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Presented  to  the 

UNIVERSITY  OF  TORONTO 
LIBRARY 

by  the 

ONTARIO  LEGISLATIVE 
LIBRARY 

1980 


HISTORY 


OF   THE 


WAR     IN     THE     PENINSULA 


WAR  IN  THE  PENINSULA^ 


VJ 


AND    IN    THE 

OF   FRANCE 


FROM    THE    YEAR    1807    TO    THE    YEAR    1814 


BY 

MAJOR-GENERAL  SIR  W.  F.  P.  NAPIER,  K.C.B 

COLONEL   27TH    REGIMENT 


STX   VO.UMHS 


FIFTY  -FIVE  MAPS  AND  PLANS®  i  ,  t  it  T  ?,  0 


VOL.  III. 


LONDON 
FREDERICK    WARNE    AND    CO. 

AND    NEW    YORK 


TABLE   OF  CONTENTS. 


BOOK  THE  ELEVENTH. 

CHAPTER  v 

Slight  operations  in  Gallicia,  Castille,  the  Asturias,  Estremadura,  and 
Andalusia — Reynier  passes  the  Tagus — Hill  makes  a  parallel  move- 
ment— Romana  spreads  his  troops  over  Estremadura — Lord  Welling- 
ton assembles  a  reserve  at  Thomar — Critical  situation  of  Silveira — 
Captures  a  Swiss  battalion  at  Puebla  de  Senabria — Romana's  troops 
defeated  at  Benvenida  —  Lacy  and  captain  Cockburn  land  troops  at 
Moguer  but  are  forced  to  re-embark — Lord  Wellington's  plan — How 
thwarted — Siege  of  Almeida — Allies  advance  to  Frexadas — The  maga- 
zine of  Almeida  explodes — Treachery  of  Bareiros — Town  surrenders — 
The  allies  withdraw  behind  the  Mondego — Fort  of  Albuquerque  ruined 
by  an  explosion — Reynier  marches  on  Sabugal,  but  returns  to  Zarza 
Mayor— Napoleon  directs  Massena  to  advance — Description  of  the 
country — Erroneous  notions  of  lord  Wellington's  views  entertained  by 
both  armies p.  1 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Third  invasion  of  Portugal — Napoleon's  prudence  in  military  afFaira 
vindicated — Massena  concentrates  his  corps — Occupies  Guarda — 
Passes  the  Mondego — Marches  on  Viseu — Lord  Wellington  falls  back 
— Secures  Coimbra,  passes  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Mondego,  and  is 
joined  by  the  reserve  from  Thomar — General  Hill  anticipates  his 
orders,  and  by  a  forced  march  reaches  the  Alva — The  allied  army  is 
thus  interposed  between  the  French  and  Coirnbra — Daring  action  of 
colonel  Trant — Contemporaneous  events  in  Estremadura,  and  the  Con- 
dado  de  Niebla — Romana  defeated — Gallantry  of  the  Portuguese 
cavalry  under  general  Madden — Dangerous  crisis  of  affairs — Violence 
of  the  Souza  faction — An  indiscreet  letter  from  an  English  officer 
creates  great  confusion  at  Oporto — Lord  Wellington  rebukes  the  Por-  | 
tuguese  regency — He  is  forced  to  alter  his  plans,  and  resolves  to  offer  -^ 
battle — Chooses  the  position  of  Busaco 13 

CHAPTER  VII. 

(General  Pack  destroys  the  bridges  on  the  Criz  and  Dao — Remarkable 
panic  in  the  light  division — The  second  and  sixth  corps  arrive  in  from 
of  Busaco — Key  and  Reynier  desire  to  attack,  but  Massena  delays — 


vi  CONTENTS. 

The  eighth  corps  and  the  cavalry  arrive — Battle  of  Busaco-- Massena 
turns  the  right  of  the  allies — Lord  Wellington  falls  back,  and  orders 
the  northern  militia  to  close  on  the  French  rear — Cavalry  skirmish  on 
the  Mondego — Coimbra  evacuated,  dreadful  scene  there— Disorders  in 
the  army — Lord  Wellington's  firmness  contrasted  with  Massena's 
indolence — Observations  .......  ,  ^  ....  p.  22 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

Massena  resumes  his  march — The  militia  close  upon  his  rear — Cavalrj 
skirmish  near  Leiria — Allies  retreat  upon  the  lines — Colonel  Trant 
surprises  Coimbra — The  French  army  continues  its  march — Cavalry 
skirmish  at  Rio  Mayor — General  Craufurd  is  surprised  at  Alemquer 
and  retreats  by  the  wrong  road — Dangerous  results  of  this  error — 
Description  of  the  lines  of  Torres  Vedras — Massena  arrives  in  front  of 
them — Romana  reinforces  lord  Wellington  with  two  Spanish  divisions 
— Remarkable  works  executed  by  the  light  division  at  Aruda — The 
French  skirmish  at  Sobral — General  Harvey  wounded' — Geneial  St. 
Croix  killed — Massena  takes  a  permanent  position  in  front  of  the  lines 
— He  is  harassed  on  the  rear  and  flanks  by  the  British  cavalry  and 
the  Portuguese  militia 36 


CHAPTER  IX. 

State  of  Lisbon — Embargo  on  the  vessels  in  the  river — Factious  conduct 
of  the  patriarch — The  desponding  letters  from  the  army — Base  policy 
of  ministers — Alarm  of  lord  Liverpool — Lord  Wellington  displays  the 
greatest  firmness,  vigour,  and  dignity  of  mind — He  rebukes  the  Por- 
tuguese regency,  and  exposes  the  duplicity  and  presumption  of  the 
patriarch's  faction — Violence  of  this  faction — Curious  revelation  made 
by  baron  Eben  and  the  editor  of  the  '  Braziliense' — Lord  Well esley 
awes  the  court  of  Rio  Janeiro — Strengthens  the  authority  of  lord  Wel- 
lington and  Mr.  Stuart — The  French  seize  the  islands  in  the  river — 
Foolish  conduct  of  the  governor  of  Setuval — General  Fane  sent  to  the 
left  bank  of  the  Tagus — Lord  Wellington's  embarrassments  become 
more  serious — The  heights  of  Almada  fortified — Violent  altercation  of 
the  regency  upon  this  subject — The  patriarch  insults  Mr.  Stuart  and 
nearly  ruins  the  common  cause 48 


CHAPTER  X. 

Massena's  pertinacity — He  collects  boats  on  the  Tagus,  and  establishes  a 
dep6t  at  Santarem — Sends  general  Foy  to  Paris — Casts  a  bridge  over 
the  Zezere — Abandons  his  position  in  front  of  the  lines — Is  followed 
by  lord  Wellington — Exploit  of  serjeant  Baxter — Massena  assumes  the 
position  of  Santarem — Lord  Wellington  sends  general  Hill  across  the 
Tagus — Prepares  to  attack  the  French — Abandons  this  design  and 
assumes  a  permanent  position — Policy  of  the  hostile  generals  exposed 
— General  Gardanne  arrives  at  Cardigos  with  a  convoy,  but  retreats 
again — The  French  marauders  spread  to  the  Mondego — Lord  Welling- 
ton demands  reinforcements — Beresford  takes  the  command  on  the  left 
of  the  Tagus — Operations  of  the  militia  in  Beira — General  Drouet  enters 
Portugal  with  the  ninth  corps — Joins  Massena  at  Espinal — Occupies 


CONTENTS.  vii 

Leiria — Claparede  defeats  Silveira  and  takes  Lamego — Returns  to  the 
Mondego — Seizes  Guarda  and  Covilhoa — Foy  returns  from  France — 
The  duke  of  Abrantes  wounded  in  a  skirmish  at  Rio  Mayor— General 
Pamplona  organizes  a  secret  communication  with  Lisbon — Observa- 
tions   ' p.  58 


BOOK  THE  TWELFTH. 


CHAPTER  I. 

General  sketch  of  the  state  of  the  war — Lord  Wellington  objects  to 
maritime  operations — Expedition  to  Fuengirola — Minor  operations  in 
Andalusia — National  Cortes  assemble  in  the  Isla  de  Leon — Its  pro- 
ceedings— New  regency  chosen — Factions  described — Violence  of  all 
parties — Unjust  treatment  of  the  colonies 75 

CHAPTER  II. 

Soult  assumes  the  direction  of  the  blockade  of  Cadiz — His  flotilla — 
Enters  the  Troccadero  canal — Villantroys,  or  cannon  mortars,  em- 
ployed by  the  French — Inactivity  of  the  Spaniards — Napoleon  directs 
Soult  to  aid  Massena — Has  some  notion  of  evacuating  Andalusia — 
Soult's  first  expedition  to  Estremadura — Forces  the  bridge  of  Merida 
— Besieges  Olivenza — Ballesteros  defeated  at  Castellejos — Flies  into 
Portugal — Romana's  divisions  march  from  Cartaxo  to  the  succour  of 
Olivenza — That  place  surrenders — Romana  dies — His  character — Lord 
Wellington's  counsels  neglected  by  the  Spanish  generals — First  siege 
of  Badajos — Mendizabel  arrives — Files  the  Spanish  army  into  Badajos 
— Makes  a  grand  sally — Is  driven  back  with  loss — Pitches  his  camp 
round  San  Christoval — Battle  of  the  Gebora — Continuation  of  the 
blockade  of  Cadiz — Expedition  of  the  allies  tinder  general  La  Peila — 
Battle  of  Barosa — Factions  in  Cadiz 83 

CHAPTER  III. 

Siege  of  Badajos  continued  —  Imas  surrenders  —  His  cowardice  and 
treachery  —  Albuquerque  and  Valencia  d' Alcantara  taken  by  the 
French — Soult  returns  to  Andalusia — Relative  state  of  the  armies  at 
Santarem — Retreat  of  the  French — Massena's  able  movement— Skir- 
mish at  Pombal — Combat  of  Redinha — Massena  halts  at  Condeixa 
— Montbrun  endeavours  to  seize  Coimbra — Baffled  by  colonel  Trant — 
Condeixa  burnt  by  the  French — Combat  of  Casal  Nova — General  Colt 
turns  the  French  flank  at  Panella — Combat  of  Foz  d'Aronce — Massena 
retires  behind  the  Alva 108 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Allies  halt  for  provisions — State  of  the  campaign — -Passage  of  the  Oeira 
of  the   Alva — Masseua   retires  to  Celorico — Resolves  to 


vm  CONTENTS. 

march  upon  Coria — Is  prevented  by  Ney,  who  is  deprived  of  his  com- 
mand and  sent  to  France— Massena  abandons  Celorico  and  takes  post 
at  Guarda — The  allies  oblige  the  French  to  quit  that  position,  and 
Massena  takes  a  new  one  behind  the  Coa — Combat  of  Sabugal — Trant 
crosses  the  Coa  and  cuts  the  communication  between  Almeida  and 
Ciudad  Rodngo — His  danger — He  is  released  by  the  British  cavalry 
and  artillery — Massena  abandons  Portugal p.  124 

CHAPTER  V. 

Estimate  of  the  French  loss — Anecdote  of  colonel  Waters — Lord  Wel- 
lington's great  conceptions  explained — How  impeded — Affairs  in  the 
south  of  Spain — Formation  of  the  fourth  and  fifth  Spanish  armies — 
Siege  of  Campo  Mayor — Place  falls — Excellent  conduct  of  major 
Tallaia — Beresford  surprises  Montbrun — Combat  of  cavalry — Campo 
Mayor  recovered — Beresford  takes  cantonments  round  Elvas — His 
difficulties — Reflections  upon  his  proceedings — He  throws  a  bridge 
near  Jerumenha  and  passes  the  Guadiana — Outpost  of  cavalry  cut  off 
by  the  French — Castanos  arrives  at  Elvas — Arrangements  relative  to 
the  chief  command — Beresford  advances  against  Latour  Maubourg, 
who  returns  to  Llerena — General  Cole  takes  Olivenza — Cavalry  skir- 
mish near  Usagre —  Lord  Wellington  arrives  at  Elvas,  examines 
Badajos — Skirmish  there — Arranges  the  operations — Political  diffi- 
culties— Lord  Wellington  returns  to  the  Agueda — Operations  in  the 
north — Skirmishes  on  the  Agueda — Massena  advances  to  Ciudad 
Rodrigo — Lord  Wellington  reaches  the  army — Retires  behind  the 
Duas  Casas — Combat  of  Fuentes  Onoro — Battle  of  Fuentes  Onoro — 
Evacuation  of  Almeida  .  135 


CHAPTER  VI. 

Lord  Wellington  quits  the  army  of  Beira — Marshal  Beresford's  opera- 
tions— Colonel  Colborne  beats  up  the  French  quarters  in  Estremadura, 
and  intercepts  their  convoys — First  English  siege  of  Badajos — Captain 
Squire  breaks  ground  before  San  Christoval — His  works  overwhelmed 
by  the  French  fire — Soult  advances  to  relieve  the  place — Beresford 
raises  the  siege — Holds  a  conference  with  the  Spanish  generals,  and 
resolves  to  fight — Colonel  Colborne  rejoins  the  army,  which  takes 
a  position  at  Albuera — Allied  cavalry  driven  in  by  the  French — 
General  Blake  joins  Beresford — General  Cole  arrives  on  the  frontier — 
Battle  of  Albuera .  158 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Continuation  of  the  battle  of  Albuera — Dreadful  state  of  both  armies — 
Soult  retreats  to  Solano — General  Hamilton  resumes  the  investment 
of  Badajos — Lord  Wellington  reaches  the  field  of  battle — Third  and 
seventh  divisions  arrive — Beresford  follows  Soult — The  latter  abandons 
the  castle  of  Villalba  and  retreats  to  Lerena — Cavalry  action  at 
Usagre — Beresford  quits  the  army — General  Hill  re-assumes  the  com- 
mand of  the  second  division,  and  lord  Wellington  renews  the  siege  of 
Badaios— Observations 171 


CONTENTS  ix 


BOOK  THE  THIRTEENTH. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Lord  Wellington's  sieges  vindicated — Operations*  in  Spain — State  of 
Gallicia — Change  of  commanders — Bonnet's  operations  in  the  Asturias 
— Activity  of  the  partidas — Their  system  of  operations — Mina  captures 
a  large  convoy  at  Arlaban — Bessieres  contracts  his  position — Bonnet 
abandons  the  Asturias — Santocildes  advances  into  Leon — French  dis- 
mantle Astorga — Skirmish  on  the  Orbigo — General  inefficiency  of  the 
Gallicians  and  Asturians — Operations  in  the  eastern  provinces — State 
of  Aragon — State  of  Catalonia — State  of  Valencia — Suchet  marches 
against  Tortoza — Fails  to  burn  the  boat-bridge  there — Macdonald 
remains  at  Gerona — The  Valencians  and  Catalonians  combine  opera- 
tions against  Suchet — O'Donnel  enters  Tortoza — Makes  a  sally  and  is 
repulsed — The  Valencians  defeated  near  Uldecona — Operations  of  the 
seventh  corps — Macdonald  reforms  the  discipline  of  the  troops — 
Marches  with  a  convoy  to  Barcelona — Returns  to  Gerona  and  dis- 
mantles the  out- works  of  that  place — O'Donnel's  plans — Macdonald 
marches  with  a  second  convoy— Reaches  Barcelona  and  returns  to 
Gerona — Marches  with  a  third  convoy — Forces  the  pass  of  Ordal— 
Enters  Reus  and  opens  the  communications  with  Suchet  .  .  p.  183 


CHAPTER  II. 

O'Donnel  withdraws  his  troops  from  Falcet  and  surrounds  the  seventh 
corps — Macdonald  retires  to  Lerida — Arranges  a  new  plan  with  Suchet 
— Ravages  the  plains  of  Urgel  and  the  higher  valleys — The  people 
become  desperate — O'Donnel  cuts  the  French  communication  with  the 
Ampurdam — Makes  a  forced  march  towards  Gerona — Surprises  Swartz 
at  Abispal — Takes  Filieu  and  Palamos — Is  wounded  and  returns  to 
Taragona — Campo  Verde  marches  to  the  Cerdana — Macdonald  enters 
Solsona — Campo  Verde  returns — Combat  of  Cardona — French  retreat 
to  Guisona,  and  the  seventh  corps  returns  to  Gerona — Macdonald 
marches  with  a  fourth  convoy  to  Barcelona — Makes  new  roads — 
Advances  to  Reus — The  Spaniards  hai-ass  his  flanks — He  forages  the 
Garriga  district  and  joins  the  third  coi-ps — Operations  of  Suchet — 
General  Leval  dies — -Operations  of  the  partidas — Plan  of  the  secret 
junta  to  starve  Aragon — General  Chlopiski  defeats  Villa  Campa — 
Suchet's  difficulties — He  assembles  the  notables  of  Aragon  and  re- 
organizes that  province — He  defeats  and  takes  general  Navarro  at 
Falcet — Bassecour's  operations — He  is  defeated  at  Uldecona  .  .195 


CHAPTER  III. 

Tortoza — Its  governor  feeble — The  Spaniards  outside  disputing  and 
negligent — Captain  Fane  lands  at  Palamos — Is  taken — O'Donnel 
resigns,  and  is  succeeded  by  Campo  Verde — Description  of  Tortoza — 
It  is  invested — A  division  of  the  seventh  corps  placed  under  Suchet's 
command — Siege  of  Tortoza — The  place  negotiates — Suchet's  daring 


TONTENTS. 

conduct — The  governor  surrenders — Suchet's  activity— Habert  takes 
the  fort  of  Balaguer — Macdonald  moves  to  Ileus — Sarsfield  defeats  and 
kills  Ugenio — Macdonald  inarches  to  Lerida — Suchet  goes  to  Zaragoza 
— The  confidence  of  the  Catalans  revives — The  manner  in  which  the 
belligerents  obtained  provisions  explained —The  Catalans  attack 
Perillo,  and  Campo  Verde  endeavours  to  surprise  Montjuic,  but  i» 
defeated  with  great  loss — Napoleon  changes  the  organization  of  the 
third  and  seventh  corps — The  former  becomes  the  army  of  Aragon — 
The  latter  the  army  of  Catalonia .  p.  206 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Suchet  prepares  to  besiege  Taragona — The  power  of  the  partidas 
described — Their  actions — They  are  dispersed  on  the  frontier  of 
Aragon — The  Valencians  fortify  Saguntum — Are  defeated  a  second 
time  at  Uldecona — Suchet  comes  to  Lerida — Macdonald  passes  with 
an  escort  from  them  to  Barcelona — His  troops  burn  Manresa — Sars- 
field harasses  his  march — Napoleon  divides  the  invasion  of  Catalonia 
into  two  parts — Sinking  state  of  the  province — Rovira  surprises  Fort 
Fernando  de  Figueras — Operations  which  follow  that  event  .  .  217 


CHAPTER  V. 

Suchet's  skilful  conduct — His  error  about  English  finance — Outline  of 
his  arrangements  for  the  siege  of  Taragona — He  makes  French  con- 
tracts for  the  supply  of  his  army — Forages  the  high  valleys  and  the 
frontiers  of  Castile  and  Valencia — Marches  to  Taragona — Description 
of  that  place — Campo  Verde  enters  the  place — Suchet  invests  it — Con- 
vention relative  to  the  sick  concluded  between  St.  Cyr  and  Reding 
faithfully  observed — Sarsfield  comes  to  Momblanch— Skirmish  with 
the  Valencians  at  Amposta  and  Rapita — Siege  of  Taragona — Rapita 
and  Momblanch  abandoned  by  Suchet — Taragona  reinforced  from 
Valencia — The  Olivo  stormed — Campo  Verde  quits  Taragona,  and 
Senens  de  Contreras  assumes  the  chief  command — Sarsfield  enters  the 
place  and  takes  charge  of  the  port  or  lower  town — French  break 
ground  before  the  lower  town — The  Francoli  stormed — Campo  Verde 's 
plans  to  succour  the  place — General  Abbe  is  called  to  the  siege — Sars- 
field quits  the  place — The  lower  town  is  stormed — The  upper  town 
attacked — Suchet's  difficulties  increase — Campo  Verde  comes  to  the 
succour  of  the  place,  but  retires  without  effecting  anything — Colonel 
Skerrett  arrives  in  the  harbour  with  a  British  force — Refuses  to  land 
— Gallant  conduct  of  the  Italian  soldier  Bianchini — The  upper  town  is 
stormed  with  dreadful  slaughter 228 


CHAPTER  VI. 

Suchet  marches  against  Campo  Verde — Seizes  Villa  Nueva  de  Sitjes  and 
makes  fifteen  hundred  prisoners — Campo  Verde  retires  to  Igualada — 
Suchet  goes  to  Barcelona— A  council  of  war  held  at  Cervera  by  Campo 
Verde — It  is  resolved  to  abandon  the  province  as  a  lost  country — Con- 
fusion ensues — Lacy  arrives  and  assumes  the  command — Eroles  throws 
himself  into  Montserrat — Suchet  send*  detachments  to  the  valley  of  Con- 


CONTENTS.  xi 

gosta  and  that  of  Vich,  and  opens  the  communication  with  Macdonald 
at  Figueras — Returns  to  Reus — Created  a  marshal — Destroys  the  works 
of  the  lower  town  of  Taragona — Takes  Montserrat — Negotiates  with 
Cuesta  for  an  exchange  of  the  French  prisoners  in  the  island  of  Cabrera 
— Stopped  by  the  interference  of  Mr.  Wellesley — Mischief  occasioned 
by  the  privateers — Lacy  re-organizes  the  province — Suchet  returns  to 
Zaragoza,  and  chases  the  partidas  from  the  frontier  of  Aragon — 
Habert  defeats  the  Valencians  at  Amposta — The  somatenes  harass 
the  French  forts  near  Montserrat — Figueras  surrenders  to  Macdonald 
— Napoleon's  clemency — Observations — Operations  in  Valencia  and 
Murcia p.  246 


BOOK  THE  FOURTEENTH. 


CHAPTER  I. 

State  of  political  affairs — Situation  of  king  Joseph — His  disputes  with 
Napoleon — He  resigns  his  crown  and  quits  Spain — TSie  emperor  grants 
him  new  terms  and  he  returns — Political  state  of  France  as  regards  the 
war 260 


CHAPTER  II. 

Political  state  of  England  with  reference  to  the  war — Retrospective  view 
of  affairs — Enormous  subsidies  granted  to  Spain — The  arrogance  and 
rapacity  of  the  juntas  encouraged  by  Mr.  Canning — His  strange  pro- 
ceedings— Mr.  Stuart's  abilities  and  true  judgment  of  affairs  shown — 
He  proceeds  to  Vienna — State  of  politics  in  Germany — He  is  recalled 
— The  misfortunes  of  the  Spaniards  principally  owing  to  Mr.  Canning's 
incapacity — The  evil  genius  of  the  Peninsula — His  conduct  at  Lisbon 
— Lord  Wellesley's  policy  totally  different  from  Mr.  Canning's — Parties 
in  the  cabinet — Lord  Wellesley  and  Mr.  Perceval — Character  of  the 
latter — His  narrow  policy — Letters  describing  the  imbecility  of  the 
cabinet  in  1810  and  1811 268 


CHAPTER  III. 

Political  state  of  Spain — Disputes  among  the  leaders — Sir  J.  Moore's 
early  and  just  perception  of  the  state  of  affairs  confirmed  by  lord 
Wellington's  experience — Points  of  interest  affecting  England — The 
reinforcement  of  the  military  force — The  claims  of  the  princess  Car- 
iotta — The  prevention  of  a  war  with  Portugal — The  question  of  the 
colonies — Cisnero's  conduct  at  Buenos  Ayres — The  Mexicans  demand 
the  duke  of  Infautado  for  their  viceroy — Proceedings  of  the  English 
ministers — Governor  of  Curavoa — Lord  Wellesley  proposes  a  media- 
tion— Mr.  Bardaxi's  strange  assertion — Lord  Wellington's  judgment 
on  the  question — His  discernment,  sagacity,  and  wisdom  shown,  27S 


xii  CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Political  state  of  Portugal — Mr.  Villiers'  mission  expensive  and  inefficient 
— Mr.  Stuart  succeeds  him — Finds  everything  in  confusion-^-His  efforts 
to  restore  order  successful  at  first — Cortes  proposed  by  lord  Wellesley 
— Opposed  by  the  regency,  by  Mr.  Stuart,  and  by  lord  Wellington — 
Observations  thereon — Changes  in  the  regency — Its  partial  and  weak 
conduct- — Lord  Strangford's  proceedings  at  llio  Janeiro  only  productive 
of  mischief — Mr.  Stuart's  efforts  opposed  and  successfully  by  the  Souza 
faction — Lord  Wellington  thinks  of  abandoning  the  contest — Writes 
to  the  prince  regent  of  Portugal — The  regency  continues  to  embarrass 
the  English  general — Effect  of  their  conduct  upon  the  army — Miserable 
state  of  the  country — The  British  cabinet  grants  a  fresh  subsidy  to 
Portugal — Lord  Wellington  complains  that  he  is  supplied  with  only 
one-sixth  of  the  money  necessary  to  carry  on  the  contest — Minor  follies 
of  the  regency — The  cause  of  Massena's  harshness  to  the  people  of 
Portugal  explained — Case  of  Mascarhenas — His  execution  a  foul 
murder — Lord  Wellington  reduced  to  the  greatest  difficulties — He 
and  Mr.  Stuart  devise  a  plan  to  supply  the  army  by  trading  in  grain 
— Lord  Wellington's  embarrassments  increase — Reasons  why  he  does 
not  abandon  Portugal — His  plan  of  campaign p.  289 

CHAPTER  V. 

Second  English  siege  of  Badajos — Means  of  the  allies  very  scanty — Place 
invested — San  Christoval  assaulted — The  allies  repulsed  —  Second 
assault  fails  likewise — The  siege  turned  into  a  blockade — Observa- 
tions.  303 


CHAPTER  VI. 

General  Spencer's  operations  in  Beira — Pack  blows  up  Almeida — Mar- 
mont  marches  by  the  passes  to  the  Tagus,  and  Spencer  marches  to  the 
Alemtejo — Soult  and  Marmont  advance  to  succour  Badajos — The  siege 
is  raised,  and  the  allies  pass  the  Guadiana — Lord  Wellington's  position 
on  the  Caya  described — Skirmish  of  cavalry,  in  which  the  British  are 
defeated — Critical  period  of  the  war — French  marshals  censured  for 
not  giving  battle—  Lord  Wellington's  firmness — Inactivity  of  the 
Spaniards — Blake  moves  to  the  Condado  de  Niebla — He  attacks  the 
castle  of  Niebla — The  French  armies  retire  from  Badajos,  and  Soult 
marches  to  Andalusia — Succours  the  castle  of  Niebla — Blake  flies  to 
Ayamonte — Sails  for  Cadiz,  leaving  Ballesteros  in  the  Condado — 
French  move  against  him — He  embarks  his  infantry  and  sends  hia 
cavalry  through  Portugal  to  Estremadura — Blake  lands  at  Almeira 
and  joins  the  Murcian  army — Goes  to  Valencia,  and  during  his  absence 
Soult  attacks  his  army — Rout  of  Baza — Soult  returns  to  Andalusia — 
His  actions  eulogised 311 

CHAPTER  VII. 

State  of  the  war  in  Spain — Marmont  ordered  to  take  a  central  position  in 
the  valley  of  the  Tagus — Constructs  forts  at  Almaraz — French  affairs 
assume  a  favourable  aspect — Lord  Wellington's  difficulties  augment — 


CONTENTS.  xiii 

Remonstrances  sent  to  the  Brazils — System  of  intelligence  described — 
Lord  Wellington  secretly  prepares  to  besiege  Ciudad  Rodrigo — Marches 
into  Beira,  leaving  Hill  in  the  Alemtejo — French  cavalry  take  a  con- 
voy of  wine,  get  drunk,  and  lose  it  again — General  Dorsenne  invades 
Gallicia — Is  stopped  by  the  arrival  of  the  allies  on  the  Agueda — 
Blockade  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo — Carlos  Espana  commences  the  formation 
of  a  new  Spanish  army — Preparations  for  the  siege — Hill  sends  a 
brigade  to  Castello  Branco p.  823 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

Fhe  garrison  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo  make  some  successful  excursions — 
Morillo  operates  against  the  French  in  Estremadura,  is  defeated  and 
driven  to  Albuquerque — Civil  affairs  of  Portugal — Bad  conduct  of  the 
regency — They  imagine  the  war  to  be  decided,  and  endeavour  to  drive 
lord  Wellington  away  from  Portugal — Indications  that  Napoleon  would 
assume  the  command  in  the  Peninsula  observed  by  lord  Wellington — 
He  expects  a  combined  attack  on  Lisbon  by  sea  and  land — Marmont 
and  Dorsenne  collect  convoys  and  unite  at  Tamames — Advance  to 
succour  Ciudad  Rodrigo  —  Combat  of  Elbodon  —  Allies  retreat  to 
Guinaldo — To  Aldea  Ponte — Combat  of  Aldea  Ponte — The  allies 
retire  to  Soita — The  French  retire — Observations ......  332 


APPENDIX. 

Wo. 

1.  Extracts  from  a  report  made  by  the  duke  of  Dalmatia  to  the 

prince  of  Wagram  and  Neufchatel 349 

Intercepted  letter  from  marshal  Mortier  to  the  emperor     .     .     .  352 

2.  Miscellaneous  correspondence  of  the  French  marshals  and  others, 

and  extracts  from  general  Pelet's  journal 352 

3.  The  French  officers,  prisoners  of  war  at  Oporto,  to  general  Trant  364 

4.  A  letter  from  lieutenant-general  Graham  to  the  right  hon.  H. 

Wellesley,  and  state  of  the  troops  at  Tarifa,  under  his  com- 
mand   365 

Extract  of  a  letter  from  general  Frederick  Ponsonby,  and  various' 
other  documents 369 

5.  Extracts  from   the   correspondence  of  captain  Squire,    of   the 

engineers .  376 

6.  Extract  of  a  letter  from  general  Campbell  to  lord  Liverpool    .     .  378 

7.  Justificatory  papers  relating  to  the  state  of  Spain  at  different 

periods 378 

8.  Siege  of  Taragona 390 

8.  Political  state  of  king  Joseph 401 


LIST  OF  PLATES. 


1.  Operations  on  the  Mondego.     Battle  of  Busaco     .     .     to  face     13 

2.  Lines  of  Torres  Vedras .39 

3.  Battle  of  Barosa        99 

4.  Massena's  retreat Ill 

5.  Battle  of  Fuentes  Onoro 147 

6.  Battle  of  Albuera 163 

7.  Siege  of  Tortoza 201 

8.  Siege  of  Taragona 227 

9.  Combat  of  Elbodon    .  .  337 


HISTORY 


OP  THE 


PENINSULA    WAR. 

BOOK    THE    ELEVENTH. 
CHAPTEE  V. 

DURING  the  siege  of  Rodrigo,  an  expedition  sailing  from 
Coruna  under  Porlier  seized  and  dismantled  Santona  and 
other  points  on  the  coast.  Mahi,  coming  down  from  the  Gallician 
mountains,  also  menaced  Astorga ;  and  part  of  his  army,  under 
Toboado  Gil,  occupied  Puebla  de  Senabria  to  act  in  concert 
with  Silveira.  Mahi's  movements  were  unopposed  by  Keller- 
man  and  Serras  during  the  siege  of  Rodrigo,  because  the  first 
being  at  Banos  was  too  distant,  and  the  latter's  troops  were 
too  widely  spread ;  but  when  the  fortress  fell,  the  eighth  corps 
repassed  the  Tormes  to  gather  provisions,  which  enabled 
Serras  to  concentrate'  and  drive  Mahi  back  to  the  hills. 
Toboado  Gil  then  removed  his  stores  from  Puebla  de  Senabria, 
and  drew  closer  to  Silveira  in  expectation  of  an  attack ;  but 
Serras  put  a  Swiss  battalion  and  sixty  dragoons  into  Puebla 
and  fell  back  to  Zamora,  the  eighth  corps  returned  to  the 
Agueda,  and  these  were  the  only  Spanish  efforts  to  draw  off 
any  of  the  besiegers  from  Rodrigo,  and  give  the  English  general 
an  opportunity  of  succouring  it. 

Meanwhile  Bonnet  having  defeated  the  Asturians  at  Sales, 
entered  Castropol  on  the  frontier  of  Gallicia,  but  returned 
to  Oviedo  on  hearing  of  the  expedition  to  Santona;  the 
Spaniards  then  re -embarked  for  Coruna  and  the  project  of  a 

VOL.   III.  B 


2  PENINSULA  WAR.  [JULY,  1810. 

larger  armament,  to  be  directed  against  Santander  itselfj  was 
adopted ;  for  the  success  of  this  small  enterprise  had  elated  the 
allies,  and  Mahi  boasted,  that  if  arms  and  ammunition  were 
supplied  by  England  he  would  clear  the  plains  of  Leon  as  far 
as  the  Esla  river:  his  proposals  were  acceded  to,  and  sir 
Home  Popham  was  appointed  to  superintend  a  great  naval 
expedition  against  the  Asturian  and  Biscay  coasts. 

Reynier  now  passed  the  Tagus.  He  had  collected  boats  at 
Barca  de  Alconete  in  June,  expecting  to  be  joined  by  the 
French  column  from  Andalusia;  but  hearing  it  was  attacked 
by  Mendizabel  at  Los  Santos  the  23rd  of  that  month  marched 
to  its  succour.  Lacy's  expedition  to  the  Pumda  had  just  then 
drawn  Mortier  from  Seville,  the  French  on  the  Odiel  had 
fallen  back  to  the  Tinto,  and  Copons  was  foraging  about  the 
former  river.  Reynier  thought  the  crisis  formidable,  and 
instead  of  returning  to  the  Tagus  sought  to  surprise  Imas; 
failing  in  that  he  pushed  across  the  Morena  against  BallesteroS; 
who  was  at  Campo  Frio  and  only  saved  himself  by  a  hasty 
flight  into  Portugal.  Lacy,  as  before  said,  was  soon  beaten 
from  the  Honda,  Mortier  returned  to  Seville,  Huelva  and 
Moguer  were  re-occupied,  and  Reynier  resumed  his  project 
for  passing  the  Tagus  at  Alconete,  where  his  boats  remained, 
the  Spaniards  having  neglected  the  opportunity  for  destroying 
them. 

To  cover  his  movement  from  Hill,  then  at  Campo 
39iV01  ^avorJ  Reynier  placed  a  rear-guard  on  the  Salor, 
and  Kellennan  came  from  Banos  to  Coria  to  awe 
the  Portuguese  on  the  Elga,  On  the  10th  the  passage  was 
effected  by  the  main  body ;  on  the  1 6th  by  the  rear-guard,  which 
thus  escaped  Hill  and  Romana,  who  being  united  and  advanc- 
ing to  gather  the  harvest  for  victualling  Badajos  and  the  other 
fortresses  had  designed  to  fight.  Reynier's  movement  forced 
Hill  to  make  a  parallel  march  by  Vilha  Velha,  which  only 
required  thirty-six  hours,  and  meanwhile  Wellington  had 
assembled  at  Thomar,  under  general  Leith,  a  reserve  of  eight 
thousand  Portuguese,  and  two  thousand  British  troops  just 
arrived  from  England.  When  Reynier  reached  Coria  he 
detached  troops  by  Perales  upon  Sabugal,  but  recalled  them 
on  finding  Hill  was  close  at  hand,  and  the  two  generals  then 


JUI.Y,  1810.]  BOOK  XL— CHAP.  5.  3 

fcced  each  other.  Hill,  reinforced  by  the  Portuguese  cavalry 
under  general  Fane,  encamped  sixteen  thousand  men  with 
frjgKfryii  guns  at  Sarzedas,  having  the  Sobreira  Formosa  dose 
behind;  his  advanced  guard  was  in  Castello  Branco,  his  horse- 
men on  the  Poncul ;  and  a  Portognese  brigade  of  infantry  was 
detached  to  Fondao  to  cover  the  Estrada  Nova  and  commu- 
nicate with  Guarda:  general  Leith  immediately  adopted  the 
line  of  the  Zezere,  in  support  of  Hill,  and  thus  twenty-six 
thousand  regulars,  aided  by  the  militia.,  were  between  Beynier 
and  Lisbon.  That  general  made  a  demonstration  on  the  side 
of  Salvatierra  bat  was  repulsed  by  some  Portuguese  cavalry, 
and  then  dividing  his  forces  between  Penamacor  and  Zarza 
Mayor,  established  a  small  post  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Tagus 
near  the  month  of  the  Bio  del  Monte,  and  by  continual  move* 
ment  rendered  it  doubtful  whether  he  meant  to  repass  the 
Tagus,  to  advance  upon  Sarzedas,  or  to  join  Massena.  Mean- 
while Ballesteros  returned  to  Aracena,  and  Bomana  sent  Imas 
to  Xeres  de  los  Gavalleros,  O'Donnel  to  Truxfflo,  and  Carlos 
d'Espana  to  surprise  Beynier's  post  on  the  Bio  del  Monte; 
yet  he  soon  recalled  these  detachments  because  Mortier  was 
preparing  to  re-enter  Estremadnra.  Such  was  the  state  of 
affairs  in  August,  when  Maasena,  assured  of  Beynier's  aid, 
invested  Almeida,  which  produced  CraufnnTs  action  on  the 
Coa,  during  which  Loison,  thinking  the  governor  a  native, 
pressed  him  to  desert  the  English,  'that  vile  people  whose 
object  was  to  enslave  Portugal/ 

Wellington's  situation  was  embarrassing.  Ciudad  Bodrigo 
furnished  the  French  with  a  place  of  arms,  they  might  dis- 
regard Almeida,  and  their  tardy  investment,  viewed  in  epn- 
junction  with  the  great  magazines  collecting  at  Ciudad  Bodrigo, 
indicated  an  intention  of  so  doing.  Key's  corps  and  the 
reserve  cavalry  were  indeed  around  Almeida,  but  by  tele- 
graphic intercourse  with  the  place,  it  was  known  the  invest- 
ment was  not  real,  and  that  the  heads  of  the  columns  pointed 
towards  Celorico.  Loison's  advanced  guard  entered  Pinhel 
the  day  after  Cranfnrofs  action,  Beynier's  troops  were  divided 
between  Zarza  Mayor  and  Penamacor,  and  having  boats  near 
Alcantara  on  the  Tagus,  menaced  equally  the  line  of  that  river 
and  the  line  of  the  Zezere :  it  was  as  likely  Massena  would  join 

B2 


4  PENINSULA   WAR.  [JULY,  1810. 

Reynier,  as  that  Keynier  would  join  Massena.  A  letter  con- 
taining Napoleon's  orders  for  Reynier  to  invade  by  the  line  of 
Abrantes,  while  Mortier  entered  the  Alemtejo  and  Massena 
acted  by  the  valley  of  the  Mondego,  was  intercepted;  but 
Reynier  was  by  the  same  letter  placed  under  Massena's  com- 
mand, Mortier  was  not  in  a  condition  to  move  against  the 
Alemtejo,  and  no  certain  notion  of  the  enemy's  intention  could 
be  formed.  Junot,  Serras  and  Kellerman  were  between  the 
Tormes  and  the  Esla,  and  might  break  into  the  northern  pro- 
vinces of  Portugal,  while  Ney  and  Reynier  held  the  allies  in 
check  j  and  this  was  the  surest  course,  because  the  taking  of 
Oporto  would  have  furnished  many  resources,  stricken  the 
natives  with  terror,  dispersed  the  northern  militia,  opened  the 
great  coast-road  to  Lisbon,  and  enabled  Massena  to  avoid  all 
the  difficult  country  about  the  Mondego.  The  English  general 
must  then  have  retired  before  the  second  and  sixth  corps, 
unless  he  attacked  Ney;  an  unpromising  measure,  because  of 
the  enemy's  strength  in  horse ;  in  fine,  Massena,  though  dila- 
tory, had  one  hundred  and  sixteen  thousand  men  and  the 
initial  power:  the  English  general  was  forced  to  await  his 
movements. 

The  actual  position  of  the  allies  was  too  extended  and  too 
forward,  yet  to  retire  at  once  would  have  seemed  timid ;  hence 
Wellington  remained  quiet  during  the  25th,  26th,  and  27th 
of  July,  although  the  enemy's  posts  were  thickening  on  the 
Pinhel  river.  The  28th,  the  British  cavalry  advanced  to 
Frexadas,  the  infantry  withdrew  behind  the  Mondego,  Cole 
only  remaining  at  Guarda.  Craufurd  occupied  Celorico,  the 
other  divisions  were  at  Penhancos,  Carapichina,  and  Fornos, 
the  Portuguese  a  day's  march  behind.  The  sick  were  sent 
daily  to  the  rear,  the  line  of  retreat  kept  free  from  encum- 
brance, the  army  ready  for  action.  In  this  state  the  enemy 
made  a  demonstration  towards  St.  Joa  de  Pesquera  and  defeated 
some  militia  at  Fosboa  on  the  Douro,  after  which  he  retired 
across  the  Coa,  and  the  communication  with  Almeida  was 
again  open.  A  detachment  of  Reynier's  horse,  encountered  at 
Atalajd,  near  Fundao,  was  beaten  by  the  Portuguese  cavalry 
and  orderian9a,  with  a  loss  of  fifty  killed  or  taken,  and  the 
French  withdrew  from  Penamacor. 


AUGUST,  1810.]  BOOK  XI.  — CHAP.   5.  5 

On  the  side  of  Gallicia,  Kellerman  entered  Castro  Contrijo, 
and  part  of  Serras'  troops,  advancing  towards  Monterey,  or- 
dered provisions  for  ten  thousand  men  on  the  road  to  Bra- 
ganza.  Silveira  immediately  marched  against  Puebla  de 
Senabria,  drove  off  the  French  cavalry  and  invested  the  Swiss 
on  the  7th.  They  capitulated  on  the  10th  at  the  moment 
when  Serras,  who  had  so  carelessly  left  them  there,  was  com- 
ing to  their  relief:  five  hundred  men  and  an  eagle  were  thus 
captured.  Silveira  in  his  foolish  pride  would  then  have  given 
battle  to  the  French,  and  when  Beresford,  dreading  mischief, 
sent  him  imperative  orders  to  retreat,  he  obeyed  in  so  slovenly 
a  manner  as  to  abandon  his  rear-guard  under  J.  Wilson,  who 
nevertheless  saved  it  in  circumstances  of  such  trying  diffi- 
culty that  he  received  the  public  thanks  of  the  marshal.  This 
advantage  in  the  north  was  balanced  by  a  disaster  in  Estrema- 
dura.  The  Spanish  generals,  never  much  disposed  to  respect 
Wellington's  counsels,  were  now  discontented  by  the  fall  of 
Ciudad  Rodrigo.  He  had  pressed  upon  Romana  the  policy  of 
avoiding  battles,  had  obtained  Campo  Mayor  for  him  as  a 
place  of  arms,  with  leave  to  retire  there  when  over-matched  by 
the  enemy,  and  he  had  shown  him  that  Hill's  departure 
greatly  augmented  the  necessity  of  caution.  Romana,  despising 
this  counsel,  joined  Ballesteros,  and  their  united  forces  amounted 
to  eighteen  thousand  infantry  and  two  thousand  cavalry,  besides 
partidas.  Wellington  foreseeing  then  they  would  offer  battle, 
be  defeated,  and  thus  lay  open  the  Alemtejo,  ordered  Hill  to 
send  Madden's  Portuguese  cavalry  in  all  haste  to  their  succour, 
and  that  officer  reached  Campo  Mayor  the  14th,  but  he  was 
too  late;  Romana's  van-guard,  under  Mendizabel,  had  been 
defeated  at  Benvenida  by  Mortier  on  the  1 1th,  with  a  loss  of 
six  hundred  men,  and  was  going  to  surrender  when  Carrera 
coming  up  with  the  Spanish  cavalry  disengaged  it.  The  whole 
then  retreated  across  the  Morena  to  Monte  Molin  and  Fregenal, 
pursued  by  the  French,  who  slew  or  took  four  hundred :  the 
next  day  Mortier  entered  Zafra  and  Romana  retired  to  Almen- 
dralejos.  This  check  shook  the  defence  of  Portugal  to  its 
centre.  There  was  nothing  to  prevent  Mortier  penetrating  to 
the  lower  Tagus,  and  thus  drawing  Wellington  from  Beira, 
before  the  measures  for  laying  waste  the  country  were  ripe  for 


6  PENINSULA   WAR.  [AUGUST,  1810. 

execution.  But  a  counter-check  of  a  like  nature  arrested  Mor- 
tier.  Lacy,  sailing  from  Cadiz  under  the  convoy  of  captain 
Gockburn  of  the  British  navy,  landed  three  thousand  men  near 
Moguer,  and  drove  the  duke  of  Aremberg  towards  Seville 
while  Copons  drove  general  Kemondupon  Zalamea;  the  French 
indeed  rallied  and  forced  Lacy  to  re-embark,  but  on  the  first 
alarm  Mortier  was  recalled  to  the  Morena,  and  Komana  once 
more  occupied  Zafra.  This  affair  at  Moguer  was  contemptible 
in  itself,  yet  the  check  it  gave  to  Mortier's  progress,  and  a  very 
tumid  despatch  from  captain  Cockburn  gave  it  a  momentary 
celebrity. 

Massena  had  been  waiting  for  Mortier's  co-operation,  and  on 
the  day  the  latter  entered  Zafra  the  sixth  corps  formally  in- 
vested Almeida.  Wellington  immediately  brought  up  the  Por- 
tuguese army  to  Celorico,  Govea,  Melho,  and  Trancoso,  while 
the  British  troops  occupied  Pinhel,  Freixadas,  and  Guarda.  In 
these  positions,  expecting  a  vigorous  defence  from  Almeida, 
he  hoped  to  delay  the  enemy  for  two  months,  when  the  rainy 
season  would  give  him  farther  advantages  in  defence  of  the 
country.  His  original  intention  had  been  to  keep  the  light 
division  always  on  the  Cabe9a  Negro,  a  rugged  hill  overhang- 
ing the  bridge  of  the  Coa,  expecting  thus  to  keep  open  his 
communication  with  the  fortress,  or  to  make  the  French  invest 
the  place  with  their  whole  army.  Craufurd's  rashness  marred 
this  plan ;  and  his  despondency  after  the  action  on  the  24th, 
rendered  it  imprudent  to  renew  the  project.  Yet  Massena's 
tardiness  and  the  small  force  with  which  he  finally  invested  the 
place,  led  Wellington  again  to  think  of  assembling  secretly  a 
large  and  chosen  body  of  men  behind  the  Cabe9a  Negro,  with 
the  view  of  suddenly  forcing  the  bridge  and  the  fords  and 
taking  the  French  battering  train;  but  while  revolving  this 
great  stroke  in  his  mind  a  terrible  disaster  broke  his  measures. 


SIEGE   OF   ALMEIDA. 

This  fortress  was  garrisoned  by  four  thousand  Portuguese 
regulars  and  militia  under  the  English  colonel  Cox.  Although 
regularly  constructed  with  six  bastions,  ravelins,  an  excellent 


AUGUST,  1810.]  BOOK   XI.  — CHAP.   5  7 

ditch  and  covered  way,  it  was  extremely  defective.  The  ram- 
parts were  too  high  for  the  glacis,  and  from  some  near  ground 
the  bottom  of  the  ditch  might  be  seen.  An  old  square  castle, 
built  on  a  mound  in  the  centre  of  the  town,  contained  three 
bomb  proofs,  the  doors  of  which  were  not  secure,  and  with  the 
exception  of  some  damp  casemates  in  one  bastion,  there  was 
no  other  magazine  for  the  powder. 

On  the  18th,  ground  was  broke  under  cover  of  a  false 
attack,  and  in  the  morning  of  the  26th,  sixty-five  pieces  of 
artillery,  opening  at  once,  set  many  houses  in  flames,  which 
the  garrison  was  unable  to  extinguish.  The  counter-fire  was 
however  briskly  maintained  and  very  little  military  damage 
was  sustained.  Towards  evening  the  cannonade  slackened, 
but  just  after  dark  the  ground  suddenly  trembled,  the  castle 
bursting  into  a  thousand  pieces  gave  vent  to  a  column  of 
smoke  and  fire,  and  with  a  prodigious  noise  the  whole  town 
sunk  into  a  shapeless  ruin !  Treason  or  accident  had  caused 
the  magazines  to  explode,  and  the  devastation  was  incredible. 
The  ramparts  were  breached,  the  guns  thrown  into  the  ditch, 
five  hundred  people  were  struck  dead  on  the  instant,  and  only  six 
houses  were  left  standing :  the  stones  thrown  out  hurt  forty  of 
the  besiegers  in  the  trenches,  and  the  surviving  garrison, 
aghast  at  the  horrid  commotion,  disregarded  all  exhortations 
to  rally.  Cox  fearing  the  enemy  would  take  the  opportunity 
to  storm  tHe  ramparts,  beat  to  arms,  and  running  to  the  walls, 
with  the  help  of  an  artillery  officer,  fired  off  the  few  guns  that 
remained.  No  attack  was  made,  but  the  French  shells  fell 
thickly  all  the  night,  and  in  the  morning  of  the  27th,  two 
officers  appeared  at  the  gates,  bearing  a  letter  from  Massena 
with  an  offer  of  terms.  Further  resistance  was  impossible, 
but  the  governor,  thinking  if  he  could  impose  on  the  enemy 
for  two  days  the  army  might  succour  him,  was  in  the  act  of 
rejecting  the  offer,  when  a  mutiny,  openly  fomented  by  the 
lieutenant-governor  Bernardo  da  Costa,  privately  by  Josef 
Bareiros  the  chief  of  the  artillery,  who  had  corresponded 
secretly  with  the  French,  broke  out.  The  other  native  officers, 
disturbed  by  fear  or  swayed  by  the  influence  of  those  two, 
were  more  willing  to  follow  than  to  oppose  their  dishonourable 
proceedings,  and  Costa  expressed  his  resolution  to  hoist  the 


8  PENINSULA   WAR.  [AUGUST,  1810. 

white  flag'.  Cox,  unsupported  except  by  the  British  captain 
Hewit,  and  seeing  no  remedy  of  force,  endeavoured  to  pro- 
crastinate ;  he  was  ignorant  of  Bareiros'  proceedings,  and  sent 
him  with  counter-proposals  to  the  French  camp,  but  the  traitor 
immediately  informed  Massena  of  the  true  state  of  the  gar- 
rison and  never  returned;  the  place  then  capitulated;  the 
militia  to  return  to  their  homes,  the  regulars  to  remain  pri- 
loners  of  war. 

While  the  treaty  was  pending,  an,d  even  after  the  signature 
of  the  articles,  in  the  night  of  the  27th,  the  French  bom- 
barded the  place.  This  act  equally  unjustifiable  and  strange, 
because  Massena's  aide-de-camp,  colonel  Pelet,  was  actually 
within  the  walls  when  the  firing  commenced,  was  excused  on 
the  ground  of  an  error  in  the  transmission  of 
orders;  yet  it  lasted  during  the  whole  night,  and 
W.  Cox.  (jox  asserts  that  the  terms  of  the  capitulation  with 

Note^bygene-  regpect  to  the  militia  were  also  violated.  Pelet 
appended  to  indignantly  denies  this  charge.  He  says  the  garri- 
•Victoh-es  et  son  seemg  tne  marquis  of  Alorna,  their  country- 
Conquetes  man,  amongst  the  French  generals,  offered  for  the 
9ais.Fri  most  Part  t°  serve,  and  this  version  is  corrobo- 

Mr.  Stuart's  rated  by  two  facts.  The  24th  Portuguese  regiment 
certaiuly  took  service  with  the  French  in  a  body, 
and  Massena  released  the  Arganil  regiment  of 
militia  who  refused  to  do  so.  Yet,  so  easily  are  men's  minds 
moved  by  present  circumstances,  that  the  greater  number 
deserted  again  when  they  saw  the  allied  armies.  Bareiros 
joined  the  enemy  and  escaped  punishment;  Da  Costa  was, 
long  afterwards,  shot  by  order  of  marshal  Beresford,  and  his 
cowardice  and  mutiny  merited  death ;  yet  the  only  evidence 
produced  against  him  was  an  explanatory  letter,  written  to 
lord  Liverpool  by  Cox  while  a  prisoner  at  Verdun.  The 
explosion,  the  disappearance  of  the  steeple  and  cessation  of 
fire,  proclaimed  the  fall  of  Almeida  in  the  allied  camp ;  but 
the  surrender  was  first  ascertained  by  Wellington  on 
the  29th,  when,  with  a  telescope,  he  observed  many  French 
officers  on  the  glacis  of  the  place.  Then  he  withdrew  to 
his  former  position  behind  the  Mondego;  and  while  this 
happened  on  the  Coa,  the  powder  magazine  in  Albuquerque, 


.  1810.]  BOOK  XI.— CHAP.  5.  9 

Struck  with  lightning,  also  exploded  and  killed  four  hundred 
men. 

Reynier  now  made  demonstrations  towards  Castello  Branco, 
in  one  of  which  he  lost  a  squadron  of  horse;  but  the  1st  of 
September  he  suddenly  entered  Sabugal,  and  the  British 
piquets  on  the  Pinhel  river  were  driven  in  the  following  day 
by  Ney.  Massena's  plans  then  seemed  ripe  for  execution,  and 
Wellington,  transferring  head-quarters  to  Govea,  withdrew  his 
infantry  behind  Celorico,  leaving  the  cavalry  in  front  of  that 
place  with  posts  of  observation  on  the  flanks,  at  Guarda  and 
Trancoso:  but  Reynier  returned  to  Zarza  Mayor,  and  throwing 
a  bridge  over  the  Tagus  at  Alcantara  again  involved  the  French 
projects  in  obscurity. 

Massena,  chilled  by  age  and  honours,  was  wasting  time. 
He  found  it  difficult  to  feed  his  troops,  was  disinclined  to 
invade  so  late  in  the  year,  and  undecided  as  to  the  mode,  for 
his  knowledge  of  the  country  was  derived  entirely  from 
Alorna  and  Pamplona.  It  was  two  months  since  Ciudad 
Rodrigo  fell,  Almeida  had  only  resisted  ten  days,  yet  the 
French  army  was  still  behind  the  Coa;  and  a  second  inter- 
cepted letter,  dictated  by  Napoleon  in  September,  indicated 
his  fear  of  further  inaction :  (  Lord  Wellington,'  he  observed 
to  Massena,  '  has  only  eighteen  thousand  men,  Hill  has  only 
six  thousand ;  it  would  be  ridiculous  to  suppose  that  twenty- 
five  thousand  English  can  balance  sixty  thousand  French,  if 
the  latter  do  not  trifle,  but  fall  boldly  on  after  having  well 
observed  where  the  blow  may  be  given.  You  have  twelve  thou- 
sand cavalry,  and  four  times  as  much  artillery  as  is  necessary 
for  Portugal.  Leave  six  thousand  cavalry  and  a  proportion 
of  guns  between  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  Alcantara,  and  Salamanca, 
and  with  the  rest  commence  operations.  The  emperor  is  too 
distant,  and  the  positions  of  the  enemy  change  too  often  to 
direct  how  you  should  attack ;  but  it  is  certain  the  utmost 
force  the  English  can  muster,  including  the  troops  at  Cadiz, 
will  be  twenty-eight  thousand  men.'  This  letter  was  accurate 
as  to  the  numbers  of  the  English  army,  but  Napoleon  was 
ignorant  how  strongly  Wellington  had  secured  Portugal  in  the 
rear ;  and  before  his  letter  arrived,  Massena  had  commenced 
the  invasion.  A  remarkable  event  in  the  world's  history  it 


10  PENINSULA    WAR.  [SEPT    1810. 

proved,  and  it  is  essential  to  a  clear  understanding  of  the 
operations  which  followed  to  describe  the  country  in  which 
they  were  conducted. 

It  has  been  shown  that  the  advanced  positions  of  the  allies 
extended  from   Almeida  across   the  Sierra  de  Estrella,  by 
Guarda,    to   Fundao,    Sarzedas,    and    Castello    Branco,   thus 
guarding  at  each  side  of  the  Estrella  the  two  great  entrances 
to  Portugal  by  the  Beira  frontier.     A  serious  attack  at  either 
side  was  to  be  the  signal  for  a  gradual  concentric  retreat  of. 
the  army  towards  Lisbon.      Guarda,  the  connecting  point, 
was  however  to  be  held  to  the  last  moment;  because  from 
thence   the  enemy   could,   while    menacing   Celorico,   move 
secretly  by  Belmonte  and  Covilhao  between  Hill  and  Welling- 
ton, whose  distance  from  each  other  was  double  that  of  such  a 
march.     It  was  to  balance  this  disadvantage,  the  Covilhao 
road  had  been  broken  up,  and  a  brigade  from  Hill's  corps 
stationed  at  Fundao.     Two  entrenched  positions  also  were 
formed,  between  which  Leith's  reserve  was  placed.     The  first 
behind  the  Zezere  extending  from  its  confluence  with  the 
Tagus  to  the  Barca  de  Codies.     The  second  behind  the  Alva, 
a  stream  descending  from  the  Estrella,  and  falling  into  the 
Mondego  a  few  miles  above  Coimbra.     Both  positions  were 
strong,  the  covering  rivers  deep,  swift,  and  difficult  of  access, 
and  the  Alva  was  hugged  on  the  left  bank  by  the  rugged 
Sierra   de   Murcella.     During   the   spring   and   summer  the 
militia  destined  to  reinforce  Leith  on  the  Zezere  had  been 
kept  in  winter  quarters,  because  money  could  not  be  obtained 
from   the   English   ministers  to   bring   them  into   the   field 
until  the  last  moment:   they  were  now  however  placed   in 
second  line  to  support  Hill,  who  could  fall  back  on  the  Zezere 
from  Sarzedas,  and  gain  the  Alva  by  the  military  road  of 
Espinal. 

It  has  been  shown  that  from  Celorico  to  the  Alva,  sixty 
miles,  the  road  is  a  long  defile  between  the  Sierra  Estrella 
and  the  Mondego ;  the  ridge  upon  which  Celorico  stands, 
being  a  shoot  from  the  Estrella,  closes  this  defile  at  one  end 
and  is  covered  by  the  Mondego ;  the  Sierra  Murcella  covered 
by  the  Alva  closes  it  at  the  other  end.  The  principal  road 
leading  through  this  defile  had  been  repaired  and  joined  to 


SEPT.  1810.]  BOOK  XL  — CHAP.   5.  11 

the  military  road  of  Espinal,  having  a  branch  also  carried 
across  the  Mondego  to  Coimbra,  and  thus  an  internal  com- 
munication was  established  for  the  junction  of  all  the  corps. 
Between  Celorico  and  the  Alva,  the  country  was  not  per- 
manently tenable,  because  from  Guarda  and  Covilhao  roads 
led  over  the  Estrella  to  Gouvea,  Cea,  and  Gallices,  in  rear 
of  Celorico ;  and  the  enemy  could  also  turn  the  whole  tract  by 
moving  through  Trancoso  and  Viseu,  and  so  down  the  right 
bank  of  the  Mondego  to  Coimbra.  But  while  the  head  of  the 
army  was  one  march  behind  Celorico,  in  observation  of  the 
flanking  routes  over  the  Estrella,  and  the  rear  close  to  the 
Alva,  the  line  was  safe ;  and  as  the  Mondego  was  fordable  in 
summer,  and  bridged  at  several  places,  it  could  be  passed  in  a 
few  hours  to  meet  the  enemy  on  the  right  bank,  where  the  road, 
the  worst  in  Portugal,  was  crossed  by  several  deep  streams,  as 
the  Criz  and  Dao,  and  was  a  long  defile  between  the  Mon- 
dego and  the  Sierra  de  Alcoba  or  Caramula:  there  also  a 
transverse  ridge,  called  the  Sierra  de  Busaco,  seemingly  a 
prolongation  of  the  Murcella,  barred  the  way  to  Coimbra. 
The  Caramula  extending  from  the  Douro  to  Coimbra  sepa- 
rated the  Mondego  valley  from  the  coast  line;  but  it  had 
breaks,  and  one  near  Viseu  by  which  the  French  could  gain 
the  royal  road  from  Oporto,  and  so  reaching  Coimbra,  turn 
Busaco :  in  this  system  the  weakest  point  was  Guarda,  and 
the  mass  of  the  allied  force  was  kept  on  that  side  with  a 
cavalry  post  in  the  town. 

Massena,  ill-acquainted  with  the  military  features  of  Por- 
tugal, was  absolutely  ignorant  of  the  lines  of  Torres  Vedras. 
So  circumspectly  had  those  works  been  carried  on,  that  only 
vague  rumours  of  their  existence  reached  the  bulk  of  the 
English  army;  neither  the  Portuguese  government,  nor  the 
British  envoy,  although  aware  great  defensive  works  were 
constructing,  knew  their  nature :  they  imagined  the  entrench- 
ments immediately  round  Lisbon  were  the  lines!  Many 
British  officers  laughed  at  the  notion  of  remaining  in  Por- 
tugal j  the  major  part  supposed  the  campaign  on  the  frontier 
to  be  only  a  decent  cloak  to  cover  the  shame  of  an  embarka- 
tion. In  England  the  opposition  asserted  that  Wellington 
would  embark ;  the  Portuguese  dreaded  it,  the  French  army 


12  PEWlNStJLA   WAR.  [SEPT-  18 1C 

universally  believed  it;  and  the  English  ministers  entertained 
the  same  opinion;  for  at  this  time  an  officer  of  engineers 
arrived  at  Lisbon,  whose  instructions,  received  personally 
from  lord  Liverpool,  were  unknown  to  Wellington,  and  com- 
menced thus  : — '  As  it  is  probable  the  army  will  embark  in 
September.' 


OPERATIONS 
on  tlie 

MOKB3E  <& 
1810o 


avalry 


<-'      0 

Perm,  Ctivtt 


Covnbra 


BATTLE    OF 

BU  SAC  CD. 


SEPT.  1810. J  BOOK   XL  — CHAP.   6. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THIRD    INVASION   OF    PORTUGAL. 

MASSENA'S  command  extended  from  the  banks  of  the  Tagus 
to  the  Bay  of  Biscay,  from  Almeida  to  Burgos.  His  troops 
under  arms  exceeded  one  hundred  and  ten  thousand  men ;  but 
thirteen  thousand  were  in  the  Asturias  and  the  province  of 
Santander;  four  thousand  in  the  government  of  Valladolid; 
eight  thousand  under  Serras,  at  Zamora  and  Benevente;  nine- 
teen thousand  under  Drouet  at  Bayonne.  This  last  named 
body  entered  Spain  in  August  as  the  ninth  corps,  but  though 
replaced  at  Bayonne  by  another  reserve  under  Caffarelli,  it  did 
not  join  Massena  until  long  afterwards;  his  efficient  troops 
were  not  more  than  seventy  thousand,  and  as  every  man, 
combatant  or  non-combatant,  is  borne  on  the  strength  of  a 
French  army,  only  fifty-five  thousand  bayonets  and  eight 
thousand  sabre-men  were  with  the  eagles.  The  ninth  corps 
had  however  orders  to  follow  his  march,  and  the  void  thus 
made  at  Burgos  and  Valladolid  was  filled  by  sixteen  thousand 
of  the  young  guard.  This  arrangement  shows  how  absurdly 
Napoleon  has  been  called  a  rash  warrior,  never  thinking  of 
retreat;  no  man  ever  made  bolder  marches,  yet  no  man 
secured  his  base  with  more  care.  Here,  he  would  not  suffer 
any  advance  to  fresh  conquests  until  his  line  of  communica- 
tion  had  been  strengthened  with  three  additional  fortresses, — 
namely,  Astorga,  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  and  Almeida;  and  while 
he  employed  sixty-five  thousand  men  in  the  invasion  of  Por- 
tugal, he  kept  more  than  eighty  thousand  in  reserve.  The 
total  loss  of  the  army  destined  to  make  what  is  technically 
termed  'a  point'  upon  Lisbon,  would,  as  a  mere  military 
disaster,  have  scarcely  shaken  his  hold  of  Spain. 

Massena's   instructions   were,  to  convert  Ciudad  Rodriga 


!4  PENINSULA    WAR  [SEPT.  1810. 

and  Almeida  into  places  of  arms,  and  move  on  both  sides  of 
the  Tagus  against  Lisbon  in  the  beginning  of  September. 
But  thinking  his  force  too  weak  to  act  upon  two  lines  at 
the  same  time,  or  trusting  to  the  co-operation  of  Soult,  he 
Relinquished  the  Alemtejo,  and  looked  only  to  the  northern 
bank  of  the  Tagus;  and  as  Junot's  march  in  1807  warned  him 
off  the  Sobreira  mountains,  his  views  were  confined  to  the 
three  roads  of  Belmonte,  Celorico,  and  Viseu.  The  strength 
of  the  position  behind  the  Alva  river  was  known  to  him,  as 
were  also  the  impediments  to  his  descent  from  Covilhao  upon 
Espinhal;  but  Alorna,  Pamplona,  and  the  other  Portuguese 
in  the  French  camp  asserted  with  singular  ignorance,  that 

the  road  by  Viseu  to  Coimbra  along  the  right 

Note  by  * 

general  bank  of  the  Mondego  was  easy,  and  no  important 

position  covered  the  latter  town.  The  French 
general  thus  deceived,  resolved  suddenly  to  assemble  all  his 
forces,  distribute  thirteen  days'  bread,  and  rush  in  one  mass 
down  the  right  of  the  Mondego,  not  doubting  to  reach 
Coimbra  before  Hill  could  join  lord  Wellington.  In  this 
view,  the  three  corps  were  directed  te  concentrate  on  the  16th 
of  September;  Reynier's  at  Guarda,  Ney's  and  the  heavy 
cavalry  at  Ma^al  de  Chao,  Junot's  at  Pinhel.  By  this  dispo- 
sition all  three  roads  were  menaced,  and  the  allies  kept  in 
suspense  as  to  the  ultimate  object;  Massena  thus  hoped  to 
gain  one  march,  a  great  thing,  seeing  that  from  Coimbra  he 
was  not  more  than  a  hundred  miles,  whereas  Hill's  distance 
from  that  town  was  greater.  To  cover  his  real  project  and  to 
keep  Hill  as  long  as  possible  at  Sarzedas,  he  caused  the  town 
of  Guarda  to  be  seized  on  the  12th,  by  a  detachment,  which 
however  withdrew  again  as  if  it  were  only  a  continuation  of 
former  feints:  meanwhile  Reynier,  having  ascertained  that 
Mortier  was  at  Monasterio,  menacing  Estremadura,  destroyed 
his  boat-bridge  at  Alcantara,  and  marched  rapidly  towards 
Sabugal. 

On  the  13th  the  allies  re-established  their  post  at  Guarda. 
On  the  15th,  it  was  again  driven  away  by  a  considerable  mass 
of  the  enemy  and  retired  up  the  side  of  the  Estrella;  the 
cavalry  in  front  of  Celorico  was  also  forced  back  in  the  centre, 
and  the  post  at  Trancoso  chased  towards  Mongualde  on  the 
left.  "Wellington  then  felt  assured  the  invasion  was  in  serious 


SEPT.  1810.]  BOOK   XI.  — CHAP.   6.  15 

progress,  and  having  ascertained  that  the  troops  in  Guarda 
were  of  Reynier's  corps,  despatched  his  final  orders  for  Hill 
and  Leith  to  concentrate  on  the  Alva.  On  the  16th,  Reynier 
descended  from  Guarda  to  the  low  parts  bordering  the  Mon- 
dego,  where  he  was  joined  by  Ney's  corps  and  Montbrun's- 
cavalry,  and  the  whole  passed  the  river.  Pushing  through 
Celorico  their  horsemen  drove  back  the  cavalry  posts  of  the 
allies  to  the  village  of  Cortico,  but  the  first  German  hussars 
turned  there  and  charged  the  leading  squadrons  making  some 
prisoners.  The  road  divaricated  to  Fornos  on  the  right,  to 
Gouvea  on  the  left,  and  a  French  brigade  advanced  along  the 
latter  to  cover  the  march  of  the  main  body  towards  Fornos, 
but  this  feint  was  soon  discovered;  for  there  is  a  custom, 
peculiar  to  the  British  army,  of  sending  mounted  officers, 
good  riders,  singly  to  observe  the  enemy's  motions ;  they  will 
penetrate  through  the  midst  of  his  cantonments,  cross  the 
line  of  his  movement,  and  hover  almost  within  musket-shot 
on  the  skirts  of  his  columns  to  learn  his  numbers  and  the 
true  direction  of  his  march.  Colonel  Waters,  one  of  these 
exploring  officers,  being  on  the  left  of  Reynier's  troops  this 
day,  soon  noticed  the  movement  on  Fornos  and  following  with 
some  German  cavalry,  made  several  prisoners  and  took  the 
baggage  of  a  general.  The  French  operations  being  thus 
opened,  Wellington  made  the  first,  third,  and  fourth  divisions 
march  towards  the  Alva,  withdrew  the  heavy  cavalry  from 
the  front,  and  placed  the  light  division  at  St.  Romao  in  the 
Estrella,  to  cover  the  head-quarters,  which  were  transferred 
that  night  to  Cea. 

The  17th,  the  second  and  sixth  corps  passed  the  bridge. of 
Fornos,  and  the  advanced  guard  approached  Mongualde.  The 
eighth  corps  kept  on  the  road  leading  towards  Oporto,  to 
observe  ten  thousand  of  the  northern  militia  who  under  the 
command  of  Trant,  J.  Wilson,  and  Miller,  were  collected  to 
harass  Massena's  right  flank  and  rear.  Trant  was  already  at 
Moimenta  de  Beira  in  the  defiles  leading  through  the  hills  to 
Lamego,  the  ordenanga  were  all  in  arms,  the  country  on  both 
sides  of  the  Mondego  laid  waste,  the  mills  destroyed,  and  the 
Helpless  part  of  the  population  hidden  amongst  the  highest 
mountains. 

On  the    18th,   the   French   advanced   2'uard   reached   the 


16  PENINSULA   WAR.  [SEPT.  1810. 

deserted  city  of  Viseu,  and  Pack's  Portuguese  brigade  was 
sent  across  the  Mondego  at  Fosdao  to  the  Criz,  while  general 
Pakenham  entered  Coimbra  with  a  brigade  of  the  first  division. 
On  the  19th,  captain  Somers  Cocks,  a  gallant  and  zealous 
officer,  who  commanded  the  cavalry  post  driven  from  Guarda, 
came  down  from  the  Estrella,  and  following  the  enemy 
through  Celorico  ascertained  that  neither  sick  men  nor  stores 
were  left  behind:  hence  it  was  evident  that  Massena,  re- 
linquishing his  communications,  had  thrown  his  cavalry, 
infantry,  artillery,  pares,  baggage  and  hospital  waggons,  in 
one  mass  upon  the  worst  road  in  Portugal ! 

Wellington  was  in  motion  to  cross  the  Mondego,  when  a 
false  report  that  the  enemy  was  again  on  the  left  bank  arrested 
the  movement.  The  next  day  the  truth  became  known,  and 
the  third,  fourth,  and  light  divisions,  and  the  British  cavalry, 
passed  the  river  at  Pena  Cova,  Olivarez,  and  other  places. 
The  light  division  marched  to  Mortagao  in  support  of  Pack, 
the  third  and  fourth  entered  the  villages  between  the  Sierra 
de  Busaco  and  Mortagao,  the  horsemen  occupied  a  plain 
between  the  light  division  and  Pack's  brigade.  But  now  the 
eighth  corps  pointed  towards  the  valley  of  the  Vouga,  and 
thus  rendered  it  doubtful  whether  Massena  would  not  that 
way  gain  the  main  road  from  Oporto  to  Coimbra.  Spencer 
moved  therefore  with  the  first  division  upon  Milheada,  and 
Trant  was  directed  to  join  him  by  a  march  through  San 
Pedro  de  Sul  and  Sardao.  Meanwhile  Leith  arrived  on  the 
Alva,  and  Hill  was  only  one  march  behind;  for  having  dis- 
covered Reynier's  movements  on  the  12th,  and  hearing  that 
the  French  boats  on  the  Tagus  had  been  destroyed,  he  with 
ready  decision,  anticipating  orders,  sent  his  artillery  by 
Thomar,  and  marching  rapidly  with  his  troops  by  the  military 
way  reached  Espinal  the  evening  of  the  20th:  there  he  was 
joined  by  general  Lecor,  who  with  equal  vigour  and  judg- 
ment had  brought  the  Portuguese  brigade  by  long  marches 
from  Fundao.  The  21st,  Hill  reached  the  Alva  and  pushed 
his  cavalry  in  observation  beyond  that  river;  thus  the  whole 
of  the  allied  army  was  united  on  the  very  day  the  main  body 
of  the  enemy  entered  Viseu:  the  French  horsemen  were 
indeed  on  the  Criz,  but  the  bridges  had  been  destroyed  by 
Pack,  and  the  project  of  surprising  Coimbra  was  baffled. 


SEPT.  1810.]  BOOK  XL  — CHAP.   ft.  17 

Nor  had  Massena  escaped  other  evil  consequences  from  his 
false  movement.  Forced  to  repair  the  road  from  day  to  day 
for  his  artillery  it  was  twenty  miles  from  Viseu  on  the 
19th,  and  Trant  formed  the  hardy  project  of  destroying  it. 
Quitting  Moimenta  de  Beira  in  the  night  with  a  squadron  of 
cavalry,  two  thousand  militia  and  five  guns,  he  passed  between 
the  convoy  and  the  army,  and  on  the  20th  surprised  a  patrole 
of  ten  men,  from  whom  he  learned  that  the  guns  were  close 
at  hand  and  Montbrun's  cavalry  in  their  rear.  The  enter- 
prise was  serious,  but  the  defiles  were  narrow,  and  charging 
the  head  of  the  escorting  troops  he  took  a  hundred  prisoners 
with  some  baggage.  The  convoy  fell  back,  Trant  followed, 
and  such  was  the  rtiggedness  of  the  defile  that  Montbrun's 
cavalry  could  never  get  to  the  front.  The  French  were  in 
disorder,  and  a  resolute  attack  would  have  ruined  them,  when 
the  militia  became  alarmed  and  unmanageable;  the  enemy 
then  repulsed  the  Portuguese  horsemen  with  a  loss  of  twelve 
troopers,  and  Trant  seeing  nothing  more  could  be  effected 
returned  to  Moimenta  de  Beira  and  from  thence  marched  to 
Lamego  with  his  prisoners.  Montbrun,  ignorant  of  the 
number  and  quality  of  the  assailants,  fell  back,  and  the  artil- 
lery did  not  reach  Viseu  until  the  23rd,  whereby  Massena  lost 
two  most  important  days. 

While  these  events  were  passing  in  the  valley  of  the  Mon- 
dego,  a  small  expedition  from  Cadiz  again  landed  at  Moguer 
to  aid  Copons  in  collecting  provisions  on  the  Tinto ;  it  was 
however  quickly  obliged  to  reimbark,  and  Copons  was  defeated 
by  general  Remond  with  the  loss  of  three  hundred  men  on 
the  15th.  Meanwhile  Romana  attacked  the  French  posts 
near  Monasterio  and  pushed  his  cavalry  towards  Seville, 
whereupon  Soult  sent  Mortier  against  him,  and  he  was  beaten 
at  Fuente  de  Cantos  on  the  same  day  that  Copons  had  been 
defeated  on  the  Tinto.  The  pursuit  was  continued  to  Fuente 
del  Maestre,  and  the  whole  army  was  like  to  disperse  in 
flight,  when  Madden's  Portuguese  cavalry  coming  up  charged 
the  pursuers  with  signal  gallantry,  overthrew  the  leading 
squadrons,  recovered  some  prisoners,  and  gained  time  for  the 
Spaniards  to  rally.  Nevertheless,  the  French  entered  Zafra, 
and  Romana  retreated  by  Almendralejo  and  Merida  to  Mon- 

VOL.  in.  .c 


18  PENINSULA  WAR.  [SEPT.  mo. 

tijo  on  the  18th,  throwing  as  he  passed  a  garrison  into 
Oiivenza  and  three  battalions  into  Badajos,  which  was  how- 
ever so  little  able  to  resist  that  he  sent  the  junta  to  Valencia 
de  Alcantara  and  took  refuge  himself  under  the  guns  of  Elvas. 
Wellington's  anticipations  were  thus  realized  and  the  Alem- 
tejo  laid  open.  Fortunately  Sebastiani  was  at  this  moment 
near  Carthagena  in  pursuit  of  the  Murcian  army,  and  a  fresh 
insurrection  had  broken  out  in  the  Grenada  mountains,  where 
the  French  posts  of  Motril  and  Almunecar  were  taken. 
Copons  also  advanced  to  the  Tinto,  and  these  events  falling 
at  one  time  prevented  Soult  from  sending  more  than  twelve 
thousand  men  to  Estremadura;  a  force  inadequate  to  the 
invasion  of  the  Alemtejo,  because  several  British  regiments 
withdrawn  from  Cadiz,  and  others  coming  from  England, 
reached  Lisbon  about  this  period,  and  formed  a  reserve  of 
more  than  five  thousand  good  troops.  Wherefore 'the  French, 
who  were  suffering  from  sickness,  returned  to  Ronquillo, 
the  Spaniards  again  advanced  to  Xeres  de  los  Cavalleros  and 
Aracena,  and  this  dangerous  crisis  glided  gently  away.  But 
to  understand  its  importance,  it  is  necessary  to  show  how 
increasing  political  embarrassments  had  thwarted  the  original 
plan  of  the  English  general. 

Although  the  first  vexatious  interference  of  the  Souza  fac- 
tion had  been  checked,  the  loss  of  Almeid?  furnished  a  favour- 
able opportunity  to  renew  their  clamorous  hostility  to  the 
military  proceedings.     Falsely  asserting  that  the 
Pr°visions  of  that  fortress  had  been  carried  away 
by  the  English  commissaries,  and  as  falsely  pre- 
tending that  Wellington  had  promised  to  raise  the  siege,  this 
party  hypocritically  assumed,  that  his  expressions 

fa^VoJfiL*  °^  sorrow  f°r  its  feU  were  assurances  of  an 
intention  to  remove  by  a  splendid  victory  the 

public  despondency.  They  insisted  therefore  that  the  frontier 
should  be  defended,  inveighed  against  the  destruc- 

Mr  Stuart's 

Papers,  MSS.  *^on  °^  *ne  mills>  endeavoured  to  force  their  own 
fidalgo  faction  on  to  the  staff  of  Beresford,  to 
embarrass  the  operations,  and  even  proposed  to  have  the 
fleet  and  transports  sent  away  from  the  Tagus !  But,  neglecting 
or  delaying  the  measures  agreed  upon  for  laying  waste  the 


SEPT.  1810.]  BOOK   XI.  — CHAP.    6.  19 

country,  they  protected  the  minor  authorities  when  disobedient, 
refrained  from  punishing  delinquents,  and  took  every  occasion 
to  mislead  the  public  mind  when  the  enemy  commenced  the 
invasion.  Nor  was  there  wanting  either  accident  or  indis- 
cretion to  increase  the  growing  confusion. 

When  Almeida  fell,  an  officer  of  the  guards,  writing  to  a 
friend  at  Oporto,  indiscreetly  declared  that  Massena  was 
advancing  in  front  with  a  hundred  thousand  men,  and  eighty 
thousand  more  were  moving  in  rear  of  the  allies  upon  Lisbon. 
This  letter  was  made  public,  and  created  such  a  panic  amongst 
the  English  merchants  at  Oporto  that  one  and  all  applied  for 
ships  to  carry  their  families  and  property  away ;  and  such  a 
tumult  ensued,  that  Trant,  who  was  still  governor,  had  to  quit 
the  field  to  suppress  the  commotion.  To  dry  up  this  spring 
of  mischief  Wellington  announced  in  general  orders  that  he 
would  not  even  seek  for  the  authors  of  that  and  similar  letters, 
being  assured  their  sense  and  feeling  would  prevent  a  continu- 
ance of  such  pernicious  correspondence.  This  appeal  had  a 
good  effect. 

To  the  regency  he  addressed  a  more  peremptory  rebuke. 
Reproving  them  for  the  false  colouring  given  to  his  communi- 
cations, he  declared,  '  he  would  never  permit  public  clamour 
and  panic  to  induce  him  to  change  in  the  smallest  degree  a  sys- 
tem and  plan  of  operation  which  he  had  adopted  after  mature 
consideration,  and  which  daily  experience  proved  to  be  the  only 
one  likely  to  produce  a  good  end/  This  only  increased  the 
virulence  of  his  opponents,  and  before  he  reached  Busaco,  he 
was  forced  to  tell  them,  '  their  miserable  intrigues  must  cease 
or  he  would  advise  his  own  government  to  withdraw  the  British 
army.'  These  factious  proceedings  had  however  been  so  mis- 
chievously successful,  that  the  country  between  the  Mondego 
the  Tagus  and  the  Lines,  still  contained  provisions  sufficient 
for  the  French  during  the  ensuing  winter;  and  between  fighting 
the  invaders  on  the  Mondego,  or  wasting  the  country  by  force 
as  he  retreated,  the  English  general  had  then  to  choose.  But 
what  an  act  the  last !  Final  success  depended  on  the  moral 
strength  he  could  call  forth,  and  he  would  have  had  to  retire 
with  a  mixed  force,  his  rear-guard  engaged  daily  with  a 
powerful  army,  his  advanced  guard  driving  unhappy  multitudes 

G'2 


20  PENINSULA  WAR.  [SEPT.  1810. 

before  it  to  the  capital,  where  no  preparation  was  made  to  save 
them  from  famine ;  but  where  a  violent  powerful  faction  was 
ready  to  misrepresent  every  proceeding  and  inflame  the  people's 
minds.  And  this  when  the  court  of  Rio  Janeiro  was  discon- 
tented, and  the  English  ministers  were  panic-stricken  by  the 
desponding  letters  of  general  officers  immediately  about  the 
head-quarters  of  the  commander-in-chief !  It  was  necessary 
therefore  to  fight,  although  the  French  marshal  had  sixty-five 
thousand  veterans,  and  only  fifty  thousand  troops,  half  of  them 
untried,  could  be  opposed  to  him.  It  was  necessary  to  fight, 
though  the  battle  was  not  to  be  estimated  by  the  result  of  the 
fighting.  Massena  might  by  victory  gain  everything;  a 
defeat  would  scarcely  hurt  him ;  a  serious  check  might  send 
him  from  Coimbra  to  Oporto,  where  he  would  be  more  for- 
midable,— where  he  could  feed  and  be  strongly  reinforced. 
But  the  English  general's  resources  could  not  be  much  im- 
proved ;  and  he  could  scarcely  expect  that  England  or  Portugal 
would  endure  a  war  without  any  palpable  advantage  to  balance 
the  misery  and  expense. 

While  Massena  remained  at  Viseu,  Spencer  held  Milheada 
with  the  first  division,  observing  the  great  road  from  Oporto; 
the  light  division  was  at  Mortagao,  watching  the  road  from 
Viseu ;  the  remainder  of  the  army  was  in  reserve  ready  to  move 
to  either  side.  But  when  the  French  advanced  guard  repaired 
the  bridges  over  the  Criz  and  passed  that  river,  the  first  divi- 
sion was  recalled,  and  the  Sierra  de  Busaco  chosen  for  the 
position  of  battle.  This  mountain,  eight  miles  in  length, 
abuts  with  its  right  on  the  Mondego,  while  its  left  is  connected 
with  the  Sierra  de  Caramula  by  a  rugged  country  impervious 
to  the  march  of  an  army.  A  road  along  the  crest  afforded  an 
easy  communication  from  right  to  left ;  and  behind  the  ridge 
on  the  right,  the  ford  of  Pena  Cova  furnished  a  passage  over 
the  Mondego  to  the  Alva.  The  face  of  Busaco  was  steep, 
rough,  and  fit  for  defence ;  the  artillery  of  the  allies,  placed  on 
certain  salient  points  could  play  along  the  front,  and  there  was 
some  ground  on  the  summit  suitable  for  a  small  body  of  cavalry. 
But  neither  guns  nor  horsemen  on  the  French  side  had  a  field, 
and  their  infantry  were  to  contend  with  every  difficulty  of 
approach  and  attack. 


SEPT.  1810.]  BOOK   XL  — CHAP.   6.  21 

After  passing  the  Criz,  a  table-land  permitted  Massena  to 
march  with  a  wide  order  of  battle  to  Mortagao;  but  from 
thence,  a  succession  of  ridges  led  to  the  Sierra  Busaco,  which 
was  separated  from  the  last  by  a  chasm,  so  profound  the  naked 
eye  could  hardly  distinguish  the  movement  of  troops  in  the 
bottom,  yet  in  parts  so  narrow  that  twelve- pounders  could 
range  across.  From  Mortagao  four  roads  conducted  to  Coim- 
bra.  The  first,  unfrequented  and  narrow,  crossed  the  Caramula 
to  Boyalva,  a  village  situated  on  the  western  slope  of  that  sierra, 
and  from  thence  led  to  Sardao  and  Milheada.  The  other 
roads,  penetrating  through  the  rough  ground  in  front,  passed 
over  the  Sierra  de  Busaco ;  one  by  a  large  convent,  fronting 
the  enemy's  right,  and  on  the  highest  point ;  another  on  his 
left,  by  a  village  called  St.  Antonio  de  Cantara;  the  third,  a 
branch  from  the  second,  being  still  more  to  his  left,  followed 
the  Mondego  to  Pena  Coya.  When  this  formidable  position  was 
chosen,  some  officers  expressed  their  fears  that  Massena  would 
not  assail  it.  '  But  if  he  does,  I  shall  beat  him,'  was  the  reply 
of  the  English  general.  He  was  however  well  assured  the 
prince,  whose  advanced  guard  was  already  over  the  Criz,  would 
attack.  The  second  and  sixth  corps  were  massed  behind  that 
stream,  and  Massena  was  not  likely,  merely  at  the  sight  of  a 
strong  position,  to  make  a  retrograde  movement  and  adopt  a 
new  line  of  operations  by  the  Vouga,  which  would  be  exposed 
to  Bacceilar's  militia :  he  was  indeed  anxious  for  a  battle,  but 
being  still  misled  by  Alorna  and  Pamplona  as  to  the  topo- 
graphy, was  convinced  Wellington  would  retreat  and  embark. 


PENINSULA   WAR.  fSEpT.  1810. 


CHAPTER  VII. 


GENERAL  PACK  having  destroyed  the  bridges  on  the  Criz  fell 
back  on  the  light  division,  but  the  French  restored  them  the 
23rd  and  drove  the  British  cavalry  into  the  hills  behind 
Mortagao.  Six  or  seven  squadrons  were  retained  there,  the 
rest  went  to  the  low  country  about  Milheada,  from  whence 
Spencer  was  recalled  to  Busaco ;  Picton  and  Cole  also  took  post 
on  that  position,  the  former  at  St.  Antonio  de  Cantara,  the 
latter  at  the  convent.  The  light  division  encamped  in  a  pine 
wood,  where  happened  one  of  those  extraordinary  panics  attri- 
buted in  ancient  times  to  the  influence  of  a  god.  No  enemy 
was  near,  no  alarm  given,  yet  suddenly  the  troops,  as  if  seized 
with  a  frenzy,  started  from  sleep  and  dispersed  in  every 
direction ;  nor  was  there  any  possibility  of  allaying  this  strange 
terror  until  some  persons  called  out  that  the  enemy's  cavalry 
were  amongst  them,  when  the  soldiers  mechanically  run 
together,  and  the  illusion  was  dissipated.  On  the  24th  the 
French  skirmished  with  the  piquets,  the  division  retired 
leisurely  to  some  strong  ground  four  miles  in  the  rear,  and 
towards  evening  some  French  cavalry,  venturing  too  close,  were 
charged  by  a  squadron  of  the  14th  and  lost  thirty  men. 

Next  morning  Craufurd  moved  to  the  low  ground  in  front 
and  seemed  disposed  to  renew  the  fault  of  the  Coa.  The  French 
cavalry  were  gathering  thickly,  and  three  columns  of  infantry 
were  descried  on  the  table-land  above  Mortagao  coming  on 
all  abreast  with  an  impetuous  pace,  while  behind  them  clouds 
of  dust  loading  the  atmosphere  for  miles,  showed  that  the 
whole  army  had  passed  the  Criz  and  was  in  march  to  attack. 
The  horsemen  were  actually  exchanging  pistol-shots,  when 
Wellington  arrived  and  taking  the  command  in  person  made 
the  division  retire,  covered  by  the  52nd,  the  rifles,  and  Ross's 
battery.  It  was  a  timely  interference,  for  the  French  brought 


SEPT.  1810.]  BOOK   XI.  — CHAP.    7.  23 

up  guns  and  infantry  so  quickly,  that  all  the  skill  of  the 
general  and  the  readiness  of  the  troops  could  scarcely  evade 
a  disaster.  Howbeit  a  series  of  rapid  evolutions  under  a 
sharp  cannonade  placed  the  division  in  an  hour  safely  on  the 
Busaco  Sierra,  and  the  opposite  ridge  was  immediately  crowned 
by  the  masses  of  the  sixth  corps,  the  French  -batteries  opening 
while  the  English  troops  were  yet  ascending  the  position. 
Reynier,  pursuing  a  Portuguese  battalion,  arrived  about  the 
same  time  at  Antonio  de  Cantara  in  front  of  Picton,  and 
before  three  o'clock  forty  thousand  French  infantry  were 
embattled  on  the  two  points,  their  guns  trying  the  range 
above,  while  the  skirmishing  clatter  of  musketry  arose  from 
the  dark-wooded  chasms  beneath.  Ney,  whose  military  glance 
was  sure,  instantly  perceived  that  the  mountain,  a  crested  not 
a  table  one,  could  hide  no  great  reserves,  that  it  was  only  half- 
occupied,  and  that  the  allies  were  moving  with  the  disorder 
usual  on  the  taking  unknown  ground.  He  wished  therefore  to 
attack,  but  Massena  was  ten  miles  in  rear,  the  officer  sent 
to  him  waited  two  hours  for  an  audience,  and  then  returned 
with  an  order  to  attend  the  prince's  arrival.  Thus  a  great 
opportunity  was  lost,  for  Spencer  was  not  up,  Leith's  troops, 
now  called  the  5th  division,  were  only  passing  the  Mondego, 
and  Hill  was  still  behind  the  Alva.  Scarcely  twenty-five 
thousand  men  were  in  the  line,  and  with  great  intervals. 

Next  day  Beynier  and  Ney  wrote  in  concert  to  Massena  to 
urge  an  immediate  attack;  but  he  did  not  come 
up  from  Mortagao  until  twelve  o'clock,  bringing    §  Jfel 
with  him  Junot's  corps  and  the  cavalry,  which  he 
formed  as  a  reserve  to  connect  Ney's  and  Reynier's  troops) 
then  throwing  out  skirmishers  along  the  whole  front  he  care- 
fully examined  the  allies'  position.     It  was  no  longer  denuded. 
Hill,   having  crossed   the  Mondego,   was   athwart   the  road 
leading  over  the  sierra  to  the  Pena  Cova  ford; — on  his  left  Leith 
prolonged  the  line  of  defence,  having  the  Lusitanian  legion  in 
reserve; — Picton,  supported   by   Champlemond's  Portuguese 
brigade,  was  next  to  Leith; — Spencer  occupied  the  highest 
part  of  the  ridge,  between  Picton  and  the  convent.     Cole  was 
on  the  extreme  left,  covering  a  path  leading  to  the  flat  country 
about  Milheada.     A  regiment  of  heavy  dragoons  was  in  re- 


24  PENINSULA   WAR.  [SEPT.  1810. 

serve  on  the  summit  of  the  sierra,  and  Pack's  brigade  and 
some  other  Portuguese  troops  were  in  front  of  Spencer  half 
way  down  the  mountain.  On  their  left,  the  light  division, 
supported  by  a  German  brigade  and  the  nineteenth  Portu- 
guese regiment  of  the  line,  occupied  a  spur,  jutting  out  nearly 
half  a  mile  in  front  of  but  lower  than  the  convent,  the  space 
between  being  scooped  like  the  hollow  of  a  wave  before  it  breaks: 
the  whole  mountain  side  was  covered  with  skirmishers,  and  fifty 
pieces  of  artillery  were  disposed  upon  the  most  salient  points. 
Key  was  now  averse  to  attack,  but  Massena  resolved  to 
storm  the  ridge.  Keynier  thinking  he  had  only  to  deal  with 
a  rear-guard  encouraged  the  prince ;  and  the  latter,  too  con- 
fident in  the  valour  of  his  army  and  his  own  fortune,  directed 
the  second  and  sixth  corps  to  fall  on  the  next  day,  each  to  its 
own  front,  while  the  eighth  corps  the  cavalry  and  the  artillery 
remained  in  reserve.  Towards  dusk  the  light  troops,  dropping 
by  twos  and  threes  into  the  lowest  parts  of  the  valley,  endea- 
voured to  steal  up  the  wooded  dells  and  hollows,  and  establish 
themselves  unseen  close  to  the  piquets  of  the  light  division ; 
the  riflemen  and  cacadores  drove  them  back,  but  renewed 
attempts  seemed  to  menace  a  night  attack  and  excited  all  the 
vigilance  of  the  troops.  Yet  only  veterans  tired  of  war  could 
have  slept  while  that  serene  sky  glittered  above,  and  the  dark 
mountains  were  crowned  with  the  innumerable  bivouac  fires  of 
more  than  a  hundred  thousand  warriors. 

BATTLE     OF      BUSACO. 
See  Plan,  page  13. 

Before  daybreak  on  the  29th,  Ney  planted  three  columns 
of  attack  opposite  the  convent,  and  Reynier  planted  two  at 
Antonio  de  Cantara,  those  points  being  about  three  miles 
apart.  Reynier's  men,  having  easier  ground  to  assail,  were  in 
the  midst  of  the  piquets  and  skirmishers  of  Picton's  division 
almost  as  soon  as  they  could  be  perceived  in  movement;  and 
though  the  allies  fought  well,  and  six  guns  played  along  the 
ascent  with  grape,  in  less  than  half  an  hour  the  French  were 
close  upon  the  summit :  so  swiftly  and  with  such  astonishing 
power  and  resolution  did  they  scale  the  mountain,  overthrow- 


SEPT.  1810.]  BOOK   XL  — CHAP.    7.  25 

ing  everything  that  opposed  their  progress.  The  right  centre 
of  the  third  division  was  forced  back,  the  eighth  Portuguese 
regiment  broken,  the  hostile  masses  gained  the  highest  part 
of  the  crest,  just  between  the  third  and  the  fifth  divisions, 
and  the  leading  battalions  established  themselves  amongst 
the  crowning  rocks,  while  a  confused  mass  in  rear  wheeled  to 
the  right,  intending  to  sweep  the  summit  of  the  sierra.  At 
that  moment  Wellington  caused  two  guns  to  open  with  grape 
upon  their  flank,  a  heavy  musketry  was  poured  into  their 
front,  and  in  a  little  time,  the  eighty- eighth  regiment  and  a 
wing  of  the  forty-fifth  charged  so  furiously  that  even  fresh 
men  could  not  have  withstood  the  shock ;  the  French,  spent 
with  their  previous  efforts,  gave  way,  and  both  parties  went 
mingled  together  down  the  mountain  side  with  a  mighty 
clamour  and  confusion,  their  track  being  marked  with  dead 
and  dying  even  to  the  bottom  of  the  valley. 

Meanwhile  those  French  battalions  which  had  first  gained 
the  crest,  were  formed  across  the  ridge  with  their  right  resting 
upon  a  precipice  overhanging  the  reverse  side,  and  the  position 
was  in  fact  gained  if  any  reserve  had  been  at  hand ;  for  the 
greatest  part  of  the  third  division,  British  and  Portuguese, 
were  fully  engaged;  some  of  the  French  skirmishers  were 
descending  the  back  of  the  position,  and  a  misty  cloud  capped 
the  summit,  so  that  the  hostile  mass,  ensconced  amongst  the 
rocks,  could  only  be  seen  by  general  Leith.    That  officer,  notic- 
ing the  first  impression  made  on  Picton's  division,  had  moved 
with  a  brigade  to  his  aid ;  he  had  two  miles  of  rugged  ground 
to  traverse  on  a  narrow  formation,  but  he  was  now  coming  on 
rapidly,  and  directed  the  thirty-eighth  regiment  to  turn  the 
French  right  flank  while  colonel   Cameron  with  the  ninth 
assailed  their  front.     A  precipice  stopped  the  thirty- eighth, 
but  Cameron,  hearing  from  a  staff-officer  the  critical  state  of 
affairs,  formed  line  under  a  violent  fire,  and  without  returning 
a  shot  run  in  upon  and  drove  the  French  grenadiers  from  the 
rocks  with  irresistible  bravery ;  plying  them  with  a  destructive 
musketry  as  long  as  they  could  be  reached,   and  yet  with 
excellent  discipline  refraining  from  pursuit  lest  the  crest  of 
the  position  should  be  again  lost :  for  the  mountain  was  so 
rugged  no  general  view  could  be  taken.     This  secured  the 


2f>  PENINSULA    WAR.  [SEPT.  1810. 

victory,  for  Hill's  corps  had  now  edged  in  towards  the  scene 
of  action,  Leith's  second  brigade  had  joined  the  first,  and  a 
great  mass  of  fresh  troops  was  thus  concentrated,  while 
Reynier  had  neither  reserves  nor  guns  to  restore  the  fight. 

Ney's  attack  had  as  little  success.  From  the  abutment  of 
the  mountain  upon  which  the  light  division  was  stationed,  the 
lowest  parts  of  the  valley  could  be  discerned,  the  ascent  was 
steeper  than  where  Reynier  had  attacked,  and  Craufurd  in  a 
happy  mood  of  command  made  masterly  dispositions.  The 
table- land  between  him  and  •  the  convent  was  sufficiently 
scooped  to  conceal  the  forty-third  and  fifty-second  regiments 
drawn  up  in  line;  and  a  quarter  of  a  mile  behind  them,  on 
higher  ground  and  close  to  the  convent,  the  German  infantry 
appeared  to  be  the  only  solid  line  of  resistance  on  this  part  of 
the  position.  In  front  of  the  British  regiments,  some  rocks, 
overhanging  the  descent,  furnished  natural  embrasures  in 
which  Ross's  guns  were  placed,  and  beyond  them  the  rifle- 
men and  cacadores  were  planted  as  skirmishers,  covering  the 
slope  of  the  mountain. 

"While  it  was  still  dark  a  straggling  musketry  was  heard  in 
the  deep  valley,  and  when  the  light  broke,  three  heavy  masses, 
detached  from  the  sixth  corps,  were  seen  to  enter  the  woods 
below  and  throw  forward  a  profusion  of  skirmishers.  One  of 
these,  under  general  Marchand,  emerging  from  the  dark  chasm 
and  following  the  main  road  seemed  intent  to  turn  the  right 
of  the  light  division ;  a  second  under  Loison  made  straight  uj> 
the  face  of  the  mountain  against  the  front,  the  third  remained 
in  reserve.  Simon's  brigade,  leading  Loison's  attack,  ascended 
with  a  wonderful  alacrity,  and  though  the  light  troops  plied  it 
unceasingly  with  musketry,  and  the  artillery  bullets  swept 
through  it  from  the  first  to  the  last  section,  its  order  was 
never  disturbed  nor  its  speed  in  the  least  abated.  Ross's 
guns  were  worked  with  incredible  quickness,  yet  their  range 
was  palpably  contracted  every  round,  the  enemy's  shot  came 
singing  up  in  a  sharper  key,  the  English  skirmishers,  breath- 
less and  begrimed  with  powder,  rushed  over  the  edge  of  the 
ascent,  the  artillery  drew  back,  and  the  victorious  cries  of  the 
French  were  heard  within  a  few  yards  of  the  summit. 

Craufurd,  standing  alone  on   one  of  the  rocks,  had  been 


SEPT.  1810.]  BOOK   XL  — CHAP.  7.  27 

intently  watching  the  progress  of  this  attack,  and  now  with  a 
shrill  tone  ordered  the  two  regiments  in  reserve  to  charge ! 
the  next  moment  a  horrid  shout  startled  the  French  column 
and  eighteen  hundred  British  bayonets  went  sparkling  over 
the  brow  of  the  hill.  Yet  so  brave  so  hardy  were  the  leading 
French,  that  each  man  of  the  first  section  raised  his  musket 
and  two  officers  and  ten  soldiers  fell  before  them.  Not  a 
Frenchman  had  missed  his  mark !  They  could  do  no  more. 
The  head  of  their  column  was  violently  thrown  back  upon 
the  rear,  both  flanks  were  overlapped  at  the  same  moment  by 
the  English  wings,  three  terrible  discharges  at  five  yards' 
distance  shattered  the  wavering  mass,  and  a  long  trail  of 
broken  arms  and  bleeding  carcasses  marked  the  line  of  flight. 
The  main  body  of  the  British  now  stood  fast,  but  some 
companies  pursued  down  the  mountain,  whereupon  Ney  threw 
forward  his  reserve  division,  and  opening  his  guns  from  the 
opposite  heights  killed  some  of  the  pursuers :  thus  warned 
they  recovered  their  own  ground,  and  the  Germans  were 
brought  forward  to  the  skirmish.  During  this  fight  a  small 
flanking  detachment,  having  passed  round  the  right,  rose  near 
the  convent  and  was  gallantly  charged  and  defeated  by  the 
nineteenth  Portuguese  regiment  under  colonel  M'Bean. 

Loison  did  not  renew  the  action,  but  Marchand  having 
formed  several  small  bodies,  gained  a  pine-wood  half-way  up 
the  mountain  on  the  right  of  the  light  division,  and  sent  a 
cloud  of  skirmishers  against  the  highest  part;  on  that  steep 
ascent  however,  Pack's  men  sufficed  to  hold  them  in  check, 
and  half  a  mile  higher  up  Spencer  showed  a  line  of  the  foot- 
guards  which  forbad  any  hope  of  success.  Craufurd's  artillery 
also  smote  Marchand's  people  in  the  pine-wood,  and  Ney,  who 
was  there  in  person,  after  sustaining  this  murderous  cannonade 
for  an  hour  relinquished  that  attack  also.  The  desultory 
fighting  of  the  light  troops  then  ceased,  and  at  two  o'clock 
parties  from  both  armies  were,  under  a  momentary  truce,  mixed 
together  carrying  off  wounded  men.  Towards  evening  a  French 
company,  with  signal  audacity,  seized  a  village  only  half-musket 
shot  from  the  light  division,  and  refused  to  retire,  whereupon 
Craufurd  turned  twelve  guns  on  the  intruders  and  overwhelmed 
them  with  bullets  for  half  an  hour ;  but  after  paying  the  French 


28  PENINSULA    WAR.  [SEPT.  1810. 

captain  this  distinguished  honour,  recovered  his  temper,  and 
sent  a  company  of  the  forty-third  down  which  cleared  the 
village  in  a  few  minutes.  Meanwhile  happened  an  affecting 
incident,  contrasting  strongly  with  the  savage  character  of  the 
preceding  events.  A  poor  orphan  Portuguese  girl,  about 
seventeen,  and  very  handsome,  was  seen  coming  down  the 
mountain,  driving  an  ass  loaded  with  all  her  property  through 
the  midst  of  the  French  army.  She  had  abandoned  her  dwell- 
ing in  obedience  to  the  proclamation,  and  now  passed  over  the 
field  of  battle  with  a  childish  simplicity,  totally  unconscious  of 
her  perilous  situation,  and  scarcely  understanding  which  were 
the  hostile  and  which  the  friendly  troops,  for  no  man  on  either 
side  was  so  brutal  as  to  molest  her. 

The  French  were,  notwithstanding  their  astonishing  valour, 
repulsed  in  the  manner  to  be  expected  from  the  strength  of 
the  ground  and  the  bravery  of  the  soldiers  opposed  to  them ; 
their  loss  was  preposterously  exaggerated  at  the  time,  but  it 
was  really  great,  one  general,  Grain-d'orge,  and  eight  hundred 
men  were  killed;  Foy,  Merle,  and  Simon  were  wounded,  and 
the  last  made  prisoner.  The  whole  loss  might  be  about  four 
thousand  five  hundred,  while  that  of  the  allies  was  only 
thirteen  hundred,  because  the  French  strove  to  win  by  audacity 
rather  than  by  fire,  and  were  exposed  to  grape  all  the  time. 
Massena  then  finding  Busaco  impregnable,  and  seeing  it  could 
not  be  turned  by  the  Mondego,  because  the  allies  might  pass  that 
river  on  a  shorter  line,  held  a  council  in  which  it  was  proposed 
to  return  to  Spain ;  but  at  that  moment  a  peasant  told  of  a 
road  leading  from  Mortagao  over  the  Caramula  ridge  to 
Boyalva,  and  it  was  resolved  to  turn  Wellington's  left.  To 
mask  the  movement,  skirmishing  was  renewed  the  28th  so 
vigorously  that  a  general  battle  was  expected;  but  an  ostenta- 
tious display  of  men,  disappearance  of  baggage,  and  casting 
up  of  earth  on  the  hill  covering  the  road  to  Mortagao,  plainly 
indicated  some  other  design.  Towards  evening  the  French 
infantry  were  sensibly  diminished,  the  cavalry  were  descried 
by  the  light  division  winding  over  the  distant  mountains  to- 
wards the  allies'  left,  and  at  that  moment  Wellington  arrived 
from  the  right,  and  looked  at  the  distant  columns  with  great 
earnestness ;  he  seemed  uneasy,  his  countenance  bore  a  fierce 


SEPT.  1810.]  BOOK  XL  — CHAP.   7.  29 

angry  expression,  and  suddenly  mounting  his  horse  he 
rode  away  without  speaking :  one  hour  afterwards  the  whole 
army  was  in  movement.  Hill  recrossing  the  Mondego  retired 
by  Espinal  upon  Thomar,  the  centre  and  left  denied  in  the 
night  by  narrow  roads  upon  Milheada,  the  guns  followed  the 
convent  road,  and  the  light  division  furnished  the  rear-guard 
until  the  open  country  enabled  the  cavalry  to  take  that  duty. 

Massena's  scouts  reached  Boyal  vain  the  evening  of  the  28th, 
and  it  has  been  asserted  that  Trant's  absence  from  Sardao 
enabled  the  French  to  execute  their  design.  Trant  was  how- 
ever at  Sardao  four  miles  from  Boyalva  at  one  o'clock  the  28th ; 
but  having,  under  orders  from  Baccellar,  moved  from  Lamego 
by  the  circuitous  way  of  Oporto  instead  of  the  direct  road  by 
San  Pedro  da  Sul,  his  numbers  were  reduced  by  fatigue  and 
desertion  to  fifteen  hundred,  and  his  presence  even  at  Boyalva, 
as  Wellington  had  designed,  would  have  produced  no  effect. 
As  it  was,  the  French  cavalry  pushed  between  him  and  the 
British  horsemen,  and  drove  him  with  loss  behind  the  Vouga. 
Then  Massena's  main  body  clearing  the  defile  of  Boyalva 
marched  upon  Coimbra,  and  the  allies,  crossing  the  Mondego 
near  that  city,  commenced  passing  the  defiles  leading  upon 
Condeixa  and  Pombal.  The  commissariat  stores,  previously 
removed  from  Pena  Cova  to  Figueras,  were  embarked  at 
Peniche",  the  light  division  and  the  cavalry  remained  on  the 
:ght  bank  of  the  Mondego,  and  Baccellar  was  directed  to 
bring  down  all  the  militia  of  the  northern  provinces  upon  the 
Vouga.  The  pernicious  effect  of  the  regency's  folly  and  neg- 
ligence was  now  manifest.  Notwithstanding  the  proclama- 
tions, and  the  urgent  and  even  menacing  remonstrances  of  the 
English  general,  the  regency  had  not  caused  the  country  behind 
the  Mondego  to  be  laid  waste ;  while  the  enemy  was  stopped 
at  Busaco  only  the  richest  inhabitants  had  quitted  Coimbra. 
When  the  army  retreated  that  city  was  still  populous;  and 
when  Massena's  approach  left  only  the  choice  between  flight 
and  the  death  and  infamy  announced  in  the  proclamation,  so 
direful  a  scene  of  distress  ensued  that  none  could  behold  it 
without  emotion.  Mothers  with  children  of  all  ages,  the  sick, 
the  old,  the  bedridden,  and  even  lunatics,  went  or  were  carried 
forth,  the  most*part  with  little  hope  and  less  help,  to  journey 


30  PENINSULA  WAR.  [SEPT.  1810. 

for  days  in  company  with  contending  armies :  fortunately  for 
this  unhappy  multitude,  the  weather  was  fine  and  the  roads 
firm  or  the  greatest  number  must  have  perished  in  the  most 
deplorable  manner.  And  all  this  misery  was  of  no  avail,  the 
object  was  not  gained;  the  people  fled,  the  provisions  were 
left,  and  the  mills  were  only  partially  and  imperfectly  ruined. 
On  the  1st  of  October,  the  allied  outposts  were  driven 
from  the  hills  north  of  Coimbra,  but  the  French  horse- 
men, entering  the  plain,  suffered  some  loss  from  a  can- 
nonade. The  British  cavalry  were  in  line  on  open  ground, 
the  disparity  of  numbers  was  not  great,  the  opportunity  fair ; 
yet  the  English  were  withdrawn  across  the  Mondego,  and  so 
unskilfully,  that  the  French  cut  down  some  troopers  in  the 
middle  of  the  river,  and  thus  forced  a  combat  in  which  fifty 
or  sixty  men  fell.  This  scrambling  affair  caused  the  light 
division  to  march  hastily  through  the  city  to  gain  the  defiles 
of  Condeixa,  which  commence  at  the  end  of  the  bridge,  and 
then  all  the  inhabitants  who  had  not  quitted  the  place 
rushed  out,  driving  before  them  a  number  of  animals  loaded 
with  sick  people  and  children.  At  the  entrance  to  the  bridge 
the  press  was  great  and  the  troops  halted  a  few  moments 
under  the  prison;  the  jailer  had  fled  with  the  keys,  the 
prisoners,  crowding  to  the  windows  endeavoured  to  tear  down 
the  bars  with  their  hands,  and  even  with  their  teeth,  bellow- 
ing in  the  most  frantic  manner,  while  the  bitter  lamentations 
of  the  multitude  on  the  bridge  increased,  and  the  pistol  shots 
of  the  cavalry  engaged  at  the  ford  below  were  distinctly  heard. 
William  Campbell,  a  staff  officer,  breaking  the  prison  doors, 
soon  freed  the  wretched  inmates,  and  the  troops  forced  a 
passage  over  the  bridge;  but  at  the  other  end,  the  defile,  cut 
through  high  rocks,  was  so  crowded  no  effort  could  make 
way.  A  troop  of  French  dragoons  which  had  passed  the  ford 
now  came  close  upon  the  flank,  and  a  single  regiment  of 
infantry  would  have  destroyed  the  division,  wedged  as  it  was 
in  a  hollow  way,  and  unable  to  retreat,  to  advance,  or  break 
out  on  either  side.  At  last  a  passage  was  opened  to  the  right, 
and  the  road  was  cleared  for  the  guns,  yet  it  was  dark  before 
the  troops  reached  Condeixa,  although  the  distance  was  less 
than  eight  miles. 


SEPT.  1810]  BOOK  XT.  — CHAP.   7.  dl 

That  night  the  head-quarters  were  at  Redinha,  the  next  day 
at  Leiria;  the  marches  were  therefore  easy,  and  provisions 
were  abundant,  yet  the  usual  disorders  of  a  retreat  had  already 
commenced.  In  Coimbra  a  quantity  of  harness  and  entrench- 
ing tools  were  scattered  in  the  streets ;  at  Leiria,  the  maga- 
zines were  plundered  by  the  troops  and  camp-followers;  at 
Condeixa,  a  magazine  of  tents,  shoes,  spirits,  and  salt  meat 
was  destroyed  or  abandoned  to  the  enemy.  And  while  the 
town  was  flowing  with  rum,  the  light  division  and  Pack's 
Portuguese  brigade,  only  a  quarter  of  a  mile  distant,  had  to 
slaughter  their  own  bullocks,  and  received  but  half  rations  of 
liquor !  Wellington  however  arrested  these  growing  disorders 
with  a  strong  hand.  Three  men  taken  in  the  fact  were 
hanged  at  Leiria  for  plundering,  and  some  regiments  more 
tainted  than  others,  were  forbidden  to  enter  a  village.  This 
vigorous  exercise  of  command,  aided  by  the  fine  weather  and 
the  enemy's  inactivity,  restored  regularity  amongst  the  allies, 
while  Massena's  conduct,  the  reverse  of  the  English  general's, 
introduced  the  confusion  of  a  retreat  in  the  pursuing  army. 
At  Coimbra,  he  permitted  such  waste,  that  resources  were  dis- 
sipated in  a  few  days  which  would  have  supplied  his  troops  for 
two  months  under  good  arrangements ;  and  during  this  licen- 
tious delay  the  advantage  gained  by  his  dangerous  flank  march 
to  Boyalva  was  lost. 

OBSERVATIONS. 

1°.  'Attack  vigorously,  after  having  observed  well  where  to 
strike'  This  simple  but  profound  expression  in  Napoleon's 
letter  to  Massena  furnishes  a  test  for  the  latter's  operations, 
which  were  not  conformable  to  it.  His  design  to  turn  the 
defiles  behind  Celorico  by  the  way  of  Viseu  required  rapid 
movements,  yet  he  did  not  quit  Viseu  to  march  on  Coimbra 
until  the  tenth  day  after  passing  the  Pinhel  river :  that  was 
not  a  'vigorous  attack.'  Again,  a  battle  might  have  been 
forced  on  Wellington  when  Almeida  fell,  or  even  before  that 
event.  The  mules  required  for  transport  being  then  incom- 
plete, the  commissary-general  Kennedy  was  dependent  on  the 
country  carts,  and  when  the  first  retrograde  movement  from 
Aivercu  commenced,  the  drivers  fled  with  their  bullocks  and 


32  PENINSULA  WAR.  [SEPT.  1810. 

produced  infinite  confusion.  Kennedy  in  a  few  days  pro- 
cured indeed  fifteen  hundred  additional  mules,  but  inter- 
mediately a  vigorous  advance  of  the  French  would  have  forced 
a  battle  or  a  retreat  more  hasty  than  suited  the  English 
general's  political  position.  There  also  the  French  marshal 
failed  to  strike  vigorously. 

2°.  If  Massena  had  not  been  entirely  misled  by  Alorna  and 
Pamplona,  and  the  more  readily  because  the  latter's  estates 
were  about  Coimbra,  he  would  have  judged,  that  the  direct 
line  from  Celorico,  so  jealously  guarded  by  his  enemy  after 
eight  months'  study  of  the  country,  was  more  likely  to  offer 
advantages  than  the  circuitous  and  comparatively  neglected 
route  by  Viseu.  Ignorant  of  the  topography,  but  having  the 
stronger  and  more  moveable  army,  he  should  have  pressed  his 
adversary  closely;  a  rapid  pursuit  through  Celorico  would 
have  brought  him  to  the  Alva  before  Hill  or  even  Leith 
could  have  come  into  line,  and  Wellington  must  then  have 
fought  with  only  half  his  force  or  gone  back  to  the  lines.  If 
he  accepted  battle,  his  position  being  only  half  manned  could 
be  turned  on  his  right  by  the  slopes  of  the  Estrella,  on  his 
left  by  crossing  the  Mondego.  Hence  it  is  clear  that  the 
great  object  of  forcing  a  battle  before  Hill  could  enter  the 
line  was  more  attainable  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Mondego 
than  by  the  road  to  Viseu.  Here  then  the  '  where  to  strike' 
was  not  well  observed ! 

3°.  When  the  rocks  of  Busaco,  glittering  with  bayonets, 
first  rose  on  the  prince  of  Esling's  view,  two  questions  were  to 
be  solved.  Should  he  attack  or  turn  that  formidable  post? 
Should  he  keep  the  allies  in  check,  seize  Oporto,  and  neglect 
Lisbon  until  better  combinations  could  be  made?  The  last 
question  has  been  already  solved,  but,  contrary  to  the  general 
opinion,  the  attack  upon  Busaco  appears  faulty  in  the  execution 
rather  than  in  the  conception;  and  the  march  by  which 
that  position  was  turned,  was  a  violation  of  the  soundest 
principles  of  war:  in  a  purely  military  view,  the  English 
general  may  be  censured  for  not  punishing  his  adversary's 
rashness.  With  respect  to  the  attack,  sixty-five  thousand 
French  veterans  had  no  reason  to  believe,  that  fifty  thousand 
inexperienced  troops,  spread  along  a  mountain  crest  more  than 


1810.] 


BOOK  XI.— CHAP.   7.  33 


eight  miles  long,  were  impregnably  posted;  arid  it  is  an  error 
to  suppose,  as  some  persons  have,  that  guns  could  not  have  been 
used;  the  light  division  was  constantly  within  long  range, 
and  thirty  pieces  of  artillery  employed  on  that  point  would 
have  greatly  aided  the  attack  by  the  sixth  corps.  But  when 
a  general  in  chief  remains  ten  miles  from  a  field  of  battle, 
gives  his  adversary  two  days  to  settle  in  a  position,  makes  his 
attacks  without  connexion  and  without  artillery,  and  brings 
forward  no  reserves,  success  is  impossible  even  with  such  valiant 
soldiers  as  Massena  commanded. 

4°.  '  An  army  should  always  be  in  a  condition  to  fight ' 

'  A  general  should  never  abandon  one  line  of  communication 
without  establishing  another.' 

'  Flank  marches  within  reach  of  an  enemy  are  rash  and 
injudicious.' 

These  maxims  of  Napoleon  have  been  illustrated  by  many 
examples.  Senef,  Kollin,  Rosbach,  the  valley  of  the  Brenta, 
Salamanca,  attest  their  value.  Massena  violated  all  three  by 
his  march  to  Boyalva,  when  no  desperate  crisis  of  affairs  war- 
ranted such  a  departure  from  general  principles.  Sir  Joshua 
Reynolds,  treating  of  another  art  says,  '  genius  begins  where 
rules  end.'  Here  genius  was  dormant  and  rules  disregarded. 
Massena  was  not  driven  to  a  desperate  game,  the  conquest  of 
Oporto  was  open  to  him,  so  was  a  march  to  the  Vouga  by 
Viseu;  yet  he  threw  his  whole  army  into  a  single  narrow 
defile  within  ten  miles  of  an  enemy  in  position.  And,  as  I 
have  been  told  by  an  officer  of  Ney's  staff,  with  such  disorder, 
that  the  baggage,  the  commissariat,  the  wounded  and  the  sick, 
were  mixed  with  the  artillery,  cavalry,  and  infantry,  each 
striving  who  should  first  make  way; — that  discord  raged 
amongst  the  generals,  confusion  amongst  the  soldiers, — and  all 
this  in  a  night  march ! 

'  Massena? s  army  was  not  then  in  a  condition  to  fight — he 
made  afiank  inarch  within  reach  of  an  enemy  in  position,  and 
he  abandoned  his  line  of  communication  without  having  estab- 
lished another? 

5°.  Wellington  was  within  four  hours'  march  of  either  end 
of  the  defile  through  which  the  French  army  was  moving.  He 
might  with  the  first  division  and  the  cavalry,  the  Portuguese 

VOL.  III.  D 


34  PENINSULA    WAR.  [1810. 

regular  troops  and  Trant's  militia  have  presented  twelve  or 
fourteen  thousand  men  at  Sardao,  to  head  the  French  in  the 
defile,  while  the  second,  third,  fourth,  fifth,  and  light  divisions 
advancing  by  Mortagao,  assailed  their  rear.  That  he  did  not 
do  so  is  to  be  attributed  to  his  political  position ;  his  mixed 
and  inexperienced  army  was  not  easily  handled,  war  is  full  of 
mischances,  and  the  loss  of  a  single  brigade  might  have  caused 
the  English  government  to  abandon  the  contest  altogether. 
Nevertheless,  his  retreat  was  as  dangerous  as  such  an  attack 
would  have  been,  and  in  a  military  view  the  battle  of  Busaco 
should  not  have  been  fought ;  it  was  extraneous  to  his  original 
plan  and  forced  upon  him  by  events ;  it  was  in  fine  a  political 
battle  and  he  afterwards  called  it  a  mistake. 

6°.  Massena's  march  was  successful,  and  the  allied  army 
could  not  cope  with  him  in  the  open  country,  between  Busaco 
and  the  sea,  where  his  cavalry  would  have  had  a  fair  field. 
Wellington  therefore,  reverting  to  his  original  plan,  retreated 
by  the  Coimbra  and  Espinal  roads;  but  the  French  were  at 
Avelans  de  Cima  and  Milheada  on  the  30th,  the  allied  cavalry 
and  the  light  division  being  then  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Mondego,  which  was  fordable  in  many  places  below  Coimbra. 
Had  Massena,  marching  by  Tentugal,  crossed  at  the  lower 
fords,  and  pushed  on  to  Leiria,  the  retreat  would  have  been 
intercepted,  terror  and  confusion  would  have  raged  at  Lisbon, 
the  patriarch's  faction  would  have  triumphed,  and  a  dangerous 
battle  must  have  been  fought  to  reach  the  lines. 

7°.  When  the  allies  had  secured  their  retreat,  the  fate  of  Por- 
tugal was  still  in  Massena's  hands.  He  could  have  established 
a  fresh  basis  at  Coimbra,  employed  the  ninth  corps  to  seize 
Oporto,  and  secured  lines  of  communication  with  that  city  and 
with  Almeida  by  fortified  posts.  Then  attacking  Abrantes 
he  could  have  connected  his  operations  with  Soult's  troops  in 
Estremadura,  and  would  have  effectually  frustrated  both  the 
political  and  military  defence  of  Portugal.  .Wellington  dreaded 
this  danger,  and  to  him  the  renewed  advance  of  the  French 
was  as  the  rising  of  a  heavy  cloud  showing  a  clear  horizon. 

8°.  Even  at  Coimbra  Massena  knew  nothing  of  the  lines  of 

Torres  Vedras,  and  believed  the  country  beyond 

Appendix  2,     ^  j^ondego  to  be  fit  for  the  usage  of  all  arms. 

Yet  Junot,  Loison,  Foy,  and  many  other  officers 


1810.]  BOOK  XL  — CHAK   7.  35 

who  had  served  in  Portugal  were  with  him  and  able  to  correct 
Alorna  and  Pamplona's  erroneous  information!  But  this 
campaign  was  a  strange  one  and  illustrated  Massena's  character 
as  drawn  by  Napoleon.  '  Dull  in  conversation,  decided  and 
intrepid  in  action,  danger  gave  his  thoughts  clearness  and 
force.  Ambitious  and  selfish,  he  was  neglectful  of  discipline, 
regardless  of  good  administration,  and  consequently  disliked 
by  his  troops ;  his  dispositions  for  a  battle  were  always  bad, 
but  his  temper  was  pertinacious  to  the  last  degree :  he  was 
never  discouraged.' 

9°.  The  French  reached  Coimbra  just  as  fourteen  days 
bread  carried  by  the  soldiers  was  exhausted.  French  soldiers 
only  are  accustomed  to  carry  so  much  bread.  Other  nations, 
and  notably  the  English,  would  not  husband  it ;  yet  it  was  a 
practice  of  the  ancient  Romans  and  it  ought  to  be  the  practice 
of  all  armies.  It  requires  previous  discipline  and  well-con- 
firmed military  habits,  and  it  is  a  vital  element  of  success. 
The  secret  of  making  perfect  soldiers  is  however  only  to  be 
found  in  national  customs  and  institutions  j  men  should  come 
to  the  ranks  fitted  by  previous  habits  for  military  service, 
instead  of  being  stretched  as  it  were  upon  the  bed  of  Procrustes 
by  a  discipline  which  has  no  resource  but  fear. 


36  PENINSULA    WAR  [ OCT.  1810. 


CHAPTER   VIII. 

FROM  the  1st  until  the  3rd,  the  French  army  was  in  disorder. 
The  4th,  Massena  resumed  his  march  by  Condeixa  and  Leiria, 
leaving  his  sick  and  wounded  with  a  slender  guard  at  Coimbra. 
His  hospital  was  established  at  the  convent  of  Santa  Clara  on 
the  left  bank  of  the  river,  and  all  the  inhabitants  who  were 
averse  or  unable  to  enter  the  lines,  immediately  came  down 
from  their  hiding-places  in  the  mountains.  But  scarcely  had 
the  prince  left  the  city  when  Trant,  Miller,  and  Wilson  closing 
upon  his  rear  with  ten  thousand  militia,  occupied  the  sierras 
on  both  sides  of  the  Mondego,  and  cut  off  all  communication 
with  Almeida. 

On  the  evening  of  the  4th  the  French  drove  the  English 
piquets  fromPombal,  and  next  morning  pushed  so  suddenly  upon 
Leiria  as  to  create  general  confusion.  The  road  was  however 
crossed  by  a  succession  of  parallel  ravines,  and  captain  Somers 
Cocks,  defending  one  with  a  single  squadron,  charged  the 
head  of  the  enemy's  column  vigorously  and  checked  its  march 
until  Anson's  brigade  of  horsemen  and  Bull's  artillery  came 
up.  The  French  then  formed  three  columns,  and  endeavoured 
to  bear  down  the  British  with  the  centre  one,  while  the  others 
turned  the  flanks ;  but  the  ravines  were  difficult,  Bull's  artillery 
played  well  into  the  principal  body,  and  Anson,  charging  as  it 
emerged  from  every  defile,  slew  a  great  number.  The  British 
lost  three  officers  and  fifty  men,  the  French  lost  more,  and  in 
five  hours  did  not  gain  as  many  miles  of  ground,  although 
they  had  thirty-six  squadrons  opposed  to  ten.  During  this 
delay  Leiria  was  cleared,  and  the  army  retreated,  the  right  by 
Thomar  and  Santarem,  the  centre  by  Batalha  and  Kio  Mayor, 
the  left  by  Alcobaca  and  Obidos;  at  the  same  time  a  native 
force,  under  colonel  Blunt,  was  thrown  into  Peniche".  Massena 
followed  in  one  column  by  the  way  of  Rio  Mayor,  but  meanwhile 


OCT.  1810]  BOOK  XL  — CHAP.    8.  37 

the  most  daring  and  hardy  enterprise  executed  by  any  partisan 
during  the  whole  war,  convicted  him  of  bad  generalship  and 
shook  his.  plan  of  invasion  to  its  base. 


SURPRISE    OF   COIMBRA. 

Trant  had  returned  from  the  Vouga  to  Milheada  after  the 
French  passed,  designing  to  unite  with  Miller  and  J.  Wilson ; 
but  those  officers  were  still  distant,  and  his  own  arrival  being 
unknown  at  Coimbra.  he  resolved  to  attack  the  French  in  that 
city  without  waiting  for  assistance.  Surprising  a  post  at 
Fornos  early  in  the  morning  of  the  7th,  he  sent  his  cavalry  at 
a  gallop  through  the  streets  of  Coimbra,  with  orders  to  pass 
the  bridge  and  cut  off  all  communication  with  the  French 
army,  of  whose  progress  he  was  ignorant.  His  infantry  then 
penetrated  at  different  points  into  the  principal  parts  of  the 
town,  the  astounded  enemy  made  little  or  no  resistance,  and 
the  convent  of  Santa  Clara  surrendered  at  discretion.  Thus 
on  the  third  day  after  Massena  quitted  the  Mondego,  his 
depots  and  hospitals,  and  nearly  five  thousand  prisoners, 
wounded  and  unwounded,  amongst  them  a  marine  company 
of  the  imperial  guards,  fell  into  the  hands  of  a  small  militia 
force !  The  next  day,  Miller  and  Wilson  came,  and  spreading 
their  men  on  all  sides  picked  up  three  hundred  more  prisoners, 
while  Trant  conducted  his  to  Oporto.  During  the  first  con- 
fusion the  militia  ill-used  some  prisoners,  and  the  Abbe*  du 
Pradt  and  other  French  writers  have  in  consequence  accused 
Trant  of  disgracing  his  uniform  by  encouraging  such  ferocity. 
But  it  was  he  who  repressed  the  ferocity:  only  endix's 

ten  lives  were  lost,  and  the  falsehood  is  rendered 
conspicuous  by  a  letter  of  thanks  addressed  to  him  by  the 
French  officers  who  fell  into  his  hands. 

This  disaster  did  not  stop  Massena's  march.  The  8th  his 
advanced  guard  drove  Slade's  cavalry  piquets  out  of  Eio  Mayor, 
and  pushing  on  to  Alcoentre  were  like  to  have  captured  the 
field  battery  there.  The  royals  and  the  sixteenth  dragoons 
forced  the  French  back  and  sabred  many,  but  the  combat  was 
renewed  next  morning  and  the  British  cavalry,  ill- handled  by 
Slade,  retired.  Meanwhile  the  lines  were  being  occupied. 


88  PENINSULA   WAR.  [OCT.  1810. 

Cole  and  Leith  took  the  centre  at  Sobral,  Picton  occupied 
Torres  Vedras  on  the  left.  Hill  entered  Alhandra  on  the 
right.  Craufurd  and  Pack  should  have  gone  to  Aruda,  but 
the  former,  who  reached  Alemquer  on  the  9th,  was  still  there 
at  three  o'clock  P.M.  on  the  10th.  The  weather  was  stormy, 
and  he  put  the  men  under  cover  and  let  them  cook ;  he  knew 
the  cavalry  had  filed  into  the  lines,  yet  he  posted  no  guards, 
sent  no  patroles  forward,  took  no  precaution  against  a  sur- 
prise, although  the  town,  situated  in  a  deep  ravine,  was 
-peculiarly  liable  to  such  a  disaster.  Some  officers,  uneasy 
at  JiMs  state  of  affairs,  anxiously  watched  the  height  in  front, 
and  about- four  o'clock  observed  French  dragoons  on  the 
'  summit,  within  cannon  shot.  The  alarm  was  instantly  given, 
but'  -the  assembly  post  had  been  marked  on  an  open  space 
exposed  to  an  enemy's  fire,  and  from  thence  the  road  led 
through  an  ancient  gateway  to  the  top  of  a  mountain  behind. 
The  French,  increasing  every  moment,  feigned  to  be  pointing 
guns,  and  the  general  hastily  desired  the  regiments  to  break 
and  re-form  on  the  other  side  of  the  archway  out  of  range. 
In  a  moment  all  was  disorder.  The  streets  were  crowded 
with  the  camp  followers  and  baggage  animals,  and  the  whole 
in  one  confused  mass  rushed  or  were  driven  headlong  to  the 
archway;  several  were  crushed,  and  with  worse  troops  a 
general  panic  must  have  ensued,  but  most  of  the  officers  and 
soldiers,  ashamed  of  the  order,  stood  firm  until  the  first  con- 
fusion had  abated. 

Nevertheless  the  mischief  was  sufficiently  great,  and  the 
enemy's  infantry,  descending  the  heights,  endeavoured  to  turn 
the  town  on  the  left,  while  some  pushed  directly  through  the 
streets  in  pursuit;  thus  with  his  front  in  disorder,  his  rear 
skirmishing,  and  the  night  falling,  Craufurd  commenced  a 
retreat,  but  the  weather  being  boisterous  the  fire  soon  ceased : 
some  wounds  and  the  loss  of  baggage  was  all  the  hurt 
sustained,  yet,  so  uncertain  is  everything  in  war,  this  affair 
had  like  to  have  produced  the  most  terrible  results  in  another 
quarter.  For  the  division,  instead  of  marching  by  Caregada 
and  Cadafaes,  followed  the  route  of  Sobral,  and  thus  made  in 
the  dark  a  flank  march  of  several  miles  along  the  foot  of  the 
lines  to  gain  Aruda,  which  was  meanwhile  left  open  to  the 


lit 


LINES     OF 

TOTRBES  "VEDRA& 
181Oo 


OCT.  1810.]  BOOK   XL—  CHAP.    8.  &9 

enemy.  In  this  state,  the  cavalry  patroles  from  Villa  Franca, 
meeting  some  stragglers  and  followers  near  Caregada,  were  by 
them  told  the  light  division  was  cut  off;  a  report  confirmed 
in  some  measure  by  the  unguarded  state  of  Aruda  and  by  the 
presence  of  the  enemy's  scouts  on  that  side.  This  information 
alarmed  Hill  for  the  safety  of  the  second  line,  and  the  more  so 
that  the  weakest  part  was  in  the  vicinity  of  Aruda;  he  there- 
fore made  a  retrograde  movement  towards  Alverca,  with  a 
view  to  watch  the  valley  of  Calandrix,  or  to  gain  the  pass  of 
Bucellas,  according  to  circumstances :  hence,  while  the  enemy 
was  in  march  against  the  lines,  the  latter,  from  Alhandra  to 
the  forts  above  Sobral,  a  distance  of  eight  or  nine  miles,  were 
disgarnished  of  troops.  The  true  state  of  affairs  was  however 
quickly  ascertained,  and  Hill  regained  Alhandra  before  day- 
light on  the  llth.  During  this  time  Reynier  and  Junot 
passed  Alemquer.  The  first  marched  upon  Villa  Franca,  the 
second  upon  Sobral;  but  Reynier's  operations  were  languid, 
he  did  not  discover  the  unguarded  state  of  Alhandra,  and  his 
piquets  only  entered  Villa  Franca  the  next  day.  It  was 
different  on  Junot's  side.  Clausel,  one  of  the  ablest  generals 
of  the  French  army,  leading  the  head  of  the  eighth  corps, 
came  upon  Sobral  in  the  dusk,  dislodged  the  first  division, 
occupied  the  ridge  upon  which  that  town  is  built,  and  before 
morning  had  thrown  up  works  close  in  the  centre  of  those 
justly-celebrated  entrenchments. 

THE  LINES  OF  TORRES  VEDRAS. 

They  consisted  of  three  distinct  ranges  of  de-  ITT 

fence.  Jones,  Royal 

The    first,    extending   from  Alhandra  on   the    onfteHSs 
Tagus  to  the  mouth  of  the  Zizandre  on  the  sea-    Printed  for 
coast,  was,  following  the  inflections  of  the  hills, 
twenty-nine  miles  long. 

The  second,  traced  at  a  distance,  varying  from  six  to  ten 
miles,  in  rear  of  the  first,  stretched  from  Quintella  on  the 
Tagus  to  the  mouth  of  the  St.  Lorenza,  being  twenty-four 
miles  in  length. 

The  third,  intended  to  cover  a  forced  embarkation,  extended 


40  PENINSULA    WAR.  [OCT.  18lO. 

from  Passo  d'Arcos  on  the  Tagus,  to  the  tower  of  Junquera 
on  the  coast.  Here  an  outward  line,  constructed  on  an  open- 
ing of  three  thousand  yards,  enclosed  an  entrenched  camp,  the 
latter  being  designed  to  cover  an  embarkation  with  fewer  troops 
if  such  an  operation  should  be  delayed  by  bad  weather.  This 
second  camp  enclosed  Fort  St.  Julian,  whose  high  ramparts 
and  deep  ditches  defied  an  escalade,  and  were  armed  to  enable 
a  rear-guard  to  resist  any  force.  From  Passo  d'Arcos  to  the 
nearest  part  of  the  second  line  was  twenty-four  miles ;  from 
the  first  line  it  was  two  marches,  but  the  principal  routes  led 
through  Lisbon,  where  means  to  retard  the  enemy  were 
prepared. 

Of  these  stupendous  lines,  the  second,  whether  for  strength 
or  importance,  was  the  principal;  the  others  were  appendages, 
the  third  a  mere  place  of  refuge.  The  first  line  was  originally 
designed  as  an  advanced  work,  to  stem  the  primary  violence 
of  the  enemy  and  enable  the  army  to  take  up  its  ground  on 
the  second  line  without  hurry  or  pressure;  but  while  Massena 
remained  inactive  on  the  frontier,  it  acquired  strength,  which 
was  now  so  much  augmented  by  the  rain  that  Wellington 
resolved  to  abide  the  attack  there  permanently. 

It  offered  five  distinct  positions,  which  shall  be  described 
from  right  to  left. 

1°.  From  Alhandra  to  the  head  of  the  valley  of  Calandrix 
This  portion,  five  miles  long,  was  a  continuous  and  lofty  ridge 
defended  by  thirteen  redoubts,  and  for  two  miles  rendered 
inaccessible  by  a  scarp  fifteen  to  twenty  feet  high.  It  was 
guarded  by  Hill's  corps,  and  flanked  from  the  Tagus  by  a 
flotilla  of  gun-boats  manned  with  British  seamen. 

2°.  Fmm  the  head  of  the  vale  of  Calandrix  to  the  Pe  de 
Monte.  This  portion,  also  of  five  miles,  presented  two  salient 
mountains  forming  the  valley  of  Aruda,  that  town  'being 
exactly  in  the  mouth  of  the  pass.  Only  three  feeble  redoubts, 
incapable  of  stopping  an  enemy,  were  constructed  here,  and 
the  defence  was  entrusted  to  the  light  division. 

3°.  The  Monte  Agraqa.  This  lofty  mountain  overtopped 
the  adjacent  country,  and  from  its  summit  the  whole  of  the 
first  line  could  be  seen.  The  right  was  separated  from  the 
Aruda  position  by  a  deep  ravine  which  led  to  nothing;  the 


OCT.  1810.]  BOOK  XL— CHAP.  8.  41 

left  overlooked  the  village  and  valley  of  Zibreira;  the  centre 
overhung  the  town  of  Sobral.  The  summit  was  crowned  by 
an  immense  redoubt  armed  with  twenty-five  guns,  round  which 
three  smaller  works,  containing  nineteen  guns,  were  clustered. 
The  garrisons,  amounting  to  two  thousand  men,  were  supplied 
by  Pack's  brigade ;  and  on  the  reverse  slope,  which  might  be 
about  four  miles  in  length,  Leith  was  posted  in  reserve. 

4°.  From  the  valley  of  Zibreira  to  Torres  Vedras.  This 
portion,  seven  miles  long,  was  at  first  without  works,  because 
it  was  only  when  the  rains  had  set  in  the  resolution  to  defend 
the  first  line  permanently  was  adopted.  But  the  ground, 
rough  and  well  defined,  having  a  valley  in  front,  deep  and 
watered  by  the  Zizandre,  now  a  considerable  river,  presented  a 
fine  field  of  battle.  Here  Spencer  and  Cole,  reinforced  with  a 
sixth  division,  formed  of  troops  recently  come  from  England 
and  Cadiz,  were  stationed  under  the  immediate  command  of 
Wellington,  whose  quarters  were  fixed  at  Pero  Negro,  just 
under  the  lofty  Secora  rock,  on  which  a  telegraph  was  erected 
to  communicate  with  every  part  of  the  line. 

5°.  From  the  heights  of  Torres  Vedras  to  the  mouth  of  the 
Zizandre.  The  right  flank  of  this  portion  and  a  pass  in  front 
of  the  town  of  Torres  Vedras  were  secured  by  a  great  redoubt, 
mounting  forty  guns,  and  by  smaller  forts  judiciously  planted 
so  as  to  command  all  the  approaches.  From  these  works  to 
the  sea  a  range  of  moderate  heights  was  crowned  with  minor 
redoubts ;  but  the  chief  defence  there,  after  the  rains  had  set 
in,  was  to  be  found  in  the  Zizandre,  unfordable  and  overflow- 
ing so  as  to  form  an  impassable  marsh.  Such  were  the 
defences  of  the  first  line,  strong,  but  at  several  points  defective; 
and  there  was  a  paved  road,  running  parallel  to  the  foot  of 
the  hills  through  Torres  Vedras,  Runa,  Sobral  and  Aruda  to 
Alhandra,  which  gave  the  enemy  an  advantage. 

The  second  and  most  formidable  line  shall  now  be  described 
from  left  to  right. 

1°.  From  the  mouth  of  tlie  St.  Lourenga  to  Mafra.  In  this 
distance  of  seven  miles,  there  was  a  range  of  hills,  naturally 
steep,  artificially  scarped,  covered  by  a  deep  and  in  many  parts 
impracticable  ravine.  The  salient  points  were  secured  by  forts 
which  flanked  and  commanded  the  few  accessible  points;  but 


42  PENINSULA   WAR.  [OCT.  1810. 

as  the  line  was  extensive,  a  secondary  post  was  fortified  a  few 
miles  in  the  rear,  to  secure  a  road  leading  from  Ereceira  to 
Cintra. 

2°.  The  Tapada  or  royal  park  of  Mafra.  Here  there  was 
some  open  but  strong  ground  which,  with  the  pass  of  Mafra, 
was  defended  by  a  system  of  fourteen  redoubts,  constructed 
with  great  labour  and  care,  well  considered  with  respect  to 
the  natural  features,  and  in  some  degree  connected  with  the 
secondary  post  spoken  of  above :  the  Sierra  de  Chypre,  covered 
with  redoubts,  was  in  front  and  obstructed  all  approaches  to 
Mafra  itself. 

3°.  From  the  Tapada  to  the  pass  of  Bucellas.  In  this 
space  of  ten  or  twelve  miles,  forming  the  middle  of  the  second 
line,  the  country  is  choked  by  the  Monte  Chique,  the  head  of 
which  is  in  the  centre  of  and  overtops  all  the  other  mountain 
masses.  A  road  conducted  along  a  chain  of  hills,  high  and 
salient  though  less  bold  than  any  other  part  of  the  line,  con- 
nected Mafra  with  the  Cabeca,  and  was  secured  by  a  number 
of  forts.  The  country  in  front  was  extremely  difficult,  and 
behi-nd  was  a  parallel  and  stronger  ridge  which  could  only  be 
approached  with  artillery  by  the  connecting  road  in  front; 
but  to  reach  that,  the  Sierra  de  Chypre  on  the  left,  or  the 
defile  of  the  Cabega  on  the  right,  must  have  been  carried. 
Now  the  latter  was  covered  by  a  cluster  of  redoubts  con- 
structed on  some  inferior  rocky  heads  in  advance;  they  com- 
manded all  the  approaches,  and  from  their  artificial  and 
natural  strength  were  nearly  impregnable.  The  Cabe9a  itself 
and  its  immediate  flanks  were  secure  in  their  natural  preci- 
pitous strength;  so  likewise  were  the  ridges  connecting  the 
Cabe9a  with  the  pass  of  Bucellas,  wherefore,  save  the  blocking 
of  one  mule  path,  they  were  untouched. 

3°.  From  Bucellas  to  the  low  ground  about  tlie  Tagus. 
The  defile  of  Bucellas,  narrow  and  rugged,  was  defended  by 
redoubts  on  each  side,  and  a  ridge,  or  rather  collection  of 
impassable  rocks,  called  the  Sierra  de  Serves,  stretched  to  the 
right  of  it  for  two  miles  without  a  break,  and  then  died 
away  by  a  succession  of  ridges  into  the  low  ground  on  the 
bank  of  the  Tagus.  These  declivities  and  the  flat  banks  of 
the  river  offered  an  accessible  opening,  two  miles  and  a  half 


OCT.  1810.]  BOOK   XL— CHAP.   8.  43 

wide.  It  was  laboriously  defended  indeed  by  redoubts,  water- 
cuts,  retrenchments,  and  carefully  connected  with  the  heights 
of  Alhandra;  yet  it  was  the  weakest  part  of  the  line,  and 
dangerous  from  its  proximity  to  the  valleys  of  Calandrix  and 
Aruda. 

Five  roads  practicable  for  guns  pierced  the  first  line  of 
defence;  two  at  Torres  Vedras,  two  at  Sobral,  one  at  Alhan- 
dra; but  as  two  of  these  united  again  at  the  CabeQa,  there 
were  only  four  points  of  passage  through  the  second  line,  that 
is  to  say,  at  Mafra,  Monte  Ghique,  Bucellas,  and  Quintella  in 
the  flat  ground.  Hence  the  aim  and  scope  of  all  the  works 
were  to  bar  those  roads  and  strengthen  the  favourable  fighting 
positions  between  them,  without  impeding  the  movements  of 
the  army;  the  loss  of  the  first  line  therefore  would  not  have 
been  injurious,  save  in  reputation,  because  the  retreat  was 
secure  upon  the  second  and  stronger  line :  moreover  the  guns 
of  the  first  line  were  all  of  inferior  calibre,  mounted  on  com- 
mon truck  carriages,  immoveable,  and  useless  to  the  enemy. 
The  allies'  movements  were  quite  unfettered  by  the  works,  but 
those  of  the  French  army  were  impeded  and  cramped  by  the 
Monte  Junta,  which,  rising  opposite  to  the  centre  of  the  first 
line,  sent  out  a  spur  called  the  Sierra  de  Baragueda  in  a 
slanting  direction  towards  the  Torres  Vedras  mountain,  and 
only  separated  from  it  by  the  pass  of  Runa,  which  was  com- 
manded by  heavy  redoubts.  Massena  was  therefore  to  dis- 
pose his  army  on  one  or  the  other  side  of  the  Baragueda. 
which  could  not  be  easily  passed;  nor  could  a  movement 
over  it  be  hidden  from  the  allies  on  the  Monte  Agraca,  who 
from  thence  could  pour  down  simultaneously  on  the  head 
and  tail  of  the  passing  columns  with  the  utmost  rapidity, 
because  convenient  roads  had  been  previously  prepared,  and 
telegraphs  established  for  the  transmission  of  orders. 

These  celebrated  lines  were  great  in  conception  and  execu- 
tion, more  in  keeping  with  ancient  than  modern  military 
labours;  and  it  is  clear  that  the  defence  was  not  dependent, 
as  some  French  writers  suppose,  upon  the  first  line.  If  that 
had  been  stormed  the  standard  of  Portuguese  independence 
would  still  have  floated  securely  amidst  the  rocks  of  the 
second  line.  But  to  occupy  fifty  miles  of  fortification,  to  man 


44  PENINSULA  WAR.  [OCT.  1810. 

one  hundred  and  fifty  forts,  and  work  six  hundred  guns 
required  many  men,  and  numbers  were  not  wanting.  A  great 
fleet  in  the  Tagus,  a  superb  body  of  marines  sent  out  from 
England,  the  civic  guards  of  Lisbon,  the  Portuguese  heavy 
artillery  corps,  the  militia  and  ordenanga  of  Estremadura, 
furnished  a  powerful  reserve  to  the  regular  army.  The 
native  gunners  and  the  militia  supplied  all  the  garrisons  of 
the  forts  on  the  second,  and  most  of  those  on  the  first  line ; 
the  British  marines  occupied  the  third  line;  the  navy  manned 
the  gun-boats  on  the  river,  and  aided  in  various  ways  the 
operation  in  the  field.  The  recruits  from  the  depots,  and  the 
calling  in  of  all  the  men  on  furlough  rendered  the  Portuguese 
army  stronger  than  it  had  yet  been,  while  the  British  troops, 
reinforced  from  Cadiz  and  England,  arid  remarkably  healthy, 
presented  such  a  front  as  a  general  would  desire  to  see  in  a 
dangerous  crisis. 

It  was  however  necessary  to  have  the  appearance  of  even 
greater  strength,  and  Wellington  therefore  so  dealt  with 
Romana,  that?  without  much  attention  to  the  wishes  of  his 
own  government  he  joined  the  allies  with  six  thousand  men. 
The  English  general  did  not  however  ask  this  until  assured 
Massena's  force  was  insufficient  to  drive  the  British  from 
Lisbon,  as  it  would  have  been  dishonest  to  draw  the  Spaniards 
to  a  corner,  where  they  could  not  from  want  of  shipping 
have  escaped  in  the  event  of  failure.  Romana  crossed  the 
Tagus  at  Aldea  Gallega  the  19th,  and  took  post  the  24th  at 
Enxara  de  los  Cavalleros,  just  behind  the  Monte  Agraca, 
The  remainder  of  the  Spanish  army,  reinforced  with  Madden's 
Portuguese  dragoons,  advanced  towards  Zafra,  and  Ballesteros 
moved  on  Araoena.  Mortier  ignorant  of  Romana's  absence 
had  retreated  over  the  Morena  on  the  8th,  desirous  to  be 
nearer  to  Soult  who  was  then  seriously  menacing  Cadiz.  Thus 
fortune  aided  the  English  general's  efforts  to  increase  the  dis- 
tance between  Massena  and  Soult,  and  to  diversify  their 
objects  at  the  moment  he  had  concentrated  the  greatest  force 
on  the  most  important  point ;  for  before  September  more  than 
one  hundred  and  twenty  thousand  fighting  men  were  rationed 
within  the  lines,  seventy  thousand  being  regular  troops, 

Massena,,  surprised  at  the  extent  and  strength  of  works 


OCT.  1810.1  BOOK   XT.  — CHAP.   R.  45 

which  he  had  only  heard  of  five  days  before  he  came  npon 
them,  employed  several  days  to  examine  their  nature.  The 
heights  of  Alhandra  were  inexpugnable;  but  the  valleys  of 
Calandrix  and  Aruda  attracted  his  attention.  By  the  former 
he  could  turn  Alhandra  and  reach  the  weakest  part  of  the 
second  line;  but  the  abattis  and  redoubts,  hourly  strengthen- 
ing, gave  little  encouragement  to  attack  there.  The  ground 
about  Aruda  did  not  give  him  a  view  of  the  troops,  although 
he  frequently  skirmished  to  make  Craufurd  show  his  force; 
but  that  general,  by  occupying  Aruda  as  an  advanced  post, 
had  rendered  it  impossible  to  discover  his  true  situation  with- 
out a  serious  affair,  and,  in  an  incredibly  short  space  of  time, 
he  secured  his  position  in  a  manner  worthy  of  admiration. 
Across  the  ravine  on  the  left,  a  loose  stone  wall  sixteen  feet 
thick  and  forty  feet  high  was  raised;  across  the  great  valley 
of  Aruda  a  double  line  of  abattis  was  drawn ;  not,  as  usual,  of 
the  limbs  of  trees,  but  of  full-grown  oaks  and  chesnuts,  digged 
up  with  all  their  roots  and  branches,  dragged  by  main  force 
for  several  hundred  yards,  and  then  reset  and  crossed  so  that 
no  human  strength  could  break  through.  Breast-works,  at 
convenient  distances  to  defend  this  line  of  trees,  were  also 
cast  up ;  and  along  the  summits  of  the  mountain,  for  a  space  of 
nearly  three  miles,  including  the  salient  points,  other  stone 
walls,  six  feet  high  by  four  in  thickness,  with  banquettes,  were 
piled  up !  Romans  never  raised  greater  works  in  the  time ! 

Monte  Agraca  and  the  upper  Zizandre  vale  had  no  out- 
works; neither  the  Zibreira  valley,  nor  the  hills  above  Runa 
had  been  fortified,  and  battle  could  be  joined  there  on  more 
equal  terms ;  but  the  position  was  by  nature  strong,  the  rear 
supported  by  great  forts,  a  powerful  body  of  troops  occupied 
the  ground,  and  six  battalions  drawn  from  Hill's  corps  formed 
a  reserve  at  Bucellas.  Beyond  Runa,  Massena  could  not  take 
a  view ;  the  Baragueda  ridge  and  the  forts  of  Torres  Vedras 
stopped  him.  Convinced  by  this  survey  that  the  lines  were 
not  to  be  forced,  he  disposed  his  troops  in  permanent  positions 
between  Villa  Franca  and  Sobral.  Reynier  holding  the 
heights  opposite  Alhandra  with  his  left,  extended  his  right 
along  open  ground  as  far  as  Aruda  where  it  was  covered  by 
cavalry ;  Junot  held  the  ridge  near  Sobral  seized  bv  Clause!, 


46  PENINSULA   WAR.  [OCT.  181(S 

and  also  occupied  the  lower  shoots  from  the  Baragueda,  and 
lined  the  Zizandre  to  Duas  Portas  on  the  road  to  Ruria,  the 
outposts  of  both  armies  being  there  in  contact.  Ney  remained 
at  Otta.  These  dispositions  were  not  made  without  fighting. 
Clausel's  men,  attempting  to  dislodge  the  71st  regiment  from 
a  work  near  Sobral,  were  repulsed  and  driven  also  from  their 
own  retrenchment,  which  was  held  until  the  whole  of  Junot's 
corps  advanced  to  re-establish  the  position.  The  allies  in  this 
and  other  petty  combats  lost  a  hundred  and  fifty  men,  most  of 
whom  fell  at  Sobral,  and  the  Portuguese  general  Harvey  was 
wounded.  On  the  other  hand  the  French  general  St.  Croix,  a 
young  man  of  signal  ability  and  promise,  was  killed  by  the 
gun-boats  at  Villa  Franca. 

The  war  was  now  reduced  to  a  blockade.  Massena  only 
sought  to  feed  his  army  until  reinforcements  reached  it; 
Wellington  endeavoured  to  starve  the  French  before  succour 
could  arrive.  The  former  spread  his  moveable  columns  in  the 
rear  to  seek  for  provisions,  and  established  magazines  at 
Santarem.  The  latter  drew  down  all  the  militia  and  orde- 
nanca  of  the  north  on  the  French  rear,  putting  them  in  com- 
munication with  the  garrison  of  Peniche  on  one  side,  and  on 
the  other  with  the  militia  of  Lower  Beira :  Carlos  d'Espana 
also,  crossing  the  Tagus,  acted  between  Castello  Branco  and 
Abrantes.  Thus  the  French  were  completely  enclosed  without 
any  weakening  of  the  regular  army. 

Obidos,  having  an  old  wall,  had  been  armed  as  a  post  of 
communication  between  the  northern  militia  and  Peniche; 
the  regency  left  it  without  provisions,  and  it  was  evacuated 
when  Massena  first  arrived;  the  concentration  of  his  troops 
now  permitted  major  Fenwick  to  re-occupy  it  with  three 
hundred  northern  militia-men,  and  he  was  supported  by  a 
Spanish  battalion  and  some  British  cavalry  sent  from  the  lines 
west  of  the  Baragueda.  At  the  same  time  colonel  Waters, 
issuing  forth  with  a  moveable  column  against  the  French 
marauding  parties,  made  several  prisoners  and  captured  a 
convoy  passing  the  Baragueda.  Massena  was  thus  harassed, 
but  his  detachments  continued  to  scour  the  country  as  far  as 
Leiria,  and  obtained  abundance  of  food.  During  this  partisan 
warfare  Wellington  remained  quiet,  to  the  surprise  of  many 


OCT.  1810.]  BOOK    XL  — CHAP.   8.  47 

persons;  for  Massena's  right  was  much  exposed,  and  four 
British  divisions  and  Romana's  troops,  forming  a  mass  of 
twenty-five  thousand  men,  were  around  Sobral.  If  then,  the 
six  battalions  at  Bucellas  and  the  cavalry  had  joined  the  light 
division,  ten  thousand  men  would  have  been  at  Aruda,  and, 
in  conjunction  with  Hill's  force,  would  have  held  Reynier  in 
check,  while  the  twenty-five  thousand  pouring  at  daylight 
from  Monte  Agra9a,  the  valley  of  Zibreira,  and  Runa,  enve- 
loped and  crushed  the  head  of  Junot's  corps  before  the  reserves 
could  come  from  Otta.  War  is  a  curious  and  complicated  web ! 
The  Portuguese  government  was  a  direr  enemy  co  the  English 
general  than  Massena.  Scarcely  could  the  former 
maintain  his  defensive  attitude  against  the  follies  Annals  of  the 
and  intrigues  of  men,  who  have,  nevertheless,  war*** 
been  praised  by  a  recent  writer  for  their  earnest 
and  manly  co-operation!  with  what  justice  and  knowledge  of 
facts  shall  be  shown  in  the  next  chapter. 


