ilSTORT OF
ITHE WAR IN SOUTH
AFRICA I899-I902
rOMPimO BY THE DIRECTION
mmS MAJESTYS GOVERNM^T
VOfclV
HISTORY OF THE
WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
1899-1902
HISTORY
OF THE
WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
1899-1902
WRITTEN BY DIRECTION OF HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
VOLUME IV
b>iv- Trec^©r»ck I^laUrK^ and
Captain MAURICE HAROLD GRANT
(Devonshire Regiment)
LONDON I ^
HUEST AND BLACKETT LIMITED
1910
All right* reserved
AI3f
PREFACE.
This Volume comprises the account of the War in South Africa from
the assumption of the command-in-chief by General Lord Kitchener,
G.C.B., G.C.M.G., to the termination of hostilities. It might, there-
fore, be considered as dealing with a distinct phase of the campaign,
even if the peculiar nature of the operations did not of themselves
distinguish it from what had gone before. From December,
1900, to May, 1902, was waged incessantly guerrilla warfare of the
purest type and on the most extensive scale between an army of
195,400 men on the one side and of 30,000 to 50,000 men on the other.
The contest was remarkable in many respects, but in none, perhaps,
more than in its duration. When it is considered that at the moment
at which this narration opens the Boer forces were already beaten,
inasmuch as their cause was irretrievably lost, their long -sustained
effort to ward off the end requires some military explanation. It is
to be found in the fact that in their expiring struggle they reverted to
weapons which were peculiarly their own and precisely those in which
their opponents were least practised. Casting off the trammels of
formal warfare, and disintegrating into a thousand bands, they
compelled the British Army to conform, and agitated the whole vast
theatre of war with an infinite complexity of movement which never
for a moment desisted, nor for more than a moment was marked by
any distinguishable trend.
To trace in detail the components of this universal stir has been
the author's task. It was necessary to do so minutely. An official
historian owes a duty from which a general writer is exempt ; his
work would be valueless to military students if it could not be referred
to for information concerning the minutiae of the campaign, the lesser
as well as the greater tactics, the work of units, and even of individual
officers and men. Moreover, a campaign such as that recorded in the
following pages especially calls for dissection, because it was mainly
composed of a myriad of events, each so small, yet contributing to so
vast a sum, that it was often impossible to determine which was
vi THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
greater than another, or wliich was worthy or unworthy of mention.
The elimination of every minor operation would, in fact, have
resulted in almost total silence on a whole campaign of small affairs
which together composed one of the greatest feats of the British
Empire and Army. As much as possible, therefore, has been briefly
recorded ; to record it all was beyond the power of man.
Of one deficiency in the scheme of the Volume the author is well
aware, namely, the rarity of any periodical " purview " or general
glance over the theatre of war. This has not been neglected because
it was forgotten, but because it seemed alike valueless and impossible.
Rarely was the campaign marked by any permanent development of
the situation ; never, until the end, by one that affected it all. If
the enemy appeared few and dispirited on one day, they were
numerous and aggressive on the next ; the clearance of one area did
but embroil its neighbour ; defeats and victories of columns and
commandos followed one another with a regularity in which the
gradual attrition of the weaker side was scarcely to be perceived. In
short, it could never be said precisely how matters stood at any given
moment ; those who attempted to do so from the seat of war were
sadly at fault. Now, as then, only the size of the campaign can be
truly stated, for shape it had none.
For the assistance of the reader it may be remarked that the
work has been so designed that those desirous of following the
operations in any particular province of South Africa may do so by
omitting the intervening chapters which deal with other parts.
In cases where a number of officers of the same name were in the
field, the initials are repeated as often as is necessary to avoid
confusion.
A mass of technical material for which there was no place in the
text has been incorporated in Appendices.
In conclusion, the author wishes to record his indebtedness to
two ofi&cers, namely. Captain J. Bowers (Army Service Corps) and
Captain L. Oppenheim (2nd Dragoon Guards, Queen's Bays), who
took charge of, and extracted the essentials of the enormous and
intricate mass of material from which this Volume has been written.
He can say no more, and no less, than that without their services
the work could not have been completed.
M. H. Grant.
CONTENTS.
VOLUME IV.
CHAI*. PAGE
I. — Events in the Western Transvaal. December,
1900 I
II. — Events in the Eastern Transvaal. December
1ST, 1900 — January 30TH, 1901 ... 23
III. — Events in the Orange River Colony. December,
1900 — January, 1901 45
IV. — Events in Cape Colony. December, 1900 —
February 28th, 1901 60
V. — Events in the Orange River Colony. {Con-
tinued from Chapter III.) February — June,
1901 93
VI. — Events in the Eastern Transvaal. (Continued
from Chapter II.) January — March, 1901 . iii
VII. — Events in the Western Transvaal. (Continued
from Chapter I.) January — April, 1901 . 128
VIII. — Events in the Eastern Transvaal and Natal.
{Continued from Chapter VI.) April — May, 1901 139
IX. — Events in the Orange River Colony. {Continued
from Chapter V.) April — June, 1901. . . 156
X. — Events in Cape Colony. {Continued from Chapter
IV.) March — April, 1901 .... 172
XI. — Events in the Western Transvaal. {Continued
from Chapter VII.) May — August, 1901 . i8i
viii THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
CHAP. PACK
XII. — Events in the Eastern Transvaal. (Continued
from Chapter VIII.) June — September, 1901 . 198
XIII. — Events in Cape Colony. {Continued from Chapter
X.) June — September, 1901 .... 224
XIV. — Events in the Orange River Colony. {Continued
from Chapter IX.) July — August, 1901 . . 245
XV. — Events in Cape Colony. {Continued from Chapter
XIII.) September — October, 1901 . . 270
XVI. — Events in the Western Transvaal. {Continued
from Chapter XI.) September — November, 1901 291
XVII. — Events in the Eastern Transvaal. {Continued
from Chapter XII.) The Action of Baken-
laagte, October 30TH, 1901 .... 304
XVIII. — Events in the Orange River Colony. {Continued
from Chapter XIV.) August — November, 1901 316
XIX. — Events in the Western Transvaal. {Continued
from Chapter XVI.) November, 1901 — January,
1902 339
XX. — Events in the North- West and West of Cape
Colony. April — December, 1901 . . . 349
XXI. — Events in the Eastern Transvaal, {Continued
from Chapter XVII.) November, 190 i —
January, 1902 371
XXII. — Events in the Orange River Colony. {Continued
from Chapter XVIII.) December, 1901 —
February, 1902 382
XXIII. — Events in the Western Transvaal. {Continued
from Chapter XIX.) January — March, 1902 . 406
XXIV. — Events in the Orange River Colony. {Continued
from Chapter XXII.) February, 1902 . . 423
XXV. — Events in the Northern Transvaal. April,
1901 — May. 1902 ...... 435
CONTENTS. ix
CHAI'. I'AGK
XXVI. — Events in Cape Colony. {Continued from Chapter
XX.) January — May, 1902 .... 453
XXVII. — Events in the Orange River Colony. {Continued
from Chapter XXIV.) March — May, 1902 475
XXVIII. — Events in the Western Transvaal. {Continued
from Chapter XXIII.) March — May, 1902 . 491
XXIX. — Events in the Eastern Transvaal. {Continued
from Chapter XXI.) February — May, 1902 . 512
XXX. — The Conclusion of Peace 523
ILLUSTRATIONS.
WiTKOPPiEs — Views of, from the North and West
Facing page 104
APPENDICES.
»0. PAGE
1. SuMMARV OF Supplies sent by the Natal District for
General French's Force, Garrisons, etc., February —
March, 1901 567
2. The Evolution of the Blockhouse System in South
Africa 568
3. Letter from General C. R. De Wet to General J. C.
Smuts, appointing him Successor to Kritzinger and
GIVING Instructions as to the Conduct of the
Campaign in Cape Colony, February 8th, 1902 . . 577
4. Orders by Lieut. -General Sir I. S. M. Hamilton,
K.C.B., D.S.O., Commanding Columns operating in
Western Transvaal, May 6th, 1902 .... 581
5. Notes on the Supply System in South Africa,
1901— 2 . 584
6. Notes on the Transport System in South Africa,
1901 — 2 598
7. Notes on the Royal Army Medical Department
IN South Africa, 1901 — 2 602
8. Notes on the Army Ordnance Department in South
Africa 617
9. Notes on the Army Post Office Corps in South Africa 625
10. Notes on the Military Railway System in South
Africa 629
11. Notes on the Army Remount Department . . . 650
T2. Notes on the Refugee Concentration Camps in South
Africa, 1901 — 2 659
xii THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
NO. PAGE
13. Strength of the Garrison in South Africa on August
1ST, 1899, AND Reinforcements, etc., from Home and
Colonies during the War up to May 31ST, 1902 . 671
14. Drafts, etc., despatched to South Africa during the
War, 1899 — 1902 675
15. Statement showing : —
(a.) Comparative Recruiting Figures of the Army
and Militia prior to and during the War in
South Africa 678
(b.) Recruiting Figures during the War of
THE Imperial Yeomanry, Volunteers, South
African Constabulary, etc. . . . . 679
i6. Casualties, Wastage, etc., in the Army in South
Africa during the War, up to May 31ST, 1902 . . 680
17. Statement of Casualties, by Corps, during the War
IN South Africa, 1899 — 1902 681
18. Expenditure incurred on Army Votes in consequence
of the War in South Africa 698
19. A List of Recipients of the Victoria Cross during the
War in South Africa, 1899 — 1902 .... 700
20. Statement of Boer Prisoners of War, showing how
disposed of . ....... 704
Monthly Comparative Statement for 1901 — 2,
Casualties in the Boer Forces .... 705
Summary, showing Decrease of Boer Forces . . 705
LIST OF MAPS AND SKETCHES.
VOLUME IV.
No. 56. Eastern Transvaal.
No. 57. The Action of Bakenlaagte. October 30th. 1901.
No. 58. South Africa, showing lines of Blockhouses, Stationary Garrisons
and Posts, May, 1902.
No. 59. Western Transvaal.
No. 60. General Sir Ian Hamilton's " Drive " in the Western
Transvaal, May 6th — nth, 1902.
No. 61. Plan of Railway Line. Illustrating System of Blockhouses, etc.,
generally adopted.
No. 62. Plan of Road — Machadodorp and Lydenburg. Illustrating
System of Blockhouses, etc., generally adopted.
No. 63. Cape Colony.
No. 64. Orange River Colony.
MAPS TO VOLUME IV.
The general remarks on maps prefacing Volume I. are applicable also
to the maps in this Volume. Maps Nos. 56, 59 and 64 have been
compiled chiefly from the four-miles- to-one-inch sheets issued by the
Topographical Section of the War Office previous to the war, and
these again were prepared from the Government Farm Surveys of
the Transvaal and Orange Free State. Where the ground is not
covered by that series, Jeppe's Map of the Transvaal has been used.
No. 57 is an enlargement made from some reconnaissance
mapping done since the war.
Nos. 58 and 63 are compiled from ordinary published maps of
South Africa revised in parts from special sketches made by officers.
No. 60 is from Jeppe's Map of the Transvaal.
Nos. 61 and 62 are from special sketches.
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
CHAPTER I.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL, DECEMBER, IQOO.*
At the moment of Field-Marshal Lord Roberts' departure
from the theatre of war, and of the assumption of the chief
command by General Lord Kitchener, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.,
the Western Transvaal seemed very little disturbed except General
by rumour. Of the combined Boer descent upon Cape the West.
Colony nothing had materialised except De Wet's single-
handed incursion between the Orange and Caledon rivers, where
that daring leader was daily becoming more deeply involved in
one of the most dangerous predicaments of his career, f Botha
himself was not to be seen ; his foremost troops were supposed
to have fallen back into the Pilands Berg. Liebenberg, near
Ventersdorp, and De la Rey, known to be hovering between
the Harts river and Wolmaranstad, seemed to be cut off alike
from De Wet by distance, and from their Chief to the north
by Lord Methuen's garrisons at Lichtenburg, Otto's Hoop,
Zeerust, by Cunningham's at Rustenburg, by Douglas', Barton's,
Hart's and Clements' along the Klerksdorp — Pretoria railway,
and by the various columns which certain of these Generals
despatched from both flanks to and fro across the Zwart Ruggens
between Otto's Hoop and the Magaliesberg mountains. At
the end of November, 1900, the western approaches to that
range were being patrolled by Broadwood, whose nominal coad-
* See map No. 59. t See Volume HI., pages 494 and 495.
VOL. IV. I
2 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
jut or, Clements, was tied up in Krugersdorp ; Hart was operating
in the Gatsrand. All these were under general command of
Lieut. -General French, who had been placed in charge of the
entire Johannesburg district,* which extended westward to
Klerksdorp and southward to the Vaal river.
Yet though there was no sign of any considerable concentra-
tion of hostile forces, there were several troublesome parties
in the country beyond the Magaliesberg to the west of Rusten-
burg. During November they had been kept moving by Broad-
wood, and he was in constant touch with them as he fell back
for orders behind Olifants Nek in the first week in December.
Situation in On December ist the reported arrival of De la Key himself at
the Magahes- yiakhoek in the midst of these bands gave their presence a
fresh significance, and Clements was ordered northward from
Krugersdorp to join Broad wood in clearing the neighbourhood, f
Clements had already arranged to do this some days earlier ; but
the constant depletion of his command whilst in Krugersdorp —
some of his men and guns being lent to Hart in the Gatsrand,
some sent to Potchefstroom, some chained to garrison duty
in Krugersdorp during Hart's absence, and at the fortified com-
munication post at Rietfontein, whilst Broadwood himself had
possession of half of one of Clements' battalions — all this had
so weakened Clements that he considered himself practically
immobile, and on November 27th had informed Broadwood that
any joint action must be postponed for the present. The
Commander-in-Chief's orders of December ist found him in no
better position ; nevertheless, they were peremptory, and on
December 3rd Clements marched northward as far as Dwarsvlei
with about 1,500 men and ten guns, J Broadwood arriving at
♦ See Volume III., Chapter XXI.
t Telegram No. K. 33, from Lord Kitchener to General Clements, December ist,
1900.
* Composition — ^Two hundred and forty-two men 2nd M.I., 211 men Kitchener's
Horse, 199 men Imperial Yeomanry, P. battery R.H.A. (four guns), 8th battery R.F.A.
(four guns), a 4.7-in. gun and a Vickers-Maxim, 38th company R.E. (twenty-four men),
2nd Northumberland Fusiliers (560 men), 2nd King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry
(279 men).
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 3
Oorzaak, on the north side of OUfants Nek some thirty miles
away, on the same date. On that very day, and almost mid-
way between the two, the enemy struck a blow more unex-
pected from its direction than its weight, though it was heavy
enough.
At Rustenburg, it will be remembered, Cunningham had been
stationed since the re-occupation of that town in October. He
had some 2,000 officers and men in the place, too few to com-
bine the guardianship of a large dep6t with field operations,
especially at a post which might have to be evacuated at any
time, yet numerous enough to require frequent convoys to keep
them supplied. These convoys had been wont to travel along
the Rustenburg — Pretoria road. It was so long since the enemy
had been seen in this quarter that the track had come to be
considered " as safe as Piccadilly."* To and fro throughout
November the baggage trains had passed regularly without
molestation, with escorts growing gradually weaker and vigilance
relaxing ; yet the passage was long and difficult, unguarded
westward of Commando Nek, and open to sudden forays from
either side. Noting these things, and being in need of supplies
himself, De la Rey kept watch upon the road from the southern
side of the mountains, determined to seize the first opportunity
for a coup. In the last week in November a convoy of more
than 260 wagons, having discharged its load at Rustenburg, pro-
ceeded eastward to refill. The journey was made in peace,
and on December 2nd, the road being reported as safe as usual,
the wagons once more headed westward for the return march.
De la Rey saw his chance. Broadwood was still beyond the
western arm of the mountains, kept there by the presence of
the aforementioned patrols ; Clements lay inactive on garrison
duty in Krugersdorp. Stealing into the gap between, De la Rey
dashed across the range by Breedts Nek, and on the morning of
the 3rd was in hiding with 800 men near Buffelspoort, flanking
the track of the advancing convoy. This was marching in two
equal divisions, the leading half escorted by twenty men of the
* Description by an officer.
VOL. IV. I*
4 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Victorian Mounted Rifles, two companies 2nd West Yorkshire
regiment, twenty-one men ist King's Own Yorkshire Light
Infantry, two guns 75th battery R.F.A., the whole under com-
mand of Major J. G. Wolrige-Gordon (ist Argyll and Suther-
land Highlanders). The rear portion, accompanied by twenty
men of the Victorian Mounted Rifles and two companies Argyll
and Sutherland Highlanders, was under Captain A. Patten
(Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders). The whole train covered
some eight miles of road, so that with an escort of the strength
and composition detailed it was practically defenceless through-
out its length, whether the troops were kept concentrated at
Loss of a one point or distributed in many. At 3 a.m. on December 3rd
Declsrd.iooo. *^® convoy left its halting-place of the night before, near Wol-
huter's Kop, and proceeded along the lower of the two tracks
leading to Rustenburg, the more northerly and safer road having
been rendered impracticable by a fortnight's fall of rain. Two
hours later the foremost wagons were abreast of Buffelspoort,
and here the scouts reported the presence of a hostile party close
ahead. This was at once a surprise and a confirmation. The
road had indeed been reported clear on all sides by every British
authority, but a native headman, coming in to the bivouac at
Wolhuter's Kop, had warned Wolrige-Gordon of De la Rey's
passage of the Magaliesberg, adding, however, the misleading
information that the Boer General had gone away to the north-
ward, and had not returned. Immediately after the first dis-
covery— too quickly to allow of the wagons being parked for
defence — a hot fire-attack was delivered from the south of the
road ; many of the draught oxen were shot, the native drivers
and conductors fled, and the head of the convoy fell into instant
disorder. In the few moments at his disposal the commander
of the escort made prompt preparations for defence. On both
sides of the track stood kopjes some 700 yards apart, that to
the south of small dimensions, but 500 feet higher than the
northern hill, which was longer and divided by a depression.
Seizing the former with half a company of the West Yorkshire,
Wolrige-Gordon posted half a company of the same battalion
on the western end of the northern kopje, and the guns and the
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 5
handful of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry on the nek
to the east, sending back at the same time to warn the second half
of' the convoy, which was now some six miles in rear. It hap-
pened that at this moment the leading half of the convoy was
itself divided into two parts by the intervention of a spruit. In
front of the second part of the train marched another company
of the West Yorkshire, which was immediately pushed forward
into the bed of the spruit, whilst the wagons were parked behind
it. But the company itself was first in difficulties. Dense bush,
which there was no time to clear, blinded the banks of the
stream ; the enemy, crawling through the thickets, closed around
in force, and, firing suddenly from point-blank range, shot down
sixteen of the soldiers and made prisoners of the rest when
their ammunition was exhausted. Before this Wolrige-Gordon,
seeing the predicament of his rearguard, had signalled to Patten
to bring up his men to the rescue from the rear division of
the convoy. Patten, who had laagered his section of wagons
at the first alarm, complied ; but on approaching the spruit
under heavy fire he became aware that the Boers were turning
his own flanks to get at his now unguarded wagons, and he pru-
dently fell back to protect them, leaving the company in the
spruit bed to its inevitable fate. Meanwhile the troops at the
head of the convoy were being hard pressed. The dispositions,
of necessity hurriedly made, were all in favour of the enemy.
The higher hill on the south of the road, the key of the other,
was held by but thirty-five non-commissioned officers and men ;
they had no officer with them, and being directly between the
main kopje and the enemy, who attacked from the south, had
to bear the full brunt with no possibility of support by fire
from their comrades behind, whose guns and rifles their posi-
tion effectually masked. Nor was any assistance, except re-
plenishment of ammunition, sent to them ; and at 3.30 p.m.,
after having lost but four killed and wounded, they surrendered
to the enemy. This placed the main defences almost at the
mercy of the captured crest. From it the Boers looked down
into the hastily built sangars, and, firing fiercely into them,
they began an enveloping movement which it was impossible
6 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
to check. Towards 6 p.m., when the kopje was practically sur-
rounded, the Boers rushed in to carry it, directing their greatest
efforts against the artillery, which with its paltry escort and bushy
surroundings seemed a certain prey. Then arose a combat
which General De la Key himself, than whom there was not in
the whole theatre of war a keener critic of close fighting, watched
with admiration. Encircled by the enemy, the rapidly diminish-
ing infantry shot back as fast as their nfegazines could be
emptied and re-charged. The guns — finely commanded by
Captain H. J. Farrell, R.A., an intrepid officer, who when many
of his men were down armed the rest with rifles taken from the
slain and laid the field-pieces himself — were run trail to trail,
and with depressed muzzles shattered the front of the charge
at only forty yards' distance with case shot and shrapnel fuzed
to zero. The infantry around the guns showed equal valour.
Of the twenty-one men of the King's Own Yorkshire Light
Infantry, who formed the escort, eleven fell ; but of the soldiers
of this regiment it was to be known that so long as any remained
aHve guns were safe in their keeping. The survivors rifled the
pouches of the dead for cartridges with which to avenge them.
But not only here did the troops fight with resolution ; over all
the kopje the loss of half the defenders found the rest still resist-
ing to the utmost, and when darkness fell the Boers had ex-
hausted their spirit, if not their strength, for they were six to one.
About 7.30 p.m. they ceased firing and fell back amongst the
wagons on the encumbered road. There their booty was heavy
enough to make amends for the failure to conquer the British
detachment on the ridges above. One hundred and twenty-six
wagons of supplies, much needed, especially by Broad wood, and
1,862 oxen were driven off or destroyed ; losses to the number-
of 118* had been inflicted on the escort. Tactically, the results
were that the Rustenburg communications were effectually
severed, and Cunningham at that place and Broadwood at Olifants
Nek were cut off alike from Pretoria and from Clements at
Krugersdorp. But De la Rey, knowing how more prompt his
* Casualties— Killed, eighteen; wounded, forty-six ; prisoners, fifty-four.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. ;
opponents were to avenge than avoid a disaster, had no inten-
tion of being caught with his practically beaten men between
converging forces. Already troops were on the march from
Rustenburg, more might be coming out of Pretoria, whilst Broad-
wood, though he had not yet stirred, was certain to be on the
scene shortly. Moreover, De la Rey had plans afoot which
rendered him particularly anxious not to hazard his force. He
therefore drew off, and a relieving detachment from Rustenburg*
which at i a.m. on December 4th reinforced Wolrige-Gordon
on the kopje, had nothing to do but to conduct the surviving
troops and wagons to their destination, which was reached on
the 7th. Broadwood had come up soon after the Rustenburg
troops ; but no sooner had he arrived than he received insistent
warning from Rustenburg that the Boers were now making for
Ohfants Nek, with the intention of attacking that key to the
western Magaliesberg. Accordingly Broadwood hurried back
to Oorzaak, only to be met there on the 6th by a message from
Clements, ordering him eastward to begin the pre-arranged co-
operation. Clements by this time was upon the Magaliesberg Clements
above Scheerpoort, and hearing only on the 5th of the capture MaJjaUesberg.
of the convoy, he proposed marching westward along the moun-
tain crests towards the scene of the disaster, and to meet Broad-
wood. Once more Broadwood set out eastward, and on the 7th
at Kromrivier, to the south of Buffelspoort, gained touch with
Clements, who had advanced along the Berg to Doornhoek, in-
tending to take the joint forces on towards Olifants Nek in search
of the destroyers of the convoy. But Clements had now become
aware of the real nature of those marauders. Not now had he to
deal with the usual gangs of freebooters such as had formerly
infested the Magaliesberg ; he was in the presence of a strong
and aggressive force, led by one of the most able Generals of
the federal armies. To search out and attack so formidable an
opponent in unfavourable country with his own diminished and
* Strength — Detachment Victorian Mounted Rifles, two companies West Yorkshire
regiment, and two guns, under Lieut. -Col. W. Fry, West Yorkshire regiment. This
detachment had left Rustenburg at 3 p.m. on December 3rd.
8 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
almost immobile column seemed to him the height of impru-
dence. In any case he required reprovisioning, and concen-
trating his troops at Nooitgedacht on December 8th, he sent a
convoy to Rietfontein for the rations, and renewed his requests
both to French and to Headquarters that the rest of his proper
troops might be freed from their garrison duties in Krugers-
dorp and despatched to reinforce him. French, not knowing
where to find other guards for the important centre, refused, and
so at first did Headquarters ; but in the meantime Hart returned
to Krugersdorp from his expedition, and on the nth and 12th
Clements, who was now stationary at Nooitgedacht, was told
that his men had been ordered to proceed to him on the 13th.
At this moment rumour, the will-of-the-wisp of troops in the
field, spirited Broadwood from him just as he had at last got
him to his side. First, Broadwood had on December nth
moved across to Elandskraal, consequent on a report that
Commando Nek was in danger of a raid from the north. Here
he was still in close touch with Clements ; but he had halted for
only a few hours when another alarm from the exactly opposite
direction called him to horse again, Rustenburg once more
warning him that Olifants Nek was about to be attacked from
the west. Back to the Nek for the third time hurried the
cavalry leader, nor could he well refrain, since to keep open
the Rustenburg road was the chief of his duties in the Magalies-
berg. Yet dire events were to hang largely on his departure,
and what can be said of the system which allowed a brigade
of cavalry to be thus abstracted from its column and led about
a mountain range by the messages of friends and feintings of
hostile patrols ? At this time, indeed, the whole military
machinery in the Magaliesberg was out of gear, largely owing
to a somewhat confused delimitation of areas of command.
Clements, whilst at Krugersdorp, had been under French ; but
that General's jurisdiction did not extend to the Magaliesberg,
so that Broadwood had been always in a different sphere of
command from his colleague, until Clements, having reached
Nooitgedacht, became himself beyond the orders of an officer
who yet retained command over the considerable portion of
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 9
his force which remained behind ; finally, as has been seen,
Clements was unable to keep Broadwood near him for more
than a few hours together. Thus doubly weakened, Clements' ^
column lay in the mountains during the second week of December,
its continued isolation carefully noted by the scouts of a Boer
commander whose manoeuvring had done much to produce it.
For De la Key had now, with a skill worthy of all admiration,
played the opening moves of a game as well conceived as any
which had been undertaken by the federal tacticians, a game,
moreover, which was to be for heavy stakes. Ever since the
dchdcle at Komati Poort a cloud had hung over the Boer arms,
casting a shadow all the darker because, though the disintegra-
tion of Botha's commandos had its origin in the fine encounter
at Bergendal, its final stages had lacked the glamour of severe
fighting. Exhaustion and bewilderment had done more than The Boer
combat to scatter the Boer forces, and an army which breaks up
thus is harder to mend than one shattered by defeat in a pitched
battle. Botha, sheltering unmolested in Pietersburg, had worked
hard to piece together his dissevered armament ; and so well
did he succeed that by the end of November he was ready
with a scheme, which if it could not save the campaign, or even
set it back greatly in favour of his side, would at least revive
in his commandos the spirit of offence which was fast rotting.
That it could do more than this the Commandant-General could
scarcely hope, for he, almost alone amongst his compatriots, had
an eye to measure the disaster which had overtaken his country.
His plan was to fall upon the Johannesburg — Krugersdorp line,
and to capture if possible one or both of these places, the first the
mainspring of his enemy's existence in South Africa, the other the
Mecca of his countrymen, where stood the monument sacred
to all burghers slain by British and Zulus from 1836 to the
triumph at Majuba Mountain forty-five years later. To approach
this line was tactically easy by way of the Magaliesberg and
the Witwatersrand, but all depended upon the strength of the
British forces at those defensible ranges. All depended, too,
upon the quality of the leadership, and Botha, looking about
for men to conduct the enterprise, found one at his side and
10 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
another mthin easy call. At Pietersburg was General Beyers,
an officer who had had need of all his great strength of character
to overcome the unpopularity caused by his somewhat brusque
supercession of the aged and beloved Grobelaar, the former
commandant in those parts. The other was General De la
Key, a leader who in his sombre intensity of purpose, his courage,
and his high sense of honour, bore witness to the Huguenot
blood which preserved in him a personality somewhat foreign
and aloof from his compatriots. These two would undertake
the operation. At the beginning of December the situation in
the Magaliesberg was as favourable as it was ever likely to be.
Paget, with his efficient scouting service, had been removed
to the eastward too far to be able to keep watch on the road.
The garrison at Rustenburg was practically immobile ; at
Krugersdorp there was no sign of movement, except in the oppo-
site direction. The only free troops in the Magaliesberg were
those of Broadwood. Him it was very desirable to lure aside,
and, as has been seen, De la Rey found little difficulty in doing
so at will by demonstrating at the western arm of the Magalies-
berg. So surely as he showed troops there was Broadwood
called to the spot, a victim to the tactics which had placed a
mountain range in the keeping of a brigade of cavalry. De
la Rey had first tested his power in this manner on December
3rd, when, having drawn Broadwood away to Ohfants Nek,
he had captured the convoy a few miles behind his back at
Buffelspoort. He had then retired through Breedts Nek, which
was unguarded by British troops, to Boschfontein, to await
the coming of Beyers from the north, only falling back a
little way to Zeekoehoek when Clements and Broadwood
effected their brief and fruitless union at Kromrivier and
Doomhoek.
On December 6th Beyers marched from Warm Bath with
some 1,600 men of the Krugersdorp, Zoutpansberg and Water-
berg commandos. Moving slowly at first — he was only at
Boer Hamanskraal on the nth — a night march of sixty miles carried
in Uie"^*'°" him with a rush across the Rustenburg road and into touch with
M^;aiiesb€rg. De la Rey. Plans were quickly made for an attack on Clements.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. il
That General had now lain for a week in the same camp at
Nooitgedacht below the Magaliesberg ; every detail of his posi-
tion was known, and they all seemed to favour an attack.
Broadwood was away to the west ; the reinforcements from
Knigersdorp had not yet started ; nothing was to be feared
from Rustenburg, where the small garrison was shut up in strong
entrenchments as became an isolated post with the enemy in
strength in the field.
Clements, in truth, had done httle to discount the many dis-
advantages under which he laboured. Of Beyers' approach,
indeed, he knew nothing; but he was aware of De la Rey's
presence at Zeekoehoek, and recent events were sufficient in-
dication that the Boer was not there for sport. So little did
Clements divine the true situation that, weak and isolated as
he was, on the very day of Beyers' junction with De la Rey he
telegraphed to Headquarters that his presence at Nooitgedacht
prevented " any combination of Boers in south joining those in
valley north of Magaliesberg."
This, had it been true, were enough and good reason for his
long pause at Nooitgedacht ; but the General's supposition rested
on no foundation. At Nooitgedacht he blocked no passage
through the MagaHesberg ; the nearest, Breedts Nek, he knew
to be at that very moment in the hands of a strong force of the
enemy,* apparently ignored by the British, though it had been
and was shortly to be again a gateway of the greatest value to
De la Rey. At Nooitgedacht, in short, Clements hampered the
movements of no one but himself, for he lay under the MagaUes-
berg where they rose most sheer. His tactical position was as
dangerous as his strategical. Where, at Nooitgedacht, a steep
ravine indented the Magaliesberg, he had pitched his camp Clements'
close against the mountain side, holding the crests of the cliffs ^*th°"
high overhead with a line of piquets, whose chief duty was to Magaliesberg.
maintain communication with Broadwood. These were found
by four companies of the 2nd Northumberland FusiUers, which
were disposed, two on the height east of the ravine, and two on
* Major-General Clements' report, evening of December I2th.
12 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
that to the west, which was more lofty than the other. The left
front, where the crest receded and fell abruptly southward, was
watched by a post of Legge's mounted infantry, whose camp lay
close behind them on the western buttress of the ravine. South
of this, on an isolated knoll called Green Hill, were forty men
of Kitchener's Horse, their post protecting the camp from the
south-west. Some kopjes which rose separately from the flat
ground below the range, to the east and south-east of the camp,
were held by men of the 2nd King's Own Yorkshire Light In-
fantry. The defects of such an arrangement from the point of
view of defence were many. The piquets on the mountain could
neither be reinforced nor withdrawn quickly. So steeply fell the
ground behind them that the ravine constituted the only line
of approach or retreat, and the use even of this narrow and
difficult way depended on the integrity of the heights on both
sides. Should either fall, not only would the troops on that
opposite be cut off, but the camp itself and the artillery within
it would lie at the mercy of plunging rifle fire, from which escape
would be difficult, for the only line of retreat ran across the flat and
exposed ground skirting the foot of the heights. But there were
even more serious internal faults in the position. Solid rock,
crowning the mountain top, rendered entrenching impossible ;
the ground in front of the crest either continued to rise gently
or fell in rounded shoulders which hid the neighbouring hollows.
The piquets, in short, could neither see nor shoot for any great
distance, so that the only lines of observation and resistance
were of little avail for either purpose. Finally, the eastern half
of the piquets, invisible from the camp below, could only signal
to Headquarters through the western section ; and both portions,
though divided by the nature of the ground, were under a single
commander. Against this not very formidable disposition De
la Key and Beyers planned a triple attack, to be carried out by
Beyers himself across the mountains against the piqueted British
front ; by Commandant Badenhorst, from De la Key's contingent,
against the camp itself, from under the foot of the range from
the west ; by De la Key's main body from the south-west, whence
he would threaten the line of retreat. A reconnaissance on the
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 13
previous day had pointed to the mountain tops being but
weakly held ; for the piquets, though they had detected the
investigation, had refrained from firing according to rule, though
on this occasion, perhaps, a smart fusilade might have inspired
a groundless respect for the strength of a front, the position of
which was already known to the enemy. At midnight on
December 12th Beyers ordered his men to saddle their almost
exhausted horses, and led them out towards the northern slopes
of the Magaliesberg. His plan of attack was simple and tactic- The Boer
ally perfect. The British piquets lay in a shallow line, their atfackupon
main body hundreds of feet below the cliff behind ; their left Clements.
flank, the key to the whole, in the air. This flank he intended to
roll up with the Waterbergers, whilst the Krugersdorpers engaged
the right, and the Zoutpansberg men, advancing up a central
depression which led up to the head of the rift between the
two portions of the position, would endeavour to cut the hostile
line in two. He himself accompanied the Waterbergers, both
because their task was the crux of his tactics, and because much
depended on making connection with Badenhorst on the lower
ground on the same flank. Guides from De la Key's force,
who knew the ground more intimately than the northerners,
accompanied each division. Before dawn on the 13th the
three commandos began to climb the slopes. The first blow
at the British, however, was not to come from them. At 3.40
a.m., Badenhorst, betrayed into too great haste by his easy
line of advance below the mountains, fell hotly but single-handed
upon the mounted infantry post to the west and south of
the piquet line. For a time he carried all before him. The The action at
mounted infantry, reinforced by a company which Legge D^.'?3^th^*^ *'
despatched to the front at the first shots, stood firmly with '900.
the bayonet against the determined rush of the Pretoria and
Krokodil River burghers ; but Badenhorst had nearly 400 men,
some of the posts were soon annihilated, and through the gaps
thus formed the enemy darted in until the whole spur was
practically in their hands. Their hold was as brief as the
fight for it had been. In a few minutes Legge was upon them
with every man from the mounted infantry camp ; and though
14 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
he himself fell in the forefront almost at once, his men, well
handled by Colonel G. A. Cookson, and aided by two guns of
P. battery R.H.A., under Lieut.-Colonel Sir Godfrey Thomas,
and a Vickers-Maxim which was brought across at full speed from
the main camp by General Clements in person, fairly wrested
the ridge back from the Boers by hard fighting, and re-occupied
it themselves, heavy losses occurring on both sides. Baden-
horst was flung back westward ; not a shot had supported him
from the crest ; he had struck too soon, and his opponent's
impression that this had been but an ordinary attack on out-
posts seemed to be confirmed. Badenhorst, however, had
been premature by so few moments that his discomfiture points
again the old moral how with the utmost care and calculation
perfect co-operation by separated units in a night attack is
practically impossible except by chance. Scarcely had the
echo of his rifles died away when distant shots were heard
coming from the extreme left of the Une of infantry piquets on
the summit of the Magaliesberg. There the four companies of
the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers, under Captain C. Yatman,
were not only fully prepared for but expectant of an attack.
Whilst standing to arms before dawn they had heard the firing
during Badenhorst's abortive attempt ; the Boer reconnaissance
of the day before, the movement of lights all night about their
front, had given certain warning that a hostile body wis near,
and every man was vigilant. The many precautions taken
did not, unfortunately, include either a demand for reinforce-
ments or the supply of a reserve of cartridges, of which there
was only the normal field supply in the pouch of each soldier.
An attempt to communicate with Broadwood, a matter of vital
importance, was foiled by the haziness of the dawn. There
was to be little opportunity to repeat it. At 4.25 a.m., quiet
being restored in the camps below, the officer in command was
about to dismiss his spare men from parade, when the enemy
suddenly appeared in front of the extreme left of the piquet line,
and advancing swiftly, speedily enveloped it, shooting rapidly
the while. The troops fought well, but they were outnumbered
and outflanked from the first. Group by group from the left
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 15
they were overwhelmed, the Boers steadily gaining both ground
and prisoners as they worked eastward along the ridge towards
the head of the rift behind the centre of the hne of piquets.
For half an hour or more there was severe fighting along this,
the left, section of the Northumberland Fusiliers ; but during
all that time Yatman, though the rapidly swelling firing was
plainly audible to him, knew nothing of the fate befalUng the
key of the position, for being on the eastern and lower half of
the ridge, much of the ground to his left was invisible. At
the first outbreak of shooting his own attention had been at-
tracted by a strong body of the enemy who came in sight for
a moment upon a patch of green grass some 1,700 yards to his
front. These were fired on by his men so long as they were
visible ; but, riding forward, they were soon lost to view in the
dead ground nearer the position, and for a time the two eastern
companies had nothing to do but listen to the unaccountable
uproar drawing momentarily nearer to their left flank. Whilst
they stood, the Boers on their own front were making rapid and
silent headway. They too heard with anxiety the heavy firing
to the west, for all depended on success in that quarter. As,
still unseen, they approached the crest they were given cheering
evidence that matters had gone well on the right. Away from
the back of the Waterbergers' position marched a band of a
hundred British prisoners. A few moments later, about 6 a.m.,
Yatman's two companies found themselves under a warm fire
from front and right and left fronts, and worse, soon from left
and left rear, for the Waterbergers, having swept away the
British left, had worked eastward along the ridge as far as the
dividing rift, from the edge of which they commanded the
remaining defenders in flank and reverse. Yatman's position
was doubly lost ; for even without this turning of his flank, the
frontal attack which he had now to meet was many times
heavier than his men could bear. The Boers, safe in their
superior numbers, disdained all cover and advanced like veteran
infantry, adopting as their formation that enclosing horn which
at the price of many a devastated laager they had learned from
the Zulu impis. The Northumberland Fusiliers faced in all
i6 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
directions and strove desperately to keep off the swarm of rifle-
men ; but they had no cover from such a ring of bullets, and
soon were without bullets themselves, for their furious firing
all but emptied their pouches. At 6.45 a.m. came the in-
evitable end ; when only some score out of the original 150
soldiers remained effective, the officer in command ordered the
white flag to be hoisted to save the lives of the rest. About
that time Clements returned to camp, from which he had been
absent since Badenhorst's attack on the western piquets. He had
heard the shooting on the Magaliesberg, and riding towards the
front to investigate the cause, had himself come under fire ;
but it was not until, puzzled, he sought information in camp
that he learned that the summit was in the hands of the Boers.
Lieut. -Colonel the Hon. C. Lambton, the commanding officer
of the Northumberland Fusiliers, who had been left in charge
of camp, had earlier inkling of the situation. Reinforcements
and ammunition mules which he had sent to close the lower end
of the ravine had instead gone to the top; but had been un-
able to reach the piquets. The Fife and Devon Yeomanry lost
half their numbers as they attempted to emerge from the head
of the kloof, whilst a half company of the King's Own York-
shire Light Infantry, who climbed the precipice by a goat track
in single file, were shot down man by man until their officer
withdrew the survivors. Then a last signal message had come
down from the mountain to the effect that the enemy was
within 300 yards of the piquets, which were cut off. In a few
moments the worst fears were confirmed by a warm plunging
fire from the crest beginning to beat at medium range upon
the defenceless camp. Now in one instant every vice of his
position came home to Clements. With the loss of his piquets
his lines of observation and resistance had disappeared together.
He had lost all chance of communicating with Broadwood ; he
had lost one half of his force, and it seemed as though nothing
could save the other half from as summary a fate, so totally
exposed was it to an unanswerable fire from high overhead. But
Clements' skill was only awakened by a situation which would
have confused or appalled a weaker soldier. The camp, which
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 17
was becoming mixed under the searching fire, was quickly brought
to order by his cool and rapid commands. Leaving the guns to
bombard the crest of the Magaliesberg, he ordered the transport,
hospitals, etc., to make for a hill, called Yeomanry Hill, to the
south-east, where he intended to gather his troops and make
a stand. The artillery in the main camp at this moment con-
sisted of the 8th battery R.F.A. (four guns), under Major H.
Chance, and a 4.7-in. gun Eastern Division R.G.A., under Major
N. B. Inglefield. The four guns of the R.H.A. were with the
mounted infantry on the other side of the ravine, two being in
the camp there, and two in the piquet Une, where they had gone
to assist in the repulse of Badenhorst. All were completely
exposed, and the gunners and teams suffered heavily ; but,
covered by a united fire, Clements gradually evacuated his
camps in spite of inconceivable difficulties caused by the de-
struction and terror amongst his draught animals and the flight
of most of the native drivers. Nearly two hours elapsed before
the wagons could be got to move, and during that time nothing
but the admirable practice of the guns kept the enemy from
pouring down the mountain side. The danger of the situation
reached its cUmax when it became the turn of the artillery
to retire. Referring first to P. battery R.H.A. , on the west
side of the ravine, Lieut. -Colonel Sir G. Thomas, seeing the stir
of retreat in the main camp, and finding that the enemy was
gradually closing upon his two guns in the piquet line, sent them
back by a circuitous track which he had fortunately discovered
and investigated during the week's halt at Nooitgedacht. This
track was somewhat protected ; for on the knoll which marked
the south-western extremity of the destroyed piquet Une,
Kitchener's Horse were still holding on, though the advance of
De la Rey from the south-west was threatening to make their
position untenable. Both guns, after coming into action again
on an intermediate position, retired in safety on the main body.
After their departure Sir G. Thomas hurried back to the other
two guns in the mounted infantry camp close behind. He found
the officer whom he had left in charge wounded ; one gun was
being vigorously fought by a sergeant, the other stood silent
VOL. IV. 2
i8 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
and deserted, all its gunners out of action, its last round ex
pended. The teams of neither piece were to be seen, for they
were sheltering in two separated kraals in rear ; but when found
they were brought up into a clump of scrub as near to the guns
as the hot lire permitted. Then, by dint of crawling on the ground,
Sir G. Thomas and a few volunteers contrived to make fast the
ends of eighty-foot ropes to the trails, the pieces were hauled
into the bush, and were driven off under the very eyes of the
enemy. A little later the whole battery came into action again
from near Yeomanry Hill. At the main camp, the 8th battery
R.F.A., which had been firing heavily from a knoll close behind
the tents of Clements' Headquarters, fell back with little difficulty
by the direct route to Yeomanry Hill. There remained only
the 4.7-in., and the fate of this ponderous cannon seemed certain.
It stood on rising ground towards the north of the camp, in an
emplacement which had at first been surrounded by scrub and
brushwood. To gain a field of fire this, however, had been cleared
away on all sides except the northerly, where it still grew so
high and dense as to screen the weapon from view of the crest
of the Magaliesberg. To this fortunate circumstance, which
emphasised once more how little the mountains had been con-
sidered the true front of the position, the 4.7-in. owed its rescue.
The Boers were beginning to come down from the hills, from
which a fierce fire continued ; the troops had departed, and but
for his detachment and escort Inglefield was almost alone. His
team of bullocks, which he had inspanned at the first alarm,
had stampeded, and their drivers were not to be seen. To
extricate so large and heavy a target seemed a forlorn hope ;
but after half an hour's search Inglefield collected nine bullocks,
seven less than the proper team. To drive these up to the em-
placement was impossible, so hot was the fire. The gun had
to be dragged to them, and after one failure the five tons of metal
began to move over the rough ground. The stirring of the
weapon from the bushes betrayed to the Boers how great a prize
was slipping from their grasp. Every rifle was levelled at the
spot, and two of the detachment were wounded. But the gun,
now travelling fast downhill, rolled on beyond reach; more
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 19
bullocks were found and yoked in, and soon Inglefield, from
Yeomanry Hill, was bursting shell over the very spot whence he
had so narrowly escaped, for he had barely got clear when the
whole camp was in the hands of the Boers.
Scarcely had Clements concentrated the remnants of his
force, some 350 rifles in all, upon Yeomanry Hill, when fresh
misfortune befell him. De la Key's advance from the south-
west had been unexpectedly tardy, largely owing to the firm
stand of Kitchener's Horse on Green Hill ; but now he too
began to draw near, and opening fire with his artillery, made as
if to surround Yeomanry Hill. His two guns were quickly
silenced ; but not before they had almost completed the ruin of
the column, for the shells, falling amongst the already terrified
transport animals, sent the whole baggage-train careering in
panic towards Rietfontein to the south. Bands of Boers had
already been seen in that direction, others were coming in from
east and west ; the wagons were rushing straight into the arms
of the enemy. Clements had always been famous as a horse-
man ; his skill in the saddle was now to stand him and his troops
in good stead. Galloping with a few others at full sp)eed after
the receding mob, he succeeded in heading and turning them
back, a feat the difficulty of which only veteran stockriders can
appreciate. So narrow was the margin of safety that his own
aide-de-camp, who accompanied him, rode into the enemy in
the course of the chase, and was taken prisoner. This disaster
averted, Clements had now to face the multitude of dangers by
which he was confronted, nay surrounded, for by this time
the Boers were on all sides of Yeomanry Hill. Shortly before
the stampede of the transport he had received a message from
the Intelligence Department warning him of Beyers' march from
Warm Bath with 2,000 men. The information, coming cir-
cuitously from Rustenburg through Paget far to the east, was
late indeed ; half his infantry were already prisoners to that
very Boer leader ; but it was not without value, for it con-
firmed Clements in the knowledge of the great superiority of
the forces which had fallen upon him. He had previously de-
termined to entrench and fight to the last at Yeomanry Hill ;
VOL. IV. 2*
20
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Clements
retreats.
but having lost nearly 640 men,* the warning of the numbers
surrounding him rendered this too desperate a resource, and he
now watched narrowly for a chance of withdrawing. For a
brief moment such a chance was given. Wearied by their night's
marching and the long fighting of the morning, which had cost
them about one hundred men, the Boers paused in their advance.
To the indignation of their officers, they hngered in the de-
serted British camps, looting freely, and little encouraged to
advance by the shells from the batteries on Yeomanry Hill.
Their bands on flank and rear were not yet formidable. Clements
saw his opportunity and that it must be seized instantly or not
at all. At 2.30 p.m. he gave the order to retire, and setting out
three quarters of an hour later, the column marched almost un-
molested, and with fine discipline, through the night, arriving at
Rietfontein at 4.30 a.m. on December 14th. Clements' action
at Nooitgedacht will long be remembered, but rather for his
triumph over almost incalculable misfortunes than for the errors
which led to them. The disaster, indeed, ought never to have
been incurred ; but having occurred, it should by the laws of
tactics and topography have been final, so deeply had the troops
been compromised. That it was not fatal was due to the presence
of a commander able to collect a broken force and lead it out
from the very midst of ten times its numbers, f
At Rietfontein Clements found reinforcements enough.
During December 14th his own men, released at last from
Krugersdorp, marched in, nearly a thousand strong, comprising
• Summary of Casualties, December 13TH, 1900.
Ranks.
Killed.
Wounded.
Prisoners
and
Missing.
Total.
Remarks.
Officers
Other ranks ...
9
65
*7
ti79
13
355
29
609
»i died of
wounds.
ti3 died of
wounds.
Totals . . .
74
186
368
638
t For gallantry at this action Sergeant D. Farmer, ist battalion Cameron High-
landers, was awarded the Victoria Cross.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 21
the ist Border regiment, 200 mounted infantry, and two guns
of the 8th battery R.F.A. Here, too, he was joined by Brigadier-
General E. A. H. Alderson with 800 mounted men and J. bat-
tery R.H.A. Nevertheless a critical moment had arrived, not
so much for Clements as for the whole balance of the campaign
in this area. The Magaliesberg were now in the hands of the Results of the
enemy, for Broadwood and Rustenburg were for the moment NSgedacht.
negligible quantities, and even in extreme danger. And these
mountains were the key to the Western Transvaal, indeed
to the whole theatre of war, so closely did they command the
most vital parts of the country. The briefest pause might
confirm the Boers in possession of the range, and Lord Kitchener
saw that no time was to be lost in wresting it back. Appointing
French to command the whole zone, he directed him to use
all the troops for the clearance of the district, at the same time
bringing a brigade of cavalry across from Heidelberg to the
Krugersdorp line, and summoning Paget westward towards
Hamanskraal. Within three days of the repulse at Nooitgedacht
the columns took the offensive to regain the lost advantage.
December i6th, Dingaan's Day, ♦found French busily gather-
ing troops into the town in which the Boers had vowed to
celebrate the festival. But the place was in little danger ;
once more the enemy showed his incapacity to follow up a
stroke or maintain a brisk offensive. The collaboration of
Beyers and De la Rey failed just when it might have been fruit-
ful, and Nooitgedacht, the first of their united efforts, was also
their last. French at Krugersdorp and Clements at Riet-
fontein concentrated their units with little hindrance, and on
the 19th joined forces at Thorndale in the Hekpoort valley.
The enemy was there in strength ; but Nooitgedacht seemed to
have exhausted his courage as well as his energy ; a very brief
encounter sufficed to sen4 2,000 Boers " in a panic-stricken
rout "f northward, through Breedts Nek, losing some fifty as
* An annual festival of the Boer States, commemorative of the defeat of the Zulus
under Dingaan by Pretorius on Sunday, December i6th, 1838.
t Lieut. -General French's telegram, December 20th, 1900.
22
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
they ran. These were De la Rey's men, and leaving Clements
to deal with them, French sent Gordon westward down the
French clears Hckpoort Valley, driving Beyers before him towards Broadwood,
suuation. ^^^^ ^^^ been summoned southward to co-operate. Having
thus effectually cut up the Boer combination, French returned
to Krugersdorp, and thence to Johannesburg, where he organised
a force for the complete clearance of the disturbed sub-district.
The immediate danger to be met was a descent upon Potchef-
stroom by Beyers, who appeared to be circling southward on
finding himself pursued by Gordon and headed by Broadwood.
To keep him off the Potchefstroom — Johannesburg railway
French decided to estabUsh a centre at Ventersdorp, which was
easily occupied on December 28th.
By the last day of December French had drawn a line of
columns from Ohfants Nek through Ventersdorp to Klerks-
dorp, thus denying to the enemy all the vital tract to the east-
ward, whilst Clements and Alderson in the Magaliesberg acted
as a similar guard against incursion from the north. Thus,
the stir in this region abated, the year closed less anxiously than
had seemed probable, for undoubtedly the Boer arms had for
a few hours pointed near to the heart of the British occupation
of the country.
Approximate Strength States of Columns referred to in
foregoing chapter.
«
bow
§*
.ss
•a-5
CO
a
9
COLUMN.
•0
V
a
1
1
a
9 cS
.9 '
0
a
1
December, 1900.
Maj.-Gen. R. A. P. Cle-
ments
6S2
863
10
2
Brig.-Gen. R. G.Broadwood
444
344
7
2
Brig.-Gen. E. A. H. Aider-
son
800
~
4
23
CHAPTER II.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL.*
DECEMBER 1ST, I9OO — JANUARY 3OTH, IQOI.
Following on Paget's engagement at Rhenoster Kop,t the situation on
month of December witnessed much, if somewhat unproductive ^y raih?^.
activity along the eastern Une. On the ist Payne's, and on
the 3rd Carleton's and Macbean's columns returned to their
bases at Middelburg and Belfast, having neither inflicted nor
suffered any but trifling losses. The outgoings included an
expedition by Barker from Balmoral on the 3rd, and another
under W. P. Campbell (ist K. R. Rifles) on the 7th, the latter
being designed generally for co-operation with Paget, and
specifically to close the Waterval Drift (Wilge river) to any
Boers who might fall southward away from Paget's force. A
week had, however, elapsed since Viljoen's retirement, and in
any case that leader's command had withdrawn in good order,
not south, but north to the Botha's Berg. Campbell, therefore,
met but few opponents ; and after communicating with Paget
on the loth — only then to be apprised of the direction of the
enemy's retreat — he returned to Middelburg on the 12th, Paget
remaining entrenched about Rhenoster Kop. Troops, indeed,
could ill be spared from a line of communication, which, even
in their presence, appeared almost at the mercy of the enemy.
On the 5th, 6th, 8th, J 20th, 24th and 26th,§ attacks were made
* See map No. 56.
t See Volume III., page 450.
t Casualties — Two men killed and five wounded, one officer and thirteen men taken
prisoners. Near Barberton.
§ British casualties — One man killed, one officer and four men wounded. Boer
casualties — One killed, seven woimded. At Pan.
24 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
on trains, rail or fortified posts, causing occasional loss of each.
The series culminated on the 29th in a memorable onslaught.
Towards the end of December, General B. Viljoen removed
his laager from the Botha's Berg to Windhoek in the Sten-
kamps Berg. Since leaving Rhenoster Kop his command had
been nearly doubled by the addition of the Lydenburg and
Middelburg commandos ; and Viljoen, eager to use his strength,
ooked for the weakest hnk in the chains of British posts which
traversed the district. Nor was his choice easy : there were
many posts ; none escaped the scrutiny of his scouts, and few
were numerically formidable, though all were sufficiently en-
trenched to demand an assault to bring them down. But in
Viljoen the too elastic tactics of his countrymen were braced
by a soldierly confidence in the timely use of weight of men as
well as of lead ; and of all the federal leaders none would have
made better use than he of the steel which was missing from the
equipment of his burghers. And so much more powerful is
leadership than training with natural soldiers like the burghers,
that, as will more than once be seen, the very presence of such
a man at the head of commandos sufficed to convert them from
evasive guerillas into daring and determined regiments, not afraid
of close combat, though without the only proper weapon for
such work. Viljoen's men, too, were in high feather from other
causes. The affair at Rhenoster Kop, whether victory or
rebuff, mattered little compared with cheering events outside,
which, now some months old, must have worked far in their
favour. In November Viljoen had received information, the
egregious source of which, as is usual with good news in the
field, was disregarded in the delight of the message. At a
conference held at Paris, so ran the telegram, England had
begged in vain of the Powers six months in which to attempt to
finish the war. The German Consul at Pretoria had received
instructions from BerUn to remain accredited, not to the British,
but the Republican Government. As for France, she was ready
to land troops in England at any moment. The Czar of Russia
had received the Boer delegates at St. Petersburg as represen-
tatives of a friendly State. The Belgian monarchy was pre-
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 25
paring to do the same. In America the hoped-for election of
Mr. Bryan to the Presidency wais assured. Internally the cause
of Britain was in even greater straits. Australia, India, Canada
and Cape Colony were clamouring for the return of their con-
tingents. Two thousand five hundred loyalist troops in Cape
Colony had already broken with the army, had been disbanded
and their arms burnt.* Such documents, the excreta of warfare,
would not be worth recording, were they not in this case actual
weapons of war in the hands of the leaders of an immured and
gullible people. In the field all armies credit fair prophecies as
blindly as men in the desert press on for cascades suspended in
the far-off air. None were even more prone to feed on myths,
or were more lavishly fed, than the Boers ; and it is as difficult
to measure the stimulant thus derived as to determine its
morality. With his burghers in this spirit Viljoen cast about to
do damage, and he soon selected Helvetia for his first blow.
This post — originally dropped, it will be remembered, by Sir
R. Buller in September, as the first link of his communications
with Lydenburg — was held by a mixed force of 344 officers
and men with a 4.7-in. gun, under Major S. L. Cotton (King's
Liverpool regiment). It consisted of four separate kopjes
aligned east and west, of which the outside two, called respect-
ively King's Kopje and Gun Hill, were somewhat distant
from those in the centre, i.e.. South Hill and Middle Hill. All
were defended by closed works and by barbed wire entangle-
ments. In front (north) of the centre kopjes a camp was pitched
for the troops of the detachment not on outpost duty. The
nearest adjacent posts were at Zwartkoppies, some three miles
to the north-east, at Machadodorp, the same distance to the
south, and at Waterval Boven, four miles to the south-east.
Well situated and defended, and adequately garrisoned, the
place seemed strong enough for all contingencies ; appearing
especially inaccessible to the enemy on its eastern and southern
sides, since these were practically surrounded by neighbouring
* Telegram from Superintendent of Telegraphs, Ermelo, to General Viljoen,
November 2nd, 1900, embodying the report of a German doctor recently released from
the British lines.
26 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
garrisons. The configuration and garrison of the post were
well known to Viljoen, and since it was probably most alert
towards the north and west he decided to assail it from the
south and east.
Leaving Windhoek on the night of December 28th with
some 580 men, he marched through Dullstroom and across the
Crocodile, upon the left bank of which he paused to arrange
the attack. Against a place so ringed in by friendly camps as
Helvetia, Viljoen had to provide as much for the safety of his
command as its success. But the very audacity of his plan of
attack relieved him of the necessity of detaching largely in order
The attack on to fend off reinforcements from adjacent garrisons. Insinuating
DeJ^db, ^s whole force between Helvetia and its neighbours, he ordered
1900. two field-cornetcies (120 men) to attack Zwartkoppies simul-
taneously with his own descent on Helvetia, whilst the main
body (350 men), encircling the eastern extremity of the line
of kopjes, would both deliver the assault and keep off any
assistance coming from Water val Boven. A third body of
about 100 men, chiefly composed of State artillerists, serving as
mounted riflemen since the loss of their guns, would act at once
as a reserve and as scouts towards Machadodorp and Belfast.
Viljoen fixed 3.30 a.m., December 29th, as the hour of attack.
A thick fog descending about 2 a.m. aided the main body to
take up its positions undetected, but the eastern detachment
lost its way, and failed to find Zwartkoppies. Nevertheless, at
the appointed time, Viljoen, who had been apprised of this
mischance, gave the word, and his men, discharging a burst of
musketry, ran in upon the kopjes. Gun Hill, the nearest, fell
at once ; and with it the 4.7-in. gun upon it and its twenty-one
attendant artillerymen passed into the hands of the enemy.
This, the first blow, was tactically and morally the worst for the
defence ; for Gun Hill commanded the other knolls, whilst the
officer in command of Middle and South Hills, deprived of judg-
ment by a severe wound in the head, thought nothing worth
saving when the gun was lost, and ordered a surrender. Thus,
only the isolated King's Kopje remained, and there the defenders,
a half company (sixty-five men) of the Liverpool regiment,
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 27
under Lieutenant F. A. Wilkinson, knowing nothing of the capture
of the cannon, resisted so stoutly that no effort of the enemy
could reduce them. The value of this handful's tenacity
appeared when at daybreak the Boers proceeded to remove their
trophy and the prisoners, who numbered 235, from Gun Hill.
This they began to do by way of the track running westward
close below Helvetia Kopjes, and away from Zwartkoppies, which
was now thoroughly alert and had brought two guns into action.
But the undiminished shooting of Wilkinson's detachment
effectually denied the route, and the captors of the gun, com-
pelled to make a detour to the northward, came under the
shrapnel from Zwartkoppies, which not only did execution,
but forced them to abandon the only wagon-load of 4.7 pro-
jectiles, and another containing the rifles of the prisoners of
war.* Viljoen then made off with his cortege towards DuU-
stroom, soon releasing the prisoners, but retaining the gun,
which was now nothing but an unwieldy trophy, for the loss
of its store of ammimition had rendered it useless.
The news of the surrender of Helvetia sent a thrill through
the British army such as had not stirred it since the sombre
affair at Nicholson's Nek ; but its effect proved actually detri-
mental to the enemy. There is no better touchstone of the
quality of troops who have been long in the field than their
attitude after disaster, an indication by no means trustworthy
with fresh and inexperienced soldiers. Over the theatre of war
were scattered a multitude of posts similar to Helvetia, and
Uable momentarily to a like trial ; and in them there served no
officer or soldier who did not look again to his defences, his
vigilance, and his resolution, and promise himself that such a
test would not find him so easy a victim.
If on the other Une of communication in the Eastern Trans-
vaal— i.e., the railway from Johannesburg through Standerton
into Natal — no event had transpired of such importance as
that at Helvetia, the troops thereon were incessantly employed
• Casualties — Killed, eleven men ; wounded, one officer and twenty-eight men ;
prisoners, four officers and 231 men.
28 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
throughout December, and any departure from the fortified line
entailed fighting or skirmishing with hostile bands. But though
from Heidelberg down to Zandspruit there was scarcely a
patrol or an outpost which did not exchange shots with the
enemy, the absence of any notable Boer leader in these parts
enabled much to be done in the way of clearance of crops and
supplies from the country-sides adjacent to the railway, Especi-
Events on the ally was this the case in the northern district, where the Boers,
Nat^"^^^"'^" though bolder and more numerous than in the south, were kept
railway. on the move by the constant peregrinations of Lieut. -Colonel
A. E. W. Colville's mobile column of about 1,400 men of all
arms, with eight guns, which was usually based on Greylingstad.
Trains, the easiest prey of guerillas, were more than once inter-
cepted, resulting on one occasion (December 9th, at Vlaklaagte)
in the loss of 124 horses ; but not until the end of the month
did the Boers seriously take the initiative. On December 24th
a foraging party from Eden's Kop, near Heidelberg, was roughly
handled by a band of 100 with a Vickers-Maxim, losing sixteen
out of the 150 men of the 2nd Devonshire regiment who were
engaged. Two days later Colville's column was itself heavily
attacked twelve miles to the west of Greylingstad. Colville's
constant depredations amongst the farm-borne stock and
supplies, upon which the enemy depended for subsistence, had
greatly exasperated the local commandos under Buys and
Trichard. The clearance of Rietvlei, south of Vlakfontein,
on December 24th, had already been more strongly opposed
than usual*, and when, two days later, Colville, turning south-
ward, undertook Roodewal, the Boers were ready with a trap,
which they all but closed upon the column. Having cleared
one farm, not without considerable opposition, Colville moved
forward to another, leaving the baggage, guarded by 150 men
of the Rifle Brigade under Captain C. E. Radclyffe, with a
Vickers-Maxim, some distance in rear. As the column advanced,
continually engaged in front, it was reported to Colville that a
body of the enemy had worked around his flanks and was closing
* Casualties — Killed, one man ; wounded, two men.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 29
in upon the baggage. He therefore ordered a retirement, which
was begun at about 1.15 p.m., the Boers following too closely
for much speed to be made. Before the column could come
within reach, the blow which it was hurrying to avert, fell.
Surrounding the transport, the enemy opened a furious fire upon
the parked wagons, and were with difficulty kept off by the
escort, until Radclyffe, having got the oxen inspanned, moved
the train off towards the approaching column. The Boers
pressed hard, the Vickers-Maxim narrowly escaped capture,
and Radclyffe, as the only means of saving his charge, dehvered
a dashing and successful counter-attack, with very inferior
numbers, which gained him a covering position 800 yards in
front of the wagons. Here he was reinforced by artillery and
by a company of infantry which Colville had sent in mule-
wagons from his own force. The baggage was thus enabled to
draw off in safety, but at a cost to the rearguard of fifty-seven
casualties, including Radclyffe himself, wounded. The majority
of the losses arose from the annihilation of a detached half
company, which was surrounded and decimated, and forced
to capitulate after firing the last cartridge. Altogether, the
day's losses amounted to eighty-one*, out of a total of ninety
sustained by the column during the whole month of December.
Meanwhile the troops of the Natal command had been kept Signs and
uneasy by sporadic fighting, not, indeed, within the colony itself invasion of
but in the south-east angle of the Transvaal, which marched Na^ai.
with the frontier. Persistent rumours of a hostile concentration
on a large scale for the invasion of Natal were afoot, and seemed
to be warranted by the numbers and aggressions of the enemy,
who appeared to be aiming at bases for an important movement
in these parts. Thus, Wakkerstroom, Utrecht and Vryheid
were centres around which revolved continually bands which
were evidently anxious to test the strength of the defences. A
half-hearted and easily repelled inquiry at the Vryheid outposts
on December ist was followed by a sharp skirmish outside
* Casualties — Killed, eleven men ; wounded, ihree officers, forty-seven men ;
prisoners, twenty men.
30 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Utrecht on the next day,* and that by a brief but warm bom-
bardment of the Wakkerstroom lines on the 6th, when in one
hour two Boer guns sent a hundred shells against the entrench-
Attackon ments. Then on the nth Vryheid, despite these warnings, was
D^^oth— surprised by night and all but lost. The defences there were
nth, 1900. as singular from their strength as their configuration. North of
the village rose a high, steep hill, named Lancaster Hill, upon the
flat top of which was pitched the camp of the half battahon
2nd Royal Lancaster regiment who defended it. The rim of
the summit, which was roughly square, was armed at the four
comers with natural bastions formed by projections of the
almost precipitous faces, and upon the north-westerly and south-
easterly of these, 12-pr. guns were strongly emplaced, the
infantry lining the others and the " curtains " between. Five
hundred feet below the sheer western side of Lancaster Hill an
oval fiat, called Mounted Infantrj^ Plateau, projected like the
low forecastle of a turret ship, and on this were the camp and
outposts of a company of the 5th division mounted infantry,
from which one small advanced post, under an officer, was thrown
out upon the Utrecht road, 2,200 yards to the north of the
mounted infantry encampment, and another midway between
this and the north gun on Lancaster Hill. Sentries were
numerous and well posted, their supports strongly entrenched.
The distance of the mounted infantry camp from the infantry
supports, the isolation of the weak posts at night, the presence
of tents so close to the piquets, and the fact that both the
officers and visiting non-commissioned officers slept in them,
the exposed position of the horse Unes, were nevertheless defects
which were soon to be all discovered in turn.
At 2 a.m. on the morning of December nth, the Boers
gathered around Vryheid in numbers over a thousand strong.
The detached post to the northward fell into their hands at once,
not a warning sound reaching the camp behind. They then
moved on against the plateau, rushed the line of sentries from
* British casualties — Killed, two men ; wounded, one officer and four men ;
missing, three men. Boer casualties — Killed, six men ; wounded, ten men ; prisoner,
one man.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 31
end to end, and breaking into the lines, stampeded all the horses,
and used the very rows of saddles on the ground as cover from
which to pour a fire which threw the whole mounted infantry
camp into confusion. The troops made every effort to recover
possession. Time after time knots of men, hastily rallied by the
officers, charged, and engaging the enemy hand to hand with
bayonets and clubbed rifles, drove them out temporarily. But
the attackers were in overpowering strength, and the mounted
infantrymen had either to fall back or to be demohshed. The
Boers then closed around Lancaster Hill, collecting thickest
below the gun emplacements on its opposite sides. There the
garrison was ready, and denied any further advance with a girdle
of musketry. An attempt to rush the northern gun at 3.30 a.m.
was trapped within fifty yards of the crest by a barbed wire
entanglement ; the southern gun, its muzzle depressed to the
utmost, defended itself by sweeping the steep hillside. At 4 a.m.
Lieut. -Colonel J. M. Gawne (2nd Royal Lancaster regiment), the
officer in command and District Commissioner at Vryheid, led
a half company up from the village, where he was in residence,
towards the scene of the fighting. High up the track he
came upon a knot of mounted infantry, whom two young officers
had collected and posted to keep the enemy from descending
into Vryheid. The reinforcement, hotly assailed at close range,
could get no further, Gawne himself being mortally wounded as
he attempted to cUmb higher ; but its presence here still further
safeguarded the town. Thus the attack was everywhere held
in check, and the Boers, relinquishing all further attempts at
assault, settled down under cover to an aimed musketry, which
lasted without intermission throughout the day. At 7.30 p.m.,
when Lancaster Hill had shown itself the master, and retire-
ment was covered by dusk, they made off. The day's fighting
had cost the garrison fifty-eight officers and men, and nearly all
the horses.
Lieut. -General H. J. T. Hildyard lost no time in despatching
troops to the eastward. Colonel C. J. Blomfield (commanding at
Dundee) taking a column of all arms across De Jager's Drift on
the I2th, in co-operation with a mounted force under Lieut.-
32 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Colonel H. De la P. Gough, which hurried out from Nqutu.
Though the actual attackers of Vryheid had vanished north-
ward, Blomfield and Gough on the 14th encountered on the
Schurwe Berg, to the west of that place, a strong body which
they all but succeeded in catching between them, the enemy
losing heavily as he galloi)ed for safety under a searching shrapnel
from the 69th battery R.F.A.* On the same day, a small
column, under Major-General J. Talbot Coke, marched to
Wakkerstroom. On the i6th Blomfield, warned at Vryheid
that Utrecht was threatened, reconnoitred vigorously in that
direction, driving the enemy over the Kambula Mountain
with no loss to himself, and securing stock which brought his
total captures during the two days' fighting up to nearly 10,000
head. Thereafter, nothing noteworthy occurred until December
26th, when reiterated reports of an attempt to be made on
Utrecht were justified to the full.
Never in the whole coui-se of the campaign had a British
force been fore-armed with more ample information of an im-
pending attack. There was not only a fantastic epistle from
a Russian officer, who on the 24th wrote demanding supplies
from the District Commissioner under menace of a descent
which was actually to be made at the time threatened, but the
Boers themselves seemed to have thrown to the winds their
accustomed secrecy, for there were reports of speeches by their
leaders promising them Utrecht in compensation for Vryheid,
There was so much prophecy, indeed, that it rendered the possi-
bility of an actual attack almost incredible in a campaign where
it had become an axiom that the expected did not happen.
Attack on Nevertheless, it was duly deUvered, and the commander at
Dec^^^zSth— Utrecht, profiting by his unusual good fortune, had made all
26th, 1900. ready to receive it. The force available consisted of six com-
panies of infantry drawn from the ist and 2nd York and
Lancaster, the 2nd Royal Lancaster, and 2nd Middlesex regi-
ments, of which two companies lay in the town, one on a hill
to the east, and three, with a 12-pr. gun, two Maxims, and sixty
♦ Casualties — Two killed, four missing.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 33
mounted infantrymen, on another hill to the northward, the
whole under command of Major A. J. Chapman (Royal Dublin
Fusiliers). To deceive the many eyes which he knew were
directed on his defences, that officer practised an artifice which
can never fail to mystify the most wary of adversaries. Posting
his men towards evening, but in full light, as if in their defences
for the night, he would transfer them as soon as it was dark to
completely different positions, so that hostile scouts and spies
were alike baffled to report their true situations. Remembering
Vryheid, Chapman furthermore emptied his tents and manned
his trenches by night, giving the troops rest in the daytime ;
he also removed his horses from their lines into a sheltered
donga.
Against this well-prepared post the Boers advanced on
Christmas night, and at 2 a.m. attacked it on every side. On
the side of the town a band, shouting a battle cry of " Utrecht !
Utrecht ! " poured a violent fusilade against the untenanted
camp and its entrenchments. Encouraged by the silence, they
then rushed through both, only to be disconcerted first by
the deserted state of the defences, and next by an unmistakable
summons to halt from the rifles of the inner line. Here, then,
a heavy interchange of lead began to stream from and to the
town, the inhabitants of which, by a pre-arranged plan, had at
once sought safety in the church. Meanwhile, a determined
onslaught was being made upon the hill to the west. This was
a kopje so broken and precipitous that it could be defended
only in parts where there was room for half a dozen men to
entrench, and the hill was dotted with such posts. The fore-
most, which lay under a low cliff, was surrounded and captured
early, the Boers, who had wrapped sheepskins round their feet
to deaden the sound, climbing to the verge of the overhanging
cliff, whence they shot straight down upon the soldiers. But
the other posts, warned by the firing, were not to be caught ;
and though the enemy approached within fifteen yards of the
rifles — in one case cutting through a barbed-wire entanglement
in their ardour to close — and though, when repulsed, they more
than once came on again, the knots of British, standing firm and
VOL. IV. 3
34 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
shooting steadily, lost not another foot of ground, and heavily
punished their assailants. Before daybreak the Boers were in
retreat on every side, carrying with them many dead and
wounded, amongst them the before-mentioned Russian, mortally
struck as he headed an attack on one of the groups of infantry.
The British losses numbered but seven, of whom four were
prisoners ; few, indeed, and little indicative of the closeness of
the fighting until it is remembered how little dangerous is a
night attack when the advantage of surprise has been lost, and
there is no steel to make it good. An attack on the hill to the
north at the same time as that on the east hill came to nothing^
owing, so said the enemy, to the cowardice of the commanders
detailed to lead it.
These successes, though they by no means cleared the dis-
tricts, ensured for Natal almost complete repose for a month,
during which the interest of the eastern campaign again shifted
to the Delagoa Bay railway.
The anxiety of the Commander-in-Chief to unlock at least
a portion of the army of troops on that expensive line of com-
munication for more active service in the open field found
expression in earnest soHcitations to the commanders to reduce
their permanent posts and increase the strength of their mobile
columns. But if no channel of supply absorbed more men per
mile, none was more continually harried, and in the first week in
January, 1901, an unmistakable hint was given that in the
presence of an enemy who could put even strong posts, strongly
entrenched, in jeopardy, weak columns in the open were scarcely
Botha to be thought of. On the 3rd and 4th of January, 1901,
rffD^fag^ Commandant-General Louis Botha rode up from Ermelo with
Bay line. His 1,200 men Under Generals C. Botha and T. Smuts. Leaving the
'^*"^' commandos on the Upper Komati, between Carolina and Bel-
fast, Botha himself with his subordinates crossed the line east
of Middelburg by night, and on the 5th summoned all his officers
to receive his orders at Hoedspruit, a farm on the western slopes
of the Botha's Berg. Amongst others, General Ben Viljoen
repaired to the spot, receiving there the congratulations of his
chief on his recent feat at Helvetia. Botha had in mind no less
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 35
a plan than a wholesale demolition of the British eastern line
of communications by means of simultaneous night onslaughts
on its central section from both sides, by Viljoen from the north,
and by C. Botha and Smuts from the south. As the points of
attack he selected Machadodorp, Dalmanutha, Belfast, Wonder-
fontein and Pan, with the smaller posts linking these garrisons.
Such a scheme possessed radical defects which by no means
escaped the criticism of Botha's Ueutenants. With an available
strength of under 3,000 men it contemplated an operation on a
front of forty miles, and that by divided forces at night, when
the advantage of darkness would be more than counterbalanced
by the difficulties of timing and intercommunication. Neverthe-
less, the conception commended itself by its very boldness to
the majority of the Boer leaders, and it was resolved to carry it
out to the letter.
The night of January 7th exhibited every circumstance of General attack
vileness which is prejudicial to defence. It was intensely p'^y^fiJ^^''^"*
dark ; a fine cold rain fell persistently, and a piercing easterly !»"• 7th— 8th,
gale, which deadened the ears of sentries, did nothing to '^'*
dissipate the driving mist which blinded their eyes. With
everything in their favour the various Boer detachments
gathered, and at midnight each hurled itself upon its appointed
victim. But the lesson of Helvetia — a lesson which Botha him-
self had feared might prove a marplot* — had not been wasted.
As at Utrecht, commanders of garrisons had long turned night
into day for their men ; the trenches were bivouacs guarded on
every side by mazes of barbed wire and often by chained watch
dogs ; the soldiers who slept fully armed therein had been
taught to anticipate a night attack as a certainty. Nor were
they entirely without specific warning. A native, coming
into Nooitgedachtf at dusk, had foretold a visitation that night,
and the word had been passed along the posts, which, however,
were now habitually prepared without it, and indeed gave little
• General B. Viljoen, " The Anglo-Boer War," page 309.
t This place, which lies close to Pan upon the line midway Ijctween Belfast and
Middelburg, is not to be confused with another of the same name situated midway
between Machadodorp and Nelspruit, i.e., some fifty miles to the eastward.
VOL. IV. 3*
36 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
credence to intelligence from such sources, so often disproved.
Thus each post, suddenly struck, was ready at once with a
counter-blow, and all along the line arose bouts of fighting,
so close, so well contested, and so disconnected, that they must
be recounted, however briefly, in detail, and for convenience
from east to west.
Attack on Machadodorp, the headquarters of Reeves's section of the
°^^' line, was attacked simultaneously by Viljoen's Lydenburgers
from the north, and on the other side by the Ermelo men, under
Smuts. The garrison consisted of the 2nd Royal Irish Fusiliers,
with guns and cavalry, disposed on three heights, Rocky Hill,
Natal Hill, and Signal Hill, all of which were separately engaged
by the enemy and stoutly defended. On the first-named
especially was there a remarkable combat in which ninety-three
men of the FusiUers and six artillerymen withstood and iinally
repulsed the onset of nearly seven times as many burghers.
Natal Hill and Signal Hill, though closely beset, were in Uttle
danger from smaller commandos, and by 3 a.m. on the 8th the
whole attack, decisively defeated, was withdrawn.
Attack on Dalmanutha, to the westward, was attacked at the same time,
Dalmanulha. , ' , , ' , . . ,
but at first from the south only. This garrison, the easternmost
of Smith-Dorrien's section, was held by two companies (161
men) of the 2nd Royal Berkshire regiment, and a troop of the
19th Hussars, with a 12-pr. gun. The defences on the north side
of the railway consisted of a redoubt, surrounded by smaller
works, and an entrenched piquet on the hne itself, the ground
on the southern side of which fell sharply. The southern side,
the weakest and most accessible, was selected by the enemy,
who, collecting below the slope, charged suddenly up the hill,
shooting from the saddle as they galloped, rode over the sentries
and groups, and had lined the railway before they were checked
by the fire of the entrenched piquet only thirty yards away on
the other side. So hot was their reception here that the attack
faltered in spite of the efforts of the Boer leaders, who shouted
encouragement to their men. At i a.m. the burghers ceased
firing altogether, hoping thus to silence the unendurable fusilade
from the British trench. Meanwhile another party, working
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 37
round to the north, fell upon the redoubt and the gun-pit, their
attack being accompanied by so overwhelming a recrudescence
of fire from the railway that the entrenchments began to crumble,
and the piquet seemed likely to be overpowered. The Boers,
however, knew nothing of the effect they were producing and,
being in worse case themselves, soon fell back. At 2.15 a.m.
Dalmanutha was free, the losses numbering but four in killed
and wounded, and a few prisoners, who were shortly -afterwards
released.
Belfast, the key of the hne, and Smith-Dorrien's Head- Attack on
quarters, had a far more severe trial. Here were over 1,300 ** '
infantry of the ist Royal Irish regiment, 2nd Shropshire
Light Infantry, ist Gordon Highlanders, ist Royal Inniskilling
Fusiliers, together with 230 men of the 5th Lancers, 180 mounted
infantry, the 84th battery R.F.A., and two 5-in. guns. But this
was all too small for the ground to be defended, which, extend-
ing over a perimeter of fifteen miles, cut up the force into detach-
ments nowhere strong enough to be safe against such attacks
as those which were launched against them by Botha in person.
Every post, was, however, strongly entrenched, and so thickly
belted round with wire that it seemed as if they must be im-
pregnable from that cause alone. The system of defence, which
was divided by the railway into northern and southern sections,
was as follows : Monument Hill, to the north-east of Belfast,
and about one and a half miles from it, was crowned by a fort
containing a company of the Royal Irish regiment, which found
piquets in subsidiary works in front. Another company, not on
outpost duty and under canvas in rear, brought the numbers
on the hill to ninety-three officers and men. Outside the north-
east .corner of Belfast the Shropshire Light Infantry, less one
company on duty in the town, garrisoned a fort, which, like that
on Monument Hill, was piqueted by troops in smaller works.
A drift, due north of Belfast and midway between the two above-
mentioned heights, was held by mounted infantry ; and this
completed the northern section. South of the railway a semi-
circular hne of defences was in the keeping of the Gordon High-
landers, who maintained it by means of the two main works
38 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
on either flank, connected by circular fortalices of stone, the main
body of the battaUon lying encamped behind the centre, in
support. Belfast was thus well watched on every side, but as
there were neither troops nor ground for an inner line, its de-
fences possessed the weakness common to all in which the Unes
of observation and resistance are compelled to be the same,
namely, the liability to be ruptured by the mere surprise of an
outpost. The first and heaviest stroke fell upon Monument
Hill. Nowhere were the fog and drizzle thicker than here,
so dense, indeed, that not only did the sentries fail to detect
the approach of an enemy, but the Boers themselves, about
500 Johannesburgers and Boksburgers under MuUer, saw
nothing until they were through the outlying posts, which, in
consequence, fell into their hands. They then broke through
the entanglement, especially at one point where it was weak
owing to a failure of the stock of wire, and rushed upon the
fort calling upon the garrison to surrender. The soldiers,
unable to stop them with their rifles, answered with defiant
shouts as they met them at the parapet, and a fierce meUe
ensued in which bayonets and butts of rifles were freely used,
some even fighting with their fists, whilst others wrestled upon
the ground. Everywhere the garrison, hopelessly outnumbered,
resisted desperately, their commander, Captain F. L. Fosbery,
animating all by his example until he was slain. Amongst so
much valour as was displayed there is room here to mention
none but the most conspicuous, and that was shown by Private
J. Barry (No. 3733). Seeing the regimental Maxim gun sur-
rounded by the enemy, this brave soldier burst into the group
and proceeded to smash the lock in order to render the trophy
useless ; and this, in spite of threats, he persisted in doing,
until one of the Boers, less chivalrous than the rest, shot him
dead.* For half an hour the struggle continued before the
garrison, having lost thirty-eight of its number, was overpowered.
Together with the fort, two officers and fifty-one rank and file,
belonging chiefly to the second company on the hill, were taken
• For Private Barry's gallant act a Victoria Cross (posthumous) was awarded.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 39
by the enemy, who lost thirty-four in the assault, and dared not
wait for light on the scene of their triumph, which was re-occupied
by the British at dawn.
Simultaneously with the above a combat, only less disastrous
because on a smaller scale, was in progress at the Colliery to
the westward. Here, as usual, the outl5^ng post fell a victim,
but not until it had covered itself with glory by its resistance.
In the small work in front of the Shropshire fort were nineteen
men under a subaltern, who were suddenly set upon by a band
more than ten times their number, chiefly composed of Viljoen's
State artillerymen, led by Coetzee. For an hour this handful
held their own, shooting down some two dozen of their assailants
before they themselves succumbed, having lost their officer and
thirteen men killed and wounded. The main work behind was
then threatened, but the tenacity of the annihilated post had
taken the sting from the attack, and the Boers were easily driven
back. A demonstration against the mounted infantry at the
drift between Monument and Colliery Hills led to heavy inter-
change of firing, but was pressed no further.
The attacks on the north of Belfast had been in progress
some time before Botha's men made their descent upon the
southern section ; and the Gordon Highlanders, warned by the
distant uproar, had reinforced their outposts and were lying in
readiness for what might befall. At. 1.15 a.m. matters opened
by an onslaught by 400 Boers upon the extreme right, or south-
west work, which was occupied at first by twenty-five men and
two officers, who were soon assisted by the approach of two
companies from the supports. Severe fighting followed here.
The Boers, carrying stones, built up sangars within forty yards
of the parapet, and actually inside the wire entanglements,
which, as at other places, had failed to keep out their determined
rush. But the Highlanders kept them at bay, and at the end of
two hours the Boers fled beaten, leaving their dead behind.
From this spot, however, the attack of the Ermelo and CaroHna
men had developed rapidly all along the arc, and there was no
entrenched group but had to fight its hardest to avoid destruction.
Only one, a post of ten men under a corporal, somewhat exposed
40
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Attack on
Wonderfon-
tein.
Attack on
Wildfontein.
Attack on
Nooitgedacht.
near the eastern flank, after losing six of its number and firing
nearly 200 rounds per man, was eventually demolished by the
invasion of 200 Boers. So much for the defence of Belfast,
which cost the garrison 134 casualties.
Next in order of place, though not of time — for it was one of
the first to be attacked — came Wonderfontein, where separated
trenches of strong profile, guarded by a continuous and complex
zigzag of barbed wire, sheltered the 150 men of the 2nd Royal
Berkshire regiment who formed the garrison. Here the enemy
were unfortunate from the outset, themselves giving warning
by a preUminary reconnaissance which was discovered by
the sentries, whilst sounds of fighting from other parts had
already brought the defence to arms when at midnight the
Middelburgers and men of Germiston opened upon the piquets
to west and north of the enclosure. The post on the railway
was most heavily engaged, some 200 burghers emptying their
rifles against it, striking the officer and seven of the eleven
men who lay therein. But here for once the formidable wire
did its work, and after attempts to get in at different spots,
which lasted two and a half hours, the enemy fell back, their
retirement being hastened by shrapnel from two 12-pr. guns
which had been mounted on armoured trucks upon the line.
At Wildfontein, too, the soldiers had been called to the loop-
holes by the firing on either side. Here some 100 men of the
Royal Berkshire were entrenched within an oval enclosure,
having the railway as its longer axis ; a detached triangular
work sheltered a detachment of the 5th (Royal Irish) Lancers
on the south of the line. The latter was first attacked, but the
firing soon spread, until both southern and western forces were
fully engaged. Matters, however, went no further, and when
the enemy departed at 2.30 a.m. the British detachment had
suffered but three casualties.
Nooitgedacht, warned as related, was as admirably entrenched
as every other post held by the Royal Berkshire, a regiment
which since the days of McCracken's Hill* had been notable
See Volume I., Chapter XXIV.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 41
for its skill in field fortification. One hundred and fifty men
of that battalion, a detachment of the 5th Lancers and a
section of the 66th battery R.F.A. held the place, which was a
square formed of rifle pits on three faces, and on the fourth —
the southern — of loopholed farm buildings of brick and
masonry. It was against this side that the Boers, creeping up
two bifurcating ditches, advanced in two parties. So doing —
a faint moon giving some intermittent Ught — their heads were
discerned by the sentries, who aroused their comrades. A trap
was then set for the would-be surprisers. A sudden volley at
close range staggered the advance and checked it once and
for all, shrapnel from the field guns joined in with effect, and
Nooitgedacht remained intact with but two casualties.
Finally Pan, kept by a company of the Royal Berkshire, with Attack on
two field guns, had to withstand an attack from the east, a ^^"*
bridge guard on the railway in that direction retiring just in
time to avoid capture. Secure in their strong and well-designed
trenches, which formed a parallelogram about the station, the
garrison easily held its own, with the loss of one man, against an
attempt less determined than at other places, and at 1.30 a.m.
its vicinity was clear enough for the bridge to be re-occupied.
Such was the memorable attack on the eastern line of com-
munication on January 7th ; and if it seem to have been dwelt
upon with overmuch detail, yet too much that was creditable
to the arms of both sides has been unwillingly omitted.*
Throughout the rest of the month of January, the flame,
which for one night had been concentrated, spread and broke
out at every spot along the eastern line which afforded it
momentary fuel. On the 8th, 12th, 14th, 23rd, 25th and 29th
skirmishes occurred near the line ; a convoy of wagons and
sheep was captured near Bronkhorstspruit Station on the 13th ;
on the 9th one train was wrecked, on the 17th three trains ; the
line being severed on several other days, on one occasion (23rd)
cutting off the Commander-in-Chief from Middelburg, whither
he was proceeding for an interview with Lyttelton. On the
* For full casualty list see end of chapter.
42 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
night of the i6th, Rocky Hill at Machadodorp was twice
attacked, whilst Helvetia had to repulse attempts on the nights
of both the 19th and 21st. In short the line was harried with
a persistency which seemed to point to more than a desire to
cause annoyance. Botha, indeed, had long been occupied
with preparations from which he anxiously wished to divert
attention. To that end had been inflicted every damage which
the British had suffered on the Hne and in the field since Viljoen's
affair at Rhenoster Kop. His proceedings were, however, well
known to the British Intelligence Department, Every report
disclosed a powerful concentration of commandos about Bethel
and Ermelo, and all that was at first uncertain was its purpose.
By the time that became clear. Lord Kitchener had already de-
vised measures to avert what might have proved a grave crisis.
To both the Transvaal and Free State generalissimos, as with
the majority of their brothers in arms, the south still glowed
with the memories of early successes. Along the Tugela, on
the heights of Cape Colony, and the Modder, the campaign had
once seemed so nearly won that it might perhaps still be saved
Botha's fresh there. Botha and C. De Wet had determined, therefore, to turn
again that way from the disastrous north, and had planned a
simultaneous re-invasion of Ca-pe Colony and Natal, the former
to be carried out by De Wet, Hertzog, the Free State judge,
and Kritzinger, of Zastron, whilst Botha reserved for his own
hands to grasp at the well-remembered mountains and valleys
across the Buffalo. Some talk there was also of a ship to be
met by Hertzog at Lamberts Bay, laden with munitions of war
and mercenaries from the Europe which almost every burgher,
except the Commandant-General himself,* still believed to hold
his interests first in its heart. This scheme had already
partially broken down by the failure of the very leader whose
success had been most confidently expected. A month earlier
De Wet, hemmed in by the flooded waters of the Caledon
and Orange rivers, and pursued by a pack of columns, had so
* "It is useless for us to entertain the thought of intervention, and we shall
have to fight the matter out ourselves." — Letter to General C. De Wet, January 15th,
1901.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 43
narrowly escaped destruction* that he was no longer to be
counted on as a factor m Botha's strategy. But Hertzog and
Kritzinger had fared better. They were at this moment in the
heart of Cape Colony, re-opening everywhere the deepest sore
in the British cause. f Such success could only be partial, but
a vigorous offensive in the east might yet confirm it, and Botha
persisted in his plan. Slowly — for communication was more
difficult than of yore — he gathered together some 4,000 men
at the places mentioned, employing part of them on January 7th
in the raid upon the Une which, costly failure as it had proved,
might yet, he hoped, have served as a useful bUnd to his and
De Wet's proceedings in the opposite direction.
But now, with every railway in British hands, the theatre of
war had resolved itself into a series of fortified angles within
one or the other of which every Boer force still in the field was
compelled to operate. Thus Botha, marching southward from
Ermelo, would find himself entering the narrowing tract shut
in on the one side by the Swazi and Zulu borders, and on the
other by the railway posts until they gave place to the forts
and garrisoned drifts which screened and defended the Buffalo.
Into this corner Lord Kitchener prepared to hunt him with a
pack of columns to be directed by Lieut. -General French ; but
whilst they made ready he first, on January 25th, despatched
Smith-Dorrien to Carolina with about 4,000 men of all arms and
fourteen guns to try the ground. This column had to fight all
the way out and back, and when it returned to Wonderfontein
on the 30th had suffered fifty-five casualties at the hands of
2,000 Boers who were left close to CaroUna. Smith-Dorrien then
awaited on the line the approach of the great expedition in which
he was to play a part, and which French had already set in
motion two days earlier.
On the Heidelberg — Standerton section of the Une nothing of
importance had occurred during January. Only Colville in the
course of his usual patrolUng encountered near Vlaklaagte on the
i6th another combination of some 900 Boers who attacked his
* See Volume III., pages 494 to 496. f See Chapter IV.
44
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
baggage and drove in the rearguard, only to be handsomely
beaten by a bayonet charge, followed by a pursuing fire, de-
livered by six companies of the ist Rifle Brigade which formed
his main body. The enemy lost fifty men, and Colville but
sixteen. At the end of the month he was as before in the
neighbourhood of Greylingstad.
Casualties — Railway Line of Communication — East of Pretoria-
Night Attack by Boers, January 7th, 1901.
Killed.
Wounded.
Captured or
Total.
Missing.
Action.
t^
1- in
r.
h a
C
u in
iS
Si
w
*> ^
V
v^
V
<u^
4>
1
0
•s s
oc2
u
0
5§
0
0(2
0
•s g
Machadodorp
I
I
_
II
_
I
12
Dalmanutha
—
I
—
J
—
—
—
4
Belfast
I
16
3
2
70
6
134
Wonderfontein
—
3
I
7
I
10
Wildfontein
—
I
2
__
_
—
3
Nooitgedacht
—
I
I
—
—
I
I
Pan
~
~
I
73
~
I
Totals
2
22
S
2
70
9
165
The Boer casualties numbered approximately 100, of which some thirty were killed.
Commandant-General Botha returned his losses as twenty-one killed, sixty-one wounded,
and two missing, but this was somewhat under the mark.
45
CHAPTER III.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY.*
DECEMBER, IQOO — JANUARY, IQOI.
After his abortive attempt to enter Cape Colony in December,
1900, t De Wet turned northward hoping to find a retired spot
about Hammonia where he could prepare for another effort.
His reputation and his force were alike little weakened ; his De Wet turns
numbers, indeed, were actually increased by bands which joined orange°rTver!*
him upon the left bank of the Caledon, and he was soon at the
head of some 5,000 burghers. Only his horseflesh had suffered
greatly in the forced marches up and down the miry river
banks : his passage 6i the Caledon alone had cost him 500
animals ; more dropped out at every mile, and deprived of
horses, De Wet, Uke every Boer, was like an engine without
steam. But he had small immediate prospect of the respite
he so greatly desired. His fortunate escape from a circle of
floods had but delivered him into the midst of another of British
troops and forts. On December nth, when his commandos
gained Helvetia, J Major-General C. E. Knox was so close behind
that the Boer rearguard was actually engaged with the three
columns of Lieut. -Colonels J. S. S. Barker, W. H. Williams and
W, L. White (the latter replacing Lieut. -Colonel E. B. Herbert).
Further back, in the Rouxville district, was Colonel C. J. Long
* See map No. 64.
t See Volume III., pages 494 to 496.
X Not to be confused with the place of the same name on the Delagoa Bay
railway.
position.
46 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
with Lieut. -Colonels T. D. Pilcher and H. M. Grenfell advancing
in front of Herbert in support at Aliwal North. Colonel Sir C.
Parsons, who had reheved Major-General H. H. Settle at Eden-
burg on the 5th, was on the left front at Reddersburg ; Colonel
A. W. Thomeycroft and Lieut. -Colonel the Hon. J. Byng,
brought from Standerton and Volksrust respectively, were hning
up from Israels Poort through Thabanchu and Springhaan
Nek to the banks of the Caledon, thus shutting off the north-
east, or right front. C. Knox first manoeuvred to drive the Boers
upon Sir C. Parsons at Reddersburg ; but De Wet, kept well
informed by his scouts, edged away to the north-east, and, pass-
ing between the Caledon and Dewetsdorp, laagered at Daspoort,
seven miles to the east of the latter on the night of December
13th. C. Knox and Sir C. Parsons were then only ten miles
behind, with Pilcher, the foremost of Long's command, twenty-
five miles in rear again.
J^|s_<iangerous De Wet was now voluntarily entering a trap very similar to
that from which, four months before,* he had escaped with his
own small following, leaving the Orange Free State army fast in
the toils of the Brandwater basin. He was perfectly aware of
the situations of his various opponents, of the line of troops and
blockhouses barring his front, the great topographical strength
of their disposition, and of the exact distance of his pursuers.
His haven was only to be gained by extreme good fortune or an
expensive engagement, whilst failure, of which there was every
chance, would mean total ruin, for half a day's march by C. Knox,
in rear, would shut him up. Here, as elsewhere, indeed, De
Wet, compelled to stake everything upon long odds, made it
doubtful whether he did not shine brighter as an inspired
gambler than as a serious leader of men. A greater than he had
indeed set, at Somosierra for instance, the seal of genius upon
feats of unbridled tactical licence based upon penetration as pro-
found as it was instantaneous of his enemy's condition. But
in tactics, as apart from policy. Napoleon never risked his all
except once, when all was already lost ; whereas De Wet, now
* See Volume III., pages 292 to 306.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 47
become on his smaller scale, even more than Napoleon, the
soul of his country's resistance, had to hazard on one throw
the whole campaign. But he knew that his chances were better
than they appeared, and neither he nor his adversaries failed
to improve them. The line taken up on the night of December
1 2th by Byng and Thorneycroft ran, as stated, from Israels
Poort to the banks of the Caledon river facing south. Thorney-
croft, who was in command, assigned the right, from Israels
Poort to the foot of Patchoana, to Byng, taking post himself
on Patchoana, about the left centre. On either side of Tha-
banchu his disposition followed the course of the existing
block-houses, which, indeed, the columns had been sent by
the Commander-in-Chief to reinforce. These defences had the
double defect of lying too far apart, and of stopping short at an
important point. For example, the pair called Springhaan Post
and Intermediate Post, which had been designed to command
Springhaan Nek, the best outlet towards Hammonia and the
north, were no less than 4,000 yards apart. Another 2,700
yards separated the latter of these from its nearest neighbour, Springhaan
Hut Post, the easternmost defence of the Nek, beyond which
again a stretch of rideable ground extending to Patchoana
Mountain was entirely unobstructed. Intervals like these over
so wide a front the two commanders, who had less than 1,100
men between them, were unable to fill and at the same time
preserve strength and mobility to strike from any part. It
was absolutely necessary to retain the power of offensive ; for
though Springhaan Nek was the main entry, it was neither the
only passage, nor from its very prominence that most Ukely
to be attempted. De Wet himself had avoided it to make ure
of another, namely, the space between Hut Post and Patchoana,
on his recent march southward to the Orange, and there was
soon given another sign of the enemy's preference for this
track.
Its importance had been by no means overlooked by Thorney-
croft. Well aware of the weakness at this spot, he had already
requested Byng, in whose section it lay, to make it good ; but
Byng could find no troops for the duty. Immediately on
Nek.
48 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
his arrival on Patchoana, therefore, Thorneycroft pushed
out a company of his own regiment midway into the space,
where it entrenched itself, an orderly being sent to the officer
at the Hut Post to acquaint him with the proceeding. Soon
after this man had delivered his message, and while it was
still dark, a strong body of horsemen appeared in the gap,
coming not from the south but the north. They rode forward
with such confidence that the garrison of Hut Post, believing
them to be Thorneycroft's approaching company, refrained
from shooting, thereby letting Prinsloo's Bethlehem commando,
some 400 strong, pass through undamaged. Descending the
Nek in safety, Prinsloo pursued his way southward and joined
De Wet at Daspoort. On this being reported, Thorneycroft,
though he could ill spare the men, at once entrenched another
company in a series of detached posts across the space, leaving
himself less than 300 mounted men available for offence.
Neither he nor Byng could do more for the centre, for Tha-
banchu on the one side and Patchoana on the other were them-
selves by no means unlikely to be completely turned. Thus
Springhaan Nek proper, except for the inadequate defences
on its widely separated flanks, remained open ; and it was
pecuUarly vulnerable because close in front of it a height called
Ngoana towered some 700 feet higher than the general line
of defence, forming both a secure gathering ground for a rush
upon the Nek and an excellent point from which to reconnoitre
the whole of the British dispositions. This mountain, the true
outwork of the passage, was left unoccupied. De Wet, as
he approached the gateway, had in fact determined to win
t by his former route, which would carry him outside the
defending blockhouses instead of between them. Prinsloo's
undisputed passage promised well, and he trusted that the
troops since arrived in this quarter were too few, and had had
too little time to entrench to be able to oppose him seriously.
He had more fear of those in the direction of Thabanchu, whom
very little delay on his part in front of Springhaan would
assuredly bring down upon him, when, even if he could master
them at all, it must be at such expense of time that C. Knox
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 49
would inevitably come up on his rear and ruin him. To keep
the defence extended, then, and to pierce it quickly were vital
objects, and to this end he set in motion a train of masterly
tactics.
In order to contain the western troops and hold them to De Wet's
their position it was necessary, unless De Wet detached largely springhaan
himself, to threaten them from a point which would arouse Nek.
more apprehension than a merely frontal demonstration.
De Wet determined, therefore, to send a small force to break
through the weak centre, and to place it directly in rear of
the Thabanchu section of the line. It was probable that the
commander there, menaced from so unexpected a direction,
would not venture to move a man to the assistance of any other
quarter. For this service De Wet selected the last arrivals,
the Bethlehem burghers, whose horses were fresher than his
own exhausted animals, who, moreover, had but the morning
before traversed in one direction the very ground over which
his plans required them to return. Before light on December
14th, Prinsloo, marching well ahead of the main body, ap-
proached the gap at a point between Hut Post and the most
westerly of Thorneycroft's detached outposts. He was imme-
diately detected and fired upon ; but keeping his men well
together, and protected by the darkness, he charged through
the narrow gap almost unharmed, indeed almost unseen, for
the troops were under the impression that they had driven back
the majority of the party, and so reported to Thorney croft
when he sent a patrol to ascertain the cause of the firing. In
a few seconds Prinsloo was safely on the other side, when he
swung north-westward, and made for the reverse of. Byng's line
of defence.
At sunrise Thorneycroft received a heliograph message from
Wepener to the effect that De Wet and Steyn, with 4,000 men
and three guns, were approaching him from the south. But
he had little need of warning. Soon, from the top of Patchoana,
the Boer army came full into view, marching from the direction
of Dewetsdorp. Guns, transport and commandos were all
plainly discernible, and warning was sent along the line to all
VOL. IV. 4
50 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
the posts, all, that is, with the exception of Thabanchu itself,
which was so thickly shrouded in mist that the heliograph was
useless. As a consequence Byng, who from the first had had
no very clear idea of the situation, remained throughout in partial
ignorance of the significance of the ensuing events, though his
uncertainty had but little effect upon the results, for he had
not a man to spare.
De Wet now manoeuvred to discover his best crossing place.
Still bent on that immediately to the east of Hut Post, at
5.30 a.m. he sent his scouts forward to prove it. But day-
hght had rendered it impassable. The fire from the Post,
and from Thorneycroft's western detachment covered all the
space. The Boer scouts then probed further to the east, to-
wards Patchoana ; but here matters were even worse, for still
Thorneycroft's men lay in front, whilst from the slopes of
Patchoana the artillery joined in denying the passage. Though
baulked here, the reconnaissance gave De Wet the clue to the
problem before him. His old route was closed ; but the dis-
closure of the presence of the British main strength upon
Patchoana rendered Springhaan Nek itself not only his sole
hope, but no bad one. The wide separation of its defending
forts was known to him ; it was unhkely that Thorneycroft's
extension had been continued so far to the west, whilst Byng's
must by this time be surely checked and contained by Prinsloo's
appearance on his rear. Nevertheless, Thorneycroft was still
nearer to the Nek than De Wet himself, and it was essential to
pin him to his ground until the last moment. FaUing back,
therefore, with half his force under the shelter of Ngoana,
De Wet sent the other half, nearly 2,000 strong, to threaten
the outer or eastern flank of Thorneycroft upon Patchoana,
feigning an intention against the difficult but almost unguarded
tract between Patchoana and the Leeuw river. Whilst this
demonstration was in progress, De Wet edged the wing upon
Ngoana under the mountain side towards a point opposite the
entry of Springhaan Nek. Thorneycroft, to whom the above
evolutions were plainly visible, was now in a greater quandary
than if he had seen nothing at all. It was impossible to devise
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 51
the enemy's real intentions. He had, as stated, a striking force
of less than 300 men left under his hand ; to strip Patchoana
of these in order to reinforce Springhaan would be to expose
his baggage, his left flank, and the ground beyond to a force
six times the strength of his own. To withdraw the already
entirely inadequate defences of the Nek would present the
main passage as a free gift. It was impossible to summon
Byng to the spot, even more so than Thorneycroft was
aware.
Hidden in thick mist, Byng was at this moment preoccupied
by reports of attacks from all sides, and practically isolated by
the necessity of dealing with Prinsloo, who was well seconding
the able tactics of his chief by his close attentions to the
Thabanchu defences. Sending a Colt gun to Hut Post, and to
Intermediate Post a section of Byng's mounted infantry which
had joined him the night before, Thorneycroft therefore remained
on Patchoana, watching keenly for the slightest disclosure of the
real attack. He had not long to wait. At about 8 a.m. the
commandos with De Wet, having wound around Ngoana, began The forcint,'
to move rapidly upon Springhaan. As they advanced the ^^Spnnghaan
body on the right inclined inwards, and refusing the front of Dec. 14th,
Patchoana, swiftly closed in upon the others. Only one party '^°°*
of 300 men under Commandant Haasbroek of Winburg re-
mained behind, and, turning back at Ngoana, disappeared
westward down the Khabanyana river. Instantly Thorneycroft,
his doubts removed, issued from Patchoana with three companies
of his regiment, two guns R.F.A. and a Vickers-Maxim, and
galloped for Springhaan Nek, leaving but one company to
guard the baggage on the mountain.
As he debouched, the enemy also broke into a gallop, and in
two compact bodies rushed for the entry. The first, led by
Vice-Chief-Commandant P. Fourie, burst through almost un-
scathed by the hurried long-range fire from the badly placed
flanking forts, before Thorneycroft came within reach. Having
passed the fire zone, this party of Boers swung eastward and,
facing round, took up a fire position which commanded not only
the rear of the Nek, but also the flank of Thomeycroft's
VOL. IV. 4*
52 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
advance, an admirable piece of tactics which would have done
much to ensure success had much been necessary. Flankers
from this band soon engaged Thorneycroft's foremost troops,
and, though they were driven back, the slight delay enabled the
main Boer body to get through the more safely, because
Thorneycroft found himself obliged to detach from his handful
in order to cope with so dangerous a menace to his flank.
With one united rush the second portion of De Wet's force,
under Field-Cornet J. Hattingh, covered the space between
the forts, the hurried and distant fire from which was again
almost ineffectual. Just as all had passed Thorneycroft threw
himself with his few remaining men athwart the gap, his guns
shelling the receding horsemen with some effect. To pursue in
force was out of the question, but a strong patrol which
Thorneycroft sent out upon the line of retreat met with
gratifying success. The capture of forty-two stragglers, a 15-pr.
gun, a Vickers-Maxim (the former part of De Wet's booty at
Dewetsdorp) and 60,000 rounds of ammunition, in some
measure made amends for the loss of the main issue of
the day.
De Wet's daring and lucky venture had not been made a
moment too soon. By mid-day C. E. Knox, marching up on
a broad front through Daspoort, W. H. Williams' column on
the right, Barker's in the centre, W. L. White's on the left,
had practically closed all retreat from Springhaan Nek. Haas-
broek's band was actually caught at dusk by White near
Victoria, and before it escaped in the darkness lost nearly
forty burghers, the majority at the hands of " A " squadron
1 6th Lancers and a party of the Welsh Yeomanry, who, under
Colonel W. Forbes, charged into the midst of the laager,
taking twenty prisoners and killing and wounding as many
more. At nightfall C. Knox halted on either side of Ngoana.
Pursuit of On the next day, December 15th, Thorneycroft, having col-
lected his men, went in pursuit of De Wet, who had disappeared
in the direction of Walspruit. On clearing this farm in the
forenoon the Boer rearguard was seen falling back across Brands
Drift on the Linyana Spruit, and Thorneycroft's advance parties
De Wet.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 53
pushed on to gain touch. But they found De Wet posted
too strongly to be interfered with on the heights commanding
the Spruit from New Holstein down to Hoepel, with a party
thrown in advance of his right flank on the mountain at Lokoala.
Thomeycroft could do no more than remain in observation at
Maseru Farm. About i p.m. the Boers ostentatiously withdrew
their piquets along the whole front, and despatched their convoy
down the Linyana towards Zamenkomst. Thomeycroft, suspect-
ing that a trap was being set for his greatly outnumbered force,
prudently stood fast on Maseru. His caution was soon amply justi-
fied. A pause of half an hour exhausted the patience of the enemy,
who, seeing that the column was not to be inveigled, suddenly
emerged, nearly 3,000 strong, from behind New Holstein, and
followed their baggage northward. Still a considerable body
remained concealed, and the outlying force on Lokoala was
actually reinforced. But early on the i6th Thomeycroft
detected both parties, and remained stationary, whilst Barker
joined him at Maseru, White moved up towards his left flank, and
Pilcher, who had caught up with C. E. Knox the day before,
took post upon his right. This alignment was complete on
December 17th, and a united movement in pursuit of De Wet
was on the point of being made, when orders were received
which broke up Knox's combination in the Thabanchu district.
Thomeycroft, W. H. Williams, Byng and Sir C. Parsons were
now to hasten to Bloemfontein to entrain for Cape Colony,
where Hertzog and Kritzinger, more fortunate than their
chief, were rapidly penetrating British territory by west and
east.* Only Pilcher, W. L. White and Barker remained with
Knox, and with these the chase of De Wet was resumed.
A three days' advance by Clocolan, Mequatlings Nek,
Evening Star and Conoviam confirmed the north-easterly
direction of the Boers' retreat. All three columns were con-
stantly in touch with one portion or another of De Wet's widely
extended rearguard, which on the 25th appeared to be cover-
ing a position lying between Gouverneur's Kop and Ficksburg.
• See Chapter IV.
54 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
In the last-named town much activity was apparent, and
Knox sent Pilcher and Barker upon the place by way of the
Caledon, whilst White moved on Hammonia. This advance
into the heart of the most tangled district of the Orange River
Colony promised to lead to serious fighting. But De Wet was
more intent on husbanding his resources for his main strategy,
a renewed invasion of Cape Colony, than on giving battle.
De Wet He knew well that so long as he kept his large force together
forces.^" '^ neither men nor horses would have rest from pursuit. Moreover,
he was being rapidly driven into a district every town of which,
Lindley, Senekal, Reitz, Frankfort, Bethlehem, was held by the
troops of Sir L. Rundle, based on Harrismith, portions of whose
division, under Lieut. -Colonel C. P. Crewe and Major-General
J. E. Boyes, were already moving on his flank with convoys
for Lindley from Winburg and Senekal. At this point, there-
fore, De Wet broke up his army, dispersing it, part under
Assistant-Head-Commandant P. Botha, part under Vice-Chief-
Commandant P. Fourie, part under Commandant Davel, to
which last he also entrusted the guardianship of President
Steyn. Davel's party made towards Reitz. De Wet himself,
with a small guard, rode for the Heilbron district, intending
there to collect, with General P. Froneman's assistance, transport
and ammunition for his next attempt on Cape Colony. Thus
the British columns, though unaware of the cause, found their
task at once lightened and confused. Ficksburg, in spite of its
strong defences, was at once yielded, whereupon Pilcher hastened
to the assistance of W. L. White, whose single column at
Hammonia had as much as it could manage with a considerable
hostile body. On December 28th White and Pilcher advanced
to Rietvlei ; Barker, having destroyed the flour mills in Ficks-
burg, moved to Commando Nek. Next day all three turned
northward upon Rexford, on the Senekal — Bethlehem road,
White and Pilcher in front. Barker following to Rietvlei. The
columns were now in close touch with Fourie's detachment,
which was pushed through Rexford, and kept in a north-easterly
direction by a movement by White on Tweepoort, and Pilcher
on Luipaardsfontein, Barker halting at Rexford. This band
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 55
then seemed to disappear ; but on December 30th another,
that of P. Botha, was discovered in the other direction upon
Kaffir Kop, a strong position on the northern spurs of the Witte
Bergen. C. E. Knox manoeuvred to surround the Kop by
despatching White around the north by Lindley, Barker towards
the south, whilst Pilcher moved directly against the position.
The appearance of a strong line of battle on the morning of
the 31st heralded an engagement, and for four hours the three
columns skirmished with clouds of riflemen, who were especially
thick opposite Barker on the left. But a threat of closer
quarters and the practice of the howitzers speedily cleared the
mountains, and the commando vanished towards the north.
White then marched to Lindley, Pilcher back to Tweepoort,
and Barker camped close to Kaffir Kop.
On January ist, 1901, all three concentrated at Lindley, and
on the 3rd White and Barker led the advance eastward upon
Reitz. Arrived at Plesier in the afternoon, the two columns
were joined by Crewe, who had been sent from Boyes' command
at Winburg with 500 men of the Colonial division. (At this
time both Winburg and Senekal were garrisoned by troops from
Boyes' column.) Crewe arrived in the presence of disaster. It
happened that some 150 men of an irregular corps from White's
force, entitled the Commander-in-Chiefs Bodyguard, had been
sent to reconnoitre in front of Plesier towards the head of
Liebenbergs Vlei. At Kromspruit this party, which regardless
of rules and experience was in close formation and without
even ground-scouts, fell suddenly in with P. Botha's vastly
superior force, which had not been seen since its evacuation of
Kaffir Kop, three days before. In a moment the patrol was
completely surrounded. A desperate but hopeless combat
ensued, which was maintained until forty officers and men,
including the commanding and three other officers, had been
killed and wounded. The remainder then surrendered, were
immediately disarmed, but as quickly released, White dashing
up to the rescue a few moments later.
Once more P. Botha's and every other formed body dis-
appeared, and C. E. Knox, tvirning from Reitz, cast vainly north-
56 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
ward in search of something to strike at. He began to suspect
that the enemy had doubled and was now behind him. Accord-
ingly on January 5th he concentrated his columns at Gelderland,
north-west of Reitz, preparatory to a movement southward,
that is, by the way he had just come. On the 6th he was
at Winbult, close by his former halting-place at Plesier. Here
he lost Barker's and White's columns which were ordered to
Kroonstad for reconstruction and subsequent service under
Bruce Hamilton, who was coming from Hoopstad to organise
a force for operations against De Wet. Knox pursued his
way uneventfully with Crewe and Pilcher to Senekal (January
loth) where he found Boyes, come from Winburg, together with
a column of 500 horsemen, chiefly Bethune's mounted infantry,
under Colonel S. C. H. Monro, which had been railed from
Dundee, in Natal, to relieve Lindley at the end of December.
Monro had reached Lindley on January 2nd, and two days
later had joined Boyes. On January 6th, when marching to-
gether on Senekal, both had been heavily attacked in flank and
rear by the ubiquitous P. Botha at Rietpan, where there was
some difficulty in saving the guns, one of which was disabled,
the other deprived of its horses. In the skilfully conducted
rearguard action the columns lost fifteen, the Boers twenty
casualties. Throughout the march such large hostile bodies were
discovered in the Lindley district that, on his arrival at Senekal,
Boyes was able to report the main body of the Boers in that
quarter. Nevertheless, a council of war between the five com-
manders resulted in the decision that, in accordance with orders
received from the Commander-in-Chief, Boyes should return
to his proper sphere, Harrismith, and Monro into Lindley, to
evacuate the perilously placed garrison of that town. C. E.
Knox himself, completely at a loss amid conflicting reports
and an invisible foe, marched on to Winburg, which he
entered on January 12th.
Monro lost no time in undertaking his dangerous mission.
For such a task as probably awaited him, his force, composed
of only 400 mounted men, 100 regular and 200 militia infantry,
with three guns, was totally inadequate, just such a body,
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 57
indeed, as De Wet loved to discover isolated upon the
veld. Fortunately the Free State leader was intent on
other schemes, and Monro pushed on almost unnoticed, en-
countering only a weak Boer force on January nth at
Bronsfontein, midway to his object. On the 13th he
entered Lindley unopposed, cleared the place of its garrison
and stores, and safely gained the railway at America Siding
on the 23rd.
Boyes had more trouble on his march to rejoin Rundle at
Harrismith. He moved by Honingfontein and Wilansspruit,
in the angle of the Senekal — Lindley and Senekal — Bethlehem
roads, a route which, for a time at least, afforded some support
to Monro. On the last-named of these two roads a commando
was discovered, which moved parallel with Boyes as far as
Rexford, and when he turned south-easterly for Bethlehem,
placed itself upon his left front about Onverdacht, disputing
his further advance on January 13th from a strong double
position. For nine hours Boyes fought for his passage, much Actional
hindered by the enveloping nature of the enemy's dispositions, j^n^^jfh)**'
and by a 15-pr. gun which was accurately served against his 1901-
troops. The key of the advance was a prominent hill some 5,000
yards in the direction of Bethlehem. Although this was un-
occupied by the enemy, approach to it was difficult, because of
the danger of being surrounded on the way ; for the Boer rifle-
men lapped partly around the left rear, only awaiting an oppor-
tunity to close in. Boyes, keeping off the left attack with his
guns and infantry, collected his mounted men, under Lieut. -
Colonel R. B. Firman, on his right, which was protected by the
Zand river at Wilansspruit, and at 3 p.m. ordered them to
go forward and attempt to seize the commanding hill in front.
Firman moved out boldly, and approaching the height, saw that
he could do even better than secure it, for his line of advance
led him with good cover actually around the enemy's left flank.
He therefore circled rapidly to his left, and furiously charged
the flank of the Boer first line, which instantly dissolved. In
ten minutes the whole situation had been reversed. Boyes
then pushed forward allhis strength and carried both positions,
58 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
the enemy's second line not awaiting his attack. He was no
more opposed on the west of Bethlehem, which he entered
on the 15th. Thence he moved to and emptied Reitz. Orders
were then received from Rundle to join hands with Major-
General B. B. D. Campbell at Elands River Bridge, and this,
with constant skirmishing by the way, was carried out on
January 23rd. Boyes' column arrived in a deplorable con-
dition. Not only the incessant marching with columns more
mobile than itself, than which nothing is more exhausting to
any unit, had worn its efficiency to the last thread. A form of
low fever had infected the ranks and claimed many victims.
Both the commanding officer and his brigade-major were
seriously ill. Out of the two battaUons which composed the
column 170 had already come in sick to the base. One of
these regiments, which Rundle had sent out 700 strong, returned
with only some 300 men able to stand on parade, and of these
nearly half were reported by the medical officer as unfit for
active service. The other battalion was little less debiUtated.
All were in rags, the majority bootless.
De Wet turns On the very day on which Boyes and Monro reached their
^iony°'^^^ respective destinations, De Wet, having completed his pre-
parations, joined his reunited commandos on the Doornberg,
and prepared to lead them once more southward to the invasion
of Cape Colony. Lord Kitchener had kept in remarkably close
touch with his obscure manoeuvres of the previous three weeks ;
in closer touch, indeed, than his subordinates on the spot, whom
a less elaborate intelhgence service and the constant encounter-
ing with bodies of unknown strength served to bewilder beyond
all hope of distinguishing the Boer main body. No sooner was
De Wet on the march when Bruce Hamilton, at Kroonstad, and
C. E. Knox, who had worked his way round to Leeuw Kop
again, were ordered to converge upon his rendezvous and cut
him off from the south. Then followed the events next to
be described in connection with De Wet's second inroad into
Cape Colony.*
• See Chapter IV. pages 75 to 78,
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 59
Approximate Strength States of Columns referred to in
foregoing chapter.
t
.£ S
i
X
na'Z
3
c
s
b
.2 5
0
Column.
c
c
<n u
1
5
2 <j
0|5
:s
December, i<^po^/anuary, 1901.
Lieut. -Colonel J. S. S. Barker
750
90
4
2
] Major - General
„ W. H. Williams
340
3
6
C. E. Knox in
„ W. L. White
830
138
I
command.
„ „ T. D. Pilcher
„ H. M. Grenfell
„ E. B. Herbert
1,070
450
386
82
no
2
Col. C. J. Long
in command.
Colonel A. W. Thorneycroft
500
150
—
Lieut. -Colonel the Hon. J. H. G. Byng ...
380
—
Colonel Sir C, Parsons
500
—
3
Lieut. -Colonel C P. Crewe
640
—
2
] Lieut. - General
Major-General T- E. Boyes (later Harley)
3'8
1,361
3
Sir L. Rundle
„ B. B. D. Campbell
34a
1.393
2
J in command.
Lieut. -Colonel S C. H. Monro
320
480
2
—
Major-General Bruce Hamilton
830
752
8
3
6o
CHAPTER IV.
EVENTS TN CAPE COLONY.*
DECEMBER, I9OO — FEBRUARY 28tH, I9OI.
To a commander in the field a more constant anxiety than an
open foe is a wavering ally. Such a confederate must be alter-
nately tnisted and suspected ; though he may at any moment
assume the offensive, he must be given no cause of offence ;
his territory is sacred, yet must be watched like that of a hostile
State ; the very grasp of his right hand must be received witli
Attitude of caution, in case his left conceal a dagger. When, in addition.
Cape Colony, g^ doubtful a friend dwells upon the chief hnes of communica-
tion, the danger and difficulty of dealing with him become
doubled ; for, even should he himself be too weak or timorous
to strike, he may have a welcome for enemies bolder than him-
self, who \\'ill ask no more than admittance within his borders.
Such was the position of a large portion of Cape Colony through-
out the war in South Africa.f The reasons why long years of
prosperitv under British rule had failed to win the loyalty of
many sections of this great province have been already given ;
the first outbreaks of disaffection and their suppression have
been described. J Let it suffice to say that when, after the
paltry rebellions of the spring of 1900, Sir Charles Warren ceased
his punitive expeditions in July, none who knew the colony,
none, indeed, who knew war, were deceived into the belief that
* See map No. 63.
f Roughly, the parts about Colesberg, Philipstown, Hanover, Burghersdorp, Albert,
Steynsburg, Aliwal North, Wodehouse, Prieska, Kenhardt, Griqualand West, Hay,
Herbert and Barkly West.
J Volume ni., Chapter I.
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 6i
the immense communications of the western theatre of war
stood at last upon a firm foundation. The fear of a wide-
spread rebellion had, indeed, become more remote. The enthu-
siasm of the disloyal farmers for the Republican cause had now
been diagnosed. In the majority of cases it was likely to indulge
itself very little further than the giving of supplies and informa-
tion to the favoured side, and withholding them from the other,
valuable, nay indispensable, military aids to guerilla bands,
but in no way symptomatic of a universal conflagration. More-
over, the merciful measures taken by the British Government
after the first rebellion had considerably dulled the edge even
of that enthusiasm. Martial law has never been more leniently
administered than it was upon the armed rebels of the early part
of 1900, who found not only their lives, but their liberties,
possessions, and even their business, preserved for them after a
mere pretence at arraignment. But disaffection, in spite of
all opiates, is a light sleeper ; if it slumbered throughout the
summer of 1900, the Boer leaders had good hopes that it only
awaited the time and the call to awake. Neither were long
delayed ; nor could the moment for the summons have been
better chosen. The early days of 1901 found Cape Colony
thinly and unscientifically occupied by British troops, and stir-
ring uneasily from its lethargy. In November, 1900, so-called
" congresses," in reaUty meetings of conspirators, engineered
by agents of the Boer Government, had been held at various
centres of unrest, notably Graaff Reinet and Worcester, with no
more interference by the British authorities than had been exer-
cised with the target practice of notorious rebels in the previous
year. It was a moment when something of a St. Martin's summer
was beginning to revive the waning Republican cause ; when
their forces all over the theatre of war were being strengthened
by the reappearance of hundreds of burghers, who were driven,
or rode voluntarily, back from their sworn neutrality into the
ranks of the commandos. The British armies, on the other hand,
were in the act of depriving themselves of most of the first
contingents of Colonials, whose presence had bestowed the very
qualities which the regular troops most lacked and the campaign
62 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
most demanded. It has been seen how, despite these advan-
tages, the Boers' initial strategy in the contemplated double
scheme of invasion went to pieces amidst the waters of the
Orange and Caledon.* But this did not save Cape Colony.
Two of De Wet's officers, less closely watched than their famous
leader, contrived to evade both the floods and C. E. Knox's
columns ; and soon the disturbance of the whole colony, down
to its very seaboard, was to point the lesson how that the least
De Wet's Considered factors of an enemy's combination may, in certain
advanced circumstances, prove the most troublesome of all. On December
parties invade
Cape Colony. 15th and i6th, Commandants P. H. Kritzinger and Judge
Hertzog dashed across the Orange river, the former between
Bethulie and Odendaal Stroom, the latter by Sand Drift, oppo-
site Philippolis. To have foreseen this sally on the part of
one at least of the invaders should have required no great gift
of prophecy. For the past fortnight Lieut. -Colonel H. M.
Grenfell, in the Rouxville district, and Sir H. MacDonald, recon-
noitring across the Orange from Aliwal North, had been in close
observation of Kritzinger, and their reports gave no uncertain
indication of his designs. It was known on December 8th that
the Free Stater was seeking information about the drifts over
the Orange, that the whole Zastron district was covered with
his parties busy collecting fresh horses. Continually, too, he
edged southward, and on the 14th was at Wolve Kop, within a
march of the main drift at Odendaal Stroom. Still no hint of
his intentions was gathered ; his refusal to be headed northward,
and his long delay about Rouxville, were attributed only to the
presence of C. E. Knox at Smithfield, whilst the recent repulse
of De Wet rendered inconceivable a single-handed foray south-
ward by his weakest lieutenant. Kritzinger's appearance south
of the Orange, then, caused as much surprise as though he
had ridden secretly 500 miles to effect it, instead of from
one bank of the river to the other. Not only the audacity of
these unsupported invaders showed their supreme and signifi-
cant confidence in the sympathy of the British province. Their
* See Volume III., Chapter XX.
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 63
forces were small ; Kritzinger had but 700 men, Hertzog some
1,200, nearly all of them oath-breakers.* They carried with
them no wheeled vehicles of any kind ; artillery would be of as
httle service as transport to leaders who intended to rely for
success on avoiding engagements, and for provender on the
innumerable friendly farms, with the names of which the sleepn
less agents of the Boer cause had furnished them. So dispro-
portionate, in short, seemed these expeditions to the task of
serious invasion that the British Headquarters were scarcely
to be blamed if they regarded them as merely marauding bands.
Though they were, in fact, httle more than this, the inroad of the
two Free Staters was a serious diversion, partly because it was
evidently designed for the purpose of collecting horses and
supphes from the rich districts within the British borders for
the use of a larger force which was to follow, but still more because
of its constant incentive to that large section of the people which,
though it had proved aUke its stupidity, timidity and egotism,
was Repubhcan to the core. However damp the powder in the
barrel, the entry of sparks even so feeble as the armed bands of
Kritzinger and Hertzog might provoke an explosion at any
moment.
The passage of the Orange placed the two Boer forces at
once in rear of the only formed body of troops in Cape Colony.
This was part of a brigade of Guards under Major-General
Inigo Jones, which was disposed on either side of Norval's Pont,
along the Orange river. There was no second hne, nor any-
where else a force in being either of foot or horse ; only the
mihtia and irregular levies under Major-General Sir H. Mac-
Donald, who commanded at Aliwal North, and of Lieut. -General
Sir F. Forestier-Walker at Cape Town were distributed in small
guards along the hnes of communication. There, however,
they were invaluable. The possession of the railways, always ol
the first importance, becomes practically the sole means of coping
with an adversary of superior mobihty. Already the British
commanders had learned how to wage guerilla warfare on the
• De Wet to Botha, dated from Stnilhfie d, December loth, 1900.
64 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Importance of rails. Throughout the complicated operations which followed,
the skilful employment of the railways was so constant a feature
of their tactics that it ^^dll not always be especially remarked
upon. For a general scheme of defence this would have been
simple enough. The tracks were seldom in the enemy's hands.
Their general direction towards the southern ports, through
the parallel moimtain ranges and desert plains which guarded
them like lines of fortifications and glacis, rendered easy the
conveyance of troops from the remotest garrisons in South
Africa into strong positions covering the most valuable por-
tions of the colony. Against a regular enemy the province
could quickly have been rendered impregnable. Armies could
have lain in the Roggeveld, the Sneeuw Bergen and the Storm
Berg, covering Cape Town, Port Ehzabeth and East London
as securely as Lisbon was covered from Torres Vedras. But
here was an enemy of a different type, one who operated from
no base and towards no objective, whose victories lay in escapes,
and in the length of time during which he could remain im-
trapped ; who could never be said to advance or retire, but
merely to move, now this way, now that, his tactics rendered
imfathomable either by utter lack or rapid change of purpose.
Against such an opponent cross railroads are the chief need,
and these were infrequent in the eastern part of the colony, and
altogether absent in the west. In the east, from Hopetown to
Cape Town, there existed but one cross communication with the
Norval's Pont — Port Ehzabeth line ; from that, and the Port
Alfred hne which joined it at Middleburg, to the Ahwal North —
East London railway, but one. With what infinite resource
these meagre facihties were managed will only be understood
when it is told how seldom the great spaces between the hues of
railway were free from the presence of roving bands, and how
seldom these were unattended by columns which had been
hurried into contact by train. In the west the value of the
main and only line lay chiefly in its power to provide for the
protection of the capital by placing troops in possession of the
encircUng ranges from either side. For the offensive within
the vast equilateral triangle, whose sides, each 300 miles long,
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 65
were the Atlantic seaboard, the Orange river and the railway
itself, the absence of branch Unes rendered it useful only as a
moveable base.
A strong hold upon the railway system of an extensive theatre
of war goes so far to nullify the weakness or faulty disposition
of troops in any part, that the Director of Railways and his pro-
tecting troops are the real props and executive of strategy.
Within a week of the violation of the frontier of Cape Colony,
no less than sixteen bodies of troops were within the border
and organised for the field. To Hanover Road from the Roux-
ville district, where they had been left by Major-General C. E.
Knox after his operations against De Wet, came the commands
of Lieut. -Colonels H. M. Grenfell, G. F. Gorringe and E. B.
Herbert ; from other parts of the Orange River Colony the
columns of Colonel Sir C. Parsons, Lieut.-Colonels A. W. Thomey-
croft, R. K. Parke, the Hon. J. H. G. Byng, E. C. Bethune and
W. H. WilUams and H. de B. de Lisle to Naauwpoort ; from the
Transvaal, Lieut. -Colonel W. Lowe with the 7th Dragoon Guards
and Brabant's Horse ; Kimberley provided a force of Yeomanry,
whilst Inigo Jones immediately formed three mobile columns
under Major H. G. D. Shute atColesberg, Lieut.-Colonels E. M. S.
Crabbe at Petrusville, and the Hon. A. H. Henniker at De Aar.
All these were placed under the general command of Major-
General Sir H. H. Settle, who had been called up from Cape
Town to Naauwpoort on December i8th. His first task was to
delimitate the commands. Taking himself the western area,
with Headquarters at De Aar, he assigned to Inigo Jones the
central, with Headquarters at Naauwpoort, to Sir H. Macdonald
the eastern. Headquarters at Burghersdorp. In endeavouring to
obtain a grasp of the enemy's plan of campaign a strange diffi-
culty beset him. The closer his touch with Kritzinger and
Hertzog — and he was at once in touch — the more imcertain be-
came their motives. On December i8th Shute found Hertzog
south of Petrusville ; next day Grenfell touched Kritzinger near
Venterstad. On the 19th Hertzog passed through Philipstown, Tactics of the
and three days later entered Britstown, whilst Kritzinger, though '"^* "^'
he loitered below Venterstad, still pointed southward on Ste5ms-
VOL. IV. q
66 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
burg. Thus there seemed an inclination of the Boer leaders to
separate rather than combine, tactics so unusual that it was
some time before the British commanders, accustomed as they
were to the occurrence of the unexpected in Boer warfare, could
reahse that bodies so weak had ventured to invade a vast hostile
territory on divergent hues and unsupported. When, however,
the full significance of such a movement was suspected, it
increased the necessity of taking prompt measures against the
marauders. Their single-handed persistence and daring left
little room for doubt that De Wet himself was soon to form
the body to his far-thrown wings. To manoeuvre to gain time
and a bloodless penetration of Cape Colony became at once
the main object of Kritzinger and Hertzog ; to destroy them
before they could be Unked by the redoubtable Commander-in-
Chief of the Free State, before, in short, the disconnected forays
were transformed into a real invasion, was Settle's insistent
problem. Now, therefore, his campaign resolved itself into two
distinct operations — the chase of Hertzog in the west, of Krit-
zinger in the east. By the arrangement of commands above
referred to, the piu-suit of Hertzog came within his own province,
of Kritzinger within that of Inigo Jones and Sir H. MacDonald,
and the fortimes of each must be briefly followed.
It would be an endless task to describe in detail the efforts
to find and engage in a vast terrain bands whom a single hollow
could conceal, who rode fast, and who were bent on nothing so
much as avoiding battle. Space denies all but an indication
of the toil involved, the constant scouting, marching, and
entraining, the never-ceasing contest of wits on the part of the
leaders on both sides, of endurance on the part of their men.
Kritzinger On December 26th Kritzinger, shadowed by Grenfell (in com-
heads south- maud of Goniuge and Herbert), by Colonel A. A. Garstin, who
had come from Kimberley to command Lowe, W. H. Williams,
Byng and Shute, suddenly headed for Stormberg, was turned
back at Henning from crossing the Stormberg — Rosmead rail-
way, and sidhng first north-westward between the Zuur Berg
and Kikvorsch Berg towards Colesberg, and then southward
past Arundel, attacked Sherborne and Bangor on December 30th.
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 67
He then went on south, making presumably for the historic
centre of Boerdom in Cape Colony, Graafi Reinet. Next day
he was not to be seen, and the five columns concentrated at
Middleburg and Rosmead to search for him.
At Britstown Hertzog threatened the very centre of the
western system of supply, the great depot at De Aar, and
instant efforts were made to chase him thence. On December
23rd Sir H. Settle arrived at De Aar, and on the same day de Pursuit of
Lisle, Thomeycroft and Parke marched westward. Hertzog, " °^'
however, had passed through Britstown, which was occupied
by Thomeycroft on the 25th, and was now reported at Stryden-
burg. Accordingly the columns, moving on a broad front,
swung northward, the left on the Ongers river, on the banks of
which de Lisle ran into the enemy near Houwater on the 26th.
A sharp skirmish resulted in the Boers slipping away towards
Prieska ; but the encounter proved a valuable reconnaissance,
for it revealed both the strength and composition of Hertzog's
force, which was discovered to consist of six commandos,
1,200 strong in all, xmder Hertzog, Brand, Wessels, Pretorius,
Theunissen and Nieuhoudt. On this day and the next Sir C.
Parsons and Bethime appeared on the scene, the former detrain-
ing at Victoria West, the latter at De Aar. Both had been
intended to march northward, but on the 28th Hertzog, doubhng
de Lisle's left flank, struck suddenly southward, arousing fears
both for Carnarvon and Victoria West. Bethune was accord-
ingly railed to the latter place. Sir C. Parsons hastened by forced
marches to the former, whilst de Lisle, Thomeycroft and Parke
clung closely to Hertzog through Vosburg and Brandewjms
Kuil. On December 30th the commandos were within seven
miles of Carnarvon, and Bethune from Victoria West prepared
to turn them back into the arms of the pursuing columns.
In this he was unsuccessful ; but his movements had the
effect of diverting the enemy's advance from south to west, Hert«^ turns
and the occupation of Fraserburg and Camarvon by Sir H. ^^^^^" •
Settle's troops cut all communication between Hertzog and
his confederates in the eastem part of the colony. The western
and southern counties were still open, however, and these, the
VOL. IV. c*
68 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
richest agricultural districts in all South Africa, were Hertzog's
real object. There he could subsist in plenty for an indefinite
period, requisitioning with small risk of refusal amongst
prosperous farms well stocked with horses, grain and every
kind of provender, and inhabited many by open, many by
secret sympathisers. At present this hunting groimd could
hardly be denied to the marauders, and only on his possession
of the railways could Sir H. Settle base his hopes of barring
Hertzog from the approaches to the capital, and the raiding
of the southern seaboard counties, which would turn a mere
incursion into a veritable invasion.
Thus the New Year of 1901 saw the virus of rebellion
nmning deeply into the receptive veins of the colony. The
Boer plan of campaign was now more obvious than the means
of confoimding it. Experience had taught that to come to
Difficulties of tcrms with bands like those of Kritzinger or Hertzog by fair
™F*'gn- chasing was a remote hope. They possessed mobility such
as their opponents could never attain. Provided with two or
three horses apiece they could always keep ahead of pursuit ;
made acquainted by the reports of their spies with every
granary and pasture, they were sure of supplies ; whilst so great
was their elasticity that their usual habit was to march and
forage at full speed over a front of fifteen or twenty miles,
concentrating at a given point at the end of the morning or
afternoon stage to receive fresh orders. The only way to deal
with such an enemy is to press him hard, and at the same time
to throw troops across his path. These tactics must absorb
a large number of men, all, indeed, that were available in Cape
Colony ; and it was now more than a suspicion that Krit-
zinger and Hertzog were purposely drawing the British troops
aside to east and west in order to leave a clear course down the
centre of the colony for the expected rush of De Wet. The
problem, in short, was of a complexity only to be fully under-
stood when it is remembered on what dangerous ground it had
to be worked out ; ground beneath which rebellion smouldered
hke an imprisoned flame, ground upon which rested not only
the stability of the armies manceuvring in the Orange River
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 69
Colony and the Transvaal, but the whole British ascendency in
South Africa. The loss of Cape Colony, even temporarily, or
even a serious struggle within its frontiers, might transform
the whole campaign. Therefore, Cape Town itself stirred
uneasily on the news of the inroad of these insignificant bands ;
the men-of-war lying in its harbours prepared for a possible part
in a campaign which had recently seemed to be dwindhng far
in the interior of the sub-continent towards the Tropic of
Capricorn, Loyalty, which never slumbers on a bed so uneasy as
Cape Colony, sprang to arms in every county. Within three
weeks 10,000 officers and men were enrolled, and despatched in
detachments to hold the towns and villages which stood in the
path of the commandos. And as for the regular troops, they
threw themselves once more into the weary task of running
down an enemy swifter than themselves, who promised infinite
toil before he could be caught, and little honour in the catching.
On January ist Sir H. Settle confessed his inabihty to con-
fine the raiders to the north by moving his Headquarters down
to Beaufort West, Next day Thomeycroft and de Lisle, having
by great exertions followed Hertzog to Spioen Berg, east of
WilUston, were obhged to leave him to seek supphes at the
railway. Thus disencumbered, Hertzog turned due southward
once more, and de Lisle and Thomeycroft were thrown hur-
riedly into Fraserburg ; Sir C. Parsons, few of whose men had
mounts, was ordered to follow. It was less likely, however,
that Hertzog should trouble to surmount the difficult mountain
ranges which intervened between him and Cape Town, than
that he should turn them where they sank towards the western
seaboard by ClanwiUiam and Piquetberg. This, indeed, if
done earher, would have been a master-stroke, and it was not
yet too late for the Boer to attempt it if he were really in earnest.
Sir H, Settle, therefore, appreciating the fortunate trend of his Sir h. Settle
communications, requested Sir F. W. Forestier-Walker at Cape (w Town,
Town to send a garrison for ClanwiUiam by sea, whilst, in order
to shut off the south, he railed portions of his own troops to
Matjesfontein, whence he extended them westward, Bethune
through Sutherland, and Henniker along the passes of the
yq THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Roggeveld mountains, the natural outpost line of Cape Town.
This last was a delicate manoeuvre, the result of which hung in
the balance of moments, until Henniker, by an admirable forced
march from the line had made all safe at the passes. Now,
therefore, was presented the singular spectacle of one set of
forces hurrying southward by train, another northward upon
the ocean, converging towards the critical spot at a speed
beyond the utmost capacity of their opponents. But Hertzog
was as quick to perceive as Sir H. Settle to utilise the dangers of
the narrowing angle. He continued to sidle westward, and on
January 7th de Lisle was ordered to entrain for the south at
Beaufort West, and to move on Clanwilliam by Piquetberg,
which was held by a levy under Major H. J. Du Cane, R.A.
As Hertzog's westerly movement became more pronounced,
Bethune was railed southward to Touws River to follow de
Lisle ; Lowe and Parke came down to Prince Albert Road ;
Thomeycroft, still followed by Sir C. Parsons, from Fraserburg
to Sutherland ; whilst at Matjesfontein, which Sir H. Settle
now made his Headquarters, a mounted corps, called Kitchener's
Fighting Scouts, was being raised under Colonel Colenbrander
for the operations in the west. Henniker, with Du Cane on his
left at Piquetberg, remained in the Roggeveld. By January 21st
Hertzog found himself cut off from south and east by an ad-
vancing semi-circle traced from Sutherland through Ceres, Tul-
bagh, Piquetberg and Clanwilliam to the open sea itself, where
H.M.S. Syhille, the true left flank of the British forces, was
steaming up to Lamberts Bay. Hertzog immediately drew in
his horns. Foraying amongst the farmsteads of Prieska, Ken-
hardt and Calvinia, he had let slip the moment when he might
even have outrun the railway, which had now placed an im-
penetrable fence of colunms in his way. He checked his advance
on the Doom river, and Sir H. Settle, whose chief anxiety up to
now had been to save the colony from being overrun, saw that
the tide had reached its height, and immediately assumed the
offensive.
On January 30th de Lisle and Colenbrander, supported by
Bethune, were ordered to cross the Doom river and march on
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 71
Van Rhyns Dorp and Calvinia, which were occupied on February
6th. They found their advance unexpectedly easy. Hertzog, Hertzog fails
making no pretence at resistance, fell back rapidly through Willis-
ton, and thence past Carnarvon, which de Lisle reached on the
i6th. But the Boer leader retired, not in alarm, but in hope ;
his task in the west was completed, and he was now hastening
to take his part in events of which his own incursion had been
but the foreshadow. As he marched the chase grew weaker ;
the same causes which drew him northward with equal urgency
calling off his pursuers. More dangerous game than Hertzog
was now afoot.
Meanwhile, it will be remembered that by the end of Decem-
ber Kritzinger had penetrated the eastern part of the colony as
far as Middleburg. On January ist, 1901, when Colonel D.
Haig arrived to take command of the four British columns,
Kritzinger was moving southward on New Bethesda, and orders
were issued for Lowe and Grenfell to be railed to Graaff Reinet
to forestall him by operating northward. Shute's colunm
accompanied them to garrison this, the kernel of Boer influence
in the colony, and from this time forth the place was kept quiet,
if not loyal, by that officer's administration. Kritzinger, how-
ever, who was now marching fast, was first in the town, and on
the 4th Haig disposed his forces so as to enclose him, Byng on
the east in front of the Cradock border, Grenfell on the south
between New Bethesda and Graaff Reinet, Lowe on the west,
whilst W. H. Williams remained to hold the passes of the Sneeuw
Bergen on each side of the lofty Compass Berg. This pressure Pursuit of
was too much for Kritzinger, who on January 6th, finding him- '^"''•"s^''-
self checked in all directions but the west, turned that way as
Hertzog had done on the other side of the colony, and for greater
safety divided his forces into two parts, one of which imder
Commandant Scheepers moved on Richmond, the other, under
his own leadership, on Murraysburg. Haig at once followed in
pursuit, much hampered by the want of reliable information,
always the chief difficulty of a commander in chase of separated
forces. On the 13th Kritzinger and Scheepers reunited ten
miles west of Murraysburg, only to move southward singly once
72 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
more, the one by the Willowmore road, the other by that lead-
ing to Aberdeen. Haig then sent Lowe round by rail to Prince
Albert Road, and attempted to throw Byng and W. H. Williams
between the Boer columns, Grenfell falling out to refit at Beaufort
West. But the enemy was travelUng too rapidly to be caught ;
on the i8th, Haig, reaching Willowmore, found the commandos
still to the south of him, and with nothing between them and
the coast. Mossel Bay, Knysna and all the coast townships
were in a ferment, the first-named especially, for it was now
an important supply dep6t for Haig's columns. The place had
neither defenders, defences, nor transport until Captain W. L.
Grant, R.N., arriving in H.M.S. Doris, by great energy succeeded
in organising not only fencible forces, but a complete system of
supply and communication with Haig. The subsequent appear-
ance of H.M.S. Widgeon, which scouted beyond Plettenberg
Bay, still further reassured the coast dwellers, who had given
themselves up for lost.
On January 19th Lowe, from Prince Albert, was at Klaar-
stroom, watching, but by no means safeguarding, the approaches
to Cape Town, whilst the Free Staters, again separating, sprayed
outwards over the seaboard counties, Kritzinger towards
Kritzinger Oudtshoom, Scheepers towards Uniondale. Haig, now for the
first time favoured by the configuration of the ground, soon had
them in difficulties. Blocking the Oudtshoom — Klaarstroom
end of the OHfants River valley with the columns of Lowe and
Grenfell, who had now rejoined, he despatched W. H. Wilhams
to Uniondale, whilst he himself with Byng drove down the
Olifants from the direction of Willowmore. Wilhams, entering
Uniondale early on January 21st, all but put a summary end
to Scheepers, whom he surprised at breakfast with his commando
at the village inn. The Boers escaped, however, with the loss
of four of their number. Haig's dispositions now had the effect
of herding the enemy amongst the Kammenassie mountains,
where, on January 24th, Haig proceeded to surround them
by means of Lowe and Grenfell on the west, Williams from the
north, B5mg from the east, a fifth column — a new organisation
of 500 Colonial Defence forces imder Colonel G. F. Gorringe —
near ihe coast.
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 73
approaching from Steytlerville to co-operate. For two days
Kritzinger lurked in the mountains, uncertain how to escape,
for Haig's troops appeared to occupy every outlet. On January
26th he made a dash for the west by Dysseldorp, but running into
Grenfell, who had artfully changed the stations of his piquets
after dark, he retired precipitately. An attempt to emerge in
the opposite direction near Avontuur was similarly foiled by
Major H. E. Gogarty, who had come on from Willowmore with a
party of details, the Boers losing five killed and several wounded.
But Kritzinger, seeing that he must break out or be lost, renewed
his attempt at the same spot before dawn on the 28th, and
favoured by the darkness slipped by Avontuur and made for
Haarlem, closely pursued by Gogarty, and threatened in front
by Gorringe, who was approaching from the east over the diffi-
cult mountain ranges between Uniondale and Steytlerville.
Kritzinger's commandos lost nine men in the resulting skir-
mishes, and broke up into small bands, which, scattering north-
ward, fled into the Baviaans Kloof mountains, a stronghold of
gorges and precipices.
Meanwhile Scheepers, instead of following his chief east-
ward, had left him to attempt a break-back through Zuur-
berg Poort towards Willowmore. The Groote Zwarte Bergen
passages were here held by Parke's Yeomanry, whom Haig had
especially cautioned to guard a certain footpath by which the
enemy might escape. Scheepers' first attempt was frustrated,
and he fell back in a somewhat perilous plight. He then heard
that a party of Yeomanry was marching to block the footpath
in question, which hitherto had been left unguarded. Knowing
that his sole hope of safety rested on keeping this outlet open,
he advanced towards the approaching troops with the intention
of fighting. The Yeomanry, fifty in number, marching care-
lessly without the proper scouts and flankers, were completely
surprised, and after a brief resistance captured ; whereupon
Scheepers, dashing for the footpath, got clear north of the Groote
Zwarte Bergen. Now the Boer leaders, abandoning all idea of
concerted action, made haste northward by widely different ^"'^l"p',
J J turned back
routes, Scheepers heading towards Beaufort West, Kritzinger in northward.
74 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
the direction of Aberdeen. Grenfell, clinging closely to Scheepers,
harried him through Amos Poort, and on February 9th was
in front of him at Letjesbosch, on the railway. Grenfell was
then ordered into Beaufort West for more urgent operations
elsewhere, and Scheepers had a temporary respite. Kritzinger,
hunted by Lowe, and raced by W. H. Williams on the railway,
made for Swanepoerls Poort, where a vain attempt was made
to entrap him, thence over the railway near Klipplaat (February'
7th), and north-west, as if pointing on Murraysburg. On
February loth he was at Been Kraal, amongst the headstreams
of the Kariega river. Once more Haig reshuffled his cards, rail-
ing Byng up from Willowmore to Aberdeen Road for Camdeboo,
Gorringe from Uitenhage to Beaufort West for Murraysburg,
Lowe to Graaff Reinet to forward supplies, whilst W. H. Williams
was sent to beat up the Kariega River valley from its lower end.
Byng's appearance at Camdeboo on the nth had the effect of
deflecting Kritzinger north-eastward through Bassons Hoek
to near Murraysburg, whence, given no rest, he circled towards
Graaf! Reinet. On the i6th Byng pushed him hard, whilst
Lowe coming from Graaff Reinet by way of Zuurpoort placed
himself in front of the commandos. Thereupon Kritzinger,
swinging rapidly westward and northward, hurried across the
Sneeuw Bergen directly to Dassiefontein, south-east of Rich-
mond. There on February 17th he found the pressure unex-
pectedly eased by the withdrawal of three of the pursuing
columns. The same urgent summons as had relieved Scheepers
of Grenfell, and Hertzog of the attentions of de Lisle, Thomey-
croft and all the columns in the west, now called Haig with
Lowe, Byng and Williams to other parts of the colony. What
that summons was Hertzog by this time knew, and Kritzinger
News of De and Schccpcrs could surely guess. De Wet had crossed the
Orange river ; he had been already a week within the colony,
and the time had come for the consummation of the campaign
in front of which the three Free State Commandants had scouted
long and anxiously from the frontier down to the seaboards of
the Atlantic and Indian Oceans,
To the Boers, Transvaalers as well as Free Staters, great
Wet
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 75
events waited on the inroad of De Wet. Two months earlier
Kritzinger had written that the Cape farmers were only waiting
for the event to rise en masse* Assistant-Commandant-General
J. C. Smuts, when on the eve of his temporary trimnphs at
Modderfontein and against Cminingham in the Gatsrand,t
promised to come with General Beyers and 2,000 men to
aid an enterprise of which the fruits were to be a " general
revolution and declaration of Independence of Cape Colony
. . . the beginning, not only of the real independence of the
Republics, but also the dehverance of the whole of South Africa
and the union of our people into a great nation from Table Bay
to the Equator. "J But his hopes would have soared, less high
had he known that the Free State Chief had already lost his
most trusted weapon, that of surprise. De Wet had indeed been
less adroit than usual in retaining it. Lord Kitchener had
suspected and fully prepared for his design from its earUest
initiation in the interior of the Orange River Colony. The proba-
bility of an effort to wipe out the memory of the rebuff from
the Caledon had always been recognised. The unrest in the
Smithfield and Rouxville districts, and the bold perseverance
of Kritzinger and Hertzog in Cape Colony tended to confirm
the cloud of rumours which invariably arose whenever the
invasion of British soil was in the air.
On January 22nd the Commander-in-Chief was warned that
De Wet was on his way to join his commandos, the majority
of which had been on furlough, at the Doomberg, north-east
of Winburg. Next day the Free State leader, accompanied by
President Steyn, crossed the railway near Holfontein Siding,
and was traced on his way to the Doomberg, whereupon Major-
General Bruce Hamilton at Kroonstad and Major-General C. E.
Knox at Leeuw Kop were ordered to concentrate and engage
him before he could organise his forces and set out for the south.
The two British commanders arranged to attack the Doom-
* Kritzinger to De Wet, December 22nd, 1900.
t See Chapter VII.
X Smuts to De Wet, January 20th and February loth, 1901.
76 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Pursuit of De berg on the 28th ; but De Wet, who was watching as keenly
the o^ge^ as he was watched, sHpped between the converging columns
River Colony, on the night of the 27th, crossed the Winburg branch hne, and
moved southward at full speed with more than 2,000 men under
Commandants Froneman, Fourie and Haasbroek, two 15-pr. gims
and a Vickers-Maxim. C. E. Knox, who was nearer than Bruce
Hamilton, followed in pursuit at once with a twin command
composed of forces imder Lieut.-Colonels T. D. Pilcher (Bedford-
shire regiment) and C. P. Crewe (Border Horse), whilst Bruce
Hamilton hurried into Winburg and Smaldeel, hoping to be
able to throw his troops by train between the Boers and the
Orange river. De Wet was travelling at a great pace ; but he
was driving before him large flocks and herds, the food supplies
for his intended campaign, and lingering to let these gain an
offing, he allowed Knox to come up with his rearguard on the
Tabaksberg, forty miles north of Thabanchu, on January 29th.
Action on the The position was immensely strong, and Knox, sending Pilcher
Jan. 29th, ' against the front, and Crewe with only 600 rifles and three
*9oi- field guns around the Boer right flank, no less than ten miles
distant to the eastward, found his divided forces, which would
have been fully employed even if acting together, almost
over-matched. Pilcher, attacking doggedly, made ground with
difficulty all day against a delaying action, which was dangerous
from the accuracy of the shrapnel burst by De Wet's artillery-
men. By the evening, with a loss of fifteen killed and wounded,
including two officers, he had sent the Boer rearguard after its
main body, and occupied its ground. Crewe, isolated to the
eastward, fared more hardly. His appearance on the flank
endangered the enemy's line of retreat, but he was too weak to
push his advantage, and could barely withstand the resistance
which his threatening position brought against him. Indeed,
only the fine conduct of his troops, especially of the Kaffrarian
Rifles, preserved him from destruction, for he was outnumbered
by three to one, and it was vital to De Wet to disable him.
In a fierce attack made in the afternoon the Boers got so nearly
home that they actually surrounded and captured in his fines
a Vickers-Maxim gun which had jammed. Crewe was then
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 77
practically surrounded; but seizing commanding ground in the
very midst of the enemy he concealed his transport below it,
and entrenched himself successfully, beating of? another heavy
attack deUvered during the night. Altogether his casualties
numbered thirty-five, making fifty in both columns. The
enemy lost about the same number, but they had Crewe's gun,
and had kept their southward road open. On January 30th
De Wet, outpacing Knox and forestalling Bruce Hamilton,
reached Israels Poort, whence, hearing of no body of British
troops between himself and the frontier of Cape Colony, he raced
on southward and disappeared. Lord Kitchener now saw that
direct pursuit was fruitless, and that De Wet could only be
headed upon the same swift steed that had outstripped Krit-
zinger and Hertzog, the railway. Ordering well-nigh every body Preparations
of troops in Cape Colony to the strategic points, and simimoning De wet's
the columns of Paget and Plumer from far-distant Balmoral and ij^^ision of
Brugspruit, he called in Bruce Hamilton and C. E. Knox to ° °"^"
Bloemfontein, to entrain for BethuUe. He further withdrew all
the township garrisons in the Smithfield and Rouxville districts,
and transferred the forces which had been acting in those districts
under Lieut.-Colonels E. B. Herbert and J. W. Hughes-Hallett
from the right bank of the Orange to the left. Finally at Naauw-
poort he concentrated a new mobile force, composed of the ist
(King's) Dragoon Guards and two battalions (900 men) M.I.,
just landed from England, the Prince of Wales' Light Horse,
3rd Dragoon Guards and G. battery R.H.A. The cavalry
and horse artillery were formed into a brigade under Lieut.-
Colonel E. C. Bethune ; two battalions of mounted infantry
with four field guns into a fresh column imder Colonel T. E.
Hickman (Worcestershire regiment). These and all other troops
in Cape Colony were then placed under Lieut. -General the Hon.
N. G. Lyttelton, who left the Pretoria — Komati Poort line of
communications to take charge of the defence of Cape Colony
against the oncoming Free State forces.
Whilst all these measures were being prepared against him,
De Wet, with singular lack of penetration or information, ac-
quired confidence instead of suspicion from the sudden cessation
78 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
of the pressure on his rear, and delayed his march upon the
Orange. Not until February 4th were his scouts in observation
of the river, which they found so strongly guarded on both sides
of Norval's Pont that a passage there was out of the question.
Thereupon De Wet, crossing the railway at Pompey Siding, struck
westward, and was lost to sight at the very moment when close
touch would have been most valuable. He cleverly obscured
his intentions as well as his movements. Even when it was
discovered that he was pointing directly upon Sand Drift, the
passage by which Hertzog had entered the colony six weeks
previously, the continued presence of strong commandos under
Fourie, whom De Wet had purposely detached in the Rouxville
district, rendered it by no means impossible that the real invasion
was to be from that side, and the westward march nothing but
a blind. Awaiting the resolution of these alternatives, and with
insufficient troops for both, Lyttelton held his forces in readi-
ness for either until, on February 8th, on which day Fourie
followed his chief, Bruce Hamilton, reconnoitring north-eastward
from the line of the Slik Spruit, found the coimtry clear. To
the west, then, the crossing would probably be made. On
February 9th C. E. Knox was ordered from Bethuhe to Philip-
polis, Bruce Hamilton to follow from the Slik Spruit, and the
troops in the colony were directed towards Sand Drift.
On the nth Knox was at Philippolis, Bruce Hamilton at Priors
Siding ; Plumer, passing through Colesberg, by a forced march
reached Onverwacht, on the Seacow river. But these move-
ments, admirably designed to shut in Sand Drift from both banks
of the river, were two days too late. De Wet had thoroughly
De Wet confused his opponents. On February loth whilst Army Head-
Orange river quarters were telegraphing to Lyttelton that they still believed
Feb. loth, that the crossing place would be between Bethulie and Aliwal,
^^'' the Free State leader took all his forces across the Orange by
Sand Drift. On the 12th Pilcher, from C. E. Knox's column,
traversed the flooded drift far behind him, followed by Bruce
Hamilton who, after crossing, turned from the direct pursuit
of De Wet to hasten for an intercepting position to the south
of him. Then Plumer, coming down the Seacow with Cradock
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 79
and Jeffreys in extended line, encountered the heads of the
invading commandos at Hamelfontein. This was a critical meet-
ing, for all De Wet's hopes of penetrating into the interior of
Cape Colony depended on his being neither delayed nor deflected
at this moment. Plumer's problem, on the other side, was of
the utmost nicety. To keep the invaders from the vitals of the
colony he must not only turn them, but turn them westward.
The enemy's left, in short, was the strategical flank, and Plumer,
though he fully recognised this was fortunately served by
subordinates able to anticipate his orders before they could be
conveyed across the field. It happened that the enemy was first
struck into by a reconnoitring squadron of the Imperial Light
Horse, commanded by Captain G. T. M. Bridges, R.A. Had
this party bungled in its tactics infinite harm might have resulted ;
but the situation was as clear to Bridges as to his chief. He
instantly sprang towards the proper flank and, establishing him-
self in a defensive position, successfully clung to De Wet and
warned him away from the east imtil Jeffreys' column, coming
up, finally barred the south and east, and bent the hostile line
of advance in the required direction. After a sharp skirmish, in De Wet is
which six of Plumer's men were wounded, the Boers drew off ^j. ^"^
towards Phihpstown, whence another part of the Boer vanguard
was beaten off by the small garrison, opportunely supported by
Henniker's Coldstream Guards, after eleven hours' fighting.
De Wet now began to have misgivings. The preparedness
of his adversaries, and their swift recovery from the false scent
about Bethulie took him by surprise. He had intended to have
penetrated the colony in three separate divisions, but forced
marches had much diminished both his strength and mobility ;
he was already short of 600 men, many of the remainder
went afoot ; there were hostile columns both before and behind
him. He had been compelled already to abandon his southerly
incursion ; but his enforced deflection might yet turn to his ad-
vantage, for Hertzog was pressing to join him with 1,500 fresh
horses, the fruits of his forays amongst the stud farms of the west.
On February 13th he swung back to the Hondeblafs river, and
laagered at De Put, north of Philipstown. Here late in the after-
^ THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
noon he was unearthed by Plumer, who, drawing in his wings
at Venter's Valley, had followed the trail closely from Hamel-
fontein. Hastily mounting, the enemy retreated westward to
Wolve Kuil, Pliuner, who was beset by a great thunderstorm,
being compelled to call a halt at Leeuw Berg, after a march of
thirty-four miles. The rain continued to fall ; all that night
and the next both sides halted knee-deep in water. On the
14th the Boers, anxious to give their convoy time to get away
over the quaggy roads which led around the northern end
of the Bas Berg, stood firmly on the strong position at
Wolve Kuil. Plumer lost no time in attacking, and once
more one of his officers, this time Cradock, on his own ini-
tiative anticipated his wishes by faUing instantly and with
vigour upon the Boer left, thus holding them up still to the
westward. Contained in front by the King's Dragoon Guards
and Imperial Light Horse, and turned by the 3rd Imperial
Bushmen and New Zealand Mounted Rifles, after consider-
able resistance, which cost Plumer fourteen casualties, the
Boers followed their transport around the Bas Berg, pursuit
being shortly foiled by another storm which laid the tracks
two feet deep in mud. Meanwhile C. E. Knox, hampered by the
same causes, had not yet reached Philipstown, Pilcher, who led
his advance, being still six miles short of that place, which was
entered on the 15th. Then Knox, learning how closely Plumer
was pressing the commandos, judged that they would soon
double southward, Bruce Hamilton had already made De Aar,
and Knox took his own troops towards Hout Kraal, where an
armoured train and a small column composed of a company
of the 3rd Grenadier Guards, two guns and 150 mounted
troops under Colonel E. Crabbe had already arrived, expecting
to be joined by another vmder Henniker, which was on the
march from Philipstown. These bodies had been hastily formed
at De Aar by Sir H. Settle for the express purpose of clinging
to De Wet until the regular columns should arrive. At 4.30 a.m.
on the 15th, before either Knox or Henniker appeared on the
scene, Crabbe discovered the Boers in the act of crossing the
railway four miles north of Hout Kraal. De Wet had destroyed
I
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 8i
the track on either side of the crossing, and the armoured train,
which promptly steamed towards the spot, could only shell the
rear portion of the convoy, whilst Crabbe was too weak to do
more than follow in observation. About noon he was joined
by Plumer, whose march in pursuit of the commandos would have
been rendered intolerable by the morasses had not these ex-
hausting obstacles held so many derelict Boer wagons as to cheer
his men with evidence that the enemy's case was worse than
their own. More than twenty wagons, for the most part laden
with flour and ammunition, lay embedded in the mud, to be
joined soon by as many of Plumer's. The night's scurry from
Wolve Kuil and Plumer had indeed reduced the Boers to an
abject plight. It confirmed the suspicion which had already
arisen in the minds of the majority of the burghers, that their
trusted leader's sole triumph in Cape Colony was to be that
over the floods of the Orange river, a victory which that un-
certain stream might yet avenge. They were now without re- De Wet in
serve ammunition or the certainty of supply ; horses and men
were faihng as rapidly as their adversaries were increasing
around them. General Fourie, who had remained behind to
attempt to extricate the wagons before they fell into Plumer's
hands, had disappeared. At this moment their adventure threw
off the last rags of the disguise which "had begun to drop from
it from the day of their entering the colony. Nor was there now
any burgher so bUnd as to mistake this headlong flight for the
hurry of invasion. Later on the 15th Henniker joined forces
at Hout Kraal, after skirmishing his way through from Philips-
town with a few casualties. Next day the chase was resumed.
The enemy had pointed on Strydenburg, and Plumer, most of
whose supphes were still fast in the bogs of the Bas Berg, pressed
on that way to Brits Kraal, followed by Crabbe and Henniker
as far as Pienaars Pan, whilst C. E. Knox pushed his leading
troops through Hout Kraal to Rhenoster Vlakte. On the 17th
De Wet fled northward, intending to strike for Prieska by one
of the lower drifts of the Brak river.
Whilst resting his weary forces at Gous Pan he was once
more marked down by Plumer's efficient Intelligence Staff,
VOL. IV. 6
82 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
conducted by Captain B. Williams, R.E., who, fastening on the
spoor, and guided more than all by the receipts for commandeered
horses and provender which De Wet thoughtlessly left behind
him at every farm, never lost touch with the enemy during
300 miles of tortuous riding. A threat of attack sent the
commandos on again, to be hunted as far as Geluks Poort, where
their breaking up into various bands seemed to indicate a
dissolution. But at this moment Plumer was compelled to caU a
halt. He was absolutely destitute of supphes ; neither man
nor horse had fed that day, the latter were almost immoveable
from fatigue. He had nm himself to a standstill at the very
brush of his exhausted quarry. However, a few carts came up
during the night, and Crabbe and Henniker, who closed up from
the rear, shared what scanty rations they had with Plumer's
starving troops, who thought themselves fortunate at receiving
one biscuit apiece, with five pounds of grain for their horses,
after a succession of forced marches as severe and under con-
ditions as trying as it is possible to conceive. On February
i8th the three columns pushed on, tracking the commandos by a
trail of foimdered horses through Elsjes Vlakte and Gras Vlakte
to Krans Pan. There at 4 p.m. the troops once more came in
sight of the game, just as their own force was spent and that
of De Wet's men renewed by the brief rest which was the re-
ward of their short but irreducible lead. De Wet, too, had
made good a measure of his losses in horseflesh by vigorous
requisitions, and this advantage he retained throughout by
depleting the stables and paddocks close in front of his pursuers.
