  crimson  cloth  out  of  the 
Sikh  howdah,  and  it  was  known  that  the  lion  of  the  Pun- 


*  It  is  generally  acknowledged  that  nothing  could  have  been  more 
orderly  or  more  creditable  both  to  the  regiments  and  their  commanding 
officers,  than  the  style  in  which  all  the  components  of  the  ' '  Army  of 
the  Indus"  made  their  way  to  Ferozepore.  Captain  Havelock,  an 
excellent  authority  on  such  points,  says  :  "A  force  has  never  been 
brought  together  in  any  country  in  a  manner  more  creditable  and  soldier- 
like than  was  the  Bengal  portion  of  the  Army  of  the  Indus." 

t  Captain  Havelock  says  the  28th — Colonel  Fane,  the  29th. 


390  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  INDUS. 

jab  was  then  seated  on  the  elephant  of  the  Enghsh  ruler. 
In  a  minute  the  little,  tottering,  one-eyed  man,  who  had 
founded  a  vast  empire  on  the  banks  of  the  fabulous  rivers 
of  the  Macedonian  conquests,  was  leaning  over  the  side 
of  the  howdah,  shaking  hands  with  the  principal  officers  of 
the  British  camp,  as  their  elephants  were  wheeled  up 
beside  him.  Then  the  huge  phalanx  of  elephants  was  set 
in  motion  again.  There  was  a  rush  towards  the  Durbar 
tent ;  the  English  and  the  Sikh  cortege  were  mixed  up 
together  in  one  great  mass  of  animal  life.  Such  was  the 
crush — such  was  the  struggle — that  many  of  the  attendant 
Sikhs  believed  that  there  was  a  design  to  destroy  their  old 
decrepit  chief,  and  "began  to  blow  their  matches  and 
grasp  their  weapons  with  an  air  of  mingled  distrust  and 
ferocity."  *  But  in  time  a  passage  was  made,  and  the 
imbecile  little  old  man  was  to  be  seen  tottering  into  the 
Durbar  tent,  supported  on  one  side  by  the  Governor- 
General,  and  on  the  other  by  Sir  Henry  Fane,  whose  fine 
manly  proportions  and  length  of  limb,  as  he  forced  his  way 
through  the  crowd,  presented  a  strange  contrast  to  the 
puny  dimensions  of  the  Sikh  chieftain  who  leant  upon 
his  arm. 

In  the  gorgeous  tent  of  the  Governor- General,  the  ladies 
of  Lord  Auckland's  family,  and  of  the  principal  military 
and  political  officers,  were  seated,  ready  to  receive  his 
Highness.  The  customary  formalities  were  gone  through, 
and  civilities  interchanged ;  and  then  the  Maharajah  was 
conducted  into  an  inner  chamber,  where  the  presents 
intended  for  his  reception  were  laid  out  in  costly  and 
curious  array.  Here,  a  picture  of  Queen  Victoria,  from 
the  easel  of  Miss  Eden,  whose  felicitous  pencil  has  ren- 
dered the  European  eye  familiar  with  the  persons  of  many 

*  Captain  Haveloch's  Narrative — from  which  this  description  has 
been  mainly  written.  Colonel  Panels  Five  Years  in  India  ;  and  Mr. 
Stocqueler's  Memorials  of  A  -^ghanistan  also  contribute  some  details. 


THE   SIKH   CAMP.  391 

of  the  principal  Sikh  chieftains  who  graced  the  Ferozepore 
gathering,  was  presented  to  Runjeet  Singh.  Sir  Wil- 
loughby  Cotton  bore  it,  with  becoming  reverence,  into 
the  tent,  and  as  he  presented  it  to  the  Maharajah,  who 
bowed  before  it,  the  guns  of  the  camel  battery  roared 
forth  a  royal  salute.  Then  Runjeet  was  escorted  to 
another  tent,  where  specimens  of  British  ordnance,  capa- 
risoned elephants,  and  horses  of  noble  figure,  stood  ready 
for  his  Highness' s  acceptance.  All  these  were  inspected 
with  due  expressions  of  admiration  and  a  becoming  inter- 
change of  courtesies;  and  then,  amidst  an  uproar  of 
hurras,  a  crash  of  military  music,  and  another  scene  of 
indescribable  confusion,  Runjeet  Singh  ascended  his  ele- 
phant and  turned  his  back  upon  the  British  camp.* 

On  the  following  day.  Lord  Auckland  returned  the  visit 
of  Runjeet  Singh.  It  was  said  by  one  present  on  this 
occasion,  that  the  Sikhs  "  shone  down  the  English."  t 
The  camp  of  the  Maharajah  was  on  the  other  side  of  the 
river;  and  there,  amidst  a  scene  of  Oriental  splendour, 
difficult  to  describe  or  imagine,  the  great  Sikh  chieftain 
received  the  representative  of  the  British  nation.  The 
splendid  costumes  of  the  Sikh  Sirdars — the  gorgeous  trap- 
pings of  their  horses — the  glittering  steel  casques  and 
corslets  of  chain  armour — the  scarlet  and  yellow  dresses — 
the  tents  of  crimson  and  gold — made  up  a  show  of  Eastern 
magnificence  equally  grand  and  picturesque.  As  the  Maha- 
rajah saluted  the  Governor-General,  the  familiar  notes  of 

*  "  It  is  worthy  of  notice  that  a  strange  accident  befel  the  old  Maha- 
rajah in  the  tent  containing  the  larger  gifts  of  the  British  Government. 
He  was  not  very  firm  on  his  legs  at  any  time,  but  here  he  had  the 
misfortune  to  stumble  over  a  pile  of  shells,  and  fell  prostrate  before  the 
British  guns." — [Haveloch's  Narrative.}  Remembering  how  the  Sikh 
Empire  fell  before  the  British  guns  at  Goojrat,  we  may  at  least  observe 
that  this  was  a  curious  type  of  the  destiny  then  awaiting  the  great 
kingdom  founded  by  Runjeet  Singh. 

t  Stocqv^ler' s  Memorials  of  Afghanistan, 


392  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  INDUS. 

the  national  anthem  arose  from  the  instruments  of  a  Sikh 
band,  and  the  guns  of  the  Khalsa  poured  forth  their  noisy 
welcome.  In  the  splendid  Durbar  tent  of  the  ruler  of  the 
Punjab,  the  British  Statesman  and  British  General,  after 
the  due  formalities  had  been  observed  and  some  conversa- 
tion had  been  carried  on  through  the  medium  of  inter- 
preters, were  regaled  with  an  unseemly  display  of  dancing 
girls,  and  the  antics  of  some  male  buffoons.  The  evening 
entertainments  were  still  less  decorous.  It  was  a  melan- 
choly thing  to  see  the  open  exhibition,  even  on  this  great 
public  occasion,  of  all  those  low  vices  which  were  destroy- 
ing the  life,  and  damning  the  reputation,  of  one  in  whom 
were  some  of  the  elements  of  heroism — who,  indeed,  but 
for  these  degrading  sensualities,  would  have  been  really 
one  of  the  greatest,  as  he  was  one  of  the  most  remai-k- 
able,  men  of  modern  times. 

Then  came  a  grand  display  of  the  militaiy  resources  of 
the  two  nations.  On  one  day  the  British  force  was 
manoeuvred  by  Sir  Henry  Fane  ;  and  on  another  the 
Sikh  troops  were  exercised  by  the  Sirdars.  The  consum- 
mate skill  with  which  the  British  chief  attacked  an 
imaginary  enemy  was  equalled  by  the  gallantry  with 
which  he  defeated  it.  He  fought,  indeed,  a  great  battle 
on  the  plain,  and  only  wanted  another  army  in  his  front 
to  render  his  victory  a  complete  one.  The  Sikh  Sirdars 
were  contented  with  less  elaborate  movements  ;  but  what 
their  troops  were  ordered  to  do  they  did  readily  and 
well,  and  military  critics  in  the  British  camp  admitted 
that  their  allies  made  no  contemptible  show  of  the  tactics 
which  they  had  learnt  from  their  French  instructors.* 

Eunjeet  Singh  returned  to  Lahore,  and  the  Governor- 
General  followed  him,  on  a  complimentary  visit,  to  the 

*  For  an  account  of  the  manoeuvres  both  of  the  British  and  Sikh 
divisions,  see  Captain  HavelocMs  Narrative. 


CURTAILMENT    OF   THE   ARMY.  393 

Sikh  capital;  whilst  the  British  troops  prepared  to  cross 
the  frontier  in  furtherance  of  the  objects  mapped  out  in 
the  great  Simlah  manifesto.  But  there  was  no  longer  a 
Persian  army  to  be  encountered  at  Herat — no  longer  a 
Russian  force  in  the  background.  The  expedition  had 
lost  half  its  popularity  with  the  army ;  and  the  force  that 
was  to  take  the  field  had  been  shorn  of  a  portion  of  its 
original  dimensions.  On  the  27th  of  November  it  had 
been  publicly  announced  by  the  Commander-in-Chief, 
"that  circumstances  in  the  countries  west  of  the  Indus 
had  so  greatly  changed  since  the  assembly  of  the  army  for 
service,  that  the  Governor-General  had  deemed  that  it  was 
not  requisite  to  send  forward  the  whole  force ;  but  that  a 
part  only  would  be  equal  to  effecting  the  future  objects  in 
view."  It  had  become  the  duty  therefore  of  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief to  determine  what  regiments  should  cross 
the  Indus,  and  what  should  remain  in  Hindostan.  Sir 
Henry  Fane  had  selected  for  service  the  corps  whose  effi- 
ciency, on  his  recent  tour  of  inspection,  had  been  most 
clearly  demonstrated ;  and  now  that  it  devolved  upon  him 
to  dash  the  hopes  of  some  of  those  regiments,  imwilling 
to  make  an  invidious  choice,  he  had  decided  the  difficult 
question  by  lot.  Instead  of  two  divisions,  the  Bengal 
army  was  now  to  consist  of  one,  under  the  command  of 
Sir  Willoughby  Cotton.  The  brigades  of  infantiy  com- 
manded by  Colonels  Denniss  and  Paul  were  to  be  left 
behind  ;*  the  Irregular  Cavalry,  under  that  fine  old 
veteran,  Colonel  Skinner,  of  the  Local  Horse,  were  to  share 

*  These  brigades  consisted  of  the  3rd  Buffs,  the  2nd,  27th,  5th, 
20th,  and  53rd  Regiments  of  Native  Infantry.  Captain  Havelock  and 
other  military  authorities  have  condemned  this  decision  by  lot.  It  is 
said  that  the  principle  of  selection  should  have  been  adhered  to  on  the 
reduction,  as  well  as  on  the  formation  of  the  force.  "Sir  Henry 
Fane,"  says  Captain  Havelock,  "need  not  thus  have  distrusted  or 
paid  so  poor  a  compliment  to  his  own  sagacity  and  impartiality ;  the 


394    .        THE  ARMY  OF  THE  INDUS. 

the  same  fate  ;  and  the  artillery  force,  greatly  reduced  in 
strength,  now  lost  its  Brigadier  (Colonel  Graham),  and  was 
ordered  to  go  forward  under  Major  Pew,  who  had  orga- 
nised the  camel  battery,  and  had  joined  the  brigade  in 
command  of  that  experimental  section  of  the  ordnance 
corps.  Nor  were  these  the  only  changes  which  the  intel- 
ligence of  the  defeat  of  Mahomed  Shah  had  wrought  upon 
the  Bengal  force.  Sir  Henry  Fane,  as  Commander-in-Chief 
of  the  Indian  army,  had  determined  to  take  command  in 
person  of  the  forces  assembled  for  the  expedition  across 
the  frontier.  The  assemblage  of  regiments  ordered  upon 
this  service  was  to  be  called  "  The  Army  of  the  Indus." 
Both  the  extent  of  the  force,  and  the  objects  of  the  expe- 
dition, seemed  to  demand  the  supei-vision  of  the  chief 
military  authority  in  the  country.  But  now  that  the  force 
had  been  greatly  reduced,  and  the  objects  of  the  campaign 
had  dwindled  down  into  a  measure  of  interference  with 
the  internal  government  of  an  independent  country.  Sir 
Henry  Fane  had  no  ambition  to  command  such  a  force, 
or  to  identify  himself  with  such  an  expedition.  There  was 
no  want  of  physical  energy  or  mental  vigour  in  the  man, 
but  his  health  was  failing  him  at  this  time ;  and  it  was 
expedient  that  he  should  altogether  escape  from  the  fiery 
climate  of  the  Eastern  world.     He  determined,  therefore, 

one  had  seldom  been  at  fault  in  India  or  in  Europe,  the  other  was 
above  suspicion.  Sortilege,  after  all,  did  little  for  the  army  in  one 
instance  ;  for  it  sent  forward  to  the  labours  of  the  campaign,  the  13th 
Light  Infantry,  then  as  ever  zealous,  indeed,  and  full  of  alacrity,  but 
even  at  Ferozepore  shattered  by  disease  ;  the  spirit  of  its  soldiers 
willing,  but  unequal  to  the  task  ;  whilst  it  doomed  to  inactivity  the 
Buffs,  one  of  the  most  eff'ective  European  corps  in  India."  This  is  the 
impartial  testimony  of  an  officer  of  the  13th  Light  Infantry,  It  was 
written  immediately  after  the  first  campaign  of  the  Army  of  the  Indus. 
No  writer  would  now  regret  the  chance  which  sent  Sale  and  Dennie 
into  Afghanistan,  and  associated  the  name  of  the  13th  Light  Infantry 
with  some  of  the  most  illustrious  incidents  of  the  war. 


FANE   AND    KEANE.  395 

to  resign  the  command  of  the  expedition  into  other  hands, 
and  to  set  his  face  towards  his  native  land. 

Sir  John  Keane,  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Bombay 
army,  was  coming  round  from  the  western  presidency,  in 
command  of  the  Bombay  division,  which  was  to  be  con- 
veyed by  water  from  that  port  to  KuriTichee.  On  the 
junction'  of  the  two  divisions,  the  chief  command  would 
fall  into  his  hands.  In  Sir  Henry  Fane  the  Bengal  army 
had  unbounded  confidence.  They  knew  him  to  be  a  strict, 
but  a  good  officer.  They  may  have  thought  that  he  made 
of  too  much  account  external  forms  and  appearances, 
better  suited  to  the  mild,  cloudy  atmosphere  of  Great 
Britain,  than  to  the  fiery  skies  of  Hindostan.  But  they 
admired  the  energy  of  his  character  ;  the  decision  of  his 
judgment ;  the  promptitude  of  all  his  actions.  The  initial 
measures  which  had  been  entrusted  to  him  had  been  car- 
ried out  with  remarkable  ability.  There  was  a  coolness 
in  all  that  he  did  ;  a  clearness  in  all  that  he  said  ;  which 
inspired  with  unlimited  confidence  the  officers  with  whom 
he  was  associated.  They  knew  that  he  had  the  welfare 
of  the  araiy  at  heart; — that  their  safety  and  honour 
could  not  be  confided  to  one  less  likely  to  abuse  the 
trust.  It  was  with  no  common  regret,  therefore,  that 
they  saw  him  yield  into  other  hands  the  command  of  the 
Army  of  the  Indus.  Of  Sir  John  Keane  they  knew  little, 
and  what  little  they  did  know  did  not  fill  them  with  any 
very  eager  desire  to  place  themselves  under  his  command. 

Such  was  the  position  of  affairs  at  the  commencement 
of  December.  The  Bengal  army,  then  encamped  at  Fe- 
rozepore,  consisted  of  about  9500  men  of  all  arms.  The 
levy  that  had  been  raised  for  the  immediate  service  of 
Shah  Soojah  was  then  passing  through  Ferozepore.  It 
comprised  two  regiments  of  cavaliy;  four  regiments  of 
infantry ;  and  a  troop  of  horse  artillery — in  all  about 
6000  men.     It   had  marched  from  Loodhianah  on  the 


396  THE  ARMY  OP  THE  INDUS. 

15th  of  November,  under  the  command  of  Major-General 
Simpson ;  and  was  now  about,  on  the  2nd  of  December, 
to  commence  its  progress  across  the  frontier.  On  the 
10th  of  the  same  month' the  Bengal  division  was  to  break 
ground  from  Ferozepore. 

The  line  of  march  to  be  followed  by  the  invading  army 
ran,  in  a  south-westerly  direction,  through  the  territories 
of  Bahwulpore,  and  thence  crossed,  near  Subzulkote,  the 
frontier  of  Sindh,  striking  down  to  the  banks  of  the  Indus, 
and  crossing  the  river  at  Bukkur.  It  then  took  a  north- 
westerly course,  passing  through  Shikarpoor,  Bhag,  and 
Dadur  to  the  mouth  of  the  Bolan  Pass ;  thence  through  the 
pass  to  Quettah,  and  from  Quettah  through  the  Kojuck,  to 
Candahar.  A  glance  at  any  map  of  the  countries  on  the 
two  sides  of  the  Indus  will  satisfy  the  reader  at  once  that 
this  was  a  strangely  devious  route  from  Ferozepore  to 
Candahar.  The  army  was  about  to  traverse  two  sides  of 
a  triangle,  instead  of  shaping  its  course  along  the  third. 

But  it  was  hardly  a  subject  for  after-consideration,  when 
the  tripartite  treaty  had  been  signed,  what  route  should 
be  taken  by  the  army  destined  for  the  restoration  of  Shah 
Soojah  to  his  old  dominions.  It  had  from  the  first  been 
intended  that  the  Shah  should  proceed  through  the  Sindh 
country,  whilst  Runjeet's  troops  were  advancing  through 
the  Khybur  Pass.  It  was  not,  indeed,  a  geographical  but 
a  political  question.  It  was  necessary  that  the  army 
should  proceed  through  Sindh,  for  Runjeet  Singh  did  not 
will  that  it  should  traverse  the  Punjab ;  and  the  Ameers 
were  to  be  coerced. 

It  had  been  determined,  in  the  first  instance,  that 
twenty  lakhs  of  rupees  should  be  paid  by  the  Ameers 
of  Sindh,  as  ransom-money,  for  Shikarpoor.  Runjeet,  as 
has  been  seen,  asked  for  more  than  a  moiety  of  the  money, 
which  it  was  proposed  to  divide  equally  between  him  and 
ShaJi,  Soojah ;   and,  as  it  was  not  deemed  expedient  by 


TREATMENT   OF   THE   AMEERS    OF    SINDH.  397 

the  British  Government  to  gratify  Runjeet's  cupidity  at 
the  expense  of  the  King,  it  was  determined  that  the 
amount  demanded  from  the  Ameers  should  be  increased, 
and  that  Runjeet  should  receive  fifteen  instead  of  ten 
lakhs,  without  injury  to  the  claims  of  his  ally.  But  there 
seemed  to  be  some  doubt  whether  the  Ameers  would  con- 
sent to  pay  the  money  thus  appropriated  to  others'  uses. 
The  Shikarpoor  question,  indeed,  required  some  definite 
settlement  by  Shah  Soojah  himself;  and  as  Shah  Soojah 
was  to  proceed  through  Sindh,  for  the  piu-pose  of  bringing 
the  Ameers  to  a  proper  understanding  of  their  duties,  it 
was  necessary  that  the  British  army  that  escorted  him 
should  march  by  the  same  route. 

That  the  Ameers  should  have  demurred  to  the  payment 
of  the  money  claimed  by  an  exile  of  thirty  years'  standing 
would,  under  any  circumstances,  have  been  a  result  of  the 
demand,  exciting  no  surprise  in  the  mind  of  any  reason- 
able being  on  one  side  of  the  Indus  or  on  the  other.  But 
that,  having  already  received  a  formal  release  from  the 
Shah,  they  should  have  objected  to  the  revival  of  an 
abandoned  claim,  is  something  so  natural  and  so  intelli- 
gible that  it  would  have  been  a  miracle  if  they  had  not 
resisted  the  demand.  Colonel  Pottinger  saw  this  at  once  : 
he  saw  the  injustice  of  the  whole  proceeding;  and  he 
wrote  to  the  Supreme  Government  :  "  The  question  of  a 
money-payment  by  the  Ameers  of  Sindh  to  Shah  Soojah- 
ool-Moolk  is,  in  my  humble  opinion,  rendered  very 
puzzling  by  two  releases  written  in  Korans,  and  sealed 
and  signed  by  his  Majesty,  which  they  have  produced. 
Their  argument  now  is,  that  they  are  sure  the  Governor- 
General  does  not  intend  to  make  them  pay  again  for  what 
they  have  already  bought  and  obtained,  in  the  most  bind- 
ing way,  a  receipt  in  full."* 

*  Colonel  H.  Pottinger  to  Government :  Published  Papers  relating 
to  Sindh. 


398  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  INDUS. 

Injustice  ever  begets  injustice.  It  was  determined  by 
the  Simlah  Council  that  Shah  Soojah  and  the  Army  of 
the  Indus  should  be  sent  through  the  country  of  the 
Ameers.  To  accomplish  this,  it  was  necessary  that,  in 
the  first  instance,  an  existing  treaty  should  be  set  aside. 
When  the  Ameers  consented  to  open  the  navigation  of 
the  Indus,  it  was  expressly  stipulated  that  no  military 
stores  should  be  conveyed  along  the  river.  But  as  soon 
as  ever  Lord  Auckland  had  resolved  to  erect  a  friendly 
power  in  Afghanistan,  and  to  march  a  British  army  across 
the  Indus,  it  became  necessary  to  tear  this  prohibitory- 
treaty  to  shreds,  and  to  trample  down  the  scruples  of  the 
Ameers.  ''Whilst  the  present  exigency  lasts,"  it  was 
intimated  to  Colonel  Pottinger,  "you  may  apprise  the 
Ameers  that  the  article  of  the  treaty  with  them,  prohibit- 
ing the  using  of  the  Indus  for  the  conveyance  of  military 
stores,  must  necessarily  be  suspended  during  the  coiu^e 
of  operations  undertaken  for  the  permanent  establishment 
of  security  to  all  those  who  are  a  party  to  the  treaty." 
And  that  there  might  be  no  miscomprehension  of  the 
general  course  of  policy,  which  the  Governor-General 
desired  to  pursue  towards  the  Ameers,  a  letter  was  ad- 
dressed to  Colonel  Pottinger,  stating  that  "  he  (the  Gover- 
nor-General) deems  it  hardly  necessary  to  remind  you 
that  in  the  important  crisis  at  which  we  are  arrived, 
we  cannot  permit  our  enemies  to  occupy  the  seat  of 
power :  the  interests  at  stake  are  too  great  to  admit  of 
hesitation  in  our  proceedings ;  and  not  only  they  who 
have  shown  a  disposition  to  favour  our  adversaries,  but 
they  who  display  an  unwillingness  to  aid  us  in  the  just 
and   necessary*  undertaking   in  which  we   are  engaged, 

*  "Just  and  necessary  !" 

Earth  is  sick, 

And  Heaven  is  weary  of  the  hollow  words 
Which  States  and  Kingdoms  utter  when  they  talk 
Of  truth  and  justice. 


TREATMENT   OF    THE   AMEERS.  399 

must  be  displaced,  and  give  way  to  othei*s  on  whose 
friendship  and  co-operation  we  may  be  able  implicitly  to 
rely."  This  was  the  dragooning  system  now  to  be  carried 
out  in  Sindh.  Sensible  of  the  injustice  of  such  proceed- 
ings, and  the  discreditable  breach  of  faith  that  they  in- 
volved. Colonel  Pottinger  did  his  best  to  soften  down 
these  intimations ;  but  still  the  naked  fact  remained,  that 
if  the  Ameers  of  Sindh  displayed  any  unwillingness  to 
co-operate  with  the  parties  to  a  treaty  under  which  they 
were  to  be  fined  a  quarter  of  a  million  of  money,  they 
were  at  once  to  be  dragooned  into  submission  and  de- 
prived of  their  possessions,  at  the  point  of  our  bayonets 
and  the  muzzles  of  om*  guns.  * 

The  system  now  to  be  adopted  was  one  of  universal 
intimidation  and  coercion.  Along  the  whole  line  of  coun- 
try which  the  armies  were  to  traverse,  the  will  and  plea- 
sure of  the  British  Government  was  to  be  the  only  prin- 
ciple of  action  recognisable  in  all  our  transactions  with 
the  weaker  States,  which  were  now  to  be  dragooned  into 

*  I  do  not  intend  to  enter  into  the  politics  of  Sindh  more  than  is 
absolutely  necessary  to  the  elucidation  of  the  history  of  the  war  in 
Afghanistan  ;  but  it  ought  to  be  mentioned  here  that  the  harsh  and 
unjust  treatment  of  the  Ameers  in  1838-39  has  been  defended  or 
extenuated  upon  the  grounds  of  an  alleged  traitorous  correspondence 
with  Mahomed  Shah  of  Persia.  A  letter  from  one  of  the  Ameers  to 
the  "King  of  Kings"  was  intercepted,  but  Colonel  Pottinger  declared 
that  it  was  of  no  political  importance,  but  simply  an  ebullition  of 
Sheeahism,  addressed  to  Mahomed  Shah  as  Defender  of  the  Faith. — 
[CwTespondence  relating  to  Afghanistan.]  A  letter,  also  said  to  have 
been  written  by  the  Persian  King  to  two  of  the  Ameers  (Mahomed 
Khan  and  Nussur  Khan),  acknowledging  the  receipt  of  letters  from 
them,  and  exhorting  them  to  look  to  him  for  protection,  was  forwarded 
from  Khelat  to  Runjeet  Singh,  who  sent  it  in  through  Captain  Wade 
to  the  Governor-General.  But  Major  Todd,  who  by  this  time  had 
joined  Shah  Soojah  at  Loodhianah,  "did  not  hesitate  to  pronounce  it, 
from  its  style  and  language,  to  be  a  palpable  fabrication." — [Captain 
Wade  to  Mr.  Macnagkten,  October  24,  1838.     MS.  Becords.] 


400  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  INDUS. 

prompt  obedience.  Their  co-operation  was  not  to  be 
sought,  but  demanded.  Anything  short  of  hearty  acqui- 
escence was  to  be  interpreted  into  a  national  offence.  The 
Khan  of  Bahwulpore  and  the  Ameers  of  Sindh  were 
ordered  not  only  to  suffer  the  passage  of  our  troops 
through  their  dominions  but  also  to  supply  them  on 
their  way.  The  former  had  ever  been  regarded  as  one  of 
the  staunchest  friends  of  the  British  Government ;  but 
when  he  was. called  upon  to  collect  camels. and  to  place 
supplies  at  the  different  stages  for  the  use  of  the  army, 
the  work  was  carried  on  with  obvious  reluctance.  It  was 
found  necessary  to  remind  the  Khan  of  his  "  obligations  " 
and  "responsibilities."  His  officers  affected  to  believe 
that  the  British  force  would  not  march,  and,  whilst  laying 
in  supplies  for  the  Shah's  troops,  hesitated  to  make  an 
effort  in  behalf  of  our  supporting  columns.  The  "ob- 
stinacy and  perversity" — the  "duplicity  and  equivoca- 
tion"— the  "neglectful,  if  not  reckless  conduct  of  the 
Bahwulpore  authorities,"  was  severely  commented  upon 
by  oiu"  political  officers  ;*  and  it  was  apprehended  that 
the  march  of  the  army  would  be  delayed  by  the  mis- 
guided conduct  of  our  respectable  ally. 

The  reluctance  of  the  Bahwulpore  authorities  was  soon 
overcome ;  but  the  demands  made  upon  the  forbearance 
of  the  Ameers  of  Sindh  were  of  a  more  oppressive  and 
irritating  character.  The  Bahwul  Khan  has  ever  been 
held  up  to  admiration  as  the  most  consistently  friendly  of 
all  the  allies  of  the  British  Government ;  but  the  expe- 
dition was  distasteful  to  him  and  his  people,  and  the  real 
feeling  broke  out  in  the  beginning,  though,  after  a  while, 
it  was  suppressed.  It  is  not  strange,  therefore,  that  the 
Talpoor  Ameers,  of  whom  so  much  more  was  demanded, 
should  have  co-operated  somewhat  unwillingly  in  a  measure 

*  Captain  Wade  to  Mr.  Macnaghten,  Nov.  8  and  9,  1838.  MS. 
Records. 


TREATMENT    OF    THE    AMEERS.  401 

which  had  openly  exacted  from  them  a  large  amount  of 
treasure,  and  was  not  unlikely  in  the  end  to  deprive  them 
of  all  that  they  possessed.  Interpreted  into  homely 
English,  the  language  now  to  be  addressed  to  these  un- 
happy Princes  was  simply,  "  Your  money  or  your  life." 
Colonel  Pottinger  was  the  agent  employed,  in  the  fii'st 
instance,  to  dictate  terms  to  the  Court  of  Hyderabad  ; 
but  he  was  too  clear-headed  and  too  high-minded  a  man 
not  to  perceive  the  injustice  of  the  course  prescribed  by 
his  government,  and  to  feel  painfully  unwilling  to  pursue 
it.  The  instructions  he  had  received,  divested  of  the 
specious  outside  dress  of  diplomatic  phraseology,  and 
rendered  in  plain  English  by  Colonel  Pottinger  himself, 
were  truly  of  a  startling  character.  The  British  agent 
was  directed  to  tell  the  Ameera  that  "  the  day  they  con- 
nected themselves  with  any  other  power  than  England 
would  be  the  last  of  their  independence,  if  not  of  their 
rule."  "  Neither,"  it  was  added,  "  the  ready  power  to  crush 
and  annihilate  them,  nor  the  will  to  call  it  into  action, 
were  wanting,  if  it  appeared  requisite,  however  remotely, 
for  the  safety  or  integrity  of  the  Anglo-Indian  Empire  or 
frontier."  The  Ameers  were  known  to  be  weak;  and 
they  were  believed  to  be  wealthy.  Their  money  was  to 
be  taken  ;  their  country  to  be  occupied  ;  their  treaties  to 
be  set  aside  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet — but  amidst  a 
shower  of  hypocritical  expressions  of  friendship  and  good- 
will 

Whilst  Colonel  Pottinger,  not  without  some  scruples, 
was  enclosing  the  Ameers  of  Lower  Sindh  in  the  toils  of 
his  diplomacy.  Captain  Bumes,  who  by  this  time  had 
reaped  the  reward  of  his  services  in  knighthood  and  a 
lieutenant-colonelcy,  was  proceeding  to  operate  upon  the 
Princes  of  Beloochistan.  Originally  sent  upon  a  mission 
to  Mehi*ab  Khan  of  Khelat,  he  had  turned  aside,  however, 
to  negotiate  with   the   Ameers   of    Khyi'pore,    in  Upper 


402  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  INDUS. 

Siiidh,  and  had  found  them  more  tractable  than  the 
Hyderabad  Princes  in  Colonel  Pottinger's  hands.  It  was 
deemed  expedient  that  the  British  troops  should  cross  the 
Indus  at  Bukkur,  and  Bumes  was  instructed  to  obtain 
the  temporary  cession  of  the  island.  The  fortress  stands 
on  a  rock,  dividing  the  river  into  two  channels.  Appre- 
hending that  the  incursion  of  British  troops  into  their 
country  would  be  followed  by  acts  of  territorial  spoliation, 
the  Ameers  of  Khyrpore,  whilst  expressing  in  general 
terms  their  willingness  to  co-operate  with  our  government, 
expressly  stipulated  that  the  forts  on  either  bank  of  the 
river  were  to  be  untouched.  But  as  Bukkur  stood  on 
neither  bank,  but  on  an  island,  it  appeared  to  the  British 
diplomatist  that  the  wording  of  the  memorandum  actually 
placed  the  fortress  in  his  hands.  Ashamed,  however,  of 
such  an  exhibition  of  legal  acuteness,  he  declared  that  he 
had  no  intention  to  take  advantage  of  such  a  reading  of 
the  document ;  he  cited  it  merely  as  an  instance  of  the 
manner  in  which  very  cunning  people  sometimes  oveiTcach 
themselves.  There  was  no  need,  indeed,  to  look  for  flaws 
in  a  state  paper,  when  the  Army  of  the  Indus  was  assem- 
bling to  help  itself  to  what  it  liked.  The  Ameers  were 
told  that,  whatever  might  be  their  dislike  to  the  march 
of  our  troops  through  Sindh,  "  the  Sindhian  who  hoped 
to  stop  the  approach  of  the  British  army  might  as  well 
seek  to  dam  up  the  Indus  at  Bukkur."  The  fiat  had 
gone  forth,  an  army  was  to  march,  and  it  was  now  on 
the  road. 

There  was  every  reason  why  the  restoration  of  Shah 
Soojah,  who  was  famous  for  the  extravagance  of  his  pre- 
tensions in  the  direction  of  Sindh,  should  have  been 
viewed  with  apprehension  and  alami  by  the  Talpoor 
Ameers.  But  the  matter  now  began  to  wear  a  much 
more  formidable  aspect.  The  British  Government  had  not 
only  announced   its  intention   to   assist   the  long-exiled 


CONDUCT  OF  THE  AMEERS.  403 

monarch  in  his  attempt  to  regain  his  crown,  but  had  en- 
couraged him  to  assert  long  dormant  claims,  and  had 
announced  its  intention  to  march  an  army  into  the 
country  of  the  Ameers,  to  plant  a  subsidiary  force  there, 
to  compel  the  Princes  of  Sindh  to  pay  for  it,  to  knock 
down  and  set  up  the  Princes  themselves  at  discretion,  to 
take  possession  of  any  part  of  the  countiy  that  might  be 
wanted  for  our  own  purposes — in  fact,  to  treat  Sindh  and 
Beloochistan  in  all  respects  as  though  they  were  petty 
principalities  of  our  own.  That  the  Ameers  thus  stiiig- 
gling  in  our  grasp,  conscious  of  their  inability  openly  to 
resist  oppression,  should  have  writhed  and  twisted,  and 
endeavoured  to  extricate  themselves  by  the  guile  which 
might  succeed,  rather  than  by  the  strength  which  could 
not,  was  only  to  follow  the  universal  law  of  nature  in  all 
such  contests  between  the  weak  and  the  strong.  Mac- 
naghten  complained,  some  time  afterwards,  that  no  civi- 
lised beings  had  ever  been  treated  so  badly  as  were  the 
British  by  the  Princes  of  Sindh.  If  it  w^ere  so,  it  was 
only  because  no  civilised  beings  had  ever  before  committed 
themselves  to  acts  of  such  gross  provocation.  Through- 
out the  entire  period  of  British  connection  with  Afghan- 
istan, a  strange  moral  blindness  clouded  the  visions  of  our 
statesmen :  they  saw  only  the  natural,  the  inevitable 
results  of  their  own  measm-es,  and  forgot  that  those  mea- 
sures were  the  dragon's  teeth  from  which  sprung  up  the 
ai-med  men.  The  Ameers  of  Sindh  viewed  all  our  pro- 
ceedings at  this  time  w^ith  mingled  ten-or  and  indigna- 
tion. Our  conduct  was  calculated  to  alaim  and  incense 
them  to  the  extremest  point  of  fear  and  in'itation ;  and 
yet  we  talked  of  their  childish  disti*ust  and  their  unpro- 
voked hostility. 

The  Ameers  of  Sindh  were  told  that,  whether  they  were 
friendly  or  unfriendly  to  the  movement,  the  British  anny 
would  cross  the  Indus  when  and  w^here  our  government 

j>d2 


4C4r  THE   ARMY   OF   THE   INDUS. 

directed,  and  do  whatsoever  our  government  pleased — 
that  resistance  on  their  part  would  be  not  only  useless, 
but  insane,  as  it  would  bring  down  inevitable  destruction 
on  the  head  of  all  who  stood  up  to  oppose  us.  From  that 
time  these  unhappy  Princes  felt  that  they  ruled  only  by 
sufferance  of  the  British.  They  knew  their  helplessness, 
and  if  at  any  time  they  thought  of  open  resistance,  the 
idea  was  speedily  abandoned.  Two  British  armies  were 
bearing  down  upon  their  dominions — the  one  from  Upper 
India ;  the  other  from  the  Sea.  Burnes  and  the  Com- 
missariat officers  were  in  advance,  laying  in  supplies 
for  the  consumption  of  the  invading  force,  and  threaten- 
ing with  heavy  penalties  all  who  refused  to  co-operate 
with  them.  It  would  be  difficult  to  conceive  anything 
more  distressing  and  more  irritating;  and  yet  we  expected 
the  Ameers  to  open  their  arms  and  to  lay  down  their  trea- 
sures at  OLU"  feet. 