48  PENINSULA    WAR.  [OCT.  1810. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

MASSENA'S  invasion  seriously  affected  the  Portuguese  finances, 
and  the  regency  applied  for  an  additional  subsidy.  Mr.  Stuart, 
seeing  the  extreme  distress,  directed  the  house  of  Sampayo  to 
furnish  provisions  to  the  troops  on  the  credit  of  the  first  sub- 
sidy; and  he  also  made  great  exertions  to  feed 
the  fugitive  inhabitants,  forty  thousand  of  whom 
arrived  before  the  13th  of  October,  and  others 
were  hourly  coming  in,  destitute  and  starving.  Corn  at  any 
price  was  sought  for  in  Ireland,  America,  and  Egypt ;  and  one 
thousand  tons  of  government  shipping  were  lent  to  merchants 
to  fetch  grain  from  Algiers.  One  commission  of  citizens  was 
formed  to  facilitate  the  obtaining  cattle  and  corn  from  the 
northern  province;  another  to  regulate  the  transport  of  pro- 
visions to  the  army,  and  to  push  a  trade  with  Spain  through 
the  Alemtejo.  Small  craft  were  sent  up  the  Tagus  to  carry 
off  the  inhabitants  and  their  stock  from  the  islands  and  the  left 
bank,  and  post-vessels  were  established  along  the  coast  to 
Oporto.  Bullion  and  jewels  were  put  on  board  the  men  of 
war,  a  proclamation  was  issued,  calling  upon  the  people  to  be 
tranquil,  and  astrong  police  was  established  to  enforce  this  object. 
Finally,  to  supply  the  deficiency  of  tonnage  occasioned  by 
sending  transports  in  search  of  corn,  an  embargo  was  laid  upon 
the  port  of  Lisbon :  this  was  protested  against  by  the  Ameri- 
cans, but  an  imperious  necessity  ruled. 

All  these  measures  were  vehemently  opposed  by  the  Patriarch 
and  his  faction ;  and  that  nothing  might  be  wanting  to  show 
how  entirely  the  fate  of  the  Peninsula  depended  in  that  hour 
upon  Wellington's  firmness,  the  fears  of  the  British  cabinet, 
which  had  been  increasing  as  the  crisis  approached,  were  now 
plainly  disclosed.  Their  private  letters  contained  hints  at 
variance  with  their  public  despatches ;  they  wished  the  general 


OCT.  1810.]  BOOK  XI.  — CHAP.   9.  49 

to  abandon   the   country,  yet   threw   the   responsibility  en- 
tirely upon  him.     They  thought  him  rash,  because  they  were 
unequal  to  the  crisis;  and  having  neither  the  modesty  to 
resign,  nor  the  manliness  to  continue  the  contest  with  vigour, 
cast  their  base  policy  with  a  view  only  to  their  own  interests 
in  case  of  failure.    During  the  retreat  from  Beira,  some  officers 
of  rank  let  their  correspondence  bear  evidence  of  their  own 
despondency;    Spencer  and  Charles  Stewart  especially  wrote 
so  hopelessly  to  lord  Liverpool,  that  he  transmitted  their  letters 
to  Wellington,  and  by  earnestly  demanding  his  opinion  of  their 
contents  showed  how  deeply  they  had  disturbed  his  own  mind. 
Thus  beset,  the  English  general  rose  like  a  giant.     Without 
noticing  the  arguments  or  forebodings  in  these  letters,  he  took 
a  calm  historical  review  of  the  circumstances  which  had  in- 
duced  him   to   defend  Portugal,    and  which   he  had  before 
explained  to  the  very  minister  he  was  addressing.    He  showed 
how,  up  to  that  period,  his  opinions  had  been  justified  by  the 
results,  and  therefore  he  claimed  confidence  for  the  future, 
then  tracing  the  probable  course  of  coming  events,  he  dis- 
cussed his  own  and  the  enemy's  designs  with  such  sagacity 
that  the  subsequent  course  of  the  war  never  belied  his  antici- 
pations.    This  remarkable  letter,  were  all  other  records  lost, 
would  suffice  to  vindicate  his  great  reputation  to  posterity. 
Having  with  conscious  superiority  replied  to  his  own  govern- 
ment, he,  with  a  fierceness  rendered  necessary  by  the  crisis, 
turned  upon  the  patriarch  and  his   coadjutors.     Reproaching 
them  for  their  unpatriotic,  foolish,  and  deceitful 
conduct,  he  told  them  they  were  unfaithful  ser-    ^P8env^  *  J' 
vants  of  their  country  and  their  prince;  and  he 
threatened  to  withdraw  the  British  army  altogether  if  the 
practices  of  which  he  complained  were  not  amended.     '  The 
king  of  England  and  the  prince  regent  of  Portugal  had  en- 
trusted him  with  the  military  operations,  and  he  would  not 
suffer  any  person  to  interfere.     He  knew  what  to  do,  and 
would  not  alter  his  plans  to  meet  the  senseless  suggestions  of 
the  regency.  Let  the  latter  look  to  their  own  duties !   Let  them 
provide  food  for  the  army  and  the  people  and  keep  the  capital 
tranquil.' — '  With  principal  Souza  it  was  impossible  to  act ;  if 
that  person  continued  in  power  the  country  would  be  lost. 

VOL.  III.  E 


50  PENINSULA    WAR.  [OCT.  18H&. 

Either  the  principal  or  himself  must  quit  their  employment. 
If  it  was  to  be  himself,  he  would  take  care  the  world  should 
know  the  reasons:  meanwhile  he  would  address  the  prince 
upon  the  conduct  of  the  regency.'  '  He  had  hoped/  he  resumed 
in  another  letter,  'the  Portuguese  government  was  satisfied 
with  his  acts,  and  instead  of  seeking  to  render  all  defence  use- 
less by  disturbing  the  minds  of  the  populace  at  Lisbon,  would 
have  adopted  measures  to  secure  tranquillity  in  the  capital. 
But  like  other  weak  individuals  they  added  duplicity  to  weak- 
ness, and  their  past  expressions  of  approbation  and  gratitude 
he  supposed  were  intended  to  convey  censure.  All  he  asked 
from  them  was  to  preserve  tranquillity,  to  provide  food  for 
their  own  troops  while  employed  in  the  lines,  and  be  prepared, 
in  case  of  disaster,  to  save  those  persons  and  their  families  who 
were  obnoxious  to  the  enemy.'  '  I  have'  he  said,  ' little  doubt 
of  final  success,  but  I  have  fought  a  sufficient  number  of  battles 
to  know,  that  the  result  of  any  is  not  certain  even  with  the  best 
arrangements.' 

These  reproaches  were  neither  too  severe  nor  ill-timed,  for 
the  war  had  been  hanging  in  even  balance,  and  the  weight  of 
interested  folly  thus  thrown  in  by  the  regency  was  beginning 
to  sink  the  scale.     Instead  of  performing  its  own  duties,  the 
government  assumed  that  the  war  could  be  maintained  on  the 
frontier,  and  when  it  should  have  removed  the  people  and  food, 
urged  impracticable  military  operations.     When  convicted  of 
error  by  facts,  it  threw  the  task  of  driving  the  country  upon 
the  general ;  although  he  was  necessarily  ignorant  of  the  names 
and  places  of  abode  of  the  officers  and  magistrates  who  were 
to  execute  it,  and  there  was  but  one  Portuguese  agent  at  head- 
quarters to  give  assistance  in  translating  the  necessary  orders. 
When  this  was  pointed  out,  they  issued  the  orders,  but  made 
the  execution  referable  to  the  general  without  his  knowledge, 
well  knowing  he  had  no  means   of  communicating  with  the 
provincial  folks:  the  stopping  of  Massena  at  Busaco  alone 
enabled  the  orders  even  to  reach  the  country  authorities.    But 
the  great  object  of  the' regency  was  to  soothe  and  nourish  the 
national  indolence  and  throw  the  odium  of  rigorous  measures 
on  the  British,  and  though  Wellington  reproached  them  for  so 
doing,  he  never  shrunk  from  that  odium.     Avowing  himself 


OCT.  1810.]  BOOK   XL  — CHAP.    9.  51 

the  author  of  the  wasting  plan,  he  permitted  the  regency  to 
shelter  themselves  under  his  name,  but  he  would  not  tamely 
let  them  deprive  him  of  the  fruits ;  nor  would  he  suffer  them, 
shrinking  as  they  did  in  the  trial,  to  seek  popularity  at  the 
expense  of  their  country's  safety. 

After  the  disputes  which  followed  the  fall  of  Almeida,  the 
English  government,  influenced  by  Wellington,  and  convinced 
that  a  more  secure  and  powerful  grasp  must  be  taken  of  Por- 
tugal, insisted  that  the  subsidy  should  be  placed  under  the 
control  of  the  British  instead  of  the  native  authorities.  Lord 
Wellesley,  ashamed  of  his  colleagues,  also  gave  assurance,  that 
.if  the  army  was  forced  to  quit  Lisbon,  the  Portuguese  troops 
should  be  carried  to  Oporto  and  the  war  re-commenced  in  that 
quarter;  but  Mr.  Stuart  prudently  reserved  this  information 
until  the  necessity  should  arrive,  well  knowing  that  the  patri- 
arch and  Souza,  who  had  already  proposed  to  go  there  them- 
selves, would  eagerly  seize  the  occasion  to  urge  the  evacuation 
of  Lisbon.  The  2nd  of  October  Mr.  Stuart  took  his  seat  as 
a  regent,  and  proceeded  to  control  the  intrigues  and  violence  of 
the  patriarch  and  the  principal.  It  was  full  time.  For  both 
were  formally  protesting  against  the  destruction  of  the  mills  in 
Beira,  and  vigorously  opposing  every  measure  proposed  by  Wel- 
lington. 

Deeply  offended  by  the  suppression  of  the  Lusitanian  legion, 
which  about  this  time  was  incorporated  with  the  regular  forces, 
they  had  openly  declared  the  Portuguese  troops  should  not 
retreat  from  the  frontiers ;  and  if  the  enemy  forced  the  British 
to  embark,  not  a  native,  whether  soldier  or  citizen,  should, 
they  said,  go  with  it.  When  the  allies,  notwithstanding  this, 
fell  back  to  the  lines,  principal  Souza  proposed  that  the 
regency  should  fly  to  the  Algarves ;  and  when  this  was  indig- 
nantly opposed  by  Mr.  Stuart,  he  threatened  to  quit  the 
government.  This  dispute  being  referred  to  Wellington, 
drew  from  him  those  severe  expressions  of  which  an  abstract 
has  been  given  above.  But  when  the  army  approached  the 
lines,  Souza  proposed  that  the  Portuguese  troops  should  remain 
outside  while  the  British  took  shelter  within !  a  notion  so  pre- 
posterous as  to  justify  Beresford's  observation,  that  he  knew 
not  whether  the  proposer  were  more  fool,  rogue,  or  madman. 


62  PENINSULA   WAR.  [OCT.  181(X 

Unchecked  by  this,  the  restless  principal  pursued  his  scheme 
with  the  greatest  activity,  and  in  conjunction  with  his  brothers 
and  the  patriarch,  established  a  regular  and  systematic  oppo- 
sition to  the  plan  of  defence.  Factious  in  council,  they  were 
clamorous  out  of  doors,  where  many  echoed  their  sentiments 
from  anger  at  some  wanton  ravages  which  had  marked  the 
retreat ;  they  also  courted  the  mob  of  Lisbon  servilely ;  and 
the  principal,  getting  the  superintendence  of  the  succours  for 
the  fugitive  population,  became  the  avowed  patron  of  all 
persons  preferring  complaints.  He  stimulated  and  exasperated 
the  public  griefs,  and  frequently  hinted  that  the  Portuguese 
people,  not  the  British  army,  had  formerly  driven  out  the 
French.  All  these  calumnies  were  echoed  by  the  numerous 
friends  and  partisans  of  the  caballers,  and  by  the  fidalgos,  who 
endeavoured  to  spread  discontent  as  widely  as  possible;  they 
were  so  successful  that  the  slightest  encouragement  from  the 
Brazils  would  have  formed  a  national  party  openly  opposed  to 
the  conduct  of  the  war.  To  obtain  this  encouragement,,  Kay- 
mundo,  the  old  tool  of  the  party  in  the  Oporto  murders,  was 
sent  to  the  court  of  Rio  Janeiro  to  excite  the  prince ;  and  the 
patriarch  wrote  to  the  prince  of  Wales  and  to  the  duke  of 
Sussex,  thinking  to  incense  them  also  against  the  English 
general.  But  the  extent  and  nature  of  the  intrigues  may 
be  estimated  from  revelations,  made  at  the  time  by  baron 
Eben,  and  by  the  editor  of  a  Lisbon  newspaper  called  the 
£raziliense. 

Those  persons,  abandoning  their  faction,  asserted  that  the 
patriarch,  the  Souzas,  and,  while  he  remained  in  Portugal,  the 
ex-plenipotentiary  Mr.  Villiers,  being  personally  inimical  to 
Wellington,  Forjas,  and  Beresford,  were  seeking  to  remove 
them  and  get  the  duke  of  Brunswick  appointed  generalissimo. 
This  part  of  the  project  was  naturally  aided  by  the  princess  of 
Wales;  and  the  caballers  in  London  had  also  sounded  the 
duke  of  Sussex,  but  he  repulsed  them.  Part  of  their  plan  was 
to  engage  a  newspaper  as  their  organ  in  London,  the  Bra- 
ziliense  being  so  in  Lisbon.  In  their  correspondence  they 
called  Wellington  ^Alberoni,  lord  Wellesley  Lama,  Beresford 
Ferugem,  Mr.  Stuart  Labre,  the  patriarch  Saxe,  Antonio  Souza 
Lamberti,  colonel  Bunbury  and  Mr.  Peel,  the  under-secretaries 


OCT.  1810.]  BOOK   XL  — CHAP.    9.  53 

of  state,  Thin  and  By -thin,  sir  Robert  Wilson  De  Camp,  lord 
Liverpool  Husband,  Mr.  Villiers  Fatut,  Mr.  Casamajor  Par- 
venu, and  so  on  of  many  others.  After  Mr.  Villiers'  departure 
the  intrigue  was  continued  by  the  patriarch  and  the  Souzas, 
but  upon  a  different  plan.  Overborne  by  Mr.  Stuart's  vigour 
in  the  council  they  agreed  to  refrain  from  openly  opposing  him 
or  Forjas,  but  resolved  to  write  down  what  either  might  utter, 
and  transmit  that  which  suited  their  purpose  to  the  conde  de 
Linhares  and  the  chevalier  Souza,  who  undertook  to  present, 
after  their  own  fashion,  the  information  so  received  to  the 
cabinets  of  St.  James'  and  Rio  Janeiro. 

Mr.  Stuart  having  obtained  their  secret  was  resolute  to 
suppress  their  intrigues.  Yet  he  first  endeavoured  to  put 
them  from  their  mischievous  designs,  by  the  humorous 
expedient  of  writing  a  letter  to  Domingo  Souza  in  his  own 
cipher,  warning  him  and  his  coadjutors  not  to  proceed  because 
their  party  was  insecure,  and  Mr.  Stuart,  Wellington,  Beres- 
ford,  and  Forjas,  united  and  resolved  to  crush  all  opposition, 
might  be  made  friends  but  would  prove  dangerous  enemies ! 
This  had  some  effect,  yet  principal  Souza  would  not  take  any 
hint,  and  the  violent  temper  of  the  patriarch  soon  broke  out 
again.  He  avowed  hostility  to  the  English  general;  and 
while  thwarting  every  measure  necessary  to  resist  the  enemy, 
his  faction  exercised  odious  cruelty  against  persons  denomi- 
nated by  them  well-wishers  to  the  French,  provided  they  were 
not  of  the  fidalgo  party.  A  decree  of  the  prince  regent's, 
dated  20th  of  March,  1809,  permitted  private  denunciations 
in  cases  of  disaffection,  the  informer's  name  to  be  kept  secret, 
and  in  September,  1810,  this  infamous  system,  although 
strenuously  opposed  by  Mr.  Stuart,  was  acted  upon;  many 
persons  were  suddenly  sent  to  the  islands  and  others  thrown 
into  dungeons.  Some  might  have  been  guilty,  and  the  govern- 
ment pretended  a  traitorous  correspondence  with  the  enemy 
was  carried  on  through  a  London  mercantile  house,  which  they 
indicated ;  yet  it  does  not  appear  that  direct  crime  was  brought 
home  to  any,  and  it  is  certain  that  many  innocent  persons 
were  oppressed. 

At  last  lord  Wellesley,  to  prevent  the  ruin  of  the  genera] 
cause,  dealt  so  with  the  Brazilian  court,  that  intrigue  there 


54  PENINSULA  WAR.  [OCT.  18 10, 

ceased  for  a  time,  Wellington's  power  in  Portugal  was  con- 
firmed, and  his  proceedings  approved  of.  Authority  was  also 
given  him  to  dismiss  or  to  retain  Antonio  Souza,  and  even  to 
remove  lord  Strangford,  the  British  envoy  at  Eio  Janeiro,  who 
had  contrived  the  change  in  the  members  of  the  regency,  and 
whose  proceedings,  generally  in  unison  with  the  malcontents, 
were  mischievously  opposed  to  the  English  policy  in  Por- 
tugal. The  subsidies  were  placed  under  Wellington's  and  Mr. 
Stuart's  control,  admiral  Berkeley  became  a  regent,  and 
Portugal  was  thus  reduced  to  the  condition  of  a  vassal  state, 
which  could  never  have  been  attempted,  however  necessary, 
if  the  people  at  large  had  not  been  willing  to  acquiesce.  But 
firm  in  their  attachment  to  independence,  they  submitted 
cheerfully  to  this  temporary  assumption  of  command,  and 
fully  justified  the  sagacity  of  the  man,  who  thus  dared  to  grasp 
at  the  whole  power  of  Portugal  with  one  hand,  while  he  kept 
the  power  of  France  at  bay  with  the  other.  This  strong  remedy 
was  however  not  perfected  for  a  long  time,  nor  until  after 
a  most  alarming  crisis  of  affairs  had  been  brought  on  by  the 
conduct  of  the  Lisbon  cabal,  of  which  notice  shall  be  taken 
hereafter :  while  the  army  was  in  the  lines  the  evils  were  in 
full  activity. 

The  strength  of  the  works,  defying  attack,  rendered  it  likely 
Massena  would  finally  operate  by  the  left  bank  of  the  Tagus. 
This  was  to  be  dreaded.  He  could  in  the  Alemtejo  more 
easily  subsist,  more  effectually  operate  to  the  injury  of  Lisbon, 
more  securely  retreat  upon  his  own  resources.  Wellington 
had  therefore  repeatedly  urged  the  regency  to  make  the  inha- 
bitants carry  off  their  herds  and  grain  from  that  side,  and  from 
the  numerous  islands  in  the  river,  and  above  all  things  to 
destroy  or  remove  every  boat.  To  effect  these  objects  a  com- 
mission had  been  appointed,  but  so  many  delays  and  obstacles 
were  interposed  by  the  patriarch  and  his  coadjutors,  that  the 
commissioners  did  not  leave  Lisbon  until  the  enemy  was  close 
upon  the  river,  both  banks  being  then  stocked  with  cattle  and 
corn,  and  forty  large  boats  lying  on  the  right  side.  The 
French  therefore  entered  the  alluvial  islands  called  the  Lizirias, 
where  they  obtained  abundance  of  provisions;  and  while  the 
regency  thus  provided  for  the  enemy,  they  left  the  fortresses 


OCT.  1810.]  BOOK   XL— CHAP.   9.  55 

of  Palmella,  St.  ?elippe  cle  Setuval,  and  Abrantes,  with  empty 
magazines.  Wellington,  thinking  the  ordenanca  on  the  left 
bank,  of  whom  five  hundred  were,  contrary  to  his  wishes, 
armed  with  English  muskets  and  furnished  with  two  pieces  of 
artillery,  would  be  sufficient  to  repel  any  plundering  parties 
attempting  to  cross  the  Tagus,  was  unwilling  to  spare  men 
from  the  lines.  He  wanted  numbers  there,  and  thought  the 
ordenanca  would  if  assisted  by  a  regular  force  leave  the  war  to 
their  allies.  But  Antonio  Souza  was  continually  urging  the 
planting  of  ambuscades  and  other  like  frivolities  upon  the  left 
bank  of  the  Tagus;  his  opinions  spread  abroad,  and  the 
governor  of  Setuval,  adopting  the  idea,  suddenly  advanced  with 
his  garrison  to  Salvatierra  on  the  river  side.  This  ridiculous 
movement  attracted  the  enemy's  attention,  and  Wellington, 
fearing  a  detachment  would  cross  to  disperse  the  Portuguese 
troops  and  seize  Setuval  before  it  could  be  succoured,  ordered 
the  governor  to  return  to  that  fortress.  This  retrograde 
movement,  however,  caused  the  dispersion  of  the  ordenanca  and 
consternation  pervaded  the  Alemtejo;  the  supply  of  grain 
coming  from  Spain  was  stopped,  the  chain  of  communication 
was  broken,  the  alarm  spread  to  Lisbon,  and  there  was  no 
remedy  but  to  send  general  Fane,  with  some  guns  and  Portu- 
guese cavalry,  which  could  be  ill  spared  from  the  lines,  to 
that  side. 

Fane  destroyed  all  the  boats  he  could  find,  hastened  the 
removal  of  provisions,  and  kept  a  strict  watch  upon  the 
enemy's  movements  as  high  as  the  mouth  of  the  Zezere.  But 
other  embarrassments  were  continually  arising.  The  prisoners 
in  Lisbon  had  accumulated  so  as  to  become  a  serious  incon- 
venience ;  for  the  English  Admiralty,  pretending  alarm  at  a 
fever  generated  by  the  infamous  treatment  of  the  prisoners, 
refused  to  let  them  be  transported  to  England  in  vessels  of 
war,  and  no  other  ships  could  be  had;  thus  the  rights  of 
humanity  and  the  good  of  the  service,  were  alike  disregarded; 
for  had  there  been  real  danger  Wellington  would  not  have 
continually  urged  the  measure.  About  this  time  also,  admiral 
Berkeley  admitted  that  his  elaborate  report,  made  the  year 
before,  stating  that  the  enemy  even  though  he  should  seize 
the  heights  of  Almada  could  not  injure  the  fleet  in  the  river, 


56  PENINSULA   WAR.  [1810. 

was  erroneous :  hence  the  engineers  were  directed  to  construct 
lines  on  that  side  also,  but  it  was  in  the  eleventh  hour.  And 
now  also  the  native  army  showed  the  effects  of 
the  regency's  folly.  The  troops  were  so  ill 
supplied  that  more  than  once  they  would  have 
disbanded,  had  they  not  been  succoured  from  the  British 
magazines.  Ten  thousand  soldiers  of  the  line  deserted  be- 
tween April  and  December,  and  of  the  militia  two-thirds  were 
absent  from  their  colours;  for  as  no  remonstrance  could 
induce  the  government  to  put  the  laws  in  force  against  delin- 
quents, that  which  was  at  first  the  effect  of  want  became  a 
habit :  even  when  regularly  fed  from  the  British  stores  within 
the  lines  the  desertion  was  alarmingly  great. 

Notwithstanding  the  mischiefs  thus  daily  growing  up, 
neither  the  patriarch  nor  the  principal  ceased  their  opposition. 
The  order  to  fortify  the  heights  of  Almada  caused  a  violent 
altercation.  Wellington  complained  of  this  opposition  to  the 
Portuguese  prince  regent,  which  produced  such  a  paroxysm  of 
rage  in  the  patriarch,  that  he  personally  insulted  Mr.  Stuart, 
and  vented  his  passion  in  the  most  indecent  language.  Soon 
after  this,  the  state  of  the  finances  compelled  the  government 
to  resort  to  the  dangerous  expedient  of  requisitions  in  kind 
for  the  feeding  of  the  troops ;  and  in  that  critical  moment  the 
patriarch,  whose  influence  was  from  various  causes  very  great, 
took  occasion  to  declare  that  '  he  would  not  suffer 
t ioPenvoT  II  burthens  to  be  l^d  upon  the  people  which  were 
evidently  for  no  other  purpose  than  to  nourish  the 
war  in  the  heart  of  the  kingdom.'  But  it  was  his  and  his 
coadjutors'  criminal  conduct  that  really  nourished  the  war,  for 
there  were  ample  means  to  have  carried  off  in  time  ten  times 
the  quantity  of  provisions  left  for  the  enemy.  Massena  could 
not  then  have  remained  a  week  before  the  lines,  and  his  retreat 
would  have  been  attended  with  famine  and  disaster,  if  the 
measures  previously  agreed  to  by  the  regency  had  been  duly 
executed.  The  country  about  Thomar,  Torres  Novas,  Gollegao, 
and  Santarem  was  absolutely  untouched,  the  inhabitants  re- 
mained, the  mills  were  little  injured  and  quickly  repaired ;  and 
Wellington  had  the  deep  mortification  to  find  his  grand 
project  frustrated  by  the  very  persons  from  whom  he  had  a 


1810.]  BOOK   XL— CHAP.   0.  57 

right  to  expect  the  most  zealous  support;  there  seemed 
nothing  to  prevent  the  prince  of  Esling  holding  his  positions 
until  an  overwhelming  force  should  arrive  from  Spain.  It  is 
heart-breaking,  exclaimed  the  British  general — *  It  is  heart- 
breaking  to  contemplate  the  chance  of  failure  from  such  obsti- 
nacy and  folly.' 


58  PENINSULA    WAR.  [Ocr.  1810. 


CHAPTER  X. 

MASSENA  was  convinced  by  the  increasing  strength  of  the 
works,  and  the  report  of  British  deserters,  unhappily  very 
numerous  at  this  period,  that  to  force  the  lines  he  must  have 
great  reinforcements;  his  army  also  suffered  from  sickness,  from 
the  irregular  forces  in  his  rear,  and  from  the  vengeance  of  indi- 
viduals driven  to  despair  by  the  excesses  which  the  licentious 
French  soldiers  too  often  committed  in  their  foraging  courses. 
Nevertheless,  with  a  pertinacity  only  to  be  appreciated  by  those 
who  have  long  made  war,  the  French  general  'maintained  his  posi- 
tion until  the  country  for  many  leagues  behind  him  was  a  desert ; 
then  reluctantly  yielding  to  necessity,  he  sought  for  a  fresh  camp, 
in  which  to  make  head  against  the  allies  while  his  foragers 
searched  more  distant  countries  for  food.  Early  in  October, 
he  had  collected  boats  for  crossing  both  the  Tagus  and  the 
Zezere,  and  Montbrun's  cavalry,  scouring  the  right  bank  of 
the  former,  gathered  provisions  and  stored  them  at  Santarem. 
There  and  also  at  Barquina,  a  creek  in  the  Tagus  below  the 
mouth  of  the  Zezere,  rafts  were  formed  and  boats  constructed 
with  wheels  to  move  from  one  place  to  another;  but  the 
extreme  paucity  of  materials  and  tools  made  the  progress 
slow,  and  Fane,  reinforced  with  some  infantry,  closely  watched 
the  movements  from  the  left  bank.  Carlos  d'Espana  likewise 
came  down  from  Castello  Branco  to  Abrantes,  Trant  acted 
sharply  on  the  side  of  Ourem,  and  Wilson's  Portuguese  militia 
so  infested  the  country  from  Espinal  to  the  Zezere,  that 
Loison  was  detached  towards  Thomar  to  hold  him  in  check. 

Towards  the  end  of  October,  all  Massena's  hospitals,  stores, 
and  other  incumbrances  were  removed  to  Santarem,  and  on 
the  31st,  two  thousand  men  forded  the  Zezere  above  Punhete 
to  cover  the  construction  of  a  bridge.  From  this  body  four 
hundred  infantry  and  two  hundred  dragoons  were  led  by  Foy 


Nov.  1810.]  BOOK   XI.  — CHAP.    10.  59 

against  Abrantes,  and  after  skirmishing  with  the  garrison 
made  towards  Sobreira  Formosa,  whereupon  the  allies'  bridge 
at  Vilha  Velha  was  foolishly  burnt.  Foy  however  pushed  for 
Pena  Macor  with  a  smaller  escort,  and  the  8th  gained  Ciudad 
Rodrigo  on  his  way  to  France,  having  undertaken  to  carry 
information  of  the  state  of  affairs  to  Napoleon,  a  task  which 
he  performed  with  singular  rapidity  courage  and  address :  the 
remainder  of  his  escort  returned  down  the  Zezere,  and  being 
attacked  by  Wilson  suffered  some  Loss. 

Massena's  bridge  on  the  Zezere  was  destroyed  by  floods 
the  6th  of  November,  but  having  now  entrenched  the  height 
over  Punhete  he  easily  restored  it,  and  cast  a  second  at  Mar- 
tinchel  higher  up  the  river.  Then  he  commenced  a  retro- 
grade march  with  great  circumspection,  because  his  position 
was  overlooked  from  the  Monte  Agraca,  and  the  defile  of 
Alemquer  behind  the  eighth  corps  rendered  it  a  delicate 
operation.  To  blind  the  partisans  on  his  rear  Montbrun's 
cavalry  marched  upon  Leiria,  and  his  detachments  scoured 
the  roads  to  Pombal  on  the  one  side,  and  towards  the  Zezere 
on  the  other.  Ney  marched  from  Otta  and  Alemquer  to 
Thomar,  and  Loison,  removing  to  Golegao,  was  reinforced  with 
a  brigade  of  dragoons.  Clausel  then  withdrew  from  Sobral 
during  the  night  of  the  14th,  and  Junot's  corps  passed  the 
defile  in  the  morning  of  the  15th,  his  march  being  protected  by 
some  cavalry  left  in  front  of  Aruda,  and  by  a  strong  rear- 
guard on  the  height  covering  Alemquer.  Reynier  also  fell 
back  towards  Santarem  by  the  royal  causeway,  while  Junot 
continued  his  march  by  Alcoentre  upon  Alcanhede  and  Torres 
Novas.  These  movements  were  not  interrupted.  The  morn* 
ing  of  the  15th  proved  foggy,  and  it  was  some  hours  after 
daybreak  ere  the  void  space  in  front  disclosed  the-  ability  of 
the  French  general.  Fane  had  reported  on  the  14th  that 
boats  were  collecting  at  Santarem,  and  information  arrived  at 
the  same  time  that  reinforcements  for  Massena  were  on  the 
march  from  Ciudad  Rodrigo ;  but  the  enemy's  intention  was 
not  clearly  developed;  it  might  be  a  retreat  to  Spain;  it 
might  be  to  pass  round  the  Monte  Junta,  and  so  push  the 
head  of  his  army  on  Torres  Vedras  while  the  allies  were 
following  the  rear.  The  principal  part  of  the  army  therefore 


60  PENINSULA    WAR.  [Nov.  1810. 

remained  stationary;  only  Hill  and  Craufurd  followed  the 
enemy,  the  former  along  the  causeway  to  Villa  Franca,  the 
latter  by  Alemquer :  at  the  same  time  the  cavalry  were 
brought  forward  and  all  the  boats  of  the  fleet  went  up  the 
Tagus,  to  enable  the  allies  to  pass  rapidly  to  the  other  bank 
if  necessary. 

Early  on  the  16th,  the  French  were  tracked  on  the  roads  of 
Rio  Mayor  and  Santarem.  Having  passed  Alcoentre,  it  was 
clear  they  had  no  views  on  Torres  Vedras;  but  whether  to 
cross  the  Zezere  by  the  bridges  at  Punhete  and  Martinchel  in 
retreat  or  to  make  for  the  Mondego,  was  still  uncertain.  In 
either  case,  it  was  important  to  strike  at  the  rear  before 
reinforcements  and  a  convoy,  said  to  be  on  the  road  from 
Ciudad  Rodrigo,  could  join.  The  first  division  was  therefore 
brought  up  to  Alemquer,  the  fifth  entered  Sobral,  the  light 
division  and  cavalry  continued  the  pursuit.  Four  hundred 
prisoners,  principally  marauders,  were  soon  picked  up,  and 
a  remarkable  exploit  was  performed  by  one  Baxter,  a  serjeant 
Ca  tain  °^  *^e  six*eentn  dragoons.  With  only  five  troopers 

Somers  Cocks    he  came  suddenly  upon  a  piquet  of  fifty  men  who 

were  cooking;  they  ran  to  their  arms,  fired,  and 
killed  one  of  the  dragoons,  yet  Baxter  broke  in  amongst  them 
and  with  the  assistance  of  some  countrymen  made  forty-two 

captives.  The  17th,  Junot  marched  upon  Alcan- 
pein.an4  nete  and  Pernes,  and  Reynier  reached  Santarem; 

Fane,  deceived  by  some  false  movements,  reported 
that  the  whole  army  was  in  full  retreat,  and  the  troops  at 
Santarem  a  rear-guard;  and  this  information  seemed  to  be 
confirmed  by  the  state  of  the  immense  plains  skirting  the 
Tagus,  which  were  left  covered  with  straw-ricks :  it  was  con- 
cluded therefore  that  Massena  intended  to  pass  the  Zezere, 
over  which  it  was  known  he  had  cast  a  second  bridge.  Hill 
immediately  passed  the  Tagus  with  the  second  division  and 
thirteenth  dragoons,  to  succour  Abrantes,  or  to  head  the 
march  of  the  French  according  to  circumstances.  The  fourth, 
fifth,  and  sixth  divisions  were  directed  upon  Alemquer,  the 
first  division  and  Pack's  brigades  upon  Cartaxo,  the  light 
division  upon  the  village  of  El  Valle  on  the  Rio  Mayor;  here 
a  considerable  rear-guard  was  left  by  the  French,  and  Crau- 


Nov.  1810.]  BOOK  XT.  — CHAP.  10.  61 

furd,  forgetting  the  lesson  on  the  Coa,  would  have  provoked 
an  unequal  engagement;  but  again  the  opportune  arrival  of 
the  commander-in-chief  stopped  him  and  in  the  evening  the 
French  moved  to  Santarem. 

Hitherto  Wellington,  looking  to  his  lines  with  a  jealous  eye, 
was  cautious.  On  the  15th  and  16th,  while  the  French  were 
still  hampered  by  the  denies,  his  pursuit  was  even  slack, 
although  it  would  in  no  degree  have  risked  the  safety  of  the 
lines  or  of  the  pursuing  troops,  to  have  pushed  three  divisions 
and  Pack's  brigade  vigorously  against  the  enemy's  rear.  But 
on  the  18th,  when  Hill  had  passed  the  Tagus  at  Villada,  and 
Fane  was  opposite  to  Abrantes,  whether  deceived  by  false 
reports,  or  elated  at  a  retrograde  movement  evincing  his  own 
superior  sagacity,  he  prepared  to  assail  at  Santarem  what  he 
thought  the  rear- guard  of  an  army  in  full  retreat.  Massena 
however  had  no  intention  of  falling  back  farther,  his  great 
qualities  were  roused  by  the  difficulty  of  his  situation,  he  had 
carried  off  his  army  with  good  skill,  and  his  new  position  was 
chosen  with  equal  sagacity  and  resolution.  Santarem  was  on 
a  mountain,  rising  almost  precipitously  from  the  Tagus  and 
extending  about  three  miles  inland ;  a  secondary  range  of  hills 
in  front  were  covered  by  the  Rio  Mayor,  which  is  composed 
of  two  streams,  flowing  side  by  side  until  within  a  mile  of  the 
Tag-us,  and  then  uniting  to  run  in  a  direction  parallel  with  that 
river  for  many  miles  through  an  immense  alluvial  flat,  called 
the  plain  of  Santarem.  Advancing  from  the  lines,  the  allies 
had  ascended  the  right  of  the  Rio  Mayor  as  far  as  the  Ponte 
Seca,  a  raised  causeway  eight  hundred  yards  long,  which 
bridged  the  river  and  led  directly  to  the  position.  On  the 
allies'  right  a  sedgy  marsh,  not  impassable  though  difficult 
from  water-cuts,  covered  the  French  line  down  to  the  Tagus. 
On  the  left  hand,  the  double  stream  of  the  Rio  Mayor  had 
overflowed  into  a  vast  impassable  swamp  covering  the  enemy's 
right.  The  causeway  was  therefore  the  only  practicable  line 
of  approach,  but  it  was  narrow  and  barred  at  the  French  end 
by  an  abattis  and  a  gentle  eminence,  from  the  summit  of 
which  a  battery  looked  down  the  whole  length.  To  force  this 
dangerous  passage  was  however  only  a  preliminary  step.  The 
secondary  range  of  hills  was  then  to  be  carried  before  the 


62  PENINSULA   WAR.  [Nov  1810. 

great  height  of  Santarem  could  be  reached :  finally,  that  town 
with  its  old  walls  offered  a  fourth  point  of  resistance. 

In  this  formidable  post,  Reynier's  corps  covered  the  rich 
plain  of  Golegao,  which  was  occupied  by  Loison,  who  was 
placed  there  to  watch  the  Tagus  and  keep  the  communication 
with  Punhete.  On  Reynier's  right,  in  a  rugged  country 
separating  Santarem  from  the  Monte  Junta  and  the  Sierra  de 
Alcoberte,  Junot  was  posted;  not  in  a  continuous  line  with 
Reynier,  but  having  his  right  pushed  forward -to  Alcanhete, 
his  centre  at  Pernes,  and  his  left  thrown  back  to  Torres 
Novas,  where  Massena's  head-quarters  were  fixed.  On  the 
right  of  Alcanhete  the  cavalry  were  disposed,  as  far  as  Leiria, 
and  the  sixth  corps  was  at  Thomar  in  reserve,  having  pre- 
viously forced  Wilson's  militia  to  retire  from  the  Zezere  upon 
Espinal.  Massena  thus  enclosed  an  immense  tract  of  fertile 
country.  The  plain  of  Golegao  supplied  him  with  maize  and 
vegetables,  the  Sierra  de  Alcoberte  with  cattle;  presenting 
a  formidable  head  to  the  allies  at  Santarem,  he  commanded 
the  road  through  Leiria  to  Coimbra  with  the  eighth  corps  and 
the  cavalry;  that  through  Thomar  and  Ourem  to  Coimbra 
with  the  sixth  corps;  and  by  help  of  his  bridges  over  the 
Zezere,  he  had  opened  two  new  lines  of  retreat  towards  the 
Spanish  frontier,  one  through  Castello  Branco,  the  other  by 
the  Estrada  Nova  to  Belmonte.  He  also  preserved  the  power 
of  resuming  offensive  operations,  whether  by  a  passage  of  the 
Tagus  on  his  left,  or  by  turning  the  Monte  Junta  on  his  right, 
and  thus  paralysing  the  allied  army  he  appeared,  even  in 
retreating,  to  act  on  the  offensive.  His  first  dispositions  were 
however  faulty  in  detail.  From  Santarem  to  the  nearest 
division  of  Junot's  corps  was  ten  or  twelve  miles,  and  the 
British  general  might  thus  turn  Reynier's  right,  and  cut  him 
off  from  the  rest  of  the  army ;  and  indeed  Reynier,  fearing 
such  an  attempt,  had  hastened  off'  his  baggage  and  hospitals 
to  Golegao,  despatched  a  regiment  up  the  Rio  Mayor  to 
watch  two  bridges  on  his  right,  and  called  for  succour.  It 
was  the  hurried  march  of  his  baggage  that  misled  Fane  to 
think  Massena  was  retreating  to  the  Zezere ;  and  at  the  time 
it  was  supposed  also  to  have  caused  the  dispositions  for 
attacking  Santarem;  but  from  the  despatches  it  would  appear 


Nov.  1810.]  BOOK  XL  — CHAP.    10.  63 

it  was  only  designed  to  ascertain  the  strength  of  the  French 
position.  However,  on  the  19th  Craufurd  was  sent  into  the 
plain  beyond  the  Eio  Mayor  to  menace  the  Santarem  heights  by 
the  sedgy  marsh,  while  Spencer  moved  against  the  causeway, 
and  Pack's  Portuguese  and  the  cavalry,  crossing  the  upper 
river  at  the  bridges  of  Saliero  and  Subajeiro,  menaced 
Reynier's  right:  the  skirmishers  of  the  light  division  were 
actually  engaged  when  it  became  known  that  Pack's  guns 
had  not  reached  him,  and  the  troops  regained  their  former 
ground. 

Massena's  resolution  to  hold  his  ground  was  evident. 
Every  advantageous  point  was  occupied,  the  sentinels  re- 
turned the  fire  of  the  skirmishers,  strong  reserves,  some 
in  arms,  some  cooking  were  descried,  the  strokes  of  the 
hatchet  and  the  fall  of  trees  resounded  in  the  woods  clothing 
the  Santarem  hills,  and  the  commencement  of  a  triple  line 
of  abattis  with  the  fresh  earth  of  entrenchments  were  dis- 
cernible. The  demonstrations  were  renewed  next  day,  yet 
soon  ceased,  and  Hill  was  ordered  to  halt  at  Chamusca,  on 
the  left  bank  of  the  Tagus.  Craufurd,  however,  still  thought 
a  rear-guard  only  was  at  Santarem;  his  spirit  was  chafed, 
he  seized  a  musket,  and,  followed  by  a  serjeant,  advanced  in 
the  night  along  the  causeway  to  commence  a  personal  skir- 
mish with  the  French  piquet:  he  escaped  from  its  fire 
miraculously  and  came  back  convinced  that  Massena  was  not 
in  flight. 

Wellington  was  preparing  forcibly  to  examine  the  French 
right  on  the  22nd,  when  Massena,  having  ordered  Reynier's 
baggage  to  return,  directed  Clausel  to  drive  back  the  allies' 
posts  near  the  town  of  Rio  Mayor.  This  counter-stroke  caused 
Spencer  and  Pack  to  be  withdrawn  to  Cartaxo,  and  the  light 
division  also  was  held  in  readiness  to  retreat.  In  truth, 
Massena  was  only  to  be  assailed  by  holding  Reynier  in  check 
at  the  Ponte  Seca,  while  a  powerful  mass  penetrated  by 
Tremes  and  Pernes;  but  heavy  rains  rendered  those  roads 
impracticable,  and  the  position  of  Santarem  was  maintained 
in  quiet  for  several  months.  For  this  both  generals  have  been 
censured,  but  it  may  be  shown  that  they  acted  wisely  and  like 
great  captains.  Massena,  without  any  extreme  dissemination, 


64  PENINSULA  WAR.  [Nov.  1810. 

menaced  several  points  and  commanded  two  distinct  lines  of 
retreat;  but  he  had  other  objects  also  in  view;  he  expected 
detachments  and  convoys  from  Castille,  and  the  ninth  corps, 
which  had  lately  been  placed  under  his  orders ;  his  position, 
touching  upon  Leiria  and  the  Zezere,  enabled  him  to  give  his 
hand  to  these  reinforcements  and  convoys,  either  by  the  line 
of  the  Mondego  or  that  of  Belmonte  and  the  Estrada  Nova; 
and  at  the  same   time  he  could  communicate   with   troops 
coming  from  Andalusia.     He  was  undoubtedly  open  to  a  dan- 
gerous  attack    between   Santarem   and   Alcanhete;    but   he 
thought  himself  safe  from  such  a  decisive  operation  by  an 
army  composed  of  three  different  nations  and  unpractised  in 
great  evolutions.     Guided  by  a  long  experience,  he  calculated 
upon  moral  causes  with  confidence,  and  he  who  cannot  do  so 
is  but  half  a  general.     Like  a  great  commander  he  counted 
likewise  upon  the  political  effect  his  menacing  attitude  would 
produce.     While  he  maintained  Santarem,   he   appeared   to 
besiege  Lisbon,  and  encouraged   the   disaffected,   who  were 
expected  to  rise ;  and  he  prolonged  the  sufferings  of  the  capital : 
forty  thousand  persons  are  said  to  have  died  from  privations 
within  the  lines  during  the  winter  of  1810.     He  thus  shook 
the  English  influence  in  Portugal,  and  so  obscured  the  future, 
that  few  men  had  sagacity  to  judge  rightly.     At  this  period 
also,  the  illness  of  George  the  Third,  reviving  the  question  of 
a  regency  in  England,  had  strengthened  the  opposition  in  par- 
liament,  and  Massena's  position  supported  their  arguments 
against  the  war.     Wherefore  he  did  right  to  hold  his  ground : 
and  if  he  committed  errors  early  in  the  campaign,  he  now 
proved  himself  a  daring,  able,  and  pertinacious  commander. 

On  the  English  general's  side  the  difficulties  were  so  great 
that  a  battle  was  equally  to  be  desired  and  dreaded.  Desired 
because  victory  would  silence  opponents  in  England  and  Por- 
tugal, and  enable  him  to  dictate  to  the  ministers  instead  of 
struggling  incessantly  against  their  fears.  It  would  relieve 
the  misery  of  the  Portuguese  people  from  their  horrible  suf- 
ferings ;  and  was  also  to  be  desired,  lest  a  second  and  a  third 
army,  now  gathering  in  Castille  and  in  Andalusia,  should 
reach  Massena  and  again  shut  up  the  allies  in  their  works. 
Dreaded,  because  a  defeat  or  even  a  repulse  would  have  ruined 


Nov.  1810.]  BOOK   XL  — CHAP.  10.  65 

the  cause;  for  it  was  at  this  period  the  disputes  relative  to  the 
lines  at  Almada  were  most  violent,  and  the  slightest  disaster 
would  have  placed  the  patriarch  at  the  head  of  a  national 
party.  Dreaded,  because  of  the  regency  discussion  in  Eng- 
land, as  a  serious  check  would  have  caused  the  Whigs  to  triumph, 
and  the  troops  would  have  been  withdrawn  from  Portugal. 
So  powerful  indeed  was  the  opposition,  and  so  much  did  the 
ministers  dread  its  cry  for  economy,  that,  forgetting  the  army 
in  their  keen  love  of  place,  they  actually  issued  orders  to  dis- 
charge all  the  transport  ships  to  save  expense  !  In  fine,  the 
prime  minister  Perceval,  with  that  narrow  cunning  and  selfish 
spirit  which  marked  his  whole  public  career,  was,  to  use  an 
expression  of  his  own,  starving  the  war  in  the  Peninsula, 
despite  of  lord  Wellesley's  indignant  resistance  in  the  cabinet, 
and  lord  Wellington's  energetic  remonstrances  from  the 
field. 

In  this  balanced  state,  it  was  essential  that  the  battle  should 
not  be  fought  except  on  terms  of  advantage,  and  those  terms 
were  not  to  be  had.  Wellington,  reinforced  from  Halifax  and 
England,  had  indeed  more  than  seventy  thousand  men  under 
arms,  and  the  enemy  not  more  than  fifty  thousand ;  neverthe- 
less, the  latter  could  from  the  advantage  of  position  bring 
more  soldiers  into  the  fight.  The  Portuguese  army  had  in  six 
months  lost  four  thousand  men  by  death,  four  thousand  by 
discharges,  and  ten  thousand  by  desertion.  Thirty  thousand 
recruits  had  come  in,  therefore  the  numbers  were  increased, 
but  efficiency  for  great  operations  was  diminished ;  and  every 
department  was  neglected  by  a  government  which  neither  paid 
nor  fed  its  soldiers.  The  Spanish  auxiliaries,  ill-governed  and 
turbulent,  quarrelled  with  the  Portuguese,  and  their  generals 
were  not  able  in  war  nor  amenable  to  better  officers.  The 
heights  of  Almada  being  naked,  twelve  thousand  men  were 
required  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Tagus,  and  two  British  divi- 
sions were  necessarily  kept  in  the  lines,  because  the  French  at 
Alcanhete  were  nearer  to  Torres  Vedras  than  the  allies  were 
at  Cartaxo.  Keynier  also  might  break  out  from  Santarem 
during  an  attack  on  Pernes,  wherefore  ten  thousand  men  were  - 
wanting  to  hold  him  in  check ;  and  thus  the  disposable  troops, 
comprehending  soldiers  of  three  nations  and  many  recruits3 

VOL.  in.  F 


66  PENINSULA   WAR.  [Nov    1810. 

would  have  fallen  short  of  forty-five  thousand :  but  Massena 
could  bring  nearly  all  his  men  to  one  point,  because  a  few 
would  have  sufficed  to  watch  the  British  division  on  the  left 
of  the  Tagus  and  at  Santarem. 

"Wellington's  experience  was  not  at  this  period  equal  to  his 
adversary's;  and  the  attack  was  to  be  made  in  a  heavy  difficult 
country,  where  the  Alviella,  the  Almonda,  and  other  rivers, 
greatly  swelled  by  incessant  rain,  furnished  a  succession  of 
defensive  lines  to  Massena,  and  in  case  of  defeat  the  means  of 
carrying  off  two-thirds  of  his  army.     Victory  might  crown  the 
attempt,  but  the  stakes  were  unequal.    If  Massena  lost  a  third 
of  his  force,  the  ninth  corps  could  have  replaced  it.     If  the 
allies  failed,  the  lines  were  gone  and  with  them  the  whole 
Peninsula.     Wellington  thought  the  relief  of  the   northern 
provinces,  perhaps  of  Andalusia,  would  reward  a  victory";  but 
those  objects  might  be  obtained  without  fighting,  and  a  battle 
would  bring  the  greatest  part  of  the  French  troops  in  Spain 
upon  him  without  bringing  the   Spaniards  to  his  side.     '  I 
cannot  forget,'  he  wrote  to  lord  Liverpool,  '  that  last  year  I 
brought  upon  myself  and  general  Cuesta  not  less  than  five 
corps  d'arm^e,  and  the  king's  guards  and  reserve,  more  than 
equal  to  a  sixth  corps ;  and  when  Castille  and  the  north  of 
Spain  was  cleared  of  the  enemy,  not  a  man  was  put  in  the 
field  by  those  provinces,  nor  even  one  raised !'     These  things 
considered,  it  was  judged  better  to  remain  on  the  defensive,  to 
strengthen  the  lines,  to  forward  the  works  at  Almada,  to  per- 
fect the  discipline  of  the  Portuguese  troops,  to  improve  the 
organization  of  the  militia  in  rear  of  the  enemy,  and  to  remedy 
the  evils  occasioned  by  the  patriarch's  faction.    Amongst  those 
evils,  the  destitution  of  the  fortresses  was  so  prominent,  that 
at  one  moment  the  drawing  off  the  garrison  from  Abrantes  to 
prevent  the  men  from  starving,  seemed  inevitable. 

In  this  defensive  view  of  affairs  the  light  division,  supported 
by  a  brigade  of  cavalry,  occupied  El  Valle  and  the  heights 
overlooking  the  marsh  and  inundation.  The  bridge  at  the 
English  end  of  the  causeway  was  mined,  and  a  sugar-loaf 
hill,  looking  straight  down  the  approach,  was  crowned  with 
embrasures  for  artillery,  and  laced  in  front  with  a  zig-zag  covered 
way  capable  of  containing  five  hundred  infantry ;  the  cause- 


Nov.  1810.]  BOOK   XL  — CHAP.    10.  67 

way  being  thus  blocked,  the  French  could  not  while  the  waters 
were  out  make  any  sudden  irruption  from  Santarem.  On  the 
left  of  the  light  division,  posts  were  extended  along  the  inun- 
dation to  Malhorquija,  and  thence  by  a  range  of  heights  to  Rio 
Mayor.  Behind  the  latter  place,  Anson's  cavalry  watched  the 
roads  leading  from  Pernes  and  Alcanhede;  and  in  rear  of 
Anson,  an  entrenched  position  at  Alcoentre  was  occupied  by 
a  division  of  infantry.  Thus  all  the  roads  leading  upon  the 
lines  between  the  Tagus  and  the  Monte  Junta,  were  secured 
by  what  are  technically  called  heads  of  cantonments,  under 
cover  of  which  the  troops  took  winter  quarters.  The  first 
division  and  head- quarters  were  at  Cartaxo,  a  few  miles  behind 
El  Valle ;  some  troops  were  kept  at  Alemquer  and  Sobral,  and 
Torres  Vedras  was  occupied  in  force,  lest  the  enemy  should 
make  a  sudden  march  round  the  Monte  Junta.  Massena  was 
building  boats,  he  had  fortified  a  post  at  Tancos  on  the  Tagus, 
and  expected  with  impatience  a  convoy,  escorted  by  five  thou- 
sand men,  which  Gardanne  was  conducting  fromCiudad  Rodrigo. 
This  force,  consisting  of  detachments  and  convalescents  left  in 
Castille  when  the  army  entered  Portugal,  had  marched  by 
Belmonte  and  the  Estrada  Nova,  and  was  at  Cardijos  the  27th, 
within  a  few  leagues  of  the  French  brigades  on  the  Zezere.  A 
cavalry  patrole  on  either  side  would  have  opened  the  communi- 
cation and  secured  the  junction.  But  Gardanne,  harassed  by 
the  ordenanga,  and  deceived  by  a  rumour  that  Hill  was  in 
Abrantes  to  move  against  him,  suddenly  retreated  upon  Sabugal 
with  such  haste  and  blindness  that  he  sacrificed  a  part  of  his 
convoy,  and  lost  many  men.  Hill  was  not  at  Abrantes,  yet  it  is 
remarkable  that  Wellington  had  contemplated  sending  him 
there  to  make  an  attack  upon  the  French  posts  beyond  the 
Zezere,  and  the  advance  of  Gardanne's  column,  the  strength 
of  which  he  could  not  clearly  ascertain,  deterred  him ! 

Notwithstanding  this  event,  Massena  continued  to  strengthen 
his  position  at  Santarem,  which  enabled  him  to  draw  the  bulk 
of  his  forces  to  his  right,  and  push  his  marauding  excursions 
in  a  daring  manner.  General  Ferey,  crossing  the  Zezere  with 
a  strong  detachment  of  the  sixth  corps,  foraged  as  far  as 
Castello  Branco  without  difficulty,  and  returned  without  loss. 
Junot  occupied  Leiria  and  Ourem  with  detachments,  and  en- 

F  2 


6ft  PENINSULA  WAR.  [DEO.  1810. 

deavoured  to  surprise  Coimbra,  but  Trant  baffled  that  project. 
Drouet  made  movements  avowedly  to  invade  the  Tras  os 
Montes,  but  on  the  22nd  he  occupied  the  line  of  the  Coa  with 
the  ninth  corps,  and  Massena's  patroles  appeared  again  on  the 
Mondego  above  Coimbra,  making  inquiries  about  the  fords. 
At  the  same  time  the  spies  reported  that  a  great  re-union  of 
forces  from  the  south  was  to  take  place  near  Madrid,  which 
gave  reason  to  fear  that  Massena  intended  to  file  behind  the 
Mondego  and  seize  Oporto;  or  that  the  expected  reinforce- 
ments would  enable  him  to  throw  bridges  over  the  Mondego 
and  occupy  the  northern  country  without  quitting  his  present 
position.     A  tenth  corps  was  forming  at  Burgos,  the  head  of 
the  fifth  corps  was  again  in  Estremadura,  the  French  boats 
at  Punhete  and  Barquina  were  numerous  and  large,  and  in  all 
parts  there  was  evidence  of  great  forces   assembling   for  a 
mighty  effort  on  both  sides  of  the  Tagus.     Wellington  calcu- 
lated that  more  than  forty  thousand  fresh  troops  would  co- 
operate with  Massena,  and  had  made  preparation  accordingly. 
An  outward  line  of  defence  from  Aldea  Gallega  to  Setuval  was 
in  a  forward  state,  and  a  chain  of  forts  parallel  to  the  Tagus 
was  being  constructed;  Abrantes,  Palmella,  and  St.  Felippe 
de    Setuval   were    at    last    provisioned,   and    the   works    of 
Alhandra,  Aruda  and  Monte  Agra$a  were  strengthened,  so 
as  to  defy  any  force.     Lord  Liverpool  was  urged  to  send  rein- 
forcements, and  five  thousand  men  from  England  and  three 
regiments  from  Sicily  were  embarked  for  Lisbon.     Soult  was 
now  collecting  a  force  behind  the  Morena,  the  troops  on  the 
left  of  the  Tagus  were  therefore  augmented,  and  as  general 
Hill  was  sick,  Beresford  took  the  command.    He  had  eighteen 
guns  two  divisions  of  infantry  and  five  regiments  of  cavalry, 
in  all  fourteen  thousand  men,  exclusive  of  Carlos  d'Espana's 
brigade,  which  being  at  Abrantes  was  also  under  his  orders, 
yet  so  troublesome  and  so  ill- behaved,  that  lord  Wellington, 
who  had  not  asked  for   their  assistance,  threatened  to  send 
them  out  of  Portugal. 

To  prevent  Massena  passing  the  Tagus,  and  to  intercept 
communication  between  him  and  Soult,  to  join  the  main 
body  of  the  army  by  Vellada  if  in  retreat,  by  Abrantes  if  in 
advance,  were  the  instructions  given  to  Beresford ;  whose  head- 


DEC.  1810.]  BOOK  XL  — CHAP.    10.  69 

quarters  were  at  Chamusca,  his  troops  being  disposed  along 
the  Tagus  from  Almeyrim,  by  Chamusca,  to  the  mouth  of  the 
Zezere.  Signals  for  communication  were  then  established, 
the  roads  leading  to  Spanish  Estremadura  were  scoured,  a 
sure  intercourse  was  opened  with  Elvas  and  other  frontier 
fortresses,  and  good  sources  of  intelligence  were  organized  at 
Golegao,  Santarem,  and  Thomar.  Batteries  opposite  the 
mouth  of  the  Zezere  were  also  constructed,  but, 
against  the  advice  of  the  engineers,  at  too  great 
distance  from  the  river,  and  in  other  respects 
unsuitably:  French  craft  dropped  down  towards  Santarem 
without  hindrance,  until  colonel  Colborne,  of  the  sixty-sixth 
regiment,  moored  of  his  own  accord  a  guard-boat  close  to  the 
mouth  of  the  Zezere,  and  disposed  fires  in  such  a  manner  on 
the  banks  of  the  Tagus  that  nothing  could  pass  without  being 
observed. 

On  the  right  of  the  Tagus,  the  country  between  Alcanhete 
and  the  Ponte  Seca  continued  impracticable  from  the  rain, 
and  both  armies  were  of  necessity  tranquil.  Anson's  cavalry, 
however,  acting  in  concert  with  major  Fenwick,  who  came 
down  from  Obidos  towards  Rio  Mayor,  harassed  the  enemy's 
foraging  parties ;  and  in  the  Upper  Beira  several  actions  took 
place  with  the  militia,  which  must  be  noticed  as  essential 
parts  of  the  combinations.  Drouet  had  been  so  delayed 
scouring  Biscay  and  Upper  Castille,  in  his  progress  towards 
Massena,  that  he  lost  all  connexion  with  the  army,  and  this 
enabled  the  partidas  of  Leon  so  to  molest  Serras  that  the  Tras 
os  Montes  was  unmenaced ;  wherefore,  Silveira,  falling  down  on 
the  lower  Douro,  invested  Almeida  the  29th  of  October,  and 
made  an  unsuccessful  attempt  to  surprise  a  French  post  at 
San  Felices.  However,  in  November,  Drouet  reached  Ciudad 
Rodrigo  with  a  large  convoy  for  Massena,  which  Wellington 
was  anxious  to  intercept,  and  with  that  view  directed  Silveira 
to  waylay  it,  ordering  Miller  to  be  at  Viseu  in  support  on 
the  16th.  But  on  the  13th  general  Gardanne,  who  had  charge 
of  the  convoy  with  four  thousand  infantry  and  some  squadrons, 
raised  the  blockade  of  Almeida,  and  being  supported  by 
Drouet  with  the  ninth  corps  proceeded  towards  Penamacor. 
Silveira  fell  upon  him  while  in  march  and  took  many 


70  PENINSULA    WAR.  [DEC.  1810. 

prisoners,  but  finding  Garclanne  too  strong  retired  on  the 
17th  to  Trancoso  where  he  found  Miller.  Gardanne  then 
pursued  his  march  and,  as  before  related,  after  reaching  Car- 
digos  retreated  in  a  panic.  At  that  time  Drouet  had  no  order 
to  place  his  corps  under  Massena's  command,  but,  being 
urged  by  Foy,  moved  forwards,  first  spreading  the  report 
before  noticed  that  his  design  was  to  invade  the  Tras  os 
Montes.  On  the  17th  of  December  he  passed  the  Coa,  and 
the  22nd  reached  Gouvea  with  fourteen  thousand  infantry 
and  two  thousand  horsemen;  from  thence  he  detached  Clapa- 
rede's  division  and  the  cavalry  to  drive  Silveira  from  Trancoso, 
and  with  the  rest  of  his  troops  marched  on  the  Ponte  Mur- 
cella. 

Hitherto  lord  Wellington's  communications  with  general 
Baccellar  had  been  through  Trant  on  the  side  of  Coimbra, 
and  through  Wilson  on  that  of  Espinal  and  Abrantes;  this 
advance  of  the  ninth  corps  forced  Wilson  to  cross  the  Mon- 
dego,  and  Drouet  having  effected  his  junction  with  Massena  by 
Espinal,  then  occupied  Leiria,  and  spreading  towards  the  sea  cut 
off  all  communication  between  the  allies  and  the  northern 
provinces.  On  the  2nd  of  January,  Trant  intercepted  a  letter 
from  him  to  Claparede,  giving  an  account  of  his  own  arrival 
and  the  state  of  Massena's  army;  he  spoke  also  of  a  great 
operation  being  in  contemplation,  said  the  fifth  corps  was 
expected  in  the  Alemtejo,  and  directed  Claparede  to  seize 
Guarda,  forage  the  neighbouring  villages,  watch  the  road  of 
Belmonte,  and  if  Silveira  was  troublesome  to  crush  him.  That 
vain  insufficient  man  had  already  attacked  Claparede  near  Trau- 
coso,  was  defeated  with  loss,  and  as  Oporto  was  thus  laid  open, 
Baccellar  called  Trant  and  Miller  to  its  succour.  The  last  had 
re-crossed  the  Mondego  and  taken  a  hundred  of  Drouet's 
stragglers,  but  both  hurried  towards  Oporto,  now  in  serious 
danger;  for  Silveira  having  again  provoked  Claparede  was 
driven  over  the  Douro,  and  the  French  general  seized  Lamego : 
Baccellar  however  brought  up  his  reserve  to  the  Pavia,  Miller 
and  Trant  reached  Castro  d'Airo,  and  then  Claparede  returned 
to  Moimenta  de  Beira  followed  by  Wilson. 

Meanwhile  Drouet's  momentary  presence  in  Leon  had 
enabled  Serras  to  menace  the  Tras  os  Montes,  which  drew 


DEC.  1810.]  BOOK   Xt  — CHAP.    10.  *I\ 

Silveira  back  to  Braganca,  and  Miller  died  at  Viseu.  Trant 
and  Wilson  continued  in  Beira,  but  Claparede  entering  Guarda 
seized  Covilhao,  and  Foy  with  three  thousand  convalescents, 
gathered  from  Massena's  hospitals  in  Castille,  was  again  in 
Portugal  on  his  return  from  Paris.  He  had  encountered  many 
perils,  and  at  Pancorbo  only  escaped  from  the  partidas  with 
the  loss  of  half  his  escort  and  his  despatches ;  and  now  at 
Enxabarda,  notwithstanding  Claparede's  vicinity,  he  was  so 
harassed  by  colonel  Grant  with  a  corps  of  ordenanca  from  the 
Lower  Beira,  that  three  hundred  of  his  men  died  on  the 
mountain  from  cold,  yet  he  finally  reached  Santarem,  where 
affairs  were  coming  to  a  crisis. 

During  December  and  January,  the  country  being  more  or 
less  flooded,  the  armies  remained  quiet,  and  Wellington, 
hearing  that  a  serious  attack  on  Cadiz  was  at  hand,  prepared 
to  send  some  British  regiments  to  the  assistance  of  that  place. 
Massena  had  meanwhile  strengthened  his  works,  reinforced 
his  outposts,  and  extended  his  marauders  in  proportion  to  his 
increasing  necessities.  Both  generals  watched  Rio  Mayor 
with  jealousy  as  the  season  advanced  and  the  roads  became 
firmer,  and  when  some  reinforcements  landed  at  Lisbon, 
Massena  thinking  the  allies  were  concentrating  at  Alcoentre, 
sent  Junot  to  drive  their  outposts  back  from  Rio  Mayor  and 
probe  the  state  of  affairs  :  a  general  attack  was  expected,  but 
after  a  skirmish,  thmot  returned  with  a  wound  which  disabled 
him  for  the  rest  of  the  campaign.  Soon  afterwards  six  thou- 
sand French  scoured  all  the  country  beyond  the  Zezere,  and 
found  considerable  stores  concealed  near  Pedragoa;  thence 
they  marched  to  the  Mondego  and  carried  off  from  below 
Coimbra  four  hundred  oxen  and  two  thousand  sheep  intended 
for  the  allies.  These  excursions  gave  rise  to  horrible  excesses, 
which  broke  down  the  discipline  of  the  French  army,  and 
were  not  always  executed  with  impunity ;  the  British  cavalry 
at  various  times  redeemed  many  cattle,  and  brought  in  a  con- 
siderable number  of  prisoners,  amongst  them  Clausel's  aid-de- 
camp. 

Massena  also  organized  a  secret  communication  with  Lisbon, 
through  the  Portuguese  general  Pamplona,  who  effected  it  by 
the  help  of  the  fidalgos  in  that  capital ;  their  agents,  under 


72  PENINSULA   WAR  [l8lO. 

pretence  of  selling  sugar  at  Thomar  and  Torres  Novas,  passed 
by  the  road  of  Caldas,  and  through  the  mountains  of  Pedragoa; 
and  it  was  suspected  this  treason  extended  to  the  provisioning 
of  the  enemy  on  so  large  a  scale  as  to  be  one  of  the  resources 
which  enabled  Massena  so  long  to  brave  the  difficulties  of  his 
position.  Certain  it  is  that  herds  of  cattle  were  often  placed 
in  his  way  under  circumstances  raising  doubts  if  it  could  be 
done  without  design.  On  the  other  hand,  lord  Wellington 
had  secret  intelligence  with  a  French  officer  of  high  rank,  and 
thus  both  generals  had  excellent  information.  In  this  manner 
hostilities  were  carried  on,  each  commander  impatiently  waiting 
for  reinforcements  which  should  enable  him  to  act  offensively : 
how  both  were  disappointed,  and  how  other  events,  hitherto 
unnoticed,  bore  upon  the  plans  of  each,  must  be  the  subject  of 
another  book. 

OBSERVATIONS. 

1°.  '  War  is  not  a  conjectural  art.'  Massena  conjectured  the 
allies  would  not  stand  in  front  of  Lisbon,  that  the  militia 
would  not  attack  Coimbra ;  but  the  battle  of  Busaco  and  the 
capture  of  his  hospitals  evinced  the  soundness  of  the  maxim. 
Again,  he  conjectured  the  English  would  re-embark  if  pressed, 
and  the  lines  put  an  end  to  that  dream.  Then  he  awoke  and 
made  war  like  a  great  man,  more  formidable  with  reduced 
means  and  in  difficulties,  than  he  had  been  when  opportunity 
was  rife  and  his  numbers  untouched.  His  stay  at  Santarem 
showed  what  thirty  thousand  additional  troops  acting  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Tagus  would  have  done.  Had  they  reached 
the  heights  of  Almada  before  admiral  Berkeley's  error  was  dis- 
covered, the  supply  of  provisions  from  Alemtejo  and  from 
Spain,  would  have  been  transferred  from  Lisbon  to  the  French 
armies ;  the  fleet  would  have  been  driven  from  the  Tagus,  and 
then  the  misery  of  the  inhabitants,  the  fears  of  the  British 
cabinet,  the  machinations  of  the  patriarch,  and  the  little  chance 
of  final  success,  would  probably  have  forced  the  British  general 
to  abandon  the  country. 

2°.  It  has  been  said  Massena  might  in  the  first  week  have 
passed  the  Tagus,  secured  the  resources  of  the  Alemtejo,  and 
driven  the  British  fleet  out  of  the  port.  This  was  not  so 


1810.]  BOOK  XI.  — CHAP.   10.  73 

practicable  as  supposed ;  tlie  rains  were  heavy,  the  fords  im- 
passable, and  the  French  had  not  boats  sufficient  for  a  bridge ; 
to  detach  a  small  force  would  have  been  useless,  to  detach 
largely  dangerous ;  to  collect  boats,  cast  a  bridge,  and  raise 
the  entrenchments  necessary  to  defend  it  in  the  face  of  the 
allied  forces,  would  have  been  neither  safe  nor  sure :  moreover, 
Massena  would  thus  have  relinquished  the  certain  aid  of  the 
ninth  for  the  uncertain  assistance  of  the  fifth  corps. 

3°.  It  has  been  said  lord  Wellington  might  have  strait- 
ened the  enemy's  quarters  more  effectually  at  Santarem; 
that  Hill's  corps,  passing  through  Abrantes,  could  have 
destroyed  the  bridges  at  Punhete,  lined  the  Zezere,  cut  off 
Massena's  reinforcements,  and  forced  him  to  abandon  his  posi- 
tions, or  even  to  capitulate.  This  argument  held  at  the  time 
by  colonel  Squire,  an  engineer  of  ability,  well  acquainted  with 
the  localities,  merits  examination.  A  partial  attack  of  this 
nature  was  contemplated  by  lord  Wellington,  but  a  successful 
result  on  the  larger  design  of  colonel  Squire  was  not  certain. 
While  the  lines  of  Almada  were  unfinished,  to  leave  the  Tagus 
unguarded  before  an  enemy  who  possessed  eighty  large  boats, 
exclusive  of  those  forming  the  bridges  on  the  Zezere,  would 
have  been  rash.  Hill's  corps  must  therefore  have  been  replaced, 
and  then  the  force  before  Santarem  would  have  been  so  weak 
as  to  invite  attack,  to  the  danger  of  the  lines.  Nor  was  the 
forcing  of  the  French  works  at  Punhete  a  sure  matter ;  the 
ground  was  strong,  there  were  two  French  bridges  on  the 
Zezere,  and  Ney  might  have  passed  at  Martinchel  and  taken 
Hill  in  flank. 

4°.  Colonel  Squire,  at  a  later  period,  miscalculating  the 
enemy's  numbers  at  thirty  thousand  men,  and  the  allies  at 
more  than  seventy  thousand,  proposed  that  Beresford  should 
cross  the  Tagus  at  Azingha  behind  the  Almonda  river,  and 
march  upon  Golegao,  while  Wellington,  concentrating  at  Rio 
Mayor,  pushed  upon  Torres  Novas.  Seventy  thousand  men 
would  thus,  in  a  single  march,  have  been  placed  in  the  midst 
of  the  enemy's  extended  quarters ;  but  the  hand  of  Napoleon 
could  scarcely  have  launched  such  a  thunderbolt.  Massena 
had  fifty  thousand  fighting-men,  the  boats  from  Abrantes 
must  have  come  down  to  pass  the  Ta^us,  and  the  concentra- 


U  PENINSULA  WAft.  [l8H>. 

tion  of  troops  at  Rio  Mayor  could  scarcely  have  escaped  the 
enemy's  notice.  Exact  concert,  in  point  of  time,  was  essential, 
but  Junot  could  have  held  the  allies  in  check  on  the  Alviella, 
while  Reynier  from  Santarem,  and  Ney  from  Thomar,  crushed 
Beresford  between  the  Almonda  and  the  Tagus ;  moreover  the 
roads  about  Tremes  were  impassable  from  rain  during  December, 
and  in  January,  Soult,  whose  operations  are  now  to  be  related, 
was  menacing  the  Alemtejo.  A  disaster  would  at  this  time 
have  relieved  the  enemy's  difficulties,  when  nothing  else  could. 
Wellington,  convinced  of  this,  earnestly  wished  Masseua  to 
retire ;  and  was  so  far  from  desiring  to  hem  him  in  and  force 
a  battle,  that  he  doubted  if  he  had  not  already  rendered  his 
line  of  retreat  too  difficult  by  the  operations  of  the  northern 
militia.  A  campaign  is  like  other  works  of  art,  accessories 
however  splendid  must  be  rejected  when  not  conducive  to  the 
main  object.  That  judgment  which  duly  classes  the  value  of 
every  feasible  operation  is  the  best  quality  of  a  general.  Lord 
Wellington  possessed  it  in  a  remarkable  degree  and  to  it  his 
genius  and  his  courage  were  made  subservient :  without  that 
mental  balance,  he  might  have  performed  many  brilliant 
exploits  in  the  Peninsula,  but  he  could  never  have  conducted 
the  war  to  a  successful  end. 


OCT.    1810.]       -         BOOK   Xn.— CHAP.    1.  75 


BOOK   THE  TWELFTH. 


CHAPTER  I. 

SPANISH  affairs  so  deeply  affected  the  operations  in  Portugal 
that  some  account  of  them  is  absolutely  necessary.  The 
general  defensive  line  of  the  allies  presented  a  great  crescent, 
extending  from  Corufia  to  Cadiz,  in  the  concave  of  which  the 
French  armies  were  operating.  Their  main  body  menaced 
Lisbon,  the  most  important  point ;  if  checked  there  they  could 
reinforce  it  from  the  wings,  unless  the  allies  at  the  horns  of 
the  crescent  acted  vigorously  upon  a  system  which  the  har- 
bours and  fortresses  at  each  extremity  indicated  as  suitable 
for  those  who  possessed  the  absolute  command  of  the  sea.  A 
British  army  and  fleet  were  therefore  established  at  Cadiz,  a 
squadron  of  frigates  at  Corufia,  and  how  far  this  warfare 
relieved  the  pressure  on  lord  Wellington  shall  now  be 
shown. 

Mahi's  Gallicians,  usually  hanging  on  the  borders  of  Leon, 
were  always  reported  above  twenty  thousand  men  when  arms 
or  stores  were  demanded  from  England ;  but  there  were  never 
more  than  ten  or  twelve  thousand  in  line.  They  suffered 
Serras'  division,  only  eight  thousand  strong,  to  spread  over 
the  plains  of  Leon,  from  Benevente  to  the  Agueda  during 
Massena's  advance;  and  the  arrival  of  the  ninth  corps,  in 
October,  quite  paralysed  them,  while  the  partidas  often  sur- 
prised both  posts  and  convoys. 

Behind  Mahi  was  a  second  army,  about  six  thousand  strong, 
embodied  to  defend  the  coast  line  towards  the  Asturias ;  and  in 
the  latter  province,  eight  thousand  men,  including  the  irregular 
bands  of  Porlier  and  other  chiefs,  constantly  watched  the 
movements  of  Bonnet's  division.  This  general  frequently 


76  PENINSULA  WAR.  [OCT.  isio. 

mastered  but  could  never  hold  the  Asturias,  because  the 
country  is  a  long  defile  lying  between  the  great  mountains  and 
the  sea,  and  being  crossed  by  a  succession  of  parallel  ridges 
and  rivers,  is  admirably  calculated  for  partisan  warfare  in  con- 
nexion with  a  fleet.  If  he  penetrated  towards  Gallicia,  British 
and  Spanish  frigates  from  Coruna,  landing  troops  at  the  ports 
of  Gihon,  Santander,  or  Santona,  could  form  a  junction  with 
the  great  bands  of  Longa,  Mina,  and  Amor,  and  excite  insur- 
rections on  his  rear.  In  this  manner,  when  he  had  defeated 
Ponte,  at  Sales,  just  before  Massena's  invasion  of  Portugal, 
Porlier  forced  him  to  withdraw  from  Castropol;  and  the 
advantage  of  such  operations  being  thus  shown,  sir  Home 
Popham  and  general  Walker  were  sent  to  direct  the  naval  and 
military  affairs  at  Coruna.  Preparations  were  then  made  to 
embark  a  large  force  under  Renovales,  for  an  attack  on  San- 
tona and  Santander,  the  partidas  of  the  interior  being  to 
co-operate;  a  battalion  of  marines  from  England  was  to  form 
the  garrison  of  Santona  when  taken,  and  Mahi  promised  to 
co-operate  by  an  incursion  along  the  coast.  But  Serras 
threatened  the  frontier  of  Gallicia,  Mahi  remained  in  suspense, 
and  this  with  the  usual  procrastination  of  the  Spaniards,  and 
the  late  arrival  of  Popham,  delayed  the  expedition  until 
October,  although  Porlier,  Escadron,  and  other  chiefs  had 
commenced  an  isolated  attack  in  the  beginning  of  September. 
Finally,  Serras  returned  to  Zamora,  Mahi  sent  a  division  into 
Leon,  and  Bonnet,  aware  of  the  preparations  at  Coruna,  fell 
back  towards  Santander,  leaving  only  a  post  at  Gihon. 

On  the  16th  of  October  Eenovales  sailed  with  thirteen 
hundred  men.  He  was  accompanied  by  Walker,  who  carried 
ten  thousand  stand  of  arms  and  ammunition,  and  on  the  19th, 
they  captured  in  Gihon  some  French  vessels,  while  Porlier  on 
the  land  side,  took  some  treasure  and  eighty  prisoners. 
Renovales  then  proceeded  to  Santona,  but  tempests  impeded 
his  landing,  and  the  2nd  of  November  he  returned  to  Coruna 
with  only  eight  hundred  and  fifty  men ;  a  frigate  and  brig 
containing  the  remainder  of  his  men  had  foundered  in  a 
dreadful  gale,  which  destroyed  all  the  Spanish  naval  force 
along  the  coast,  and  wrecked  twelve  vessels  even  in  the  har- 
bour of  Coruna.  Mahi,  then  leaving  Toboado  Gil's  division  to 


18ia]  BOOK  XII.  — CHAP.   1.  77 

watch  Serras,  entered  the  Asturias,  and  being  joined  by  t2ie 
troops  of  that  province,  and  by  Kenovales,  was  very  superior 
to  the  French :  yet  he  effected  nothing,  and  Bonnet  re-estab- 
lished his  line  from  Gihon,  through  Oviedo,  to  the  borders  of 
Leon.  During  these  actions  the  junta  of  the  Asturias  remained 
distinguished  by  venality  and  indifference  to  the  public  good. 
Their  province  was  in  a  miserable  state,  the  powers  of  the 
British  naval  officers  on  the  coast  were  not  denned,  disputes 
arose  between  them  and  general  Walker,  and  the  junta  was 
thus  enabled  to  interfere  improperly  with  the  distribution  of 
the  English  stores.  Gallicia  was  comparatively  rich,  but  its 
junta,  culpably  inactive  in  the  discharge  of  duties 
and  oppressive,  disgusted  the  whole  province.  walker's 
During  the  winter  the  clergy  combined  to  oppose  MSS^' 
both  the  provincial  junta  and  the  general  Cortes ; 
and  they  assumed  such  a  menacing  attitude,  that  Mahi,  then 
in  the  Asturias,  dreaded  personal  violence,  and  applied  for  an 
English  vessel  to  take  him  to  Coruna.  One  Acuna  was  soon 
after  arrested  at  Ponferrada,  but  the  discontent  spread,  and 
the  army  was  more  employed  to  overawe  this  faction  than  to 
oppose  the  enemy.  Finally  Walker,  despairing  to  effect  any- 
thing useful,  desired  either  that  a  British  force  should  be 
placed  at  his  disposal,  or  that  he  might  join  the  army  in 
Portugal. 

These  expeditions  from  Coruna  naturally  increased  the 
audacity  of  the  inland  partidas,  who  became  really  dangerous 
only  when  they  had  a  sea-port  where  they  could  receive  sup- 
plies and  reinforcements,  or  by  embarking  save  themselves  in 
extremity  and  change  their  theatre  of  operations.  To  prevent 
this,  the  emperor  employed  many  men  in  the  military  govern- 
ments touching  on  the  Bay  of  Biscay,  and  directed  all  the 
reinforcements,  in  their  progress  towards  Portugal,  to  scour 
the  disturbed  countries  to  the  right  and  left.  The  ninth  corps 
had  been  thus  employed  during  the  months  of  August  and 
September,  but  when  it  passed  onwards  the  partidas  resumed 
their  activity.  Mina,  Longa,  Campillo,  and  Amor,  frequently 
united  about  Villar  Caya  and  Espinosa,  in  numbers  sufficient 
to  attack  large  French  detachments  with  success,  and  to  aid 
them,  Walker  repeatedly  recommended  that  Santona  should 


78  PENINSULA   WAR.  [1810 

be  occupied  with  British  troops  :  it  had  the  best  winter  har- 
bour along  the  coast,  was  built  on  a  mountain  promontory 
joined  to  the  main  by  a  narrow  sandy  neck,  and  could  have 
been  made  very  strong.  It  would  have  cut  Bonnet's  com- 
munication with  France  by  sea,  given  the  British  squadron  a 
secure  post  from  whence  to  vex  the  French  coasts,  and  fur- 
nished a  point  of  connexion  with  the  partidas  of  the  Rioja, 
Biscay,  and  Navarre. 

Lord  Liverpool,  swayed  by  these  considerations,  desired  to 
employ  four  thousand  men  to  secure  it  ;  but  lord  Wellington 
earnestly  dissuaded  him  from  such  maritime  operations.  'For,' 

said  he,  '  unless  a  very  large  force  be  sent,  it  will 
Letter  to  lord  ,     ,         ,,  '     . 

Liverpool,  7th    scarcely  be  able  to  ettect  a  landing  and  maintain 


MSS'  1811>       ^e  s^uation  °f  wm'cn  it  might  take  possession. 

Then  that  large  force  will  be  unable  to  move  or 
effect  any  object  at  all  adequate  to  the  expense,  or  to  the 
expectations  which  would  be  formed  from  its  strength,  owing 
to  the  want  of  those  equipments  and  supplies  in  which  an 
army  landed  from  its  ships  must  be  deficient.  It  is  vain  to 
hope  for  any  assistance,  even  in  this  way,  much  less  military 
assistance  from  the  Spaniards;  the  first  thing  they  will  require 
uniformly  will  be  money  ;  then  arms,  ammunition,  clothing  of 
all  descriptions,  provisions,  forage,  horses,  means  of  transport, 
and  everything  which  the  expedition  would  have  a  right  to 
require  from  them  ;  and  after  all,  this  extraordinary  and  per- 
verse people  will  scarcely  allow  the  commander  of  the  expedi- 
tion to  have  a  voice  in  the  plan  of  operations  to  be  followed 
when  the  whole  shall  be  ready  to  undertake  any,  if  indeed  they 
eyer  should  be  ready.' 

The  question  was  soon  set  at  rest,  Caffarelli's  reserve  and 
other  forces  entered  Spain,  Santona  was  seized  and  fortified  by 
the  French,  and  Bessieres  took  the  command  of  a  new  organi- 
zation called  the  army  of  the  north,  which  included  the  young 
guard,  the  third  and  fourth  governments,  and  Bonnet's  divi- 

sion, and  in  February,  1811,  it  was  seventy  thou- 
Appendix  IT,  gan(j  strOng,  nearly  fifty-nine  thousand  men  and 

nine  thousand  horses  being  present  under  arms. 
Bessieres  was  invested  with  unusual  powers  and  had  orders 
to  support  Massena's  operations.  The  king's  army  also  was 


1810.]  BOOK    XII.  — CHAP.    1.  7* 

augmented  to  twenty-seven  thousand,  exclusive  of  his  French 
and  Spanish  guards,, and  of  juramentados,  native  troops  who 
had  taken  the  oath  of  allegiance.  With  this  force  he  watched 
the  Valencians,  protected  his  capital  and  chased  the  partidas, 
who  continually  hovered  in  the  vicinity  of  Madrid,  cutting  ofl 
small  detachments  and  intercepting  all  despatches  not  pro- 
tected by  large  escorts.  To  obviate  this  vexation  small  but 
strongly  fortified  posts  protected  the  lines  of  correspondence, 
running  by  Guadarama  and  Segovia  to  the  provinces  of  Valla- 
dolid  and  Salamanca, — through  Buitrago  and  the  Somosierra  to 
the  army  of  the  north — through  Guadalaxara  and  Calatayud 
to  the  army  of  Aragon — through  La  Mancha  to  the  army  of 
the  south.  A  line  also  went  by  the  bridge  of  Arzobispo  to 
Truxillo,  where  a  brigade  of  cavalry  was  generally  stationed 
to  communicate  with  tl»e  fifth  corps  during  its  incursions  into 
Estremadura. 

This  partida  warfare  being  only  a  succession  of  surprises 
and  massacres,  need  not  be  detailed ;  but  during  the  summer 
and  autumn,  not  less  than  twelve  considerable,  and  an  infinite 
number  of  trifling  affairs,  took  place  between  the  moveable 
columns  and  the  bands.  The  latter  were  generally  beaten; 
the  Empecinado,  Duran,  Sanchez,  Longa,  Campillo,  Porlier, 
and  Mina  only  retained  reputation,  and  the  country  people 
were  so  harassed,  that  many  counter  partidas  assisted  the 
French.  Joseph  might  therefore  have  aided  Massena  by  an 
advance  to  the  Elga,  or  by  reinforcing  and  supporting  Mortier 
in  Estremadura;  but  troubled  by  the  partidas  and  having 
many  convoys  to  protect,  he  would  not  stir.  He  was  averse 
to  join  the  marshals,  with  all  of  whom,  except  Massena,  he 
was  on  ill  terms ;  nor  would  his  feelings  towards  Napoleon 
let  him  take  an  interest  in  any  military  operations,  save 
those  which  affected  the  immediate  security  of 
the  court.  His  poverty  was  extreme ;  he  was  §  4.pe  voh  ii.' 
surrounded  by  intriguers  ;  his  plan  for  organizing 
a  national  party  was  thwarted  by  his  brother's  regulations; 
plots  were  formed,  or  supposed  to  be  formed,  against  his 
person ;  and  in  this  state,  feeling  he  could  only  act  a  secondary 
part,  and  being  from  natural  gentleness  averse  to  the  terrible 
scenes  around  him,  he  resolved  to  resign  the  throne. 


80  PENINSULA    WAR.  []810. 

At  the  southern  horn  of  the  crescent  the  allies  were  most 
favourably  situated  for  resisting  the  invasion.  Sebastian! 
having  Grenada  and  other  cities  of  the  interior  to  hold,  as 
well  as  the  coast  towns  which  were  separated  from  him  by 
very  rugged  mountains,  was  peculiarly  exposed  to  a  harassing 
warfare.  The  narrow  stripe  of  country  bordering  the  Medi- 
terranean required  a  large  controlling  force,  which  was  con- 
tinually menaced  from  Gibraltar  and  the  Spanish  camp  of  San 
Roque  on  one  flank,  and  on  the  other  by  the  Murcian  army; 
he  had  to  fear  descents  from  the  sea,  against  which  it  could 
never  concentrate  in  time,  because  of  the  long  shallow  line 
he  occupied;  the  Murcian  army,  based  on  the  cities  of 
Murcia  and  Carthagena,  menaced  alike  his  coast  line  and 
Grenada,  and  any  movement  by  Baza  and  Guadix  was  sure  to 
draw  him  to  that  side,  and  give  opportunity  lor  troops  coming 
from  Cadiz  and  Gibraltar  to  strike  at  the  coast  line.  His 
mode  of  warfare  was  to  keep  a  reserve  near  Grenada  in  an 
entrenched  camp,  from  whence  he  made  sudden  incursions 
sometimes  against  the  Murcian  s,  sometimes  on  the  side  of 
Gibraltar;  but  that  fortress  afforded  a  refuge  to  the  Spaniards 
on  one  flank,  and  Carthagena,  surrounded  by  arid  lands  where 
for  two  marches  no  water  is  to  be  found,  offered  a  sure  retreat 
on  the  other.  His  principal  object  was  however,  to  win  the 
castles  on  the  coast,  and  of  these  Estipona  and  Marbella  were 
so  stiffly  defended,  that  the  latter  was  only  reduced  in 
December,  when  the  garrison  of  one  hundred  men  took  refuge 
on  board  the  Topaze  frigate.  But  to  keep  these  towns,  and 
support  his  troops  on  the  coast,  it  was  essential  to  preserve 
communications  across  the  mountains  with  Grenada,  Chiclana, 
and  Seville ;  a  difficult  task,  for  general  Campbell  sent  British 
officers  into  the  Ronda  to  lead  the  wild  mountaineers  of  that 
district,  and  they  were  successful  until  Lacy's  misconduct 
disgusted  the  people. 

In  October  general  Campbell  and  admiral  Penrose  had  con- 
certed with  the  governor  of  Ceuta  to  surprise  Malaga,  where 
French  privateers  and  gun-boats  supposed  to  be  destined 
against  the  islands  near  Ceuta  were  collected.  The  siege  of 
Marbella  was  then  in  progress,  the  French  dep6t  for  it  was  afc 
Fuengirola,  thirty  miles  from  Malaga,  and  any  attack  there 


OCT.  1810.]  BOOK  XII.— <:HA1>.   1.  81 

would  draw  the  troops  from  that  city  to  its  succour.  General 
Valdemoro,  commanding  at  San  Roque,  promised  to  aid,  and 
an  armament  was  prepared. 

EXPEDITION   OF   PUENGIROLA.     . 

Captain  Hope  sailed  from  Ceuta  with  the  Topaze,  a  division 
of  gun-boats,  and  a  convoy  containing  a  brigade 
of  twelve-pounders,  sixty-five  gunners,  a  battalion      Campbell's 
of  the   eighty-ninth  regiment,  a  detachment  of      Correspond- 

f       .          j          *  , '  V         a          •  i     •  •    ^  -          ence>  MSS- 

foreign  deserters,  and  the  bpanish  imperial  regi- 
ment of  Toledo,  in  all  fifteen  hundred  men,  under  lord 
Blayney.  He  was  to  make  a  false  attack  on  Fuengirola, 
and  if  the  enemy  came  from  Malaga,  he  was  to  sail  against 
that  place,  A  landing  was  effected,  and  Sebastiani  instantly 
marched,  leaving  only  three  hundred  men  in  Malaga;  lord 
Blayney  was  as  instantly  apprized  of  this,  yet  he  remained 
two  days  cannonading  the  castle  with  twelve-pounders,  after 
the  heavier  metal  of  the  gun-boats  and  frigate  had  failed  to 
make  any  impression.  His  dispositions  betrayed  the  utmost 
contempt  of  military  rules,  and  on  the  second  day,  he  being  in 
a  gun-boat,  the  garrison,  about  two  hundred  men,  having 
descried  Sebastiani's  column  approaching,  made  a  sally,  took 
the  battery,  and  drove  the  British  investing  force  headlong 
towards  the  boats.  Lord  Blayney  landed,  rallied  his  men  and 
retook  the  artillery,  but  two  squadrons  of  French  cavalry 
coming  up,  he  mistook  them  for  Spaniards,  advanced  alone, 
and  was  immediately  made  a  prisoner ;  then  his  troops 
again  fled,  and  would  have  been  all  sabred  but  for  the  oppor- 
tune arrival  of  the  Rodney  with  the  eighty-second  regiment, 
the  flank  companies  of  which  were  immediately  disembarked 
and  first  checked  the  enemy.  The  Spaniards,  untouched  by 
the  panic,  regained  the  ships  without  loss,  but  of  the  British, 
two  officers  and  thirty  men  were  killed  or  wounded,  a  general, 
seven  inferior  officers  and  two  hundred  Serjeants  and  privates 
taken,  and  this  expedition,  well-contrived  and  adequate  to  its 
object,  was  ruined  by  misconduct  and  terminated  in  disaster 
and  disgrace. 

Scarcely  was  the  affair  finished,  when  Valdemoro  and  the 
VOL.  in.  G 


82  PENINSULA   WAR.  [OCT.  1810, 

marquis  of  Portasgo  appeared  in  the  Ron  da,  an  insurrection 
commenced  at  Velez  Malaga  and  the  neighbouring  villages, 
and  Blake,  who  had  returned  from  Cadiz  to  the  army  in 
Murcia,  advanced  with  eight  thousand  men  towards  Cullar  on 
the  side  of  Baza.  Campbell  furnished  money  to  Portasgo, 
embarked  a  thousand  stand  of  arms  for  the  people  of  Valez 
Malaga,  and  Penrose  sent  a  frigate  to  cruize  along  the  coast ; 
but  Sebastiani,  relieved  from  the  coast  descent,  soon  quelled 
this  insurrection  and  then  turned  against  Blake.  That 
general  had  been  held  in  check  by  Rey  with  a  small  force. 
and  when  Milhaud  arrived  with  Sebastiani's  cavalry,  he  retired 
behind  the  Almanzora  river,  where  he  was  defeated  the  4th  of 
November:  his  army  then  dispersed,  and  as  a  contagious 
fever  broke  out  at  Carthagena  and  spread  along  the  coast 
to  Gibraltar  and  Cadiz,  operations  on  the  side  of  Murcia 
ceased. 

In  the  kingdom  of  Seville,  the  war  turned  chiefly  upon  the 
blockade  of  the  Isla  and  the  movements  of  the  Spanish  armies 
in  Estremadura.  Provisions  for  Cadiz  were  principally  drawn 
from  the  Condado  de  Neibla;  and  it  has  been  seen  that 
Copons,  aided  by  descents  from  the  ocean,  endeavoured  to 
secure  this  important  resource.  But  neither  would  have 
availed,  if  Ballesteros  had  not  constantly  menaced  Seville 
from  Aracena  and  the  Aroche  mountains.  Nor  could  Balles- 
teros have  warred  there  without  the  support  of  Badajos  and 
Olivenza,  from  whence  Romana  supported  his  line  of  opera- 
tion, and  sent  him  at  times  military  supplies:  on  the  pos- 
session of  Badajos  therefore  the  supply  of  Cadiz  chiefly 
depended.  Seville  was  the  head  of  the  French  system  in 
Andalusia.  Cadiz,  Estremadura  and  the  Condado  de  Neibla 
were  objects  for  their  offensive  operations.  To  obtain  pro- 
visions, to  cut  off  Spanish  convoys,  or  to  meet  expeditions 
from  Cadiz  against  their  posts  at  Moguer  and  Huelva,  they 
were  forced  to  act  on  the  coast  side;  the  enterprises  of 
Ballesteros  threw  them  towards  Aracena;  Romana's  opera- 
tions brought  them  to  Estremadura ;  where  the  country  was 
so  wasted  that  Soult  could  only  send  Mortier  there  for  sudden 
momentary  strokes,  and  to  prevent  the  Spaniards  establishing 
a  formidable  military  base  on  that  frontier  of  Andalusia. 


1810.]  BOOK   XII.  — CHAP.    1.  83 

This  occasioned  many  irregular  movements  without  a  definite 
object  which  can  only  be  slightly  treated.  Thus,  when 
Romana  entered  the  lines,  Mendizabel,  who  remained  with 
two  divisions  in  Estremadura,  finding  that  Mortier,  un- 
conscious of  Romana's  absence,  had  retired  across  the  Morena, 
occupied  Merida  in  the  view  of  feeding  on  the  yet  unwasted 
district  of  Llerena,  but  a  roving  column  from  the  king's  army 
in  La  Mancha  sent  him  back  to  Badajos,  from  whence  he 
marched  to  join  Ballesteros.  Soult  then  fortified  Gibraleon 
and  other  posts  in  the  Condado  de  Neibla ;  and  Girard's  divi- 
sion, recrossing  the  Morena,  joined  the  column  from  La 
Mancha,  and  foraged  the  Llerena  district,  while  Mendizabel 
occupied  Zafra  with  nine  thousand  infantry  and  two  thousand 
cavalry,  including  Madden's  Portuguese  brigade.  Meanwhile 
Copons  was  defeated  in  the  Condado. 

At  Cadiz,  no  military  event  occurred  after  the  affair  of 
Matagorda,  save  the  expeditions  against  Moguer,  already 
noticed,  and  a  slight  attempt  of  the  Spaniards  against  the 
Chiclana  works  in  September.  But,  after  two  years  of 
intrigues  and  delay  the  national  Cortes  had  assembled,  and 
the  long  suppressed  voice  of  the  people  was  to  be  heard. 
Yet  only  partially,  for  deputies  could  not  be  legally  chosen  in 
the  provinces  possessed  by  the  enemy,  and  some  members 
were  captured  on  their  journey  to  Cadiz :  hence  many  un- 
known even  by  name  to  their  supposed  constituents  were 
chosen.  A  new  principle  of  election  was  also  adopted. 
Every  man  twenty-five  years  old,  not  holding  office  or 
pension  under  the  government,  and  not  incapacitated  by  crime 
by  debts  to  the  state  or  bodily  infirmity,  was  eligible  to  sit 
if  chosen,  which  had  never  before  been  the  rule.  A  supple- 
ment of  sixty -eight  members  was  likewise  provided  to  supply 
accidental  vacancies;  and  it  was  agreed  that  twenty-six 
persons  then  in  Spain,  natives  of  the  colonies,  should  repre- 
sent those  dependencies.  The  assembly  met  the  end  of 
September,  and  took  the  title  of  majesty.  It  declared  the 
press  free  in  respect  of  political,  not  of  religious  matters ;  it 
abolished  some  provincial  juntas,  re- appointed  captains-general, 
and  proceeded  to  form  a  constitution  worded  in  the  very  spirit 
of  democracy.  These  things,  aided  by  a  vehement  eloquence, 

G2 


84  PENINSULA  WAR.  [SEPT.  1810. 

drew  much  attention  to  the  proceedings,  and  a  fresh  impulse 
seemed  given  to  the  war :  but  men  brought  up  under  des- 
potism do  not  readily  attain  the  fashions  of  liberty.  The 
provincial  junta,  the  central  junta,  the  junta  of  Cadiz,  the 
regency,  had  all  been  in  succession  violent  and  oppressive 
while  claiming  only  to  be  popular  leaders ;  and  this  spirit  did 
not  desert  the  Cortes.  Abstract  principles  of  liberty  were 
freely  promulgated,  yet  tyrannical  and  partial  proceedings 
were  of  common  occurrence;  and  the  reformations,  outstrip- 
ping the  feeling  and  understanding  of  the  nation,  weakened 
the  springs  of  its  resistance  to  the  French.  It  was  not  for 
freedom,  but  from  national  pride  and  religious  influence  the 
people  struck.  Liberty  had  no  attractions  for  the  nobles, 
nor  for  the  monastics,  nor  even  for  the  merchants ;  and  the 
Cortes,  by  suppressing  old  establishments  and  violating 
ancient  customs,  shocked  those  very  prejudices  which  had 
produced  resistance  to  Napoleon.  Nothing  beneficial  was 
given  in  return.  In  the  conduct  of  the  war,  the  execution  of 
the  laws,  the  treatment  of  the  colonies,  there  was  as  much  of 
vanity  and  intrigue,  of  procrastination  negligence  folly  and 
violence  as  before.  The  people  became  discontented,  and 
when  the  Cortes  proposed  to  abolish  the  inquisition,  the  clergy 
turned  bitter  opponents.  The  principle  of  feudal  privilege 
being  once  given  up,  the  natural  tendency  of  the  Cortes  was 
towards  the  enemy ;  and  a  broad  line  of  distinction  was  thus 
drawn  between  the  objects  of  the  Spanish  and  English  govern- 
ments in  the  prosecution  of  the  war.  Ere  the  contest  finished, 
such  distemperature  was  between  them  as  would  have  given 
the  Peninsula  to  Napoleon,  if  fortune  had  not  betrayed  him 
amidst  the  snows  of  Russia. 

Jealous  of  the  Cortes  and  dissatisfied  with  the  inferior  title 
of  highness,  the  regency  partook  not  of  the  republican  spirit. 
Anxious  to  check  innovation,  it  had  early  in  the  year  invited 
the  duke  of  Orleans  to  command  the  provinces  bordering  on 
France,  permitted  him  to  issue  proclamations,  and  received 
him  at  Cadiz  with  the  honours  of  a  royal  prince,  designing  to 
oppose  his  authority  to  that  of  the  local  juntas  at  the  moment, 
and  finally  to  that  of  the  Cortes.  He  had  been  well  received 
at  Taragona,  but  at  Cadiz  he  was  regarded  with  indifference. 


DEC.  1810.]  BOOK   XJI.—  CHAP.    1.  85 

Mr.  Wellesley  opposed  his  stay ;  lord  Wellington  judged  his 
presence  in  Spain  would  render  the  Spanish  war  popular  in 
the  south  of  France;  the  English  ministers  sent  him  a  verbal 
invitation  to  reside  in  England,  which  he  did  not  accept,  and 
the  Cortes,  aware  of  the  cause  of  his  arrival,  compelled  him  to 
quit  Spain.  Soon  after  this,  the  regency  of  five  was  effaced, 
and  one  of  three  members,  namely,  Blake,  Cisgar,  and  Agar, 
were  appointed.  The  two  first  were  absent,  and  substitutes 
were  provided,  one  of  whom,  Palacios,  hesitated  to  take  the 
oath,  whereupon  he  was  declared  to  have  forfeited  the  confidence 
of  the  nation.  The  new  regents  were  as  little  pleased  with  the 
democratic  spirit  as  their  predecessors,  but  wishing  to  retain 
power,  refused  to  listen  to  Carlotta's  claim  to  be  sole  regent,  and 
thus  factions  sprung  up  on  every  side.  For  the  republicans 
were  not  at  first  paramount  in  the  Cortes,  and  the  majority 
were  so  subtilely  dealt  with  by  Pedro  Souza,  that  they  privately 
admitted  Carlotta's  pretensions  both  to  the  succession  and  the 
immediate  control  of  the  whole  Peninsula. 

Manuel  Lapena  was  declared  captain-general  of  Andalusia, 
and  commander  of  the  forces  in  the  Isla,  and  he  was  subser- 
vient to  the  Cortes.  The  new  regency,  jealous  of  Eomana's 
power,  adopted  the  complaints  of  his  enemies  in  Badajos, 
removed  him  from  his  command,  and  ordered  his  divisions  to 
abandon  the  English  army  and  come  to  Cadiz. 
The  conduct  of  his  troops  had  been  very  unsa-  MssStuart> 
tisfactory,  yet  numbers  were  so  essential  to  keep 
Massena  in  check,  that  Wellington  sent  colonel  O'Neal  to 
remonstrate ;  and  as  he  clearly  showed  the  regents  that  the 
loss  of  Estremadura  and  of  all  communication  with  the 
interior  of  Spain  would  ensue,  a  momentary  respite  was 
obtained. 

In  matters  touching  the  war  or  the  administration  no 
Spanish  party  acted  cordially  or  wisely ;  but  towards  the 
colonies  all  agreed  to  push  violence,  injustice,  cruelty,  and 
impolicy  to  their  utmost  bounds.  The  British  government 
had  obtained  from  the  first  regency  a  decree,  permitting 
South  America  to  export  its  own  products  under  certain 
conditions.  This  legalizing  of  a  trade,  which  could  not  be 
suppressed,  and  which  was  but  a  decent  return  to  Eng- 


86  PENINSULA   WAR.  [DEC.  18HX 

land  for  her  assistance,  gave  offence  to  the  municipal  junta  of 
Cadiz;  and  its  resentment  was  so  much  dreaded,  that  in  June 
the  regency  disowned  their  own  decree  of  the  previous  month, 
and  even  punished  the  printers  of  it  for  having  given  birth  to 
a  forged  instrument !  The  colonists  had  resisted  all  the 
intrigues  of  the  French  with  an  independence  and  singleness 
of  purpose  very  displeasing  to  the  government  in  Old  Spain, 
for  the  latter  wished  to  have  them  follow  in  its  wake. 
When,  ex&J>eVa£iretl>  J^JF  this  arrogance,  they  expressed  their 
disconteht^h^j^tl^uoriti'es  in  the  mother- country,  throwing  off 
the  mask  oMiber&lity  and  patriotism,  exposed  their  own  secret 
views.U  '  S?a"s:ii^b  enough  that  Americans  should  be  Spanish 
subjects  hbwf  btit  that  in  all  cases  they  should  belong  to 
Spain,'  was  the  proclamation  of  the  regency,  in  answer  to  a 
declaration  from  the  Caraccas  avowing  attachment  to  Ferdi- 
nand: meaning,  that  if  Spain  should  pass  to  the  usurper, 
America  must  follow,  as  having  no  right  to  decide  in  any  case 
for  herself. 

When  the  Cortes  met,  the  Americans  expected  justice. 
They  had  contributed  ninety  millions  of  dollars  for  the 
support  of  the  war,  and  many  had  served  zealously  in 
person;  America  had  also  been  declared  an  integral  part  of 
the  empire  by  the  central  junta,  and  her  deputies  were  to  sit 
in  the  great  national  assembly.  She  was  however  soon  made 
to  understand,  that  the  first  meant  eternal  slavery,  and  the 
second  was  a  mere  form.  'The  Americans  complain  of 
having  been  tyrannized  over  for  three  hundred  years !  they 
shall  now  suffer  for  three  thousand  years ;'  and  '  We  know  not 
to  what  class  of  beasts  the  Americans  belong :'  such  were  the 
expressions  heard  and  applauded  in  the  Cortes,  when  the 
rights  of  the  colonists  were  agitated  in  that  assembly.  Better 
give  Spain  to  Joseph  if  America  be  retained,  than  save  Spain 
if  America  be  separated  from  her,  was  a  feeling  rooted  in 
every  Spanish  heart,  covertly  expressed  in  many  public  docu- 
ments, and  openly  acted  upon.  For  when  repeated  insults, 
treachery,  and  violence,  had  driven  the  colonists  to  defend 
their  rights  in  arms,  the  money  and  stores,  supplied  by  England 
for  the  support  of  the  war  against  the  French,  were  applied 
to  the  fitting  out  of  expeditions  against  America.  Thus  the 


1810.]  BOOK   XII.— CHAP.    1.  87 

convocation  of  the  national  Cortes,  far  from  improving  the 
posture  of  affairs,  dried  up  the  chief  sources  of  revenue, 
weakened  the  army  in  the  field,  offended  many  powerful 
bodies  in  the  state,  involved  the  nation  in  a  colonial  war,  and 
struck  at  the  root  of  the  alliance  with  England, 


PENINSULA    WAR.  [Nov.  I8ir, 


CHAPTER  II. 


WHILE  the  Spaniards  were  entirely  occupied  with  the  debates 
in  congress,  the  French  works  were  finished;  their  chain  of 
forts  was  completed,  each  fort  having  a  ditch  and  palisades 
with  a  week's  provisions.  Soult  came  to  San  Lucar,  and  his 
flotillas  there  and  at  Santa  Maria,  Puerto  Heal,  and  Chiclana 
being  all  ready  for  action,  he  proceeded  to  concentrate  them. 
In  the  last  night  of  October,  thirty  pinnaces  and  gun-boats, 
slipping  out  of  the  Guadalquivir,  eluded  the  allied  fleet, 
passed  along  the  coast  to  Rota,  and  from  thence,  aided  by  shore 
batteries,  fought  their  way  to  Santa  Maria  and  the  San  Pedro 
river.  But  to  avoid  the  danger  of  doubling  Matagorda,  the 
vessels  were  transported  overland  on  rollers,  and  one  hundred 
and  thirty  armed  vessels  and  transports  were  thus  safely 
assembled  in  the  Trocadero  canal :  the  success  was  however 
alloyed  by  the  death  of  general  Senarmont,  a  man  of  great 
reputation.  At  the  Trocadero  point  there  were  immense  bat- 
teries, and  some  notable  pieces  of  ordnance  invented  by 
colonel  Villantroys,  called  cannon-mortars.  These  huge  engines, 
one  of  which  now  stands  in  St.  James's  Park,  were  cast  at 
Seville,  and  being  placed  in  slings,  threw  projectiles  over 
Cadiz,  a  distance  of  more  than  five  thousand  yards.  To 
obtain  this  flight  the  shells  were  partly  filled  with  lead,  and 
their  charge  of  powder  was  too  small  for  an  effective  explosion, 
yet  they  alarmed  the  city,  and  were  troublesome  to  the 
shipping. 

Soult's  design  was  to  ruin  by  superior  fire  the  fort  of  the 
Puntales,  then  to  pass  the  straits  with  his  flotilla,  and  estab- 
lish his  army  between  the  Isla  and  the  city;  nor  was  this 
plan  chimerical,  for  on  the  side  of  the  besieged  there  was 
neither  concert;  nor  industry.  New  drafts,  made  by  Wellington, 


DEC.  1810.]  BOOK   XTl.  — CHAP    2.  89 

had  reduced  Graham's  force  to  five  thousand  men,  and  in 
October  the  fever  broke  out ;  but  as  Soult's  preparations  became 
formidable,  reinforcements  were  drawn  from  Gibraltar  and 
Sicily,  and  at  the  end  of  the  year,  seven  thousand  British, 
Germans,  and  Portuguese  were  still  behind  the  Santi  Petri. 
Graham  was  confident  that,  with  due  preparation,  he  could 
maintain  the  Puntales  even  though  its  fire  should  be  silenced, 
— that  Soult  must  establish  a  stronger  flotilla  than  the  allies, 
or  his  communication  with  Matagorda  could  not  be  maintained, 
— and  that  the  intercourse  between  the  Isla  and  the  garrison 
of  Cadiz  could  not  be  interrupted,  unless  the  great  redoubt  oi 
the  Cortadura  was  lost.  To  insure  naval  superiority,  admiral 
Keats  drew  all  the  armed  craft  from  Gibraltar. 
To  secure  the  land  defence,  Graham  urged  the  Graham's 

,  ,    •        i  11  i  Despatches 

regency  to  adopt  certain  plans,  and  he  was  warmly      MSS. 
seconded  by  sir  Henry  Wellesley ;  but  neither  their 
entreaties  nor  the  imminence  of  the  danger  could  overcome 
the   apathy  of  the  Spaniards;  their  troops  were  wanting  in 
discipline,  clothing,  and  equipments,  and  only  sixteen  thousand 
men  of  all  arms  were  effective  on  a  muster-roll  of  twenty- 
three  thousand.     The  labour  of  the  British  troops,  far  from 
being  assisted,  was  vexatiously  impeded,  and  December  ended 
before   Graham,    after   many  altercations,   could    A    endix  19 
even  obtain  leave  to  put  the  interior  line  of  the    §§  i,  2, 3, 4. 
Cortadura  in  a  state  of  defence,  although  Soult    Vol>  IL 
was  ready  for  an  attack  there,  which  would  have  been  exe- 
cuted and  probably  fatal,  if  events  in  Portugal  had  not  suddenly 
arrested  his  operations. 

When  Massena  entered  that  kingdom,  his  communications 
with  France  became  so  uncertain  that  the  emperor's  principal 
information  came  through  the  English  newspapers:  Foy 
brought  the  first  exact  intelligence.  It  was  then  BessiSres 
was  directed  to  support  the  army  of  Portugal,  and  the  ninth 
corps  was  made  a  component  part  of  the  latter.  Massena  was 
enjoined  to  hold  fast  between  Santarem  and  the  Zezere,  to 
besiege  Abrantes,  and  if  forced  to  retreat  momentarily,  was 
to  keep  his  bridges  and  protecting  works  on  the  Zezere 
with  a  view  to  a  renewed  invasion  from  Castello  Branco.  He 
was  to  expect  Soult  who  had  been  several  times  com- 


90  PENINSULA  WAR.  [DEC.  1810. 

Joseph's  Cor-  manded  *°  move  through  the  Alemtejo  to  his 
respondence,  assistance,  and  that  marshal  was  censured  for  suffer- 
ing Romana  to  join  Wellington  unmolested,  when 
he  ought  to  have  been  closely  followed  by  the  fifth  corps. 
The  emperor  seemingly  contemplated  the  evacuation  of  Anda- 
lusia and  the  concentration  of  the  whole  army  of  the  south 
on  the  Tagus,  because  it  was  more  important  to  crush  the 
regular  warfare  in  Portugal,  than  to  hold  any  particular  pro- 
vince. Massena's  instructions  reached  him  in  due  time,  Soult's 
were  intercepted  by  the  guerillas,  and  the  duplicates  did  not 
arrive  before  the  end  of  December.  When  they  did  reach 
him  his  ripe  design  against  Cadiz  was  rendered  a  nullity. 
Drawing  off  Latour  Maubourg's  cavalry  and  five  thousand  of 
Victor's  infantry  he  repaired  to  Seville ;  but  his  instructions 
pointed  out  no  fixed  line  of  movement  nor  a  specific  operation, 
— Massena  was  to  communicate  his  plan  and  Soult  was  to 
conform  to  it.  No  certain  intelligence  even  of  Massena's  early 
operations  had  reached  Seville,  and  such  was  Wellington's 
vigilance,  and  the  activity  of  the  bands,  that  the  French  mar- 
shals were  now  forced  to  operate  without  communication,  and 
entirely  ignorant  of  each  other's  plans  and  situation. 

Soult  did  not  know  of  Romana's  being  in  the  lines,  but 

showed   he    could   not   have    followed   him,    for 
Soult's  Cor-  . 

respondence,  Mendizabel  had  covered  the  movement  with  con- 
siderable forces,  and  five  fortresses  were  on  the 
frontiers  of  Portugal  which  he  dared  not  neglect.  Nor  could 
he  now  co-operate  directly  with  Massena.  Sebastiani's  hands 
were  full,  the  blockade  of  Cadiz  was  to  be  maintained,  and 
Seville  protected  from  the  Spanish  forces  at  Aracena  and  in 
the  Neibla :  hence  only  twenty  thousand  men  were  disposable. 
With  that  force  he  dared  not  enter  the  Alemtejo  leaving  Oli- 
venza  and  Badajos  in  his  rear,  because  Ballesteros  would  join 
Mendizabel  to  vex  his  communications,  and  Romana,  without 
counting  Hill's  force,  could  oppose  him  with  ten  thousand  men 
in  front.  Wherefore  he  demanded  and  obtained  Napoleon's  leave 
to  reduce  those  fortresses  before  he  co-operated  directly  with 
Masseua.  While  awaiting  the  answer  he  prepared  for  the 
sieges  and  the  protection  of  Andalusia.  Dessolles'  division  had 
rejoined  the  king's  army,  and  Godinot's  now  replaced  it  at 


JAN.  1811.]  BOOK   XII.  — CHAP.   2.  91 

Cordoba;  a  corps  of  observation  under  general  Digeon  was 
posted  at  Ecija;  Seville,  being  entrenched  on  the  Neibla  side, 
was  given  in  charge  to  general  Daricau,  and  Remond  occupied 
Gibraleon.  The  expeditionary  force  of  sixteen  thousand 
infantry,  four  thousand  cavalry,  and  fifty-four  guns,  was 
assembled  the  2nd  of  January.  A  siege  equipage,  Joge  h,g 
a  light  pontoon  train,  and  seventeen  hundred  carts  Correspond- 
for  stores  and  provisions  attended  the  troops ;  and  ttce' M  ' 
so  efficient  was  the  civil  administration,  that  Soult  ordered  a 
levy  of  five  thousand  young  Spaniards,  called  escopeteros, 
(fuzileers),  to  maintain  the  police  of  Andalusia. 

Mortier,  moving  from  Guadalcanal,  entered  Zafra  the  5th, 
whereupon  Mendizabel  retired  to  Merida  and  Ballesteros 
passed  over  the  mountain  to  Frejenal.  The  French  convoy 
was  detained  at  the  foot  of  the  hills  by  the  winter  tempests 
which  then  raged,  and  to  protect  it  and  drive  Ballesteros  from 
Frejenal  Gazan's  division  moved  from  Zafra.  The  Spanish 
leaders  in  Estremadura  and  at  Cadiz  judged  lightly  of  Soult's 
object ;  some  said  he  was  to  pass  the  Tagus,  others  that  he 
only  aimed  at  Ballesteros ;  Wellington  alone  divined  his  inten- 
tions, and  first  gave  Mendizabel  notice  that  the 
French  were  assembling  their  army  at  Seville: 
hence  when  they  broke  into  Estremadura  terror 
and  confusion  prevailed.  Badajos  was  ill-provisioned,  Albu- 
querque though  garrisoned  was  in  ruins,  Olivenza  nearly 
dismantled;  and  in  the  midst  of  all  this  disorder,  Ballesteros 
was  suddenly  drawn  off  towards  the  Condada  de  Neibla  by 
the  regency,  who  thus  deprived  Estremadura  of  half  its 
defenders  at  the  moment  of  invasion.  Wellington  had  advised 
a  concentration  of  the  troops,  the  destruction  of  the  accessible 
bridges  over  the  Guadiana,  and  a  disputed  passage  of  that 
river  to  gain  time;  these  things  were  neglected  and  an  ad- 
vanced guard  of  cavalry  carried  the  bridge  of  Merida  on  the 
6th.  Soult  then  turned  upon  Olivenza  with  the  infantry; 
and  while  his  dragoons  held  Mendizabel  in  check  on  the  side 
of  Badajos,  his  light  horsemen  collected  cattle  on  the  side  of 
Estremadura.  Gazan's  division  protected  the  march  of  the  artil- 
lery and  convoy,  and  La  Houssaye's  brigade,  belonging  to  the 
army  of  the  centre,  marched  from  Truxillo  against  the  par- 


92  PENINSULA   WAR.  [JAN   1811. 

tidas,  and  scoured  the  banks  of  the  Tagus  from  Arzobispo  ti> 
Alcantara. 

FIRST   SIEGE    OF    OLIVENZA. 

This  place  fortified  with  nine  bastions  a  covered  way  and 
some  unfinished  ravelins,  was  incapable  of  a  good  defence. 
With  an  old  breach  slightly  repaired,  very  few  guns  mounted, 
and  commanding  no  passage,  it  was  of  little  importance;  but 
it  contained  four  thousand  troops.  Wellington  had  pressed 
Romana  to  destroy  the  defences  entirely  or  furnish  good 
means  of  resistance ;  the  marquis  decided  on  the  former,  but 
Mendizabel,  slighting  his  orders,  had  thrown  his  best  division 
into  the  place.  It  was  invested  on  the  llth.  An  abandoned 
outwork,  three  hundred  and  forty  yards  south  of  the  town, 
was  taken  possession  of  the  first  night,  and  breaching  and 
counter-batteries  for  eight  and  six  guns  were  marked  out. 
The  trenches  were  opened  on  the  west,  and  approaches  by  the 
flying  sap  were  made  against  the  old  breach ;  yet  heavy  rain 
and  a  scarcity  of  entrenching  tools  retarded  the  siege  until  the 
head  of  the  great  French  convoy  had  passed  the  mountains. 
However,  the  covered  way  was  crowned  and  on  the  20th  the 
breaching  batteries  opened  their  fire ;  two  mortars  threw  shells 
into  the  town  and  a  globe  of  compression  was  prepared  to 
blow  in  the  counter-scarp.  In  the  evening,  Mendizabel 
skirmished  unsuccessfully  with  Latour  Maubourg's  horsemen 
covering  the  siege,  and  on  the  21st  the  mine  was  completed 
and  preparations  made  for  the  passage  of  the  ditch.  Men- 
dizabel, weakened  by  the  absence  of  Ballesteros,  demanded  suc- 
cour from  Romana,  who  was  sick  but  sent  Carlos  d'Espana 
with  two  thousand  men  from  Abrantes  the  18th,  and  Virues, 
with  his  own  divisions  from  Cartaxo  the  20th.  The  21st, 
the  governor  of  Olivenza  was  informed  of  this,  and  replied 
that  he  would  maintain  the  place  to  the  last  moment;  yet  he 
capitulated  the  next  day,  having  still  provisions, 

French  ...  .   ,  ,  Jf  '  * ..  ! 

Journal  of        ammunition,  eighteen  guns,   and  four  thousand 
?£e~ations'       one  hundred   effective   soldiers.      The   prisoners 
were  immediately  sent  to  Cordoba,  escorted  by  a 
regiment,  and  on  the  26th  Soult  marched  against  Bajados. 

During  the  siege  Ballesteros  advanced  upon  Neibla,  but 
being  followed  by  Gazan,  was  beaten  at  Castillejos  the  28th, 


JAN.  1811.]  BOOK  XII.— CHAP.   2.  98 

and  driven  over  the  Guadiana  into  Portugal  with  the  loss  of 
fifteen  hundred  prisoners  besides  killed  and  wounded:  his 
artillery  escaped  to  the  castle  of  Paymigo,  the  infantry  took 
refuge  at  Alcontin  and  Mertola.  His  force  was  thus  reduced 
by  three  thousand  men  and  the  regency  recalled  Copons  to 
Cadiz!  In  this  manner  a  fortress  was  taken,  and  twelve 
thousand  men,  who  well  employed  might  have  frustrated  the 
French  designs  against  Badajos,  were  dispersed,  withdrawn, 
or  made  prisoners  in  twenty  days  after  the  commencement  of 
Soult's  expedition.  Wellington  had  striven  hard  to  teach  the 
Spanish  commanders  there  was  but  one  safe  mode  of  pro- 
ceeding in  Estremadura,  and  Romana  had  just  yielded  to  his 
counsels,  when  the  sudden  arrival  of  the  French  threw  every- 
thing into  confusion,  and  the  defence  of  the  Guadiana,  the 
dismantling  of  Olivenza,  the  concentration  of  the  armies  were 
neglected.  Romana's  own  divisions  reached  Montemor  the 
22nd,  but  the  23rd  they  received  Mendizabel's  orders  to  halt, 
because  Olivenza  had  surrendered.  The  24th  Romana  died 
of  an  aneurism  in  the  heart.  A  worthy  man  and  of  quick 
parts,  although  deficient  in  military  talent,  his  death  was  a 
great  loss;  yet  his  influence  was  on  the  wane,  and  he  had 
many  enemies;  his  authority  was  only  sustained  by  the 
attachment  of  his  troops,  and  by  his  riches;  for  his  estates 
being  in  the  Balearic  Isles  his  revenues  did  not  suffer  by 
the  war. 

Mendizabel,  now  commanding  in  Estremadura,  had  received 
Romana's  orders  to  follow  Wellington's  counsels.  These  were, 
to  concentrate  his  ten  or  eleven  thousand  men,  and  before 
Soult  appeared  on  the  Guadiana  to  occupy  a  position  of  great 
natural  strength  close  to  Badajos.  The  right  was  to  touch 
the  fort  of  St.  Christoval,  the  front  to  be  covered  by  the 
Gebora  river  and  the  Guadiana.  The  fortress  of  Campo 
Mayor  was  to  be  immediately  in  rear  of  the  left,  Elvas  behind 
the  centre.  Entrenched  in  that  position  with  a  strong  gar- 
rison in  Badajos,  the  English  general  thought  Mendizabal 
might  defy  Soult  to  invest  or  even  straiten  the  communi- 
cations of  the  town;  yet  he  prophetically  observed, 
'  with  soldiers  of  any  other  nation  success  is  cer-  §  6.P  Vol^ilf' 
tain,  but  no  calculation  can  be  made  of  any  opera- 
tion in  which  Spanish  troops  are  engaged.'  When  Olivenza 


94  PENINSULA  WAR,  [JAN.  1811. 

fell,  Mendizabel  had  a  small  garrison  in  Albuquerque,  another 
in  Valencia  de  Alcantara;  Romana's  divisions  were  at  Mon- 
temor  under  Virues,  and  Carlos  d'Espana  was  at  Campo 
Mayor.  Instead  of  concentrating  all  this  force  at  once  on 
the  Gebora,  he  waited  until  Soult  drove  back  his  outposts  and 
then  shut  himself  up  with  six  thousand  men  in  Badajos. 
That  place  was  still  unprovisioned,  though  a  siege  had  been 
constantly  expected  for  a  year,  and  on  the  27th  Latour 
Maubourg's  dragoons  having  crossed  the  Guadiana  at  Merida, 
forded  the  Gebora,  and  cut  off  all  communication  with  Campo 
Mayor  and  Elvas. 

FRENCH    SIEGE   OP   BADAJOS. 

This  city  stands  at  the  confluence  of  the  Guadiana  with  the 
Bivillas ;  the  first  a  noble  river  five  hundred  yards  broad ;  the 
second  a  trifling  stream.  A  rock,  one  hundred  feet  high, 
crowned  by  an  old  castle,  overhangs  the  meeting  of  the  waters. 
The  town,  spreading  like  a  fan  as  the  land  opens  between 
the  rivers,  was  protected  by  eight  regular  curtains  and  bastions, 
from  twenty-three  to  thirty  feet  in  height,  with  good  counter- 
scarps, covered  way  and  glacis.  On  the  left  bank  of  the  Gua- 
diana the  outworks  were,  1°,  the  Lunette  of  San  Roque, 
covering  a  dam  and  sluice  on  the  Rivillas  by  which  an  inun- 
dation could  be  made;  2°,  an  isolated  redoubt,  called  the 
Picurina,  situated  beyond  the  Rivillas,  and  four  hundred  yards 
from  the  town;  3°,  the  Pardaleras,  a  defective  crown-work, 
central  between  the  lower  Guadiana  and  the  Rivillas,  two 
hundred  yards  from  the  ramparts.  On  the  right  bank  of  the 
Guadiana  a  hill  crowned  by  the  San  Christoval  fort,  three  hun- 
dred feet  square,  overlooked  the  interior  of  the  castle ;  and  a 
quarter  of  a  mile  farther  down  the  stream,  the  bridge,  six 
hundred  yards  in  length,  was  protected  by  a  bridge-head, 
slightly  connected  with  San  Christoval  but  commanded  on 
every  side. 

Soult  constructed  a  ferry  on  the  Guadiana,  above  the  con- 
fluence of  the  Gebora,  and  opened  three  attacks  the  28th,  two 
against  the  Picurina,  one  against  the  Pardaleras.  The  29th 
and  30th  slight  sallies  were  repulsed,  but  tempestuous  weather 
ruined  the  French  works ;  Gazan's  division  was  distant,  the 


FBB.  1811.]  BOOK  XII.— CHAP.  2.  95 

infantry  before  the  place  were  few,  and  on  the 
31st,    a    sally   from    the    Pardaleras,   killed    or 
wounded  sixty  men  and  cleared   the   trenches; 
some  of  the  Spanish  cavalry  also,  gliding  round 
the  left  of  the  French  parallel,  sabred  several  'engineers  and 
sappers.     Two  nights  afterwards  the  Rivillas,  flooded  by  a 
tempest,  carried  away  the  French  bridges,  drowned  men  and 
horses,  damaged   the   depdts,  and   reduced    the        ,     de 
besiegers   to   the    greatest    distress;    and   next    Badajos. 
morning  another  sally  from  the  Pardaleras  killed    Lamare- 
or  wounded  eighty  men  and  ruined  part  of  the  parallel.     The 
cavalry  employed  in  the  investment  could  not  forage,  the  con- 
voys only  came  in  by  detachments,  scarcity  was  felt  in  the 
camp,  and  the  rigour  of  the  winter  bivouacs  caused  sickness. 

Gazan  arrived  the  3rd,  but  the  French  cavalry 

J       Wellington's 

was  withdrawn  from  the  right  bank  of  the  Gua-     Correspond- 
diana  in  consequence  of  the  severe  weather,  the       ace' 
Spanish  communication  with  Elvas  was  re-established,  and 
Mendizabel  called  all   the    divisions   from   Portugal   to   his 
assistance:    Virues  marched  upon  Elvas,  Carlos 
d'Espana  and  Madden  united  at  Campo  Mayor, 
and  Julian  Sanchez  brought  down  his  partida  from 
Upper  Estremadura  to  the  Tagus. 

In  the  night  of  the  5th,  Mendizabel  repaired  to  Elvas  and 
took  the  command  of  Virues'  divisions.  He  passed  the  Caya 
the  next  morning,  and  being  joined  on  his  march  by  Carlos 
d'Espana,  pushed  the  few  French  cavalry  posts  still  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Guadiana  over  the  Gebora :  Madden's  Portu- 
guese even  crossed  that  river  and  captured  some  baggage 
beyond.  The  French  soon  returned,  forced  Madden  to  recross 
the  stream,  and  killed  many  of  his  rear-guard;  the  Spanish 
cavalry  then  fled  shamefully,  and  the  infantry  entered  Badajos. 
Mendizabel,  instead  of  taking  the  strong  position  behind  the 
Gebora  recommended  by  Wellington,  resolved  to  raise  the 
siege  by  a  sally,  yet  he  delayed  the  execution  until  next  morn- 
ing, at  the  risk  of  being  shut  up  in  Badajos  with  his  whole 
army ;  and  this  would  inevitably  have  happened  if  a  greater 
body  of  the  French  cavalry  had  passed  the  Gebora  in  pursuit 
of  the  beaten  horsemen. 


96  PENINSULA  WAR.  [?BB.  1811. 

Badajos  now  contained  sixteen  thousand  righting  men.  and 
the  projected  sally  was  made  with  great  vigour  by  Carrera 
and  Carlos  d'Espana.  Breaking  out  on  the  Picurina  side  with 
five  thousand  infantry  and  three  hundred  cavalry  they  carried 
all  the  trenches  and  batteries,  for  the  soldiers  fought  with  sur- 
prising ardour,  but  the  generals  had  forgotten  even  to  provide 
the  means  of  spiking  the  guns  when  taken.  Mortier  then  fell 
with  his  reserves  upon  the  front  and  flank  of  the  column  and 
drove  it  back  in  disorder  with  a  loss  of  six  hundred  killed  and 
wounded.  It  was  a  hard  struggle,  and  the  French  lost  several 
engineers  and  four  hundred  men;  but  while  the  action  was 
being  fought,  Latour  Maubourg's  cavalry  occupied  the  ground 
between  the  Gebora  and  the  Caya,  and  again  cut  the  com- 
munication with  Elvas  and  Campo  Mayor.  He  was  however 
too  weak  to  maintain  himself  there,  and  Madden  forced  him 
to  repass  the  Gebora  on  the  9th :  Mendizabel  then  gave  over 
Badajos  to  the  governor  Rafael  Menacho,  and  pitched  his  own 
camp  round  San  Christoval.  Some  days  previous  to  these 
events  the  French  had  bombarded  the  place ;  a  proceeding 
only  mischievous  to  themselves,  for  the  inhabitants  fled  in 
great  numbers  to  avoid  the  danger,  leaving  behind  them  pro- 
visions which  enabled  Menacho  to  feed  his  garrison. 

Soult  now  seeing  that  the  Spaniards  had  great  resources  if 
their  generals  knew  how  to  use  them,  feared  a  change  of  com- 
manders or  of  system,  and  resolved  to  bring  the  siege  to  a 
crisis  rapidly;  in  this  view  he  stormed  the  Pardaleras  on  the 
llth,  sent  fifteen  hundred  cavalry  across  the  Guadiana  to 
Montijo  on  the  12th,  and  the  14th  threw  shells  into  the  camp 
about  San  Christoval.  His  efforts  were  well  timed,  for 
Romana's  soldiers,  who  had  long  considered  themselves  inde- 
pendent of  the  central  government,  were  now  enraged  to  hear 
that  Castanos  was  made  captain-general  of  Estremadura,  and 
became  so  unruly  that  when  the  position  behind  the  Gebora 
was  assumed,  no  one  dared  meddle  with  them  and  military 
discipline  ceased.  The  Spaniards  had  been  ex- 
j£pe  pressly  counselled  to  entrench  their  camp  by 

Wellin  ton  Wellington,  whose  design  was  to  have  them  on 
to  lord  Liver-  an  impregnable  post,  from  whence  they  could  aid 
pool,  MSS.  i  f  •  i> 

the   garrison,  and  preserve  free   communication 


FEB.  1811.]  BOOK  XII.— CHAP.    2  97 

with  the  Alemtejo  until  the  reinforcements  from  England 
enabled  him  to  raise  the  siege.  Mendizabel  hung  for  twelve 
days  on  the  Christoval  heights,  torpid,  and  when  driven  from 
thence  by  the  French  shells,  he  merely  destroyed  a  small 
bridge  on  the  Gebora,  cast  up  no  entrenchment,  and  kept  no 
guard  in  front :  wherefore,  Soult,  seeing  this  negligence,  sud- 
denly leaped  upon  him. 

BATTLE    OF    THE    GEBORA. 

Although  the  Guadianaandthe  Gebora  covered  the  Spanish 
camp,  Soult  hoped  to  pass  both  and  surprise  the  careless 
general ;  but  first,  to  mislead  and  deprive  Mendizabel  of  the 
support  of  the  fort,  he  threw  shells  again  on  the  17th,  and 
the  swell  of  the  rivers  delayed  the  great  operation  until  the 
18th.  In  the  evening  of  that  day  the  cavalry  drew  down  the 
right  bank  of  the  Guadiana  from  Montijo,  while  the  artillery 
and  infantry  crossed  the  ferry  four  miles  above  the  confluence 
of  the  Gebora ;  this  combination  was  exactly  timed,  and  pre- 
cisely at  daybreak  the  19th,  five  thousand  infantry,  and  three 
thousand  cavalry  were  on  the  right  bank ;  but  the  Gebora  was 
still  to  be  passed  in  face  often  thousand  infantry,  two  thousand 
cavalry,  and  many  armed  camp  followers,  in  all  not  less  than 
fifteen  thousand  fighting  men.  A  thick  mist  hid  the  French, 
no  Spanish  post  or  patrole  was  in  advance,  and  Soult  after 
riding  through  the  ranks  and  exhorting  his  soldiers  to  fight 
strongly,  commenced  the  passage  of  the  Gebora ;  the  cavalry 
forded  five  miles  up  the  stream,  the  infantry  on  the  right  and 
left  of  the  broken  bridge;  then  some  random  shots  from 
the  French  guns  awakened  Mendizabel,  and  though  the 
mist  still  hid  all  things,  a  loud  clamour,  following  the  cannon 
shot,  showed  that  the  surprise  was  complete.  Mortier,  acting 
under  Soult,  soon  formed  his  line  of  battle,  the  mist  cleared  upf 
and  at  eight  o'clock  the  first  beams  of  the  sun  and  of  victory 
flashed  together  on  the  French  soldiers ;  for  their  horsemen 
were  around  Mendizabel's  left,  and  his  infantry  cavalry  and 
guns  were  heaped  together  in  the  centre  waving  to  and  fro  in 
disorder.  His  right  having  fallen  away  from  San  Christoval 
the  17th  to  avoid  the  shells,  had  no  position,  and  in  a  few 
moments  Girard  placed  three  battalions  between  the  Spanish 

VOL.  III.  H 


^8  PENINSULA   WAR.  [FEB.  1811. 

centre  and  that  fort;  the  artillery  then  opened  and  the 
French  bore  onward  as  one  man  to  the  attack.  Six  battalions 
pressed  the  Spanish  front,  Girard  struck  their  right  flank, 
the  cavalry  charged  their  left,  and  instinctively  the  multitude 
crowded  on  the  centre;  but  the  French  infantry  closed  with  a 
destroying  musketry,  the  horsemen  spurred  in  with  loose 
bridles  and  the  huge  quivering  mass  was  broken : 
'  *^e  cavalrv  fled  outright,  and  even  Madden's  Portu- 
guese, regardless  of  his  example  and  reproaches, 
shamefully  turned  their  backs. 

At  ten  o'clock  the  fight  was  over.  Virues  was  taken, 
Mendizabel  and  Carrera  escaped  with  difficulty,  Espana  alone 
made  an  orderly  retreat  to  Campo  Mayor  with  two  thousand 
men.  A  few  reached  Elvas,  three  thousand  got  into  Badajos 
by  the  bridge,  nine  hundred  bodies  strewed  the  field.  Eight 
thousand,  including  armed  followers,  were  made  prisoners, 
together  with  all  the  guns,  colours,  muskets,  ammunition,  and 
baggage,  it  was  a  shameful  defeat.  Soult,  with  a  small  force, 
had  passed  two  difficult  rivers,  carried  a  strong  position,  and 
annihilated  an  army  which  had  been  two  years  in  constant 
service.  Mendizabel,  instead  of  destroying  the  bridge  over  the 
Gebora  should  have  cast  others,  that  he  might  freely  pass  to 
attack  the  French  while  crossing  the  Guadiana;  he  should  have 
opposed  them  again  in  passing  the  Gebora ;  or  he  might  have 
gone  through  Badajos,  and  fallen  on  the  troops  in  the  trenches 
with  his  whole  army,  while  Soult  was  still  entangled  between 
the  rivers. 

After  the  action  the  French  cast  up  entrenchments  and 
posted  three  battalions  and  the  heavy  cavalry  on  the  position 
gained.  Next  day  the  siege  was  renewed,  but  the  difficulty 
was  rendered  apparent  by  the  victory.  Continual  rains 
interrupted  the  convoys,  and  men  were  detached  a  great 
distance  to  gather  provisions ;  nearly  two  thousand  had  been 
killed  or  wounded  in  the  two  sieges  and  this  battle,  many 
were  sick,  and  Badajos  was  still  powerful.  The  garrison  was 
nine  thousand  strong,  and  by  the  flight  of  the  inhabitants 
well  provided  with  food,  there  was  no  want  of  other  store?, 
the  governor  was  resolute,  the  season  rigorous  for  the  be- 
siegers :  no  communication  had  been  opened  with  Massena, 


V,il  , ">  .Plate  J-~  ff 


BATT1L1E  of  1BAROSA 
.5* March,  1811. 


Rondo, 


FEB.  1811.]  BOOK   XII.  — CHAP.   2.  99 

and  Wellington;  momentarily  expecting  his  reinforcements, 
was  eager  to  succour  the  place.  Andalusia  was  meanwhile 
seriously  menaced. 

CONTINUATION    OF    THE   BLOCKADE   OP   CADIZ 

When  Graham  knew  that  Soult  had  gone  to  Estremadura 
he   undertook   to   drive   Victor   from   his   lines. 
Troops   sailing   from   Cadiz  were   to   disembark       ^bstaraet 
in    rear   of  the   French   and   be  joined   by  the       of  Military 
garrison  of  Tarifa  under  major  Brown,  and  by       MSS?*' 
three  thousand  Spaniards  from  San  Roque  under 
general  Beguines.     Contrary  winds  delayed   the  expedition, 
and  the  despatch  vessels  carrying  counter  orders  to  Browc 
and  Beguines  being  likewise  retarded,  those  officers  advanced, 
the  first  to   Medina,  the  second  to  Casa  Vieja.     Victor  got 
notice  of  the  design  and  kept  close  in  his  works  until  he 
heard  of  this  failure  in  the  combinations,  when  he  sent  troops 
to  retake  Medina  and  the  Casa.     At  the  same  time  twelve 
thousand  men  from  the  northern  governments  reached  him, 
and,  his  whole  force  being  twenty  thousand,  he 
had  fifteen  thousand  in  the  lines :  the  remainder    f™™^7' 
were   at   San   Lucar,  Medina,  and   other   posts. 
This  was  known  at  Cadiz,  but  ten  thousand  infantry  and  six 
hundred  cavalry  were  again  embarked,  being  this  time  to  land 
at  Tarifa  and  march  straight  on  Chiclana.     General   Zayas 
was  left  in  command  of  the  Isla  with  orders  to  throw  a  bridge 
over  the  Santi  Petri  near  the  sea  mouth.     Ballesteros  with  the. 
remnant  of  his  broken  force  was  to  menace  Seville,  the  par- 
tidas  were  to  hold  Sebastiani  in  check,  and  insurrections  were 
expected  in  all  quarters. 

On  the  22nd  the  British  troops  passed  their  port  in  a  gale, 
but  landed  at  Algesiras,  marched  to  Tarifa   the   next   day, 
and  were  joined  by  the  twenty-eighth  regiment  and  the  flank 
companies  of  the  ninth  and  eighty-second  regi- 
ments.    Thus  more  than  four  thousand  effective     APPendix  4« 
troops,  including  two  companies  of  the  twentieth 
Portuguese   and   one   hundred  and  eighty  German    hussars, 
were  assembled  under  Graham;  all  good  and  hardy  troops, 


100  PENINSULA  WAR.  [FEB.  1811. 

and  himself  a  daring  old  man  and  of  a  ready  temper  for 
battle.  The  captain  general  La  Pena  landed  the  27th  with 
seven  thousand  Spaniards,  and  Graham  to  preserve  unanimity 
ceded  the  command  although  it  was  contrary  to  his  instruc- 
tions. Next  day  a  march  of  twelve  miles  carried  them  over 
the  ridges  which  separate  the  plains  of  San  Roque  from  those 
of  Medina  and  Chiclana,  and  being  then  within  four  leagues  of 
the  enemy's  posts,  the  troops  were  re-organized.  The  van- 
guard was  given  to  Lardizabal,  the  centre  to  the  prince  of 
Anglona,  the  reserve,  composed  of  two  Spanish  regiments 
and  the  British  troops,  was  confided  to  Graham :  the  cavalry 
of  both  nations,  formed  in  one  body,  was  under  colonel  Whit- 
tiugham,  then  in  the  Spanish  service. 

Before  this  Beguines  and  the  partidas  had  driven  the 
French  from  Casa  Vieja  and  Medina ;  but  general  Cassagne, 
being  reinforced  from  Arcos,  had  retaken  both  places  and 
entrenched  Medina,  acting  as  a  covering  force  to  the  lines. 
Meanwhile  the  generals  in  the  higher  districts  of  Andalusia, 
seeing  the  people  ripe  for  commotion,  gathered  their  scattered 
troops,  and,  following  Soult's  orders,  concentrated  at  Seville, 
j  Ecija,  and  Cordoba.  In  Grenada  the  insurgents 

Werie  to  were  especially  active,  and  Sebastiani,  doubtful 
Shama™'  ^  *ne  s^orm  would  not  break  on  his  side,  con- 
March  12.  centrated  troops  at  Estipona  as  a  covering  point 

for  the  coast  line,  whence  he  could  easily  gain 
Honda.  Victor  manned  his  works  at  Rota,  Santa  Maria, 
Puerto  Real,  and  the  Troccadero,  with  a  mixed  force  of 
juramentados  and  regular  troops;  but  he  assembled  eleven 

thousand  good  soldiers  near  Chiclana,  between 
Appendix  17,  tlie  roads  of  Conil  and  Medina,  to  await  the 

unfolding  of  the  allies'  project,  which  was  not 
long  delayed.  At  first  La  Pena's  march  pointed  to  Medina 
Sidonia,  his  vanguard  stormed  Casa  Vieja  on  the  2nd  of 
March,  and  he  was  joined  by  Beguines  with  sixteen  hundred 
infantry  and  several  hundred  irregular  cavalry.  Having 
then  twelve  thousand  infantry,  eight  hundred  horsemen, 
and  twenty-four  guns,  he  turned  towards  the  coast  and 
drove  the  French  from  Vejer  de  la  Frontera.  The  following 
evening  he  continued  his  movement,  and  at  nine  o'clock  in 


MARCH,  1811.]     .     BOOK   XII.  — CHAP.  2.  101 

the  morning  of  the  5th,  after  a  skirmish,  in  which  his 
advanced  guard  of  cavalry  was  routed  by  a  French  squadron, 
he  reached  the  Cerro  de  Puerco,  called  by  the  English  the 
heights  of  Barosa,  being  then  four  miles  from  the  sea  mouth 
of  the  Santi  Petri. 

Barosa  is  a  low  ridge,  creeping  in  from  the  coast  about 
one  mile  and  a  half;  it  overlooked  a  high  broken  plain  of 
small  extent,  bounded  on  the  left  by  the  coast  cliffs,  on  the 
right  by  the  forest  of  Chiclana,  in  front  by  a  pine-wood. 
Beyond  this  wood  a  long  narrow  height,  called  the  Bermeja, 
filled  the  space  between  the  Almanza  creek  and  the  sea,  and 
could  be  reached  by  moving  through  the  pine-wood  in  front, 
or  by  the  beach  under  the  cliffs.  Graham,  foreseeing  that 
Victor  would  come  out  of  his  lines  to  fight,  had  previously 
obtained  La  Pena's  promise  to  make  short  marches,  to  keep 
the  troops  fresh  for  battle,  and  not  to  approach 
the  enemy  except  in  a  mass;  but  in  violation  Appendix  4, 
of  this  promise,  the  march  from  Casa  Vieja,  made 
on  bad  roads  with  ignorant  guides,  had  occupied  fifteen  hours, 
and  the  night  march  to  Barosa  had  been  still  more  fatiguing. 
The  troops  therefore  came  up  in  a  straggling  manner;  and 
ere  they  had  all  arrived,  La  Pena,  without  disclosing  his  own 
plans,  or  communicating  by  signal  or  otherwise  with  Zayas, 
sent  Lardizabal,  reinforced  by  a  squadron  and  three  guns, 
straight  to  the  mouth  of  the  Santi  Petri.  Zayas  had  cast 
his  bridge  on  the  2nd,  and  commenced  an  entrenchment, 
but  in  the  night  he  had  been  surprised  by  the  French  and 
driven  again  into  the  Isla ;  Lardizabal's  movement  was  there- 
fore dangerous,  yet,  after  a  sharp  fight  in  which  three  hundred 
Spaniards  fell,  he  forced  the  French  posts  and  effected  a 
junction  with  Zayas. 

La  Pena  desired  the  British  troops  to  follow,  but  Graham 
was  desirous  to  hold  the  Barosa  height  in  strength.  He 
argued  that  Victor  could  not  attack  Lardizabal  and  Zayas, 
as  he  would  thus  lend  his  flank  to  the  allies  on  Barosa; 
Lascy,  chief  of  the  Spanish  staff,  controverted  this  reasoning, 
and  La  Pena  peremptorily  commanded  Graham  to  march  the 
British  troops  through  the  wood  to  Bermeja.  With  great 
temper  he  obeyed  the  uncourteous  order,  but  left  the  flank 


102  PENINSULA   WAR.        .       [MARCH,  1811, 

companies  of  the  ninth  and  eighty-second  regiments  under 
major  Brown  to  guard  his  baggage :  he  moved  also  thinking 
La  Pena  would  remain  at  Barosa  with  Anglona's  division  and 
the  cavalry,  and  the  more  certainly  that  a  Spanish  detachment 
was  still  on  the  side  of  Medina.  Yet  the  British  had  scarcely 
entered  the  wood  in  front,  when  La  Pena,  without  notice, 
carried  off  the  corps  of  battle,  and  directing  the  cavalry  to 
follow,  repaired  himself  by  the  sea-road  to  Santi  Petri,  leaving 
Barosa  crowded  with  baggage  and  protected  only  by  a  rear- 
guard of  four  guns  and  five  battalions. 

Victor  had  hitherto  kept  so  close  to  the  forest  of  Chiclana 
that  the  allies'  patroles  could  find  no  enemy,  and  Graham's 
march  of  only  two  miles  seemed  safe,  but  the  French  marshal 
was  keenly  watching  his  opportunity.  He  had  recalled  Cas- 
sagne's  infantry  from  Medina  Sidonia  when  La  Pena  reached 
Barosa,  and,  momentarily  expecting  its  arrival,  felt  so  sure 
of  success,  that  the  great  body  of  French  cavalry,  then  at 
Medina  and  Arcos,  was  directed  upon  Vejer  and  other  points 
to  cut  off  the  fugitives  after  the  battle.  He  had  fourteen 

pieces  of  artillery  and  nine  thousand  excellent 
Appendix^!?,  soidiers  in  hand  commanded  by  Laval,  Ruffin,  and 

Villatte.  From  these  he  drafted  three  grena- 
dier battalions  to  form  reserves,  attaching  two  of  them  and 
three  squadrons  of  cavalry  to  Ruffm's  brigade  which  formed 
his  left  wing:  the  other  waited  on  Laval's  brigade  which 
formed  his  centre.  Villatte's  brigade,  two  thousand  five 
hundred  strong,  originally  on  the  Bermeja,  had  retired  from 
thence  before  Lardizabal,  and  was  now  posted  close  to  a 
bridge  on  the  Almanza  creek,  to  cover  the  works  of  the 
camp  and  to  watch  the  Spanish  forces  at  Santi  Petri  and 
the  Bermeja. 

BATTLE   OF   BAROSA. 

Cassagne  had  not  yet  arrived,  but  Victor  seeing  Graham's 
corps  in  the  wood,  Zayas  and  Lardizabal  on  the  Bermeja,  a 
third  body  and  all  the  baggage  on  the  Barosa  height,  a  fourth 
in  movement  by  the  coast,  and  a  fifth  still  on  the  march  from 
Vejer,  poured  at  once  into  the  plain  and  begun  the  battle. 
Laval  was  directed  against  the  British  in  the  wood.  Victor, 


MARCH,  1811.]  BOOK  XII.— CHAP.  2, 

leading  Ruffin's  troops  in  person,  ascended  the  rear  of  the 
Barosa  height,  and  thus  intercepted  the  Spanish  detachment 
coming  from  Medina.  He  drove  the  rear-guard  off  the  hill 
towards  the  sea,  dispersed  the  baggage  and  followers  in  all 
directions,  and  took  three  Spanish  guns;  but  major  Brown 
kept  his  companies  in  good  order,  and  though  unable  to  stem 
the  torrent  slowly  retired  into  the  plain  and  sent  to  Graham 
for  orders.  That  general  was  near  Bermeja,  and  simply 
answered,  fight!  then  facing  about  himself  regained  the  plain 
with  great  celerity,  expecting  to  find  La  Pena  with  the  corps 
of  battle  and  the  cavalry  on  the  Barosa  hill.  When  the  view 
opened  he  beheld  Ruffin's  brigade,  flanked  by  the  two  grenadier 
battalions,  near  the  summit  on  the  one  side,  the  Spanish  rear- 
guard and  the  baggage  flying  toward  the  sea  on  the  other, 
the  French  cavalry  following  the  fugitives  in  good  order, 
Laval  close  upon  his  own  left  flank,  and  La  Pena  nowhere ! 

In  this  desperate  situation,  feeling  that  a  retreat  to  Bermeja 
would  bring  the  enemy  pell-mell  with  the  allies  on  to  that 
narrow  ridge,  and  must  be  disastrous,  Graham  resolved  to 
attack,  although  the  key  of  the  field  of  battle  was  in  the 
enemy's  possession.  Ten  guns,  under  major  Duncan,  instantly 
opened  a  terrific  fire  against  Laval's  column,  and  colonel 
Andrew  Barnard  running  vehemently  out  with  his  riflemen 
and  some  Portuguese  companies,  commenced  the  fight  while 
the  rest  of  the  British  troops,  without  any  attention  to 
regiments  or  brigades,  so  sudden  was  the  affair,  formed  two 
masses,  with  one  of  which  general  Dilkes  marched  against 
Ruffin,  while  colonel  Wheately  led  the  other  against  Laval. 
Duncan's  guns  ravaged  the  French  ranks,  Laval's  artillery 
replied  vigorously,  Ruffin's  batteries  took  Wheately's  column 
in  flank,  and  the  infantry  on  both  sides  pressed  forward 
eagerly  and  with  a  pealing  musketry.  But  when  the  masses 
drew  near,  a  fierce  rapid  prolonged  charge  of  the  87th  regi- 
ment overthrew  the  first  line  of  the  French,  and  though  the 
latter  fought  roughly,  they  were  dashed  violently  upon  the 
second  line  and  both  being  broken  by  the  shock  went  off, 
the  reserve  battalion  of  grenadiers,  hitherto  posted  on  the 
right,  alone  remaining  to  cover  the  retreat.  Meanwhile 
Brown  having  received  Graham's  laconic  order,  fell  headlong 


104  PENINSULA  WAR.  [MARCH,  1811. 

upon  Ruffin ;  and  though  nearly  half  of  his  detachment  went 
down  under  the  enemy's  first  fire,  he  maintained  the  fight, 
until  Dilkes'  column,  which  had  crossed  a  deep  hollow  and 
never  stopt  even  to  reform  the  regiments,  arrived,  with  little 
order  indeed  but  in  a  fighting  mood,  and  then  the  whole  run 
up  towards  the  summit :  there  was  no  slackness  on  either  side, 
for  at  the  very  edge  of  the  ascent  their  gallant  opponents  met 
them,  when  a  dreadful  and  for  some  time  a  doubtful  combat 
raged.  Finally  Ruflin,  and  Chaudron  Rousseau,  who  com- 
manded the  chosen  grenadiers,  fell,  both  mortally  wounded, 
the  English  bore  strongly  onward,  and  their  slaughtering  fire 
forced  the  French  from  the  hill  with  the  loss  of  three  guns 
and  many  brave  soldiers.  The  discomfited  divisions,  retiring 
concentrically  from  the  different  points  of  battle,  soon  met,  and 
with  infinite  spirit  endeavoured  to  reform  and  renew  the  action, 
but  the  play  of  Duncan's  guns,  rapid  and  murderous,  rendered 
the  attempt  vain :  Victor  then  quitted  the  field  of  battle,  and 
the  British  having  been  twenty-four  hours  under  arms  without 
food,  were  too  exhausted  to  pursue. 

While  these  terrible  combats  of  infantry  were  fighting,  La 
Pena  looked  idly  on,  neither  sending  his  cavalry,  nor  his 
horse-artillery,  nor  any  part  of  his  army  to  the  assistance  of 
his  ally,  nor  yet  menacing  Villatte  who  was  close  to  him  and 
comparatively  weak.  The  Spanish  Walloon  guards,  the  regi- 
ment of  Ciudad  Real,  and  some  guerilla  cavalry,  turned 
indeed  without  orders  and  came  up  just  as  the  action  ceased ; 
and  it  was  expected  that  Whittingham,  an  Englishman,  com- 
manding a  powerful  body  of  Spanish  horse,  would  have  done 
as  much — but  no  stroke  in  aid  was  struck  by  a  Spanish 
sabre  that  day,  although  the  French  cavalry  did  not  exceed 
two  hundred  and  fifty  men,  and  it  is  evident  the  eight  hundred 
under  Whittingham  might,  by  sweeping  round  the  left  of 
Ruffin's  division,  have  rendered  the  defeat  ruinous.  So  certain 
indeed  was  this,  that  Frederick  Ponsonby,  drawing  off  the 
hundred  and  eighty  German  hussars  belonging  to  the  English 
army,  reached  the  field  of  battle,  charged  the  French  squadrons 
in  their  retreat,  overthrew  them,  took  two  guns,  and  even 
attempted  though  vainly  to  sabre  Rousseau's  chosen  battalions. 
This  was  the  fight  of  Barosa.  Short,  for  it  lasted  only  one 


MARCH,  1811.]  BOOK  XII.  — CHAP.  2.  105 

hour  and  a  half,  violent  and  bloody,  for  fifty  officers,  sixty 
sergeants,  eleven  hundred  British  soldiers,  and  more  than  two 
thousand  French  were  killed  and  wounded :  six  guns,  an  eagle, 
two  generals,  both  mortally  wounded,  together  with  four 
hundred  other  prisoners,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  victors. 

Graham  remained  some  hours  on  the  height,  still  hoping  La 
Pena  would  awake  to  the  prospect  of  success  and  glory  which 
the  extreme  valour  of  the  British  had  opened.  Four  thou- 
sand men  and  a  powerful  artillery  had  come  over  the  Santi 
Petri,  and  the  Spanish  general  was  therefore  at  the  head  of 
twelve  thousand  infantry  and  eight  hundred  cavalry,  all  fresh 
troops;  before  him  were  the  remains  of  the  French  line  of 
battle  retreating  in  the  greatest  disorder  upon 
Chiclana ;  but  military  feeling  was  extinct  in  him,  APPendix  4, 
and  Graham  no  longer  able  to  endure  this  scene, 
left  the  dastard  on  the  Bermeja  and  filed  the. British  troops 
over  the  bridge  into  the  Isla. 

On  the  French  side,  Cassagne's  reserve  came  up  from 
Medina  and  a  council  of  war  was  held  in  the  night  of  the  5th. 
Victor,  although  naturally  of  a  desponding  temper,  proposed 
another  attack,  but  the  suggestion  was  ill-received,  and  the 
6th,  admiral  Keats  landed  his  seamen  and  marines  and  dis- 
mantled, with  exception  of  Catalina,  every  fort  from  Kota  to 
Santa  Maria,  and  even  obtained  momentary  possession  of  the 
latter  place.  This  caused  such  alarm  in  the  French  camp, 
that  Victor,  leaving  garrisons  at  the  great  points  of  his  lines 

and  a  rear-guard  at  Chiclana,  retreated  behind  the 

.  Abstract  of 

San  Pedro,  where  he  expected  to  be  immediately       Military 

attacked ;  and  if  La  Pena  had  even  then  pushed       MSS  ^ 
to  Chiclana,  Graham  and  Keats  were  willing  to 
make  a  simultaneous  attack  upon  the  Trocadero ;  but  two  days 
passed  without  even  a  Spanish  patrole  following  the  French. 
On  the  8th  Victor  returned  to  Chiclana,  whereupon  La  Pena 
recrossed  the  Santi  Petri  and  destroyed  the  bridge  j  his  detach- 
ment on  the  side  of  Medina  was  thus  cut  off  from  the  Isla,  and 
soon  afterwards  retired  to  Algesiras. 