Next day (February 19th) Plumer employed his last fragment
of strength in struggling on to Zout Pan. Halting there, he col-
lected the remaining crumbs of his supplies, and picking from
the three columns imder his command the best mounted men,
he despatched them, 230 in number under Major Vialls (3rd
regiment AustraUan Bushmen), towards the banks of the
Brak to endeavour after all to deny the passage to De
Wet, or at least to keep him in sight. Vialls started at
9.30 a.m. and bivouacked in the evening at Vrouw Pan,
having reported to Plumer at i p.m. that the Boers were
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 83
now heading south-west, that is, up the course of the
Brak. To intercept this fresh direction seemed impossible,
which indeed it was for Plimier. But C. E. Knox, accurately
forecasting on the i8th De Wet's dash towards Prieska,
and knowing that the Brak ran high, had thrown his own
troops wide on Plumer's left flank in the hopes of placing
them between De Wet and the river, which a few hours' fine
weather would convert from a barrier to an outlet of escape.
Three messengers whom he sent to Plumer, who was at
that moment lying well-nigh exhausted at Krans Pan, were
captured by the enemy's scouts ; but Knox, though completely
out of touch with his colleague, persisted in his movement, was
at Springbok Vlakte on the 19th, and next day at Khp Drift
on the Brak river, thus denying to De Wet all but the lower and
heavier waters of the Brak. Knox even contrived to send a
strong patrol under Pilcher across the raging stream to demon-
strate upon the other bank towards Karabee. On the 20th
Plumer, bankrupt of every form of supply, was forced to fall
back on Elsjes Vlakte, bitterly regretting that — so he thought —
he must yield the drifts of the Brak to a quarry who had so barely
outstayed him. But Knox's tactics fully counterpoised the
enforced abandonment of the direct pursuit. On the day of his
appearance at Klip Drift De Wet arrived on the banks of the
Brak some ten miles above its confluence with the Orange,
and sought eagerly for a practicable drift. But the Brak was
a torrent, "its great waves roaring like a tempestuous sea,"* DeWet foiled
and it would have been less foolhardy to brave the troops of '^^ ^^^ ^^^^
Knox, whose approach was now reported, than the whirlpools
of the swollen river. De Wet, however, had hopes of en-
countering neither. One way of escape still remained, if indeed
that could be called escape which exchanged one peril for anothe r,
a way so hazardous that De Wet, before he threw the dice,
thought proper to submit the chances to Mr. Steyn. This was
to double back eastward, past the right flanks of Vialls at Vrouw
Pan and Plumer at Elsjes Vlakte, and to dash for the Orange river
» "Three Years War," by C. R. De Wet, 1902.
VOL. IV. 6*
river.
84 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
below Hopetovvn, trusting that the main stream might have
fallen. The plan teemed with dangers. To be discovered meant
to be hemmed in between two rivers at present impassable ;
and even if undetected the Orange might remain in flood, when
nothing but a miracle could deliver him. The first throw fell
well. Taking advantage of a night of intense darkness, De Wet
led his burghers, many of them dismounted, down a broad de-
De Wet pression which sheltered him from Vialls' outposts, and striking
w^rd.^^^^' north-eastward was abreast of Plumer by dawn on February
2ist. By this time Vialls had discovered the evasion, and
Plumer, receiving his report, hastily threw Crabbe and Henniker
in the direction of the Leeuw Berg. C. E. Knox, it should
be mentioned, had also anticipated this last shift of De Wet,
and had done his best to close the gap between Plumer and the
railway by ordering the Kimberley column, which was marching
westward from Hope town, under Major Paris, to halt between
that place and Geluks Poort. Then Knox himself, learning the
news, began to move north-eastward towards Zout Pan, whilst
Bruce Hamilton, who was at this moment driving another band
of Boers from Beer Vlei towards Knox, deflected his columns
instead towards Strydenburg. De Wet was thus shut into the
great loop of the Orange, where it receives the Vaal, by a semi-
circle of troops curving from the confluence of the Brak river
through Bhnk Kop to Hopetown, whilst Plumer, Crabbe and
Henniker, who were hurrying up by different routes to Welgevon-
den, were close upon him. Still closer, though De Wet did not
know it, was a party of Queensland Imperial Bushmen, whom
Vialls had despatched from the Brak to keep contact with the
commandos. These men, in spite of the difficulty of subsistence
— for they carried no supplies and were directly in the wake
of an enemy who left the farms bare — never lost the trail from
beginning to end of the chase, and their feat was only robbed
of its full value by the difficulty of transmitting news to Plumer.
For De Wet all depended on the mood of the Orange river.
The frontier stream proved to be in league with the waters of
the Brak against their common violator. The Orange, although
faUing, was still impassable. De Wet turned upstream, trying
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 85
every yard foi' a practicable crossing, only to find each drift a Finds the
cataract. At the entry of the Vaal river the ferry punts, which J^^^bie
ordinarily were moored there, were found to be destroyed. The
report that a boat had been discovered some miles higher up
sent the despairing commandos cantering in that direction ; and
though the boat proved to be a mere wherry it was joyfully
hailed as a means of escape from the dreaded colony. By
the evening of February 21st 200 burghers had been trans-
ported over the river by this means, a few more in their eager-
ness crossing by swimming. The rest bivouacked at nightfall
on the left bank, awaiting daylight to enable them to follow
their envied comrades. But dawn brought news of Plumer's
near approach, and De Wet hurried on to De Kalk, where he
off-saddled and halted to draw breath. Here Plumer, who
had marched in the dark from Welgevonden, discovered him
about 10 a.m. and rushing upon him with all the force his
wearied troops could muster, threw him in utter confusion past
Kameel Drift, Slyp Steen and Dooters Kraal, the Boers scatter-
ing in all directions. At Slyp Steen Plumer was informed
about 3.30 p.m. that De Wet's guns were close ahead, with
beaten animals. The troop-horses were all but exhausted, but
a mixed party of his own and Henniker's men, consisting of the
King's Dragoon Guards, Victorian Imperial Bushmen, and
Imperial Light Horse, pushed on, led by Colonel Mostyn Owen
and Henniker's staff officer. Captain R. J. Marker (Coldstream
Guards). After a three hours' chase, which foundered most of Capture of
the horses, the two pieces of artillery, a 15-pr. and a Vickers- ?,ns^**
Maxim, were sighted on the road at Disselfontein, surrounded
by burghers who, thinking that they had outrun pursuit, were
preparing to bivouac. Every Boer immediately galloped in
panic from the less than half a dozen troopers with Marker
who had been able to urge their horses to the spot. By night-
fall, when Plumer ordered a halt at Disselfontein, besides the
guns and two ammimition carts, 102 burghers were prisoners,
an unlooked-for celebration of the anniversary, the forty-seventh,
of the foundation of their native State. Meanwhile, little more
fortunate, De Wet and the rest struggled on upstream, hoping,
86 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
but scarcely expecting, to be able to double by the west of Hope-
town and strike across the railway below the town towards
Petrusville. But De Wet's rapid countermarch from the Brak
river had actually saved him, by bringing the pursuit closer
on his heels. When it had become certain that De Wet, foiled
at the Pont, at Mark's Drift and every other drift within the
angle of the Vaal confluence, was pushing south-east up the left
bank of the Orange, it became of the first importance to inter-
cept as well as press him. Pursuit alone, the hotter it was made,
could but tend to drive him the faster out of the imprisoning
angle towards an outlet only partially filled by Paris at Geluks
Poort. Plumer, of course, could not abandon the direct pursuit.
It was his incessant harrying alone which had turned De Wet's
retreat into a rout. At any moment he might run the Boer down,
and he knew too well the danger of relaxing even for an hour
the pressure on so elusive a quarry. It was for the commanders
in rear to provide the " stops," and one of these was prompt to
recognise the emergency. Henniker, marching northward from
Verlaten Dam upon Welgevonden, had perceived the advantage
to be gained by a change of direction ; but though permission
to turn eastward was given as soon as asked, it came too late.
De Wet indeed had escaped but narrowly at De Kalk and Dissel-
fontein ; but he asked no more ; he could at least run as fast
as his pursuers could follow. As he approached Hopetown he
learned that Paris' column extended between that place and
Middelplaats. The discovery little dashed his rising hopes of
safety. Paris' column was small, and alone. A rapid night
ride would carry him around its flank with less risk than that
which had led him past Plumer' s associated columns at Wel-
gevonden. De Wet's chief anxiety was for his dismounted
men, of whom he was now hampered by many. These it was
impossible to take with him on a march so fast and far as that
which lay before him. He therefore detached this unhappy
band under Commandant Haasbroek, and bade them strike
by a short cross road for the banks of the Orange, where they
must trust to fate for a crossing. Then with the rest he rode
all night clear around Paris, passing outside, that is, to the
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 87
westward of him, until, having got well to the south of Hope- DeWet
town, he turned sharply eastward and broke across the railway Hopetown.
above Kraankuil at 11,30 on the morning of February 24th.
Meanwhile Bruce Hamilton, by hard marching, had reached
Strydenburg. At De Aar he had received orders from the Com-
mander-in-Chief to block the west and south ; and moving up
the Ongers river about Houwater he had been in touch since
February 21st with a strong commando, evidently not that of
De Wet, which he had chased northward through Beer Vlei,
until, as described, the movements both of his own quarry and of
De Wet himself turned him towards Strydenburg. Bruce
Hamilton soon discovered that he was on the heels of no less Reappearance
a personage than Hertzog, then hurrying from the raided western ° ertzog.
counties to join his chief. On the evening of the 23rd Hertzog
was still in front of Hamilton, travelling north-eastward with
the evident intention of effecting a junction with De Wet above
Hopetown ; but, turned, as De Wet had been, by the troops at
Middelplaats, he swimg eastward instead, and darted in two
bands for the railway. Bruce Hamilton, who was in Stryden-
burg early on the 24th, thus found the pursuit of both the Free
State leaders temporarily in his hands alone. For the moment
Plumer and C. E. Knox, both beyond Hopetown, were out of the
chase. Only Paris, turning rapidly southward from his now
useless Middelplaats — Hopetown line, was following the stragglers
of De Wet's broken bands north of the Elands Berg. Lyttelton
had already, on the 23rd, ordered Thomeycroft, who had been
left in a watching position further down the line, to entrain at
De Aar for the north, to attempt to intercept De Wet wherever
he should strike the line. With the rest of his troops he made
after Hertzog's divided commando, which he was unable to
prevent from crossing the railway at Paauwpan and Potfontein.
Thomeycroft went very near to better fortune. At 10.30 a.m.,
an hour before De Wet began to cross above him, his trains
arrived at Kraankuil ; but the station was so congested with
transport trains that Thomeycroft did well to get his coliuim
on the march by 2 p.m., when he hurried after De Wet to Bak-
oven Pan. Next day, Febmary 25th, he pressed on the trail
88 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
towards Zoutpans Drift, to leam that De Wet had turned from
that impracticable passage towards Petrusville. Thomeycroft
heard also of Hertzog's approach from across the railway, in
strength reported as 1,500 men. Whilst he continued the pur-
suit up the Orange, Plumer and C. E. Knox marched into Hope-
town, Crabbe and Henniker into Kraankuil, and a newly arrived
column, under Hickman from Hout Kraal, to Philipstown.
Of these Knox alone received some compensation for the
enormous and apparently wasted exertions of the past ten
days. News having been brought to him that Haasbroek's
horseless unfortunates were engaged in stealing across the Orange
by means of a small boat below Hopetown, Knox despatched
thither the Scottish Yeomanry. Although the majority of the
fugitives had crossed when the troops arrived, they secured thirty-
seven burghers, killed ten, and were only prevented from doing
greater damage by the jamming of the Maxim gun.
Meanwhile, the commandos flying with De Wet were under-
going every vicissitude of hope and fear. The cheering effect
of the successful passage of the railway was brief enough. The
The Orange Orange was still inexorable ; it ran even higher than before ;
abie.""^'*^" Zoutpans Drift was impassable ; Bosjesman's Drift, Vissers
Drift, Lemoenfontein Drift, by Petrusville, were the same, and
Thomeycroft chased the fugitives furiously through that town.
A still greater danger than the direct pursuit was the column of
Hickman, which was coming up on the flank from Philipstown ;
but from this the Boers were deUvered by an error of tactics
on the part of their opponents. Hickman had rightly intended
to march straight on Sand Drift, where he might well have
anticipated the commandos. Instead, he received an order to
go to Petrusville, which would bring him in touch with Crabbe
and Henniker, but must inevitably place him behind instead
of before De Wet. As he reached De Put Hickman discovered
the Free Staters hurrying out of Petrusville across his front
eight miles ahead. He immediately dashed for the mouth of
the Hondeblafs river ; but he was too late ; the enemy was
already to the south of him. Meanwhile, Crabbe and Henniker
reached Kalkfontein, Thomeycroft halting outside Petrusville.
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 89
Lyttelton now rested upon the railway, the last expectation of
heading De Wet, and he ordered Plrnner to entrain for Coles-
berg, where Byng, from Haig's command, was about to detrain
whilst W. H. Wilhams and Lowe, from the same force, had •
been railed to Hanover Road, with orders to advance on Philips-
town. With the Boers every hope centred on Sand Drift and
many a prayer went up that the gateway which had ushered
the commandos in to the conquest of Cape Colony should now
let the remnants of them out to save themselves from destruction.
But here, too, the water covered man and horse, and the two
burghers who tested the crossing for the rest aU but lost their
lives. As De Wet, his hopes nearly extinguished, turned once Union of De
more upstream, he was joined at last by Hertzog and Brand with ^^^ »"d
all their burghers; with them came Fourie. last seen below the ""''"^•
Bas Berg. Such a union, effected in the very midst of encircling
columns, and in the course of a disastrous flight, constituted a
tactical feat as wonderful as it was now useless. Hertzog's
reward for his bold entry into the zone of peril could only be
to share the confusion and perhaps the capture of his general
On February 27th the British cordon began to tighten round
both, though the converging movements were much retarded
m the case of some of the columns by delays in the railway
arrangements, of others by the length of the marches and the
severe storms which ruined the marching. The neglect to post
signallers on Coles Kop, whose lofty summit became visible to
every column in turn, further militated against speedy com-
munication and transmission of orders and information On
this day Hickman was in closest touch with the enemy whom
he might have shut in had the line of the Seacow been held in
time. On the 28th Byng was about De Eerste Poort, intending
to throw his right to the Orange at Twyfel Poort, his left towards
Karee Kml, where Lowe and Williams would link him with
Hickman at Venters Valley. On Hickman's left at Riet Valley
was Thomeycroft, coming down to close the Hartzen Berg
from Kattegat, Crabbe and Henniker at Elands Kloof beyond
completing the circle to the river. Plumer was hastening up
from Colesberg ; Paris, who since the 24th had been on the trail
90 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
of a wandering party in the direction of Britstown, was ap-
proaching Venter's Valley from Kraankuil. These movements,
improvised by consultation between the various commanders
during the morning of the 28th, were in progress when they were
suddenly interrupted, about 2 p.m., by the news that De Wet
had already crossed the Seacow river opposite Goede Hoep,
and was two hours on his south-eastward way. Byng, who was
at that time about Weltevreden, immediately threw his flankers
out to Bastards Nek — Rietfontein Ridge, following with his main
body to Ortlepp's Request, marching forty-five miles during
the day in the endeavour to get to the Orange at Colesberg
Bridge before De Wet. But his efforts were in vain. A long
night march had carried De Wet across the front of the columns,
and on to the bank of the Orange at LeHefontein, close to Coles-
berg Bridge. Here was a drift, the fifteenth which he had
sounded during his flight, but one so Uttle known and used that
there seemed small chance of its proving the prayed-for means of
De Wet salvation. With intense anxiety the burghers watched the pro-
fhTSTi^e*^ gress of the few whom De Wet ordered to essay the passage,
mrer, Feb. -pj^g Stream Still ran high ; it washed over the saddles ; but just
as a cry of despair went up over yet another failure, the horses
floundered into shallow water and emerged on the other side.
" Soon," wrote the Free State leader in after days, " the river
was one mass of men from bank to bank."* Thus, with psalms
of thankfulness for their deUverance, the broken rabble rushed
from the territory into which, a Uttle more than a fortnight
before, they had ridden to conquer. Their campaign had been
but one headlong flight ; abandoned guns, horses, transport,
and prisoners marked their track. Their reputation amongst
their adherents in Cape Colony had fallen as low as their con-
fidence in themselves. That they, who had lost everything
else, still retained their trust in their leader was on this occasion
at least more to the credit of his irresistible personality than
to any display of skill. De Wet's invasion had been guided
by little of the tactical genius which had led, and was again
* " Three Years War," by C. R. De Wet.
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 91
to lead, to successes which made his name famous. Truly
once on the left bank of the Orange he was guiltless of the mis-
fortunes of his burghers. There he was crushed by superior
numbers, worn down by men as inexhaustible as himself, warred
agamst by the rivers, until his mere escape from such odds
seemed a miUtary miracle. His error lay rather in the initial
strategy of his campaign; in the advertisement of his intentions
by the despatch of Kritzinger and Hertzog in advance; by the
delay m supportmg his forerunners until his opponents had
ample time ahke to comprehend the warning, to reduce his
detachments to impotence, and to prepare for himself. His own
undisguised and dilatory march from the Doomberg had but
intensified the rashness of his passage of the Orange. Not for
one moment had Cape Colony been in danger; and if the exer-
tions of the British columns in pursuit of him had been almost
superhuman, it was rather in the fervent hope of capturing his
person, the highest prize in aU South Africa, than of foiling
lus campaign, the futihty of which had been apparent from
the first.
92
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Approximate Strength States of Columns referred to in
foregoing chapter.
December, 1900 — February.
1901.
Maj.-Gen. Sir H. MacDonald
Lt.-Col. H. M. Grenfell
Lt.-Col. G. F. Gorringe
Lt.-Col. E. B. Herbert
Col. Sir C. Parsons
Lt.-Col. A. W. Thomeycroft
Lt.-Col. R. K. Parke
Lt.-Col. the Hon. J. H. C
Byng
Col. E. C. Bethune . ,
Lt.-Col. W. H. Williams .
Lt.-Col. H. de B. de Lisle
Lt.-Col. W. H. M. Lowe .
Col. A. A. Garstin . .
Maj. H. G. D. Shute
Lt.-Col. E. M. S. Crabbe .
Lt.-Col. the Hon. A. H
Henniker . .
Maj. H. J. Du Cane
Maj. H. E. Gogarty
Lt.-Col. T. D. Pilcher
Lt.-Col. C. P. Crewe
Maj.-Gen. B. Hamilton
Col. S. C. H. Monro
Maj.-Gen. A. H. Paget
Col. H. B. Jeffreys . .
Lt.-Col. M. Cradock
Lt.-Col. J.W.Hughes-Hallett
Col. T. E. Hickman
Maj. A. Paris
140
450
SCO
380
195
SCO
500
380
130
340
639
400
200
200
122
220
220
640
1.070
640
400
320
100
455
503
25
880
326
tew
1
« fi
a
i^
^1
p
0
s
i
V
a
l-l
si
u
5?
S
500
2
3
I
640
I
2
2
320
2
—
ISO
5
I
—
3
2
3
6
3
3
—
—
2
I
300
2
I
3SO
2
I
360
2
I
640
2
2
300
2
I
7
—
82
2
—
4
2
—
7
2
480
2
—
2,200
4
g
3
2
2
385
2
5
3
I
176
—
I Maj.-Gen. C. E. Knox
i in command.
I Brig.-Gen. H. C. O.
f Plumer in command.
93
CHAPTER V.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY.
{Continued from Chapter III.).*
FEBRUARY — JUNE, IQOI.
On February loth, his pinions already considerably shorn.
De Wet passed out of his native country to begin that feverish
rush of seventeen days over the northern portion of Cape Colony
described in the previous chapter. His departure left to the
Orange River Colony an interlude of comparative quiet. Only
B. Campbell and Colonel G. E. Harley (who succeeded the
invalided Boyes) manoeuvred about Harrismith, whilst small
columns, under Major W. G. Massy. Lieut.-Colonel E. C. Ingouville
WiUiams and Major J. E. Pine-Coffin, revolved about Bloemfon-
tein. Heilbron and the Doomberg under the auspices of Lieut.-
General C. Tucker, the commander of the lines of commimication.
Amongst other successful performances Williams withdrew the
garrisons and inhabitants of Frankfort and Ventersburg, the
latter after a sharp engagement which cost eleven casualties.
But the peace was short-lived. On the last day of February
De Wet brought with him in his leap back to his own side of the
Orange a dozen columns and a very whirl of activity. The
operations at once resolved themselves into two distinct
portions, i.e., those to the east and west of the Bloemfontein
railway. The latter, as being concerned with the immediate
pursuit of De Wet. will be first dealt with.
On the day after De Wet's passage at Leliefontein. Plumer, Pursuit of
whose columns were in Paget's command, crossed the Orange in Jj^nu^" *'°"'
pursuit at Norval's Pont ; C. E. Knox, Pilcher and Lieut.-Colonel
* See map No. 64.
94 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
C. P. Crewe and Lieut. -Colonel E. C. Bethune crossed at Orange
River Bridge, the first being thus immediately behind the fugi-
tive, the others upon his left (western) flank. Plumer earnestly
desired to find himself at Springfontein, whence it would be pos-
sible to throw himself into Philippolis and across the front of the
commandos. Indeed, had his plans been carried out, he would
now, even at this eleventh hour, most surely have cut De Wet
off from the north, and perhaps have brought about his ruin.
Plumer's two columns. Colonel H. B. Jeffreys' and Lieut.-Colonel
M. Cradock's, had been entrained at Hopetown in three parties,
the first comprising Jeffreys, the second Cradock, the third
Plumer himself and his staff. All were on the rails in excellent
time to be carried across the river past De Wet to Springfontein.
But on arriving at Colesberg Plumer foimd to his chagrin that
Jeffreys had been ordered to detrain at that place ; his trains
blocked the way of Cradock's and the rest, and much invaluable
time was lost before the troops could be again sent on their
way. Not until late on March ist was Plumer in Springfontein,
whence he hurried across to Philippolis, only to learn that De Wet
had already passed on his way to Fauresmith, parting with
Hertzog, whom he had deflected with 500 men towards Luckhoff.
Paget, who had accompanied Plumer's colunms, then returned
to Springfontein, after sending orders to Massy, who happened
to be well placed to the west of Edenburg to be on the alert
to act as a " stop." Plumer, continuing the pursuit northward,
made forced marches to Zuurfontein (March 4th) and Faure-
smith (5th), but by no exertions could he gain upon De Wet,
who, putting forth equal efforts, kept from eighteen to twenty
hours ahead. Nor could Plumer gain touch with any friendly
column imtil, having crossed the Riet river at Kalabas Drift,
he came in signalling communication with Bethune on his left
late on the night of March 5th. Bethune had crossed at Orange
River Bridge on the ist, and had only made less speed than
Plumer because of the necessity of dealing with the strong flank
guards which De Wet threw out as he posted northward. One
of these, nearly 1,000 strong, he all but brought to action at
Openbaar on the 4th and 5th, and a small wagon laager fell
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 95
into his hands. Both columns then pushed for the Modder
nver, which Plumer reached at Abrahams Kraal on the 7th.
when Bethune entered Petnisburg behind him. The news of
De Wet was for once authentic, but the reverse of encouraging.
He was still eighteen hours ahead of the columns, a lead which
there was now Httle hope of reducing, for Plumer was obliged
to halt a whole day for suppUes. When Plumer reached
Hagenstadt on March loth. De Wet had not only doubled his
former advantage, but had practically thrown out the chase by
turning eastward and breaking across the railway nine miles
north of Brandfort. Plumer foUowed to Brandfort on the nth,
his last hopes of coming to terms with De Wet being there ex-
tinguished by torrential rains, which stopped all progress on
the i2th. Giving up the pursuit he went into Winburg on the
15th. and four days later entrained his column for Pietersburg,
having thus, in the course of a single month, performed arduous
service in the remotest extremities of the theatre of war. His
subsequent operations in the Northern Transvaal are elsewhere
described.* At this time Major-General A. H. Paget returned
to England.
Bethune found Petnisburg infested with the enemy, even
before the last of Plumer's troops had quitted it. A party of
thirteen men of Plumer's force, who had been left in charge
of some empty wagons, had already been attacked, and when
Bethune entered the place he found them disarmed, having been
captured and released in the brief interval between Plumer's
departure and his own appearance. When next day (8th)
Bethune marched on for Abrahams Kraal, he left an ambuscade
in Petrusburg ; but the Boer patrols which entered the town
behind his rearguard were saved by the discharge of a prema-
ture shot. The enemy, in short, appeared to be on every side.
A convoy of empty wagons which Bethune despatched towards
Bloemfontein was heavily attacked on this day, and only ex-
tricated by the prompt arrival of reinforcements from the
column. On March 13th Bethune entered Bloemfontein, where
he remained awaiting orders.
» See Chapter VIII.
h
96 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
The ubiquity of these small commandos was not at once
to be accounted for. As he had done after his first rebufi from
De Wet again Cape Colony in December, De Wet had sought safety in dis-
for^"^ *"^ persion, sphtting his force into no less than twenty imits, each
of which, under its own Field-Comet, repaired towards its local
habitation, skirmishing with whomsoever it met on the way.
Thus every column engaged in driving northward was surprised
to fall in with bands which seemed to have httle connection
with De Wet's supposed general retirement. C. E. Knox,
crossing the Orange on March 4th with Pilcher and Crewe,
and marching by Ramah and Koffyfontein, found the enemy
on the 8th at Venter's Poort, where one of Pilcher's patrols,
advancing too far to the front, was lost, three being kiUed, five
wounded, the rest, numbering nine men and an officer, captured.
Next day Crewe, who was marching apart from Pilcher, ran
down near Olievenberg, to the south of. the Bloemfontein —
Petrusburg road, a convoy belonging to the Petrusburg com-
mando, which Uke the rest was returning to its own district.
After a chase of sixteen miles Crewe secured the whole, con-
sisting of twenty-one vehicles, and some 11,000 head of stock ;
but he soon had to fight hard to hold his capture. At 4 p.m.
a strong body made desperate efforts to retake their supphes
at Driekop, and were only driven off at dark. This, it will
be seen, occurred within a few miles and hours of the passage
of Plmner and Bethune. On March nth C. E. Knox entered
Bloemfontein, where Crewe left him to take part in the opera-
tions in Cape Colony. There remained but one column engaged
in the pursuit on the west of the railway, namely, that of Colonel
D. Haig, which had crossed the Orange from Nerval's Pont
three days later than Plumer. Haig made for Philippolis, and
De Wet being now hopelessly out of reach, he turned instead
upon Hertzog, whom he pushed in the direction of Luckhoff.
Haig was then called in to the fine, and moving by Fauresmith
and Jagersfontein, reached Edenburg on March loth.
Meanwhile, on the east of the railway, Lieut. -General the
Hon. N. G. Lyttelton had been organising an operation of a
more coherent nature than the improvised scurry after De Wet
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 97
on the western side. This was a " drive " on a broad front from
the Orange river to the Bloemfontein — Thabanchu — Basutoland
line of posts, which was reinforced by Harley's (late Boyes')
column from Sir L. Rundle's command. For this purpose
Lyttelton took under his control the three columns (Lieut.-
Colonels Monro, Maxwell and White) of Bruce Hamilton's com-
mand at Ahwal North, Colonel T. E. Hickman's column at
Bethulie, Haig's at Edenburg, and that of Thomeycroft, who,
having crossed the river at Norval's Pont on March 6th, was at
Springfontein on the 9th. On March loth Lyttelton began his
advance, and for the next ten days the array rolled slowly
northward, hampered at every mile by enfeebled oxen and
tracks axle-deep in mud, and by an ever-increasing mob of
captured cattle. The enemy's bands scattered in all directions,
but few fell victims, for the enclosing lines were by no means
so impenetrable as had been hoped. First Hickman, then
Thomeycroft and finally Bethune fell in on the left of the hne
as it progressed, whilst Pilcher placed himself by Harley's side
at Hout Nek to act as a " stop." On March 20th the operation
closed at the defended hne with seventy prisoners, 4,300 horses
and an enormous mass of stock to its credit.
The columns then dispersed in accordance with a redis-
tribution of commands which had recently taken effect in the
Orange River Colony. Bethune, clearing the country by Win-
burg and Ventersburg, repaired to Kroonstad on April 2nd.
There he came under command of Major-General E. L. Elliot, Distribution
who, having recently arrived in South Africa from India, had S'ntheoTangc
been allotted the northern section of the province down to J^'^cr Colony,
the hne Bultfontein — Winburg — Ficksburg and west of Frank-
fort— Reitz — Bethlehem, beyond which Sir L. Rundle retained
his jurisdiction. Thomeycroft marched into Bloemfontein on
March 19th, thence on the 26th to Brandfort, replacing now the
departed Crewe as a unit of C. E. Knox's sphere, which on the
north marched with that of EUiot, and on the south terminated
along the hne Petrusburg — Thabanchu — Ladybrand. South of
this Lyttelton commanded down to the Orange river, Haig
proceeding to Commissie Drift on the Caledon river to strengthen
VOL. IV. 7
98 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
the watch on the frontiers of Cape Colony. Finally, Bruce
Hamilton, with Hickman's in addition to his own three columns,
after commencing a fresh sweep from the Basuto border towards
Wepener and Dewetsdorp, was ordered to concentrate south-
ward to intercept an expected northerly movement on the part
of the invaders of Cape Colony, where Kritzinger especially
seemed about to be hustled back across the Orange river.*
On the last day of March Bruce Hamilton had all his columns
in and about Springfontein.
The various manoeuvres recorded above were not made
without an immensity of labour and incident, which were not
always commensurate with the damage inflicted on the enemy's
fighting strength. Now, as long after, the columns, passing
through almost virgin tracts of hostile territory, had strict orders
to clear the country wherever they moved ; and often a com-
mander, when in not too promising pursuit of some body of
the enemy, found himself in doubt as to whether he should
not turn from the possibly fruitless chase to the certain profit
to be gained from the teeming flocks and herds, the spreading
crops, and the well-garnished farmhouses which surrounded
him. The decision of leaders in such situations will commonly
be in favour of the enemy, who would probably in any case
escape, and against the stock and produce which cannot. There
will be few willing to risk the verdict of failure which will be
incurred by one whose very zeal after the foe brings him into his
base with nothing to his credit, neither prisoners, nor herds,
beasts and tons of farm stuffs. The duties of pursuit and
clearance are always widely separated ; they are actually anti-
pathetic when fugitives so mobile and resourceful as Boer com-
mandos lead the chase. The failure resulting from the attempt
to compass both ends, and the delusive gains of a sole devotion
to the less important aim were alike seen too often during
the campaign in South Africa to be omitted from its history.
Massy and E. C. Ingouville Williams, their duty of block-
ading De Wet on the west of the railway ended by the
* See Chapter X.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 99
Boer leader's disappearance eastward, recrossed the line on
March 24th and, combined as one column under Williams,
successfully swept up the neighbourhood of Heilbron imtil
the middle of April. Similar duties about Ficksburg, Tha-
banchu and Vrede, the last of which was now completely
evacuated,* occupied the mobile portion of Sir L. Rundle's
Harrismith command, namely, the columns of B. Campbell
and Harley ; Pilcher, from Bloemfontein, co-operating with
Harley in the more westerly operations. Finally, to com-
plete the account of March, the doings of Major A. Paris'
Kimberley column must be briefly mentioned. After playing
his part in the pursuit of De Wet in Cape Colony, Paris
had returned to his own district, reaching Kimberley on March
12th. From the 26th he raided between the railway at Boshof,
continually and sometimes heavily engaged with bands found at
Doombult, Raadel, Kameelfontein and the adjacent farms.
All of these he dispersed with the loss to his own force of six
killed and a few wounded, and on April 2nd returned to Kim-
berley with 9,000 head of stock, having taken or destroyed
some forty vehicles besides and a large amount of foodstuffs.
The early days of April, 1901, were spent by the troops in
the Orange River Colony in refitting and reorganising in accord-
ance with the scheme of redistribution above detailed. Their
greatest need, however, at this time was certainly that of a definite
object. De Wet's wholesale dissemination of his army had
practically paralysed the initiative of his opponents, who found
themselves forced to a necessity the most uninspiring to an
energetic army, that of undertaking something for no better
reason than the undesirabiUty of doing nothing. De Wet,
repudiate as indignantly as he might the term " guerilla,"t only
failed to shine when he undertook operations which encroached
on the province of legitimate warfare. None employed worse
than he the arts necessary to imited action for a grand purpose,
♦ See Chapter IX.
t "Three Years' War," by C. R. De Wet, page 282. The Boer leader failed to
observe that the term " guerilla " refers not to a measure but a form of warfare.
VOL. IV. 7*
lOO THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
such, for instance, as the invasion of Cape Colony ; none better
the thousand annoyances, distractions and local triumphs
which are the best arms of the outnumbered partisan. Especi-
ally was he skilful in the timely use of the weapon of dispersion,
to which, as has been seen, he never failed to resort when danger,
want or fatigue became too pressing. Time after time he had
thus in one moment torn to pieces the plans of the British Head-
quarters, cancelled their carefully compiled lists of his com-
mandos, and obliterated all traces of his own much sought-for
person, which certain staff officers only lived to shadow, detective
like, day and night. Such an artifice as this dispersion, indeed,
can seldom lead to success ; but it may often atone for failure,
and the commander of regular forces who finds the terrain domi-
nated by innumerable small bands in place of a single large and
tangible body will usually confess that the last state of his
district is worse than the first. Confronted by circumstances
such as these, the army in the Orange River Colony, in default of
an enemy, had to content itself with warring instead upon the
countryside on which he subsisted.
In the first week of April Elliot had partially completed at
Kroonstad the organisation of a division 6,000 strong, composed
of the three columns of H. de B. de Lisle, R. G. Broad wood
Elliot's first and E. C. Bethune. On the loth he moved out with the object
of sweeping the western side of the railway up to the Vaal,
traveUing slowly, both to effect a thorough clearance and to
acclimatise his men and animals, many of whom were fresh to
campaigning. With very little incident the three columns
worked northward in line, and on April 15th Bethune on the left
touched the Vaal at Vlakfontein, foUowed next day by Broad-
wood in the centre to Rensburg Drift, de Lisle somewhat with-
holding the right at Paardekraal. At Parys, which Bethune
entered on the 17th, the column of E. C. Ingouville Williams,
from Wolvehoek, was met with. Since April 9th Williams had
been conducting a successful raid within the quadrilateral formed
by the lines Wolvehoek — Heilbron — Frankfort — the Vaal river.
Putting in at Wolvehoek on the 17th, he had been ordered by
Elliot to co-operate with the cavalry division on the west of the
' drive.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. loi
railway. A south-easterly swing then brought in Elliot's force
on the 20th to Vredefort Road, where it was revictualled.
Williams returned to Wolvehoek to hand over his column to
Lieut. -Colonel W. G. B. Western, he himself proceeding to
Pretoria to command a new contingent from New South Wales.
The booty obtained by both commanders had been chiefly
in the nature of supplies, and the amount brought in from the
area which had been partially cleared — a mere strip bordering
on the railway and the Vaal — bore testimony to the magnitude
of the task of subjugating a nation of farmers by such means.
Up to April 2oth Elhot had secured 35,000 head of stock, forty-
seven wagons and carts, 184,400 lbs. of grain. His losses in
killed and wounded exactly equalled those of the enemy, namely,
three killed, five wounded, but the columns had come the worst
out of the trifling exchanges by the loss of a complete patrol of
an officer and thirty-five men, who were taken on the Rhenoster
river on the 14th, and subsequently released. Williams' two
raids had resulted in the gathering of 14,500 animals and
twenty-four vehicles, besides the destruction of thousands of
bags of flour and of the mills which had ground it. After one
day's pause Elliot disposed his troops for a second march, this
time to the east of the line.
The new plan, communicated by the Commander-in-Chief
on April 14th, was of greater scope. Whilst EUiot's three
columns moved eastward, on the broad front Heilbron — Lindley,
C. E. Knox, from the south, would drive the scattered bodies
hovering between Senekal and Bethlehem in the way of the
march by despatching a column towards Reitz ; Western perform-
ing a similar service from the opposite flank, from the line of
the Wilge river north of Frankfort. When his left-hand colunm Elliot's second
should have cleared Heilbron, Elhot, pivoting his other two "^**
units on that place, would circle northwards, his right passing
through Frankfort, the whole then moving upon the Vaal.
During this second phase columns were to come out from
Standerton and Heidelberg towards him. Finally, as a third
phase, the whole hne, turning at the Vaal, would sweep down
the Klip river, inside the hne Frankfort — Tafel Kop — Vrede to
I02 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
the borders of Natal, when it would have scoured the great
triangle whose angles lie at Vereeniging, Heilbron and Botha's
Pass.
In accordance with the first part of this scheme, from the
24th to the end of April Bethune moved eastward from Vrede-
fort Road to Heilbron, Vechtkop, Uitkyk, Hamburg; de Lisle
from Roodeval by Tulbagh, Elandskop, Kleinkop ; Broadwood
from Honingspruit by Lindley and Buff els vlei. In the neigh-
bourhood of Reitz on the 28th Broadwood momentarily came
in sight of Pilcher, from C. E. Knox's force,* who thus per-
formed the duty assigned him under the scheme of combination.
On the 30th EUiot re-rationed his whole command in mid-
veld from a convoy which came out from Heilbron, and next
day a twenty-five mile march took Headquarters and de Lisle's
colunm into Frankfort. At this time a few small Boer convoys
flitted about the front, of which one was now and then brought
in by one or other of the coliunns to swell the enormous booty
which Elhot was accumulating. After four days' raiding, with
some skirmishing, from Frankfort up to the Vaal, Elliot, hear-
ing of the richness of the country towards Vrede, decided to
traverse it. When on the point of starting Broadwood became
unfitted for immediate work and was sent back to Heilbron
under an escort which turned its journey into profit by capturing
on the way two Boer laagers, with sixteen prisoners, thirty-five
vehicles and 500 cattle. De Lisle then took over Broadwood' s
column, Lieut.-Colonel R. Fanshawe replaced de Lisle, and
Colonel W. H. M. Lowe relieved Bethune, who was also tem-
porarily absent. On May 7th the columns lay as follows :
Lowe at ViUiersdorp, de Lisle at Parys and Perth, Fanshawe
at Tafel Kop. On the gth Cornelia was cleared, and the next
day de Lisle surprised and surrounded Vrede, taking seven
prisoners. The curious nature of this species of warfare was
seldom better exemphfied than by the fact that Fanshawe, sup-
porting de Lisle to Driespruit, that is, immediately in rear of
an irresistible combination of troops, was hotly engaged through-
* See page loi.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 103
out his march, a portion of his rearguard being at one time
surrounded. Approaching De Lange's Drift on May nth,
communication was estabUshed with Lieut.-Colonel A. E. W.
Colville's colunm from Standerton. Two days later Elliot
handed over to Colville for escort to the line twenty- three
prisoners, 70,000 head of stock, 106 captured vehicles and many
more belonging to the refugees, who numbered 826 souls ; all
these were the proceeds of only ten days' operations, for the
General had already sent back with the convoy returning to
Heilbron thirty-three carts and wagons and nearly 9,000 stock.
At De Lange's Drift Bethune rejoined the command.
The fourth phase of the operation comprised a four days'
south-easterly sweep parallel to and on the west of the Khp
river, on the other side of which Colville kept in hne, having on
his own outer flank a small column under Lieut.-Colonel F. J. Pink,
from Zandspruit, which scoured the Verzamel Berg.* At every
mile the country became more difficult, for not only had the
columns to cross the innumerable tributaries of the Khp, but
they were approaching the buttresses of the Drakensberg, which
become more broken as they protrude westward and sink to the
great plateau on which they are founded. On May 19th Elliot
called a halt at the mouth of Botha's Pass, through which he
sent his wagons to be refilled at Newcastle, and a further 22,000
head of stock, the gleanings of the Klip basin.
The increasing activity and numbers of the enemy had for
some days past aroused, a suspicion in EUiot's mind that he
was intruding upon some secret haunt of the enemy. For
example, at Vlaknek and Rietport Passes, the western posterns
to the greater gateway of Botha's Pass, the Boers had strongly
disputed the passage on the i8th ; indeed, Lowe could scarcely
have forced Rietport without the aid of de Lisle, who, having
fought his way through Vlaknek, sent a detachment to open
the other entrance from inside. Since then every raiding
excursion had been resisted in a manner hitherto imusual,
and ElUot looked about for the source of this sudden volume
*See Chapter VIII., page 154.
io4 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
of opposition in so remote a comer of his district. He was
not long in discovering it. Some twenty-five miles to the west
of Botha's Pass a horseshoe of isolated downs, ten miles in
length, arose from the High Veld, crowned with crags so sheer,
and so squarely hewn by Nature, that the hiUs appeared to be
crenellated by a parapet of Norman castles. This remarkable
feature was shown upon no map ; information about it was
difficult to obtain ; it was, indeed, a place of some mystery,
and there were strange tales of miles of caves which burrowed
into its depths as if eaten out by the waves of some long
vanished sea.
The place was a typical Boer stronghold, and its almost
unsearchable recesses had long been used as a magazine and
a remount dep6t for the Orange Free State commandos. At
this very moment, so ElUot was informed, De Wet and
Steyn were in the neighbourhood endeavouring to organise the
scattered horse and cattle guards to keep him from their
sanctuary. He therefore decided to search the place at once,
and on May 20th manoeuvred to get upon its flank and rear by
despatching Bethune back through Vlaknek Pass for Boschhoek,
placing Lowe upon the Elandshoek Plateau, and supporting
him by de Lisle at Mowbray. This march was httle opposed,
though the road ran through so veritable a canon that Lowe
had actually to blast a track up to the plateau. Next day de
Lisle and Lowe faced west and advanced straight upon the
Witkoppies, Bethune being then at Boschhoek on the right.
Only a few Boers, some 400 in all, had gathered to hold their
ramparts, and these speedily broke and scattered in all direc-
tions on being shelled. Their occupation here was shown by
a thousand horses which they left to be driven in by the invaders.
The columns then marched over the Witkoppies, finding nothing
more above ground, and not pausing to search the subterranean
vaults, of which at that time rumour had scarcely reached them.
Once more on the open veld, Elliot spread his columns again,
sending Lowe north-westward, Bethune to the west, and de
Lisle southward in chase of the dispersed commando. On
May 23rd Headquarters and de Lisle entered Harrismith with
r V,
t
i'
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 105
1,700 captured horses. Elliot then ordered a concentration at
Vrede which was effected by the end of the month, all the
columns loading themselves afresh with four-footed captures,
and meeting with constant but ineffectual opposition on the
way to the rendezvous.
The opening of the fifth and last phase of the great foray
was somewhat delayed by the difficulty of obtaining supphes
owing to the enormous demands being made at this time upon
the depot at Standerton. Elliot was now to return to Kroonstad
by way of Reitz and Lindley, a road which never failed to afford
fighting ; and as a precaution he had already sent de Lisle
forward with what rations he could spare, to hold Pram Kop,
towards the Wilge river. From the moment of starting, on
June 3rd, the enemy was in active attendance, especially on the
rearguards, which they pestered not only with rifles but with
miles of flames urged across the grass by a following wind. On
June 5th Lowe was in contact with and took nine wagons from
a commando reported to belong to De la Rey. On that evening
de Lisle was on the Wilge at Schurvepoort, east of Reitz, and
was there ordered to push a party across the river to search for
a Boer laager reported to be in the neighbourhood. De Lisle
sent 100 men of the 6th (Bedfordshire regiment and (iordon
Highlanders) mounted infantry, and 100 South Austrahan
Bushmen, under Major J. R. F. Sladen, who, early on the
morning of the 6th, discovered a large convoy upon Graspan,
seven miles east of Reitz. A dashing charge resulted in the
capture of 114 wagons and carts and forty-five prisoners,
whereupon Sladen, parking his booty, sent sixty of his
Australians to regain touch with de Lisle. This party had
hardly disappeared when Sladen suddenly found himself
almost surrounded by a semi-circle of horsemen more than
double his own strength, which with scarcely a pause bore
straight down upon him.
Sladen' s position lay on a spur, at the foot of which he The action at
had drawn up h's captured wagons ; his men lined some scattered 61^,^1901. ^
kraals above, in one of which were immured the prisoners. In a
moment the enemy was at the wagons, and dismounting there,
io6 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
some remained under cover, others ran forward to the shelter
of the nearest native huts which Sladen had been unable to
occupy. Then, whilst some of those behind secured and drove
off the wagons, the rest of the Boers settled down to a fire attack
at less than fifty yards' range, which seemed hkely to have
but one end for the outnumbered and outflanked mounted
infantry. Sladen had indeed fallen into a nest of hornets, and
his prospects, bad as they plainly were, were even less hopeful
than they appeared. Behind him de Lisle, as yet in total
ignorance alike of his detachment's first success and its subse-
quent predicament, was being greatly delayed by a bad drift
over the Wilge. Around him, even in his midst, lay a com-
mando whose daring and promptitude bespoke no common
leadership. Such was in fact the case. No lesser personages
Presence of than De Wet and De la Key led the attack, drawn to the spot
DeURey!^ by chances which will be described later. The wagons were
already practically retaken, many were being fast removed, with
the mass of the Boers between them and the troops. It seemed
equally impossible to retain the prisoners, who lay in a hut
within ten yards of the foremost of the attack, the escort con-
sisting of but two men.* Giving up for lost the wagons at any
rate, Sladen's men turned stubbornly to keeping themselves from
capture, and for four hours their rifles were neither silent nor
ineffective. Meanwhile de Lisle had at last made the passage
of the Wilge and, all unaware of the above events, was march-
ing towards the spot. Not until 3 p.m., when yet six miles
distant, did he receive a message from Sladen, learning more
soon after from a fugitive who had been captured and released
by the enemy. De Lisle at once pushed on and soon arrived
on the scene at the gallop. He found Sladen's detachment
still holding its own, despite the loss of a quarter of its numbers.
By its indomitable resistance it had even gained the upper hand.
* Sergeant Sutherland and Corporal Geddes, of the Gordon Highlanders. Both
were especially commended in Colonel de Lisle's report for the way in which they
prevented the escape of their forty-five charges. Sutherland performed his duty in
spite of a severe wound obtained when assisting a wounded comrade outside the hut.
He was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal, Geddes being promoted to sergeant
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 107
The losses of the attack were heavy, the burghers were disincUned
to close in further, and at the sight of the reinforcements they
at once broke and fled, leaving twenty dead and wounded on the
field. In the pursuit which followed de Lisle recaptured all
but two of the wagons and 6,000 oxen. Altogether the enemy's
losses — fifty killed and wounded, including two officers, and
forty-five prisoners — ^nearly doubled those of the troops, which
numbered three officers sind twenty-three men killed and twenty-
four wounded. The severity of the fire may be gauged by the
fact that, though somewhat covered by the kraals, nearly 150
horses were shot. The whole affair redounded greatly to the
credit of all concerned, and especially, if distinctions can be
made, to two young officers. Lieutenants C. P. Strong of the
Bedfordshire regiment, and G. E. Cameron of the Gordon
Highlanders, who both fell in the forefront.
Not their foe but their friends had brought together the chief
of the Republican leaders at this unimportant spot in the Orange
River Colony. Early in May the Government of the Transvaal,
in a moment of weakness, had actually laid before the directorate
of the sister State proposals for an armistice with a view to
negotiations for peace. The spreading desolation of their country,
the certainty of ultimate defeat, had so dismayed the Trans-
vaalers that even ardent patriots like J. C. Smuts, B. Viljoen
and F. W. Reitz, the last, especially, the incarnation of the
spirit of irreconcilable resistance, had felt it their duty to put
their hands to a document which had been forwarded to Presi-
dent Steyn for his consideration. But this unexpected thrust
only struck fire from the leader of the Orange Free State. In an
indignant reply he had repudiated on behalf of his nation all
thought of yielding. If the Transvaal laid down her arms, he
said, his own countrymen, who had endured the first blows of
the campaign, would assuredly strike the last. He would be no
party to this " National Murder,"* and even were he to be so
base, he knew that his people would abandon, not their country
* President Steyn's reply to Secretary of State F. W. Reitz's communication on
behalf of his Government, dated from the Government Offices on the Veld, Ermelo
District, May loth, 1901.
io8 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
but himself, and would continue the struggle without him.
Reason of Then, fearful lest his ally should take some irrevocable step,
De Wet's
presence. Steyn had summoned De Wet to his side for a visit in company
to the Transvaal Headquarters. At that moment De Wet
himself was on the point of meeting De la Key in the Western
Transvaal to discuss plans for a joint invasion of Cape Colony,
ever the ultima ratio of the strategy of the Western leaders.
In view of the freshly arisen contingency, De Wet had then
requested De la Key to meet him instead in the presence of Steyn,
and June 5th found all three in laager on the Liebenberg's Vlei,
less than thirty miles in front of EUiot's returning army. Close
by a large convoy of wagons laden with local families and their
household effects was seeking to escape from the British troops.
On the morning of June 6th Sladen's successful dash upon these
wagons was reported to the assembled Boer leaders, who imme-
diately decided upon a rescue, with the results already seen. At
the conclusion of the affair the Boer officers made off for Lindley,
thence to make their way by circuitous routes and with many
an adventure to a momentous conference on the banks of the
Waterval river, east of Heidelberg, which will be described
elsewhere.*
After the affair at Graspan, Elliot, his left flank sweeping
through Bethlehem, marched on Reitz (June 9th) and thence
in to the railway at Kroonstad, which was re-entered on the
15th. During his seven weeks' absence he had deprived the
enemy of 100 prisoners, thirty-six kiUed, 131,500 cattle, sheep
and horses, 264 wagons and carts and an incalculable amount
of foodstuffs. At Kroonstad Elliot remained a week, a pause
of which advantage wiU be taken in a subsequent chapter to
synchronise with his . operations the work of the other divisions
of troops in the Orange River Colony. One unit may, how-
ever be first dismissed, that of Western, which, acting as the
northerly " stop " as Elliot passed Frankfort, had held the
drifts over the Wilge from its confluence with the Vaal
up to Leeuwbank Drift from May ist to 6th. After raiding
• See Chapter XII.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 109
13,000 head of stock, Western moved into Heilbron on
the 8th, There he was met by a wire from Headquarters
acquainting him with the presence of a laager at Buffelsvlei.
He immediately took his force thither by two divergent lines
of march, so as to come u|X)n the camp from opposite sides,
tactics which were most successful. At dawn on May loth Major
D. P. Driscoll with his regiment of Scouts surprised the Boers
from the east, and with no loss to himself secured thirty-one
prisoners, seventeen vehicles, 100 horses and more than 3,000
stock. Western then pursued his way to Vereeniging, on both
sides of which he foraged until the end of the month, when he
had sent into Vereeniging from the country side sixty-one
carts and wagons, 7,300 animals and some 7,500 bags of grain.
His next move was towards Parys, which, in the face of sharp
opposition, he entered and cleared on June 4th. Two days
later, reconnoitring from Vredefort, Western gained touch with
his Parys opponents, 150 in number, and chased them for five
miles, capturing two. Passing Reitzburg he then made for a
laager at Witkopjes, which he attacked and dispersed on the
8th, taking eight prisoners, thirty-nine vehicles, 1,400 stock and
a quantity of grain and ammunition. Thence he put in at Kopje
Station, taking the field again on the 17th to clear the banks
of the Rhenoster river down to the Vaal. A ten days' active
raid brought him into Klerksdorp with eight prisoners, ten
wagons and spans of oxen and 3,000 stock, having destroyed
as much again on the march. Western was then attached to
G. Hamilton, at Klerksdorp, thus passing out of the area
under review in this chapter.
no
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Approximate Strength States of Columns referred to in
foregoing chapter.
Column.
February— June, 1901.
Lieut. -Colonel J. S. S. Barker .
„ W. H. Williams .
„ W. L. White
„ T. D. Pilcher
„ H. M. Grenfell .
Colonel A. W. Thorneycroft
Lieut. -Colonel the Hon. J. H. G. Byng.
Colonel Sir C. Parsons
Lieut. -Colonel C. P. Crewe
Major-General J. E. Boyes (later Harley)
B. B. D. Campbell
Lieut. -Colonel S. C. H. Monro ...
Major-General Bruce Hamilton ...
Lieut. -Colonel W. G. Massy
,, ,, E. C Ingouville Williams
(later G. W. B. Western)
Major J. E. Pine-Coffin ...
Colonel E. C. Bethune
Brigadier-General H. C. O. Plumer
Colonel H. B. Jeffreys
Lieut. -Colonel M. Cradock
Major-General Bruce Hamilton'scolumns :
Lieut. -Colonel S. C. H. Monro
,, ,, C. Maxwell (later S. W.
Follett)
Lieut. -Colonel W. L. White
Colonel D. Haig's columns :
Lieut. -Colonel the Hon. J. H. G. Byng
„ W. H. Williams
„ ,, H. J. Scobell
Colonel T. E. Hickman ...
Lieut. -Colonel E. B. Herbert
,, ,, the Hon. A. Murray
Major A. Paris
Brigadier-General R. G. Broadwood
(later de Lisle) ...
Colonel E. C. Bethune (later Lowe)
Lieut. -Colonel H. de B. de Lisle (later
R. Fanshawe)
Lieut. -Colonel W. G. B. Western
„ A. E. W. Colville
„ F. J. Pink
i
1
1
05;
s
0
c
£3
c
tn V
M
a 0
^
s
750
90
4
2
1 Major - General
340
830
~'^
3
5
6
I
[ C. E. Knox in
J command.
1,070
82
7
2
1 Col. C. J. Long
J in command.
450
—
3
—
500
150
5
—
380
—
3
—
19s
320
2
—
640
—
4
2
Lieut. - General
318
1. 361
5
3
Sir L. Rundle
342
1.393
S
2
in command.
320
480
2
—
400
—
2
—
510
3
I
Lieut. - General
• C. Tucker di-
459
447
625
4
3
I
recting.
130
...
2
~
Major - General
1 .522
~
10
2
A. H. Paget in
command.
290
—
3
—
650
6
Lieut. - General
the Hon. N. G.
617
3
Ly t t e 1 ton
654
—
4
—
directing.
3SI
—
3
3
639
II*
3
—
>
560
—
S
—
380
—
3
I
185
—
2
I
32s
131
2
I
2,083
—
4
I
Major - General
1,411
"—
5
—
- E. L. Elliot in
command.
700
22*
—
I
J
764
266
3
—
267
376
5
I
170
280
2
—
Cyclists.
Ill
the columns.
CHAPTER VI.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL*
[Continued from Chapter II).
JANUARY — MARCH, I9OI.
By the evening of January 27th eight columns, of a fighting
strength of 15,000 men and sixty-three gims.f had taken stand
around the fringe of the Eastern Transvaal, under the supreme
command of Lieut. -General J. D. P. French. From left to right
they were placed as follows : — At VVonderfontein, Major-General Positions of
H. L. Smith-Dorrien with 3,000 men and twelve gims ; at Middel-
burg, Colonel W. P. Campbell with 1,250 men and five guns ;
at Mooiplaats, Brigadier-General E. A. H. Alderson with 1,900
men and nine guns ; at Bapsfontein, Colonel E. C. Knox with
1,850 men and eight guns ; at Putfontein, Lieut.-Colonels E. H. H.
Allenby and W. P. Pulteney with respectively 1,560 men and
seven guns and 1,800 men and eight guns ; at Springs, Brigadier-
General J. G. Dartnell with 2,600 men and nine gims ; and at
Greylingstad, Lieut.-Colonel A. E. W. ColviUe with 650 men
and five guns. The scheme had originally included the force
of Major-General A. H. Paget ; but the threat to Cape Colony,
the most sensitive nerve-centre of the campaign, had caused
his withdrawal from the eastern theatre, and he was at this
moment marching westward to entrain for service in the south.
W. P. Campbell filled the gap in the arc, and Pulteney, hitherto
intended to be held in reserve, came up as a unit of the first line.
* See nup No. 56.
f Exclusive of machine guns. The numbers quoted are of combatants only ; the
whole assembly totalled over 22,000 men and 20,000 animals. For state, see page 127.
112 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
The topographical situations of the above-named columns
foreshadowed the general intention. The Eastern Transvaal was
to be swept diagonally ; at first eastward — whilst W. P. Campbell
and Smith-Dorrien barred the northern exits; then south-east-
ward towards the broken cul de sac between the Buffalo and
the forbidden native border. Thither, it was hoped, the com-
mandos of Botha would be headed, and there receive a coup de
grdce such as Prinsloo had undergone in the Brand water basin.
The country Imagination must supplement the map if the scope of such an
an t e p an. Qpgj-a^^jon is to be grasped. Briefly, it comprehended a clearance
of the High Veld, a tract 170 miles by 150 in area, destitute
of aU supplies save those afforded by the infrequent and
impoverished townships and by the scattered farms whose
produce in all which is required by armies was in inverse ratio
to their acreage ; a tract on which movement alone was easy,
though even that grew difficult as the immense prairies, as if
constricted by their narrowing political frontiers, piled them-
selves up into the mountains of the south-east comer. Further,
as is commonly the case, facility of movement was hable to be
heavily braked by the anxious question of subsistence. The
columns were to start with supplies for ten days ; but an army
in the midst of the High Veld might be almost as isolated as
one at sea, so vast the distances to be traversed, and so
exposed to the enemy the routes. In one particular, however,
the conditions favoured the projected manoeuvre, in that the
columns whilst marching away from one base would be
approaching another. Their supply thus resolved itself into
two separate phases. To deal with the first stage Colville
was detailed to escort convoys working out from Greylingstad
by a line of advance which would be daily more masked and
protected as the fighting columns swung south-eastward. He,
perhaps, might serve as far as Ermelo, and thereafter French
must look for sustenance to Natal, where, in the quietude of
January, preparations to that end had been in full progress.
There is space for only a suggestion of the infinite and minute
calculations which formed the basis of the Commander-in-Chief's
orders under this head ; computations of places, times, and
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 113
loads ; of the comings, goings, and interchanges of full and
loaded convoys ; of the provision of escorts, and a thousand
other details which had to be none the less exact because the
weather, the roads, or the enemy, might confound them all.
Truly the spirit of prophecy must inform those whose duty it
is to supply armies in the field. Such was the plan, and such
the material ; it remains now to describe the issue.
On January 28th French struck eastward with the columns Opening of
of Alderson, E. C. Knox, Allenby, Pulteney and Dartnell. The J^^i^ ,„
first obstruction was the line of the Wilge river, running due Jj^e Eastern
north and south across his front, with the commandos of General jan. 28ih,'
Beyers and Commandant Badenhorst watching it from end to '9oi-
end. Beyers was merely in observation ; but skilfully utihsing
the long ridge, the local watershed, which runs from Baps-
fontein across to Bethel, he stood in turn at Boschmanskop,
Rolspruit and Rooipoort. Four days' operations and several
sharp encounters threw him back on Bethel. On February 4th Occupation
French, accompanying Pulteney's column, reached that village, peU^lh,''
which was foimd deserted. The positions of the other colunms 1901.
on this date were as follows : — Smith-Dorrien at Onbekend, six
miles south of CaroHna ; W. P. Campbell at Boschmanskop, on the
Middelburg — Ermelo road ; Alderson, who was now in touch with
Campbell, at Schurvekop, on the eastern fork of the Ohphant
river ; E. C. Knox at Eerste Geluk, due south of Alderson and
four miles north-east of Bethel ; Allenby at Rietfontein, the same
distance south-east of Bethel ; Pulteney, as stated, at Bethel ;
Dartnell, due south of Allenby, at Schaapkraal ; Colville at
Niekerksvlei, eleven miles out on the Standerton — Ermelo road.
None had been seriously engaged except Campbell, who had
fought successfully every day since leaving Middelburg, and
Allenby and Pulteney, on whom had fallen the brunt of Beyers'
rearguard tactics from the Wilge river until he disappeared at
Rooipoort, leaving a gun in Allenby's hands. With 2,000 men
Beyers fell back on Ermelo, his arrival swelling the forces there to
some 6,000 ; and French, in Bethel, learned that Botha intended
to give battle at De Roodepoort, before Ermelo. French, there-
fore, on February 5th, manceuvred to surround that place, and
VOL. IV. 8
114 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
had all but got his columns into position when a blow fell upon
one of them which not only dislocated his plan, but seriously
affected the whole enterprise. In Botha French had an opponent
in many respects resembling himself, one as quick to escape as
to draw a cordon, and as sure of eye to detect a single doorway
opening into or out from the midst of his enemies. The Boer
General, though he already gave up hopes of marching as an
invader over the southern mountains, had no intention of being
driven into them, still less of being " corralled"* in mid veld,
Botha as French bade fair to do at this juncture. He determined to
to e^f«!^ break loose at once, sent word to Viljoen to demonstrate strongly
against the eastern railway, and looking around for the best
outlet, fixed his eye on the north, and on Smith-Dorrien.
On the evening of February 5th that general's column went
into bivouac at Bothwell, at the north end of Lake Chrissie.
There had been little fighting during the day, and the main
trend of the enemy seemed still to be in the opposite direction,
for a convoy, many miles in length, had been sighted at 9.30
a.m. on the move from Ermelo towards Amsterdam, and had
been pursued until dusk. Nothing, therefore, seemed less
probable than an attack from the south. The night passed
quietly. At 2.55 a.m. on the 6th an officer from French's
Headquarters arrived, bearing orders for Smith-Dorrien relative
to the converging movement upon Ermelo. As he rode into the
Botha's attack Unes, a semi-circle of fire broke like a squall against three sides of
Dofrkn^ the outpost-line which fringed the bivouac, striking most heavily
Feb. 6th, upon that section held by the 2nd West Yorkshire regiment. f
* As it will be found necessary frequently to employ throughout this volume similar
expressions borrowed from the domain of sport, an explanation may not be found super-
fluous by every reader. A "corral" is a pen or enclosure into which wild game is
driven for capture or destruction. " Beaters " are men whose duty it is to " flush " or
arouse game from its hiding place. Their combined action in a straight or curved line,
and in a given direction, constitutes a " drive." " Stops " are men or groups posted at
intervals some distance ahead of or on the flanks of an advancing "drive," in order
to confine the game fleeing from the "beaters" within a desired area, by turning
back any attempt to break out. Though devices such as these are common to both the
sporting and military arts, the latter has no terms which so adequately express them.
t For gallantry at this action Sergeant W. B. Traynor, 2nd West Yorkshire regiment,
was awarded the Victoria Cross.
1901.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 115
The piquets stood firm, but the interior of the camp fell into wild
disorder. Some, thinking the enemy had penetrated, ensconced
themselves amongst the bushes, and began to fire in all directions.
The horses of the cavalry, lashed by innumerable bullets,
wrenched themselves from their fastenings, and stampeded in a
body through the outposts. Outside they were turned again
by the oncoming commandos, whereupon they wheeled and
galloped back the way they had come, carrying with them a
knot of Boers who, hidden in the mob of animals, dashed into
the camp, and swelled the promiscuous shooting from inside.
Their speedy annihilation of two of the piquets opened a road
for their comrades. But the rest of the outposts remained
immoveable ; the supports closed up, and by a furious fire
shattered the rush of the Boer main body before it closed upon
the camp. At 4.15 a.m. the commandos abandoned the attack
and passed on, leaving thirty-three killed and wounded on the Botha breaks
field, and filling every farm with their injured as they made of! ^rdon!^^
northward ; for imfortunately they had not been turned, nor
could anything have turned them from that direction. The
British losses were eighty-two officers and men killed and
wounded, and in horses no fewer than 254 killed and lost,
besides a number of animals belonging to the supply column
which Smith-Dorrien was conve5ang to W. P. Campbell and
Alderson. Thus Botha, with more than 2,000 men, was free
to unite with the not inconsiderable forces whom Smith-
Dorrien had brushed aside, and who had harassed W. P.
Campbell abreast of CaroUna. Smith-Dorrien, ordered to re-
main motionless on the 6th, was joined by W. P. Campbell
on the morning of the 7th, the two columns thenceforward
working under the first-named officer's direction.
February 6th had not passed without fighting in another
quarter. French, hopeful of securing the Boer convoys, which
were on the eastern of the two roads crossing the Vaal at Witpunt
and Beginderlyn, ordered AUenby to pursue. On the night of
the 5th AUenby was at Vereeniging on the Kaffir Spruit, and at
dawn on the 6th he pushed on for the drift at Witpunt. But
the enemy, fighting a delaying action with 1,000 men at
VOL. IV. 8*
ii6 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Kromdraai, successfully covered the passage of their train
which had got a start of many miles, and there was nothing
for it but to resume the chase with the whole army.
Occupation of In closing in upon Ermelo, French had bared both his own
Feb!\°h flanks. To prevent being turned by the right, he despatched
1901- Dartnell southward on the 7th by Beginderlyn to Amersfoort,
which was reached and occupied on the 8th ; whilst Smith-
Dorrien extended eastward on the 9th to close the gap on the
left. So doing, he seized a chance of damaging severely his
vanished assailants of the 6th. Heavy rains had swollen the
spruits and clogged the tracks, and Botha, speeding north-
ward, had far outstripped his transport, which was labouring
after him by a circuitous route close under the Swazi border.
On the 9th the head of the convoy had got no further than the
north bank of the Umpilusi river, where it was sighted by Smith-
Dorrien's cavalry, the Imperial Light Horse, commanded by
Lieut. -Colonel D. McKenzie. The convoy was strongly guarded,
but McKenzie, despite the fatigue of his horses, which had
already covered more than twenty miles, fell impetuously
upon the column, and after a spirited encounter drove off the
Smith- escort and captured some sixty wagons, 18,000 head of stock
lures'aco^oy ^^^ twenty-one prisoners, with which he returned in triumph
Feb. 9th, to the bivouac at Lillibum. The Umpilusi, running high in
"^^' flood, prevented any enterprise against the rest of the Boer
transport which was water-bound on the south bank, nor could
operations be immediately undertaken by the other columns,
which were awaiting supplies from Standerton. During the
night of the loth Colville safely dehvered at Ermelo 117 wagons
which he had escorted from Niekerksvlei, and on the next day
French, evacuating Ermelo, pushed on. Meanwhile, Smith-
Dorrien's engineers had been strenuously bridging the raging
Umpilusi, which he crossed to Warburton on the loth, effecting
next day a further capture of twenty wagons and 5,000 head
of stock.
Pulteney and Allenby, crossing the Vaal at Witpunt and
Uitspan, were next in sight of the quarry, both converging on
the tail of the retiring train at Klipfontein on February 12th.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 117
The Boer rearguard was brushed aside by a charge delivered
by the 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons, who, getting amongst the
burghers with the sabre, accounted for many and took ten
prisoners, with the loss of five troopers. The two columns
camped that night at Rotterdam and Kalkoenkrans, on opposite
banks of the Mabusa Spruit ; E. C. Knox at Zandspruit, within
eighteen miles of Amsterdam ; Alderson at Sandcliff , midway
between Knox and Smith-Dorrien, the last of whom, by means
of an improvised bridge of sunken wagons, had crossed the
Umpilusi for the second time to Busby. Dartnell being still
at Amersfoort, the columns were now arrayed in an unbroken
diagonal line from the Swazi border to the apex of Natal.
Though a heavy booty seemed assured, it was even more
certain that the most desired quarry, Botha and his force, was
already at large behind them. On the 13th the army moved
forward as follows : — Smith-Dorrien to Mary vale, Alderson to
Khprug, Knox to Zandspruit, Allenby to Donkerhoek, Pulteney
to Taaiboschspruit, and Dartnell from Amersfoort into the
Elands Berg to Mooipoort. On the 14th Smith - Dorrien Occupation of
entered Amsterdam, remaining there whilst General French andViei*'"
with the columns of Knox and Pulteney occupied Piet Retief p^l*^^'
on the i6th, and Allenby made good the Slangapies Berg by i6ih, 1901.
the seizure of the pass at Langgewacht. A small mounted
force under Rimington, detached by Pulteney to Meyershoop,
kept touch between Headquarters and Dartnell.
French now turned to Natal for supplies, which were sorely French
needed. Throughout the month Hildyard's chief occupation hisUse,
had been the accumulation of enormous quantities of stores and ^«^- ^^^^'
1901.
wagons, and he had at this moment three large convoys ready
for forwarding, borrowing troops from other commands to
furnish the escorts.* On the 12th he had despatched the first
convoy, containing supplies for 12,000 men and for 15,600
horses and mules, with a number of fresh horses, with orders
to be at Liineberg on February i6th or 17th. He had provided
for the safety of its march by posting a small force under Colonel
* For details of supply and transport work done ly Natal during February and
March, see Appendix i.
Ii8
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Delay of
supplies.
Heavy rains.
Captures by
Henry's M.I,
G. M. Bullock in the mountains east of Wakkerstroom. But
Dartnell, arriving at Liineberg on the appointed date to meet
the convoy, found that it had not arrived, and moved on east-
ward on both sides of the Slangapies Berg to Marienthal. The
convoy, delayed by fog, floods, precipitous gradients and muddy
roads, was, in fact, no nearer than Vaalbank, outside Utrecht,
on the 1 6th, with the barrier of the Elands Berg still before
it. Not until the 19th, when it had safely surmounted the
Elands Berg, did Bullock gain any communication with Dart-
nell, and still nearly thirty miles separated the two. Six more
days elapsed before the first wagons were received by Dartnell
at Marienthal. Meanwhile the troops of the columns had been
enduring great privations. The rain, which had seldom ceased
since the start, settled down on the i8th to a downpour of six
days' unbroken duration, swelling the smallest spruits to im-
passable torrents, turning the roads into bogs, and placing
camps and bivouacs in an indescribable state. On the 19th
supplies totally failed owing to the non-arrival of the convoy,
which was itself at this time contending with atrocious con-
ditions. The columns had then to subsist upon the country,
a task which armies have found difficult even in districts of fat
harvests and well-stored villages, but here, on the starveling
uplands, necessitating resort to shifts which recalled those of
long besieged garrisons. The enemy suffered still more severely.
Not a day passed but they were deprived of stock, crops, wagons
and fighting men. Their heaviest loss in one day occurred
on March ist, when Colonel St. G. C. Henry's mounted infantry,
in advance of Smith-Dorrien's column which was in process of
sweeping along the Swazi border, fell upon the convoy of
the Piet Retief commando near the junction of the Shela
and Compies rivers, and took fifty-six prisoners, twenty-four
wagons, and a quantity of stock. The Boer Commandant,
vainly hoping to retrieve a desperate situation by a voluntary
surrender, fled from the field with thirty burghers and gave
himself up to W, P. Campbell, who was operating a few miles to
the southward ; but as the wagons had already fallen in fair
fight into Henry's hands, the Boer lost both his commando and
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 119
his liberty.* On the loth and the night of the 12th further
successful enterprises by Henry resulted in the capture of
twenty-six prisoners, eighteen wagons and more sheep and
cattle. The positions of the various columns on March 15th
were as follows : — Smith-Dorrien at Rustplaats, north-west of
Piet Retief ; W, P. Campbell and Allenby on the Assegai river
at Zandbank and Mahamba ; Alderson at Marienthal, midway
between Campbell and Dartnell, the last-named being on the
Intombie river north-east of Liineberg. A small force under
Rimington south of that place guarded the convoy road about
Schikhoek, whence Brigadier-General J. F. Bum-Murdoch held
the hne to Utrecht. Bullock was still to the east of Wakker-
stroom, and Headquarters with E. C. Knox's and Pulteney's
columns in Piet Retief.
On March 6th the rain, which had given a brief respite, began
again, to fall continuously for eight days, until for the troops,
exposed day and night and hemmed in by cataracts, health,
cheerfulness and movement seemed ahke impossible. Never-
theless they remained healthy, their good spirits were never
more marked, and they were kept in full activity ; for though
confined temporarily within narrow hmits, every column
thoroughly cleared its immediate neighbourhood, and each had
to make its own roads through the morasses, its own bridges
and ferries across the almost innumerable streams, and its own
living from the scarce and hidden foodstuffs which, as a rule,
only heavy bribes to the natives succeeded in bringing to light.
For a full month, from February i6th to March i6th, these
conditions prevailed, and though daily surrenders and cap-
tures bore witness to the value of the work done, yet every
description of ill luck had caused it to fall short of the results
which the columns had set out to procure. The proper finish
to the great sweep, from which so much had been hoped, seemed
now to be drowning in the deluge of rain. Botha's refusal on Botha refuses
March i6th of terms of peace proffered by the British Govern- Sch leTh,"'
ment at an interview with Lord Kitchener at Middelburg on '90'-
* For gallantry in an outpost affair near Derby, on March 3rd, Lieutenant F. B.
Dugdale, 5th LAncers, was awarded the Victoria Cross.
I20 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
February 28th,* was not only in itself evidence of the indecisive-
ness of the campaign in the south-east, but it blew up again the
flame which for a moment had seemed to flicker. The Com-
mander-in-Chief began to be impatient for the conclusion of
French's operations and for the return of troops who were
urgently needed elsewhere. French, however, had still to
accomplish much that only the terrible weather and the failure
of supplies had prevented him from doing three weeks earlier,
and Lord Kitchener left him to his task.
French On March i6th French abandoned the Liineberg — Utrecht
HnToHuppiy, ^^^^ ^^ communications which had proved so unreliable, and,
March i6th, trusting to a new line vid Volksrust and Wakkerstroom, and
to Vryheid, which Hildyard had filled with supplies, resumed
his advance. Securing the lines of the Pongola and Pivaan
rivers by means of Alderson's and Rimington's columns, he
directed Dartnell on to P. P. Burg, which was occupied on
the 1 8th. Smith-Dorrien, who had absorbed Allenby in
addition to W. P. Campbell, then came down into Piet
Retief, relieving E. C. Knox and Pulteney, who marched
southward across the Assegai. On the 25th French was
in Vryheid with Pulteney, Dartnell and Rimington ; Knox
being at Ersterling on the right bank of the Pivaan, next
to Alderson at Welgevonden. At Vryheid French had a
personal interview with Hildyard, and a telegraphic con-
versation across 320 miles of wire with Lord Kitchener.
On March 27th the last beat of the " drive " was set on
foot. The tracts still to be cleared fell naturally into
two triangles, each with its apex pointing eastward ; the one
lying between the confluent Pongola and Pivaan rivers, its
central point being P. P. Burg ; the other, and larger, between
the converging Unes of the Pongola and the Zulu border, Vry-
heid standing on the centre of its base. French assigned the
clearance of the former to Knox, detailing for the latter Aider-
son, Dartnell and Pulteney, with whom he himself intended
to take the field. The result of these movements could only
» See Chapter XXX.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 121
be to drive the enemy against the Swazi border, and Smith- Various opera-
Dorrien with his own, W. P. Campbell's, and AUenby's columns sou"h'raSJern
was instructed to hold a blocking Une from Piet Retief through Transvaal.
Zandbank — Mahamba — Plat Nek — Henwoods to Langdraai on
the Pongola. On the 27th Dartnell, with supplies for ten
days, marched from Vryheid eastwards to Rietvlei, followed
by Pulteney, who was to operate on his right flank, as far as
Welgevonden. Alderson, who was designed to cover Dart-
nell's left rear, was at Express on the 28th, when Dartnell
made Welkom, and Pulteney Vaal Krantz, the latter also
reconnoitring towards Alderson as far as Waterval. The
enemy fell back before them in such straits that C. Emmett,
the principal remaining leader and a bold man, offered to sur-
render if he could obtain the authority of his officers. But
there was no surrender. On the 29th the chase continued to
Pietersrust, Toovemaarsrust and Bloemendal. On the 30th
Dartnell, finding the roads becoming impassable for wheeled
transport, formed an entrenched dei>dt at Toovemaarsrust
and turned thence northward to Wonderboom, whilst Aider-
son drew towards him to Kruisfontein, and Pulteney moved
to hold at Rietvlei the road which Dartnell had quitted. The
driven Boers now began to throw themselves against Smith-
Dorrien's " stops." At Langdraai an attempted passage of
the drift yielded three guns, some prisoners, transport and
stock to Allenby, who was there on watch ; at De Kraalen,
where the Piet Retief road crossed the Assegai, W. P. Campbell
surprised a small Boer convoy in the act of crossing, and cap-
tured the whole. On the next day (March 31st) Emmett
endeavoured to make a stand with the few men — under 500
in number — he could collect, and for a time contested Dart-
nell's advance at Smaldeel. But his burghers fought without
heart, and allowing themselves to be outflanked, were driven
away with the loss of a gun, nearly 150 wagons and carts, and
some 14,000 head of stock. Dartnell then proceeded to
Langverwacht, where he was joined next day by Alderson,
who had outstripped his infantry and transport at Mooikhp.
Having raided as far as Uithoek in company, the two colunms
122 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
again separated on April ist, Dartnell's going on to Wonder-
boom, Alderson's returning to its main body at Mooiklip. For
the next few days these colmnns scoured this neighbourhood.
Dartnell, reaching the easternmost point of the operations,
Zuikerkran, on April 2nd, descended thence along the Zulu
border to Morgenzon, where he turned his face homeward.
On the 5th he broke up his depot at Toovernaarsrust and
marched by Welkom back to Vaalbank, near Hlobane Moun-
tain, where he arrived on the 6th, and remained for four days
awaiting the cessation of the operations. Alderson, who had
preceded him to Vaalbank on the 3rd, was outside Vryheid
until the 6th, when he passed through the town and took up
a line through Zaaifontein to the Blood river, in preparation
for an excursion down the angle between the Umvolosi river
and the Nqutu wedge of Zululand. On the 7th and 8th he
was on the line Tintas Drift — Strydplaats, on the 9th on Brand
Kraal — Spitzkop — Wanbestuur, on the loth at Scheepers-
laagte, whence he took the road vid Leeuwnek (April nth)
back to Vryheid, thus concluding the clearance of the lower
triangle.
Meanwhile E. C. Knox, sweeping up his river-enclosed area,
had seen little of the enemy until on April 5th he surprised
and took a convoy and nine prisoners at Dordrecht, ten miles
east of P. P. Burg. On the lOth he, too, was in Vryheid on
his way to the railway at Glencoe. Pulteney had already
departed the same way a week earUer ; Dartnell followed on
the I2th, Alderson on the 14th, and two days later French,
entraining at Dimdee, quitted the scene for Johannesburg.
Results of His two and a half months' labours, though unattended by
o'^^radons. ^^y remarkable coup, had not been unproductive. At a cost
of 150 casualties* to his own force, he had deprived the enemy
of over 1,300 fighting men, of eleven guns, of 2,281 carts and
wagons, of 272,752 head of stock, and of a quantity which is
not to be measured of crops and farm produce. If the opera-
tions had failed of their chief expectations by the escape of
* Casualties — Killed, five officers, forty-one men ; wounded, four officers, io8 men.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 123
Botha with nearly 3,000 of his following, they had neverthe-
less contributed largely to a crisis in the affairs of the Re-
publics. Rumours of capitulation filled the air, and doubt
and mistrust the burghers, who, after each day of disaster, knew
well how many of their weaker brethren — even men hither-
to honoured as "splendid burghers"* — were stealing away by
night to give themselves up to the invaders. By the middle
of March Botha, who had hurried from Lake Chrissie to join
the Government at Roos Senekal, was back at Ermelo, estab-
lishing his Headquarters at Rietspruit, outside the town.
There he learned of the failure of De Wet's descent upon Cape
Colony. This, then, was the real end of an enterprise which a
month earlier had been reported to him as opening with a
triumphal march through the Orange River Colony, attended
by the destruction of two British camps, and the death of
General C. E. Knox, and culminating in the approach of the
commandos to Cape Town — " rumour says right in the Cape."t
On March 2Qth Botha took horse for Vrede to ascertain the Botha visits
Dc Wet
truth from De Wet in person. At this moment, indeed,
the Commandant-General found himself beset by a multitude
of falsehoods, both of good and evil rep>ort, which gathered as
numerous as his enemies in the field. Even he did not
escape the universal breath of suspicion which, like a
poisonous gas, had begun to creep amongst the discomfited
commandos all over the southern theatre of war. His
flight from the front to Roos Senekal, his pourparlers with
Lord Kitchener, and even his present visit to De Wet,
all met with cavilling, which, though only whispered, Botha
deemed loud enough to be refuted.J Nor was mistrust the
only foe which he had to drive from his own laagers. It was a
time when many of the commandos were so untrustworthy
that it was imsafe to call them from the homes to which they
* Letter from Commandant-General to Acting State President, April 5th, 1901.
t Report from Acting Chief-Commandant C. Badenhorst, February 14th, 1901.
X Letter from Commandant-General to General B. Viljoen, March 17th, 1901 ; and
other sources.
124
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Depression
amongst the
Transvaal
commandos.
had retreated* ; when even such stalwarts as General B. Vil-
joen " emphatically urged that the war must now be brought
to an end,"t when the Acting President himself evinced a
gloom which, had it been universally shared, had speedily
ended the struggle. " All human help," wrote Burger to his
" Brother in oppression,"J " upon which we have hitherto
rehed has proved a broken reed. Europe is silent, and the
enemy proceeds to destroy our people with his great force,
. . . The question is, what must we, what shall we do ?
May we, can we, continue the struggle further ? " Such
despondency was not confined to high places. That sudden
dejection which the historian has noted even in victorious armies,
for example in the Germans marching in full career against Paris
in 1870, had descended heavily upon the harried forces of the
Transvaal, and the weaker spirits were yielding in hundreds
to it and to their enemy. But Botha, though his military in-
sight had long condemned him, too, to dread the issue of the
struggle, saw in this wastage of his numbers the very means
of making his foes pay the more dearly for their inevitable
triumph. Only now, in fact, in its darkest hour, was his army
undergoing that process of sloughing off the old skin of its de-
fective system and undisciplined spirit, which, under the attrition
of war, no guerilla levies can escape, which many have not sur-
vived at all, and from which few indeed have emerged so re-
invigorated as the federal forces were to do. None better than
Botha, none, perhaps, except he, could have safely tided over
this most critical period of his country's campaign. For none
knew better how indomitable a spirit lay like a core within his
fast-shredding commandos, a spirit the finer in temper the less
it was in touch with the influences of the old Dopper regime ;
the spirit, in short, of the young men who had grown up with
himself. Yet he had been loyally silent when many had loudly
declared that had this spirit of the Young Transvaal been
* Letter from Commandant-General to State President, March 23rd, 1 901.
t Letter from Commandant-General to President, Orange Free^State, April 28th,
1901.
X Letter from Acting-President Schalk Burger to President Steyn, March 21st, 1901,
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 125
invoked to begin instead of finish the war, under his leadership
the British had long ago been driven to the sea, leaving the
Republican flags floating over their territories behind them.
In the breasts of men of this stamp the Acting President's cry of
despair found faint echo. Not from them came the lament that
the commandos moved about their ancestral veld like " the
ghosts of the past in a haunted house."* Unlike the greybeards,
they looked not for the miracle, but the victory which should
save them, remaining in the very midst of the destitution wrought
by French's columns " as cheerful as if they were living like
kings."* Sustained by such a reserve, though at the lowest
ebb of fortune, Botha had refused terms such as have rarely
been offered by the conquerors of a province. He now sternly
silenced the cry, so difficult to stifle, " We are betrayed ! " which
had begun to sound in his ranks, and for long to come his
followers were to show that such a raid as this of General French
was but a tooth of the file required to wear them down.
On April ist Botha returned from Vrede to his camp at Botha returns
Rietspruit. Two decisions had resulted from his interview Trnnsv^L*™
with the Free State leader ; one, that owing to the shortage
of small-arm ammunition operations in the open should be
abandoned in favour of incessant interruption of the British
communicating railways, until, perhaps, a captured train or two
should have replenished tlie bandoliers ; the other, that a
meeting should be contrived between the Governments of
the two States. To the former resolve were due the fresh
series of attacks on the line from Middelburg to Standerton,
and as far south as in Natal, where a train was attacked
and a farmstead burned below Majuba on April 7th. To
effect the meeting of the Governments was a less easy task,
for neither President knew on one night where his resting-place
for the next might be, and an adventurous ride through hostile
forces and across two closely-guarded railways lay before
whichever official elected to visit the other. But Botha,
assuredly grown accustomed to safeguarding his peripatetic
Executive as an addition to his multifarious cares, made all
* Diary of a Burgher.
126 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
arrangements. On April 12th, Burger and his entourage
were safe at Ermelo ; on the 13th they set out for Vrede,
and on the i6th Botha, who had escorted them, was back at
Rietspruit, where on the 21st he saw Smith-Dorrien go past on
his way northward to VVonderfontein.
Of all the columns engaged in the above-described opera-
tions, those of Smith-Dorrien alone returned by road. On
April 1 2th he had drawn in his widely-extended lines, and
starting northward in two divisions on the 13th, arrived at
Wonderfontein on the 27th after a march which bogs, swollen
streams, weak horses and a cumbersome train had hampered
more than the Boers, though they were never absent. Little
Events in the of importance had occurred on the Delagoa Bay railway line
Trans^i?"' during Smith-Dorrien's long absence. Viljoen's somewhat feeble
efforts to create diversions in favour of his hard-pressed
chief had, nevertheless, the effect of drawing troops from the
thinly manned line to deal with him. On February 12th two
small columns of 700 and 900 men and nine guns, from Belfast
and Lydenburg respectively, united under Major-General F. W.
Kitchener at Zwartkoppies, near Dullstroom, proceeding next
day to reconnoitre towards Roos Senekal, where Viljoen was
known to be in laager. A scrambling fight ensued in which
neither leader, each over-estimating the strength of the other,
risked any definite course of action. F. W. Kitchener came
into Belfast on the 14th and took over command of the line
of communication, which L5d;telton had reUnquished to pro-
ceed to Cape Colony. Nothing further transpired until the
end of the month, when Lord Kitchener's fruitless conference
with Commandant-General Botha took place at Middelburg.
Much more blood and treasure were still to be expended to
purchase the very terms then offered and refused.*
The month of March was little more eventful, being chiefly
marked by a succession of blown-up trains. The losses caused
thereby were set off, first by an ambush laid on the 29th near
a destroyed train at Wonderfontein, which resulted in the
death of seven Boers ; secondly by a success at Lydenburg,
♦ See Chapter XXX.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 127
where Colonel C. W. Park, of the ist Devonshire regiment,
commanding in the absence of F. W. Kitchener, surrounded
a laager at Krugerspost, capturing thirty-six Boers and a
quantity of stores. Equally infested was the railway along
the Heidelberg section, where scarcely a day in February passed
but damage was done by raiders, resulting in the loss of
two complete trains, and on almost every occasion in the
severance of communication. During March this section
had more quiet, though attacks on cattle guards were
frequent, and a train was blown up on the 22nd. These two
months passed with Uttle incident over the Standerton sec-
tion, where the enemy remained as before few in numbers
and very little venturesome. Finally, Colville's mobile column,
busied during February in supply work in connection with
French's operations to the eastward, spent the greater part
of March about Standerton, and was very slightly engaged
with the enemy.
Lieutenant-General French's Force.
Approximate Strength of Columns during Operations described in
foregoing chapter.
Feeding Strength
(approximate only).
Fitting Strength (exclusive
of R.A., R.E,, A.S.C., etc.).
COLUMN.
d
«>
B
i
9
1i
Guns, includ-
ing Vickers-
Maxiros.
Brigadier-Geneml J. G. Dartnell ...
Colonel E. H. H. AUenby
Colonel W. P. Pulteney
Colonel E. C. Knox
Brigadier-General E. A. H. Alderson
Colonel W. P. Campbell
Major-General H. L. Sinith-Dorrien
Lieut. -Colonel A. E. W. Colville ...
4,222
2,000
2,956
2,572
2,674
1,600
6,000
2,500
1,600
1,600
1,900
1,600
1,000
1,400
1,400
1,000
1,200
1,300
1,000
900
1,500
1,901
',079
936
1,362
1,348
430
1 304
'207
708 9
481 7
878 1 8
490 8
529 i 9
829 5
1,840 1 12
440 1 5
4
3
3
i
2
5
I
Totals
22,024
11,600
8,300
8,567
6,195 1 63
27
128
CHAPTER VII.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL* {continued front Chapter I.).
JANUARY — APRIL, IQOI.
At the beginning of January, 1901, the situation in the Western
Transvaal was as follows : At or near Ventersdorp were the
Headquarters of the columns brought together by Lieut. -
General J. D. P. French, namely, those of Major-General J. M.
Babington (920 men), Colonel W. P. Pulteney (940 men),
Brigadier-General J, R. P. Gordon (1,160 men), and Colonel
R. G. Kekewich (980 men). Brigadier-General R. G. Broadwood
was now invalided, and his brigade, handed over to Colonel
E. C. Knox, was refitting at Potchefstroom. Major-General
R. A. P. Clements was at Wolhuter's Kop, passing convoys
to Rustenburg, where Brigadier-General G. G. Cunningham was
still in command. Major-General A. H. Paget was on the march
westward from north of Balmoral, arriving at Commando Nek
on the 8th. Major-General A. FitzR. Hart held the railway
from Welverdiend to Krugersdorp, with posts in the Gatsrand.
Although the lines of communication were now protected,
• the Rustenburg and Hekpoort districts had been by no means
cleared by the incursion of so many troops. De la Rey and
Beyers were still at large, and though no longer acting in
concert, were all the harder to find and deal with from their
Situation Very isolation. Herein were illustrated once more two ever-
Magaiiesber present embarrassments of the campaign. In ordinary war-
fare to break up the enemy is a victory ; in South Africa it
usually only doubled the difficulty of subduing him. Again, to
introduce thousands of fresh troops into an area of conflict
• See map No. 59.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 129
is commonly to assure the desired result. In South Africa
these troops had at once to be thinly spread over the par-
ticular line of communication threatened, and this the more
urgently the smaller the bands into which the defeated or
voluntarily separating enemy had broken. In short, if the
defensive was difficult, an effective offensive was almost impos-
sible, and time rather than arms had to be invoked to get the
better of the enemy. Such a prospect was no new thing in war,
and had for some time been evident to students of such cam-
paigns as had had for their object the reduction of an entire
nationality. The European forefathers of these very burghers
had proved that the weaker people need not own even time
itself as their subduer, but rather as their deliverer. The flag
of peace in South Africa, then, was still below the horizon, and
nowhere did it seem less likely to emerge immediately than in
the Western Transvaal at the New Year of 1901.
Babington, left at Ventersdorp in command of his own,
Gordon's, Kekewich's and Pulteney's columns, was early on the
move towards Rustenburg, with the intention of driving north-
ward, whilst Breedts Nek, recognised at last as the enemy's
chief passage through the mountains, was blocked by Gordon.
On January 5th De la Rey was come upon near Naauwp)Oort,
between the Witwatersrand and the Magaliesberg, and was duly
pushed northward, not, however, before he had inflicted a loss
of forty-eight men upon the scouts of the Imperial Light Horse,
who rode too eagerly into close range of his lines. On the 9th
Babington was back at Ventersdorp, leaving the patrolling of
the Magaliesberg and the Hekpoort valley to Paget and Plumer,
who had arrived at Commando Nek the day before, to Clements
on the Rustenburg road, and to Gordon south of Breedts Nek,
As he marched south Beyers on his left flank did the same, and
on the 8th fell in with a convoy for Gordon coming from Krugers-
dorp. The Boers were repulsed with loss ; but Beyers was under
urgent orders to join Commandant-General Botha in the expedi-
tion against Natal, and, pushing on, he camped on the night
of the nth only ten miles north of Johannesburg. On the 12th
he fell upon the railway with all his force, and after a warm
VOL. IV. Q
130 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
bombardment broke across to the eastward, laagering that night
at Bapsfontein on a position too strong for the small forces which
hurried out froni Springs and Germiston in pursuit. Gordon
from Breedts Nek, E. C. Knox from Johannesburg, and Plumer
from the Hekpoori: valley were immediately on Beyers' track,
Knox coming into contact with him on the 13th. But the
Boer leader was travelling too fast to be caught or turned
from his union with Botha at Ermelo. Knox's column there-
fore abandoned the chase, to resume it in a few days as a
unit in the extensive operations in the Eastern Transvaal
described in the last chapter.
Meanwhile De la Key remained in the west, and Babington,
his Headquarters transferred to Naauwpoort, watched him as
closely as possible with the columns serving in the district.
To these had been added the force lately commanded by Clements
and now by Cunningham, who handed over Rustenburg to Lieut. -
Colonel B. J. C. Doran (Royal Irish regiment), and marched
through OHfants Nek to join the rest. So doing he was hotly
attacked in the defile, and for two days was hard put to it to
hold his own in the unfavourable ground. Babington's approach
from Ventersdorp on the 25th eased the pressure, and getting
through with a loss of fifty-seven killed and wounded, Cunning-
ham gained touch with Babington and camped at Vlakfontein.
De la Rey had now thrown detachments in all directions. One
penetrated into Bechuanaland ; another, more than 1,000 strong
under the State Attorney, J. C. Smuts, entered the Gatsrand,
Capture of and on January 31st surrounded Modderfontein. This post,
fontei" ^^ter an attack lasting forty-four hours, was literally over-
Jan. 31st, whelmed by force of numbers, many of the soldiers being dis-
armed, as they were shooting in one direction, by Boers coming
up from the other.* A convoy which arrived from Krugersdorp
at the height of the fighting — the failure of the sun having made
a warning heliogram impossible — became part of the enemy's
booty. Cunningham, who had come down to Gemsbokfontein
* Casualties — Killed, two officers and eighteen men ; wounded, two officers and
forty-seven men ; captured and missing, three officers and 190 men.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 131
on January 31st, was immediately ordered to Modderfontein,
together with six companies of infantry, under Lieut. -Colonel
the Hon. U. de R. B. Roche (South Wales Borderers), which
had been detailed to relieve the place as soon as its danger
had become known. On February 2nd Cunningham marched
southward with 2,500 men, and was quickly in touch with the
captors of the garrison. But Smuts had been reinforced and
was now so strongly fortified that Cunningham, after vainly
endeavouring to turn his flank, was glad to be able to withdraw
with no more than forty casualties, and marched back to the
railway at Roodepoort, intending to try to turn the Boer position
by a wide movement from the western arm of the Gatsrand.
For some days, therefore, Smuts was left master of the field, and
in such high feather that he wrote to De Wet proposing to join
him in his descent on Caf>e Colony " to bring about a revolu-
tion."* A week elapsed before Cunningham was again on the
offensive, working now in co-op)eration with a column which
had been formed at Potchefstroom under Colonel G. E.
Benson, R.A. Cunningham's instructions were to make for
the Frederikstad area, and for the rest of February he
patrolled the Gatsrand with little damage to himself or to the
enemy, who was not now to be found anywhere in strength
except on one occasion at Buffelsdooms (February 13th) when
he was left undisturbed. On the 28th Cunningham was back
at Krugersdorp,
Meanwhile Lord Methuen had entered this sphere of opera-
tions from the west. Throughout December and January he
had been manoeuvring without cessation, now between Lichten-
burg and Otto's Hoop and Zeerust, at all of which he left
garrisons; now into Griqualand West (January 22nd), where a
Boer incursion from the south caused anxiety ; now at Vryburg
(December 31st), and finally at Taungs, whence he garrisoned
and provisioned Kuruman, ninety-eight miles south-west of
Vryburg (January i6th — 25th). Owing to the departure of
the columns from the Krugersdorp command, and the disturbed
* Smuts to De Wet, February loth, 1901.
VOL. IV. O*
132 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
condition of the country south of that place, Lord Kitchener
Lord Methuen decided to call Loid Methuen eastward. On February «ith he
ward. left Taungs, had a shght engagement at Schweizer Reneke (which
he had evacuated on January 9th), and on the 13th reached
Wolmaranstad. Continuing his march on the 15th he obtained
information that a large laager belonging to the commandos
which had hung about him since leaving Taungs lay at Brakpan,
north-west of Klerksdorp. He further discovered that the Boer
fighting force was lying in wait for him at Hartebeestfontein,
across the direct Klerksdorp road, leaving their encampment
weakly guarded at Brakpan, which they thought to be safely
out of the line of march. Lord Methuen, therefore, determined
to strike at the laager first, and marching at midnight on the
17th, surprised the camp guards. By noon he was in possession
of the whole laager, with thirty-six prisoners, sixty-seven wagons
and carts and quantities of gear of every description. He then
turned towards Hartebeestfontein. Here he found himself con-
Lord fronted by nearly 1,500 Boers, under De Villiers and De Beers,
operatfons posted on the plateau on either side of a defile which led towards
in the Klerks- Klerksdorp, and bent on resisting to the utmost the despoiler of
their laager. Lord Methuen first attempted to gain the western
height, but the 5th Imperial Yeomanry whom he sent thither
with a Vickers-Maxim were so hotly received that they were
unable to gain ground, though they were not to be shaken off
all day from the spurs and flanks of the hill. Leaving them
to hold the enemy there. Lord Methuen ordered the loth Imperial
Yeomanry to storm the eastern wall, covering the advance by
four field guns. The attack was brilliantly delivered, and the
nearer crest won with Uttle loss ; but the Boers then fell back
to the more distant edge of the plateau, and the task of the
Yeomanry became formidable. Not only had they to face a
serious fire from the front, but the enemy on the unconquered
western crest now had them in full view ; a flanking fire from the
left swept the summit of the plateau, whilst danger appeared in
the rear in the shape of 500 Boers who approached and engaged
the escort of the convoy. Reinforced by the Victorians the
Yeomanry continued to gain ground, fighting like veteran troops
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 133
from one cover to another ; finally, greatly relieved by detached
attacks which Lord Methuen launched against prominent parts
of the Boer stronghold on either flank, the whole line charged
against the southern edge of the plateau and tumbled the enemy
on to the plain below, where he was punished severely with a
following fire. By this spirited action, which cost forty-eight
casualties,* the road to Klerksdorp was opened, and on February
19th Lord Methuen marched in with all his forces and cin immense
mass of captured stock, forage and Boer families.
Lord Methuen, however, was not to remain long in the
Klerksdorp district. After a few days of bustling operations
in conjunction with Benson in the triangle Klerksdorp — Pot-
chefstroom — Ventersdorp he again turned towards his own
district in order to withdraw the garrison of Hoopstad, march-
ing by Wolmaranstad, south of which, on March 6th, he found
the local commando standing between him and Commando
Drift, by which he intended to cross the Vaal river. A run-
ning fight of twenty-three hours' duration brought the column
to the banks of the stream ; but a high flood was in progress,
and try where he would Lord Methuen was unable to find a
practicable passage, though he marched down the whole length
of the right bank as far as Fourteen Streams, which was reached
on March 14th.
This enforced change of direction, unwelcome as it was, De la Rey
was perhaps fortunate, for behind Lord Methuen on March 8th c°"=«"»™''»'
there occurred at Wolmaranstad a concentration of commandos
strong enough to have overmatched the British column, which it
was the Boers' avowed object to pursue to Bloemhof. At War-
renton Lord Methuen was placed temporarily on the sick list, and
Colonel the Earl of Enroll, who assumed command, carried out
the original purpose of the march by leading the column to
Hoopstad and back between March 27th and April 7th. On
April 23rd Lord Methuen resumed command, and at once trans-
ferred his force to Maf eking for service against De la Rey, who
* Casualties — Killed, three officers, thirteen men ; wounded, five officers, twenty-
seven men.
134 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
had been practically unmolested in the Lichtenburg district for
the past two months, since Babington's Une of posts was almost
powerless beyond its own piquets. De la Key had employed his
freedom to singularly small purpose, save in fermenting the
country and deluding British columns into long and purposeless
attacks marches. On March 6th De la Key, with CelUers and Vermaas,
March 6th'^' ^'5^^ "^^^ i° ^1' made an attack on Lichtenburg which seemed
1901. at first certain to be successful. Penetrating the outposts,
which were widely separated owing to the large circumference
of the defences, the Boers surrounded each piquet in turn and
cut them off from all communications with Headquarters. The
piquets, however, were strongly entrenched, and fought va-
liantly, and the enemy could get no further during twenty-four
hours, finally retiring after as singular an investment as had
occurred during the campaign. The Boers lost, besides much
credit, sixty-Seven burghers ; the troops, who were ably com-
manded by Lieut. -Colonel C. E. Money (Northumberland
Fusiliers), had sixteen killed and twenty-six wounded, and
gained great honour for their stout resistance to superior num-
bers. Foiled at Lichtenburg the federal combination then
rushed southward, and on the 8th joined the Wolmaranstad
men at their capital with the intention, as previously referred
to, of cutting off Lord Methuen from his march down the Vaal.
But the British commander had two days' start, and all inno-
cent as he was of the storm gathered in his rear, was making too
good speed towards Fourteen Streams to be worth following.
Immediately on news of the attack on Lichtenburg reaching
Headquarters, Babington, still at Naauwpoort, was ordered to
the relief of the place, to be joined at Ventersdorp by Lieut. -
Colonel H. P. Shekleton with a column from Rooipoort. It
was fortunate that Lichtenburg was in no need of assistance,
for Babington, delayed by bad weather, did not appear until
the 17th. He then turned southward after the long vanished
enemy, arriving at Klerksdorp on March 21st with sixty-two
prisoners taken in the constant but unimportant skirmishing
which had fallen to his lot.
Two days later De la Rey, with 500 men and three guns,
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 135
beset one of Babington's patrols at Geduld, within twenty miles
of his Headquarters. The patrol, which was composed of men
of the ist Imperial Light Horse, was less than half the strength
of the enemy, and had but one Vickers-Maxim, but it was well
handled by Major C. J. Briggs (King's Dragoon Guards), and
defended itself so resolutely that once more De la Rey had
the mortification of seeing his men retire beaten from a field
where all the odds had been in their favour. The Boers lost
some two dozen killed and wounded ; the British party two
officers and five men killed, three officers and thirteen men
wounded. Babington coming up next day drove the Boers
still further northward, and on the 24th completed their rout is defeated
by overtaking and capturing the whole of their guns, nine in Sfafch'lllftlr"'
number, including two 15-prs., a Vickers-Maxim, and six Maxims, 1901.
all with ammunition complete, transport to the number of
seventy-seven wagons and carts, and all the camp stuff, together
with the escort of 140 men, on the banks of the Taaibosch
Spruit. The action which brought about this success was a
model of pursuing tactics. The enemy continually took up
strong rearguard positions, out of which Babington as constantly
manoeuvred them by vigorous threats at the flanks, with-
holding a powerful and menacing front until the defence had
actually begun to dissolve under the lateral pressure. The
result was a series of hasty retreats on the part of De la Key's
rearguard, soon degenerating into a rout which infected the
whole force and hurried it in disorder from the field. This
was a heavy blow to De la Rey, whose star was now consider-
ably obscured by such repeated terminations to forays, the
first speed and spirit of which had died at the moment of action.
Babington with Shekleton then made for Ventersdorp, where
he halted on March 26th, Shekleton soon after handing over
command of his column to Lieut. -Colonel Sir H. Rawlinson.
It is necessary now to revert to Benson, who, it will be
remembered, had been in co-operation with Lord Methuen for
the short time that officer was in the Klerksdorp area before
his departure to Fourteen Streams and Hoopstad. Benson then
received orders to traverse the country east of Frederikstad,
136 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
and arriving there on March 4th, marched to Kaalplaats next
day. He was busily employed in clearing the farms when the
news of De la Key's attack on Lichtenburg caused him to
be recalled to Frederikstad, and thence to Potchefstroom
(March 9th), where he remained hemmed in by flooded roads
until the 15th. Thence he proceeded to scour the country
lying between the Vaal, the railway and the Gatsrand, being
in constant touch with the enemy until the end of the month,
when he halted on the Riet Spruit with fifteen prisoners, fifty
wagons and a great herd of captured stock. On April 4th
Benson marched to Krugersdorp where his force was broken
up, and he and his staff transferred to another column, the
eventful career of which will be followed elsewhere.*
During March Cunningham had been holding Naauwpoort
since Babington's departure for the relief of Lichtenburg. On
April 7th he was relieved in command by Brigadier-General
H. G. Dixon, who also absorbed the column lately commanded
by Benson. The command of the Klerksdorp area had shortly
before been delegated to Major-General M. W. Willson, who thus
forund himself in control of the columns of Babington, Dixon
and Sir H. Rawlinson. These he was anxious to concentrate
for combined operations in the Schoon Spruit district ; but the
Commander-in-Chief was unwilling to relax even temporarily
his hold on Naauwpoort, the key of the campaign in these
parts ; Dixon, therefore, remained about Naauwpoort during
April, making sundry raids between that place and the railway
at Welverdiend, and was finally diverted on April 28th towards
Tafel Kop.
Babington, based on Ventersdorp, operated on both sides of
that place during April, being at Tafel Kop on the 4th, and on
the 1 8th near Klerksdorp, to the west of which he found De
la Rey with Kemp in full strength on his old ground at Harte-
beestfontein. The enemy was not pressed, however, and
Babington moved by the Schoon and Taaibosch Spruits to
Syferkuil, thus leaving the enemy threatening his communica-
• See Chapter XVII.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 137
tions with Klerksdorp, on which he depended for supplies.
As a result, an empty convoy which he despatched to Klerks-
dorp on the 22nd was attacked from all sides at Brakspruit on
the Schoon Spruit by 700 Boers, who rode out of the Harte-
beestfontein hills ; but the skill of its commander, Major
H. T. Lyle (Royal Welsh Fusiliers), and the stoutness of the
escort preserved it from capture. The enemy was beaten back
with the loss of more than thirty men, and the convoy
proceeded in safety with the loss of eight of its guards.
Sir H. Rawlinson had for the most part co-operated in
Babington's operations during April, and his movements were
generally indistinguishable from those of his superior. On
one occasion, however, he had an experience individual indeed.
On April 13th a laager had been discovered near to the scene Affair at
of Lord Methuen's capture two months earlier at Brakpan. Apina'th,
The laager, which contained a 12-pr. gun and a Vickers-Maxim, 1901.
was surprised by a night march conducted by Babington, and
captured with all its contents by Sir H. Rawlinson's . column.
It was not until after they had lost their camp that the enemy
returned from a sauve qui peut to fight. So close did they come
in from all sides that the guns of P. battery R.H.A. had to face
in opposite directions to drive skirmishers almost from their
muzzles, whilst Sir H. Rawlinson, who was riding close behind
the battery, found himself in the midst of a band who shot his
horse and disarmed him. In the confusion caused by the
short-range artillery fire he contrived to escape, and rejoining
his troops, easily held the enemy for the rest of the day with
the assistance of Babington, who had been marching wide on
the right and now came across to reinforce. This was a most
successful affair, for whilst the Boers lost, besides their guns
and all their impedimenta, twenty-three prisoners and sixteen
other casualties, Sir H. Rawlinson had but three men sUghtly
wounded. These, though a host of minor incidents are neces-
sarily omitted, were the chief events of the campaign in the
Western Transvaal up to the end of April, 1901.
138
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Approximate Strength States of Columns referred to in
foregoing chapter.
COLUMN.
H
c
42
c
00 to
e
i
►— (
a^
0
o>
S
January— April. 1901.
Maj.-Gen. J. M. Babington
470
450
6
I
•V
Col. W, P. Pulteney
941
3
I
Lt.-Gen. J. D. P. French
in command.
Brig.-Gen. J. R. P. Gordon
1,08 s
80
II
4
Col. R. G. Kekewich
700
280
5
3
Col. E. C. Knox . .
883
370
8
_
Maj.-Gen. R. A. P. Cle-
ments
883
1,647
14
3
Maj.-Gen. A. H. Paget
Col. M. Cradock . .
Brig-.Gen. H. C. O. Pluraer
100
500
450
1,400
4
2
8
I
I
? Maj.-Gen. A. H. Paget
( in command.
Brig.-Gen. G. G. Cunning-
ham
100
1,460
6
3
Lt.-Col. G. E. Benson
365
515
6
Lt.-Gen. Lord P. Methuen
1.294
8
5
Lt.-Col. H. P. Shekleton . .
1,500
8
Brig.-Gen. H. G. Dixon . .
1,050
I,3l6
8
3
(Maj.-Gen. M. W. WiU-
( son in command.
Maj.-Gen. J. M. Babington
860
580
9
—
Col. Sir H. Rawlinson (late
Shekleton's)
1,350
—
3
—
1
139
CHAPTER VIII.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL AND NATAL*
{Continued from Chapter VL).
APRIL — MAY, I9OI.
Nearly three weeks before the conclusion of French's operations preparations
south of the Pretoria — Delagoa Bay railway, Lord Kitchener for clearance
had taken the preliminary steps in a similar scheme, to be north-eastern
worked out to the northward of that Hne. On March 26th Transvaal.
Brigadier-General H. C. O. Plumer was despatched to Pieters-
burg, which was occupied almost without fighting on April 8th.
Plumer, who for this purpose was withdrawn from the pursuit
of De Wet in the Orange River Colony,! had with him a moimted
force, composed of Australian and New Zealand corps, and
numbering 1,200 men with eight guns. He remained at Pieters-
burg until the 14th, his hne of communications with Pretoria
being held by the 2nd Gordon Highlanders, the 2nd North-
amptonshire, and 2nd Wiltshire regiments.
Meanwhile, for the projected clearance six columns had been
prepared, under the command of Lieut. -General Sir B. Blood,
which on the evening of April 13th were stationed as follows :
Place.
Commander.
Infantry. 1
Mounted
Troops. 1
! Guns, including
Vickers- Maxims.
Lydenburg
»»
Witklip ...
Belfast ...
Middelburg
Lieut. -Col. C. W. Park
Major-Gen. F. W.
Kitchener
Lt.-Col. W. Douglas...
Lt.-Col.W. P. Pulteney
Lt.-Col. G. E. Benson
Maj.-Gen. S. B. Beatson
930
2,290
1,280
800
350
1,020
200
SSO
330
7SO
720
600
' Under command
6 - of Major-Gen.
A F.W. Kitchener.
Under command
8 . of Major-Gen.
8 1 R. S. R. Fether-
) stonhaugh.
4
6,670
3.150
33
9,820
* See map No. 56.
t See Chapter V.
X Round numbers only.
t46 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
The country to be swept was roughly a square, nearly
bisected by the Steelpoort river, and bounded on the north by
the 25th parallel of latitude, on the south by the railway, on
the east by the Stenkamps Berg, on the west by the OHphant
river. Towards its central point — the reported refuge of the
Transvaal Government at Roos Senekal — the columns were
to converge from north, east, and south, the expected break-
away to the westward being blocked by the seizure of the drifts
over the Oliphant by Plumer, who would thus enact along
that river a rdle similar to that recently performed in the
south-eastern Transvaal by Smith-Dorrien around the Swazi
border.
Two days before the machine was set in motion the Acting
President and his officials had slipped out of its reach, and were
in safety by the side of Commandant-General Botha. On the
very day on which Blood's columns moved to enclose Roos
Senekal, the Transvaal Government body was setting out from
Ermelo to meet ex-President Steyn at Vrede. Whether this
timely evasion was by accident or design, the British opera-
tions in the north came as no surprise to Botha. A month
earlier he had warned General B. Viljoen of the probability of
such an event, and had cautioned him against being taken
unawares.* It wiU be seen how narrowly that leader escaped,
despite the foresight of his chief.
Sir B. Blood's Of Sir B. Blood's columns that of Park was the first to move.
mirj'°'^ Leaving Lydenburg on the evening of April 12th, Park marched
north-eastern northward by Krugerspost, seeking a position whence he could
block the northern exits of the Steelpoort and Waterval valleys.
At dawn on the 13th he reached Vlakfontein. A commanding
nek near De Grootboom, which threatened to bar his next day's
progress, was seized the same evening by a party of mounted
infantry under Major H. B. Walker (Duke of Cornwall's Light
Infantry) who performed a forced march of thirty-five miles to
gain their end. The main column followed to Klipkloof on the
13th, and next day to De Grootboom, where an attack on the
* Letter from the Commandant-General to General B. Viljoen, March 17th, 1901.
EVENTS IN EASTERN TRANSVAAL AND NATAL. 141
rearguard was driven off with three casualties. On the 15th
Park reached Bergfontein, where he took a small laager and much
ammunition. Thence he sent on a detachment to seize the
Magnets Hoogte which commanded the passage of the Steel-
poort. Park then moved to Rietfontein. F. W. Kitchener had
left Lydenburg on the night of the 13th and come up by Bosch-
hoek and Boschfontein, in hot pursuit of a 94-pr. gun. This
piece, the identical cannon which had bombarded Ladysmith
from Pepworth Hill sixteen months before, was blown up by the
enemy as it was on the point of being taken. On April 17th
F. W. Kitchener moved on towards Magnets Hoogte, whilst
Park, remaining at Rietfontein, sent into the eastern valley-fork
of the Dwars river two small columns under Lieut.-Colonel
H. W. N. Guinness (Royal Irish regiment) and Major C. L. E.
Eustace (King's Royal Rifles). These met with immediate
success ; for the enemy, chased eastward from the valley by
Guinness, ran into Eustace as he lay in wait at Vygehoek, and
sixty-two burghers with 1,000 cattle were the prize. The two
parties remained out until the 20th, when Park, recalling them,
turned his attention to the Waterval valley, which he shut up
with four divisions of his command, thereby enclosing and cap-
turing on April 25th, forty-two Boers, two guns, and much
stock. He then returned to Rietfontein, where he remained
until May 3rd, leaving no corner of his neighbourhood unscoured.
Meanwhile F. W. Kitchener had arrived on the Magnets Hoogte
on the 1 8th, marching the next day vid Pokwani to Fort
Weeber, where he gained touch with Plumer, whose
movements in the interval must now be described.
Leaving a garrison in Pietersburg, Plumer had quitted the
town on the 14th April, pointing on the Oliphant river. On the
i6th, after an uneventful march, he was upon the banks of the
stream, which he proceeded to hold from its junction with the Plumer on the
Malips river to some fifty miles up stream, by means of the ^vJr^*"^
drifts at Port Scheiding. Tabakplaats, Oliphant's Poort, Bath-
fontein, to Koedoes Kop, with many lesser passages between ;
extending eventually (April 22nd) as far as Commissie
Drift, twenty-two miles further up the river. Plumer received
142 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
supplies from P. P. Rust for his posts on the upper river, for
those on the lower from Pietersburg. The journeys of
convoys, though never interrupted, were not unaccompanied
by fighting. On one occasion (April 24th) fourteen Boers were
captured during an attack on an escort commanded by Lieut.-
Colonel J. W. Colenbrander, at Jaskraal.
Plumer by no means contented himself with passively watch-
ing the drifts. He had early sent patrols into F. W. Kitchener's
Unes at Fort Weeber, and his parties wandered far afield. On
April 25th Lieutenant G. E. Reid (4th Imperial Bushmen's
corps), the officer at Commissie Drift, located a Boer camp
fifteen miles to the south-east. This was a party resting
from a twenty-four hours' flight from the ist Devonshire
regiment, of F. W. Kitchener's force. Under cover of dark-
ness Reid surrounded it with only twenty men who at day-
break rushed in and captured the whole laager, taking the
commandant, twice their own number of burghers, a Maxim
gim, besides wagons, horses and cattle. On April 29th, when
Sir B. Blood's operations were drawing to a conclusion,
Plumer concentrated at Commissie Drift, and on the follow-
ing days marched down the lines of the Elands and Kameel
rivers, vid Uyskraal, Slagboom, Pieterskraal to Enkelde-
dooms. Beatson was at this time moving parallel to Plumer
down the Wilge river towards Eerstefabrieken, whilst AUenby,
fresh from the operations at Piet Retief, was out from Witbank
in co-operation with the two columns which were working south-
ward. From Enkeldedoorns Plumer detached a party under
Major H. G. Vialls (3rd regiment Australian Bushmen) in pur-
suit of bands which were scattering across the railway about
Hamanskraal from the area traversed by Beatson. Vialls,
having chased them about all day, bivouacked at Haakdoorn-
fontein in the evening, with twenty-seven prisoners, and a
convoy of Boer wagons and cattle in his possession. On May
4th Plumer gained the eastern railway at Eerstefabrieken.
Whilst the " stop " on the OUphant river was thus occupied,
the main " drive " to the eastward had been in full progress.
On April 14th, when Park was at De Grootboom and F. W.
EVENTS IN EASTERN TRANSVAAL AND NATAL. 143
Kitchener at Boschhoek, Douglas, trending south-west from
WitkHp, seized the Zwagershoek Pass, camped at Zuikerbosch-
hoek that night, at Palmietfontein on the next, and on the i6th,
after handsomely repulsing a determined attack by 700 Boers
led by Muller, entered Dullstroom, which he made his centre
of operations for the remainder of the month. Pulteney, who
had come up along the Belfast road by Moeyelykheid, joined
Douglas at Dullstroom on the 17th, whilst on the same day
Beatson, who had struck north from Middelburg, and marched
by Driefontein and Klipplaatdrift to Naauwpoort, fought a
successful skirmish in the Botha's Berg. Benson's — the other
column from Middelburg — with which went Sir B. Blood,
was then at Bankfontein, facing north-east with the object
of turning the Botha's Berg by the east, as Beatson meant
to turn that range by the west. Thus a circle of troops
some seventy-five miles in diameter had begun to compress
the area around Roos Senekal, and had there been any
formed bodies of the enemy therein, they must soon have
been forced to a battle. But the commandos of B. Viljoen,
in spite of his efforts to hold them together, had scattered viijoen's
into the thousand rifts and secret places of the district, '°'''^'^* ^^^"^
until the whole country-side teemed with small groups, which
lurked invisible until by chance or perseverance some were
discovered and hunted from their holes. Only a minority
remained around Viljoen, who began to look about anxiously
for a sally-port. The cordon around him tightened daily.
On April 20th Sir B. Blood was with Benson at Blink water,
behind the Botha's Berg ; Pulteney close to the eastward
at Windhoek ; Beatson, who had turned the Botha's Berg
by Avontuur and Laatste Drift, at Leeuwfontein to the west-
ward ; F. W. Kitchener and Park being, as already described,
respectively at Fort Weeber and in the act of clearing the Dwars
River and Waterval valleys. On the 19th Benson had scored a
signal success by the capture of twenty-nine Boers with a
convoy at Klipspruit, Beatson taking a smaller number near
Wagendrift. On his arrival at Blinkwater Benson was met
by a body of 100 Boers desirous of surrender, most of whom
144 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
had been previously deprived of horses and ammunition by
Viljoen.
Operations next day by Benson resulted in the voluntary
surrender of thirty-two more burghers and the capture of thirty-
one ; a Krupp gun, discovered upset in a kloof, was also
secured. On the same day one of Beatson's patrols, consisting
of only six men under Lieutenant J. H. Brabazon (Victorian
Mounted Rifles), ranging far across the OUphant, and even
across the Moos river, chased and captured a convoy of ten
wagons and fourteen Boers. Meanwhile F. W. Kitchener had
cleared the coimtry southward through Pokwani down to Paarde-
plaats, where he camped on the 23rd. Pulteney during the
same period had moved northward from Windhoek to Klip-
bankspruit, and thence on the 22nd to Roos Senekal, capturing
four, and accepting the surrender of sixty Boers on the way.
Sixty-eight more capitulated during the next few days, which
Pulteney devoted to searching the environs of the town, finding
amongst other trophies a Vickers-Maxim and a 15-pr. gun, both
destroyed, and a parcel of Transvaal banknotes of the face
value of £50,000. Pulteney joined Headquarters at Blink-
water on April 29th, by which time F. W. Kitchener had
descended to Holnek, and Beatson, working from Roodepoort,
had thoroughly swept the angle formed by the sharp easterly
turn of the Oliphant river at Slaghoek. Benson had joined
Douglas at Dullstroom on the 28th, and on the 30th both
columns, under Douglas's command, proceeded to attack a band
which had gathered at Roodekranz, a position threatening the
line of retreat on Belfast. In the brief engagement which
resulted, three Boers were killed and two captured ; and aU
were dislodged, though mist and the difficulty of the ground
prevented an attack being pressed home. F. W. Kitchener,
now on his homeward way, had come still further southward,
and on April 30th held a Une from Buff els vlei, through Rooi kraal
to Kleinfontein on the northern slopes of the Botha's Berg ;
Park was still at Rietfontein ; Benson and Douglas in the neigh-
bourhood of Dullstroom ; Pulteney with Sir B. Blood at Bhnk-
water ; Beatson, whose share in the operations was now ended.
EVENTS IN EASTERN TRANSVAAL AND NATAL. 145
was about Roodeiwort, whence he soon after began the march
back to the Hne in the co-operation with Plumer which has
already been referred to.
Meanwhile B. Viljoen, wandering about Mapoch's Gronden Viijoen's
in the very vortex of the revolving columns, had been making ^^ape.'°
desperate efforts to escape. On the 20th April his position had
become intolerable, and Benson's success at Klipspruit warned
him that but a few hours remained in which to make a dash for
liberty. On that night Viljoen burnt all his transport, destroyed
his few remaining guns, and stole out southward, intending to
work his way down the valley of the Steelpoort to Wonder-
fontein, there to cross the railway and gain the freedom of the
High Veld. But his scouts found Benson barring the way at
Blinkwater, and Pulteney at Windhoek ; and Viljoen, baffled
on every side, returned before dawn to his abandoned bivouac
at Mapoch's. Previous to his march a hundred of his burghers,
chiefly men of the Boksburg commando, having no heart for
such an adventure, had deserted him in a body, openly an-
nouncing their intention to surrender These, as related,
gave themselves up to Benson at Blinkwater. Shut in on east
and south, Viljoen saw that his only hope of safety, and that a
faint one, lay to the westward. As soon as darkness fell on the
22nd, he led his men across the Steelp)oort at Lagersdrift, struck
thence north-westward along the Bloed river, and evading
Beatson's patrols and outposts reached the banks of the Oli-
phant before dawn on the 23rd. By sunrise he was safely over
a dangerous and little known drift situated near the confluence
of the Bloed and Oliphant rivers. Viljoen then gave out to
the natives — the best intelligence department of his adver-
saries— that he was bound for Pietersburg, and for a while
marched steadily in that direction. But striking the Moos
river, he swung suddenly south-west along its course, and by
the evening was on its headstream at Roodepoortje, Next day,
turning eastward, he crossed the Wilge below Langkloof, and viijoen
bivouacked at Blackwoods Camp, less than twenty miles north ^*^P"*
of Balmoral, where he hoped to cross the railway. Here,
actually in rear of the columns which had hunted him for a
VOL. IV. 10
146 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
fortnight, he remained for several days, so confident of security
that he ventured to send a detachment back across the Oliphant
to attack the post at Wagendrift. In the first week in May the
commando, divided into two parties, safely effected the passage
and re-crosses of the hue between Balmoral and Brugspruit. Viljoen, leaving
the railway, ^us men to a much needed rest at Kromdraai, near the sources
of the Wilge river, then rode on to join the Commandant-General
at Beginderlyn on the Vaal, south of Ermelo. In this manner
did Boer leaders, not once, but on many occasions, slip from the
grasp of their pursuers ; nor are there methods of war which
can frustrate them, except by a fortunate chance. In a wide
country full of innumerable hiding places, against an enemy
who is acquainted with them all and has a mobiUty which
enables him to vanish from one haunt when it becomes unsafe
to the next, and again to a third or a fourth in the course of a
day or a night, what art can close every outlet, or what number
of troops watch every hollow and every thicket, though any one
may contain the sought-for game ? Under such conditions the
escape of well-led fugitives even from vastly greater forces
is not only practicable but easy, and few but the careless,
the treacherous, or the faint-hearted will be caught.
On May 2nd, Pulteney, surrounding Roos Senekal after a
night march from BUnkwater, secured a small laager to the north
of the town, the Boers losing thirteen men. This was the last
noteworthy incident of the operations, which were soon after-
wards concluded. On May 5th Sir B. Blood returned to Middel-
burg, and during the next few days all his columns regained
their respective bases. Three weeks of ceaseless activity had
resulted in the capture of 1,439 armed Boers, nine guns, 750
rifles, half a million rounds of S.A. ammunition, 964 wagons
and carts, and nearly 55,000 head of stock, besides two engines
and thirty-six trucks found by Plumer in Pietersburg station.
With scarcely a pause the Commander-in-Chief now turned
the tide of war from north to south of the Pretoria — Delagoa
o/operations Bay railway. Once more the scattered townships of the south-
^'^^'?^ eastern Transvaal — refuges which French had vainly solicited
south-eastern .. " ,,-ii .xj.xi.t-
Transvaal. permission to raze to the ground — had begun to attract the
EVENTS IN EASTERN TRANSVAAL AND NATAL. 147
hunted bands who roved the country in search of rest. There
was, in short, every indication of a re-occupation by the enemy ;
to nip it whilst yet in the bud no fewer than thirteen columns
were prepared early in May.
Colonel G. M. Bullock, relieved of his supervision of French's
convoys in the Wakkerstroom Hills, had come into Volksrust,
and there, on April 25th, had taken over from Dartnell — whose Bullock and
political duties recalled him to Natal — the command of his ""'"e^°"
column, with promotion to the rank of Brigadier-General. This
force, in conjunction with another under Colonel M. F. Rimington
from Standerton, Lord Kitchener now directed on Ermelo, whilst
eleven other columns made ready to thresh out the same area.
Bullock, leaving Volksrust on April 29th, marched by Amers-
foort, the Riet Spruit, Tweefontein, and Vereeniging, faiUng
to gain touch with Colville's and two other small columns which
went out to co-operate from Standerton and Platrand towards
Blauw Kop. On May 9th Bullock arrived at Ermelo, after several
spirited skirmishes with General Botha who was here in com-
pany with B. Viljoen, the latter just come from the scene of
his adventures around Roos Senekal. Rimington started from
Standerton on May 14th and moved along the Ermelo road
with a convoy for Bullock, whom he joined on the i6th. There-
after the two units, raiding the country in all directions, took up
a stopping line from Ermelo up to Lake Chrissie, blocking the
exits from the area about to be swept by the main force. A
column at Nelspruit under Brigadier-General J. Spens effected
the same service at the northern outlets, playing indeed a double
part, for Park was driving the country from Lydenburg down
to Nelspruit vtd the Mauch Berg, and Spens placed himself
to turn both Park's quarry fleeing southward, and fugitives
making nortnward out of the Ermelo district. Now began
two distinct but converging sets of operations, one by Sir B.
Blood from the Delagoa Bay railway, the other by Plumer
from Pretoria and the western line. These it will be necessary
to describe separately.
The tactics of Sir B. Blood had as their object a junction Sir B. Blood's
with Bullock, and a complete clearance of the zones around '**^""-
VOL. IV. 10*
148
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Sir B. Blood
inarches
south from
Middelburg.
Caxolina, Steynsdorp, down to Amsterdam, much of which had
been untouched by French during his raid of March and April.
For this task six columns and a brigade of cavalry were allotted
which up to May 12th were posted as follows : — At Middelburg,
Major-General F. W. Kitchener and Lieut. -Colonel W. P.
Pulteney ; at Belfast, Lieut. -Colonel G. E. Benson ; at Machado-
dorp, Lieut. -Colonel W. Douglas ; at Wonder fontein, Major-
General J. M. Babington with the cavalry brigade ; at Nelspruit,
Brigadier-General J. Spens, to be joined later by Colonel C. W.
Park from Lydenburg.
F. W. Kitchener and Pulteney marched out of Middelburg on
May 13th, and sweeping the coimtry on either bank of the Klein
Ohphant river, were between its source and that of the Komati
river on the i6th, camping at Groblers Recht and Witkrans
respectively.* Douglas reached Uitkomst on the same date, his
left flank harassed all day from Schoonwater, and his wagons
impeded both by morasses and by bands whom he finally drove
with loss south over Boschoek into the Komati valley. F. W.
Kitchener and Pulteney reached the Carolina — Ermelo road
at the source of the Vaal river on the i8th, when Benson, who had
only left Belfast on the i6th, was at Bonnefoi, where he joined
hands with Douglas, and co-operated with him in hunting the
scattered groups of Boers who were in hiding in the Komati
valley. Carohna, guarded on three sides, was now safe, and
there the cavalry brigade was based on the i8th for operations
to the eastward. Pulteney, echelonned on F. W. Kitchener's
right-front at Goodeverwachting, made Lake Chrissie on the
19th, these two columns pushing on to Florence and Lilliburn
on the 20th, next day to Weltevreden and Holnek, and on the
22nd to Jacht Lust and Pittville, whilst Benson and Douglas
to the northward cleared to the banks of the Komati about
Kalk Kloof and Driehoek. On the 27th Pulteney occupied
Steynsdorp.
Whilst the columns circled about these areas, running down
with an infinity of toil the broken handfuls of Boers who fled
* For gallantry on May i6th Lieutenant F. W. Bell, West Australian M.I., was
awarded the Victoria Cross.
EVENTS IN EASTERN TRANSVAAL AND NATAL. 149
before them, or hid in their very midst, the cavalry, coming
forward by Rietfontein, Silverkop and Boschoek (on the Zekoe
Spruit), entered the Komati valley below Benson, and en-
deavoured likewise to track fugitives, drive cattle, and collect
wagons and Boer families. The brigade returned to Boschoek
on the 28th with but a single prisoner, with twenty-five burghers
voluntarily surrendered, and a quantity of stock and wagons.
Where infantry, scrupulously searching for individuals or
trifling laagers over the scarred country by day and night could
reap however small a harvest, cavalry might have been expected
to glean more than a few ears. The total gain of all these
columns by the end of May was but 142 Boers (of whom four
were killed in action, and forty-four had voluntarily surrendered),
about 270 wagons and carts, and some 36,000 head of stock ;
and both troops and commanders were mortified to discover
how httle their severe exertions were affecting the fortunes of
the campaign. From the end of May to the middle of June,
F. W. Kitchener and Pulteney beat up these districts between
the Komati and Impilusi valle)^, and from Lake Chrissie to the
Swazi border. The cavalry worked from Silverkop, concen-
trating there on May 30th, when Benson returned to Carolina ;
whilst Douglas, after exhaustive operations around Driehoek,
retouched tlie line at Machadodorp on June 5th. On that
date also Bullock, having marched with many a foray by
Beginderlyn, went into Standerton with thirty prisoners and
r8o Boer wagons.
Meanwhile, Plumer with his own, Allenby's, and E. Knox's piumcr
columns had been similarly employed in the western half of ^"h'^om
the High Veld area. Plumer, it will be remembered, had gone Siiverton.
to Eerstefabrieken, after his operations on the drifts of the
Oliphant. Thence he moved to Siiverton, where he lay on May
13th, his coadjutors, Allenby and E. C. Knox, being at Witbank
and Greyhngstad respectively on that date. On May 14th all
three columns started to converge on the sources of the Wilge
river. At Kromdraai still rested the exhausted commandos
which Viljoen had temporarily abandoned in order to join the
Commandant-General at Beginderlyn. Viljoen was now on his
ISO
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Plumer at
Bethel.
Plumer
continues
southward.
way back to his command, with a wary eye for Bullock, who was
raiding to the east, and Rimington, who was making his way out
from Standerton to join Plumer. Of Plumer and his trio of
columns, however, he knew nothing until, arriving on the
Steenkool (or Steenbok) Spruit, on the evening of the 15th, he
was startled to hear first of Knox's sortie from Greyhngstad.
Guessing his purpose Viljoen hurriedly extricated his commando ;
and uniting with Commandant Mears, an independent freebooter
of a type irregular even in that army of partisans, spent the
ensuing period darting about in the midst of the increasing
crowd of his enemies, trying at every hour every point of the
compass for an opportunity to sting or a chance to escape.
On May 15th Plumer, marching by Klipkoppies, reached
Leeuwpoort, where the Queensland Imperial Bushmen, chasing a
knot of fifty Boers, rode them down and captured five. AUenby
on the same day camped at Zaaiwater, midway between the
Wilge and the Oliphant rivers ; and E. C. Knox, at Paardefontein.
The two former columns both searched Kromdraai on the i6th,
Knox, who had been delayed, getting no further than Zondags-
kraal, and on the 17th to Grootpan where he communicated with
Plumer. On the i8th, Allenby, after handing over a convoy to
Plumer, set out vid Cypherfontein and Bloemendal for Springs,
arriving there on the 20th with eight prisoners, many Boer
families, and 6,300 head of stock. At Springs he remained
some days preparing to co-operate with Beatson in another series
of operations which will be described later. Finding Kromdraai
to be an empty nest, Plumer now pushed on to Bethel. There
by way of Blesbokspruit, and on a front Kaffirskraal — Tweedraai,
he arrived with E. C. Knox on May 20th, having been much
pestered on the way by skirmishers who clung to his flanks and
rear, but melted like mist before his van.
On May 21st Rimington, on his return journey from Bullock
at Ermelo, came into touch with Bethel and reported the state
of the districts through which he had passed. Plumer's inten-
tion had been to send this column northward, but hearing that
considerable forces still roved between Bethel and Ermelo, he
detained Rimington, and arranged a joint drive by the three
EVENTS IN EASTERN TRANSVAAL AND NATAL. 151
columns in a southerly direction. By the 23rd he had drawn a
line of mounted troops completely across the interval between
the two towns, posting Rimington at Middelplaat, E. C. Knox at
Uitzicht, his own column at Rietpan. The infantry and trans-
port remained at Bethel, with orders to pursue the high road
which led southward to the Vaal. On the 24th the line
advanced to Uitgezocht (Rimington), Winkelhaak (Knox),
Klipfontein (Plumer), and Witbank (transport), and next day
to Drinkwater, Klipkraal and Bankhoek. Few Boers were en-
countered, and those chiefly by Rimington, outside the left flank.
To all appearances this country, so recently ravaged by French,
contained little but a few deserted families on the farms, and
some fields of crops which had been overlooked. But the
enemy, practised in being hunted, was not necessarily absent
because he was not in front of the chase. Nor was Viljoen a
leader slow to profit by an opportunity because he was being
pursued ; and an opportunity was soon given him. Plumer's
transport, following the Standerton road, was marching outside
the line of columns ; and the Boers, observing this, had dogged
it closely, twice attacking the rearguard since leaving Bethel.
The train consisted of 120 wagons, and a large herd of stock,
escorted by 650 men of the 2nd Somersetshire Light Infantry
and ist Royal Munster Fusiliers ; 120 mounted men, and two
guns Q. battery R.H.A.. the whole under Lieut. -Colonel E. J.
Gallwey (Somersetshire Light Infantry). At 6 a.m. on the
morning of May 25th tliis column, as it left Witbank for Mooi- piumer's
fontein, was waylaid by Viljoen, and attacked simultaneously a°,^c^ ^ay
from front, right, and rear. 2Sih, 1901.
The Boers fell on with spirit, rushing into close quarters
time after time, in spite of the accurate practice of the artillery,
and the firmness of the infantry, who beat back every attack.
Soon the whole column was enveloped by flaming grass ignited
by the enemy, who endeavoured to penetrate into the baggage
and snatch the cattle under cover of the smoke. But every
attempt was foiled by the steadfastness of the defence. A
Vickers-Maxim with which the Boers belaboured the British
guns and right flank was quickly silenced ; the wagons, stoutly
152
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Plumer
regains the
railway.
Allenby and
Beatson.
guarded, were gradually moved to a place safe both from the
flames and the enemy, and after seven hours of close and
anxious fighting Viljoen was beaten off with the loss of nearly
forty men, that of Gallwey having been thirty-one.
Immediately on hearing of this occurrence Plumer hurried
westward towards the convoy, which he conducted as far as
Verblyding (May 27th) whence it was passed into Standerton.
The arrival of E. C. Knox north of Standerton and of Rimington
at Platrand on the 28th concluded the operations, which had
yielded thirty-seven prisoners and about 12,000 head of stock.
Turning again to AUenby's column at Springs, May 24th saw
it marching eastward towards Beatson. The last-named com-
mander had known no rest since he dropped out of Sir B. Blood's
ojjerations around Roos Senekal. Unceasingly he had scoured
the country on both banks of the Wilge river, between its junction
with the Oliphant and the railway— the escaping Viljoen barely
avoiding him — finally concentrating at Brugspruit on May 23rd
with 166 Boers, many wagons and much stock to the credit
of his troops. He immediately received instructions for a foray
southward about the jvmction of the Oliphant river and Steen-
kool (or Steenbok) Spruit, where the fugitives from Bethel were
reported to have collected ; Allenby was to co-operate from
Springs. Accordingly, Beatson was at Klippan on the 25th,
and next day at Van Dyksdrift, at the confluence, wliere he
gained touch with Allenby, who had come by Witklip, Leeuw-
fontein, and Hartebeestfontein, capturing on the way a small
laager, eight prisoners and a Colt gun. Beatson now found
himself in the midst of scattered bodies of the enemy, which
during the next few days he engaged constantly and always with
success, fighting at Koornfontein on the 27th, at Middelkraal
on the 28th, at Rensburghoop on the 29th, and again near
Koornfontein on June ist, with loss to his own troops of ten
officers and men killed and wounded, and to the enemy of twelve
killed and wounded, seven prisoners, the contents of fifty farms
cleared or destroyed, and more than 100 wagons and 13,000
head of stock captured. Meanwhile Allenby, working back, by
arrangement with Beatson, towards the source of the Wilge,
EVENTS IN EASTERN TRANSVAAL AND NATAL. 153
came upon many untouched farms, and considerable bands of
Boers subsisting upon them. By the last day of May he had
thoroughly swept a line through Middeldrift, Rietvlei, Weltevre-
den, Straffontein and Van Dyksput, having taken in all twelve
prisoners and 21,000 head of stock before he returned to the
railway at Wilge River station, en route for Pretoria.
Of the lines of communication during April and May there The lines of
was little to record. The universal stirring of columns over the tion'duriS
open veld in April had the effect of casting many small bands of April.
Boers, hke waves from a distant storm, up against the sur-
rounding lines of communication. Posts on the Delagoa Bay
line were frequently attacked to cover the passage of fugitives
from one untenable district into the other. On the Standerton
line the mounted reconnaissances from Heidelberg, and Colville —
who captured a laager at Boschmanskop on the 29th — more
than once met with the enemy in force, whilst, lower down,
the blockhouses between Kromdraai and Volksrust dealt
successfully with five different attempts to cross the railway.
Natal, during this month, though continually threatened from
Botha's Pass and the west, had chiefly to cop)e with an irruption
by the enemy into the Nkandhla and Mahlabitini districts of
Zululand. From the former a small column under Major A. J.
Chapman (Royal Dublin Fusiliers) temporarily dislodged them
by a sharp attack at Babanango on the 26th ; whilst the Boers,
attacking in their turn the magistracy at Mahlabitini two days
later, were repulsed with loss by the Natal Police, who, in the
course of a stout resistance to ten times their numbers, lost
seven out of the twenty men who formed the garrison. These
successes, however, by no means freed the districts, which
attracted the enemy by their fertility after the ruin and desola-
tion of their own veld ; and Lieut. -General Hildyard was
compelled later to adopt regular methods of clearance.
In May, Spens and Park were active on the Delagoa Bay line, The lines of
whilst the Standerton railway furnished several small offensive [^^'JJ'durit^
forces, notably one under Major J. M. Vallentin (Somersetshire May.
Light Infantry) from Heidelberg on the 25th, which surprised
a laager and took nine prisoners on the banks of the Vaal river.
154 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
The two columns mentioned previously as issuing from Stander-
ton and Platrand to co-operate with Bullock were under Brigadier-
General E. O. F. Hamilton ; they returned on the yth with
five prisoners, having suffered the same number of casualties.
Another force, under Colonel F. J. Pink (Queen's regiment),
in co-operation with Colville — who was in his turn a flanker
of a sweep by Major-General E. L. Elliot in progress along
the other side of the Klip river* — made a bonfire of the
Verzamel Berg, a noted place of call for wandering commandos
both from the Orange River Colony and the Southern Transvaal.
A feat performed during the month by an officer stationed at
Gras Kop, Captain H. R. Bottomley (Queen's regiment) by name,
deserves mention if only to show that the Boers were not always
the layers but sometimes the victims of ambuscades. Riding
out by night, and concealing himself and a few companions in
the town of Amersfoort before daylight on the 22nd, this officer
killed, wounded, or captured, singly, several noted Boers of the
district, including the commandant of the Wakkerstroom com-
mando ; and when at last forced by the arrival of strong parties
to gallop for the distant Gras Kop, took with him three
prisoners whom he had snatched from the very midst of the
Boer bands.
Once more Hildyard, in Natal, had had to deal with the
Nkandhla and Melmoth districts of Zululand, where the Boers,
though quiet after their repulses in April, had quartered them-
selves on the farms in such numbers that except for the few
British posts they were practically in occupation of the country.
Three small columns were accordingly despatched thither,
under Colonel R. W. Evans (Natal Volunteers), Captain G.
Capron (Vth division mounted infantry), and Major A. J.
Chapmcin (Royal Dublin Fusiliers). A night march on May 19th
by the last-named officer resulted in the capture of a complete
laager in the Babanango range. Next morning Chapman was
himself attacked by superior forces, and though compelled to
retire into Nkandhla, extricated his party and inflicted more
» See Chapter V.
EVENTS IN EASTERN TRANSVAAL AND NATAL. 155
losses than he received. Chapman was then reinforced from
Dundee, and the establishment of entrenched posts at various
spots soon safeguarded the districts from raids.
There fell also upon Lieut. -General Hildyard at this time the
preparation of columns and lines of entrenchment for stopping
the western passes, to assist that operation of Major-General
Elliot in the Orange River Colony to which allusion has already
been made in connection with the forays of Colonels Colville and
Pink on both sides of the Verzamel Berg.
Approximate Strength States of Columns referred to in
foregoing chapter.
COLUMN.
April — May, 1901.
Lieut.-GeneraJ Sir B. Blood's
Force.
Col. C. W. Park
Maj.-Gen. F. W. Kitchener
Lt-Col. W. Douglas
Lt.-Col. W. P. Pulteney . .
Lt-Col. G. E. Benson
Maj.-Gen. S. B. Beatson..
Brig.-Gen. G. M. Bullock . .
Lt.-Col. M. F. Rimington . .
Lt.-Col. A. E. W. Colville..
Brig.-Gen. H. C. O. Plumer
Brig.-Gen. J. Spens
Maj.-Gen. jf. M. Babington
Col. E. C. Knox . .
Lt.-Col. E. H. H. Allenby
300
SSO
330
750
720
600
2,537
1,450
250
1,428
163
1,004
1,490
762
930
2,290
1,280
800
350
1,020
621
278
370
570
337
464
550
CO 8
3
6
3
8
8
4
14
4
6
2
8
8
7
O
s
Maj.-Gen. F. W.
Kitchener in com-
mand.
Maj.-Gen. R. S. R.
Fetherstonhaugh in
command.
156
CHAPTER IX.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY*
{Continued from Chapter V.),
APRIL — JUNE, I9OI.
Sir L. Of the larger units in the Orange River Colony, the Harrismith
Sjeiations. Command must now be dealt with. Since early in February
Sir L. Rundle had seen neither of his mobile columns, Harley's
being in garrison at Ficksburg, that of B. Campbell in parts still
more remote. Campbell, after evacuating Vrede of all but its
garrison on February loth, had marched into Standerton to
re-equip. The duty of forwarding supplies to French, who was
then in the Eastern Transvaal,t detained him at Standerton,
after which he paid a second visit to Vrede on March 4th. This
town, which was held by the ist Leinster regiment under Lieut. -
Colonel H. Martin, had been virtually invested during the past
five months, the troops suffering greatly from disease. It was
now completely cleared by Campbell, who for the eight days
following found his return blocked by swollen rivers. So un-
likely then seemed the prospects of his being able to regain
Harrismith by his former route, that the column was en-
trained for Ladysmith in Natal, thence to march on Harrismith
by way of Van Reenen's Pass. In effecting this Campbell was
still further delayed by an attack by a party of Boers on the
line at Mount Prospect, near Laing's Nek, where a goods train
was blown up in front of the troop trains. Not until April loth
was Campbell back in Harrismith. Harley, locked up in Ficks-
♦ See map No. 64. t See Chapter VI.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. i57
burg, had been similarly alienated, performing, however, much
useful work from that place both in co-operation with Pilcher
about Ladybrand, Clocolan and Mequatlings Nek, with Lyttel-
ton on his northerly drive from the Orange, and on his own
account, for he had never ceased to radiate exp)editions into the
disturbed area about him.
Campbell's return enabled Sir L. Rundle to resume the
offensive. He selected as his first objective the Brandwater
basin, which Harley reported to be teeming with the enemy.
So numerous were the bands, and so formidable their strongholds,
especially the passes which led into the basin, that Rundle
represented to the Commander-in-Chief the desirability of the
co-operation of at least four columns in the work. Neither
Elliot nor C. E. Knox, however, were at the moment available,
and Lord Kitchener instructed Sir L, Rundle to conduct his
expedition as a reconnaissance on the results of which future
action would be decided. On April 20th Rundle took B. Camp-
bell's reconstructed column, 2,200 strong with eight guns, out
of Harrismith. Four days' incessant skirmishing, which cost
eighteen casualties, brought the force to Bethlehem, where two
days were spent in reorganising the garrison of Bethlehem and
fitting it for the field. This set at liberty an additional batta-
lion, the 2nd Manchester, under Lieut. -Colonel C. T. Reay,
which, until April 28th, cleared the vicinity^ of Bethlehem in
co-operation with Campbell's column. On the 29th the whole
force plunged into the Brandwater basin by Retief's Nek, and
on May 2nd entered Fouriesburg. For the next month Sir
L. Rundle constituted this town as his base for raids in all
directions.
First, two srtiall columns under Lieut. -Colonels Reay and
F. W. Romilly beat up the immediate neighbourhood of Fouries-
burg, finding scattered all over the mountains patrols which,
assembled, would have totalled some 800 men. These groups
contented themselves, however, with long-range skirmishing
from the mountain tops, and never seriously interfered with the
extensive clearing operations in progress beneath them. From
the 15th to the 29th Rundle had four columns out, under Lieut.-
158 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Colonels J, L. Keir, Reay, Romilly and Colonel Harley, the
latter having come from Ficksburg with a convoy of supplies.
Ten days later Rundle, having destroyed everything within
reach, evacuated Fouriesburg, and began a double movement
upon the Roode Bergen to the east. Whilst he himself marched
direct upon Naauwpoort Nek, Campbell took the road out of
Retief s Nek. Campbell was escorting a convoy for Bethlehem,
and he had orders to strike south-eastward when he should
have delivered it, and attempt to rejoin the main body at Naauw-
poort Nek. In spite of considerable opposition Campbell, who
had to fight his way to Bethlehem, duly effected this on May
31st. Making a forced march back, he appeared so suddenly at
the north entry of Naauwpoort Nek that a small Boer convoy of
nine wagons, which was making its escape from Rundle, fell into
his hands, the skirmish costing him five wounded. Sir L. Rundle
was at that moment on the other side of the Nek, above Mooi-
hoek, and moving with Harley up the valley of the little Caledon,
he ordered Campbell to move by Naauwpoort Nek and sweep
eastward along the Roode Bergen on the opposite or northern
side, thus completely enveloping the range. Throughout the
first week of June the movement proceeded, the main difficulty
being the roads, or the lack of them, for the troops had practically
to cut their own track, and several wagons were lost over the
precipices. On the 4th both columns issued from the mountains,
Campbell by Witzies Hoek, Harley by Golden Gate, both con-
verging towards Elands River Drift, where they united on the
8th. Their joint captures amounted to 6,000 head of stock,
forty-one vehicles, a quantity of Krupp shells and small-arm
ammunition, and 350 tons of foodstuffs, about the same quantity
having been destroyed for lack of means to remove it. The
British casualties had numbered twelve killed and wounded,
those of the enemy about double. Sir L. Rundle then marched
for Harrismith, where he arrived on the 9th, and proceeded
to refit.
C. E. Knox's Turning now to the troops of the central district, C. E. Knox's
operations. ^^q columus, namely, Pilcher's and Thorneycroft's, like those of
Sir L. Rimdle, had been engaged in opposite directions in the
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 159
early part of April, Pilcher, it will be remembered, had been
sighted at Reitz by Broadwood, on the right flank of Elliot's
easterly drive, on April 28th. Three weeks earUer Pilcher had
been in touch with Harley at Ficksburg on MequatUngs Nek ;
and when amongst the headstreams of the Vet river at New
Holstein, orders had reached liim to convey the mass of booty
which he had acquired into Winburg. Skilfully turning the
formidable Koranna Berg on April 8th, Pilcher worked his way
by easy stages, and incessantly engaiged, to Winburg, which
he reached on April 22nd, Thence he was ordered to Senekal
to resume co-operation with Thorneycroft. That officer had
been as busy as Pilcher in another direction. A raid to the
west of Brandfort in the first week of April had culminated in a
successful night surprise of a laager at Mooiwater, where by
admirable tactics Thorneycroft's seasoned regiment secured
thirty-three prisoners. On April 5th Thorneycroft returned to
Brandfort, to sally again two days later to the east of the rail-
way. Another week's sweep by Landdrost Monde, and between
the Vet river and Winburg, brought him into that town on the
14th, thence by Tzamen, the Tabaksberg and \'erblijden on April
20th to Brandfort again, where he handed over nearly 500
refugees and 16,000 beasts. Thence by the same route Thorney-
croft returned to Winburg on the 23rd, and on the next day
C. E. Knox himself accompanied him towards Senekal with a
view of co-operating with Elliot with both his columns. Arriving
at Senekal on the afternoon of April 25th, Knox found Pilcher
already in possession of the place, having surrounded it by a
well-conducted night march from Doornfontein. Pilcher was
then despatched towards Reitz, his task being to drive as many
of the enemy as he could in front of ElUot, Knox returning
to Winburg with Thorneycroft. Pilcher, as already recorded,
duly reached Reitz by the difficult road on the 28th, and, having
performed his part, returned almost immediately, being under
orders to rejoin his Headquarters by May 2nd. On that date
he reached Senekal, where he had expected to find C. E. Knox ;
but that General had moved to Winburg, leaving orders for
Pilcher to penetrate the Doornberg 'from the north, whilst
i6o THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Thorneycroft entered from the opposite side. Accordingly
Pilcher marched to Lehefontein, and thence to Spytfontein,
skirmishing all the way with a strong body which was based on
Schaapplaat. On May 8th, in co-operation with Thorneycroft
from Helpmakaar, the Doomberg was thoroughly scoured,
after which Pilcher put in to Ventersburg Road on May 9th,
and Thorneycroft to Virginia Siding.
At this time the railway both north and south of Kroonstad
was infested by bands which it seemed impossible to prevent
from crossing, and in many instances from damaging the line.
They were especially numerous on the west, and Major J. E.
Pine-Coffin's mounted infantry, which W. G. Knox, the com-
mander of that section of the lines of communication, had
des{>atched on May 6th to attempt to sweep the country towards
Bothaville, had to return before superior numbers. C. E. Knox
was therefore ordered to proceed with his two columns to this
district, and on the night of May 13th he moved out with the
general intention of clearing up the tract between the Vet and
Valsch rivers. An attempt to compress a commando between
Thorneycroft, supported by Pine-Coffin, at Kalkkuil — Kopje
Alleen and Pilcher at Bloemhof — (ieluk failed, though some loss
was occasioned to the enemy. Thorneycroft then remained
stationary whilst Pilcher circled by Alettasdraai towards
Bothaville. His movements had the effect of forcing the Boers
south-westward towards the drifts of the Vaal north of Hoop-
stad, which they endeavoured to gain. Pilcher was too quick
for them, however, and seized both Commando and Hofman's
Drifts, whilst Thorneycroft closed towards him to Boschrand
on the 1 6th to cover the crossings of the Zand Spruit. Thus
shut in, the enemy's bands broke up, and Pilcher was directed
on Bothaville. An outpost which he had thrown across the
river at Commando Drift was hotly attacked on the night of
the 1 6th, losing fifteen horses. The detachment at Hofman's
Drift was also attacked as it was withdrawing, all the captured
stock being retaken by the enemy, who inflicted five casualties
upon the troops. Next day this party was again attacked,
the Boers coming in to close quarters. Eleven more casualties
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. i6i
resulted, but the detachment was fortunate to rejoin Pilcher
with so few, for the enemy fought with determination, and
nothing but the coolness of the rearguard kept them at bay.*
On the 19th Thomeycroft and Pilcher united close to Bothaville,
to part again next day, each in chase of separate hostile bodies
which were reported to be trekking southward. Little more
fighting occurred. The Boers had made good their escape out
of the area, and only some fifteen vehicles fell into Pilcher's hands
at Roodepoort ; a patrol of Thomeycroft's, reconnoitring across
the Valsch, found five more hidden in the bed of the Rhenoster
river. On May 22nd Pilcher arrived at Virginia Siding and
Thomeycroft at Kroonstad, their total capture amounting to
twenty-three wagons and carts and 5,000 animals ; the casualties
numbered eighteen, as against some score amongst the enemy.
Seven mills, including an important one at Alettasdraai, and a
vast amount of crops had also been destroyed ; but the area was
too great and too well furnished to be completely cleared by the
number of troops employed. At the close of May Pilcher was
at Brandfort and Thomeycroft at Vet River station, whence
they soon issued to co-operate with the columns of the southern
section of the Orange River Colony, whose previous operations
must now be described.
At the end of March Lyttelton had under his command Bruce Lytteiton's
Hamilton's three columns (Monro, VV. L. White, C. Maxwell), "P^"''^"'*-
the three under Haig (Byng, W. H. Williams, Lowe) and Hick-
man's. Of these, it will be remembered the first was at Spring-
fontein, Bethanie and Edenburg ; Haig was on the Caledon
river, Hickman at Edenburg, all preparing to intercept the
expected return of the worsted invaders of Cape Colony.f
This event, however, came to nothing ; Cape Colony was not
relieved of a single Boer band, and Bruce Hamilton's troops
were otherwise employed. News having come that a commando
* Lieutenant and Adjutant G. H. B. Coulson (killed), King's Own Scottish
Borderers (7th M.I.), was awarded the Victoria Cross (posthumous) for gallantry on this
occasion.
t See Chapter V. , page 97.
VOL. IV. II
i62 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
was in occupation of Dewetsdorp, on April 7th the three columns
marched thither, and on the gth Monro, who was leading, sur-
rounded the town, only to find that the enemy had been warned
and had just made oif. The trail pointed south-eastward, and
on the morning of tfie nth Monro fastened upon it, and for
three hours galloped in pursuit with 150 men and a Vickers-
Maxim. The tracks then disappeared, obbterated by the heavy
rain, and Monro, caUing a halt, scouted widely. It was not long
before the commando was discovered outspanned by a group
of farms which, though protected in front by a deep donga,
were surrounded by kopjes within rifle range. Instantly Monro's
squadron leaders, scarcely waiting for orders, rushed for the
points of vantage, and in a few moments every commanding
knoll was in their possession. The Boers who filled the donga
made a hot reply ; but a dash into the hollow from both flanks
awed them so thoroughly that the fifty-three burghers therein
soon succimibed to half their numbers, and the farm buildings
behind lay uncovered. They were defended by some thirty
riflemen whose rapid firing showed that they were by no means
daunted by the capitulation which had occurred before their
eyes. They seemed to be in expectation of assistance, and
Monro, scanning the horizon, saw that he must make haste, for
the distant hilltops were dotted with approaching horsemen.
An immediate assault, however, was not easy, his force being
now scattered too widely around the farms to be quickly
assembled. He therefore determined to try negotiation, and
called for a volunteer to approach the buildings under the white
flag with a demand for surrender. Thereupon Lieutenant H. H.
Shott, an officer of Bethune's mounted infantry, who had
already greatly distinguished himself by his initiative in
the attack on the donga, armed only with a handkerchief
walked up to the farmhouses, in spite of the hot fire still
pouring from them. After a parley, which was attended with
extreme danger to himself, Shott succeeded in inducing the
defenders to yield. Monro, who had lost but five men, then
marched off with eighty-three prisoners, including two officers,
and many wagons and animals, and arrived at Dewetsdorp at
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 163
midnight, having covered forty miles since the morning. A
similar expedition towards Ventershoek on the night of the 12th
was less fortunate ; the party became entangled in difficult
country, and owed its escape with but seven casualties largely
to its being mistaken for friends by the Boers, who were met
with in considerable strength.
On April 13th Bruce Hamilton was ordered to take over Bruce Hamil-
ton succeeds
command of the southern area from Lyttelton, who had been Lytteiton.
granted leave of absence. He accordingly returned to the rail-
way, whither his columns, which were now to be commanded
by Monro, also skirmished their way back on the i8th, bringing
ninety-five prisoners and 46,000 head of stock. The main inci-
dent of the return march occurred at the junction of the Hex and
Riet rivers, where a troop of thirteen men of the 9th Lancers, of
C. Maxwell's column, gallantly charging a kopje on foot, were
overcome by a superior body entrenched on the top, and all but
one killed or captured. A dash upon Reddersburg on April 21st,
to Helvetia two days later, and into the Smithfteld district on
the 25th, placed Monro favourably for a clearance of the trans-
Caledon area, for which orders now came from the Commander-
in-Chief. Such a movement was especially necessary, because
at this moment Kritzinger was actually north of the Orange, Kritzinger
having temporarily parted from his allies in the Barkly East orange'River
district in the manner described elsewhere.* For this purpose Colony,
was designated also W. H. Williams, who had taken over Haig's
command when, on April 8th, that officer had been ordered
across the Orange river to deal with the raiders in Cape Colony.
Williams brought with him, in addition to Byng, the columns of
Herbert and the Hon. A. Murray, lent by Hart from Aliwal North
and Bethulie, and after clearing the Elands Berg, he was at
Smithfteld and in touch with Monro on April 25th. A combined
southerly raid on both sides of the Caledon was then arranged,
Williams to move on the west of the river with W. L. White and
C. Maxwell added to his own troops, whilst Monro was respon-
sible for the country on the opposite bank. On the 28th, when
• See Chapter X., page 176.
VOL. IV. II*
i64 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Bruce Hamilton repaired to Aliwal North, his columns were thus
disposed from east to west : At Akel, on the Basuto border,
were White and Maxwell ; at Naseby, Williams with Byng ; at
Constantia, Herbert ; at Smithfield, Monro ; whilst Hickman,
who had for the past week been watching the Orange about
Krugers Drift to intercept an anticipated retreat by Hertzog,
was nearing Bethulie for Karreepoort, where he was to com-
mence the clearance of the fork between the Orange and
Caledon. Murray was in Aliwal North, detailed to escort a
convoy of suppUes for the columns. By the time the foraying
columns had arrived about Rouxville, a reported concen-
tration of the enemy along the frontier near Philippolis
caused WilUams, with Byng and Lieut. -Colonel P. G. Wynd-
ham (successor to Herbert), to be transported across the rail-
way with orders to move along the right bank of the Orange
towards Ramah, Bruce Hamilton taking a central position at
Edenburg. Monro remained in the east, vainly endeavouring
to close with Kritzinger, who was supposed to be travelling
northward from the Orange.
Starting from Springfontein on May loth, W. H. WilUams
was at Goemans Berg on the 12th, and two days later had
a sharp affair fifteen miles south-west of Fauresmith, where
two squadrons of the South African light Horse killed and
wounded three and captured fourteen burghers, including a
noted Field-Comet, Van der Merwe. On May 15th WilUams
was at Somersfontein, and on the 21st reached Ramah with
his prisoners and tens of thousands of sheep and cattle, having
foimd no hostile concentration, but instead an immense herd of
stock which had been driven from the Fauresmith farmsteads.
WilUams subsequently regained the railway at the end of the
month at Priors Siding, marching by PhiUppolis. Meanwhile
Monro could get Uttle more news of Kritzinger than a rumour,
which proved true, that the Boer was on his way back to the
frontier. He was in the midst of a cast around Rouxville on
May 19th when he was ordered to take his column into Cape
Colony, where he shortly embarked on that career of activity in
the north-eastern counties which is fully narrated in subsequent
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 165
chapters.* Kritzinger, doubling cleverly, had preceded Monro a Kritzinger
week earlier, and his departure left that part of the south of oran^ d'ver
the Orange River Colony east of the railway practically clear.
But Kritzinger's re-entry into the British province, effected in
spite of the bevy of columns around him as easily as his former
passages in and out of it, added to the growing demands of the
state of affairs south of the Orange. Haig had long ago gone
thither ; A. Murray, replaced by Lieut. -Colonel L. E. du Moulin,
had rejoined Hart at Ahwal North ; and now first Monro, then
W, L. White, were ordered across the border, to be followed in
course of time by others. The 9th and 17th Lancers were also en-
trained for Cape Colony, taken from the column which was now
commanded by Major S. W. Follett in place of C. Maxwell, who,
on May 20th, had been thrown from his horse, sustaining injuries
from which, to the regret of all, he died. Finally Hickman, on
his return to the railway on May 30th, proceeded to Cape Colony,
leaving his column at Edenburg. These changes afforded a
favourable opportunity for a reorganisation of Bruce Hamil-
ton's forces into less unwieldy units, a measure which the Com-
mander-in-Chief had recently enjoined. After another short
expedition by tluree of his commanders towards the Caledon,
which produced some 97,000 livestock, Bruce Hamilton pre-
pared to resume operations on a larger scale but with smaller
columns. His three remaining forces he sub-divided into seven, Bruce
each about 500 strong, and placed them under command of the "oJJanTses
following officers, Colonel A. N. Rochfort, Lieut. -Colonel W. H. his columns
Williams, Lieut, -Colonel the Hon, J. H. G. Byng, Majors F. L.
Banon, H. E. Gogarty and O. Harris. With these, and certain
reinforcements, Bruce Hamilton now undertook a scheme of
considerable dimensions.
For some time past all reports had tended to show that the
tract between the Riet and Modder rivers provided a sanctuary
for many of the fighting men and most of the stock of the Boers
of the southern part of the Orange River Colony. Here, but
for the hasty passages of Plumer and Bethune when in chase of
• See Chapters X., XIII., XV. and XXVI. on operations in Gipe Colony.
i66 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
De Wet, they had remained almost undisturbed. W. H. Williams
had merely skirted the fringe of their preserve on his recent
march to and from Ramah, but his gleanings, nearly 100,000
head of stock and seventy prisoners, seemed to be good evidence
of the value to be obtained from a clearance of the richer and
more secluded country to the north. In the first week of June,
therefore, Bruce Hamilton, in conjunction with C. E. Knox,
arranged an extensive " drive '* from south to north through
the district in question. Whilst Knox sent Pilcher from
Brandfort and Thomeycroft from Vet River station to block
the drifts of the Modder from Brand vallei to Kruger's Drift,
Hamilton drew out his troops into a great semi-circle, facing
and drives up northward from Kaffir River on the east, through Jagersfontein
to the Modder Road, Philippohs and Luckhoff, up to the banks of the Riet
river south of Jacobsdal. The western section of this disposi-
tion was supplied by Major A. Paris' column from Kimberley,
and by a new force under Colonel St. G. C. Henry which
had just completed its organisation at Orange River station.
By the night of June 5th all were in their places, and
next morning the movement began. Its subsequent history
was too uneventful to be followed in detail. For the next
three days the wide arc of troops rolled towards Petrus-
turg, its approach continually heralded by the agitated
stirring of herds of stock, clusters of wagons laden with
women and children and household goods, and small knots
of armed Boers, who darted hither and thither about the
front seeking to escape. The majority of these fell into
the hands of one or other of the columns ; but with the
formed fighting bodies, of which several were reported,
Bruce Hamilton was less fortunate, for none were stopped
either by the advancing troops or those watching the drifts
in front.
Altogether some 600 men escaped in this way ; but when
Hamilton drew up on the Une Emmaus — Petrusburg on June
8th, he had taken 243 prisoners and much material, including
several sets of signalling apparatus belonging to Hertzog's com-
mandos. The combination of columns was then broken up.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 167
Sending W. H. Williams westward with his own and the two
western columns to clear the country beyond Luckhoff up
to the Kimberley railway, and Byng with two columns to
do the same between Fauresmith and Philippolis, Bruce
Hamilton himself returned to Edenburg with Rochfort and
du MouUn and all the captures, which he increased by twenty-
five prisoners taken on the way. For the rest of the month
there was incessant but disconnected activity in every quarter
of Bruce Hamilton's and Sir C. Knox's areas. Within the Various
vast quadrilateral whose sides were the Kimberley and Bloem- wesrortlfe
fontein railways, the Vaal and the Orange rivers, six columns Bioemfontein
r&ilwAv
fell to work. Henry forayed towards Boshof, where on the
2ist he was joined by Paris, the two making Christiana by
the 27th. Williams, having reached Witteputs station on
June i8th, turned eastward again after refitting, and there-
after was continually in touch with small commandos which
revolved about Luckhoff, daily depriving them of men and
stores, but having his account somewhat lowered by the
loss of an officer and thirty-two men, captured from his rear-
guard on tlie 20th. Byng performed similar services about
PhiUppolis, both he and Williams gradually working towards
Headquarters at Edenburg, which they reached on July 4th.