The  Bengal  army  moved  from  Ferozepore  on  the  10th 
of  December.*  Availing  themselves  of  the  water-carriage, 
they  moved  down  parallel  to  the  river.  The  sick,  the 
hospital  stores,  and  a  portion  of  our  Commissariat  supplies 
were  forwarded  on  boats,  which  were  subsequently  to  be 
used  for  the  bridging  of  the  Indus.  The  force  consisted 
of  about  9500  men  and  38,000  camp-followers.  Some 
30,000  camels  accompanied  the  army.t  There  was  an 
immense  assemblage  of  baggage.  Sir  Henry  Fane  had 
exhorted  the  officers  of  the  Army  of  the  Indus  not  to 

*  Shah  Soojah's  force  passed  through  Ferozepore  on  the  2nd. 
Major  Todd  accompanied  the  Shah.  Macnaghten  joined  the  royal 
camp  at  Shikarpoor. 

f  It  had  been  no  easy  matter  to  provide  can-iage-cattle  for  that 
immense  assemblage.  The  camels,  which  constituted  the  bulk  of  the 
beasts  of  burden,  had  been  mostly  drawn  on  hire  from  Bekaneer, 
Jaysulmer,  and  the  northern  and  north-western  provinces  of  India  ; 
but  the  country  had  been  so  drained,  that  at  last  it  became  necessary 
to  indent  upon  the  brood- camels  of  the  government  stud  at  Hissar. 


BAGGAGE    OF   THE    ARMY.  AOij' 

encumber  themselves  with  large  establishments  and  un- 
necessary equipages  ;  but  there  is  a  natural  disposition  on 
the  part  of  Englishmen,  in  all  quarters  of  the  globe,  to 
carry  their  comforts  with  them.  It  requires  a  vast  deal 
of  exhortation  to  induce  officers  to  move  lightly  equipped. 
The  more  difficult  the  country  into  which  they  are  sent 
— the  more  barbarous  the  inhabitants — the  more  trying 
the  climate — the  gi-eater  is  their  anxiety  to  suiTound 
themselves  with  the  comforts  which  remote  countries  and 
uncivilised  people  cannot  supply,  and  which  ungenial 
climates  render  more  indispensable.  In  the  turmoil  of 
actual  war,  all  these  light  matters  may  be  forgotten ;  but 
a  long,  a  wearisome,  and  unexciting  march  through  a 
difficult  but  uninteresting  country,  tries  the  patience  even 
of  the  best  of  soldiers,  and  fills  him  with  unappeasable 
yearnings  after  the  comforts  which  make  endm-able  tlie 
tedium  of  bariack  or  cantonment  life.  It  is  natural  that 
with  the  prospect  of  such  a  march  before  him,  he  should 
not  be  entirely  forgetful  of  the  pleasures  of  the  mess- 
table,  or  regardless  of  the  less  social  delights  of  the 
pleasant  volume  and  the  solacing  pipe.  Clean  linen,  too, 
is  a  luxury  which  a  civilised  man,  without  any  imputation 
upon  his  soldierly  qualities,  may,  in  moderation,  desire  to 
enjoy.  The  rudeness  and  barrenness  of  the  country 
compel  him  to  supply  himself  at  the  commencement  of 
his  journey  with  everything  that  he  will  require  in  the 
course  of  it ;  and  the  exigencies  of  the  climate  necessarily 
increase  the  extent  of  these  requirements.  The  expedi- 
tion across  the  Indus  had  been  prospectively  described 
as  a  "  grand  military  promenade  ; "  and  if  such  were  the 
opinion  of  some  of  the  highest  authorities,  it  is  not 
strange  that  officers  of  inferior  rank  should  have  endoi-sed 
it,  and  hastened  to  act  upon  the  suggestion  it  conveyed. 
And  so  marched  the  Army  of  the  Indus,  accompanied 
by  thousands  upon  thousands  of  baggage-laden    camels 


406  THE    ARMY    OF   THE    INDUS. 

and  other  beasts  of  burden,  spreading  themselves  for 
miles  and  miles  over  the  country,  and  making  up  with 
the  multitudinous  followers  of  the  camp  one  of  those 
immense  moving  cities,  which  are  only  to  be  seen  when 
an  Indian  army  takes  the  field,  and  streams  into  an 
enemy's  country. 

It  was  clear,  bright,  invigorating  weather — ^the  glorious 
cold  season  of  Northern  India — when  the  army  of  the 
Indus  entered  the  territories  of  Bahwul  Khan.  Nature 
seemed  to  smile  on  the  expedition,  and  circumstance  to 
favour  its  progress.  There  was  a  fine  open  country 
before  them ;  they  moved  along  a  good  road  f  supplies 
were  abundant  everywhere.  The  coyness  of  the  Bah- 
wulpore  authorities,  which  had  threatened  to  delay  the 
initial  march  of  the  army,  had  yielded  in  good  time, 
and  at  every  stage  Mackeson  and  Gordon  had  laid  up  in 
depot  stores  of  grain,  and  fodder,  and  firewood,  for  the 
consumption  of  man  and  beast,  t  Officers  and  soldiers 
were  in  the  highest  spirits.  "  These,"  it  was  said  by 
one  who  accompanied  the  army  on  the  staff  of  its  com- 
mander, and  has  chronicled  all  its  operations,t  "  were  the 
halcyon  days  of  the  movements  of  this  force."  To  the 
greater  number  who  now  crossed  the  frontier  this  was 

*  This  road,  some  280  miles  in  length,  had  been  prepared,  under 
Mackeson' s  directions,  to  facilitate  the  march  of  our  troops. 

i*  As  the  army  advanced,  the  Khan,  to  whose  court  Mackeson  had 
been  despatched  to  conclude  a  treaty  of  protective  alliance,  exerted 
himself  to  assist  the  enterprise,  and  exhibited  the  most  friendly  feeling 
towards  Shah  Soojah.  He  gave  the  Shah  two  guns — made  him  a 
present  of  money — sent  a  party  of  irregular  horse,  under  one  of  his 
chief  officers,  to  escort  him  through  the  Bahwulpore  dominions  ;  and 
allowed  the  officers  of  the  Shah's  contingent  to  recruit  their  regiment 
from  the  ranks  of  his  own  regular  infantry.  The  Shah's  regiments 
were  in  this  way  raised  to  their  full  strength,  six  hundred  men  having 
Jseen  drawn  from  the  Bahwulpore  army. — [MS.  Notes.'\ 

+  Captain  Havelock. 


SUFFERINGS    OF   THE   ARMY.  407 

their  virgin  campaign.  The  excitement  was  as  novel  as 
it  was  inspiriting.  They  might  be  about  to  meet  mighty 
armies  and  to  subdue  gi-eat  principahties ;  or  they  might 
only  be  entering  upon  a  "  grand  militaiy  promenade." 
Still  in  that  bright  December  weather  the  very  march 
through  a  strange  countiy,  with  all  that  great  and  motley 
assemblage,  was  something  joyous  and  animating.  The 
army  was  in  fine  health,  full  of  heart,  and  overflowing 
with  spirits.  It  seemed  as  if  an  expedition  so  auspiciously 
commenced  must  be  one  great  triumph  to  the  end. 

There  was  but  one  thing  to  detract  from  the  general 
prosperity  of  the  opening  campaign.  Desertion  was  going 
on  apace — not  from  the  ranks  of  the  fighting  men,  but 
from  the  mass  of  oflicers'  servants,  camel  drivers,  and 
camp-followers  which  streamed  out  from  the  rear  of  the 
army.  The  cattle,  too,  were  falling  sick  and  dying  by 
the  way-side.  The  provisions  with  which  they  were  sup- 
plied were  not  good,  and  dysentery  broke  out  among 
them.  Many  were  carried  off"  by  their  owners,  who 
shrunk  from  the  long  and  trying  journey  before  them  ; 
and  it  soon  became  manifest  that  the  most  formidable 
enemy  with  which  the  advancing  araiy  would  have  to 
contend,  would  be  a  scarcity  of  carriage  and  supplies. 

Even  in  those  early  days  the  voice  of  complaint  was 
not  wholly  silent  ;*  but  when  the  army  began  to  make 
its  toilsome  way  through  Sindh  and  Beloochistan,  there 
were  few  in  its  ranks  who  did  not  look  back  with  regi'et 
to  the  march  through  Bahwulpore,  when  all  their  wants 
had  been  supplied  in  a  manner  which  they  were  little 
likely  to  see  again.     It  was  on  the  29  th  of  December 

*  Some  of  the  Shah's  troops  were  very  unreasonable  in  their  expec- 
tations and  their  complaints.  The  raw  levies  of  horse,  just  recruited 
from  the  grain  districts  of  Upper  India,  made  violent  complaints 
because  they  foimd  that  to  the  westward  bai-ley  was  the  food  of 
horses. 


408  THE    ARMY    OF    THE    INDUS. 

that  the  head-quarters  of  the  army  reached  the  capital 
of  Bahwul  Khan's  country.  Sir  Henry  Fane,  who  had 
been  proceeding  down  the  river  by  water,  landed  from 
his  boats,  and  held  a  Durbar  on  the  following  day ;  and 
on  the  31st  returned  the  visit  of  state  which  the  Khan 
had  paid  him.*  On  the  first  day  of  the  new  year  the 
army  broke  ground  again,  and  set  out  for  the  frontier 
of  Sindh. 

On  the  14th  of  January,  the  head-quarters  of  the 
Army  of  the  Indus  entered  the  Sindh  territory  near  Sub- 
zulkote.  On  the  preceding  day.  Sir  Alexander  Burnes 
had  joined  the  British  camp  ;  and  though  he  had  ob- 
tained by  his  negotiations  the  cession  of  Bukkur  to  the 
British   Goveniment,t  for   such   time  as  it  might   seem 

*  Sir  Henry  Fane  was  much,  pleased  with,  the  economy  of  Bahwul 
Khan's  Court.  Though  not  on  an  extensiv^e  scale,  it  was  perhaps, 
better  ordered,  on  the  whole,  than  that  of  any  native  potentate  at  the 
time. 

+  The  cession  of  Bukkur  was  extremely  distasteful  to  Meer  Roostum. 
It  was  calculated  to  lower  him  in  the  eyes  both  of  the  other  Ameers 
and  of  his  own  subjects  ;  and  Bumes,  fearing  that  he  would  be 
dissuaded  by  his  relatives,  made  the  stipulation  for  the  surrender  of  the 
place  a  separate  article  of  the  treaty,  in  order  that  the  Ameer  might 
conceal  it  from  them  if  he  feared  that  they  would  remonstrate  against 
it.  When  Burnes  despached  Mohun  Lai  to  Khyrpore,  to  deliver  the 
treaty  and  the  separate  article,  "face  to  face,"  to  the  Ameer,  and  to 
demand  his  acceptance  of  its  terms,  *'  the  consternation,"  says  Burnes, 
"caused  by  this  public  declaration,  was  very  great.  The  Ameer  first 
offered  another  fort  in  its  stead  ;  next,  to  find  security  that  our  trea- 
sure and  munitions  were  protected  ;  but  the  Moonshee,  as  instructed, 
replied  to  all  that  nothing  but  the  unqualified  cession  of  the  fortress  of 
Bukkur,  during  the  war,  would  satisfy  me.  He  said  it  was  the  heart 
of  his  country,  his  honour  was  centred  in  keeping  it,  his  family  and 
children  would  have  no  confidence  if  it  were  given  up,  and  that  if  I 
came  to  Khyrpore  the  Ameer  could  speak  in  person  to  me  many  things. 
To  this  I  had  instructed  the  Moonshee  to  say,  that  it  was  impossible 
till  he  signed  the  treaty,  as  I  asked  a  plain  question  and  wanted  a 
plain  answer." — [Published  Papers.]     Earnestly  was  Meer  Roostum 


THE   CESSION    OF   BUKKUR.  409 

expedient  to  us  to  retain  it,  and  had  thus  secured  the 
peaceful  passage  of  the  Indus,  the  report  which  he  made 
of  the  general  feeling  of  the  Sindhians  was  not  veiy 
encouraging.  It  was  plain  that  our  armed  passage 
through  the  country  of  the  Ameers  was  extremely  dis- 
tasteful to  them  ;  and  that  if  they  did  not  break  out 
into  acts  of  open  hostility,  their  conduct  towards  us  was 
likely  to  be  marked  by  subterfuges,  evasions,  and  deceit 
of  every  possible  kind. 

And  presently  it  began  to  be  suspected  that  the  temper 
of  at  least  some  of  the  Talpoor  Princes  was  such,  that  a 
hostile  demonstration  against  them  was  little  likely  to  be 
avoided.  The  Hyderabad  Ameers  had  assumed  an  atti- 
tude of  defiance.  They  had  insulted  and  outraged  Colonel 
Pottinger,  and  were  now  collecting  troops  for  the  defence 

entreated  by  his  family  not  to  sign  the  treaty,  but  to  resist  the  unjust 
demand.  Greatly  perplexed  and  alarmed,  he  wrote  a  touching  letter 
of  entreaty  to  Burnes ;  but  by  this  time  his  doom  was  sealed.  It  was 
useless  for  him  any  longer  to  struggle  against  his  fate  ;  so  on  the  morning 
of  the  24th  of  December  he  sent  for  Mohun  Lai,  told  him  that  Burnes 
had  been  the  first  and  best  friend  of  the  Khyrpore  state,  but  that  he  had 
made  an  unexpected  demand  upon  him,  and  that  his  good  name  would 
be  irrecoverably  lost  if  Lord  Auckland  did  not  seize  upon  Kurachee,  or 
some  other  place  from  the  Hyderabad  family  ;  who  were  our  enemies, 
and  now  triumphing,  whilst  he,  our  dearest  friend,  was  thus  depressed. 
If  they  were  suffered  to  escape,  he  said,  that  his  only  course  would  be 
to  commit  suicide.  "With  this,"  wi'ote  Burnes  to  Government,  "and 
saying  Bismillah!  (in  the  name  of  God)  he  sealed  the  treaty  and  the 
separate  article  in  the  presence  of  All  Morad  l^^han,  Meer  Zungee, 
Soolaman  Abdur,  and  about  twenty  other  people."  A  day  or  two 
afterwards,  Burnes  himself  called  on  Meer  Roostum  and  received  his 
submission  in  person.  The  poor  old  man,  declaring  that  he  was  irre- 
trievably disgraced,  asked  what  he  could  now  do  to  prove  the  sincerity 
of  his  friendship  for  the  British  Government.  "The  answer  to  this 
declaration,"  wrote  Burnes,  "was  plain — to  give  us  orders  for  supplies, 
and  to  place  all  the  country  as  far  as  he  coidd  at  our  command — and 
he  has  done  so  as  far  as  he  can." — [Burnes  to  Government:  Khyr- 
pore,  Dec.  28,  1838.     Published  Papers.] 


410  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  INDUS. 

of  their  capital.  Sir  John  Keane,  with  the  Bombay  army, 
had  landed  at  Vikkur  at  the  end  of  November,  and,  after 
a  long  and  mortifying  delay,  had  made  his  way  on  to 
Tattah.  Having  come  by  sea,  he  was  necessarily  without 
carriage.  He  had  relied  upon  the  friendly  feelings  of  the 
Sindh  rulers ;  but  the  Sindh  rulers  were  not  disposed  to 
do  anything  for  him,  but  everything  against  him.  They 
regarded  the  British  General  as  an  enemy,  and  threw 
every  obstacle  in  his  way.  Sir  John  Keane  was  compelled, 
therefore,  to  remain  in  inactivity  on  the  banks  of  the 
river  until  the  24th  of  December.  A  supply  of  carriage 
from  Cutch,  by  nO  means  adequate  to  the  wants  of  the 
force,  but  most  welcome  at  such  a  time,  came  opportunely 
to  release  Sir  John  Keane  from  this  local  bondage,  and 
the  Bombay  column  then  commenced  its  march  into 
Sindh.  Proceeding  up  the  right  bank  of  the  Indus  to 
Tattah,  and  thence  to  Jerruk,  he  awaited  at  the  latter 
place  the  result  of  the  negotiations  which  were  going  on 
at  Hyderabad.  Captain  Outram  and  Lieutenant  East- 
wick  had  been  despatched  to  the  Court  of  the  Ameers 
with  Lord  Auckland's  ultimatum ;  and  Keane  with  the 
Bombay  column,  was  now,  at  the  end  of  January,  await- 
ing the  result. 

Surrounded  by  his  own  contingent,  Shah  Soojah  had 
proceeded  in  advance  of  the  Bengal  column ;  arid  his 
force  had  crossed  the  Indus,  in  very  creditable  order, 
before  the  end  of  the  third  week  of  Januaiy.  Shikar- 
poor  had  been  fixed  upon  as  the  place  of  rendezvous. 
There  the  force  was  now  encamped,  and  there  the  Envoy 
and  Minister  joined  the  suite  of  the  Douranee  monarch. 

Cotton  was  to  have  crossed  the  Indus  at  Rohree, 
which  lies  opposite  to  the  fort  of  Bukkur.  Some  delay 
had  taken  place  in  the  cession  of  the  fortress ;  for  the 
Bengal  column  had  arrived  on  the  banks  of  the  river 
before  the  treaty  with  the  Ameer  of  Khyrpore,  by  which 


THE    CESSION    OF   BUKKUR.  411 

it  was  to  be  ceded,  had  arrived  with  the  ratification  of 
the  Governor-General ;  and  after  its  arrival,  some  further 
delay  was  occasioned,  either  by  the  mistrust  or  by  the 
guile  of  the  Sindh  ruler.  He  was  not  ignorant  of  the 
state  of  affairs  at  Hyderabad.  He  knew,  or  suspected, 
that  there  was  a  likelihood  of  a  large  portion  of  the 
Bengal  column  being  detached,  and  he  was  eager  to 
temporise.  Something  might  be  written  down  in  the 
chapter  of  accidents,  that  might  enable  him  to  retain 
possession  of  Bukkur ;  or  something  might  be  gained  by 
the  detention  of  Cotton's  troops.  It  was  not,  therefore, 
till  the  29th  of  January  that  the  British  flag  waved  from 
the  fort  of  Bukkur — and  even  when  the  detachment  of 
troops,  which  was  to  receive  possession,  crossed  the  river, 
opposition  seemed  so  probable,  that  some  powder-bags, 
wherewith  to  blow  in  the  gates  of  the  fort,  were  stowed 
away  in  one  of  the  boats. 

The  military  authorities  now  determined  to  despatch 
the  greater  part  of  the  Bengal  column  down  the  left 
bank  of  the  Indus  to  co-operate  with  Sir  John  Keane 
against  Hyderabad.  Bumes  entirely  approved  of  the 
movement,*  It  does  not  appear  that  Keane  had  then 
made  any  requisition  for  more  troops,  t    The  two  columns, 

*  "The  aspect  of  affairs  to  the  south  being  anything  but  satisfac- 
tory, the  Commander-in-Chief  intimated  to  me,  in  the  presence  of 
General  Cotton,  that  the  passage  of  the  army  across  the  Indus,  even 
had  the  bridge  been  ready,  which  it  will  not  be  for  ten  days,  was 
inexpedient,  whilst  matters  were  unadjusted  at  Hyderabad — that  it  was 
further  his  decided  opinion  that  a  portion  of  the  army  should  at  once 
march  down  towards  Hyderabad.  Participating  entirely  in  these 
sentiments,  rs  far  as  political  matters  were  concerned,  I  felt  myself 
bound  to  give  the  fullest  effect  to  tlie  views  of  his  Excellency,  and 
notify  the  intended  inovement  of  the  troops  to  the  south  to  Meer 
Roostum  Khan." — [Sir  A.  Bumes  to  Government:  Rohree,  January 
28,  1839.     MS.  Reccyrda.] 

+  Some  days  after  Cotton's  force  had  moved  down  the   river,  a 


412  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  INDUS. 

indeed,  were  entirely  ignorant  of  each  other's  operations. 
Thus  early  the  want  of  an  intelligence-department  was 
painfully  apparent;  but  up  to  the  last  day  of  our  con- 
nection with  Afghanistan  nothing  was  done,  nor  has  any- 
thing been  done  in  more  recent  wars,  to  remedy  the 
admitted  evil.  Down  the  left  bank  of  the  Indus  went 
Cotton  with  his  troops,  glorying  in  the  prospect  before 
them.  The  treasures  of  Hyderabad  seemed  to  lie  at  their 
feet.  Never  was  there  a  more  popular  movement.  The 
troops  pushed  on  in  the  highest  spirits,  eager  for  the 
affray — confident  of  success.  An  unanticipated  harvest 
of  honour — an  unexpected  promise  of  abundant  prize- 
money  was  within  their  reach.  A  march  of  a  few  days 
would  bring  them  under  the  walls  of  Hyderabad,  to 
humble  the  pride  of  the  Ameers,  and  to  gather  up  their 
accumulated  wealth. 

But  there  was  one  man  then  on  the  borders  of  the 
Indus  to  whom  this  movement  down  the  left  bank  of 
the  river  was  a  source  of  unmixed  dissatisfaction.  Mr. 
Macnaghten,  who,  under  the  title  of  Envoy-and-Minister 
at  the  Court  of  Shah  Soojah,  had  been  appointed  political 
director  of  the  campaign,  viewed  with  alarm  the  departure 
of  Sir  Willoughby  Cotton  from  Eohree,  just  as  it  'was 
hoped  that  the  Bengal  column  was  about  to  cross  to  the 
right  bank  of  the  river.  The  Shah,  with  his  contingent, 
was  at  Shikarpoor.  Macnaghten  had  joined  the  royal 
camp.  The  King  and  the  Envoy  were  alike  eager  to 
push  on  to  Candahar ;  but,  deserted  by  the  Bengal  troops, 
they  were  compelled  to  remain  in  a  state  of  absolute 
paralysis.  Seldom  has  any  public  functionary  been  sur- 
rounded by  more  embarrassing  circumstances  than  those 
which,  at   this   time,  beset   Macnaghten.     At   the   very 

requisition  came  for  a  troop  of  horse  artillery,  a  detacliment  of  cavalry, 
and  a  brigade  of  infantry. — [HavelocJc's  Narrative.] 


VIEWS    OF    MR.   MACNAGHTEN.  413 

outset  of  the  campaign  there  was  a  probabihty  of  the  civil 
and  military  authorities  being  brought  into  perilous  col- 
Hsion.  The  Envoy  looked  aghast  at  the  movement  upon 
Hyderabad,  for  he  believed  it  involved  an  entire  sacrifice 
of  the  legitimate  objects  of  the  campaign.  It  appeared 
to  him,  in  this  conjunctiu*e,  to  be  plainly  his  duty,  as  the 
representative  of  the  British- Indian  Government,  to  take 
upon  himself  the  responsibility  of  preventing  the  march 
for  the  restoration  of  Shah  Soojah  from  being  converted 
into  a  campaign  in  Sindh.  Yet  to  no  man  could  the 
assertion  of  such  authority  be  more  painful  than  to  one 
of  Macnaghten's  temper  and  habits.  It  was  certain  that 
the  military  chiefs  would  resent  his  interference,  and  that 
the  whole  army  would  be  against  him.  But  he  turned 
his  face  steadfastly  towards  Candahar;  and  determined  to 
arrest  the  progress  of  the  Bengal  column  on  its  march  to 
the  Sindh  capital. 

In  what  light  this  diversion  was  viewed  by  him,  and 
for  what  reasons  he  deprecated  it,  Macnaghten's  letters, 
written  at  this  time,  indicate  with  sufficient  distinctness ; 
and  it  is  just,  therefore,  that  in  a  matter  which  has  en- 
tailed some  odium  upon  him,  he  should  be  suffered  to 
speak  for  himself : 

*'  The  Governor-General,"  he  wrote  to  Burnes,  "  never  seems  to 
have  contemplated  the  diversion  of  the  army  of  the  Indus  from 
its  original  purpose,  except  on  emergency.  No  such  emergency 
appears  to  have  arisen.  "We  are  utterly  ignorant  of  the  state  of 
affairs  below.  It  is  hardly  possible  to  conceive  that  matters  should 
not  have  been  settled,  unless  under  the  very  improbable  supposi- 
tion that  Sir  J.  Keane  should  be  waiting  for  reinforcements,  or 
that  a  suspension  of  hostilities  may  have  been  agreed  upon, 
pending  the  receipt  of  further  instructions  from  the  Governor- 
General.  In  the  first  place  it  may  be  presumed  that  the  Bombay 
reserve  will  reach  Sir  John  Keane  long  ere  Sir  Willoughby  Cotton 
can  do  so.  In  the  latter  case,  it  is  probable  that  the  suggestions 
with  which  I  have  this  day  furnished  Colonel  Pottinger,  will  bring 
matters  to  an  amicable  conclusion.     As  far  as  I  have  learnt  the 


414  THE    ARMY    OF   THE    INDUS. 

motives  of  Sir  W.  C's  movement  down  the  left  bank  of  the  Indus, 
it  was  with  a  view  of  creating  a  diversion,  and  never  with  any 
intention  of  actually  proceeding  all  the  way  to  Hyderabad.  The 
effect  of  the  movement  whatever  it  may  have  been,  must  have  been 
already  produced.  At  all  events,  by  crossing  to  this  side  of  the 
river,  the  effect  will  rather  be  heightened  than  lessened;  while,  if 
the  force  should  not  be  required  further,  it  might  be  all  ready  to 
proceed  at  the  proper  season  to  its  original  destination  in  Afghan- 
istan. I  should  hope  in  less  than  ten  days  from  this  date  to 
receive  a  reply  from  Colonel  Pottinger;  and,  in  the  mean  time,  the 
boats  might  be  got  ready  to  proceed  with  the  troops  downwards, 
should  their  services  be  required.  Thus  no  time  would  be  lost. 
But,  as  in  that  case  there  could  be  little  hope  of  the  return  of  the 
troops  to  proceed  this  season  into  Afghanistan,  I  would  strongly 
urge  that  a  force,  to  the  extent  specified  in  the  second  paragraph  of 
this  letter  (one  European  regiment,  one  Native  cavalry,  a  troop  of 
horse  artillery,  with  a  suitable  battering  train),  with  a  suflficiency 
of  carriage-cattle  for  itself  and  Shah  Soojah's  army,  should  be 
directed  to  proceed  to  Shikarpoor.  With  such  a  force  I  am  clearly 
of  opinion  that  the  views  of  the  Governor-General,  in  regard 
to  Afghanistan,  could  be  carried  into  effect  during  the  present 
season.  The  consequences  of  losing  a  whole  season  ai"e  not  to  be 
foreseen."  * 

In  another  letter  he  vncote  to  the  Governor-General — 
and  the  passage  has  an  additional  interest,  as  affording, 
for  the  first  time,  a  glimpse  of  the  unreasonable  character 
of  Shah  Soojah,  and  the  extent  to  which  his  Majesty's 
peculiarities  heightened  the  difficulties  of  Macnaghten's 
position  : 

We  should  not,  I  think,  on  any  account,  lose  the  season  for 
advancing  upon  Candahar.  With  our  European  regiment,  some 
more  artillery,  a  couple  of  Native  regiments,  and  a  small  battering 
train,  we  might  not  only  occupy  Candahar,  but  relieve  Herat ;  and 
by  money,  if  we  have  no  disposable  troops,  make  Caubul  too  hot 
for  Dost  Mahomed. 

The  Shah  is  veiy  solicitous  about  future  operations,  and,  I  am 
sorry  to  say,  talks  foolishly  eveiy  time  I  see  him  on  the  subject  of 

*  Unpublished  Correspondence  of  Sir  W.  H.  MacnagTiten. 


VIEWS    OF    MR.  MACNAGHTEN.  415 

his  confined  territories  that  are  to  be — and  frequently  says  it 
would  be  much,  better  for  him  to  have  remained  at  Loodhianah. 
The  next  time  he  touches  on  the  subject,  I  intend  to  remind  him  of 
the  verse  of  Sadi,  "  If  a  king  conquers  seven  regions  he  vv'ould 
still  be  hankering  after  another  territory."  I  have  little  doubt  of 
being  able  to  bring  him  into  a  more  reasonable  temper  of  mind. 
He    is  much  delighted  with  the  four   six-pounders    presented  to 

him  by   your  Lordship I  hardly  think  it  probable  that 

50,000  rupees  per  mensem  will  suffice  for  the  Shah's  expenses,  but 
on  this  point  I  will  write  to  your  Lordship  more  fully  on  another 
occasion.* 

And  again  he  wrote,  soon  afterwards,  to  Mr.  Colvin  : 

I  grieve  to  say  that  I  have  no  consolation  to  afford  you.  Our 
accounts  from  every  quarter  as  to  what  is  really  passing  are  most 
unsatisfactory,  and  Sir  Willoughby  Cotton  is  clearly  going  on  a 
wild-goose  chase.  He  cannot  possibly,  I  think,  be  at  Hyderabad 
under  twenty-five  days  from  this  date,  and  he  seems  to  be  travel- 
ling by  a  route  which  has  no  road.  He  will  soon,  I  fear,  find 
himself  in  the  jungle.  If  this  goes  on  as  it  is  now  doing,  what  is 
to  become  of  our  Afghan  expedition  Burnes's  letters  are  most 
unsatisfactory.  + 

He  had  hardly  despatched  the  letter  from  which  this 
last  passage  is  taken,  when  a  communication  from  the 
Governor-General  was  pnt  into  his  hands,  and  it  became 
more  than  ever  obvious  from  its  contents,  that  Lord 
Auckland's  first  wish  was,  that  the  Bengal  column  should 
accompany  Shah  Soojah  and  his  contingent  as  expedi- 
tiously as  possible  to  Candahar.  Fortified  by  these 
advices,  Macnaghten,  on  the  following  day,  wrote,  in  em- 
phatic language  to  Sir  Willoughby  Cotton,  in  virtue  of  the 
powder  vested  in  him  by  the  Governor-General,  requiring 
that  mihtary  chief  to  furnish  him  w4th  a  force  sufficient 
to  enable  him  to  give  effect  to  his  Lordship's  plans  in 
Afghanistan  : 

*    Unpublished  Correspondence  of  Sir  W.  IT.  Macnaghten, 
t  Ibid.,  Feb.  5, 1839. 


416  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  INDUS. 

"  I  have  already  urged,"  he  added,  "  in  the  strongest  terms,  your 
crossing  over  to  this  side  of  the  river  with  your  whole  force.  Of 
Sir  John  Keane's  army  there  can  be  no  apprehension.  His 
Excellency  will  always  be  able  to  keep  up  his  communication  with 
the  sea,  whilst  your  presence  on  this  side  would  enable  us  to 
establish  a  strong  post  at  the  extremity  of  the  Sindh  territories,  and 
ensure  the  safety  of  the  supplies  for  the  Army  of  the  Indus  in  its 
advance  into  Afghanistan.  The  Ameers  cannot  for  any  length  of 
time  keep  up  an  army — they  must  be  reduced  to  act  on  the 
defensive,  and  then  the  result  could  hardly  be  doubtful.  Dangerous 
as  the  experiment  might  be,  it  would,  in  my  opinion,  be  infinitely 
better  that  we  should  let  loose  fifteen  or  twenty  thousand  of 
Runjeet  Singh's  troops  (who  would  march  down  upon  Hyderabad 
in  a  very  short  space  of  time),  than  that  the  grand  enterprise  of 
restoring  Shah  Soojah  to  the  throne  of  Caubul  and  Candahar 
should  be  postponed  for  an  entire  season.  By  such  a  postponement 
it  might  be  frustrated  altogether." 

Thus  were  the  mihtary  and  pohtical  authorities  brought 
into  a  state  of  undisguised  antagonism.  Circumstances, 
however,  had  already  occurred  to  unravel  the  web  of  diffi- 
culty that  had  been  cast  around  them.  The  progress  of 
the  Bengal  column  towards  Hyderabad  was  arrested  by 
the  receipt  of  intelligence  to  the  effect  that  the  Ameers, 
awed  by  impending  danger,  had  submitted  to  the  demands 
of  the  British  Government.  Outram  and  Eastwick  had 
been  from  the  20th  of  January  to  the  4th  of  February  at 
Hyderabad  negotiating  with  them,  and  after  much  reason- 
able doubt  of  the  issue  had  received  their  submission.* 
They  had  consented  to  pay  the  money  which  had  been 
required  from  them,  and  it  was  believed  that  it  would 
soon  be  paid.t  They  had  consented  to  the  terms  of  a 
stringent  treaty,  which  had  been  fastened  upon  them 
by  the  British  authorities,  and  agreed  to  pay  annually 

*  See  Outram^s  Rough  Notes. 
t  Their  share  was  twenty  lakhs  of  rupees,  a  moiety  of  which  was 
paid  down.    Seven  more  lakhs,  making  up  the  gross  amount  to  be  paid 
by  the  Talpoor  Princes,  were  paid  by  the  Ameer  of  Khyrpore. 


SUBMISSION    OF   THE   AMEERS.  417 

three  lakhs  of  rupees  for  the  support  of  a  British  sub- 
sidiary force  in  their  dominions.  Cotton  was,  there- 
fore, instructed  to  halt  his  division;  and  on  the  very 
7th  of  February  on  which  Macnaghten  had  written  and 
despatched  the  letter  which  I  have  above  quoted,  the 
hopes  of  the  Bengal  column  were  dashed  by  the  an- 
nouncement that  Hyderabad  and  its  treasures  were  no 
longer  lying  at  their  feet.  The  Ameers  paid  an  instal- 
ment of  the  tribute-money,  and  Cotton,  to  the  great  joy 
of  the  Envoy,  but  to  the  extreme  disappointment  of  his 
troops,  retraced  his  steps  to  Kohree,  and  prepared  to 
effect  the  passage  of  the  river,  whilst  Keane,  with  the 
Bombay  column,  moved  up  along  the  right  bank  of  the 
Indus,  and  saw,  through  the  dusty  atmosphere  of  Lower 
Sindh,  the  palace  and  the  city  where  was  stored  the 
gathered  wealth  which  was  to  have  enriched  his  army. 

Halting  for  some  days  opposite  Hyderabad,*  the  Bom- 
bay troops  received  intelligence  to  the  effect  that  the 
Reserve  which  had  been  sent  to  their  assistance  from  the 
Presidency  had  arrived  at  Kurachee,  under  Brigadier 
Valiant.  The  40th  Queen's  Regiment  formed  a  portion 
of  this  brigade.  It  had  been  brought  from  Bombay  in 
a  seventy-four  gun-ship — the  Wellesley — and  Admiral 
Sir  Frederick  Maitland  was  on  board.  In  the  position 
which  affairs  had  assumed  in  Lower  Sindh,  it  seemed 
desirable  that  the  English  should  possess  themselves  of 
the  fort  of  Kurachee  ;  so  the  Admiral  summoned  it  to  sur- 


*  "The  city  of  Hyderabad,"  says  Dr.  James  Bumes,  in  his  Visit  to 
the  Court  of  Sindh,  an  interesting  and  valuable  work,  "is  a  collection 
of  -wretched  low  mud  hovels,  as  destitute  of  the  means  of  defence  as 
they  are  of  external  elegance  or  internal  comfort ;  and  even  the  boasted 
stronghold  of  the  Ameer,  which  surmounts  their  capital,  is  but  a 
paltry  erection  of  ill-burnt  bricks,  crumbling  gradually  to  decay,  and 
perfectly  incapable  of  withstanding  for  an  hour  the  attack  of  regular 
troops." 