All  the  passages  in  this  extraordinary  battle  were  broadly 
marked,  and  La  Pena's  contemptible  weakness  was  surprisingly 
contrasted  with  the  heroic  vigour  of  Graham,  whose  attack  was 


106  PENINSULA  WAR.  [MARCH,  1811. 

an  inspiration  rather  than  a  resolution,  so  wise  so  sudden  was 
the  decision,  so  swift  so  conclusive  the  execution.  The 
original  plan  of  the  enterprise  has  however  been  censured. 
Sebastiani,  it  is  said,  might,  by  moving  on  the  rear  of  the 
allies,  have  crushed  them,  and  they  had  no  right  to  calculate 
upon  his  inactivity.  This  is  shallow  criticism.  Graham, 
weighing  the  natural  dislike  of  one  general  to  serve  under 
another,  judged  that  Sebastiani  would  not  hastily  abandon  his 
own  district,  menaced  as  it  was  by  insurrection,  to  succour 
Victor  before  it  was  clear  where  the  blow  was  to  be  struck. 
The  distance  from  Tarifa  to  Chiclana  was  fifty  miles,  Sebas- 
tiani's  nearest  post  to  Chiclana  was  above  a  hundred,  and  the 
object  of  the  allies  could  not  be  known  until  they  passed  the 
mountains  separating  Tarifa  from  Medina.  Combining  these 
moral  and  physical  considerations,  Graham  expected  several 
days  of  free  action,  and  thus  it  happened;  with  a  worthy 
colleague  he  would  have  raised  the  blockade,  and  more  than 
that  could  not  have  been  hoped,  as  the  French  would  have 
concentrated  before  Cadiz  or  about  Seville  or  Ecija,  and  they 
had  still  fifty  thousand  men  in  Andalusia.  The  real  error  of 
the  French  has  been  pointed  out  by  Napoleon.  Soult  dissemi- 
nated his  forces  too  widely,  and  made  unskilful  combinations. 
Seville  and  the  lines  at  Cadiz  were  the  important  points  to 
guard  during  his  absence;  he  should  therefore  have  collected 
his  hospitals  in  Seville,  leaving  his  scattered  posts  free  to  move 
to  any  point.  Sebastiani  and  Godinot  should  have  been  under 
Victor's  orders,  who  could  then  have  drawn  them  to  his 
succour  in  time,  and  crushed  the  allies.  In  this  manner 
Sebastiani  might  certainly  have  prevented  the  expedition  alto- 
gether;  but  Graham  knew  Sebastiani  was  not  under  Victor's 
command,  and  it  was  a  proof  of  genius  to  rely  as  he  did  on 
the  effect  of  the  insurrections  in  Grenada.  The  error  was  with 
Sebastiani,  who  suffered  his  sixteen  thousand  excellent  troops 
to  be  paralysed  by  some  insurgents.  Victor's  attack  was  well- 
timed,  and  vigorous;  with  a  few  thousand  more  troops  he 
would  have  destroyed  the  allies.  The  unconquerable  English 
spirit  prevented  this  disaster ;  but  if  Graham  had  given  way, 
or  even  hesitated  the  army  must  have  been  driven  like  sheep 
into  an  enclosure,  having  the  Almanza  creek  on  one  side,  the 


MARCH,  1811.]  BOOK  XII. —CHAP.  2.  107 

sea  on  the  other,  the  Santi  Petri  to  bar  their  flight,  and  the 
enemy  hanging  on  their  rear  in  all  the  fierceness  of  victory. 
Indeed,  such  was  La  Pena's  misconduct  that  the  French, 
although  defeated,  gained  their  main  point ;  the  blockade  was 
renewed ;  and  during  the  action  a  French  detachment,  passing 
the  Santi  Petri  near  the  bridge  of  Zuazo  without  difficulty, 
brought  back  prisoners :  with  a  few  more  troops  Victor  might 
have  seized  the  Isla.  Ballesteros  menaced  Seville  during  the 
operations,  but  was  driven  back  in  a  miserable  condition  to  the 
Aroche  hills  by  Daricau. 

Violent  disputes  arose  in  Cadiz.  La  Peiia,  in  an  address  to 
the  Cortes,  claimed  the  victory  for  himself:  he  said  that  the 
arrangements  previous  to  the  battle  were  made  with  the 
knowledge  and  approbation  of  the  English  general,  and  the 
latter's  retreat  to  the  Isla  was  the  real  cause  of  failure.  Lascy 
and  Cruz-Murgeon,  also  published  inaccurate  accounts  of  the 
action,  and  had  deceptive  plans  engraved  to  uphold  their 
statements.  Graham,  incensed  at  these  unworthy  proceedings, 
wrote  a  letter  to  the  British  envoy  in  which  he  exposed  La 
Pena's  misconduct ;  he  refused  with  disdain  the  title  of  grandee 
of  the  first  class  voted  to  him  by  the  Cortes,  and  when  Lascy 
used  expressions  relative  to  the  action  personally  offensive,  he 
enforced  an  apology  with  his  sword.  Having  thus  shown 
himself  superior  to  his  opponents  at  all  points,  the  gallant  old 
man  relinquished  his  command  to  general  Cooke,  and  joined 
lord  Wellington's  army. 


108  PENINSULA  WAR.  [MARCH,  1811. 


CHAPTER  III. 

ANDALUSIA  continued  to  be  disturbed  by  insurrection,  but 
Soult's  resolution  to  take  Badajos  remained  unshaken,  and 
early  in  March,  the  approaches  being  carried  by  sap  to  the 
covered  way,  mines  were  prepared  to  blow  in  the  counter- 
scarp. Kafael  Menacho  the  governor  was  however  a  resolute 
man :  his  courage  and  activity  gained  the  confidence  of  his 
troops,  his  sallies  were  frequent  and  vigorous,  his  fire  was 
superior  to  that  of  the  French,  and  he  had  entrenched  the 
streets  behind  the  breach;  but  on  the  2nd  March,  in  a  success- 
ful sally,  he  was  killed,  and  the  command  fell  to  Imas,  a  man 
so  base  that  a  worse  could  nowhere  be  found.  Then  the 
spirit  of  the  garrison  sunk,  the  French  passed  the  ditch,  a 
lodgment  was  made  on  one  of  the  ravelins,  the  rampart  was 
breached,  and  the  place  was  summoned  previous  to  the 
assault. 

At  this  time  the  great  crisis  of  the  campaign  in  Portugal 
having  passed,  a  strong  body  of  British  and  Portuguese  troops 
was  in  march  to  raise  the  siege.  In  three  different  ways,  by 
telegraph,  by  letter,  by  a  confidential  messenger,  Imas  was 
told  that  Massena  was  in  retreat,  and  an  army  actually  in 
march  to  succour  the  place.  The  breach  was  still  imprac- 
ticable, provisions  were  plentiful,  the  garrison  was  above  eight 
thousand  strong,  and  the  French  army  reduced  to  less  than 
fourteen  thousand  men:  Imas  read  the  letter,  received  the 
messages  and  instantly  surrendered,  handing  over  at  the  same 
moment  the  intelligence  thus  obtained  to  the  enemy.  He 
only  demanded  that  his  grenadiers  should  march  out  of  the 
breach,  and  it  was  granted,  but  he  was  forced  to  enlarge  the 
opening  himself  ere  they  could  do  so !  Yet  this  man  who  had 
secured  his  own  liberty  while  consigning  his  fellow-soldiers  to 
a  prison,  was  never  punished  by  the  Spanish  rulers ;  for  though 
Wellington's  indignant  remonstrances  procured  a  trial,  the 


MARCH,  1811.J          BOOK  XII.  — CHAP.  3.  109 

process  lasted  during  the  whole  war.  "When  the  place  fell, 
Mortier  marched  against  Campo  Mayor,  and  Latour  Maubourg 
seized  Albuquerque,  and  Valencia  d'Alcantara  making  six 
hundred  prisoners,  but  Soult,  alarmed  by  the  effects  of  the 
battle  of  Barosa,  returned  to  Andalusia.  He  had  in  fifty  days 
mastered  four  fortresses  and  invested  a  fifth;  he  had  killed  or 
dispersed  ten  thousand  men,  and  made  twenty  thousand 
prisoners  with  a  force  at  no  time  exceeding  the  number  of  his 
captives.  Great  daring  and  successful  his  operations  had  been, 
yet  the  principal  object  was  frustrated,  Massena  was  in  full 
retreat — Wellington's  combinations  had  pakied  the  hand  of  the 
conqueror ! 

While  the  siege  was  proceeding,  no  change  took  place  in  the 
main  positions  of  either  army  at  Santarem.  Massena  was 
encouraged  by  the  destitute  state  of  the  Portuguese  army, 
which  he  hoped  would  break  up  the  alliance;  for  the  native 
troops  were  starving  in  their  own  country  while  the  British 
were  well  fed,  and  the  deserters  from  the  former,  without 
knowing  the  cause,  had  a  story,  as  true  as  it  was  pitiable,  to 
tell  of  their  miseries.  The  English  general,  certain  that  the 
French,  reduced  by  sickness,  must  soon  quit  their  ground  if 
he  could  relieve  Badajos,  only  waited  for  his  reinforcements  to 
send  Beresford  with  fourteen  thousand  men  against  Soult. 
The  defeat  on  the  Gebora  ruined  this  project,  the  expected 
reinforcements  would  not  suffice  for  the  execution,  Massena 
could  not  be  starved  out  in  time,  and  there  only  remained  the 
resource  of  a  general  battle, — the  prince  of  Esling  had  there- 
fore reason  for  saying  that  so  far  from  being  aided  by  Soult 
he  had  covered  that  marshal's  operations.  Wellington's  design 
was  to  post  ten  thousand  men  before  Santarem  to  hold  Keynier 
in  check ;  to  make  Beresford  cross  the  Tagus  at  Abrantes  and 
fall  on  Massena's  rear ;  and  with  the  rest  of  the  army,  moving 
by  Rio  Mayor  and  Tremes,  to  drive  back  the  enemy's  centre 
and  right,  cut  off  the  left  at  Santarem,  and  drive  it  into  the 
Tagus.  But  day  after  day  he  looked  in  vain  for  his  reinforce- 
ments. They  had  been  embarked  in  January  and  would  have 
reached  Lisbon  before  the  end  of  that  month,  if  the  admiral, 
sir  Joseph  Yorke,  had  taken  advantage  of  a  favourable  wind, 
blowing  when  the  trooDS  were  first  put  on  board;  but  the 


110  PENINSULA   WAR.  [MARCH,  1811. 

opportunity  was  neglected,   contrary  gales  followed,  and  the 
ordinary  voyage  of  ten  days  was  prolonged  for  six  weeks. 

Massena's  situation  however  was  becoming  very  perilous. 
He  could  not  besiege  Abrantes,  and  that  place,  although  a 
strategic  point  for  the  allies  who  had  a  moveable  bridge,  was 
not  so  for  him,  as  it  did  not  give  a  passage  over  the  river. 
Three  courses  remained  for  choice.  To  force  a  passage  of  the 
Tagus  alone,  to  await  Soult's  co-operation,  or  to  retreat.  He 
seemed  inclined  towards  the  first,  showing  great  jealousy  of 
the  entrenchments  opposite  the  mouth  of  the  Zezere,  and 
moving  his  boats  on  wheel  carriages  down  the  bank  of  the 
Tagus,  as  if  to  alarm  Beresford  and  make  him  concentrate  to  his 
left.  His  demonstrations  produced  no  effect,  Beresford  held 
his  ground,  and  was  so  vigilant  that  neither  spy  nor  officer 
could  pass  his  line,  Massena  only  knew  that  Soult  was  before 
Badajos,  nothing  more.  Meanwhile  sickness  wasted  the  French, 
famine  menaced  them,  discipline  was  loosened,  the  leading- 
generals  were  at  open  discord,  and  the  conspiracy  to  place  St. 
Cyr  at  the  head  of  all  the  armies  in  opposition  to  the  emperor 
was  still  smouldering.  These  accumulating  difficulties  over- 
came Massena's  obduracy,  he  promised  to  retreat  when  he  had 
no  more  provisions  left  than  would  supply  him  for  the  march ; 
and  this  tardy  assent  was  given  when  by  holding  his  position  ten 
days  longer  he  would  have  insured  the  co-operation  of  Soult ! 
It  was  however  wrung  from  him  by  necessity,  and  general 
Pelet,  speaking  Massena's  sentiments,  says  that  Soult's  sieges 
when  he  should  have  come  down  to  the  Tagus  at  once  were  the 
great  cause  of  failure; — it  would  be  juster  to  say  that  Welling- 
ton's combinations,  which  barred  the  road  to  Soult,  effected 
their  object.  Before  the  sieges  of  Olivenza  and  Badajos,  Men- 
dizabel  could  have  assembled  twenty  thousand  men  on  Soult's 
rear  if  he  moved  towards  the  Tagus ;  there  was  a  large  body 
of  militia  on  the  Ponful  and  the  Elga  who  could  by  Abrantes 
have  joined  Beresford,  and  that  marshal  had  fourteen  thousand 
regular  troops  besides  ordenanca.  Wellington  also  had  so 
many  boats  that  he  could  have  thrown  troops  over  the  river 
with  a  celerity  forereaching  any  effort  of  Massena  to  join 
Soult,  who  would  thus  have  to  pass  thirty-five  thousand  men 
and  several  fortresses  to  fight  a  superior  army. 


Vol.  3.  Plate  4 


MAS  SENA'S    RETKEAT 
COMBAT  of   SABITOAL 
1811. 


MARCH,  1811.]  BOOK  Xll.  —  CHAP.  8.  Ill 

The  difficulty  of  communication  was  always  a  stumbling- 
block  for  the  French  combinations  in  Spain.  At  this  time 
Napoleon  had  remodelled  the  organization  of  his  troops  in  a 
manner  to  give  Massena  great  relief.  The  king's  force  was  to 
be  diminished,  Soult's  was  to  be  augmented ;  -Drouet  was  to 
join  Mortier  with  eleven  thousand  of  the  9th  corps,  the 
remainder  of  which  was  to  be  incorporated  in  the  divisions 
of  the  army  of  Portugal  under  Clausel  and  Toy.  Marmont  was 
to  supersede  Ney  with  the  sixth  corps,  Loison  was  removed 
to  the  second  corps,  and  Bessieres  was  to  send  six  thousand 
men  to  Ciudad  E-odrigo  in  support  of  general  Claparede. 
Seven  thousand  of  the  young  guards  were  to  occupy  Zamora 
in  observation  of  the  Gallicians,  and  the  remainder  were  to  be 
at  Valladolid  with  strong  cavalry  posts  between  to  insure  fre- 
quent intelligence  of  what  was  passing  in  Portugal.  These 
dispositions,  at  an  earlier  period  would  have  enabled  Massena 
to  adopt  any  line  of  operations  without  regard  to  his  original 
base,  and  made  his  command  easier  by  removing  captious  sub- 
ordinates; but  they  did  not  reach  the  armies  until  a  late 
period,  and  in  the  end  of  February  the  French  forces  about 
Santarem  being  reduced  to  fifty  thousand  fighting  men,  exclu- 
sive of  Drouet's  troops  about  Leiria,  could  no  longer  defend 
their  extended  positions  against  Wellington's  projected  attack. 
Hence  when  the  prince  of  Esling  knew  from  the  fidalgos  that 
the  long-expected  reinforcements  from  England  had  landed  at 
Lisbon  on  the  2nd  of  March,  he  commenced  his  retreat,  and 
on  the  6tb  all  his  positions  were  void. 

MASSENA'S  RETREAT. 

Several  projects  were  considered.  1°.  Attempt  to  pass  the 
Tagus  between  Punhete  and  Santarem  by  boats,  or  possibly 
by  fords,  which  were  often  practicable  after  a  week  of  dry 
weather.  2°.  Fall  back  by  Sobreira  Formosa  upon  Castello 
Branco,  and  communicate  by  Plasencia  with  the  king,  and  with 
Soult  by  Alcantara.  3°.  Ketreat  by  the  Estrada  Nova  and 
Belmonte,  to  Sabugal,  and  afterwards  act  according  to  circum- 
stances. 4°.  Gain  the  Mondego,  and  ascend  the  left  bank  of 
that  river  towards  Guarda  and  Almeida,  or,  crossing  it,  march 


112  PENINSULA  WAR.  [MARCH,  1811. ' 

upon  Oporto  through  an  untouched  country.  Of  these  four 
plans  the  first  was  thought  perilous,  because  the  weather  was 
too  unsettled  to  be  sure  of  the  fords.  The  second  and  third 
were  difficult  from  the  ruggedness  of  the  Sobreira,  and  dan- 
gerous, because  the  allies  could  break  out  by  Abrantes  upon 
the  flank  of  the  army  while  in  retreat.  Massena  decided  to 
gain  the  Mondego,  but  with  intent  to  halt  behind  it  and 
reduce  Oporto  with  a  detachment.  For  he  calculated  that  the 
junction  of  the  ninth  corps  and  other  troops  from  Leon,  would 
raise  his  force  to  seventy  thousand  men,  and  enable  him  to 
remain  there  until  greater  means  were  prepared  for  a  renewed 
advance  against  Lisbon  by  both  banks  of  the  Tagus,  with  an 
intermediate  corps  on  the  Zezere,  after  the  emperor's  original 
scheme.  This  design  involved,  as  a  preliminary  step,  a  flank 
march,  with  more  than  ten  thousand  sick  men  and  all  the  army 
stores,  under  the  beard  of  an  able  adversary:  yet  this  he  effected 
like  a  great  commander. 

Commencing  by  the  destruction  of  ammunition,  and  all 
guns  not  horsed,  he  passed  his  sick  and  baggage  by  degrees 
upon  Thomar,  keeping  only  his  fighting  men  in  front,  and 
strongly  indicating  an  intention  to  pass  the  Zezere.  But 
when  the  impediments  had  gained  two  marches,  Ney  sud- 
denly assembled  the  sixth  corps  and  the  cavalry  on  the  Lys 
near  Leiria,  as  if  to  advance  against  Torres  Vedras ;  thus 
holding  Wellington  in  suspense,  while  the  second  and  eighth 
corps,  quitting  Santarem  Tremes  and  Alcanhete  in  the  night 
of  the  5th,  fell  back  by  Pernes  upon  Torres  Novas  and 
Thomar,  and  destroyed  the  bridges  on  the  Alviella  behind 
them.  Next  morning  the  boats  were  burnt  at  Punhete,  and 
Loison  retreated  by  the  road  of  Espinal  to  cover  the  flank  of 
the  main  line  of  retreat;  he  was  followed  by  Reynier;  but 
the  rest  of  the  army  made  rapid  concentric  marches  towards 
a  position  in  front  of  Pombal.  The  line  of  movement  to  the 
Mondego  was  thus  secured,  and  four  days  gained ;  for  Wel- 
lington, although  knowing  a  retreat  was  in  progress,  could 
take  no  decided  step,  lest  he  should  open  the  lines  to  his 
adversary.  Nevertheless  he  had  made  Beresford  close  towards 
Abrantes  the  5th,  and  on  the  6th  finding  at  daylight  that  the 
Santarem  camp  was  abandoned,  he  followed  Reynier  with  his 
own  force. 


MARCH,  1811.]  BOOK   XIT.  — CHAP.   8.  118 

Thomar  seemed  the  French  point  of  concentration,  but  as 
their  boats  were  supposed  to  be  still  at  Punhete,  general 
Stewart  was  directed  to  cross  the  Tagus  at  Abrantes  with  the 
greatest  part  of  Beresford's  troops ;  the  light  division  moved  to 
Pernes  where  the  broken  bridge  was  rapidly  restored,  and  the 
first,  fourth,  and  sixth  divisions  with  two  brigades  of  cavalry 
marched  on  Golegao.  When  it  was  found  that  Massena  had 
burned  his  boats,  the  Abrantes  bridge  was  floated  down  the 
Tagus  for  Stewart  to  cross  and  move  by  the  shortest  line  upon 
Thomar,  and  on  that  point  also  the  divisions  at  Golegao  were 
directed.  The  line  of  retreat  being  then  clearly  pronounced 
for  the  Mondego,  the  main  body  halted  at  Thomar,  but  the 
light  division  the  German  hussars  and  the  royal  dragoons  fol- 
lowed the  8th  corps  and  took  two  hundred  prisoners.  During 
this  march,  in  an  obscure  place  among  the  hills,  a  large  house 
was  discovered  filled  with  starving  persons.  Above  thirty 
women  and  children  were  already  dead,  and  sitting  by  the 
bodies  were  fifteen  or  sixteen  living  beings,  of  whom  only  one 
was  a  man,  and  all  so  enfeebled  as  to  be  unable  to  swallow  the 
little  food  that  could  be  offered  to  them.  The  youngest  had  fallen 
first,  all  the  children  were  dead,  none  were  emaciated,  but  the 
muscles  of  their  faces  were  invariably  drawn  transversely, 
giving  a  laughing  appearance  unimaginably  ghastly.  The 
man  seemed  most  eager  for  life,  the  women  patient  and 
resigned,  and  they  had  carefully  covered  and  arranged  th« 
bodies  of  the  dead  ! 

While  part  of  the  army  thus  tracked  the  French,  the  third 
and  fifth  divisions  moved  from  Torres  Vedras  upon  Leiria,  and 
the  Abrantes'  boats  dropped  down  the  river  to  Tancos  to  form 
a  new  bridge ;  that  effected,  the  second  and  fourth  divisions 
and  some  cavalry  coming  back  from  Thomar,  recrossed  the 
Tagus  to  succour  Badajos ;  and  in  that  view  also  Beresford, 
who  had  remained  at  Barca,  sent  a  brigade  of  cavalry  to 
Portalegre. 

Wellington,  misled  by  a  letter  from  Trant,  by  information 
obtained  in  Santarem,  and  by  Massena's  first  movements, 
thought  on  the  7th  the  retreat  would  be  by  Puente  Murcella ; 
on  the  8th  he  trembled  for  Coimbra ;  but  the  9th  the  prince, 
instead  of  continuing  his  retrograde  movement,  concentrated 

VOL.  in.  I 


114  PENINSULA  WAR.  [MARCH.  1811. 

the  fourth  and  eighth  corps  and  Montbrun's  cavalry  on  a  high 
table-land  in  front  of  Pombal,  where  the  light  division  skir- 
mished with  the  advanced  posts,  and  in  a  cavalry  fight  the 
Germans  took  some  prisoners.  This  was  perplexing.  To  fight 
with  advantage  it  would  be  necessary  to  bring  up  the  troops 
destined  to  relieve  Badajos.  To  decline  battle  would  be  giving 
up  Coimbra  and  the  untouched  country  behind  the  Mondego 
to  Oporto,  and  Massena  would  retire  as  a  conqueror.  While 
thus  embarrassed,  Wellington  received  letters  from  Badajos  say- 
ing the  place  could  hold  out  for  a  month,  which  decided  the 
question;  the  fourth  division  and  the  heavy  cavalry,  then  at 
Tancos  on  march  for  the  Alemtejo,  were  recalled,  general 
Nightingale  was  sent  with  a  brigade  of  the  first  division  and 
some  horse  by  Espinal  to  follow  Reynier,  and  the  rest  of  the 
army  closed  concentrically  upon  Pombal.  How  dangerous  a 
captain  Massena  could  be  was  here  proved.  He  had  main- 
tained an  army  for  nearly  six  months  in  a  country  supposed 
to  be  incapable  of  sustaining  it  for  fifteen  days,  and  carried  it 
off  with  consummate  skill.  Moving  the  4th,  it  was  the  llth 
before  sufficient  troops  could  be  assembled  to  fight  him  at 
Pombal ;  in  these  seven  days  he  executed  a  very  difficult  opera- 
tion, gained  four  marches,  and  organized  his  retreat ;  had  rain 
fallen  the  first  day,  the  allies  could  not  have  brought  artillery 
by  those  bad  roads ;  but  he  had  before  sent  off  or  destroyed  all 
his  guns,  except  a  few  light  pieces. 

COMBAT   AT    POMBAL. 

Pack's  brigade  and  the  cavalry;  the  1st,  3rd,  4th,  5th,  6th, 
and  light  divisions;  and  the  Portuguese  troops,  attached  to 
each  division  like  the  Latin  auxiliaries  to  the  Roman  legions, 
were  assembling  to  fight  on  the  10th,  when  Massena,  who  had 
sent  his  baggage  over  the  Soure  river  in  the  night  by  the 
bridge  of  Pombal,  suddenly  retired  through  that  town.  Being 
followed  closely  by  the  light  division,  Ney,  who  had  charge 
of  the  rear-guard  drew  up  on  a  height  behind  and  threw 
a  detachment  into  the  castle.  He  had  waited  too  long,  the 
streets  were  still  encumbered,  and  the  French  army  was 
moving  with  some  confusion  by  a  long  defile  between  the 


MARCH,  1811.]  BOOK   XII.  — CHAP.   3.  115 

mountains  and  the  Soure  river  which  was  fordable,  while  the 
British  main  body  was  moving  along  the  opposite  bank  to 
cross  lower  down  and  cut  the  line  of  retreat.  The  fall  of  night 
marred  this  operation,  but  a  sharp  action  happened  at  Pombal, 
where  the  riflemen  and  cacadores  of  the  light  division  drove  the 
French  from  the  castle  and  town  with  such  vigour,  they  could 
not  destroy  the  bridge  although  it  was  mined :  forty  of  the  allies 
were  hurt,  and  the  loss  of  the  enemy  was  somewhat  greater. 
In  the  night  Massena  continued  his  retreat.  His  baggage 
and  sick  marched  first,  protected  by  the  reserve  cavalry ;  they 
were  followed  by  the  eighth  corps,  while  the  sixth,  reinforced 
with  some  light  cavalry  and  the  best  horsed  of  the  artillery, 
were  destined  to  stem  the  pursuit.  Ney  had  been  directed 
to  detach  Marcognet's  brigade  from  the  Lys  river  on  the  10th 
to  seize  Coimbra,  but  he  neglected  the  order,  and  Massena 
now  sent  Montbrun  on  that  service;  a  very  important  one, 
for  Wellington's  object  was  to  hurry  Massena  p'ast  Coimbra, 
and  force  him  out  of  Portugal.  This  he  hoped  to  effect 
by  operating  on  his  flanks  rather  than  by  battles,  for  he 
judged  the  moral  effect  would  suffice  for  the  general  cause; 
yet  he  still  retained  the  fourth  division  and  the  cavalry  from 
the  succour  of  Badajos,  being  willing  enough  if  occasion  offered 
to  strike.  The  country  was  however  full  of  strong  positions, 
every  village  was  a  defile,  the  weather  was  moderate,  and  N"ey, 
with  a  happy  mixture  of  courage  and  skill,  illustrated  every 
league  of  ground  by  some  signal  combination. 

Daybreak,  on  the  12th,  saw  both  armies  in  movement,  and 
eight  miles  of  march,  with  some  slight  skirmishing,  brought 
the  head  of  the  British  into  a  hollow  way,  leading  to  some 
table-land,  on  which  Ney  had  disposed  five  thousand  infantry 
a  few  squadrons  of  cavalry  and  some  guns.  His  centre  was 
opposite  the  hollow  road,  his  wings  covered  by  wooded 
heights  which  he  occupied  with  light  troops,  his  right  rested 
on  the  ravine  of  the  Soure,  his  left  on  the  Redinha  stream, 
which  circling  round  his  rear  fell  into  the  Soure.  Behind 
him  the  village  of  Redinha,  situated  in  a  hollow,  covered  a 
narrow  bridge  and  a  long  defile.  Beyond  the  stream,  some 
rugged  heights,  commanding  a  view  of  the  position  in  front  of 
the  village,  were  occupied  by  a  division  of  infantry,  a  regi- 

i2 


116  PENINSULA   WAR.  [MARCH,  1811. 

merit  of  cavalry,  and  a  battery  of  heavy  guns,  so  well  disposed 
as  to  appear  a  considerable  force. 


COMBAT   OF   REDINHA. 

The  light  division,  now  under  sir  William  Erskine,  was 
directed  to  attack  the  wooded  slopes  covering  Ney's  right, 
which  were  immediately  carried,  and  the  skirmishers  even 
advanced  on  the  open  plain;  but  the  French  line,  supported 
with  four  guns,  opened  a  rolling  fire,  and  a  squadron  of  their 
hussars  led  by  colonel  La  Ferriere  charged  and  took  some 
prisoners.  Erskine  then  formed  his  line,  consisting  of  five 
battalions  and  six  guns,  in  such  a  manner  as  to  outflank  the 
French  right  and  tend  towards  the  ford  of  the  Redinha. 
He  was  immediately  reinforced  with  two  regiments  of  dragoons, 
and  at  the  same  time  Picton  seized  the  wooded  heights  cover- 
ing the  French  left.  Ney's  position  was  thus  laid  bare,  but 
he  perceived  that  Wellington,  deceived  as  to  his  numbers, 
meant  to  use  his  whole  force  in  attack,  and  with  great  cool- 
ness held  his  ground  and  even  charged  Picton's  skirmishers, 
although  that  general  was  nearer  to  the  village  and  bridge 
than  the  French  right  was,  and  there  were  already  troops  and 
guns  enough  on  the  plain  to  overwhelm  him.  In  this  state 
an  hour  passed  away,  but  then  three  cannon  shots  were  fired 
from  the  British  centre  as  a  signal,  and  a  splendid  spectacle 
was  presented.  The  woods  on  the  flanks  seemed  alive  with 
troops,  and  thirty  thousand  infantry  were  stretched  in  three 
gorgeous  lines  of  battle  across  the  plain  bending  in  a  gentle 
curve,  and  moving  onwards  while  the  horsemen  and  guns, 
springing  forward  simultaneously  from  two  points,  charged 
under  a  general  volley  from  the  French,  who  were  instantly 
shrouded  in  smoke :  when  that  cleared  away  no  enemy  was  to 
be  seen.  For  marshal  Ney,  while  keenly  watching  the  pro- 
gress of  this  magnificent  formation,  had  opposed  general  Picton's 
foremost  skirmishers  with  his  left,  and  covered  by  their  fire, 
had  withdrawn  the  rest  of  his  people,  and  with  such  rapidity 
as  to  gain  the  village  before  even  the  cavalry  could  touch 
them:  the  utmost  efforts  of  Picton's  light  troops  and  the 
horse-artillery  only  enabled  them  to  gall  the  hindmost  with 


MARCH,  1811.]          BOOK   XII. -CHAP.   3.  117 

their  fire.  One  howitzer  was  dismounted,  but  the  village  of 
Redinha  was  in  flames  between  it  and  the  pursuers,  and  Ney 
to  confirm  the  courage  of  his  soldiers  ordered  the  French 
officer  Briie  to  stand  fast  with  some  infantry,  while  in  person 
he  carried  off  the  howitzer.  This  was  effected"  with  the  loss 
of  fifteen  or  twenty  of  Briie's  men,  and  with  great  danger  to 
the  marshal,  for  the  British  guns  were  smiting  his  rear,  and 
the  light  troops  of  the  third  division,  chasing  like  heated 
blood-hounds,  passed  the  river  almost  at  the  same  time 
with  the  French,  whose  reserves  cannonaded  the  bridge,  yet 
were  soon  compelled  to  fall  back  ten  miles  to  Condeixa. 
Twelve  officers  and  two  hundred  men  of  the  allies  were  killed 
and  wounded :  N"ey  lost  as  many,  but  he  should  have  been 
destroyed.  Nevertheless  the  facility  with  which  the  English 
masses  were  handled  made  him  more  cautious  though  it  did 
not  entirely  check  his  over  daring. 

On  the  13th  the  allies,  about  ten  o'clock,  found  the  French 
army  in  order  of  battle,  Reynier's  corps,  which  was  at  Espinal, 
excepted.  The  crisis  of  the  retreat  had  arrived.  The  defiles 
of  Condeixa  leading  upon  Coimbra  were  behind  the  French ; 
those  of  Miranda  de  Corvo  leading  to  the  Puente  de  Murcella 
were  on  their  left;  between  them  N"ey  was  in  position,  on 
a  strong  range  of  heights  covered  by  a  marsh,  and  only  to  be 
approached  by  the  high  road  which  led  through  a  hollow 
against  his  right.  Trees  were  felled  to  obstruct  this  passage, 
the  hollow  way  was  palisaded  and  breast-works  thrown  up  at 
each  side.  Here  Massena  resolved  to  stop  the  allies  until 
Montbrun  seized  Coimbra ;  then  assuming  a  permanent  posi- 
tion behind  the  Mondego  he  designed  to  wait  until  Soult's 
operations  should  draw  off  Wellington,  or  the  advance  of 
Bessieres  should  enable  himself  to  resume  the  offensive ;  for 
he  judged  justly  that  the  devastated  country  between  the  lines 
and  the  Mondego  would  secure  him  from  serious  operations  on 
that  river.  Hitherto  he  had  appeared  the  abler  tactician,  but 
now  his  adversary,  being  no  longer  compelled  to  await  the 
development  of  the  French  projects,  assumed  the  superiority. 
When  at  Thomar,  thinking  the  Mondego  could  not  be  defended, 
he  had  directed  Baccellar  to  look  to  the  security  of  Oporto 
intending  himself  to  follow  Massena  closely.  In  that  view  be 


118  PENINSULA  WAR.  [MARCH,  1811, 

ordered  Trant  and  Wilson  to  abandon  the  Mondego  and  the 
Vouga  when  the  fords  should  become  passable,  to  take  the 
line  of  the  Douro,  and  to  break  up  the  roads  as  they  retreated 
and  remove  all  boats  and  means  of  transport.  Wilson  was 
then  near  the  Puente  de  Murcella  road,  but  hearing  the  enemy 
were  menacing  Coimbra,  he  crossed  the  Mondego,  passed 
between  the  French  scouting  parties  and  effected  a  junction 
with  Trant,  when  both  fell  back.  The  latter  however  soon 
returned,  for  he  had  previously  destroyed  an  arch  of  the  Coim- 
bra bridge,  the  river  was  flooding  very  fast,  and  the  sound  of 
guns  told  him  the  allies  were  close  at  Massena's  heels.  Orders 
from  Baccellar  indeed  compelled  him  to  send  the  greatest  part 
of  his  force  back  again  towards  the  Vouga  the  llth,  yet  with 
the  remainder  he  resolved  to  dispute  the  passage  of  the  Mon- 
dego, though  some  French  dragoons  had  actually  forded  that 
river  at  Pereiras. 

On  the  12th  French  officers  were  seen  to  examine  the 
bridge,  a  skirmish  took  place  along  the  banks  of  the  river, 
and  a  party  which  attempted  to  creep  on  to  the  bridge  was 
dispersed  with  grape.  The  fords  were  however  practicable  for 
cavalry,  and  not  more  than  three  hundred  militia  were  in 
opposition;  hence,  if  Marcognet's  brigade  had  marched  as 
originally  ordered  by  Massena,  Goimbra  must  have  fallen,  but 
now  the  French,  thinking  the  reinforcements  from  England  had 
come  by  sea  to  the  Mondego,  feared  to  attack,  and  thus 
Coimbra  was  saved  by  Trant  and  a  few  militiamen.  Montbrun 
sent  an  exaggerated  report  of  its  resistance  to  Massena  the 
13th,  and  the  latter  then  credulously  relinquished  his  plan  for 
the  river :  to  the  emperor  he  assigned  an  additional  cause, 
namely,  that  Hill  was  said  to  be  in  march  from  the  Zezere  to 
the  Mondego  by  the  mountains  in  his  rear;  but  Hill  was  in 
England.  There  remained  only  the  line  of  retreat  by  the 
Puente  de  Murcella,  and  to  cover  that,  and  preserve  the  com- 
munication with  Reynier  on  the  side  of  Espinal,  Massena  had 
placed  Loison  at  Fonte  Coberta,  a  village  five  miles  on  his  left, 
where  the  Anciao  road  joined  the  Murcella  road;  he  now 
reinforced  him  with  Clausel's  division ;  and  being  thus  pivotted 
on  the  Anciao  Sierra,  having  Reynier  beyond  that  mountain 
and  Ney  at  Condeixa,  he  offered  as  confident  a  front  as  it 


MARCH,  1811.]  BOOK  XII.— CHAP.   3.  119 

Coimbra  had  been  gained.  His  baggage  had  however  been 
observed  filing  off"  by  the  Murcella  route,  and  Wellington,  com- 
prehending the  matter,  detached  the  third  division  to  turn  his 
left  by  a  difficult  path  over  the  sierra.  The  prince  was  at 
Fonte  Coberta,  and  Ney  had  orders  to  fire  Condeixa  at  a  certain 
hour,  when  all  the  divisions  were  to  concentrate  at  Casal 
Nova  on  another  position,  perpendicular  to  the  first  and 
covering  the  road  to  the  Murcella;  but  towards  three  o'clock 
Picton  was  descried  winding  round  a  bluff  end  of  the  Anciao 
Sierra,  eight  miles  distant,  and  as  he  was  already  beyond  the 
French  left  confusion  pervaded  their  camp;  a  thick  smoke 
then  arose  from  Condeixa,  columns  were  seen  hurrying 
towards  Gasal  Nova,  and  the  British  troops  pushed  forward; 
but  the  felled  trees  and  obstacles  impeded  pursuit,  and 
many  fires,  kindled  at  once,  covered  the  retreating  troops  with 
smoke,  while  the  flames  of  Condeixa  stopped  the  artillery. 
Hence  only  the  skirmishers  and  some  cavalry  could  close  with 
the  enemy,  and  they  did  so,  cutting  off  the  French  in  Fonte 
Coberta  so  rapidly,  that  Massena  only  escaped  by  taking 
the  feathers  out  of  his  hat  and  riding  through  the  light 
troops. 

When  Condeixa  was  thus  opened  the  British  cavalry  pushed 
towards  Coimbra,  opened  the  communication  with  Trant,  and 
captured  some  of  Montbrun's  cavalry.  The  army  kindled  its 
fires,  and  the  light  division  piquets,  being  pushed  close  up  to  the 
enemy  heard  in  the  night  the  march  of  the  French  division 
coming  from  Fonte  Coberta  to  regain  the  main  body.  Its 
isolation  was  unknown  to  the  British  and  it  reached  Miranda, 
de  Corvo  without  difficulty:  but  the  noise  of  the  march 
was  mistaken  for  the  movement  of  baggage,  and  so  reported 
to  general  Erskine  at  daylight,  whereupon  that  officer,  rashly 
concluding  the  French  were  in  full  retreat,  put  the  division 
in  march. 

COMBAT   OF   CASAL    NOVA. 

A  thick  mist  hid  everything,  yet  there  was  the  dull  sound 
of  a  moving  multitude  in  front,  and  several  officers  objected  to 
an  advance  without  superior  orders  in  such  a  fog ;  but  Erskine, 
disregarding  these  remonstrances,  with  astounding  indifference 


120  PENINSULA  WAR.  [MARCH,  1811 

sent  the  fifty-second  regiment  forward  in  a  simple  column  of 
sections,  without  an  advanced   guard  and  even  before   the 
piquets   had   come   in.     The   road   dipped   suddenly   into   a 
valley,  and  the  regiment  vanished  in  the  mist;  which  was  so 
thick  that  the  French  out-posts  were  unwittingly  passed,  and 
Ney  who  had  remained  all  night  near  the  piquets  was  nearly 
captured.     The  riflemen  followed,  and  the  rest  of  the  division 
was  about  to  plunge  into  the  same  gulf  when  the  rattling  of 
musketry  and  the  booming  of  round  shot  were  heard ;  then 
the  vapour  rose  slowly,  and  the  fifty-second  was  descried  on  the 
slopes    of  the   opposite   mountain,   closely  engaged   without 
support   in   the   midst    of  Ney's   corps.      At   that   moment 
Wellington  arrived.     His  design  had  been  to  turn  the  left  of 
the  French,   for  their  front  was  strong,  and  they  occupied 
mountain  ridges  in  succession  to  the  Deuca  or  Deixa  river, 
and   the   defiles  of  Miranda   de  Corvo.     There  was  a  road 
leading  from  Condeixa  to  Espinal,  by  which  Cole  was  moving 
with  the  fourth  division  on  Panella,  having  orders  to  commu- 
nicate with  Nightingale,  attack  Reynier,  and  gain  the  sources 
of  the   Deuca  and  Ceira  rivers;    between   Cole   and   Key, 
Picton  was  also  turning  the  French  left  flank  in  a  more  direct 
line;   and  the  main  body,   coming  up  in   one  long  column 
required  time  to  form :   all  this  fine  combination  was  marred 
by  Erskine's  folly  which  had  forced  on  the  action  prematurely, 
and  the  whole  of  the  light  division  was  necessarily  pushed 
forward  to  succour  the  fifty-second  regiment.     Ney's  ground 
was  so   extensive,  and  his  skirmishers  so  thickly  spread,  so 
easily  supported,  that  the  division  was  soon  stretched  in  one 
thin  thread  and  closely  engaged  at  every  point  without  a 
reserve;  nor  could  it  even  thus  present  an  equal  front  until 
Picton  sent  the  sixtieth  riflemen  to  prolong  the  line.     Fight- 
ing strongly,  amidst  the  stone  enclosures  on  the  mountain 
side,  it  partially  turned  the  French  right,  but  their  position 
was  not  shaken  until  Picton  near,  and  Cole  further  off,  turned 
the  left ;   then  also  came  up  on  the  centre  the  first  fifth  and 
sixth  divisions,  the  heavy  cavalry  and  the  guns;  whereupon 
Ney,  covering  his  rear  with  light  troops  and  artillery,  retired, 
disputing  ridge  after  ridge  with  admirable  skill.     Long  he 
did   this   with   little  loss,  but  towards  noon  the  guns  and 


MARCH,  1811.]          BOOK   XII.  —  CHAP.   3.  121 

skirmishers  disordered  his  masses  and  hurried  his  movements 
towards  the  strong  pass  of  Miranda  de  Corvo,  where  Massena 
was  in  position  with  the  main  body;  and  there  Montbrun 
came  in,  having  from  Coimbra  made  way  through  the  hills 
for  the  Deuca  by  a  very  difficult  road. 

In  this  combat  the  light  division  lost  eleven  officers  and 
one  hundred  and  fifty  men,  but  took  a  hundred  prisoners. 
During  the  fight,  Reynier  abandoned  Panella,  and  Nightingale 
who  had  constantly  followed  him  united  with  Cole,  when  both 
passed  the  Deuca.  Massena,  fearing  to  find  them  next  day 
on  his  rear,  burned  Miranda,  and  crossed  the  Ceira  in  the 
night,  and  his  whole  army  was  thus  crowded  in  the  narrow 
way  between  the  Sierras  and  the  Mondego.  To  ease  his 
movement  he  destroyed  baggage  and  ammunition,  yet  his 
army  was  still  so  encumbered  and  disordered,  that  he  directed 
Ney  to  cover  the  passage  with  a  few  battalions,  charging  him 
not  to  risk  an  action.  Ney  however,  in  contempt,  retained 
ten  or  twelve  battalions  a  brigade  of  cavalry  and  some  guns, 
and  thus  wilfully  provoked  a  fight. 

COMBAT    OF   FOZ   D*ARONCE. 

The  French  right  rested  on  wooded  and  rugged  ground, 
their  left  upon  the  village  of  Foz  d'Aronce.  The  weather 
was  obscure  and  rainy,  the  allies  reached  the  Ceira  at  four 
o'clock  on  the  15th,  and  expecting  no  action  kindled  fires; 
but  Wellington,  having  rapidly  scanned  Key's  position, 
directed  the  light  division  and  Pack's  brigade  to  hold  the 
right  in  play,  and  sent  Picton  against  the  left,  while  the 
horse-artillery,  galloping  forward  to  a  rising  ground,  opened 
with  a  great  and  sudden  effect.  Ney's  left,  overthrown  by 
the  first  charge,  fled  in  confusion  towards  the  river,  and  some, 
missing  the  fords,  rushed  into  the  deeps  and  were  drowned, 
others,  crowding  to  the  bridge  were  crushed  to  death.  On  the 
right,  the  ground  being  rugged  and  close,  the  action  resolved 
itself  into  a  skirmish  and  Ney  was  enabled  to  use  some 
battalions  to  check  the  pursuit  of  his  left,  but  darkness  came 
on  and  the  defeated  troops  in  their  disorder  fired  on  each 
other.  Four  officers  and  sixty  men  fell  on  the  side  of  the 


122  PENINSULA   WAR.  [MARCH,  1811. 

British ;  the  French  lost  five  hundred,  one  half  being  drowned, 
and  an  eagle  was  afterwards  found  in  the  river.  Massena  had 
gone  behind  the  Alva,  yet  Ney,  notwithstanding  this  dis- 
astrous combat,  kept  his  post  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Ceira 
until  every  encumbrance  had  passed,  and  then  blowing  up 
seventy  feet  of  the  bridge  sent  his  corps  on,  remaining  himself 
with  the  rear-guard. 

This  terminated  the  first  part  of  the  retreat  from  Santarem? 
in   which,  if  the   great   error   of  relinquishing  Coimbra   be 
excepted,   Massena   displayed   infinite   ability,  but   withal   a 
harsh  and  ruthless  spirit.    The  burning  of  Kedinha,  Condeixa, 
Miranda  de  Corvo,  and  many  villages  on  the  route,  covered 
his  movements,  and  something  may  be  attributed  to  the  disorder 
of  a  forced  retreat;  but  the  town  of  Leiria  and  convent  of 
Alcoba9a,  though  out  of  the  line,  were  given  to  the  flames  by 
express   orders.      The  laws  of  war,   rigorously   interpreted, 
authorize  such  examples  when  the  inhabitants  take  arms,  yet 
it  can  only  be  justly  done  to  overawe  and  not  to  revenge 
defeat :   but  every  horror  making  war  hideous,  attended  this 
dreadful  retreat !     Distress,  conflagration,  death,  in  all  modes ! 
from  wounds,  from   fatigue,  from  water,   from   the   flames, 
from  starvation :    on  every  side  unlimited  ferocity !     I  myself 
saw   a   peasant  hounding   on   his   dog   to   devour  the   dead 
and  dying,  and  the  spirit  of  cruelty  once  unchained  smote 
even  the  brute  creation;  for  on  the  15th  Massena,  to  diminish 
the  encumbrances,  ordered  the  destruction  of  some  beasts  of 
burthen,  and  the  inhuman  fellow  charged  with  the  execution, 
ham-stringed   five   hundred   asses   and   left  them  to  starve. 
Being  thus  found  by  the  British  army,  the  mute  yet  deep 
expression  of  pain  and  grief  visible  in  their  looks,  wonderfully 
aroused  the  fury   of  the  soldiers:  and  so  little  weight  has 
reason  with  the  multitude  when  opposed  by  a  momentary 
sensation,  that  no  quarter  would  have   been   given   to  any 
prisoner  at  that  moment,  and  a  humane  feeling  would  have 
led  to  direct  cruelty.     The  French  have  however  been  accused 
Southe  's         °^  crmies  which   they  did   not    and   could   not 
Peninsular       commit;  such  as  the  driving  of  all  women  above 
ten  years  of  age  into  their  camp  at  Redinha,  near 
which  there  were  neither   men   nor  women   to   be   driven! 


MARCH,  1811.]          BOOK  XII.  — CHAP    3.  123 

The  country  was  a  desert !  They  have  been  also  charged  by 
the  same  writer  with  the  mutilating  of  John  the  First's  body 
in  the  convent  of  Batalha",  during  Massena's  retreat ;  whereas 
the  body  of  that  monarch  had  been  wantonly  pulled  to  pieces, 
and  carried  off  by  British  officers  during  the  retreat  to  the 
lines ! 


124  PENINSULA   WAB.  [MARCH,  1811. 


CHAPTER  TV. 


ON  the  16th  the  allies  halted,  partly  because  the  Ceira  was 
swollen  and  unfordable,  partly  that  the  troops,  who  had 
suffered  far  greater  privations  than  the  enemy,  were  ex- 
hausted. The  French,  following  their  custom,  carried  fifteen 
days'  bread ;  the  allies  depended  upon  a  commissariat  which 
broke  down  under  the  difficulties;  not  from  deficiency  in 
the  chief,  for  he  was  distinguished  alike  for  zeal,  probity, 
and  talent,  but  from  the  ill-conduct  of  the  Portuguese  govern- 
ment. Deaf  to  the  representations  of  Wellington  and  Beres- 
ford,  it  would  neither  feed  the  Portuguese  troops  regularly 
at  Santarem,  nor  fill  the  magazines,  nor  collect  the  means 
of  transporting  food  during  the  march.  Hence,  after  passing 
Pombal,  few  of  the  native  forces  had  been  able  to  continue 
the  pursuit,  and  the  brigades  under  Pack  and  Ashworth, 
which  did  keep  up  and  engaged  daily  with  the  enemy,  were 
actually  fotir  days  without  food  of  any  sort :  numbers  died  of 
inanition  on  the  roads,  and  to  save  the  whole  from  destruc- 
tion, the  British  supplies  were  shared  with  them.  The  com- 
missariat was  thus  overlaid,  the  whole  army  suffered,  and  was 
forced  to  halt.  And  there  were  also  indications  of  treachery ; 
for,  during  the  pursuit,  at  Coimbra  and  on  the  Alva,  Trant 
discovered  large  supplies  placed  by  Portuguese  government 
agents  within  reach  of  the  French  at  critical  moments. 

Notwithstanding  these  difficulties,  Coimbra  had  been  saved, 
and  Massena,  turned  out  of  every  strong  position,  had  been 
forced  into  a  narrow  intricate  and  ravaged  country,  by  a 
series  of  masterly  operations;  for  Wellington  had  constantly 
menaced  the  passes  in  his  rear  and  thus  compelled  him  to 
abandon  positions  which  could  scarcely  have  been  forced.  To 
turn  the  strength  of  a  country  to  profit  in  this  manner  is  the 
secret  of  mountain  warfare ;  he  who  receives  battle  in  the  hills 


MARCH,  1811.]  BOOK  XII.  — CHAP.  4.  125 

has  an  advantage ;  and  hence,  if  a  general  seriously  menaces 
a  pass  or  position  behind  his  adversary,  the  latter  must  retreat 
or  become  the  assailant.  Wellington  had  thus  constantly  dis- 
lodged Massena,  and  with  inferior  numbers  after  Redinha, 
seeing  that  when  Coimbra  was  saved,  a  brigade  of  cavalry, 
some  guns,  and  a  division  of  Portuguese  infantry  had  been 
detached  to  the  Alemtejo.  And  when  the  fall  of  Badajos, 
which  uncovered  Lisbon,  was  known,  Cole's  division  also 
marched  to  enable  Beresford  to  retake  it  before  the  breaches 
could  be  closed :  the  pursuit  then  became  more  circumspect. 
The  loss  of  the  fortress  was  indeed  known  the  13th,  but 
Wellington,  erroneously  thinking  the  ninth  corps  was  with 
Massena,  made  Cole's  division  available  for  that  day,  using  it 
however  on  the  side  of  Panella,  because  the  road  of  Espinal 
being  the  shortest  to  the  bridge  on  the  Tagus,  it  attained  two 
objects  at  once. 

These  dispositions  were  finely  combined  and  successful,  yet 
the  military  horizon  was  still  clouded.  Intelligence  from  the 
north  spoke  of  the  imperial  guards  at  Zamora  being  designed 
to  invade  Gallicia,  and  though  Mahi  had  sixteen 
thousand  men  Wellington  anticipated  no  resist-  fjf^y^j*!!8' 
ance.  In  the  south  affairs  were  more  gloomy. 
The  battle  of  Barosa,  the  disputes  which  followed^  and  the  mis- 
conduct of  Imas  and  Mendizabel,  proved  that  from  Spain  no  useful 
co-operation  was  ever  to  be  expected.  Mortier  had  invested 
Campo  Mayor  and  it  was  not  expected  to  hold  out  until 
Beresford  could  succour  it.  The  Spaniards,  to  whom  it  had 
been  delivered  under  an  engagement  of  honour,  contracted  by 
Romana,  to  keep  it  against  the  enemy,  had  disloyally  aban- 
doned it  when  Badajos  fell,  and  two  hundred  Portuguese 
militia,  thrown  in  at  the  moment,  had  to  defend  a  fortress 
which  required  a  garrison  of  five  thousand  regulars.  Nor 
was  the  enemy  immediately  in  the  British  front  the  last  to 
be  considered.  Ney  had  withdrawn  from  the  Ceira  late  on 
the  1 6th,  and  next  day  the  light  division  forded  it  with  great 
difficulty,  while  the  main  body  used  a  trestle  bridge  thrown  in 
the  night.  But  Massena  having  repaired  the  Puente  Murcella 
and  occupied  the  Sierra  de  Moita  behind  the  Alva,  resolved  to 
halt  for  some  days.  In  this  view  he  again  destroyed  the  Mur- 


126  PENINSULA  WAR.  [MARCH,  1811. 

cella  bridge,  and  another  near  Pombeira,  sent  Reynier  to  guard 
the  higher  parts  of  the  river,  and  spread  his  foragers  abroad. 
He  was  soon  disturbed.  Three  British  divisions  marched  the 
18th  by  the  Sierra  de  Guiteria,  made  way  over  that  rugged 
mountain  with  persevering  strength,  and  menaced  Reynier 
while  two  other  divisions  cannonaded  Ney.  The  upper  Alva 
thus  threatened,  ran  parallel  to  the  French  line  of  retreat,  and 
Massena,  seeing  the  extreme  ruggedness  of  the  mountains  had 
not  protected  his  left,  recalled  Reynier,  abandoned  the  lower 
Alva  and  concentrated  on  the  Sierra  de  Moita  for  battle. 
The  allies  had  then  to  concentrate  also  in  advance,  lest  their 
disseminated  columns  should  be  crushed  in  detail.  This  was 
difficult.  The  lower  Alva  was  wide  and  rapid,  but  the  staff- 
corps  contrived  an  ingenious  raft,  by  which  the  light  division 
passed  above  Murcella;  the  right  of  the  army  then  closed  to 
Arganil  on  the  upper  river,  and  Trant  and  Wilson  closed  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  Mondego  j  for  those  officers  had  orders 
to  move  on  that  side  parallel  to  the  French  line,  to  prevent 
their  foragers  passing  the  Mondego,  and  to  interfere  between 
them  and  Oporto.  Thus  pressed,  Massena  re-commenced  his 
retreat,  and  being  desirous  to  gain  Celorico  and  the  defiles 
leading  upon  Guarda  betimes,  again  destroyed  baggage  and 
ammunition.  He  even  abandoned  his  more  distant  foraging 
parties,  who  were  taken  to  the  number  of  eight  hundred ;  for 
Wellington,  seeing  the  success  of  his  combinations,  had  con- 
centrated all  his  columns  upon  Moita,  the  19th.  The  20th 
the  pursuit  was  renewed  through  Penhancos  by  the  light 
division  and  the  cavalry;  and  a  communication  was  opened 
with  Wilson  and  Trant,  who  had  reached  the  bridge  of  Fornos, 
and  with  Silveira  who  was  about  Trancoso.  The  third  and 
sixth  divisions  followed  in  reserve,  but  the  remainder  of  the 
army  halted  at  Moita,  until  provisions,  coming  by  sea  from 
Lisbon  to  the  Mondego,  arrived. 

Massena  having  reached  Celorico  the  21st  with  two  corps 
and  the  cavalry,  opened  a  communication  with  Almeida,  and 
posted  detachments  of  horse  on  the  Pinhel,  while  Reynier, 
who  had  retired  through  Govea,  occupied  Guarda.  He  had 
now  regained  his  original  base  of  operations,  and  his  retreat 
may  be  said  to  have  terminated ;  yet  he  was  far  from  wishing 


MARCH,  1811.]  BOOK  XII.  — CHAP.  4.  127 

to  re-enter  Spain.  There  he  could  only  appear  as  a  baffled 
general,  and  shorn  of  half  his  authority,  because  Bessieres 
now  commanded  the  northern  provinces  which  had  been 
under  himself.  Hence,  to  make  his  previous  retreat  appear 
only  a  change  of  position,  he  formed  the  design  of  throwing 
all  his  sick  men  and  other  encumbrances  into  Almeida,  and 
then,  passing  the  Estrella  at  Guarda,  countermarch  through 
Sabugal  and  Pena  Macor  to  the  Elga,  and  establish  new  com- 
munications across  the  Tagus  with  Soult,  and  by  the  valley  of 
the  Tagus  with  the  king.  But  the  factions  in  his  army  had 
risen  to  such  a  height  he  could  no  longer  command  the 
obedience  of  his  lieutenants.  Drouet,  Montbrun,  Junot, 
Reynier  and  Ney,  were  all  at  variance  with  each  other 
and  with  him.  The  first  had  been  desired  to  secure  Coimbra 
early,  instead  of  which  he  quitted  Portugal,  and  carried  with 
him  Claparede's  division.  Marcognet  was  then  ordered,  but 
did  not  move,  and  Montbrun  failed  in  default  of  vigour. 
Junot  was  disabled  by  his  wound,  yet  his  faction  did  not 
the  less  show  their  discontent.  Reynier's  dislike  to  the 
prince  was  so  strong,  the  officers  carrying  flags  of  truce 
from  his  corps  never  failed  to  speak  of  it  to  the  British, 
and  Ney,  more  fierce  than  all  of  them,  defied  Massena's 
authority.  To  him  the  dangerous  delay  at  Pombal,  Mar- 
cognet's  neglect  and  the  too  sudden  evacuation  of  Condeixa, 
have  been  attributed ;  and  it  is  alleged  that  far 
from  being  ordered  to  set  fire  to  that  town  on 
the  13th,  as  the  signal  for  a  preconcerted  retreat,  he  had  pro- 
mised Massena  to  maintain  the  position  for  twenty-four  hours. 
The  personal  risk  of  the  latter,  in  consequence  of  the  hasty 
change  of  position,  would  seem  to  confirm  this;  but  when 
Picton  was  observed  passing  the  Sierra  de  Anciao  by  a  road 
before  unknown  to  the  French,  and  by  which  Reynier  could 
be  separated  and  the  pass  of  Miranda  de  Corvo  seized,  Ney 
would  have  been  insane  to  have  delayed. 

At  Miranda  the  long  gathering  anger  between  the  prince 
and  the  marshal  broke  out  in  a  violent  altercation,  and  at 
Celorico  Ney  absolutely  refused  to  concur  in  the  march  to 
Coria;  he  even  moved  his  troops  in  another  direction;  but 
Massena,  a  man  not  to  be  crossed  with  impunity,  then  deprived 


128  PENINSULA  WAR.  [MARCH,  1811. 

him  of  command.  Both  marshals  sent  confidential  officers 
to  Paris  to  justify  their  conduct  to  the  emperor,  and  from  both 
of  those  officers  I  have  derived  information;  but  as  each 
thought  the  conduct  of  his  general  was  approved  by  Napoleon, 
their  opinions  are  irreconcileable  upon  many  points,  and  the 
leading  sentiments  of  each  are  therefore  given,  without  drawing 
other  conclusions  than  those  deducible  from  the  acknowledged 
principles  of  art  and  unquestioned  facts.  Thus  judging,  it 
appears  Massena's  general  views  were  as  superior  to  Ney's,  as 
the  latter's  genius  for  handling  troops  in  action  were  superior 
to  the  prince's.  Yet  the  duke  of  Elchingen  often  played  too 
near  the  flame,  whereas  nothing  could  be  grander  than  the 
conceptions  of  Massena:  nor  was  the  project  now  meditated 
by  him  the  least  important. 

From  Guarda  to  Coria  was  only  two  marches  longer  than 
to  Ciudad  Rodrigo ;  but  going  to  the  last  the  army  of  Por- 
tugal would  appear  a  beaten  force  seeking  the  shelter  of  its 
fortresses ;  going  to  Coria  it  made  a  great  movement  wiping 
out  the  notion  of  a  forced  retreat.  A  close  and  concentric 
direction  would  thus  have  been  given  to  the  armies  of  the 
south,  of  the  centre,  and  of  Portugal ;  and  a  powerful  demon- 
stration against  Lisbon  would  have  brought  Wellington  back 
to  the  Tagus.  The  conquests  of  the  campaign,  namely,  Ciudad 
Rodrigo,  Almeida,  Badajos,  and  Olivenza,  would  have  been 
preserved,  and  Bessieres  could  have  protected  Castille  and 
menaced  the  frontier  of  Portugal.  Massena,  having  maturely 
considered  this  plan,  gave  orders  on  the  22nd  for  the  execu- 
tion ;  but  then  Ney  thwarted  him ;  and  as  the  English  cavalry 
and  the  militia  were  hourly  skirmishing  with  success,  the 
French  horsemen  withdrew  from  the  Pinhel.  Loison,  now  in 
Ney's  command,  occupied  Guarda,  Reynier  took  post  at 
Belmonte;  the  cavalry  and  the  eighth  corps  entered  the 
eastern  valleys  of  the  Estrella,  and  from  those  positions 
Massena  still  hoped  to  communicate  with  the  king  and  Soult: 
his  foragers  had  gathered  provisions  in  the  western  valleys, 
and  he  calculated  upon  holding  Guarda  for  eight  days,  which 
it  was  essential  to  do,  because  Drouet  had  suffered  Julian 
Sanchez  to  cut  off  a  convoy  destined  for  Ciudad  Rodrigo, 
and  had  left  Almeida  with  only  ten  days'  provisions. 


APRIL,  1811.]  BOOK   XII.  — CHAP.   4.  129 

In  this  state  Wellington's  ready  boldness  again  baffled  the 
prince's  calculations.  All  the  British  forces  had  come  up 
the  28th,  and  with  them  the  reinforcements  from  England, 
forming  a  seventh  division ;  whereupon  the  light  division  and 
the  cavalry  passed  the  Mondego  at  Celorico,  drove  the  French 
from  Frexadas,  and  occupied  the  villages  beyond  that  place. 
Then  the  militia  took  post  on  the  Pinhel  river,  cutting  the 
communication  with  Almeida,  and  the  third  division  was 
established  at  Porca  de  Misarella,  half  way  up  the  Estrella,  to 
secure  the  bridges  over  the  higher  Moudego.  This  done,  three 
divisions  of  infantry  and  two  regiments  of  cavalry  were  dis- 
posed in  five  columns  of  attack,  on  a  half  circle  round  the  foot 
of  the  Guarda  mountain,  and  on  the  29th  ascended  by  as 
many  paths,  leading  concentrically  upon  the  town  and  over- 
lapping the  French  flanks.  Supported  on  one  wing  by  the 
militia,  on  the  other  by  the  fifth  division,  in  the  centre  by  the 
first  and  seventh  divisions,  they  advanced  expecting  a  great 
battle ;  but  the  absence  of  Ney  was  felt  by  both  armies ;  the 
appearance  of  the  allied  columns  threw  the  French  for  the 
first  time  into  the  greatest  confusion,  and  without  firing  a  shot 
this  nearly  impregnable  position  was  abandoned.  At  day- 
light on  the  30th,  the  horse  artillery  and  cavalry  wrere  launched 
against  Reynier,  who  was  at  Belmonte,  and  his  corps  would 
have  been  cut  off  if  general  Slade  had  led  those  troops  with 
the  celerity  required  by  the  occasion,  but  he  was  too  slow,  and 
Reynier  escaped  in  the  night  with  a  loss  of  only  three  hundred 
men. 

On  the  1st  of  April,  the  allied  army,  descending  the  moun- 
tains, reached  the  Coa,  where  the  French  general,  who  had  now 
recovered  the  ninth  corps,  and  was  anxious  to  hold  on  to 
Portugal  and  preserve  the  power  of  operating  on  the  side  of 
Coria,  or  Almeida,  was  again  in  position  on  the  right  bank. 
The  sixth  corps  held  Rovina,  with  detachments  guarding  the 
bridge  of  Sequiras  and  the  ford  of  Atalayon ;  the  communica- 
tion with  Almeida  was  maintained  by  a  brigade  of  the  ninth 
corps,  posted  near  the  ford  of  Junca;  the  second  corps  occupied 
the  hills  behind  Sabugal,  stretching  towards  Alfayates,  with 
strong  detachments  at  the  bridge  of  Sabugal  and  the  ford  of 
Rapoulha  de  Coa;  the  eighth  corps  was  at  Alfayates,  and  a 

VOL.  III.  K 


130  PENINSULA   WAR.  [APRIL,  1811, 

post  was  established  at  Rendo  to  maintain  the  communication 
between  the  second  and  the  sixth  corps.  The  French  army 
was  thus  disposed  on  two  sides  of  a  triangle,  the  apex  at 
Sabugal,  and  both  fronts  covered  by  the  Coa,  because  Sabugal 
was  situated  in  a  sharp  bend  of  the  stream.  Massena  was 
even  inclined  to  retake  the  offensive,  for  a  notion  prevailed  in 
his  camp,  that  the  allied  divisions  were  very  much  scattered 
and  might  be  beaten  in  detail.  The  disputes  amongst  the 
superior  officers  prevented  this  enterprise,  which  was  founded 
on  false  information;  but  the  strength  of  the  position  again 
lulled  the  French  into  a  false  security,  from  which  they  were 
roughly  awakened. 

Wellington  occupied  a  line  parallel  to  the  enemy's  right, 
which  could  not  be  attacked,  because  the  Coa,  a  considerable 
river,  runs  in  a,  rugged  channel,  deepening  as  the  stream  flows. 
Trant  and  Wilson  were  therefore  directed  to  turn  Massena,  by 
passing  below  Almeida  and  penetrating  between  that  fortress 
and  Ciudad  Rodrigo;  the  6th  division  was  then  placed  in 
opposition  to  Loison  at  Rovina,  and  a  battalion  of  the 
seventh  division  was  posted  at  the  bridge  of  Sequiras  to  cover 
the  left  flank  from  incursions.  This  disposition  seemed  to 
menace  the  French  right,  but  the  real  attack  was  designed 
against  their  left,  which  was  to  be  enveloped  and  crushed  by 
the  main  body.  To  effect  this,  Blade's  cavalry  was  to  cross  the 
upper  Coa,  where  the  bed  was  less  rugged,  at  daybreak  on  the 
3rd,  the  light  division  was  to  ford  that  river  a  little  below  the 
cavalry,  and  the  third  division  still  lower.  The  fifth  division 
and  the  artillery  were  to  force  the  bridge  of  Sabugal,  but  the 
first  and  seventh  divisions  were  held  in  reserve.  Thus  ten 
thousand  men,  pivoted  upon  the  fifth  division  at  Sabugal,  were 
destined  to  turn  Reynier's  left,  to  separate  him  from  the  eighth 
corps,  and  to  surround  and  crush  him  before  the  sixth  corps 
could  come  from  Rovina  to  his  succour:  one  of  those  acci- 
dents which  are  frequent  in  war  marred  this  well-concerted 
plan. 

BATTLE    OF   SABUGAL. 

A  foggy  morning  prevented  the  troops  from  gaining  their 
respective  posts  with  the  simultaneous  regularity  essential  to 


APRIL,  1811.]  BOOK  XIL  — CHAP.  4.  131 

success;  Erskine  took  no  pains  to  put  the  light  division  in  a 
right  direction,  his  columns  were  not  held  together,  and  he 
carried  off  the  cavalry  without  communicating  with  Beck  with, 
who  commanded  his  first  brigade.  That  officer  remained 
therefore  at  a  ford  waiting  for  orders,  when  one  of  the  staff 
rode  up  hastily  and  asked  why  he  did  not  attack1?  The  thing 
appeared  rash  as  the  combinations  were  not  developed,  but 
with  an  enemy  in  front  he  could  make  no  reply;  wherefore 
passing  the  river  which  was  deep  and  rapid,  he  ascended  a 
steep  wooded  hill  in  front.  Four  rifle  companies  led,  and 
were  closely  followed  by  the  forty-third;  but  the  direction 
was  wrongly  given,  and  the  ca^adores  of  the  brigade  were,  at 
this  time,  passing  higher  up,  along  with  the  other  brigade  of  the 
division,  and  moving  on  the  true  point  of  attack,  which  was 
distant.  Heavy  rain  made  it  impossible  to  distinguish  friends 
or  foes,  and  the  obscurity  had  also  retarded  the  arrival  of  the 
other  divisions.  This  attack  was  therefore  untimely,  partial, 
dangerous,  and  on  the  wrong  point ;  for  Reynier's  whole  corps 
was  in  front,  and  Beckwith  having  only  one  bayonet  battalion 
and  four  companies  of  riflemen,  was  assailing  twelve  thousand 
infantry  supported  by  cavalry  and  artillery ! 

Scarcely  had  the  riflemen  reached  the  top  of  the  hill,  when 
a  strong  body  of  French  drove  them  back  upon  the  forty-third, 
the  weather  cleared  at  the  instant,  and  Beckwith  saw  and 
felt  all  the  danger,  but  his  heart  was  too  big  to  quail ;  with 
a  fierce  charge  he  beat  back  the  assailants,  and  kept  the  top 
of  the  hill,  although  two  French  howitzers  poured  showers 
of  grape  into  his  ranks,  and  fresh  forces  assailed  him  in  front 
and  menaced  both  flanks.  Reynier,  little  expecting  to  be 
attacked,  had  for  the  convenience  of  water  placed  his  main 
body  in  low  ground,  behind  the  height  on  which  the  action  com- 
menced, and  his  renewed  attack  was  therefore  up  hill;  yet 
his  musketry,  heavy  from  the  beginning,  soon  increased  to 
a  storm,  and  his  men  sprung  up  the  acclivity  with  such  vio- 
lence and  clamour,  that  the  most  desperate  fighting  only  could 
save  the  British.  Captain  Hopkins,  commanding  a  flank 
company  of  the  forty-third,  running  out  to  the  right,  with 
admirable  presence  of  mind  seized  a  small  eminence,  close  to 
the  French  guns  and  commanding  the  ascent  up  which  their 


182  PENINSULA  WAR.  [APRIL,  181 L 

| 
troops,  turning  the  right  flank,  were  approaching.     His  first 

fire  threw  the  assailants  into  confusion ;  they  rallied  but  were 
again  disordered*  by  his  volleys;  a  third  time  they  endea- 
voured to  form  a  head  of  attack,  but  Hopkins  with  a  sudden 
charge  increased  their  disorder,  and  at  the  same  moment  the 
two  battalions  of  the  fifty-second  regiment,  attracted  by  the 
fire,  entered  the  line.  The  centre  and  left  of  the  forty-third 
were  also  furiously  engaged,  and  there  Beckwith,  blood  stream- 
ing from  a  wound  in  the  head,  rode  amongst  the  skirmishers, 
praising  and  exhorting  the  soldiers  in  the  loud  cheerful  tones 
of  a  man  sure  to  win  his  battle.  The  bullets  flew  however 
thicker  and  closer  every  moment,  and  the  fight  became  very 
perilous,  yet  the  French  fell  fast,  a  second  charge  again  cleared 
the  hill,  one  of  the  howitzers  was  taken,  and  the  English 
skirmishers  were  closely  following  the  retiring  mass  to  the 
low  ground,  when  small  bodies  of  cavalry  came  galloping  in 
from  all  parts  and  drove  them  back  on  the  main  body,  which 
instantly  re-formed  its  line  behind  a  low  stone  wall. 

In  this  state  of  affairs,  a  French  squadron  of  dragoons, 
having  surmounted  the  ascent,  rode  with  incredible  daring  up 
to  the  wall,  and  fired  over  it  with  pistols,  but  a  rolling  volley 
laid  nearly  the  whole  lifeless  on  the  ground.  Then  a  strong 
column  of  infantry  rushed  up  the  face  of  the  hill,  and  endea- 
voured to  retake  the  howitzer,  which  was  on  the  edge  of  the 
descent  and  only  fifty  yards  from  the  wall ;  a  vain  attempt, 
no  man  could  reach  it  and  live,  so  deadly  was  the  forty-third's 
fire.  Meanwhile  two  English  guns  came  into  action,  and  the 
fifty-second,  charging  violently  upon  the  flank  of  this  infantry 
column,  again  vindicated  the  possession  of  the  height.  Never- 
theless fresh  squadrons  of  cavalry,  following  the  infantry 
in  the  last  attack,  seeing  the  fifty-second  men  scattered  by 
this  charge,  flew  upon  them  with  great  briskness,  and  caused 
some  disorder  amongst  the  foremost  skirmishers  before  they 
were  repulsed.  Eeynier  now  put  his  reserve  of  six  thousand 
infantry  with  cavalry  and  artillery  in  motion,  outflanking  the 
British  left  and  seeming  resolute  to  storm  the  position ;  but 
the  fifth  division  had  then  passed  the  bridge  of  Sabugal,  the 
British  cavalry  crowned  the  hills  beyond  the  French  left,  and 
general  Colville's  brigade  of  the  third  division,  emerging  from 


APRIL,  1811.]  BOOK  XII.  — CHAP.   4.  133 

the  woods  on  their  right,  opened  a  fire  which  decided  the 
action :  Reynier  hastily  retreated  to  Kendo,  where  he  met  the 
sixth  corps,  and  both  fell  back  to  Alfayates,  pursued  by  the 
cavalry.  The  allies  lost  in  this  fight,  which  did  not  last  an  hour, 
two  hundred  men,  the  French  loss  was  enormous.  Three  hun- 
dred dead  bodies  were  heaped  together  on  the  hill,  the  greatest 
part  around  the  captured  howitzer;  and  more  than  twelve 
hundred  were  wounded,  so  unskilfully  had  Reynier  handled 
his  masses,  and  so  deadly  was  the  British  fire.  This  dispro- 
portion was  chiefly  caused  by  the  heavy  rain  which  gave  the 
French  only  a  partial  view,  while  the  thick  wood,  ending  at 
the  hill  top,  covered  the  British,  and  left  an  open  space  for  the 
French  attack :  it  was  however  no  exaggeration  for  lord  Wel- 
lington to  say,  'This  was  one  of  the  most  glorious  actions 
British  troops  were  ever  engaged  in.'  Next  day  the  light 
division  took  the  route  of  Valdespina,  to  feel  for  the  enemy 
on  the  side  of  the  passes  leading  to  Coria ;  Massena  was  how- 
ever in  full  retreat  for  Ciudad  Rodrigo.  The  5th  he  crossed  the 
frontier  of  Portugal,  and  then  the  vigour  of  French  discipline 
was  surprisingly  manifested;  those  men  who  had  for  months 
been  living  by  rapine,  whose  retreat  had  been  one  continued 
course  of  violence  and  devastation,  having  passed  an  imaginary 
line  of  frontier  became  the  most  orderly  of  soldiers ;  not  the 
slightest  rudeness  was  offered  to  any  Spaniard,  and  everything 
demanded  was  scrupulously  paid  for,  although  bread  was  sold 
at  two  shillings  a  pound !  Massena  himself  also,  fierce  and 
terrible  as  he  was  in  Portugal,  always  treated  the  Spaniards 
with  gentleness  and  moderation. 

Whilst  these  events  were  passing,  Trant  who  had  crossed  the 
lower  Coa  with  four  thousand  militia,  two  miles  from  Almeida, 
was  in  great  peril;  for  the  river  suddenly  flooded  behind  him, 
all  the  bridges  had  been  broken  by  Massena,  and  near  fort 
Conception  was  a  brigade  of  the  ninth  corps,  employed  to 
cover  the  march  of  the  battering  train  from  Almeida  to  Ciudad 
Rodrigo.  Trant  hastily  constructed  a  temporary  bridge  with 
great  difficulty,  and  would  have  retired  the  6th  but  for  a  letter, 
coming  from  head-quarters,  which  warned  him  to  be  vigilant 
and  fearless,  because  the  next  morning  a  British  force  would 
be  up  to  his  assistance.  Marching  then  to  Val  de  Mula,  he 


134  PENINSULA   WAR.  [1811. 

boldly  interposed  between  Almeida  and  the  French  brigade ; 
but  the  proposed  succour  did  not  appear,  and  the  French 
advanced  within  half  a  mile  of  his  position !  Suddenly  two 
cannon  shots  were  heard  to  the  southward,  the  enemy  hastily 
formed  squares  in  retreat,  and  in  ten  minutes  six  squadrons  of 
British  cavalry  and  a  troop  of  horse  artillery  came  sweeping 
over  the  plain  in  the  rear.  Military  order  and  coolness  marked 
the  French  retreat  across  the  Turones,  and  though  the  cannon 
shots  ploughed  with  a  fearful  effect  through  their  masses,  and 
the  horsemen  continually  flanked  their  march,  they  gained  the 
rough  ground,  and  finally  escaped  over  the  Agueda  by  Barba 
del  Puerco,  with  the  loss  of  three  hundred  men  killed  wounded 
and  prisoners.  Trant  was  thus  saved  as  it  were  by  a  miracle ; 
for  accident  had  stopped  the  English  infantry  marching  in  the 
morning  according  to  Wellington's  promise,  and  he  instantly 
pushed  on  this  cavalry.  The  prince  of  Esling  had  reached 
Ciudad  Rodrigo  two  days  before,  and  Wellington  now  stood  vic- 
torious on  the  confines  of  Portugal,  having  effected  what  to 
others  appeared  incredibly  rash  and  useless  to  attempt. 


APRIL,  1811.1  BOOK   Xlt.-CHAP.   5.  135 


CHAPTER  V. 

MASSENA  entered  Portugal  with  sixty-five  thousand  men,  and 
his  reinforcements  while  at  Santarem  were  about  ten  thousand, 
he  repassed  the  frontier  with  forty-five  thousand ;  the  invasion 
therefore  cost  him  thirty  thousand  men,  of  which  fourteen 
thousand  might  have  fallen  by  the  sword  or  been  taken.  Not 
more  than  six  thousand  were  lost  during  the  retreat ;  but  had 
Wellington,  unrestrained  by  political  considerations,  attacked 
him  vigorously  at  Redinha,  Condeixa,  Casal  Nova,  and  Miranda 
de  Corvo,  half  the  French  army  would  have  been  destroyed, 
though  with  great  loss  to  the  assailants :  a  retreating  army 
should  fight  as  little  as  possible. 

When  the  French  reached  the  Agueda,  their  cavalry  detach- 
ments, heavy  artillery,  and  convalescents,  again  augmented  the 
army  to  more  than  fifty  thousand  men,  but  the  fatigues  of  the 
retreat  and  the  want  of  provisions  would  not  suffer  them  to 
show  a  front  to  the  allies ;  wherefore,  drawing  two  hundred 
thousand  rations  from  Eodrigo,  they  fell  back  to  Salamanca, 
and  Wellington  invested  Almeida.  The  light  division  then 
occupied  Gallegos  and  Espeja,  the  rest  of  the  army  was  dis- 
posed in  villages  on  both  sides  of  the  Coa,  and  the  head- 
quarters were  transferred  to  Villa  Formosa,  where  colonel 
Waters,  who  had  been  taken  near  Belmonte  during  the  retreat, 
rejoined  the  army.  He  had  refused  his  parole,  and  when 
carried  to  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  rashly  consulted  the  Spaniard  in 
whose  house  he  was  lodged  about  escaping ;  the  man  betrayed 
counsel,  but  his  servant  detesting  the  treachery  secretly  offered 
his  own  aid,— Waters  told  him  to  get  the  rowels  of  his 
spurs  sharpened,  nothing  more,  for  his  design  was  one  of  open 
daring.  He  was  placed  under  the  guard  of  four  gens  tfarmes, 
and  when  near  Salamanca,  the  chief,  who  rode  the  only  good 
horse  of  the  party,  alighted  for  a  moment,  whereupon  Waters 


136  t>ENlNSTJLA  WAR.  [APRIL,  1811. 

gave  the  spur  to  his  own  mare,  a  celebrated  animal,  and  gal- 
loped off!  It  was  an  act  of  incredible  resolution  and  hardi- 
hood, for  he  was  on  a  wide  plain,  and  before  him  and  for  miles 
behind  him  the  road  was  covered  with  the  French  columns ; 
his  hat  fell  off,  and  thus  marked  he  rode  along  the  flank  of 
the  troops,  some  encouraged,  others  fired  at  him,  and  the 
gens-tfarmes  sword  in  hand  were  always  close  at  his  heels. 
Suddenly  he  broke  at  full  speed  between  two  of  the  columns, 
gained  a  wooded  hollow,  and  having  thus  baffled  his  pursuers, 
evaded  the  rear  of  the  enemy's  army,  and  the  third  day  reached 
head-quarters,  where  lord  Wellington,  knowing  his  resolute 
subtle  character,  had  caused  his  baggage  to  be  brought,  observ- 
ing that  he  would  not  be  long  absent ! 

Massena  having  now  occupied  Salamanca  and  communicated 
A  di  2  w^  Bessieres,  sent  a  convoy  to  Rodrigo,  which 
could  not  be  interrupted;  for  Wellington  could 
scarcely  maintain  his  forward  position.  He  had  been  com- 
pelled, in  default  of  money,  to  disband  all  his  militia  at  the 
moment  when  they  were  acquiring  solidity  in  the  field,  and  his 
operations  were  reduced  to  a  precarious  blockade  of  Almeida. 
He  even  laid  two  temporary  bridges  over  the  Coa  to  secure  a 
retreat  if  pressed,  which  might  easily  happen :  for  the  Portu- 
guese army  was  in  a  dreadful  state,  and  the  continued  mis- 
conduct of  the  regency,  and  the  absolute  want  of  money,  gave 
/ittle  hope  of  amelioration.  The  great  depots  were  re-estab- 
lished at  Lamego  and  Raiva,  on  the  Douro  and  the  Mondego, 
and  magazines  of  consumption  at  Celorico,  from  whence  the 
mule-brigades  supplied  the  troops  by  Castello  Bom.  Com- 
missariat stations  were  also  commenced  at  Guarda,  Pena 
Macor  and  Castello  Branco,  to  be  supplied  from  Abrantes,  and 
the  three  great  rivers  were  thus  rendered  subservient  to  the 
wants  of  the  army  up  to  the  nearest  navigable  points ;  but 
from  thence  the  land  transport  was  very  difficult,  and  that, 
coupled  with  the  capricious  nature  of  the  Agueda  and  the  Coa, 
rendered  it  dangerous  to  blockade  Ciudad  Rodrigo  and  Almeida 
together.  The  covering  army  would  have  had  bad  ground, 
and  those  rivers  behind  it ;  indeed  Almeida  was  only  block- 
aded because  it  was  supposed  to  have  but  a  fortnight's  pro- 
visions, and  Wellington  was  prepared  to  relinquish  it  if 


APRIL,  1811.]  BOOK  XII.  — CHAP.   5.  137 

pressed,  because  the  reduction  of  it  formed  no  part  of  his 
general  plan. 

His  success  having  given  stability  to  the  Tory  cabinet,  the 
ministers  now  wished  to  restrict  the  war  to  Portugal,  and  re- 
called many  battalions  to  England;  but  offensive  operations  in 
Spain  occupied  the  general's  thoughts,  and  two 

.  -i  o     T    J    •         -.L     Wellington 

projects  presented  themselves.  1°.  Judging  it  to  lord  Liver- 
would  be  long  ere  Massena  could  resume  the  ^Q^Jg|th* 
invasion  of  Portugal,  he  thought  to  leave  part  of 
his  force  in  Beira  and  with  the  remainder  raise  the  siege  of 
Cadiz.  2°.  If  Almeida  surrendered  to  his  blockade,  to  besiege 
Rodrigo;  or  if  Almeida  did  not  yield,  he  might  in  time 
besiege  and  take  both  together,  and  then  marching  into  the 
heart  of  Spain,  open  a  communication  with  Valencia  and  the 
English  army  in  Sicily.  This  would  deliver  Andalusia  as 
certainly  as  a  direct  operation,  because  Madrid,  the  principal 
French  depot,  would  be  taken,  the  northern  and  southern 
French  armies  separated;  and  a  new  base  on  the  Mediter- 
ranean being  obtained,  the  whole  of  the  allied  forces  would  be 
united,  when  a  few  general  battles  would  decide  the  fate  of  the 
Peninsula.  With  this  great  design  in  view,  which  successfully 
executed  would  have  surpassed  Marlborough's  march  to  Blen- 
heim, he  resisted  the  recal  of  his  battalions,  demanded  rein- 
forcements from  England,  and  required  leave  to  act;  yet  his 
secret  aspirations  were  checked  by  reflecting  on  the  arrogance 
broken  promises  and  folly  of  the  Spaniards,  upon  the  foul 
practices  of  the  Portuguese  regency,  and  upon  the  timid 
temper  of  the  English  cabinet.  Wherefore  revolving  the. 
leading  points  in  secret  he  waited  on  circumstances ;  and 
both  projects  were  necessarily  conditional;  for  if  Napoleon 
reinforced  his  armies  new  combinations  would  arise,  and  it 
was  essential  first  to  recapture  Badajos,  the  loss  of  which 
affected  the  safety  of  Cadiz,  and  menaced  Portugal  by  placing 
Elvas  in  danger.  Thinking  now  that  Massena  could  not 
easily  interrupt  the  blockade  of  Almeida,  he  departed  to  join 
Beresford  in  the  Alemtejo,  leaving  Spencer  to  direct  the 
northern  operations;  and  as  this  was  a  critical  period  of  the 
war,  it  is  essential  to  review  the  state  of  affairs  in  the 
south. 


138  PENINSULA  WAR.  [APRIL,  1811. 

Soult  had  returned  to  Andalusia  when  Badajos  fell,  leaving 
Mortier  to  besiege  Campo  Mayor.  His  presence  and  the 
fame  of  his  successes  restored  tranquillity  to  the  province,  and 

his  troops  then  recovered  from  the  despondency 
Engineers,  caused  by  the  battle  of  Barosa,  which  was  so 
March  25th  great  tnat  tne  works  of  Arcos,  Lucar,  Medina  de 
intercepted.  Sidonia,  and  Alcala  de  Gazules,  had  been  stopped, 
Abstract  and  fear  was  prevalent.  But  gloom  and  discon- 
tents from  *en*  were  ^so  paramount  in  Cadiz.  The  fall  of 
Cadiz,  1811,  Badajos  menaced  the  city  with  famine :  and  though 

the  regency  pretended  at  first  to  menace  Victor 
with  a  new  attack,  Zayas  was  finally  despatched  with  six  thou- 
sand infantry  and  four  hundred  cavalry  to  gather  provisions 
in  the  Condada  de  Neibla,  where  Ballesteros  had  surprised  and 
dispersed  Remond's  troops.  The  French  were  however  rein- 
forced, Zayas  made  no  progress,  many  of  his  men  deserted  to 
Ballesteros,  and  he  withdrew ;  Blake  then  assumed  command 
in  the  Condada,  and  Ballesteros  and  Copons  were  placed  under 
his  orders.  Their  united  corps  amounting  to  eleven  thousand 
infantry  and  twelve  hundred  cavalry  were  called  the  '  fourth 
army,'  and  the  fugitives  from  the  Gebora  having  rallied  under 
Mendizabel  at  Villa  Viciosa  were  called  the  '  fifth  army.' 

Mortier  had  meanwhile  taken  possession  of  Albuquerque 
and  Valencia  d' Alcantara,  and  besieged  Campo  Mayor,  which 
would  have  fallen  at  once  but  for  the  courage  of  major  Tallaia, 
a  Portuguese  engineer.  With  only  two  hundred  men  and 
five  mounted  guns,  he  compelled  Mortier  to  open  regular 
trenches,  to  batter  in  breach,  to  bombard  the  place,  and  to  push 
his  sap  to  the  crest  of  the  glacis.  When  a  breach  was  made, 
Tallaia,  though  ill-seconded  by  his  garrison,  repulsed  one  assault 
and  obtained  a  truce  of  twenty-four  hours  to  wait  for  succour : 
none  arrived  and  this  brave  man  surrendered  the  21st  of 
March.  Mortier  then  returned  to  Badajos,  leaving  Latour 
Maubourg  to  remove  the  siege  artillery  and  stores.  It  was  in 
this  state  of  affairs  that  Beresford,  who  had  quitted  Wellington's 
army  after  the  combat  of  Foz  d'Aronce,  arrived  at  Portalegre 
with  twenty  thousand  infantry,  more  than  two  thousand 
cavalry,  and  eighteen  guns.  His  instructions  were  to  relieve 
Campo  Mayor,  and  retake  Olivenza  and  Badajos :  the  first  had 


MARCH,  1811.]  BOOK   XII.  —  CHAP.   5.  189 

already  surrendered,  but  the  marshal  being  only  two  marches 
distant,  thought  he  might  surprise  the  besieging  corps,  and 
with  this  view  put  his  troops  in  motion. 


COMBAT    OP   CAMPO    MAYOR. 

In  the  morning  of  the  25th  the  advanced  guard,  consisting 
of  all  the  cavalry,  supported  by  a  detachment  of  infantry 
under  colonel  Colborne,  came  suddenly  upon  Campo  Mayor. 
Latour  Maubourg  was  then  marching  out  with  nine  hundred 
dragoons,  three  battalions  of  infantry,  some  horse  artillery 
and  the  battering  train  of  sixteen  guns ;  but  his  troops  were 
in  disorder,  and  the  English  cavalry  under  general  Long 
immediately  turned  the  town  by  the  left,  whereupon  the 
French  retreated  on  the  Badajos  road,  and  the  allies  followed 
along  some  gentle  slopes,  gradually  forming  a  half  circle 
round  the  retiring  troops  in  the  plain.  Colborne  was  still  at 
a  considerable  distance,  yet  coming  up  at  a  running  pace,  and 
followed  by  the  second  division ;  the  French  infantry  halted 
and  formed  a  square,  placing  their  horsemen  before  and 
behind  it,  while  their  baggage  and  guns  hurried  towards 
Badajos;  then  Long,  keeping  the  heavy  cavalry  back,  ordered 
the  thirteenth  dragoons  under  colonel  Head,  and  some  Por- 
tuguese squadrons  under  Loftus  Otway  to  attack.  The 
thirteenth,  charging  at  a  gallop  received  the  infantry  fire, 
and  the  French  hussars  met  them  with  loose  reins;  both  came 
strongly  to  the  shock  and  many  were  dismounted,  yet  those 
who  kept  the  saddle  passed  fiercely  through  on  both  sides, 
re-formed,  and  again  charged  in  the  same  fearful  manner! 
Desperately  they  fought,  but  Head's  troopers  riding  more 
closely  together  than  their  adversaries,  overthrew  horse  and 
man  and  finally  the  French  dispersed.  Then,  galloping  on- 
wards, these  gallant  swordsmen  passed  the  convoy,  hewed  down 
the  gunners  of  the  battering  train,  and  being  joined  by  some 
of  the  Portuguese,  the  French  hussars  still  fighting  here  and 
there,  rode  forward.  They  naturally  thought  the  English 
heavy  dragoons,  the  artillery  and  the  infantry,  some  of  which 
was  close  up,  would  dispose  of  the  enemy  they  were  passing; 
but  Beresford  would  not  let  the  dragoons  charge,  and  when 


140  PENINSULA   WAR.  [MARCH.  1811. 

six  guns  might  have  opened  he  would  not  suffer  more  than 
two  to  play,  and  those  only  for  a  few  rounds  ;  hence  the  French 
recovered  their  battering  train  and  retreated  in  safety !  Mean- 
while the  thirteenth  and  the  Portuguese  having  reached  the 
bridge  of  Badajos  took  some  guns  close  to  the  fortress,  but 
were  repulsed  by  its  fire,  and  being  followed  by  Mortier  in 
person,  and  met  by  the  retreating  infantry  and  the  remains  of 
the  beaten  cavalry,  lost  some  men.  Altogether  one  hundred 
of  the  allies  were  killed  or  hurt,  and  seventy  were  taken. 
The  French  lost  three  hundred  men  and  a  howitzer,  and  their 
hussar  colonel,  Chamorin,  was  slain  in  single  combat  by  a 
powerful  swordsman  of  the  thirteenth. 

To  profit  from  sudden  opportunities,  a  general  must  be 
constantly  with  the  advanced  guard  in  an  offensive  movement. 
When  this  combat  commenced,  Beresford  was  not  in  front, 
and  baron  Trip,  a  staff-officer,  told  him  the  thirteenth  had 
been  cut  off.  The  marshal  therefore,  anxious  to  spare  his 
cavalry  which  could  not  be  replaced,  refused  to  follow  up  the 
blow,  saying  the  loss  of  one  regiment  was  enough;  but  the 
regiment  was  not  lost,  the  country  was  open,  the  enemy's 
force  and  the  posture  of  affairs  easy  to  be  discerned  without 
trusting  baron  Trip.  The  errors  of  the  day  were  all  Beres- 
ford's ;  yet  when  the  falseness  of  Trip's  report  was  discovered, 
the  thirteenth  dragoons  were  severely  reprimanded  for  pur- 
suing so  eagerly !  But  the  unsparing  admiration  of  the  whole 
army  consoled  them ! 

Campo  Mayor  was  recovered  so  suddenly,  that  the  French 
left  eight  thousand  rations  of  bread  in  the  magazines;  and 
they  also  evacuated  Albuquerque  and  Valencia  d' Alcantara, 
being  infinitely  dismayed  by  the  appearance  of  so  powerful  an 
army  in  the  south:  indeed  so  secretly  and  promptly  had  it 
been  assembled,  that  its  existence  was  first  made  known  by 
the  blow  at  Campo  Mayor.  But  to  profit  from  this  surprise 
it  was  essential  to  be  rapid,  for  the  breaches  in  Badajos  were 
not  closed,  nor  the  trenches  obliterated,  nor  the  exhausted 
magazines  replenished.  Soult  had  carried  away  six  battalions 
and  a  regiment  of  cavalry,  four  hundred  men  had  been 
thrown  into  Olivenza,  three  thousand  into  Badajos;  thus 
Mortier,  deducting  the  losses  sustained  during  the  operations, 


APRIL,  1811.]  BOOK   XII.  — CHAP.   5.  141 

had  less  than  ten  thousand  men,  and  he  could  not  hold  the 
line  of  the  Guadiana  and  collect  provisions  also.  Beresford 
should  have  instantly  marched  upon  Merida,  driven  back  the 
fifth  corps,  and  opened  a  communication  by  Jerumenha  with 
Elvas;  the  fall  of  Badajos  would  then  have  been  inevitable. 
The  confusion  occasioned  by  the  surprise,  and  the  moral 
impression  produced  by  the  charge  of  the  thirteenth,  guaranteed 
the  success  of  this  march;  he  might  even  have  passed  at 
Merida  before  Mortier  could  ascertain  his  object.  Neglecting 
this  opportunity  he  put  his  troops  in  quarters  round  Elvas, 
for  the  soldiers,  especially  those  of  the  fourth  division,  who 
had  been  marching  incessantly  since  the  6th  of  the  month, 
were  bare-footed  and  exhausted. 

Wellington's  instructions  were  to  throw  a  bridge  over  the 
Guadiana  at  Jerumenha,  push  back  Mortier,  and  invest 
Olivenza  and  Badajos.  The  Portuguese  government  were  to 
provide  some  of  the  means,  and  had  reported  that  provisions, 
shoes,  battering-guns,  ammunition  and  transport,  were  actually 
collected;  that  the  Guadiana  abounded  in  serviceable  craft; 
that  twenty  large  boats,  formerly  belonging  to  Cuesta,  were 
at  Elvas,  and  all  other  things  would  be  sent  from  Lisbon. 
Yet  no  magazines  had  been  prepared,  and  very  little  trans- 
port provided;  only  five  of  Cuesta's  boats  were  in  Elvas; 
there  was  no  serviceable  craft  on  the  river,  and  some  small 
pontoons,  sent  from  Lisbon,  were  unfit  to  bear  the  force  of  the 
current  or  to  sustain  the  passage  of  guns :  the  country  fur- 
nished no  food  and  the  garrison  stores  of  Elvas  were  taken  to 
feed  the  army.  All  these  things  pointed  out  Merida  as  the 
true  line  of  operations.  Food  was  to  be  had  on  the  left  of 
the  Guadiana,  and  to  remedy  the  evils  enumerated  did  not 
require  the  presence  of  an  army  on  the  right  bank.  The 
want  of  shoes  in  the  fourth  division  was  indeed  an  obstacle, 
yet  those  excellent  troops  could  have  made  an  effort,  and 
might  without  much  risk  have  been  left  behind.  Beresford 
preferred  halting  for  the  means  to  cross  at  Jerumenha,  and 
thus  commenced  in  error  those  bloody  operations  which 
marred  Wellington's  great  conceptions  for  carrying  the  war 
into  Spain,  and  detained  the  army  more  than  a  year  on  the 
frontiers  of  Portugal.  General  Phillipon,  one  of  the  ablest 


142  PENINSULA   WAR.  [APRIL,  1811. 

governors  that  ever  defended  a  fortress,  employed  the  time 
thus  given  to  level  the  trenches  of  Badajos,  restore  the  glacis, 
and  close  the  breach;  and  La  tour  Maubourg  who  had  suc- 
ceeded Mortier  in  command  covered  the  country  with  foragers 
and  filled  the  magazines. 

After  some  days,  a  squadron  of  cavalry  having  passed  over 
the  Guadiana  by  a  deep  ford  to  protect  the  workmen,  a  bridge 
was  cast  at  Jerumenha,  by  fixing  trestles  in  the  shallows  and 
connecting  them  with  Cuesta's  boats.  It  was  finished  the 
3rd,  and  the  army  assembled  at  night  in  the  neighbouring- 
woods  with  intent  to  cross  at  daylight,  but  the  river  rose 
suddenly,  swept  away  the  trestles,  and  rendered  the  ford  im- 
passable. No  more  materials  for  a  solid  passage  could  be 
immediately  procured,  and  the  Spanish  boats  were  therefore 
converted  into  flying  bridges  for  the  cavalry  and  artillery, 
while  the  engineer  Squire  constructed,  with  pontoons  and 
casks,  a  slight  bridge  for  the  infantry.  To  cover  this  opera- 
tion a  battalion  was  added  to  the  squadron  on  the  left  bank, 
yet  it  was  late  in  the  night  of  the  6th  ere  the  army  crossed 
and  took  position  on  a  range  of  hills  covered  by  a  swampy 
rivulet.  Latour  Maubourg  was  so  occupied  with  the  provi- 
sions of  Badajos,  that  his  foragers  were  extended  fifty  miles  in 
the  rear,  and  he  took  no  notice  of  Beresford,  a  neglect 
savouring  more  of  Spanish  than  French  warfare ;  for  five 
thousand  infantry,  with  guns  and  cavalry,  could,  notwith- 
standing the  guns  of  Jerumenha,  have  easily  cut  off  the  small 
detachment  of  the  British  on  the  left  bank,  and  completely 
frustrated  the  operations.  Beresford  should  have  passed  over 
and  entrenched  a  strong  force  to  protect  his  workmen,  instead 
of  a  battalion  and  some  cavalry;  but  he  tempted,  and  Latour 
Maubourg  neglected  fortune  with  equal  pertinacity.  When 
the  allies  had  secured  the  left  bank,  the  French  general, 
awaking,  collected  three  thousand  infantry  five  hundred 
cavalry  and  four  guns  at  Olivenza,  and  marched  at  daylight  on 
the  7th  to  oppose  a  passage  which  had  been  completed  the  day 
before;  he  however  surprised  a  squadron  of  the  thirteenth 
dragoons,  and  advanced  so  close  to  the  position  as  to  exchange 
shots,  yet  he  was  suffered  to  retire  unmolested ! 

Mendizabel    now    re-occupied    Valencia    d' Alcantara    and 


APRIL,  1811.]  BOOK   X1T.-CHAP.   5.  143 

Albuquerque  witli  the  fifth  army,  and  pushed  cavalry  posts  to 
La  Eocca  and  Montijo,  Ballesteros  re-entered  Fregenal,  and 
Castanos,  made  captain-general  of  Estremadura  as  well  as  of 
Gallicia,  arrived  at  Elvas.  He  was  friendly  towards  Beresford, 
but  had  a  grudge  against  Blake,  and  pretended  to  chief 
authority  as  the  elder  captain-general;  Blake  then  claimed 
on  the  same  ground  a  superiority  over  Beresford,  which  he  was 
not  disposed  to  admit  of.  Castanos,  who  disliked  a  disputed 
authority,  and  was  fearful  that  Blake's  pretensions  would 
prevent  Beresford  crossing  the  Guadiana,  finally  agreed  that 
he  who  brought  the  greatest  force  into  the  field  should  be 
generalissimo.  Blake  was  thus  put  aside,  and  Beresford,  the 
younger  officer,  commanded  in  chief.  To  protect  his  bridges 
which  he  had  now  re- constructed  in  a  substantial  manner,  he 
employed  the  Elvas  militia  to  raise  entrenchments,  and  having 
placed  a  strong  detachment  in  them  advanced.  Latour 
Maubourg  retired  upon  Albuera,  and  the  allies  being  joined  by 
Madden's  cavalry  summoned  Olivenza;  this  was  on  the  9th, 
and  it  is  certain  that  no  defence  was  expected,  for  it  was  not 
until  the  summons  was  rejected  that  major  Dickson  was  sent 
to  Elvas  to  prepare  a  battering  train.  The  Anglo-Portuguese 
British  troops  then  encamped  round  the  place,  and  opened 
a  communication  with  Ballesteros,  while  Castanos  entered 
Merida  and  pushed  cavalry  to  Almendralejos;  but  the  French 
fell  back  to  Llerena,  whereupon  Beresford  left  Cole  to  besiege 
Olivenza  with  the  fourth  division  and  Madden's  cavalry,  and 
took  post  himself  on  the  llth  at  Albuera.  There,  being 
in  connexion  with  Castanos  by  his  left,  he  spread  his  horse- 
men to  cut  off  all  communication  with  Badajos,  and  sent  a 
brigade  to  collect  supplies  at  Talavera  Real. 

On  the  14th,  six  twenty-four  pounders  being  placed  in 
battery,  at  ^Olivenza,  opened  a  practicable  breach,  and  the 
garrison  surrendered.  Cole  then  marched  on  Zafra,  and 
Beresford  having  recalled  the  brigade  from  Talavera  also 
"  marched  on  that  place.  His  object  was  to  drive  Latour 
Maubourg  over  the  Morena,  and  to  cut  off  general  Maransin, 
who  had,  when  Zayas  quitted  the  Condada,  pursued  Ballesteros 
to  Fregenal,  had  defeated  him  thereon  the  12th,  and  was  now 
following  up  his  victory ;  an  alcalde  gave  him  timely  notice  of 


144  PENINSULA  WAR.  [APRIL,  1811. 

Beresford's  vicinity  and  he  escaped,  but  two  French  regiments 
of  cavalry,  having  advanced  from  Llerena  to  collect  contribu- 
tions, were  encountered  beyond  Usagre  by  the  thirteenth 
dragoons,  and  so  vigorously  pressed  for  six  miles  that  one 
hundred  and  fifty  were  killed  or  taken. 

On  the  16th  Cole  arrived,  and  the  army  being  thus  con- 
centrated about  Zafra,  Latour  Maubourg  retired  on  the  18th 
to  Guadalcanal;  the  Spanish  cavalry  then  occupied  Llerena, 
and  the  resources  of  Estremadura  were  secured  to  the  allies. 
General  Charles  Alten,  coming  from  Lisbon  with  a  brigade  of 
German  light  infantry,  now  reached  Olivenza,  and  Wellington 
came  to  Elvas,  whither  Beresford,  after  drawing  his  infantry 
nearer  to  Badajos,  went  to  meet  him.  The  presence  of  the 
general-in- chief  was  agreeable  to  the  troops;  they  had  seen 
great  masses  put  in  motion  without  any  adequate  results,  and 
thought  the  operations  had  been  slow  without  being  prudent. 
The  army  had  passed  the  Guadiana  the  7th,  and,  including  the 
Spaniards  from  Montijo,  numbered  twenty-five  thousand  men; 
Latour  Maubourg  never  had  more  than  ten  thousand,  many  of 
them  dispersed  foraging,  yet  without  displaying  much  skill,  he 
had  maintained  himself  in  Estremadura  for  ten  days ;  during 
which  no  corps  being  employed  to  constrain  the  garrison  of 
Badajos,  the  governor  brought  in  timber  and  other  materials 
for  the  defence.  Wellington  arrived  the  21st,  forded  the 
Guadiana  on  the  22nd,  and  pushing  close  up  to  Badajos  with 
Madden's  Portuguese  cavalry  and  Alten's  Germans,  endea- 
voured to  cut  off  a  convoy  going  to  the  place,  but  the  alert 
governor  sallied,  and  the  allies  lost  a  hundred  men  without 
stopping  the  convoy. 

Beresford  had  despised  his  enemy;  but  Wellington  thought 
he  would  certainly  disturb  the  siege  with  a  considerable 
force,  and  demanded  the  Spanish  generals'  assent  to  the 
following  operations  before  he  would  commence  even  the 
investment  of  Badajos.  1°.  Blake,  marching  up  from  Aya- 
monte,  was  to  take  post  at  Xeres  de  los  Cavalleros,  and  " 
Ballesteros  to  occupy  Burquillo  on  his  left.  2°.  Mendizabel's 
cavalry,  stationed  at  Llereua,  was  to  observe  the  road  of 
Guadalcanal,  and  communicate  through  Zafra  with  Ballesteros: 
these  dispositions  were  made  to  watch  the  passes  of  the 


APRIL,  1811.  J  BOOK  XII.  —  CHAP.  ft.  U5 

Morena.  3°.  Castanos  was  to  furnish  three  battalions  for  the 
siege,  and  keep  the  rest  of  his  corps  at  Merida,  to  support 
the  Spanish  cavalry.  The  British  army  was  to  be  in  second 
line,  and  Albuera,  centrically  situated  with  respect  to  the 
roads  leading  from  Andalusia  to  Badajos,  was  to  be  the  point  of 
concentration  for  all  the  allied  forces  in  the  event  of  a  battle. 

To  attack  Badajos  the  battering  train  and  stores  were  taken 
from  the  ramparts  and  magazines  of  Elvas ;  it  was  therefore 
necessary  to  ensure  the  safety  of  the  guns,  lest  that  fortress 
should  in  the  end  be  exposed  half  dismantled  to  a  siege.  But 
the  Guadiana,  rising  ten  feet  on  the  24th,  had  again  carried 
away  the  bridges  at  Jerumenha;  wherefore  Wellington  changed 
the  line  of  communication,  making  it  run  by  Merida  until 
settled  weather  should  admit  of  fresh  arrangements,  and  ere 
that  was  effected  political  difficulties  forced  him  to  delay  the 
siege.  Mendizabel's  troops  had  committed  excesses  in  Portu- 
gal, their  disputes  with  the  inhabitants  were  constant,  the 
Spanish  general  pillaged  the  town  of  Fernando,  and  the 
Portuguese  government  in  reprisal,  resolved  to  seize  Oli- 
venza,  which  had  formerly  belonged  to  Portugal.  The  Spanish 
regency  publicly  disavowed  Mendizabel's  conduct,  and  Mr. 
Stuart's  strenuous  representations  deterred  the  Portuguese 
from  plunging  the  two  countries  into  a  war;  but  this  affair, 
joined  to  the  natural  slowness  and  arrogance  of  the  Spaniards, 
prevented  Castanos  and  Blake  from  immediately  assenting  to 
the  English  general's  demands.  Now  also  came  unexpected 
intelligence  that  Massena  was  again  on  the  Agueda,  and  in 

force,  wherefore,  postponing  the  siege  until  the 

o«i  -i  -i        ,    •  A  ••!     Appendix  18, 

bpanish  generals  could  act  in  concert,  or  until    $10%  vol.  II. 

the   fall   of  Almeida   should   permit    a    British 
force   to   come  down,  Wellington  repaired  with   the  utmost 
speed  to  the  Coa,  and  gave  orders  for  the  northern  militia  again 
to  take  the  field. 

OPERATIONS   IN   THE  NORTH. 

Almeida  had  indeed  been  closely  pressed,  and  the  army  so 
disposed  as  to  cut  off  all  communication ;  but  the  allies  were 
themselves  so  distressed  for  provisions  that  great  part  of  their 
corn  came  from  the  side  of  Ledesma,  being  smuggled  by  the 

VOL.  III.  L 


146  PENINSULA    WAR.  [APRIL,  1811. 

peasants  through  the  French  posts,  and  passed  over  the 
Agueda  by  ropes,  which  were  hidden  amongst  the  deep  chasms 
of  that  river  near  its  confluence  with  the  Douro.  Massena 
had  twice  supplied  Ciudad  Eodrigo,  and  though  Spencer, 
crossing  the  Agueda  with  eight  thousand  men,  overtook  and 
surrounded  the-  rear-guard  of  the  last  convoy  with  his  cavalry 
on  a^' pla^  it;  'reached  the  place.  Having  thus  succoured 
one  %j;resj3$ie  became  intent  to  relieve  the  other,  and  he  was 
StroHtg;  e^swigb  .to  do  so  by  force.  His  retreat  to  Salamanca 
was  merely "to  testore  the  organization  and  equipments  of  his 
army,  which  he  could  not  do  at  Rodrigo  without  exhausting 
the  resources  of  that  place,  but  his  cantonments  were  ex- 
tended from  Ledesma  and  Toro  on  the  Douro  to  San  Felices 
on  the  Agueda,  by  which  he  still  lent  his  hand  to  Almeida. 
His  cavalry  was  indeed  in  bad  condition,  and  his  guns  nearly 
unhorsed  by  the  retreat  from  Santarem,  yet  he  only  waited 
for  aid  from  Bessieres  to  retake  the  offensive.  This  he  did 
not  readily  obtain,  Bessieres  had  neglected  and  continued  to 
neglect  the  army  of  Portugal,  contrary  to  the  emperor's 
instructions,  and  now  proffered  remonstrances  and  counsel 
instead  of  men  and  guns.  He  disliked  the  war  in  Spain, 
condemned  the  mode  of  conducting  it,  and  having  his  thoughts 
fixed  more  upon  Russian  than  Peninsula  politics,  gave  his 
opinion  that  a  northern  war  must  occur  so  openly,  that  it 
reached  the  English  camp. 

Towards  the  end  of  April  the  new  organization,  decreed 
while  Massena  was  at  Santarem,  was  making  progress.  Two 
divisions  of  the  ninth  corps  joined  Massena,  and  Drouet  with 
the  remaining  eleven  thousand  infantry  and  cavalry  was 
going  to  reinforce  and  take  command  of  the  fifth  corps,  when 
he  was  prevailed  upon  by  Massena,  who  had  at  last  received  a 
promise  of  assistance  from  Bessieres,  to  aid  in  an  effort  to 
relieve  Almeida.  With  this  view  the  French  army  advanced 
in  the  latter  part  of  April.  The  light  division  immediately 
resumed  its  old  positions  at  Gallegos  and  Espeja,  and  the 
cavalry  was  dispersed,  part  in  observation  towards  the  sources 
of  the  Azava,  part  behind  Gallegos  in  support  of  the  infantry. 
In  this  state  of  affairs  colonel  O'Meara  and  eighty  men  of 
the  Irish  brigade  were  captured  by  Julian  Sanchez,  the  affair 


Vol. 3. Plate  5. 

147. 


Rvdrigo 


BATTLE     OF 
FUJEISTTES 

S^Mav.lflll. 


MAT,  1811.]  BOOK  XII.- CHAP.   5.  147 

being,  it  was  said,  preconcerted  to  enable  the  former  to  quit 
the  French  service.  "Soon  afterwards  two  thousand  infantry 
and  a  squadron  of  cavalry,  coming  from  Rodrigo,  endeavoured 
to  seize  the  bridge  of  Marialva  in  front  of  Gallegos,  but  it 
was  bravely  maintained  by  captain  Dobbs  of  the  fifty-second, 
with  one  bayonet  company  and  some  riflemen. 

On  the  25th,  Massena  reached  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  and  the 
27th,  his  advanced  guards  felt  the  light  division  from  Espeja 
to  Marialva.  Wellington  arrived  the  28th,  and  immediately 
concentrated  the  main  body  of  the  allies  behind  the  Duas 
Casas  river.  The  Azava  was  swollen  and  difficult  to  ford, 
and  the  enemy  continued  to  feel  the  line  of  outposts  until 
the  2nd  of  May,  when,  the  waters  having  subsided,  the  French 
army  came  out  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  and  the  light  division, 
after  a  slight  skirmish  of  horse  at  Gallegos,  commenced  a 
retrograde  movement,  from  that  place  and  from  Espeja,  upon 
Fuentes  Onoro.  The  country  immediately  in  rear  of  those 
villages  was  wooded  as  far  as  the  Duas  Casas,  but  an  open 
plain,  separating  the  two  lines  of  march,  offered  the  enemy's 
powerful  cavalry  an  opening  to  cut  off  the  retreat;  they 
neglected  the  opportunity,  and  the  separated  brigades  re- 
mained unmolested  in  the  woods  bordering  the  plain  until 
midnight,  when  they  resumed  their  march  and  crossed  the 
Duas  Casas  at  Fuentes  Onoro.  That  village  had  escaped 
injury  during  the  previous  warfare,  although  occupied  alter- 
nately by  French  and  English  during  a  whole  year.  Every 
family  was  well  known  to  the  light  division,  and  it  was  with 
deep  regret  and  anger  they  found  that  the  British  troops 
preceding  them  had  pillaged  it,  leaving  only  shells  of  houses, 
where  three  days  before  a  friendly  population  had  been  living 
in  comfort.  This  wanton  and  disgraceful  act  was  felt  so 
deeply  throughout  the  army,  that  eight  thousand  dollars  were 
afterwards  collected  for  the  poor  despoiled  people,  yet  the 
injury  sunk  deeper  than  the  atonement. 

Lord  Wellington  had  resolved  not  to  risk  much  for  his 
blockade.  Massena  he  knew  could  bring  down  superior 
numbers ;  because  the  Portuguese  troops  continued  to  be  so 
neglected  by  their  government,  that  they  were  starving  under 
arms;  the  infantry  abandoned  their  colours  or  dropped  from 

L2 


148  PENINSULA  WAR.  [MAY,  1811. 

exhaustion  by  thousands,  the  cavalry  was  entirely  ruined, 
and  a  general  dispersion  was  feared.  Nevertheless,  when  the 
trial  came,  his  warlike  spirit  would  not  let  him  go  back ;  he 
could  not  indeed  with  only  thirty-two  thousand  infantry, 
twelve  hundred  cavalry  in  bad  condition  and  forty-two  guns 
face  Massena  on  the  plains  beyond  the  Duas  Casas ;  but  he 
occupied  a  table-land  between  the  Turones  and  Duas  Casas, 
the  left  at  Fort  Conception,  the  centre  opposite  the  village  of 
Alameda,  the  right  behind  Fuentes  Onoro.  This  line  was 
five  miles  long,  yet  the  Duas  Casas,  flowing  in  a  deep  ravine, 
covered  his  front ;  and  the  French  dared  not  march  by  their 
right  on  Almeida  because  he  would  then  have  crossed  the 
ravine  at  Alameda  and  Fuentes  Onoro,  and  have  fallen  on  their 
flank;  hence  to  cover  the  blockade,  it  sufficed  to  have  the 
fifth  division  near  Fort  Conception,  and  the  sixth  opposite 
Alameda :  the  first  and  third  divisions  were  concentrated  in 
mass  about  cannon-shot  behind  Fuentes  Onoro,  where  the 
table-land  turned  back  on  the  Turones,  becoming  rocky  and 
harsh  as  it  approached  that  river. 

FIRST    COMBAT   OF   FUENTES   ONOBO. 

Massena  came  up  three  columns  abreast.  The  cavalry,  the 
sixth  corps,  and  Drouet's  division,  threatened  Fuentes  Onoro ; 
the  eighth  and  second  corps  moved  against  Alameda  and  Fort 
Conception,  menacing  the  allies'  left;  the  light  division, 
therefore,  after  passing  the  Duas  Casas,  reinforced  the  sixth 
division.  Loison,  without  waiting  for  Massena's  orders,  fell 
upon  Fuentes  Onoro,  which  was  occupied  by  five  battalions 
picked  from  the  first  and  third  divisions.  Most  of  the  houses 
were  in  the  bottom  of  the  ravine,  but  an  old  chapel,  and  some 
buildings  on  a  craggy  eminence  overhanging  one  end  gave 
a  prominent  point  for  rallying.  The  low  parts  were  vigo- 
rously defended,  yet  the  violence  of  the  attack,  and  the  can- 
nonade, made  the  British  abandon  the  streets,  and  they  could 
scarcely  maintain  the  upper  ground  about  the  chapel.  Colonel 
Williams,  the  commanding  officer,  fell  badly  wounded,  and  the 
fight  was  critical,  when  the  twenty-fourth,  the  seventy-first, 
and  the  seventy-ninth  regiments,  marching  down  from  the 


MAY,  1811.]  BOOK  XII.  — CHAP.  5.  149 

main  position,  charged  roughly,  and  drove  the  French  quite 
over  the  Duas  Casas.  During  the  night  the  detachments  were 
withdrawn,  and  the  three  succouring  regiments  were  left  in 
the  village,  where  two  hundred  and  sixty  of  the  allies  and 
somewhat  more  of  the  French  had  fallen. 

On  the  4th  Massena,  accompanied  by  Bessi£res,  who  had 
brought  up  fifteen  hundred  cavalry  and  a  battery  of  the  impe- 
rial guard,  examined  all  the  line  and  made  dispositions 
for  the  next  day.  His  design  was  to  hold  the  left  of  the 
allies  in  check  with  the  second  corps,  and  turn  their  right 
with  the  remainder  of  the  army.  Forty  thou- 
sand French  infantry,  and  five  thousand  horse,  ^P^J}^"' 
with  thirty-six  pieces  of  artillery,  were  under 
arms;  they  had  shown  in  the  action  of  the  3rd  that  their 
courage  was  not  abated,  and  it  was  a  very  audacious  resolution 
to  receive  their  battle.  The  position,  as  far  as  Fuentes  Onoro, 
was  indeed  strong^  free  for  the  use  of  all  arms,  and  covered 
the  communication  by  the  bridge  of  Castello  Bom ;  but  on  the 
right,  the  plain  was  continued  in  a  second  steppe  to  Nava  d'Aver, 
where  a  considerable  hill,  overlooking  all  the  country,  com- 
manded the  roads  leading  to  the  bridges  of  Sequiras  and 
Sabugal.  Massena  could  therefore,  by  a  direct  march  from 
Ciudad  Rodrigo  seize  that  hill,  place  his  army  in  line  of  battle 
upon  the  right  flank  of  the  allies,  and  attack  them  while 
entangled  between  the  Duas  Casas,  the  Turones,  the  Ooa,  and 
the  fortress  of  Almeida:  the  bridge  of  Castello  Bom  alone 
would  have  been  open  for  retreat.  To  prevent  this,  and  to 
cover  his  communications  with  Sabugal  and  Sequiras,  Welling-, 
ton,  yielding  to  Spencer's  earnest  suggestions,  extended  his 
right  to  Nava  d'Aver,  caused  Julian  Sanchez  to  occupy  the 
hill,  and  supported  him  with  the  seventh  division  under  gene- 
ral Houstoun : — thus  the  line  of  battle  was  made  seven  miles 
in  length,  besides  the  circuit  of  blockade.  The  Duas  Casas 
still  covered  the  front,  but,  above  Fuentes  Onoro,  the  ravine 
was  gradually  obliterated,  resolving  itself  into  a  swampy  wood, 
which  extended  to  Poco  Velho,  a  village  half  way  between 
Fuentes  and  Nava  d'Aver, 


150  PENINSULA  WAR.  [MAY,  1811 

BATTLE   OP   FUENTES  ONORO. 

It  was  Massena's  intention  to  commence  the  attack  at  day- 
break on  the  5th,  but  a  delay  of  two  hours  occurred  and  all 
his  movements  were  descried.  The  eighth  corps,  withdrawn 
from  Alameda,  and  supported  by  all  the  French  cavalry,  was 
seen  marching  above  the  village  of  Poco  Velho,  which  with  its 
swampy  wood,  was  occupied  by  Houstoun's  left,  his  right  being 
thrown  back  in  the  plain  towards  Nava  d'Aver.  The  sixth 
corps  and  Drouet's  division  took  ground  to  their  own  left,  still 
keeping  a  division  in  front  of  Fuentes  Onoro,  menacing  that 
point  j  at  this  sight  the  light  division  and  the  English  horse 
hastened  to  the  support  of  Houstoun,  while  the  first  and  third 
divisions  made  a  movement  parallel  to  that  of  the  sixth  corps. 
The  latter,  however,  drove  the  left  wing  of  the  seventh  division 
from  the  village  of  Po£o  Velho,  and  it  was  fast  gaining  ground 
in  the  wood  also  when  the  riflemen  of  the  light  division  arriv- 
ing there  restored  the  fight.  The  French  cavalry  then  passed  Poco 
Velho  and  commenced  forming  in  order  .of  battle  on  the  plain, 
between  the  wood  and  the  hill  of  Nava  d'Aver  where  Julian 
Sanchez  was  posted.  He  immediately  retired  across  the  Turones, 
partly  in  fear,  but  more  in  anger,  because  his  lieutenant,  having 
foolishly  ridden  close  up  to  the  enemy  making  many  violent 
gestures,  was  mistaken  for  a  French  officer  and  shot  by  a 
soldier  of  the  guards  before  the  action  commenced. 

Montbrun  occupied  himself  with  this  weak  partida  for  an 
hour,  and  when  the  guerilla  chief  was  gone,  turned  the  right 
of  the  seventh  division,  and  charged  the  British  cavalry  which 
had  moved  up  to  its  support;  the  combat  was  unequal,  for  by 
an  abuse  too  common,  so  many  men  had  been  drawn  from  the 
ranks  as  orderlies  to  general  officers,  and  for  other  purposes, 
that  not  more  than  a  thousand  English  troopers  were  in  the 
field.  The  French  therefore  drove  in  all  the  cavalry  outguards 
at  the  first  shock,  cut  off  Ramsay's  battery  of  horse  artillery, 
and  came  sweeping  in  upon  the  reserves  of  cavalry  and  upon 
the  seventh  division.  Their  leading  squadrons,  approaching 
in  a  disorderly  manner,  were  partially  checked  by  fire,  but  a 
great  commotion  was  observed  in  their  main  body ;  men  and 
horses  were  seen  to  close  with  confusion  and  tumult  towards 


MAT,  1811.]  BOOK  XII.  —  CHAP.  5.  151 

one  point,  where  a  thick  dust  and  loud  cries,  and  the  sparkling 
of  blades,  and  flashing  of  pistols,  indicated  some  extraordi- 
nary occurrence.  Suddenly  the  multitude  became  violently 
agitated,  an  English  shout  pealed  high  and  clear,  the  mass  was 
rent  asunder,  and  Norman  Kamsay  burst  forth  sword  in  hand 
at  the  head  of  his  battery,  his  horses,  breathing  fire,  stretched 
like  greyhounds  along  the  plain,  the  guns  bounded  behind 
them  like  things  of  no  weight,  and  the  mounted  gunners  fol- 
lowed close,  with  heads  bent  low  and  pointed  weapons,  in  des- 
perate career.  Captain  Brotherton  of  the  fourteenth  dragoons, 
seeing  this,  instantly  rode  forth  and  with  his  squadron  shocked 
the  head  of  the  pursuing  troops,  and  general  Charles  Stewart, 
joining  in  the  charge,  took  the  French  colonel  Lamotte,  fight- 
ing hand  to  hand ;  but  then  the  main  body  of  the  French 
came  on  strongly  and  the  British  cavalry  retired  behind  the 
light  division,  which  was  immediately  thrown  into  squares. 
The  seventh  division,  which  was  more  advanced,  did  the  same, 
but  the  horsemen  were  upon  them  first,  and  some  were  cut 
down.  The  mass  however  stood  firm,  and  the  Chasseurs 
Britanniques,  ranged  behind  a  loose  stone  wall,  poured  such  a 
fire  that  their  foes  recoiled  and  seemed  bewildered. 

While  these  brilliant  actions  were  passing  on  the  right  the 
French  made  progress  in  the  wood  of  Poco  Velho,  and  as  the 
English  divisions  were  separated  and  the  right  wing  turned, 
it  was  evident  the  battle  would  soon  be  lost,  if  the  original 
concentrated  position  above  Fuentes  Onoro  was  not  quickly 
regained.  The  seventh  division  were  therefore  ordered  to 
cross  the  Turones,  and  move  down  the  left  bank  to  Frenada 
while  the  light  division  retired  over  the  plain;  the  cavalry 
covered  this  movement ;  and  the  first  and  third  divisions,  and 
the  Portuguese  were  at  the  same  time  placed  on  the  steppe 
of  land  before  described,  perpendicular  to  the  ravine  of 
Fuentes  Onoro.  General  Craufurd,  who  had  resumed  the 
command  of  the  light  division,  covered  Houstoun's  passage 
across  the  Turones,  and  then  retired  slowly  over  the  plain  in 
squares,  followed  by  the  French  horsemen,  who  continually 
outflanked  but  never  dared  to  assail  him;  however  in  ap- 
proaching the  new  line  they  sabred  some  of  the  foot  guards 
under  colonel  Hill,  making  that  officer  and  fourteen  men 


152  PENINSULA   WAR.  [MAY,  1811. 

prisoners,  and  then  continuing  their  course  were  repulsed  by 
the  forty-second  regiment.  Many  times  Montbrun  feigned 
to  charge  Craufurd's  squares,  but  always  he  found  them  too 
dangerous  to  meddle  with,  and  this  crisis  passed  without  a 
disaster,  yet  there  was  not  during  the  whole  war  a  more 
perilous  hour.  For  Houstoun's  division  was  separated  from 
the  position  by  the  Turones,  and  the  vest  plain  was  covered 
with  commissariat  animals  and  camp-followers,  with  servants, 
led  horses,  baggage,  and  country  people,  mixed  with  broken 
detachments  and  piquets  returning  from  the  woods,  all  in  such 
confused  concourse  that  the  light  division  squares  appeared 
but  as  specks;  and  close  behind  those  surging  masses  were 
five  thousand  horsemen,  trampling,  bounding,  shouting  for  the 
word  to  charge.  Fifteen  guns  were  up  with  the  •  French 
cavalry,  the  eighth  corps  was  in  order  of  battle  behind  them, 
the  woods  on  their  right  were  filled  with  Loison's  skirmishers ; 
and  if  that  general,  pivoting  upon  Fuentes,  had  come  forth 
with  the  sixth  corps  while  Drouet  assailed  the  village,  and  the 
cavalry  had  made  a  general  charge,  the  loose  crowds  of  non- 
combatants  and  broken  troops  would  have  been  violently  dashed 
against  the  first  division,  to  intercept  its  fire  and  break  its 
ranks,  and  the  battle  would  have  been  lost.  No  such  effort 
was  made,  the  plain  was  soon  cleared,  the  British  cavalry 
took  post  behind  the  centre,  and  the  light  division  formed  a 
reserve  on  the  right  of  the  first  division,  having  its  riflemen 
amongst  the  rocks  to  connect  it  with  Houstoun,  who  had 
reached  Frenada  and  been  there  joined  by  Julian  Sanchez. 
At  sight  of  this  new  front,  so  deeply  lined,  the  French  stopped 
short  and  opened  their  guns,  tearing  the  close  masses  of  the 
allies;  but  twelve  English  guns  soon  replied  so  briskly  that 
the  violence  of  the  French  fire  abated,  and  their  cavalry  drew 
back  out  of  range.  A  body  of  infantry  then  attempted  to 
glide  down  the  ravine  of  the  Turones,  but  they  were  repulsed 
by  the  riflemen  and  the  light  companies  of  the  guards,  and 
the  action  on  this  side  resolved  itself  into  a  cannonade. 

Meanwhile  a  fierce  battle  was  going  on  at  Fuentes  Onoro. 
There  Drouet  was  to  have  carried  the  village  when  Mont- 
brun's  cavalry  had  turned  the  right  of  the  line;  he  delayed  his 
attack  for  two  hours  and  thus  marred  the  combination ;  but 


MAY,  1811.]  BOOK  XII.  — CHAP.   5.  153 

finally  he  assailed  with  such  fierceness  and  vigour  that  the  three 
British  regiments,  overmatched  in  numbers  and  unaccustomed 
to  the  desultory  fighting  of  light  troops,  were  pierced  and 
divided.  Two  companies  of  the  seventy-ninth  were  taken, 
colonel  Cameron  of  that  regiment  was  mortally  wounded,  and 
the  lower  part  of  the  village  was  lost :  the  upper  part  was 
however  stiffly  held  and  the  rolling  of  musketry  was  incessant. 
Had  the  attack  been  made  earlier,  and  all  Drouet's  division 
thrown  frankly  into  the  fight,  while  the  sixth  corps  moving 
through  the  wood  closely  turned  the  village,  the  passage 
must  have  been  forced  and  the  left  of  the  new  position  out- 
flanked. But  now  Wellington,  having  all  his  reserves  in 
hand,  detached  considerable  masses  to  the  support  of  the 
regiments  in  Fuentes;  and  as  the  French  continued  also  to 
reinforce  their  troops,  the  whole  of  the  sixth  corps  and  part 
of  Drouet's  division  were  finally  engaged.  At  one  time  the 
fighting  was  on  the  banks  of  the  stream  and  amongst  the 
lower  houses,  at  another  on  the  rugged  heights  and  around  the 
chapel,  and  some  of  the  enemy's  skirmishers  penetrated  com- 
pletely through  towards  the  main  position ;  yet  the  village 
was  never  entirely  abandoned  by  the  defenders,  and  in  one 
charge  the  seventy-first,  seventy -ninth,  and  eighty-eighth  regi- 
ments, led  by  colonel  M'Kinnon,  broke  a  heavy  mass  near  the 
chapel  and  killed  a  great  number  of  French.  This  fighting 
lasted  until  evening,  when  the  lower  part  of  the  town  was 
abandoned  by  both  parties,  the  British  remaining  at  the  chapel 
and  crags,  the  French  retiring  a  cannon  shot  from  the  stream. 
After  the  action  a  brigade  of  the  light  division  relieved  the 
regiments  in  the  village,  a  slight  demonstration  made  by  the 
second  corps,  near  Fort  Conception,  was  checked  by  a  bat- 
talion of  the  Lusitanian  legion,  and  both  armies  remained  in 
observation.  Fifteen  hundred  men  and  officers,  of  which 
three  hundred  were  prisoners,  constituted  the  loss  of  the  allies. 
That  of  the  enemy  was  estimated  at  five  thousand,  upon  the 
erroneous  supposition  that  four  hundred  dead  were  lying 
about  Fuentes  Onoro.  All  armies  make  rash  estimates  on 
such  occasions.  Having  had  charge  to  bury  the  carcases 
immediately  about  the  village,  I  found  only  one  hundred  and 
thirty  bodies,  one-third  being  British. 


154  PENINSULA   WAR.  [MAY,  1811. 

During  the  battle  the  French  convoy  for  the  supply  of 
Almeida  had  remained  at  Gallegos,  and  Wellington  now  sent 
Julian  Sanchez  to  menace  it,  and  disturb  Massena's  communi- 
cation with  Ciudad  Kodrigo ;  this  had  no  effect,  and  a  more 
decisive  battle  being  expected  on  the  6th  the  light  division 
made  breast-works  amongst  the  crags  of  Fuentes ;  the  main 
position  immediately  behind  that  village  was  also  entrenched ; 
yet  Fuentes  Onoro  was,  in  military  phrase,  not  tenable. 
A  wooded  tongue  of  land,  overlooking  at  half-cannon  shot  the 
upper  as  well  as  the  lower  part  of  the  village  both  in  flank 
and  rear,  was  too  distant  to  be  occupied  by  the  allies,  but 
had  N"ey  been  there  he  would  have  crowned  that  ridge,  and 
Fuentes  could  only  have  been  held  by  submitting  to  a  butchery. 

On  the  6th  the  enemy  sent  his  wounded  to  the  rear  and 
made  no  demonstration  of  attack;  the  7th  passed  in  a  like 
inaction  and  the  British  entrenchments  were  perfected.  The 
8th,  Massena  withdrew  his  main  body  to  the  woods  leading 
upon  Espeja  and  Gallegos,  but  still  maintained  posts  at 
Alameda  and  Fuentes.  On  the  10th,  without  being  molested, 
he  retired  across  the  Agueda;  the  sixth  and  eighth  corps 
and  the  cavalry  passed  at  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  the  second  corps  at 
Barba  del  Puerco.  Bessieres  then  carried  off  the  imperial 
guards,  Massena  was  recalled  to  France,  and  Marmont 
assumed  the  command  of  the  army  of  Portugal.  Both  sides 
claimed  the  victory.  The  French,  because  they  won  the 
passage  at  Poco  Velho,  cleared  the  wood,  turned  our  right 
flank,  made  the  cavalry  retire,  and  forced  the  army  to  re- 
linquish three  miles  of  ground  and  change  its  front.  The 
English,  because  the  village  of  Fuentes,  so  often  attacked, 
was  successfully  defended,  and  the  blockade  of  Almeida  was 
maintained.  Massena  at  first  gained  great  advantages,  Napo- 
leon would  have  made  them  fatal.  Yet  with  an  overwhelm- 
ing cavalry,  on  suitable  ground,  the  prince  merely  indicated 
as  it  were  the  English  general's  errors,  and  stopped  short, 
when  he  should  have  sprung  forward.  By  some  this  has  been 
attributed  to  negligence,  by  others  to  disgust  at  being  super- 
seded by  Marmont ;  but  in  truth  discord  had  arisen  to  actual 
^subordination.  The  imperial  guards  would  not  charge  at 
his  order— Junot  did  not  second  him  cordially — Loison  dis- 


MAT,  1811.]  BOOK   XII.  — CHAP.   5.  155 

regarded  his  instructions — Drouet  sought  to  spare  his  own 
divisions  in  the  fight,  and  Reynier  remained  perfectly  inactive: 
the  machinery  of  battle  would  not  work. 

General  Pelet,  Massena's  first  aide-de-camp,  censures  Wel- 
lington for  not  sending  his  cavalry  against  Reynier  after  the 
second  position  was  taken  up :  he  asserts  that  danger  on  that 
side  would  have  forced  the  French  to  retreat.     This  criticism 
is  based  on  the  notion  that  the  allies  had  fifty  thousand  men 
in  the  field,  whereas,  including  Sanchez'  partida,  they  had  not 
thirty-five  thousand.    It  may  be  with  more  justice 
objected  to  Massena,  that  he  did  not  launch  some 
of  his  numerous  horsemen  by  the  Sequiras  or 
Sabugal  bridges,  against  Guarda  and  Celorico,  to  destroy  the 
magazines,  cut  the  communication,  and  capture  the  mules  and 
other  means  of  transport  belonging  to  the  allied  army.     The 
vice  of  the  English  general's  position  would  then  have  been 
clearly  exposed;  for  though  the  second  German  hussars  were 
on  the  march  from  Lisbon,  they  had  not  passed  Coimbra,  and 
could  not  have  protected  the  depots.     War,  however  adorned 
by  splendid  strokes  of  skill,  is  commonly  a  series  of  errors  and 
accidents.     Ney's  opposition  prevented  Massena's  march  upon 
Coria,  which  would  have  secured  Badajos  and  Campo  Mayor, 
and  probably   added   Elvas   to   them.      Latour   Maubourg's 
tardiness   was  like   to   cost    Mortier    a    rear-guard    and    a 
battering-train.     Beresford's  blunder  at  Campo  Mayor,  and 
his   neglect  of  the  line  of  Merida,  enabled  the  French  to 
secure  Badajos.     At  Sabugal,  the  petulance  of  a  staff-officer 
marred  an  admirable  combination,  and  produced  a  dangerous 
combat.     Drouet's  negligence  placed  Almeida  at  the  mercy 
of  the   allies.     A   mistaken   notion   of  Massena's  sufferings 
during   the   retreat   induced   Wellington    to   undertake   two 
operations  at  the  same  time,  which  was  above  his  strength; 
and  this  error  might  have  been  his  ruin,  for  Bessieres,  who 
only  brought  fifteen  hundred  men  and  six  guns 
to  the  battle  of  Fuentes  Onoro,  could  have  brought  Shor- 
ten thousand  men  and  sixteen  guns.     In  that  Despondence 
battle   more  errors   than   skill   were   observable  * 
on  both  sides,  and  the  train  of  accidents  did  not  stop  there 
there  was  still  another  example  of  the  uncertainty  of  war  to 
be  presented. 


156  PENINSULA   WAR.  [MAY,  1811. 

EVACUATION   OF   ALMEIDA. 

General  Brennier,  made  prisoner  at  Vimiero  but  afterwards 
exchanged,  was  governor  of  this  fortress.  During  the  battle 
his  garrison,  of  fifteen  hundred  men,  skirmished  boldly  with 
the  blockading  force,  and  loud  explosions,  supposed  to  be 
signals  of  communication  with  the  relieving  army,  were  fre- 
quent in  the  place.  After  the  battle,  a  French  soldier  named 
Tillet,  with  extraordinary  courage  and  presence  of  mind,  con- 
trived to  penetrate  in  uniform,  for  he  refused  to  be  a  spy, 
through  the  posts  of  blockade,  carrying  an  order  for  Brennier 
to  evacuate  the  fortress  and  rejoin  the  army  by  Barbara  del 
Puerco.  Massena  appeared  to  have  abandoned  the  place  to 
its  fate,  and  Wellington  having  placed  the  light  division  on  its 
old  position  on  the  Azava,  with  cavalry  posts  on  the  lower 
Agueda,  directed  general  Campbell  to  resume  the  investment 
with  the  sixth  division  and  Pack's  brigade,  and  ordered  sir 
W.  Erskine  to  send  the  fourth  regiment  from  Val  de  Mula  to 
Barba  del  Puerco.  Campbell  disposed  his  troops  negligently, 
Erskine  sent  no  order  to  the  fourth  regiment,  and  Brennier, 
despairing  of  succour  from  without,  resolved  like  Julian 
Estrada  at  Hostalrich,  to  break  through  the  blockade,  though 
an  open  country  and  a  double  line  of  posts  aggravated  the 
difficulty.  To  render  the  fortress  useless  for  the  allies,  he 
mined  the  principal  bastions  and  destroyed  the  guns  by  an 
ingenious  expedient  j  for  always  he  fired  several  at  once  with 
heavy  charges,  placing  one  across  the  muzzle  of  another,  thus 
some  shots  flew  towards  the  besiegers  while  others  destroyed 
the  pieces  without  attracting  notice. 

On  the  10th  at  midnight,  he  sprung  his  mines,  broke 
through  the  piquets  in  one  column,  and  steered  between  the 
reserves  with  a  nicety  proving  at  once  his  coolness  and  previous 
observation.  Pack  followed  him  with  a  few  men  hastily  col- 
lected, and  plied  him  with  fire,  but  silently  steadily  swiftly  his 
column  glided  onward  until  the  rough  ground  leading  to  Barba 
del  Puerco  was  gained ;  there  it  halted  for  a  moment,  just  as 
daylight  broke,  and  Pack  sent  an  officer  to  a  village  on  the 
right  to  bring  out  some  dragoons-upon  the  French  flank  which 
occasioned  a  skirmish  and  more  delay.  Campbell's  troops  had 


MAY,  1811  ]  BOOK  XII.  — CHAP.    5.  157 

paid  little  attention  to  the  explosion  of  the  mines,  thinking 
them  a  repetition  of  Brennier's  practice  with  the  guns;  but 
Pack's  musketry  had  aroused  them,  and  the  thirty- sixth  regi- 
ment was  now  close  up.  The  fourth  regiment  also,  having 
heard  the  firing  at  Val  de  Mula,  was  rapidly  closing  on  the 
French  right  flank,  and  Brennier,  having  beat  off  the  dragoons, 
resumed  his  march ;  then  the  Englisl^  infantry  throwing  oft 
their  knapsacks  overtook  his  column  just  as  it  was  descending 
the  chasm  of  Barba  del  Puerco,  killed  many,  and  made  three 
hundred  prisoners.  The  thirty-sixth,  excited  by  the  action, 
very  rashly  passed  the  bridge,  whereupon  Reynier's  corps 
which  was  there,  awaiting  Brennier's  arrival,  drove  it  back  with 
a  loss  of  forty  men  :  had  Erskine  obeyed  his  orders  about  the 
fourth  regiment  Brennier  would  have  been  lost.  Stung  by 
this  event,  and  irritated  by  some  previous  examples  of  undis- 
ciplined valour,  lord  Wellington  issued  this  severe  rebuke, 
as  applicable  to  many  English  writers  as  to  the  persons 
addressed : — '  The  officers  of  the  army  may  depend  upon  it 
that  tJie  enemy  to  whom  they  are  opposed  is  not  less  prudent 
than  powerful.  Notwithstanding  what  has  been  printed  in 
gazettes  and  newspapers,  we  have  never  seen  small  bodies 
unsupported  successfully  opposed  to  large;  nor  has  the  expe- 
rience of  any  officer  realized  tJie  stories  which  all  Jwve  readt 
of  whole  armies  being  driven  by  a  handful  of  light  infantry 
and  dragoon*. 


PENINSULA  WAR  [MAY,  1811 


CHAPTER  VI. 

• 

WHEN  Marmont  had  thus  recovered  the  garrison  of  Almeiha, 
he  withdrew  most  of  his  forces  to  Salamanca.  Wellington 
then  placed  the  first,  fifth,  sixth,  and  light  divisions  and  the 
cavalry  on  the  Azava,  under  Spencer,  and  directed  the  third 
and  seventh  divisions  and  the  second  German  hussars  upon 
Badajos.  On  the  15th,  hearing  that  Soult,  hitherto  reported 
by  Beresford  to  be  entirely  on  the  defensive,  was  advancing  at 
the  head  of  a  powerful  army  into  Estremadura,  he  went  in  all 
haste  to  that  province,  but  ere  he  could  arrive  a  great  battle 
had  been  fought  with  extraordinary  fury. 

While  awaiting  the  adhesion  of  the  Spanish  generals,  Beres- 
ford had  fixed  his  head-quarters  at  Almendralejos,  but  Latour 
Maubourg  remained  at  Guadalcanal,  and  his  parties  foraged 
the  most  fertile  tracts  between  the  armies.  To  check  them, 
Penne  Villamur  was  reinforced  with  five  squadrons,  and  colonel 
Colborne  was  detached  with  a  brigade  of  the  second  division, 
two  Spanish  guns,  and  two  squadrons  of  cavalry,  to  curb  their 
inroads  and  give  confidence  to  the  people.  Colborne,  having 
a  fine  talent  for  war,  by  rapid  marches  and  sudden  changes,  in 
concert  with  Villamur,  confused  the  enemy's  parties,  inter- 
cepted several  convoys,  and  forced  the  French  to  quit  Fuente 
Ovejuna,  La  Granja,  Azuaga,  and  many  other  frontier  towns ; 
and  he  imposed  upon  Latour  Maubourg  with  so  much  address, 
that  the  latter  imagining  a  great  force  was  at  hand,  fell  back 
to  Constantino.  Having  cleared  the  country  on  that  side,  he 
made  a  singularly  bold  attempt  to  surprise  the  fortified  post  of 
Benelcazar.  For  riding  on  to  the  drawbridge,  with  a  few 
officers,  in  the  grey  of  the  morning,  he  summoned  the  com- 
mandant to  surrender  as  a  means  of  saving  himself  from  the 
Spanish  army,  which  was  close  at  hand  and  would  give  no 
quarter;  the  French  officer  was  amazed  at  the  appearance  of 


MAY,  1811.1  BOOK   XII  — CHAP.   6.  159 

the  party,  but  too  resolute  to  yield,  and  Colborne,  perceiving 
the  attempt  had  failed,  galloped  off  under  a  few  straggling 
shot,  and  then  taking  to  the  mountains,  rejoined  the  army 
without  any  loss. 

During  his  absence  the.  Spanish  generals  had  acceded  to 
Wellington'  proposition,  the  Guadiana  had  subsided,  the 
bridge  at  Jerumenha  was  restored,  and  on  the  5th  of  May 
William  Stewart  having  two  squadrons  of  horse,  six  field- 
pieces  and  three  brigades  of  infantry  had  invested  Badajos  on 
the  left  of  the  Guadiana;  on  the  7th  the  remainder  of  the 
infantry,  reinforced  by  two  thousand  Spaniards  under  Carlos 
d'Espana,  encamped  in  the  woods  near  the  fortress,  Madden's 
Portuguese  horse  were  in  observation  near  Merida,  and  a  troop 
of  horse-artillery,  coming  from  Lisbon,  was  attached  to  the 
English  cavalry  which  remained  near  Los  Santos  and  Zafra. 
The  flying  bridge,  moved  from  Jerumenha,  was  re-established 
near  the  mouth  of  the  Caya,  yet  was  soon  drawn  back,  because 
the  right  bank  of  the  Guadiana  being  still  open  some  French 
horse  had  come  down  the  river.  On  the  8th  however,  general 
Lumley  invested  Christoval  with  a  brigade  of  the  second  divi- 
sion, four  light  Spanish  guns,  the  seventeenth  Portuguese 
infantry,  and  two  squadrons  of  horse  drafted  from  the  garrison 
of  Elvas.  These  troops  did  not  arrive  simultaneously  at  the 
point  of  assembly,  which  delayed  the  operation,  and  sixty 
French  dragoons  moving  under  the  fire  of  the  place  maintained 
a  sharp  skirmish  beyond  the  walls.  This  was  the  first  serious 
siege  undertaken  by  the  British  in  the  Peninsula,  and,  to  the 
discredit  of  the  English  government,  no  army  was  ever  worse 
provided  for  such  an  enterprise.  The  engineer  officers  were 
zealous ;  and  notwithstanding  some  defects  in  the  constitution 
and  customs  of  their  corps,  tending  rather  to  make  regimental 
than  practical  scientific  officers,  many  of  them  were  well  versed 
in  the  theory  of  their  business :  yet  the  ablest  trembled  at 
their  destitution  in  all  things  necessary  to  real  service.  With- 
out a  corps  of  sappers  and  miners,  without  a  private  soldier 
who  knew  how  to  carry  on  an  approach  under  fire,  they  were 
compelled  to  attack  fortresses  defended  by  the  most  warlike, 
practised,  and  scientific  troops  of  the  age ;  and  the  best  officers 
and  the  finest  soldiers  sacrificed  themselves  in  a  lamentable 


160  PENINSULA   WAR.  [MAY,  1811. 

manner,  to  compensate  for  the  negligence  and  incapacity  of  a 
government,  always  ready  to  plunge  the  nation  into  war  with- 
out the  slightest  care  of  what  was  necessary  to  obtain  success. 
The  sieges  carried  on  by  the  British  in  Spain  were  a  succes- 
sion of  butcheries,  because  the  commonest  materials  and  means 
necessary  for  their  art  were  denied  to  the  engineers. 


FIRST   ENGLISH   SIEGE    OF   BADAJOS. 

The  chief  engineer,  colonel  Fletcher,  proposed  to  breach  the 
castle,  while  batteries  established  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Guadiana  took  the  defence  in  reverse.  False  attacks  against 
the  Pardaleras  and  Picurina  were  to  be  made  by  re-opening 
Soult's  trenches ;  yet  it  was  necessary  to  reduce  San  Christoval 
before  the  batteries  to  take  the  castle  in  reverse  could  be 
constructed,  and  captain  Squire  was  directed  to  break  ground 
there  on  the  night  of  the  8th.  The  moon  shone  bright,  he 
was  ill  provided  with  tools,  and  exposed  to  a  destructive 

musketry  from  the  fort,  and  to  shot  and  shell 
Appendix  5,  from  ^]ie  town ;  nevertheless  he  worked  with  great 

loss  until  the  10th,  when  the  French  made  a  furi- 
ous sally  and  carried  the  battery.  They  were  immediately 
driven  back  by  the  reserves,  but  the  allies  pursued  too  far,  and 
being  taken  in  flank  and  front  with  grape  lost  four  hundred 
men.  At  this  time  five  engineers  had  fallen  and  seven  hun- 
dred officers  and  soldiers  of  the  line  had  been  inscribed  upon 
the  bloody  list  of  victims  offered  to  this  Moloch,  and  only  one 
small  battery  against  an  outwork  was  completed !  On  the 
llth  it  opened,  and  before  sunset  the  fire  of  the  enemy  had 
disabled  four  of  its  five  guns,  and  killed  many  more  of  the 
besiegers:  nor  could  any  other  result  be  expected,  because 
the  concert  essential  to  success  in  double  operations,  whether 
in  sieges  or  the  field,  was  totally  neglected  by  Beresford. 
Squire's  single  work  was  exposed  to  the  undivided  fire  of  the 
fortress  before  the  approaches  against  the  castle  were  even 
commenced ;  and  two  distant  batteries,  which  had  been  con- 
structed at  the  false  attacks,  scarcely  attracted  the  notice  of 
the  enemy.  To  check  future  sallies,  a  second  battery  wus 
erected  against  the  bridge-head,  but  this  was  also  overmatched; 


MAY,  1811.]  BOOK   XII.— CHAP.  6.  161 

and  then  Beresford,  having  received  intelligence  that  the 
French  army  was  in  movement,  arrested  the  progress  of  all 
the  works.  On  the  12th,  believing  this  information  prema- 
ture, he  directed  the  trenches  to  be  opened  against  the  castle; 
yet  the  intelligence  was  true,  and  being  confirmed  at  twelve 
o'clock  in  the  night,  the  working  parties  were  again  drawn  off 
and  measures  taken  to  raise  the  siege. 

SOULT'S  SECOND  EXPEDITION  TO  ESTREMADUKA. 

This  marshal  had  resolved  to  succour  Badajos  the  moment 
he  heard  of  Beresford's  appearance  at  Campo  Mayor,  and  he 
rejoiced  that  the  latter's  tardiness  gave  Phillipon  time  to 
organize  a  good  defence,  and  himself  a  respite  to  tranquillize 
Andalusia,  and  arrange  measures  for  resisting  the  allies  in  the 
Isla  during  his  absence.  With  that  object  he  had  imme- 
diately commenced  several  additional  fortifications  in  the  city  of 
Seville,  and  at  the  same  time  renewed  the  construction  of  those 
which  had  been  suspended  in  other  places  by  the  battle  of 
Barosa :  he  thus  deceived  Beresford,  who  believed  that  he  was 
trembling  for  his  own  province.  Nothing  could  be  more 
fallacious.  There  were  seventy  thousand  fighting  men  in 
Andalusia ;  and  Drouet,  who  had  quitted  Massena  immediately 
after  the  battle  of  Fuentes  Onoro,  was  likewise  in  march  for 
that  province  by  the  way  of  Avila  and  Toledo,  bringing  with 
him  eleven  thousand  men. 

On  the  10th  of  May  Soult  quitted  Seville  with  three  thou- 
sand heavy  dragoons,  thirty  guns,  and  two  strong  brigades  of . 
infantry  under  the  command  of  Werle  and  Godinot.  This 
force,  drawn  from  the  first  and  fourth  corps  and  Dessolles* 
reserve,  entered  Olalla  the  llth,  and  was  there  joined  by 
Maransin.  Godinot  then  marched  by  Constantino  to  rein- 
force the  fifth  corps,  which  was  falling  back  from  Guadalcanal 
in  consequence  of  Colborne's  operations.  The  13th  a  junction 
was  effected  with  Latour  Maubourg,  who  assumed  the  com- 
mand of  the  heavy  cavalry,  resigning  the  fifth  corps  to  Girard, 
who  immediately  advanced  to  Los  Santos.  The  14th  Soult 
reached  Yilla  Franca,  and  being  then  within  thirty  miles  of 
Badajos,  caused  his  heaviest  guns  to  fire  salvos  during  the 

VOL.   III.  M 


162  PENINSULA    WAR.  [MAY,  1811. 

night,  to  give  notice  of  his  approach  to  the  garrison.  This 
expedient  failed,  and  the  15th,  in  the  evening,  the  French 
army  was  concentrated  at  Santa  Marta. 

Beresford,  as  we  have  seen,  perplexed  by  bad  intelligence, 
did  not  raise  the  siege  until  the  night  of  the  12th,  and  then 
contrary  to  the  earnest  representations  of  the  engineers,  who 
promised  to  win  the  place  in  three  days.  This  promise  was* 
nought,  and  if  it  had  been  good  Soult  would  yet  have  surprised 
him  in  his  trenches :  his  firmness  therefore  saved  the  army, 
and  his  arrangements  for  carrying  off  the  stores  were  admir- 
ably executed.  The  artillery  and  platforms  were  removed  in 
the  night  of  the  13th,  and  at  twelve  o'clock  on  the  15th,  all 
the  guns  and  stores  on  the  left  bank  were  over  the  Guadiana, 
the  gabions  and  fascines  burned,  and  the  flying  bridge  removed. 
These  transactions  were  well  masked  by  the  fourth  division, 
which  in  concert  with  the  Spaniards  maintained  the  invest- 
ment ;  it  was  only  by  a  sally  on  the  rear-guard,  in  which  the 
Portuguese  piquets  were  roughly  treated,  that  the  governor 
knew  the  siege  was  raised,  and  of  the  cause  he  was  still 
ignorant. 

In  a  conference  with  the  Spanish  generals,  held  the  1 3th  at 
Valverde,  it  was  agreed  to  receive  battle  at  Albuera.  Balles- 
teros'  and  Blake's  corps  being  then  united  at  Baracotta,  were 
falling  back  upon  Almendral,  and  Blake  engaged  to  have  them 
at  Albuera  before  twelve  o'clock  on  the  15th.  Badajos  was 
the  centre  of  an  arc,  sweeping  through  Valverde,  Albuera,  and 
Talavera  Keal,  and  Blake  undertook  to  watch  the  roads  on  the 
right,  while  Beresford  and  Mendizabel  watched  those  in  the 
centre,  and  Madden  those  on  the  left.  The  British  being 
chiefly  in  the  woods  near  Valverde  could  reach  Albuera  by  a 
half  march,  and  no  part  of  the  arc  was  more  than  four  leagues 
from  Badajos.  Soult  on  the  14th  was  at  Los  Santos  eight 
leagues  distant,  and  Beresford,  thinking  he  could  not  be  fore- 
stalled on  any  point,  kept  the  fourth  division  in  the  trenches. 
On  the  14th  Colborne  came  in,  Madden  retired  to  Talavera 
Eeal,  Blake  reached  Almendral,  and  the  Anglo- Portuguese 
cavalry  under  general  Long  fell  back  to  Santa  Marta,  where  they 
were  joined  by  Blake's  dragoons. 

In  the  morning  of  the  15th  the  Anglo- Portuguese  army 


Vol.  3 .  Plate.  6 . 


3/Loruisterio 


BATTUE  OF  ATLBTCTEBA 
16th May,  18R. 


MAY,  1811.]  BOOK  XII.  — CHAP.  6.  163 

occupied  the  left  of  the  Albuera  position,  a  ridge  about  tour 
miles  long,  having  the  Aroya  Val  de  Sevilla  in  rear,  and  the 
Albuera  river  in  front.  The  right  was  prolonged  towards 
Almendral,  the  left  towards  Badajos,  the  ascent  from  the  river 
was  easy,  and  the  ground  practicable  for  cavalry  and  artillery. 
In  advance  of  the  centre  were  the  bridge  and  village  of 
Albuera,  the  former  commanded  by  a  battery,  the  latter 
occupied  by  Alton's  German  brigade.  Behind  the  Germans, 
the  second  division  under  William  Stewart  formed  one  line, 
the  right  on  a  commanding  hill  over  which  the  Valverde  road 
passed,  the  left  on  the  road  of  Badajos,  beyond  which  the 
order  of  battle  was  continued,  in  two  lines,  by  the  Portuguese 
troops  under  Hamilton  and  Collins.  The  right  of  the  posi- 
tion, stronger,  higher,  and  broader  than  any  other  part,  was 
left  for  Blake's  army ;  because  Beresford,  thinking  the  hill  on 
the  Valverde  road  to  be  the  key  of  the  position,  as  protecting 
his  only  line  of  retreat,  was  desirous  to  secure  it  with  the 
best  troops.  The  fourth  division  and  the  infantry  of  the 
fifth  Spanish  army  were  still  before  Badajos ;  but  Cole  had 
orders  to  send  the  seventeenth  Portuguese  regiment  to  Elvas, 
to  throw  a  Spanish  battalion  into  Olivenza,  to  bring  his 
second  brigade,  which  was  before  Christoval,  over  the 
Guadiana,  by  a  ford  above  Badajos,  if  practicable,  and  to  be  in 
readiness  himself  to  march  at  the  first  notice. 