Further north, but still within the figure described above.
Sir C. Knox, withdrawing his troops from the Modder at the
conclusion of Bruce Hamilton's " drive " to Petrusburg, em-
ployed his troops in scouring the country between the line
Paardeberg — Bultfontein — Smaldeel and the railway, that is,
to the east of the operations of Henry and Paris. Pilcher,
moving by Doornlaagte, Jagtpan and Kalkfontein, surrounded
Bultfontein on the i8th and took three prisoners. Next day,
when reconnoitring towards Hoopstad, he had himself to beat
off a determined attack made under cover of a veld fire near the
town, which he did with the loss of three to his own force and
seven to the enemy's. Thence by easy stages he made his way
into Brandfort on June 25th. Thorneycroft worked in com-
bination with Pilcher by Nooitgedacht, Schiedam, Ganna-
fontein, Cyfergat and Luxemburg, skirmishing with considerable
i68
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Operations
east of the
Bloemfontein
railway.
Elliot
"drives"
eastward from
Kroonstad.
bodies aiid finding much to clear. He, too, entered Brandfort
on the 25th, the joint captures of the two columns amounting
to four prisoners, 181 vehicles and more than 20,000 Uvestock.
The casualties had been an officer and two men killed and an
officer and twelve men wounded, the Boers having lost some
thirty-five men.
Meanwhile — a sufficiency of troop)s thus traversing the
districts on the west of the railway — Bruce Hamilton employed
Rochfort and du Moulin upon a fresh expedition on the opposite
side. By this time VV, L. White had re-entered the eastern area
from Aliwal North, and moving northward by Commissie Drift,
had reached Wepener on June 19th, reporting all local Boers
to have gone to Dewetsdorp. Accordingly Bruce Hamilton
directed his two units thither in co-operation with White.
The columns found themselves at once amongst the enemy.
On June 21st Rochfort fell in \^^th a Boer convoy on the Smith-
field — Dewetsdorp road, capturing the whole, with seventeen
prisoners, twenty-one vehicles and a herd of horses and stock.
Another convoy on the Reddersburg — Dewetsdorp road evaded
him two days later, after which the three columns combined
against a commando discovered at Oorlogs Poort. This party
scattered southward, and in the pursuit du Moulin captured a
third small convoy of fifteen vehicles and five prisoners ten miles
west of Helvetia. The chase was continued towards Redders-
burg, near to which, on June 28th, du Moulin's force suffered
five casualties from a counter-attack delivered by the hard-
pressed enemy. At the end of the month these columns were
still engaged between Reddersburg and Dewetsdorp, where for
the present they must be left, to turn to operations of greater
scope elsewhere.
On June 22nd Elliot, having refitted his armament in
Kroonstad, started out on another of those raids upon the
enemy's scattered means of subsistence with which, in the
absence of formed hostile bodies or definite lines of supply,
the side on the offensive has to be content. Elliot now had
four mounted brigades, and with Bethune on the left, Lowe
at left centre, de Lisle at right centre and Broadwood on the
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 169
right, he swept between Lindley and Senekal, making for
Springfield Drift, where he was to re-ration. A night march
by the right flank on Senekal on June 25th found the town
empty, the Boers having had full warning of the advancing
array. On the left Bethune's frequent night raids and forced
marches proved equally fruitless, and for the whole of the east-
ward march the enemy, whose tracks were numerous, had no
difficulty in keeping well ahead of Elliot's van. On July 2nd
the division drew up at the appointed spot with only 3,000 cap-
tured horses and the same number of cattle in its train. This
species of warfare, cheated of the armed opponent, its proper
prey, falls the more terribly upon the innocent. No fewer
than 12,000 sheep were slaughtered on the march, their
numbers and slowness of foot rendering it impossible to drive
them on.
Meanwhile, before Elliot's departure from his base, Sir L.
Rundle had been operating about the very tract over which
the Kroonstad division was to pass, but from the opposite
direction. A few days had sufficed to refit his colimins after Sir L. Rundie
their exertions in the Brandwater basin, and on June 13th they JJ^jslEntot.
were again in the field, hunting bands on either side of the Harri-
smith — Bethlehem road. Working towards them was a small
force despatched from Bethlehem. On June i6th both columns
were across the Libenbergs Vlei, about Loskop and Spitzkrans,
south-east of Bethlehem. Here Rundle received notice of
Elliot's impending movement, which he was first to provide with
fresh supplies at Springfield Drift, and thereafter to reinforce.
On the 1 8th Rundle occupied both sides of the Bethlehem —
Harrismith road by sending Harley to Leeuwpoort, north of the
first-named town, and B. Campbell to Poortje to the south-east.
During the next three days he refilled Bethlehem with two
months' supplies and relieved the garrison, and on the 22nd
fell back towards Harrismith to prepare the mass of provender
which would be required by Elliot, Campbell marching by Jolly-
kop, Harley by Tweefontein. The last days of June were spent
in forwarding the material to Springfield Drift, where it was
duly taken over by Elliot on his arrival.
I70 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
This completed the more important affairs of June. The
processions of troops which traversed the country on either
side of the railway by no means rendered the guardians of the
line either immune or immobile ; but there is no space to
record the numberless encoimters which enlivened the Unes
of conmiimication, whence Sir C. Tucker from Bloemfontein,
Sir W. G. Knox from Kroonstad and Barker from Winburg
had all frequently despatched small forces for special purposes
in their neighbourhoods.*
• For gallantry during a skirmish near Thabanchu on June 15th, Serjeant James
Refers, South African Constabulary, was awarded the Victoria Cross.
Note. — Lieut. -General C. Tucker, Major-Generals W. G. Knox and C. E. Knox
were created Knights Commander of the Bath for services during 1899- 1900. — London
Gazette, April 19th, 1901.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 171
Approximate Strength States of Columns referred to in
foregoing chapter.
i
i
3
e:
b
5. S
0
COLUMN.
1
1
■^1
.s
c
»-4
i-2
0
s u
IS,
April— Junt, 1 901.
Lieut. -Colonel C. P. Crewe
640
—
4
2
1 Lieut. - General
Major-General J. E. Boyes (later Harley)
318
1,361
3
Sir L. Rundle
B. B. D. Campbell
342
1,858
2
in command.
Lieut. -Colonel S C. H. Monro
320
480
2
—
» ,, W. G. Massy
Sio
--
3
I
Lieut. - General
» M E. C. Ingouville Williams
(Uter W. G. B. Western)
459
62s
4
• Sir C. Tucker
directing.
Major J. E. Pine-Coffin
447
3
I
Major-General Bruce Hamilton's columns:
Lieut. -Colonel S. C. H. Monro
290
—
3
—
M .. C. Maxwell (later S.
W. Follett)
Lieut. -Colonel W. L. White
Colonel D. Haig's columns :
650
617
—
6
3
—
Lieut. - General
the Hon. N. G.
Lyt t e 1 ton
directing.
Lieut. -Colonel the Hon. J- H. G. Byng
W. H. Williams
654
—
4
—
35 «
3
3
H. J. Scol^ell
639
II*
3
Lieut. -Colonel T. D. Filcher
1,070
82
7
2
Major - General
SirC. E.Knox
in command.
Colonel A. W. Thomeycroft
500
ISO
5
—
M T. E. Hickman
560
—
5
—
Lieut.-Colonel E. B. Herbert (later P.
G. Wyndham)
Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. A. Murray
380
—
3
I
185
—
2
I
Brigadier-General R. G. Broadwood
(later de Lisle)
Colonel E. C. Bethune (later W. H. M.
Lowe)
Lieut.-Colonel H. de B. de Lisle (later
2,023
820
—
4
5
I
Major - General
• E. L. Elliot in
command.
R. Fanshawe)
658
22*
3
—
Lieut.-Colonel C. T. Reay
„ F. W. Romilly
II II J. L. Keir...
Colonel G. E. Harlev
1, A. N. Rochfort
150
150
'50
332
480
850
160
',595
2
2
I
5
3
Lieut. - General
Sir L. liundle
in command.
530
3
Lieut.-Colonel W. H. Williams
500
—
2
1
the Hon. J. H. G. Byng
709
—
2
—
Major - General
Major F. L. Banon ...
550
—
2
2
'^ Bruce Hamilton
,, H. E. Gogarty
640
—
I
—
in command.
1, 0. Harris
517
—
2
—
Lieut.-Colonel L. E. du Moulin
184
250
3
J
II 1, St. G. C. Henry
642
—
3
I
Major A. Paris
325
131
2
1
Cyclists.
172
CHAPTER X.
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY.*
{Continued from Chapter IV.).
MARCH — APRIL, IQOI.
Effect of De The expulsion of De Wet at the end of February left Cape Colony
ets inroad. ^ ^ singular condition. The extinction of that chief firebrand
removed all immediate danger of a general conflagration in the
British province. Nevertheless, he had bequeathed a legacy
of imrest which was not to be stamped out. Everywhere arose
incendiaries who endeavoured to set a light to the combustible
material which existed in every quarter of the colony. It became
the fashion for any minor leader who possessed or could raise
a following to take the field and try his skill at blowing about
the sparks of rebellion. Although only the most trivial and
sporadic outbreaks arose in response, yet the attempts them-
selves were so persistent, so widespread, and so difficult to cope
with from their very insignificance, that for the rest of the
duration of the war they formed the history of Cape Colony
and the sole occupation of nearly 50,000 British troops, regular
and colonial.
Foremost amongst these disturbers of the peace remained for
a time Kritzinger, with his adherents Fouche and Scheepers,
who have been traced into the Sneeuw Bergen, into which they
had been chased when three of the four pursuing columns were
withdrawn to join in the hue and cry after De Wet. The
crumbling of the main Boer plan of campaign on the banks of
the Orange, and the disappearance of De Wet and Hertzog,
left Kritzinger alone in the heart of Cape Colony.
* See map No. 63.
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 173
Kritzinger had in full measure the unlimited self-reliance of Kritzinger's
the Boer warrior. Deeply buried though he was in hostile ™°^«™ents.
country, with greatly superior forces between himself and his
native land, with the strategy of which he was only a factor
ruined, and its mainstay falling back broken in the opposite
direction, he yet showed no disposition to vanish after his re-
ceding commander-in-chief. He had occupied the period o
De Wet's disastrous campaign in the north by leading Gorringe
and Herbert a tortuous chase from Dassiefontein to Twist Kraal,
thence to Roode Hoogte, where he burned the station, to Spitz
Kop, and back into the Sneeuw Bergen on February 25th. He
then rode northward to Dwars Vlei Siding, where on the last
day of the month he emulated De Wet, who was then plunging
across the Orange, by escaping out of all touch with his pur-
suers. During this adventure Kritzinger received some com-
pensation for his desertion by De Wet and Hertzog by the arrival
of Lieutenant W. Malan, an independent leader, who had con-
trived, whilst all eyes were turned towards De Wet, to work his
way deep into the colony with some 100 burghers.
Meanwhile (February 6th to 28th), Scheepers had been
similarly dragging Grenfell and Sir C. Parsons about the
Klaarstroom district and up into Aberdeen.
De Wet, flying routed into the Orange River Colony, trailed
after him all but two of the fourteen columns which had hunted Troop* in
him for the last seventeen days. Only those of Colonel E. M. S. ^^ ^°'°"''
Crabbe, now at Kraankuil, and Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. A. H.
Henniker, about Petrusville, remained within the border, the
latter scoring a success on March ist by securing with one of his
patrols thirty-three stragglers from the departed commandos
on the banks of the Orange above Sand Drift. Besides these
there were now in Cape Colony columns under Lieut.-Colonel
H. M. Grenfell (Colenbrander and Wilson) about Nels Poort
station, Colonel Sir C. Parsons and Colonel H. J. Scobell at
Aberdeen Road, Lieut.-Colonel R. F. Lindsell around Sutherland,
Lieut.-Colonel G. F. Gorringe, soon to be joined by Lieut.-Colonel
H. de B. de Lisle and fresh levies under Lieut.-Colonel E. B.
Herbert and Colonel A. E. Codrington in the Cradock district ;
174 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
all these under the general direction of Major-General Sir H. H.
Settle, who resumed command on Lieut.-General the Hon. N. G.
Lyttelton's departure.
Now Cape Colony became the field of kaleidoscopic operations
of which the space at command renders it impossible to attempt
to arrest more than the main figures. On the one side were
Kritzinger, Fouch6, Scheepers and Malan, and many lesser
leaders, sometimes united in various combinations, sometimes
separate, now joined by some fresh arrival of minor standing
whom they absorbed, now by officers more noted than them-
selves, who for the time dominated the scene ; on the other
side were British columns, varying from fifteen to twenty in
number, pressing now this, now that commando with such tire-
less industry and infinite complexity of movement that the
symmetrical vagaries of the kaleidoscope present actually the
truest image of their activities.
Pursuit of Early in March Gorringe, marching southward through the
Kritringer. Cradock country, refound Kritzinger and 600 men at Pearston
on the 5th, and drove him towards Somerset East. Here the
Boer force was headed by de Lisle who had come by train to
Cookhouse station, and turned southward down the Vogel river,
Gorringe and de Lisle hurrying to Darlington to intercept it.
On March 7th Kritzinger was located at Waterford ; thence
he dashed due eastward to Sheldon station (March loth), and so
northward into the Winter Berg, closely dogged by the columns,
which reached Adelaide on the i6th. Kritzinger now doubled
again, leading Gorringe to Elands Drift on the Tarka river,
thence northward across the Bamboes mountains towards
Steynsburg. On the 21st he crossed the railway at Henning,
and threatened Burghersdorp. Now the hunt was swelled by
Henniker, Codrington and Crabbe, but heavy rain covered
Kritzinger's tracks and he was temporarily lost. Some reported
him to have continued northward ; others that he had doubled
back beyond Tarkastad ; nor did the discovery of a commando
at Venterstad on the 26th clear up matters, for it was suspected
that Kritzinger, like a stag too closely pressed, had roused a
fresh quarry to exhaust the hounds whilst he himself drew breath*
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY.
175
Whether this was so or not, the new game showed that it was
dangerous by destroying a British post at Van Tonder's Drift
on the last day of March, moving afterwards on Knapdaar.
Meanwhile, close to the west, on the other side of the Fish
river, Sir C. Parsons, Scobell and Colenbrander had been in
chase of Scheepers and Fouche through the districts of Aber-
deen, Graaff Reinet, Jansenville and Somerset East. A sharp
fight on March 6th, north of Aberdeen, which cost Parsons
thirty casualties, drove the Boers in disorder into the Koudeveld
Bergen, where on the 15th they were engaged by Scobell, who
took six prisoners. Crossing the railway at Marais Siding on
the 17th, and turning south-eastward, Scheepers and Fouch^
then menaced Jansenville ; but Scobell, by a march of forty-five
miles, anticipated them there, and the Boer leaders halted un-
decidedly at the junction of the Bull and Sunday's rivers. Here
they were joined by Malan from Poortje, south of Aberdeen,
whence he had been driven by Grenfell after events to be next
described. A nearly successful attempt by Scobell to surround
the trio on March 20th caused the complete disorganisation of
the commandos, which lost about 150 horses and many men^
Scobell having only seven casualties. The combination was
effectively broken up ; Scheepers and Malan crossed the line at
Kendrew, making for the Camdeboo hills, Fouch6 running in the
opposite direction for Pearston, whither Scobell, who was in
Graaff Reinet on the 24th, despatched a detachment under
Major K. E. Warden in pursuit.
Malan's appearance was to be accounted for thus. Raiding
alone at the head of the Kariega valley in the first week of March,
he had been pushed in the rear and flank by Lieut.-Colonel A. E.
Wilson from Biesjes Poort and Grenfell from Beaufort West.
The former was first in touch, and Malan turned upon him at
Stellenbosch Vallei before Grenfell, who was advancing to
Juriesfontein, could make his movement felt. Wilson was
temporarily checked ; but on Grenfell coming up next day Malan
made down the Kariega valley, being so hard pressed at Harte-
beest Kuil on the 12th that he abandoned his march on Willow-
more and turned eastward. Wilson was then recalled to Graaff
Pursuit of
Scheepers and
Fouche.
Pursuit of
Malan.
176 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Reinet, leaving the chase to Grenfell, who from the 13th drove
Malan beyond Poortje and into Scobell's sphere of operations.
On April ist Sir H. Settle established his Headquarters at
Graaff Reinet and assumed immediate command of the group
of columns in the midland area. Both combatants adopted
fresh combinations, Grenfell departing for the Northern Trans-
vaal, Gorringe falUng out to refit, Codrington's column being
broken up, whilst Crewe, Pilcher's former colleague under C. E.
Knox, came into service in the northern area, and Henniker
in the southern. On the Boer side the most notable variation
was the junction of Fouch^ with Kritzinger to the south of
Middleburg. Their union was brief, however. Pressed by
Crewe from April nth, the two commandos sidled eastward,
crossed the railway near Fish River station, and on the i8th
passed to the south of Maraisburg and thence north into the Zuur
Kriuii^er Berg. Here they separated, Kritzinger riding off to recruit in the
Orange River Orange River Colony, whilst Fouch6, followed by Crewe, passed
Colony. eastward into the Jamestown district to await his return. Mean-
while, Scheepers and Malan, attended by Scobell and Henniker,
revolved between Murraysburg, Aberdeen and Jansenville, being
nearly caught at the last-named place by Scobell on April 13th.
About this time occurred several changes amongst the British
commanders in Cape Colony. In the field, Sir H. Settle pro-
ceeded to De Aar, prior to his return to England a month later,
when he handed over his office to Colonel Colin Mackenzie, Colonel
D. Haig assuming direction of the operations in the midland
area. On April 13th Major-General Sir H. MacDonald was
ordered home, his command of the Highland brigade and the
Aliwal North — Bethulie zone being added to that of Major-
General A. FitzRoy Hart, who was already in charge of the
lines of communication from the Orange river up to below
Bloemfontein. At Cape Town Lieut. -General Sir F. Forestier-
Walker embarked for England on April i8th, and handed over
the command of Cape Colony to Major-General A. S. Wynne.
Administra- Wynne Succeeded to an office daily becoming more difficult to
cullies at administer. Upon him centred with full force all the anomalies
Cape Town. Qf ^a.r in a friendly, yet infected country. Situated as he was in
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 177
a city, which his Intelligence Department warned him was the
headquarters of treason and rebeUion, he was yet unpossessed
of the only weapon, martial law, with which such foes could
be encountered. Newspapers of republican sympathies issued
their inflammatory sheets untouched because out of his reach.
His officers looked on powerless whilst munitions of war, or
what were reported as such, and mail bags containing matter
little less encouraging to the enemy, were landed at his dock-
yards and delivered at their destinations. Suspected individuals
bound to and from ports, the very names of which were certificates
ol hostility, came and went by steamer with impunity, because
too rapidly to be waylaid by the slow and cautious process
of civil law. He was in daily and necessarily intimate contact
with leading men, some of whom he distrusted and others had
actively to oppose, so little secret was there of their sympathy
with his country's enemies ; whilst even some of those with
whom he had common cause were forced by the very duties
of their offices to run counter to him on vital pKjints of ad-
ministration. Martial law, which had been proclaimed in many
districts of the colony, stopped short at the very boundaries
within which it was most needed, those of the great seaports.
Cape Town, receiving none of its advantages, was nevertheless
the focus of all its woes and hardships, which poured into
the city, there to be bandied between the Government officers,
the natural protectors of the proclaimed districts, and Wynne,
their official oppressor. This became more marked when troops
took the field over whom Wynne had no control, though their
every misdeed amongst the farmsteads came home to him un-
failingly in a swarm of complaints which grew the more numerous
and bitter as columns entered the colony fresh from the ravagings
of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, and unable to
appreciate immediately the niceties of dealing with country-
sides which were at the same time friends to the British and
magazines to the Boers. Wynne's jurisdiction was further
complicated by its enormous extent, its lack of homogeneity,
and the difficulty of reaching its units. Forty thousand men
received his orders, but they were composed of many different
VOL. IV. 12
178 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
organisations — regulars, militia, colonials, town guards and
fencibles — and were largely locked up in the multitude of town-
ships of Cape Colony. His chief channels of administration
were the commandants of districts, officers charged with the
control of large areas infested often by open, always by secret,
enemies, and these in their turn had to rely largely upon
magistrates, whose natural antipathy to martial law was apt to
find expression in direct communication not with the military
but the civil powers in Cape Town. Such were some of the
disabilities under which Wynne and the Cape Legislature were
to labour alike in the capital until, six months later, the
proclamation of martial law in that and all the other ports
removed a source of serious weakness in the conduct of the
campaign in Cape Colony.
Pursuit of At the end of April Scobell and Henniker drove Scheepers
MdM^" *"^ and Malan northward on the line Pearston — Z wagers Hoek, a
wing of the Cape Mounted Riflemen, freshly arrived from the
Orange River Colony under Lieut.-Colonel H. T. Lukin, assisting
from the flank at Cradock ; but the Boers, breaking the cordon,
doubled back by Garstlands Kloof and were next heard of across
the railway at Daggaboers Nek. Chased thence by Henniker,
Malan and Scheepers separated after recrossing the railway near
Drennan, the former going northward past Cradock, the latter
making back for his old haunts in Somerset. At Zwagers Hoek
Scheepers was intercepted and severely punished by Henniker who
came from Witmoss on the railway, finally escaping in a snow-
storm on May 12th, much reduced in strength, by Kendrew to a
stronghold at Camdeboo. Henniker, who put in to Graaff Reinet,
kept touch with him during the rest of May by a detachment
from his column under Colonel B. Doran. Meanwhile Scobell,
finding Malan ten miles west of Cradock, handled him roughly
there on May 2nd, drove him northward across the railway near
Fish River, and closing upon him again on May 20th at Doom
Nek sigUcdly worsted him. Once more Malan, who had now
but a handful, turned for sanctuary to the nearest of his friends
whom he could hear of. He found an ally both close at hand
and of reassuring strength.
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 179
A few days earlier Kritzinger had returned across the border Kritzingcr
with fresh men and horses, rejoining Fouche, who had avoided oape'coi^ony.
Gorringe and Crewe by breaking back across the railway at
Rayner station into the Zuur Berg. The combined commandos
now numbered 1,500 men, and Haig drew every available column
towards the Zuur Berg. But the Boers, dashing past Steyns-
burg and across the branch railway near Thebus, moved on
Maraisburg, receiving the enfeebled Malan into their midst as
they marched southward. By rapid marching Gorringe placed
himself to the west of the enemy, Scobell and the others to the
south, below Maraisburg, effectually turning Kritzinger, who
flew off at a tangent into the Bamboes mountains. Here for
the next week he was so ruthlessly harried that, leaving behind
Malan and a commando of rebels under G. H. P. Van Reenan,
he crossed the railway at Cypher Gat on May 29th and pressed
on eastward. Still the British columns, finely handled by Haig,
met him at every turn. The 9th Lancers, detraining at Dor-
drecht from the Orange River Colony on June 2nd, were, with
Lukin's Cape Mounted Riflemen, placed under Scobell, who took
them at once to Toom Nek, south-east of Jamestown, to bar
Kritzinger from the east. Gorringe, with whom was a column
under Lieut. -Colonel the Hon. A. Murray, hurried north of
Jamestown and, extending his wings, joined up with Scobell on
the east, and on the west as far as Albert Junction with Crabbe,
with Lieut. -Colonel W. P. Wyndham (the 17th Lancers), who had
detrained at Burghersdorp and Colonel S. C. H. Monro's column
freshly arrived from RouxviUe. Kritzinger, boldly charging the
cordon, surprised the small and somnolent garrison of Jamestown
on June 2nd, and being then turned by Gorringe, made north-
eastward down the Holle Spruit, closely pursued by Scobell and
Gorringe. Four days later Kritzinger was all but caught as he
and his men lay asleep at Wildfontein Farm, north of the Kraai
river, where Scobell, throwing Lukin's force upon him at 3 a.m.,
killed six and captured twenty-five burghers and seventy horses,
Kritzinger himself escaping on foot into the mountains. Next
day (June 7th) he was again set upon and mu h damaged, this
time by Gorringe, aided by a force from Aliwal North under
VOL. IV. 12*
i8o
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Lieut. -Colonel W. L. White. These were but the chief of
incessant attempts to bring the evasive Boer to book, en-
deavours apparently profitless, but in sum so effectual that
before the middle of June the constant friction had worn
away two-thirds of Kritzinger's fighting strength.
Nor had Malan and his companion, Van Reenan, been left in
peace. An attempt to surprise the former in the Doom Berg on
the night of June 7th miscarried, the commando getting warning
and disappearing. But on the same night Van Reenan was com-
pletely scattered close to Steynsburg by the 17th Lancers, under
Wyndham, whose leading squadrons, led by Captain D'A. Legard,
rushed up>on the farm buildings which sheltered the commando
and cleared them, capturing twenty-three prisoners. Legard was
seriously, and two men mortally, wounded in the affair.
Approximate Strength States of Columns referred to in
foregoing chapter.
COLUMN.
M
MM
H
&
a g
is
0
•2
1
0*7
a
1
a
1
647
200
2
^_
427
179
2
2
432
s
—
830
I
—
500
I
—
Soo
3
3
879
"5
5
I
—
242
2
—
530
—
3
—
461
30*
3
—
400
122
3
I
210
55
2
—
700
3
I
690
—
3
I
185
—
2
I
820
—
3
3
648
—
3
I
426
—
3
March — April, 1901.
Lt.-Col. E. M. S. Crabbe
Lt.-Col. the Hon. A. H.
Henniker
Lt.-Col. H. M. Grenfell
Lt.-Col. J. W. Colenbrandcr
Lt.-Col. A. E. Wilson
Col. Sir C. Parsons . .
Col. H. J. Scobell . .
Lt.-Col. R. F. Lindsell
Lt.-Col. G. F. Gorringe
Lt.-Col. H. de B. de Lisle
Lt.-Col. E. B. Herbert
Col. A. E. Codrington
Lt. Col. C. P. Crewe
Lt.-Col. H. T. Lukin
Lt.-Col. the Hon. A. Murray
Col. S. C. H. Monro
Lt.-Col. W. L. White
Lt.-Col. W. P. Wyndham
Major-General Sir H.
Settle directing (later
Colonel D. Haig as-
sumed the direction
of the columns in the
midland area).
* Cyclists.
Note. — Major-Generals IL A. MacDonald and H. H. Settle were created Knights
Commander of the Bath for services during 1899-1900. — Londott Gazette,
April 19th, 1901.
i8i
CHAPTER XL
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL*
{Continued from Chapter VII.).
MAY — AUGUST, I9OI.
On May ist Lord Methuen marched from Mafeking south- Operations in
eastward in order to gain touch with Willson's columns for com- ^Jj-p district,
bined operations in the Klerksdorp district. On the 3rd he
passed through Lichtenburg, and two days later came near
Brakpan, where he hoped to get sight of WiUson. As usual,
the enemy, undeterred by their recent discomfitures on this very
spot,t were in occupation of Brakpan, and a party nearly suc-
ceeded in cutting off some of Lord Methuen's transport, which
had been wrongly guided behind the column. Beaten off once
they continued to follow, were reinforced a few miles further
on, and were only deterred by the forming up of the whole of
the rearguard behind the wagons. These manoeuvres were
intended to distract Lord Methuen's attention from their
own transport, which was making off across the British front,
guarded by 500 burghers. The convoy was nevertheless espied,
and the 5th and loth Imperial Yeomanry giving chase, returned
with seven prisoners, one of the British field-pieces which had
been lost at Zilikat's Nek, J and a few wagons. The c>!umn
bivouacked at Brakpan. During the day Lord Methuen was
in communication with Babington, who was waiting on the
Taaibosch Spruit, and plans were instantly made for combina-
tion. The object was the Hartebeestfontein hills, so long the
* See map No. 59. t See Chapter VII.
X See Volume III., page 240.
i82 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
haunt of De la Key and his lieutenants, and the troops were
already well placed for a converging descent upon the stronghold
by Lord Methuen, Babington, Sir H. Rawlinson, and a column
under Lieut. -Colonel E. C. Ingouville Williams, which Major-
General M. Willson brought out from Klerksdorp. But the
carefully-laid trap, working perfectly on the 6th, closed upon
nothing, nor was there the slightest intimation as to the
direction the game had taken. A series of confused and profit-
less attempts to intercept first a possible northward, then a
southward flight, concluded by Lord Methuen and Sir H. Raw-
linson marching parallel, following a trail, towards the western
line of railway, the former arriving at Mafeking, the latter, who
took several small laagers on the way, at Maribogo on May 12th.
Willson's other columns continued to operate in the Wolmaran-
stad area, Dixon, from Tafel Kop, coming down towards them
as far as Leeuwfontein. All had fighting, but with such scat-
tered bands as to render still more uncertain the direction in
which the main Boer force had vanished. On May 8th Babing-
ton, scouting from Palmietfontein, intercepted a convoy travel-
ling northward, and took twenty prisoners and forty- four wagons
and carts. Two days later E. C, L Williams, whilst marching
for Korannafontein, came upon a considerable commando east
of that place and drove it off headlong. The success of the
attack was marred by the misfortune of a troop of the New
South Wales Mounted Rifles, who, mistaking a party of Boers
for comrades, were cut off and lost two officers and eight men
as they ran the gauntlet back to their own side.
On May 14th Willson's columns were again near Klerksdorp,
having secured between them seventy-six prisoners, more than
100 vehicles and mj'riads of sheep and other stock. The general
result of the combination had been thoroughly to smoke the
hive at Hartebeestfontein ; but the swarm was still at large,
and there is little doubt but that to scatter guerrillas of the type
of the Boers is a military misfortune rather than a gain.
On May 15th Babington departed to command a brigade of
cavalr}^ handing over the leadership of his own column to
Lieut.-Colonel W. B. Hickie, whilst Major-General R. S. R.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 183
Fetherstonhaugh was kppointed to direct the group composed
of the columns commanded by Hickie, E. C. I. Williams and
Sir H. Rawlinson. The last-named was now on the march back
from the western line, whence Lord Methuen was also returning.
Nothing of importance occurred during the rest of May except
an attack on a Potchefstroom — Ventersdorp convoy on the
23rd. The attack, which was twice repeated, was of a deter-
mined nature, and the convoy was surrounded and all but taken
as it came within sight of Ventersdorp. The Boers were kept
off, however, by the stubborn defence of the escort, under Major
P. Palmes (Loyal North Lancashire) and Captain E. C. Purchas
(South Wales Borderers), and by a gun which the Commandant
at Ventersdorp, Major J. H. du B. Travers (South Wales Bor-
derers), took out from the village with what men he had — some
twenty in all — and the convoy barely escaped with the loss of
six killed and thirty-one wounded amongst the escort. At the
end of May Lord Methuen was at Lichtenburg with thirty-five
prisoners and seventy-eight vehicles, captured in two raids
between Mafeking and the Little Harts river ; Sir H. Rawlinson
was back at Brakspruit ; Hickie and E. C. L Williams at Klerks-
dorp, Fetherstonhaugh having received orders to concentrate
his command consequent upon events now to be related.
Since May 8th Dixon had been moving into the area from
Tafel Kop, marching by way of Putfontein on the Lichtenburg
— Ventersdorp road, where he surprised and captured twenty-
five of a laager of 100 Boers. From Leeuwfontein (May loth —
12th), he marched by the Schoon Spruit and Witpoortje to Wel-
verdiend on the railway (May 17th). Hence he returned north
by the direct route to Naauwpoort (May 24th), halted there one
day, and on the 26th set out westward, with twelve days' sup-
plies, to clear the Witwatersrand towards his former p)ost at Tafel
Kop. That height had been by no means deserted during the
fortnight of Dixon's absence. Like Hartebeestfontein near Boerstrong-
Klerksdorp, hke Kromdraai at the head of the Wilge river, like ^°'^*-
Blauw Kop on the Vaal, the Elands Berg in the Wakkerstroom
district, and a number of other places of the kind, Tafel Kop pro-
vided a secure and commanding camping ground, very valuable
1 84 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
in a wide and inhospitable terrain such as South Africa.
At such spots the enemy was always to be found, either concen-
trating before an engagement, or taking rest or refuge after one.
They became as well known to the troops as storm-centres to
the meteorologist, and there were but few expeditions through-
out the long campaign which had not one or the other of these
places as their objects. So familiar were they, and as a matter
of course so easily defensible — otherwise they would not have
answered the enemy's purpose — that it may well be worth con-
sideration whether such strongholds, which are the bases of all
guerrilla warfare, should not be impregnably fortified and held
at the very outset of campaigns like that in progress in South
Africa in 1901 ; and for this but small garrisons would be neces-
sary. In richer and more enclosed theatres of war such a mode
of action would of course be impossible ; but fortunately guerrilla
warfare does not commonly occur in such theatres ; if it did it
would bid fair to be interminable.
Thus it happened that no sooner had Dixon disappeared from
Tafel Kop on May 8th when the place began to refill with Boers
Kemp collects from all directions. General Kemp, one of De la Key's most
a force. dashing subordinates, had been invested with almost supreme
powers of commandeering in this district, and thoroughly he
exercised them. From every side appeared bands which after
the manner of their kind had been resting, idling, or wandering
in the neighbouring valleys and ranges, until Kemp, finding him-
self in command of nearly 3,000 men, began to look about for a
task worthy of so imposing a force.
Dixon's return at once gave him the opportunity he sought.
The British column was alone and weak, weaker indeed than it
ought to have been, for 200 of Dixon's mounted men had been de-
tained on the Unes of communication, whilst some of his infantry
were on convoy duty in Krugersdorp. Moving east as Dixon
Dixon approached from Naauwpoort on May 28th, Kemp was in obser-
marches from yatiou from Basfontein to Tafel Kop, his parties being sighted and
Naauwpoort. .^. , ■, r . , .
slightly engaged by Dixon as he made for a campmg ground at
Vlakfontein. Not a whisper of the Boer concentration had
reached the British commander. On the 29th he made a short
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 185
march to search for some guns and ammunition reported to be
buried on the farms at Vlakhoek and Waterval, close to the
north-west. The approaches to them from Vlakfontein con-
sisted of two parallel ridges with a valley between. Dixon,
conforming his dispositions to the ground, marched in three divi-
sions, sending Lieut. -Colonel C. E. Duff with 100 Scottish Horse,
two companies King's Own Scottish Borderers, and two guns
8th battery R.F.A. along the right-hand (northern) ridge ; Major
H. Chance with 250 men Imperial Yeomanry, 100 men of the
Derbyshire regiment, two guns 28th battery R.F.A. and a
Vickers-Maxim along the left-hand ridge ; he himself followed
the central depression with two companies King's Own Scottish
Borderers, one company Derbyshire regiment, two guns 8th
battery R.F.A. and a howitzer.
Waterval, the first farm searched, proved empty, though a
large hole in the ground showed where the guns had once lain
buried. Dixon then faced about to investigate Vlakhoek, east of Dixon's
Waterval. This wheel transferred his former left flank into a viaWonSn?^
rearguard, Chance being so instructed by a message sent from
Waterval before the movement began. Finding nothing at
Vlakhoek Dixon ordered a general retirement to camp, and soon
he and Duff were on the march towards Vlakfontein, expecting
Chance, from whose direction some unimportant firing had been
heard, to follow. But Chance did not appear, and there was
no intimation of events on his f)osition until Dixon, nearing
camp, became aware to his amazement that shrapnel from that
very ridge, and from Chance's own guns, was bursting amongst
the tents.
With an enemy in the neighbourhood Chance's position had
from the first been peculiarly dangerous, for the nature of the
ground rendered it well-nigh impossible to guard against sur-
prise. Running east and west, the ridge at its western ex- His
tremity fell steeply to a deep donga, beyond which a rocky and vukfoStJL
bush-covered kopje rose again athwart the general Ime of the
ridge like the cross-piece of the letter " T." To the south
another ridge ran parallel to and of equal height with that
occupied by Chance, who could see little of either of these
i86 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
neighbouring heights owing to the convex nature of the contours
of his own hill, on the bare summit of which his men had little
or no cover. The position, in short, resembled closely that at
Nicholson's Nek in Natal, where Sir G. White's detachment
had met with so serious a reverse in the earliest days of the
campaign.*
Chance, having previously reconnoitred the ground, had
better acquaintance with its dangers than means to obviate
them. The wooded kopje on the west was too distant to hold,
and the donga beneath it consequently untenable. He could,
therefore, do no more in this direction than throw out upon his
own side of the hollow a screen of mounted men, whom he strictly
ordered to halt a thousand yards short of and overlooking the
donga. Behind these he placed a party in support, and in rear
of these again his two guns and infantry, the left of the whole
being guarded by a troop (twenty-five men) of Imperial Yeo-
manry, which he sent under an officer on to the parallel ridge
to the south. From the very moment when Dixon's retrograde
movement from Waterval on Vlakhoek and the camp con-
verted Chance's party from flankguard to rearguard, this troop
of Yeomanry, which was composed of men totally fresh to cam-
paigning, became the most important unit in the field, for they
Kemp attacks Were then rearmost of all and nearest to the enemy. Kemp,
VkWontein ^^^ ^^^ ^* °^^^ marked Chance's ridge as the vulnerable point
May 29th, of Dixon's whole disposition, was equally quick to discern the
*^^' joint in the harness. Despatching part of his force to the south-
ward towards the Yeomanry on the ridge, he attracted attention
in the other direction by delivering a frontal attack from the
woody cross-kopje across the donga up the western spur of
Chance's ridge, that is, full against the screen and supports
which lay in front of the guns. As they advanced the Boers
lighted the dry veld grass, and coming on behind the smoke and
flame, were soon upon the summit. Their attack here, which
they had taken little pains to conceal, had been visible from
the first, and Chance's artillery had no difficulty in bringing it to
a check. It was plain, however, that in view of Dixon's retire-
• See Volume I., Chapter X.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 187
ment, which was then in progress, the rearguard was now too
far westward ; and, amidst considerable firing. Chance withdrew
his screen, guns and infantry about a mile along the ridge,
towards the camp. As he did so the detached troop on his left,
which was also being smothered by the smoke of an advancing
fire, retired likewise ; but instead of reporting their action to
Chance, they fell back directly eastward, unknown to the rest, so
that Chance knew nothing of the exposure of his flank. Kemp,
on the other hand, who had been keenly watching this very
spot, was instantly aware of his advantage. Rushing on at great
speed behind the racing fire, the burghers swept unseen across
the depression between the two ridges, and in a moment ap-
peared in the very midst of the guns, shooting down the gunners
and teams, and playing havoc with the escort. There was a
brief, but for one combatant hopeless, miUe, in which many
gallant acts were performed by men of both sides. The few
gunners who were not laid low by the first volley attempted to
fire with case ; but their own magazine was ablaze and no
other shells could be reached. Then the drivers, riding into the
midst of the press, strove to extricate the guns : every horse and
most of the riders were shot at once. In a few moments the hill
was covered with dead ; and when all resistance was crushed the
Boers, who had brought artillerymen with them, seized the guns
and turned them towards the camp which Dixon, as related, was
in the act of entering with the rest of his forces.
At about that moment a messenger whom Chance had con-
trived to despatch before the end of the struggle around the
guns reached Dixon with news which confirmed the need for
instant help on the ridge. Dixon immediately launched a Dixon's
counter-attack as daring as it was rapid. Some time earher, auack^"^
just before falling back on camp, he had posted on a knoll at the
western end of Vlakfontein two guns of the 28th battery R.F.A ,
the howitzer, a Vickers-Maxim, with a company of the Derbyshire
regiment to act as a covering force to his own and Chance's
retirement. Sending these to the front, and Duff with his sec-
tion of artillery back to his former ridge, he ordered a general
advance. The Boers at once turned the fire of the captured
i88 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
guns from the camp to the troops, shelling especially the guns of
the 8th battery with Duff. But once more a victorious com-
mando had spent its strength and spirit upon its first success.
Dixon's troops, attacking by rushes which were not to be stopped
by any fire, came to within 600 yards of the sc^ne of disaster,
and were about to hurl themselves over the ridge when the
burghers' hearts failed. Mounting hastily they galloped away,
leaving all their trophies on the field. Thus for only the second
time in the campaign — the first had been at Wagon Hill — a reso-
lute counter-stroke had retrieved the apparently hopeless fortunes
of the day. Moreover, it had cost the enemy more than his so
nearly won triumph. Forty-one burghers bit the dust on the
spot ; many more fell out of sight or were removed. The heavy
losses on the British side — 186 officers and men* — were chiefly
amongst Chance's detachment, and the value of the lesson taught
by Dixon lay in the small expense with which he had re-taken
both the guns and the ground of a wing which had been
annihilated.
In spite of his hard-won success Dixon could not disguise
from himself that his column was not only useless, but in extreme
danger in the presence of the greatly superior forces of Kemp.
At any moment the tables might be turned on him as quickly as
he had turned them on his adversary. After burying his dead,
and allowing Kemp, who asked permission under a flag of truce,
to do the same, Dixon, instead of persisting to Tafel Kop, fell back
on Naauwpoort, whilst every available column moved to rein-
force him. Fetherstonhaugh's already mentioned concentra-
tion at Klerksdorp was consequent on receipt of the news of
Concentration Vlakfouteiu. From the west came Lord Methuen with orders
^"ins" K?mp. to b^ ^t ^oo^^ ^op, next to Tafel Kop, on June 8th ; from the
east Brigadier-General G. Hamilton, now in command of a
brigade of cavalry at Heidelberg ; whilst in Pretoria Colonel
E. H. H. Allenby was held in readiness to co-operate when
the projected sweep should have arrived within reach.
Fetherstonhaugh moved from Klerksdorp with his three
* Casualties — Killed and died of wounds, six officers, fifty-one men ; wounded, six
officers, 115 men ; missing, one officer, seven men.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 189
columns (Sir H. Rawlinson, E. C. I. Williams and Hickie)
on June ist ; was at Ventersdorp on the 3rd, at Klipkrans next
day, and on the 7th upon the scene of Dixon's engagement.
With support thus at hand Dixon himself quitted Naauwpoort
on the same day, and leaving to Fetherstonhaugh the area to
the west of the Magaliesberg, followed the north-eastern slopes
to Boschhoek, whilst Fetherstonhaugh moved on through the
broken country to Kosterfontein, turning thence towards Rus-
tenburg to Roodewal, where he captured seventeen prisoners
and thirty-three carts and wagons. He then lined up his columns
along the Rustenburg — Zeerust road, intending to drive the
country up to the Elands river in conjunction with Lord Methuen,
who had arrived at Brakfontein on the 9th. Lord Methuen,
however, came no further, and Fetherstonhaugh, who was so
little in need of more troops that he had dispensed with the
assistance of G. Hamilton, whom he sent into Krugersdorp,
proceeded to the banks of the Elands river at Bestershoek.
Still no considerable body of the enemy was to be found ; indeed, Kemp
scarcely a Boer was seen until Fetherstonhaugh, returning south- '^PP^""^-
wards, came upon a moderate gathering on the old ground at
Vlakhoek. His attempt to enclose it on June 13th was foiled by
the dispersion of the enemy, and after a raid up the valley of the
Selous river, which produced six prisoners, he returned with
Hickie and Sir H. Rawlinson to Ventersdorp, leaving Dixon at
Selouskraal, G. Hamilton close to Tafel Kop, E. C. L Williams
at Krugersdorp, and Allenby at Doom Kop.
The last-named had been out since the loth in the Hekpoort
valley, where he had been joined by G. Hamilton from Krugers-
dorp on the 12th. As usual he had found the useful passage at
Breedts Nek strongly held. A brisk skirmish on June 14th had
temporarily cleared the pass ; but Allenby, moving on westward,
once more left it to the enemy, who thus still retained both a
gate of escape and a sallyport for attack through the mountains.
For a week after these indecisive operations there was a pause,
the only movement being that of Sir H. Rawlinson and Hickie
into Klerksdorp, consequent on an unfounded alarm that the
town was in danger. This part of the Western Transvaal indeed
190
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
The problem
of the Western
Transvaal.
The country
driven
towards
Zeerust,
had become a rock in the path which was beginning to be recog-
nised as being only soluble by the vinegar of time. All that
could be done had been done ; in every direction columns and
groups of columns had swept until their tracks crossed and re-
crossed each other almost beyond the power to trace them.
Still the enemy remained at about his original strength, losing
it is true a few here and there, but making good his losses from
the recruiting grounds provided by the lonely farms and valleys,
where hundreds of recreant burghers only awaited the advent of
a capable leader to take the field again for some bold enterprise.
Yet scarcely a rifleman was to be found when sought for. The
columns with Fetherstonhaugh might have been wandering in
a wilderness haunted by a few bandits, so little had they seen
of armed strength worthy to have called so elaborate a concen-
tration from its base. WTiat had become of Kemp and his
three thousand, of Badenhorst, of De la Key himself ? Since
they were neither in the north, east nor south, the western
watershed remained the only undrawn covert, and on June 26th
orders were issued for a general drive in the direction of Zeerust
by way of the Magahesberg valley and the Zwart Ruggens moun-
tains. Accordingly on June 29th, E. C. I. WiUiams, arriving at
Vlakfontein, was in touch with Sir H. Rawlinson and Hickie at
Khpkrans, the three columns manoeuvring next day to get into
line from Roodewal through Basfontein to Rietfontein. Kemp
was reported to be at Koperfontein ; but only a small band
was unearthed about Basfontein, which, after an attempt to
capture WiUiams' baggage, was driven off with loss, Williams'
casualties being three. Kemp himself, however, was close by,
as was proved by the receipt of a flag of truce seeking permission
to bury the dead. Meanwhile Dixon, who was also to take part
in the expedition, had moved up to Bashoek at the western
extremity of the Magaliesberg.
On July ist the westward march began. It would serve no
purpose to follow its various stages, so destitute were they of any
marked features. The columns were opposed throughout, or
rather harassed than opposed, and on July loth entered Zeerust
with a few prisoners. Four days before this Lord Methuen had
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 191
been in the town, coming from Mafeking on his way into the
Enzelberg to the north. He was back at Zeerust on the day of
its evacuation by Fetherstonhaugh, and in Mafeking again on
the i6th. After taking in ten days' suppUes Fetherstonhaugh 's
columns set out on the 12th for the return march to Klerksdorp,
which was reached on the 28th. This stage was sUghtly more
eventful than the former. On the 17th Hickie's camp at Doom-
bult was attacked with some determination by 200 Boers, to
drive off whom some close fighting was necessary. Next day
the same band endeavoured to cut off Hickie's rearguard, only
to be again chased from the field with loss. Throughout these
operations Dixon had been somewhat detached from che rest^
though he entered Zeerust on the same day from the line of the
Elands river. At the close he went to Welverdiend, and thence
by the direct route northward to Naauwpoort and OUfants Nek,
which he reached on July 31st, handing over command of his
column shortly afterwards to Colonel R. G. Kekewich.
Whilst Dixon was thus occupied Hickie and E. C. I. and from
Williams, leaving Sir H. Rawlinson in Klerksdorp, again took the to Taungs!'
field, heading this time due westward through Hartebeestfontein
towards the Little Harts river, which Lord Methuen was also
approaching from Lichtenburg. Hartebeestfontein was for once
clear, but a short distance beyond it the enemy had laid an
ambush which E. C. L Williams detected in time to turn the
tables by attacking the flanks of the would-be surprisers and
scattering them over the veld. Four casualties resulted on
Wilhams' side and six on the other, no fewer than thirty- two
horses being shot in the affray. Thereafter both columns
made straight across country, and striking the Harts river at
Kopjesvlei, marched down it past Schweizer Reneke to Taungs,
which was entered on August 8th with fifty-nine prisoners, and
nearly 100 captured vehicles. The return journey to Klerksdorp
was commenced the next day, the columns marching with their
right on the right bank of the Vaal, which Hickie touched at
Bloemhof on August 15th. Next day E. C. L Williams came
in touch with a Boer convoy travelling eastward. A three
days' chase through Leeuwboschen and Brandewynskuil, with
192
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Lord Methuen
drives from
Taungs to
Klerksdorp.
Operations of
G. Hamilton,
Allenby and
Kekewich.
a halt at Wolmaranstad, resulted in the capture of nine
wagons ; but these were known to be only a fragment of the
fugitive train, which was now reported to have doubled westward.
E. C. I. Williams hurried to intercept it at Katdoomplaat. In
this he was successful. Group by group the wagons were over-
hauled and taken, the resistance of the escorts being summarily
swept aside by the New South Wales Mounted Rifles, and on the
evening of the i8th E. C. I. Williams halted at Spruitplaats
with eighteen prisoners and more than lOO wagons and carts.
On August 23rd both columns were back at Klerksdorp.
In this operation Lord Methuen had co-operated from Lich-
tenburg, and a small column under Lieut. -Colonel A. B. Scott
from Vryburg. Lord Methuen had quitted Taungs in company
with Fetherstonhaugh, and getting upon his left flank, swept
eastward in line with him across to Klerksdorp. Approaching
Wolmaranstad on August 15th, he intercepted and captured a
convoy which was making off from Fetherstonhaugh's south-
easterly advance, taking twelve prisoners, sixty-two vehicles,
and large herds of stock. Three days later, when passing to the
north of Wolmaranstad at Korannafontein, he in his turn suffered
some loss by a patrol of Yeomanry falling into an ambush which
deprived them of twenty-four officers and men, of whom fourteen
were made prisoners. On August 22nd Lord Methuen arrived
in Klerksdorp, where he stayed until the 27th.
Turning back to the other columns : during July G. Hamil-
ton had never ceased to move about Klerksdorp, Potchefstroom,
Ventersdorp and Wolmaranstad, putting in at the first-named
place on the last day of the month. He had had constant
skirmishing, and one brisk and successful affair on the 26th at
Bhnkklip, where, deceiving Potgieter by a ruse, with four
casualties he captured his entire laager of thirty vehicles, with
ten of the escort, the like number escaping wounded. Early in
the month G. Hamilton was temporarily strengthened by
Western's column from the Orange River Colony. Allenby,
too, had a few days' co-operation with Hamilton, and was then
ordered north into the Magaliesberg. Approaching BreedtsNek
he came upon a force guarding the southern entrance, which
Breedts Nek.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 193
he promptly attacked on July loth, and deprived of thirteen
prisoners and their belongings. Two days later, at Nooitgedacht,
the scene of Clements' engagement in the previous December,
he found another laager of thirteen wagons, all of which were
burnt by the flames from a dynamite wagon which had been
exploded by a shell from Allenby's 5-in. howitzer. On the 31st
his camp was at Boschfontein, whence he issued to assist through
Olifants Nek a convoy which Kekewich was taking from
Naauwpoort to Rustenburg.
Kekewich, after delivering his convoy, came back through
Olifants Nek, and instead of returning to Naauwpoort .turned
eastward and co-operated with Allenby in an attack on Breedts
Nek. The enemy abandoned it at once, and on August 7th the Occupation of
pass which had assisted to more than one British reverse was at
last crowned with a defensive p)ost.
Whilst Allenby remained about Breedts Nek with parties out
in all directions, Kekewich moved eastward along the Magalies-
berg to Boschfontein and Elandskraal. Allenby, keeping touch
with him, reinforced him with mounted men through the rift
at Damhoek, eight miles north-east of Hekpoort, which was
held by Barton's infantry. The enemy was unexpectedly
numerous in these often-scoured ravines. At Elandskraal on
August loth forty-one prisoners fell to Kekewich's search parties
after scarcely a shot had been fired, and cattle were to be taken
at every step. After halting a while at Commando Nek, and re-
filling with supplies at Rietfontein, Kekewich turned north to
clear the Hekpoort and Sterkstroom valleys, then south (August
24th) to Wolhuter's Kop across the Rustenburg road. There he
remained until fresh orders came at the end of the month
relative to a projected operation against Kemp, causing him
to move to Broadwood's old camping ground at Oorzaak on
the 31st. On August 19th Allenby also refitted at Rietfontein,
and after accompanying Kekewich northward, returned on the
29th to Rustenburg, whence he too moved in accordance with the
same instructions as had reached Kekewich, the effect of which
will be described in a subsequent chapter.*
» See Chapter XVI.
VOL. IV. 13
194 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
About the middle of August AUenby had had another brief
co-operation with G. Hamilton. That officer had marched
from Klerksdorp on the 5th ; and raiding northward through
Geduld and across the Taaibosch Spruit, in pursuit of a com-
mando under Liebenberg which no effort could bring to a stand,
was in Ventersdorp on the 12th. Hence he moved vi<f Klipkrans
into the Witwatersrand at Basfontein, where he came into touch
with Allenby. An attack on Basfontein made jointly with the
6th Dragoon Guards (Carabiniers) from Allenby's force on
August 14th resulted in the capture of a laager of thirty-eight
carts and wagons, three Boers being killed, ten captured, Allenby
losing an officer and six men killed and wounded. G. Hamilton,
followed by skirmishers, of whom he captured three, then
reconnoitred Tafel Kop, returning to Ventersdorp on August
i8th. On the 21st he came near the railway at Kaalfontein to
take charge of a convoy for Rustenburg, coming from Krugers-
dorp. After this had been carried out without incident, G.
Hamilton was detailed to join Allenby and Kekewich in the
above referred to scheme, which was also about to absorb the
attention of Lord Methuen, and the three columns under
Fetherstonhaugh.
Minor Two frcsh bodics of troops working in the neighbourhood
at this time must be referred to, namely, that of Major-General
Barton who was covering the establishment of a line of block-
houses for occupation by the South African Constabulary in the
Hekpoort valley, and another, under Colonel Lord Basing (Royal
Dragoons), which was affording similar cover to a blockhouse
line building from Breed ts Nek to Frederikstad, the other end
of which was watched by a force under Lieut. -Colonel W.
Fry (West Yorkshire). Both Barton and Lord Basing had
come out from Pretoria, the former on June 24th, the latter on
July i6th.
On August 5th Lord Basing was detached in pursuit of a
party of Boers under P. De la Key, which had broken south
from Barton's stopping line along the Hekpoort valley. After
a circuitous chase by Vlakplaats, Kaalfontein and Steenkoppies,
the Boers dodging amongst the rapidly growing blockhouses,
columns.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 195
Lord Basing was stopped near Olifants Nek, having fairly broken
up P. De la Rey's band by incessant hunting, and picked up
thirteen of his men who had fallen behind. On August 15th
Lord Basing repaired to Krugersdorp, where he was entrained
for Springfontein, to assist in the turning of Smuts from
Cape Colony.*
Other troops new to the area were those of Lieut. -Colonel Operations of
F. S. Garratt, who, starting from Springs on July gth, had come *^™"*
past Vereeniging to the Los Berg. Before him fled a Boer
convoy which was come up with just as it had crossed the Vaal
at Lindequee on the 21st. Garratt, sending 100 men across the
drift in pursuit, had surrounded the whole with Uttle fighting
when General Smuts, appearing from the west, hastened to the
rescue with a strong commando. Twenty-six prisoners and
fourteen wagons were nevertheless secured and brought across
the river, and next day Garratt pushed out to come to terms
with Smuts. That leader, however, after several rearguard
actions, established himself too strongly at Buffelshoek to be
disturbed, and Garratt returned to Lindequee, whilst Sir H.
Rawlinson took his men out from Klerksdorp and moved vid
Potchefstroom to his assistance. On July 27th the two were
in touch with each other, and also with a small column come
out from Vereeniging under Brigadier-General G. G. Cunningham.
On the 28th, whilst Garratt moved down the right bank of
the Vaal, Sir H. Rawlinson and the Vereeniging column fell in
concert upon a commando which was laagered near the junction
of the Krommellboog Spruit with the Vaal. The Boers fled
before a determined attack by Sir H. Rawhnson's mounted
infantry, making off so fast south-west through Vredefort that,
gallop as he would, Rawlinson could not catch them. The whole
of the convoy fell into his hands, however, with some score of
prisoners and twenty-five wagons. On the next day Sir H.
Rawlinson was called away for operations elsewhere, and Garratt,
continuing alone, had just regained touch with the enemy at
Schoeman's Drift when he received orders to join in the same
movement which had drawn Sir H. Rawlinson away from him.
* See Chapter XIV.
VOL. IV. 13*
196 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
This was the passage of the three columns of Major-General
Elliot E. L. Elliot's division on their way southward to cany out the
appearance in great Sweep south of the Vaal and west of the main railway
Tra^^^™ down to the Modder river, the initiation of which is described
elsewhere.* On July 23rd Elhot's Headquarters were at Klerks-
dorp, where he absorbed two other minor columns, those of
Colonels Henry and Western, the former of whom had been
working in the Hoopstad district, the latter about Bothaville
and Coal Mines. Elliot made but a brief pause within the Western
Transvaal. On July 28th he marched out with all his seven
columns due southward to Yzerspruit and Koedoesdraai, passing
at once beyond the limits of this chapter.*
In three weeks' time Garratt re-appeared in the Western
Transvaal. Having acted in second line during the greater
part of Elliot's advance, on August 21st he turned northward
again, and recrossing the river at Wonderwater, made for Los
Berg, where he expected to find parties which had broken aside
from the front of Elliot's sweep. Nor was he mistaken. A
laager discovered on the 23rd in the recesses of the Los Berg
was easily captured, and was being removed when 300 Boers,
coming south from the Gatsrand, attempted to rescue their
wagons. For a time they pressed hard, but Garratt pushed them
as strongly back, and after a spirited encounter drove them
northward, losing four officers and men himself, and capturing
eight and killing three of the enemy. Until the end of the month
he remained in this neighbourhood, actively covering the con-
struction of a line of blockhouses which was to deny this favourite
haunt to the enemy. Constantly patrolling amongst the hills,
he had another successful affair on August 28th, taking nine and
killing one of a party of twenty-five Boers who were laagered
at Enzelpoort. These were stragglers from a larger convoy
which had gone on to Weltevreden, where Garratt engaged
them the same evening, securing three more prisoners.
• See Chapter XI\'.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 197
Approximate Strength States of Columns referred to in
foregoing chapter.
COLUMN.
a
1-
1
c
a
1
s
May — August, 190 1.
Lt.-Gen. Lord P. Methuen
1,163
150
10
2
Brig. -Gen. H. G. Dixon , .
1,050
1,216
8
2
)
Maj.-Gen. J. M. Babington
860
580
9
—
Col. Sir H. Rawlinson (late
( Maj. • Gen. Mildmay
Shekleton's)
1,250
2
f Willson in command.
Lt.-Col. E. C. Ingouville
Williams . .
S69
169
3
-^
Lt.-Col. W. B. Hickie (late
Babington's)
849
Soo
8
—
Maj.-Gen. R. S. R.
Lt.-Col. E. C. Ingouville
> Fetherstonhaugh in
Williams . .
996
168
4
—
command.
Col. Sir H. Rawlinson
».279
—
8
Brig.-Gen. H. G. Dixon
760
555
8
I
Brig.-Gen. G. Hamilton . .
1,060
356
3
3
Col. E. H. H. Allenby
740
729
7
I
Col. R. G. Kekewich
576
83s
4
2
Lt.-Col. F, S. Garratt
870
296
5
I
Col. St. G. C. Henrv
66^1
265
3
I
1
Col. W. G. B. We.st'em
670
118
3
I
/
Brig.-Gen. R. G. Broad-
I Maj.-Gen. E. L. Elliot
wood . . ...
2,032
—
5
3
in command.
Col. E. C. Bethune..
991
—
5
I
Lt.-Col. H. de B. de Lisle
967
—
5
2
Col. Lord Basing . .
442
-
3
I
Lt.-Col. F. Hacket-Thomp-
1
Maj.-Gen. G. Barton
son
269
671
5
I
in command.
Lt.-Col. W. Fry ..
40
792
2
—
198
CHAPTER XII.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL*
{Continued from Chapter VIII.).
JUNE — SEPTEMBER, I9OI.
To arrest the broken bubbles of mercury were a similar task to
that which at this time confronted Lord Kitchener's troops.
In all parts of South Africa they were called upon daily to get
sight of the invisible, to crush the impalpable, and to surround —
Difficulties of nothing. The Commander-in-Chief clearly realised the nature
the campaign. q£ ^-^q problem before him.f His heaviest blows, though they
never failed to break up the enemy, did so into fragments so
numerous and full of vitality that there was not a soldier in
the British forces but wished that they might re-unite into a
body worth finding, worth striking, or capable of being found
and struck. Few such gatherings were in the field ; a dozen
Boers had become a notable prize for a strong colimin ; a lield-
cometcy for a whole complicated operation ; neither were often
to be secured at all, and never without labour and wastage out
of all proportion to the reward. Such is the triimiph — prolonged
perhaps, though inevitably doomed to extinction — of guerrilla
warfare, and, of the belligerents concerned, only soldiers of
experience and keen sight can avoid being impatient on the
one side or contemptuous on the other. Not only the Boers at
this juncture had doubts whether the British forces had not
become but " an army of cow-catchers, "J when chiefly droves
of stock, every thousand head of which would have been willingly
* See map No. 56. t Despatches, July 8th, 1901.
X Diary of a Burgher.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 199
exchanged by the captors for but a single rifleman, poured into
the camps, or perished in heaps upon the veld, the useless
trophies of exhausting campaigns.
Yet even the Boer supphes seemed inexhaustible. Expedi-
tions which brought in thousands of beasts had only to sally
out again to find thousands more ; conflagrations which illu-
minated the whole horizon seemed impotent to bum the crops ;
broad belts of ransacked farms ran only Uke lanes of ruin through
districts which still afforded not only shelter but subsistence.
In short, in spite of the enormous efforts of the British columns,
the Republican forces were being but slowly whittled.
Even in the much scoured region of the High Veld there still
roved at least 6,000 men, and only so much territory as lay
within the British outposts was conquered. Thus there was no
rest for the various coliunns dealt with in Chapter VHI. The
early days of June saw each and all of them once more in motion,
until the Eastern Transvaal was again alive with bodies of troops
from the Mauch Berg down to the borders of Natal. First,
Plumer, E. C. Knox and Rimington, within three days of their
conclusion of one set of operations, set out to undertake another
— this time to the south of the Vaal river, where the country
between Amersfoort and Piet Retief was reported to be as rife
with the enemy as though French and his array of columns had
never been. Next, Beatson, revisiting the district at the junc-
tion of the Steenkool (or Steenbok) Spruit and Oliphant river,
found the enemy not only present but so aggressive that Sir
B. Blood, whose forces were still busied between Carolina and
Amsterdam, had to move westward with four colimins to his
assistance. Spens, Park, Benson and Douglas returned from
a raid northward of the Delagoa Bay railway line, with
captures sufficient to show how much they had met and
left behind. Nor did Bullock brush fruitlessly the right
bank of the Vaal eastward up to its junction with the Mabusa
Spruit, and Colville the same bank westward towards Villiers-
dorp, nor Grey twice visit the districts of Bethel and Ermelo
in vain. These were the doings in June, each of which must
now be described shortly.
200 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Operations in On Junc ist PluiTier placed his three columns in line for an
the south east, advance on Piet Retief— E. C. Knox on the left at Uitkyk,
north of the Vaal, his own column at Springbokspruit, that of
Rimington starting one day later from Platrand. Zevenfontein
— Hartebeestfontein — Strydkraal was the line on the 2nd, Trans-
valia — Rietspniit — Amersfoort on the 3rd, when Bullock was
sighted on his way back from Ermelo to Standerton. On June
4th E. C. Knox touched the Vaal at Welgelegen, Plumer reached
Familiehoek, and Rimington Kromhoek on the spurs of the
Elands Berg, the last-named column becoming more closely
engaged as it neared that constant haunt of the enemy. Turn-
ing the mountain range by Kalkoenskranz next day, Rimington
drove aside a commando which opposed him, and reached Bal-
moral, whilst Plumer made Welgevonden on the Mabusa, and
E. C. Knox crossed the Vaal at the well-used drift at Witpunt.
On the 6th Knox drew towards the Compies river to Alkmaar,
thence eastward to Zoar and Watervaldrift on the Shela, Plumer
marching on his right by Rotterdam and Brereton to Breda,
whilst Rimington, still in touch with the enemy, came up on
Plumer's right to Driefontein. During the night of June 8th,
Plumer enclosed Piet Retief on north, west and south. The
Boers hurriedly evacuated the town, which was found deserted
when E. C. Knox entered it at dawn ; but a number who had
delayed their departure until too late were cut off by Rimington,
who was blocking the drifts on either side of Swartwater, and
thirty prisoners and twelve wagons, with horses, cattle and sheep
were taken.
Plumer now turned quickly against the Slangapies Berg, both
because that range was reported to harbour several Boer laagers,
and because it stood in the way of a convoy which was expected
from Wakkerstroom for his own supply. Accordingly on June
I2th he was at St. Helena, advancing next day to Zuikerhoek
where he safely received the convoy. For the next few days
his three columns searched the Slangapies Berg and the Pongola
Bosch, hunting with fair success the ravines and thickets of
that almost inaccessible region, in which armies might have
lain hidden for weeks, and single men for ever. Only twice
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 201
diu this furtive enemy take the offensive, once in a manner
more worthy of brigands than of soldiers in the field. On June
1 6th a train of empty wagons, which was making its way into
Utrecht to refill, was attacked in the Elands Berg, Rimington
going to its assistance next day. On the same occasion a
mounted patrol, in the course of searching amongst the gorges
of the Slangapies Berg, came upon a laager deep down in a
wooded crevice of the mountain, and noticing that a white flag
hung from a wagon, assumed that surrender was intended, and
trotted forward to accept it. Instantly a murderous fire broke
out from the bush on either side ; six horses fell at once, the
patrol was all but hemmed in, and before it had galloped into
safety, had lost an officer and ten men by bullet and capture.
Plumer hurried next day to avenge the losses ; but though he
seized and burnt the laager, the Boers crawled scathless through
the impenetrable scrub, and only three of their number were
accounted for.
Between June i8th and 20th P. P. Burg was surrounded as
Piet Retief had been, with the same result, Rimington again
securing the only seven Boers captured as he intervened between
the emptying township and the Pivaan river. Plumer then
cast back to the Elands Berg, which he thoroughly cleared, con-
centrating around Utrecht on the 23rd. Since leaving the
Standerton railway he had accounted for six Boers killed,
seventy-nine prisoners, 125 wagons and carts, and a quantity
of cattle. At Utrecht the columns parted company, Plumer
with E. C. Knox setting out northward on June 28th for the
Delagoa Bay railway, whilst Rimington remained behind to
continue the clearance of the mountains between Utrecht and
Wakkerstroom. Plumer marched by Pivaanspoort and Liine-
berg, capturing a small laager on Jime 30th south of that town ;
thence over the eastern end of the Slangapies Berg, across the
Assegai, Shela and Compies rivers, taking another laager between
the last-named streams on July 4th, to pursue his way by Onver-
wacht to Driefontein, where another laager fell into his hands
on July 6th. On the 7th Plumer was at Bothwell, on the 9th at
Carolina, whence he made his way into Wonderfontein with
202 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
captured wagons and stock and thirteen prisoners. Soon after
he was railed to Bloemfontein to take part in a vast combination
which was about to sweep across the Orange River Colony.*
It must here be stated that in this, as in many other instances,
considerations of space alone compel arduous marches and
carefully laid plans such as those narrated above to be thus
dismissed in a mere itinerary. A history such as this must
largely confine itself to results ; and they are frequently the
feeblest colouring of a campaign. The thousand problems and
trials of soldiers on the march form no part of the writer's task,
nor could he, however profuse, adequately paint such detail
upon a canvas so enormous as the theatre of war in South Africa.
It is fitting to mention this here, because many an operation
which in less crowded times would have provided material for
a volume in itself, has been and will be referred to with a brevity
all unworthy of the immense toil, thought, and self-sacrifice
expended on its execution. Let it then be alwa)^ under-
stood that credit for such expenditure is not omitted because it
was not earned, but because it is too great for inclusion.
Rimington went into Platrand on July 7th after a series of
forays amongst the Elands Berg, Pongola Bosch, Slangapies Berg
and Rand Berg which had effectually cleared those fastnesses of
all that was visible. In conjunction with parties from Utrecht
he had harried the enemy on July 2nd at Schuilhoek, and again
on the 3rd and 4th, pressing him sometimes so closely that the
burghers threw away their rifles and bolted for safety into the
dark recesses of the surrounding bush, where only a pack of
bloodhounds could have tracked them.
Meanwhile Bullock's column, which left Standerton on Jime
loth, was operating in the same neighbourhood as Plumer's, but
neither in connection nor communication with it. Bullock
had marched by nearly the same route as E. C. Knox had
done; camping at Uitkyk on the nth, Morgenzon 12th, Dorps-
plaats 14th and Beginderlyn, where the Vaal was crossed, on
June 1 6th. Thence, hke Knox, he turned southward into the
• See Chapter XIV.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 203
Elands Berg, aiming at Langberg on the 19th, proceeding then
to clear the eastern slopes of the range as far as Roodepoort.
Cattle and farms alone rewarded his efforts, both in surprising
quantities in a district which had never known respite from the
forays of both armies. On June 27th Bullock was recalled to
Standerton, which he reached on July 4th by way of Bergvliet,
Wolvespruit and Platrand, having taken live prisoners, 3,700
head of stock and fifty-nine wagons.
Turning now to the north — On June 5th Beatson, at Brug- Operations in
spruit, received orders to go down to Bethel in order to co- '''e north-east,
operate with the columns of Sir B. Blood, which were about
to move southward from the neighbourhood of Carolina. Beat-
son marched next day, making once more for the junction of
the Oliphant river and Steenkool (or Steenbok) Spruit, where
the enemy was reported. Having cleared his way to Van Dyks-
drift, he halted for several days, using this spot as a base for
the despatch of reconnaissances and raiding parties in every
direction. Upon one of these fell disaster. Hearing of the
presence of a small commando at Boschmansfontein, on the
Middelburg — Ermelo road, Beatson sent in that direction on
June loth a force consisting of 350 men of the 5th Victorian
Mounted Rifles, with two Vickers-Maxim guns. Soon after their
departure, he himself discovered the enemy nearer and more to
the south, at Elands fontein. He thereupon signalled to the
detachment, which had found Boschmansfontein empty, to
concentrate on Elandsfontein, where he intended to move next
morning. Returning to carry this out, the Victorians halted Affair at
for the night of Jtme 12th at Wilmansrust. Here they were J^n^fj"^"''*'
marked down by General Muller, who was in command of a 1901.
portion of General B. Viljoen's force, that leader himself, with
the remainder, being away on duty with the Transvaal Govern-
ment, which he was about to escort westward to another meeting
with the Executive of the sister State. Muller had been left
with orders to attack any detaclunent which ventured far from
its main body, and he recognised his opportimity. Surround-
ing the spot as darkness fell, his men approached within
twenty yards before they were discovered. After a tremendous
204 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
discharge of ten minutes' duration which did heavy execution,
they rushed in, and in a moment the whole camp was theirs.
Of the Australians fifteen had been killed, forty-two wounded ;
few of those unhurt escaped capture and as many as lOO
horses were shot. Muller then disarmed and released his
prisoners, looted the camp, and made off with the two guns,
several wagons and about lOO horses, having inflicted a blow
as humiliating to the worsted as it was admirable for its light-
ning-like rapidity and the numerical inferiority of the force
with which it was dealt.
At 1.30 a.m. on the 13th Beatson received intelligence of
this disaster and at once hurried to the scene, arriving there
before daylight. As his baggage left Van Dyksdrift it was
dogged by a commando, and it was evident that the coliunn
was in the midst of the enemy, who was still reported in force
at Elandsfontein. But Beatson, moving south, passed by that
place unmolested on the 15th, when he halted ten miles north of
Bethel. He then turned towards Ermelo, in order to draw nearer
to Sir B. Blood, who had been ordered to his assistance. Sir
B. Blood was at this time in general command of operations
which stretched from the Mauch Berg down to Amsterdam,
his eight columns being actively employed in every direction.
Four of them, namely, Spens', Benson's, Douglas' and Park's,
were engaged to the north of the Delagoa Bay railway line on a
scheme which will be subsequently described. The remainder
were still east and south of Carolina. They had consisted, it
will be remembered, of F. W. Kitchener's and Pulteney's columns
and Babington's cavalry brigade, and Sir B. Blood had now
increased his mobile strength by the creation of another column
out of part of the troops holding his lines of communication under
Colonel W. P. Campbell (King's Royal Rifle Corps). This force
had already operated independently and successfully around
Carolina from June 7th — 12th, clearing forty-four farms. The
remainder of the lines of communication troops were placed
under Colonel J. W. Hughes-Hallett, and watched the Komati
valley about Goodehoop, so that Sir B. Blood now controlled
nine units.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 205
On receipt of Lord Kitchener's orders to repair to the district
which Beatson had found so full of the enemy, Sir B. Blood
made arrangements to draw out his four southern columns
towards the west. They were widely separated ; F. W. Kit-
chener and Pulteney being north and south of Amsterdam, W. P.
Campbell and Babington about Carolina. Sending orders to the
two former commanders to follow as soon as possible. Sir B.
Blood, on June i6th, took the others to Vaalbank, and thence
towards Ermelo to Sterkfontein, where on the i8th he was in
signal communication both with Beatson on the west and F. W.
Kitchener on the east. On the next day junction was effected
with Beatson, the three columns camping together at Hartebeest-
spruit. On the 20th Sir B. Blood received intelligence that
Commandant-General Botha and the members of the Transvaal
Government were close to the westward. He immediately
despatched a flying column under Babington towards Kaffir-
stad, and on receipt of news from that officer on the 21st that
the enemy was moving up the Oliphant river, expected notable
results. But the information, though well founded, was late.
Botha and the Government with Viljoen's escort had indeed
passed that way two days before. At the very time of Babing-
ton's message they were bidding farewell to ex-President Steyp»
Generals De Wet and De la Rey, and the members of the Orange
Free State Executive, on the farm Witbank, twenty-six miles
east of Heidelberg, after a conference which had been begun the
day before at Branddrift, on the Waterval river. Not without
adventures had either party reached the place of meeting.
Acting-President Burger, Botha and the Transvaalers had
escaped with such difficulty from the Amsterdam district that
they had had to abandon every vehicle ; and carrying alike
their personal effects and the insignia of Government upon
their saddles, had wormed their way, conducted by Viljoen,
through the very midst of the surrounding British columns.
Steyn and his companions had only escaped destruction by a
hair's breadth on their ride from Vrede. Striking the railway
south of Platrand on the night of June 14th, an alert block-
house had first to be dealt with, and its attention having^been
2o6 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
distracted by an attack, the whole party rushed across the line.
No sooner had they crossed when a dynamite mine exploded
a few yards behind them. Next morning the men of the block-
house found two slain horses, a rifle, and some burnt clothing on
the spot, proof that the travellers had not escaped scathless.
Steyn and De Wet then made for Blauw Kop on the Vaal, and
after awaiting there for three days the arrival of the Transvaalers
— whilst Bullock, all unconscious of their presence, passed them
by one day's march to the east — repaired to Waterval, where
the meeting took place on June 20th. On that night the Boer
leaders, fearful of discovery, transferred their laagers to Brand-
drift ; nor were their fears groundless, for the British Intelligence
Department had full warning of their assembly. In mid-veld.
The Boers watchcd OH cvcry sidc by vedettes, the Council of War took
of*'wa?""*^'' place. There were present the following officers and officials :
June 20th. Acting- President Schalk Burger, ex- President Steyn, State
^'' Secretary Reitz, Conunandant-General Botha, Chief Com-
mandant De Wet, Generals Hertzog, Viljoen, Spruyt, De la
Rey, Smuts, MuUer, Lucas Meyer and several commandants
and officers of inferior rank.
Of the results of the discussion the most important was the
decision arrived at " That no peace shall be made, and no peace
proposals entertained which do not ensure our independence,
and our existence as a nation, or which do not satisfactorily
provide for the case of our Colonial brethren," etc.* Beyond
this the conference was chiefly confined to speeches of a general
nature, in which dissatisfaction with Kruger, with his silence and
the unprofitable results of his European mission, was openly
expressed. The appearance at the meeting of a silken banner
worked by the hands of the Boer ladies in Pretoria, was evidence
alike of the spirit of the women and of the ease with which
communication could still be had with sympathisers who were
immured deeply within the lines of the British forces.
At noon on Jime 21st the assembly broke up, the Trans-
vaalers retiuning eastward, whilst Ste5m , De Wet and De la Rey,
* Report of a Boer who was present.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 207
recrossing the line near Vlaklaagte without incident, moved
down the Waterval through a district which Colville had only
just quitted. Arrived on the banks of the Vaal the party
separated, De la Key proceeding down stream to cross the rail-
way between Vereeniging and Meyerton, whilst the ex-President
and his Chief Commandant entered the Orange River Colony at
Villiersdorp.
In accordance with an arrangement arrived at at the Council
of War, B. Viljoen, having rejoined his commando, now moved
up the Oliphant river, intending to make war once more in
the Lydenburg district from which he had so narrowly escaped.
His adventures on the way will be related later. His were
the commandos reported on Jime 21st and following days by
Babington, who, to Sir B. Blood's disappointment, did nothing
to intercept them, but remained at Kaffirstad imtil joined on
the 24th by W. P. Campbell. By this time (June 22nd) F. W.
Kitchener had come up to Tweefontein, and Sir B. Blood ordered
a general concentration at Middelkraal, to be carried out whilst
he himself with Beatson's column went into Middelburg to
bring out supplies. Kitchener moved by Vaalbank and Bank-
pan — a mounted infantry patrol being cut off with the loss of
an officer and two men during a reconnaissance to the south
on the 22nd — and after further operations was with Campbell
at Middelkraal on the 29th, where Babington, who had had
skirmishing and affairs of outposts at Uitgedacht and Legdaar,
arrived on the same date. Meanwhile Pulteney had gone into
Carolina on the 21st, and raiding far around that place, failed
to receive Sir B. Blood's orders to meet him and the convoy,
and conduct them to the place of concentration. He eventually
(July 3rd) made his way into Middelburg to refit. Here
for the moment Sir B. Blood's southern columns must be
left, whilst those to the north of the Delagoa Bay railway
are followed.
Spens and Park at Nelspruit, Benson and Douglas at Macha- Operations in
dodorp were ready on June 8th, and next day began an opera-
tion which had for its object the clearance of the country
in the triangle Machadodorp — Lydenburg — Nelspruit. Spens,
the north-east
2o8 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA. '
who was in charge of the scheme, divided the sphere of opera-
tions into two zones, namely, the country north and south of
the Crocodile river respectively, basing Douglas and Benson
on the Machadodorp — Lydenburg road, his own and Park's
columns on Nelspruit and Alkmaar. By June i8th the northern
section had been cleared, and the four columns having been
refitted, turned to the southern section, which was thoroughly
scoured by the 2Qth. The enemy's tactics consisted mainly
in hiding, and the chief work of the troops lay in ferreting
amongst the deep and thicketed ravines which seamed this,
one of the most difficult terrains in South Africa. Twenty days'
exhausting labour resulted in the accounting for sixty-five Boers,
about 15,000 stock, and 266 carts and wagons, besides a quan-
tity of rifles and ammunition, and a number of mills which were
destroyed. Spens then returned to Alkmaar, Benson and
Douglas to Machadodorp, whilst Park went into Lydenburg.
A small column under McCracken of the 2nd Royal Berkshire
regiment, which had co-operated with Spens' quartet during
the last week of their operations, returned to Godwaan on
June 28th.
viijoen Two days earlier Viljoen, having evaded Babington and all
nortKeast.^ ^ ^^^ ^ Blood's southem columns, had made his dash across the
Delagoa Bay railway. He had received with misgivings his
orders at the Council of War of June 20th ; the Botha's Berg
district held no good luck for him, and none but the best of
fortune would enable him to escape for the second time from
an area so beset bj' cohunns. Merely to re-enter that area was
difficult enough, and nearly proved disastrous to Viljoen and
his commandos. On the night of June 26th he attacked two
blockhouses one and a half miles apart between Balmoral and
Brugspruit, and attempted to pass his baggage and guns across
between th^m. But the little forts, held by a few men of the
2nd Buffs (East Kent regiment), resisted furiously ; many
burghers were laid low around them, and all would have gone
well had not the garrison, seven in number, of one of the block-
houses, in their eagerness to get a better field of fire, rashly left
the shelter inside the walls for the trench without, where they
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 209
were soon overwhelmed by numbers and captured. The
burghers then hurriedly filled up a roadway across the ditches
of the permanent way, and Viljoen with some of the men and
carts passed over. But suddenly the armoured train from Brug-
spruit dashed into the very midst of the procession, and illu-
minating the scene with its searchlight, quickly cleared the
vicinity with discharges from rifles and Maxim guns. Viljoen's
force was thus cut in two ; the party attacking the western
blockhouse was beaten back with loss ; some of the carts were
wrecked, including that containing Viljoen's papers and personal
effects, and the whole commando was in confusion. The Boers
on the south of the line then drew off ; not until two nights later
did they manage to cross with Viljoen's assistance close to the
south-west of Middelburg, and then not without adventure.
Once more an armoured train, this time from Pan, descended
upon them, and though a dynamite charge brought it to a stop
short of the scene, its fire and that of the railway guards did
much damage, and several wagons and rifles were picked up by
the soldiers in the morning.
In the Standerton section, now commanded by Clements, the Raids from
columns of Grey and Colville had little rest during June. Grey, \\ne.
leaving Standerton on the 6th with special instructions to search
for guns reported to be with the commandos in the Ermelo
district, surprised a laager at Rietvlei on the nth, killing and
capturing eleven Boers. Thereafter he was in constant touch
with the enemy, having several brisk affairs which incurred
eleven casualties before he regained Standerton on the 17th with
twelve prisoners, seventeen other Boers having been accounted
for in action. Colville moved in the opposite direction, and drove
Buys from Villiersdorp on the 5th and 6th. He then traversed
the country on the left bank of the Vaal, the Boers cUnging
closely to the column. On one occasion (June 8th) a determined
rush against the rearguard was finely met by a counter-charge.
On the 2ist Colville was at Val station, where he received orders
to co-operate with Grey in a sweep through the Bethel district
towards the columns of Sir B. Blood which were then converging
on Middelkraal. Colville, camping on the Klip Spruit, was
VOL. IV. 14
2IO THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
attacked at dawn on the 24th by a party under Commandant
Alberts, the attempt being repulsed with the loss of three men
to each side. Neither column succeeded in gaining touch with
Sir B. Blood, and towards the end of the month both were back
in the neighbourhood of Greylingstad, where Grey handed over
command of his force to Colonel F. S. Garratt {6th Dragoon
Guards, Carabiniers). On July ist Colville and Garratt re-
ceived fresh orders to co-operate with Sir B. Blood. On the
next day they again marched northward, and on July 3rd Col-
ville gained touch with F. W. Kitchener near the source of the
Steenkool (or Steenbok) Spruit. Sir B. Blood was now nearing
the close of his operation, only the angle between the Heidelberg
— Pretoria and Pretoria — Middelburg railways remaining un-
traversed. Between July the 7th and loth his troops gathered
along the line Springs — Elandsriver station ; Headquarters
with F. W. Kitchener and Babington were at the former place,
W. P. Campbell on the right was at the latter. All then, after
sundry minor expeditions, converged on Middelburg, where
Babington's column was broken up (July i8th). Colville and
Garratt, who had been in touch with the left, were then detached
from Sir B. Blood's sphere, Colville returning to the Greyling-
stad district, whilst Garratt was called away into the Orange
River Colony.* On the way thither he had a smart engage-
ment with Colville's late opponent. Buys, on the banks of the
Vaal midway between Vereeniging and Villiersdorp, the Boer
commander being surprised in his laager and severely punished.
Operations Meanwhile north of the Delagoa Bay railway Spens had
^jSninthe employed Park's and Benson's columns in the pursuit of B.
north-east. Viljoen, and his own in carrying supplies to these from Middel-
burg. Benson pointed on Dullstroom, marching early (July
3rd) from Machadodorp in order to surprise a laager midway
between the two towns. But the enemy had warning, and after
a pretence at flight, turned hotly upon the Scottish Horse who
led the column. In the close combat which followed the Scottish
Horse patrols lost eleven out of twenty-six men engaged, the
* See Chapter XIV.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 211
Boers one more.* Benson reached Dullstroom on the 7th,
whence he pushed Viljoen westward towards Blink water. On
the 8th he gained touch with Park from Lydenburg, whom he
asked to watch his right flank about KUpbankspruit whilst he
advanced against Roos Senekal, whither Viljoen appeared to
be heading, A bustUng chase on the gth and loth brought
Benson to Roos Senekal, Viljoen's men scattering over the Steel-
poort river with the loss of many wagons and a few prisoners.
The column accounted for over thirty fighting men in the course
of the raid. On the 13th Park returned to Lydenburg to refit,
whilst Benson, whose wagons had been refilled by Spens, con-
tinued the pursuit of Viljoen to the banks of the Oliphant at
Laatstedrift, where a sharp fight cost him ten casualties, but the
Boers many more. Next day, as Viljoen still fled westward,
Benson crossed the Oliphant river and pressed towards the Moos
river. But the wary Boer was not to be hustled further, and
turning northward, doubled across the OHphant at Kalkfontein
back into the Roos Senekal territory from which he had been
so often driven. Benson who was running short of supplies
had then to return to the line to replenish. On the 21st he
reached Groote OHphant River station, passing on the way a small
column which Beatson had taken out for the second time during
the month from Middelburg on the 12th. Beatson's previous
excursion (July 7th — nth) had resulted in the surprise and
capture of a small laager which had been discovered twenty-five
miles north of Middelburg. His second foray closed on the
24th, when he returned to Bronkhorstspruit station. The total
increment of the work of Sir B. Blood's nine columns between
July ist and 24th had been the capture of fifty-four prisoners,
twenty-five surrenders, 289 wagons and carts, over 16,000 sheep,
1,600 oxen, besides rifles, ammunition and farm produce.
Brigadier-General Spens was now called away to take charge
of a force for the Orange River Colony. f His column was
• For gallantry on this occasion Lieutenant W. J. English, 2nd Scottish Horse, was
awarded the Victoria Cross. On the following day (July 4th) Private H. G. Crandon,
i8th Hussars, performed an act of gallantry for which he was awarded the Victoria Cross
t See Chapter XIV.
VOL. IV 14*
212 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
therefore broken up, and on July 24th Sir B. Blood reconstituted
his forces into five mobile columns under F. W. Kitchener, Park,
Benson, W. P. Campbell and Beatson, and a covering body under
Hughes-Hallett.
On the lines of communication in the Eastern Transvaal
little of note occurred except in the southern section, where a
brilliant little affair brightened the tedium of the passive but
Affair near laboHous duty of the troops. The IntelUgence Officer at Platrand
jufy'joth. having notified the presence of a laager at a farm behind the
1901. Verzamel Berg, Brigadier-General E. O. F. Hamilton, who com-
manded that sub-section, despatched seventy-six men of an
irregular corps called Menne's Scouts, under Captain F. C. C.
Barker, to attempt to surprise it on the night of July 30th.
The enterprise was perfectly successful. The Boers were sur-
rounded asleep, and the Scouts utterly routed them, killing
and wounding over thirty men, and securing nine prisoners,
nearly all the horses, cattle, and camp stuff. They might have
taken the whole had not a detachment sent from Zandspruit
to hold a pass over the mountain been checked by a superior
Boer piquet, which caused Barker to fear for his line of
retreat. As it was he completely demolished the site of the
laager, after which he made his way safely back to camp with
his booty.
In the Boer camps some stir was caused at the end of July
by a deed of Assistant-General T. Smuts. Despatched to clear
the Swazi border, that officer, having accomplished his mission,
burned to the ground the township of Bremersdorp, which he
declared had formed a focus of robbery and freebooting in this
remote district. Such an act, performed at a time when bitter
recriminations as to needless violence were rife between the
British and Boer authorities, drew upon Smuts the anger of the
Commandant-General, who promptly dismissed his subordinate
from his command, and turned a deaf ear to all arguments for
his reinstatement. The correspondence which ensued between
the two commanders, on the one side indignant and protesting,
on the other dignified and implacable, is too long for insertion ;
but Botha's choler at an event which leaders of far more
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 213
punctilious societies than his have regarded as a justifiable
act of war, exemplifies one of the most curious traits of the
Boer military character, namely its humanity and regularity
of conduct, unusual products of soil so rough as that from
which had risen the warriors of the Republican States in
South Africa.
On July 25th F. W. Kitchener's four columns were again on Operations
the march with orders for a fresh search for Viljoen, the needle y^-^^
in the bottle of hay of the tangled Roos Senekal area. Pointing resumed,
north-east from Middelburg, Kitchener and Campbell cast across
the eastern arm of the Botha's Berg and reconnoitred towards
Witpoort, where Viljoen was said to be. He was not there,
however, and the majority of the reports pointed to his presence
in the opposite direction, on the Bloed river, a tributary of the
Oliphant river. On the 29th, therefore, F. W. Kitchener took
a flying column* from his and W. P. Campbell's camps in the
Botha's Berg, and had n6t gone far when he discovered Viljoen's
convoy moving towards the Bloed river about Blaauwbank. A
hot chase, consummated by a bayonet charge by the men of the
19th Hussars, resulted in the capture of a Vickers-Maxim gun
and a number of wagons. Until far into the night the pursuit
went on, and dawn of the 30th saw the troops again on the
heels of the Boer train. But MuUer now came across to the
rescue of his chief from the banks of the Oliphant river, with
some hundreds of men and another automatic gun, and a stiff
skirmish ensued, both sides taking and losing prisoners as they
fought at close quarters in the dense bush. After some hours
of exciting combat the Boers withdrew, leaving six wagons in
the hands of F. W. Kitchener, who next day established his men
in a central camp at Diepkloof, whence he raided the surround-
ing country. Up to this date his gain had been fifty-seven
Boers killed, wounded and taken prisoners, the Vickers-Maxim
gun, forty-four wagons, and a number of animals and camp
equipment. On the morning of August 4th he added to these
• 18th and 19th Hussars, West Australians, two guns 8ist battery R.F.A., two guns
83rd battery R.F.A., one Vickers-Maxim, one company ist Devonshire regiment in
wagons.
214 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
by the surprise of a laager beneath Olifants Kop, fourteen more
burghers falling into his hands. Meanwhile Park, who had
started from Dullstroom, had come across the Steelpoort river.
Beatson, who had set out under F. W. Kitchener's orders, was
supposed to be west of the junction of the Wilge and Oliphant
rivers ; but Kitchener, sending the i8th Hussars on August loth
to join him on the banks of the Ohphant, heard to his surprise
that Beatson was not to be found. Beatson, in fact, had been
recalled to the railway by the Commander-in-Chief on the 6th,
preparatory to the breaking up of his column.
F. W. Kitchener thereupon decided to cross the Oliphant
river himself, for Viljoen was now reported to be between the
Moos and Elands rivers to the west. On the nth his mounted
troops were at Uyskraal, near the confluence of the Elands and
Oliphant rivers, the drift over the latter being held by the infantry
and mounted infantry, behind whom again was W. P. Campbell
in an entrenched camp on the Bloed river. Viljoen was now
chased first down stream towards Commissie Drift, then up
stream past Slagboom, beyond which, on August i6th, he nearly
entrapped the 19th Hussars who were scouting ahead of the
column. The Hussars lost six killed and wounded, and twenty-
six by capture, the prisoners, however, being released the same
day. The i8th Hussars who came to the rescue lost three.
F. W. Kitchener then returned to his base camp, having accounted
in all for eighty Boers by battle and surrender, sixty-one wagons
and carts, and the usual sundries in cattle and stuffs. On August
24th he moved into Pan.
Operations South of the railway Sir B. Blood had accompanied Benson
DdagoaBry il^^Y 26th) on a foray up the Oliphant river, returning himself
railway. to Middelburg on August 7th, whilst Benson pursued his way
by Ermelo (August loth) to CaroHna (14th). When on the
Komati river, west of Carolina, on July 29th news had been
received that the wandering Transvaal Government had paused
near the head of the Vaalwater, and Sir B. Blood had at once
despatched Benson in pursuit. At dawn on the 30th the site
of the laager was successfully surrounded, and though the
Government officials had vanished, twenty-four Boers were
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 215
taken. So close was Benson to the more important object,
that the Scottish Horse surprised and captured five of Botha's
despatch riders who were resting in a kraal two miles from the
scene. Up to his arrival in CaroUna Benson had accounted for
seventy of the enemy's men from all causes. Immediately on
his return he received intimation of a laager to the east, at
Warmbath, south-west of Hlomohlom, and at once set out
again. Marching all night, the column arrived on the scene,
thirty-four miles distant, before dawn on the i6th, and surprised
a cluster of small encampments, capturing thirty-two Boers.
Benson returned to Carolina on the 20th. Next day he received
urgent orders to hurry westward to deal with Prinsloo who was
reported with a following of 600 on the Bronkhorst Spruit.
Accordingly Benson left Carolina on the 22nd, and after a fruitless
search towards the Upper Oliphant, was at the head of the Steen-
kool (or Steenbok) Spruit on the last day of August. He had
killed or taken over 100 of the enemy during the month. In
the first week in September he moved towards the Delagoa Bay
railway, reaching Middelburg on the 7th. During the latter part
of August Benson had been in touch with a column from Springs,
under Lieut. -Colonel R. C. A. B. Bewicke-Copley (King's Royal
Rifle Corps), which had been operating between the Bronkhorst
Spruit and Springs from August 17th to September 4th.
Bewicke-Copley had been in touch also with Colville's column
which, reinforced by the Johannesburg Mounted Rifles, had
marched north from Greylingstad on August ist on a rumour
that the Transvaal Government had been marked down at
Watervalshoek, twenty-six miles north of Greylingstad. Colville
found the enemy west of Bethel on the 4th, and on the 5th, after
a chase of seven miles, killed and captured twenty-one Boers
and took forty carts and wagons and a quantity of stock from a
convoy which, however, was unaccompanied by the sought-for
Government. Colville then made for Standerton, whence on
August 15th he marched by Miillers Pass down to Newcastle.
The Johannesburg Mounted Rifles had already gone by train
to Dundee with orders to co-operate with a column under
Pulteney which was forming at Utrecht.
2i6 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
This concentration of troops on the border of Natal, of which
Lieut. -Colonel C. J. Blomfield, the commandant at Dundee,
assumed command, was in consequence of warnings that Botha
was about to re-enter the colony. As the invader failed to
appear, the columns were employed in raids through the Vryheid
district, and on September 8th both were back at Dundee,
Colville having returned to Standerton two days earlier. The
rumours, to both sides the most stirring that could blow about
the theatre of war, continued however, and they were not without
Botha plans foundation. Botha was indeed meditating a descent, pluming
NauK*^'°"° himself on the " commotion "* it would cause in the British
councils. On September 2nd he was at Piet Retief, sending the
fiery cross amongst the dispirited burghers of Vryheid and
Utrecht. To Viljoen, whom he severely upbraided for some un-
authorised parleying with Sir B. Blood at Lydenburg on August
25th, the Commandant-General wrote that he expected to be
near Glencoe at the middle of the month. But rain, the arbiter
of military plans in all South Africa, and especially in this part
of it, fell heavily, and Botha had to postpone the movement.
Meanwhile more troops converged towards Natal, for the British
intelligence Department was closely watching the barometer
as it fell before the approaching storm. On September 4th Lieut. -
General the Hon. N. G. Lyttelton assumed command of all the
forces in Natal. On the 6th Garratt's column, summoned from
the Orange River Colony, detrained at Paardekop, and promptly
reconnoitred across the Elands Berg towards Wakkerstroom
(September 9th — 17th), whilst Colville, from Standerton, felt
towards Amsterdam. Colville gained touch with F. W.
Kitchener, who at Lyttelton's request was hurrying south-
ward in company with W. P. Campbell to deal with the
impending invasion, of which Garratt had now got almost certain
information from a prisoner taken in the Elands Berg. On the
13th, too. Major H. de la P. Gough's mounted infantry arrived
at Dundee from the Orange River Colony ; soon after Allenby
from Pretoria, G. Hamilton from Klerksdorp, Spens from!Kroon-
* Letter to General B. Viljoen, September I2th, 1901.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 217
stad, and Clements from Standerton were ordered to Natal,
whilst Sir L. Rundle from Harrismith made arrangements to
close the Drakensberg Passes, sending Sir J. Dartnell,* who
now again took the field, across the mountains to co-operate
actively in Natal. Finally Elliot's cavalry division was held in
readiness to reinforce on the edge of the Orange River Colony.
Such was the " commotion " which, as Botha had anticipated,
was caused in the British camps at the whisper of a
menace to Natal.
On September i6th the Commandant-General issued his
orders, which were almost duplicates of those which had carried
Joubert's commandos down to Glencoe at the dawn of the war,
an occasion to which the Commandant-General significantly
referred. Next day fortune rather than foresight enabled him
to strike his first blow, and it was ominously heavy. On the
15th Gough had taken his mounted infantry, together with
Lieut. -Colonel H. K. Stewart's Johannesburg Mounted Rifles,
out from Dundee, bent on a reconnaissance to ascertain the
true situation in the east. Having crossed the Buffalo river Affair at
by De Jager's Drift, the parties pushed eastward, and were ^^ejf*^"
approaching the Blood river on the 17th when Gough, who Sept'. 17th,
was an hour's ride in front of Stewart, espied a band of 300 '^''
Boers who came from Scheepers Nek, a height which from a
distance of seven miles overlooks the town of Vryheid, and
apparently off -saddled at a farm. Gough determined to attack
them at once. He had all available information of the strong
hostile gathering in this quarter ; but the long campaign against
an almost invisible enemy had lulled him into disbelief of the
existence of powerful Boer forces. The commando now in sight
delighted him by its unusual incautiousness, and at last there
seemed a prospect of a combat on equal terms. Having made
a detour to isolate the unwary commando, he sent a messenger
back to inform Stewart of his plans, and gave the word to close.
His men had scarcely got within range of the enemy when they
were fallen upon by two bodies, each of five hundred Boers, one
* Created a Knight Commander of the Bath for services during the Natal campaign.
2i8 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
of which swooped down upon the right flank, overriding it
completely and sweeping round to the rear, where they galloped
amongst the guns, whilst the other bore down upon the front.
After a miUe of twenty minutes' duration Gough and the whole
of his force were surrounded and captured. One officer and
nineteen men were killed, five officers and nineteen men wounded,
six officers and 235. men taken prisoners. Only Gough himself
and a few more contrived to slip away when darkness and the
careless guardianship of the elated burghers made escape possible.
Meanwhile Stewart, who had early information of the disaster,
was confronted with a difficult problem. To go to Gough's
assistance would be to involve his own small force with its gims
and baggage with unknown but certainly strong numbers of the
enemy, and moreover would lay bare the road to De Jager's
Drift and Dundee. He therefore wisely feU back on the drift,
where he was joined next morning by Gough, who, after many
adventures, had made his way on foot from the scene of his
discomfiture.*
This reverse, if it taught once more the difficulty of dealing
with an enemy against whom daring seemed as dangerous as
caution was unprofitable, at least thoroughly cleared up the
Botha on the situation. Botha was on the borders of Natal with a muster
borders of powerful cuough temporarily to destroy Natal as a line of com-
munication even if the colony itself were in no danger of being
reconquered. But the betrayal of his presence was the signal
for an answering concentration, the celerity of which might
well have made the Boer commander envious. He who by
exhortation, by endless labour and by the most difficult corre-
spondence with distant subordinates had been barely able to
muster a few thousand fighting men, now saw arrayed against
him at a few days' notice nine columns of all arms, standing
across the path to Natal. At Utrecht was F. W. Kitchener, in
command of his own, of W. P. Campbell's and Garratt's columns ;
Clements lay at De Jager's Drift, with Stewart, Pulteney and G.
* For gallantry on this occasion Lieutenant L. A. E. Price-Davies, King's Royal
Rifle Corps, was awarded the Victoria Cross.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 219
Hamilton ; at Vant's Drift was Bruce Hamilton, in charge
of the forces of Spens and Allenby. The Drakensberg mountains
were full of Sir L. Rundle's men ; Sir J. Dartnell was on the
march from Harrismith. The " invasion " was checkmated ere
scarce begun. Shouldered away from the Buffalo border by the
imposing forces there in waiting, Botha, still seeking to achieve
his purpose, edged away southward down the long tongue of the
Vryheid district which penetrates Zululand between the Nqutu,
Nkandhla, Entonyaneni and Ndwandwe districts, its termination
pointing close to Melmoth. Near that place and to the north-
west of it two small posts guarded the British frontier, namely.
Fort Prospect and Itala. The former was held by thirty-five
men of the Vth division M.I., and fifty-one men of the 2nd
Dorsetshire regiment under Captain C. A. Rowley ; the latter
by 300 men of the Vth division M.I., and two guns 69th battery
R.F.A., commanded by Major A. J. Chapman of the Royal
Dublin Fusiliers. Towards these trifling obstacles Botha's
commandos converged with the intention of sweeping them
both aside.
Itala had been well fortified, but it possessed a weak spot in
the point of the mountain which stood up a mile distant from
the entrenchments, and could not be included in them. On
receipt of warning of the Boer advance on September 25th Chap-
man manned this pinnacle with eighty mounted infantrymen
under Lieutenants B. P. Lefroy (ist Royal Dublin Fusiliers), and Attacks on
H. R. Kane (ist South Lancashire regiment). At midnight the prosp^t,
sound of an outburst of firing from this advanced post reached Sept. 26th,
the main position ; it ceased for a few moments, again broke out,
and finally died away altogether. Shortly after. Chapman heard
that the outpost had fallen to vastly superior numbers, and he
took care that his own men were prepared for a conflict. About
2 a.m. he found himself surrounded by 1,500 Boers. Preceded
by a whirlwind of bullets the enemy stormed close up to the
stones of the sangars, only to be beaten back by the troops
who stood immovably and fenced their stronghold with a ring
of fire. At 4 a.m. the Boers, their first momentum spent, fell
silent, and Chapman, thinking they had given back, sent out his
1901.
220 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
scouts to reconnoitre, and also a medical officer to tend the
wounded on Itala point. But suddenly a fusilade even fiercer
than the first broke upon every side of the camp. It seemed
as though the defence must be shortly blown to pieces, so heavy
was the storm of lead which, coming from all sides, appeared to
revolve Uke a tropical typhoon around the restricted area of the
fort. For twelve hours the Mausers poured out an almost un-
broken volley, which was answered by Chapman's men as rapidly
as the diminishing store of ammunition allowed. Their cover
was good ; but nothing could have withstood such battering,
and men fell regularly. The gunners, who had at first sent shell
with great effect, were ordered by Chapman to leave their pieces
and take shelter when their officer and four men had fallen.*
As the day wore on the position became almost untenable ;
but to retire from it was impossible, for L. Botha, who directed
the attack by signal from a neighbouring height, had drawn an
outer ring of investment. One commando lay across the southern
roads ; General D. Opperman with 500 burghers stood between
Itala and Melmoth and also between that place and Fort Prospect,
fifteen miles to the east ; General C. Botha with 800 barred the
west, and 600 riflemen under Commandant H. J. Potgieter held
the front (north). There was, then, no way out ; but Chapman
had determined already to fight to a finish where he stood, for he
knew every moment's resistance was invaluable to Natal behind
him. As evening descended over the long day's combat, his firm-
ness began to draw towards its reward. The enemy, disheartened
by their losses, which numbered over 300, and astounded at the
failure of their apparently irresistible attack, fired more and more
feebly. The encircling rifles, ceasing one by one, and group
by group, gave the sign, more significant to a veteran soldier
than a sudden cessation, of an onslaught which had spent its
force. At 7.30 p.m. the musketry had died away, and Chapman,
having waited an hour in silence, once more felt all around him
with scouts. He soon learned that the enemy was retiring in
every direction. Then only, his task being accomplished, did he
* For gallantry on this occasion Driver F. G. Bradley, 6gth battery R.F.A., wa
awarded the Victoria Cross.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 221
think of retreat. His casualties* numbered over eighty, the
survivors were exhausted, their ammunition was well-nigh
expended. Loading every wagon with stores he marched away
at midnight and at 4 a.m. on the 27th reached Nkandhla,
deriving the best assurance of his victory from the fact that the
slow progress of his weak and weary force had been unmolested
by the enemy.
Meanwhile it had gone hard also with Fort Prospect, sur-
rounded and isolated fifteen miles to the east. There for each
soldier inside the fort were seven Boer riflemen who strove
for the mastery from 4.30 a.m. to 4 p.m. Two separate assaults
were repelled at the very wires surrounding the sangars, and
thereafter the enemy attempted, like their comrades at Itala, to
batter the place to pieces with lead alone. With unwavering
resolution the defence maintained itself, the Durham company
of militia artillery, under Lieutenant R. C. M. Johnson, especially
distinguishing itself at the north-west angle. During the fore-
noon the garrison was moved to admiration by the appearance
of a posse of Zululand Native Police, led by Sergeant Gumbi,
who, hearing the firing from their post four miles distant, had
galloped to the scene, and broken through the surrounding
Boers to the aid of their comrades. By 6 p.m. the garrison
of the fort had gained the upper hand with the loss of but
nine men, and Commandant Grobelaar led his dumbfounded
burghers off the field.
The irresolution of the enemy — for half his numbers might
have poured irresistibly over both Itala and Fort Prospect —
was largely to be accounted for by the very cause which made
it fatal to his plans, namely, the movement of the numerous
British columns on his flank and rear. F. W. Kitchener was now
near Vryheid, Clements across Vant's Drift, Bruce Hamilton
* British casualties — Killed, one officer and twenty-one men ; wounded, five officers
and fifty-four men. Boer casualties — Reliable eye-witnesses staled, killed, 128;
wounded, 270 (about). Amongst their killed were Commandants Scholtz and H. J.
Potgieter.
Ammunition expended by the force — Guns, sixty-three shrapnel ; Lee-Metford,
70,040 rounds.
222 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
approaching Melmoth, each with the group of columns enumerated
above. Sir J. Dartnell was making for Eshowe. Bullock at
Wakkerstroom was busy throwing a line of blockhouses across
to the Swazi border ; Colville covered his working parties, ex-
pecting momentarily the return of Plumer from the Orange River
Colony. From the midst of Natal itself a mounted column, 1,450
strong, under Lieut. -Colonel G. A. Mills (Royal Dublin Fusiliers),
was mobilising at Greytown.
Botha, excusing his failure to his Government on the score
of false information and the unfavourable weather,* ordered a
general retirement, and fell back with a small following. He
narrowly avoided being cut off by F. W. Kitchener and Colville,
and was heard of at Amsterdam on October 8th. Thence he
was hunted by columns under Colonel Sir H. Rawlinson, recently
come, like Plumer, from the Orange River Colony, and Colonel
M. F. Rimington from Standerton, who nearly succeeded in
surrounding the Boer Headquarters, actually capturing some of
Botha's personal property and papers, from which useful informa-
tion was obtained. Sir H. Rawlinson went into Volksrust on
October 30th and Rimington to Zandspruit. Meanwhile the
main columns to the south completed the repulse of Botha's levy
by a thorough scouring of the Vryheid and Utrecht districts,
and on October 21st Lord Kitchener, considering their task
accomplished, dispersed them in other directions. G. Hamilton,
W. P. Campbell, and Allenby went to Standerton, vid Dundee;
Spens to Newcastle ; F. W. Kitchener's columns, except Garratt's
and Pulteney's, to Volksrust ; Sir J. Dartnell returned to Harri-
smith ; Plumer swept to and fro between Wakkerstroom and
the Swazi border. As for Natal, the " commotion " over, it
returned to its normal role of sleepless guardian of the line
of communications.
* Letter to State Secretary, September 28th, 1901.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 223
Approximate Strength States of Columns referred to in
foregoing chapter.
&
S B
S
,
5
TJ-g
9
COLUMN.
a
1
a
^■1
0
«
a
1
1
S
June — September, 1901.
Lt.-Col. H. 13. Jeflfrey
553
—
6
—
1 Brig.- Gen. H. C 0.
Plumer in command.
Lt.-Col. F. F. Colvin
496
264
—
—
Col. E. C. Knox . .
1.393
45»
8
3
Lt.-Col. M. F. Rimington. .
IA70
278
—
Maj.-Gen. S. B. Beatson . .
800
347
4
—
BriR.-Gen. G. M. Bullock..
1.705
545
la
4
Lt.-Col. A. E. W. Colville
418
347
5
I
Lt.-Col. R. Grey ..
879
357
5
I
Brig.-Gen. J. Spens
120
51a
4
3
-
Col. G. E. Benson . .
1.398
808
8
Col. W. Douglas . .
340
709
5
I
Col. C. W. Park . .
130
636
4
I
Major-Gen. Sir Bindon
Maj.-Gen. F. W. Kitchener
800
839
7
2
Blood in command.
Col. W. P. Pulteney
850
861
7
4
Maj.-Gen. J. M. Babington
400
—
J
a
Col. W. P. Campbell
530
460
I
—
Col. J. W. Hughes-Hallett
300
648
a
a
Lines of Communication.
Lt.-Col. R. C. A. B. Be-
wicke-Copley
328
859
2
I
Lt.-Col. H. K. Stewart . .
800
3
3
Col. E. H. H. Allenby
750
—
5
4
Maj. H. De la P. Gough . .
600
—
a
Brig.-Gen. G. Hamilton . .
820
345
5
3
Brig.-Gen. J. Spens
1,200
8
Brig.-Gen. Sir J. G. Dartnell
I. TOO
—
3
"7
Col. Sir H. Rawlinson
1,200
18s
6
—
Lt.-Col. F. S. Garratt
950
348
5
I
1
224
CHAPTER XIII.
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY*
(Continued from Chapter X.).
JUNE — SEPTEMBER, I9OI.
French takes On June 9th Lieut. -General Sir J. Frenchf arrived at Middleburg,
C^pTcoiom-, ^"^ assumed command of all the mobile columns in Cape Colony.
June 9th, Wynne, however, still retained the administration of the pro-
' vince, and jurisdiction over all garrisons, a dual control which
was to result in considerable inconvenience. The operations had
now reached a scale which necessitated an army in the field.
Indeed a fresh source of trouble had recently arisen in the shape
of a renewed ebullition of the old fountain of rebellion in the
Prieska, Kenhardt, Calvinia and Namaqualand districts, where
a certain commandant, S. G. Maritz, one of Scheepers' officers
and a man of strong character, had been sent to consolidate the
incoherent rebel bands which had sprung into activity at the
advent of Hertzog and De Wet. Nevertheless, Sir J. French took
over from Haig a not unfavourable situation, both tactical and
administrative. Supply, transport, intelligence, remounting,
communication, had all been elaborated to an admirable degree,
and were fully adequate to the extraordinary demands of a
campaign which consisted of nothing but the incessant gyrations
of many small bodies of both belligerents.
Tactically, the outlook was more hopeful than at any time
during the operations. The north-western counties, at no time
disturbed by more than a few hundreds of timid and half-hearted
• See map No. 63.
•f Created a Knight Commander of the Bath for services during 1899 — 1900. —
London Gazelle, April 19th, 1901.
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 225
rebels, were adequately patrolled by a small mounted column,
some 500 strong, with two guns, which Sir H. Settle had fitted
out at De Aar at the end of April, under Major H. S. Jeudwine,
R.A.,* and which was now about Katkop. In the central area,
although no Boer leader had been captured, all had been weak-
ened, and transformed from raiders into fugitives. The chief
of these, Kritzinger, together with his Ueutenants, Fouche, Pursuit of
Myburg, Erasmus, Lategan and the rebel Lotter, had been ^"^'"e^'-
manoeuvred into an impasse, and was at this moment enclosed
within the triangle Burghersdorp — Dordrecht — Barkly East by
Scobell, Gorringe, Murray, White and Monro, of whom Haig
retained the direction. Wyndham with the 17th Lancers near
Molteno, and Crabbe towards Knapdaar, lay in wait to inter-
cept a break-out either southward or northward. But this
promising aspect of affairs was quickly dispelled. On June
14th the Boers, breaking up into small groups, filtered south-
ward through the cordon and gained the Bamboes mountains,
west of Sterkstroom. Monro from Stormberg and Crabbe
from Steynsburg promptly advanced against the mountains,
whereupon Myburg and Erasmus fled eastward along the ranges
and across the railway, where Wyndham came in touch with
them. Kritzinger and the others, including Van Reenan, who
had left Malan and rejoined his chief, continued southward,
followed by Monro and Crabbe, and made towards Tarkastad.
On the 17th, when still north of that place, Kritzinger was over-
taken and sharply engaged, losing forty-four burghers, of whom
eight were taken prisoners, and seventy-five horses, before he
made good his escape past Cradock — where Van Reenan parted
company — into the Tandjes Berg. There the remarkable fatality
which throughout the campaign had so often promptly consoled
the Boer arms for reverses enabled Kritzinger to avenge his
recent mischance by capturing on June 20th a patrol of sixty
men, which, coming out from Cradock, was reconnoitring about
Water Kloof, north of Petersburg. Now French attempted to
shut Kritzinger into the Tandjes Berg by drawing a line,
* For a brief account of this and other isolated bodies of troops in the north-west,
see Chapter XX.
VOL. IV. 15
226 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
composed of B. Doran's column (from Aberdeen, in Henniker's
command) and local defence troops, from Kendrew through
Pearston to Somerset East, whilst Scobell, from Graaff Reinet,
occupied Petersburg on July ist, and Crewe was ordered to
come down by Spitz Kop to Zuurfontein, where he would close
the only road leading northward from the Tandjes Berg. But
instead of this Crewe directed his march upon Bethesda Road ;
Kritzinger at once darted out by the opened door ; the combina-
tion became useless, and Scobell returned to Graaff Reinet.
Meanwhile Van Reenan, after leaving Kritzinger, had pursued
his way due southward, hunted by Crabbe alone, Monro having
returned to Molteno. A fast and ringing chase, during which
Van Reenan was continually turned by the local defence troops,
first from Somerset East eastward along the northern boun-
daries of Bedford and Fort Beaufort counties into the Winter
Berg, thence northward through Tarka, sent the pursued once
more into the Bamboes mountains by the end of June, and
Crabbe into Tarkastad, where he refitted. On July 5th Crabbe
was at Cradock, with orders to resume the pursuit of Kritzinger
and leave V^an Reenan to Haig.
Pursuit of Malan, more to the west, had been pursuing an adventurous
course since his evasion of Crabbe in the Doom Berg on June
7th. Winding amongst the subsidiary ranges which branch
northward from the Sneeuw Bergen, he was followed by Crewe,
from Conway, who turned him out of one haunt after another.
On June 23rd Malan was met in the Rhenoster Berg by a rein-
forcement of 120 men, whereupon he assumed the offensive,
not against his pursuer, but in exactly the opposite direction.
Hurrying to Richmond, he invested and fiercely attacked that
place on the morning of June 25th. The garrison, who were
disposed in small forts around the town, defended themselves
gallantly, but seven out of the twelve posts fell with the loss
of thirty-five men in a day and night of fighting, and it might
have gone hard with the rest had not a small column under
Captain F. T. Lund (9th Lancers), which French had fitted out
at Middleburg two days before, arrived on the scene at 7 a.m.
on the 26th. Malan was driven off and fell back northward,
Malan.
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 227
and at Vogelfontein, close to Hanover, was forced by Lund's
close pursuit to turn and give battle. Though strongly posted
he was completely outmanoeuvred and his band cut into two
parts which fled east and west, Malan himself accompanying
the latter, and a certain Breedt the other portion. Malan's
losses here and at Richmond numbered some forty men out of
220 engaged. Richmond was then regarrisoned and provi-
sioned, and the safety of the district further assured by the
arrival in the first week of July of the i6th Lancers with two
guns and a squadron of Imperial Yeomanry under Lieut. -Colonel
W. P. Wyndham, who had handed over command of the 17th
Lancers to Colonel D. Haig. As for Scheepers, throughout the Pursuit of
month of June, as in May, he continued to rove the Graaff *^ nepers.
Reinet district from his haunt in the Koudeveld Bergen, watched
only by the weak column of Lieut. -Colonel B. Doran. His
most noteworthy feat during this time was a partially successful
attack on the outposts at Willowmore on June ist. On the 23rd
Sir J. French himself visited Graaff Reinet, and for two days
reconnoitred Scheepers' rugged stronghold, the most inaccessible
in all Cape Colony. The intricacy of the country well nigh
forbade the use of artillery, and the General returned to Middle-
burg convinced that nothing less than three or four columns
would avail. B. Doran's column was therefore merely strength-
ened and rendered more mobile by the addition of some newly
arrived Yeomanry, and Scheepers was left to himself for the
present. The Boer's confidence was supreme, and whilst mar-
velUng at his attitude, it is necessary also to understand it, for
it was that of every guerrilla leader who was at this moment
in a like extraordinary military position within the border of
Cape Colony.* In a long communication to De Wet, written
on July 3rd, Scheepers announced his intention of wintering in
the Camdeboo district, where " everything was in excellent con-
dition, bandoliers always full," and of sallying towards Cape
Town as soon as the rains should have fallen. Five-sixths of
his commando, he boasted, were rebels ; fresh men were daily
• See remarks upon Kritzinger, Chapter X., pages 172-3.
VOL. IV. IS*
surrounded.
228 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
joining him. He was in communication both with Kritzinger
and with Maritz in the north-west. French, he was aware, was
busy concentrating an overpowering force of 15,000 men around
him, but he " awaited their arrival." This from a leader of less
than 300 men, lurking in a mountain range nearly 200 miles
from his own frontier, unsupported, un victualled, and unsuccess-
ful in all but evasion, may, by throwing hght on the almost
insensate valour and self-rehance of one such a man, afford a
hint of the difficulty of deaUng with many like him in a
vast country bristling with strongholds and populated by
their friends.
Scheepers is Sir J. French now determined on a special effort to rouse
this close-lying band. Early in July he began to draw around
the Camdeboo area the cordon of which Scheepers had already
had an inkling. His plan was, after shutting up the mountainous
region from all sides, to send a column in from the north to
attack the laagers. Accordingly Wyndham, from Rosmead,
was ordered to Murraysburg, Crewe and B. Doran from Graaff
Reinet to Sneeuw and Uitkomst respectively, whilst infantry
and Yeomanry from Graaff Reinet formed a line facing westward.
The exten.sion of all these by the morning of July 13th would
close every exit of the mountains, when Scobell, passing through
Zuurpoort, would descend upon the Koudeveld from the north
and attack the laagers which were known to be about Ossen-
berg. Whilst the columns moved to their appointed positions
on the 1 2th, each side struck a blow. That of the enemy was
in a direction very unexpected. At 3 a.m. a party of thirty of
Scheepers' men coming from Aberdeen attacked the railway
station at Aberdeen Road, burnt the buildings and stores,
destroyed the telegraph material, and looted the mail bags,
making off unscathed on the approach of an armoured train.
A little later Scobell more than levelled the score in the moun-
tains to the north. Leaving Zuurpoort at i a.m. he marched by
Quaggas Drift and up the Toverwater river, skirmishing with
the Boer outposts which covered Camdeboo. Contact with
laagers of any importance was not to be obtained, but Scobell,
hearing of a detached band outside his right flank, moved south
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 229
and by hard galloping over difficult ground succeeded in sur-
rounding and capturing in a kloof two officers and twenty-seven
burghers. At the same time B. Doran, opposite Graaff Reinet,
made prisoner a patrol of seven Boers on the Zwart river, after
which he moved forward to Zeekoe Gat to tighten the hold
on the Camdeboo area. On the 13th, whilst all the columns
closed inwards, Scobell pressed Scheepers back to Plat Rust,
where the commando came under artillery fire also from Crewe,
who had moved up to the north-west of Camdeboo. All looked
promising for the next day's operations, when Wjmdham's troops,
guarding the south-west, were moved into Aberdeen for sup-
plies, leaving a gap on that side by which Scheepers instantly Scheepers
dashed for the outlet at Oorlogs Poort. Wyndham, supported ^**^P"-
by B. Doran, at once turned in pursuit, and at Been Kraal
overtook the enemy's rearguard. But no mere stem-chasing
could catch a Boer commando in retreat. On the 15th Scheepers
hurried through the Poort, where he was joined by Malan with
such remnants of his band as had survived the reverses at Rich-
mond and Hanover. The pair were closely tracked by Wjmd-
ham, who again engaged the rearguard at Alexanders Kraal on
the i8th, and kept the retreat in the desired northerly direction.
But the enclosure of the Camdeboo mountains had failed, and
French, who had witnessed the three days' operation from
Spandouws Kop, seven miles west of Graaff Reinet, had already
returned to Middleburg.
On July 1 6th he was visited there by the Commander-in- Lord
Chief. Lord Kitchener's appearance in this remote quarter of villts*^"^'
his command signalised the extraordinary success of the insignifi- Cape Colony,
cant marauders who had so long kept the colony in a broil,
and defied the strength of an army corps to extirpate them.
Their agitations had now rendered affairs in Cape Colony the
most serious item of the whole British campaign and one which
seemed about to become still more grave, for there were reliable
reports of the approach of fresh and more powerful invaders.
The continued occupation of territory of the Crown by defiant
hostile bands could not fail to be universally regarded as a stigma
on the British arms. So long as matters stood thus the enemy,
230 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
however worsted elsewhere, need never acknowledge defeat ;
moreover, it was not to be forgotten that the Boers, with some
show of reason, based their fondest hopes of European sympathy
upon their success within British frontiers. The strangely
incurable disorder which they had succeeded in fomenting in
Cape Colony imposed a particularly heavy burden upon Army
Headquarters at this moment. Probably at no time during the
war had the Commander-in-Chief been, or was he to be, more
preoccupied by every branch of his vast jurisdiction, military,
political and administrative, than in this month of July, 1901,
and many of his cares were such as cannot without injury dis-
turb a General deeply occupied in the field. These, as regards
Cape Colony, had mainly to do with the administration of
martial law and the terms to rebels, subjects on which Lord
Kitchener and the Cape Government, and indeed the Govern-
ment at home, were by no means in thorough agreement.* More-
over, the members of the Cape Legislature had not hesitated to
give expression to their natural uneasiness at the, to them, inex-
plicable continuance of the insecurity within their borders, sup-
porting their views with a request, impossible to comply with,
for the restoration to their own control of the local forces then
engaged in the field, f Their complaints drew from Lord
Kitchener a categorical opinion as to several matters in which
the Government at Cape Town might do more to hasten the
desired end. The incidence of the expense of maintaining the
Colonial Defence forces, too, was a further question between
Army Headquarters and Cape Town, no less than two-thirds of
the entire cost of such troops in South Africa being incurred in
Cape Colony. Finally, the apparent ill success of the columns
in the field was a disquieting factor. They seemed quite unable
to do more than push the commandos from one part of the
colony to another, an endless process against an enemy who
was only to be suppressed by extinction. Lord Kitchener's
* Correspondence between Lord Kitchener, the Secretaries of State for War and
Colonies, and the Governor, Cape Colony, April 17th to July i8th, 1901.
I The Governor, Cape Colony, to Lord Kitchener, July 8th and 17th, 1901.
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 231
wonder at a demand for more troops in a certain locality when
there were already " five thousand mounted men to catch as
many hundred " expressed a feeling not confined to Army
Headquarters, and the reply that " quality rather than quan-
tity " was required was little reassuring, for it undoubtedly
embodied the truth about the raw irregulars of whom the pur-
suing columns were largely composed. In short, affairs in the
colony were running as little smoothly in council as in the field,
and just at this moment the rumours of renewed invasion
sharpened the thorn in the side. Against such an eventuality
the colony, full as it was of troops, was totally unprepared.
Every considerable column was already fully occupied in the
midland districts, leaving almost unprotected the counties of
the western seaboard, by which hostile reinforcements would
find a practically open road down to Ceres and the capital. On Warnings of
July 19th the Intelligence Department issued warning that a fn"j!^7on
double inroad by Smuts from the Transvaal and De Wet from
the Orange River Colony was to be expected.
It became absolutely necessary to draw the bulk of the
troops towards the crossings of the Orange river, and French
decided to utiUse the northerly trend of Wyndham in his pur-
suit of Scheepers by carrying out a general sweep towards the
frontier between the midland and western lines of railway,
using three of the four columns which the recent manoeuvre in
the Camdeboo district had brought together, joined by that of
Lund, who was refitting at Nels Poort station, after his success-
ful expedition against Malan. Crewe would remain in the
Camdeboo district to frustrate any attempt by Scheepers to
return to his favourite haunt. On July i8th then, Lund on
the left was at Nels Poort ; Wyndham, in close pursuit of
Scheepers, was near Poort je ; B. Doran was coming up on
Wyndham's right, south of Murraysburg, whilst Scobell com-
pleted the line of troops between the railways at Graaff Reinet,
where he remained until the 20th. The first important inci-
dents of the advance occurred on the left flank, and amongst
them was one which showed once more the amazing promptitude
of the Boers to profit by the most momentary lapse on the part
232 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
of their opponents. On the i8th Lund, leaving Nels Poort,
moved north-eastward somewhat in advance of Wjnidham's left
towards Karree Bosch, where next day he encountered and drove
Operations back with loss a roving band vmder a certain Smit. On that day,
Sdi'eepers and ^^^ 19th, Wyndham was close behind Scheepers and Malan at
Maian. Poortje, SO that the Boers, with Lund before them and Wynd-
ham behind, were in a dangerous predicament. On the 20th,
however, Wyndham, unable to cling to his quarry, fell back to
his wagons, which he had far outstripped, at Stellenbosch Vallei,
and in a moment Scheepers was not only free but again on the
offensive. Dashing westward for the railway, which was now
uncovered by Lund's departure, he attacked and burnt a troop
train a few miles north of Nels Poort on the night of the 20th,
inflicting a loss of five men killed and two officers and
twenty-one men wounded. He then gained an opening to the
westward and disappeared. Wyndham then marched into Rich-
mond. Meanwhile, on the other flank, Scobell, quitting Graaff
Reinet on the 20th, reached Smithvale next day. He had seen
little of the enemy, but hearing of a commando, 120 strong,
under Lategan, at Tweefontein, twenty-five miles to the east,
at the junction of the Sneeuw and Voor Sneeuw Berg mountains,
he detached the Cape Mounted Riflemen, only ninety in num-
ber, under Lukin, to attempt to surprise them by night. In
spite of the length of the march Lukin's men brilliantly carried
Defeat of out their task. Lategan's band was completely scattered ;
^^"' many of the Boers fell ; eleven, including a Field-Cornet, with
105 horses, were captured. Scobell was then directed to Middle -
burg to work with Haig, his place in the combination being taken
by a column under Lieut. -Colonel A, G. Hunter-Weston, R.E.,
who will be remembered as having performed much valuable
scouting in front of Lord Roberts's advance upon Pretoria in
the early months of the previous year. On July 26th French's
four columns were thus placed — in front were B. Doran and
Lund on the railway at Hanover Road and Rietfontein, with
Hunter-Weston at Wildfontein, and Wyndham in rear at
Richmond. The arrival of reinforcements, consisting of five
mounted corps {5th and 12th Lancers, loth Hussars, each with
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY'. 233
two guns R.H.A., Prince of Wales' Light Horse, Nesbitt's
Horse) and the ist Royal Berkshire regiment/ materially
strengthened Cape Colony. Now also the policy of Ulockhouse
building along the Orange river, the railways and impfprtant
routes, and around infested areas, was being actively pur^^ued,
the covering of the construction being entrusted to Inigo Jor/;es.
East of the Graaff Reinet railway Kritzinger had been aj»s Operations
active as his fellow commandant to the west of that line. He 'iP.'"?^
Kntzinger.
had made but a short flight after his escape from the net around
the Tandjes Berg at the end of June, hovering about Garstlands ,
Kloof, a few miles north of his former haunt. Here, after "•^^
sundry false casts in the first fortnight of July, he was dis- \
covered by Crabbe, who had come across on the 6th from
Tarkastad, where, it will be remembered, he had put in after
his fruitless chase of Van Reenan. An attack on the kloof on
July 17th drove Kritzinger southward into the hills west of
Witmoss station, and Crabbe, anxious to turn him in the oppo-
site direction, manoeuvred to get to the southward of him on
the 20th. So doing, he was ambushed near Zwagers Hoek by
the watchful commandant. On the morning of the 21st a sudden Crabbe is
fire from all sides stampeded 200 of Crabbe's horses, which fell ^'"^"shed.
into the hands of the enemy. Thereupon the Boers pressed
hard on the column, which they twice summoned to surrender.
But Crabbe, keeping them off all day, fell back safely under
cover of darkness to Mortimer station, leaving Kritzinger to
himself. The Boer leader's ascendancy in the Cradock district
was shortly afterwards still further promoted by the arrival of
Commandant Theron and 100 burghers who had crossed the Arrival of
Orange river on the i6th. On his way southward from the 'theron.
frontier Theron had temporarily joined Van Reenan, who was
then running from kloof to kloof in the Bamboes mountains
before Gorringe and the 17th Lancers, whom Haig had sent
into the mountains at the end of June. The commandos soon
separated, Van Reenan, with great loss of horses, escaping
northward, whilst Theron pursued his way in the opposite
direction to join Kritzinger. Meanwhile Myburg and Erasmus,
Kritzinger's recent allies in the Bamboes mountains, easily
234
THE:. WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Operations
against
Fouch^.
/
Engagement
at Zuur
Vlakte,
July 14th,
1901.
avoiding Wyn^Iham in the Molteno district, had attached them-
selves to FoTach6, whom they found between Barkly East and
Jamestowp.. Since the middle of Jime Fouch^ had been resting
and recruiting in the Transkei, a territory which, since the local
Govep^hment had undertaken to defend it, Sir J. French had not
incljaded in his scheme of operations. Fouch6, however, was
leJLt imdisturbed, and occupied his time mainly in collecting
firesh horses. On July 4th he moved to Rhodes, and three days
later was joined by the two above-mentioned officers. Major-
General Hart at this moment had two mobile forces available,
one under Colonel S. C. H. Monro, based on Dordrecht, the
other, a partly mounted battalion of the Connaught Rangers,
commanded by Lieut. -Colonel M. G. Moore, who drew his
supplies from Jamestown. These columns had taken the field
immediately on the approach of the three Boer bands, Monro
following Myburg and Erasmus northward, Moore, starting
from Aliwal North, coming from the opposite direction to inter-
cept Fouch^. On July 12th Monro was north of Jamestown,
his left flank extending to midway to Burghersdorp ; Moore was
at Plat Kop Drift, on the Kraai river, with a party of Lovat's
Scouts, imder Lieut. -Colonel the Hon. A. Murray, to the east
of him at Drizzly Hill. The effect of these converging move-
ments was to compress Fouche and his associates into the hills
which close the southern angle of the AUwal North county.
On the 13th Moore moved into Zuiu: Vlakte in close touch with
the enemy, whereupon Fouch6, with good soldiership, seeing
one of his opponents unsupported within striking distance,
determined to strike first. On the morning of the 14th he lay
in wait on a semi-circle of hills west of Zuur Vlakte. Moore,
who had moved from bivouac in a south-westerly direction at
8 a.m., came in touch with Fouch6's advance parties about
10 a.m. and drove them back ; then, finding his march disputed,
immediately parked his wagons and assumed the offensive.
But he had to deal with superior numbers posted on command-
ing ground ; a ring of fire began to encircle his men as they
advanced over the level veld which footed the heights, and
when the enemy began to ride boldly down the slope towards
EVENTS IN CAPE COLi^ny. 235
the column Moore saw that further progress ^^^ impossible.
So also, whilst daylight lasted, was retreat, so Exposed and so
closely committed were the troops. From noon ^ntil dusk
therefore, the Connaught Rangers, ably handled .^,y Moore,
lay on the defensive with every disadvantage of posiM-JQu and
with no more cover than that afforded by the infreque^^^. ^nt.
hills, their heavy and well-directed shooting and that of a IVj^axim
gim keeping the enemy at arm's length. Only on the i-ight
(west), where a section of a company watched the hills whiv-h
curved around that flank, did the Boers succeed in closing, ana^
that only because, unknown to the rest, a sentry on the exposed
flank had been silenced. All this party, including the officer JSA
in command, were killed or woimded. As twiUght fell, Moore -'""
began to withdraw his men, and though a heavy fusilade
greeted the retirement of each unit, he soon, and with small ^
loss, had them posted on a strong line of rocks in rear. Many
of the enemy followed up the retreat, and these now found
themselves upon the same open ground as the troops had lain
upon all day, with the difference that now their opponents \
instead of themselves commanded it from cover. They began
to lose considerably, and Moore was in a fair way to compensate
for his day's losses, which numbered thirty-one,* when it became
too dark for aimed firing. After nightfall, Moore, who had
shown the greatest resource throughout a very critical action,
scored the last point by recovering all his wounded by a ruse
almost from the very midst of the Boer outposts.
At 5 p.m., before he began his retirement, Moore had sent
off a despatch acquainting Hart with his situation. The message
was received twelve hours later, and Hart at once led out a
party of 230 Lovat's Scouts, arriving at the scene at 3.30 p.m.
on July 15th. The Boers had disappeared westward, and touch
with them was lost until on the 19th Monro discovered them
attempting to break southward. They were already on the
Molteno border at Roode Kloof, but Monro successfully drove
them back north-east in spite of a determined attack on his
• Casualties — Killed, seven men ; wounded, three officers, seventeen men ; missing,
four men.
236
THE ^AR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
/
ftiver.
baggage. Fonr^^^ then hurried past Zuur Vlakte, skirmishing
again on the 7***^ with Moo^e, who was still there, and made
towards the- Kraai river. Moore followed for some miles
and pitchr-^ ^ ^^^ camp near Vlaktefontein. Thereupon the
Boers dr^^^^^^ ^^<^^ undetected to the Aliwal — Jamestown
road, a'^^ °" *^^ morning of the 26th fell upon a convoy pro-
ceedip^S to the latter place below Limoen Kloof. The escort,
whic^ consisted of only thirty men, succeeded in holding their
Qy,/i\ until Moore, hearing the firing, galloped to the spot and
cleared the ground. Proceeding to escort the wagons towards
Jamestown he found the enemy so numerous and strongly posted
across the narrow road that he thought it prudent to await the
arrival of Monro, who had gone into Burghersdorp. On the
' 28th the two columns, directed by Hart in person, combined
Foup«^^ crosses against the heights ; but Fouch^ had vanished. On the pre-
tb^e Orange yious evening he had re-appeared outside Ahwal North, where*
at 8 p.m. he deUvered a vindictive attack on the refugee camp
which sheltered his own compatriots of both sexes. Next day
he was over the Orange river.
On July 29th Myburg and Erasmus, who remained behind,
were joined by a fresh commando of Free Staters about Toom
Nek, north of Dordrecht. Here they were severely dealt with
on July 30th by Gorringe, who had come eastward after his
chase of Van Reenan in the Biamboes mountains. The three
commandos then fled south-westward through Oorlogs Poort,
ten miles north-west of Dordrecht, and across the railway about
Rayner, closely pursued by Gorringe, who for some days was
never far from their rearguard. In the first week of August he
came up with them in the Keesen Berg, north-east of Steyns-
burg. Gorringe successfully surrounded that stronghold, and
although the Boers broke through his cordon at night, it was
not without severe loss both in men and horses.
At the end of July, Lieut. -General Sir J. French initiated a
change of tactics. The Boer commandos in the midland districts
were at this moment all to be found within controllable Umits,
and the unceasing harrying to which they had been subjected
made it probable that they would not be able to withstand a
French
"drives" t
the Orange
river.
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 237
strong impetus in any given direction. French, therefore, deter-
mined to attempt to push them bodily across the Orange river
by a combined drive by all the available columns. For this
purpose it was necessary first to place the troops to the south-
ward of the enemy without arousing suspicions, and this French
accomplished in the following ingenious manner. Disposing
first, on July 30th, eight columns on a line Victoria West — Rich-
mond— Middleburg — Schombie — Sterkstroom, he ordered them
to march southward towards the enemy, not closed up, but
maintaining wide intervals between the flanks of columns, so
that the Boers, espying the gaps, as they surely would, might
take advantage of them to break through in the direction most
desired by French, that is, to the north of his line of columns.
This plan proved very profitable. On August 3rd when the
columns, after two successful skirmishes by B. Doran and
Hunter- Weston on the 2nd, faced about for the return drive on
the line Beaufort West — Aberdeen — Witmoss — Seymour, all
the commandos but one were between them and the Orange
river. The exception was Scheepers, who, recoiling southwards
from Oorlogs Poort, west of Aberdeen, at the first advance of
the columns, was already below Willowmore when they halted,
nor could Lieut. -Colonel H. Alexander, whom French detached
by train with the loth Hussars and two guns, head him back
into the net. Sending the 12th Lancers and two guns, under
Lieut.-Colonel T. J. Atherton, to assist Alexander, French
ordered his line to move northward on August 6th. In front
of him were now seven commandos, those of Kritzinger, Malan,
Lategan, Theron, Smit, Lotter and C. J. Botha. All but two,
Theron's and Smit's, had moved east of the Graaff Reinet rail-
way, and for the next three days they made desperate attempts
to break through the advancing lines. On the gth Scobell had
a sharp affair at Spitz Kop with Lotter and Botha, whom he
drove north-westward. Kritzinger, who attempted to support
them, was intercepted by Crabbe and Lieut.-Colonel C. T. McM.
Kavanagh from Maraisburg, who hustled the interloper north-
ward nearly to Thebus. Kritzinger then made a determined
effort to shake himself free. Braving the blockhouses and
238
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Kritzinger
driven across
the Orange
river.
Escape of
Letter and
C. J. Botha.
armoured trains which guarded the line, he threw his men across
in small parties on the nights of August 9th and loth, and on
the nth gained the Zuur Berg, where he found Van Reenan
and Wessels, whom Gorringe had driven thither from the Keesen
Berg. Thereupon Gorringe, from Stormfontein, joined Crabbe
in the pursuit and pressed the three commandos northward past
Venterstad, clear over the Orange river, on August 15th, Gor-
ringe inflicting severe loss on Kritzinger on the 13th.* Once
across the river the commandos separated. Kritzinger remained
in the Orange River Colony, but Van Reenan, swinging down
stream, recrossed the frontier between Hopetown and Colesberg
Bridge, and once more entered British territory. On the 19th
he broke across the De Aar — Orange River railway, and dis-
appeared westward. Meanwhile the columns of B. Doran and
Wyndham had been marching upon either side of New Bethesda,
connected by Captain Lord W. A. Cavendish-Bentinck's squad-
ron of the loth Hussars from Alexander's command. Theron
and Smit were before them ; the former, after being engaged by
each in turn, made his escape southward, to be no more seen.
At The Willows, Smit was joined by Lotter and C. J. Botha as
they fled from the advance of Scobell and Hunter-Weston
between the Sneeuw Bergen and the railway. An attack by
B. Doran had the effect of driving them northward to Leeuw
Hoek, where they separated, Smit moving westward, the other
two to Roode Berg and Gryze Kop in the opposite direction.
The Boers had now before them the heavily defended railway,
and French promptly made dispositions to bear them against it.
On the night of August i6th Doran was to the north of the
enemy at Winterhoek, Hunter-Weston behind them at Paarde
Vallei, Scobell south of them at Vinkfontein, and Kavanagh,
who had been withdrawn from the chase of Kritzinger, at
McKinnon's Post, whence he was linked by local troops from
Middleburg to the railway, which was patrolled by two armoured
trains. The escape of Lotter and Botha seemed impossible.
On the night of the i6th they hotly attacked the blockhouses,
• Sergeant-Major A. Young, Cape Police, was awarded the Victoria Cross for
gallantry on this date.
EVENTS. IN CAPE COLONY. 239
but were repulsed at every point. Before dawn next day the
columns began to converge on the imprisoned commandos.
With the courage of despair the Boers rode to meet them.
Between Scobell and Kavanagh there was a gap, narrow, but
large enough to be discovered and used by men who never lost
their heads or their way. Rushing through this at full speed in
the darkness they broke free, and by the afternoon were safely
back in the Rhenoster Berg, leaving only a trail of dead horses
and a few prisoners behind them. Sir J. French sent Kavanagh
and Scobell in pursuit at once, but the Boers, passing over the
Rhenoster Berg, and thence imder the mountains to Spitz Kop,
made no halt until they had gained the Tandjes Berg. There,
at Water Kloof, north of Petersburg, they were engaged by
Scobell and Kavanagh, who drove them through Garstlands
Kloof, whence they doubled back to Spitz Kop. Here B. Doran,
whom French had posted at Lang Kloof, intercepted them,
and they separated, Botha, pursued by Doran, going eastward
across the railway, Lotter once more seeking the Tandjes Berg
at Water Kloof. At this moment Theron was rediscovered,
and was reported to be making his way towards the southern
counties. As this was at all costs to be avoided, French with-
drew Kavanagh to oppose him, leaving Lotter alone for the
moment, whilst Scobell and Doran devoted themselves to Botha.
Driving that leader about east of Cradock they had so worn
him out before the end of the month that less than thirty men
remained with him, and French diverted the two columns to deal
with Lotter instead. On August 30th Scobell and B. Doran put
into Cradock to re-equip.
Meanwhile Smit, after parting with Lotter and Botha near
Middleburg, had been shouldered north-westward by Wyndham
from Richmond, and Bentinck and Lund from Hanover, the
last-named coming once to close terms with him. Smit was
moving on Britstown on August i8th when French was com-
pelled by news of the concentration of a fresh body of invaders
near the frontier to withdraw Lund and Bentinck to join the
columns of observation which it was necessary to post along the
Orange river. Wyndham, therefore, continued the pursuit of
240
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Pursuit of
Letter.
Capture of
Lotter,
Sept. 5 th,
1901.
Smit alone, and during the first week of September he chased
him, inflicting daily losses, into the hills south of Sutherland.
Simultaneously the other columns drove Lategan out of the
country.
Lotter, at Water Kloof, thus remained the chief figure, with
Scobell, B. Doran and a column of local forces under Lieut.-
Colonel J. R. MacAndrew devoted to his destruction. On
September ist these three officers opened a scheme to enclose
him in the Tandjes Berg. Scobell, who feigned to be marching
on Bethesda, moved to Koude Heuvel, MacAndrew to close to
the south of Water Kloof, whilst Doran blocked all the exits on
the eastern side. On the next night (September 2nd) Scobell,
fetching a compass completely around the Berg, placed himself
secretly upon the south-west of the Boer laager. Thereupon
Lotter abandoned his position, and endeavoured to break out in
two opposite directions at once. Both attempts were repulsed
with loss, but soon after, the commando, reuniting, fought a
clever rearguard action which enabled it to escape into the
intricate country east of Petersburg. Scobell lay on the night
of September 3rd at Middle Water. He fully reaUsed that
in order to come to close quarters with Lotter he must dis-
regard direct pursuit in favour of surprise from an unlooked-
for direction. His own men and horses, as well as supplies,
were nearly exhausted, but he determined on one last effort
to accomplish his task. Served as well by his InteUigence
Staff as by his troops, he was at once informed of Lotter's
line of march, which led back in the direction of Petersburg.
Throughout September 4th, by dint of incredible exertions
amongst the precipitous Tandjes Berg, the column actually
succeeded in outpacing the rapidly moving commando. In
the evening Scobell bivouacked near the village of Petersburg,
having marched completely around Lotter, who, all unconscious
of his pursuer's volte face, had taken refuge in a secluded farm
near Groen Kloof. Here he was soon " harboured," and Scobell,
after issuing an inspiriting order to his men, at i a.m. on Sep-
tember 5th led them out in cold and wet for a last round with
the elusive rebel. Steered by first-rate guides the expedition
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 241
found itself at dawn within striking distance of the laager.
This lay close behind an isolated hill which was easily ap-
proached from the side to which the force had been conducted,
but on the other, whence alone the Boers expected attack,
was protected by tier upon tier of ridges. Upon the kopje
overhanging the camp there was not even a piquet, though it
commanded at short range two open kraals and the small farm-
house which formed the sleeping places of the burghers. Scobell,
accurately informed of the nature of the ground by his invalu-
able scouts, quickly delivered his attack. Directly against the
intervening hill went the Cape Mounted Riflemen led by Lukin
and Captains J. F. Purcell and C. L. Goldsworthy. Two
squadrons (" A." and " D.") of the gth Lancers under Captains
Lord D. Compton and E. Gordon respectively passed around
either flank to envelop the laager behind. The Boers were
thought to be in the farmhouse ; but as the flankers of "A."
squadron rode by the intervening kraals a shout went up from
the interior, followed by a hot fire which at the closest range did
execution amongst the Lancers. Lord D. Compton, never-
theless, led a party of his men at the gallop through the fire zone
to his appointed place in rear of the enemy ; the rest flung them-
selves under the very walls of the kraals, and fought it out
muzzle to muzzle. Purcell's squadron of the Cape Mounted
Riflemen rushed for the crest of the unguarded hiU and began
to shoot down into the kraals, and soon, " D." squadron of the
9th Lancers having swung completely around the farm from
the side opposite to "A." squadron, the whole laager was in-
vested by a circle of musketry. In the farmhouse itself were
only five burghers, all of whom were shot as they dashed for
the open. Eight more were killed in the kraals, from the
walls of one of which, after half an hour's fighting, a white flag
went up, signifying that Lotter and all his commando, to the
number of 120 men, of whom forty-six were wounded, surrendered
as prisoners of war. Two hundred ponies and some 30,000
rounds of ammunition which also fell into Scobell's hands tes-
tified to the excellence of the equipment of the bands which
troubled Cape Colony. Scobell himself lost nine men kiUed
VOL. IV. 16
242 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
and an officer and eight men wounded, eighteen in all, and
twelve of these casualties (seven killed, five wounded) occurred
in Lord D. Compton's squadron outside the kraals. To that
officer, Scobell, in a congratulatory order, especially conveyed
his thanks, for had he allowed himself to be checked by the
point-blank fire the Boers would undoubtedly have made off
over the hills in rear, where the column, which was destitute of
every means of subsistence, was incapable of pursuing. But
to Scobell himself, and to every officer and man in his force,
was due much honour for this, the first real success in Cape
Colony. Not the small numbers engaged or who fell or were
taken in action were the measure of the brilliance of this feat
of arms ; rather the enormous exertions and privations which
preceded, and the skill and resolution which consummated it.
Yet it is not to be forgotten that there were at this moment
in Cape Colony, and indeed in all South Africa, a multitude of
columns whose equal endurance and devotion had not procured
a like result. Seldom in the history of war have soldiers been
so willing as the British troops in South Africa in the last phase
of the campaign against the Boers to expend their utmost
strength upon objects apparently so insignificant, yet so diffi-
cult to attain. There was at this period no more striking
example of this ill-rewarded energy than in the south, where
Operations Scheepers, repeating the earliest triumphs of the invasion, was
Sheepers. scouring the southem counties from the Port Elizabeth to the
Cape Town railways, bidding defiance to the utmost efforts
of Alexander and Atherton to catch him. On August 15th Major-
General S. B. Beatson arrived at Willowmore to take charge of
the operations, and at once made plans to enclose Scheepers,
who was then between Uniondale and Avontuur. But Scheepers,
taking the offensive, drove back not only the squadron which
had been posted at Avontuur to stop him, but also Alexander
himself who moved to its support out of Uniondale on the 19th,
the loth Hussars losing sixteen casualties, including two officers,
in the encounters. Atherton's 12th Lancers were then sent to
Uniondale to reinforce the loth Hussars, and both together
pressed after Scheepers, who was travelling westward through
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 243
George county into Oudtshoom, making for Ladismith. Before
making his point Scheepers' rearguard was twice caught up
by the cavalry, first at Moeras River on the 23rd and again
near CaHtzdorp ; but he gained the town, and passing through
it, turned as if for Montagu or Swellendam, Both the Cape
Town and Worcester — Swellendam railways were thus endan-
gered and at points of the greatest importance. At Swellen-
dam, the then easterly terminus of the branch hne, there were
large accumulations of stores, which Wynne hastened to safe-
guard by despatching a company from Worcester to hold the
pass of the Lange Bergen, which commanded both Swellendam
and Montagu. Worcester itself contained some thousands of
remounts, and in addition to men whom Wynne borrowed from
a recently arrived troopship to fill the place of those sent to
Swellendam, the ist Royal Berkshire regiment was ordered
from De Aar to Worcester. Beatson, who found his opponent
running out of his reach, now changed his Headquarters to
Matjesfontein. But before he left Willowmore the situation Disturijed
had been complicated by the approach of Theron, who was twrhern
coming down through Prince Albert with a band of eighty counties.
men. To deal with him Kavanagh was ordered from Graaff
Reinet to Willowmore, where he arrived on September 2nd,
marching next day against Theron, who was then nearing
Oudtshoom.
Thus the early days of September, 1901, saw a recrudescence
of trouble in a part which it had been hoped had been delivered.
Once more Cape Town and the sea-board communities became
uneasy, wondering impatiently at the apparent impossibihty of
stopping the leaks by which the small, but dangerous, Boer
bands trickled down upon them. The renewed disturbance in
this quarter was doubly unfortunate and difficult to deal with
at this moment because in the north a fresh cloud had arisen,
more portentous than any which had threatened Cape Colony
since the incursion of De Wet.
VOL. IV. 1 6*
244
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Approximate Strength States of Columns referred to in
foregoing chapter.
CO
BCcri
COLUMN.
H
S
a
a
"O-r
0
4)
a
si
0 u
a
IS
0
o>
S
June — September, 1901.
Lt.-Col. E. M. S. Crabbe . .
816
96
2
—
Lt-Col. the Hon. A. H.
Henniker ...
686
179*
2
1
Col. H. J. Scobell . .
1,091
I2t
3
—
Lt.-Col. G. F. Gorringe ..
530
3
—
Lt.-Col. C. P. Crewe
500
3
2
Lt.-Col. H. T. Lukin
690
3
I
Lt.-Col. the Hon. A.Murray
2,2
84
2
I
Col. S. C. H. Monro
820
3
4
Lt.-Col. W. L. White
500
3
I
Lt.-Col. W. P. Wyndham . .
426
3
—
Maj. H. S. Jeudwine
370
50
2
—
Lt.-Col. B. Doran . .
668
sot
2
—
Capt. F. T. Lund . .
594
I
I
Lt.-Col. A. G. Hunter-
Weston
468
I4t
3
I
Lt.-Col. M. G. Moore
250
250
—
Lt.-Col. H. Alexander
604
—
2
I
Lt.-Col. T. J. Atherton . .
633
—
2
I
Lt.-Col. C. T. McM. Kava-
nagh
480
—
I
I
Lt.-Col. J. R. MacAndrew . .
380
7+
—
"""
Note.— Lieut. -General Sir J. D, P. French assumed command of all columns in
Cape Colony on June 9th, 1901.
Thirty-three Cyclists.
t Cyclists.
245
CHAPTER XIV.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY*
{Continued from Chapter IX.).
JULY — AUGUST, IQOI.
At the beginning of July, to sum up the situation all over the
Orange River Colony, six columns had come in to the railways,
namely, W. H. Williams' and Byng's, of Bruce Hamilton's
command at Edenburg ; Pilcher's and Thomeycroft's, of Sir C.
Knox's sphere at Brandfort ; Henry's and Paris', of the western
area, at Christiana. In mid-veld Bruce Hamilton had Rochfort,
du Moulin and W. L. White about Oorlogs Poort ; Elliot and Sir
L. Rundle were at Springfield Drift. The enemy was nowhere
absent, yet nowhere in strength sufficient even seriously to
dispute the wholesale destruction of his flocks, herds, mills
and magazines, which had become the common task of columns
on the march. De Wet himself was as ubiquitous as his
purposely dispersed burghers. All fears of the desertion of
his country by the allied State had been removed by the con-
ference on the Water val,t and he rode from one group of his
adherents to another, exhorting them to avoid fighting and to
direct their efforts mainly against the lines of communication,
which in consequence had suffered continual annoyance and
damage throughout June. De Wet was at this time un-
accompanied by Steyn, who, parting from him after their return
together from the Transvaal, had repaired to the district about
* See map No. 64.
t See Chapter XII., page 206.
246 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Reitz with his political staff. Here the ex-President was within
Elliot's zone of operations, and, as will be seen, went very near
to being added to his booty.
Elliot and Elliot made but a brief halt at Springfield Drift. On
Sir L. Rundie jyjy ^th he was again on the march, this time in a northerly
direction ; his brigades, de Lisle on left, Bethune in centre,
Broadwood on right, filling the space between the Libenbergs
Vlei river and th*e left bank of the Wilge, on the opposite side
of which Sir L. Rundie, with B. Campbell (i6th brigade), and
Harley (17th brigade), prolonged the front as far as the eastern
of the two roads from Harrismith to Vrede. Rundie had now
organised his division into three columns under Reay, Harley
and B. Campbell, which marched in that order from left to right,
Reay thus linking with Broadwood across the Wilge. The
whole front covered some fifty miles of country. On the 5th
Elliot threw his left flank forward by advancing de Lisle to
Driehoek, south of Reitz ; Bethune, with whom were Elliot and
his Headquarters, moving to Rust, whilst on the right Broad-
wood remained at Springfield Drift, the whole of this part of
the array thus facing diagonally north-eastward. Sir L. Rundie
pushed on nearly to the Mill river from Constantia to Astan
Drift. Next day de Lisle passed through Reitz — Steyn and
his entourage evacuating in good time — to Wolfnest ; Bethune
moved to Vaalbank ; Broadwood, after detaching Lowe to
Morgenzon on the Leeuw Spruit, up to Klip Drift on the Wilge
river ; Sir L. Rundie made the Une of the Cornells river. On
July 7th Elliot's front from left to right was Rustfontein —
Vlakfontein — Mooigelegen (Lowe) — Rondedraai. Sir L. Rundie
continued to conform until the loth, when he halted on the line
Leeuw Kop — Botha's Berg. Meanwhile Elliot, still keeping his
left forward, had passed through : —
July 8th, Roodekopjes — Zorgvleit — Leeuwspruit.
July 9th, Paardenkraal — Leeuwkuil — Aasvogels Krans —
Strijdpoort.
July loth, Groenvlei Drift — Boschmansfontein — Vogel-
draai — Rietgat.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 247
With the exception of small rearguard actions by de Lisle
and Bethune on the 8th there was no fighting, and the chief
occupation of the troops consisted in gathering in the wandering
wagons, flocks and herds, and the isolated rovers who flitted
across the front. In the midst of this monotony, however,
suddenly occurred an incident which, like a stroke of Ughtning,
might have struck off one of the sturdiest limbs of the Orange
Free State.
The persistence of the enemy upon his left -rear had caused
Elliot to realise that he had brushed aside bands sufficiently
numerous to be worth a diversion from his main line of advance.
On July 9th, therefore, he had sent orders to Broad wood to carry
out a night raid upon Reitz, whence the annoyance probably
emanated. The message had arrived too late to be acted upon
on that night, so Broadwood deferred action until the next,
when, having diverted suspicion by sharing in the general
advance as far as Rietgat, he suddenly wheeled 400 mounted men
under cover of darkness, passed behind the brigades of the
centre, and made for Reitz, calculating to surround it exactly
by dawn on the nth. Delayed, however, by the straying of
one of his connecting files, he lost so much time that when day
broke he was still three miles from Reitz. He therefore ordered
his men to gallop, and as the sun rose bore rapidly down upon
the sleeping township. Such an approach could scarcely escape
detection, but its very speed all but gave it its reward. Not
until the troopers thundered into the outskirts did any stir arise Surprise of
amongst the buildings, and then it seemed all too late to save j^^y^'ith
the Republics from the most crushing blow they had yet suffered. 1901-
In Reitz lay Steyn and all his military and jwUtical staff. He
had re-entered the village close behind de Lisle four days before,
and tracking the columns northward by means of the scouts
which had attracted Elliot's attention, felt all secure from any
return of the receding waves of the British advance. In this way
Broadwood, bursting into Reitz with no greater hope than that
of surprising a small commando, found himself in the midst of
the headsprings of the resistance of the Orange Free State.
There was little or no opposition. Generals A. P. Cronje and
248 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
J. B. Wessels, Commandant O. Davel, Field-Comet Steyn (the
brother of the ex-President), T. Brain, his private secretary,
and twenty-four other officials were quickly made prisoners.
Steyn himself was not to be foimd. None thought of associating
the deposed leader with a soUtary mounted figure which was
seen galloping, coatless and unbooted, away from the opposite
^dge of the town and out across the veld. Two horsemen, an
officer and a sergeant, were in hot pursuit, and gained rapidly
on the fugitive. They drew within point-blank range, and were
on the verge of overhauling the flying Boer, of whose personality
they knew nothing, when their horses, which had already been
ridden thirty miles, stopped beaten. Leaping to the ground
the sergeant levelled his rifle at the burly form now only eighty
yards distant. But the oil on the sliding bolt and striker-spring
had become frozen and clogged in the long night ride, disabhng
the weapon. Thrice the man pulled trigger harmlessly, the
Narrow escape quarry Sped on, and when shooting and further pursuit alike
of Steyn. became hopeless the pair turned towards Reitz, regretting not
overmuch the loss of a single ordinary burgher. Thus Steyn
made his escape by a miracle which was not undeserved. If he
had led his coimtrymen into war, there was not one amongst
them who fought with higher motives than he, or displayed greater
fortitude and love of country. His hopes crushed, his nation
sacrificed by allegiance to an ally who, once so domineering,
was now to be kept in heart mainly by his own indomitable
spirit ; ailing, especially in his eyes, nowhere so vitally a man's
outposts as in time of war and upon the veld, there was no hard-
ship or danger which he had not shared ; nor was there any
despair, and this affliction Steyn, who knew better than any
the hopeless state of his people, added in double mccisure to
his trials by steadfastly concealing it. In a war not poor in
striking figures Ste}^ will ever stand out as the man whose
obduracy most nearly approached heroism.
The ex-President lost everything but his liberty. Besides
his staff, all his papers and his treasury, containing ;£ii,ooo, fell
into the hands of Broadwood, who immediately set out to rejoin
Elliot. He had to skirmish all his way back, and when he
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 249
reached Grootklip on the Harrismith — Frankfort road he had
covered more than sixty miles. Meanwhile, the general line
had gone forward, swinging on the nth through Groenvlei
and Klipoog towards Heilbron, which was entered on the 13th,
Broadwood appearing there on the next day. The whole force
was back upon the railway at Vredefort Road on July i6th,
bringing with it sixty-one prisoners, 54,000 sheep, 4,000 ponies,
3,600 cattle and seventy-five carts and wagons, the casualties
having been only three men slightly wounded.
Sir L. Rundle had also advanced, his front on the 12th
stretching from the Wilge river through Tafel Kop nearly to
Vrede, south of which a commando some 800 strong was sighted
but could not be brought to action. On the 13th a patrol of
Imperial Yeomanry from Harley's brigade had to be rescued
from superior numbers after an engagement in which the patrol
had lost six wounded, but the Boer commandant, C. Botha,
had been killed. Rundle then pointed on Standerton, whence
columns under Colonel F. S. Garratt, Brigadier-General G. M.
Bullock and Lieut. -Colonel M. F. Rimington were on the march
in his direction across the drifts of the Vaal river. With little
further incident Sir L. Rundle's columns entered the dep6t
town on the 17th, having had sixteen casualties, and taken or
destroyed 46,000 sheep, 10,000 ponies, 6,000 cattle and eighty-
nine vehicles, besides a mass of wheat, fodder and farming
implements.
Of the three Standerton columns touched by Sir L. Rimdle
during the above march, Bullock soon returned to the railway.
Garratt, who, with Colville, had recently been in combination
with Sir B. Blood south of Middelburg,* skirmished his way
along the Vaal by Vereeniging and Parys to Reitzburg, where
he will be met with again in connection with events shortly to
be recorded. t Rimington must have somewhat fuller mention.
He had come from the Wakkerstroom district of the Transvaal,
where in company with Plumer he had been engaged in the
operations described in an earlier chapter. J Plumer and
* See Chapter XII., page 210. f See post, page 254.
I See Chapter XII., pages 199 — 202.
250 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Rimingtpn entered the Orange River Colony at about the same
time, and for similar duties, but by widely different routes.
Plumer, as will be seen, made for the Modder river by way
of Bloemfontein. Rimington, crossing the Klip river by Steele's
Drift, pointed on Vrede, coming immediately in touch both
with Sir L. Rundle's columns and with the Boers. At Gems-
bokhoek Berg on July 13th ten prisoners and forty-four wagons
were smartly captured. Constantly engaged, Rimington reached
Heilbron on the 21st, and on the night of the 23rd moved his
columns first parallel to the Frankfort— Lindley road, then in-
wards and back towards Heilbron, a ride of sixty miles which
resulted in the capture of twenty-two prisoners. Based on Heil-
bron, Rimington scoured the country on all sides, working in
co-operation with Spens, who arrived from Heidelberg on
August 5th, fresh from the arduous operations in the Lydenburg
district.* Together the two commanders cleared the neigh-
bourhood, and the end of August found both in Kroonstad
with some thirty prisoners and the produce ravished from many
square miles of country.
Elliot Three days' pause on the railway re-rationed Elliot's troops
marches west. ^^^ another effort. This time the goal was to be Klerksdorp,
the march upon this base of the British operations in the never
quiet Western Transvaal having a twofold object. At this
time Fetherstonhaugh was on his way back to Klerksdorp from
that expedition to Zeerust which has been referred to.f Elliot
hoped to intercept any commandos which might seek to avoid
Fetherstonhaugh's returning columns by crossing to the left
bank of the Vaal. This, however, was but a subsidiary aim.
His main intention was to dispose his own columns, and
certain fresh ones which he was to acquire, for a great sweep
from the Vaal to the Modder, over the rich tracts which Pilcher
and Thomeycroft had recently found it beyond their powers
to clear effectually. On July 19th Broadwood, on the right
flank, was on the Vaal near Parys, de Lisle to the south-east
of Reitzburg, and Lowe (who had now succeeded Bethune) at
* See Chapter XII., page 211. f See Chapter XL, page 190.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 251
Wilgeboschdrift on the Rhenoster. Broadwood then got astride
the Vaal, and the columns, searching every cranny as they
marched, moved on down the Vaal towards the rendezvous,
entering Klerksdorp on July 23rd and 24th with fifteen prisoners,
16,000 stock and fifty-two vehicles, the losses having been but
two. In four days all was ready for the development of the
main scheme, but before narrating Elliot's subsequent movements
it is necessary to turn back to the doings of the commanders
of other areas of the Orange River Colony.
Sir L. Rundle regained his own district by way of the Botha's Sir L. Rundie
Berg, Verkykers Kop and Maaritsdrift, Harley and Reay being H^smlth.
detached towards the Witkoppies. Constant opposition of a
trifling sort was met with, and on August 3rd Rundle was back
at his base. He was met by news of a minor disaster which
had occurred in his absence. On July 27th, a Boer laager
having been reported inconveniently close to Harrismith, the
town Commandant had promptly despatched all his available
mounted men to attempt a surprise. But the party, finding
the encampment to be much more distant than had been sup-
posed, had pushed on too far, and coming upon the enemy
in a strong position, had lost an entire patrol, falling back with
the loss of an officer killed, six men wounded, and an officer and
twenty-four men taken prisoners.
More to the south Bruce Hamilton for the first half of July Bruce
resumed his double operations on both sides of Edenburg. JJj«Hoii'
Rochfort and du Moulin circled about Dewetsdorp chasing
scattered bands first northward towards Wepener, then in the
opposite direction on Helvetia. On the west of the railway
W. H. Williams and Byng combined in a more detailed scheme
from July 5th, sweeping defined areas, the former north and
the latter south of the line Edenburg — Fauresmith — Luckhoff —
Belmont, intending subsequently to cross the Riet river and
beat back to Petrusburg. These affairs were in progress when
on July i6th Bruce Hamilton received notice from the Com-
mander-in-Chief that, in view of Elliot's approaching sweep
towards the Modder, a general hostile movement might be
expected from the Vaal southwards, and that the troops of the
252 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
southern command were to be at once disposed so as to secure
the Bloemfontein — Jacobsdal blockhouse line and to deny
approach to the Orange. Breaking off his own operations,
Hamilton called Rochfort and du Moulin to Edenburg, formed
a new column imder Major J. H. Damant for the protection
of the railway, and issued orders in accordance with which W. H.