VOL.  I.  E  K 


418  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  INDUS. 

render.  The  answer  of  the  Commandant  was  a  gallant 
one.  "  I  am  a  Beloochee,"  he  said,  "  and  I  will  die 
first."  With  characteristic  mendacity  the  Sindhian  boat- 
men in  the  harbour  declared  that  the  place  was  prepared 
to  withstand  a  siege,  and  that  one  of  the  Ameers  had 
come  down  with  an  army  of  3000  men.  The  English 
sailor  had  now  an  answer  to  give  as  gallant  as  that  of 
the  Beloochee  chief.  "  The  more  the  better,"  he  said ; 
"we  shall  have  the  first  trial  of  them."  Everything  was 
soon  ready  for  the  attack.  But  British  humanity  again 
interposed,  and  Maitland  a  second  time  summoned  the 
garrison  to  surrender.  The  reply  was  a  w^ord  of  defiance, 
and  a  shot  from  the  fort.  Then  was  heard  by  the  gar- 
rison that  which  had  never  been  heard  there  before,  and 
of  which  they  had  no  conception — a  broadside  from  an 
English  man-of-war.  The  Welleslei/s  guns  did  their 
work  in  less  than  an  hour,  and  the  British  coloiu^  soon 
floated  over  the  place.  The  garrison  had  consisted  of 
only  some  twenty  men.  * 

On  the  20th  of  February,  Sir  Willoughby  Cotton, 
with  the  head-quarters  of  his  force,  arrived  at  Shikar- 
poor.  On  the  morning  of  that  day  the  General  and 
the  Envoy  were  for  some  time  in  conference  with  each 
other.  The  discussion  was  a  long  and  a  stormy  one. 
The  General  seems  to  have  anticipated  the  interference 
of  Macnaghten,  and  to  have  resented  it  before  it  took 
any  really  offensive  shape.  The  two  officers  looked  on 
each  other  with  suspicion.  The  General  leapt  hastily 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  civilian  was  determined  to 
overrule  his  military  authority ;  and  the  Envoy,  on  the 
other  side,  thought  that  the  soldier  regarded  him,  the 
King  and  the  King's  army,  with  something  veiy  like 
contempt.     Macnaghten  wanted  caniage  for  the  Shah's 

•  Kennedy. 


COTTON   AND    MACNAGHTEN.  419 

force,  and  asked  for  1000  camels.  Sir  Willoughby  re- 
sented this  as  an  act  of  interference ;  accused  the  Envoy 
of  wishing  to  assume  the  command  of  the  army,  and  de- 
clared that  he  knew  no  superior  authority  but  that  of 
Sir  John  Keane.  At  this,  and  at  subsequent  meetings, 
the  Enyoy  urged  that  he  had  no  intention  of  interfering 
with  the  military  movements  of  the  General,  but  that  if 
he  thought  it  for  the  good  of  the  service  that  Shah 
Soojah  should  be  left  behind,  the  matter  must  be  referred 
for  the  decision  of  the  Governor-General  In  the  evening 
they  met  at  dinner  in  the  Envoy's  tent.  The  meal  was 
not  over  when  important  despatches  from  the  Governor- 
General  were  placed  in  Macnaghten's  hands.  In  the 
Envoy's  private  tent  they  were  read  and  discussed. 
Bumes  and  Todd  were  present  at  the  conference.  Late 
at  night  the  General  and  the  Envoy  parted  "  very  good 
friends,"  * 

*  '*  Sir  Willougliby,''  wrote  the  Envoy  to  Mr.  Colvin,  on  the  24th  of 
February,  **made  his  appearance  in  camp  yesterday  morning.  He  is 
evidently  disposed  to  look  upon  his  Majesty  and  his  disciplined  troops 
and  myself  as  mere  cyphers.  Any  hint  from  me,  however  quietly  and 
modestly  given,  was  received  with  hauteur  ;  and  I  was  distinctly  told 
that  I  wanted  to  assume  the  command  of  the  army  ;  that  he,  Sir  Wil- 
loughby, knew  no  superior  but  Sir  John  Keane,  and  that  he  would  not 
be  interfered  with,  &c.,  &c.  All  this  arose  out  of  my  requesting  1000 
camels  for  the  use  of  the  Shah  and  his  force.  Sir  "Willoughby  was  ably 
backed  by  the  Commissariat  officers.  My  arguments  were  urged 
throughout  in  the  most  mild  and  conciliatory  tone.  I  was  determined 
on  no  account  to  lose  my  temper  ;  and  we  parted  at  a  late  hour  last 
night  very  good  friends.  I  told  him  I  was  the  last  man  in  the  world 
who  would  presume  to  interfere  with  his  military  arrangements  ;  but 
I  found  it  requisite  to  tell  him,  during  one  of  our  conversations,  that  if 
he  thought  it  for  the  good  of  the  service  to  leave  Shah  Soojah  in  the 
lurch,  without  the  means  of  moving,  I  should  esteem  it  my  duty,  as  a 
political  officer,  to  protest  most  strongly  against  the  arrangement,  and 
that  the  Governor-General  would  determine  which  of  us  was  right. 
Sir  Willoughby  dined  with  me,  and  at  dinner  the  important  despatches 
from  the  Governor- General  and  yourself,  dated  the  5th  instant,  were 

xb2 


420  THE  ARMY  OP  THE  INDUS. 

It  was  decreed  that  the  Bengal  column  should  at  once 
move  in  advance.  On  the  following  day  it  was  ma- 
noeuvred in  presence  of  the  King.  The  parching  heats 
of  Sindh,  and  the  evil  effects  of  a  faihng  Commissariat, 
had  not  then  begun  to  impair  our  army;  and,  in  fall 
health  and  fine  condition,  the  troops  moved  before  the 
well-pleased  Shah.  On  the  23rd,  Sir  Willoughby  Cotton 
began  to  put  his  force  again  in  motion.  But  the  Shah's 
contingent  remained  halted  at  Shikarpoor.  There  was 
not  carriage  sufficient  for  its  advance. 

The  difficulties  of  the  march  now  began  to  obtrude 
themselves.  Between  Sukkur  and  Shikarpoor  the 
camels  had  dropped  down  dead  by  scores.  But  there 
was  a  worse  tract  of  country  in  advance.  The  officers 
looked  at  their  maps,  and  traced  with  dismay  the  vast 
expanse  of  sandy  desert,  where  no  green  pasture  met 
the  eye,  and  no  sound  of  water  spoke  to  the  ear.  But 
the  season  was  favorable.  Escaping  the  arid  and  pesti- 
lential blasts  of  April  and  May,  and  the  noxious  exhala- 
tions of  the  four  succeeding  months,  the  column  advanced 
into  Cutch-Gundawa.  The  hard,  salt-mixed  sand,  crackled 
under  their  horses'  feet  as  the  General  and  his  staff 
crossed  the  desert,  on  a  fine  bright  night  of  early  March 
— so  cool  that  only,  when  in  a  full  gallop,  the  riders 
ceased  to  long  for  the  warmth  of  their  cloaks.*  The 
distance  from  Shikarpoor  to  Dadur  is  146  miles.  It 
was  accomplished  by  the  Bengal  column  in  sixteen  pain- 
ful marches.  Water  and  forage  were  so  scarce  that  the 
cattle  suffered  terribly  on  the  way.  The  camels  fell 
dead  by  scores  on  the  desert ;  and  further  on  the  Beloo- 
chee  robbers  carried  them  off  with  appalling  dexterity. 

put  into  my  hands.     We  discussed  their  contents  in  my  private  tent 
afterwards — present  Sir  W.   C.   Todd,    and  Bumes." — [UnpiMisJied 
Correspondence  of  Sir  W.  H.  Macnaghten.] 
*  Havelock. 


SCARCITY    OF   PROVISIONS.  421 

When  the  column  reached  a  cultivated  tract  of  country, 
the  green  crops  were  used  as  forage  for  the  horses.  The 
ryots  were  liberally  paid  on  the  spot ;  but  the  agents  of 
the  Beloochee  chiefs  often  plundered  the  unhappy  culti- 
vators of  the  money  that  had  been  paid  to  them,  even  in 
front  of  the  British  camp. 

It  was  on  the  10  th  of  March  that  the  Bengal  column 
reached  Dadur,  which  lies  at  the  mouth  of  the  Bolan 
Pass.  Whatever  doubts  may  before  have  been  enter- 
tained regarding  the  provisionary  prospects  of  the  Army 
of  the  Indus,  they  were  now  painfully  set  at  rest.  Major 
Leech  had  been  long  endeavouring  to  collect  supplies 
for  the  army  at  this  place ;  but,  in  spite  of  all  his  zeal 
and  all  his  ability,  he  had  signally  failed.  Mehrab  Khan 
of  Khelat,  under  whose  dominion  lay  the  provinces 
through  which  the  army  was  now  passing,  had  thrown 
every  impediment  in  the  way  of  the  collection  of  gTain 
for  our  advancing  troops.  The  prospect,  therefore,  before 
them  was  anything  but  an  encouraging  one.  At  Dadur 
they  found  themselves,  on  the  10th  of  March,  with  a 
month's  supplies  on  their  beasts  of  burden.  Cotton  saw 
that  there  was  little  chance  of  collecting  more  j  so  he 
deteraiined  to  push  on  with  all  possible  despatch. 

On  the  16th  he  resumed  his  march  ;  and  entered  the 
Bolan  Pass.  Burnes  had  gone  on  in  advance  with  a 
party  under  Major  Cureton,  to  secure  a  safe  passage  for 
the  column;  and  had  been  completely  successful.  The 
Beloochee  authorities  rendered  him  all  the  aid  in  their 
power ;  *  and  when  Cotton  appeared  with  his  troops  on  a 

*  "The  conduct  of  the  officers  of  the  Khelat  chief  has  been  most 
creditable  and  praiseworthy.  Syud  Mahomed  Sheriflf,  the  Governor  of 
Gundava,  and  MooUa  Ramzan,  a  slave  of  the  Khan,  have  attended  me 
the  whole  way,  procured  a  band  of  eighty  of  the  natives  to  escort  us, 
and  they  likewise  addressed  the  Ameers  and  the  neighbouring  Beloochee 
tribes  to  attempt  at  their  peril  to  molest  us.  Such  has  been  the  con- 
fidence thus  given,  that  a  great  body  of  the  migratory  inhabitants  from 


422  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  INDUS. 

clear,  still  morning,  at  the  mouth  of  the  defile,  there  was 
little  likelihood  of  any  obstacle  being  opposed  to  his  free 
progress.  But  the  baggage-cattle  were  falling  dead  by  the 
wayside  ;  the  artillery  horses  were  showing  painful  symp- 
toms of  distress.  The  stream  of  the  Bolan  river  was 
tainted  by  the  bodies  of  the  camels  that  had  sunk  beneath 
their  loads.  The  Beloochee  freebooters  were  hovering 
about,  cutting  off  our  couriers,  murdering  stragglers, 
carrying  off  our  baggage  and  our  cattle.  Among  the 
rocks  of  this  stupendous  defile  our  men  pitched  their 
tents ;  and  toiled  on  again  day  after  day,  over  a  wretched 
road  covered  with  loose  flint  stones,  surmounting,  at  first, 
by  a  scarcely  perceptible  ascent,  and  afterwards  by  a 
difiScult  acclivity,  the  great  Brahoo  chain  of  hills.  The 
Bolan  Pass  is  nearly  sixty  miles  in  length.  The  passage 
was  accomplished  in  six  days.  They  were  days  of  drear 
discomfort,  but  not  of  danger.  A  resolute  enemy  might 
have  wrought  mighty  havoc  among  Cotton's  regiments  ; 
but  the  enemies  with  which  now  they  had  to  contend  were 
the  sharp  flint  stones  which  lamed  our  cattle,  the  scanty 
pasturage  which  destroyed  them,  and  the  marauding 
tribes  who  carried  them  off.  The  way  was  strewn  with 
baggage — with  abandoned  tents,  and  stores  ;  and  luxuries 
which,  a  few  weeks  afterwards,  would  have  fetched  their 
weight  twice  counted  in  rupees,  were  left  to  be  trampled 
down  by  the  cattle  in  the  rear,  or  carried  off  by  the  plun- 
derers about  them. 

Happy  was  every  man  in  the  force  when  the  army 
again  emerged  into  the  open  country.  The  valley  of 
Shawl  lay  before  them,  a  favoured  spot  in  a  country  of 
little  favour.  The  clear  crisp  climate  braced  the  Euro- 
pean frame ;  and  over  the  wide  plain,  bounded  by  noble 
mountain-ranges,  intersected  by  many  sparkling  streams, 

Cutchee  availed  themselves  of  our  escort  to  ascend  into  Afghanistan." 
— [Burnes  to  MacnagUen :  March  16,  1839.     MS.  Records.] 


SUFFERINGS    OF   THE    ARMT.  423 

and  dotted  with  orchards  and  vineyards,  the  eye  ranged 
with  dehght  ;  whilst-  the  well-known  carol  of  the  lark, 
mounting  up  in  the  fresh  morning  air,  broke  with  many 
home  associations  charmingly  on  the  English  ear.*  On 
the  26th  of  March  the  Bengal  column  reached  Quettah 
— "  a  most  miserable  mud  town,  with  a  small  castle  on  a 
mound,  on  which  there  was  a  small  gun  on  a  rickety 
carriage,  t  Here  Sir  Willoughby  Cotton  was  to  halt  until 
further  orders.  Starvation  was  beginning  to  stare  his 
troops  in  the  face. 

Seldom  has  a  military  commander  found  himself  in  the 
midst  of  more  painful  perplexities  than  those  which  now 
surroimded  Cotton.  It  seemed  to  be  equally  impossible 
to  stand  still  or  to  move  fbrward.  His  supplies  were  now 
so  reduced,  that  even  upon  famine  allowances  his  troops 
could  not  have  reached  Candahar  with  provisions  for  more 
than  a  few  days  in  store ;  and  to  remain  halted  at  Quettah 
would  necessarily  aggravate  the  evil.  There  appeared  to 
be  no  possibility  of  obtaining  supplies.  All  the  provisions 
stored  in  Quettah  and  the  surrounding  villages  would  not 
have  fed  our  army  for  many  days.  In  this  painful  con- 
juncture. Cotton  acted  with  becoming  promptitude.  He 
despatched  his  Adjutant-General  to  Sir  John  Keane  for 
orders,  whilst  Bumes  proceeded  to  Khelat  to  work  upon 
the  fears  or  the  cupidity  of  Mehrab  Khan ;  and,  in  the 
meanwhile,  reduced  to  the  scantiest  dole  the  daily  supplies 
meted  out  to  our  unfortunate  fighting  men  and  our  more 
miserable  camp-followers,  i     These  privations  soon  began 

*  See  Havelock^s  Narrative. 

t  Hough* s  Narrative  of  the  Operations  of  the  Army  of  the  Indus. 

X  Captain  Havelock  says  :  "  From  the  28th  of  March,  the  loaf  of  the 
European  soldier  was  diminished  in  weight,  the  Native  troops  received 
only  half  instead  of  a  full  seer  of  ottah  (that  is  a  pound  of  flour)  per 
diem,  and  the  camp-followers,  who  had  hitherto  found  it  difficult  to 
subsist  on  half  a  seer,  were  of  necessity  reduced  to  the  famine  allow- 
ance of  a  quarter  of  a  seer." 


424  THE   ARMY    OP   THE    INDUS. 

to  tell  fearfully  upon  their  health  and  their  spirits.  The 
sufferings  of  the  present  were  aggravated  by  the  dread  of 
the  future  ;  and  as  men  looked  at  the  shrunk  frames  and 
sunken  cheeks  of  each  other,  and  in  their  own  feebleness 
and  exhaustion  felt  what  wrecks  they  had  become,  their 
hearts  died  within  them  at  the  thought  that  a  day  was 
coming  when  even  the  little  that  was  now  doled  out  to 
them  might  be  wholly  denied. 

Bumes  hastened  to  Khelat.  He  was  courteously  re- 
ceived. He  found  Mehrab  Khan  an  able  and  sagacious 
man.  Suspicious  of  others,  but  with  more  frankness  and 
unreserve  in  his  character  than  is  commonly  found  in 
suspicious  men,  the  Khan  commented  freely  on  our  policy 
— said,  with  prophetic  truth,  that  we  might  restore  Shah 
Soojah  to  Afghanistan,  but  that  we  should  not  carry  the 
Afghan  people  with  us,  and  that  we  should,  therefore, 
fail  in  the  end ;  and  then,  after  launching  into  an  indig- 
nant commentary  on  the  ingratitude  of  Shah  Soojah,  for 
whom  he  had  suffered  much  and  reaped  nothing  in 
return,  he  proceeded  to  set  forth  the  evils  which  had 
resulted  to  him  and  his  people  from  the  passage  of  the 
British  army  through  his  dominions.*     "The  English,". 

*  *'The  Khan,  with  a  good  deal  of  earnestness,  enlarged  upon  the 
undertaking  the  British  had  embarked  in — declaring  it  to  be  one  of 
vast  magnitude  and  difficult  accomplishment — that  instead  of  relying 
on  the  Afghan  nation,  our  government  had  cast  them  aside  and  inun- 
dated the  country  with  foreign  troops — that  if  it  was  our  end  to  esta- 
blish ourselves  in  Afghanistan,  and  give  Shah  Soojah  the  nominal  sove- 
reignty of  Caubul  and  Candahar,  we  were  pursuing  an  erroneous 
course — that  all  the  Afghans  were  discontented  with  the  Shah,  and  all 
Mahomedans  alarmed  and  excited  at  what  was  passing — that,  day  by 
day,  men  returned  discontented,  and  we  might  find  ourselves  awkwardly 
situated  if  we  did  not  point  out  to  Shah  Soojah  his  errors,  if  the  fault 
originated  with  him,  and  alter  them  if  they  sprung  from  ourselves — 
that,  the  chief  of  Caubul  was  a  man  of  ability  and  resource,  and  though 
we  could  easily  put  him  down  by  Shah  Soojah,  even  in  our  present 


MEHRAB   KHAN.  425 

he  said,  "had  now  come,  and  by  their  march  through 
his  country,  in  different  directions,  destroyed  the  crops, 
poor  as  they  were ;  helped  themselves  to  the  water 
which  irrigated  the  lands,  made  doubly  valuable  in  this 
year  of  scarcity;" — "but  he  had  stood,"  he' added,  "qui- 
escent, and  hoped  from  the  English  justice,  from  the 
Shah  justice ;  hoped  that  his  claims  might  be  regarded 
in  a  proper  light,  and  he  for  ever  relieved  from  the  mas- 
tery of  the  Suddozye  Kings."  He  then  spoke  freely  and 
fluently  of  our  policy  in  Central  Asia,  of  the  position  in 
which  we  had  placed  ourselves  at  Herat  by  supporting 
such  a  miscreant  as  Yar  Mahomed,  and  of  the  failure  of 
our  negotiations  at  Caubul  and  Candahar.  "I  might 
have  allied  myself,"  he  said,  "  with  Pereia  and  Russia — 
but  I  have  seen  you  safely  through  the  great  defile  of 
the  Bolan,  and  yet  I  am  unrewarded." 

Bumes  had  brought  with  him  the  dratt  of  a  treaty, 
which,  on  the  following  day,  he  sent  to  the  Khan.  He 
had  made  it  a  condition  of  all  peaceable  negotiation  with 
the  Beloochee  Prince,  that  he  should  wait  upon  Shah 
Soojah  in  his  camp — a  condition  which  Mehrab  Khan 
disliked  and  resisted,  and  from  which  he  could  extricate 
himself  only  by  pleading  sickness.  The  treaty,  by  which 
the  supremacy  of  Shah  Soojah  was  distinctly  acknow- 
ledged, bound  the  British  Government  to  pay  Mehrab 
Khan  a  lakh  and  a  half  of  rupees  annually,  in  return  for 
which  the  Khan  engaged  to  "  use  his  best  endeavours  to 
procure  supplies,  carriage,  and  guards  to  protect  provisions 
and  stores  going  and  coming  from  Shikai-poor,  by  the 
route  of  Rozan,  Dadur,  the  Pass  of  Bolan,  through  Shawl 
to  Koochlak,  from  one  frontier  to  another." 

Mehrab  Khan  affixed  his  seal  to  the  treaty.     But  he 


mode  of  procedure,  we  could  never  win  over  the  Afghan  nation  by  it." 
— [Bumes  to  Macnaghten  :  Khelat^  March  30,  1839.      MS.  Record$.'\ 


426  THE    ARMY    OF    THE    INDUS. 

disliked  the  bargain  he  had  made.  He  was  altogether 
suspicious  of  Shah  Soojah  and  the  Suddozyes.  He 
was  by  no  means  certain  of  the  success  of  the  present 
enterprise.  He  believed  that,  by  paying  homage  to  the 
Shah,  he  would  raise  up  a  host  of  powerful  enemies, 
and  plunge  himself  into  a  sea  of  ruin.  Striving  to  allay 
the  apprehensions  of  the  Khan,  Burnes  made  some  tri- 
fling concessions,  which  were  not  without  their  effect ; 
and  then  proceeded  to  press  upon  him  the  subject  which 
at  that  moment  was  of  most  immediate  importance  to 
British  interests — the  matter  of  supplies ;  and  earnestly 
pointed  out  the  imperative  necessity  of  every  possible 
exertion  being  made  by  the  Khan  to  provide  them.  But 
it  was  easier  to  suggest  such  provision  than  to  make  it. 
Mehrab  Khan  said  that  he  would  do  his  best — that  he 
would  place  men  at  Burnes's  disposal  to  proceed  to 
Nooshky  and  other  places,  where  the  crops  were  nearly 
ripe  ("and,"  said  Burnes,  parenthetically,  "he  has  done 
so  ") — that  he  would  "  give  grain  in  Gundava  and  Cutchee, 
and  if  we  would  send  for  our  stores  at  Shikarpoor  to 
Dadur,  he  would  actively  aid  in  passing  them  through 
the  Bolan — that  he  might  also  aid  us  at  Moostung  in 
getting  a  small  quantity  of  grain  ;  but  that  there  was 
really  very  little  grain  at  Khelat,  or  in  the  country — that 
he  had  reduced  his  escort  to  wait  on  the  Shah  to  1000 
men,  on  account  of  the  scarcity — and  that  he  could  not 
then  furnish  the  grain,  but  each  man  must  bring  his  own.' 
"  This  intelligence,"  wrote  Burnes  to  Macnaghten,  "  is 
very  distressing  in  our  present  position ;  but  my  inquiries 
serve  to  convince  me  that  there  is  but  a  small  supply 
of  grain  in  this  country,  and  none  certainly  to  be  given 
us,  without  aggravating  the  present  distress  of  the  in- 
habitants— some  of  whom  are  feeding  on  herbs  and  grasses 
gathered  in  the  jungle.  It  is  with  some  difficulty  we 
have  supported  ourselves,  whilst  the  small  quantities  we 


POSITION    OF   SHAH    SOOJAH.  427 

have  procured  have  been  got  by  stealth.  This  scarcity  is 
corroborated  by  a  bhght  in  last  year's  harvest.  Under 
such  circumstances,  the  only  way  of  turning  the  Khan  to 
account  is  in  supplying  sheep ;  and  here  he  can  and  is 
willing  to  assist  us  to  a  great  extent.  Probably  10,000 
or  15,000  may  be  prociu-ed ;  and  arrangements  are  now 
being  made  for  purchasing  and  sending  them  down  to 
Shawl."* 

In  the  meanwhile,  the  Shah's  Contingent  and  the  Bom- 
bay division  of  the  Army  of  the  Indus  were  making  their 
way  through  Sindh.t  Greatly  straitened  for  carriage,  it 
had  been  fbr  some  time  doubtful  whether  the  whole  of 
the  Shah's  army  would  be  able  to  proceed  to  Candahar. 
There  had  been  a  disposition  on  the  part  of  Sir  Wil- 
loughby  Cotton  to  look  with  contempt  upon  the  Sud- 
dozye  levies,  and  to  make  the  King  and  his  regiments 
play  a  part  in  the  coming  drama,  by  no  means  in  accord- 
ance with  the  estimate  which  Macnaghten  had  formed 
of  their  importance.  And  now  Sir  John  Keane  seemed 
equally  inclined  to  throw  into  the  background  the  King, 
the  Envoy,  and  the  Contingent.  But  Macnaghten  had 
claimed  for  the  Shah  a  prominent  place  in  the  coming 
operations,:}:  and  the  military  chief  had   yielded  to  his 

*  JSurnes  to  Macnaghten  :  Khelat,  April  2,  1839. 

+  The  Shah  and  his  Contingent  moved  from  Shikarpoor  on  the  7th  of 
March. 

X  "His  Majesty  the  Shah  is  naturally  anxious  to  occupy  a  promi- 
nent position  in  our  movements,  and  it  is  very  desirable,  on  political 
grounds,  that  he  should  do  so  :  I  trust,  therefore,  that  your  Excellency 
will  see  fit  to  attend  to  his  Majesty's  wishes  in  this  particular,  and  to 
authorise  his  being  in  advance  with  at  least  a  portion  of  his  own  troops, 
after  the  junction  of  the  several  divisions  shall  have  been  effected,  or 
rather  after  you  have  made  your  final  arrangements  for  the  order  of 
our  advance.  This  you  will  observe  will  be  conformable  to  the  wishes 
of  the  Govern  or -General,  as  expressed  in  the  accompanying  extracts. 
His  Lordship  never  contemplated  the  leaving  behind  any  portion   oi 


428  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  INDUS. 

representations,  and  even  placed  at  his  disposal  a  number 
of  baggage-cattle  which  he  greatly  needed  for  his  own 
force.  Anxious  to  conciliate  the  commander  of  the  army, 
and  never  unmindful  of  the  public  interests,  the  Envoy 
gratefully  declined  the  offer.*  Keane  was,  at  that  time, 
"  in  a  wretched  plight  for  want  of  cattle,"  and  the  Bengal 
Commissariat  were  compelled  to  supply  him  largely  both 
with  camels  and  grain. 

Sir  Willoughby  Cotton  had  suggested  to  Macnaghten 
the  expediency  of  a  movement  upon  Khelat;  but  the 
Envoy  was  then  little  inclined  to  take  the  same  unfavour- 
able view  of  the  conduct  of  Mehrab  Khan,  which  Cotton, 
smarting  under  the  privations  to  which  his  force  had 
been  subjected,  was  prone  to  encourage.  "With  regard 
to  moving  upon  Khelat,"  he  wrote  on  the  15th  of  March 
to  the  Bengal  General,  "  I  am  not  prepared  at  present  to 
take  upon  myself  the  responsibility  of  that  measure  ;  and 
I  am  in  great  hopes  that  Sir  Alexander  Burnes  will  be 
able  to  arrange  everything  satisfactorily."  "t  The  further 
he  advanced,  indeed,  the  more  obvious  it  became  that  the 
Khan  of  Khelat  had  just  grounds  of  complaint  against 
the  English  army.  Everywhere  traces  of  the  devastation 
— much  of  it  unavoidable  devastation — which  our  advanc- 

the  Shah's  force,  except  in  the  case  of  opposition  being  shown  by  Sindh 
and  Khelat." — [Mr.  Macnaghten  to  Sir  J.  Keane  :  Shikai'poor,  Feb. 
27,  1839.      Unpublished  Correspondence.] 

*  "I  am  exceedingly  obliged  to  you  for  the  attention  you  have  paid 
to  my  suggestions  regarding  the  Shah's  troops ;  but  your  want  of  camels 
is  so  pressing,  that  I  feel  it  impossible  to  retain  the  1000  camels  placed 
at  my  disposal.  Deeply  as  I  regret,  on  political  grounds,  the  necessity 
of  leaving  behind  any  portion  of  the  troops  of  his  Majesty,  I  feel  that 
any  scruples  on  this  score  must  give  way  to  the  more  urgent  exigencies 
of  the  public  service." — [Mr.  Macnaghten  to  Sir  J.  Keane :  Shikar- 
poor,  March  3,  1839.      Unpublished  Coo'respondence.] 

t  Mr.  Macnaghten  to  Sir  W.  Cotton :  March  15,  1839.  Unpub- 
lished Correspondence. 


FEELING   OP   THE   BELOOCHEES.  429 

ing  columns  had  left  behind  them,  spoke  out  intelligibly 
to  him  ;  and  he  plainly  saw  how  extremely  distasteful  both 
our  officers  and  our  measures  had  become  to  the  Beloochees. 
Pondering  these  things,  he  sate  down  and  wrote  the  follow- 
ing letter  to  Lord  Auckland — a  significant  letter,  which 
shows  how  early  had  burst  upon  Macnaghten  the  truth, 
that  only  by  a  liberal  expenditure  of  money  was  there  any 
hope  of  reconciling  to  our  operations  the  chiefs  and  people 
beyond  the  Indus : 

Camp  Bagh,  March  19. 
I  found  the  Khelat  authorities  in  the  worst  possible  humour. 
Our  enemies  have  evidently  been  tampering  with  them,  and  they 
had  good  cause  for  dissatisfaction  with  us ;  their  crops  have  been 
destroyed,  and  the  water  intended  for  the  irrigation  of  their  fields 
has  been  diverted  to  the  use  of  our  armies.  A  great  portion  of 
these  evils  was  perhaps  unavoidable,  but  little  or  no  effort  seems  to 
have  been  made  either  to  mitigate  the  calamity  or  to  appease  the 
discontent  which  has  been  created  by  our  proceedings.  Our  officers 
and  our  measures  are  alike  unpopular  in  this  country,  and  I  very 
much  fear  that  Sir  A.  Burnes  may  be  led,  by  vague  rumours  of  the 
Khan's  unfriendly  disposition,  to  recommend  offensive  operations 
against  him.  In  what  difficulties  we  might  be  involved  by  such  a 
proceeding  it  would  be  impossible  to  foretell.  My  most  strenuous 
efforts  have  been  day  and  night  directed  towards  reconciling  all 
persons  of  influence  to  our  operations ;  and  in  this  I  have  been  suc- 
cessful ;  but  considerable  sums  must  be  expended,  not  only  in  re- 
munerating the  people  for  the  severe  losses  they  have  sustained,  but 
in  bribing  the  authorities.  Your  Lordship  may  rely  upon  it,  that  I 
shall  not  expend  one  rupee  of  the  public  money  more  than  I  deem 
indispensably  necessary ;  but  here  we  are  quite  at  the  mercy  of  the 
Beloochees.  This  very  day,  had  they  been  inimically  inclined,  they 
might  with  the  greatest  ease  have  turned  an  inundation  into  our  camp, 
which  would  have  swept  away  our  entire  force  and  everything  belong- 
ing to  us.  The  change  in  the  demeanour  of  the  authorities  since  yester- 
day is  wonderful.  They  are  now  our  devoted  servants,  and  the  Vizier 
has  promised  to  write  off  instantly  to  his  master  at  Khelat,  advising 
him  to  give  us  his  entire  and  unqualified  friendship  and  support.  Sir 
John  Keane  is  in  a  wretched  plight  for  want  of  cattle,  and  I  cannot 
help  thinking  he  has  been  neglected  in  a  very  unwarrantable  manner 
by  the  Bengal  authorities.    ...    I  went  out  myself  this  morning  to 


430  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  INDUS. 

see  what  damage  had  been  done  to  the  crops.  The  devastation  is 
grievous ;  but  the  interest  which  the  people  saw  me  take  in  their 
complaints  has  done  more  to  pacify  them  than  I  ever  expected. 
Another  source  of  great  dissatisfaction  has  been  the  seizure  by  our 
troops  of  different  individuals,  and  even  families,  on  the  plea  of 
being  robbers.     This  I  have  done  all  in  my  power  to  remedy.* 

More  and  more  sensible,  after  every  march,  of  the 
miserable  country  through  which  he  was  passing,  and  the 
difficulties  which  now  beset  the  expedition,  Macnaghten 
was  anxious  to  push  on  with  all  possible  expedition.  But 
Sir  John  Keane,  who  was  in  the  rear  with  the  Bombay 
column,  dreading  the  assemblage,  on  the  same  spot,  of  so 
large  a  body  of  troops  as  would  be  brought  together  by 
the  junction  of  the  three  forces,  urged  upon  him  the  ex- 
pediency of  halting,  whilst  his  Excellency  went  forward 
to  ascertain  the  chances  of  finding  forage  and  provisions 
in  the  Bolan  Pass.  So  the  Shah  and  his  Contingent  halted 
for  a  few  days  at  Bagh,t  whilst  Sir  John  Keane  pushed  on 
with  his  escort.  On  the  28th  of  March,  the  King,  the 
Minister,  and  the  Commander-in-Chief  were  all  assembled 
together  at  Dadur.  *' Their  united  camps  displayed  all 
the  pomp  and  circumstances  of  a  triple  head-quarter." 
The  passage  of  the  Bolan  was  accomplished  without  diffi- 
culty, and  on  the  4th  of  April,  Sir  Willoughby  Cotton, 
having  ridden  out  with  his  staff  from  Quettah,  greeted 

*  Unpublished  Correspondence  of  Sir  W.  H.  Macnaghten. 

+  From  Bagh,  Macnaghten  wrote  to  the  Governor-General's  Private 
Secretary  :  * '  This  is  a  wretched  country  in  every  respect.  It  may  be 
said  to  produce  Uttle  else  hut  plunderers ;  but  with  the  knowledge  we 
now  have  of  it,  we  may  bid  defiance  to  the  Russian  hordes  as  far  as 
this  route  is  concerned.  Any  army  might  be  annihilated  in  an  hour  by 
giving  it  either  too  much  or  too  little  water.  The  few  wells  that 
exist  might  easily  be  rendered  unavailable,  and  by  just  cutting  the 
Sewee  bund  the  whole  country  might  be  deluged." — [i¥r.  Macnaghten 
to  Mr.  Colvin :  Camp  Bagh,  March  22,  1839.  Unpublished  Corres- 
pondence.] 