In  this  posture  of  affairs,  about  three  o'clock  in  the  evening 
of  the  15tb,  Beresford  being  at  some  distance  on  the  left,  the 
whole  mass  of  the  allied  cavalry,  closely  followed  by  the 
French  light  horsemen,  came  in  from  Santa  Marta,  and 
finding  no  infantry  beyond  the  Albuera  in  support  passed 
that  river.  Thus  the  wooded  heights  on  the  right  bank  were 
abandoned  to  the  enemy,  whose  force  and  dispositions  were 
thereby  effectually  concealed,  and  the  strength  of  the  allies' 
position  was  already  sapped.  Beresford  immediately  formed 
a  temporary  right  wing  with  the  cavalry  and  artillery, 
stretched  his  piquets  along  the  road  to  Almendral,  and  sent 
officers  to  hasten  Blake's  movements;  but  that  general,  who 
had  only  a  few  miles  of  good  road  to  march  and  had  pro- 
mised to  be  in  line  at  noon,  did  not  reach  the  ground  before 
eleven  at  night,  and  his  rear  did  not  arrive  before  three  in 


164  PENINSULA  WAR.  [MAY,  1811. 

the  morning  of  the  16th.  Meanwhile,  as  the  French  army 
was  now  evidently  in  front,  Cole  and  Madden  were  called  up; 
the  order  failed  to  reach  the  latter,  but  Cole  brought  the 
infantry  of  the  fifth  army,  two  squadrons  of  Portuguese 
cavalry,  and  two  brigades  of  the  fourth  division,  into  line 
between  eight  and  nine  o'clock;  his  third  brigade,  unable 
to  pass  the  Guadiana  above  Badajos,  was  in  march  by  Jeru- 
menha.  The  Spanish  troops  joined  Blake  on  the  right,  the 
two  brigades  of  the  fourth  division  were  drawn  up  in  columns 
behind  the  second  division,  and  the  Portuguese  squadrons 
were  sent  to  reinforce  Otway,  whose  horsemen,  of  the  same 
nation,  were  pushed  forwards  in  front  of  the  left  wing.  The 
principal  mass  of  the  allied  cavalry  was  concentrated  behind 
the  centre,  and  Beresford,  dissatisfied  with  general  Long,  gave 
the  command  to  general  Lumley. 

Thirty  thousand  infantry,  more  than  two  thousand  cavalry, 
and  thirty-eight  pieces  of  artillery,  eighteen  being  nine- 
pounders,  were  in  line,  but  the  British  infantry,  the  pith  of 
battle,  did  not  exceed  seven  thousand,  and  already  Blake's 
arrogance  was  shaking  Beresford's  authority.  Soult  had  forty 
guns,  four  thousand  veteran  cavalry,  and  nineteen  thousand 
chosen  infantry,  all  of  one  discipline,  animated  by  one  spirit 
and  amply  compensated  for  their  inferiority  in  number  by 
their  fine  organization  and  their  leader's  capacity,  which  was 
immeasurably  greater  than  his  adversary's.  He  had  examined 
the  position  without  hindrance  on  the  evening  of  the  15th, 
and  hearing  that  the  fourth  division  was  left  at  Badajos,  and 
Blake  would  not  arrive  before  the  17th,  resolved  to  attack 
next  morning,  for  he  had  detected  the  weakness  of  Beresford's 
dispositions.  The  hill  in  the  centre,  commanding  the  Valverde 
road,  was  undoubtedly  the  key  of  the  position  if  an  attack 
was  made  parallel  to  the  front ;  but  Soult  saw  that  on  the 
right,  a  high  rough  broken  table- land  trended  back  towards 
the  Valverde  road  and  looked  into  the  rear  of  Beresford's  line. 
Hence,  if  he  could  suddenly  place  his  masses  there,  he  might 
roll  up  the  allies  on  their  centre  and  push  them  into  the 
valley  behind ;  the  Valverde  road  could  then  be  seized,  the 
retreat  cut,  and  the  strong  French  cavalry  would  complete  the 
victory. 


MAY,  1811.]  BOOK   XII.  — CHAP.    6.  165 

Beresford's  right  and  Soult's  left  approximated,  being  only 
divided  by  a  hill,  about  cannon-shot  distance  from  either, 
which  was  separated  from  the  allies  by  the  Albuera  and  from 
the  French  by  a  rivulet  called  the  Feria.  This  height, 
neglected  by  Beresford,  was  ably  made  use  of  by  Soult. 
During  the  night  he  placed  behind  it  the  greatest  part  of  the 
artillery  under  general  Ruty,  the  fifth  corps  under  Girard,  the 
heavy  cavalry  under  Latour  Maubourg,  thus  concentrating 
fifteen  thousand  men  and  thirty  guns  within  ten  minutes' 
march  of  Beresford's  right  wing:  yet  that  general  could 
neither  see  a  man,  nor  draw  a  sound  conclusion  as  to  the  real 
plan  of  attack.  The  light  cavalry,  the  brigades  of  Godinot 
and  Werle  with  ten  guns  remained.  They  were  placed  in  the 
woods  near  the  confluence  of  the  Feria  with  the  Albuera. 
Werle*  was  in  reserve,  Godinot  was  to  attack  the  bridge  and 
village,  to  bear  against  the  centre,  attract  Beresford's  attention, 
separate  his  wings,  and  double  up  his  right  when  the  principal 
attack  should  be  developed. 

BATTLE   OP   ALBUERA. 

During  the  night  and  morning,  sixteen  thousand  additional 
men  had  come  into  line  under  Blake  and  Cole,  but  so  defective 
were  Beresford's  dispositions  that  Soult  adhered  to  his  first 
plan,  and  at  nine  o'clock  just  before  Cole  arrived,  Godinot 
emerged  from  the  wood  in  one  heavy  column  preceded  by  ten 
guns.  Being  flanked  by  the  light  cavalry,  and  followed  by 
Werle,  he  made  for  the  bridge  and  with  a  sharp  cannonade, 
and  musketry  endeavoured  to  force  the  passage.  At  the  same 
time  general  Briche  led  two  hussar  regiments  further  down  the 
river  to  observe  Otway's  horsemen,  and  the  French  lancers 
passed  the  river  above  bridge.  The  third  dragoon  guards 
drove  the  lancers  back  to  their  own  side,  and  Dickson's  Portu- 
guese guns,  opening  from  a  rising  ground  above  the  village, 
ploughed  Godinot's  column,  which  crowded  to  the  bridge 
though  the  river  was  fordable  above  and  below.  Beresford 
observing  Werl6  did  not  follow  closely,  judged  the  chief  effort 
would  be  on  the  right,  and  therefore  ordered  Blake  to  form 
part  of  his  first  and  all  his  second  line  on  the  broad  part  of  the 


166  PENINSULA   WAR.  [MAY,  1811. 

hilts  at  right  angles  to  their  actual  front.  Then  drawing  the 
Portuguese  infantry  of  the  left  wing  to  the  centre,  he  sent  one 
brigade  to  support  Alten  at  the  bridge,  and  directed  Hamilton 
to  hold  the  remainder  in  columns  of  battalions  as  a  general 
reserve.  The  thirteenth  dragoons  he  posted  near  the  river, 
above  bridge,  and  sent  the  second  division  to  support  Blake. 
The  horse  artillery,  the  cavalry  under  Lumley,  and  the  fourth 
division  also  took  ground  to  the  right,  and  were  posted,  the 
horsemen  and  guns  on  a  small  plain  behind  the  Aroya,  the 
fourth  division  in  an  oblique  line  half  musket  shot  behind 
them.  This  done,  Beresford  galloped  to  Blake,  for  that 
general  had  refused  to  change  his  front,  and  with  great  heat 
told  colonel  Hardinge,  the  bearer  of  the  order,  the  real  attack 
was  at  the  village  and  bridge,  A  second  time  he  was  entreated 
to  obey,  yet  remained  obstinate  until  Beresford  arrived  in 
person,  and  then  only  assented  because  the  enemy's  columns 
were  actively  menacing  his  flank :  yielding  to  this  evidence 
he  changed  his  front,  yet  with  such  pedantic  slowness,  that 
Beresford  impatient  of  his  folly  took  the  direction  in  person. 

Great  was  the  confusion  and  the  delay  thus  occasioned,  and 
ere  the  troops  were  completely  formed  the  French  were 
amongst  them.  For  scarcely  had  Godinot  engaged  Alten's 
brigade,  when  Werle",  leaving  only  a  battalion  of  grenadiers  to 
support  the  former,  and  some  squadrons  to  watch  the  thirteenth 
dragoons  and  connect  the  attacks,  countermarched  with  the 
remainder  of  his  division,  and  rapidly  gained  the  rear  of  the 
fifth  corps  as  it  was  mounting  the  hills  on  the  right  of  the 
allies.  The  great  mass  of  light  cavalry  also  quitted  Godinot's 
column,  crossed  the  river  Albuera  above  the  bridge,  ascended 
the  left  bank  at  a  gallop,  and  sweeping  round  the  rear  of  the 
fifth  corps  joined  Latour  Maubourg's  dragoons,  who  was 
already  facing  Lumley's  squadrons.  Thus  half  an  hour  had 
sufficed  to  render  Beresford's  position  nearly  desperate,  Two- 
thirds  of  the  French  were  in  compact  order  of  battle  perpen- 
dicular to  his  right,  and  his  army,  composed  of  different 
nations,  was  making  a  disorderly  change  of  front.  Vainly  he 
tried  to  get  the  Spanish  line  advanced  to  make  room  for  the 
second  division  to  support  it,  the  French  guns  opened,  their 
infantry  threw  out  a  heavy  musketry  fire,  and  their  cavalry, 


MAY,  1811.]  BOOK  XII. —CHAP.  6.  167 

outflanking  the  front  and  menacing  different  points,  put  the 
Spaniards  in  disorder :  they  fell  fast  and  went  back. 

Soult  thought  the  whole  army  was  yielding,  he  pushed 
forward  his  columns,  his  reserves  mounted  the  hill  behind  him, 
and  general  Euty  placed  all  the  French  batteries  in  position; 
but  then  William  Stewart  reached  the  foot  of  the  height  with 
a  brigade  of  the  second  division  under  Colborne,  who,  seeing 
the  confusion  above,  desired  to  form  in  order  of  battle  previous 
to  mounting;  but  Stewart,  whose  boiling  courage  generally 
overlaid  his  judgment,  led  up  in  column  of  companies,  passed 
the  Spanish  right,  and  attempted  to  open  a  line  by  succession 
of  battalions  as  they  arrived.  The  enemy's  fire  was  found 
too  destructive  to  be  borne  passively,  and  the  foremost  troops 
charged;  but  then  heavy  rain  obscured  the  view,  four  regi- 
ments of  French  hussars  and  lancers  galloped  in  from  the  right 
at  the  moment  of  advancing,  and  two-thirds  of  the  brigade 
went  down:  the  31st  regiment  only,  being  on  the  left,  formed 
square  and  resisted,  while  the  French  horsemen,  riding  furi- 
ously about,  trampled  the  others  and  captured  six  guns.  The 
tumult  was  great,  a  lancer  fell  upon  Beresford,  who,  being  a 
man  of  great  strength,  put  aside  the  lance  and  cast  him  from 
his  saddle ;  and  then  a  shift  of  wind  blowing  aside  the  smoke 
and  mist,  Lumley  perceived  the  mischief  from  the  plain  below, 
and  sending  four  squadrons  up  against  the  straggling  lancers 
cut  many  of  them  off :  Penne  Villemur's  Spanish 
cavalry  was  also  directed  to  charge  the  French  Appendix  4, 
horsemen  in  the  plain,  and  they  galloped  forwards 
until  within  a  few  yards  of  their  foes  but  then  shamefully, 
fled. 

During  this  first  unhappy  effort  of  the  second  division,  so 
great  was  the  disorder,  that  the  Spaniards  in  one  part  fired 
without  cessation,  though  the  British  troops  were  before  them ; 
in  another  part,  flying  before  the  lancers,  they  would  have 
broken  through  the  twenty-ninth,  then  advancing  to  succour 
Colborne,  but  with  a  stern  resolution  that  regiment  smote 
friends  and  foes  without  distinction  in  their  onward  progress. 
Meanwhile  Beresford,  finding  the  main  body  of  the  Spaniards 
would  not  advance,  seized  an  ensign  by  the  breast  and  bore 
him  and  his  colours  by  main  force  to  the  front,  yet  the  troops 


168  PENINSULA   WAR.  [MAY,  1811. 

did  not  follow,  and  the  coward  ran  back  when  released  from 
the  marshal's  iron  grasp.  In  this  crisis  the  weather  which 
had  ruined  Colborne's  brigade  saved  the  day.  Soult  could 
not  see  the  whole  field  of  battle,  and  kept  his  heavy  columns 
inactive  when  the  decisive  blow  might  have  been  struck.  His 
cavalry  indeed  began  to  hem  in  that  of  the  allies,  yet  the  fire 
of  the  horse-artillery  enabled  Lumley,  covered  as  he  was  by 
the  bed  of  the  Aroya  and  supported  by  the  fourth  division,  to 
check  them  on  the  plain ;  Colborne  'still  remained  on  the 
height  with  the  thirty-first  regiment,  the  British  artillery, 
under  Julius  Hartman,  was  coming  fast  into  action,  and 
William  Stewart,  who  had  escaped  the  charge  of  the  lancers, 
was  again  mounting  the  hill  with  Houghton's  brigade,  which 
he  brought  on  with  equal  vehemence,  but  in  a  juster  order  of 
battle.  The  day  then  cleared  and  a  dreadful  fire  poured  into 
the  thickest  of  the  French  columns  convinced  Soult  that  the 
fight  was  yet  to  be  won. 

Houghton's  regiments  reached  the  height  under  a  heavy 
cannonade,  and  the  -twenty-ninth,  after  breaking  through  the 
fugitive  Spaniards,  was  charged  in  flank  by  the  French  lancers  : 
yet  two  companies,  wheeling  to  the  right,  foiled  this  attack 
with  a  sharp  fire,  and  then  the  third  brigade  of  the  second 
division  came  up  on  the  left,  and  the  Spanish  troops  under 
Zayas  and  Ballesteros  at  last  moved  forward.  Hartman's 
artillery  was  now  in  full  play,  and  the  enemy's  infantry 
recoiled,  but  soon  recovering,  renewed  the  fight  with  greater 
violence  than  before.  The  cannon  on  both  sides  discharged 
showers  of  grape  at  half  range,  the  peals  of  musketry  were 
incessant,  often  within  pistol-shot,  yet  the  close  formation  of 
the  French  embarrassed  their  battle,  and  the  British  line 
would  not  yield  them  an  inch  of  ground  or  a  moment  of  time 
to  open  their  ranks.  Their  fighting  was  however  fierce  and 
dangerous.  Stewart  was  twice  wounded,  colonel  Duckworth 
was  slain,  and  the  intrepid  Houghton,  having  received  many 
wounds  without  shrinking,  fell  and  died  in  the  very  act  of 
cheering  on  his  men.  Still  the  struggle  continued  with  un- 
abated fury.  Colonel  Inglis,  twenty-two  officers,  and  more 
than  four  hundred  men,  out  of  five  hundred  and  seventy  who 
had  mounted  the  hill,  fell  in  the  fifty-seventh  alone ;  the  other 


MAY,  1811.]  BOOK   XII.  — CHAP.    6*.  169 

regiments  were  scarcely  better  off,  not  one-third  were  stand- 
ing in  any:  ammunition  failed,  and  as  the  English  fire 
slackened  a  French  column  was  established  in  advance  upon 
the  right  flank.  The  play  of  the  guns  checked  them  a 
moment,  but  in  this  dreadful  crisis  Beresford  wavered! 
Destruction  stared  him  in  the  face,  his  personal  resources 
were  exhausted,  and  the  unhappy  thought  of  a  retreat  rose 
in  his  agitated  mind.  He  had  before  brought  Hamilton's 
Portuguese  into  a  situation  to  cover  a  retrograde  movement ; 
he  now  sent  Alten  orders  to  abandon  the  bridge  and  village  of 
Albuera,  and  to  take,  with  his  Germans  and  the  Portuguese 
artillery,  a  position  to  cover  a  retreat  by  the  Valverde  road. 
But  while  the  commander  was  thus  preparing  to  resign  the 
contest,  colonel  Hardinge  had  urged  Cole  to  advance  with  the 
fourth  division;  and  then  riding  to  the  third  brigade  of  the 
second  division,  which,  under  the  command  of  colonel  Aber- 
croinbie,  had  hitherto  been  only  slightly  engaged,  directed 
him  also  to  push  forward  into  the  fight.  The  die  was  thus 
cast,  Beresford  acquiesced,  Alten  received  orders  to  retake  the 
village,  and  this  terrible  battle  was  continued. 

The  fourth  division  was  composed  of  two  brigades :  one 
of  Portuguese  under  general  Harvey ;  the  other,  under  sir 
William  Myers,  consisting  of  the  seventh  and  twenty-third 
regiments  was  called  the  fuzileer  brigade :  Harvey's  Portu- 
guese were  immediately  pushed  in  between  Lumley's  dragoons 
and  the  hill,  where  they  were  charged  by  some  French  cavalry, 
whom  they  beat  off,  and  meantime  Cole  led  his  fuzileers  up 
the  contested  height.  At  this  time  six  guns  were  in  the 
enemy's  possession,  the  whole  of  Werl6's  reserves  were  coming 
forward  to  reinforce  the  front  column  of  the  French,  the 
remnant  of  Houghton's  brigade  could  no  longer  maintain  its 
ground,  the  field  was  heaped  with  carcasses,  the  lancers  were 
riding  furiously  about  the  captured  artillery  on  the  upper 
parts  of  the  hill,  and  behind  all,  Hamilton's  Portuguese  and 
Alten's  Germans,  now  withdrawing  from  the  bridge,  seemed 
to  be  in  full  retreat.  Soon  however  Cole's  fuzileers,  flanked 
by  a  battalion  of  the  Lusitanian  legion  under  colonel  Hawk- 
shawe,  mounted  the  hill,  drove  off  the  lancers,  recovered  five 
of  the  captured  guns  and  one  colour,  and  appeared  on  the 


170  PENINSULA  WAR.  [JUNE,  1811. 

right  of  Houghton's  brigade,  precisely  as  Abercronibie  passed 
it  on  the  left. 

Such  a  gallant  line,  issuing  from  the  midst  of  the  smoke 
and  rapidly  separating  itself  from  the  confused  and  broken 
multitude,  startled  the  enemy's  masses,  which  were  increasing 
and  pressing  onwards  as  to  an  assured  victory ;  they  wavered, 
hesitated,  and  then  vomiting  forth  a  storm  of  fire,  hastily 
endeavoured  to  enlarge  their  front,  while  a  fearful  discharge  of 
grape  from  all  their  artillery  whistled  through  the  British 
ranks.  Myers  was  killed,  Cole  and  the  three  colonels,  Ellis 
Blakeney  and  Hawkshawe,  fell  wounded,  and  the  fuzileer 
battalions,  struck  by  the  iron  tempest,  reeled  and  staggered 
like  sinking  ships ;  but  suddenly  and  sternly  recovering  they 
closed  on  their  terrible  enemies,  and  then  was  seen  with  what 
a  strength  and  majesty  the  British  soldier  fights.  In  vain  did 
Soult  with  voice  and  gesture  animate  his  Frenchmen,  in  vain 
did  the  hardiest  veterans  break  from  the  crowded  columns  and 
sacrifice  their  lives  to  gain  time  for  the  mass  to  open  out  on 
such  a  fair  field;  in  vain  did  the  mass  itself  bear  up,  and, 
fiercely  striving,  fire  indiscriminately  upon  friends  and  foes, 
while  the  horsemen  hovering  on  the  flank  threatened  to 
charge  the  advancing  line.  Nothing  could  stop  that  astonish- 
ing infantry.  No  sudden  burst  of  undisciplined  valour,  no 
nervous  enthusiasm  weakened  the  stability  of  their  order, 
their  flashing  eyes  were  bent  on  the  dark  columns  in  their 
front,  their  measured  tread  shook  the  ground,  their  dreadful 
volleys  swept  away  the  head  of  every  formation,  their  deafen- 
ing shouts  overpowered  the  dissonant  cries  that  broke  from  all 
parts  of  the  tumultuous  crowd,  as  slowly  and  with  a  horrid 
carnage  it  was  pushed  by  the  incessant  vigour  of  the  attack  to 
the  farthest  edge  of  the  hill.  In  vain  did  the  French  reserves 
mix  with  the  struggling  multitude  to  sustain  the  fight,  their 
efforts  only  increased  the  irremediable  confusion,  and  the 
mighty  mass,  breaking  off  like  a  loosened  cliff,  went  headlong 
down  the  steep :  the  rain  flowed  after  in  streams  discoloured 
with  blood,  and  eighteen  hundred  unwounded  men,  the 
remnant  of  six  thousand  unconquerable  British  soldiers,  stood 
triumphant  on  the  fatal  hill  1 


MAY,  1811 J  BOOK   XII.— CHAP.   7.  171 


CHAPTER  VII. 


WHILE  the  fiizileers  were  striving  on  the  height,  the  cavalry 
and  Harvey's  brigade  continually  advanced,  and  Latour  Mau- 
bourg's  dragoons,  being  also  battered  by  Lefebre's  guns, 
retired  before  them;  yet  still  they  threatened  the  fuzileers 
with  their  right,  and  with  their  left  prevented  Lumley's  horse- 
men from  falling  on  the  defeated  infantry.  Alten's  Germans 
had  now  retaken  the  village  with  some  loss,  and  Blake's  first 
line,  which  had  not  been  engaged,  was  directed  to  support 
them;  Hamilton's  and  Collins's  Portuguese,  forming  a  mass 
of  ten  thousand  fresh  men,  were  brought  up  to  support  the 
fuzileers  and  Abercrombie's  brigade,  and  at  the  same  time 
Zayas,  Ballesteros,  and  Espaiia  advanced.  Nevertheless,  so 
rapid  was  the  execution  of  the  fuzileers  that  the  enemy's 
infantry  were  never  attained  by  these  reserves,  which  yet 
suffered  severely ;  for  Ruty  got  the  French  guns  altogether, 
and  worked  them  with  prodigious  activity  while  the  fifth  corps 
still  made  head;  and  when  the  day  was  irrevocably  lost,  he 
regained  the  other  side  of  the  Albuera  and  protected  the 
passage  of  the  broken  infantry. 

Beresford  was  too  hardly  handled  to  pursue.  He  formed 
a  fresh  line  with  his  Portuguese,  parallel  to  the  hill  from 
whence  Soult  had  advanced,  and  where  the  French  were  now 
rallying  with  their  usual  celerity ;  the  action  still  continued  at 
the  bridge,  but  Godinot's  division  and  the  connecting  battalion 
of  grenadiers  were  soon  afterwards  withdrawn,  and  all  firing 
ceased  before  three  o'clock.  The  serious  fighting  had  endured 
four  hours,  and  in  that  time,  nearly  seven  thousand  of  the 
allies  and  above  eight  thousand  of  their  adversaries  were  struck 
down.  Three  French  generals  were  wounded,  two  slain,  and 
eight  hundred  soldiers  so  badly  hurt  as  to  be  left  on  the  field. 
On  Beresford's  side  only  two  thousand  Spaniards  and  six 


172  PENINSULA   WAR.  [MAY,   1811. 

hundred  Germans  and  Portuguese  were  killed  or  wounded; 
hei\ce  it  is  plain  with  what  a  resolution  the  pure  British  fought, 
for  they  had  but  eighteen  hundred  men  left  standing !  The 
laurel  is  nobly  won  when  the  exhausted  victor  reels  as  he  places 
it  on  his  bleeding  front. 

The  trophies  of  the  French  were  five  hundred  unwounded 
prisoners,  a  howitzer,  and  several  stand  of  colours.  The 
British  had  nothing  of  that  kind  to  boast  of,  but  the  horrid 
piles  of  carcasses  within  their  lines  told  with  dreadful  eloquence 
who  were  the  conquerors;  and  all  that  night  the  rain  poured 
down,  and  the  river  and  the  hills  and  the  woods  resounded 
with  the  dismal  clamour  and  groans  of  dying  men.  Beresford, 
compelled  to  place  his  Portuguese  in  the  front  line,  was  op- 
pressed with  the  number  of  his  wounded;  they  far  exceeded 
the  sound  amongst  the  British  soldiers,  and  when  the  piquets 
were  posted  few  men  remained  to  help  the  sufferers.  In  this 
cruel  situation  he  sent  Hardinge  to  demand  assistance  from 
Blake ;  but  with  him  wrath  and  mortified  pride  were  predo- 
minant, and  he  refused,  saying,  it  was  customary  with  allied 
armies  for  each  to  take  care  of  its  own  men.  Morning  came, 
and  both  armies  kept  their  respective  positions,  the  wounded 
still  covering  the  field  of  battle,  the  hostile  lines  still 
menacing  and  dangerous.  The  greater  number  had  fallen  on 
the  French  side,  the  best  soldiers  on  that  of  the  allies;  and 
the  dark  masses  of  Soult's  powerful  cavalry  and  artillery, 
covering  all  his  front,  seemed  alone  able  to  contend  again  for 
the  victory.  The  right  of  the  French  also  appeared  to  threaten 
the  Badajos  road,  and  Beresford  in  gloom  and  doubt  awaited 
another  attack;  but  on  the  17th,  the  third  brigade  of  the 
fourth  division  came  up  by  a  forced  march  from  Jerumenha, 
which  enabled  the  second  division  to  retake  their  former 
ground  between  the  Valverde  and  the  Badajos  roads,  and  on 
the  18th  Soult  retreated. 

He  left  to  English  generosity  several  hundred  men,  too 
deeply  wounded  to  be  removed ;  all  that  could  travel  he  had, 
in  the  night  of  the  17th,  sent  by  the  royal  road,  through  Santa 
Marta,  Los  Santos,  and  Monasterio  to  Seville.  Now  protect- 
ing his  movements  with  his  horsemen  and  six  battalions  of 
infantry,  he  filed  the  army  in  the  morning  to  its  right,  and  so 


MAT,  1811.]  BOOK  XII— CHAP.   7.  178 

gained  the  road  to  Solano;  when  this  flank  march  was  com- 
pleted, Latour  Maubourg  covered  the  rear  with  the  heavy 
dragoons,  and  Briche"  protected  the  march  of  the  wounded 
men  by  the  royal  road.  Soult  however  halted  the  19th  at 
Solano,  designing  to  hold  on  in  Estremadura,  and  draw  rein- 
forcements from  Andalusia ;  for  he  knew  well,  though  Beres- 
ford  was  no  longer  in  a  condition  to  hurt  Badajos,  Wellington 
would  soon  come  down  and  fresh  combats  would  be  necessary 
to  save  that  fortress.  He  had  as  early  as  the  14th  commenced 
repairing  the  castle  of  Villalba,  a  large  structure  between 
Almendralejos  and  Santa  Marta,  and  now  he  continued  the 
work,  with  a  view  to  form  a  head  of  cantonments,  which  the 
allies  should  be  unable  to  take  before  the  French  army  could 
be  reinforced. 

When  Beresford  discovered  this  retreat,  he  despatched 
Hamilton  to  make  a  show  of  re-investing  Badajos,  and  it  was 
effected  at  daybreak  the  19th,  but  on  the  left  bank  only.  The 
allied  cavalry,  supported  by  Alten's  Germans,  followed  the 
French  line  of  retreat.  Soult  then  transferred  his  head- 
quarters to  Fuente  del  Maestre,  and  the  Spanish  cavalry  cut 
off  some  of  his  men  and  menaced  Villalba.  Lord  Wellington 
reached  the  field  of  battle  the  same  day.  After  examining  the 
state  of  affairs,  he  desired  the  marshal  to  follow  the  enemy 
cautiously,  and  returned  to  Elvas  himself,  directing  the  third 
and  seventh  divisions,  which  were  already  at  Campo  Mayor, 
to  complete  the  re-investment  of  Badajos  on  the  right  bank. 
Beresford'  advanced  by  the  Solano  road  to  Almendralejos, 
where  he  found  some  more  wounded  French,  and  his  further 
progress  was  not  opposed.  The  number  of  officers  who  had 
fallen  in  the  French  army,  together  with  the  privations 
endured,  had  produced  despondence  and  discontent;  the 
garrison  at  Vallalba  was  so  little  disposed  to  maintain  the 
castle,  that  Soult  evacuated  it,  and  continued  his  own  retreat 
in  the  direction  of  Llerena,  where  he  assumed  a  position  on 
the  23rd,  placing  his  cavalry  nearllsagre.  This  abandonment 
of  the  royal  road  to  Seville  was  a  well-considered  movement : 
the  country  through  which  he  passed  was  more  fruitful  and 
open,  and  he  could  draw  greater  advantage  from  his  superior 
cavalry;  the  mountains  behind  him  were  so  strong  he  had 


174  PENINSULA  WAR.  [MAY.  1811. 

nothing  to  fear  from  an  attack,  and  by  Belalcazar  and  Alma- 
den,  he  could  communicate  with  La  Mancha,  from  whence  he 
expected  Drouet's  division.  The  road  of  Guadalcanal  was  in 
his  rear,  by  which  he  could  draw  reinforcements  from  Cordoba 
and  from  the  fourth  corps ;  and  as  the  allies  dared  not  expose 
their  left  flank  by  marching  on  Monasterio  he  effectually 
covered  Andalusia. 

From  Llerena,  a  detachment  was  sent  to  drive  away  a 
Spanish  partida  infesting  the  communications  with  Guadal- 
canal, and  Latour  Maubourg  was  directed  to  scour  the  country 
beyond  Usagre.  That  town,  built  upon  a  hill,  and  covered 
towards  Los  Santos  by  a  river  with  steep  and  rugged  banks, 
had  only  the  one  outlet  by  the  bridge  on  that  side,  and  when 
Latour  Maubourg  approached,  Lumley  who  was  there  retired 
across  the  river.  The  French  light  cavalry  then  marched 
along  the  right  bank,  meaning  to  cross  lower  down  and  cover 
the  passage  of  the  heavy  horsemen;  but  before  they  could 
effect  this  object,  general  Bron  rashly  passed  the  river  with 
two  regiments  of  dragoons,  and  drew  up  in  line  just  beyond 
the  bridge.  Lumley  was  lying  close  behind  a  rising  ground, 
and  when  the  French  had  advanced  a  sufficient  distance, 
Lefebre's  guns  opened  on  them,  and  the  third  dragoon  guards 
and  fourth  dragoons  charged  them  in  front  while  Madden's 
Portuguese  fell  on  their  flank.  They  were  overthrown  at  the 
first  shock  and  fled  towards  the  bridge,  which  was  however 
choked  by  other  cavalry  coming  on  to  their  support;  the 
fugitives  then  turned  to  the  right  and  left  and  endea- 
voured to  save  themselves  in  some  gardens  on  the  banks  of 
the  river,  but  they  were  pursued  and  sabred  until  the  victors 
vrere  checked  by  a  fire  of  carbines  and  artillery  from  the 
opposite  bank.  Some  wounded  prisoners  were  taken  and  a 
guerilla  band,  which  had  not  joined  in  the  attack,  suddenly 
massacred  them.  Forty  killed  in  fair  fight,  and  more  than  a 
hundred  wounded,  attested  the  vigour  of  Lumley's  conduct 
in  this  affair,  which  terminated  Beresford's  operations;  for 
the  miserable  state  to  which  the  regency  had  reduced  the  Por- 
tuguese army  imperatively  called  for  the  marshal's  presence 
elsewhere.  General  Hill,  having  now  returned  to  Portugal, 
re- assumed  the  command  of  the  second  division  amidst  the 


MAY.  1811.]  BOOK   XII.  —  CHAP.   7.  175 

rejoicings  of  the  troops,    and  lord  Wellington    directed  the 
renewed  siege  of  Badajos  in  person. 


OBSERVATIONS. 

No  general  ever  gained  so  great  a  battle  with  so  little 
increase  of  military  reputation  as  marshal  Beresford.  His 
personal  intrepidity  and  strength,  qualities  so  attractive  for 
the  multitude,  were  conspicuously  displayed,  yet  the  breath 
of  his  own  army  withered  his  laurels :  his  triumph  was  dis- 
puted by  the  very  soldiers  who  followed  his  car.  Their  censures 
have  been  reiterated  without  change  and  without  abatement  to 
this  hour;  and  a  close  examination  of  his  operations,  while  it 
detects  many  ill-founded  objections  and  others  tainted  with 
malice,  leaves  little  doubt  that  the  general  feeling  was  right. 

When  he  passed  the  Guadiana  and  drove  the  fifth  corps 
upon  Guadalcanal,  the  delayed  investment  of  Badajos  was 
attributed  to  him  unjustly,  for  he  only  obeyed  lord  Welling- 
ton's orders,  founded  upon  the  tardiness  of  the  Spanish 
generals.  But  when  the  time  for  action  arrived,  the  want  of 
concert  in  the  investment  and  the  ill-matured  attack  on  San 
Christoval  belonged  to  himself ;  and  he  is  especially  respon- 
sible in  reputation  for  both,  because  captain  Squire 
earnestly  warned  him  of  the  inevitable  result,  and 
his  words  were  unheeded.  During  the  siege  the  want  of 
correct  intelligence,  or  a  blunted  judgment,  misled  the  mar- 
shal; and  it  was  remarked  that  at  all  times  he  too  readily 
believed  those  idle  tales  of  distress  and  difficulties  in  the 
French  armies,  with  which  the  spies  generally,  the  deserters 
always,  interlarded  their  information ;  he  was  incredulous  of 
Soult's  enterprise,  and  that  marshal  was  actually  over  the 
Morena  before  the  orders  were  given  to  commence  the  main 
attack  of  the  castle  of  Badajos.  However,  the  firmness  with 
which  Beresford  resisted  the  importunities  of  the  engineers  to 
continue  the  siege,  and  the  quick  and  orderly  removal  of  the 
stores  and  battering-train,  were  alike  remarkable  and  praise- 
worthy :  happy  would  it  have  been  if  he  had  shown  as  much 
magnanimity  in  what  followed. 

When  he  met  Blake  and  Castanos  at  Valverde,  the  alterna- 


176  PENINSULA   WAR.  [MAY,  1811. 

tive  of  fighting  or  retiring  behind  the  Guadiana  was  discussed 
The  Spanish  generals  demanded  battle.      Blake,  who  could 
not  retire  the  way  he  had  arrived  without  danger  of  having 
his  march  intercepted,  was  particularly  earnest  to  fight,  saying 
his   troops,    already   in   a   miserable    state,   would    disperse 
entirely  if  they  entered  Portugal.      Castanos  held  the  same 
opinion.     Beresford,  equally  for  fighting,  argued,  that  it  was 
unwise  to  relinquish  the  hope  of  taking  Badajos,  ungenerous 
to  desert  the  people  of  Estremadura, — that  a  retreat  would 
endanger  Elvas,  lay  open  the  Alemtejo,  and  encourage  the 
enemy  to  push  his  incursions  further,  which  he  could  safely 
do,  having  Badajos  with  its  bridge  over  the  Guadiana,  in  his 
rear, — that  a  battle  must  then  be  fought  in  the  Alemtejo  with 
fewer  troops  and  after  a  dispiriting  retreat, — that  there  was  a 
greater  scarcity  of  food  in  the  Portuguese  than  in  the  Spanish 
province,  —  that   the   weather   was  menacing,   the  Guadiana 
might  again  rise  before  the  stores  were  carried  over,  and  the 
latter  must  then  be  abandoned  or  the  army  endangered  to 
protect  their  passage.     These  plausible  reasons  were  a  mask, 
he  was  pushed  to  fight  against  his  judgment  by  the  impatient 
temper  of  his  British  troops.     None  of  them  had  fought  in 
the  late  battles  under  Wellington.      At  Busaco  the  fourth 
division  was  idle  on  the  left,  as  the  second  division  had  been 
on  the  right,  while  the  action  was  decided  in  the  centre. 
In  Massena's  retreat  neither  had  been  under  fire,  and  the 
combats  of  Sabugal  and  Fuentes  Onoro  had  been  gained  with- 
out them.     Thus  a  burning  thirst  for  battle  was  generated, 
and  Beresford  had  not  the  art  of  conciliating,  nor  that  of 
exacting  the  confidence  of  his  troops;  if  he  had  retreated,  a 
violent  and  unjust  clamour  would  have  been  raised  against 
him :   and  this  was  so  strongly  and  unceremoniously  repre- 
sented to  him  by  an  officer  on  his  own  staff  that  he  gave  way. 
These  are  what  may  be  termed  the  moral  obstacles  of  war. 
Such  men  as  lord  Wellington  or  sir  John  Moore  can  stride 
over  them  j  to  second  -rate  minds  they  are  insuperable.     Prac- 
tice and  study  may  make  a  good  general  as  to  the  handling  of 
troops  and  the  designing  a  campaign,  but  the  ascendancy  of 
spirit  which  leads  the  wise  while  it  controls  the.  insolence  of 
folly,  is  a  rare  gift  of  nature. 


1811/]  BOOK  XII.  —  CttAfc.   7. 

Beresford  yielded  with  an  unhappy  flexibility,  for  the  reso- 
lution to  fight  was  unwarrantable  on  any  sound  military 
principle.  The  taking  of  Badajos  was  a  chimera;  neither  the 
measures  nor  the  means  promised  success;  the  siege  would 
have  died  away  of  itself  in  default  of  resources  to  carry  it  on. 
The  true  question  was,  not  whether  Estremadura  should  be 
deserted  or  Badajos  abandoned,  but  whether  Wellington's  com- 
binations, his  great  and  well  considered  design  for  the  deliver- 
ance of  the  Peninsula  should  be  ruined  and  defaced  at  a  blow. 
To  say  the  Alemtejo  could  not  have  been  defended  until  the 
commander-in-chief  arrived  from  the  north  with  reinforce- 
ments was  mere  trifling.  Soult,  with  twenty,  or  even  thirty 
thousand  men,  dared  not  attempt  the  siege  of  Elvas  in  the 
face  of  twenty-four  thousand  men  such  as  Beresford  com- 
manded. The  battle  of  Fuentes  Onoro  was  known  in  the 
English  and  in  the  French  camps  before  the  allies  broke  up 
from  Badajos;  hence  Beresford  was  certain  reinforcements 
would  soon  come  to  the  Guadiana:  the  third  and  seventh 
divisions  were  actually  at  Campo  Mayor  the  23rd  of  May. 
The  danger  to  the  Alemtejo  was  therefore  slight,  the  necessity 
of  a  battle  by  no  means  apparent,  and  it  remains  to  analyse 
the  chances  of  success. 

It  was  known  that  Soult  had  twenty  thousand  veteran 
troops,  and  a  great  superiority  in  cavalry  and  artillery,  the 
country  being  peculiarly  suited  for  those  arms :  the  martial 
character  of  the  man  was  also  known.  The  allies  had  more 
infantry  by  ten  thousand  than  the  French,  but  speaking 
various  tongues,  and  the  Spanish  part  ill-armed,  starving  and 
worn  with  fatigue,  had  been  recently  defeated  by  the  very 
troops  they  were  going  to  engage.  The  French  force,  com- 
pact and  swift  of  movement,  was  inured  to  war,  and  under 
one  able  and  experienced  chief.  The  allied  army  was  unwieldy, 
each  nation  mistrusted  the  others,  and  there  was  no  unity  of 
hope  or  spirit,  or  discipline  or  command.  On  what  then 
rested  the  hope  of  success?  The  British  troops.  They  were 
therefore  to  be  freely  used.  Was  it  the  time  to  risk  two 
superb  divisions,  and  court  a  certain  loss  of  men,  whose  value 
their  general  fixed  when  he  looked  to  them  alone  for  victory  1 
AAbuera  was  the  point  of  concentration.  Colborne's  brigade 

VOL,  III.  K 


178  PENINSULA   WAR.'  [1811. 

did  not  arrive  until  the  14th,  and  it  was  doubtful  if  it  could 
forestall  the  enemy.  Blake  did  not  come  until  three  o  clock 
in  the  morning  of  the  16th,  Cole  came  at  nine  o'clock,  after 
the  action  had  commenced ;  Kemmis's  fine  brigade,  and  Mad- 
den's  cavalry  did  not  come  at  all.  The  whole  plan  was  faulty, 
it  was  accidental  that  a  force  sufficient  for  battle  was  as- 
sembled. Beresford  was  behind  time,  and  his  persevering 
investment  of  Badajos,  though  laudable  in  one  sense,  was 
an  error;  it  was  only  an  accessory,  yet  the  success  of  the 
main  object  was  made  subservient  to  it.  If  Soult,  instead  of 
moving  by  Villa  Franca,  had  pushed  straight  from  Los  Santos 
to  Albuera,  he  would  have  arrived  the  15th,  when  Beresford 
had  about  half  his  force  in  position;  the  point  of  concentra- 
tion would  then  have  been  lost  and  the  allies  scattered.  If 
Soult  had  even  continued  his  march  by  Solano  instead  of 
turning  upon  Albuera,  he  could  have  communicated  with  Bada- 
jos, unless  Beresford  had  fought  without  waiting  for  Blake, 
and  without  Kemmis's  brigade.  Why  did  the  French  marshal 
turn  thus  to  seek  a  battle  in  preference  to  attaining  his  object 
without  one1?  Why  did  he  not  operate  by  his  right  or  left 
until  the  unwieldy  allied  force  got  into  disorder?  Because 
Beresford's  dispositions  were  so  defective  no  worse  error  could 
be  expected,  and  there  was  a  fair  chance  offered  for  a  victory 
which  would  more  than  counterbalance  Massena's  failures. 
Soult  knew  on  the  15th  that  only  half  the  allied  army  was  in 
line,  and  success  appeared  sure. 

Beresford  had  studied  his  own  field  of  battle  a  month  before 
the  action  took  place,  and  yet  occupied  it  so  as  to  render 
defeat  almost  certain ;  his  infantry  were  not  in  hand,  his  infe- 
riority in  guns  and  cavalry  was  not  compensated  by  entrench- 
ments. He  had  superior  numbers  of  infantry  on  a  position 
which  was  contracted  to  three  miles ;  yet  ten  thousand  never 
fired  a  shot,  and  three  times  the  day  was  lost  and  won,  the 
allies  being  always  fewest  in  number  at  the  decisive  point. 
Blake's  conduct  was  undoubtedly  perplexing,  and  William 
Stewart's  vehemence  annihilated  a  brigade,  and  paralysed  Col- 
borne,  a  man  capable  of  deciding  the  turn  of  a  battle  with 
fewer  troops  than  were  swept  from  him  by  the  French  cavalry 
but  there  also  the  loss  is  imputable  to  Beresford,  because 


1811.]  BOOK   XII.— CHAP.    7.  179 

general  Long,  expecting  such  a  charge,  advised  the  placing  of 
Spanish  cavalry  to  meet  it  and  was  disregarded.  The  neglect  of 
the  isolated  hill  between  the  two  armies  was  another  error;  so 
also  was  the  succession  of  attacks  by  brigades,  and  the  hesita- 
tion about  bringing  up  the  fourth  division.  There  was  no 
promptness  at  critical  moments.  It  was  Hardinge  who  caused 
Cole  and  Abercrombie  to  win  the  victory ;  it  was  the  astound- 
ing valour  of  their  troops  in  offence,  the  astonishing  firmness 
of  Houghton  in  defence,  that  saved  the  day.  The  person  of 
the  general-in-chief  was  seen  everywhere,  a  gallant  soldier ! 
The  mind  of  the  great  commander  nowhere. 

Master  of  the  field  of  battle,  Beresford  could  not  take 
Badajos;  that  prize  was  obtained  by  other  efforts,  and  deeper 
combinations  on  the  part  of  a  far  greater  man ;  neither  did 
he  clear  Estremadura,  for  Soult  maintained  his  positions  from 
Llerena  to  Usagre.  What  did  he  gain?  The  power  of 
simulating  a  renewal  of  the  siege,  and  keeping  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  Guadiana;  simulating  only,  for  if  the  third  and 
seventh  divisions  had  not  arrived  from  Beira,  even  the  invest- 
ment could  not  have  been  completed.  These  illusive  advan- 
tages were  purchased  at  the  price  of  seven  thousand  men. 
With  smaller  loss  Wellington  had  fought  two  general  and 
several  minor  actions,  had  baffled  Massena,  and  turned  seventy 
thousand  men  out  of  Portugal !  What  would  have  been  the 
result  of  defeat?  There  was  no  retreat  save  by  the  tempo- 
rary bridge  of  Jerumenha;  and  had  Soult  won  the  contested 
hill,  the  Valverde  road  would  have  been  his,  and  the  line  of 
retreat  cut.  With  four  thousand  victorious  French  cavalry 
at  his  heels  Beresford  could  never  have  passed  the  Guadiana. 
Back  then  must  have  come  the  army  from  the  north  to 
re-occupy  the  lines  of  Lisbon — a  French  force  would  have 
been  established  south  of  the  Tagus — Spain  would  have  been 
ruined — Portugal  prostrate — England  in  dismay.  Could 
even  the  genius  of  Wellington  have  recovered  such  a  state  of 
affairs'?  And  with  these  results  in  prospect  the  terrible 
balance  trembled  for  two  hours,  twice  leaned  to  the  sinister 
side,  and  only  yielded  at  last  to  the  superlative  vigour  of  the 
fuzileers.  The  battle  should  never  have  been  fought.  The 
siege  of  Badajos  could  not  have  been  renewed  without  re- 


180  PENINSULA   WAR.  [1811. 

inforcements,  and  with  them  it  could  have  been  renewed 
without  an  action,  or  at  least  without  risking  an  unequal 
one. 

Could  the  day  have  been  saved  even  by  British  soldiers  if 
the  French  general  had  not  also  committed  great  errors? 
His  attack,  up  to  the  moment  when  the  Spanish  line  fell  back 
in  disorder,  cannot  be  too  much  admired;  after  that,  the 
mode  of  fighting  in  dense  columns  being  followed  beyond 
reason,  lost  the  fairest  field  ever  offered  in  Spain  to  the 
French  arms.  Had  the  fifth  corps  opened  out  while  there 
was  time  to  do  so,  that  isj  between  the  falling  back  of  the 
Spaniards  and  the  advance  of  Houghton's  brigade,  what  could 
have  saved  Beresford?  The  fire  of  the  French  columns 
destroyed  two-thirds  of  the  British  troops,  the  fire  of  lines 
would  have  swept  away  all!  It  has  been  said  Latour 
Maubourg  and  Godinot  did  not  second  Soult  with  vigour; 
and  the  latter  certainly  did  not  display  much  energy ;  but  he 
was  opposed  by  Alten's  Germans,  good  and  hardy  troops, 
backed  by  a  great  -body  of  Portuguese.  Latour  Maubourg's 
movements  do  not  seem  open  to  censure.  He  took  six  guns, 
sabred  many  Spaniards,  and  overthrew  a  British  brigade, 
without  ceasing  to  keep  the  allied  cavalry  in  check.  He  had 
superior  numbers,  but  Lumley  handled  the  allied  squadrons 
with  skill  and  courage,  using  all  the  advantages  of  his  posi- 
tion, and  in  the  choice  of  that  position  none  can  deny  ability 
to  Beresford.  The  rising  ground  behind  the  horsemen,  the 
bed  of  the  Aroya  in  their  front,  the  aid  of  the  horse  artillery, 
the  support  of  the  fourth  division,  were  all  circumstances  of 
strength,  and  well  combined.  They  dictated  Latour  Mau- 
bourg's proceedings.  If  he  had  charged  in  mass  under  the 
fire  of  Lefebre's  guns,  he  must  have  been  thrown  into  con- 
fusion in  passing  the  bed  of  the  Aroya  at  the  moment  when 
the  fourth  division,  advancing  along  the  slopes,  would  have 
opened  a  musketry  on  his  right  flank :  Lumley  could  then 
have  charged,  or  retired  up  the  hill,  according  to  circum- 
stances. Great  loss  might  thus  have  been  sustained,  and 
nothing  decisive  gained,  because  cavalry,  if  unsustained  by 
infantry  and  artillery,  cannot  make  a  serious  impression 
against  the  three  arms  united.  It  was  therefore  an  error  in 


1811.]  BOOK   XTL  — CHAP.   7.  181 

Soult  not  to  have  joined  some  guns  and  infantry  to  his 
cavalry  when  he  perceived  the  enemy  had  done  so.  Ten 
guns,  and  half  the  infantry  uselessly  slaughtered  in  columns 
on  the  height  above,  would  have  turned  the  scale  of  battle 
below, — for  when  the  fuzileers  came  up  the  hill,  Houghton's 
brigade  was  quite  exhausted,  and  the  few  men  standing  were 
without  ammunition:  if  a  French  battery  and  a  body  of 
infantry  had  been  with  their  cavalry  the  fuzileers  could  not 
have  moved. 

As  Latour  Maubourg  was  not  so  strengthened,  a  repulse 
might  have  been  fatal,  not  only  to  himself  but  to  the  infantry 
on  the  hill,  whose  left  would  then  have  been  exposed  to  the 
allied  cavalry.  If  he  had  stretched  away  to  his  own  left,  he 
would,  in  like  manner,  have  exposed  the  flank  of  Soult's 
infantry :  the  movement  would  have  been  eccentric,  and,  the 
troops  on  the  hill  being  beaten,  destructive  for  the  retreating- 
army.  By  keeping  in  mass  on  the  plain,  and  detaching 
squadrons  from  time  to  time,  as  favourable  opportunities 
offered  for  partial  charges,  Latour  Maubourg  gained  great 
advantages  and  kept  his  troopers  in  hand  for  the  decisive 
moment :  finally,  he  covered  the  retreat  of  the  beaten  infantry. 
Still  with  such  superior  numbers,  he  should  have  more  closely 
pressed  Lumley. 

When  the  battle  ceased,  each  side  was  exhausted.  Here 
was  the  greatest  failure  of  the  French  commander.  He  had 
lost  eight  thousand  men,  but  he  had  still  fifteen  thousand,  and 
his  artillery  and  cavalry  were  comparatively  untouched.  In 
the  allied  army  only  eighteen  hundred  British  infantry  were 
left  standing,  and  all  the  troops  suffering  from  famine;  the 
Spanish  infantry  were  feeding  on  horse-flesh,  and  so  attenu- 
ated by  fatigue  and  misery,  that  previous  to  the  battle  they 
deserted  even  to  the  French,  hoping  thus  to  get  food :  under 
such  a  general  as  Blake,  and  enduring  such  privations,  it  was 
a  great  effort  to  fight  at  all.  Their  resistance,  feeble  com- 
pared to  the  desperate  valour  of  the  British,  was  not  weak  in 
itself;  it  was  natural  that  meu  exhausted  and  ill-managed 
ihould  have  been  unmoved  by  the  appeals  of  Beresford,  a 
strange  general,  whose  exhortations  they  hardly  understood: 
when  the  fortune  of  the  day  changed  they  followed  the  fuzi- 


182 


PENINSULA   WAR. 


[181L 


leers  with  alacrity,  and,  with  exception  of  Villemur's  cavalry, 
at  no  period  gave  way  with  dishonour.  But  they  were  not 
equal  to  a  second  struggle;  a  renewed  attack  on  the  17th 
must  have  ended  in  favour  of  the  French.  Beresford  conscious 
of  this,  wrote  in  the  evening  of  the  16th  to  lord  Wellington, 
saying  he  anticipated  a  ruinous  defeat  next  day,  and  would 
not  survive  it.  The  resolution  with  which  he  maintained 
the  position  notwithstanding,  was  the  strongest  indication  of 
military  talent  he  gave  during  the  whole  of  his  operations; 
had  Soult  held  his  position  with  equal  pertinacity,  Beresford 
must  have  retired.  It  was  a  great  mistake  not  to  have  done 
so.  Nothing  is  more  essential  in  war  than  a  confident  front, 
a  general  should  never  acknowledge  himself  vanquished ;  the 
front  line  always  looks  formidable,  and  the  adversary  can 
seldom  know  what  is  passing  behind.  The  importance  of 
this  maxim  is  finely  indicated  in  Livy,  who  relates,  that  after 
a  drawn  battle  a  god  called  out  in  the  night,  that  the 
Etruscans  had  lost  one  man  more  than  the  Romans !  Where- 
upon the  former  retired,  and  the  latter  remaining  on  the  field 
gathered  all  the  fruits  of  a  real  victory. 


1810.1  BOOK  XIII— CHAP.   1.  183 


BOOK  THE  THIRTEENTH. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  siege  of  Badajos  was  now  resumed,  but  the  transactions 
in  Spain  during  Massena's  invasion  of  Portugal  must  first  be 
noticed ;  for  it  is  not  by  following  one  stream  of  action  that  a 
just  idea  of  this  war  can  be  obtained.  Many  of  Wellington's 
proceedings  would  seem  rash,  others  timid,  if  taken  separately, 
yet  viewed  as  parts  of  a  plan  for  delivering  the  whole  Penin- 
sula, they  will  be  found  discreet  or  daring,  as  circumstances 
warranted.  No  portion  of  his  campaigns  requires  this  wide- 
based  consideration  more  than  his  early  sieges,  which  were 
instituted  contrary  to  the  rules  of  art,  and  unsuccessful,  or, 
when  successful,  attended  with  such  a  mournful  slaughter,  as 
to  give  occasion  for  questioning  his  great  military  qualities, 
which  were,  however,  then  most  signally  displayed. 

OPERATIONS   IN   THE   NORTHERN    PROVINCES    OP    SPAIN. 

Gallicia  after  the  failure  of  Renovales'  expedition  and  the 
shipwreck  that  followed  became  torpid;  the  junta  disregarded 
Walker's  exhortations,  and,  although  he  furnished  vast  supplies, 
the  army,  nominally  twenty  thousand  strong,   mustered  only 
six  thousand  in  the  field :  there  was  no  cavalry, 
the  infantry  kept  in  the  mountains  about  Villa    Of  general 
Franca,  and  a  weak  French  division  occupied  the    Walker's 
rich  plains  of  Leon.     Mahi  refusing  to  combine 
his  operations  with  those  of  the  Anglo-Portuguese  army,  was 
thought  disaffected,  and  at  the  desire  of  the  British  authorities 

removed  to  make  way  for  Albuquerque  :  he  was 

,  .  ,.   J   .     J         .         .  ,      -p.,  ,     •  Abstractor 

however  immediately  appointed  by  Blake  to  com-    Mr.  Welies- 

mand  in  Murcia,  despite  of  Mr.  Wellesley's  remon-  ley's  Des^ss 
strances.  When  Albuquerque  died,  Gallicia  fell 


184  PENINSULA   WAR.  [1810. 

to  Castanos,  and  while  he  was  acting  with  Beresford  in  Es- 
tremadura,  Santocildes  assumed  military  authority;  it  was 
then  Caffarelli's  reserve  entered  Spain,  that  Santona  was 
fortified,  and  that  Bessieres  assembled  seven  thousand  men  at 
Zamora. 

In  the  Asturias,  Bonnet  was  harassed  by  the  partidas  from 
the  Leibana  mountains,  and  on  the  coast  by  the  English 
frigates ;  but  he  held  Oviedo,  maintained  his  communications 
with  the  French  in  Leon,  and  in  November,  1810,  defeated  the 
insurgents.  General  San  Pol  Lozada  carried  on  operations  in 
concert  with  partidas  during  December  and  Janu- 
ary>  yet  he  failed>  and  in  February  withdrew  to 
the  Navia;  this  gave  the  Gallicians  such  alarm 
that  he  was  forced  to  advance  and  was  again  driven  back. 
Bonnet  then  dispersed  the  partidas  and  prepared  to  aid  Bessieres 
against  Gallicia.  Wellington's  arrival  on  the  Coa,  in  pursuit 
of  Massena,  having  stopped  that  project,  Bonnet  scoured  the 
coast  and  seized  all  the  Spanish  stores  of  English  arms  and 
clothing.  The  war  in  the  Asturias  was  indeed  so  slight,  that 
in  May  Santander  was  evacuated,  and  all  the  cavalry  of  Castille 
and  Leon  joined  Massena  at  Fuentes  Onoro,  yet  the  Gallician 
and  Asturian  regular  armies  gained  no  advantage.  The  partidas 
were  more  active,  Porlier,  Campillo,  Longa,  Amor,  and  Merino 
cut  off  small  parties  in  the  Montana,  the  Bioja,  Biscay,  and  the 
Baston  de  Laredo.  They  might  have  been  destroyed  by  combined 
movements,  but  those  were  hard  to  make  from  the  little  accord 
amongst  the  French  generals.  Campillo  was  next 
letterof  get.  to  Porlier  in  power.  His  haunts  were  the  val- 
Bartheiemy,  jeyg  of  Mena  and  Caranza,  and  he  concerted 
expeditions  with  Barbara,  Honejas,  and  Curillas, 
petty  chiefs  of  Biscay.  Sometimes  he  overrun  the  valleys  of 
Gurieso,  Soba,  Carrado,  and  Jorrando,  to  raise  recruits  and 
contributions,  but  his  chief  aim  was  to  intercept  despatches 
between  Bilbao  and  Santander.  For  this  purpose  he  infested 
Liendo  between  Ovira  and  Laredo,  which  he  could  more  safely 
do,  because  Barthelemy,  the  governor  of  the  Montana,  was 
forced  to  watch  Liefoana  on  the  side  of  Leon,  which  was  the 
stronghold  of  Porlier.  That  chief,  who  vexed  the  valleys  of 
Cabuerniego,  Rio  Nauza,  Cieza,  and  Buelna,  forced  the  people 


1811.]  BOOK    XIII.  — CHAP.    1.  185 

to  fly  with  their  effects  to  the  mountains  whenever  the  French 
approached,  and  in  Liebana  this  was  popular,  it  was  elsewhere 
disliked. 

To  ruin  Porlier  required  great  combinations,  and  it  was 
necessary  first  to  seize  Espinoza,  not  that  of  M'onteres,  but  a 
village  in  the  Liebana,  from  whence  the  valleys  all  descended 
as  from  a  point.  When  Drouet  had  the  9th  corps  lgn 

on  the  upper  Douro,  Barthelemy  proposed  a  com- 
bined movement  of  this  nature,  which  was  feebly  executed; 
Liebana  and  Santander  continued  to  be  disturbed,  and  the 
chain  of  partidas  was  unbroken  through  Biscay  and  the  Rioja 
to  Navarre  where  Mina  carried  on  the  war.  That  chief  had 
on  the  22nd  of  May  defeated  at  the  Puerta  de  Arlaban,  near 
Vitoria,  twelve  hundred  men,  escorting  prisoners  and  treasure  to 
France;  the  success  was  alloyed  by  the  death  of  two  hundred 
of  the  Spanish  prisoners  killed  in  the  tumult,  and  horribly 
stained  also  by  the  cold-blooded  murder,  after  Mr.  Stuart, 
the  fight,  of  six  Spanish  ladies  attached  to  French  MSS 
officers.  Massena,  whose  baggage  was  taken,  was  to  have  gone 
with  this  convoy,  but  disliking  the  discipline  of  the  escort  he 
remained  at  Vitoria  and  so  escaped. 

This  partisan  warfare,  the  descents  on  the  coast,  the  aspect 
of  affairs  in  Estremadura,  the  denuded  state  of  Castille,  now 
menaced  by  Santocildes,  and  an  important  event  to  be  noticed 
hereafter,  induced  Bessieres  to  contract  his  position.  He 
ordered  Eeille  and  Caffarelli  to  scour  Biscay,  and 
in  June  caused  Bonnet  to  dismantle  the  coast  bat- 
teries, send  his  sick  and  baggage  to  Santander  by  sea  and 
abandon  the  Asturias.  Santocildes  was  then  menacing  As- 
torga  with  thirteen  thousand  men,  and  the  French  evacuated 
that  place  also,  after  ruining  some  of  the  works ;  but  Serras 
and  Bonnet  were  united  on  the  Esla,  and  being  supported  by 
three  thousand  men  from  Kio  Seco,  skirmished  the  23rd  at 
Puente  Orvigo  with  Santocildes,  yet  they  had  the  worst,  and 
general  Valletaux  was  killed.  Lord  Wellington's  operations 
in  Estremadura  soon  drew  the  attention  of  the  French  to  that 
side,  and  Santocildes  kept  Astorga  until  August,  but  mean- 
while two  thousand  French  were  put  into  Santona,  and 
general  Roguet,  coming  from  Burgos  with  a  division  of  the 


186  PENINSULA   WAR.  [JUNE,  1810. 

young  guard,  made  another  fruitless  attempt  on  the  Liebana. 
This  warfare  though  harassing,  proved  that  Gallicia  and  the 
Asturias  were  not  to  be  relied  on  as  auxiliaries  by  lord  Wel- 
lington. Gallicia  with  its  lordly  junta,  regular  army,  fortified 
towns,  rugged  fastnesses,  numerous  population,  and  constant 
supplies  from  England,  had  been  of  less  weight  in  the  contest 
than  five  thousand  Portuguese  militia  conducted  by  Trant  and 
Wilson.  The  irregular  warfare  was  also  producing  bad  effects; 
the  tree  though  grafted  in  patriotism  bore  strange  fruit.  In 
Biscay  the  armed  peasantry  often  fought  in  the  ranks  of  the 
Appendix  7  enemy,  and  on  one  occasion  attacked  the  boats  of 
§i.  the  Amelia  frigate  to  save  French  military  stores ! 

OPERATIONS    IN   THE   EASTERN   PROVINCES. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  Suchet,  after  the  fall  of  Mequi- 
nenza,  was  to  besiege  Tortoza  while  Macdonald  marched 
against  Taragona.  Massena  was  then  concentrating  his  army 
against  Portugal,  and  Napoleon  designed  that  Suchet,  after 
taking  Tortoza,  should  march  with  half  his  corps  to  support 
the  prince  of  Esling.  The  reduction  of  Tortoza  proved  how- 
ever a  tedious  task,  and  as  the  French  armies  of  Catalonia 
and  Aragon  had  now  a  common  object,  their  situation  and 
resources  shall  be  compared  with  those  of  their  adversary. 

Suchet  was  master  of  Aragon,  not  more  by  force  of  arms 
than  by  the  influence  of  his  administration ;  the  province  was 
fertile,  and  so  tranquil  that  his  convoys  travelled  under  the 
care  of  Spanish  commissaries  and  conductors.  But  Mina  was 
in  Navarre  on  his  rear,  and  communicated  on  the  right  bank 
of  the  Ebro  with  the  partidas  in  the  mountains  of  Moncayo 
and  Albaracin.  These  last  were  occasionally  backed  by  the 
Empecinado,  Duran,  and  others  whose  strongholds  were  in  the 
Guadalaxara,  and  who  from  thence  infested  Cuenca  and  the 
vicinity  of  Madrid;  and  from  Albaracin,  Villa  Campa  con- 
nected the  partisan  warfare  with  the  Valencian  army,  which 
had  also  a  line  of  operation  towards  Cuenca.  Mina  received 
supplies  of  all  kinds  from  Corufia  through  the  English  ships ; 
and  in  like  manner  the  other  end  of  the  chain  was  supplied, 
by  the  English  consul  Tupper,  from  Valencia.  Thus  a  line 


JUNE,  1810.]  BOOK  XIII.  — CHAP.    1.  187 

was  drawn  across  the  Peninsula  which  it  was  useless  to  break, 
the  retreat  being  secure  at  both  ends,  and  the  excitement  to 
renewed  efforts  constant. 

On  the  other  flank  of  Suchet's  position,  the  high  valleys  of 
the  Pyrenees  were  swarming  with  small  bands,  which  formed 
the  link  between  Mina  and  a  Catalonian  division  holding  Seu 
d'Urgel,  a  fortified  castle  closing  the  passage  leading  from  the 
plain  of  that  name  to  the  Cerdaiia.  This  division,  acting  in 
concert  with  Rovira,  and  other  partisans,  extended  the  irre- 
gular warfare  on  the  side  of  Olot  and  Castelfollit  to  the  Ampur- 
dam;  and  the  whole  depended  upon  Taragona,  which  itself  was 
supported  by  the  English  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean.  Aragon 
was  therefore  like  an  invested  fortress,  which  the  Spaniards 
thought  to  reduce  by  famine,  by  assault,  and  by  exciting  the 
population  against  the  garrison;  but  Suchet  made  such 
arrangements  that  his  convoys  were  secure  in  the  interior,  and 
all  important  points  on  the  frontier  circle  were  fortified  and 
connected  with  Zaragoza  by  minor  forts  radiating  from  that 
common  centre.  Lerida,  Mequinenza,  the  plain  of  Urgel  in 
Catalonia,  and  Morella  in  Valencia  were  his ;  and  by  fortifying 
Teruel  and  Alcanitz  he  secured  the  chief  passages  leading 
through  the  mountains  to  the  latter  kingdom :  he  could  thus 
invade  either  Catalonia  or  Valencia;  and  from  Mequinenza 
could,  by  water,  transport  stores  for  the  siege  of  Tortoza. 

In  Catalonia  affairs  were  different.  Macdonald,  who  assumed 
command  at  the  moment  when  Napoleon  wished  him  to 
co-operate  with  Suchet,  was  inexperienced  in  the  peculiar 
warfare  of  the  province,  and  unprepared  for  extended  opera- 
tions. His  troops  were  about  Gerona  and  Hostalrich,  the 
bounds  of  the  French  conquest  at  this  period.  Barcelona 
was  a  point  beyond  their  field  system  to  be  maintained  by 
expeditions,  the  country  was  exhausted  of  provisions,  and  the 
army  could  only  be  fed  by  land  convoys  from  France,  or 
coasters  which,  eluding  the  vigilance  of  the  English  cruisers, 
could  reach  Rosas,  St.  Filieu,  and  Palamos.  Barcelona  like  the 
horse-leech  continually  cried  for  more;  the  inhabitants  as  well 
as  the  garrison  depended  on  the  convoys,  which  were  enor- 
mous with  reference  to  the  limited  means  arid  difficulty  of 
moving.  The  distance  between  Hostalrich  and  Barcelona  was 


J88  PENINSULA   WAR.  [JULY,  1810, 

only  forty  miles  j  but  the  road,  as  far  as  Granollers,  was  a  suc- 
cession of  defiles  and  crossed  by  several  rivers,  of  which  the 
Congosta  and  the  Tordera  were  considerable  obstacles,  and 
the  nature  of  the  soil  was  clayey  and  heavy,  especially  in  the 
defiles  of  the  Trenta  Pasos.  It  was  therefore  difficult  for 
Macdonald  to  operate  from  his  base  of  Gerona  j  and  as  stores 
for  the  siege  of  Taragona  were  to  come  from  France,  he  could 
not  until  they  arrived  do  more  than  make  sudden  incursions 
with  light  baggage,  trusting  to  the  resources  still  to  be  found 
in  the  open  country,  or  to  be  gathered  in  the  mountains  by 
detachments  which  had  to  fight  for  every  morsel.  This  then 
was  the  condition  of  the  French  armies,  that  starting  from 
separate  bases,  they  were  to  operate  on  lines  meeting  at  Tor- 
toza,  which  it  was  far  more  difficult  for  Macdonald  than  for 
Suchet  to  reach. 

After  the  battle  of  Margalef,  Henry  O'Donnel  reunited  his 
scattered  forces,  and  being  of  a  stern  unyielding  disposition, 
not  only  repressed  the  discontent  occasioned  by  that  defeat, 
but  forced  the  reluctant  migueletes  to  fill  his  ranks  and  submit 
to  discipline.  Assisted  with  money  and  arms  by  the  British 
agents,  and  having  communication  by  sea  with  Gibraltar, 
Cadiz,  and  Minorca,  he  was  soon  enabled  to  re-organize  his 
army,  to  collect  vast  magazines  at  Taragona,  and  strengthen 
that  place  by  new  works :  in  July  he  had  twenty-two  thou- 
sand men  exclusive  of  partidas  and  somatenes.  One  division 
under  Campo  Verde  was  in  the  higher  valleys,  having  a 
detachment  at  Olot,  and  it  was  supported  by  the  fortified 
castles  of  Seu  d'Urgel,  Cardona,  Solsona,  and  Berga ;  a  second 
division  was  on  the  Llobregat,  watching  the  garrison  of  Bar- 
celona, and  having  detachments  in  Montserrat,  Igualada, 
and  Manresa,  to  communicate  with  Campo  Verde.  The  third 
division,  the  reserve  and  the  cavalry  were  on  the  hills  about 
Taragona,  and  that  place  and  Tortoza  had  large  garrisons. 

By  this  disposition  of  his  force,  O'Donnel  occu- 
Green's  Cor-  pied  Falcet,  the  Col  de  Balaguer,  and  the  Col  del 
respondence,  Alba,  passages  leading  to  Tortoza ;  the  Col  de 

Bibas  and  Momblanch,  commanding  the  roads  to 
Lerida ;  San  Coloma  de  Queralt  and  Igualada,  through  which 
his  connexion  with  Campo  Verde  was  maintained.  The  two 


JULY,  1810.]  BOOK  XIII.  — CHAP.   1.  189 

French  armies  were  therefore  separated  not  only  by  the  great 
spinal  ridges  descending  from  the  Pyrenees,  but  by  the  posi- 
tion of  the  Spaniards,  who  held  all  the  passes,  and  could 
at  will  concentrate  and  attack  either  Suchet  or  Macdonald. 
The  Catalonian  system  was  now  also  connected  with  Valencia, 
where,  exclusive  of  irregulars,  there  were  fifteen  thousand  men 
under  Bassecour.  That  officer  had  in  June  occupied  Cuenca, 
yet,  being  at  variance  with  his  officers,  could  do 

i  •  j  j  •  r  ^  \  Abstract  of 

nothing,  and  was  driven  from  thence  by  troops  Mr. 
from  Madrid;  he  returned  to  Valencia,  but  the 
disputes  continued,  and  extending  to  the  junta 
or  congress  of  Valencia  three  members  were  imprisoned  by 
the  general :  nevertheless,  all  parties  being  now  sensible  that 
Valencia  should  be  defended  at  Tortoza,  Bassecour  prepared 
to  march  to  its  succour  by  the  coast  road,  where  he  had  seve- 
ral fortified  posts.  Thus  while  Suchet  and  Macdonald  were 
combining  to  crush  O'Donnel,  the  latter  was  combining  with 
Bassecour  to  press  upon  Suchet ;  and  there  was  always  the 
English  maritime  force  at  hand  to  aid  attacks  or  facilitate 
escape. 

In  this  exposition  the  native  armies  are  named  after  their 
provinces,  but  in  December,  1810,  the  whole  military  force 
being  re-organized  by  the  regency  the  armies  had  been  desig- 
nated by  numbers.  The  Catalonian  forces,  formerly  called 
the  army  of  the  right,  was  now  called  the  first  army.  The 
Valencians,  Villa  Campa's  division,  and  the  partidas  of  the 
Empecinado  and  Duran,  were  called  the  second  army.  The 
Murcian  force,  the  third  army.  The  troops  at  Cadiz,  at  Alge- 
siras,  and  in  the  Conde  Niebla:,  the  fourth  army.  The  remnants 
of  Romana's  Gallician  division  which  escaped  the  slaughter  on 
the  Gebora  formed  the  fifth  army.  The  new  raised  troops  of 
Gallicia  and  those  of  the  Asturias  were  called  the  sixth  army. 
The  partidas  of  the  north,  that  is  to  say,  Mina's,  Longa's, 
Campillo's,  Porlier's,  and  other  smaller  bands,  formed  the 
seventh  army. 

Such  was  the  state  of  affairs  when  Napoleon's  order  to 
besiege  Tortoza  arrived.  Suchet  was  ready.  More  than  fifty 
battering  guns,  selected  from  those  at  Lerida,  were  equipped, 
his  depots  were  established  at  Mequinenza,  Caspe,  aiid  Alca 


190  PENINSULA   WAR.  [JutT,  1810. 

nitz,  and  all  the  fortified  posts  were  provisioned.  Twelve 
thousand  men  under  Musnier,  destined  to  secure  Aragon,  were 
disposed  at  Huesca  and  other  minor  points  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  Ebro;  and  at  Daroea,  Teruel,  and  Calatayud  on  the 
right  bank.  The  troops  for  the  siege  assembled  at  Lerida 
and  Alcanitz,  under  Habert  and  Laval,  their  provisions  being 
drawn  from  the  newly  conquered  district  of  Urgel.  From 
Mequinenza,  the  principal  depot,  there  was  water-carriage ;  but 
the  Ebro  being  crossed  at  several  points  by  rocky  bars,  some 
of  which  were  only  passable  in  full  water,  the  communication 
was  too  uncertain  to  depend  upon,  and  Suchet  set  workmen  to 
re-open  an  old  road,  thirty  miles  in  length,  which  had  been 
made  by  the  duke  of  Orleans,  during  the  war  of  the  succes- 
sion. It  pierced  the  mountains  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Ebro, 
passed  through  Batea  to  Mora,  and  from  thence  by  Pinhel  to 
Tortoza,  running  through  a  celebrated  defile  called  indifferently 
the  Trmcli&ras,  and  the  Passage  of  Arms. 

When  these  preliminary  arrangements  were  made,  Habert 
assembled  his  division  at  Belpuig,  near  Lerida,  feigning  to  go 
towards  Barcelona,  but  suddenly  turned  to  his  right,  and 
penetrating  through  the  district  of  Garriga,  reached  Garcia,  on 
the  left  bank  of  the  lower  Ebro,  the  5th  of  July.  Laval  also, 
from  Alcanitz,  made  a  feint  towards  Valencia  by  Morella,  and 
then  turning  to  his  left,  came  so  unexpectedly  upon  Tortoza, 
by  the  right  bank  of  the  Ebro,  that  he  surprised  some  of  the 
outposts  on  the  2nd,  and  then  encamped  before  the  bridge- 
head. The  4th  he  extended  his  line  to  Amposta,  seized  the 
ferry-boat  of  the  great  road  from  Barcelona  to  Valencia, 
and  posted  Boussard's  cuirassiers,  with  a  battalion  of  infantry, 
and  six  guns,  at  Uldecona,  on  the  Cenia  river,  to  observe  Basse  - 
cour's  Valencians.  During  these  operations  Suchet  fixed  his 
own  quarters  at  Mora,  and  c.s  the  new  road  was  not  finished, 
he  occupied  Miravet,  Pinhel,  and  the  Trincheras  on  its  intended 
line,  placed  flying  bridges  with  covered  works  on  the  Ebro  at 
Mora  and  Xerta,  and  made  those  places  his  depot  of  siege. 
He  seized  the  craft  on  the  river,  established  posts  at  Kapita, 
near  the  mouth  of  the  Ebro,  and  at  Amposta,  and  made  a 
fruitless  attempt  to  burn  the  boat  bridge  of  Tortoza  with  fire 
vessels.  Following  Napoleon's  order,  Macdonald  should  at 


AUGUST,  1810.]        BOOK  XIII.  — CHAP.    1.  191 

this  time  have  been  before  Taragona;  but  on  the  9th,  Suchet 
learned  from  a  spy,  that  the  seventh  corps  was  still  at  Gerona, 
and  thus  found  himself  exposed  alone  to  the  combined  efforts 
of  the  Catalans  and  Yalencians.  This  made  him  repent  of 
having  moved  from  Aragon  so  soon ;  yet  thinking  it  would 
be  bad  to  retire,  he  resolved  to  blockade  Tortoza,  hoping 
to  resist  both  O'Donnel  and  Bassecour  until  Macdonald  could 
advance. 

The  Spaniards,  who  knew  his  situation,  sallied  on  the  right 
bank  the  6th  and  8th,  and  on  the  10th  his  outposts  on  the  left 
bank  were  driven  in  at  Tivisa  by  a  division  from  Falcet,  which, 
the  next  day,  fell  on  his  works  at  Mora,  but  was  repulsed. 
The  12th,  general  Paris  pushed  back  the  Spanish  line  while 
Habert  took  post  in  force  at  Tivisa,  by  which  he  covered  the 
roads  to  Xerta  and  Mora.  O'Donoghue,  who  commanded 
Bassecour's  advanced  guard,  now  menaced  Morella,  but  general 
Montmarie  being  detached  to  its  succour,  drove  him  away. 
The  30th,  O'Donnel  brought  up  fresh  trgops  to  Falcet,  made  a 
feint  with  ten  thousand  men  against  Tivisa,  and  then  suddenly 
entered  Tortoza,  from  whence  at  mid-day,  on  the  3rd  of 
August,  he  passed  the  bridge,  and  fell  with  the  bayonet  on 
Laval's  entrenchments.  The  French  gave  way  at  first,  yet 
soon  rallied ;  and  the  Spaniards,  fearing  for  their  communica- 
tions, regained  the  town  in  disorder,  having  lost  two  hundred 
prisoners  besides  killed  and  wounded.  This  operation  was 
concerted  with  general  Caro,  who  had  superseded  O'Donoghue, 
and  was  moving  with  the  Valencians  by  the  coast-road  towards 
Uldecona ;  wherefore  Suchet,  judging  the  Spaniards  designed 
to  force  him  from  the  lower  Ebro  before  Macdonald  could  pass 
the  Llobregat,  resolved  to  strike  a  sudden  blow  at  the  Valen- 
cians, and  then  turn  upon  the  Catalans:  in  this  view  he 
united  at  Uldecona,  on  the  13th,  eleven  battalions  with  eight 
hundred  horsemen.  Caro  was  then  in  a  strong  position 
covering  the  two  great  routes  to  Valencia,  but  when  the 
French,  after  driving  in  his  advanced  guard  from  Vinaros, 
came  up,  his  Valencians  would  not  stand  a  battle,  and  being 
followed  beyond  Peniscola  separated  and  retreated  in  disorder 
by  different  roads.  Suchet  then  returned  to  Mora,  where  he 
found  an  officer  of  Macdonald's  army  bringing  information 


192  PENINSULA   WAR.  [JUNE,  1810 

that  the  seventh  corps  was  in  the  plains  of  Reus,  and  its  com- 
munications with  the  third  corps  open. 


OPERATIONS  OF  THE  SEVENTH  CORPS. 

When  Macdonald  succeeded  Augereau  he  found  the  troops 
in  a  state  of  insubordination,  accustomed  to  plun- 
der, and  excited  to  ferocity  by  the  cruelty  of  the 
Catalans  and  the  conduct  of  his  predecessor;  they  were 
without  magazines  or  regular  subsistence,  and  lived  by  exac- 
tions, while  the  people,  driven  to  desperation,  were  more  like 
wild  beasts  than  men.  The  war  was  repulsive  to  him  in  all 
its  features.  It  was  one  of  shifts  and  devices,  and  he  better 
understood  methodical  movements;  it  was  one  of  plunder, 
and  he  was  a  severe  disciplinarian;  it  was  full  of  cruelty  on 
all  sides,  and  he  was  of  a  humane  and  just  disposition.  He 
severely  rebuked  the  troops  for  their  bad  discipline  and 
cruelty,  and  endeavoured  to  soothe  the  Catalans ;  but  neither 
were  softened;  the  mutual  injuries  were  too  horrible  and  too 
recent  to  be  forgiven.  The  soldiers,  drawn  from  different 
countries,  were  without  a  common  national  feeling,  and  were 
irritated  against  a  general,  who  made  them  pay  for  wanton 
damages,  and  punished  them  for  plundering ;  and 
the  Catalans,  attributing  his  conduct  to  fear 
because  he  could  not  entirely  restrain  the  violence  of  his  men, 
still  fled  from  the  villages  and  massacred  his  stragglers  with 
unrelenting  barbarity. 

While  reforming  this  system  Macdonald  could  not  take  the 
field,  because,  without  magazines,  no  army  can  be  kept  in 
due  discipline;  wherefore  he  remained  about  Gerona,  drawing 
with  great  labour  and  pains  his  provisions  from  France,  and 
storing  up  the  overplus  for  his  future  operations.  On  the 
10th  of  June  however,  the  wants  of  Barcelona  had  become  so 
serious,  that  leaving  his  baggage  under  a  strong  guard  at 
Gerona,  and  his  recruits  and  cavalry  at  Figueras,  he  marched 
with  ten  thousand  men  and  a  convoy  to  its  relief,  by  the  way 
of  the  Trenta  Pasos,  Cardedieu,  and  Granollers.  The  road 
was  heavy,  the  defiles  narrow,  the  rivers  swollen,  the  manner 
of  march  too  pompous  for  the  nature  of  the  war ;  for  Mac- 


JULY,  1810.]  BOOK   XIII.— CHAP.    1.  193 

donald  always  formed  in  order  of  battle  on  each  side  of  the 
defiles  while  the  engineers  repaired  the  ways,  and  in  every- 
thing adhered  to  his  resolution  of  restoring  a  sound  system ; 
but  while  thus  imitating  the  Jugurthine  Metellus,  he  forgot 
that  he  had  not  Komans,  but  a  mixed  and  ferocious  multitude 
under  his  command,  and  he  lost  more  by  wasting  of  time, 
than  he  gained  by  enforcing  an  irksome  discipline.  When 
he  reached  Barcelona,  his  own  provisions  were  expended,  his 
convoy  furnished  only  a  slender  supply  for  the  city,  and  the 
next  day  he  returned  with  the  empty  carts  in  all  haste  to 
Gerona,  where  he  resumed  his  former  plan  of  action,  and 
demolished  the  forts  beyond  that  city. 

In  July  he  collected  another  convoy  and  prepared  to  march 
in  the  same  order,  designing  to  form  magazines  in  Barcelona, 
sufficient  for  that  city  and  his  own  supply,  during  the  siege  of 
Taragona;  meanwhile  Suchet  was  unable  to  commence  the 
siege  of  Tortoza,  in  default  of  his  co-operation.  Henry 
O'Donnel  also  gained  time  to  re-organize  his  army  and 
re-establish  his  authority,  and  was  ready  to  interrupt  Mac- 
donald'c  march,  proposing,  if  he  failed,  to  raise  a  fresh  insur- 
rection in  the  Ampurdam,  and  thus  give  further  occupation  on 
that  side.  He  had  transferred  a  part. of  his  forces  to  Caldas, 
Santa  Coloma,  and  Brunolas,  taking  nearly  the  same  posi- 
tions that  Blake  occupied  during  the  siege  of  Gerona;  yet  the 
French  detachments  soon  compelled  him  to  concentrate  again 
behind  the  defiles  of  the  Congosta,  where  he  hoped  to  stop 
the  passage  of  the  convoy.  Nevertheless  Macdonald  entered 
Hostalrich  the  16th,  forced  the  Trenta  Pasos  on  the  17th,  and 
though  his  troops  had  only  fifty  rounds  of  ammunition,  drove 
three  thousand  men  from  the  pass  of  Garriga  on  the  18th, 
reached  Barcelona  that  night,  delivered  his  convoy,  and 
returned  immediately.  The  French  soldiers  then  became 
sickly  from  the  hardships  of  a  march  rendered  oppressive  by 
the  severity  of  their  discipline,  and  many  deserted,  while 
others,  who  had  before  gone  off,  returned  to  their  colours. 
However  reinforcements  arrived  from  France,  the  emperor's 
orders  to  take  the  field  were  pressing,  and  Macdonald,  giving 
Baraguay  d'Hilliers  the  command  of  the  Ampurdam,  marched 
on  the  8th  of  August  with  a  third  convoy  for  Barcelona, 

VOL.  III.  Q 


.194  PENINSULA    WAR.  [AUGUST,  1810. 

resolved  at  last  to  co-operate  with  Suchet.  Instructed  by  ex- 
perience he  moved  this  time  with  less  formality,  and  having 
reached  Barcelona,  deposited  his  convoy,  appointed  Maurice 
Mathieu  governor  of  that  city,  and  then  forcing  the  pass  of 
Ordal,  reached  Villa  Franca  with  sixteen  thousand  men. 
O'Donnel,  still  smarting  from  the  affair  at  Tortoza,  retired 
before  him  to  Taragona  without  fighting,  but  directed  Campo 
Verde  to  leave  a  body  of  troops  under  Martinez  in  the  moun- 
tains about  Olot,  and  to  move  himself  through  Montserrat  to 
the  district  of  Garriga,  which  lies  between  Lerida  and  Tortoza, 
The  seventh  corps  then  passed  by  Braffin  and  Vails  into  the 
plain  of  Reus,  and  opened  the  communication  with  Suchet, 
but  to  how  little  purpose  shall  be  shown  in  the  next  chapter. 


AUGUST,  1810.]         BOOK   XIII.  — CHAP.   £.  195 


CHAPTER  II. 

As  the  Spanish  general  knew  the  French  could  find  provi- 
sions for  only  a  few  days  at  Reus,  he  withdrew  his  divisions 
from  Falcet;  and  while  Campo  Verde  occupied  the  passes 
behind  them,  and  other  troops  were  placed  in  the  defiles 
between  Vails  and  Villa  Franca,  he  held  his  army  concentrated 
at  Taragona,  to  fall  upon  Macdonald  whenever  he  moved. 
Macdonald  cared  little  for  the  vicinity  of  the  Catalan  troops, 
but  he  had  not  yet  formed  sufficient  magazines  at  Barcelona 
to  commence  the  siege  of  Taragona,  nor  could  he,  as  O'Don- 
nel  had  foreseen,  procure  more  than  a  few  days  supply  about 
Reus ;  he  therefore  relinquished  all  idea  of  a  siege  and  pro- 
posed to  aid  Suchet  in  the  operation  against  Tortoza,  if  the 
latter  would  feed  the  seventh  corps.  Pending  Suchet's  deci- 
sion he  resolved  to  remove  to  Lerida,  and  leaving  seven 
hundred  sick  men  in  Reus,  made  a  feint  against  the  Col  de 
Balaguer,  but  then  changing  direction  marched  upon  Mom- 
blanch  and  the  Col  de  Ribas.  His  rear-guard,  composed  of 
Italian  troops,  being  overtaken  near  Alcover,  at  the  bridge  of 
Goy,  offered  battle,  which  the  Spaniards  declined ;  and  as  they 
also  neglected  the  heights  on  each  side,  the  Italians  turned 
the  error  to  account,  and  made  their  way  safely  to  Pixa- 
moxons.  They  were  however  pursued,  and  Sarsfield  coming 
from  the  Lerida  side  disputed  the  passage  of  Pixamoxons; 
whereupon  Macdonald,  keeping  the  troops  from  Taragona  in 
chock  with  a  rear-guard,  again  sent  his  Italians  up  the  hills 
on  the  flanks,  while  he  pushed  his  French  troops  against  the 
front  of  the  enemy,  and  so  succeeded.  For  the  Italians 
quickly  carried  the  heights,  the  rear-guard  was  slightly  pressed, 
the  front  was  unopposed,  and  in  two  hours  the  army  reached 
Momblanch,  whence  after  a  short  halt,  it  descended  into  the 
plains  of  Urgel. 

o2 


196  PENINSULA  WAR.  [SEPT.  1810. 

Suchet,  informed  of  this  march,  came  from  Mora  to  confer 
with  Macdonald,  and  they  agreed  the  seventh  corps  should 
have  for  its  subsistence  the  magazines  of  Monzon,  and  the 
plain  of  Urgel,  which  had  not  yet  delivered  its  contributions. 
In  return  Macdonald  lent  the  Neapolitan  division  to  guard 
Suchet's  convoys  down  the  Ebro,  and  promised  the  divisions 
of  Severoli  and  Souham  to  cover  the  operations  during  the 
siege,  by  drawing  the  attention  of  the  Catalan  generals  to  the 
side  of  Cardona.  The  seventh  corps  was  then  quartered  about 
Tarega,  Cervera,  Guisona,  and  Agramunt,  and  Severoli  was 
detached  with  four  thousand  men  over  the  Segre  to  enforce 
requisitions  about  Talarn.  He  drove  four  hundred  Swiss 
from  the  bridge  of  Tremp,  and  executed  his  mis- 
sion; but  with  such  violence,  that  the  people, 
becoming  furious,  assassinated  the  stragglers,  and  laid  so  many 
successful  schemes  of  murder  that  Macdonald  was  forced  to 
renew  the  executions  and  burnings  of  his  predecessors.  Indeed, 
to  feed  an  army  forcibly,  will,  when  all  things  are  paid  for, 
create  soreness  in  a  poor  and  mountainous  country,  because  the 
things  taken  cannot  easily  be  replaced,  and  with  requisitions 
severity  is  absolutely  necessary.  In  rich  plains  the  inhabitants 
can  afford  to  supply  troops,  and  will  do  so  to  avoid  being 
plundered,  whereas  mountaineers  having  scarcely  anything 
besides  food,  and  little  of  that,  become  desperate  and  must  be 
treated  as  enemies  or  left  in  quiet. 

While  Severoli  was  ravaging  Tremp  and  Talarn,  general 
Eugenio  marched  with  another  Italian  detachment  towards 
Castelfollit  which  had  a  French  garrison,  and  Macdonald 
removed  his  own  quarters  to  Cervera.  O'Donnel  then  re- 
placed a  division  at  Falcet  to  observe  Suchet,  and  distributed 
his  other  forces  on  a  line  through  San  Coloma  de  Querault, 
Igualada,  Montserrat,  and  Cardona;  he  thus  cut  off  all  con- 
nexion between  Macdonald  and  the  Ampurdam,  and  enabled 
Campo  Verde  closely  to  follow  the  operations  of  the  seventh 
corps.  That  general  first  menaced  the  head  -  quarters  at 
Cervera,  and  then  marching  against  Eugenio,  was  by  him 
repulsed  near  Castelfollit;  Eugenio,  distinguished  alike  by  his 
valour  and  ferocity,  returned  with  his  booty  safely  to  Agra- 
munt, and  afterward  spoiled  and  ravaged  all  the  district  of 


SEPT.  1810.J  BOOK  XIII.  — CHAP.  2.  197 

Pons  without  hindrance.  The  provisions  obtained  were 
heaped  up  in  Lerida  and  Balaguer;  but  while  Macdonald 
was  thus  acting  in  the  plain  of  Urgel,  O'Donnel  formed 
and  executed  the  most  skilful  plan  which  had  yet  graced 
the  Spanish  arms. 

It  has  been  said  that  Baraguay  d'Hilliers  was  left  with 
eighteen  or  twenty  thousand  men  in  the  Ampurdam;  these 
troops  were  necessarily  scattered;  seven  hundred  were  at 
Palamos,  San  Filieu,  and  other  small  ports  along  the  coast ; 
twelve  hundred,  under  Swartz,  were  in  Abispal,  one  short 
march  from  Gerona;  two  hundred  were  at  Calonje  connecting 
Abispal  with  Palamos ;  the  rest  were  in  Figueras,  Rosas,  Olot, 
Castelfollit,  Gerona,  and  Hostalrich,  and  several  thousands 
were  in  hospital.  O'Donnel  having  exact  information,  left  a 
small  garrison  in  Taragona,  placed  Eroles  at  Montserrat, 
Georget  at  Igualada,  and  Obispo  at  Martorel.  Then  with 
six  thousand  infantry  and  four  hundred  cavalry  marched 
through  the  mountains,  by  San  Gulgat  to  Mattaro  on  the 
sea-coast;  from  thence  passing  by  Vidreras  he  reached  Llago- 
stera  the  12th.  His  arrival  was  unknown  to  Macdonald,  or 
Maurice  Mathieu,  or  Baraguay  d'Hilliers;  for  though  many 
reports  were  afloat,  most  of  them  spread  by  himself,  no  person 
divined  his  real  object :  some  said  he  was  to  attack  a  French 
corps,  which,  from  the  side  of  Navarre,  had  entered  the 
Cerdana;  others  that  he  was  concentrating  at  Manresa,  and 
many  thought  he  was  still  in  Taragona. 

O'Donnel's  detachments,  acting  in  concert  with  two  English 
frigates,  fell  upon  Calonje  and  other  posts,  while  he,  leaving 
Campo  Verde  with  a  reserve  in  the  valley  of  Aro,  marched 
violently  down  from  Casa  de  Silva  upon  Abispal.  Swartz, 
always  unfortunate,  was  there  in  an  entrenched  camp  and 
accepted  battle;  he  lost  two  hundred  men  and  surrendered. 
All  the  French  troops  along  the  coast  did  the  like,  and  the 
prisoners  and  spoil  were  carried  to  Taragona  by  the  English 
vessels.  Until  that  time  Baraguay  d'Hilliers  knew  nothing 
of  O'Donnel's  presence,  the  whole  Ampurdam  was  thrown 
into  confusion,  and  the  somatenes  cut  off  the  communica- 
tion with  Macdonald,  whose  posts  on  the  side  of  Calaf  and 
Cervera  were  simultaneously  harassed  by  Eroles  and  Obispo 


198  PENINSULA  WAR.  [OCT.  1810. 

A  rumour  of  Swartz's  disaster  reached  the  marshal,  but  being 
incredulous  he  remained  in  the  plain  of  Urgel,  and  Baraguay 
d'Hilliers,  who  was  unable  to  do  more  than  protect  his  own 
convoys  from  France,  would  have  been  in  peril  if  O'Donnel's 
activity  had  continued  j  but  he  had  been  severely  wounded, 
the  Spanish  vigour  relaxed,  and  Napoleon,  always  watchful, 
sent  general  Conroux,  in  the  latter  end  of  October,  with  a 
convoy  and  reinforcement  of  troops  from  Perpignan  to  Gerona. 
O'Donnel  then  embarked,  and  Campo  Verde  sent  a  part  of  the 
army  to  Taragona,  leaving  Rovira,  Claros,  and  Manso,  to 
nourish  the  insurrection  in  the  Ampurdam.  Taking  post  him- 
self at  Manresa,  he  menaced  Macdonald's  posts  at  Calaf,  his 
real  object  being,  however,  to,  break  up  that  road,  which  he 
effected,  and  then  passing  suddenly  through  Berga  and  Car- 
dona  to  Puigcerda,  drove  the  French  detachment,  which  had 
come  to  forage  the  Cerdana,  under  the  guns  of  Fort  Louis. 
Macdonald  being  now  apprised  of  Swartz's  misfortune,  hoped 
to  repair  it  by  crushing  Campo  Verde,  taking  Cardona,  and 
dispersing  the  local  junta  of  Upper  Catalonia,  which  had 
assembled  in  Solsona.  On  the  18th,  he  put  his  troops  in 
motion,  passed  the  mountains  of  Portellas,  and  entered 
Solsona ;  but  the  junta  and  inhabitants  escaped  to  Cardona 
and  Berga,  and  up  the  valleys  of  Oleana  and  Urgel.  Mac- 
donald then  sent  columns  in  all  directions,  to  collect  provisions 
and  chase  the  Spanish  detachments;  he  thus  forced  Campo 
Verde  to  abandon  the  Cerdana  which  was  immediately  foraged 
by  the  troops  from  Fort  Louis.  Cardona  remained  and  the 
French  marched  against  it,  but  Campo  Verde  arrived  before 
them,  and  was  in  order  of  battle  when  they  came  up. 

COMBAT   OF   CARDONA. 

This  town  stands  at  the  foot  of  a  rugged  hill,  which  is 
joined  by  a  hog's-back  ridge  to  the  great  mountain  spine, 
dividing  eastern  from  western  Catalonia.  The  Cardona  river 
washed  the  walls,  a  castle  of  strength  crowned  the  height 
above,  and  though  the  works  were  weak,  the  Spanish  army, 
covering  all  the  side  of  the  hill  between  the  town  and  castle, 
appeared  so  formidable  that  Macdonald  feared  to  engage. 


Nov.  1810.]  BOOK  XIIL  — CHAP.  2.  199 

His  French  and  Italian  troops,  however,  marched  separately 
and  Eugenio  arriving  first  attacked  contrary  to  his  orders. 
He  soon  found  his  hands  too  full,  and  the  battle  was  neces- 
sarily continued  by  the  other  division,  to  bring  him  off;  but 
Campo  Verde  drove  both  French  and  Italians  down  the 
mountain,  and  followed  them  briskly  to  Solsona. 

Macdonald  who  had  lost  many  men  returned  to  Guisona. 
He  had  now  been  two  months  from  the  Ampurdam,  and  had 
struck  no  useful  blow,  nor  much  aided  Suchet's  operations. 
For  the  Catalans  continually  harassed  that  general's  convoys 
from  the  left  of  the  Ebro,  while  the  seventh  corps,  besides 
suffering  severely  from  assassinations,  had  been  repulsed  at 
Cardona,  had  excited  the  people  of  the  plain  of  Urgel  to  a 
state  of  rabid  insurrection,  and  had  lost  its  own  communica- 
tions with  the  Ampurdam.  In  that  district  Swartz  had  been 
destroyed,  Filieu  and  Palamos  taken,  and  the  Catalans  were 
everywhere  more  powerful  and  elated.  Barcelona  was  again 
in  distress,  and  a  convoy  from  Perpignan  destined  for  its 
relief,  dared  not  pass  Hostalrich.  Macdonald  therefore 
resolved  to  return  to  Gerona  by  the  road  of  Manresa,  Moya, 
and  Granollers,  and  having  communicated  his  intention  to 
Suchet,  and  placed  his  baggage  at  Lerida,  commenced  his 
march  the  4th  of  November.  Campo  Yerde  getting  know- 
ledge of  this  resolved  to  fight  him  in  a  pass  near  Calaf,  but  his 
heart  failed  and  the  French  reached  Manresa  the  7th.  Parties 
were  immediately  sent  towards  Vich  and  other  places  to  mis- 
lead the  Spaniards,  while  the  main  body  moved  by  the  Gariga 
pass  to  Granollers,  where  Baraguay  d'Hilliers  was  to  meet  it 
with  the  convoy  for  Barcelona ;  he  did  not  come,  and  Macdonald 
returned  by  the  Trenta  Pasos  to  Gerona  the  10th  and  sent  his 
convalescents  to  Figueras. 

The  vicinity  of  Gerona  was  exhausted  and  the  troops  were 
to  be  fed  by  convoys  from  -  France  while  the  posts  in  the 
Ampurdam  were  re-established  and  the  district  re-organized 
The  muster-rolls  showed  ten  thousand  men  in  hospitals,  sir. 
thousand  in  Barcelona,  and  several  thousands  distributed  along 
the  coast  and  lines  of  communication,  leaving  about  thirty 
thousand  for  field  operations.  Of  these  fourteen  thousand 
were  under  Baraguay  d'Hilliers  in  the  Ampurdam,  and 


200  PENINSULA  WAR.  [DEC.  1810. 

Macdonald  marched  with  the  remaining  sixteen  thousand  for 
the  fourth  time  to  succour  Barcelona.  Souham  and  Pino 
commanded  his  divisions,  for  Severoli  had  been  recalled  to 
Italy  to  organize  reinforcements,  and  the  march  was  made  as 
before  in  one  mass;  the  denies  were  broken  up  and  the  bridge 
over  the  Tordera  destroyed,  but  Macdonald  in  six  hours  opened 
new  roads  over  the  hills  right  and  left  of  the  Trenta  Pasos, 
and  so  reached  the  more  open  country  about  Granollers. 
,  Verde  retired  to  Tarasa  and  Caldas,  and  the  French 
tnoved  onwards  to  Barcelona,  yet  so  resolved  to  avoid 

-, -;.  a  defeat,  he  would  not  suffer  Pino  to  improve  a 

favourable  moment  for  crushing  the  Catalans  in 
nor  would  he  pursue  Campo  Verde  to  Tarasa  as  all 
his  gerierals  advised.  Having  delivered  his  convoy  and  sent 
his  carts  back  to  France  he  moved  to  the  Llobregat,  leaving 
Souham  and  Pino  discontented  at  Barcelona,  and  giving  their 
divisions  to  Frere  and  Fontanes. 

Macdonald  had  no  design  of  besieging  Taragona.  He 
inarched  without  artillery  or  wheel-carriages,  and  the  Spaniards, 
seeing  that  he  would  return  to  Lerida,  posted  their  main  body 
at  Montserrat  and  Igualada ;  he  disregarded  them,  drove  Sars- 
field  from  Arbos  and  Vendril,  and  turned  towards  the  pass  of 
Massarbones,  which  leads  through  the  range  of  hills  separating 
Villa  Franca  from  the  district  of  Vails.  The  Catalans  had 
broken  up  that  and  the  pass  of  Christina  leading  to  the  Gaya, 
but  the  French  general  made  new  ways,  and  the  30th  spread 
his  troops  over  the  Paneda  or  plain  of  Taragona,  thus  showing 
how  useless  it  is  to  destroy  roads  as  a  defence,  unless  men  are 
also  there  to  fight.  Instead  of  occupying  Ecus  as  before, 
Macdonald  now  took  post  about  Momblanch,  having  his  rear 
to  Lerida  and  leaving  the  passes  from  Taragona  to  the  Ebro 
open.  But  in  this  position  he  could  not  feed  his  troops,  nor 
stop  the  Catalans  from  succouring  Tortoza;  for  Campo  Verde 
encamped  at  Lilla  above  the  defiles  between  him  and  Tara- 
gona, and  O'Donnel,  who  still  directed  the  movements  although 
not  able  to  take  the  field,  sent  parties  into  the  rocky  Gariga  dis- 
trict behind  their  right,  to  interrupt  Macdonald's  foragers  and 
harass  Suchet's  water  communications  by  the  Ebro.  From  the 
heights  of  Lilla  the  Catalans  called  on  the  French  soldiers  to  come 


EXPLANATORY     SKETCH 
AND 

SIEGE    OF 

1811. 


JAN.  1811.]  BOOK  XIII.— CHAP.  2.  201 

up  and  fight,  and  they  would  have  done  so  if  Macdonald  would 
have  suffered  them ;  but  after  ten  days  of  inactivity  he  divided 
his  troops  into  many  columns,  and  in  concert  with  Abbe"'s 
brigade  of  Suchet's  corps,  which  marched  from  Xerta,  endea- 
voured to  inclose  and  destroy  the  detachments  in  the  Gariga. 
The  Spaniards  immediately  dispersed  in  the  mountains,  and 
the  French  army  only  gained  some  mules  and  four  thousand 
sheep  and  oxen ;  with  this  spoil  they  united  again  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  Ebro,  and  were  immediately  disposed  on  a  line 
extending  from  Vinebre  which  is  opposite  to  Flix — to  Masos 
which  is  opposite  to  Mora — and  from  thence  to  Garcia  and 
Gniestar.  Suchet  was  thus  enabled  to  concentrate  his  troops 
about  Tortoza,  and  the  siege  of  that  place  was  immediately 
commenced.  His  operations  during  the  five  months  he  had 
been  waiting  on  the  slow  movements  of  Macdonald  shall  now 
be  related. 

When  he  resigned  the  Urgel,  and  his  magazines  at  Monzon 
to  Macdonald  in  September,  he  deprived  himself  of  the 
resources  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Ebro  from  Mequinenza  to 
Tortoza,  and  was  forced  to  fetch  provisions  from  Zaragoza, 
Teruel,  and  other  parts  a  hundred  miles  from  his  camp. 
Macdonald  by  going  to  Cardona  had  exposed  his  water- 
carriage  to  attacks  from  the  Spaniards  stationed  between 
Taragona,  Momblanch,  and  Falcet;  and  the  difficulty  of 
getting  his  battering-train  down  the  river  became  more  diffi- 
cult as  the  sinking  of  the  water  exposed  the  bars  and  weirs 
impeding  the  navigation.  He  had  however  taken  advantage 
of  an  accidental  flood  to  bring  down  twenty-six  pieces,  which 
were  escorted  by  Macdonald's  Neapolitan  division,  before  that 
marshal  marched  to  Cardona.  When  that  march  occurred 
Habert  was  at  Tivisa,  and  a  reserve  occupied  Mas  de  Mora. 
And  as  Laval  died  about  this  time,  his  division  was  given  to 
Harispe,  a  general  distinguished  throughout  the  war  by 
ability,  courage,  and  humanity.  The  Valencians  then  pre- 
pared again  to  disturb  the  blockade  of  Tortoza,  wherefore 
Suchet  strengthened  Boussard's  detachment  at  Uldecona,  and 
gave  the  command  to  Musnier,  who  was  replaced  at  Zaragoza 
by  general  Paris.  At  the  same  time  colonel  Kliski  was  sent 
to  command  the  detachments  on  the  side  of  Montalvan, 


202  PENINSULA  WAR.  [SEPT.  1810, 

Teruel,  Daroca,  and  Calatayud,  where  a  partisan  warfare  was 
continued  with  undiminished  activity  by  Villa  Campa.  He 
had  opened  secret  communications,  and  excited  commotions 
even  in  Zaragoza,  and  on  the  7th  of  August,  beating  a  forag- 
ing detachment  near  Cuevas,  had  recaptured  six  thousand 
sheep,  and  at  Andorra  had  taken  both  convoy  and  escort: 
on  the  side  of  Navarre  also,  Mina  coming  down  into  the 
Cinco  Villas  destroyed  some  detachments,  and  impeded  the 
foraging  parties.  Thus  the  third  corps  also  began  to  suffer 
privations,  and  no  progress  was  made  towards  the  conquest  of 
Catalonia. 

In  September,  Villa  Campa  with  increased  forces,  advanced 
so  near  Suchet  that  Habert  attacked  and  drove  him  over  the 
frontier  in  dispersion,  recapturing  all  the  sheep  before  lost. 
Suchet  then  brought  down  the  remainder  of  the  battering 
train,  and  stores  for  the  siege ;  but  as  the  waters  of  the  Ebro 
were  low,  the  new  road  was  used  for  the  convoys,  which  thus 
came  slowly  and  with  many  interruptions  and  considerable 
loss;  especially  on  the  17th  of  September,  when  a  whole 
Neapolitan  battalion  suffered  itself  to  be  taken  without  firing 
a  shot.  In  this  manner  affairs  dragged  on  until  the  28th  of 
October  when  Macdonald  returned  to  Gerona,  and  Suchet's 
hopes  of  commencing  the  siege  were  again  baffled.  At  this 
time  the  assembling  of  the  Cortes  had  given  new  vigour  to 
the  resistance  in  Spain,  and  the  regency's  plan  of  sending 
secret  juntas,  to  organize  and  regulate  the  partidas,  being  put 
in  execution,  the  activity  of  those  bands  became  proportioned 
to  the  supplies  and  promises  conveyed  to  them.  One  of 
those  secret  juntas,  composed  of  clergy  and  military  men 
having  property  or  influence  in  Aragon,  endeavoured  to  renew 
the  insurrection  formerly  excited  by  Blake  in  that  province; 
they  sent  emissaries  to  all  quarters,  concerted  operations 
with  Mina,  and  diligently  followed  the  plan  of  secretly  draw- 
ing off  provisions  from  Aragon  to  starve  the  French.  Car- 
bajal,  one  of  the  junta,  joining  Villa  Campa  assumed  command 
on  that  side;  while  the  English  naval  captain,  Codrington, 
carried  a  detachment  by  sea  to  Peniscola,  with  intent  to  fall 
on  Suchet's  flank  if  he  should  march  by  the  court  road 
against  Valencia.  And  when  Macdonald  returned  to  the 


Nov.  1810.]  BOOK  XIII.  — CHAP.   2.  203 

Ampurdam,  the  Aragonese  also  became  unquiet,  the  partidas 
from  Navarre  and  the  district  of  Montalvan  and  Calatayud, 
closed  in  on  Suchet's  communications,  the  Valencians  came 
up  towards  Uldecona,  and  Garcia  Navarro  moving  from 
Taragona  with  a  division,  again  took  the  position  of  Falcet. 

To  disperse  these  gathering  clouds  Suchet  struck  first  at 
the  insurgents.  Chlopiski  was  sent  with  a  strong  force 
against  Carbajal,  and  defeated  him  at  Alventoza.  Villa 
Campa  rallied  the  beaten  troops  on  the  mountain  of  Fuente 
Santa,  received  reinforcements,  and  renewed  the  project  of 
insurrection;  but  Chlopiski  again  defeated  him  on  the  12th  of 
November,  and  drove  him  to  the  river  Libras,  where  the 
bridge  broke  and  many  Spaniards  were  drowned :  the  French 
lost  a  hundred  men,  and  Chlopiski  returned  to  Tortoza  leaving 
Kliski  with  twelve  hundred  to  watch  Villa  Campa.  Now 
the  Ebro  rose,  and  the  remainder  of  the  battering  train  and 
stores,  being  embarked  at  Mequinenza  on  the  3rd,  dropped 
down  the  stream;  but  the  craft  outstripped  the  escort,  and 
the  convoy  being  assailed  from  the  left  bank,  lost  two  boats ; 
the  others  grounded  on  the  right  bank,  and  were  there  de- 
fended by  the  cannoneers,  until  the  escort  came  up  on  the 
one  side,  and  on  the  other  general  Abbe",  who  had  been  sent 
from  Guardia  to  their  succour.  The  waters,  however,  sud- 
denly subsided,  and  the  convoy  was  in  danger  until  Suchet 
reinforced  Abbe",  who  was  thus  enabled  to  keep  the  Spaniards 
at  bay,  while  Habert,  with  fifteen  hundred  men,  made  a 
diversion  by  attacking  the  camp  at  Falcet.  On  the  7th,  the 
river  rose  again,  and  the  boats  with  little  loss  reached  Xerta 
on  the  9th.  All  things  were  therefore  ready  to  commence 
the  siege,  but  the  seventh  corps  still  kept  aloof. 

Suchet  was  perplexed.  The  provisions  he  had  with  so 
much  pains  collected  from  the  most  distant  parts  of  Aragon, 
were  rapidly  wasting,  forage  was  becoming  scarce,  and  as  the 
plain  of  Urgel  was  given  over  to  the  seventh  corps,  the 
latter  had  become  a  burthen  to  him  instead  of  an  aid.  He 
had  since  the  beginning  of  the  year  supplied  his  army  entirely 
from  the  resources  of  Aragon  without  help  from  France,  and 
had  in  six  months  used  up  a  hundred  and  twenty  thousand 
sheep  and  twelve  hundred  bullocks.  Anxious  about  the  future 


204  PENINSULA   WAR.  [Nov.  1810. 

consumption  he  called  the  notables  and  heads  of  the  clergy  in 
Aragon  to  his  head-quarters,  and  with  their  advice  re-organ- 
ized his  internal  administration.  He  removed  many  absurd 
restrictions  upon  industry  and  trade,  placed  the  municipal 
power  and  police  entirely  with  the  natives,  and  thus  obtained 
greater  supplies  with  less  discontent.  And  he  was  well 
served  and  obeyed,  both  in  matters  of  administration  and 
police  by  the  Aragonese,  whose  feelings  he  was  careful  to 
sooth,  showing  himself  in  all  things  a  shrewd  governor  and 
an  able  commander. 

When  Macdonald  marched  from  Barcelona  towards  Tara- 
gona  Suchet  attacked  the  Spanish  troops  at  Falcet.  Habert 
assailed  their  camp  in  front  while  detachments  turned  it 
by  both  flanks,  and  the  Catalans  fled,  leaving  Garcia  Navarro 
and  three  hundred  men  in  the  hands  of  the  victors.  But 
while  Suchet  operated  on  the  side  of  Falcet,  the  Valencian 
Bassecour,  thinking  he  would  be  detained  by  Navarro  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Ebro,  resolved  to  surprise  Musnier  at  Ulde- 
cona.  To  aid  this  operation,  a  flotilla  from  Peniscola,  attacked 
Rapita,  and  other  small  posts  on  the  coast  between  the  Cenia 
and  the  Ebro,  and  the  governor  of  Tortoza  menaced  Amposta 
and  the  stations  at  the  mouth  of  the  Ebro. 

Bassecour  moved  in  three  columns ;  one,  following  the  coast- 
road  towards  Alcanar,  turned  the  French  left;  another  passing 
behind  the  mountains  took  post  at  Las  Ventallas,  in  rear  of 
Musnier,  to  cut  him  off  from  Tortoza ;  the  main  body  moved 
against  his  front.  In  the  night  of  the  26th  the  Spanish 
cavalry  fell  upon  the  French  camp  outside  the  town,  but  the 
guards  checked  the  attack  until  the  troops  came  out  of  the 
town  and  formed  in  order  of  battle.  At  daylight,  the  Spanish 
army  covered  the  hills  in  front,  and  those  in  rear  also,  for  the 
detachment  at  Ventallas  was  in  sight:  the  French  were 
thus  surrounded  when  the  action  commenced.  The  Valencians 
in  front  were  however  beaten  with  loss  of  sixteen  hundred 
men,  and  those  in  rear  made  off  to  the  mountains  again. 
Bassecour  withdrew  behind  the  Cenia,  Musnier  surprised  him 
there  in  the  night,  and  sending  the  cuirassiers  by  the  route  of 
Vinaros  cut  off  his  retreat,  which  was  made  with  such  haste 
and  disorder,  that  the  French  cavalry  falling  in  with  the  fugi- 


Nov.  1810.]  BOOK   XIII.  — CHAP.   2.  205 

tives  near  Benicarlo  killed  or  took  nine  hundred : 
the  Spanish  general  saved  himself  in  Peniscola,      ^MTwel- 
and   thither   also   the    flotilla,   having   failed   at      lesiey's 
Rapita,  returned.     Suchet  then  sent  his  prisoners      MSS* 
to  France  by  Jaca,  and  directed  a  convoy  of  pro- 
visions, newly  collected  at  Mequinenza,  to  fall  down  the  Ebro 
to  the  magazines  at  Mora.     Fearing  the  current  might  again 
carry  the  boats  faster  than  the  escort,  he  directed  the  latter 
to  proceed  first,  and  sent  Abbe*  to  Flix  to  meet  the  vessels, 
but  the  Spaniards  in  the  Garriga  placed  an  ambuscade  near 
Mequinenza,  and  attacked  the  craft  before  they  could  come  up 
with  the  escort.     The  boats  were  then  run  ashore  on  the 
right  side,  and  seventy  men  from  Menquinenza  came  down 
the  left  bank  to  their  aid,  which  saved  the  convoy,  though  the 
succouring  detachment  was  cut  to  pieces.     Soon  after  this 
Macdonald  took  post  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Ebro,  when  the 
long  delayed  siege  was  commenced. 


206 


PENINSULA  WAR. 


[DEC.  18ia 


CHAPTER  III. 


TORTOZA,  with  a  population  of  ten  thousand   souls   and  a 
garrison  of  from  eight  to  nine  thousand  regular  troops,  was 
justly   considered   the   principal    bulwark    of   Catalonia   and 
Valeacia ;  but  it  was  commanded  by  Lilli,  conde  d'Alaeha,  a 
feeble  man,  whose  only  claim  was,  that  he  had  shown  less 
incapacity  than  others  before  the  battle  of  Tudela  in  1808. 
The  Spaniards  outside,  confiding  in  the  strength  of  the  place, 
let  the  attack  advance  far  ere  any  interruption  was  contem- 
plated; and  had  any  project  for  its  relief  been  framed,  it  could 
not  have  been  executed,  because  discord  raged  amongst  the 
Spanish  chiefs.     Campo  Verde  desired  to  supersede  O'Donnel, 
Bassecour  held  unceasing  dispute  with  his  own  officers,  and 
with   the    members    of   the   Valencian    congress,    and   Villa 
Campa  repelled  both  Carbajal  and  Bassecour.     At  this  critical 
time  therefore  all  was  stagnant,  except  the  English  vessels, 
blockading  Rosas,  Barcelona,  and  the  mouths  of  the  Ebro. 
Watching  from  certain   head-lands   they  pounced  upon  the 
enemy's   convoys   as   they   crept  from  port   to  port,   threw 
provisions,  ammunition,  and  stores  into  Taragona  and  Tor- 
toza,  and  were   generally  successful,   yet  at  times  met  with 
disasters.     Thus,  captain  Rogers  of  the  Kent,  having  with 
him  the  Ajax,  Cambrian,  Sparrow-hawk,  and  Minstrel,  disem- 
barked six  hundred  men  and  two  field-pieces  under  captain 
Fane  at  Palamos,  where  they  destroyed  a  convoy  intended  for 
Barcelona,    but   re-embarking   in   a   disorderly  manner,   the 
French  took  or  killed  two  hundred,  Fane  being  amongst  the 
prisoners.      The  Catalan  army  was  thirty  thou- 
sand strong,  including  garrisons,  and  in  a  better 
state  than  it  had  hitherto  been ;  the  Valencians, 
although  discouraged  by  the  defeat  at  Uldecona, 
were  still  numerous,  and  the  Spaniards  were  con- 


Abstract 

of  Mr.  Wel- 

lesley's 

Despatches, 

MSS. 


DEC.  1810.]  BOOK  XIII.  —  CHAP.   3.  207 

vinced  that  succoured  or  unsuccoured  the  place  would  not  fall. 
O'Donnel,  created  conde  de'  Bispal,  was  so  disabled  by  wounds, 
that  he  resigned  the  command,  and  Campo  Verde  was  by  the 
voice  of  the  people  raised  in  his  stead :  for  it  was  their  nature 
always  to  believe  that  the  man  who  made  most  noise  was  the 
fittest  person  to  head  them,  and  in  this  instance,  as  in  most 
others,  they  were  mistaken. 

Tortoza,  situated  on  the  left  of  the  Ebro,  communicated 
with  the  right  bank  by  a  bridge  of  boats,  which  was  the  only 
Spanish  bridge  on  the  river  from  Zaragoza  to  the  sea.  Below 
and  above  the  place  there  was  a  plain,  so  narrowed  by  the 
juttings  of  the  mountains  where  the  town  was  built,  that 
while  some  houses  were  close  to  the  water  on  flat  ground, 
others  stood  on  bluff  rocky  points  shot  from  the  hills  above, 
and  appeared  to  tie  the  ntountains,  the  river,  and  the  plains 
together.  Five  of  these  shoots  were  taken  in  by  the  ramparts 
and  outworks.  One,  south  of  the  town,  was  crowned  by  the 
fort  of  Orleans,  and  on  the  north  another  was  occupied  by  a 
fort  called  the  Tenaxas.  To  the  east  a  horn-work  was  raised 
on  a  third  shoot,  which  being  prolonged,  and  rising  suddenly 
again  between  the  suburbs  and  the  city,  furnished  the  site  of 
a  castle  or  citadel:  the  other  two,  and  the  deep  ravines 
between  them  were  defended  by  the  ramparts,  which  were 
extremely  irregular,  and  strong  from  situation,  rather  than 
construction. 

There  were  four  fronts. 

1°.  The  northern,  defending  tlie  suburb.  This  front,  built 
on  the  plain,  was  so  embedded  between  the  Ebro,  the  horn- 
work,  the  citadel,  and  the  Tenaxas,  that  it  could  not  even  be 
approached  until  the  latter  fort  was  taken. 

2°.  The  eastern.  Extending  from  the  horn-ivork  to  the 
bastion  of  San  Pico.  Here  the  deep  ravines  and  the  rocky 
ground,  which  was  also  overlooked  by  the  citadel  and  flanked 
by  the  horn-work,  rendered  any  attack  very  difficult. 

3°.  The  south-eastern.  From  the  bastion  of  San  Pico  to 
tlie  bastion  of  Santa  Cruz.  This  front,  protected  by  a  deep 
narrow  ravine,  was  again  covered  by  the  fort  of  Orleans,  which 
was  itself  covered  by  a  second  ravine. 

4°.   The  southern.     From  tlie  Santa  Cruz  to  tlie  Ebro.     The 


208  PENINSULA   WAR.  [DEC.  1810. 

ground  of  approach  here  was  flat,  the  soil  easy  to  work,  and 
the  fort  of  Orleans  not  sufficiently  advanced  to  flank  it  with 
any  dangerous  effect;  wherefore  against  this  front  Suchet 
resolved  to  conduct  his  attack. 

A  rising  ground  opposite  the  bridge-head  on  the  right  bank 
of  the  Ebro,  called  the  Roquetta,  was  fortified  and  occupied 
by  three  regiments;  and  on  the  15th,  Suchet  crossed  the  Ebro 
by  his  own  bridge  at  Xerta,  with  eight  battalions,  the  sappers, 
and  two  squadrons  of  hussars.  He  marched  between  the 
mountains  and  the  river  upon  the  fort  of  Tenaxas,  while 
Habert,  with  two  regiments  and  three  hundred  hussars,  moving 
from  Perillo,  attacked  a  Spanish  detachment  encamped  on  the 
Col  d'Alba.  WhenSuchet's  column  arrived  in  sight  of  it,  the  rear, 
under  Harispe,  filing  across  the  rugged  shoots,  swept  round  the 
place,  leaving  in  every  ravine  and  oi*every  ridge  a  detachment, 
until  the  half  circle  ended  on  the  Ebro  below  Tortoza.  The 
investment  was  perfected  on  the  left  bank  by  the  troops  from 
Kocquetta,  and  by  Habert  who  entered  the  line  of  investment, 
Suchet's  driving  before  him  six  hundred  men  from  the  Col 

Memoirs.  d'Alba.  The  communication  across  the  water  was 
lesley,  then  established  by  three,  and  afterwards  by  four 

MSS.  flying  bridges,  placed  above  and  below  the  town ; 

a  matter  of  some  difficulty  and  importance,  because  all  the 
artillery  and  stores  had  to  come  from  Rocquetta  across  the  water, 
which  was  there  two  hundred  yards  wide  and  in  certain  winds 
very  rough. 

Macdonald  finding  no  forage  sent  his  cavalry  back  to 
Lerida  by  the  road  of  Lardecans,  and  marched  from  Mas  de 
Mora  across  the  hills  to  Perillo  to  cover  the  siege ;  his  patroles 
discovered  a  Spanish  division  near  the  fort  of  Felipe  de  Bala- 
guer,  yet  he  would  not  attack  them,  and  thinking  he  could 
not  remain  for  want  of  provisions,  returned  on  the  19th  to 
Gniestar.  This  retrograde  movement  was  like  to  have  exposed 
the  investing  troops  to  a  disaster ;  for  as  the  seventh  corps 
retired,  a  second  Spanish  division  coming  from  Reus  reinforced 
the  first;  but  Macdonald  then  placed  Frere's  division  of  six  thou- 
sand infantry  and  a  regiment  of  cavalry  at  Suchet's  disposal, 
on  condition  that  the  latter  should  feed  them,  which  he  couk. 
well  do.  These  trooos  were  stationed  behind  the  investing 


DEC.  1810.]  BOOK   XIII. -CHAP.    3.  209 

force  on  the  road  of  Amposta,  by  which  the  Spaniards  from 
Taragona  could  most,  easily  approach;  the  remainder  of  the 
seventh  corps  encamped  at  Gniestar,  a  strong  position  covering 
the  siege  on  the  side  of  Falcet,  and  only  fifteen  miles  from 
Tortoza.  In  this  situation  it  could  be  fed  from  Lerida,  and 
with  greater  facility  send  detachments  up  the  Ebro,  to  protect 
the  convoys  coming  from  Mequinenza.  During 
these  movements  one  division  of  Catalans  took 
post  on  the  Llobregat  under  Caro ;  another  under 
Yranzo  at  Momblanch ;  a  third  under  Campo  Verde  in  observ- 
ation of  Frere's  covering  division.  O'Donnel  had  previously 
sent  two  convoys  to  Tortoza,  which  from  the  rapidity  of  the 
investment  failed;  he  then  proposed  combined  movements 
to  raise  the  siege,  when  his  wounds  forced  him  to  resign,  as 
before  noticed:  Yranzo  should  have  succeeded  him,  but  the 
popular  cry  gave  the  authority  to  Campo  Verde. 

SIEGE   OF   TORTOZA.. 

•  San  Pedro,  a  half  bastion  situated  in  the  plain  close  to 
the  river,  was  the  first  object  of  attack;  and  to  prevent  Fort 
Orleans  incommoding  the  trenches,  the  approach  was  traced 
in  a  slanting  direction,  refusing  the  right  and  pushing  forward 
the  left.  To  cover  the  flanks,  Fort  Orleans  was  masked  by  a 
false  attack  on  one  side  of  the  Ebro,  and  trenches  opened 
against  the  bridge-head  were  brought  down  close  to  the  water 
on  the  other  side.  The  19th  the  posts  of  the  besieged  were 
driven  in,  and  an  unfinished  work  in  advance  of  Fort  Orleans 
was  taken  possession  of.  In  the  night  a  deceitful  flying  sap 
was  commenced  one  hundred  and  sixty  yards  from  the  fort, 
upon  an  extent  of  three  hundred  and  sixty  yards,  but  the 
following  night  the  true  attack  was  opened  in  the  plain  during 
a  storm;  and  as  the  Spaniards  had  placed  no  guards  in  front, 
the  French  worked  within  a  hundred  and  fifty  yards  of  the 
San  Pedro.  Their  parallel  was  five  hundred  yards  long; 
extending  from  the  false  sap  down  to  the  bank  of  the  river; 
two  communications  were  also  begun,  and  ground  was  broken 
on  the  left  bank  against  the  bridge-head. 

At  daylight,  the  Spaniards,  perceiving   the   works,  com- 

VOL.  IIL  P 


210  PENINSULA  WAR.  [DEC.  1810. 

menced  a  heavy  fire  and  made  a  sally.  They  were  over- 
whelmed by  musketry  from  the  false  attack  of  Fort  Orleans, 
and  the  trenches  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Ebro ;  and  in  the 
night,  the  communication  was  extended  to  fourteen  hundred 
yards,  nine  batteries  were  commenced,  and  bags  of  earth  placed 
along  the  edge  of  the  trenches,  whence  chosen  men  shot  down 
the  Spanish  artillery  men. 

On  the  23rd,  a  night  sally,  made  from  the  bridge-head,  was 
repulsed,  and  next  day  the  second  parallel  of  the  true  attack 
was  commenced.  In  the  night  of  the  25th,  separate  sallies 
were  again  made  and  repulsed,  and  the  works  were  advanced 
to  within  twenty-five  yards  of  the  palisades ;  a  tenth  battery 
was  also  commenced,  and  when  day  broke  the  Spanish  gunners 
quailed  under  the  aim  of  the  chosen  marksmen.  In  the  night 
of  the  26th,  the  besieged  overturned  the  head  of  the  sap  and 
killed  the  sappers,  but  were  finally  repulsed  by  the  reserve, 
and  the  approach  was  immediately  pushed  forward  to  the 
place  of  arms.  Thus,  on  the  seventh  night  of  open  trenches, 
the  besiegers  were  lodged  in  the  covered  way  before  a  shot 
had  been  fired  from  either  breaching  or  counter  batteries ;  'a 
remarkable  instance  of  activity  and  boldness,  and  a  signal 
proof  that  the  defence  was  ill-conducted. 

During  the  night  of  the  27th,  the  works  were  enlarged  as 
much  as  the  fire  of  the  place  would  permit ;  whereupon  the 
Spaniards,  seeing  the  batteries  ready  to  open,  made  a  general 
sally  through  the  eastern  gates  against  the  false  attack  at  Fort 
Orleans,  and  through  the  southern  gates  against  the  works  in 
the  plain.  Habert  drove  them  back  with  slaughter  from  the 
former  point ;  at  the  latter  they  won  the  covered  way,  reached 
the  second  parallel,  burnt  the  gabions,  and  did  much  damage 
ere  the  reserves  could  repulse  them.  Next  night  the  batteries 
were  armed  with  forty-five  pieces,  seventeen  being  on  the  right 
bank,  to  take  the  works  at  the  main  attack  in  reverse  and 
break  the  bridge.  At  daybreak  all  these  guns  opened  with 
success  against  the  demi-bastion  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river; 
but  the  fire  from  the  castle,  the  bridge-head,  the  horn- 
work,  and  the  quay,  overpowered  the  guns  on  the  right  bank, 
and  although  the  bridge  was  injured,  it  was  not  rendered  im- 
passable. 


JAN.  1811.]  BOOK  XIII.— CHAP.  3. 

On  the  30th,  the  Spanish  fire  was  overpowered,  the  bridge 
was  broken,  and  in  the  night  an  attempt  was  made  to  pass 
the  ditch  at  the  true  attack,  but  two  guns,  still  untouched, 
defeated  this  effort.  However,  the  Spaniards  abandoned  the 
bridge-head,  and  the  French  batteries  on  the  right  bank  dis- 
mounted the  two  guns  which  had  defended  San  Pedro.  The 
besiegers  then  effected  the  passage  of  the  ditch  without  diffi- 
culty, and  the  miner  being  attached  to  the  scarp,  worked  into 
the  wall  while  the  batteries  opened  a  breach  in  the  curtain. 
A  lodgment  was  then  made  in  preparation  for  an  assault,  but 
at  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning  the  besieged  displayed  the  white 
flag:  the  negotiations  for  a  surrender  were,  however,  pro- 
longed until  evening  by  the  governor,  without  any  result,  and 
the  miner  resumed  his  work  in  the  night. 

At  seven  o'clock  on  the  1st  of  January,  two  practicable 
breaches,  besides  that  in  the  curtain,  were  opened  by  the  artil- 
lery, and  the  mine  was  ready  to  explode,  when  three  white 
flags  were  seen  to  wave  from  different  parts  of  the  fortress ; 
nevertheless  the  disposition  of  the  garrison  was  mistrusted, 
and  Suchet  demanded  as  a  preliminary  the  immediate  posses- 
sion of  one  of  the  forts, — a  necessary  precaution,  for  disputes 
arose  amongst  the  besieged,  and  Lilli  intimated  to  Suchet,  that 
his  own  authority  was  scarcely  recognised.  In  this  critical 
moment,  the  French  general  gave  proof  that  he  was  more 
than  a  mere  soldier ;  for  riding  up  to  the  gates  with  a  con- 
siderable staff,  and  escorted  only  by  a  company  of  grenadiers, 
he  informed  the  Spanish  officer  on  guard,  that  hostilities  had 
ceased,  and  then,  leaving  his  grenadiers  on  the  spot,  desired  to 
be  conducted  to  the  governor  who  was  in  the  citadel.  Lilli 
was  just  yielding  to  the  remonstrances  of  the  officers  about 
him  against  a  surrender,  when  the  French  general  thus  sud- 
denly appeared  at  his  council  board ;  the  Spanish  guard  began 
to  stir,  but  Suchet  assumed  an  arrogant  tone,  spoke  of  the 
impatient  fierceness  of  the  French  troops,  and  even  menaced 
military  execution  if  further  delay  occurred.  During  this 
extraordinary  scene  Habert  brought  in  the  grenadiers  from 
the  gate,  and  the  stupified  governor  after  signing  a  short 
capitulation  gave  over  the  citadel  to  them.  This  event 
being  made  known,  the  Spanish  troops  assembled,  and 


PENINSULA  WAR.  [JAN.  1811. 

Alacha,  in  presence  of  Suchet,  ordered  them  to  lay  down  their 
arms. 

Four  hundred  French  and  fourteen  hundred  Spaniards  had 
fallen  during  the  siege;  many  thousand  prisoners,  nine 
standards,  one  hundred  pieces  of  artillery,  ten  thousand 
muskets,  and  immense  magazines  enhanced  the  value  of  the 
conquest,  which  by  some  was  attributed  to  Lilli's  treachery, 
by  others  to  his  imbecility, — there  seems  reason  for  both 
charges,  and  it  was  a  heavy  treason.  For  the  fall  of  the  place, 
besides  opening  the  western  passage  into  Catalonia,  and  cut- 
ting off  the  communication  between  that  province  and  Valencia, 
reduced  the  Catalan  army  to  twenty  thousand  men,  including 
the  garrisons  of  the  towns  still  in  their  possession.  Campo 
Verde  immediately  retired  from  Falcet  to  Momblanch,  and 
Suchet,  always  prompt  to  make  one  success  the  prelude  to 
another,  endeavoured  in  the  first  moment  of  consternation  and 
surprise  to  get  possession  of  the  forts  of  Peniscola  and  San 
Felipe  de  Balaguer.  Nor  was  he  deceived  with  respect  to  the 
last,  for  that  place,  in  which  were  five  guns  and  a  hundred 
men,  was  taken  on  the  9th  by  Habert ;  but  at  Peniscola  his 
summons  was  disregarded. 

Meanwhile  Macdonald,  leaving  the  Neapolitan  brigade  still 
on  the  Ebro,  passed  by  Falcet  to  Keus,  where  he  encamped 
the  1.1th,  as  if  to  invest  Taragona;  yet  without  any  real 
intention  to  do  so,  for  his  cavalry  and  field  artillery  were  left 
at  Lerida  and  Tortoza,  and  his  actual  force  did  not  exceed 
twelve  thousand  men.  Campo  Verde,  who  had  retreated  before 
him,  then  posted  Sarsfield  with  six  thousand  men  at  Vails, 
from  whence  he  made  incursions  against  Macdonald's  foragers, 
and  also  surprised  at  Tarega,  on  the  other  side  of  the  moun- 
tains, a  regiment  of  Italian  dragoons  which  he  would  have 
destroyed  but  for  the  succour  of  a  neighbouring  post. 

On  the  14th  Macdonald  marched  towards  Vails,  Sarsfield 
retired  to  Pla,  and  was  pursued  by  Eugenio  with  two  thousand 
Italian  infantry.  This  officer,  headstrong  and  intractable, 
pushed  into  the  plain  of  Pla,  contrary  to  his  orders,  and  was 
nearing  that  town,  when  a  strong  body  of  cavalry  poured  out 
of  it,  and  on  each  side  the  Spanish  infantry  were  seen  descend- 
ing the  hills  in  order  of  battle.  Eugenio  attacked  the  first 


JAN.  1311.]  BOOK  XIII —CHAP.   3.  213 

that  entered  the  plain,  but  fell  mortally  wounded  and  his  men 
retreated  fighting.  The  firing  being  heard  at 
Vails,  Palombini  marched  to  his  assistance,  but 
was  himself  beaten  and  thrown  into  confusion: 
Sarsfield,  at  the  head  of  the  Spanish  horse,  was  then  preparing 
to  complete  the  victory,  when  the  French  colonel  Delort 
coming  up  with  some  squadrons  charged  with  great  fury,  and 
so  brought  off  the  Italians:  Delort  himself  was  however 
desperately  wounded,  and  the  whole  loss  was  not  less  than  six 
hundred  men.  Macdonald  would  scarcely  suffer  Palombini  to 
succour  Eugenie's  troops,  and  did  not  move  himself;  a  great 
error,  for  Sarsfield  was  so  eager  in  pursuit  as  to  come  within 
two  miles  of  Vails,  and  being  on  open  ground  might  have 
been  crushed  in  turn.  Being  unmolested  he  returned  to  the 
pass  of  Cabra,  leaving  his  cavalry  as  before  in  Pla,  whence 
through  bye-roads  they  communicated  with  Taragona. 

A  few  days  after  this,  Sarsfield  came  out  again  in  order  of 
battle,  and  at  the  same  time  Campo.  Verde  appeared  with  a 
division  on  the  hills  in  rear  of  Vails.  Macdonald  was  thus 
surrounded,  but  Palombini's  brigade  sufficed  to  send  Campo 
Verde  back  to  Taragona,  and  Sarsfield  refused  battle;  then 
the  French  marshal,  who  had  resolved  to  go  to  Lerida  yet 
wished  to  move  without  fighting,  broke  up  from  Vails  in  the 
night,  and  with  great  order  and  silence  passed  by  the  road 
of  Fuencalde,  between  the  defiles  of  Cabra  and  Bibas ;  both 
Were  occcupied  by  the  Spaniards,  yet  his  movement  was  not 
discovered  until  next  day.  From  thence  he  marched  by 
Momblanch  upon  Lerida,  where  he  arrived  the  19th,  and 
three  days  afterwards  spread  his  troops  oyer  the  plains  of 
Urgel,  to  collect  provisions,  money,  and  transport,  and  to 
watch  the  defiles  of  the  mountains.  But  the  Catalan  general, 
having  received  stores  and  arms  from  England  and  Cadiz, 
called  out  all  the  migueletes  and  somatenes  of  the  hills  round 
the  plain  of  Urgel,  and  united  them  at  Santa  Coloma  de 
Querault  under  Sarsfield,  while  the  regular  army  assembled 
at  Igualada  and  Villa  Franca.  The  Spaniards  thus  occupied 
a  concentrated  position  and  cut  off  Macdonald  from  Barcelona 
and  the  Ampurdam,  which  was  then  harassed  by  Eroles, 
Rovira,  and  the  brigade  of  Martinez. 


214  PENINSULA   WAR.  [FEB.  1811. 

Suchet  being  called  by  the  exigencies  of  his  government  to 
Zaragoza,  carried  one  division  there,  and  distributed  another 
under  Musnier  at  Teruel,  Molina,  Alcanitz,  and  Morella. 
He  also  withdrew  his  troops  from  Cambril,  which  Habert  had 
surprised  on  the  7th  of  February;  but  he  left  that  general, 
with  a  division,  in  command  of  Tortoza,  having  two  thousand 
men  at  Perillo  to  connect  the  city  with  San  Felipe  de  Bala- 
guer.  These  things  gave  importance  to  the  success  against 
Eugenio,  for  the  Spaniards  attributed  the  separate  retreats  of 
the  French  corps  to  fear.  Macdonald's  movement  had  the 
appearance  of  a  flight;  but  while  gathering  provisions  at 
Lerida,  he  repaired  the  works  of  Balaguer  as  a  pivot  for  the 
troops  employed  to  forage  the  country  watered  by  the 
Noguera,  Cinca,  and  Legre  rivers. 

It  may  appear  extraordinary  that  the  war  could  have  been 
continued  under  such  difficulties,  but  the  resources 
Appendix  7,  were  s^  great.  A  junta  had  been  formed  in 
Catalonia  to  procure  provisions,  and  although  the 
English  orders  of  council  interfered  with  the  trade  of  neutral 
vessels  bringing  grain,  bread  could  be  bought  at  the  rate  of 
121bs.  to  the  dollar,  while  with  Wellington's  army  in  Castille 
it  often  cost  half  a  dollar  a  pound.  When  the  French  forag- 
ing parties  came  out  from  Barcelona,  their  march  could  be 
always  traced  by  the  swarms  of  boats,  loaded  with  people  and 
provisions,  shooting  out  from  the  coast-towns,  to  hover  for  a 
while  under  the  protection  of  the  English  vessels,  and  then 
return  when  the  danger  was  over :  and  the  enemy  did  never 
meddle  with  these  boats,  lest  they  should  remove  the  cover  to 
their  own  supplies.  Suchet  also  armed  Rapita  and  other  small 
places  at  the  mouth  of  the  Ebro,  with  a  view  to  afford  shelter 
to  the  armed  craft,  which  watched  provision-vessels  sailing 
from  Valencia  for  Taragona,  and  aided  French  vessels  engaged 
in  a  like  course  coming  from  France.  To  feed  Barcelona, 
Maurice  Mathieu  at  times  occupied  the  head-lands  from  St. 
Filieu  to  Blanes,  while  small  convoys  crept  along  shore,  and 
a  fleet  loaded  with  provisions  and  powder  and  escorted  by 
three  frigates,  entered  it  in  February.  A  continual  supply 
was  likewise  kept  up  by  sailing-boats  and  small  vessels,  which 
could  not  be  easily  detected  amidst  the  numerous  craft  belong- 


MARCH,  1811.]          BOOK  XIII.  —  CHAP.   3.  215 

ing  to  the  people  along  the  coast  ;  and  as  the  claims  of  hunger 
are  paramount  to  all  .others,  it  was  necessary,  for  the  sake  of 
the  inhabitants,  to  permit  provision  sometimes  to  reach  Bar- 
celona by  land.  The  Spanish  generals  winked  at  it,  and 
Milans  and  Lacy  have  even  been  charged  with  permitting 
corn  to  pass  into  that  city  for  private  profit.  Yet  by  these 
and  like  expedients  the  war  was  sustained. 

No  important  event  occurred  after  Eugenio  fell,  until  the 
3rd  of  March,  when  the  garrison  of  Tortoza  being 
weakened    by  the    detachment    at   Perillo,   the 


Spaniards  endeavoured  to  cut  the  latter  off,  intend-  Despatches, 
ing  if  successful  to  assault  Tortoza  itself.  They 
also  attacked  the  fort  of  San  Felipe,  yet  failed,  and  the 
French  at  Perillo  effected  their  retreat  with  considerable  loss. 
This  attempt  was  followed  by  a  more  important  effort.  On 
the  19th  of  March,  Campo  Verde  assembled  eight  thousand 
men  at  Molinos  del  Rey,  four  thousand  at  Guisols,  and  three 
thousand  at  Igualada,  to  surprise  the  city  and  forts  of  Barce- 
lona, for  he  had,  as  he  thought,  corrupted  the  town-major  of 
Montjuic.  He  sent  eight  hundred  chosen  grenadiers  in  the 
night  by  the  hills  of  Hospitalette,  to  enter  that  fort,  and  they 
descended  into  the  ditch,  where  Maurice  Mathieu,  apprised  of 
the  plan,  in  an  instant  overwhelmed  them  with  fire. 

Napoleon  now  changed  the  system  of  the  war.  All  Cata- 
lonia west  of  the  upper  Llobregat,  and  from  Igualada  by 
Ordal  to  the  sea,  including  the  district  of  Tortoza,  was  placed 
under  Suchet's  government  j  and  seventeen  thousand  of  Mac- 
don  aid's  troops  were  united  to  the  third  corps,  which  was  thus 
augmented  to  forty-two  thousand  men,  and  took  the  title  of 
the  '  Army  of  Aragon."1  It  was  destined  to  besiege  Taragona, 
while  Macdonald's  force,  reduced  to  twenty-seven  thousand 
under  arms,  including  fifteen  thousand  in  garrison  and  in  the 
Ampurdam,  was  restricted  to  the  upper  part  of  Catalonia. 
His  orders  were  to  attack  Cardona,  Berga,  Seu  d'Urgel,  and 
Montserrat;  and  to  war  down  Martinez,  Manso,  Rovira,  and 
other  chiefs  in  the  mountains  between  Olot  and  the  Cerdana. 
Five  thousand  men,  chiefly  composed  of  national  guards,  was 
also  ordered  to  assemble  at  Mont  Louis,  to  act  in  the  Cerdana, 
and  on  the  rear  of  the  partisans  in  the  high  valleys  who  had 


216  PENINSULA  WAR.  [MARCH,  1811. 

even  penetrated  into  France  and  burnt  some  villages  there. 
The  line  of  operations  against  Catalonia  was  thus  altered 
from  France  to  Aragon,  the  difficulties  were  lessened,  and 
the  seventh  corps,  reduced  in  numbers,  became  the  secondary 
army ;  finally  Macdonald's  formal  method  was  exchanged  for 
the  lively  vigorous  talent  of  Suchet.  But  the  delay  already 
caused  in  the  siege  of  Tortoza  could  never  be  compensated; 
Suchet  had  been  kept  on  the  Ebro,  when  he  should  have  been 
on  the  Guadalaviar,  and  this  enabled  the  Murcians  to  keep 
the  fourth  corps  in  Grenada,  when  it  should  have  been  on  the 
Tagtis  aiding  Massena, 


MARCH,  1811.1          BOOK   XITT.  — CHAP.   4.  217 


CHAPTER  IV. 


DURING  the  siege  of  Tortoza,  Villa  Campa  and  others  waged 
active  war  against  Aragon.     Stimulated  by  the  secret  juntas, 
and  supported  by  English  supplies  this  warfare  was  now  from 
experience  more  ably  conducted.     The  English  squadrons  on 
the  northern  coast  combined  their  operations  better,  and  the 
partidas  thus  supported  acquired  a  more  solid  military  orga- 
nization.     They  were  not  equal  to  the  deliverance  of  their 
country  but  were  useful  auxiliaries,  and  the  interruption  they 
gave  to  the  French  correspondence  was  certainly  tantamount 
to  a  diminution  of  forty  thousand  troops,  without  reckoning 
those  who  were  necessarily  employed  to  watch  and  pursue  the 
bands.   The  moral  effect  produced  in  Europe  by  a  struggle  thus 
maintained  was  also  very  considerable.    Nevertheless  the  same 
number  of  men  under  good  discipline  would  have  been  more 
efficacious,  less  onerous  to  the  country  people,  less  subversive 
of  social  order.      When  the   regular  army  is  completed,  all 
that  remains  in  a  country  may  be  turned  to  advantage  as 
irregulars,  yet  they  are  to  be  valued  as  their  degree  of  orga- 
nization approaches  that  of  the  regular  troops:  militia  are 
better  than  armed   bodies  of  peasantry,   and  these   last,  if 
directed  by  regular  officers,  better  than  sudden  insurrections 
of  villagers.    The  Spanish  armies  were  never  completed,  never 
well  organized;  when  they  were  dispersed,  which  happened 
nearly  as  often  as  they  took  the  field,  the  war  must  have 
ceased  in  Spain,  had  it  not  been  kept  alive  by  the  partidas, 
and  it  is  there  we  find  their  moral  value.     When  the  British 
armies  kept  the  field,  the  partidas  harassed  the  enemy's  com- 
munications, and  this  constituted  their  military 
value.     It  is  however  certain  they  never  much     Appendix  i 
exceeded  thirty  thousand  in  number;  and  they 
could  not  have  long  existed  in  anv  numbers  without  English 


218  PENINSULA  WAR.  [MARCH,  1811. 

supplies,  unless  a  spirit  of  order  and  providence,  different 
from  anything  witnessed  during  the  war,  had  arisen  in  Spain. 
How  absurd  then  to  reverse  the  order  of  the  resources  pos- 
sessed by  an  invaded  country,  to  confound  the  moral  with  the 
military  means,  to  place  the  irregular  resistance  of  the  pea- 
sants first,  and  that  of  the  soldiers  last  in  the  scale  of  physical 
defence. 

That  many  partida  chiefs  became  less  active,  after  they 
received  regular  rank,  is  true ;  but  this  was  a  consequence  of 
the  inveterate  abuses  which  oppressed  the  vigour  of  the 
regular  armies,  and  necessarily  affected  the  partidas  when  they 
became  a  constituent  part  of  those  armies.  Many  persons  of 
weight  ascribed  to  this  bestowal  of  rank  on  the  chiefs,  the 
acknowledged  after  inactivity  of  the  partidas.  It  is  however 
probable  that  a  life  of  toil  and  danger,  repeated  defeats,  the 
scarcity  of  plunder,  and  general  discontent  at  the  exactions  of 
the  chiefs,  had  abated  the  fire  of  patriotism;  inactivity  was 
rather  the  sign  of  subjection  than  the  result  of  an  injudicious 
interference  by  the  government.  During  the  siege  of  Tortoza, 
the  concentration  of  the  third  and  seventh  corps  exposed 
Aragon  and  Catalonia  to  desultory  enterprises,  when  the  par- 
tidas, more  numerous  and  powerful,  were  also  more  ardent, 
because  the  assembly  of  the  Cortes  seemed  to  acknowledge 
the  people's  importance  in  the  struggle.  Hence  no  better 
test  of  their  real  influence  can  be  found  than  their  exploits 
during  that  period,  when  two  French  armies  were  fixed  as  it 
were  to  one  spot,  the  supplies  from  France  nearly  cut  off  by 
natural  difficulties,  the  district  immediately  round  Tortoza 
completely  sterile,  Catalonia  generally  exhausted,  and  a  project 
to  create  a  fictitious  scarcity  in  the  fertile  parts  of  Aragon 
diligently  and  in  some  sort  successfully  pursued  by  the  secret 
juntas.  The  number  of  French  foraging  parties,  and  the 
distances  to  which  they  were  sent  were  then  greatly  increased, 
and  the  facility  of  cutting  them  off  proportionably  augmented, 
yet  nothing  important  was  effected  by  the  partidas. 

Villa  Campa's  operations  during  the  blockade  have  been 
already  related,  but,  although  sometimes  successful,  the  results 
were  mostly  adverse  to  him ;  and  when  after  the  siege  was 
actually  commenced,  he  came  down  towards  the  side  o 


MARCH,  1811.]  BOOK  XIII.  —  CHAP.  4.  219 

Daroca,  his  cavalry  was  surprised  by  colonel  Kliski  who  cap- 
tured or  killed  one  hundred  and  fifty  in  the  village  of  Blancas. 
Then  he  retired,  but  being  soon  after  joined  by  the  Empe- 
cinado  from  Cuenca,  he  returned  in  January  to  the  frontier  of 
Aragon,  and  took  post  between  Molina  and  Albaracin.  At 
this  period  Tortoza  had  surrendered,  and  Musnier's  division 
was  spread  along  the  western  part  of  Aragon;  wherefore 
Suchet  detached  Paris  with  one  column  from  Zaragoza,  and 
Abbe*  with  another  from  Teruel,  to  chase  these  two  partidas. 
Near  Molino,  Paris  found  the  Empecinado,  who  joined  Villa 
Campa,  but  the  French  general  forced  both  from  their  moun- 
tain position  near  Frias,  and  being  joined  by  Abbe"  continued 
the  pursuit  for  several  days,  until  the  fugitives  took  different 
routes.  Paris  then  followed  Villa  Campa,  and  Abbe"  pursued 
the  Empecinado  through  Cuenca,  from  whence  Carbajal  and 
the  secret  junta  immediately  fled.  Paris  failed  to  overtake 
Villa  Campa,  but  entered  Beleta,  Cobeta,  and  Paralejos,  all 
three  containing  manufactories  for  arms,  which  he  destroyed, 
and  then  returned.  This  expedition  lasted  only  twelve  days, 
yet  the  smaller  bands  in  Aragon,  had  taken  advantage  of  it  to 
cut  off  a  detachment  of  fifty  men  near  Fuentes :  and  on  the 
side  of  Navarre  Mina  entered  the  Cinco  Villas  and  cut  to 
pieces  one  hundred  and  fifty  gens-d'armes  near  Sadava. 
However  Chlopiski  pursued  him  so  closely,  that  his  band 
dispersed  near  Coseda  in  Navarre. 

During  this  time  the  Valencians,  always  swayed  by  factions, 
displaced  Bassecour  and  appointed  Coupigny  in  his  stead. 
The  notables  raised  money  for  recruits,  but  Coupigny  would 
not  take  the  command,  because  the  Murcian  army  was  not  also 
given  to  him;  and  that  army,  although  numerous,  was  in  a 
very  neglected  state,  and  unable  to  undertake  any  service. 
When  Tortoza  fell,  the  Valencians  were  frightened.  They 
repaired  and  garrisoned  the  fort  of  Oropesa,  and  some  smaller 
posts  on  the  coast,  along  which  runs  the  only  artillery-road  to 
their  capital ;  they  commenced  fortifying  Murviedro,  or  rather 
the  rock  of  Saguntum  overhanging  it,  and  they  sent  fifteen 
hundred  men  into  the  hills  about  Cantavieja.  These  last  were 
dispersed  on  the  5th  of  April  by  a  column  from  Teruel ;  and 
on  the  llth  another  body  having  attempted  to  surprise  Ulde- 


220  PENINSULA   WAR.  [APRIL,  1811. 

cona,  which  was  weakly  guarded,  were  also  defeated  and 
sabred  by  the  French  cavalry.  These  events,  especially  the 
destruction  of  the  gun-manufactories,  repressed  the  activity  of 
the  partisans,  and  Suchet  went  to  Lerida  in  the  latter  end  of 
March,  to  receive  the  soldiers  to  be  drafted  from  the  seventh 
corps. 

Macdonald,  desirous  to  reach  Barcelona,  was  forced  to  take 
an  escort  of  seven  thousand  men,  and  marched,  not  by 
Igualada,  which  was  occupied  in  force  by  Sarsfield,  but  by 
the  circuitous  way  of  Manresa;  for  neither  he  nor  Suchet 
wished  to  engage  in  desultory  actions  with  the  forces  destined 
for  the  siege.  Sarsfield,  however,  passing  by  Calaf  with  his 
own  and  Eroles'  troops,  waited  on  Macdonald  near  the  Car- 
denera  river,  while  a  detachment,  barricading  the  bridge  of 
Manresa,  opposed  him  in  front.  The  bridge  was  carried,  and 
the  town  being  abandoned,  the  Italian  soldiers  wantonly  set 
fire  to  it  in  the  night ;  an  act  immediately  revenged ;  for  the 
flames,  seen  to  a  great  distance,  so  enraged  the  Catalans,  that 
in  the  morning  all  the  armed  men  in  the  district,  regulars 
migueletes  and  somatenes,  assembled  on  the  neighbouring 
hills,  and  fell  with  infinite  fury  upon  Macdonald's  rear  as  it 
passed  out  from  the  ruins  of  the  burning  city.  The  French 
then  pushed  for  the  bridge  of  Villamara  over  the  Llobregat, 
which  was  two  leagues  distant;  but  the  country  between  the 
rivers  was  one  vast  mountain,  and  Sarsfield,  seeing  the  French 
rear  halting  to  receive  the  somatenes,  while  the  front  still 
advanced,  thought  to  place  his  division  between,  by  moving 
along  the  heights  which  skirted  the  road.  Macdonald,  how- 
ever, finally  passed  the  Llobregat,  but  with  difficulty  and 
the  loss  of  four  hundred  men,  for  his  march  was  continually 
under  Sarsfield's  fire,  and  some  of  his  troops  were  forced  to 
cross  by  a  ford.  During  the  night  he  collected  his  scattered 
men,  and  moved  upon  Sabadel,  whence  he  pushed  on  alone 
for  Barcelona,  and  Harispe  returned  by  the  Momblanch  road 
to  Lerida  with  the  escort. 

The  invasion  of  Catalonia  was  now  divided  into  three  parts, 
each  assigned  to  a  distinct  army. 

1°.  Suchet,  with  that  of  Aragon,  was  to  take  Taragona  and 
subdue  the  lower  part  of  the  province. 


APRIL,  1811.1  BOOK  XIII.  — CHAP.  4. 

2°.  Macdonald,  with  that  part  of  the  seventh  corps  called 
the  active  army  of  Catalonia,  was  to  break  the  long  Spanish 
line,  extending  from  Taragona  through  Montserrat  to  the 
Cerdana,  and  the  high  mountains  about  Olot. 

3°.  Baraguay  d'Hilliers,  having  his  head-quarters  at  Gerona, 
was  to  hold  the  Ampurdam  and  co-operate  with  Macdonald, 
under  whose  orders  he  still  remained.  The  five  thousand  men 
collected  near  Mount  Louis,  at  the  entrance  of  the  French 
Cerdana,  were  to  act  on  the  rear  of  the  Spaniards  in  the 
mountains,  while  the  others  attadked  them  in  front.  .Nor  did 
the  success  appear  doubtful,  for  the  hopes  and  means  of  the 
province  were  sinking.  The  loss  of  men  at  Tortoza  and  other 
places,  the  reputation  of  Suchet,  the  failure  at  Barcelona, 
Perillo,  and  San  Felipe  de  Balaguer,  the  incapacity  of  Campo 
Verde,  now  generally  felt,  and  the  consequent  desertion  of  the 
migueletes,  would  have  insured  success,  for  the  French  if  they 
had  not  been  suddenly  thwarted  by  Rovira,  who  surprised  the 
great  fortress  of  Fernando  de  Figueras,  the  key  of  the  Pyrenees. 
This,  the  boldest  and  most  important  enterprise  effected  by  a 
partida  chief  during  the  whole  war,  merits  a  particular  detail. 

Guillot,  governor  of  the  place,  enforced  no  military  disci- 
pline.    His  guards  were  weak,  the  soldiers  used      vacani, 
the  palisades  for  fuel,  and  the  garrison  often  made      Mr- Wel- 

IG^IBY 

incursions   to   a   distance.      The   town,  situated      Campbell, 
below  the  hill,  upon  which  the  great  fortress  of      J^dr' 
Fernando  stands,  had  been  momentarily  occupied      Stuart, 
by  the  Italian  general  Peyri,  with  six  hundred      MSSt 
men  destined  to  join  Macdonald,  and,  trusting  to  the  fortress 
above,  they  were  negligent;  the  garrison  above  was  still  more 
so ;  for  Guillot  having  on  the  9th  sent  his  best  men  to  drive 
some  somatenes  from  the  neighbouring  hills  they  returned  at 
night  fatigued,  and  being  to  go  out  again  next  day  slept  while 
gates  were  confided  to  convalescents,  or  men  unfit  for  duty, 
and  the  ramparts  were  unguarded. 

There  were  in  the  fort  two  Catalan  brothers  named  Palopos, 
and  a  man  called  Juan,  under- storekeepers,  who  being  gained 
by  Rovira  had  obtained  from  the  head  of  their  department 
the  keys  of  the  magazines,  and  of  a  postern  under  one  of  the 
gates.  Things  were  in  this  state  when  Rovira  came  down  from 


222  PENINSULA  WAU.  [APRIL,  1811. 

St.  Lorenzo  de  Muga  in  the  night  of  the  9th,  and  secretly 
reached  the  covered  way  with  seven  hundred  chosen  men  of 
his  own  partida.  Martinez  followed  in  support  with  three 
thousand  migueletes,  and  the  Catalan  brothers  opened  the 
postern  for  Rovira,  who  immediately  disarmed  the  guard  and 
set  wide  the  gate  for  the  reserve.  Some  shots  being  fired  the 
garrison  took  arms,  but  Martinez  came  in  so  quickly  no  effec- 
tual resistance  could  be  made.  Thirty  or  forty  men  were 
killed  or  wounded,  the  magazines  were  seized,  the  governor 
and  sixteen  hundred  soldiers  and  camp-followers  were  taken  in 
their  quarters,  and  in  an  hour  Rovira  was  master  of  one  of  the 
strongest  fortresses  in  Europe :  three  cannon-shot  were  then 
fired,  as  a  signal  to  the  somatenes  in  the  surrounding  moun- 
tains to  bring  in  provisions  as  rapidly  as  possible.  Peyri 
alarmed  by  the  noise  in  the  fortress  and  guessing  the  cause, 
had  collected  the  troops,  baggage,  sick  men,  and  stores  in  the 
town  below,  and  sent  notice  to  Gerona;  but  he  made  no 
attempt  to  retake  the  place,  and  at  daylight  retired  to  Bascara. 
He  had  mounted  the  hills  during  the  night,  to  observe  how 
matters  went,  and  thought  nothing  could  be  done :  this  opinion 
was  condemned  at  the  time,  and  during  the  confusion  of  the 
first  surprise,  it  is  probable  a  brisk  attempt  by  six  hundred 
fresh  men  might  have  recovered  the  fortress. 