Williams hastened with his three columns (his own and two
others, commanded by Majors S. Bogle Smith and G. N. Going)
to Jacobsdal, whence he reached out eastward through Kalk-
laagte to Emmaus. Beyond this Rochfort extended past
Petrusburg to within touch of Bloemfontein, a strong line being
thus formed behind the Modder. More to the south Byng
went on to Ramah, du Moulin marched on Philippolis, whilst
Damant took up his station at Jagersfontein Road. These
movements were completed by July 2ist when Bruce Hamilton
proceeded to Bloemfontein and thence traversed his whole
front along the Modder, being at Petrusburg on the 25th, Poplar
Grove and Brandvallei on the succeeding two days, and on
the 29th at Kimberley, whence the train conveyed him back
into his own area at Springfontein on the last day of the month.
Several minor successes had been achieved by his various detach-
ments. On July 20th Damant, sallying eastward, attacked
a band who had occupied some kopjes twelve miles from Jagers-
fontein Road, and after an hour's fighting captured the Com-
mandant and twelve of his men. A few days later Rochfort,
having got news that Commandant Myburgh was laagered on
the Riet river, west of Jagersfontein Drift, on his way to invade
Cape Colony, made a night march of twenty miles from Zwart-
koppies in conjunction with a detachment from Tafelkop, under
Colonel A. W. G. Lowry-Cole. Favoured by a thick mist the
two parties effected a complete surprise on the morning of the
28th. Myburgh, mortally wounded, was secured with seven of
his men by Lowry-Cole, Rochfort taking sixteen prisoners in
addition, and killing another commandant, Erasmus. Finally,
on the last day of July, Damant, making a sudden raid on
Fauresmith, made prisoners of three Field-Comets and ten
burghers who were sheltering in the place. Soon after his
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 253
return, Bruce Hamilton received orders to co-operate \vith Sir
C. Knox, whose previous operations must here be described.
From the ist to the 13th of July Sir C. Knox employed his sir C. Knox's
troops in raiding the mountainous country between Brandfort, op^'^^"°'^-
Thabanchu, Ladybrand, Senekal and Winburg, i.e., the area
to the north of that which was being simultaneously cleared by
Rochfort and du Moulin. What little fighting occurred fell
mainly to Thomeycroft about Mequatlings Nek, and on the 13th
and 14th Thomeycroft put into Ladybrand and Pilcher into
Thabanchu with 16,000 stock and seventy-three vehicles, their
joint casualties amounting to but six killed and wounded.
Finding all Bruce Hamilton's units then withdrawing across
the railway in accordance with the orders detailed above, Knox
then decided to remain on the east of the line and embark
upon a systematic clearance of the country as far as the Basuto
border. This was carried out by five parties, made up from
the two normal columns, and placed under Lieut. -Colonels
H. d'A. P. Taylor and C. F. Minchin and Majors K. E. Lean,
F. C. Lloyd and H. C. Copeman. Pilcher's detachments were
reassembled at Bethulie on July 26th, Thomeycroft's at Aliwal
North two days later, the casualties being nil, and the booty
five prisoners, 126 carts and wagons, and nearly 70,000 stock,
some of which were brought in but more destroyed. Some 350
ovens, threshing machines and other baking and agricultural
appliances had also been wrecked.
From the western boimdary of the Orange River Colony Entry of fresh
three columns had been active during July, namely, those of columns
Western, Henry and Paris. The first named, returning on the
8th from his temporary alliance with G. Hamilton west of
Klerksdorp,* subsequently swept both banks of the Vaal easp-
ward, basing himself on Coal Drift, and clearing in the course
of his operations Venterskroon and Bothaville. He returned
to Coal Drift on July 23rd with 5,000 head of stock and sixteen
carts, and was then ordered to fall in with Elliot's drive to the
south. From July ist to 12th Henry and Paris from Christiana
* See Chapter XL, page 192.
254 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
combined to sweep up both banks of the Vaal through Bloemhof
to Hoopstad. Whilst Paris then went into Warrenton for
supplies, the expected southerly Boer movement took Henry
eastward to Aaronslaagte from July i8th to 24th to watch the
roads leading from the drifts of the Vaal. He was there rejoined
by Paris, who, on his march from Warrenton, had had a sharp
little affair at Palmietpan on the 23rd. The two columns then
raided the district in company, another brisk skirmish at
Wolvepan on the 26th resulting in Paris completely routing
his opponents, who left eight dead, and their Field-Comet
wounded on the field. Orders now came for these forces, too,
to fall in with Elliot's great manoeuvre, and Paris moved into
Windsorton on July 31st to obtain supplies for Henry, whilst
the latter marched on Hoopstad.
Drawn into these parts by the same cause now came also
Garratt, as previously mentioned, and Sir H. Rawhnson from
Klerksdorp,* and on July 27th, the tale of his columns being
complete, Elliot gave the order to march.
The general scope of the plan on which he was about to
embark had now assumed colossal proportions. In addition
to the nimierous columns already enumerated as coming within
his jurisdiction, not only had several minor bodies, such as
Pine-Coffin's from Kroonstad and Barker's from Vet River
station, been ordered to strike out in co-operation with him
from the Unes of communication, but Plumer had now appeared
from distant CaroUnaf to take a part, with the columns
of Colonel Sir J. Jervis-White-Jervis, R.A,, and Lieut.-Colonel
F. F. Colvin. Railed from Wonderfontein, these fresh contin-
gents had arrived at Bloemfontein on July 17th, and had
thence made a preliminary excursion down both sides of
the Modder river by Palmietfontein, Poplar Grove, Kameel-
fontein and Pandamsfontein, that is, directly across Elliot's
projected front. Only the flanking parties were engaged, but
much country was cleared, and on July 31st Plumer marched to
Modder River station with eleven prisoners, having taken or
* See Chapter XI., page 195. | See Chapter XII., page 202.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 255
destroyed some 10,000 stock and twenty vehicles. He was now
in position to fulfil his role in Elliot's scheme, and he awaited
the moment to begin it.
The great quadrilateral whose sides were the Kimberley and Elliot's plans.
Bloemfontein railways, and the V^aal and Modder rivers which
intersected them, was now completely enclosed by troops.
Across the north stood Elliot, holding in line from Klerksdorp
to Vredefort the columns of de Lisle, Broadwood, Lowe, Western
and Sir H. Rawlinson in this order from west to east, besides a
seventh, under Lieut. -Colonel H. M. Owen, which he had recently
organised and attached to Broadwood. Western and Garratt
were at Coal and Schoeman's Drifts on either side of Klerksdorp ;
Paris and Henry lay lower down the river opposite Hoopstad.
On the west was Plumer ready to extend in any direction. The
east was doubly guarded by the heavily defended railway and
the two light columns of Barker and Pine-Coffin. Finally the
fourth side, the line of the Modder on the south, was trebly
barred, first by a connected series of defensible posts which had
been recently completed and manned by the South African
Constabulary, secondly by the columns of SirC. Knox which were
to watch the fine of the right bank of the Riet river, thirdly
by Bruce Hamilton's troops, in the country on the left bank of
the Riet, still further to the south. The whole area, in short,
resembled one of those vast bag-nets into the mouths of which
the fishermen of Sicily and Sardinia, pushing in with a line of
boats, herd the swarming tunny of the Mediterranean.
On July 28th Elliot set his flotilla in motion.* Advancing Elliot
his Headquarters first to Koedoesdraai, and then to Wal kraal, U^ModdCT,
he sent Broadwood forward by a night march upon Botha ville, July 28th,
whilst de Lisle, crossing the Vaal below that town, blocked *
all the drifts of the Valsch behind it. Bothaville was found
deserted, but a party of 300 Australians under Major J. S. Shea
whom de Lisle had sent along the left bank of the Valsch,
detected the lights of a Boer laager on the opposite bank before
dawn on July 30th, and Shea immediately laid plans to take it.
• See Chapter XL, page 196.
256 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Discovering a convenient drift, he held it with fifty of his men,
and with the rest galloped across the stream, past the encamp-
ment, and on to some high ground beyond, thus cleveriy shutting
in his quarry. Some of the Boers rushed for the drift, there to
be captured by the detached party, and after a brief inter-
change of shots the whole laager was taken without a single
casualty to the Australians. Shea rejoined de Lisle with twenty
prisoners, twelve vehicles and a herd of ponies and stock. Next
day, July 31st, when EUiot crossed the Vaal to Witkrans, Lowe
scouting further up the Valsch towards Rhenoster Kop, surprised
by night-marching two more small laagers, and halted with
eleven prisoners and ten captured wagons at Besterskraal. Here
he was joined by Western, on whose left rear Sir H. Rawlinson
advanced from Vredefort to Van Stades Drift on the Honing
Spruit. Only Garratt remained behind near Reitzburg with
orders to bring up the rear. On the last day of July, then, all
Elhot's forces were within the Orange River Colony, his general
front from right to left curving from Witkrans (Headquarters and
de Lisle), through Bothaville (Broadwood), Besterskraal (Lowe
and Western) back to Van Stades Drift (Rawlinson).
On August ist de Lisle followed the Vaal down to Leeuw-
krantz, Broadwood (with Owen) crossed the Zand Spruit to
Kruidfontein, Lowe and Western the Otter Spruit to De Rust
and Leeuwpan, Sir H. Rawlinson the Honing Spruit to
Rhenoster Kop, Garratt following to Witkop, west of Van
Stades Drift. Henry, coming from the opposite direction,
entered Hoopstad, capturing a few wagons, and driving more
towards the advancing line. Next day, when the array pushed on
towards the Vet river, the screens of both the right-hand columns
gained touch with the wandering population whom the wide
movement had set astir. At Graspan, close to Wonderfontein,
which was to be Broadwood's bivouac for the night, two squadrons
of Owen's King's Dragoon Guards, under Captain F. C. Quicke,
captured a laager of sixty-five wagons and 4,000 cattle with
Uttle trouble. The South Australians from de Lisle's column
which was nearing the Vet had even better fortune. Led as
before by Shea, they crossed the river by night above Grootvallei,
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 257
and swinging down stream for Rooiwal discovered a commando
in laager at Grootvallei. After a stealthy and undetected
reconnaissance Shea galloped in from three sides, and his men
were about to ride over the camp when they were checked by
a barbed wire fencing. This accident aroused the Boers and
gave them time to scatter into the bush, and the Australians,
charging home on foot with the bayonet, were too late for their
full reward. Some score of burghers were killed and wounded,
however, and eleven, including two officers, captured ; Shea's
losses being two troopers wounded, and one killed, this last
his orderly, a sowar of the 15th Bengal Lancers, who, rather
than forego the adventures of a campaign in which his colour
forbade him to draw sabre, had voluntarily ridden unarmed
behind his officer.
On the evening of August 2nd de Lisle was at Grootvallei,
Broad wood at Wonder fontein, Lowe at Zoete Inval, Sir H.
Rawlinson at Valsch River Drift. Garratt took the road
towards Kroonstad, where he was to obtain supplies, thus
dropping out of the general movement for a few days. On
the 3rd Henry joined in the advance by moving out of Hoop-
stad down to Langkuil, in line with de Lisle as he crossed the
Vet river. Broadwood remained about Wonderfontein, his
patrols capturing a further seven wagons and 2,000 stock. Lowe,
pushing past liis left, marched at i a.m. for .Rietpan. Dawn
brought him upon a large laager, which he attacked and cap-
tured entire, bringing in thirteen prisoners, eighty-six vehicles
and 2,000 horses and cattle. On his left again came Western
to Leeuwpan, beyond which Sir H. Rawlinson lined up at Kopje
AUeen, whence he in his turn gained touch with Pine-Coffin's
railroad column stretching a hand from Kroonstad, as Barker
was preparing to do from Vet River station. On August 4th
Henry on the right was thrown forward to Scheerpan, dis-
covering a hidden magazine containing 12,000 rounds of
ammunition and a quantity of dynamite at Aaronslaagte on his
way. The rest of the army took up the line of the Vet river,
prolonged by that of its northern fork, the Zand river. It
was now time for Plumer to play his part. Leaving Modder
VOL*. IV 17
258 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
River station, he struck north-eastward to Kraal Kop, to be
in readiness to close the angle between the Kimberley railway
and the Modder river on the west, as Barker, again, was to
do from the Bloemfontein line on the east. Paris, too, moved
out into the arena with his convoy from Windsorton, awaiting
the approach of Henry, to whom he was to hand over his
supplies. On the 5th Henry halted at Scheerpan, feeling for
de Lisle, with whom he had lost touch. Broad wood and all to
his left Ukewise remained on the Vet at Bultfontein Drift and
beyond, whilst the captures of the past few days were escorted
in to the railway. Of the fighting front only de Lisle made a
move forward, carrying out an advance to Karreepan, in the
course of which he successfully entrapped a laager of fifty wagons
and 1,500 stock. The chief activity on this day was on the
part of the outlying " stops." In advance of the right front
Plumer, still moving north-eastward, disposed Colvin and Sir
J. Jervis in line from Biesjesbult, on the right, to Katdoombult
on the left. At the opposite angle of the enclosure Barker
patrolled between Vet River station and Eensgevonden, beating
back several attempted crossings by parties of Boers who were
in full flight from Elhot's slowly encircling net. Finally, on the
left rear, Garratt now came out of Kroonstad and followed the
army as far as Gohaths kraal.
On the 6th, whilst Garratt pushed on to Kaalvley, and
Plimier edged his left up to Koppiesfontein, the whole Une
advanced, Henry to Boschput, de Lisle to Inktpan, Broad-
wood to Biessiepan, Lowe to Zandheuvel, Western and Sir H.
Rawhnson keeping in close touch on the left along the Vet
river. On the 7th Henry, taking nine wagons whilst seeking
for Paris and his convoy, went forward to Elandsfontein,
Plumer approaching liim to Trekpoort and Kanonfontein.
The rest of the force closed in somewhat towards its right,
Broadwood and Lowe, with Western and Sir H. Rawlinson
conforming, inclining to Holfontein, Harmsfontein and Water-
bron towards de Lisle, who made a short march to Boschrands-
pan. After coming into bivouac de Lisle received intelligence
that a Boer laager lay ten miles to the south-east. At 11 p.m.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 259
he took out 300 mounted men, and at dawn on the 8th found
himself in the midst of a bevy of small Boer convoys moving
about in all directions. At the sight of him some 200 horse-
men, who formed the various escorts, abandoned their charges
and fled, and when de Lisle drew up at Paknietfontein in the
evening he had taken forty prisoners, and drove into camp
102 carts and wagons and over 3,000 horses and cattle.
The enemy was now darting at the meshes on all sides, and
in such small bodies that it was impossible to stop them all.
There was scarcely a blockhouse from Winburg southward
but had to repel parties which suddenly appeared upon the
railway. At 1.30 a.m. on this day, the 8th, one such band,
escorting ten wagons, courageously opened a way by hurling
themselves against a blockhouse between Eensgevonden, where
Pine-Cofiin was, and Brandfort, compelling a surrender by
bursting open the door and overpowering the inmates ; and
in several other parts there were partially successful attempts
at breaking out. August 8th was a profitable day for nearly all
the columns. Henry, mid-way on his march to join hands with
Plumer at Quaggapan, captured twenty-five prisoners, thirty-
eight vehicles, and 1,800 horses and stock ; Broadwood took
eight wagons about Sterkfontein ; Lowe, marching for Zamer-
fontein before light, surprised and secured a laager of sixty-six
carts and wagons, with twenty-seven prisoners. With less
fortune Western advanced to Karoolaagte. Throughout the
march he had seen but few of the enemy, and on his arrival in
camp a patrol of twenty mounted infantry went forward con-
fidently towards some Boer wagons which had been sighted
three miles to the south-west. These proved to belong to a
small laager, guarded apparently by some thirty men. The
patrol instantly charged, captured the nearest wagons, and
was making for the rest, when suddenly a body of more than
200 Boers appeared over a rise within twenty yards. The tables
were at once turned. The patrol was forced to retreat, and lost
nine men taken prisoners ; but a more serious sequel to the
affair was that the commando, which numbered in all some 400
men, all finely mounted and with many led horses, pushed on
VOL. IV. 17*
26o
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Elliot at the
Modder,
Aug. loth,
1901.
Results of
Elliot's
inarch.
northward, broke through the line between Western's and Lowe's
columns, and was soon at large behind them. On this day Sir
H. Rawlinson, on the left of Western, reached Kaalpan, still
touching Pine-Coffin, who moved to Brandfort, Barker going
down beyond AUeman's Dam. On the left rear Garratt had
moved by Du Preez Lager Drift, the scene of French's cavcdry
action of May 9th, 1900,* to Kalkfontein. On the evening of
the next day, August 9th, the line was : — Henry and Plumer at
Poplar Grove ; Broadwood at Kopjes Kraal ; Lowe, who
captured a further twenty-one prisoners, twenty vehicles and
1,700 stock, at Twyfelkopspan. Western, on Lowe's left, all
but touched the Modder at Kruitfontein after taking in the day's
march nine prisoners, tifty-two carts and wagons, and a small
herd of cattle ; Sir H. Rawlinson was close on his outer flank at
Zoutspruit. On August loth every column was upon the banks
of the Modder, and the operation was concluded.
Thus, in summary fashion, has been described a manoeuvre
the scope of which can only be realised by a reference to the
map and to the scale upon it. From the Vaal to the Modder,
and from Kimberley to Kroonstad, a tract of some 120 miles
in length by 100 in breadth, no comer had been left imsearched.
In some respects the elaborate scheme had failed of its pur-
pose. The area had divulged far fewer lighting men than it
actually contained. Elliot reported that he had seen only
some 500 in all, and that those he had been unable to capture
need not be reckoned with for the future, so little spirit remained
in them.f It will appear later how greatly he undervalued, not
only the numbers, but the quality of the game which had
escaped him. He had, it is true, taken a large number of pri-
soners, 259 in all ; but they produced between them but eighty-
seven rifles, and though threats induced many to reveal where
their weapons had been hidden on the veld, a large proportion
of these men were undoubtedly non-combatants. Such, indeed,
was invariably the case with " drives " of this cumbersome
* See Volume III., page 52.
f Report by Lieut. -General E. L. Elliot, dated from Glen, August, 1901.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 261
nature, manoeuvres prone to entrap those who from age or
youth were slower of foot and less resourceful than the full-
fledged fighting burgher. But if the operation had not seriously
reduced the enemy's strength in the field it had dealt a heavy
blow to a pastoral people whose wealth and munitions went
largely on wheels and hoof. Elliot, whose own casualties had
been but eleven (two killed, nine wounded), sent into the line,
or left destroyed upon the veld, 748 wagons and carts, 202,500
cattle and sheep. He also brought in 14,450 rounds of rifle
ammunition, and 640 families, who, no longer able to exist in
a province rendered uninhabitable, had now to be supported,
like many thousand similar unfortunates, by the commissariat
of their conquerors. At this time vast and growing niunbers of
surrendered Boers with their families were being cared for, fed,
attended and even entertained in protected encampments at
the expense of the British Government. There was scarcely a
base town, or even any considerable post on the lines of com-
munication which had not in close and often dangerous
proximity to its defences a camp of refugees living under the
protection of British rifles and upon British rations. That nation
is fortunate which, doomed to defeat, suffers it at the hands of
an opponent who has wealth proportionate to his humanity, and
looking beyond the military needs of the moment, deliberately
adopts means which are dissonant with every principle of
warfare in order to preserve his victims.
Its task completed, the great combination disp)erscd at once. Dispersal of
On August 13th Elliot himself took de Lisle, Broadwood and columns.
Lowe of his own division, together with Sir H. Rawlinson, to
(ilen. He immediately made ready for a fresh excursion, this
time to the eastward, in which direction Barker and Pine-
Cofiin had already hurried from Karee Siding (nth) in pursuit
of the Boer bands which had broken across the railway on the
8th. Garratt, turning northward past Kroonstad, made for the
Transvaal again. Paris departed into Griqualand. Western,
entraining at Bloemfqntein, was conveyed to Aliwal North to
strengthen the line of the Orange river against sundry pressing
eventualities which will be shortly referred to. Plumer received
262 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
orders to clear the country between the Modder and Orange
rivers in conjunction with the troops of Bruce Hamilton, and
with Henry. Most of these must now be followed separately.
Garratt may be briefly dismissed, for he was soon out of
the arena. He scored a point before quitting it, however,
which must be recorded. When on the march for Wonderwater
Drift, on the Vaal, he was informed of a commando laagered
at the junction of the Rhenoster river and Honing Spruit and
on August 17th he detached Lieut. -Colonel the Hon. H. F.
White with 300 men of the 7th New Zealand regiment and New
South Wales Bushmen to attempt a capture. On the i8th
White attacked successfully, killed two of the band, and re-
joined Garratt with twenty-five prisoners. Garratt then pursued
his way to the Vaal, which he crossed at Wonderwater Drift
on the 2ist, his object being a second visit to the Los Berg,
where he had encountered Smuts exactly a month before. How
he fared there has been described.*
Dealing still with the western side of the Bloemfontem rail-
way, Plumer, having concentrated at Modder River station
marched on August 15th for Jacobsdal. Hence, Colvin on nght
flank and Sir J. Jervis on left, he moved by Doomhoek-Koffy-
fontein (x7thHRoodepan-Vaalpan (19th) to St^nhoud^^^
Kraal on the 20th, seeing no enemy and very little stock
Various Plumer was then ordered to sweep eastward upon thc/ailway
o;e'Sns. ^t^,en Springfontein and Norval's Pont. On the 25th, when
eight miles west of Luckhoff, he fell in with Henry, who, sent
to work in the same area, had come ^^^'\'^y ^^^^l^'""^^^^^^
and Koffyfontein to Luckhoff on the 23rd. On the 26th and
27th Plumer marched to Berg river and Karreepoort, getting
touch with three of Bruce Hamilton's <^«1""^"% "^^^^ "'^'^
found at Platberg, Somersfontem and Karreepoort. At Groen
Kloof four prisoners were taken by Colvin as he ^^^^ to K^"^
Waaihoek on the 28th, when Jervis passed through Philip-
poUs Next day a report was received that a Bntish post had
been driven in on the left bank of the grange, fifteen miles
* See Chapter XI., p^e 196.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 263
west of Colesberg, and Plumer, who had already sent a party
to Colesberg Bridge, joined with du Moulin from Philippolis
and Crabbe from Colesberg in an attempt to round up the
raiders. The combination was brought to nothing, however,
by the band boldly plimging towards and past it in the night,
and on the last day of August Plumer, leaving Henry about
Luckhoff , went in to the line at Priors Siding with eight prisoners,
ten vehicles and a small quantity of stock. Throughout this
march nothing had been seen of Sir C. Knox, most of that com-
mander's troops having been withdrawn from the line of the
Riet river to act east of the railway on the same day as Plumer
had left Modder River station.
Bruce Hamilton, as has been seen, remained to work with
Plumer's column. A week before its appearance he had par-
celled out the district amongst his columns, which he had now
sub-divided into eight, namely, those of W. H. Williams, Roch-
fort, du Moulin, Byng, Damant, Dawkins, Lowry-Cole and S. B.
Smith. All these had been busily engaged in raiding since early
in August, co-operating first with Sir C. Knox's columns in the
Jagersfontein hills, and when Plumer entered the area, con-
fining themselves to that part east of the line Paardeberg —
Koffyfontein — Luckhoff, beyond which the country was left to
Plimier and Henry. Constantly employed, their joint captures
amounted to some 135 prisoners by the end of August, when
they were still out in their various allotments. Only Damant
had been withdrawn from the group for a special object, the
same that had drawn Sir C. Knox eastward from the Riet and
Western down to the drifts of the Orange. This purpose, as it
had become the central point of all the tactics in the Orange
River Colony, must now be made clear.
It has been stated that when Elliot reported the presence
of but few fighting Boers within the great net which he had
cast over the western half of the Orange River Colony he was
unaware that the real object of this and all other warfare, the
enemy's main force, had slipped from his grasp. The best of the
fighting men had escaped, some backward through the narrow
gaps in the way, some through all the obstacles on the railway
264 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
and the Modder. Amongst them was one who for the rest oi
the campaign was to cause well-nigh the keenest anxiety that
could beset the British Headquarters. Rumours of this man's
presence had indeed reached ElUot's ears from the outset.
Smuts' evasion Certain of the prisoners taken by de Lisle in his brilliant little
affair at Grootvallei on the night of August 2nd, had let slip
the intelligence that they formed part of a force of some 450
men whom Assistant-Commandant-General J. C. Smuts, the
State Attorney of the Transvaal, was leading through the
Orange River Colony to the invasion of Cape Colony. Later,
however, ElUot received information that this body had turned
back into the Transvaal,* and he dismissed it from his mind.
At that time Smuts, though he had already shown something
of his quality, had little more reputation than that of being the
most eloquent of the Boer patriots. Elliot's information con-
cerning him was only partially correct. Smuts himself, with
about one-fourth of his followers, had indeed retraced his steps,
only, however, for the purpose of getting behind instead of in
front of Elliot, the direction of whose " drive " was evident.
The other three divisions of his force had already gone forward
under Commandants Van der Venter, Bouwers, names to be
heard of again, and Kirsten, all of whom contrived to land
their commands, considerably damaged, on the safe side of
the Bloemfontein railway between August 8th and 12th, for
the most part between Brandfort and Eensgevonden. On the
15th Smuts himself arrived at the Modder river, to find that
Elliot had withdrawn to one side, leaving only the Constabulary
blockhouses to oppose him. Making the passage near Abrahams
Kraal, he inclined south-eastward up the Kaal Spruit, over the
Riet, which Sir C. Knox had by this time almost relinquished,
and skirted the railway seeking for a crossing place. This he
found near Jagersfontein Road about August i8th, where-
upon he set his face for Smithfield and Zastron. Meanwhile
his detachments, having broken through the Bloemfontein —
Thabanchu line of blockhouses at Ramahutshe on the night
* Report of Lieut. -General E. L. Elliot.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 265
of the 12th, were making all haste southward towards the
appointed rendezvous near Zastron. Smuts, hurrying thither Smuts and
to join them, found unexpected company in the shape of Krit- meet^o^the
zinger, breathless from the " desperate close " of French's Orange,
columns in Cape Colony, which he had just, when near the last
gasp, thrown off.* Suddenly, therefore, the country east of
the railway between Bloemfontein and Norval's Pont, lately
the least troublesome area of the Orange River Colony, became
the focus of the enemy, and all the British strategy had to
conform.
This was an example of the salient disability of a regular army
in contest with a horde of guerrillas manoeuvring about their
own country. Seldom in the course of the whole campaign in
South Africa was it possible for the British Commander-in-
Chief, or any of his lieutenants, to select their own sites for battle
or ground for manoeuvre. Well-nigh invariably these spots
were dictated by the enemy, insignificant numbers of whom led
great armies whither they would, so essential was it to keep in
toucli with them, so impossible to confine them. One result is
that the larger force, even when most successful, always labours
under an appearance of humiliation as it is thus bandied about
at the will of handfuls of evasive freebooters. It is not easy for
the troops to bear in mind that it is only an appearance of
inferiority, that no seeds of victory lie in soil which is ever in
motion, and that the more rapid the enemy's evolutions, the
more desperate is in reality his case, the fate of one who can
survive only so long as he can gallop being certain.
Now, therefore, every column received an impetus in a fresh I'lans to
direction. Elliot's division was to strike across the path of ^ '^ °^
Smuts' descending detachments for the Brandwater basin, where
B. Campbell, from Sir L. Rundle's command, was at this moment
in command of the district. Sir H. Rawlinson, who had parted
from EUiot at Glen, was directed on Dewetsdorp ; Thomeycroft
was sent to Pompey Siding ; Pilcher a week later to Bethulie ;
Lord Basing was railed from the Western Transvaal to
* See Chapter XIII., page 238.
266 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Springfontein ;* Damant was withdrawn from Bruce Hamil-
ton's Philippolis and Fauresmith operations, and Hart's troops
co-operated from both sides of Aliwal North whither Western
had already come by train. All these combined to deal with
Smuts and Kritzinger, and especially to forestall the former at
the drifts of the Orange. There was every prospect of success,
and the preliminary movements of the various columns were
well designed to convert the enemy's rendezvous into a veritable
cul de sac. By August 25th Western and Pilcher, the latter
with two colimins under Lieut. -Colonel H. d'A. P. Taylor and
Major K. E. Lean, covered the Orange river from Bethulie to
Aliwal North, Hart carrying on the line eastward. Thomey-
croft was at Commissie Bridge with orders to cross the Caledon
and sweep up the left bank towards Runnymede, and towards
Sir H. Rawlinsoi\, who had taken over the chase from Barker
and Pine-Cofiin, and was to come from Dewetsdorp by Jammers-
berg Drift down the same side of the stream. Damant and
Lord Basing were about Boesmans Kop and Carmel, north-west
and south-west of Smithfield.
The whole success of the manoeuvre depended upon the
eastern columns keeping out towards the Basuto border so as
to be always outside the commandos, which were known to be
concentrating about Zastron. These tactics the Commander-
in-Chief, with a clearer eye for the situation than his subordin-
ates on the spot, repeatedly enjoined from Pretoria. But the
natural difficulty of organising quickly combined action for a
special purpose amongst a number of separated units, always
one of the nicest problems of the military art, was here doubled
first by the neglect to appoint a single and supreme commander
on the scene of action, next by the clouds of vagrant Boers
who floated around Smuts' place of concentration and utterly
obscured the main issue. Meeting the enemy everywhere, unable
either to count them or discover any general aim to their move-
ments, and lacking central control themselves, the column
commanders could never be certain whether they had Smuts,
* See Chapter XI., page 195.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 267
Kritzinger, or a mere field-cometcy in front of them. That the
Boer leaders had been marked down in a certain spot on a cer-
tain day was of very little assistance ; for this was warfare in
which a report only a night old might be nearly a hundred miles
wide of its reckoning. As a consequence, most of the columns
so exhausted themselves with skirmishing that at a critical
moment they had to put in to the railway to refit, Sir H. Raw-
linson to Edenburg, Thomeycroft to Aliwal North, Damant
and Lord Basing to Springfontein, leaving Kritzinger to recruit
and Smuts to collect his men and reconnoitre the Orange for a
crossing place in peace. Still there was time to effect the pur-
j)ose. Smuts, misliking the preparedness of the troops along
the Orange, made no movement. On September 2nd he was still
north of the river, with Sir H. Rawlinson coming down upon
him by Sweetwater, and Thomeycroft well placed to cut him
off at Willemsfontein, south-east of Rouxville, where he had
been since the day before, with Lord Basing on liis left at Jurys
Baken. But Thomeycroft came no further, and Smuts saw that
he must seize his opportunity. Bidding adieu to Kritzinger,
who promised to follow him as soon as possible, he crept towards Smuts crosses
the river, and on the night of September 3rd crossed with nearly rivcr,™"^^
500 men at a weak spot which he had discovered, namely, Kiba •'^P'' 3fd.
Drift, hard by the Basuto border. In timing his crossing his skill
or fortune attained its cUmax. At that moment Hart, in
accordance with instructions received on September ist to keep
the enemy well to the north of the Orange, was loosening his
watch over the river in order to throw troops across in the direc-
tion of Zastron.* Most of his mobile units, namely. Western,
Lieut. -Colonels the Hon. A. Murray (Lord Lovat's Scouts), and
M. G. Moore (Connaught Rangers M.L) were no further east-
ward than the drift at Driefontein, on the northern side of which
they were deploying prior to an advance, and to cover the tardy
passage of their transport over the bad drifts behind. This
* For further reference to Major-General Hart's part in these events, see also
Chapter XV., page 287. As has Iwen the case with other portions of this work, the
affairs there described so closely overlap those under review in the present chapter
that some repetition is unavoidable.
268 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
was nearly completed when a second order was sent to Hart
(September 3rd) forbidding him to leave the river ; but it was
then too late. His right flank was already turned, and Smuts,
appearing from a country which Thomeycroft had on that very
day reconnoitred and found clear as far as Elandskloof, i.e.,
twenty miles east of Rouxville, was over the river before Hart
could recall and once more extend his troops. Now the invader
had burned his boats. Leaving the bevy of columns at a loss
Smuts invades behind him, he penetrated into Cape Colony, braving one peril
Cape Colony, ^^^^j. another, and for mimy months after provided for the British
province that most unhappy chapter in its history which has
been written in another place.*
Thus vanished an opportunity as fair as had ever been offered
of demolishing one of the main props of the Boer campaign.
The British combination had signally, almost unaccountably
failed. Allowing for all the difficulties of intelligence, com-
munication, imd for the bewilderment of Boer diversions, the
task had been far more simple than many which had been
carried to success by these very columns. Throughout his
subsequent long career of adventure Smuts was never to be in
more danger than he had been at its outset, and his cautious
tactics of the next few days showed how thoroughly he was
impressed by the narrowness of his escape. Yet it was not
to be called escape. If the Boer leader had shown his heels,
it was not to avoid a superior opponent, but rather to invade
his enemy's own territory. Throughout the campaign in South
Africa there was scarcely a more striking feat of perseverance,
daring and good fortune than Smuts' ride of 300 miles, through
one British army after another from the Gatsrand up to and
over the banks of the Orange.
* See Chapter XV., and subsequent chapters on Cape Colony.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 269
Approximate Strength States of Columns referred to in
foregoing chapter.
8
ri
S
^'S
3
&•
3 S
0
COLUMN.
-0
1
— g
c
c
s
s
il
0
3.y
S
July— August, 1901.
Ll-CoI. W. H. Williams
Lt.-Col. the Hon. J. H. G. B>tib
449
1,014
—
2
3
I
1 Part of Major - General
Bruce Hamilton's com
j mand.
U.-Col. T. D. Pilcher
1,182
—
5
1
1 Maior-General Sir C. E.
f Knox in command.
Col. A. W. Thorneycroft
>.345
—
5
2
Lt.-Col. C. St. G. Henry
542
260
3
I
Major A. Pari.s
273
94
3
I
Col. A. N. Rochfort
Lt.-Col. L. E. du Moulin
Lt-Col. W. L. White
441
500
600
3
3
2
—
Part of Major - General
Bruce Hamilton's com-
mand.
Lt.-Col. J. W. G. Dawkins ...
659
—
3
—
Brig. -Gen. K. G. Broadwood ...
81s
—
5
3
•
Col. E. C. Bethune (later Col.
Lieut. - General E. L.
Lowe)
1.618
—
5
2
Elliot in command.
Lt.-Col. H. de B. de Lisle ...
1,005
—
3
2
Maj.-Gen. B. B. R. Campbell ...
Col. G. E. Harley
Lt.-Col. C. T. Reay
357
275
254
1,204
610
60s
5
3
3
2
2
2
Lieut. • General Sir L.
Rundle in command.
Col. F. S. Garratt
900
269
5
1
Brig.-Gen. G. M. Bullock
1,200
2
2
Lt.Col. M. F. Rimington
>.53o
262
5
—
Major J. H. Dainant
Major S. B. Smith
57 «
99
3
I
478
2
2
Lieut -Colonel W. H.
Williams in command.
Major G. N. Going
500
—
2
—
Col. A. W. G. LowryCole ...
Lt.-Col. H. d'A. V. Taylor ...
505
—
2
—
726
—
2
I
Lt.-Col. F. C. Minchin
695
—
3
2
Major K. E. Lean
477
—
3
1
Ma^or F. C. Lloyd
Major H. C. Copeman
Lt-Col. W. G. B. Western ...
210
—
—
457
—
2
—
641
211
3
—
Col. Sir H. Rawlinson
1.09s
i8s
4
—
Major J. E. Pine-Coffin (later
Holmes)
834
50
3
I
Lt.-Col. J. S. S. Barker
500
3
—
Col. Sir J. Jervis- White- Jer\Ls
Major F. C. Lloyd
Lt-Col. F. F. Colvin
360
210
410
—
5
—
Brig. -General 11. C. O.
Plumer in command.
Lt-Col. H. M. Owen
350
—
2
1
Lt.-Col. Lord Basing
500
—
3
I
Lt.-Col. the Hon. A. Murray ...
250
—
2
I
Maior-General A. FitzR.
Hart in command.
Lt-Col. M. G. Moore
250
2SO
—
I
270
CHAPTER XV.
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY*
{Continued from Chapter XIII.).
SEPTEMBER — OCTOBER, I9OI.
Smuts in Cape That Smuts had been so long redeeming the pledges given to
Co ony. y)q y^^^ .j^ Januaryt and February bore witness to the extreme
difficulty under which the Boers were now waging war, for there
was not to be found amongst the commandos a leader more
sanguine and ardent than he. His promise of co-operation
had been ratified four months later at the historic meeting on
the Waterval.J Of the several plans of campaign born of that
conference the participation of the Transvaalers in the invasion
of Cape Colony was one of the most definite. De la Rey, the
upholder of the cause in the Western Transvaal, was originally
charged with the mission, and he left the council revolving
schemes of shepherding the manifold but scattered sympathies
of the British colony. Smuts was only to precede him with
a small force for reconnoitring purposes, and to discover the
hiding-places of disloyalty. But De la Rey found elsewhere
full scope for liis tremendous activity, and in the multitude of
adventures in his own districts had neither need nor time to
seek others beyond the frontier. To Smuts alone of the Trans-
vaal Generals fell the duty of keeping compact with the Free
Staters across the Orange, and, as has been seen, they waited
long for his appearance.
* See map No. 63. f See Chapter IV., page 75.
X See Chapter XII., page 206.
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 271
Unlike De Wet, six months earlier, he had kept the secret of
his plan of campaign. His start from the Gatsrand and his
difficult passage through the Orange River Colony* had not
attracted undue interest, at any rate from his opponents, for
neither his plans nor his striking personaUty were as yet
revealed. Yet both were dangerous. With many of his fellows Character of
Smuts shared the patriotism, the keen observation, the tactical """ ^'
opportunism, the mingled daring and caution which kept the
cause of the Republics alive long after the States themselves
were dead. But his observation was enlarged by a certain
statesmanship and prescience which marked him out from
those whose vision was bounded by the line of kopjes
within artillery range. His patriotism was remarkable chiefly
for the tinge of romance and enthusiasm which made it glow
amidst the somewhat sombre prepossession of the majority
of his fellow-countrymen. Sharing to the full their in-
extinguishable hope and bitterness, his hope rose to a higher
and brighter flame, and his animosity against his country's
enemies was ennobled by a species of soldiership or chivalry
to which all but a few of his compatriots were contemp-
tuous, or strangers. Such was the man who, already much
exhausted, arrived on the left bank of the Orange river at
dawn on September 4th, 1901. With him returned Fouch^
with a band of about 100 men ; another party of the same
strength had preceded them two days earlier and joined Myburg,
who was facing Monro, east of Rhodes. Kritzinger, left at
Zastron, was to follow shortly.
Smuts found affairs in Cape Colony in the position described situation in
in Chapter XIII. In the south, Scheepers and Theron main- ^'«l^ Colony,
tained the cause almost within sight of the sea, and with good
hopes of success, for they were ransacking the most fruitful
fields of disloyalty in all the colony. The north-west was still
harried by roving bands, to whom Maritz had not yet succeeded
in giving a definite aim. Elsewhere, the capture of Lotter and
the northward retreat of most of the other commandos had
• See Chapter XIV.
hesitates.
272 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
practically demolished the Boer campaign. Of the difficulties
which had arisen between the British Commander-in-Chief and
the Cape Government, Smuts may have had no knowledge. The
question was, as before, on the subject of martial law, especially
at the ports, and it is sufficient to say that whilst doubling Lord
Kitchener's difficulties in dealing with his anomalous and com-
plicated campaign in Cape Colony, it exasperated those who
might have done much to remove them. The Commander-in-
Chief, with his thousand pre-occupations at Headquarters,
French with all his energy in the field, and at the capital the
Governor, Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson, striving with tact and
industry to keep the equipoise between the insistent demands of
the military and the dread of suspended animation on the part
of the Legislature, all these thus found themselves confused and
weakened at a moment when in the absence of such obstacles
Cape Colony might have been swept clear.
Smuts Smuts plunged at once into difficulties. Though his designs
on the colony had not long been known , the warning was
enough. The three days following on his passage of the
river, days which he spent in unnecessarily cautious fencing
with the few local troops who stood in his way, saw the
convergence of six bodies of troops towards his line of
march. On September 6th Sir J. French ordered the column
of Lieut. -Colonel B. Doran from Cradock and the 17th
Lancers from Steynsburg both to Molteno, Gorringe from
Venterstad to Storm berg. Pilcher's column, composed of two
forces imder Lieut. -Colonel H. d'A. P. Taylor and Major K. E.,
Lean, which had followed Smuts from the Orange River Colony,
was detrained at Burghersdorp on the 7th. Monro, who was at
Dordrecht, hurried out to cover Barkly East. Whilst these
movements took place Smuts, leaving Fouch6 and Myburg
behind in the Rhodes district, came southward, still skirmishing
with levies of which he greatly exaggerated the strength and
importance. On the 8th he was east of Dordrecht, and here,
rather than attempt the Storm Bergen, which he imagined to
be full of troops, he decided to break westward across the
railway into the interior of the colony.
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 273
Up to this point Smuts had evinced nothing either of his
wonted fire or tactical ability. Ill-informed, and not yet
acquainted with the country, chastened by his experiences in
the Orange River Colony, and over-heedful, perhaps, of tales of
hair-breadth escapes told by the recent invaders whom he had
met rejoicing at their safety on the right bank of the Orange,
he saw British troops everywhere, and confessed himself to be
" completely hemmed in " and " practically hopeless "* of a situ-
ation which would have daunted not at all one of the seasoned
marauders of the colony. Although he was in reality by no
means surrounded, the place and moment adopted by Smuts
for his turn westward might well have carried him straight into
a cluster of columns. At AUemans Poort was Gorringe, with
Taylor in line with him at Stryd Poort, on one side, and Monro
at Vogel Vlei on the other, whilst Pilcher at Burghersdorp and
B. Doran at Molteno formed a strong second line. Nevertheless,
on September loth Smuts made an attempt on the very centre
of this combination, was repulsed by Gorringe and Taylor, and
next day was caught in retreat by Monro, who attacked him
with five squadrons and a gun. This force the Boers were able
to hold in check until dark, when they retired northward, leaving
Monro, who had lost ten killed and wounded, to bivouac on the
Holle Spruit. Now Smuts exhibited one of those sudden
miracles of judgment and endurance which had so often set at
nought the closest meshes woven by surrounding columns.
Monro in the course of his pursuit had opened a narrow interval
between his left flank and the railway, to fill which B. Doran
was marching eastward from Molteno. In a few hours the
Sterkstroom — Dordrecht railway would be barred ; but before
the gap closed Smuts, though he had already fought continually
for twelve hours, led his force at full speed between Monro and
Doran, crossed the branch railway near Halseston, then rushing Smuts dashes
south-westward through a storm of rain, broke over the main
line at Putters Kraal station and did not draw rein until, at
daylight on September nth, he stood on the heights of the
* Report to the Boer Headquarters by Assistant-Commandant-General J. C. Smuts.
VOL. IV. 18
southward.
274 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Wildschuts Berg, more than forty miles from his starting-point.
A party of twelve of his burghers who lost their way during the
march were no more seen ; but like those fragments which are
cast off by certain organisms, they began a separate existence,
and even gathered around themselves a small fresh commando.
Their loss was more than counter-balanced by the arrival in
Smuts' laager of a band of local rebels, and these men, with their
intimate knowledge of the country, made possible the certainty
and celerity of movement to which Smuts was shortly to owe
his safety.
Lieut. -General Sir J. French, who had been at Dordrecht, re-
turned to Stormberg on finding his net empty, and made fresh
dispositions. He had now to deal with a double problem. In
the north Fouch^ and Myburg were too dangerous a threat to
the river guards to be ignored, and French ordered both Monro
and Pilcher with his twin command to operate against them
from Dordrecht. The pursuit of Smuts was committed to
Haig, who was given the columns of Gorringe and B. Doran,
and the 17th Lancers, which had been railed to Tarkastad,
Scobell also being ordered from Graaff Reinet to Cradock to
block the west.
Puisuitof On September 15th Smuts made a short westerly movement
Smuts. ^Q jj neighbouring height, Bamboes Hoek. There he was engaged
on the 1 6th by Gorringe, who with B. Doran had hurried after
him from Putters Kraal. Smuts fell back slightly southward,
intending to make for Maraisburg. The 17th Lancers, relieved
by Doran at Tarkastad, had been posted in squadrons along
the Elands river, less with the object of denying the drifts which
were now unfordable from the incessant rain, than of blocking
the southern exits of the mountains at Elands Poort and the
adjacent passes. But Smuts was determined to gain his free-
dom. The numerical weakness of each particular detachment
on the Elands river practically assured him of victory in an
attack on any one of them, and when on the morning of the
17th he heard that the stream had fallen shghtly, he sent his
men forward against the nearest post. This was at Modder-
fontein, where " C." ' squadron 17th Lancers, under Captain
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 275
V. S. Sandeman, 130 strong, with a g-pr. gun and a Maxim, was
disposed on a long double-topped kopje which lay in the angle
formed by the left bank of the Elands and a small tributary
spruit which joined it from the east. The kopje faced north-
ward, looking across a gentle slope to where, about 2,000 yards Attack on
distant, the river made a short bend eastward parallel to the fontei"
face of the position. Another thousand yards across this bend, Sept. 17th,
that is, about 3,000 from his position, Sandeman had placed a
post in observation of the mouth of Elands Poort. In rear of
the kopje he had pitched his camp, behind which again, almost
on the margin of the tributary streamlet, stood Modderfontein
farmhouse. Four miles to the southward was the camp of
another squadron, "A.," of the 17th Lancers. The chief defect
of Sandeman's position consisted in the proximity to its left
flank of a commanding hill, which rose some 800 yards distant
on the other side of the river. Until mid-day on the morning of
the 17th a fog obscured the encircling hills, and taking advan-
tage of this, Smuts first surrounded Modderfontein at a distance
too great for discovery by the cavalry patrols, who at noon
reported " all clear." The earliest warning of the enemy's
approach came from the observation post on the right bank of
the river about 12.30 p.m., and Sandeman at once sent forward
a troop to reconnoitre. The patrol duly gained touch with a
mounted band to the northward, but the strange horsemen were
seen to be wearing khaki clothing, and were accepted at once
as the forerunners of Gorringe's cohuiin, which was known to
be marching from that direction. A volley from the saddle
which killed two troopers and a few horses revealed the truth,
and both the patrol and the observation post were quickly borne
back into camp. The Boers then crowded along the bank of
the Elands river, where, as described, it curved to face Sande-
man's position, and opening a hot fire from the bushes, extended
southwards, and occupied also the above-mentioned hill on the
right bank, thus gaining a dominating fire position within medium
range of the kopje. The cavalry rephed with vigour, and though
the Maxim soon jammed and the fire was too severe for the
service of the 9-pr., the Boers were effectually held, not only in
VOL. IV. 1 8*
2;6 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICx^.
front, but on the right flank, where the narrow eastern end of
the kopje fell directly to the bush-covered plain. All seemed
to be going well \vith the squadron when a misfortune occurred
against which no care or courage could have guarded.
About I p.m., when the action in front was at its height, a
party of horsemen were seen approaching the farm on the
southern foot of the kopje. These, like the surprisers of the
patrol an hour before, wore timics and breeches of khaki, and
as they were riding straight from the direction of the camp of
'* A." squadron so near to the southward, there was no man on
the position but imagined them to be comrades who had been
brought to the scene by the soimd of the firing. They were,
in fact, a strong body whom Smuts had sent roimd under cover
of his diversions on the opposite side, and their unimpeded
approach sealed the fate of the already fully occupied squadron
on the hill. Gaining the cover of the farm enclosures the
burghers first poured an annihilating fire into the backs of the
defence, then rushed in to close quarters. A handful of men
whom Sandeman led in person to check the attack were all shot
down, the officer himself being wounded. The rest fixed
bayonets and defended themselves stubbornly until overcome
by the superior numbers which fell upon them from all sides.
When the kopje passed into the enemy's hands four officers and
twenty-eight men had been killed and two officers and fifty-one
men wounded, or three-quarters of the nimiber actually on the
position, for some of the patrols sent out in the early morning
had not returned. The Boers, who had lost about thirty killed
and wounded, then proceeded to destroy the camp and wagons.
At that moment '* A." squadron, whose commander. Captain
N. T. Nickalls, had only been informed about i p.m. of Sande-
man's situation, came in sight moving at full speed from the
south. Making straight for the key of the position, Nickalls
crossed the river, which was now just passable, and attacked
and took the hill on the right bank. The effect was immediate.
The Boers hurriedly made off towards Elands Poort, leaving
the guns untouched, but driving before them three wagons con-
taining dead and wounded, and all the surviving horses of the
Smuts.
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 277
squadron, of which half had been already killed before the enemy
closed upon the kopje.
Thus turned back, and finding himself still more effectually Pursuit of
barred from the south by a westerly extension by B. Doran from
Tarkastad, Smuts, with Gorringe in pursuit, strove to gain
Maraisburg. But the local fencibles from that town denied all
approach to the Bamboes mountains, and when on September
i8th Doran closed up to Vlakpoort, the 17th Lancers to Kriegars
Kraal, and Gorringe from Wildschuts Berg up to the head of
the Elands river. Smuts appeared to be in a quandary. But by
a manoeuvre as bold and prompt as his recent feat at Dordrecht
he quickly led his commando into the open. Espying the nar-
rowing gaps between the columns, he wriggled between Gorringe
and Doran on the night of the 19th, and raced southward with-
out a halt for the Winter Berg, which he attempted to traverse
on the 2 1 St. But again the local forces turned him back, this
time with loss, and doubling westward Smuts retired into the
hills about Elands Drift on the Cradock — Tarkastad road.
Scobell immediately sallied out from Cradock against him, the
pursuing columns approached, and once more Smuts saw liimself
being surrounded. Once more, however, he achieved salvation
by his resolution and the skill of his guides. On the night of
September 23rd, when all but hemmed in, his rebel allies led
him over the Winter Berg by an almost unknown bridle-path
east of Quaggas Nek. A hundred horses succumbed by the
way, but the commando, which had amply horsed itself by the
success at Modderfontein, moved at incredible speed upK)n Ade-
laide. Then was resumed a chase such as had seldom awakened
even the scoured counties of Cape Colony. Beaten back by
the skilfully disposed local forces, first from Adelaide, next from
Seymour, then from Carlisle Bridge on the (ireat Fish river,
Smuts ran fast up the left bank of that stream and burst across
the railway at Sheldon. Gorringe, now with both his own
colimin and the 17th Lancers, foUowed hard, and on the last
day of September came up with the band, which had swung
southward, at Driefontein in the Zuurberg. A sharp skirmish
resulted in Smuts again disappearing southward into the
27% THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Uitenhage district, Gorringe following on October ist. Mean-
while B. Doran and Scobell, entrained by French's orders at Shel-
don and Cookhouse respectively, steamed past the Zuurberg for
Mount Stewart and Klipplaat on the Graaff Reinet line, in
order to throw themselves between Smuts and the west, a notafcle
use of the railway. Smuts, however, clung to the Zuurberg,
liis movements being for some hours crippled from a curious
circumstance. Some wild trees, bearing attractive but deadly
fruit, lured him and his men to eat, whereupon Smuts and half
his commando were attacked by illness, from which they had
barely recovered when Gorringe's appearance necessitated a
hasty move. With some of his suffering burghers tied to their
horses. Smuts then fled northward, to be overtaken and driven
on with loss on the morning of October 3rd at Brakfontein,
where a dismoimted rush by the 17th Lancers destroyed one of
his piquets. Next day Gorringe moved into Darlington, whence,
in conjunction with the other columns, he so harassed the
commando that on the 6th Smuts, who endeavoured for reasons
which will appear later to gain an opening towards Port Eliza-
Smuts divides beth, divided his force, sending half under Commandant Van der
his orces. Venter towards Somerset East, whilst he himself with Command-
ant Bouwers and the rest made for the (iraaff Reinet railway,
which he reached and crossed near Marais Siding on October 8th.
Scobell, who had been detached in pursuit of Smuts with the
17th Lancers from Barroe on the 6th, passed through Marais a
few hours behind him, hearing that the quarry had run by the
north of Aberdeen. On the loth and nth Smuts was traced
through Zeekoe Gat and Camdeboo to Sneeuw ; but Scobell,
though he travelled ahnost without a rest by day or night, was
still behind the Boer, who was now reported to be on the
Murraysburg border to the north-west. Another night march
on the 1 2th, the third in four days, brought the column upon a
deserted laager. Smuts had now turned southward, and was
flying down the Kariega River valley. For four days the hunt
drove on, a munber of foundered horses and a few stragglers
falling into Scobell's hands. On October i6th Smuts doubled
westward near the junction of the Kariega and Salt rivers, and
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 279
striking across towards Prince Albert, fell in with a certain Com- Smuts joined
mandant S. Pypers, who was at the head of the force lately ^ Pypers.
commanded by Scheepers, that leader having vanished from the
scene in a manner soon to be described. Pypers was at this
moment occupied in evading Crabbe, who was seeking him from
Beaufort West, and as Scobell was now compelled to put into
Prince Albert (October 20th) for supplies, Crabbe undertook
the pursuit of the combined commandos of Smuts and Pypers,
following them down the Kouka river, then through Kandos
Poort and over the Groote Zwarte Bergen into the valley of the
Olifants. The Boers then turned westward, and Crabbe, moving
on Oudtshoom, combined with Kavanagh from Ladismith and
the local troops extended from Willowmore to Prince Albert
in an attempt to surround them. Incessant exertions along
the Groote and Olifants rivers during the last week of October
were brought to nothing by the commandos breaking out west-
ward. On October 31st Smuts, with Pypers, after being chased Smuts enters
up to Constable by Kavanagh, crossed the Cape railway at that cape Colony,
place, and striking northward made for Sutherland and Calvinia.
There he became absorbed in a fresh scheme of aggression
which, slowly maturing under a strong and able leader, had
influenced for weeks past the movements of every Boer leader
in the midlands and south. But before describing the resulting
events, it is necessary to pick up several threads which, having
their origin in other parts, will be found to form part of the fabric
of the new campaign in the west.
First, then, to trace Van der Venter after his parting with Pursuit of
Smuts on October 8th. To all appearances this commandant ^aJg^'
had been abandoned to a certain fate. The terrible marching
had all but exhausted his horses, and for the first four days of
his isolation he circled desperately about Jansenville, pursued
by B. Doran and by Lukin of the Cape Mounted Riflemen, who
had succeeded Gorringe on the transference of the latter to a
command in Egypt. MacAndrew, with a body of Cape Colonists,
lay at Pearston, ready to turn the commando back into the
arms of the columns ; and when on the loth the local force from
Somerset East joined hands with MacAndrew by extending upon
28o THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
strong positions along the mountains between Pearston and
their own town, Van der Venter's fate looked to be sealed.
But the Boer, bearing with the unerring tactical instinct of his
race upon the line of least resistance, staggered up the valley
of the Vogel river, and on the I2th suddenly presented himself
before the Somerset East contingent, who with scarcely a show
of resistance surrendered not only the passes in their charge, but
their persons, horses, arms and equipment to the delighted
commandant. Replenishing bandohers, and mounted on fresh
hgrses, the commando sped on across the mountains, and on
the 15th reached Garstlands Kloof, west of Cradock, whilst
behind it MacAndrew, his rSle reversed, faced about ; Lukin
was hurried ahead by train to Letskraal Siding between Graatt
Reinet and Middleburg, and B. Doran on the other flank pursued
directly by way of Cradock. But Van der Venter had no inten-
tion of losing his so unexpectedly bestowed freedom. Drawing
Lukin farther northward by advuncmg through Var Kens Kop
and Spitz Kop to a position threatening the railway at Roode
Hoogte, he suddenly (October i8th) doubled back and dashed
westward across the hne at the very spot just quitted by Lukin.
Doran was then ordered to stand on guard at Letskraal Siding,
and Lukin, pressing on in pursuit, overtook the enemy, and by
a night march on the 20th surprised him in laager seven miles
south-west of New Bethesda. The commando barely escaped
destruction, and flying in confusion, left fourteen prisoners and
many horses in the hands of Lukin. Continuing the chase, Lukin
came in sight of Van der Venter again on October 24th at
Elands Poort, south-west of Richmond. Three days before
this, it will be remembered, Scobell had come in from his
hunting of Smuts to Prince Albert, whence on October 21st he
was pushed up to Beaufort West by Sir J. French, who fore-
saw Van der Venter's probable course. On receiving Lukin's
report, French ordered Scobell still farther north to Victoria
West Road, where he concentrated on the 25th facing Van der
Venter, who was now moving cautiously upon the railway.
During the day Scobell was informed that the Boers were making
for Biesjes Poort. A night march to that place brought him to
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 2gi
close quarters at 5 a.m. on the 26th, when an attack, somewhat
prematurely delivered, turned Van der Venter back to the south-
east. False information now misled Scobell, who took a line of
pursuit too much to the west, whereupon Van der Venter, clinging Van der
obstifiately to his determination to cross the line, dashed north- j^jq j^^ ^yg^t
ward again and made for Victoria West. Lukin had meanwhile
marched into Biesjes Poort, his horses and supplies alike ex-
hausted. Not until the 29th could he recover mobility enough
to follow with 350 men ; then Van der Venter, easily avoiding
him, made good his point and his crossing at Victoria West,
and like Smuts steered his course with fresh hopes towards
the bestirring west.
As he struck the line a small band under Commandant Malan Pursuit of
and Judge Hugo, which had joined him during the flight from ' **"'
New Bethesda, parted company again and made for Willow-
more. This party had been led by Hugo into the colony on
September nth and, after being reinforced by Malan with the
remnants of his veterans left from the adventures of the four
previous months, had fought and stalked its way southward,
surviving a host of narrow escapes at the hands of the cavalry
from De Aar, the troops of Lund's column, and the garrisons
of the blockhouses upon the railways. At one time not a
burgher of the party remained horsed ; at another all were in
hiding in kloofs and caves ; indeed, did space permit, how
much might be written of the romantic adventures and the
extraordinary tenacity of the score or so of weather-beaten rille-
men who greeted Van der Venter's worn band, to vanish as
suddenly as they had appeared. Nor is such an account willingly
foregone, for it would depict in unmistakable colours the charac-
ter of a race of lighting men of whom it is safe to say that their
primitive peculiarities will soon be forgotten. Not alone of the
soldier peoples of the world will the Boers, absorbed in the deep,
calm waters of the pax britannica, invoke memory alone for the
violent currents which gave to them character, and to their
opponents a task of such enormous difficulty that rival nations,
which began by gibing at a bungled task, ended by thanking
fortune that it was not theirs to accomplish. The amazing
282 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
commingling of qualities which marked the burgher on commando,
all guided by eyes keen as those of eagles to discern everything
but foredoomed failure, nowhere is this more to be kept in mind
than in studying the necessarily inanimate category of operations
which must serve to compose the history of the campaign in
Cape Colony, for only thus is the magnitude of the task, and
the devotion of those who laboured at it, to be grasped.
Malan's There were few Boer leaders whose liberty might become
characteristics, j^^j.^ dangerous than Malan. Possessing an intimate knowledge
of the coimtry, a knowledge gained in innumerable adventures,
not one-half of which can be referred to, in well-nigh every
county of Cape Colony, Malan had in addition the peculiar
faculty of appearing after every disaster with a fresh following
many leagues distant from where he had seemed to have been
crushed out of existence. He was besides a notorious wrecker
of trains, little less dreaded than Hindon in the Northern
Transvaal. French accordingly determined not to lose sight of
him, and observing him separate from Van der Venter at the
railway, ordered B. Doran from Willowmore to keep touch
with the band, which numbered no more than twenty-five men.
At dawn on November 6th Doran closed with it, forty miles to
the west of Willowmore. Malan had now been strengthened
by a junction with Lategan, another wandering marauder of
the same type as himself, and the forces of both were securely
ensconced in the bed of a spruit. They soon made off, how-
ever, though not before B. Doran, who rode at the head of his
men, had been woimded by their first volley, his horse being
killed. Lieut. -Colonel W. Doran, the President of the Military
Court at Graaff Reinet, was then summoned to replace his
namesake in command of the column, which pressed after Malan,
Malan breaks Hugo and Lategan in a north-westerly direction. Like the rest
ewes. ^£ ^j^^^j. comrades, these parties now hastened their steps
towards the west. Passing through Prince Albert, W.
Doran vainly pursuing, on November 13th they crossed the
Cape Town railway above Fraserburg Road station, and ten
days later were deep in Sutherland, where for the moment
they must be left.
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 283
To retrace Scheepers and Theron, the harriers of the south,
it is necessary to revert to the early days of September, when
the Ladismith and Gudtshoom districts were crossed and
recrossed by their tracks and those of Beatson's leash of columns
in pursuit.
Theron may be briefly accounted for. It will be remembered Pursuit of
how, on September 2nd, his descent upon Gudtshoom had ^*^^'^""-
brought Kavanagh to Willowmore whilst the rest of Beat-
son's columns devoted themselves to Scheepers. On the 4th
Kavanagh moved upon Gudtshoom, whereupon Theron, forcing
the passage of the Attaquas mountains by Robinson Pass,
drew on towards Mossel Bay. But he was not destined to
appear in a British port, though the report that he had achieved
this crowning feat delighted for a moment the Boer Head-
quarters. Caught by Kavanagh at Brandwacht on the 9th,
Theron was driven westward over the Gouritz river at Otters
Hoek, running in such haste that he dropped fifty-two horses
and much of his equipment on the road, besides losing several
killed and wounded. On the 12th Kavanagh struck him again,
and Theron sped on through Riversdale. On the night of the
i2th a despatch for Kavanagh from Lieut. -Colonel Burke, the
officer in command of the local troops in this district, fell into
the hands of Theron, who gleaned from it that Heidelberg, which
stood in his way, was but weakly held. Accordingly on the
evening of September 13th he delivered a sharp attack on the
township, which was defended by only twenty-eight men of the
4th West Yorkshire regiment, under Major Sir W. H. Mahon.
Burke himself, who had already shown much promptitude and
resource in the handling of his troops against Scheepers, was also
present, and stoutly supported by his men, kept off Theron,
and held his own until, on Kavanagh coming up from the east,
the commando beat a hasty retreat, leaving several dead and
wounded. Kavanagh pursued through Barrydale until the 17th,
when he was forced to go into Swellendam to replenish supplies
exhausted by a fortnight's incessant marching. Alexander
from Laingsburg took up the chase, but was unable to head
Theron. Wyndham, too, at Prince Albert, received orders
284 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
to follow Theron ; but his participation was prevented by an
incident which illustrates the difficulties of campaigning in these
regions. It was necessary to traverse a ravine eleven miles
long, through which ran a road and a river, the former crossing
the stream no fewer than twenty-three times within the defile.
Soon after the column had entered, heavy rain fell, causing
the water to rise so quickly that for twenty-four hours the troops
were not only imprisoned but in considerable danger. On
Theron breaks September 22nd Theron, drawn by the magnet in the west,
into the west, crossed the Cape Town railway near Touws River, and disappeared
into Sutherland.
Pursuit of On September 9th Scheei)ers, headed from the Cape Town
Scheepers. railway, turned inwards to the Klein Zwart Berg, and there
showed the Boer's certain signal of distress by dividing his
forces. He himself, followed by Atherton, moved with 150
men towards Swellendam ; his detachment, 120 strong under
Van der Merwe, went northward and was promptly encountered
by Crabbe from Laingsburg, who on the loth fell upon the
commando at Seven Weeks Foort, east of the Buffels river,
and destroyed it. Van der Merwe himself and two others were
killed and thirty-seven burghers captured at a loss to Crabbe of
two officers and three men killed and wounded.
On September 12th Crabbe was at Ladismith, whenc* he
joined in the pursuit of Scheepers down the Groote river and
across the Gouritz (i8th), whilst Atherton marched around by
Oudtshoom to bar the hne of flight. In the entangled country
lying on both sides of the Olifants river Scheepers turned and
doubled for days. Theron, flying in the opposite direction, at
this moment intensified Scheepers' predicament by his successful
evasion of Alexander, who, with Kavanagh, was thus set free
to turn upon Scheepers. It should be mentioned that the five
columns in this area, namely, those of Crabbe, Alexander,
Atherton, Wyndham and Kavanagh, now came under the
single control of Major-General T. E. Stephenson, who had
arrived at Matjesfontein on October ist. Scheepers strove like
an imprisoned panther to break through the cage of troops and
precipices which held him in. Displaying infinite skill he
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 285
succeeded in avoiding contact with the columns until October
5th, when Atherton, who was little less exhausted than his
opponent, drove him between Barrydale and the Touws river
into the arms of Kavanagh. With the loss of sixteen men and
forty horses Scheepers ran for the Witte Berg, south of Matjes-
fontein, dropping stragglers and 150 more horses in his flight.
On the 8th he lost a further sixty horses to Kavanagh, who
allowed him not a moment's respite. By the time he gained
the mountains the commando was on the verge of collapse.
Most of the burghers had been dismounted on the way and had
disappeared into hiding. Only some fifty or sixty remained
horsed, and rallying these, Scheepers, rather than remain in the
dangerous vicinity of Matjesfontein, struggled across the Buffels
river, hoping to get clear into Prince Albert. His prospects were
not entirely desf>erate. Of the pursuing columns three, those
of Wyndham, Kavanagh and Atherton, had now to refit, the
two first at Touws River, the last-named at Montagu, preparatory
to taking the field in the rapidly embroiling west. Only Alex-
ander and Crabbe remained, and whilst the former followed
behind Scheepers, Crabbe took train to Beaufort West, intending
to come down upon him from the north. But now fortune dealt
to Scheepers a blow more unkind than any to be feared from
his foes. On the banks of the Dwyka river he fell ill with fever,
and unable to ride further, was laid in Wolve Hoek farm, whilst
the conmiando, led by P5rpers, went on towards the (iamka river.
On October nth the loth Hussars, coming up to Wolve Hoek, Capture of
found the long-sought guerrilla leader delivered into their hands Scheepers.
by a common enemy. How great a disaster to his side was
this sudden termination to Scheepers' career was confessed by
President Stejm when he pronounced over the Commandant's
departed leadership the following epitaph : — " From my heart I
hope that it is not true, because he is nearly indispensable to
our cause. If true, we will always with gratitude think of the
good and inestimable service that he has done us, and honour
his name."*
* President Steyn to Commandant Hugo, October 27th, 1901.
286
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Pursuit of
Pypers.
Operations in
the north-east
against
Myburg and
Fouche.
Meanwhile Pypers fled on, and was soon free of all his
pursuers but Crabbe, for Alexander was withdrawn into Prince
Albert to refit, and being granted leave of absence, was replaced
in conunand by Kavanagh, who in his turn handed over his
o\\Ti column to Lieut. -Colonel C. E. Callwell, R.A. At the same
time Atherton was relieved in command of his column, prior to
its being broken up, by Major the Hon. H. G. Heneage (12th
Lancers). Eventually, in the manner already related, Pypers
attached himself to Smuts, and with him penetrated into the
north-west, when Callwell took up the pursuit of both commandos
in the Sutherland district.
There remain unrecorded only the operations in the north-
east of Cape Colony, where Hart from Aliwal North watched
the Orange river, and Pilcher, recently arrived with his two
columns from the Orange River Colony, and Monro dealt with
Myburg and Fouch^ after the departure of Smuts for the south.
On September 14th Pilcher reached Dordrecht, and was
immediately strengthened by the arrival of another force, Lieut. -
Colonel W. G. B. Western's, from the Orange River Colony. The
commandos were still to the east of Jamestown, and Sir J.
French desired that they should be pushed north-eastward, and
prevented from moving across the Drakensberg into the interior
of the colony. On the 17th Myburg of his own accord forwarded
this plan by moving towards Barkly East and Rhodes. Pilcher
then drew a line of guards over the passes from Rhodes down
to Dordrecht ; but before this was complete Fouch6 placed him-
self outside the barrier by crossing the mountciins into Elliot
coimty, passing within artillery range across the front of Monro,
who was marching on Barkly East. On September 23rd Monro
heard that Myburg had destroyed a post of local troops, killing
and wounding six and taking twenty-one prisoners at Lauriston.
He accordingly moved thither, and in a runnmg fight inflicted
nine casualties on Myburg, drove him east of Rhodes, and
occupied that place himself on September 27th. Two days later
Pilcher was recalled to the Orange River Colony. Monro, thus
left alone, was ordered to draw in his detachments, in order to
cover the completion of the line of blockhouses from Stormberg
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 287
to Queenstown. Leaving 250 local troops facing the frontier
at Barkly East, Monro fell back on Dordrecht on October 4th.
Meanwhile Major-General Hart had received (September ist) Han's opera,
from Lord Kitchener orders to fend off from the north (right) orange river,
bank of the Orange river the bands which roved about the Orange
River Colony watching for an opportunity to cross and add to
the turmoil within Cape Colony. A modification of these in-
structions, sent on the 3rd, did not reach Hart in time to be
acted upon. Accordingly on September 3rd and 4th Hart
threw across the stream troops drawn from Western's column, -
Moore's mounted Connaught Rangers and a detachment of
Lord Lovat's Scouts under Lieut. -Colonel the Hon. A. Murray,
which he disposed at Beestkraal, Willemsfontein, Zandfontein
and Quaggafontein in a series of mobile and extended drift-
heads from Aliwal North round to the north of Herschel. With
these he patrolled constantly towards the north, co-operating
with the columns of Sir H. Rawlinson, Plumer and Thomey-
croft, which were engaged in that part of the Orange River
Colony. He was just too late, it will be seen, to prevent Smuts'
the crossing both of Smuts, who, as related, contrived to ol^e.°
pass around his right flank between Herschel and the
Basuto border on the 3rd and 4th, and of smaller bodies
who circumvented the opposite flank and entered Cape
Colony between Aliwal North and Bethulie. Smuts, indeed,
either by skill or fortune, made his dash at the precise
moment when Hart, in the act of passing his troops and
transport across the difficult drifts, was powerless to turn upon
him.* In front of Hart there remained Kritzinger, who was
about Zastron, awaiting a chance to follow Smuts, with whom
he had recently arranged a plan of campaign. Hart had by
this time left no passage unguarded, and Kritzinger saw that if
he were to keep his pledge to Smuts he would have to force an
entrance. Accordingly he reconnoitred the river line on Kritzinger
September 19th from Vecht Kop, a height north-east of Zastron, [he^Orang"
approaching within sight of the outposts of Lovat's Scouts, wlio
• See also Chapter XIV., and footnote on page 267.
288 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
held the drift -head opposite Quaggafontein. Murray, whose
strength had been in any case insutficient for the proper
guardianship of his allotted length of river, which included
several drifts, happened at this time to be weaker than usual
owing to the absence of one of his two squadrons, with a gun,
which had been despatched under Major Lord Lovat to the relief
of Lady Grey, that place being reported to be in danger from
Smuts' descending conmiando. Lord Lovat had departed on
the nth, and should have rejoined about the i6th ; but the
rising of the river enforced a long detour to regain Quagga-
fontein, and on the evening of the 19th he was still on the left
bank near Elands Kloof Drift, with a difficult crossing before him
and his draught animals exhausted by four days' hard marching.
Arranging with Lord Lovat to join forces next morning, Murray,
who had visited the detachment and inspected the drift in person,
returned to his camp across the river at 8 p.m., hearing from his
outposts that the Boer patrols seen during the day had returned
to Vecht Kop.
Murray's force on the right bank of the Orange river now
consisted of one gun and 106 men. Of these more than one-
third were on night duty, a party of sixteen being on guard at a
drift three miles from his camp, twenty-one more on piquet
and horse-guard at the camp. Ordering reveille to be sounded
at 3 a.m., Murray retired to rest with small anticipation of being
attacked, for the moon would shine brightly until midnight,
and the Boers, having retired to their distant haunt at Vecht
Kop, had very few hours of darkness in which to be dangerous.
Kritzinger But immediately night had fallen Kritzinger led out his burghers
^os^at^ ^^^ ^^ attack the enfeebled post at Quaggafontein. Marching by the
Quagga- rays of the moon he was within striking distance just as the light
^p\!"i'9th— failed ; he then ordered his men to dismount and advance in a
20th, 1901. crescent on foot. Murray's outposts were completely surprised.
Not until the Boers had penetrated to the horse-lines was a shot
fired, and then a semi-circle of musketry from 400 rifles at short
range called the sleepers in camp to arms and many of them
to instant death. Murray and Captain the Hon. J. Forbes-Sempill
(The Black Watch) did their utmost to retrieve the already
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 289
complete disaster. The colonel rallied a few men around the
machine gun, which maintained a hot discharge until a bullet,
striking the muzzle, rendered it useless. The enemy then closed
upon it, and Murray, refusing to surrender, was shot by a rifle
held close to his breast. Forbes-Sempill, who was severely
wounded, called some rifles together under cover of the wagons,
and offered a stout resistance until, seeing the whole camp in the
enemy's hands, he withdrew his party and led them in safety
back to Lord Lovat's camp. The Boers then took entire Seizes the
possession of the camp. Their stay was brief, and they made ^^
no attempt to push on across the Orange river, the main object
of the expedition. About 1.30 a.m. they hastily abandoned their
capture and retired towards Rouxville with many of Murray's
horses and the gun, which was retaken by Thorneycroft next
day.*
Kritzinger's unaccoimtable hesitation removed all danger of
his co-operation with Smuts, and it was followed by months of
inactivity which drew bitter complaints from his exasperated
superior. When at last he made a brief and fateful reappear-
ance he found himself alone in the scenes of his old adventures,
for the campaign in Cape Colony had completely shifted its axis
in a manner soon to be described.
• See Chapter XVIII., page 318.
VOL. IV 19
290
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Approximate Strength States of Columns referred to in
foregoing chapter.
i
.si
en
§
.9
COLUMN.
1
a
9
i
1
o>
a
September — October, 1901.
Lt.-Col. G. F. Gorringe . .
5 SO
—
3
—
\
OflScer Commanding 17 th
Lancers . .
440
—
—
3
Lt.-Col. S. C. H. Monro . .
600
—
3
2
Lt.-Col. E. M. S. Crabbe . .
445
68
2
—
Lt.-Col. H. J. Scobell
652
—
3
I
Lt.-Col. B. Doran (later W.
Doran) . .
443
—
2
—
Lt.-Col. P. G. Wyndham . .
Capt. F. T. Lund . . . .
400
—
—
—
580
—
2
—
Lt.-Col. C. P. Crewe
350
—
2
2
Lt.-Col. J. R. MacAndrew
495
—
—
Lieut. - Gen. Sir J.
Officer Commanding at
French in command.
Conway . .
150
—
I
—
Lt.-Col. A. G. Hunter-
Weston
700
—
4
6
Lt.-Col. C. T. McM. Kava-
nagh (later C. E. Callwell,
R.A.)
400
—
I
—
Lt.-Col. H. Alexander
400
—
I
—
Lt.-Col. T. J. Atherton
(later the Hon. H. G.
Heneage) . .
500
—
2
/
Lt.-CoJ. H. T. Lukin
690
—
3
I /
Lt.-Col. the Hon. A.Murray
250
—
2
Major-Gen. A. FitzR.
Hart directing.
Lt.-Col. M. G. Moore
250
250
—
I
Lt.-Col. H. d'A. P. Taylor . .
538
—
2
Col. T. D. PUcher in
command.
Maj. K. E. Lean . .
505
—
3
Lt.-Col. W. G. B. Western
506
89
3
^"-
Note. — The columns of Lieut. -Colonels Crabbe, Alexander, Atherton, Wyndham
and Kavanagh were controlled by Major-General T. E. Stephenson from October ist.
291
CHAPTER XVI.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL*
{Continued from Chapter XL).
SEPTEMBER — NOVEMBER, I9OI.
September, 1901, opened with the manoeuvre for which most of operations to
the columns referred to in Chapter XI. had suspended all other enclose Kemp,
operations. This was a comprehensive attempt to surround
Kemp, who since his eruption at Vlakfontein had remained
quiescent in the eastern arm of the Zwart Ruggens mountains,
a threat alike to the communications of Rustenburg, Klerks-
dorp, Ventersdorp, and all the western posts. By September
1st a cordon was drawn partially around him through south
and east by seven columns which were posted as follows from
left to right : — Lord Methuen at Brakfontein, Hickie at Bank-
drift, Fetherstonhaugh at Leeuwfontein, E. C. Ingouville Williams
at Rietfontein, G. Hamilton at Zandfontein, Kekewich at Magato
Nek, Allenby at Boschhoek, all facing inwards towards a central
point about Blokkloof. But the enclosure, close as it was around
two sides, was open on the others, and an attempt by Lord
Methuen to prolong his watch to the unguarded western exits •
resulted in the uncovering of those nearer at hand. Kemp was
quick to utilise his chance. Seeing Lord Methuen's troops
extending thinly northward, he dashed into the interval opening
between them and Hickie's column, and made good his escape Kemp escapes,
across the Elands river and out to the west. Lord Methuen's
movement, however, which had been made in consequence of a
report that the enemy was breaking out by Lindleys Poort, was
• See map No, 59.
VOL. IV. 19*
292 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
not unproductive. An evading party was duly discovered and
brought to book, being turned back with the loss of several
killed and wounded and twenty-two prisoners. Kemp had left
many more such bands behind him whilst he escaped. Three
days' search by the columns produced more than 150 prisoners
and a large amount of transport and supplies with which the
Boer General had been imwilling to hamper himself. Neverthe-
less, the main object of the manoeuvre had failed, and on Sep-
The columns tcmber 4th the columns dispersed, Lord Methuen making for
disperse. Zeerust, Allenby for Conmiando Nek, G. Hamilton for Olifants
Nek; a few days later Fetherstonhaugh with Hickie and
E. C. I. Williams marched for Ventersdorp, and Kekewich for
Naauwpoort. Not without fighting did some of the columns
make good their points. On September 5th Lord Methuen,
skirting the Schurve Bergen near Wonderfontein, was waylaid
by a commando in a most difficult valley, from which a long
day's close fighting extricated him with the loss of eleven killed
and twenty-six wounded, the enemy losing somewhat more in
killed and wounded, and eleven prisoners besides. On the 9th
Lord Methuen was in Zeerust, with twenty-three prisoners and
some eighty wagons captured by himself and by von Donop,
who had marched slightly detached to the southward, his own
casualties during that time having been one officer and twelve
men killed, two officers and twenty-eight men wounded. He
then marched to Mafeking (September nth) where he refitted,
and was for some time thereafter busied in filling Zeerust and
Lichtenburg with supphes. Of the other column commanders
, Allenby, when on his way to Commando Nek, received informa-
tion of a laager situated at Schaapkraal, on the Sterkstroom
river. On September 7th he surrounded it at dawn with 400
cavalry and two guns, and though the bulk of the commando
had already escajjed the net, twenty- two prisoners and all the
camp equipment fell into his hands. On the nth Allenby
reached Pretoria, whence he was moved into the Eastern Trans-
vaal. G. Hamilton, after a brief stay at Olifants Nek, went to
Ventersdorp on the 9th and Klerksdorp a week later, taking
twenty-nine prisoners on the way ; soon after he was entrained
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 293 .
for Natal. Fetherstonhaugh's columns, after having thoroughly
searched the Zwart Ruggens, went into Ventersdorp on Sep-
tember 13th with more than 100 prisoners captured during and
since the movement against Kemp. At Ventersdorp Fetherston-
haugh remained until the 21st, when he again set out northward
in search of Kemp, who was reported about Tafel Kop. The
height, however, was found unoccupied on September 22nd,
though touch was made with a party of some 300 Boers next
day beyond the Elands river, and again on the 25th at Winkel-
haak, north of the Zeerust road, sharp fighting resulting at both
places. Until the end of September Fetherstonhaugh continued
to raid in this neighbourhood. On the last day of the month
he received orders to reinforce Kekewich, who had had a
critical adventure close to the north-east.
After dropping out of the combination in the Zwart Ruggens
Kekewich had remained a week at Naauwpoort, when orders to
clear the northern slopes of the MagaUesberg about the Sterk-
stroom river sent him again into the field. Marching through
Olifants Nek, he had gone some way on the other side of the
mountains when fresh orders were received (September 17th) to
desist from his north-easterly movement, and to remain instead
within touch of Olifants Nek, so as to be at hand to co-operate with
Fetherstonhaugh against the hostile bodies whom that General
had found to the west of Naauwpoort. Accordingly Kekewich
remained some days at Rhenosterfontein, moved into Rusten-
burg on the 22nd, and thence through Magato Nek to Moedwil
on the Selous river, to the west of which his cavalry surprised
and captured a laager of thirty-five Boers on the 24th. Kekewich
then made a circuit northward along the Elands river to Lindleys
Poort, and finding little to do, returned on September 29th to
Moedwil, not a Boer being sighted on the march, which con- Kekewich at
eluded at noon. On the evening of arrival Kekewich despatched ^*^^^"'-
his supply column by Magato Nek and Rustenburg towards
Naauwpoort where it was to refill. With the wagons as escort
went one and a half companies of the ist Derbyshire regiment,
and one and a half squadrons of the Scottish Horse. There
remained with Kekewichjat Moedwil four companies of the ist
294 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Derbyshire regiment, four and a half squadrons of the Scottish
Horse, and two companies of Imperial Yeomanry, some 800
men in aU, with three guns of the 28th battery R.F.A., and a
Vickers-Maxim. These were in a camp about 600 yards from
the east (right) bank of the Selous river. The operations of the
past week had apparently fixed the enemy in the neighbour-
hood at such insignificant strength that Kekewich, feeling safe
Positionof his from molestatiou, had chosen his camp with more regard to
*^'"'** convenience than to tactical efficiency. It was pitched on the
sky-line of a rise and faced west, towards the Selous river which
boimded the entire front, the Zeerust — Magato Nek road roughly
marking the left (southern) flank. The drift which carried the
track across the river was thus at the left (south-west) comer of
the front of the encampment ; it was held by one and a half
companies of the ist Derbyshire regiment, the remainder of
whom were distributed in piquets over the road along the left
flank and around to the left rear, where the line of outposts was
taken up by the mounted troops through right rear and right
to front again, the circle being completed by their junc-
tion with the infantry at the drift. Although he had little
expectation of being attacked, Kekewich had faced his men
in the direction from which attack was most likely, namely, the
west. Here the Selous river, as is common with such obstacles,
provided a problem not easily to be decided. Beyond it lay
broken and scrub-grown ground which required watching, though
to do so properly would have demanded the assumption of the
left (western) bank as a Une of observation, and possibly of
resistance. With so few troops at his disposal Kekewich con-
sidered this inadvisable. With the exception of a single in-
fantry piquet posted in some native huts about 500 yards across
the drift, he confined himself to his own bank of the river,
which — though it lay dangerously near the camp, that is to
say, both camp and outposts might be surprised together — was
so steep and high that it seemed adapted to defence to the last
against attack from across the river, and absolutely to forbid
any lodgment by the enemy in the river bed itself. It appeared,
in short, to do away with the necessity for surveillance of the
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 295
cover on the opposite side of the stream, other than such as
could be carried on by small patrols, which Kekewich ordered
to go out from every piquet an hour before dawn, and by two
stronger mounted reconnoitring parties which were to start to
search north-west and south-west at 4.30 a.m. The repeated
failure of precautions of this particular nature during the cam-
paign may well throw doubt on their utility. Should the enemy
be gathering for an assault, he will usually do so earlier in the
night than the hour of starting of such patrols, which, neces-
sarily slow of movement and restricted in observation, are
likely to precipitate rather than anticipate the onslaught,
and that close to the outposts from which they issue. Further,
in such an event the patrols themselves, moving in the open,
must almost certainly be lost, and had far better be within
the outposts, which they can usually in any case do Uttle to warn.
Thus it happened that about 4.30 a.m. on September 30th a De u Rey
patrol of the Imperial Yeomanry, going out from the north- KScewich,
westerly piquet of the mounted troops on the western front, Sept. 30th,
ran into a strong body of Boers, who swept them aside at once,
and in a few seconds were upon the piquet behind, which they
destroyed to the last man. As little virtue remains in a broken
outpost line as in a ruptured dam. Rapidly the breach widens
on either side as the neighbouring piquets are rolled away by
the outflanking fire from the place of the lost link. Both up and
down the river the enemy pushed his men, covering them with a
fusilade which annihilated first the Yeomanry piquet next to
the northward, then the infantry guard at the drift in the oppo-
site direction, both detachments withstanding resolutely to the
last. By a curious chance the piquet across the drift passed
unnoticed, and thus escaped destruction. In a brief space the
line of the river bed, the sole defence of the camp, was lost, just
as Clements' front on the Magaliesberg heights had been lost at
Nooitgedacht. The Boers then poured so dense a fire upon the
tents that it seemed as though the camp must fall within a few
moments without an answering shot. Amongst the lines inevit-
able confusion arose. It was still half dark. As usual the
tethered horses, the largest and most helpless targets, added to
1 901.
296 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
the riot by their wild stampeding, very many being killed, and
scarcely one escaping unstnick as they blundered about the lines.
The soldiers, roused by the rush of lead through their canvas
walls, hurried into the open, fixing their bayonets as they ran,
and seeking the orders which at such a time it is the hardest task
to issue. But soon from the chaos was evolved a steady drift
of men, and it was all toward the front. In a few moments the
open space between the river and the boundary of the camp
was barred by a mixed but solid firing line, which replied vigo-
rously to the fire pouring from the river bed. As the light
grew, and with it the certainty of the Boer positions, Kekewich's
guns opened one by one, and the shooting of the troops became
more and more powerful and accurate, until it equalled that of
the enemy, who attempted in vain to push in to close quarters
and overwhelm the camp. Advance after advance was shat-
tered ere well begun, and the effect of the resistance was shown
by the galloping off of small parties of daunted burghers. The
majority remained, however, and whilst this fierce fire-fight
was waged along the western front, a nmiour arose that a strong
body of Boers was riding roimd to surround the camp by the
east or rear. At this moment Kekewich, having just been
disabled by a wound, the second he had received, was in the act
of delegating command to the Colonel of the Derbyshire regiment,
H. C. Wylly. This officer immediately ordered Major C. N.
Watts, of his own regiment, and Major R. A. Browne, of the
Border regiment, to collect all the men they could and move
in that direction, for had the report been true there was little
hope of safety for the camp. But the east was found to be
clear, and Watts, with a rapid grasp of the situation, at once
swung his men northward, and sent them with fixed bayonets
straight at the enemy in the bushes upon the river bank to the
north-west of the camp. As the infantry charged they were
joined by many of the Scottish Horse and Imperial Yeomanry,
imtil a strong and resolute body bore down upon the flank of
the enemy's position in the river bed. The effect was instan-
Defeat of taneous. The Boers directly in the face of the onset broke and
^^' fled ; those higher up the river bed, seeing themselves outflanked,
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 297
and already much disheartened by the inflexibility of the defence,
began to disappear group by group. By 6.15 a.m. the whole
were in full flight, the cup dashed from their lips, as that at
Vlakfontein had been, by the effect of a counter-attack upon a
soldiery unequal to a prolonged or redoubled effort to complete
what they had brilliantly begun. Such indeed seemed the dis-
tinguishing trait of the commandos under De la Key and Kemp,
for they it was who, concentrating with extraordinary secrecy,
had fallen upon Kekewich and so nearly ruined him. They
could scarcely have failed to do so had their plan been carried
out as designed. De la Key had with him some 1,500 men,
nearly all the local commandos in his jurisdiction. The report
which had first misled and then guided Watts into the move- Miscarriage of
ment which decided victory for the British contained the essence '* '''*"''■
of his scheme of attack. The camp was indeed to have been
surrounded, by Kemp and Van Heerden from the east, by Steen-
kamp and Oosthuizen from the north, by De la Key himself
from west and south with the 900 men he kept imder his hand
along the Selous river. But every attack except his own mis-
carried ; only a few burghers found their way to the British
flanks and rear, where they acted too feebly to be worth repelling.
The frontal attack alone was made in full power, and how nearly
it came to success gave no uncertain hint of the fate of the camp
had the plan been carried out in its entirety. Kekewich's losses
were heavy ; in an hour the fight had cost him about twenty-five
per cent, of his force,* and so many of his horses that his order
to pursue, which he gave immediately the enemy loosened, could
not be obeyed. He himself had been twice wounded during the
affray, towards the success of which his fine and cool leadership
had greatly contributed, f De la Key admitted forty-eight
casualties ; but that brilliant commander was prone to make as
little of his defeats as of his successes in his reports to the Boer
Headquarters, and the accuracy of his casualty list may be
• Gisualties — Killed, officers five, men fifty-six ; wounded, officers twenty-one, men
no; total, 192. No fewer than 512 animals, horses and mules, were killed
t For gallantry in this action Private W. Bees, ist Derbyshire regiment, was awarded
the Victoria Cross.
298
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Fetherston-
haueh
reiiuorces
Kekewich.
estimated from the fact that even a month later he included
Kekewich amongst the British dead at Moedwil.*
On the day after the action Fetherstonhaugh was on the spot
with two of his columns, those of Hickie and E. C. I. Williams.
Williams, bivouacking at Kosterfontein on the previous evening
after a successful raid (sixteen prisoners), had actually been in sig-
nalling communication with Kekewich towards the close of the
fight at Moedwil, learning that his assistance was not required.
For a week Fetherstonhaugh searched in vain for Kekewich's
aggressors, and on October gth turned southward toward
Ventersdorp, coming in to the line at Klerksdorp to refit on the
1 6th. Fetherstonhaugh was then removed from the district to
take conunand of the Eastern (Delagoa Bay) line of communi-
cations, leaving his columns, of which that of E. C. I. Williams
was entrained for Pretoria, whilst Hickie's was retained to cover
the construction of a line of blockhouses to be built along the
Schoon Spruit from Ventersdorp to the Vaal river. The neces-
sity for protection here had been shown by an attack on the
8th, when Wolmarans, with a section of the Potchefstroom
commando, killed and captured twenty-two men who had been
engaged in fuel cutting on the proposed line, taking also a dozen
wagons. Meanwhile Kekewich's column, temporarily commanded
by Lieut. -Colonel H. C. Wylly, was refitting at Magato Nek,
320 horses and 200 mules for its use being ready within twenty-
four hours of the engagement at Moedwil. The majority of the
troops who had fought in that exhausting affair were now re-
lieved by fresh units, the 2nd Norfolk regiment replacing the
1st Derbyshire. On October 13th Kekewich, sufficiently re-
covered from his wounds to resume command, took his column
to Bashoek, where for a week he awaited the approach of Lord
Methuen, who was coming from Mafeking to co-operate in a
further search for De la Rey's vanished combination. Lord
Lord Methuen Methuen had left Mafeking on October 2nd, and after a leisurely
M^rfrom march, chiefly employed in the destruction of crops and stock,
Mafeking. reached Zeerust on the 14th, and a week later Lindleys Poort,
general De la Key to Commandant-General Botha, October 28th, 1901.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 299
where Kekewich, who had moved up to Rietfontein, gained
touch with him. But the conjunction was brief and quite un-
profitable. Lord Methuen, who had seen nothing of De la Rey,
turned again almost immediately westward, and Kekewich in
the opposite direction, the latter being back at Bashoek on the
25th. Lord Methuen's two columns, retracing the route to
Zeerust, marched, according to their usual custom, by parallel
but separate routes. Some miles from Lord Methuen's own left His detach-
flank was Lieut. -Colonel S. B. von Donop's force, consisting of ^n"i>,no"
the 5th Imperial Yeomanry (680 men), ist Northumberland
Fusiliers (140 men), ist Loyal North Lancashire regiment (190
men), four guns 4th battery R.F.A., a 5-in. howitzer of the 37th
battery R.F.A., and two Vickers-Maxims. One himdred and
two ox and mule wagons accompanied the detachment. It fell
to von Donop to discover at last the whereabouts of De la Rey
and his contingent, and in a manner as surprising as it was
costly. At 7.30 a.m. on October 24th he was between Wilge-
boomsspruit and Kleinfontein, south of the Zeerust road, Lord
Methuen being at that moment about Rickertsdam, some twelve
miles to the north-east. Von Donop was in the act of turning
northward to reduce the distance between himself and his chief,
whom he had arranged to meet next day, when some firing from
a group of kopjes in front caused him to pause and open with
his artillery in reply. The hostile demonstration was weak, and
not at all unexpected, for these kopjes had been invariably occu-
pied by Boer piquets and patrols. On this occasion, however,
they formed part of a carefully laid trap to enclose Lord Methuen's
detached column. Concealed by a belt of timber which ran
parallel to von Donop's left flank, De la Rey with Kemp and
Steenkamp lay in hiding with 600 men. Immediately the sound De la Rey
of the guns gave the signal that the British were engaged in ton^Etonop,
front, De la Rey's force emerged from the recesses of the wood Oct. 24th,
in three divisions, each two or three lines deep, and rode like a '^'"
regiment of European cavalry straight for the centre of the
convoy. The flanking parties with which von Donop had sur-
rounded himself were obliterated almost in silence, and the train,
laid open to the impact, was in a moment broken in three places.
300 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
One body of the enemy, cutting the mule convoy in two, sepa-
rated both it and the rearguard from the rest ; another dashed
straight for Lieutenant H. N. Hill's section of gims at the rear
of the convoy ; the third, galloping clean through the line of
march, wheeled on the other side, and enveloped the same two
guns from the north. Hill swung his pieces facing rearwards and
came into action with case shot, but he had only time to tire
three roimds before he and all but two of his gimners fell. But
the escort, F. company of the Northumberland Fusiliers under
Captain A. C. Girdwood, fought so valiantly, losing half its per-
sonnel, that though the Boers were amongst and on every
side of the guns they never succeeded in capturing them, though
a burgher, or, as some say, a man of the defence, tired one of
the limbers. Lieutenant R. F. A. Hobbs (Royal Engineers),
proceeding to the spot to ascertain what had occurred, found
the pieces surrounded by disabled artillerymen, and with the aid
of the only two unwoimded men actually fired some rounds of
shrapnel, and remained in possession, hoping for rescue. Owing
to the thickness of the bush on either side of the colimin it was
as difficult for von Donop to obtain information as to give orders.
The Boers were in every part of the convoy. Many of the
wagons of the rear of the convoy were being driven off ; twelve
had already disappeared ; twenty more had been upset ; nearly
all the native drivers of the rest were shot, many incurring
death by their devotion in refusing to drive away the booty for
the enemies of their employers. Fearing from the silence of the
field pieces with the rearguard that both were lost, von Donop
sent a party of moimted troops to attempt to withdraw them. He
next set himself to saving the bulk of his wagons, which he
effected by collecting all the available mounted men and posting
the other pair of gims and the howitzer in a commanding posi-
tion. He then heard that his guns had not yet passed into
the enemy's hands, and he immediately sent another mounted
party and a Vickers-Maxim to extricate them. In all this he was
successful. Once more the heat of De la Key's attack cooled
suddenly at the first show of resolute and organised opposition.
It seemed as though his burghers were incapable of success unless
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 301
they achieved it at the first onset. At the very moment of De la Rey
victory they drew off ; the fire of the artillery, now swelled by ^^ "^^
that of the two rescued guns — even of that which had been set
on lire, so quickly had it been supplied with fresh fittings — sent
them still further, and in half an hour the column was clear on
every side and free to re-establish its broken array. The casualties
amongst the troops numbered ninety ;* forty-nine natives were
killed, wounded or missing ; twelve wagons had vanished alto-
gether, many others were damaged or deprived of their teams.
But the enemy's failure had cost him dear. Some fifty burghers
were found dead on or near the field ; many wounded had been
carried away. Nevertheless, von Donop had had a narrow
escape, and his experience cast doubts on the wisdom of allow-
ing a detached force, heavily burdened with transport, to march
alone so far from its parent column through " the worst portion
of a most difficult route."t On October 28th both portions of
Lord Methuen's command reached Zeerust, with nine prisoners
and forty-eight wagons and carts, leaving behind them a broad
belt of ravished country which accounted for some three-quarters
of the entire harvest of the fertile Marico district, the enemy's
most trusted granary.
Turning back now to Kekewich, that officer, last seen at Kekewich
Bashoek, was soon in possession of information which caused w^/dfrom
him to set his column again in motion. Within the confluences Bashoek.
of the Hex, Elands and Crocodile rivers to the east considerable
hostile assemblages were reported, and on October 28th Keke-
wich sallied out to come to terms with them. Marching by
night and with great secrecy he reached Hartebeestspruit before
dawn. Here his excellent Intelligence Service gave him notice
of several bodies of Boers in the neighbourhood. He became
aware, too, that his movements were being keenly watched by
the enemy, and increased caution became necessary if good
results were to accrue. At Beestekraal, twenty-five miles due
* Casualties — Killed, two officers, twenty-eight men ; wounded, five officers, forty-
nine men ; missing, six men.
t Lord Methuen's report to the Adjutant -General.
302
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
A success at
Beestekraal,
Oct. 30th.
1901.
Kekewich at
Rustenburg,
Nov. 2nd,
1901.
eastward, lay the largest of the reported laagers. At 8 p.m. on
the 29th Kekewich despatched Lieut. -Colonel C. E. Duff with all
his mounted men with orders to surprise Beestekraal at dawn,
he himself following shortly after with the infantry and baggage.
Duff was at first delayed by missing the road in the darkness, but
thereafter he marched rapidly, and daylight of the 30th found
him across the Hex river, and within sight of Beestekraal, which
was seen to be occupied. Duff was himself almost immediately
discovered by the enemy, who began to fire from an outpost on
a kopje opposite his left. Sending a squadron against these.
Duff at once dashed for the drifts over the Crocodile, of which he
captured two, one above, the other below the laager, which
lay on the right bank of the Crocodile. Having thus gained an
ingress, his men poured in from both sides and won the farm-
stead with little opposition. Meanwhile his squadron on the
left had surrounded the kopje, where a commando of seventy
men, in spite of the vigilance of its piquet, was completely sur-
prised in the act of cooking breakfast, and captured. Altogether
Duff took seventy-eight prisoners, with the loss of only two of
his own men wounded, burned the farms and their contents,
and on that afternoon was again in touch with Kekewich who
had come on to Klipplaat, on the Elands river. The rain, which
had fallen heavily throughout these operations, then brought
the rivers down in flood, and after halting, Kekewich on the
Elands river and Duf! on the Hex, both returned to Rustenburg
on November 2nd, thus concluding an expedition in which
the value of good information and of decision in following it
up had been well exemplified.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 303
Approximate Strength States of Columns referred to in
foregoing chapter.
09
MS
0.
0 6
1
8
=3-8
£•
|l
0
COLUMN.
a
a
1
1
.s
September — November, 1901.
Lt.-Gen. Lord Methuen . .
1.325
600
13
2
Lt.-Col. S. B. von Donop . .
680
330
7
—
Lt.-Col. W. B. Hickie
673
193
6
I
f Maj.-Gen. R. S.
R.
Lt.-Col. E. C. Ingouvjlle
V Fetherstonhaugh
in
Williams . .
78s
198
5
—
) command.
Brig.-Gen. G< Hamilton . .
823
345
5
3
Col. R. G. Kekewich
853
i.oao
5
3
Col. E. H. H. Allenby
1,104
"""
5
4
304
CHAPTER XVII.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL*
{Coniinued from Chapter XII.).
THE ACTION AT BAKENLAAGTE.f OCTOBER 3OTH, I9OI.
The dangerous, but, as it proved, abortive attempt against Natal,
had by no means put a stop to the offensive in the northern
sections of the Eastern Transvaal. Sir B. Blood, though deprived
of most of his strength by the urgent needs of the threatened
colony, had nevertheless kept his remaining columns in full
Benson's activity. Ou September loth Lieut. -Colonel G. E. Benson,
Sept "1901." raiding from Carolina towards Middelburg, surprised numerous
bodies of the enemy, from whom he took nearly fifty prisoners
and a quantity of stock, marching on one occasion fifty-two miles
in twenty-four hom^s to effect his purpose. On the 22nd he was
back at Carolina, set out afresh on the 26th, and after activities
too various to be related, by the end of the month had accounted
for 117 Boers. Park during the same period had been circu-
lating about Lydenburg, where he was on September 30th, whilst
Bewicke-Copley from Springs covered the construction of a series
of blockhouses from that place towards the Delagoa Bay railway.
This Une was intended for occupation by the men of the South
African Constabulary, a corps recently formed, somewhat on
the lines of the Cape Mounted Riflemen, by Major-General R. S. S.
Baden Powell and Colonel J. S. Nicholson at Johannesbiurg.
In this task a small colunm under Lieut. -Colonel F. Hacket-
Thompson (Cameron Highlanders) also co-operated from
* See map No 9S. f See map No. 57.
EVENTS IN* THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 305
Bronkhorstspruit station, command of this unit being eventually
transferred to Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. C. G. Fortescue (Rifle
Brigade).
In October Benson continued the harrjdng tactics which had Benson's
made his a name of terror to every body of Boers compelled oa'*wT "
to laager in his vicinity. From the ist to the 13th he ranged
the district between the Oliphant and Komati rivers, without
great profit it is true, for his very reputation now scattered his
quarry in every direction before he had time to close ; but when
he marched into Middelburg to refit, his train was swelled by
many captives, wagons and cattle. After a week's rest Benson
set out again, struck rapidly south-west across the Oliphant,
and on the third day out surrounded and captured a laager
midway between the Wilge and Oliphant rivers, and eighteen
miles south of Brugspruit, taking thirty-seven prisoners, in
spite of a hot attack upon his rear by a strong outlying com-
mando. On October 25th he was close to Bethel, sparring
with a force which, warned of his approach, was under arms
when he appeared. Benson's losses here were seventeen officers
and men, those of the Boers about the same, besides three
burghers taken prisoners by the column. The resistance en-
countered by Benson in this affair and that of the 22nd was not
without omen. These were no local bands, concerned more
with escape than fighting. It was plain that the small column
was in the way of the commandos retiring in angry mood from
the borders of Natal, their exasperation heightening as the tale
of damage reached their ears at every six)t where Benson's
lightning strokes had fallen.
Commandant -General Botha, pausing gloomily at Ermelo with Botha orders
the officials of the Transvaal Government whom he did not dare to t" ^^^^^ °"
Benson.
move, sent peremptory orders to General D. Opperman to keep
his commandos together and " attack with all their force when-
ever possible."* The veld must be rid of Benson's " restless
colimin "* which was rapidly demoraUsing the very centre of
resistance. Benson himself, admirably informed as he had been
* Letter from Commandant-General L. Botha to General C. Bolh.-i, October 23rd,
1901.
VOL. IV. 20
3o6 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
throughout by his Intelligence Officer, Colonel A. Wools-Sampson,
was fully aware both of the increasing numbers and the changing
temper of the enemy in his vicinity. His column was absolutely
alone in the district. It was composed of unseasoned soldiers ;
for during the rest at Middelburg Benson had unwillingly seen
many of his well-tried horse and foot exchanged for infantry
which had been for a year and a half immured in blockhouses,
and moimted infantry which for many months had ridden no
further than around the outskirts of Middelburg.* On October
Benson at 29th he informed Headquarters from Syferfontein, north-west of
o?t!l^?h!'"' Bethel, that he was about to make for Brugspruit down the line
i9o»' of the Steenkool (or Steenbok) Spruit. He reported that he was
being closely watched by strong hostile patrols, coming chiefly
from the south and east. His convoy and forty-two prisoners
might be expected at Brugspruit on November 2nd.
The events of At 5 a.m. on October 30th the column left its camp on
Oct^3oth, Sj^erfontein and began its north-westerly march, pointing on
Bakenlaagte, where Benson intended to make a halt. The
previous evening Wools-Sampson's scouts and spies had reported
the presence of about 500 enemy in the immediate neighbour-
hood. Under cover of mist and storms of rain these Boers
attacked early in the day, but not seriously enough to check
the march. They were, in fact, less bent on fighting than on
outstripping the colunm, and when after sundry delays, caused
by the wagons at the drifts over the branching headstreams of
the Steenkool (or Steenbok) Spruit, Benson's advance-guard
approached the farm of Bakenlaagte about 9 a.m., it found
the enemy already there. But to the surprise of all the Boers
vanished at once, and seemed to be returning the way they had
come outside the flanks of the column. Wools-Sampson, who was
guiding the van, was now thoroughly suspicious. For days
past he had viewed with apprehension the gathering numbers
and mysterious tactics of an enemy whom none in South Africa
* Gjmposition of Benson's column, October 30th, 1901 — 3rd mounted infantry
(501), 2Sth mounted infantry (462), 2nd Scottish Horse (434), 84th battery R.F.A.
(eighty-two), (four guns), CC and R sections of Vickers- Maxims (thirty-six), 1st Field
troop R.E. (fourteen), 2nd battalion The BuflTs (650).
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 307
knew better than he. Personally acquainted with numbers of
his adversaries, knowing many more by sight and name, he
had in addition that natural but rare instinct for feeling the piilse
of his opponents which stamps the bom intelligence officer,
an agent whose guesses must be little less valuable than his
actual information if he is to be of signal service to his side.
He now scented grave danger, and urging Benson to look
immediately to his rear, he himself led the convoy forward to
the so strangely evacuated farmstead. But Benson had little
need of warning. The failure of L. Botha's invasion of Natal,
followed by the mustering of the commandos in the neighbour-
hood of his lonely column, had hinted plainly in whose path
he stood, and much he regretted that owing to his weakness he
had to move northward to avoid the stroke of Botha's forces
instead of southward to challenge it. On this particular day the
very quickness of eye which had so often delivered his enemy
into his hand showed him his own danger. His troops had
entered the very t5rpe of country where they were least effective.
The veld, rolling in great but gentle curves, offered nowhere
shelter or positions of defence, but ever5rwhere covered approaches
and hiding places for the gathering of an assault. In such
ground a small force, especially if encumbered with wagons, is
at the mercy of a swifter enemy ; it can neither scout with safety
on front or flanks, nor effectually guard its rear, for detached
parties become immediately invisible to the rest, and may be
lost without a sign ; nor, when they quit the top of one broad
saddle and descend the slope to make for the next, are they
unlikely to be annihilated in the low ground between by opponents
who have come up unseen from the other side. Thus, in whatever
formation, a weak column is in momentary peril in the presence
of the enemy ; marching united, one valley may be the grave
of all, or if in detachments, it may easily perish in detail. All
this Benson, looking over the grassy ground-swell, knew well,
and in a few moments the Boers were to show him that
they too were not neglectful of the aid of their hereditary
ally, the veld.
It happened that at about 1.45 p.m. one of the rearmost
VOL. IV. 20*
3o8 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
wagons, lagging behind the rest, had become embedded in the
mud of a drift. The rearguard consisted of two companies
3rd M.I., one company The Buffs (East Kent regiment), with
a Vickers-Maxim gun. Brevet Major F. G. Anley (Essex regi-
ment), who commanded these units, made every effort to extricate
the wagon and bring it on. But the Boers, with whom he had
been closely engaged since leaving camp, were increasing
momentarily, and they pressed so hard that Anley, fearing to be
cut off, ordered the wagon to be abandoned, and fell back
towards Bakenlaagte. At this moment the order of march of
the whole column was as follows : — Nearing the proposed camp
at Bakenlaagte Farm was the supply column, guarded by the
advance-guard of two companies of The Buffs, two guns 84th
battery R.F.A., and two companies of the 25th (King's Royal
Rifles) M.I., all under Major C. L. E. Eustace, the commanding
officer of the 25th M.I. These troops were both escort to the
convoy and formed the advance-guard, and had left camp an
hour before the main body. The delays at the drifts, however,
had brought the two portions of the column together, and close
upon the van were now two more companies of the 25th M.I.,
three of The Buffs, a Vickers-Maxim gun, the remaining two
guns of the 84th battery R.F.A., and the Scottish Horse. The
six companies of The Buffs (the seventh being with Anley and
the rearguard) closely surrounded the wagons, having two
companies in front, and two on either flank, the exposed side of
the latter being watched by a half company of Anley's 3rd M.I.
Benson, who had just posted the gims of the advance-guard
on a ridge one and a half miles behind the reversed rearguard,
letting the other two go on into camp, strongly disapproved
of Anley's action, for he had never lost a wagon to the enemy,
and as yet he knew nothing of the real straits of the out-
numbered rearguard. Two companies of The Buffs, which the
firing in rear had caused to linger behind some time earlier, had
been ordered by Benson to march on to the camping ground,
which they had now nearly reached. Sending word to these to
come back to reinforce, and to Anley to hold on imtil they
arrived, Benson himself took two squadrons (seventy-five men)
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 309
of the Scottish Horse, and hastened to the rear to help reclaim
the derelict wagon. But Anley had been already forced back,
and Benson, expecting the two companies of The Buffs to be up
shortly, and fearing for the flanks of his distant convoy, ordered
Anley to move to a position covering the north-east of the camp
whilst the whole rearguard fell back. Anley's orders were
clear, and he left at once, too promptly in truth for the
safety of the rest.
Commandant-General Botha, pressing keenly, his force well in
hand, espied the opening as soon as it was given. Instantly he
launched upon the retiring troops a double crescent of twelve
hundred horsemen. The few remaining mounted men of the
rearguard had to gallop for it, and dashed through the extended
company of The Buffs which, much disarrayed by this rush of
their own friends, was in a few seconds over-ridden and dashed
to pieces by the pursuing horde. Brandishing their rifles and
flring from the saddle as they stormed yelUng over the veld, the
burghers, in their eagerness to catch the Scottish Horse, scarce
noticed the scattered groups of foot soldiers who staggered
amongst them like men overtaken by a flood. A little further
on half of another company of the same regiment was similarly
obliterated. This party had been acting as escort to the two
guns posted by Benson, and when on the approach of danger
these pieces had been removed at the trot to the next ridge,
the infantrymen were left behind. As they toiled after they
too were overtaken by the charging commandos. Seldom have
troops found themselves in a more hopeless predicament than
this group. The first press of Boers, hot on the track of higher
game, having caught up the half-company, passed over it as if
it had no existence, and surged on before without firing a shot,
so that The Buffs looked into the backs of their receding
adversaries as a swimmer in deep water sees a billow roll from
him towards the shore. Behind these another rank of burghers
came on fast ; but they, more careful of the Uttle band, instead
of charging, dismoimted and began to shoot them down, the
noise of their firing calling many of those who had ridden on back
upon the melting handful, which lost eighteen of its thirty-three
3IO THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
men before it disappeared. Meanwhile Benson and most of
the Scottish Horse had gained the second gun position, and
turned to face the onset. On the ridge were the two guns of the
84th battery R.F.A., with Major E. Guinness in command; a
section (twenty men) 25th (King's Royal Rifles) M.I., under
Sergeant W. Ashfield ; the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry
company of the 3rd M.I., under Captain F. T. Thorold and
Second Lieutenant L. H. Marten ; a section (twenty men) of the
2nd Scottish Horse under Lieutenant J. B. Kelly, in addition
to the seventy men or so of the same regiment from the rear-
guard who were commanded by Major F. D. Murray, with
Captains M. W, Lindsay and S. W, Inglis and Lieutenants E. O.
Straker and C. Woodman, names then not famous, but now
not to be left unrecorded by any historian howsoever pledged to
brevity. A mile to the west, where the same great roll of the
veld rose to a cup-topped knob overlooking a farm, were two
sections of the King's Royal Rifles mounted infantry, under
Captain F. M. Cnun and Lieutenant R. H. Seymour. Another
half -company of the King's Royal Rifles M.I., under Lieutenants
W. P. Lynes and H. H. R. White, with a few of the Royal
Dublin Fusihers M.I., were on a detached rise 2,000 yards north-
west of Crum, and here Eustace had posted a third gun of the
84th battery, having sent the fourth back into camp at Baken-
laagte. On came the federal regiments, their outriders swarming
about the heels of the hindmost men of the Scottish Horse. As
they galloped their nimibers swelled. From every dip appeared
mounted men ; from behind the farm below Crum's post a
strong body, emerging suddenly at full speed, joined in the
charge, whilst others, scattering to the flanks, hotly engaged
with fire both Crmn's and Lynes' detached parties on the west
and Anley's on the east. Two thousand horsemen raced down
upon Benson and the men with him around the guns. So grand
and terrible a spectacle had not been seen nor had the earth so
shaken on ajiy battlefield in South Africa. But the ancient
splendour of the scene was not all with the furious squadrons of
the Boers. Alone on the gigantic bosom of the veld the little
knot with Benson calmly faced the approaching catastrophe.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 311
Flight was still possible ; the horses were at hand, and the
undulations between the ridge and the camp offered good and
sheltered galloping ground. But no man stirred from his place.
Two lessons the band had vowed to teach, one to the enemy
that not for him was the crowning glory of a charge home into
British troops and guns ; the other the last and greatest lesson
of soldiers to all the soldiers in the world. So fast and steadily
shot the men that the Boers, recalling the instinct which their
rage had momentarily banished, winced, and drawing rein,
flimg themselves from the saddle into a dip some two hundred
yards from the ridge. From its invisible recesses arose a chorus
of the voices of leaders, threatening and exhorting. For a few
moments the fortunes of the attack trembled in the balance, for
a charge is a flame easily quenched, auid then difficult indeed to
relight. But here were fighting men who, in throwing themselves
from the saddle to the ground, did but exchange one long-practised
art for another. Extending rapidly they began to close on foot,
each man knowing perfectly where his quarry lay and how best
to approach it, each bent on shooting and on not being shot,
none thinking of deeds of daring but all that victory must be
won — troops more formidable than these marksmen who could
crawl like Highland stalkers after a two-mile gallop have seldom
made war. In a few moments a tempest of lead burst at point-
blank range upon Benson's soldiers. Nothing now could avert
their doom or diminish their glory. The two companies of
infantry sunmioned by Benson, the last hope of saving the ridge,
had not appeared, nor were they to be seen upon the hill and dale
towards the camp. The foremost Boers gained ground rapidly,
covered by a fire which laid low all the British gimners and
mowed half the defenders from the ridge. Guinness still lived,
and when after two last shots of case the guns were silent, he
ordered up the horses to attempt to drag the pieces away. The
teams were shattered as soon as they appeared on the rise, and
not one of their riders rose from the heap. Soon after a third
team arrived, sent to the rescue by Lieutenant N. H. C. Sher-
brooke from his gun at Lynes' post on the west ; it dropped
beside the others, and Guinness himself, his duty ended, fell
312 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
dead amidst his men and horses. The Boers, a line of riflemen
1,200 yards wide, now fastened upon the scene of ruin. Many
\\ere within twenty yards of the gims, using their Mausers like
pistols but still crouching before the rifles and revolvers of the
survivors on the ridge, who lay as immovable as their dead,
only stirring to throw ammunition one to the other. Still no
help came from camp. Yet if valour alone be reinforcement the
defence grew stronger as it died. A few men of the King's Own
Yorkshire Light Infantry, who had escorted the Vickers-Maxim
into safety, were led back at full speed into the fight by Lieutenant
R. E. Shepherd, who perished at their head. Out from camp,
too, galloped Captain T. H. E. Lloyd (Coldstream Guards),
Benson's Assistant Staff Officer. As he arrived on the siunmit
his horse, and the man to whom he had thrown the reins to
hold it, fell dead beside him. He walked towards the front.
The Boers were in the act of closing upon the few remaining
troops ; the gims stood deserted but for the dead who covered
their trails and blocked the wheels ; on all sides were slain and
wounded, foremost amongst the latter Benson himself, grievously
injured. A whirlwind of bullets tore across the bloody grass,
one of which struck Lloyd on the wrist and broke it. The officer
saw that he had but one brief part to play in the tragedy so
nearly ended. Thrusting his bleeding wrist into his coat, he
sauntered, upright and smiling, through the dead and dying
towards his commander, in full view of a thousand enemies not
twenty paces away, and many who perished next moment
rejoiced that they had seen his act before they died. In a few
seconds he too was down. Space forbids the due relation of
every deed like this, though to soldiers they represent military
history as much as the movements of a brigade, aye, and may
mean as much to the fortunes of a fight. What should be said
of Murray of the Scottish Horse, who cis he fought at close
quarters with his pistol, never ceased to shout encouragement to
all around him until his voice was silenced ; of Squadron-
Quartermaster-Sergeant Wamock, of the same regiment, an old
grey-headed soldier, who, though his proper place was in camp
and safety, dragged boxes of ammunition into the very front,
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 313
together with two comrades, Trooper A. Cunningham and
Corporal J. M'Carthy, and when his companions fell, went on
himself and plied his rifle right and left in the very thick of
the Boer lines, until three bullets threw him down amidst his
admiring foes ; of Trooper N. H. Grierson (Scottish Horse),
who, hearing his wounded commander call for a messenger, leapt
to his feet to obey, and was struck by the very shot which gave
to Benson his second and mortal hurt ; of Lance-Corporal J.
Bell (Scottish Horse), who, when he, the only unwounded man
by the guns, was summoned to surrender by the crowd of Boers
upon him, answered only with his rifle and died for his reply ;
of Captain C. W. Collins (Cheshire regiment), who, until he was
wounded near the guns, signalled continually for assistance ; of
Lieutenant T. D. Jackson (King's Own Royal Lancaster), who
brought out ammunition from camp and distributed it to the
vanishing firing line ; of every officer and man of the King's
Own Yorkshire Light Infantry mounted infantry, who were
killed where they lay, each in his proper place in the firing line ?
Such soldiers have earned more than a hne, unless, indeed, it be
one as immortal as that brief ancient legend graven over the
bones of men of like valour with them — " Stranger, go tell the
Lacedcemonians thai we died in obedience to their laws.''*
The final scene came soon. When silence told the Boers that
resistance was extinguished they rose, and in five dense rows
of foot poured over the ridge and swarmed about their handi-
work, some still firing furiously, some stripping the corpses,
some, with unusual ferocity, robbing and even shooting the
wounded ;t others hurrying forward to the reverse slope to seize
the led horses, which, stampeding madly, added the thunder of
their hoofs to the uproar. At that moment Benson, nearing
• Epitaph of the Spartans at Thermopylae.
♦ The evidence of seventy-five officers, non-commissioned officers and men who
suffered and witnessed ill-treatment on this occasion renders too certain outrages on the
part of a usually chivalrous enemy mention of which would otherwise be omitted.
In the words of the officer ordered to inquire into the case: "There seems no doubt
that though the Boer Commandants have the will they no longer have the power to
repress outrage and murder on the part of their subordinates."
314 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
death as he was, showed himself the bravest of all the brave
who lay around him. Beckoning a soldier to him, a man stripped
to his shirt by the looters, he bade him speed into camp, and
order the guns to shell the ridge and clear it of the enemy,
Rome boasted of such orders, and few legions but hers have
heard them. The messenger, contriving to escape notice, per-
formed his mission, and soon both shrapnel and Vickers-Maxim
shells burst fiercely over the spot, sent from guns pushed out of
camp by Major A. Young, R.H.A., Benson's Staff Officer, who
had gone on earlier in the day to mark out the site of the in-
tended camp. Benson and his woimded comrades, welcoming
this final peril, exulted as they saw the Boers give back before
the projectiles until the hill was nearly clear. But ambulances
coming out of camp in spite of all efforts to detain them, masked
the fire, and when it stopped about 5.30 p.m. the enemy crowded
once more on to the ridge and dragged away the gims, to keep
their hands from which had been Benson's last wish. Prisoners
there were few to take. Of the approximately 280 officers and
men on the ridge, sixty-six lay dead and 165 wounded.
In other parts of the field it had gone less badly, yet hardly
enough, and more than once the little detachments seemed as
likely as they were prepared to share the fate of the lost company
on the gun ridge. Especially was Crum's party sore put to
it to maintain itself in the elevated depression to the west of
the gims. All day strong bodies, detached from the main Boer
assault, hemmed in the group with fire, and though eight of the
thirteen officers and men were hit, the rest, burrowing for cover
with their bayonets and using several rifles apiece, were not to
be shaken from their post, which they only quitted by order at
the fall of evening. North and east of Crum, Lynes and Anley
were heavily engaged until dusk in keeping the enemy from the
camp, around which Wools-Sampson had disposed the infantry
for a last defence. After their success on the gim ridge, however,
the Boers came no further ; they were both satisfied and ex-
hausted by their triiunph, to attain which many of them had
ridden sixty miles in the preceding twenty-four hours. Thus
the camp, which was almost at their mercy, was unmolested, and
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 315
next morning the British scouts could find no trace of the horde
which had wrought such mischief.
Within two hours of receipt of orders at Standerton, G.
Hamilton was on the march to the rescue with his own, Allenby's
and de Lisle's columns, A small column imder Lieut. -Colonel
C. St. L. Barter (successor to Bewicke-Copley), from the direction
of Springs, set out with the same intent, and covering thirty
miles between dusk and dawn, was the first to reach Bakenlaagte.
A resolute march of fifty-two miles in sixteen and a half hours
brought G. Hamilton with the rest of the reUevers to the spot
early on November ist, whereupon Wools-Sampson, having sent
his wounded into Springs, marched northward along the block-
housed (South African Constabulary) banks of the Wilge river,
and regained the Delagoa Bay railway line at Brugspruit.
Approximate Strength States of Columns referred to in
foregoing chapter.
S
booi
COLUMN.
0.
1
.SE
IS
M
a
0
it
a
*J
a
2
i
s
1^
§ 0
o>
^
S
October, 1 90 1.
Lt.-Col. F. Hacket-Thomp-
son (later the Hon. C. G.
Fortescue)
538
126
3
4
Lt.-Col. G. E. Benson, R.A.
1.529
650
6
—
Brig. -Gen. G. Hamilton . .
897
272
S
3
Col. E. H. H. Allenby
1,288
—
s
4
Lt.-Col. H. de B. de Lisle . .
1,001
—
5
a
Lt.-Col. C. St. L. Barter . .
551
784
5
3
3i6
CHAPTER XVIII.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY*
{Continue from Chapter XIV.).
AUGUST — NOVEMBER. IQOI.
After Smuts' THOUGH the coIumns devoted to the pursuit of Smuts had let
ance''^' slip the main prize, their work of the past fortnight had not
been entirely fruitless. All had made captures, Damant being
especially successful in this respect. On August i6th, when
on the march from the railway to Smithfield, Damant had
turned aside to clear the Klein Marsfontein hills, to the north
of the road. A converging movement on the group of kopjes
by four detachments resulted in the capture of nine Boers, and,
scouting forward, Damant was soon on the trail of a convoy
which was trekking between him and Boesmans Kop. This was
well enveloped by his squadrons, which took eighty-seven
prisoners and twenty-two carts.
Smuts was barely through the closing door before it was shut
and bolted behind him. On September 4th Thomey croft was
sent to Zonneschyn with orders to block the river as far east
as Inhoek, Murray and Moore prolonging his left to Willems-
fontein. The day before both Plumer and PUcher had moved
to contract the circle. The former, marching from Priors
Siding on a broad front from Helvetia down to Smithfield, was
drawing near to close the line of the Caledon. Pilcher filled
the gap on Plimier's right by striking up the Caledon towards
Smithfield ; Sir H. RawUnson was fast coming down the Basuto
* See map No. 64.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 317
border by Runnymede and Oudenaarde. In short, the enclosure
was now so complete, yet by a narrow margin of time so in-
effectual, that both sides may well have learned anew the old
military lesson of the value of hours. When it was seen that
the main object of the concentration had fallen through, Damant
was withdrawn to rejoin Bruce Hamilton at Fauresmith, whilst
Pilcher, entraining for Burghersdorp, took up with Lieut. -
General Sir J. French and the troops in Cap>e Colony the pursuit
of the commandos which had so effectually outwitted the
columns on the other side of the Orange.
There yet remained a chance of partially redeeming the
failure. Kritzinger was still within the fence, and in his broken
state was likely to prove an easier prey than his departed col-
league. On September 8th Thomeycroft and Sir H. Rawhnson
were in touch along the Orange river. The latter, however,
was soon called away by more pressing needs elsewhere. At this
time Commandant-General Botha was in the act of launching
his commandos upon the frontier of Natal, drawing after him
British columns from every quarter. Entraining at Burghers- sir H. Kaw-
dorp Sir H. Rawhnson was at Heidelberg on September 26th. jj,"^" '^si'Jfrn
arriving there in time to take an active part in the pursuit of the Transvaal,
discomfited Boer Headquarters in the Eastern Transvaal,*
whither Bruce Hamilton had preceded him a fortnight before.
Kritzinger seemed strangely difficult to find. Sir H. Raw- Search for
hnson had arrived at Aliwal North, reporting all the country to '^"^""8^'^-
the east of the Caledon to be absolutely clear, whilst between
the 15th and 20th Thomeycroft retraversed the same route up
to Wiesbaden without coming across anything more than
patrols. With similar lack of success Plumer, crossing the
Caledon at Arcadia and Commissie Bridge, swept up to Wepener
and beyond, then south again to Rouxville, which he entered on
September 22nd. The only sign of Kritzinger's presence was
revealed by the Boer himself, when in an attempt to keep his
pledge to Smuts on the night of September igth, he delivered
that fierce and successful attack on one of Hart's main camps
* See Chapter XII.
3i8
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Defeat of
Kritzinger.
Affair near
Sannah's Post,
Sept. 19th,
1901.
at Quaggafontein which has been narrated in a former chapter.*
Declining the advantage of his victory, he remained in the
Rouxville area, electing rather to endure in his own district the
unknown, and so far not too pressing, ills which might beset
him, than to brave those of which he had had full experience in
Cape Colony. Immediately after his encounter on the Orange
Kritzinger found himself at the same moment unexpectedly
assisted in one quarter and all but annihilated in another. As
he rode with his captured gun and horses back from the river,
re-seeking his hitherto undetected sanctuary north of Vecht
Kop, he was discovered on the evening of the 20th by Thomey-
croft, who all unknown had come down from Lincelles to
Bismarck. Thomeycroft immediately attacked with vigour
and suddenness, and the commando was broken up, part flying
back towards Vecht Kop, part towards Zastron. The latter
party was hotly pursued, and though many got away in the
gathering darkness, one band of forty were so hard pressed that,
abandoning the gim by the wayside, they turned to bay in a
donga at Florence. A determined charge by two companies
of Thomeycroft's M.I., led by Captains R. Barrett and T.
Thompson, promptly cleared out the shelter, Barrett and a
sergeant being killed, and three others wounded in the attack.
Thirteen Boers were taken here, eight in other parts ; the gun
was recovered, and the rest of Kritzinger's men, scattered all
over the countryside, seemed likely to fare badly between
Thomeycroft on one side and on the other Plumer, who was
nearing Rouxville from Commissie Bridge. But at this moment
Plumer was unfortunately called from the scene by an event
which had recently occurred in another place.
It had happened that on September i8th a Boer laager had
been discovered at Vlakfontein, south of Sannah's Post. On
the next day two detachments of mounted infantry, some
160 in all, taken from the Sannah's Post — Thabanchu line,
moved out to raid the camp, taking with them two guns of
U. battery R.H.A., which had recently reinforced the line of
* See Chapter XV.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 319
defences. The expedition, of which those in authority knew
nothing, was incautious in the extreme ; the country was full of
Boers who were watching for an opportunity to escape from the
uneasy districts to the south, and the result showed the dangers
of pla5^ng even one false card against opponents so alert. The
paltry British force was itself quickly surrounded by superior
numbers, and though it fought creditably for four hours, had to
capitulate with the loss of both guns, an officer and five men
killed, seventeen men wounded, and six officers and ninety-four
men taken prisoners. At this stage of the campaign the loss of
artillery was a moral gain to the enemy out of all prop)ortion to
the actual value of the capture, and the Commander-in-Chief
urged every effort to retake the pieces. Plumer was ordered to
hurry northward just as he was on the point of regaining contact
with Kritzinger's broken commando ; from the western side of
the railway Rochfort, who had succeeded Bruce Hamilton on the
latter's departure for the Eastern Transvaal, transferred towards
the scene of the disaster six columns under W. H. Williams,
Damant, Lowry-Cole, Bogle Smith, A. C. Hamilton and du
Moulin. On September 26th Plumer at Wepener got in touch
with du Moulin at Droogfontein and Lowry-Cole at Jammersberg
Drift, learning that the Boers were hastening southward in front
of Damant and W, H. Williams, who were chasing them down
from Vlakfontein. Damant was at that moment actually south
of Plumer at Vaalspruit, watching the area between Helvetia
and the Caledon ; W. H. Williams was at Buls Kop, in line with
du Moulin ; Lowry-Cole held the Caledon drifts from Jammers-
berg down to Deep Dene. A. C. Hamilton and Bogle Smith
were attending to the supplies from Springfontein and Eden-
burg. None had encountered the Vlakfontein commandos,
though on the 24th du Moulin, passing the scene of the disaster,
had recovered fifty-seven rifles and a quantity of the equipment
which had been lost by the mounted infantry.
Falling in with the scheme of pursuit, and satisfied that no
formed body remained north of Rochfort's columns, on Sep)-
tember 27th Plumer turned southward again to sweep down
the Caledon on the left bank in conjunction with du Moulin on
320 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
the other. At Mokari Drift Plumcr had a sharp skirmish
with a commando on a strong position on the opposite side of
the river, his advance-guard boldly crossing the stream to
attack whilst Plumer signalled to du Moulin to co-operate. But
du Moulin had wandered westward to Vermaakfontein, looking
out for a convoy from Springfontein, and an opportunity for a
combined attack was lost. With the loss of eighteen casualties,
including two officers killed, Plumer's men cleared the kopjes,
the enemy scattering westward ; then, hearing nothing of du
Moulin, Plumer crossed the river in chase to Lichtenstein on
the 28th. Du MouHn had then joined W. H. Williams, and the
two, taking up the tracks of Plumer's quarry, followed them, du
Moulin towards Boesmans Kop, Williams down to Commissie
Bridge, where Lord Basing was found on the 29th. Plumer,
passing Commissie Bridge on the same day, reached Rouxville
Plumer leaves on October ist, and Springfontein soon after. Thence, Plumer's
Trans^vaaL*^"' ^o^ce was couveycd by train to Volksrust, soon to find itself once
more in its old hunting ground, the wooded gorges of the Pongola
bush, sweeping up the fragments of Botha's dismembered
" invasion." *
Meanwhile one Boer band under Commandant Dreyer,
circling northward again, had once more gained the hilly
country between Wepener and Dewetsdorp. Lowry-Cole got
information of this at Jammersberg, and pushing out along
the Dewetsdorp road, attacked at dawn with much success,
capturing both Dreyer and his Field-Comet, and inflicting ten
other casualties.
The situation in the south-eastern comer of the Orange River
Colony at the end of September, 1901, was, then, as follows :
The double failure of the combination against Smuts and Krit-
zinger had left all the columns in the district busily and not
fruitlessly engaged, it is true, but without any real object. It
was not long before the operations here took a fresh shape,
consideration of which must be deferred until the work of the
forces in other parts has been traced up to the same point.
* See Chapter XII.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 321
On August i8th Elliot, having dispersed the units of his Elliot's
great combination north of the Modder, marched eastward from °P^'^^'^*°"5-
Glen with his own division, to take up a Une through Sannah's
Post to Ladybrand, Barker and Pine-Coffin Unking him to the
railway. Hi's intention was to sweep north-eastward, in the
hope of driving the enemy into an enclosure which had been
already partially formed by troops from other commands. In
the Brandwater basin was B. Campbell, whom Sir L. Rundle
had recently placed in command there, with orders to fortify
himself and deny the whole of this magazine and stronghold to
the Boers. Campbell was now the weaker by a battalion, the
2nd Scots Guards, which had been removed to Natal a fortnight
earlier. Rimington and Spens, reinforced by Kitchener's Fight-
ing Scouts under Lieut. -Colonel A. E. Wilson, were between
Kroonstad and Lindley, raiding with so much success and over
so wide a stretch of country that it seemed improbable that
any considerable bodies would slip past them to the north.
With Bethune, de Lisle, Lowe and Broadwood in line in this
order from left to right, Elliot moved northward, pausing from
August 22nd — 26th to clear the Koranna Berg, and to take in
supplies which were provided on the left by Winburg, on the
right by Warringham. Though much was heard of the enemy
— a commando 1,000 strong being reported near Wonderkop —
nothing was seen of any formed body. The only affair of note
was to the credit of the Boers themselves, who on August 22nd
surprised and captured at Evening Star a party of sixty-five
mounted infantry, detached from the garrison of Ladybrand,
which incautiously went into the open hoping to drive some of
the enemy's patrols into Elliot's arms. Broadwood rode hard
to the rescue, but was too late. Then, whilst Barker and Pine-
Coffin held Retief's and S'abberts Neks, Elliot continued his
march eastward to the A^itte Bergen, Bethune moving by
Leyden, Braamboschfontein and Kaffirkraal to Rietvlei ; de
Lisle by Governors Kop and Groenfontein ; Lowe and Broad-
wood through Ficksburg. The results were small, and com-
munication with the outside columns so defective that a message
sent to B. Campbell on the 31st requesting him to co-operate did
VOL. IV. 21
322 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA,
not reach him untU late on September ist, whilst to the north
Rimington, Spens and Wilson were at this momen busy upon
a separate scheme which had no bearing on EU>ofs opera Uon
For three days Elliot remained near the Brandwater basm, clear-
ing as much stock and produce as the difficulty of the country
permitted, but unable to come to close quarters with the human
population, who could be seen "climbing up the slopes of the
mountains on their hands and feet to get away. *
The division then marched back to Wmburg, mto which on
September 6th were taken nine prisoners, 100,000 stock and 140
vehicles, 850 tons of wheat having been destroyed on the way
TUrwa^ so Uttle profit from the richest and least harned distnct
of the Orange River Colony that ElUot was almost immediately
ordered to repeat his raid. On the mght of September 8th he
again marched eastward, practically by his former rou e and to
his former stations, but with better results. First on the nth.
de Lisle came in sight of a Boer convoy on the move near
Governors Kop. A gallop of twelve miles dehvered the whole
into his hands, the capture consisting of seventeen prisoners,
sixty-nine vehicles, a wheeled flour mill and some stock. On
the I2th and 13th Bethune had smaU successes at Wond^°p
and Rietvlei. The clearance of the western slopes of the W,t e
Bergen during the next five days not only yielded considerable
booty, but had the effect of driving parties of Boers across to
B. CampbeU, who was still in his original position about Bnndis.
Drift in co-operation with Brigadier-General Sir J. G. Uartnell
who had recently brought the Imperial Light Horse bngade (ist
Tnd and regiments) from Harrismith to Bethlehem and thence
to Relief s and Slabberts Neks. On September 17th B. Camp-
beU took seventeen prisoners near Steynsberg : his and Dart-
neU's captures of stock had already been immense and the
general clearance bade fair to become thorough when affairs
flsewhere somewhat interrupted it. Botha's threat at Natal was
»."..» . at this time fast developing, and the Commander-m-Chief was
rhe°S?r,'" manceuvering all available troops withm hail. Sir L. Rundle
Effect of
Botha's
Transvaal
Report by Lieut- General E. L. Elliot, September 8th, 1901.
I
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 323
had already been ordered to block every pass of the Drakens-
berg between Van Reenen's Pass and Witzies Hoek. On Sep-
tember 19 th Elliot received orders to march on Bethlehem for
Harrismith. On the same date Spens, from the northern trio
of columns, and a few days later Dartnell with one of his regi-
ments, were withdrawn for entrainment to Natal. His other
unit Dartnell left in Bethlehem under Lieut.-Colonel C. J. Briggs,
who displayed the greatest activity, capturing twenty prisoners
before the end of the month. Elliot, his line of march harassed
by sharpshooters throughout, reached Bethlehem on the 22nd,
and Harrismith four days later, his total gains since September
loth having been thirty-six prisoners, 60,000 head of stock,
228 wagons and carts, and a mass of agricultural stuff. On
September 30th Bethune followed Sir J. Dartnell to Natal.
Meanwhile Rimington, Spens and Wilson had made sundry Rimington's,
successful raids from Kroonstad in combination. On September v^ison't"
2nd Wilson accounted for ten Boers near Zuurfontein, south- operations,
east of Kroonstad. On the next day Rimington ran down a
Boer convoy at the head of the Bloem Spruit, taking twenty
prisoners and seventy-four vehicles, Rimington then received
information that De Wet and Steyn were between Heilbron and
Frankfort. He accordingly moved thither, and although the
Free State leaders remained invisible, long and rapid marches
were rewarded by continual small captures. On September
23rd Rimington scoured the space between the Wilge and
KHp rivers,* and after a ride of forty-eight miles brought into
camp thirty prisoners and thirty-six vehicles. There was still
news of De Wet, the most definite being a circumstantial report
that the prize of the campaign was lying ill at a farm near
Uitenhage, south-east of Serfontein station. On the evening
of the 24th Rimington took 300 men, and riding all night a dis-
tance of fifty-seven miles, surrounded the building at dawn.
But the information, as indeed all that had concerned De Wet,
was false. Five Boers found asleep in the garden were the only
* The stream between Heilbron and Frankfort ; not to be confused with that which
joins the Vaal on the west of Standerton.
VOL. IV. 21*
324 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
reward. Rimington then returned to Heilbron after a suc-
cession of forays such as the Boers themselves could scarcely
have equalled in speed and distance, and, above all, in pre-
servation of horseflesh ; for it was no uncommon thing for the
troopers to be called upon for a bout of the severest galloping
as the termination of a march which would itself have brought
in less skilfully managed men and horses exhausted and only
fit for camp.
Byng'sand There Only remained to be accounted for in September two
!^~V;!!* columns from Bruce Hamilton's late command. When that
operations.
General's forces were dissevered early in September Byng and
Dawkins, instead of following the rest across the railway, were
detached on a special mission. At this time there was in process
of construction a line of blockhouses from Potchefstroom through
Scandinavia to Kopjes station, the work being carried out
simultaneously by the 2nd Scots Guards from the western end
and the Oxfordshire Light Infantry (recently come from Heil-
bron) from the eastern. The presence of some 600 Boers in
the vicinity seemed hkely to interfere, and Byng and Dawkins
were ordered northward to drive them clear by working from
east to west. On September loth both columns reached Vrede-
fort Road by train, and on the next day marched upon the Vaal.
Brigadier-General G. G. Cunningham had previously occupied
Lindequee, and beyond him Lieut. -Colonel A. H. M. Edwards,
with 800 South African Constabulary, held the Los Berg ; the
Scots Guards were at Scandinavia Drift. On the night of Sep-
tember 12th Byng raided Parys and Vredefort, securing thirteen
prisoners. Holding Reitzburg, Byng then scoured the lower
Rhenoster river, having several smart skirmishes with local
bands which were chiefly engaged in the guardianship of the
large magazines of grain and the numerous women's laagers which
had collected in this district. On the night of the 19th twenty
prisoners were taken at Rensburgs Drift. Next day Dawkins
secured nine more, and by September 24th sixty fighting men
and more than 500 families had been gathered in. At every
march the country seemed to become richer and more infested,
and Byng reported that it would occupy at least three weeks
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 325
properly to deal with the Boers and the innumerable storehouses
which he had met at every turn. Here may be noted another
formidable difficulty of this singular campaign, namely, the
extraordinary rapidity with which the enemy contrived to
re-occupy districts which had been apparently denuded of every
hving and growing thing. This district but a month before
had been the path of ElUot's line of columns on their way to
the Modder ; but its speedy replenishment was only an instance
of many such feats performed in every quarter of the theatre
of war. Thus EUiot, again, had lately found the very farms of
the Witte Bergen which he had ransacked in the first week of
September to be as full as ever of grain when he revisited them
ten days later on his second excursion from Winburg. No
resources are so difficult to dry up as those of an agricultural
people. Manufacture, commerce, finance, war may kill at one
blow ; but the army which makes war upon the sons and stores
of the soil has a long and tedious task.
About September i6th the last blockhouse of the new system
was completed, its value being shown by the continual attempts
to pierce it which occurred from this time forward. The Boers
were gradually pressed towards Bothaville, Byng taking in all
eighty-one prisoners before he moved up the Valsch towards
Kroonstad, which he reached on October 3rd. His own losses
had been small, the heaviest in one day having been one killed
and ten taken prisoners in an attack made by a commando under
Liebenberg upon a party of South African Light Horse which
was returning from a patrol to Klerksdorp. Of the other
columns in the west Henry had all this time been operating in
the Ramah — Luckhoff district, and W. H. Williams between
Fauresmith and Edenburg, accounting between them for 145
Boers in raids too frequent to be given in detail.
Within less than a week from his return to Kroonstad,
Byng, now in command both of his own column and that
of Dawkins (who departed to take up a command in
the Northern Transvaal*), was once more in the Bothaville —
• See Chapter XXV.
326 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Reitzburg area. Here he remained throughout October,
operating with uniform success against his former opponents.
On the I2th and 13th he took twenty-eight prisoners north-
east of Botha ville. He then combined with Hickie, who
pushed the enemy towards him from Dood's Drift whilst
Byng himself came south from a visit to Klerksdorp. The
result was that on the 26th Byng was able to surround a
laager at Kameelfontein, and take a whole field-cornetcy of
twenty-two men, including two officers. Making for Vredefort
Road towards the end of the month, a sudden volte-face
surprised the enemy's scouts as they tracked the hne of
march, and a further sixteen prisoners brought Byng's total
captures for October to sixty-six. These and the prisoners of
the previous month were especially valuable because all the
Boers in this district were under orders to reinforce the invaders
of Cape Colony, and Byng had not only considerably weakened
the contingent, but thoroughly disorganised its preparations for
the march southward. On November ist Byng was in Vrede-
fort Road. The only other columns working on the western
side of the railway during October were those of Henry and W. H.
Williams, who combined in a search for Hertzog between Faure-
smith and the defended Riet river. Wilhams met with success
on the I2th at Schraalfontein, one day's march from Edenburg,
taking ten prisoners, including three officers. At the end of
the month he was back at Edenburg, Henry going in the opposite
direction to Modder River station. On the east of the railway
there was more activity. The continually disturbed state of the
area bounded by the Orange river, the railway, the Basuto
border, and the Bloemfontein — Thabanchu — Ladybrand block-
houses, that is, the south-eastern quarter of the Orange River
Colony, now caused the Commander-in-Chief to inaugurate fresh
measures for its subjugation. Combinations of troops, " drives "
and raids had all aUke failed to free this district, a part the
more important because it gave access to the main passages
in^^e south- i^^o Cape Colony. Abandoning the principle of moving
^t of the columns, therefore. Lord Kitchener now ordered the assign-
Orange River r /- 1 • 1 • 1
Colony. ment of fixed areas to the several columns withm the zone.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 327
each column to be made responsible for the complete clearance
of " the enemy, as well as of every living creature "* from the
country within its allotted section. In comphance with this
scheme a number of columns drawn from Sir C. Knox and
Rochfort (late Bruce Hamilton) were at once centred as
follows : Du Moulin at Ventershoek ; Lowry-Cole at Jammers-
berg Bridge ; Bogle Smith at Schanskopjes on the Kaffir
river ; Major A. C. Hamilton at Kransfontein ; Lord Basing at
Humans Rust ; Minchin and Copeman, Thomeycroft's two wing
commanders, at Elands Berg and Vecht Kop ; Western at Zand-
fontein, north of Aliwal North ; Taylor and Lean, the leaders
of Pilcher's units (which returned from Cape Colony on
October 5th), at Wolve Kop and Pampasfontein respectively.
All were placed under the general command of Lieut.-General
Sir C. Tucker, who controlled also the South African Con-
stabulary posts along the hne Kaffir River — Dewetsdorp —
Wepener. Space fails to deal in detail with the doings of each
and all of this assembly during the ensuing two months. There
was never a moment's cessation of activity, never a day without
fighting. In this district, scoured a hundred times as it had
been, every column found an enemy, and sometimes alone,
sometimes in combination with a neighbour, carried out schemes
so numerous and varied, evolved with so much care and pro-
ductive of so much labour that here, as in too many other por-
tions of this history, a paragraph must do scant justice to what
would adequately fill a volume. That the enemy survived Tenacity of
at all in the narrow interstices between the revolving bodies of ^ * «"emy.
troops was striking evidence of his extraordinary military
quaUties. But he did more ; he was as ready as ever to take
the offensive, and to deal prompt justice upon the most momen-
tary lapse on the part of a column commander. As late as
October 26th, when scarcely a yard of the region had been left
unswept, a detachment of 200 men wandering too far afield at
Klein Zevenfontein, north-west of Smithfield, found itself in
extreme danger from a commando double its strength, which
* Telegram from Commander-in-Chief, September 28th, 1901.
328 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
charged in to within fifty paces of camp, killing an officer,
wounding ten men, and destroying most of the horses. By a
stout defence, aided by the approach of Lean from Pampas-
fontein, the Boers were driven off with loss. A few days earlier
a patrol had been surrounded and destroyed near the same spot.
Again, on the 27th a reconnoitring party sent out by A. C. Hamil-
ton north of Bethulie was attacked by some 200 Boers near
Grootfontein. On November 5th Bogle Smith and Lowry-Cole
were in contact with a band of 200 near Daspoort ; a week later
a strong patrol was attacked at Rietput ; on the 17th one of
Lowry-Cole's patrols of 100 men had to fight for six hours at
Roodepoort against a commando which all but succeeded in
rushing the position, an officer and eleven men falling in the
encoimter ; on the 19th A. C. Hamilton discovered a laager of
200 on the Shk Spruit ; on the 27th a commando of 300 was
reported at Commissie Hoek. These repeated apparitions were
largely the work of the same roving bands, a fact which only
exemplified the difficulty of clearing, even by the closest quarter-
ing, a single small area of the theatre of war. Nevertheless,
the final balance was heavily against the enemy. By the end
of November two-thirds of their armed strength had been
removed by death or capture ; their most secret storehouses
had been ransacked, " sufficient wheat being found concealed
in false ceilings and by false walls to feed the Boer forces in the
district for years ; "* scarcely a head of stock remained alive
between Dewetsdorp and Aliwal North. The system, in short,
proved more successful than any which had been yet attempted ;
and if its profits appear trifling in comparison with its enormous
expenditure, such must always be the case when a nation of
armed nomads, for such the Boers had now become, challenges
its opponent to a war of extermination.
Elliot on the Throughout October affairs on the Natal borders and the
subsequent pursuit of Botha's defeated forces confined Elliot
to the neighbourhood of Harrismith, where he held himself in
readiness to reinforce the eastern troops should need arise.
* Colonel A. N. Rochfort's report, December nth, 1901.
Natal border.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 329
Nevertheless, he kept his columns continually employed, and
his stay was more fruitful than many of his more comprehensive
manoeuvres had been. De Lisle, supported by Broadwood, and
based on Verkykers Kop, scoured first the Witkoppies, then the
valley of the Wilge river, in which on October 15 th a laager of
thirty-four vehicles was captured with fifteen prisoners. A
movement upon the Botha's Berg, to be made in conjunction
with Rimington from Standerton, fell through owing to rain
and mist. The columns then separated, Broadwood's moving
southward to Witzies Hoek in combination with a force
despatched by Sir L. Rundle, whilst de Lisle, pushing on north-
ward, skirmished his way by Pram Kop and De Lange's Drift
(26th) to Standerton at the end of the month. Thirty-three
Boers killed, wounded and taken prisoner, eighty-five vehicles
and 26,000 head of stock were the gains of these operations.
Rimington, it has been mentioned, was at Standerton at the
time of de Lisle's northward marches from Verkykers Kop. He
had been led thither partly in the hope of co-operating with
Sir H. Rawlinson who, in the course of his operations in the
Transvaal, was nearing the Vaal. As it was probable that bands
would avoid him by crossing this frontier, Rimington had
skirted the left bank of the river by Villiersdorp and Cornelia,
and fording Roberts Drift on October 3rd, camped near Stander-
ton until the 7th. He then made for the Botha's Berg, expecting
to combine with de Lisle and Broadwood. But for the reasons
given above Elliot's columns were not to be found, and Rimington
circled northward in chase of several small convoys, some of
which he captured. On October 14th he took twelve prisoners
near Vilhersdorp, and returning thence to Standerton with thirty- Rimington
seven prisoners and eighty-two vehicles to his credit, was drawn ^"m"' *^*
into the pursuit of Botha's levies in the Eastern Transvaal. Transvaal.
He returned to Standerton early in November.
In the first week of October Lord Kitchener ordered the
construction of a fresh blockhouse line, to run in the first
instance from Heilbron to Frankfort. In order that the work
might be begun from both ends simultaneously, which was now
the usual practice, Damant, last seen at Edenburg, was railed
330 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
northward with orders to march to Frankfort, and Wilson was
despatched to Heilbron with his regiment of Kitchener's Fight-
ing Scouts, Wilson was strongly opposed on his march from
Fighting Kroonstad. Rimington had now been absent for five days,
HeUbJon. Damant had only just reached Heilbron, and in the interval a
strong body of Boers had gathered to the south of the town.
On the 6th, after passing the Rhenoster, Wilson became hotly
engaged. One of his parties was lured into an ambush and
almost surrounded, thirteen men being captured ; but the rest,
holding out firmly, kept off superior numbers at thirty yards'
range, and the force got through to Heilbron with the loss of
four killed, and fourteen, including five officers, wounded.
Damant, delayed by weather and the difficulty of equipping,
did not leave Heilbron until the 12th, and employed the time
in driving off Wilson's attackers, whom he ascertained to be
part of a nmnerous body assembled by De Wet himself. On
the 13th Damant was at Frankfort, and at once came in touch
with a commando 500 strong which was on the march for the
interior of the Orange River Colony from out of the Transvaal.
From this time imtil the end of October strong hostile
bodies were reported and observed in every direction. On
the 2ist there were some 1,500 Boers within reach of Heil-
bron, and Damant decided to strike. On the night of October
24th he marched against a laager discovered on the Vaal at
Rietfontein, which he attacked at dawn. The majority of the
Boers, who were some 300 strong, escaped, but nineteen were
taken with thirteen wagons. Damant then (27th) pursued
another commando along the Libenbergs Vlei river, capturing
five, and thereafter continued to raid around Frankfort until,
in the first week of November, he received orders concerning a
manoeuvre which must now be considered in some detail.
The experiences of Damant and Wilson revealed the presence
of an unusually strong hostile concentration between Heilbron,
Lindley, Reitz and Frankfort, collected, it was continually
reported, by the long invisible De Wet. At this period no news
was more gladly received by the British Headquarters than that
of a tangible enemy, especially in the Orange River Colony,
I
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 331
where De Wet's tactics of dispersion had practically demorahsed
the campaign. But De Wet himself had now begun to suspect De Wet
the ultimate futility of such methods against an opponent who concentrates.
was to be worn out neither by tedium nor expense. His multi-
tudinous bands had in reality achieved little or nothing, and,
gradually whittled as they were by incessant contact with
superior forces, it was they, not the British columns, who were
feeling the strain. Towards the end of September, therefore,
De Wet had summoned the commandos of Bethlehem, Vrede,
Heilbron, Ladybrand, Kroonstad and others to assemble on the
Libenbergs Vlei river, and it was the gradual convergence of
these forces that had caused the columns in the district daily
to report the appearance of fresh bodies.
Lord Kitchener at once prepared elaborate measures for Plan to sur-
... J , , , rj^t , round De Wet
taking advantage of so welcome an occurrence. 1 he enemy s
rendezvous appeared to be a farm, called Paardehoek, on the
Libenbergs Vlei river, some forty miles south-east of Heilbron
and twenty south of Frankfort. On all sides of this, but at
a great distance from it, the Commander-in-Chief disposed a
cordon of columns. The spot was in a measure already sur-
rounded. At Harrismith were Sir L. Rundle and Elliot, the
latter strengthened by McKenzie's 2nd Imperial Light Horse
(of Brigadier-General Sir J. Dartnell's brigade) in place of de
Lisle, who was at Standerton in company with Rimington ;
Damant was at Frankfort ; Wilson with Kitchener's Fighting
Scouts at Heilbron ; the ist Imperial Light Horse under Briggs
(of Brigadier-General Sir J. Dartnell's brigade) at Bethlehem ;
Barker, W. H. Williams and Holmes (successor to Pine-Coffin)
at Winburg. Completing the ring by bringing Sp)ens to Botha's
Pass and sending Byng to join Wilson in Heilbron, Lord
Kitchener issued orders for a general movement on Paardehoek
by all the columns with the exception of Sir L. Rundle's and
those from Winburg, which were instructed to take up an im-
passable line from Lindley through Bethlehem to Harrismith,
blocking all egress to the south. Unlimited ingenuity and
thought were lavished on the scheme. It was to be carried
out in six marches. Whilst the daily destinations of each
332 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
column were strictly appointed, and carefully adjusted to equalise
the pressure and allay the suspicions of the enemy, each com-
mander was allowed to select his own route, and was enjoined
above all to conceal his ultimate aim from the enemy. Decep-
tion, it was hoped, would be further assisted by Damant remain-
ing motionless at Frankfort until the rest of the cordon had
contracted by four days' marching. On November 6th the
operation began, and the columns advanced from the circum-
ference of a circle of a diameter of more than 150 miles in
length. Six days later they drew up face to face at the
appointed spot, having neither seen nor heard of any large hostile
body, and with less than 100 prisoners amongst them all. Yet
the plan and its execution, if they had failed to command
success, had well deserved it. In spite of a hundred unfore-
seen difficulties the orders had been carried out as accurately
as they had been drawn. Swollen rivers had baulked the
arrangements of the commanders, heavy mists had blinded their
scouts. In the obscured atmosphere the labour of deceiving
the enemy was almost useless, yet it was faithfully borne. " No
column marched straight upon its objective ; some at times were
actually moving away from it ; and the marches of all were
circuitous and misleading to a degree : yet none were late, and
all reached their allotted points fresh and ready for the work
which they hoped would ensue. . . . The results were less than
the excellence of the work performed by officers and men deserved,
and this was in a great measure due to accident."* Twenty-two
Boers killed, ninety-eight captured, 200 wagons and 14,000 head
of stock formed the total acquisitions of the thirteen columns.
The Boers, in fact, had been so much more scattered than had
been reported that many had drifted through the meshes with-
out even being aware that a net had been thrown around them.
De Wet Every accident conspired to assist them. De Wet, finding sup-
disperses, plies, and especially grass, insufficient to maintain a concentrated
levy, had ordered another partial dispersal, and his detach-
ments were now riding in all directions seeking pasture. By
* Lord Kitchener's despatch, December 8th, 1901.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 333
pure good fortune their marches had led them out through the
columns during the first three days of marching, when the gaps
in the circle were still wide. Only one force of any strength
had been sighted, when on the evening of November gth some
400 men had passed between EUiot and Sir J. Dartnell moving
south-eastward, to be quickly lost in the fog.
This effort concluded, all the units returned to the original
points of departure except those of Rimington and Spens, who
made for Frankfort and Standerton respectively. Even on the
return marches only one column encountered a formed hostile
body. On the morning of November i6th Byng and Wilson
were boldly attacked in rear as they left bivouac at Jagersrust
for the last day's march into Heilbron, and, hampered by an
unwieldy mass of cattle and vehicles, had some difficulty in
beating off their assailants. Eventually they handsomely
repulsed the Boers, who left eight on the field and carried off
many more, the casualties in the columns being an officer and
man killed, three officers and nine men wounded, all of Kitchener's
Fighting Scouts, which were ably handled by Wilson. Having
arrived in Heilbron, Wilson resumed his task of guarding the
construction of the blockhouse line, whilst Byng, going on to
Vredefort Road, raided the Vaal basin about Lindequee, then
came back to the railway at Kroonstad on November 24th.
Rimington and Damant entered Frankfort together on the Rimington's
i6th, only to quit it again still in company three days later for ^rations!"^ *
a joint foray down the valley of the Wilge in search of Com-
mandant Buys, a noted leader who was reported from Head-
quarters to be in the neighbourhood. A party of South African
Constabulary and Railway Pioneer regiment were detached to
hold the drifts of the Vaal across the front. Buys was not on
the Wilge, and Damant, whose special duty tied him to Frankfort,
returned on the 19th. Rimington had a roving commission,
and keeping out east of the Wilge, moved by Bendigo to Villiers-
dorp. Crossing the Vaal there on the 20th he then swung west-
ward, and immediately came in touch with the enemy. On that
morning a post of the Railway Pioneer regiment stationed at a
drift at Bothaskraal had been rushed, and Rimington, sighting
334 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
a force on the march, found it to be the successful commando
making off with its captives, some fifty in number, towards the
Hex Rivier hills. At Rimington's approach the Boers scattered
and fled, the prisoners were recovered, and shortly after the
object of the operation, Buys himself, who had been wounded
in the attack on the Railway Pioneer regiment, was discovered
and captured as he was attempting to reach a hospital. Drawing
supphes from Greyhngstad, Rimington now for a short time
covered the building of a hne of blockhouses which was in
progress from Greyhngstad to Villiersdorp, taking eleven
prisoners on the 22nd. Once more a combined operation was
arranged with Damant, who, on the 23rd, drove northward from
Frankfort towards Rimington, who lined the Vaal from Platkop
to Villiersdorp. Few of the enemy were seen north of the Vaal,
but Damant discovered several bands lurking beyond Perth,
and accounted for sixteen Boers and eleven wagons before
reaching Villiersdorp. Regaining Frankfort on the 24th, Damant
was immediately despatched southward to follow a reported trail
of De Wet. Six prisoners were the result of a night march to
Houbaan and back to Frankfort on the 27th. Both Damant
and Rimington, together with Wilson from Heilbron, were then
ordered to conceal themselves near the Krom Spruit, in order to
be able to descend suddenly southward, Rimington having
news that De Wet was about to hold a Council of War in the
midst of his forces half-way between Lindley and Reitz. This
movement would also enable the columns to act effectively
outside the right flank of Elliot in a manoeuvre which must now
be followed.
At the conclusion of the abortive convergence upon Paarde-
hoek Elliot had returned to Harrismith on November i6th.
Elliot Three days later he set out westward again, with orders to
wMtward. Sweep back to Kroonstad by Bethlehem and Lindley, in con-
junction with Sir J. Dartnell's and Sir L. Rundle's troops, who
would hold the mountainous ground on both flanks for the first
few stages of the march. Accordingly Sir J. Dartnell took the
Imperial Light Horse brigade to Elands River Bridge ; Reay
moved to Witzies Hoek ; Firman, with the nth Imperial Yeo-
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 335
manry, to Oliviers Hoek Pass, and B. Campbell collected his
long scattered troops at Fouriesburg to post them at Naauwpoort
Nek, all on November 19th. On the same day Elliot pushed out
Broadwood and de Lisle, both lightly equipped, towards the
Brandwater basin, following himself two days later with
Lowe and the transport of the whole division by the direct
road to Bethlehem. Constant skirmishing attended the march,
especially on the left where Broadwood, riding under the shadow
of the mountains from Elands River Drift to the Roode Bergen,
found himself almost beneath the rifles of sharpshooters perched
upon the walls of every defile. He lost in this manner eight
men on the 22nd. On the 23rd the three columns of EUiot's
division concentrated east of Bethlehem, and Sir J. Dartnell's
and Sir L. Rundle's troops turned to leave them and regain
Harrismith ; not, however, before the value of their assistance
had been shown, for Dartnell was able not only to divert but
to defeat an attack on the rear of Lowe's column as it drew on
towards the others. RefiUing their light wagons, Broadwood
and de Lisle then pushed on through Bethlehem, Rimington,
Wilson and Damant on the north, Byng in front, and Barker's
and the other Winburg columns on the south-west all receiving
orders to be on the alert both for fugitives and to cover Elliot's
now open flanks.
After a night raid to Rexford by Broadwood, which just
failed to secure Prinsloo's laager, Elliot's columns turned north-
ward, Broadwood to Bankfontein, Lowe, now in the centre, to
Rietpoort, de Lisle on the right to Middel Water. North-east
of Lindley both flanks were engaged, and reports of several
commandos were current. Nothing more was seen, however,
than a few small laagers, several of which were taken, and on
November 30th EUiot entered Kroonstad with eleven prisoners,
200 vehicles, 42,000 stock ; heaps of destroyed farm stuff and
implements marked his track across the veld. Towards the
termination of his march, Rimington and Damant, as has been
seen, came southward to Jagersrust, joining Wilson who had
got touch with Elliot on November 27th. Rimington decided Rimington
to test the truth of the report of De Wet's concentration by a De w?. °'
336
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Rimington's
convoy
attacked by
DeWet.
De Wet pre-
surprise. On the 30th he pressed on to Spytfontein, ordering his
convoy to follow on the Lindley — Heilbron road escorted by 250
mounted troops, 300 infantry and a gun under Major A. J.
Bennett (New South Wales Mounted Rifles).
The accuracy of the information concerning De Wet was
quickly proved. At the moment when Rimington ranged ahead
across the Lindley — Reitz road, chasing groups of Boer scouts,
De Wet was encamped close on his left front at Blydschap,
with the commandos of General M. Prinsloo (Bethlehem), General
Hattingh (Kroonstad) and Commandant H. Botha (Vrede) and
others lying around him in scattered laagers. Hattingh was the
first to espy the advancing troops, and sending word to De Wet,
he circled round behind Rimington and attacked his wagons
from right and rear. Soon after Prinsloo hurried up, and fell
upon the left of the convoy, which was thus almost surrounded.
The escort fought well, a troop of the 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons
especially distinguishing itself by a charge the leader of which.
Second Lieutenant L. M. Oliver, was killed ; but it must have
gone hard with the convoy, which was now some seven miles
behind the main body, had not a messenger despatched by
Bennett safely reached Rimington with the news. The course
of Rimington's pursuit had fortunately brought him at this
moment back to the Lindley — Heilbron road about Groenvlei.
The whole column immediately galloped back, and outflanking
the attack, drove it off just as De Wet himself arrived on the
field with the Vrede and Heilbron men. The Free State leader
was now in superior strength, and he quickly restored order
amongst his disconnected units. Expecting Rimington to make
^imtn°ton^'^'^ for Lindley, he disposed his commandos so as to envelop the
road, and looked for anpther of those captures such as had
marked this district as lucky ground for his arms. As his ar-
rangements progressed, and Rimington appeared to be furthering
his plans by advancing southward to Victoriaspruit, a torrential
fall of rain brought both sides to a halt. The downpour con-
tinued until dark, and De Wet, whose extension had been inter-
fered with by the storm, decided to postpone his attack until
next day. He saw the British going into bivouac, and had so
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 337
little doubt of their intention to march on Lindley, from which
they were only five miles distant, that he placed no special out-
posts to keep watch on them. But Rimington had more than a
suspicion of the dangers l5nng in wait for him. From a Boer
scout captured at dusk he had learned the strength and com-
position of his opponents. Benson's fate exactly a month
before had taught the risks attending isolated columns in the
presence of a sudden concentration, and Rimington decided that
for once he would adopt the only portion of his enemy's tactics
in which he had not already excelled, that of evasion. Parading
his column at 11.30 p.m. he marched all night, not to Lindley Rimington
but northward towards Heilbron, leaving De Wet to marvel at Heiibron.
his disappearance at dawn of December ist.
VOL. IV. 22
338
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Approximate Strength States of Columns referred to in
foregoing chapter.
COLUMN.
August — November, 1 901.
Lt.-Col.T.D.Pilcher(twocolumns)
Lt.-Col. A. W. Thorneycroft
Lt.-Col. C. St. G. Henry
Lt.-Col. W. G. B. Western
Major A. Paris ...
Col. A. N. Rochfort ...
Lt.-Col. W. n. Williams
Lt.-Col. the Hon. J. Byng
Ll-CoI. L. E. du Moulin
Lt.-Col. W. L. White ...
Lt.-Col. A. Lowry-Cole
Major A. C. Hamilton ...
Major J. H. Damant
Lt.-Col. J. G. W. Dawkins
Major S. Bogle Smith ...
Major G. N. Going
Brig.-Gen. R. G. Broadwood
Col.E.C.Bethune(later Col.Lowe)
Lt.-Col. H. de B. de Lisle
Maj.-Gen. B. B. R. Campbell ..
Col. G. E. Harley
Lt.-Col. C. T. Reay
Col. F. S. Garratt
Brig.-Gen. G. M. Bullock
Lt.-Col. M. F. Rimington
Major H. d'A. P Taylor
Major C. F. Minchin
Major K. E. Lean
Major F. C. Lloyd
Lt.-Col. H. C. Copeman
Major J. E. Pine-Coffin (later
Holmes)
Lt.-Col. J. S. S. Barker
Col. Sir J. Jervis-White-Jervis
Major F. C. Lloyd
Lt.-Col. F. F. Colvin ...
Col. Sir H. Rawlinson ...
Lt.-Col. Lord Basing
Lt.-Col. the Hon. A- Murray
Lt.-Col. M. G. Moore ...
Brig.-Gen. J. Spens
Lt.-Col. A. E. Wilson ...
Lt.-Col. C. J. Briggs
LL-CoI. D. McKenzie ...
Lt.-Col. A. H. M. Edwards
Lt.-Col. W. B. Hickie ...