PROSPECTS    OF   THE   ARMY.  431 

the  General-in-Chief  and  his  companions  as  they  were 
resting  at  the  entrance  to  the  Shawl  Valley,  after  the 
fatigues  of  the  passage  through  the  defile.  The  tidings 
which  he  had  to  communicate  were  of  the  gloomiest  hue. 
He  reported  that  his  men  were  on  quarter-rations,  and 
that  there  was  every  prospect  of  the  army,  as  it  entered 
Afghanistan,  being  opposed  at  every  step.  Macnaghten, 
however,  more  sanguine,  was  already  beginning  to  think 
and  to  write  about  the  means  of  disposing  of  the  Barukzye 
Sirdars.  On  that  4th  of  April  he  wrote  to  the  Governor- 
General  a  letter,  which  indicates  the  tone  of  his  own  feel- 
ings and  of  those  of  the  Afghan  Prince  : 

April,  4,  1839. 
We  are  now  encamped  within  ten  miles  of  Shawl.  Sir  Willoughby 
came  in  here  this  moriiing,  and  talks  in  a  most  gloomy  strain  of  his 
prospects.  He  says  he  has  but  twelve  days'  supplies,  and  his  men 
are  already  on  quarter-rations.  We  cannot  reckon  on  being  at 
Candahar  under  a  fortnight,  and  it  will  go  hard  with  us  if  we  cannot 
get  supplied  in  the  meantime  from  other  quarters.  Sir  Willoughby 
is  a  sad  croaker ;  not  content  with  telling  me  we  must  all  inevitably 
be  starved,  he  assures  me  that  Shah  Soojah  is  very  unpopular  in 
Afghanistan,  and  that  we  shall  be  opposed  at  every  step  of  our  pro- 
gress. I  think  I  know  a  little  better  than  this.  My  accounts  from 
Candahar  lead  me  to  believe  that  the  religious  excitement  is  sub- 
siding, and  that  the  Sirdars  are  only  thinking  how  they  can  make 
good  terms  for  themselves ;  or,  failing  that,  how  they  may  best  con- 
trive to  effect  their  escape.  It  will  be  as  well  not  to  reduce  them 
to  desperation ;  for  though  they  cannot  oppose  us  in  the  field,  yet 
they  make  sad  havoc  with  our  supplies.  Large  bands  of  camel- 
plunderers  kept  hovering  over  our  line  of  march,  and  it  certainly 
looks  as  if  they  had  been  incited  by  some  one  of  influence.  The 
mistakes  and  contretemps  which  are  constantly  occurring  in  our 
motley  camp,  require  the  exercise  of  much  patience  and  discrimi- 
nation. The  Shah  is  in  good  health  and  spirits ;  but  says  he  never 
had  so  much  trouble  and  bother  in  his  lifetime  as  he  has  met  with 
during  this  campaign.  The  reason  is  obvious ;  the  people  on  former 
occasions  helped  themselves  to  everything  they  wanted,  and  no 
complaint  was  permitted  to  approach  the  sacred  person  of  his 
Majesty.     His  opinion  of  the  Afghans  as  a  nation  is,  I  regi'ct  to  say, 


432  THE    ARMY    OF   THE    INDUS. 

extremely  low.  He  declares  that  they  are  a  pack  of  dogs,  one  and 
all,  and,  as  for  the  Barukzyes,  it  is  uttei-ly  impossible  that  he  can  ever 
place  the  slightest  confidence  in  any  one  of  that  accursed  race.  We 
must  try  and  bring  him  gradually  round  to  entertain  a  more  favor- 
able opinion  of  his  subjects.  I  cannot  yet  say  how  the  Barukzye 
chiefs  shall  be  disposed  of,  but  I  am  decidedly  of  opinion  that  it 
would  be  a  wise  measure  to  get  them  quietly  out  of  Afghanistan  and 
pension  them,  if  we  can  do  so  at  an  expense  not  exceeding  a  lakh  of 
rupees  per  annum.  If  they  oppose  us  and  are  taken,  the  Shah 
must,  I  imagine,  be  permitted  to  do  what  he  likes  with  them  short 
of  putting  them  to  death ;  and  his  own  human  nature  is  a 
sufficient  security  that  he  will  not  proceed  to  extremities.* 

On  the  6th  of  April,  Sir  John  Keane  fixed  his  head- 
quarters at  Quettah,  and  assumed  the  personal  command 
of  the  army.  Reviewing  all  the  circiunstances  of  his  posi- 
tion, he  came  to  the  determination  to  push  forward  with 
all  possible  despatch  to  Candahar.  There  was  no  prospect 
of  obtaining  supplies  through  the  agency  of  Mehrab 
Khan.  Already  was  the  Envoy  convinced  of  the  trea- 
chery of  that  Prince — already  was  he  beginning  to  talk 
about  dismembering  the  Khanate  of  Khelat,  and  annex- 
ing the  provinces  of  Shawl,  Moostung,  and  Cutchee  to  the 
Douranee  Empire.  On  that  day  he  wrote  to  the  Private 
Secretary  of  the  Governor-General : 

Camp  Quettah,  April  6,  1839. 
*  *  *  Sir  John  Keane  has  represented  to  me  in  the  strongest 
terms  the  necessity  for  moving  on.  The  fact  is,  the  troops  and 
followers  are  nearly  in  a  state  of  mutiny  for  food,  and  the  notion  of 
waiting  for  such  a  person  as  Mehrab  Khan,  who  has  done  his  best  to 
starve  us,  seems  utterly  preposterous.  I  trust  the  Governor- 
General  will  see  fit  to  annex  the  provinces  of  Shawl,  Moostung,  and 
Cutchee  to  the  Shah's  dominions.  This  would  be  the  place  for 
cantoning  a  British  regiment.  It  is  so  cold  now  that  I  can  hardly 
hold  my  pen,  and  the  climate  is  said  to  be  delightful  all  the  year 
round.     I  am  certain  the  annexation  could  be  made  without  the 


*  Unpublished  Correspondence  of  Sir  W,  H.  Macnaghteiu 


THE    CANDAHAR   SIRDARS.  433 

slightest  diflSculty Now  for  Candabar.    The  game  is  clearly 

up  with  the  Sirdars.  I  had  a  letter  from  the  triumvirate  yester- 
day, brought  by  Syud  Muhun  Shah,  whom  they  have  sent  to  treat, 
or  rather  to  get  the  best  terms  for  themselves  they  can.  As  to 
opposition,  it  is  quite  clear  that  they  look  upon  that  as  hopeless,  and 
they  have  not  even  the  power  to  retreat.  I  am  unwilling  to  reduce 
them  to  desperation,  and  shall  try  and  get  the  Shah  to  make  some 
provision  for  them ;  but  he  is  very  loth  to  do  so.  Their  demands 
now  are  extravagant  beyond  measure ;  but  I  do  not  think  that  a 
lakh  of  rupees  per  annum,  distributed  among  the  three  brothers, 
would  be  too  much  for  the  King  to  give,  if  they  agreed  upon  that 
to  sink  into  the  retirement  of  private  life.  Notwithstanding  all  the 
croaking  about  Shah  Soojah's  want  of  popularity,  feel  certain  that 
my  prediction  will  be  verified,  and  that  his  Majesty  will  be  cordially 
welcomed  by  all  classes  of  the  people.* 

On  the  7th  of  April  the  army  resumed  its  march.  +  On 
the  9th  it  was  at  Hykulzye,  a  spot  rendered  famous  in 
the  later  annals  of  the  war.  From  this  place  Macnaghten 
wrote  again  to  the  same  correspondent : 

Camp  Hykulzye,  April,  9. 
*  *  *  I  have  reason  to  believe  that  the  Sirdars  of  Candahar  are 
at  their  wit's  end.  They  make  resolutions  one  day  and  break  them 
the  next.  But  all  accounts  concur  in  reporting  that  they  are  aban- 
doned by  the  priesthood,  and  that  if  there  is  any  religious  feeling 
extant,  it  is  all  in  favour  of  Shah  Soojah.  In  a  fit  of  desperation  the 
last  resolve  of  Kohun-dil-Khan  is  stated  to  be,  that  he  will  make  a 


*  Unpublished  Correspondence  of  Sir  W.  H.  Macnaghten. 

t  The  head-quai-ters  of  the  2nd  brigade  were  left  in  garrison  at 
Quettah,  under  General  William  Nott,  of  the  Company's  army,  who, 
at  a  later  period,  so  distinguished  himself  in  command  of  the  troops 
at  Candahar.  "Whilst  Sir  Willoughby  Cotton  was  commanding  the 
Bengal  army  in  chief,  Nott  had  commanded  a  division ;  but  when  Sir 
John  Keane  joined  the  Bengal  column.  Cotton  fell  back  to  the  divisional 
command,  and  Nott  returned  to  the  brigade  to  which  he  had  originally 
been  posted.  Out  of  this  much  controversy  arose  ;  the  command  of  the 
other  division  of  the  "Army  of  the  Indus"  having  been  conferred  on 
General  Willshire,  of  the  Queen's  army,  a  junior  major-general,  but  au 
older  officer  and  lieutenant-colonel. 


i34  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  INDUS. 

night  attack  on  our  camp  with  about  2000  followers  who  are  still 
attached  to  his  person.  This  I  fully  believe  to  be  fudge.  The 
whole  of  the  force,  from  Sir  W.  Cotton  downwards,  are  infected 
with  exaggerated  fears  relating  to  the  character  of  the  King  and  the 
prospects  of  the  campaign.  They  fancy  that  they  see  an  enemy  in 
every  bush.  The  Khan  of  Khelat  is  our  implacable  enemy,  and  Sir 
J.  Keane  is  burning  with  revenge.  There  never  was  such  treatment 
inflicted  upon  human  beings  as  we  have  been  subjected  to  on  our 
progress  through  the  Khan's  country.  I  will  say  nothing  of 
Burnes's  negotiations.  His  instructions  were  to  conciliate,  but  I 
think  he  has  adhered  too  strictly  to  the  letter  of  them.  The  Com- 
mander-in-Chief is  very  angry.  I  would  give  something  to  be 
in  Candahar ;  and  there,  Inshallah,  we  shall  be  in  about  a  week ; 
but,  in  the  meantime,  this  union  of  strictly  disciplined  troops  with 
lawless  soldiers  is  very  trying  to  my  patience.  With  a  less  tractable 
king  than  Shah  Soojah  the  consequences  might  be  fatal.  I  have 
references  every  minute  of  the  day,  and  we  are  compelled  to  tell  his 
Majesty's  people  that  they  must  not  touch  the  green  crops  of  the 
country.  This  they  think  very  hard,  and  so  I  believe  does  th« 
King,  but  he  has,  nevertheless,  forbidden  them.  Supplies  are  now 
coming  in,  but  they  are  yet  very  dear — 2^  seers  of  flour  for  a  I'upee! 
But  this  price  will,  no  doubt,  daily  fall.  The  great  thing  is  to 
give  people  confidence.  All  the  villages  in  the  Khan  of  Khelat 's 
territory  were  deserted  at  our  approach,  and  not  a  soul  came  near 
us,  except  with  the  view  of  plundering  and  murdering  our  followers. 
The  instant  we  crossed  the  frontier  the  scene  was  entirely  changed. 
The  inhabitants  remained  in  their  villages,  and  have  manifested  the 
greatest  possible  confidence  in  our  justice  and  good  faith.  Is  it 
possible  to  conceive  that  the  difference  of  feeling  in  the  Khelat 
country  has  not  been  brought  about  by  design  ]  *  *  * 

Macnaghten  was  naturally  of  a  sanguine  temperament. 
Civilians  seldom  estimate  military  difficulties  aright.  It 
is  true  that  our  political  difficulties  were  melting  away. 
The  Candahar  Sirdars,  deserted  and  betrayed,  seemed  to 
have  given  themselves  up  to  despair,  and  there  was  little 
f  nance  of  the  progress  of  our  army  being  disputed  by  an 
Afghan  force.  But  the  scarcity,  which  had  pressed  so 
severely  on  our  troops,  and  had  nearly  destroyed  our 
horses,  was  not  less  a  reality  because  no  enemy  appeared 


ENTRY    INTO   AFGHANISTAN.  435 

to  educe  all  the  disastrous  results  which  were  likely  to 
flow  from  such  deterioration  of  the  physique  of  our  army. 
The  army  of  the  Indus  surmounted  the  Kojuck  Pass  as 
safely  as  it  had  traversed  the  Bolan.  The  Shah,  with  his 
Contingent,  was  now  in  advance,  leading  the  way,  as  it 
became  him,  into  his  restored  dominions ;  and  many 
of  the  chiefs  and  people  of  Western  Afghanistan  were 
flocking  to  his  standard.*  There  were  not  wanting  those 
who  said  that,  if  there  had  been  any  prospect  of  opposi- 
tion at  Candahar,  the  King  and  his  levies  would  not  have 
been  the  first  to  appear  under  the  walls  of  the  city.  But 
authentic  intelligence  had  reached  Macnaghten,  to  the 
effect  that  Kohun-dil-Khan  and  his  brothers  had  fled 
from  Candahar — that  there  was  no  union  among  the 
Barukzye  brotherhood — and  that,  if  a  stand  were  to  be 
made  at  all,  the  battle-field  would  be  nearer  the  northern 
capital.  The  way,  indeed,  was  clear  for  the  entry  of  the 
Suddozye  monarch ;  so  he  pushed  on  in  advance  of  Sir 
John  Keane  and  his  army,  to  receive,  it  was  said,  the 
homage  of  his  people.  Money  had  been  freely  scattered 
about ;  and  the  Afghans  had  already  begun  to  discover 
that  the  gold  of  the  Feringhees  was  as  serviceable  as 
other  gold,  and  that  there  was  an  unfailing  supply  of  it. 
Early  in  the  campaign,  Macnaghten  had  encouraged  the 
conviction  that  the  allegiance  of  the  Afghans  was  to  be 
bought — that  Afghan  cupidity  would  not  be  proof  against 
British  gold.  So  he  opened  the  treasure-chest ;  scattered 
abroad  its  contents  with  an  ungrudging  hand  ;  and  com- 
menced a  system  of  cori'uption  which,  though  seemingly 

*  Foremost  among  these  was  the  notorious  Hadjee  Khan,  Khaukiir, 
whose  sudden  defection  broke  up  the  Barukzye  camp,  just  as  Rahun-dil- 
Khan  and  Mehr-dil-Khan  were  meditating  a  night  attack  on  the  Shah's 
Contingent.  He  joined  the  Shah  on  the  20th  of  April,  and  from  this 
time  the  Sirdars  saw  that  their  cause  was  hopeless.  Further  mention 
of  this  chief  will  be  found  in  a  subsequent  chapter. 

Vf2 


436  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  INDUS. 

successful  at  the  outset,  wrought,  in  the  end,  the  utter 
ruin  of  the  poHcy  he  had  reared.* 

*  I  have  not  attenlpted  in  this  chapter  to  give  a  minute  account  of 
the  march  of  the  three  columns  of  the  invading  army  to  Candahar.  It 
is  no  part  of  my  design  to  render  this  work  conspicuous  for  the  com- 
pleteness of  its  military  details.  I  do  not  underrate  their  importance ; 
but  the  operations  of  the  Army  of  the  Indus  have  already  been  so 
minutely  chronicled,  that  I  have  only  to  refer  the  reader  to  the  works 
of  Havelock,  Kennedy,  and  Hough.  The  real  history  of  the  march  is 
to  be  found  in  the  records  of  the  Commissariat  department.  The 
difficulty  of  obtaining  carriage  and  supplies  was  almost  unprecedented, 
and  the  expenditure  incurred  was  enormous.  There  were  two  different 
Commissariat  departments  (the  Bengal  and  the  Shah's)  sometimes  to  be 
found  bidding  against  one  another.  Everything  was  paid  for  at  a 
ruinous  price.  The  sums  paid  for  the  hire  and  purchase  of  carriage- 
cattle  were  preposterous ;  and  the  loss  incurred  by  government  from 
the  deaths  of  the  animals  may  be  surmised,  when  it  is  stated  that  the 
number  of  deaths  between  Ferozepore  and  Candahar  has  been  esti- 
mated at  not  less  than  20,000.  Large  sums,  too,  were  often  paid  for 
demurrage.  For  example,  on  one  batch  of  camels  hired  from  Bekanier 
and  Jaysulmere,  44, 000  rupees  were  paid  for  demurrage  and  remune- 
ration for  losses  before  they  reached  the  place  (Shikarpoor)  at  which 
their  services  were  required,  or  were  even  seen  by  our  Commissariat 
officers. — [MS.  Notes. 


437 


CHAPTEK  II. 

[April— August,  1839.] 

Arrival  at  Candahar — The  Shah's  Entry  into  the  City — His  Installation 
— Nature  of  his  Reception — Behaviour  of  the  Douranees — The 
English  at  Candahar— Mission  to  Herat — Difficulties  of  our  Posi- 
tion— Advance  to  Ghuznee. 

On  the  25th  of  April,  Shah  Soojah-ool-Moolk  re-entered 
the  chief  city  of  Western  Afghanistan.  As  he  neared 
the  walls  of  Candahar,  riding  in  advance  of  his  Contin- 
gent, some  Donranee  horsemen  had  gone  out  to  welcome 
him;  and  as  the  cavalcade  moved  forward,  others  met 
him  with  their  salutations  and  obeisances,  and  swelled 
the  number  of  his  adherents.  It  is  said  that  some  fifteen 
hundred  men,  for  the  most  part  well  dressed  and  well 
mounted,  joined  him  before  he  reached  the  city. 

Accompanied  by  the  British  Envoy,  his  Staff,  and  the 
principal  officers  of  his  Contingent,  and  followed  by  a 
crowd  of  Afghans,  the  Shah  entered  Candahar.  There 
was  a  vast  assemblage  of  gazers.  The  women  clustered 
in  the  balconies  of  the  houses,  or  gathered  upon  the  roofs. 
The  men  thronged  the  public  streets.  It  was  a  busy  and 
an  exciting  scene.  The  curiosity  was  intense.  The 
enthusiasm  may  have  been  the  same.  As  the  royal 
cortege  advanced,  the  people  strewed  flowers  before  the 
horses'  feet,  and  loaves  of  bread  were  scattered  in  their 
way.  There  were  shouts  and  the  sound  of  music,  and 
the   noise   of  firing;   and   the  faces  of  the    crowd   were 


438  THE    HALT   AT    CANDAHAR. 

bright  with  cheerful  excitement.  The  popular  exclama- 
tions which  were  flung  into  the  air  have  been  duly 
reported.  The  people  shouted  out,  "Welcome  to  the 
son  of  Timour  Shah  !"  "We  look  to  you  for  protection  !" 
"Candahar  is  rescued  from  the  Barukzyes !"  "May 
your  enemies  be  destroyed  !"  It  was  said,  by  some  who 
rode  beside  the  Shah,  to  have  been  the  most  heart-stirring 
scene  they  ever  witnessed  in  their  lives.  Thus  greeted 
and  thus  attended,  the  King  rode  to  the  tomb  of  Ahmed 
Shah,  and  offered  up  thanksgivings  and  prayers.  Then 
the  procession  returned  again  through  the  city,  again  to 
be  greeted  with  joyous  acclamations ;  and  "  the  eventful 
day,"  as  the  Court  chroniclers  affirmed,  "  passed  off  with- 
out an  accident." 

The  welcome  thus  given  to  the  Shah,  on  his  public 
entry  into  his  western  capital,  filled  Macnaghten  with 
delight.  The  future  appeared  before  him  bright  with 
the  promise  of  unclouded  success.  It  seemed  to  him 
that  the  enthusiastic  reception  of  the  Shah  would  be  a 
death-blow  to  the  hopes  of  Dost  Mahomed,  and  that  in 
all  probability  the  Ameer  would  fly  before  us  like  his 
brothers.  It  was  encouraging  intelligence  to  communi- 
cate to  the  Governor-General ;  so  on  his  return  from  the 
royal  progress  through  the  city,  Macnaghten  sate  down 
and  wrote  thus  to  Lord  Auckland  : 

Candahar,  April  25,  1839. 
We  have,  I  think,  been  most  fortunate  in  every  way.  The  Shah 
made  a  grand  pubUc  entry  in  the  city  this  morning,  and  was  received 
with  feelings  nearly  amounting  to  adoration.  I  shall  report  the 
particulars  officially.  I  have  already  had  more  than  one  ebullition 
of  petulance  to  contend  with.  The  latest  I  send  herewith,  and  I 
trust  that  a  soft  answer  will  have  the  effect  of  turning  away  wrath. 
There  are  many  things  which  I  wish  to  mention,  but  I  really  have 
no  leisure.  Of  this  your  Lordship  may  judge,  when  I  state  that  for 
the  last  three  days  I  have  been  out  in  the  sun,  and  have  not  been 
able  to  get  my  breakfast  before  three  in  the  afternoon.     I  think  it 


MACNAGHTEN  TO  THE  GOVERNOR- GENERAL.     439 

would  be  in  every  way  advantageous  to  the  public  interests  if,  after 
Shah  Soojah  gains  possession  of  Caubul,  I  were  to  proceed  across 
the  Punjab  to  Simlab,  having  an  interview  with  Ruujeet  Singh,  and 
giving  him  a  detail  of  all  our  proceedings  ;  perhaps  getting  him  to 
modify  the  treaty  in  one  or  two  respects.  I  have  broached  the  sub- 
ject of  our  new  treaty  to  his  Majesty,  but  my  negotiations  are  in  too 
imperfect  a  state  to  be  detailed.  Of  one  thing  I  am  certain,  that 
we  must  be  prepared  to  look  upon  Afghanistan  for  some  years  as  an 
outwork  yielding  nothing,  but  requiring  much  expenditure  to  keep 
it  in  repair.  His  Majesty  has  not  yet  nominated  a  Prime  Minister, 
nor  has  he  as  yet,  I  believe,  determined  his  form  of  administration. 
His  new  adherents  are  all  hungry  for  place  ;  and  in  answer  to  their 
premature  solicitations,  he  tells  me  that  he  has  informed  them  that, 
since  it  took  God  Almighty  six  days  to  make  heaven  and  earth,  it  is 
very  hard  they  will  not  allow  him,  a  poor  mortal,  even  the  same 
time  to  settle  the  afiairs  of  a  kingdom.  I  am  gratified  at  being  able 
to  assure  your  Lordship  that  the  best  feeling  is  manifested  towards 
the  British  officers  by  the  entire  population  here,  and  I  devoutly 
hope  that  nothing  may  occur  to  disturb  the  present  happy  state  of 
things.  Dost  Mahomed  will,  I  doubt  not,  take  himself  off  like  his 
brothers,  though  not,  perhaps,  in  quite  so  great  a  hurry,  when  the 
intelligence  reaches  him  of  the  manner  in  which  Shah  Soojah  has 
been  received  at  Candahai*.  The  Sirdars  have  carried  off  my 
elephants,  and  I  am  informed  that  the  animals  proved  of  the  greatest 
service  to  them  in  crossing  their  ladies  over  a  deep  and  rapid  river 
not  far  from  this.  We  have  heard  nothing  since  our  arrival  here  of 
the  embassy  from  Herat.  If  I  go  to  Simlah  from  Caubul,  Sir  A. 
Burnes  could  be  left  to  officiate  for  me,  and  in  case  of  my  return  he 
might  go  to  Candahar  and  relieve  Major  Leach,  who  might  be  left 
there  in  the  first  instance. 

I  remain,  my  Lord,  yours,  &c. 

W.  H.  Macnaqhten.* 

Encouraged  by  the  presumed  "  adoration"  of  the  people, 
it  was  now  determined  to  give  them  another  opportimity 
of  testifying  the  overflowing  abundance  of  their  loyalty 
and  affection.  So  the  8th  of  May  was  fixed  upon  for  a 
general  public  recognition  of  the  restored  sovereign,  on 
the  plains  before  Candahar.     Both  columns  of  the  British 

*  Unpunished  Correspondence  of  Sir  W.  H.  Macnaghten, 


440  THE   HALT    AT    CANDAHAR. 

army  had  now  arrived.  The  troops  were  to  pass  in 
review-order  before  the  king;  and  other  ceremonial  ob- 
servances were  to  give  eclat  to  the  inauguration.  Upon 
a  raised  platform,  under  a  showy  canopy,  sate  the  restored 
monarch  of  the  Douranee  Empire.  He  had  ridden  out 
at  sunrise  under  a  royal  salute.  The  troops  had  pre- 
sented arms  to  him  on  his  ascending  the  musnud,  and  a 
salute  of  a  hundred  and  one  g-uns  had  been  fired  in  honour 
of  the  occasion.  Around  him  were  the  chief  military 
and  political  officers  of  the  British  Government.  Every- 
thing went  off  as  it  had  been  ordered  and  arranged,  and 
most  imposing  was  the  spectacle  of  the  review-march  of 
the  British  troops.  But  the  King  had  then  been  a  fort- 
night at  Candahar,  and  the  curiosity  of  the  people  had 
subsided.  There  was  no  popular  enthusiasm.*  The  whole 
affair  was  a  painful  failure.  The  English  officers  saluted 
the  King ;  and  the  King  made  a  speech  about  the  disin- 
terested benevolence  of  the  British  Government.  Greatly 
pleased  was  his  Majesty  with  the  exhibition ;  and  when 
the  troops  had  been  dismissed,  he  said  that  its  moral 
influence  would  be  felt  from  Pekin  to  Constantinople. t 
But  the  miserable  paucity  of  Afghans  who  appeared  to 


*  Captain  Havelock,  who  is  by  no  means  disposed  to  take  an 
unfavorable  view  of  the  policy  out  of  which  emanated  the  assembling 
oftheAi-myof  the  Indus,  says:  "  Unless  I  have  been  deceived,  all 
the  national  enthusiasm  of  the  scene  was  entirely  confined  to  his 
Majesty's  immediate  retainers.  The  people  of  Candahar  are  said  to 
have  viewed  the  whole  affair  with  the  most  mortifying  indifference. 
Few  of  them  quitted  the  city  to  be  present  in  the  plains  ;  and  it  was 
remarked  with  justice,  that  the  passage  m  the  diplomatic  programme 
which  presented  a  place  behind  the  throne  for  '  the  populace  restrained 
by  the  Shah's  troops,'  became  rather  a  bitter  satire  on  the  display  of 
the  morning."  Compare  Dr.  Kennedy's  version  of  these  proceedings. 
All  the  private  accounts  I  have  received,  confirm  the  truth  of  the 
printed  narratives. 

t  Kennedy. 


INSTALLATION   OF   THE   KING.  441 

do  homage  to  the  King,  must  have  warned  Shah  Soojah, 
with  ominous  significance,  of  the  feebleness  of  his  tenure 
upon  the  affections  of  the  people,  as  it  bitterly  dis- 
appointed and  dismayed  his  principal  European  sup- 
porters. Every  effort  had  been  made  to  give  pubHcity 
to  the  programme  of  the  ceremony ;  and  yet  it  is  said,  by 
the  most  trustworthy  witnesses,  that  barely  a  hundred 
Afghans  had  been  attracted,  either  by  curiosity  or  by 
loyalty,  to  the  installation  of  the  adored  King. 

Such  were  the  mere  outward  facts  of  Shah  Soojah's 
reception  as  recorded  by  the  chroniclers  of  the  day.  Sur- 
rounded by  his  own  Contingent,  and  supported  by  the 
British  army,  he  had  advanced  unopposed  to  Candahar. 
But  the  brief  local  excitement,  which  his  entrance  into  the 
city  had  aroused,  cannot  be  regarded  as  national  enthu- 
siasm. When  the  first  outbreak  of  curiosity  had  sub- 
sided the  feeling  which  greeted  the  restored  King  was 
rather  that  of  sullen  indifference  than  of  active  devotion. 
In  the  vicinity  of  Candahar  the  Douranee  tribes  consti- 
tuted the  most  influential  section  of  the  inhabitants. 
They  had  been  oppressed  and  impoverished  by  the  Ba- 
rukzye  Sirdars,  and  had  longed  to  rid  themselves  of  the 
yoke  of  their  oppressors.  But  when  the  representative 
of  the  Suddozye  dynasty,  under  which  they  had  been 
pampered  and  protected,  appeared  at  the  gates  of  the 
Douranee  Empire,  they  had  neither  spirit  nor  strength 
to  make  a  strenuous  effort  to  support  or  to  oppose  the 
restored  monarch.  It  is  doubtful  whether,  in  the  conjunc- 
ture which  had  then  arisen,  the  Douranees,  had  they  pos- 
sessed any  military  streng-th,  would  have  openly  arrayed 
themselves  on  the  side  of  the  Shah ;  for  although  they 
hated  the  Barukzyes  who  had  oppressed  them,  there  were 
the  strongest  national  and  religious  feelings  to  excite 
them  against  a  Prince  who  had  brought  an  army  of  Franks 
tj  desolate  their  country.     Had  they  stood  erect  in  their 


442  THE    HALT    AT    CANDAHAR. 

old  pride  of  conscious  power,  a  mighty  conflict  would 
have  raged  within  them.  The  antagonism  of  personal 
and  national  interests  would  have  rent  and  convulsed 
them ;  and  it  is  not  improbable  that  in  the  end,  abhorring 
the  thought  of  an  infidel  invasion,  they  would  have  deter- 
mined to  support  the  cause  of  the  Sirdars.  But  when 
Shah  Soojah  was  advancing  upon  Candahar,  the  Douranees 
were  in  a  state  of  absolute  feebleness  and  paralysis.  They 
held  aloof,  for  they  had  neither  power  nor  inclination  to 
take  any  conspicuous  part  in  the  revolution  which  w^as 
then  brooding  over  the  empire. 

But  when,  supported  by  his  Feringhee  allies,  the  Shah 
had  established  himself  in  Candahar,  the  Douranees, 
offering  their  congratulations  and  tendering  their  allegi- 
ance, gathered  round  the  restored  monarch.  The  issue 
of  the  contest  seemed  no  longer  doubtful.  The  dominion 
of  the  Barukzye  Sirdars  had  received  its  death-blow.  The 
restoration  of  the  Suddozye  dynasty  was  certain ;  and 
with  whatever  feelings  the  Douranees  may  have  inwardly 
regarded  it,  it  was  politic  to  make  an  outward  show  of 
satisfaction  and  delight.  The  change  had  been  effected 
without  their  agency;  but  they  might  turn  it  to  good 
account.  So  they  clustered  around  the  throne,  and  began 
to  clamour  for  the  wages  of  their  pretended  forbearance. 
They  put  forward  the  most  extravagant  claims  and  pre- 
tensions; bargained  for  the  restoration  of  all  the  old 
privileges  and  immunities  which  they  had  enjoyed  under 
Ahmed  Shah  and  his  successors ;  and  would  fain  have 
swept  the  entire  revenues  of  the  state  into  their  own 
hands. 

It  was  plain  that  the  King  could  not  recognise  the 
claims  which  were  thus  profusely  asserted.  But  it  would 
have  been  imprudent,  at  such  a  time,  to  have  offended  or 
disappointed  these  powerful  tribes.  The  Shah  had  esta- 
blished himself  at  Candahar.     Kohun-dil-Khan  and  his 


TREATMENT   OF   THE   DOURAJTEES.  443 

brothers  had  fled  for  safety  across  the  Helmund,  and 
sought  an  asylum  in  Persia.*  But  Dost  Mahomed  was 
still  dominant  at  Caubul.  There  was  work  yet  to  be  done. 
There  were  dangers  yet  to  be  encountered.  It  was  neces- 
sary, therefore,  to  conciliate  the  Douranees.  So  steering, 
as  well  as  he  could,  a  middle  course,  the  Shah  granted 
much  that  was  sought  from  him ;  but  he  did  not  grant 
all.  He  restored  the  Sirdars  to  the  chieftainships  of  their 
clans,  and  to  the  offices  which  they  had  been  wont  to  hold 
about  the  Court.  He  gave  them  back  the  lands  of  which 
they  had  been  denuded,  and  granted  them  allowances 
consistent  with  the  rank  which  they  had  been  sufl"ered  to 
reassume.  Some  vexatious  and  oppressive  imposts  were 
removed,  and  a  considerable  remission  of  taxation  was 
proclaimed.  But  the  system  of  assessment  which  the 
Barukzye  Sirdars  had  introduced  was  continued  in  opera- 
tion ;  and  the  same  revenue  officers  continued  to  collect 
the  tax.  These  men  were  thoroughly  hateful  to  the  Dou- 
ranees. They  had  been  the  willing  instruments  of 
Barukzye  oppression,  and  had  carried  out  the  work  of 
their  masters  with  a  ferocity,  strengthened  by  the  recol- 
lection of  one  of  those  old  hereditary  blood-feuds,  which 
keep  up  from  generation  to  generation  a  growth  of  imex- 
tinguishable  hate. 

If  any  feelings  of  delight  at  the  thought  of  the  restora- 
tion of  the  Suddozye  dynasty  welled  up  anywhere  in  the 
breasts  of  the  people  of  Afghanistan,  it  was  among  these 
Douranee  tribes.  As  the  grandson  of  Ahmed  Shah,  they 
were  prepared  to  welcome  Shah  Soojah.  They  were  pre- 
pared to  welcome  him  as  the  enemy  of  the  Barukzye 
Sirdars.  But  the  ugly  array  of  foreign  bayonets  in  the 
background  effectually  held  in  control  all  their  feelings  of 


•  "Where  they  remained  as  guests  of  Mahomed  Shah  until  the  with- 
drawal of  the  British  from  Afghanistan. 


444  THE   HALT   AT    CANDAHAR. 

national  enthusiasm.  They  regarded  the  movement  for 
the  restoration  of  the  Suddozye  Prince  in  the  Hght  of  a 
foreign  invasion ;  and  chafed  when  they  saw  the  English 
officers  settling  themselves  in  the  palaces  of  their  ancient 
Princes. 

In  the  meanwhile,  the  Army  of  the  Indus  remained 
inactive  at  Candahar.  The  halt  was  a  long  and  a  weary- 
one.  Provisions  were  miserably  scarce.  It  was  necessary 
to  remain  under  the  city  walls  until  a  sufficiency  could 
be  obtained,  and  to  obtain  this  sufficiency  it  was  necessary 
to  await  the  ripening  of  the  crops.  Every  one  was  im- 
patient to  advance.  The  delay  was  painful  and  disheart- 
ening. There  were  no  compensating  advantages  to  be 
obtained  from  a  halt  under  the  walls  of  Candahar.  Save 
a  few  who  had  the  real  artist's  eye  to  appreciate  the  pic- 
turesque, the  officers  of  the  force  were  disappointed  with 
the  place.  They  had  believed  that  they  were  advancing 
upon  a  splendid  city;  but  they  now  found  themselves 
before  a  walled  town,  presenting  so  few  objects  of  interest 
that  it  was  scarcely  worth  exploring.  After  the  desolate 
tracts  over  which  they  had  passed,  the  valley  of  Candahar 
appeared  to  the  eye  of  our  officers  to  be  a  pleasant  and  a 
favoured  spot.  There  were  green  fields,  and  shady  or- 
chards, and  running  streams,  to  vary  the  siu-rounding 
landscape.  But  they  found  the  city  itself  to  be  little 
better  than  a  collection  of  mud-houses,  forming  very  un- 
imposing  streets.*     The  city  was  in  ruins.     "  The  interior 

*  As  at  Herat,  the  four  principal  streets  meet  in  the  centre  of  the 
city,  and  at  their  junction  are  covered  over  with  a  great  dome.  Th$ 
picturesque  accessories  of  Candahar  are  by  no  one  so  well  described  a;< 
by  Lieutenant  Rattray,  in  his  letter-press  accompaniments  to  hia 
admirable  series  of  "Views  in  Affghanistan ."  With  true  artisti-? 
feeling,  he  writes  ;  ' '  Viewing  Candahar  from  without,  or  at  a  distance, 
there  is  no  peculiarity  in  its  structure  to  strike  the  eye,  as  nothing 
appears  above  the  long,  high  walls,  but  the  top  of  Ahmed  Shah's  tomb, 


THE   CITY   OF   CANDAHAR.  445 

consisted  only  of  the  relics  of  houses  of  forgotten  Princes."* 
There  was  altogether  an  air  of  dreariness  and  desolation 
about  the  place.  Many  of  the  houses  had  been  thrown 
down  by  repeated  shocks  of  earthquake,  and  had  not 
been  rebuilt.  The  pubhc  buildings  were  few ;  but  con- 
spicuous among  them  was  the  tomb  of  Ahmed  Shah, 
whose  white  dome,  seen  from  a  distance,  stood  up  above 
the  houses  of  the  city,  whilst  a  spacious  mosque,  with 
its  domes  and  minarets,  seen  also  from  afar,  enshrined 
a  relict  of  extraordinary  sanctity — the  shirt  of  the  Prophet 
Mahomed. 

When  the  British  arrived  before  Candahar  in  April, 
1839,  it  was  said  that  the  principal  inhabitants  had  for- 
saken the  place.  But  enough  remained  to  give  an 
animated  and  picturesque  aspect  to  the  city.  The  streets 
and  bazaars  were  crowded  with  people  of  different  castes 


the  summits  of  a  few  minarets,  and  the  upper  parapets  of  the  citadel. 
But  the  interior,  as  seen  from  the  battlements,  cannot  fail  to  delight. 
Its  irregular  mud-houses,  partly  in  ruins,  varied  with  trees  and  mina- 
rets ;  the  square  red-brick  dwellings,  with  doors  and  windows  of 
Turkish  arches  ;  the  lofty  habitations  of  the  Hindoo  ;  the  tents 
pitched  here  and  there  on  the  flat  house-tops ;  the  long  terraces  crowded 
with  people,  busied  in  their  various  callings  in  the  open  air ;  the  dung 
and  mud-plastered  hut  of  the  Khaukur,  with  his  heavy,  wild-looking 
buffaloes  tethered  round  it ;  the  high  enclosures  of  the  different  tribes ; 
the  warlike  castles  of  the  chieftains ;  the  gaily-decorated  palace  of  some 
great  Douranee  Lord,  with  its  fountains,  squares,  and  court-yards  ;  and 
the  domed  houses  of  the  other  inhabitants,  the  bazaars,  mosques, 
turrets,  and  cupolas,  rising  up  in  the  midst  of  stupendous  and  inacces- 
sible mountains,—  from  the  whole  rise  a  panorama  pleasing  to  look 
upon." 