At  Bascara,  five  hundred  men  detached  from  Gerona  on  the 
spur  of  the  occasion,  met  him  with  orders  to  re -in vest  the 
place,  and  Baraguay  d'Hilliers  promised  to  follow  with  all  his 
forces.  Then  Peyri,  although  his  troops,  many  of  whom  were 
only  national  guards,  were  fearful,  returned  to  Figueras,  drove 
the  Spaniards  out  of  the  town  and  took  post  in  front  of  the 
fort :  yet  he  could  not  prevent  Martinez  from  receiving  men 
and  provisions  from  the  somatenes.  Rovira's  exploit  spread 
with  inconceivable  rapidity  throughout  the  Peninsula,  and  its 
exhilarating  influence  affected  even  the  Anglo-Portuguese 
army,  then  not  much  given  to  credit  or  admire  the  exploits  of 
the  Spaniards.  However  Baraguay  d'Hilliers  invested  the 
fort  with  six  thousand  infantry  and  five  hundred  cavalry,  and 
this  so  quickly  that  the  Spaniards  had  not  time  to  remove  six- 
teen thousand  muskets  which  were  in  the  fort. 

Martinez  remained  governor,  Rovira  went  to  the  mountains. 


APRIL,  1811.]  BOOK  XIII.  — CHAP.  4.  223 

and  all  Catalonia,  animated  by  the  Promethean  touch  of  this 
chief,  seemed  to  be  moving  at  once  upon  Figueras.  Cainpo 
Verde  came  to  Vich,  designing  to  relieve  it,  and  in  concert 
with  the  English  and  Spanish  vessels  to  blockade  Rosas  by 
land  and  sea.  Rovira  collected  a  convoy  of  provisions  near 
Olot.  Captain  Bullen  with  the  Cambrian  and  Volontaire 
frigates,  seeing  the  French  troops  withdrawn  from  Gerona, 
drove  out  the  garrisons  of  San  Filiou  and  Palamos,  destroyed 
the  batteries,  and  made  sail  to  join  captain  Codrington  at 
Rosas.  A  Spanish  frigate  with  a  fleet  of  coasting-vessels 
loaded  with  supplies  anchored  at  Palamos ;  Francisco  Milans, 
after  beating  a  detachment  near  Arens  de  Mar,  invested  Hos- 
talrich;  Juan  Claros  hovered  about  Gerona,  and  Eroles  and 
Manso  coming  from  Montserrat  reduced  Olot  and  Castel- 
follit.  Sarsfield  remained  in  the  Seu  d'Urgel  and  directed  the 
mountaineers  to  establish  themselves  at  Balaguer,  but  they 
were  driven  away  with  great  loss  by  a  detachment  from 
Lerida. 

On  the  3rd  of  May  Campo  Verde,  having  drawn  Milans 
from  Hostalrich,  marched  with  eleven  thousand  men  from 
Avionet  and  Villa  Fan  against  Figueras,  hoping  to  draw  the 
French  general  to  that  side,  while  Rovira,  whose  convoy  was 
at  Besalu,  forced  a  small  camp  near  Llers  on  the  opposite 
quarter  and  entered  the  fortress.  The  circuit  of  investment 
was  wide,  rugged,  and  thinly  garnished  with  men ;  but  some 
works  had  been  raised,  and  when  the  Catalans  approached, 
Baraguay  d'Hilliers,  reinforcing  the  camp  at  Llers,  marched 
with  four  thousand  men  against  Campo  Verde  who  was  already 
in  the  Figueras  valley.  He  had  driven  back  the  French 
cavalry,  and  had  but  one  battalion  in  his  front  when  this 
column  took  him  in  flank,  and  at  the  same  time  the  dispersed 
cavalry  rallied  and  charged,  whereupon  he  retreated  with  the 
loss  of  fifteen  hundred  men.  His  confidence  had  been  so 
great  that  he  kept  the  sheep  of  the  convoy  too  far  behind  to 
enter  the  fort  while  the  way  was  open,  and  the  succour  was 
confined  to  a  few  artillerymen  some  tobacco  and  medicines. 
Captain  Codrington  by  agreement  made  a  simultaneous  attack 
on  Rosas  but  it  produced  no  serious  effect,  and  Fernando  was 
eft  to  its  own  resources ;  those  were  few,  for  the  French  with 


PENINSULA   WAR.  [APRIL,  1811. 

a  strange  negligence  had  never  stored  the  place.  Martinez 
who  had  four  thousand  men  was  therefore  driven  to  a  rigid 
economy  of  food,  but  in  bearing  such  privations  the  Peninsula 
race  are  unrivalled. 

Macdonald  setting  aside  his  own  plans,  now  earnestly 
adjured  Suchet  to  suspend  the  siege  of  Taragona,  and  restore 
him  the  troops  of  the  seventh  corps.  Maurice  Mathieu  also 
wrote  from  Barcelona  in  a  like  strain,  thinking  the  possession 
of  upper  Catalonia  depended  upon  one  powerful  effort  to 
recover  the  lost  fortress.  But  Suohet,  who  had  no  immediate 
interest  in  that  part  of  the  province,  whose  hope  of  obtaining 
a  marshal's  staff  rested  on  the  taking  of  Taragona,  his  pre- 
parations being  all  made  for  that  siege, — Suchet  whose  judg- 
ment was  unclouded,  and  military  talent  of  a  high  order, 
refused  even  to  delay  for  a  moment  his  march  against  Tara- 
gona. His  battalions,  he  said,  were  scattered  in  search  oi 
supplies,  he  could  not  reunite  them  and  reach  Figueras  under 
twenty-five  days ;  in  that  time  the  enemy,  unless  prevented 
by  Baraguay  d'Hilliers,  could  gather  provisions,  receive  rein- 
forcements, and  secure  the  fortress.  A  simple  blockade  might 
be  established  by  the  nearest  troops ;  to  accumulate  numbers 
on  such  a  sterile  spot  would  not  forward  the  recapture,  but 
would  create  infinite  difficulties  with  respect  to  subsistence. 
It  was  probable  Napoleon  had  received  information  of  the 
disaster  and  given  orders  for  the  remedy;  and  it  would  be 
unwise  to  renounce  the  attack  on  Taragona,  the  only  remain- 
ing bulwark  of  Catalonia,  at  the  moment  of  execution,  because 
of  the  loss  of  a  fort.  In  Taragoca  the  greatest  part  of  the 
Catalan  forces  would  be  shut  up,  and  it  was  only  in  such 
situations  they  could  be  made  prisoners.  At  Lerida,  Mequi- 
nenza,  and  Tortoza,  eighteen  thousand  men  and  eight  hundred 
officers  had  been  captured;  and  if  ten  or  twelve  thousand 
more  could  be  taken  in  Taragona  the  strength  of  Catalonia 
would  be  entirely  broken.  If  the  Spaniards  failed  in  revic- 
tualling  Fernando,  that  place  would,  by  occupying  their  atten- 
tion become  more  hurtful  than  useful  to  them.  Campo  Verde 
would  probably  march  to  its  succour  and  thus  weaken  Tara- 
gona, which  was  a  reason  for  hastening  rather  than  suspending 
the  investment  of  the  latter;  wherefore,  notwithstanding  the 


,  1811.]          BOOK   Xlir.  — CHAP.  4  22ft 

separation  of  his  battalions  and  the  incomplete  state  of  his 
preparations,  he  would  move  down  immediately  and  com- 
mence the  siege.'  A  wise  determination  and  justifying  his 
reputation  as  a  general. 

Macdonald  was  now  fain  to  send  all  the  troops  he  could 
safely  draw  together,  to  reinforce  Baraguay  d'Hilliers ;  a  de- 
tachment from  Toulon  and  some  frontier  guards  arrived  at 
Figueras  in  June,  and  fifteen  thousand  men  being  thus  united 
he  took  the  command  in  person.  Establishing  a  rigorous 
blockade,  he  worked  day  and  night  on  works  of  circumvallation 
and  contravallation,  and  his  lines,  six  miles  in  length,  crown- 
ing the  tops  of  mountains  and  sinking  into  the  deepest 
valleys,  showed  what  prodigious  labours  armies  are  capable  of. 
With  these  works  and  incessant  wakefulness  Macdonald 
recovered  the  place,  but  at  a  late  period  in  the  year,  and 
when  Suchet's  operations  had  quite  changed  the  aspect  of 
affairs  in  Catalonia. 

After  the  fall  of  Tortoza,  that  general  had  been  so  diligent, 
that  when  the  siege  of  Taragona  was  confided  to  him,  his 
magazines  at  Lerida  and  Mora  were  full,  -and  his  battering 
train  formed  at  Tortoza;  to  which  place  his  tools,  platforms, 
and  other  materials,  fabricated  at  Zaragoza,  were  also  con- 
veyed. Fifteen  hundred  draft  horses,  with  artillerymen  and 
engineers,  and  ten  battalions  of  infantry  were  there  collected, 
and  from  thence  shot  and  shells  were  continually  forwarded 
to  San  Felipe  de  Balaguer;  this  was  a  fine  application  of 
Caesar's  maxim,  that  war  should  maintain  itself;  for  all  the 
money,  the  guns,  provisions,  and  materials,  collected  for  this 
siege,  were  the  fruits  of  former  victories ;  nothing  was  derived 
from  France  but  the  men.  It  is  however  curious  that  Suchet 
praises  the  English  ministers'  financial  ability,  exemplified  by 
making  Spain  pay  all  the  expense  of  the  war,  and  never  permit- 
ting English  gold  to  circulate  in  the  Peninsula !  He  was  igno- 
rant that  Spain  and  Portugal  lived  upon  England,  and  that  the 
English  ministers'  paper  system  had  left  them  no  English  gold 
to  send. 

To  avoid  difficulties,  the  French  artillery  moved  by  the 
carriage  road  of  the  Col  de  Balaguer,  but  the  provisions  and 
stores  passed  from  Mora  by  Falcet  and  Momblanch  to  lieus ; 

YOL.  III.  Q 


226  PENINSULA   WAR.  [APRIL,  1811 

Mora  was  itself  supplied  from  Zaragoza,  Caspe,  and  Mequi- 
nenza,  and  the  following  general  precautions  were  adopted : — 
Gens-d'armes  and  frontier  guards,  descending  the  high  valleys  of 
Aragon,  occupied  the  castles  of  Jaca  and  Venasque.  The  great 
line  of  correspondence  with  France  was  changed  from  Pampe- 
luna,  to  run  by  Pau  and  Jaca  to  Zaragoza,  being  guarded  by 
four  or  five  thousand  troops  of  all  arms,  who  watched  the 
partidas  of  the  Moncayo  mountains  and  Navarre.  General 
Paris  occupied  Daroca  with  four  battalions,  some  cavalry  and 
guns,  and  his  command  extended  to  Molina,  which  was  armed 
and  garrisoned.  Abbe*,,  having  five  battalions,  three  hundred 
cuirassiers,  and  two  guns  at  Teruel,  watched  Villa  Campa  and 
the  Valencian  army.  Alcanitz  and  Morella,  guarded  by  fifteen 
hundred  infantry,  furnished  a  short  passage  through  the  moun- 
tains into  Valencia ;  from  the  former,  the  line  to  Caspe,  and  down 
the  Ebro  from  Mequinenza  to  Tortoza,  was  protected  by  twelve 
hundred  men ;  two  battalions  were  in  Tortoza  and  four  hun- 
dred men  in  Rapita. 

This  line  of  defence  was  from  right  to  left  fourteen 
marches,  but  the  fortified  posts  enabled  the  troops  to  protect 
it.  The  Valencian  army,  Villa  Campa,  and  the  partidas  of 
New  Castille  and  Navarre,  including  Mina  and  the  Empeci- 
nado,  were  thus  held  in  check  by  twelve  thousand  French  on 
a  line  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles.  Covered  only  by  that 
slight  curtain,  Suchet  proceeded  to  besiege  a  strong  city, 
having  a  powerful  garrison,  an  open  harbour,  and  sea  commu- 
nications with  Cadiz,  Valencia,  Gibraltar,  and  the  Balearic 
islands ;  detachments  from  the  army  of  the  centre  did,  indeed, 
at  times,  chase  the  partidas  from  the  line  of  defence  thus 
traced,  but  at  this  period,  that  army,  from  circumstances  to 
be  hereafter  noticed,  was  nearly  paralysed. 

To  avoid  using  up  the  sheep  and  cattle  of  Aragon,  which 
would  have  alienated  the  people  and  annihilated  his  own 
future  supply  by  destroying  the  breeding  flocks,  Suchet  con- 
tracted for  his  meat  in  France ;  and  so  entirely  had  he  pacified 
Aragon,  that  none  of  the  contractors  failed  though  their  herds 
and  flocks  passed  through  that  province  and  were  paid  for  by 
Aragonese  contributions.  This  resource  however,  not  being 
immediate,  and  the  scarcity  of  meat  great,  incursions  were 


EXPLANATORY    SKETCH 
AND 

OF  TARAGOETA. 


APRIL,  181  l.J  BOOK  XIII.— CHAP.  4.  227 

made  beyond  the  frontier  of  Aragon  and  in  the  higher  valleys 
of  the  Pyrenees  to  obtain  cattle.  This  was  the  state  of  affairs 
when  the  surprise  of  Figueras  took  place,  but  then  Suchet, 
fearing  Mina  would  intercept  his  communication  with  France, 
detached  Chlopiski  with  four  hundred  infantry  and  two  hun- 
dred hussars  to  watch  that  chief  only;  and  he  besought  the 
emperor  for  troops  from  Pampeluna  and  the  army  of  the 
north  to  relieve  his  posts  at  Sanguessa,  Soria,  and  Calatayud. 
Then,  having  recovered  his  foraging  detachments  from  the 
high  valleys,  he  reviewed  his  army,  issued  a  month's  pay 
and  six  rations  to  each  soldier,  loaded  many  carriages  and 
mules  with  flour,  spread  a  report  that  he  was  going  to 
Figueras,  and  moved  by  Momblanch  upon  Taragona.  Some 
migueletes  entrenched  in  the  pass  of  Ribas  were  dispersed  by 
Harispe,  and  the  army  descended  the  hills  to  Alcover;  but 
four  hundred  men  were  left  in  Momblanch,  where  a  post  was 
fortified  to  protect  the  communication  with  Lerida,  and  pre- 
vent the  partisans  on  that  flank  troubling,  the  line  between 
Mora  and  Ecus.  The  Spanish  outposts  were  soon  driven  over 
the  Francoli,  the  artillery  moved  by  the  Col  de  Balaguer,  and 
Habert  came  with  a  large  convoy  from  Mora,  to  Reua. 


228  PENINSULA    WAR.  [MAT,  1811. 


CHAPTEK   V. 


IN  Taragona,  there  was  a  scarcity  of  money  and  ammunition; 
and  so  many  men  had  gone  to  succour  Figueras,  that  the  garri- 
son, commanded  by  Gonzales,  was  not  more  than  six  thousand, 
including  twelve  hundred  armed  inhabitants  and  the  seamen  of 
the  port.  The  town,  encumbered  with  defensive  works,  most 
of  them  ill-constructed,  irregular,  and  without  convenient 
places  for  making  sallies,  was  built  upon  rocks,  steep  on  the 
north-east  and  south,  but  sinking  gently  on  the  south-west  and 
west  into  low  ground.  The  mole  harbour  could  receive  ships 
of  the  line,  and  beyond  that  there  was  a  roadstead.  The 
upper  town,  surrounded  by  ancient  walls,  crowned  the  rocks, 
winch  were  again  enclosed  by  a  second  rampart  with  irregular 
bastions  running  round  the  whole  city.  On  the  east,  across 
the  road  to  Barcelona,  was  a  chain  of  redoubts  connected  by 
curtains,  with  ditch  and  covered  way;  and  behind  this  line 
was  a  rocky  space  called  the  Milagro,  opening  between  the 
body  of  the  place  and  the  sea.  The  lower  town  on  the  west, 
separated  from  the  upper  by  the  ramparts  of  the  latter,  was 
protected  by  three  regular  and  some  irregular  bastions  with  a 
ditch.  A  square  work,  called  Fort  Koyal,  formed  a  species  of 
citadel  between  the  two  towns,  and  the  whole  offered  an 
irregular  oblong  figure,  whose  length,  lying  parallel  to  the  sea, 
was  about  twelve  hundred  yards,  On  the  west  beyond  the 
walls,  a  newly  constructed  line,  carried  along  the  coast  to  the 
mouth  of  the  Francoli,  ended  in  a  large  redoubt  built  to  secure 
access  to  that  river  when  the  ancient  aqueducts  which  fur- 
nished the  city  with  water  should  be  cut  by  the  French.  This 
line  was  strengthened  by  a  second  redoubt,  called  the  Prince, 
raised  between  that  near  the  Francoli  and  the  town,  and  it  was 
supported  by  the  mole,  which  being  armed  with  batteries,  and 
nearly  in  a  parallel  direction,  formed  as  it  were  a  second  sea-line. 


MAY,  1811.]  BOOK  XIII.— CHAP.   ft.  229 

On  the  Francoli  side  the  approach  was  level,  and  exposed  to 
the  fire  of  the  Olivo,  a -very  large  outwork  which,  on  the  north, 
crowned  a  rocky  table-land,  equalling  the  upper  town  in  height 
but  divided  from  it  by  a  ravine  nearly  half  a  mile  wide,  yet 
united  by  a  double  aqueduct.  Of  irregular  construction,  the 
Olivo  was  four  hundred  yards  long  with  a  ditch  twenty-four 
deep  and  forty  wide ;  but  the  covered  way  was  incomplete,  and 
the  gorge  of  the  work  only  closed  by  an  unfinished  loopholed 
wall,  because  the  steepness  of  the  rock  and  the  fire  of  the  upper 
town  seemed  sufficient  for  its  protection.  On  the  left,  one 
bastion  was  cut  off  by  a  ditch  and  rampart  from  the  rest  of  the 
work,  and  on  the  right  was  a  small  interior  redoubt  of  refuge, 
having  a  high  cavalier  from  which  three  guns  overlooked  every- 
thing around.  The  ordinary  garrison  was  from  twelve  to 
fifteen  hundred  men,  and  it  contained  fifty  out  of  three  hun- 
dred pieces  mounted  for  the  defence  of  Taragona. 

The  nature  of  the  soil  combined  with  the  peculiarities  of  the 
works  determined  Suchet's  line  of  attack.  On  the  north  and 
east  side  the  ground  was  rocky,  the  fronts  of  defence  wide,  the 
approaches  unfavourable  for  breaching  batteries:  and  as  all 
the  guns  and  stores  would  have  to  be  dragged  over  the  hills 
on  a  great  circuit,  unless  the  Olivo  was  first  taken,  no  diffi- 
culty could  be  avoided.  The  lower  town  was  therefore  chosen, 
although  the  artificial  defences  were  there  accumulated,  and 
the  ground  between  the  walls  and  the  Francoli  taken  in  reverse 
by  the  Olivo,  which  rendered  it  necessary  first  to  reduce  that 
outwork.  But  the  soil  was  deep  and  easily  moved,  the  depots 
and  parks  close  at  hand,  the  ground-plot  of  the  works  so 
salient  they  could  be  embraced  with  fire,  and  the  attack,  it  was 
supposed,  would  deprive  the  garrison  of  fresh  water. 

On  the  4th  of  May  the  French,  passing  the  Francoli,  drove 
in  the  outposts,  took  possession  of  two  small  detached  redoubts 
situated  on  the  northern  side  called  the  forts  of  Loretto,  and 
invested  the  place.  The  Spaniards,  supported  by  the  fire  of 
the  Olivo,  killed  and  wounded  two  hundred  men,  and  the  next 
day  made  a  fruitless  attempt  to  retake  the  lost  ground. 
Captain  Codrington,  having  three  English  ships  of  the  line 
three  frigates  and  several  Spanish  vessels  of  war,  aided  the 
defence  by  cannonading  the  French  right,  and  harassing  their 


230  PENINSULA  WAR.  [MAY,  1811. 

convoys  coming  by  the  coast  road,  but  the  investment  was 
completed. 

Habert's  division  on  the  right  extended  from  the  sea  to  the 
Francoli  bridge.  Frere's  division  connected  Habert  with 
Harispe,  who  was  before  the  Olivo.  The  Italians  prolonged 
Harispe's  left  across  the  Barcelona  road  to  the  coast,  eastward 
of  Taragona.  A  trestle-bridge  was  constructed  on  the  upper 
Francoli;  the  pare,  established  west  of  that  river  at  Canonja, 
contained  sixty-six  battering  guns  and  mortars,  with  seven 
hundred  rounds  of  ammunition,  and  thirty-six  field-pieces ;  two 
thousand  artillerymen,  seven  hundred  sappers  and  miners,  four- 
teen hundred  cavalry,  and  fifteen  thousand  infantry  were  present. 
Head-quarters  were  at  the  village  of  Constanti,  which  offered 
a  strong  covering  position.  The  dep6t  at  Ecus  was  secured  by 
fortified  convents ;  Mora  by  a  strong  detachment;  and  other 
troops  from  Falcet  watched  over  the  communications,  which 
were  also  protected  by  the  escorts  of  the  convoys.  The  aque- 
ducts leading  from  the  Olivo  to  the  town  were  cut  by  the 
French,  but  the  water,  which  was  as  necessary  to  them  as  to 
the  besieged,  had  its  source  twelve  miles  distant,  and  the 
somatenes  cut  it  off  again,  which  forced  Suchet  to  guard  the 
whole  course  during  the  siege. 

Campo  Verde  after  his  defeat  at  Figueras  sent  Sarsfield 
and  Eroles  to  their  old  posts  about  Vails,  Momblanch,  and 

Igualada,  and  went  himself  with  four  thousand 
Appendix  8,  men  ^o  Taragona,  where  the  consternation  at 

Suchet's  appearance  was  great ;  but  when  Campo 
Verde  came  with  men,  and  the  English  agent  Green,  brought 
from  Cadiz  fifty  thousand  dollars  and  two  transports  laden  with 
arms  and  stores,  apathy  ensued  and  military  measures  were  neg- 
lected. Beyond  the  walls  indeed,  an  attack  was  made  by  the 
migueletes  on  Momblanch,  and  the  somatenes  assembled  against 
Reus,  but  without  success  at  either  place;  French  patroles 
were  then  pushed  over  the  Gaya  to  Torre-dembarra,  where  some 
Spaniards  remained  under  the  protection  of  St.  Cyr's  con- 
vention with  Keding,  by  which  wounded  men  were  to  be 
placed  in  the  civil  hospitals  and  taken  care  of  without  being 
made  prisoners.  This  compact,  strange  to  say,  was  never 
violated,  while  beyond  the  hospitals  the  utmost  ferocity  was 


MAY,  1811.]  BOOK   XIII.  — CHAP.   5.  231 

displayed :  but  there  is  always  some  point  of  honour  reserved 
even  by  the  worst  men,  which  if  rightly  touched  may  be 
depended  upon. 

SIEGE   OF   TARAGONA. 

Sarsfield's  arrival  near  Momblanch  menaced  the  French 
communications  with  Mora,  and  a  Valencian  column,  acting  in 
concert  with  captain  Adam  of  the  Invincible,  attacked  Rapita 
and  Amposta;  the  first  was  abandoned,  but  a  French  regi- 
ment succoured  the  second  and  defeated  the  Valencians. 
Suchet,  unwilling  to  weaken  his  force,  would  not  restore 
Rapita,  and  immediately  commenced  operations  against  the 
lower  town  of  Taragona ;  but  first  he  constructed  a  fort  and 
batteries  on  the  right  of  the  Francoli,  near  the  shore,  to  keep 
off  the  ships  of  war  and  the  gun- boats  which  could  otherwise 
have  looked  into  his  trenches.  These  works  begun  in  the 
night  of  the  7th,  were  successfully  continued  under  the  fire  of 
the  ships,  and  a  trench  lined  with  musketeers  was  also  carried 
up  the  bank  of  the  river  to  the  bridge.  The  Spaniards  how- 
ever harassed  the  camp  and  the  investing  troops  from  within 
and  without  so  incessantly,  that  a  brigade  posted  near  the 
Olivo  was  compelled  to  raise  a  rampart,  and  yet  lost  fifty  or 
sixty  men  daily  in  skirmishes ;  but  in  the  night  of  the  1 3th, 
during  a  tempest,  the  French  having  stormed  two  advanced 
entrenchments  near  the  Olivo  turned  them  against  the  be- 
sieged. A  vigorous  attempt  to  retake  them  was  repulsed  with 
a  loss  of  one  hundred  men ;  and  on  the  Francoli  side,  a  sally 
supported  by  the  shipping  failed  in  consequence 
of  the  cowardice  of  some  Spanish  officers.  On  Appendix  8, 
the  same  day,  the  garrison  came  out  from  the 
Barcelona  gate,  and  six  hundred  somatenes  from  the  Upper 
Gaya  fell  on  the  patroles  of  the  Italian  division,  whereupon 
Palombini  scoured  the  country  on  the  15th  as  far  as  Arbos. 

On  the  18th  a  powerful  sally  was  made  from  the  lower 
town  by  Gonzales.  Covered  by  the  fire  from  the  ramparts, 
the  Olivo  and  the  fleet,  he  passed  the  bridge  over  the  Francoli, 
and  pressed  Habert  hard,  until  Suchet  pushing  the  reserves 
between  that  river  and  the  Olivo  menaced  his  rear  and  forced 
him  to  retire.  On  the  20th  three  other  sallies  from  the 


232  PENINSULA   WAR.  [MAY,  1811. 

Olivo  and  the  upper  town  were  made  on  the  Barcelona  side, 
and  likewise  repulsed.  Sarsfield  now  came  down  with  twelve 
hundred  men  to  a  high  rock  near  Alcover,  and  menaced  the 
depot  at  Reus;  he  was  dislodged  by  general  Broussard  with 
a  loss  to  the  French  of  one  hundred  men ;  yet  three  days  after 
he  appeared  at  Momblanch,  and  it  required  two  brigades  to 
drive  him  off.  Divers  attempts  were  also  made  on  the  Falcet 
line,  especially  at  GrattallOpes,  where  the  Spanish  colonel  Vil- 
lamil  was  repulsed  by  Morozinski,  a  Pole,  with  the  bravery 
inherent  to  his  heroic  nation :  a  nation  whose  glory  springs 
like  an  ignis  fatuus  from  the  corruption  of  European  honour  ! 
These  repeated  attacks  warned  Suchet  that  his  force  was 
too  weak  for  the  extent  of  communication,  and  he  abandoned 
Momblanch,  retaining  only  Falcet  and  Felipe  de  Balaguer. 
It  was  time  to  concentrate,  for  Blake,  having  gone  to  Valencia, 
had  got  from  Carlos  O'Donnel  two  thousand  infantry  and  a 
hundred  cannoneers,  and  returned  with  them  on  the  22nd  to 
Taragona.  Two  thousand  stand  of  arms  were  in  return  given 
by  captain  Codrington  to  O'Donnel,  to  equip  fresh  levies,  and 
thus  twelve  thousand  fighting  men  were  in  the  fortress ;  but 
the  richest  citizens  had  removed  with  their  families  and  effects 
to  Villa  Nueva  de  Sitjes,  and  the  people  were  dispirited. 

Suchet  broke  ground  before  the  Olivo  in  the  night  of  the 
21st,  his  approaches  being  made  from  both  ends  of  the 
Spanish  entrenchments  seized  on  the  night  of  the  13th. 
The  engineers  aimed  at  a  round  hill,  close  to  the  works, 
on  which  to  plant  their  first  breaching  battery ;  they  crowned 
it  the  22nd,  but  with  much  loss,  being  obliged  to  carry 
earth  up  the  hill  in  baskets,  under  continual  interruption  from 
sallies.  Three  counter-batteries  were  however  completed,  and 
armed  on  the  27th  with  thirteen  pieces,  of  which  six  threw 
shells.  To  effect  this,  the  artillery  had  been  dragged  over  the 
rocks  under  a  heavy  fire  of  grape,  and  in  despite  of  a  sully  in 
which  general  Salme  was  killed.  The  contest  was 
long  doubtful,  but  was  finally  decided  for  the 
French,  and  on  the  29fch,  a  breach  being  formed,  the  assault 
was  ordered. 


MAT,  1811.")  BOOK   XIII.  — CHAP.   5.  233 

STORMING    OF   THE    OLIVO. 

Upon  the  success  of  this  attack  Suchet  felt  his  chance  of 
taking  the  town  would  depend,  for  his  army  was  too  feeble 
to  bear  a  serious  check.  Wherefore,  having  formed  his 
columns,  he  personally  encouraged  them,  and  directed  the 
troops  along  the  whole  line  of  investment  to  advance  simul- 
taneously and  menace  every  part  of  the  town.  The  night 
was  dark,  the  Spaniards  unexpectant  of  an  attack  because  none 
of  their  guns  had  been  silenced,  but  the  French,  full  of  hope, 
eagerly  watched  for  the  signal:  when  that  was  given,  the 
troops  on  the  Francoli,  and  those  on  the  Barcelona  side,  made 
a  sudden  discharge  of  musketry,  beat  their  drums,  and  loudly 
shouting  approached  the  town  at  opposite  quarters ;  the  ram- 
parts were  instantly  covered  with  fire  from  within  and  from 
without,  the  ships  in  the  offing  threw  up  rockets,  and  amidst 
the  noise  of  four  hundred  guns  the  storming  columns  rushed 
upon  the  Olivo.  The  strongest  one  made  for  the  breach ;  a 
second,  turning  the  work,  got  between  it  and  the  town  just  as 
fifteen  hundred  men,  sent  to  relieve  the  garrison,  were  entering 
the  gates :  the  French  instantly  fell  on  their  rear, 
and  hurrying  forward,  entered  with  it  before 

Vacani 

the  gates  could  be  closed.     Thirty  sappers  endea- 
voured to  cut  down  the  door  while  Papignay,  their  officer, 
climbed  the  wall,  but  the  Spaniards  killed  him  and  most  of 
the  sappers ;  the  other  troops  planted  their  ladders,  and  break- 
ing the  stakes  above,  opened  the  gate. 

At  the  main  attack  a  narrow  breach  was  boldly  assailed, 
yet  the  ditch  was  fifteen  feet  deep,  the  Spaniards  firm,  the 
fire  heavy,  and  the  French  were  wavering,  when  the  historian, 
Vacani,  followed  by  some  of  his  countrymen, — it  is  a  strange 
error  to  think  the  Italians  have  not  a  brave  spirit! — forced 
some  paling,  blocking  a  subterranean  aqueduct,  and  thus 
got  into  the  ditch,  and  afterwards  into  the  fort.  The 
Spaniards,  although  driven  from  the  ramparts  to  the  little 
works  of  refuge  at  each  end  of  the  Olivo,  continued  to  resist 
until  the  reserves  and  a  third  column  under  Harispe  came  up, 
and  with  a  terrible  slaughter  ended  the  contest.  Twelve 
hundred  men  perished,  some  escaped,  a  thousand  were  taken, 


234  PENINSULA    WAR.  [JUNE,  1811. 

amongst  them  their  commander  who  had  received  ten 
wounds.  In  the  morning  three  thousand  Spaniards  came  out 
of  Taragona,  yet  retired  without  attacking,  and  Suchet  de- 
manded a  suspension  of  arms  to  dispose  of  the  dead.  This 
was  treated  with  scorn,  and  the  heaps  were  burned,  for  the 
sterile  rocks  afforded  no  earth  to  bury  them.  Campo  Verde 
now  gave  Senens  de  Contreras  the  command  of  Taragona, 
and  went  himself  to  the  field-army,  which  was  ten  thousand 
strong,  including  some  new  levies  made  by  the  junta  of  Cata- 
lonia. 

Suchet's  investment  having  been  precipitated  by  the  fall  of 
Figueras,  his'  stores  were  not  all  collected  until  the  1st  of 
June,  when  trenches  were  opened  to  embrace  the  whole  of  the 
lower  town,  including  the  fort  of  Francoli  and  its  chain  of  con- 
necting works  running  along  the  sea-shore,  that  is  to  say, 
1°.  The  Nun's  bastion  and  a  half-moon  called  the  King's, 
which  formed  on  the  Spanish  right  a  sort  of  hornwork  to 
the  royal  fort  or  citadel.  2°.  The  bastion  of  San  Carlos,  and 
a  half-moon  called  the  Prince's,  which,  standing  in  the  retiring 
angle  where  the  sea-line  joined  the  body  of  the  place,  served 
as  a  counter-guard  to  the  bastion  of  San  Carlos.  3°.  The 
sea-line  itself  and  the  Francoli  fort.  A  fruitless  sally  was 
made  the  2nd,  and  in  the  night  of  the  3rd  some  advanced 
entrenchments  were  destroyed  by  the  French.  Sarsfield  then 
entered  Taragona  with  a  detachment,  and  took  command  of 
what  was  called  the  Port,  which  included  the  mole  the  works 
leading  to  the  Francoli  and  the  suburb  or  lower  town :  Con- 
treras still  remained  governor  of  all,  but  he  expected  no 
success. 

The  approaches  were  now  carried  forward  by  the  sap,  the 
second  parallel  was  commenced,  and  on  the  6th  the  besiegers 
were  within  twenty  yards  of  the  Francoli  fort,  which  had 
a  wet  ditch  and  was  of  regular  construction.  The  breaching 
batteries  opened  against  it  the  7th,  the  fresh  masonry  crum- 
bled away  rapidly,  and  at  ten  o'clock  that  night,  the  fort 
being  entirely  destroyed,  three  hundred  chosen  men  in  three 
columns,  one  of  which  forded  the  Francoli  river,  attacked  the 
ruins.  The  Spaniards  retired  fighting  towards  the  half-moon 
of  the  Prince;  and  the  French  made  a  disorderly  attempt  to 


JUNE,  1811.]  BOOK   XIII.  — CHAP.    ft.  235 

enter  with  them,  but  were  quickly  repulsed  with  a  loss  of 
fifty  men.  Next  night  a  battery  of  six  pieces  was  con- 
structed in  the  ruins  to  silence  the  guns  of  the  mole,  which, 
together  with  that  of  the  place,  endeavoured  to  overwhelm 
the  new  lodgment  with  shot.  In  the  nights  of-  the  8th  and 
9th,  under  terrible  discharges  from  the  upper  and  lower  town, 
the  second  parallel  was  prolonged  to  fort  Francoli  on  the 
right,  and  on  the  left  carried  to  within  seventy  yards  of  the 
Nun's  bastion.  On  the  llth  Sarsfield,  in  a  sally,  killed  some 
men  and  retarded  the  works,  but  finally  three  approaches  by 
the  sap  were  conducted  against  the  Nun's  bastion  where  the 
besiegers  crowned  the  glacis,  and  against  the  half-moon  of  the 
King  and  Prince.  Fresh  batteries  were  also  constructed, 
whose  fire  embraced  the  whole  front  from  the  Prince  to 
the  Nun's  bastion. 

On  the  morning  of  the  16th  fifty-four  guns  opened  from 
the  French  batteries,  and  the  Spaniards,  placing  sand-bags 
along  the  parapets,  endeavoured  to  kill  the  gunners,  who  were 
much  exposed;  all  the  cannon  which  could  be  directed  upon 
the  trenches  were  employed  to  crush  the  batteries,  and 
towards  evening  this  fire  mastered  that  of  the  besiegers, 
destroyed  the  centre  of  their  second  parallel,  and  silenced 
a  battery  on  their  right :  the  loss  and  damage  was  however 
great  on  both  sides,  for  two  consumption  magazines  exploded 
in  the  town,  and  the  Nun's  bastion  was  breached.  The 
French  engineers  now  observed  that  the  ditch  of  the  Prince 
was  not  carried  round  to  the  sea,  and  Suchet  who  feared  a 
continuation  of  this  murderous  artillery  battle  resolved  to 
storm  that  point  at  once.  Wherefore  at  nine  o'clock  two 
columns,  supported  by  a  reserve,  issued  from  the  trenches 
and  after  a  short  resistance  entered  the  work  by  the  gap  of 
the  ditch  and  by  escalade ;  yet  the  garrison  fought  well,  and 
a  few  escaping  to  another  point  endeavoured  to  defend  them- 
selves, but  being  unsupported  were  put  to  the  sword  like  the 
rest :  the  lodgment  thus  made  was  included  in  the  trenches. 

During  the  night  of  the  17th  the  old  batteries  were  repaired 
and  a  new  one,  to  breach  the  San  Carlos,  was  begun  upon  the 
half-moon  of  the  Prince,  a  lodgment  was  effected  in  the  covered 
way  of  the  Nun's  bastion,  and  the  third  parallel  was  com- 


286  PENINSULA   WAR.  [JUNE,  1811. 

inenced;  but  on  the  right  of  the  trenches  the  workmen  were 
stopped  by  water.  However,  on  the  18th  the  third  parallel 
was  completed  and  the  descent  of  the  ditch  at  the  Nun's 
bastion  was  commenced  by  an  under-ground  gallery;  yet  the 
fire  from  the  upper  town  plunged  into  the  trenches,  and 
thirty-seven  shells  thrown  very  exactly  into  the  lodgment 
on  the  counterscarp  delayed  the  operations  there.  The  gun- 
boats, hitherto  of  little  service  in  the  defence,  were  now  put 
under  the  British  navy;  yet  the  enemy  suffered  little  from 
the  vessels  of  war,  beyond  the  interruption  sometimes  given 
to  their  convoys  on  the  Col  de  Balaguer  road. 

In  the  nights  of  the  19th  and  20th  all  the  French  works 
were  advanced,  and  the  morning  of  the  21st  the  new  battery 
in  the  Prince  opened  its  fire  against  San  Carles  and  was 
followed  by  all  the  other  batteries.  The  explosion  of  an 
expense  magazine  silenced  the  French  battery,  but  the 
damage  was  repaired,  and  at  four  o'clock  in  the  evening, 
the  Spanish  fire  being  nearly  abated  and  the  breaches  en- 
larged, Suchet  resolved  to  storm  the  lower  town.  But  pre- 
vious to  describing  this  terrible  event,  the  proceedings  within 
and  without  the  place  must  be  noticed,  to  give  a  just  idea  of 
the  state  of  affairs. 

Macdonald  had  blockaded  Figueras  with  unceasing  vigi- 
lance, the  best  of  the  migueletes  were  shut  up  there,  the 
defeat  of  Campo  Verde  spread  consternation  throughout  the 
province,  and  the  efforts  to  succour  Martinez  were  confined  to 
Kovira,  Manso,  and  other  chiefs.  Francisco  Milans  had  been 
left  in  the  Hostalrich  district,  and  being  popular  was  enabled 
to  keep  up  an  irregular  force;  but  he  sought  to  be  made 
captain-general  of  the  province,  and  this,  or  some  other 
motive,  led  him  to  favour  the  towns  of  his  district  at  the 
expense  of  the  general  cause:  Mattaro  and  Villa  Nueva  de 
Sitjes  trafficked  in  corn  with  Barcelona,  and  a  secret  convoy 
was  detected  at  a  later  period  passing  the  outposts 
Appendix  s,  wjth  Milans'  written  authority.  He  put  the  men 
to  death  who  permitted  the  convoy  to  pass,  but 
did  not  remove  the  suspicion  of  corruption  from  himself. 
This  traffic  was  so  advantageous  to  the  French,  that  Maurice 
Mathieu,  who  had  recently  suffered  in  a  skirmish  at  Mattaro, 


JUNE,  1811.]  BOOK  XIII. -CHAP.  5.  237 

was  unwilling  to  disturb  it,  and  made  no  movement  to  aid 
Suchet,  which  he  might  have  done  by  occupying  Villa  Nueva 
de  Sitjes. 

In  the  western  parts  of  Catalonia,  Sarsfield  Eroles  and 
Caro  had  formed  from  the  new  levies  an  army  of  seven  or 
eight  thousand  men,  of  which  one  thousand  under  Caro  were 
cavalry :  they  might  have  done  much  if  Campo  Verde,  a  man 
of  weak  character,  had  not  continually  changed  his  plans.  At 
the  opening  of  the  siege,  Sarsfield  had  some  success  on  the 
side  of  Momblanch  and  Keus ;  but  when  he  was  sent  into  the 
lower  town,  the  active  army,  reduced  to  Eroles'  division  and 
Caro's  cavalry,  could  only  watch  the  French  convoys  and  posts. 
Campo  Verde  fixed  his  quarters  at  Igualada,  sent  detach- 
ments to  the  Gaya  and  Villa  Franca,  and  holding  Villa  Nueva 
de  Sitjes  as  his  post  of  communication  with  the  fleet,  de- 
manded assistance  from  Murcia  and  Valencia,  but  in  Taragona 
his  proceedings  were  disliked.  Succours  came  however  from 
various  quarters.  After  captain  Codrington  had  landed  the 
reinforcements  from  Valencia,  stores  of  powder  and  mortars 
were  sent  from  that  place  and  from  Cadiz,  and  more  men  from 
Murcia;  yet  with  inexplicable  folly,  these  soldiers  were  de- 
prived of  their  arms  before  embarking,  although  there  were 
already  two  thousand  men  without  muskets  in 
the  fortress ;  this  was  attributed  by  some  to  the  ^Ppendix  8> 
Murcian  authorities,  by  others  to  the  military 
agent  Koche,  and  the  confusion  did  not  end  there.  When 
Codrington  embarked  the  Valencian  reinforcement  he  gave 
four  thousand  muskets  to  O'Donnel  for  the  recruits  who  were 
to  supply  the  place  of  the  men  he  carried  away,  and  to  enable 
Villa  Campa  and  the  Empecinado  to  resume  operations: 
thus  while  arms  were  sent  away  from  Taragona 
to  Valencia,  troops  without  arms  were  being  con-  Appendix  s-. 
veyed  to  Taragona.  The  garrison  was  thus 
augmented  nominally  to  seventeen  thousand  men,  yet  not 
more  than  twelve  thousand  were  available;  for  the  Murcians 
were  necessarily  sent  to  Montserrat  to  receive  arms,  and  the 
hospitals  were  full.  Everything  was  confused  and  disorderly. 
Several  colonels  and  other  officers,  feigning  sick-  Report  Of 
ness  or  with  open  cowardice  quitting  the  place,  Contreras 


238  PENINSULA   WAR.  [JUNE,  1811. 

left  their  regiments  under  subordinate  officers;  the  general 
of  artillery  was  an  incapable  man;  and  Contreras,  unknown 
to  the  inhabitants  and  unacquainted  with  the  place  and 
its  resources,  was  likewise  vacillating  and  deceitful  to  those 
under  his  orders.  He  had  accepted  the  command  reluctantly 
and  was  at  variance  with  Campo  Verde  outside,  and  jealous 
of  Sarsfield  inside  the  fortress;  in  the  fleet  the  Spanish 
captains  of  the  Diana  and  Prueba  were  accused  of  gross 
misconduct,  and  disputes  also  arose  between  the  English 
captains  Codrington  and  Bullen. 

Carlos  O'Donnel  and  his  brother  Henry  at  the  desire  of 
Codrington,  now  permitted  four  thousand  of  the  best  Valencian 
troops  to  embark  under  general  Miranda  to  join  in  a  grand 
sally  from  Taragona ;  but  they  exacted  a  pledge  from  him  to 
bring  back  the  survivors  of  this  their  second  detachment  when 
the  action  was  determined.  They  landed  the  12th,  and  the 
next  day  Miranda  instead  of  making  the  sally,  went,  at 
Campo  Verde's  order,  by  sea,  to  Villa  Neuva  de  Sitjes.  From 
thence  he  marched  to  meet  a  detachment  of  cavalry  coming 
from  Villa  Franca,  and  being  joined  on  the  15th  by  two  other 
squadrons  which  had  broken  out  of  Taragona  by  the  Barce- 
lona gate,  he  united  with  Campo  Verde  at  Igualada.  This 
movement  was  in  pursuance  of  a  new  plan  to  succour  Tara- 
gona. The  junta,  after  quitting  the  place  on  the  fall  of  the 
Olivo,  had  repaired  to  Montserrat  and  from  thence  made  the 
Peninsula  ring  with  their  clamours,  and  they  had  received 
promise  of  aid  from  O'Donnel  and  Villa  Campa,  and  from 
the  partida  chiefs.  On  this  foundation,  forgetting  the  sally, 
Campo  Verde  proposed  that  the  English  ships  should  can- 
nonade the  French  convoys  between  the  Col  de  Balaguer  and 
the  place ;  that  troops  should  take  post  at  Ordal  in  observa- 
tion of  the  Barcelona  garrison;  and  the  remainder  of  the  army, 
which,  including  Miranda's  men  amounted  to  ten  thousand 
infantry  and  a  thousand  cavalry,  should  occupy  a  position 
near  Reus.  His  design  was  to  communicate  with  the  fleet, 
to  avoid  any  serious  action,  and  by  operating  with  small  corps 
against  the  French  line  of  supply  compel  them  to  raise  the 
siege,  or  come  out  of  their  entrenchments  and  fight  him  in 
strong  positions.  Contreras  treated  this  with  contempt.  He 
said  it  would  c»use  the  loss  of  tho  place  and  the  army ;  the 


JUNE,  1811.]  BOOK  XIII.  —  CHAP.  5.  239 

French  would  not  raise  the  siege  except  for  a  general  battle, 
and  the  best  mode  of  fighting  them  would  be  in  concert  with 
the  garrison;  wherefore  he  desired  the  general-in-chief  to 
attack  them  in  conjunction  with  himself,  and  the  junta, 
hating  Campo  Verde,  backed  this  proposal. 

Neither  plan  was  sound.  If  the  generals  could  have 
depended  upon  their  troops,  Suchet's  force  was  so  reduced 
and  his  investment  so  extensive  it  would  have  been  easy  to 
break  through ;  yet,  unless  he  was  entirely  routed,  which  was 
unlikely,  no  great  advantage  would  have  followed,  because 
the  communication  was  already  open  by  sea.  Campo  Verde's 
plan  was  only  proposed  the  13th,  and  would  have  been  too 
slow  for  the  critical  nature  of  the  case.  It  would  have  been 
more  in  accord  with  that  great  maxim  of  war,  which  pre- 
scribes the  attack  of  an  enemy's  weakest  point  with  the  greatest 
possible  numbers,  to  have  marched  with  his  whole  force  upon 
Mora,  or  upon  Reus  to  beat  the  troops  there  and  destroy  the 
dep6ts ;  and  then  seizing  some  strong  posts  on  the  hills  close 
to  the  besieger's  lines  to  have  entrenched  it  and  operated 
daily  and  hourly  against  their  rear.  If  either  of  these  depots 
had  fallen  the  siege  must  have  been  raised ;  and  if  he  could 
not  beat  two  or  three  thousand  infantry  at  those  places,  he 
could  not  hope,  even  with  the  assistance  of  the  garrison,  to 
destroy  sixteen  thousand  of  all  arms  in  the  entrenchments 
before  Taragona.  Suchet  did  not  fear  a  battle  on  the  Fran- 
coli  river;  but  so  tender  was  he  of  the  dep6ts,  that  when 
Campo  Verde  sent  an  officer  to  raise  the  somatenes  about 
Mora,  he  called  Abbe  with  three  thousand  infantry  from 
Teruel.  And  that  general,  active  and  experienced  in  guerilla 
operations,  soon  dispersed  the  Spanish  levies  and  took  their 
chief  with  many  other  prisoners,  after  which  he  joined  the 
besieging  army.  Suchet  required  this  reinforcement.  He 
had  lost  a  general,  two  hundred  inferior  officers,  and  two 
thousand  five  hundred  men  during  the  siege,  and  had  not 
more  than  twelve  thousand  infantry  fit  for  duty. 

But  Villamil,  a  partisan  of  Campo  Verde's,  taking  advan- 
tage of  Abbe's  absence,  marched  with  a  thousand  men  to 
attack  Mora,  and  being  beaten  on  the  16th  was  succeeded  by 
Eroles,  who  came  with  his  whole  division  to  Falcet  on  the 
20th,  and  captured  a  convoy  of  loaded  mules.  The  design 


240  PENINSULA   WAR.  [JUNE,  181L 

was  to  tempt  Suchet  to  send  a  strong  detachment  in  pursuit 
of  Eroles,  in  which  case  the  latter  was  by  a  rapid  march  to 
rejoin  Campo  Verde  near  Alcover,  when  the  whole  army  was 
to  attack  Suchet  thus  weakened :  the  French  general  did  not, 
however,  move,  and  his  magazines  at  Reus  were  still  so  full 
that  the  loss  of  the  convoy  was  little  felt. 

Such  was  the  situation  of  affairs  on  the  21st  of  June,  when 
the  order  to  assault  the  lower  town  was  given  to  an  army 
small  in  number  but  full  of  vigour  and  confident  of  success ; 
while  in  the  place,  confusion  falsehood  and  folly  were  work- 
ing. Contreras  acted  a  shameful  part.  Sarsneld  had  prudently 
concerted  that  if  the  lower  town  was  stormed,  the  ships  of 
war  should  come  close  to  the  mole,  and  the  garrison  should 
retire  there  instead  of  going  to  the  upper  town.  Scarcely 
was  this  settled  when  Campo  Verde  recalled  him  to  the  active 
army,  intending  that  Velasco  should  replace  him ;  but  the  latter 
did  not  arrive,  the  breaches  were  open,  the  assault  momen- 
tarily expected ;  and  yet  Contreras  ordered  Sarsneld  to  embark 
instantly,  falsely  averring  that  to  be  Campo  Verde's  peremp- 
tory commands.  Vainly  he  remonstrated,  saying 
Appendix  8,  ^e  troops  would  be  left  to  an  inefficient  subordi- 
nate, he  was  compelled  to  embark,  the  assault 
took  place,  and  Velasco,  who  came  a  few  hours  later,  found 
only  the  dead  bodies  of  his  garrison :  Contreras  then  assured 
Codrington  and  the  junta,  that  Sarsneld  had  gone  without 
orders  and  betrayed  his  post ! 

STORMING    OF   THE    LOWER   TOWN. 

This  calamitous  event  happened  in  the  evening  of  the  21st. 
Two  breaches  had  been  made  in  the  bastions  and  one  in  the 
fort  Royal ;  they  were  not  wide,  and  a  few  Spanish  guns  still 

answered  the  French  fire ;  nevertheless  the  assault 
Codrington,  was  ordered,  and  as  some  suppose,  because  Suchet 

had  secret  intelligence  of  Sarsfield's  removal  and 
the  consequent  confusion.  Fifteen  hundred  grenadiers  as- 
sembled under  Palombini  in  the  trenches ;  a  second  column 
was  to  support  the  stormers  and  repel  any  sally  from  the  upper 
town ;  and  while  the  arrangements  were  in  progress,  the  French 


JUNE,  1811.]  BOOK  Xllt.  — CHAP.   5.  241 

guns  thundered  incessantly,  and  the  shouts  of  the  infantry, 
impatient  for  the  signal,  were  heard  between  the  salvos, 
redoubling  as  the  shattered  walls  gave  way.  Soon  Harispe 
began  to  menace  the  city  on  the  side  of  Barcelona  to  distract 
the  attention  of  the  besieged,  and  then  Suchet  exhorting  his 
soldiers  let  them  loose  while  it  was  still  day,  and  in  an  instant 
the  breaches  were  crowned,  and  the  assailants  swarmed  on  the 
bastions,  the  ramparts,  and  the  fort  Royal.  The  Spaniards, 
without  a  leader,  and  falling  in  heaps,  broke  and  fled  towards 
the  port,  towards  the  mole,  and  towards  the  upper  town,  where 
even  a  reserve  stationed  under  the  walls  was  overthrown: 
some  of  the  fugitives  running  towards  the  mole  were  saved 
by  the  English  launches,  others  escaped  into  the  upper  town, 
and  a  few  were  made  prisoners,  the  rest  were  slaughtered. 

At  eight  o'clock  the  lower  town  was  won.  Fifteen  hundred 
bodies,  many  of  them  citizens,  were  stretched  upon  the  place, 
and  the  mercantile  magazines  of  the  port  being  set  on  fire,  the 
flames  finished  what  the  sword  had  begun.  When  the  carnage 
ceased,  working  parties  were  formed,  and  ere  the  confusion  in 
the  upper  town  had  subsided,  the  besiegers  were  again  hidden 
in  their  trenches  and  burrowing  onwards.  Before  them  was  a 
front  of  four  bastions  with  curtains,  but  no  ditch.  The  bastion 
of  St.  Paul  was  opposite  their  left,  that  of  St.  John  opposite 
their  centre ;  the  bastion  of  Jesus  was  opposed  to  their  right, 
but  that  of  Cervantes,  which  covered  the  landing  place  of 
the  Milagro,  being  somewhat  retired,  was  not  embraced 
by  the  attack.  A  hollow  piece  of  ground,  serving  as  a  trench, 
enabled  the  French  engineers  to  establish  their  left  on  a  side 
bastion  of  a  wall  connecting  the  upper  with  the  lower  town, 
and  their  right  was  strongly  protected  by  some  houses  lining 
the  road ;  for  between  the  two  parts  of  the  city  there  were  four 
hundred  yards  of  open  garden-ground  interspersed  with  single 
houses.  A  battery  was  constructed  to  play  upon  the  landing- 
places  of  the  Milagro,  two  mortars  from  the  hill  of  fort  Loretto 
concurred  in  this  object,  and  the  light  troops  were  pushed  close 
up.  At  daylight  however,  the  ships  of  war  passed  the  port 
delivering  their  broadsides  in  succession,  Contreras  showed  the 
heads  of  columns  as  for  a  sally,  and  the  French  skirmishers 
retired. 

VOL.  in.  R 


242  PENINSULA   WAR  [JUNE,  1811. 

The  men  saved  by  the  ships  during  the  assault  were  now 
re-landed  in  the  upper  town,  and  the  second  reinforcement 
from  Murcia  arrived,  but  again  without  arms,  thus  adding  to 
the  confusion  and  difficulties.  Nevertheless,  as  the  French 
had  lost  six  hundred,  and  the  Spaniards  only  two  thousand, 
Contreras  had  still  nine  thousand  fighting  men,  a  number 
nearly  equal  to  the  whole  infantry  of  Suchet's  army;  and  far 
from  quailing,  he  would  not  even  receive  a  flag  of  truce  sent 
to  offer  honourable  conditions.  Suchet's  position  was  indeed 
very  embarrassing.  He  had  delivered  four  assaults,  his  force 
was  diminished  nearly  one-fifth,  and  the  men's  strength  was 
spent  with  labour  on  his  prodigious  works;  his  line  of  com- 
munication with  Lerida  was  intercepted,  that  with  Mora  inter- 
rupted, and  he  had  lost  a  large  convoy  of  provisions  together 
with  the  mules  that  carried  it.  The  resolution  of  the  besieged 
seemed  in  no  manner  abated,  and  their  communication  with 
the  sea,  although  partially  under  the  French  fire,  was  still  free; 
the  sea  itself  was  covered  with  ships  of  war,  overwhelming 
reinforcements  might  arrive  at  any  moment,  and  Campo  Verde 
with  ten  thousand  men  was  daily  menacing  his  rear.  The 
Valencian  army,  Villa  Campa,  the  Empecinado,  Duran  who 
had  defeated  a  French  detachment  near  Mirando  del  Ebro, 
Mina  who  had  just  then  taken  the  convoy  with  Massena's 
baggage  at  the  Puero  de  Arlaban,  in  fine,  all  the  partidas  of 
the  mountains  of  Albaracin,  Moncayo,  and  Navarre  were 
in  motion,  and  menacing  his  position  in  Aragon.  This 
rendered  it  dangerous  to  call  up  any  more  troops  from  the 
right  of  the  Ebro:  and  yet  a  single  check  might  introduce 
despondency  amongst  his  soldiers,  men  of  different  nations, 
and  some  but  lately  come  under  his  command :  indeed  their 
labours  and  dangers  were  so  incessant  and  wearing,  that  it  is 
no  small  proof  of  the  general's  talent  and  the  men's  spirit, 
that  the  confidence  of  both  was  still  unshaken. 

On  the  24th  intelligence  arrived,  that  the  Spanish  army 
was  coming  down  the  Gaya  river  to  fight,  the  garrison  was 
seen  to  get  under  arms,  and  an  active  interchange  of  signals 
took  place  between  the  town  and  the  fleet.  Suchet  leaving  a 
support  for  his  trenches,  marched  at  once  to  meet  Campo 
Verde.  That  general  had  relinquished  his  own  plan,  recalled 
Eroles.  united  his  ariny  at  Momblanch  on  the  22nd,  and  I 


JUNE.  1811.]  BOOK   XIII.  — CHAP.    5.  243 

moving  by  Villadona,  descended  the  hills  between  the  Gaya 
and  the  Francoli ;  he  was  moving  to  deliver  battle  and  had 
directed  Contreras  to  make  a  sally;  but  Miranda,  who  com- 
manded his  right  wing,  found,  or  pretended  to  find,  some 
obstacles  and  halted;  whereupon  Campo  Verde  relinquished 
the  attack,  and  retired  to  Vendril.  The  25th  he  again  pro- 
mised Contreras  to  make  a  decisive  attack,  and  desired  that 
three  thousand  of  the  garrison  should  be  sent  to  Vendril, 
and  the  remainder  held  ready  to  cut  their  way  through  the 
enemy's  lines  during  the  action :  he  said  also  that  four  thou- 
sand English  were  coming  by  sea  to  aid  in  this  project.  The 
breaching  batteries  had  not  then  opened  their  fire,  the  wall  of 
the  place  was  consequently  untouched ;  ten  thousand  infantry 
and  a  thousand  cavalry  under  Campo  Verde  w,ere  within  a 
few  miles  on  the  Barcelona  side ;  eight  thousand  men  accus- 
tomed to  fire  were  still  under  arms  within  the  walls ;  and  on 
the  26th  colonel  Skerrett  appeared  in  the  roadstead,  not  with 
four  thousand,  but  twelve  hundred  British  soldiers,  sent  from 
Cadiz  and  Gibraltar  to  succour  Taragona.  This  force,  the 
increase  of  shipping,  and  the  promises  of  Campo  Verde,  raised 
the  spirits  of  the  Spaniards;  and  they  were  more  elated  when 
Skerrett  and  his  staff,  accompanied  by  Doyle,  Codrington, 
and  others  disembarked  to  examine  the  means  of  defence.  But 
they  were  struck  with  consternation  when  they 
heard  the  British  commander,  because  his  engineers 
thought  the  wall  would  give  way  after  a  few  salvos,  Appendix  8, 
had  resolved  to  keep  his  troops  on  board,  idle 
spectators  of  an  assault  on  the  place  they  had  come  to  succour. 
Contreras,  disappointed  on  all  sides,  and  without  depen- 
dence on  Campo  Verde,  resolved,  if  the  French  delayed  the 
storm  until  the  29th,  to  make  way  by  a  sally  on  the  Barcelona 
road,  and  so  join  the  army  in  the  field :  meanwhile  to  stand  the 
assault  if  fortune  so  willed  it.  And  he  was  not  without 
means,  for  though  there  was  neither  ditch  nor  covered  way, 
the  approach  to  the  walls  was  high  and  narrow,  and  a  hedge 
of  aloes,  no  slight  obstacle,  grew  at  the  foot  of  the  breached 
rampart,  which  was  cut  also  off  from  the  town  and  side  works 
by  an  internal  -ditch  and  retrenchment.  Behind  this  the 
houses  of  the  great  street  called  the  Rambla,  were  prepared 


244  PENINSULA  WAR.  [1811. 

for  defence,  furnishing  a  second  line  of  resistance ;  and  although 
the  cuts  on  the  flanks  hindered  the  making  of  sallies  in  force, 
the  reduced  numbers  of  the  French  gave  good  hope  that  eight 
thousand  brave  men  would  resist  them  effectually.  Still  the 
predominant  feeling  was  to  break  out  on  the  Barcelona  side, 
the  fleet  and  the  active  army  being  to  co-operate.  Eroles 
was  to  enter  the  place  and  lead  the  sally  on  the  29th,  but 
Suchet's  batteries  opened  on  the  28th  with  crushing  effect,  a 
magazine  exploded  in  the  Cervantes,  the  guns  of  St.  Paul 
were  dismounted,  the  rampart  fell  away  in  huge  fragments 
before  the  incessant  stroke  of  the  batteries,  and  from  the 
Olivo  and  the  old  trenches,  guns  and  mortars  showered 
bullets  and  shells  into  the  town.  This  fire  was  well  returned, 
and  the  shoulders  of  the  breaching  batteries  were  beaten  down ; 
but  the  French  gunners  stood  to  their  work,  the  musketry 
rattled  round  the  walls,  the  men  on  both  sides  crowded  for- 
ward, and  while  opprobrious  words  and  defiance  passed  between 
them,  the  generals,  within  hearing  of  each  other,  exhorted  their 
soldiers  to  fight  manfully. 

STORMING  OP  THE   UPPER  TOWN. 

At  five  o'clock  in  the  evening  the  French  fire  suddenly 
ceased,  and  fifteen  hundred  men  led  by  Habert, 
Sachet.    ,        passing  out  from  the  parallel,  went  at  full  speed 
Eogniat'          up  against   the   breach;   twelve   hundred   under 
Ficatier  followed  in   support;   Montmarie  led  a 
MSS.  brigade  round  the  left,  to  the  bastion  of  Rosario, 

with  a  view  to  break  the  gates  there  during  the 
assault,  and  thus  turn  the  interior  defence  of  the  Rambla; 
Harispe  took  post  on  the  Barcelona  road,  to  cut  off  all  retreat. 
The  columns  had  to  pass  an  open  space  of  a  hundred  yards  to 
reach  the  breach,  and  within  twenty  yards  of  it,  the  hedge  of 
aloes  forced  them  to  turn  to  the  right  and  left,  under  a 
terrible  fire  of  musketry  and  of  grape,  which  the  Spaniards 
poured  upon  them.  The  destruction  was  great  an<t  the  head 
of  the  French  gave  back  and  was  beginning  to  fly,  when  the 
reserves  led  by  a  crowd  of  officers  rushed  up  in  a  body. 
Suddenly,  one  Bianchini,  an  Italian  soldier  who  had  demanded 
leave  to  join  the  column  as  a  volunteer,  and  whose  white 
clothes  amidst  the  blue  uniform  of  the  French  gave  him  a 


JUNE,  1811. j  BOOK  XTIL  — CHAP.   5.  245 

supernatural  appearance,  issued  from  the  ranks  and  gliding 
silently  and  sternly  up  the  breach  reached  the  top  and  there 
fell  dead  with  many  wounds.  Then  his  comrades  bounded 
forward  with  a  shout,  the  Spaniards  fled,  and  the  ramparts 
were  darkened  by  the  following  masses  of  the  French.  Mont- 
marie's  sappers  had  cut  away  the  palisades  at  Bosario,  and  his 
light  troops  finding  a  rope  hanging  from  the  wall  mounted 
by  it  at  the  moment  when  the  breach  was  carried,  and  the 
whole  poured  into  the  town  like  a  devastating  torrent.  In 
the  Rambla  a  momentary  stand  was  made,  but  the  impulse  of 
victory  was  too  strong,  and  a  dreadful  scene  of  slaughter  and 
violence  ensued.  Citizens  and  soldiers,  maddened  with  fear, 
fled,  some  by  the  Barcelona  gates,  others,  throwing  themselves 
over  the  ramparts,  made  for  the  landing-places  of  the  Milagro ; 
but  that  way  also  had  been  intercepted,  and  numbers  leaping 
from  the  steep  rocks  were  dashed  to  pieces,  while  those  who 
gained  the  shore  were  still  exposed  to  the  sword  of  the  enemy. 
The  multitude  flying  by  the  Barcelona  gate  were  met  by 
Harispe's  men,  and  some  being  killed,  the  rest,  three  thou- 
sand, were  made  prisoners. 

WthiD  the  town  all  was  horror.  Houses  were  in  flames, 
Gonzales  fighting  manfully  was  killed,  Contreras,  wounded 
with  the  stroke  of  a  bayonet,  was  saved  by  a  French  officer, 
and  though  the  hospitals  were  respected  by  the  soldiers,  in 
every  other  part  their  fury  was  unbounded.  The  ship-launches 
had  come  close  into  the  Milagro  and  now  saved  some  of  the 
fugitives,  but  their  guns  swepfc  the  open  space  beyond,  killing 
friends  and  enemies,  as  mixed  together  they  rushed  to  the 
shore ;  and  the  French  dragoons,  passing  through  the  flaming 
streets  at  a  trot,  rode  down  upon  the  fugitives,  sabreing  those 
who  had  outstripped  the  infantry.  In  every  quarter  there  was 
great  rage  and  cruelty,  and  though  most  of  the  women  and 
children  had  been  previously  removed  by  the  English  shipping, 
and  the  richest  citizens  had  gone  to  Sitjes,  this  assault  was 
memorable  as  a  day  of  blood.  Seven  or  eight  hundred  mise- 
rable creatures,  principally  soldiers,  escaped  on  board  the 
vessels,  nine  thousand  including  sick  and  wounded  were  made 
prisoners,  more  than  five  thousand  persons  were  slain,  and  a 
great  part  of  the  city  was  reduced  to  ashes 


246  PENINSULA  WAR.  [JUNE,  1811, 


CHAPTER  VI. 

SUCHET  lost  in  killed  and  wounded  during  the  siege  between 
four  and  five  thousand  men;  yet  scarcely  had  the  necessary 
orders  to  efface  the  trenches,  secure  the  prisoners,  and  esta- 
blish order  in  the  ruined  town  been  given,  than  he  was  in 
movement  to  disperse  Campo  Verde's  force.  In  the  night  of 
the  29th  Frere's  division  marched  upon  Villa  Franca,  Harispe's 
upon  Villa  Nueva,  followed  by  Suchet  with  Abbe's  brigade 
and  the  heavy  cavalry.  Campo  Verde  abandoned  Vendril, 
Harispe's  column,  although  cannonaded  by  the  English  squa- 
dron, reached  Villa  Nueva,  where  a  great  multitude,  military 
and  others,  were  striving  to  embark ;  the  light  cavalry  sabred 
some  and  made  fifteen  hundred  prisoners,  including  the 
wounded  men  who  had  been  carried  there  from  Taragona 
during  the  siege:  Frere's  column  in  like  manner  dispersed  the 
Spanish  rear-guard  at  Vendril  and  Villa  Franca.  Campo 
Verde  fled  with  the  main  body  to  Igualada,  Suchet  pushed  on 
to  Barcelona,  where  he  arranged  with  Maurice  Mathieu  a  plan 
to  prevent  the  Valencian  division  from  re-embarking  or 
marching  to  aid  the  blockade  of  Figueras. 

Distrust,  confusion,  and  discord  prevailed  amongst  the 
Catalans.  The  people  were  enraged  against  Campo  Verde, 
the  junta  demanded  Infantado  for  chief;  Milans  proposed 
himself;  and  Sarsfield,  whose  division  was  the  only  one  in  any 
order,  was  at  variance  with  Eroles.  The  country 
Appendix  8,  pe0pie  desired  to  have  the  latter  made  captain- 
general,  and  a  junta  of  officers  actually  appointed 
him;  yet  he  would  not  accept  it  while  Campo  Verde  remained, 
and  that  general  had  already  reached  Agramunt,  whence,  over- 
whelmed with  his  misfortunes,  he  meant  to  fly  towards  Ara- 
gon.  Being  persuaded  to  return  to  Cervera  and  call  a  council 
of  war,  it  was  proposed  to  abandon  Catalonia  and  embark  the 


JULY,  1811.]  BOOK   XTIL— CHAP.   6.  247 

army;  and  this  disgraceful  resolution,  althoifgh  opposed  by 
Sarsfield,  Santa-Cruz,  and  even  Campo  Verde  himself,  was 
adopted  by  the  council,  and  spread  universal  consternation. 
The  junta  remonstrated  loudly,  but  all  the  troops  who  were 
not  Catalans  deserted,  making  principally  for  the  Segre  and 
Cinca  rivers,  in  hope  to  pass  through  Aragon  into  New 
Castille  and  so  regain  their  own  provinces :  every  place  was 
filled  with  grief  and  despair. 

In  this  conjuncture  captain  Codrington  refused  to  embark 
any  Catalans;  but  having  promised  to  take  back  the  Valen- 
cians,  although  the  conditions  of  his  agreement  had  been 
grossly  violated  by  Campo  Verde  and  Miranda,  he  performed 
his  contract :  yet  even  this  was  not  arranged  without  a  con- 
test between  him  and  Doyle  on  the  one  side,  and  Miranda  and 
Caro  on  the  other.  Green,  instead  of  remaining  at  the  Spa- 
nish head-quarters,  returned  to  Peniscola  with  all  the  money 
and  arms  under  his  control;  and  the  captain  of  the  Prueba 
frigate,  having  under  his  command  several  Spanish  vessels  of 
war  loaded  with  wounded  men,  the  archives  of  the  munici- 
pality, ammunition,  stores  and  money,  all  belonging  to  Cata- 
lonia, set  sail  for  Majorca  under  such  suspicious  circumstances, 
that  Codrington  thought  it  necessary  to  send  a  ship  to  fetch 
him  back  by  force.  In  this  afflicting  disorder  Suchet  brought 
up  his  troops  to  Barcelona,  and  Maurice  Mathieu  dispersed  a 
small  body  of  men  that  Eroles  had  collected  at  Mataro.  Two 
thousand  four  hundred  Valencian  infantry,  having  escaped  to 
Arens  de  Mar,  got  on  board  the  English  vessels  and  were  sent 
back  to  their  own  country;  but  the  cavalry,  unwilling  to  part 
with  their  horses,  would  not  embark,  and  menaced  their  gene- 
ral Caro,  who  fled  from  their  fury.  Eroles  rallied  them,  and 
having  gathered  some  stores  and  money  from  the  smaller 
depots,  marched  inland;  Campo  Verde  then  embarked  pri- 
vately in  the  Diana  to  avoid  the  vengeance  of  the  people,  and 
general  Lacy,  who  had  arrived  from  Cadiz,  took  the  command : 
he  would  however  have  been  disregarded,  if  Eroles  had  not 
set  the  example  of  obedience.  Suchet  immediately  moved 
against  him,  and  first  scouring  the  valley  of  the  Congosta  and 
that  of  Vich,  spread  his  columns  in  all  directions,  and  opened 
a  communication  with  Macdonald  at  Figueras;  thus  pressed, 


248  PENINSULA    WAR.  [JULY,  1811. 

Lacy  collected  tTie  cavalry  and  a  few  scattered  Catalonian  bat- 
talions remaining  about  Solsona,  Cardona,  and  Sen  d'Urgel, 
and  took  refuge  in  the  hills,  while  Eroles  threw  himself  into 
Montserrat,  where  large  magazines  had  been  previously  formed. 
But  Suchet  resolved  to  attack  this  celebrated  place,  and  in 
that  view,  leaving  Frere  and  Harispe  at  Yich  and  Moya,  with 
orders  to  move  at  a  given  time,  returned  with  the  reserve  to 
Reus.  Here  despatches  from  Napoleon  conveyed  to  him  the 
title  of  marshal,  and  orders  to  take  Montserrat,  destroy  the 
works  of  Taragona,  with  the  exception  of  a  citadel,  and 
finally  to  march  against  Valencia.  He  therefore  preserved  the 
upper  town,  ruined  the  rest  of  the  works,  carried  the  artillery 
to  Tortoza,  and  marched  against  Montserrat  on  the  22nd  of 
July  by  the  way  of  Momblanch  San  Coloma  and  Igualada : 
at  the  same  time  Harispe  and  Frere  moved  by  Manresa,  and 
Maurice  Mathieu  entered  Esparaguera  with  a  part  of  the  gar- 
rison of  Barcelona. 

TAKING   OF   MONTSERRAT. 

This  stronghold  was  occupied  by  fourteen  or  fifteen  hundred 
migueletes  and  somatenes,  and  Eroles  was  daily  raising  recruits 
and  adding  works  to  its  natural  strength.  It  would  soon 
have  been  impregnable,  for  the  approaches  were  through 
steeps  and  precipices;  and  high  upon  a  natural  platform, 
opening  to  the  east  and  overlooking  the  Llobregat,  stood  the 
convent  of  '  Neustra  Senora  de  Montserrat]  a  great  edifice, 
and  once  full  of  riches,  but  the  wary  monks  had  removed 
their  valuables  to  Minorca  earjy  in  the  war.  It  was  now  well 
stored  and  armed,  and  above  it  huge  peaks  of  stone  shot  up 
into  the  clouds,  so  rude,  so  naked,  so  desolate,  that,  to  use 
Suchet's  expressive  simile,  'It  was  like  the  skeleton  of  a 
mountain.' 

There  were  three  ways  to  reach  the  convent.  From 
Igualada,  by  Casa  Mansana  on  the  north,  one  wound  between 
a  perpendicular  rock  and  a  precipice,  and  was  defended  by  two 
batteries  in  succession,  and  by  a  retrenchment  in  front  of  the 
edifice.  The  other  ways  were  a  foot-path  leading  to  Colbato, 
and  a  narrow  road  running  by  Monistrol  on  the  east;  but 


JULY,  1811.]  BOOK  XIII.— CHAP.   6.  -249 

both  so  crossed  by  precipices  as  to  be  nearly  inaccessible  to 
troops.  Suchet  disposed  one  brigade  at  Colbato  to  menace 
that  front  and  intercept  the  retreat  of  the  Spaniards ;  then 
occupying  the  roads  of  Igualada  and  Monistrol  with  Harispe's 
and  Frere's  divisions,  he  directed  Abbe"  to  attack  the  convent 
by  the  northern  line.  Abbe  drove  the  Spaniards  from  Casa 
Mansana,  and  the  25th  advanced  up  the  mountain,  flanked  by 
some  light  troops,  and  supported  by  Suchet  in  person  with 
the  Barcelona  troops.  He  was  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the 
somatenes,  who  had  gathered  round  the  peaks  above,  and  the 
first  Spanish  battery  opened  upon  the  head  of  the  column  as 
it  turned  an  angle;  yet  his  light  troops  being  reinforced, 
climbed  the  rock,  got  above  the  battery  and  shot  down  the 
gunners ;  then  the  head  of  the  column  went  on,  and  reached 
the  foot  of  the  battery  beneath  the  line  of  fire.  The  Spaniards 
threw  down  large  stones,  but  soon  the  fire  of  the  light  troops 
above  became  so  galling  the  work  was  abandoned,  the  French 
followed  close,  and  the  men  above  clambering  along  with  the 
energy  inspired  .by  success  overtook  and  bayoneted  the 
Spaniards  in  the  second  battery. 

Abbe  was  in  march  to  assail  the  entrenchments  of  the- 
convent,  when  a  sharp  musketry  was  heard  on  the  opposite 
quarter,  and  suddenly  the  Spanish  garrison  came  flying  out 
of  the  building  pursued  by  French  soldiers,  who  were  sup- 
posed to  be  the  brigade  from  Colbato,  but  they  were  light 
troops  first  sent  out  to  keep  off  the  somatenes  from  the  right 
flank.  For  when  the  column  advanced  up  the  mountain, 
these  men,  three  hundred  in  number,  wandering  to  the  right, 
insensibly  gained  ground  up  hill,  seized  one  or  two  of  the 
hermitages  with  which  the  peaks  are  furnished,  and  growing 
more  daring,  finally  gained  the  rock  overhanging  the  convent 
itself,  and  with  the  intelligence  proper  to  veterans,  imme- 
diately attacked  the  Spanish  reserves.  Their  commanding 
position,  the  steep  rocks,  and  narrow  staircases,  compensated 
the  inferiority  of  numbers ;  they  gained  one  door,  and  fought 
the  defenders  amongst  the  cloisters  and  galleries  with  various 
turns  of  fortune,  until  the  fugitives  from  the  batteries,  fol- 
lowed by  Abbe,  arrived.  The  garrison  then  gave  way  and 
fled  down  the  eastern  precipices  to  the  Llobregat,  where  from 


850  PENINSULA   WAR.  [JULY,  1811. 

their  knowledge  of  the  country  they  easily  avoided  Harispe's 
men. 

Eroles  and  others  attributed  the  fall  of  Montserrat  to  Green, 
because  he  had  carried  off  the  money  destined  to  fortify  it. 
The  loss  was  deeply  felt  both  in  a  military  view,  and  from 
the  religious  veneration  in  which  it  was  held :  several  towns 
and  many  villages  then  submitted,  and  fear  of  Suchet  spread 
over  Spain.  However  the  Catalans,  a  fierce  and  constant 
race,  were  not  yet  conquered.  Mischief  was  indeed  at  work 
far  and  wide ;  those  who  might  have  restored  order  increased 
the  confusion,  and  their  bad  example  infected  the  authorities 
of  all  the  places  immediately  connected  with  Catalonia. 
Cuesta  now  governor  of  the  Baleares,  Bassecour  at  Cuenca, 
Palacios,  just  appointed  captain-general  of  Valencia,  all  failed 
to  act  with  vigour.  Cuesta,  who  had  before  neglected  to  send 
from  Minorca  the  guns  wanted  in  Catalonia,  now  offered  to 
exchange  the  prisoners  at  Cabrera  against  the  captives  of 
Taragona ;  a  praiseworthy  act,  if  as  Suchet  asserts,  it  was  an 
impulse  of  humanity  j  nor  was  it  ill-judged  in  itself,  because 
the  Catalan  soldiers  were  the  best  in  Spain,  and  the  French 
prisoners  were  broken  in  constitution  by  their  hard  captivity. 
But  it  was  at  this  time  viewed  with  suspicion  in  Catalonia  as 
tending  to  increase  the  French  forces,  and  Mr.  Wellesley, 
involving  the  English  in  this  shameful  cruelty  and  breach  of 
faith  towards  those  miserable  men,  so  wrought  with  the 
regency  that  it  was  peremptorily  forbidden.  Cuesta  then 
refused  to  receive  any  more  prisoners  at  Cabrera,  and  this, 
whatever  the  motive,  was  a  meritorious  act  and  the  last  im- 
portant one  of  his  life,  for  he  soon  afterwards  died.  The 
prisoners  therefore  remained  a  disgrace  to  Spain  and  to 
England ;  for  if  her  envoy  interfered  to  prevent  their  release, 
she  was  bound  to  insist,  that  thousands  of  men  whose 
prolonged  captivity  was  the  result  of  her  interference  should 
not  be  exposed  upon  a  barren  rock,  naked  as 
Appendix  7,  tney  were  korrij  an(j  fighting  for  each  other's 
miserable  rations  to  prolong  an  existence  incon- 
ceivably wretched. 

This  untoward  state  of  affairs  in  Catalonia  was  aggravated 
by  the  English,  Spanish,  and  French  privateers,  who  taking 


AUGUST,  1811.]         BOOK   XIII.  — CHAP.   6.  251 

advantage  of  the  times  plundered  the  people  along  the  coast 
in  concert;  and  they  were  all  engaged  in  smuggling  tobacco, 
the  monopoly  of  which  was  the  principal  revenue.  Yet  there 
were  many  considerable  resources  left  to  the  Catalans.  The 
chief  towns  had  fallen,  but  the  mountainous  districts  had  been 
scarcely  crossed  by  the  French  lines  of  invasion.  The  soma- 
teues  were  numerous,  more  experienced,  and  ready  to  come 
forward  under  a  good  general  if  arms  were  provided  for  them. 
English  squadrons  were  always  at  hand  to  aid ;  admiral  Keats 
brought  three  thousand  muskets  from  Gibraltar;  sir  E.  Pellew, 
who  had  succeeded  to  the  command  of  the  Mediterranean 
fleet,  was  anxious  to  succour  the  province,  and  Minorca  was  a 
great  depot  of  guns,  stores,  and  even  men.  Lacy,  Eroles, 
Rovira,  and  others,  raised  fresh  levies ;  and  while  the  blockade 
of  Figueras  kept  Macdonald's  army  employed,  the  Catalans 
operated  partially  on  the  side  of  Besalu  and  Bispal  and  even 
in  the  French  Cerdana,  which  being  unprotected  was  invaded 
by  Lacy. 

Suchet,  whose  posts  now  extended  from  Lerida  to  Mont- 
serrat  on  one  side,  and  on  the  other  from  Taragona  to 
Mequinenza,  foresaw  that  a  new  and  troublesome  Catalonian 
war  was  preparing ;  yet  he  was  forced  to  return  to  Zaragoza, 
partly  to  prepare  for  the  invasion  of  Valencia,  partly  to  restore 
tranquillity  in  Aragon,  which  had  been  disturbed  by  the 
passage  of  the  seceders  from  Campo  Verde's  army.  The 
Valencian  cavalry  also  had,  when  Eroles  threw  himself  into 
Montserrat,  endeavoured  under  the  conduct  of  Gasca  to  push 
through  Aragon  towards  Navarre;  and  although  they  were 
intercepted  by  Reille,  and  followed  closely  by  Chlopiski,  they 
reached  Valencia  without  much  loss :  the  rest  of  the  fugitives 
gained  the  Moncayo  mountains  and  afterwards  joined  Mina. 
That  chief  was  in  a  low  state.  He  had  been  defeated  by 
Chlopiski  and  Reille  on  the  14fch  of  July  at  Sanguessa,  and 
the  reinforcements  then  pouring  into  Spain,  previous  to  Mas- 
sena's  invasion  of  Portugal,  enabled  those  generals  to  beat 
him  at  Estrella  the  23rd,  at  Sorlada  the  24th,  and  at  Val  de 
Baygory  the  25th.  He  finally  escaped  to  Motrico  on  the 
Biscay  coast,  where  he  received  fresh  arms  and  stores  from  the 
English  vessels,  but  was  once  more  defeated  by  Caffarelli.  and 


252  PENINSULA    WAR.  [AUGUST,  1811. 

i 

finally  driven  for  refuge  to  the  Liebana,  where,  however,  the 
soldiers  flying  from  Taragona  and  Figueras  joined  him, 
and  he  soon  re-appeared  more  fierce  and  powerful  than  be- 
fore. 

Villa  Cam  pa,  whose  division  had  been  re-equipped  from  the 
supplies  given  by  Codrington,  concerted  operations  with  the 
partida  chiefs  Duran  and  Campillo,  and  their  combined  forces, 
eight  thousand  strong,  advanced  from  different  quarters  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Ebro,  invested  Calatayud,  and  sought  to 
carry  off  grain  which  was  now  very  scarce.     This  delayed  the 
invasion  of  Valencia,  for  Suchet  would  not  undertake  it  until 
he  had  again  secured  the  frontier  of  Aragon,  and  many  of  his 
battalions  were  then  escorting  the  prisoners  to  France.     When 
they   returned   he   directed   numerous   columns   against   the 
partidas,  while  French  troops  from  the  army  of  the  centre  came 
down  by  Medina  Celi;  the  Spaniards  then  retired  to  their 
fastnesses  in  the  mountains  of  Soria  on  one  side,  and  to  those 
of  Albaracin  on  the  other.     Four  thousand  of  the  Valencian 
army  had  meanwhile  marched  against  Rapita  and  Amposta, 
the  former  post  having  been  re-established  after  the  fall  of 
Taragona ;  and  though  Habert,  marching  out  of  Tortoza,  de- 
feated them  with  a  considerable  loss,  the  embarrassments  of 
the  third  corps  were  not  removed.     For  the  Catalans  began  to 
harass  the  posts  between  Lerida  and  Montserrat,  and  on  the 
9th  of  August  the  somatenes  fell  on  some  Italians  placed  in 
Monistrol  and  were  with  difficulty  repulsed;  a  few  days  after, 
a  convoy  coming  from  Igualada  to  Montserrat  was  attacked  by 
fifteen  hundred  insurgents,  and  was  unable  to  proceed  until 
Palombini  arrived  with  a  battalion  and  dislodged  the  Catalans, 
yet  he  lost  more  than  a  hundred  of  his  own  men  in  the  action. 
Suchet,  seeing  then  he  could  not  safely  withdraw  from  Catalonia 
until  the  fall  of  Figueras  should  let  loose  the  army  of  the 
upper  province,  sent  fresh  troops  to  Montserrat,  and  ordered 
Palombini  to  aid  Macdonald  in  the  blockade  of  Fernando,  but 
that  place  had  yielded  before  Palombini  passed  Barcelona. 

Martinez,  after  many  vain  efforts  to  break  the  line  of 
blockade,  and  having  used  all  edible  substances,  had  prepared, 
the  16th,  to  make  a  final  effort  in  concert  with  Rovira,  but 
an  officer  deserting  from  the  garrison  betrayed  the  project 


AUGUST,  1811.]         BOOK  XIII.  —  CHAP.   6.  258 

and  Rovira  was  beaten  the  morning  before  the  garrison 
sallied ;  nevertheless  Martinez  strove  to  cut  his  way  through 
on  the  side  of  Rosas,  but  was  driven  back  with  a  loss  of 
four  hundred  men.  Three  days  after,  the  place  was  given 
up  and  three  thousand  famishing  men  were  made  prisoners. 
Thus  ended  the  fourth  great  effort  of  the  Catalonians.  The 
success  of  the  French  was  not  without  alloy,  more  than  a 
quarter  of  the  blockading  troops  had  died  of  a  pestilent  dis- 
temper. Macdonald  himself  was  too  ill  to  hold  command, 
and  his  army  so  weakened,  that  no  further  active  operations 
could  be  undertaken;  Suchet  was  still  occupied  in  Aragon, 
and  Lacy  thus  obtained  time  and  means  to  re-organize  troops 
for  a  fifth  effort.  The  persons  who  had  originally  betrayed 
the  place  to  Rovira  were  shot,  and  the  commandant  whose 
negligence  had  occasioned  the  misfortune  was  condemned  to 
death.  But  Napoleon,  so  foully  misrepresented  as  a  sanguinary 
tyrant,  Napoleon  who  had  commuted  the  sentence  of  Dupont, 
now  pardoned  Guillot :  a  clemency  in  both  cases  remarkable, 
seeing  that  the  loss  of  an  army  by  one,  and  of  a  great  fortress 
by  the  other,  not  only  tended  directly  and  powerfully  to  the 
destruction  of  the  emperor's  projects,  but  were  in  themselves 
great  crimes.  No  other  sovereign  in  Europe  could  have  dis- 
played such  a  merciful  greatness  of  mind. 

OBSERVATIONS. 

1°.  The  emperor  was  discontented  with  Macdonald,  who 
seems  to  have  mistaken  the  nature  of  mountain  warfare  in 
general,  and  that  of  Catalonia  in  particular.  The  first  requires 
a  persevering  activity  in  seizing  commanding  posts  on  the 
flanks  or  rear  of  an  adversary;  and  as  the  success  depends 
upon  rapidity  and  vigour,  the  troops  should  be  excited  by  con- 
tinual enterprise,  and  nourished  by  commendation  and  rewards. 
Macdonald,  if  we  may  believe  Vacani,  an  eye-witness,  did 
neither  gain  the  confidence  of  his  soldiers  nor  cherish  their 
ardour;  and  while  he  exacted  a  more  rigid  discipline  than  the 
composition  of  his  troops  and  the  nature  of  the  war  would 
bear,  let  pass  important  opportunities  of  crushing  his  enemies 
in  the  field.  His  intent  was  to  reduce  the  ferocious  and 


254  PENINSULA  WAR.  [AUGUST,  1811. 

insubordinate  disposition  of  his  men ;  but  the  peculiar  state  of 
feeling  on  both  sides  did  not  permit  this,  and  his  marches  ap- 
peared rather  processions  and  ceremonies  than  warlike  opera- 
tions. He  won  no  town,  struck  no  important  blow  in  the 
field,  gave  no  turn  to  the  public  feeling,  and  lost  an  important 
fortress,  which  with  infinite  pains  and  trouble  he  could 
scarcely  regain. 

2°.  All  the  French  generals  had  acted  on  different  plans.  St. 
Cyr  remained  quiet  until  the  Spaniards  gathered  in  such 
numbers  that  he  could  crush  them  in  general  battles,  but  then 
he  lost  the  fruit  of  his  success  by  after  inactivity.  Augereau 
neither  fought  battles  nor  made  excursions  with  skill,  nor 
fulfilled  the  political  hopes  which  he  had  excited.  Macdonald 
was  in  constant  movement,  yet  avoided  battles,  although  in 
every  previous  important  attack  the  Catalans  had  been  beaten, 
whether  in  strong  or  in  weak  positions.  Suchet  combined 
skill,  activity  and  resolution,  and  the  success  which  dis- 
tinguished his  operations  is  the  best  comment  upon  the 
proceedings  of  the  others.  It  is  in  vain  to  allege  that  he 
was  in  a  better  condition  for  offensive  operations,  and 
that  the  emperor  required  of  the  seventh  corps  exertions 
which  want  .of  provisions  prevented  it  from  making.  Na- 
poleon might  have  been  deceived  as  to  the  resources  at 
first,  and  have  thus  put  it  upon  enterprises  beyond  its 
means  j  but  after  two  years'  experience,  after  receiving 
the  reports  of  all  the  generals  employed  there,  and  having 
the  most  exact  information  of  all  occurrences,  it  is  im- 
possible to  imagine  so  consummate  a  captain  would  have 
urged  impracticable  operations.  Nor  did  Macdonald  give  any 
convincing  proof  that  his  own  views  were  sound.  It  would 
be  presumptuous  to  doubt  the  merit  of  a  man  who  in  so 
many  wars  has  maintained  a  noble  reputation,  amidst  innume- 
rable dangers  and  great  political  convulsions,  but  Macdonald's 
military  talent  seems  to  have  been  at  fault  in  the  warfare  of 
Catalonia.  St.  Cyr  and  other  French  writers  have  endea- 
voured to  show  indeed  that  Napoleon  was  the  only  man  who 
did  not  understand  the  nature  of  the  war  in  Spain,  and  that 
the  French  armies  were  continually  overmatched.  This  criti- 
cism is  easily  refuted.  After  Baylen,  the  French  armies  never 


1811.]  BOOK  XIII. —CHAP.   6.  255 

lost  a  great  battle  except  to  the  English ;  they  took  every 
town  they  besieged,  and  suffered  no  reverse  from  the  Spaniards 
which  cannot  be  distinctly  traced  to  the  executive  officers. 
Where  then  was  Napoleon's  error  ? 

3°.  The  surprise  of  Figueras  has  been  designated  a  misfor- 
tune to  the  Spaniards,  because  it  shut  up  a  large  body  of  the 
best  migueletes  who  fell  with  the  place  ;  and  because  it  drew 
Campo  Verde  from  Taragona  at  a  critical  period.  Contrast 
the  advantages,  however,  and  apart  from  the  vigour  and  enter- 
prise displayed  in  the  execution,  no  mean  help  to  the  cause  at 
the  time,  it  will  be  found  a  great  gain.  It  carried  Macdonald 
from  Barcelona,  and  thus  the  fall  of  Montsenat  was  deferred, 
and  great  danger  of  failure  incurred  by  Suchet  at  Taragona ; 
a  failure  infallible  if  the  adverse  generals  had  behaved  with 
skill  or  courage.  It  employed  all  the  French  army  of  Upper 
Catalonia  the  national  guards  of  the  frontier,  and  even  troops 
from  Toulon  in  a  blockade,  during  which  the  sword  and  sick- 
ness destroyed  more  than  four  thousand  men,  and  the  remain- 
der were  so  weakened  as  to  be  incapable  of  field  service  for  a 
long  time  :  meanwhile  Lacy  re-organized  fresh  forces,  and  re- 
vived the  war,  which  he  could  never  have  done  if  the  seventh 
corps  had  been  disposable.  Campo  Verde  was  incapable  of 
handling  large  masses,  it  is  doubtful  if  he  could  have  resisted 
or  retarded  for  any  time  the  investment  of  Taragona ;  but  it 
is  certain  the  blockade  of  Figueras  gave  an  opportunity  for 
recovering  the  loss  of  Taragona,  and  it  forced  Suchet,  instead 
of  Macdonald,  to  take  Montserrat,  which  disseminated  the 
former  force  and  retarded  the  invasion  of  Valencia.  Where- 
fore Rovira's  daring  surprise  and  Martinez'  resolute  mainte- 
nance of  Figueras  were  useful  and  glorious. 

4°.  During  this  campaign,  resolution,  perseverance,  and 
talent  were  evinced  by  Suchet  in  all  his  operations,  but  the 
success  was  in  a  great  measure  due  to  the  faults  of  his  oppo- 
nents, amongst  which  Skerrett's  conduct  was  prominent.  Cap- 
tain Codrington  and  others  agreed  indeed  in  the  resolution 
not  to  land,  there  was  a  heavy  surf,  and  the  engineers  pre- 
dicted that  the  wall  would  soon  be  beaten  down :  but  the 
question  should  have  been  viewed  in  another  light.  Taragona 
was  the  bulwark  of  the  principality,  the  stay  and  hope  of  the 


256  PENINSULA.  WAR.  [1811. 

war;  it  was  the  city  of  Spain  whose  importance  was  next  to 
Cadiz,  and  before  its  walls  the  security  or  the  ruin  of  Valencia  as 
well  as  of  Catalonia  was  to  be  found.  Of  the  French  scarcely 
fourteen  thousand  infantry  were  under  arms,  and  exhausted 
with  toil.  The  upper  town  was  still  unbreached,  and  attacked 
only  upon  one  very  narrow  front,  and  behind  it  the  Rambla 
offered  a  more  powerful  line  of  defence.  There  were,  to  use 
the  governor's  expression,  within  the  walls  l  eight  thousa/nd  of 
the  most  warlike  troops  in  SpaAn?  and  there  was  a  succouring 
army  without,  equal  in  number  to  the  whole  infantry  of  the 
besiegers:  hence  the  stoutest  assailants  might  have  been 
repulsed,  and  a  severe  repulse  would  have  been  fatal  to  the 
French  operations. 

5°.  Captain  Codrington  says  that  in  the  skirmishes  beyond 
the  walls  the  valour  of  the  garrison  was  eminent :  that  he  saw 
a  poor  ragged  fellow  endeavouring,  such  was  his  humanity  and 
greatness  of  mind,  to  stifle  the  burning  fuze  of  a  shell  with  sand, 
that  some  women  and  children  might  have  time  to  escape.  Feel- 
ing and  courage,  the  springs  of  moral  force,  were  therefore  not 
wanting,  but  the  virtue  of  the  people  was  diminished  and  the  spirit 
of  the  soldiery  overlaid  by  the  bad  conduct  of  their  leaders. 
The  rich  citizens  fled  early  to  Villa  Nueva,  and  were  followed 
by  many  superior  officers  of  regiments;  Contreras,  jealous  of 
Sarsfield,  forced  him  to  quit  his  post  at  a  critical  moment,  and 
then  represented  it  to  the  garrison  as  a  desertion ;  the  Valen- 
cians  were  carried  off  after  being  one  day  in  the  place,  and  the 
Murcians  came  without  arms.  All  this  confusion  and  mischief 
being  palpable,  the  poor  Spanish  soldiers  could  anticipate  no- 
thing but  failure  if  left  to  themselves,  and  it  was  precisely  for 
that  reason  the  British  should  have  been  landed  to  restore 
confidence.  Was  there  nothing  to  be  allowed  for  the  impe- 
tuous fury  of  an  English  column  breaking  out  of  the  place  at 
the  moment  of  attack?  A  seventy-four,  convoying  the  trans- 
ports, had  arrived  with  Skerrett,  and  such  was  the  number  of 
ships,  that  a  thousand  seamen  and  marines  might  have  been  added 
to  the  troops.  Who  then  can  believe  that  three  or  four  thou- 
sand French  and  Italians,  the  utmost  able  to  bear  in  mass  on 
one  point,  and  that  not  an  easy  point,  the  breach  being 
narrow  and  scarcely  practicable,  would  have  carried  the  place 


1811.]  BOOK   XIII.- CHAP    tf.  257 

against  eight  thousand  Spaniards  and  two  thousand  British. 
But  then  the  surf  and  the  enemy's  shot  at  the  landing-place, 
and  the  opinion  of  Doyle  and  of  Codrington  and  of  the  en- 
gineers !  The  enemy's  shot  could  not  at  night  have  stopped 
the  disembarkation,  and  the  engineers  only  reported  on  the 
walls,  which  touched  not  the  moral  considerations.  When  the 
Roman  .Pompey  was  adjured  by  his  friends  not  to  put  to  sea 
during  a  violent  storm  he  replied,  '  It  is  necessary  to  sail — it 
is  not  necessary  to  live.'  It  was  also  necessary  to  save  Tara- 
gona!  Was  no  risk  to  be  incurred  for  so  great  an  object? 
Was  an  uncertain  danger  to  be  weighed  against  such  a  loss  tc 
Spain?  Was  the  British  intrepidity  to  be  set  at  nought? 
Were  British  soldiers  to  be  quiet  spectators,  while  Spaniards 
stood  up  in  a  fight?  Is  that  false  but  common  doctrine,  so 
degrading  to  soldiers,  that  brick-and-mortar  sentiment,  that 
the  courage  of  the  garrison  is  not  to  be  taken  into  account,  to 
be  implicitly  followed?  What  if  the  Spaniards  had  been  suc- 
cessful? The  result  was  most  painful.  Taragona  strongly  forti- 
fied, having  had  at  different  periods  fifteen  thousand  men  thrown 
into  it,  with  an  open  harbour  and  free  communication  by  sea, 
was  taken  by  less  than  twenty  thousand  French  and  Italian 
infantry,  in  the  face  of  a  succouring  army,  a  British  brigade, 
and  a  British  fleet ! 

6°.  Suchet's  cruelty,  and  the  ferocity  of  his  soldiers,  have 
been  dwelt  upon  by  several  writers,  but  he  has  vindicated 
his  own  conduct,  and  it  is  unnecessary  here  to  investigate  facts 
which  have  been  distorted,  and  reasoning  which  has  been 
misapplied.  That  every  barbarity  commonly  attendant  upon 
the  storming  of  towns  was  practised  may  be  supposed ;  there 
is  in  the  military  institutions  of  Europe  nothing  calculated  to 
arrest  such  atrocities.  Soldiers  of  every  nation  look  upon  the 
devastation  of  a  town  taken  by  assault  as  their  right ;  and  it 
would  be  unjust  to  hold  Suchet  responsible  for  the  violence  of 
an  army,  composed  of  men  from  different  countries,  exasperated 
by  the  obstinacy  of  the  defence  and  a  cruel  warfare :  in  Spanish 
towns  also  the  people  generally  formed  a  part  of  the  garrison. 


VOL.  III. 


258  PENINSOLA   WAR.  [1811. 

OPERATIONS   IN   VALENCIA   AND    MURCIA. 

The  transactions  in  the  first  of  these  provinces  have  been 
noticed;  those  in  Murcia  were  of  little  interest,  for  the  defeat 
of  Blake  at  Cullar  in  November,  1810,  and  the  fever  which 
raged  at  Carthagena,  together  with  the  frequent  change  of  com- 
manders, and  the  neglect  of  the  government,  had  completely 
ruined  the  Murcian  army.  The  number  of  men  was  consider- 
able, and  the  fourth  corps,  weakened  by  draughts  and  menaced 
by  the  Barossa  expedition,  could  not  oppose  more  than  five  or 
*ix  thousand  men.  Murcia  had  not  been  touched  by  the 
French,  yet  in  February,  1811,  Roche,  the  military  agent,  de- 
scribed the  whole  army  as  '  ready  to  disperse  on  the  first 
appearance  ol  an  enemy ;'  and  in  the  following  June  says, '  after 
being  left  to  themselves  for  three  years,  the  Murcian  troops 
are  absolutely  in  a  worse  state  than  they  were  at  the  com- 
mencement of  the  revolution.  General  Freire,  at  the  head  of 
sixteen  thousand  infantry  and  three  thousand  cavalry,  will  not 
attack  the  six  thousand  French  before  him  lest  his  men  should 
disperse ;  and  they  think  as  little  of  their  general  as  he  does 
of  them.  Indolence,  lassitude,  and  egotism  prevail  in  all 
parts,  the  establishment  of  the  Cortes  has  proved  a  very  slight 
stimulus  to  enthusiasm,  and  the  most  agreeable  thing  in 
the  world  to  the  Spaniards,  would  be  to  remain  neuter  while 
England  and  France  fought  the  battle  and  paid  all  the  expense.' 
The  Murcian  force  was  increased  after  Mahi's  arrival  to  twenty- 
two  thousand  men,  but  remained  inactive  until  August,  when 
Blake  assume^  the  command. 

In  the  south  of  Grenada  and  Andalusia  little  passed  worth 
notice,  for  during  Blake's  absence  in  Estremadura  the  war  was 
principally  confined  to  the  Honda,  where  the  Serranos,  aided 
at  times  by  the  troops  from  Algesiras,  and  by  succours  from 
Gibraltar,  were  always  in  arms;  yet  even  there,  the  extreme 
arrogance  of  the  Spanish  generals  so  vexed  the  Serranos  they 
were  hardly  prevented  from  capitulating  in  form  with  the 
French:  and  while  Soult  continued  at  Lierena,  after  the 
battle  of  Albuera,  the  escopeteros  and  civic  guards  sufficed  to 
keep  the  partidas  in  check.  Thus  the  blockade  of  the  Isla 
remained  undisturbed  from  without,  and  Cadiz  itself,  the  seat 


.811.]  BOOK   XIII.  —  CHAP.   6.  269 

of  all  intrigues  and  follies,  was  fed  by  English  fleets  and 
defended  by  English  troops.  But  the  narrative  of  secondary 
operations  being  now  completed,  and  the  fate  of  Spain  proved 
to  depend  upon  the  British  general  alone,  it  will  be  proper  in 
the  next  book  to  take  a  view  of  political  affairs,  showing  how 
strongly  they  bore  upon  lord  Wellington's  decisions :  and  if 
such  an  interruption  of  the  military  story  should  be  distasteful, 
the  reader  must,  reflect,  that  war  is  not  so  much  a  series  of 
battles  as  a  series  of  difficulties  in  the  preparations  to  fight 
them  with  success. 


260  PENINSULA  WAR.  |>n 


BOOK   THE   FOURTEENTH. 


CHAPTER  I. 

POLITICAL   SITUATION    OF   JOSEPH, 

AFTER  the  conquest  of  Andalusia,  the  intrusive  monarch 
pursued  his  own  policy  with  more  eagerness  than  before.  He 

published  amnesties,  granted  honours  and  rewards 
Papers,  to  his  followers,  took  many  of  the  opposite  party 

into  his  service,  and  treated  the  people  generally 
with  mildness.  He  was  however  guided  generally  by  his  Spanish 
ministers,  who,  tainted  with  the  national  weakness,  were, 
especially  Orquijo,  continually  making  exaggerated  reports, 
intriguing  against  the  French  generals,  and  striving,  some- 
times with,  sometimes  without  justice,  to  incense  the  king 

against  them.  This  course,  which  was  perhaps 
Appendix  9,  inevitable,  excited  angry  feelings  and  produced 

constant  disputes;  and  in  the  conquered  pro- 
vinces, Joseph's  civil  agents  sought  more  of  the  spoil  than 
comported  with  the  wants  of  the  armies,  wherefore  bickerings 
between  the  French  and  Spanish  authorities  were  as  unceasing 
as  they  were  violent.  The  prefects,  royal  commissaries,  and 
intendants  would  not  act  under  military  orders  with  respect  to 
the  supplies,  nor  would  they  furnish  sums  for  the  military 
chests.  The  generals  often  seized  the  king's  revenue,  raised 
extraordinary  and  forced  contributions,  disregarded  legal 
forms,  and  threatened  to  arrest  the  royal  agents  when  they 

refused  compliance  with  their  wishes.  Nor  was 
Mr.  Stuart,  Joseph's  conduct  always  free  from  violence;  in 

the  latter  part  of  1811  he  compelled  the  merchants 
of  Madrid  to  draw  bills  for  two  millions  of  dollars  on  their 
correspondents  in  London,  to  meet  a  forced  loan.  He  con- 


JAN.  1811.]  BOOK  XIV.  — CHAP.    1.  261 

stantly  complained  to  the  emperor  that  the  niggardly  allow- 
ances from  France,  the  exactions  of  the  generals,  and  the 
misery  of  the  country  left  him  no  means  of  existence  as  a 
monarch.     During  the  greatest  part  of  1810  and  the  begin- 
ning of  1811,  Santa  Fe",  Almenara,  and  Orquijo,  succeeding 
each  other  as  ambassadors  at  Paris,  had  angry        Joseph.8 
negotiations  upon  this  subject,  and  upon  the  cession        Papers, 
of  the  Ebro  provinces  in  exchange  for  Portugal. 
Against  this  project  Joseph  protested  as  a  violation  of  the 
constitution  of  Bayonne,  likely  to   alienate   the   Spaniards, 
degrading  to  himself,  and   unjust  as  a  bargain ;  seeing  that 
Portugal  was  neither  so  rich,  so  industrious,  so  pleasant,  nor 
so  well  affected  to  him  as  the  provinces  to  be  taken  away :  and 
the  well-known  hatred  between  the  Spaniards  and  Portuguese 
would  never  allow  the  latter  to  be  quiet  subjects. 

Napoleon  answered  with  his  usual  force  and  clearness  of 
judgment.  He  said  the  cost  of  the  war  had  drained  the 
French  exchequer;  he  had  employed  nearly  four  hundred 
thousand  men  for  the  king's  interest,  and  rather  than  increase 
the  expenses  he  would  withdraw  some  of  the  troops.  He 
reproached  Joseph  with  the  feebleness  of  his  operations,  the 
waste  and  luxury  of  his  court,  his  ill-judged  schemes  of  con- 
ciliation, his  extravagant  rewards,  his  too  great  generosity  to 
the  opposite  party,  and  his  raising,  contrary  to  the  opinion  of 
the  marshals,  a  Spanish  army  which  would  desert  on  the  first 
reverse.  The  constitution  of  Bayonne,  he  said,  was  rendered 
null  by  the  war,  nevertheless  he  had  not  taken  a  single  village 
from  Spain,  and  he  had  no  wish  to  seize  the  provinces  of  the 
Ebro,  unless  the  state  of  the  contest  compelled  him  to  do  so. 
He  required  indeed  a  guarantee  for  the  repayment  of  the 
money  France  had  expended  for  the  Spanish  crown;  yet  the 
real  wishes  of  the  people  were  to  be  ascertained  before  any 
cession  of  territory  could  take  place,  and  to  talk  of  Portugal 
before  it  was  conquered  was  folly.  As  this  last  observation 
was  Joseph's  own  argument,  an  explanation  ensued,  when  it 
appeared  that  Almenara,  thinking  the  seizure  of  the  Ebro  pro- 
vinces a  settled  plan,  had,  of  his  own  accord,  asked  for  Portugal 
as  an  indemnification;  a  fact  characteristic  of  Spanish  poli- 
ticians. Napoleon  also  assured  the  king  there  must  be  a  great, 


262  PENINSULA   WAR.  [JAN.  1811. 

deal  of  money  in  Spain;  for,  besides  the  sums  sent  from 
France,  the  plate  of  the  suppressed  convents,  and  the  silver 
received  by  the  Spaniards  from  America,  there  were  the  sub- 
sidies from  England  and  the  enormous  expenditure  of  her 
troops.  Then  the  seizure  and  sale  of  national  domains,  and 
of  confiscated  colonial  produce,  were  to  be  taken  into  calcula- 
tion, and  if  the  king  wanted  more,  he  must  extract  it  from  the 
country;  France  would  only  continue  her  subsidy  of  two 
millions  of  francs  monthly,  the  emperor  had  always  supported 
his  wars  by  the  resources  of  the  territory  in  which  it  was  carried 
on,  and  the  king  might  do  the  same. 

Joseph  replied  that  his  court  was  neither  luxurious  nor 
magnificent ;  that  he  recompensed  services,  by  giving  bills  on 
the  contingent  sales  of  national  domains,  which  could  not  be 
applied  to  the  wants  of  the  soldiers;  that  he  could  scarcely 
keep  the  public  servants  alive,  and  his  own  expenses  were  not 
greater  than  the  splendour  of  the  crown  required.  Many  of 
the  best  generals  approved  of  his  raising  a  Spanish  army, 
desertions  from  it  were  less  frequent  than  was  imagined,  and 
were  daily  diminishing;  and  these  native  troops  served  to 
garrison  towns  while  the  French  were  in  the  field.  He  wished, 
he  said,  to  obtain  large  loans  rather  than  small  gifts  from  the 
French  treasury,  and  desired  that  the  confiscated  property  of 
the  Spanish  noblemen  who  had  been  declared  traitors  in  1808, 
should  be  paid  to  him ;  but  with  regard  to  harsh  measures, 
the  people  could  not  pay  the  contributions,  and  the  proceed- 
ings of  a  king  with  his  subjects  should  not  be  like  those  of  a 
foreign  general ;  lenity  was  necessary  to  tranquillize  the  pro- 
vinces subdued,  and  as  an  example  to  those  which  resisted. 
The  first  thing  was  to  conciliate  the  people's  affections.  The 
plate  of  the  suppressed  convents  was  not  so  valuable  as  it 
appeared  at  a  distance,  the  greater  part  of  it  was  already  plun- 
dered by  the  guerillas,  or  by  the  French  troops.  The  French 
marshals  intercepted  his  revenues,  disregarded  his  orders, 
insulted  his  government,  and  oppressed  the  country.  He  was 
degraded  as  a  monarch  and  would  endure  it  no  longer.  He 
had  been  appointed  to  the  throne  of  Spain  without  his  own 
consent,  and  although  he  would  never  oppose  his  brother's 
will,  he  would  not  live  a  degraded  king,  and  was  therefore 


JAN.  1811.]  BOOK   XIV.— CHAP.    1.  263 

ready  to  resign,  unless  the  emperor  would  come  in  person  and 
remedy  the  present  evils. 

Napoleon  admitted  the  reasonableness  of  some  of  the  king's 
statements,  but  still  insisted,  with  propriety  of  argument,  that 
it  was  necessary  to  subdue  the  people  before  they 
could   be   conciliated.     Yet   to   prevent   wanton     Appendix », 
abuses  of  power,  he  fixed  the  exact  sum  which 
each  person  from  the  general  governors  down  to  the  lowest 
subaltern  was  to  receive,  and  he  ordered  every  person  violat- 
ing this  regulation  to  be  dismissed  upon  the  spot,  and  a  report 
of  the  circumstance  sent  to  Paris  within  twenty 
hours  after.     Bessieres,  acknowledged  by  all  to  be 
a  just  and  mild  man,  had  been  sent  to  remedy  the  mischief 
said  to  have  been  done  by  Kellerman  and  others  in  the  northern 
provinces.     In  respect  of  conciliation,  the  emperor  remarked 
he  had  himself,  at  first,  intended  to  open  secret  negotiations 
with  the  Cortes,  but  on  finding  what  an  obscure  rabble  they 
were,  he  had  desisted.     He  therefore  recommended  Joseph  to 
assemble  at  Madrid  a  counter-cortes,  composed  of 
men  of  influence  and  reputation,  wherein  advert- 
ing to  the  insolence  of  the  Spaniards  towards  their  colonies,  he 
might  by  discussing  really  liberal  institutions,  and  exposing 
the  bad  faith  with  which  the  English  encouraged  the  Ameri- 
cans, improve  public  opinion,  and  conciliate  the  Spaniards,  with 
hopes  of  preserving  the  integrity  of  the  empire,  so  rudely  shaken 
by  the  revolt  of  the  colonies. 

An  additional  subsidy  was  peremptorily  refused,  but  the 
emperor  finally  consented  to  furnish  Joseph  with  half  a  million 
of  francs  monthly,  for  the  particular  support  of  his  court;  and  it 
is  worthy  of  notice,  as  illustrating  the  character  of 

,  Appendix  9. 

Napoleon,  that  in  the  course  of  these  disputes, 

Joseph's  friends  at   Paris    repeatedly  advised  him,  that  the 

diplomatic   style   of  his   letters  incensed  and   hardened  the 

emperor,   whereas     his   familiar   style   as   a   brother   always 

softened  and  disposed  him  to  concede  what  was  Ma 

demanded.      Joseph  would  not  however  endure 

the  decree  for  establishing  the  military  governments,  by  which 

the  administration  was  placed  entirely  in  the  hands  of  the 

generals,  and  their  reports  upon  the  civil  and  judicial  admi- 


264  PENINSULA   WAR.  [MAY,  1811. 

nistration  referred  entirely  to  the  emperor : — it  was  a  measure 
assailing  at  once  his  pride,  his  power,  and  his  purse.  His 
mind,  therefore,  became  daily  more  embittered,  and  his  pre- 
fects and  commissaries,  emboldened  by  his  opinions,  absolutely 
refused  to  act  under  the  French  marshals'  orders.  Many  of 
these  complaints,  founded  on  the  reports  of  his  Spanish 
servants,  were  untrue  and  others  distorted.  The  habitual 
exaggerations,  and  downright  falsehoods  of  the  juntas  and 
the  regency,  thwarted  the  English  general's  operations,  and 
the  king,  as  well  as  the  French  generals,  must  have  en- 
countered a  like  disposition  in  the  Spanish  ministers.  Never- 
theless, the  nature  of  the  war  rendered  it  impossible  but  that 
much  ground  of  complaint  should  exist.  Joseph's  personal 
sentiments,  abstractedly  viewed,  were  high-minded  and  bene- 
volent; but  they  sorted  ill  with  his  situation  as  an  usurper. 
He  had  neither  patience  nor  profundity  in  his  policy,  and  at 
last,  such  was  his  irritation,  having  drawn  up  a  private  but 
formal  renunciation  of  the  crown,  he  took  an  escort  of  five 
thousand  men,  and  about  the  period  of  the  battle  of  Fuentes 
Onoro,  passed  out  of  Spain  and  reached  Paris :  there  Ney, 
Massena,  Junot,  St.  Cyr,  Kellerman,  Augereau,  Loison,  and 
Sebastian!  were  also  assembled,  all  discontented  with  the  war 
and  with  each  other. 

By  this  proceeding,  the  intrusive  government  was  left  with- 
out a  head,  and  the  army  of  the  centre  was  rendered  nearly 
useless  at  the  critical  moment,  when  Soult,  engaged  in  the 
Albuera  operations,  had  a  right  to  expect  support  from 
Madrid.  The  northern  army  also  was  in  a  great  measure 
paralysed,  and  the  army  of  Portugal,  besides  having  just 
failed  at  Fuentes,  was  in  all  the  disorganization  attendant 
upon  the  retreat  from  Santarem,  and  upon  a  change  of  com- 
manders. This  was  the  principal  cause  why  Bessieres  aban- 
doned the  Asturias  and  concentrated  his  forces  in  Leon  and 
Castille  on  the  communications  with  France;  for  it  behoved 
the  French  generals  everywhere  to  hold  their  troops  in  hand, 
and  to  be  on  the  defensive  until  the  emperor's  resolution  in 
this  extraordinary  conjuncture  should  be  known.  Napoleon 
astounded  at  the  king's  precipitation,  complained,  that  having 
promised  not  to  quit  the  country  without  due  notice,  Joseph 


JUNE,  1811.]  BOOK   XIV.  — CHAP.    1.  265 

had  failed  to  him,  both  as  a  monarch  and  as  a  general :  he 
should  at  least  have  better  chosen  his  time.  If  he  had  retired 
in  January,  when  the  armies  were  all  inactive,  the  evil  would 
have  been  less,  as  the  emperor  might  then  have  abandoned 
Andalusia  and  concentrated  Soult's  and  Massena's  troops  on 
the  Tagus,  which  would  have  been  in  accord  with  the  policy 
fitting  for  the  occasion.  But  now  when  the  armies  had  suffered 
reverses,  when  they  were  widely  separated  and  in  pursuit  of 
different  objects,  the  mischief  was  great,  and  the  king's  con- 
duct not  to  be  justified ! 

Joseph  asserted  that  he  had  taken  good  measures  to  pre- 
vent confusion  during  his  absence,  and  then  reiterating  his 
complaints  and  declaring  his  resolution  to  retire  into  obscu- 
rity, finished  by  observing  with  equal  truth  and  simplicity  of 
mind,  that  it  would  be  better  for  the  emperor  that  he  should 
do  so,  inasmuch  as  in  France  he  would  be  a  good  subject, 
but  in  Spain  a  bad  king.  Napoleon's  intellect  was  however 
too  powerful  for  his  brother.  Partly  by  reason,  partly  by 
authority,  partly  by  concession,  he  induced  him  to  return  in 
July,  furnished  with  a  species  of  private  treaty  by  which  the 
army  of  the  centre  was  placed  entirely  at  his  disposal.  He 
was  empowered  to  punish  delinquents,  to  change  the  organiza- 
tion and  remove  officers  who  were  offensive  to  him,  even  to 
the  chief  oi>  the  staff,  Belliard,  who  had  been  represented  by 
Orquijo  as  inimical  to  the  system.  And  if  any  of  the  other 
armies  should  by  the  chances  of  war  arrive  within  the  district 
of  the  centre  army,  they  also  while  there  were  to  be  under 
the  king;  and  at  all  times,  even  in  their  own  districts,  when 
he  placed  himself  at  their  head.  The  army  of  the  north  was 
to  remain  with  its  actual  organization  and  under  a  marshal, 
but  Joseph  had  liberty  to  change  Bessieres  for  Jourdan. 

To  prevent  the  oppression  of  the  people,  especially  in  the 
north,  Napoleon  required  the  French  military  authorities  to 
send  daily  reports  to  the  king  of  all  requisitions  and  contri- 
butions exacted.     He   advised   his   brother   also   to   keep  a 
Spanish  commissary  at  the  head-quarters  of  each 
army  to  watch  over  Spanish  interests :  promising     Appendix  8. 
that  whenever  a  province  should  have  the  means 
and  the  will  to  resist  the  incursions  of  the  partidas,  it  should 


266  PENINSULA    WAR.  [JUNE.  1811. 

revert  entirely  to  the  government  of  the  king,  and  be  subjected 
to  no  charges,  save  those  made  by  the  Spanish  civil  autho- 
rities for  general  purposes.  The  armies  of  the  south  and  of 
Aragon  were  placed  in  a  like  situation  on  the  same  terms, 
and  Joseph  was  to  receive  a  quarter  of  the  contributions  from 
each,  for  the  support  of  his  court  and  of  the  central  army. 
But  the  entire  command  of  the  forces  in  Spain  the  emperor 
would  not  grant,  observing  that  the  marshal  directing  from 
Madrid  as  major-general,  would  naturally  claim  the  glory  as 
well  as  the  responsibility  of  arranging  the  operations ;  and  the 
other  marshals,  finding  themselves  in  reality  under  his  instead 
of  the  king's  command,  would  obey  badly  or  not  at  all. 
All  their  reports  and  the  intelligence  necessary  to  the  under- 
standing of  affairs  were  therefore  to  be  addressed  directly  to 
Berthier  for  the  emperor's  information.  Finally  the  half 
million  of  francs  hitherto  given  monthly  to  the  king  was  to 
be  increased  to  a  million  for  the  year  1811:  and  it  was 
expected  that  Joseph  would  immediately  re-organize  the  army 
of  the  centre,  restore  its  discipline,  and  make  it,  what  it  had 
not  yet  been,  of  weight  in  the  contest. 

The  king  afterwards  obtained  some  further  concessions, 
the  most  important  being  the  employment  and  assembling  of 
Spaniards  according  to  his  own  directions  and  plans.  This 
arrangement  and  the  importance  given  to  Joseph's  return,  for 
by  the  emperor's  orders  he  was  received  as  if  he  had  only 
been  to  Paris  to  concert  a  great  plan,  produced  a  good  effect 
for  a  short  time;  but  after  the  fall  of  Figueras,  Napoleon, 
fearing  to  trust  Spanish  civilians,  extended  the  plan,  hitherto 
confined  to  Catalonia,  of  employing  Fiench  intendants  in  all 
the  provinces  on  the  left  of  the  Ebro.  Then  the  king's 
jealousy  returned,  and  the  bickering  between  him  and  the 
marshals  revived.  But  the  political  situation  of  France  deter- 
mined Napoleon's  proceedings.  For  though  in  1811  his 
power  over  the  continent,  as  far  as  the  frontier  of  Russia,  was 
absolute,  and  in  France  internal  prosperity  was  enjoyed  with 
external  glory,  the  emperor  of  Russia,  stimulated  by  English 
diplomacy,  and  personal  discontent,  in  dread  also  of  his 
nobles  who  were  impatient  under  losses  inflicted  by  the  con- 
tinental system,  was  plainly  opposed  to  French  ascendancy. 


1811.J  BOOK   XIV.  — CHAP.    1. 

Napoleon  therefore  clearly  perceived  the  coming  of  a  more 
gigantic  contest  than  any  he  had  hitherto  engaged  in,  and 
would  no  longer  lavish  money  and  soldiers  on  the  Spanish  war. 
He  had  indeed  poured  men  continually  into  that  country,  but 
these  were  generally  conscripts,  while  in  the  north  of  France 
he  was  forming  a  reserve  of  two  hundred  thousand  old  soldiers ; 
yet  with  such  art  that  it  was  doubtful  whether  they  were 
intended  for  the  Peninsula  or  for  ulterior  objects,  being  ready 
for  either,  according  to  circumstances.  This  state  of  affairs 
prevented  him  from  taking  those  decided  steps  in  person  with 
relation  to  Spain,  which  he  would  have  done,  if  that  war  had 
been  the  only  great  matter  on  his  hands.  The  aspect  of 
French  politics  in  Spain  and  other  places,  was  therefore 
favourable  to  lord  Wellington's  views,  and  a  Kussian  war, 
sooner  or  later,  was  one  of  the  principal  chances  upon  which 
he  rested  his  hopes  of  final  success.  His  anticipations  were 
however  dashed  with  fears,  for  the  situation  of  the  Spanish 
and  Portuguese  governments,  and  their  armies,  and  the  con- 
dition of  the  English  government,  were  by  no  means  so 
favourable  to  his  plans. 


268  PENINSULA  WAR.  flSll. 


CHAPTER  II. 


POLITICAL   STATE    OF    ENGLAND    WITH    REFERENCE  TO 
THE   WAR. 

IT  was  clear  that  merely  to  defend  Portugal  with  enormous 
loss  of  treasure  and  of  blood  would  be  a  ruinous  policy ;  and 
to  redeem  the  Peninsula,  the  Spaniards  must  be  brought 
to  act  more  reasonably.  The  national  character  and  the 
extreme  ignorance  of  public  business,  military  and  civil,  which 
distinguished  the  generals  and  statesmen  rendered  this  a  very 
difficult  task :  yet  Wellington,  finding  the  English  power  weak 
to  control,  its  influence  as  weak  to  sway  the  councils  of  Spain, 
hoped  by  industry,  patience,  and  the  glory  of  his  successes  to 
acquire  a  personal  ascendancy  which  would  enable  Mm  to 
direct  the  resources  of  the  whole  Peninsula  towards  a  common 
object.  The  difficulty  of  attaining  that  ascendancy  can,  how- 
ever, only  be  made  clear  by  a  review  of  the  intercourse 
between  the  British  government  and  the  Spanish  authorities, 
from  the  first  bursting  out  of  the  insurrection  to  the  period 
now  treated  of:  a  review  which  will  disclose  the  utter  unfit- 
ness  of  Mr.  Canning  to  conduct  great  affairs.  For  heaping 
treasure,  stores,  arms,  flattery,  upon  those  who  were  unable 
to  bear  the  latter  or  use  the  former  beneficially,  he  neglected 
all  persons  who  were  capable  of  forwarding  the  cause.  And 
neither  in  the  choice  of  his  agents,  nor  in  his  instructions  to 
them,  nor  in  his  estimation  of  the  value  of  events,  did  he  dis- 
cover wisdom  or  diligence,  although  he  covered  his  miscon- 
duct at  the  moment  by  his  glittering  oratory. 

When  the  Spanish  deputies  first  applied  for  the  assistance 

of  England,   Mr.  Charles    Stuart,   who  was  the 

only  regular  diplomatist  sent  to   Spain,  carried 

to  Coruiia  such  a  sum  as  made  up  with  previous  subsidies  one 


1811.]  BOOK  XIV.  — CHAP.   2.  269 

million  of  dollars  for  Gallicia  alone.  The  deputies  from 
Asturias  had  demanded  five  millions  of  dollars,  and  one  was 
paid  in  part  of  their  demand;  but  when  this  was  known,  two 
millions  more  were  demanded  for  Gallicia  and  not  refused: 
yet  the  first  point  in  Mr.  Canning's  instructions  to  Mr.  Stuart 
was,  '  to  enter  into  no  political  engagements.1  Mr. 
Duff,  consul  at  Cadiz,  also  carried  out  a  million  f  1*^*11' 
of  dollars  for  Andalusia,  the  junta  asked  for  three 
or  four  millions  more,  and  the  demands  of  Portugal  although 
less  extravagant  were  very  great ;  thus  above  sixteen  millions 
of  dollars  were  craved,  and  more  than  four  millions,  including 
the  gift  to  Portugal,  had  been  sent.  The  remainder  was  not 
denied,  and  the  amount  of  arms  and  stores  given  may  be 
estimated  by  the  fact,  that  eighty-two  pieces  of  artillery, 
ninety- six  thousand  muskets,  eight  hundred  thousand  flints, 
six  millions  and  a  half  of  ball-cartridges,  seven  thousand  five 
hundred  barrels  of  powder,  and  thirty  thousand  swords  and 
belts  had  been  sent  to  Coruna  and  Cadiz.  The  supply  to  the 
Asturians  was  in  proportion,  but  Mr.  Canning's  instructions 
to  Mr.  Duff  and  other  agents  were  still  the  same.  'His 
majesty  had  no  desire  to  annex  any  conditions  to  the  pecuniary 
assistance  which  he  furnished  to  Spain1 

Mr.  Canning  said  he  considered  the  amount  of  money  as 
nothing!  yet  he  acknowledged  specie  was  so  scarce,  that  it 
was  only  by  a  direct  and  secret  understanding  with  the  former 
government  of  Spain,  under  the  connivance  of  France,  that 
any  considerable  amount  of  dollars  had  been  collected  in 
England.  '  Each  prvoince  of  Spain,'  he  said,  '  had  made  its 
own  particular  application,  and  the  whole  occasioned  a  call  for 
specie  such  as  had  never  before  been  made  upon  England  at 
any  period  of  its  existence.  There  was  a  rivalry  between  the 
provinces  with  reference  to  the  amount  of  sums  demanded 
which  rendered  the  greatest  caution  necessary.  And  the 
more  so,  that  the  deputies  were  incompetent  to  furnish 
either  information  or  advice  upon  the  state  of  affairs  in  Spain;1 
yet  Mr.  Duff  was  commanded,  by  the  man  representing  these 
astounding  things  to  the  junta  of  Seville,  '  to  avoid  any  ap 
pearance  of  a  desire  to  overrate  the  merit  and  value  of  tlie 
exertions  then  making  by  Great  Britain  in  favour  of  t/te 


270  PENINSULA   WAR.  [1811. 

Spanish  lation  or  tc  lay  the  grounds  for  restraining  or 
limiting  those  exertions  within  cmy  other  bounds  than  those 
which  were  prescribed  by  the  limits  of  the  actual  means  of  the 
country.'  In  proof  of  Mr.  Canning's  sincerity  upon  this  head, 
lie  afterwards  sent  them  two  millions  of  dollars  by  Mr.  Frere, 
while  the  British  army  was  without  any  funds  at  all !  More- 
over the  supplies,  so  recklessly  granted,  being  transmitted 
through  subordinates  and  irresponsible  persons  were  absurdly 
and  unequally  distributed. 

This  obsequious  extravagance  produced  the  utmost  arro- 
gance on  the  part  of  the  Spanish  leaders,  who  treated  the 
English  minister's  humble  policy  with  the  insolence  it  courted. 
When  Mr.  Stuart  reached  Madrid,  after  the  establishment  of 
the  supreme  junta,  that  body,  raising  its  demands  upon 
England  in  proportion  to  its  superior  importance,  required 
in  the  most  peremptory  language,  additional  succours  so 
enormous  as  to  startle  even  the  prodigality  of  the  English 
government.  Ten  millions  of  dollars  instantly,  five  hundred 
thousand  yards  of  cloth,  four  million  yards  of  linen  for  shirts 
and  for  the  hospitals,  three  hundred  thousand  pair  of  shoes, 
thirty  thousand  pair  of  boots,  twelve  million  of  cartridges, 
two  hundred  thousand  muskets,  twelve  thousand  pair  of 
pistols,  fifty  thousand  swords,  one  hundred  thousand  arobas 
of  flour,  besides  salt  meat  and  fish!  These  were  their 
demands,  and  when  Mr.  Stuart's  remonstrance  compelled 
them  to  alter  the  insulting  language  of  their  note,  they 
insisted  the  more  strenuously  upon  having  the  succours; 
observing  that  England  had  as  yet  only  done  enough  to 
set  their  force  afloat,  and  that  she  might  naturally  expect 
demcmds  like  the  present  to  follow  the  jwst.  They  desired 
also  that  the  money  should  be  furnished  at  once  by  bills 
on  the  British  treasury,  and  at  the  same  time  required  the 
confiscation  of  Godoy's  property  in  the  English  funds ! 

Such  was  Mr.  Canning's  Opening  policy.  The  sequel  was 
worthy  of  the  commencement.  His  proceedings  with  respect 
to  the  Erfurth  proposals  for  peace,  his  injudicious  choice  of 
Mr.  Frere,  his  leaving  of  Mr.  Stuart  without  instructions  for 
three  months  at  the  most  critical  period  of  the  insurrection, 
and  his  management  of  afi'airs  in  Portugal  and  at  Cadiz  during 


1811.]  BOOK  XIV.  — CHAP.  2.  271 

sir  John  Cradock's  command,  have  been  already  noticed :  and 
that  he  was  not  misled  by  any  curious  accordance  in  the 
reports  of  his  agents  is  certain,  for  he  was  early  and  con- 
stantly informed  of  the  real  state  of  affairs  by  Mr.  Stuart. 
That  gentleman  was  the  accredited  diplomatist,  and  in  all 
important  points  his  reports  were  very  exactly  corroborated 
by  the  letters  of  sir  John  Moore,  and  by  the  running  course  of 
events ;  yet  Mr.  Canning  neither  acted  upon  them  nor  pub- 
lished them,  although  he  received  all  the  idle  vaunting 
accounts  of  subordinate  civil  and  military  agents  with  com- 
placency, and  published  them  with  ostentation:  thus  en- 
couraging the  misrepresentations  of  ignorant  men,  increasing 
the  arrogance  of  the  Spaniards,  deceiving  the  English  nation, 
and  as  far  as  he  was  able  misleading  the  English  general. 

Mr.  Stuart  reached  Coruiia  in  July,  1808,  and  on  the  22nd 
of  that  month  informed  Mr.  Canning  that  the  reports  of 
successes  in  the  south  were  not  to  be  depended  upon,  seeing 
they  increased  exactly  in  proportion  to  the  difficulty  of  com- 
municating with  the  alleged  scenes  of  action,  and  with  the 
dearth  of  events,  or  the  recurrence  of  disasters  in  the  northern 
parts.  He  also  assured  him  the  numbers  of  the  Spanish 
armies  within  his  knowledge  were  by  no  means  so  great  as 
they  were  represented.  On  the  26th  of  July  he  gave  a 
detailed  history  of  the  Gallician  insurrection,  by  which  he 
plainly  showed  that  every  species  of  violence  disorder  in- 
trigue and  deceit  were  to  be  expected  from  the  leading 
people, — that  the  junta's  object  was  to  separate  Gallicia  from 
Spain,  —  that  so  inappropriate  was  the  affected  delicacy  of 
abstaining  from  conditions  while  furnishing  succours,  that  the 
junta  of  Gallicia  was  only  kept  in  power  by  the  countenance 
of  England,  evinced  in  her  lavish  supplies,  and  by  the 
residence  of  her  envoy  at  Coruna.  The  interference  of  British 
naval  officers  to  quell  a  political  tumult  had  been  asked  for 
and  had  been  successful;  Mr.  Stuart  had  been  entreated  to 
meddle  in  the  appointments  of  the  governing  members,  and 
in  other  contests  for  power  which  were  daily  taking  place.  In 
fine  the  folly  peculation  waste  and  improvidence  charac- 
terising Spanish  proceedings  were  by  Mr.  Stuart  forcibly  laid 
before  Mr.  Canning,  without  altering  the  latter's  egregious 


272  PENINSULA   WAR.  [1811. 

policy,  or  even  attracting  his  notice:  he  even  intimated 
to  the  ambitious  junta  of  Seville,  that  England  would  acknow- 
ledge its  supremacy  if  the  other  provinces  would  consent; 
thus  offering  a  premium  for  anarchy. 

Mr.  Stuart  was  kept  in  a  corner  of  the  Peninsula  whence 
he  could  not  communicate  freely  with  any  other  province,  and 
where  his  presence  materially  contributed  to  cherish  the  pro- 
ject of  separating  Gallicia;  and  this  without  a  pretence, 
because  there  was  a  British  admiral  and  consul,  and  a  military 
mission  at  Coruiia,  all  capable  of  transmitting  local  intelli- 
gence. Indeed,  so  little  did  Mr.  Canning  care  to  receive  his 
envoy's  reports,  that  the  packet  conveying  his  despatches  was 
ordered  to  touch  at  Gihon  to  receive  the  consul's  letters,  which 
caused  the  delay  of  a  week  when  every  moment  was  big  with 
important  events :  a  delay  not  to  be  remedied  by  the  admiral 
on  the  station,  because  he  had  not  even  been  officially  informed 
that  Mr.  Stuart  was  an  accredited  person !  And  when  the 
latter,  looking  to  the  public  interest,  proceeded  on  his  own 
responsibility  to  Madrid  and  finally  to  Andalusia,  he  found 
the  evils  springing  from  Mr.  Canning  s  inconsiderate  conduct 
everywhere  equally  prominent.  In  the  capital  the  supreme 
junta  regarded  England  as  a  bonded  debtor;  and  the  influence 
of  her  diplomatist  at  Seville  may  be  estimated  from  the  fol- 
lowing note,  written  by  Mr.  Stuart  to  Mr-  Frere,  upon  the 
subject  of  permitting  British  troops  to  enter  Cadiz.  'The 
junta  refuse  to  admit  general  Mackenzie's  detachment,  you 
tell  me  it  is  merely  from  alarm  respecting  the  disposition  of 
the  inhabitants  of  Seville  and  Cadiz.  I  am  not  aware  of  the 
feelings  which  prevail  in  Seville,  but  with  respect  to  this 
town,  whatever  the  navy  or  the  English  travellers  may  assert 
to  the  contrary,  I  am  perfectly  convinced  there  exists  only  a 
wish  to  receive  them,  and  general  regret  and  surprise  at  their 
continuance  on  board.' 

Nor  was  the  mischief  confined  to  Spain.  Frere,  apparently 
tired  of  the  presence  of  a  man  whose  energy  and  talent  were 
a  continued  reflection  upon  his  own  imbecile  diplomacy,  ordered 
Mr.  Stuart  either  to  join  Cuesta's  army  or  to  go  by  Trieste 
to  Vienna ;  he  chose  the  latter,  because  there  was  not  even  a 
subordinate  political  agent  there,  although  this  was  the  criti- 


1611.]  BOOK  XIV.  —  CHAP.  2. 

cul   period  which   preceded  the  Austrian   declaration  of  war 
against  France  in  1809.     He  was  without  formal  powers  as  an 
envoy,  yet  his  knowledge  of  the  affairs  of  Spain,  and  his  inti- 
mate personal  acquaintance  with  many  of  the  leading  states- 
men at  Vienna,  enabled  him  at  once  to  send  home  the  most 
exact  information  of  the  proceedings,  the  wants,  the  wishes, 
and  intentions  of  the  Austrian  government,  in  respect  to  the 
impending  war.     But  that  great  diversion  for  Spain,  which 
with  infinite  pains  had  been  brought  to   maturity  by  count 
Stadion,  was  on  the  point  of  being  abandoned  because  of  Mr. 
Canning's  conduct.     He  had  sent  no  minister  to  Vienna,  and 
while  he  was  lavishing  millions  upon  the  Spaniards  without 
conditions,  refused  in  the  most  haughty  and  repulsive  terms 
the  prayers  of  Austria  for  a  subsidy,  or  even  a  loan,  with- 
out  which    she    could   not    pass  her  own   frontier.      When 
Mr.  Stuart  suggested  the  resource  of  borrowing  some  of  the 
twenty-five  millions  of  dollars  which  were  then  accumulated 
at  Cadiz,  it  was  rejected  because  Mr.  Frere  said  it  would  alarm 
the   Spaniards.     Thus,  the  aid  of  a  great  empire  with   four 
hundred  thousand  good  troops,  was  in  a  manner  rejected  in 
favour  of  a  few  miserable  self-elected  juntas  in  the  Peninsula, 
while  one-half  the  succours  which  they  received  and  misused, 
would  have  sent  the  whole  Austrian  nation   headlong  upon 
France ;  for  all  their  landwehr  was  in  arms,  and  where  the 
emperor  had  only  calculated  upon  one  hundred  and  fifty  bat- 
talions, three  hundred  had  come  forward  voluntarily,  besides 
the  Hungarian  insurrection.     In  this  way  Mr.  Canning  proved 
his  narrow  capacity  for  business,  and  how  little  he  knew  either 
the  strength  of  France,  the  value  of  Austria,  the  weakness  of 
Spain,  or  the  true  interests  of  England ;  although  he  had  not 
scrupled,  by  petulant  answers  to  the  proposals  of  Erfurth,  to 
confirm   a  war   which   he    was    so  incapable   of  conducting. 
Instead  of  improving  this  great  occasion,  he  angrily  recalled 
Mr.  Stuart  for  having  proceeded  to  Vienna  without  permission; 
the  breach  of  form  was  with  him  of  higher  importance  than 
the  success  of  the  object.     Yet  it  is  capable  of  proof  that  Mr. 
Stuart's  presence  would  have  made  the  Austrians  slower  to 
negotiate  after  the   battle  of  Wagram;  and  the  Walcheren 
expedition  would  have  been  turned  towards  Germany,  where 

VOL.  ILL  T 


274  PENINSULA  WAR.  [1811. 

a  great  northern  confederation  was  ready  to  oppose  France. 
The  Prussian  cabinet,  in  defiance  of  the  king,  or  rather  of  the 
queen,  whose  fears  influenced  the  king's  resolutions,  only  waited 
for  that  expedition  to  declare  war,  and  it  seems  certain  Russia 
would  also  have  adopted  that  side. 

The  misfortunes  of  Moore's  campaign,  the  folly  and  arro- 
gance of  the  Spaniards,  the  loss  of  a  British  army  in  Wal- 
cheren,  the  exhausting  England  of  troops  and  specie  when 
she  most  needed  both ;  finally  the  throwing  Austria  entirely 
into  the  hands  of  France,  may  be  distinctly  traced  to  Mr.  Can- 
ning's incapacity  as  a  statesman.  But  through  the  whole  of 
the  Napoleonic  war  he  was  the  evil  genius  of  the  Peninsula. 
He  gave  misplaced  military  power  to  Mr.  Villiers'  legation  in 
Portugal  while  he  neglected  the  political  affairs  in  that  country; 
he  sent  lord  Strangford  to  Rio  Janeiro  whence  all  manner 
of  mischief  flowed;  and  when  Mr.  Stuart  succeeded  Villiers 
at  Lisbon,  Mr.  Canning  insisted  upon  having  the  enormous 
mass  of  intelligence  received  from  different  parts  of  the  Penin- 
sula translated  before  it  was  sent  home, — an  act  of  undis- 
guised indolence,  which  retarded  the  real  business  of  the 
embassy,  prevented  important  information  from  being  trans- 
mitted rapidly,  and  exposed  the  secrets  of  the  hour  to  the 
activity  of  the  enemy's  emissaries  at  Lisbon.  In  after  times, 
when  Napoleon  returned  from  Elba  and  Mr.  Canning  was  by 
a  notorious  abuse  of  ministerial  power  sent  ambassador  to 
Lisbon,  he  complained  that  no  archives  of  former  embassies 
remained,  and  compelled  Mr.  Stuart,  then  minister  plenipo- 
tentiary at  the  Hague,  to  employ  several  hundred  soldiers 
copying  papers  relating  to  the  previous  war,  to  be  sent  at 
great  public  expense  to  Lisbon,  where  they  were  to  be  seen  in 
1826  unpacked! 

And  while  this  folly  was  passing,  the  interests  of  Europe 
in  general  were  neglected,  and  the  particular  welfare  of  Por- 
tugal seriously  injured  by  another  display  of  official  impor- 
tance still  more  culpable.  It  had  been  arranged  that  a  Por- 
tuguese auxiliary  force  was  to  have  joined  the  duke  of 
Wellington's  army,  previous  to  the  battle  of  Waterloo,  and  to 
have  this  agreement  executed,  was  the  only  business  of 
importance  which  Mr.  Canning  had  to  transact  during  liia 


.811.]  BOOK  XIV.  — CHAP.  2.  275 

embassy.  Marshal  Beresford,  well  acquainted  with  the  cha- 
racter of  the  Portuguese  regency,  had  assembled  fifteen  thousand 
men,  the  flower  of  the  old  troops,  perfectly  equipped,  with 
artillery  baggage  and  all  things  needful  to  take  the  field :  the 
ships  were  ready,  the  men  willing  to  embark,  and-  the  marshal 
told  the  English  ambassador  that  he  had  only  to  give  the 
order  and  in  a  few  hours  the  whole  would  be  on  board,  warn- 
ing him  at  the  same  time  that  in  no  other  way  could  the 
thing  be  effected.  This  summary  proceeding  did  not  give  Mr. 
Canning  an  opportunity  to  record  his  own  talents  for  nego- 
tiation, and  he  replied,  that  it  must  be  done  by  diplomacy ; 
the  Souza  faction  eagerly  seized  the  opportunity  of  displaying 
their  talents  in  the  same  line,  they  beat  Mr.  Canning  at  his 
own  weapons,  and  as  Beresford  had  foreseen,  no  troops  were 
embarked  at  all.  Wellington  was  thus  deprived  of  important 
reinforcements,  the  Portuguese  were  deprived  of  the  advan- 
tage of  supporting  their  army  for  several  years  on  the  resources 
of  France,  and  of  their  share  of  the  contributions  from  that 
country.  Last  and  worst,  those  veterans  of  the  Peninsula 
war,  the  strength  of  the  country,  were  sent  to  the  Brazils, 
where  they  all  perished  by  disease  or  by  the  sword  in  the 
obscure  wars  of  Don  Pedro !  If  such  errors  may  be  redeemed, 
by  an  eloquence  always  used  in  defence  of  public  corruption, 
and  a  wit  that  made  human  sufferings  its  sport,  Mr.  Canning 
was  an  English  statesman  and  wisdom  has  little  to  do  with 
the  affairs  of  nations. 

When  the  issue  of  the  Walcheren  expedition  caused  a  change 
of  ministry,  lord  Wellesley  obtained  the  foreign 
office.  Mr.  Henry  Wellesley  then  replaced  Mr. 
Frere  at  Cadiz,  and  he  and  Mr.  Stuart  received 
orders  to  demand  guarantees  for  the  due  application  of  the 
British  succours ;  those  succours  were  more  sparingly  granted, 
and  the  envoys  were  directed  to  interfere  with  advice  and 
remonstrances  in  all  the  proceedings  of  the  respective  govern- 
ments to  which  they  were  accredited.  Mr.  Stuart  was  even 
desired  to  meddle  with  the  internal  administration  of  the 
Portuguese  nation,  the  exertions  and  sacrifices  of  Great 
Britain,  far  from  being  kept  out  of  sight,  were  magnified,  and 
the  system  adopted  was  in  everything  a  contrast  to  that  of 


276  PENINSULA   WAR.  [1811. 

Mr.  Canning.  But  there  was  in  England  a  powerful,  and  as 
recent  events  have  proved  an  unprincipled  parliamentary 
opposition,  and  two  parties  in  the  cabinet.  The  one  headed  by 
lord  Wellesley,  who  was  anxious  to  push  the  war  vigorously 
in  the  Peninsula  without  much  regard  to  the  ultimate  pres- 
sure upon  the  people  of  his  own  country;  the  other  headed  by 
Mr.  Perceval  who  sought  only  to  maintain  himself  in  power. 
Narrow,  harsh,  factious,  and  illiberal  in  everything  relating 
to  public  matters,  this  man's  career  was  one  of  unmixed  evil. 
His  bigotry  taught  him  to  oppress  Ireland,  but  his  religion 
did  not  deter  him  from  passing  a  law  to  prevent  the  intro- 
duction of  medicines  into  France  during  a  pestilence;  he 
lived  by  faction ;  he  had  neither  the  wisdom  to  support,  nor 
the  manliness  to  put  an  end  to  the  war  in  the  Peninsula ;  and 
his  crooked  contemptible  policy  was  shown,  by  withholding 
what  was  necessary  to  sustain  the  contest  and  throwing  on  the 
general  the  responsibility  of  failure. 

With  all  the  fears  of  little  minds  he  and  his  coadjutors 
awaited  the  result  of  Wellington's  operations  in  1810.  They 
affected  to  dread  his  rashness,  yet  could  give  no  reasonable 
ground  for  their  alarm;  and  their  private  letters  were  at 
variance  with  their  public  instructions  that  they  might  be 
prepared  for  either  event.  They  deprived  him  without  notice 
of  his  command  over  the  troops  at  Cadiz ;  they  gave  Graham 
power  to  furnish  pecuniary  succours  to  the  Spaniards  at  that 
place,  which  threw  another  difficulty  in  the  way  of  obtaining 
money  for  Portugal ;  and  when  Wellington  complained  of  the 
attention  paid  to  the  unfounded  apprehension  of  some  supe- 
rior officers  more  immediately  about  him,  he  was  plainly  told 
that  those  officers  were  better  generals  than  himself.  At  the 
same  time  he  was  with  a  pitiful  economy  ordered  to  dismiss 
the  transports  on  which  the  safety  of  the  army  depended  in 
the  event  of  failure!  Between  these  factions  there  was  » 
constant  struggle,  and  Wellington's  successes  in  the  field  onty 
furthered  the  views  of  Perceval,  because  they  furnished  ground 
for  asserting  that  due  support  had  been  given  to  him.  Such 
a  result  is  to  be  always  apprehended  by  English  commanders. 
The  slightest  movement  in  war  requires  a  great  effort,  and 
IB  attended  with  many  vexations,  which  the  general  feels 


APRIL,  1811.]  BOOK  XIV.  — CHAP.   2.  277 

acutely  and  unceasingly;  the  politician,  believing  in  no  diffi- 
culties because  he  feel&  none,  neglects  the  supplies  charges 
disaster  on  the  general  and  covers  his  misdeeds  with  words. 
The  inefficient  state  of  the  cabinet  under  both  Canning  and 
Perceval  may  however  be  judged  of  by  the  following  extracts, 
the  writers  of  which  as  it  is  easy  to  perceive  were  in  official 
situations. 

'  I  hope  by  next  mail  will  be  sent,  something  more  satis- 
factory  and   useful   than   we  have  yet  done  in 
the  way  of  instructions.      But  I  am  afraid  the 

*  f  April,  1810. 

late  0.  P.  riots  have  occupied  all  the  thoughts  of 
our  great  men  here,  so  as  to  make  them,  or  at  least  some  of 
them,  forget  more  distant  but  not  less  interesting  concerns.' — 
'  With  respect  to  the  evils  you  allude  to  as  arising 
from  the  inefficiency  of  the  Portuguese  govern-          j?i«n 
ment,  the  people  here  are  by  no  means  so  satis- 
fied of  their  existence  as  you  who  are  on  the  spot.     Here  wt 
judge  only  of  the  results,  the  details  we  read  over,  but  being- 
unable  to  remedy  forget  them  the  next  day ;  and  in  the  mean- 
time, be  the  tools  you  have  to  work  with  good  or  bad,  so  it  is 
that  you  have  produced  results  so  far  beyond  the  most  san- 
guine expectations  entertained  here  by  all  who  have  not  been 
in  Portugal  within  the  last  eight  months,  that  none  inquire 
the  causes  which  prevented  more  being  done  in  a  shorter 
time;    of  which  indeed  there  seems  to  have  been   a   great 
probability,  if  the  government  could  have  stepped  forward  at 
an  earlier  period  with  one  hand  in  their  pockets,  and  in  the 
other   strong    energetic    declarations    of    the    indispensable 
necessity  of    a  change   of  measures    and  principles   in   the 
government.' 

'  I  have  done  everything  in  my  power  to  get  people  here  to 
attend  to  their  real  interests  in  Portugal,  and  I 
have  clamoured  for  money!  money!  money!   in  s* 

every  office  to  which  I  have  had  access.  To  all 
my  clamour  and  all  my  arguments  I  have  invariably  received 
the  same  answer,  '  that  the  thing  is  impossible.'  The  prince 
himself  certainly  appears  to  be  a  la  hauteur  des  cir Constances, 
and  has  expressed  his  determination  to  make  every  exertion 
to  promote  the  good  cause  in  the  Peninsula.  Lord  Welleslcy 


278  PENINSULA   WAR.  [SEPT.  181L 

has  a  perfect  comprehension  of  the  subject  in  its  fullest 
extent,  and  is  fully  aware  of  the  several  measures  which 
Great  Britain  ought  and  could  adopt.  But  such  is  the  state 
of  parties  and  such  the  condition  of  the  present  government, 
that  I  really  despair  of  witnessing  any  decided  and  adequate 
effort,  on  our  part  to  save  the  Peninsula.  The  present  feel- 
ing appears  to  be  that  we  have  done  mighty  things,  and  all 
that  is  in  our  power,  that  the  rest  must  be  left  to  all -boun- 
teous Providence,  and  that  if  we  do  not  succeed  we  must 
console  ourselves  by  the  reflection  that  Providence  has  not 
been  so  propitious  to  us  as  we  deserved.  This  feeling  you 
must  allow  is  wonderfully  moral  and  Christian-like,  but  still 
nothing  will  be  done  until  we  have  a  more  vigorous  military 
system,  and  a  ministry  capable  of  directing  the  resources  of 
the  nation  to  something  nobler  than  a  war  of  descents  and 
embarkations.' 

A  more  perfect  picture  of  an  imbecile  administration  could 
scarcely  be  exhibited,  and  it  was  not  wonderful  that  lord 
Wellington,  oppressed  with  the  folly  of  the  Peninsula  govern- 
ments, should  have  often  resolved  to  relinquish  a  contest  that 
was  one  of  constant  risks,  difficulties,  and  cares,  when  he  had 
no  better  support  from  England.  In  the  next  chapter  shall 
be  shown  the  ultimate  effects  of  Canning's  policy  on  the 
Spanish  and  Portuguese  affairs. 


1811.]  BOOK  XIV.  — CHAP.  3  279 


CHAPTER  III. 


POLITICAL   STATE    OP   SPAIN. 

As  the  military  operations  were  by  the  defeat  of  the  regular 
armies  broken  into  a  multitude  of  petty  and  disconnected 
actions,  so  the  political  affairs  were  by  the  species  of  anarchy 
which  prevailed  rendered  exceedingly  diversified  and  incon- 
gruous. Notwithstanding  the  restoration  of  the  captain- 
generals,  the  provincial  juntas  remained  very  powerful,  and 
while  nominally  responsible  to  the  Cortes  and  the  regency 
acted  independently  of  either,  except  when  interested  views 
urged  them  to  a  seeming  obedience.  The  disputes  between 
them  and  the  generals,  who  were  for  the  most  part  the 
creatures  of  the  regency  or  of  the  Cortes,  were  constant.  In 
Gallicia,  in  the  Asturias,  in  Catalonia,  in  Valencia,  and  in 
Murcia,  discord  augmented.  Mahi,  Abadia,  Moscoso,  Campo 
Verde,  Lacy,  Sarsfield,  Eroles,  Milans,  Bassecour,  Coupigny, 
Castanos,  and  Blake  were  always  in  contention  with  each 
other  or  with  the  juntas.  Palacios,  dismissed  from  the 
regency  for  his  high  monarchical  opinions,  was  made  captain- 
general  of  Valencia,  where  he  immediately  joined  the  church- 
party  against  the  Cortes.  In  the  Condado  de  Niebla  the 
junta  of  Seville  claimed  superior  authority,  but  Ballesteros 
declared  martial  law,  and  the  junta  appealed  to  colonel  Austin 
the  British  governor  of  the  Algarves ! 

The  Cortes  often  annulled  the  decrees  ot  the  regency,  and 
the  latter,  of  whomsoever  composed,  always  hating  and  fear- 
ing the  Cortes,  were  only  intent  upon  increasing  their  own 
power,  and  entirely  neglected  the  general  cause ;  their  conduct 
was  at  once  haughty  and  mean,  violent  and  intriguing,  and 
it  was  impossible  ever  to  satisfy  them.  Thus  confusion  was 
everywhere  perpetuated,  and  it  is  proved  by  the  int^'cepted 


280  PENINSULA    WAR.  [18I1. 

papers  of  Joseph,  as  well  as  by  the  testimony  of  the  British 
officers  and  diplomatists,  that  with  the  Spaniards,  the  only 
moral  resource  left  for  keeping  up  the  war  was  their  personal 
hatred  of  the  French,  when  partially  called  into  action  by 
particular  oppression.  Sir  John  Moore,  with  that  keen  and 
sure  judgment  which  marked  all  his  views,  had  early  described 
Spain  as  being  '  without  armies,  generals,  or  government.' 
In  1811,  after  three  years  of  war,  lord  Wellington 
general  complained  that  '  there  was  no  head  in  Spain, 

Dumouriez,       neither  generals  nor  officers,  nor  disciplined  troops, 

LSI  I,  IVlfeo.  _ 

ana  no  cavalry;  that  the  government  had  com- 
menced tlw  war  without  a  magazine  or  military  resoy/rce  of 
any  kind,  without  money  or  financial  resource,  and  that  the 
people  at  the  head  of  affairs  were  as  feeble  as  tJieir  resources 
were  small.''  But  the  miserable  state  of  the  soldiers,  the 
unquenchable  vanity  of  the  officers,  need  no  further  illustra- 
tion; they  hated  and  ill-used  the  peasantry,  and  were  so 
odious  that  the  poorer  people,  much  as  they  detested  the 
French  almost  wished  for  Joseph's  success. 

Only  four  points  of  real  interest  presented  themselves. 
Improvement  and  better  guidance  of  the  military, — preven- 
tion of  a  war  between  Portugal  and  Spain, — the  pretensions 
of  the  Portuguese  princess  Carlotta, — the  dispute  with  the 
American  colonies.  Wellington  had  laboured  strenuously  on 
the  first,  and  had  more  than  once  saved  the  armies;  and 
partial  attempts  had  been  made  to  introduce  British  officers 
into  them,  but  to  the  system  adopted  in  Portugal  the  leading 
Spaniards  would  not  listen:  this  also  was  a  result  of  Mr. 
Canning's  fostering  of  Spanish  arrogance.  It  was  by  no 
means  certain  that  the  people  would  have  objected,  if  the 
matter  had  been  prudently  urged  before  the  republicans  in  the 
Cortes  and  the  popular  press  had  prejudiced  them  on  the 
subject.  For  the  Catalans  repeatedly  desired  to  have  an 
English  general,  and  in  1812  Green  did  organize  a  small 
corps  there,  while  Whittingham  and  Roche  formed  in  the 
Balearic  isles  large  divisions ;  colonel  Cox  proposed  a  like 
scheme  for  the  north,  but  it  was  rejected  by  lord  Wellington. 
No  important  service  was  indeed  rendered  by  those  officers 
with  their  divisions,  yet  the  principle  was  acknowledged,  and 


1811.]  BOOK   XIV.  — CHAP.   3.  281 

it  was  extended  by  one  Downie,  who  had  passed  from  the 
British  commissariat  into  the  Spanish  service.  The  English 
ministers,  taken  with  his  boasting  manner,  supplied  him  with 
uniforms  and  equipments  for  a  body  of  cavalry  called  the 
Estremadura  Legion,  of  such  an  expensive  and  absurd  nature 
as  to  induce  a  general  officer  to  exclaim  on  seeing  them  that 
he  blushed  for  the  folly  of  his  government. 