1,182
>.345
542
641
273
441
449
1,014
Soo
505
S04
57 «
659
478
500
81S
1,618
1,005
357
275
254
900
».53o
726
695
477
210
457
834
500
360
210
410
1.095
500
250
250
1,119
600
635
677
8oot
642
260
211
94
600
99
1,204
610
60s
269
1,200
262
50
250
152
.S E
in a;
9 u
OS
o
Major - General Sir C.
Knox in command.
Major - General Bruce
) Hamilton in command
(later Col. Rochfort).
Lieut. - General E. L.
Elliot in command.
Lieut. - General Sir L.
Rundle in command.
[ Brig.-General H. C. O.
I Plumer in command.
1 Major-General A. FitzR.
\ Hart directing.
Brig. - General Sir J.
Dartnell in command. ,
t South African Constabulary.
{
339
CHAPTER XIX.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL*
{Continued from Chapter XVI.).
NOVEMBER, IQOI — JANUARY, I902.
Early in November, 1901, Lord Methuen and Kekewich were
once more on the move towards each other by the now familiar
routes. Withdrawn from an area in which he had made so
excellent a start, and where there was still much left to do,
Kekewich passed through Olifants Nek on the 4th, was at Naauw-
poort on the 5th and 6th, and spent the next few days searching
for Lord Methuen along the Zeerust road. Not until the loth
was indirect signalling communication by Magato Nek (or Hoek) Lord Methuen
gained with Lord Methuen, who, having left Zeerust on Novem- tn coSina-"^^
ber 5th, had marched in pursuit of bands of freebooters and tion.
small convoys (nine prisoners) by the Zwart Ruggens to Lindleys
Poort (November loth). On the next day the two commanders
joined forces at Brakfontein, to find that all combined work
against De la Rey in the north was to be suspended in favour of
a movement into the Klerksdorp area, whence Hickie, then
engaged in covering the blockhouse building on the Schoon
Spruit, had signalled that large bodies of the enemy were massing
to the west and north-west of him. Accordingly both columns
turned southward, Kekewich by Vlakfontein and Rietfontein
to Ventersdorp which he reached on the 15th, on which day Lord
Methuen, who travelled by Zuurfontein and Rietpan, had a
sharp affair of patrols at Sterkfontein. Three days later both
columns marched into Klerksdorp. Meanwhile Hickie, on the
• See map No. 59.
VOL. IV. 22*
340
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
In Klerks-
dorp, Nov.
1 8th— 26th,
1901.
In Klerks-
dorp, Dec.
4th — iith,
1901.
13th, had sustained a serious loss at Brakspruit by the destruc-
tion of two squadrons of Imperial Yeomanry whom he had sent
to reconnoitre northward, seven men being killed, twelve
wounded and sixty-four officers and men captured. Both Lord
Methuen and Kekewich remained at Klerksdorp until November
26th. Then, with Kekewich and Hickie on his right flank,
Lord Methuen moved out westward through Hartebeestfontein.
A number of Boers made off from that prolific hive as he
approached, some of whom were overtaken next day (27th) at
Kliprif, where seven Boers with eleven carts of their convoy
were taken. That the enemy was in greater strength close by
was proved when the convoy, taking a different route from that
of the main column, was greeted with a hot fusilade as it
approached some kopjes on Leeuwfontein. A general stampede
of the draught animals ensued, seventy-seven horses were
lost, two men wounded and eleven others injured by the
unmanageable wagons.
On the 28th, still heading westward and marching by night,
Lord Methuen had another minor success. Once more the
rear of the Boer convoy, lingering at Kleinplaats, was caught
up after a smart gallop and captured by Lord Methuen's scout-
ing corps and the 19th Imperial Yeomanry, who brought back
to Headquarters eight prisoners, eleven carts and wagons, and
some horses, mules and stock cattle. From Kleinplaats Lord
Methuen bent south-westward through Klipdrift to Tweepannen,
where he checked his westward march and turned back towards
Klerksdorp. Hearing Rooipoort, on the Makwasi Spruit, on
December ist further small convoys were sighted by one part
or another of Lord Methuen's front, which covered nearly ten
miles of the veld ; nearly all those seen were portions of Lie-
benberg's transport, and were duly ridden down, the results of
the day being nineteen prisoners, four carts and wagons, 9,000
head of stock, and nearly 150 horses, mules and donkeys. On
December 4th Lord Methuen was again in Klerksdorp, bringing
with him thirty-six prisoners, sixty-six wagons and carts, 14,000
head of stock, 200 draught animals, and much farm produce,
many more tons having been destroyed on the way.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 341
Meanwhile Kekewich, in occasional touch with Lord Methuen,
had also been operating westward, circling chiefly about Harte-
beestfontein from Geduld down to Rhenosterspruit and Yzerspruit.
The sighting of a number of Boer patrols and rearguards
proved the presence of a considerable force in the neigh-
bourhood ; but it always eluded approach, and on December
3rd Kekewich returned to Klerksdorp with three prisoners and
a mass of booty. A week's rest at Klerksdorp refitted both Lord
Methuen 's and Kekewich's colimins for the field, and on Decem-
ber nth they once more moved out westward in combina-
tion. This time Lord Methuen 's aim was the Mstkwasie Berg,
north-east of Wolmaranstad, a range some twelve miles long by
one mile broad, and difficult to search from its rugged and woody
nature. In its recesses lurked the Wolmaranstad commando,
led by Potgieter, under whose protection a great number of
refugees and cattle were reported to be in hiding. On Decem-
ber 1 2th Kekewich, moving wide on Lord Methuen's right,
reached Korannafontein, assisting Lord Methuen's movements
by keeping from his flank a band of 300 Boers under Vermaas
who were coming down through Witpoort. On the 13th a brisk
affair, which cost Kekewich two officers and eight men wounded,
was necessary to drive these away. Lord Methuen was at Pal-
mietfontein on the 12th on the northern flank of the Makwasie.
No enemy were encountered here, but the mounted troops, push-
ing on westward the same night, discovered a convoy on the
move well to the west of Wolmaranstad. Lord Methuen im-
mediately pursued, and after a seven-mile gallop on the 13th
ran down and captured near Kareepan twenty-two wagons and
carts, 3,000 head of stock, 130 draught animals, together with
fourteen Boers who had been guarding them. These were a por"
tion of Potgieter's transport. On the 15th, Kekewich having
advanced to Klipdrift and Rooipoort, Lord Methuen swung
southward to Kareepoort, in which direction it was reported that
Potgieter's column had gone. He was not there, however, and
had evidently doubled back into the Makwasie Berg, which the
column had so far only skirted. Lord Methuen, having beaten
up the outskirts, now decided to draw through the main covert.
342 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Sending his divisional scouting corps to Leeuwfontein (south-
west of Wolmaranstad), to block escape from the south, he
requested Kekewich to come in nearer from the north, whilst he
himself entered the range. Kekewich failed to receive these
instructions, as did Lord Methuen likewise a despatch from him ;
nevertheless, his movement on Palmietfontein on the i6th
exactly coincided with the requirements of Lord Methuen's
tactics, more especially as Kekewich, rightly appreciating the
situation, demonstrated widely athwart the northern arm of the
range, from Uitkyk on the west to his camp at Palmietfontein,
effectually anticipating any northerly break-away. Lord
Methuen's Leeuwfontein detachment scored the first success.
Their retrograde march in the direction of Wolmaranstad had
taken Potgieter by surprise, for tracking Lord Methuen as far as
Kareepan, he had imagined him to be travelling westwcird. He
had, therefore, as Lord Methuen soon discovered, turned back
to his stronghold in the Makwasie Berg, and, being now in no
haste, had allowed the rear of his transport to remain near
Leeuwfontein. There on December loth it was discovered by
Major B. W. Cowan and the divisional scouting corps, who
secured the whole, namely, ten prisoners, 5,000 sheep, and
a number of vehicles. The southerly and westerly exits thus
barred, on the 17th Lord Methuen made sure of the east
with von Donop's and the mounted troops, and with 300
infantry advanced into the Makwasie. He found success
unexpectedly easy. So close had his sudden turn northward
brought him on to the heels of the Boers, that they had
neither time nor courage to organise opposition along the
formidable faces of the hills. A good track admitted the
column into the innermost recesses of their stronghold.
Soon the whole range was alive with stampeding burghers
and cattle, and by evening Lord Methuen halted at Klippan
with sixteen prisoners, 26,000 head of stock, 130 wagons, and
289 spare draught animals, the captures including the family of
Potgieter himself. On the i8th Lord Methuen started to return
to Klerksdorp, captured four more Boers on the 19th, and on
the 20th re-entered Klerksdorp with thirty-six prisoners, 161
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 343
vehicles, 36,000 stock, 480 spare draught animals, and more Lord Methuen
than a quarter of a million pounds of grain. Kekewich, after f^^J^^^^^'^^^J^
his comparatively tmeventful but most useful manoeuvres more Dec. 20th-
to the north, came into Klerksdorp on the same day with only ^ ^ > ^901.
one prisoner but a considerable quantity of stock and stuffs
in his train.
It cannot fail to have been remarked what hosts of cattle
and sheep, masses of grain, farm implements, grinding mills,
etc., the various columns brought in or destroyed upon the veld
from time to time. Lord Methuen's short raid described above
was but one of hundreds which had been and still were in pro-
gress all over the theatre of war, sometimes with less results,
often with greater. In view of the vast quantities of provender The supplies
thus accounted for, the statement that South Africa was a °^ **** ^'^'*^*
sparsely supplied and inhospitable country may be held to be
belied. Nevertheless, for regular troops, moving, as they must,
slowly and in compact bodies, it must be repeated that few
countries could have been worse provided than South Africa.
Only guerrillas, speedy, able to carry much on the saddle, and
with an intimate knowledge of the country, could have sub-
sisted, as did the Boers, on the widely disseminated resources
of the veld farms. Yet the aggregate of such sustenance was of
course incalculable ; a tally merely of that burned by the columns
would provide melancholy evidence of the destructive powers
of war. The attempt to despoil the whole sub-continent — and
the campaign had for some time resolved itself into nothing less
than this — revealed both the charity of Nature to men who
aided her so feebly as the Boer farmers, and the ruinous industry
of the British columns ; for enormous as were the stores of
foodstuffs scattered over the veld, they were being surely whittled
down. The time was drawing nigh when the whole Boer
nation was to lie exhausted, not in spirit but in body. The task
was long, and was not yet ended : the General who is compelled
to grind the mill of destruction upon the provisions of an enemy
whom he can rarely reach with the sword has taken a slow
weapon into his hands. Nevertheless, it is a sure one ; and
every long train of captured stock and wagons brought into
344
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
at Vryburg,
Jan. 6th,
1902.
camp by the columns, and every wheat-field left burnt and black
upon the veld was a drop indenting the stone which had so often
turned, and sometimes shivered, the steel.
For the third time Lord Methuen and Kekewich saUied in
company westward from Klerksdorp on December 28th, and
once more the target was the Makwasie Berg and Wolmaranstad.
A repetition of the tactics which had been successful ten days
before found the hills nearly empty. Only Potgieter himself
with a few followers broke away northward. Reconnaissance,
however, disclosed the tracks of a much larger body which had
disappeared in the opposite direction, and following these up.
Lord Methuen withdrew out of all touch with Kekewich, passed
Lord Methuen through Schweizer Reneke on January ist, 1902, and on the 6th
entered Vryburg on the western line, having picked up nine
prisoners, 8,000 head of sheep and cattle, and six wagons
and carts.
Kekewich, blocking, as before, the northern exits of the Mak-
wasie Berg, on the 29th had vainly endeavoured to intercept
Potgieter as he ran from the other column, which came in sight
on the south. Thereafter communication with Lord Methuen
ceased as the latter hurried westward, and Kekewich, completely
at a loss as to his whereabouts, was obliged to forego the pre-
arranged combination. He found, however, plenty to do in
dealing with the bands which roved around his column and
infested his camping grounds as soon as he had quitted them.
One of these he outwitted on January 2nd by leaving a party
concealed on the deserted ground, seven Boers being wounded
and captured a few moments later. Still hoping to be of assist-
ance to Lord Methuen, who should have been now at Doorn-
bult, Kekewich moved to Holfontein on the 2nd. During
the march the enemy avenged his mischance of the morning
by setting an ambush for the scouts. Of an officer and the
thirteen foremost troopers who rode into the midst of 250 Boers,
six were wounded in the course of a hard fight, which ended in
the capture of all. Kekewich now received warning that
De la Rey and Kemp were close to the northward, and with
Moedwil in his mind he doubly guarded his bivouacs. He
Kekewich
loses touch
with Lord
Methuen,
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 345
still moved forward however, keeping to the north of the route
which was to have been taken by the vanished column of Lord
Methuen, imtil, wearying of the chase, and hearing that De la Key
was no nearer than between Tafel Kop and Lichtenburg, he
turned on January 4th back for Ventersdorp, which he reached and enters
on January 9th, having taken twenty-six prisoners, 7,000 beasts, Ventersdorp.
twelve carts and wagons since starting out on December 27th.
Ten days earlier Tafel Kop had at last been denied to the
enemy by the establishment upon it of a fortified post of the
Suffolk regiment from Naauwpoort. The work of construction
had been covered by Hickie's force. After seeing the Tafel
Kop garrison securely seated, Hickie then protected the building Blockhouse
of a line of blockhouses from the Kop down to Ventersdorp. '*"'''''"g-
The whole district was at this time busy in the erection of these
chains of fortifications, Lieut. -Colonel Sir R. Colleton (Royal
Welsh FusiUers) being thus employed upon the line of the Vaal
to Bothaville ; Lieut. -Colonel G. N. Mayne (King's Own Scottish
Borderers) from Ventersdorp to the Mooi river ; Lieut.-Colonel
G. F. C. Mackenzie (Suffolk regiment) upon the previously men-
tioned hne from Ventersdorp to Tafel Kop. Space only peimits
of the briefest reference to the work of several small columns
circulating in various parts of the Western Transvaal during the
last quarter of 1901. On the Kimberley side a force under Minor
Colonel St. G. C. Henry had accoimted for seventy prisoners in ^"'"j"""' '" '*^^
many forays since September. In the previous month a credit-
able action had been fought by the escort to a convoy under
Major J. F. Humby which, proceeding with supplies towards
Griquatown, had been determinedly attacked on August 24th
in very much the same manner as von Donop in October.* Only
Humby's promptness in laagering his wagons, and the good
conduct of his troops (Imperial Yeomanry and Northumberland
Fusiliers), who fought through an entire night, saved the whole
from capture. The convoy was safely brought into Griquatown
with the loss of ten killed and twenty-four wounded. In Sep-
tember a force from Vrybiurg, under Lieut.-Colonel W. H. E.
Murray, captured twenty-three prisoners in a dashing attack on
* See Chapter XVI.
346 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
superior numbers entrenched at Devondale, which cost him
exactly the same number of casualties as the enemy.
Another praiseworthy affair in this part was that conducted
by Lieut. -Colonel R. L. Milne towards the end of November.
Ordered to proceed with a provision column to Schweizer
Reneke on the 20th with 129 mounted men, 330 infantry and
two guns, Milne found his progress opposed from the first,
being finally intercepted by a strong body when a day's march
from his objective. Eluding these by a flank march, he entered
Schweizer Reneke on November 25th. Two days later he
started to return, and though by disseminating false information
he kept off the enemy's largest bodies, he had to fight sharply
at O'Reilly's Pan to get back into Vryburg, which he reached on
the 30th. The repulse of a band of 150 Boers two days earlier
by a small blockhouse near Pitsani commanded by Sergeant H.
Waring (ist Loyal North Lancashire regiment) also deserves
mention in connection with the western line.
Nearer the centre of operations about the middle of Septem-
ber a small column was formed at Bank, under Lieut. -Colonel
H. T. Hicks (Royal Dublin Fusiliers), with the object of supply-
ing and covering the South African Constabulary in the Gatsrand
and Los Berg. Hicks was out until October nth, during which
time he cleared the Venterskroon and Parys districts, and
took a 7-pr. gun and some score of prisoners, amongst them
a commandant, before returning to resume command of the
garrison at Krugersdorp. He was also instrumental in pro-
curing the surrender of twenty-seven burghers. Co-operating
with Hicks, parties under Lieut. -Colonel J. E. Capper and Major
C. Howard, both officers of the Railway Pioneer regiment, had
been working about Lindequee blockhousing the drifts over the
Vaal from October ist onwards. This district continued to be
disturbed throughout the rest of the year. Early in December
an alarm that the Schoeman's Drift post was cut off drew Hickie
from Klerksdorp and McMicking from Vereeniging to its assist-
ance, and although they found the post surrounded more by
water than by the enemy, the Vaal being in high flood and im-
passable, there were undoubtedly strong bands in its vicinity,
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 347
and constant skirmishes occurred. On December 19th G. G.
Cunningham, who was commanding the Irene — Wolvehoek
section of communications, organised a force of 400 officers
and men* which he took into the angle between the Vaal, the
Rhenoster and the central rcdlway. On December 21st he
attacked the hills south of Lindequee from two directions, and
cleared them with the loss of fourteen officers and men. The
enemy was then heard of in greater force near Reitzburg, and
on the 23rd Cunningham reconnoitred in this direction, finding a
strong position in front of him at Leeuwdooms. The brisk
skirmishing entailed by a successful movement against the foot-
hills entailed seven casualties. Cunningham's wagons were
now empty, and he paused to await the arrival of co-operating
forces from Witkoppies and Kerr's Drift on the Rhenoster river.
These arrived under command of Lieut .-Colonel the Hon, A. E.
Dalzell (Oxfordshire Light Infantry) on Christmas Day, and on
the 26th the Leeuwdoom hills were cleared after a long day's
close but inexpensive fighting. At Witbank on the Vaal next
day the commando narrowly escaped being surrounded, but,
escaping with the loss of four burghers, it broke up into two
bands, one of which ran southward past Reitzburg, the other
up the Vaal towards Parys. Whilst Dalzell pursued the first,
Cunningham followed the latter, and both so hustled the fugi-
tives that by the end of December Cunningham was able to
report the district clear. His casualties during the operations
had been three men killed, two officers and nine men wounded.
Dalzell's assistance had been as energetic as it was timely.
Both on December 27th and 28th he sharply engaged the enemy,
driving them in succession from Rensburgs Drift and through
Botha ville, which he thoroughly cleared. These, though many
minor and often profitable affairs and expeditions must be
omitted, are all that can be here recorded. To describe the
skirmishes of every patrol, the attack on every blockhouse, the
fighting at every drift, would fill many pages with tales of
adventiure which must be left to oblivion.
* McMicking's M.I., Royal Irish Rifles M.I., Reynolds' and Richardson's South
African Constabulary, 4th Railway Pioneer regiment M.I.
348
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Situation in
the west at
the end of
1901.
The campaign in the Western Transvaal at the close of 1901
was somewhat in a state of suspension. The enemy, shouldered
away by lines of blockhouses, harried out of the best tactical
positions by the incessant traffic of the columns, was little to be
heard of along the usual routes or within hail of the lines of com-
munication. Nevertheless, it was felt rather than known that
he was by no means mastered. Somewhere out on the western
veld there still roved leaders whose names might yet sound the
rally in every Boer laager and the alarm in every British camp.
In spite of the lull the Commander-in-Chief was well aware that
scarce one of his columns, garrisons or posts between Rusten-
burg, Klerksdorp, Vryburg and Mafeking but was in daily risk
of extinction. Such, however, must always be the imeasy
position of the opponent of guerrillas. Though the general
situation be never so safe, at any moment the wire, the tele-
phone, the hehograph may bring him disagreeable surprises ;
but he is unfortunate indeed if they convey what would be the
greatest surprise of all — that the enemy had achieved a success
great enough to affect the issue of the campaign.
Approximate Strength States of Columns referred to in
foregoing chapter.
November, \c/a\— January, 1902.
Lt.-Gen. Lord Methuen...
Lt.-Col. S. B. von Donop
Col. W. B. Hickie
Col. R. G. Kekewich
Col. St. G. C. Henry
Lt.-Col. H. T. Hicks
Lt.-Col. R. L. Milne
Maj. H. McMicking
Brig.-Gen. G. G. Cunningham...
Lt.-Col. the Hon. A. E. Dalzell
"3 '3
S
9
1
2. S
0
c
s
l-H
•s
0
s 0
s
1,325
600
»3
2
680
330
7
—
67.S
«93
6
1
853
1,020
S
2
541
'75
3
I
250
560
3
I
129
330
2
—
300
180
2
—
400
—
2
I
450
~
I
I
349
CHAPTER XX.
EVENTS IN THE NORTH-WEST AND WEST OF CAPE COLONY.*
APRIL — DECEMBER, IQCI.
It was characteristic of the limitations of the military talent of Strategical
the Boers that the real joint in the strategic armour of Cape Bw^°nCape
Colony remained undiscovered until the weapon which might Colony,
have pierced it had been broken. In its midland and eastern
parts the British province could never have been in extreme
danger from such forces as the Boer States were able to bring
against it from the end of 1900 onwards ; the country was too
difficult, the barriers too numerous, the hostile communications,
lengthy though they were, too well guarded, and the objectives
too few. It was comparatively easy for the British commanders
to cut up the terrain into so many enclosures, and so quickly
to transfer the fencing, that the commandos, though they might
long escape actual arrest, were always either in prison or flying
from one corral to another. True, a more intelligent and
coherent plan of campaign might have done much in the earUer
days of the invasion ; but it must have eventually perished on
one of the many ranges which barred the way to the sea. More-
over, even supposing that the Boer commandos should have
pitched their laagers upon the coastline from Cape Agulhas to
East London, Cape Colony, for all its rebeUion, would still not
have been theirs. The heart of the coimtry beat elsewhere,
and not only the British but the Boer heart. In Cape Town
alone, and in the country immediately north of it, lay the true
Republican forces, forces far more potent than the sentimental
* See nuip No. 63.
350
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Maritz
assumes com-
mand in the
north-west ;
April, 1 901.
vapourings of Graaff Reinet — ^the forces of money, brains, organi-
sation and a statesmanship only awaiting the proper hour to
reveal itself, and astute enough not to emerge at all if that hour
should never strike. If in Natal there had been no hope at all
— for not the fall of Ladysmith, of Pietermaritzburg, or of Durban
itself would have wrested that little community from the British
flag — in Cape Colony there was but one hope, and one way to it.
Only the capture, or even the investment, of Cape Town would
have fired the sluggish but enormous explosive of rebellion lying
dormant in Cape Colony ; and the military road to Cape Town
ran not within sight of the Indian but the Atlantic Ocean. Of
all the many invaders, then, up to the time to which this narra-
tion has been brought, Hertzog alone had opened the Boer
game aright. But weak, unsupported and timid as he had been,
looking back to the Orange for De Wet rather than forward to
his best reinforcements — the unawakened commandos of the
western farmsteads — he had proved the least instead of the most
dangerous of the disturbers of Cape Colony. Small rebellions,
it is true, had followed, but they were equally aimless, and even
less daring. Such were those of J. F. Froneman in Kenhardt
and A. Van Niekerk in Calvinia. It was not until the middle
of April that a leader appeared with an eye to see and an arm
to wield the potentialities of a campaign in the west.
This was the already referred to Commandant S. G. Maritz,
an officer selected from the staff of Scheepers at the time when
that leader was beginning his career of adventure upon the
mountain staircases between the Cape Town and Port Elizabeth
railways. Maritz, with four companions, made the long and
hazardous journey to the north-west, some 300 miles, in safety,
and in the middle of April appeared first in Brandvlei and next
in Kakamas. He found the field not only untilled but actually
impoverished by his predecessors. Hertzog had done no more
than rob it of its most valuable military asset, its horseflesh ;
the others, by their high-handed conduct and incapacity, had
disgu ted hundreds who had been all for the cause. Maritz
himself was a leader after the burghers' own heart. Physically
of great strength, recklessly brave, a fine rider and shot, he had
EVENTS IN N.-W. AND W. OF CAPE COLONY. 351
in addition those qualities of friendliness, patience and sympathy
without which none could successfully command men who both
in their own eyes and those of the law were his equals as much in
the field as in the farm. His first act was to degrade the hated
Froneman, who appealed in vain to the votes of the men whom
he had mishandled. His next was to return to Brandvlei and
take the offensive against the only British force in the district.
This wcLs the column of Major H. S. Jeudwine, R.A., which, as British troops
already related,* had moved from De Aar, in strength 420 men, west under
of whom fifty were infantry, with two guns, on April 20th. Jeudwine;
On May 12th Jeudwine entered Brandvlei, having improvised ^" '
his supply and transport in the face of great difficulties at Van
Wyks Vlei. Moving upon Brandvlei from the south, in order
to keep the Boer bands above him, Jeudwine encountered on
the way only one of Maritz's patrols at Nelskop. The march
from De Aar, indeed, had been no secret ; from the moment he
left the railway Jeudwine had been dogged by a party of Boer
officers, under a Commandant E. Conroy, who were on their
way to join Maritz at Brandvlei. Whilst Jeudwine was occupied
at Van Wyks Vlei this band hovered on his communications
in observation, but Conroy, as soon as he was certain that
Jeudwine was marching upon Brandvlei, hurried thither, out-
riding the column. Maritz, who was unprepared to encounter
an opponent of such strength, emptied the town of its inhabi-
tants, goods and stock, and himself fell away twenty miles to
the south of Nelskop, on which he left the afore-mentioned patrol
to amuse Jeudwine. Soon after Maritz turned this enforced
evasion both to his profit and prestige. Waylaying at Melk-
boschfontein two detachments of Calvinia district troops, he
captured both, and though nearly all the prisoners subsequently
contrived to escape, the, to the Boers, more valuable portion of
the booty, consisting of several carts and wagons and 15,000
rounds of ammunition, remained in Maritz's hands. On the
next day Jeudwine more than equalised matters by capturing
on the Klaver Vlei road sixteen men of the Nelskop patrol, with
» See Chapter XIII.
the country.
352 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
twenty vehicles and nearly 7,000 head of stock. Nevertheless,
Maritz's easily earned success confirmed his ascendancy over his
raw rebels. Especially did they admire the skill with which he
had avoided the main British colimin, for, as with all men who
fight as felons, the prospect of the penalties of unsuccessful
fighting caused them to dread any encounter in which victory
was uncertain. Unlike regular combatants, rebels, however
numerous, are usually weakest in spirit at the opening of their
campaign. Maritz knew this well. For weeks following this
success he nursed both his followers and their friends by harm-
Maritz scours less but incessant marches over all the north-west, visiting as
many farms as possible, and generally creating an impression of
ubiquitous power in every homestead from Kenhardt down to
Calvinia. Conroy he had early sent up to Kakamas to organise
the numerous but vacillating rebels there, with what success will
be referred to later.
Meanwhile Jeudwine moved to Tontelbosch Kolk on May
1 6th, and to Loeries Fontein a week later, hearing much but
seeing little of the enemy. Thence his information took him
first to Klaver Vlei, on to Katkop, then back to Klaver Vlei
on June ist, the troops and transport performing prodigies of
marching over the almost impassable tracks. From Klaver
Vlei he reconnoitred westward without result ; then, on June 6th,
converged once more on Brandvlei, which Maritz was reported
to have re-entered two days before. The commando was not
there, however, and Jeudwine, whose animals were now be-
coming exhausted, made for Tontelbosch Kolk, intending to
rest them amid the good grazing ground. Arriving there on
June 8th he was immediately drawn out again by news of Maritz
at Loeries Fontein, but a forced march of fifty-four miles in
twenty-four hours once more brought the troops upon an empty
nest. A last effort against a reported laager fifteen miles further
on proved equally fruitless, and Jeudwine then took his weary
men and beasts into Calvinia to rest and refit, arriving there
on Jime i6th. Once more his respite was brief. On the i8th
the interruption of the telegraph to the post at Nieuwoudtville,
forty-eight miles west of Calvinia, warned him of the enemy's
EVENTS IN N.-W. AND W. OF CAPE COLONY. 353
presence in that direction. Nieuwoudt villa was held by but a
dozen men, whose fate was certain without speedy reUef. At
3 p.m. Jeudwine set out with all the troops he could mount,
200 in all, and marching all night through pouring rain and
pitchy darkness, appeared before the place exactly twenty-four
hours later. There at last he found the enemy, engaged in
feebly beleaguering the handful of defenders. But still it was
not the commando of Maritz, but that of a certain Commandant
A. Louw, a rebel farmer of Calvinia, who had joined Maritz
during his brief visit to Brandvlei in the first week of June, only
to quarrel with and separate from him almost as soon as the two
had met. Maritz himself was in the Bokkeveld mountains,
south-west of Loeries Fontein, and thither Jeudwine, after
driving off Louw, followed and found him with his patrols on
June 2ist. Thereafter he was constantly in touch, and on the
25th nearly forced the commando to an engagement at Gannen-
bosch. But Maritz was more bent on canvassing the district Maritz refuses
for recruits than on battle ; his fighting material was still untem- '° ^
pered, his men had as yet learned little more than scouting,
and the Commandant desired above all things not to alarm them
and their families by losses in action. Though he was almost
impregnably posted, he therefore declined a serious encounter,
and instead led off his men on one of those extraordinary
marches which had already taught them to respect him as one of
their ideal leaders, one who conquered by speed and endurance
rather than by the clumsy resort of battle. For 200 miles he
rode without a halt, not for any fixed objective, but on a roaming,
ringing course, first north-easterly through Tontelbosch Kolk,
thence south-easterly to Williston, then west again past Calvinia,
next into the valley of the Fish river, which he followed to the
borders of Sutherland, finally, having thrown out the chase,
settling into laager in a rich valley below the Roggeveld. He
was now once more joined by Louw with a following of sixty-six
burghers, and the two rested together for a few days.
Jeudwine had followed as fast as he was able. On July 2nd
he reached Williston, where he captured a piquet which Maritz
had apparently forgotten. On the 8th Jeudwine, after a sixty-
VOL. IV.
23
354
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
T. Capper
relieves
Jeudwine.
Maritz recon-
noitres the
approaches to
Cape Town.
eight-mile march, halted at Harde Heuvel. He was then called
to Grahamstown on urgent civil business, and handing over
command to Lieut. -Colonel T. Capper, temporarily bade adieu
to the column which he had led for 1,150 miles in fifty-four days'
marching, an average of over twenty-one miles a day, in the
face of incredible difficulties of supply, transport and conditions
of road. Capper was as unable as his predecessor to close with
Maritz. Encimibered by gims and transport, his camps always
overlooked from the precipices by which he was surrounded, he
could do no more than obtain intermittent sight of the enemy,
who fled, as active and as unhampered as goats, over the heights
at the first appearance of danger. By devious ways Maritz
approached within striking distance of Sutherland, around which
he wove a network of small bands composed of local rebels,
who watched every approach. Especially did he reconnoitre
towards the Cape Town railway, the party-wall between himself
and the midlands of Cape Colony ; and this not so much in
apprehension of his adversary as in expectation of his friends,
for the time was drawing near when the sole strategically sound
combination of all the Boer operations in Cape Colony was to
be inaugurated. It was to this end that Maritz, den5dng himself
the hazards of combat, had been industriously sowing tares of
disloyalty amongst the sparse enough British wheat in the north-
west. As yet, however, neither the crop nor the time were ripe ;
only half the road to Cape Town had been proved, and Attorney-
General J. C. Smuts, the leader commissioned to reap the fruits
of Maritz's industry as of that of all the other forerunners in
Cape Colony, might well, as he perforce did,* delay his advent for
a time. For the remainder of July Maritz remained in the
vicinity of Sutherland, communicating freely with Scheepers,
then gyrating in the Camdeboof hills, whom he urged to come
over to aid in the work of preparation. Less fortune attended
his attempts to consult with De Wet, his despatch riders
being captured on the road.
Early in August Maritz, having thoroughly investigated
» See Chapters XIV. and XV.
t See Chapter XIII.
EVENTS IN N.-W. AND W. OF CAPE COLONY. 355
Sutherland, made another of his wonderful marches, as long, as
swift, as sinuous and as sudden as flashes of lightning, which
marked him as one of the most able masters of man and
horse who had yet appeared upon the veld. Rushing down
the Tanqua Vallei, he swung northward at its junction with the
Doom river, and traversing half Calvinia, drew rein where the
Bokkeveld mountains stand on the borders of Van Rhyns Dorp
county. His recruiting had now outstepped his stores, and he
was much in need of arms, ammunition, and supplies, and of
the latter especially horseshoes, which wasted fast under such
travelUng as he imposed upon them. An attempt on a convoy Capture of
making for the town of Van Rhyns Dorp miscarried, whereupon oirp!^^^"*
Maritz decided to possess the town itself. On August 7th he
secured it, with all its contents and twenty-nine prisoners of the
Western Province Moimted Rifles, retiring almost immediately
to the Bokkeveld with forty rifles, six cases of ammimition,
sixty-five horses, 300 carts, and three wagon loads of stores.
Capper, following at his best pace, was in Van Rh5ms Dorp four
days after the Boers ; but he was then drawn out to Clanwilliam
by the necessity of guarding the approaches to Cape Town, a
measure rendered advisable by the presence therein of the Heir
to the British Throne, who had touched at the capital on his
return voyage from India. Maritz, left untroubled in his moun-
tains, made eastward at his leisure, and after a visit to the
Hantam's Berg, went into laager at Brandwacht, near to his old
hunting ground between Loeries Fontein and Tontelbosch Kolk.
During the rest of August little was done on either side.
Maritz had all to gain by delay, whilst Capper, even when
released from Clanwilliam, was not only too numerically weak
for active operations, but of the men he had, many had lost much
of their efficiency from a strange cause. These were colonial
troops, who, taking service originally for three months, found
themselves still in the field after fifteen, and they did not scruple
to assist towards the further prolongation of a campaign under-
taken largely for their own salvation, some by active and some
by that passive resistance to orders which can nullify the efforts
of a commander as effectually as open mutiny. Jeudwine, it
VOL. IV. 23*
356 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
should be said, had returned to the west on August 8th, but
there being an intention to fit out a second force for him, Capper
remained in actual command. Jeudwine merely accompanied
the column, serving of his own free will as Staff Officer to a force
of which, but for an accident, he would still have retained the
leadership. On the last day of the month Capper, after escort-
ing a convoy into Calvinia, made a determined attempt to bring
Maritz to book. Hiding by day and marching by night he
Capper at actually surrouuded the site of the laager at Brandwacht. But
witTMariu'^^ ^^^^^ *^^ fortune of war was on the side of the enemy. A number
of the burghers, led by Maritz himself, happened to be
absent on a distant reconnaissance. They neither knew nor
learned anything of Capper's approach until, on riding back
towards their camp, they suddenly discovered that they were
behind the British force. Maritz immediately despatched
messengers by different roads to attempt to pass the column
and warn the commando. Only one of these contrived to
get in, but it was enough. Led by a Free State officer
named Rudolph, the commando succeeded in galloping through
a narrow and closing gap in the encircling troops, and thus
escaped when on the very verge of being shut in. Only
a few stragglers and fifty ponies remained to reward the skill
and perseverance of the column and its leaders. Capper then
received orders to march to Ceres, which was reached on
September 15th. A fortnight later, after a vain attempt to inter-
cept Theron's westerly movement, Capper was moved to Piquet-
berg Road station, and thence — Maritz's strategy becoming
clearer — to Moorreesburg, where he lay until October 15th, bar-
ring the road to Cape Town to commandos reputed to number
1,200 strong. Meanwhile Maritz returned to the Bokkeveld,
and thence to Van Rhyns Dorp. His reputation was higher
than ever. Daily fresh bodies of recruits joined him from the
districts under his control. The most considerable of these was
a band of 120 collected in Sutherland by one of Maritz's staff
officers, one Piet De Wet ; another strong posse answered the
call of Rudolph in Gries, a strategic post at the junction of the
roads from Ookiep, Port NoUoth and Hondeklip Bay, which
EVENTS IN N.-W. AND W. OF CAPE COLONY. 357
Maritz did not fail to occupy. This success was timely, for now
was in sight the harvesting of the crop which he had sown and
so long tended. Smuts was already in Cape Colony, and one
by one the various Boer commanders might be expected
to appear to the west of the Cape Town railway, to add
their weight at last to a scientific blow at the British hold
upon Cape Colony.
The Boer plan of campaign has already been referred to. The Boer
It was drawn in broad and imposing lines. Whilst Smuts him- ^^'^'^sy-
self descended upon Port Elizabeth, Maritz, strengthened on his
inner flank in Ceres by Scheepers, Theron and all the group
of leaders who had embroiled the midland counties, would move
upon Cape Town by Clanwilham, Piquetberg and Malmesbury.
Strategy of such a scope, more fitted to armies than to guerrilla
bands, was indeed, with the materials now available, a limbus
fatuorum. It presupposed much that was unlikely, or even
impossible — that Smuts should fare triumphantly where De Wet
and all others had failed ; that the various units should enter
upon it in fighting condition ; that the scheme should materialise
unobserved by the British, though it threatened the very vitals
of their colony. It has been described how Smuts did in fact
fare ; how he and those of the lesser leaders who survived
counted themselves fortunate when they reeled broken across
the railway with a few exhausted followers, seeking safety at
the side of Maritz rather than affording him support. Never-
theless, by the beginning of October, 1901, the storm-centre had
definitely shifted from east to west, moving with a concentration
of purpose which rendered it for the first time dangerous. It
now lay over the vast plateau which is bounded on the north
by the Orange river, on the east by the railway from the Orange
down to Beaufort West, on the south by the line of the Doom
and Tanqua rivers, and their prolongation the Koms Berg and
Nieuwveld ranges, on the west by the Kobe and Bokkeveld
mountains, east of Van Rh5ms Dorp. Over all this tract Maritz
had hauled down the British and planted the Republican
flag, and he held as his keep the noble and gigantic redan,
whose parapets were 200 miles of mountains, having their
358 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
salient in front of Sutherland and their gorge from Calvinia
to Beaufort West.*
But Marilz well knew that his conquest of the uplands pro-
vided him with little more than a base. Watching with dismay
the appearance of one battered " supporter " after another, he
saw, too, that now all depended on himself, and he determined
Maritz moves to strike at once directly at the strategic point. In the first
week of October he overran ClanwilUam and Piquetberg, masked
the garrison of Piquetberg Town, and crossing the Great Berg
river, entered Malmesbury. On October nth he occupied
Hopefield, less than three days' ride from Cape Town. In
the stir which arose in the capital all varying interests
were silenced. The proclamation of martial law two days
earlier had at last given to the military the power so long
begrudged, but which all hastened to invoke now that
the enemy was so near the gates. At this moment Lieut.-
General Sir J. French appeared on the scene at Piquetberg
Road. The trend of the campaign had long been clear to
him, and it was more than a month since he had assumed
control of the operations in the west. During that time the
General's chief aim had been, as it still was, to ruin the
Boer combination by the wearing down of its units before they
could come together. If he could not prevent Smuts, Scheepers,
Theron and the others from joining Maritz, he was determined
at least that they should carry across the railway but shreds of
Success of ^ their fighting strength, and he saw his policy everywhere suc-
tactics.'^^"*^ ^ ceeding. Examining the situation in Piquetberg and Malmesbury
from October 12th to 14th, he was, therefore, very Httle alarmed
at Maritz's daring. To the 500 men or so whom the Boer had at
his disposal, he could oppose at once the three mounted columns
of Wyndham, who arrived at Piquetberg Road with him on the
I2th ; of T. Capper, who, with a reorganised and refitted force,
was in Moorreesburg, in company with a recently formed column
imder Major F. Wormald (12th Lancers). When these were
lined up from Hopefield through Klip Gat to Piquetberg Road
* The physical features of this part of Cape Colony are clearly shewn on the relief
map to be found in the case of maps published with Volume I.
EVENTS IN N.-W. AND W. OF CAPE COLONY. 359
for a northward drive, Maritz himself saw the folly of pushing on
further, and held to the hne of the Great Berg river. Having
placed all in order in the west Sir J. French returned to
Middleburg, delegating command of the operations against Stephenson
Maritz to Major-General T. E. Stephenson. command.
Before the columns moved against the Great Berg river,
Maritz made a dash up the right bank, and hotly attacked a
detachment of local troops at Halfmanshof on Twenty-Four
river. The post was rescued on October i6th by a squadron
of the 1 6th Lancers from Piquetberg Road, after a sharp affair
which cost the squadron its commander (Captain R. W. D.
Bellew) and three men killed and three men wounded, the Boers
losing seven. On the 20th, the columns advanced, Wormald on
the left, within touch of the coast, T. Capper in the centre,
Wyndham on the right, and Maritz saw that he must fall back.
The Great Berg river was yielded with Uttle opposition, nor was
a stand made upon any of the numerous ridges which traversed
the counties of Piquetberg and Clanwilliam. Maritz drew his Maritz fails
men northward in several bodies, which he reimited at Graaf
Water and took into the Bokkeveld just as on October 24th the
three columns halted on the line Clanwilliam — Lamberts Bay.
But the Commandant's retreat was neither so aimless nor so
precipitate as it appeared. Whilst Wyndham turned aside with
a convoy for Calvinia, and Capper and Wormald laboured
across the sandy wastes to Compagnies Drift on the Ohfants
river, several Boer leaders appeared to join Maritz, amongst
them Theron, who, ever since his evasion of Wyndham and
Alexander a month earlier, had been cautiously making his way
about the borders of Ceres and Calvinia, looking for a chance to
throw the remnants of his force into the western movement.
On October 2Qth Maritz, his conmiand much augmented, re- Again
sumed his original plan and once more turned his face towards southward,
the south. On the 30th he crossed the Ohfants between Com-
pagnies Drift and the sea, and pushing on, captured and burned
a convoy which was returning from Lamberts Bay to Clan-
wiUiam on the 31st. Wormald, hurrying to save it, arrived too
late, though he made a noteworthy forced m<irch of sixty-five
36o THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
miles in seventeen hours, largely in the dark. With only 150
men he was himself in some danger below the Lange Berg
until Capper hastened by night to support him. Maritz, having
thus completely doubled on his former pursuers, now moved
southward by way of the coast. On November 3rd he was at
St. Helena Fontein, and turning the Piquetberg mountains, re-
touched the line of the Great Berg river, up the right bank of
which he marched as far as Zand Drift. Stephenson promptly
called all his available units towards the spot. To T. Capper and
Wormald orders were sent to face about and pursue southward ;
to Wyndham, who had safely deposited his convoy in Calvinia,
to march on Clanwilliam. Kavanagh, arrived at Constable
station on November 2nd, was directed to Moorreesburg.
Crabbe was entrained at Laingsburg for Malmesbury. Never-
theless, for seven days Maritz marched unpursued, and almost
imopposed. Not until November 8th did Capper and Wormald
receive their instructions ; Wyndham and Crabbe, at opposite
ends of the sphere of operations, had far to come. Only
Kavanagh, who arrived at Moorreesburg on the 5th, was within
the zone, and until the others appeared he could do no more
than cover in some measure Malmesbury and the approaches
to the capital, though he was easily to be turned from the west.
In short, the road to Cape Town was practically open, and a
blow which, successful or not, might have roused all rebel Cape
Colony, seemed about to fall. But at this critical moment
Wastes time Maritz, instead of rushing across Malmesbury, lingered on the
Great Berg river to attend to a side issue. On the night of
November 6th he sent Theron with half his force, some 300
men, to attack the neighbouring town of Piquetberg. The
undertaking of a diversion so wasteful of time was forced upon
him by his urgent need of arms and horses. His very success
had now encumbered him with a large and growing band of
unequipped rebel recruits ; from Piquetberg county alone he had
recently acquired more than one hundred, who made no secret
of their chagrin and alarm at their helpless condition. Much
depended, then, on Theron's mission, who, at 4.20 a.m. on the
8th, having surrounded Piquetberg, ordered his men to fall on.
on a
diversion
EVENTS IN N.-W. AND W. OF CAPE COLONY. 361
But the burghers, deterred by the sharp reply of the garrison,*
and kept at arm's length by the wire entanglements which
surrounded the place, contented themselves with shooting almost
harmlessly at the excellent defences. This fire they maintained
for twenty-four hours, every moment of which was of value to
Maritz's plans, after which Theron, fearing to delay longer,
withdrew and fell back upon the main body at Zand Drift. His
losses had been treble those of his opponents, whose casualties
numbered three killed and four wounded.
On the 9th Maritz and Theron crossed the Great Berg river
together, but separating soon after, pushed on rapidly through
Malmesbury on divergent lines, Maritz pointing on Darling,
and Theron, whose attack on Piquet berg had drawn Kavanagh
northward, on Malmesbury. Next day Darling was in Maritz's Maritz within
hands, his patrols even appearing at Mamre, only thirty miles from^cajj^^
from the capital. But the stroke, daring as it was, even more Town,
daring than if it had been delivered, as it might have been,
three days earlier, was too late. Stephenson had handled his
only available unit with skill and rapidity. On the loth,
as Maritz rode into Dariing, Crabbe's column detrained at ^
Piquetberg Road station. It was immediately sent by road to
Malmesbury, and entraining again at midnight for Kalabas
Kraal, by daybreak on the nth extended from the railway west-
ward to the Little Salt river, barring all approach from the
north. Nor was Crabbe confined to the defensive. At night-
fall he was on the Une of the Mooimook river. Pushing on next
day he drove Maritz out of Darling, and halted in the evening Maritz driven
on the line Groot Zwart Berg — Uilen Kraal — Vogelstruis-
fontein. Meanwhile Kavanagh, finding Piquetberg safe, had
returned to Moorreesburg, near to which on November 13th
he fell in with Theron, whom he chased southward past Rie-
beek Kasteel, then westward towards Kanon Berg. Crabbe
on this day had pushed Maritz still further northward, back to
the Great Berg river, across which he drove him on the 14th.
• This consisted of eighty-six officers and men of the Town Guard, Western
Province Mounted Rifles, District Mounted Police and other local troops, all under
Major A. F. Pilson.
362 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
By this time T. Capper and Wormald had come into touch, and
from Zuurefontein they manoeuvred to intercept Maritz at the
drifts of the Great Berg river. In this, however, they were
unfortunate, and although Capper succeeded in engaging Maritz,
the Boer got clear away towards Jan Boers Kraal, to the
north-west.
Theron Meanwhile Theron, vainly seeking his chief, had the worst
ISO at . ^1 g^ encounter with an armoured train at Kanon Berg on the
13th, but pressed on westward, only to find himself actually far
in rear of the very colunm engaged in hunting Maritz out of
Malmesbury. Theron's position was now extremely critical.
Crabbe, warned of his presence behind him, turned at Hope-
field ; Kavanagh was between that place and Moorreesburg ;
Capper and Wormald, now doubly alert, watched the Great
Berg river from Piquetberg almost to its mouth, where a gunboat
lay ready to deal with any evasion by way of the coast. Con-
siderably bewildered by Maritz's disappearance, Theron made
for Darling, and finding nothing there, laagered on the i6th at
Elands Vallei, on the Zout river. He was discovered next
day by Crabbe, who had come down to Schildpad Vallei on
the other side of the river. Theron at once took to his heels.
Never had he more need of speed, nor had he ever galloped
with better fortune and skill. Dashing north-eastward, and
evading both Crabbe and Kavanagh, he gained and crossed
Theron Vogelstruis Drift below Bridgetown, and disappeared on the
**^^*' other side of the river on November i8th. There was now a
risk lest Theron should turn the whole combination by the east
through Ceres, whilst Maritz did the same along the coast on
the west. Keeping Capper at Klip Bank in reserve, Stephenson
therefore directed Kavanagh through Porterville on Piekeniers
Kloof for Elands Kloof and Clanwilliam, and Wormald by Ceres
towards Sutherland, whilst Crabbe marched by Piquetberg, down
Verloren Vallei, to Lamberts Bay, which Wyndham was at this
time also approaching.
These dispositions were effective. The advance of Wormald
to Wagen Drift, north of Ceres, turned Theron, who was, in
fact, heading eastward, back through Kardouws Pass into the
EVENTS IN N.-W. AND W. OF CAPE COLONY. 363
Piquetberg mountains, whereupon Capper was moved up to
Piquetberg Town in observation, whilst Wormald remained at
Wagen Drift, and the other columns made their above-mentioned
destinations. Little more was seen or heard of Maritz imtil in
the last week of November it was reported that, in company
with Malan, Bouwers, Pypers, Van der Venter and Van Reenan,
he was closely investing the post at Tontelbosch Kolk, on the
Zak river, fifty miles north-east of Calvinia. All these com-
mandos were now imder the orders of Smuts, who had assumed Smuts assumes
command of all the Boer forces in Cape Colony. The garrison J^hrSli"^ °^
at Tontelbosch Kolk consisted of only four officers and eighty-six forces,
men, of the Western Province Mounted Rifles and Bushmanland
Borderers, under Captain R. M. Bertram, disposed in six small
forts, and was of so little tactical importance that Wynne was
in the act of withdrawing it when it was shut up.
To such futility, then, was reduced the long-talked-of com-
bination of the commandos in the west. Sir J. French's policy
of attrition in the midland areas had done its work. Maritz's six
allies brought between them less than 400 men, and these bands
were as spiritless as they were weak. A hot attack, which was The "siege"
gallantly repulsed, on November 28th, was the first and last kJJJ"''''''**^*'
bolt of the investment. Still further discouraged by losing
Maritz, who received a severe wound, the Boers for seven days
after relapsed into a respectful fusilade of the greatly out-
numbered but indomitable garrison. On December 5th they
departed after expending vastly more ammunition than they
could spare, and four days later W. Doran, who had marched
to the relief from Sutherland on the 6th with the greater portion
of Callwell's column, withdrew the garrison, whose losses in a
most creditable defence had numbered three killed and eight
wounded. Doran's movement had been profitable in other ways.
Covering the egregious siege of Tontelbosch Kolk was Louw,
Maritz's former confederate, and Doran, surprising him on his
last day's march towards the post, scattered the commando and
took nine prisoners. Three weeks earlier Callwell himself, then
taking up the pursuit of the various Boer bands entering
Sutherland from across the Cape Town railway, had also
364
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
encountered Louw in the same neighbourhood ; but on that
occasion Van der Venter, Bouwers and Smit had come to Louw's
assistance, and Callwell had to fall back with twenty-one
casualties on Sutherland. There he was joined on November
17th by Doran, who had followed Malan up through Sutherland
district. At the same period Lund's force had been detrained at
Matjesfontein, and these three columns, W. Doran's, Callwell's
and Limd's, were now placed under command of Colonel D. Haig,
to be based on Sutherland.
Thus, by the beginning of December, 1901, the capital and
the adjacent south-western portion of Cape Colony had been
cleared, and Lord Kitchener determined on heroic measures to
The Lamberts keep it iuviolate for the future. On December 3rd his order
w«t bicK:k"* was received for the construction of the most imposing line of
house line. blockhouses which had been yet attempted across the open veld.
The line to be taken was from Victoria West, on the main rail-
way, through Carnarvon, Williston, Calvinia and ClanwiUiam,
to Lamberts Bay, a distance of 320 miles. To cover the con-
struction of the easterly section Wormald was sent to Victoria
Road. The other columns remained in the west, for though
their movements from December ist to 4th had driven the com-
mandos over the Doom river, the cessation of the pursuit had
been followed by a return of the enemy across the river, and
there were signs of a strong concentration at Frederick's Dal,
north of Clanwilliam. Theron was still actually behind the pro-
posed blockhouse line imtil, on the 8th, T. Capper from Piquet-
berg engaged him at Witte Drift, and drove him northward to
join the rest. It now became necessary to refill Calvinia with
supplies, and Stephenson got ready a convoy of fifty wagons,
which on December 19th left Clanwilliam under escort of the
columns of Wyndham and Crabbe. It was fortunate that the
guard selected was no weaker, for the preparation and destina-
tion of the wagons had been as little of a secret to Smuts as his
own presence in force was to his opponents, and he had lined
the route to Calvinia with his commandos. Three times the
Fighting on troops had to beat off determined attacks — on the 20th near
road. Elizabethsfontein, two days later at Kordemoersfontein, when
EVENTS IN N.-W. AND W. OF CAPE COLONY. 365
Wyndham's fine handling of the rearguard foiled a bold bid for
the convoy, and on the 23rd close outside Calvinia. On the last
occasion the enemy, under Smuts himself, barred the road from
strong entrenchments, but a determined rush full against the
position by the i6th Lancers of Wyndham's column, this time
in advance-guard, wrested the ridge from the burghers, who fled
incontinently. In all these attempts the Boers suffered consider-
able losses. They left twenty burghers on the field at Korde-
moersfontein alone, and gained not a rifle or an ounce of the muni-
tions of which they were now in extreme need. The casualties
among the escort had been some score in all, chiefly amongst the
1 6th Lancers, who bore the brunt of the fighting throughout
the march with much honour. On December 23rd both columns
entered Calvinia, whence they returned to Clanwilliam without
further molestation, arriving on the 27th. Four days later the
section of the blockhouse line from Clanwilliam to Lamberts Bay,
which had been pushed on under protection of Kavanagh's
column, was completed and fully manned, only a fortnight after
its commencement. It effectually barred the true military road
to the capital, and Smuts, who lay with the main body of the
commandos about Van Rhyns Dorp, found himself without an
object in an inhospitable and tactically unfavourable country.
For some time past he had anticipated some such anti- Smuts' views
climax to Maritz's well-laid strategy, A month earlier the rapid sil^tbn.
concentration of the British columns and the damaged condition
of his own adherents had convinced him of the impossibility
of maintaining the war in the west with the forces available.
He had insisted that the lack of men and material alone would
prevent him from bringing the campaign to a successful con-
clusion in Cape Colony. " The future," he wrote, " is bright
and promising. . . . Thousands are anxious to join us, but
they have no horses, as the enemy have collected all animals
in these districts, and I am convinced that if animals were not
so scarce it would be quite possible to cause a general rising."
Let but a thousand men be spared from the aimless operations
in progress in the two RepubUcs to lend weight to the blow
which he knew how to strike at the centre of British rule in
366 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
South Africa. Especially he had urged the return of Kritzinger,
whom he had long ago left idling in the Zastron district under
promise of a speedy reappearance in Cape Colony. It was
owing to his continued absence that the commandos in the mid-
lands and east had fallen to pieces, thereby destroying the whole
balance of the campaign in Cape Colony.* Smuts' sound and
soldier-like appreciation of the situation contained a suggestion
of the only possibility of success left to the republican arms.
The Boers' It had long been apparent to him how much might turn upon
strategical ^ the enlargement of the invasion of Cape Colony from a mere
opportunity, diversion into the grand plan of campaign. But neither he nor
his superiors perceived that the moment for such a transference
of strategy was not approaching but passing away. Smuts him-
self actually deprecated the appearance of De la Key, of which
there was now fresh talk at the Boer Headquarters, on the ground
that the operations were insufficiently advanced for such dis-
tinguished leadership. In the east of the main theatre of war
Commandant-General Botha, in the west De la Key, in the south
De Wet, continued to expend in brilliant but fruitless feats of
arms men whose presence in Cape Colony at this moment might
have kindled a fresh struggle, the termination of which no man
could have foreseen. In other respects Smuts' representations
remained unanswered. No considerable reinforcements were
despatched to him, nor, until his campaign in the west had
evaporated, did even Kritzinger attempt to fulfil his part.
Before he appeared only one insignificant band had come to
recruit the Boer forces in Cape Colony. On November 22nd,
a certain Commandant Naude led fifty men over the Orange
river at Sand Drift. He was promptly intercepted by columns
under Lieut. -Colonel A. G. Hunter- Weston and Captain Lord
W. A. Cavendish-Bentinck, who had been posted between
Colesberg and De Aar for such eventualities. Naude avoided
them both, however, and on the night of the 29th broke west-
ward across the railway between Hout Kraal and Potfontein,
in spite of the blockhouses and armoured trains, and was lost to
* Summary of a report by Assistant-Commandant-General J. C. Smuts to the Boer
Headquarters; undated, but written about November, 1901.
EVENTS IN N.-W. AND W. OF CAPE COLONY. 367
sight in the Prieska district. There he joined Conroy, who, ever
since his parting from Maritz at Brandvlei in May, had been
marauding, with many an adventmre, between Griquatown,
Katkop and Prieska. What success attended Kritzinger will
now be seen.
On December 14th, nearly four months after his parting with Kritzinger
Smuts in Zastron, Kritzinger dashed across Sand Drift and cotony"^^ ^^"^
re-entered Cape Colony with no men. Before undertaking the
expedition his burghers had been reviewed and addressed by Mr.
Steyn, who urged them to fire their rebel brethren with tales of
the havoc they had seen wrought by the hands of the British
in the Orange River Colony. But the adventurers had little
leisure for preaching a crusade. No sooner were they across
the well-worn drift than they found themselves confronted by
the columns of B. Doran from Bosch Duiven Kop and Lord
W. A. Cavendish-Bentinck from Hamelfontein. Barely evading
these by a turn southward, the commando was hunted down
to the De Aar — Naauwpoort branch railway. On the night of
December i6th, after a rearguard action at Bosch varkens-
fontein which cost him many horses, Kritzinger made an
attempt to cross the intervening railway between Hanover Road
and Franschmans Kop. But the Guards of Inigo Jones' brigade
who held this portion of the line were on the alert, and gave
the Boers a heavy reception. Kritzinger himself fell wounded Capture of
and was taken prisoner ; his adjutant, nine other burghers and ^"^"^^"■
eighty horses were also taken. Nothing, however, could arrest
the rush of the rest through the severed wires. Led by L.
Wessels, Kritzinger's second-in-command, who was also wounded,
the commando sped on through Hanover and Richmond into
Aberdeen, where, on December 20th, having clean outrun the
chase, it disappeared into the tangle of the most famous covert
of the Great Karroo, the Camdeboo mountains.
So much, then, for Smuts' most trusted ally and long-expected
reinforcement in the centre of Cape Colony. In order to align
his fortunes over all his sphere of operations up to the close of
1901, there remain to be traced from an earlier period the doings
of his detachments in the north-east.
368 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Events in the Whilst duTuig November the incessant revolution of French's
Cai^Coiony columns had cleared the midland and southern counties of Cape
Colony, the north-east, with its all but inaccessible tangle of
precipices, had resisted every effort to reclaim it. Fouch6,
Myburg and P. Wessels, still maintained themselves between
Burghersdorp and Barkly East, observed, but unmolested, by
Monro, whom the departure of Pilcher at the end of September
had left alone and passive in his duty of covering the construc-
tion of the Stormberg — Lady Frere blockhouses. Not until
November 14th, when Scobell's column, having been recruited
after its exhausting chase of Van der Venter, became available,
was it possible to resume the offensive in this quarter. At
that time Fouche was in laager at Patriots Klip, Myburg and
Wessels between Rhodes and Barkly East, their joint forces
amounting to nearly 500 men. Sir J. French ordered a simul-
taneous movement by Scobell against Fouche, by Monro against
the other two, whilst Hart from Aliwal North sent down Moore's
Connaught Rangers mounted infantry and Lord Lovat's Scouts
to co-operate. All three contingents were quickly in touch with
their allotted opponents. Scobell, working with Lovat's Scouts,
hunted Fouche uninterruptedly and always with success all over
Jamestown, depriving him of twenty men and nearly 200 horses,
and so harrying the commando that by the last day of the month
it had broken up into the small bands which were the certain
sign of exhaustion with Boer units. Scobell had then been led
back to near Jamestown. Monro was equally successful with
Myburg and Wessels. His movement from Dordrecht on Barkly
East (14th to 2oth) drove the Boers over the Drakensberg, on the
other side of which, on the spur known as the Gatberg, they
were encountered by a body of local defence troops under
Captain H. W. D. Elliot, A sharp affair, in which Elliot was
killed, resulted in the repulse of the enemy, who left eight killed
and many wounded, as well as fifty horses, on the field as they
made off northward. Basing himself on Barkly East Monro
followed in three parties, and from November 22nd to 25th
made further captures as far as Rhodes, though the main com-
mando managed to escape him in the mists. At Barkly East,
EVENTS IN N.-W. AND W. OF CAPE COLONY. 369
on the 26th, Monro got news that the laager had been discovered
in its old haunt at Drizzly Hill. Marching by night on the 28th
he successfully surrounded the spot, broke up the camp, and
in the running fight which ensued killed and wounded five of
the enemy and captured eighteen with 100 horses, completely de-
moralising Myburg, who rehnquished his independent command.
On December ist Monro was back at Barkly East, and a few days
later made another attempt to catch Wessels towards Rhodes.
It was attended by no success ; but returning empty-handed to
Barkly East on the 7th, Monro collided with Fouch^, who was in
the act of evading Scobell, and, attacking him near Cold Brook
on the 8th, took two prisoners and more than 200 horses. On
the 14th Scobell and Monro joined forces in Barkly East.
Meanwhile a fresh leader, Odendaal, had gathered together
the fragments of Myburg's commando, and had established them
in the old laager at Patriots Klip. The British columns had
likewise received an addition. The Cape Colonial Government
had recently formed a division which had been placed imder
Lieut.-Colonel H. T. Lukin, of the Cape Mounted Riflemen, and
a detachment of this force had been sent, under Colonel R. H.
Price, to assist the operations in the north-east. On December
14th Price's Kaffrarian Rifles resolutely attacked the laager at
Patriots Klip, took five prisoners and some fifty horses and
scattered the rest, after which Price took them back to Burghers-
dorp. Next, a movement by Scobell on Rhodes had the effect
of driving Fouch^ and P. Wessels south-west. As they passed
Barkly East Monro darted out upon them, and on the 15th, at
Schilder Kranz, on the Dordrecht road, fell upon the rear and
captured thirteen prisoners. The Boers then doubled north-west-
ward towards Lady Grey, Monro pursuing until the 24th. Both he
and Scobell then returned to Dordrecht, where the latter, whose
incessant exertions now placed him on the sick list, was relieved
in command of his column by Major S. W. Follett (9th Lancers).
On December 27th Price, from Burghersdorp, made another
successful sally upon a small laager discovered at Paarde Verlies,
killing the rebel Field-Comet, one Venter, and securing a prisoner
and twenty-seven animals.
VOL. IV. 24
370
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Approximate Strength States of Columns referred to in
foregoing chapter.
1
boa
•SE
T3'C
p
COLUMN.
>>
u
1
.2"
0
V
a
^^
^
1
^
April — December, icjoi.
Mai. H. S. Jeudwine (later
T. Capper)
\
370
50
a
—
Lt.-Col. G. F. Gorringe . .
680
3
—
Officer Commanding 17th
Lancers . .
316
—
2
U.-Col. S. C. H. Monro..
641
3
4
Lt.-Col. E. M. S. Crabbe . .
449
70
2
I
Lt.-Col. H. J. Scobell (later
S. W. FoUett) . .
635
3
I
Lt.-Col. B. Doran , .
489
2
—
Lt.-Col. P. G. Wyndham . .
5 SO
2
—
Maj. F. T. Lund . .
630
2
—
Lt.-Col. C. P. Crewe
340
2
2
Lt.-Col. J. R. MacAndrew
Officer Commanding at
510
—
—
Lt.-Gen. Sir J. D. P.
French in command.
Conway . .
310
40
1 •
Lt.-Col. C. T. McM. Kava-
nagh
400
I
Lt.-Col. A. G, Hunter-
Weston . .
630
I
Lt.-Col. H. Alexander
420
2
—
Lt.-Col. T. J. Atherton ..
530
2
Capt. Lord W. A. Caven-
dish-Bentinck . .
280
I
Lt.-Col. H. T. Lukin
690
3
Maj. F. Wormald ..
330
I
—
Lt.-Col. C. E. CallwelJ . .
350
2
Lt.-Col. W. Doran . .
420
2
—
Lt.-Col. M. G. Moore
250
250
—
I 1
Note. — Major-General T. E. Stephenson assumed command (under General Sir J.
French) of operations in the west and south-west of Cape Colony in October, 1901.
371
CHAPTER XXI.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL*
{Continued from Chapter XVII.).
NOVEMBER, IQOI — JANUARY, I9O2.
During the first half of November, 1901, there was a compara-
tive lull over all the Eastern Transvaal whilst lines of block-
houses were pushed on along the Wilge river, and across the
southern angle from Wakkerstroom to the Swazi border, Plumer,
Colville, Sir H. Rawlinson, Garratt and Pulteney continued raiding
in the south, whilst Bullock supervised the blockhouse building.
Spens, returning by Botha's Pass into the Orange River Colony
early in the month, came back into the Transvaal on the 17th,
and remained for the next ten days at Standerton, into which
town also came Allenby's and W. P, Campbell's forces. All these
columns made small but constant profit in men and stock, the
most considerable being the capture of a laager and fourteen
Boers near Mahamba on November 8th, and a week later of
another laager and twelve Boers at Plat Nek, both effected by
Colville with his mounted troops; Major E. A. Wiggin, 13th
Hussars, commanding the 26th battalion M.I., having a large
share in the successes. A patrol of the 2nd West Yorkshire
regiment under Second Lieutenant E. T. Welchman surprised
and secured eight Boers in the Pongola Bosch on the i8th.
Altogether about 100 of the enemy's fighting men were taken
in operations too trifling for detailed narration. This was small
gain, and it was plain that the main hostile bodies had now to The problem
be sought once more upon the High Veld, that vast tract which ydd^ '^
columns and armies had so often crossed and recrossed, leaving
no traces more permanent than those of ships upon the ocean.
On expanses like these the Boers could long fend off either defeat
* See map No. 56.
VOL. IV. 24*
372
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Lines of
blockhouses.
Bruce Hamil-
ton placed in
command.
or starvation, and though in truth they were being slowly filed
down by isolated captures and surrenders, their numbers were
stiU sufficient to render such a process well-nigh interminable,
and enormously expensive in men, animals, and money to the
British army, wasting itself in carrying it out. How, then, to
master these giant meadows and their roving populations had
become the main problem of the Eastern Transvaal. Lord
Kitchener had long been occupied, and was now weU advanced
with schemes of which the map and measure alone can suggest
the magnitude ; nothing less, in short, than the fencing in of
whole provinces with blockhouses and entrenched posts, which
constantly contracting towards a common centre, would eventu-
ally choke each area in their grip as the ancient chambers of
torture crushed their victims with converging walls. Something
of this has already been referred to in these pages. Already in
the Eastern Transvaal a line of blockhouses ran from Wakker-
stroom to Piet Retief, a chain of posts from Greyhngstad up to
WUge River station. Now (November i6th) whilst the South
African Constabulary were ordered to advance their chain
eastward from the line Wilge River station — Greylingstad to
that of Brugspruit — Waterval station, Clements was to build
blockhouses from Standerton across to Ermelo, to be extended
later to Wonderfontein and Amsterdam, thus gridironing the
High Veld into irregular rectangular figures enclosed by forts and
the armoured railways which parcelled out its prairies into areas
of manageable size. The immensity of labour and material
entailed by these tasks must here be passed over in silence ;*
let it suffice to remember how far and in what quantities work-
men, fabric and tools had to be transported, how often to be
employed in remote spots, and in the presence of the enemy,
and in how many different directions at once these fortified lines
were being projected.
To protect the advance of the Constabulary posts a strong
covering force was necessary. Early in November Major-
General Bruce Hamilton, having been placed in command of
all operations in the Eastern Transvaal south of the Delagoa
* See Appendix 2 ; and map No. 58.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 373
Bay railway, led six columns into the field, and disposed them
in various positions. These columns were gathered as follows :
from Standerton, Colonels E. H, H. Allenby's and W. P. Camp-
bell's (the last-named soon to be divided into two separate com-
mands under Lieut. -Colonels F. D. V. Wing and G. G. Simpson) ;
from near Springs, Colonel C. St. L. Barter's (lately Bewicke-
Copley's) ; from Brugspruit, Colonel C. J. Mackenzie's (lately
Benson's) ; from Wonderfontein, Lieut. -Colonel E. C. IngouviUe
WiUiams' with Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. C. G. Fortescue ; from
Volksrust, Colonel Sir H. Rawlinson with Lieut.-Colonel H. K.
Stewart, whilst Brigadier-General J. Spens on his return to
Standerton was sent to cover the construction of the Standerton
— Ermelo chain of blockhouses, his column eventually forming a
seventh under Bruce Hamilton's command. Behind these troops
the work of building was rapidly pushed on. By November
22nd it was completed, and Bruce Hamilton, establishing his
Headquarters in Bethel, prepared for more active operations.*
On the last day of November his troops faced eastward from Bruce Hamil-
the Delagoa Bay railway at Middelburg through Bethel down e^^^d^*
to the Vaal, with Mackenzie, Fortescue and WiUiams on the
left ; Barter, Wing and Simpson with the General in the centre ;
Sir H. Rawlinson next, and Spens on the right, standing on the
bank of the Vaal. Allenby was posted in a supporting position
behind the right centre. Still further to the south-east Plumer
and Pulteney were at Brereton awaiting the subsiding of many
flooded streams before marching northward to co-oi>erate in
the great movement which Bruce Hamilton was about to under-
take. On December ist, whilst Barter remained to hold Bethel,
the line advanced, the trio on the left reaching Carolina on the
2nd, Bruce Hamilton and the centre halting between the source
of the Vaal and Ermelo, Sir H. Rawhnson and Spens drawing
near to that town from the south-west and south. On the 3rd
Ermelo was entered by the centre and right, and the columns Bruce Hamii-
at once found themselves in the presence of the enemy. ton at Ermelo.
The approach of so strong a line of British troops had put
• For gallantry on November 23rd, Lieutenant L. C. Maygar, 5th Victorian
Mounted Rifles, was awarded the Victoria Cross.
374 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
the commandos in a ferment, which their admirable scouting
only served to increase when from end to end of a hundred
miles of front came only the word " the enemy ! " Their
position, in truth, would have spelt ruin to forces less mobile.
They had been taken by surprise, and already there was but
little space for manoeuvring between the storm travelling from
the west and the lee shore of the eastern frontiers of the Trans-
vaal. Paardeberg and the Brandwater basin had intensified
a hundredfold the Boers' natural terror of a cul de sac. With
The 0^6 accord they began to penetrate in small bodies the inter-
commandos stices of the hne of columns, and Bruce Hamilton saw that unless
break up.
he struck rapidly and on aU sides he would have to turn and
seek his quarry on the spaces behind him instead of in front.
Such an emergency, one scarcely to be met with in any warfare
but this, formed the strongest test of the acquired rapidity and
elasticity of an army which, until this campaign, had not been
remarkable for either because the need had so seldom arisen on
a large scale. Nor could there have been on the spot any com-
mander more able than Bruce Hamilton to snatch advantage
from situations whose duration was to be measured in moments.
Yet, surrounded as he was by dissolving hostile bodies, the most
adroit General would have been helpless without good infor-
mation. In war the power to strike is as widely dissociated
from as it is dependent on the knowledge of where and when to
strike : witness the spectacle, common in history, of strong
armies wasting their vigour in purposeless blows, or so bewil-
dered that they refrain from striking at all. Fortunately at this
juncture Bruce Hamilton had the services of Colonel A. Wools-
Sampson, the Intelligence Officer who had so often marked down
the game for Benson. Tracking now the shifting units of the
Boers, he was able to guide his commander to a series of suc-
cesses which struck terror throughout the Eastern Transvaal.
On the very day of his entry into Ermelo Bruce Hamilton,
informed that hostile bodies had filtered through his right wing,
took all the available mounted men from the columns of Spens
?/"'^^ , and Sir H. Rawlinson, and marching all night, fell upon a large
Hamilton's , _ t^, , ..,.
successes. laager at dawn on December 4th, capturmg ninety-three prisoners.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 375
116 horses, fifty-five carts and wagons, and a vast quantity
of signalling and other gear. On the 9th he struck again,
this time west of Bethel — so far had the enemy penetrated his
lines — with results which make it doubtful which were the more
amazing, the endurance or the valour of his men. By a march
of thirty miles by night he brought the horsemen of Sir H. Raw-
hnson's. Wing's and Williams' columns upon the laager, which
fell to an assault worthy of fresh troops. Nor did the discom-
fiture of the Boers end here ; for six miles they fled before
Hamilton's inexhaustible troopers, who by the end of the day
had killed seven and secured 130 burghers and all the camp
stuff, riding then over twenty miles more into Bethel with their
booty. Retracing his steps towards Ermelo on the 12th, Bruce
Hamilton received intimation of another laager twenty-five
miles north-east of Bethel. For the third time he hurried
through the night, with Sir H. Rawlinson's, Wing's and E. C. I.
Williams' men, to burst at dawn upon the encampment
and send its occupants flying over the veld. Once more a six-
mile gallop in pursuit rewarded the soldiers, who garnered
eighty-six of their foes and one of the guns lost at Bakenlaagte,
before they were recalled to Ermelo, where they halted after a
march of more than fifty miles. Nor had Bruce Hamilton's
columns been idle in the intervals. On December 4th E, C. I.
Williams, raiding along the Oliphant river, had accounted for
seventeen Boers, and Allenby and Barter five ; Sir H. Rawlinson
had taken eight on the 7th, and Mackenzie six on the 13th, each
securing much loot in cattle, wagons and crops.
After sundry minor operations Bruce Hamilton moved east-
ward from Ermelo with 2,150 mounted men from the columns
of Sir H, Rawlinson, Williams and Wing, intending to push the
remnants of Botha's forces against the Swazi border. Bad
weather, drifts and guides delayed the first portion of the march
until the Boers had warning and scattered. But Hamilton drove
on, and assisted by Mackenzie from the north, ran down, killed
or captured more than seventy burghers in the neighbourhood
of Mary vale, taking nine more on his return march towards
Ermelo on the 25th.
376 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Altogether, up to the end of December, 508 Boers, loi
wagons and 10,000 cattle had fallen to Bruce Hamilton's troops.
The effect of these misfortimes was great on an enemy who, until
recently, had camped contemptuously close to British outposts ;
who boasted that he had made the night and the veld tracks his
own, and that he was not to be beaten at the game of surprise
by the very impis of the Zulu. Realising on how formidable a
successor the mantle of Benson had fallen, Botha's commandos
The enemy became Utterly demoralised, and nowhere was the end of the war
emora i . j^^j.^ plainly in sight than in the Eastern Transvaal at the
close of 1 90 1.
During Bruce Hamilton's advance Spens, with his Head-
quarters on the Standerton — Bethel road, had forayed con-
tinuously with flying columns. He would have come out with
profit but for a mischance to one of his strong patrols which,
Loss of a chasing a commando on the banks of the Vaal on December 19th,
Sec^igth, ^^^ ^^^ ^"^^ ^^ ambush from which it only emerged after
1901- desperate fighting, with the loss of about 140 killed, wounded
and prisoners. Spens was then directed southward, and placed
with Pulteney under command of Plumer for raiding west of
Amersfoort, which was carried out with good results.
Barter and Allenby were likewise detached from Bruce
Hamilton's forces in order to join a brigade of cavalry which had
been sent down from Pretoria on the 15th under G. Hamilton,
to deal with the broken bodies which had crept through Bruce
Hamilton's lines, and were now wandering in some strength about
the Constabulary blockhouse line east of Springs. Vigorous
chasing resulted in the capture of thirty-four of these by Allenby's
men, many more surrendering at the blockhouses ; a determined
remnant under General Alberts, however, eluded capture, and
remained to do much mischief in the future.*
Events north North of the Delagoa Bay line. Park from Lydenburg, and
Riy ra?iw51?°^ Urmston, with a roving base, but usually from Belfast, had
patroUed the Dullstroom district, searching mainly for the Boer
Government, and incidentally for the many small groups which,
with constant loss, were attempting flight across the railway
♦ See Chapter XXIX.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 377
from before Bruce Hamilton's advancing line of columns. The
only formed body in the district was that of Viljoen, whose
heutenant, the daring Muller, feU hotly upon Park near DuH-
stroom on the night of the 19th, being repulsed with loss, but
inflicting thirty-one casualties upon Park's command. Three
days later Park responded with an onslaught on Muller's camp,
the greater part of which fell into his hands, Muller abandoning
also a Vickers-Maxim gun. Both columns returned to the line
on the 26th, Park to Dalmanutha, Urmston to Belfast.
In Natal Bullock, covered by Garratt, continued to build in Natal,
blockhouses, now from Botha's Pass to Vrede, and this he con-
tinued to do with assiduity for a month to come. By the end
of December the blockhouses along the Ermelo road were com-
pleted ; over those from Piet Retief to the Swazi border Colville
remained on guard, whilst Chapman took out for a fortnight a
raiding party 700 strong, which scoured the Zulu border from
Nkandhla round to Nondweni. These were the doings in
December, a month of great effort and results.
The New Year (1902) found Bruce Hamilton busy amongst 1902
the demoralised knots of Boers who crept along the river beds
seeking a way of escape from the narrowing space between the
British columns and the Swazi border. On January ist twenty- Further
two of these were run down on the banks of the Umtali river, gru'^T^* ^^
north of Amsterdam. Sixty-nine more, including Commandant Hamilton.
Erasmus, fell victims on the 3rd, forty-nine of which were taken
on the Compies river by Colonels A. B. Scott (temporarily com-
manding Sir H. Rawlinson's column), Stewart and Simpson,
directed by Hamilton in person, the others falling on the Umtali
to Wing, who next day added six more prisoners to his train on
the Umpilusi north of Bell's Kop. On the 9th Bruce Hamilton,
his task in the east reduced to the chasing of individuals, re-
turned to Ermelo, around which he at once foimd fresh occupa-
tion amongst the bands who had broken through his lines at his
first advance. These were now mere wanderers, ringed in by
blockhouses, exhausted by incessant harrying, and so unnerved
that the^' dared not approach the famihar farmhouses to seek
for the provisions and fodder which they sorely lacked. Whether
378 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
or no, for men in such a case, capture were a relief from their
unhappy lot, it duly befell many of them. On the night of
January loth Bruce Hamilton, leading out Wing and E. C. I.
Williams, marched rapidly to Witbank, and surrounded a laager
which yielded forty-two prisoners to the throw of the net at
dawn, Major Wolmarans, the renowned State artillerist, being
taken with two of his officers. A second raid by Hamilton
with Scott, Stewart and Simpson in the same neighbourhood two
days later, nearly miscarried, owing to the vigilance of a Boer
piquet, and the troopers, who had ridden hard for thirty miles
in the dark, had to gallop furiously for seven miles more before
they were content to draw rein with thirty-six burghers to their
credit. Sir H. Rawlinson's column now (January 14th) left the
command for Standerton, and that of Simpson was broken up ;
but Spens had brought his force back to Ermelo on the 9th,
and Allenby had returned to Bethel where also was Barter, so
that there was no weakening of the chase. On the night of the
i8th Bruce Hamilton once more cast his pack eastward, intending
to draw the confluence of the Zand Spruit and Compies river,
about Alkmaar. Twenty-seven prisoners had been brought to
bag when the Vaal, coming down in flood, warned Hamilton to
return, or be caught himself, and at midnight on the 19th Spens,
Wing, E. C. I. Williams and Stewart, who had conjointly carried
out the hunt, were back in Ermelo. On the 22nd a fresh series
of blockhouses was begun from Ermelo to Carohna under cover
of Fortescue's force, and the columns, prowling separately on
both sides of the new line, secured a few more prisoners on the
24th and 29th. Next day Bruce Hamilton, receiving intelli-
gence of a laager at Tafelkop, ten miles north-west of Ermelo,
took Spens, Mackenzie and Stewart, with 850 men, and set out
for another trophy, directing Allenby, who was midway between
Bethel and Ermelo, towards the same spot. The columns, sur-
rounding the lair at midnight, found it empty ; but they followed
hotly on the spoor which led southward from it. Near Springbok-
fontein they fairly ran down a marching commando which
they instantly charged and shattered, hurling it against
the Standerton — Ermelo blockhouses, ninety-four burghers,
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 379
including several officers, being accounted for. By the time the
troops regained Ermelo they had covered sixty-five miles in
twenty-four hours, in heavy rain, and without food or rest. So
well had they learned from the enemy not how to endure, for
that was as native in them as in the Boers, but that endurance
was the hard road to success. The results achieved — 338 Results of
prisoners during January, 850 during the two months' raid — ^n^w^T"*^"
showed that it was now for the enemy to learn something
fresh, for his hereditary crafts had been mastered.
Meanwhile G. Hamilton's cavalry, strengthened up to
January 14th by Barter's troops, and until the 21st by
AUenby's, had continued to intercept to the east of Springs
many of the fugitives from the zone which Bruce Hamilton
had made uninhabitable. To the south Plumer, Pulteney (with Piumer in the
Spens up to the 9th) and ColviUe had performed similarly, ***"*^*
the first forming a roving stop between the Vaal and the
fixed barrier of the Piet Retief — Wakkerstroom blockhouse
line, whilst Colville patrolled the space between the terminus
of that line at Piet Retief and the Swazi border. Operating
first from Rotterdam, on the Mabusa Spruit, and sub-
sequently from Wakkerstroom, Plumer had sundry encounters
with bands whose strength and quality seemed to indicate that
Bruce Hamilton had brushed southward the best of his opponents,
perhaps Botha himself, in whose presence audacity and deter-
mination were ever to be expected. On the morning of January
3rd Plumer's New Zealanders pursuing too confidently a band
seen retreating up the left bank of the Vaal, near Rotterdam,
found themselves suddenly charged by 250 horsemen, who killed,
wounded and captured thirty-one men, then drew off, and
pursued their way. Next day Plumer pushed after across
the Ermelo — Amsterdam road, north of which his advance-
guard, under Major J. M. Vallentin (Somersetshire Light
Infantry), having sighted no enemy all day, halted on the
plateau of Onverwacht. Vallentin then descried a party Affair at
moving north-east, and started in pursuit. No sooner was ?a'rr'^'T**^*"'
he well on the trail when a commando of 400 men, which 1902.
had gathered during his halt, fell upon him in front and
38o THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
both flanks. A desperate miUe followed, in which both com-
batants lost heavily. On the British side VaUentin himself
and eighteen non-commissioned officers and men were killed,
thirty-six officers and men wounded, and some fifty captured in
the hand-to-hand fighting. The Boers lost Opperman, one of
their bravest Generals, and many killed and wounded, but they
were like to have annihilated Vallentin's party but for the
opp>ortune arrival of Pulteney's supporting troops, who drove
the enemy from the field and far to the north. Soon after this
event Plumer repaired to the neighbourhood of Wakkerstroom
where the wooded gorges, peopled by lurking refugees, gave him
full occupation for the next three weeks, and finally an oppor-
tunity of avenging his mischances earlier in the month. On the
Success by night of the 25th Plumer surrounded, with five bodies of troops,
jan."2sth, the kloofs between Spitz Kop and Castrol Nek, and at dawn next
'902. (Jay sent his men through them. A number of Boers emerged,
only to be driven against the blockhouse line where thirty-four
prisoners were taken. Plumer then returned to Rotterdam,
and, after some minor raids, went down with Pulteney to
Volksrust to replenish supphes (February 4th).
Events north North of the Delagoa Bay line Park and Urmston
of the Deiagoa manoeuvred in the Roos Senekal area, but were much
Bay railway. '
hampered by rain and fog. This was the more unfortunate
because the Transvaal Acting-President and Government were
at this time wandering near Dullstroom, in great straits,
and virtually cut off from their main hope in this district.
General B. Viljoen, who was now reduced to impotence at
Pilgrim's Rest. Schalk Burger was anxious for more practical
guardianship, and about the middle of the month summoned
Viljoen to meet him at Windhoek in the Stenkamps Berg.
In a few days Viljoen, accompanied by four adjutants, was beside
his chief, and it was arranged that the official body should follow
him back to Pilgrim's Rest, whither Viljoen himself set out on
the 25th. It befell strangely that the Government had called
their protector to his own destruction, for this ride proved to
be the last of the Boer leader's many adventures. The British
Intelligence Department was keenly watching the vagrant
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 381
legislature ; every outpost was alert, and ambuscades lay in
many a likely spruit bed and rail and river crossing. Into one
of these traps — laid by a party of the ist Royal Irish regiment,
sent out under Major A. S. Orr by Lieut.-Colonel H. Guinness —
fell Viljoen as, having stolen past the outposts of Lydenburg,
he made to ford the Spekboom river. Two of his adjutants Capture of
were killed at once, three bullets brought down the General's viijoen.
horse, and soon one of the staunchest of the federal leaders was
escorted into captivity.
Approximate Strength States of Columns referred to in
foregoing chapter.
|.
^1
s
i:
b
il
0
COLUMN.
1
1
4>
s
o>:
s
November, 1901 — January,
1902.
I.t.-Col. Sir J. H. Jervis-
White- Jervis
520
—
—
—
Brig.-Gen. H. C. O.
PI umer i n command .
Lt.Col. F. F. Colvin
700
—
6
—
Lt.-Col. A. E. W. Colville . .
550
300
4
I
Col. Sir H. Rawlinson
1,100
182
6
I
Lt.-Col. F. S. Garratt
450
290
I
Col. W. P. Pulteney
800
361
3
Brig-Gen. J. Spens
1,550
867
—
\
Col. E. H. H. Allenby . .
1,000
4
Col. W. P. Campbell
1,300
1,130
4
Col. C. St. L, Barter
450
690
I
Maj. - Gen. Bruce
Col. C. J. Mackenzie
1,050
720
—
Hamilton in com-
Lt.-Col. E. C. Ingouville
mand.
Williams . .
SSo
—
—
Lt.-Col. the Hon. C. G.
Fortescue
520
473
5
Lt.-Col. F. D. V. f late ")
Wing Camp- 1
'850
a8s
3
Lt.-Col. G. G.j bell's
Simpson (. column. J
500
SCO
—
Col. C. W. Park . .
440
639
I
Lt.-Col. E. B. Urmston
Soo
467
3
Lt.-Col. H. K. Stewart
700
3
Brig.-Gen. G. Hamilton . .
750
359
3
382
EflFect of
Dc Wet's
concentration.
Improved
situation in
S. Africa.
CHAPTER XXII.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY*
{Continued from Chapter XV III.).
DECEMBER, I9OI — FEBRUARY, I902.
With De Wet once more at the head of a force in being, the
eastern part of the Orange River Colony became in December,
1 90 1, the cynosure of all the theatre of war. This his presence
would have ensured in any event, for now both sides had come
to determine largely the chances, or rather the duration of
the war, by the measure of the famous leader's forces and for-
tunes. It is true that not a British soldier doubted the issue
of his prolonged exertions, but there were few who expected
their cessation until De Wet was either killed or taken, for either
event was expected promptly to terminate the fighting. The
name of Jackson was not more celebrated in the camps of Pope,
or of Rupert in those of Fairfax than that of De Wet in the
numberless bivouacs which had dotted the veld of South Africa
for two years. But, apart from his high reputation, there were
other reasons why at this moment De Wet's return to activity
should have absorbed the attention of the British Headquarters.
In aU other parts the Commander-in-Chief's patient, unrelenting
methods seemed to be slowly doing their work.
In the Eastern Transvaal Bruce Hamilton's six columns
and the contracting rings of blockhouses were fastening upon
the High Veld with a hold which Botha found it impossible to
shake off.f Viljoen was practically isolated in Lydenberg. The
Western Transvaal was less under control, but, after all, the
* See map No. 64.
t See Chapter XXI.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 383
chief difficulty of Lord Methuen and Kekewich was to discover
De la Key or any other tangible enemy.* In the Northern Trans-
vaal Colenbrander was carrying all before him.f The Orange
River Colony was seriously disturbed nowhere but in its eastern
half. Cape Colony, the true foundation of the whole campaign,
and one to be preserved from crumbhng only by the most unre-
mitting efforts, remained a keen anxiety, but even there things
were brighter than they had been at any time during the past
year. In the eastern part there was scarcely a Boer leader
above the level of a bandit, and in the west Maritz's strategy,
and with it the success of all Smuts' plans, had been confounded
just as it had developed into a real danger. J De Wet, then,
took the field at a moment when some striking performance was
most needed by his own side and least desired by the other, and
Lord Kitchener, knowing well what to expect, directed all his
efforts towards anticipating the offensive on the part of the
Free State levy.
The central point of De Wet's concentration seemed to lie
about Elands Kop, between Lindley and Frankfort. Accord-
ingly the following ingenious raid was instituted against the
suspected locaUty. Whilst Elliot was to move out from Kroon- Operations
stad, marching steadily up the Valsch, not widely extended, v^l"^' *^
and keeping to the south of the real objective, Rimington,
Damant and Wilson, coming from Frankfort would approach
up the right or eastern bank of the Libenbergs Vlei river. These
movements, it was hoped, would have the effect of deluding De
Wet into the impression that a general easterly march was in
progress which would leave him free behind the receding forces.
When the Kroonstad and Frankfort forces should come into
touch with the Libenbergs Vlei river, the whole would suddenly
face about, and sweep over the country between the Lindley —
Reitz and Heilbron — Frankfort roads. On December 8th Elhot,
marching light, took out Broadwood, de Lisle and Byng (the
latter in place of Lowe), and advanced up the Valsch, de Lisle
on the left, Byng in centre and Broadwood on the right.
* See Chapter XIX. f See Chapter XXV. X See Chapter XX.
384
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
De Wet
discovered^
Loss of
contact.
Rimington and Wilson simultaneously started from Heilbron
to join Damant at Frankfort. Elliot was in the midst of his
first day's march when, about 11.30 a.m., De Wet was discovered
by Broadwood to be sitting upon a strong position Klein
Sedan — Quaggafontein, covering Lindley with 1,000 men. De
Wet was at this moment meditating an attack on Barker, whose
forays from Winburg had earned his special displeasure, and the
appearance of the columns from Kroonstad, whilst it surprised
him, only caused him to look with more certainty for a move-
ment by Barker in his direction. Reserving himself, as usual,
for the weaker opponent, he offered little resistance to Broad-
wood and Byng who lined up on his left, and after a skirmish of
two hours, feU back rapidly on the Libenbergs Vlei. Elliot,
who was on the extreme left with de Lisle, knew nothing of this
important discovery, and it was not until five hours later that
he heard from Broadwood, who had gone into camp at Quagga-
fontein at 3 p.m., how touch had been gained and lost. At
9 p.m. Broadwood endeavoured to recover contact by a long and
difi&cult night march to Rietpoort ; but De Wet, anticipating
some such action, was also on the move, and circling south-
ward, passed by the east of Broadwood and past Bethlehem,
making for Kaffir Kop, north of Fouriesburg. Finding nothing
at the end of a thirty-mile march in the dark Broadwood
returned to resume his part in the set scheme. On the night of
the 8th Elliot's front was Lindley — Mooifontein.
Nothing could have been more unfortunate than these
events. The object of the whole manoeuvre had now plainly
vanished outside the right flank, and was to be sought rather
at the head of the Valsch river than that of the Rhenoster.
Only in an instant pursuit by every column towards Bethlehem
was there any chance of regaining touch with De Wet, tactics
in which the Frankfort troops might equally well have co-
operated. But a plan had been formulated, and it was evidence
of the inherent inelasticity of schemes laid down and controlled
from Army Headquarters, that no attempt was made to depart
from it. The march eastward was duly persisted in, Elliot
actually feinting at Bethlehem, his proper target, with the object
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 385
of diverting attention from the now purposeless advance towards
Reitz. On the loth he was astride of the Libenbergs Vlei
river on the Une Bulhoek — Fanny's Home — Zwartfontein, whilst
De Wet, still with an eye to Winburg, scouted secure from
interruption from Kaffir Kop.
Meanwhile the Frankfort troops had joined hands with Elliot
along the Libenbergs Vlei from Bordeaux and Zorgvleit. At
4 a.m. on December nth all six columns turned and faced
westward for the " drive " over Elands Kop. Broad wood, on
the extreme left was thrown forward from Bulhoek so as to
prevent a break-out by the south ; escape by the north was
barred by the hne of blockhouses now standing between Wolve-
hoek and Frankfort. For the next four days the return march
proceeded, the columns searching carefully and maintaining a
line which it would have been difficult to penetrate. It was
not surprising, however, that their discoveries were small. Every
mile removed them further from De Wet's main gathering, which,
even at the outset, had been forty miles to the southward.
Some 300 Boers in all were sighted, and when on December
14th the operation concluded on the hne Heilbron — Kaal-
fontein, only forty-three prisoners had been taken. Of convoys Result of the
containing fugitive famihes there had been no lack, and 187 "P*™^'^"^
wagonsful were driven in.
The whole of the eastern Orange River Colony, from Frank-
fort down to Thabanchu now became the scene of great activity
on both sides. De Wet, whose strength increased daily, divided rx- vvet
his forces, sending some 800 men under General W. J. Wessels forcer*"*
northward to reconnoitre with a view to attacking any columns
found outside Frankfort. There was good prospect of success
here, because at this time Brigadier-General E. O. F. Hamilton
was engaged in laying out a prolongation of the Heilbron —
Frankfort blockhouse hne to Tafel Kop, and the camp of his
working parties was in the open at Dundas. De Wet himself
returned from Kaffir Kop to his former ground between Beth-
lehem and Lindley. No sooner had he done so when, as if led
by a mahcious spirit, five columns converged on Kaffir Kop in
search of him. From Kaalfontein came EUiot with his three
VOL. IV. 25
3^6
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Failure to
find De Wet.
De Wei near
Bethlehem.
De Wet
attacks
Dartnell,
Dec. i8th,
1901.
brigades, Barker issued from Winburg, and from the opposite
direction Sir J. DartneU came out of Harrismith by way of
Elands River Bridge and Bethlehem. On December 17th all
these should have met at Kaffir Kop ; but even had the lair not
been deserted, the mission might have miscarried from faulty
communication. Although they duly arrived in the neigh-
bourhood from opposite sides, Elliot and Dartnell failed to meet,
whilst the latter, though he did get sight of Barker, was unable
to establish signalling communication with him. Then, having
seen so Uttle of each other and nothing of the enemy, all five
columns turned for the counter-march to their respective bases.
De Wet, who had observed these manoeuvres from above Beth-
lehem had actually hurried to attack Dartnell on his westward
way, but was only in time to see the column disappear into
Bethlehem, where B. Campbell had been recently installed with
his wing of Sir L. Rundle's command. He therefore lay in
wait some fifteen miles to the north-east of the town, and
kept a watchful eye on the Harrismith road for the first sign of
Dartnell's reappearance.
At 8 a.m. on the i8th Sir J. Dartnell cleared Bethlehem and
set out on his return march to Harrismith. He had received
double warning of De Wet's presence. First, a native captured
the day before had stated that the Free State force had already
placed itself between the column and its destination ; next, just
as Dartnell quitted Bethlehem a surrendering burgher rode up
with the news that the Free State force was actually lying in
wait only eight miles out upon the road. So certain did an
attack appear that B. Campbell had agreed to send on his own
mounted men in support of the march for a certain distance.
Taking every precaution except that of attempting at all costs
to discover and inform Elliot, Dartnell moved cautiously upon
his way. As, about 11 a.m., the advance guard approached the
drift which carried the road over the Tiger Kloof Spruit, a sudden
and heavy volley from a hill close to the left front warned
Dartnell that his informants had spoken truly. He instantly
parked his wagons and pushed forward his artillery ; but before
the guns could unlimber for action, a fusilade broke upon him
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 387
from every side, De Wet's commandos had perfectly enveloped
the road. Whilst a strong force of riflemen, aided by a Maxim-
Nordenfeldt posted on the east of the Spruit, opened fire from
the surrounding kopjes, smaller bodies galloped in and took
cover at close quarters, and a united rush upon the column
seemed imminent. For a few moments Dartnell's column was
in danger of sharing the fate of others which had been waylaid
in similar fashion by the arch highwayman of the veld ; but
De Wet soon found that he had met his match. The Imperial
Light Horse, the majority of whom were as experienced in such
combats as himself, fought with determination, and utterly
denied with their rapid shooting the 400 yards of open ground
which separated them from the assaulting bodies. Moreover,
the burghers by no means displayed their usual confidence in
themselves or their leader. De Wet had ordered a general
charge, but only half his men responded to the signal, and
these, finding their comrades hanging back, declined to carry
matters to a conclusion. De Wet was quick to see that an affair
which had cooled at its first onset had miscarried ; and there
were indications that he had not only failed, but would soon
have to look to himself. As soon as the seriousness of the
attack had become apparent, Dartnell had signaUed to Campbell
that the support of his mounted men, who had advanced to
Vogelfontein, would be welcome, and Campbell had not only
ordered them forward, but was coming on himself with his
infantry. At 3 p.m. De Wet called his men from the field. Repulse of
and Dartnell, safe, but in no position to pursue, continued his ^ ^^^'
march to Elands River Bridge and thence into Harrismith on
December 23rd without further incident. His losses in the
engagement were one man killed, four officers and ten men
wounded; those of the enemy, five killed and nine wounded.*
De Wet retired into the Lange Berg much chagrined by his
discomfiture at the hands of a column which he had looked
upon as a certain prey. In a few hours news reached him
of a hot engagement in another quarter.
* For gallantry on this occasion Surgeon-Captain T. J. Crean, 1st Imperial Light
Horse, was awarded the Victoria Cross.
VOL. IV. 25*
388 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Rimington Within a week of their co-operation with Elliot's raid between
^u?fS- ^® Libenbergs Vlei and Kroonstad, Rimington and Damant
fort. were again in combination in the Frankfort district, chiefly with
the object of covering the contemplated extension of the block-
house line from Frankfort to Tafel Kop. On the night of
December 19th the two commanders set out on a pre-arranged
enterprise, the general scheme of which was a circular sweep
around Tafel Kop from the east, concluding with a drive down
the valley of the Wilge back towards Frankfort. Soon after
dawn on the 20th the coliunns, having encompassed Tafel Kop,
were facing west, in line but not in touch, Rimington on the left
at the head of the tributary Kalk Spruit, Damant at the head
of the Riet Spruit some five miles to the north. From the start
there had been reports of the presence of a considerable Boer
force in the hills upon the right bank of the Wilge river, and both
Rimington and Damant had captured more than one patrol and
outpost. These were in reahty the antennae of Wessels, who,
fearing to attack E. O. F. Hamilton's strongly fortified camp
at Dimdas, had lain between Tafel Kop and the Wilge observing
the blockhouse building, and alert for any false step which would
afford him a chance to sting. The advent of the two field-columns
on the morning of the 20th came as a surprise to the Boer leader.
Seeing Damant on one side of him and Rimington on the
other, he imagined that he was being purposely surrounded,*
whereas neither of the British commanders was in reality aware
of his presence. This idea seemed to be confirmed when a third
party — whether of his own men, or an advanced detachment of
Damant's or Rimington's columns, or a reconnoitring patrol
from Frankfort, cannot be ascertained — alarmed him by appear-
ing to the west, and Wessels, certain that he was now shut in,
thought that nothing could save him but a charge. Soon
Damant's horsemen, galloping down the Riet Spruit in chase of
a band which had been unearthed on the southern slope of Tafel
Kop, arrived much scattered on the high ground overlooking
the right bank. Damant himself, with eighty officers and men
* Report by Assistant-Head-Commandant W. J. Wessels to Chief Commandant C.
De Wet.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 389
and the three guns, drew rein about the centre of the line, taking Damant's :
post on a long straggling flat-topped kopje which fell steeply ^aiel^KT^
to the broad and shallow bowl of grass curving between the rise Dec. 20th,
and the river. Five hundred yards on Damant's right a '^*'
squadron of Damant's Horse had halted. Other portions of this
regiment were on the opposite flank, that is, to the south, but
so distant that Rimington, though completely out of touch with
Damant himself, had picked them up on his way down the Kalk
Spruit. The veld in front of Damant was covered with moving
horsemen. Some were making up the river, others were crossing
to the left bank. Five groups, each some 100 strong, could be
distinguished from the rest, standing motionless under the
shadow of the opposite slope. The men composing these were
dismounted and holding their horses ; they were clothed in khaki
uniform, and were drawn up in so compact and orderly a fashion
that Damant, who examined them closely, came to the conclu-
sion that they were squadrons of Yeomanry from Heilbron or
Dundas. This impression seemed confirmed beyond suspicion
when the parties, turning their backs on Damant's position, took
to firing at some invisible target in the opposite direction, cer-
tainly, so it seemed to Damant, the scattered Boers who were
in retreat from his own advance. Next, portions of the groups
broke up, and, collecting some cattle which were straying in the
neighbourhood, drove them in the direction of Damant's position.
Finally, all five groups mounted, and rode slowly in cavalry
formation straight towards Damant. There was now no room
for doubt ; Damant's men allowed them to approach at leisure,
and they were soon within hail of the position. Only when one
of the knots rode within ten yards was the identity of the whole
array suddenly revealed, and the troops became aware that
they had admitted a strong Boer commando almost into their
lines. Lieutenant W. Scott's squadron, that on Damant's right,
was the first to discover the danger, and shot point-blank into
the nearest band, putting it to flight with the loss of eight of
its members. The rest of the intruders, throwing off all dis-
guise, then galloped at full speed for the foot of Damant's kopje,
which was so steep on that side that the ground at its foot was
390 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
hidden from view. Realising the situation at last, Damant
hurriedly collected a troop, and rushed forward to forestall the
enemy on the edge of his crest-line ; but he was too late. The
Boers scrambled over the lip before he could reach it, and in
one moment an overwhelming force poured in amongst the
guns and covered the whole top of the kopje. Now ensued a
combat as noble and as hopeless as that which had strewn Gun
Hill at Bakenlaagte with dead seven weeks earlier.* The party
with Damant was manifestly lost ; the guns were already in
the enemy's hands ; but every man who had a rifle plied it where
he lay, striving only how much he might cost the enemy before
a bullet ended his own account. For an hour and a half the
unequal contest was maintained, so long does it take men even
so bold and skilful as Wessels' veterans to make an end of a reso-
lute band six times smaller than itself, f At the end of that
time, out of the eighty on the hill seventy-seven were killed or
wounded, amongst the latter Damant himself. J When all
resistance was quenched the Boers took possession of the kopje,
sullying their triumph by permitting a few of their number to
perpetrate those outrages on the wounded of which it seems
impossible altogether to purify warfare, however humane the
combatants. Their hold upon their capture was, however,
but momentary. Whilst Wessels cast vainly around for means
to remove the guns, every horse of which had long been shot,
Scott came charging up from his detached position on the right
with the squadron of Damant's Horse and the 30th and 31st
companies Imperial Yeomanry, which with one united rush
hurled the enemy from the hill almost as soon as he had won it.
Soon after Rimington appeared from the south-west and com-
pleted the rout. Rimington had heard the first outburst of
firing, and also its cessation ; but he learned nothing of the
* See Chapter XVII., pages 310-13.
■f For gallantry on this occasion Shoeing-Smith A. E. Ind, Royal Horse Artillery
(XI. section pompoms) was awarded the Victoria Cross.
X Casualties, December 20th, 1901 — Killed, two officers and twenty-nine men ;
wounded, six officers, forty men.
<
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 391
disaster until it was complete, when first a straggler from Damant
and then a messenger from Scott informed him of the facts.
He was then some miles distant, but, galloping for the scene,
he arrived in time to chase the broken commando across the Wilge
as far as the exhausted condition of his horses permitted. Thus
ended an engagement remarkable for its startUng changes of
fortune and, it may be added, for the extraordinary report
rendered of it by Wessels, whose undoubted daring with the
sword was certainly equalled by that with the pen. De Wet,
brooding over his late discomfiture in the Lange Berg, must have
derived delusive solace from an account which informed him of
charges delivered by only 130 burghers over a bare plain 6,000
yards broad against 2,000 Britons in position ; of incessant
counter-charges incessantly repulsed ; of a hundred dead, and
this but a third of the losses of the ill-fated column, being
counted by himself in one spot.* Be this as it may, the Free
State generaUssimo could scarcely have learned the truth before
he delivered a more than rival blow.
Since the middle of December the constniction of the block- Weakness of
house line from Harrismith to Bethlehem had been steadily district. ^ ^"^
progressing. At this moment such work, in the absence of a
strong and mobile covering force, was risky in the extreme. This
was one of the rare occasions during the campaign on which
information as to De Wet was absolutely reliable. The attack
on Sir J. Dartnell on the i8th had disclosed both his strength
and his anxiety to use it, and it was unlikely that such a leader
would rest contented under the unaccustomed smart of the
defeat of one of his favourite schemes. True, after the affair at
Tiger Kloof Spruit, all touch with De Wet had immediately been
lost, no special effort having been made to retain or regain it.
Dartnell had moved on into Harrismith, taking with him the
only mounted force in the district strong enough to beat for game
so dangerous. Thereafter informatio was mainly dependent
upon natives, who still reported the presence of the commandos
in the Lange Berg. Both B. Campbell and Sir L. Rundle were
* Sec footnote, page 388.
392 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
practically powerless for distant scouting. Their available
forces were trifling, and would have been immobile even had
they not been chained by protective and working purposes
to the partially completed blockhouse line. The brigade of
Imperial Light Horse had been broken up, Dartnell having re-
signed command on his return to Harrismith ; and although the
two regiments came out again on the 24th, they were not only
under independent commanders, but were expressly excluded
from Sir L. Rundle's jurisdiction, reporting instead directly to
the Commander-in-Chief.* One (Briggs) was to be based on
Bethlehem ; the other (McKenzie) between that and Harrismith,
Lord Kitchener intending, though he did not so inform Sir L.
Rundle, that it should work from the blockhouse-head, f which
it might effectually have protected. Finally, the Intelligence
Department, lacking the only certain means of obtaining informa-
tion, keen-eyed men on good horses, had to concern itself more
with reports of distant British columns than of the nearer Boer
commandos. Labouring under all these disabilities Sir L. Rundle
remained as blind to De Wet's immediate presence as he was
vulnerable to his attack, and it happened that Christmas Eve
Situation on found him at his weakest. Blockhouse-head was then in the
i^i.^'*^ ' 3^ir 3-t Tweefontein, nine miles to the west of Elands River Bridge,
and was covered by some 500 men of the Imperial Yeomanry
with a gun and a Vickers-Maxim, all under command of Major
F. A. WiUiams (South Staffordshire regiment), who temporarily
replaced Lieut. -Colonel R. B. Firman, whilst that officer was on
leave of absence. This force lay some two miles to the west of
the last completed blockhouse. Sir L, Rundle himself had gone
into camp three miles behind Williams with 270 men of the
Grenadier Guards (destined for B. Campbell) and sixty-six
mounted men of the ist South Staffordshire mounted infantry.
These were all the troops at the front. The regiments of the
Imperial Light Horse were not at blockhouse-head, but both
together at Elands River Bridge, nine miles in rear of it, and
* Telegram from Commander-in-Chief K. 9199, December 22nd, 1901.
•f Telegram from Commander-in-Chief. K. 9264, December 25th, 1901.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 393
eleven miles from the force covering it. Beyond the undoubted
fact of De Wet's presence there seemed, however, no special
likehhood of an attack. The Intelligence summary on the
evening of the 24th was entirely reassuring. The " situation to
the south was quite clear. . . . Movement from north was
unhkely." Only seventy-five Boers in all, posted as scouts and
cattle guards, could be discovered anywhere.* Christmas Day
had not dawned before De Wet, rushing out of this peaceful
country, had disappeared into it again, dragging after him the
relics of a British force.
F. A. Williams' position at Tweefontein much resembled that Position of
the force
of Damant in the recently described encounter on the Wilge. covering the
His outposts lined the edge of the almost precipitous southern '''^ci^house
side of a kopje, the opposite slope of which, faUing gently to the
north, contained the camp and baggage. This northern side,
being pecuharly vulnerable to attack, was strongly defended by
entrenched outposts. The hill was the usual camping ground
for all columns passing that way,f and was thus almost as well
known to the enemy as to the troops. Nevertheless De Wet
carefully reconnoitred it in person for two days, and having DeWet
drawn the fire of the guns by means of his scouts, and ascertained the covering
the position of the various defences, he marked it as his victim. ^°'^"-
Remaining in observation himself, he ordered his burghers to
meet him at a spot four miles distant from Tweefontein during
the night of December 24th. This was duly carried out, and
about midnight eight commandos, numbering some 1,200 men,
advanced upon Tweefontein. It had long been an axiom with
the Boers, and might by this time have well been conceded by
their opponents, that the steepest side of a position is that
most favourable to attack. The numberless proofs of this in
history were probably unknown to men who studied warfare not
from books but the face of nature ; but South Africa, from
Majuba onwards, had provided lessons enough to both sides that
difficulties of ground are nothing compared to the advantages of
* Intelligence summary, Harrismith District, December 24th, 1901.
f Sir L. Rundle's report, December 26th, 1901,
394 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
the cover from fire and view provided by the precipitous faces
which at first sight seem impregnable. The force, therefore,
which watches only the edge and neglects the foot of such a steep
will always be in extreme danger from an active enemy by night.
Wagon Hill and Spion Kop had taught the British, Elands-
laagte and Driefontein the Boers, how much easier it is to lose
than regain such a crest. At heavy cost F. A. Williams' Yeomanry
were now to learn it again. De Wet steered straight for the
De Wet southern face. At two o'clock on Christmas morning his men
covedngforce ^^6^^ ^o scalc the height. Climbing in stockinged feet, they
Dec. 25th, were undetected until the last moment, and then only a single
' sentry took the alarm. Five minutes later the whole outpost
line was destroyed and the camp flooded from comer to corner
with an overwhelming inrush of riflemen. Of defence there
was none ; every body of men on duty was instantly dashed to
pieces ; the troops in camp were of no more military value than
any other collection of suddenly and so terribly awakened
sleepers. But of battling with an inevitable fate, the peculiar
quality of the British soldier, there was enough both to redeem
the field to its losers and to increase the credit of the assault.
Broken into groups, and lost in the darkness, the Yeomanry
offered a fierce resistance, dehvering time after time gallant but
ineffectual charges, which were finely led wherever a leader could
be found. The gunners stood and fell to a man by their pieces.
De Wet himself, no unpractised judge of courage, bore witness
Loss of the to the gallantry of his victims. In less than an hour his work
covering ^g^g done ) 145 of the column were killed and wounded ;* and
as dawn broke he left the hill, taking with him the two guns and
more than 200 prisoners of war.
The first shots fired in this disastrous affair were heard in
Sir L. Rundle's little camp, and a quarter of an hour later the
Staffordshire mounted infantry were led out by a Staff officer
to ascertain the cause of the ensuing roar of musketry. As the
scouts approached Tweefontein the faint light of a cloudy moon
* British casualties — Killed, six officers (including Major Williams) and fifty-one
men ; wounded, eight officers and eighty men. The Boer losses numbered about fifty,
including three officers.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 395
was sufficient to show them the state of affairs, and they them-
selves were so nearly discovered that the officer in command,
who rode ahead to reconnoitre with two men, was summoned
to surrender, his companions being actually captured. In an
hour's time the patrol was back with Sir L. Rundle, who, on
hearing their report, concentrated his small force and sent his
aide-de-camp. Captain A. C. McLean, to summon the Imperial
Light Horse from Elands River Bridge. His own position was
extremely hazardous. Had De Wet turned upon him it is Ukely
that he would have shared Williams' fate ; but the Boer leader
had allowed his men to scatter in search of the loot and as guards
over the wagons, guns and prisoners, and he had only a small
force with him when the rising sun revealed the adjacent camp.
Even so, Rundle was in some jeopardy from the Boer stragglers.
The Staffordshire mounted infantry, whom he sent at the gallop
to seize a hill commanding his left and the road by which the
reinforcements were expected, were all but forestalled by a
hostile body of equal strength who raced for it from the other
side ; a stronger commando hovered on his right. Meanwhile
McLean, riding at speed through the darkness, dashed into
Elands River Bridge in less than an hour, and soon both regi-
ments of Imperial Light Horse arrived at full gallop from the
east. But the enemy had almost disappeared. A pursuit into De Wci
the tangled spurs of the Lange Berg led the cavalry into country '*«pp<*"-
of such difficulty that it was imsafe to persist, and once more
De Wet vanished.
It now fell to Elhot to take up the chase. On his return
from the barren operation against Kaffir Kop, Elliot had reor-
ganised his division into two columns under de Lisle and Major
R. Fanshawe (Oxfordshire Light Infantry), Broadwood having
proceeded on leave of absence. Since then these troops had
been engaged in covering the construction of the Kroonstad —
Lindley blockhouse line, based chiefly on Quaggafontein, with
Byng behind at Kaalfontein. On the day of the occurrence at
Tweefontein, EUiot received intelligence that De Wet was near
Reitz. CaUing Byng forward to guard the rapidly accumulating ^'ijot "j?jes
depot at Quaggafontein, on the evening of December 26th, that Wet.
396 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
is, some forty-eight hours after the disaster, Elliot sent out
de Lisle without guns or transport, with orders to conduct a
wide-ranging reconnaissance, Fanshawe following at dawn on
the 27th with the impedimenta. De Wet was reported with
suspicious promptitude. On the 28th, when de Lisle was
approaching the left bank of the Libenbergs Vlei by Fanny's
Home, the heights on the opposite side were seen to be covered
by an apparently strong force which made little effort to conceal
its numbers or disposition. It appeared certain that De Wet
was about to oppose the passage of the Vlei, and Elliot prepared
for an encounter with the elusive marauder. But the General
was doubly out in his reckoning. De Wet himself was far away,
having ridden off to visit Steyn and the commandos of W. J.
Wessels on the Wilge river. In the meantime he had entrusted
the leadership to General M. Prinsloo, ordering him to lead the
commandos west of Reitz, and it was this officer who now faced
Boer tactics Elliot across the Libenbergs Vlei. At the first news of the
be^ Vlei. approach of the British column Prinsloo conceived a manoeuvre
worthy of De Wet himself. Sending the bulk of his men to
cross the Vlei, an hour's ride down stream, he drew up a small
but showy force opposite Fanny's Home, trusting that it would
draw Elliot across the river and allow the undisturbed passage
of his main body in the opposite direction. In this he was
perfectly successful. By the time that Elliot, forced to deploy
against unknown numbers, and further delayed by his transport
at the damaged drift, had crossed the stream, nothing was to be
seen but a few groups of scouts. Prinsloo's actual commandos
were at that moment fording the river ten miles to the north,
and were fast gathering upon the very bank which Elliot had
just quitted with so much labour. Reitz was found deserted,
and it was not until 5.30 p.m. that the news of a numerous
body on the march west of Roodekraal, that is, almost behind
him, showed Elliot how he had been outwitted.
Facing about, he at once sent five regiments and all his
guns to gain contact, and hopes of a decisive engagement were
renewed by the discovery of a strong rearguard embattled this
time on the high ground on the left bank of the Libenbergs VJei
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 397
river. The enemy was reported to number 2,000 men ; it was
known that they possessed gims, the trophies of Tweefontein,
and ammunition for them. The situation of a commander in
the presence of a hostile covering force of considerable but un-
known strength has always been held to be one of the most diffi-
cult in warfare since the days when Ney shone in command of
rearguards and Soult failed in attacking them. Elliot's problem
on the Libenbergs Vlei, however differing in scale from the
classic prototypes of the Peninsula and Russia, was even more
difficult than they, for he was opposed to an enemy of unpre-
cedented mobility, and in a campaign in which it were hard to
say whether caution had proved the more profitless or dash the
more dangerous. Where prudence gains the day it is useless
to speculate on the possible gains or losses. Elliot, widely ex-
tending his troops, formally advanced against the position, duly
disclosed the enemy's guns and firing lines, and accordingly
missed his mark. Night fell upon his division still on the right
bank of the Libenbergs Vlei river after a remarkable march of
seventy miles ; a few of his parties which had crossed to the
other side were even recalled, and next morning the columns, Touch with
extending once more on a front eight miles broad, marched over ll'Jt.^"'^"'^
an empty position, and soon after completely lost touch even
with the hoof and wheel marks of their quarry. On the last
day of December EUiot returned to the blockhouse line to refiU,
bringing twelve prisoners and fifty-four carts and wagons.
Thus the opening days of the year 1902 found the whole The eastern
campaign almost come to a head in the eastern Orange River cdony th'e^^*^
Colony and De Wet. The conflagration which elsewhere seemed centre of the
to be flickering to its close here burned as fiercely as ever, for *^'"P*'^-
De Wet's renaissance was marked by an energy which recalled
the earhest periods of the Boer campaign. From Ventersburg to
Vrede and from Frankfort down to Fouriesburg there was not
a convoy whose safe arrival could be counted on, not a garrison
that did not stand continually to arms, not a column which
even whilst it marched against the enemy had not to move with
the strictest precautions of the defensive. The history of the
next few months is one of continual effort to bring the guerrilla
398
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Fresh lines of
blockhouses.
DeWet
disperses his
force.
Elliot sweeps
the country.
chief to book. Columns from all parts drove and counter-drove
from every base and every angle across his hunting ground ;
colossal lines of blockhouses daily cut up his sphere of action.
Soon Heilbron was joined to Frankfort, Frankfort to Tafel Kop
and Vrede, Vrede to Botha's Pass and Natal by these fortified
buildings, of which an unbroken row stretched also from Harri-
smith through Bethlehem and Lindley to Kroonstad.* In
bringing all this about De Wet had at once achieved his object
and ended his occupation. He had roused a giant which might
even by accident overpower him. To keep watch on the inces-
sant gyrations of so many colimins, the almost insensible tighten-
ing of the grip of the blockhouses on every horizon, demanded
a hundred eyes. De Wet perceived that the moment had come
for another disembodiment. Now, therefore, he again broke up
the force which he had gathered for so short and adventurous a
course, and in a few days there was scarcely a hill, hoUow, hamlet
or farm in all the countryside without its little population of
armed men, whilst scarcely two hundred remained anywhere
together to reward the powerful arrays which Lord Kitchener
poured into the district. De Wet himself, with a moderate
following, made for the Elands Kop district. With only a few
hours' pause Elliot, knowing nothing of this, took the field
again, and swept rapidly to Reitz, thence northward down the
Libenbergs Vlei river and eastward to the Wilge river, gaining
touch with Tafel Kop (January 4th), whither E. O. F. Hamilton
had now successfully pushed his blockhouses. Nothing was to
be seen and little heard of the enemy, and but for sohtary scouts
the country seemed deserted. A sudden dash back to the
banks of the Libenbergs Vlei in the evening, often a profitable
ruse against the Boers, resulted in the capture of eight prisoners ;
but the commandos had utterly vanished, and Elliot, whose men
were now on reduced rations, gave the word for Lindley. On
this day, January 4th, he covered sixty miles : the last five
days' marching had totalled nearly 250 miles, a feat which the
* Fuller details of these and all other lines of blockhouse construction within the
theatre of war will be found in Appendix 2.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 399
most brilliant rewards have seldom been able to extract from
troops, especially under service conditions of such rigour ; for
it is never to be forgotten what incessant tension of mind and
body added to the labours of columns surrounded by enemies
who had time and again suddenly transformed themselves from
a sprinkling of vedettes into a formidable offensive force.
No sooner was Elliot in Lindley (January 7th) than a rumour
of De Wet's presence close to the north-east once more drew out
his weary men and horses. The Boer leader was reported near
Vecht Kop, moving west with the apparent intention of break-
ing across the railway about Roodewal. This proved true.
On January 8th de Lisle and Fanshawe gained touch, and Touch made
• • o ' with De WeL
retaming it skilfully by another fifty-mile march, interposed
between the railway and De Wet, who was already across the
Rhenoster, and pushed him back beyond Vecht Kop, the Boer
leader eventually drawing off out of reach towards Reitz again.
Rest was now absolutely necessary for two out of Elliot's three
columns. He remained based on Lindley, Fanshawe clearing
the country around the place whilst de Lisle entrenched on
Kaffir Kop to the south, so as to cover an extension of the
Kroonstad — Lindley blockhouse line to that commanding hill.
Whilst they were thus occupied Byng, who had remained in
charge of Quaggafontein, took their place in the field, and
endeavoured to pick up the slender threads which led to De Wet.
He had therefore to make for Reitz, and moved in the first
instance on Fanny's Home, where he expected to find two
columns from Frankfort which had been placed under his com-
mand for the task. These were the forces of Garratt, and of
Lieut.-Colonel J. W. Dunlop, R.A., the first of whom had recently
been engaged in covering Bullock's blockhouse building from
Botha's Pass to Vrede, whilst the latter had been performing
similar service for E. O. F. Hamilton from Frankfort to Tafel
Kop. Both were delayed one day on their southward march,
but on January 20th all three columns united at Verkykers
Kop, and for the rest of the month they drove and counter-drove
between the Libenbergs Vlei and the Wilge rivers, returning to
Fanny's Home with twenty-three prisoners on February ist. By
400
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
A general
scheme
against De
Wet.
Incidents
during the
concentration
of troops.
Successes by
Sir H. Raw-
linson and
Rimington.
that date not only was EUiot again on the move, but three more
columns had taken the field in the immediate neighbourhood to
join in the unending search for De Wet, namely, those of Barker
from Winburg, Dawkins (strengthened by the two regiments
of Imperial Light Horse) from the Harrismith — Bethlehem
blockhouse-head, and Sir H. Rawhnson who reappeared from
Standerton. Rimington, too, came from Frankfort, on every
side of which, from ViUiersdorp to Heilbron and even down to
Elands Kop, he had been raiding with his accustomed vigour
since January ist.
From the converging marches of all these units were
evolved two grand tactical ideas, which were briefly as follows :
First, to press De Wet south-eastward, either into the Drakens-
berg, or against the Harrismith — Bethlehem blockhouses ;
secondly, should this miscarry by De Wet breaking through the
cordon in a westerly direction, to mass a line of columns behind
him and drive him westward, either against a column to be
dropped by EUiot during his advance or, failing that, into the
strongly fortified angle between the Kroonstad railway and the
Wolvehoek — Heilbron blockhouses. The columns did not come
together without sundry incidents on the way. In the last week
of January when EUiot, keeping to the south of Reitz, was
marching on a broad front towards Harrismith, Rimington was
sweeping down the angle between the Libenbergs Vlei and the
WUge rivers, with Sir H. Rawhnson on his left, on the opposite
(right) bank of the WUge. Rawhnson, who reached Comeha on
the 23rd, secured thirty prisoners by a skilfuUy managed round-
up of the farms on the Venters Spruit on the next night. Four
days later he was joined by Dawkins on the Hoi Spruit, and
continuing southward, drove before him a Boer convoy down to
the junction of the CorneUs and WUge rivers. This he surprised
and rushed on the 30th, taking eleven prisoners and forty-five
vehicles. Rimington, who had arrived and remained at Reitz
January 26th — 28th, was now abreast of Rawhnson, and
resumed his march on Harrismith. On the night after RawHn-
son's capture on the right bank of the WUge, Rimington was
equally successful within a few miles of the spot on the left bank.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 401
He, too, had been pushing a Boer convoy southward, and on
the evening of the 31st was so close to it that its capture on the
next day would be almost certain. Rimington's keeji observa-
tion of Boer tactics now prompted him to adopt a manoeuvre
after his opponent's own heart. Suspecting that the imperilled
convoy would double past him in the dark, he himself made a
night march backward, and at dawn on the 31st caught the
whole convoy, with twenty- three prisoners and twenty-one •
wagons at Morgenzon, nine miles in rear of his bivouac of
the evening before.
Lord Kitchener's expectation that De Wet would not be
found in front of the foregathering columns was soon borne out.
The troops made touch with Harrismith with no more serious The army
encounters than those recorded, but Byng, whom Elliot had n^rismith.
stopped at Fanny's Home, exactly fulfilled the purpose for which
he had been left behind. On the night of February 2nd Byng,
acting on inteUigence that the enemy was on the move to the
north, raided in that direction, and at once struck into the midst
of a party under Commandants Mears and Wessels whom De Wet Success \>y
had ordered to extricate the captured guns from the closing ^"^'
cordon of troops. Byng at once attacked, and after a close
combat in which his South African Light Horse and Garratt's
New Zealanders and Queensland Bushmen much distinguished
themselves, recaptured the three guns lost at Tweefontein,
taking in addition twenty-seven prisoners, including three officers,
and six carts. Besides these the Boers suffered the loss of some
dozen killed and wounded, amongst the former being Wessels.
Byng's casualties, in spite of, or perhaps because of the
determined nature of his attack, numbered but three.
The quarry, though thus broken, was now out of the ring, The army
and on February 4th the columns were turned and hurried into war"/*"*"
position for the westerly " drive." Could some aeronaut have
poised high enough to enable him to survey the array in all its
proportions, he would have beheld next day the veld of the
Orange River Colony barred from Frankfort down to Kaffir
Kop by an unbroken arc of horsemen, whose flanks were at the
extremities of a chord more than eighty miles in length, closing,
VOL. IV. 26
402 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
as they moved forward, the "gorge " of the vast open field-work
into which the fortification of the railway and blockhouse lines
had converted the whole of the eastern half of the province.
The walls of this enclosure had been doubly strengthened for the
event. Two additional battalions of infantry lined the defences
between Kroonstad, Wolvehoek and Heilbron, which were
patroUed incessantly by seven armoured trains. At Wolvehoek
a battalion of mounted infantry lay in readiness to gallop to
any quarter at a moment's notice. As for the disposition of the
advancing semi-circle, on the left, from Lindley to near Fanny's
Home, were Elliot's two columns, linking with Rimington, who
reached to Stabbertswaag ; next came Byng, extended as far as
Marsala, north of which was Sir H. Rawlinson, whose right
touched Frankfort and gave a hand to three columns under
Damant, Wilson and Keir* drawn up in front of the Frank-
fort— Heilbron blockhouses. Barker remained in second line
on Kaffir Kop behind Elliot. As this great horn, a colossal
reproduction of the formation of the vanished Zulu impis,
advanced, its embrace grew wider by the addition to Elliot's left
of two columns under Majors W. R, Marshall and H. G. Holmes,
from Sir C. Knox's southern district.
Progress of From February 6th — 8th the unbroken curve rolled in upon
the operation, ^j^^ railway. Not an inch of the country was left unsearched by
day. By night, when no officer or man in all the army was
reUeved from duty, all egress was denied by a continuous line
of entrenched outposts, some distance in front of which fires
were hghted both to increase the apparent depth of the forma-
tion and to disguise the real positions of the works. To attempt
to break through such a barrier was a madman's venture ; yet
it was constantly attempted, especially against Rawlinson, who
in three days took 129 prisoners, and at the northern block-
houses, which, dangerous as they were, seemed less fatal than
the wakeful rank of troops out on the veld. In one of these
encounters ten Boers were killed and many wounded ; in all
* Lieut. -Colonel J. L. Keir, R.A., who, with a command of Royal Horse artillery-
men serving as cavalry without guns, had been placed in charge of the operations
covering the blockhouse building in the north.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 403
of them the fugitives suffered losses by death and capture ;
but here and there parties and individuals, helped by fortune
and their own valour, contrived to get through, in spite of every
precaution. Amongst these evasions was one the bitter mis-
fortune of which was well-nigh atoned for by the desperate
daring of its carrying out. On February 6th De Wet himself, Escape of
with a small following, was west of Elands Kop in the very ^''
centre of the circle. He was precisely informed of the con-
verging forces by his heliographs which had begun to work from
Blaauwkopje (between Bethlehem and Lindley) and Verkykers
Kop as soon as the line of troops had passed them by. The
dangers of the railway and the blockhouses radiating from it
had long been known to him. At the first news of the army
encompassing him he had ordered all his detachments to break
out where they could, and he himself had now to determine
quickly against which of the fences he should make his own rush
for safety. For the blockhouses De Wet had invariably, both
in conversation and his despatches, expressed such contempt that
his decision was a foregone conclusion. Hiding himself near
the Lindley — Kroonstad line late in the afternoon of February
6th, he waited for darkness to cover his salvation or niin. His
chances were small, but every moment's delay would make them
less. Elliot was no further forward than Doomkloof ; Holmes
and Marshall had not yet come up into line from the south.
When night was some hours old he gave the word to march,
and at one o'clock on the morning of February 7th he found
himself close against the wire entanglements which barricaded
the narrow space between the blockhouses. In the intense dark-
ness his approach had been quite undiscovered, and when the
wires were cut De Wet himself and his foremost men effected the
crossing in perfect silence. Close behind him, however, came a
herd of driven cattle, the precious meat supply of the commando,
and it was not until these began to blunder noisily amongst the
wires that the garrisons in the blockhouses awoke to the situa-
tion and opened fire. Many of the beasts and a few burghers
who were riding with them were shot ; many were turned
back, but the majority burst their way through and rejoined
VOL. IV. 26*
4^4
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Close of the
operation.
Its results.
Desperate
resources of
the fugitives.
De Wet when he gained the banks of the Valsch river and
freedom at dawn.*
On the next day, February 8th, the great armament, its
main object thus dissipated, checked its career at the railway
and counted its gains. These were not inconsiderable, though
there were few who would not have bartered the total yield for
one prize which was not in the net. In killed, wounded and
prisoners the manoeuvre had deprived the enemy of some 285
men, perhaps one-sixth of those who had from time to time been
reported, or had disclosed themselves during the past few weeks.
The rest had disappeared, some with De Wet, the others as if
they had been moles or bats, for the surface of the ground had
been apparently utterly denied to them. Some, at least, had
attempted to escape like fish, for Rimington actually made
prisoners of men who had buried themselves all but their mouths
under the waters of the Rhenoster, whilst many were raked from
the mud and reeds of the adjacent banks ! Such desperate
devices to avoid a captor from whom no cruelty was to be feared
may well arouse wonder, not at the length, but the shortness of
the campaign which brought a nation of these stalwarts to its
knees. Must not the Romans have encountered a like spirit
when, under remarkably similar conditions of comparative
discipline, organisation and resources, they found a period
of nearly one hundred and fifty years all too short for the
subjugation of Britain ?
* There was much uncertainty on both sides with regard to this occurrence. It was
believed by the British, and Lord Kitchener so repxirted in his despatch, that De Wet
had driven the cattle as a ram against the wires, hiding himself and his men in
the midst of the mob, a device of the credit of which the Boer leader would scarcely
have deprived himself as he did in his own account of the aflTair (" Three Years' War,"
page 352). It is probable that, unknown to him as he rode ahead in the darkness, the
majority of his followers did actually become involved in the stampede which carried
the herd of 600 beasts through the line of defences.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 405
Approximate Strength States of Columns referred to in
foregoing chapter.
t
I
&-
.s e
a 8
3
0
COLUMN.
1
e
9
a
i
".IS
1-5
1
0
9 u
•^
:s
^>
»«5
December, iqoi— February, 1902.
Brig. -Gen. R. G. Broadwood ...
1,030
—
Lieut. - General E. L.
Lt.-Col. H. de B. de Lisle
1,052
—
I
Lt.Col. the Hon. J. Byng
1.284
»7'
I
1' Elliot in command.
Major K. Kanshawe
1,526
1
Lt.-Col, M. F. Rimin^jton
1,620
365
Lt.-Col. A. E. Wilson
569
180
2
Major J. H. Damant
611
83
3
I
Lt.-Col. J. S. S. Barker (two
columns)
1.07s
—
1
LI.-C0I. C.J. Briggs*
583
—
—
) Brig. - General Sir I.
) Diartnell in commanti.
Lt.-Col. D. McKenzie •
795
—
I
Major-Gen. B. B. R. Campbell...
393
1,486
2
1 Lieut. - General Sir L.
J Kundle in command.
Major F. A. Williams
500
—
—
Col. F. S. Garratt
1. 031
270
I
Lt.-Col. J. W. Dunlop
721
3
Lt.-Col. J. G.W. Dawkins ...
Col. Sir H. Rawlinson
824
—
1.299
178
I
Lt-Col. J. L. Keir
884
Major W. R. Marshall
Major H. G. Holmes
571
I5+
501
1
» These two columns worked independently on Sir J.
command.
Dartnell relinquishing
t Scottish cyclists.
406
CHAPTER XXIII.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL*
{Continued from Chapter XIX.).
JANUARY — MARCH, I902.
Lord Lost to sight, both of his colleague Kekewich and of Army
mowments. Headquarters, Lord Methuen, in hot pursuit of a Boer convoy,
had, as related, reached Vryburg on January 5th. His quarry,
with two days' start, had disappeared, and Lord Methuen
remained for a few days at Vryburg, employing the interval in
scattering a laager discovered to the north-west (January 8th),
from which his troops captured seven prisoners. On the 12th
he struck eastward again, marching fast by way of O'Reilly's
Pan and Mooiplaats across the Harts river to Rooiwal, beyond
which, by hard galloping, he picked up a wandering Boer convoy
of thirty-two vehicles and much stock on the 14th. Two days
later, whilst heading for Boschpoort, at the head of the Little
Harts river. Lord Methuen suddenly came upon the very convoy
which had misled him across to Vryburg. Although it was
strongly guarded it was quickly captured entire, forty-live
vehicles, a herd of beasts and nineteen burghers falling into
the hands of the mounted troops, who rode fifty horses to death
in the pursuit. On January 19th the column entered Lichten-
burg. Near this town the enemy, as he was so often fortunate
enough to do, made amends for his losses on the i6th by
inflicting a sharp blow on part of Lord Methuen's column. It
happened that a party of some forty Boers had been reported
at Treurfontein, some twenty miles to the south-east. On
* See map No. 59.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 407
January 21st Lieut.-Colonel K. Chesney was despatched to
engage them with 200 men. But the supposed small band
proved to be a strong commando, under General Celliers, who,
after demolishing Chesney's advance-guard squadron, pro-
ceeded to outflank and hustle the rest back towards Lichten-
burg. Within six miles of the town the detachment, which had
lost more than a third of its strength,* was fortunately met by
Lord Methuen, who had heard of the affair and had sallied out
to the rescue with 500 men and three guns. Rain and " rinder-
pest " kept Lord Methuen at Lichtenburg until the 26th, when
he made for Klerksdorp by a circuitous route around Tafel Kop,t
arriving on the railway on February ist.
Kekewich, since his abortive combination with Lord Methuen, Kekewich's
had been engaged during the previous month in covering the "o^e^^"*'-
construction of a line of blockhouses along the Taaibosch Spruit
to Vaalbank. This he effected chiefly from Rietfontein, em-
ploying his time in harrying any hostile parties within reach,
from one of which, at Brakpan on January i6th, he took eleven
prisoners and a small train of wagons. Altogether Kekewich
took twenty-eight prisoners by these means during the month.
On the 29th, the blockhouse line being completed to Vaalbank,
it was decided to prolong it to Lichtenburg, and Hickie was
called down from Tafel Kop to assist Kekewich in protecting
the building operations. Hickie appeared on February ist,
and Kekewich immediately resumed his wonted activity. The
northward extension of the blockhouses was carrying him daily
into the heart of a region which had never failed to be infested
with the enemy's most determined bands, such as had lately
done damage to Chesney's party within a few miles. Not far
to the north, at Roodepan, De la Rey himself was reported to be
in laager, and there were other camps in the vicinity. All
were known to Kekewich's Intelligence Officer, Mr. W. Carlisle,
a man as subtle in the detective part of war as he was skilled
• Casualties — Killed, nine men ; wounded, twenty-four men ; captured, three officers
and thirty-eight men ; total, seventy-four,
f Not to l)e confused with the height of similar name in the Frankfort district of
the Orange River Colony.
408 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
in fighting, to whom, as to Wools-Sampson in the Eastern
Transvaal, well-nigh every burgher on this side was known by
name and sight, and every camping ground and water-pan upon
the vast tract a familiar haunt. On the night of February 4th
Kekewich despatched Major H. P. Leader, of the ist Scottish
Horse, accompanied by Carhsle, to try their fortune with 634
mounted men and a Vickers-Maxim.
Success at Leader, intent on the most important game, marched straight
1902. to Roodepan, a Boer piquet fell into his hands, from whom he
learned that De la Rey had probably moved, but that another
laager was certainly to be found at Gruisfontein, an intermediate
farm. Leader decided to grasp at the substance rather than
risk the shadow. With great skill he advanced on Gruisfontein,
not from the south, which would have given the Boers a clear
run in the direction most safe for them, but by a wide circling
movement made in the dark from the north, which would both
bewilder the enemy and drive him towards Kekewich, who was
at Leeuwfontein, at the source of the Taaibosch Spruit. Before
dawn on February 5th Leader arrived within charging distance
of the laager. He disposed his men in three bodies, placing the
scouts of the Scottish Horse in the centre, two squadrons (ninety-
five men) of the same corps under Captain J. R. Mackenzie on
the right, and the same (no men) under Captain W. Jardine
on the left. In this order the force rushed upon the laager during
the last few moments of twilight, for Leader, fearing to be dis-
covered, would not wait for day. The Boers were completely
taken by surprise. Sleeping in various scattered kraals, each
party in turn attempted resistance, and more than once by their
rapid and resolute firing went near to checking the onset. But
Leader had sent in his men with as much intelligence as deter-
mination. Pushing his flanks well in advance of his centre he
had soon surrounded the whole group of kraals, from which,
shoot as fiercely as they would, not a Boer could make his escape,
whilst all were practically without cover from one side or the
other. First, on the right, seventeen burghers were taken as
they broke and fled ; a moment later Jardine secured twenty-
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 409
seven more from one of the huts on the left ; finally, after
hot fighting at close quarters, the centre had the satisfaction of
receiving the surrender of Commandant Sarel Alberts, a noted
commander, with seventeen of his officers and all his men, to the
number of 131, of whom ten were wounded ; seven others were
found dead. Leader's losses were comparatively trifling. Only
eight officers and men were woimded, and twenty-eight horses
kiUed, so completely had dismay ruined the aim of fine marks-
men, though they had shot furiously at a few yards' range.
Leader's march back, encumbered as he was by wounded and
prisoners, was much facilitated by a movement by Kekewich
westward, accompanied by an artillery demonstration, which
effectually distracted attention from the returning detachment.
On February 8th Kekewich, still with Hickie, advanced on
the Lichtenburg road to Rietvlei, and on the 15th to Rietgat,
where he remained until the completion of the blockhouses on
the 2ist. He was then ordered back on Klerksdorp, Hickie
handing over his command to Lieut. -Colonel H. M. Grenfell on
the same date. On the 25th he reached Hartebeestfontein, and
there he was met by the news that a convoy from von Donop's
column had been lost to the south-west of Klerksdorp. There
was not the faintest indication which way it had been removed,
and Kekewich, feeling in all directions, entered Wolmaranstad
on February 28th, determined to organise there a flying column
for the rescue of the wagons. At Wolmaranstad he joined von Kekewich
Donop, whose presence here, and the circumstances of his loss {^'"^j^""
must now be explained. Woimaran-
Lord Methuen, it will be remembered, after his expedition to
Lichtenburg had returned to Klerksdorp on February ist. Here
he remained for a week. On the 8th he was granted leave of
absence prior to estabhshing his permanent Headquarters at
Vryburg on the western railway ; for it was his intention to
rehnquish for a time the actual leadership of the column with
which he had done such long and arduous work in the field. The
command of the column then devolved upon Lieut. -Colonel S. B.
von Donop, R.A., who had been Lord Methuen's lieutenant in
all his expeditions. On the very day of his promotion von
stad.
4IO
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Von Donop's
previous
movements.
Von Donop
sends a convoy
towards
Klerksdorp.
De la Rey in
the neighbour-
hood.
Donop signally justified it. Hearing of a concentration of Boers
under Potgieter — lately a fugitive from the Makwasie Berg — at
Elandslaagte, eleven miles west of Klerksdorp, von Donop
issued from Klerksdorp by night, and turning the laager from
the north, fell upon it at dawn and completely overthrew it,
capturing thirty-six prisoners. Potgieter himself again escaped,
but so narrowly that he had to ride for it bareback, and clad
only in his shirt. Von Donop then went into camp on a neigh-
bouring farm. At 9 p.m. that night the enemy attempted to
avenge their losses of the morning by a sharp attack on the
baggage and supply columns, in which four men and twenty-six
mules were shot, and some of the horses stampeded. Next day
von Donop marched upon Wolmaranstad, which he had been
ordered to make his base for clearing the district. There,
making constant raids amongst the enemy's cattle, he remained
during February until the occurrence of the incident which
brought Kekewich to his side. On the 23rd it was necessary to
send a convoy into Klerksdorp for supplies. The convoy, which
consisted of 145 mule-wagons and six drawn by oxen, was
escorted by 230 men of the 5th Imperial Yeomanry, 225 of the
ist Northumberland Fusihers, twenty British South African
Police, fifteen men of the 3rd South Wales Borderers with two
guns of the 4th battery R.F.A., a Vickers-Maxim and two
Maxims ; the whole imder Lieut. -Colonel W. C. Anderson,
the commanding officer of the Imperial Yeomanry, Besides
these there were seventy-eight men of Paget's Horse, who were
proceeding on special duty to Klerksdorp, and therefore not
properly to be considered as forming part of the escort. A
similar convoy had travelled over and back by the same route a
week previously. On the evening of the 23rd Anderson halted
at Kareeboomskuil ; on the following evening at Yzerspruit.
The two days had been quite uneventful, nor did there seem
any hkehhood of danger attending the short march which would
bring the column into Klerksdorp. Nevertheless every mile
covered had brought the convoy into more imminent peril. A
few days earlier General De la Rey had come down to the Wol-
maranstad— Klerksdorp road in search of adventure, of supplies,
I
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 411
of revenge for many miscarried enterprises. He had come in
full strength, with a following of 1,500 to 2,000 men under his
most trusted subordinates, Kemp, Celliers and Liebenberg. His
scouts, watching von Donop in Wolmaranstad, had immediately
informed him of the departure of the convoy, and De la Rey,
unaware that the wagons were empty, determined to take them.
This with the force under his control he might have done at
any spot upon the road, but with a true soldierly instinct, eager
as he was, he wished to make his capture as little costly to his
own troops as possible. He therefore deferred his stroke until
there remained but one day's march to Klerksdorp, " for," said
he, " seeing that in the vicinity of a fortified place the desire of
the enemy to arrive there safely is more powerful, the English
would offer less resistance in the neighbourhood of Klerksdorp,
and more readily take to flight than out in the veld."* The
added power of a mihtary leader who knows human nature, and
how to play upon it, has long been acknowledged : that such a
one, that more than one, existed in the Boer forces may perhaps
enlighten those who lavished scorn on the British army for being
so long kept at bay " by a nation of farmers." As De la Rey
lay watching Anderson on the 24th, he was nearly discovered by
the posse of Paget's Horse, whom Anderson sent on ahead of
the column into Klerksdorp, where they were urgently wanted
for duty with another column. As these horsemen drew clear
along the road, they passed close under De la Rey himself, who
had taken post on a rise overhanging their road, and the
Boer General confessed that it was with difficulty that he
restrained himself from ordering their destruction.* But to
open fire then might lose him the heavier booty behind, and
the party, all innocent of its escape, disappeared towards Klerks-
dorp. At 4.30 a.m. on February 25th Anderson set his troops oeiaRey
and wagons in motion towards Klerksdorp. The wagons moved a"acics
four abreast, which reduced the length of road covered by them convoy""^'* "
to 1,000 yards. In front went an advance-guard of forty- Kd^K'
five men ; twenty more extended as guards on either flank ; '902.
* Account of a Boer official present with General De la Rey.
412 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
sixty-two men with a Maxim acted as rearguard, all these riding
from 1,000 yards to a mile wide of the column. The infantry
marched in three bodies at equal intervals amongst the train,
which was actually headed by lOO mounted men escorting the
field guns and Vickers-Maxim. Long before the convoy had left
its camping ground at Yzerspruit, De la Rey had laid his plans.
Once more they were founded as much on the characteristics of
his antagonists as on their strength and formation. The wagons,
which he chiefly desired, he knew that the troops would naturally
do their utmost to preserve, probably with all their none too
great strength, at the very first threat at any part. To draw
them away from the convoy he arranged first a frontal attack
to be delivered at the head of the column by Liebenberg's Pot-
chefstroom commando from a tree-covered ridge running athwart
the road. When this should have brought the majority of the
troops to the front, Celliers, who had already ridden off with the
Lichtenburgers by a circuitous track, would push the column into
disorder from the rear, whereupon Kemp with the Rustenburg
commando would fall upon it in flank and complete the rout.
The sequence of these orders should be noted. The relegation to
the last of the blow at the side, the weakest point, is especially
remarkable as an inteUigent departure from precedent ; for
even had the other manoeuvres failed, success here would be
almost certain, so denuded must the flank of the convoy be by
the efforts to repel the attacks on its front and rear. The
colmnn had marched about a mile and a half when a volley from
the wooded crest close in front struck not only the advance-guard
but the leading wagons, the mules of which promptly wheeled
and raced in panic towards the rear. Anderson, reinforcing the
front, lost no time in pushing his guns into action, and soon
belaboured the wood with so heavy a shower of shot and shell
that the riflemen therein, disagreeably surprised at the success
of their rdle, began to break up and run for shelter to other parts.
Anderson immediately ordered the leading infantry to rush the
plantation, which was done with such success that the front was
cleared, and it was possible to park the wagons under the crest
of the high ground, where the guns also took post. But Anderson
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 413
was not to be duped into premature confidence. He feared
continually for his left flank, which he had already reinforced with
a squadron. When the fighting in front had proceeded for a
quarter of an hour he had seen a strong body of Boers circling
in this direction, and it became almost a certainty that the real
attack was to be made there. Anderson hastily sent thither
every available man, cooks, servants, commissariat assistants,
etc., and soon had his flank guarded by more than 150 rifles.
This was done only just in time to ward off the summary annihila-
tion of the column. Nine hundred horsemen appeared on the
left. Having advanced in unbroken Hne to within 500 yards,
firing from the saddle as they ambled forward, the whole body
suddenly charged impetuously down ui>on the flank. A fire Severe
which was not to be faced met the stormers ; three times they "anting,
came on, wavered, and fled back out of range. Once under
shelter they were steadied by their officers, and twenty minutes
later advanced and charged again. For the fourth time they were
hurled back by a terrible fusilade from the men of the flank guard
who lay immovable, in the face of what were virtually repeated
rushes of cavalry. Anderson seized this opportunity to send
an officer at full speed to summon help from Klerksdorp. So
far De la Key's machinery had gone sadly out of gear ; both his
men and his tactics had signally failed. His frontal demon-
stration had been unexpectedly swept aside ; Celliers had not
yet appeared in rear to roll up the column for the finishing stroke
of the flank attack, which had thus been delivered too soon.
But De la Key's strength was too great to penalise him fatally
for his mischances. It was only a question of getting by patience
what he had hoped to achieve by dash. Nor had he long to
wait for the missing commando. Celliers, surprised by the early
start of the column, had lingered in his hiding-place on the rear
towards Jackalsfontein, but having discovered his mistake he
rode hard to rectify it. Soon after the second repulse of Kemp
from the flank he galloped on to the field with 500 men and
immediately rode against the British rearguard. For a time
it seemed as though this last throw, too, would fail. Like
Kemp, Celliers met with a shattering reception ; his men refused
414 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
to face the fire, and scattering backwards and outwards, con-
tented themselves for the next two hours with bringing a cross
fire to bear upon the rearguard, which suffered considerably but
replied with vigour. The troops here were now in an unfortunate
position. The very firmness of their resistance was momen-
tarily robbing them of the chance of victory. Ammunition began
to fail ; the men were growing exhausted ; the rest of the
column had by this time closed up to the front and out of
reach. Finally, when every round was spent, and to remain a
moment longer meant massacre, the rearguard was ordered to
fall back. It was of course the signal for its destruction. The
enemy, rising from the bushes rode down in overpowering num-
bers upon the defenceless soldiers, and passing through them, as
Botha's burghers had passed through the Buffs at Bakenlaagte,*
moved straight up the wooded crest where stood the remnants
of Anderson's convoy. At the same time, on the left, Kemp's
beaten men took heart again, and began to extend on foot in
skirmishing order, pouring in a hot fire. At the edge of the
plantation Anderson did his utmost to stave off the end. The
guns had been fought until they could be no longer served.
The wagons were now both outflanked and totally exposed in
rear. Ordering the officer in charge to get them on the move
towards Klerksdorp, he sent his adjutant to urge the commander
of the artillery to attempt to gallop his guns away to the town.
The adjutant, however, was taken prisoner almost as soon as
he had started, and the order never reached the guns. Anderson
then endeavoured to collect men to form a fresh rearguard behind
which guns and wagons might get clear. Descending the slope
in search of the scattered soldiers, he suddenly found himself
surrounded by men in khaki uniforms who, holding their rifles
Capture of the to his breast, demanded surrender. Other Boers, similarly dis-
convoy. guised, were in a moment upon the guns, and soon the entire
column passed into the enemy's hands after a resistance which
had made its overthrow more creditable than many a victory.
Of the 490 officers and men engaged 187 had been killed and
wounded, the detachment of the Northumberland Fusihers alone
* See Chapter XVII.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 415
losing thirty-one killed and sixty-four wounded out of this
number. Only one wounded officer and 108 men escaped and
made their way into Klerksdorp.* The Boers owned to fifty-
one killed and wounded, included amongst the former being one
of their bravest officers, the young General Lemmer.
On the news of this disaster rescue parties were organised in Search for De
all directions. Brigadier-General J. C. Barker, in command at * ^^*
Klerksdorp, had plainly heard the firing, and had indeed
attempted to intervene with the few mounted troops at his
disposal, but without success. He then collected some 300
Yeomanry, whom he ordered to proceed to join Kekewich who
was hurrying towards Wolmaranstad. A small column which
had been operating about Bothaville under Colonel Sir R. Colle-
ton was called northward with orders to join von Donop, which
it did at Wolvespruit on the evening of February 26th, von
Donop having dashed across from Wolmaranstad, thirty miles
distant, with 500 men the same morning. An anxious search
to the northward revealed no sign of the enemy and his booty,
and on the 27th von Donop turned back for Wolmaranstad,
where, as already related, he was joined by Kekewich, who next
morning entered the entrenched township. Kekewich at once
prepared a mounted column for a last effort at retaking the
convoy. On the evening of the 28th he placed Lieut.-Colonel
H. M. Grenfell in command of a force of 1,654 officers and men
and 1,823 horses, with four field pieces and a Vickers-Maxim.
These he sent northward towards Rietfontein, on the Koranna-
fontein — Klerksdorp road, on the trail of a convoy supposed to
be that taken from Anderson. On March 2nd he himself
evacuated Wolmaranstad, after destroying all the defences which Evacuation of
had been thrown up by von Donop. The abandonment of a ^j™*™""
fortified place as the result of the loss of a convoy may be added
to the list of curious tactical reagents. It was here, of course,
chiefly entailed by the departure of all the garrison of the town
for purposes of pursuit, but undoubtedly the retention of Wol-
maranstad had become exceedingly precarious. Kekewich then
» Casualties— Killed, five officers, fifty-three other ranks ; wounded, six officers, 123
other ranks; captured, one officer, 193 other ranks.
4i6 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
moved by Yzerspruit, where he found dead bodies still unburied,
to Klerksdorp, which he entered on March 4th. Finally Lord
Methuen, roused by the news at Vryburg, instantly took the field
with one hurriedly formed column under Major A. Paris (Royal
Marine Artillery) from his Headquarters, whilst he called
Colonel A. N. Rochfort with another from across the Vaal.
Lord Methuen communicated these movements to Kekewich,
and requested him to send a force to meet him on March 7 th
about Rooirantjesfontein, due south of Lichtenburg, the inten-
tion being for Paris and Kekewich to stand between De la Rey
and the Marico district whilst Rochfort, advancing from the
south, should drive the as yet undiscovered Boer leader into
their arms. For this Kekewich decided to employ Grenfell,
who, on March 4th, had gone into camp at Rietkuil, outside
Klerksdorp, after a vigorous search during which he had cast
vainly around by the south of Lichtenburg, by Holfontein and
Paardeplaats, at both of which he had shght engagements.
Hearing from Lord Methuen that he was being delayed by bad
roads, and would be late at the rendezvous, Grenfell only covered
the first stage towards Rooirantjesfontein on March 6th, when
he marched to Leeuwfontein. On the 8th he was at the appointed
place ; but there was no sign of the Vryburg column, and during
the morning Grenfell learned why it would be vain to await its
appearance.
Lord Methuen Lord Methucu, accompanying Paris's column,* had marched
v^'biir^'^*''" out of Vryburg on March 2nd, and following the meagre water
supply of this parched district moved by Grootpan, Barberspan,
and Leeuwspruit, at the junction of the two Harts rivers, to
Tweebosch on the Little Harts river, which was reached on the
evening of the 6th. Up to this stage his only trouble had been
with the water supply, which had to be as carefully scouted for
•Composition — 5th battalion I. Y., 184 men; 86th company I.Y., no men; Cape
Police, 233 men ; Cullinan's Horse, sixty-four men ; B.S.A. Police, twenty-four men ;
Diamond Fields Horse, ninety-two men ; Dennison's Scouts, fifty-eight men ; Ash-
burner's Light Horse, 126 men ; 4th battery R.F.A., two guns; 38th battery R.F.A.,
two guns ; two Vickers-Maxims ; 1st battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, 200 men ;
1st battalion Loyal North Lancashire regiment, 100 men ; about 1,200 men in all.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 417
as the enemy. Not until this day, the 6th, had any considerable
hostile body been met with, nor would the commando of 100 men
or so which followed the troops through Leeuwspruit have
attracted notice had it not been for the disquieting behaviour of
the rearguard, a company of Imperial Yeomanry, who allowed
the sniping of this paltry force so to disorganise their formations
that Lord Methuen himself rode to the rear with two guns to
steady them. The commando, which was under Van Zyl, retired
under shell-fire towards Tweebosch, where, taking up a position
in the bed of the Little Harts river, it remained in observation.
Lord Methuen's intention had been to camp at Leeuwkuil.
Learning that that place was waterless, he decided instead to
follow the Boers to Tweebosch, which he reached in the fore-
noon, Van Zyl's men disappearing southward on their flanks
being threatened by the mounted troops. Though it was still
early in the day the heat of the weather, following upon the
extreme hardships of the previous four days' marching, induced
Lord Methuen to go into camp at Tweebosch. There was no Lord Methuen
cause for haste ; his information ran that the guns and convoy *' *"
captured from Anderson were still to the south of him ;* he had
warned Grenfell of one or possibly two days' postponement of
their junction, the place app>ointed for which was but one march
to the north-east.
At three o'clock next morning, March 7th, the column was
set in motion, pointing northward towards Leeuwkuil. The His order of
enemy being to the south the rear was the vulnerable part, and JJarch 7th,
Lord Methuen especiaUy enjoined Major Paris to look to this >902.
quarter. For this reason also the transport travelled in front.
It consisted of ox and mule wagons, the former preceding the
latter, both escorted by a squadron of Cape Pohce, the 86th com-
pany Imperial Yeomanry, the detachments of Northumberland
Fusihers and Loyal North Lancashire, the two guns 4th battery
R.F.A., and a Vickers-Maxim. Behind these, and leaving the
bivouac an hour later, came the fighting portion of the column, dis-
posed in three bodies, advance-guard, main body, and rearguard,
* Lord Methuen to Commander-in-Chief, March 5th, 1902.
VOL. IV. 27
4i8
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
De la Rey
attacks Lord
Methuen at
Tweebosch,
5 a-m-.
March 7th,
1902.
the last being composed of two detachments of irregular
moimted levies. The country on either side was flat and open,
unimpeded by either kopje or bush. Darkness, however, is better
cover for an enemy than even these, and the head of the column
had marched for two hours before the first streak of dawn.
During that time the force was being shadowed, as a file of
coolies is followed by the Indian tiger, by the most formidable
depredator in all the theatre of war. Close behind the rear-
most screen, invisible and noiseless, rode De la Rey and nearly
2,000 men, most of whom were fresh from the field of Yzer-
spniit, and under the same officers, Kemp, Celliers, the elder
Lemmer, Vermaas and, finally. Van Zyl, the jackal who had
" harboured " the game on the previous day. Enveloping the
British rearguard under cover of the gloom, at break of day
(5 a.m.) the commandos suddenly opened so terrible a fire from
three sides that, with scarcely a pretence at resistance, the
untrained, undisciplined irregulars broke and fled, before the
guns of the 38th battery and the Vickers-Maxim, which were sent
with other troops to their assistance, could come into action.
The burghers were upon them at once, and, galloping forward
amongst them in a confused mob, bore down upon the front
and flanks of the mounted supports which had been moving
with the guns to reinforce the now shattered screen in rear.
For a short time these troops stood with some determination,
but their resolution melted before the overwhelming numbers
opposed to them, and soon the guns remained isolated in the
midst of the enemy. Now, not for the first time, were training
and tradition to illumine the blackness of disaster. Lieutenant
T. P. W. Nesham and his artillerymen of the 38th battery were
men of the same blood as they who had given way, but to them
flight was not even a last resort, it was an impossibility. Until
every man had fallen the gims were served with case, and even
when the pieces were actually captured and lost to sight amidst
the surging crowds of Boers, the young officer in command, the
only unwounded member of the personnel, refused to surrender,
and suffered death for his gallantry at the hands of some
unchivalrous butcher amongst his enemies. This left the rest of
I
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 419
the column completely open to attack. The enemy's flanking
parties had already outridden and assailed the slow moving
convoy, and Lord Methuen, ordering the ox-wagons to halt, and
the mule-drawn portion to close upon it, had disposed the troops
of the escort for defence on both sides. Before the mule-wagons
had drawn on far the bullets of the rear attack tore amongst
them. Instantly appalling confusion ensued. Some of the teams
wheeled round ; the majority, maddened by fear, rushed on in a
weltering mass past the ox convoy and far ahead, scattering
northward over the veld pursued by the enemy, who was now
close in upon three sides of the motionless ox-wagons. Lord
Methuen strove as desperately as had Anderson at Yzerspruit to
save what remained. His ox- wagons were immovable ; no
threats or entreaties could induce the native drivers, who lay
panic-stricken beneath the wagons, to urge their teams forward.
Espying a kraal on rising ground about a mile to the front
towards Leeuwkuil, Lord Methuen then ordered Paris to rally
there as many of the mounted men as he could collect, whilst he
himself with the infantry and guns remained with the convoy.
For two hours the devoted troops around him kept off their in-
evitable fate. Surrounded at point-blank range by a force of
marksmen five times their number, their only prospect was to
show how soldiers may perish. The two guns of the 4th battery
were fought as nobly as those of the 38th had been. Even after
Lieutenant G. R. Venning, their commander, was killed, the
gunners remained at their work until all were down. The men
of the Northumberland Fusiliers showed that even constant mis-
fortune could not lower their spirit. This regiment had suffered
in well-nigh every disaster in the Western Transvaal, and that
through as little fault and after as stout fighting as on this
occasion. The Loyal North Lancashire vied with the Fusiliers.
Lord Methuen himself was the central figure of his forlorn hope
until his horse was killed and he himself fell with a fractured
thigh. Soon after the fighting here ceased, and he passed into Capture of
the hands of General De la Rey who rode into the convoy. In and his*' "^"^
this manner did Lord Methuen meet the Boer leader whom be column.
and many others had long sought with intense assld.uity. ©Cj fe*
VOL. IV. 27*
420 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Key, ever the most chivalrous of foemen, after treating his
prisoner with the utmost kindness, with extraordinary generosity
permitted him to be conveyed in his own wagon to Klerksdorp,
and this in the face of considerable opposition by some of his
colleagues, who objected to the hberation of so valuable a captive.
Meanwhile at the kraal there had been a short but sharp
affray. Paris had been able to collect but forty men from the
routed irregulars, and distributing these in the huts and around
a patch of meahes, he strove to keep off Celliers, who turned upon
him from chasing the panic-stricken mule train, and completely
enclosed him. Celliers had with him three light guns, and
when shells began to riddle the kraals and tumble them in, the
defenders, who had fought stubbornly, were in a hopeless plight,
and at lo a.m. they surrendered. Thus, after five hours
from its first surprise, Lord Methuen's column was completely
destroyed. Three-quarters of the personnel were killed, wounded
or taken prisoner.* The rest were scattered over the veld, making
for Kraaipan, Maribogo and other places on the western railway
line, which many reached before nightfall. It was long since
so complete a catastrophe had befallen the British arms. Other
disasters there had been of a similar kind during the campaign,
but none involving the capture of an officer of high rank ; more-
over, not even much honour had been saved at Tweebosch, for
the personal gallantry of Lord Methuen and the few who
emulated him could not cloak the pusillanimity of those whose
flight had sacrificed their comrades. Of the panic of the majority
of the mounted troops lack of training, insufficiency and inex-
perience of officers, and above all, the heterogeneous nature of
their composition were the main causes. But with many
examples before them of fine defences offered by troops similarly
handicapped, neither the soldier nor the historian can appeal too
much to such apologies.
Eflfoct of the Tweebosch sent the star of De la Key, which after much
Tweebosch. wavering had for some time been in the ascendant, up to its
zenith. The Western Transvaal was now in extreme danger, if
* Casualties — Killed, four officers, sixty-four other ranks ; wounded, ten officers, 122
other ranks.
successes.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 421
not of being reconquered by the Boers, at least of being rendered
uninhabitable for the conquerors. One deliberately chosen
depot, Wolmaranstad, had been already evacuated ; all others
wide of the main hnes, especially Lichtenburg, were in danger
either of attack or of isolation, for it was unsafe to move a
convoy whilst such a hornet was on the wing. Yet, for the
warning of those who base their hopes of defeating invasion on a
last resort to guerrilla fighting, it cannot be too strongly pointed
out that De la Key, with all his brilliant successes, had scarcely
so much as checked the sweep of the scythe which was mowing
down his country. His feats, like those of Botha at Baken-
laagte, of De Wet at Roodewal and Kom Spruit, were nothing
more than tactical and local annoyances, rockets which fell
harmless almost as soon as they had dazzled. In them was inutility
none of the irresistible influence of some great but possibly
noiseless strategic accomplishment, giving a momentum to a
campaign which a hundred affairs such as those at Yzerspruit
or Tweebosch could not stir either forward or backward. Recall-
ing events not long past for a single instance, what had De Wet's
sparkhng capture at Waterval on February 15th, 1900, weighed
against Field-Marshal Lord Roberts' intent herding of Cronje's
commandos into the fatal bed of the Modder ?* It has not been
the duty of the writer to point morals except by the narration of
facts ; his space is limited, and the lessons of engagements,
skirmishes, tactics and strategy in the war in South Africa are as
innumerable as they are generally easily deduced. The greatest
lesson of the campaign is, however, brief enough to be more than
once insisted upon — that the nation which is robbed of or
divests itself of broad military purposes, long conceived and
long prepared, and leans instead upon the patriotism of irregu-
lars and the delusive brilliance which so often illuminates
their warfare, is about to vanish from its high place none the
less surely because it sinks amid a cloud of falling stars.
• See Volume II., Chapter VI.
422
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Approximate Strength States of Columns referred to in
foregoing chapter.
i
fi
(0
a
COLUMN.
•8
i
II
.9 '
3
4)
a
e
"S
m 4>
0
H4
S-^
S
1
3 0
s
January — March, 1902.
Col. R. G. Kekewich
690
523
3
I
/ Maj. - Gen. Mildmay
Col. W. B. Hickie . .
539
170
3
I
\ Willson in command.
Lt.-Gen. Lord Methuen . . |
Lt.-Col. S. B. von Donop . . j
1,687
409
5
3
Maj. H. P. Leader
634
I
—
Lt.-Col. H. M. Grenlell
1.654
5
—
Lt.-Col. W. C. Anderson . .
250
240
3
2
Col. Sir R. Colleton, Bart. . .
—
778
I
Maj. A. Paris
891
300
6
—
1 Lt. Gen. Lord Methuen
1 in command.
Col. A. N. Rochfort
1.377
513
4
I
423
CHAPTER XXIV.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY*
[Continued from Chapter XXII.).
FEBRUARY, I902.
Whilst the troops of the eastern part of the Orange River
Colony rested on the railway. Lord Kitchener prepared plans a fresh
for another expedition, which in dimensions and complexity ^foHhe
far outstripped its predecessor. The scheme provided for con-
volutions by co-operating but separated bodies, which can best
be rendered intelligible in parallel tabular form, as follows : —
FIRST PHASE.
Elliot.
(De Lisle, Fanshawe, Holmes, Marshall.
Lawley.t Du Cane.t)
March east from line Kroonstad — Venters-
burg — Doornberg to line Lindley —
Bethlehem.
Rimington, Byng, Sir H. Rawlinson.
March east, right on Wolvehoek — Frank-
fort blockhouses, left on Heidelberg, to
line Standerton — Tafel Kop.
SECOND PHASE.
Wheel eastward to line of Wilge river
between Strijdpoort and Majoors Drift.
Wheel south, pivoting on Tafel Kop, on
line between Wilge river and Stander-
ton railway.
THIRD PHASE.
railway.