*  Kennedy.  The  author  adds  :  "Shah  Soojah  had  sheltered  him- 
self in  one,  Mr.  Macnaghten  in  another,  and  Sir  Alexander  Bumes  in  a 
third.  The  latter  had  been  rebuilt  by  one  of  the  chiefs  of  Candahar 
for  his  favourite  wife.  It  had  an  air  of  magnificence  and  grandeur 
where  it  stood  :  but  m  the  Mogul  Serai   of  Surat,  or  in  Ahmedabad, 

would  be  passed  unobserved." 


446  THE   HALT   AT   CANDAHAR. 

and  different  costumes — Afghans,  Persians,  Oosbegs,  Beloo- 
chees,  Armenians,  and  Hindoos ;  whilst  strings  of  laden 
camels  everywhere  passing  and  repassing,  enhanced  the 
picturesque  liveliness  of  the  scene. 

There  was  little  to  break  the  monotony  of  the  halt  at 
Candahar.  The  movements  of  the  enemy,  and  the  pro- 
babilities of  a  stirring  or  a  languid  campaign  were  dis- 
cussed in  our  officers'  tents;  and  when,  on  the  9th  of  May, 
a  brigade  under  Colonel  Sale — an  officer  who  had  already 
done  much  good  service  to  his  country,  and  was  destined 
now  to  play  a  conspicuous  part  in  the  great  Central- Asian 
drama — was  despatched  to  Ghiresk,  a  place  some  seventy- 
five  miles  in  a  westerly  direction  from  Candahar,  in 
pursuit  of  the  fugitive  Sirdars,  there  were  few  officers 
in  Keane's  army  who  did  not  long  to  accompany  it.  But 
the  campaign  was  a  brief  and  an  inglorious  one — Sale 
marched  to  Ghiresk  and  returned  to  Candahar.  The  Sir- 
dars had  abandoned  the  place,  and  fled  across  the  Persian 
frontier.  They  had  but  a  handful  of  followers,  and  they 
were  powerless  to  offer  any  resistance  to  our  advancing 
troops.  From  Kohun-dil-Khan  and  his  brothers  nothing 
was  to  be  apprehended.  Their  very  names  were  soon 
almost  forgotten  by  the  Feringhees  who  had  driven  them 
from  their  homes.  Candahar  and  the  surrounding  country 
was  in  possession  of  the  restored  Suddozye  Princes.  But 
Shah  Soojah  and  his  supporters  still  looked  anxiously 
towards  the  north,  where  Dost  Mahomed,  the  ablest  and 
the  most  powerful  of  the  Barukzye  brotherhood,  was  still 
mustering  his  fighting  men — still  endeavouring  to  rouse 
the  chiefs  to  aid  him  in  the  defence  of  his  capital  against 
the  often-rejected  King,  who  had  now  come  back  to  them 
again,  supported  by  the  gold  and  bayonets  of  the  infidels. 

But  the  very  circumstances  which  might  be  supposed 
to  work  to  our  disadvantage,  and  to  give  strength  to  the 
enemy,  really  favoured  our  cause.     The  protracted  halt 


PLANS   OF   DOST   MAHOMED.  447 

at  Candahar  gave  Dost  Mahomed  and  his  adherents 
abundant  time  to  mature  their  measures  of  defence. 
Whilst  the  British  army  was  starving  in  that  city,  the 
Barukzyes  at  Caubul  might  have  been  collecting  troops 
and  strengthening  their  defences  for  a  vigorous  and  well- 
organised  opposition.  But  to  Dost  Mahomed  this  con- 
tinued halt  was  altogether  unintelligible.  He  could 
not  understand  why,  if  they  really  purposed  to  advance 
upon  Caubul,  Macnaghten  and  Keane  were  wasting  their 
strength  in  utter  idleness  at  Candahar.  It  was  the  Ameer's 
belief  that  the  British  were  projecting  a  movement  upon 
Herat ;  that  the  Army  of  the  Indus  would  branch  off  to 
the  westward;  and  that  its  operations  against  Caubul 
would  be  deferred  to  the  following  year.  Believing 
this,  Dost  Mahomed  turned  his  thoughts  rather  to  the 
defence  of  the  eastern  than  of  the  western  line  of  road. 
It  had  been  arranged,  under  the  Tripartite  treaty,*  that 
Prince  Timour,  the  eldest  son  of  Shah  Soojah,  accom- 
panied by  Captain  Wade  and  a  Sikh  force,  should  pene- 
trate the  passes  beyond  Peshawur,  and  advance  upon 
Caubul  by  the  road  of  Jellalabad  and  Jugdulluck.  This 
force  was  now  advancing.  Dost  Mahomed  sent  out 
against  it  some  of  his  best  fighting  men,  under  the  com- 
mand of  his  favourite  son,  Akbar  Khan — the  young 
chief  who  was  destined  to  stand  out  with  such  teiTible 
prominence  from  among  the  leading  personages  distin- 
guished in  the  later  history  of  the  war. 

No  thought,  however,  of  a  movement  upon  Herat 
weighed  at  this  time  on  Macnaghten's  mind.  It  ap- 
peared to  him  little  desirable  to  march  a  British  army 
into  the  dominions  of  Shah  Kamran,  so  long  as  there 
was  a  possibihty  of  attaining  the  desired  results  by  any 
means   less    costly    and    hazardous.      There   was   little 

•  See  ante,  page  332 


i48  THE   HALT   AT   CANDAHAR. 

immediate  prospect  then  of  Mahomed  Shah  returning  for 
the  re-investment  of  Herat.  There  was  no  pressing 
danger  to  be  combated.  So  Macnaghten  determined  to 
send,  instead  of  a  British  army,  a  British  mission  to 
Herat,  with  a  handful  of  engineer  and  artillery  officers, 
and  a  few  lakhs  of  rupees,  to  be  expended  on  the  de- 
fences of  the  place. 

It  was  in  the  month  of  September,  1838,  that,  after 
a  nine  months'  investment  of  Herat,  Mahomed  Shah 
struck  his  camp,  and  turned  his  face  towards  his  own 
capital.  Eldred  Pottinger  had  saved  the  city  from  the 
grasp  of  the  Persians.  But  his  work  was  not  yet  done. 
The  wretched  people  were  starving.  The  necessary 
evils  of  the  protracted  siege  had  been  greatly  enhanced 
by  the  grinding  cruelty  of  Yar  Mahomed.  To  have 
left  Herat  immediately  on  the  departure  of  the  Persian 
army  would  have  been  to  have  left  the  inhabitants  to 
perish.  Moreover,  the  accursed  traffic  in  human  flesh, 
which  the  Persian  Prince  had  set  forth  as  the  just  cause 
of  his  invasion  of  Herat,  had  not  been  suppressed.  So 
Pottinger  remained  in  Herat,  and  Stoddart,  having  wit- 
nessed the  breaking  up  of  the  Persian  camp,  joined  his 
brother-officer  in  the  city,  and  then  the  two  began  to 
labour  diligently  together  in  the  great  cause  of  universal 
humanity. 

But  these  labours  were  distasteful  to  the  Wuzeer- 
Pottinger  and  Stoddart  had  done  the  work  which  Yar 
Mahomed  required  of  them.  The  one  had  driven  off, 
and  the  other  had  drawn  off,  the  Persian  army.  He 
did  not  desire  that  they  should  interfere  with  his  in- 
ternal tyranny.  To  oppress  the  helpless  people  at  his 
will  seemed  to  be  his  rightful  prerogative.  The  slave- 
trade,  which  he  carried  on  with  such  barbarous  acti- 
vity, was  the  main  source  of  the  Heratee  revenue.  The 
English  officers  did  not  propose  to  effect  its  suppression 


AFFAIRS    AT    HERAT.  44*9 

without  securing  adequate  compensation  to  the  slavu- 
deaUng  state.  But  Yar  Mahomed  viewed  all  their 
proceedings  with  jealousy  and  suspicion  ;  and  two 
months  after  the  close  of  the  siege  of  Herat,  they  were 
grossly  insulted  in  the  presence  of  the  King,  and  ordered 
to  withdraw  themselves  beyond  the  limits  of  the  Heratee 
territory. 

Stoddart  had  work  to  do  in  another  quarter.  He 
quitted  Herat  and  made  his  way  to  Bokhara.  But 
Pottinger  was  solicited  to  postpone  his  departure,  and 
the  da^vn  of  the  new  year  still  found  him  at  the  Court 
of  Herat.  He  only  remained  to  be  insulted.  In  Januaiy, 
1839,  another  outrage  was  committed  upon  him.  His 
house  was  attacked  by  the  retainers  of  Yar  Mahomed 
One  of  his  public  servants  was  seized  and  mutilated. 
As  the  year  advanced,  the  hostile  temper  of  the  Wuzeer 
became  more  and  more  apparent.  Tidings  of  the 
advance  of  Shah  Spojah  and  his  British  allies  had 
reached  Herat ;  and  although  the  integi'ity  of  that  state 
had  been  especially  guaranteed  by  the  Tripartite  treaty, 
and  British  money  was  then  maintaining  both  the  go- 
vernment and  the  people  of  Herat,  Yar  Mahomed 
began  to  intrigue  both  with  the  Persian  Court  and  the 
Candahar  Sirdars,  and  endeavoured  to  form  a  confede- 
racy for  the  expulsion  of  the  Shah  and  his  allies  from 
Afghanistan.* 

But  the  Persian  Court  was  little  inclined  to  commit 
itself  to  an  act  of  such  direct  hostility  against  Great 
Britain.  The  Army  of  the  Indus  continued  to  advance  ; 
there  was  no  prospect  of  any  organised  opposition.  Our 
success  was  sufficiently  intelligible  to  Yar  Mahomed. 
He   respected  success.     So,   when   Shah  Soojah  entered 

*  "Facts  regarding  our  Political  Relations  with  Herat,  and  the 
Conduct  of  Yar  Mahomed  Khan,  from  November,  1837,  to  February, 
1841,"  by  Dr.  J.  S.  Login,  attached  to  the  Heratee  Mission. 

VOL.  I.  G   G 


450  THE    HALT   AT    CANDAHAR. 

Candahar,  and  the  British  army  encamped  beneath  its 
walls,  the  Wuzeer  hastened  to  congratulate  the  Shah  upon 
his  restoration,  and  sent  a  friendly  mission  to  the  British 
camp.  In  return  for  this,  Macnaghten  now  determined 
to  despatch  a  British  officer  to  Herat,  to  negotiate  a 
friendly  treaty  with  Shah  Kamran.  His  first  thought 
was  to  entrust  the  duty  to  Burnes ;  but  Bumes  was  dis- 
inclined to  undertake  it ;  and  Sir  John  Keane  was  of 
opinion  that  he  could  not  be  spared. 

So  the  choice  of  the  Envoy  fell  upon  Major  Todd,  an 
officer  of  the  Bengal  Artillery,  who  had  been  for  many 
years  employed  in  Persia,  instructing  the  artillerymen 
of  Mahomed  Shah  in  the  mysteries  of  his  profession,  and 
assisting  the  British  Mission  in  matters  lying  beyond 
the  circle  of  mere  military  detail.  Thoroughly  ac- 
quainted with  the  languages  and  politics  of  Western 
Asia,  a  man  of  good  capacity,  good  temper,  and  good 
principle,  he  appeared  to  be  well  fitted  for  the  office 
which  the  Envoy  now  thought  of  delegating  to  him. 
He  had  been  in  the  camp  of  Mahomed  Shah  during  the 
siege  of  Herat,  and  had  been  employed  in  the  negotia- 
tions which  had  arisen  between  the  two  contending  states. 
He  had  subsequently  travelled  down  through  Afghanis- 
tan to  India,  charged  with  information  for  the  Governor- 
General,  and  had  then  recommended  himself,  by  the 
extent  of  his  local  knowledge  and  general  acquirements, 
scarcely  more  than  by  the  integrity  of  his  character  and 
the  amiabihty  of  his  disposition,  for  employment  upon 
the  Minister's  staff.  He  was  military  secretary  and 
political  assistant  to  Mr.  Macnaghten  when  the  Envoy 
deputed  him  to  Herat.  There  went  at  the  same  time 
other  officers,  whose  names  have  since  been  honourably 
associated  with  the  great  events  of  the  Central-Asian 
War — James  Abbott  and  Richmond  Shakespear,  of  the 
Bengal  Artillerj'^ ;  and  Sanders,  of  the  Engineers,  who  fell 


TEMPER  OP  THE  PEOPLE.  451 

nobly  upon  the  field  of  Maharajhpore.*  They  went  to 
strengthen  the  fortifications  of  the  place,  and  they  took 
with  them  guns  and  treasure. 

A  few  days  after  the  departure  of  the  Mission  to 
Herat,  the  army  recommenced  its  march.  It  had  been 
halted  at  Candahar  from  the  25th  of  April  to  the  27th 
of  June.  During  this  time  the  harvest  had  ripened  ;  the 
carriage-cattle  had  gained  strength ;  but  sickness  had 
broken  out  among  our  troops.  The  heat  under  canvass 
had  been  extreme.  Fever,  dysentery,  and  jaundice  had 
been  doing  their  work;  and  many  a  good  soldier  had 
been  laid  in  a  foreign  grave.  Money,  too,  had  been 
painfully  scarce.  It  had  been  scattered  about  so  pro- 
fusely on  our  first  arrival  at  Candahar,  that  now  an 
empty  treasury  stared  Macnaghten  in  the  face ;  and 
he  tried  in  vain  to  negotiate  a  loan.  AU  these  were 
dispiriting  circumstances ;  and  there  were  others  which 
pressed  heavily  upon  the  mind  of  the  Envoy.  It  was 
becoming  clearer  to  him  every  day  that  the  Afghans 
regarded  the  intrusion  of  the  British  into  their  dominions 
with  the  strongest  feelings  of  national  hatred  and 
rehgious  abhorrence.  A  different  class  of  men  from  the 
Belooch  marauders,  who  had  carried  off  our  cattle  and 
plimdered  our  stores  in  the  southern  country,  were  now 
surrounding  our  camp.  If  our  people  straggled  far  from 
their  supports,  they  did  it  at  the  peril  of  their  lives. 
"  Remember,  gentlemen,  you  are  not  now  in  IIindostan,"t 
was  the  significant  warning  which  broke  from  Shah 
Soojah,  when    two    young    officers,  J  returning   from   a 

*  Lieutenant  North,  of  the  Bombay  Engineers,  and  Drs.  Login  and 
Ritchie,  also  accompanied  them.  The  Mission  left  Candahar  on  the 
21st  of  June,  and  reached  Herat  on  the  25th  of  July. 

+  Havelock. 

X  Inverarity  and  Wilmer.  The  former  was  murdered ;  the  latter 
escaped  with  his  life. 

G  a  2 


4:52  THE    HALT    AT    CANDAHAR. 

fishing  excursion  along  the  banks  of  the  Urghundab, 
had  been  cut  down  by  a  party  of  assassins.  It  was 
plain,  too,  that  the  GhUzyes  of  Western  Afghanistan — 
the  original  lords  of  the  land — ^were  disinclined  to  bend 
their  necks  to  the  Suddozye  yoke.  They  had  rejected 
the  overtures  made  to  them.  They  were  not  to  be 
bought  by  British  gold,  or  deluded  by  British  promises. 
Perhaps  they  may  have  doubted  the  sincerity  of  the 
latter.  Already  were  Shah  Soojah  and  Macnaghten 
scattering  about  those  promises  even  more  freely  than 
their  money  ;  and  already  were  they  ceasing  to  respect 
the  obligation  of  fulfilling  them.  The  Ghilzyes  now 
regarded  us  with  unconquerable  mistrust.  There  was 
every  prospect  of  their  long  continuing  to  be  a  thorn 
in  the  flesh  of  the  restored  monarch  and  his  supporters 
— a  wild  and  lawless  enemy,  not  to  be  reduced  to 
loyalty  by  Douranee  Kings,  or  to  subjection  by  foreign 
bayonets. 

This,  at  all  events,  had  been  learnt  at  Candahar  during 
the  two  months'  halt  of  our  army,  which,  when  every- 
thing has  been  said  on  the  subject  of  supplies,  seems  still 
to  demand  from  the  pen  of  the  historian  something  more 
in  the  way  of  explanation.  The  supplies  had  now  come 
into  camp.  They  might  not  be  available  for  the  troops 
on  the  line  of  march  to  Caubul  ;*  but  there  was  no  longer 

*  A  convoy  of  camels  laden  witli  grain  had  been  for  some  time 
expected  from  the  southward,  under  the  charge  of  a  Lohanee  merchant, 
named  Surwar  Khan.  Some  efforts  had  been  made  by  the  enemy  to 
intercept  this  convoy,  or  to  corrupt  the  Lohanee  chief ;  and  it  is  said 
that  nothing  but  the  determined  fidelity  of  the  leader  of  the  Irregular 
Horse  sent  to  escort  it  into  Candahar,  saved  the  convoy  from  being 
carried  off  to  the  Barukzyes.  It  reached  Candahar,  but  there  a  new 
difficulty  presented  itself.  The  camel-drivers  refused  to  proceed. 
There  were  20,000  maunds  of  grain  now  at  the  disposal  of  our  Com- 
missariat officers  ;  but  the  contumacy  of  these  men  was  now  likely  to 
render  it  wholly  useless.     Surwar  Khan  had  contracted  to  bring  the 


ARRIVAL   AT    GHUZNEE.  453 

any  excuse  for  protracting  the  halt.  So,  on  the  27th  of 
June,  as  Runjeet  Singh,  the  old  Lion  of  Lahore,  was 
wrestling  with  death  at  his  own  capital,  the  British  army- 
resumed  its  march;  and  on  the  21st  of  July  was  before 
the  famous  fortress  of  Ghuznee. 

convoy  to  Candahar  ;  but  the  camel- drivers,  afraid  of  the  vengeance 
of  Dost  Mahomed,  refused  to  proceed  any  further.  There  was  no 
contending  against  this  ;  so  the  supplies  were  made  over  to  the 
Commissariat,  and  stored  at  Candahar,  where  a  detachment  of  our 
troops  was  left. 


454 


CHAPTER  III. 

[June— August :  1839.] 

The  Disunion  of  the  Barukzyes — Prospects  of  Dost  Mahomed — Keane's 
Advance  to  Ghuznee — Massacre  of  the  Prisoners — Fall  of  Ghuznee 
— Flight  of  Dost  Mahomed — Hadjee  Khan,  Khaukur — Escape  of 
Dost  Mahomed — Entry  of  Shah  Soojah  into  Caubul. 

The  disunion  of  the  Barukzye  brethren  lost  Afghanistan 
to  the  Sirdars.  The  bloodless  fall  of  Candahar  struck  no 
astonishment  into  the  soul  of  Dost  Mahomed.  He  had 
long  mistrusted  his  kinsmen.  Candahar,  too,  was  the 
home  of  the  Douranees.  He  knew  that  the  Barukzyes 
had  nothing  to  expect  from  the  allegiance  of  that  power- 
ful tribe.  He  knew  that  they  were  little  inclined  to 
strike  a  blow  for  the  existing  dynasty ;  but  he  knew  at 
the  same  time,  that  they  were  so  prostrate  and  enfeebled, 
that  the  Suddozye  Prince  would  derive  no  active  assist- 
ance from  them — that  they  would  only  throw  into  the 
scale  the  passive  sullenness  and  harmless  decrepitude  of 
men  broken  down  by  a  long  course  of  oppression. 

If  Dost  Mahomed  and  the  Candahar  Sirdars  had 
leagued  themselves  firmly  together,  without  jealousy  and 
without  suspicion — if  they  had  declared  a  religious  war, 
and  appealed  to  the  Mahomedan  feelings  of  the  people — 
if  they  had,  by  their  own  energy  and  activity,  encouraged 
Mehrab  Khan  of  Khelat  to  array  himself  against  the 
invaders,  and  throwing  themselves  heart  and  soul  into 
the  cause,  had  opposed  our  passage  through  the  Bolan  and 
Kojuck   Passes,  they  might    have   tiu-ned   to   the   best 


PROSPECTS   OP  DOST   MAHOMED.  455 

recount  the  sufferings  of  our  famine-stricken  army,  and 
bave  given  us,  at  the  outset  of  the  campaign,  a  check 
from  which  we  should  not  have  speedily  recovered.  But 
it  seems  to  have  been  the  design  of  Providence  to  para- 
lyse our  enemies  at  this  time,  and  so  to  lure  us  into 
greater  dangers  than  any  that  could  have  beset  us  at  the 
opening  of  the  campaign. 

But  although  with  slight  feelings  of  astonishment  Dost 
Mahomed  now  contemplated  the  successful  establishment 
of  Shah  Soojah  at  Candahar,  it  could  not  have  been  without 
emotions  of  bitterness  and  mortification  that  he  beheld 
his  countrymen  either  flying  ignobly  before  the  invaders, 
or  bowing  down  without  shame  before  the  money-bags  of 
the  infidels.  It  was  a  sore  trial  to  him  to  see  how  almost 
eveiy  chief  in  the  country  was  now  prepared  to  sell  his 
birthright  for  a  mess  of  pottage.  He  had  not  sufficient 
confidence  in  his  own  strength,  or  the  loyalty  of  his 
people,  to  believe  that  he  could  offer  any  effectual  resist- 
ance to  the  approach  of  the  Suddozye  King,  supported  as 
he  was  by  British  bayonets  and  British  gold.  His  enemies 
were  advancing  upon  Caubul,  both  along  the  eastern  and 
western  lines  of  approach;  and  he  was  necessitated  to 
divide  his  strength.  Nor  could  he  even  give  his  undi- 
vided attention  to  his  foreign  enemies.  There  were  danger 
and  disaffection  at  home.  The  Kohistan  was  in  rebellion.* 
He  could  see  plainly  that  the  Kuzzilbashes  were  against 
him.  Indeed,  all  the  bulwarks  of  national  defence  which 
he  could  hope  to  oppose  to  the  advancing  enemy,  were  crum- 
bling to  pieces  before  his  eyes.  Believing  that  all  nation- 
ality of  feeling  was  utterly  extinct  in  the  souls  of  his 
brethren,  it  had,  ever  since  he  had  established  himself  at 
Caubul,  been  his  policy  to  place  the  least  possible  amount 
of  power  in  their  hands,  and  to  entrust  all  his  delegated 

*  The  Kohistan  is  the  hill  country  to  the  north  of  Caubul,  lying 
between  the  capital  and  the  Hindoo-Koosh. 


456  THE    FALL    OF   GHUZNEE. 

authority  to  the  hands  of  his  sons.  His  only  trust  now 
was  in  them.  Akbar  Khan  had  been  despatched  through 
the  eastern  passes  to  oppose  the  march  of  Wade  and  the 
Sikhs ;  Hyder  Khan  was  in  command  of  the  garrison  of 
Ghuznee ;  and  Afzul  Khan,  w^ith  a  body  of  horse,  was  in 
the  neighbourhood  of  that  fortress,  instructed  to  operate 
against  the  flanks  of  our  army  in  the  open  country.  The 
Ameer  himself  was  at  the  capital  waiting  the  progress  of 
events,  and  husbanding  his  strength  for  the  final  conflict. 

In  the  Ameer's  camp  there  seems  to  have  been  little 
knowledge  of  the  movements  and  designs  of  the  enemy. 
It  had  been  for  some  time  believed  that  it  w^as  the  inten- 
tion of  the  British  chiefs  to  march  upon  Herat,  and  now 
again  it  was  the  opinion  that  they  purposed  to  mask 
Ghuznee  and  move  at  once  upon  Caubul.  It  seems, 
therefore,  to  have  been  the  design  of  Dost  Mahomed  that 
Afzul  Khan  and  Hyder  Khan,  having  suffered  us  to  ad- 
vance a  march  or  two  beyond  Ghuznee,  should  fall  upon 
our  rear,  whilst  Dost  Mahomed  himself  was  to  give  us 
battle  from  the  front.*  But  he  had  not  measured  aright 
the  policy  of  the  British  Commander.  It  was  not 
Sir  John  Keane's  intention  to  mask  Ghuznee,  but  to 
reduce  it. 

The  strength  of  Ghuznee  was  the  boast  of  the  Afghans. 
They  believed  that  it  was  not  to  be  carried  by  assault. 
On  the  other  hand,  Sir  John  Keane,  persuaded  that  it 
was  not  a  place  of  any  strength,  had  advanced  upon  Ghuz- 
nee without  any  siege  guns.  A  battering  train  had  been 
brought  up,  with  great  labour  and  at  great  expense,  to 
Candahar,  and  now  that  it  was  likely  to  be  brought  into 
use,  and  so  to  repay  the  labour  and  the  expense,  Sir  John 

*  This  was  the  account  of  the  Ameer's  tactics  given  by  Hyder  Khan. 
Mohun  Lai,  upon  whose  authority  I  instance  it,  was  in  daily  personal 
communication  with  the  Prince  after  his  capture,  and  ought  to  be  well 
informed  upon  this  point. 


STRENGTH   OF   GHUZNEE.  457 

Keane  dropped  it  by  the  way.  He  was  nearing  the 
strongest  fortress  in  the  country ;  he  knew  that  it  was 
garrisoned  by  the  enemy,  and  that,  if  he  advanced  upon 
it,  it  would  be  vigorously  defended.  He  determined  to 
advance  upon  it ;  and  yet,  with  an  amount  of  infatuation 
which,  although  after-events  have  thrown  it  into  the 
shade,  at  the  time  took  the  country  by  surprise,  and  was, 
perhaps,  unexampled  in  Indian  warfare,  he  left  his  heavy 
guns  at  Candahar,  and  advanced  upon  Ghuznee  with 
nothing  but  light  field-pieces.  He  had  been  told  that  it 
was  a  place  of  no  considerable  strength,  and  that  it  would 
give  him  no  trouble  to  take  it.  Major  Todd  and  Lieu- 
tenant Leech  had  seen  Ghuznee,  and  their  reports  had 
dissipated  the  anxieties  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  So 
he  found  himself  before  a  place  which  he  subsequently 
described  as  one  of  "  great  strength  both  by  nature  and  by 
art,"  without  any  means  of  effecting  a  breach  in  its  walls. 
The  city  of  Ghuznee  lies  between  Candahar  and  Caubul 
— about  230  miles  distant  from  the  former,  and  ninety  miles 
from  the  latter  place.  The  entire  line  of  country  from  Can- 
dahar to  Caubul  is,  in  comparison  with  that  which  lies 
between  Caubul  and  Peshawur,  an  open  and  a  level  tract, 
opposing  no  difficulties  to  the  march  of  an  army  encum- 
bered with  artillery  and  baggage.  As  a  city,  it  was  of  less 
importance  than  either  Caubul  or  Candahar.*     But  the  » 

*  "The  town,"  says  Lieutenant  Rattray,  "stands  on  the  extreme 
point  of  a  range  of  hills,  which  slope  upwards  and  command  the  north- 
east angle  of  the  Balla  Hissar,  near  which  is  perched  the  tomb  of 
Belool  the  Wise,  among  ruined  mosques  and  grave-stones.  As  a  city, 
it  will  not  bear  comparison  with  Caubul  or  Candahar  ;  and  a  previous 
visit  to  the  bazaars  of  either  would  spoil  you  for  the  darkened  narrow 
streets  and  small  charloo  of  Ghuznee.  However,  it  possesses  snug 
houses  and  capital  stabling,  sufficient  for  a  cavalry  brigade,  within  its 
walls  ;  and  in  the  citadel,  particularly,  the  squares  and  residences  of 
its  former  governors  were  in  many  instances  spacious  and  even  princely 
in  their  style  and  decorations." 


458  THE    FALL    OF    GHUZNEE. 

strength  of  the  citadel  had  been  famous  throughout  many 
generations  ;  and  the  first  sight  of  the  fortress,  as  it  burst 
suddenly  on  the  view  of  our  advancing  army,  "with  its 
fortifications  rising  up,  as  it  were,  on  the  side  of  a  hill, 
which  seemed  to  form  the  background  to  it,"  must  have 
thrust  upon  every  ofiicer  of  the  force  the  conviction  that, 
at  Candahar,  they  had  all  underrated  the  strength  of  the 
place.  It  obviously  was  not  a  fortress  to  be  breached  by 
nine-pounder  and  six-pounder  guns. 

From  the  fortifications  of  the  citadel  Hyder  Khan 
looked  out  through  a  telescope,  and  beheld  our  British 
columns  advancing  slowly  and  steadily  across  the  plain. 
Some  preparations  had  been  made  for  external  defence ; 
but  not  on  any  extensive  scale.  Parties  of  the  enemy 
were  posted  in  the  villages  and  gardens  around  the  fort  ; 
but  our  light  companies  soon  dislodged  them.  The  morn- 
ing was  spent  in  brisk  skirmishing  ;  *  the  range  of  the 
enemy's  guns  was  tried ;  the  engineers  reconnoitred  the 
place  ;  and  then  it  was  determined  that  the  camp  should 
be  pitched  upon  the  Caubul  side  of  the  city.  It  was 
reported  that  Dost  Mahomed  himself  was  advancing  from 
the  capital,  and  it  was  expedient  to  cut  off  his  direct 
communication  with  the  fort.  Not  without  some  con- 
fusion the  camp  was  pitched.  Had  Afzul  Khan  descended 
with  his  cavalry  upon  us  at  this  time,  he  might  have 
wrought  dire  mischief  amongst  us. 

Day  had  scarcely  dawned  on  the  22nd  of  July,  when 
Sir  John  Keane,  accompanied  by  Sir  Willoughby  Cotton 
and  the  engineers,  ascended  the  heights  commanding  the 
eastern  face  of  the  works,  and  reconnoitred  the  fortress. 
He  had  determined  on  carrying  the  place  by  assault.     In 

*  The  enemy,  dislodged  from  the  garden,  retreated  to  an  outwork, 
whence  they  directed  a  heavy  fire  upon  our  people,  and  did  some  mis- 
chief among  them.  Captain  Graves,  of  the  16th  Native  Infantry,  and 
Lieutenant  Homrigh,  of  the  48th,  were  wounded. 


TREACHERY    OF    ABDOOL    RESHED.  453 

ignorance  of  the  means  whereby  this  was  to  be  accom- 
pHshed,  the  King  had  recommended  that  the  anny  should 
leave  Ghuznee  to  itself,  and  march  on  at  once  to  Caubul. 
It  was  evident  that  the  light  field-pieces  which  Keane  had 
brought  up  with  him  from  Candahar  could  not  breach  the 
solid  walls  of  Ghuznee.  "  If  you  once  breach  the  place," 
said  the  Shah,  "it  is  yours  ;  but  I  cannot  understand 
how  you  are  to  breach  it — how  you  are  to  get  into  the 
fort."  But  Sir  John  Keane  did  understand  this  ;  for  his 
engineers  had  taught  him.  He  understood,  though  he  had 
left  his  siege  train  behind,  that  there  was  still  a  resource 
remaining  to  him.  Though  the  walls  could  not  be 
breached,  a  gate,  Captain  Thomson  assured  him,  might 
be  blown  in  with  gunpowder. 

The  gate  to  be  blown  in  was  the  Caubul  gate.  All  the 
others  had  been  built  up.  The  military  historians  leave 
it  to  be  surmised  by  the  reader  that  the  knowledge  of 
this  important  fact  was  derived  from  the  reconnaissances 
of  the  British  Commander  and  his  engineers.  The  truth 
is,  that  the  British  had  then  in  their  camp  a  deserter 
from  the  Ghuznee  garrison — a  Barukzye  of  rank,  who  had 
been  induced  to  turn  his  traitorous  back  upon  his  tribe. 
Abdool  Reshed  Khan  was  the  nephew  of  Dost  Mahomed. 
When  the  "  Commercial  Mission "  was  in  Afghanistan, 
Mohun  Lai  had  made  the  acquaintance  of  this  man.  The 
Moonshee  seems  to  have  been  endowed  with  a  genius  for 
traitor-making,  the  lustre  of  which  remained  undimmed 
to  the  very  end  of  the  war.  He  now  began  to  operate 
iipon  his  friend ;  and  he  achieved  a  brilliant  success. 
Abdool  Eeshed  was  not  deaf  to  the  voice  of  the  channer. 
Mohun  Lai  wrote  him  a  seductive  letter,  and  he  deter- 
mined to  desert.  As  the  British  army  approached  Ghuz- 
nee he  joined  our  camp.  "I  introduced  him,"  says  Mohun 
Ijal,  "to  the  Envoy,  who  placed  him  under  the  immediate 
disposal  of  Lord  Keane.     The  information  which  he  gave 


460  THE    FALL    OF   GHUZNEB. 

to  Major  Thomson,  the  chief  engineer,  relative  to  the  forti- 
fications of  Ghuznee,  was  so  valuable  and  necessary,  that 
my  friend  Abdool  Reshed  Khan  was  requested  to  attend 
upon  him  in  all  his  reconnoitring  expeditions."  He 
was  precisely  the  man  we  wanted.  He  gave  us  all  the 
information  we  required.  He  taught  us  how  to  capture 
Ghuznee. 

Having  determined  to  enter  Ghuznee  through  an  en- 
trance effected  by  an  explosion  of  gunpowder,  Keane 
began  to  issue  his  instructions  for  the  assault,  which  was 
to  take  place  before  daybreak  on  the  following  morning. 
Every  preparation  was  made,  and  every  precaution  was 
taken  to  ensure  success.  It  was  a  day  of  expectation  and 
anxiety,  and  not  wholly  uneventful.  On  that  22nd  of 
July  was  made  known  to  us,  with  fearful  demonstrative- 
ness,  the  character  of  those  fanatic  soldiers  of  Islam,  who 
have  since  become  so  terribly  familiar  to  us  under  the 
name  of  Ghazees.  Incited  by  the  priesthood,  they  flock  to 
the  green  banner,  eager  to  win  Paradise  by  the  destruc- 
tion of  their  infidel  foes,  or  to  forestall  the  predestined 
bliss  by  dying  the  martyr's  death  in  the  attempt.  A 
party  of  these  fearless  followers  of  the  Prophet  had  assem- 
bled in  the  neighbourhood  of  Ghuznee,  and  now  they 
were  about  to  pour  down  upon  the  Shah's  camp,  and  to 
rid  the  country  of  a  King  who  had  outraged  Mahomed- 
anism  by  returning  to  his  people  borne  aloft  on  the 
shoulders  of  the  infidels.  A  gallant  charge  of  the  Shah's 
Horse,  led  by  Peter  Nicolson,  who  took  no  undistinguished 
part  ii:i  the  after-events  of  the  war,  checked  the  onslaught 
of  these  desperate  fanatics ;  and  Outram,  with  a  party  of 
foot,  followed  them  to  the  heights  where  the  cavalry  had 
driven  them,  and  captured  their  holy  standard.  Some 
fifty  prisoners  were  taken.  It  is  painful  to  relate  what 
followed.  Conducted  into  the  presence  of  Shah  Soojah, 
they  gloried  in  their  high  calling,  arid  openly  reviled  the 


MASSACRE    OF   GHAZEES.  461 

King.  One  of  them,  more  audacious  than  the  rest, 
stabbed  one  of  the  royal  attendants.  Upon  this,  a  man- 
date went  forth  for  the  massacre  of  the  whole. 