When  the  British  ministers  found  themselves  unable  to 
deal  with  the  Spanish  regulars,  they  looked  to 
the  irregulars;  but  the  increase  of  this  force  gave  Appendix  7, 
offence  to  the  regular  officers,  and  amidst  these 
distractions,  the  soldiers,  ill-organized,  ill-fed,  and  quite 
incapable  of  moving  in  the  field  in  large  bodies,  lost  all  con- 
fidence in  their  generals.  The  latter,  as  in  the  case  of  Freire 
with  the  Murcian  army,  expected  to  be  beaten  in  every  action, 
and  cared  little  about  it;  the  regency  were  sure  to  affirm 
that  they  were  victorious,  and  another  of  those  wandering 
starved  naked  bands  called  armies  could  be  formed  in  a 
month.  But  a  war  with  Portugal  was  always  to  be  appre- 
hended. The  ravages  of  the  Spanish  insurgent  forces  when 
Junot  was  in  Lisbon,  the  violence  of  Romana's  soldiers,  the 
burning  of  the  village  of  San  Fernando  by  Mendizabel, 
coupled  with  disputes  between  the  Algarve  people  and  the 
Andalusians,  revived  the  mutual  national  hatred.  The  govern- 
ments indeed  entered  into  a  treaty  for  recruiting  in  their 
respective  territories,  but  it  was  with  the  utmost  difficulty 
that  the  united  exertions  of  Mr.  Stuart  and  Wellington  could 
prevent  the  Portuguese  regency  first,  and  afterwards  the  court 
of  the  Brazils,  from  provoking  a  war  by  re-annexing  Olive^a 
to  Portugal,  when  it  was  taken  from  the  French  by  Beresford. 
And  so  little  were  the  passions  of  these  people  subordinate 
to  their  policy,  that  this  design  was  formed  at  the  very 
moment  when  the  princess  Carlotta  was  strenuously  and  with 
good  prospect  of  success  pushing  her  claim  to  the  regency  of 
Spain. 

Her  intrigues  were  constant  sources  of  evil,  she  laboured 
against  the  influence  of  the  British  at  Cadiz,  and  her  agent, 
Pedro  Souza,  proffering  gold  to  vulgar  baseness,  diamonds 
to  delicate  consciences,  and  promises  to  all,  was  adroit  and 


282  PENINSULA    WAR.  [1811. 

persevering.  In  August,  1810,  a  paper,  signed  by  only  one 
member,  but  with  an  intimation  that  it  contained  the  senti- 
ments of  the  whole  Cortes,  was  secretly  given  to  Mr.  Wellesley 
as  a  guide  for  his  conduct.  Its  purport  was  that  the  impos- 
sibility of  releasing  Ferdinand  and  his  brother 
^rom  *keir  captivity  being  apparent,  the  princess 
Carlotta  should  be  called  to  the  throne,  and  her 
eldest  son,  Pedro,  should  marry  the  princess  of  Wales  or 
some  other  princess  of  the  house  of  Brunswick,  to  give  a 
1  sudden  and  mortal  blow  to  the  French  empire.'  Mr. 
Wellesley  was  also  told  that  a  note,  of  the  same  tendency 
would  in  the  first  session  of  the  Cortes  be  transmitted  to  the 
English  legation.  This  however  did  not  happen,  because 
Arguelles,  openly  and  eloquently,  expressed  his  reasons 
against  the  appointment  of  a  royal  person  as  regent,  and 
some  months  later  procured  a  decree  rendering  such  persons 
ineligible.  Carlotta's  intrigue  was  then  quashed,  but  though 
continually  overborne  by  the  English  influence,  her  preten- 
sions were  always  renewed,  and  often  on  the  point  of  being 
publicly  admitted.  This  assumption  that  Ferdinand's  escape 
could  not  be  effected,  was  founded  partly  on  the  great  influ- 
ence which  it  was  known  Napoleon  had  acquired  over  his 
mind,  partly  on  his  personal  timidity  which  rendered  it  hope- 
less to  attempt  his  deliverance.  For  at  this  time  there  were 
two  brothers  called  Sagas,  Spaniards  and  daring  men,  who 
were  only  deterred  from  undertaking  the  enterprise  by  a 
previous  experiment  made  at  Bayonne.  There  they  had  for 
an  hour  implored  Ferdinand  to  escape,  all  things  being  ready, 
yet  in  vain,  because  Escoiquez  who  ruled  the  prince  and  was 
as  timid  as  himself  opposed  it.  To  prevent  ill  effects  from 
this  well-known  weakness  the  Cortes  passed  a  decree  to 
render  null  every  act  of  Ferdinand  while  in  captivity. 

Carlotta's  intrigues  were  however  of  minor  consequence 
compared  to  the  proceedings  of  the  American  colonies,  which 
were  of  the  highest  interest  and  importance.  The  causes  and 
the  nature  of  their  revolt  have  been  already  touched  upon. 
When  the  Spanish  insurrection  first  commenced,  the  leading 
men  of  Mexico  signed  a  paper  which  was  sent  to  the  Penin- 
sula in  November,  1808,  urging  the  immediate  appointment 


1811.]  BOOK    XIV.— CHAP.    3.  283 

of  Infantado  to  the  vice-royalty.  He  was  averse  to  quitting 
Spain,  but  his  wife  persuaded  him  to  consent,  provided  the 
central  junta,  just  then  established,  was  not  opposed  to  it. 
Mr,  Stuart  foreseeing  great  advantage  from  this  appointment 
laboured  to  persuade  Mr.  Frere  to  support  it ;  but  the  latter, 
always  narrow  in  his  views,  refused  because  Infantado  was 
personally  disliked  in  England!  This  joined  to  the  duke's 
own  reluctance  seemed  to  end  the  matter.  Carlotta  however 
urged  her  claim  to  be  regent  of  Spain  and  ultimately  queen 
of  that  country  and  America,  and  her  interests  were  strongly 
supported  in  the  latter  country  until  May,  1809,  when 
Cisneros  the  Spanish  viceroy  reached  Monte  Video  and  spoiled 
her  schemes. 

A  cry  for  free  trade  with  England  was  then 

/  September. 

raised  in  America,  and  Cisneros  assented  under 
conditions  presenting  a  curious  contrast  to  the  affected  gene- 
rosity of  Mr.  Canning ;  and  affording  also  an  additional  proof 
how  little  the  latter  knew  of  the  people  he  was  dealing  with. 
After  detailing  the  danger  of  his  situation  from  the  tendency 
to  revolt,  and  the  impoverishment  of  the  royal  treasury, 
Cisneros  said  the  only  mode  of  relief  was  a  temporary 
permission  to  trade  with  England  for  the  sake  of  the  duties; 
necessity  drove  him  to  this  measure,  but  he  regretted  it, 
and  the  ordinary  laws  relative  to  the  residence  of  foreigners, 
rigorous  in  themselves,  should  be  most  rigorously  executed. 
He  added  others  which  would  seem  to  be  directed  against  an 
enemy  of  mankind,  rather  than  the  subjects  of  a  nation  which 
was  supporting  the  mother-country  with  troops  and  treasure 
in  the  most  prodigal  manner.  Englishmen  were  not  to  possess 
property,  to  have  a  residence,  to  keep  an  hotel,  or  even  to 
remain  on  shore  except  for  a  fixed  period.  Any  property 
already  acquired  by  them  was  to  be  confiscated,  and  when  the 
goods  by  which  he  hoped  to  raise  his  revenue  were  landed,  the 
owners  were  not  to  have  them  carried  to  the  warehouses  by 
their  own  sailors! 

In  April,  1810,  the  Caraccas  and  Porto  Rico  declared  or 
independence,  and  the  British  governor  of  Curacoa  expressed 
his  approval  of  their  proceedings.  This  alarmed  the  Spaniards, 
who  looked  upon  it  as  a  secret  continuation  of  Miranda's  affair. 


284  PENINSULA   WAR.  [1811. 

Lord  Liverpool  disavowed  the  governor's  manifesto,  but  his 
policy  produced  no  effect,  because  he  sought  three  incompatible 
objects  at  once,  namely,  to  obtain  the  trade,  to  conciliate  the 
Spaniards,  and  force  the  colonists  to  declare  for  Ferdinand. 
Mexico  remained  obedient  in  outward  appearance,  but  the 
desire  to  have  Infantado  existed,  and  a  strong  party  of  the 
Mexicans  purposed  raising  him  to  the  throne,  if  Napoleon's 
success  should  separate  the  two  countries :  the  Spanish  regency, 
with  characteristic  folly,  chose  this  moment  to  appoint  Venegas, 
the  avowed  enemy  of  Infantado,  viceroy  of  Mexico,  and  thus 
revolt  was  forced  on  that  country  also.  This  state  of  affairs 
affected  the  war  in  Spain  many  ways.  The  Spaniards,  thinking 
to  retain  the  colonies  by  violence,  sent  out  a  small  squadron  at 
first,  but  at  a  later  period  employed  the  succours  received  from 
England  to  fit  out  large  expeditions  of  their  best  troops,  when 
the  enemy  were  most  closely  pressing  them  in  the  Peninsula. 
The  remonstrances  of  the  British  were  considered  as  indications 
of  a  faithless  policy:  and  Carlotta  also  wrote  to  Elio,  the 
governor  of  Buenos  Ayres,  and  to  the  Cortes,  warning  both, 
to  beware  of  the  English  as  '  a  people  capable  of  any  baseness 
where  their  own  interests  were  concerned.'  Thus  a  notion  was 
engendered  that  England  designed  to  connect  itself  with  the 
colonies  independently  of  Spain,  which  greatly  diminished  the 
English  influence  at  Cadiz. 

By  this  dispute  the  supply  of  specie,  which  involved  the 
existence  of  the  war,  was  also  endangered.  Lord  Wellesley 
therefore  hastened  to  offer  mediation,  and  to  please  the 
Spaniards  removed  the  governor  of  Curacoa;  but  like  lord 
Liverpool,  he  desired  to  preserve  the  colonial  trade,  and  this 
feeling  pervaded  and  vitiated  his  instructions  to  Mr.  Wellesley. 
Lord  Welles-  That  gentleman  was  to  discuss  the  matter  on 
Wellesle*  H  Prm(Jip^es  °f  cordial  amity  and  good  faith,  and 
May,  isii,  seek  to  convince  the  regency  that  the  British 
proceedings  had  hitherto  been  best  for  all  parties. 
For  the  primary  object  being  to  prevent  a  French  party  rising 
in  America,  England  had  opened  an  intercourse  of  trade,  a 
measure  consistent  with  good  faith  to  Spain,  inasmuch  as 
the  colonists  would  otherwise  have  had  recourse  to  France, 
whereas  now  England  was  considered  by  them  as  a  safe  and 


MAT,  1811.]  BOOK  XIV.  — CHAP.   3.  285 

honourable  channel  of  reconciliation  with  the  mother-country. 
There  had  been  no  formal  recognition  of  the  self-constituted 
governments,  and  if  any  had  taken  place  by  subordinate 
officers  they  would  be  disavowed.  Protection  and  mediation 
had  indeed  been  offered,  but  the  rights  of  Ferdinand  had  been 
supported ;  and  as  war  between  Spain  and  America  would  only 
injure  the  great  cause  a  mediatory  policy  was  pressed  upon 
the  latter.  The  blockade  of  Buenos  Ayres  and  the  Caraccas 
had  already  diverted  money  and  forces  from  Spain,  and  driven 
the  Americans  to  seek  for  French  officers  to  assist  them.  The 
trade  would  enable  England  to  continue  her  assistance  to 
Spain,  and  this  had  been  frequently  represented  to  the  regency; 
yet  the  latter  had  sent  ships  fitted  out  in  English  ports,  and 
stored  at  the  expense  of  Great  Britain  for  the  war  with  France 
to  blockade  the  colonies  and  cut  off  the  English  trade ;  and  it 
was  done  at  a  moment  when  the  regency  was  unable  to  trans- 
port Blake's  army  from  Cadiz  to  the  Condado  de  Niebla  with- 
out the  assistance  of  British  vessels.  '  It  was  difficult,'  lord 
Wellesley  said,  '  to  state  an  instance  in  which  the  prejudices 
and  jealousy  of  individuals  had  occasioned  so  much  confusion 
of  every  maxim  of  discretion  and  good  policy,  and  so 
much  danger  to  the  acknowledged  mutual  interests  of  two 
great  states  engaged  in  a  defensive  alliance  against  the  assaults 
of  a  foreign  foe :' — '  Spain  could  not  expect  England  to  concur 
hi  a  system  by  which,  at  her  own  expense,  her  trade  was 
injured,  and  by  which  Spain  was  making  efforts,  not  against 
the  French  but  against  the  main  sources  of  her  own  strength.' 
These  instructions  being  given  before  the  constitution  of 
Spain  was  arranged  by  the  Cortes,  were  pressed 
upon  Bardaxi  the  Spanish  minister,  who  agreed 
to  accept  the  mediation  upon  condition  that  Mexico,  which 
had  not  declared  a  form  of  government,  should  be  excepted, — 
that  England  should  immediately  break  off  all  intercourse  with 
the  colonies  and  if  the  mediation  failed  should  assist  Spain  to 
reconquer  them.  The  injustice  and  bad  policy  of  this  propo- 
sition was  objected  to,  but  Bardaxi  maintained  that  it  was  just 
and  politic,  and  pressed  it  as  a  secret  article ;  he  however 
finally  offered  to  accept  the  mediation,  if  England  were 
pledged  to  break  off  the  intercourse  of  trade.  This  was 


286  PENINSULA  WAR.  [JUNE,  1811. 

refused,  yet  the  negotiation  continued.  Bardaxi  asserted  that 
lord  Wellington  had  agreed  to  the  propriety  of  England  going 
to  war  with  the  colonies,  whereupon  Mr.  Wellesley  referred  to 
the  latter,  and  that  extraordinary  man,  while  actually  engaged 
with  the  enemy,  was  thus  called  upon  to  discuss  so  grave  and 
extensive  a  subject.  It  was  however  on  such  occasions  his 
great  power  of  mind  was  displayed,  and  his  manner  of  treat 
ing  this  question  proved,  that  in  political  and  even  in  com- 
mercial affairs,  his  reach  of  thought  and  enlarged  conceptions 
immeasurably  surpassed  the  cabinet  he  served :  his  opinions, 
stated  in  1811,  have  been  since  verified  in  all  points. 

1  He  denied  he  had  given  grounds  for  Bardaxi's  observa- 
tion. His  opinion  had  always  been  that  Great  Britain  should 
follow,  as  he  hoped  she  had,  liberal  counsels  towards  Spain,  by 
laying  aside  at  least  during  the  existence  of  the  war  all  con- 
sideration of  merchants'  profits.  Such  a  policy  would  equally 
suit  her  commercial  interests  and  her  warlike  objects  as  well 
as  add  greatly  to  her  character.  The  immediate  advantages 
extorted  by  an  open  trade  with  the  colonies  he  considered 
ideal.  Profit  was  to  be  made  there  and  eventually  the  com- 
merce would  be  very  great ;  but  its  value  must  arise  from  the 
increasing  riches  of  the  colonies  and  the  growth  of  luxury; 
and  the  period  at  which  this  would  happen  was  more  likely  to 
be  checked  than  forwarded  by  the  extravagant  speculations  of 
English  traders.  Whatever  might  be  the  final  particular  rela- 
tions established  between  Spain  and  her  colonies,  the  general 
result  must  be,  the  relaxation  if  not  the  annihilation  of  their 
colonial  commercial  system,  and  Great  Britain  was  sure  to  be 
the  greatest  gainer.  In  expectation  of  this  ultimate  advan- 
tage her  policy  ought  to  have  been  liberal  throughout,  that  is, 
the  colonies  themselves  should  have  been  checked,  and  the 
endeavours  of  traders  and  captains  of  ships  to  separate  them 
from  Spain  ought  to  have  been  repressed.  England  should, 
when  the  colonies  first  showed  a  disposition  to  revolt,  have 
considered  not  only  what  they  could  do  but  what  Great 
Britain  could  assist  them  to  effect.  His  knowledge  of  the 
Spanish  government  and  its  means  enabled  him  to  say  she 
could  not  reduce  even  one  of  the  weakest  of  her  colonies,  and 
to  make  the  attempt  would  be  a  gross  folly  and  misapplication 


JUNE,  1811.]  BOOK   XIV.  — CHAP.   3.  287 

of  means.  Nay  England  could  not  in  justice  to  the  great 
object  in  the  Peninsula  give  Spain  any  effectual  assistance ; 
for  it  was  but  too  true  that  distant  colonies  could  always  sepa- 
rate from  the  mother  country  when  they  willed  it,  and  cer- 
tainly it  would  be  the  highest  madness  for  Spain  to  attempt, 
at  that  time,  to  prevent  such  a  separation  by  force,  and  for 
England  to  assist  or  even  encourage  her  in  such  an  attempt. 
1  The  latter  should  by  influence  and  advice  have  prevented 
the  dispute  coming  to  extremity,  and  should  now  divert  Spain 
from  the  absurdity  of  having  recourse  to  violence.  The  recep- 
tion of  the  deputies  from  America  which  the  Spaniards  so 
much  complained  of,  was  useful  to  the  latter.  It  prevented 
those  deputies  from  going  to  France,  and  if  they  had  gone, 
the  fact  that  colonies  have  the  power  to  separate,  if  they  have 
the  will,  would  have  been  at  once  verified. 

'  Great  Britain,  although  late,  had  offered  mediation  which 
he  wished  to  have  been  asked  for,  it  remained  to  consider  on 
what  terms  it  ought  to  be  accepted.  It  would  have  been 
better  if  Spain  had  come  forward  with  an  explicit  declaration 
of  what  her  intentions  towards  the  colonies  in  respect  to  con- 
stitution and  commerce  were.  England  could  then  have  had 
something  intelligible  to  mediate  upon,  but  now  Spain  only 
desired  her  to  procure  the  submission  of  Buenos  Ayres  and 
the  Caraccas;  and  if  she  failed  in  that  impracticable  object 
she  was  to  aid  Spain  in  forcing  them  to  submission !  and  he, 
iord  Wellington,  was  said  to  have  approved  of  this  !  One 
would  really,'  he  exclaimed,  'believe  that  Mr.  Bardaxi  has 
never  adverted  to  the  means  and  resources  of  his  own  country, 
to  the  object  they  have  at  home,  nor  to  the  efforts  making  by 
England  in  the  Peninsula :  and  he  imagines  I  have  considered 
these  facts  as  little  as  he  appears  to  have  done?  Great  Britain 
cannot  agree  to  that  condition  !* 

1  In  respect  to  constitution'  (alluding  to  the  acknowledg- 
ment of  the  civil  rights  of  the  Americans  by  the  Cortes)  '  the 
Spaniards  had  gone  a  great  way,  but  not  so  far  as  some  of  her 
colonies  would  require,  they  would  probably  ask  her  to  have 
separate  local  representative  bodies  for  their  interior  concerns, 
such  as  the  English  colonial  assemblies.  Yet  this  important 
point  had  not  been  considered  in  the  treaty  of  mediation, 


288  PENINSULA   WAR.  [JUNE,  1811. 

and  in  respect  of  commerce  the  Spanish  government  had  said 
nothing :  although  it  was  quite  certain  her  prohibitory  system 
could  not  continue,  and  the   necessary  consequence  of   the 
actual  state  of  affairs  required  that  in  the  treaty  of  mediation 
the  colonies   should  be  put  with  respect  to  trade,  exactly  on 
the  same  footing  as  the  provinces  of  Old  Spain.     If  that  was 
not  done  it  would  be  useless  to  talk  to  the  colonists  of  equal 
rights  and  interests;  they  would  feel  that  their  interests  were 
sacrificed  to  those  of  the  mother  country.     It  was  true  that 
Spain  would  lose  immediately,  though  probably  not  eventually, 
very  largely  in  revenue  and  commercial  profit  by  such  a  con- 
cession.    This  was  the  unavoidable  result  of  the  circumstances 
of  the  times,  she  had  therefore  a  fair  claim  to  participate  in 
the  advantages  the  colonies  would  enjoy  from  it.     To  this 
object  the  treaty  ®f  mediation  should  have  adverted.     Spain 
should  have  confidentially  declared  to  Great  Britain  her  in- 
tended course,   what  system  she  would  follow,  what  duties 
impose,  and  what  proportion  she  would  demand  for  general 
imperial  purposes.     Upon  such  materials  England  might  have 
worked  with  a  prospect  of  permanently  maintaining  the  inte- 
grity of  the  Spanish  empire  on  just  and  fair  principles;  or  at 
all  events  have  allayed   the  present  disputes  and  so  removed 
the  difficulties  they  occasioned  in  the  Peninsula,  and  in  either 
case  have  insured  her  own  real  interests.     Spain  had  however 
taken  a  narrow  view  both  of  her  own  and  the  relative  situation 
of  others  ;  if  she  did  not  enlarge  it,  matters  would  grow  worse 
and  worse.     It  ivould  be  useless  for  England  to  interfere,  and 
after  a  long  contest  which  would  only  tend  to  weaken  the  mother 
country  and  deprive  her  of  the  resources  which  she  would  other- 
wise find  in  the  colonies  for  her  war  with  France,  the  business 
would  end  in  tJie  separation  of  the  colonies  from  Spain.'' 

After  much  discussion  the  mediation  was  accepted  by  the 
Cortes,  Mexico  only  being  excepted,  and  an  English  commis- 
sion, Mr.  Stuart  being  the  head,  was  appointed  in  September, 
1811,  but  from  various  causes  never  proceeded  beyond  Cadiz. 
The  Spaniards  continued  to  send  out  expeditions,  Mr.  Welles- 
ley's  remonstrances  were  unheeded,  and  though  the  regency 
afterwards  offered  to  open  the  trade  under  certain  duties  in 
return  for  a  subsidy  nothing  was  concluded. 


1810.  j  BOOK    XIV.  -CHAP.   4.  289 


CHAPTER  IV. 

.POLITICAL   STATE   OF     PORTUGAL. 

ALL  the  crafty  projects  of  the  Souzas,  their  influence  over 
their  weak-minded  prince,'  their  cabal  to  place  the  duke  of 
Brunswick  at  the  head  of  the  Portuguese  army,  the  personal 
violence  of  the  patriarch,  the  resignation  of  Das  Minas,  and 
the  disputes  with  lord  Wellington,  have  been  before  touched 
upon;  but  the  difficulties  thus  engendered  cannot  be  under- 
stood without  a  more  detailed  exposition. 

Mr.  Villiers's  mission,  like  all  those  emanating  from  Mr. 
Canning,  had  been  expensive  in  style,  tainted  by  intrigues, 
useless  in  business,  and  productive  of  disorders.  When  Mr. 
Stuart  arrived,  he  found  everything  except  the 
army  under  Beresford  in  a  state  of  disorganiza- 
tion; and  the  influence  of  England  was  decreasing  from  the 
vacillating  system  hitherto  pursued  by  her  government.  As 
early  as  1808  Wellington  had  advised  the  ministers  not  only 
to  adopt  Portugal  as  the  base  of  operations  in  the  Peninsula, 
but  to  assume  in  reality  the  whole  administration  of  that 
country ;  to  draw  forth  all  its  resources  of  men  and  money, 
and  make  up  any  deficiency  by  the  power  of  England.  This 
advice  had  been  neglected,  and  an  entirely  different  policy 
pursued  with  a  feeble  and  uncertain  execution. 

Like  most  constitutions  springing  from  the  feudal  system 
that  of  Portugal  was  excellent  for  defence,  but  overwhelmed 
by  abuses.  It  was  a  favourite  maxim  that  it  did  not  become 
a  paternal  government  to  punish  neglect  of  duty.  When 
court  intrigues  were  to  be  effected,  or  poor  men  to  be 
oppressed,  there  was  no  want  of  vigour  or  of  severity;  but 
in  the  administration  of  affairs  it  was  considered  sufficient  to 
give  orders  without  looking  to  their  execution,  and  no  animad- 

VOL.    III.  U 


290  PENINSULA    WAR. 


[1810. 


version,  much  less  punishment,  followed  disobedience.  Weak- 
ness characterised  the  government — the  taxes,  partially  levied, 
produced  only  half  their  just  amount — the  payments  from  the 
treasury  were  in  arrears — the  army  was  neglected  in  all  thinga 
dependent  on  the  civil  administration,  and  a  bad  navy  was 
kept  up  at  the  cost  of  a  quarter  of  a  million  to  meet  a  war 
with  Algiers.  The  last  matter  was  however  a  knife  with  a 
double  edge, — for  peace  involved  a  tribute  paid  in  coin  which 
drained  the  treasury,  and  in  war-  the  fleet  dio>  nothing;  the 
feeding  of  Lisbon,  and  still  more  of  Cadiz,  was  thus  rendered 
precarious.  Ih  commercial  affairs  the  usual  Peninsular  jealousy 
was  displayed;  the  import  of  British  goods  was  prohibited 
to  the  advantage  of  smugglers,  while  the  government,  neglect- 
ing its  own  resources  to  the  injury  of  both  countries,  was 
clamorous  for  subsidies.  Finally,  the  power  of  the  Souzas 
was  so  great  and  the  regency  so  entirely  subservient  to  them, 
that,  although  Mr.  Stuart  had  been  assured  by  Canning  that  a 
note  forbidding  Domingo  Souza  to  meddle  with  affairs  at 
Lisbon  had  been  procured  from  the  Brazils,  all  representations 
to  the  regency  were  still  met  by  references  to  that  nobleman, 
who  was  in  London !  The  business  of  the  mission  was  thus 
paralysed.  v 

In  March,  1809,  the  British  government  took  ten  thousand 
Portuguese  troops  into  pay ;  in  May  twenty  thousand ;  in  June 
thirty  thousand.  Their  cost,  added  to  the  subsidy,  amounted 
to  two  millions  sterling;  but  partly  from  negligence,  prin- 
cipally from  poverty  caused  by  Canning's  prodigal  donations 
to  Spain,  the  subsidy  was  in  arrears.  This  being  however  in 
unison  with  their  own  method  did  not  much  disturb  the 
regency;  but  they  were  eager  to  obtain  a  loan,  in  the  disposal 
of  which  they  would  have  been  quite  uncontrolled,  and  for 
that  reason  Wellington  strenuously  opposed  it.  In  revenge, 
by  wilful  misinterpretations  of  the  debates  in  parliament  and 
the  distortion  of  facts  the  regencj  assailed  the  sincerity  of 
England;  arid  the  Whigs,  encouraging  all  Portuguese  malcon- 
tents and  clamouring  justly  against  the  ministers,  but  unjustly 
against  the  generals,  greatly  augmented  the  disorder  of  the 
times.  In  1810  after  Mr.  Canning  had,  happily  for  the 
country,  los*  his  office,  lord  Wellesley  changed  the  diplomatic 


1810.]  BOOK  XIV. —  CHAP.   4.  291 

instructions.  The  envoys  and  agents  were  then  to  make  con- 
ditions as  to  the  supplies,  and  in  Portugal  were  to  meddle 
with  civil  changes,  augmentations  of  revenue  and  military 
resources,  even  to  demanding  monthly  reports  of  the  condition 
of  the  troops  and  the  expenditure  of  the  subsidy.  Lord 
Wellesley  also,  thinking  the  Spanish  Cortes  might  excite  a 
desire  for  more  temperate  government  in  Portugal,  was  willing 
to  forward  a  change  provided  old  forms  were  preserved,  and 
that  it  should  appear  to  flow  from  the  crown.  Resistance  to 
the  enemy,  he  said,  would  be  in  proportion  to  the  people's 
attachment,  and  it  was  advisable  to  make  timely  concessions, 
giving  no  more  than  was  absolutely  necessary. 

This  notion  of  a  Cortes  was  ill-received  by  the  regency. 
Mr.  Stuart  and  lord  Wellington  also  affirmed  that  the  people's 
docility  and  hatred  of  the  French  were  sufficient  for  action. 
The  time  was  perhaps  inconvenient,  the  people  certainly  did 
not  desire  this  revolutionary  measure,  which,  as  Spain  proved, 
would  not  necessarily  help  the  war,  and  Wellington,  looking 
only  to  military  success,  acted  consistently ;  but  the  English 
cabinet  displayed  wondrous  absurdity.  The  military  con- 
scription in  France,  authorized  by  the  laws,  was  they  said  an 
unheard-of  tyranny !  In  Portugal  that  conscription,  enforced 
by  foreigners,  was  a  wise  measure !  Lord  Wellesley,  acknow- 
ledging the  Portuguese  government  to  be  harsh  oppressive 
weak  and  capricious,  was  yet  content  to  withhold  from  the 
people,  expressly  because  they  loved  their  country  and  were 
obedient  subjects,  a  better  system  which  he  would  have 
granted  them  if  they  had  been  unruly  and  of  doubtful 
patriotism ! 

Mr.  Stuart  in  concert  with  lord  Wellington  diligently 
laboured  to  remedy  the  evils  of  the  hour,  but  whenever  they 
complained  of  any  particular  disorder,  they  were  offered  arbi- 
trary power  to  punish,  an  expedient  to  render  the  British 
odious  to  the  people,  and  therefore  refused.  The  intrigues  of 
the  fidalgos  were  now  apparent,  and  the  first  regency  was 
broken  up  in  1810.  Das  Minas  retired  under  pretext  of  ill 
health,  but  really  because  he  could  not  uphold  one  De  Mello, 
a  fidalgo  officer,  thrust  forward  to  oppose  the  authority  of 
Beresford ;  Cypriano  Freire  was  then  made  minister  of  finance 


292  PENINSULA    WAR.  [1810. 

and  of  foreign  affairs,  and  Forjas,  secretary  at  war  with  a 
vote  in  the  regency  on  matters  of  war.  The  former  soon 
resigned  from  some  disgust,  and  the  conde  Eedondo  having 
undertaken  the  office,  commenced,  with  the  advice  of  Mr. 
Stuart,  a  better  arrangement  of  the  taxes,  especially  the 
1  decima'  or  income  tax,  an  impost  neither  impartially  nor 
strictly  enforced  on  the  rich  towns,  nor  on  the  powerful  people 
of  the  fidalgo  faction.  The  clergy  also  evaded  the  imposts, 
and  the  British  merchants,  although  profiting  enormously 
from  the  war,  sought  exemption  under  the  factory  privileges 
from  the  taxes,  which  in  certain  cases  they  could  legally  do ; 
and  from  the  billets  and  recruiting  laws  affecting  their  ser- 
vants, which  they  could  not  justly  demand  when  all  other 
classes  in  the  community  were  liable. 

This  organization  of  the  regency  was  soon  changed  by  the 
working  of  the  Souzas  in  the  Brazils,  where  the  finance 
minister  desired  to  have  the  regulation  of  the  Portuguese 
treasury.  Freire's  resignation  was  therefore  not  accepted, 
Redondo  was  excluded  from  the  regency,  and  Forjas,  the  most 
efficient  member  of  the  government,  was  deprived  of  all  his 
functions.  The  remaining  members  proposed  to  fill  Das 
Minas'  vacancy,  but  lord  Wellington  resisted  on  the  ground  of 
illegality,  which  would  involve  him  in  an  indefensible  quarrel 
with  the  Brazils.  The  removal  of  Redondo  and  the  dismissal 
of  Forjas  he  in  concert  with  Mr.  Stuart  withstood,  and  thus 
for  the  moment  stopped  a  change  which  would  have  impeded 
the  ameliorations  begun;  but  the  finances  were  so  disordered 
that  Mr.  Stuart  as  the  least  difficulty  proposed  to  take  the 
whole  direction  on  himself,  England  being  responsible  for  the 
sums  required.  Lord  Wellington  thought  this  could  only  be 
done  by  assuming  the  whole  government,  which  he  had  pre- 
viously advised  but  judged  it  now  too  late.  Other  springs  of 
mischief  soon  bubbled  up.  Lord  Strangford,  in  reward  for 
his  diplomatic  dexterity  about  the  Brutou-street  despatch, 
had  been  appointed  minister  plenipotentiary  at  the  Brazils, 
and  failed  not  to  justify  his  previous  character  for  intrigue.  The 
policy  of  the  English  general  and  Mr.  Stuart  was  to  keep  the 
regency  permanent,  and  the  secretariats  in  the  hands  of 
Redondo  and  Forjas,  men  who  co-operated  best  with  the 


1810.  J  BOOK  XIV.— CHAP.  4.  293 

British  authorities.  Lord  Strangford  soon  intimated  that  he 
had  persuaded  the  prinee  to  add  the  English  envoy  at  Lisbon, 
the  conde  Redondo,  doctor  Nogueira,  and  the  principal  Souza 
to  the  old  regency;  to  appoint  admiral  Berkeley  naval  com- 
mander-in-chief ;  and  to  direct  that  all  traitorous  correspon- 
dence should  be  prevented,  and  the  exuberant  power  of  sub- 
ordinates limited.  This  last  article  was  aimed  at  Forjas,  and 
the  whole  designed  to  give  preponderance  to  the  Souzas :  even 
the  envoy's  appointment,  settled  by  lord  Strangford  before  he 
knew  of  Mr.  Villiers'  recall  and  designed  to  give  the  latter 
power,  not  Mr.  Stuart,  had  the  same  view  of  favouring  that 
pernicious  faction. 

This  change,  although  very  offensive,  was  submitted  to  by 
the  English  general  and  by  the  envoy  to  avoid  an  appearance 
of  disregarding  the  prince  regent's  rights;  Mr.  Stuart  was 
however  averse  to  join  a  government  where  a  diversity  of 
views  existed,  without  any  casting  vote  or  controlling  power; 
and  only  yielded  to  the  wishes  of  the  general  who  justly  thought 
his  presence  would  obviate  much  evil.  Nogueira's  appointment 
was  by  lord  Strangford  called  a  tribute  to  democracy ;  whereas 
the  real  object  was  to  sap  the  power  of  those  secretariats  which 
Wellington  and  Stuart  were  labouring  to  uphold.  But  lord 
Strangford  prided  himself  chiefly  on  the  appointment  of  prin 
cipal  Souza,  who  had,  he  said,  been  recommended  to  him  by 
Mr.  Villiers,  a  confession  showing  the  secret  spirit  of  the  ar 
rangement.  For  the  principal,  while  in  a  subordinate  situation, 
had  always  opposed  the  British  authorities  in  Portugal,  was 
the  avowed  enemy  of  Beresford,  the  contriver  of  all  confusion, 
and  known  as  the  most  mischievous  person  in  the  kingdom. 
So  pernicious  indeed  had  been  his  proceedings  that  lord 
Wellesley  and  Mr.  Stuart  formally  intimated  to  him  that  his 
absence  from  Portugal  was  desirable ;  and  now  he  was  armed 
with  additional  power  by  lord  Strangford's  diplomacy,  which 
tended  in  effect  to  ruin  the  cause  he  had  been  sent  to  the  Brazils 
to  support. 

Lord  Strangford  in  announcing  this  change  described  him- 
self as  a  voluntary  agent;  but  in  a  subsequent  despatch  he 
affirmed  that  Mr.  Canning  had  directed  him  to  press  the  ap- 
pointnx^p*  of  the  English  envoy  as  a  regent;  and  that  Nogueira'a 


294  PENINSULA   WAR  [l81(>. 

appointment  was  the  prince  regent's  own  will.  In  like  man- 
ner when  lord  Wellesley  was  intent  to  assemble  a  Portuguese 
Cortes,  lord  Strangford  called  it  l  a  great  and  essential  measure 
strongly  and  wisely  urged  by  the  government?  yet  afterwards 
acknowledged  that  he  neglected  to  press  it,  because  he  thought 
it  ' useless  and  even  hurtful'  This  inconsistency  renders  it 
difficult  to  determine  on  whom  these  affairs  rested.  As  affect- 
ing Mr.  Canning's  policy,  if  he  arranged  the  change,  his  object 
was  to  put  Mr.  Villiers  in  the  regency;  not  with  a  view 
to  control  Portugal  for  the  purposes  of  war,  but,  as  the 
instructions  to  Cradock  prove,  to  ensure  a  preponderance 
to  the  diplomatic  department  over  the  military  chief  in  that 
country. 

Lord  Wellington  had  earnestly  sought  a  better  arrangement 
of  the  financial  system — the  execution  of  the  laws  without 
favour  to  the  fidalgos — the  suppression  of  the  junta  di  vivres, 
a  negligent  and  fraudulent  board  for  which  he  wished  to  estab- 
lish a  Portuguese  commissariat — the  due  supply  of  provisions 
and  stores,  for  the  national  troops  and  fortresses — the  consoli- 
dation of  the  arsenal  department  under  one  head — the  forma- 
tion of  a  military  chest  distinct  from  the  treasury  which  was 
always  diverting  the  funds  to  other  purposes — the  enforcing 
regulations  about  military  transport — the  repairs  of  roads  and 
bridges — the  reformation  of  the  hospitals — the  succouring  of 
the  starving  people,  and  the  revival  of  agriculture  in  the 
parts  desolated  by  the  war.  He  had  hope  of  success  until 
lord  Strangford  effected  his  change,  but  then  unceasing 
acrimonious  disputes  ensued  with  the  government:  and  no 
apecies  of  falsehood  or  intrigue,  not  even  personal  insult  and 
the  writing  of  anonymous  threatening  letters  were  spared  by 
the  Souza  faction.  In  the  beginning  of  1811  they  had 
organized  an  anti-English  party,  and  a  plot  was  laid  to  force 
the  British  out  of  the  country ;  which  would  have  succeeded  if 
less  vigilance  had  been  used  by  Mr.  Stuart,  or  less  vigour  of 
control  by  lord  Wellington.  The  execution  of  this  dangerous 
conspiracy  however  required  the  patriarch's  presence  in  the 
northern  provinces,  which  Mr.  Stuart  always  dexterously 
prevented,  and  so  saved  the  cause. 

Lord  Wellington's  complaints,  accompanied  with  a  demand 


MAY,  1811.]  BOOK  XIV.  —  CttAF.  4.  295 

for  the  removal  of  principal  Souza,  reached  the  Brazils  in 
February,  1811,  and  Das  Minas  died  about  the  same  time; 
but  the  Souza's  faction  were  so  powerful  at  Rio  Janeiro,  that 
in  May  the  prince  announced  his  approval  of  their  proceedings 
and  his  high  displeasure  with  Forjas  and  Mr. -Stuart.  His 
minister  the  conde  de  Linhares  wrote,  that  the  capture  of 
Massena  and  his  army,  which  he  daily  expected  to  hear  of, 
would  not  compensate  the  devastation  of  the  country  by  the 
allies;  and  officially  to  lord  Strangford  he  declared,  that  the 
prince  would  not  permit  Mr.  Stuart  to  vote  on  the  internal 
government  because  he  consulted  persons  suspected  of  dis- 
affection :  an  expression  referring,  lord  Strangford  said,  solely 
to  Forjas.  The  prince  also  wrote  to  Wellington,  charging  Mr. 
Stuart  with  acting  separately  and  mischievously  so  as  to  pro- 
duce the  factions  complained  of;  and  unless  he  were  recalled 
Souza  should  remain  in  power:  Forjas,  he  said,  was  the  real 
opponent  of  the  British  and  must  come  to  the  Brazils  to 
answer  for  his  conduct :  finally  he  would  write  in  like  strain 
to  the  king  of  England.  In  reply  to  this  royal  intemperance 
lord  Wellington  proposed  to  quit  Portugal; — 
Forjas  resigned,  —  the  envoy  and  the  admiral 
decided  to  do  so  likewise,  and  the  latter  withdrew  from  council 
until  the  pleasure  of  the  English  cabinet  was  made  known, 
The  war  was  then  on  the  point  of  being  ended  without  the 
public  being  aware  of  the  crisis,  because  Wellington  kept  th* 
matter  secret  to  avoid  disturbance,  and  in  hopes  the  prince 
would  finally  yield.  But  now  other  embarrassments  were 
superadded,  sufficient  to  dash  aside  hopes  of  continuing  the 
war  even  though  the  intrigues  at  Rio  Janeiro  should  be 
abated.  Forjas,  Nogueira,  and  Redondo  had  been  supported 
against  their  enemies  because  they  were  the  best  public  men 
to  be  found ;  but,  tainted  alike  by  national  habits  and  the  fear 
of  ultimate  consequences,  they  continually  thwarted  the  execu- 
tion of  measures  they  had  agreed  to  in  council.  No  delinquent 
was  ever  punished,  no  fortress  ever  stored  in  due  time  and 
quantity,  the  suffering  people  were  uncared  for,  disorders  were 
unrepressed,  the  troops  were  starved,  the  fidalgos  favoured, 
the  junta  de  viveres  supported,  the  formation  of  a  military 
chest  and  commissariat  delayed:  wild  and  foolish  schemes 


296  PENINSULA    WAR.  [1811. 

were  daily  broached,  and  the  natural  weakness  of  the  govern- 
ment was  increased  by  its  instability,  because  the  prince 
regent  early  in  1811  intimated  an  intention  of  immediately 
returning  to  Europe. 

To  the  favourite  maxim  with  the  regency,  that  a  paternal 
government  should  not  punish  delinquents  in  the  public 
service,  was  now  added  another  more  pernicious,  namely,  that 
the  Portuguese  troops  could  thrive  under  privations  of  food 
which  would  kill  men  of  another  nation.  With  these  two 
follies  they  excused  neglect,  whenever  denying  the  neglect 
became  fatiguing.  Collisions  in  the  market  between  the 
British  commissariat  and  the  junta  de  viveres  were  frequent 
and  hurtful;  for  the  former,  able  to  outbid  and  more  in  fear 
of  failure,  overbought  the  latter;  which  contracted  the  small 
sphere  of  their  activity.  Lord  Wellington  was  also  prevented 
feeding  the  whole  Portuguese  army  himself  by  a  curious 
obstacle.  He  depended  for  the  support  of  his  own  troops  upon 
the  Spanish  muleteers  attached  to  the  army;  they  were  the 
life  and  sustenance  of  the  war,  and  their  patient  hardiness  and 
fidelity  to  the  British  were  remarkable ;  but  they  abhorred  the 
Portuguese  people  and  would  not  carry  provisions  for  their 
soldiers :  their  services  could  only  be  obtained  for  the  native 
brigades  attached  to  the  English  divisions  by  making  them 
think  the  food  was  entirely  for  the  latter.  Upon  such  nice 
management  even  in  apparently  trifling  matters  did  this  war 
depend.  Yet  it  is  not  uncommon  for  politicians,  versed  only 
in  the  classic  puerilities  of  public  schools  and  the  tricks  of 
parliamentary  faction,  to  hold  the  rugged  experience  of 
Wellington's  camp  as  nothing  in  the  formation  of  a  states- 
man! 

Very  soon  and  severely  were  the  effects  of  this  complication 
of  evils  felt.  Abrantes  was  like  to  be  abandoned  from  want 
while  Massena  held  Santarem;  the  Portuguese  troops  were 
starved  during  that  general's  retreat,  Beresford's  operations 
in  the  Alemtejo  were  also  impeded,  and  his  hospitals  left 
without  succour.  At  Fuentes  Onoro  ammunition  failed,  and 
the  Portuguese  artillery  had  to  pick  up  the  enemy's  bullets ; 
the  cavalry  of  that  nation  was  entirely  ruined ;  and  of  more 
than  forty  thousand  regular  troops  formed  by  Beresford. 


1811.]  BOOK  XIV. -CHAP.   4.  297 

only  nineteen  thousand  were  under  arms  after  the  battle  of 
Albuera :  the  rest  had  deserted  or  died  from  extreme  want. 
When  Massena  retreated,  the  provincial  organization  of  the 
country  was  restored,  and  seed  corn  furnished  by  Mr.  Stuart 
on  the  credit  of  the  subsidy;  an  amnesty  for"  deserters  was 
also  published,  the  feudal  imposts  for  the  year  were  remitted, 
and  fairs  were  established  to  supply  tools  of  husbandry.  But 
so  great  was  the  misery  that  at  Caldas  eighty  persons  died 
daily;  and  at  Figueras,  where  twelve  thousand  people,  chiefly 
from  Portuguese  Estremadura,  had  taken  refuge,  the  daily 
deaths  were  above  a  hundred :  the  whole  would  have  perished 
but  for  the  active  benevolence  of  major  Von  Linstow,  an 
officer  of  Trant's  staff.  Bands  of  robbers  were  so  numerous 
that  military  persons  could  not  travel  on  service  in  safety,  and 
it  was  feared  troops  must  be  employed  to  scour  the  country. 
Officers  on  duty  were  insulted  daily,  and  even  assassinated  in 
Lisbon  with  impunity,  the  whole  army  was  disgusted,  and  the 
letters  to  England  were  engendering  a  dislike  to  the  war.  The 
British  soldiers  when  not  with  their  regiments  committed 
many  outrages  on  the  lines  of  communication,  and  as  a  climax 
of  misery  the  harvest  failed  in  Portugal  and  in  England.  No 
corn  could  be  got  from  the  Baltic,  because  there  was  no  specie 
to  pay  for  it  and  bills  were  refused ;  hence  famine,  dire  and 
wasting,  prevailed,  until  Mr.  Stuart  obtained  leave  to  license 
fifty  American  corn  vessels,  whose  cargoes  were  paid  for  partly 
by  English  charitable  donations,  partly  by  a  parliamentary 
grant  passed  when  Massena  retreated. 

In  this  crisis  the  British  cabinet  granted  an  additional  sub- 
sidy to  Portugal ;  but  the  greatest  part  was  of  necessity  paid 
in  kind,  and  the  distress  of  the  regency  for  money  was  scarcely 
lessened;  for  these  supplies  merely  stood  in  the  place  of 
the  plunder  which  had  hitherto  prevailed  in  the  country. 
Thus  Mr.  Canning's  prodigality,  Mr.  Vansittart's  paper  system, 
and  Mr.  Perceval's  economy,  all  combined  to  press  upon  the 
British  general ;  to  use  his  own  words,  he  was  supplied  with 
only  one-sixth  part  of  the  money  necessary  to  keep  the  great 
machine  going  which  had  been  set  in  motion ;  and  in  answer 
to  his  remonstrances,  a  secretary  of  the  Treasury  was  employed 
by  Mr.  Perceval  to  prove  in  a  laboured  paper,  founded  upon 


298  PENINSULA    WAR.  [1811. 

false  data,  that  the  army  had  been  over-supplied  and  must 
have  money  to  spare. — That  minister,  whose  speeches  were 
big  with  the  final  destruction  of  France,  was  then  intent  to 
confine  the  efforts  of  England  to  the  defence  of  Portugal  without 
regard  to  the  rest  of  the  Peninsula ! 

Amongst  the  follies  of  the  Portuguese  regency  was  a 
resolution  to  issue  proclamations,  filled  with  bombastic  adula- 
tion of  themselves,  vulgar  abuse  of  the  French,  and  altogether 
unsuited  to  the  object  of  raising  the  public  feeling,  which 
nagged  under  their  system.  To  the  English  general's  remon- 
strances on  this  head,  Forjas  replied,  that  praise  of  themselves 
and  abuse  of  the  French  was  the  national  custom  and  could 
not  be  dispensed  with !  English  writers  who  have  implicitly 
followed  the  accounts  of  the  Portuguese  authors,  such  as 
Accursio  de  Neves  and  men  of  his  stamp,  relative  to  French 
enormities,  would  do  well  to  consider  this  fact.  And  here  it 
may  be  remarked,  that  so  many  complaints  were  made  of  the 
cruelty  committed  by  Massena's  army  while  at  Santarem,  that 
lord  Wellington  had  some  thoughts  of  reprisals;  but  having 

first  caused  strict  inquiry  to  be  made,  it  was  dis- 
MSSStUart'  covered  that  in  most  cases,  the  ordenan$as,  after 

having  submitted  to  the  French  and  received 
their  protection,  took  advantage  of  it  to  destroy  the  stragglers 
and  small  detachments,  and  the  cruelty  complained  of  was 
only  the  infliction  of  legitimate  punishment:  the  projected 
retaliation  was  therefore  changed  for  an  injunction  to  the 
ordenangaa  to  cease  such  warfare. 

Faithless  and  foul  as  the  regency's  conduct  was  on  all 
subjects,  it  was  most  openly  displayed  in  reference  to  the 
convention  of  Cintra.  All  benefits  insured  to  Portugal  were 
complacently  accepted,  all  points  affecting  England's 'character 
overlooked  or  annulled.  In  violation  of  that  treaty  French 
residents  in  Lisbon  were  cast  into  loathsome  dungeons  with- 
out offence  charged ;  and  in  respect  to  the  count  Mascarhefias, 
wanton  cruelty  and  useless  treachery  were  alike  exhibited. 
This  youth,  when  fifteen  years  old,  had  with  many  others 
entered  the  French  service  in  Junot's  time,  but  with  the  per- 
mission of  his  own  prince.  He  and  Sabugal  were  captured  in 
1810,  passing  from  Massenas  army  to  Spain, — Sabugal  iu 


1811.]  BOOK  XIV.— CHAP.  4.  299 

uniform,  Masearheiias  in  disguise.  Being  tried  for  treason, 
the  first,  a  general  with  friends  amongst  the  fidalgos,  was 
acquitted,  which  was  just :  but  he  was  immediately  employed 
under  the  regency,  which  was  disgraceful  and  the  result  of 
faction.  Mascarhenas,  a  boy  without  powerful  friends,  was 
condemned  to  death!  Lord  Wellington  and  Mr.  Stuart 
impugned  the  justice  of  the  sentence,  and  desired,  if  humanity 
were  unheeded,  that  he  might  be  executed  as  a  spy  for  being 
disguised,  as  that  would  obviate  the  danger  of  reprisals  already 
menaced  by  Massena.  The  boy's  mother  and  sisters  grovelling 
in  the  dust  implored  mercy  of  the  regency,  but  that  body  told 
the  miserable  women  that  the  British  general  and  envoy 
demanded  his  death,  and  they  were  sent  with  this  brutal 
falsehood  to  weep  and  ask  grace  of  those  who  had  no  power 
to  grant  it.  Mascarhefias  was  publicly  executed  as  a  traitor 
for  entering  the  French  service  under  the  authority  of  his 
native  prince,  while  Sabugal  was  acquitted  and  rewarded, 
although  precisely  in  the  same  circumstances  when  the  excuse 
of  the  disguise  had  been  rejected! 

In  1810,  one  Corea,  calling  himself  an  aide-de-camp  of 
Massena,  was  seized  in  disguise  within  the  British  lines.  He 
gave  useful  information,  and  was  kept  in  St.  Julians  to  pro- 
tect him  from  the  Portuguese  government.  Becoming  de- 
ranged he  was  released,  whereupon  the  regency  desired  he 
might  be  sent  as  a  prisoner  of  war  to  England ;  thus  for  con- 
venience admitting  the  principle  which  they  had  rejected  when 
honour  and  humanity  were  concerned.  A  process  against 
d'Alorna  was  also  commenced,  but  his  family  was  toe 
powerful;  yet  the  government  refused  madame  d'Alorna  leave 
to  join  her  husband,  thus  showing  themselves  spiteful  and 
contemptible  as  well  as  cowardly  and  bloody.  Even  tin 
court  of  Brazil  was  shocked ;  the  prince  rebuked  the  regency 
severely  for  the  death  of  Mascarhenas,  reversed  the  sentences 
on  some  others,  and  banished  Sabugal  to  Terceira. 

This  was  the  political  state  of  Portugal. 

Lord  Liverpool's  intimation,  that  neither  corn  nor  specie 
could  be  had  from  England,  threw  Wellington  on  his  own 
resources  for  feeding  his  troops.  He  had  created  a  paper 
money  by  means  of  commissariat  bills  paid  regularly  at 


800  PENINSULA    WAR  [1811. 

certain  periods,  which  passed  with  the  people  when  the 
national  bonds  called  'apolocies'  were  at  an  enormous  dis- 
count. He  now  in  concert  with  Mr.  Stuart  engaged  in  com- 
merce to  supply  his  necessities.  For  having  ascertained  that 
grain  in  different  parts  of  the  world,  especially  in  South 
America,  could  be  bought  by  bills  cheaper  than  it  is  sold 
for  hard  cash  in  Lisbon ;  and  that  in  Egypt  although  only  to 
be  bought  with  specie  it  was  at  a  reduced  price,  they  em- 
ployed agents  to  purchase  for  the  army  account,  and  after 
filling  the  magazines  sold  the  overplus  to  the  inhabitants. 
This  transaction  was  however  impeded  by  the  disputes  with 
North  America,  which  were  now  rapidly  hastening  to  a 
rupture;  and  American  ships  frequenting  the  Tagus,  being 
prevented  by  the  non-importation  act  from  bringing  back 
merchandise,  were  forced  to  demand  coin,  which  helped  to 
drain  the  country  of  specie. 

Mr.  Stuart  could  obtain  no  assistance  from  the  English 
merchants  of  Lisbon  to  aid  a  traffic  interfering  with  their 
profits.  Wherefore  he  wrote  circular  letters  to  the  consuls  in 
the  Mediterranean,  and  in  the  Portuguese  islands,  and  to  the 
English  minister  at  Washington,  desiring  them  to  negotiate 
treasury  bills,  to  increase  the  shipments  of  corn  to  Lisbon, 
and  pay  with  new  bills  to  be  invested  in  the  articles  of  British 
manufacture  still  permitted  by  the  non-importation  law  to  go 
to  America.  This  commerce,  which  Wellington  truly  observed 
was  not  what  ought  to  have  occupied  his  time  and  attention, 
saved  the  army  and  the  people  when  the  proceedings  of  Mr. 
Perceval  Would  have  destroyed  both :  yet  it  was  cavilled  at 
and  censured  by  the  ministers  on  the  representations  of  the 
merchants  with  whose  exorbitant  gains  it  interfered.  These 
accumulated  difficulties  and  the  want  of  adequate  support  in 
England  caused  the  English  general  seriously  to  think  of 
quitting  his  command.  But  when  he  reflected  that  it  was 
more  an  English  than  a  Peninsula  cause, — that  the  French 
embarrassments  might  be  greater  even  than  his  own, — that 
Napoleon,  gigantic  as  his  exertions  had  been,  was  scarcely 
aware  of  all  the  difficulty  of  conquering  while  an  English 
army  held  in  Portugal,  and  that  light  was  breaking  in  the  north 
on  the  chances  of  war  there,  his  mental  eye  perceived  a  coming 


1811.]  BOOK  XIV.— CHAP.  4.  301 

glory  and  he  retempered  his  mighty  energy  to  bear  the  buffet 
of  the  tempest. 

But  many  obstacles  choked  his  path,  and  yet  he  could  not 
stand  still  lest  the  ground  should  open  beneath  his  feet.  If 
he  moved  in  the  north,  Marmont  and  Bessieres.were  there  to 
oppose  him,  and  he  must  take  Ciudad  Rodrigo  or  blockade  it 
before  he  could  advance  against  them.  To  take  that  place  a 
battering-train  was  to  be  brought  through  a  mountainous 
country  from  Lamego,  and  there  was  no  covering  position  tor 
the  army  during  the  siege.  To  blockade  and  pass  it  would 
so  weaken  his  forces,  already  inferior  to  the  enemy,  that  he 
could  do  nothing  effectual;  and  then  Soult  would  again 
advance  from  Llerena,  and  perhaps  add  Elvas  to  his  former 
conquests.  To  act  on  the  defensive  in  Beira,  and  invade 
Andalusia  in  concert  with  Blake,  Beguines,  Graham,  and  the 
Murcians,  while  Joseph's  absence  paralysed  the  army  of  the 
centre, — while  the  army  of  Portugal  was  being  re-organized 
in  Gastille,  and  Suchet  engaged  with  Taragona,  would  have 
been  an  operation  suitable  to  circumstances.  But  then 
Badajos  must  have  been  blockaded  with  a  force  able  to  meet 
the  army  of  the  centre ;  and  the  Portuguese  government  had 
so  reduced  the  native  forces  that  a  sufficient  army  to  en- 
counter Soult  would  not  have  remained.  Hence,  after  the 
battle  of  Albuera,  the  only  thing  to  be  done  was  to  renew  the 
siege  of  Badajos.  It  contained  the  enemy's  bridge  equipage 
and  battering-train,  and  on  ordinary  military  calculations 
could  scarcely  be  expected  to  fall  before  Soult  and  Marmont 
would  bring  succour;  but  it  was  only  by  reducing  it  that 
Portugal  itself  could  be  secured  beyond  the  precincts  of 
Lisbon,  and  a  base  for  further  operations  obtained. 

Following  the  rules  of  art,  Soult  should  have  been  driven 
over  the  mountains  before  the  siege  was  begun,  but  there  was 
no  time  for  this,  and  Marmont  was  equally  to  be  dreaded  on 
the  other  side;  wherefore  Wellington  sought,  as  it  were,  to 
snatch  away  the  fortress  from  between  them ;  and  those  who 
knowing  his  real  situation  censure  him  for  the  attempt  are 
neither  generals  nor  statesmen.  The  question  was,  whether 
the  attempt  should  be  made  or  the  contest  in  the  Peninsula 
resigned.  It  was  made  and  failed,  yet  the  Peninsula  was  not 


302  PENINSULA   WAR.  [1811. 

lost;  but  no  argument  can  be  thence  derived,  because  the 
attempt  rather  than  success  was  requisite  to  keep  the  war 
alive :  moreover  the  French  did  not  push  their  advantages  as 
far  as  they  might  have  done,  and  the  unforeseen  circumstance 
of  a  large  sum  of  money  being  brought  to  Lisbon  by  private 
speculation  at  the  moment  of  failure,  enabled  the  English 
general  to  support  the  crisis. 


MAY.  \Sl\r  BOOK    XIV.— CHAP.   ft.  303 


CHAPTER  V.   . 

SECOND    ENGLISH    SIEGE   OP   BADAJOS. 

THERE  is  no  operation  in  war  more  certain  than  a  modem 
siege  if  the  rules  of  art  are  strictly  followed;  and  unlike  the 
ancient  sieges  in  that  particular  it  is  also  different  in  this,  that 
no  operation  is  less  open  to  irregular  daring,  because  the 
course  of  the  engineer  can  neither  be  hurried  nor  delayed  with- 
out danger.  Wellington  knew  the  siege  of  Badajos  in  form 
required  longer  time  and  better  means  than  were  at  his 
disposal;  but  he  was  compelled  to  incur  danger  and  loss  of 
reputation,  which  is  loss  of  strength,  or  to  adopt  some  com- 
pendious mode  of  taking  that  place.  The  time  he  could  com- 
mand, and  time  is  in  all  sieges  the  greatest  point,  was  precisely 
that  which  the  French  required  to  bring  up  a  force  sufficient 
to  disturb  the  operation.  Their  doing  so  depended  on 
Marmont,  whose  march  from  Salamanca  to  Badajos  through 
Banos,  or  the  Gata,  could  not  be  stopped  by  Spencer,  seeing 
that  those  denies  were  commanded  by  the  French  positions :  it 
was  possible  also  at  that  season  to  ford  the  Tagus  near  Alcan- 
tara, and  more  than  twenty  days'  free  action  against  Badajos 
could  not  be  calculated  upon.  The  battering-gun  carriages 
used  in  Beresford's  siege  were  damaged ;  the  artillery  officers 
asked  eleven  days  to  repair  them,  and  the  scanty  means  of 
transport  for  stores  were  diminished  by  carrying  the  wounded 
from  Albuera.  Fifteen  days  of  open  trenches  and  nine  days 
of  fire  was  all  that  could  be  expected,  and  with  good  guns, 
plentiful  stores,  and  a  corps  of  regular  sappers  and  miners  this 
time  would  have  sufficed;  but  none  of  these  things  were  in 
camp,  and  it  was  a  keen  jest  of  Picton  to  say,  that  'lord 
Wellington  sued  Badajos  in  forma  pauperis ' 

Of  the  guns,  some  cast  in  Philip  the  Second's  reign  were  ot 


304  PENINSULA    WAR.  MAY,  1811. 

soft  brass  and  false  in  their  bore;  the  shot  were  of  different 
sizes  and  the  largest  too  small ;  the  Portuguese  gunners  were 
inexperienced,  there  were  but  few  British  artillerymen,  fewer 
engineers,  no  sappers  or  miners,  and  no  time  to  teach  the 
troops  how  to  make  fascines  and  gabions.  Regular  approaches 
against  the  place  by  the  Pardaleras  and  the  Picurina  outworks 
could  not  be  attempted ;  Beresford's  lines  of  attack  on  the 
castle  and  Fort  Christoval  were  therefore  adopted,  avoiding 
the  errors  of  that  general:  that  is  to  say,  the  double  attacks 
were  to  be  pushed  simultaneously  and  with  more  powerful 
means.  San  Christoval  might  thus  be  taken,  and  batteries 
from  thence  sweep  the  interior  of  the  castle,  which  was  mean- 
while to  be  breached :  something  also  was  hoped  from  the 
inhabitants,  and  something  from  the  effect  of  Soult's  retreat 
from  Albuera.  In  this  hope  the  work  was  begun.  Major 
Dickson,  an  artillery  officer  conspicuous  for  talent,  prepared 
with  unexpected  rapidity  a  battering  train  of  thirty  twenty- 
four  pounders,  four  sixteen-pounders,  and  twelve  eight  and 
ten  inch  howitzers  used  as  mortars  by  placing  them  on  trucks. 
Six  iron  Portuguese  ship-guns  were  forwarded  from  Salvatierra, 
making  altogether  fifty -two  pieces;  a  convoy  of  engineer's 
stores  arrived  from  Alcacer  do  Sal ;  and  some  British  artillery 
came  from  Lisbon  to  be  mixed  with  the  Portuguese,  making  a 
total  of  six  hundred  gunners.  The  regular  engineer  officers 
present  were  twenty-one  in  number;  eleven  volunteers  from 
the  line  were  joined  as  assistant  engineers :  and  a  draft  of  three 
hundred  intelligent  infantry,  including  twenty-five  artificers  of 
the  staff  corps,  strengthened  the  force  immediately  under  their 
command. 

Hamilton's  Portuguese  division  was  already  before  the  town, 
and  the  24th  of  May,  at  the  close  of  evening,  Houston's 
division,  increased  to  five  thousand  men  by  the  seventeenth 
Portuguese  regiment  and  the  Tavira  and  Lagos  militia,  invested 
San  Christoval.  The  flying  bridge  was  then  laid  down  on  the 
Guadiana,  and  on  the  27th,Picton's  division  arrived  from  Campo 
Mayor,  crossed  the  river  by  the  ford  above  the  town,  and  joined 
Hamilton,  their  united  force  being  about  ten  thousand  men. 
The  covering  army  which  included  the  Spaniards  was  under 
Hill,  and  spread  from  Merida  to  Albuera ;  the  cavalry  pushed 


MAY,  i8it.]  BOOK   XIV.  — CfiAP.   6.  80f 

forward  in  observation  of  Soult ;  and  when  intelligence  arrived 
that  Drouet  was  effecting  his  junction  with  that  marshal,  two 
regiments  of  cavalry  and  two  brigades  of  infantry,  quartered  at 
Coria  as  posts  of  communication  with  Spencer,  were  called  up 
to  reinforce  the  covering  army. 

Phillipon  had  used  the  respite  given  him  to  level  Beresford's 
trenches,  repair  his  own  damages,  and  obtain  small  supplies  of 
wine  and  vegetables  from  the  people  of  Estremadura,  who  were 
still  awed  by  Soult's  vicinity.  Within  the  place  all  was  quiet, 
for  the  citizens  did  not  now  exceed  five  thousand  souls  and 
when  the  place  was  invested  parties  of  the  townsmen,  mixed 
with  soldiers,  were  observed  working  to  improve  the  defences. 
Wherefore,  as  retrenchments  behind  the  intended  points  of 
attack  would  prolong  the  siege,  a  large  telescope  was  placed  in 
the  tower  of  La  Lippe  at  Elvas,  with  which  the  interior  of  the 
castle  was  plainly  seen  and  all  preparations  discovered. 

In  the  night  of  the  29th  ground  was  broken  for  a  false 
attack  against  the  Pardaleras ;  and  the  following  night  sixteen 
hundred  workmen,  having  a  covering  party  of  twelve  hundred, 
sunk  a  parallel  against  the  castle  on  an  extent  of  eleven 
hundred  yards,  without  being  discovered  by  the  enemy,  who 
did  not  fire  until  after  daylight.  The  same  night  twelve 
hundred  workmen,  covered  by  eight  hundred  men,  opened  a 
parallel,  four  hundred  and  fifty  yards  from  San  Christoval  and 
seven  hundred  yards  from  the  bridge-head.  On  this  line  one 
breaching  and  two  counter  batteries  were  raised  against  the 
fort  and  bridge-head  to  prevent  a  sally :  a  fourth  battery  was 
also  commenced  to  search  the  defences  of  the  castle,  but  the 
workmen  were  discovered  and  a  heavy  fire  struck  down  many 
of  them. 

On  the  31st  the  attack  against  the  castle,  the  soil  being 
very  soft,  was  rapidly  pushed  forward  without  much  interrup- 
tion ;  but  the  Christoval  attack,  carried  on  in  a  rocky  soil  and 
the  earth  brought  from  the  rear,  proceeded  slowly  and  with 
considerable  loss.  This  day  the  artillerymen  from  Lisbon 
came  up  on  mules,  and  the  engineers  hastened  the  works-  The 
direction  of  the  parallel  against  the  castle  made  the  right  gra 
dually  approach  the  point  of  attack,  by  which  the  heaviest  fire 
of  the  place  was  avoided ;  yet,  so  great  was  the  desire  to  save 

VOL.  in.  x 


306  PENINSULA    WAR.  [Jura,  1811. 

time,  that  before  the  suitable  point  of  distance  was  attained 
a  battery  of  fourteen  twenty-four-pounders  with  six  large 
howitzers  was  marked  out. 

On  the  Christoval  side  the  batteries  were  not  finished 
before  the  night  of  the  1st  of  June,  for  the  rocky  soil  required 
that  the  miner  should  first  level  the  ground  for  platforms; 
and  the  garrison  having  mortars  of  sixteen  and  eighteen 
inches'  diameter  mounted  on  the  castle  sent  every  shell  amongst 
the  workmen.  These  huge  missiles  would  have  ruined  the 
batteries  on  that  side  altogether,  if  the  latter  had  not  been  on 
the  edge  of  a  ridge  from  whence  most  of  the 
Register  of  shells  rolled  off  before  bursting ;  yet  so  difficult 
the  Siege,  is  it  to  judge  rightly  in  war  that  Phillipon  stopped 
this  fire  thinking  it  thrown  away !  The  work  was 
also  delayed  by  the  bringing  of  earth  from  a  distance,  and  wool- 
packs  purchased  at  Elvas  were  used  instead.  However,  in  the 
night  of  the  2nd,  all  the  batteries  were  completed  and  armed 
with  forty-three  pieces  of  different  sizes,  twenty  being  pointed 
against  the  castle ;  the  next  day  the  fire  opened,  but  the  wind- 
age caused  by  the  smallness  of  the  shot  rendered  it  ineffec- 
tual at  first,  and  five  pieces  were  soon  rendered  unserviceable. 
Towards  evening  the  practice  became  steadier,  the  fire  of  the 
fort  was  nearly  silenced,  and  the  covering  of  masonry  falling 
from  the  castle  wall  discovered  a  perpendicular  bank  of  clay. 
Next  night  the  parallel  against  the  castle  was  prolonged  and 
a  battery  for  seven  guns  traced  out  six  hundred  and  fifty  yards 
from  the  breach.  On  the  4th  the  garrison's  fire  was  increased 
by  several  additional  guns,  and  six  pieces  of  the  besiegers  were 
disabled ;  their  batteries  told  also  but  slightly  against  the  bank 
of  clay. 

Christoval  was  now  much  injured,  and  some  damage  was 
done  to  the  castle  from  one  of  the  batteries  on  that  side ;  but 
the  guns  were  so  soft  and  bad  the  rate  of  firing  was  of  neces- 
sity greatly  reduced  in  all  the  batteries.  In  the  night  the  new 
battery  was  armed,  the  damaged  works  repaired,  and  next  day, 
the  enemy  having  trained  a  gun  in  Christoval  to  plunge  into 
the  trenches  on  the  castle  side,  the  parallel  was  deepened  and 
traverses  constructed  to  protect  the  troops.  Fifteen  pieces 
still  played  against  the  castle,  yet  the  bank  of  clay,  although 


JUNE,  1811.]  BOOK  XIV.  — CHAP.   5.  807 

falling  away  in  flakes,  always  remained  perpendicular:  one 
damaged  gun  was  repaired  on  the  Christoval  side,  but  two 
more  had  become  unserviceable. 

In  the  night  the  parallel  against  the  castle  was  again 
extended,  and  a  fresh  battery  traced  out  five  hundred  and 
twenty  yards  from  the  breach  to  receive  the  Portuguese  iron 
guns  which  had  arrived  at  Elvas ;  on  the  Christoval  side  also 
some  new  batteries  were  opened  and  some  old  ones  aban- 
doned. During  this  night  the  garrison  began  to  entrench 
themselves  behind  the  castle  breach,  and  two  additional 
pieces  from  Christoval  plunged  into  the  trenches  with  great 
effect.  On  the  other  hand  the  besiegers'  fire  had  broken  the 
clay  bank,  which  took  a  slope  nearly  practicable,  and  the  stray 
shells  set  fire  to  the  houses  nearest  the  castle,  but  three  more 
guns  were  disabled.  On  the  6th  there  were  two  breaches  in 
Christoval,  the  principal  one  seeming  practicable,  and  a  com- 
pany of  grenadiers  with  twelve  ladders  were  directed  to  assault 
it,  while  a  second  company  turned  the  fort  by  the  east  to 
divert  the  enemy's  attention.  Three  hundred  men  from  the 
trenches  were  at  the  same  time  pushed  forward  by  the  west 
side  to  cut  the  communication  between  the  fort  and  the  bridge- 
head, while  a  detachment  with  a  six-pounder  moved  into  the 
valley  of  the  Gebora  to  prevent  any  passage  of  the  Guadiana 
by  boats. 

FIRST   ASSAULT    OF   CHRISTOVAL. 

Major  M'Intosh  of  the  85th  regiment  led  the  stormers,  being 
preceded  by  a  forlorn  hope  under  lieutenant  Dyas  of  the  51st; 
and  that  very  gallant  gentleman,  guided  by  the  engineer  Forster, 
a  young  man  of  uncommon  bravery,  reached  the  glacis  and 
descended  the  ditch  without  being  discovered.  The  French 
had  cleared  the  rubbish  away,  the  breach  had  still  seven 
feet  of  perpendicular  wall,  and  above  it  were  pointed  beams  of 
wood  and  carts  chained  together,  large  shells  being  also  ranged 
along  the  ramparts  to  roll  down.  The  forlorn  hope  finding 
the  opening  impracticable  was  retiring  with  little  loss,  when 
the  main  body,  which  had  been  exposed  to  a  flank  fire  from 
the  town  as  well  as  a  direct  fire  from  the  fort,  came  leaping 
into  the  ditch  with  ladders.  Then  an  effort  was  muile  to  esca- 


808  PENINSULA   WAR.  [JUNE,  1811. 

lade  at  different  points,  but  the  Bladders  were  too  short,  and 
the  garrison,  consisting  o.f  only  seventy-five  men  besides  the 
cannoneers,  made  so  stout  a  resistance,  and  the  confusion  and 
mischief  occasioned  by  the  bursting  of  the  shells  was  so  great, 
that  the  assailants  finally  retired  with  the  loss  of  more  than 
one  hundred  men. 

Bad  success  always  produces  disputes.     This  failure  was 

attributed  by  some  to  the  breach  being  impracticable  from  the 

first,  by  others  to  confusion  after  the  main  body 

Lamarre's         na(j   entered.       French   writers    affirm   that    the 

BHG$£68« 

breach,  certainly  practicable  on  the  night  of  the 
5th,  was  not  so  on  the  6th ;  for,  as  the  besiegers  did  not  attack 
until  midnight  the  workmen  had  time  to  clear  the  ruins 
away  and  raise  fresh  obstacles,  and  the  bravery  of  the  soldiers 
who  were  provided  with  three  muskets  each  did  the  rest.  It 
is  however  evident,  that  from  inexperience,  accident,  or  other 
causes,  the  combinations  for  the  assault  were  not  well  calcu- 
lated ;  the  storming  party  was  too  weak,  the  ladders  few  and 
short,  the  breach  not  scoured  by  the  fire  of  the  batteries. 
The  attack  was  also  ill-combined,  for  the  leading  troops  were 
repulsed  before  the  main  body  entered  the  ditch.  The  intre- 
pidity of  the  assailants  was  admitted  by  all  sides,  yet  it  is  a 
great  point  in  such  attacks  that  the  supports  should  form 
almost  one  body  with  the  leaders ;  the  sense  of  power  derived 
from  numbers  is  a  strong  incentive  to  valour,  and  obstacles 
insurmountable  to  a  few  vanish  before  a  multitude. 

During  this  night  the  iron  guns  were  placed  in  battery 
against  the  castle,  but  two  more  of  the  brass  pieces  became 
unserviceable,  and  the  following  day  three  others  were  dis- 
abled. The  bank  of  clay  however  sloped  more,  and  captain 
Patton  of  the  engineers  examined  it  closely;  he  was  mortally 
wounded  in  returning  yet  lived  to  report  it  practicable.  The 
French  as  usual  cleared  away  the  ruins,  and  with  bales  of 
wool  and  other  materials  formed  interior  defences.  They 
likewise  ranged  a  number  of  huge  shells  and  barrels  of  powder 
with  matches  fastened  to  them  along  the  ramparts,  placed 
chosen  men,  each  supplied  with  four  muskets,  to  defend  the 
breaches,  and  in  that  order  fearlessly  awaited  another  attack, 
which  was  soon  made.  For  intelligence  now  arrived  that 


JUNE,  1811.]  BOOK   XIV.  —  CHAP.    5.  309 

Drouet  was  close  to  Llerena,  and  Marmont  on  the  move  from 
Salamanca,  wherefore,  lest  the  prey  should  escape,  another 
assault  on  Christoval  was  orderea.  This  time  four  hundred 
British,  Portuguese,  and  French  men  of  the  Chasseurs  Bri- 
tarmiqueSj  carrying  sixteen  long  ladders,  were  employed ;  the 
supports  were  better  closed  up ;  the  appointed  hour  was  nine 
instead  of  twelve;  and  more  detachments  were  distributed  on 
the  right  and  left  to  distract  the  enemy's  attention,  cut  off 
his  communication  with  the  town,  and  improve  success.  Phil- 
lipon  in  opposition  made  the  garrison  two  hundred  strong. 


SECOND   ASSAULT   OF   CHRISTOVAL 

Major  M'Geechy  commanded  the  stormers,  the  forlorn  hope 
was  again  led  by  the  gallant  Dyas,  accompanied  by  the 
engineer  Hunt.  A  little  after  9  o'clock  the"  first  troops 
bounded  forward,  and  were  closely  followed  by  the  support 
under  a  shattering  musketry  which  killed  M'Geechy,  Hunt,  and 
many  men,  but  the  others  with  loud  shouts  jumped  into  the 
ditch;  then  the  French  scoffingly  calling  to  come  on  rolled 
the  barrels  of  powder  and  shells  down,  and  the  musketry 
made  fearful  havoc.  The  two  leading  columns  united  at  the 
main  breach,  the  supports  also  came  up,  confusion  arose  about 
the  ladders,  of  which  only  a  few  could  be  reared,  and  the 
enemy  standing  on  the  ramparts  bayonetted  the  foremost, 
overturned  the  ladders,  and  again  poured  their  destructive 
fire  upon  the  crowd  below.  When  a  hundred  and  forty  had 
fallen  the  order  to  retire  was  given.  After  this  failure  the 
breach  in  the  castle  remained  to  be  stormed ;  but  the  stormers 
could  not  there  gather  in  force,  between  the  summit  and  the 
interior  entrenchment,  unless  Christoval  was  taken  and  its 
guns  used  to  clear  the  castle  of  obstacles ;  this  would  have  taken 
several  days  and  Soult  was  now  ready  to  advance  :  wherefore 
on  the  1st  a  blockade  was  substituted  for  the  attack. 

OBSERVATIONS. 

1°.  This  siege  in  which  four  hundred  men  and  officers  fell, 
violated  all  rules.  The  working  parties  were  too  weak,  the 


810  PENINSULA    WAR.  [Joins,  1311 

guns  and  stores  too  few,  the  point  of  attack  ill  chosen ;  the 
defences  were  untouched  by  counter  fire,  and  the  breaching 
batteries  were  too  distant  for  the  bad  guns;  howitzers  on 
trucks  were  poor  substitutes  for  mortars,  and  the  sap  was  not 
practised:  lastly,  the  assaults  were  made  before  the  glacis 
had  been  crowned  and  a  musketry  fire  established  against  the 
breach. 

2°.  It  was  not  strange  that  the  siege  failed.  It  was  strange, 
and  culpable,  that  the  British  government  after  such  long 
wars  should  have  sent  an  engineer  corps  into  the  field  so  ill- 
organized  and  equipped  that  all  the  officers'  bravery  and  zeal 
could  not  render  it  efficient.  The  very  tools  used,  especially 
those  supplied  from  the  store-keeper  general's  department, 
were  unfit  for  work ;  the  captured  French  cutting  instruments 
were  eagerly  sought  for  in  preference ;  and  when  the  soldiers' 
lives  and  the  honour  of  England's  arms  were  at  stake  English 
cutlery  would  not  bear  comparison  with  French  ! 

3°.  Want  of  foresight  has  also  been  objected  to  the  general, 
inasmuch  as  he  might  have  previously  obtained  a  good  batter- 
ing train  from  England.  But  in  the  lines  the  conduct  of  the 
English  and  Portuguese  governments  led  him  to  think  rather 
of  embarking  than  besieging  a  frontier  fortress;  moreover 
the  extreme  badness  of  the  Portuguese  guns  was  not  known 
before  trial,  and  the  time  between  Soult's  capture  of  Badajos 
and  this  siege  was  not  sufficient  for  bringing  out  an  English 
battering  train.  It  may  also  be  taken  as  a  maxim  that  in 
the  requirements  of  war  no  head  was  ever  strong  enough  to 
fore-calculate  all. 


JUNE,  1311.]  BOOK    XIV.  — CHAP.    (5.  311 


CHAPTER  VI. 


SOTTLT'S  position  at  Llerena  after  the  battle  of  Albuera  was 
adopted  with  great  knowledge  of  war.  It  was  the  most 
favourable  point  for  securing  Drouet's  junction,  and  though 
closely  watched  by  Hill,  while  his  own  troops  were  oppressed 
in  spirit  by  their  losses  and  unruly  from  want,  he  maintained 
an  offensive  attitude  until  assured  of  Drouet's  vicinity,  and 
then  advanced  to  Los  Santos,  near  which  place  his  cavalry 
sustained  some  disadvantage  in  a  skirmish.  On  the  14th 

Drouet  arrived,  and  Soult,  who  knew  Wellington 

Soult  to 

was  expecting  large  reinforcements  from  Beira,  Marmont. 
and  was  desirous  to  forestal  them,  again  ad-  intercepted 
vanced  to  Fuente  del  Maestro,  whereupon  Hill  concentrated 
the  covering  troops  at  Albuera.  Meanwhile  Marment  who 
had  re-organized  the  army  of  Portugal  in  six  divisions  of 
infantry  and  five  brigades  of  cavalry,  received  Napoleon'8 
orders  to  co-operate  with  Soult,  and  in  that  view  sent  Reynier 
with  two  divisions  by  the  pass  of  Banos,  marching  himself 
with  a  considerable  force  of  infantry  cavalry  and  guns  to 
introduce  a  convoy  into  Ciudad  Rodrigo. 

General  Spencer  was  then  behind  the  Agueda  with  four 
divisions  of  infantry  and  a  brigade  of  cavalry;  Pack's  Por- 
tuguese were  near  Almeida  which  had  now  been  rendered  defen- 
sible against  a  sudden  assault.  Spencer's  orders  were  to 
make  his  marches  correspond  with  Marmont's  if  the  latter 
pointed  towards  the  Tagus;  but  if  the  French  attacked,  he 
was  to  take  the  line  of  the  Coa  and  blow  up  Almeida  when 
the  movements  went  to  isolate  that  fortress.  On  the  morning 
of  the  6th,  Marmont  marched  out  of  Rodrigo  in  two  columns, 
one  moving  upon  Gallegos  the  other  upon  Espeja.  The 
light  division  fell  back  before  the  latter,  Slade's  cavalry  before 
the  former,  but  so  as  to  lend  its  flank  to  the  enemy,  who 


312  PENINSULA    WAR.  [JUNE,  1811. 

soon  closed  and  opened  a  cannonade  from  eight  pieces.  The 
British  rear-guard  thus  got  jammed  between  the  French  and  a 
marsh,  and  would  have  been  destroyed,  if  captain  Purvis  had 
not  gallantly  charged  the  French  with  a  squadron  of  the  royals, 
during  which  the  other  troopers  having  strong  horses  and  a 
knowledge  of  the  firmest  parts  got  through  the  marsh :  Purvis 
then  passed  also  and  the  French  horses  could  not  follow. 
The  retreat  was  thus  effected  with  the  loss  of  only  twenty 
men,  and  after  the  action  an  officer  calling  himself  Montbrun's 
aid-de-camp  deserted  to  the  allies. 

General  Spencer,  more  noted  for  intrepidity  than  military 
quickness,  was  now  vacillating,  and  the  army  was  ill-placed; 
the  country  was  covered  with  baggage,  the  movements  were 
wide  and  without  concert,  Pack  had  too  hastily  destroyed 
Almeida,  and  some  decided  step  was  absolutely  necessary. 
In  this  state  the  adjutant-general  Pakenham  observed  that  the 
French  did  not  advance  as  if  to  give  battle,  that  their  num- 
bers were  small,  their  movements  more  ostentatious  than 
vigorous,  and  probably  designed  to  cover  a  flank  movement 
by  the  passes  leading  to  the  Tagus.  He  therefore  urged 
Spencer  to  assume  a  position  of  battle  and  thus  force  the 
enemy  to  discover  his  numbers  and  intentions,  or  march  at 
once  to  lord  Wellington's  assistance.  His  views  were  sup- 
ported by  colonel  Waters,  who,  having  been  close  to  the 
French,  said  they  were  too  clean  and  well  dressed  to  have 
come  off  a  long  march,  and  must  therefore  be  a  part  of  the 
garrison :  he  had  also  ascertained  that  a  large  body  was 
pointing  towards  the  passes. 

Yielding  to  these  representations  Spencer  marched  in  the 
evening  by  Alfayates  to  Soito,  and  the  next  day  crossed  the 
Coa.  There  certain  intelligence  that  Marmont  was  in  the 
passes  reached  him,  wherefore  he  continued  his  march  to  the 
Alemtejo  by  Penamacor.  detaching  a  division  and  his  cavalry 
to  Coria  as  flankers,  while  he  passed  Castello  Branco,  Vilha 
Velha,  Niza,  and  Portalegre.  The  season  was  burning,  the 
marches  long,  yet  so  hardened  and  so  well  organized  was  the 
light  division  that,  covering  from  eighteen  to  eight-and-twenty 
miles  daily,  they  did  not  leave  a  single  straggler  behind:  the. 
Hanking  troops,  who  had  been  rather  unnecessarily  exposed  at 


JUNE,  1811.]  BOOK   XIV.  — CHAP.    6.  313 

Ooria,  then  followed ;  and  Marmont  satisfied  with  his  demon- 
stration in  front  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo  filed  off  by  the  pass  of 
Perales,  while  Reynier  moved  by  Bejar  and  Banos,  and  the 
whole  were  by  forced  marches  soon  united  at  the  bridge  of 
Almaraz.  A  pontoon  bridge  expected  from  Madrid  had  not 
arrived  and  the  passage  of  the  Tagus  was  made  with  only  one 
ferry  boat,  which  caused  a  delay  of  four  days  and  would  have 
been  fatal  to  Badajos  if  the  allies'  battering-guns  had  been 
effective.  The  French  army  then  marched  in  two  columns  with 
the  greatest  rapidity  upon  Merida  and  Medellin,  where  they 
arrived  the  18th  and  communicated  with  Soult. 

Wellington  had  been  attentively  watching  these  move- 
ments. He  had  never  intended  to  press  Badajos  beyond  the 
10th,  because  he  knew  that  Soult  reinforced  with  Drouet's 
division  would  be  strong  enough  to  raise  the  siege,  hence  the 
hurried  assaults.  But  he  was  resolved  to  fight  Soult,  and  as 
a  deciphered  intercepted  letter  told  him  Phillipon's  provisions 
would  be  exhausted  on  the  20th  he  continued  the  blockade, 
hoping  some  such  accident  of  war  as  the  delay  at  Almaraz 
might  impede  Marmont.  Here  it  may  be  asked  why  he  did 
not  retrench  his  camp  and  persist  in  the  siege?  Because 
Elvas  being  out  of  repair,  and  exhausted  of  provisions  and 
ammunition  for  the  attack  on  Badajos,  Soult  would  have  taken 
that  fortress. 

Hamilton's  Portuguese  division  now  joined  Hill's  covering 
force,  and  Wellington  went  in  person  to  Albuera  expecting  a 
battle,  but  unlike  Beresford,  he  had  that  position  entrenched 
and  did  not  forget  to  occupy  the  heights  on  his  right. 

On  the  14th  it  was  known  that  Marmont  had  reached 
Truxillo  and  would  in  four  days  unite  with  Soult,  where- 
fore the  blockade  was  also  raised  with  a  view  to  repass 
the  Guadiana.  Wellington  lingered  at  Albuera  hoping  to  fall 
on  Soult  separately,  but  that  cautious  captain,  always  refus- 
ing his  left  and  edging  with  his  right  towards  Almendralejos, 
soon  extinguished  this  chance;  hence  the  blockade  being  raised 
the  16th  the  allies  repassed  the  Guadiana  in  two  columns 
the  17th;  the  British  and  Portuguese  by  the  pontoon  bridge 
near  Badajos,  Blake's  Spaniards  at  Jerumenha.  This  move- 
ment, not  an  easy  one,  was  executed  without  loss  of  men  or 


314  PENINSULA   WAR.  [JUNE,  1811 

stores,  and  without  accident,  save  that  William  Stewart  by 
some  error,  took  the  same  line  as  Blake,  and  coming  on  the 
Spaniards  at  night,  they  thought  his  division  French  and  were 
like  to  have  fired. 

On  the  19th  the  united  French  armies  entered  Badajos, 
which  was  thus  succoured  after  two  honourable  defences,  and 
at  a  moment  when  Phillipon,  despairing  of  aid  and  without 
provisions,  was  preparing  to  break  out  and  escape.  The  21st 
Godinot's  division  which  had  marched  by  Valverde  took  pos- 
session of  Olivenza;  the  22nd  he  pushed  a  detachment  under 
the  guns  of  Jerumenha ;  and  the  next  day  the  whole  of  the 
French  cavalry  crossed  the  Guadiana  in  two  columns,  advancing 
towards  Villa  Viciosa  and  Elvas  on  one  side,  and  Campo  Mayor 
on  the  other. 

But  now  Spencer  was  come  up  and  Wellington  held  a  posi- 
tion on  both  sides  of  the  Caya,  having  cavalry  posts  near  the 
mouth  of  that  river  and  on  the  Guadiana  in  front  of  Elvas. 
His  right  stretched  behind  the  Caya  to  the  lowest  bridge,  and 
his  left,  having  a  field  of  battle  on  high  ground,  rested  on  the 
Gebora  a  little  beyond  Campo  Mayor,  which  was  occupied  and 
the  space  between  it  and  the  troops  strongly  entrenched.  The 
cavalry  was  beyond  the  Gebora  and  about  Albuquerque,  and  the 
whole  position  presented  an  irregular  arc  embracing  the  stone 
bridge  of  Badajos.  The  wood  and  fortified  town  of  Aronches  were 
a  few  miles  behind  the  centre,  and  the  small  fortified  place  of 
Ouguella  was  behind  the  left.  The  right  wing  being  on  weaker 
ground  was  most  numerous,  and  the  Monte  Reguingo,  a 
wooded  ridge  between  Campo  Mayor  and  the  Caya,  was  held 
by  the  light  division  in  reserve,  but  hidden  from  the  enemy, 
[f  the  French  attacked  the  left  a  short  movement  would  bring 
the  bulk  of  the  army  to  that  side,  for  the  whole  position  was 
not  more  than  twelve  miles  long,  and  the  communications  were 
good.  On  the  open  plains  in  front,  extending  to  Badajos,  the 
enemy's  movements  could  be  distinctly  observed  from  Campo 
Mayor,  from  Elvas,  and  from  the  many  atalayas  or  watch-towers 
anciently  erected  for  that  purpose.  This  position  could  not  be 
recognised  by  the  enemy,  and  to  prevent  his  turning  it  on  either 
flank  the  first  division  was  retained  at  Portalegre,  from  whence 
it  could  intercept  him  at  Marvao  and  Castello  de  Vide  on  the 


JUNE,  1811.]  BOOK   XIV.  — CHAP.    fi.  315 

left,  and  between  Estremos  and  Elvas  on  the  right ;  but  it  was 
too  distant  to  aid  in  a  battle  near  Campo  Mayor. 

The  French  cavalry  having  passed  the  Ouadiana  on  the 
23rd  in  two  columns,  one  by  the  bridge  of  Badajos  the  other 
by  the  fords  below  the  confluence  of  the  Caya,  the  former 
drove  back  the  outposts,  yet  being  opposed  by  Madden's  horse- 
men and  the  heavy  dragoons  retired  without  being  able  to  dis- 
cover the  position  on  that  side.  The  other  column,  moving 
towards  Villa  Viciosa  and  Elvas,  cut  off  a  squadron  of  the 
eleventh  dragoons,  and  the  second  German  hussars  escaped 
from  it  to  Elvas  with  great  difficulty;  one  hundred  and  fifty 
men  were  killed  or  taken  in  this  affair,  and  the  French  aver 
that  colonel  Lallemand  drew  the  British  cavalry  into  an  am- 
buscade. The  rumours  in  the  allied  camp  were  discordant, 
but  no  more  fighting  occurred,  and  a  fruitless  attempt  to  sur- 
prise the  English  detachments  at  Albuquerque  ended  the 
demonstrations :  the  French  marshals  then  spread  their  forces 
along  the  Guadiana  from  Xeres  de  los  Cavalheiros  to  Montijo, 
and  proceeded  to  collect  provisions. 

A  great  and  decisive  battle  had  been  expected,  and  though 
the  crisis  glided  away  quietly,  the  moment  was  one  of  the  most 
dangerous  of  the  whole  war.  Marmont  had  brought  down  of 
his  own  and  the  centre  army  nearly  thirty-six 
thousand  men  with  fifty-four  guns.  Soult  came  Appendix  9, 
with  twenty-eight  thousand  combatants  and  thirty- 
six  guns.  Sixty-four  thousand  fighting-men,  of  which  more 
than  seven  thousand  were  cavalry,  having  ninety  field-pieces 
were  in  line;  but  to  effect  this  Andalusia  and  Castille 
had  been  nearly  stript  of  troops,  and  Bessieres  had  abandoned 
the  Asturias  without  being  able  to  do  more  than  hold  the 
Gallicians  in  check  on  the  Orbijo.  The  chief  armies  of  the 
Peninsula  were  therefore  in  presence,  a  great  battle  was 
for  the  interest  of  the  French,  they  had  the  power  of  forcing 
it  on,  and  the  repulsed  assaults  at  Badajos,  and"  the  cavalry  suc- 
cess on  the  Caya  had  compensated  for  the  defeats  at  Los  Santos 
and  Usagre;  hence  when  Badajos  was  succoured  and  the  allies 
forced  back  into  Portugal  Albuera  seemed  a  victory.  The 
general  results  of  the  campaign  had  therefore  been  favourable, 
and  the  political  state  demanded  some  dazzling  action.  Their 


316  PENINSULA   WAR.  [JUNE,  1811 

army  was  powerful,  they  were  strong  in  cavalry,  and  on  favour- 
able ground.  A  successful  blow  would  have  avenged  Massena 
and  sent  Wellington  to  Lisbon,  perhaps  to  England;  an 
unsuccessful  one  would  have  involved  no  serious  consequences, 
because  of  their  strength  in  horse,  and  the  nearness  of  Badajos. 
But  the  allied  force  was  supposed  to  be  stronger  than  it  really 
was  by  the  whole  number  of  the  Spanish  troops,  the  position 
was  difficult  to  be  recognised,  Wellington  showed  a  bold  front, 
and  no  battle  took  place. 

Napoleon's  estimation  of  moral  over  physical  force  in  war 
was  here  exemplified.  Marmont's  army  was  conscious  of 
recent  defeats  at  Busaco,  Sabugal,  and  Fuentes  Onoro;  the 
horrid  field  of  Albuera  was  fresh,  the  fierce  blood  there  spilled 
still  reeked  in  the  nostrils  of  Soult's  soldiers ;  and  if  Caesar 
held  it  unsafe  at  Dyrracchium  to  risk  his  veterans  in  battle 
after  a  partial  check,  the  French  marshal  may  be  excused, 
for  there  were  fighting  men  on  the  Caya  as  good  at  all  points, 
and  more  experienced  than  those  he  met  on  the  Albuera. 
Soult  knew  the  stern  nature  of  the  British  soldier,  and  he 
could  not  hope  here  to  overmatch  the  general:  nevertheless 
Wellington's  offer  of  battle  was  one  of  unmitigated  boldness, 
as  the  occasion  was  one  of  unmitigated  peril.  The  Portuguese 
government  had  brought  the  native  troops  to  the  last  degree 
of  misery,  and  the  fortresses  were  destitute.  The  English 
cabinet  had  undertaken  to  pay  the  native  troops,  not  to  feed 
them,  and  Wellington  in  consequence  repeatedly  refused  sup- 
plies from  the  English  stores ;  yet  at  last,  unable  to  endure  the 
sight  of  their  misery,  and  to  prevent  them  from  disbanding,  he 
took  three-fourths  on  his  own  commissariat,  charging  the  cost 
to  the  subsidy;  but  then  the  infamous  government  starved  the 
remnant  likewise,  and  during  the  siege  of  Badajos  it  was  sub- 
sisted from  and  exhausted  the  magazines  of  Elvas.  Thus  by 
desertion,  famine,  and  sickness,  this  fine  army  which  had  pre- 
sented forty  thousand  good  soldiers  under  arms  to  Massena, 
could  only  present  fourteen  thousand  sinking  men  for  a  battle 
on  the  Caya  when  their  country's  fate  was  at  stake. 

Although  largely  reinforced,  the  British  troops  had  so  many 
sick  and  wounded  that  only  twenty-eight  thousand  sabres  and 
bayonets  were  in  line;  wherefore  the  French  had  a  fourth 


JUNK,  1811.]  BOOK  XIV.  — CttAP.   6.  $17 

more  of  artillery  and  infantry,  and  twice  as  many  cavalry. 
To  accept  battle  with  such  disparity  of  force  on  mere  military 
considerations  would  have  been  reckless  folly;  but  the  Portu- 
guese government  had  neglected  the  fortresses  as  it  had 
the  troops,  and  Elvas,  Jerumenha,  Campo  Mayor,  Ouguella, 
Aronches,  Santa  Olaya,  were  unprovided.  No  carriage  for  the 
transport  of  stores  had  been  provided,  and  hence  the  siege  of 
Badajos  had  been  necessarily  furnished  entirely  at  the  expense 
of  Elvas;  but  all  the  carts  and  animals  to  be  found  in  the 
vicinity  and  as  far  as  detachments  could  go,  and  all  the  per- 
manent commissariat  means,  scarcely  sufficed  to  convey  ammu- 
nition-stores and  subsistence  for  the  Portuguese  troops  day  by 
day  from  Elvas  to  the  siege ;  and  it  was  impossible  to  replace  this 
consumption  by  drawing  from  the  magazines  of  Abrantes  and 
Lisbon :  wherefore,  when  the  army  crossed  the  Guadiana,  Elvas 
had  only  ten  thousand  rounds  of  shot  and  less  than  a  fortnight's 
provisions  for  the  garrison;  the  works  were  mouldering, 
houses  and  enclosures  encumbered  the  glacis,  most  of  the  guns 
had  been  rendered  unserviceable  at  Badajos,  the  rest  were  bad, 
and  the  garrison  was  a  mixture  of  young  soldiers  and  militia. 
Jerumenha  was  in  no  better  condition,  Olaya  Campo  Mayor 
and  Ouguella  had  only  their  walls. 

Had  Soult  known  this  state  of  affairs  he  might  have  passed 
the  Guadiana  by  the  fords,  and  by  means  of  his  pontoon  train 
from  Badajos,  overpowered  the  allies'  right,  invested  Elvas 
and  covered  his  army  with  lines,  iinless  the  English  general 
anticipating  the  attempt  defeated  him  between  the  Caya  and 
Elvas;  which  might  not  have  been  easy  in  an  open  country 
offering  every  advantage  for  the  overwhelming  cavalry  and 
artillery  of  the  French.  Soult  could  also  have  turned  the 
right  by  Estrernos  and  menaced  the  communication  with 
Abrantes,  which  would  have  forced  on  a  retreat  or  a  battle. 
Wellington's  position  on  the  Caya  was  therefore  a  political 
one  to  impose  on  the  enemy,  and  it  did  so :  he  thus  saved 
Elvas  and  Jerumenha,  perhaps  the  whole  Peninsula. 

While  a  front  of  battle  was  thus  presented  the  rear  was 
cleared  of  hospitals  and  heavy  baggage,  workmen  laboured 
day  and  night  to  restore  the  fortifications,  and  guns  ain- 
ttmnitioii  and  provisions  were  brought  up  from  Abrautes, 


818  PENINSULA   WAR.  [JUNE,  1811, 

by  the  animals   and  carts  before  employed  in  the  siege  of 


Meanwhile  Portugal  was  on  the  brink  of  perdition,  and  the 
Peninsula  character  was  displayed  in  a  manner  forcibly  illus- 
trating the  difficulties  of  the  English  general.  The  danger  of 
Elvas  aroused  all  the  bustle  of  the  Lisbon  government,  but 
when  its  tardy  efforts  were  forestalled  by  Wellington's 
activity,  the  regency  with  prodigious  effrontery  asserted  that 
he  had  exhausted  Elvas  to  supply  his  Englishmen,  and  they 
had  replenished  it!  His  imperturbable  temper  under  these 
crosses  and  insults  was  the  more  admirable,  that  Perceval's 
policy,  prevailing  in  the  cabinet,  had  left  him  with  an  empty 
military  chest  and  with  little  hope  of  future  support.  Yet 
his  daring  was  no  wild  cast  of  the  net  for  fortune,  he  threw 
it  with  circumspection,  and  his  penetration  and  activity 
let  no  advantages  escape.  He  looked  over  the  whole  Penin- 
sula and  beyond  it;  he  knew  his  true  situation,  and  he  told 
the  Spaniards  how  to  push  their  war  while  the  French  were 
concentrated  in  Estremadura.  From  them  he  had  a  right  to 
expect  much  aid,  but  he  obtained  little.  Soult  and  Marmont  were 
before  him,  the  armies  of  the  north  and  centre  were  paralysed 
by  the  king's  flight,  the  armies  of  Catalonia  and  Aragon  were 
entirely  occupied  by  Figueras  and  Taragona.  Thus  nearly 
all  Spain  was  open  to  patriotic  enterprise,  and  the  Murcians 
and  Valencians  had  above  forty  thousand  regular  troops 
besides  numerous  partidas  with  which  they  might  have 
menaced  Madrid,  while  the  Gallicians  operated  in  Castille 
and  the  Asturians  supported  the  northern  purtidas.  Yet 
nothing  useful  was  effected.  Sanchez,  indeed,  cut  off  a  convoy, 
menaced  Salamanca,  and  blockaded  Ciudad  Rodrigo  while 
Santocildes  came  down  to  Astorga;  Mina  and  the  northern 
chiefs  harassed  the  French  communications;  some  stir  was 
made  by  the  guerillas  near  Madrid,  and  Suchet  was  harassed; 
but  the  commotion  soon  subsided,  and  a  detachment  from 
Madrid  surprising  a  congregation  of  partidas  at  Peneranda 
killed  many,  and  recovered  a  large  convoy  which  had  been 
taken.  But  though  the  war,  spreading  over  the  Peninsula  and 
quivering  like  a  spider's  web  to  the  most  distant  extremities 
if  a  drag  was  made  at  any  point,  offered  the  regular  Spanish 


JUNE,  1811.]  BOOK  XIV.  — CHAP.  6.  819 

armies  good  opportunity,  they  effected  nothing;  nor  did  any 
general  insurrection  take  place.  The  French  retained  all  their 
fortified  posts,  and  their  civil  administrations  governed  the 
great  towns  tranquilly  as  if  peace  prevailed. 

To  dissipate  the  storm  lowering  over  the  Caya,  Wellington 
had  relied  chiefly  on  Blake.  That  Spaniard,  as  usual,  wanted 
to  fight  beyond  the  Guadiana  and  was  discontented  at  being 
denied.  In  this  mood  the  English  general  knew  he  would 
prove  an  uneasy  colleague,  and  bring  into  line  ten  or  twelve 
thousand  bad  soldiers  who  would  quarrel  with  the  Portuguese, 
and  weaken  rather  than  strengthen  the  army.  Wherefore, 
giving  him  the  pontoons  used  at  Badajos,  he  persuaded  him  to 
move  down  the  Guadiana  to  Mertola,  and  cross  there  to  attack 
Seville,  then  slightly  guarded  by  a  mixt  force  of  French  and 
Spanish  troops  in  Joseph's  pay.  This  blow,  apparently  easy 
of  execution,  would  have  ruined  the  arsenals  and  magazines 
supporting  the  blockade  of  Cadiz,  and  have  broken  up  the 
united  French  force  on  the  Cayaj  to  aid  it,  Wellington 
urged  the  regency  to  push  Beguines  likewise  against  Seville 
from  San  Roque,  while  the  Honda  insurgents  harassed  the 
small  force  left  in  Grenada  on  one  side,  and  the  Murcian  army 
pressed  them  on  the  other. 

Blake  crossed  the  Guadiana  at  Mertola,  but  halted  from  the 
22nd  until  the  30th,  when  he  detached  a  small  force  against 
Seville,  and  sent  his  heavy  artillery  by  water  to  Ayamonte. 
He  wasted  two  days  more  before  the  small  castle  of  Niebla, 
which  he  could  not  take  for  want  of  the  guns  he  had  just 
parted  with ;  but  the  force  of  the  combination  was  strongly 
felt ;  Soult  instantly  destroyed  Olivenza,  and  passed  the 
Morena  with  some  cavalry  and  Godinot's  infantry,  to  succour 
Seville,  sending  a  detachment  off  from  Monasterio,  to  succour 
Niebla;  at  the  same  time,  general  Conroux,  moving  from 
Xeres  de  los  Cavalheiros,  crossed  the  mountains  by  Aracena,  to 
cut  Blake  off  from  Ayamonte.  Thus  far,  notwithstanding 
Blake's  stupidity,  the  plan  was  successful,  Soult  was  drawn 
off,  Marmont  could  not  remain  alone,  and  Portugal  was  safe. 
Blake's  cavalry  under  Penne  Villemur,  and  some  infantry 
under  Ballesteros,  had  also,  during  the  investment  of  Niebla. 
menaced  Seville,  and  a  slight  insurrection  had  place  at 


320  PENINSULA  WAR.  [JUNE,  1811. 

Carmona.  The  Serranos,  always  in  arms,  being  aided  by 
Begiiines  with  three  thousand  men,  blockaded  the  town  of 
Ronda;  and  the  Murcians  menaced  Laval,  who  had  succeeded 
Sebastian!  in  Grenada.  General  Daricau,  unable  to  keep  the 
field,  shut  himself  up  in  a  great  convent  fortified  by  Soult  in 
the  Triana  suburb  of  Seville;  Joseph's  Spanish  soldiers  did 
not  shrink  from  him,  and  the  Sevillanos  were  quiet,  but  a 
great  blow  might  have  been  struck  if  Blake's  incapacity  had 
not  marred  the  whole. 

On  the  6th  Soult  approached  Seville,  Ballesteros  and  Ville- 
mur  retired,  and  the  Carmona  insurrection  ceased.  Blake,  to 
avoid  Conroux,  fled  from  Niebla,  and  only  escaped  into  Por- 
tugal because  colonel  Austin  laid  a  bridge  for  him  at  San 
Lucar  de  Guadiana.  He  would  then  have  embarked  some 
troops  to  attack  San  Lucar  de  Barameda,  but  being  inter- 
rupted by  the  advancing  French  fled  to  Ayamonte  and  from 
thence  got  into  the  island  of  Canelas,  where  a  Spanish  frigate 
and  three  hundred  transports  had  accidentally  arrived.  Bal- 
lesteros, who  was  near,  took  a  position  on  the  Rio  Piedra,  but 
Blake  embarking  with  great  disorder  sailed  away.  The 
French  after  reinforcing  San  Lucar  entered  Ayamonte,  where- 
upon the  Algarve  militia  was  called  out,  and  Ballesteros,  losing 
some  men  on  the  Piedra,  entered  the  Aroche  mountains 
until  the  enemy  retired,  when  he  entrenched  himself  in 
Canelas.  There  he  remained  until  August,  and  then  em- 
barked his  infantry  under  protection  of  the  Portuguese 
militia  while  his  cavalry  went  up  the  Guadiana  to  join  Cas- 
tafios  who  remained  with  a  few  troops  in  Estremadura.  A 
battalion  left  in  the  oastle  of  Paymago  was  soon  after  un- 
successfully attacked,  bvt  the  partisan  warfare  of  the  Condado 
de  Niebla  ceased. 

Soult  now  recalled  the  troops  of  the  fourth  corps  from 
Estremadura,  to  take  the  place  of  detachments  sent  from 
Seville,  Cadiz,  Grenada  and  Malaga,  to  quell  the  Serranos  of 
the  Ronda,  and  prepared  to  move  himself  against  the  Mur- 
cians: Beguines  was  soon  after  driven  back  to  San  Roque, 
and  the  Serranos,  disgusted  by  the  insolence  of  the  regular 
Spanish  general,  were  inclined  to  capitulate.  Meanwhile 
Godinot,  quitting  the  pursuit  of  Blake,  came  to  Jaen,  and 


AUGUST,  1811.]         BOOK   XIV.  — CHAP.   6.  321 

was  directed  to  march  against  the  Murcians  at  Pozalgou  and 
Baza,  where  Blake,  who  had  landed  at  Almeira,  joined  them 
raising  their  numbers  to  twenty-seven  thousand.  He  designed, 
to  attack  Grenada,  but  first  he  went  to  Valencia,  where 
Palacios  was  making  mischief,  and  before  he  could  return  his 
army  was  dispersed  by  Soult  and  Godinot. 

ROUT    OF    BAZA. 

The  Murcian  right  wing  at  Pozalcon  was  under  general 
Quadra,  who  had  orders  to  rejoin  the  centre  and  left  wing 
under  Freire  at  Venta  de  Bahul,  but  he  disobeyed.  Hence 
Soult,  leading  a  mixed  force  of  French,  and  Spanish  troops 
in  Joseph's  service,  drove  back  Freire's  advanced  guards  and 
came  in  front  of  Bahul  the  9th,  before  the  army  was  concen- 
trated. The  Murcians  had  strong  ground  and  a  deep  ravine 
covered  their  front,  wherefore  Soult,  who  designed  to  cut  oft 
their  retreat  by  Lorca,  only  showed  a  few  troops  at  first,  skir- 
mishing slightly  to  draw  attention  while  Godinot  forced  his 
way  by  Poza^on  to  Freire's  rear ;  but  Godinot  also  lost  time. 
When  his  advanced  guard  had  defeated  Quadra  with  loss,  he 
halted  for  the  night  near  Baza,  and  let  Freire's  troops,  who 
were  then  falling  back  in  disorder  before  Soult,  pass  in  the 
dark  through  that  place  and  make  for  Lorca :  yet  the  French 
cavalry,  intercepting  that  line  also,  drove  the  fugitives  to  the 
by-roads,  slaughtering  many.  Murcia  was  then  in  a  defenceless 
state,  yet  the  people  generally  took  arms  to  protect  the  city, 
which  was  entrenched,  and  as  the  yellow  fever  was  raging  at 
Carthagena,  the  French  marshal,  whose  troops  were  few  and 
fatigued  with  constant  marching,  returned  to  Grenada.  From 
thence  he  sent  detachments  to  disperse  some  insurgents  in  the 
Alpuxaras,  and  thus  the  province  was  quieted. 

His  vigour  and  ability  had  now  been  signally  displayed 
for  six  months.  Taking  the  field  with  a  small  force  in  the 
depth  of  winter  he  reduced  Olivenza,  Badajos,  Albuquerque, 
Valencia  d'Alcantara,  and  Campo  Mayor,  defeated  a  large 
army  on  the  Gebora,  and  captured  twenty  thousand  men. 
When  unexpectedly  assailed  by  Beresford  from  the  north,  by 
the  Murcians  on  the  east,  by  Ballesteros  on  the  west,  by  Gra- 

VOL.  III.  Y 


322  PENINSULA   WAR.  f AUGUST,  1811. 

ham  and  Lapena  in  the  south,  he  found  means  to  repel  three 
of  those  attacks,  to  continue  the  blockade  of  Cadiz,  and  to 
keep  Seville  tranquil  while  he  marched  against  the  fourth. 
At  Albuera  he  lost  one  of  the  fiercest  battles  upon  record  at 
a  moment  when  the  king  by  abandoning  his  throne  had 
doubled  every  embarrassment;  nevertheless,  holding  fast  to 
Estremadura,  he  maintained  the  struggle,  and  again  taking 
the  offensive  compelled  the  allies  to  repass  the  Guadiana.  It 
he  did  not  then  push  his  fortune  it  must  be  considered,  that 
his  command  was  divided  and  his  troops  still  impressed  with  the 
recollection  of  Albuera,  while  the  genius  of  his  adversary  was 
working  new  troubles  for  fcim  in  Andalusia.  With  what  reso- 
lution and  activity  he  repressed  those  troubles  has  just  been 
shown;  and  he  is  likewise  to  be  commended  for  the  prudent  vigour 
of  his  administration,  which,  despite  the  opposition  of  Joseph's 
Spanish  counsellors,  had  impressed  the  Andalusians  with  such 
a  notion  of  his  power  and  resources  that  no  revolt  of  any 
real  consequence  took  place,  and  none  of  his  civic  guards  or 
escopeteros  failed  him  in  the  hour  of  need.  Let  the  wide 
extent  of  country  he  had  to  maintain  be  considered ;  the  fron- 
tiers fringed  as  it  were  with  hostile  armies,  the  interior  suffering 
under  war  requisitions,  the  people  secretly  hating  the  French, 
a  constant  insurrection  in  the  Honda,  a  national  government 
and  a  powerful  army  in  the  Isla  de  Leon.  Innumerable 
English  and  Spanish  agents,  prodigal  of  money  and  of  arms, 
continually  instigating  the  people  to  revolt,  the  coast  covered 
with  hostile  vessels,  Gibraltar  sheltering  beaten  armies  on  one 
side,  Cadiz  on  another,  Portugal  on  a  third,  Murcia  on  a 
fourth;  the  communication  with  France  difficult,  two  battles 
lost,  the  reinforcements  few,  and  all  the  material  means  to  be 
created  in  the  country.  Few  men  could  have  stood  firm  in 
such  a  whirlwind;  yet  Soult  did  not  merely  keep  his  ground  but 
contemplated  gigantic  offensive  enterprises,  and  was  always  to 
be  dreaded.  What  though  his  skill  in  actual  combat  was 
not  so  remarkable  as  in  some  of  his  contemporaries,  who  can 
deny  him  firmness,  activity,  vigour,  foresight,  grand  concep- 
tion^ and  admirable  arrangement^ 


JULY.  1811.1  BOOK   XIV. -CHAP.   7.  323 


CHAPTER  VTl. 

MARMONT  having  covered  Soult's  retrograde  operations  retired 
gradually  from  Badajos,  and  quartered  his  army  in  the  valley 
of  the  Tagus,  leaving  one  division  at  Truxillo.  The  fifth  corps 
went  to  Zafra,  and  Wellington  was  thus  relieved  from  the 
French  when  he  had  most  reason  to  dread  their  efforts.  He 
had  secured  the  fortresses,  but  his  troops  were  beginning  to 
suffer  from  the  terrible  pestilence  of  the  Guadiana,  which, 
coupled  with  Marmont's  well-chosen  position,  forbad  any 
renewal  ot  the  siege,  and  compelled  him  to  relinquish  the 
brilliant  and  grand  combinations  he  had  designed  after 
Massena's  retreat  for  a  new  plan  of  operations  conformable  to 
his  altered  circumstances.  But  to  appreciate  the  motives  of 
this  change,  another  hasty  glance  must  be  thrown  over  the 
general  state  of  the  war,  which  was  constantly  varying. 

In  Catalonia  Suchet  had  stormed  Taragona  seized  Montserrat 
and  dispersed  the  Catalan  army.  The  army  of  the  centre  had 
chased  the  partidas  from  Guadalaxara  and  Cuenca,  and  re- 
established the  communications  with  Aragon.  Valencia  and 
Murcia  were  in  confusion  from  internal  intrigue  and  the 
disasters  on  each  side  of  their  frontiers  at  Baza  and  Taragona. 
Napoleon  was  again  pouring  reinforcements  into  Spain  by  the 
northern  line,  and  as  usual  they  scoured  the  country  to  put 
down  the  guerillas  on  each  side  of  their  march.  Forty  thou- 
sand fresh  men,  mostly  old  soldiers,  were  come,  or  coming 
into  the  north  of  Spain ;  and  the  king  was  on  his  return  from 
Paris  in  harmony  with  his  brother,  and  having  the  powers  and 
duties  of  all  persons  defined.  The  young  guard,  now  under 
Dorsenne,  was  at  Burgos  increased  to  seventeen  thousand ;  and 
as  the  Spaniards  had  made  no  effort  to  profit  from  the 
toncentration  of  their  enemies  before  Wellington,  the  French 
vere  enabled  to  plan  extensive  measures  for  further  conquest. 

Y2 


324  PENINSULA   WAR.  [JULY,  1811. 

Suchet,  urged  by  the  emperor  to  attack  Valencia,  proposed  to 
batter  its  gates  in  the  middle  of  September;  and  Soult  was 
secretly  revolving  a  gigantic  enterprise  calculated  to  change 
the  whole  aspect  of  the  war.  On  the  northern  line  when  the 
king,  who  re-entered  Madrid  the  14th,  had  passed  Valladolid, 
the  young  guards  quitted  Burgos  to  enter  Leon,  and  thirteen 
thousand  men  of  the  army  of  the  north  were  concentrated 
at  Benevente.  Santocildes  withdrew  into  the  mountains,  and 
Bessieres  then  sent  a  large  convoy  to  Rodrigo,  but,  following 
the  convention  between  Joseph  and  Napoleon,  returned  him- 
seli  to  France.  Dorsenne  succeeded  to  his  command,  and 
immediately  prepared  to  invade  Gallicia.  Castille  and  Leon 
were  also  consigned  to  him  by  Marmont,  who  had  orders  to 
withdraw  all  his  own  posts  and  depots,  except  the  garrison  of 
Rodrigo,  which  was  delayed  for  a  more  convenient  time. 
Madrid  was  to  be  Marmont's  base  and  chief  depot,  his  per- 
manent positions  were  to  be  in  the  valley  of  the  Tagus  and  at 
Truxillo,  he  was  to  fortify  Alcantara  and  Almaraz,  and  to  secure 
his  communication  across  the  river. 

Napoleon's  instructions  to  Marmont  were  clear  and  powerful. 
Penetrating  Wellington's  secret  thoughts,  he  observed  that  an 
invasion  of  Andalusia  to  succour  Cadiz  could  be  the  only 
object  of  the  allies  at  that  time,  and  Marmont  could  from  his 
new  position  always  frustrate  it  by  moving  against  their  flank. 
In  the  north  they  would  not  make  any  serious  attempt,  be- 
cause as  they  advanced,  the  French  would  retire  upon  their 
resources,  and  must  in  time  overmatch  them.  Marmont  also 
would  then  act  on  their  right  flank,  as  he  could  on  their  left 
flank  if  they  entered  Andalusia;  and  while  he  remained 
stationary  he  protected  Madrid,  and  gave  power  and  activity 
to  the  king's  administration.  United  with  Dorsenne,  seventy 
thousand  troops  would  be  opposed  to  Wellington;  united 
with  Soult,  sixty-five  thousand  men  would  be  in  line ;  and  if 
the  allies  advanced  on  either  side  of  the  Tagus,  Marmont, 
reinforced  with  ten  thousand  men  from  the  army  of  the  north, 
fifteen  thousand  from  the  army  of  the  south,  and  six  thousand 
from  the  army  of  the  centre,  could  offer  battle  with  more  than 
seventy  thousand  combatants. 

It  was   in  pursuance  of  these  instructions  that  Marmont 


JULY,  1811.]  BOOK   XIV.  — CHAP.    7.  325 

placed  a  division  at  Truxillo,  repaired  the  castles  of  that  place 
and  Medellin,  and  extended  his  army  from  Talavera  to  Pla- 
sencia  down  the  valley  of  the  Tagus,  with  posts  at  Bejar  and 
Baiios ; — that  Girard's  division  of  the  fifth  corps  held  Zafra  to 
connect  Soult  and  Marniont,  and  support  Badajos,  which 
Napoleon  wisely  garrisoned  with  detachments  from  the  three 
armies,  to  give  them  a  direct  interest  in  its  safety :  in  the  same 
policy  Eodrigo  was  in  time  to  be  garrisoned  by  Dorsenne,  that 
Marmont  might  not  neglect  the  army  of  the  south  under  pre- 
tence of  succouring  that  fortress.  To  restore  and  maintain 
Alcantara  was  beyond  Marmont's  means,  but  he  repaired  the 
bridge  of  Almaraz,  and  constructed  strong  forts,  one  on  each 
bank,  to  protect  it  and  serve  as  field  depots.  A  third  and  more 
considerable  fort  was  erected  on  the  Mirabete  ridge  to  secure 
the  passage  to  Truxillo,  by  which  free  intercourse  with  Soult 
was  maintained;  and  on  the  other  side  the  communication 
with  Dorsenne  was  maintained  by  the  fortified  pass  of  Baiios, 
and  by  Bejar  ;  and  by  the  old  Roman  road  through  the  Pico 
pass,  which  had  been  restored  in  1810  and  was  now  being 
enlarged. 

Napoleon's  affairs  in  Spain  at  this  time  bore  a  favourable 
aspect.  There  was  indeed  want  of  money,  but  the  people 
scrupulously  obeyed  the  military  authorities,  not  only  in  the 
occupied  districts  but  even  where  the  partidas  acted.  Wel- 
lington attributed  this  submission  to  fear,  and  thought  the 
heavy  exactions  would  finally  force  the  people  to  fight  or  flee 
from  their  habitations;  but  this  did  not  happen  generally, 
and  the  obedience  seems  rather  to  have  been  the  sign  of  sub- 
jection, which  by  a  judicious  mixture  of  mildness  and  severity 
would  have  been  complete,  if  England  had  not  kept  the  war 
alive :  for  on  the  Spanish  side  weakness  and  anarchy  increased. 
The  disputes  between  the  British  general  and  Portuguese 
government  were  also  becoming  unappeasable,  and  lord  Wel- 
lington drawing  up  powerful  expositions  of  his  grievous 
situation,  sent  one  to  the  Brazils,  another  to  England,  declar- 
ing that  if  a  new  system  was  not  adopted  he  could  not  and 
would  not  continue  the  war.  Lord  Wellesley  made  strenuous 
exertions  in  both  countries  to  avoid  this  termination,  but  his 
brother  while  awaiting  the  effect  of  his  efforts  had  to  contend 


326  PENINSULA    WAR.  [JULY,  1811. 

with  the  most  imperious  difficulties,  and  seek  in  his  personal 
resources  the  means  of  holding  Portugal.  He  had  sent 
Beresford  to  Lisbon,  immediately  after  Albuera,  to  organize 
the  restoration  of  the  Portuguese  army;  and  Beresford  had 
sent  De  Lemos  an  officer  of  his  staff  to  the  Brazils  to  represent 
the  evils  of  the  regency  interfering  in  military  matters.  To 
meet  this  the  Souzas  sent  one  Vasconeellos,  who  had  been 
their  spy  at  the  British  head-quarters,  to  Bio  Janeiro,  and 
thus  the  political  affairs  became  more  complicated  while  the 
military  prospect  became  less  promising. 

Wellington  understood  and  felt  the  force  of  the  emperor's 
new  combinations,  yet  he  did  not  despair  of  overcoming  them 
if  he  could  sustain  the  political  burthens  so  recklessly  heaped 
upon  his  shoulders.      He  had  a  powerful  and  experienced 
British  force,  the  military  departments  were   become  more 
skilful  and  ready,  and  he  had  seen  enough   of  his  adversaries 
to  estimate  their  powers  justly.     The  king  was  no  general 
and  was  discontented  with  the  marshals;  Soult  was  able  in 
administration  and  vast  in  his  military  plans,  yet  too  cautious 
in  execution ;  Marmont  was  vigorous  and  prompt,  but  had 
already  shown  some  rashness  in  pushing  Reynier's  division 
forward  after  passing  the  Tagus.     It  was  easy  to  conceive 
that  no  very  strict  concert  would   be  maintained  by  these 
different  commanders  in  their  combined  operations,  and  Wel- 
lington had  now  also  established  good  channels  of  information. 
His  Spanish  spies  were  numerous  within  the  French  lines, 
and  a  British  officer  constantly  visited  their  armies  in  disguise. 
Sobral,  a  Spanish  counsellor  of  state,  living  at  Victor's  head- 
quarters,  gave  intelligence  from  that  side;  and  Fuentes,   a 
guitar-player  of  celebrity,  repeatedly  made  his  way  to  Madrid. 
Mr.  Stuart,  under  cover  of  vessels  licensed  to '  fetch  corn  from 
France,    kept    chasse    marees   constantly   plying   along   the 
Biscay  coast,  by  which  he  not  only  acquired  direct  informa- 
tion, but  facilitated  the  transmission  of  intelligence  from   the 
land    spies;    amongst   those    the    most   remarkable   was    a 
cobbler,  living  in  a  little  hutch  at  the  end  of  the  bridge  of 
Iran,  where,  always  plying  his  trade,  he  continued  for  years 
without    being    suspected   to    count    every    French     soldier 
passing  in  or  out  of  Spain  by  that  bridge,  and  transmitted 


JULY,  1811.]  BOOK  XIV.— CHAP.    7.  327 

their  numbers  by  the  c/iasse  marees  to  Lisbon.  With  excep- 
tion of  Sobral,  a  double  traitor,  all  the  persons  thus  employed 
were  meritorious.  The  greater  number,  and  the  cleverest 
also,  were  Spanish  gentlemen,  alcaldes,  and  poor  men,  who 
disdained  rewards,  disregarded  danger,  and  are  to  be  lauded 
alike  for  their  boldness,  their  talent,  and  their  virtue.  Many 
are  dead.  Fuentes  was  drowned  in  passing  a  river  on  one  of 
his  expeditions.  The  alcalde  of  Caceres,  a  man  of  the  clearest 
courage  and  patriotism,  who  expended  his  own  property  in 
the  cause  and  spurned  at  remuneration,  was  on  Ferdinand's 
restoration  cast  into  a  dungeon,  where  he  perished,  a  victim 
to  the  unbounded  ingratitude  and  baseness  of  the  monarch  he 
had  served  so  well! 

With  such  means  Wellington  did  not  quail  before  the 
military  policy  of  the  emperor.  He  thought  the  saying  of 
Henry  the  Fourth  of  France,  that  '  large  armies  would  starve 
and  small  ones  be  beaten  in  Spain?  was  still  applicable. 
Solid  possession  of  Portugal  and  her  resources,  which, 
through  his  brother's  aid  he  still  hoped  to  have,  would  enable 
him  to  strike  partial  blows  against  the  French,  or  compel 
them  to  concentrate  in  large  masses,  which  he  could  hold  in 
check,  while  the  Spaniards  ruined  the  small  posts,  and  dis- 
organized the  civil  administrations  in  their  rear.  Hitherto 
the  Spaniards  had  not  made  any  such  efforts  except  by  the 
partidas,  which  were  insufficient;  but  time,  his  own  remon- 
strances, and  the  palpable  advantages  of  the  system  might 
yet  teach  them  what  to  do.  Wherefore,  having  meditated 
upon  these  matters  and  received  reinforcements  from  England, 
he  resolved  to  place  Hill  with  ten  thousand  infantry,  a  division 
of  cavalry  and  four  brigades  of  artillery,  about  Portalegre, 
Villa  Viciosa,  and  Estremos.  From  these  rich  towns,  beyond 
the  influence  of  the  Guadiana  fever,  his  troops  could  rapidly 
concentrate  for  advance  or  retreat;  and  the  latter  could  be 
eftected  upon  Abrantes,  or  by  Niza,  to  Vilha  Velha,  where  a 
permanent  boat-bridge  was  established.  Elvas,  Jerumenha, 
Campo  Mayor,  and  Ouguella  were  in  front;  and  Castanos 
remained  in  Estremadura  with  the  fifth  army,  which,  by  the 
return  of  the  cavalry  from  Ayamonte  and  the  formation  of 
Downie's  legion,  now  amounted  to  a  thousand  infantry  and 


328  PENINSULA    WAR.  [JULY,  1811. 

nine  hundred  horse.  This  force,  posted  near  Montijo,  had 
Albuquerque  and  Valencia  d' Alcantara  as  points  of  support, 
and  could  retreat  by  the  fords  of  the  Tagus  near  the  bridge 
of  Alcantara,  or  upon  Portugal  by  Marvao  and  Castello  de 
Vide.  Hill  was  thus  so  well  covered  he  could  not  be  sur- 
prised, nor  pressed  except  by  a  very  strong  army ;  and  he 
could  make  incursions  against  the  fifth  corps  in  Estremadura. 
The  rest  of  the  army  was  placed  in  quarters  of  refreshment  at 
Castello  de  Vide,  Marvao  and  other  places  near  the  Tagus, 
partly  to  avoid  the  Guadiana  fever,  partly  to  correspond  with 
Marmont's  movement ;  partly  to  sustain  a  great  stroke  now 
meditated.  For  as  Napoleon  had  foreseen,  the  disposition  of 
the  French  army  barred  any  sustained  offensive  operations, 
and  Wellington,  ignorant  of  the  great  strength  of  Dorsenne's 
army,  thought  to  take  Rodrigo  by  surreption.  In  this 
view  he  caused  a  battering  train  of  iron  guns  and  mortars 
just  arrived  from  England  with  their  gunners,  to  be  re-em- 
barked ostentatiously  at  Lisbon  as  if  for  Cadiz,  but  had 
them  shifted  at  sea  to  smaller  craft,  and  while  the  original 
vessels  went  to  their  destination,  the  train  was  secretly  landed 
at  Oporto,  and  carried  up  the  Douro  in  boats  to  Lamego. 
From  thence  they  were  brought  to  Villaponte  near  Celorico 
without  attracting  attention,  because  Lamego  and  Celorico 
being  great  depots  the  passage  of  stores  was  constant,  Other 
combinations  deceived  the  enemy  and  facilitated  the  project, 
before  the  troops  commenced  their  march  for  Beira;  but  to 
hide  such  extensive  preparations  would  have  been  scarcely 
possible,  if  the  personal  hatred  borne  to  the  invaders  by  the 
peninsulars,  combined  with  the  latter's  peculiar  subtlety  of 
character,  had  not  prevented  any  information  spreading  abroad, 
beyond  the  fact  that  artillery  had  arrived  at  Oporto.  The 
bringing  of  sixty-eight  huge  guns,  with  proportionate  stores 
across  fifty  miles  of  mountain  was  an  operation  of  magnitude; 
five  thousand  draft  bullocks  were  required  for  the  train  alone, 
and  above  a  thousand  militia  were  for  several  weeks  employed 
merely  to  repair  the  road:  the  effort  however 
marred  one  of  Napoleon's  formidable  projects. 
After  quitting  the  Caya  considerable  reinforcements,  espe- 
cially in  cavalry,  had  arrived,  but  the  army  was  generally 


AUGUST,  1811.]         BOOK   XIV.  — CHAP.   7.  329 

sickly  and  required  change  of  quarters,  wherefore  as  an  inter- 
cepted despatch  said  Ciudad  Bodrigo  wanted  pro- 
visions,  Wellington,  hoping  to  profit  from  this 
circumstance,  suddenly  crossed  the  Tagus  at  Vilha  Velha  and 
moved  by  Castello  Branco  towards  that  fortress -pretending  he 
sought  healthy  cantonments.  This  was  in  August, 
and   the  march  was  unmolested  save   by  some          Harvey's 
French  dragoons  from  Plasencia,  who  captured  a          MssT*1' 
convoy  of   mules  loaded  with  wine,  got  drunk, 
and  in  that  state  falling  on  some  Portuguese  infantry  were 
beaten  and  lost  the  mules  again.     But  there  were  other  osten- 
sible causes  for  the  movement  to  blind  the  French  generals. 
Dorsenne  was  then  menacing  Gallicia,  Soult  was   operating 
against  the  Murcians,  and  at  first  designed  to  invade  that 
kingdom;  Wellington's  march  therefore  appeared  to  have  the 
double  object  of  saving  Gallicia  by  threatening  Dorsenne,  and 
of  relieving  Murcia  by  drawing  Marmont  from  the  support  of 
Soult,  who  would  not  then  quit  Andalusia.     But  Gallicia  was 
in  great  peril.  The  partidas  of  the  north  had  been  so  repressed 
by  Caftarelli  and  Reille,  that  Dorsenne  was  able  to  assemble 
twenty  thousand  men  on  the  Esla.     Abadia  who          Gener  l 
had  succeeded  Santocildes  was  a  vain  weak  man,          Walker, 

1UTGQ 

disputing  with,  and  fearing  Moscoso  the  chief  of          Abadia, 
his  staff,  and  on  bad  terms  with  the  junta.    He  had          MSS- 
only  seven  thousand  starving  troops  on  the  Esla,  and  a  reserve 
of  fifteen  hundred  at  Foncebadon,  for  to  this  had  the  Gallician 
army  dwindled ;  and  the  danger  was  so  manifest  that  general 
Walker  advised  the  removal  of  the  ships,  the  stores,  and  fifteen 
hundred  guns,  from  Ferrol,  which  was  untenable,  to  Coruna. 

In  this  state  of  affairs  general  Dorsenne  passed  the  river 
Esla  in  four  columns,  and  general  Abadia  after  a  sharp  con- 
flict near  La  Baneza  retired  by  the  line  sir  John  Moore  had 
taken  in   1809,  having  nearly  the    same    disproportion    of 
force;  but  wanting  that  general's  skilful  diligence  he  was  fore- 
stalled by  the  enemy  at  Bembibre,  entirely  cut  off  from  Villa 
Franca  and  driven  into  the  Val  des  Orres.     From  that  strong 
country  he  could  always  retire  upon  Portugal ;  but 
his  army  was  ready  to  disband  from  misery,  Gal-          Douglas 
licia  was  helpless,  and  Dorsenne  would  have  taken          Mss. 


330  PENINSULA   WAK.  [AUGUST,  1811. 

Coruna  and  Ferrol  if  the  arrival  of  Wellington  on  the  Coa  had 
not  alarmed  him.  Then  he  relinquished  the  invasion,  and 
Souham  also,  who  was  in  march  from  Burgos  to  aid  him, 
halted  at  Rio  Seco,  events  which  Abadia  with  laughable  vanity 
ascribed  to  his  own  fighting  at  La  Baneza.  This  saving  of 
Gallicia  was  a  great  thing.  That  kingdom  was  the  base  of  all 
the  operations  against  the  great  French  line  of  communication  ; 
from  thence  went  forth  British  squadrons  to  nourish  the 
guerillas  of  Biscay,  of  the  Montana,  Navarre,  the  Rioja,  and 
the  Asturias ;  it  was  the  chief  resource  for  the  supply  of  cattle 
to  the  allied  army,  it  was  the  outwork  of  Portugal ;  and  if 
honestly  and  vigorously  governed,  would  have  been  more 
important  than  Catalonia.  But  like  the  rest  of  Spain  it  was 
always  weak  from  disorders,  and  there  was  nothing  to  prevent 
Dorsenne  from  conquering  it.  Had  he  only  occupied  St 
Jago,  Lugo,  Villa  Franca,  and  Orense,  they  would  have  given 
him  entire  command  of  the  interior,  and  the  Spaniards  holding 
only  the  ports  could  not  have  dislodged  him. 

Wellington  reached  the  Goa  on  the  8th  of  August,  intend- 
ing first  a  close  blockade  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo  and  finally  a  siege, 
he  was  too  late:  the  place  had  been  revictualled  for  two 
months  on  the  6th  by  Bessieres'  convoy,  and  the  blockade 
being  necessarily  relinquished  the  troops  were  quartered  near 
the  sources  of  the  Coa  and  Agueda,  close  to  the  line  of  com- 
munication between  Marmont  and  Dorsenne,  and  in  a  country 
where  there  was  still  some  corn.  From  thence  if  the  enemy 
advanced  in  superior  numbers,  there  was  a  retreat  through  a 
strong  country  to  a  position  of  battle  near  Sabugal,  whence 
the  communication  with  Hill  was  direct.  Nor  was  the  rest  of 
Beira  much  exposed,  as  the  French  would  have  lent  their  left 
flank  by  an  advance  towards  Almeida,  and  the  allies  could,  by 
Guurda,  send  detachments  to  the  valley  of  the  Mondego  in 
time  to  secure  the  magazines  at  Celorico;  but  the  battering 
train  and  line  of  supply  from  Lamego  was  unprotected.  In 
these  positions  the  preparations  for  the  siege  went  on  until 
Wellington  learned,  contrary  to  his  former  belief,  that 
Dorsenne's  disposable  force  was  above  twenty  thousand  good 
troops,  and  Ciudad  Rodrigo  could  not  be  attacked  in  face  of 
that  force  and  Marmont's  army.  Then  changing  his  plans, 


AUGUST,  1811.]         BOOK  XIV.    -CHAP.   7.  331 

lie  again  resolved  to  blockade  the  place  and  watch  to  strike  a 
sudden  blow  against  the  fortress,  or  against  the  enemy's  troops: 
for  it  was  the  foundation  of  his  hopes,  that  as  the  French  could 
not  long  keep  in  masses  for  want  of  provisions,  so  he  could 
check  those  masses  on  the  frontier  of  Portugal,  and  always 
force  them  to  concentrate  or  suffer  the  loss  of  some  important 
post.  But  it  is  worthy  of  observation,  that  he  did  not  com- 
prise the  Gallician  army  as  an  auxiliary ;  he  had  no  expecta- 
tion that  it  would  act  at  all,  and  was  certain  it  would  not  act 
effectually;  yet  this  was  in  August,  1811,  and  Gallicia  had  not 
seen  an  enemy  since  June,  1809! 

Early  in  September,  Marmont  pushed  a  detachment  from 
Plasencia  through  the  passes,  surprised  a  British  cavalry 
piquet  at  St.  Martin  de  Trebcjo,  and  thus  opened  his  com- 
munications with  Dorsenne.  Wellington  had  however  then 
formed  his  blockade,  and  fixing  head-quarters  at  Guinaldo 
placed  the  fifth  division  at  Perales  to  watch  Marmont,  the 
first  division,  which  was  now  under  Graham,  occupied  Pena- 
macor ;  a  field  battery  was  withdrawn  from  Hill,  and  three  of 
his  brigades,  reinforced  by  a  Portuguese  regiment,  were  posted 
on  the  Poncul,  beyond  Castello  Branco,  to  protect  the  maga- 
zines on  that  line.  The  battering  train  then  reached  Villa 
Ponte,  the  troops  made  gabions  and  fascines,  and  two  hundred 
men  of  the  line  were  instructed  as  sappers;  the  Almeida 
bridge  on  the  Coa  was  permanently  repaired,  and  Almeida 
was  once  more  restored  as  a  place  of  arms  for  guns  and  stores. 
Carlos  d'Espafia  also  came  from  Leon  to  form  a  new  army 
under  the  allies'  protection,  but  he  was  without  money, 
officers,  arms  or  stores. 


332  PENINSULA   WAR.  [SEPT.  1811. 


CHAPTER   VIII. 


DURING  the  first  arrangements  for  the  blockade,  the  garrison 
had  made  excursions  to  beat  up  the  quarters  of  the  British 
cavalry  and  forage  the  villages,  and  some  lancers  from  Sala- 
manca drove  Julian  Sanchez  out  of  Ledesma.  In  Estrema- 
clura,  Morillo  chased  the  enemy  from  Caceres  and  menaced 
Truxillo,  but  was  beaten  by  Foy  and  returned  to  Montijo. 
whence  some  French  cavalry  coming  from  Zafra  drove  him  to 
Albuquerque.  Other  military  operations  worth  relating  there 
were  none,  but  the  civil  transactions  in  Portugal  were  very 
important.  Mr.  Stuart's  exertions  had  improved  the  revenue; 
the  ranks  of  the  infantry  were  filled  by  the  return  of  deserters 
and  by  fresh  recruits,  which  with  the  reinforcements  from 
England  had  raised  the  allied  army  to  upwards  of  eighty 
thousand  men,  fifty-six  thousand  being  English.  The  number 
under  arms  did  not  however  exceed  twenty-four  thousand 
Portuguese  and  thirty-three  thousand  British,  five  thousand 
being  cavalry,  with  ninety  pieces  of  artillery;  for  the  sick- 
ness acquired  in  the  Alemtejo  was  increasing  and 
5  L^oi.^iv.  twenty-two  thousand  were  in  hospital :  hence, 
Hill's  corps  being  deducted,  Wellington  could 
not  bring  to  the  blockade  of  Ciudad  above  forty -four  thou- 
sand of  all  arms,  including  Sanchez's  partida.  But  Marmont 
alone  could  in  a  few  days  bring  quite  as  many  to  its  succour ; 
and  Dorsenne  had  from  twenty  to  twenty-five  thousand  men 
in  hand,  because  the  French  reinforcements  having  relieved 
the  old  garrisons  in  the  north  the  latter  had  joined  the  army 
in  the  field. 

At  this  time  the  British  military  chest  was  bankrupt;  even 
the  muleteers,  upon  whose  fidelity  and  efficiency  the  war 
absolutely  depended,  were  six  months  in  arrears;  and  the  dis- 
putes with  the  Portuguese  government  were  more  acrimonious 


SEPT.  1811.]  BOOK  XIV.  — CHAP.   8.  333 

than  ever.  The  regency  had  proposed  a  new  system  of 
military  regulations,  calculated  to  throw  the  burthen  of  feed- 
ing the  native  troops  entirely  upon  the  British  commissariat 
without  any  reform  of  abuses ;  Wellington  rejected  it,  which 
caused  more  violence,  and  as  Beresford  had  "fallen  sick  at 
Cintra,  Mr.  Stuart,  deprived  of  his  support  on  military  ques- 
tions and  himself  no  longer  a  member  of  the  regency,  was 
unable  to  restrain  the  triumphant  faction  of  the  Souzas.  The 
prince  regent's  return  to  Portugal  was  prevented  by  troubles 
in  the  Brazils,  and  the  regency,  expecting  a  long  hold  of 
power,  and  foolishly  imagining  the  war  wa-j  no  longer  doubtful, 
were,  like  all  people  who  employ  powerful  auxiliaries,  devising 
how  to  get  rid  of  the  British  army.  With  this  view  they 
objected  to  or  neglected  every  necessary  measure,  and  made 
many  absurd  demands,  such  as  that  the  British  general  should 
pay  the  expenses  of  the  Portuguese  post-office;  at  the  same 
time  they  preferred  various  vexatious  and  unfounded  charges 
against  British  officers,  while  gross  corruption  and  oppres- 
sion of  the  poorer  people  marked  the  conduct  of  their  own 
magistrates. 

But  the  fate  of  Portugal,  which  to  these  people  appeared 
fixed,  was  in  the  eyes  of  the  English  general  more  doubtful 
than  ever.  Intercepted  letters  gave  reasons  to  believe  the 
emperor  was  coming  to  Spain.  This  was  corroborated  by  the 
assembly  of  an  army  of  reserve  in  France,  and  the  formation 
of  great  magazines  at  Burgos  and  other  places,  to  supply 
which  and  to  obtain  money,  the  French  generals  were 
exacting  the  fourth  of  the  harvest  and  selling  the  overplus 
again  even  by  retail.  Minute  reports  of  the  state  of  these 
magazines  were  demanded  by  Napoleon,  reinforcements,  chiefly 
of  the  imperial  guards,  were  pouring  into  Spain;  and  Wel- 
lington, judging  the  emperor  must  either  drive  the  British 
from  the  Peninsula  or  lower  his  tone  with  the  world,  thought 
he  would  invade  Portugal  from  the  side  of  Rodrigo,  moving 
also  by  the  valley  of  the  Tagus  and  the  Alemtejo;  and  that 
he  would  risk  his  fleet  in  a  combined  attack  upon  Lisbon 
by  sea  and  land.  It  is  uncertain  if  Napoleon  really  meaned 
this,  or  spread  the  report  with  a  view  to  restrain  the 
allies  from  offensive  operations  during  the  summer;  or  to 


334  PENINSULA   WAR.  [SEPT.  1811. 

mislead  the  English  cabinet  as  to  the  real  state  of  his  nego- 
tiations with  Russia,  intending  if  tne  latter  proved  favour- 
able to  turn  his  whole  force  against  the  Peninsula;  but 
everything  in  Spain  at  this  time  indicated  his  approach. 
Wellington's  notion,  that  he  was  bound  to  drive  the  British 
army  away  or  lose  his  influence  in  the  world,  does  not  how- 
ever seem  conclusive.  The  mighty  expedition  to  Moscow 
proved  that  the  emperor  did  not  want  force  to  conquer  Spain ; 
success  in  Russia  would  have  enabled  him  to  prolong  the  war 
in  the  Peninsula  as  a  drain  on  the  English  resources  for  many 
years;  and  the  rest  of  Europe  could  not  from  thence  draw 
conclusions  unfavourable  to  his  influence. 

Napoleon's  coming  being  probable,  Wellington  with  charac- 
teristic prudence  turned  his  own  attention  again  to  the  lines 
of  Torres  Vedras.  and  urgently  desired  the  government  to  put 
the  fortresses  in  order,  repair  the  roads,  and  restore  the 
bridges  broken  during  Massena's  invasion.  An  increased 
number  of  workmen  were  also  put  to  the  lines,  for  the 
engineers  had  never  ceased  to  improve  those  on  the  northern 
bank  of  the  Tagus.  On  the  southern  bank  the  double 
entrenchments  of  Almada  had  been  continued  on  a  gigantic 
scale.  A  defensive  canal  there  was  planned  on  a  depth  to 
float  ships  of  three  hundred  tons,  and  serve  as  a  passage  from 
the  Tagus  to  Setuval  by  joining  the  navigation  of  the  Sadao 
and  Marateca  rivers,  thus  conducing  to  objects  of  general 
utility  as  well  as  the  military  defence ;  and  it  will  be  found 
that  Wellington  did  at  all  times  sustain,  not  only  the  political 
and  financial  and  military  affairs,  but  also  the  agricultural 
commercial  and  charitable  interests  of  Portugal.  The  batteries 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Tagus  being  likewise  put  in  order  were 
provided  with  furnaces  for  heating  shot ;  a,nd  captain  Holloway 
of  the  engineers,  at  a  trifling  expense,  constructed  four  jetties 
at  St.  Julian's  in  such  an  ingenious  manner,  that  they  with- 
stood the  most  tempestuous  gales  and  secured  the  embarkation 
of  the  army  in  any  season.  The  militia  also  were  again 
called  out,  a  measure  of  greater  import  in  the  actual  state  of 
affairs  than  would  at  first  appear;  for  the  expense  was  a 
heavy  drain  upon  the  finances,  and  the  number  of  hands  thus 
taken  away  from  agriculture  was  a  serious  evil. 


SEPT.  1811.]  BOOK  XIV.  — CHAP.   8.  335 

Had  all  these  things  been  duly  executed,  even  Napoleon 
was  not  to  be  feared ;  but  the  Portuguese  government,  if  that 
can  be  called  government  which  was  but  an  idle  faction,  was, 
as  usual,  entirely  negligent.  The  regency  refused  to  publish 
any  proclamation  announcing  danger,  or  exciting  the  people 
to  prepare  for  future  efforts ;  and  though  the  ancient  laws  of 
Portugal  provided  ample  means  for  meeting  such  emergencies, 
the  bridges  over  the  Ceira  the  Alva  and  other  rivers  on  the 
line  of  retreat  were  left  unrepaired.  The  roads  were  there- 
fore impassable,  the  rainy  season  was  coming  on,  and  the 
safety  of  the  army  would  have  been  seriously  endangered  if  it 
had  retired  before  the  emperor.  The  regency  pleaded  want  of 
money,  a  result  of  its  own  negligence  in  the  collection  of 
taxes,  for,  the  devastated  districts  excepted,  the  people  were 
richer  than  they  had  ever  been,  and  in  hard  cash  also 
from  the  enormous  sums  expended  by  the  British  army. 
Another  terrible  embarrassment  was  likewise  caused  by  the 
culpable  indiscretion  of  the  regency.  The  secret  corre- 
spondents on  the  side  of  Salamanca  suddenly  ceased  to  write, 
because  the  Portuguese  government  published  in  the  Lisbon 
Gazette  the  intelligence  sent  to  Silveira,  and  the  English 
newspapers  by  copying  it  drew  the  enemy's  attention.  At 
first  it  was  feared  the  poor  people  had  lost  their  lives,  but 
fortunately  it  was  not  so ;  yet  an  aggravating  sense  of  all  his 
difficulties  was  thus  pressed  on  the  English  general  when  he 
compared  his  own  situation  with  that  of  the  enemy.  Neither 
his  necessities  nor  his  money  could  procure  due  assistance 
from  the  Portuguese,  while  the  French  generals  Wellin(rton 
had  only  to  issue  their  orders  to  the  Spaniards  to  lord  Liver- 
through  the  prefects  of  provinces,  and  all  kinds  of  po° ' 
aid  possible  to  be  obtained  were  surely  provided  on  the  day 
and  at  the  place  indicated. 

In  the  midst  of  these  cares  Wellington  was  suddenly  called 
into  military  action.  Ciudad  Kodrigo  again  wanted  food,  and 
Marmont,  wrho  had  received  eleven  thousand  men  from  France, 
and  had  fifty  thousand  under  arms,  concerted  with  Dorsenne  a 
combined  operation  for  its  succour.  In  this  view  Truxillo 
had  been  occupied  by  a  part  of  the  fifth  corps,  and  Girard 
with  the  remainder  advanced  to  Merida  while  Foy,  reinforced 


PENINSULA    WAR  [SEPT.  181L 

i*a> 'strong  division  of  the  army  of  the  centre,  occupied 
*9'  Marmont  passed  tlie  mountains  and  collected  a 
. 'convoy  at  Bejar;  Dorsenne  reinforced  by  eight  thousand 
'men  under  Souham,  collected  another  convoy  at  Salamanca ; 
and  leaving  Bonnet's  division,  which  now  included  Mayers 
troops,  at  Astorga  to  watch  the  Gallicians,  came  down  to 
Tamames.  They  met  on  the  21st,  presenting  altogether  sixty 
thousand  men,  six  thousand  being  cavalry,  with  a  hundred 
pieces  of  artillery.  Wellington  immediately  concentrated  his 
scattered  troops.  He  could  not  fight  beyond  the  Agueda,  but 
he  would  not  retreat  until  he  had  seen  the  whole  French 
army,  lest  a  detachment  should  relieve  the  place  to  his  dis- 
honour. With  this  object,  he  placed  the  third  division,  re- 
inforced by  three  squadrons  of  cavalry,  in  the  centre  on  the 
heights  of  Elbodon  and  Pastores,  within  three  miles  of  Ciudad 
Rodrigo  and  overlooking  the  plains  round  that  place.  The 
right  wing,  composed  of  the  light  division  some  squadrons  of 
cavalry  and  six  guns,  was  sent  beyond  the  Agueda  to  the 
Vadillo,  a  river  rising  in  the  Pena  de  Francia  and  falling  into 
the  Agueda,  three  miles  above  Rodrigo :  from  this  line  an 
«nemy  coming  from  the  eastern  passes  could  be  descried.  The 
left  wing,  formed  of  the  sixth  division  and  Anson's  cavalry, 
the  whole  under  Graham,  was  at  Espeja,  with  advanced  posts 
at  Carpio  and  Marialva.  From  thence  to  Rodrigo  was  about 
eight,  miles  over  a  plain;  and  on  Graham's  left,  Julian 
Sanchez's  partida,  nominally  commanded  by  Carlos  d'Espana, 
was  spread  along  the  lower  Agueda  in  observation. 

The  heads  of  these  columns  were  thus  presented  towards 
the  fortress  from  three  points — namely,  the  ford  of  the 
Vadillo,  the  heights  of  Pastores,  and  Espeja.  The  left  and 
centre  were  connected  by  two  brigades  of  heavy  cavalry  posted 
on  the  upper  Azava,  and  supported  at  Campillo  by  Pack's 
Portuguese;  the  left  was  however  far  from  Guinaldo  the 
pivot  of  operations,  and  to  obviate  danger  from  a  flank  march 
in  retreat,  the  seventh  division  was  in  reserve  at  Alamedillo, 
and  the  first  division  at  Nava  d'Aver.  These  dispositions 
spread  the  army  out  on  all  the  roads  like  a  fan,  the  sticks  of 
which  led  to  one  point  on  the  Coa.  The  fifth  division 
remained  at  San  Payo  to  watch  the  passes,  lest  Foy  should 


EXPLANATORY  SKETCH 
Alfi)    COMIiAT  OF 

EIL 


.  1811.]  BOOK  XlV.  —  OMAi*.   fc.  83? 

from  Plasencia  take  the  right  wing  in  reserve.  Meanwhile 
Hill,  sending  Hamilton's  Portuguese  towards  Albuquerque  to 
support  the  Spanish  cavalry,  then  menaced  by  the  fifth  corps, 
drew  nearer  the  Tagus,  to  take,  if  necessary,  the  place  of  his 
third  brigade,  which  marched  from  the  Ponyul  to  Penamacor. 
But  the  army  was  too  much  spread.  The  broad  range  of 
heights  lining  the  left  bank  of  the  Agueda  ended  somewhat 
abruptly  above  Elbodon  and  Pastores  where  the  centre  was 
posted,  and  was  flanked  in  its  whole  length  by  plains  and 
woods  extending  from  Oiudad  Rodrigo  to  the  Coa;  it  was 
therefore  untenable  against  an  enemy  commanding  that  open 
country;  and  if  the  centre  were  driven  rapidly  beyond  Guinaldo, 
the  distant  wings  could  be  intercepted  in  retreat.  To  avoid 
that,  three  field  redoubts  were  constructed  at  Guinaldo  to 
impose  upon  the  enemy,  and  thus  gain  time  to  concentrate 
arid  feel  Marmont's  disposition  for  battle,  because  a  retreat 
beyond  the  Coa  was  if  possible  to  be  avoided. 

On  the  23rd  the  French,  advancing  from  Tamames,  en- 
camped behind  the  hills  to  the  north-east  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo, 
and  a  strong  detachment,  entering  the  plain,  communicated 
with  the  garrison  examined  the  position  of  the  light  division 
on  the  Vadillo  and  returned.  The  24th,  six  thousand  cavalry 
and  four  divisions  of  infantry  crossed  the  hills  in  two 
columns,  and  placing  some  troops  in  observation  on  the 
Vadillo  introduced  the  convoy.  On  this  day  the  fourth 
division  of  the  allies  was  brought  up  to  the  position  of 
Guinaldo,  and  the  redoubts  were  completed;  yet  no  other 
change  was  made,  for  it  was  thought  the  French  would  not 
advance  further.  But  the  25th,  soon  after  daybreak,  fourteen 
squadrons  of  the  imperial  guards  drove  the  outposts  of  the 
left  wing  from  Garpio  across  the  Azava,  and  the  lancers  of 
Berg  crossed  that  river  in  pursuit;  they  were  however 
flanked  by  some  infantry  in  a  wood,  and  then  charged  and 
beaten  by  two  squadrons  of  the  fourteenth  and  sixteenth 
dragoons,  who  re-occupied  the  post  at  Carpio. 

During  this  skirmish,  fourteen  battalions  of  infantry,  thirty 
squadrons  of  cavalry,  and  twelve  guns,  the  whole  under  Mont- 
brun,  passed  the  Agueda  by  the  bridge  of  Rodrigo  and  the 
forcls  above  it,  and  marched  towards  Guinaldo.  The  road 

VOL.  ni.  z 


338  PENINSULA.   WAR.  [SEPT.  1811. 

divided,  one  branch  turned  the  Elbodon  heights  on  the  right 
hand,  the  other  leading  nearer  to  the  Agueda  passed  through 
Pastores,  La  Encina,  and  Elbodon;  and  as  the  point  of 
divarication  was  covered  by  a  gentle  ridge  it  was  for  some 
time  doubtful  which  branch  the  French  would  lollow.  Soon 
the  doubt  vanished,  their  cavalry  poured  along  the  right-hand 
road  leading  directly  to  Guinaldo,  the  small  advanced  posts 
which  the  allied  squadrons  had  on  the  plain  were  rapidly 
driven  in,  and  the  enemy's  horsemen,  without  waiting  for 
their  infantry,  commenced  the  combat  of  Elbodon. 

This  action  began  disadvantageous^  for  the  allies.  The 
seventy-fourth  and  sixtieth  regiments  of  the  third  division 
being  at  Pastores  on  the  right,  were  too  distant  to  be  called 
in,  and  Picton  with  three  other  regiments,  being  at  Elbodon, 
could  not  immediately  join  in  the  fight.  Wellington  sent  to 
Guinaldo  for  a  brigade  of  the  fourth  division,  and  directed 
Colville  to  draw  up  the  seventy-seventh  and  fifth  British 
regiments,  the  twenty-first  Portuguese,  and  two  brigades  of 
artillery  of  the  same  nation,  on  a  hill  over  which  the  road  to 
Guinaldo  passed,  supporting  their  flanks  with  Alten's  three 
squadrons.  This  height  was  convex  towards  the  enemy  and 
covered  in  front  and  on  both  flanks  by  deep  ravines ;  but  it 
was  too  extensive,  and  before  Picton  could  come  from  Elbo- 
don the  crisis  had  passed.  The  Portuguese  guns  sent  their 
shot  into  Montbrun's  horsemen  in  the  plain,  yet  the  latter 
crossing  the  ravines  rode  up  the  rough  height  on  three  sides, 
and  fell  vehemently  upon  the  allies.  The  loose  fire  of  the 
infantry  and  artillery  could  not  stop  them,  but  they  were 
checked  by  the  fine  fighting  of  the  cavalry,  who  charging  the 
heads  of  the  ascending  masses,  not  once  but  twenty  times, 
maintained  the  upper  ground  above  an  hour. 