Hold above line on the Wilge, right
prolonged to Harrismith by Sir L.
Rundle.
March south to line of l>lockhouses Van
Reenen's Pass — Elands River Bridge.
Right flank blocked by Elliot on Wilge.
Lett flank (passes of Drakensberg) held
by troops from Natal.
* See map No. 64.
t These fresh columns were provided as follows : Major J. P. Du Cane came from
Colonel Rochfort's southern district ; Lieut. -Colonel the Hon. R. T. Lawley, with the
7th Hussars and 2nd Dragoon Guards, from Winburg.
424
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Object of the
plan.
The first
move,
Feb. 1 2th,
1902.
The driving
The scope and intention of these operations will be under-
stood by reference to the map better than by any written
description. Briefly, their first aim was to herd the Boers of
the eastern Orange River Colony into a closed funnel, formed by
the Wilge river on the one side, the Khp river and the Drakens-
berg on the other, the Harrismith — Van Reenen's blockhouses
completing the cul de sac. Down this lane the northern columns
would then sweep from its entrance southward, pushing the
enemy towards its blind end, just as the fowlers of past days
used to drive the wild-fowl through the decoy " pipes " which
ended in the fatal enclosure of the net.
Elliot was the first to move, quitting Kroonstad on February
12th and 13th, with his left (Fanshawe) on the Valsch, his right
(Lawley and Du Cane) extending southward towards the Win-
burg — Senekal road. On the 14th his line from right to left
was Senekal — Rienzi ; on the next day from Elands Spruit
to the Molen Spruit. On the i6th he was between .Lindley and
Bethlehem, halting on that hne until the distant factors of the
operation should develop. A raid by his left flank against
Elands Kop on the 17th resulted in the capture of ten prisoners
and De Wet's invaluable heliograph.
Turning now to the north, where the driving force had been
Fe" leth^' "* ^'^ki^g ready : On February i6th Rimington's right was on the
1902- Heilbron — Frankfort blockhouses (the line of which, as before,
had been stiffened by Damant, Wilson, and Keir), his left at
Groenvlei, whence Byng carried the front across the Vaal
at Grobler's Drift to join Sir H. Rawlinson, who was extended
from Bierlaagte to Daspoort, south-east of Heidelberg. Rawlin-
son had already been busied in deahng with a Boer band which
had attacked a Heidelberg detachment in the Zuikerbosch Rand ;
this he did effectually on the 15th before taking up his Une as
above. With little incident the three columns now advanced
on a solid front for three days, and on the i8th had arrived at
the wheeUng point, the Hne being then, from right to left, Tafel
Kop — Zaam Dam — Lemoenskraal — Zamenkomst — Standerton.
On the 19th there was a general halt for suppUes, which were
drawn from the opposite flanks — ^Tafel Kop and Standerton.
EVEP^TS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 425
On the 20th, whilst Damant moved to connect Rimington's
right with the Wilge river, an advance was made to the hne
Cyferpoort — Gruisplaats — Baviaanskraal — Paardekop, a front of
nearly sixty miles. On the 21st Rimington, still pivoting on
Tafel Kop, threw his left through Vrede to Paardenkop, Byng
beyond, touching the Klip river at Eerstegeluk. RawUnson,
detaching his left from the Standerton railway, pushed down
to Eerstegeluk — Zoetendalsvlei, the gap thus created between
him and the railway being filled by a column from Paardekop
station under Colonel J. E. Nixon, who cleared the Verzamel
Berg on his way.
All was now set for the final act, and Elliot moved forward Elliot seizes
and seized the Wilge from Strijdpoort down to Majoors Drift, wli^e"*" °^ ^*'*'
his left in touch with the Frankfort contingents, his right with
those from Bethlehem. Facing him, and sixty miles distant,
troops from Natal blocked every loophole of the Drakensberg ;
the men in the Harrismith — Van Reenen's defences stood to
arms, and every side of the great alley was lined with guns and
rifles. On February 22nd the line descending from the north
reached Woodside — Botha's Berg — Poortje — Zeekoevlei. Except
for a large capture of stock by Sir H. Rawlinson, on the left, as
he passed over the Gemsbokhoek Berg, there had been so far
little reward for so much marching and manoeuvring. All
depended upon the next few days, and before these had passed
each side in turn had scored and suffered a grievous blow.
In order to comprehend ensuing events it is necessary to De Wet
transfer the story to the Boer side, reverting first to De Wet, [J^J'JJ^"^"
last seen emerging into safety on the left bank of the Valsch.
Despite his adventures the Boer leader deliberately discarded
the opportunity of escaping from the district to which his
presence had drawn so many thousands of British troops.
Instead, no sooner was he informed by his signallers on Elands
Kop that the columns had come to rest upon the railway than
with extraordinary temerity he turned back and once more
made for the hilly country at the head of the Rhenoster river.
In so doing it is hard to say whether he displayed even more
than his customary daring or less of his strategical acumen,
426
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
De Wet meets
Steyn in front
of Elliot.
De Wet in
the centre of
the cordon.
De Wet
determines to
break out
northward.
for his mission was plainly ended in these districts, whereas
there was now scarcely another in the Orange River Colony which
was not thinly occupied and at the mercy of a sudden irruption
by his commandos. Be this as it may, the first steps of his
return all but led to his extinction. This time the Lindley —
Kroonstad blockhouses were alert, and a hot reception greeted,
but did not repel, his crossing. De Wet had not been many
days in his old stronghold before he found himself once more
in front of Elliot's hne of columns coming out from Kroonstad
for their above-described march to the Wilge. On the night
of February 17th one of his signalUng parties was captured, in
the manner related, only four miles from his bivouac, de Lisle
and Fanshawe Uttle knowing how close they had been to the
sleeping-place of the leader who had long robbed armies of their
rest. De Wet then slowly fell back before Elliot across the
Libenbergs Vlei, and happening upon the wandering Steyn at
a farm north-east of Reitz, the two watched for a time the
oncoming of the tide of troops which lapped without a break
over every horizo^j. Soon they had to be gone, for Elliot
was bearing down on the Wilge. On February 22nd they
sidled away up the ComeUs river with eyes on every side, faUing
in continually with groups of burghers who were flying in all
directions from one danger to another. Now W. Wessels, now
H. Botha, Mentz, Ross and Beukes, all noted commandants,
appeared and vanished, each with news of a fresh barrier on
the north, east, south or west. De Wet had formed a plan of
breaking through the blockhouse line between Vrede and Botha's
Pass ; but his own scouts brought him intelhgence that Byng
and Rawlinson were already in front of those despised obstacles.
On the 23rd, as the columns still came on, De Wet, driven to
definite action, determined to risk all upon a rush against what-
ever troops he might find immediately in front of him, and at
set of sun he moved northward with four commandos, some
800 strong, for the decisive throw. On that evening Rimington
lay behind the Hoi Spruit from Pram Kop to Langverwacht,
Byng thence to Strydplaats, Sir H. RawUnson carrying on the
hne to the left bank of the Khp river. For the first time there
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 427
had been news of Boers within the cordon, the Vrede — Botha's
Pass blockhouses reporting the passage two days earUer of a
commando making southward. As De Wet approached the
sleepless hne of troops his scouts informed him that they had
discovered a comparatively weak spot at Kalkrans, on the Hoi
Spruit, near the point of union between the columns of Rimington
and Byng. Steering for this he crossed the Hoi Spruit, and in the
midst of a downpour of rain and thick darkness fell furiously upon De Wet
the outposts of Garratt's New Zealanders, who were hned up conion^at ^
before him. The onset was irresistible ; a section of the defence, ^}'*'^"^
standing firm to the last, was swept away, and the enemy poured 1902.
in upon the flanks of the rest, who were partly rolled up from
opposite sides. A desperate combat ensued. The New Zea-
landers yielded not an inch until they were dashed aside, and
then the survivors fought on individually. Their resistance
was of the greatest value, for it enabled Lieut. -Colonel F. Cox,
the commanding officer, to swing some of his posts on to a new
front, and endeavour to deny the passage by a flank fire. In this
he was partly successful, his rifles doing such execution that
many of the burghers refused to run the gauntlet and fled back.
But nothing could stop De Wet's progress, which had itself
acquired the momentum of a stamp)ede. Many of the Boers, De Wet
as they rushed through in the half hght intermingled with [j[^^h ^^ijh
vehicles, loose horses and cattle, confused the defence with heavy loss,
friendly shouts, thereby considerably checking the shooting.
For half an hour the intermittent onrush continued, and at the
end of that time, when all who dared had passed, the New
Zealanders closed up their broken front, and under the rising
sun counted the cost of De Wet's escape. Eighty dead and
wounded of both sides* lay mingled on the narrow field amidst
the carcasses of the same number of Boer horses and a mob of
carts and cattle, the whole of which De Wet had left behind
him. For the moment neither the true gains nor the losses of the
• British casualties — Killed, two officers, eighteen men ; wounded, five officers,
thirty-three men.
Boer casualties — Killed and wounded, twenty-one. De Wet (" Three Years* War ")
accounts for twelve more wounded, removed by himself, of whom two died.
428
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Commandos
still within
the cordon.
Desperate
attempts to
escape.
event could be appraised. They were by no means unevenly
balanced. On the debit side Steyn and some 500 men had
burst the cordon with De Wet, and thus to some extent the
whole combination had missed its aim. But De Wet had lost
the whole of i;he moveable suppUes on which he depended, and
was still within an area intersected by lines of blockhouses, at
any of which he might yet meet his fate. Moreover, a portion
of his men, about 300 in number, had turned in fear from the
dangerous breach in the New Zealanders' ranks, and these were
still in front of the columns, doubtless spreading alarm amongst
their comrades with the tale of the disastrous night's adventure.
On February 24th there was a partial halt whilst Sir H.
Rawhnson somewhat advanced his outer flank and strengthened
his union with Byng by transferring Nixon from the extreme
left to about Boschfontein. On the next day all the columns
made the line of the Comelis river from its junction with the
Wilge to the Drakensberg. Still so few of the enemy were met
with that failure seemed to await the closing phase of the expe-
dition. The 26th, however, put a more hopeful aspect on affairs.
Six or seven hundred Boers were sighted by the various columns,
and in the skirmishing the Imperial Light Horse of Dawkins'
column captured sixteen prisoners, and Byng's units twenty-
eight. There was soon further evidence that De Wet had taken
with him neither all the strength nor spirit of his forces. The
line on the evening of the 26th was Majoors Drift — Pleasant Gift —
the Dwaal Spruit to below Melani Kop, leaving but half a day's
march to be accomphshed on the morrow. The troops knew
that within the narrow strip between this front and the Harri-
smith — Van Reenen's blockhouses must be imprisoned aU that
was to reward the arduous beat of the last twelve days. Every
man was alert, and only the vigilance of the troops saved them
from being robbed of everything at the eleventh hour. At
midnight a body of nearly 700 desperate Boers suddenly rushed
against the central groups of Nixon's outposts along the Dwaal
Spruit. A few broke through ; the rest were hurled back,
ten remaining in the hands of the soldiers. An hour later the
attempt was repeated on the left of the same section, with the
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 429
same result. This was the final effort. Next morning, as Briggs
took his Imperial Light Horse forward in advance of Sir H.
Rawlinson, he was met by two envoys, who prayed for terms
on behalf of the entrapped commandos. No conditions could
be granted other than the retention of their personal belongings,
and an hour was given them in which to consider. Before the Surrender of
expiration of that time 648 burghers came forward under the l^^^^th!
white flag and yielded themselves prisoners of war to Sir H. 1902-
Rawlinson, together with 1,078 horses, forty-seven carts and
wagons and 40,700 rounds of ammunition. Thus, for the third
time, was signahsed in fatal fashion for the enemy another
anniversary of that victory of twenty-one years before, which
had given to the Republics their brief summer and their final
doom. Lord Kitchener, as he rode out from Albertina station
to greet the troops on February 28th had no reason to be dis-
satisfied with the results of his vast calculations, even though
the chief figures were missing from the account. The total Total results
captures numbered 778 prisoners, 25,000 head of stock, 2,000 oUr^tjon.
horses, and 200 wagons. Thirty-nine prisoners had been picked
up by Barker as he watched and raided on Elliot's right rear,
and though for some time to come the eastern part of the Orange
River Colony was to be still the scene of much activity, it was
not because De Wet's p)ower remained unbroken, but because
he himself was still at large.
This is a suitable opportunity for tracing the movements Evenu in
in the Orange River Colony of other bodies of troops, the story °he Onmee
of whom was interrupted by that of the great schemes which had River Colony,
their chmax between the Wilge river and the Drakensberg. To
do so it is necessary to make a retrospection of some three
months, picking up first the ten columns under Sir C. Knox and
Rochfort which were left at work in the basin of the upper
Caledon. For the first half of December, 1901, there was httle
change in their occupation. Brand's scattered bands continued
to haunt the district, and they to bandy him about from one
to the other. About December 17th, however, there app)eared
signs that the country on the western side of the railway, so
long quiet, was receiving the fugitives from other and more
430
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Rochfort
crosses to the
west of the
railway.
Successes by
both sides.
Capture of a
convoy at
Kokskraal,
Dec. 25th,
1901.
harried areas, and Rochfort was ordered to take his troops,
now in five divisions under Lieut. -Colonels Western and du
Mouhn, Major D. P. DriscoU (DriscoU's Scouts), Major E. S.
Bulfin (Yorkshire regiment) and Major P. A. Kenna (21st
Lancers), across the line. A. C. Hamilton's column had already
been sent to Philippohs at the first sign of renewed activity
in the west. Sir C. Knox was left in the east with Lord Basing,
Pilcher (two columns), and Thomeycroft (two columns).
Rochfort found immediate occupation amongst the small
commandos which had recently re-entered the district. At
dawn on December 24th du Moulin surprised a laager near
Jagersfontein Road and captured twenty-eight prisoners, in-
cluding two officers. This success was promptly discounted.
Christmas Day, so grimly celebrated by De Wet 250 miles to
the north-east*, here also brought good fortune to the Boer
arms. A. C. Hamilton, having discovered a commando at the
head of the Berg river, attacked at dawn, scattered the laager,
took sixteen prisoners and hotly pursued the rest into the
Heen-en-Weers Kop, a stronghold north-west of Fauresmith.
The chase took him far in advance of his baggage train, which
was escorted only by some sixty men. Once more full payment
was exacted for a momentary and not inexcusable mistake.
When the wagons had reached Kokskraal they were suddenly
surrounded by 250 Boers under Hertzog and Nieuwhoudt, the
presiding genii of this part. Resistance was out of the question ;
the handful of guards were caught in the open and Hamilton
was out of sight. Every wagon was quickly in the hands of the
enemy, who having set fire to them all rode off with fifty-
seven prisoners, the other casualties amongst the escort being
four killed and five wounded. To what a level of brutaUty the
long campaign had lowered a once honourable enemy was shown
when the Boers, having shot three of the native drivers in cold
blood, stripped some of the prisoners naked and compelled them,
an officer amongst them, to walk in this plight more than thirty
miles across the burning veld into Springfontein. Some amends
was made for this mischance three days later when Driscoll,
* See Chapter XXII.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 431
operating along the Riet river, accounted for twelve Boers in a
chase of many miles ; but when December closed it was plain
that on the west of the railway there was full employment for
Rochfort, whose task was not lightened by his having to send
two of his columns, Kenna's and Bulfin's, to join Sir C. Knox
at Ladybrand.
Since the first week of December Sir C. Knox had been dis- sirc. Knox
posing his forces for a general drive northward towards the °he*j2i*^* °^
Bloemfontein — Ladybrand blockhouses. On the loth his left
was north of Edenburg, his right near Bismarck on the Basuto
border. A week later he drew up at the blockhouses, having met
with scarcely a living thing on the way. During the halt here,
Colonel T. P. B. Teman succeeded to Thomeycroft's command.
Major F. W. Heath to that of Taylor. At Christmas-time a
move was made to the north of the blockhouses, and in conjunc-
tion with Barker from Winburg, and the two columns sent by
Rochfort, all were now engaged in scouring the districts about
Clocolan, Senekal, Governors Kop, the Koranna Berg and Me-
quatlings Nek. The country was by no means clear of the enemy,
which was to be accoimted for by the succession of sweeps in pro-
gress to the northward under Elliot and others, such operations
invariably brushing a number of fugitives into the adjacent
districts. There were several smart affairs, notably one on
January 6th, when Lord Basing's outposts were hotly attacked
near Ficksburg by 150 Boers under Van Niekirk. Later on
Barker found considerable numbers about Rexford, and Teman
and Bulfin met with opposition in the Witte Bergen. Both sides
of the railway below Kroonstad became thus once more the scene
of a campaign which, though it had degenerated into the constant
revolutions of strong patrols, might at any moment provide
incidents such as compose the triumphs and disasters of guerrilla
warfare. Rochfort had already experienced one such affair ;
he was soon to be the victim of another. His columns had con-
tinued to raid between PhilippoUs and the Modder with varying
fortune. On January 26th Driscoll found Hertzog and Nieuw-
houdt as far north as Makauws Drift on the Petrusburg road,
and in a creditable attack took seventeen prisoners, including
432
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Attack on
du Moulin,
Jan. 28th,
1902.
Du Moulin
killed.
Boers
repulsed.
two officers. Subsequently he so harassed the Boer main
body that its leaders endeavoured to shake him off by with-
drawing southward. At this time du Moulin was north of
the Riet river about Batsheba, and coming on the trail of the
retreating commandos on the Emmaus road, he followed it south-
ward, Western co-operating from Koffyfontein. On the night
of January 27th du Moulin camped opposite Abrahamskraal*
on the left bank of the Riet river, having pushed some of the
enemy across the drift during the day. The night's dispositions
consisted of a series of piquets posted on a semi-circle of kopjes
overlooking the river; behind these, on either side of a small
farmhouse, lay the horse lines and the parked transport wagons.
At one o'clock on the morning of the 28th the sentries at
the drift heard the sound of men fording the water. Before
warning could be given, the whole piquet was overwhelmed
by a rush of burghers who, seizing the point of vantage, kept
the gap open whilst a strong body poured through into the
camp. In a moment the horse lines and the outbuildings of the
farmhouse were theirs, and every comer was searched by bullets.
Du Moulin, who had passed the night in the house, emerged at
the first shots, and caUing a few men round him led a charge
against the nearest Boers. He himself, with several others, fell
dead immediately, but the kraals were cleared, and soon after
another determined counter-stroke against the position of the
piquet which had been first destroyed regained that also,
and at 1.45 a.m. the enemy fell back. Brevet-Major A. R.
Gilbert (Royal Sussex regiment) had now assumed command
in place of du Moulin, and he quickly redistributed his men
along the line of defence. His promptitude was fortunate, for
in an hour's time a second attack was dehvered against the
outposts. This was smartly repulsed, and was not repeated.
This affair cost the column its commander and ten men killed,
six men wounded, and nearly 150 horses and mules lost or
destroyed. The enemy left three on the field, and carried off
some dozen wounded, for some of whom they next day begged
an ambulance from Gilbert. When dayUght came they were seen
* Not to be confused with the place of similar name on the Modder river.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 433
to be holding strong positions on both banks of the Riet, and
Gilbert, cut off from both Western and Driscoll, prudently
withdrew towards Jagersfontein.
During the first part of the month of February, whilst the
country to the east of the line was being crossed and recrossed
by the pack of columns there collected, Rochfort remained
centred at Fauresmith, his columns circulating about him.
On the 19th he moved northward to near Boshof, to co-operate Rochfort
with a column under Lieut. -Colonel W. H. Sitwell. The latter ^^rrand"^"
had come into the Orange River Colony after a month's raiding combines
in Griqualand,* in the course of which he had had several sharp
encounters with 400 Boers under De Villiers. On January 13th,
when between Campbell and Griquatown, Sitwell had found this Sitweii's
commando drawn up across his path, and after a close action operations,
had cleared the way by a dashing bayonet charge delivered by
the Royal Munster Fusiliers. The column lost an officer and
twenty-three men killed and wounded ; the enemy was severely
handled, and his losses numbered some forty. Two days later
an officer and twelve men had been cut off and captured from
Sitweii's rearguard. On February 5th Sitwell had returned
to Kimberley, marching thence on the 9th towards Leeuwkop.
On the i6th he found the local commandos strongly posted
between Varkfontein and West Rietfontein. They remained
immovable after an engagement of six hours' duration, followed
on the next day by a searching bombardment of four hours,
the column sustaining twenty-two casualties, f This affair
was the cause of Rochfort's already referred to northward
movement, the results of which must be narrated later.
Turning again to the east of the railway : early in February Sir C. Knox
Sir C. Knox's columns were ordered to block the southern exits ^iS^Eiu^t.
from the area about to be swept by Elliot's advance to the
Wilge. This they did in connection with Barker, the whole line
moving forward to the Senekal — Bethlehem road on the i6th.
After EUiot had passed on his way Sir C. Knox resumed his
* See map No. 63.
t Casualties — Killed, one officer, four men ; wounded, one officer, eight men ;
missing, eight men.
VOL. IV. 28
434
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
clearing operations, and soon after gave up command in the
field to relieve Sir C. Tucker at Bloemfontein. About the
same time Sir L. Rundle was similariy replaced at Harrismith
by Major-General E. S. Brook.
Approximate Strength States of Columns referred to in
foregoing chapter.
t
i
8
"S'S
s
H
b
.2 rt
■".12
0
COLUMN.
1
c
c
1
5
3 0
s
February, 1902.
Lt.-Col. H. de B. dc Lisle
I ,'626
7
__
1
Ll.-Col. R. Fanshiiwe
—
6
I
1
Major H. G. Holmes
SOI
—
—
I
{ Lieut. - General E. L.
Major W. R. Marshall
571
25*
2
( Elliot in command.
Col. the Hon. R. T. Lawley ...
».I3S
3
2
I
Major I, P. Du Cane
Ll-CoI. M. F. Rimington
413
—
3
—
1
'.513
470
5
—
Lt.-Col. the Hon. J. Byng
1,242
«55
5
I
Col. Sir H. Rawlinson
M13
200
3
Major J. II. Damant
6SS
75
3
—
Lt.-Col. A. E. Wilson
454
176
1
2
Lt.-Col. J. L. Keir
893
3
Lt.-Col. J. E. Nixon
1,102
—
3
2
Col. F. S. Garratt
855
167
3
1
Ll-CoL J. W. G. Dawkins ...
716
3
Lt.-Col. C. J. Brills
570
—
2
—
Lt -Col. W. G. B. Western ...
327
—
3
—
)
Lt.-Col. L. E. du Moulin (later
/
Major A. R. Gilbert)
91
545t
3
—
y Colonel A. N. Rochfort
Major D. P. DriscoU
544
I
—
I in command.
Major E. S. Bulfin
458
—
2
—
Major P. A. Kenna
602
—
2
—
)
Major A. C. Hamilton ...
58.
—
3
—
Lt.-Col. T. D. Pilcher (two
]
columns)
Col. A. W.Thorneycroft (twocol-
J.34»
—
5
I
1 Major - General Sir C.
/ Knox in command.
umns)(later Col. T. P. B. Ternan)
1,246
—
7
I
Lt.-Col. Lord Basing j
590
—
3
I
1
Lt.-Col. J. S. S. Barker (two j
columns)
1,100
—
2
I
Lt.-CoL W. H. Sitwell
552
236
3
I
Major-Gen. B. B. R. Campbell
526
, 1
3'4
2 I
i From Lieut. -General Sir
'[ L. Riindle's force.
Cyclists.
_•)• Including sixty-four cyclists.
435
CHAPTER XXV.
EVENTS IN THE NORTHERN TRANSVAAL.*
APRIL, I9OI — MAY, 1902.
This district, of which the town of Pietersburg formed the Remoteness of
capital, had from the first played a rSle somewhat disconnected *e<l»*"f'ct
from that of the rest of the theatre of war, and this less from
its remoteness, its unhealthiness for man and horse, and its
paucity of inhabitants, than from its comparative strategical
inutility. At Pietersburg the interests of both combatants
seemed to end with the railway which found its terminus there.
Beyond lay a waste so inhospitable that, as was pointed out in
an earlier chapter, Rhodesia itself, even without a garrison,
was almost safeguarded from Boer invasion, had it indeed been
worth invading in a military sense, for it was more difficult to
approach across the salty ridges which fell to the Limpopo than
Cape Colony across the Karroos, True, in the earliest phases
of the conflict the duels between Plumcr and Grobelaar had
seemed to point to mutual apprehension in this region ;f but
that campaign had died a natural death, and in a few weeks
the Northern Transvaal had relapsed into its normal lethargy,
the Boers only maintaining a weak and inactive garrison in the
capital town itself. Not until the British army had swept up
to the eastern frontier at Komati Poort did the interest revive
at Pietersburg. Then Botha, escaping round Lord Roberts'
left (northern) flank, made his way thither, followed in driblets
by many of his men, and there, when he had collected a sufficient
number, he ceased to be a fugitive and resumed his ofl&ce of
• See maps Nos. 56 and 59. | See Volume III., Chapter VII.
VOL. IV. 28*
436 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
commander of the Transvaal army. In this he was quite un-
disturbed, and the respite he enjoyed undoubtedly enabled him
to reconstitute a force which had been temporarily shattered in
spirit and therefore — after the manner of the Boers — in numbers.
Anent the omission to intercept or forestall the federal leader
at Pietersburg contemporary criticism was as severe upon the
British strategy as it was — as such criticism commonly is —
The neglect unjust. Had Pietcrsburg been occupied in September, 1900,
Piet^rsl^urg. ^^ ^'^^ ^^^<i' ^^^ enemy's last base, his last source of supplies,
his last plotting place would have been denied to him, and the
war consequently have been at an end. How httle of this will
bear scrutiny. Pietersburg might indeed have been seized and
held with advantage, but only if such a measure had left sufficient
troops for the eastern march of the British army, with its
necessarily strong and remote flanking detachments, and its
liabihty to heavy general engagements at any moment. Doorn-
kop, Diamond Hill and Bergendal had warned the Commander-
in-Chief that he must have strength at hand however fast fled
the enemy. He had to deal with a hostile army which though
seen to gallop away in disorder in the evening might be found
lying embattled at the next dawn. Pietersburg might indeed
have been taken, but both it and the long hne of communica-
tion linking it with Pretoria must have been held in strength ;
it was quite in the air, the veiy mark for wandering commandos,
for by no effort could Lord Roberts keep all the enemy before
himself. The strong bands roving unaffected in the Waterberg
district to the west could descend upon it at any moment. But
even had it been occupied, Botha and his following would have
been perfectly content to draw breath elsewhere. The Boers,
unhke European forces, demanded no " place " in which to
concentrate, to find sustenance, to plot or recuperate. Their
bases were the numberless farms, their resting places the sheltered
valleys of the veld ; their councils of war took place not in inns
or mansions, but under the stars. Their warfare, which had
survived the loss of Pretoria, was not Ukely to die at Pieters-
burg, nor did it die for many a long month after that town
was securely in British hands. It is necessary to recount these
EVENTS IN THE NORTHERN TRANSVAAL. 437
facts less for the purpose of answering criticism than of antici-
pating it ; for the neglect of Pietersburg, if it did not prolong the
general campaign, at least rendered portions of the British
tactics more difficult, or even meaningless, especially the earUer
operations north of the Delagoa Bay railway. When Pieters-
burg was eventually occupied in April, 1901, it became imme-
diately useful. Thence Plumer, it will be remembered, based
his blockade of the Ohphant river drifts, whilst F. W. Kitchener's
and other columns scoured the area to the east. Thereafter,
as Plumer returned no more to Pietersburg, the conduct of
affairs devolved upon Lieut. -Colonel H. M. Grenfell, the com-
mander of a corps called, Kitchener's Fighting Scouts, which was
composed of two regiments, commanded by Lieut. -Colonels
J. W. Colenbrander and A. E. Wilson respectively. His are
the operations now to be described.
Grenfell took with him to Pietersburg some 900 men of the Grenfell in
ist and 2nd Kitchener's Fighting Scouts, 400 of the 2nd Wiltshire <=°"""»"^-
regiment, ninety-six cyclists and three Vickers-Maxim guns. At
Pietersburg already were parts of the 2nd Gordon Highlanders
and 2nd Wiltshire regiment, three companies of the 12th M.L, two
guns i8th battery R.F.A., and a 5-in. gun, these being under
command of Colonel F. H. Hall, R.A., who was also in charge of
the seventeen posts which held the line of communication down
to Pretoria.* Information as to the enemy was meagre, as it
could not fail to be in a district which the majority of the Boers
therein had entered rather to escape observation as cattle guards,
than with any idea of making active war. Certain fighting bodies
there were, however, under the general command of Assistant-
Commandant-General C. J. Beyers, a leader whose quality had
been too well proved on the heights of the Magaliesbergf for
his presence to be ignored. Towards th*e end of April Beyers,
with a strong band, was reported to be at Klipdam, fifteen miles
* The 2nd Northamptonshire regiment, a company M.I., the 8sth battery R.F.A.,
and portion of the ist West Riding regiment, formed the remainder of Colonel Hall's
command at this time.
t See Chapter I,
438 ' THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
north of Pietersburg, and it became Grenfell's first task to find
Grenfell's and engage him. Leaving Pietersburg on the evening of April
^inst°"^ 26th Grenfell marched northward in three divisions, of which
Beyers. the right was Under Lieut.-Colonel J. W. Colenbrander, the
centre under Major N. A. Thomson (12th M. I.), the left under
Lieut.-Colonel A. E. Wilson. The laager was found at dawn
on the 27th when Colenbrander, attacking from the east, drove
the Boers into the arms of Wilson on the west. The whole
laager, which proved to be under Commandant Van Rensburg,
was secured with thirty-seven prisoners, seven Boers being
killed. Next day four more prisoners and a cache of 76,000
rounds of ammunition fell into the hands of the patrols. Grenfell
now got news of the Boer main body on the Haenertsburg
mountain, due east of Pietersburg ; with them was reported to
be a 6-in. gun, rumours of which had long gone about the district.
He immediately turned in that direction, and passing through
Woodbush on the 29th, was greeted by the cannon from the high
ground 10,000 yards to the south. The gun continued to shell
his rapid advance ; but the demonstration was only a plucky
piece of bravado, for Lieutenant Du Toit (State Artillery), who
was in charge of the piece, had been deserted by his proper
escort, two commandants who were coquetting with surrender,
and he was almost alone. Firing until the attack came within
Destruction of 3,000 yards, Du Toit then blew the weapon to fragments with
a 6-in. gun. dynamite cartridges and made his escape, ten of his men being
taken by Grenfell in the pursuit. The troops then scoured the
country in all directions, discovering enormous quantities
of buried ammunition, whilst on May 4th, Thomson, with 100
men of his 12th M.L, surprised a Commandant Marais with
forty men in laager, and captured the whole. Returning
to Pietersburg Grenfell prepared another expedition, which set
out on May 7th, 960 strong.* Louis Trichardt was occupied on
the 9th, thirty-seven Boers being cut off and taken in the neigh-
bourhood. Vigorous patrolling resulted in many surrenders,
and on the 22nd in a considerable capture by Colenbrander, who,
* Kitchener's Fighting Scouts 350 men, 12th M.I. 150 men, 2nd Wiltshire regiment
360 men, two guns 83rd battery R.F.A., two Vickers-Maxims.
EVENTS IN THE NORTHERN TRANSVAAL. 439
with one casualty, took seventy-two prisoners in a surprise
attack on a laager commanded by Field-Comet Venter. On Results of
May 26th the column was back in Pietersburg. Grenfell's gains or^ratlons in
during the month's operations amounted to 265 Boers kiUed ^^^y. 1901.
and captured, 1,766 voluntary surrenders, a Maxim gim, the
destroyed 6-in. gun, nearly half a million rounds of ammunition,
and farm and laager stuffs too numerous to detail.
Whilst Grenfell had been about Louis Trichardt, the reported
approach of Beyers himself from the Waterberg district had
caused two small columns to be concentrated for the protection
of the railway, one* under Wilson at Naboomspruit, the otherf
imder Major H. McMicking, who came up from Pretoria, at
Nylstroom. These were intended to act in co-operation, but
Wilson encountered Beyers alone at Boekenhoutskloof (twenty
miles north-west of Nylstroom) on the i8th, and forced him back Successes by
1 • 1 , 1 r Vx- 1 1 /- 1-1 Wilson and
westward with the loss of a Field-Comet and eighty burghers McMicking.
captured. Next day Wilson was in touch with McMicking, and
the two, pushing Beyers back on to Zandrivierspoort, nearly
surrounded him and took eighteen prisoners. The Boer leader
fell back upon a strong main body laagered in the almost
inaccessible fastness of Zandrivierspoort, where he had to be 5*^"^*.*
, , , , ... _,, Zandriviers-
left until more strength could be brought against him. The poort.
InteUigence reports now gave infonnation of other bands more
to the south, abreast of Warm Bath, and Wilson, moving
down to the Rooi Berg, made plans to round them up. But *
two squadrons which he despatched to turn the enemy in the
desired direction fell in with commandos numbering 500 men
under Commandants Uys and Pretorius on June ist, and after
a spirited fight were obliged to retire with the loss of thirteen
kiUed and wounded. The Boers, who had suffered severely,
made off also, only to come after all within reach of Wilson. He
fell upon them heavily on the 2nd, and after a stubborn combat
* Strength— Four hundred Kitchener's Fighting Scouts, twenty-two Bushveld
Carbineers, thirteen 12th M.I., 104 2nd Gordon Highlanders.
t Strength— Three hundred and ten 20th battalion M.I., 188 2nd Lincolnshire
regiment, two guns 7Sth battery K.F.A.
440 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
which continued all day, utterly routed them, killing and wound-
ing many and taking forty prisoners, with loss to his own force
of only eleven. Wilson then went into Warm Bath, whence
for the next three weeks he fended the enemy from the railway
in conjunction with McMicking from Nylstroom.
Meanwhile Grenfell was preparing a force strong enough to
deal with Beyers and his imexpectedly numerous following to
the west of the hne. On Jime 21st he marched from P. P. Rust
with 1,300 men and three guns,* McMicking moving out of
Nylstroom at the same time with 550"|" and two guns. Whilst
the latter moved direct upon Zandrivierspoort, Grenfell, bent on
getting well behind that stronghold, first trended north-west
and gained the line of hiUs at Groethoek before he turned south-
west towards his objective. Much delayed by his transport
amongst the precipitous heights, he did not reach the Poort until
the 28th, when he found McMicking already entrenched there and
Beyers driven the Boer laagers in full retreat north-westward. Estabhshing a
riviersp^rt. depot, and leaving the infantry and convoy at the defile, he
immediately set out in pursuit with his mounted men, and at
dawn on July ist overtook the fugitives at Hopewell, in the
Rustenburg district. Beyers himself was not with them, and
a few shots sufficed to bring to terms the Commandant,
who was hampered by the presence of several hundred women
and children. With a booty of 133 prisoners and seventy-seven
wagons, Grenfell's men returned to Zandrivierspoort.
The captures of the past few months, considerable though
they were, by no means disposed of the Boer strength in the
Northern Transvaal ; for Beyers was doing his utmost to main-
tain his numbers, even at the cost of constant flight and loss
Beyers' of material. The Boer General was fighting under the greatest
difficulties, difficulties. Sickness, especially amongst the horses, was never
absent from his laagers, and its anxieties were doubled by the
mobs of women and children whom his men insisted on carrying
* Kitchener's Fighting Scouts, I2th M.I., 2nd Wiltshire regiment, two guns 85th
battery R.F.A,, one Vickers-Maxim.
f 20th battalion M.I., 2nd Lincolnshire regiment, two guns 75th battery R.F.A.
EVENTS IN THE NORTHERN TRANSVAAL. 441
about less from fear of the British than of the native tribes, who
in this region were at open feud with the Trans vaalers. The
aloofness of the district with the consequent absence of news
and its long neglect by the British invading columns had caused
the burghers to relax in military ardour ; many of them, hear-
ing nothing of war, actually beheved that peace had returned
to the land, and were more intent on reaping their crops than
guarding their camps. Here, too, far removed from the central
spirit of resistance, there were many waverers and traitors.
Important citizens, who had been fiery enough for the cause
when at Headquarters, found their patriotism cooling rapidly
in this outlying province, and daily Beyers discovered now one
officer, now another, absent from his side, spirited away by the
alluring terms of a Proclamation, or, worse, by the tempting
voice of a comrade who had already sought shelter in the camp
of his country's enemies. Against so many foes, visible and
invisible, Beyers, strong as his character was, could do little.
Determined, nevertheless, to preserve his men and their scarcely
less valuable horses as long as p)ossible, he gave strict orders
that no laager on being attacked was to defend itself to the
last ; rather were the burghers to scatter from the spot, and
abandoning all women, children and wagons, to make off with
the food beasts. Thus Grenfell and his lieutenants, falling
upon camp after camp, captured few but those who had obeyed
their own solicitude for their families instead of the orders of
their General, who travelled the lighter for their loss. Lighter
also returned Grenfell from his many forays when he had
abstracted all of these, the more climisy or soft-hearted of his
opponents. July and August were unproductive months. The
most striking event of July was the destruction near Naboom- Train-
spruit of a train from Pietersburg, an incident chiefly notable ^'«^'^'"8-
from the extreme gallantry of the escort, a party of the 2nd
Gordon Highlanders, under Lieutenant A. A. Best. These
held out until every man was out of action, the losses being the
officer and thirteen men killed and ten wounded. On July 8th
Grenfell, leaving McMicking at Zandrivierspoort, took a convoy
into Nylstroom. Finding himself followed by Beyers he turned
442 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
against him on the 12th, hoping to catch him between his own
forces and those of McMicking* at the Poort. But six messages
to that officer ordering co-operation all miscarried, and Grenfell,
able to do no more than push the commandos far to the west,
was back at Nylstroom on the 27th. During August, though
constantly in touch with Beyers, Grenfell could by no effort
or device come to grips with the elusive Boer, who lost less
than a score of his men in the whole month's manoeuvrings.
Once more the most expensive operations were train-wrecking
expeditions. Twice during the month these were perpetrated
by a certain " Captain " J. Hindon, a ruthless expert in this
class of damage, near Naboomspruit on August loth, and
Hamanskraal on the 31st. On the first of these occasions
Hindon, having successfully derailed a mail train from Pretoria,
was advancing on his prize when he found the scales suddenly
turned against himself by the escort and by an armoured train
behind, and he had to decamp, leaving six dead and seven
wounded on the ground. His second venture was terribly
successful. Having blown the train almost to fragments with
a powerful charge, Hindon's men, who numbered 250, poured
musketry upon it from all sides, though resistance was out of the
question, so shattered were the trucks that held the stunned or
maimed soldiers. An officer and thirteen men were killed, four
officers and twenty men wounded, the other victims being a
civilian passenger and two natives kUled and a woman wounded.
The Boers then looted the debris and made off eastward, to
be pursued some days later by a small force under Lieut.-
Colonel F. Hacket-Thompson (Cameron Highlanders), from
the Hekpoort valley, who overtook the marauders at De
Wagendrift on September 3rd, kilhng four and recovering a
portion of the mails.
During the first half of September Grenfell continued to hunt
Beyers west of Nylstroom, forcing him continually to change
his ground, and always with some small loss in men and animals,
* Lieut. -Colonel Wilson had now left this district for recruiting duties at Cape
Town, his column being absorbed by Grenfell. McMicking's force was shortly after
absorbed in a similar manner.
EVENTS IN THE NORTHERN TRANSVAAL. 443
but never succeeding in bringing him to bay. On the nth
Grenfell himself left the district, handing over command to Coienbrander
Colenbrander, who had never ceased to do useful work in a Q^g^ifeli
region intimately known to him for many years past. From
September 15th — 25th Kitchener's Fighting Scouts patrolled
with success (fourteen prisoners) whilst Colenbrander collected at
Warm Bath a column for a serious operation in the hitherto
untraversed tract between the Pietersburg and Mafeking lines
of railway. This, after an abortive expedition amongst the
Klipdraai hills (September 27th), was begun on October 6th.
Marching by Donkerpoort, Groethoek and Hopewell, Colen-
brander covered the country with his patrols, scouting indeed
so far and wide that on the 19th he found himself ten days'
march from his base with only three days' provisions in his
wagons. Magalipsi, on the Mafeking — Buluwayo railway, being Colenbrander
just that distance ahead, he decided to continue his way, crossing kbg^ranwly.
the Crocodile river at Saasi's Drift, and arrived at that distant Dawkins at
post on the 22nd with fifty-five prisoners and a great quantity of ^ s'''oo"™-
captured ammunition, wagons and stock. Behind him on the
Pietersburg hne a force had been left at Nylstroom under Lieut. -
Colonel J. W. G. Dawkins, Byng's recent colleague in the Orange
River Colony. This party worked with much success about
Geelhout Kop, on one occasion feeling as far northward as Palala,
where a laager and forty prisoners fell into Dawkins' hands,
bringing his total captures to seventy-six. After this Dawkins
was summoned south-eastward to keep watch outside the op)era-
tions then in progress in the Lydenburg district. Thence,
continually picking up prisoners as he roved, he worked across
to Kameelfontein, the scene of French's critical share in the
battle of Diamond Hill, eventually regaining the railway at
Pienaars River station on November 13th with twenty-four
more prisoners.
Meanwhile, since November ist, Colenbrander had been
marching back from Magalipsi, by way of Sehka Drift and the
Palala River valley to Palala, At the latter place he once more
spread out his patrols, collecting them again on the Dwars
river with thirty-seven priscaiers in their hands. Further on,
444 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
the Boers were once more encountered in strength, at their
favourite haunt Zandrivierspoort, where Commandant C. Baden-
horst, with three or four hundred, had taken the place of Beyers.
Colenbrander Colenbrander attacked at once, drove the commando headlong,
dJtemjSrt^ ^^^ ^^*^^ ^ chase of no less than forty miles, in which several
Boers were killed, drew rein with eighteen prisoners at De
Naauwte. Thence he went into Warm Bath, arriving there
on November 19th with fifty-five prisoners of war and a mass of
Further produce and stock. On November 23rd Colenbrander was out
cSSbr^der ^^^^^ Badenhorst again, in conjunction with Dawkins who left
and Dawkins. Nylstroom on the 2ist. The two columns met at De Naauwte
on the 27th, and when Badenhorst had been discovered in the
hills near Hartebeestfontein, an enclosing movement was set on
foot the next night which shut up the exits from four different
directions. The commando fell to pieces at once, and breaking
out at many points, was pursued piecemeal for five days by
Colenbrander towards the west, and Dawkins to the south,
with the result that there were 104 prisoners of war in the hands
of both columns when the chase desisted on December 3rd.
Sixty-two of these were cleverly taken in one band by an ambush
laid by Thomson (12th M.I.). Badenhorst himself, with about
sixty men, escaped ; but his liberty was of short duration. It
had happened that Dawkins had returned to Nylstroom for
supplies, and Badenhorst, thinking that both his adversaries had
left the field, camped with his remnant in fancied security at
Sterkfontein. Here he was discovered on December loth by
Colenbrander, who had remained out at Zandrivierspoort, and
Dawkins having by that time rejoined, the two once more
enclosed Badenhorst's laager by a skilfully arranged night
march. On the morning of the nth, after a brief resistance, the
Boer Commandant, hopelessly surrounded, gave himself up with
five other officers and seventeen burghers. Two days earlier
his chief, Beyers, had all but shared the same fate at Geelhout
Kop. But a failure of combination between Colenbrander and
Dawkins, caused by atrocious weather, had given him time to
get so far clear to the north-west that a thirty-mile chase had
failed to catch him.
EVENTS IN THE NORTHERN TRANSVAAL. 445
On December 13th, leaving Dawkins in the Waterberg hills,
Colenbrander once more pushed westward. He had informa-
tion of laagers in the Rooi Berg hills, and on the banks of the
Crocodile, the latter reported to be the moveable base of Kemp,
De la Rey's heutenant in the Western Transvaal. At Morgenzon,
on the i6th, Colenbrander hghtened himself of his infantry and
wagons, which he sent back to Warm Bath, and taking on 300
of Kitchener's Fighting Scouts crossed the Aapies river, and
on the evening of the i8th set out to surprise a Boer camp which
his scouts had marked on the spot where he had expected to
find it, Klipgat. But the camp had already been attacked
and scattered by a party of South African Constabulary from
Hamanskraal on that very morning, and Colenbrander had
nothing to do but to beat up the district for the refugees, which
he did by extending his troops in long Unes. When on the
evening of the 19th he called in his men at Jericho, they brought
with them fifty-two prisoners gathered without loss from many
spots in the dense bush. Further searching during the next
two days produced only eight more, and Colenbrander, finding
not enough to occupy him further, turned towards the line, and
arrived with his captures at Hamanskraal on the 23rd. The
season of horse-sickness was now due and active operations had Horse-
to be suspended. Colenbrander was therefore removed into the '"c''"^?'' stops
* operations.
Rustenburg district after three months of strenuous campaigning,
during which he had lessened the enemy by twenty-two killed
and wounded and 318 prisoners, including nineteen officers.
Neither these results, nor his own trifling casualties, which
numbered but four in all, were any gauge of the enormous
exertions of his and Dawkins' troops in a region in some parts
mountainous, in others densely clothed with bush, everywhere
unhealthy, and at times so arid that more than once the men
marched waterless for forty hours on end. In no part of the
Transvaal had the work been more arduous, and its proportion-
ately small rewards so hard to come by. Shortly after Colen-
brander's departure Dawkins was also withdrawn, to entrain
on December 27th for the Orange River Colony. For the same
reasons Beyers, too, was forced to change his ground and seek
44<5 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
the High Veld to the north ; but the departure of the columns
encouraged him to attempt to deal a blow on his way. On
January 21st, 1902, he was at Matala's Location, abreast of
Pietersburg. His movements were fully known to the British,
and some scouts from Pietersburg had even engaged and taken
Beyers attacks sixteen prisoners from his flanking parties. Nevertheless Beyers
Tan^S^d"^^' determined on a throw for the capital. Before dawn on the
1902. 23rd he actually succeeded in introducing forty of his men into
the burgher refugee camp, from which they soon rode out with
148 perjured compatriots behind them. Beyers then blew up
the hne, crossed to the east of it, and from that side at 4 a.m.
on January 24th assailed the town with hot musketry. Twenty
minutes' sharp firing, during which the commando suffered
several casualties, sufficed to drive off a hesitating attack, and
Beyers, raiding cattle as he went, moved slowly away south-
eastward to estabhsh a laager in the sheltered, well watered, and
well-nigh impenetrable valley between Malipspoort and Pylkop.
The capture of nine wagon loads of grain on the 30th near Bufiles
Beyers went far to replenish his supphes. At Pylkop he remained
inactive. throughout February, condemned like his opponents to idleness
until the subsidence of the horse-sickness, which in this region
drives troops to quarters as regularly as did winter in the
campaigns of old. Beyers' stronghold was constantly recon-
noitred by troops from Pietersburg under Major H. d'E. Vallancey
(Pietersburg Light Horse), who hung as closely on the laager as
his small force permitted, on one occasion (February 6th)
dispersing and taking ten prisoners from a Boer patrol of 100
men which incautiously wandered too near him.
About the middle of March Beyers once more became active.
Moving northward across the Spelonken mountains, about
the head waters of the Klein Letaba river, he made for his old
groimd to the west of the railway, intending to reach it by
circhng round the extreme northern limit of the British com-
munications. This — Louis Trichardt having been destroyed in
the previous autumn — was at Fort Edward, a lonely little post
held by but fifty men, with a Umited and easily destroyed water
supply. News of Beyers' march came at once to hand ; from
EVENTS IN THE NORTHERN TRANSVAAL. 447
its direction, it was certain that Fort Edward would be attacked,
and on the i6th Vallancey moved up to Fort Dahl with 120
men of the Pietersburg Light Horse. On the 17th Beyers was
at Ramagoep's Location, and three days later surrounded Fort Beyers sur-
Edward and cut off its water, Vallancey being too weak to EdwAxd^^^
interfere. A force of 550 of all arms* was thereupon despatched March 20th,
to reheve the place from Pietersburg under Lieut. -Colonel H. C.
Denny (Northamptonshire regiment). Denny encountered the
enemy at Vliegenpan, and at once attacked with his mounted
troops. But the enemy was strongly posted, in number some
400, and Denny's men, a mixed band of surrendered Boers and
other irregulars, who regarded each other with suspicion, fought
badly. They were soon driven back, and Denny, despairing of
doing anything against a strong position with such discordant
material, abandoned his mission and fell back on the Dwars river.
The fate of Fort Edward now seemed sealed. But Beyers, whose
operations in the Northern Transvaal had lately seemed infected
with the listlessness characteristic of the region, sat idly round the
little post, and time was given for other measures. By good
fortune Colenbrander, the scourge of the northern Boers, was
at this moment within hail of Krugersdorp. Hurrying up by a»ienbrander
rail to Pietersburg with his column on March 27th, he marched Edward, ^"^
the same evening for the Dwars river. On the next day he March 28th,
threw himself upon Beyers, dislodged him at once and chased '^^*
him eastward, punishing him severely before he left his heels to
take the weary troops back to Fort Edward on the last day of
March. Thence Colenbrander moved down to Pietersburg to
prepare to settle once for all his old antagonist.
Strengthened by the arrival of 600 men of the 2nd Royal
Inniskilling Fusiliers, on April 5th he was ready with about
2,000 men and four guns, one of the latter a 5-in. piece. Beyers,
turned back from the north, was now again below Pylkop, and Beyers at
Colenbrander, who well knew the strength of that fastness, ^^'''^P-
concerted careful measures to entrap him. On the evening
* Composition — One hundred Pietersburg Light Horse, 120 Beddy's Scouts, thirty
National Scouts, 115 Steinacker's Horse, 1002nd Northamptonshire regiment, ico 2nd
Wiltshire regiment, two guns.
448 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
of his arrival in Pietersburg he made the first move by sending
two parties, each of 400 men of Steinacker's Horse and the
National Scouts, under Captain McQueen and an ex-Boer, CeUiers,
with orders to march by circuitous routes and close the south-
eastern and south-western exits of Malipspoort. Both parties
left at night, and circhng round by Chunies Poort, arrived at
their resp)ective posts at the same hour before daybreak on
April 8th. On the night of the 6th a third party of the same
strength, under Captain J. C. V. Lyle (Kitchener's Fighting
Scouts), moved out to block the western and nearer exits, whilst
Colenbrander himself, twenty-four hours later, took the remaining
mounted men and the infantry, intending to place himself across
the tracks leading northward out of the Poort. All these move-
ments, admirably planned and conducted, were carried out with
such secrecy that Beyers, in spite of his hundred-eyed scouts,
had caught not so much as a glimpse of the contracting toils.
Colenbrander At dawn on the 8th he was practically surrounded, and a few
Pvfko* hours later his commando was fighting hard for its existence.
April ' Fixing their hopes on an escape northward, the Boers collected
f ~'°*^' chiefly in the strong entrenchments which they had thrown up
on that side, so that whilst McQueen and Celliers advanced
towards Pylkop from the direction of Chunies Poort with little
opposition, Colenbrander found his way disputed by numbers
so formidably posted, that it was doubtful whether his
infantry (2nd Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers) could seize the hills
commanding Mahpspoort and its exits. A long and anxious
engagement ensued. The hills were steep and bushy, and the
opposition more stubborn than had long been encountered
from these northern Boers. The Inniskilling Fusiliers fought
with valour ; but the only party which succeeded in gaining the
crest before nightfall was incontinently driven off again by
superior numbers. Lyle, too, coming in from the west, was
stoutly opposed, and could make but little inroad, and when
darkness fell Colenbrander, seeing he was in for serious work,
gave orders for all to entrench where they stood. Of the detach-
ments from the south nothing had so far been seen, nor did they
come in sight throughout the next day (9th), from dawn to
EVENTS IN THE NORTHERN TRANSVAAL. 449
dusk of which heavy interchanges of fire went on as Colen-
brander and Lyle slowly gained ground southward and eastward
into Mahpspoort. During the night a mixed party of Innis- Capture of
killing Fusiliers and Kitchener's Fighting Scouts clambered up ApriMoih,
a towering hill, seized the summit, and entrenching at once, 1902-
found themselves at dawn in a position commanding the whole
Poort from the west. The enemy ran forthwith, and Colen-
brander, pushing on, swept away the laager, kiUing, wounding and
capturing many of its defenders. The rest, amongst whom was
Beyers himself, had already fled south-eastward during the night
and should have fallen in with McQueen or Celhers, who had been
posted for this precise contingency. But these detachments,
arriving utterly exhausted after their long and rapid march
from Pietersburg, had got no further northward than Pylkop,
where they halted to rest on a mountain which indeed seemed
to command the whole field. A gap to the south-east, however,
was thus left ojjen, and Beyers, with the Boer's unerring eye
for a bolt-hole, dashed through it with the remnants of his
commando, and made good his escape. By the time this was
known to Colenbrander it was too late to follow, and he ordered
a general sweep towards Lyle on the west who was still slowly
fighting his way into Malif)Sf>oort. In its recesses remained
many scattered parties of Boefs, which, crushed between Lyle
and the rest, surrendered as fast as they could be found. Colen-
brander then went into bivouac at the northern end of the Results of the
Poort, having killed and wounded twenty Boers and captured *"*'^''-
108 in three days' fighting, during which his men had laboured
incessantly without rest, and almost without food and water.
Still he was unwilling to let Beyers go unharried. Scouting
continually, he learned on April 14th that the General had fled
north-east beyond Haenertsburg. Colenbrander pressed after
with the mounted troops on the same day. On the 15th a trap
was laid by long night marches, but in vain, for the enemy had
warning and made towards Leydsdorp. Sending 230 men of Pursuit of
Kitchener's Fighting Scouts under Captain Blaine with orders ^y^"-
to follow them up, Colenbrander himself dashed with incredible
speed by a roundabout route to intercept them, and on the 17th
VOL. IV. 29
1902.
450 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
was on the lookout on the Groot Letaba river. But no enemy
came into his arms, and Colenbrander, thinking he was too far
north, hurried down through Oud Agatha to Burghersdorp, and
once more lay in wait, this time along the Haenertsburg —
Leydsdorp road. Two days passed here, with news neither of
the enemy nor of their pursuer, Blaine. Of the latter Colen-
brander had heard nothing since parting with him on the 15th,
though two days later it had been reported to him that heavy
firing had been heard from the direction which the chase had
probably taken. Not imtil the 19th did he get any certain
intelligence, and it accounted only too plainly for his own lack
of success. Blaine had met with a reverse, and instead of
pursuing was in retreat.
A detachment On the i6th Blaine had been so close to the retiring
ImbuSe" commando that he rode into a laager twelve miles south-east
April 16th, of Haenertsburg only a few moments after the Boers had
abandoned it, finding therein all the indications of a hasty
evacuation. Here he rested his travel-worn men, who break-
fasted from the food left behind by the enemy. The appearance
of a few Boer scouts drew several of the soldiers out to drive
them off ; more Boers appeared and were engaged by more of
Blaine's men ; and finaUy almost the whole detachment mounted
and galloped against the enemy. The ground beyond the camp
narrowed between low walls of rock, and no sooner had the
troops passed the mouth of the defile when a heavy discharge
from both sides warned them that they had ridden into an
ambush. Now the enemy appeared in force on both flanks.
Some 700 Boers were visible ; many of the British groups became
isolated and surrounded, and only the order for a sauve qui
pent saved the rest from sharing their fate. Scattering singly
the men made the best of their way out of the predicament and
back to the infantry camp at Malipspoort, the detachment having
lost in all twenty-three killed and wounded and thirty prisoners.
On hearing of this Colenbrander ordered his infantry up to
Haenertsburg and repaired thither himself on April 20th, in-
tending to carry on the pursuit with all his force. But the
intervention of an armistice to enable certain terms of peace
EVENTS IN THE NORTHERN TRANSVAAL. 451
then under discussion at Headquarters* to be conveyed to Beyers
kept him idle until May 3rd, an interval spent in camp near
Legalie's Location. By the time the truce had expired, Beyers
himself had removed far out of reach to the north-east ; but many
of his burghers were known to have returned to Pylkop, and
Colenbrander determined to endeavour to bring them to bay.
He had never relaxed his hold on Malipspoort, the northern
exit of the Pylkop gorges. On to the heights on each side of Colenbrander
this he sent two strong parties of infantry, with orders to move ^kop, "^
southward against Pylkop, The southern gateway, it will be Maysrd— sth,
remembered, was at Chunies Poort, and thither on the night of
May 3rd Colenbrander took 900 men of Kitchener's Fighting
Scouts, Pietersburg Light Horse, Steinacker's Horse, and Beddy's
and the National Scouts. These were to advance northward
on Pylkop. Whilst engaged in these manoeuvres Colenbrander
learned that nearly 450 of Beyers' commando had been traced
elsewhere. Although this left but 150 or so to be accounted for
at Pylkop, Colenbrander decided to devote himself to the task
in hand before turning to seek the main hostile body. At
daybreak on May 5th Colenbrander's detachment came suddenly
upon the Boer laagers below the southern foot of Pylkop. The
Boers scattered at once, chmbing into such a confusion of preci-
pices, gorges and thickets which lay behind that they may
well have seemed lost for ever. But on their trail Wcis an enemy
whom they themselves, perhaps, had taught that where one
man could run another could follow, though waterless, foodless
and without rest. For three days and nights Colenbrander's
men hunted foot by foot through the maze, taking here a single
prisoner, there a worn-out batch of fugitives, and finally, on
the afternoon of May 9th, the Commandant, Biermann himself,
with thirty of his following. Then only did Colenbrander give
the word to halt. Of the 150 Boers in the place he had secured Results of the
104. He soon discovered the hiding place of the remnant, and *^^<=''-
he had marked them for his own when Peace put an end to
their danger and his own exertions.
• See Chapter XXX.
VOL. IV. 29*
452
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Approximate Strength States 9F Columns referred to in
FOREGOING CHAPTER.
April, 1901 — May, 1902.
Lt.-Col. H. M. Grenfell ...
I^t.-C^'- A. E. Wilson
Maj. H. McM'cking
Lt.-Col. J. W. Colenbrander
Lt!-Col. ]. W. G- Dawkins...
Lt.-Col. H. C. Denny
a
Is
i
0)
ei
•- J)
c
c
3
3 0
u
<4
^
o>
^
900
496*
3
435
104
310
188
2
656
242
3
2
520
220
3
—
365
200
2
Including ninety-six cyclists.
453
CHAPTER XXVI.
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY*
[Continued from Chapter XX.).
JANUARY — MAY, I902.
Notwithstanding the discouraging events recorded in Chapter Smuts'
XX. Smuts professed to welcome the dawn of 1902 with unabated
confidence. Never was he more assured of Divine and hopeful
of human assistance. Reviewing the whole campaign before
his deposed President, in an epistle which glowed with love of
his country and hatred of his enemies, he declared that all
things pointed to a triumphant conclusion, and that in Cape
Colony especially " the cause had made splendid progress."!
Nor was the Boer leader's military vision entirely blinded.
There were features in the apparently moribund invasion which
by no means belied his asseverations. Smuts had now nearly
13,000 rebels in the field, a levy which, if largely powerless from
lack of arms and horseflesh, was of a significance grave enough
to have drawn from so cool-headed and stout-hearted an observer
as the British High Commissioner the confession that " The
condition of Cape Colony is deplorable, not so much for the
material damage which is being done, as for the evidence it
affords of the lawless and disaffected temper of the mass of the
population. "J Smuts was as well aware as Lord Milner that
the overt revolters were but the scoria of treasonable forces
which were as yet beneath the surface. He knew, even better
* See map No. 63.
f Report by J. C. Smuts to President Kruger ; dated from Van Rhyns Dorp,
January, 1902.
X Despatch by the High Commissioner, November 15th, 1991 (Colonial Offic?
Letter, S.A. No. 43056).
454 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
perhaps than the High Commissioner, that at last the Boer army
had put its hand, however timidly and however late, upon the
only lever which bore upon the power of the British in South
Africa. To him the unprofitable operations of the past months
appeared as indications, not that the campaign in Cape Colony
was about to be quenched, but that it was unquenchable. At
the beginning of this, the third year of the struggle, his own
forces and all but one of his most distant detachments still sur-
vived in an arena in which the mere existence of a commando
was both a triumph and a recruiting agency for the repubhcan
cause. If these bands were too battered to wage effective war
themselves, they were well placed to pass fresh fuel across the
frontier to feed the enfeebled flame of invasion. From the Witte
Bergen in the east to beyond the Kakamas uplands in the west
his men held drift-heads upon the British side of the Orange
river, and even of those passages which were not in Boer
hands the British seemed unable to deny the use. Twice
during the past six weeks one of the main thoroughfares into
Cape Colony had been traversed without hindrance by his rein-
forcements. The mere territory under Smuts' control was
enormous. It was a " plain fact," as Lord Milner, despising all
foolish optimism, at this time reported, " that the rebels are
still in undisturbed possession of about one-third of the Colony."*
For all these reasons Smuts, whom the disappearance of Krit-
zinger had now formally installed as Commander-in-Chief of the
Boer forces in Cape Colony, faced the new year with hope, and
it was not long before he endeavoured to give a fresh turn to
the campaign.
At this time all the energies of Sir J. French's columns in the
west were devoted to keeping the enemy to the north of the
partially completed blockhouse hne,t the "Chinese Wall,"*
which was to preserve the reclaimed portion of Cape Colony from
a return of the tide of invasion, and in accumulating supplies for
a general advance northward from that base. Smuts, seeing them
thus engrossed, developed activity in two opposite directions at
* Lord Milner to Colonial Office ; Telegram No. 273/S,
t See Chapter XX,
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 455
once. Sending Maritz northward to overrun Namaqualand, he Smuts' tactics
began to feel around the right flank of the columns by way of '"J*"' '902.
Williston. His primary object was to take Fraserburg, towards
which Malan moved by circuitous routes, whilst, in order to
divert suspicion, Hugo, Pyper and Van der Venter feinted
strongly in the direction of Sutherland.* Malan, now promoted
to General, was in charge of the manoeuvre. Smuts himself pro-
ceeding into Calvinia, to a central position between his widely
separated operations. As these tactics became declared, about
January 15th, T. Capper and W. Doran were drawn out towards
Sutherland, approaching Callwell, who was already at Ganst-
fontein, and Lund, who was escorting a convoy up from
Matjesfontein. As it was uncertain how far eastward the Boer
movement might extend Crabbe was railed from Piquetberg
Road round to Beaufort West. At the same time Callwell was
ordered to Prince Albert Road. This left Capper the fore-
most of the Sutherland columns, and failing to receive Callwell's
intimation of his departure, on the 23rd he unexpectedly
encountered the advance-guard of the Boer combination in the
defile of Verlaten Kloof. Driving these back, Capper next day
found the eastern exit of the Kloof at Jakals VaUei barred by
entrenchments. But a prompt attack (five casualties) cleared
the road, and on the 25th Capper entered Sutherland, where he
was joined by Lund. As the enemy continued to collect between
Sutherland and Fraserburg, a converging movement on the latter
town was ordered to be carried out by Capper (with Lund) and
Crabbe, from their opposite stations. Crabbe, who was escorting
a train of donkey wagons carrying suppHes for Fraserburg, was
first in touch with the enemy. Passing VVaterval on February 3rd
he found himself in the presence of commandos nearly 800
strong, who so determinedly disputed the road to Fraserburg
that, in view of their superior strength, Crabbe retired upon a
defensive position. At the moment when Crabbe was checked, Loss of a
his convoy, which was marching twelve miles in rear of him, p^b**'.'^!^
guarded by only 160 troops, had reached Uitspanfontein. A 1902.
* Instructions by Fighting General W. Malan to Commandant H, Hugo, January
Qth, 1902 ; dated from Oude Muur.
456 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
message despatched to bring it forward miscarried, and through-
out the 4th both Crabbe and his wagons remained separated,
the former rendered immovable by the close investment of the
enemy, who imagined that the much desired supplies were with
him. Discovering their mistake, on the night of the 4th the
Boers passed around the flanks of the column towards the
convoy, which they easily captured at 4 a.m. on February 5th.
Two hours later Crabbe, who had left his main body at Waterval,
appeared, and with only 200 men made a daring attempt to
recover his wagons. But, greatly outnumbered, he was fortunate
to be able to fall back upon his column again. In the three
days' fighting his losses had been fifty-three killed and wounded ;
those of the enemy more than seventy. By this time Capper
and Lund had come up to Fraserburg, and by their union with
Crabbe extricated him from an awkward predicament. Whilst
the columns put in for re-fitting to Nels Poort and Rhenoster
Kop the Boers withdrew to Lapfontein.
Meanwhile, not far to the east of the scene of these events,
a totally distinct operation had been in progress. This was
I'ursuit of the chase of L. Wessels, Kritzinger's successor, last seen plunging
" ^"^ ^' for safety into the recesses of the Camdeboo mountains. Wessels
was bent on breaking westward across the railway to join Malan,
and quitted his hiding-place on January 2nd. For the next five
weeks his history is one of twists and turns all over the Aberdeen,
Murraysburg, Graaff Reinet, Cradock, and Somerset East dis-
tricts in his efforts to accomplish his end. B. Doran and
Lord W, A. Cavendish-Bentinck followed, first across Murrays-
burg to Leeuwfontein, thence to Rondavel, in Richmond, and
round by the county town back to Niet Gedacht, where Doran
caught up with him on the 15th and drove him on southward
with the loss of eight burghers. A few days' further hunting in
the west of Murraysburg took Doran into Nels Poort to refit on
January 21st, Lord W. A. Cavendish-Bentinck having been pre-
viously withdrawn from the pursuit to take part in the operations
against Malan on the other side of the railway. At Nels Poort
Doran stayed three days, and, taking advantage of the respite,
Wessels , dashed eastward, burned the railway station ^t
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 457
Bethesda Road, and turned southward for the Tandjes Berg.
Another column now appeared to replace Lord W. A. Cavendish-
Bentinck's, namely, Wormald's, temporarily commanded by
Major J. Vaughan, This force had been at Richmond Road on
January i8th, and was thence directed against L. Wessels. On
the 26th Vaughan crossed the Graaff Reinet railway at Letskraal,
and getting in touch with Wessels, followed him southward to
Water Kloof, where there was a skirmish (four casualties),
which ended in Wessels disappearing down the Vogel river.
Vaughan pursued to Pearston, where he was on the last day of
January. Meanwhile, B. Doran had come forward by Houd
Constant to Oudeberg on the same date. The pursuit was now
strengthened by the arrival of Follett, Scobell's successor in the
north-west, who had been withdrawn from that district after a
series of operations which will be described later. Vaughan,
Doran, and the newcomer tossed Wessels about between them
in Murraysburg, until on February 12th the commando, reduced
to under fifty men, at last succeeded in effecting its purpose by
breaking through the blockhouses near Three Sisters station, not l. WesseU
without further loss, and joining Malan north of the Nieuwveld. J°*"* ^aUn.
When Follett quitted the north-east there had seemed little
left to do in that part, for the disintegration of one commando Operations in
and the temporary expulsion of the other left scarcely 200 Boers ^^^ north-easi.
to carry on the war. A northerly movement by Follett from
Dordrecht on December 28th had begun the clearance by
turning P. Wessels in front of Lord Lovat, who in the first week
of January was between Schilder Kranz and Jamestown, Monro
remaining at Dordrecht. Pushing the Boers northward on the
4th, Lord Lovat drove them across the Holle Spruit, and on the
5th surprised the laager at Kings Crown, where he secured nine
prisoners. Monro and Follett, concentrating at Clifford, then
arranged a joint drive westward, that is, towards Lord Lovat,
who returned to his former situation. This time Fouch^ came
in the way of Major N. T. Nickalls with a squadron of the 17th
Lancers and some Imperial Yeomanry at Mooi Hoek, west of
Oorlogs Poort, on January nth ; but he was in considerable
strength, and got away after inflicting fourteen casualties on the
458
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
r. Wessels
joins Fouche.
P. Wessels
and Fouche
driven from
the north-east.
Lancers. P. Wessels, trending south-west before the advancing
columns, found return impossible, and made for the railway
below Molteno. He was intercepted by Price when sixteen miles
from the line ; but a dense fog on the morning of the 14th enabled
him to avoid an action, and crossing near Cypher Gat, he made
his escape into the Bamboes moimtains, Price following. With
one opponent thus outside the area, all the columns then turned
upon Fouche, who had slipped back in the direction of Clifford.
An elaborate " drive " eastward by five bodies on the line Schilder
Kranz — Montagu Hill — Drizzly Hill — Lady Grey was unpro-
ductive, only Nickalls succeeding in engaging Fouche on the
22nd, and the end of January found the columns somewhat at
a loss. Meanwhile Price, aided after January 25th by two
squadrons from Follett's column under Nickalls, had been vainly
endeavouring to come to terms with P. Wessels in the Bamboes
mountains. Price's object was to drive him into the angle of
the Steynsburg — Middleburg — Cradock blockhouse line. But
Wessels, well aware of the trap, turned and doubled inter-
minably, finally gaining an offing in precisely the opposite direc-
tion. From an attack by Price on January 30th he darted away
north-eastward, tecrossed the railway on February 4th, and
hurrying back into his old district, eventually rejoined Fouche
on February 17th, when that leader had himself cast back into
Jamestown county. At that moment Monro's column, the only
one in the vicinity, happened to be, for the first time, unready
for concerted action. Fouche's commando had practically
dissolved before the incessant harrying, and Monro had just
dispersed his troops into separate posts for purposes of local
raiding. Fouche and P. Wessels now seized the opportunity
to escape together from a district where they had experienced so
many adventures in company. Crossing the railway north of
Molteno on the night of February 28th, they steered for the
midlands, and their departure at last left the north-eastern
counties free from trouble. Price, reinforced from Molteno by
Monro's mounted troops under Colonel A. C. Baillie (Imperial
Yeomanry), was ordered to follow. As this force moved westward
Malan approached from the opposite direction in the act of
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 459
evading a combination of columns which had completely broken
up his own gathering in Beaufort West.
When the columns of Crabbe, Lund, Capper and B. Doran
put in to the main railway in the middle of February, they were
placed under command of Major-General T. E. Stephenson,
who was ordered to act vigorously against the enemy in the
district. He at once, on th& 17th, launched a " drive " in a Stephenson's
north-westerly direction, which took the following lines : Crabbe f'ro^[f,e"^ain
and Lund from Rhenosterfontein through Uitspanfontein, line.
Lapfontein, Paarde Gras Vallei, and Spioen Berg to Gorras
(February 20th) ; Capper, from Nels Poort through Dassiefon-
tein, Bultfontein, Laken Vallei to Gans Vlei (February 23rd),
and thence into Williston ; B. Doran, from Three Sisters station
through Doom Kloof to Taaiboschfontein, where he was stopped
in order to prevent the enemy breaking back eastward from his
colleagues. This operation was successful in so far as it cleared
the front of the Williston — Carnarvon — Victoria West section
of the great blockhouse hne ; the Boers gave way everywhere,
and in the small rearguard actions which ensued they suffered
some losses, including Commandant Hugo, who was mortally
wounded. But neither Smit nor Malan, who commanded the
two bodies in which the enemy retreated, were brought to book,
and they treated with contempt the fences by which they were
surrounded. Smit, going northward, passed through the Car-
narvon— Victoria VV^cst blockhouses on the 22nd, followed to
Pampoen Poort by B. Doran, who then went into Richmond on
the last day of February. Malan took a bolder line. Turning The Bocre
eastward across the face of the " drive," he crossed the railway ''•'P^'**-
below Victoria Road early on the morning of February 21st.
The pursuit was immediately taken up by Wormald, now again
in command of his column, who chased him by the south of
Richmond down to Murraysburg, close to which, at Voet Pad,
there was a skirmish. Malan, who was too weak to effect much,
then dispersed and attempted to conceal his men until he could
receive reinforcements from the west, whence he exp)ected Smit
eventually to follow him. But Wormald left him little peace,
engaging him five times in one week,
46o
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Operations in
the west.
Fresh Boer
concentration
in the west.
All this time Haig had been left in charge of affairs in the
extreme west, having under him the columns of Wyndham and
Kavanagh at Clanwilliam, Callwell about Sutherland, and
W. Doran in the southern border of Calvinia. There were many
signs that, though the danger to the western seaboard had been
averted, strong bands still hovered within touch of the new
blockhouses, and might at any time become the nucleus of a
fresh descent upon the home counties of Cape Town. On
February 6th a convoy proceeding to Calvinia in charge of
part of^V5mdham's column was hotly attacked by Theron's
commando at Zoetwater. The return march, during which
Kavanagh joined Wyndham at Zoetwater, was directed through
Van Rhyns Dorp, where Bouwers, with a considerable force,
was found and attacked. On this occasion Captain E. R. A.
Shearman's squadron of the loth Hussars charged superior
numbers and accounted for some dozen of the enemy. Bouwers
then dogged the march back to ClanwiUiam, which was re-entered
on the nth, and Kavanagh was ordered northward again to
drive him off. This he did with success, pushing the commando
north of Clanwilliam, twenty miles beyond which, on February
14th, he surprised the laager and captured ten prisoners.
Earlier than this W. Doran, at Middel Post, had gained prac-
tical knowledge that the tide had not altogether receded. Having
been informed that the Boers were making use of the farm De
Hoop, situated at the foot of the Roggeveld not far to the west
of him, on February 4th Doran took 100 men to attempt to
surround it, leaving his baggage and guns entrenched at Middel
Post in charge of 250 men. In the afternoon, during his absence,
Van der Venter suddenly fell upon the encampment with nearly
400 men, and although he was beaten off with considerable loss
on both sides,* he succeeded in setting fire to most of the
wagons before he retreated, forcing Doran to go first into Ceres
and then to Matjesfontein (24th) to refit. So numerous seemed
the enemy in the west at this time that Haig became convinced
that a fresh concentration was in progress about Van Rhyns
• Doran's casualties — Killed, three officers, sever) n^en ; wounded, seventeen,
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 461
Dorp, and on February 24th Sir J, French ordered Call well
from Sutherland to reinforce him.
If this renewed gathering was in military strength compara-
tively trifling, its origin rendered it more formidable than the
British authorities could at that moment appreciate. Smuts
had just received the strongest encouragement to maintain his
hold on so much of the British colony as he possessed. At
last his strategy had received the recognition of his leaders,
and he saw the realisation of his dream approaching. Cape
Colony, hitherto the scene of aimless marauding, the cockpit of
insignificant forces, wherein no issue greater than the fate of a
convoy or a Commandant had been or could be decided, was
soon to become the main theatre of war. Both De Wet and Reason of it.
De la Rey, undazzled by their own futile brilliance on the great
Boer plateaux, had conceded, what Smuts had long contended,
that " The question of complete independence for the people
will be decided in the Cape Colony."* This forecast, it will be
seen, was appended to the ratification of Smuts' appointment to Boers plan
be Commander-in-Chief in Cape Colony, with the significant pro- ^^mSi in
viso — " until such time as General De la Rey has arrived there." Cape Colony.
The added code of rules for regularising the fighting and adminis-
tration in Cape Colony plainly showed that the guerrilla raiding
was soon to be changed for warfare of a more legitimate and
purposeful type. De la Rey's communication was even more
practical. He promised troops, announcing his intention of
detaching a strong force to descend upon the frontier by the west
of the Maf eking railway about April. It had already been
agreed that the Transvaal commandos should operate in the
west of the Colony, leaving the east to Smuts.f Smuts, indeed,
had less need of precepts than of reinforcements, from the lack
of which the cause was now almost at a standstill. His
governance of such parts of the territory as were within his
• Letter from Head Commandant De Wet to Mr. Advocate Smuts, dated from
Winburg, February 8th, 1902. This document contains so much that is of interest in
throwing light on the attitude of the Boer directorate during this, the final phase of
the campaign, that it is inserted in exlenso in Appendix 3.
t Report by Smuts tu Botha ; undated, but written early in February.
462 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
influence was regular enough ; he had already issued a proclama-
tion annomicing the supreme rule, and how it should be obeyed,
of the Repubhcs in " nearly all the Districts of the Colony
north and west of the Cape Town railway line, and many other
Districts and parts of Cape Colony ... in which the enemy
has only the chief villages in his possession and authority."*
Until the promised assistance should arrive Smuts could do
Uttle more on the offensive, and he contented himself with
maintaining his positions from Van Rhyns Dorp to Tontelbosch
Kolk, having especial care of Prieska, with its command over
the drifts of the Orange river, and of Namaqualand, where still
a single British column, that of W. L. White,"f patrolled an area
which Smuts had marked for his own, in view of its utility as a
Both sides base for the next descent by the western seaboard. On the other
P*"^- side the British columns became little less inactive, being largely
tied to the lines of blockhouses, both by the difficulty of supply
over an area so enormous and so dangerous for convoys, and
by the weakness of the lines themselves, which the enemy had
proved that he could rupture almost at wiU without serious
losses. It thus occurred that the month of March was almost
the most uneventful period of the campaign. Only T. Capper,
based on the almost inaccessible WilUston, was severely engaged
as he repeatedly thrust back Theron and L. Wessels from coming
southward. One band alone eluded him, and this was unsuccess-
fully encountered on March 25th by a detachment of the ist
Colonial division from Sutherland, which had to fall back with
loss. The strongest Boer concentration was in Prieska, where
Smit, deprived of Malan, was reinforced instead by Van Reenan
and two leaders named Pyper, the total force amounting to some
700 men. From his laager on Omdraai Vlei, Smit haunted the
Prieska — De Aar road, lying in wait for convoys. But W. Doran
and a column under Colonel G. J. Younghusband converging
from Britstown and Strydenburg respectively upon Klip Drift,
the passage which had defied De Wet a year before, cleared the
* Proclamation by Head Commandant J. C. Smuts, temporary Commander-in-Chief
in Cape Colony ; dated from Brandvlei, Calvinia, February ist, 1902.
t See post, page 468.
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY.
463
borders of the road between March 26th and 29th, and little
further transpired in this quarter. The most active operations
in progress were those against Malan's remnants about Rich-
mond, and against Fouche after his above-described escape
from the north-eastern area.
On March ist B. Doran from Richmond Road joined Wor- Pursuit of
maid in the pursuit of Malan. The commando soon broke '**"'
up again under the pressure and, Wormald being withdrawn
for service elsewhere, Doran kept touch with it alone. On
the loth a band was caught near Middle Mount, and worsted
with the loss of four prisoners. Doran then chased Malan
down to Murraysburg (13th), thence northward again towards
Richmond. Doran's need of supplies now gave Malan a
breathing space which he utilised by swinging down into the
Camdeboo mountains, towards which he knew that a comrade
was winding his way from a remote part of the country. This
was Fouche from the north-east. Followed by Price and Baillie Pursuit of
from Molteno from the last day of February, by March 8th °"
Fouch^ had crossed the Cradock railway near Drennan. Price
was before him however, and turned him back from the passes
which led southward into Somerset East, whereupon Fouch^
avoided him by a wide cast to the north, appearing again on
the loth at Buffels Hoek, north-east of Pearston. An encounter
here, in which the Boers lost five men, broke the commando into
two, half, under Bezuidenhout, going into the Tandjes Berg
by Petersburg, half, led by Fouch^ himself, persisting south-
ward. Detailing Baillie to follow the first. Price pursued Fouch6
through Wheat Lands down to abreast of Jansenville, There
Fouche swung westward, and on March i6th succeeded in cross-
ing the Graaff Reinet railway between Saxony and Klipplaat.
Next day Price overtook him near Vlak Laagte, on the borders
of Aberdeen and WiUowmore, capturing four prisoners. But
Fouch6 was now sure of his mark. Nothing was now between Fouch6 joins
him and the Camdeboo mountains, and darting northward he ^*'*"-
was soon in that stronghold by the side of Malan.
By this time B. Doran, having refitted at Graaff Reinet, had
come to Houd Constant (March 24th), and was favourably
Bezuidenhout.
464 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
placed to co-operate with Price in a drive through the Camde-
boo mountains. This was begun on the 26th. The Boers, hunted
from the kloofs and recesses, scattered westward, and by the end
of the month Doran put into Three Sisters station, and Price
into Nels Poort, leaving the enemy scattered in groups too
small to deal with all over the northern part of Murraysburg.
Pursuit of Meanwhile Baillie, in pursuit of Bezuidenhout, had been
drawn off rapidly in the opposite direction. The Boer first
dashed across the western angle of Cradock to Spitz Kop, turned
east there, crossed the railway north of Fish River station,
and was soon after caught up for a moment by Baillie, who
took four prisoners. Bezuidenhout then ran on through Doom
Nek and made for the Bamboes mountains, whilst Baillie, on
March 24th, entered Maraisburg, and three days later out-
manceuvred his opponent by skirting the Bamboes mountains
and facing around at Sterkstroom. Bezuidenhout was now
located at Spitz Kop, at the western end of the mountains ; but
Baillie traversed the range from east to west without result, and
on March 31st was in Maraisburg again. Here he awaited
the arrival of Major-General A. FitzR. Hart, who was expected
to arrive at once from Aliwal North. Hart duly appeared,
bringing with him the columns of Moore and Lord Lovat. But
Bezuidenhout successfully evaded an elaborate attempt to enclose
him, and on April 2nd crossed the railway north of Sterkstroom.
He then made straight for the old quarters of the commando in
the Jamestown district, whither he was followed by Lord Lovat
and Moore, whilst Baillie was withdrawn to take part in the
operations against Fouche. Alone as he was in the north-east
Bezuidenhout had an uneasy time during the rest of April.
Hunted from one comer to another, what httle strength he had
was whittled away, especially by Lord Lovat, who on the 15th,
i6th and 25th attacked his laagers, securing a dozen prisoners,
fifty horses, and nearly all his suppUes and equipment, whilst
on the i8th the local troops of Lady Grey took a further six
prisoners. Under this rough treatment many of his remaining
burghers surrendered, and by the end of April Bezuidenhout,
though still uncaught, was practically harmless.
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 465
Fouche and Malan, now in alliance, remained to be dealt Pursuit of
with in Murraysburg. In the first week of April an easterly M°"ianf*"**
sweep by B. Doran and Price brought the columns to Oude-
berg and Graaff Reinet respectively. On the loth Price was
entrained back to his proper sphere at Stormberg, in view of
the reappearance of Bezuidenhout's commando. BaiUie, on
the other hand, who had as related been withdrawn from the
pursuit of Bezuidenhout, now took a place in that of Fouche
and Malan, coming to Graaff Reinet on Af>ril i8th. Three
days later W. Doran joined him in Graaff Reinet, having
marched across from Stephenson's sphere of operations in the
Britstown district. There were thus present in the Graaff Reinet
area B. Doran, W. Doran, and Baillie, and these made yet
another effort to catch the enemy in the Camdeboo mountains.
As before it was ineffectual, because practically impossible.
By the end of April the Boers had scattered yet again into the
north of Murraysburg ; BaiUie had gone to Nels Poort, W.
Doran to Graaff Reinet, B. Doran to Schietkraal, east of Biesjes
Poort station. Thrice again early in May the Camdeboo moun-
tains were scoured, this time by Baillie and W. Doran alone, who
crossed and recrossed the area from Oudeberg to Nels Poort,
halting on the Zuurpoort pass of the Koudeveld on May 13th,
when BailUe's column became absorbed in W. Doran's. B. Doran
at the same time hunted Fouche, who had separated from the
others, past Richmond through Middle Mount and Dassicfontein
to Schietkraal, where he was on the 15th. B. Doran was soon
after joined by another column from Stephenson's command,
namely, that lately commanded by Younghusband, and now
led by Colonel R. C. A. B. Bewicke-Copley (King's Royal Rifles).
Other reinforcements were on the way, for Lord Kitchener had
enjoined special efforts to make an end of Fouch6 and Malan, and
Sir J. French had ordered both the Scots Greys and Lord Lovat's
Scouts into the area. Before they arrived, and whilst the colunms
on the spot halted at Zuurpoort and Schietkraal, the enemy once
more combined, and crossing the Koudeveld, moved upon
Aberdeen. Accompanying Fouch6 and Malan was a certain rebel
Commandant named Van Heerden, who at the head of a small
VOL. IV. 30
466 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
band had made an abortive raid on the outskirts of the town
on April 7th, in which he had gained a knowledge of the dis-
Foucheand position of the gamson. He now guided the rest in a second
Ab^rd^nr'' attack on Aberdeen on the night of May i8th. It was as unsuc-
May 1 8th— cessful as the first, for, though the enemy got into the town
«9 > >902. buildings, the blockhouses resisted every effort to rush them,
and Van Heerden himself was killed.* Fouche and Malan
then drew off eastward, crossed the Graaff Reinet railway, and
turning southward, were marked on May 20th at Staple Ford,
near the border of Jansenville. Meanwhile, Lord Lovat had
reached Graaff Reinet, and Bewicke-Copley and B. Doran had
marched into Aberdeen. Sir J. French now ordered all the
columns to manoeuvre so as to drive the Boers eastward across
the Cradock hne, and if possible into the Bamboes moimtains, on
two sides of which he had drawn an impenetrable wall of rail-
way blockhouses, whilst on the other sides the Scots Greys at
Maraisburg, and Colonel Lukin's Colonial troops at Tarkastad
were to be placed to turn any attempt to avoid the trap. Then
followed one of the most elaborate operations of all the com-
plicated campaign in Cape Colony. As the pursuing column
moved eastward. Lord Lovat surprised Fouch^ and Malan at
Staple Ford and accounted for six Boers, nearly 100 horses and
mules, and drove the commandos down the Sunday river towards
Jansenville. Twelve miles above that town the Boers turned
south-eastward, pointing on Slangfontein and the Cradock rail-
way. The columns performed rapid evolutions to keep them
enclosed. On May 25th Lord Lovat, who had followed closely,
moved into Darhngton to deny the Zuurberg ; W. Doran hung
upon the opposite flank at Pearston ; Bewicke-Copley, who had
entered Pearston the day before, pushed on for Cradock ; B.
Doran, who had been kept at Kendrew on the Graaff Reinet
railway awaiting the trend of the chase, took train for Comma-
dagga, which, though only to be gained by the circuitous route
through Uitenhage to AUcedale, was reached on the 27th.
On that day Fouche and M;ilan were at Allegrens Kraal, with
Lord Lovat close behind th&m at Allemans Kraal, W. Doran
* Casualties — Killed, one ; wounded, four.
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 467
upon the left flank at Somerset East, B. Doran on the right at
Commadagga. Despairing of crossing the alert and reinforced
railway blockhouse line, which was constantly patrolled by
armoured trains, the commandos turned desperately, and at-
tempted to cut a way back. Somewhat in front of Lord Lovat
was a party of district troops under Major Collet. These re-
ceived the full force of the attack, and were at once surrounded.
But fighting well, they kept the enemy at bay until Lord Lovat
brought his men to the rescue, whereupon the Boers fled east-
ward again, leaving Malan severely wounded on the field. Capture of
Fouche then at all costs made for the railway, which on the ^^"'
28th he succeeded in crossing in the face of every obstacle.
Flying through Bedford, and past Adelaide, on June ist he was
at Paling Kloof, blocked in front by Lukin at Tarkastad, by
a force under Colonel A. E. Codrington at Baileyton, by the
East London railway which was fortified round to Thebus, and
reinforced by every infantry soldier whom Sir J. French had been
able to muster. Behind, B. Doran and Lord Lovat near Elands
Drift pressed closely, whilst a hne of troops from Thebus down
to Mortimer denied all return to the west. A column under
Lieut. -Colonel J. A. G. Drummond-Hay was at Thebus, the
Scots Greys lay at Maraisburg, Bewicke-Copley moved forward
from Cradock, W. Doran from Mortimer. " In another forty- pouch^
eight hours," declared Sir J. French, " Fouch^ must have surrounded,
been surrounded in the mountains." But the miracle which
sometimes arrives to help those who have well helped themselves
intervened to save the Boer leader. " The news arrived that
peace had been signed and hostilities ceased."*
All this time Smuts, awaiting the day of greater things, had smuts' cam-
been steadily prosecuting his campaign in the far north-west. p*'P" '" '^*
^, ■ ' Cr , , , xr , , , north-west.
The region, compnsmg Namaqualand and Kenhardt, now thus
brought into the body of the campaign, had throughout the war
been so remote from it that events therein have been barely
alluded to in the course of this narration. Yet it had seldom
been untraversed by either belligerent since the early days of
the war. Fourteen months earher than the events recorded
• Lieut. -General Sir J. French's report.
VOL. IV. 30*
468 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Previous above, that is, in March, 1901, hostile bands had appeared at
nortWest*^^^ Pella, extending their depredations down to Ookiep ; Kakamas
1 901. had even raised a commando of its own, levied and led by
Conroy, Maritz's assistant. The township garrisons at that
time were commanded by Lieut.-Colonel W. Shelton, with
Headquarters at Ookiep. Having no mobile troops or equip-
ment he could do nothing in so vast, waterless and sparsely
inhabited an area, and he had urged the introduction of a field
column to deal with the bands, one of the worst effects of whose
presence was that his own troops dared not leave their farms
to go on duty with their corps.*
Not until August of that year, however, had it been possible
to accede to his wish. Then a column was formed at Ookiep
and placed under Lieut.-Colonel W. L. White, R.A., whose
orders were, generally, to patrol the left bank of the Orange
river, and clear the districts of Namaqualand and Kenhardt.
His opponents consisted of roaming, thieving bands of rebels,
grouped roughly under Conroy, Van Zyl and Jan Louw, parties
with no aim but looting, and of small military effect except to
subvert both British and Boer influence by their overbearing
conduct to the settlers. They amounted, however, to the respect-
able total of some thousand men, and until White appeared
were masters of all the tracts between the garrisoned posts.
White quickly made his presence felt. Marching with great
rapidity, in spite of the enormous difficulties of the country, to
and fro from Ookiep eastward to Upington and southward to Van
Rhyns Dorp, a desert area 117,000 square miles in extent, he
estabhshed posts at the tactical centres, and obtained a hold on
the country which, weak as it was, was never shaken off. His
encounters were few, but some were more than skirmishes. In
1902. January, 1902, an attack which he delivered from Kenhardt on
the commandos massed in superior numbers at Kakamas cost
him two days' sharp fighting at Middel Post and Omkyk, and
fifteen casualties. The incursion of Maritz into Namaqualand
in February took him back to the south of Ookiep to cover that
place and the railway to Port Nolloth, In the course of escorting
* Lieut. -Colonel Shelton's report, March 4th, 1901.
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 469
a convoy to Garies he successfully surprised a laager on the road,
but having arrived, he found himself unable to return to
Ookiep, for Maritz, with his own and two other commandos, had
appeared at Leliefontein, between him and his base. At Garies,
however. White was secure with six weeks' supplies, and Lieut.-
General Sir J. French, seeing that the campaign in this part
might shortly become important, ordered White to hold on, and
himself assumed the direction of affairs in Namaqualand, which
had hitherto been controlled from Cape Town. French's forecast
proved correct. Events in Namaqualand began to move rapidly.
First Maritz overran Namaqualand with his patrols, carrying
out the same process of thorough reconnaissance and recruiting
as that which had long before swept together the rebels and
supphes of Calvinia. This was but the prelude to the arrival of Smuts assumes
Smuts himself, who in the first week of April took command and ^hr^th-'"
prepared to open a fresh campaign. He came with a pohcy well west,
adapted to, indeed, dictated by, the nature of the country. * ^" * '^^"
The occupation of the few scattered inhabitable spots would
practically place him in possession of the country, and he at
once set about reducing those within reach. Ookiep, the ter-
minus of the railway to the coast was his prime objective, and
it was quickly invested. Springbok and Concordia, both gar- Capture of
risoned places on opposite sides of the town, soon fell, the first cScordia.'" '
with credit after a fight of sixteen hours, the latter by a disgrace-
ful act of surrender on the part of the Town Guard without the
interchange of a shot. The loss of this village was peculiarly
unfortunate because it contained a large stock of arms and
ammunition, and six tons of dynamite, which the enemy desired
to possess for purposes of destruction upon the invaluable line
of railway leading to the coast. On the last day of March
Ookiep was surrounded, just as a train carrying a fresh supply Ookiep
of ammunition succeeded in making its way into the town, surrounded.
The enemy then took possession of the track as far as $teinkopf,
where they took up a strong position, and prepared to move
upon Port Nolloth. They got no further, however, towards the
sea, their last hope of maintaining communication with the
outer world. At Port Nolloth lay H.M.S. Barracouta, commanded
470 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Proim)t action by Commander S. H. B. Ash, R.N. This officer at once grasped
Port NoHoth. *^® situation, and landing a party of bluejackets with a gun,
promptly occupied the hght railway for some distance. The
approaches to Ookiep were finally secured by Captain M. Mac-
donald (Namaqualand Border Scouts), who on his own initiative
guarded Annenous and its adjacent viaducts with local troops.
These were most valuable services, for the reconquest and recon-
struction of the Une would have indefinitely delayed the progress
of a force for the relief of Ookiep, which was fast approaching
by sea from Cape Town. Ookiep was separated from the coast
by thirty miles of desert so impassable that a river of equal
width would have been an easier obstacle than the sand. The
bridge-heads, as it were, were at Annenous and Klipfontein,
and fortunately Smuts had either overlooked or been forestalled
in the seizure of posts which the destruction of the railway might
well have rendered unapproachable. On April nth and 12th a
Arrival of half-battaUon of the 2nd East Surrey regiment landed at Port
column '^*^*'*^ Nolloth, Colonel H. Cooper accompanying it to command the
April nth— "Namaqualand Field Force," which was shortly completed by
' '^^" the arrival, also by sea, of Callwell's column. Whilst the dis-
embarkation was in progress, Cooper himself hastened up the
railway with local troops, and thanks to Ash's and Macdonald's
foresight, and Smuts' lack of it, was able to occupy first Annenous,
and next Khpfontein by April 17th, thus making good the huge
obstacle of sand. The difficulties of the country convinced him
of the inutility of mounted troops, and he asked for reinforce-
ments of infantry. Accordingly the 2nd Royal Fusihers were
despatched from Cape Town, arriving at the front at the end
of the month. Cooper's advent had the effect of causing Smuts
to withdraw half his investing force to stand in the way of the
column, which they did at Steinkopf, now strongly entrenched.
Siege of Meanwhile, Ookiep was experiencing all the incidents of a regular
ApriTs'th— siege. On April 5th Smuts demanded the surrender of the place.
Mayist, 1902. Shelton confidently refused the summons. In the short time at
his disposal he had thoroughly organised his resources. The
garrison, which consisted of some 700 officers and men of the 5th
Royal Warwick regiment. Town Guard, Namaqualand Border
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 471
Scouts and Imperial Bushmen, he strengthened by enroUing and
arming at the last moment 275 volunteers drawn from the
civihan population, which numbered 4,426 souls. These troops
he disposed in two circles of defence about the town, the outer
ring, five miles in perimeter, comprising thirteen blockhouses, a
small fort, called " Fort Shelton," and four entrenched piquets ;
the inner Une included four strongly entrenched posts at the
angles of the town itself, these connected by a continuous series
of sangars and loopholed walls. The enemy began active opera_
tions by occupying, on April 8th, the ridges to the north and
east, from which they opened a rifle fire which seldom ceased from
beginning to end of the siege. On the four foUowing nights Attacks on
they made determined attempts to rush the northern defences. '^ "^^'
But in spite of the free use of dynamite bombs with which Con-
cordia had supphed them, every attack was repulsed with loss,
and only one outlying blockhouse fell into their hands on the loth.
The fourth and last attempt, on the night of the 12th, was more
resolute than any. On that occasion the Boers, concentrating
their fire power on two adjacent blockhouses, endeavoured to
overwhelm both by sheer weight of lead. In this they were
partially successful, the garrison of one of the houses being
driven back to the inner zone after firing their last round. But
as daylight drew on the enemy pressed the attack no further,
nor did he again venture to close upon the town. For this the
advance of the rehef force was in the main resp>onsible. On
April 22nd Shelton was in heliographic communication with Ookicp in
Cooper, then at Khpfontein. On that night part of the garrison ^jon'^'lJli*^'
made a sally, and drove the enemy from the blockhouse which relief column,
had been lost on the loth. Thereafter the defence was very ,tj^2, ^^" '
little troubled, though the investment continued to be soHd.
About this time Smuts handed over control of the undertaking
to Maritz, proceeding himself to attend the Peace Conference
which had been inaugurated at Vereeniging. On April 29th,
three days after a preliminary reconnaissance by Call well.
Cooper, not awaiting the arrival of the fresh battalion of infantry,
delivered his attack on the covering position at Steinkopf.
But the ground was so formidable and the enemy in such strength
472
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Relief column that he found the task more than he could accompUsh, and fell
Aprif29th, ^^ck to KHpfontein. The Boers, however, suffered severely
»902. from his artillery fire, and appeared in no way encouraged to
prosecute their enterprise at Ookiep. Nothing more active was
undertaken by them than an attempt to blow up the place by a
truck containing two tons of the dynamite obtained from Con-
cordia, which was run along the line towards the outskirts at
4 a.m. on May ist. But the truck, which was propelled by an
engine under full steam, was derailed just outside the danger
zone and, catching fire, its tremendous contents burned harm-
lessly away in sight of both belligerents. How great the danger
thus averted might have proved was shown by the discovery of
a force of some 800 Boers who lay under cover close behind
the train, with the intention of rushing in at the height of the
confusion to be caused by the explosion. During that day
Cooper advanced for the second time against Steinkopf, But
the enemy, abandoning the whole attempt against Ookiep, had
scattered in all directions, and three days later the column
entered the town. Shelton's creditable defence of thirty days
against a close and occasionally pressing investment had cost the
weU-sheltered garrison and inhabitants only seventy casualties,
of which twenty-three were non-combatants. The enemy lost
more than 100. Some 500 rounds of shrapnel were fired by the
g-pr. gun, which did excellent service, and 120,000 rounds of
small-arm ammunition were expended.
Meanwhile White in Caries, though cut off from Ookiep,
had not only preserved his communications with the south, but
had operated with considerable success in the Kamies Berg. On
April 29th his supplies were replenished by a convoy brought
from Clanwilliam by Kavanagh, who returned to Van Rhyns
Dorp. Soon afterwards White re-opened the road to Ookiep, and
on May 20th joined Cooper there. Wyndham's column, now
commanded by Major H. P. Kirkpatrick (i6th Lancers), was
then posted to the west of Van Rhyns Dorp as a connecting link
between Namaqualand and the Clanwilliam defences. All other
of Sir J. French's columns had been still occupied in covering
the great line of blockhouses, a duty which absorbed all their
Relief of
Ookiep,
May 4th,
1902.
Final opera-
tions in Cape
Colony.
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 473
strength and rendered them largely immobile. Those under
Haig, in the extreme west, as has been seen, afforded aid both
in the relief and to the commmiications of Ookiep. Further
east, Stephenson's command of six columns had still sparred
with Smit, Conroy and the two Pypers between De Aar and
Williston, baulking every attempt to approach the blockhouse
line. This produced a series of small encounters. Early in
April L. Wessels and Theron, reconnoitring south-eastward from
Tontelbosch Kolk, were driven back by T. Capper from Williston.
The enemy's favourite bases for their investigations were the
Pram Bergen and Storm Berg, west and north-west of Richmond
Road, and twice during April expeditions had to be sent to
drive them thence. On the 19th Bewicke-Copley, temporarily
in command of Younghusband's column, threw Smit and the
Pypers out of Varkfontein with loss. The latter retired to
Dagga, Smit to Baznards Dam, where four days later he was
again attacked, this time by Wormald from Richmond Road,
who pushed him down the Ongers river back upon the Pypers
at Dagga. Beyond this little occurred in this area either in
April or May. The great cross-country blockhouse line had
effectually paralysed the commandos between Tontelbosch Kolk
and the main line of railway, and the failure at Ookiep pro-
mised to expose the right flank just as Fouche's abandonment
of Barkly East and Jamestown had exposed the left. Smuts, Smuts leaves
when he quitted the siege of Ookiep to attend the Peace nl^sUuIS*.
Conference at Vereeniging,* left his cause in Cape Colony in a
condition of mingled promise and failure. His men kept the field
in one vast diagonal line from Namaqualand down to Cradock.
Though worn down, they were stiU unconquered ; though
scattered, they were well placed to resume the invasion, and
to cover the passage of reinforcements from^ across the Orange
river. In short, he had preserved the foundations of success,
but nothing more ; without powerful help the campaign had
already failed upon the ground where he and his superiors had
declared that it must be decided. His existing forces were so
many dying embers ; he, more than any Boer commander, must
* See Chapter XXX
474
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
cast his vote at Vereeniging in accordance with the reports of
leaders from other parts, for his own bolt was shot. Thus it
transpired that at the very time when he had looked for the
poviring in of fresh fuel, he was to invoke instead the extin-
guishing breath of Peace.
Approximate Strength States of Columns referred to in
foregoing chapter.
«
tAW
COLUMN.
1
1
c
42
.9 6
9 IS
m
a
5
1
a
1
»-4
il
.a
January — May, 1902.
Col. S. C. H. Monro
960
2
S ^
\
Col. H. J. Scobell (Folletfs)
1,010
6
2
Capt. Lord W. A. Caven-
dish-Bentinck . .
150
1
I
Lt.-C«l. W. Doran . .
300
2
—
Lt.-Col. B. Doran . .
38s
2
3
Maj. F. T. Lund (later
Russell)
350
2
I
Maj. F. Wormald . .
310
1
—
Lt.-Col. E. M. S. Crabbe . .
500
80
2
I
Lt.-Col. C. T. McM. Kava-
nagh
47.'?
3
—
Lt.-Col. P. G. Wyndham
(later Kirkpatrick)
430
—
...
Lt.-Col. T. Capper . .
530
18
2
1
Lt.-(;en. Sir J. D. P.
Lt.-Col. C. E. Callwell
350
2
^
French in command.
Maj. S. J. Lord Lovat
460
—
I
Lt.-Col. W. L. White
280
54
»
—
Lt.-Col. G. J. Young-
husband (later Bewicke-
Copley) . .
450
—
I
—
Lt.-Col. M. G. Moore
200
160
—
I
Lt.-Col. W. H. Hippisley . .
Lt.-Col. H. T. Lukin
600
—
—
1
600
—
7
1
Lt.-Col. the Hon. H. A.
Lawrence
y-z
..
Maj. R. Hoare
330
—
1
2
Lt.-Col. A. C. Baillie
6 so
—
I
5
Col. H. Cooper
60
1,040
2
2
/
Col. E. C. Bethune
500
2
1
475
CHAPTER XXVII.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY*
{Continued from Oiapter XXIV.).
MARCH — MAY, I902.
The minor issues in the Orange River Colony being accounted
for as described in Chapter XXIV., a return must be made to
the arena which by common consent had become the cockpit
of the whole campaign. By the end of February Botha in
the Eastern Transvaal seemed to have done his worst ; in the
Western Transvaal De la Rey had scarcely awakened to his
short but brilliant day of success upon the plains of Lichtenburg ;
Cape Colony, the real strategical touchstone of the campaign,
remained, as it had begun, no more than a raiding ground in the
plans of one belligerent, and an expensive nuisance in the eyes
of the other. It could not yet be known how far the recent
event on the Mill (Molen) river had robbed De Wet of his
power to sting, and without delay Lord Kitchener inaugurated a fresh
another enormous manoeuvre for the purpose of discovering who "^^^^^ " ''^
still rode between Kroonstad and the Drakensberg, and between columns.
Bethlehem and the Vaal. As before, a parallel table will best
show the various phases of the project.
FIRST PHASE.
Elliot with de Lisle, Fanshawe, Lawley,
Barker, Du Cane, Riminyton, Keir,
Wilson and Damant to move north from
line Bethlehem — Majoors Drift up to
the line Frankfort — Tafel Kop^Botha's
Pass.
Garratt (replacing Hyng), Sir IL Rawlin-
son and Nixon to sweep westward
across Elliot's rear from line Majoors
Drift — Mill (Molen) river confluence to
line Lindley — Millerale, facing north-
west.
• See map No. 64.
476
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
SECOND PHASE.
Above columns to wheel about, pivoting
on Frankfort, and form line upon the
southern columns, right flank on Heil-
hron — Frankfort blockhouses.
Above columns await formation of line by
the others, left flank on Bethlehem —
Lindley blockhouses.
THIRD PHASE.
A general advance in line westward to Kroonstad railway.
The troops
move on
March 4th,
1902.
On March 4th Elliot set out on his northward march with
his columns on the appointed line in the following order from
left to right : de Lisle, Fanshawe, Barker, Du Cane, Rimington,
Keir, Damant, Wilson. By nightfall he had extended to the
line Blydschap — Reitz — Newmarket. Colour was given to
reports that De Wet was in front by three attempts to break
back through Barker's outposts beyond Reitz during the night,
ail of which were easily repulsed. Very little more was seen or
heard of the enemy during the following two days which brought
the front through the Une Aangaan — Bamboes Spruit to the
turning point on March 6th. The chief event was the discovery
by Major C. Ross, a Canadian officer skilled in scouting, of
one of those hidden magazines which supplied the secret fuel
of the Boer campaign. The site of the trouvaille was no less
surprising than its amount. In a cave near Tafel Kop Ross
unearthed 310,000 rovmds of smaU-arm ammunition, several
hundred shells for field artillery, thousands of fuzes, 600
Vickers-Maxim projectiles, a Maxim gun, three sets of field
signalling and telegraph and one of telephone apparatus, all
this from almost under the feet of a British garrison of
long standing. The booty also included most of De Wet's
personal effects.
Meanwhile the southern columns, marching on the 5th,
passed athwart Elliot's receding rear by Dipka — Rust — Vinknest
— Rondedraai to the line of the Libenbergs Vlei river on the 8th,
meeting with even less opposition than Elliot had done. On
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 477
the gth, Elliot having wheeled into his new front on the Liben-
bergs Vlei, all was ready for the final stage. The driving line
had now been weakened by the falling out of four of the columns. Four col umns
withdrsiwn
Lawley, marching by Villiersdorp, made for the Eastern Trans-
vaal by Heidelberg and Springs, his subsequent history being
dealt with elsewhere.* The ill news from the Western Trans-
vaal drew Keir, Wilson and Damant from the combination
to entrain at Volksrust for Klerksdorp, where all was gloom after
Lord Methuen's disaster on the Harts river. f On March 6th
Sir C. Knox, suspending his clearing operations about Ficksburg,
had concentrated at Senekal, moving thence to hold the Une of
the Valsch river from Kroonstad to Lindley. He thus formed,
with the blockhouses, a double rail along the left flank of the
general advance.
On March loth the eight columns on the Libenbergs Vlei
river moved westward. Hopes of another large capture did not
run high. Several strong bands were known to have broken
back around the open flanks of Elliot's columns as they drove
northward ; worst of all, it was certain that De Wet himself
was outside the enclosure, he having safely crossed the railway
near Wolvehoek as long before as the night of the 5th. The
only remaining quarry seemed to be a commando of some 400
men under Commandant F. Mentz of Heilbron ; nor were these
long in danger. On the night of the loth Mentz, with Rimington
only an hour behind him, boldly charged the Heilbron branch
railway close to Gottenburg, being so feebly received by the
defensive posts on the line that he got across from south to north
with all his men. He then doubled eastward in the direction
of Villiersdorp. Another band had previously effected an even
more daring escape through the double line of columns and
blockhouses between Kroonstad and Lindley. As a consequence,
on the conclusion of the " drive " on March 13th, it was found Operation
that the whole operation had yielded but eighty-two prisoners, ^"rch"^^^th
forty-seven vehicles, and a small quantity of stock, poor return 1902.
indeed for such an effort.
• See Chapter XXIX., page 518, j See Chapter XXIII., page 418.
478 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
The columns immediately separated and went in opposite
directions on various missions. Sir H. Rawlinson's and Lord
Basing 's commands, and a small force under Major E, S. Bulfin
(Yorkshire regiment), were deputed to pursue De Wet, and
marched on Reitzburg. Elliot and the rest were ordered to
undertake another sweep back over the ground by which
they had come. The march was to be performed leisurely,
with the object of effecting a thorough clearance of the supplies
and hidden stores of the country, and would be conducted right
up to the border of Natal.
Sir H. Rawlinson set out on March 13th, and after much
delay caused by flooded rivers, manceuvred to hem De Wet in
against the Vaal. But information was as scanty as the enemy,
and on the 21st RawUnson went into Klerksdorp, his arrival being
welcome in the headquarters of a district which had fallen upon
evil days. There, at the very moment when De Wet's power
had been worn away by sheer attrition almost to vanishing
point, Yzerspruit and Tweebosch had given his place in the fore-
front of the campaign to De la Rey and the Western Transvaal.*
De Wet takes Three days before Rawlinson's appearance De Wet himself,
DeTa^Rey. having led the ailing and half-blind Steyn safely past all the
dangers of blockhouses and guarded drifts between Kroonstad
and the Vaal, had been received in De la Rey's laager at Witpoort.
He came almost in the guise of a refugee. He had faithfully
played his part. His own commandos were ground and scattered
like dust to the four winds; with equal envy of his brother
commander and regret for his vanished stalwarts he found him-
self in the midst of a new force, strong, compact, daring, and
inspired by a personality as masterful as his own. For a week
he remained with the Transvaal General, then withdrew for
the Boshof district, planning to muster what forces he could
for a continuation of the struggle in the west of the Orange
River Colony.
At this time Colonel Rochfort was also working slowly north-
ward with four columns towards the confines of the Western
* For the situation see Chapter XXIII,
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 479
Transvaal. After clearing the country around Boshof during
the early part of March (twenty-two prisoners), he subsequently
absorbed Lord Basing's force and crossed the frontier to take
part from time to time in the series of extensive operations
which were to render the basin of the Harts river as familiar
ground to British columns as the valleys of the Wilge and
Libenbergs Vlei.*
On the sixth day after their return to the railway, Elliot, "Drive "by
Barker, Nixon, Garratt and Rimington, in this order from right t^7he Naur*"
to left, struck out again over the well-trodden eastern veld on a border begun
hne stretching from Doornkloof, on the Kroonstad — Lindley ,9^2*! '^ '
blockhouse line, to Heilbron on the left. Heavy rain by day
and night marred the plans and prospects from the outset ; and
when, after a march rendered miserable by the mud and the
fatiguing delays at the Libenbergs Vlei and every other water-
course, the columns arrived at the Wilge river on the 27th,
there was nothing for it but to halt on the bank and
await the subsidence of the roaring flood. This was the more
unfortunate because many Boer bands, amoimting in the
aggregate to 1,000 men, were reported so close in front, that
their rearguards had barely time to swim the rising stream
and avoid the oncoming hne. For four days this enforced idle-
ness continued, the hopes of good results falling faster than the
water. Rimington, who had received orders to push ahead,
and to act in advance of the rest, got across on the 31st by the
bridge at Frankfort, losing twenty-four hours of his appointed
precedence by the necessary detour. The others crossed on the
next day, the majority by swimming, whilst almost all the trans-
port had to be sent round to the few and widely-separated
bridges, the water being still too deep for wheels.
On the night of April 2nd Elliot lay astride of the Comehs
river from Leeuwkop northward ; Barker joined EUiot at
Middelkop, his other hand holding Nixon, who bivouacked on
the scene of De Wet's recent deed of daring at Kalkrans. Next
to Nixon Garratt was on both sides of Langverwacht, whilst
• See Chapter XXVIII.
48o
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
The enemy
attempt to
force ihe line.
Operation
closes
April 5th,
1902.
Other
columns.
Rimington, who had completely encircled the Botha's Berg
during the day, rested on the Spruit Zonder Drift where it
crossed the Tafel Kop — Botha's Pass blockhouse hne.
The chances of a profitable termination to the expedition
had now somewhat improved. Whilst on the march Garratt
had received information from some Boer women that the
commandos had been ordered to concentrate on the night of
the 2nd for a rush through the line of troops, and there was
every evidence that the warning was well founded. From
9 p.m. onwards the sound of hoofs in front, now at one point,
now another, drew a continuous fusilade from Garratt's out-
posts. The night was very dark, rain fell heavily, and all
patrolUng was impossible ; but a wire fence, an effective entangle-
ment against a night attack, ran parallel to the front of the
piquets. Suddenly, at i a.m., two trumpets rang out close in
front of the line, and immediately after a mob of mingled Boers
and cattle burst against the wires and endeavoured to force a
breach. The stout strands, and the heavy fire which poured
through them, were too much for many of the Boers ; but at
one place in the fence the weight was irresistible. The wires
snapped, the nearest piquet was swept away, and some hundreds
of horsemen poured over the place and galloped westward into
freedom. Next morning many of the cattle and eleven prisoners
were taken in front of the line, but the last prospect of a great
coup had vanished.
On April 5th the " drive " terminated amongst the foot-
hills of the Drakensberg from Melani Kop up to the Gansvlei
Spruit. The results were ten Boers killed and wounded, seventy-
six prisoners, 4,800 cattle and horses, 178 vehicles, and three
75 mm. Krupp field guns, the latter part of the original arma-
ment of the Orange Free State.* These pieces Nixon had
discovered on March 22nd submerged in a deep pool of a tributary
of the Libenbergs Vlei river.
It has been mentioned that Lord Basing, from Sir C. Knox's
columns, had crossed the railway with Sir H. Rawlinson. When
the latter made for Klerksdorp, Basing was left in the Bothaville
* See Volume I., page 85.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 481
area in command of his own column and those of Bulfin, Driscoll
and Sitwell, incorporating also the 9th M.I., under Major M. H.
Tomlin. With these he operated for the latter half of March
between Bothaville and Commando Drift, coming eventually
under Rochfort. Sir C. Knox's other columns, namely, Pilcher's
and Ternan's, soon followed across the railway. After searching
the Doomberg (March nth — 14th), both columns were ordered
westward to scour the Boschrand, and on the last day of March
were at Hoopstad. Pilcher was then sent to Boshof and Ternan
to Bultfontein, to raid from those bases with results which will
be described later. Sir C. Knox's command was thus finally
broken up. He himself, as already stated, had gone into Bloem-
fontein in relief of Sir C. Tucker, who had proceeded to England
on leave of absence.
Early in April the great gathering of troops drawn up under
the shadow of the Drakensberg after their miry march across
the eastern part of the Orange River Colony was also partially
dispersed. On April nth. Colonels J. E. Nixon and F. S. Nixon and
Garratt, in this order from left to right, lined up facing north- f^'^^^ '^^P^'^
ward between the Spruit Zonder Drift and Commando Spruit, Transvaal,
south of Vrede, for a march across the Vaal and into the Trans-
vaal. Two days later, as the front ncared the Vaal, Nixon was
sharply attacked by some 150 Boers who appeared not from
the north, as might have been expected, but from behind him,
the attack falling upon both flanks of his rearguard. The
Boers, who were almost starving in the denuded country, were
beaten off, and fled southward, leaving a wounded prisoner in the
hands of Nixon, whose losses were one killed and six wounded.
On April 14th these columns reached the Standerton railway
near Greyhngstad and were immediately absorbed by Bruce
Hamilton, who was then engaged in that other great system
of " drives " between the Delagoa Bay and the Standerton
railways which ended his work in the east.* Soon, then,
Nixon and Garratt found themselves acting as teeth in
another vast harrow of troops, raking this time the veld of
the Transvaal.
;♦ See Chapter XXIX,
. VOL. IV. 31
482
THE WAR fN SOUTH AFRICA.
Elliot in
Lindley,
April 2 1 St,
1902.
Disturbance
in the Brand-
water basin.
There remained in the east of the Orange River Colony,
Elliot with de Lisle and Fanshawe, and Barker in charge of
Marshall, Kenna, Holmes and F. C. Heath. All these repaired
to Harrismith at the conclusion of the sweep to the Drakens-
berg, but they quickly parted. Elliot moved out westward on
Bethlehem on April nth ; next day Barker struck down the
right bank of the Wilge for Frankfort. At Harrismith de Lisle
relinquished command of his brigade to take up that of the force
recently led by Thomeycroft, which was now at Klerksdorp,
Brigadier-General M. O. Little taking his place in Elliot's division.
EUiot set out on the front Majoors Drift — Aberfeld, and swinging
northward to the head of the Leeuw Spruit on April 13th, he
passed between Reitz and Bethlehem. The enemy still haunted
this often razed district. On the 14th Fanshawe's rearguard was
attacked near Rietkuil by a band whose laager was discovered
and scattered next day at Fanny's Home, Fanshawe taking
four prisoners. A commando nearly 300 strong escaped him in
a heavy mist, and for the rest of the week the columns pursued
westward, entering Lindley on April 21st. The object of this
march was to drive the enemy so as to be caught by a hne of
columns which were about to sweep southward from the
Heilbron — Frankfort blockhouses ; but its performance involved
the neglect of a more insistent problem.
Before Elliot left Harrismith an emergency had arisen
close at hand, and had his return march been made to the south
instead of the north of the Bethlehem — Harrismith road much
trouble might have been averted. From the beginning of April
the Brandwater basin had shown itself to be re-occupied by
hostile bands of a singularly daring and agressive nature, the
collected debris of the incessant scourings of the valleys of the
Valsch, the Libenbergs Vlei and the Wilge. These Boers were
now well-nigh desperate, and their case was rendered worse by
finding this, the last stronghold in the district, practically denied
to them by the lines of blockhouses which were now complete
from Bethlehem to Harrismith in one direction, and through
Fouriesburg to Ficksburg in the other. They therefore applied
themselves to what was nothing less than a systematic attempt
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 483
to wipe the blockhouses from the field, meeting with a measure The enemy
of success which added a new item to the Ust of their military S^khdlfses.
feats and a new anxiety to their opponents. The blockhouse
lines, especially the section between Bethlehem and Fouries-
burg, were nightly invested by detachments from a force of some
1,500 men, which was laagered about Snyman's Hoek. The
customary tactics of these parties were those well known to
campaigners in the hiUs of the Indian frontier. Every evening
the sinking of the sun below the horizon was the signal for the
first shot of a steady all-night rifle practice directed at the walls
and especially the loopholes of the little buildings which usually
held a non-commissioned ofiicer and some half-dozen men. This
procedure was at first sight aimless enough, but it struck so
precisely at the weak point of the blockhouse system, that it
did, in fact, practically eliminate them as a means of denying
movement to the enemy at night. To reply to the fire was as
useless as it was fatal, for the marksmen were scattered and well
hidden, whereas the blockhouse, and even its loopholes, were
marks by no means safe from a rifle in the hands of a Boer.
To remain silent, on the other hand, was but to throw open
the intervals between the blockhouses to any who wished to
pass, for the intervening wires were never to be relied upon.
Time after time they were cut to allow the passage of mounted
bands ; often a crossing was effected when but one of the strands
had been severed. These adventures sometimes proved costly
to the enemy, especially in horses, but they were more often
carried out undetected, the only evidence being the broken
wires and the marks of hoofs discovered by the troops next
morning. Nor did the Boers confine themselves to mere
annoyance. Before dawn on April 8th a fierce rush was made Destruction
against the blockhouse on Stenekamps Kop and the three next bit^houses
to the south of it. The usual " sniping " had continued inter- April 8th,
mittently for the seven previous hours of darkness, and there
was nothing to indicate any special effort on the part of the
enemy until at 2 a.m. the two southernmost of the above-
mentioned blockhouses were suddenly surrounded at close
quarters by 500 men, who poured such a crushing fire upon them
VOL. IV. 31*
1902.
4^4 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
that the loopholes and even the walls crumbled under it in
ten minutes, when there was nothing for the inmates but to
surrender. The Boers then turned upon the next building with
the same result, this house being actually set on fire. Finally,
to complete the night's work, the blockhouse on Stenekamps Kop
was similarly beset ; but here the enemy met with an unexpected
rebuff, being handsomely repulsed with the loss of some score
men by the garrison under Captain B. J. Jones (Leinster regi-
ment). They then returned to their laager with fifteen prisoners,
the other casualties amongst the defence numbering three killed,
five wounded. The deliberate nature of this enterprise was
shown by the enemy's carrying off in a cart brought for the
purpose 150 yards of the barbed wire used as obstacles.
For the next ten days there was no further attack, though
the " sniping " continued unabated, and the wires between the
The enemy s blockhouses were constantly cut. But the enemy were seen to
TncnMuw. ^ increasing daily in the various laagers, and they practically
dominated the district, as must always be the case when bodies
of great mobility place themselves within reach of an opponent
who, however superior his strength, cannot set it free to strike.
On the night of April 19th a body of 200 Imperial Yeomanry
and mounted infantry which had been sent to escort a convoy
to Brindisi, instead of returning at once with the empty wagons,
rashly undertook an expedition against a laager reported on
the Moolmans Spruit. The party was promptly ambushed and
severely handled, losing two officers and four men killed, three
officers and twelve men wounded, and twenty-eight men taken
prisoners. All these events, it will be seen, occurred before and
during Elliot's unprofitable march to Lindley, when he might
at any moment have wheeled southward and quelled the dis-
Eiiiot ordered turbance. It was not imtil he entered Lindley on April 21st
Brandwater ^^^^ ^^ ^^^ Ordered to retum and make Bethlehem his base for a
basin. clearance of the Brandwater basin, and then two full days elapsed
before he reached that town.
At this time, the preliminary negotiations for peace being
in progress,* De Wet was riding from laager to laager to take
• See Chapter XXX.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 485
the votes of his burghers, a safe-conduct carrying him un-
molested across the scenes of a hundred adventures. On April
22nd he had visited the camp of the Vrede commandos about
Pram Kop, Two days later he passed through Bethlehem on
his way to meet the men of the Brandwater basin. But though
the Free State leader was himself immune, there was no inter-
ruption to the campaign by either side. On the 26th Elliot Elliot at
marched to Retief's Nek, whence he scouted on every side, Aprif^^t^*'^'
attempting to mark down the five different bands, amounting in 1902.
all to 1,500 men, with information of which his Intelligence
officers had furnished him. But the enemy remained quiet and
invisible, and after a week of almost bloodless reconnaissance
Elliot received orders which withdrew him once more from the
infested district.
On May 2nd Bruce Hamilton, having exhausted all resistance Bruce
in the Eastern Transvaal, threw seven columns across the ^lt'"''!u"
' enters the
Standerton railway to give the coup de grdce to the Orange Orange Rjvei
River Colony.* The scheme was that in which EUiot's westerly seven"^**^
march from Harrismith had been intended to co-op)erate. It columns,
included two phases, the first a "drive " from the Une Vereenig- 1902.
ing — Greyhngstad across the Vaal on to the Kopjes station —
Frankfort blockhouses, with Allenby (who had been at Villiers-
dorp since April 19th) closing the eastern flank from Villiersdorp
down to Frankfort ; the second an advance thence to the
Kroonstad — Lindley hne of blockhouses, which obstacle would
be prolonged to the Libenbergs Vlei by EUiot's troops coming
from Bethlehem. Barker, it will be remembered, had already
gone towards Frankfort ; his orders now were to block the eastern
exits from the area covered by the second stage of the sweep
by extending down the Libenbergs Vlei to the point of union
with Elliot's right. By May 4th Bruce Hamilton's columns
were on the following line : Rimington, Lawley, Nixon and Bruce
Duff from Wonderheuvel on the Vereeniging railway to Gotten- »dHve^"
burg on the Heilbron branch line ; Garratt from Gottenburg southward
to Elandskop ; Spens, Elandskop to Somerset ; Colonel CoUn EiUot*
Mackenzie, Somerset to the Krom Spruit ; Wing thence
• See Chapter XXIX.
486 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
to Frankfort, Allenby being aligned along the Frankfort —
Villiersdorp road. There was little opposition, but in front of
the line rode a number of desperate fugitives, some of whom
broke southward through the blockhouses, and some eastward
through Allenby's line. The rest, ninety in number, were taken
prisoners, seventy-one faUing to Mackenzie in one day within
gunshot of the blockhouse hne, which they dared not attempt.
For the next two days the line drove steadily southward, whilst
Elliot placed himself across the front from Lindley through
Damplaats to Halfmaan on the Libenbergs Vlei river, and Allenby,
his watch to the north over, fell in on the left and came down
the left bank of the Libenbergs Vlei. The troops on the right
flank found Httle to occupy them ; but at the centre both
" beaters " and " stops " had sport enough. On the last day,
when the space between the advancing and stationary hues
was fast narrowing to artillery range, two parties of Boers, some
400 in all, made heroic efforts to escape the closing jaws of the
The enemy trap. At noon ou the 6th one band, 270 strong, driven by
EuISiine. Allenby through Deelfontein, flung itself against EUiot's right,
burst through, and made good its escape with the loss of but one
man and twenty-five horses. Two hours later the other com-
mando, which was led by Mentz, also charged at Elliot, this time
at the part of his line near Groenvlei. But the 7th Dragoon
Guards who were posted there were impenetrable. The attack
was roughly driven back, five Boers being killed, the same number
taken and twenty-eight horses destroyed. Mentz then fell
back and hid his force in the lands of the farm Grootdam, He
was here directly in the path of Mackenzie, who was fast
approaching, and there was nothing for it but a forlorn hope.
As the Scottish Horse, marching at the right centre of the column,
drew close, Mentz hurled a body of resolute men at them, and
prepared, should a way be opened, to make a rush with the
rest. For a few minutes he had a hope of success. The attack
got into the flanks and rear of the supports of the Scottish Horse
whose order was momentarily broken ; but the reserves,
galloping forward, turned the tables on the daring band, fell
upon it in rear and took thirteen prisoners. This was the last
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 487
throw. Mackenzie's line was quickly re-formed, and pushing on
to Grootdam, he came upon Mentz, who surrendered with 123
burghers. This event at once ended and doubled the gains of Thesouth-
the operation, the net results of which were 311 Boers captured concludes,
and ten killed. Mackenzie had had the good fortune to account ^**y 6'^'
° 1902.
for 155 of these.
On May 7th the whole line faced about for a return drive it is reversed
over precisely the same ground as that by which it had come, "^^^ '^^'
EUiot and Barker this time moving forward with the line, the
former on the left bank of the Wilge, the latter on the right.
Nor was the field as barren as might have been expected ; indeed
the gleanings might well have almost equalled the previous
harvest. Once more some 300 Boers flitted before the advance,
and once more it fell to Mackenzie to deal with them. In the
forenoon of May 9th, when his column was marching down the
Krom Spruit, its left in somewhat uncertain touch with Spens,
a body of some 230 Boers who had concealed themselves in front
suddenly charged the thinly filled point of union between the
two columns, and successfuUy broke through, leaving only ten
stragglers in the hands of Spens' and Mackenzie's flankers.
Another party, about sixty in number, similarly doubled back
through Elliot's line between Mowbray and Bezuidenhout's
Drift on the Wilge. This accounted for well-nigh all the game
left in the district, and when the " drive " terminated on the
blockhouse line on the evening of the 9th, only twenty-two and finally
prisoners were brought in. MaToth"
With the close of this operation ends the long tale of fighting 1902.
in the eastern half of the Orange River Colony. The survivors
of the Boer nation had now chosen their representatives and
charged them to obtain what terms they might at a conference
soon to be held at Vereeniging under the protection of the
British Commander-in-Chief.* Peace hovered in the air, and
seemed so nearly about to alight that on May loth Lord Kitchener
forbade any further offensive action south of the Vaal. The
whole gathering therefore dispersed, Spens and Lawley departing
for Heidelberg; Mackenzie, Duff and Allenby for Greyhngstad.
• See Chapter XXX.
488
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Operations
suspended,
May 15th,
1902.
The work
of other
columns.
A reverse near
Bultfontein,
April 8th,
1902.
The remainder, namely, Elliot, Barker, Garratt, Nixon and
Rimington, spread themselves over the rectangle within
the points Heilbron — Frankfort — Lindley — Majoors Drift, and
omitting no precaution — for the enemy might yet reassert
his boast of being inextinguishable — applied themselves to a
systematic clearance of whatever crops or supplies still existed
in this ravaged area. On May 15th even this was suspended,
and all the troops returned to the railways to await the turn of
the scale which wavered at Vereeniging.
There still remain to be described the operations carried out
by the troops on the west of the Bloemfontein railway from the
first week in April, when Pilcher was traced to Boshof, and
Teman to Bultfontein. Rochfort, with his five columns, last
seen at Commando Drift (Vaal river), now passes out of the area
under review, his subsequent movements being accounted for in
the chapter deaUng with the final events in the Western Trans-
vaal.* Pilcher, with Boshof as his base, raided the neighbour-
hood of that place until, on April 8th, he received orders to cross
the railway and cover the placing of supplies in the various posts
to the west of Kimberley. Skirmishing intermittently with the
commando of De Villiers, Pilcher marched by Schmidt's Drift
and Daniel's Kuil to Griquatownf (May ist), returning on
May 9th to Kimberley, where he relinquished command of the
little force which he had led for eighteen months, during
which time it had done and suffered much.
Meanwhile Teman in the course of his clearance of the
vicinity of Bultfontein had met with a reverse which for a time
drove him off the veld. At 2.30 a.m. on April 8th he had
despatched from Bultfontein a party of 200 men of the Burma
M.I., Thomeycroft's M.I., and Imperial Yeomanry with orders
to march westward on Hartenbosch and deal with any small
bands which might be found. The day opened inauspiciously
with the loss of a patrol which mistook the enemy for their own
side. Having reached its destination the force turned to regain
Bultfontein, eighteen miles distant. Scarcely two miles had been
» See Chapter XXVIII.
f See map No. 63.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 489
covered when a body of some 300 Boers was sighted by
the rearguard, coming rapidly from the west. Thereupon the
officer in command ordered his men to trot for a good position
which stood across the road about four miles further on ; but
before this could be gained the enemy feU upon the rear and flanks
and broke up all formation. A small party which attempted
to make a stand to cover the retreat was quickly overpowered ;
the rest scattered along the road, to be overtaken and captured
group by group by the better mounted Boers, who in this way
took 128 prisoners. The other losses were two officers and
fifteen men killed and wounded, only one quarter of the force
escaping. The affair practicaUy crippled Teman, who was
ordered to Eensgevonden to refit. This was effected by April
15th when, after escorting a convoy to Hoopstad, Teman
marched to Bothaville on the 23rd. Thence he despatched
Thomeycroft's M.I. to rejoin the officer from whom this veteran
corps took its name, Thomeycroft being now at Klerksdorp in
command of a new column of Australians and New Zealanders.
Three days later Teman took his force into Kroonstad, where
it was broken up.
490
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Approximate Strength States of Columns referred to in
foregoing chapter.
..
!l
t
la
S
9
0
COLUMN.
1
B
s
1
1.^
.s
5
3 u
rt
S
o>
s
March— May, 1902.
Lt.-Col. H. de B. de Lisle (later
'
Brig. -Gen. Little)
1.743
—
5
—
Lt.-Col. K. Fanshawe ...
1,226
—
6
—
Lt.-Col. the Hon. R. T. Lawley
1. 135
—
3
2
Lt.-Col. J. S. S. Barker
(four
Lieut. - Gen. E. L.
columns)
2.347
—
8
2
Elliot in command.
Major J. P. DuCane
731
—
3
—
Lt.-Col. M. F. Rimington
1,921
196
5
—
Lt.-Col. J. L. Keir
893
2
—
Lt.-Col. A. E. Wilson ...
454
176
I
2
Major J. H. Damant
\^
3
—
,
Col. F. S. Garratt
855
167
3
I
Col. Sir H. Rawlinson
(four
columns)
2,800
—
10
I
Lt.-Col. J. E. Nixon
...
1.474
—
3
2
Lt.-Col. T. D. Pilcher
(three
columns)
1.903
—
8
2
Maj.-Gen. Sir C.Knox
Col. T. P. B. Teman
(two
in command.
columns)
i,6is
—
4
—
Lt.-Col. Lord Basing
670
—
3
I
Lt.-Col. W. H. Sitwell ...
755
174
3
—
Major E. S. Bulfin
467
I
—
Major D. P. Driscoll
536
—
—
—
Col. A. N. Rochfort
in command.
Lt.-Col. W. G. P. Western
501
—
I
—
Major A. R. Gilbert
95
545*
3
—
Major M. H. Tomlin
557
—
I
-
Major P. A. Kenna
455
—
2
2
Major W. R. Marshall ..
733
—
2
—
Lieut-Col. J. S. S.
Barker in command.
Major H. G. Holmes
^^\
—
I
—
Major F. C. Heath
598
—
3
I
Brig. -Gen. J. Spens
1. 159
—
5
2
Col. Colin Mackenzie
1,030
—
3
I
Major - Gen. ^ Bruce
Lt.-Col. C. E. Duff
800
—
2
—
Hamilton in com-
Lt.-Col. F. D. V. Wing ...
1,309
• —
3
—
mand.
Col. E. H. H. Allenby ...
957
3
1
Including sixty-two cyclists.
491
CHAPTER XXVIII.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL*
{Continued from Chapter XXIII.).
MARCH — MAY, I9O2.
If the enemy could not be called supreme in the Western Trans-
vaal, the hold of the British upon the district in the early part of
March, 1902, was sufficiently loosened to cause extreme anxiety,
not, indeed, for the result of the campaign, but for its duration.
The troops on the spot were plainly unable to find De la Rey,
and too few to defeat him if they found him. The Commander-
in-Chief made haste to supply both deficiencies. Calling
Wools-Sampson from his work in the Eastern Transvaal to act More trcwps
as Intelligence Officer in the west, he ordered F. W. Kitchener ^Ufem
and Sir H. Rawlinson to bring their columns to Klerksdorp, the Transvaal,
former by train from Standerton, the latter from out of the
Orange River Colony by Schoeman's Drift and Potchefstroom.
Rochfort's column, which it will be remembered had been
intended to form a unit of Lord Methuen's last ill-fated scheme,
was disposed along the line of the Vaal to the north of Hoopstad.
Rochfort actually controlled seven small columns — those of Lieut. -
Colonels W. H. Sitwell, Lord Basing and W. G. B. Western,
and Majors D. P. Driscoll, E. S. Bulfin, C. D. Vaughan and P. G.
Reynolds. These had been placed under his command for the
purpose of keeping surveillance over the Vaal drifts in the Bloem-
hof district, which they did with much success. Under Keke-
wich, who was at Klerksdorp, were placed the recently organised
flying columns of von Donop and Grenfell, the latter of whom was
* See map No. 59.
492 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
recalled on March gth from Rooirantjesfontein, where he still
awaited co-operation with Lord Methuen, to Vaalbank. The
garrison of Lichtenburg was rapidly reinforced by the 2nd
Norfolk regiment, that of Klerksdorp by a Highland brigade. On
March 19th Lord Kitchener himself hurried down to Klerksdorp
to supervise preparations for a universal effort to extirpate
De la Rey, which a few days later was put into operation.
Kekewich's On the 22nd Kekewich concentrated his twin forces at Vaal-
operations. bank, and on the next evening the whole of the troops above
enumerated moved westward in light order, without guns or
wheeled transport of any Idnd. The first object aimed at was
to get imperceived outside Hartebeestfontein, where some of
De la Rey's commandos were reported to have repaired after
their recent triumphs. The columns, therefore, marched in
close order throughout the night, and not until they had covered
forty miles and were well to the westward did they turn about
and shake themselves out for a wide sweep back towards the
Une of blockhouses along the Schoon Spruit, which had been
strengthened by two battalions of Highlanders. This manoeuvre,
it win be seen, was to be in the Western Transvaal the first of the
The first great greater " drivcs," such as in other parts had for some time con-
" drive. stituted practically the whole offensive tactics of the campaign.
As the columns faced round and extended they became aligned
in the following order from left (north) to right. Kekewich, his
left grazing the Lichtenburg — Vaalbank blockhouses, threw his
right flank down to Geluk on the Little Harts river ; next to him
came Sir H. Rawlinson, who covered the country to Gestop-
fontein, where F. W. Kitchener (who had a triple command of
columns under Colonels W. H. M. Lowe and G. A. Cookson
and Lieut. -Colonel J. L. Keir) took up the line to Zwartrand.
The circuit should have been closed by Rochfort's forces moving
up the Vaal, and with their right on the river filling the gap
from Zwartrand to Klipspruit ; but Keir and Rochfort never
gained touch. A glance at the map will indicate more than any
description the vastness of this conception, and its primitive
simpUcity ; the extraordinary difficulty of carrying out even its
preUminary formations in the dark and after an exhausting march
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 493
must be left to the knowledge of military and the imagination of
other readers. Before the extension had well begun it became
evident, first, that there were fish in the net ; secondly, that the
meshes must be knit closer than was possible with the forces avail-
able in order to prevent them escaping. Dawn had not broken
before a band of 300 Boers, disguised in khaki clothing and
shouting that they were a British corps, shpped between the
rapidly closing flanks of Lowe and Keir, of F. W. Kitchener's
contingent, and escaped to the west. Others evaded the line
by skirting its extreme right flank. Space fails to recount the
innumerable adventures of the several columns on the way back,
how here a hostile band was turned and broken, there another
missed and lost, another encountered and captured. Scarcely
a unit but had fighting, none but endured labour and privations
which would have been arduous had they come at the beginning
instead of the midst of a march which was to total eighty
miles, partly in drenching rain, before the troops regained their
starting points. F. W. Kitchener took 102 prisoners, Kekewich
thirty-eight, the last-named recovering also three field guns and
two Vickers-Maxims which had been lost in the recent disasters.
Every unit secured something, and those which had less fortune
than others had not the less energy and toil. When the worn-out
troops were stopped on the evening of the 24th, after twenty-
six hours' incessant movement, they had accounted for 173 of Results of the
the enemy, 103 wagons and carts and 1,671 horses and cattle. "*^"^*-"
Kekewich put in again to Vaalbank, F. W. Kitchener and Sir H.
Rawhnson to Klerksdorp, Rochfort's columns faUing back to
the Vaal near Commando Drift. The " drive " had not been
vastly productive ; too much, indeed, had been attempted ;
but the results of colossal sweeps such as this against a mobile
enemy in an open country are not to be considered failures
because the gains are small out of all proportion to the expense.
They may be likened to safe investments, from which, with a
minimum of risk, certain if Umited increment is to be obtained.
At any rate, they were now to be the set form of operations
against an enemy upon whom experiment had exhausted
itself in vain. The Commander-in-Chief, with such expedients
494
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
A second
"drive."
The enemy
met with in
force.
De la Key's
attack at
Boschbult,
March 31st,
1902.
forced upon him, knew that they must be often repeated
to be profitable.
Before the end of March the columns were again active, Keke-
wich making the first move of a fresh disposition by fortifying
himself on March 29th on Middelbult^ a strong place in the heart
of De la Key's country. It was henceforth held, and proved
of great value. F. W. Kitchener, his right flank thus covered,
moved out to Rietvlei, and on March 30th was in Une with
Kekewich at Driekuil, due south of Middelbult. Sir H. Rawlin-
son conformed to this westerly movement by advancing through
Rhenosterspruit. Rumours of the enemy's presence now came
thick, and on March 31st F. W. Kitchener despatched Cookson
and Keir with about 1,800 men to search the junction of the
Harts river and Brak Spruit about Doombult, remaining him-
self in support at Driekuil. At the same time Kekewich, who
had information of De la Rey's convoy to the westward, pushed
a night expedition toward Leeuwpan, midway between Middel-
bult and the Mafeking railway. This proved abortive ; but
Cookson and Keir were more successful in discovering the enemy,
though their good fortune nearly cost them their columns.
Working through Doomlaagte there was unmistakable evidence
that a strong hostile force with guns was on the move down the
Brak Spruit, and when, about 10 a.m., a body of 500 were dis-
covered by the screen, Cookson halted his baggage and sent
forward his mounted troops under Colonel J. H. Damant,
supporting them with Keir's column. From Boschpan to Bosch-
bult Damant's men pursued, their hope of a good capture rising
to its height when at the latter place they nearly succeeded in
riding round the enemy's left. But they were dealing with a
band which had grown more accustomed to setting traps than
falling into them. They had come into the presence of com-
mandos trained by De la Rey and elated by victories. Suddenly
at 10.30 a.m., on front and both flanks appeared large bodies of
horsemen, and in a few moments Damant was well-nigh
surrounded. The enemy, who appeared not to recognise his
advantage, was successfully kept off by the 28th M.I., with
the timely assistance of other mounted troops, who galloped
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 495
eight miles from the rear to reinforce the advance guard. But
the situation was critical in one sense. The Boers had the
advantage of position, and were in superior force. Recent
events had shown how the fate of troops in such a case balanced
on the razor edge of a moment's decision. Cookson had been
completely and needlessly surprised, but if he was fortunate in
being allowed a breathing space, he used it well. Retirement,
even the shortest, would probably have been fatal, because
impossible to check in the face of the avalanche which would
surely have descended upon it. Instead, Cookson promptly
advanced, disengaging himself from the bush which hamf)ered
him, and opened with his guns. This had the effect of causing
the enemy to recoil slightly, whereupon Cookson ordered up
his baggage and hastily entrenched himself on the Brak Spruit
to await the arrival of the wagons. Keir's men were posted
on the left facing Oshoek, Damant held the front and right,
strengthening his defences on the flank by fortifying and holding
with the R. H. A. Mounted Rifles (O., T. and P. batteries) with
a Vickers-Maxim gun, a house and garden which stood detached
some 800 yards distant. This was the key of the position, a
miniature Bazeilles, the loss of which would jeopardise the whole
camp. These measures speedily checked the Boers. About
noon Cookson 's wagons came up unmolested ; they were
speedily parked inside an entanglement of wire, and De la Rey
found that, instead of a column scattered in the open, he had
now to deal with a laager of considerable strength, which he
had allowed to be formed under his very eyes. To a soldier of
his methods the resort to artillery was somewhat of a confession
of failure. At 1.20 p.m. he brought up four field guns and a
Vickers-Maxim, and after bombarding heavily, sent a strong
party with a rush against the two sides of the camp which were
held by Damant and the 28th M.I. This was a critical moment
for the defence. The shells, bursting over the transport, caused
a stampede amongst the draught animals, many of which were
still inspanned. Great confusion arose in the interior of the
camp, whilst outside annihilation seemed to be fast approaching
in the shape of a line of Boers spreading nearly four miles from
496 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
flank to flank, who cantered against the front and right, many
firing from the saddle. The screen of 28th M.I., and Damant's
Horse, which had remained out in the bush in front to cover
the formation of the camp, was forced back after determined
fighting, during which each man fired 200 rounds. Many stirring
incidents occurred during this retirement. The Boers pressed as
closely as they dared, being only prevented from riding over
the small force opposing them by the steady shooting of each
successive front of the retreating Echelon. A moment's weakness
of one of these would have sacrificed the whole. But whilst all
were admirably firm, perhaps the greatest devotion was shown
by an officer (Lieutenant B. Carruthers) and twenty-one men
of the Canadian Moimted Rifles, who, finding themselves cut
off as they brought up the rear, fought on until eighteen of their
number, including the officer, were down. But even this band
had an especial hero in Private C. N. Evans, who after receiving a
mortal wound, fired at the enemy two bandohers full of cartridges,
then with his dying hands broke his rifle in pieces lest the enemy
should take it. Arrived at the fringe of the camp the mounted
men, joining their fire to that of Cookson's main body, allowed
no nearer approach. The imposing rank of Boers broke up into
circling groups as the riders sought shelter from the tremendous
discharges. They had even less success on the right, where the
fire from the defended house and its enclosures, the occupation
of which completely surprised them when they dashed heed-
lessly for it, caused heavy losses and effectually kept them from
closing. Meanwhile Cookson had been collecting his scattered
wagons and strengthening his defences. Sacks and the carcasses
of dead horses were used to thicken the parapets, in front of
which were strewn entanglements and trip wires. By the after-
noon he was safely shut in, and though the Boers time after
Repulse of time attacked from all sides, they could make no impression
De la Rey. ^^^ finally retired, pursued by shrapnel, but by nothing else,
at 5.30 p.m.
The enemy's main tactical triumph in this affair at Boschbult
was one too often conceded to them by British commanders,
namely, the ease with which they had first made and then shaken
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 497
off at will contact with columns which should have been as
mobile as themselves. On the other hand, they had lost
considerably more than the 106 casualties* which it had cost
Cookson to drive them off. They had lost, in addition, that repu-
tation for infallibiUty which had been fast attaching to them.
The resolute conduct of Cookson's troops had shown that small
columns were not a certain prey, even when partially entrapped
by the strongest and most brilUantly led force of Transvaalers
in the field. Another lesson, of wider significance, was that a
firmly-held rifle was still the match for a mounted charge in line,
though it was strange that such a lesson should have been taught
to riflemen par excellence by troops who had clung longer to the
tradition of weight and the steel than any in Christendom. Still
more strange was it that the Boers themselves were to incur by
their own act a repetition of the same lesson within a fortnight
and within a few yards of this very spot.
About 2.30 p.m., when the fight was at its height, the sound
of the firing became audible to F. W. Kitchener at Driekuil.
He promptly marched westward with Lowe's column. Towards
evening terrified natives were fallen in with, who announced the
destruction of Cookson's expedition. The distant uproar had
hen ceased, arguing that for good or ill the combat had already
been decided. Surrounded as he was by thick bush, with night
coming on, and a possibly triumphant and superior enemy in the
vicinity, Kitchener decided to return. His action, or lack of it,
was undoubtedly the better part of valour, for, as it happened,
De la Key was aware of his approach, and had he persisted, fully
intended to waylay him. Early on the next morning Kitchener
took his whole force to the scene. On the way he was met
by a driver of one of Cookson's batteries, who had been taken
prisoner and stripped of his uniform, an ill omen of the fate of
the rest. Not until noon was the unconquered camp discovered, F. w.
surrounded by the bodies of 500 dead animals. The Boers had reacheT^'
disappeared, but their ambulances still wandered amongst the Boschbuit.
bush seeking their dead and wounded. So many mules had been
• Casualties — Killed, one officer, thirteen other ranks ; wounded, eight officers,
seventy-eight other ranks ; missing, six other ranks ; 364 horses and mules were shot.
VOL. IV. 32
498
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
De la Rey
disappears.
Sir Ian
Hamilton
assumes com-
mand in the
Western
Transvaal,
April 8th,
1902.
shot that Kitchener, seeing it was impossible to get the wagons
to Driekuil that day, halted in a clearing for the night. On
April 2nd he withdrew the whole force to Driekuil, where he
found Sir H. RawHnson just come up from Rhenosterspruit.
Once more all energies were concentrated on finding De la
Rey and bringing him to book, and once more that leader had
disappeared as effectually as if the open veld had been shrouded
in darkness, and his strong commandos a sergeant's patrol.
A combined expedition to Makoiespan by the mounted troops of
all the British columns in the neighbourhood, including those
of Kekewich from his stronghold at Middelbult, though founded
on apparently reUable information, proved profitless. It was
evident that if De la Rey were to be mastered, or even discovered
at all, and this now seemed vital to the retention of the Western
Transvaal, the various columns must be directed by one mind.
The Boer leader, if he had not actually reconquered the district,
had completely transformed it from a playground for British
columns into the scene of something very like a struggle for
existence. The climax of his success was that he now
forced his disconnected and heterogeneous opponents to turn
themselves into an army, and compelled the Commander-in-
Chief to deprive himself of his own Chief-of-the-Staff in order
to provide a commander for it. For such a step Lord Kitchener
had the precedent of his own intermittent delegation to command
in the field when serving with Lord Roberts early in the cam-
paign ; but it was none the less a striking circumstance, the
more so as it formed the most abrupt, indeed, almost the sole
transition from the system of intense centrahsation which had
hitherto characterised Lord Kitchener's administration.
On April 8th Lieut.-General Sir I. S. M. Hamilton arrived at
Middelbult from Pretoria to assume general command of the
columns of Kekewich, F. W. Kitchener and Sir H. Rawlinson ; a
fourth column, under Colonel A. Thomeycroft, being prepared
to join him from Klerksdorp. Hamilton immediately acted
with his accustomed vigour. It was evident that De la Rey
was still to the south of the Brak Spruit. Disposing his columns
in a semi-circle around the right bank and head of that stream,
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 499
he ordered an extended movement southward to be carried out
on April nth. On the night of the loth Kekewich on the right His
was entrenched at Rooiwal, near the confluence of the Brak °P^'^'^i°"s.
Spruit and Harts river, Sir H. Rawlinson in the centre about
Boschpan, F. W. Kitchener on the left at Khpdrift, all joining
hands on their inner flanks. During the day's march which
brought the troops into these positions there was some instructive
finessing which showed the value of control under the clear eye
of one commander. F. W. Kitchener, nearing Klipdrift, found a
strong hostile force demonstrating boldly outside his left flank,
that is, altogether outside the horns of the arc of columns. If
this were the sought-for game, it had already escaped and was
from its position a source of danger; but Sir I. Hamilton, know-
ing his enemy, became solicitous, not for his left flank, but instead
for his centre and right. Ordering Kitchener on no account to
pursue, but rather to . close in towards Sir H. Rawlinson, he
warned Kekewich, on the right, to move next day in battle Kekewich's
formation, instead of the open "driving" order which had been movements,
intended, and to be more careful to reconnoitre far to his right
across the Harts river than to keep his alignment with the other
columns, which were to be inclined towards him on the morrow.
Seldom has insight been of greater value. At 7.30 a.m. on
April nth, von Donop, who was in command of Kekewich's
mounted screen, whilst moving westward down to Brak Spruit,
sighted a strong force advancing towards his left front, a body
so orderly and compact in appearance that von Donop, having
at that very moment received warning from Headquarters that
a co-operating column was approaching, inquired of Kekewich,
who was at the front, whether the new comers were not the rein-
forcement in question, and actually ordered his signallers to open The action at
communication with the supposed advancing troops. When Apri'ru'th
about a mile away the larger portion of the mass of horsemen, 1902-
who were 1,700 strong in all, detached themselves from the rest
and broke into a gentle trot which carried them onwards in a dense
line, two, three and four files deep. As the array rolled forward
its flanks began to protrude around the front and left of the
column. At the same time a roar of musketry, breaking from
VOL. IV. 32*
Soo THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
the advancing ranks, disclosed an imminent Boer attack. Part
of the scattered British advance-guard, seeing itself about to be
enveloped, and opposed by a superior fire, changed front to the
right, and maintained a series of resolute but detached stands,
which did much to keep back the enemy from this flank ; some
of the troops became actually mingled with the Boers. But
their resistance did not prevent Grenfell's command, which was
close behind von Donop's, from being much exposed. Grenfell
knew nothing of the impending danger beyond what the bursts
of firing in front, the ordinary noise of the progress of the van of
a column on the veld, had told him. It was this shooting which
had caused him to close up upon von Donop, who had just
passed through the farmstead of Rooiwal. Grenfell was in low
ground at this moment ; the grass land on his front and left
rising gently to an indefinite skyhne some thousand yards away ;
but he had no fears, since von Donop's . men were out in that
direction, and their lines were actually to be seen defined upon
the ridge which overlooked liis left. But now an officer, gal-
loping in at full speed from the south-west, informed Grenfell
that the rows of riders in sight were not von Donop's soldiers,
but Boers, that they were in great strength, that he himself had
been actually amongst them. Behind him the enemy was fast
descending the slope, and Grenfell, who at first had scarcely
credited the news, saw that he had but a few seconds in which
to prepare for the shock. With 460 men of the ist and 2nd
Scottish Horse, 420 Imperial Yeomanry, 290 South African Con-
stabulary, two field guns and a Vickers-Maxim, he dashed to the
front, and coming up to Kekewich carried out his orders as
quickly as they were issued. Swinging the artillery into action
at once to the west, the Constabulary remaining to guard it,
GrenfeU sent the Scottish Horse at the run on foot forward and
to the left to seize a mealie-covered rise in the ground which
faced the advancing enemy on the south-west, whilst the Yeo-
manry wheeled into fine on their left. Lieut. -Colonel Leader
smartly manoeuvred the Scottish Horse in accordance with these
instructions ; the rest conformed, and in a trice a semi-circle of
troops lay facing west, south-west and south, under a heavy
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 501
but ill-aimed fire, for the Boers, still advancing in line, were The great
now shooting furiously from the saddle, a wild and imposing ^o^r charge.
spectacle. By the time the last of Grenfell's men had rushed
into his place the hostile van had come within 600 yards and was
the target for 1,100 rifles. The Boers were still ambling slowly
on, riding knee to knee, a ragged wall of horsemen, apparently
as lost to all sense of tactics as of fear. In front cantered a few
intrepid officers, Kemp, who was in command, in the absence of
De la Key (then discussing pourparlers of peace within the
British lines). Van Zyl, von Tonder, and T. De Beer, and amongst
the foremost a tall figure clad in blue, with long jack-boots, in
whom the South African Colonials in Grenfell's ranks recognised
Commandant Potgieter of Wolmaranstad. The volleys and
rounds of case which burst upon the mass in no wise quickened
its pace, nor turned it a hair's breadth from its calm and dehbe-
rate advance. A scene more strange had not been witnessed in
this or any other campaign. The howling rush of the Dervish
or Ghazi, the sonorous charge of European cavalry, the chanting
onset of the Zulu impi were less impressive than the slow
oncoming of this brigade of mounted riflemen. Minutes passed,
during which most of von Donop's scattered troops, directed by
Kekewich in person, raUied in line with the Scottish Horse, and
their shooting swelled the volume of fire beating upon the Boer
advance. The range shortened to 400 yards, to 300, then to
200 ; still the attack neither wavered nor charged, though some
additional speed was imparted to its widely thrown wings. The
Boer centre, in fact, was as if in leash, pausing for the flanks to
swing forward and envelop the British line, just as the mass of
Russian cavalry had checked its pace to open its arms to embrace
the Heavy Brigade at Balaklava. The streams of bullets which
poured from the magazines of Grenfell's riflemen had here to do
the work of the sabres of Scarlett's troopers. To within 100
yards rode the intrepid burghers, Potgieter and a few more Defeat of the
faUing close by the Maxim gun of the Scottish Horse ; then ^"^'^y-
their plans and not their magnificent courage failed ; it was
madness to press further : not a man of the British column had
run, not enough had fallen : by common impulse they themselves
502
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Sir Ian
Hamilton
arrives on the
field.
Sir Ian
Hamilton's
counter-
attack.
turned and galloped away, and in that moment the spirit
which had sustained them snapped imder the irresistible influence
of flight. A sauve qui pent set in. The veld was covered with
faUing and fljang horsemen, and had a reserve of cavalry been
available scarcely a burgher would have escaped. But many of
Grenfell's horses had been shot, many more stampeded ; the rest
were some distance in rear, and nearly an hour elapsed before
sufficient could be collected for the pursuit. During that time
Sir I. Hamilton arrived on the scene, drawn thither by the
tremendous din of the contest. Soon after, the Imperial Light
Horse from Sir H. Rawlinson's column also galloped on to
the field, striking in at a point which overlapped the left of the
retiring Boers, who quickened their pace until, gaining the cover
of a hollow, they faced about and were seen to form up in line
once more. None could have been quicker than Sir I. Hamilton
to recognise and deal with this, the psychological moment in the
Boer ranks. The enemy were repulsed but not shattered ; their
action showed that a strong hand had gathered up the dangling
reins. Hesitation on the part of Hamilton would either bring
down the swarm of riflemen upon his ill-protected lines again,
next time probably with more of their accustomed skiU, or once
more favour them with that loss of contact which had so often
enabled them to recover. Taking the whole conduct of affairs
into his own hands, Hamilton immediately ordered a coimter-
attack down the Harts River valley by all his available force,
at the same time telegraphing to F. W. Kitchener to attempt to
throw his column across the enemy's hne of retreat, which pointed
on Schweizer Reneke. Unfortunately Rochfort's columns, which
were at Bloemhof, had not been included in Sir I. Hamilton's
command on this occasion. As if foreseeing some such event
as had actually happened, the General had requested that
Rochfort might be at Schweizer Reneke on the 12th.* Had
this been effected, Rochfort would have been exactly placed
to intercept the exhausted commandos and great gain must
have resulted.
* Telegram H|9, Sir Ian Hamilton to Commander-in-Chief, April 8th, 1902.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 503
Now from Kekewich's lines some 2,000 troopers rode out
through the fallen burghers, who lay where the highest tide of
the attack had broken and turned. Spreading over the veld
six miles from flank to flank, they cantered towards the crowded
rise. For a few moments the enemy stood gazing at the
advancing lines. But Sir I, Hamilton had felt their pulse ;
the offensive spirit had been blown away by the point-blank
breath of the rifles, and the only magician who could have con-
jured it back was far away. De la Key's " New Model " was
broken, and another moment saw its fragments careering south-
ward. For three hours the troops gave chase. But the bulk of
the fugitives had too long a start along an open road ; only
stragglers whose horses had foundered were picked up. Grenfell,
however, made an important capture in the shape of two 15-pr.
guns and a Vickers-Maxim. At midday the force, its horses
run to a standstill, drew rein at Kopjesvlei, midway to Schweizer
Reneke, with twenty-three prisoners. All except Sir H. Raw-
linson, who bivouacked at Nooitgedacht, then marched back
to Rooiwal, which was reached at 9 p.m., fourteen hours from
the beginning of the action. Considering the extraordinary Considera-
nature of the day's fighting the losses on the British side had io^°" ^^^
been large, on the other strangely few. A casualty list of eighty-
seven killed and wounded* in Kekewich's two columns was
greater than was to be expected in forces which had been mainly
on the defensive against a reckless attack accompanied by a fire
intended as much to intimidate as to do damage. Kekewich,
moreover, lost some hundreds of horses. The counted Boer
losses were fifty-one killed, forty taken prisoners wounded, and
thirty-six captured unwounded, 127 in all. This was compara-
tively small injury, even allowing for the numerous wounded who
had been carried off during the fight, a task for which with the
burghers no fire was too hot or crisis too intense. The soldiers
had been confronted by a target such as British troops had
not seen since the battle of Omdurman. At that engagement the
musketry of trained soldiers had piled the desert thick and high
* Casualties — Killed, two officers, ten other ranks ; wounded, ten officers, sixty-five *
other ranks ; horses, about 300.
Boer defeat.
504 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
with the riddled tribesmen of the Soudan. But in Kekewich's
ranks at Rooiwal stood but a handful drilled in rifle practice.
The majority of the troops were irregulars, and their failure to
kill, which against many an opponent would have cost them the
day, was but another tribute to the necessity of training to
empower men to preserve their marksmanship, even in the face
of so astounding a spectacle as " the transmigration of the soul
of the Dervish into the heart of the Dutchman."*
Effect of the This Striking encounter, of which only the outlines have been
given, broke the power of the enemy in the Western Transvaal.
It was the culminating failure of that change in the Boer method
of attack which had begun with success at Bakenlaagte, continued
at Lake Chrissie, Vlakfontein and Moedwil, and had wavered at
Doombult ; and it supplied another assurance of a fact which
may always be counted on in this description of warfare, that
up to a point guerrillas grow more daring the nearer they
approach exhaustion. The news of the repulse soon penetrated
to the Coimcil Chamber in Pretoria, where De la Key and his
brother leaders were entering upon the long struggle for terms
which is recounted in another place. t Apart from its inevitable,
if invisible, effect upon the negotiations, it is easy to imagine
how deeply De la Key himself was moved by the fate of the
splendid force which he had levied, schooled and led to many
triumphs, only to hear of its ruin in his absence by the impetuosity
of his young heutenant. Rupert's valorous folly at Naseby and
Marston Moor had not wounded his cause so deeply as Kemp's
rash onset at Rooiwal, where was gambled away the last striking
force left to his side in the field. From this time until the end
of the war De la Rey's commandos were driven like sheep over
the country which they had once hunted like a pack of wolves.
As for their gallant and humane old General, he was now to raise
the voice which had urged them to victory in favour of their
submission, for he knew that now that the weapon which he
* "A Military History of Perthshire— ' The Scottish Horse at Rooiwal,'" by
Captain L. Oppenheim, 2nd Dragoon Guards (Queen's Bays).
t See Chapter XXX.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 505
had forged was shivered, there was nothing left in the armoury
of his country.
Two days after this Sir I. Hamilton changed front eastward
for a sweep back to Klerksdorp, with Kekewich on the left at
Middelbult, Sir H. Rawlinson and F. W. Kitchener covering the
ground through Doomlaagte to Driekuil on the south and right.
Various small bands darted about in dismay before the columns,
sixty-four burghers — of whom F. W. Kitchener took thirty-eight
— being captured by the time the force entered Klerksdorp on
the evening of the 15th, after a march of over forty miles during
the day.
Rochfort, whose co-operation in the pursuit from Rooiwal Rochforts
had been so severely missed, had been nevertheless successfully °P^™^'°'^-
employed elsewhere. After sundry minor manoeuvres on the
banks of the Vaal during the first week in April, Rochfort had
concentrated his columns at Bloemhof, whence, on April nth,
he made a night march, capturing a small laager (five prisoners)
at Kareeboschfontein to the north. The mounted troops,
1,200 strong, were then ordered to go on to Vuurfontein with
the object of eventually co-operating with Sir I. Hamilton ;
but torrential rain, falling on the 12th, sent the troops back
to Bloemhof, when a march of the same distance westward might
have resulted in the interception of some of Kemp's defeated
bands. Almost equal results were, however, attained a few
days later, when Rochfort, having carefully laid his plans,
surrounded the township of Schweizer Reneke before dawn on
April i6th. Well-nigh every burgher refuging therein was
taken, including Douthwaite, a well-known Commandant, also
one of General C. De Wet's adjutants, and the brother of the
renowned De la Rey, In all fifty-seven prisoners were captured.
On the i8th Rochfort marched back to Bloemhof, his flankers
discovering twelve Boers, part of the ungathered harvest of
Rooiwal, lying wounded in farmhouses by the way, on that day,
and five more on the next, when the force evacuated Schweizer
Reneke, followed by a hot fire from a commando under T. De
Beer, which entered the town as soon as the troops were clear.
The Boers lost several more men, and were deterred from coming
5o6 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
to closer quarters. Rochfort next based himself on Hoopstad,
in the Orange River Colony, whence he raided the farms of the
intricate " pan " district towards Boshof. By means of good
information a laager of twenty-five Boers was successfully sur-
prised at Groot Gannapan on April 23rd. Rochfort then swept
both banks of the Vaal between Christiana and Bloemhof,
around which he continued to rove until called to take part in
more important operations in the first week of May.
Sir Ian Whilst Sir I. Hamilton's troops remained a week at Klerks-
^e^*" drive" ^^^P *° ^^^^ ^"^ Tefit, that General prepared plans for another
westward. great excursion across the Western Transvaal. On April 25th
he made the first moves of a scheme so elaborate, yet so direct in
its purpose, that it must be studied inr detail. The main object
was to herd the widely-scattered enemy into the angle of
Bechuanaland lying between Vryburg and the western boundary
of the Transvaal. A commander could have set himself no
more difficult, nay in its entirety, impossible task ; for such a
sweep, to be fully effective, must be flanked, or better still,
intersected by obstacles to form the walls of the enclosures, such
as mountain ranges, deep rivers, or the lines of blockhouses which
Lord Kitchener had constructed to take the place of these natural
barriers. But in this part of the Western Transvaal no such
aids existed. The country was so open and featureless that the
widest possible extension would still leave its flanks in the air,
free to be circumvented by the enemy as soon as he had located
them ; it was so vast that double the number of troops available
could scarcely have covered it all ; finally it was so poorly sup-
phed with water that the majority of the long array of men must
be always from fifteen to twenty miles distant from the muddy
pools which alone were to be found. A bluff advance would
therefore be doomed to failure, and Sir I. Hamilton deter-
mined to trust largely to deceptive manoeuvring. Everything
depended upon his power to hold the enemy in front of him,
and to keep them ignorant until too late of his uncovered flanks
and the inevitable gaps in his line. For this purpose he seized
upon the only condition in his favour, that of precedent. Every
column, or hne of columns, which had previously traversed
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 507
the Western Transvaal had, with the exception of a small incur-
sion by Lord Methuen, faced about after marching some distance
eastward, for the return drive towards the Klerksdorp railway.
So often had this been done that the Boers had come to consider
themselves safe so long as they could only keep to the westward
of the British. Sir I. Hamilton made every effort to encourage
them in this belief. Behind a veil of reports, busily spread by
spies and natives, that he intended to halt and turn back when
within three days' march of Vryburg, he moved his pieces for a
drive to the very edge of the board, the fortified Vryburg rail-
way, which had been rendered doubly impenetrable by the
reinforcement of four battalions of infantry, and six armoured
trains each provided with a powerful searchlight. Two
additional columns were now at his disposal, Thomeycroft's,
previously referred to, and that of Rochfort, who, on May 6th,
was at Bloemhof. By the evening of that day Sir L Hamilton Position of
had leisurely manoeuvred his columns into the westward-facing jjjay'g^'*""
line* Rooirantjesfontein (Kekewich) — Nooitverwacht (Thomey- 1902.
croft, Sir H. Rawlinson) — Korannafontein (F. W. Kitchener).