The  Shah  ordered  them  to  be  beheaded,  and  they  were 
hacked  to  death,  with  wanton  barbarity,  by  the  knives  of 
his  executioners.  Coolly  and  deliberately  the  slaughter  of 
these  unhappy  men  proceeded,  till  the  whole  lay  mangled 
and  mutilated  upon  the  blood-stained  ground.*  Macnagh- 
ten,  a  little  time  before,  had  been  commending  the  humane 
instincts  of  the  King.  The  humanity  of  Shah  Soojah  was 
nowhere  to  be  found  except  in  Macnaghten's  letters.  It 
is  enough  simply  to  recite  the  circumstances  of  a  deed  so 
terrible  as  this.  It  was  an  unhappy  and  an  ominous  com- 
mencement. The  Shah  had  marched  all  the  way  from 
Loodhianah  without  encountering  an  enemy.     And  now 

*  There  has  been  so  much  bitter  controversy  on  this  unhappy  subject, 
that  I  have  not  written  this  bare  outline  of  the  event  without  instituting 
inquiries  among  those  who  were  most  likely  to  have  had  some  personal 
cognizance  of  it.  That  I  have  rightly  characterised  these  murders  I 
know,  for  I  have  the  evidence  of  one  who  saw  the  butchery  going  on. 
An  officer  of  the  highest  character  writes,  in  reply  to  my  inquiries  : 
*  *  As  regards  what  is  called  the  Ghuznee  massacre,  I  was  walking  one 
day  in  camp,  and  came  upon  the  King's  tents,  at  the  rear  of  which  I 
saw  a  fearfully  bloody  sight.  There  were  forty  or  fifty  men,  young  and 
old.  Many  wer^  dead  ;  others  at  their  last  gasp  ;  others  with  their 
hands  tied  behind  them  ;  some  sitting,  others  standing,  awaiting  their 
doom  ;  and  the  King's  executioners  and  other  servants  amusing  them- 
selves (for  actually  they  were  laughing  and  joking,  and  seemed  to  look 
upon  the  work  as  good  fun)  with  hacking  and  maiming  the  poor 
wretches  indiscriminately  with  their  long  swords  and  knives.  I  was  so 
horrified  at  coming  so  suddenly  on  such  a  scene  of  blood,  that  I  was 
for  the  instant  as  it  were,  spell-bound.  On  inquiry,  I  ascertained  that 
the  King  had  ordered  this  wholesale  murder  in  conseqxience  of  one  of 
the  number  (they  were,  or  were  said  to  be,  all  Ghazees,  who  had 
shortly  before  been  taken  prisoners)  having  stabbed,  in  his  Majesty's 
presence,  a  Pesh-Khidmut,  or  body -attendant  of  the  King.  My  friend 
and  I  made  our  exit ;  and  he  went  direct  to  the  Envoy's  tent  and 
reported  the  circumstance." — [MS.  Correspondence.'] 


462  THE    FALL    OF   GHUZNEE. 

the  first  men  taken  in  arms  against  him  were  cruelly 
butchered  in  cold  blood  by  the  "  humane  "  monarch.  The 
act,  impolitic  as  it  was  unrighteous,  brought  its  own  sure 
retribution.  That  "martyrdom"  was  never  forgotten. 
The  day  of  reckoning  came  at  last ;  and  when  our  unholy 
policy  sunk  unburied  in  blood  and  ashes,  the  shrill  cry  of 
the  Gliazee  sounded  as  its  funeral  wail. 

A  gusty  night  had  heralded  a  gusty  mom,  when  Keane, 
inwardly  bewailing  the  absence  of  his  heavy  guns,  planted 
his  light  field-pieces  on  some  commanding  heights  opposite 
the  citadel,  and  filled  the  gardens  near  the  city  walls  with 
his  Sepoy  musketeers.  No  sound  issued  from  the  fortress, 
nor  was  there  any  sign  of  life,  whilst  unseen  under  cover 
of  the  night,  and  unheard  above  the  loud  wailings  of  the 
wind,  the  storming  column  was  gathering  upon  the  Caubul 
road,  and  the  engineers  were  carrying  up  their  powder- 
bags  to  the  gate.  The  advance  was  under  Colonel  Dennie, 
of  the  1 3th  Light  Infantry ;  and  the  main  column  under 
Brigadier  Sale.*  Captain  Thomson,  of  the  Bengal  Engi- 
neers, directed  the  movements  of  the  explosion  party;  and 
with  him  were  his  two  subalterns,  Durand  and  Macleod, 
and  Captain  Peat,  of  the  Bombay  corps.  Three  hours 
after  midnight  everything  was  ready  for  the  assault. 

Then  Keane  ordered  the  light  batteries  to  open  upon 
the  works  of  Ghuznee.  It  was  a  demonstration — harmless 
but  not  useless ;  for  it  fixed  the  attention  of  the  enemy, 
and  called  forth  a  responsive  fire.  A  row  of  blue  lights 
along  the  walls  now  suddenly  broke  through  the  darkness 
and  illuminated  the  place.  The  enemy  had  been  beguiled 
by  the  false  attack,  and  were  now  looking  out  towards  our 
batteries,  eager  to  learn  the  nature  of  the  operations  com- 

•  The  advance  consisted  of  the  light  companies  of  the  four  European 
regiments ;  the  remaining  companies  compc«»ed  the  other  sections  of  the 
stormiug  columns.  The  regiments  were  :  the  2nd,  the  13th,  and  17th 
(Queen's),  and  the  Company's  European  Regiment. 


THE    ASSAULT.  46'.> 

menced  by  the  investing  force.  And  whilst  the  Afghans 
were  thus  engaged,  anticipating  an  escalade  and  manning 
their  walls,  the  British  engineers  were  quietly  piling  their 
powder-bags  at  the  Caubul  gate. 

The  work  was  done  rapidly  and  well.  The  match  was 
applied  to  the  hose.  The  powder  exploded.*  Above  the 
roaring  of  the  guns  and  the  rushing  of  the  wind,  the  noise 
of  the  explosion  was  barely  audible. f  But  the  effect  wa|3 
as  mighty  as  it  was  sudden.  A  column  of  black  smoke 
arose ;  and  down  with  a  crush  came  heavy  masses  of 
masoniy  and  shivered  beams  in  awful  ruin  and  confusion. 
Then  the  bugle  sounded  the  advance.  Dennie  at  the  head 
of  his  stormers,  pushed  forward  through  the  smoke  and 
dust  of  the  aperture  ;  and  soon  the  bayonets  of  his  light 
companies  were  crossing  the  swords  of  the  enemy  who  had 
rushed  down  to  the  point  of  attack.  A  few  moments  of 
darkness  and  confusion ;  and  then  the  foremost  soldiers 
caught  a  glimpse  of  the  morning  sky,  and  pushing  gallantly 
on,  were  soon  established  in  the  fortress.  Three  hearty, 
animating  cheers — so  loud  and  clear  that  they  were  heard 
throughout  the  general  camp:}: — announced  to  their  ex- 
cited comrades  below  that  Dennie  and  his  stormers  had 
entered  Ghuznee. 

Then  Sale  pressed  on  with  the  main  column,  eager  to 
support  the  stormers  in  advance ;  anfl  as  he  went  he  met 
an  engineer  officer  of  the  explosion  party,  who  had  been 
thrown  to  the  ground,  shattered  and  bewildered  by  the 
concussion,  §  and  who  now  announced  that  the  gate  was 

*  Hough  says  :  *'  Lieutenant  Durand  was  obliged  to  scrape  the  hose 
with  his  finger-nails,  finding  the  powder  failed  to  ignite  on  the  first  ap- 
plication of  the  port-fire." 

t  Havelock.  Hough  says:  "The  explosion  was  heard  by  nearly 
ail." 

X  Havelock. 

§  Captain  Peat. 


464:  THE    FALL    OF   GHUZNEE. 

choked  up,  and  that  Dennie  could  not  force  an  entrance. 
So  Sale  sounded  the  retreat.  The  column  halted. 
There  was  a  pause  of  painful  doubt  and  anxiety ;  and 
then  the  cheering  notes  of  the  bugle,  sounding  the  ad- 
vance, again  stirred  the  hearts  of  our  people.  Another 
engineer  officer  had  reported  that,  though  the  aperture 
was  crowded  with  fallen  rubbish,  Dennie  had  made  good 
his  entrance.  Onward,  therefore,  went  Sale ;  but  the 
enemy  had  profited  by  the  brief  pause.  The  opposition 
at  the  gateway  now  was  more  resolute  than  it  would 
have  been  if  there  had  been  no  check.  The  Afghans 
were  crowding  to  the  gate  ;  some  for  purposes  of  defence, 
others  to  escape  the  fire  which  Dennie  was  pouring  in 
upon  them.  Sale  met  them  amidst  the  ruins — amidst 
the  crumbled  masonry  and  the  fallen  timbers.  There  was 
a  sturdy  conflict.     The  Brigadier  himself  was  cut  down  ;  *" 

*  I  give  the  circumstances  of  Sale's  escape  in  the  words  of  Captain 
Havelock,  who  has  detailed  them  with  trustworthy  minuteness.  *'  One 
of  their  number  rushing  over  the  fallen  timbers,  brought  down  Briga- 
dier Sale  by  a  cut  in  the  face  with  his  sharp  shunsheer  (sabre).  The 
Afghan  repeated  his  blow  as  his  opponent  was  falling ;  but  the  pummel, 
not  the  edge  of  his  sword,  this  time  took  effect,  though  with  stunning 
violence.  He  lost  his  footing,  however,  in  the  effort,  and  Briton  and 
Afghan  rolled  together  amongst  the  fractured  timbers.  Thus  situated, 
the  first  care  of  the  Brigadier  was  to  master  the  weapon  of  his  adver- 
sary. He  snatched  at  it,  but  one  of  his  fingers  met  the  edge  of  the 
trenchant  blade.  He  quickly  withdrew  his  wounded  hand,  and 
adroitly  replaced  it  over  that  of  his  adversary,  so  as  to  keep  fast  the 
hilt  of  his  shunsheer.  But  he  had  an  active  and  powerful  opponent, 
and  was  himself  faint  from  the  loss  of  blood.  Captain  Kershaw,  of 
the  13th,  aide-de-camp  to  Brigadier  Baumgardt,  happened  in  the  mHee 
to  approach  the  scene  of  conflict :  the  wounded  leader  recognised  and 
called  to  him  for  aid.  Kershaw  passed  his  drawn  sabre  through  the 
body  of  the  Afghan  ;  but  still  the  desperado  continued  to  struggle  with 
frantic  violence.  At  length,  in  the  fierce  grapple,  the  Brigadier  for  a 
moment  got  uppermost.  Still  retaining  the  weapon  of  his  enemy  in 
his  left  hand,  he  dealt  him  with  his  right  a  cut  from  his  own  sabre, 
which  cleft  his  skull  from  the  crown  to  the  eyebrows.     The  Mahomedan 


THE    LAST   STRUGGLE.  465 

but  after  a  desperate  struggle  with  his  opponent,  whose 
skull  he  clove  with  his  sabre,  he  regained  his  feet,  again 
issued  his  commands ;  and  the  main  column  was  soon 
within  the  fortress.  The  support,  under  Colonel  Croker, 
then  pushed  forward ;  the  reserve  in  due  course  followed ; 
the  capture  of  Ghuznee  was  complete ;  and  soon  the  colours 
of  the  13th  and  17  th  regiments  were  flapping  in  the  strong 
morning  breeze  on  the  ramparts  of  the  Afghans'  last  strong- 
hold.* 

But  there  was  much  hard  fighting  within  the  walls.  In 
the  frenzy  of  despair  the  Afghans  rushed  out  from  their 
hiding-places,  sword  in  hand,  upon  our  stormers,  and  plied 
their  sabres  with  terrible  effect,  but  only  to  meet  with 
fearful  retribution  from  the  musket-fire  or  the  bayonets 
of  the  British  infantry.  There  was  horrible  confusion  and 
much  carnage.  Some,  in  their  frantic  efforts  to  escape  by 
the  gateway,  stumbled  over  the  burning  timbers,  wounded 
and  exhausted,  and  were  slowly  burnt  to  death.  Some 
were  bayoneted  on  the  ground.  Others  were  pursued  and 
hunted  into  comers  like  mad  dogs,  and  shot  down,  with 
the  curse  and  the  prayer  on  their  lips.  But  never,  it  is 
said  by  the  historians  of  the  war,  after  the  garrison  had 
ceased  to  fight,  did  the  wrath  of  their  assailants  overtake 
them.  Many  an  Afghan  sold  his  life  dearly,  and,  though 
wounded  and  stricken  down,  still  cut  out  at  the  hated  enemy. 
But  when  resistance  was  Qver,  mercy  smiled  down  uf)on 
him.  The  appeals  of  the  helpless  were  never  disregarded 
by  the  victors  in  their  hour  of  triumph.  The  women,  too, 
were  honourably  treated.  Hyder  Khan's  zenana  was  in 
the  citadel ;  but  not  a  woman  was  outraged  by  the  captors,  t 

once  shouted,  ^ Ne  UlJahP  (Oh!  God!)  and  never  moved  or  spoke 
again." — [Captain  HavelocJSs  Narrative.] 

*  Havelock.  The  colour  of  the  13th  was  first  planted  by  the  hand 
of  Ensign  Frere — a  nephew  of  John  Hookham  Frere. 

t  Havelock.     The  military  historian  attributes  the  forbearance  of  the 

VOL.  I.  H  H 


466  THE    FALL    OF    GHUZNEE. 

Resistance  over,  the  Commander-in-Chief  and  the  Envoy 
entered  Ghuznee  by  the  Caubul  gate.  Shah  Soojah, 
before  the  contest  was  over,  had  ridden  down  to  the 
point  of  attack,  and  watched  the  progress  of  events  with 
the  deepest  interest,  but  with  no  apparent  want  of  col- 
lectedness  and  nerve.*  Keane  and  Macnaghten  now  led 
him  up  to  the  citadel.  The  wife  of  Hyder  Khan,  and  the 
other  women  of  his  zenana,  were  conducted,  under  the 
orders  of  the  political  and  military  chiefs,  by  John 
Conolly,  a  cousin  of  the  Envoy,  to  a  house  in  the  town, 
where  they  were  placed  under  the  charge  of  the  Moonshee 
Mohun  Lalf  But  Hyder  Khan  himself  had  not  yet  been 
discovered.  The  Suddozye  Prince  and  the  British  chiefs 
were  inquiring  after  the  commander  of  the  garrison  ;  but 
no  tidings  of  him  were  to  be  obtained.  He  might  have 
been  concealed  in  the  fortress,  or  he  might  have  effected 
his  escape.  Accident  only  betrayed  the  position  of  the 
young  Sirdar.  He  was  found  in  a  house  near  the  Can- 
soldiery  to  the  fact,  that  no  spirit  rations  had  been  served  out  to  them 
during  the  preceding  fortnight.  "No  candid  man,"  he  says,  "of  any 
military  experience,  will  deny  that  the  character  of  the  scene,  in  the 
fortress  and  the  citadel,  would  have  been  far  different  if  individual 
soldiers  had  entered  the  town  primed  with  arrack,  or  if  spirituous 
liquors  had  been  discovered  in  the  Afghan  depots." 

*  I  have  been  assured  by  an  officer  on  the  staff  of  the  Shah's  army, 
that  he  was  near  his  Majesty  at  the  taking  of  Ghuznee,  when  under 
fire,  and  that  he  exhibited  great  coolness  and  courage.  He  is  said  by 
my  informant,  who  was  close  beside  him,  to  have  sate  "as firm  as  a  rock, 
not  showing  the  slightest  alarm  either  by  word  or  gesture,  and  seeming 
to  think  it  derogatory  to  his  kingly  character  to  move  an  inch  whilst  the 
firing  lasted." — [MS.  Correspondence.] 

t  Mohun  Lai  says:  "Captain  John  Conolly  conducted  them,  with 
every  mark  of  deference,  to  a  house  in  the  town,  where  it  fell  to  my  lot 
to  provide  them  with  everything  necessary  which  they  wanted  :  and 
that  responsible  charge  of  them  I  had  for  a  long  time,  and  executed  it 
to  the  satisfaction  of  the  ladies,  until  they  were  sent  to  India." — [Life 
of  Dost  Mahomed.] 


DISCOVERY    OF   HYDER   KHAN.  467 

dahar  gate,  by  an  officer  of  the  Company's  European 
regiment.*  At  once  acknowledging  that  he  was  the 
governor  of  Ghuznee,  he  threw  himself  upon  the  mercy 
of  his  captors.  Conducted  to  Keane's  tent,  the  Sirdar 
was  guaranteed  his  personal  safety,  and  placed  under  the 
charge  of  Sir  Alexander  Burnes.f  He  was  unwilling  at 
first  to  appear  in  the  presence  of  Shah  Soojah ;  but  the 
assurances  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  overcame  his  reluc- 
tance, and  Keane  conducted  him  both  to  the  Mission  and 
to  the  King.  Instructed  as  to  the  reception  he  was 
to  accord  to  the  fallen  Barukzye  chief,  the  Suddozye 
monarch  received  him  with  an  outward  show  of  kindness, 
and,  with  a  dignified  courtesy  which  he  so  well  knew  how 
to  assume,  declared  that  he  forgave  the  past,  and  told 
him  to  go  in  peace. 

And  so  Ghuznee  fell  to  the  British  army,  and  was  made 
over  to  the  Suddozye  King.  It  cost  the  victors  only 
seventeen  killed  and  a  hundred  and  sixty-five  wounded. 
Of  these  last  eighteen  were  officers.  The  carnage  among 
the  garrison  was  most  fearful.  Upwards  of  five  hundred 
men  were  buried  by  the  besiegers  ;  and  many  more  are 
supposed  to   have    fallen   beyond    the  walls,   under  the 


*  Captain  Tayler,  Brigade-Major  of  the  4th  Brigade.  Mohun  Lai 
says  that  "  Major  Macgregor  found  him  concealed  with  an  armed  party 
in  the  tower,  waiting  for  the  night."  Mr.  Stocqueler  {Memorials  of 
Afyhanutan)  attributes  the  honour  of  the  capture  to  Brigadier  Roberts, 
who  directed  Captain  Tayler  to  proceed  to  the  house. 

t  "The  Sirdar,  mounted  on  a  small  horse,  and  accompanied  by  a 
few  of  his  companions,  was  conducted  by  Major  Macgregor  to  the  tent 
of  the  Commander-in-Chief.  Sir  Alexander  Burnes  and  myself  were  sent 
for,  and  as  soon  as  the  Sirdar  saw  him  he  felt  a  little  easy  in  his  mind  ; 
and  discovering  me  with  him,  the  expression  of  his  countenance  was  at 
once  changed,  and  he  asked  me  for  a  glass  of  water.  Lord  Keane  al- 
lowed him  to  remain  in  my  tent,  under  the  charge  of  Sir  A.  Burnes.  I 
clothed  him  with  my  own  clothes  every  day,  and  he  partook  of  my 
meals." — [Mohun  LaVs  Life  of  Dost  Mahomed.'] 

H  H  2 


% 


468  THE    FALL    OF   GHUZNEE. 

sabres  of  tlie  British  horsemen.  Sixteen  hundred  pri- 
soners were  taken.  Immense  stores  of  grain  and  flour, 
sufficient  for  a  protracted  defence,  fell  into  our  hands ; 
and  a  large  number  of  horses  and  arms  swelled  the  value 
of  the  captured  property. 

The  fall  of  Ghuznee — a  fortress  hitherto  deemed  by  the 
Afghans  impregnable — astounded  Dost  Mahomed  and  his 
sons,  and  struck  terror  into  their  souls.  Afzul  Khan,  who 
was  hovering  about  the  neighbourhood,  prepared  to  fall 
upon  our  baffled  army,  found,  to  his  wonderment,  that  the 
British  colours  were  waving  over  the  far-famed  citadel  of 
Ghuznee,  and  immediately  sought  safety  in  flight.  Aban- 
doning his  elephants  and  the  whole  of  his  camp-equipage 
which  fell  as  booty  into  the  hands  of  Shah  Soojah,  the 
Sirdar  fled  to  Caubul.  His  father,  greatly  incensed, 
ordered  him  immediately  to  halt,  and  ''  peremptorily 
refused  to  receive  him."*  He  had  expected  something 
better  from  one  who  had  done  such  good  sei-vice  on  the 
boasted  battle-field  of  Jumrood. 

In  little  more  than  four-and-twenty  hours  after  the  fall 
of  Ghuznee,  intelligence  of  the  event  reached  the  camp  of 
the  Ameer.  He  at  once  assembled  his  chiefs,  spoke  of 
the  defection  of  some  of  his  people,  expressed  his  appre- 
hension that  others  were  about  to  desert  him,  and  declared 
his  conviction  that,  without  the  aid  of  treachery,  Ghuznee 
would  not  have  fallen  before  the  Feringhees.  Then  he 
called  upon  all  present,  who  wavered  in  their  loyalty,  at 
once  to  withdraw  from  his  presence,  that  he  might  know 
the  extent  of  his  resom-ces,  and  not  rely  upon  the  false 
friendship  of  men  who  would  forsake  him  in  the  crisis 
of  his  fate.  All  protested  their  fidelity.  A  council  of  war 
was  held,  and  the  Newab  Jubbar  Khan  was  despatched  to 
the  British  camp f  to  treat  with  Shah  Soojah  and  his  allies. 

*  Outram. 
+  Whether  this  step  was  taken  by  Dost  Mahomed  on  his  own  account, 


VISIT   OF   JUBBAR   KHaN.  469 

The  Newab  mounted  his  horse  and  rode  with  unaccus- 
tomed rapidity  to  GhuRnee.  Mohun  Lai  went  out  to  meet 
him  some  miles  beyond  the  camp  ;  and  Burnes  received 
him  at  the  piquets.  A  tent  was  pitched  for  his  accom- 
modation near  the  Envoy's  ;  and  he  was  well  received  by 
the  British  Mission.  The  King  received  him,  too,  with 
the  same  well-trained  courtesy  that  he  had  bestowed  on 
Hyder  Khan — ^but  the  efforts  of  the  Newab  were  fruit- 
less. He  tendered  on  the  part  of  the  Ameer  submission 
to  the  Suddozye  Prince ;  but  claimed,  on  the  part  of  the 
brother  of  Futteh  Khan,  the  hereditary  office  of  Wuzeer, 
which  had  been  held  so  long  and  so  ably  by  the  Baruk- 
zyes.  The  claim  was  at  once  rejected,  and  the  mockery 
of  an  "honourable  asylum"  in  the  British  dominions 
offered  in  its  stead.  Jubbar  Khan  spoke  out  plainly  and 
bluntly,  like  an  honest  man.  His  brother  had  no  ambi- 
tion to  surrender  his  freedom  and  become  a  pensioner 
on  the  bounty  of  the  British  Government.  Had  his  cause 
been  far  more  hopeless  than  it  was,  Dost  Mahomed,  at 
that  time,  would  have  rather  flung  himself  upon  the 
British  bayonets  than  upon  the  protection  of  the  Ferin- 
ghees.  Jubbar  Khan  then  frankly  stating  his  own  deter- 
mination to  follow  the  fortunes  of  his  brother,  requested 
and  received  his  dismissal.* 

or  whether  it  was  recommended  or  agreed  to  by  his  principal  partisans, 
does  not  very  clearly  appear. 

*  Mohun  Lai  says  that  the  Newab,  who  had  acted  with  the  greatest 
friendliness  towards  Burnes  and  his  Mission,  and  was  known  to  have 
been  at  the  head  of  the  English  party  in  Caubul,  begged  that  the  wife 
of  Hyder  Khan  might  be  given  up  to  him  ;  but  preferred  the  request  in 
vain.  He  sought  an  interview,  too,  with  his  nephew  ;  and  it  would 
Lave  been  granted  to  him,  but  the  official  references  caused  delay,  and 
i  he  Newab  took  his  departure  without  seeing  the  Sirdar.  He  said  sig- 
nificantly to  the  Envoy,  in  the  course  of  conversation,  *'  If  Shah  Soojah 
is  really  a  King, ♦and  come  to  the  kingdom  of  his  ancestors,  what  is  the 
use  of  your  army  and  name  ?     You  have  brought  him,  by  your  money 


i70  THE    FALL    OF    GHUZNEE. 

The  Newab  returned  to  the  Ameer's  camp.  All  hope 
of  negotiation  was  now  at  an  end,  and  Dost  Mahomed, 
with  resolution  worthy  of  a  better  fate,  marched  out  to 
dispute  the  progress  of  the  invaders.  At  the  head  of  an 
army,  in  which  the  seeds  of  dissolution  had  already  been 
sown,  he  moved  down  upon  Urghundeh.  There  he  drew 
up  his  troops  and  parked  his  guns.  But  it  was  not  on 
this  ground  that  he  had  determined  to  give  the  Feringhees 
battle.  The  last  stand  was  to  have  been  made  at  Maidan, 
on  the  Caubul  river — a  spot,  the  natural  advantages  of 
which  would  have  been  greatly  in  his  favour.  But  the 
battle  was  never  fought.  At  Urghundeh  it  became  too 
manifest  that  there  was  treachery  in  his  camp.  The  venal 
Kuzzilbashes  were  fast  deserting  his  standard.  There  was 
scarcely  a  true  man  left  in  his  ranks.  Hadjee  Khan 
Khaukur,  on  whom  he  had  placed  great  reliance,  had  gone 
over  to  the  enemy,  and  others  were  fast  following  his 
example.  This  was  the  crisis  of  his  fate.  He  looked 
around  him  and  saw  only  perfidy  on  the  right  hand  and  on 
the  left.  Equal  to  the  occasion,  but  basely  deserted,  what 
could  the  Ameer  do  ?  Never  had  the  nobility  of  his 
nature  shone  forth  more  truly  and  more  lustrously.  In 
the  hour  of  adversity,  when  all  were  false,  he  was  tnie  to 
his  own  manhood.  Into  the  midst  of  his  own  perfidious 
troops  he  rode,  with  the  Koran  in  his  hand ;  and  there 
called  upon  his  followers,  in  the  names  of  God  and  the 
Prophet,  not  to  forget  that  they  were  true  Mahomedans 
— not  to  disgrace  their  names  and  to  dishonour  their 
religion,  by  rushing  into  the  arms  of  one  who  had  filled 
the  country  with  infidels  and  blasphemers.  He  besought 
them  to  make  one  stand,  like  brave  men  and  tnie  be- 
lievers ;  to  rally  round  the  standard  of  the  commander 


and  arms,  into  Afghanistan.     Leave  him  now  with  us  Afghans,   and 
let  him  rule  us  if  he  can." 


DESERTIOX    OF    DOST    MAHOMED.  471 

of  the  faithful ;  to  beat  back  the  invading  Feringhees  or 
die  in  the  glorious  attempt.  He  then  reminded  them  of 
his  own  claims  on  their  fidelity.  "  You  have  eaten  my 
salt,"  he  said,  "  these  thirteen  years.  If,  as  is  too  plain, 
you  are  resolved  to  seek  a  new  master,  grant  me  but  one 
favour  in  requital  for  that  long  period  of  maintenance 
and  kindness — enable  me  to  die  with  honour.  Stand  by 
the  brother  of  Futteh  Khan,  whilst  he  executes  one  last 
charge  against  the  cavalr}"-  of  these  Feringhee  dogs ;  in 
that  onset  he  will  fall ;  then  go  and  make  your  own  terms 
with  Shah  Soojah."*  The  noble  spirit-stirring  appeal 
was  vainly  uttered ;  few  responded  to  it.  There  was 
scarcely  a  true  heart  left.  With  despairing  eyes  he  looked 
around  upon  his  recreant  followers.  He  saw  that  there 
was  no  hope  of  winning  them  back  to  their  old  allegiance 
he  felt  that  he  was  surrounded  by  traitors  and  cowards, 
who  were  willing  to  abandon  him  to  his  fate.  It  was  idle 
to  struggle  against  his  destiny.  The  first  bitter  pang  was 
over;  he  resumed  his  serenity  of  demeanour,  and,  ad- 
dressing himself  to  the  Kuzzilbashes,  formally  gave  them 
their  discharge.  He  then  dismissed  all  who  w^ere  inclined 
to  purchase  safety  by  tendering  allegiance  to  the  Shah  ; 
and  with  a  small  handful  of  followers,  leaving  his  guns 
still  in  position,  turned  his  horse's  head  towards  the 
regions  of  the  Hindoo-KoosLt 

*  Havelock. 
t  General  Harlan,  who  was  at  Caubul  at  this  time,  has  written  an 
account  of  the  desertion  of  Dost  Mahomed  by  his  followers  at  Urghun- 
deh,  which  only  wants  a  conviction  of  its  entire  truth  to  render  it 
extremely  interesting.  According  to  this  writer,  the  Ameer  was  not 
only  deserted,  but  plundered  by  his  followers  at  the  last.  '*  A  crowd 
of  noisy  disorganised  troops,"  he  says,  "insolently  pressed  close  up  to 
the  royal  pavilion — the  guards  had  disappeared — the  groom  holding  the 
Prince's  horse  was  unceremoniously  pushed  to  and  fro — a  servant 
audaciously  pulled  away  the  pillow  which  sustained  the  Prince's  arm — 
another  commenced  cutting  a  piece  of  the  splendid  Persian  carpet — the 


472  THE    FALL    OF   GHUZNEE. 

It  was  on  the  evening  of  the  2nd  of  August  that  Dost 
Mahomed  fled  from  Urghundeh.  On  the  following  day 
the  British  army,  which  had  moved  from  Ghuznee  on 
the  30th  of  July,  received  tidings  of  his  flight.  It  was 
now  determined  to  send  a  party  in  pursuit.  It  was 
mainly  to  consist  of  Afghan  horsemen ;  but  some  details 
from  our  cavalry  regiments  were  sent  with  them,  and 
Captain  Outram,  ever  ready  for  such  service,  volunteered 
for  the  command.  Other  officers — bold  riders  and  dash- 
ing soldiers  * — were  eager  to  join  in  the  pursuit ;  and  a 
party  of  ten,  with  about  five  hundred  mounted  men,  mus- 
tered that  afternoon  before  the  Mission  tents,  equipped 
for  the  raid. 

If  the  success  of  this  expedition  had  depended  upon 
the  zeal  and  activity  of  the  officers,  Dost  Mahomed 
would  have  been  brought  back  a  prisoner  to  the  British 
camp ;  for  never  did  a  finer  set  of  men  leap  into  their 
saddles,  flushed  with  the  thought  of  the  stirring  work 
before  them.  But  when  they  set  out  in  pursuit  of  the 
fallen  Ameer,  a  traitor  rode  with  them,  intent  on  turn- 
ing to  very  nothingness  all  their  chivalry  and  devotion. 
There  was  an  Afghan  chief  known  as  Hadjee  Khan 
Khaukur,  of  whom  mention  has  been  made.  He  was  a 
man  of  mean  extraction,  the  son  of  a  goat-herd,  t  but  from 

beautiful  praying  rug  of  the  Prince  was  seized  on  by  a  third 

*  Take  all,'  said  he,  '  that  you  find  wdthin,  together  with  the  tent.'  In 
an  instant  the  unruly  crowd  rushed  upon  the  pavilion — swords  gleamed 
in  the  air  and  descended  upon  the  tent — the  canvas,  the  ropes,  the 
carpets,  pillows,  screens,  &c.,  were  seized  and  dispersed  among  the 
plunderers." 

*  The  names  of  many  of  them  were  subsequently  associated  with  the 
later  incidents  of  the  war.  They  were  Captains  Wheler,  Troup,  Law- 
rence, Backhouse,  Christie,  and  Erskine  ;  Lieutenants  Broadfoot,  Hogg, 
Ryves,  and  Dr.  Worral.  Captains  Tayler  and  Trevor  joined  them  on 
the  8th. 

t  Outram  says  he  was  a  melon-seller. 


HADJEE   KHAN   KHAUKUR.  473 

this  low  estate  had  risen  into  notice,  and  obtained  ser- 
vice with  Dost  Mahomed.  It  was  not  in  his  natiu-e  to 
be  faithful.  He  deserted  Dost  Mahomed,  and  attached 
himself  to  the  Candahar  Sirdars.  On  the  advance  of 
the  British  army  he  deserted  the  Sirdars,  and  flung  him- 
self at  the  feet  of  the  Suddozye.  Delighted  with  such 
an  accession  to  his  strength,  the  King  appointed  him 
Nassur-ood-dowlah,  or  "  Defender  of  the  State,"  and  con- 
ferred on  him  a  Jaghire  of  the  annual  value  of  three 
lakhs  of  rupees. 

At  Candahar,  whence  the  Sirdars  had  fled,  the  Hadjee, 
profoundly  conscious  of  the  hopelessness  of  their  cause, 
broke  out  into  loyalty  and  enthusiasm,  and  was,  to  all 
outward  seeming,  a  faithful  adherent  of  the  Shah.  But 
as  he  entered  the  principality  of  the  Caubul  Ameer,  he 
seemed  to  stand  upon  more  uncertain  ground ;  the  issue 
of  the  contest  was  yet  doubtful.  Dost  Mahomed  and 
his  sons  were  in  the  field.  So  the  Hadjee  made  many 
excuses ;  and  fell  in  the  rear  of  the  British  army.  He 
was  sick ;  it  was  necessary  that  he  should  march  easily ; 
he  could  not  bear  the  bustle  of  the  camp.  Keeping, 
therefore,  a  few  marches  in  the  rear,  he  followed  our 
advancing  columns,  with  his  retainers  ;  and  there,  it  is 
said,  "enjoyed  the  congenial  society  of  several  discon- 
tented and  intriguing  noblemen."  * 

*  See  the  "Life  of  Hadjee  Khan  Khaukur,  the  Talleyrand  of  the 
East,"  published  originally  in  the  Delhi  Gazette.  It  is  attributed  to  the 
pen  of  Arthur  Conolly.  The  -writer  adds  :  "In  the  camp  of  those 
chiefs  conspiracies  against  Shah  Soojah  and  his  allies  were  daily  agi- 
tated.    Their  letters  formed  the  pride,  the  comfort,  the  hope,  and  the 

amusement  of  the  Caubul  Court Sometimes  it  was  proposed  by 

the  traitors  to  attack  the  English  camp  in  concert  with  the  Ghilzyes  at 
night.  Fear  prevented  this  plot  ripening  ;  but  had  the  army  met 
with  a  repulse,  it  would  undoubtedly  have  been  attacked  in  rear.  At 
last,  at  a  full  meeting — I  have  it  from  the  lips  of  one  present  at  it — it 
was  determined  to  join  Dost  Mahomed  en  masse.     At  this  meeting 


474  THE    FALL    OF   GHUZNEE. 

If  Ghuznee  had  not  fallen,  Hadjee  Khan  and  his 
friends  would  have  gone  over  in  a  body  to  the  Ameer, 
and  on  the  slightest  information  of  a  reverse  having  be- 
fallen us,  would  have  flung  themselves  on  our  rear.  But 
the  fall  of  this  great  Afghan  stronghold  brought  the 
Hadjee  again  to  the  stirrup  of  the  Shah  ;  and  he  was 
again  all  loyalty  and  devotion.  Confident  of  his  fidelity, 
and  perhaps  anxious  to  establish  it  in  the  eyes  of  all  who 
had  viewed  with  suspicion  the  proceedings  of  the  Hadjee, 
the  King  now  put  it  to  the  proof  The  man  had  once 
been  Governor  of  Bameean.  He  knew  the  country  along 
which  the  Ameer  had  taken  his  flight.  What  could  be 
better  than  to  entrust  the  conduct  of  the  expedition  to 
the  veteran  chief?  The  King  and  Macnaghten  were  of 
the  same  mind ;  so  Hadjee  Khan,  who  had  been  for  some 
time  in  treasonable  correspondence  with  Dost  Mahomed, 
was  now  despatched  to  overtake  him  and  bring  him  back 
a  prisoner  to  the  camp  of  the  Shah. 