It  was  astonishing  to  see  so  few  troopers  resist  the  surging 
multitude  even  on  that  steep  rocky  ground;  and  when  Mont- 
brun,  obstinate  to  win,  brought  up  his  artillery,  his  horsemen, 
gaining  ground  in  the  centre,  cut  down  some  gunners  and  cap- 
tured the  guns ;  one  of  the  German  squadrons  charging  too 
far  then  got  entangled  in  the  intricacy  of  the  ravines  and 
the  crisis  was  perilous ;  but  suddenly  the  fifth  regiment,  led  by 
major  Ridge,  a  daring  man,  dashed  into  the  midst  of 


SEPT.  1811.]  BOOK   XIV.  — CHAP.   8. 

the  French  cavalry  and  retook  the  artillery,  which  again  opened 
its  fire,  and  nearly  at  the  same  time  the  seventy-seventh, 
supported  by  the  twenty-first  Portuguese,  vigorously  repulsed 
the  enemy  on  the  left.  This  charging  of  infantry  against  a 
powerful  cavalry  could  only  check  the  foe  at  that  particular 
point.  Montbrun  pressed  on  with  fresh  masses  against  the 
left  flank  of  the  allies,  while  other  squadrons  penetrated 
between  the  right  flank  and  Elbodon,  from  the  vineyards 
of  which  village  Picton  was  then  with  difficulty  and  some  con- 
fusion extricating  his  troops ;  he  could  give  no  succour,  the 
brigade  of  the  fourth  division  was  not  in  sight,  the  French 
infantry  rapidly  approached,  the  position  was  untenable,  and 
Wellington  directed  both  Picton  and  Colville  to  fall  back  and 
unite  in  the  plain  behind.  Colville,  forming  his  battalions  in 
squares,  immediately  descended,  but  Picton  was  at  a  considerable 
distance ;  and  the  German  squadrons,  fearing  to  be  surrounded 
by  the  French  who  had  completely  turned  their  right,  took 
refuge  at  a  gallop  with  the  Portuguese  regiment,  then  the 
farthest  in  retreat.  Thus  the  fifth  and  seventy-seventh,  two 
weak  battalions  formed  in  one  square,  were  quite  exposed,  and 
in  an  instant  the  whole  of  the  French  cavalry  came  thunder- 
ing down  upon  them.  But  how  vain  to  match  the  sword  with 
the  musket,  to  send  «the  charging  horseman  against  the  stead- 
fast veteran !  The  multitudinous  squadrons  rending  the  skies 
with  their  shouts  closed  on  the  glowing  squares  like  the  falling 
edges  of  a  burning  crater,  and  were  as  instantly  rejected, 
scorched,  and  scattered  abroad ;  the  rolling  peal  of  musketry 
echoed  through  the  hills,  bayonets  glittered  at  the  edge  of  the 
smoke,  and  with  firm  and  even  step  the  British  regiments 
came  forth  unscathed  as  the  holy  men  from  the  Assyrian's 
furnace.  Picton  then  effected  his  junction  and  the  whole 
retired  over  the  plain  for  six  miles  to  the  position  at  Guinaldo. 
The  French  would  not  renew  the  close  attack  but  plied  shot 
and  shell  until  four  o'clock,  when  the  entrenched  camp  was 
gained.  Here  the  fourth  division  presented  a  fresh  front, 
Pack's  brigade  came  from  Campillo,  the  heavy  cavalry  from 
the  upper  Azava,  and  the  action  ceased.  This  retrograde 
movement  of  the  left  and  centre  of  the  third  division  isolated 
the  seventy-fourth  and  the  sixtieth  regiments  posted  at 


340  PENINSULA  WAR.  [SEPT,  1811. 

Pastores,  and  they  had  to  ford  the  Agueda,  and  then  moving 
up  the  right  bank  happily  reached  Guinaldo  in  the  night  after 
a  march  of  fifteen  hours,  in  the  course  of  which  they  captured 
a  French  cavalry  patrole. 

During  the  retreat  from  Elbodon,  the  left  wing  of  the  army 
was  ordered  to  fall  back  on  the  first  division  at  Nava  d'Avcr, 
but  to  keep  posts  in  observation  on  the  Azava.  Carlos 
d'Espana  retired  with  Sanchez's  infantry  behind  the  Coa,  and 
the  guerilla  chief  himself  passed  with  his  cavalry  into  the 
French  rear.  The  seventh  division  was  withdrawn  from  Alla- 
madilla  to  Albergaria,  and  the  head-quarters  baggage  moved 
to  Casilla  de  Flores.  The  light  division  should  have  marched  by 
Robledo  to  Guinaldo,  and  Craufurd  received  the  order  at  three 
o'clock,  heard  the  cannonade,  and  might  have  reached  Guin- 
aldo before  midnight;  but  fearing  a  night  march  he  only 
moved  to  Cespedosa,  one  league  from  the  Vadillo,  which  river 
was  immediately  passed  by  fifteen  hundred  French.  The 
position  at  Guinaldo  was  therefore  occupied  by  only  fourteen 
thousand  men,  of  which  about  two  thousand  six  hundred 
were  cavalry.  The  left  of  the  army,  concentrated  at  Nava 
d'Aver  under  Graham,  was  ten  miles  distant;  the  light 
division  being  at  Cespedosa  and  debarred  the  direct  route  by 
the  ford  of  Garros,  was  sixteen  miles  distant ;  the  fifth  division, 
posted  at  Payo  in  the  mountains,  was  twelve  miles  distant. 
Meanwhile  Marmont  brought  up  a  second  division  of  infan- 
try, and  in  the  course  of  the  night  and  following  day,  united 
sixty  thousand  men  in  front  of  Guinaldo.  Wellington  was 
then  dangerously  menaced,  but  he  would  not  abandon  the 
light  division,  which  being  intercepted  by  the  French  cavalry 
at  Kobleda,  and  compelled  to  make  a  circuit,  did  not  arrive 
until  after  three  o'clock  in  the  evening.  Mannont's  fortune 
was  fixed  in  that  hour !  Ignorant  of  the  true  state  of  affairs,  he 
detached  a  strong  column  by  the  valley  of  the  Azava  to 
menace  the  left,  and  made  an  ostentatious  display  of  the 
imperial  guards  in  the  plain  instead  of  attacking  an  adversary, 
who,  being  too  weak  to  resist,  laughed  to  see  him  so  employed 
and  soon  changed  the  state  of  affairs. 

In  the  night,  by  a  skilful  concentric  movement  from  Gui- 
ualdo,  Nava  d'Aver,  Perales,  and  Payo,  the  allies  were  united 


SEPT.  1811.]  BOOK    XIV.— CHAP.   8. 

between  the  Coa  and  the  sources  of  the  Agueda,  twelve  miles 
beyond  Guinaldo;  and-  Marmont  so  little  knew  his  own  advan- 
tages, that  he  also  retired  during  the  night,  and  was  actually 
in  march  to  the  rear  when  the  scouts  of  the  column  which 
had  marched  by  the  valley  of  Azava,  told  him  the  allies  were 
in  retreat  and  their  divisions  still  widely  separated.  Dor- 
senne's  remonstrances  then  compelled  him  to  wheel  round 
and  pursue,  but  Wellington  was  already  in  a  strong  position 
behind  the  stream  of  the  Villa  Maior.  The  fifth  division 
was  on  the  right  at  Aldea  Yelha;  the  fourth  and  light 
divisions,  Victor  Alten's  cavalry,  and  the  heavy  dragoons 
under  Cotton,  were  in  the  centre  covering  Alfayates,  with  the 
convent  of  Sacaparte  on  their  left;  the  line  was  prolonged  to 
Rebulon  by  Pack's  and  M'Mahon's  Portuguese  brigades,  and 
the  sixth  division  with  Alison's  cavalry  closed  it  at  Bismula. 
The  cavalry  piquets  were  pushed  beyond  the  Villa  Maior  to 
Aldeaponte  in  the  centre,  and  Furcalhos  on  the  right;  the 
third  and  seventh  divisions  were  in  reserve  behind  Alfa- 
yates. This  position  was  extensive,  but  the  days  were  short, 
the  allies  covered  all  the  practicable  roads  leading  to  the 
bridges  and  fords  of  the  Coa,  they  could  not  be  turned,  and 
serious  dispositions  were  necessary  for  a  battle. 

COMBAT    OF    ALDEAPONTE. 

Coming  on  by  the  roads  both  of  Furcalhos  and  Aldea- 
ponte, the  French  were  checked  by  the  piquets  e  f  the  light 
division  on  the  former;  but  on  the  latter  their  horsemen 
drove  the  cavalry  posts  across  the  stream  of  the  Villa  Maior, 
and  about  ten  o'clock  took  possession  of  Aldeaponte.  At 
twelve  o'clock  the  head  of  their  infantry  arrived  and  imme- 
diately attacked  Pakenham's  brigade  of  the  fourth  division, 
which  was  posted  on  the  opposite  heights.  Wellington  came 
up  at  the  moment,  and  directed  the  seventh  fuzileera  to  charge 
in  line,  supporting  them  on  each  flank  with  a  Portuguese 
regiment  in  column.  The  French,  who  had  nearly  crowned 
the  hill,  were  driven  back;  and  though  they  afterwards 
attempted  to  turn  the  brigade  by  a  wood,  distant  about  mus- 
ket-shot from  the  right,  while  their  cavalry  advanced  to  the 


342  PENINSULA   WAR.  [SEPT.  1811 

foot  of  the  hill,  the  artillery  baffled  that  effort.  Then  the 
allies  taking  the  offensive  turned  the  French  left  and  seized 
the  opposite  hills,  but  the  fire  soon  ceased,  Aldeaponte  was  re- 
occupied,  and  Wellington  who  had  been  personally  much 
exposed  rode  to  another  part  of  the  position.  Scarcely  was 
he  gone  when  the  French,  coming  by  the  Furcalhos  road, 
joined  those  at  Aldeaponte  and  retook  that  village,  and  Paken 
ham,  though  he  recovered  it  with  his  fuzileers,  finding  the 
enemy  numerous,  and  unable  in  that  rugged  and  wooded 
country  to  see  what  was  passing  on  his  flanks,  knowing  also 
the  final  battle-ground  was  behind  the  Coa,  abandoned  Aldea 
Ponte  for  his  original  post. 

In  the  night  the  allies  retreated,  and  on  the  morning  of  the 
28th  occupied  a  strong  position  in  front  of  the  Ooa,  the  right 
resting  on  the  Sierra  de  Mesas,  the  centre  covered  by  the 
village  of  Soita,  the  left  at  Rendo  upon  the  river.  The 
army  thus  shut  up  as  it  were  in  a  deep  loop  of  the  Coa  river 
could  only  be  attacked  on  a  narrow  front,  and  Marmont.  who 
had  only  a  few  days'  provisions  and  could  gather  none  in  that 
country,  retired  the  same  day.  The  garrison  of  Ciudad 
Rodrigo  was  then  changed,  and  Marmont  returned  to  the 
valley  of  the  Tagus.  Dorsenne  re-occupied  Salamanca,  and 
placed  a  division  at  Alba  de  Tormes  to  connect  his  left  with 
Marmont.  Foy,  who  had  come  with  his  two  divisions  to 
Zarza  Mayor,  returned  to  Plasencia.  Girard,  menaced  by 
Hamilton's  Portuguese  division,  which  Hill  had  sent  to  check 
his  advance,  left  two  thousand  men  of  the  fifth  corps  at 
•  Merida  and  retired  to  Zafra.  When  these  movements  were 
known,  the  light  division,  reinforced  by  some  cavalry,  resumed 
the  nominal  blockade  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo  in  concert  with 
Julian  Sanchez,  and  the  rest  of  the  army  was  cantoned  on 
both  sides  of  the  Coa,  head-quarters  being  fixed  at  Frenada. 
Nearly  a  month  had  been  employed  by  the  French  in  prepara- 
tion and  execution  of  this  great  operation,  which  terminated 
feebly  and  abruptly  because  the  generals  were  as  usual  at 
variance ;  Ciudad  Rodrigo  had  been  victualled,  but  the  oppor- 
tunity of  invading  Gallicia  was  lost,  nothing  had  been  gained 
in  the  field,  time  was  wasted,  and  the  English  general's  plans 
were  forwarded. 


SEPT.  1811.]  BOOK   XIV.— CHAP    8.  349 

OBSERVATIONS. 

1°.  Wellington's  position  behind  the  Soita  has  been  noticed 
by  two  military  authors.     One  censures  the  im- 
prudence of  offering  battle  where  there  was  no       Annais°n'3 
retreat ;  the  other  intimates  that  it  was  assumed       Lon  don- 
in  contempt  of  the  adversary's  prowess.    This  last       Narrative, 
appears  a  mere  evasion  of  what  was  .not  under- 
stood :  had  Wellington  despised  Marmont  he  would  have  fought 
him  beyond  the  Agueda.     But  sixty  thousand  French  soldiers 
were  never  to  be  despised ;  and  it  is  not  difficult  to  show  that 
the  position  was  chosen  without   imprudence,    and  without 
presumption. 

From  the  Sierra  de  Mesas  to  the  Coa  was  less  than  six 
miles,  and  the  part  open  to  attack  was  much  reduced  by  the 
rugged  bed  of  a  torrent  covering  the  left.  Forty  thousand 
men  were  enough  to  defend  this  line,  which  was  little  more 
than  one-third  of  their  full  front;  and  as  the  roads  were  bad, 
the  country  broken  with  woods  and  ravines,  the  enemy's 
superiority  in  horse  and  guns  would  have  availed  him  little. 
Wellington  had  a  right  to  affront  an  adversary  who  had  not 
molested  him  at  Guinaldo,  and  it  is  always  of  importance  to 
show  a  menacing  front.  Great  combinations  must  have  been 
made  by  Marmont  for  a  general  battle ;  it  was  known  that  he 
had  only  a  few  days'  provisions  and  the  neighbourhood  could  not 
supply  him :  it  was  therefore  reasonable  to  expect  he  would 
retire  rather  than  fight,  and  he  did  so. 

Let  it  be  supposed  Marmont  was  prepared  and  resolute  to 
fight.  The  position  behind  Soita  would  have  been  good.  The 
French,  too  strong  on  the  plain,  were  not  so  powerful  as  to  war- 
rant a  retreat  indicating  fear;  hence  the  allies  had  retired  slowly 
or  three  days,  although  each  day  engaged,  and  the  enemy's 
fpowerful  horse  and  artillery  always  close  upon  their  rear.  The 
rugged  bed  of  the  Coa  offered  only  a  few  points  of  passage, 
the  principal  being  the  ford  of  Serraleira  behind  the  right  of 
the  allies ;  the  ford  of  Rapoulha  de  Coa  behind  their  left ;  the 
bridge  of  Sabugal  behind  their  centre.  The  ways  to  those 
points  were  narrow,  and  the  passage  of  the  river  with  all  the 
baggage,  could  not  have  been  easily  effected  in  face  of  an 


344  PENINSULA    WAR.  [SEPT.  1811. 

enemy  without  some  loss  and  perhaps  dishonour;  and  the 
difficulty  of  passing  after  losing  the  position  would  not  have 
been  much  increased,  because  the  incumbrances  would  have 
been  at  the  other  side,  and  a  second  range  of  heights  half-a- 
mile  in  front  of  Sabugal  was  favourable  for  a  rear-guard. 
The  position  of  Soita  was  therefore  well  taken  to  oppose  the 
enemy,  but  the  battering-train,  then  between  Pinhel  and  Villa 
Ponte,  was  completely  exposed  to  the  enemy :  Marmont,  how- 
ever, had  not  sufficiently  considered  his  enterprise,  and  knew 
not  where  or  how  to  strike. 

2°.  Aldea  Ponte  was  also  a  good  position.  Had  the  allies 
retreated  at  once  from  Guinaldo  to  Soita,  baggage  and  stores 
would  have  been  lost,  the  movement  would  have  seemed  a 
flight,  the  road  from  Payo  would  have  been  uncovered,  and  the 
junction  of  the  fifth  division  endangered.  At  Aldea  Ponte 
the  meeting  of  all  the  roads  was  strongly  commanded,  and  it 
was  easy  for  such  a  quick  general,  having  excellent  troops  and 
knowing  the  country,  to  check  the  heads  of  the  advancing 
columns  until  the  baggage  had  gained  a  sufficient  offing  and 
the  fifth  division  came  in. 

3°.  Guinaldo  rests  on  different  grounds.  The  early  en- 
trenching of  it  denoted  foresight;  the  holding  it  for  thirty- 
six  hours  was  proof  of  firmness.  It  is  said  sir  George 
Murray  urged  Wellington  to  abandon  it  in  the  night  of  the 
25th,  but  anxious  for  the  light  division  he  would  not  stir; 
that  delay  was  one  of  those  daring  impulses  of  fine  genius 
which  rules  were  never  made  to  control.  The  position 
was  contracted,  of  no  great  natural  strength  in  front,  and 
easily  to  be  turned;  the  entrenchments,  a  few  breastworks 
and  two  weak  field  redoubts,  were  open  in  rear  and  without 
palisades;  not  more  than  fourteen  thousand  British  and 
Portuguese  troops  were  in  line,  and  sixty  thousand  French 
veterans  with  a  hundred  pieces  of  artillery  were  before  them ! 
When  Marmont  heard  of  the  escape  of  the  light  division  and 
discovered  the  deceit,  he,  alluding  to  Napoleon's  fortune, 
prophetically  exclaimed,  '  And  Wellington's  star  also  is 
bright  /' 

4°.  If  the  positions  of  Aldea  Ponte  and  Soita  are  to  be 
commended,  that  at  Guinaldo  is  to  be  admired  rather  than 


SEPT.  1811.]  BOOK   XIV.  — CHAP.  8.  345 

imitated,  but  the  preceding  operations  are  censurable.  The 
country  beyond  Ciudad  Rodrigo  furnished  no  covering  posi- 
tion, and  the  sudden  floods  of  the  Agueda  rendered  the  com- 
munications with 'the  left  bank  precarious.  Nor  with  bridges 
could  the  allies  have  encamped  round  the  place  within  lines 
of  contravallation  and  circumvallation,  because  Marmont 
would  have  advanced  by  Castello  Branco,  seized  the  bridge 
at  Vilha  Velha,  and  in  concert  with  the  fifth  corps  endan- 
gered Hill.  This  would  have  compelled  Wellington  to  quit 
his  entrenched  camp,  and  Dorsenne  could  have  revictualled 
the  place.  It  was  necessary  to  have  a  position,  central  with 
respect  to  Marmont  and  Dorsenne,  strong  enough  to  hold 
both  in  check  while  separate,  and  defensible  against  them 
when  united.  Such  a  position  was  found  on  the  Coa;  for 
Salamanca  and  Bejar,  the  two  nearest  points  where  convoys 
for  Ciudad  Rodrigo  could  be  collected,  were  fifty  and  sixty 
miles  distant;  and  the  French  were  as  much ,  compelled  to 
assemble  in  large  masses  for  its  relief  by  this  distant  invest- 
ment as  they  would  have  been  by  a  close  one.  So  far  the 
combination  was  well  calculated,  but  when  sixty  thousand  men 
came  to  Ciudad  Rodrigo  the  allies  should  have  concentrated 
at  Guinaldo  without  delay.  Instead  of  this,  a  line  many 
miles  long  was  maintained,  and  the  right  wing  separated  from 
the  centre  by  a  difficult  river.  The  English  general  justified 
it  because  he  wanted  to  verify  by  actual  observation  some 
uncertainty  as  to  the  French  numbers ;  but  that  is  not  a  valid 
reason ;  his  object  could  have  been  obtained  by  other  means, 
and  the  whole  war  should  not  have  been  endangered,  and  the 
following  vital  rules  of  war  violated  for  such  a  secondary 
object. 

1°.  An  army  should  never  be  parcelled  before  a  concen- 
trated enemy. 

2°.  The  point  of  concentration  should  not  be  within  the 
enemy's  reach. 

Now  on  the  24-th  and  25th  the  army  was  parcelled  from  the 
ford  of  the  Vadillo  beyond  the  Agueda  to  Marialva  on  the 
Azava,  and  from  those  places  to  Guinaldo  was  as  long  as  from 
Ciudad  Rodrigo  to  Guinaldo,  and  by  worse  roads :  the  dis- 
tance from  Rodrigo  to  Elbodon  was  as  nothing  compared  to 


34ft  PENINSULA    WAR.  [SEPT   1811. 

the  distance  of  the  wings  from  the  latter  point.  Wherefore, 
when  Elbodon  was  abandoned,  the  right  wing  was  cut  ofi,  and 
if  the  light  division  and  the  troops  at  Pastores  escaped  it  was 
by  fortune  and  gallantry.  But  what  if  Marmont  had  made 
good  dispositions  for  a  great  battle?  He  must  have  known 
through  the  garrison  of  the  allies'  positions  and  their  camp  at 
Guinaldo,  and  he  might  have  reached  Campillo  two  hours 
after  daybreak  the  25th  with  one  column,  while  another 
assailed  Elbodon  and  Pastores.  The  third  division  would 
thus  have  been  enveloped,  or  broken  and  driven  over  the 
Agueda  at  the  Zamara  ford  and  irretrievably  separated  from 
Guinaldo;  and  then  Marmont  would  have  overwhelmed  the 
fourth  division  on  that  position.  Meanwhile  a  few  thousand 
men,  thrown  across  the  ford  of  Caros  near  Robleda,  would 
have  kept  the  light  division  at  bay,  because  the  channel  of  the 
Robleda  torrent,  over  which  their  retreat  lay,  was  a  very  deep 
and  rugged  ravine.  The  French  could  then  at  their  choice, 
have  surrounded  the  light  division  or  directed  the  mass  of 
their  forces  against  the  reserves,  and  have  compelled  the  left 
wing  to  retreat  from  the  Azava  to  Almeida. 

It  is  true  all  the  French  were  not  up  on  the  25th,  but  they 
might '  have  been  so,  and  as  Wellington  was  resolved  to  see 
their  number  he  would  have  been  in  the  same  position  the 
26th.  It  is  however  sufficient  to  remark  that  the  allies 
exclusive  of  the  fifth  division,  which  was  at  Payo,  did  not 
exceed  thirty-five  thousand  men  of  all  arms ;  that  they  were 
on  an  irregular  line  of  at  least  twenty  miles,  and  mostly  in  an 
open  country;  that  at  no  point  were  the  troops  more  than 
eight,  and  at  Pastores,  the  principal  point,  only  three  miles 
from  a  fortress  whence  sixty  thousand  infantry  and  six  thou- 
sand cavalry  with  one  hundred  and  twenty  guns  were  ready 
to  issue.  Finally  the  point  of  concentration  at  Guinaldo  was 
only  twelve  miles  from  that  fortress.  The  allies  escaped 
because  their  adversary  was  blind !  Wellington's  conduct  at 
Guinaldo  was  above  rules,  at  Elbodon  it  was  against  rules, 
which  is  just  the  difference  between  genius  and  error. 

5°.  Marmont  was  a  general  rather  shining  than  great. 
Before  he  commenced  his  march  he  had  desired  Girard  to 
advance  on  the  side  of  the  Alemtejo,  assuring  him  the  whole 


SEPT.  1811.]  BOOK  XIV.  — CHAP.  8.  847 

of  the  allied  army,  and  even  the  Spanish  troops  under 
Castanos  had  crossed  ,the  Tagus  to  operate  against  Rodrigo; 
but  in  fact  only  one  brigade  of  Hill's  corps  had  moved, 
and  Girard  would  have  been  destroyed,  if,  fortunately  for  him, 
the  allies  had  not  intercepted  the  original  and  duplicate  of  the 
letter  containing  this  false  information.  Again,  when  the 
convoy  entered  Ciudad,  Marmont  had  no  intention  of  fighting ; 
but  tempted  by  the  false  position  of  the  allies,  and  angry  at 
the  repulse  of  his  cavalry  on  the  lower  Azava,  he  turned  his 
scouting  troops  into  columns  of  attack ;  yet  he  permitted  his 
adversary  to  throw  dust  in  his  eyes  for  thirty-six  hours  at 
Guinaldo.  At  Aldea  Ponte  his  attack  was  a  useless  waste 
of  men,  because  there  was  no  local  advantage  offered  and  he 
did  not  intend  to  fight  a  great  battle. 

6°.  The  loss  was  not  heavy  on  either  side.  Three  hundred 
men  and  officers  fell  on  the  part  of  the  allies ;  of  the  French 
rather  more,  because  of  the  fire  of  the  squares  and  artillery 
at  Elbodon;  but  the  movements  for  three  days  were  full  of 
interest  and  instruction,  diversified  also  "by  brilliant  examples 
of  heroism.  Ridge's  daring  charge  has  been  noticed,  and  in 
one  of  the  cavalry  encounters  a  French  officer,  while  striking 
at  Felton  Harvey  of  the  fourteenth  dragoons  perceived  he 
had  only  one  arm,  and  with  a  rapid  change  brought  down  his 
sword  into  a  salute  and  passed  on !  In  the  next  book  will  be 
found  the  contemporary  events  in  Spain. 


APPENDIX. 


No.  I. 

EXTRACT  PROM  A  REPORT  MADE  BY  THE  DUKE  OF  D  ALM  ATU 
TO  THE  PRINCE  OF  WAGRAM  AND  OF  NEUFCHATEL. 

SECTION  I. 

'  Seville,  August  Uh,  1810. 

'  PAR  une  decision  de  1'empereur  du  mois  de  Fevrier  dernier 
S.  M.  determine  qu'a  compter  du  ler  Janvier  toutes  les  depenses 
d'administration  generale  du  genie  et  de  1'artillerie  seraient  au 
compte  du  gouvernement  Espagnol;  aussitot  que  j'en  fus  instruit 
je  sollicitai  S.  M.  C.  d'assigner  a  cet  efiet  une  somme;  mais  je  ne 
pus  obtenir  que  2,000,000  de  reaux  (533,000f.)  et  encore  le 
roi  entendait  il  que  les  pavements  ne  remontassent  qu'au  mois 
de  Fevrier;  cette  somme  etait  de  beaucoup  insuffisante.  Je  n'ai 
cesse  d'en  faire  la  representation,  ainsi  que  Monsr.  I'lntendant 
General;  nos  demandes  n'ont  pas  ete  accueillies,  et  pour  couvrir 
autant  que  possible  la  difference  j'ai  du  avoir  recours  aux 
recettes  extraordinaires  faites  sans  la  participation  des  ministres 
Espagnols.  J'espere  que  ce  moyen  reussira,  deja  meme  il  a 
produit  quelques  sommes.  L'etat  que  je  mets  ci  joint  fait 
connaitre  les  recouvremens  qui  ont  ete  operes  sur  les  fonds  de 
533,000f.  du  credit  mensuel  a  1'epoque  du  ler  Aout  lesquels  for- 
ment  la  somme  de  3,731,000f.  mais  independamment  il  y  a  eu 
des  recettes  extraordinaires  pour  au  moins  500,000f.  qui  ont 
re?u  la  meme  destination  (les  depenses  d'administration  generale) 
anterieurement  a  cette  epoque.  J'avais  fait  mettre  a  la  disposition 
de  Monsr.  I'lntendant  General,  des  valeurs  pour  plus  d'un  million 
qui  devait  servir  a  payer  une  partie  de  1'armee.  Mr.  1'Inten- 
dant  General  Justine  de  1'emploi  de  toutes  ces  sommes  dans  ses 
comptes  generaux.  Les  ministres  de  S.  M.  C.  n'admettent  pas 
les  comptes  que  je  presente;  d'abord  ils  ne  veulent  pas  allouer 
la  somme  de  500,000f.  qui  a  ete  reportee  a  1'article  des  depenses 
d'administration  generale,  s'appuyant  sur  ce  sujet  sur  la  decision 
du  roi  qui  ne  fait  remonter  ces  depenses  que  jusqu'au  mois  de 
Fevrier,  quoique  1'empereur  ait  expressement  entendu  que  le 
mois  de  Janvier  devait  aussi  y  etre  compris ;  ils  ne  veulent  pas  non 
plus  reconnaitre  les  recettes  extraordinaires,  ou  ils  pretendent  en 
precompter  le  produit  sur  le  credit  mensuel  de  533,000f.;  i] 
u'est  pas  dans  mon  pouvoir  d'admettre  leurs  niortifs;  la  decision 


350  APPENDIX. 

de  1'empereur  est  expresse.  et  tant  que  je  serai  dans  la  situation 
delicate  cm  je  me  trouve,  mon  devoir  m'obligera  de  pourvoir  aux 
besoms  du  service  par  tous  les  moyens  praticables.  Les  recettes 
qui  ont  eu  lieu  en  Andalusie  ont  servi  a  toutes  les  depenses  de 
1'artillerie,  du  genie,  des  etat  majors  et  de  I'administration  generale 
qui  sont  vraiment  immenses,  et  quoiqu'oa  ait  absolument  rien  reQu 
de  France  ni  de  Madrid,  j'ai  en  meme  temps  pu  faire  payer  trois 
mois  de  solde  a  1'armee;  c'est  sans  doute  bien  peu  quand  il  est  du 
8  a  10  mois  d'arriere  a  la  troupe  et  que  rinsuffisance  des  moyens 
oblige  a  augmenter  encore  cet  arriere,  mais  ne  recevant  rien  je 
crois  qu'il  m'etait  impossible  de  mieux  faire.  V.  A.  en  sera  elle- 
ineme  convaincue  si  elle  veut  s'arreter  un  moment  sur  1'appercu 
que  je  vais  lui  donner  des  charges  que  F Andalusie  supporte.  On 
consomme  tous  les  jours  pres  de  100,000  rations  de  vivres  et 
20,000  rations  de  fourrage;  il  y  a  2000  malades  aux  hopitaux. 
La  forteresse  de  Jaen,  le  fort  de  Malaga,  1'Alhambra  de  Grenade, 
au  dessus  duquel  on  a  construit  un  grand  camp  retranche;  tous 
les  chateaux  sur  les  bords  de  la  mer  depuis  le  cap  de  Grata  jusqu'a 
Fuengirola,  le  chateau  d'Alcala  la  Real,  la  place  de  Eonda,  les 
anciens  chateaux  d'Olbera  et  de  Moron,  le  chateau  de  Belalcazar, 
le  chateau  de  Castillo  de  Los  Guardias  et  plusieurs  autres  portes 
sur  les  frontieres  de  1'Estremadura  qu'on  a  du  aussi  occuper. 
On  a  pourvu  aux  depenses  que  les  travaux  devant  Cadiz  et  la 
construction  d'une  flottille  occasionment.  On  a  etabli  a  Grenade 
une  poudnere  et  une  fabrique  d'armes,  laquelle  jusqu'a  present 
a  peu  donne,  mais  qui  par  la  suite  sera  tres  utile.  On  a  retabli 
et  mis  dans  une  grande  activite  la  fonderie  et  1'arsenal  de  Seville 
ou  journellement  1500  ouvriers  sont  employes.  Nous  manquions 
de  poudre  et  de  projectiles  de  feu  et  d'affuts.  J'ai  fait  retablir 
deux  moulins  a  poudre  a  Seville  et  fait  exploiter  toutes  les 
nitrieres  de  1'Andalusie.  A  present  on  compte  aussi  a  Seville  des 
projectiles  de  tous  les  calibres,  jusqu'aux  bombes  de  12  pouces; 
tout  le  vieux  fer  a  ete  ramasse;  on  a  construit  les  affiits  necessaires 
pour  1'armement  des  batteries  devant  Cadiz.  On  a  fait  des  requi- 
sitions en  souliers  et  effets  d'habillement  dont  la  troupe  a  profite. 
J'ai  fait  lever  dans  le  pays  2000  mules  qui  ont  ete  donnees  a 
1'artillerie,  aux  equipages  militaires  et  au  genie.  J'ai  fait  con- 
struire  et  organiser  un  equipage  de  36  pieces  de  montagnes,  dont 
1 2  obusiers,  de  12  qui  sont  portes  a  dos  de  mulcts  et  vont  etre 
repartis  dans  tous  les  corpes  d'arm^e.  La  totalite  de  ces  depenses 
ainsi  qu'une  infinite  d'autres  dont  je  ne  fais  pas  1'enumeration 
sont  au  compte  du  gouvernement  Espagnol,  et  le  pays  les  sup- 
porte independamment  du  credit  mensuel  de  533,000f.  et  des 
recettes  extraordinaires  que  je  fais  operer  lorsqu'il  y  a  jpossibilite 
dont  I'application  a  lieu  en  faveur  de  1'administration  generale  de 
1'armee,  du  genie,  de  1'artillerie,  des  etats  majors,  des  frais  de 
courses  et  des  depenses  secrettes.  Ces  charges  sont  immenses,  et 
jamais  le  pays  n'aurait  pu  les  supporter  si  nous  n'etions  parvenus 
a  mettre  de  1'ordre  et  la  plus  grande  regularite  dans  les  depenses 
et  consommations ;  mais  il  serait  difficile  de  les  augmenter,  peut- 
etre  m^me  y  aura  it  il  du  danger  de  chercher  a  la  faire;  c'est  au 


APPENDIX.  351 

point  que  malgre  que  nous  soyons  a  la  recolte  il  faut  deja  penser 
a  faire  venir  du  bled  des  autres  provinces,  le  produit  de  1'Anda- 
lusie  etant  insuffisant  pour  la  consommation  de  ses  habitans  et 
celle  de  1'armee.  Cependant  S.  M,  C.  et  ses  niinistres  qui  sont 
pariaitement  instruits  de  cette  situation  ont  voulu  attirer  a  Madrid 
les  revenues  de  1'Andalusie :  je  dis  les  revenues,  car  leurs  demandes 
depassaient  les  recettes;  des  ordres  ont  meme  ete  expedies  en 
consequence  aux  commissaires  royaux  des  Prefectures,  et  je  me 
suis  trouve  dans  1'obligation  de  m'opposer  ouvertement  a  1'efiet 
de  cette  mesure  dont  1'execution  eut  non  seulement  compromis 
tous  les  services  de  1'armee,  mais  occasionne  peut-etre  des 
mouvemens  seditieux;  d'ailleurs  il  y  avait  impossibilite  de  la 
remplir,  a  ce  sujet  j'ai  1'honneur  de  mettre  sous  les  yeux  de 
V.  A.  extrait  d'une  lettre  que  j'eus  l'honneur  d'ecrire  au  roi  le 
13  Juillet  dernier,  et  copie  de  celle  que  j'adressai  a  Monsieur  le 
marquis  d'Almenara,  ministre  des  finances,  le  30  du  meme  mois 
pour  repondre  a  une  des  siennes,  ou  il  me  peignait  1'etat  deses- 
perant  des  finances  de  S.M.C.  Je  supplie  avec  instance  V.  A.  de 
vouloir  bien  rendre  compte  du  contenu  de  ces  lettres  et  du  present 
rapport  a  S.  M.  1'empereur. 

'  J'aurai  voulu  pour  que  S.  M.  fut  mieux  instruite  de  tout  ce 
que  s'est  fait  en  Andalusie  pouvoir  entrer  dans  des  details  plus 
etendus;  mais  j'ai  du  me  borner  a  traiter  des  points  principaux, 
les  details  se  trouvent  dans  ma  correspondance,  et  dans  les  rap- 
ports de  Monsieur  ITntendant  General  sur  radministration. 
Cependant  d'apres  ce  (jue  j'ai  dit  S.  M.  aura  une  idee  exacte  des 
operations  administratives  et  autres  qui  ont  eu  lieu,  ainsi  que  de 
1'etat  de  ces  troupes  et  des  embarras  de  ma  situation:  elle  est 
telle  aujourd'hui  que  je  dois  supplier  avec  la  plus  vive  instance 
S.  M.  au  nom  meme  de  son  service  de  daigner  la  prendre  en  con- 
sideration: j'ai  des  devoirs  a  remplir  dont  je  sais  toute  1'etendue, 
je  m'y  livre  sans  reserve  mais  la  responsibilite  est  trop  forte  pour 
que  dans  la  position  ou  je  me  trouve  je  puisse  la  soutenir;  en 
effet  j'ai  a  combattre  des  pretentious  et  des  interets  qui  sont 
eVidemment  en  opposition  avec  ceux  de  1'armee  et  par  consequent 
avec  ceux  de  1'empereur;  je  suis  force  par  mes  propres  devoirs  de 
in'opposer  a  1'execution  des  divers  ordres  que  le  roi  donne  et 
faire  souvent  le  contraire.  J'ai  aussi  constamment  a  lutter  contre 
Famour  propre  des  chefs  militaires,  que  souvent  peuvent  differer 
d'opinion  avec  moi  et  naturellement  pretendent  faire  prevaloir 
leurs  idees.  Toutes  ces  considerations  me  font  regarder  la  tache 
qui  m'est  imposee  comme  au  dessus  de  mes  forces  et  me  portent 
a  desirer  que  S.  M.  1'empereur  daigne  me  faire  connaitre  sos 
intentions  ou  pourvoir  a  mon  remplacement  et  mettre  a  la  tete 
de  son  armee  dans  le  midi  de  1'Espagne,  un  chef  plus  capable 
que  moi  d'en  diriger  les  operations.  Je  me  permettrai  seulement 
de  faire  observer  a  ce  sujet  que  le  bien  du  service  de  1'empereur 
commande  imperieusement  que  toutes  les  troupes  qui  sont  dans 
le  midi  de  FEspagne  depuis  le  Tage  jusqu'aux  deux  mers  suivent 
le  meme  systeme  d'operations,  et  soyent  par  consequent  com- 
mandes  par  un  seul  chef  lequel  doit  etre  dans  la  pensee  de 


352  APPENDIX. 

1'empereur,  et  avoir  ses  instructions  alin  que  le  cas  se  presentant 
ou  il  lui  serait  fait  opposition  d'urie  maniere  quelconque,  il  puisse 
se  conduire  en  consequence  et  parvenir  au  but  qui  lui  sera 
indique;  tout  autre  systenie  retardera  la  marche  des  affaires  et 
occasionera  inevitablement  des  desagremens  qu'on  peut  autre- 
ment  eviter. 

'  J'ai  1'honneur,  &c. 
1  (Signe)  LE  MARECHAL  DUC  DE  DALMATIE." 

SECTION  II. 

Intercepted  Letter  from  marshal  Mortier  to  the  emperor,  ' 
\Wi  July,  1810. 

'  SIRE, — L'etat  de  nullite  ou  je  suis  depuis  que  Monsieur  le  due 
de  Dalmatie,  major-general,  a  pris  1'initiative  de  tous  les  mouve- 
mens  meme  le  plus  niinutieux  de  5eme  corps  rend  ici  ma  presence 
tout-a-fait  inutile,  il  ne  me  reste  que  le  chagrin  de  voir  excellentes 
troupes  animees  du  meilleur  esprit,  disseminees  dans  tout  1'Anda- 
lusie  et  perdant  tous  les  jours  de  braves  gens  sans  but  ni  resultat. 
Dans  cet  etat  des  clioses  je  prie  V.M.  de  vouloir  bien  me  per- 
mettra  de  me  retirer  a  Burgos  pour  y  attendre  des  ordres  s'ii  ne 
iuge  pas  a  propos  de  m'accorder  un  conge  pour  retourner  en 
France,  conge  que  reclame  ma  sante  a  la  suite  d'une  maladie 
grave  dont  je  suis  a  peine  convalescent. 

'  J'ai  riionneur,  &c.  &c. 

'  LE  MARECHAL  DUG  DE  TKEVISE.' 


No.  II. 

SECTION  I. 

Extract  from  an  intercepted  despatch  of  Massena,  dated 
July  10,  1810. 

'  Generals  Eomana  and  Carrerahave  gone  to  lord  Wellington's 
head-quarters,  but  the  latter  has  not  abandoned  his  lines.' 

General  P.  Boyer  to  S.  Swartz,  July  8,  1810. 

'  We  are  covering  the  siege  of  Ciudad  Hodrigo,  a  place  strong 
by  its  position  and  works,  and  which  has  been  attacked  with  but 
little  method.  The  English  army  is  opposite  ours,  but,  for  good 
reasons,  does  not  move:  we  compose  the  corps  of  observation,  we 
are  on  the  look  out  for  them.' 

Extrait  du  Journal  du  C.  de  B.  Pelet,  premier  aide-de-camp 
du  marechal  prince  d'Essling. 

'  1810.  5  Aout,  a  Ciudad  Eodrigo. — Le  capitaine  du  genie 
Boucherat  arrive  du  2e  corps;  il  a  fait  la  campagne  du  Portugal. 


APPENDIX.  858 

1807.  Beaucoup  cause  avec  lui  sur  ce  pays.  H  a  fait  la  route  de 
ijisbonne  a  Almeyda  avec  M.  Mairet,  et  me  remet  un  itineraire 
qu'il  en  a  dresse.  II  prdtend  ces  routes  tres  difficiles;  les  rivieres 
tres  encaissees,  et  inabordable  sur  les  deux  rives  du  Mondego. 
Celui-ci  a  peu  d'eau,  doit  etre  gueable  presque  partout;  et  une 
partie  de  ses  rives  bien  difficiles,  et  en  certains  endroits  il  n'y  a 
pas  plus  de  20  toises  de  largeur;  un  seul  pont  sans  cliemin  (je 
crois  aFornos;)  mais  la  riviere  n'est  pas  un  obstacle  aux  commu- 
nications des  deux  rives.  La  route  d'ldanha,  Castelbranco,  &c. 
mauvaise,  cependant  non  absolument  impraticable  a  des  pieces 
legeres.  Tage,  tres  escarpe,  rocailleux,  profond  jusqu'a  Abrantes 
*****  Au  dessus  de  cette  ville,  ou  plutot  au  confluent  du 
Zezere,  le  pays  devient  plat;  le  lit  duTage  s'elargit;  il  n'y  aplus 
que  des  collines  meme  eloignees,  et  tout  est  tres  praticable.  Les 
montagnes  de  Santarem  sont  des  collines  peu  elevees,  praticables, 
accessibles  sur  leur  sommet,  peu  propres  a  etre  defendues  ce  qui 
est  commune  jusqu'a  la  mer  pour  celles  de  Montachique,  qui  sont 
des  plateaux  arrondis,  accessibles  atouteles  armes;  etonpourrait 
marcher  ou  manoeuvrer  dans  toutes  les  directions.  J'ai  fait  copier 
cet  itineraire.' 

'  1810.  7  Octobre,  a  Leyria. — Cause  avec  le  general  Loison 
des  position  de  Montachique,  ensuite  avec  le  prince.' 

'1810.  9  Octobre,  a  Biomajor.  On  dit  que  I'ennemi  se 
retranche  a  Alhandra  et  Bucellas.  Les  generaux  Eeynier  etPoy 
ont  une  carte  de  Biomajor  a  Lisbonne;  espece  de  croquis  fait  a  la 
hate,  d'apres  de  bons  materiaux,  mais  ou  la  figure  est  tres  man- 
vaise.  Je  le  fais  copier.' 

SECTION  III. 

A  Monsieur  le  mar  6chal  prince  (T  Ess  ting.     Sur  la  hauteur  en 
arriere  de  Moira,  le  26  Septembre,  1810,  a  10  Jieures  |. 

J'ai  1'honneur  de  vous  adresser  une  lettre  que  je  viens  de  reoe- 
voir  du  general  Beynier  et  copie  d'une  reponse. 

Vous  trouverez  egalement  ci -joint  une  lettre  du  general  Beynier 
adressee  a  votre  excellence. 

Je  vous  renouvelle,  prince,  1'assurance  de  ma  haute  conside- 
ration. 

(Signe)  LE  MARECHAL  DUC  D'ELCHINGEN. 

A  Monsieur  le  marechal  due  d ' Elchingen.     St.  Antonio,  le 
26  Septembre,  a  8  heures  du  matin. 

Depuis  que  le  brouillard  est  dissipe,  on  apper9oit  sur  le  Serra 
au  dela  de  St.  Antonio,  cinq  bataillons  Portugais  qui  etoient  ii 
mi-cote  et  qui  sont  montes  sur  la  crete  a  mesure  que  le  brouillard 
s'est  eclairci.  II  y  a  de  plus  au  col  ou  passe  ie  chemin,  6  pieces 
de  canon  et  un  detachement  d'infantrie  Anglais,  et  a  mi-cote  une 
ligne  de  tirailleurs  partie  Anglais  qui  s'etend  depuis  le  chemin 
qui  nionte  du  village  de  Carvailha  a  ma  gauche,  jusques  vis-a-vis 
des  postes  du  6e  corps,  on  voit  des  troupes  sur  les  sommites  qui 

VOL.   III.  A   A 


354  APPENDIX. 

font  face  an  6e  corps;  mais  comme  on  ne  les  appercoit  que  de 
revers,  on  ne  pent  juger  de  leur  nombre. 

On  ne  pent  deviner  s'il  y  a  des  troupes  en  arriere,  mais  d'apres 
I'organisation  de  la  montagne  dont  les  cretes  sont  etroites,  et  qui 
a  des  pentes  rapides  de  chaque  cote,  il  ne  doit  pas  avoir  de  terrain 
pour  y  placer  de  fortes  reserves  et  manoeuvres.  Cela  me  parait 
une  arriere  garde,  mais  la  position  est  forte,  et  il  faut  faire  des 
dispositions  pour  1'attaquer  avec  succes.  J'attends  des  nouvelles , 
de  ce  que  1'ennemi  fait  devant  vous  pour  faire  aucun  mouvement ; 
si  vous  jugez  que  c'est  une  arriere  garde  et  que  vous  1'attaquiez, 
j'attaquerai  aussi.  Si  vous  jugez  convenable  d'attendre  lesordres 
de  Monsieur  le  marechal  prince  d'Essling,j'attendrai  aussi;  comme 
je  pense  qu'il  viendra  vers  votre  corps,  je  vous  prie  de  lui  faire 
parvenir  le  rapport  ci-joint  avec  les  votres. 

J'ai  1'lionneur  de  vous  prier,  Monsieur  le  marechal,  d'agreer 
rhommage  de  mon  respect. 

(Signe)  REYNIER. 

A  Monsieur  le  general  Reynier.     Sur  la  hauteur  en  arriere  de 
Moira,  le  26  Septembre,  1810,  a  10  Jieures  |  du  matin. 

Je  re9ois  a  1'instant,  mon  cher  general,  votre  lettre  de  ce  jour. 
Je  pense  qu'une  grande  partie  de  1'armee  Anglo-Portugaise  a 
passe  la  nuit  sur  la  cr&te  des  montagnes  qui  domine  toute  la 
vallee  de  Moira.  Dn  paysan  dit  qu'il  existe  de  1'autre  cote  de  cos 
montagnes  une  plaine  assez  belle  d'une  demi-lieue  d'etendue,  et 
tres  garnie  d'oliviers.  Depuis  ce  matin,  1'ennemi  marche  par 
sa  gauche,  et  semble  diriger  ses  colonnes  principales  sur  la  route 
d'Oporto;  cependant  il  tient  encore  assez  de  monde  a  la  droite  du 
pare  que  couvre  le  couvent  des  minimes  npmme  Sako;  et  il  montre 
une  12me  de  pieces  d'artillerie.  Le  chemin  de  Coimbre  passe  tres 
pres  de  ce  couvent. 

J'ai  envoye  ce  matin  un  de  mes  aides-de-camp  au  prince 
d'Essling  pour  lui  dire  que  nous  sommes  en  presence,  et  qu'il 
serait  necessaire  qu'il  arrivat  pour  prendre  un  parti.  Si  j 'avals  le 
commandement,  j'attaquerais  sans  hesiter  un  seul  instant;  mais 
je  crois,  mon  cher  general,  que  vous  ne  pouvez  rien  compromettre 
en  vous  echelonnant  sur  la  droite  de  1'ennemi;  et  en  poussant  ses 
avant-nostes,  car  c'est  veritablement  par  ce  point  qu'il  faudrait  le 
forcer  a  faire  sa  retraite. 

Je  vous  renouvelle,  &c. 
(Signe)  LE  MARECHAL  DUC  D'ELOHINGEN. 

SECTION  IV. 

A  Monsieur  le  marSchal  prince  d'Essling \  commandant-en-chef 
Varmee  de  Portugal,  Paris,  le  4  Decembre,  1810. 

MONSIEUR  LE  PRINCE  D'ESSLING, — Le  general  Foy  que  vous  avez 
expedie  est  arrive  a  Paris  le  22  Novembre;  il  a  fait  connaitre  a 
sa  majeste  et  dans  le  plus  grand  detail  ce  qui  s'est  passe  et  votre 
situation. 

Des    le    t  Novembre   le   general   Gardanne   £tafr  en    avant 


APPENDIX.  355 

d' Almeida  avec  un  corps  de  6000  liommes.  Le  comte  d'Erlon 
avec  les  divisions  C  aparede,  Conroux,  et  la  division  Fournier  a 
du  se  trouver  a  Gruarda'  vers  le  20  JSTovembre. 

L'empereur,  prince,  a  vu  par  les  journaux  Anglais,  que  vous 
aviez  etabli  des  ponts  sur  le  Tage  et  que  vous  en  avez  un  sur  le 
Zezere,  defendu  sur  les  deux  rives  par  de  fortes  tetes  de  pont. 
Sa  majeste  pense  que  vous  devez  vous  retrancher  dans  la  position 
que  vous  occupez  devant  1'ennemi ;  qu'Abrantes  se  trouvant  a 
800  toises  du  Tage,  vous  1'aurez  isole  de  son  pont  et  bloque  pour 
en  faire  le  siege.  L'empereur  vous  recommande  d'etabiir  deux 
ponts  sur  le  Zezere,  de  defendre  ces  ponts  par  des  ouvrages  con- 
siderables, comme  ceux  du  Spitz  devant  Vienne.  Yotre  ligne 
d'operations  et  de  communications  devant  etre  etablie  par  la  route 
de  Garda,  partant  du  Zezere,  passant  par  Cardigos,  suivant  la 
crete  des  montagnes  par  Campinha  et  Belmonte,  vous  aurez  tou- 
jours  la  route  de  Castelbranco  et  Salvatera  pour  faire  des  vivres. 

Je  viens  de  donner  de  nouveau  1'ordre  deja  reiteree  plusieurs 
fois  au  due  de  Dalmatie,  d'envoyer  le  5me  corps  sur  le  Tage  entre 
Montalveo  et  Villaflor,  pour  faire  sa  jonction  avec  vous.  L'em- 
pereur croit  qu'il  serait  necessaire  de  s'emparer  d' Alcantara,  de 
fortifier  et  de  consolider  tous  les  ponts  sur  le  Zezere  et  sur  le 
Tage,  d'assurer  toutes  vos  communications  en  sassissant  les 
points  favorables  que  peuvent  offrir  les  localites  pour  fortifier  de 
petites  positions  ;  des  chateaux  ou  maisons  qui,  occupees  par  peu 
de  troupes,  soient  a  1'abri  des  incursions  des  rnilices. 

Vous  sentirez,  Monsieur  le  prince  d'Essling,  1'avantage  de 
regulariser  ainsi  la  guerre,  ce  qui  vous  mettra  a  meme  de 
profiter  de  la  reunion  de  tous  les  corps  qui  vont  vous  renforcer, 
pour  marcher  sur  lord  Wellington  et  attaquer  la  gauche  de  sa 
position,  soit  pour  1'obliger  a  se  rembarquer  en  marchant  sur  la 
rive  gauche  du  Tage,  ou  enfin,  si  tous  ces  moyens  ne  reussissaient 
pas,  vous  serez  en  mesure  de  rester  en  position  pendant  les  mois 
de  Decembre  et  de  Janvier,  en  vous  occupant  d'organiser  vos 
vivres  et  de  bien  etablir  vos 'communications  avec  Madrid  et 
Almeyda. 

L'armee  du  centre  qui  est  a  Madrid,  ayant  des  detachernents 
sur  Placentia,  vos  communications  avec  cette  capitale  ne  sont  pas 

i •  /•-     •  i 

dimciles. 

Deux  millions  500  mille  francs  destines  a  la  solde  de  votre 
armee  sont  deja  a  Valladolid;  deux  autre  millions  partent  en  ce 
moment  de  Bayonne.  Ainsi  votre  armee  sera  dans  une  bonne 
aituation. 

Votre  position  deviendra  tres  embarrassante  pour  les  Anglais, 
qui,  independamment  d'une  consommation  enorme  d'hommes  et 
d'argent,  se  trouveront  engages  dans  une  guerre  de  systeme,  et 
ayant  toujours  une  immensite  de  batimens  a  la  mer  pour  leur 
rembarquement.  II  faut  done,  prince,  travailler  sans  cesse  a 
vous  fortifier  vis-a-vis  de  la  position  des  ennemis,  et  pouvoir 
garder  la  v6tre  avec  moins  de  monde;  ce  qui  rendra  une  partie 
de  votre  armee  mobile  et  vous  mettra  a  meme  de  faire  des  incur- 
sions dans  le  pays. 

A  A* 


856  APPENDIX. 

Vous  trouverez  ci-joint  desMoniteurs  qui  donnent  des  nouvelles 
de  Portugal,  parvenues  par  la  voie  de  1'Angleterre,  datees  du 
12  Novembre. 

Le  prince  de  Wagram  et  de  Neuchatel, 
Major-general, 

(Signe)  ALEXANDRE. 

SECTION  V. 

A  Monsieur  le  marshal  prince  d'Essling,  commandant-en-chef 
I'arme'e  de  Portugal,  Paris,  le  22  Decembre,  1810. 

Je  vous  expedie,  prince,  le  general  Foy  que  1'empereur  a 
nomine  general  de  division;  je  vous  envoie  les  Moniteurs;  vous 
y  verrez  que  nous  apprenons  par  les  nouvelles  d'Angleterre  qu'au 
1  Decembre,  vous  vous  tbrtifiez  dans  votre  position  de  San- 
tarem. 

L'empereur  met  la  plus  grande  importance  a  ce  que  vous 
teniez  constamment  en  echec  les  Anglais,  a  ce  que  vous  avez  des 
ponts  sur  le  Zezere  et  sur  le  Tage;  la  saison  va  devenir  bonne 
pour  les  operations  militaires,  et  vous  aurez  le  moyen  de  harceler 
les  Anglais  et  de  leur  faire  eprouver  journellement  des  per  tea. 
Par  les  nouvelles  des  journaux  Anglais,  il  parait  qu'il  y  a  beau- 
coup  de  malades  dans  leur  armee,  ils  ne  oomptent  que  27  a 
28  mille  homines  sous  les  armes  et  un  effectif  de  31  mille, 
y  compris  la  cavalerie  et  1'artillerie.  La  situation  de  1'armee 
Anglaise  en  Portugal  tient  Londres  dans  une  angoise  continuelle, 
et  1'empereur  regarde  comme  un  grand  avantage  de  tenir  les 
Anglais  en  echec,  de  les  attirer  et  de  leur  faire  perdre  du  monde 
dans  les  affaires  d'avant-gardes,  jusqu'a  ce  que  vous  soyez  a 
mSme  de  les  engager  dans  une  affaire  generale.  Je  reitere  encore 
au  marechal  due  de  Trevise  1'ordre  de  marcher  sur  le  Tage  avec 
le  5me  corps. 

Le  comte  d'Erlon,  qui  reunit  son  corps  a  Ciudad-Rodrigo, 
va  profiter  de  ce  moment  ou  les'  pluies  cessent  pour  reprendre 
Toneri  sive  et  battre  tous  ces  corps  de  mauvaises  troupes  que  se 
trouvent  sur  vos  communications  et  sur  vos  flancs. 

Vos  ponts  etant  bien  assures  sur  le  Zezere,  la  ligne  de  vos 
operations  la  plus  naturelle  parait  devoir  etre  par  la  rive  gauche  de 
cette  riviere. 

Le  general  Foy,  a  qui  1'empereur  a  parle  longtemps,  vous  don- 
nera  plus  de  details. 

Le  prince  de  Wagram  et  de  Neuchatel, 
Maj  or-general, 

(Signe)  '  ALEXANDRE. 

SECTION  YI. 

A  Monsieur  le  marechal  d'Essling,  commandant-en-chef  V armee  de 
Portugal,  Paris,  le  16  Janvier,  1811. 

Je  vous  previens,  prince,  que  par  decret  imperial,  en  date  du 
15  de  ce  mois,  1'empereur  a  forme  une  armee  du  Nord  de 


APPENDIX.  357 

1'Espagne,  dont  le  commandement  est  confie  a  Monsieur  le 
marechal  due  d'Istrie,  qui  va  etablir  son  quartier  general  a 
Burgos. 

L'arrondissement  de  1'armee  du  Nord  de  1'Espagne  est  com- 


1°.  De  la  Navarre  formant  le  3e  gouvernement  de  1'Espagne. 

2°.  Des  trois  provinces  de  la  Biscaye  et  de  la  province  dc  San- 
tander,  formant  le  4e  gouvernement. 

3°.  De  la  province  des  Asturies. 

4°.  Des  provinces  de  Burgos,  Aranda,  et  Soria,  formant  le 
5e  gouvernement. 

5°.  Des  provinces  de  Palencia,  Valladolid,  Leon,  Benevente, 
Toro,  et  Zamore,  formant  le  6e  gouvernement. 

6°.  De  la  province  de  Salamanque. 

Ainsi  cet  arrondissement  comprend  tout  le  pays  occupe  par 
les  troupes  Prancaises  entre  la  mer,  la  France,  le  Portugal,  et 
les  limites  de  I'arrondissement  des  armees  du  centre  et  de  1'Ar- 
ragon. 

Cette  disposition,  en  centralisant  le  pouvpir,  va  donner  de 
I'ensemble  et  une  nouvelle  impulsion  d'activite  aux  operations 
dans  toutes  les  provinces  du  Nord  de  1'Espagne  ;  et  Monsieur  le 
marechal  due  d'Istrie  mettra  un  soiu.  particulier  a  maintenir  les 
communications  entre  Yalladolid,  Salamanque,  et  Almeida. 

Je  vous  engage,  prince,  a  correspondre  avec  Monsieur  le 
marechal  due  d'Istrie  toutes  les  fois  que  vous  le  jugerez  utile  au 
service. 

D'apres  les  ordres  de  1'empereur  je  previens  Monsieur  le  due 
d'Istrie  que  dans  des  circonstances  imprevues,  il  doit  appuyer 
1'armee  de  Portugal  etlui  porter  du  secours;  je  le  previens  aussi 
qne  le  9me  corps  d'armee  serait  sous  ses  ordres  dans  le  cas  ou  ce 
corps  rentrerait  en  Espagne. 

Le  prince  de  Wagram  et  de  Neuchatel, 
Major-general, 

(Signe)  ALEXANDEE. 

SECTION  VII. 

A  Monsieur  le  marechal  due  de  Dalmatic,  Paris,  le  24 
Janvier,  1811. 

Vous  verrez  par  le  Moniteur  d'hier,  Monsieur  le  due  de  Dal- 
matie,  que  les  armees  de  Portugal  etaient  a  la  fin  de  1'annee  der- 
niere  dans  la  meme  position.  L'empereur  me  charge  de  vous 
renouveller  1'ordre  de  vous  porter  au  secours  du  prince  d'Essling, 
qui  est  toujours  a  Santarem ;  il  a  plusieurs  ponts  sur  le  Zezere, 
et  il  attend  que  les  eaux  soient  diminuees  pour  en  jetter  un  sur  le 
Tage.  II  parait  certain  que  le  9me  corps  a  opere  sa  jonction  avec 
lui  par  le  Nord,  c'est-a-dire,  par  Almeyda. 

L'empereur  espere  que  le  prince  d'JEssling  aura  jette  un  pant 
sur  le  Tage;  ce  que  lui  donnera  des  vivres. 

Les  corps  insurges  de  Valence  et  de  Murcie  vont  se  trouver 
occupe  par  le  corps  du  general  Suchet,  aussitot  que  Taragone 


358  APPETSDIX. 

Bcra  tombe  entre  nos  mains,  comme  1'a  fait  la  place  de  Tortose; 
alors  sa  majeste  pense  que  le  5me  corps  et  une  partie  du  4mc 
pourront  se  porter  au  secours  du  prince  d'Essling. 

Le  major-general, 
(Signe)  ALEXANDEE. 

SECTION  VIII. 

A  Monsieur  le  marecJial  prince  d'Essling,  Paris,  le  25  Janvier. 
1811. 

Je  vous  previens,  prince,  que  Monsieur  le  marechal  due  de 
Dalmatie  s'est  mis  en  marche  dans  les  premiers  jours  de  Janvier 
avec  le  5me  corps  d'armee,  un  corps  de  cavalerie,  et  un  equipage 
de  siege  pour  se  porter  sur  Badajoz  et  faire  le  siege  de  cette  place. 
Ces  troupes  ont  du  arriver  le  10  de  ce  mois  devant  Badajoz;  je 
mande  au  due  de  Dalmatie  qu'apres  la  prise  de  cette  place  il  doit 
se  porter  sans  perdre  de  terns  sur  le  Tage  avec  son  equipage  de 
siege  pour  vous  donner  les  moyens  d'assieger  et  de  prendre 
Abrantes. 

Le  prince  de  Wagram  et  de  Neuchatel, 

Major-general, 
(Signe)  A.LEXANDRE. 

SECTION  IX. 

Au  prince  de  Wagram  et  de  Neuchatel,  major-general,  Paris,  le 
6  Fevrier,  1811. 

Mon  cousin,  je  pense  que  vous  devez  envojer  le  Moniteur 
d'aujourd'kui  au  due  de  Dalmatie,  au  due  de  Trevise,  au  general 
Belliard,  au  due  d'Istrie,  aux  commandans  de  Ciudad-Eodrigo  et 
d' Almeida,  aux  general  Tkiebaut,  et  aux  generaux  Dorsenne, 
Cafarelli,  et  Heille.  Ecrivez  au  due  d'Istrie  en  lui  envoy  ant  le 
Moniteur, pour  lui  annoncer  qu'il  y  trouvera  les  dernieres  nouvelles 
du  Portugal,  qui  paraissent  etre  du  13;  que  tout  parait  prendre 
une  couleur  avantageuse :  que  si  Badajoz  a  ete  pris  dans  le  courant 
de  Janvier,  le  due  de  Dalmatie  a  pu  se  porter  sur  le  Tage,  et 
faciliter  V  etablissement  du  pont  au  prince  d'Essling :  qu'il 
devient  done  tres  important  de  faire  toutes  les  dispositions  que  j'ai ' 
ordonnees  afin  que  le  general  Drouet  avec  ses  deux  divisions  puisse 
etre  tout  entier  a  la  disposition  du  prince  d'Essling.  Ecrivez  en 
meme  terns  au  due  de  Dalmatie  pour  lui  faire  connaitre  la  situa- 
tion du  due  d'Istrie,  et  lui  reiterer  1'ordre  de  favoriser  le  prince 
d'Essling  pour  son  passage  du  Tage;  que  j'espere  que  Badajoz 
aura  ete  pris  dans  le  courant  de  Janvier;  et  que  vers  le  20  Jan 
vier  sajonction  aura  eu  lieu  sur  le  Tage,  avec  le  prince  d'Essling; 
qu'il  peut,  si  cela  est  necessaire,  retirer  des  troupes  du  4me  corps ; 
quenfin  tout  est  sur  le  Tage.  Sur  ce  je  prie  Dieu,  mon  cousin, 
qu'il  vous  ait  dans  sa  sainte  et  digue  garde. 

(Signe)  NAPOLEON. 

P.S.  Je  vous  renvoie  votre  lettre  au  due  d'Istrie,  faites  le 
partir. 


APPENDIX.  359 


SECTION  X. 

A   Monsieur  le  marecJial  prince  dEssling,  commandant-en-chej 
Varmee  de  Portugal,  Paris,  le  7  Fevrier,  1811. 

Je  vous  envoie,  prince,  le  Moniteur  du  6;  vous  y  trouverez 
les  dernieres  nouvelles  que  nous  avons  du  Portugal;  elles  vont 
jusqu'au  13  Janvier,  et  annoncent  que  tout  prend  une  tournure 
avantageuse.  Si  Badajoz  a  ete  pris  dans  le  courant  de  Janvier, 
comme  cela  est  probable,  le  due  de  Dalmatie  aura  pu  faire 
marcher  des  troupes  sur  le  Tage,  et  vous  faciliter  I' etablissement 
d'unpont.  Je  lui  en  ai  donne  et  je  lui  en  reitere  1'ordre;  I'em- 
pereur  espere  que  lajonction  des  troupes  de  ce  marechal  a  eu  lieu 
maintenant  avec  vous  sur  le  Tage. 

Les  deux  divisions  d'infanterie  du  corps  du  general  Drouet 
vont  rester  entierement  a  votre  disposition  d'apres  les  ordres  que 
je  donne  a  Monsieur  le  marechal  due  d'Istrie,  commandant-en- 
chef  Farmee  du  nord  de  1'Espagne;  je  lui  mande  de  porter  son 
quartier  general  a  Valladolid,  d'etablir  des  corps  nombreux  de 
cavalerie  dans  la  province  de  Salamanque  afin  d'assurer  d'une 
maniere  journalieresureet  rapide  lacorrespondance  entreAlmeyda, 
Ciudad  Eodrigo  et  Valladolid,  et  nous  envoyer  promptement  toutes 
les  nouvelles  qui  pourront  parvenir  a  1'armee  de  Portugal. 

Je  lui  prescris  de  tenir  a  Ciudad  Eodrigo  un  corps  du  6000 
homines  qui  puisse  eloigner  toute  espece  de  troupe  ennemie  de 
Ciudad  Eodrigo  et  d'Almeida,  faire  meme  des  incursions  sur 
Pinhel  et  Guardo,  empecher  qu'il  se  forme  aucun  rassemblement 
sur  les  derrieres  du  9me  corps,  et  presenter  des  dispositions  offen- 
sives sur  cette  frontiere  du  Portugal. 

De  reunir  une  forte  brigade  de  la  garde  imperiale  vers  Zamora 
d'ou  elle  sera  a  portee  de  soutenir  le  corps  de  Ciudad  Eodrigo,  et 
ou  elle  se  trouvera  d'ailleurs  dans  une  position  avancee  pour  agir 
suivant  les  circonstances. 

De  reunir  une  autre  forte  brigade  de  la  garde  a  Valladolid  ou 
elle  sera  en  mesure  d'appuyerla  premiere;  et  de  reunir  le  reste 
de  la  garde  dans  le  gouvernement  de  Burgos. 

Par  ces  dispositions,  prince,  les  deux  divisions  d'infanterie  du 
9me  corps,  seront  entierement  a  votre  disposition,  et  avec  ce  secours 
vous  serez  en  mesure  de  tenir  longtems  la  position  que  vous  occu- 
pez;  de  vous  porter  sur  la  rive  gauche  du  Tage;  ou  enfin  d'agir 
comme  vous  le  jugerez  convenable  sans  avoir  aucune  inquietude 
sur  le  nord  de  1'Espagne,  puisque  le  due  d'Istrie  sera  a  portee  de 
marcher  sur  Almeydaet  Ciudad  Eodrigo  et  meme  sur  Madrid,  si 
des  circonstances  iuattendues  le  rendaient  necessaire. 

Des  que  le  due  d'Istrie  aura  fait  ses  dispositions  il  enverra  un 
officier  au  general  Drouet,  pour  Ten  instruire  et  lui  faire  connoitre 
qu'il  peut  rester  en  entier  pour  vous  renforcer. 

Le  general  Foy  a  du  partir  vers  le  29  Janvier  de  Ciudad  Eo- 
drigo, avec  4  bataillons  et  300  hommes  de  cavalerie  pour  vous 
rejoindre. 

Le  prince  dc  Wagram  et  de  Neuchatel, 

M  a]  or-  gen  eral , 
(ISigne)  ALEXANDUE. 


360  APPENDIX. 

SECTION  XI. 
A  Monsieur  le  marechal  due  d'Istrie,  Guarda,  le  20  Mars,  1811. 

MON  CHER  MARECHAL, — Vous  aurez  appris  notre  arrivee  aux 
frontieres  du  Portugal,  1'armee  se  trouve  dans  un  pays  absolument 
mine;,  et  avec  toute  ma  volonte  et  la  patience  de  1'armee,  je 
crains  de  n'y  pouvoir  tenir  8  jours,  et  je  me  verrai  force  de  rentre? 
en  Espagne. 

J'gcris  a  M.  le  cte-  d'Erlon  pour  qu'il  fasse  approvisionner 
Almeyda  et  Rodrigo ;  ces  deux  places  n'auraient  jamais  du 
cesser  d'avoir  pour  3  mois  de  vivres  aux  quels  on  n'aurait  pas  du 
toucher  sous  aucun  pretexte;  et  ma  surprise  est  extreme  d'ap- 
prendre  qu'il  n'y  a  que  pour  10  jours  de  vivres  a  Almeyda.  Je  lui 
ecris  aussi  de  prendre  une  position  entre  Rodrigo  et  Almeyda, 
avec  ses  deux  divisions;  vous  sentez  combien  il  est  necessaire. 
qu'il  se  place  a  portee  de  marclier  au  secours  d' Almeyda. 

Sije  trouvais  des  vivres,  je  ne  quitterais  pas  les  frontieres 
d'Espagne  et  du  Portugal,  mais  comme  je  vousl'ai  dit,  je  ne  vois 
guere  la  possibilite  d'y  roster, 

(Signe)        ,        LE  PRINCE  D'ESSLING. 

SECTION  XII. 
A  Monsieur  le  marechal  due  d'Istrie,  Alfayates,  le  2  Avril,  1811. 

MON  CHER  MARECHAL, — Le  pays  que  1'armee  occupe  ne  pouvant 
au  aucune  maniere  le  faire  vivre,  je  me  vois  force  de  la  faire  rentrer 
en  Espagne.  Voici  les  eantonnements  que  je  lui  ai  assignes  et 
1'itineraire  de  marche  de  chaque  corps  d'armee 

(Signe)  LE  PRINCE  D'ESSLING. 

SECTION  XIII. 
A  Monsieur  le  marechal  due  d'Istrie,  Rodrigo,  le  5  Avril,  1811. 

MON  CHER  MARECHAL, — Je  suis  arrive  avec  toute  1'armee  sur 
Ciudad  Rodrigo,  mes  troupes  depuis  plusieurs  jours  sont  saus 
pain;  et  jc  suis  oblige  de  faire  prendre  sur  les  approvisionnements 
de  Rodngo  200  mille  rations  de  biscuit,  que  je  vous  prie  d'ordon- 
ner  de  remplacer  avec  les  ressources  qui  peuvent  se  trouver  a 
Salamanque  et  Valladolid.  Nous  partirons  ensuite  pour  les  ean- 
tonnements que  j'ai  eu  soin  de  vous  faire  connaitre.  J'espere  que 
YOUS  aurez  bien  voulu  faire  donner  des  ordres  aux  intendans  de 
province,  d'y  faire  preparer  des  vivres,  seul  moyen  d'y  faire 
maintenir  1'ordre. 

«Te  compte  sejourner  3  a  4  jours  ici  pour  voir  si  Fennemi  nc 
s'approclierait  pas  des  places.  ) 

(Signe)  LE  PRINCE 


APPENDIX.  861 

SECTION  XIV. 

A  Monsieur  Ce  marechal  due  d'Istrie,  Salamanque,  le  15  Avril, 

1811. 

MON  CHER  MARECHAL,— Ma  position  devienttoujoursplusallar- 
mante;  les  places  appellent  des  secours;  je  ne  re9ois  pas  de 
reponses  de  vous  a  aucune  de  mes  demandes;  et  si  cet  etat  de 
chose  se  prolonge,  je  serai  force  de  faire  prendre  a  1'armee  des 
eantonnements  ou  elle  puisse  vivre,  et  d'abandonner  les  places 
que  je  ne  suis  pas  charge  de  defendre  et  encore  bien  moins  d'ap- 
provisionner,  mes  troupes  manquant  absolument  de  vivres. 

(Signe)  LE  PRINCE  D'ESSLING. 

SECTION  XV. 
A  Monsieur  le  marechal  due  d'Tstrie,  Paris,  le  3  Avril,  1811. 

Le  general  Foy  est  arrive,  Monsieur  le  marechal  due  d'Istrie, 
ainsi  que  les  deux  aides-de-camp  du  marechal  prince  d'Essling, 
le  capitaine  Porcher,  et  le  chef  d'escadron  Pelet.  II  parait  quele 
prince  d'Essling  avec  son  corps  d'armee  prend  position  a  G-uarda, 
Belmonte,  et  Alfayates.  Ainsi  il  protege  Ciudad  Rodrigo, 
Almeyda,  Madrid  et  1'Andalousie.  Ses  communications  doivent 
s'etablir  facilement  avec  1'armee  du  midi  par  Alcantara  et  Badajoz. 
Si  ce  qu'on  ne  prevoit  pas,  le  prince  d'Essling  etoit  vivement 
attaque  par  1'armee  Anglaise,  1'empereur  pense  que  vous  pourriez 
le  soutenir  avec  une  \§me  de  milles  Tiommes,  L'armee  du  centre 
doit  avoir  pousse  un  corps  sur  Alcantara.  L'armee  du  midi  sera 
renforcee  par  ce  que  vous  aurez  deja  fait  partir,  et  d'apres  le 
prince  d'Essling,  elle  va  se  trouver  assez  forte  pour  ne  rien 

craindre  de  1'ennemi 

(Le  reste  est  sans  interet.) 

Le  major-general, 
(Signe)  ALEXANDRE. 

SECTION  XVI. 

A  Monsieur  le  marechal  due  d'Istrie,  Salamanque,  le  17  Avrilt 

1811. 

MON  CHER  MARECHAL, — Le  general  Reynaud,  commandant 
superieur  a  Hodrigo,  ainsi  que  le  general  Marchand,  qui  est  avec 
sa  division  autour  de  cette  place,  me  rendent  compte  que  2  divi- 
sions Portugaises  avec  une  division  Anglaise  pnt  pris  position  aux 
environs  d' Almeyda.  Quoique  cette  place  ait  encore  des  vivres 
pour  une  20me  de  jours,  et  que  les  Anglais  et  les  Portugais 
meurent  de  faim  dans  leurs  positions,  il  faut  faire  des  dispositions 
pour  les  chasser  au  dela  de  la  Coa,  et  pour  ravitailler  cette  place. 
Je  vous  propose  en  consequence,  mon  cher  marechal,  de  mettrea  ma 
disposition  12  a  1500  chevaux,  ceux  de  1'armee  de  Portugal  n'etant 
en  etat  de  rendre  aucun  service;  je  vous  demande  de  plus  une 
division  d'infanterie  pour  placer  en  reserve.  Vers  le  24  ou  le 
29,  ces  forces  se  joindront  aux  6  divisions  que  je  compte  reunir 
de  1'armee  de  Portugal  pour  attaquer  1'ennemii  s'il  nous  attend 


862  APPENDIX. 

dans  ses  positions  et  le  chasser  au  dela  de  la  Coa.  II  est  impos- 
sible de  faire  faire  le  moindre  mouvement  a  toutes  ces  troupes, 
du  moins  a  celles  de  1'armee  de  Portugal  pour  attaquer  1'ennemi; 
si  on  ne  peut  leur  faire  distribuer  pour  10  jours  de  biscuit  et  avoir 
de  1'eau  de  vie  a  la  suit  de  1'armee.  Je  vous  demande  encore  15 
a  18  pieces  d'artillerie  bien  attelees,  celles  a  mes  ordres  etant  liors 
d'etat  de  marcher.  Avec  ces  moyens,  nul  doute  que  1'ennerni  ne 
soit  deposte  et  chasse  hors  des  frontieres  de  1'Espagne  et  au  dela 
de  la  Coa.  Mon  cher  marechal,  je  vis  ici  au  jour  de  jour;  je  suis 
sans  le  sol,  vous  pouvez  tout;  il  faut  done  nous  envoyer  du  biscuit, 
de  1'eau  de  vie,  du  pain  et  de  1'orge.  Ce  sera  avec  ces  moyens 

?ue  nous  pourrons  manceuvrer.     II  ne  faut  pas  perdre  un  instant. 
1  est  tres  urgent  de  marclier  au  secours  d'Almeyda.  C'est  a  vous 
a  donner  vos  ordres ;  et  vous  me  trouverez  porte  de  la  meilleure 
yolonte  a  faire  tout  ce  qui  sera  convenable  aux  interets  de  S.  M. 
(Signe)  LE  PRINCE  D'ESSLING. 

SECTION  XVII. 

A.  Monsieur  le  mareckal  due  d'Istrie,  Salamanque,  le  22  Avril, 
1811. 

MON  CHER  MARECHAL, — J'ai  recu  votre  depeche.  Toutes  vos 
promesses  de  vous  reunir  a  moi  s'evanouissent  done  dans  le 
moment  ou  j'en  ai  besoin;  ravitailler  Almeida  et  Rodrigo  est  la 
lre  operation  et  la  seule  qui  peut  nous  donner  la  faculte  de  rendre 
1'armee  de  Portugal  disponible,  lorsqu'on  n'aura  rlus  rien  a 
craindre  sur  le  sort  des  places.  En  y  jettant  pour  3  a  4  mois  de 
vivres,  on  peut  ensuite  etablir  plusieurs  colonnes  mobiles;  dn 
peut  envoyer  des  troupes  a  Avila  et  Segovie;  on  peut  au  besoin 
appuyer  le  mouvement  de  1'armee  d'Andalousie.  Mais  ne  serait 
il  pas  honteux  de  laisser  rendre  une  place  faute  de  vivres,  en  pre- 
sence de  deux  marechaux  de  1'Empire?  Je  vous  ai  deja  prevenu 
de  la  nullite  de  ma  cavalerie,  de  I'impossibilite  ou  se  trouvent  les 
chevaux  d'artillerie  de  rendre  aucun  service.  Vous  savez  aussi 

Sue  je  dois  envoyer  le  9me  corps  en  Andalusie;  je  voulais  aussi 
3  faire  concourir  avant  son  depart  au  ravitaillement  des  places. 
Pouvez-vous,  mon  cher  marechal,  balancer  un  seul  instant  a 
m'envoyer  de  la  cavalerie,  et  desattelages  d'artillerie,  si  vous  voulez 
garder  votre  materiel?  Ne  vous  ai-je  pas  prevenu  que  je  com- 
mencerais  mon  mouvement  le  26  ?  et  vous  paraissez  attendre  le 
(22)  une  seconde  demande  de  ma  part.  Vous  le  savez  aussi  bien 
que  moi,  perdre  un  ou  deux  jours  a  la  guerre  est  beaucoup;  et 
ce  delai  peut  avoir  des  suites  facheuses  qu'on  ne  repare  plus. 

Quand  je  vous  ai  dit  que  je  ne  reunerais  que  6  divisions, 
c'etait  pour  ne  pas  tout  degarnir  des  points  importans  occupes 
par  les  corps  d'armee ;  mais  de  la  cavalerie  et  de  1'artillerie  sont  un 
gecours  dont  je  ne  puis  me  passer.  Je  vous  prie  en  consequence, 
mon  cher  marechal,  de  me  faire  arriver  de  la  cavalerie  et  dea 
attelages  d'artillerie  a  marches  forcees.  Heflecliissez  qu'une  fois 
les  places  reapprovisionne*es,  je  pourrai  disposer  des  f  de  1'armee, 
et  que  cette  operation  passe  avant  tout. 


APPENDIX.  363 

Eii  m'offrant  de  nous  envoyer  les  attelages  pour  16  pieces,  vous 
aurez  bien  entendu,  sans  doute,  mon  cher  marechal  y  comprendre 
ceux  necessaires  pour  les  caissons  des  pieces. 

(Signe)  LE  PEINCE  D'ESSLINCK 

SECTION  XVIII. 

A  Monsieur  le  marechal  due  d'lstrie,  Salamanque,  le  24  Avril, 

1811. 

MON  CHER  MARECHAL,  —  Je  me  rends  demain  a  Ciudad 
Kodrigo,  ou  toute  1'armee  sera  reunie  le  26.  Le  ravitaillement  de 
la  place  d' Almeida  est  du  plus  haut  interet  pour  les  armes  de 
S.M. ;  et  il  eut  ete  bien  a  desirer  que  les  secours  que  j'ai  eu 
i'honneur  de  vous  demander  nous  eussent  ete  envoyes.  L'ennemi 
parait  avoir  de  20  a  29  mille  kommes  autour  de  cette  place. 
Vous  dire  que  je  n'aurai  en  cavalerie  que  15  a  1800  homines,  et 
Beulement  20  pieces  de  canon  pour  toute  1'armee,  c'est  vous  faire 
sentir,  mon  cher  marechal,  combien  votre  secours  m'eut  ete  neces- 
saire  au  moins  sous  deux  rapports,  pour  votre  armee  meme  et 
pour  la  tranquillite  du  nord  de  1'Espagne.  Je  n'ai  pas  menage 
mes  instances  aupres  de  vous.  Si  mes  efforts  n'etaient  pas  heu- 
reux,  votre  devouement  pour-le  service  de  1'empereur,  vous 
ferait  certainement  regretter  de  ne  pas  les  avoir  secondes  avec 
les  moyens  que  vous  m'aviez  fait  esperer,  avant  que  j'en  eusse 
besoin. 

(Signe)  LE  PRINCE  D'ESSLING. 

SECTION  XIX. 
A  Monsieur  le  marechal  due  d'Istrie,  Rodrigo,  le  29  Avril,  1800, 

MON  CHER  MARECHAL, — Vos  lettres  sont  inconcevables.  Dans 
celle  du  20,  vous  me  dites  que  vous  ne  pouvez  me  donner  aucun 
secours.  Par  celle  du  22  vous  me  dites  que  le  25  ou  le  26  vous 
me  joindrez  partout  ou  je  serai,  et  que  la  tete  de  votre  colonne 
arrivera  a  Salamanque  le  26.  Par  celle  que  je  re9pis  a  1'instant, 
vous  me  dites,  que  votre  cavalerie  et  votre  artillerie  se  trouvent 
encore  le  27  a  une  journee  en  arriere  de  Salamanque;  et  vous 
concluez  que  mon  mouvement  doit  etre  fini;  et  vous  me  temoig- 
nez  vos  regrets  de  n'avoir  pu  y  cooperer.  Convenez,  mon  cher 
marechal,  que  si  1'armee  de  Portugal  recevait  un  echec,  vous 
auriez  bien  des  reproches  a  vous  faire.  Je  vous  ai  demande  de 
1'artillerie  et  des  attelages  et  encore  plus  positivement  de  la  cava- 
lerie; vous  avez  sous  differens  pretextes  elude  ma  demande. 
Toutes  les  troupes  qui  sont  en  Espagne,  sont  de  la  meme  famine. 
Vous  etes,  jusques  a  ce  qu'il  y  ait  de  nouveaux  ordres,  charge  dc 
la  defense  et  de  1'approvisionnement  des  places  d' Almeida  et  de 
Eodrigo.  Je  n'aurais  pas  mieux  demande  que  d'employer  1'armee 
de  Portugal  sous  mes  ordres  a  defendre  ces  places,  a  marcher  au 
secours  de  1'armee  du  midi;  mais  comment  puis-je  le  faire  sans 
vivres? 

Je  cornpte  faire  mon  mouvement   demain  matin.     J'ignore 


361  APPENDIX. 

quelle  pourra  etre  Tissue  de  ce  mouvement;  si  ma  lettre  TOUS 
arrive  dans  la  journee  de  demain,  votre  cavalerie  et  votre  artil- 
lerie  pourraient  toujours  se  mettre  en  mouvement  dans  la  nuit 
pour  arriver  apres  demain  ler  Mai  a  Cabrillas.  Je  vous  prie  de 
faire  filer  sans  s'arreter  le  biscuit,  la  farine,  le  grain  que  vous 
n'aurez  pas  manque  de  reunir  a  la  suite  de  vos  troupes.  II  est 
instant  que  ces  ressources  comme  beaucoup  d'autres  arrivent  a 
JRodrigo;  cette  place  n'aura  pas  pour  15  jours  de  vivres.  A  mon 
depart  d'ici,  il  faudra  que  des  convois  considerables  y  soient 
envoyes. 

(Signe)  LE  PEINCE  D'ESSLING. 

SECTION  XX. 

A  Monsieur  le  marechal  due  de  Raguse,  Paris,  le  20  Avril, 
1811. 

MONSIEUE  LE  DUC  DE  RAGUSE, — Yous  trouverez  ci-joint  1'ordre 
de  1'empereur  qui  vous  donne  le  commandement  de  Tarmee  du 
Portugal.  Je  donne  1'ordre  au  marechal  prince  d'Essling  de  vous 
remettre  le  commandement  de  cette  armee.  Saisissez  les  renes 
d'une  main  ferme ;  faites  dans  Tarmee  les  changemens  qui  devien- 
draient  necessaires.  L'intention-  de  1'empereur  est  que  le  due 
d'Abrantes  et  le  general  Heynier  restent  sous  vos  ordres.  S.  M. 
cornpte  assez  sur  le  devouement  que  lui  portent  ses  generaux, 
pour  etre  persuade  qu'ils  vous  seconderont  de  tous  leurs  moyens. 

L'empereur  ordonne,  Monsieur  le  due  de  Raguse,  que  le 
prince  d'Essling  en  quittant  1'armee  n'emmene  avec  lui  que  son 
fils  et  un  de  ses  aides-de-camp.  Mais  son  chef  d'etat-major,  le 
general  Fririon,  le  colonel  Pelet,  ses  autre  aides-de-camp,  tous 
les  officiers  de  son  etat-major  doivent  rester  avec  vous. 

Toutefois,  Monsieur  le  due,  je  vous  le  repete  S.  M.  met  en  voua 
ime  confiance  entiere. 

Le  Major-general,  &c. 

(Signe)  ALEXANDEE. 


No.  III. 

Les  Officiers  Francais,  prisonniers  de  Guerre,  detenus  a  la 
Maison  Rue  S.  Jean,  a  Monsieur  le  general  Trant,  Gouver- 
neur  de  la  Ville  et  Province  d'  Oporto. 

MONSIEUE  LE  GENEEAL, — Chacun  des  officiers  Fran9ais,  pri- 
sonniers de  guerre,  detenus  a  la  maison  rue  S.  Jean,  penetre  des 
obligations  qu'il  vous  a,  desirerait  vous  offrir  individuellement 
1'expression  de  sa  reconnoisance.  C'est  nous  que  ces  messieurs 
ont  choisi  pour  etre  aupres  de  vous  leur  organes,  et  nous  sommes 
d'autant  plus  flattes  de  cette  commission  agreable  qu'il  n'y  en  a 
pas  un  parmi  nous  qui  dans  son  particulier  n'ait  re9u  de  vous  des 
services  importants.  Nous  osons  nous  flatter  que  vous  agreerez 
favorablement  ce  foible  temoignage  de  notre  gratitude  et  les  sin- 


APPENDIX.  365 

ceres  remerciments  que  nous  venons  vous  presenter  pour  toutes 
lea  bontes  que  vous  avez  eus  pour  nous.  Ce  n'est  pas  sans  un 
vif  regret  C[ue  nous  envisageons  le  moment  de  votre  depart,  mais 
ce  que  deja  vous  avez  fait  pour  nons,  nous  fait  esperer  que  votre 
solicitude  s'etendra  au  dela  de  votre  sejour  et  que  pendant  votre 
absence  nous  continuerons  a  en  eprouver  les  effets. 

Ce  n'est  pas,  monsieur  le  general,  d'apres  1'etendue  de  notre 
lettre  qu'il  faudra  mesurer  celle  de  notre  reconnoissance ;  nous 
sommes  mieux  en  etat  de  sentir  que  d'exprimer  ce  que  nous  vous 
devons  et  lorsque  des  circonstances  plus  heureuses  nous  ramene- 
ront  vers  notre  patrie,  nous  nous  ferons  un  devoir  et  une  satis- 
faction de  faire  connaitre  la  maniere  dont  nous  avons  ete  traites  et 
les  peines  que  vous  vous  etes  donnes  pour  adoucir  notre  sort. 
Nous  nous  recommandons  a  la  continuation  de  votre  bienveil- 
lance,  et  nous  vous  prions  d'agreer  I'assurance  de  gratitude  et 
de  haute  consideration  avec  lesquelles  nous  avons  1'lionneur 
d'etre,  monsieur  le  general,  vos  tres  humbles  et  tres  obeissanta 
serviteurs, 

Au  nom  des  officiers  Francais,  prisonniers  de  guerre, 

FALLOT, 
Docteur  me*decin  des  armees  Francaises  attache  au 

grand  quartier  general  de  1'armee  de  Portugal. 
Le  colonel  sous  inspecteur  aux  revues  des  troupes  Francaises, 

CATELOT. 
H.  DELAHAYE, 
Com-  de  la  Marine. 


No.  IV. 
SECTION  I. 

Letter  from  lieut. -general  Graham  to  the  right  honourable  Henry 
Wellesley,  Isla  de  Leon,  14<th  M^arch,  1811. 

SIB, — You  will  do  justice  to  my  reluctance  to  enter  into  any 
controversy  for  the  purpose  of  counteracting  the  effects  of  that 
obloqiiy  which  you  yourself  and  many  others  assured  me  my 
conduct  was  exposed  to  by  the  reports  circulated  at  Cadiz,  rela- 
tive to  the  issue  of  the  late  expedition. 

But  a  copy  of  a  printed  statement  of  general  La  Pena  having 
been  shown  to  me,  which,  by  implication  at  least,  leaves  the 
blame  of  the  failure  of  the  most  brilliant  prospects  on  me,  it 
becomes  indispensably  necessary  that  I  should  take  up  my  pen 
in  self-defence. 

Having  already  sent  you  a  copy  of  my  despatch  to  the  earl  of 
Liverpool,  with  a  report  of  the  action,  I  will  not  trouble  you 
with  a  detail  of  the  first  movements  of  the  army,  nor  with  any 
other  observation  relative  to  them,  than  that  the  troops  suffered 
much  unnecessary  fatigue  by  marching  in  the  night,  and  without 
good  guides. 

Considering  the  nature  of  the  service  we  were  engaged  in,  I 


860  APPENDIX. 

was  most  anxious  that  the  army  should  not  come  into  contest 
with  the  enemy  in  an  exhausted  state,  nor  be  exposed  to  the 
attack  of  the  enemy  but  when  it  was  well  collected;  and,  in  con- 
sequence of  representations  to  this  effect,  I  understood  that  the 
march  of  the  afternoon  of  the  4th  was  to  be  a  short  one,  to 
take  up  for  the  night  a  position  near  Conil;  to  prepare  which, 
staff-officers,  of  both  nations,  were  sent  forward  with  a  proper 
escort. 

The  march  was,  nevertheless,  continued  through  the  night, 
with  those  frequent  and  harassing  halts  which  the  necessity  of 
groping  for  the  way  occasioned. 

When  the  British  division  began  its  march  from  the  position 
of  Barrosa  to  that  of  Bermeja,  I  left  the  general  on  the  Barrosa 
height,  nor  did  I  Jcnoio  of  his  intentions  of  quitting  it;  and, 
when  I  ordered  the  division  to  countermarch  in  the  wood,  I  did 
so  to  support  the  troops  left  for  its  defence,  and  believing  the 
general  to  be  there  in  person.  In  this  belief  I  sent  no  report  of 
the  attack,  which  was  made  so  near  the  spot  where  the  general 
was  supposed  to  be,  and,  though  confident  in  the  bravery  of  the 
British  troops,  I  was  not  less  so  in  the  support  I  should  receive 
from  the  Spanish  army.  The  distance,  however,  to  Bermeja  is 
trifling,  and  no  orders  were  given  from  head-quarters  for  the 
movement  of  any  corps  of  the  Spanish  army  to  support  the 
British  division,  to  prevent  its  defeat  in  this  unequal  contest,  or 
to  profit  of  the  success  earned  at  so  heavy  expense.  The 
voluntary  zeal  of  the  two  small  battalions  (Walloon  guards  and 
Ciudad  Real,)  which  had  been  detached  from  my  division, 
brought  them  alone  back  from  the  wood;  but,  notwithstanding 
their  utmost  efforts,  they  could  only  come  at  the  close  of  the 
action. 

Had  the  whole  body  of  the  Spanish  cavalry,  with  the  horse- 
artillery,  been  rapidly  sent  by  the  sea-beach  to  form  in  the  plain, 
and  to  envelop  the  enemy's  left;  had  the  greatest  part  of  the 
infantry  been  marched  through  the  pine-wood,  in  our  rear,  to 
turn  his  right,  what  success  might  have  been  expected  from  such 
decisive  movements?  The  enemy  must  either  have  retired 
instantly,  and  without  occasioning  any  serious  loss  to  the  British 
division,  or  he  would  have  exposed  himself  to  absolute  destruc- 
tion, his  cavalry  greatly  outnumbered,  his  artillery  lost,  his 
columns  mixed  and  in  confusion;  a  general  dispersion  would 
have  been  the  inevitable  consequence  of  a  close  pursuit;  our 
we'aried  men  would  have  found  spirits  to  go  on,  and  would  have 
done  so  trusting  to  finding  refreshments  and  repose  at  Chiclana. 
This  moment  was  lost.  Within  a  quarter  of  an  hour's  ride  of  the 
scene  of  action,  the  general  remained  ignorant  of  what  wras  passing, 
and  nothing  wasdone!  Let  not.then,thjs  action  of  Barrosa  formany 
part  of  the  general  result  of  the  transactions  of  the  day;  it  was  an 
accidental  feature;  itwastheresultofno  combination,  it  was  equally 
unseen  and  unheeded  by  the  Spanish  staff;  the  British  division, 
left  alone,  suffered  the  loss  of  more  than  one-fourth  of  its  number, 
and  became  unfit  for  future  exertion.  Need  I  say  more  to  justify 


APPENDIX.  367 

my  determination  of  declining  any  further  co-operation  in  the 
field  towards  the  prosecution  of  the  object  of  the  expedition?  1 
am,  however,  free  to  Confess  that,  having  thus  placed  myself  and 
the  British  division  under  the  direction  of  the  Spanish  Com- 
mander-in-chief in  the  field,  (contrary  to  my  instructions,)  I 
should  not  have  thought  myself  justified  to  my  king  and  coun- 
try to  risk  the  absolute  destruction  of  this  division  in  a  second 
trial.  But  I  have  a  right  to  claim  credit  for  what  would  have 
heen  my  conduct  from  what  it  was;  and  I  will  ask  if  it  can  be 
doubted,  after  my  zealous  co-operation  throughout,  and  the 
ready  assistance  afforded  to  the  troops  left  on  Barrosa  height, 
that  the  same  anxiety  for  the  success  of  the  cause  would  not 
have  secured  to  the  Spanish  army  the  utmost  efforts  of  the 
British  division  during  the  whole  of  the  enterprise,  had  ^ve  been 
supported  as  we  had  a  right  to  expect? 

There  is  not  a  man  in  the  division  who  would  not  gladly  have 
relinquished  his  claim  to  glory,  acquired  by  the  action  of  Barrosa, 
to  have  shared,  with  the  Spaniards,  the  ultimate  success  that  was 
within  our  grasp  as  it  were. 

The  people  of  Spain,  the  brave  and  persevering  people,  are 
universally  esteemed,  respected,  and  admired  by  all  who  value 
liberty  and  independence;  the  hearts  and  hands  of  British  soldiers 
will  ever  be  with  them ;  the  cause  of  Spain  is  felt  by  all  to  be  a 
common  one. 

I  conclude  with  mentioning  that  the  only  request  expressed  to 
me  at  head-quarters,  on  the  morning  of  the  6th,  on  knowing 
of  my  intention  to  send  the  British  troops  across  the  river  St. 
Petri,  was  that  the  opportunity  of  withdraiving  the  Spanish  troops, 
during  the  night,  was  lost;  and  on  my  observing  tnat,  after  such 
a  defeat,  there  was  no  risk  of  attack  from  an  enemy,  a  very  con- 
trary opinion  was  maintained. 

In  point  of  fact,  no  enemy  ever  appeared  during  several  days 
employed  in  bringing  off  the  wounded  and  burying  the  dead.  It 
may  be  proper  to  remark  on  the  report  published  relative  to  the 
enemy's  number  at  St.  Petri,  (4500  men  of  Yillatte's  division,) 
that,  oy  the  concurrent  testimony  of  all  the  French  officers  here, 
general  Villatte's  division  had  charge  of  the  whole  line, — what, 
then,  must  be  the  strength  of  that  division  to  have  afforded  4500 
men  to  St.  Petri  alone?  In  order  to  establish,  by  authentic  docu- 
ments, facts  which  may  have  been  disputed,  and  to  elucidate 
others,  I  enclose,  by  way  of  appendix,  the  reports  of  varioas 
officers  of  this  division. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be,  &c.  &c.  &c. 

(Signed)  THOS.  GEAHAM. 

Lt.- general. 

P.S.  I  must  add  this  postscript  distinctly  to  deny  my  having 
spoken,  at  head-quarters,  in  the  evening  of  the  5th,  of  sending 
for  more  troops,  or  for  provisions  from  the  Isla.  My  visit  was  a 
very  short  one,  of  mere  ceremony.  I  may  have  asked  if  the 
Spanish  troops  expected  were  arrived.  This  error  must  have 
arisen  from  the  difficulty  of  conversing  in  a  foreign  language. 


368 


APPENDIX. 


With  tliis  I  send  you  a  sketch  of  the  ground,  &c.,  of  the 
action  of  Barrosa;  by  which  it  will  be  seen  how  impossible, 
according  to  my  judgment,  it  would  be  for  an  enemy  to  expose 
his  left  flank,  by  making  a  direct  attack  through  the  wood  on  the 
Bermeja  position,  while  that  of  Barrosa  was  occupied  in  force  by 
the  allied  army. 

SECTION  II. 

Adjutant-general's  state  of  the  troops  assembled  at  Tarifa,  under 
the  command  of  lieut. -general  Graham,  25tk  Fal.  1810. 


Designations. 

Two  squadrons  of  2nd ) 
German  hussars \ 

Detachment  of  artillery  ... 
Detachment  of  engineers... 

Brigade  of  guards  re-in  \ 
forced  by  a  detachment  I 
of  the  2nd  battalion  95th  f 
rifles J 

1st  battalion   28th   fooi;] 
2nd  battalion  67th ;  2nd  | 
battalion    87th  ;    re-in-  I 
forced  with  2  companies 
of  the  20th  Portuguese.] 

Flank  battalion,  composed 
of  detachments  of  the 
3rd  battalion  95th  rifles 
and  two  companies  of 
the  47th  foot 

Two  companies  of  2nd  bat- , 
1  alion  9th  regt.  ;  two  J 
companies  of  1st  bat- 1 
talion  28th  regt. ;  two  [ 
companies  of  2nd  bat-  I 
talion  82nd  regt ' 

One  company  of  the  royal ) 
staff  corps J 

Total  number  of  bayonets 
The  hussars  were  about... 


Number  of 
Bayonets.  Commanders. 

Major  Busche. 

Major  Duncan.     10  guns, 
47         Captain  Birch. 

1221         Brigadier-gen.  Dilkea. 


1764        Colonel  Wheatley. 


594        Lt-col.  A.  Barnard,  95th  regt. 


475        Lt.-col.  Brown,  28th  regt. 


33        Lieutenant  Read. 

4134 
180 


Total  of  sabres  and  bayonets        4294,  with  10  guns. 


APPENDIX.  869 


SECTION  III. — BATTLE  OF  BAEOSA. 

Extract  from  a  letter  of  general  Frederick  Ponsonby. 

'  Iproceeded  rapidly  towards  the  entrance  of  the  wood,  found 
the  Gi-ermans,  and  conducted  them  along  the  right  flank  of  our 
little  army.  We  came  in  contact  with  the  French  dragoons, 
whom  we  found  nearly  abreast  of  our  front  line  and  about  three 
hundred  yards  apart  from  it  on  our  right  flank;  our  line  had  just 
halted  and  the  firing  was  gradually  decreasing  at  the  time  we 
charged.  I  do  not  imagine  the  French  dragoons  much  exceeded 
us  in  number;  they  behaved  well,  but  if  we  had  had  half  a  dozen 
stout  squadrons  the  mass  of  beaten  infantry  would  not  have 
returned  to  their  camp.' 

SECTION  IV. — BATTLE  OF  ALBUERA. 

Extract  of  a  letter  from  colonel  Light,  serving  in  the  4,th  dragoons, 
at  the  battle  of  Albuera. 

'  After  our  brigade  of  infantry,  first  engaged,  were  repulsed, 
I  was  desired  by  general  d'Urban  to  tell  the  count  de  Penne 
Villamur  to  charge  the  lancers,  and  we  all  started,  as  I  thought, 
to  do  the  thing  well;  but  when  within  a  few  paces  of  the  enemy 
the  whole  pulled  up,  and  there  was  no  getting  them  farther;  and 
in  a  few  moments  after  I  was  left  alone  to  run  the  gauntlet  as 
well  as  I  could.' 


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APPENDIX.  871 

SECTION  VI. 

Intercepted  papers  of  colonel  Le  Jeune. 
OEDEE. 

H  est  ordonne  a  Monsieur  le  colonel  baron  Le  Jeune,  mon 
A.D.C.,  departir  sur  le  champ  en  poste  pour  porter  les  ordres  ci- 
joints  et  parcourir  1'Andalousie  et  1'Estremadure. 

Monsieur  le  colonel  Le  Jeune  se  rendra  d'abor  da  Grenade 
aupres  de  Monsieur  le  general  Sebastiani,  commandant  du  4me 
corps  d'armee,  et  il  lui  remettra  les  ordres  qui  le  corcernent. 

De  Grenade,  Monsieur  le  Jeune  se  rendra  par  Seville  devant 
Cadiz,  et  verra  par  lui-meme  la  situation  des  choses,  afin  de  pouvoir 
a  son  retour  en  rendre  un  compte  detaille  a  1'empereur.  Monsieur 
Le  Jeune  remettra  a  Monsieur  le  marechal  due  de  Dalmatie,  les 
depeches  qui  lui  sont  destinees,  soit  a  Seville,  soit  a  Cadiz,  soit 
partout  ou  il  sera.  II  se  rendra  ensuite  au  5me  corps  d'armee  com- 
mande  par  Monsieur  le  marechal  due  de  Trevise  en  Estremadure ; 
le  corps  doit  etre  a  Badajos,  ou  meme  sur  le  Tage. 

Monsieur  Le  Jeune  prendra  une  connaissance  exacte  de  sa  posi- 
tion, et  de  celle  des  troupes  de  1'armee  du  centre  commandee  par 

le  general qui  sont  reunies  sur  le  Tage.     II  verra  si 

ces  corps  sont  en  communication  avec  1'armee  de  Portugal,  et 
recueillera  les  nouvelles  que  Ton  pourrait  avoir  de  cette  armee  de 
ce  cote. 

Monsieur  Le  Jeune  prendra  tous  les  renseignemens  necessaires 
pour  pouvoir  repondre  a  toutes  les  questions  de  1'empereur,  sur 
la  situation  des  choses  en  Andalousie,  devant  Cadiz,  et  en  Estre- 
madure, d'ou  il  viendra  me  rendre  compte  de  sa  mission. 

LE  PEINCE  DE  WAGEAM  ET  DE  NEUFCHATEL, 
Major-general. 

Paris,  le  14  F&vrier,  1811. 

SECTION  VII. 

Extracts  from  Le  Jeune  s  reports. 
CADIZ. 

*  Montagnes  de  Honda  foyer  d'insurrection  entre  le  4me  corps 
et  le  premier.' 

'Les  obusiers  a  la  villantrois  portent  a  2560  toises:  1'obus  doit 
peser  75  livres,  et  contient  11  a  12  onces  de  poudre:  on  charge 
I'pbusier  a  poudre  d'un  \  du  poids  de  1'obus  pour  obtenir  cette 
distance.  II  n'y  en  a  que  le  4  en  batterie:  a  la  redoute  Na- 
poleon on  en  a  12  en  fondus :  mais  il  manque  de  projectilles  et 
de  la  poudre  en  suffisante  quantite.  Toutes  les  obus  n'eclatent 
pas  en  ville.' 

'  Le  pont  de  St.  Petri  a  ete  traverse  le  jour  de  1'affaire  par  un 
sergent  du  24me  qui  est  revenu  avec  les  Espagnols  que  Ton  a  pris. 
Le  moment  eut  ete  favorable  pour  s'emparer  de  1'Isle.' 

'Le  due  de  Bellune  bien  ennuye,  desire  beaucoup  retourner: 
bon  general,  mais  voyant  les  choses  trop  en  noir.' 

B  B  2 


872  APPENDIX. 

SECTION  VEX 

Puerto  Real,  20  Mars,  1811. 

MON  CHE*  GENERA.L, — Enfin  apres  15  jours  des  plus  cruelles 
souffrances  je  me  trouve  en  e'tat  de  reprendre  la  plume  et  de 
•continuer  le  recit  que  j'ai  eu  I'honneur  de  vous  adresser  dans  ma 
lettre  du  6  au  7  de  ce  mois. 

L'une  des  choses  qui  merite  d'abord  de  fixer  votre  attention,  est 
la  composition  de  cette  armee  combinee  dont  nous  avons  ete  tout- 
a-coup  assaillis.  J'ai  deja  ditquele  26  Eevrier  une  flotte  de  180 
voiles  etait  sortie  de  Cadiz  portant  1500  liommes  de  debarquement, 
et  que  de  ce  nombre  etaient  environ  4000  Anglais  et  1000  Por- 
tugais.  Cette  flotte  se  dirigea  vers  Tarif'a  ou  le  debarquement  se 
fit  le  lendemain  sans  aucun  accident.  II  parait  que  les  Anglais 
en  re*unissant  les  garnisons  d'Algeciras  et  de  Gibraltar  a  quelques 
restes  de  troupes  venues  recemment  de  Sicile,  avaient  deja  forme  a 
Tarifa  un  petit  corps  de  1000  Anglais  et  de  2000  Portugais  com- 
mande  par  le  general  Stuart,  et  qui  forma  avec  2  ou  300  homines 
de  cavalerie,  l'a,vant  garde  de  1'expedition  dirigee  contre  nous. 
Cette  armee  ainsi  composee  de  10  a  12,000  Espagnols  bien  ou 
mal  equipes,  de  4  a  5000  Anglais  et  de  3000  Portugais  se  mit 
enfin  en  campagne,  et  vint  nous  attaquer  le  5.  II  parait  que 
Monsieur  le  marechal  Victor  ne  fut  instruit  que  tard  de  la  vraie 
direction  prise  par  Tarmee  ennemie.  II  arriva  a  Chiclana  le  5 
entre  8  et  9  heures  du  matin,  suivi  des  bataillons  de  la  I'6  et 
2ae  division:  le  plan  d'operations  auquel  il  s'arreta  fut  d'envoyer 
sur  le  champ  la  division  Villatte  avec  un  regiment  de  cavalerie  aux 
lignes  de  St.  Petri,  avec  ordre  de  laisser  arriver  1'ennemi,  de  lui 
resister  foiblement  pour  1'engager  a  suivre  notre  mouvement  de 
retraite  et  de  1'attirer  ainsi  sous  la  position  St.  Anne,  ou  il  ne 
pouvait  manquer  de  se  trouver  dans  une  situation  extremement 
desavantageuse.  Pendant  cette  manoeuvre  Monsieur  le  marechal 
Victor  s'etait  lui-me'me  porte  avec  la  lre  et  2de  division  entre  Conil 
et  St.  Petri,  a  peu  pres  a  la  hauteur  de  la  Torre  Barrossa  avec 
1'intention  de  couper  a  1'ennemi  la  retraite  des  montagnes.  La, 
rencontrant  la  queue  de  1'armee,  qui  finissait  de  se  filer,  il  la  fit 
attaquer  vigoureusement,  culbuta  tout  ce  qui  se  rencontra  devant 
lui  et  accula  les  Espagnols  a  la  mer,  mais  les  Anglais  que  cette 
manoeuvre  hardie  mettaient  entre  deux  feux,  et  dans  1'impossibilite 
de  regagner  Conil,  revinrent  sur  leurs  pas,  et  attaquant  avec  la 
rage  du  desespoir,  ils  forcerent  a  la  retraite  nos  deux  divisions, 
qui  ne  formaient  pas  ensemble  5000  hommes. 

Cependant  Monsieur  le  marechal  Victor  se  croyait  si  sur  de  la 
victoire  qu'avant  d'attaquer  il  envoya  ordre  aux  troupes  qui  etaieut 
a  Medina,  de  se  porter  entre  Veger  et  Conil,  pour  ramasser  lo 
reste  des  trainards;  les  bagages,  et  les  trains  de  munitions  qu'ils 
pouvaient  rencontrer. 

Le  projet  d'attirer  1'ennemi  sur  le  feu  de  St.  Anne  n'avait  pas 
mieux  reussi  du  cote  de  la  division  Villatte;  car  si  cette  division 
fut  d'abord  assaillie  par  presque  toute  1'nrmee  combinee,  les  gene"- 
raux  Anglais  et  Espagnois,  avertis  de  bonne  heure  que  Monsieur 


APPENDIX  373 

ta  marechal  les  tournaient  avec  un  corps  de  troupes,  arretereut 
leurs  colonnes  sur  la  rive  gauche  du  ruisseau  qui  touclie  au  Moulin 
d'Almanza,  et  la,  naturellement  retranches  derriere  ce  marais,  ils 
n'eurent  a  garder  que  le  pont  et  le  Moulin,  les  seuls  endroits  par 
lesquels  on  pouvait  les  attaquer.  Quelque  chose  de  plus  malheu- 
reux,  fut,  que  des  le  commencement  de  1'action,  nos  lignes  de  St. 
Petri  n'etant  pas  defendues,  il  sortit  par  le  pont  de  Radeaux  5000 
hoinmes  de  troupes  fraiches  de  la  Isla,  lesquels  se  placant  en 
bataille  devant  la  division  Villatte,  et  converts  par  la  ruisseau  du 
Moulin  d'Almanza,laisserentaureste  del'armee  combineela  liberte 
de  se  retourner  tout  entiere  centre  1'attaque  de  Monsieur  le  mare, 
chal  Victor.  Ainsi  se  termina  la  bataille  du  5, 1'ennemi  coucha 
sur  son  champ  de  battaille,  sans  poursuivre  les  divisions  Laval  et 
Kufin  dans  leur  retraite.  Je  vous  ai  deja  fait  part  de  notre 
perte.  Le  general  Rufin  que  nous  croyons  tue  paruneballe,  qui 
lui  a  traverse  la  tete,  a  ete  porte  par  les  Anglais  a  la  Isla,  ou 
apres  deux  jours  de  lethargic,  il  a  donne  signes  de  vie;  on  dit 
qu'il  va  mieux. 

La  perte  de  1'ennemi  a  ete  a  peu  pres  de  3000  Anglais  ou 
Portugais,  et  de  5  a  600  Espagnols,  tues  ou  blesses;  les  Anglais 
ont  eu  beaucoup  des  officiers  mis  hors  de  combat,  on  croit  les 
generaux  Gram  et  Stuart  ainsi  que  le  general  Pena  blesses. 
Le  6  a  la  pointe  du  jour  nous  nous  attendions  bien  a  une  attaque 
generale  qui  pouvait  nous-etre  tres  funeste ;  mais  1'ennemi  se 
contenta  d'occuper  avec  2000  hommes  le  forte  de  Medina,  que 
nous  avions  un  peu  imprudemment  abandonnes :  la  flotille  ennemie 
fit  aussi  des  demonstrations  d'attaque  sur  le  Trocadero,  mais  sans 
effet.  Elle  debarqua  6  a  700  hommes  entre  le  Port  de  St.  Marie, 
et  le  fort  St.  Cataline,  qui  fut  somme  de  se  rendre;  on  repondit 
a  coups  de  canons.  Un  officier  Anglais  vint  chez  le  gouverneur 
de"  St.  Marie  le  prevenir  qu'il  allait  prendre  possession  de  la  ville, 
mais  il  avait  laisse  ses  troupes  a  la  porte.  Elles  courent  faire 
une  action  d'eclat  en  brulant  et  re*duisant  la  petite  redoute  St. 
Antoine,  qui  n'etait  point  gardee;  enchantes  de  ce  succes  ils 
Be  rembarquerent.  M.  le  marechal  s'attendait  bien  a.  etre  attaques 
le  6  a  Chiclana,  il  avait  donne  des  ordres  en  consequence,  cea 
ordres  furent  xnal  interpretes,  et  on  endommagea  mal-a-propos 
dans  la  nuit  quelques  uns  de  nos  ouvrages,  mais  ils  furent  sur  le 
champ  repays.  Lui-meme  etait  venu  a  Puerto  Real  avec  la 
division  Laval,  et  avait  envoye  la  lere  division  a  St.  Marie  pour 
reprendre  la  ligne  de  Blocus  comme  avant  la  bataille  du  5.  Le 
5me  regiment  de  chasseurs  fut  envoye  entre  Puerto  Real  et 
Medina  a  la  ferme  de  G-eurra  en  reconnaissance;  il  y  rencontra 
une  poste  de  cavalerie  ennemie,  et  la  tailla  en  pieces.  Le  6  au 
soir,  on  essaya  de  reprendre  le  forte  de  Medina,  mais  sans  succes. 
Le  7  il  fallut  y  envoyer  plus  de  monde,  et  les  Espagnols  1'eva- 
cuerent  sans  opposer  de  resistance. 

Dans  la  nuit  du  5  les  Espagnols  avaient  rases  nos  lignes  de 
St.  Petri,  ils  employ erent  pendant  plusieurs  jours  et  plusieurs 
nuits  6000  hommes,  a  transporter  a  la  Isla  du  bois,  dont  ils 
manquaient,  quelques  jours  apres,  nous  avons  fait  cesser  cea 


374  APPENDIX. 

approvisionnements,  en  reprenant  la  position  de  St.  Petri,  ou  on 
ne  trouva  personne;  les  Espagnols  craignant  une  repetition  de 
1'affaire  du  2  Mars,  ont  detruits  eux-meme  de  forte  bonne  grace 
leur  tete  de  pont,  et  replie  leur  pont  de  radeaux,  des  ce  moment 
chacun  resta  chez  soi,  comme  avant  les  hostilites. 

Du  21  Mars,  1811. 

II  est  surprenant  que  1'armee  combinee  ne  nous  ait  pas  pour- 
suivis  le  5,  bien  plus  surprenant  encore  qu'elle  ne  nous  ait  point 
attaques  le  6  au  matin;  on  en  concoit  plusieurs  raisons.  On 
conjecture  d'abord  que  la  principale  perte  de  la  bataille  etant 
tombee  sur  les  Anglais,  qui  ont  eu  un  grand  nombre  d'officiers  et 
meme  leurs  genersnix,  mis  liors  de  combat,  les  Espagnols  n'ont 
pas  ose  venir  seuls  nous  attaquer.  Le  general  Gram  voulait 
cependant  les  y  contraindre  le  lendemain.  mais  sur  leur  refus 
form  el,  il  les  a  traite  de  laches,  de  gens  indignes  d'etre  secourus. 
Us  ont  repondu  qii'ils  feraient  une  sortie  de  la  Isla  si  Ton  voulait 
mettre  le  tiers  d' Anglais  ou  Portugais  avec  les  deux  tiers  d'Es- 
pagnols,  le  general  Anglais  a  repondu  qu'il  n'exposerait  plus  un 
seul  de  ses  soldats  avec  des  troupes  de  cette  espece,  et  sur  le 
champ  il  a  donne  ordre  aux  Anglais  et  Portugais  de  se  retirer 
a  Cadiz  ou  dans  le  ville  de  la  Isla.  II  parait  meme  que  le 
lendemain  les  Anglais  se  sont  embarques  pour  se  rendre  a 
Gibraltar  ou  peut-etre  a  Lisbonne.  Les  gens  du  pays  donnent 
pour  certain  que  le  general  Gram,  en  envoyant  ces  jours  derniers 
a  Londres  trente-trois  officiers  des  moins  blesses,  n'apas  dissimulo 
qu'il  les  chargeaint  d'exposer  a  son  gouvernement  quelle  folie 
il  y  avait  de  sacrifier  de  braves  gens  pour  soutenir  en  Espagne 
un  parti  sans  moyens,  sans  bravoure  et  sans  moralite.  Si  ce 
qui  precede  n'est  pas  vrai,  au  moins  sommes  nous  certains  qu'une 
grande  mesintelligence  regne  entre  les  Espagnols  et  leurs  allies. 
Le  20,  les  Espagnols  ont  encore  essaye  une  sortie  de  la  Carraca, 
mais  sans  succes ;  ils  s'y  prennent  un  pen  tard.  Nous  sommes 
a  present  tres  a  mesure  pour  les  recevoir.  Ils  font  semblant 
d'embarquer  continuellement  de  troupes  qui  n'agissent  pas  et  qui 
ne  peuvent  plus  nous  nuire.  II  est  arrive  a  Medina  quelques 
bataillons  du  4me  corps,  deux  bataillons  du  soixante-trois  sont 
aussi  venus  de  Seville.  Nous  apprenons  avec  la  prise  de  Badajos, 
que  M.  le  marechal  Soult  est  a  Seville.  La  blessure  de  M.  le 
commandant  Bompar  et  les  miennes  vont  un  peu  mieux. 

LEGENTIL. 

Excusez  les  imperfections  de  cette  longue  lettre,  j'ecris  de  mon 
lit,  dans  une  posture  g£nante. 

Monsieur  le  general  de  division  Lery,  a  Seville. 

SECTION  IX. 

Extracts  from  the  intercepted  report  of  general  Garbe,  com- 
manding the  French  engineers  at  the  blockade  of  Cadiz. 

'  25  Mars,  1811. 
'  On  avait  apper^u  le  26  de  Fevrier  au  matin  un  grand  convoi 


APPENDIX  375 

partant  de  la  baye  de  Cadiz,  pour  se  diriger  sur  Tarifa.  Ce 
convoi  portait  a  peu  pres  6  ou  7000  homines  des  troupes  de  de- 
barquement,  qui  allait  joindre  celles  qui  etaient  deja  reunies  sur 
la  Barbate  et  dans  les  environs  de  1'Alcala  de  los  Gazules.  Le  2 
Mars  a  la  pointe  du  jour,  Fennemi  commen9a  son  operation  sur 
Caza  Vieja,  qui  fut  evacue  et  en  meme  temps,  il  effectua  vers 
1' embouchure  de  St.  Petri,  un  passage  pour  faciliter  1'etablisse- 
ment  d'un  pont  de  radeaux  et  d'une  tete  de  pont.  II  fit  aussi 
debarquer  des  troupes  dans  1'Isletta  del  Goto,  et  s'occupa  d'y 
etablir  deux  batteries.  Le  3,  on  fit  marcher  la  division  du 
general  Rufin,  qui  prit  position  a  moitie  chemin  de  Puerto  Heal 
a  Medina  Sidonia.  Celle  du  general  Laval,  s'etablit  en  avant  de 
Puerto  Real,  et  le  general  Villatte  garda  ses  positions  aupres  de 
Chiclana.  Ce  jour  on  n'apper£ut  aucun  mouvement  de  Fennemi. 
Tous  les  ouvrages  de  la  ligne  etaient  gardes  par  les  garnisons 
qu'on  avait  designees  auparavant.  Santa  Marie  fut  evacue  et  le 
pont  replie  sur  la  rive  gauche. 

'Puerto  Real  etait  defendu  par  une  compagnie  de  sapeurs, 
deux  du  45me  regime,  et  par  tous  les  refugies  Francais  qu'on 
avoit  armes. 

'  Le  4  Monsieur  le  marechal  fit  attaquer  a  la  pointe  du  jour 
1'ennemi  dans  sa  tete  de  pont  de  Santi  Petri.  Cette  attaque  se 
fit  par  4  compagnies  du  95me  regiment  qui  s'emparerent  de  l'ou< 
vrage,  firent  prisonniers  500  homines,  et  enleverent  un  drapeau. 
II  est  certain  que  si  on  eut  employe  dans  cette  operation  2  ou  3000 
hommes  on  enlevait  le  pont  et  1'Isle  de  Leon.  L'ennemi  fut  si 
disconcerte  qu'il  avait  abandonne  ses  batteries  et  ses  ouvragea 
fermes.  Un  pareil  resultat  paraissait  etre  d'un  toe's  bon  augure 
pour  les  grandes  operations.  On  fit  partir  le  meme  jour  de  Medina 
une  reconnaissance  sur  Casa  Vieja.  On  recut  avis  dans  la  nuit 
que  cette  reconnaissance  n'avait  rencontre  personne,  et  que  les 
colonnes  ennemies  se  dirigeant  sur  Conil,  le  mouvement  ne 
pouvait  avoir  pour  but  que  d'operer  la  jonction  de  ce  corps 
d'armee  avec  celui  qui  etait  reste  dans  Tile.  Le  5,  avant  le  jour, 
on  se  mit  en  marche  de  la  position '  qu'on  occupait  a  moitie 
chemin  de  Medina  pour  se  porter  sur  Chiclana.  Arrive  dans 
cet  endroit,  Monsieur  le  marechal  donna  1'ordre  au  general 
Villatte  de  rassembler  toute  sa  division  vers  les  fleches  de 
St.  Petri,  pour  y  maintenir  1'ennemi  qui  y  paraissait  en  force, 
pendant  qu'il  dirigeait  sur  la  route  de  Conil,  les  divisions  de 
Laval  and  Rufin,  et  le  peu  de  cavalerie  qu'il  avait  avec  lui.  II 
se  porta  de  ce  c6te,  et  ne  tarda  pas  a  rencontrer  une  forte 
colonne,  qui  marchait  le  long  de  la  mer  entre  St.  Petri  et  Conil, 
et  se  dirigeait  sur  le  premier  de  ses  endroits.  Les  troupes 
arrivees  a  portee  de  canon  se  formerent.  Le  general  Rufin  prit 
la  gauche  pour  aller  occuper  un  mamelon  ou  1'ennemi  paraissait 
s'etablir.  Quand  les  deux  divisions  furent  formees,  elle  se  trou- 
verent  enpresence  d'une  armee,  beaucoup  plus  nombreuse  qu'on  ne 
1'avait  era  d'abord.  L'artillerie  n'etait  pas  encore  arrivee,  et  celle 
de  1'ennemi  commencait  a  jouer  de  toute  parts.  Le  general  Villatte 
n'avait  pu  garder  les  fleches  de  St.  Petri,  qui  etaient  au  moment 


376  APPENDIX. 

d'etre  prises,  n'etant  alors  defendues  que  par  un  seul  bataillon  du 
27me  d'iufantrie  legere. 

Cette  division  fut  obligee  de  se  replier  et  de  repasser  le  ravin 
dans  lequel  roulent  les  eaux  du  Moulin  d'Almanza.  Ce  mouve- 
ment  empecha  le  general  Villatte  de  se  reunir  aux  deux  autres 
divisions,  qui  n'ayant  en  tout  que  dix  bataillons,  essuyaient  un 
feu  terrible  de  la  part  de  1'ennemi.  Nos  pertes  devenaient  d'autant 
plus  sensible  que  le  nombre  des  combattans  n'etait  que  le  tiers  de 
celui  de  1'ennemi.  Des  corps  entiers  se  trouvaient  accables  avant 
qu'on  eut  pu  entamer  la  ligne  des  Anglais.  II  n'y  avait  point  de 
reserve.  Les  deux  mille  homines  de  Medina  Sidonia  etaient  en 
marche  pour  Conil.  II  fallut  penser  a  la  retraite  qui  se  fit  en  bon 
ordre,  jusque  sur  les  hauteurs  en  avant  de  Chiclana,  ou  Ton  fit 
camper  une  division  pendant  la  nuit.  Les  Anglais  firent  leur 
jonction  avec  les  troupes  de  1'ile  de  Leon,  et  les  Espaguols  con- 
tinuerent  d'occuper  notre  position  du  Moulin  d'Almanza  et  de 
St.  Petri.  Si  1'ennemi  voulant  continuer  ses  operations  offensives 
dans  la  journee  du  6,  se  fut  presente  de  bonne  heure,  il  est  pro- 
bable que  dans  la  situation  ou  nous  nous  trouvions  apres  la  journee 
du  5  nous  etions  obliges  d'evacuer  le  terrain  jusqu'a  Puerto  Real, 
ou  on  aurait  pris  la  position  dont  j'ai  parle  plus  haut,  pour  y 
livrer  une  seconde  bataille,  mais  les  operations  ont  manque  d'en- 
semble.  II  s'est  contente  de  rentrer  dans  1'ile  et  pendant  ce 
temps  un  tres  petit  corps  de  troupes  Anglaises  operarient  un 
debarquement  entre  St.  Marie,  et  la  pointe  de  St.  Catherine,  qui 
n'eut  d'autre  resultat  que  d'enlever  une  batterie  defendue  par 
quinze  hommes  et  de  se  promener  une  ou  deux  heures  dans  les 
rues  de  St.  Marie.  Monsieur  le  marechal  ne  voyait  aucun 
mouvement  offensif,  ordonna  de  retablir  les  grandes  communica- 
tions par  St.  Marie,  chacun  rentra  dans  ses  portes  et  cette  mesure 
produisit  beaucoup  plus  d'effet,  sur  1'armee  et  les  habitans  du 
pays,  que  les  dispositions  qu'on  auraient  pu  prendre.' 


No.  V. 

EXTRACTS  FROM  THE  CORRESPONDENCE  OF  CAPTAIN 
SQUIRE,  OF  THE  ENGINEERS. 

SECTION  I. 

'March  I,  1811. 

'  I  have  been  employed  in  constructing  batteries,  opposite  the 
mouth  of  the  Zezere,  for  twenty-five  guns !  though  we  have  only 
one  brigade  of  nine-pounders  to  arm  them. 

'Thank  God,  for  my  own  credit,  I  protested  against  these 
batteries  from  the  first,  in  my  reports  which  were  sent  to  lord 
Wellington,  and  now  I  verily  believe  the  marshal  himself  is 
ashamed  of  their  construction.  Punhete,  you  know,  is  situated 
precisely  at  the  confluence  of  the  Zezere  with  the  Tagus,  tho 


APPENDIX.  377 

enemy's  bridge  is  about  half  a  mile  from  the  mouth  of  the  river, 
and  one  mile,  by  measurement,  from  the  nearest  of  our  heights, 
which  we  have  crowned  with  an  eight-gun  battery.' 

SECTION  II. 

'I  was  truly  sorry  to  hear  that  the  Spaniards  were  so 
thoroughly  routed  near  Badajos,  but  Mendizabel  was  an  idiot. 
On  the  18th  February,  the  enemy  threw  a  bridge  over  the  Qua- 
diana,  above  Badajos.  Don  Carlos  Espana,  an  active  officer, 
whom  I  know  very  well,  reconnoitred  the  bridge,  and  made  his 
report  to  Mendizabel,  who  was  playing  at  cards.  Very  well,  said 
the  chief,  we'll  go  and  look  at  it  to-morrow!  At  day-break  the 
Spanish  army  was  surprised.' 

SECTION  III. 

'  May  17,  1811. — I  reconnoitred  the  ground  in  front  of  Chris- 
toval,  and  was  pressed,  by  colonel  Fletcher,  who  was  on  the  other 
side  of  the  Guadiana,  to  commence  our  operations  that  evening. 
The  soil  was  hard  and  rocky,  and  our  tools  infamous.  I  made, 
however,  no  difficulties,  and  we  began  our  battery  on  the  night 
of  the  8th,  the  moon  being  at  the  full:  our  work  was  barely  four 
hundred  yards  from  Christoval.  In  spite,  however,  of  a  most 
destructive  fire  of  musketry,  and  shot,  and  shells,  from  various 
parts  of  the  body  of  the  place,  we  succeeded  in  completing  our 
battery  on  the  night  of  the  10th;  and,  on  the  morning  of  the 
llth,  at  four  a.m.  its  fire  was  opened.  The  enemy's  fire  was, 
however,  very  superior  to  our  own,  and,  before  sunset,  the  three 
guns  and  one  howitzer  were  disabled,  for  against  our  little  attack 
was  the  whole  attention  of  the  enemy  directed.  On  the  other 
side  of  the  river  the  intended  attack  had  not  yet  been  begun, 
and  we  sustained  the  almost  undivided  fire  of  Badajos!  I  told 
the  marshal,  when  I  saw  him  on  the  llth,  that  to  continue  to 
fight  our  battery  was  a  positive  sacrifice;  he  did  not,  however, 
order  us  to  desist  till  our  guns  were  silenced.  If  doubt  and 
indecision  had  not  governed  all  our  operations,  and  had  we  begun 
even  on  the  night  of  the  9th,  I  am  satisfied  that  our  plan  of 
attack  was  excellent,  and  that  we  should  have  entered  the  place 
on  the  15th.  It  is  true  that  two  distant  batteries  were  erected, 
on  the  left  bank  of  the  river,  against  the  place,  but  they  scarcely 
excited  the  enemy's  attention,  our  little  corps  bore  the  brunt  of 
the  enemy's  exertions,  which  were  great  and  spirited.  Including 
those  who  fell  in  the  sortie,  our  loss  has  been  from  six  to  seven 
hundred  men.  Both  officers  and  men  were  exhausted,  mind  and 
body;  they  felt  and  saw  that  they  were  absurdly  sacrificed.' 

SECTION  IV. 

'  Elvas,  May  20,  1811. 

'Had  our  operations  been  conducted  with  common  activity 
and  common  judgment,  Badajos  would  have  been  in  our  hands 


APPENDIX. 

before  the  15th  of  May.  But  what  has  been  the  fact  P  Our 
little  corps  on  the  Christoval  side  was  absolutely  sacrificed.  The 
whole  fire  and  attention  of  Badajos  was  directed  against  our 
unsupported  attack,  and  our  loss  in  consequence  was  severe.' — 
'  Our  operation  before  Christoval  was  absurdly  pressed  forward 
witJwut  any  co-operation  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river.  The  mar- 
shal hesitated — delayed,  and  at  last  withdrew  his  troops  at  such 
a  moment  that  he  was  scarcely  time  enough  to  meet  the  enemy 
in  the  field!' 


No.  VI. 

EXTRACT  OF  A  LETTER  FROM  GENERAL  CAMPBELL 
TO  LORD  LIVERPOOL. 

'  Gibraltar,  October  23,  1810. 

'  The  troops  at  Malaga,  with  the  exception  of  three  hundred 
men,  moved  upon  Fuengirola,  of  which  lord  Blayney  was  ap- 
prised; but,  in  place  of  his  lordship  taking  advantage  of  this 
fortunate  event,  he  wasted  two  days  in  a  fruitless  attack  on  the 
fort  of  Fuengirola,  cannonading  it  from  twelve-pounders,  although 
he  perceived  that  no  impression  had  been  made  on  it  by  the  fire 
of  the  shipping  and  gun-boats,  the  artillery  of  which  were  double 
the  calibre.  In  this  situation  he  was  surprised  by  an  inferior 
force,  and,  whilst  he  was  on  board  of  a  gun-boat,  his  guns  taken 
and  the  whole  thrown  into  confusion;  at  this  moment  he  was 
informed  of  the  disaster,  and,  so  far  to  his  credit,  he  retook  his 
guns,  but,  immediately  after,  conceiving  a  body  of  French  cavalry 
to  be  Spaniards,  he  ordered  the  firing  to  cease,  when  he  was 
surrounded  and  made  prisoner;  his  men,  losing  confidence,  gave 
way,  and,  hurrying  to  the  beach,  relinquished  their  honour  and 
the  field.' 


No.  VIL 

JUSTIFICATORY  PAPERS  RELATIVE  TO  THE  STATE  OF 
SPAIN  AT  DIFFERENT  PERIODS. 

SECTION  I. — NORTHERN  PROVINCES. 
Captain  Irby  to  Mr.  Croft. 

'  H.  M.  S.  Amelia,  Coruna,  May  6,  1810. 

'  I  have  been  cruizing  for  these  two  months  past  between 
Bayonne  and  Santona. 

'  In  addition  to  the  troops  I  have  observed  under  arms,  there 
has  been  a  great  proportion  of  armed  peasantry  at  Baquio,  a 
small  place  to  the  westward  of  Eachidaes ;  as  our  boats  were 


APPENDIX.  879 

returning  from  destroying  some  batteries,  they  were  attacked  by 
armed  peasantry  alone,  who  were  dispersed  by  shot  from  the 
ship,  and  also  since  they  have  assisted  the  French  troops,  when 
we  captured  a  vessel  laden  with  military  stores  from  St. 
Andero.' 

Mr.  Stuart  to  general  Walker. 

'  Lisbon,  February  20,  1811. 

'  I  own  that  from  the  various  appointments  which  have  lately 
taken  place  in  their  armies,  I  forebode  little  advantage  in  the 
course  of  the  ensuing  campaign;  it  is  perhaps  needful  to  tell  you 
that  my  fears  are  grounded  on  the  nomination  of  the  duke  of 
Albuquerque  to  Gallicia,  Castanos  to  Estremadura,  Mahi  to 
Murcia,  Coupigny  to  Valencia,  and  the  brother  of  O'Donnel  to 
Catalonia.' 

Sir  Hoivard  Douglas  to  lord  Wellington. 

'  Villafranca,  January  4,  1812. 

'  Each  chief  is  allowed  three  servants,  a  captain  two,  a  sub- 
altern one;  the  number  of  soldiers  employed  in  this  way  is 
certainly  not  under  the  regulation,  and  all  officers  resident  in  the 
interior  likewise  have  this  excessive  indulgence.  The  officers' 
servants  never  do  duty,  or  attend  any  drill  or  review.  The  cooks 
are  in  general  changed  weekly,  and  are  never  present  at  drill  or 
review;  one  cook  is  allowed  besides  to  every  three  Serjeants. 
These  two  items  certainly  take  5000  choice  men  from  the  ranks 
of  this  army. 

'  Some  very  violent  recriminations  have  been  brought  on  by  the 
imprudent  reply  of  the  military  press,  to  some  observations  pub- 
lished in  a  Coruna  paper  extolling  the  guerillas,  and  at  the  same 
time  intended  to  convey  a  censure  on  the  conduct  of  the  army. 
I  have  had  frequent  conversations  with  general  Abaclia  on  the 
spirit  of  disunion  which  these  two  papers  are  sowing.  He  has  at 
length  prohibited  the  military  press  from  publishing  anything 
but  professional  papers.  I  was  present  when  he  gave  the  order — 
he  engaged  me  in  the  conversation,  and  I  could  not  avoid  observ- 
ing, that  what  was  lost  could  only  be  regained  by  the  sword,  not 
the  pen.  In  this  I  alluded  to  the  Asturias,  where  certainly  repu- 
tation and  public  confidence  were  sacrificed. 

'  The  truth  is,  the  army  is  oppressive  and  expensive,  as  well  as 
inefficient,  from  its  disorganized  state,  particularly  in  the  depart- 
ments of  supply;  and  it  is  a  very  unpleasant  circumstance  to  hear 
it  generally  admitted,  that  a  Spanish  corps  is  much  more  destruc- 
tive to  the  country  than  an  equal  French  army.  There  are  also 
violent  dissensions  between  the  juntas  of  Leon  and  Gallicia:  in- 
closure  No.  6  will  show  this  state  of  feeling.' 

Sir  Howard  Douglas  to  sir  H.  Wellesley. 

'  Coruna,  March  1,  1812. 

'  On  the  20th  ultimo  I  had  the  honour  to  despatch  to  your 
excellency  a  copy  of  my  letter  of  that  date  to  lord  Wellington,  in 


380  APPENDIX. 

which  I  acquainted  his  lordship  that  three  battalions  of  the  armj 
of  Gallicia  are  preparing  for  embarkation  for  America,  and  that 
I  had  positively  declined  making,  and  would  not  permit  the 
delivery  of  any  British,  arms  or  stores  for  that  service.  I  have 
now  discovered,  that  in  addition  to  these  troops  it  is  intended  to 
send  a  division  of  horse  artillery,  to  equip  which,  orders  have 
been  given  to  transfer  appointments  from  the  cavalry  of  the 
army,  and  a  demand  is  made  for  funds  to  prepare  the  ordnance, 
and  even  to  adapt  to  colonial  service  more  of  the  field-artillery 
which  I  lately  delivered  for  the  use  of  the  sixth  Gallician  army. 
This  measure  has  never  been  openly  avowed  by  the  government 
of  Cadiz,  it  has  never  been  communicated  to  the  junta  of  this 
province  by  the  regency.  It  has,  I  imagine,  been  concealed  from 
your  excellency,  and  it  has  only  come  to  my  knowledge,  by  the 
arrangements  no  longer  to  be  hidden,  which  general  Abadia  is 
making  to  carry  it  into  effect.' 

SECTION  II. — CATALONIA. 

Extract  of  a  Letter  from  Don  Antonio  Rocca. 
[Translated.] 

'  Reus,  January  20,  1811. 

'  While  we  have  venal  men,  ignorant  men,  and  perfidious  men 
in  our  government,  no  good  can  befal  us.  He  must  be  mad  who 
can  expect  our  condition  to  ameliorate.  The  venal  are  those 
who,  without  being  called,  seemingly  abandon  their  own  affairs, 
and  introduce  themselves  in  the  different  branches  of  administra- 
tion with  no  other  view  than  to  enrich  themselves  at  the  public 
expense.  The  ignorant  are  those  who  think  themselves  wise,  and 
who  either  obtain  by  intrigue  or  accept  without  reluctance 
employments  the  duties  of  which  they  are  not  capable  of  dis- 
charging. The  perfidious  are  all  those  who  are  indifferent  spec- 
tators of  this  bloody  struggle,  and  who  care  not  for  the  issue,  as 
they  will  equally  submit  to  any  master.  Place  no  confidence,  my 
friend,  in  these  sort  of  persons,  nothing  can  be  expected  from 
them,  and  yet  by  an  inconceivable  fatality  which  is  attached  to 
us,  to  the  ruin  of  all  parties,  it  would  appear  that  the  provinces 
employ  none  but  these  very  people.  Those  who  commend  us  are 
either  venal,  or  ignorant,  or  indifferent;  at  least,  the  more  we 
search  for  the  remedy  the  more  our  evil  increases.' 

Captain  Codrington  to  sir  Charles  Cotton. 

1  April  24,  1811. 

'  With  respect  to  the  proposed  plan  of  admitting 

supplies  of  grain  in  neutral  vessels  from  the  ports  of  the  enemy, 
&c.,  I  have  no  hesitation  in  saying  I  do  not  see  sufficient 
reason  to  justify  it  in  the  present  circumstances  of  this  part  of 
the  Peninsula,  as  I  have  always  found  bread  for  sale  at  the  dif- 
ferent places  on  the  coast,  at  the  rate  of  about  two  pounds  and 
three  quarters  for  the  quarter  of  a  dollar,  at  which  price  I  yes- 


APPENDIX.  381 

terday  bought  it  at  Escala.  And  as  there  has  been  of  late  more 
corn  at  Taragona  than  money  to  purchase,  I  presume  the  latter 
has  been  the  greater  desideratum  of  the  two.' 

*  The  difficulty  of  allowing  a  free  passage  of  pro- 
visions from  one  part  of  the  coast  to  the  other  would  be  lessened 
by  being  limited  to  vessels  above  the  size  of  common  fishing- 
boats,  in  which  I  have  reason  to  believe  considerable  quantities 
have  been  carried  to  Barcelona :  and  captain  Bullen,  I  under- 
stand, found  even  a  mortar  in  a  boat  of  this  description.' 

General  C.  Doyle  to  Captain  Sullen. 

'  Eipol,  April,  1811. 

'  Can  you  believe  that  in  this  town,  the  only  fabric  of  arms, 
six  months  have  passed  without  a  firelock  being  made  ! !  They 
begin  to-morrow,  and  give  me  two  hundred  and  fifty  every 
week,  &c.' 

[Note.  The  italics  and  notes  of  admiration  are  in  the  original.] 

Admiral  Fremantle  to  captain  Codrington. 

'  Mahon,  May  19,  1811. 

'  The  uncertainty  of  everything  connected  with  Spanish  affairs 
is  such,  that  I  am  tired  of  writing  and  explaining  all  that  arises 
from  their  inconsistency  and  want  of  energy. 

'  Until  eight  o'clock  1  had  understood  that  the  intendant  had 
procured  one  thousand  quintals  of  biscuit  for  the  army  at  Tara- 
gona, which  number  I  find  on  inquiry  has  dwindled  to  fifty-seven 
bags.  I  have  therefore  been  under  the  necessity  of  sending  five 
hundred  bags,  which  we  can  very  ill  spare,  from  our  own  stores, 
with  a  proportion  of  rice.  I  cannot  tell  you  how  much  I  have 
been  worried  and  annoyed  the  last  three  days,  particularly  as  I 
feel  the  very  great  importance  Taragona  is  to  the  Spaniards,  and 
how  much  this  island  is  connected  with  the  event  of  the  fall  of 
that  fortress.  The  intendant  here  has  wrote  that  he  has  sent 
two  hundred  and  thirty -two  bags  of  bread.  You  will  have  the 
goodness  to  explain  that  only  fifty-seven  were  procured  by  him, 
which  I  have  engaged  to  pay  for,  and  that  all  the  rest  comes 
immediately  from  our  own  stores,  and  are  consequently  at  the 
disposal  of  the  British  authorities  at  Taragona.' 

Extract  of  a  letter  from  sir  Edward  Pellew  to  captain 
Codrington. 

'  H.  M.  ship  Caledonia,  July  22,  1811. 

*  The  indecision,  inactivity,  and  apparent  disunion  amongst  the 
Spanish  leaders  have  been  the  great  cause  of  failure  throughout 
the  whole  of  this  arduous  contest,  and  is  especially  observable  in 
the  late  events  in  Catalonia ;  nor  until  the  patriots  are  directed 
by  pure  military  councils  and  more  energy  and  decision,  can  I 
permit  myself  to  think  that  any  effectual  stand  can  be  made 
against  the  invaders.' 


882  APPENDIX. 

Sir  Edward  Pellew  to  captain  Codrington. 

'  August  2,  1811. 

*  I  have  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  letter,  &c.  The 
information  therein  conveyed  affords  me  a  very  melancholy  view 
of  the  affairs  of  the  patriots,  and  gives  me  little  reason  to  hope 
better  things  from  their  future  exertions.' — '  A  despatch  which 
reached  me  by  the  same  opportunity  from  the  superior  junta  of 
Catalonia  contains  a  proposal  for  occupying  a  position  on  the 
coast  as  a  naval  depot,  and  the  selection  of  Palamos  is  presented 
to  my  choice.  It  does  not  appear  to  me  that  the  junta  possesses 
at  present  resources  for  defending  any  such  position,  and  from 
the  measures  being  submitted  to  my  determination,  it  seems  to 
be  expected  that  I  should  provide  means  of  defending  them  while 
employed  in  securing  themselves  in  their  new  station.' — '  Yet 
whilst  the  noble  spirit  of  this  ill-fated  people  remains  unsubdued, 
it  would  not  be  just  to  expect  a  total  failure,  although  the  loss  of 
all  confidence  between  them  and  the  privileged  orders,  and  the 
want  of  leaders  among  themselves  who  possess  either  skill  or 
competency  to  guide  them,  afford  but  a  very  precarious  prospect 
of  their  doing  anything  effectual  to  stop  the  invaders.' 

Captain  Codrington  to  sir  JE.  Pellew. 

'  November  1, 1811. 

'By  a  letter  from  captain  Strong  it  seems  the  people  of 
Cadagues  in  the  early  part  of  October  openly  refused  assistance 
to  the  governor  of  the  Medas  islands,  declaring  that  they  only 
acknowledged  the  strongest  party,  and  therefore  paid  their  sub- 
scriptions to  the  French;  and  that  upon  the  Bustard's  going  with 
a  pa,rty  of  Spanish  troops  to  enforce  obedience,  they  rang  the 
alarm-bell  as  the  signal  for  the  approach  of  an  enemy,  and  sent 
to  Rosas  for  assistance.' 

Extract  of  a  letter  from  captain  Codrington  to 
JB.  H.  Locker,  JEsq. 

'  February  7,  1812. 

'  Whilst  the  French  pay  the  poor,  who  serve  their  purpose, 
at  the  expense  of  the  rich,  the  Spaniards  deal  out  severity  to 
the  lower  classes,  and  oblige  them  to  serve  without  pay  and  with- 
out clothes ;  and  the  debauched  and  profligate  of  higher  life  are 
in  many  instances  rewarded,  for  imbecility,  ignorance,  and  indif- 
ference to  the  fate  of  their  country  never  yet  exceeded,  without 
one  single  example  being  made  of  the  many  traitors  which  have 
been  discovered  in  the  persons  of  priests,  officers  of  rank,  or 
what  are  termed  gentlemen.' 

Captain  Codrington  to  general  Lacy. 

'  February  18,  1812. 

'  Being  an  eye-witness  of  the  discontent  of  the  people,  which 
has  arisen  from  their  being  partially  disarmed,  and  knowing 


APPENDIX.  383 

how  fatal  have  been  the  consequences  which  have  followed  these 
practices  on  former  occasions,  I  must  own  I  cannot  offer  to  the 
admiral  my  conviction  'of  all  that  benefit  arising  from  his  good 
intentions,  in  which  I  should  otherwise  have  confided.  The  offi- 
cers and  men  of  the  French  army  are  walking  about  this  part 
of  the  coast  unarmed,  because  the  juntas  and  justices  have  con- 
cealed the  muskets  they  had  at  their  disposal,  and  refused  the 
people  permission  to  attack  the  enemy.  In  the  meantime,  the 
poor  people,  whose  hearts  are  burning  with  patriotism,  are  starv- 
ing for  want  of  bread,  and  the  richer  citizens  of  this  devoted 
country  are  supplying  the  enemy  with  corn  and  other  species  of 
provisions.' 

Captain  Codrington  to  sir  E.  Pellew. 

'  Villa  Nueva,  February  22,  1812. 

'  I  fear  things  are  going  on  very  ill  in  this  principality  from 
the  sudden  change  in  the  system  of  general  Lacy,  and  the  con- 
sequent destruction  of  that  confidence  on  the  part  of  the  people 
which  was  certainly  the  cause  of  his  former  successes.  Nor  can 
there  be  any  doubt  of  the  sound  reason  which  guides  the  conduct 
of  the  Catalans  on  this  occasion;  for  the  mode  in  which  general 
Lacy  effected  the  dishonourable  breach  of  faith  of  which  they 
complain,  bespeaks  a  mind  practised  in  deception.  He  ordered 
the  patriotic  companies  to  be  sent  to  particular  points  in  sub- 
divisions, at  which  points  general  Sarsfield  was  to  take  forcible 
possession  of  them,  and  attach  them  to  different  corps  of  the 
regular  army.  And  the  discovery  of  this  treachery  was  made  by 
the  letter  to  general  Sarsfield  falling,  by  mistake,  into  the  hands 
of  the  officer  who  commanded  the  whole  division  of  patriotic 
companies.  In  the  meantime  the  discontent  of  the  people  gains 
ground  with  their  sufferings,  and  instead  of  the  Spanish  army 
being  increased  by  the  late  arbitrary  mandate  according  to  its 
avowed  object,  and  not  less  probably  in  consequence  of  the  late 
extraordinary  conduct  of  general  Sarsfield,  many  of  the  Catalan 
soldiers  have  actually  passed  over  to  the  enemy.' 

'  The  letter  of  the  baron  de  Eroles  in  the  gazette  No.  10, 
shows  that  he  was  again  deceived  in  the  promised  support  of 
general  Sarsfield  on  the  24th,  and  I  am  told  he  says  publicly  it 
was  part  of  a  settled  plan  to  sacrifice  him  and  his  whole  division.' 

Captain  Codrington  to  sir  JE.  Pellew. 

'  Ville  Nueva  de  Sitjes,  February  22,  1812. 
*  Nothing  but  a  total  change  can  produce  permanent  good; 
for  the  villanies  of  the  intendant  and  commissary  departments  are 
so  thoroughly  organized,  that  not  one  link  of  the  chain  can  be 
left  with  safety.  I  have  good  reason  to  think  that  even  the  money 
furnished  by  England  is  so  employed  in  the  traffic  of  corn,  by  the 
individuals  through  whose  hands  it  passes,  as  to  be  the  direct 
means  of  supplying  the  enemy.' 


384  APPENDIX. 


Captain  Codrington  to  Mr.  H.  Wellesley. 

1  March  1,  1812. 

'  The  change  of  the  regency  will,  I  trust,  produce  a  radical 
change  of  that  diabolical  83^stem  by  which  plunder  has  been  openly 
licensed,  and  despotism  and  injustice  towards  the  people,  and 
even  treachery  itself,  in  those  of  a  higher  class,  have  hitherto 
passed  with  impunity.' 

SECTION  III. — VALENCIA  AND  MURCIA. 

The  councillor  of  state,  Mariano  Orquijo,  to  king  Joseph. 

1  Madrid,  Decembre  4,  1810. 

'  Je  viens  de  voir  le  proviseur  et  vicaire  general  qui  fut  arrete 
a  Logrogne  par  les  insurges.  Son  opinion  prononcee  en  faveur 
de  V.  M.  lui  a  attire  toutes  sortes  de  mauvais  traitemens  et  de  dis- 
graces, mais  enfin  il  est  parvenu  a  se  sauver  de  Valence.  II  m'a 
rapporte  que  1'esprit  public  de  cette  capitale  a  beaucoup  change 
depuis  que  le  general  Caro  (frere  de  J&omana)  s'est  livre  aux 
vexations  et  aux  dilapidations  de  toute  espece,  et  que  son  opi- 
nion est  qu'on  n'y  eprouvera  aucune  resistance.  L'archeveque 
de  Valence,  qui  jouit  a  present  d'une  grande  influence,  lui  a 
souvent  parle  en  secret  d'une  maniere  favorable  de  V.  M.  et 
de  ses  ministres.  C'est  a  1'archeveque  qu'il  est  redevable 
de  son  evasion.  Ce  prelat  m'ayant  connu  ainsi  que  a  M.  de 
Montarco  dans  d'autres  terns  le  chargea  de  nous  voir.  Le  gene- 
ral Bassecourt  n'etait  nullement  considere.  Le  proviseur  ajoute, 
qu'a  Alicant  d'ou  il  est  parti  le  14  Novembre,  tout  etait  rempli, 
de  refugies  de  Cadiz.  B'apres  tout  ce  qu'il  m'a  dit,  je  conte 
qu'aussitot  la  prise  de  Tortoze,  Valence  se  rendra  sans  coup 
ferir.  J'ai  renvoye  ce  proviseur  a  Monsieur  de  Santa  Fe  qui  Fa 
protege  en  sa  qualite  de  ministre  des  affaires  ecclesiastiques  et  qui 
fut  tres  sensible  au  malheur  qui  lui  arriva  a  Logrogne.' 

General  Doyle  to  Mr.  Stuart. 

'March  8, 1811. 

'There  is  a  strong  French  party  in  Valencia.  It  is  a  sad 
thing  that  we  cannot  sacar  Partido  of  that  kingdom,  in  which  are 
more  resources  than  in  all  the  other  provinces  of  Spain.  With 
my  head  I  answer  for  it  that  in  one  month  two  thousand  cavalry 
and  twenty  thousand  infantry,  independent  of  the  existing  army, 
which  is  one  thousand  five  hundred  effective  cavalry  and  eleven 
thousand  infantry,  could  be  raised,  and  there  is  money  enough 
within  the  city  to  pay  them  for  six  months,  and  without  looking 
elsewhere  for  assistance  to  clothe  them.  There  is  abundance  of 
cloth,  and  provisions  in  abundance,  yet  Valencia  is  doing  nothing ! 
and  this  time  so  precious !  while  Massena  draining  all  the  rest 
of  the  Peninsula  gives  us  time  to  organize.  We  want  a  Hobes 
pierre  in  the  government,  and  another  in  every  province  ! ! ' 


APPENDIX.  385 


Colonel  Roche  to  Mr.  Stuart. 

'  Carthagena,  June,  20,  1811. 

'  After  three  years  leaving  them  to  themselves,  this  army  (the 
Murcian)  is  everywhere  in  a  worse  state  absolutely  than  it  was  in 
the  commencement  of  the  revolution.' 

'  The  fact  is  that  the  Spaniards  have  no  confidence  in  their 
general,  nor  he  in  them,*and  thus  Freire  apprehends  if  he  fights 
his  people  will  disperse.  Valencia,  with  an  immense  population 
and  great  resources,  is  doing  little. '  Bassecour  retired  to  Cuenca. 
The  same  indolence,  lassitude,  and  egotism  prevails  through  the 
country,  and  I  see  little  stimulus  produced  by  the  establishment 
of  the  Cortes;  that  feeling  of  enthusiasm  which  existed  is  fast 
dying  away.  The  thing  in  the  world  most  agreeable  to  the 
Spaniards  at  this  moment  would  be  to  be  allowed  to  be  neuter, 
that  England  and  France  should  fight  the  battle  and  pay  all  the 
expenses.' 

Captain  Codrington  to  the  honourable  H.  Wellesley. 

<  September  8,  1811. 

*  After  ascertaining  that  much  art  was  employed  to  disgust  the 
army  with  general  Blake,  and  at  the  same  time  to  prejudice  the 
people  against  their  officers,  I  relied  upon  the  purity  of  my 
motives,  and  opened  the  subject  to  the  general  with  the  candour 
and  freedom  it  required.  I  had  great  satisfaction  in  finding  him 
well  aware  of  all  that  was  passing,  and  upon  his  guard  as  to  the 
consequences.  Upon  my  mentioning  that  certain  hand-bills  were 
posted  up,  he  produced  and  gave  me  the  enclosed  copies.  He 
told  me  that  upon  obtaining  them  he  went  to  the  marquis  of 
Palacios,  who,  necessarily  agreeing  in  their  evil  tendency,  con- 
sented to  accompany  the  general  to  the  palace  of  the  archbishop, 
where  I  trust  measures  were  adopted  to  prevent  a  repetition  of 
the  misconduct  of  the  Padre  Igual  and  his  numerous  bigoted 
coadjutors.  I  submitted  to  the  general's  attention  the  fatal 
effects  of  his  quitting  this  part  of  the  Peninsula,  while  the  minds 
of  the  people  were  in  such  a  state  of  fermentation,  and  allowing 
the  supreme  authority  to  revert  to  the  marquis  of  Palacios. 
He  assured  me  that  he  clearly  saw  the  danger  which  would 
arise  from  it ;  he  had  determined  on  no  account  to  do  so  until 
the  marquis  was  removed  by  the  government  from  his  present 
situation,' 

SECTION  IV. — ANDALUSIA.. 

General  Grraham  to  Mr.  Stuart. 

'  May  9,  1810. 

'  Nothing  new  here ;  the  regency  and  the  junta  are  as  usual 

more  asleep  than  awake,  and  I  can  augur  nothing  good  from  the 

government  remaining  in  such  hands—let  their  intentions  be  ever 

so  good.     Nothing  but  the  assembly  of  the  Cortes,  and  from 

VOL.  III.  C  C 


S86  APPENDIX. 

thence  springing  up  a  revolutionary  system,  overturning  abuses 
and  interesting  the  people  in  their  own  cause  by  solid  and  perma- 
nent, instead  of  contingent  and  prospective  reforms,  calling  forth 
talents  if  to  be  found  for  the  chief  situations,  and  enforcing  vigour 
and  rousing  enthusiasm.  Nothing  but  some  great  change  (such 
as  we  might  in  the  beginning  have  assisted  in  bringing  about)  can 
carry  on  this  war  to  any  good  result.  The  people  are  obstinate 
in  their  hatred  of  the  French,  and  from  that  alone  spring  the  fits  of 
patriotism  and  loyalty  which  keep  alive  the  flame  in  some  place 
or  another;  that  it  is  so  one  cannot  doubt  from  the  effects, 
but  it  is  never  to  be  met  with  where  one  is;  at  least  I  have  never 
seen  enthusiasm  though  I  have  heard  of  it.  Hence  the  bulk  of 
the  people  seem  to  be  completely  indifferent  to  what  is  going  on, 
and  all  seem  most  unwilling  to  submit  to  the  deprivation  of  any 
comfort,  and  to  tlie  sacrifices  which  a  state  of  siege  requires. 
They  would  be  very  well  pleased  to  have  anything  done  for  them 
and  to  see  the  enemy  driven  away,  that  they  might  go  to  eat 
strawberries  at  Chiclana,  and  they  are  much  disposed  to  blame 
our  inactivity,  especially  that  of  the  navy,  in  permitting  the  enemy 
to  have  advanced  so  near  on  the  point  of  Trocadero.  The  destruc- 
tion of  these  two  forts  at  first  was  certainly  a  great  error  in 
admiral  Purvis ;  had  they  been  kept  up  and  well  garrisoned,  as 
they  support  one  another,  it  would  have  been  a  very  tedious 
operation  to  have  reduced  them.  Meanwhile  you  will  hear  that 
the  improvidence  of  the  junta,  and  their  denial  of  any  such  risk 
to  Mr.  Wellesley,  placed  the  bread  provision  of  the  town  in 
much  too  precarious  a  situation;  in  short,  they  completely  de- 
ceived him  by  their  assurances  of  the  most  ample  means  of  sub- 
sistence, and  both  flour  and  wheat  have  been  sent  away  since  he 
came.' 

Mr.  Wellesley  to  Mr.  Stuart. 

'  Isla  de  Leon,  February  5,  1811. 