It will thus be seen that a great gap existed between F. W.
Kitchener's left flank and Rochfort, and much depended on this
being undetected before it could be closed. On May 8th MaySih.
Rochfort began to reduce it by moving inwards to the line
Vuurfontein — Kareeboschfontein, athwart the road to Schweizer
Reneke, whilst Sir I. Hamilton pushed his four columns forward
through the Hne Biejesvallei — Schoonoord — Kareekuil — Witklip
up to that df the Great Harts river. This was the critical
moment of the operation. The enemy, who had sidled away
westward, narrowly watching the advancing lines of troops, now
expected to see them turn and make eastward. The continua-
tion of the westward march could not fail to enhghten them as
to the real intention, and there were still wide avenues of
escape. On the morning of May 9th Rochfort was at Schweizer May 9th.
Reneke, whilst F. W. Kitchener, on his right, was still nearly
twenty miles distant to the north at Schietfontein, forming
there the left of a line which now curved through Bulpan and
* See map No. 60.
So8 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Geysdorp to the western railway at Maribogo, a secure barrier
to any attempt at escape towards Lichtenburg. In addition to
the interval between Kitchener and Rochfort, the latter in his
march towards Schweizer Reneke had now opened another on
his own left flank, by which the enemy could get out in the
direction of Christiana. To deter them from these gateways Sir
I. Hamilton adopted a ruse worthy of his resourceful antagonists
themselves. Sending a few scouts at dusk to spread themselves
thinly across the gaps, he instructed them to set fire to the veld,
so that when the Boers, now thoroughly alarmed, looked out
into the night for the dark gaps which should show the empty
spaces between the bivouac fires of the columns, they beheld
instead an unbroken line of light stretching from Maribogo down
to the Vaal, and thought themselves shut in.
May loth. On May loth the line, picking up a few prisoners on the
march, advanced to the Transvaal border, and, throwing for-
ward its flanks, drew an uninterrupted arc from Doornbult
Siding, where Kekewich rested his right flank, to Brussels Siding,
which Rochfort, who was now in one line with F. W. Kitchener,
touched with his left. By a curious and unpremeditated coin-
cidence this aUgnment penned the Boers into the only tract of
country in which on the morrow it would be lawful to attack
them. At this time the Boer leaders were sitting in conference,
discussing the desirability of continuing the war, and Lord
Kitchener, in order to facilitate their meeting, had consented,
as one of the terms of armistice, that all commandos whose
officers were attending the conference should be free from moles-
tation within their own borders from May nth imtil the termina-
tion of the truce. On the night of the loth Sir I. Hamilton
himself lay along the frontier, and having pushed the enemy
into British territory, presumed himself to be entitled to deal
with him there. The point, however, was not uncasuistic, and
might have given birth to a new and nice case of military juris-
prudence, had not the Boers removed all cause of argument by
throwing themselves in smaU bands against Hamilton's line in
an endeavour to break back into their own country. In this
only a single individual succeeded ; the rest, despite numberless
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 509
devices, being turned back by the strong entrenchments which
the columns had thrown up on this, as on each night of
the movement. It was a strange scene. The troops were now
within fifteen miles of the railway, and the armoured trains,
steaming up and down, threw across the dark veld from their
searchlights great beams of light against which the enemy's
bands were plainly silhouetted to the eyes of Hamilton's soldiers,
whose defences had been traced not on the crests of the imdula-
tions, but half-way down the reverse slopes, bringing the skylines
into sharp reUef. It was a grievous night for 'the Boers, and
its effects were evident next day. No sooner had Thomey- May nth.
croft's column moved off in its place between F. W. Kitchener's
and Sir H, Rawhnson's for the last day's drive to the railway
hne, when Colonel H. de B. de Lisle was met by an emissary
with a white flag who came from 200 burghers, the remnants of
the now famous commandos of Van Zyl and T. De Beer, who
desired to surrender. As the British troops moved onward, these
men were met and disarmed, and in a few more hours the whole
British line rolled up to the Kimberley railway, having captured Results of
367 prisoners of war. Thus ended an operation which may be
taken as a type of many of which space has forbidden so full a
record. The difficulties entailed in its successful performance Difficulties
can only be outhned, though to ignore them altogether might be
to inspire a delusive confidence in the future. Only by a trusted
and trustful commander with a corps of troops of supreme
excellence can such a scheme be carried out. Sir I. Hamilton
had under him men who were able and wilhng to make no halt
by day and take no rest by night, for each long day's march,
often nearly foodless and waterless, was intended only to bring
them to the place of vigil or of fighting. Their labours were
almost incredible. Long and deep trenches, impervious wire
entanglements, fortified laagers of wagons, redoubts to hold
from seven to twenty men — not only bullet-proof, but proof
against artillery — sprang up each night under the hands of
men who had already performed the extremity of toil since
dawn, and were to do the same on the morrow, and for days
after. During the day every man was a scout ; at night not one
of such an
operation.
5IO THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
but had to become a sentry, with eyes, ears and rifle alert. Such
efforts would cause more casualties amongst inferior troops than
amongst their adversaries. For a hke reward they have seldom
been equalled by soldiers in the field, and indeed there have
been few who could have sustained them. Finally, to achieve
success in a manoeuvre of this scope and nature, there must be
a leader, who is able to issue the clearest orders, and to consider
them once launched as irrefragable. To attempt to supervise
or alter the details of so vast a Une when once in motion would
result in confusion. In the manoeuvre above described. Sir I.
Hamilton, having given to his subordinates their several lines of
march, in itself a calculation of no small complexity, left every-
thing else to their discretion.* Their modes of marching,
scouting, piqueting and fortification were all their own, and
differed widely, though all were uniformly successful.
On May 17th the columns began to return independently to
their respective bases. On the 23rd Sir I. Hamilton was back
in Pretoria, where a week later peace was signed.
* Sir I. Hamilton's complete orders for the operations will be found in Appendix
4, and it will be useful to study them in amplification of the al>ove text.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 511
Approximate Strength States of Columns referred to in
foregoing chapter.
COLUMN.
CO
t
**
■91
CO
1
i
a
3
sl
1^
i
1
1
s 0
s
March — May, 1902. |
Lt.-Col. A. B. Scott
600
—
3
—
Col. Sir H. Rawlinson
Lt.-Col. J. W. G. Dawkins
700
—
3
—
in command.
Col. C. J.Briggs ..
Lt.-Col. W. H. Sitwell
650
—
3
—
422
174
3
—
Col. Lord Basing . .
380
3
Lt.-Col. W. G. B. Western . .
762
363
a
Maj. D. P. Driscoll..
500
_
—
Col. A. N. Rochfort
Maj. E. S. Bulfin . .
400
—
I
—
in command.
Maj. C. D. Vaughan
200
—
Maj. P. G. Reynolds
Lt.-Col. W. H. M. Lowe . .
200
.^
— .
1,320
'_
3
—
Maj. - Gen. F. W.
Kitchener in com-
Lt.-Col. G. A. Cookson . .
i>i34
—
4
Lt.-Col. J. L. Keir
626
—
4
mand.
Col. R. G. Kekewich:—
Lt.-Col. H. M. Grenfell
1,471
—
4
Lt.-Col. S. B. von Donop
1.346
—
3
Maj.-Gen.F. W. Kitchener:—
Lt.-Col. G. A. Cookson . .
1,050
4
Lt.-Col. J. L. Keir
626
—
4
Lt.-Gen. Sir I. S. M.
Hamilton in com*
Lt.-Col. A. Wilson
375
775
I
Lt.-Col.W. H.M.Lowe..
1,200
3
—
mand.
Col. Sir H. Rawlinson : —
Lt.-Col. A. B. Scott
.S84
—
3
—
Lt.-Col. J. W. G. Dawkins
690
—
3
—
Col. C. J. Briggs..
637
500
1 3
—
•
Col. R. G. Kekewich
rwo columns as abc
>ve.
Col. Sir H. Rawlinson
Three columns as al
>ove.
0
Col. A. W. Thorneycroft :—
j
Lt.-Col. R. H. Davies . .
1,100
- 3
—
Lt.-Col. H. de B. de
1
Lisle . .
, 1.447
— \ 3
I
Maj.-Gen. F. W. Kitchener
Three columns (Coo
kson,
Lt.-Gen. Sir I. S. M
Keir and Lowe]
,
Hamilton in com<
Col. A. N. Rochfott:—
1
mand.
Lt.-Col. W. G. B. Western
' 756
414
1 1
—
Maj. E. S. Bulfin
354
1 3
—
Col. Lord Basing
569
—
1 3
I
Lt.-Col. D. P. Driscoll . .
596
—
—
Lt.-Col. W. H. Sitwell . .
1 651
1
160
i^
I
-
512
CHAPTER XXIX.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL*
{Continued from Chapter XXI.).
FEBRUARY — MAY, 1902.
In that part of the Eastern Transvaal controlled by Bruce
Hamilton little of importance was undertaken during the greater
part of February 1902, except the commencement by Barter
of another blockhouse line along the Amsterdam road from
Ermelo to the Vaal. It seemed to be impossible to find hostile
bodies considerable enough to be worth pursuit. Yet though
the columns had apparently exhausted their occupation, the very
thoroughness of their work had, as usual, cast out to the fringe of
the zone of operations many vagrant bands of fugitives, and
soon one of these somewhat rudely broke the pause.
On February 4th the Commander-in-Chief, believing the
country to be completely swept, ordered Major J. Fair, the
commanding officer of the South African Constabulary around
Heidelberg, to push his line of posts farther out into the veld.
Fair prepared to comply, but before moving his main body
despatched a party from Val to reconnoitre the ground east of
the Waterval river, which his information led him to suspect was
occupied by the enemy in some strength. The reconnaissance
was carried out on the 8th by 130 picked men of the South
African Constabulary under Captain A. Essex-Capell, and it
Affair near immediately justified Fair's precaution. Fifteen miles north of
Feb'^^^' Vlaklaagte station a commando more than 400 strong, with
1902. a large convoy, was discovered. The Boers replied to a
* See map No. 56.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 513
somewhat over-bold attack on their laager by a vigorous
counter-stroke which immediately threw the Constabulary on the
defensive and would have done worse but for the tenacity of
Capell's men and his skill in drawing them off. After an exciting
contest, during which many brave deeds were performed,* the
reconnoitring party disengaged with the loss of two officers and
four men killed, an officer and eight men wounded and five men
missing. The enemy lost more heavily, the majority of their
casualties being incurred in repeated attacks on a party of
twenty-four men under Lieutenant Swinburne, who refused
either to retire or surrender, even after the main body had
left the field, eventually so intimidating their assailants that
they dechned to renew the attack.
For G. Hamilton, patrolling east of Springs, February was a Affair near
month which produced very varying fortunes. Assisted inter- pPJJ"f|'th
mittently during the first half of the month by Wing's column, 1902.
from Bruce Hamilton's command, G. Hamilton was in constant
motion, accounting on February 3rd for thirty-four Boers by a
converging movement on the Upper Wilge river, followed by
a long gallop by the 5th Dragoon Guards of his own force and
the i8th and 19th Hussars of Wing's ; a few more captures
were made on the loth. On the i6th, in consequence of informa-
tion from good sources that an exhausted commando of about
200 men was moving east of Heidelberg, G. Hamilton headed
in that direction with about 400 men of the Royal Scots Greys
and 5th Dragoon Guards, all that the lack of remounts and
Wing's, departure on the 14th had left to him. On the i8th
two squadrons, which he had detached to circumvent a small
commando falling back before him, ran into the enemy, to find
him not, as reported, a weary two hundred, but a watchful
and aggressive force, nearly 700 strong, which first destroyed
the detachment, then proceeded to attack the main body itself,
of the weakness of which they were fortunately ignorant.
G. Hamilton withdrew to Springs in safety, and though the
affair had cost him more than sixty casualties, forty-seven of
* For gallantry on this occasion Surgeon-Captain A. Martin-Leake was awarded
the Victoria Cross.
VOL. IV. 33
5 '4 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
these were by capture and the prisoners were released the
same evening.
These affairs accentuated the fact that although Bruce
Hamilton had crushed the shell of the Boer resistance in the
Eastern Transvaal, the kernel had escaped him. Commandant-
Effect of General Botha was still at large, and surrounded by adherents
freedom whose numerical weakness was never to be despised so long as
they were inspired by his presence. More than any troops are
guerrillas, more than any guerrillas were the Boers, to be estimated
rather by the quality of their leadership than by their own
strength or mihtary excellence. The campaign had abounded
in instances of commandos which exchanged futility for heroism,
or the reverse, with a change in the personality of the com-
mander. To catch Botha, then, was still the most insistent
problem in the east, and for the moment he seemed to have dis-
appeared. Not imtil the end of February was his path discovered,
and its direction was both a surprise and an alarm. For Botha,
Kotha weary of being buffeted about the High Veld, had passed around
't'^P^^j*^^ °" the eastern extremity of Colville and his blockhouses, and was
the borders of ■'
Natal. now heading straight for Vryheid, and presumably once again for
Natal. Instantly, as if drawn by a powerful magnet, a bevy of
columns were on the march southward. Taking with him
Spans, Mackenzie, AUenby and Stewart, and calling on Plumer,
Pulteney and Colville to co-operate, Bruce Hamilton was at
Wakkerstroom on the 28th, and at Vryheid on March 5th, Wing
meanwhile being left in Ermelo, and Barter on his partially
constructed blockhouse line. Plumer and Pulteney, who had
been raiding successfully in the Rand Berg, securing twenty-six
prisoners, were now ordered to join Wing in a drive westward,
for there was a rumour that Botha had escaped into the Orange
River Colony, They departed on this mission, and concluded
a fruitless search on March 8th at Standerton, where both columns
were broken up. Amongst the units thus dispersed were the
5th Victorian Rifles, who by seven months' admirable service
under Pulteney had fully retrieved their misfortune of the
previous June. Meanwhile Bruce Hamilton scoured the south-
eastern angle of the Transvaal throughout March, not without
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 515
success, though that most desired, the capture of Botha, was still
missed, once only by a hair's breadth. Twenty-seven Boers,
including General C. Emmett, were taken on the 15th in a
night raid in the Ngotsi hills, about the head waters of the Mkusi
river near Broedersrust, where Bruce Hamilton, outpaced by a
band of fugitives, resorted to the ruse of a feigned retirement,
which had the effect of luring the enemy back to him to their
ultimate confusion. Again on the i8th, in the tangled Ngomi
forest, night operations resulted in the capture of six Boers, with
whom Botha himself had been present the night before. A third
night expedition, on April ist, gathered seventeen prisoners from
the Intombi river. Then Bruce Hamilton, having lost all trace Touch with
of Botha, turned his face once more towards Ermelo, which he ^^^^ '^''
reached on April 5th.
Turning to the zone of operations north of the Delagoa Events north
Bay railway — The certainty of the Transvaal Government's ^^^ ^
presence in the Roos Senekal area had induced the Commander- railway,
in-Chief to resume active operations in that quarter. Appointing * *' '^^"
Major-General R. S. R, Fetherstonhaugh to command from
Middelburg, he ordered energetic operations with three columns
— those of Colonel C, W. Park and Lieut. -Colonels E. B. Urmston
and E. C. Ingouville Williams — which by the middle of February
were concentrated on the railway at Pan. Another column
under Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. C. G. Fortescue patrolled the line
and kept communication. The exact situation of the Boer
officials was uncertain, but Muller, Viljoen's successor, was known
to be near Roos Senekal, and Trichardt in the Botha's Berg,
and Fetherstonhaugh, watching the comings and goings between
these two, ordered the first dash to be made against the hills.
At 7 p.m. on the 19th Park led the mounted men of all three
columns, followed an hour later by the infantry, north-eastward
up the hne of the Steelpoort river, and by a swift night march
turned the Botha's Berg by the east before dawn on the 20th.
Opposite the eastern flank of the range Urmston was dropped
to attack the southern slopes whilst Park went on to near Blink-
water to command the northern. The expedition then turned
eastward against the Botha's Berg, and was soon absorbed in a
VOL. IV. 33*
516
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Events north
of the
Delagoa Bay
railway,
March, 1902.
series of successes. First two small laagers were suddenly come
upon by the 4th mounted infantry and Williams' Australians.
The latter attacked brilliantly and took thirty-nine prisoners by
one rush. Next Trichardt's own encampment was discovered,
eight burghers were captured, and the rest with their leader
driven into the kloofs, the southern exits of which Urmston
was in the act of blocking. A hue and cry followed. Trichardt
himself escaped, but for hours his followers were hunted from
their hiding places until 164 prisoners were marshalled, the
victims as much of their own negUgence as of their enemy's
dash, for though Trichardt had been warned of Park's approach
by MuUer from east of the Steelpoort, the British had been
undetected by so much as a single scout or sentry. Leaving
E. C. I. Williams on the Botha's Berg, Park and Urmston then
turned towards the base. Further searching of the kloofs next
day resulted in another twenty-eight captures by Williams, who
on the 23rd took five more, and then received orders to come in.
On February 24th Fetherstonhaugh's command was back on
the line, along which he moved his units by train to Bronk-
horstspniit station for a descent on Langkloof, where the
Acting-President of the Transvaal was reported to be sheltering.
Railway delay marred a promising plan ; a thirty miles' march
by E. C. I. Williams ended in the surrounding of an empty farm ;
but Park, finding he could not be up in time, searched the ground
about Rhenoster Kop and returned with seventeen prisoners,
including an officer of the State artillery. These captures,
together with over 100 voluntary surrenders at the railway
posts, brought the yield in this quarter for the month of February
to the total of some 470 fighting men. In March the raiding
continued, chiefly to the west of the Wilge and Ohphant rivers.
On the nth Park, moving at night from Wilge River station,
fell upon a group of small laagers a few miles north-west of the
junction of the Wilge and theOliphant, and took fifteen prisoners.
The same night E. C. I. WiUiams, from Bronkhorstspruit station,
captured five Boers near Rhenoster Kop, where Park joined
him at dusk on the 12th, having marched seventy miles in the
previous twenty-four hours. Next day both columns crossed
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 517
the Wilge, having first detached a party westward to the
head of the Moos river, where eleven Boers were surprised and
taken. After reaching Bahnoral on the i6th further raids,
involving night marches of great length, were undertaken to
the south of the railway which Fortescue remained to guard,
with Urmston, who was short of horses, near him. Finding little
to gain, the columns continued southward, and marched up to
near the head of the Steenkool (or Steenbok) Spruit, where orders
were received for a combined sweep to be made on the 23rd in
conjimction with Wing's column, which had returned to Bethel
the previous day with a convoy from Paardekop.
The drive was to be based on the line Driefontein — Elands- «• Drive " to
fontein — Bethel, and to be directed against the railway between [^^ raSy,
Standerton and Val stations. By the evening of the appointed
day the troops were in position. Wing on the left keeping
touch with the Ermelo — Standerton blockhouses. But the line,
advancing at dawn on the 24th, encountered very few of the
enemy, and puUed up on the Standerton railway with only
seven prisoners, results very disappointing to men many of
whom had marched seventy-six miles in sixty hours to attain
them. There was, however, no pause. On the 29th Park,
E. C. I. Williams and Wing were out again, bent on an eastward
drive to Ermelo, based on a line of which Bethel was the centre,
Schurvekop and Roodekrans the left and right extremities.
Ermelo was entered on April 4th with only three prisoners
taken, and thereafter Park and Wing manoeuvred towards Lake
Chrissie, whilst Williams went into Carolina. Altogether during Results in the
the month of March the four columns, namely. Park's, E. C. L ""'*''*
WiUiams', Urmston's and Fortescue's, had accounted for forty-
six of the enemy in field op)erations and 118 by voluntary sur-
render. Meanwhile, as already narrated, Bruce Hamilton came
up to Ermelo on the 5th after his expedition into the southern
angle of the Transvaal. With him, or close behind, were Spens,
Mackenzie, Allenby and Stewart, and Hamilton now assumed Bruce
command also of Park, Williams and Wing. Continuing hisH^^^^^oi
northward way Hamilton was about to make for Carohna on seven columns
the 9th when he received orders to employ all his seveq columns
5i8 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
in a great south-westerly " drive " against the Standerton railway,
starting with his right at Groot Oliphants station, the termina-
tion of the Constabulary blockhouse line, his left at Carolina,
where ended the blockhouses from Ermelo. On April nth
he was in position and ready to march, but before describing the
operation it is necessary to refer briefly to an incident which had
occurred a few days previously near Springs.
There G. Hamilton having been invalided after two years*
command in the field, his brigade of cavalry had been broken
up and Colonel the Hon. R. T. Lawley had taken over the
surveillance of a district which no effort seemed to be able to clear.
Lawley brought with him from the Orange River Colony the 7th
Hussars and the 2nd Dragoon Guards (Queen's Bays). He at
once inherited from his predecessor the task of dealing with the
numbers and aggressiveness of the bands which refuged here
from the scoured and enclosed areas further east. On the last
day of March Lawley was at Boschmanskop, eighteen miles south-
east of Springs, whence on the morning of April ist he despatched
three squadrons (295 officers and men) of the 2nd Dragoon
Guards, under Lieut. -Colonel H. D. Fanshawe, to endeavour to
surprise some Boer piquets which were visible about twelve
Affair at milcs toward the east. The enterprise opened well, several
i^*March Boers, including a Commandant Pretorius, being captured before
31st, 1902. daylight ; but the squadrons, pushing on, found themselves in
the presence of a commando over 800 strong which, after a heavy
fusilade, charged in at full speed to close quarters, shooting from
the saddle, whilst many drew out around the flanks of the out-
numbered cavalry. Fanshawe, seeing that he must fall back or
be surrounded, then disposed his men for a rearguard fight
towards Boschmanskop. His backward march was attended
with extreme difficulty. Day had not yet broken, and the
Boers, galloping where they pleased in the semi-darkness, not
only threw themselves repeatedly against the rear, but occupied
the flanking points of vantage on the line of retreat, so that the
force was shouldered away from the direct line and in momentary
danger of being cut off. Yet though deprived of six of their
eleven officers, the troopers, fighting with unimpaired discipline,
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 519
were manoeuvred with great skill from position to position, and
kept the enemy at bay until, nearing Boschmanskop, they were
met by the 7th Hussars and covered by Lawley's guns. They
then withdrew to camp with the loss of two officers and eighteen
men killed, four officers and fifty-seven men wounded and three
men missing. The Boers lost at least as heavily; they had
exposed themselves courageously, and the Bays had time after
time struck down the foremost groups of their pursuers.
Thus closed an affair as creditable as it was costly to the The enemy's
troops engaged, but of minor importance in itself were it not an recuTCration
illustration of the singular difficulties encountered in this cam-
paign. How closely and continually must an enemy be watched
who can, when near exhaustion, glean suddenly nearly a thousand
well mounted men with transport and ambulances complete (for
Fanshawe's adversaries had both) from a field swept by marching
armies and intersected by fortifications, who can secretly place
such a force within a day's march of its opponent's depots and
lines of communication, and within two hours' ride of one of his
most mobile and vigilant colunms. Against such an adversary
the provision of suitable checks everywhere is an impossibility. To
attack him, or to await his attack, must remain a speculation up
to the last shot, for the strength^ of a posse or a brigade may
lie in ambush, gathered in the last few hours unseen by the
keenest of scouts or spies. In such a case for small columns
every throw is a gamble. Only the most certain information
is safe to act on, and as that is rarely obtainable, operations,
especially at night, are so dangerous that the punitive force
will usually find itself marching and operating as if on the
defensive. The attack, then, would seem to be in the more
need of consolidation the more the enemy disintegrates, and to
do this over a theatre so vast as South Africa demanded forces
which were apt to seem disproportionately large to the results
attained, or indeed attainable. The General confronted with
widespread guerrilla warfare may well send for more troops
rather than dismiss any of those he has.
To Lord Kitchener's recognition of this was due the initiation
first of the blockhouse lines and next of those extensive sweeps.
520
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
DHficulties
attending the
" drives."
Bruce
Hamilton's
great "drive,"
April 1 2th —
20th, 1902.
or " drives " as they were called by an army which drew much
of its phraseology as of its spirit from the field of sport. To
thresh out large areas of country with immense and uninter-
rupted lines of troops may seem a primitive device only to those
who consider nothing of the enormous difficulty of collecting,
aligning, supplying and ordering large bodies of men to move
with coherence and with a common object on a front whose
flanks were often three days' march apart. Of such a nature had
been most of the larger manoeuvres in 1902, and yet another
was that about to be set on foot by Bruce Hamilton when
the narrative was interrupted for the inclusion of Fanshawe's
significant httle action at Boschmanskop.
Groot Ohphants station and Carolina are more than sixty
miles apart. Near the former stood Park, with E. C. I. Williams,
Wing, Spens, Mackenzie and Allenby between him and Stewart
by Carolina. On April 12th this hne advanced to the front
Welstand — Klipstapel. The enemy stirred like game indeed
before it. The majority scurried away, of whom many were
taken; but some, of sterner stuff, turned and charged the
beaters, and sweeping over every obstacle, literally smashed a
way through the solid rank and gained their freedom to the
north. On the 14th Bruce Hamilton's men drew up with 136
prisoners on the Standerton line, where they were joined on the
i6th by columns under Rimington, Nixon, Lawley and Garratt,
fresh from Elliot's great foray in the Orange River Colony.*
The country east of the line of South African Constabulary
blockhouses having been thus swept, on the 17th eight of the
columns turned their faces northward for a return drive north-
ward west of that line. The enemy here was now desperate,
but his skill and cunning grew with his peril. Detecting a small
leak on the extreme left of the British line, the majority of the
Boers poured back through it on the night of the 19th, and
the troops, on their arrival on the Delagoa Bay railway next
day, had only three prisoners to show for their exertions. Three
days later Rimington, Nixon and Lawley left in company to clear
the angle of country which had been omitted between Springs,
♦ See Chapter XXVII.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 521
Pretoria and Brugspruit, whilst the rest, facing about once more,
prepared to sweep the veld down to Heidelberg and Val. This
was completed on the 27th, and the meagreness of its results —
four prisoners taken — seemed to prove that at last this covert
was bare. It must again be recorded what labour such
operations entailed on the troops. Each day, in rain or wind or Endurance ot
under tropical sun, they marched from dawn to dusk, each night ^^^ troops-
they dug entrenchments, and strung up leagues of barbed-wire
entanglements before they lay down in the open, to the brief
rest which many, from the necessity of finding innumerable
outposts, never obtained at all. In short, here, as over all the
theatre of war, the British soldier was at this time registering
his capacity to endure the extremity of fatigue, his willingness
to display the extremity of fortitude and discipline. As for his
enemy, mounted, knowing how to subsist and find shelter
easily upon his native veld, the Boer suffered physically far less
than his opponent. His was the keener suffering of the patriot
soldier who knows himself, his tactics, and his country to be
mastered beyond all hope of recovery, and that he remains alive
in the dying days of his national cause.
The beginning of May, 1902, saw the war at a low ebb indeed
in the Eastern Transvaal. Seven of Bruce Hamilton's columns
quitting the district, entered the Orange River Colony to sweep
up the country below Vereeniging. * Only to the north of the
Delagoa Bay line, in the never-to-be-pacified Roos Senekal area,
was there work still to be done, and here Park and Urmston
operated briskly until the 12th, taking in all thirty prisoners and
about sixty wagons. The opposition encountered from Muller's
men was, however, occasionally considerable, and though Park
incurred but five casualties, the enemy more than once took
stand upon positions and in numbers to attack which with the
forces available involved great risk. Park clung closely to him,
and was in a fair way to stamp out this last flicker in the Eastern
Transvaal when Peace, dropping " as the gentle rain from
Heaven," put out with merciful shower the whole conflagration
which had so long tormented South Africa.
• See ChapteriXXVII.
522
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Approximate Strength States of Columns referred to in
foregoing chapter.
COLUMN.
1
1
9 IS
in
i
9
0)
a
9
a
AM
12
0
9 U
S
Febntaiy — May. 1902.
Lt.-Col. Sir J. H. Jervis-
White-Jervis
520
—
—
1 Brig.-Gen. H. C. O.
J IMumer in command.
Maj. F. F. Colvin . .
700
6
—
Lt.-Col. A. E. W.ColviUe..
550
300
4
I
Col. W. P. Pulteney • . .
800
261
3
2
Col. C. St. L. Barter
450
690
3
I
Brig.-Gen. G. Hamilton . .
7 so
259
5
3
Col. C. W. Park . .
400
547
3
I
1
Lt.-Col. E. B. Urmston . .
500
271
2
3
Lt.-Col. E. C. Ingouville
Maj. Gen. K. S. R
Williams
700
112
3
I
y FctherstonhauRh in
Lt.-Col. the Hon. C. G.
command.
Fortescue
200
'53
—
—
1
Lt.-Col. F. D. V. Wing . .
775
3
—
J
Brig.-Gen. J. Spens
Lt.-Col. C. J. Mackenzie . .
Col. E. H. H. Allenby
500
600
700
—
4
3
3
I
4
<
Maj. - Gen. Bruco
> Hamilton in com-
mand.
Lt.-Col. H. K. Stewart . .
600
—
I
I
Col. M. F. Rimington
1,300
102
5
—
Lt.-Col. J. E. Nixon
1,000
—
3
2
Col. the Hon. R. T. Lawley
(late G. Hamilton's)
1,000
—
3
2
Col. F. S. Garratt ..
700
178
3
I
523
CHAPTER XXX.
THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE.
For more than a year before the stage to which events have been
brought in the preceding chapters, the Boers had cognisance of
the terms of peace which the British Government was prepared
to offer to their nation.
Only passing reference has been made to a meeting between First reference
Lord Kitchener and Commandant-General L. Botha at Middel- '"*"'"*"^
peace,
burg on February 28th, 1901.* At that meeting, which as it Feb. 28ih,
proved ineffectual was not entered upon in detail in the course '^''
of the narration, the Boer leader had declared himself to be
doubtful of bringing about a cessation of hostilities unless
national independence, the soul of his country's aspirations,
should be conceded as a fundamental condition. The interview
was therefore abortive from the outset, for Lord Kitchener
declined even to discuss what was now virtually the whole casus
belli ; but it was not entirely unprofitable.
For the first time the British Government obtained an insight
into other questions which in the minds of its opponents stood
prominent as conditions of submission. These were (i.) the sp>eedy
inauguration of representative government ; (ii.) equal rights
for the Dutch language ; (iii.) the postponement of the franchise
of Kaffirs ; (iv.) the integrity of Dutch Church property ; (v.)
the assumption by Great Britain of all the debts of the Repubhcs,
especially of notes, requisitions and other liabilities incurred
during the war ; (vi.) that no war tax should be imposed on
farmers ; (vii.) the early return of prisoners of war ; (viii.)
financial assistance to ruined farmers ; (ix.) amnesty to all at
* See Chapter VI., pages 119 and I2Q.
offered in
1901
524 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
the conclusion of war ; (x.) the retention of rifles by those liable
to danger from the natives.
The Boers, on the other hand, learned definitely the price
of peace. A week after the Middelburg interview Lord
Kitchener, having in the meantime communicated with
London, supplemented his provisional and verbal replies to
Commandant-General Botha's queries by the despatch of the
following letter : —
" Pretoria,
" March 7th, 1901.
" Your Honour,
The terms " With reference to our conversation at Middelburg
on the 28th February, I have the honour to inform you
that, in the event of a general and complete cessation of
hostilities, and the surrender of all rifles, ammunition,
cannon and other munitions of war in the hands of the
burghers, or in Government depots, or elsewhere. His
Majesty's Government is prepared to adopt the following
measures.
" His Majesty's Government wiU at once grant an
amnesty in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony for
all bond fide acts of war committed during the recent
hostihties. British subjects belonging to Natal and Cape
Colony, while they will not be compelled to return to those
Colonies, will, if they do so, be liable to be dealt with by the
laws of those Colonies specially passed to meet the circum-
stances arising out of the present war. As you are doubt-
less aware the special law in the Cape Colony has greatly
mitigated the ordinary penalties for High Treason in the
present case.
" All prisoners of war, now in St. Helena, Ceylon, or
elsewhere, being burghers or Colonists, will, on the
completion of the surrender, be brought back to their
country as quickly as arrangements can be made for
their transport,
THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE. 525
" At the earliest practicable date military adminis-
tration wiU cease, and will be replaced by civil administra-
tion in the form of Crown Colony Government. There will,
therefore, be, in the first instance, in each of the new Colonies,
a Governor and an Executive Council, composed of the
principal officials, with a Legislative Council consisting of a
certain number of official members to whom a nominated
unofficial element will be added. But it is the desire of His
Majesty's Government, as soon as circumstances permit,
to introduce a representative element, and ultimately to
concede to the new Colonies the privilege of self-govern-
ment. Moreover, on the cessation of hostilities a High
Court will be estabhshed in each of the new Colonies to
administer the laws of the land and this Court will be
independent of the Executive.
" Church property, public trusts, and orphan fimds will
be respected.
" Both the English and Dutch languages will be used
and taught in Public schools when the parents of the children
desire it, and allowed in Courts of Law.
" As regards the debts of the late RepubUcan Govern-
ments, His Majesty's Government cannot undertake any
liability. It is however prepared, as an act of grace, to set
aside a sum not exceeding one miUion pounds sterling to
repay inhabitants of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony
for goods requisitioned from them by the late Republican
Governments, or subsequent to annexation, by Com-
mandants in the field being in a position to enforce such
requisitions. But such claims will have to be established
to the satisfaction of a Judge or Judicial Commission,
appointed by the Government, to investigate and assess
them, and, if exceeding in the aggregate one million pounds,
they will be liable to reduction pro rata.
" I also beg to inform Your Honour that the new
Government will take into immediate consideration the
possibility of assisting by loan the occupants of farms,
who will take the oath of allegiance, to repair any injuries
526 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
sustained by destruction of buildings or loss of stock during
the war, and that no special war tax will be imposed upon
farms to defray the expense of the war.
" When burghers require the protection of fire-arms,
I such will be allowed to them by licence, and on due regis-
tration, provided they take the oath of allegiance. Licences
will also be issued for sporting rifles, guns, etc., but military
fire-arms will only be allowed for purposes of protection.
" As regards the extension of the franchise to Kaffirs
in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, it is not the
intention of His Majesty's Government to give such franchise
before representative Government is granted to those
Colonies, and if then given it will be so Hmited as to secure
the just predominance of the white race. The legal posi-
tion of coloured persons will, however, be similar to that
which they hold in the Cape Colony.
" In conclusion I must inform Your Honour that, if
the terms now offered are not accepted after a reasonable
delay for consideration they must be regarded as cancelled.
" I have, etc.,
" Kitchener, General,
** Commander-in-Chief, British Forces, South Africa.
" To His Honour Commandant-General Louis Botha."
It is unnecessary to insist on the hberality of these terms,
which embodied concessions the mere asking of which by the
beaten side the conquerors of no long past era would have heard
Terms of 1901 with derision. They were, however, promptly refused by the
refused. Boers, or rather by the Boer leaders : for, as it had ever been
in the Boer States, the pretended free-will of the people was
largely submerged in that of the oligarchy which ruled them.
In only one spirit could the British terms have been read in
the laagers, if indeed they were read at all, when submitted
with such recommendation as that to be derived from the
accompanying letter from General Botha : —
I90I.
THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE. 527
Address of Louis Botha to Burghers.
[Translation.)
" Dear Brothers,
"The spirit of Lord Kitchener's letter makes it very Botha's
plain to you all that the British Government desires burghers.^
nothing else but the destruction of our Afrikander people, ^^^ 'Sth,
and acceptance of the terms contained therein is absolutely
out of the question. Virtually, the letter contains nothing
more, but rather less, than what the British Government
will be obliged to do should our cause go wrong. Notice
that they will give us a Legislative Council consisting of
their own officials and members nominated by themselves.
The voice of the people is thus totally unrecognised. It is
also proposed, and this as a favour, to place only one million
pounds disposable for covering our State Debts, whereas,
according to general legal advice, should the cause unex-
pectedly go wrong with us, the British Government must
bear the responsibihty of all State Debts, and not simply
walk away with the State's assets.
" Our burghers have fought heavily, but how can it
be otherwise, when the existence of our nation is unlawfully
threatened ? The blood and tears that this war has cost has
been hard, but giving up our country will be doubly hard.
" I feel from the bottom of my heart for those burghers
whose famihes have been removed. Do not let this make
anyone desperate, because he who becomes desperate and
gives up the struggle, does not only an injustice to his
people, but also loses all trust in himself.
" The more we are aggrieved by the enemy the more
steadfastly we ought to stand for our goods and lawful rights.
" Let us, as Daniel in the lions' den, place our trust in
God alone, for in His time and in His way He will certainly
give us deliverance.
" Louis Botha,
" Commandant-General.
" Ermelo, March 15th, 1901."
528
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Some reasons
for the Boers*
refusal of
terms in 1901.
The Nether-
land Govern-
ment reopens
the question
of peace,
Jan. 1902.
The time, indeed, was not ripe for peace. It has been shown
elsewhere how at this moment the Boer forces were actually
becoming more compact by the stripping off of the impedimenta,
the traitors, the weakHngs, the pseudo-regular organisations
which had hampered their earher campaign. The day of
strategy, which they so httle imderstood, had ended with Lord
Roberts' occupation of every Hne of communication in South
Africa. The day of elemental tactics, in which they excelled
their opponents, was at hand. Their armies had been greatly
reduced, but the reduction had laid bare a core of stalwarts who
tacitly accepted a war of extermination, and were by no means in-
considerable in numbers. There were still nearly 50,000 burghers
in the field. De Wet had refilled the Orange River Colony with
his scattered but easUy collected bands ; De la Rey was in the
act of organising the strong " flying commando,"* which was
long to dominate the veld of the Western Transvaal ; French's
greatest efforts had been unable to clear the Eastern Transvaal ;
Kritzinger, Fouch6, Scheepers and Malan still embroiled Cape
Colony, and undeterred by De Wet's expulsion, kept the British
province op)en for the next invasion. Under these circumstances
it was not surprising that it was long before there was any further
mention of peace, and when it came again it emanated not from
the enemy in the field, but from those who wished them well
in Europe.
Towards the end of January, 1902, the Marquess of Lans-
downe. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, received from
Baron Gericke, the Netherland Ambassador in London, a com-
munication proposing the good offices of the Government of the
Queen of Holland in the cause of peace. The document, which
was in the form of an Aide-MSmoire, was in the following
terms : —
* Letter from General De la Rey to Commandant-General Botha, March i8th,
1901.
THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE. 529
Correspondence with the Netherland Government
REGARDING THE WaR IN SoUTH AFRICA.
Aide-Memoire communicated by Baron Gericke.
Jammry 2$th, 1902.
{Translation.)
" I. In the opinion of the Government of Her Majesty Proposals by
the Queen, the exceptional circumstances in which one of ^^^
the belligerent parties in South Africa is placed, and which Ambassador,
prevent it from communicating directly with the other
belligerent, constitute one of the reasons for the prolonga-
tion of the war, which is still raging without pause or end
in that country, and which is the cause of so much misery.
" 2. It is, in fact, an exceptional circumstance that
one of the belligerent parties is completely shut in and
separated from the rest of the world, and that the Boer
representatives in Europe are deprived of all means of
communicating with the Generals commanding their forces.
The difficulty thus arises that the authorities who ought
to negotiate on the Boer side are divided into two sections,
which are deprived of all means of deliberating together.
It is evident that the Boer Delegates in Europe can do
nothing, because they do not know the state of affairs in
Africa, and that the Boers in the field are obliged to abstain
from taking any steps, because they are not cognizant of
the state of affairs in Europe.
" 3. Moreover, the Delegates in Europe are bound by
their letters of credence, which were drawn up in March,
1900, and which bind them so strictly to the independence
of the Republics that they would not even be permitted to
accept the re-establishment of the status quo ante heUum
if the mode of settling disputes which might arise were not
laid down at the same time.
" 4. These circumstances give rise to the question
whether an offer of good offices could not usefully be made
VOL. IV. 34
530 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
by a neutral Power, in order to render at least possible
negotiations which could not otherwise be opened.
" 5. For this reason, it would be important to ascertain
whether it would be agreeable to His Britannic Majesty's
Government to make use of the good offices of a neutral
Power if such good offices were confined to the task of
placing in communication the negotiators to be appointed
by the two parties.
" 6. The Government of Her Majesty the Queen might
perhaps be considered as indicated for the performance of
this task, seeing that the Boer Delegates are in Netherland
territory and are accredited to that Government alone.
" 7. If His Britannic Majesty's Government should agree
in this view, the Government of Her Majesty the Queen
would have to inquire of the Boer Delegates whether they
would be willing to proceed to Africa to deliberate with
the Boer leaders on the spot, returning to Europe after a
stay of fixed length (say a fortnight), armed with adequate
full powers, providing for all eventualities, and authorising
them to conclude a Treaty of Peace which should bind
absolutely both the Boers in Europe and the Boers in
Africa.
"8. In the event of an affirmative reply, it would be for
His Britannic Majesty's Government to hand to the Nether-
land Government three safe-conducts permitting the Boer
Delegates to proceed freely to Africa, to remain there
freely for the time agreed upon, and to return freely to
Europe. It would further be necessary for the British
Government to allow the use of a telegraph code with a view
to appointing the place where the said Delegates could meet
the Boer leaders.
" 9. On their return, the Government of Her Majesty
the Queen could place them in communication with the
Plenipotentiaries appointed for the purpose by His Britannic
Majesty's Government, and would willingly undertake to
place at the disposal of these gentlemen the accommodation
necessary for their meetings.
THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE. 531
" 10. The Government of Her Majesty the Queen would
then consider their task as at an end.
"11. It is quite evident that, in spite of everything,
the negotiations thus begun might lead to no result ; but
the possibility of the contrary is also not excluded, and in
this condition of affairs it appears desirable to endeavour
to open negotiations in the hope that they may be success-
ful. And in face of the difficulty which exists for all
belligerent parties of taking the first step in this direction,
it might be useful that a third party should undertake the
matter and serve as an intermediary."
These proposals, for all their good intentions, involved
obvious difficulties which Lord Lansdowne was quick to point
out in the following reply : —
The Marquess of Lansdowne to Baron Gericke.
" Foreign Office,
" January 29th, 1902.
" Sir,
" You were good enough to lay before me on the 25th L*'r<'
instant a communication from the Netherland Government, reply,
in which it was proposed that, with the object of bringing
the war to an end. His Majesty's Government might grant
a safe-conduct to the Boer Delegates now in Holland for
the purpose of enabUng them to confer with the Boer
leaders in South Africa. It is suggested that after the
conference the Delegates might return to Europe with power
to conclude a Treaty of Peace with this country, and the
Netherland Government intimate that, in this event, they
might at a later stage be instrumental in placing the Boer
Plenipotentiaries in relation with the Plenipotentiaries who
might be appointed by His Majesty's Government.
" The Netherland Government intimate that if this
project commends itself to His Majesty's Government, they
VOL. IV. 34*
532 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
will inquire of the Delegates whether they are prepared
to make the suggested visit to South Africa.
" It may therefore be inferred that the communication
which I received from you was made on the responsibility
of the Netherland Government alone, and without authority
from the Boer Delegates or leaders.
" His Majesty's Government have given it their best
consideration, and, whilst they entirely appreciate the
motives of humanity which have led the Netherland Govern-
ment to make this proposal, they feel that they must
adhere to the decision, adopted and publicly announced by
them some months after the commencement of hostilities
by the Boers, that it is not their intention to accept
the intervention of any foreign Power in the South
African War.
" Should the Boer Delegates themselves desire to lay
a request for safe conduct before His Majesty's Government,
there is no reason why they should not do so. But His
Majesty's Government are obviously not in a position to
express an opinion on any such application until they have
received it and are aware of its precise nature, and the
grounds on which the request is made.
" I may, however, point out that it is not at present
clear to His Majesty's Government that the Delegates
retain any influence over the Representatives pf the Boers
in South Africa, or have any voice in their councils. They
are stated by the Netherland Government to have no
letters of credence or instructions later in date than March,
1900. His Majesty's Government had, on the other hand,
understood that all powers of government, including those
of negotiation, were now completely vested in Mr. Steyn for
the Boers of the Orange River Colony, and in Mr. Schalk
Burger for those of the Transvaal.
" If this be so, it is evident that the quickest and most
satisfactory means of arranging a settlement would be by
direct communication between the leaders of the Boer forces
in South Afjica and the Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty's
THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE. 533
forces, who has already been instructed to forward imme-
diately any offers he may receive for the consideration of
His Majesty's Government.
" In these circumstances His Majesty's Government
have decided that if the Boer leaders should desire to enter
into negotiations for the purpose of bringing the war to an
end, those negotiations must take place, not in Europe,
but in South Africa.
" It should, moreover, be borne in mind that if the Boer
Delegates are to occupy time in visiting South Africa, in
consulting with the Boer leaders in the field, and in return-
ing to Europe for the purpose of making known the results
of their errand, a period of at least three months would
elapse, during which hostilities would be prolonged, and
much human suffering, jjerhaps needlessly, occasioned.
" I have, etc.
" (Signed) Lansdovvne."
The Aide-MSmoire was, however, immediately forwarded to
Lord Kitchener for distribution to Mr. S, W. Burger, the Acting
President of the Transvaal, and his colleagues, with the result
that Mr. Burger expressed himself as " desirous and prepared
to make peace proposals,"* when he should have consulted with
Mr. Steyn as to the terms thereof. After some delay caused by
the difficulty of ascertaining the whereabouts of the deposed
head of the Orange Free State, who was then under medical
care in De la Key's laager,f Messrs. Burger and Steyn were The Bckt
eventually brought together, on April 9th, at Klerksdorp, the |r^o^id« '
following leaders also coming in to the conference, Generals the proposals,
C. R. De Wet and De la Rey, with the State Secretaries of both
Republican Governments, and some others. The next two days
were spent in discussion amongst these officials ; the state of
the campaign in every district was reviewed, and a decision to
make proposals to the British Government being arrived at,
* From Acting State President S. W. Burger, to Lord Kitchener, March loih, 1902.
t See Chapter XXVII., page 478.
534
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
the following request for a meeting with Lord Kitchener was
despatched to Pretoria : —
and request a
meeting with
Lord
Kitchener.
{Translation.)
" Klerksdorp,
** April loth, 1902.
" Excellency,
" We have the honour to herewith send Your Excellency
the following decision, taken here to-day.
" The Government of the S. A. R. and that of the O. F. S.
having met in connection with the sending in by His Excel-
lency Lord Kitchener, of the correspondence, exchanged
in Europe between the Government of His Majesty the King
of England and the Government of Her Majesty the Queen
of the Netherlands, regarding the desirabihty of procuring
the Governments of these Republics occasion to come into
communication with their Plenipotentiaries in Europe,
who are still enjoying the confidence of both Governments ;
" Considering the spirit of reconciliation which thereby
appears to exist on the side of His Britannic Majesty's
Government, and the desire therein expressed by Lord
Lansdowne, on behalf of his Government, to cause an end
to be put to this struggle.
" Are of opinion that it is now a suitable moment to
once more show their willingness to do everything possible
to put a stop to this war, and
" Therefore decide to make certain propositions to His
Excellency Lord Kitchener, as representative of His Britannic
Majesty's Government, which may serve as a base for
further negotiations in order to bring about the desired
peace ;
" Further decide : That it is the opinion of both these
Republics that, in order to accelerate the achievement of the
desired object, and to avoid misunderstanding as much as
possible :
THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE. 535
" His Excellency Lord Kitchener be requested to meet
these Governments personally, time and place to be appointed
by him, in order to directly lay before him peace proposals
which we are prepared to make, by which we shall be
enabled to settle all questions which may arise, at once by
direct conversation and parley with him, thereby making
certain that this meeting will have the desired effect (bear
the desired fruit).
" We shall be glad to have Your Excellency's decision
about this as soon as possible.
" We have the honour to be
" Your Excellency's obedient servants,
" S. W. Burger,
" Acting State President S. A. R.
"M. T. Steyn,
" State President O. F. S.
" To His Excellency Lord Kitchener,
" Commander-in-Chief of H. M. Troops in South Africa."
In the forenoon of April 12th Lord Kitchener received the Lord
Delegates in a saloon of his official residence at Pretoria. As meeu^the'^
the proceedings were to be confined to hearing what the Boers »oer leaders
had to propose, the Commander-in-Chief was unaccompanied by April Kst'h,'
any poUtical officer. The meeting, in short, was purely a dis- '902.
cussion between the military heads of both sides, and as such
its termination was far from promising. Once more the question
of independence barred the way. Neither party could even
discuss it. Lord Kitchener because he knew it to be the sine qud
non of his Government's requirements, the Boers because they
were constitutionally precluded from treating on the subject
without the authorisation of the full vote of the Boer peoples.
Nothing remained, therefore, but for the deputation to
frame its proposals, omitting all mention of the only item of
vital importance, and this was done in the terms set forth in a
' 536 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
telegram transmitted to London by Lord Kitchener in the
evening : —
From Lord Kitchener to the Secretary of State for War.
'* Pretoria, April 12th, 1902.
•' 9.22 p.m.
The Boer " At meeting of all Boer representatives to-day they
*^T*^tted wished the following telegram sent : —
the Secretary " ' jhe Boer representatives wish to lay before His
of State for ,,.,/- , , , i •
War. Majesty s Government that they have an earnest desire
for peace, and that they consequently decided to ask
the British Government to end hostilities, and to enter
into an agreement by which, in their opinion, all future
war between them and the British Government in
South Africa wUl be prevented. They consider this
object may be attained by providing for the following
points : —
' (i) Franchise.
' (2) Equal rights for Dutch and English lan-
guages in education matters.
' (3) Customs Union,
' (4) Dismanthng of all forts in Transvaal and
Orange River Colony.
' (5) Post, telegraph and railways union.
' (6) Arbitration in case of future differences,
and only subjects of the parties to be the
arbitrators.
" ' (7) Mutual amnesty.'
" But if these terms are not satisfactory, they desire
to know what terms the British Government would give
them in order to secure the end they all desire. ..."
Such requirements, presuming independence and equality
in every phrase, could meet, as Lord Kitchener plainly warned
the meeting, with but one reception. The inevitable reply was
in his hands before dawn.
THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE. 537
{Extract.)
From the Secretary of State for War to Lord
Kitchener.
" War Office,
" April 13th, 1902.
" 2.30 a.m.
" His Majesty's Government sincerely share the earnest Reply of the
desire of the Boer representatives for peace, and hope that |^te^o7war
the present negotiations may lead to that result ; but they
have already stated in the clearest terms, and must now
repeat, that they cannot entertain any proposals which are
based upon the continued independence of the former
Republics which have been formally annexed to the British
Crown. ..."
The Right Honourable St. John Brodrick, the Secretary of
State for War, further enjoined that the Commander-in-
Chief and Lord Milner should jointly interview the Boer repre-
sentatives, and encourage them to put forward fresh proposals,
to be based on the assumption of the reUnquishment of
independence.
On the resumption of the conference on the morning of Conference at
April i6th the Delegates received this reply with well-simulated resumed
dismay. Further discussion, then, they said, was impossible, ^P^}^ '^th,
for it must be based on a foundation which they were impotent
to accept. The Constitutions of the Boer Repubhcs empowered
the Governments to make peace, but not to surrender the inde-
pendence of the people. They were doubtful, indeed, whether
they had not already discussed questions which were beyond
their authority. In view of the resulting deadlock, they pro-
posed first an armistice, secondly the summoning of one of
their Delegates from Europe who might bring them the views of
the banished statesmen. Both these procrastinating resorts
were promptly discountenanced by Lords Kitchener and Milner,
the first on military grounds, the second not only because of
1902.
538 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
the inevitable delay, but because, in the opinion of the British
Government, the deputation wandering over Europe had cer-
tainly resigned all power as an Executive, and probably much
of its influence over the burghers. Moreover the counsel of
men who had borne little of the burden and heat of the war,
was not such as could be safely invited by parties who were all
desirous of peace. Too long already the deputation had shown
itself to be of the ancient fraternity of him who, having removed
himself into safety, " bade the rest keep fighting."
With the agreement of all the meeting was adjourned whilst
the dilemma was referred to the British Government by means
of the following telegram : —
From Lord Kitchener to the Secretary of State
FOR War.
Points " A difficulty has arisen in getting on with proceedings,
referred to the -pj^g representatives state that constitutionally they have
Secretary of '^ j j
State for War. no power to discuss terms based on surrender of independence,
inasmuch as only the burghers can agree to such a basis ;
therefore, if they were to propose terms it would put them
in a false position as regards the people. If, however. His
Majesty's Government would state the terms that, subsequent
to a surrender of independence, they would be prepared to
grant, the representatives, after asking for the necessary
explanations, without any expression of approval or
disapproval, would submit such conditions to the people."
This, it will be seen, was a step forward in so far as the prin-
ciple of the surrender of independence was by implication not
discarded. By such painful gradations does Peace regain her
throne !
Two days elapsed before a reply to the above was received,
and the Boer leaders, who had themselves argued so earnestly in
favour of every means of procrastination, now expressed im-
patience at the delay. Not until the morning of April 17th
did the conference reassemble to hear the proposals this time of
the British Government : —
THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE. 539
" London, April i6th, 1902.
" 1.55 p.m.
" We have received with considerable surprise the Reply of the
message from the Boer leaders as contained in your tele- suteToTwar.
gram No. 976. The meeting has been arranged at their
request, and they must have been aware of our repeated
declarations that we could not entertain any proposals based
on the renewed independence of the two South African
States. We were, therefore, entitled to assume that the
Boer representatives had relinquished the idea of independ-
ence and would propose terms of surrender for the forces
still in the field. They now state they are constitutionally
incompetent to discuss terms which do not include a
restoration of independence, but ask us to inform them what
conditions would be granted if, after submitting the matter
to their followers, they were to relinquish the demand for
indep)endence.
" This does not seem to us a satisfactory method of
proceeding or one best adapted to secure at the eariiest
moment a cessation of the hostihties which have involved
the loss of so much life and treasure. We are, however, as
we have from the first been, anxious to spare the effusion
of further blood and to hasten the restoration of peace and
prosperity to the countries afflicted by the war ; and you
and Lord Milner are authorised to refer the Boer leaders
to the offer made by you to General Botha more than twelve
months ago, and to inform them that although subsequent
great reduction in the forces opposed to us and the addi-
tional sacrifices thrown upon us by the refusal of that offer
would justify us in imposing far more onerous terms, we are
still prepared, in the hope of a permanent peace and recon-
ciliation, to accept a general surrender on the Unes of that
offer, but with such modifications in detail as may be
mutually agreed upon.
" You are also authorised to discuss such modifica-
tions with them, and to submit the result for our approval.
Communicate this to Lord Milner."
540
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Lord
Kitchener
suggests a
referendum
to the
commandos.
The whole prospect of peace, therefore, stood once more
on the basis on which Lord Kitchener had placed it at Middelburg
in the letter quoted on page 524. A copy of that letter was
immediately suppUed to the delegates, at the request of Botha,
who must have pondered on the probable effect of his former
hostile presentation of it to the burghers. The proposals were
the same ; the change must be in the attitude of the Com-
mandant-General towards them if the desired results were to
be obtained. For the third time the Boer representatives, pro-
fessing their powerlessness to reply to the terms without reference
to the people, repeated their desire for an armistice and the
attendance of one of the European delegates ; for the third
time both were refused by Lord Kitchener. Of what value,
said the Commander-in-Chief, was the presence of men who
had not fought, and who knew nothing of the situation on which
it was proposed to invite their views ? As for an armistice,
his duty to his own army forbade any such concession. The
conference had so far revealed nothing tangible, he had no
evidence that the Boer representatives seriously intended to
make peace. A profitless truce would operate to his own military
disadvantage, and his refusal to grant both requests had already
been sustained by his Government. He was prepared, however,
without suspending hostihties, to grant every facihty to the
Delegates for trying the temper of the burghers on the terms
submitted. Let them meet the commandos, each on a day
appointed, and protected by a local armistice, take their votes
and return with those full powers to treat, the absence of which
had so far rendered every conference nugatory. After much
discussion this was accepted. Before the meeting broke up,
it was addressed by Lord Milner. The High Commissioner
deplored the slowness of the methods adopted, anticipating the
interminable discussions which would ensue in the Boer laagers
whilst the bloodshed and destruction continued on every side.
He urged a clear presentment of the definite and immutable
terms offered by the conquerors, deprecating especially any
alterations or additions which would only result in the return of
the representatives time after time with fresh and unacceptable
THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE. 541
proposals. Before separating, Lord Kitchener and the Boer
Generals arranged the details of the forthcoming meetings
of the commandos. Sixty representatives, thirty for each
Republic, would be elected by ballot to carry the wishes of the
community to a general assembly to be held at Vereeniging on
May 15th. A local suspension of hostilities would ensure the
security of the voters at each centre of election. Lord Kitchener
had to name but two stipulations, the exclusion from the
voting both of foreigners and of any commandos operating in
Cape Colony.
On the evening of April i8th the Boer officials quitted The Delegates
Pretoria. Mr. Steyn, whose illness grew worse daily, repaired '^^^1^/1^^"^'*
to Wolmaranstad, and from this time forward took no active 1902.
part in the negotiations. The rest, provided with safe-conducts,
began the long ride which was to carry the terms of peace from
one laager to another throughout the theatre of war. They
took with them, for the information of the people, a paraphrase
of the whole negotiations up to this point. Day after day, until
May 13th the voting proceeded. At the meetings two questions
were submitted to the burghers : (i) that of the adherence to
independence ; (2) the selection of representatives for the
Vereeniging conference.
The resolution taken on the main point seemed to bode ill Results of the
for peace. The majority, especially in the Orange Free State, [oThe" """
stood firm for independence at all costs ; but this attitude repre- commandos,
sen ted the wish rather than the hope of the conquered. No other
decision was to be expected from an army of brave men still in
the field ; but with this truly national militia an overmastering
yearning for peace was as inevitable as the vote for continued
resistance. A sore conflict rent the bosom of every burgher
at the moment of voting. He approached the ballot-box divided
against himself, the soldier within him warring with the citizen,
the father, the husband, the landowner, as to which should doom
to destruction his dearest prize. The very clearness of the issue
increased the bitterness of the trial. Peace on these terms
meant political and military annihilation ; to fight on led but
to extermination, along a path strewn the thicker with such
542
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
The elected
representa-
tives of the
commandos
meet at
Vereeniging,
May 15th,
1902.
Views of the
Transvaal.
miseries as were already scarcely to be borne. If then, to the
lasting honour of the Boer army, the shout still went up for
war, the cry, for all its unanimity had so wavering a note that
one of the boldest leaders of the commandos was to confront the
gathered representatives at the final conference with the excla-
mation : " You may say what you will, resolve what you will ;
but whatever you do here in this meeting is the end of the war ! "
Certainly, when at 11 a.m. on the appointed day. May 15th,
the elected Delegates entered the Council tent at Vereeniging,
they took with them varying commissions from thoir con-
stituents. Some were pledged irrevocably to the maintenance
of independence ; some had plenary powers, with discretion to
decide according to circumstances ; in fact the conflicting nature
of the mandates bade fair to wreck the conference at the outset,
until the legal advisers of the Republics gave it as their opinion
that Delegates so appointed must be bound by their convictions
rather than by any immutable injunction laid upon them by
their electors. Nothing indicated so favourably the pacific
temper of the assembly than its ready reception of this ruling,
a decision undeniable for parliaments or other civil bodies, but
somewhat vulnerable in the light of the specific purposes of
the conference. This initial difficulty thus happily removed,
the meeting, with General C. F. Beyers in the chair, pro-
ceeded to hear from the various commanders the state of the
country and the campaign in their several districts. For two
days the Delegates listened to speech after speech, continued
until far into the night. Many were the melancholy tales of
destruction, exhaustion and suffering, but it soon became
apparent that the desire for peace on the part of each speaker
was in exact ratio with the damage sustained by his command.
The conference thus resolved itself into two opposing parties,
the delimitation of which closely followed that of the Boer
States concerned.
The Transvaal confessed herself to be ruined. Food was
so scarce that in some parts the commandos were dependent on
the natives for supphes, a condition even more humiliating to
a Boer than asking succour of his enemy. One-third of the
THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE. 543
burghers in the field were without horses ; the remainder were
being daily dismounted by the ravages of horse-sickness. Cattle,
grain and all forms of supply were so scarce that the country
stood at the threshold of a famine. The condition of the women,
many of whom still remained on the blasted veld, was in-
describable. Only in the extreme west and north was there
any hope of survival, Beyers and De la Rey both announcing
their capacity to hold out for a year to come. All but six of
the Transvaal representatives, including many who had come
to the meeting pledged to resistance, were for ending the struggle
as the only means of escaping utter destruction.
This decision was largely influenced by the noble attitude of
the Transvaal chiefs. Acting-President Burger, Commandant-
General Botha and General De la Rey in turn urged the repre-
sentatives to think of their country and not their personal
feelings. They had sworn indeed to fight to the bitter end ;
but had that end not come, or was the last hour only to
strike when the last burgher lay in his grave or in prison
across the seas ?
Smuts, fresh from the failure at Ookiep,* held out no hof)es
of success in Cape Colony. He had laid the foimdation of an
effective campaign in the British province, but even this was
crumbling, and it was plain that his leaders were in no position
to supply fresh material, much less a superstructure.
General C. R. De Wet, on the other hand, spoke as earnestly Views of the
for continued resistance. They had listened to the recital of ^"^*^ ^'"
many melancholy facts, but this, he declared, was a war of faith
and not of facts. Should it not be carried through in the same
faith as that in which it had been begun ? Evil days had been
tided over in the past too often for despair to have a place now.
The representatives of the Orange Free State stood solidly by
their leader. Their country had indeed suffered far less than
the Transvaal, food being still comparatively plentiful, but their
inflexibility sprang not only from material reasons. It was
partly the expression of a sense of grievance against the ally
for whose sake the Orange Free State had entered upon this
• See Chapter XXVI.
544 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
disastrous war, only to be now counselled to accept the conqueror's
domination. They resolved to decline negotiation on any basis
which excluded independence.
With the meeting thus divided, and the prospect of a
unanimous vote apparently hopeless, Mr. F. W. Reitz, the State
Secretary of the Transvaal, came forward with a proposition for
a middle course. A beaten people must yield something both
in territory and in hberty ; he suggested for the consideration
of the British Government fresh terms to be based on the reten-
tion of only so much independence as would be left after the
surrender of the following concessions : —
A proposal to I. The reUnquishmeut of foreign relations and embassies.
Government 2. The acceptance of the protectorate of Great Britain.
May 17th, 3. The surrender of a portion of territory of the Repubhcs.
4. The conclusion of a defensive treaty with Great Britain
with regard to South Africa.
With some reluctance this resolution was adopted on May 17th,
the third day of the conference, and a Commission was promptly
elected to carry the terms to the British Headquarters. The
Commission was further empowered to negotiate on any basis
likely to lead to peace, subject to the ratification of its resolutions
A Commission by the assembly of representatives. The Commission left for
Moposai k> Pretoria the same evening and at 11.30 a.m. on May 19th Generals
Pretoria. Botha, C. Dc Wet, De la Rey and Smuts, with Judge Hertzog,
Lords met Lords Kitchener and Milner, and handed them the following
Kitchener and minute I—
Milner,
1902. ' " Your Excellencies,
" With a view of finally ending the present hostilities,
we have the honour, in accordance with authority from the
Governments of both Republics, to propose, in addition to
the points already offered in the negotiations of April last,
the following points as a basis for negotiations : —
" [a) We are prepared to surrender our independence
as regards foreign relations.
" {b) We wish to retain internal self-government under
British supervision.
THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE. 545
" (c) We are prepared to surrender a part of our
territory.
" If your Excellencies are prepared to negotiate on this
basis, the above-mentioned points can be further worked
out.
(Signed) " Louis Botha.
" C. R. De Wet.
" J. H. De la Rey.
"J. B. M. Hertzog.
" J. C. Smuts."
It would be tedious to follow in detail the long arguments Debate on the
which ensued. The Boer proposals were manifestly so widely P"""?"^ •
divergent from those which the British Government had declared
to be final, that Lords Kitchener and Milner plainly expressed
their disincHnation even to telegraph them for consideration.
The Boer Commissioners, on the other hand, stoutly maintained
that they were practically identical with the Middelburg terms
until Lord Milner, suddenly accepting the premise, overthrew it
at the same instant by urging that if there were indeed no
inconsistency between the two it would be better to base the
discussion on the older and indubitably clearer and more detailed
document. With this description of thrust and parry the dis-
cussion continued for three hours, to be adjourned at 2.30 p.m.
without result.
On reassembling at 4 p.m. Lord Milner read to the Com-
missioners the following article which he and the Commander-in-
Chief had drafted as a necessary preamble to the terms of peace
set forth in the Middelburg document : —
" General Lord Kitchener of Khartoum, Commanding-in- Lords
Chief, and His Excellency Lord Milner, High Commissioner MnferTepty"^
on behalf of the British Government, and with a final
, acting as the Government of ^"^^"^
the South African Republic, and
, acting as the Government of the Orange
Free State on behalf of their respective burghers, desirous
VOL. IV. 35
546 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
to terminate the present hostilities, agree on the following
articles : —
" I. The burgher forces in the field will forthwith
lay down their arms, handing over all guns, rifles, and
munitions of war in their possession or under their control,
and desist from any further resistance to the authority of
His Majesty King Edward VII., whom they recognize as
their lawful Sovereign.
" The manner and details of this surrender will be
arranged between Lord Kitchener and Commandant-General
Botha, Assistant Commandant-General De la Key, and
Chief-Commandant De Wet."
These words sounded the knell of their proposals of the
morning to every member of the Commission. Receiving in
answer to a direct question a definite reply to this effect, Com-
mandant-General Botha made a passionate appeal for better
terms. But the Middelburg document was immovable, and
Lord Milner could hold out no more hopes than that of some
alleviation of its details, as distinct from its main principles,
which might render it more acceptable to the Boer peoples. It
was finally arranged that a Sub-Committee, consisting of Lord
Milner, Hon. Sir Richard Solomon, and Generals Smuts and Hert-
zog should meet on the morrow to endeavour to draw up such a
modification. The whole of May 20th was thus spent by the
Sub-Committee, and at noon on the 21st the results of its labours
were brought to the conference in the form of a document of
twelve articles which followed the previously quoted preamble
as under : —
Provisional " General Lord Kitchener of Khartoum, Commanding-in-
terms drawn (^j^-^f^ ^^^ j^g Excellency Lord Milner, High Commissioner,
May 2ist, on behalf of the British Government, and Messrs. S. W.
^^' Burger, F. W. Reitz, Louis Botha, J. H. De la Rey, L. J.
Meyer, and J. C. Krogh, acting as the Government of the
South African Republic, and Messrs. M. T. Steyn, J. Brebner,
C. R. De Wet, J. B. M. Hertzog, and C. Olivier, acting
THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE. 547
as the Government of the Orange Free State, on behalf of
their respective burghers, desirous to terminate the present
hostiUties, agree on the following articles : —
" I. The burgher forces in the field will forthwith
lay down their arms, handing over all guns, rifles, and
munitions of war in their possession or under their
control, and desist from any further resistance to the
authority of His Majesty King Edward VH., whom
they recognize as their lawful Sovereign.
" The manner and details of this surrender will be
arranged between Lord Kitchener and Commandant-
General Botha, Assistant Commandant-General De la
Rey, and Chief-Commandant De Wet.
" 2. Burghers in the field outside the hmits of the
Transvaal or Orange River Colony, on surrendering,
will be brought back to their homes.
" 3. All prisoners of war at present outside of South
Africa, who are burghers, will, on their declaring their
acceptance of the position of subjects of His Majesty
King Edward VH., be brought back to the places where
they were domiciled before the war.
" 4. The burghers so surrendering, or returning, will
not be deprived of their personal liberty, or their
property.
" 5. No proceedings, civil or criminal, will be taken
against any of the burghers so surrendering, or returning,
for any acts in connection with the prosecution of the
war.
" 6. The Dutch language will be taught in public
schools in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony
where the parents of the children desire it, and will be
allowed in Courts of Law when necessary for the better
and more effectual administration of justice.
" 7. The possession of rifles will be allowed in the
Transvaal and Orange River Colony to p)ersons requiring
VOL. IV. 35*
548 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
them for their protection, on taking out a licence
according to law.
"8. Military administration in the Transvaal and
Orange River Colony will, at the earliest possible date,
be succeeded by civil government and, as soon as cir-
cumstances permit, representative institutions leading
up to self-government will be introduced.
" 9. The question of granting the franchise to
natives will not be decided until after the introduction
of self-government.
" 10. No special tax will be imposed on landed
property in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony
to defray the expenses of the war.
"11. A judicial commission will be appointed to
which Government notes issued under Law No. i of
1900 of the South African Repubhc may be presented
within six months.
" All such notes as are found to have been duly
issued in the terms of that Law, and for which the
persons presenting them have given valuable considera-
tion, will be paid, but without interest.
" 12. As soon as conditions permit, a Commission,
on which the local inhabitants will be represented, will
be appointed in each district of the Transvaal and
Orange River Colony, under the presidency of a magis-
trate or other official, for the purpose of assisting the
restoration of the people to their homes and supplying
those who, owing to war losses, are unable to provide
for themselves, with food, shelter, and the necessary
amount of seed, stock, implements, etc., indispensable
to the resumption of their normal occupations. Funds
for this purpose will be advanced by Government free
of interest and repayable over a period of years."
Debate on the It was, in the suddenness of its change of ground, somewhat
femr°"*^ characteristic of Boer tactics that in the long day's discussion
THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE. 549
which followed the reading of this document the Commissioners
unanimously directed their criticism against but a single clause,
namely, No. 11, that dealing with the hquidation of Government
money notes issued during the war. The matter was by no means The question
simple, for besides the legally issued Government notes, there "ncurredVr
were in flotation a multitude of receipts for goods commandeered the field,
in the field, some by authorised, others by unauthorised, officers.
The whole of these the Boer Commissioners urged should be
accepted by the British Government, on the plea that a con-
queror acquiring the assets of his victims should equally under-
take their debts. A further compUcation was introduced by the
difference of the laws governing such transactions in the two
Repubhcs. In the Transvaal the issue of notes had been by
law limited to face value of £1,000,000, though vast numbers
of receipts over and above the authorised issue were in circula-
tion, having been signed by officers unprovided with the legal
currency.
In the Orange Free State there had been no such restriction,
and the army and Government had depended solely on
impromptu receipts issued as required. The result was that
an unknown liabihty hung over the heads of both legislatures,
and this they wished to transfer to the British Government, for,
said they, the honour of every signatory to a receipt was bound
up in its eventual acceptance by the ruling Power.
So bent were they on the point that one and all the Com-
missioners declined to recommend to the representatives at
Vereeniging the acceptance of the terms of p)eace unless some
such proviso were inserted. Yet it was impossible to consider
the request in its entirety. Should the British Government accede
to it even partially, it would to that extent, as Lord Milner
pointed out, be paying the expenses of the enemy for his efforts
against itself. This the Government had already pledged itself
to do to the extent of £1,000,000 in the Middelburg proposals,
and Lords Kitchener and Milner, with considerable reluctance,
intimated their willingness to recommend a further grant if
only a definite sum could be named by the Commissioners.
In order to arrive at an approximate calculation the Boers
550 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
withdrew from the meeting for a time. On their return they
announced an estimate of ^^3, 000,000, the recommendation for
which they suggested might be appended to Clause 11 of the
preceding terms as the following addendum : —
" Addendum to Clause ii.
"All receipts given by the officers in the field of the
with"refeirence ^^^^ Repubhcs, or Under their orders, may hkewise be pre-
to liabilities sented to the said Commission within six months, and if
the field. found to have been given bond fide for goods used by the
burgher forces in the field, will be paid out to the persons
to whom they were originaUy given. The sum payable in
respect of the said Government notes and receipts shall not
exceed ;f3,ooo,ooo sterUng, and if the total amount of such
notes and receipts approved by the Commission is more
than that sum, there shall be a pro rata diminution.
Facilities will be afforded the prisoners of war to present
their Government notes and receipts within the six months
aforesaid."
This was done, and after some further discussion as to the
rights of debtors and kindred matters, the document was
redrafted as a whole, and at 4.50 p.m. telegraphed to London for
the approval of the Cabinet.
The British' It was now the tum of the British Government to object,
objects tcTthe Voicing, as they had throughout the war, the sentiments of the
proposed vast majority of the nation, the Ministers took exception not to
the amount but the allocation of the sum proposed to be paid
imder Clause 11, and its addendum. Under those conditions a
large proportion of the grant might conceivably be absorbed by
foreigners who had supplied munitions of war to the Republican
forces. In substitution of the proposal submitted, the Cabinet
suggested on May 23rd the amalgamation of the proposals under
Clauses 11 and 12 as a means of achieving the desired end with-
out woimding the susceptibilities of either party. Two days
later an amended form of the clauses in question, assented to
by both sides, was telegraphed to London for sanction. In a
THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE. 551
covering telegram Lord Kitchener begged for a speedy decision
on the part of His Majesty's Government. The suspense of the
protracted negotiations was having anything but a reassuring
effect on the Delegates assembled at Vereeniging, some of whom
were even suspected of contemplating escape. But the Ministers
in London were not to be charged with tardiness. At 10.30 a.m.
on May 28th Lord Milner was able to hand to the Delegates at
Pretoria the final reply of the British Government.
It contained the following alterations to the document of
May 2ist and its subsequent modifications : —
Clauses 2 and 3 should be put together and will run as Modification
foUows :- ;'|^^
" Burghers in field outside limits of the Transvaal or recelvedTrom
Orange River Colony, and all prisoners of war at present the British
outside of South Africa, who are burghers, will, on duly May 28th,
declaring their acceptance of the position of subjects of '^^"
His Majesty King Edward VH., be gradually brought
back to their homes as soon as transport can be provided
and their means of subsistence ensured."
Clause 5. — Add at the end of clause the words : —
" The benefit of this clause will not extend to certain
acts contrary to usages of war which have been notified by
Commander-in-Chief to the Boer Generals, and which
shall be tried by Court-Martial immediately after the close
of hostilities."
Clauses 11 and 12 must be omitted, and following clause
substituted : —
" As soon as conditions permit, a Commission, on which
the local inhabitants will be represented, will be appointed
in each district of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony,
under the presidency of a magistrate or other official, for
the purpose of assisting the restoration of the people to their
homes and supplying those who, owing to war losses, are
552 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
unable to provide for themselves with food, shelter, and the
necessary amount of seed, stock, implements, etc., indis-
pensable to the resumption of their normal occupations.
" His Majesty's Government will place at the disposal
of these Commissions a sum of £3,000,000 sterling, for the
above purposes, and wiU allow all notes, issued under Law
No. I of 1900 of the Government of the South African
Republic, and all receipts, given by officers in the field of
the late Republics or under their orders, to be presented
to a judicial Commission which will be appointed by the
Government, and if such notes and receipts are found by
this Commission to have been duly issued in return for
valuable consideration, they will be received by the first-
named Commissions as evidence of war losses suffered by
the persons to whom they were originally given. In
addition to the above-named free grant of £3,000,000,
His Majesty's Government will be prepared to make
advances as loans for the same purposes, free of interest
for two years, and afterwards repayable over a period of
years with three per cent, interest. No foreigner or rebel
will be entitled to the benefit of this clause."
It probably came as a relief to all parties that the proposals
thus composed were absolutely final. They admitted of no
possible answer other than " Yes " or " No " from the
Vereeniging assembly. Furthermore, the British negotiators
were instructed to add that if this opportunity of an honourable
termination of hostilities were not accepted within a time to
be fixed by themselves, the Conference and the proposals would
be alike annuUed, and the Government would consider itself
absolved for the future from any reference to its present offer.
With the maze of ten days' tortuous argument ending
at last in a blank wall, the morning's discussion was significantly
brief. There was indeed a last attempt on the part of the
Boer Commissioners to lessen the rigidity of the provisos, but it
only elicited from Lord Milner the unmistakeable pronouncement
that " This is an absolutely final document, and the answer must
THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE.
553
be ' Yes ' or ' No.' " The burghers might, if they chose, reject
the document as a whole, but its separate provisions were
unalterable. He would only communicate to the Commissioners
the decision of his Government upon a point outside the pro-
posals which had often been referred to in the discussions of the
past days, namely, the treatment to be meted out to rebels in
Natal and Cape Colony.
Much had been informally made of this subject by the The question
Commissioners, who, as in the case of the receipts and notes, mentoi^
not unnaturally held that a point of honour was bound up in the "rebels,
question. They could not fail to see that the British Government
would be within its rights in refusing even to discuss its intention
with regard to men who had placed themselves outside the pale
of all negotiations. Nevertheless the Boer leaders were un-
wiUing to leave to an unknown fate thousands who had become
felons in aid of the lost cause, and the British Government,
which had been in communication on the subject with the
Colonial legislatures, had seen fit to indulge them by forwarding
the following declaration which was now read by Lord Milner
to the Commissioners : —
" His Majesty's Government must place it on record British
that the treatment of Cape and Natal colonials who have dedrSTor'^
been in rebellion and who now surrender will, if they return ihe question
to their Colonies, be determined by the Colonial Govern- ^ent of
ment and in accordance with the laws of the Colonies, and >"e^«is.
that any British subjects who have joined the enemy will
be liable to trial under the law of that part of the British
Empire to which they belong.
" His Majesty's Government are informed by the Cape
Government that the following are their views as to the
terms which should be granted to British subjects of the
Cape Colony who are now in the field or who have sur-
rendered or have been captured since the I2th April, 1901.
With regard to the rank and file, they should all, upon
surrender, after giving up their arms, sign a document
before the resident magistrate of the district in which
. 554 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
surrender takes place acknowledging themselves guilty of
high treason, and the punishment to be awarded to them,
provided they shall not have been guilty of murder or other
acts contrary to the usages of civilized warfare, should be
that they shall not be entitled for Ufe to be registered as
voters or to vote at any Parliamentary, Divisional Council,
or Municipal election.
" With reference to Justices of the Peace and Field-
Comets of the Cape Colony, and all other persons holding
official positions under the Government of the Cape
Colony, or who may occupy the position of Commandant of
rebel or burgher forces, they should be tried for high treason
before the ordinary Court of the country, or such special
Court as may hereafter be constituted by law, the punish-
ment for their offence to be left to the discretion of the
Court, with this proviso, that in no case shall penalty of
death be inflicted.
" The Natal Government are of opinion that rebels
should be dealt with according to the law of the Colony."
It only remained to set the limit of time within which the
Vereeniging assembly should be required to return its answer.
This was eventually arranged to be by the evening of May 31st,
The Boer at latest. At seven o'clock on the evening of May 28th
sionere'Veave ^^® Boer Commissioners, their task accomplished, took train
Pretoria, for Vereeniging, carrying with them a number of copies of
1^2.^ ' the document, the nature of the reception of which by the
representatives would decide the fate of the Boer peoples.
In the presence of the grievous calamity which had over-
taken their nation it was not easy for either the Commissioners
or the general body of the Delegates to realise how much had been
spared them, and how much was now offered them. They were
fast in the grip of a power incalculably stronger and even more
determined than themselves, a power, moreover, which might
well be exasperated at the cost in blood and treasure entailed
by a resistance which from the point of view of western warfare
had almost ceased to be admirable because it had become so
THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE.
555
hopeless. The Boer States were now represented solely by
the quarter of their manhood — the population of a British
township — which remained in the field, a body without a govern-
ment, without towns, possessions or power of any description.
Every inch of their territory, except that actually within the
outposts of their laagers, was in the hands of hostile troops.
If ever a people can lose its entity by war, the Boers had done
so now, yet to this vagrant, dispossessed tribe came the Com-
missioners from Pretoria bearing a message from the conqueror
couched in terms as formal as and less severe than might be
addressed by one sovereign Power to another at the crisis of a
first-class campaign. The very form of the British proposals was
an honour paid to the vanquished ; their purport was a triumph
for his nationahty, and it must be remembered that to a Boer his
nationality was a thing more precious even than his home, more
precious even than victory. He and his fathers had often
viewed with equanimity the destruction of their domestic life,
nay, had even uprooted it themselves in order to preserve the
national life, the hunger for which had originally driven them out
into the veld. And here, on the very verge of the utter
annihilation of the national body and soul, the hand put forth
to save both, was that to whose profit it was to give the last
push over the brink.
The assembled representatives might well have read with
amazement from the document which was placed in their hands
on the morning of May 29th that the national language, the
preserving amber of all social existence, was to be taught in the
schools ; that British gold would first rebuild and then repopulate
the ruined homes of the veld ; that for the first time in history
the conquered, instead of paying indemnity for his downfall,
would receive it ; finally, and most unprecedented pledge of all,
that representative government, and eventually actual autonomy,
was promised to a people who had not yet wrung the last of
nearly three hundred millions of pounds and thousands of lives
as the price of the eUmination of the device " independence "
from their standard. Truly the Delegates might now have
retorted upon their opponents the charge which had been often
Lenience of
the Terms of
Peace.
The assembly
of representa-
tives at
Vereeniging
receive the
final Terms of
Peace,
May 29th,
1902.
556
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Steyn
denounces the
Terms of
Peace.
The terms in
danger of
rejection.
Debate on the
Terms of
Peace.
levelled against themselves — of fighting for a mere idea. Under
the terms submitted to them only the Republics would perish ;
the Boer States would live on, governed as before by men of
their own choosing, the heart, it might still well be, of the South
African federation which had been the dream of every Boer
leader since the Great Trek. But the Boers would perceive in
the proffered terms none of these things. Steyn, to whom the
proposals were read before submission to the meeting in the tent
wherein he lay ill, denounced them in toto, and overcome by
illness and the misery of a capitulation which he probably foresaw
to be inevitable, resigned his Presidency on the spot and was
driven into the British lines for medical treatment. As for the
Delegates, blind to everything but the loss of their independence,
the whole document appeared to them so distasteful that within
a few moments of its first presentment they were within an ace
of voting for its rejection. Fortunately an appeal for a fuller
consideration prevailed, and for three days the Council tent rang
with impassioned argument ; but it was plain that at any
moment the voice of the soldier might drown that of the patriot,
when the assembled leaders would rush back to arms and to
destruction. It would serve no purpose to describe at length
the ebb and flow of that momentous and unhappy debate. Once
more reason, still largely represented by the Transvaal Delegates,
warred with the obsession of the Free State irreconcilables,
the grave eloquence of Burger, Botha, De la Rey and Smuts
contending with the splendid folly of such speeches as those
in which De Wet, Froneman and other advocates for war threw
all reason to the winds and urged the burghers to seek
independence in death rather than resign it living.
On one point there was a noble unanimity. There was
not in all the assembly an individual who personally wished to
surrender, whose spirit was broken or his endurance exhausted.
The line of demarcation ran solely between those who could not
disregard the inexorable logic of facts, and those who, like a hero
of their enemy's race, turned a blind eye to the unmistakeable
signal to withdraw from the battle. Up to the last the contest
continued, but as the decisive hour of voting drew on, it became
THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE. 557
clear that one by one the adherents of the war party were being
influenced by the recital of miseries of which many had known
nothing, or had thought to be peculiarly their own. The tension,
too, of the bitter mental struggle was doing its work. By the
morning of the final day, Saturday, May 31st, the meeting had
swayed sensibly towards peace. Nevertheless the result was The terms
far from certain and became still more doubtful when the ^Jction*'
wavering Delegates had to stand the strain first of a trumpet-
toned Motion by two fiery Free State Generals sounding the
instant resumption of hostilities, next of a declaration by one
of the most trusted officials of the Transvaal that he, for one,
would never consent to be one of the signatories of any terms
of peace involving the surrender of indejjendence.
Had the Motion been pressed to a division or the official's
avowal have had its designed effect, the Delegates would have
streamed from the Conference rifles in hand. But now, in the
words of the only chronicler* of these pregnant days, " something
great occurred." No less a personage than De Wet, effacing
every personal consideration in the desire to save his country,
intervened to quench the fire which he himself had kept alight.
Calling his burghers from the Council tent to his own, he there De Wet
in private confessed the truth. The struggle must end ; but ^^1" J^J
let it end with dignity, with union amongst the fallen, and for Motion of
their apologia the following Motion which at De Wet's suggestion 19^2.^'^'*
was drawn up for submission to the Conference by the State
Attorneys of the two Republics : —
" We, the national representatives of both the South
African Republic and the Orange Free State, at the meeting
held at Vereeniging, from the 15th of May till the 31st of
May, 1902, have with grief considered the proposal made
by His Majesty's Government in connection with the con-
clusion of the existing hostilities, and their communication
that this proposal had to be accepted, or rejected, unaltered.
We are sorry that His Majesty's Government has absolutely
dechned to negotiate with the Government of the Republics
* The Rev. J. D. Kestell, chaplkin to President Steyn and General C. De Wet.
558 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
on the basis of their independence, or to allow our Govern-
ment to enter into communication with our deputation.
Our people, however, have always been under the impression
that not only on the grounds of justice, but also taking into
consideration the great material and personal sacrifices
made for their independence, that it had a well-founded
claim for that independence.
" We have seriously considered the future of our country,
and have specially observed the following facts : —
" First, that the military pohcy pursued by the British
military authorities has led to the general devastation of
the territory of both Repubhcs by the burning down of
farms and towns, by the destruction of all means of existence,
and by the exhausting of all resources required for the
maintenance of our families, the existence of our armies,
and the continuation of the war.
" Secondly, that the placing of our families in the concen-
tration camps has brought on an unheard-of condition of
suffering and sickness, so that in a comparatively short time
about twenty thousand of our beloved ones have died there,
and that the horrid probability has arisen that, by continuing
the war, our whole nation may die out in this way.
" Thirdly, that the Kaffir tribes, within and without
the frontiers of the territory of the two Republics, are
mostly armed and are taking part in the war against us,
and through the committing of murders and all sorts of
cruelties have caused an unbearable condition of affairs
in many districts of both Repubhcs. An instance of this
happened not long ago in the district of Vrijheid, where
fifty-six burghers on one occasion were murdered and
mutilated in a fearful manner.
" Fourthly, that by the proclamations of the enemy the
burghers still fighting are threatened with the loss of all
their moveable and landed property — and thus with utter
ruin — which proclamations have already been enforced.
" Fifthly, that it has already, through the circumstances
of the war, become quite impossible for us to keep the many
THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE. 559
thousands prisoners of war taken by our forces, and that we
have thus been unable to inflict much damage on the British
forces (whereas the burghers who are taken prisoners by the
British armies are sent out of the coimtry), and that, after
war has raged for nearly three years, there only remains
an insignificant part of the fighting forces with which we
began.
" Sixthly, that this fighting remainder, which is only a
small minority of our whole nation, has to fight against
an overpowering force of the enemy, and besides is reduced
to a condition of starvation, and is destitute of all necessaries,
and that notwithstanding our utmost efforts, and the
sacrifice of everything that is dear to us, we cannot foresee an
eventual victory.
" We are therefore of opinion that there is no justifiable
ground for expecting that by continuing the war the nation
will retain its independence, and that, under these circum-
stances, the nation is not justified in continuing the war,
because this can only lead to social and material ruin, not
for us alone, but also for our posterity. Compelled by the
above-named circumstances and motives, we commission
both Governments to accept the proposal of His Majesty's
Government, and to sign it in the name of the people of
both Republics.
" We, the representative Delegates, express our confi-
dence that the present circumstances will, by accepting
the proposal of His Majesty's Government, be speedily
amehorated in such a way that our nation will be placed
in a position to enjoy the privileges to which they think
they have a just claim, on the ground not only of their
past sacrifices, but also of those made in this war.
" We have with great satisfaction taken note of the
decision of His Majesty's Government to grant a large
measure of amnesty to the British subjects who have taken
up arms on our behalf, and to whom we are united by bonds
of love and honour ; and express our wish that it may please
His Majesty to still further extend this amnesty."
56o
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
The repre-
sentatives
accept the
Motion and
the Terms of
Peace.
Signing of the
Terms of
Peace,
May 3i8t,
190a.
Text of the
Terms of
Peace.
After a short adjournment the Delegates reassembled, and
the voting on this, the supreme Motion, began. Before 3 p.m.
the Boer peoples, by fifty-four votes to six, had accepted their
doom and their salvation. The decision was communicated to
the British Headquarters in the following terms : —
" From both State Presidents to Lords Milner and
Kitchener.
" Vereeniging,
" May 31st, 1902.
" 3-55 P-m.
" Both Governments are prepared, being authorised
thereto by a resolution of the people's Delegates, and which
resolution they will submit to Your Excellencies, to accept
and sign the proposals of His Majesty's Government. They
are ready to proceed to Pretoria for this purpose at any time
which Your Excellencies may fix."
The appointed signatories lost no time in hastening to
Pretoria. At 10.30 p.m. they were in the presence of the
representatives of the British Government in the now well-
known room in the Commander-in-Chief's house. A few
moments later the following Terms of Peace were duly signed
and sealed : —
" Army Headquarters, South Africa.
" General Lord Kitchener of Khartoum, Commanding-
in-Chief , and his Excellency Lord Milner, High Commissioner,
on behalf of the British Government, and Messrs. S. W.
Burger, F. W. Reitz, Louis Botha, J. H. De la Rey, L. J.
Meyer, and J. C. Krogh, acting as the Government of the
South African Republic, and Messrs. C. R. De Wet, W. J. C.
Brebner, J. B. M. Hertzog, and C. H. Olivier, acting as the
Government of the Orange Free State, on behalf of their
respective burghers, desirous to terminate the present
hostilities, agree on the following Articles : —
" I. The burgher forces in the field will forthwith
THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE. 561
lay down their arms, handing over all guns, rifles, and
munitions of war in their possession or under their
control, and desist from any further resistance to the
authority of His Majesty King Edward VH., whom they
recognize as their lawful Sovereign.
" The manner and details of this surrender will be
arranged between Lord Kitchener and Commandant-
General Botha, Assistant Commandant-General De la
Rey, and Chief-Commandant De Wet.
"2. Burghers in the field outside the limits of
the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, and all
prisoners of war at present outside South Africa, who
are burghers will, on duly declaring their acceptance
of the position of subjects of His Majesty King
Edward VH., be gradually brought back to their
homes as soon as transport can be provided and their
means of subsistence ensured.
" 3. The burghers so surrendering or so returning
will not be deprived of their personal liberty or their
property.
" 4. No proceedings, civil or criminal, will be taken
against any of the burghers so surrendering or so
returning for any acts in connection with the prosecu-
tion of the war. The benefit of this clause will not
extend to certain acts contrary to the usage of war
which have been notified by the Commander-in-Chief
to the Boer Generals, and which shall be tried by
Court-Martial immediately after the close of hostilities.
"5. The Dutch language will be taught in public
schools in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony
where the parents of the children desire it, and will be
allowed in Courts of Law when necessary for the better
and more effectual administration of justice.
" 6. The possession of rifles will be allowed in the
Transvaal and Orange River Colony to persons requiring
them for their protection, on taking out a licence
according to law.
VOL. IV. 36
562 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
" 7. Military administration in the Transvaal and
Orange River Colony will at the earliest possible date
be succeeded by civil government, and, as soon as
circumstances permit, representative institutions, leading
up to self-government, will be introduced.
" 8. The question of granting the franchise to natives
will not be decided until after the introduction of
self-government.
" 9. No special tax will be imposed on landed
property in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony
to defray the expenses of the war.
" 10. As soon as conditions permit, a Commission
on which the local inhabitants will be represented, will
be appointed in each district of the Transvaal and
Orange River Colony, under the presidency of a
magistrate or other official, for the purpose of assisting
the restoration of the people to their homes and
supplying those who, owing to war losses, are unable
to provide for themselves, with food, shelter, and the
necessary amount of seed, stock, implements, etc.,
indispensable to the resumption of their normal
occupations.
" His Majesty's Government will place at the dis-
posal of these Commissions a sum of three million
pounds sterhng for the above purposes, and will allow
all notes, issued under Law No. i of 1900, of the
Government of the South African RepubUc, and all
receipts given by the officers in the field of the late
Repubhcs or under their orders, to be presented to a
Judicial Commission which will be appointed by the
Government, and if such notes and receipts are found
by this Commission to have been duly issued in return
for valuable consideration, they will be received by the
first-named Commissions as evidences of war losses
suffered by the persons to whom they were originally
given. In addition to the above-named free grant of
three miUion pounds, His Majesty's Government will
THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE. 563
be prepared to make advances as loans for the same
purpose, free of interest for two years, and afterwards
repayable over a period of years with three per cent,
interest. No foreigner or rebel will be entitled to the
benefit of this clause.
" Signed at Pretoria this thirty-first day of May,
in the year of Our Lord one thousand nine
hundred and two.
" (Signed) " (Signed)
"S. W. Burger. " Kitchener of Khartoum.
" F. W. ReITZ. " MiLNER."
" Louis Botha.
" J. H. De la Rey.
" L. J. Meyer.
" J. C. Krogh.
" C. R. De Wet.
" J. B. M. Hertzog.
" W. J. C. Brebner.
"C. H. Olivier.
the end.
VOL IV.
\6*
APPENDICES
567
APPENDIX I
(CHAPTER VI.).
Summary of Supplies sent by the Natal District for General French's
Force, Garrisons, dec, despatched from Newcastle and Volksrust
FOR Piet Retief and from De J Acer's Drift for Vryheid.
Date.
28th
27th March |
7th March |
From
Newcastle
Umbana
Volksrust
De Jager's
Drift
De Jager's
Drift
To
LUneberg
Utrecht
>»
Total
Piet Retief
\ Vryheid
ToUl
I Vryheid
lb.
O
a
Rations.
Rations., Rations.
6o,cx» j 120
42,400 1 —
100,000 I 2,000
80,000 I 2,000
42,400 1 —
.. Rum and Sundries to complete foregoing rations
158,800
Supplies for Utrecht and L. of C.
Rations.
30,000
"SI
Diete.
4,000
4,000
4,000
lb.
674,000
2,488,000
324.800
4,120
30,000
12,000
3,320,800
100,000
96,00°
196,000
1,600
1,600
1,000
100,000
100,000
4,000
4,000
85,680
85,680
267,000
■II
49
1 ^
II
34
31
II
41 5
71
60
131
57
* a included in Rations (Europeans) complete at b.
t Unloaded at Utrecht and taken on by 58 wagons from J.
\ 58 wagons loaded up with f unloading 16 wagon loads of oats.
568 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
APPENDIX 2.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE BLOCKHOUSE SYSTEM IN SOUTH AFRICA.*
When the army first reached Pretoria it was clear that its long lines
of communication lay undefended, and orders were issued that all
posts along the railways were to be fortified. By July ist, 1900,
defences consisting of trenches and stone-sangars had been prepared
at most points, and their numbers and strength increased as the
attacks of the Boers grew more frequent. The wrecking of the rail-
roads reached its chmax at the end of 1900, and it was obvious that
a more elaborate form of defence work was required. At some
important points near large bridges masonry blockhouses were
erected. These were usually of two stories, and from the roof a
machine-gun could fire. Entrance was by ladder : parapets sup-
ported by brackets projected from the upper angles, and loopholes
in the lower part enabled the garrison to fire on the ground below.
But the cost of such a blockhouse amounted to from £800 to ;f 1,000 ;
the time required for its erection was almost three months, and a
garrison of about thirty men was needed. Some type of work more
economical of time and material was imperatively demanded by the
situation.
The first corrugated-iron blockhouses were erected by a Louren^o
Marques contractor at Nelspruit, Kaapmuiden, and Komati Poort
in January, 1901. They were of an oblong form, measuring ten
by fifteen feet, and consisted of two rows of posts (three by three
inches), two inches apart, with a " skin " of corrugated iron fixed to
each. Stony sand filled the space between the " skins." The loop-
holes measured three by four inches and were in steel plates, two feet
wide and nine inches deep, and were fixed in wooden casings placed
in openings cut in the corrugated iron walls. A corrugated iron roof
completed the structure.
* See maps Nos. 58, 61 and 62.
Note. — For names mentioned in the text but not shown on the blockhouse maps,
see maps Nos. 56, 59, 63 and 64.
APPENDIX 2. 569
The result of this first attempt at a novel form of blockhouse
was a strong work ; yet the elaboration of a network of blockhouses
intersecting the whole sub-continent, which was now Lord Kitchener's
purpose, required the evolution of some type of work still less
cumbrous and less costly of time and material.
Major S. R. Rice, R.E., commanding the 23rd (Field) company,
was the parent of the necessary invention. In February, 1901,
he evolved a type of blockhouse which fell within the requisite
limitations.
The material and design were, of course, chosen on the assump-
tion that cover against artillery fire would rarely be required.
Advantage was taken of the disruptive effect of shingle on rifle-
bullets, and a blockhouse was designed, the walls of which were
composed of an inner and an outer " skin " of corrugated iron. The
" skins " were some six inches apart, and the intervening space was
filled with hard shingle. For each blockhouse some five cubic yards
of shingle were required, small enough to pass through a one and a
half inch mesh ; flint shingle was preferred. The original plan was
an octagon fifteen feet in diameter. To uphold the walls, the iron
" skins " were fixed to wooden uprights placed at each angle of the
octagon, care being taken that at all points the prescribed thickness
of shingle was observed. Each wall was ingeniously pierced with
cross-shaped loopholes measuring six by three inches, and splayed
inside and outside. The roof was not bullet-proof, being made only
of one corrugated iron sheet, and was in the form of a square gable.
Major Rice's company of Royal Engineers, then at Middelburg
in the Transvaal, soon became a blockhouse-factory. The manu-
facture of each separate part was placed in the hands of the same
workmen, and so well were they constructed, that the members of all
the blockhouses were practically standardised. Experience proved
that under heavy rifle-fire the " skins " of these octagonal block-
houses bulged, and a subsidence of the enclosed shingle ensued. A
greatly improved modification of the octagonal form was therefore
evolved, which, as a rule, took the following approximate shape :
A circular " skin " of iron, thirteen feet six inches diameter
and four feet high, acted as an interior revetment against which a
parapet of earth was thrown, or a wall, two feet thick, of rough stone
was built. Upon this base a circular shield was arranged, formed
of iron " skins " disposed in concentric circles, the outer " skins "
570 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
being in tension, the inner in compression. Between the two " skins "
was a filling of shingle some six inches thick. In this type of block-
house the " skins " were in the best position for resisting the strain
caused by the impact of the bullets when broken up upon the shingle,
and the subsidence of the shingle consequently ceased. Moreover,
in the circular blockhouse all woodwork was eliminated from the walls,
the portabihty of the blockhouse was greater, and the cost, time and
labour of erecting it less.
The loopholes were still usually cross-shaped, and the roof was
gabled as before. Another form of roof, however, was found to be
less penetrable and conspicuous, and more economical of time and
material, namely, a low, circular design, known as the " pepper-pot.'*
This was a variation of the " Rice " pattern.
The door was but two feet square and closed by a bullet-proof
shield. It led into a fire-trench some four feet six inches deep, which
surrounded the blockhouse and served as a protection to the sentry.
At a distance of from ten to twenty yards from the trench a high
wire entanglement completely encircled the blockhouse. This was
usually constructed of parallel fences with criss-cross wires between.
The total cost of this blockhouse was ultimately reduced to some
;fi6, and for a working party composed of five Sappers, aided by
ten natives, only four to five hours were required for its erection.*
• (A) Comparative Cost of Blockhouses by Contract:—
(i) By Contracts made at Cape Town by C. R. E., Cape Colony.
£> s. d.
Circular blockhouse with gable roof ... 30 o o
Erection, including freight 14 o o
£,iA o o
(2) By Contracts made at Pretoria by C. R. E., Pretoria.
Circular blockhouse, including materials,
labour and railway freight £y] 4 o
(B) "Rice" Pattern Blockhouse: —
Circular blockhouse (gable roof) with
R.E. labour £,\(i o o
N.B. — ^The average cost of an entanglement between blockhouses (at " coast " price)
erected by the troops was about ;^50 per mile.
The system finally included over 8,000 blockhouses, covering a total distance of
about 3,700 miles. The total cost, with entanglements, was under ;^i ,000,000.
APPENDIX 2. 571
Drawings and descriptions of this circular blockhouse were at once
forwarded to all officers commanding Royal Engineers, and the type
became the general pattern. The Commander-in-Chief wishing to
hasten the construction of this type, factories were started at the
Headquarters of every R.E. company, and at all coast ports, and
soon these circular blockhouses arose along all the railway hues, the
work being in full progress by the end of March, 1901, when parties
of Sappers from every R.E. company in South Africa were building
blockhouses along all the lines of railway.
The blockhouses were at first erected at intervals of some one and
a half miles. Even then they largely prevented the destruction of
the railway lines and trains ; but with so wide a separation, it
was impossible to stop parties of the enemy from crossing the line
at night. The interval was therefore decreased and was ultimately
from a half to three-quarters of a mile. There was no advantage to
be gained by reducing it still further, for the centre of the intervening
space was now within the range of " fixed sights " from the rifles of
the occupants of any two adjacent blockhouses.
Between the blockhouses ran at first only a slight barbed-wire
fence. This was gradually strengthened by adding " aprons" on each
side, by twisting several strands of wire into a thick rope, and by
using thick unannealed steel wire, which was unseverable. The fence
was stayed, the stays being anchored to buried stones and sandbags.
The fences splayed outwards, so that the blockhouses should not
fire into each other ; a trench was dug between the blockhouses,
in order to prevent wagons from crossing, should the fence be cut or
overturned. Along the fences automatic alarms and flares were
placed, also fixed rifle-batteries of four or six rifles, which could be
fired by one man. Each blockhouse was connected with its neigh-
bours by telephone, and contained its own water supply and reserves
of food and ammunition ; and to each native scouts were attached
for the purpose of patrolling by night. The usual garrison was one
non-commissioned officer and five or six men.
Up to June, 1901, the blockhouses had been erected solely along
the railroads to secure the lines of communication. In that month
the idea was developed further by the commencement of a cross-
country blockhouse line from Groot Oliphants River station on the
Komati Poort hne to Val station on the Natal hne. A battalion of
infantry was detailed as escort and to assist in the work of erection.
572 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
The work was rapidly executed, and the Royal Engineer parties were
ready with fresh blockhouses and transport, when in July Lord
Kitchener ordered them to go west to Frederikstad and run a line up
the Mooi river to its source, and thence across to Naauwpoort. This
line was finished in August, 1901.
The next cross-country line was begun at both ends from the
junction of the Mooi and Vaal rivers to Kopjes station on the Orange
River Colony railway. The ist Oxfordshire Light Infantry, with
Royal Engineer parties, worked from Kopjes, and the 2nd Grenadier
Guards, with a detachment of Sappers, from the Mooi river end. This
line had not long been completed when Lord Kitchener ordered that
it should be moved forward, for the area of country which it enclosed
was soon cleared of the enemy. Blockhouses were therefore erected
along the Rhenoster river from its junction with the Vaal, to Witkop,
and thence to the Lace Diamond Mines, whither a line had already
been run from Kroonstad. The Rhenoster river — Witkop section
of this line was eventually demolished, and a line was run from the
Lace Mines along the Valsch river to Bothaville. This was begun on
December 6th, 1901, and completed on February 19th, 1902. Mean-
while Heilbron and Frankfort had been connected by a line of block-
houses, which was extended to Tafel Kop on December 29th, 1901 ;
and another line of blockhouses from Inketeni (near Majuba) had
reached Botha's Pass on December 30th. Botha's Pass and Tafel
Kop were then connected by a line of blockhouses, which was com-
pleted by the end of January, 1902. In the eighty-seven miles which
intervened between Frankfort and Tafel Kop were 187 blockhouses,
garrisoned by 2,558 men, or thirty men to a mile.
Other lines of cross-country blockhouses were : —
(i) Kroonstad — Lindley : fifty miles, with 108 blockhouses and
four posts. Commenced November i8th, 1901 ; finished January 9th,
1902, with a branch from Kaalfontein to Valsch River bridge; eight
blockhouses.
(2) Lindley — Bethlehem, via Kaffir Kop and Naude's Kop : eighty
miles ; ninety-four blockhouses, with a garrison of 1,934 men, or
twenty men to the mile.
(3) Harrismith — Bethlehem : fifty miles, 134 blockhouses and
two posts. Bethlehem bridge — Bethlehem : four miles, seventeen
blockhouses ; garrison, 1,894 men, i.e., in the fifty miles, Harrismith —
Bethlehem, thirty-eight men to the mile.
APPENDIX 2. 573
(4) Elands River — Elands River bridge : ten miles, twenty
blockhouses.
(5) Van Reenen's — De Beer's — Plat Berg : twenty miles, thirty-
one blockhouses.
(6) Harrismith — Oliver's Hoek : twenty-three miles, sixteen
blockhouses.
(7) Bethlehem — Brindisi : forty miles, forty-seven blockhouses.
(8) Volksnist — Wakkerstroom : eighteen miles, twenty-one block-
houses.
(9) Wakkerstroom — Derby : seventy miles, 100 blockhouses,
with posts at Castrol Nek, Mabola, and two other points ; garrison,
1,524 men, or twenty-one men to the mile.
(10) Standerton — Ermelo: commenced November nth, 1901 ;
finished January 20th, 1902 ; fifty-six miles, 131 blockhouses and six
posts.
(11) Ermelo — Carolina: commenced (from each end) January
2ist, 1902 ; finished February 9th, 1902 ; thirty-four miles,
eighty-five blockhouses ; on one section of this line, comprising
seventy-three miles, there were 2,232 men, or thirty men to
the mile.
(12) Wonderfontein — Carolina : commenced December 30th, 1901 ;
finished January 17th, 1902 ; twenty-five miles, fifty-five blockhouses
and posts.
(13) Eerstefabrieken — Groot Oliphants River station : fifty-five
miles, with 1,700 men, or thirty to the mile.
(14) Ermelo — Bank Kop — Amsterdam : finished to Bank Kop
at armistice on March 29th, 1902.
(15) Frederikstad — Naauwpoort: commenced July, 1901 ; finished
August, 1901 ; forty-four miles, thirty-seven blockhouses.
(16) Wonderfontein — Komati Poort : along the railway, 175
miles, with 3,200 men, or eighteen men to the mile.
(17) Rooidraai (Mooi river) — Ventersdorp : nineteen miles, twenty-
one blockhouses; commenced December 19th, 1901 ; finished January
5th, 1902 ; demolished February 12th, 1902.
(18) Vaal River — Ventersdorp : fifty miles, fifty-six blockhouses
and three posts ; completed December 9th, 1901, with 491 men, or
ten men to the mile.
(19) Ventersdorp — ^Tafel Kop : twenty-seven miles, fifty-nine
blockhouses and three posts ; commenced December 19th, 1901 j
574 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
finished January 31st, 1902 ; garrisoned by 689 men, or twenty-five
men to the mile.
(20) Tafel Kop — Naauwpoort : commenced February 12th, 1902 ;
finished March 4th, 1902 ; forty-five miles, garrisoned by 566 men,
or twelve men to the mile.
(21) BufEelsvlei — Lichtenburg: commenced January 19th, 1902;
finished February 20th, 1902 ; forty miles, seventy-nine blockhouses
and two large posts, garrisoned by 1,011 men, or twenty-five men to
the mile, including Lichtenburg garrison.
(22) Mafeking — Lichtenburg vid Polfontein.
(23) Polfontein — Maretsani.
(24) Machadodorp — Lydenburg : line of posts from three to nine
blockhouses each, forty-five miles, fifty-five blockhouses.
(25) Vaal River (Koedoesdraai — Botha ville) : nine posts.
(26) Dundee — Vryheid : forty miles, seventy-three blockhouses.
(27) Victoria Road — Carnarvon : eighty miles, 112 blockhouses
and three posts ; commenced December 12th, 1901 ; finished January
24th, 1902.
(28) Carnarvon — WiUiston : commenced January 25th, 1902 ;
finished April 20th, 1902.
(29) WiUiston — Calvinia : commenced May 3rd, 1902 ; finished
May 31st, 1902.
(30) Calvinia — Clanwilliam : commenced January 15th, 1902 ;
finished May 28th, 1902.
(31) Clanwilliam — Lambert's Bay : thirty-four miles, fifty-three
blockhouses ; commenced December 14th, 1901 ; finished January
15th, 1902.
(32) Bethulie — Herschel : eighty miles, six posts and Aliwal
North.
(33) Bloemfontein — Maseru : eighty-two miles, seventy-nine block-
houses (including posts), divided into three sections : — (i.) Bloem-
fontein— Sannah's Post : twenty miles, seventeen blockhouses, 288
men ; (ii.) Sannah's Post — ^Thabanchu : twenty miles, twenty-five
blockhouses, 467 men; (iii.) Thabanchu — Maseru: forty-two miles,
thirty-seven blockhouses. In (ii.) there were also four posts on the
adjacent hills and six round Thabanchu. In (iii.) Springhaan Nek
and four other posts were occupied.
(34) Lines of posts radiated from and connected Dundee with
other near outlying strategical positions.
APPENDIX 2. 575
Mention must also be made of the lines of moveable posts erected
by the South African Constabulary. These were, as a rule, in the form
of rough redoubts. Often, however, a simple fire-trench was dug
and roofed overhead by " skins " of corrugated iron, the latter being
covered with any material affording protective colouration. Some-
times the trench would be deep, but a rough lying-down trench of
the following dimensions was often found to be adequate : —
A trench seven feet wide and one foot deep was dug, and a low
notched parapet was arranged on either side. Upon this " skins "
of corrugated iron were laid so as to form overhead cover, and upon
the " skins " the excavated earth was piled. If the trench was
merely required to face in one direction a lean-to roof was made
resting on the parapet. In all cases the loopholes were wide and low.
The strategy which underlay the evolution of the blockhouse
system in South Africa was both defensive and offensive. The
blockhouses upon the railway secured the vulnerable lines of com-
munication, upon the integrity of which the existence of the Field
Army depended ; and having fulfilled that defensive duty, required
no further justification. Advantage was taken of the power of the
modem rifle ; as many men as possible were relieved of the duty of
guarding the railway, and the force available for offensive action was
proportionately increased.
The strategy which governed the erection of the cross-country
blockhouse hues was of a different character. The earliest use of
such barriers in guerrilla warfare is lost in the darkness of antiquity.
That the undue multipUcation of such works may lead to ineffectual
dispersion, thereby condemning the strategy of their employer to a
passive defensive, was proved by the Spanish War in Cuba of 1898.
But the South African blockhouse line cannot be considered without
its complement, the " drive." As the tentacles of the blockhouse
lines closed upon the theatre of war, the area of manoeuvre con-
tracted, the bases of the raiding British columns multiplying as those
of the Boers diminished. Without the" drives " the blockhouse line
would have been as barren as the Spanish " trocha " ; without the
cross-country blockhouse lines the " drives " would have beaten the
air. It need only be noted that the combination of " drives " and
blockhouses imply an assured superiority in strength and capacity
for supply. Without these it would be exceedingly dangerous to
undertake them.
576 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
The only apparent ciltemative to such a system is one sanctioned
by history — ^the " decentrahsed vigour " of Marshal Bugeaud in
Algeria. The immediate and daily control of the several movements
of individual commanders then passes from the hands of the Com-
mander-in-Chief into those of his heutenants, who, with adequate
mobile forces, acting from fixed centres and upon local intelligence,
are made severally answerable for the pacification of their particular
districts.
m
APPENDIX 3'
(CHAPTER XXVL).
Letter from General C. R. De Wet to General J. C. Smuts,
APPOINTING HIM SUCCESSOR TO KrITZINGER, AND GIVING
INSTRUCTIONS AS TO THE CONDUCT OF THE CAMPAIGN IN CaPE
Colony.
Dist. Winburg,
In the Field,
February 8th, iqo2.
The Most Honourable Advocate Smuts,
Asst. Commandant-General
of the S.A.R. Fighting Forces in the C.C.
Most Honourable Sir,
Having heard that Asst. Hoofd. Commandant Kritzinger
was severely wounded and captured in the C.C, I have thought it
advisable to appoint you Head of all the Fighting Forces in the C.C,
formerly under Asst. Hoofd. Comdt. Kritzinger, until such time
as General De La Rey shall have arrived.
Your appointment is enclosed herein.
I wish to bring the following to your notice, not that I, nor the
Government have any doubt that you will make war in a civilized
manner, but I only consider it ray duty to bring one thing and another
to your notice, more especially as the enemy continues in his
uncivilized deeds.
I am convinced that we are of the same opinion, viz., that the
(key) question of the absolute Independence of the people will be
decided in the Cape Colony.
It is my duty to draw your attention to the following points which
have repeatedly been impressed by me and are anew impressed upon
aU (N.CO.'s) under Officers.
I. To continue the War (wage War) in the civihzed manner,
in which we commenced it and have now carried it on for twenty-eight
months.
VOL. IV. 37
578 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Though we have to deal with a barbarous Government and
Commanding Officers, judging them by the uncivilized actions they
have committed, the which it is not necessary for me to specify
(enumerate). It is well known to you and everyone what England
has done in the line of civilized actions since the commencement of
the war, to which Government and People (the noble excluded) we
never shall nor can bend.
I suppose you deplore as much as I do, and every civilized person,
as also, if not the majority, then at least a large portion of the British
Race does, the deeds of the British Government and its Chief Leaders
in S.A. and abhor it.
We hear from time to time that the Noble Classes of the British
increase daily, and that they strongly condemn the actions of their
Government and leaders in South Africa. This information (report)
we have from several reliable sources.
By strictly adhering to the course we have chosen, we will ulti-
mately win, if not the universal sympathy, at least the sympathy of
the majority of the British People, not to say anything of the sympathy
of the whole of the Civilized World.
The sympathy of the British p)eople, as that of her Civilized
Colonies, for us, would have been great, were it not that for years
before the war already, and during the war they had been deceived
by England's War Office and leaders in S.A. who, with an evil object,
had distorted matters and painted untrue pictures of the same.
The tension experienced by the British people and by almost
the whole (of the) World, distinctly (shows) proves that they have had
a fair insight into matters (seen what is behind the screen). Should
the British Parliament vote a further amount for the war, we have
the firm belief and conviction, when looking up)on the past, that the
result will only be the loss to England of the whole of South Africa.
We do acknowledge that it is a bitter pill for England to swallow,
but by continuing (the War) the pill will become the more bitter and
the larger.
Just compare England's credit to-day to what it was just before
the war, and in what disrespect she is held (and how she is falling
from time to time in the estimation) of every Nation of the World,
which disrespect will increase day by day, should the War continue
longer, or at all events, if it be waged in the uncivilized manner they are
doing it now.
APPENDIX 3. 579
2. Do not permit any Native under us to carry arms against
Britain, neither in the Repubhcs, nor in the Cape Colony, nor are any
Natives to be used (for the purpose of scouting) as Scouts, in spite of
the fact (though) that Natives are (used) employed by the enemy,
not only as scouts but thousands are armed against us.
3. Strict attention is to be paid to the fact that no Colonial is
to be forced to take up arms against England, they are to join
voluntarily until such time as the Colonials shall proclaim their own
independence and shall have formed a temporary Government.
4. Reprisals as far as the burning of houses are concerned, are not
to be permitted, although some time back a circular was circulated
there, issued by His Honour our State President and myself, wherein
we threatened to take reprisals, we do not consider that the time
to take reprisals generally upon persons in the C.C. who are evilly
(unkindly) disposed towards us, which time I hope shall never come,
has arrived yet.
At that time we meant and we are still of the firm intention,
to, should it unexpectedly (come to it) be necessary, use such steps,
before and rather than sacrifice our Independence. In a few
instances re})risals have been taken, for which the Officers concerned
had reasons and the owners were strongly against us.
No reprisals are therefore to be taken upon persons (the properties)
so generally as heretofore, who may be unkindly disposed towards
us, before receiving further instructions, for the more the enemy
continues his barbarous and uncivilized deahngs, the plainer (more
clearly) it is to be observed that God is with us as only a few days ago,
when the enemy with an overwhelming force tried to comer us
between the railway line and his B.H. Lines, God opened a safe
way for us and we crossed the so-called famous B.H. Lines. I have
experienced what I have always said and thought of the, by the
enemy so-called famous, blockhouse lines, viz., that it is merely
a White Elephant ; not only did we cross safely, but we brought a
large number of cattle through too. At another spot where cattle
were being brought across, the burghers were fired upon from the
blockhouses, the only result being that some of the horses and cattle
were hit.
The question in short is, when has, or will the enemy be able (to
stop us from) keep us away from his lines of communication. Was he
able to do so at the Orange River, at the Ladybrand — Bloemfontein
VOL. IV. 37*
58o THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
line of fortifications ? — where our vanguard, in the morning before
dawn, chased the enemy, who had thought to stop us, away. How
many times when we had to cross (when it was necessary to
cross) the line, have we crossed it by force, which still occurs daily.
He was, is not, and never will be, able to stop us nor the cattle,
crossing the railway or B.H. Lines, not that I wish to speak dis-
respectfully of the enemy's tactics, but the blockhouses is one of the
most ridiculous of tactics that I have ever seen since the commence-
ment of the War. Suppose that we are ultimately obUged to leave
the Repubhcs owing to want of food, our people are now already
determined that we shall then go to the Cape Colony and Natal.
Want of food (scarcity of food) was, is, and never shall be the cause
or reason of surrender with us, for so long as the enemy remains in
S.A. he has to hve and eat and we will also do the same, even as we
are now continuing the war almost exclusively with the rifles and
ammunition of the enemy even so will we be provided with his food.
5. Do not allow anything such as Horses, Eatables, Clothing,
etc., etc., to be taken without giving receipts, not even from those
persons who are unkindly disposed towards us, should it afterwards
appear that they were not kindly disposed towards us, and deserve
not to be paid out, it will be a matter for the Government to decide.
Wishing you and your Officers and Burghers fortune (prospeiity)
and a blessing,
I have the honour to be.
Your Most Honourable's
Obedient Servant,
(Sd.), C. R. De Wet,
Hoofd. Commandant of the O.F.S.
APPOINTMENT.
Herewith the Most Honourable Gentleman Advocate Jan Smuts
is appointed Head (Chief) of all the Fighting Forces in the Cape Colony,
formerly under Asst. Hoofd. Commandant Kritzinger, whom, the
enemy assert, is captured.
Given by me this 8th day of February, 1902.
(Sd.), C. R. De Wet,
Hoofd. Commandant O.F.S.
58i
APPENDIX 4
(CHAPTER XXVIII.).
Orders by Lieutenant-General Sir I. S. M. Hamilton, K.C.B.,
D.S.O., Commanding Columns operating in Western Transvaal.
Palmietfontein,
May 6th, 1902.
The itinerary of the marches of the various columns is set forth itinerary,
in the attached table, and in default of further orders it must be
strictly adhered to.
Column commanders should detail an officer on each flank, who Flank.s.
should be held responsible that the flanks join up at the places laid
down.
After leaving Rooirantjesfontein, Nooitverwacht, Korannaf on tein, Lining out.
columns will line out at night, and hold a continuous cordon, whicli
should be strongly entrenched during the afternoon and evening, and
strengthened with wire as much as possible.
Columns will march daily at 7.30 a.m. Hours of
march.
Columns will not outspan until reaching the line that they are Outspans.
going to hold in the evening.
Signals may be made on the Pom-pom,* as follows, but should Signals,
not be employed without the direct order of the officer commanding
a group of columns.
The " Friendly Signal," which will merely be used to indicate the Friendly
position of friendly troops will be : — signal.
Pom-Pom Pom-Pom Pom-Pom.
*/.<?., Vickers- Maxim automatic quick-firing gun.
582
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Signal for The " Signal for Help," which should only be used if a large
help. force of more than 500 Boers is visible and threatening to break
through : —
Pom-Pom-Pom Pom-Pom-Pom Pom-Pom-Pom,
followed by a belt fired as rapidly as possible.
Breaking of The line must on no account be broken by small bodies of troops
^>"e. chasing Boers in front of it. Should it be considered desirable to
break the line at all, it must be by the direct order of the officer com-
manding a group of columns, who must judge whether the situation
warrants such action.
Directing In lining out, each column commander will be responsible that
flank. iijs Left is j^ touch with the colimin on his Left.
(Sd.), Ian Hamilton,
Lieut. -General.
APPENDIX 4.
?83
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584 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
APPENDIX 5.
NOTES ON THE SUPPLY SYSTEM IN SOUTH AFRICA,
1901 — 2.
In order that a general reserve of 120 days' supplies for men and
animals should be as nearly as possible maintained, each Staff Officer
for Supplies in South Africa reported weekly by telegraph to the
Director of Supplies in that country, stating the number of mouths
in his particular district and the supplies on hand. The Director of
Supplies in South Africa was thus enabled to strike a balance of his
total requirements, which he communicated in a fortnightly cablegram
to the War Office. As far as possible all demands for supplies were
made three months in advance, so as to afford time for collection.
This fortnightly statement by the Director of Supplies was the
first cause of all demands, and formed the root of the S5^tem of supply
of the army in the field. It was first examined in the Quarter-Master-
General's department at the War Office ; next, an indent based
thereon was forwarded to the " Supply Reserve Dep6t " at Wool-
wich, which then fulfilled demands either from its own stock, or
under " running contract," or by application through the Quarter-
Master-General to the Director of Army Contracts. In the last
case the quantity, quality and description of supplies required were
defined by the Quarter-Master-General's department, and it became
the duty of the Director of Contracts to comply with the specifi-
cations. In order to fulfil such requisitions, the Director of Contracts
issued tenders, or made private purchases, or dealt through brokers.*
The trade is reported to have met all requirements well ; but, naturally,
to obtain large quantities of certain commodities not in common
demand {e.g., i-lb. tins of preserved meat, tents, saddles) time was
required, and at first substitutes had to be provided.
Delivery of goods was made either at the Reserve Dep6t at Wool-
wich, or from the factory direct to the ship's side (whether in London
* Floior, tea, sugar, rum, hay, oxen, were not supplied by contract, but either
^y brpkers, or by the Colonial Governments themselves by direct shipments.
APPENDIX 5.
585
or the provinces) ; or supplies were shipped from the Colonies to
South Africa, under arrangements made by the Colonial Governments
upon behalf of the Director of Contracts. In all cases a prolonged
examination by " Staff Officers for supply inspection " took place upon
delivery : supplies were weighed and marked with the date of receipt ;
samples were tested by the Government Analyst, Somerset House,
and in special cases examined by the Professor of Hygiene at
Netley ; whilst supplies forwarded direct from the Colonies to South
Africa were inspected by the officials of the Colonial Governments.
Shipment was made under the auspices of the Admiralty. As
soon as the Quarter-Master-General knew what his requirements would
be, he informed the Admiralty, whose duty it became to obtain sea
transport, and to advise the Quarter-Master-General when it would
be available. The transport department of the Admiralty made
requisition upon shipping agents, at the same time defining what class
of ship was to be engaged, the agents being paid either at a rate per
ton or in a lump sum. Large ships of fair speed were used. The
War Office notified the Director of Supphes in South Africa by letter
on the fourth day of each month what supplies had been ordered for
shipment during that month, as well as cabled to him the contents of
the ships which had actually sailed.* The Director of Supplies in
* Spbcimbn "Return of Ships with Supplibs on Board to Arrive."
Cargo.
Date of
Name of Vessel.
Sailing.
Expected
arrival.
Remarks.
Manhattan . . .
Windsor
Gulf of Ancud.
Gaieka
Blackhcath ...
Gaul
Lake Erie ....
Riverton
Greek
Umvoti
Klondyke
Falls of Keltic.
Umbilo
Miscellaneous
Alfalfa
Oats and preserved
meat
Compressed forage .
Hay and oats
Compressed forage .
Miscellaneous
Hay
Hospital supplies . .
Miscellaneous
Oats
Hay and oats
Hospital supplies . .
I. 10.00
2. 10.00
3.10.00
3.10.00
4. 10.00
10.10.00
10.10.00
11.10.00
II. 10. 00
11.10.00
11.10.60
II. 10.00
15.10.00
21.10.00
19. 10.00
21.10.00
24.10.00
22. 10.00
3.11.00
3.11.00
29.10.00
2. 11.00
8.11.00
29.10.00
29.10.00
12. 11.00
Cape Town for orders.
Cape Town for orders.
Durban for orders.
For Port Elizabeth.
Durban for orders.
For East London.
Optional South Afri-
can ports.
Call at Cape Town for
orders.
For Port Elizabeth.
For Natal.
Durban for orders.
Durban for orders.
Natal.
586 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
South Africa was thus enabled to decide, before they arrived, at what
point the ships were to discharge their cargoes. The time occupied
in unloading the ships depended, not alone upon the capacities of the
South African ports, but also upon the storage room near the docks
and upon the carrying powers of the railroads up-country ; for the con-
gestion of the single lines of railway often prevented the evacuation
of the sheds at the docks, and this in turn obstructed the discharge
of cargoes and caused heavy demurrage. The Naval Transport
authorities were responsible for delivery of supplies to the Army
Service Corps in South Africa at high-water mark. Cargoes were dis-
charged at Cape Town alongside the quays, elsewhere for the most
part in lighters, and were handed over by the harbour authorities,
under payment of their dues, to the Army Service Corps sheds.
Subject to the approval of the Director of Contracts, the Deputy-
Adjutant-General for Supply and Transport for South Africa had, in
October, 1899, contracted with the Cold Storage Company in Cape
Town for the supply of fresh meat to the army in the field. This
contract was extended from time to time at diminishing rates.* The
meat thus purchased by contract was destined solely for troops on,
or within three miles of the lines of railway. The mobile columns
carried, as a reserve, a store of preserved meat sufficient for at least
four days ; but except under the stress of an emergency, they lived
on captured stock, which was slaughtered either by the column itself,
or by the contractors, who at a fixed rate purchased the animals alive
from the supply officer to the column, slaughtered them, and sold
the meat to him again by the pound.
Upon the Director of Supplies in South Africa devolved the task
of maintaining not only his general reserve of 120 days' supplies in
that country, but also such local reserves in various stations as (sub-
ject to the maintenance of minimum reserves at certain points specially
ordered by the Commander-in-Chief) were demanded by the officers
commanding districts or columns.
The country was divided into supply districts, and local supply
officers reported weekly to the Staff Officers for Supply of their dis-
trict the state of supplies and numbers in their stations, or columns.
About the end of 1901 there were twenty-one such districts in the
* During the early part of the war gd. per lb. was paid for frozen and uid.
for fresh meat. This was reduced in February, 1901, to yd. and lod. respectively,
and in the February of 1902 to 5|d. and gd.
APPENDIX 5.
587
theatre of war. Within these districts a local reserve of at least
thirty days' supplies had to be maintained in over 100 depots.
The following list will show : —
The Number of " Rations" fixed early in 1902 as the prescribed
Supply Reserves at the Stations named.
Supply
District.
Pretoria
Northern L.
of C, north]
of Pretoria.
Germiston
L. of C. west
of Johannes-
burg
Station.
Heilbron.
Kroonstad . . .
Bloemfontein ■{
Pretoria (Supply
Dep6t)
Irene
Rietfontein W. ....
Pietersburg
Nylstroom
Warm Bath
Pienaars River ....
Vereeniging
Zuurfontein
Springs
Elandsfontein
Johannesburg
Krugersdorp
Naauwpoort W
Rustenburg
Coal Mine Drift
Potchefstroom . . . .
Ventersdorp
Klerksdorp
Heilbron
Frankfort
Tafel Kop
Brandfort
Smaldeel
Winbiurg
Kroonstad
Lindlev
Wolvehoek
Doornkloof
Kaffir Kop
Norval's Pont
Bethulie Bridge . . .
Bethulie
Springfontein
Edenburg
Bloemfontein
Thabanchu
Ladybrand
Ficksburg
Number of Rations.
Men's.
Medical
Comforts.
Grain.
Hay.
1,500,000
150,000
2,000,000
2,500,000
15,000
1,500
5,000
5,000
90,000
9,000
90,000
60,000
150,000
15,000
150.000
170,000
25,000
2,500
2,000
2,500
20,000
2,000
6,000
6,000
10,000
1,000
1,500
2,000
25,000
2,500
25,000
25,000
10,000
1,000
2,000
2,000
50,000
5,000
50,000
80,000
2,000,000
200,000
2,000,000
2,500,000
100,000
10,000
100,000
120,000
100,000
10,000
100,000
150,000
50,000
5.000
50,000
50,000
50,000
5,000
50,000
25,000
50,000
5,000
50,000
50,000
60,000
6.000
60,000
100,000
35. 000
3.500
35.000
20,000
300,000
30,000
300,000
350.000
120,000
12,000
120,000
150,000
50,000
5,000
50,000
25,000
50,000
5.000
50,000
25,000
20,000
2,000
20,000
25,000
3.000
300
3.000
4,000
35.000
3.500
35.000
40,000
300,000
30,000
300,000
400,000
50,000
5,000
50,000
50,000
3,000
300
3.000
4,000
25,000
2,500
10,000
10,000
50,000
5,000
50,000
25,000
35.000
3.500
35.000
40,000
50,000
5,000
50,000
50,000
25,000
2,500
25,000
30,000
60,000
6,000
60,000
70,000
30,000
3.000
30,000
30,000
500,000
50,000
500,000
600,000
30,000
3.000
30,000
35.000
100,000
10,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
10,000
100,000
50.00Q
588
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
The Number of " Rations " fixed early in 1902 as the prescribed
Supply Reserves at the Stations named {continued).
Supply
District.
Ea.stcrn
North-Wstrn.
South- Wstrn
Western
Midland ^
Namaqualand
Station.
Cape Town
Green Point
Wynberg
Durban Road
Simon's Town
Oudtshoom
Swellendam
Mossel Bay
East London
King William's Town
Queenstown
Dordrecht
Stormberg
Bnrghersdorp
Alii^ North
Prieska
Kenhardt
Upington
Clanwilliam
Endekuil
Lambert's Bay ....
Calvinia
Stellenbosch
Worcester
Matjesfontein
Beaufort West
Victoria West Road
Carnarvon
Richmond Road . . .
Richmond
De Aar
Britstown
Phillipstown
Deelfontein
Williston
Colesberg
Cradock
Graa.£E Reinet
Grahams town
Hanover Road ....
Naauwpoort
Rosmead
Port Elizabeth
Steynsburg
Middleburg
O'Okiep
Number of Rations.
Men's.
40,000
5,000
5, 000
5,000
5.000
5.000
30,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
60,000
60,000
40,000
30,000
120.000
100,000
30,000
40,000
15.000
20,000
30,000
40.000
100.000
100,000
5,000
15,000
300,000
20.000
20,000
50,000
50.000
20,000
10,000
20,000
5,000
20,000
150.000
20,000
5.000
30,000
10,000
180,000
Medical
Comforts.
4,000
500
500
500
500
500
10,000
3.000
3.000
4,000
6,000
6.000
4,000
3.000
12,000
10,000
3.000
4,000
1,500
2,000
3,000
10,000
10.000
10.000
1. 000
1,500
30.000
2,000
2,000
50,000
5,000
2,000
1,000
2,000
500
3,000
15,000
1,000
500
2,000
1,000
10,000
Grain.
40,000
5.000
5,000
5.000
10,000
5,000
40,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
60,000
60,000
40,000
30,000
120,000
100,000
30.000
50,000
30,000
60,000
20,000
30,000
100,000
100.000
10,000
15,000
300,000
20,000
20,000
1,000
75,000
20,000
10,000
20,000
5.000
10,000
150,000
20,000
15,000
20,000
10,000
100,000
Hay.
40,000
5, 000
5,000
5.000
lO.OOO
5.000
50,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
60,000
70.000
50.000
40,000
150,000
120,000
40,000
60,000
30,000
60,000
20,000
40,000
150,000
150,000
10,000
15.000
300,000
20,000
20,000
1,000
80,000
30,000
10,000
20,000
5,000
10,000
150,000
20,000
15,000
20,000
10,000
100,000
APPENDIX 5.
589
The Number of " Rations " fixed early in 1902 as the prescribed
Supply Reserves at the Stations named (continued).
Supply
District.
Station.
Number of Rations.
Men's.
Medical
Comforts.
Grain.
Hay.
Kimlierley . . {
Western (Vry-
l>»rg)
Standerton
Natal
H.irrismilli . .
Kastern* !
Transvaal . ;
OraiM^e River ...
Modder River .
Jacobsdal
Douglas
Campbell
Griquatown
Kofiyfontein ....
Kimberley
BarklyWest
Daniel's Kuil ....
Boshof
Warrenton
Fourteen Streams
Christiana
Vryburg
Ma^eking
Zeerust
Lichtenburg ....
Buluwayo
Standerton
Heidelberg
Eshowe
Melmoth
Maritzburg
Howick
Mooi River
Ladysmith
Dundee
De Ja^er's Drift . .
Vryheid
Newcastle
Utrecht
Botha's Pass
Volksrust
Wakkerstroom . .
Harrismith
Elands Kivcr ....
Tiger Kloof
Bethlehem
Brindisi
Komati Poort . . .
Barberton
Machadodorp . . .
Schoeman's Kloof
Lydenburg
Wonderfontein. . .
Middelburg
Witbank
Balmoral
100,000
20,000
6,000
10,000
6,000
15,000
10,000
300.000
10,000
6,000
35.000
35.000
50,000
50,000
300,000
30,000
35.000
5. 000
300,000
60,000
35. 000
35,000
10,000
15.000
50,000
10,000
100,000
50,000
100,000
100,000
50,000
100,000
120,000
50,000
300,000
50,000
50,000
35.000
20,000
20,000
100,000
100,000
5.000
100,000
50,000
500,000
35,000
50,000
10,000
2,000
600
1,000
600
1.500
1,000
30,000
1,000
600
3.500
3.500
5.000
5.000
30,000
3.000
3.500
500
30,000
6.000
3.500
3,500
1,000
1,500
20.000
1,000
10,000
5,000
10,000
10,000
5.000
10,000
12,000
5,000
30,000
5.000
5,000
3.500
2,000
2,000
10,000
10,000
500
10,000
5.000
50,000
2,500
5.000
100,000
20,000
3.000
4,000
3.000
5,000
4,000
300,000
4,000
3.000
35.000
35,000
50,000
50,000
300,000
30.000
35.000
5,000
300,000
60,000
35.000
25,000
10,000
2,000
150,000
10,000
100,000
50,000
100,000
100,000
50,000
100,000
120,000
50,000
300,000
50,000
50,000
35,000
15,000
20,000
100,000
100,000
5,000
100,000
50,000
500,000
15,000
50,000
100,000
25,000
2,000
3.000
2,000
5,000
2,000
350,000
2,000
2,000
15,000
40,000
20,000
60,000
350,000
20,000
20,000
5,000
350,000
60,000
35.000
35,000
10,000
2,000
150,000
10,000
100.000
50,000
50,000
120,000
50,000
100,000
150,000
50,000
350,000
50,000
50,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
100,000
120,000
5,000
50,000
50,000
600,000
15,000
50,000
590 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
The standing orders of the Director of SuppUes in South Africa —
which dealt with routine matters, and with the normal requirements of
the Field Force — were elastic, and encouraged decentralisation. As
described, supply stations (upon which minor posts and blockhouse
lines drew) and columns reported their wants to the Staff Officer for
Supplies of the district in which they were, whereupxDn the latter,
without reference to Headquarters, made his requisitions direct upon
the Base Reserve Dep6t at the nearest port of entry. He refilled the
convoys of columns in his district as opportunity served, and from
the nearest convenient point. The amount of reserves in the hands
of columns or stations was left to the discretion of the officer
commanding the district or the column.
The Director of Supplies confined himself to supervision, to
maintaining his general reserve of 120 days' supplies, and to meeting
abnormal demands. The reports of Staff Officers of districts were
merely intended to give the Director of Supplies the necessary informa-
tion on which to base his requisitions upon England, so as to maintain
his general reserve.*
At Army Headquarters, the Director of Supplies reported himself
in person to the Commander-in-Chief each day at 8.30 a.m. Copies
of all telegrams received and despatched lay upon a table in the Com-
mander-in-Chief's quarters. With these all the officers of the Head-
quarters Staff made themselves conversant, so that the Director of
Supplies was informed of all impending movements before his daily
visit to Lord Kitchener. His own familiarity with the geography of
the country, and with the fact that movements of troops repeated
themselves — columns being drawn time after time towards certain
points as to a magnet — rendered it unnecessary for him to demand
specific orders. If, for example, columns were likely to approach
the neighbourhood of the Natal line, he promptly filled Heidelberg
or Standerton with supplies ; or in the case of a " drive," convoys
were passed out from some point upon the line along the rear of the
" drive."
On each day the Army in Africa consumed some 3,000 tons of
supplies. Three hundred ten-ton railway trucks were therefore
required daily to keep pace with the consumption of the troops. As
* For a specimen state of supplies from a single district, see Table at end of
this Appendix^
APPENDIX 5, 591
many trucks as possible were daily allotted solely to the service of
supply by the Director of Railwa)^. The provision of the necessary
railway transport from the coast ports was the principal difl&culty
which confronted both the Directors of Supplies and of RailwajTs.
For this transport a charge was entered to the credit of the Railway
Department and to the debit of the Army of yd. per mile for each
ten -ton truck, and of is. 2d. for each twenty-ton truck.
The Field Force Canteen.
Brief mention must here be made of the work of the " Field Force
Canteen," which was initiated in Natal in the early da)^ of the war.
Permission was granted to Lieut. -Colonel H. G. Morgan, the ofl&cer
in charge of supplies, to purchase all goods required by the troops in
the field ; to hire his own transport for these commodities, and to
sell them at a slight profit — the increment being distributed amongst
the next-of-kin of the men who died in Natal. Subsequently the
system was extended to the whole army in Africa, and everything in
current demand amongst the troops was sold. The Field Force
Canteen eventually purchased transport for its own use. Although
profits were small, the turnover was large and rapid. Ultimately the
entire capital of the Field Force Canteen was actually turned over five
times in one month. During the latter period of the war the turn-
over exceeded £4,000,000 per annum. Soldiers' necessaries were
sold at a fraction under, officers' necessaries and luxuries at a fraction
over, cost price. At the close of the war, after distributing some
£88,000 of the profits in grants to the wounded, to the next-of-kin of
those who died, and to regimental institutes, the accounts of the Field
Force Canteen Fund still showed a balance credit of £470,000. The
major part of this was allotted to the South African Garrison Insti-
tutes as capital with which to inaugurate a civilian establishment,
and to erect buildings at places where troops were stationed. It
would be difficult to exaggerate the comfort and consequent increased
efficiency afforded to the army in South Africa during the two last years
of the war by this novel department, which in every sense strikingly
justified its existence.
Owing to the great length of the Lines of Communications, to the
exigencies of war, which caused trucks or convoys to be incessantly
diverted from their intended destinations to meet sudden wants else-
where, and to the inexperienced personnel, it was often impossible for
592 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Supply Of&cers to trace goods which had been consigned to them, but
had never reached them. Consequently they were frequently unable
to balance their accounts. The arrival of goods by rail or road was
never to be counted on. Trucks or wzigons were constantly inter-
cepted on their journey ; loads were lightened or abandoned, and
often none, or merely a fraction, of the original load reached its
destination. Trucks passed over several lines of railroad, and no one
would or could take responsibility for their passage. A train of ten
trucks, starting from Durban, for example, would be broken up
repeatedly to enable it to surmount the steep gradients ; if not
thereafter diverted or intercepted the trucks composing it would
arrive at their destination at intervals of days or weeks. Alarms
would occur on the line and supphes would be hurriedly unloaded
at, or loaded and despatched to, any safe place. It sometimes
happ)ened that convoys destined for one point were hastily off-loaded
in the dark at another, when the heaps of supphes might be largely
depleted by passing columns, or perhaps partly scattered over the veld.
Again, a convoy would be delayed on its way, and the escort, falling
consequently short of rations, would supply themselves from its
contents, with the result that on reaching its destination there were
deficiencies which no one could account for. Even in peace, with a
well-trained staff of accountants enjoying ample leisure, much time
would have been occupied in tracing a fraction of the discrepancies
which arose in any one week of the war. With an inadequate and
inexperienced staff, working at high pressure to keep the army fed,
with accountants in arrear and oppressed by the labour of attempting
to explain discrepancies, it was impossible for the individual supply
officer to attempt to close his accounts.
In order to deal with such miscarriages a central " Clearing
House " account was created, to which supply officers forwarded
the way-bills of goods which had been despatched to but had never
reached them. Discrepancies were enquired into, and accounts
balanced at Headquarters, which was in closer touch with the field
columns than the latter were with one another.
APPENDIX 5. 593
The Department of Civil Supplies.
This department was called into existence by the necessities of
the civil populations of the captured South African towns. Its
functions were as follows : —
1. To control the importation of goods of every description.
2. To control the transportation of all goods from place to place
within the sphere of its operations, whether by rail or road.
3. To regulate and provide for the food supplies of the population.
4. To allot to each Civil Government Department a share of the
railway truckage so that Government work of all descrip-
tions could be carried on. The principal departments to
which truckage had to be allotted were the Railways (first
as Imperial Military Railways and subsequently as Central
South African Railways), the Public Works, Repatriation,
Land Settlement, Burgher Camps, Native Refugee Camps.
5. To secure, through its purchasing depdts, supplies of grain
for Native Refugee Camps, Burgher Concentration Camps,
Civil Government Departments, the Army Service Corps,
etc., etc.
6. To provide for the preservation of cattle during a portion
of the war with a view to aiding in the re -stocking of
the country. (This was done by the Cattle Preservation
Branch of the Department of Civil Supplies. It was
abolished about April, 1902.)
7. To direct the operations of the Cold Storage Companies as
touching frozen and fresh meat supplies for the population.
8. To regulate the selling price of foodstuffs and liquors.
9. To control the consumption of liquors, wines, spirits, etc.,
for which purpose " Permits " to purchase rigidly limited
quantities were issued to persons of good repute.
A limited proportion of the available truckage was set apart for
Civil requirements, and under the High Commissioner a department
was created to control issues, to re-establish a produce market, and
to regulate " Trading Licences," first in Johannesburg, and later at
Pretoria and in the Transvaal generally. For this purpose certain
bases were chosen as centres of distribution ; and as a larger amount
of truckage was gradually allotted to this department a greater
variety of articles could be imported.
VOL. IV. 38
594 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
The elaboration of the blockhouse lines tended to facilitate the
work of the department, for the carrying power of the congested
railways was supplemented by wagon transport passing along the
blockhouse lines. Simultaneously the scope of the work of the depart-
ment broadened as the areas under effective control extended.
When the mining industry began to raise its head, stamps were being
dropped, and the population of Johannesburg was returning, the
pressure upon the Director of Civil Supplies became heavy, and
great discrimination had to be exercised in the task of granting
transport and " Trading Licences."
It is recorded that an aggregate of goods weighing 6,000,000 tons
was transported by the Department of Civil Supplies. Of this the
importations during 190 1 provided merely foodstuffs and clothing,
whilst those during 1902 included also large quantities of building
material, and live stock for re-stocking the country.
With the cessation of hostilities the pressure was at once relieved:
The military requirements, which had been paramount, diminished,
and more transport and personnel could be placed at the service of the
department.
Soon the Civil authorities resumed control of the railways, making
provision for the wants of the Army of Occupation ; and gradually the
control of the issue of supplies and of " Trading Licences " was
abandoned. Four months after the signing of peace the work of this
department came to an end.
APPENDIX 5.
595
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596
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
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598 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
APPENDIX 6.
NOTES ON THE TRANSPORT SYSTEM IN SOUTH AFRICA,
1901 — 2.
The change in the character of the operations which occurred towards
the end of 1900, and the numbers of flying columns produced
by it, necessitated a reorganisation of the Transport Service of the
Army in South Africa. Divisions and brigades had vanished, and
in their place a swarm of forces were in the field of varying numbers
and composition, and known only by their commanders' names.
Attached to these were detachments of Transport Companies ; but
at a time which essentially demanded the presence of many
transport dep6ts such organisations were practically non-existent.
It was the duty of the Ordnance Department to supply transport
stores ; of the Remount Department to supply transport animals.
Units demanded whatever they required direct from the remount
dep6t or the ordnance stores ; but there was little means of checking
or controlling their requisitions, and in the absence of any intermediary
transport dep6ts animals and stores were being wasted " like water
poured through a sieve " ;♦ the small reserves of transport were being
squandered, and a system adapted to the changes which had occurred
in the organisation of the troops in the field was urgently needed.
The importance of mobility was now more than ever dominant ;
nothing but mule transport was of much service to the columns.
Efficient mules were, however, scarce, owing to the facts that the
supply from overseas could not always be relied on, that imported
animals needed rest after a long sea-voyage before they could leave
the remount dep6ts, and that even after being posted to the Army
Service Corps, they required for a time special supervision. Ox
transport was still in use for Supply Columns and for local work on
the lines of communication, and casualties in oxen were large owing to
the prevalent diseases of the country. Moreover, a large proportion
of the second-line transport consisted of hired oxen and wagons.
• Report of a Staff Officer for Transport, South Africa.
APPENDIX 6. 599
The system of hired transport — suitable in a brief campaign — is costly
in a protracted war ; and the time had come when State -owned
transport would be more economical of public funds.* The purchase
of the hired transport added greatly to the amount of Government
property, and proportionately to the onus of responsibility resting
upon the Army Service Corps. It was clear that the number of
accounting units was insufficient to cope with the increased amount
of Government transport, and that the dep6ts were unable either to
equip the numerous columns with transport or to maintain it in a
state of efficiency.
Yet a system productive of economy in animals and vehicles was
a prime necessity to the new Commander-in-Chief ; for upon the
mobility of his columns depended the duration of the war. A
reorganisation of the service of transport was therefore initiated in
November, 1900, and eventually developed upon the following lines : —
Individual officers were relieved of the double responsibility for
supply as well as transport. With regard to the Transport Service,
a grave difficulty at once presented itself in the paucity of officers of
the Army Service Corps, who were at once trained in and available
for the work. This was partially overcome by the employment of
attached officers from various branches of the Service. These under-
went a preliminary training at the transport dep6ts, and after a
few months' experience, often developed into valuable transport
officers.
An Assistant-Adjutant-General for Transport, with an adequate
Staff, was appointed at the Headquarters of the Army in Pretoria.
By means of a system of weekly, fortnightly and quarterly returns
from all officers commanding columns, districts or Transport Com-
panies, as well as from all other transport officers, this official could
estimate the amount of Government transport in the four colonies.
Staff Officers for Transport were appointed to all the large commands ;
under them, companies were posted as transport dep6ts at important
centres of distribution. At such points they carried out local trans-
port duties, met the requirements of columns, established grazing
farms and repairing workshops ; formed a reserve of transport, and
oftshot similar but smaller affiliated dep6ts at the minor stations in
their districts.
* The discharges of hired wagons began to take effect about August, 1900 ;
by the end of that year little except State-owned transport was in use.
6oo THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
At Bloemfontein, for example, when the new system was initiated,
a repairing depot was estabUshed with a large staff of civiUan work-
men ; gradually radiating from this, smaller dep6ts were formed
at Kroonstad, Springfontein, Edenburg, Brandfort, Winburg and
Heilbron. Thus, whenever a column touched the railway, a transport
dep6t was accessible from which vehicles, equipment or animals
could be repaired or replaced. The direct demands hitherto made
on the Ordnance or Remount Departments were now submitted to
the Staff Officer for Transport (Orange River Colony), who met them
from his own dep6ts, which the Ordnance and Remount Departments
supplied with reserves of stores and animals sufficient to meet possible
requirements. Columns therefore drew what they required from
transport dep6ts upon instructions from the Assistant- Ad jutant-
General for Transport (Orange River Colony). An example of the
working of the system may be given. In April, 1901, Major-General
E. L. Elliot's five columns, on reaching Glen after prolonged operations,
telegraphed to the Staff Officer for Transport at Bloemfontein that
their transport required overhauling and repairing. Within forty-
eight hours the columns were refitted by the Assistant-Adjutant-
General for Transport and his repairing staff ; ninety-six unserviceable
vehicles were exchanged ; 124 were repaired ; over 500 unserviceable
wheels were replaced ; all harness was repaired or exchanged ; 300 mules
were issued to replace casualties ; and 200 mules were exchanged.
In the earlier days of the war such demands for transport stores would
have been met directly by the Ordnance Department by means of
convoys sent to the columns. This was productive of much waste.
It was frequently found that many of these demands had been
unnecessary, and that the columns had no means of carrying the
stores so issued. For example, a column commander would wire
urgently for spare wheels. In response a convoy might meet the
column and deliver the wheels ; but if the column was just about to
march, it had then no time to effect the exchanges, nor could it carry a
large number of spare wheels, which therefore would be burned on the
veld. There were cases in which large amounts of costly goods were
thus wasted. Often, again, when a column received new vehicles or
harness in a remote spot it burned the discarded articles, which,
perhaps, only a moderate expense would have sufficed to repair
and render available for re-issue.
Now, to obviate such useless destruction, column commanders
APPENDIX 6. 6oi
were required to shepherd into the local depots any abandoned
vehicle or animal which they had collected on the veld, and the ofi&cer
in charge of each dep6t reported weekly by telegram to the Staff
Officer for Transport what reserves of transport he thus acquired or
had in hand. He was then authorised to make small issues, or to
replace transport on demand whenever he considered this necessary.
If, however, the demand was abnormal, he referred to the Assistant-
Adjutant-General for Transport, who kept careful count of the
general reserve in his command, and applied for more to the Remount
or Ordnance Departments as occasion arose.
The depots kept their workmen busy in repairing all unservice-
able vehicles and harness, thus greatly relieving the pressure upon the
Ordnance Department. No wagon was now considered utterly
unserviceable ; it was always immediately put in hand for repair.
Local depdts had little difficulty in meeting normal wants : the
mules, oxen and vehicles captured on the veld and driven into the
depdts by the columns were usually enough to keep pace with the
losses caused by wear and tear. For oxen, in particular, no indent
was ever made. Depdts were supplied with oxen by the columns,
who swept them in from the surrounding country, in numbers more
than sufficient to satisfy ordinary requirements.*
Abnormal demands for stores were met by the Staff Officer of the
district, who drew first upon his scattered general reserve. For
example, when in February, 1901, Lieut. -General French's force
approached the Swazi border, an immense convoy was required at
short notice, to fill Liineberg with supplies. In order to muster such
a convoy, the Assistant -Adjutant-General for Transport in Natal
first concentrated and exhausted the whole of his reserves, then
commandeered transport wherever he could find it. Again, when at
a later date Brigadier-General Plumer's force arrived in the Orange
River Colony from the Transvaal without any transport animals, and
was ordered to march again as soon as possible, the Assistant-Adjutant-
General for Transport in the Orange River Colony called upon his
general reserve and soon found 1,300 mules fit for work.
* Captures of oxen were sometimes large ; but lung sickness and rinderpest,
as well as Boer raids on grazing farms, often invaded the reserves at the trans-
port depAts. Inoculation, which rendered the oxen immune to lung sickness,
necessitated throwing them out of work for six weeks, and this, of course, was
not always possible.
6o2 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
APPENDIX 7.
NOTES ON THE ROYAL ARMY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT IN
SOUTH AFRICA, 1901— 2.
The Medical Department of the Army was less affected than others
by the change which at the end of 1900 was occurring in the
character of the war. Up to then the maintenance in efficiency of
the medical field units and the establishment of hospitals behind the
central force advancing towards Pretoria had been of equal import-
ance. With the occupation of Johannesburg and Pretoria, and the
establishment of large hospitals in those places, the further advance
to the east and the irregular movements which took place both in
the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony had little effect on the
hospital arrangements. The main centres were already established,
and the changes which took place in them were a mere development
of their resources.
But inasmuch as the nimiber of colimins was now increased
while their individual strength was reduced, so additional but smaller
medical field units were required. Moreover, as it was impossible
to say when and where concentrations of troops might take place,
all the hospitals in the Colonies had to be maintained almost at their
maximum accommodation, so as to provide for sudden demands for
beds consequent on the arrival of a large body of troops. This
resulted in local excesses of permanent accommodation, and a dis-
persion of personnel, where, had the circumstances been different, a
concentration both of beds and staff would have been economical.
As the campaign continued, certain districts became quieter, and
it was possible to reduce some hospitals in order to enable others to
be opened at a distance from the trunk lines, so that the latter might
be in touch with the troops as these gradually pushed further into
the field and came less frequently to the railway ; and finally the
development of the S57stem of lines of blockhouses enabled hospitals
to be maintained and relieved of their sick by convoy.
The subjoined tables will show the places at which hospitals
existed, and the dates on which they were opened and closed.
APPENDIX 7.
603
General Hospitals.
Name of Hospital.
1 General Hospital.
6
7
8
9
10
1 1
'3
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
Station.
Wynberg . . .
Wynberg . . ,
Pretoria . . .
Rondebosch
Kroonstadt .
Mooi River
Cape Town
Naauwpoort
Johannesburg
Iistcourt ....
Pretoria ....
Bloemfontein
Bloemfontein
Bloiinfontein
Norval's Pont
Kimberley . .
Springfontein
Wynberg
Johannesburg.
Newcastle . . .
Howick
Elandsfontein
Standerton . .
Charles town .
Pretoria
Elandsfontein
Deelfontein . .
Pretoria
No. of
Hospital
Beds.*
77i
672
592
520
940
822
692
814
553
520
600
500
520
520
536
536
520
520
201
600
800
520
Date of
First
Return.
Date of
Last
Return.
Remarks.
2U.
8.
10.99
12.99
20.
7.00
22.
12.99
I.
6.00
12.
1. 00
30.
3.00
2.
3.00
27.
7.00
13-
4.00
9-
11.00
27.
4.00
20.
4.00
4-
S.o<)
18.
1 .01
18.
5.00
II.
5.00
20.
7.00
3-
5.01
10.
8.00
20.
7.00
I.
2.01
I.
2.01
8.
2.0I
15-
6.00
I.
3.01
5.
4.01
20.
9.01
5.02
6.00
5.02
6.00
5.02
5.02
5.02
13- 7-00
I . 10.01
26. 10.00
31- 502
5.02
5.02
1. 01
5.02
5.02
31. 502
I. 2.01
31. 502
31. 5-02
31. 502
31. 502
31- 5-02
31. 502
31. 5 02
31. 502
31- 502
31. 502
Preceded by Base
Hospital, Cape
Town, from
13.10.99.
Preceded by
Town Hospital
from 20. 10.99.
Formerly Section
No. 3 General
Hospital.
Took over from
No. 4 Station-
ary Hospital.
Formerly No. 3
Statnry. Hosp.
Formerly No. 4
Statnry. Hosp.
Formerly No. i
Statnry. Hosp.
Formerly Impe-
rial Yeo. Hosp.
Formerly Impe-
rial Yeomanry
Branch Hosp.
Notes.
No. 10 General Hospital took over the town hospitals in Bloemfontein on arrival on nth
April, 1900, and rendered its first return as a general hospital on the date shown.
Nos. I to ii.Nos. 13 and 14, were sent out from England; six were formed in South Africa
as shown in the column of remarks ; the remaining three were entirely formed in South Africa.
♦ The actual accommodation varied considerably from time to time. The number of beds
shown is that available on November 2nd, 1901, in tlic case of the hospitals that were open on
that date. In the case of the hospitals that had been closed before that date, the number
shows the accommodation that had previously been available in them.
6o4
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Stationary Hospitals.
No. of
Date of
Date of
Name of Hospital.
Station.
Hospital
Beds.*
First
Tast
Remarks.
Return.
Return.
Frere and M
od-
I Stationary Hospital'
der Spruit
—
12. I. 00
13-
7.00
•
Charlestown
—
27. 7.00
I.
2.01
5<!«No. 18 General
Hospital.
r
East London
—
22. 12.99
8.
6.00
2 .. .. \
Johannesbur
g . —
20. 7.00
24-
9.00
1
Elandsfontei
1. . —
28. 9.00
25.
1. 01
See^o. 16 General
Hospital.
3
De Aar
Frere Jt Chie
370
ve-
I. 12. 99
31-
5.02
lev
5-12. 99
15. 6.00
8.
6.00
4 ..
Newcastle .
10.
8.00
■
Standerton
. . . —
31. 8.00
25.
I .OI
S««No.i7General
Hospital.
5
Bloemfonteir
219
6. 4.00
31-
S.02
'»
Green jx)int
6
10. 1 1. 99
31-
5.02
7
Hast London
250
I. 12.99
31.
5.02
No. 2 Stationary
Hospital from
22.12.99 to
8.6.00.
8
Port Klizabe
Ih. 200
I. 12. 99
31-
5.02
9
yueenstown
fx>
23. 300
3«-
5.02
lO
Naauwpoort
177
13. 700
3»-
5.02
From Section No.
6 General Hosp.
II
Winburg . .
ISO
I. 6.00
31-
5.03
12
Wakkerstroo
m. 150
7. 9.00
31-
5.02
13
PinetownBric
Ige 250
20. 4.00
31-
5.02
Formerly Prin-
cess Christian
Hospital.
14
Pietermar
tz-
burg
150
13.10.99
3'-
5.02
Formerly Gen-
eral Hospital,
no number.
15
Heidelberg ,
150
13. 7.00
31.
5.02
i6
Maf eking. . .
150
10. 8.00
31-
5.02
17
Middelburg
(Transvaal
).. 400
17. 8.00
31-
5.02
i8
Krugersdorp
250
27. 7.00
31-
5.02
19
Harrismith
350
24. 8.00
31-
5.02
20
Waterval On
der 120
7. 9.00
31-
5.02
21
Machadodorp
... 125
12. 9.00
31-
5.02
22
Pietersburg.
100
19. 4.01
31.
5.02
23
Warm Bath
75
5. 4-OI
31-
5.02
24
Aliwal North
225
30. 1 1 . 00
31-
5.02
25
Johannesbur:
I. . 100
4. 10.01
4-
4,02
On closing of No.
6 General Hosp.
26
Beaufort We
St. 100
3. 501
3i-
5.02
27
Burghersdorj
) . 90
28. 12.00
31-
5.02
28
Worcester .
60
31. S-oi
2.
5.02
29
Heilbron . .
120
15. 6.00
31-
5.02
30
Lindley
180
17. 1.02
3i-
5.02
31
Ermelo ....
86
20. 12.01
31-
5.02
32
Klerksdorp
100
22. 6.00
31.
5.02
33
Zeerust ....
100
2. II .00
31-
5.02
34
Ladybrand
40
29. 6.00
31-
5.02
35
Potchefstrooi
n . 100
2. II .00
31-
5.02
36
Barberton .
200
5. 10.00
31-
5.02
* See previous footnote.
APPENDIX 7. ^
Stationary Hospitals {continued).
605
No. of
Date of
Date of
Name of Hospital.
Station.
Haspital
First
Last
Remarks.
Beds.*
Return.
Return.
37 Stationary Hospital
Lydenburg ....
125
5.10.00
31. 5-02
38
Rustenburg . . .
100
12.10.00
31. 5.02
39
Rietfontein . . .
100
19. 10.00
31. 502
40
Dundee
100
12. 10.00
31. S-02
41
Ficksburg ....
»43
8. 2.01
31. 5-02
Notes.
No. 10, Naauwpoort. Left behind when No. 6 General Hospital was moved to Johannesburg.
No. 14, Pietermaritzburg. The original Station Hospital, Pietermaritzburg, was increased
to form a Keneral hospital, which was not numbered, and which was reduced again when the
pressure ceased in Natal.
The first five Stationary Hospitals were scat out from England ; the remainder were formed in
South Africa. Many had been in existence for some time before being given a number, hence
the sequence of numbers is not according to dates of opening.
Temporary Hospitals.
No. of
Date of
Date of
Name of Hospital.
Station.
Hospital
First
Last
Remarks.
Beds.*
Return.
Return.
Field Hospital
Eshowe
16
13.10.99
3». 502
Palace
Simon's Town .
67
20.10.99
31. 502
'rcmporary Hospital . .
Naauwpoort . .
20
20.10.99
3»i-99
Convent
Estcourt
100
10.11.99
15. 6.00
Temporary
Nottingham Rd.
12
1.12.99
8.12.99
It ,. . .
Putters Kraal. .
30
I. 12.99
8.12.99
,, ,, . ,
Brynvilla Camp
5
15.12.99
29. 12.99
,, ,, . .
Stellenbosch . .
9
19. 1.00
3«. 5 02
,, ,, . •
Stcrkstroom . .
107
16. 2.00
6. 4.00
,, ,, . .
Klip Drift
16
23. 2.00
16. 3.00
,, ,, . .
Modder River. .
50
23. 300
I . 6.00
,, ,, . .
Orange River .
Prieska
40
23. 2.00
3«- 5 -02
,, ,, , ,
22
30. 300
31. 5.02
Sanatorium
Claremont
50
30. 3.00
7. 6.01
Originally opened
December, 1899.
Temporary Hospital . .
Thabanchu . . .
20
II. 5.00
31. S.02
,, ,, . •
Boshof
40
18. 5.00
3»- 502
1. ,, . .
Norval's Pont. .
75
25. 5.00
15.10.00
>> II • •
Smithfield ....
25
1. 6.00
3. 8.00
Race Course ,,
Pretoria
60
15. 6.00
31. 5.02
St. Andrew's College
Hospital
Bloemfontein . .
61
15. 6.00
4. 1.01
Temporary Hospital . .
Rouxville
5
15. 6.00
14. 9.00
II II • •
Dewetsdorp . . .
60
29. 6.00
29. 11.00
II 11 • .
Wepencr
26
29. 6.00
25. I. 01
Kroonstadt )
Hotel J
>4
29. 6.00
13. 7.00
II ,, . .
Lindley
120
6. 7.00
27. 7.00
II 11 . .
Viljoen's Drift .
20
20. 7.00
14.10.00
II II
Senekal
80
20. 7.00
24. 8.00
., ..
Vereeniging . . .
40
20. 7.00
12.10.00
See footnote, page 603.
6o6
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
Temporary Hospitals {continued).
No. of
Date of
Date of
Name of Hospital.
Station.
Hospital
Beds.*
First
Last
Remarks.
Piensiar's Poort
Return.
Return.
Temporary Hospital . .
i6
24. 8.00
13. 8.01
„ „ . .
Edenburg ....
25
24. 8.00
31- S.02
,, ,,
Vrede
IOC
19.10.00
IS- 3-OI
Railway Rest „
Pretoria
3. 8.00
17. I . 02
No further re-
turns rendered.
Hospital re-
mained open
till end of war.
Temporary
Otto's Hoop. . .
4
26. 10.00
28. 12.00
Lichtenburg . .
SO
7.12.00
31
S.02
Ventersdorp . .
SO
4. I. 01
31
5.02
Rouxville
S
21.12.00
4
1. 01
Vryburg
27
II. I. 01
31
5.02
Buluwayo ....
45
18. I. 01
31
S.02
Carnarvon ....
32
4. I. 01
31
5.02
Graaff Reinet .
61
4. I. 01
31
S.02
Griquatown . . .
5
4. I. 01
31
S.02
Frankfort
100
12. 10.00
I
2.01
Komati Poort .
60
22. 2.01
31
5.02
Eerstefabrieken
10
17. 8.00
3
5. 01
Daniel's Kuil . .
II
26. 4.01
31
5.02
Aberdeen
17
21. 6.01
7
3.02
Kuruman
14
7. 6.01
31
5.02
Cradock
SO
12. 7.01
31
5.02
Kofiyfontein . .
18
2. 8.01
31
5.02
Calvinia
37
21. 6.01
31
5.02
Tarkastad
2S
31. 5.01
10
1.02
Christiana ....
18
22. II. 01
31
5.02
Schmidt's Drift
S
23. 8.01
31
5.02
Douglas
s
13- 901
31
S.02
Ladysmith ....
16
4. 10.01
14
3-02
Matjesfontein .
2S
17. 1.02
31
5.02
Greytown
24
4. 10.01
I
II. 01
Vryheid
SO
25. 10.01
31
5.02
Krantz Kop . . .
18
8. II .01
3
1.02
Pienaars River.
81
20. 9.01
24
1.02
Tiger Kloof
40
24. 1.02
31
s.02
Port NoUoth...