The  result  may  be  easily  anticipated.  Hadjee  Khan 
cheerfully  undertook  the  duty  entrusted  to  him.  The 
enterprise  required  the  utmost  possible  amount  of  energy 
and  promptitude  to  secure  its  success.  The  Ameer  and 
his  party  were  more  than  a  day's  journey  in  advance  of 
his  pursuers.  Every  hour's  delay  lessened  the  chance 
of  overtaking  the  fugitive.  So  the  Hadjee  began  at  once 
to  delay.  The  pursuers  were  to  have  started  four  hours 
after  noon;  Hadjee  Khan  was  not  ready  till  night-fall. 
Then   he   was  eager  to   take   the   circuitous   high   road 

were  the  Hadjee  Khan,  Hadjee  Dost,  Fyztullub  Khan,  Noorzye,  and 
many  others.  They  had  been  deceived  by  a  false  report  of  a  partial 
action  of  cavalry  the  day  before  ;  the  opportunity  had  arrived,  they 
thought,  for  giving  us  the  coup  de  grace.  Hardly  had  the  conclave 
separated,  when  intelligence  was  received  of  the  capture  of  Ghuznee. 
It  need  hardly  be  said  that,  a  few  hours  afterwards,  Hadjee  Khan  and 
the  rest  were  congratiilating  his  Majesty  on  the  splendid  victory." 


PURSUIT  OF  THE  AMEER.  475 

instead  of  dashing  across  the  hills.  His  people  lagged 
behind  to  plunder.  He  himself,  when  Outram  was  most 
eager  to  push  on,  always  counselled  a  halt,  and  in  the 
hour  of  need  the  guides  deserted.  The  Ameer  was  now 
but  little  in  advance ;  he  was  encumbered  with  women, 
and  children,  and  much  baggage.  He  had  a  sick  son,* 
on  whose  account  it  was  necessary  to  diminish  the  speed 
of  his  flight.  Outram  seemed  almost  to  have  the  Ameer 
in  his  grasp  ;  when  Hadjee  Khan  again  counselled  delay. 
It  was  necessary,  he  said,  to  wait  for  reinforcements.  The 
Ameer  had  two  thousand  fighting  men.  The  Afghans 
under  Hadjee  Khan  were  not  to  be  relied  upon.  They 
had  no  food  :  their  horses  were  knocked  up ;  they  were 
unwilling  to  advance.  Angry  and  indignant,  Outram 
broke  from  the  Hadjee  in  the  midst  of  his  entreaties,  and 
declared  that  he  would  push  on  with  his  own  men.  Again_ 
and  again  there  was  the  same  contention  between  the 
chivalrous  earnestness  of  the  British  officer  and  the  foul 
treachery  of  the  Afghan  chief  At  last,  on  the  9th  of 
August,  they  reached  Bameean,  where  Hadjee  Khan  had 
repeatedly  declared  that  Dost  Mahomed  would  halt,  only 
to  learn  that  the  fugitives  were  that  morning  to  be  at 
Syghan,  nearly  thirty  miles  in  advance.  The  Ameer  was 
pushhig  on  with  increased  rapidity,  for  the  sick  Prince, 
who  had  been  carried  in  a  litter,  was  now  transferred 
to  the  back  of  an  elephant,  and  his  escape  was  now 
almost  certain.  The  treachery  of  Hadjee  Khan  had 
done  its  work.  Outram  had  been  restricted  in  his 
operations  to  the  limits  of  the  Shah's  dominions;  and 
the  Ameer  had  now  passed  the  borders.  Further 
pursuit,  indeed,  would  have  been  hopeless.     The  hoi-ses 


*  Akbar  Khan,  who  had  by  this  time  been  withdrawn  from  the  de- 
fence of  the  Khybur  line,  and  had  joined  his  father's  camp  prostrated 
by  sickness. 


470  THE    FALL    OF    GHUZNEE. 

of  our  cavalry  were  exhausted  by  over-fatigue  and  want 
of  food.  They  were  unable  any  longer  to  continue  their 
forced  marches.  The  game,  therefore,  was  up.  Dost 
Mahomed  had  escaped.  Hadjee  Ehan  Khaukur  had 
saved  the  Ameer  :  but  he  had  sacrificed  himself  He 
had  over-reached  himself  in  his  career  of  treachery,  and 
was  now  to  pay  the  penalty  of  detection.  Outram 
officially  reported  the  circumstances  of  the  Hadjee's 
conduct,  which  had  baffled  all  his  best  efforts — efforts 
which,  he  believed,  would  have  been  crowned  with  suc- 
cess*— and  the  traitor,  on  his  return  to  Caubul,  was 
arrested  by  orders  of  the  Shah.  Other  proofs  of  his 
treason  were  readily  found  ;  and  he  was  sentenced  to  end 
a  life  of  adventurous  vicissitude  as  a  state  prisoner  in  the 
provinces  of  Hindostan.t 

So  fled  Dost  Mahomed  Khan  across  the  frontier  of 
Afghanistan.  His  guns  were  found  in  position  at  Ur- 
ghundeh  by  a  party  of  cavalry  and  horse  artillery  sent 
forward  to  capture  them.  They  were  mostly  light  pieces ;  J 

*  Others,  however,  thought  that  his  failure  was  fortunate,  it  being 
only  too  probable,  in  their  opinion,  that,  if  he  had  come  up  with  the 
fugitive,  his  little  party  would  have  been  overwhelmed  by  the  followers 
of  the  Ameers  and  the  traitorous  Afghan  horsemen  whom  Hadjee  Khan 
had  taken  with  him. 

f  He  was  confined  at  Chunar,  where  he  seems  to  have  borne  his 
imprisonment  with  considerable  philosophy. 

J  "With  regard  to  the  ordnance  captured  at  Urghundeh,  the  guns 
were  of  all  calibres,  chiefly  below  6-pounder — one  a  17-pounder,  and  a 

few  of  different  sizes,  between  17  and  12-pounders The  number 

of  shot  left  at  Urghundeh  was  4i70,  of  various  sizes The  shot  is 

hammered  iron,    and  so  uneven,  that,    unless  weighed,    their  weight 

could  not  be  told.     They  are  chiefly  much  under  6-pounder  shot 

With  regard  to  the  other  stores  taken  at  Urghundeh,  nothing  was  of 
the  slightest  service,  except  the  old  iron  of  the  carriages,  and  the  axle- 
trees,  also  good  as  old  iron  only,  and  to  which  purpose  they  have  been 
appropriated."— [Z^g^ttenaw«  Warhirton  to  Sir  W.  H.  Macnaghten; 
Caubul,  August  15,  1841.     MS.  Records.'^ 


PURSUIT  OP  THE  AMEER.  477 

and  neither  the  ordnance  nor  the  position  which  had 
been  taken  np,  could  be  considered  of  a  very  for- 
midable character.*  It  has  been  already  said,  however, 
that  the  Ameer  had  fixed  upon  another  spot  on  which 
to  meet  the  advancing  armies  of  the  Shah  and  his  allies 
— a  spot  well  calculated  for  defence,  which,  three  years 
afterwards,  Shumshoodeen  Khan  selected  for  his  last  stand 
against  the  battalions  of  General  Nott;  but  on  which, 
like  his  distinguished  clansman,  he  never  gave  us  battle. 

On  the  6th  of  August,  Shah  Soojah  and  the  British 
army  appeared  before  the  walls  of  Caubul.  On  the  fol- 
lowing day  the  King  entered  the  capital  of  Afghanistan. 
The  exile  of  thirty  years — th6  baffled  and  rejected  repre- 
sentative of  the  legitimacy  of  the  Douranee  Empire,  was 
now  at  the  palace  gates.  The  jingling  of  the  money- 
bags, and  the  gleaming  of  the  bayonets  of  the  British,  had 
restored  him  to  the  throne  which,  without  these  glitter- 
ing aids,  he  had  in  vain  striven  to  recover.  The  Balla 
Hissar  of  Caubul  now  reared  its  proud  front  before  him^ 
It  was  truly  a  great  occasion.  The  King,  gorgeous  in 
regal  apparel,  and  resplendent  with  jewels,  rode  a  white 
charger,  whose  equipments  sparkled  with  Asiatic  gold.t 

*  "Onward,"  says  Captain  Havelock,  ** moved  tine  force,  and  an 
hour  had  not  elapsed  since  the  day  broke  when  it  came  full  upon  the 
abandoned  ordnance  of  the  fallen  Barukzye.  Twenty-two  pieces  of 
various  calibre,  but  generally  good  guns,  on  field  carriages,  superior  to 
those  generally  seen  in  the  armies  of  Asiatic  Princes,  were  parked  in  a 
circle  in  the  Ameer's  late  position.  Two  more  were  placed  in  battery 
in  the  village  of  Urghundeh,  at  the  foot  of  the  hills.  .  .  .  The  route 
by  which  we  had  advanced  was  flanked  by  a  deep,  impracticable 
ravine,  on  which  the  Afghan  left  would  have  rested  :  there  their 
artillery  had  been  parked,  and  would  probably  from  this  point  have 
swept  the  open  plain,  and  searched  the  narrow  defile  by  which  we 
would  have  debouched  upon.  Their  front  was  open  for  the  exertions  of 
a  bold  and  active  cavalry,  and  here  the  Ameer  might  at  least  have 
died  with  honour." 

+  Havelock. 


478  THE    FALL    OF    GHUZNEE. 

It  was  a  goodly  sight  to  see  the  coronet,  the  girdle,  and 
the  bracelets  which  scintillated  upon  the  person  of  the 
rider,  and  turned  the  fugitive  and  the  outcast  into  a 
pageant  and  a  show.  There  were  those  present  to  whom 
the  absence  of  the  Koh-i-noor,  which,  caged  in  Hyde  Park, 
has  since  become  so  familiar  to  the  sight-seers  of  Great 
Britain,  suggested  strange  reminiscences  of  the  King's 
eventful  career.  But  the  restored  monarch,  wanting  the 
great  diamond,  still  sparkled  into  royalty  as  he  rode  up 
to  the  Balla  Hissar,  with  the  white-faced  Kings  of  Afghan- 
istan beside  him.  In  diplomatic  costume,  Macnaghten 
and  Bumes  accompanied  the  Suddozye  puppet.  The 
principal  military  officers  of  the  British  army  rode  with 
them.  And  Moonshee  Mohun  Lai,  flaunting  a  majestic 
turban,  and  looking,  in  his  spruceness,  not  at  aU  as  though 
his  mission  in  Afghanistan  were  to  do  the  dirty  work  of 
the  British  diplomatists,  made  a  very  conspicuous  figure 
in  the  gay  cavalcade.* 

But  never  was  there  a  duller  procession.  The  King 
and  his  European  supporters  rode  through  the  streets  of 
Caubul  to  the  palace  in  the  citadel ;  but  as  they  went 
there  w^as  no  popular  enthusiasm ;  the  voice  of  welcome 
was  still.  The  inhabitants  came  to  the  thresholds  of  the 
houses  simply  to  look  at  the  show.  They  stared  at  the 
European  strangers  more  than  at  the  King,  who  had  been 
brought  back  to  Caubul  by  the  Feringhees  ;  and  scarcely 

*  I  am  indebted  for  tMs,  as  for  much  else,  to  Captain  Havelock. 
There  is  but  little  in  the  pages  of  the  military  analist  to  disturb  the 
gravity  of  the  historical  inquirer,  but  it  is  impossible  to  restrains 
smile  at  the  happy  wording  of  the  following:  "Let  me  not  forgetto 
record  that  Moonshee  Mohun  Lai,  a  traveller  and  an  author,  as  well  as 
his  talented  master,  appeared  on  horseback  on  this  occasion  in  a  new 
upper  garment  of  a  very  gay  colour,  and  under  a  turban  of  very 
admirable  fold  and  majestic  dimensions,  and  was  one  of  the  gayest  as 
well  as  the  most  sagacious  and  successful  personages  iu  the  whole 
cortege,'''' 


RESTORATION   OF    SHaH    SOOJAH.  479 

even  took  the  trouble  to  greet  the  Suddozye  Prince  with 
a  common  salaam.  It  was  more  like  a  funeral  procession 
than  the  entiy  of  a  King  into  the  capital  of  his  restored 
dominions.  But  when  Shah  Soojah  reached  the  palace 
from  which  he  had  so  long  been  absent,  he  broke  out  into 
a  paroxysm  of  childish  delight — visited  the  gardens  and 
apartments  with  eager  activity — commented  on  the  signs 
of  neglect  which  everywhere  presented  themselves  to  his 
eyes — and  received  with  feelings  of  genial  pleasure  the 
congratulations  of  the  British  officers,  who  soon  left  his 
Majesty  to  himself  to  enjoy  the  sweets  of  restored 
dominion. 

The  restoration  of  Shah  Soojah-ool  Moolk  to  the  sove- 
reignty of  Afghanistan  had  thus  been  outwardly  accom- 
plished. The  Barukzye  Sirdars  had  been  expelled  from 
their  principalities ;  a  British  gan-ison  had  been  planted 
in  Candahar  and  in  Ghuznee ;  and  a  British  army  was 
now  encamping  under  the  walls  of  Caubul.  A  great 
revolution  had  thus  been  perfected.  The  Douranee 
monarchy  had  been  restored.  The  objects  contemplated 
in  the  Simlah  manifesto  had  been  seemingly  accomplished, 
and  the  originators  of  the  policy  which  had  sent  our 
armies  thus  to  triumph  in  Afghanistan  shouted  with 
exultation  as  they  looked  upon  their  first  great  blaze  of 
success. 


APPENDIX. 


[Vol.  I.,  page  70.] 

Preliminary  Treaty  with  Persia,  concluded  by  Sir  Harford 
Jones  on  the  12th  of  March,  1809. 

In  the  Name  of  Him  wlio  is  ever  necessary,  who  is  all- 
sufficient,  who  is  everlasting,  and  who  is  the  only- 
Protector. 

In  these  times  distinguished  by  felicity,  the  excellent 
Ambassador,  Sir  Harford  Jones,  Baronet,  Member  of  the 
Honourable  Imperial  Ottoman  Order  of  the  Crescent,  has 
arrived  at  the  Royal  City  of  Teheran,  in  quality  of  Ambas- 
sador from  His  Majesty  the  King  of  England  (titles),  bearing 
His  Majesty's  credential  letter,  and  charged  with  full  powers 
munited  with  the  great  seal  of  England,  empowering  him  to 
strengthen  the  friendship  and  consolidate  the  strict  union 
subsisting  between  the  high  states  of  England  and  Persia. 
His  Majesty  the  King  of  Persia  (titles)  therefore,  by  a  special 
firmaun  delivered  to  the  said  Ambassador,  has  appointed  the 
most  excellent  and  noble  Lords  Meerza  Mahomed  Sheffeeh, 
qualified  with  the  title  of  Moatumed-ed-Dowlah,  his  First 
Vizier,  and  Hajee  Mahomed  Hoossein  Khan,  qualified 
with  the  title  of  Ameen-ed-Dowlah,  one  of  the  Ministers  of 
Record,  v  be  his  Plenipotentiaries  to  confer  and  discuss 
with  the  aforesaid  Ambassador  of  His  Britannic  Majesty,  all 
matters  and  aflairs  touching  the  formation  and  consolidation 
of  friendship,  alliance,  and  strict  union  between  the  two  high 
states,  and  to  arrange  and  finally  conclude  the  same  for  the 
benefit  and  advantage  of  both  Kingdoms.  In  consequence 
whereof,  after  divers  meetings  and  discussions,  the  aforesaid 

VOL.  I,  II 


482        .  APPENDIX. 

Plenipotentiaries  have  resolved  that  the  following  Articles 
are  for  the  benefit  and  advantage  of  both  the  high  states,  and 
are  hereafter  to  be  accordingly  for  ever  observed: 

Art.  I. — That  as  some  time  will  be  required  to  arrange 
and  form  a  definitive  treaty  of  alliance  and  friendship  between 
the  two  high  states,  and  as  the  circumstances  of  the  world 
make  it  necessary  for  something  to  be  done  -without  loss  of 
time,  it  is  agreed  these  Articles,  which  are  to  be  regarded  as 
preliminary,  shall  become  a  basis  for  establishing  a  sincere 
and  everlasting  definitive  treaty  of  strict  friendship  and  union ; 
and  it  is  agreed  that  the  said  definitive  treaty,  precisely 
expressing  the  wishes  and  obligations  of  each  party,  shall  be 
signed  and  sealed  by  the  said  Plenipotentiaries,  and  after- 
wards become  binding  on  both  the  high  contracting  parties. 

II.  It  is  agreed  that  the  preliminary  articles,  formed  with 
the  hand  of  truth  and  sincerity,  shall  not  be  changed  or 
altered,  but  there  shall  arise  from  them  a  daily  increase  of 
friendship,  which  shall  last  for  ever  between  the  two  most 
serene  Kings,  their  heirs,  successors,  their  subjects,  and  their 
respective  kingdoms,  dominions,  provinces,  and  countries. 

III.  His  Majesty  the  King  of  Persia  judges  it  necessary 
to  declare  that  from  the  date  of  these  prehminary  articles, 
every  treaty  or  agreement  he  may  have  made  with  any  one 
of  the  powers  of  Europe,  becomes  null  and  void,  and  that 
he  will  not  permit  any  European  force  whatever  to  pass 
through  Persia,  either  towards  India,  or  towards  the  ports 
of  that  country. 

IV.  In  case  any  European  forces  have  invaded,  or  shall 
invade,  the  territories  of  His  Majesty  the  King  of  Persia, 
His  Britannic  Majesty  will  afi"ord  to  His  Majesty  the  King 
of  Persia,  a  force,  or,  in  lieu  of  it,  a  subsidy  with  warlike 
ammunition,  such  as  guns,  muskets,  (fee,  and  olficers,  to  the 
amount  that  may  be  to  the  advantage  of  both  parties,  for 
the  expulsion  of  the  force  so  invading  ;  and  the  number  of 
these  forces,  or  the  amount  of  the  subsidy,  ammunition,  &c. , 
shall  be  hereafter  regulated  in  the  definitive  treaty.  In  case 
His  Majesty  the  King  of  England  should  make  peace  with 
such  European  power,  His  Britannic  Majesty  shall  use  his 
utmost  endeavours  to  negotiate  and  procure  a  peace  between 
His  Persian  Majesty  and  such  power.     But  if  (which  God 


APPENDIX.  483 

forbid)  His  Britannic  Majesty's  efforts  for  this  purpose  should 
fail  of  success,  then  the  forces  or  subsidy,  according  to  the 
amount  mentioned  in  the  definitive  treaty,  shall  still  continue 
in  the  service  of  the  King  of  Persia  as  long  as  the  said 
European  forces  shall  remain  in  the  territories  of  His  Persian 
Majesty,  or  until  peace  is  concluded  between  His  Persian 
Majesty  and  the  said  European  power.  And  it  is  further 
agreed,  that  in  case  the  dominions  of  His  Britannic  Majesty 
in  India  are  attacked  or  invaded  by  the  Afghans  or  any 
other  power.  His  Majesty  the  King  of  Persia  shall  afford  a 
force  for  the  protection  of  the  said  dominions,  according  to 
the  stipulations  contained  in  the  definitive  treaty. 

V.  If  a  detachment  of  British  troops  has  arrived  from 
India  in  the  Gulf  of  Persia,  and  by  the  consent  of  His 
Persian  Majesty  landed  on  the  Island  of  Karrak,  or  at  any 
of  the  Persian  ports,  they  shall  not  in  any  manner  possess 
themselves  of  such  places  ;  and,  from  the  date  of  these  pre- 
liminary articles,  the  said  detachment  shall  be  at  the  disposal 
of  His  Majesty  the  King  of  Persia,  except  his  Excellency  the 
Governor-General  of  India  judges  such  detachment  necessary 
for  the  defence  of  India,  in  which  case  they  shall  be  retiu-ned 
to  India,  and  a  subsidy,  in  lieu  of  the  personal  services  of 
these  troops,  shall  be  paid  to  His  Majesty  the  King  of 
Persia,  the  amount  of  which  shall  be  settled  in  the  definitive 
treaty. 

VI.  But  if  the  said  troops  remain,  by  the  desire  of  His 
Majesty  the  King  of  Persia,  either  at  Karrak,  or  any  other 
port  in  the  Gulf  of  Persia,  they  shall  be  treated  by  the 
Governor  there  in  the  most  friendly  manner,  and  orders 
shall  be  given  to  all  the  Governors  of  Farsistan,  that  what- 
ever quantity  of  provisions,  &c. ,  may  be  necessary,  shall,  on 
being  paid  for,  be  furnished  to  the  said  troops  at  the  fair 
prices  of  the  day. 

VII.  In  case  war  takes  place  between  His  Persian  Majesty 
and  the  Afghans,  His  Majesty  the  King  of  Great  Britain 
shall  not  take  any  part  therein,  unless  it  be  at  the  desire  of 
both  parties,  to  afibrd  his  mediation  for  peace. 

VIII.  It  is  acknowledged  the  intent  and  meaning  of  these 
preliminary  articles  are  defensive.  And  it  is  likewise  agreed, 
that  as  long  as  these  preliminary  articles  remain  in  force, 

I  I  2 


•484  APPENDIX. 

His  Majesty  the  King  of  Persia  shall  not  enter  into  any 
engagements  inimical  to  His  Britannic  Majesty,  or  pregnant 
with  injury  or  disadvantage  to  the  British  territories  in 
India. 

This  treaty  is  concluded  by  both  parties,  in  the  hope  of 
its  being  everlasting,  and  that  it  may  be  productive  of  the 
most  beautiful  fruits  of  friendship  between  the  two  most 


In  witness  whereof- we,  the  said  Plenipotentiaries^- have 
hereunto  set  our  hands  and  seals  in  the  Royal  City  of 
Teheran,  this  twelfth  day  of  March,  in  the  year  of  our 
Lord  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  nine,  answering 
to  the  twenty-fifth  of  Mohurrum  el  Haram,  in  the  year 
of  the  Hegira  one  thousand  two  hundred  and  twenty- 
four.  (L.S.)         Harford  Jones. 

(L.S.)         Mahomed  Sheffeeh. 

(L.S.)         Mahomed  Hoossein. 


[Vol.  I.,  page  85.] 

Treaty  with  Bunjeet  Singh,  the  Bajah  of  Lahore,  dated 
25th  April,  1809. 

Whereas  certain  differences  which  had  arisen  between  the 
British  Government  and  the  Rajah  of  Lahore,  have  been 
happily  and  amicably  adjusted,  and  both  parties  being 
anxious  to  maintain  the  relations  of  perfect  amity  and 
concord,  the  following  articles  of  treaty,  which  shall  be 
binding  on  the  heirs  and  successors  of  the  two  parties,  have 
been  concluded  by  Rajah  Runjeet  Singh  on  his  own  part,  and 
by  the  agency  of  Charles  Theophilus  Metcalfe,  Esquire,  on 
the  part  of  the  British  Government : 

Art.  I.  Perpetual  friendship  shall  subsist  between  the 
British  Government  and  the  State  of  Lahore.  The  latter 
shall  be  considered,  with  respect  to  the  former,  to  be  on 
the  footing  of  the  most  favoured  powers  ;  and  the  British 
Government  will  have  no  concern  with  the  territories  and 


APPENDIX.  485 

subjects   of    the   Rajah   to   the    northward   of    the    river 
Sutlej. 

II.  The  Rajah  will  never  maintain,  in  the  territory 
occupied  by  him  and  his  dependents  on  the  left  bank  of 
the  river  Sutlej,  more  troops  than  are  necessary  for  the 
internal  duties  of  that  territory,  nor  commit,  or  suffer,  any 
encroachment  on  the  possessions  or  rights  of  the  chiefs  in  its 
vicinity. 

III.  In  the  event  of  a  violation  of  any  of  the  preceding 
articles,  or  of  a  departure  from  the  rules  of  friendship,  on 
the  part  of  either  state,  this  treaty  shall  be  considered  nuU 
and  void. 

IV.  This  treaty,  consisting  of  four  articles,  having  been 
settled  and  concluded  at  Umritser,  on  the  25th  day  of 
April,  1809,  Mr.  Charles  Theophilus  Metcalfe  has  delivered 
to  the  Rajah  of  Lahore  a  copy  of  the  same  in  English  and 
Persian,  under  his  seal  and  signature  ;  and  the  said  Rajah 
has  delivered  another  copy  of  the  same  under  his  seal  and 
signature  ;  and  Mr.  Charles  Theophilus  Metcalfe  engages  to 
procure,  withiri  the  space  of  two  months,  a  copy  of  the  same, 
duly  ratified  by  the  Right  Honourable  the  Governor-General 
in  Council,  on  the  receipt  of  which  by  the  Rajah,  the  present 
treaty  shall  be  deemed  complete  and  binding  on  both  parties, 
and  the  copy  of  it  now  delivered  to  the  Rajah  shall  be 
restored. 


[Vol.  I.,  page  92.] 

Treaty  with  the  King  of  Cauhul,  dated  l^th  June,  1809. 

Whereas  in  consequence  of  the  confederacy  with  the 
state  of  Persia,  projected  by  the  French  for  the  purpose  of 
invading  the  dominions  of  His  Majesty  the  King  of  the 
Douranees,  and  ultimately,  those  of  the  British  Government 
in  India,  the  Honourable  Mountstuart  Elphinstone  was 
despatched  to  the  Court  of  His  Majesty,  in  quality  of  Envoy 
Plenipotentiary,  on  the  part  of  the  Right  Honourable  Lord 
Minto,  Governor-General,  exercising  the  supreme  authority 
over  all  affairs,  civil,  political,  and  military,  in  the  British 


486  APPENDIX. 

possessions  in  the  East  Indies,  for  the  purpose  of  concerting 
with  His  Majesty's  Ministers  the  means  of  mutual  defence 
against  the  expected  invasion  of  the  French  and  Persians  ; 
and  whereas  the  said  Ambassador  having  had  the  honour 
of  being  presented  to  His  Majesty,  and  of  explaining  the 
friendly  and  beneficial  object  of  his  mission,  His  Majesty, 
sensible  of  the  advantages  of  alliance  and  co-operation 
between  the  two  states,  for  the  purpose  above  described, 
directed  his  Ministers  to  confer  with  the  Honourable  Mount- 
stuart  Elphinstone,  and,  consulting  the  welfare  of  both 
states,  to  conclude  a  friendly  alliance  ;  and  certain  articles 
of  treaty  having  accordingly  been  agreed  to  between  His 
Majesty's  Ministers  and  the  British  Ambassador,  and  con- 
firmed by  the  Royal  Signet,  a  copy  of  the  treaty  so  framed 
has  been  transmitted  by  the  Ambassador  for  the  ratification 
of  the  Governor-General,  who,  consenting  to  the  stipulations 
therein  contained  without  variation,  a  copy  of  these  articles, 
as  hereunder  written,  is  now  returned,  duly  ratified  by  the 
seal  and  signature  of  the  Governor-General,  and  the  signa- 
tures of  the  members  of  the  British  Government  in  India* 
And  the  obligations  upon  both  governments,  both  now  and 
for  ever,  shall  be  exclusively  regulated  and  determined  by 
the  tenor  of  those  Articles  which  are  as  follow  : 

Art.  I.  As  the  French  and  Persians  have  entered  into  a 
confederacy  against  the  state  of  Caubul,  if  they  should  wish 
to  pass  through  the  King's  dominions,  the  servants  of  the 
heavenly  throne  shall  prevent  their  passage,  and  exerting 
themselves  to  the  extent  of  their  power  in  making  war  on 
them  and  repelling  them,  shall  not  permit  them  to  cross  into 
British  India. 

II.  If  the  French  and  Persians,  in  pursuance  of  their 
confederacy,  should  advance  towards  the  King  of  Caubul's 
country  in  a  hostile  manner,  the  British  state,  endeavouring 
heartily  to  repel  them,  shall  hold  themselves  liable  to  afford 
the  expenses  necessary  for  the  above-mentioned  service,  to 
the  extent  of  their  ability.  While  the  confederacy  between 
the  French  and  Persians  continues  in  force,  these  articles 
shall  be  in  force,  and  be  acted  on  by  both  parties. 

III.  Friendship  and  union  shall  continue  for  ever  between 
these  two  states.     The  veil  of  separation  shall  be  lifted  up 


APPENDIX.  487 

from  between  them,  and  they  shall  in  no  manner  interfere  in 
each  other's  countries  ;  and  the  King  of  Caubul  shall  permit 
no  individual  of  the  French  to  enter  his  territories. 

The  faithful  servants  of  both  states  having  agreed  to  this 
treaty,  the  conditions  of  confinnation  and  ratification  have 
been  performed,  and  this  document  Las  been  sealed  and 
signed  by  the  Right  Honourable  the  Governor- General  and 
the  Honourable  the  Members  of  the  Supreme  British 'Govern- 
ment in  India,  this  l7th  day  of  June,  1809,  answering  to 
the  1224  of  the  Hegira. 


[Vol.  L,  p.  96.] 

Treaty  with  the  Ameers  of  Sindh,  dated  22nd  August,  1809. 

Art.  I.  There  shall  be  eternal  friendship  between  the 
British  Government  and  that  of  Sindh,  namely,  Meer  Gholam 
Alee,  Meer  Kurreem  Alee,  and  Meer  Murad  Alee. 

II.  Enmity  shall  never  appear  between  the  two  states. 

III.  The  mutual  despatch  of  the  Vakeels  of  both  Govern- 
ments, namely,  the  British  Government  and  Sindhian  Govern- 
ment, shall  always  continue. 

IV.  The  Government  of  Sindh  will  not  allow  the  establish- 
ment of  the  tribe  of  the  French  in  Sindh. 

Written  on  the  10th  of  the  month  of  Rujeeb-ool-Moorujub, 
in  the  year  of  the  Hegira,  1224,  corresponding  with  the 
22nd  of  August,  1809. 


[Vol.  I.,  p.  144.] 

Definitive   Treaty    with   Persia,    concluded   at    Teheran,    by 
Messrs.  Morier  and  Ellis,  on  the  26th  November,  1814. 

Praise  be  to  God,  the  all-perfect  and  all-sufficient. 
These  happy  leaves  are  a  nosegay  plucked  from  the  thorn- 
less  Garden  of  Concord,  and  tied  by  the  hands  of  the  Pleni- 
potentiaries of  the  two  great  states  in  the  form  of  a  definitive 


488  APPENDIX. 

treaty,  in  which  the  articles  of  friendship  and  amity  are 
blended. 

Previously  to  this  period,  the  high  in  station,  Sir  Harford 
Jones,  Baronet,  Envoy  Extraordinary  from  the  English 
Government,  came  to  this  Court,  to  form  an  amicable  alliance, 
and  in  conjunction  with  the  Plenipotentiaries  of  Persia,  their 
Excellencies  (titles)  Meerza  Mahomed  Sheffeeh  and  Hajee 
Mahomed  Hussein  Khan,  concluded  a  preliminary  treaty, 
the  particulars  of  which  were  to  be  detailed  and  arranged 
in  a  definitive  treaty ;  and  the  above-mentioned  treaty, 
according  to  its  articles,  was  ratified  by  the  British  Govern- 
ment. 

Afterwards,  when  His  Excellency  Sir  Gore  Ouseley, 
Ambassador  Extraordinary  from  His  Britannic  Majesty, 
arrived  at  this  exalted  and  illustrious  Court,  for  the  purpose 
of  completing  the  relations  of  amity  between  the  two  states, 
and  was  invested  with  full  powers  by  his  own  government  to 
arrange  all  the  important  afiairs  of  friendship,  the  ministers 
of  this  victorious  state,  with  the  advice  and  approbation  of 
the  above-mentioned  Ambassador,  concluded  a  definitive 
treaty,  consisting  of  fixed  articles  and  stipulations. 

That  treaty  having  been  submitted  to  the  British  Govern- 
ment, certain  changes  in  its  articles  and  provisions,  con- 
sistent with  friendship,  appeared  necessary,  and  Henry  Ellis, 
Esquire,  was  accordingly  despatched  to  this  court,  in  charge 
of  a  letter  explanatory  of  the  above-mentioned  alterations. 
Therefore,  their  Excellencies  Meerza  Mahomed  Shefieeh, 
Prime  Minister,  Meerza  Bozoork,  Caimacan  (titles),  and 
Meerza  Abdul  Wahab,  Principal  Secretary  of  State  (titles), 
were  duly  appointed,  and  invested  with  full  powers  to  nego- 
tiate with  the  Plenipotentiaries  of  His  Britannic  Majesty, 
James  Morier,  Esquire,  recently  appointed  minister  at  this 
court,  and  the  above-mentioned  Henry  Ellis,  Esquire.  These 
Plenipotentiaries  having  consulted  on  the  terms  most  advis- 
able for  this  alhance,  have  comprised  them  in  eleven  articles. 
What  relates  to  commerce,  trade,  and  other  affairs,  will 
be  drawn  up  and  concluded  in  a  separate  commercial 
treaty. 

Art.  I.  The  Persian  Government  judge  it  incumbent  on 
them,  after  the  conclusion  of  this  definitive  treaty,  to  declare 


APPENDIX.  489 

all  alliances  contracted  with  European  nations  in  a  state  of 
hostility  with  Great  Britain,  null  and  void,  and  hold  them- 
selves bound  not  to  allow  any  European  army  to  enter  the 
Persian  temtory,  nor  to  proceed  towards  India,  nor  to  any 
of  the  ports  of  that  country  ;  and  also  engage  not  to  allow 
any  individuals  of  such  European  nations,  entertaining  a 
design  of  invading  India,  or  being  at  enmity  with  Great 
Britain,  whatever,  to  enter  Persia.  Should  any  European 
powers  wish  to  invade  India  by  the  road  of  Kharazm,  Tar- 
taristan,  Bokhara,  Samarcand,  or  other  routes,  His  Persian 
Majesty  engages  to  induce  the  Kings  and  Governors  of 
those  countries  to  oppose  such  invasion,  as  much  as  is  in 
his  power,  either  by  the  fear  of  his  arms,  or  by  conciliatory 
measures. 

II.  It  is  agreed,  that  these  articles,  formed  with  the  hand 
of  truth  and  sincerity,  shall  not  be  changed  or  altered  ;  but, 
there  shall  arise  from  them  a  daily  increase  of  friendship, 
which  shall  last  for  ever  between  the  two  most  serene  Kings, 
their  heirs,  successors,  their  subjects  and  their  respective 
kingdoms,  dominions,  provinces,  and  countries.  And  His 
Britannic  Majesty  further  engages  not  to  interfere  in  any 
dispute  which  may  hereafter  arise  between  the  princes,  noble- 
men, and  great  chiefs  of  Persia ;  and  if  one  of  the  contending 
parties  should  even  offer  a  province  of  Persia,  with  view  of 
obtaining  assistance,  the  English  Government  shall  not  agree 
to  such  a  proposal,  nor  by  adopting  it,  possess  themselves  of 
such  part  of  Persia. 

III.  The  purpose  of  this  treaty  is  strictly  defensive,  and 
the  object  is  that  from  their  mutual  assistance  both  states 
should  derive  stability  and  strength ;  and  this  treaty  has  only 
been  concluded  for  the  purpose  of  repelling  the  aggressions 
of  enemies  ;  and  the  purport  of  the  word  aggression  in  this 
treaty  is,  an  attack  upon  the  territories  of  another  state. 
The  limits  of  the  territory  of  the  two  states  of  Russia  and 
Persia  shall  be  determined  according  to  the  admission  of 
Great  Britain,  Persia,  and  Russia. 

IV.  It  having  been  agreed  by  an  article  in  the  preliminary 
treaty  concluded  between  the  high  contracting  parties,  that 
in  case  of  any  European  nation  invading  Persia,  should  the 
Persian  Government  require  the  assistance  of  the  English, 


490  APPENDIX. 

the  Governor-General  of  India,  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain, 
shall  comply  with  the  wish  of  the  Persian  Government,  by- 
sending  from  India  the  force  required,  with  ofl&cers,  ammu- 
nition, and  warlike  stores,  or,  in  lieu  thereof,  the  English 
Government  shall  pay  an  annual  subsidy,  the  amount  of 
which  shall  be  regulated  in  a  deJQnitive  treaty  to  be  con- 
cluded between  the  high  contracting  parties  ;  it  is  hereby 
provided,  that  the  amount  of  the  said  subsidy  shall  be  two 
hundred  thousand  (200,000)  tomauns  annually.  It  is  further 
agreed,  that  the  said  subsidy  shall  not  be  paid  in  case  the 
war  with  such  European  nation  shall  have  been  produced 
by  an  aggression  on  the  part  of  Persia  ;  and  since  the  pay- 
ment of  the  above  subsidy  will  be  made  solely  for  the 
purpose  of  raising  and  disciplining  an  army,  it  is  agreed 
that  the  English  minister  shall  be  satisfied  of  its  being  duly 
applied  to  the  purpose  for  which  it  is  assigned. 