'  Blake  is  becoming  very  unpopular,  and  I  think  his  reign  will 
be  short.  He  is  supposed  to  be  by  no  means  partial  to  the 
English.  I  know  not  whether  you  will  approve  of  the  appoint- 
ments to  Estremadura  and  Gallicia,  but  I  am  sure  you  will  be 
surprised  to  hear  that  general  Mahi  is  appointed  to  command  the 
army  of  the  centre.  I  communicated  confidentially  to  general 
Blake  the  copy  of  the  letter  which  you  forwarded  to  me  from 
general  Walker,  taking  care  to  conceal  general  Walker's  name, 
so  that  Blake  was  fully  apprised  of  our  opinion  of  general 
Mahi  previously  to  his  appointment  of  him  to  the  command  in 
Murcia.' 

Mr.  Vaughan  to  Mr.  Stuart. 

'  Cadiz,  February  27,  1811. 

*  It  grieves  me  to  see  from  day  to  day  how  little  is  done  by 
the  Spaniards,  and  how  little  is  likely  to  be  done.  The  Cortes 
have  not  given  a  new  impulse  to  the  war  as  was  expected.  They 


APPENDIX.  387 

look  to  their  regency  for  plans  of  reform  for  their  armies,  and 
their  regency  is  worse  than  any  former  government.  Blake,  of 
whom  I  know  that  you  as  well  as  the  world  in  general  haye  a 
good  opinion,  does  nothing.  He  refuses  to  reform  abuses  that 
are  pointed  out  to  him,  passes  his  days  in  deliberation  upon 
questions  of  no  moment,  and  is  in  my  opinion  decidedly  adverse 
to  the  English.  Whittingham's  plan,  (disciplining  a  separate 
corps,)  which  was  approved  of  before  his  arrival,  he  has  endea- 
voured by  everv  kind  of  trick  to  reject  or  render  useless.' 

*  The  Cortes  is  full  of  priests,  who,  united  with  the  Catalans, 
are  for  preserving  the  old  routine  of  business,  and  adverse  to 
everything  that  can  give  energy  and  vigour  to  the  operations  of 
government.  Fanaticism  and  personal  interest  direct  their 
opinions;  Arguelles  and  his  party  are  anxious  that  something 
should  be  done  to  remedy  the  disgraceful  state  of  their  armies. 
I  have  no  doubt  but  that  they  would  remove  the  present  govern- 
ment though  the  friends  of  Blake,  if  there  was  any  chance  of 
the  Catalan  party  permitting  them  to  elect  a  better.' 

'  Be  assured,  my  dear  Stuart,  that  the  Cortes  is,  as  at  present 
constituted,  anything  but  revolutionary  or  Jacobinical.  They  love 
their  monarchy,  and  are  anxious  to  maintain  the  inquisition  in 
all  its  forms,  the  only  branch  of  government  to  which  they  seem 
disposed  to  communicate  any  energy.  If  there  is  not  soon  some 
new  spirit  infused  into  the  Cortes,  it  will  become  an  overgrown 
junta,  meddling  with  every  paltry  detail  of  police,  and  neglecting 
the  safety  of  their  country — and  the  regency  will  be  content  to 
reign  (very  badly)  over  Cadiz  and  the  Isla.' 

Mr.  Vaughan  to  Mr.  Stuart. 

'  Cadiz,  August  5,  1811. 

'  The  temper  of  the  public  mind  at  Cadiz  is  very  bad,  the  press 
has  lately  teemed  with  publications  filled  with  reproaches  of  the 
English.' 

'  The  regency  and  Cortes  have  lost  all  influence  everywhere, 
and  the  distress  for  money  added  to  the  general  depression  here 
after  the  campaign  in  Estremadura  may  possibly  throw  us  into  a 
state  of  anarchy.' 

'I  am  somewhat  alarmed  by  the  state  of  the  Serrano  de 
E-onda;  the  Spanish  generals  have  been  quarrelling,  and  the 
peasants  declare  they  are  tired  of  the  abuses  committed  there, 
and  that  it  is  reported  they  mean  to  capitulate  with  the  French.' 

General  Graham  to  Mr.  Stuart. 

'  Isla  de  Leon,  April  24,  1811. 

'  The  Spanish  government  has  published  an  official  narrative 
of  the  expedition  (Barosa)  full  of  misrepresentations  and  blink- 
ing the  question  of  the  cause  of  failure  entirely — this  has  obliged 
me  to  add  something  to  what  I  wrote  before  to  Mr.  Wellesley. 

C  C  2 


888  APPENDIX. 

There  are  some   instances  of  impudence   supporting  falsehood 
beyond  example.    The  proud  Spaniard  is  no  less  vain,  I  think.' 

General  Graham  to  Mr.  Stuart. 

'  Isla,  May  6,  1811. 

'  The  government  here  supported  by  the  Cortes  seemed  to  be 
determined  to  adhere  with  blind  obstinacy  and  pride  to  a  system 
that  has  nearly  brought  the  cause  to  ruin,  and  notwithstanding 
lord  Wellington's  great  efforts  they  are  playing  Buonaparte's 
game  so  positively  that  I  despair  of  any  great  good.' 

Colonel  Austin  to  Mr.  Stuart. 

'  Faro,  March  24,  1811. 

Whether  Ballesteros  is  authorized  by  his  government  to 
pursue  the  steps  he  has  taken,  I  know  not,  but  I  certainly  can- 
not but  consider  them  as  just  and  necessary.  The  junta  de 
Seville  is  a  mere  farce  supported  at  an  immense  expense,  without 
the  least  utility  or  benefit,  and  preserving  in  its  train  a  number  of 
idle  characters  who  ought  to  be  employed  in  the  defence  of  the 
nation,  but  who  now  only  add  to  its  burthens.  I  have  had  many 
negotiations  with  the  junta,  and  though  I  have  always  kept  up 
appearances  through  policy,  yet  I  have  found,  in  the  room  of  the 
honour  and  candour  which  ought  to  characterize  it,  nothing  but 
chicanery  and  dissimulation.' 

General  Carrol  to  Mr.  Stuart. 

'  Olivenza,  April  29,  1811. 

'  Would  to  Heaven  that  the  Spanish  armies,  or,  more  properly 
speaking,  the  skeletons  of  the  Spanish  armies,  were  under  his 
lordship's  (Wellington's)  command;  we  might  in  that  case  do 
great  things,  but  alas !  our  pride  seems  to  increase  with  our 
misfortunes,  and  is  only  equalled  by  our  ignorance!' 

Mr.  Stuart  to  lord  Wellesley. 

'  July  13,  1811. 

'  I  have  endeavoured  to  throw  together  the  numbers,  &c.  of 
the  different  guerillas,  &c.,  which  clearly  demonstrate  the  false 
exaggerations  circulated  respecting  that  description  of  force; 
though  their  appearance  in  different  parts  has  most  unreason- 
ably increased  the  alarm  of  the  enemy  and  proportionable  con- 
fidence of  the  Spaniards,  they  cannot  be  calculated  to  exceed 
in  the  aggregate  twenty-five  or  thirty  thousand  men  at  the 
utmost.' 

Note. — Here  follows  a  list  of  the  partidas,  with  their  numbers 
and  stations,  too  long  to  insert. 

Mr.  Wellesley  to  Mr.  Stuart. 

'  Cadiz,  July  31,  1811. 

'  Nothing  can  be  more  wretched  than  the  state  of  affairs  here ; 
the  regents  are  held  in  universal  contempt,  and  such  is  the  want 


APPENDIX.  389 

of  talent,  I  can  hardly  hope  that  a  change  will  make  any  improve- 
ment :  the  treasury  is  empty,  and  no  probability  of  the  arrival 
of  any  money  from  America,  so  that  affairs  are  really  in  a  worse 
state  than  they  have  been  at  any  time  since  the  commencement 
of  the  war.' 

Extract  from  the  manifesto  of  the  Spanish'  regency. 

*  January  23,  1812. 

'  There  have  reached  the  government  the  cries  of  the  armies 
which  defend  us,  depicting  their  painful  privations;  the  groans 
of  the  inhabitants  of  districts,  ready  to  fall  under  the  yoke  of  the 
barbarous  invaders;  the  complaints  of  the  provinces  already 
occupied,  always  loyal  though  oppressed  and  laid  waste. 

'  Cease  now,  and  henceforward,  all  personal  pretensions ;  the 
ill-understood  feelings  of  interest  dictated  by  provincial  spirit ; 
exemptions  unjustly  demanded  at  this  period  of  desolation,  writ- 
ings which,  while  they  ought  to  create  the  most  ardent  patriotism, 
to  unite  and  enlighten  the  nation,  appear  inspired  by  the  enemy 
for  the  purpose  of  enslaving  it.' 

SECTION  V. — PEIVATEBRS. 

Captain  Codrington  to  sir  E.  Pellew. 

'Arens  de  Mar,  August  23,  1811. 

*  I  have  numberless  complaints  of  the  Spanish  privateers  that 
come  upon  the  coast,  and  I  am  sure  it  would  be  a  benefit  to  the 
country  if  they  were  all  deprived  of  their  commission.  They  do 
nothing  but  plunder  the  inhabitants  of  those  places  which  are 
occasionally  overrun  by  the  French  armies,  and  who  embrace  the 
opportunity  of  their  absence  to  carry  on  a  little  trade  with  other 
parts  of  the  Peninsula.' 

Ditto  to  sir  H.  Wellesley. 

'  Valencia,  September  8,  1811. 

'  I  trust  some  decisive  measures  will  be  taken  to  abolish  alto- 
gether a  system  of  privateering  nothing  short  of  piracy ;  and  in 
which  the  vessels  from  Gibraltar  seem  to  take  the  lead.  I  have 
great  reason  to  believe  that  they  plunder  the  unfortunate  vessels 
of  all  countries  by  hoisting  whatever  colours  may  answer  their 
purposes  of  assumed  national  hostility;  and  as  we  never  hear 
of  their  attacking  each  other,  I  have  no  doubt  that  the  British 
and  French  flags  are  often  united  in  furtherance  of  this  pre- 
datory warfare.  The  numberless  complaints  which  I  receive 
from  all  parts  of  the  coast,  and  the  difficulty  of  trading  betwixt 
Catalonia  and  Valencia,  on  account  of  the  privateers  which  swarm 
in  these  seas,  drive  many  into  an  intercourse  with  Barcelona 
and  other  places  in  the  occupation  of  the  enemy,  in  order  to  get 
a  livelihood. 


390  APPENDIX. 

Captain  Codrington  to  admiral  Penrose,  Valencia. 

'  The  depredations  of  tlie  Gibraltar  privateers  have  been  carried 
on  to  such  an  extent,  in  all  parts  of  the  Mediterranean,  as  to  bring 
serious  reflections  upon  the  British  flag.' 

SECTION  VI. — FRENCH  PRISONERS  AT  CABRERA. 

Captain  Codrington  to  E.  Locker,  Esq. 

<  September  18,  1811. 

'  I  cannot  at  all  events  think  it  a  wise  measure  to  receive  into 
colonel  Whittingham's  corps  the  prisoners  at  Cabrera,  who  have 
long  ago  withstood  the  offers  of  general  Roche,  ivlien  naked  as 
they  were  born,  and  fighting  for  each  other  s  miserable  rations  to 
prolong  an  existence  inconceivably  wretched,  in  hopes  of  rejoining 
the  French.' 

Sir  H.  Wellesley  to  captain  Codrington. 

'  October  10,  1811. 

'  With  regard  to  the  French  prisoners  at  Cabrera,  I  procured 
from  the  Spanish  government  long  since  an  order  to  the  governor 
of  the  Balearic  Islands  to  suspend  all  negotiations  with  the  French 
on  that  subject,  and  not  on  any  account  to  consent  to  exchange 
them.' 


No.  VIII. 

SECTION  I. 
SIEGE  OF  TARAGONA. 

Captain  Codrington  to  sir  C.  Cotton. 

'  Taragona,  May  15, 1811. 

'During  the  panic  which  seems  to  have  prevailed  upon  the 
unexpected  arrival  of  the  French  army,  the  greatest  exertions  and 
the  most  extensive  sacrifices  appear  to  have  been  readily  submitted 
to.  But  from  the  present  apathy  and  indifference  in  those  who 
should  set  an  example  of  activity,  and  from  the  general  deficiency 
of  ordnance  stores,  I  by  no  means  consider  the  place  in  that  state 
of  security  which  the  strength  of  its  works  and  position  would 
otherwise  lead  me  to  expect.' 

'  A  well  planned  sortie  was  made  yesterday,  but  failed  through 
the  backwardness*  of  some  of  the  officers  employed  in  it.' — 'I  had 
the  satisfaction  of  being  assured  by  an  officer,  who  conspicuously 
did  his  duty  on  this  occasion,  and  who  was  outflanked  by  the 
enemy,  from  the  backwardness  of  the  column  directed  to  support 
him,  that  he  attributes  the  salvation  of  his  troops  entirely  to  the 
fire  from  the  shipping.' 


APPENDIX.  391 

Captain  Codrington  to  sir  C.  Cotton. 

'  '  Slake,  off  Villa  Nueva,  June  15,  1811. 

'Leaving  Taragona  on  the  16th  (May),  we  reached  Peniscola 
in  the  forenoon  of  the  17th.' — '  From  thence  general  Doyle  wrote 
to  general  O'Donnel  an  account  of  the  situation  of  Taragona  and 
of  my  detaining  captain  Adam  at  Peniscola,  in  readiness  to  receive 
any  reinforcement  which  he  might  be  pleased  to  send  to  that 
garrison.  Upon  our  arrival  off  Murviedro,  we  found  general 
O'Donnel  had  already  ordered  the  embarkation  of  two  thousand 
three  hundred  infantry  and  two  hundred  and  eleven  artillery- 
men.'— '  Delivering  to  general  O'Donnel  two  thousand  stand  of 
arms,  accoutrements,  and  clothing  to  enable  him  to  bring  into  the 
field  as  many  recruits  already  trained  as  would  supply  the  place 
of  the  regular  soldiers  thus  detached  from  his  army,  we  pro- 
ceeded to  Valencia  and  landed  the  remainder  of  our  cargo,  by 
which  means  the  troops  of  general  Villa  Campa,  then  dispersed 
as  peasantry  for  want  of  arms,  were  enabled  again  to  take  the 
field,  and  the  corps  of  Mma  and  the  Empecinado  completed  in  all 
the  requisites  of  active  warfare.' 

'  At  Alicant  we  proceeded. to  take  in  as  many  necessary  mate- 
rials for  Taragona  as  the  ship  would  actually  stow,  besides  eighty 
artillerymen  and  a  considerable  quantity  of  powder,  ball-cartridge, 
&c.,  sent  in  the  Paloma  Spanish  corvette  from  Carthagena  in  com- 
pany with  a  Spanish  transport  from  Cadiz  deeply  laden  with 
similar  supplies.' 

'  After  returning  to  Valencia,  where  we  landed  the  additional 
arms,  &c.,  for  the  Aragonese  army,  we  moved  on  to  Murviedro, 
where  the  conde  of  Bispal  proceeded  from  Valencia  to  join  us  in 
a  consultation  with  his  brother,  although  on  account  of  his  wound 
he  was  very  unfit  for  such  a  journey.  The  result  of  this  con- 
ference was  a  determination  on  the  part  of  general  O'Donnel  to 
commit  to  my  protection,  for  the  succour  of  Taragona,  another 
division  of  his  best  troops  under  general  Miranda,  consisting  of 
four  thousand  men,  whilst  he  himself  would  move  forward  with 
the  remainder  of  his  army  to  the  banks  of  the  Ebro.' 

'  The  frequent  disappointments  which  the  brave  Catalonian 
army  had  heretofore  met  with  from  Valencian  promises,  made 
the  sight  of  so  extensive  and  disinterested  a  reinforcement  the 
more  truly  welcome,  because  the  least  expected,  and  the  admira- 
tion which  was  thus  created  in  the  besieged  appeared  to  produce 
proportionate  anxiety  on  the  part  of  the  enemy.' 

1 1  shall  direct  the  whole  of  my  attention  to  the  neighbourhood 
of  Taragona,  in  readiness  for  harassing  the  retreat  of  the  French, 
if  general  Suchet  should  fortunately  be  obliged  to  raise  the  siege, 
and  for  re-embarking  and  restoring  to  general  O'Donnel  what- 
ever may  remain  of  the  Valencian  troops,  according  to  the  solemn 
pledge  he  exacted  from  me  before  he  would  consent  thus  to  part 
with  the  flower  and  strength  of  his  army.  He  even  went  so  far 
as  to  declare,  in  the  presence  of  general  Miranda,  the  principal 


392  APPENDIX. 

officer  of  his  staff,  general  Doyle,  captain  Adam,  captain  White, 
and  myself,  that  he  considered  me  as  entirely  answerable  for  the 
safety  of  the  kingdom  of  Valencia,  and  that  if  I  failed  in  redeem- 
ing my  pledge  he  would  resign  his  command  for  that  particular 
account.' 

4  It  is  but  justice  to  myself,  however,  that  I  should  tell  you 
that  I  did  most  distinctly  warn  general  O'Donnel,  that  I  would 
in  no  case  answer  for  his  army  if  placed  under  the  immediate 
command  of  Campo  Verde,  for  any  distant  inland  operation,  more 
particularly  as  I  knew  that,  in  addition  to  his  own  deficiency  in 
ability,  he  was  surrounded  by  people  whose  advice  and  whose 
conduct  were  in  no  case  to  be  relied  on.' 

Captain  Codrington  to  sir  C.  Cotton. 

'  Blake,  Taragona,  June  22,  1811. 

'  I  found  upon  my  last  return  here  an  arrangement  made,  that 
in  case  of  the  enemy  gaining  the  Puerto,  general  Sarsfield  should 
retire  to  the  Mole  with  part  of  his  division,  from  whence  I  had 
only  to  assist,  but  was  much  astonished  to  find,  by  a  message, 
through  colonel  Green,  from  general  Contreras,  that  although  he 
had  heard  of  such  a  disposition  being  made  by  general  Sarsfield, 
and  assented  to  by  the  English  squadron,  it  had  not  his  official 
knowledge  or  approbation.' — '  I  understand  that  an  order  had 
arrived  in  the  morning  from  the  marquis  of  Campo  Verde  for 
general  Velasco  to  take  the  command  of  Puerto,  and  for  general 
Sarsfield  to  join  his  army,  that  the  latter  had  given  up  his  com- 
mand to  some  colonel  at  about  three  o'clock,  who  was,  by  his 
own  confession,  totally  unfit  for  it,  and  that  general  Velasco  only 
arrived  in  time  to  see  the  Spanish  troops  flying  in  confusion  from 
the  want  of  being  properly  commanded  and  the  French  assaulting 
the  place.' 

Captain  Codrington  to  sir  E.  Pellew. 

'  Mattaro,  November  1,  1811. 

'  Having  stated  in  a  letter  to  sir  Charles  Cotton,  on  the  22nd 
June  last,  that  I  understand  general  Sarsfield  had  quitted  the 
Puerto  and  embarked  without  the  knowledge  of  general  Con- 
treras, (which  indeed  was  the  substance  of  a  message  sent  me  by 
general  Contreras  himself,)  I  owe  it  to  an  officer  of  general 
Sarsfield's  high  military  character  to  declare  my  conviction  that 
the  statement  there  made  by  general  Contreras  is  absolutely 
false  and  unfounded,  and  I  beg  leave  to  enclose  in  justification  of 
my  present  opinion;  1st.  A  passport  sent  by  general  Contreras 
to  general  Sarsfield  in  consequence,  as  he  alleged,  of  an  order  from 
the  marquis  ot  Campo  Verde.  2nd.  An  extract  from  the  mani- 
festo of  the  marquis,  in  which  he  disavows  having  any  knowledge 
of  the  passports.  3rd.  A  letter  from  general  Contreras  to  general 
Sarsfield  in  answer  to  one  written  by  the  latter  requesting  to 
see  the  order  by  which  he  was  directed  to  quit  the  Puerto  at  such 


APPENDIX.  893 

a  critical  moment,  in  which  he  says,  '  that  he  cannot  send  him  a 
copy  of  that  letter,  because  it  is  confidential,  but  that  his  presence 
is  necessary  at  the  he" ad- quarters  to  assist  in  the  operations  about 
to  take  place  for  the  relief  of  the  garrison,  and  that  he  has  not  a 
moment  to  lose.'  4th.  The  copy  of  another  letter  written  on 
the  same  day  by  general  Contreras  to  the  superior  junta,  in  which 
he  says  that  general  Sarsfield  quitted  the  Puerto  without  his 
knowledge ! ! !' 

General  Doyle  to  colonel  Roche. 

'  June  23,  1811. 

'Is  it  possible  to  conceive  anything  so  absurd,  and  I  could 
almost  say  wicked,  as  the  conduct  of  the  junta  or  captain-general 
of  Carthagena  in  taking  away  the  firelocks  from  the  regiments 
they  sent  with  such  parade  of  their  patriotism  to  relieve  Taragona. 
Two  thousand  men  are  already  in  this  city  without  firelocks,  such 
is  the  daily  destruction  of  arms  by  the  enemy's  fire  and  the  get- 
ting out  of  repair  from  constant  use.' 

Captain  Cod/rington  to  sir  Charles  Cotton. 

1  Off  Taragona,  June  23,  1811. 

*  Another  regiment  arrived  from  Carthagena  yesterday  under 
convoy  of  the  Cossack,  but,  as  on  a  former  occasion,  their  arms 
were  taken  from  them  by  colonel  Hoche,  upon  their  going  to 
embark,  and  therefore,  as  being  of  no  use  to  the  garrison,  I  have 
by  desire  of  the  general  sent  them  to  Villa  Nueva,  and  as  there 
are  already  2000  men  in  the  place  without  arms,  I  have  sent  the 
Termagant  to  Carthagena,  to  endeavour  to  procure  those  which 
have  been  thus  inconsiderately  taken  from  the  troops  belonging 
to  that  place.' 

Captain  Codrington  to  sir  C.  Cotton. 

[Extract.] 

'  June  29,  1811. 

'  The  Hegulus  with  five  transports  including  a  victualler 
arrived  with  colonel  Skerrett  and  his  detachments  on  the  26th. 
The  surf  was  so  great  on  that  day  that  we  had  no  other  commu- 
nication in  the  forenoon  than  by  a  man  swimming  on  shore  with 
a  letter,  and  upon  colonel  Skerrett  putting  questions  to  general 
Doyle  and  myself  upon  the  conduct  he  should  pursue  according 
to  his  orders,  we  agreed  in  our  opinion  that  although  the  arrival 
of  the  troops  before  the  Puerto  (lower  town)  was  taken  would 
probably  have  saved  the  garrison,  it  was  now  too  late,  and  that 
their  being  landed,  if  practicable,  would  only  serve  to  prolong 
the  fate  of  the  place  for  a  very  short  time  at  the  certain  sacrifice 
of  the  whole  eventually.  This  opinion  was  grounded  on  a  num- 
ber of  different  circumstances,  and  was  in  perfect  coincidence 
with  that  of  captains  Adam  and  White.  In  the  evening  the 
surf  abated  sufficiently  for  general  Doyle,  colonel  Skerrett,  and 


894  APPENDIX. 

some  of  his  officers,  as  well  as  the  captains  of  the  squadron  and 
myself,  to  wait  upon  general  Contreras,  who  repeated  his  deter- 
mination to  cut  his  way  out  and  join  the  marquis  of  Campo 
Verde  the  instant  the  enemy's  breaching  battery  should  open,  and 
which  he  expected  would  take  place  the  following  morning,  and 
who  agreed  the  English  ought  not  to  land  with  any  view  of  de- 
fending the  town,  although  he  wished  them  to  join  in  his  medi- 
tated sortie.' 

Extracts  from  general  Contreras'  report. 

[Translated  ] 

'  I  saw  myself  reduced  to  my  own  garrison.' — *  I  considered 
if  my  force  was  capable  of  this  effort  (defending  the  breach), 
one  of  the  most  heroic  that  war  furnishes,  and  to  which  few  men 
can  bring  themselves.  I  recollected,  however,  that  I  had  still 
eight  thousand  of  the  lest  and  most  experienced  troops  in  Spain.' — 
'  All  conspired  against  this  poor  garrison.  Campc  Verde  in 
quitting  the  place  promised  to  come  back  quickly  to  its  succour, 
but  he  did  not,  although  he  daily  renewed  his  promises.  The 
kingdom  of  Valencia  sent  Miranda  with  a  division  which  disem- 
barked, and  the  day  following  re-embarked  and  went  to  join 
Campo  Verde.' 

'  An  English  division  came  on  the  26th,  colonel  Skerrett,  who 
commanded  them,  came  in  the  evening  to  confer  with  me  and  to 
demand  what  I  wished  him  to  do.  I  replied  that  if  he  would 
disembark  and  enter  the  place,  he  should  be  received  with  joy 
and  treated  as  he  merited;  that  he  had  only  to  choose  the  point 
that  he  wished  to  defend  and  I  would  give  it  to  him,  but  that 
all  was  at  his  choice,  since  I  would  neither  command  nor  counsel 
him.  The  27th  the  English  commandants  of  artillery  and 
engineers  came  to  examine  the  front  attacked,  and  being  con- 
vinced that  the  place  was  not  in  a  state  to  resist,  returned  to 
their  vessels,  and  then  all  went  away  from  the  place  they  came 
to  succour. 

'  This  abandonment  on  the  part  of  those  who  came  to  save  was 
the  worst  of  all ;  it  made  such  an  impression  on  the  soldiers,  that 
they  began  to  see  that  they  were  lost,  became  low-spirited  and 
only  resisted  from  my  continual  exhortations,  and  because  they 
saw  my  coolness  and  the  confidence  I  had,  that  if  they  executed 
my  orders  the  French  would  fail.  But  this  only  lasted  a  few 
hours,  the  notion  of  being  abandoned  again  seized  them  and 
overcame  all  other  ideas.' 

Captain  Codrington  to  wr  C.  Cotton. 

'  July  12,  1811. 

4  The  vacillating  conduct  of  general  Contreras  regarding  the 
lefence  of  Taragona  is  a  principal  feature  in  the  loss  of  that 
important  fortress.' 


APPENDIX.  395 

Captain  Codrington  to  sir  E.  Pellew. 

'  July  12,  1811. 

'  The  marquis  blames  generals  Caro  and  Miranda,  whilst  tke 
latter  retort  the  accusation;  and  I  am  inclined  to  think  that  in 
giving  full  credit  to  what  each  says  of  the  other,  neither  will 
suffer  ignominy  beyond  that  to  which  his  conduct  has  entitled 
him.' 

Ditto  to  Mr.  Wellesley. 

[Extract.] 

'  July  20, 1811. 

'  The  disasters  which  have  befallen  the  principality  will  pro- 
duce material  accusations  against  the  generals  who  lately 
commanded  in  it,  without,  I  fear,  any  of  them  meeting  the 
punishment  which  is  their  due.  Some  of  the  enclosed  papers 
may  help  you  to  form  a  just  opinion  of  their  conduct  and  that  of 
the  Spanish  marine;  and  those  respecting  the  arms  for  which  I 
sent  to  Carthagena  will  show  how  far  colonel  Hoche  is  entitled 
to  the  merit  which  he  so  largely  assumes  on  that  occasion.' 

*  To  enable  you  to  form  a  correct  opinion  of  general  Contreras 
I  must  refer  you  to  general  Doyle,  as  from  his  ignorance  of  our 
service,  the  various  requests  and  proposals  which  arose  from  the 
vacillations  in  what  he  called  his  determinations,  were  signified 
to  me  through  him.  It  does  not  appear  to  me  that  he  ever 
visited  the  works  himself,  or  it  would  not  have  fallen  to  the  lot 
of  captain  Adam  and  myself  to  remove  two  boats,  two  large 
stages,  sixteen  gun-carriages,  and  a  mortar  from  the  mole,  long 
after  the  French  were  advanced  beyond  the  Francoli  battery, 
and  two  nights  previous  to  their  gaining  the  Puerto;  an  acci- 
dental visit  to  the  mole  one  night,  just  after  placing  the  gun- 
boats and  launches,  discovered  to  me  this  mortar  with  no  less 
than  twelve  guns  in  readiness  for  forming  a  battery;  and  upon 
general  Doyle,  by  my  request,  representing  this  to  the  general 
of  artillery,  he  talked  of  inquiring  into  it  to-morrow! 

'  It  would  be  a  waste  of  words  to  describe  further  the  conduct 
of  the  general  of  artillery,  or  I  might  find  sufficient  subject  in 
the  events  of  every  passing  day  from  the  first  investment  'of  the 
place.' — '  I  shall  be  very  ready  to  come  forward  personally  in 
aid  of  that  justice  which  is  due  to  the  numberless  brave  men 
who  fell  a  sacrifice  to  the  criminality  of  the  persons  alluded  to 
who  have  so  grossly  misconducted  themselves.' 

SECTION  II. 

Captain  Codrington  to  sir  E.  Pellew. 

'July  29,  1811 

*  Had  colonel  Green,  the  military  agent  appointed  to  succeed 
general  Doyle,  adopted  the  plan  of  his  predecessors  of  continuing 
at  the  head-quarters  of  the  army  and  in  personal  communication 
with  the  captain-general,  instead  of  retiring  to  Peniscola  with 


396  APPENDIX. 

the  money  and  arms  remaining,  we  should  not  be  left  as  we  are 
to  the  precarious  source  of  mere  accidental  communications  for 
receiving  intelligence.' 

Captain  Codrington  to  Don  F.  Savories,  vocal  of  the  Junta. 

'  July  28, 1811. 

* Colonel  Green,  the  British  military  agent,  being  at 

Peniscola,  I  have  opened  the  letter  from  the  junta  to  him.' — 
'  Had  I  not  in  this  instance  opened  the  letters  to  the  admiral  and 
the  military  agent,  the  junta  would  have  received  no  answer  to 
them  until  it  would  have  been  too  late  to  execute  their  object.' 

Captain  Thomas  to  captain  Codrington. 

[Extract.] 

'  S.  M.  S.  Undaunted,  off  Ar ens,  Oct.  7,  1811. 

'  Having  observed,  in  the  Catalonia  Gazette  of  the  24th  of 
September,  the  copy  of  a  letter  said  to  be  written  by  colonel 
Green  to  his  excellency  general  Lacy,  relative  to  our  operations 
on  the  Medas  islands,  from  the  surrender  of  the  castle  to  the 
period  of  our  quitting  them,  I  beg  leave  to  state  to  you  my 
surprise  and  astonishment  at  seeing  facts  so  grossly  misrepre- 
sented, and  request  you  will  be  pleased  to  contradict  in  the  most 
positive  manner  the  assertions  there  made  use  of.  To  prove  how 
inconsistent  this  letter  is  with  real  facts,  it  may  be  necessary  for 
me  only  to  say  that  colonel  Green,  in  the  presence  and  hearing 
of  all  the  English  officers,  on  my  asking  him  a  question  relative 
to  the  practicability  of  keeping-  the  island,  did  declare  that  he 
had  nothing  to  do  with  the  expedition;  that  my  instructions 
pointed  him  out  as  a  volunteer  only.  But  immediately  after,  in 
the  hearing  of  all,  did  declare  it  to  be  his  opinion  that  the  island 
was  not  tenable. 

'  As  I  understood  it  was  intended  to  form  an  establishment  on 
the  larger  island,  I  judged  it  proper  to  retire  from  it  for  a  short 
time  and  destroy  the  remains  of  the  castle,  which  might  induce 
the  enemy  to  withdraw  from  the  works  he  had  thrown  up,  and 
thereby  afford  our  ally  an  opportunity  whenever  he  chose  to 
occupy  them  again,  to  fortify  himself  without  molestation;  and 
this  supposition  it  has  appeared  was  well  grounded.  But  while 
the  ruins  of  the  castle  stood,  it  was  an  object  of  jealousy  to  the 
French;  nor  would  they  in  my  opinion  have  quitted  the  ground 
they  occupied,  nor  the  Spaniards  have  been  enabled  to  settle 
themselves,  had  this  measure  not  been  adopted.  I  therefore 
gave  orders  for  embarking  the  guns  and  stores. 

'  If  necessary,  I  could  say  much  more  on  the  subject  of  this 
most  extraordinary  letter;  the  few  remarks  I  ha^e  made  will,  I 
think,  be  sufficient.  As  an  act  of  courtesy  to  colonel  Green,  on 
landing  the  marines,  I  directed  the  marine  officers  to  receive  their 
orders  from  him;  but  military  aid  was  not  necessary,  for  you 
may  recollect  before  the  expedition  sailed,  on  your  informing  me 
that  general  Lacy  had  offered  some  Spanish  troops,  and  asking 


APPENDIX.  397 

how  many  I  thought  would  be  necessary,  my  answer  was,  '  about 
forty;'  and  I  have  no  hesitation  in  declaring  that  without  the 
assistance  of  even  a  single  soldier  the  castle  would  have  fallen 
into  our  hands  as  speedily  as  it  did  on  this  occasion. 

SECTION  III. 

Captain  Codrington's  orders  to  captain  Adam  of  the  Invincible. 

'  July  1,  1811. 

'  You  are  hereby  directed,  in  consequence  of  a  representation 
made  to  me  by  general  Doyle,  to  proceed  towards  Majorca  in 
search  of  the  Spanish  frigates  Prueba,  Diana,  and  Astrea,  which 
the  general  reports  to  be  going  to  that  island  (contrary  to  orders) 
with  the  treasure,  archives  of  the  province,  and  the  vessels  laden 
with  stores  and  ammunition  destined  for  the  inland  fortresses  of 
Catalonia,  together  with  the  officers  and  soldiers  which  were 
saved  from  Taragona,  and  which  are  required  to  join  the  army 
immediately.  Upon  meeting  them  you  are  to  deliver  the  accom- 
panying order  for  them  to  return  here,  and  you  are,  if  necessary, 
to  enforce  obedience.' 

Captain  Codrington  to  sir  Charles  Cotton. 

'  Villa  Nueva,  July  3,  1811. 

'  I  should  feel  the  more  hurt  by  being  driven  to  adopt  such  a 
measure  had  not  the  whole  conduct  of  the  Prueba  and  Diana 
made  their  captains  a  disgrace  to  the  situation  they  hold. 
These  two  frigates  remained  quiet  spectators  of  the  British 
squadron  engaging  the  batteries  of  the  enemy  on  the  22nd  of 
last  month,  and  never  attempted  to  give  any  assistance  to  the 
garrison,  except  by  now  and  then  sending  a  gun-boat  to  join 
those  manned  by  the  English.  They  did  not  assist  in  the 
embarkation  of  the  numberless  women,  children,  and  wounded 
soldiers,  until  goaded  into  it  by  the  orders  of  general  Contreras, 
after  I  had  already  sent  above  two  thousand  to  this  place;  and 
even  when  I  had  no  longer  any  transports  for  their  reception,  the 
captain  of  the  Prueba  refused  to  receive  some  wounded  officers.' 

Ditto  to  ditto. 

'  July  18,  1811. 

'  I  cannot  describe  to  you  the  difficulties  which  I  have  been 
put  to  by  the  misconduct  of  all  the  Spanish  ships  and  vessels  of 
war  which  I  have  had  to  communicate  with  upon  the  coast,  with 
exception  of  the  Astrea  frigate  and  the  Paloma  corvette.  In 
the  others  I  have  seen  neither  courage  to  oppose  the  enemy  nor 
humanity  to  alleviate  the  distresses  of  their  countrymen.' — '  I 
have  heard  also  that  the  Algesiras,  which  lately  arrived  at  Arens, 
has  landed  the  stores  and  ammunition,  with  which  she  was 
charged,  at  the  risk  of  their  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy, 
and  has  quitted  the  station!' 


398  APPENDIX. 


SECTION  IV. 

Captain  Codrington  to  sir  E.  Pellew. 

'  July  12,  1811. 

'  General  Milans  is  collecting  a  mixture  of  troops,  consisting 
of  those  who  have  escaped  the  enemy.' 

'  He  speaks  loudly  of  his  indifference  to  a  command,  while  he 
boasts  that  if  he  were  captain-general  he  would  raise  forty  thou- 
sand men  and  clear  the  country  of  the  enemy  !  But  in  the  midst 
of  this  disgusting  rodomontade  it  is  not  difficult  to  see  that  self- 
interest  is  the  main-spring  of  all  his  actions,  and  that  instead  of 
raising  an  army  he  is  more  likely,  by  the  system  he  has  adopted, 
to  shake  the  stability  of  that  which  is  still  left  for  the  defence  of 
the  principality.' 

Captain  Cod/rington  to  sir  If.  Wellesley. 

1  September  1,  1811. 

'  The  affair  of  general  Milans'  (namely,  the  sending  of  corn  to 
Barcelona  under  his  passport)  '  which  I  mentioned  to  you  in  my 
last  private  letter,  is  still  involved  in  mystery,  which  I  hope 
however  to  penetrate  upon  my  return  to  Arens  de  Mar.  The 
Mataro  papers  reported  that  two  soldiers  were  shot  and  a  ser- 
jeant  flogged  at  Arena  for  suffering  corn  to  pass  their  guard  at 
Mongat  on  its  way  to  Barcelona.  The  fact  of  the  punishment  is 
I  believe  truly  stated,  but  the  cause  no  less  falsely,  entirely  as  I 
suspect  with  the  view  of  terminating  my  investigation  into  this 
nefarious  traffic.  General  Lacy,  instead  of  answering  my  letter, 
refers  me  by  word  of  mouth  to  the  junta,  and  the  deputation 
from  the  junta,  who  went  to  Mataro  (as  they  assured  me)  pur- 
posely to  investigate  the  business,  now  tell  me  that  it  is  an  affair 
purely  military,  and  refer  me  to  general  Milans  himself.' 

SECTION  V. 

Extract  from  a  minute  made  l>y  captain  Codrington. 

'  Mattaro,  July  6, 1811. 

'  Colonel  O'Eonan,  aid-du-camp  to  the  marquis  of  Campo 
Verde,  arrived,  and  informed  me  that  he  came  from  the  marquis, 
who  was  on  his  march  to  this  town  or  Arens,  for  the  purpose  of 
embarking  all  the  infantry  not  Catalans,  and  the  whole  of  the 
remaining  cavalry,  leaving  the  horses  on  the  beach.  Colonel 
O'Bonan  said  this  determination  was  the  result  of  a  junta,  com- 
posed of  the  marquis,  general  St.  Juan,  general  Caro,  general 
Miranda,  the  general  of  artillery,  brigadier  Santa  Cruz,  Velasco, 
and  Sarsfield;  that  after  the  thing  had  been  proposed  and  dis- 
cussed a  long  time,  Sarsfield  was  the  first  to  give  bis  vote,  that 
he  rose  from  his  seat  and  said,  '  any  officer  who  could  give  such 
an  opinion  must  be  a  traitor  to  his  country,  and  that  he  and  his 
division  would  stand  or  fall  with  the  principality.'  Every  other 
officer  was  of  a  contrary  opinion,  except  the  marquis  (it  after- 
wards appeared  that  Santa  Cruz  also  supported  Sarsfield),  who 


APPENDIX.  399 

thought  with  Sarsfield,  and  yet  it  seems  he  allowed  himself  to  be 
led  on  by  the  other  generals.  In  short,  it  appears  he  was  resolved 
to  abandon  the  principality. 

'  I  told  him,  without  hesitation,  that  to  embark  the  Valencians 
I  felt  a  duty  to  general  O'Donnel,  to  the  kingdom  of  Valencia, 
and  to  the  whole  nation,  but  that  I  felt  it  equally  my  duty  upon 
no  account  to  embark  the  army  of  Catalonia,  and  thus  become  a 
party  concerned  in  the  abandonment  of  a  province  I  had  been 
sent  to  protect.'  —  'The  colonel,  who  could  not  venture  on 
shore  again  lest  he  should  be  murdered  by  the  inhabitants  of 
Mattaro,  for  having  been  the  bearer  of  a  commission  to  arrest 
brigadier  Milans  about  a  month  ago,  sent  to  the  marquis  my 
answer.' 

Extract  from  a  minute  of  information  given  by  the  baron  d'Eroles. 

'  July  9,  1811. 

'  The  baron  d'Eroles  was  appointed  captain-general  of  Cata- 
lonia by  the  junta  of  general  officers,  of  which  the  marquis  of 
Campo  Yerde  was  president,  and  by  the  voice  of  the  people. 
His  reply  was,  that  so  long  as  the  army  continued  in  the  princi- 
pality, and  that  there  was  a  senior  general  officer,  he  would  not 
admit  it,  but  that  the  moment  the  army  passed  the  frontier  (it 
was  then  at  Agramunt,  in  full  march  to  Aragon),  he  would  accept 
the  command,  unmindful  of  the  dreadful  situation  in  which  he 
should  place  himself,  but  he  would  do  so  in  order  to  continue  the 
struggle,  and  to  prevent  anarchy  and  confusion.  In  this  state 
things  were  when  general  Lacy  arrived.  The  baron  instantly 
sought  him,  could  not  find,  but  met  one  of  his  aid-du-camps,  by 
whom  he  wrote  to  him  to  say  what  had  occurred,  but  that  he 
was  resolved  to  support  general  Lacy  in  his  command,  not  only 
with  all  his  local  influence,  but  by  his  personal  exertions,  and 
that  he  would  immediately  join  him  to  put  this  resolution  in 
practice.' 

Extract  from  general  Doyle  s  letter  after  seeing  the  above. 
'  The  Valencian  division,  that  is  to  say,  two  thousand  four 
hundred  of  the  four  thousand  three  hundred  soldiers  who  dis- 
embarked in  this  province,  are  now  on  board  to  return  to  Valencia. 
General  Miranda  says  the  desertion  took  place  in  consequence  of 
the  marquis's  determination  to  proceed  to  Aragon,  which  made 
them  believe  they  would  not  be  embarked.  In  short,  most  dis- 
graceful has  been  the  conduct  of  this  division,  and  the  marquis, 
as  you  will  see  by  this  letter  to  me,  attaches  to  it  no  small 
portion  of  blame.' 

Captain  Codrington  to  the  marquis  of  Campo  Verde. 

'  SlaTce,  July  5,  1811. 

'  I  have  to  remind  you  that  by  ordering  the  Valencian  division 
out  of  Taragona,  in  breach  of  the  terms  by  which  I  bound  myself 
when  I  brought  them,  you  yourself  broke  the  pledge  given  by 
me,  and  dissolved  the  contract.' 


400  APPENDIX. 


Extracted  from  captain  Codringtoris  papers. 

'Minute  of  a  conference  betwixt  generals  Caro  and  Miranda 
with  general  Doyle  and  myself  this  day. 

'  July  9,  1811. 

'About  eight  o'clock  generals  Caro  and  Miranda  came  on 
board  the  Blake.  After  being  seated  in  the  cabin  with  general 
Doyle  and  myself,  general  Caro  begged  general  Doyle  would 
explain  to  me,  that  they  were  come  in  consequence  of  my  pro- 
mise, to  request  I  would  embark  the  division  of  Valencian  troops 
which  I  had  brought  from  Peniscola.  I  desired  to  know  what 
promise  general  Caro  understood  me  to  have  made?  He 
answered,  that  I  would  take  the  above  troops  back  to  Valencia. 
I  denied  positively  that  I  had  made  any  promise  to  re-einb,ark 
them  if  they  should  ever  join  the  marquis  of  Campo  Yerde, 
although  I  had  deeply  pledged  myself  to  restore  them  to  general 
O'Donnel  if  they  joined  in  a  sortie  from  the  garrison,  which  1 
was  very  confident  would  be  decisive  of  its  success.  I  then 
referred  general  Miranda  to  a  similar  explanation,  which  I  gave 
to  him,  through  general  Doyle,  on  the  day  after  our  quitting 
Peniscola,  when  he  had  said  he  was  ordered,  both  by  his  written 
instructions  and  by  verbal  explanation  from  general  O'Donnel, 
not  to  land  within  the  garrison.  General  Miranda  instantly 
repeated  that  so  he  was;  upon  which  general  Doyle,  to  whom  he 
had  shown  those  instructions  jointly  with  myself,  after  leaving 
Taragona  for  Villa  "N ueva,  when  under  a  difficulty  as  to  how  he 
should  procee.d,  referred  him  to  them  again,  when  it  appearing 
that  he  was  therein  positively  ordered  '  desembarcar  en  la  plaza 
de  Taragona,'  general  Doyle  stopped. 
'  General  Miranda.  '  Ah !  but  read  on.' 

'  General  Doyle.  '  No,  sir,  there  is  the  positive  proof  of  your 
receiving  such  an  order.' 

'  General  Miranda.  '  Well,  but  read  on.' 

'  General  Doyle.  'No,  sir.  This  (pointing  to  the  papei*)  is  the 
positive  proof  of  your  receiving  such  an  order,  which  we  wanted 
to  establish,  because  vou  positively  denied  it.' 

'  Upon  this  general  Caro,  shrugging  up  his  shoulders,  said, 
'  He  was  not  aware  of  there  being  any  such  order.'  And  general 
Miranda  again  requested  general  Doyle  would  read  on. 
'  General  Doyle.  '  For  what  purpose?' 

'  General  Miranda.  '  To  prove  that  I  was  not  to  shut  myself 
up  with  the  division  in  the  plaza  de  Taragona.' 

'  General  Doyle.  '  There  is  no  occasion,  sir,  for  any  proof 
of  that,  for  it  was  a  part  of  the  very  stipulation  made  by 
captain  Codrington  when  he  strongly  pledged  himself  to  general 
O'Donnel.' 

'  General  Doyle  continued, — '  And  now,  general  Caro,  that  we 
have  proved  to  you  that  general  Miranda  had  orders  to  land  in 
Taragona,  and  that  captain  Codrington  is  bound  by  no  such  pro- 
mise as  you  had  imagined,  I  must  inform  you  that  he  has  been 


APPENDIX.  401 

eight  days  upon  the  Coast  with  all  the  ships  of  war  and  transports 
which  are  wanted  for  other  services,  for  the  sole  purpose  of 
embarking  these  troops ;  and  he  desires  me  to  add  that  in  con- 
sideration of  what  is  due  to  the  liberal  and  exemplary  assistance 
afforded  by  general  O'Donnel  and  Valencia  in  aid  of  Taragona, 
but  not  at  all  on  account  of  any  pledge  he  has  been  said  to  have 
given,  that  he  will  use  the  same  exertion  in  re-embarking  and 
restoring  the  troops  which,  he  would  have  done  if  so  bound  by 
his  word  of  honour.' ' 

Mr.  Wellesley  to  lord  Wellesley. 

'  July  28,  1811. 

*  The  morning  of  the  30th  of  June,  a  few  hours  after  the  arrival 
of  the  British  squadron  and  Spanish  vessels  in  the  roadstead  of 
Villa  JSTueva,  five  thousand  French  infantry  and  five  hundred 
cavalry  surprised  the  place  by  a  night  march,  and  seized  all  the 
property  of  Taragona,  which  had  been  sent  there  before  the 
siege.  Twenty-five  thousand  dollars  for  each  of  the  next  three 
months  was  demanded,  but  no  violence  or  plunder  allowed. 
Eroles  narrowly  escaped.  Lacy,  appointed  to  command  in 
Catalonia,  arrived  1st  July  at  Villa  Nueva,  the  6th  went  to 
Ingualada  to  join  Campo  Verde.' 

'  Desertion  in  the  army  at  Mattaro  has  been  carried  to  a  most 
alarming  extent  since  the  fall  of  Taragona;  the  first  night  fifteen 
hundred  men  disappeared,  nearly  three  hundred  cavalry  had 
likewise  set  off  towards  Aragon;  and  these  desertions  are  to  be 
attributed  to  the  gross  neglect  and  want  of  activity  on  the  part 
of  the  officers.' — 'The  only  division  that  keeps  together  in  any 
tolerable  order  is  that  of  general  Sarsfield,  of  about  two  thousand 
men.' — '  He  had  however  disputes  with  Eroles,  and  the  people 
called  for  the  latter  to  lead  them.' 


No.  IX. 

SECTION  I. 

POLITICAL  STATE  OF  KING  JOSEPH. 

SPANISH  MINISTER'S  COMPLAINTS  OF  THE  FRENCH  GENERALS. 
From  the  councillor  of  state,  Mariano  Luis  Orquijo,  to  Icing 


'  Madrid,  22  Juillet,  1810. 

*  SIRE, — Le  commissaire  royal  de  Cordoue  me  mande,  que  le 
due  de  Dalmatie  lui  a  fait  ecrire  officiellement  de  ne  remettre 
aucune  somme  d'argent  a  la  capitale  lors  meme  que  le  ministre 
des  finances  le  demanderait,  jusqu'a  ce  que  les  depenses  de 
1'arinee  des  regimens  qu'on  leve  et  des  employes  de  la  province, 
&c.,  furent  pleinement  converts,  et  que  le  due  prendrait  les 
mesures  convenables,  dans  le  cas  que  cette  determination  ne  fut 
pas  suivie.' 

VOL.  III.  D  D 


402  APPENDIX. 

'  Madrid,  3  Agosto  de  1810. 

'Le  general  Sebastian!  a  fait  voir  au  commissaire  royale  a 
Grenade,  un  ordre  du  due  de  Dalmatie,  qui  lui  enjoint  de  la 
maniere  la  plus  expresse,  de  le  mettre  en  etat  d'arrestation  si 
pour  le  ler  Aout  lui  et  le  prefet  de  Malaga  ne  mettent  au  pouvoir 
de  Sebastian!  quatre  millions  de  reaux.  L'exorbitance  de  cette 
somme,  pour  une  province  qui  a  deja  paye  son  contingent,  et  le 
court  terme  de  huit  jours  designe  pour  le  payement,  donnent  a 
croire  que  cette  somme  une  fois  livree  on  en  demandera  une  plus 
forte.  Selon  toutes  les  apparences  et  d'apres  les  conversations 
particulieres,  il  s'agit  de  profiter  de  1'absence  du  roi  pour  mettre 
les  Andalousies  sur  le  meme  pied  que  les  provinces  de  Biscaye, 
Burgos,  &c.  II  se  peut  neanmoins  qu'on  ait  voulu  inspirer  ces 
craintes  dans  des  idees  tout-a-fait  differentes.  Quoiqu'il  en  soit 
il  serait  scandaleux  de  voir  un  commissaire  qui  represente  la 
personne  du  roi  arrete  dans  une  de  ses  provinces.' 

From  Mariano  Luis  Or  qui  jo  to  Icing  Joseph. 

1  Madrid,  7  Aout,  1810. 

'Monsieur  d'Aranza  m'ecrit  en  date  du  22  Aout  dans  une 
lettre  particuliere  les  paroles  suivantes,  en  les  soulignant  pour 
mieux  fixer  1'attention:  '  Le  marecJial  Soult  est  tres  content,  mais 
il  ne  fera  usage  de  son  autorite  que  pour  le  lien :  il  aime  le  roi  et 
la  nation;  ce  pays  lui  plait  beaucoup.' ' 

Ditto  to  ditto. 

'  Madrid,  13  Aout,  1810. 

'  Parmi  les  lettres  que  ni'a  porte  le  courrier  d'Andalousie 
arrive  hier,  j'en  remarque  une  de  Monsieur  Aranza  ecrite  dans 
un  style  etudie  et  que  je  soup9onne  redigee  d'accord  avec  le  due 
de  Dalmatie.  C'est  un  panegyrique  a  la  louange  de  ce  marechal 
dans  lequel  monsieur  d'Aranza  porte  aux  nues  l'intelligence  et  le 
zele  du  due  de  Dalmatie  dans  la  partie  administrative;  la  consi- 
deration qu'il  donne  aux  autorites  Espagnoles;  son  extreme 
adresse  a  manier  les  esprits,  et  1'liabilite  de  ses  dispositions  mili- 
taires,  dans  un  pays  convert  d'insurges.  M.  d'Aranza  termine 
en  formant  le  voeu  que  le  mareclial  ne  soit  aucunement  trouble 
dans  1'execution  de  ses  plans,  et  que  le  sort  de  1'Andalousie  soit 
mis  entierement  a  sa  discretion.' 

Ditto  to  ditto. 

'  Madrid,  le  23  Aout,  1810. 

'  Par  ma  correspondance  avec  1'Andalousie  j'ai  appris;  de 
Cordone:  que  M.  Angulo  a  recu  les  lettres  qui  1'appellent  a 
Madrid,  et  qu'il  se  dispose  a  suivre  le  grand  convoi  sorti  de 
Seville  le  11  du  courant.  De  Seville:  qu'un  corsaire  Fran£ais 
s'etant  empar^  d'un  paquebot  qui  allait  de  Cadiz  a  Alicante,  on  y 
avait  trouve*  entr'autres  depeclies  une  lettre  de  Campmany,  grand 
partisan  des  Anglais,  et  un  des  Coryphees  de  la  revolution.  II 
arouait  a  son  ami,  don  Anselmo  Rodriguez  de  Bibas,  intendant 
de  1'armde  du  centre,  qui  s'etait  plaint  a  lui  des  exces  que  com- 


APPENDIX.  403 

mettaient  certaines  juntes,  que  Cadiz  n'offrait  pas  un  spectacle 
moms  digne  de  pitie:  que  les  Anglais  qu'il  avait  appris  a  connaitre 
s'arrogaient  peu  a  peu  toute  1'autorite :  que  le  commerce  libre 
aocorde  aux  ports  d'Amerique  excitait  a  Cadiz  un  mecontente- 
ment  general,  et  que  Venegas  allait  au  Mexique  en  qualite  de 
viceroi :  il  parle  en  outre  de  1'arrestation  de  plusieurs  personnes 
connues,  et  de  la  deconsideration  dans  laquelle  est  tombee  la 
regence.' 

From  Mariano  Luis  Orquifo  to  king  Joseph. 

'  Madrid,  27  Septembre,  1810. 

'  Le  marechal  Victor  permet  le  passage  a  beaucoup  de  femmes 
qui  veulent  se  reunir  a  leurs  maris,  les  femmes  en  contant  les 
choses  telles  qu'elles  sont,  detruisent  bien  des  erreurs  dans 
lesquelles  on  a  generalement  ete  entraine  par  le  gouvernement 
actuel.  L'ennemi  permit  ces  jours  derniers  1'entree  dans  Tile  a 
plusieurs  femmes  qui  voulaient  passer  par  Cliiclanes  pour  se 
reunir  a  leurs  parents,  mais  dernierement  elles  furent  contenus  a 
coups  de  canon,  et  un  boulet  emporta  la  tete  de  celui  qui  les 
accompagnait.  Le  gouvernement  Anglais  preside  a  toutes  les 
operations,  et  craint  cette  espece  de  communications.' 

'  Valladolid,  le  II  Aout,  1810. 

1  SIRE, — Je  suis  arrive  a  Valladolid,  ou  je  n'ai  pas  trouve  le 
general  Kellermann.  II  parait  que  les  Espagnols  ont  cerne  un 
detachement  de  Francais  qui  se  trouve  a  la-Puebla  de  Senabria, 
et  que  ce  general  y  est  alle  pour  le  debloquer.  Les  guerrilles 
ont  ete  hier  aux  portes  de  Valladolid,  et  il  y  a  cinq  a  six  jours 
que  soixante-dix  Francais  ont  ete  detruits  a  Villalon ;  la  terreur 
s'est  emparee  de  tous  les  esprits,  et  Ton  croit  que  trois  cents 
homines  ne  suffisent  pas  pour  faire  passer  un  courrier:  malgre 
cela,  je  partirai  demain,  escorte  par  deux  cents  hommes  avec  un 
convoi  de  prisonniers  de  Ciudad  Eodrigo,  done  le  nonibre  n'est 
pas  considerable,  parcequ'ici  on  leur  accorde  la  liberte*  moyennant 
une  somme  qu'on  regie  avec  le  general  Kellermann  pour  les  frais 
de  la  guerre. 

'  Toutes  les  autorites  du  pays  sont  venues  me  visiter,  et  me 
consulter  sur  la  conduite  qu'elles  doivent  tenir  depuis  les  derniers 
ordres  du  general  Kellermann  pour  qu'elles  n'obeissent  ni  ne 
correspondent  avec  d'autre  autorite  que  la  sienne.  C'est  la 
chancellerie  qui  se  trouve  plus  embarrassee  que  toute  autre, 
parcequ'elle  ne  peut  concilier  Tadministration  de  la  justice  au 
nom  de  votre  majeste  avec  1'impossibilite  de  correspondre  avec 
son  ministre. 

'  Je  n'ai  pas  re9u  le  moindre  egard  du  general  Dufrene  qui 
est  a  la  place  du  general  Kellermann.  II  ne  m'a  pas  visite,  ni 
m^me  accorde  un  factionnaire ;  tout  le  monde  s'en  est  apper^u, 
et  cette  conduite  a  confirme  1'opinion  que  Ton  a  con9ue  que  votre 
majeste  ne  regne  point  dans  ce  pays.  J'ai  tache  de  detruire  une 
idee  qui  decourage  les  veritables  sujets  de  votre  majeste,  et 
soutient  les  esperancea  de  ses  ennemis.  Les  generaux  ne  s'apper- 

DD2 


404  APPENDIX. 

^oivent  pas  du  mal  qu'ils  produisent  en  faisant  croire  que  le 
service  de  1'empereur,  et  ses  interets  peuvent  etre  en  contradic- 
tion avec  ceux  de  votre  majeste. 

*  Si  le  general  Dufrene   s'etait  borne   a  ne  rien  faire  pour 
faciliter  mon  voyage,  j'aurai  nioins  de  motifs  de  plainte  contre 
lui,  mais  il  a  retemi  1'escorte  de  cavalerie  que  le  general  Tilly 
m'avait  donnee.     De  toutes  les  manieres,  sire,  je  ferai  tout  ce 
qui  sera  en  mon  pouvoir  pour  accelerer  mon  voyage,  et  repondre 
a  la  confiance  avec  laquelle  votre  majeste   a  daigne  me   dis- 
tinguer. 

*  LE  MAKQUIS  ALMENABA.' 

Orquijo  to  Joseph,  relating  his  conference  with  the  French 
ambassador. 

[Extract.] 

'  Madrid,  Aout  22,  1810. 

*  Je  lui  dis  de  s'adresser  sur  ces  deux  points  au  ministre  des 
relations  exterieures,  il  me  repondit  qu'un  desagrement  qu'on 
eprouvait  avec  lui  etait  1'obligation  de  lui  donner  a  tout  bout  de 
champ  des  notes  ecrites,  qu'a  Vittoria  il  1'avait  compromis  en 
presentant  a  votre  majeste  ces  notes  comme  officielles,  que  le  bon 
vieux   due  (ce  sont  ses  propres  expressions)  etourdissait  dans 
1'instant,  qu'il  n'entendait  point,  ou  ne  voulait  point  entendre  ce 
qu'on  lui  disait,  et  qu'il  demandait  qu'on  lui  donnat  par  ecrit  ce 
qui  n'eta.it  pas  necessaire  d'ecrire.     Je  lui  repetais  toujours  qu'il 
devait  s'adresser  au  due  puisque  c'etait  le  seul  canal  par  lequel 
il  devait  diriger  ses  demandes,  que  je  ne  me  nielais  point  de  ces 
affaires,  et  que  je  n'en  entretiendrais  votre  majeste  a  moins  que 
votre  majeste  ne  m'en  par] at  la  premiere,  mais  comme  simple 
particulier  je  1'assurai  de  I'inviolabilite  des  promesses  de  votre 
majeste  et  de  ses  idees  liberales.  L'ambassadeur  ajouta  que  dans 
la  matinee  du  jour  de  St.  Napoleon,  et  les  jours  suivants,  le 
general  Belliard,  Borelli,  et  leurs  alentours  avaient  parle  fort 
mal  des  expressions  de  votre  majeste  sur  ses  premiers  devoirs, 
et  qu'il  ne  doutait  pas  qu'ils  n'en  eussent  ecrit  a  Paris;  qu'il 
n'avait  pas  pu  se  dispenser  de  transmettre  a  sa  cour  ces  paroles; 
mais   qu'il  les   avait  presentees   comme   une    consequence    du 
premier  discours  tenu  par  votre  majeste  et  une  nuance  necessaire 
pour  adoucir  le  mauvais  effet  qu'avait  produit  ici  1'article  du 
Moniteur  sur  les  mots  de  1'empereur  au  due  de  Berg.     Je  le  lui 
avais  presente  de  cette  ma  mere  en  sortant  de  Tappartement  de 
votre  majeste,  et  je  lui  montrai  en  meme  temps  un  rapport  venu 
de  la  Navarre  dans  lequel  on  depeignait  le  facheux  etat  de  ce 
royaume   en  proie  aux  exces   des  bandes  de  brigands  et  aux 
dilapidations  des  gouvernemens  militaires.     Si  1'ambassadeur  a 
ecrit  dans  ces  termes  comme  il  me  1'a  dit,  autant  par  honneur 
que  par  attachement  a  votre  majeste,  a  son  pays  et  au  notre,  il  a 
bien  rempli  ses  devoirs.     Quoiqu'il  en  soit,  je  me  suis  cru  oblige 
de  donner  connaissance  a  votre  majeste"  de  ces  faits  ainsi  que  de 
la  surprise  que,  selon  1'ambassadeur,  a  cause  a  1'empereur  et  au 


APPENDIX.  405 

ministere  Francais  le  silence  du  due  de  Santa  Fe  qui  ne  s'explique 
sur  rien.  L'ambassadeur  se  plaint  d'avoir  ete  compromis  par 
lui,  car  a  sa  demande  et  en  consequence  des  conversations 
frequentes  qu'il  eut  avec  lui  pendant  lea  trois  jours  qu'il  passa  a 
Madrid,  il  ecrivit  a  sa  cour  que  le  due  de  Santa  Fe  etait  charge 
de  negocier  sur  la  situation  de  votre  majeste  et  celle  de  notre 
pays,  que  1'ambassadeur  lui-meme  disait  ne  pouvoir  pas  durer. 
C'est  a  la  lettre  ce  que  c'est  dit  entre  1'ambassadeur  et  moi,' 
&c.  &c. 

Orquijo  to  Joseph. 

'  Madrid,  le  13  Novembre,  1810. 

'  Monsieur  Pereyra  a  recu  d.u  marechal  Soult  une  reponse 
extremement  aigre.  Ce  commissaire  royal  persiste  dans  son 
opinion  que  les  mesures  indiquees  par  le  due  de  Dalmatie  pour 
l'approvisionnement  de  1'armee  ne  rempliront  pas  le  but  qu'il  se 
propose;  mais  le  marechal  veut  etre  obei.  D'un  autre  cote  le 
general  Sebastiani  1'a  contraint  a  lui  donner  onze  cent  mille  reaux. 
Place  entre  ces  deux  ecueils,  Monsieur  Pereyra  a  perdu  courage 
et  demande  a  votre  majeste  de  le  rappeller  a  Madrid.  Le  general 
Dufour  a  pris  le  commandement  de  Grenade. 

'  MAEIANO  Luis  DE  ORQUIJO.' 

Ditto  to  ditto. 

'  Madrid,  19  de  Decembre,  1810. 

*  Monsieur  le  comte  de  Montarco  etait  le  11  courant  a  Man- 
zanares,  il  m'ecrit  que  les  habitans  de  la  Manche  se  plaignent 
de  ce  que  les  troupes  qui  retrouvent  dans  la  province  ne  les 
protegent  pas  autant  que  leur  nombre  le  leur  perniet,  que  les 
brigands  viennent  leur  enlever  leurs  grains  pour  les  transporter 
dans  les  royaumes  de  Valence  et  de  Murcie,  ou  dans  1'Estrema- 
doure.  Us  craignent  une  disette  et  desirent  ardemmement  qu'il 
se  forme  de  grands  depots  de  grains  dans  des  places  a  1'abri  des 
incursions  des  partis  d'insurges.  Les  commandants  des  troupes 
Fran9aises  sont  d'une  exigence  et  d'une  hauteur  insupportables, 
et  les  rapports  faits  au  comte  de  Montarco  par  toutes  les  autorites 
legales  du  pays  confirment  complettement  ceux  que  1'intendant 
de  la  Manche  ne  cesse  de  faire  aux  divers  ministeres  depuis 
plusieurs  mois.' 

'  Madrid,  le  15  Fevrier,  1811. 

'  SIEE, — Le  prefet  de  Santander  me  remet,  en  date  du  16  Jan- 
vier, copie  des  offices  qu'il  a  recus  pour  la  reunion  de  cette  pro- 
vince au  gouvernement  militaire  de  Biscaye.  J'ai  1'honneur  de 
les  mettre  sous  les  yeux  de  votre  majeste  en  lui  observant  que 
cette  mesure  a  ete  pris  sur  la  proposition  du  general  Caffarelli. 

'  On  a  demande  au  prefet  de  Santander  un  etat  des  employes 
civils  et  militaires,  des  moines,  du  clerge,  et  des  appointemens 
dont  ils  jouissent.  II  croit  en  consequence  que  des  attributions 
ainsi  que  celles  des  employes  seront  nulles  des  que  la  province 
sera  gouvernee  a  1'instar  de  celle  de  Biscaye.  II  ajoute  que  lui 


406  APPENDIX. 

et  les  chefs  principaux  de  1'administration  sont  decides  a  ne 
travailler  que  sons  les  ordres  de  votre  majeste  et  demandent 
avec  instance  que  votre  majeste  ne  les  abandonne  pas. 

'  Le  sous-prefet  de  Logrogne  me  dit  en  date  du  22  Janvier 
que  1'opinion  publique  s'est  amelioree  depuis  qu'on  y  a  appris  les 
nouvelles  du  Portugal,  et  qu'on  j  commit  le  peu  de  moyens  de 
defense  qu'offre  Valence  dans  le  desordre  extreme  qui  y.regne. 
La  Riofa  ne  renferme  plus  de  bandes  complettes  d'insurges,  mais 
on  y  trouve  encore  quelques  brigands  epars  et  des  voleurs  de 
grands  chemins. 

'  MARIANO  Luis  DE  OEQUIJO.' 

SECTION  II. 

(RELATING  TO  JOSEPH'S  ABDICATION.) 
Vindication  of  the  king. 

Le  ministre  secretaire  d'etat  a  monsieur  le  due  de  Santa  JFe,  et  en 
son  absence  a  monsieur  le  marquis  d'Almenara. 

Palais  de  Madrid,  le  12  Septembre,  1810,  Pars. 

EXCELLENCE, — Le  courrier  de  cabinet,  Don  Martin  Estenoz, 
qui  partit  de  Paris  le  22  Juillet,  a  remis  les  lettres  ecrites  par 
V.  E.  le  meme  jour  et  les  copies  de  celles  que  vous  envoyates  le 
19  Juin  par  le  courrier  Alvarez,  qui  furent  interceptees.  Le  roi 
les  a  lues  avec  la  plus  grande  attention,  et  apres  s'etre  bien 
penetre  des  communications  faites  a  V.  E.  au  nom  de  1'empereur, 
par  monsieur  le  due  de  Cadore,  et  les  observations  particulieres 
de  ce  ministre,  S.  M.  desirant  detruire  d'un  seul  trait,  les  craintes 
et  la  defiance  que  des  personnes,  tout  au  moms  mal  instruites, 
se  sont  efforcees  d'inspirer,  m'a  ordonne  d'entrer  en  explication 
sur  tous  les  points  dont  elles  traitent.  Mais  je  dois  avant  tout 
faire  connaitre  a  V.  E.  que  le  roi  s'est  montre  satisfait  de  la  juste 
interpretation  donnee  a  ses  idees,  et  a  ses  sentimens  dans  la 
reponse  que  V.  E.  a  faite  au  due  de  Cadore,  relativement  a  la 
protection  dont  S.  M.  I.  desire  que  le  commerce  Eran^ais  jouisse 
dans  les  reglemens  des  douanes,  en  offrant  d'assurer  une  faveur 
reciproque  dans  ses  etats  aux  productions  d'Espagne.  L'empereur 
ne  pent  ignorer  les  vues  liberales  de  son  auguste  frere,  et  si 
S.  M.  I.  a  ete  exactement  inform  ee  sur  ce  point,  elle  saura  que, 
des  son  avenement  au  trone,  le  roi  a  ecarte  bien  des  obstacles 
opposes  a  1'industrie  Francaise  qu'il  s'agit  de  favoriser  encore  par 
de  nouvelles  dispositions. 

II  est  bien  douloureux  pour  le  roi  d'avoir  a  se  justifier  de 
plusieurs  imputations  auxquelles  on  a  du  croire  puisqu'on  les  a 
communiquees  a  V.  E.  L'une  d'elles  est  que  le  roi  a  rendu  a 
leurs  proprietaires,  ou  dispose  a  son  gre,  d'une  partie  des  biens 
confisques  par  1'empereur.  Cela  supposerait  de  la  part  de  S.  M. 
un  oubli  de  la  parole  donnee  a  1'empereur  de  ne  se  meler  en 
aucune  maniere  de  ces  confiscations :  mais  c'est  un  infame  impos- 
ture, et  son  auteur  merite  un  chatiment  exemplaire.  Qu'on  cite 
une  propriete  un  pouce  de  terrain  confisque  par  1'empereur,  et 


APPENDIX.  407 

dont  on  ait  dispose:  on  ne  le  pourra  point  si  dans  une  pure 
question  de  fait  on  en  impose  ainsi  a  1'empereur,  que  sera  ce 
lorsqu'on  ne  parle  que  par  conjectures  et  presomption?  Le  roi 
porte  a  un  si  haut  degre  son  respect  pour  les  decrets  de  confisca- 
tions de  S.  M.  I.  qu'ayant  besoin  d'un  des  edifices  qui  y  sont 
compris  pour  y  placer  des  etablissemens  publics,  il  n'a  meme  paa 
voulu  s'en  servir  provisoirement.  S.  M.  n'a-t-elle  pas,  en  conse- 
quence, le  droit  de  reclamer,  pour  son  honneur,  la  punition  de 
ses  detracteurs  ?  S.  M.  I.  s'est  expliquee  sur  la  direction  donnee 
a  la  guerre  et  la  maniere  dont  elle  a  ete  faite. 

L'empereur  ecrivit  au  roi  pour  lui  representer  la  lenteur  des 
operations,  et  1'inaction  des  armees.  Aussitot  S.  M.  entreprit  la 
conquete  de  1'Andalousie.  Le  due  de  Cadore  a  dit  a  V.  E.  que 
la  soumission  de  cette  province  etait  illusoire,  puisqu'elle  se 
trouve  inondee  de  partis  d'insurges  et  de  bandes  de  brigands. 
Qu'on  considere  la  vaste  etendue  de  1'Andalousie:  le  petit 
nombre  de  troupes  Francaises  que  1'obstination  de  Cadiz  permet 
d'y  repandre:  les  pieges  de  toute  espece  que  tendent  les  Anglais 
et  leurs  continuelles  attaques:  qu'on  parcoure  1'histoire  de  toutes 
les  guerres  centre  1'Angleterre  et  Ton  verra  qu'independamment 
des  vingt  mille  Espagnols  constamment  stationes  a  St.  Rocq,  il 
etait  encore  necessaire  d'entretenir  sur  cette  cote  un  nombre 
considerable  de  troupes  pt>ur  les  opposer  aux  entreprises  partielles 
de  1'ennemi.  Si  ces  precautions  etaient  indispensables  dans  un 
terns  de  calme  et  de  tranquillite,  qu'elles  doivent  etre  les  espe- 
rances  et  les  moyens  de  1'Angleterre  dans  1'agitation  actuelle  de 
1'Espagne  et  la  nature  de  la  guerre  dont  elle  est  le  theatre?  Le 
roi  peut  dire  avec  verite,  que  la  conquete  militaire  et  morale  de 
1'Andalousie  est  son  ouvrage,  et  que  ses  paroles,  sa  conduite,  et 
les  sages  mesures  qu'il  a  prises,  ont  prepare  la  tranquillite  dont 
elle  jouit.  S.  M.  y  a  organise  des  gardes  civiques  chargees  de 
defendre  leurs  foyers,  et  malgre  le  voisinage  de  cette  province 
avec  1'Estremadure  et  les  instigations  continuelles  de  la  junte  de 
Cadiz  et  des  Anglais,  1'Andalousie  renferme  beaucoups  moins 
de  partis  ou  de  bandes  d'insurges  que  la  Castille,  la  Biscaye,  et 
la  Navarre,  qui  ont  ete  places  sous  le  regime  militaire.  Enfin 
1'on  trouve  en  Andalousie  une  organisation  complette  de  com- 
pagnies  de  miguelettes  qui  veillent  a  la  tranquillite  des  villes  et 
a  la  surete  des  chemins.  Leurs  services  sont  tellement  utiles  que 
le  marechal  due  de  Dalmatie  a  donne  le  plus  de  developpement 
possible  a  cette  institution. 

Si  1'Andalousie  n'est  pas  entierement  pacifiee,  si  la  junte  de 
Cadiz  existe  encore,  et  si  les  Anglais  y  exercent  leur  fatale 
influence,  on  doit  1'attribuer  en  grande  partie  aux  machinations 
et  aux  traines  ourdies  par  la  junte  et  1'Angleterre  au  moment  ou 
parvint  a  leur  connaissance  le  decret  du  8  Fevrier  qui  etablit  des 
gouvernemens  militaires  dans  la  JSTavarre,  la  Biscaye,  1'Arragon, 
et  la  Catalogue.  Quelques  gouverneurs  Fran9ais  ayant  traite  ces 
provinces  comme  si  elles  etaient  absolument  detachees  de  la 
monarchic,  les  membres  de  la  junte  de  Cadiz  et  les  Anglais  en 
profiterent  pour  souffler  de  nouveau  le  feu  de  la  discorde  et 


40R  APPENDIX. 

refuter  les  expressions  du  roi  c[ui  repetait  sans  cesse,  « Que  la 
nation  conserverait  son  integrite  et  son  independance:  que  ses 
institutions  s'amelioreraient  sous  la  protection  d'un  trone  soutenu 
par  les  relations  intimes  du  roi  avec  1'empereur;  qu'elle  n'aurait 
a  combattre  que  1'ennemi  qui  voulait  s'arroger  1'empire  exclusif 
des  mers.'  Voila  le  sens  qu'on  a  toujours  donne  enEspagne  aux 
mots  independance  et  integrite.  Ce  langage  est  celui  dont  s'est 
servi  S.  M.  I.  non  seulement  avec  les  Espagnols,  mais  a  la  face 
de  1'univers:  il  ne  peut  done  etre  odieux  ni  criminal  dans  la 
bouche  du  roi.  Mais  combien  n'est-il  pas  dementi  par  la  con- 
duite  de  certains  gouverneurs  qui  paraissent  s'obstiner  a  pro- 
longer  1'insurrection  d'Espagne,  a  1'annihiler  ou  la  detruire  plutot 
qu'a  la  soumettre  !  car  dans  plusieurs  endroits  on  ne  se  contente 
pas  d'exclure  toute  idee  de  1'autorite  du  roi  en  faisant  administrer 
la  justice  au  nom  de  1'empereur,  mais  ce  qui  est  pire,  on  a  exige 
que  les  tribunaux  civils  de  Valladolid  et  de  Valencia  pretassent 
serment  de  fidelite  et  d'obeissance  a  S.  M.  I.  comme  si  la  nation 
Espagnole  n'avait  pas  de  roi. 

Monsieur  le  due  de  Cadore  se  plaint  de  1'indulgence  dont  on 
en  a  use  en  Andalousie ;  S.  M.  a  montre  contre  ses  enemis,  dans 
les  champs  de  Talavera  et  Ocana,  toute  la  fermete  de  son  carac- 
tere;  mais  serait-il  juste,  conviendrait-il  a  ses  interets  et  aux 
vues  de  1'empereur,  que  S.  M.  deploy  at  de  la  rigueur  contre  des 
vaincus,  des  prisonniers  qui  doivent  etre  ses  sujets  ?  Si  le  mare- 
chal  Ney  eut  suivi  ce  genereux  exemple  dans  les  villes  de  Galice 
ou  il  fut  recu  a  bras  ouverts.  et  n'eut  pas  au  contraire  opprime  et 
saccage  cette  province,  elle  serait  heureuse  et  soumise,  et  non 
livree  aux  maux  de  1'insurrection  comme  tant  d'autres  a  qui  Ton 
a  fait  eprouver  le  meme  sort.  Cette  conduite  de  S.  M.  dans  des 
pays  soumis  est  vraisemblablement  ce  que  le  due  Cadore  appelle 
des  graces  accordees  aux  insurges  de  preference  aux  personnes 
attachees  a  la  cause  du  roi.  Les  insurges  n'ont  obtenu  d'autres 
graces  que  celles  qui  leur  furent  offertes  dans  les  proclamations 
pour  dissiper  1'erreur  dans  laquelle  les  Anglais  les  avaient  induits. 
Si  le  sequestre  mis  sur  les  biens  invendus  de  quelques  habitans 
ou  refugies,  a  ete  leve  posterieurement,  cet  exemple  d'indulgence 
a  eu  d'heureux  resultats,  puisqu'il  a  attire  un  grand  nombre  de 
personnes  a  1'obeissance  du  roi:  et  qu'on  ne  croye  pas  que  ces 
individus  n'aient  point  subi  le  chatiment  qui  leur  etait  du  pour  le 
retard  qu'ils  ont  mis  a  se  soumettre,  car  s'ils  possedaient  des 
billets  royaux,  il  les  ont  perdues  pour  ne  les  avoir  pas  presente  a 
terns  au  timbre  sec;  et  s'ils  sont  porteurs  d'autres  titres  de 
creances  sur  1'etat,  ils  doivent,  pour  les  valider,  solliciter  un 
decret  particulier. 

Les  avantages  de  la  formation  des  corps  Espagnols  sont  a  la 
portee  de  tout  le  monde:  leur  presence  a  influe  plus  qu'on  ne 
pense  sur  Fheureuse  issue  de  la  bataille  d'Ocaiia  et  de  1'expedition 
d' Andalousie.  En  y  admettant  un  grand  nombre  d'officiers,  on 
est  parvenu  a  eloigner  de  1'insurrection  des  hommes  inquiets  qui 
seraient  devenus  chefs  de  brigands,  et  tout  en  avouant  quo  la 
desertion  a  eu  lieu  parmi  les  soldats.  et  qu'U  en  est  resulte  quel- 


APPENDIX.       .  409 

ques  maux,  on  peut  hardiment  affirmer  que  la  somme  des  biens 
est  infiniment  plus  grande,  et  qu'il  n'y  a  pas  de  moyens  qu'on  ne 
doive  employer  pour  faire  revenir  de  son  egarement  une  nation 
de  douze  millions  d'ames  qu'il  n'est  pas  facSe  d'assujettir  par  la 
force  des  bayonnettes,  et  dont  on  veut  d'ailleurs  faire  une  amie 
et  une  alliee. 

On  a  parle  du  mauvais  emploi  des  ressources  de  1'Espagne,  et 
du  denuement  dans  lequel  ont  ete  laissees  les  troupes  Fran9aises. 
Les  soldats  ont  eu  en  Espagne  des  vivres  en  abondance:  les 
hopitaux  Eran9ais  ont  ete  les  mieux  pourvus,  il  a  fallu  pour  cela 
exiger  des  contributions  extraordinaires  et  des  emprunts  forces, 
et  vaincre  le  grand  obstacle  de  1'interceptation  des  communica- 
tions de  province  a  province,  et  souvent  de  ville  a  ville. 
L'Espagne  se  trouve  divise  en  gouvernemens  militaires  de  sorte 
que  S.  M.  est  a  peine  maitre  de  la  capitale  et  de  sa  banlieue : 
n'est  ce  done  point  par  une  espece  de  miracle  qu'elle  y  fait  sub- 
sister  des  troupes,  et  qu'elle  y  soutient  des  hopitaux.  Les 
gouverneurs  FranQais  imposent,  il  est  vrai,  des  contributions 
extraordinaires  sur  leurs  provinces,  mais  ils  les  vexent  et  les 
ruinent,  et  certes  ce  n'est  pas  la  le  moyen  de  les  maintenir  dans 
1'obeissance,  ni  un  exemple  bien  attrayant  pour  les  provinces 
soulevees :  cette  ressource  est  d'ailleurs  precaire  et  insuffisante 
comme  le  prouvera  bientot  1'experience.  S.  M.  se  flatte  de  ce 
que  les  intentions  de  1'empereur  en  faveur  de  la  nation  seraient 
mieux  remplies  et  ses  troupes  mieux  dirigees,  si  toutes  celles  qui 
sont  en  Espagne  etaient  sous  ses  ordres,  et  si  les  propositions 
qu'il  a  faites  a  son  auguste  frere  etaient  acceptees.  Le  due  de 
Cadore  a  evalue  a  plusieurs  millions  les  confiscations  des  mar- 
chandises  Anglaises,  et  1'enlevement  de  1'argenterie  des  eglises  et 
des  convents  qu'on  aurait  du  faire  en  Andalousie.  Les  confisca- 
tions eurent  lieu  par  ordre  des  generaux  Francais  a  leur  entree 
dans  cliaque  ville,  et  si  leur  valeur  fut  exageree,  dans  le  principe, 
pour  donner  plus  d'eclat  aux  entreprises  militaires,  on  reconnut 
des  qu'on  en  vint  a  1'examen  1'erreur  dans  laquelle  on  etait 
tombe;  et  dans  le  fait  comment  ne  pas  appe^evoir  qu'apres  la 
bataille  d'Ocana  1'invasion  d'Andalousie  devant  etre  prevue, 
chacun  avait  grand  soin  de  faire  refluer  les  marchandises  confis- 
cables  sur  les  points  les  plus  capables  de  resistance,  afin  de  les 
mettre  hors  de  la  portee  du  vainqueur.  L'argenterie  d'eglise  a 
beaucoup  d'apparence  et-fort  peu  de  valeur.  On  a  pris  dans  les 
couvents,  ou  il  en  restait  tres  peu,  ainsi  que  dans  les  eglises  toute 
celle  qui  n'a  pas  ete  jugee  necessaire  pour  la  decence  du  culte,  et 
comme  le  roi  ne  voulait  ni  ravager  ni  detruire,  mais  bien  pacifier 
et  conserver,  il  a  du  regler  sa  conduite  sur  ce  principe. 

Monsieur  le  due  de  Cadore  parle  de  depenses,  c'est  vraiment 
one  fatalite  qu'il  soit  si  mal  informe  de  faits  generalement  connus. 
Le  tresor  public  est  ouvert  a  quiconque  voudra  s 'assurer  de  la 
rerite.  On  y  verra  que  S.  M.  a  recu  a  peine  cliaque  mois  le 
3inquieme  de  1'assignation  de  la  liste  civile  :  qu'il  a  du  se  reduire 

la  plus  strict  economic,  et  que  non  seulement  il  s'est  vu  faute 
ie  pouvoir  donner  aux  acteurs  une  legere  avance,  dans  1'obliga- 


410  .       APPENDIX. 

tion  de  supprimer  te  theatre  Italien  qui  etait  son  unique  delasse- 
ment,  mais  encore  de  vendre  sa  vaisselle  platte,  et  de  se  defaire 
des  choses  les  plus  necessaires  a  1'ornement  de  sa  cour.  Aussi 
dans  le  repas  que  S.  M.  donna,  a  Foccasion  de  la  fete  de  1'empe- 
reur,  a  ses  ministres,  aux  grands  officiers  de  la  couronne,  et  a 
I'ambassadeur  de  France,  la  table  fut  elle  servie  en  fayence  sem- 
blable  a  celle  qu'avait  S.  M.  au  camp  de  Boulogne.  Certaine- 
ment  1'embarras  et  la  confusion  que  cette  excessive  simplicite 
causait  au  roi  n'aura  pas  echappe  a  Fambassadeur.  Au  milieu  de 
tant  de  privations,  et  dans  une  situation  aussi  contraire  a  sa 
dignite  S.  M.  a  la  douleur  de  voir  que  ses  ministres,  le  conseil 
d'etat,  les  tribunaux  de  la  capitale,  et  les  employes  civils,  qui 
sont  en  petit  nombre,  ne  percoivent  pas  leur  traitement  depuis 
plus  de  sept  mois.  Ce  sont  la  les  faveurs  que  S.  M.  a  dispenses 
avec  tant  de  prodigalite.  Le  roi  a  donne,  il  est  vrai,  quelques 
cedules  aux  officiers  de  sa  maison,  et  a  quelques  individus  attaches 
a  sa  personne,  pour  les  aider  a  acheter  des  biens  nationaux:  on 
donne  a  ces  bienfaits  le  nom  de  prodigalite,  et  d'un  autre  cote 
Ton  se  plaint  de  1'abandon  dans  lequel  S.  M.  laisse  d'autres  indi- 
vidus, ce  qui  serait  incompatible  avec  la  fa^on  de  penser  du  roi 
et  la  connaissances  de  ses  devoirs  comme  homme  et  comme 
monarque.  C'est  1'unique  chose  dont  le  roi  puisse  disposer  dans 
la  situation  ou  il  se  trouve  et  outre  le  but  politique  de  ces  dona- 
tions, S.  M.  a  cru  que  c'etait  le  seul  moyen  d'assurer  a  ces 
individus  une  mediocre  existence,  et  encore  sa  prevoyance  a  cet 
egard  a-t-elle  ete  trompee,  car  les  revenues  des  terres  et  des 
biens  qui  se  trouvent  dans  les  personnes  soumises  au  gouverne- 
ment  militaire  dont  les  limites  s'etendent  jusqu'aux  portes  de 
Madrid,  ou  ne  se  payent  pas,  tant  est  grande  la  misere  des 
fermiers,  ou  les  biens  ne  s'afferment  pas  de  crainte  d'extorsions 
de  la  part  des  gouverneurs,  ou,  enfin,  les  revenus  se  trouvent 
absorbes  par  les  contributions  extraordinaires.  Les  faits  sont 
evidens,  ils  parlent  d'eux-memes,  et  toute  personne  impartiale 
peut  en  faire  1'examen. 

Mais  il  faut  qu'elle  soit  de  meilleure  foi  que  celle  qui  a  voulu 
imputer  a  S.  M.  1'alienation  des  biens  confisques  par  1'empereur, 
et  les  griefs  auxquels  on  vient  de  repondre.  S.  M.  pourrait,  a 
bien  plus  juste  titre,  se  plaindre  de  la  conduite  des  gouverneurs 
Francais :  de  celle  du  general  Dufour,  par  exemple,  qui  a  exige 
des  dix  membres  dont  il  composa  &  sa  maniere  ce  conseil  de 
Navarre  qu'on  s'est  vu  bientot  oblige  de  dissoudre,  qu'ils  redi- 

feassent  une  adresse  a  1'empereur  dans  laquelle  ils  demandaient 
S.  M.  I.  un  code  des  lois,  et  se  mettaient  a  sa  discretion.  Trois 
de  ces  membres  refuserent  de  signer,  les  autres  cederent  a  la 
violence.  S.  M.  pourrait  citer  encore  une  foule  d'actes  qui  ont 
exaspere  les  esprits,  fourni  des  armes  a  Tinsurrection,  et  donne 
aux  Anglais  des  pretextes  pour  supposer  des  projets  qui  n'exis- 
tent  pas,  et  rendre  la  guerre  interminable.  Qu'on  compte  le 
nombre  des  bandes  de  brigands  et  d'insurges  en  Espagne,  et  Ton 
verra  combien  il  s'est  accru  depuis  1'institution  des  gouverne- 
mens  militaires.  8.  M.  ne  peut  elle  se  plaindre  avec  autant  de 


APPENDIX.  411 

justice  de  la  situation  equivoque  dans  laquelle  elle  se  trouve  P 
qu'on  en  juge  par  le  fait  suivant.  Le  nouveau  ministre  de  finances 
venait  d'entrer  en  fonction,  et  il  s'agissait  deja  de  reunir  les 
plus  forts  capitalistes  de  la  place  pour  les  engager  a  avancer  une 
bonne  somme  d'argent,  lorsque  le  payeur  de  1'armee,  Monsieur 
Crouchart,  et  1'intendant-general,  Monsieur  Denniers,  assurerent 
au  ministre  que  des  employes  venaient  de  Paris  avec  des  lettres 
cachetees  qu'ils  avaient  1'ordre  de  n'ouvrir  qu'a  Madrid.  On 
pretendit  aussitot  qu'ils  devaient  se  charger  de  Tadministration 
civile,  que  les  rentrees  seraieiit  invariablement  affectees  a  1'entre- 
tien  et  a  la  solde  de  1'armee,  et  le  surplus  seulement,  a  la  liste 
civile.  C'etait  annoncer  la  dissolution  de  1'etat.  Des  bruits  de 
cette  nature  repandus  dans  toute  la  ville  par  les  employes  Fran- 
cais  parvenus  a  la  connaissance  de  1'ambassadeur  de  S.  M.  I.  et 
appuyes  par  des  malveillans  qui  abondent  toujours  dans  les 
capitales  surtout  a  la  suite  des  guerres  d'opinions,  ne  pouvait 
produire  que  de  malheureux  effets.  La  coufiance  de  ce  petit 
nombre  d'nommes  qui  aurait  pu  faire  des  avances  s'eteignit  a 
1'instant,  et  toutes  les  portes  furent  fermees.  S.  M.  ignorait 
1'arrivee  des  nouveaux  employes  du  tresor  de  France,  et  il  n'a 
eonnu  comme  le  dernier  de  ses  sujets,  le  contenu  des  lettres  dont 
ils  etaient  porteurs  qu'a  leurs  ouvertures. 

Dans  cet  etat  de  choses  il  est  facile  de  se  faire  1'idee  de  la  con- 
fiance  que  peut  inspirer  le  roi,  et  lorsque  S.  M.  se  trouve  hors 
d'etat  de  faire  le  bpnneur  du  pays  qu'il  doit  gouverner  et  de  con- 
courir  a  la  realisation  des  vues  de  son  auguste  frere  :  qu'il  voit 
enfin  sa  dignite  avilee,  doit  on  s'etonner  qu'il  ait  manifesto  1'im- 
possibilite  de  vivre  plus  long  temps  dans  une  situation  aussi  pre- 
caire?  Monsieur  le  due  de  Cad  ore  tout  en  reconnaissant  les  hautes 
qualites  du  roi,  a  pretendu,  que  les  personnes  qui  approclient 
S.  M.  lui  ont  conseille  et  lui  conseillent  sans  cesse  de  se  maintenir 
dans  1'independance  de  la  France,  et  que  ce  principe  se  suivait 
avec  trop  de  rigueur.  Monsieur  le  due  de  Cadore  sait  que  S.  M. 
dans  aucune  epoque  de  sa  longue  et  glorieuse  carriere  n'a  eu 
besoin  de  conseils  et  ne  s'est  soumis  a  aucune  influence,  surtout 
s'il  s'est  agi  de  detruire  '  son  systeme  inalterable  d'amitie  sincere 
et  eternelle  avec  son  auguste  frere  1'empereur;  d'alliance  et  de 
bienveillance  afiectueuse  envers  la  nation  Espagnole  a  la  tete  de 
laquelle  il  est  place,  et  dont  il  s'efforcera  de  conserver  la  splen- 
deur  et  le  bien-etre,  avec  1'independance  et  1'integrite  de  territoire. 
Les  voeux  les  plus  constants  de  son  coaur  sont  que  les  deux 
nations  unies  entr'elles  par  les  me"mes  liens  que  leur  monarques 
concourent  d'une  maniere  uniforme  a  la  felicite  commune  en 
forcant  leur  ennemie  a  abandonner  le  sceptre  des  mers.' 

Le  prince  don  Fernando,  ajoute  le  due  de  Cadore,  se  preterait 
a  ceder  les  provinces  qui  conviennent  a  Vempereur  et  a  toutes  les 
conditions  qu'il  voudrait  lui  imposer.  Le  roi  ne  veut  entrer  en 
comparaison  avec  personne ;  mais  il  observera  que  ce  ne  fut  paa 
dans  ces  sentimens  ni  dans  cette  croyance  qu'il  accepta  la  cou- 
ronne  d'Espagne  en  deposant  celle  de  Naples:  que  1'empereur  ni 
la  France  ne  devraient  avoir  confiances  en  des  offres  que  la  nation 


412  APPENDIX. 

repousserait,  et  qui  ne  pourrait  avoir  d'ailleurs  qu'une  execution 

Eassagere;  car  comme  le  salt  tres  bien  Monsieur  le  due  de  Cadore, 
js  nations  humiliees  dissimulent  letir  haine  en  attendant  le 
moment  favorable  de  venger  leurs  outrages.  Une  semblable 
conduite  serait  incompatible  avec  le  fa£on  de  penser  du  roi,  avec 
son  noble  caractere  et  celui  de  la  nation  que  S.  M.  gouverne. 
Elle  est  diametralement  en  opposition  avec  les  assurances  don- 
nees  par  S.  M.  I.  a  la  nation  Espagnole  '  qu'il  etait  necessaire 
pour  son  bonheur  qu'elle  se  regenerat  sous  sa  dynastie  et  sous  le 
prince  qu'elle  lui  donnait  egal  en  tout  a  son  auguste  personne.' 
A  cette  occasion  le  due  de  Cadore  parle  du  peu  d'avantages  que 
rapporte  a  la  France  la  guerre  d'Espagne  en  proportion  des  sacri- 
fices immenses  qu'elle  a  faits.  Certes  le  roi  ne  les  ignore  pas,  et 
sa  reconnaissance  eclatera  quand  S.  M.  se  trouvera  en  etat  de  les 
recompenser.  Dans  ce  moment  cela  lui  est  impossible;  maia 
S.  M.  I.  pourrait  mettre  le  comble  a  ses  bons  offices  en  s'offrant 
pour  garant  de  1'emprunt  ouvert  en  Hollande  sous  les  memes 
conditions  que  celui  de  Prusse,  ou  du  moins  en  lui  donnant  son 
assentiment  comme  a  celui  d'Autriclie.  S.  M.  I.  se  convaincra 
facilement  que  les  liens  du  sang,  les  relations  les  plus  intimes 
et  les  plus  sures  d'une  etroite  amitie  entre  les  deux  nations,  et 
enfin  la  position  meme  de  ces  armees  seront  les  meilleurs  garants 
de  1'exactitude  des  remboursements  quelques  sacrifices  qu'ils 
exigent. 

Quant  aux  avantages  futurs  que  promettent  les  sacrifices  actuels 
de  la  France,  ce  serait  faire  injure  aux  lumieres  du  due  de  Cadore 
que  de  la  fatiguer  en  les  lui  developpant.  Lorsque  S.  M.  I.  crut 
necessaire  1'etablissement  en  Espagne  de  sa  dynastie,  1'experience 
lui  avait  demontre  que  survenant  des  troubles  dans  le  nord,  il  ne 
pouvait  jamais  compter  sans  ce  changement,  BUT  la  surete  d'une 
de  plus  importantes  frontieres  de  son  empire.  Un  siecle  d'amitie 
presque  non  interrompue  depuis  le  regne  en  Espagne  et  en 
France  de  la  maison  de  Bourbon,  le  pacte  de  famille  et  la  tournure 
differente  que  prirent  les  relations  entre  les  deux  pays  apres  1'ex- 
clusion  de  la  maison  d'Autriche,  sont  les  temoignages  les  plus 
authentiques  de  1'utilite  des  efforts  et  des  sacrifices  de  la  France 
pendant  six  ans,  au  commencement  du  siecle  dernier.  La 
resistance  opiniatre  de  presque  toute  1'Europe  et  surtout  celle  de 
1'Angleterre,  qu'elle  renouvelle  dans  cette  guerre  avec  un  plus 
grand  developpement  de  moyens  demontrent  1'importance  de  cet 
evenement  pour  la  France.  Ses  meilleurs  ecrivains  po'litiques  ont 
indique  avec  la  plus  grande  clarte  les  avantages  qui  en  ont  resulte" 
pour  le  commerce  Fran9ais  et  les  richesses  qu'il  a  procurees  a  la 
nation.  Que  ne  doit  elle  pas  attendre  aujourd'hui  de  la  reunion 
des  deux  couronnes  dans  la  meme  famille,  de  1'analogie  de  leura 
codes  politiques  et  de  leurs  institutions,  des  qualites  d'un  roi  sage 
et  eclaire  qui  aime  tendrement  son  auguste  frere  et  la  France,  et 
qui  est  penetrede  la  necessite  d'abattre  1'orgueil  de  1'Angleterre! 
n'est  ce  pas  le  plus  grand  fruit  qu'elle  puisse  retirer  de  cette 
resolution  et  de  tels  resultats  ne  valent  ils  pas  les  sacrifice* 
momentanees  qu'elle  s'impose? 


APPENDIX.  4!  3 

II  a  ete  bien  sensible  pour  S.  M.  que  les  rapports  mensongers  de 
personnes  peu  interessees  a  1'union  et  a  1'amitie  des  deux  freres 
et  des  deux  pays,  ayant  pu  mspirer  a  S.  M.  I.  un  seul  instant  de 
doutes.  Quoique  le  roi  a  deja  ecrit  a  1'empereur  son  auguste 
frere,  S.  M.  veut  que  V.  E.  ou  en  votre  absence  le  marquis  d'Al- 
menara,  remette  une  copie  de  cette  lettre  a  Monsieur  le  due  de 
Cadore,  dans  1'esperance  que  V.  E.  developpera  a  S.  M.  I.  avec 
sa  sagacite  ordinaire  les  causes  qui  ont  influe  sur  la  conduite  du 
roi  dans  les  affaires  d'Espagne,  que  S.  E.  lui  depeindra  1'etat 
veritable  de  la  nation,  et  qu'elle  contribuera  de  cette  maniere  a 
1'execution  des  intentions  des  deux  monarques  qui  n'ont  ete,  et 
qui  ne  peuvent  etre  que  les  memes. 

Le  ministre  secretaire  d'etat, 
(Signe)  MARIANO  LTIIS  D'OEQUIJO. 

Letters  from  king  Joseph  to  his  ministers. 

10  Fevrier,  1811. 

Je  suis  peine  que  Tempereur  ait  cru  necessaire  d'employer 
des  formes  diplomatiques  avec  moi  et  ineme  avec  la  reine.  Qu'il 
me  fasse  clairement  connoitre  sa  volonte  et  je  n'aurai  rien  de  plus 
agreable  que  de  m'y  conformer  puisqu'elle  ne  peut  etre  ni  com- 
patible avec  mon  honneur  qui  me  paroit  inseparable  du  sien, 
comme  mon  interet.  Le  fait  est  que  je  desire  complaire,  a  la  fois, 
a  1'empereur  et  a  mon  frere;  il  m'a  fait  reconnoitre  roi  de  Naples, 
roi  d'Espagne,  et  a  garanti  mon  existence  politique  sans  que  je 
1'aie  demande.  Je  n'ai  pas  sollicite  le  trone;  j'y  suis  monte 
parcequ'il  1'a  voulu;  aujourd'hui  1'empereur  desire-t-il  que  jeren- 
trois  dans  la  retraite  ?  Je  suis  d'autant  plus  pret  a  le  faire  que  les 
evenemens  de  trois  annees  ont  leve  bien  des  scrupules  et  empecher 
venir  bien  des  regrets. 

J'ai  du  croire  que  1'empereur  vouloit  que  je  quittasse  1'Espagne 
des  que  j'ai  vu  graduellement  mon  existence  y  devenir  humiliant, 
impossible,  et  qu'il  doit  savoir  que  je  ne  puis  pas  supporter  long- 
temps  de  me  voir  degrade:  dans  ce  cas  je  desire  partir  pour 
France.  L'ordre  publique  sera  assure  ici,  je  m'entendrai  avec 
mon  frere,  ou  pour  mieux  dire  je  lui  porterai  moi-m^me  mon 
blanc-seing. 

Je  m'abandonne  entierement  a  sa  justice  et  a  ses  sentimens 
paternels  pour  ma  famille,  aussi  point  de  negociations  particu- 
lieres ;  je  retourne  des  ce  moment  a  1'empereur  tous  les  droits 
qu'il  m'a  transmis  sur  1'Espagne  si  son  ambassadeur  juge  que  je 
puisse  partir  demain  pour  Morfontaine,  et  s'il  eu  autorise  a  croire 
que  1'empereur  verra  ce  parti  sans  deplaisir. 

L'empereur  veut-il  reellement  que  je  reste  au  trone  d'Espagne? 
Je  reste  quelques  que  soient  les  desagremens  independant  de  la 
volonte  ^qui  m'y  attendent.  Mais  il  faut  que  je  n'eprouve  que 
ceux  qu'il  ne  peut  m'eviter;  je  le  repete,  jamais  les  inter^ts  poli- 
tiques  ne  me  diviseront  avec  lui,  qu'il  me  fasse  connoitre  sa 
volonte.  Si  1'empereur  vient  ici,  tout  s'arrangera  entre  nous; 
s'il  ne  vient  pas  en  Espagne,  qu'il  me  laisse  aller  le  voir  a  Paris. 
S'il  juge  ce  voyage  inopportun,  qu'il  rende  mon  existence 


414  APPENDIX 

tolerable  pendant  la  guerre:  il  salt  mieux  que  personne  ce  qu'il 
doit  faire  pour  cela. 

H  faut  un  changement  marque  dans  tout,  avancer  ou  reculer, 
TOUS  connoissez  1'etat  actuel;  j 'ignore  comment  je  pourrai  gagner 
le  mois  necessaire  pour  connoitre  la  determination  de  1'empereur. 

(The  following  abdication,  by  J  oseph,  was  drawn  up  but  never  made 
public.) 

L'experience  de  trois  annees  nous  ayant  eonvaincu  que  1'ordre 
social  ne  peut  etre  recompose  en  Espagne  qu'en  cumulant  dans 
les  memes  mains  les  droits  de  souverainte  dont  nous  sommes 
investes,  et  les  moyens  de  force  et  de  puissance  militaire  dont 
dispose  notre  auguste  frere  1'empereur  des  Francais,  de  qui  nous 
tenons  les  droits  que  nous  exercons  aujourd'hui  sur  la  monarchic 
Espagnole,  nous  avons  resolu  de  notre  pleine  et  libre  volonte  de 
retroceder  a  notre  frere  1'empereur  des  Fran£ais  les  droits  qu'il 
nous  a  remis  et  en  vertu  des  quels  nous  sommes  entre  dans  cc 
royaume  en  1808  a  la  suite  de  la  constitution  que  nous  avons 
signee  a  Bayonne  dans  la  meme  annee. 

C'est  pourquoi  par  les  presents  signees  de  notre  main  nous 
declarons  ceder,  transporter,  et  remettre  a  notre  dit  frere  1'em- 
pereur des  Francais,  tous  les  droits  qu'il  nous  transmis  en  1808 
sur  la  monarchic  d'Espagne  et  des  Indes  dans  tout  leur  integrite 
et  tels  qu'il  les  recut  lui-meme  du  roi  Charles  Quatre. 

Nous  entendons  que  la  presente  retrocession  n'ait  de  force  et 
valeur  que  1'epoque  ou  nous  aurons  pleine  et  entiere  connois- 
sance  de  1'acceptation  de  la  presente  retrocession  de  la  part  de 
notre  frere  1'empereur  des  Francais:  et  comme  nous  ne  sommes 
portes  a  cet  acte  par  aucune  consideration  particuliere,  mais  par 
1'unique  consideration  que  nous  avons  exprimee  plus  haut,  et 
qu'en  quittant  le  trone  d'Espagne  nous  n'avons  en  vue  que  le 
plus  grand  bien  du  peuple  Espagnol  que  nous  ne  pourrons  pas 
rendre  aussi  heureux  que  nous  voudrions,  et  que  nous  n'avons 
d'autre  ambition  que  celle  de  rentrer  dans  la  vie  privee  et  dans 
la  retraite  la  plus  absolue.  JSTous  nous  abandonnons  entitlement 
a  la  justice  de  notre  frere  1'empereur  des  Fran9ais  pour  le  sort 
des  personnes  qui  nous  sont  attachees  au  sentimeus  de  la  gloire 
qui  garantit  ses  efforts  pour  le  bonheur  de  1'Espagne  et  a  ses 
sentimens  paternels  pour  nos  enfans,  pour  la  reine,  notre  epouse, 
et  pour  nous. 

Nous  nous  engagerons  a  faire  revetir  de  toutes  les  formes  qui 
pourroient  paroitre  plus  authentiques  le  present  acte  ecrit,  redige, 
et  signe  de  notre  propre  main.  Ayant  juge  que  le  plus  grand 
secret  etait  indispensable  jusqu'a  ce  que  nous  aypns  connoissance 
de  1'acceptation  de  S.  M.  1'empereur  des  Fran9ais,  roi  d'ltalie. 
Fait  a  Madrid,  etc.  etc. 

Paris,  1811. 

Depuis  la  conversation  que  j'ai  eu  avec  vous  sur  ma  position, 
elle  ne  s'est  pas  amelioree ;  elle  est  telle  aujourd'hui  que  je  me 
voir  force  d'embrasser  le  seul  pratique  qui  me  reste  a  prendre, 


APPENDIX,  415 

celui  do  la  retraite  la  plus  absolue  en  France.  Je  serois  deja  parti 
si  je  ne  venois  d'etre  instruit  que  S.  M.  1'empereur  qui  a  su  que 
j'avois  donne  ordre  d'acheter  ou  de  louer  une  terre  a  cent  lieues 
de  Paris,  avoit  disapprouve  cette  demarche,  et  qu'il  trouvait  plus 
convenable,  si  je  persistois  dans  ma  resolution,  que  je  me  rendisse 
a  ma  terre  de  Morfontaine  apres  vous  avoir  prevent!  de  ma  de- 
termination, et  avoir  assure  ici  1'ordre  publique  'apres  mon  depart. 
Je  dirai  en  partant  que  je  vais  m'entendre  avec  rempereur  pour 
les  affaires  d'Espagne,  et  je  ferois  les  memes  dispositions  par 
rapport  aux  provinces  qui  entourent  Madrid  que  je.fit  lorsqu'il  y 
a  un  an  je  partis  pour  1' expedition  d'Andalousie ;  cet  etat  dura 
six  niois  sans  nul  desordre,  et  je  ne  doute  pas  que  les  chosea 
n'aillent  de  la  menie  maniere  et  ne  donnent  le  terns  a  I'empereur 
de  prendre  les  dispositions  definitives. 

Je  suis  pre"t  a  rendre  rempereur  les  droits  qu'il  me  remit  a 
Bayonne  sur  la  monarchic  d'Espagne  et  des  Indes  si  ma  posi- 
tion ici  ne  change  pas;  parceque  je  dois  croire  que  c'est  le  desir 
de  I'empereur  puisqu'il  est  impossible  qu'il  veuille  que  je  reste  roi 
d'Espagne,  et  qu'il  m'ote  tous  les  moyens  d'existence.  II  en  peut 
etre  malheureux  que  I'empereur  ait  voulu  me  reconnoitre  roi  de 
Naples,  il  y  a  six  ans  lorsqu'a  la  tete  de  ses  troupes  je  fis  la  con- 
quete  de  ce  royaume ;  ce  fut  malgre  moi,  et  mes  instances  pour 
rester  au  commandement  de  son  armee  avec  la  simple  qualite  de 
son  lieutenant  furent  le  sujet  d'une  lettre  dont  je  me  rappelle 
tres-bien. 

Lorsqu'en  1808  je  fus  proclame  roi  d'Espagne.  je  1'ignorois 
encore ;  cependant  arrive  a  Bayonne  je  fis  tout  ce  que  voulus 
I'empereur,  je  signerais  une  constitution,  je  le  signal  appuyee  par 
sa  garantie.  Les  evenemens  n'ayant  pas  repondu  a  nos  espe- 
rances  est  ce  ma  faute  ?  Est  celui  qui  en  est  le  plus  victim  qui 
doit  en  porter  la  peine  ?  Cependant  tant  que  la  guerre  dure  je 
me  suis  soumis  a  tout  ce  que  1'on  a  voulu,  mais  je  ne  puis  pas 
I'impossible ;  je  ne  puis  pas  rester  ici  plus  longtems  si  rempereur 
ne  vient  a  mon  secours.  En  ordonnant  qu'il  soit  verse  dans  mon 
tresor  a  Madrid  un  million  de  francs  par  mois,  les  autres  pro- 
vinces doivent  contribuer  aux  besoins  de  la  capitale.  Les 
troupes  Fra^oises  qui  sont  dans  les  provinces  du  centre  (elles 
sont  peu  nombreuses)  doivent  £tre  soldees  par  le  tresor  de 
France. 

A  la  pacification  geneYale  I'empereur  exigera  des  indemnite's ; 
s'entendrer  alors  il  possede  de  fait  presque  toutes  les  provinces 
aujourd'hui,  il  sera  bien  le  maitre  de  ne  les  evacuer  c[u'a  mesure 
qu'il  croira  que  1'Espagne  aura  satisfait  aux  obligations  qu'il  lui 
aura  imposees.  En  resume  je  suis  pret  a  faire  la  volonte  de 
l'empereur  pourvu  que  je  la  connoisse. 

1°.  Veut-il  que  je  reste  roi  d'Espagne,  je  reste  des  qu'il  m'en 
donne  la  possibilite,  et  je  supporte  tous  les  gouvernemens 
militaires  qu'il  a  etablis  puisqu'il  les  croit  indispensables  pendant 
la  guerre. 

2°.  Prefereroit-il  quo  je  rentrasse  dans  la  sein  de  ma  famille  a 
Morfontaine  d'abord  et  1'liiver  dans  le  midi.  Je  suis  pr3t  a  partir 


416  APPENDIX. 

des  que  je  connoitrai  sa  volonte.  J'ajoute  de  plus  que  le  parti  de 
la  retraite  me  conviendra  beaucoup  plus  que  1'autre  des  que  je 
saurai  qu'il  lui  convient.  Je  suis  sur  alors  qu'il  aura  quelques 
bontes  pour  les  Fran£ais  qui  se  sont  attaches  a  mon  sort,  et  que 
je  ne  serai  pas  a  meme  de  rendre  aussi  heureux  qu'ils  le  meritent. 
Quant  a  moi,  a  la  reine,  et  a  mes  eufans,  1'empereur  me  faisant 
payer  mon  traitement  de  prince  Fran9ais,  nous  en  aurons  assez, 
mon  intention  etant  de  vivre  dans  la  retraite  en  m'occupant  de 
1'education  des  mes  enfans,  laissant  a  1'empereur  le  soin  de  leur 
etablissemens;  car  je  ne  doute  pas  si  ce  projet  se  verifie  que  je  ne 
retrouve  le  coeur  de  mon  frere,  et  que  dans  les  intervalles  ou  il  se 
rappellera  qu'il  est  homme,  il  ne  trouve  encore  quelque  consolation 
en  retrouvant  mon  coeur  pour  lui  aussi  jeune  qu'il  y  a  trente 
ans.  Enfin  j'aime  mieux  vivre  suject  de  1'empereur  en  France  que 
de  rester  en  Espagne  roi  nominal,  parceque  je  serai  bon  sujet  en 
France,  et  mauvais  roi  en  Espagne,  et  que  je  veux  rester  digne  de 
1'empereur,  de  la  France,  et  de  moi-meme. 

Note. — The  bad  French  is  in  the  original  MSS. 

Marquis  of  Almenara  to  the  minister  secretary  of  state. 
Translated  from  a  deciphered  Spanish  letter, 

'  Fontainebleau,  November  4,  1810. 

4  This  government  is  very  uneasy  about  the  military  operations 
in  Portugal,  from  whence  they  receive  no  accounts  except  through 
England,  described  therefore  factitiously  and  with  the  strongest 
hopes  of  resisting  the  French  forces  that  oppose  their  army.  This 
problem  will  probably  be  already  solved  and  its  conclusion  will 
decide  what  is  interesting  to  Spain.  It  is  therefore  very  impor- 
tant that  our  government  should  write  all  it  knows,  and  what 
will  prove  that  it  takes  part  in  what  belongs  to  both  countries-, 
because  here  I  am  often  asked  what  is  said  in  Madrid  on  this 
subject,  and  people  are  surprised  that  we  limit  ourselves  entirely 
to  the  urgent  points  of  our  negotiation.  This  explains  the  proofs 
of  affection  which  the  prince  royal  of  Sweden  desired  that  the 
king  should  give  to  the  emperor,  being  convinced  that  the 
letters  of  his  majesty,  written  in  his  own  mmiliar  style  when  he 
explains  his  sentiments,  produce  a  great  sensation  with  the 
emperor.' 

SECTION  111. 
Letters  from  the  prince  de  Neufcttatel  to  king  Joseph. 

Paris,  28  Janvier,  1811. 

SIRE, — J'ai  1'honneur  de  prevenir  votre  majeste  que  1'empereur 
par  sa  decision  du  21  Janvier  a  fixe  les  traitemens  extraordi- 
naires  qui  pourront  etre  payes  en  Espagne  a  date  du  ler  de 
Vannee  1811,  dans  1'arrondissement  des  armees  du  midi,  du 


APPENDIX 

nord,  de  1'Arragon,    &c.     Ces  traitemens  sont  determines  ains 
qu'il  suit — 

Savoir : 

Fr.  par  mois. 

Les  generaux  gouverneurs  dans  les  quatre  gouvernemens 

comprises  dans  1'arrondissement  de  1'armee  du  nord  .  .  4000 
Le  general  chef  de  Fetat  major  general  de  1'armee  .  .  .  3000 

Generaux  de  division 1800 

Generaux  de  brigade,  inspecteurs  aux  revues  et  commis- 

saires  ordonnateurs 1200 

Adjudans  commandans,  colonels,  et  sous-inspecteurs  aux 

revues 750 

Officiers  de  sante  principaux  .     .  ' 500 

Chefs  de  bataillons,  d'escadrons,  commissaires  de  guerre, 

et  chefs  d'administration  des  differens  services      .     .     .       400 
Commandans  de  place  occupant  dans  )  capitaines  .     .     .       400 
1'armee  un  grade  inferieur  a  ceux  ( lieutenans  et  )  O.^Q 

ci-dessus  designees,  savoir  .  .  .  .  )  sous-lieuts.  S 
Au  moyen  de  ces  indemnites  il  ne  sera  rien  alloue  au-dessus 
des  sommes  fixes  ni  pour  depenses  de  bureaux  ou  de  table,  ni 
pour  frais  extraordinaires,  quelque  nature  qu'ils  soient  et  sous 
quelque  pretexte  que  ce  puisse  etre,  et  cette  decision  n'a  aucun 
eflet  retroactif.  J'ecris  a  MM.  les  marechaux  et  generaux 
commandant  en  Espagne,  pour  leur  faire  connoitre  que,  d'apres 
les  intentions  de  1'empereur,  tout  militaire  Francais  qui  a  1'avenir 
aurait  exige  ou  repu  des  traitemens  extraordinaires  plus  forts 
que  ceux  fixes  par  la  decision  du  21  Janvier,  et  qui  s'en  serait 
fait  payer  sans  une  ordonnance  reguliere  des  intendans  generaux 
ou  commissaires  ordonnateurs,  sera  suspendu  de  ses  fonctions  et 
qu'il  en  sera  rendu  compte  clans  le  vingt-quatre  heures  pour 
prendre  les  ordres  de  1'empereur.  Votre  majeste  jugera  sans 
doute  convenable  de  donner  ses  ordres  au  general  Belliard  pour 
que  cette  disposition  soit  suivie  dans  1'arrondissement  de  1'armee 
du  centre.  Je  prie  votre  majeste  d'agreer  1'hommage  de  moc 
respect. 

Paris,  14  Fevrier,  1811. 

SIRE, — L'empereur  ne  m'a  encore  donne  aucun  ordre  relatif  a 
1'objet  de  la  lettre  apportee  par  votre  aide-de-camp  le  colonel 
Clermont  Tonnere.  On  pense  que  Valence  ne  se  soumettra  que 
par  1'approche  d'une  armee,  et  apres  la  prise  de  Tarragone  le 
corps  du  general  Suchet  sera  dispouible. — Les  affaires  paroissent 
s'ameliorer  en  Portugal,  le  due  d'Istrie  va  etablir  1'ordre  dans  le 
nord  de  1'Espagne.  J'envoye  mon  aide-de-camp  le  colonel  le 
Jeune  voir  1'etat  des  choses  a  Grenade,  Malaga,  Cadiz  et  Badajoz. 
Je  prie  votre*majeste  d'avoir  des  bontes  pour  lui.  L'empereur 
est  en  bonne  sante,  1'imperatrice  est  bientot  a  terme,  et  nous 
esperons  un  roi  des  Remains.  L'empereur  affermit  de  plus  en 
plus  le  grand  empire.  Votre  majeste  le  seconde,  mais  nous  appre- 
cions  ses  peines  et  ses  privations.  Tine  nouvelle  armee  de  deux- 
cent-milles  hommes  se  forme  dans  le  nord  de  la  France,  et 
1'empereur  est  en  position  d'en  imposer  a  qui  tenteroit  de  con- 
trarier  ses  grandes  conceptions ;  tout  est  bien  et  va  bien  en  France* 

VOL.  III.  KB 


418  APPENDIX. 

Pans,  le\l  Avril,  1811. 

SIRE,— -J'ai  eu  I'honneur  de  mander  votre  majeste,  que  1'empe- 
reur  avoit  donne  des  ordres  pour  qu'il  lui  fut  envoy e  chaque 
mois  cent  mille  francs,  et  je  lui  ai  fait  connoitre  combien  il  etoit 
important  que  les  troupes  destinees  pour  1'Andalusie  y  arrivas- 
eent  sans  retard. 

L'empereur  pense  qu'il  seroit  utile  de  chercher  a  tirer  parti  de 
bons  Espagnole  pour  reunir  de  vrais  cortez  qui  pourroient  avoir 
de  I'influence  sur  les  esprits:  1'integritede  1'Espagne  peut  encore 
etre  maintenue  si  les  cortez  operoient  une  reaction  dans  1'opinion: 
le  Perou  et  le  Mexique  se  sont  deja  declares  independant,  et 
toutes  les  autres  colonies  vont  echapper  a  1'Espagne:  les  vrais 
Espagnols  doivent  savoir  combien  les  Anglais  les  maltraitent.  On 
voit  par  les  gazettes  Anglaises  que  les  cortez  rassembles  dans 
File  de  Leon  ne  furent  qu'une  miserable  canaille  ct  des  gens 
obscures,  qui  n'ont  autre  projet  que  d'aller  yegeter  dans  les 
tavernes  de  Londres ;  il  ne  peut  y  avoir  rien  a  faire  avec  de  pareils 
hommes.  Sa  majeste  trouve  qu'il  y  auroit  un  grand  avantage  a 
former  des  cortez  tirer  de  toutes  les  provinces  de  1'Espagne 
occupees  par  les  armees  Franchises.  Une  discussion  eclairee  qui 
s'etabliroit  auroit  beaucoup  d'influence  sur  les  esprits.  L'empe- 
reur  est  oblige  d'abandonner  le  projet  qu'il  avoit  de  s'entendre 
avec  les  cortez  de  1'ile  de  Leon,  puisque  ce  n'est  qu'un  compose 
de  gens  sans  aveu:  ce  ne  seroit  done  qu'avec  des  cortez  forme 
d'hommes  tires  de  toutes  les  parties  de  1'Espagne  qu'on  pourroit 
eclairer  1'opinion  des  Espagnols  qui  aiment  leur  pays. 

L'ambassadeur  de  1'empereur  a  transmis  des  plaintes  sur  votre 
major-general.  Votre  majeste  commande  1'armee  du  centre. 
Par  consequent  la  hierarchic  militaire  ne  peut  pas  permettre  qu'il 
s'ecarte  de  ses  devoirs.  Si  je  correspond  souvent  avec  le  general 
Belliard,  c'est  que  votre  majeste  est  un  general  roi,  et  que  je  dois 
lui  eviter  des  details  qu'un  major-general  lui  soumet. 

Aucun  village  d'Espagne  n'a  ete  reuni  a  la  France,  et  1'empe- 
reur  tient  a  ce  que  votre  majeste  ait  en  Espagne  toute  la  consi- 
deration qui  lui  est  due.  Tout  depend  encore  du  parti  qu'on  peut 
tirer  de  la  nation.  Ce  qu'il  y  a  de  certain,  c'est  que  les  Anglais 
n'ont  qu'un  but;  celui  de  ruiner  la  peninsule,  de  la  detruire, 
parcequ'ils  sentent  bien  qu'elle  doit  finir  par  appartenir  a  la 
France,  ou  a  un  prince  de  la  maison  de  1'enipereur,  et  qu'ils 
trouvent  un  grand  avantage  a  diviser  un  pays  qu'il  saverit  ne 
pouvoir  garder. 

Je  presente  a  votre  majeste  I'hommage  avec  mon  respect, 
Le  prince  JNeufchatel,  major-general, 

ALEXANDRE. 

• 

Paris,  ce  6  Mai,  1811. 

SIEE, — J'ai  montre  a  1'empereur  la  lettre  de  votre  majeste,  en 
date  du  21  Avril  par  laquelle  elle  fait  connoitre  qu'elle  se  met  en 
route  pour  Paris:  1'empereur  ne  s'attendoit  pas  acette  resolution; 
volre  majeste  lui  ayant  promis  de  ne  Das  quitter  1'Espagne  sans 
6tre  convenu  a  1'avancc  des  mesures  a  prendre  et  qu'exige  une 


APPENDIX.  419 

pareille  determination.  L'empereur  trouve  que  dans  ces  circon- 
stances  le  depart  de  votre  majeste  devoit  etre  precede  de  1'evacua- 
tion  de  1'Andalousie  afin  de  concentrer  les  armees.  Car  dans  la 
position  des  clioses,  le  depart  de  votre  majeste  va  donner  une 
secousse  defavorable  a  la  situation  des  armees  de  1'empereur.  Si 
rotre  majeste  avoit  quitte  1'Espagne  au  mois  de  Janvier,  ou  lea 
armees  etoient  en  position  sans  agir,  cela  auroit  eu  moins  d'in- 
convenient.  Dans  ce  moment  votre  arrivee  met  I'empereur  dans 
de  grandes  inquietudes,  en  vous  considerant  comme  roi  d'Espagne, 
et  comme  general-en-chef,  1'empereur  voit  que  votre  retour  sera 
interprete  selon  1'esprit  et  la  tournure  que  les  Anglais  voudront  y 
donner,  et  fera  un  mauvais  effet;  qu'il  est  penible  que  votre 
majeste  se  soit  portee  a  cette  demarche  dont  il  ne  peut  resulter 
aucun  avantage,  et  qui  peut  avoir  beaucoup  d'inconvenients,  car 
dans  ce  moment  d'agitation  1'Espagne  va  se  trouver  sans  chef. 
Votre  majeste  ne  voulant  pas  rester  a  Madrid,  1'empereur  trouve 
qu'il  auroit  ete  tres  utile  qu'elle  allat  passer  la  revue  de  1'armee 
de  Portugal  ou  de  1'armee  d'Andalousie :  I'influence  de  votre 
majeste  auroit  surtout  ete  bien  utile  pour  procurer  a  1'armee 
de  Portugal  tout  ce  o^ui  lui  est  necessaire.  L'empereur,  sire,  est 
dans  une  grande  anxiete  de  savoir  a  <jui  vous  avez  donne  le  com- 
mandement  de  1'armee  du  centre ;  si  vous  avez  prevenu  le  due 
de  Dalmatic  de  votre  depart,  et  qui  etant  aux  mains  avec  1'en- 
nemi  trouvera  ses  embarras  augmentes,  n'ayant  aucune  direction 
sur  ses  derrieres.  S'il  etoit  possible  que  votre  majeste  re$ut 
cette  lettre  encore  en  Espagne,  1'empereur  m'ordonne  d'engager 
votre  majeste  a  sentir  les  inconveniens  de  son  retour  si  contraire 
aux  circonstances.  L'empereur  n'a  aucune  nouvelle  ni  de  1'armee 
d'Andalousie  ni  de  1'armee  du  centre.  J'epedie  a  votre  majest^ 
un  de  mes  aides-de-camp.  Etc.  etc. 

ALEXANDEE. 

Paris,  le  1  Jum,  1811. 

SIEE, — L'empereur  a  examine  atteutivement  les  observations 
que  votre  majeste  lui  a  adressees,  et  me  prescrit  de  me  rendre 
aupres  d'elle  pour  avoir  1'honneur  de  lui  donner  connoissance  de 
ce  qu'il  juge  le  plus  convenable  sur  les  divers  points  qui  en  sont 
1'objet.  L'empereur  pense,  sire,  que  votre  majeste  peut  partir 
de  Paris  quand  elle  le  ;,ugera  a-propos,  et  meme  sans  attendre 
son  retour,  si  cela  entrait  dans  les  intentions  de  votre  majeste. 
L'armee  du  centre  en  Espagne  est  pleinement,  entierement  sous 
les  ordres  de  votre  majeste,  le  general  Belliard  ne  doit  point 
prendre  le  titre  de  major  general,  mais  celui  que  lui  ont  toujours 
attribue  les  ordres  emanees  de  rempereur,  de  chef  d'etat  major  de 
1'armee  du  centre.  Si  votre  majeste  n'est  pas  content  de  ce 
general,  je  vous  engage,  sire,  a  en  proposer  un  autre  qui  ait 
votre  confiance.  C'est  a  votre  majeste,  sire,  qu'il  appartient  de 
suspendre,  de  renvoyer,  de  traduire  me"  me  a  des  commissions 
militaires  quand  il  y  a  lieu,  les  generaux  et  officiers  de  1'armee 
du  centre;  d'adrninistrer  les  provinces  comprises  dans  1'arron- 
dissement  de  cette  armee  comme  votre  majeste  le  jugerale  plus 

E  E2 


420  APPENDIX. 

convenable  au  bien  du  service.  A  1'armee  du  nord  de  1'Espagne, 
1'empereur  a  besoin  d'un  marechal  qui  soit  charge  du  commande- 
ment  des  troupes  stationees  dans  les  provinces  formant  Farron- 
dissement  de  cette  armee.  Le  marechal  due  d'Istrie  exerce 
maintenant  ce  commandement;  dans  le  cas,  sire,  ou  ce  marechal 
ne  conviendroit  pas  a  V.  M.  1'empereur  ne  serait  pas  eloigno  de 
le  remplacer  par  le  marechal  Jourdan,  si  cette  disposition  etoit 
agreable  a  votre  majeste  et  a  ce  marechal.  Mais  1'empereur  ne 
juge  pas  qu'on  puisse  rien  changer  a  1'organisation  de  1'armee  du 
nord;  il  est  essentiel  que  cette  organisation  reste  telle  qu'ellc 
est,  si  ce  n'est  de  mettre  cette  armee  sous  les  ordres  d'un 
marechal  Francais  qui  possede  d'avantage  la  confiance  de  votre 
majeste.  Dans  les  gouvernemens  qui  forment  1'arrondissement 
de  cette  armee,  c'est  au  nom  de  votre  majeste,  sire,  que  la  justice 
doit  se  rendre;  le  commandant  doit  envoyer  des  rapports  jour- 
naliers  a  V.  M.,  1'intendant  general  M.  Dudon  doit  envoyer  a 
V.  M.  1'etat  de  la  perception  des  contributions  et  de  leur  emploi. 
L'empereur  pense  que  V.  M.  doit  avoir  aupres  du  general-en-chef 
de  1'armee  du  nord  un  commissaire  Espagnol  pour  veiller  a  ce 
que  le  quart  du  revenu  des  provinces  de  rarroridissement  de  cette 
armee,  soit  verse  a  Madrid  pour  le  service  de  votre  majeste,  et 
pour  secourir  1'armee  du  centre.  L'empereur  consent  a  ce  qiie 
toutes  les  fois  que  les  provinces  auraient  les  moyens  necessaires 
pour  se  garder  et  se  garantir  des  incursions  des  guerillas,  elles 
puissent  rentrer  entierement  sous  I'administration  Espagnole  en 
ne  fournissant  que  ce  qui  sera  convenu.  Quant  a  1'armee  du 
midi  de  1'Espagne,  1'empereur  approuve  qu'ainsi  qu'a  1'armee 
du  nord,  le  marechal  qui  cpmmande  envoie  des  rapports  a  V.  M. 
et  1'instruire  de  tout  ce  qui  se  passe ;  les  budgets  en  recettes  et 
en  depenses  des  differentes  provinces  de  1'armee  du  midi,  doivent 
aussi  etre  envoy  es  a  votre  majeste,  qui  y  tiendra  un  commissaire 
pour  percevoir  le  quart  des  revenues. 

La  meme  methode  sera  pareillement  appliquee  a  1'armee 
d'Arragon.  L'empereur,  sire,  satisfait  aussi  aux  desirs  exprimes 
par  V.  M.  Quant  a  ce  qui  concerne  le  commandement  general 
de  ses  armees  en  Espagne,  sa  majeste  ne  croit  pas  pouvoir 
donner  un  tel  commandement  qui  doit  etre  simple  et  un;  votre 
M.  sentira  qu'il  est  dans  la  nature  des  choses  qu'un  marechal 
resident  a  Madrid  et  dirigeant  les  operations  voudrait  en  avoir  la 
gloire  avec  la  responsibiHte,  et  que  dans  ce  cas,  les  commandans 
des  armees  du  midi  et  de  Portugal  se  croyant  moins  reellement 
sous  les  ordres  de  votre  M.  que  sous  de  son  chef  d'etat  major, 
pourraient  ne  pas  obeir,  ou  executer  ce  qui  leur  serait  prescrit. 
Mais  independamment  du  commandement  de  1'armee  du  centre, 
V.  M.  sire,  aurait  le  commandement  des  troupes  qui  entreraicnt 
dans  rarrondissement  de  cette  armee.  Si  Tarmee  du  midi  se 
repliait  sur  1'armee  du  centre,  elle  serait  des-lors  sous  les  ordres 
de  V.  M.  et  il  en  serait  de  meme  pour  1'armee  du  centre. 

Dans  celles  des  armees  ou  V.  M.  se  rendrait,  elle  aurait  les 
honneurs  du  commandement;  mais,  sire,  1'empereur  juge  tres 
important  de  ne  rien  changer  au  cominandement  militaire  ni  a 


APPENDIX.  421 

1'armee  du  nord,  ni  a  1'armee  d'Arragon,  ni  aux  armees  du  micli 
et  de  Portugal,  excepte  ce  qu'il  est  necessaire  d'etablir  pour  que 
V.  M.  ait  des  rapports  de  tout  ce  qui  se  passe,  connaisse  tout  et 
puisse  se  servir  de  ces  relations,  dans  sa  position  centrale,  pour 
instruire  les  autres  generaux:  sa  majeste  pense  que  cette  com- 
munication de  renseignemens,  d'observations,  de  conseils,  peut 
m£me  avoir  lieu  par  le  canal  du  ministre  de  la  guerre  de  V.  M. 
L'empereur  desire,  sire,  que  V.  M.  veuille  bien  correspondre 
directement  avec  moi  par  des  lettres  signes  de  sa  main;  j'aurai 
1'honneur  d'adresser  directement  les  miennes  a  V.  M.  L'empereur 
desire  egalement  qu'elle  s'en  reserve  1'ouverture  et  fasse  connaitre 
ensuite  a  son  chef  d'etat-major  ce  qu'elle  jugera  convenable.  Je 
prie  votre  M.  de  vouloir  bien  donner  ses  ordres  pour  que  tons  les 
comptes  rendus  en  etats  de  situation  me  soient  adresses,  que  les 
rapports  soient  tres  exacts  et  que  je  sois  instruit  de  tout  ce  qui 
peut  interesser  le  service  de  1'empereur  comme  cela  est  d'usage 
dans  une  armee.  D'apres  les  ordres  de  l'empereur  une  somrne 
de  cinq  cents  mille  francs  par  mois  sera  envoyee  a  V.  M.  jusqu'au 
ler  Juillet,  et  a  compter  du  ler  Juillet,  cet  envoi  sera  d'un 
million  par  mois  pendant  le  reste  de  1'annee. 

L'empereur,  sire,  me  prescrit  d'avoir  1'honneur  de  concerter 
avec  votre  majeste  les  mesures  qu'elle  jugera  convenables  a 
1'organisation  de  1'armee  du  centre,  ainsi  que  pour  en  retirer  les 
generaux  qui  ne  conviendraient  pas  a  votre  majeste,  faire  des 
examples  de  ceux  qui  auroient  commis  des  dilapidations,  leur 
faire  restituer  les  sommes  qu'ils  auraient  dilapidees;  enfin,  sire, 
l'empereur  se  repose  essentiellement  sur  votre  majeste  du  soiu 
de  maintenir  les  officiers  de  son  armee  dans  la  discipline  con- 
venable et  de  faire  des  examples,  et  il  desire  que  V.  M.  envoie 
journellement  des  rapports  detailles  sur  tout  ce  qui  est  important, 
Votre  majeste,  sire,  reconnaitra  dans  ces  dispositions  que  le 
desir  de  1'empereur  est  de  faire  tout  ce  qui  peut  donner  un 
nouvel  eclat  a  1'entree  de  V.  M.  en  Espagne,  en  maintenant 
d'ailleurs  dans  leur  integrite,  ainsi  que  sa  majeste  le  gage 
indispensable,  1'organisation  de  1'armee  d'Andalousie  et  des 
autres  armees  d'Espagne,  &c, 

Observations  faites  par  le  roi  d'Espagne  sur  la  lettre  du  major 
general,  du  ler  Juin,  1811. 

Le  roi  demande: 

1°.  Que  Messrs,  les  marechaux  commandant-en-chef  les 
armees  de  l'empereur,  a  1'armee  du  nord,  du  Portugal,  de  midi, 
et  de  I'Arragon,  ne  puissent  augmenter  les  impots  existant  a  ce 
pur,  ni  lever  aucune  contribution  extraordinaire  sans  1'autorisa- 
tion  du  roi,  ou  de  l'empereur. 

2°.  Le  roi  desire  que  le  marechal  Jourdan  remplace  le  marechal 
due  d'Istrie  dans  le  commandement  de  1'armee  du  nord. 

3°.  Que  les  marechaux  commandant  les  armees  de  l'empereur 
et  les  intendans  general  ne  puissent  vendre  aucune  bien  national 
ou  communal  sans  1'autorization  du  roi;  qu'il  en  soit  de  meme 
pour  les  plombs  et  vif  argent  appartenant  a  1'etat. 


422  APPENDIX. 

4°.  Que  les  administrations  Espagnoles  dans  1'arrondissement 
des  armees  du  nord,  du  midi,  de  1'Arragon,  resteront  telles 
au'elles  sont,  et  que  si  des  changemens  paroissent  utiles,  ils  seront 
demandes  an  roi. 

5°.  Qu'il  soit  specific  que  le  quart  des  revenues  des  provinces 
occupees  par  les  armees  de  1'empereur,  en  Espagne,  sera  verse 
net  dans  le  tresor  dn  roi  a  Madrid,  et  que  les  trois  autre 
quartes  seront  employes  aux  besoin  de  1'armee  dans  les  dites 
provinces,  et  en  pavement  des  traitemens  des  administrations 
Espagnoles. 

6°.  Le  roi  se  trouvant  avoir  1'honneur  du  commandement  pres 
des  armees  on  il  se  trouve,  pense  qu'il  est  dans  les  intentions  de 
votre  majeste  qu'il  puisse  voir  et  reunir  les  autorites  Espagnoles 
comme  bon  lui  semblera  pour  leur  parler  dans  1'interet  des 
affaires  d'Espagne:  ce  que  le  roi  trouve  utile  de  faire  dans  les  lieux 
ou  il  1'arrdtera  pour  se  rendre  a  Madrid. 

7°.  II  paroit  entendu  que  le  marechal  commandant  1'armee  de 
Portugal  rendra  compte  au  roi  des  toutes  les  operations,  aussi 
que  doivent  le  faire  les  autres  marechaux. 

8°.  Le  roi  trouve  utile  pour  les  interests  des  affaires  d'Espagne 
de  pouvoir  s'attacher  des  officiers  Espagnols  ou  autres  qui  se 
trouveroient  parmi  les  prisonniers,  et  qui  par  des  motifs  particu- 
liers  iljugeroit  convenable  d'employer. 

9°.  Le  roi  de  Westphalie  qui  ne  peut  pas  recruter  les  regimens 
qu'il  a  en  Espagne  est  dispose  amettre  le  petit  nombre  d'hommes 
qui  restent  aux  drapeaux  a  la  disposition  du  roi  d'Espagne  pour 
e"tre  a  la  solde  et  a  son  service ;  le  roi  a  Espagne  les  placeroit 
utilement  dans  la  garde. 

10°.  Le  roi  desire  que  le  general  Maurice  Mathieu  remplace  le 
general  Lorge. 

11°.  Qu'il  ne  reste  a  Madrid  que  Fadministratiou  necessaire 
pour  1'armee  du  centre,  et  que  cette  grande  quantite  d'adminis- 
trateurs  appartenant  a  radministration  generale  qui  n'existe  plus 
a  Madrid  soit  envoy ee  a  Burgos  ou  en  France. 

12°.  Que  la  solde  des  troupes  Fran9aises  faisant  partie  de  1'armee 
du  centre  continue  a  £tre  payee  par  le  tresor  de  France. 

13°.  Sa  majeste*  conservera  le  general  Belliard  comme  chef  de 
son  etat  major. 

14°.  Le  roi  de*sire  pouvoir  prendre  toutes  les  mesures  politiques 
qu'il  jugera  convenable,  et  faire  toutes  autres  dispositions  a  1'egard 
de  cortez,  en  se  conformant  aux  vues  contenues  dans  la  lettre  que 
j'ai  ecrite  d'apres  1'ordre  de  V.  M.  pour  cet  objet. 

15°.  Sur  les  500,000  francs  quo  Y.  M.  met  a,  la  disposition  du 
roi  a  Madrid  on  en  retient  100,000  francs  pour  1'arriere.  Le  roi 
demande  que  cette  somme  soit  pour  le  service  courant. 

Paris,  le  17  Juin,  1811. 

SIBE, — L'empereur  m'ordonne  de  vous  envoyer  la  copie  de  la 
lettre  que  j'adresse  au  due  d'Istrie:  j'ecris  a-peu-pres  dans  les 
me'mes  termes  aux  autres  commandants.  Je  n'ai  pas  encore  vu 
le  marechal  Jourdan ;  je  ie  verrai  demain  et  immediatement  apres 


APPENDIX.  423 

il  partira  pour  Madrid,  ou  1'empereur  apprendra  avec  plaisir  qu'il 
est  employe  comme  gouverneur. 

Le  due  de  Raguse  mande  qu'il  est  en  marche  sur  le  Tage. 
L'empereur  desire  que  V.  M.  donne  ses  ordres  pour  qu'on  lui 
procure  tous  les  secours  dont  il  peut  avoir  besoin :  il  a  avec  lui 
vingt-huit  mille  bayonnettes,  trois  mille  hommes  de  cavalerie,  et 
trent-six  pieces  de  canon.  L'empereur  desire  que  V.  M.  puisse 
1'appuyer  avec  dixhuit  cent  chevaux,  quinze  a  dixhuit  pieces  de 
canon,  et  deux  a  trois  mille  hommes  d'infanterie :  ce  corps 
pourroit  etre  place  a  proximite  afin  de  pouvoir  rejoindre  et  aider 
le  due  de  Haguse,  s'ii  devoit  donner  bataille  aux  Anglais. 
L'empereur  verroit  avec  plaisir,  sire,  qu'apres  votre  arrive  a 
Madrid  vous  vous  rendissiez  a  1'armee  de  Portugal,  pour  la  passer 
en  revue,  1'animer,  et  prendre  dans  votre  revue  1'etat  des  emplois 
vacans. 

J'ecris  au  due  de  JRaguse  que  si  1'on  pouvoit  retrancher  Al- 
cantara et  faire  une  tete  de  pont  sur  la  rive  droite,  ce  seroit  une 
bonne  operation.  Si  1'armee  de  Portugal  arrivoit  a  terns  pour 
secourir  1'armee  du  midi  devant  Badajoz,  le  petit  corps  de  reserve 
dont  je  viens  de  parler  ci-dessus  a  votre  majeste  ne  pourroit  e"tre 
que  de  la  plus  grande  utilite. 

Le  siege  de  Tarragone  a  deja  attire  une  partie  des  bandes  (jui 
etoient  dans  1'arrondissement  de  1'armee  du  centre.  Deux  divi- 
sions de  1'armee  de  reserve  que  forme  1'empereur  arriveront  1'une 
a  Pampelune,  1'autre  a  Vittoria  vers  le  14  Juillet :  cela  mettra  a 
meme  d'envoyer  encore  aux  armees  du  midi  et  de  Portugal 
environ  douze  milles  hommes  qui  sont  en  Navarre,  et  qui  passe- 
ront  par  Madrid. 

L'empereur  ne  peut  qu'engager  votre  majeste  a  envoy er  a 
1'armee  du  midi  tout  ce  qui  lui  appartient,  car  c'est  la  que  se 
portent  les  grands  coups  et  qu'ont  lieu  les  operations  les  plus 
importantes. 

&c.  &c. 

ALEXANDRE. 
To  the  duke  of  Istria. 

Paris,  Juin,  1811. 

^J'ai  prevenu,  Monsieur  le  marechal,  le  general  Monthion,  les 
generaux  Caffarelli  et  Dorsenne  directement  des  dispositions  dont 
ie  vais  vous  entretenir,  et  qui  ont  rapport  aux  intentions  de 
1'empereur  relativement  au  retour  du  roi  d'Espagne  dans  ses 
etats. 

Le  roi  commande  en  chef  1'armee  du  centre,  mais  1'intention 
de  1'empereur  est  que  vous  correspondiez  avec  S.  M.  C.  en  lui 
faissant  le  rapport  de  ce  qui  se  passe  afin  de  la  mettre  a  meme  de 
connoitre  I'ensemble  des  evenemens  en  Espagne  comme  les 
autres  generaux  en  chef  ont  1'ordre  d'en  agir  de  meme,  le  roi  sera 
dans  le  cas  de  pouvoir  comme  point  central  vous  faire  faire  des 
communications  qui  contribueront  au  succes  des  armes  de  1'em- 
pereur. 

S,  M.  I.  m'ordonne  aussi  de  vous  faire  connaitre,  M.  le  due, 
que  son  intention  est  que  pendant  Je  voyage  du  roi  dans  son 


424  APPENDIX. 

retour  a  Madrid,  tous  les  honneurs  lui  soient  rendus  dans  lee 
gouvernemens  et  dans  1'arrondissement  de  1'armee  du  nord 
comme  si  S.  M.  commandait  cette  armee.  Le  roi  donnera  1'ordre 
e</  recevra  les  honneurs  du  commandement.  Les  gouverneurs 
/accompagneront  dans  leur  gouvernement  et  lui  feront  fournir 
toutes  les  escortes  qui  lui  seront  necessaires.  II  est  a  presumer 
que  le  roi  sejournera  quelque  .terns  a  Vittoria  et  a  Burgos,  et 
qu'il  profitera  de  son  sejour  pour  rassembler  les  notables  du  pays, 
les  eclairer  sur  la  situation  des  affaires,  et  ameliorer  1'esprit 
public.  Vous  seconderez,  Mons.  le  marechal,  le  mesures  que  le 
roi  pourra  prendre  pour  rendre  les  villes  et  les  villages  responsables 
des  abus  qui  se  commettent  sur  leur  territoire.  Vous  agirez  de 
meme  si  le  roi  accorde  le  pardon  a  quelques  bandes  de  guerillas  qui 
se  rendraient.  Vous  devez  aider  de  tous  vos  moyens  les  mesures 
que  S.  M.  prendra  pour  le  retablissement  de  1'ordre  et  de  la 
tranquillite  publique.  Du  reste  les  troupes  composant  1'armeo 
du  nord  doivent  rester  sous  le  commandement  respectif  de  leurs 
chefs  et  vos  ordres  doivent  continuer  a  etre  executes  sans  qu'aucun 
ordre  de  qui  que  ce  soit  puisse  les  changer.  Quant  a  I'adminis- 
tration  du  pays,  elle  doit  continuer  a  marcher  dans  la  direction 
donnee  par  les  instructions  et  les  ordres  de  1'empereur ;  les  fonds 
doivent  etre  destinees  aux  besoins  de  1'armee,  a  1'entretien  des 
h&pitaux,  et  vous  devez  defendre  et  emp&cher  toute  espece  d'abus. 
Le  roi  ayant  plus  particulierement  encore  que  vous,  les  inoyeiis 
de  connaitre  Tes  abus  qu'ont  lieu,  1'empereur  ordonne  que  vous 
profiteriez  des  lumieres  que  le  roi  pourra  vous  donner  a  cet  egard 
pour  les  reprimer.  II  est  necessaire,  Monsieur  le  due,  que  vous 
me  fassiez  connaitre  le  budjet  des  ressources  et  des  depenses,  afin 
de  savoir  la  partie  des  revenues  qui  pourront  etre  verses  a 
Madrid  dans  la  caisse  du  gouvernement  pour  le  service  du  roi  et 
pour  l'armee  du  centre. 

Je  n'ai  pas  besoin  de  vous  repeter  que  la  justice  doit  se  rendre 
au  nom  du  roi ;  cela  a  toujours  du  avoir  lieu  ;  le  droit  de  faire 
grace  ne  vous  appartient  pas  pour  les  individus  condamnes  par 
les  tribunaux;  vous  n'e"tes  autorise  qu'a  suspendre  1'execution 
dans  les  cas  que  vous  jugerez  graeiables.  Le  droit  de  faire  grace 
n'appartient  qu'au  roi.  Vous  n'avez  pas  non  plus  le  droit  de 
nommer  a  aucune  place  du  clerge ;  le  roi  y  nomme  dans  toutes 
les  parties  de  son  royaume. 

Si  le  roi  juge  a-propos  de  tenir  pres  de  vous  et  des  gouverneurs 
un  commissaire  Espagnol  pour  connaitre  les  recettes  et  les 
depenses,  vous  devez  donner  a  ce  commissaire  les  renseignemens 
dont  il  aura  besoin  pour  remplir  sa  mission.  Vous  aurez  soiii. 
Monsieur  le  marechal,  de  me  rendre  compte  journellement  de  ce 
qui  se  sera  fait  pendant  le  sejour  du  roi  afin  que  j'en  informe 
1'empereur.  &c.  &c. 

Paris,  le  24  Aout,  1811. 

SIRE, — J'ai  1'honneur  d'informer  votre  majeste  que  d'apres 
les  ordree  de  1'empereur,  je  vieus  de  faire  connaitre  a  M.  le 
marechal  due  de  Kaguse,  qiie  l'armee  de  Portugal  doit  prendre 
desormais  sa  ligne  de  communication  sur  Madrid;  je  lui  mandc 


APPENDIX.  425 

que  c'est  la  que  doit  etre  son  centre  de  dep6t,  et  que  toute  ope- 
ration que  1'ennemi  ferait  sur  la  Coa  ne  peut  deranger  cette  ligne; 
que  si  1'ennemi  veut  prendre  1'offensive  il  ne  peut  la  prendre  que 
dans  1'Andalousie  parceque  de  ce  cote  il  a  un  objet  a  remplir, 
qui  est  de  faire  lever  le  siege  de  Cadiz,  tandis  que  ses  efforts  dans 
le  nord  s'avan9a-t-il  meme  jusqu'a  Valladolid  n'aboutiraient  a 
rien,  puisque  les  troupes  que  nous  avons  dans  ces  provinces  en 
se  rcpliant  lui  opposeraient  une  armee  considerable,  et  qu'alors 
1'armee  de  Portugal  devrait  faire  pour  1'armee  du  nord  ce  qu'elle 
ferait  pour  1'armee  du  midi.  Je  le  previens  que  1' objet  important 
est  que  sa  ligne  d'operations  soit  sur  Talavera  et  Madrid,  parceque 
son  armee  est  specialement  destinee  a  proteger  celle  du  midi.  Je 
lui  fais  observer  que  1'armee  de  Portugal  etant  attaquee  de  front 
son  mouvement  de  retraite  est  encore  sur  Madrid,  parceque  clans 
tous  les  cas  possibles  ce  doit  etre  sa  ligne  d'operations;  qu'ilfaut 
done  que  tous  les  depots  quelconques  appartenant  a  1'armee  de 
Portugal  soient  diriges  sur  Talavera  et  Madrid.  Je  donne  1'ordre 
imperatif  au  general  Dorsenne  de  faire  partir  dans  les  24  heures 
tous  les  depots  et  detachemens  qu'il  a  appartenant  a  1'armee  de 
Portugal;  tout  ce  qui  est  en  etat  de  servir  sera  dirige  en  gros  de- 
tacliemens  par  Avila  sur  Placentia;  et  quant  aux  homines  qui  ue 
sont  pas  pour  le  moment  en  etat  de  servir,  le  general  Dorsenne 
les  fera  diriger  sur  Madrid,  et  aura  soin  d'en  informer  a  Favance 
votre  majeste;  de  maniere  qu'il  ne  lui  restera  plus  un  seul  nomme 
appartenant  a  1'armee  de  Portugal,  sauf  la  garnison  de  Ciudad 
llodrigo  qu'il  fera  relever  et  rejoindre  aussitot  apres  1'arrivee  dea 
renforts  qui  vont  se  rendre  a  1'armee  du  nord. 

&c.  &c. 

Boulogne,  le  20  Sept.,  1811. 

SIRE, — L'empereur  m'a  demande  si  j  'avois  reponse  a  la  lettre 
que  j'ai  eu  1'honneur  d'adresser  a  V.  M.  en  lui  rendant  compte 
de  la  reddition  de  Figueras.  L'empereur  m'ordonne  d'annoncer 
a  V.  M.  que  son  intention  est  d'etendre  a  toute  la  rive  gauche 
de  1'Ebre  la  mesure  qu'elle  a  juge  devoir  adopter  pour  la  Cata- 
logue. L'empereur  pense  que  V.  M.  temoin  de  la  resistance  qui 
eprouvent  les  armees  et  des  sacrifices  des  toutes  especes  que  la 
France  est  oblige  de  faire,  est  trop  juste  pour  ne  point  apprecier 
les  motifs  de  la  conduite  de  1'empereur,  et  je  suis  autorise  a 
assurer  V.  M.  des  sentimens  d'interet  et  d'amitie  qui  continuent 
a  animer  1'empereur  pour  V.  M.,  mais  il  ne  pouvent  pas  faire 
negliger  a  S.  M.  I.  et  11.  ce  qu'elle  doit  a  la  surete  de  son  empire 
et  u  la  gloire  de  son  regne. 


APPENDIX. 


No.  X. 

OPERATION  PROJECTED  FOR  THE  ARMY  OF  PORTUGAL, 

ADDRESSED  TO  MARSHAL  MARMONT  BY  PRINCE  BERTHIER,  DATED  COMPEIGNE, 
18TH  SEPTEMBER,   1811. 

[Extracted  from  Belmas's  '  Peninsula  Sieges.'] 

MARSHAL, — When  you  shall  have  eighty  pieces  of  artillery  well 
furnished;  when  general  Vandermaesen  and  all  your  depots  left 
in  the  north  shall  have  joined  you;  and  when  you  have  received 
all  equipments  and  clothing  destined  for  your  army,  the  emperor 
counts  on  your  having  forty-one  thousand  seven  hundred  men, 
and  we  shall  then  be  near  the  first  of  October.  When  you  are 
sure  that  Ciudad  Eodrigo  has  been  re-victualled  for  three  months, 
the  emperor  leaves  you  free  to  march  on  Badajos,  invest  Elvas, 
and  inundate  the  Alemtejo.  In  that  case  S.  M.  directs  that  the 
fifth  corps  shall  be  under  your  orders,  with  three  thousand 
cavalry  which  the  duke  of  Dalmatia  will  furnish.  You  will  thus 
have  fifty-seven  thousand  three  hundred  men  based  on  Estrema- 
dura  and  the  fortress  of  Badajos,  and  you  can  besiege  Elvas,  take 
the  town  and  one  of  the  forts,  which  will  not  be  difficult,  disturb 
the  English  towards  Abrantes  and  Lisbon,  and  in  a  good  position 
watch  to  see  if  they  will  give  battle  to  relieve  Elvas.  If  they 
let  you  besiege  that  place,  you  will  have  gained  a  real  advantage, 
you  will  have  relieved  the  north,  and  by  that  single  stroke  have 
thrown  the  enemy  into  Lisbon.  Elvas  might  be  taken  before  the 
15th  of  November  with  the  exception  of  one  fort  which  is  of 
little  importance:  this  will  forward  affairs  so,  that  before  the 
month  of  February  the  campaign  will  be  active  in  the  interior  of 
Portugal. 

If  the  enemy  should  then  take  the  offensive  and  move  on 
Salamanca  and  Valladolid,  he  will  find  Salamanca  fortified  and 
provisioned  for  two  months;  and  general  Dorsenne  will  have  to 
fall  back  upon  Valladolid,  or  even  on  Burgos,  where  he  will  find 
himself  at  the  head  of  fifty  thousand  men,  exclusive  of  a  division 
in  the  Asturias  and  of  the  troops  in  the  3rd,  4th,  and  5th 
governments.  But  this  movement  of  the  English  is  not  at  all 
probable ;  they  will  more  likely  hasten  to  the  defence  of  Lisbon, 
and  will  be  pursued  by  twenty-five  thousand  men  detached  from 
the  army  of  the  north.  So  that  two  divisions  will  hold  them  in 
check.  The  operation  which  I  have  explained  to  you,  marshal,  is 
the  only  one  which  can  do  honour  to  our  arms,  draw  us  out  of  the 
defensive  state  we  are  in,  make  the  English  tremble,  and  advance 
us  towards  great  events.  The  twenty-five  thousand  men  who 
shall  be  on  the  Coa,  will  follow  the  English  army ;  and  if  the 
latter  concentrates  entirely  on  the  Tagus,  the  army  of  the  north 
will  detach  fifteen  thousand  men  to  join  jou,  which  will  give  you 
a  force  of  seventy- two  thousand  three  hundred  men. 

The  taking  of  a  fortress  under  the  eyes  of  the  English  army ; 


APPENDIX.  427 

the  conquest  of  a  part  of  Portugal  which  will  cover  the  army  of 
the  south;  and  the  junction  with  your  force  of  twenty-five  thou- 
sand men  from  that  army  of  the  south,  will  be  for  you  motives  of 
glory  and  of  success.  On  another  side  marshal  Suchet  will 
march  upon  Valencia,  and  everything  tends  to  a  belief  that 
Valencia  will  be  taken  by  the  time  you  have  reduced  Elvas, 
and  that  you  can  be  thus  reinforced  with  another  good  division. 

You  have,  marshal,  well  observed  that  to  execute  the  operation 
proposed,  we  must  be  sure  that  the  enemy  has  not  got  any  battering- 
train  to  attack  Ciudad  Rodrigo;  because  if  the  siege  of  that  place 
is  commenced,  it  will  be  necessary  at  first  to  march  and  disengage 
the  fortress,  seeing  the  army  of  the  north  is  not  strong  enough 
alone  to  do  so,  and  its  business  is  to  fall  back  if  the  English, 
which  is  not  likely,  attempted  to  fall  upon  that  army  when  you 
march  on  the  south.  But  if  you  are  prepared,  and  that  Ciudad 
Eodrigo  is  not  besieged,  you  can,  with  the  aid  of  the  fifth  corps, 
attack  and  overthrow  all  the  positions  of  the  line  of  English 
placed  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Tagus.  That  will  cause  such  alarm 
and  will  so  disquiet  lord  Wellington,  that  he  will  probably  return 
by  long  marches  to  Lisbon. 

In  case  of  your  junction  with  the  army  of  the  north  to  march 
for  the  succour  of  Ciudad  Eodrigo,  if  the  enemy  besiege  it,  you 
will  by  his  majesty's  orders  have  the  command  of  both  armies. 
You  will  find  joined  to  this  letter  a  duplicate  order  placing  the 
fifth  corps  under  your  command  when  you  shall  have  resolved  to 
march  on  Elvas ;  also  a  duplicate  order  to  general  Dorsenne  if 
you  march  on  Ciudad  Rodrigo. 

(Signed)  ALEXANDER. 


END    OF    VOL.    HI. 


PRINTED   AT    BROWNS'    SAVILE   PRESS 
DOCK    STREET,   HULL. 


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Napier,   W.  P.  F.    (William 
231  Francis  Patrick) 

NJ  CHistory  of  the  war  in 

1900  the  peninsula  and  the  south 

v.3  of  France^ 

History  of  the  war  in  the 

Peninsula  and  in  the  south  of 

France  from  the  year  ISO?  to 

the  year  l8l4