V.  Should  the  Persian  Government  wish  to  introduce 
European  discipline  among  their  troops,  they  are  at  liberty 
to  employ  European  officers  for  that  purpose,  provided  the 
said  officers  do  not  belong  to  nations  in  a  state  of  war  or 
enmity  with  Great  Britain. 

VI.  Should  any  European  power  be  engaged  in  war  with 
Persia  when  at  peace  with  England,  His  Britannic  Majesty 
engages  to  use  his  best  endeavours  to  bring  Persia  and  such 
European  power  to  a  friendly  understanding.  If,  however, 
His  Majesty's  cordial  interference  should  fail  of  success, 
England  shall  still,  if  required,  in  conformity  with  the  sti- 
pulations in  the  preceding  articles,  send  a  force  from  India, 
or,  in  lieu  thereof,  pay  an  annual  subsidy  of  two  hundred 
thousand  (200,000)  tomauns  for  the  support  of  a  Persian 
army,  so  long  as  a  war  in  the  supposed  case  shall  continue, 
and  until  Persia  shall  make  peace  with  such  nation. 

VII.  Since  it  is  the  custom  of  Persia  to  pay  the  troops  six 
months  in  advance,  the  English  minister  at  that  court  shall 
do  all  in  his  power  to  pay  the  subsidy  in  as  early  instal- 
ments as  may  be  convenient. 

VIII.  Should  the  Afghans  be  at  war  with  the  British  na- 
tion. His  Persian  Majesty  engages  to  send  an  army  against 
them  in  such  manner  and  of  such  force  as  may  be  concerted 
with  the  English  Government.     The  expenses  of  such  an 


APPENDIX.  491 

army  shall  be  defrayed  by  the  British  Government,  in  such 
manner  as  may  be  agreed  upon  at  the  period  of  its  being 
required. 

IX.  If  war  should  be  declared  between  the  Afghans  and 
Persians,  the  English  Government  shall  not  interfere  with 
either  party,  unless  their  mediation  to  effect  a  peace  shall  be 
solicited  by  both  parties. 

X.  Should  any  Persian  subject  of  distinction,  showing 
signs  of  hostility  and  rebelHon,  take  refuge  in  the  British 
dominions,  the  EngHsh  Government  shall,  on  intimation 
from  the  Persian  Government,  turn  him  out  of  their  country, 
or,  if  he  refuse  to  leave  it,  shall  seize  and  send  him  to 
Persia. 

Previously  to  the  arrival  of  such  fugitive  in  the  English 
territory,  should  the  governor  of  the  district  to  which  he 
may  direct  his  flight  receive  intelligence  of  the  wishes  of  the 
Persian  Government  respecting  him,  he  shall  refuse  him 
admission.  After  such  prohibition,  should  such  person  per- 
sist in  his  resolution,  the  said  governor  shall  cause  him  to 
be  seized  and  sent  to  Persia  ;  it  being  understood  that  the 
aforesaid  obligations  are  reciprocal  between  the  contracting 
parties. 

XI.  Should  His  Persian  Majesty  require  assistance  from 
the  English  Government  in  the  Persian  Gulf,  they  shall,  if 
convenient  and  practicable,  assist  him  with  ships  of  war  and 
troops.  The  expenses  of  such  expedition  shall  be  accounted 
for  and  defrayed  by  the  Persian  Government,  and  the  above 
ships  shall  anchor  in  such  ports  as  shall  be  pointed  out  by 
the  Persian  Government,  and  not  enter  other  harbours 
without  permission,  except  from  absolute  necessity. 

The  articles  are  thus  auspiciously  concluded  : 

A  definitive  treaty  between  the  two  states  having  formerly 
been  prepared,  consisting  of  twelve  articles,  and  certain 
changes,  not  inconsistent  with  friendship,  having  appeared 
necessary,  we  the  Plenipotentiaries  of  the  two  states  com- 
prising the  said  treaty  in  eleven  articles,  have  hereunto  set 
our  hands  and  seals,  in  the  royal  city  of  Teheran,  this 
twenty-fifth  day  of  November,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one 
thousand  eight  himdred  and  fourteen,  corresponding  with 


492  APPENDIX. 

the  twelfth  Zealhajeh,  in  the  year  of  the  Hegira  one  thou- 
sand two  hundred  and  twenty-nine. 

(L.S.)         James  MoRiER. 

(L,S.)         HE]srE,Y  Ellis. 

(L.S.)         Mahomed  Shefeeeh. 

(L.S.)         Abdul  Wahab. 

(L.S.)         IsAH  (Meerza  Bozoork). 


[Vol.  I,  page  153. J 

Bo7ids  given  hy  Abhas  Meerza,  Prince  Royal  of  Persia,  and  hy 
the  Shah,  caricelling  the  Subsidy  Articles  of  the  Treaty  of 
25th  November,  1814. 

Bond  granted  by  Abbas  Meerza,  Prittce  Royal  of  Persia,  to 
Lieutenant- Colonel  Macdonald,  British  Envoy. 

Be  it  known  to  Colonel  Macdonald,  British  envoy  at  our 
Court,  that  we,  the  heir  apparent  to  the  Persian  throne,  in 
virtue  of  the  full  powers  vested  in  us  by  the  Shah,  in  all 
matters  touching  the  foreign  relations  of  this  kingdom,  do 
hereby  pledge  our  solemn  word  and  promise,  that  if  the 
British  Government  will  assist  us  with  the  sum  of  two  hun- 
dred thousand  tomauns  (200,000),  towards  the  liquidation 
of  the  indemnity  due  by  us  to  Russia,  we  will  expunge, 
and  hereafter  consider  as  annulled,  the  Ilird  and  IVth 
articles  of  the  definitive  treaty,  between  the  two  states, 
concluded  by  Mr.  Ellis,  and  obtain  the  royal  sanction  to  the 
same. 

This  paper  bears  the  seal  of  His  Royal  Highness  Abbas 
Meerza,  and  that  of  His  Persian  Majesty's  Minister,  the 
Kaim-Mukam. 

Dated  in  the  month  of  Shaban,  or  March,  1828. 

Ruchum  of  His  Royal  Highness  the  Heir  Apparent,  in  rati- 
fication of  the  Annulment  of  the  Ilird  and  IVth  Articles 
of  the  Treaty  with  England. 

Relative  to  the  articles  III.  and  IV.  of  the  propitious 
treaty  between  England   and  Persia,  which  was  concluded 


APPENDIX.  49$ 

by  Mr.  Ellis,  in  the  montli  Zekaud,  A.H.  1229,  agreeably 
to  the  engagements  entered  into  with  your  Excellency,  that, 
in  consequence  of  the  sum  of  200,000  tomauns,  the  cur- 
rency of  the  country,  presented  as  an  aid  to  Persia,  in 
consideration  ,of  the  losses  she  has  sustained  in  the  war 
with  Russia,  we,  the  heir  apparent,  vested  with  full  powers 
in  all  matters  connected  with  the  politics  of  this  nation, 
have  agreed  that  the  said  two  articles  shall  be  expunged,  and 
have  delivered  a  bond  to  your  Excellency,  which  is  now  in 
your  hands. 

In  the  month  of  Zikeyla,  A.H.  1243,  on  our  going  to 
wait  upon  His  Majesty  at  Teheran,  in  consistence  with  the 
note  addressed  to  your  Excellency  by  Meerza  Abul  Hassan 
Khan,  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  we  were  appointed 
sole  agent  in  this  matter  by  His  Majesty,  with  unlimited 
authority ;  therefore,  as  the  Government  of  England,  through 
the  medium  of  Colonel  Macdonald,  have  afforded  us  the 
assistance  of  200,000  tomauns,  we,  the  representative  of 
His  Majesty,  have,  on  this  day,  the  14th  of  the  month 
Suffer,  and  the  24th  of  the  Christian  month  August,  annulled 
the  two  obnoxious  articles  of  our  propitious  treaty.  The 
envoy,  considering  this  document  as  a  ratification  on  the 
subject  of  the  two  articles,  will  know  that  it  is  liable  to  no 
further  comment  from  the  ministers  of  His  Majesty^s  Court. 

Sealed  by 

Month  of  Suffer,  A. H.  1 244.      H.  R  H.  Abbas  Meerza. 


Firmawn  from  His  Majesty  the  Shah  to  Colonel  Macdonald, 

British  Envoy  in  Persia. 
A,C. 

Let  it  be  known  to  Colonel  Macdonald,  the  English 
envoy,  exalted  by  our  munificence,  that  our  noble  son 
having  represented  to  us  his  having  recently  come  to  an 
arrangement  relative  to  the  two  articles  of  the  treaty  with 
England,  we  have  ordered  that  what  has  been  executed  by 
our  son,  touching  this  transaction,  in  conformity  with  the 
firmaun  of  full  powers  granted  to  him  by  us,  be  confirmed 
by  our  royal  ratification  and  consent ;  and  we  duly  appre^ 


494  APPENDIX. 

ciate  the  exertions  of  your  Excellency  during  the  last  year, 
which  have  obtained  you  the  goodwill  of  the  Shah. 

Regarding  the  crore  of  tomauns  required  for  the  redemp- 
tion of  Khoee,  agreeably  to  what  has  been  laid  before  us, 
H.R.H.  Abbas  Meerza  has  directed  the  payment  of  400,000 
tomauns  by  Mohamed  Meerza  ;  and  we  have  besides  in- 
structed the  remaining  100,000  tomauns  to  be  delivered  to 
Meerza  Abul  Hassan  Khan,  Minister  for  Foreign  AflFairs, 
for  the  purpose  of  being  transmitted  to  you. 

Your  Excellency  will,  therefore,  conceiving  this  firmaun 
as  your  security,  become  responsible  for  the  payment  of  the 
above  sum,  which  will  be  afterwards  paid  to  you  by  the  lord 
of  exalted  rank,  Meerza  Abul  Hassan  Khan.  Also  make 
known  to  us  all  your  wishes. 

Sealed  by 
His  Majesty  Futteh  Alee  Shah. 

[VoL  I,  page  352.] 

[The  following  is, the  passage,  from  Mr.  Henry  Torrens' 
letters  to  the  "Friend  of  India,"  cited  by  his  biographer, 
(Mr.  James  Hume),  and  referred  to  in  a  note  to  the  above 
page.] 

"  On  the  sound  historical  basis  of  *  general  opinion '  and 
*  well  credited  report '  you  do  me  the  honour  of  ascribing 
to  me  the  creation  of  a  policy  which  was  a  sound  and  wise 
one,  had  it  been  carried  out  as  devised,  and  of  which  I  only 
wish  I  could  claim  the  authorship  ;  but  you  will  perhaps 
allow  me  to  cite  against  *  general  opinion '  and  '  well 
credited  report, '  the  assurance  of  a  late  Cabinet  Minister, 
Lord  de  Broughton,  that  he  was  the  author  of  the  expedition, 
the  which  he  undoubtedly  was.  Without  this  declaration 
publicly  made,  I  could  not  state  what  follows. 

"  The  facts  now  related  for  the  first  time  are  simply  these. 
Mr.  Macnaghten,  with  me  for  his  under  Secretary,  most 
unwillingly  accompanied  the  Governor- General  in  1837 
towards  the  North-West,  in  which  his  presence  was  not 
required.  Mr.  Macnaghten,  in  the  conviction  that  with  the 
peculiar   turn    of  mind   of  the  Governor-General,    it  were 


APPEXDIX.  495 

better  for  him  to  be  with  his  Council,  did  his  utmost  to 
persuade  his  Lordship  to  return  from  Cawnpore  to  Calcutta, 
the  rather  that  it  was  the  famine  year  of  1837-38.  Orders 
were  at  once  given  for  our  return,  but  countermanded. 
Before  our  arrival  at  Cawnpore,  Mr.  Macnaghten,  pressed  by 
his  Lordship's  anxiety  and  uncertainties,  had  prepared  a 
scheme,  based  upon  the  independent  expedition  of  Shah 
Soojah  in  1832— of  which  we  often  spoke  together,  with 
reference  to  the  stormy  aspect  of  the  times, — which  contained 
the  germ  of  the  famous  Afghan  expedition  ;  the  scope  of 
this  scheme  was  :  1.  According  to  the  policy  of  this  Govern- 
ment in  1809,  to  interpose  a  friendly  power  in  Central  Asia 
between  us  and  any  invasive  force  from  the  West.  2.  To 
exhibit  the  military  resoiu-ces  of  the  Government  which  had 
experienced  a  dangerous  decline  in  a  native  estimation.  3. 
To  set  at  rest  the  frontier  wars  between  Afghans  and  Sikhs 
which  interfered  with  the  extension  of  our  trade.  4.  To 
effect  these  objects  by  means  of  our  pensioner.  Shah  Soojah, 
acting  in  concert  with  Runjeet  Singh  ;  settling  through  our 
mediation  the  claims  of  the  latter  on  Scinde,  and  of  the 
former  on  Cashmere  and  Peshawur;  satisfying  Runjeet  as  to 
his  demand  for  Swat  and  Booneer,  and  purchasing  from  the 
Ameers  of  Scinde,  by  relieving  them  of  tribute  and  vassalage 
to  the  Douranee  Crown  (Shah  Soojah' s),  the  complete  opening 
of  the  Indus  navigation,  and  the  abolition  of  all  tolls.  5. 
To  establish  in  the  person  of  a  subsidized  Monarch  in 
Afghanistan  so  firm  an  ally  at  the  head  of  a  military  people 
as  might  assure  us  that,  in  the  event  of  Runjeet's  death,  the 
Sikhs  would  find  occupation  on  the  frontiers  of  Peshawur, 
for  so  large  a  portion  of  their  army  as  might  materially 
interfere  with  the  assemblage  of  an  imposing  force  on  our 
own  frontier.  6.  To  pass  into  Afghanistan,  as  Shah  Soojah 
had  done  in  1832,  by  the  Bolan  Pass,  place  him  on  his 
throne,  subsidized  at  twenty  lakhs  a  year,  and  march  home 
through  the  Punjab,  showing  our  power. 

"  Such  was  the  project  submitted,  rather  to  propose  some- 
thing to  the  Governor-General  in  his  uncertainty,  than  to 
suggest  a  plan  for  absolute  adoption.  A  few  days  afterwards, 
Mr.  Macnaghten  told  me,  that  his  Lordship  had  peremptorily 
rejected  it,  saying,  ^^  such  a  thing  ivas  not  to  he  tliought  of." 


496  APPENDIX. 

Some  fortnight  or  three  weeks  afterwards,  letters  arrived,  I 
believe  from  Her  Majesty's  Ministers  in  England,  suggestirg 
various  schemes  of  diversion  in  the  East  as  respected  the 
aggressive  views  of  Persia  in  connection  with  a  great  Euro- 
pean power  ; — one,  I  believe,  was  analagous  to  that  suggested 
by  Mr.  Macnaghten,  and  it  was  then  Lord  Auckland  asked 
for  the  paper  which  had  been  previously  submitted  to  him. 
I  never  saw  it  again  after  that  time  ;  but  on  it  was  framed 
a  scheme  in  consonance  with  the  views  of  Her  Majesty' 
Ministers  which  was  approved  hy  them  and  acted  on  ;  but 
which  only  contemplated  the  expedition  to,  not  the  occupa- 
tion of,  Afghanistan,  and  it  was  the  change  of  policy  which 
fathered  our  disasters.  My  duties,  which  as  under  and 
officiating  Secretary  were  purely  executive,  brought  me 
subsequently  much  into  official  contact  with  the  Governor- 
General,  but  not  until  after  the  policy  had  been  decided 
upon  as  respected  Afghanistan,  and  so  thoroughly  decided, 
that  Mr.  Macnaghten  was  ascending  the  hill  with  the 
tripartite  treaty  in  his  pocket,  at  the  time  when  '  well 
credited  report '  represents  *  some  body ' — myself — as  rush- 
ing down  the  hill  to  tell  him  of  the  adoption  during  his 
absence,  of  the  policy  on  which  the  treaty  in  his  pocket  was 
founded  !  I  well  recollect  the  subsequent  discussions  and 
difficulties  as  to  execution,  and  in  these  Clerk,  Wade,  Colvin, 
Mackeson,  Burnes,  D'Arcy  Todd,  Lord,  and  others  had  a 
share.  Of  those  curious  councils  it  does  not  behove  me  to 
speak — save  that  previous  to  one  I  remember  poor  Burnes 
making  his  fifth  suggestion  within  the  week,  to  the  effect 
that  *  we  had  but  to  send  Shah  Soojah  to  the  mouth  of  the 
Eiyber  Pass  with  two  battalions  of  Sepoys,  and  the  Afghans 
would  carry  him  through  it  in  their  arms,'  *  when  I  recollect 
saying  with  some  asperity — *  surely  it  is  better  not  to 
confuse  high  authority  with  fresh  plans,  when  all  oiu* 
energies  are  needed  to  carry  out  the  one  decided  upon.' 
As  you  have  honoured  me  with  the  title  of  adviser  of  Lord 
Auckland,  and  given  me  the  opportunity  of  divesting  my- 


*  Burnes  was  of  this  opinion  :  he  erred  on  that  point  in  common 
with  many  others  ;  but  his  views  from  first  to  last  were  in  favour  of 
making  the  Dost  our  ally. — H.T. 


APPENpiX.  407 

as  you  may  decide  it 
to  be,  before  the  expedition  was  decided  upon,  I  will  in 
justice  to  myself  record  with  you,  two  of  the  few  opinions  1 
ever  had  the  opportunity  of  delivering  after  it  began  ;  the 
one  was  strongly  against  the  fortification  of  Herat,  the  other 
strongly  against  the  admission  of  Enghsh  women  of  any 
rank  into  Afghanistan,  for  giving  each  of  which  I  was 
strongly  reprimanded,  and  from  this  anecdote  I  leave  you  to 
conclude  the  slight  amoimt  of  my  utility  out  of  my  strict 
line  of  duty." 

[If  there  is  anything  in  this  at  variance  with  the  state- 
ments in  my  narrative,  the  reader  will  now  have  an  oppor- 
tunity of  comparing  the  one  with  the  other,  and  forming 
his  own  judgment.  It  is  necessary  only  to  observe  that 
there  are  two  distinct  questions  to  be  considered,  and  that 
it  rather  appears  that  Mr.  Torrens  has  evaded  the  more 
important  one,  and  the  one,  too,  with  which  he  is  more 
immediately  concerned.  The  scheme  of  the  tripartite 
treaty  is  one  thing,  the  march  of  a  British  army  on  Caubul 
by  way  of  the  Bolan  Pass  is  another.  Mr.  Torrens  appeals 
triumphantly  to  the  fact  that  at  a  time  when  he  and  others 
are  represented  (by  Mr.  Masson)  as  rushing  down  the  hill  to 
tell  Mr.  Macnaghten  of  the  adoption  of  the  policy  of  the 
war,  he  (Mr.  Macnaghten)  was  ascending  the  hill  with  the 
treaty  in  his  pocket  founded  on  that  policy.  But,  in  the 
first  place,  the  story  to  which  Mr.  Torrens  refers  (and  which 
will  be  found  in  a  note  at  page  353  of  this  volume)  was  not 
told  with  respect  to  Mr.  Macnaghten' s,  but  to  Captaiii 
Burnes's,  arrival  at  Simlah,  in  Mr.  Macnagh ten's  absence. 
And  in  the  second  place,  the  policy  into  which  Lord  Auck- 
land is  said  to  have  been  persuaded  at  this  time  was  not 
the  policy  of  the  tripartite  treaty,  but  the  policy  of  marching 
a  British  army  into  Afghanistan.  It  will  have  been  seen 
that  when  Mr.  Macnaghten  negociated  the  treaty  with 
Runjeet  Singh  and  Shah  Soojah,  it  was  no  part  of  the 
scheme  that  the  restoration  of  the  Shah  should  be  mainly 
accomplished  by  our  British  bayonets.  This  was  obviously 
an  after-thought.  The  question  then  is,  how  it  arose — how 
"  the  army  of  the  Indus,"  to  which  Macnaghten  at  Lahore 


498  APPENDIX. 

and  Loodliiana;li  had  never  once  alluded,  grew  into  a  sub- 
stantial fact.  This  is  not  explained  by  Mr.  Torrens  : 
I  therefore  leave  the  statements  in  the  text  of  my  narrative 
as  they  were  originally  written,  and  I  will  only  add  in  this 
place — what  I  could  produce  living  testimony  of  the  highest 
order  to  prove — that  when  the  war  in  Afghanistan  was 
believed  to  be  a  grand  success,  Mr.  Torrens  boasted,  not 
merely  of  his  participation  in  the  councils  from  which  it 
emanated,  but  of  the  actual  authorship  of  the  war.  He 
said,  iudeed,  totidem  verbis,  that  he  "  made  the  Afghan 
war,"  an  assertion  which  need  not  be  taken  too  literally, 
but  which,  at  all  events,  warrants  the  presumption  that  he 
counselled  and  approved  the  war  in  the  shape  in  which  it 
was  undertaken.   K.l 


[Vol.  I.,  page  356.] 

[The  following  is  the  letter  from  Sir  A.  Bumes  referred  to 

in  this  page.] 

Husn  Abdul,  2nd  June,  1838, 
My  dear  Mr.  Macnaghten, 

Just  as  I  was  entering  this  place,  I  had  the  pleasure  to  re- 
ceive your  letter  of  the  23rd,  requesting  me  to  state  my  views  on 
the  means  of  counteraction  which  should  be  presented  to  Dost  Ma- 
homed Khan,  in  the  policy  that  he  is  pursuing.  I  should  have  liked 
to  have  conversed  with  you  on  this  important  subject,  for  it  has  so 
many  bearings,  and  involves  so  many  conflicting  interests,  that  it  is 
impossible  to  do  it  justice ;  but  I  do  not  delay  a  moment  in  meeting 
your  wishes,  as  far  as  can  be  done  in  a  letter. 

It  is  clear  that  the  British  Government  cannot,  with  any  credit  or 
justice  to  itself,  permit  the  present  state  of  affairs  at  Caubul  to  con- 
tinue. The  counteraction  applied  must,  however,  extend  beyond 
Dost  Mahomed  Khan,  and  to  both  Persia  and  Russia.  A  demand 
of  explanation  from  the  Cabinet  of  St.  Petersburgh  would,  I  con- 
ceive, be  met  by  an  evasive  answer,  and  gain  for  us  no  end ;  besides, 
the  policy  of  Russia  is  now  faii'ly  developed,  and  requires  no  expla- 
nation, for  it  explains  itself,  since  that  government  is  clearly  re- 
solved upon  using  the  influence  she  possesses  in  Persia  (which  is  as 
gi-eat  there  as  what  the  Bi'itish  command  in  India),  to  extend  her 
power  eastward.     It  had  better,  therefore,  be  assumed  at  once  that 


APPENDIX.  499 

such  are  her  plans,  and  remonstrate  accordingly.  If  we  can  do  but 
little  with  Russia,  the  cause  is  widely  different  with  Persia.  She 
should  at  once  be  warned  off  Afghanistan,  and  our  continuance  of 
an  alliance  with  her  should  depend  upon  her  compliance.  I  believe 
that  a  letter  from  the  Governor-General  of  India,  sent  to  the  Shah 
of  Persia  at  Herat,  would  gain  our  end,  and  this  effected,  there  is 
nothing  to  fear  from  the  proceedings  of  Dost  Mahomed  Khan,  or 
any  other  of  the  Afghan  chiefs.  If  this  be  left  undone,  they  will 
succumb  to  Persia  and  Russia,  and  become  the  instruments  for 
whatever  those  powers  desire.  I  therefore  distinctly  state  my  con- 
viction that  the  evil  lies  beyond  Afghanistan  itself,  and  must  be 
dealt  with  accordingly. 

If  it  is  the  object  of  government  to  destroy  the  power  of  the 
present  chief  of  Caubul,  it  may  be  effected  by  the  agency  of  his 
brother.  Sultan  Mahomed  Khan,  or  of  Soojah-ool-Moolk ;  but  to 
ensure  complete  success  to  the  plan,  the  British  Government  must 
appear  directly  in  it ;  that  is,  it  must  not  be  left  to  the  Sikhs  them- 
selves. Let  us  discuss  the  merits  of  these  two  plans ;  but  first  I 
must  speak  on  the  establishment  of  Sikh  power  in  Afghanistan,  to 
which  you  refer  as  a  general  question. 

No  one  entertains  a  more  exalted  opinion  than  I  do  of  the  Maha- 
rajah's head  to  plan,  and  ability  to  achieve ;  but  I  look  upon  the 
power  of  the  Sikhs  beyond  the  Indus  to  be  dependent  on  his  life 
alone.  It  is  mere  temporising,  therefore,  to  seek  to  follow  up  any 
such  plan ;  and  were  this  of  itself  not  conclusive  against  it,  the  fact 
of  its  alienating  the  Afghan  people,  who  are  cordially  disposed  as  a 
nation  to  join  us,  would  be  a  sufficiently  valid  objection  for  not 
persevering  in  it.  I  conclude  always  that  our  object  is  to  make 
the  Afghans  our  own,  and  to  guide  Afghanistan  by  Afghans,  not 
by  foreigners.  It  is,  I  assure  you,  a  mere  visionary  delusion  to 
hope  for  establishing  Sikh  ascendancy  in  Caubul.  For  argument's 
sake,  I  will  admit  that  the  Maharajah  may  take  it ;  but  how  is  it  to 
be  retained  1  Wliy,  he  cannot  keep  his  ground  with  credit  in 
Peshawur,  and  the  Sikhs  themselves  are  averse  to  service  beyond 
the  Indus.  But  facts  are  more  illustrative  than  arguments  ;  the 
French  officers  could  not  with  safety  leave  their  homes  to  an 
evening  dinner  whilst  we  were  at  Peshawur  and  our  intercourse 
was  confined  to  breakfasts.  I  saw  this  morning  two  tumbrils  of 
money  the  foUowei's  of  dozens  of  others,  on  their  way  to  Peshawur 
to  pay  the  troops,  and  the  Maharajah  only  wishes  a  road  of  honour 
to  retreat  from  it.  If  you  use  him,  therefore,  as  an  agent  to  go 
further  a-head,  the  first  request  he  will  make  of  the  British  will  be 


500  APPENDIX. 

for  money,  and  we  shall  waste  our  treasure  without  gaining  our 
ends,  which,  as  I  understand  them,  are  an  influence  in  Caubul,  to 
exclude  all  intrigues  from  the  West. 

Of  Sultan  Mahomed  Khan,  the  first  instrument  at  command, 
you  will  remember  that  his  brother  Dost  Mahomed,  plainly  con- 
fessed his  dread  of  him  if  guided  by  Sikh  gold,  and  with  such  aid 
the  ruler  of  Caubul  may  be  readily  destroyed ;  but  Sultan  Ma- 
homed has  not  the  ability  to  rule  Caubul ;  he  is  a  very  good  man, 
but  incapable  of  acting  for  himself;  and  though  fit  as  an  instru- 
ment in  getting  rid  of  a  present  evil,  he  would  still  leave  afiuirs  as 
unsettled  as  ever  when  fixed  in  Caubul,  and  he  is  consequently  a 
very  questionable  agent  to  be  used  at  all. 

As  for  Soojah-ool-Moolk  personally,*  the  British  Government 
have  only  to  send  him  to  Peshawur  with  an  agent,  and  two  of  its 
own  regiments  as  an  honorary  escort,  and  an  avowal  to  the  Afghans 
that  we  have  taken  up  his  cause,  to  ensure  his  being  fixed  for 
ever  on  his  throne.  The  present  time  is,  perhaps,  better  than  any 
previous  to  it,  for  the  Afghans  as  a  nation  detest  Persia,  and  Dost 
Mahomed  having  gone  over  to  the  Court  of  Teheran,  though  he 
believes  it  to  be  from  dire  necessity,  converts  many  a  doubting 
Afghan  into  a  bitter  enemy. 

The  Maharajah's  permission  has  only,  therefore,  to  be  asked  for 
the  ex-king's  advance  on  Peshawur,  granting  him  at  the  same  time 
some  four  or  five  of  the  regiments  which  have  no  Sikhs  in  their 
ranks,  and  Soojah  becomes  king.  He  need  not  i-emove  from  Pesha- 
w^ur,  but  address  the  Khyburees,  Kohistanees  of  Caubul,  and  all 
the  Afghans  from  that  city,  that  he  has  the  co-operation  of  the 
British  and  the  Maharajah,  and  with  but  a  little  distribution  of 
ready  money — say  two  or  three  lakhs  of  rupees — he  will  find  him- 
self the  real  King  of  the  Afghans  in  a  couple  of  months.  It  is, 
however,  to  be  remembered  always  that  we  must  appear  directly, 
for  the  Afghans  are  a  superstitious  people,  and  believe  Soojah  to 
have  no  fortune  (bukht) ;  but  our  name  will  invest  him  with  it. 
You  will  also  have  a  good  argument  with  the  Maharajah  in  the 
honour  of  "  Taj  Bukhshie  ;"  but  still  his  Highness  will  be  more 
disposed  to  use  Sultan  Mahomed  Khan  as  an  instrument  than 
Soojah,  for  he  will,    perhaps,  have  exaggerated  notions  of  Afghan 


*  Here  Sir  A.  Burnes  had  inserted  the  words,  "I  have — that  is,  as 
ex-King  of  the  Afghans,  no  very  high  opinion  ;"  and  had  drawn  his 
pen  through  them.  He  had  also  originally  written  the  word  "Of"  to 
be^in  the  sentence,  instead  of  *'As  for." 


APPENDIX.  501 

power  in  prospect ;  but  our  security  must  be  given  to  him,  and  we 
must  identify  ourselves  with  all  the  preceedings  to  make  arrange- 
ments durable. 

I  have  thus  pointed  out  to  you  how  the  chief  of  Caubul  is  to  be 
destroyed,  and  the  best  means  which  have  occurred  to  me  for 
effecting  it ;  but  I  am  necessarily  ignorant  of  the  Governor-General's 
views  on  what  his  Lordship  considers  the  best  mode  of  hereafter 
managing  Afghanistan.  It  has  been  notified  to  me  in  various 
despatches,  that  this  end  may  best  be  gained  by  using  one  small 
state  to  balance  another,  to  keep  all  at  peace,  and  thus  prevent 
any  great  Mahomedan  power  growing  up  beyond  the  Indus,  which 
might  cause  future  inconvenience.  It  is  with  every  respect  that 
I  differ ;  but  these  are  not  my  sentiments,  and  though  in  theory 
nothing  may  appear  more  just  and  beneficial,  I  doubt  the  possi- 
bility of  putting  the  theory  into  practice,  and  more  than  doubt  the 
practice  producing  the  benefit  expected  5rom  it;  for  while  you 
were  trying  to  bring  it  about,  another  power  steps  in,  paves  the 
way  for  destroying  the  chiefships  in  detail,  and  the  policy  along 
with  it.  Our  fears  of  a  powerful  Mahomedan  neighbour  are 
quickened  by  what  we  read  of  Ahmed  Shah's  wars  in  India,  .and 
the  alarms  spread  even  by  Shah  Zemaun,  so  late  as  the  days  of 
Lord  Wellesley ;  but  our  knowledge  of  these  countries  has  won- 
drously  improved  since  that  time ;  and  though  the  noble  Msu'quis, 
in  his  splendid  administration,  made  the  Afghans  feel  our  weight 
through  Persia,  and  arrested  the  evil,  we  should  have  had  none 
of  these  present  vexations  if  we  had  dealt  with  the  Afghans  them- 
selves. We  then  counteracted  them  through  Persia.  We  now 
wish  to  do  it  through  the  Sikhs.  But  as  things  stand,  I  maintain 
it  is  the  best  of  all  policy  to  make  Caubul  in  itself  as  strong  as 
we  can  make  it,  and  not  weaken  it  by  divided  power ;  it  has  already 
been  too  long  divided.  Caubul  owed  its  strength  in  bygone  days 
to  the  tribute  of  Cashmere  and  Sindh.  Both  are  irrevocably  gone ; 
and  while  we  do  all  we  can  to  keep  up  the  Sikhs  as  a  power  east  of 
the  Indus  dtu-ing  the  Maharajah's  life,  or  afterwards,  we  should 
consolidate  Afghan  power  west  of  the  Indus,  and  have  a  King 
and  not  a  collection  of  chiefs.  Divide  et  impera  is  a  temporising 
creed  at  any  time ;  and  if  the  Afghans  are  united,  we  and  they  bid 
defiance  to  Persia,  and  instead  of  distant  relations,  we  have  every- 
thing under  our  eye,  and  a  steadily  progressing  influence  all  along 
the  Indus. 

I  have  before  said,  that  we  cannot  with  justice  to  our  position  in 
India  allow  things  to  continue  as  at  present  in  Caubul ;  and  I  have 


502  APPENDIX. 

already,  in  my  despatch  of  the  30th  April,  suggested  a  prompt  and 
active  counteraction  of  Dost  Mahomed  Khan,  since  we  cannot  act 
with  him.  But  it  remains  to  be  reconsidered  why  we  cannot  act 
with  Dost  Mahomed.  He  is  a  man  of  undoubted  ability,  and  has  at 
heart  a  high  opinion  of  the  British  nation ;  and  if  half  you  must 
do  for  others  were  done  for  him,  and  offers  made  which  he  could 
see  conduced  to  his  interests,  he  would  abandon  Persia  and  Russia 
to-morrow.  It  may  be  said  that  that  opportunity  has  been  given 
to  him,  but  I  would  rather  discuss  this  in  person  with  you,  for  I 
think  there  is  much  to  be  said  for  him.  Government  have  admitted 
that  at  best  he  had  but  a  choice  of  dijB&culties ;  and  it  should  not 
be  forgotten  that  we  promised  nothing,  and  Persia  and  Russia  held 
out  a  great  deal.  I  am  not  now  viewing  the  question  in  the  light 
of  what  is  to  be  said  to  the  rejection  of  our  good  offices  as  far  as 
they  went,  or  to  his  doing  so  in  the  face  of  a  threat  held  out  to 
him ;  but  these  facts  show  the  man  has  something  in  him ;  and  if 
Afghans  are  proverbially  not  to  be  trusted,  I  see  no  reason  for 
having  greater  mistrust  of  him  than  of  others.  My  opinion  of 
Asiatics  is,  that  you  can  only  rely  upon  them  when  their  interests 
are  identified  with  the  line  of  procedure  marked  out  to  them ; 
and  this  seems  now  to  be  a  doctrine  pretty  general  in  all  politics. 

I  shall  say  no  more  at  present.  It  will  give  me  great  pleasure 
again  to  meet  you.  I  shall  be  on  the  banks  of  the  Jhelam  on  the 
7th  or  8th,  and  my  progress  beyond  that  depends  on  the  dawk  being 
laid  :  but  if  that  goes  right,  I  ought  to  join  you  in  ten  days  at  the 
furthest. 

Believe  me,  my  dear  Mr.  Macnaghten, 

Yours  sincerely, 

Alexandep.  Burnes. 

P.S. — I  have  thought  it  advisable  to  send  a  duplicate  of  this 
letter,  which  Mr.  Lord  has  been  so  good  as  to  copy  for  me,  by  the 
Maharajah's  dawk,  as  it  prevents  accidents,  and  may  reach  you 
sooner. 


END    OF    VOL.     1 


LONDON  :   PRfNTED   BT   WILLIAM  CLOWES  AND  SONS,  STAMFORD  STREET 
AND  CHARING  CROSS. 


PLEASE  DO  NOT  REMOVE 
CARDS  OR  SLIPS  FROM  THIS  POCKET 

UNIVERSITY  OF  TORONTO  LIBRARY