50
18. 4.02
31
5.02
Ladysmith ....
30
13.10.99
31
s.02
Notes.
This list includes only those temporary hospitals which maintained an independent
existence. Those which afterwards became numbered stationary hospitals, or which were
merged in other hospitals, have not been included, as, for example, the second hospital at
Naauwpoort, which was merged in No. 6 General Hospital on its arrival in Naauwpoort.
On the other hand, several of these temporary hospitals were in existence before the
dates shown, but they were then stafEed by certain field hospitals and the patients in them
were accounted for in the returns from these field hospitals. For example, Modder River Hospital
was first opened about the end of December, 1899, but only rendered separate returns from the
date shown, when the field hospitals which had staffed it moved into Kimberley and it was
furnished with a separate staff. The hospital at Orange River was actually opened in September,
1899, by a detachment from a Cape field hospital, but only entered on an independent
existence with a fresh staff after the advance into the Orange Free State, when all the field
units were required.
* See footnote, page 603.
APPENDIX 7.
607
Civil Hospitals.
No. of
Date of
Date of
Name of Hospital.
Station.
Hospital
First
Last
Remarks.
Beds.*
Return.
Return.
Edmburgh Hospital . . .
Norval's Pont . .
150
18. 5.00
18. I. 01
/
Deelfontein. . . .
1,000
23. 300
29. 3.01
I niperialY eomanry Hos -
pitals
Pretoria
McKenzie's
530
24. 8.00
13. 901
Farm
—
24. 8.00
29. 3.01
,
Elandsfontein .
138
19. 7-OI
20, 12.01
Irish Hospital
Bloemfontein . .
100
20. 4.00
29. 6.00
Pretoria
—
15. 6.00
9. 11.00
Langman Hospital
Bloemfontein , .
180
13. 4-00
20. 7.00
..
Pretoria
—
3. 8.00
26.10.00
Portland
Rondebosch . . .
160
No returns.
..
Bloemfontein . .
—
27. 4,00
21. 7.00
Sick included in
No. 3 General
Princess Christian Hos-
Hospital.
pital
Pinetown Bridge
200
20. 4.00
—
Scottish National Hos-
pital
Kroonstadt. . . .
300
8. 6.00
12. 10.00
Welsh Hospital
Springfontein .
200
8. 6.00
3. 8.00
'•
Pretoria
~
17. 8.00
24. 9.00
List of Hospitals opened after November ist, 1901.
No. of
Date of
Date of
Unit.
Station.
Hospital
First
Last
Remarks.
Beds.
Return.
Return.
Genera
Hospital.
E.— Nil.
Stationary Hospitals.
No. 30 StationaryHospital
Lindley i8o 17. 1.02
31. 5-02
N0.31
Ermelo 86 20.12.01
Temporary Hospitals.
31. S-02
Temporary Hospital . . .
Christiana
18
22. II. 01
31. 5-02
I> M
Krantz Kop . . .
18
8. II. 01
3- 1.02
» •>
Matjesfontein .
25
17. 1.02
31- S-02
>• II
Tiger Kloof. . . .
40
24. 1.02
31- 502
>l II
Port Nolloth . .
50
18. 4.02
31. 5 -02
• See footnote, page 603
6o8 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Plague. In November, 1900, cases of plague occurred among natives near
King Williams Town, and the Principal Medical Officers of the lines
of communication and the base were warned to watch for suspicious
cases, and to take precautions. In January, 1901, plague appeared
at Cape Town at the docks, and thence spread to the native, and
later to the European, population of the city. This was a serious
complication, for Cape Town was the principal port for disembarka-
tion of troops and for the discharge of foodstuffs. The preventive
measures put in force were the following : (i) Cape Town, as far
as possible, ceased to be a port of discharge for supplies. A com-
plete stoppage could not be effected owing to the needs of the
western line, and of the troops in Cape Colony itself, but every
precaution was taken in the supply depdts to limit the possibility
of infection being conveyed by foodstuffs, forage, etc. (2) Cape
Town was evacuated as far as possible, particularly Greenpoint Camp,
which was close to the docks, and provided the largest number of
cases. (3) Movements of troops from Cape Town could not entirely
cease, but arrangements were made for the inspection of troops passing
up country at the various stations at which the trains halted. In
April a conference was held at Cape Town to arrange for common
action upon the above lines by the military and civil authorities,
and a special plague hospital was established at Maitland, with a
bacteriological laboratory. The precautions taken against the
conveyance of plague by the moving troops were successful. Of
some 900 cases of plague which occurred, only twenty-four
belonged to the Imperial forces. One only occurred outside Cape
Colony, at Mafeking; there was one near Wellington, another at
Port Elizabeth, both of which places were in frequent communi-
cation with Cape Town. One case also occurred on board ship,
between Cape Town and Durban. Of the remaining twenty cases,
eleven occurred at Greenpoint, five in Cape Town itself, and four
at Maitland.
Reorganisa- Owing to the multiplication of small columns, the medical field
V°,", °^ . units were reorganised. It was no longer possible to maintain the
field units. ^,,, ..... , ,,
field hospitals as distinct from the bearer companies. A unit to
fulfil both functions was therefore formed by adding ambulance
transport to the field hospitals, or by sending additional equipment
to the bearer companies. The total strength and equipment of the
combined unit was thus reduced, resulting in greater mobility.
APPENDIX 7. 609
Tongas were found to be useful, or, in their place, Cape carts or the
four-wheeled " spiders."
In the operations in Cape Colony the nature of the country made
it impossible for wheeled ambulance transport to keep in touch with
the troops, and in these conditions, as formerly in Natal and the
Eastern Transvaal, the Indian bearers, with dhoolies from the Indian
field hospitals, were of service. These men were collected from the
various hospitals, and a number of dhoolies were sent down to the
colony.
The use of small medical units was only rendered possible by the
fact that a column was never long away from its advanced base,
and that casualties were limited, while the actual distance to some
point on the line of communications was never great. At first
columns came to the line to refit ; later they obtained supplies from
advanced bases pushed forward into the veld, and here the advanced
hospitals were posted, from which the sick left by the columns
were conveyed to the hospitals on the line of communications.
When " drives " took place, the hospitals on the line of communi-
cations where the " drive " was destined to end, were evacuated so
as to make room for the incoming sick, and hospital trains were moved
to convenient points so as to meet the columns on their arrival.
Lxjcal emergencies in various districts often necessitated the sudden
formation and despatch, at short notice, of fresh columns, so that at
any time an unforeseen demand for a medical unit might arise. One
or two units were generally available to meet such demands. Columns
were being constantly broken up, leaving a medical unit unattached.
An opportunity would thus arise of bringing it into some central
position whence it could be railed to the latest point of concen-
tration. It was not, however, always possible to obtain such early
intimation of impending movements as would enable medical units
to be sent to join new columns. Such personnel, equipment, and
transport as were available in the neighbourhood were in these cases
hastily concentrated, and an improvised field unit would be formed
from them.
Continuous movements pressed heavily on the personnel of the Wastage of
medical field units. Many were incessantly in the field during the P^*^^""*'-
whole period, except for short delays whilst the columns to which
they were attached were refitting. The wastage in personnel was
therefore large, and it was often difficult to keep units up to strength.
VOL. IV. 39
6io
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Natal
Hospitals.
The insuffi-
ciency of
Medical
Officers.
The nucleus was formed of Royal Army Medical Corps N. C. Officers
and men, but the rest of the personnel was made up principally of the
specially enlisted men of the Royal Army Medical Corps, Cape Medical
Staff Corps, and a similar body enlisted under the general term of
South African Irregulars, with, for a time, some of the Imperial
Hospital and the Imperial Bearer Corps.
The part played by the Natal hospitals should be mentioned.
From the end of 1900 to the close of the war the medical arrangements
in Natal remained unchanged. These hospitals were of much im-
portance, for, as already noted, they received the overflow from the
hospitals in the Transvaal. A regular system of evacuation was main-
tained through Natal, vid Durban, to England. Invalids, collected
in the hospitals in Pretoria, Johannesburg, and Elandsfontein,
from the eastern, northern, and western lines, were transferred
by hospital train to the Natal hospitals at Newcastle, Charlestown,
Howick, Pietermaritzburg and Pinetown. There, many of the
cases recovered, and the rest were sent home by hospital ship
or sick transport. From the time when traffic on the line between
Elandsfontein and Charlestown had become regular, all the invalids
from the Transvaal passed through the Natal hospitals, while all the
invalids south of the Vaal passed through Cape Town. The invalids
from Harrismith were also sent through Natal, and the hospitals in
that colony were thus steadily employed till the end of the war.
Both in Natal and Cape Colony hospital camps were established for
the reception of officers and men needing rest and change during
convalescence, or in the state of exhaustion which induces disease.
The chief of these were at Mooi River in Natal, at Wynberg in Cape
Colony. The benefits derived were most marked. Many potential
invalids were re-equipped for the field, both physically and mentally,
by the interlude of quiet thus afforded, whilst many extraordinary
recoveries from actual disease were recorded. It is probable that in
the future, campaigns of long duration will inevitably demand the
institution of such rest camps for the reinvigoration of those whose
organisation has temporarily succumbed to the exhausting tension of
modern warfare.
It had been foreseen that the establishment of officers of the
Royal Army Medical Corps would not be sufficient for the needs
of the field force, and from the first civil surgeons formed a large pro-
portion of the staff of the general hospitals despatched from England.
APPENDIX 7. 611
Later, civil surgeons sent by the War Of&ce, or engaged locally,
were employed in every capacity — in medical charge of regiments,
with field medical units, in ambulance trains, in the smaller hospitals,
and in charge of posts on the line, as well as in the general and
stationary hospitals.
Up to the end of 1901, of the total number of medical officers
employed, about forty-two per cent, only, were officers of the Royal
Army Medical Corps. Of the remainder, about four per cent, were
Militia, Volunteer, and Colonial officers, while the remaining fifty-
four per cent, were civil surgeons, of whom about forty per cent, were
engaged by the War Office. In 1902 the officers of the Royal Army
Medical Corps numbered about forty per cent., the War Office civil
surgeons about forty-six per cent., and those locally engaged about
ten per cent.
Before the outbreak of the war there were a number of medical
men, who had been in practice in the Transvaal, in the larger towns
of the English colonies, especially in Cape Town and Pietermaritz-
burg. Many of these, being without employment, at once offered
themselves for service as civil surgeons, and were engaged. As the
war continued more medical men became available. Some were
driven from their practices as the result of the war, others
arrived in the country in the hope of obtaining emplojmient. With
certain exceptions, practically every medical man who offered himself
locally was engaged. In addition to the civil surgeons engaged
locally for general service it was always convenient to utilise the
services of medical men in practice in many of the smaller towns
(especially in the Orange River Colony and Cape Colony), to look
after the smaller bodies of troops stationed there, or parties of sick
and wounded dropped by the columns in improvised hospitals.
Many of these did good work and set free the general service
personnel for more urgent duties. The senior medical officer of a
column was thus enabled to arrange for the care and custody of
the patients whom he left behind. Most of these civil surgeons
had considerable local influence among the Boers, and so ensured
better treatment for isolated parties of sick than could have been
obtained for them by a stranger to the district. The Principal
Medical Officer in South Africa recorded his opinion that the civil
surgeons sent out from England at the beginning of the war were,
on the whole, more efficient than the majority of those who came out
VOL. IV. 39*
6i2 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
later, the latter being for the most part young men, fresh from the
hospitals ; and that, of the civil surgeons engaged in Africa, some
were exceptionally good men, whose local knowledge, and practical
experience of the country, were particularly valuable. In addition
to the civil surgeons, a certain small proportion of colonial
medical officers were employed during the war. Most of these
belonged to certain units, e.g., the Canadian Field Hospital, the
New South Wales Ambulance, and the Cape Medical Staff Corps.
Nursing Brief mention must also be made of the work of the Nursing
Sisters. Sisters.
The authorised establishment of Sisters for a general hospital
was one lady superintendent and eight sisters. This number was
found to be insufficient, owing to the paucity of trained orderlies of
the Royal Army Medical Corps, and the staff of Sisters was increased
to an average of five for every hundred beds. This proportion was
prescribed as the standard to be maintained. The Nursing Sisters
were obtained from four sources — the Army Nursing Service, the
Army Nursing Service Reserve, the Colonial Sisters, and those
locally engaged in South Africa. The following tabular statement
shows the approximate composition per cent, of the Nursing Service
in South Africa in the months given : —
s Army Nursing Army Nursing Locally
Service. Service Reserve. Colonial. Engaged.
June, 1900 9 57 i 32
May, 1901 6 71 4 19
May, 1902 8 74 4 14
In addition to the nurses employed in the hospitals in South
Africa, a large number were employed on the sick transports and
hospital ships..
During the war 337 nurses were engaged at Cape Town, of whom
216 were for duty in the homeward-bound transports, the remainder
for duty in the hospitals on shore. Mention must also be made of
the Niusing Sisters from the oversea colonies. They came from
Queensland, Victoria, New South Wales, South Australia, Western
Australia, Tasmania, and New Zealand, while Canada also sent
others in November, 1899, and February, 1900, and again in 1901.
Most of these Sisters were originally sent free of expense to the
APPENDIX 7. 613
Imperial Government, their services having been engaged either
by their respective Governments or by private societies. Others
came with recommendations from their colonies, and were engaged
immediately on their arrival in South Africa. The Principal Medical
Ofl&cer in South Africa placed on record his opinion that by far the
most efficient of the nurses obtained from all outside sources were
those who came from the staffs of the leirge hospitals in the
British Islands.
" Invaliding " was carried out in the army in South Africa much "Invaliding."
more freely than has been usually considered necessary on foreign
service. At first the probable duration of the war was under-
estimated, and many were invalided home in the belief that they
would not again be fit for duty before the end of the campaign.
Later it became probable that a man might be sent home and
return in time to take part in the war for a second time. In fact,
many such invalids rejoined their units long before the cessation
of hostilities. A rapid rate of invaliding diminished the pressure on
the hospitals in South Africa, where the accommodation was often
strained. The hospital ships and sick transports provided early
accommodation for all who were fit to travel. It was unnecessary
(as is the case in ordinary peace conditions) that an invalid should
wait a considerable time for a transport. A sick man was therefore
often sent home for recovery, when, under peace conditions, he would
have recovered and returned to duty before an opportunity of
embarking him occurred. It was actually more economical to provide
for cases on a returning transport than to accommodate them in
Africa. There were, however, certain conditions inherent in the Army
in South Africa (not shared by other British expeditionary forces)
which tended to raise unduly the percentage of invalids in its ranks ;
and these conditions should severally be recorded. In addition to
the Regulars, the Army was composed of Militia, Volunteers and
Yeomanry, as well as of various corps of over-sea Colonials. The
physique of the first Regular troops (including a large proportion
of the Reserves) was excellent. Afterwards, the quality deteriorated,
and reached its lowest level when the last drafts arrived containing
many immature lads of poor physique. The Militia were, in general,
physically inferior to the Regulars : a large proportion were only
eighteen years of age, whereas in the Regulars, Volunteers, and
Imperial Yeomanry the average was twenty years. The V^olunteers
6i4 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
were, generally, of good ph57sique, as were the first contingent of
Imperial Yeomanry. The succeeding contingents of Yeomanry were
less satisfactory, while the last contained many men and some
officers who should never have been sent from England.
The rate of invaliding in a composite army must always be greater
than among an equal number of men regularly enlisted. In the latter
case, even after the primary and stringent medical test, a process of
elimination has developed, causing the weaker to drop out during the
early period of their service, and leaving the fittest to survive.
Amongst the auxiliary units in the South African War this normal
elimination was in process during the whole campaign, and at an
accelerated rate, owing to the conditions of campaigning. The rate
of invaliding in such an army is therefore not comparable with that
obtaining in one composed solely of regular troops.
Other causes contributed to increase the percentage of invalids.
It has been stated that as the campaign proceeded, the quality of
the recruits deteriorated. There was no doubt that much of this
deterioration was due to want of care in the medical examination
of men for active service. At the beginning of the war the
examination was in the hands of the officers of the Royal Army
Medical Corps, who have a practical knowledge of what is required
of soldiers on service. But when the home stations were denuded
of officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps, the examinations were
made by those who did not possess this special knowledge — and
were often not conducted with the necessary care. The Militia showed
a larger proportion of men who should not have been sent out than
either the Regular troops or the Volunteers, but the last contingent
of Imperial Yeomanry was by far the worst in this resj)ect.
The over-sea Colonials were of good physique, as were the earlier
regiments of South African Colonials ; but cis the campaign con-
tinued the proportion of unsuitable men enlisted in the South
African irregular forces increased till it became a serious question.
They blocked the hospitals, and were a source of needless expense.
Recruiting for these corps was Uttle under control. Each had
its own surgeon (locally engaged by the officer commanding the
corps), who examined the recruits obtained at the headquarters of
the corps, while other recruits were sent up from their base dep6ts.
No other arrangement was possible, for officers of the Royal Army
Medical Corps could not be spared from their important duties.
APPENDIX 7. 615
Ofi&cers in the Transvaal were invalided by Boards in Pretoria and
Elandsfontein, under the Principal Medical Officer of the district.
Similar Boards officiated in Natal ; in Cape Town a standing Medical
Board was early established for this purpose.
The hospital train service, as used during the campaign, may be Hospital
classified as follows : — trams.
(i) Hospital trains, specially fitted, equipped, and staffed as
such, for " lying-down cases." They were usually composed of seven
coaches, and carried ninety-two patients and a staff averaging
twenty-two.
(2) Improvised Hospital Trains. — ^These were, as a rule, first-
class corridor-carriage trains, with a kitchen-car attached, for the
conveyance of less severe cases and of convalescents. A medical
ofl&cer accompanied each convoy of sick, but there was no
permanent staff.
(3) Ambulance Coaches. — These were specially fitted carriages
placed at convenient intervals on the railways. They were used to
pick up small parties of sick from the various posts along the lines,
and were attached to passing trains for conveyance to the nearest
hospital. Many had a regular service, usually twice a week up and
down their own stretch of Une. As a rule one N.C. Officer and one
orderly were attached for duty to these carriages, and the medical
officers along the lines of communication attended to the wants of
the sick as the carriages passed the various posts.
During the period of the war 3,116 officers and 72,314 warrant Hospital
and N. C. Officers and men were shipped to England as invalids ^^^'P^-
from South Africa.
Their transport by sea was carried out by hospital ships and sick
transports ; smaller parties were despatched by the mail and
" intermediate " steamships from Cape Town and Durban.
The hospital ships were of two classes : —
(i) Those fitted and equipped in England.
(2) Those prepared in South Africa.
(i) Of those fitted and equipped in England, the Spartan, with
accommodation for 132 sick, and the Trojan, for 144 sick, were fitted
out by the Admiralty for the War Office.
In addition to these, the Red Cross Society fitted out and equipped
the Princess of Wales (accommodating 184 sick) . The Maine, with
accommodation for 163 sick, was provided by a group of American
6i6 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
ladies. The above ships ceased to be employed a considerable time
before the end of the war.
(2) The hospital ships prepared in South Africa were selected and
converted at Durban by the Naval Transport Department on
requisition from the Principal Medical Officer.
The ships were : Nubia (284 sick), Lismore Castle (214 sick),
Orcana (209 sick), Simla (278 sick), Avoca (302 sick), and Dunera
(284 sick). A regular service was maintained by these vessels
between Durban (and Cape Town) and England, and was carried
on to the end of the campaign.
Even this fleet was insufficient to cope with the nimiber of sick
and wounded sent home, and full use was made of the large passenger
ships which arrived with troops and would have returned empty to
England. These required no structural alteration ; the accommoda-
tion for invalids was ample and good ; and a suitable medical staff
was placed on each vessel, with the necessary stores and equipment.
Note. — For numbers wounded, deaths from wounds and disease, invalided,
etc., see Appendix 16.
6i7
APPENDIX 8.
NOTES ON THE ARMY ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT IN
SOUTH AFRICA.
Ordnance Stores were obtained principally upon orders originating
at Woolwich Arsenal and the Royal Army Clothing Department ;
but large quantities of articles were drawn from India,* and local
purchases were also made in order to supplement supplies from
home.f These sources of supply were further augmented by the
establishment of workshops, which were mainly engaged in repair-
ing equipment, but also executed manufactiu^es when necessary.
Under the Inspectors of Ordnance-Machinery, some excellent
emergency work was done, such as the mounting of the 9.2-in., 6-in.
and 5-in. B.L. guns on railway and travelling carriages, and the
retubing of the 12-pr. B.L. guns.
In addition to providing for all the wants of the Army,^ the
camp followers, the native drivers, etc., and the labour depots — the
Ordnance Department equipped the various burgher and refugee
camps with tents, furniture, utensils and clothing ; received and
stored all articles of equipment or of store which were not required
by the troops, the arms and equipment of the dead, and of the
captured, and carried out periodical technical inspections of guns,
vehicles and ammunition in the hands of the troops. The largest
mmiber of persons employed upon these multifarious duties in South
Africa under this Department (including natives) numbered 2,060.
The prime difficulty in the supply of ordnance stores to so great a
force for so long a period and at such a distance from its bases, lay in
the obstacles to distribution caused by the congestion of the single
* Notably : Boots, helmets, tentage, " British warm " coats and frocks.
•f Principally of transp>ort stores and equipment. The cost of such local
purchases of ordnance stores throughout the war averaged some ;{25,ooo per
mensem. These purchases were made as far as possible by tender.
X Except food, forage and fuel.
6i8 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
lines of railway 5 but from 300 to 500 trucks a month were usually
allotted to the Ordnance Department for the carriage of their stores
from the four Base Ports* to the Depots up-coimtry.
The system on which Ordnance Dep6ts were formed was briefly
as follows : —
An Issuing and Receiving Dep6t was established when the number
of troops at any place justified its existence, and the required stores
were pushed up to it from the Base Dep6ts. As the troops worked
forward, Transit and Repair Dep6ts were opened at suitable places.
When necessary, the Transit Dep6t was expanded into an Issuing
and Receiving Dep6t, and this in its turn threw out further Transit
Dep6ts as required. On each Line, or where necessary, portions
of Lines, a Chief Ordnance Ofl&cer was placed in charge, with Head-
quarters at the Central Dep6t of the area which he controlled.
He arranged for the forwarding of stores from the Base, moved
personnel and stores from one Dep6t to another to meet fresh concen-
trations of troops, opening and closing Transit Depdts when necessary.
Owing to the fact that there were no Ordnance Officers with the
troops in the field — the Department being represented only on the
Lines of Communication — there was frequently delay and confusion,
on the one side in ascertaining the actual wants of the troops, on the
other as to the spots whence ordnance stores could be drawn. The
lack of Ordnance Officers in the Field was, in fact, so greatly felt,
that an organisation has since been approved whereby an Ordnance
Officer is henceforward to be attached to each Division in the field.
In addition to the Chief Ordnance Officers of Lines and Areas, and the
officers at the different Dep6ts, there was a Principal Ordnance
Officer of the Army, and a Chief Ordnance Officer of the Lines of
Communication on the Western Line and also in Natal. The Head-
quarters of the Army Ordnance Department in Cape Town and Natal
worked practically on independent lines up to July, 1901. The
Principal Ordnance Officer and his Staff then moved to Pretoria, and
the Department was reorganised in five areas, each under a Chief
Ordnance Officer directly responsible to the Principal Ordnance
Officer. These areas were as follows : —
1. Cape Colony south of De Aar.
2. Western Line from De Aar to Buluwayo and Western
Transvaal.
* See Table at end of this Appendix.
APPENDIX 8. 619
3. Orange River Colony (excluding Harrismith area).
4. Transvaal (except Standerton area and New Republic).
5. Natal, including Zululand, Standerton and Harrismith areas,
and the New Republic.
The provision of stores was entrusted, under the authority of
the Principal Ordnance Officer, to a Chief Ordnance Officer of the Base
Ports with. Headquarters at Cape Town.
The following is a list in detail of the distribution of the Ordnance
Depdts formed throughout the war : —
Western Line.
Cape Town Opened as a Grand Base Dep6t October nth,
1899. Large Base Workshops were eventually
formed in which some 400 men were em-
ployed. A Transit Dep6t was formed at the
Dock for reception of stores landed from vessels.
Stellenbosch Opened October 4th, 1899, in connection
with a scheme for mobilisation of units after
landing ; closed December 9th, 1899.
De Aar The First Advanced Dep6t opened October
loth, 1899, to meet the wants of the ist
Division and eventually to supply the Army
under Lord Roberts prior to its march on
Bloemfontein. It remained a large Issuing
and Receiving Dep6t throughout the war.
Orange River Transit and Repair and small Issuing Dep6t
to facilitate supply of the Army concentrating
in the vicinity, opened November i6th, 1899;
closed April ist, 1900.
Modder River Transit Dep6t, opened December, 1899, for
distribution of stores for the Army; closed
March nth, 1900.
Kimberley Opened February 25th, 1900, as a Transit
Depdt for forwarding stores after the Army
en route for Bloemfontein. Eventually formed
into large Issuing and Receiving Dep6t and
remained so throughout.
620 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Vryburg Small Transit Dep6t, opened May 20th,
1900, and closed shortly afterwards.
Mafeking Opened June nth, 1900, as a Transit Dep6t ;
extended to a Receiving and Issuing Dep6t.
It took up the supply of the Rhodesian Field
Force on its arrival from the North.
Buluwayo (Rhodesia) .. .Opened January 8th, 1901, for troops
operating in the vicinity.
Piquetberg Road Transit Dep6t, opened January nth, 1901 ;
closed April 8th, 1901 ; reopened March 5th,
1902, and closed a few weeks later.
Victoria Road Transit Dep6t, opened April 7th, 1902 ;
closed shortly afterwards.
Port NoUoth For supply of Namaqualsmd Field Force ;
opened May nth, 1902.
Eastern LiNfi.
East London Base Dep6t, opened October 26th, 1899, to
meet wants of 3rd Division, and later to
facilitate landing of stores to Army in South
Africa at large.
Queenstown Opened November 8th, 1899, as an Issuing
and Receiving Dep6t to meet wants of 3rd
Division ; moved December i8th, 1899.
Sterkstroom Closed May 12th, 1900.
Aliwal North Opened December ist, 1900.
Midland Line.
Port Elizabeth Base Dep6t, opened November ist, 1899,
for supply of units on Midland Line and to
faciUtate landing of stores for the Army in
South Africa at large. This formed the main
Clothing Dep6t throughout the war.
Naauwpoort Issuing and Receiving Dep6t, opened
November 28th, 1899, for supply of Cavalry
Division and troops working in operations
near Colesberg.
APPENDIX 8. 621
Rensburg Repair and Transit Dep6t, including supply
of ammunition, opened end of December, 1899 ;
evacuated at midnight February 13th, 1900,
and moved to Arundel on retirement of the
Force.
Bloemfontein Opened as a small Depdt March i8th, 1900,
to take over captured arms and ammunition ;
extended to a large Issuing and Receiving
Dep6t with extensive workshops, and remained
one of the principal Dep6ts throughout the War.
Up to June, 1901, Bloemfontein acted as a
base for the Transvaal.
Springfontein Opened April 22nd, 1900, as a Transit
Dep6t chiefly ; closed August i8th, 1900 ; re-
opened May 14th, 1901, and closed Novem-
ber 25th, 1901.
Johannesburg Opened June 12th, 1900, for taking over
captured arms and ammunition ; extended to
a Receiving and Issuing Dep6t ; closed April
20th, 1902.
Pretoria Opened as a Receiving and Issuing Dep6t
June 19th, 1900 ", extensive workshops formed.
It remained one of the principal Depdts
throughout the war.
Kroonstad Opened for Transit work Jime 24th, 1900 5
extended to a Receiving and Issuing Depdt,
and remained open until near the close of the
war.
Graaff Reinet Opened January loth, 1901, as a Receiving
and Issuing Depdt ; closed February 20th,
1902.
Middelburg (Transvaal). .Opened as a Receiving and Issuing Dep6t
April 2nd, 190 1.
Winburg (O.R.C.) Opened November 27th, 1901 ; closed June
17th, 1902. Issuing and Receiving Dep6t.
622 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Klerksdorp Opened as an Issuing and Receiving Dep6t
March 25th, 1902.
Natal.
Durban Base Transit Dep6t for stores landed from
vessels ; remained open throughout the war.
Pietermaritzburg Grand Base Dep6t ; remained one of the
principal Ordnance Dep6ts throughout the
war.
Mooi River Small Advanced Dep6t ; closed after relief
of Lad57smith.
Estcourt Small Advanced Dep6t ; closed after relief
of Ladysmith.
Frere SmaU Advanced Dep6t ; closed after relief
of Ladysmith.
Colenso Formed when Tugela Heights had been
secured ; closed shortly before the move from
Ladysmith.
Ladysmith Opened when hostilities appeared imminent.
Supplied troops throughout the siege in con-
junction with an Indian Ordnance Park.
The stores of the latter were taken over by
A.O.D. after the reUef. Closed November,
1901.
Harrismith Issuing and Receiving Dep6t formed after
occupation of the place, and remained open
until close of war.
Dundee Small Dep6t and Magazine, chiefly for
Transit work ; closed in November, 190 1.
Newcastle Issuing and Receiving Depdt with work-
shop formed on occupation of the town after
advance from Ladysmith ; remained open
throughout the war.
Volksrust Opened as Advanced Depot when Sir R.
Buller crossed the border into the Transvaal j
closed later.
APPENDIX 8. 623
Standerton Issuing and Receiving Dep6t opened for
troops operating in Eastern Transvaal ; re-
mained open throughout the war.
Rhodesian Field Force.
The Rhodesian Field Force was equipped with stores purchased
by the British South Africa Company, chiefly from private firms,
and were not as a rule of service patterns. These were eventually
taken over by the A.O.D.
The following Dep6ts were established : —
Marandellas Base Dep6t for Rhodesian Field Force,
opened April 28th, 1900 ; closed October 26th,
1900.
Buluwayo (R.F.F.) Opened June 8th, 1900 ; closed January 7th,
1901.
Victoria Opened August 21st, 1900 ; closed Decem-
ber i8th, 1900.
Mafeking (R.F.F.) Opened August ist, 1900 ; closed as a R.F.F.
Dep6t October 15th, 1900.
Tuli Opened November 5th, 1900 ; closed
December loth, 1900.
When the Imperial Yeomanry arrived in South Africa they at
first formed Ordnance Dep6ts of their own at Maitland, Bloemfontein,
Kimberley, Mafeking and Pretoria ; but, since the Yeomanry had
of necessity to be equipped from Army Ordnance Dep6ts, confusion
was caused and the remaining stocks at the Yeomanry Store Dep6ts
were eventually taken over by the Army Ordnance Department about
the end of 1900. The Yeomanry Depdts were then closed.
There were, in addition, in Cape Colony and Natal, Ordnance
Dep6ts under the Cape and Natal Colonial Forces ; also, during the
early part of the war, yet another group under the Indian Ordnance
Department — a multiplication of sources of supply which often caused
complications when the time came for final adjustment.
Appended is a list of some items which were sent out from England
during the war, over and above the complete equipments taken out by
624
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
all the troops : it must be borne in mind that they were, in many
cases, largely supplemented from other sources as above described : —
Small-arm and machine-gun
ammunition .
137,000,000 rounds
i2-pr. and 15-pr. gun ammunition .
456,000
i2-pr. and 15-pr. guns
422
Machine guns . .
31S
Rifles
117.700
Saddlery, sets . .
76,000
Blankets
1,246,600
Tents
93,000
Transport wagons and carts
3.800
Ambulance wagons . .
3SO
Stretchers (hospital) . .
7.300
Sets of mule harness . .
119,000
Horse and mule shoes
3,772,400
Head-dresses . .
1,336,400
Garments
7,556,000
Shirts
1,700,000
Boots and shoes
2,820,000 pairs.
Socks
2,750,000 „
There were also equipped and shipped from Woolwich Arsenal
five complete Stationary Hospitals, sixteen General Hospitals (of
520 beds each), and two Ship Hospitals ; six spare Batteries of Field
Artillery and two Batteries of Horse Artillery.
625
APPENDIX 9.
NOTES ON THE ARMY POST OFFICE CORPS IN SOUTH
AFRICA.
At the beginning of the campaign the strength of this corps was three
officers, eighty-nine other ranks, composing one company of the 24th
Middlesex (Post Office) Volunteers. These men, like all the 24th
Middlesex, were drawn from the London Post Offices, and were those
who had been specially enlisted for a period of six years in the Army
Reserve to render them available for foreign service. This original
force, which proceeded to the seat of war in October, 1899, soon
became totally inadequate to the growing needs of the Army.
Reinforcing drafts followed rapidly, drawn at first from the 24th
Middlesex, but later from the postal services of all the provinces of
Great Britain, and even to a small extent from those of Canada,
Australia, Cape Colony and India. The greatest strength attained at
the height of the campaign was ten officers, a warrant officer, and
396 other ranks, with, in addition, twenty civilian clerks and 100
soldiers attached for orderly duties.
Organisation.
The system was founded upon a Base Office at Cape Town (a base
office for Natal at Pietermaritzburg was employed in the earlier part
of the campaign, but discontinued later). From this radiated a
number of forwarding offices, which served for intermediate despatch
of mail matter, and for the reception and forwarding of cross-post
letters. Next, the fixed camp and station post offices, seventy-one
in number, dealt directly with the receipt and delivery of mails to the
troops at and around normal centres of operation. Finally, there was
a system of travelling post offices, which, traversing the railways
in box trucks and sorting carriages specially fitted up by the
VOL. IV. 40
626 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Imperial Military Railwa)^, delivered and received mail matter,
cashed and sold postal orders at any spot upon the lines where
their services were required.
The bulk of the work which fell to the Army Post Ofl&ce Corps was
naturally that of the distribution of the inward mails and the
exporting of the mails for oversea. The former presented extra-
ordinary difl&culties. The railway service, being completely beyond
the control of the Post Ofl&ce Department, could not be relied on for
automatic dehvery of the mails. Trains were apt to be delayed
for military piu-poses, or by the enemy who frequently destroyed
them. In the latter case the Post Ofl&ce men on the train would be
called upon to take rifle in hand and defend their charge. Thus at
Roodewaal,* June 7th, 1900, an ofl&cer and nineteen men of the
A.P.O.C. fought with the troops, and lost five killed and wounded,
and fifteen taken prisoners. On that occasion 2,000 bags of mails
were destroyed by the enemy, and postal stock (stamps, postal orders,
etc.) lost to the value of £4,284. On two other occzisions travelling
post ofi&ces were captured by the enemy. Another complication was
that units and individuals were in incessant movement and flux.
Forces were broken up or transported rapidly from one end of the
theatre of war to the other, or were perhaps unapproachable, or
even not to be traced at the required moment. Individual ofl&cers
and men constantly, and several times in a short period, left their
units for duty in other parts, for hospital, for leave of absence, or
for home. Their letters and parcels were frequently insufl&ciently
addressed. " Private Smith, Field Force, S. Africa," was an actual
conundrum which regularly confronted the Post Ofl&ce ofl&cials. Many
correspondents, too, instead of quoting the corps of the intended
receiver of their missive, would merely inscribe his last address,
possibly that of a place at which he had only halted for a few hours
or minutes. Finally, very many men — e.g., the batches of Imperial
Yeomanry — arrived in South Africa without regimental numbers,
posted to no imit, and generally almost unidentifiable as soon as they
had disappeared into the enormous whirlpool of the campaign. In
short, there was no difl&culty with regard to the actual identification
of packages which did not present itself in full measure at every
arrival of a mail.
• See Volume III., page 130
APPENDIX 9. 627
With all these, and many other formidable difficulties, the
A.P.O.C. coped with, in general, extraordinary ingenuity and success.
The greatest obstacle in the early part of the campaign, that
of getting timely information of the multitudinous movements of
detached units and men, was surmounted by the institution
of a system of rolls, which were sent weekly from all hospitals,
depdts, departmental corps, casualty offices, etc., into the Base Office
at Cape Town. Alphabetical lists of names were carefully compiled
from these. So elaborate became the S5^tem of listing, that the
A.P.O.C. was often able to furnish other military departments with
the whereabouts of an individual who had got out of ken.
The mode adopted of distributing an incoming mail was briefly
as follows : Since mobile units instead of fixed stations had to
be dealt with, the sorting, instead of being divided into " roads,"
was divided according to military units. It was next sub-sorted
into twenty-four alphabetical divisions, which on comparison
with the above-mentioned alphabetical lists, furnished at once
information regarding any detached addressee. The " redirections "
were divided into two classes : (i.) " ordinary," i.e., individuals who
were constantly absent from their proper units on detached duty ;
(ii.) " casual," such as patients in hospital, persons on leave of
absence etc. An A.P.O.C. officer was allocated a certain batch
of units as his peculiar charge, and these he catered for, irrespective
of their geographical position at the moment. To economise time,
labour and expense in telegraphing, etc., each unit was given a code
number, which it bore throughout the campaign in all the offices of
the A.P.O.C. Latterly, when the troops became almost exclusively
embodied in mobile columns, columns suf)erseded corp)s as Post
Office units. The maUs for the several columns were then made
up separately, so that even if consigned to an abandoned address,
they could be redirected en bloc, diverted to any point, and, if
necessary, follow the columns about until caught up.
The following figures relative to the extent of the dealings of the
A.P.O.C. may prove of interest : —
(i^) Greatest number of Army Post Offices at work, 71.
(ii.) Average number of articles f Letters 190,000
received each week at \ Newspapers and packets 300,000
Cape Town [ Parcels 8,400
VOL. IV. 40*
628
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
(iii.) Heaviest mail received
(December 24th, 1901) . .
(Letters 303,000
Newspapers, etc 368,000
Parcels 31,858
(iv.) Value of Postal Orders sold ) ,, ., .
. ,^ £ ,j More than ;f 1,000,
in the field
000.
(v.) Casualties of A. P.O.C.
I Killed, 2 ; wounded, 3 ; died of
) disease, 45.
(vi.) Average weekly account rendered to the Comptroller
and Accountant-General, London 3^400,000
629
APPENDIX 10.
NOTES ON THE MILITARY RAILWAY SYSTEM IN SOUTH
AFRICA.
The main duties of a Director of Military Railways and his staff
may be briefly summarised as follows : —
(i.) To be the intermediaries between the Army and the technical
working administration of the railway.
(2.) To see that the ordinary working of the railway is carried
on in such a manner as to ensure the greatest military
efficiency,
(3.) To satisfy the demands of the Army on the railway without
disorganising the working of the railway system as a
whole.
In war these services are essential, for the officers of a civil
railway administration cannot discriminate between the demands
of the various branches and departments of the Army, or class them
in order of urgency.
The question of organisation in South Africa had been deliber-
ated by Brevet-Major E. P. C. Girouard, R.E., the officer appointed
to be Director of Railways (D,R.) during his voyage to the seat of
war. It was tentatively decided that
(i.) As regards those lines of railway under efficient civil
control in friendly parts of the country, the Director
would act only as intermediary between the Head-
quarters Staff of the Army and the Civil Administration.
(ii.) In disaffected country the Director would assume full
control of the lines, naming them " Communication
Sections " for military purposes. To enable him to
carry out his duties he was to be in close communica-
tion with the Governing Power, the Railway Boards
and the General Managers of the Railways.
630 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
(iii.) It was necessary to appoint a staff of R.E. officers
acquainted with technical railway working, whose duty
it would be to co-operate with the civilian staff of the
railways in meeting military demands.
(iv.) " Commimication Sections " were to be controlled by
officers styled Assistant Directors of Railways (A.D.R.).
They were to be under the orders of the General of
Communications within whose district their line ran,
and under the D.R., and were to co-operate with the
General Managers of lines within the district.
(v.) Deputy A.D.R.'s were to be stationed at Divisional
Traffic points. These officers were to be under the
A.D.R.'s and were to co-operate with the civil officials.
(vi.) Under the orders of D.A.D.R.'s were to be Railway
Staff Officers (R.S.O.), who were to superintend
the movement and transport of troops at railway
stations.
(vii.) An A.D.R. " Conmiunications " was to act for the
Director in details of civil railway policy ; it would
be his duty also, in consultation with the officers already
named, to formulate and to submit for the approval
of the G.O.C. and of the Director all orders and pro-
posals relating to movements of troops and stores,
diversions of rolling stock, interruptions to ordinary
traf&c, and the protection of trains and railway
property.
The principle underlying these proposals was the creation of a
Military Staff corresponding grade by grade with the civil organisa-
tion. A lack of properly trained officers was at once felt. For the
Cape lines three D.A.D.R.'s were required, as well as an A.D.R. and
an R.S.O. at Cape Town ; whereas only two officers in all were
available. Accordingly, the Eastern and Midland Sections were not
provided for.
Nor had there as yet been laid down any clear rules regarding
the relative duties of the General Staff of the Lines of Communication
and the Staff of the Director of Railways. Consequently, Com-
mandants on the Lines of Communication were ignorant of the position
and duty of the Military Controlling Staff under the D.R. A step
APPENDIX lo. 631
towards regulating matters was therefore made by the pubhcation
of the following order: —
Lines of Communication Orders.
No. 687, Dated December 27TH, 1899.
Duties of Staff Officers, Lines of Communication Railwaj^ : —
(i.) The working of the railwaj^ is carried out by the civil staff
of the Cape Government Railways with a staff of military
officers to assist and direct the mihtary traffic. This staff
forms part of the staff of the L. of C, and is the only
means of communication authorised between the military
authorities and the civil railway officials.
(2.) The Military Railway Staff will consist of : —
(i.) One A.D.R., on the staff of the Inspector-General
Lines of Communication (head office. Cape Town), in
charge of all communications.
(ii.) One D.A.D.R., on the staff of the Assistant LG. L.
of C, Western Section (head office, De Aar), in charge
of Western Section, Cape Town to Modder River.
(iii.) One D.A.D.R., on the staff of the A.LG. L. of C, Mid-
land Section (head office, Naauwpoort), in charge of
Port Elizabeth to Naauwpoort, Naauwpoort to De
Aar, and Rosmead to Stormberg.
(iv.) One D.A.D.R., on the staff of the A.LG. L. of C,
Eastern Section (head office, Queenstown), in charge
of East London to Stormberg.
(v.) One D.A.D.R., on the staff of the Base Commandant
and as S.O. to A.D.R. (head office, Cape Town), in
charge Cape Town only.
/ (vi.) R.S.O.'s on the staffs of the Station Commandants, at
stations as required.
(5.) The duties of the various Staff Officers on the railway are
as follows : —
The Assistant Director of Railways is responsible for the whole
working of Railway L. of C, and is the channel through
which should pass all communications on Railway (Com-
munications) matters from the LG. L. of C. and the D.R.
He should keep up a complete account of the state of
632 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
traf&c and position of rolling stock on the railway, and
should keep in touch with the General Traffic Manager
of the system. He should keep himself informed, through
the D.I.G. and A.I.G. L. of C, of the work carried out by
D.A.D.R.'s, and see that proper control is exercised over
the districts in their charge.
(4.) Deputy Assistant Directors of Railways, under the orders of
the D.I.G. and A.I.G. L. of C, should keep themselves
completely informed of the state of traffic in their sections.
They should, through the Station Commandants, exercise
a general supervision over the work of th^ railway
staff in their districts. They should keep careful watch
on the distribution of rolling stock on their sections, and
are responsible that it is utilised in the best way. They
should keep in touch with the Traffic Manager of their
sections of the Railway. No work of any nature will be
undertaken by the Civil Railway Department for the
Military, unless the approval of the D.A.D.R. has
previously been obtained. The D.A.D.R. is responsible
that any irregularity on his section, which he cannot
rectify himself, is reported to the A.I.G. L. of C. The office
of the D.A.D.R. should be located at the same station as
that of the District Traffic Manager, and he is responsible
that either himself or his Staff Officer is present at that
station;
(5.) Railway Staff Officers, under the orders of the Station Com-
mandants, are responsible for the traffic at the stations
where they are located. They are responsible that no
train is delayed for military requirements, except in
extremely urgent cases on the authority of the Station
Commandant. They are especially responsible for seeing
that trucks loaded with military stores are released as
quickly as possible. They should report immediately to
their D.A.D.R. any deficiency or irregularity of traffic
in their stations. They should similarly address their
D.A.D.R. on any questions concerning railway matters
on which they require information or orders. They are
responsible for all detraining and entraining operations
at their stations, and the comfort of all troops passing
APPENDIX 10. 633
through. They will furnish such returns on railway
matters as may be required to their D.A.D.R. direct. All
communications from R.S.O.'s must be sent through
Station Commandants.
It was thus sought to modify the original organisation by allotting
to the A.D.R.'s and D.A.D.R.'s definite positions on the L. of C.
staff ; and, though R.S.O.'s remained on the staffs of Station Com-
mandants, the circumstances under which they were to refer to
D.A.D.R.'s were specified.
A similar S5^tem to that adopted upon the Cape Government
Railways was put in force when Lord Roberts advanced into the
Orange Free State and the Transvaal. The Imperial Military Railways
(I.M.R.) were then created. The obstacles to smooth handhng of
traffic in the Orange Free State were at first serious ; the bridges
at Norval's Pont and Bethulie (giving access to the railways of Cape
Colony) were broken, all rolling-stock on the north bank of the Orange
river had been withdrawn by the retreating enemy, and no staffs
remained at the stations {see Appendix 3, vol. iii.).
It now became a matter of paramount importance to centralise
into the hands of the D.R. the control of the railway ; with this
object in view instructions were issued by Army Headquarters,
dated April 23rd, 1900.
As the Orange Free State and Transvaal fell into British hands, so
the mileage under the control of the Imperial Military Railways
increased. New A.D.R.'s were appointed at Bloemfontein and
Johannesburg, with deputies at Kroonstad, Johannesburg and
Pretoria.
In the absence of a railway working staff it became necessary
to create one ; though many of the members were military officers,
the technical and controlling staffs were kept distinct.
After the occupation of Pretoria, when further experience had
been gained, all applications for the use of the railways were sent to
the Chief of the Staff, who, after consulting the D.R., issued the
necessary permits. At the same time the A.D.R. was informed
and he communicated with all railway officials concerned. At
this time the lack of rolling-stock, and especially of engines, greatly
handicapped the controlling staff.
The strain resulting from lack of these necessaries was relieved
634 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
after the occupation of Komati Poort, in September, 1900. By
October, 1900, not only had temporary repairs been completed
upon every line of railway in the country, but the makeshifts were
being gradually replaced by repairs of a semi-permanent and per-
manent type, executed by the Works Department of the Imperial
Military Railways ; but the activity of the enemy made it impossible
to run trains by night, and consequently the full carrpng capacity
of the line was not available. In order to cope with the attacks
on the hues of railway which occurred at the end of 1900, the D.R.
selected stations throughout the theatre of war where there was
siding accommodation for construction trains, and there a permanent-
way inspector and his gang were quartered, with an R.E. Section
whose duty it became to take charge of the construction train,
if necessary.
Every effort was made to ensure rapid transmission to the con-
struction train of news of any break in the line. Gangers patrolled
the line at dawn, and all military posts reported alarms to the nearest
telegraph station, which in turn informed the Deputy Superintendent
of Works, who telegraphed his orders to the construction train situated
nearest to the break. Officers in charge of construction trains had
orders to proceed with all speed to any reported break, whether or
not the report had been confirmed. It is recorded that in the Orange
River Colony alone, during eight months of the war, seventy-eight
destructive raids were made on the railway. Yet the system of
intelligence and the scheme for executing repairs were equal to every
call. For example, on January ist, 1901, at 2.30 a.m., information
reached the Deputy Superintendent of Works at Bloemfontein that
the line had been broken at Wolvehoek. The break, which was
sixty-three miles distant, was repaired by 8 a.m. The gradual
extension of the blockhouse sj^tem ultimately procured more
immunity for the railways, and by April, 1901, the worst of the
actual train-wrecking was over.
Examples of Troop-Moves.
The success of the Imperial Mihtary Railways in dealing with the
transmission of troops will be gathered from the following instances : —
(i.) From December i8th to 27th, fifty-two trains of 1,305
trucks were transmitted from various points in the
Transvaal and Orange River Colony to Norval's Pont.
APPENDIX lo.
635
(ii.) During the period January 31st to February 8th, 1901 (nine
days), eighty-nine troop-trains were despatched from
Bloemfontein to Cape Colony, containing 315 ofl&cers,
8,980 men, 7,632 horses, 6,810 mules, 47 guns and 373
trucks of oxen and wagons.
(iii.) Major-General Bruce Hamilton's and other troops — of
6,391 personnel, 27 guns, and 605 truck-loads of animals,
wagons, etc. (in all, twenty-seven trains) — were, mean-
while entrained at Smalldeel and Winburg in two days,
and detrained at Bloemfontein January 30th to February
3rd. Whilst their trains were being off-loaded at
Bloemfontein, the above troops for Cape Colony passed
simultaneously through to the south, with no retardation
of the normal supply traf&c from south to north.
(iv.) Movement of Troops between 5.9.01 and ii.io.oi to
Repel Invasion of Natal.
Col. Garrait's Column.
80 officers.
1,373 other ranks.
1,191 horses.
750 mules.
600 oxen.
117 trucks of wagons.
Total number of trains — 12.
I8t train left Vereeniging 12.20 p.m., sth Sept.
I2th ., ,, ,, i.o a.m., 8th ,,
I8t train arrived Paardekop 8.45 a.m., 6th Sept.
I2th ,, „ „ 7.45 p.m., Sth „
Major-General Bruce
Hamilton's Column.
85 officers.
1,901 other ranks.
1,934 horses.
1,100 mules.
7 guns.
36 oxen.
64 wagons.
Total number of trains — 14.
I8t train left Springfontein 11.30 a.m., 8th Sept.
14th „ ,, „ I.30 p.m., i2th „
N.B. — ist/ 2nd and 14th trains detained at
Heilbron, remainder at Vredefort Road.
1st train arrived Heilbron 8.0 p.m., 9th Sept.
> 14th „ „ ,, 1.30 a.m., isth ,,
Colonel Pulteney's
Column.
38 officers.
793 other ranks.
948 horses.
214 mules.
20 carts.
20 trucks of wagons.
Total number of trains — 8.
ist train left Newcastle 12.30 a.m., 9th Sept.
8th „ „ ,, 3.45 p.m., 9th „
ist traip arrived Volksrust 5.40 a.m., 9th Sept.
8th „ ,, „ 4.10 a.m., loth „
636
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
(iv.) Movement of Troops between 5.9.01 and ii.io.oi to
Repel Invasion of Natal {continued);
LietU. -Colonel Cough's
Mounted Infantry.
14 oflBcers.
524 other ranks.
644 horses.
242 mules.
62 oxen.
16 trucks of wagons.
Total number of trains — 4.
ist train left Kroonstad 5.0 p.m., loth Sept.
4th ,, „ „ 3.0 a.m., nth
ist train arrived Dundee 5.45 p.m., 12th Sept.
4th ,. ,, ,, 10.30 p.m., i2th ,,
Colonel A llenby's Column. Total number of trains — 16.
44 officers.
1,474 other ranks.
1,280 horses.
630 mules.
8 guns.
18 trucks of wagons.
1st train left Pretoria 5.50 p.m., i6th Sept.
i6th ,, „ ,, 7.5 a.m., i8th
ist train arrived Newcastle 12.45 a.m., iSthSept.
i6th ,, ,, ,, 8.2$ a.m., 19th ,,
SSrd battery Field
A rtillery.
4 officers.
158 other ranks.
6 guns.
2nd battalion Scottish
Rifles.
27 officers.
880 other ranks.
135 horses and mules.
16 wagons.
Total nmnber of trains — 2.
ist train left Pretoria 2.30 p.m., i6th Sept.
2nd ,, ,, ,, 12.50 p.m., 17th ,,
ist train arrived Volksrust 7.40 p.m., 17th Sept.
2nd ,, ,, ,, 7.30 a.m., i8th ,,
Total number of trains — 2.
ist train left Springs 4.30 p.m., i8th Sept.
and ,, ,, ,, 8.30 p.m., i8th ,,
ist train arrived Newcastle 6.30 p.m., 19th Sept.
2nd „ „ „ 11.50 p.m., 19th
1st Yorkshire Regiment. . Total number of trains — 2.
16 officers.
434 other ranks.
4 horses.
47 mules.
ist train left Pretoria 8.50 p.m., i8th Sept.
2nd „ „ „ 9.10 p.m., i8th ,,
ist train arrived Ladysmith ii.o a.m., 20th Sept.
2nd ,, ,, ,, 12 noon, 20th ,,
APPENDIX lo.
637
(iv.) Movement of Troops between 5.9.01 and ii.io.gi to
Repel Invasion of Natal (continued).
Colonel Garratt's Column.
25 ofl&cers.
650 other ranks.
355 horses.
130 mules.
12 wagons.
Total number of trains — 5.
1st train left Volksrust 8.40 a.m., 19th Sept.
5th ,, ,, ., 4.25 p.m., 19th „
5 trains arrived Newcastle and detrained by
12 noon, 20th September.
Brigadier-General S
pens'
Total number of trains — 10.
Column.
62 ofl&cers.
1,298 other ranks.
1,191 horses.
950 mules.
6 guns.
78 trucks of wagons.
ist train left Kroonstad 8.55 a.m., 19th Sept.
loth „ „ „ 9.45 a.m., 20th ,.
1st train arrived Dundee 2.30 a.m., 21st Sept.
loth ,, ,, ,, 6,15 p.m., 22nd ,,
NeUal Mounted Rifles.
7 ofl&cers.
118 other ranks.
130 horses.
Natal Field Artillery.
3 ofl&cers.
67 other ranks.
60 horses.
2 guns.
Left Durban 19th Sept. ; arrived Pietermaritz-
burg 9 p.m.. 19th Sept.
•
Lieut.-ColonetDuMoulin's
Column.
27 ofl&cers.
688 other ranks.
1,217 horses and mules.
3 guns.
Total number of trains — 5.
ist train left Springfontein 12 noon, 20th Sept.
5th ,, ,, „ 6.25 a.m., 2i3t ,,
5 trains arrived Bloemfontein by 12 noon, 2i3t
Sept.
Brigadier-General G.
Hamilton's Column.
47 ofl&cers.
1,650 other ranks.
1,100 horses.
650 mules.
54 wagons.
Total number of trains — 12.
1st train left Klerksdorp 10.30 a.m., 20th Sept.
I2th ,, ,, Potchefstroom 9.45 a.m., 23rd ,,
2nd and 3rd trains both broke down between
Bank and Krugersdorp ; delayed 2 hours.
2nd train derailed between Zandspruit and
Paardekop ; 22 hours' delay, i engine and 18
trucks derailed ; 6 persons injured ; 25 horses
killed, 30 injured.
ist train arrived Dundee 12.45 a.m., 23rd Sept.
I2th „ „ „ 10.15 p.m., 24th ,.
638
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
(iv.) Movement of Troops between 5.9.01 and ii.io.oi to
Repel Invasion of Natal {conUnued).
1st Cameron Highlanders.
10 ofl5cers.
344 other ranks.
Left Pretoria 3.50 p.m., 20th Sept.
Arrived Dundee 3.0 p.m., 22nd ,.
Colonel Sir H. Rawlin-
son's Column.
TJ officers.
1,605 other ranks.
2,740 horses and mules.
Total number of trains — 13.
ist train left Aliwal North 7.30 p.m., 21st Sept.
13th ,, ,, Burghersdorp 5.45 p.m., 23rd ,,
3 trains loaded at Aliwal North ; remainder at
Burghersdorp.
Last 3 trains detained at Heidelberg ; move
delayed owing to suspension of night running
north of Bloemfontein by order of General Knox.
ist train arrived Elandsfontein 3.0 p.m., 23rd Sept.
13th „ „ Heidelberg i.o a.m., 26th
Black Watch.
6 oflScers.
290 other ranks.
Left Bloemfontein 2.25 p.m., 23rd Sept.
Arrived Ladysmith 2.0 a.m., 26th ,,
Note/ Mounted Rifles.
General Depot, Composite
battalion.
9 officers.
166 other ranks.
1 56 horses and mules.
Total number of trains — 3. '
ist train left Pietermaritzburg 2.30a.m.
3rd „ „ „ 4.30 a.m.. ^^^ggpj
3 trains arrived Greytown )
Major-General F. W.
Kitchener's Details.
Lieut. -General Elliot's
Details.
26 officers.
745 other ranks.
Imperial Light Horse.
26 officers.
459 other ranks.
443 horses.
250 mules.
23 wagons.
ist portion left Middelburg 22nd Sept.
Last portion arrived Volksrust 24th Sept.
Total number of trains — 5.
ist train left Harrismith 7.0 a.m., 25th Sept.
5th ,, ,, ,, II. o p.m., 25th „
ist train arrived Dundee 9.0 p.m., 25th Sept.
5th ,, ,, ,, 3.10 a.m., 26th „
APPENDIX lo.
639
(iv.) Movement of Troops betvsteen 5.9.01 and h.io.oi to
Repel Invasion of Natal (continued).
Natal Carbineers.
3 ofi&cers.
62 other ranks.
85 horses and mules.
Scots Guards.
22 officers.
825 other ranks.
121 horses and mules.
Brigadier-General
Plumer's Details.
5 officers.
328 other ranks.
16 horses.
7 officers.
554 other ranks.
380 horses.
2tid West Yorkshire
Regiment.
21 officers.
717 other ranks.
216 horses and mules.
Imperial Light Horse.
3 train loads of men,
horses, mules and
wagons.
3 train loads do. do.
Durham and Edinburgh
Garrison Artillery Militia
4 officers.
115 other ranks.
Left Pietermaritzburg 9.30 a.m., 26th Sept.
Arrived Grey town 5.30 p.m., 26th Septi
ist portion left Potchefstroom 9.30 a.m., 24th Sept.
Last portion arrived Volksrust 9.20 a.m., 29th Sept.
Left Springfontein 4.30 a.m., 25th Sept.
Arrived Bloemfontein 10.30 a.m. 25th Sept.
ist train left Kroonstad 12.30 p.m.. ist Oct.
2nd „ „ ,, 5.25 p.m., ist „
1st train arrived Volksrust 10. o p.m., and Oct.
2nd ,, ,, ,, 11.50 p.m., 2nd ,,
ist portion left Frederickstad 3.25 p.m., 26th Sept.
Last portion arrived Volksrust 4.30 p.m., 29th Sept.
Left Glencoe Junction 27th Sept.
Left Pietermaritzburg 27th Sept.
Last train left Durban for Tugela 29th Sept.
Left Ladysmith 5.50 a.m., 27th Sept. for Volkrust.
640
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
(iv.) Movement of Troops between 5.9.01 and ii.io.oi to
Repel Invasion of Natal {continued).
Ox Transport.
180 ox wagons.
2,880 oxen.
ist portion left Middelburg 7.15 a.m., 26th Sept.
Last ,. ,, „ 4.0 p.m., 30th „
Last portion arrived Volksrust 4.30 p.m., 2nd Oct.
Composite Infantry bat-
talion. Ammunition
Column and
Volunteer Medical Staff.
Left Pietermaritzburg in 3 trains for Greytown on
28th Sept.
10 ofl&cers.
400 other ranks.
43 horses and mules.
Drafts ex SS. "Lake
Erie."
Left Durban at 4.20 p.m. and 6 p.m., 27th Sept.
15 ofl&cers.
525 other ranks.
A mmunition Column,
Field Hospital and
Border Mounted Rifles.
2 officers.
20 other ranks.
190 horses and mules.
Arrived Pietermaritzburg at 12.30a.m. and 1.30 a.m.,
28th Sept.
Left Pietermaritzburg in 3 trains for Greytown on
28th Sept.
Black Watch.
4 officers.
183 other ranks.
22 horses and mules.
4 carts.
Left Ladjrsmith 8.50 p.m., 29th Sept.
Left Durban 2.45 p.m., 30th Sept., for Tugela.
21st battery Royal Field
Artillery.
1 officer.
38 other ranks.
70 horses and mules.
2 guns.
Left Pietermaritzburg in 3 trains, 30th Sept. — ist
Oct.
Left Durban 1st Oct., for Tugela.
APPENDIX 10.
641
(iv.)|M0VEMENT OF TrOOPS BETWEEN 5.9.OI AND II.IO.OI TO
Repel Invasion of Natal (continued).
Royal Irish Fusiliers,
Total number of trains — 2.
" S "Pom-pom section,
8^rd battery Royal Field
Artillery and
Royal Engineers.
ist train left Newcastle i . 10 p.m., 30th Sept.
16 ofi&cers.
2nd ,, ., „ 3.3s p.m., 30th ,,
406 other ranks.
208 horses and mules.
1st train arrived Dundee 5.30 p.m., 30th Sept.
80 oxen.
2nd ,, ,, „ lo.o p.m., 30th
24 wagons.
3 guns.
Colonel Bethune's
Total number of trains — 9.
Column.
63 officers.
ist train left Harrismith 1.45 p.m., 30th Sept.
839 other ranks.
9th ,, 5.0 a.m., 2nd Oct.
1,342 horses.
1,274 mules.
lat train arrive<l Durban 8.0 p.m., ist Oct.
2 guns.
9th „ „ „ 3.25 p.m., 4th „
wagons.
Black Watch.
II officers.
Left Kroonstad 12.30 p.m., ist Oct.
319 other ranks.
6 trucks of horses
Arrived Dundee 9.30 p.m., 2nd Oct.
and mules.
4 trucks of wagons.
Lieut.-Colonel Damanfs
Total number of trains — 4.
Column.
ist train left Bloemfontein 1.50 p.m., 2nd Oct.
15 officers.
4th ,, .. „ 6.45 a.m., 3rd ,,
400 other ranks.
970 horses and mules.
ist train arrived Heilbron 10.30 a.m., 3rd Oct.
40 trucks of wagons.
4th „ „ „ 8.0 a.m., 4th „
Drafts ex SS. " St.
Andrew."
Left Durban 6.5 p.m., 2nd Oct.
I officer.
Arrived Dundee 9.15 a.m., 4th Oct.
250 other ranks.
VOL. IV.
41
642
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
(iv.) Movement of Troops between 5.9.01 and ii.io.oi to
Repel Invasion of Natal {continued).
B rigadier-Ge neral
Plumer's Force.
4 ofl&cers.
260 other ranks.
45 officers.
618 other ranks.
650 horses.
645 mules.
6 guns.
Remounts.
4,798 horses.
168 horses.
70 mules.
Left Springfontein 12.40 p.m., 3rd Oct.
Arrived Volksrust 10.30 p.m., 5th Oct.
Total number of trains — 7.
1st train left Springfontein 9 . 30 a.m., 8th Oct.
7th ,, „ „ 7.45 p.m., 8th „
1st train arrived Volksrust i.o p.m., loth Oct.
7th „ „ „ 7.10 a.m., nth .,
Left Mooi River for north between 2nd Sept-
and 8th Oct.
Left Pietermaritzburg for Greytown. 23rd Sept.
Grand Total moved by Rail.
Officers 882
Other ranks 23.536
Animals 32,836
Guns 45
APPENDIX lo.
643
(v.) Troop Moves on Eastern Line between April 5th and i2th, 1901, to
FORM Columns under Lieut.-General Sir Bindon Blood.
Trucks.
Officers.
Men.
Trucks of
Wagons.
Date.
Guns.
Horses.
Mules.
Oxen,
April 5th, 1 901.
12.25 p.m. ■
90
2
265
26
18
2
12
—
23
—
—
16 &
mules
—
4
—
1. 15 p.m.
22
—
—
12
do.
—
6
—
1.35 pm.
20
—
—
12
do.
—
6
—
2.10 p.m.
22
13
SOD
19
do.
—
—
—
Totals
177
15
765
85
18
2
28
April 6th, 1901.
5 . 5 a.m.
5
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
6.15 a.m.
23
—
15
6
—
2
I
—
10.48 a.m.
23
I
139
—
6
—
14
—
II. 15 a.m.
23
2
no
12
—
—
6
3
12.20 p.m.
28
4
80
5
5
7
6
I. IS p.m.
23
3
90
12
—
—
6
—
1.5s p.m.
24
4
70
10
3
—
4
—
Totals
149
14
504
45
14
9
37
3
April 7th, 1901.
4.0 a.m.
26
—
28
20
—
—
—
—
4.25 a.m.
21
14
257
—
—
—
2
—
5.5 a.m.
II
I
50
3
—
—
—
—
5.50 a.m.
19
I
20
10
—
8
—
6.45 a.m.
22
4
80
3
5
2
6
—
7.40 a.m.
33
6
139
16
2
—
II
—
11.45 ^-m.
24
2
106
5
13
—
4
—
2.0 p.m.
16
I
125
10
—
—
—
—
4-23 pm.
28
3
120
16
8
—
—
—
Totals
200
32
925
7i
38
2
31
—
April 8th, 1901.
4.0 a.m.
32
8
348
I
5
—
IS
—
4.35 a.m.
24
9
300
I
3
2
3
—
5.58 a.m.
30
3
136
20
—
—
I
—
6.0 a.m.
23
2
77
10
2
—
8
—
6.45 a.m.
23
i 2
20
2
I
9
10
—
4.35 p.m.
24
35
4
16
—
4
—
5.5 p.m.
31
—
H
8
—
—
10
—
Totals
187
24
830
46
27
II
51
VOL. IV.
41*
644
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
(v.) Troop Moves on Eastern Line between April 5th and i2th, 1901, to
FORM Columns under Lieut. -General Sir Bindon Blood {continued).
Trucks of
Date
Trucks.
Officers.
Men.
Wagons.
Guns.
Horses.
Mules.
Oxen.
April 9th, 1 90 1.
4.30 a.m.
23
—
—
I
—
4
4
—
4.42 a.m.
22
—
—
2
—
—
—
—
5.40 a.m.
29
3
60
0
8
—
7
—
Totals
74
3
60
23
8
4
II
—
April loth. 1901.
4.20 a.m.
24
—
—
13
2
—
6
—
4.40 a.m.
31
—
—
20
—
—
S
—
5.20 a.m.
23
13
250
18
—
—
—
ii.o a.m.
20
38
I
2
2
4
—
2.10 p.m.
18
—
33
—
9
—
8
—
Totals
116
13
321
52
13
2
23
Ai>ril nth, 1901.
4.5 a.m.
24
2
99
—
—
14
10
5. 10 a.m.
25
5
49
14
—
I
8
—
5.20 a.m.
25
I
3!
5
5
5
7
—
7.5 a.m.
22
3
108
9
3
—
4
—
10.25 a.m.
23
5
III
12
2
—
4
—
11.35 a.m.
26
I
27
I
I
17
6
—
1.25 p.m.
29
8
95
ID
S
—
8
—
3.20 p.m.
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
9.25 p.m.
22
6
100
10
4
—
2
—
Totals
196
3»
627
61
20
37
49
—
April I2th, 1901.
12.25 3L.m.
30
10
100
19
—
—
—
—
7.15 a.m.
25
2
69
II
4
—
7
—
10.50 a.m.
31
3
125
—
—
20
ID
—
12.50 p.m.
32
3
130
—
13
2
14
—
1.3s pm.
40
9
220
4
—
20
6
—
3 30 p.m.
16
I
66
—
—
7
9
—
5.0 p.m.
35
5
187
10
"
—
8
4
10.55 P-m.
32
3
130
7
4
—
II
2
Totals
241
36
1.027
51
32
49
65
6
Grand Totals. .
1.340
168
S.OS9
436
170
116
295
9
APPENDIX lo.
645
(vi.) Move of Brigadier-General G. Hamilton's Column from
Greylingstad to Krugersdorp, June ist to 4th, 1901.
The Force, strength as under, was ordered on May 30th to march
to Greylingstad and entrain on arrival : —
Troops.
Officers.
Men.
Horses.
Mules.
Wagons.
Guns.
13th Hussars
16
2
I
'3
I
20
5
678
45 <
411
360
39
379
34
760 127
90 1 —
10 80
90 —
130
428 —
— 210
20
10
8
12
16
16
14
Q. battery R.H.A
64th battery R.F.A
East Lancashire regiment
3rd Field troop R.E
Transport
2
3
5 th Dragoon Guards , . .
Bearer company
—
58
1.576
^ J
96
Totals
I, 02 c
4
'
On the first intimation of this move the R.S.O. at Greylingstad
was ordered to detach suitable " empties " from passing trains.
Traffic officers were further ordered to collect all available empties
at Elandsfontein and Heidelberg in readiness to be despatched to
Greylingstad as soon as the hour of the column's arrival should be
approximately known. It was not thought advisable to block Grey-
lingstad with trucks in anticipation, for trains were running at short
intervals on the line and a congestion of traffic might have resulted.
G. Hamilton's force arrived at 10 a.m., June ist, and the regular
entrainment began at midday.
Trains left as under :-
ist
—
4
30
p.m. . .
2nd
—
5
25
»i • •
3rd
—
ID
0
>>
4th
—
3
0
a.m. . .
5th
—
II
25
II
6th
—
I
^0
p.m. ..
7th
—
6
I
II • •
8th
—
10
30
II • •
9th
—
I
10
a.m. . .
June ist
2nd
3rci
loth
—
7
25
a.m. . .
nth
—
10
20
II • •
i2th
—
12
40
II • •
13th
14th
15th
i6th
—
3
7
8
II
15
25
35
35
p.m. . .
17th
i8th
—
2
I
50
10
a.m. . .
p.m. . .
June 3rd
.1 4th
The up and down mail and supply trains ran as usual without
interruption to or from this move, a note which applies generally to
the greater part of the troop-moves here detailed.
646
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
(vii.) Troop-Moves in one Month through Pretoria Station.
March 19th to April 19th, 1901.
Trains.
Tracks.
Horses.
Mules.
Oxen.
Carts
and
Wagons.
Guns.
Men.
Arrivals from
South
Departures East. .
Departures North
136
74
64
3.632
1,828
1,272
10,882
4.509
2.350
4.796
2.660
580
1.143
2.524
972
659
SOI
>85
26
II
8
14,960
6.479
4.224
Totals
274
6.733
»7.74i
8.036
4.639
1.345
45
25.663
The Locomotive Department.
Mention must be made of the work of this department, on which
devolved primarily the duty of repairing engines, coaches and trucks.
The department was also called upon to execute work for the Army,
which, under other circumstances, might have been done by the
Army Ordnance Department, e.g., the mounting of Vickers-Maxim
and i2-pr. Q.F. guns on armoured trucks. As an illustration
of the work of this department, it may be recorded that between May
and October, 1901, the following repairs were effected in their
workshops at Pretoria, Johannesburg and Bloemfontein : —
Locomotives 141
Coaches 558
Trucks 1.955
The need of additional engine -power and truckage was early
realised, and during 1901 the rolling stock was increased by 106
locomotives and 1,740 thirty-ton cars.
Railway Staff Depot ; Employment Office ; Native Labour
Depot.
As already noticed (Appendix 3, Vol. III.), the supply of men
required to operate the railways had to be supplemented from outside
the ranks of the R.E. companies. A Railway Staff Depot was there-
fore formed at Johannesburg in June, 1900, in order to deal with
volxmteers from the ranks of the Army who applied for special
APPENDIX lo. 647
employment upon the railwa)^. A Railway Employment Office was
simultaneously opened in Cape Town ; it was freely advertised in the
South African newspapers, and applications poured in fast from
the civilian population. Applications were examined, enquiry was
made with regard to the character of the applicants, and a regular
system of registration was instituted, so as to ensure the admission
of none but desirable men to the ranks of the Railway Staff. This
office, to which all departments of the Imperial Military Railways
might apply when in want of additional labour, abundantly justified
its institution. It received 7,500 applications for work during the
succeeding nine months, and engaged some 800 employes.
Mention must also be made of the Native Labour Depots, established
at De Aar, Bloemfontein and Johannesburg. Ujx)n these all depart-
ments of the Army were entitled to make requisition. Large batches
of natives were employed in reconstructing the railway, and in load-
ing and off-loading supplies from trucks. At the end of 1900 some
4,500 native boys were upon the books of the Johannesburg Labour
Dep6t alone.
Armoured Trains.
Soon after Lord Kitchener assumed command he decided regularly
to organise the armoured trains as fighting units. He therefore
ap}X)inted to his Staff an officer termed the Assistant Director of
Railways for Armoured Trains, This officer was also on the Staff of
the Director of Railways, and was placed in charge of all the armoured
trains in South Africa — some twenty in number.
The principal duties of these trains may be said to have been tht
following : —
(i.) In conjunction with columns in the field, to intercept the
enemy whom the columns were driving on to the line.
(2.) To act on the flank of a column or line of columns, the train
being well advanced so as to prevent the enemy breaking
to that flank.
(3.) To reinforce stations and camps on the railway which were
threatened by the enemy.
(4.) To escort ordinary traffic trains.
(5.) To reconnoitre.
(6.) To patrol by day and night.
(7.) The general protection of traffic routes.
648 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
The A.D.R. for Armoured Trains was held responsible for the
efficiency of the garrisons, armaments and equipments of all his trains.
It was his duty to see that the armoured train rolling stock was in
good working condition, and that the officers commanding were
instructed in the manner of fighting their trains, and conversant
with ordinary traffic working. Like other officers of the Headquarters
Staff, he had access to all telegrams sent and received by the Chief ;
this privilege, and that of seeing the Commander-in-Chief daily,
enabled him to foresee events and to dispose his trains accordingly.
It was his duty also, whenever a concentration of trains was decided
upon, to attach himself to one of them and take charge of the
concerted action of the whole.
The garrison of an armoured train was composite. In addition
to the infantry escort, it contained R.A. and R.E. detachments.
The latter consisted of one N.C.O. and six Sappers, skilled in railway
repairing work and in re-setting derailed engines and trucks ; two
telegraph linesmen, one telegraph clerk, two engine drivers and two
firemen. All the men of this detachment were counted as effective rifles
when the train was engaged, with the exception of the driver and fire-
man on the footplate ; even the latter carried rifles in the engine cab
to drive off an enemy endeavouring to gain possession of their engine.
It was important that the officer commanding the train should
be a man of judgment and strong nerve. He was often called upon
to act on his own responsibility. His strong armament and defences
enabled him to attack superior forces. Yet his vulnerable points were
many. He had ever to be alert that the enemy did not cut the line
behind him. In addition to his visible foes and the constant risks
of traffic in war time, he had to contend with skilfully used automatic
and observation mines, and had to keep his head even amid the roar
which followed the passage of his leading truck over a charge of
dynamite, and then to deal with the attack which almost certainly
ensued. Officers, therefore, had to be chosen from men of no common
stamp. The danger from contact mines was to a certain extent
obviated by a standing order that each train should propel a heavily-
loaded bogie truck. Such trucks had low sides and ends ; they in
no way obstructed the view, or fire, from the train ; and they per-
formed the double purpose of exploding contact mines and carrying
the railway and telegraph materials. The necessity for this propelled
unoccupied bogie was exemplified on several occasions,
APPENDIX lo. 649
For example. No. 6 Armoured Train exploded a mine near
Kroonstad, when, through some unfortunate oversight, it was not
propelling its material truck ; the Officer Commanding was killed
instantly, the leading fighting truck was overturned, and several
men in it were injured. This would undoubtedly have been avoided
if a loaded bogie had been in front. A few days later this same
train, having again been put in commission, ran over a contact mine
near Heilbron. On this occasion the propelled bogie fired the mine,
and a length of three feet of rail was blown out ; but as the mine was
laid on a straight portion of the line, the whole train bumped across
the break and kept the rails. Three minutes after the explosion it
was engaging the enemy with the 12-pr. Q.F. gun. There were
no casualties on the train.
No. 5 Armoured Train was similarly blown up west of Middelburg,
Transvaal, when running to reinforce Uitkyk, which the Boers had
attacked by night. Again the propelled bogie fired the mine ; but in
this case two box trucks in rear of the engine were thrown off by the
broken rail , the officer commanding promptly disconnected these,
and steamed forward with the front portion of his train to assist in
the defence of Uitkyk.
All tfEiins carried a special gun-truck, on which was a j^edestal-
mounted Q.F. gun. They carried also a machine gun at each end,
arranged with a lateral sweep, to allow the fires to cross at either
side of the train at a distance of from fifty to eighty yards.
Armoured trains were officially recognised as moving telegraph
offices, and equipped with field sounders, vibrators, phonophores and
telephones; and whenever trains stopped away from a regular
office, which they did nearly every night, they were never out of
communication with the neighbouring stations and blockhouses.
When several trains patrolled one section, it was found advisable^
especially at night, that they should all halt at fixed intervals and
connect up with the telegraph wires to receive instructions and news;
Such a train carried out the whole of Brigadier-General Plumer's
telegraph work when he crossed the railway near Houtkraal in Cape
Colony in pursuit of De Wet.
One of the later improvements made to armoured trains was
the addition of a strong electric light. The steam for the engine and
turbines working the dynamos was supplied by a flexible pipe from
the engine dome, the pipe being fairly protected by steel plates.
6sa THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
APPENDIX II.
NOTES ON THE ARMY REMOUNT DEPARTMENT.
It has been remarked that in the Crimean war the wastage
of horseflesh amounted to some forty per cent, annually less
than in the South African war. Whilst the comparison is scarcely
fair — inasmuch as the first named campaign was largely a war
of infantry, and infantry engaged in the least mobile of operations,
the prosecution of a siege — nevertheless, the South African statistics
show heavy figures. Of the numbers of horses and mules upon the
ration list, ten per cent, were usually sick, and some thousand animals
were, as a rule, each week destroyed as incurable ; these irrespective
of the numbers killed in action or dead of disease.
The extent of the demands for horses and mules made upon the
Remount Department, and the manner in which they were met,
may be judged from the following table showing the numbers of
remounts supplied to the Army in Africa up to the end of January,
1902 : —
Quarter ending. Demanded Supplied.
Horses. Mules. Horses. Mules.
31st December, 1899 4.272 12,900 5,901 18,095
31st March, 1900 13.930 18,000 14.155 15.092
30th June, 1900 19.830 20,600 34.104 18,749
30th September, 1900 18,530 6,000 19.751 9.988
31st December, 1900 10,072 5,000 10,090 6,055
31st March, 1901 35,394 6,000 25,118 4.467
30th June, 1901 30,716 7,000 23,468 5.971
30th September, 1901 3i.7i<^ 6,000 30,855 7,500
31st December, 1901 30,816 6,000 40,365 5.113
and for
31st January, 1902 9.972 2,000 13,056 3,000
205,248 89,500 211,863 94.030
APPENDIX II. 651
System of Purchase at Home.
The purchase of horses at home was carried out as in peace time,
except that the enormous requirements necessitated the employment
of additional purchasing officers. Attempts were made to buy from
horse owners, at fairs, and by advertisement, but the results were
not commensurate with the cost involved.
The horse registration system was also brought into of)eration.
As a means of supplying horses to meet artillery requirements this
reserve proved a success ; the class of horse registered by the omnibus
companies and large owners of van transport was suitable ; but as
regards the lighter class of horse required for riding, the results were
not so successful. Of the 14,105 horses on the registered reserve list,
3,682 were taken in 1899, and 1,679 i" 1900. It was then found that
horses could be bought cheaper in the open market, and the number
thus obtained (amounting at the end of 1901 to 73,000), was greatly
in excess of the expectations founded on previous experience. The
increase in the number of horses available in the open market was
attributed both to the improved means of transport by railway and
sea, bringing the breeding grounds nearer to the sale-yards, and also
to the advancing substitution of mechanical for horse traction.
It is to be observed that whereas the estimated cost in October,
1899, for horses purchased in the United Kingdom was £55 a head,
the actual cost proved little over £43. The total number bought in
three years, 1899 to 1901 inclusive, was 60,980 horses and 12,083
cobs, costing 3^2,711,279 and ;f35i,732 respectively. Of these, 5,361
horses from the horse reserve were purchased in 1899 and 1900,
costing 3^300,860, i.e., an average of a little over £56 each ; and the
remaining 55,619 horses purchased in 1899, 1900, and 1901 cost an
average of ,^43 6s. each. The cobs purchased during the same years
cost an average of ,^29 each.
System of Purchase Abroad.
(i.) Of Mules.
The consular reports from mule -producing countries — giving full
information with regard to animals in those countries — having been
examined by the purchasing officers — on September 23rd, 1899, an
order was given to begin buying mules in Spain, Italy and at
652 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
New Orleans. Purchases of mules were thereupon effected at the
following approximate prices, and in numbers as given below : —
Approximate price Approximate total
at port of embarkation, numbers of mules bought.
Spain I20 18,500
Italy ;^20 to I22 8,000
United States ;£i2 to lit, 75.000
(ii.) Of Horses.
Argentina. Anent the foreign horse-markets little information was recorded
in the Inspector-Greneral's office, except with reference to Argentina.
When it had become clear that more horses would be required than
the home market could supply, the Inspector-General of Remounts,
encouraged by the favoiu"able reports received in 1897 from South
Africa upon 2,000 Argentine horses which had then been sent thither,
first turned to Argentina, whence at a price of some £8 per head
(delivered at the port of embarkation) some 26,000 horses and cobs
Australia. were ultimately obtained. Soon after, recourse was also had to
Australia, where suitable animals were purchased " f.o.b."* at a
price of from £10 to ;fi2 for cobs, and ^^14 for horses. Some numbers
were also purchased in Australia " c.i.f."t Under the latter terms
the losses occurring on the voyage fell upon the seller, and the horses
safely delivered in South Africa cost the Government from £^1 to
;f33 each. From Australia a total of some 25,000 horses and cobs
was eventually obtained.
Early in 1900 the mule-purchasing commission of officers in the
United States were ordered to buy horses also, and here, at prices
ranging from £17 to £2$ on delivery, some 97,000 horses in all were
purchased.
Simultaneously some 14,000 horses and cobs were purchased in
Canada, at prices ranging from £2$ to £30 as delivered on the wharves
at Montreal.
Hun- In order that the horse-markets of Australia, Argentina and
America should be left to the Inspector-General of Remounts, the
Yeomanry Committee, charged with the duty of mounting the Imperial
Yeomanry, drew upon Austria-Hungary for its requirements. Some
* Free-on-board.
I Cost, insurance, freight — i.e., cost of the article, its insurance while on the
voyage, and freight.
United Stales.
Canada.
Austria
gary.
APPENDIX II.
653
three months later the task of finding horses for the Imperial
Yeomanry devolved upon the Inspector-General of Remounts, but
the same system was continued.
Here the prices varied from £^s for artillery to £30 for cavalry
horses, and ^^20 for Croatian cobs. These were later supplemented
by large shipments of Russian cobs purchased in Hungary. In all
some 45,000 of these horses and cobs were bought " f.o.b." at Fiume.
The experience of the war led the Assistant -Inspector of Remounts
to record his opinion that the horses, cobs and mules from the various
countries ranked in the following order of merit for the purposes of
this particular campaign.
Horses.
Cobs.
MuUs.
I.
South African.
I.
South African.
I.
American (U.S.),
2.
British.
2.
British.
2.
South African.
3.
American (U.S.).
3.
Austrahan.
3-
Spanish.
4.
Australian.
4.
American and
4-
Itahan.
5-
Canadian.
Canadian.
6.
Hungarian.
5-
Hungarian.
7.
Indian (country-
6.
Argentine.
bred : Arabs and
walers).
8.
Argentine.
Supply of Veterinary Surgeons.
There was great difficulty in obtaining veterinary surgeons. The
supply afforded by the Army Veterinary Department was soon
exhausted, and the number of civil veterinary surgeons who were
obtained at home was insufficient to meet the demands of the Army
in South Africa as well as of the Army Remount Department.
For the important duty of conducting the veterinary examination
of animals purchased in foreign countries, competent veterinary
surgeons were with difiiculty procured. For service on board horse-
ships they could not always be obtained at all. The purchasing
officers in America and Australia were authorised to engage local
veterinary surgeons ; some of these did good service, but the in-
competence of others was in some instances the cause of serious loss
to the public. Owing to the difficulties experienced in obtaining
veterinary surgeons locally, a few ships from foreign ports sailed
without them, but no ships conveying remoimt horses left home
ports without a veterinary surgeon in charge. The reason given for
654 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
the difficulty in obtaining qualified veterinary surgeons was simply
the excess of demand over supply. Those in military employment
in April, 1902, amounted to ten per cent, of the whole profession in
the United Kingdom.
Transport of Remounts by Sea.
In time of peace the transport by sea of horses and mules is a
service rarely required ; in war this duty is performed by the Trans-
port Department of the Admiralty. In the case of mounted troops,
provision has to be made for carrying in the same ship, not only
horses, but also men, saddlery, and equipment. Ships employed on
this duty are taken up on time charter, and are specially fitted for
the service, according to plans prepared beforehand by the Admiralty
in commimication with the War Office.
The already large export trade of horses and cattle from Argentina
was carried on under a well-established system which was adopted for
the despatch of remount animals from that country to South Africa.
The shipowners fitted the ship according to specification, and under-
took to provide forage and attendants for the voyage, the service
being paid for by a capitation rate for the number of animals
embarked. The ships chartered by the Admiralty for the transport
of mules from foreign ports to South Africa were engaged on similar
terms. The ships chartered to take remount horses from England
were all engaged on the same conditions, viz., a capitation rate
which covered all expenses of the voyage. The amounts paid for
capitation rates varied greatly, being governed by the differing con-
ditions of the length and nature of the voyage, and the general cost
of freight which obtained at different times. The rate was at first
calculated on the number of animcJs embarked ; but after a short
experience it was deemed advisable to divide the capitation rate into
two parts, one being paid for each animal embarked, and the other,
by way of bonus, for each animal landed. It thus became the interest
of the shipowner that the animals should be carried safely to their
destination. Each ship called at Cape Town for orders, and might be
required to proceed thence to any other port in South Africa for
disembarkation, without extra charge.
In the charter of every ship a condition was made that accommo-
dation should be provided for a conducting officer and a veterinary
surgeon ; it was soon proved that the condition in which animals
APPENDIX II. 655
landed in South Africa largely depended upon the efficiency of these
officers.
Cases occurred in which ships put to sea short of the proper Att ndams.
proportion of attendants, and the animals suffered accordingly. The
proportion laid down was that of one man to twenty mules, and one
man to fifteen horses ; this, in the opinion of the Quarter-Master-
General, was sufficient, provided the conducting officer and the
veteriuciry officer did their duty. But neither conducting officer
nor veterinary officer was always available, and the master of the
ship could not invariably concern himself with the way in which the
attendants carried out their duties. The provision of a sufficient
number of competent attendants to take charge of horses and mules
on board ship was, in fact, a matter of much difficulty, both in British
and in other ports. The attendants were drawn from all classes,
and, being engaged and paid by the owners, it was difficult to keep
them under discipline, and they frequently deserted the ship as soon
as it arrived in port. In several cases it was reported that ships were
overcrowded, owing to the desire of the owner to carry as much
freight as possible. It was usually a condition of the charter that
five per cent, of the stalls should be vacant, so as to allow of horses
being shifted in case of necessity, and also to get at the stalls and horses
for cleaning purposes. This condition was not always observed.
Remount Depots in South Africa.
In the Tables of War Establishments, which had been prepared
at the War Office, provision was made for (i.) a base dep6t for 1,000
horses, personnel of seven officers and 274 N.C.O.'s and men ; and
(ii.) an advanced remount dep)6t for 300 horses, personnel of three
officers and fifty-six N.C.O.'s and men. These dep6ts were to form
part of the line -of -communication troops and in accordance with the
regulations were to be under the Director of Transport. It was
intended that Army Service Corps companies should form the nucleus
of all remount depdts, their personnel being expanded by transport
conductors and natives;
Before the war, remount dep6ts had been established at Stellen-
bosch, in Cape Colony, and at Nottingham Road (Natal), the
personnel of which was furnished from the troops serving in the
command, aided by native establishments. When war appeared
imminent, a number of Army Service Corps companies were sent out
656
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
for the lines of communication. Five of these were allotted to
remount work, depdts being formed at De Aar, Naauwpoort, Queens-
town, Port Elizabeth, in addition to that at Stellenbosch. On the
arrival of Lord Roberts in January, 1900, the needs of the transport
service necessitated the withdrawal of the whole of the Army Service
Corps personnel, European and native, from remount work. A new
staff had then to be improvised, with civilian and native labour,
aided by Indian N.C.O.'s and syces, who were arriving with horses
from India.
About the end of March, 1900, seven base remount dep6ts arrived
from England. Of these, two only brought men ; the other five,
of which two were sent to Natal, were cadres comprising officers and
N.C.O.'s only. During the next three months, the soldiers belonging
to the two complete depdts were withdrawn to join the ranks of the
Field Army. In July, 1900, the personnel of the base and advanced
depdts, nine in number (excluding Natal), consisted of 4,425 of all
ranks, which included 2,303 Cape boys and Kaffirs, 1,475 Indians and
only 337 British N.C.O.'s and men. The whole of these were under
the charge of Lieut. -Colonel W. H. Birkbeck, Assistant -Inspector of
Remounts.
Subsequent additions made to the remount dep6ts in South
Africa brought the total on March ist, 1902, to twenty-four remount
dep6ts, ten of which were composed entirely of civilians and natives.
Table Showing Number of Horses Shipped, Country of
Embarkation, and Percentage of Loss Incurred on the
Voyage, from September ist, 1899, to December 3ist,
190 1.
Horses (Remounts only).
United Kingdom.
1899
1900
1901
Totals
Shipped.
2,308
16,871
26,859
46,038
Loss.
172
886
1.865
2,923
Percentage
of Loss.
7.4s
5-25
7-95
6.34
APPENDIX II.
Horses (Remounts only) {continued).
6S7
Shipped.
Loss.
Percentage
of Loss.
India.
1899
ipoo
24s
2,80s
2
58
0.81
2.06
Totals
3.050
60
1.96
A ustralia.
1899
1900
1901
706
7.196
11,828
10
297
318
1. 41
4.12
2.60
Totals
19.730
635
3.16
United States.
1900
1901
20,086
56.045
51^
1.605
4.19
3.14
76.131
3.448
3.21
A rgentina.
1899
1900
2,981
22,891
35.872
6
186
0.20
0.81
TotaU
193
0.74
A ustria.
1900
IQOI
6.999
16,939
212
385
3.03
1.68
Totals
33.938
497
3.07
Canada.
1900
1901
3.738
7.566
263
5.37
3.46
Totals
".304
458
4.05
Grand Totals
206,063
7.303
3-49
VOL. IV.
42
658
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Table Showing Number of Mules Shipped, Country of
Embarkation, and Percentage of Loss Incurred on the
Voyage, from September 23RD, 1899, to December 31ST,
1901.
Mules (Remounts only).
Spain.
"899
1900
1J)01
Totals
Italy.
1899
India.
»899
United States.
1899
1900
1901
Totals
Grand Totals
Shipped.
3.919
14,600
24
18.543
5.10a
500
9.074
35.499
23.051
67,624
91.769
Loss.
16
488
504
28
373
1.079
361
1.813
2.346
Percentage
of Loss.
0.40
3-34
2.71
O.S4
4. II
3-03
1.56
Tsr—
2.68
2-SS
659
APPENDIX 12
NOTES ON REFUGEE CONCENTRATION CAMPS IN
SOUTH AFRICA.
The subjoined telegrams account for the initiation of these camps
at the end of 1900 : —
From Lord Kitchener to the Secretary of State for War.
(Telegram.)
(No. 117, cipher.) " Pretoria,
" December 27th, 1900, 8.20 a.m.
"As I consider some steps are necessary to induce Boers
in field to surrender voluntarily, I am issuing instructions that
all who do so will be allowed to live with their families, property,
and live-stock in laagers, under our protection, near railway
in their district. Those who took the oath of neutrality will
also be allowed this privilege, unless it is proved that they went
out on commando again without coercion.
" At present, Boers who surrender are removed from their
district, making others afraid to come in. Boer families will be
brought into these laagers in their district, and notices posted
up that burghers still out are free to join them until country
is safe for them to return to their farms. I have formed a Burgher
Peace Committee here, consisting of influential surrendered
burghers ; they are sending delegates to each district to induce
Boers in the field to come in and do away with present
misrepresentations of Boer leaders."
From the Secretary of State for War to Lord Kitchener.
(Telegram.)
(No. 322, cipher.) " War Office,
" December 28th, 1900.
" Your No. 117, cipher. We fully agree with proposed |X)licy.
Is it not possible to extend it to ' undesirables ' rather than send
them into Cape Colony, where they produce similar result to
Boers on parole ? "
VOL. IV. 42*
66o THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
In a circular despatched by the Commandant-General of the
Boer Forces in the Transvaal to all his conmiandants, dated Roos
Senekal, November 6th, 1900, the following extract occurred : —
" Do everything in your power to prevent the burghers from
laying down their arms. If they do not listen to this, I shall
Ix* forced to confiscate everything from them, movable or
immovable, and to bum their houses."
At the meeting which subsequently took place at Middelburg
between the rival Commanders-in-Chief,* this subject was raised
by Lord Kitchener ; and General Botha then declared his views as
follows : —
" I am entitled to force every man to join me, and if they fail,
to confiscate their property and leave their families on the veld.
The only thing that you can do is to send them out of the country
as if I catch them they must suffer."
To this expressed intention Lord Kitchener replied to General
Botha in a letter dated Pretoria, April i6th, 1901, from which the
following is an extract : —
" As I informed your Honour at Middelburg, owing to the
irregular manner in which you have conducted and are conducting
hostihties by forcing unwiUing and peaceful inhabitants to join
your commandos ... I have now no other course open to me
except to take the unpleasant and repugnant step of bringing in
the women and children."
In addition, therefore, to the burghers who voluntarily surrendered,
and to the families of surrendered burghers who came into the British
lines of their own accord, many such famihes were compulsorily
brought in solely in order to save them from the reprisals of the
enemy. There were, however, two other categories of refugees for
whom the camps were intended : —
(a) Famihes who had habitually engaged in passing intelligence
to the enemy.
• See Chapter VI., pages 119 and 120, and Chapter XXX., page 523.
APPENDIX 12. 66i
{b) Families from farms which had been constantly used by
the enemy either as shelters from which to fire on the
troops, or as commissariat dep6ts.
Refugees were therefore differentiated as follows : —
(i) Self-supporting refugees who had voluntarily sought the
protection of camp for themselves and their stock.
(2) Refugees who were unable to support themselves, but who
had sought the protection of the camps.
(3) Families of persons who had been brought into camp either
for protection or for military reasons. This class were
in a minority in most camps and formed usually the
malcontent portion of the inhabitants of a camp.*
With the above objects in view, camps were initiated early in
1901 by the military authorities, and were taken over by the civil
governments of the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies on March
ist, 1901, and of Natal on November ist, 1901. The increase of
the concentration camps during 1901 can be gauged by the table
of expenditure attached to this Appendix.
Accommodation for the refugees was provided as far as jwssible
in wood and iron buildings, but mainly in marquees and bell-tents.
Overcrowding was in all cases prohibited. Persons who arrived in
camp without bedding, plates, knives, etc., were supplied with these
articles at Government expense ; clothing also was supplied free to
destitute refugees. Dutch reformed ministers were encouraged to
hold services in the various camps and received their usual stipends
for so doing. Native servants were usually allowed to attend their
employers. Refugees were permitted to correspond with their friends
subject to censorship. Baths and wash-houses were provided, and
as far as possible a continuous water supply was laid on.
The weekly ration per head varied, but was approximately as
follows : —
For adults and children over twelve years : — 7 lbs. of meal oi- flour ;
4 ozs. salt ; 6 or 7 ozs. coffee ; 12 or 14 ozs. sugar ; 3 to 3^ lbs. meat ;
^ to I lb. rice ; 14 lbs. fuel ; 3^ lbs. potatoes.
Children imder twelve years received the same ration, with the
exception of meat, of which they were given usually one half the
quantity allowed to adults. In many camps soap and candles also
* Reports on Working of Concentration Camps, November. 1901 (Cd. 819).
662 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
formed part of the weekly rations, and children under twelve received
oatmeal and milk.
Provision of medical comforts was also made by the Colonial
Administrations, at a total cost in the Transvaal and Orange River
Colony camps alone of some {,7,000 per mensem. It was on so liberal
and comprehensive a scale that the Committee of Ladies appointed
by the Secretary of State to report on the condition of the camps
declared it " very difficult to discover any suitable channel into which
they could direct the flow of private charity."*
The Colonial Administrations adopted the policy of offering
paid employment to the inmates of the refugee camps for work done
in the camps. In some cases families received as much as ;f 20 a month
for such work. The monthly bill for labour in the Transvaal camps
alone amounted in August, 1901, to some ;f6,ooo — the whole of
which sum was paid into the pockets of the refugees. Eventually
labour for three hours daily for the good of the camp was usually
made compulsory for all adult males in the camps. Whenever, as was
usually the case, the camp was in the neighbourhood of a town, able-
bodied men had the opportunity of earning wages at the usual
Colonial rates of pay, still living on free rations in the camp. Ulti-
mately, however, owing to the dissatisfaction this caused in the labour
market, the free rationing of competitors for employment outside the
camps was abandoned.
In each camp shops were established containing supplies of
groceries, clothing, and a few luxuries — of which the price was
regulated by martial law. In addition, large charitable gifts of
clothing were distributed to the refugees free. Arrangements were
also made by which such refugees as had cattle or other stock with
them obtained grazing under their own guards, so as to protect them
from the dcj^redations of marauding parties of the enemy.
Soon after the refugee camps were initiated a systematic effort
was made by the Education Department to provide the means of free
education for the children in the camps. Tents, frame-houses or
more solid structures were erected as school houses ; furniture, books
and other apparatus were provided, and a staff of teachers was
employed at the expense of the Colonial Governments. An unique
opportunity was thus seized for placing the means of education
* Report on Concentration Camps, by a Committee of Ladies appointed
by the Secretary of State for War (Cd. 893, page 4).
APPENDIX 12. 663
within reach of many children who hitherto had Uved in remote parts
of the veld, many miles from any school. Early in 1901 " organising
insj)ectors " were sent to open schools in the camps ; and soon, in
spite of the difficulties caused by want of accommodation, of furniture
and other requisites, and of teachers — in spite also of the sickness
in the camps and of the hostile feelings of the refugees — in almost
every camp in South Africa there was a flourishing school, and in
many the number of children, who, without compulsion, at once
attended school, was large.* Moreover, the schools were open to
adults ; and many young men and women availed themselves of this
their first opportunity of receiving an elementary education. f
Ultimately, attendance at school was made compulsory for all
children in the camps. By the end of 1901 there were more children
receiving education in the refugee camps than had been known in
the history of the State Schools. Much of the charitable funds at the
disposal of an organisation called the " Victoria League " was
employed in providing school teachers of cooking and of hygiene — and
in forming lending-libraries of books for the benefit of the inmates
of the camps.
The principal officials at each camp usually consisted of the
following : —
One superintendent.
One storekeeper (with clerks), i
One medical officer,
One dispenser,
One matron with nurses and assistants as required ; the
latter being drawn at first when procurable from the
refugee women in the camp, who were encouraged to
seek paid employment at work calculated to promote
the benefit of the camp.
The successful organisation of each refugee camp depended
primarily upon the superintendent. " Each camp bore the impress
of the character of its superintendent. "f Good water, drainage, and
sanitation, an excellent hospital and teaching staff were imjwrtant
factors in the successful conduct of such a camp ; but the paramount
* Up to the end of September, 1901, that is to say. for some six months, the
camp schools cost £7,2^0. This figure does not include the cost of the schools
in Natal, nor of the refugee schools in the towns.
t See footnote page 662.
664 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
element was the capacity of the individual superintendent, and the
extraordinary difficulty of his task may be imagined.
As the war continued, considerable experience was gained in the
management of the refugee camps. TraveUing inspectors of camps,
with a staff of an inspecting medical officer, and an inspecting water
engineer, were appointed, who practically standardised the best features
of camp management throughout the country. Public boilers for
boiling water and pubhc ovens for baking were supplied by the
Administration to all camps. Vegetables, lime juice, butter and jam
were added to the rations of adults, and more milk to that of small
children. More school teachers were applied for. The number of
matrons* in the camp was increased, and the supply of food-
stuffs on sale in the camp shops was supplemented. Additional
doctors and nursesf were despatched to those camp hospitals
which were particularly in need of their services ; and as far as
possible a reserve staff of doctors and nurses was formed.
The dispensaries were invariably well-stocked ; the supply of
invalid food was almost unlimited ; and in spite of the insufficient
number of medical officers and trained nurses, the work of the medical
and nursing staff in most cases left little to be desired.
A certain amount of transport was allowed to all superintendents
so that they might deal efficiently with the sanitation and water
supply of their camps. Every effort was made to supply the refugees
with beds, and the number of inmates of any individual camp was
as far as possible limited ; any sites found to be insanitary were
moved ; and the fencing-in of camps and restrictions upon free
ingress and egress in the interest of health gradually became universal.
The death-rate, especially amongst the children, in the camps was
naturally higher than normal ; it was to be attributed : — (i) To the
insanitary condition of the coimtry engendered by the war. Small
children were peculiarly susceptible to the tainted drinking water
and atmosphere, and to the want of food suitable to their age ; but
these conditions would have been at least " as severely felt by the
child population had they been left to live on their farms. "J
* See previous footnote.
t Hitherto the usual proportion of doctors had been one per thousand, and
of nurses three per thousand inhabitants.
J Report on Concentration Camps by a Committee of Ladies appointed by
the Secretary of State for War (Cd. 893, page 15).
APPENDIX 12. 665
(2) To causes within the control of the refugees themselves. Even
under the best circumstances protracted existence in stationary camps
has always been productive of disease, especially of enteric disorders.
The massing together of large numbers of persons is, in itself,
liable to cause the propagation of disease, owing to the resultant
contact between them. In the concentration camps conditions were
particularly unfavourable owing largely to the character and in-
experience of their inhabitants. " The majority of the refugees were
filthy in their habits,"* and did not realise that " what might be
comparatively harmless when family was separated from family by
miles of open veld was dangerous when thousands of people were
gathered together in a small area." Moreover, the Dutch refugees had
a rooted objection to sending their children into hospital, and did all
in their power to conceal cases of disease among them. Thus in-
fection was spread broadcast. The cubic space in the tents was
small, and the infected patient came into intimate contact with
every other occupant of the tent. The mothers had little idea
of feeding and nursing a sick child — and their neglect in this respect,
and their invariable objection to proper ventilation, rendered any
check on infection a matter of extreme difficulty.
Europeans, hardened by the frequent recurrence of epidemics in
Europe, enjoy a certain immunity from infection, which apj^ears to have
been lost by the South African Dutch, owing, perhajjs, to their long
sojourn in that country and to the complete isolation of their homes.*
Whatever the cause, the susceptibility of the Africanders to infection
of most kinds was markedly greater than that of Europeans. Such
diseases as measles, pneumonia, whooping cough, chicken-pox, mumps
— all of a malignant type — spread rapidly amongst the refugees, both
children and adults, in a manner imheard of amongst a similar
]X)pulation of Europeans. The variation of temperature was
also a potent factor in the production of disease. It was often as
much as 60° Fahrenheit, and provided, especially for children and
aged persons, the very conditions most conducive to the germination
of disease.
Often, too, the refugees were admitted to camp in a low and
destitute state, particularly in the case of women and children who
had been following a commando. In one case at Kroonstad, a
* Papers relating to the Refugee Camps (Cd. 853, pages 113 and 1 14).
f^ THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
batch of refugees brought into camp eight moribund cases and three
dead bodies. It was unquestioned that the epidemics were primarily
caused by the sufferings of women and children previous to entering
the camps, and no sooner did one species of disease germ die out in a
camp than it was quickly re-introduced by fresh arrivals from the
veld. Under similar circumstances in the future, some system of
quarantine camps where suspected incomers could be kept under
observation before being given free pratique to the permanent camp,
would be advisable.
The subjoined Tables contain much statistical information with
regard to the camps: —
APPENDIX 12.
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THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
APPENDIX 15.
Statement shewing : —
A. Comparative Recruiting Figures of the Army and Militia prior to
AND DURING THE WaR IN SoUTH AFRICA.
B. Recruiting Figures during the War of the Imperial Yeomanry,
Volunteers, South African Constabulary, etc.
Rscruiting Figures prior to the War in Soxjth Africa.
The average take of Recruits was (7 years) : —
33,815 per year for the Army.
39,523 per year for the Militia.
During the War the Figures were as follows : —
Raised during
Army.
Militia.
Last Quarter of 1899
1900
., »90i
Five Months of 1902
13,063
47.700
45.157
20,229
10,337
37-853
37.644
20,010
The average number of Recruits per year amounted to : —
47,305 for the Army.
39,691 for the Militia.
The Nett yearly gain to Recruiting during the War, as compared with previous years, amounted
roughly to 13,500 for the Army, while the Recruiting for the Militia remained at the same figure.
APPENDIX 15.
679
B.
Recruiting Figures during the War of the Imperial Yeomanry,
Volunteers, South African Constabulary, etc.
DetaU.
1900.
1901.
1902.
Total
Imperial Yeomanry.
(
First Contingent, Army Order i of 1900
10,242
—
—
10,242 j
Drafts, Army Order 40 of 1901
—
16,597
—
^^•S97Ua7ic
655 > 34,715
Drafts, Re-enlisted Men, Army Order 208 of 1901
—
655
—
Drafts, Army Order 8 of 1902
—
—
7,221
7,221
Volunteers.
Infantry, Army Order 29 of 1900
10,568
—
—
10,568)
City of London Rifle Volunteers, Army Order 31 of 1900
1.664
—
—
1,664
Drafts, Infantry, Army Order 41 of 1901
—
4.530
—
4,530 M9.393
2181
2,413)
Cyclists, Army Order 92 of 1901
—
218
—
Drafts, Infantry, Army Order 29 of 1902
—
—
2.413
Engineers : —
fortress, Army Order 30 of 1900 1
Electrical, Army Order 30 of 1900 >
469
828
'63
1,460
Fortress, Army Order 66 of 1 901 )
Medical : —
Volunteers for South Africa, Army Order 58 of 1900 j
Volunteers for Home Duty, Army Order 58 of 1900 (
784
886
191
1,861
Compounders (Circulars) j
Trained Men, Army Order 86 of 1901 ... )
Artificers
722
75
69
866
Army Post Office Corps
235
339
40
514
Telegraphists
300
—
—
|00
Army Service Corps, Clerks, Army Order I18 of 1902...
—
—
611
611
Royal Reservists, Army Order 48 of 1900
24.130
—
—
24,130
Time-expired Men in South Africa to extend for one
year for ;^5
—
, »3
—
. J3
Time-expired Men in India to extend for Bounty
South African Constabulary
—
16,612
—
16,612
—
7.739
635
8.374
ToUls
49. "4
48.392
".343
108,849
Period two years five months : —
Enlistments
Bounty extensions
92,224
16,625
Total
108,849
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employmen
1
686
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APPENDIX 17.
687
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THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
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APPENDIX 17.
689
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VOL. IV.
44
690
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
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APPENDIX 17,
691
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VOL. IV.
44'
692
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
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APPENDIX 17.
693
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THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
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APPENDIX 17.
695
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696
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
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Brought forward
2nd bn. Northamptonshire
1st „ Royal Berkshire
2nd ,, ,, ,,
2nd ,, Royal West Kent
1st „ Yorkshire Light Infantry
2nd ,, „ ,, M
1st ,, Shropshire Light Infantry
2nd ,, ,, M ,1
2nd „ Middlesex
3rd ,
1st ,, King's Royal Rifle Corps
2nd ,, ,, M »» >>
3rd „ „ „ ,,
4th „ ,, ,, ,, ,,
2nd ,, Wiltshire
1st ,, Manchester
2nd ,, ,
3rd ,, „
4th ,, „
2nd ,, North Staffordshire
1st ,, York and Lancaster
1st „ Durham Light Infantry
2nd ,, ,, ,, ,
1st ,, Highland Light Infantry
APPENDIX 17.
697
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APPENDIX i8.
Expenditure Incurred on Army Votes ii
Vote I.— Pkj, Ac.oCAnBj
„ a.— Medleia StabiWiaHt ..
„ 3.-M lUtte, IV. Bonaty. *c.
„ &— TimiMportuidB«n>oaBU..
„ 7.— FmrWoot, Vbnta, *e. ..
„ t.— Olothiiiff
„ 9.— WarlOw kod othar Sloni
„ la— Wotka, BiiUdliigm,Mid Bapaln.,
„ ii.-UnoaikNMl btoblMimBli .
„ 12.— MiMMllUMIMi
„ iJl— WwOOm
„ 14.— Noo-«ffect!T« Chugw— Ofllom
„ iS.— Kon-«flecUre Ohff Ifan
IbUk
1899—1900.
1,793,000
149.000
2*3,900
io,siB,ooo
3,396,700
t,a3o,ooo
2,976,000
14.S00
i7,i3o
»9.6»7
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RMMlyli.
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i,Soo
98,300
36,000
900
29,76«
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63,359
Nflk
Bstn
i,7«9,6oo
»49.ooo
282,000
10,189,300
3,>8o,70o
l,290/X)O
2,976,000
132,700
900f
17,000
A9,7ftft
A 2J^2io,i97 187,397 S3,0S2,6oo 64,979,200 2,668,200 62,3ii,ooc
1900—1901.
Bxtn
Cluus«s.'
«
9,410,990
795,000
1,690,100
11,640,000
16,022,000
3,578,000
9,654,900
i,499.'«»
2,000
178,490
36,400
378,900
74,<oo
SkTlngt
and
Bzti*
BMelpU.
713,450
3,000
103,700
476,000
750,000
94,000
4,600
342,890
600
190,000
26,000
Net
Bxtra
Charge. •
«
8,695,500
790,000
1,986,400
21,164,00c
19,272,000
3,92 4, noc
9,654, .Vx;
1.499.'°^
t,r.Oi
161,,14'x
55,8of
i88,5oc
48,40<
•loi
I of OTttanated paMa opcndltan.
699
DNSEQUENCE OF THE WaR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
1901—1900.
I9M— I90SL
190S— 1904.
TOTAU
*
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Baring*
Mid
Bztn
BMOtpta.
Net
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Bxti»
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flftTingt
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«
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5^560
i88,iS5
4.90MSS
6,158,125
184,270
•.154,494
592.045
J^5oo
1,450,247
750
542,859
122,500
NM
■xtn
Ohuf*.*
■ t'J,000
796.300
i,zi6,3oo
8,562,So-)
9,106,600
2,944, 2<»
6,000,000
1,759,900
199,600
7«.floo
922,000
246,000
792,000
2,700
73,200
310,000
200,000
55,000
4*3.900
177,500
18,000
M
14.497.000
795,800
1,145,100
18,252,500
17,456,500
2,944.>00
5,800,000
1,702,500
MMMH
78,500
344.900
228,090
14,895,125
528,660
1,006459
10,692,115
12,588,050
•.7*9.470
5,081,000
l,2l5,38o
418,800
71,200
585,700
44«.A»
£
701,125
10,660
9.755
A, 287,515
2,541,000
•07,270
978,000
i85,5Bo
_
621,500
112,000
.^9,500
I4,l9«.ooo
518,000
996,900
7,404,600
10,247,000
l,662,MO
2,508,000
1,080,000
tOSjOOOf
71,200
47«,7oo
40M00
A
1,597.438
2,676,77*
47/MO
74.494
7«,668
27.U9
2i.\ooa
438.000
M
127,846
18/100
79M«
i,8«o,77*
tfftfflW
»>.4»4
118^668
I8,aa9
59.000
842,000
i«,a»t
747.000
1,886,000
itTjOOOt
Mjoom
9t00o
218,000
899,000
«
49^5421
x.s69,i6o
4.i9^>»
62,66o«oas
90,780.125
9.568,670
»«.7«5,794
4.701,843
2,000
M4»«79
228^180
1,786,827
1,206,700
41,016,100
2,282,800
4,008,000
57,757,600
49.571.000
9,384,400
2o,65i,5oo
4,549.500
S,fOOf
222,500
1,185,968
1,084,200
^678,700
5,680,600
62,992,100
17,295,7*5
7.9M.7S9
•fc*7.ooo
6,06«,44S
l.SaM4S
5480^000
208,220355
17,887,859
191^862,700
t Mat SkTlnri ud Bxtn B««ipu.
700
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
APPENDIX 19.
A LIST OF RECIPIENTS OF THE VICTORIA CROSS DURING THE WAR
IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1899—1902.
NAME AND RANK.
Mafeking (Action near)
Elandslaagte (Natal)
Ladysmith (Action near)
Magersfontein
>>
Colenso (NaUl)
Game Tree (near Mafeking) j
14th Oct. 1899
aist Oct. 1899
2 1st Oct. 1899
2ist Oct. 1899
2ist Oct. 1899
30th Oct. 1899
nth Dec. 1899
nth Dec. 1899
nth Dec 1899
15th Dec. 1899
15th Dec. 1899
15th Dec. 1899
15th Dec. 1899
iSth Dec. 1899
iSthDec. 1899
iSth Dec. 1899
26th Dec. 1899
26th Dec. 1899
Captain C. Fitzclarence, Royal Fusiliers^
Ijmd. Gaz. 6th July, 1900.
Captain M. F. M. Meiklejohn, Gordon
Highlanders, /^«rf. 6^as. 20th July, 1900.
Sergeant-Major VVm. Robertson, Gordon
Highlanders, Z<7WflC. Cai. 20th July, 1900.
Captain R. Johnstone, Imperial Light
Horse, Lond. Gaz. 12th Feb. 1901.
Captain C. H. MuUins, Imperial Light
Horse, Lond. Gaz. 12th Feb. 1901.
Second Lieutenant J. Norwood, sth Dra-
goon Guards, Lond, Gaz. 20th July,
1900.
Corporal J. Shaul, Highland Light
Infantry, Lofid. Gaz. 28th Sept. 1900.
Lieutenant H. E. M. Douglas, Royal
Army Medical Corps, Lottd. Gaz. 29th
March, 1901.
Captain E. B. Towse, Gordon High-
landers, Lond. Gaz. 6th July, 1900.
Captain W. N. Congreve, Rifle Brigade,
Lond. Gaz. 2nd Feb. 1900.
Lieutenant Hon. F. S. Roberts, King's
Royal Rifle Corps, Lond. Gaz. 2nd
Feb. 1900. (Died of wounds.)
Corporal G. E. Nurse, 66th battery Royal
Field artillery, Lond. Gaz. 2nd Feb.
1900.
Captain H. L. Reed, 7th battery Royal
Field artillery, Lond. Gaz. 2nd Feb,
1900.
Major W. Babtie, C. M.G., Royal Army
Medical Corps, Lond. Gaz. 20th April,
1900.
Private C. Ravenhill, Royal Scots Fusi-
liers, Lond. Gaz. 4th June, 1901.
Captain H. N. Schofield, Royal Field
artillery, Zo«a^. Gaz. 30th Aug. 1901.
Trooper H. E. Ramsden, Protectorate
regiment, Lond. Gaz. 6th July, 19CX).
Sergeant H. R. Martineau, Protectorate
regiment, Lond. Gaz. 6th July, 1900.
APPENDIX 19.
A List of Recipients of the Victoria Cross {continued).
701
Colesberg (Reconnaissance
near)
Caesars Camp (Ladysmith)
Wagon Hill (Ladysmith)
>> <«
>> >>
Paardeberg
Tugela Heights (Natal)
Arundel (Plewman's Farm,
Cape Colony)
Hart's Hill (Natal)
Terrace Hill (Tugela, Natal
Bloemfontein (Action near)
Korn Spruit
f» M
>« >>
>> >>
Wakkerstroom
5th Jan. 1900
6th Jan. 1900
6th Jan. 1900
6th Jan. 1900
6th Jan. 1900
6th Jan. 1900
i8th Feb. 1900
1 8th Feb. 1900
23rd Feb. 1900
24th Feb. 1900
34th Feb. 1900
27th Feb. 1900
13th Mar. 1900
31st Mar. 1900
3i8t Mar. 1900
31st Mar. 1900
31st Mar. 1900
31st Mar. 1900
20th Apr. 1900
NAME AND RANK.
Lieutenant Sir J. P. Milbanke, Bart. loth
Hussars, Land. Gaz. 6th July, 1900.
Private J. Pitts, Manchester regiment,
Lond. Gaz. 26th July, 1901.
Private R. Scott, Manchester regiment,
Lond. Gaz. 26th July, 1901.
Lieutenant J. E. L .Masterson, 1st
battalion Devonshire regiment, Lond.
Gaz. 4th June, 1901.
Lieutenant R. J. T. Digby Tones, Royal
Engineers, Lond. Gaz. 8tn Aug. 1902.
(Killed.)
Trooper H. Albrecht, Imperial Light
Horse, Lond. Gaz. 8th Aug. 1902.
(Killed.)
Lieutenant F. N. Parsons, Essex regi-
ment, Lond. Gaz. 20th Nov. 1900.
(Killed at Driefontein, loth March,
1900)
Sergeant A. Atkinson, Yorkshire regi-
ment, Lond. Gaz. 8th Aug. 1902.
(Died of wounds.)
Private A. E. Curtis, 2nd battalion East
Surrey regiment, Lond. Gaz. 15th Jan.
1901.
Sergeant J. Firth, 1st battalion West
Riding regiment, Lond. Gaz. lith
June, 1901.
Lieutenant E. T. Inkson, Royal Army
Medical Corps, I^ond. Gaz. 15th Jan.
1901.
Captain C. Mansel-Jones, West York-
shire regiment, Lond. Gaz. 27th July,
1900.
Sergeant H. Engleheart, loth Hussars,
/.ond. Gaz. 5th Oct. 1900.
.Major E. J. Phipps- Hornby, Q. battery
Royal Horse artillery, Lond. Gaz. 26th
June, 1900.
Sergeant C. Parker, Q. battery, Royal
Horse artillery, Lond. Gaz. 26th June,
1900.
Gunner Isaac Lodge, Q. battery Royal
Horse artillery, Lond Gat. 26th June,
1900.
Driver H. Glasock, Q. battery. Royal
Horse turtillery, Lond. Gaz. 26th June,
1900.
Lieutenant F. A. Maxwell, D.S.O., In-
dian Staff Corps, attached Roberts'
Horse, Lottd. Gaz. 8th March, 1901.
Lieutenant W. H. S. Nickerson, Royal
Army Medical Corps, Lond. Gaz. 12th
Feb. 1901.
702 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
A List of Recipients of the Victoria Cross (coniimud).
BATTLE.
Wakkerstroom
Crows Nest Hill (near
Johannesburg)
Delagoa Bay I^lway
Lindley
Wolve Spruit (near Stander-
ton)
Krugersdorp (Action near)
Leehoek, or Doombosch
Fontein (nearKrugersdorp;
Vredefort
Mosilikatse Nek
Essenbosch Farm
Van Wyks Vlei (Transvaal)
DATE.
Bergendal (Transvaal)
Warm Bad (Transvaal)
>• >• <•
Geluk (Transvaal)
Zeerust (Action near)
Komati River
32nd Apr. 1900
29th May, 1900
2nd June, 1900
26th June, 1900
5th July, 1900
I ah July, 1900
nth July, 1900
24th July, 1900
2nd Aug. 1900
7th Aug. 1900
2ist Aug. 1900
2ist Aug. 1900
23rd Aug. 1900
27th Aug. 1900
1st Sept. 1900
1st Sept. 1900
13th Oct. 1900
20th Oct. 1900
7th Nov. 1900
7th Nov. 1900
7th Nov. 1900
NAME AND RANK.
Corporal H. Beet, ist battalion Derby-
shire regiment, Loud. Gaz. 12th Feb.
1901.
Corporal J. F. McKay, Gordon High-
landers, Lond. Gaz. lOth Aug. 1900.
Corporal F. Kirby, Royal Engineers,
Lond. Gaz. sth Oct. 1900.
I'rivate C. Ward, 2nd battalion York-
shire Light Infantry, Lond. Gaz. 28th
Sept. 1900.
Sergeant A^ 11. L. Richardson, Lord
Strathcona's Corps, Lond. Gaz. I4lh
Sept. 1900.
Captain D. R. Younger, Gordon High-
landers, Lond. Gaz. 8lh Aug 1902.
(Killed.)
Captain W. E. Gordon, Gordon High-
landers, Lond. Gaz. 28th Sept. 1900.
Captain N. R. Howse, New South
Wales Medical Staff Corps, Lond.
Gaz. 4lh June, 1901.
Private W. House, 2nd battalion Royal
Berkshire regiment, Lond. Gaz. 7th
Oct. 1902.
Sergeant T. Lawrence, 17th Lancers,
Lond. Gaz. 15th Jan. 1901.
Corporal H. J. Knight, 1st battalion
Liverpool regiment, Land. Gaz. 4th
Jan. 1901.
Sergeant H. Hampton, 2nd battalion
Liverpool regiment, Loud. Gaz. i8th
Oct. 1901.
Private VV. Heaton, 1st battalion Liver-
pool regiment, /-<»«</. Gaz. iSlhJan. 1901.
Private E. Durrani, 2nd battalion Rifle
Brigade, Lond. Gaz. i8th Oct. 1901.
Private J. H. Bisdee,Tasmanian Imperial
Bushmen, Lond. Gaz. 13th Nov. 1900.
Lieutenant G. G. E. Wylly, Tasmanian
Imperial Bushmen, Lond. Gaz. 23rd
Nov. 1900.
Major E. D. Brown, 14th Hussars, Lond.
Gaz. 15th Jan. 1901.
Lieutenant A. C. Doxat, 3rd battalion
Imperial Yeomanry, L^nd. Gaz. 15th
Jan. 1901.
Lieutenant H. Z. C. Cockburn, Royal
Canadian Dragoons, I^ond. Gaz. 23rd
April, 1901.
Ivieutenant R. E. W. Turner, Royal
Canadian Dragoons, L^ond. Gaz. 23rd
April, 1901.
Sergeant E. Holland, Royal Canadian
Dr^oons, Lond. Gaz. 23rd April, 1901.
APPENDIX 19.
A List of Recipients of the Victoria Cross {continwd).
703
NAME AND RANK.
Dewetsdorp
Nooitgedacht
Monument Hill (Belfast)
Naauwpoort (Action near)
Bothwell Camp
Strijdenburg
Derby
Brakpan
Lambrecht Fontein
Thabanchu
Vlakfontein
Springbok Laagte
Ruiters' Kraal
Blood River I'oort
Itala (Zululand)
Moedwil
Geelhoutboom
Tygerskloof
Tafelkop (Orange River
Colony)
Vlakfontein
22nd Nov. 1900
13th Dec. 1900
Night of 7th~
8th Jan. 1 901
28th Jan. 1901
6th Feb. 1901
24th Feb. 1901
3rd Mar. 1 90 1
1 6th May, 1901
1 8th May, 1901
1 5th June, 1901
3rd July, 1901
4th July, 1 901
13th Aug. 1 901
17th Sept. 1901
26th Sept. 190 1
30th Sept. 1 90 1
23rd Nov. 1901
1 8th Dec. 1901
20th Dec. 1901
8th Feb. 1902
Private C. Kennedy, 2nd battalion High-
land Light Infantry, Lond. Gaz. i8th
Oct. 1 901.
Sergeant D. Farmer, ist battalion
Cameron Highlanders, I,ond. Gaz.
I2th April, 1901.
Private J. Barry, Royal Irish raiment,
I^nd. Gaz. i8th Aug. 1902. (Killed.)
Farrier-Major W. J. Hardham, 4th New
Zealand contingent, Ijmd. Gaz. 4th
Oct. 1901.
Sergeant W. B. Traynor, 2nd battalion
West Yorkshire regiment, Lond. Gaz.
17th Sept. 1 901.
Corporal J. J. Clements, Rimington's
Guides, /u>nd. Gaz. 4th June, 1901.
Lieutenant F. B. Dugdale, 5th Lancers,
/^nd. Gaz. 17th Sept. 1901.
Lieutenant F. W. Bell, West Australian
M. I., Land. Gaz. 4th Oct. 1901.
Lieutenant and Adjutant G. H. B. Coul-
son, King's Own Scottish Borderers
7th M.I., Lond. Gas. 8th Aug. 1902.
(Killed.)
Sergeant Jas. Refers, South African Con-
stabulary, Zumd. Gaz. i8th April, 1902.
Lieutenant W. J. English, 2nd Scottish
Horse, Lond. Gaz. 4th Oct. 1901.
Private H. G. Crandon, i8th Hussars,
Lond. Gaz. 1 8th Oct. 1901.
Sergeant- Major A. Young, Cape Police,
Lond. Gaz. 8th Nov. 1901.
Lieutenant L. A. E. Price-Davies,
D.S.O., King's Royal Rifle Corps,
Loptd. Gaz. 29th Nov. 1901.
Driver F. G. Bradley, 69th battery Royal
Field artillery, /^nd. Gaz. 27lh Dec.
1901.
Private W. Bees, ist battalion Derby-
shire regiment, Lond. Gaz. 17th Dec.
1901.
Lieutenant L. C. Maygar, 5th Victorian
Mounted Rifles, Lond. Gaz. nth Feb.
1902.
Surgeon-Captain T. J. Crean, 1st Im-
perial Light Horse, ■Ij>nd. Gaz. nth
Feb. 1902.
Shoeing-Smith A. E. Ind, Royal Horse
artillery, XI. section Pom-poms, Ijtnd
Gaz. 15th Aug. 1902.
Surgeon-Captain A. .Martin-Leake, South
African Constabulary, Iu)nd. Gaz.
13th May, 1902.
704
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
APPENDIX 20.
Statement of Boer Prisoners of War, showing how disposed of —
December 27 th, 1900.
'Confined at Green Point (near Cape Town) ... 4,825
„ „ Simon's Town ... ... ... 1,901
Cape Colony ■ „ in Hospital 81
On parole at Cape Town ... ... ... ... 236
„ in the Colony 310
Natal
Ceylon ...
St. Helena
Dead ...
Total
Confined in
On parole in
Confined in
On voyage to
Total prisoners
7.353
607
126
4,335
633
2,456
245
15.755
Statement of Boer Prisoners of War, showing how disposed of —
June ist, 1902.
In South Africa
1,733
„ India
...
9,125
„ Colonies
... 15,136
Total
... 25,994
Released on parole
.
789
Dead
.
812
Returned to refugee camps ..
.
••• 3,194
Burghers on parole
Total
••• 2,552
••• 33,341
APPENDIX 20.
70s
Monthly Comparative Statement for 1901 — 2, showing approximately
the Casualties in the Boer Forces during that period.
S-g
-o-g
I90I.
1
i2
s
1
Killed or
wounded, n
specified whi
1
£
c
a
s
Prisoners c
turrenders, r
specified whi
Total.
January
227
442
14
98
78
859
February
161
>75
405
530
501
—
1.772
March
»99
234
23
610
406
—
1.472
April
105
118
18
3
—
2,193
2,437
May
•«3
324
—
9
—
2,069
2.5SS
June
220
»93
—
970
894
—
2.277
July
160
«35
—
1.074
45»
—
I, Sao
August
185
60
—
1.363
554
—
2,163
Septeml)cr
242
164
—
1.505
3.M
—
2,245
October
"55
97
1,192
162
-
1,606
Novemljcr ...
:^
118
—
844
162
^
1.257
December
64
—
'.338
375
—
1.925
1902.
January
134
70
—
1,013
256
—
1.463
February
150
146
—
1,921
344
-
2,561
March
70
8S
—
599
261
—
1. 01 5
April
May
138
131
—
73<>
164
—
1,149
39
6
—
934
38
—
987
Totals
3,619
2.552
460
14.729
4.970
4,262
29.592
Summary, showing Decrease of Boer Forces at specified periods
of the War.
Original Strength of Boer Forces {yide Volume I.,
Appendix 4, page 459)
Prisoners of war, December 27th, 1900 ... ... i5i7S5
Casualties, 1899 — 1900 ... ... ... ... 21,339
87.365
36,994
Forces in the Field, January ist, 1901
Casualties, 1901 — 2
Total Forces in the Field on conclusion of peace,
May 31st, 1902
* Transvaal
Orange Free State
Rebels
Renegades and foreigners
Total ...
50.371
«9,S9«
20,779*
11,232
5,833
3.574
140
20,779
VOL. IV.
45
INDEX
INDEX TO VOLUME IV
Aangaan, 476.
Aapies river, 445.
Aaronslaagte, 254, 257.
Aasvogels Krans, 246.
Abandonment of Wolmaranstad, 415.
Aberdeen, and district, 72, 74, 173,
175-6, 226, 228-9, 367. 456.
463, 465 : attack on the town,
466.
Aberdeen Road Station, 74, 173, 237,
278 ; attack on, 228.
Aberfeld, 482.
Abrahams Kraal (Modder river), 95,
264.
Abrahamskraal (cast of Kofiyfontein),
432.
Action of: Bakenlaagte, 304-15;
r3o3chbult, 494-6 ; Boschmanskop,
518-19 ; Forts Itala and Prospect.
219-21 ; Graspan, 105 ; Gruis-
fontein, 408 ; Moedwil, 295-7 >
Nooitgedacht, 13-22 ; Onvcrdacht.
57 ; Onverwacht, 379-80 ; Quagga-
fontein, 287-8 ; Richmond, 236 ;
Rooiwal, 499-503 ; Sannah's Post,
318-19; Scheepers Nek, 217-18;
Springhaan Nek. 51 ; Tabaksberg,
the, 76 ; Tafel Kop (Orange
River Colony). 389-90 ; Tiger
Kloof Spruit, 386-7 ; Treurfontein,
406-7; Tweebosch, 417-20; Twee-
fontein, 394 ; Vlakfontein, 186-8 ;
Wilmansrust, 203 ; Yzerspruit, 411-
14 ; Zuur Vlakte, 234-5.
Acting-President, South African Re-
public. See BuRGBR, S. W.
Address to burghers, by L. Itotha,
527-
Adelaide, 174, 277, 467.
Adjutant-General, The, 301.
Administration of: Cape Colony, 176-
8, 224. 230-1 ; the Orange River
Colony and the Transvaal, on
conclusion of peace, 535, 548.
560-3.
Aide-Memoire, from the Netherland
Government (peace proposals), 529-
31-
Akel, 164.
Albert, 60.
Albert Junction, 179.
Albertina station, 439.
Alberts, Commandant H., 210, 376.
Alberts, Commandant Sarel, 409.
Alderson, Brigadier-General E. A. H.,
C.B., A.D.C., 31-3, III, 113, 115.
117, 119-32, 137.
Alcttasdraai. 160-1.
Alexander. Lieut. -Colonel H., D.S.O..
337-8. 243, 344. 283-6, 390, 359,
370.
Alexanders Kraal, 329.
Alicedale, 466.
Aliwal North, 46, 60, 62-4, 78, 97,
163-5, >68, 176, 179, 234. 236, 253.
261, 266-7, 286-7, 3>7. 327-8.
368, 464.
Alkmaar (Delagoa Bay line), 208.
Alkmaar (or Spitrkop), 300, 378.
AUegrens Kraal, 466.
Alleman's Dam, 360.
AJlemans Kraal. 466.
7IO
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
AUemans Poort, 273.
AUenby. Colonel E. H. H., iii, 113.
115-17, 119-21, 127, 142, 149-52.
155, 188-9, '92-4. 197. 216, 219,
222-3. 291-2. 303. 315. 371. 373.
375-6. 378-9. 381. 485-7. 490. 514.
517, 520, 522.
Ambuscades, 154, 191, 233. 330. 344,
376. 381. 444. 450. 484.
America (U.S.A.), 25.
America siding, 57.
Amerspoort. 1 16-17, 147. '54. '99-
200, 376.
Ammunition, 81, 109; Boers, capture
of, by, 351, 355, 469 ; expenditure
of, 363 : short of. 125, 355 ;
British, capture of, by, 52, 135, 141,
146, 158, 208, 211, 241, 257, 261,
429, 438-9, 443, 476 ; exhaustion
of. at Yzerspruit. 414 ; expendi-
ture of, 221 : at Bakenlaagte, 312-
13; Boschbult, 496; Itala. 220:
Ookiep, 472.
Amnesty, general. 532-4, 536, 560-3.
Amos Poort. 74.
Amsterdam, and district, 114, 117,
148,199. 204-5, 216. 222, 377, 379;
blockhouse line to, 372, 512.
Anderson. Lieut. -Colonel W. C, 410-
15, 417. 419. 422.
.\nley. Major F. G., 308-10, 314.
Annenous, 470.
.\ppcndices, 567-705.
Arbitration, 536.
.\rcadia, 317.
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
See Regular Units.
Arming of loyalists in Cape Colony, 69.
Armistice, proposals for, 107, 450 ;
terms of, for peace, 508.
Armoured trains, 80-1, 209, 228, 238,
362. 366, 402, 442. 467, 507.
509.
Arms : Boers, short of, 355 ; capture
of. by. 469 ; laying down of, by,
107 ; thrown away by. 202. See
also Peace Conditions.
Army, British, strength of in South
Africa. See Strength ; also Ap-
pendix 13.
Army Medical Corps, Royal. See
Regular Units ; also Appen-
dix 7.
Army Ordnance Department. See
Appendix 8.
Army Post Office Corps. See Appen
Dix 9.
Army Remount Department. See
Appendix ii.
Army Service Corps. See Regular
Units ; also Appendices 5 and 6.
Articles of peace. 547-63.
Artillery, Royal. See Regular Units.
Arundel, 66.
Ash, Commander S. H. B., R.N., 470.
Ashburner's Light Horse. See Colo-
nial Units.
Ashheld, Sergeant W., 310.
Assegai river, 1 19-21, 201.
Astan Drift, 246.
Atherton, Lieut. -Colonel T. J., C.B.,
237, 242, 244, 284-6. 290, 370.
Atlantic Ocean, seaboard of. 65, 74,
350.
Attack, steepest side of position most
favourable to. 393-4.
Attack on : Aberdeen, 466 ; Belfast.
37-40 ; blockhouses, 205, 208-9,
259. 346, 483-4 ; Dalmanutha,
36-7 ; Delagoa Bay railway, 35 ;
Du Moulin's camp, 432 ; Helvetia,
26, 42 ; Lichtcnburg, 134 ; Machado-
dorp, 36, 42 ; Motlderfontein (Cape
Colony), 274-6 ; Modderfontein
(Gatsrand), 130; Nooitgedacht, 40;
Pan, 41 ; Wildfontein, 40 ; Wonder-
fontein, 40; railways, 125 ; Smith-
Dorrien's camp, 114; Vryheid,
30-2. See also Convoys.
Attaquas mountains, 283.
Attitude of Cape Colony, 60, 330-1.
Australia, 25.
Australian contingents. See Colonial
Units.
INDEX.
711
Avontuur (Botha's Berg, Eastern
Transvaal), 143.
Avontuur (Cape Colony), 73, 242.
Babanago, 153-4.
Babington, Major-General J. M., 128-
30. 134-8, 148, 155. 181-2. 197.
204-5, 207-8, 210, 223.
Baden-Powell, Major-General R. S. S.,
C.B., 304.
Badenhorst, Commandant C, 12, 14,
16-17, "3. 123, 190, 444.
Bag-nets, 255.
Baileyton, 467.
Baillie, Colonel A. C, D.S.O., 458.
463-5.474-
Bakenlaagte, 375, 390, 414, 421, 504;
action of, 304-15.
Bakoven Pan, 87.
Balaklava, British and Russian cavalry
at, 501.
Balmoral (Delagoa Bay line), 23, tj,
128, 145-6, 208, 517.
Balmoral (Mabusa Spruit). 200.
Bamboes Hock, 274.
Bamboes mountains, 174, 179. 225-6,
236, 277, 458. 464, 466.
Bamboes Spruit, 476.
Bangor, 66.
Bank, 346.
Bankdrift, 291.
Bankfontein (south of Lindley). 335.
Bankfontein (north of Middelburg).
143-
Bankhoek, 151.
Bank-notes, South African Republic,
144.
Bankpan, 207.
Banon, Major F. L., 165, 171.
Bapsfontein (or Bapsfon.), m. 113.
130.
Barbed wire, 33, 35. 40, 257. 403. 484.
Barberspan, 416.
Barber ton, 23.
Barker, Captain F. C. C, 212.
Barker, Brigadier-General J. C, 23,
415-
Barker, Lieut. -Colonel J. S. S., 45.
53-6. 59. no, 170. 254-5, 257-8.
260-1, 266, 269, 321, 331. 335.
338, 384. 386, 400, 402, 405. 420.
43'. 433-4. 475-6. 479. 482. 485,
487-8, 490.
Barkly East, and district, 163. 22^^,
234, 272, 286-7. 368-9. 473-
Barkly West, 60.
Barracouta, H.M.S.. 469.
Barrett, Captain R., 318.
Barroc, 278.
Barry, Private J. (awarded the Vic-
toria Cross posthumously), 38.
Barrydale, 283, 285.
Barter. Lieut. -Colonel C. St. L.. C.B..
3>5. 373. 375. 378-9. 3«'. 514. 522.
Barton. Major-General (i.. C.B..
C.M.G., I. 193-4. 197.
Bas Berg. 80-1. 89.
Basfontein, 184, i<>o, 194.
Bashoek, 190, 298-9, 301.
Basing, Colonel G. L., Lord. 104-5.
197, 265-7, 269, 320, 327. 33H.
430-1. 434. 478-80. 490- «. 51 '•
Bassons Hoek, 74.
Bastards Nek, 90.
Basutoland. and border of. 97-8. 164.
253. 265-7. 287, 316. 326. 431.
Bath, the order of the, 170, iKo. 217.
224.
Bathfontein, 141.
Batsheba. 432.
Baviaans Kloof mountains. 73.
Baviaanskraal, 425.
Bazeilles. in miniature at Boschbalt,
495-
Baznards Dam. 473.
" Beaters." 486 ; definition of, 1 14.
Beatson. Major-General S. B.. 139.
142-5. 150, 152, 15s. 199. 203-5.
207. 211-12. 214, 223, 243, 283:
arrives in Cape Colony, 242.
Beaufort West, 6^70. 72-4, 175. 237.
279-80, 285, 357-8, 455, 459.
Bechuanaland, 130, 506.
Beddy's Scouts. See Colonial Units.
712
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Bedford (county in Cape Colony), 326.
467.
Bedfordshire regiment. Sm Regular
Units.
Been Kraal, 74. 239.
Beer Vlei. 84. 87.
Bees. Private W. (awarded the Vic-
toria Cross), 297.
Beestekraal, 301-2.
Beestkraal, 287.
Beginderlyn, 11 5-16, 146. 149, 302.
Belfast, and road, 23, 36, 34-5, I36.
143-4. 148. 376-7 ; attack on. 37-
40 ; casualties at, 44.
Belgian monarchy, 24.
Bell, Lieutenant F. W. (awarded the
Victoria Cross), 148.
Bell, L4Uice-Corporal J., 313.
Bell's Kop, 377.
Bellew, Captain R. W. D., 359.
Belmont, 351.
Bendigo. 333.
Bengal Lancers (T5th), 357.
l^ennett. Major A. J., 336.
Benson, Lieut. -Colonel G. E.. 131,
133. »35-6. 138-9. M3-S. 148-9.
^55. *99- 204. 307-8. 3to-i2, 314-
15. 3*3. 337. 373-4. 376 ; at Baken-
laagte, 304-15.
Berkshire regiment, The Royal. See
Regular Units.
Berg river. 362. 430.
Bergcndal, 9, 436.
Bergfontein, 141.
Bergvleit, 303.
Berlin, 34.
Bertram, Captain R. M., 363.
Best, Lieutenant A. A., 441.
Bestershoek, 189.
Besterskraal, 256.
Bethanie, 161.
Bethel, and district, 42, 113, 150-2,
199, 303-4, 309. 215. 305-6, 373.
375-6. 378, 517.
Bethesda, 340.
Bethlehem, and road, 54, 57-8. 97,
loi, 108, 157-8, 169, 322-3, 331,
334-6. 384-6, 403. 423-5. 433. 475.
482, 484-5 ; blockhouse line to. 391,
398. 400. 476. 483.
Bethlehem commando. See Com-
mandos.
BethuUe, 62, 77-9, 97, 163-4, 176.
353, 365-6, 369, 387, 338.
Bethulie commando. See Com-
mandos.
Bethune, Colonel E. C. 65. 67, 69-70.
73, 93, 94-7, 100, 103-4, no, 165,
168-9, ^71. ^97. 246-7. 350, 331-3,
338. 474-
Bethune's Mounted Infantry. Ser
Colonial Units.
Beukes, Commandant, 436.
Bcwicke-Copley. Lieut. -Col. R. C. A. B..
C.B.. 315. 223, 304, 315. 373, 465-7.
473-4-
Beyers, General C. J., 10-13. 19, 21-2.
75, 113. 128-30. 437-42. 444-9.
451 ; chairman at peace conference,
542-3-
Bezuidenhout, Field-Cornet, 463-5.
Bezuidenhout's Drift, 487.
Bierlaagte, 424.
Biermann, Commandant, 451.
Biesjes Poort, 175, 280-1, 465.
Biesjesbult, 258.
Biesjesvallei, 507.
Biessiepan, 258.
Bismarck, 318, 431.
Blaauwbank, 213.
Blaauwkopje, 403.
Black woods Camp, 145.
Blaine, Captain, 449-50.
Blauw Kop, 147, 183, 206.
Blesbokspruit, 150.
BHnk Kop, 84.
Blinkklip, 192.
Blinkwater, 143-6, 211, 515.
Blockhouses, lines of, etc., 46-7, 153,
194, 196, 222, 233, 237-8, 252, 264,
286, 298, 304, 324-6, 329. 333-4.
339. 344. 346, 348. 364-6. 368,
376-80, 382, 385, 388, 391-2, 395,
398-400, 402-3, 407, 409, 423-8,
INDEX.
713
431, 458-9. 462, 466-7, 471-3.
476-7, 480, 482, 486, 506, 512,
514, 517-20 ; attack on, 205, 208-9,
259, 346, 457 ; attack on, omission
of, 347 ; evolution of system of —
see Appendix 2 ; systematic attempt
to destroy, 483-4 ; system in East-
ern Transvaal, 371-3.
Bleed river, 145, 213-14.
Bloem Spruit, 323.
Bloemendal (south-east of Springs),
ISO,
Bloemendal (east of Vryheid,) 121.
Bloemfontein, and road, 53, 77, 93.
95-7. 170. 176, 202, 250, 252, 254,
261, 434, 481, 488 ; blockhouse line
to, 264, 326, 431 ; railway of, 93,
167-8, 255, 258, 262, 264-5.
Bloemhof, and district, 133, 160, 191.
254, 491, 502. 505-7.
Hlokkloof, 291.
Hlomfield, Colonel C. J., 31-2, 216.
Blood. Lieut. -General Sir B., K.C.B.,
139-40, 142-4, 146-8, 152, 199,
203-5, 207-12, 214, 216, 223, 249,
304-
Blood river. 122.
Blydschap. 336, 476.
Boekenhoutskloof. 439.
lioers : arms of, abandoned, 202 ;
brutality of, towards British prison-
ers and natives, 430 ; capitulation
of, rumours of, 123 ; character-
istics of, 281 ; combination of, in
the Magaliesberg, 1 1 ; concentration
of. Western Transvaal, 184 ; council
of war of, 206, 334 ; delegates of, to
Europe, 24 ; demoralisation of,
376-7 ; depression among, 124, 216.
260; desertion of. 145 ; dismounted,
86 ; dispersion of. 96, 143, 332 ;
effect of defeat of, 504 ; families of.
261 ; fearlessness of, at Rooiwal,
501 ; festival, annual, of, 21 ; free
from molestation during peace
negotiations, 508 ; Government of
the — see Governments ; in British
territory, 508 ; independence of, to
be decided in Cape Colony. 461 ;
intelligence — see Intelligence,
Boer ; inutility of successes of,
421 ; irresolution of, at Forts Itala
and Prospect, 221 ; magazine of.
104 ; military talent of, 349 ;
mobihty of. 68 ; plan of cam-
paign— see Campaign ; plans of, at
Nooitgedacht. 9 ; recruits for (Cape
rebels). 356 ; recuperative powers
of, 519; reinforcements for, 226.
454 ; remount depAt of. 104 ;
shooting, stripping and robbing the
British dead and wounded at
Bakenlaagte, 313 ; spies of. 68 ;
spirit of, 404 ; States of, 21 :
statistics of — see Appendix 20 ;
strategy of — see Strategy ; strength
of — see Strengths of Boer
Forces ; strongholds of. 104, 183-4 ;
supplies : need of. 3, 68, 355,
377 ; plenitude of, 199 ; tenacity
of, 327 ; the veld, their " place "
of concentration, 436.
Boesmans Kop, 266. 316, 320.
Bokkeveld mountains, 353, 355-7.
359-
Boksburg commando. See Comman-
dos.
Bonnefoi. 148.
Bordeaux. 385.
Border Horse. See Colonial Units.
Border regiment. See Regular
Units.
Borderers, King's Own Scottish. See
Regular Units.
Borderers. South Wales. See Militia
and Regular Units.
Bosch Duiven Kop. 367.
Boschbult, 497 ; action at, 494-6.
Boschfontein (south of Breedts Nek),
10, 193.
Boschfontein (west of Lydenburg).
141.
Boschfontein (east of Olifants Nek),
193-
714
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Boschfontein (south-east of Vrede),
428.
Boschhoek (south-west of Botha's
Pass). 104.
Boschhoek (west of Lydenburi?). 141.
143.
Boschhoek (north-west of Rusten-
burg), 189, 291.
Boschhoek (or Boschoek) (south of
Waterval Onder). 148-9.
Boschmansfontein (west of Frankfort),
246.
Boschmansfontein (south of Pan). 203.
Boschmanskop (south of Middelburf;),
H3-
Boschmanskop (south-east of Spring),
153- 5^0; affair at, 518-19-
Boschpan. 494, 499.
Boschpoort, 406.
Boschput, 258.
Boschrand. 481.
Boschrandspan. 258.
Boschvarkensfontein, 367.
Boshof, and district, 99, 167, 433,
478-9, 481, 488. 506.
Bosjesman's Drift, 88.
Botha. Commandant C, 249.
Botha. Commandant C. J.. 237-9.
Botha, General Chris., 34-5. 220, 305.
Botha. Commandant H., 336. 426.
Botha, Commandant-General L., 1,9,
35. 37. 39. 42-4. 63, 112-17. !23-6.
129-30, 140, 146-7, 149, 205-6.
215, 217-20. 298. 307, 317, 320,
322. 328-9. 366, 375-6, 379, 382.
414. 42T, 435-6, 461, 475. 514-15 :
address of, to burghers, 527 ; attacks
Benson, 309 ; at the peace con-
ference, 523-6. 533. 539-40, 543-7.
556, 560-1, 563 ; dismisses T.
Smuts, 212 ; excuse for failure at
Itala, 222 ; orders to Opperman,
305 ; plans of, 34, 42, for invasion
of Natal, 216; refuses terms of
peace, 119; visits De Wet, 123.
Botha, Assistant-Head-Commandant
P.. 54-6.
Botha's Berg (Eastern Transvaal),
23-4. 34. 143-4. 208, 213, 5 > 5-16.
Botha's Berg (Orange River Colony),
246. 251, 329. 425, 480.
Botha's Pass. 102-4, ^S3' 33^- 37 '•
475 : blockhouse line to, 377, 398-9.
426-7. 480.
Bothaskraal, 333.
Bothaville, 160-1, 196, 253, 255.
325-6, 347, 415, 480-1, 4S9 ; block-
house line to, 345.
Bothwell. 114. 201.
Bottomley. Captain H. R.. 154.
Bouwers, Commandant R. D., 264.
278. 363-4. 4^-
EJowers, Captain J. See Pkeface.
Boyes. Major-General J. E.. 54-9, 93,
97, 1 10. 171.
Braamboschfontein. 321.
Brabant's Horse. See Colonial
Units.
Brabazon. Lieutenant J. H.. 144.
Bradley, Driver F. G. (awarded the
Victoria Cross), 220.
Brain T., private secretary to Ex-
President Steyn, 248.
Brak river. 81-4, 86.
Brak Spruit. 494-5, 498-9.
Brakfontein (Elands river. Western
Transvaal), 189, 291, 339.
Brakfontein (south of Pearston), 278.
Brakpan. 132. 138, 181.407.
Brakspruit. 137. 183, 340.
Brand, Commandant G., 67, 89, 429.
Brand Kraal. 122.
Branddrift, meeting of Boer leaders at.
205-6.
Brandewyns Kuil, 67.
Brandewynskuil, 191.
Brandfort, 95, 97, 159, i6t. 166-8.
245, 253, 259-60, 264.
Brands Drift, 52.
Brandvallei, 166. 252.
Brandvlei, 350-4. 367, 462.
Brandwacht (north of Calvinia), 355-6.
Brandwacht (north of Mossel Bay),
283-
INDEX.
7i<>
Brandwater basin, 46, 112, 157, 169,
265, 321-2, 335, 374, 482, 484-5.
Brebner J., Treasurer, Orange Free
State, 546, 560, 563.
Breda, 200.
Breedt (Cape rebel), 226.
Breedts Nek, 3, lo-ii, 21, 129-30,
189, 192-4.
Bremersdorp, destruction of, by T.
Smuts, 212.
Brereton, 200, 373.
Bridges, Captain G. T. M., 79.
Bridgetown, 362.
Bridging, the work of, 1 16-17,
Brigade of Guards, 367.
Brigades. See Cavalry, Columns
and Highland.
Briggs, Lieut. -Colonel C. J., 135, 323.
331. 338. 392. 405. 429. 434.
511.
Brindisi. 484.
Brindisi Drift, 322.
Britain, subjugation of, by the Ro-
mans, 404.
British, the, ascendency of, in South
Africa, 69; Government of, 119,
230, 261 ; peace negotiations by.
525-63 ; peace terms of, refused
by Botha, 119; protection of Boer
families by, 261 ; rule of, 60, 365-6 ;
terms of peace offered by, 523-4 ;
territory of, Boers in, during i)eace
negotiations, 508.
British South Africa Police. See
Colonial Units.
British Throne, Heir to, 355.
British troops, behaviour of, at Baken-
laagte, 310-14; Twecbosch, 419;
Tweefontein, 394 ; difficulties of
campaign for, 68, 198-9, 230-1,
265 ; endurance of, etc., 242. 379,
399, 449, 493, 521 ; stigma on
arms of, 229 ; the .shooting of, at
Rooiwal, 503-4.
Brits Kraal, 81.
Britstown. and district. 65, 67, 90,
239, 462, 465.
Broadwood, Brigadier-General R. G.,
C,B., 1-3, 6-1 1, 14, 16, 21-2, TOO,
102, no, 128. 159, 168, 171, 193, 197,
246-51. 255-61. 269, 321. 329. 335,
338, 383-5. 405.
Brodrick. The Right Hon. St. John.
M.P., Secretary of State for War,
537-
Broedersrust, 515.
Bronkhorst Spruit, 215.
Bronkhorstspruit station, 41, 211,
305. 5«6.
Bronsfontein. 57.
Brook. Major-General E. S.. C.B..
434.
Browne. Major R. A., 296.
Brugspruit, jj, 146. 153. 203. 208-9.
305-6, 315, 373, 521 ; blockhouse
line to. 372.
Brussels siding, 508.
Bryan, Mr., 25.
Buffalo, border of. 219.
Buffalo river, 42-3, 112, 217.
Buflels Hoek, 463.
Buifcls river, 284-5.
Buffelsdoorns, 131.
Buffelshock, 195.
Buffelspoort. 3-4, 7. 10.
Buffclsvlei (south of Frankfort), 102.
Buflfelsvlci (north of Heilbron), 109.
Butfflsvlei (west of Roos Senekal). 144.
Buiflcs, 446.
Buffs, The (East Kent regiment). See
Regular Units.
Bulfin, Major E. S.. 430-1. 434, 478.
481, 490-1, 511.
Bulhoek, 385.
Bull river. 175.
Buller, General The Right Hon. Sir
H. H., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., V.C, 25.
Bullock, Brigadier-General G. M..
C.B., 1 18-19. 147, 149-50, 154-5,
T99-200, 202-3, 222-3, 249, 269.
338, 371. 377. 399-
Bulpan, 507.
Buls Kop, 319.
Uultfontein (Cape Colony), 459.
7i6
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Bultfontein (Orange River Colony), 97.
167, 481, 488.
Bultfontein Drift, 258.
Buluwayo, railway to. 443.
Burger, Acting-President of the Sonth
African Republic Schalk W., 123-6,
140, 205-6, 380, 516; at the
peace conference, 533, 543. 546,
$56, 560, 563 ; peace proposals of.
534-5-
Burghers, restoration to their homes,
liberty and property of. 547-8 ; to
vote on peace proposals, 540-1. See
also BoBRS.
Burghersdorp (Cape Colony). 60. 65.
174, 179, 225. 234. 236, 272-3. 317.
368-9.
Burghersdorp (west of I^eydsdorp).
450.
Borke. Lieut.-Colonel. 383.
Burma Mounted Infantry. See In
FANTRY. Mounted.
Bum • Murdoch, Brigadier • General
J. R, C.B.. 119.
Busby, 117.
Bushmanland Borderers. See Colo-
nial Units.
Bushveld Carbineers. 5m Colonial
Units.
Buys, Commandant S. B.. 28, 309-10.
333-4.
Byng, Lieut.-Colonel The Hon. J. H. G..
46-51. 53. 59. 65-6, 71-2. 74.
89. 90, 92, no, 161, 163-5, 167.
171. 345, 251-2. 263, 269, 324-6.
331. 333. 335. 338. 383-4. 395-
399, 401-2, 405, 423-8. 434. 443.
475-
Caledon river, and area, i, 42, 45-7,
54, 62, 75, 97, 161, 163. 165-6,
316-17, 319, 429. See also Little
Caledon.
Calitzdorp, 243.
Callwell. Lieut.-Colonel C. E., 286,
290. 363-4. 370. 455. 460-1, 470-1.
474.
Calvinia, and district, 70-1, 224, 279.
350. 352-3. 355-6, 358-60, 363-5.
455, 460, 462, 469 ; blockhouse line
to, 364.
Calvinia District Troops. See Colo-
nial Units.
Camdeboo mountains, and district,
74, 175. 178, 227-9. 231. 278. 354.
367. 456. 463-5-
Cameron, Lieutenant G. E., 107.
Cameron Highlanders. See Regular
Units.
Campaign : Boer plan of, 68, 172, 349,
461 ; difficulties of, for British, 68,
198-9. 265 ; in Cape Colony. 230-1 ;
lessons of. 421, 497, 504; pro-
longation of. by action of Colonial
troops, 355 ; scheme of, in Orango
River Colony, 423-4, 475-6.
Campbell, Major-Gcneral B. B. D.,
M.V.O., 58-9, 93, 99, no, 156-8,
169. 171. 246, 265, 269. 321-2,
335. 338. 386-7, 391-2. 405, 434.
Campbell, Colonel W. P., 23, 111-13,
115, 118-21, 127, 204-5, 207, 210.
212-14, 216. 218, 222-3, i7^' 373.
381.
Campbell (town), 433.
Canada, 25.
Canadian contingents. See Cqlonial
Units.
Canadians, Royal (Leinster regiment).
See Regular Units.
Cape Agulhas, 349.
Cape Colony, 25. 42, 45, 53, 93, 96,
98-100, III, 123, 126, 161. 163-5.
195. 252. 265, 268, 317-18, 326-7,
435 ; attitude of inhabitants in,
60-3 ; blockhouse lines in, 454 ;
commands in, 176, 224 ; corre-
spondence with Government of,
230 ; cost of troops in, 230 ; de-
scent upon, I, 131 ; dual control
in, 224 ; effect in, of De Wet's
invasion, 172 ; Government of, 230,
272, 369 ; independence of, 75 ;
legislature of, 177, 272 ; local
INDEX.
717
defence troops in, 225, control of,
230 ; physical features of, 358 ;
ports of, martial law for, 178 ;
proclamation, by Smuts, for govern-
ance of, 462 ; railways of, 279 ;
rebellion in, 60-1, 68, 172, 224, 349-
50, 360 ; reinforcements for, 465 ;
re-invasion of, by De Wet, 42-3, 54,
58, 62, 108 ; renewed invasion of,
warnings of, 231 ; situation in, 224,
230-1, 271, 349-50. 383. 453-4;
situation of Boers in, 365-6, 461,
473 ; special efforts to deal with
Fouch6 and Malan in, 465 ; Smuts'
invasion of, 264, 268, 270 ; Smuts
to command Boer forces in, 363 ;
the main theatre of war, 461. See
also Events in, and Appendix 3.
Cap>e Mounted Riflemen. See Colo-
nial Units.
Cape Police. See Colonial Units.
Cape Town, 63-5, 69-70, 72, 123, 176,
227, 230, 242-3, 349-50. 354-8.
360, 460, 469-70 ; headquarters of
treason and rebellion, 177 ; Maritz
thirty miles from, 361 ; martial law
for, 358 ; measures for safety of,
364 ; railway to, 242, 279, 282,
284. 354. 357. 363.461.
Capitulation of Boers, rumours of,
123-
Capper, Lieut. -Colonel J. E., 346.
Capper, Lieut. -Colonel T.. 354-6, 358-
60, 362-4, 370, 455-6. 459. 462.
473-4-
Capricorn, Tropic of, 69.
Capron, Captain G., 154.
Captures : by Boers — 20, 27, 29, 38,
41. 55. 73. 76, 95-6, loi, 167, 192,
204, 209, 218, 225, 233, 251, 280,
289, 298, 319, 321, 333, 340. 355.
450, 456, 469 ; by British — 52, 85,
88, 94, 102-3, 105. 1*3. 121-2,
127, 132, 135, 137, 143-4, 179-82,
192, 195-6, 211, 213-15, 225, 229,
232, 241, 248-9, 252, 256, 292, 330,
400-1, 429, 476, 480, 493 ; of
stock, etc., by British, 32, 96,
99, lOi, 103, 107-9, 116, 1 18-19,
121-2, 133, 136, 141, 146. 149-
50, 152-3, 158-9, 161, 163-5, 168-9.
182. 192, 200-3, 208. 211, 249,
251. 253. 255-61. 263. 304, 322-3,
329. 332. 335. 340-S. 352. 371.
376, 429, 443-4.
Carabiniers. See Regular Units.
Carleton, Lieut.- Colonel G. D., 23.
CarUsle, Mr. W.. InteUigence officer.
407-8.
Carlisle Bridge, 277.
Carmel. 266.
Carnarvon, 67, 71 ; blockhouse line
to, 364. 459.
Carolina, 34, 43, 113, 115, 148-9,
199, 201, 203-5, 207, 214-15, 254.
304. 373. 5'7. 520; blockhouse
Hne to, 378, 518.
Carolina commando. See Com-
mandos.
Carruthers, Lieutenant B., 496.
Castrol Nek, 380.
Casualties: Boer — 101. 108, 116-17.
132, 149, 154, 158, 164, 166-8, 189,
201, 211, 313-15, 225, 249, 283-5.
292. 301. 305. 318, 320. 332-6.
340-5. 361, 365, 374-81. 387, 401-4.
427, 429. 432, 438-40. 445. 449.
456-7, 480, 486-7. 509, 513, 519;
at Aberdeen, 466 ; Avontuur, 73 ;
Basfontein. 194 ; Belfast, 39 ; Blink-
klip, 192 ; Boschbult, 497 ; Both-
well. 115; Brakpan, 137; Brak-
spmit. 137 ; Drizzly Hill, 369 ;
Geduld, 135 ; Graspan, 107 ; Groen
Kloof, 241 ; Grootvallei, 257 ; Gruis-
fontein, 409 ; Itala, 220-1 ; Lichten-
burg, 134 ; Modderfontein (Cape
Colony), 276 ; Ookiep, 472 ; Pan.
23; Platrand, 212 : Rensburghoop,
152; Rietvlei, 209; Roodekranz,
144 ; Rooiwal, 503 ; Roos Senekal.
146; Steynsburg, 180; Uniondale
72 ; Utrecht, 30 ; Victoria, 52
Vlakfontein, 188 ; Wildfontein Farm
7i8
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Casualties : Boer — contintted.
(Cape Colony), 179 ; Wolvepwui,
254; Wonderfontein, 126; Yzer-
spmit, 415 ; in the Los Berg, 196 ;
near Hopetown, 88 ; on L. of C.
east of Pretoria. 44 ; on Taaibosch
Spmit, 135 : British — 183, 298,
328. 345-6. 359. 361. 44J-2. 450-
4S4. 513 ; at Belfast. 38. 40 ; Both-
well. 115 ; Brakspniit, 137 ; Bufiels-
poort, 6 ; Dalmanutha, 37 ; Gras-
pan, 107 ; Helvetia, 2j ; Krom-
spruit. S5 ' Lauriston. 286 ;
Lichtenburg, 134 : Modderfontein
(Western Transvaal), 130; Nels
Poort (Cape Colony). 232 ; Nooitge-
dacht (Eastern Transvaal), 41 ;
Nooitgedacht (Western Transvaal),
20 ; Ooldep. 472 ; Pan, 23 ; Rich-
mond, 226 ; Rietvlei. 28 ; Roode-
wal, 29 ; Sannah's Post, 319 :
Utrecht, 30, 34 ; Ventersburg, 93 ;
Vryheid, 31 ; Wildfontein, 40 ; near
Barbcrton, 23 ; near Carolina, 43 ;
on the Schurwc Berg, 32 ; on
L. of C. east of Pretoria. 44 ;
on the Tabaksberg, 76-7 ; Alex-
ander's, 242 ; Allenby's, 194 ;
Anderson's, 414-15 ; Babington's,
135 ; Beatson's, 152, 204 ; Benson's,
210, 305. 314 ; Blood's, 141 : Byng's,
325- 333. 401 ; B. Campbell's, 157-8 ;
Chapman's, 153, 221 ; Chesney's,
407 ; Cole's, 328 ; Cookson's, 497 ;
Crabbe's, 284, 365, 456; Cun
ningham's, 130-1, 347 ; Damant's,
390 ; Dartnell's, 387 ; Dixon's,
188 ; W. Doran's, 460 ; du Moulin's,
432 ; Elliot's, loi, 249, 261 ; H. D.
Fanshawe's, 519: French's, 122;
Garratt's, 196, 427 : Gough's, 218 ;
Grey's, 209 ; A. Hamilton's, 430 ;
B. Hamilton's, 168 ; E. Hamilton's,
154; G. Hamilton's, 192, 513-14;
I. Hamilton's, 503, 509 ; Harley's,
249 ; Henniker's, 81 ; Hickie's,
340; Kekewich's, 297, 341, 344;
F. W. Kitchener's, 214 ; Leader's,
409; Lund's, 227; Methuen's, 133,
192, 292. 340, 420 : Monro's, 162-3 ;
Moore's, 235 ; Nixon's, 481 ;
Paris', 99 ; Park's, 377 ; Parsons',
175 ; Pilcher's, 96, 160-1, 167,
253 ; Plumer's, 79-80, 201, 320, 380 ;
Rawlinson's, 137 ; Kundle's, 158,
249, 251 ; Sandeman's, 276; Sco-
bell's, 175, 241-2 ; Shea's, 257 ;
Sitwell's, 433 ; Spens', 376 ; Ter-
nan's, 489; Thomeycroft's, 161,
168, 253, 318 ; Von Donop's, 292,
301, 410; White's, 468; E. C. I.
Williams', 182, 190-1 ; F. A.
Williams'. 394 ; Wilson's, 330, 333 ;
Wyndham's, 365. Set also Appen-
dices 16, 17 and 20.
Cattle driven against wire fences,
403-4-
Cavalry, British and Russian at
Balaklava, 501 ; Royal Horse
artillerymen as, 402.
Cavalry brigades, 148, 182, 188, 204,
376.
Cavendish-Bentinck, Captain Lord
W. A., 238-9, 366-7. 370. 456-7. 474-
Celliers, General J., 134, 407, 411-13,
418, 420.
Celliers (National Scout), 448-9.
Ceres, 70, 231, 356-7, 359, 362, 460.
Cessation of hostilities in Boer terri-
tory during peace negotiations, 508.
Chance, Major H., 17 ; at Vlakfontein,
185-8.
Chapman, Major A. J., 33, 15 3-5,
219-20, 377.
Chesney, Lieut. -Colonel K., 407.
" Chinese Wall," blockhouse line in
Cape Colony, 454.
Christiana, 167, 245, 253, 506, 508.
Chunies Poort, 448, 451.
Church property, Dutch, 523, 525.
Civil proceedings, not to be taken
against burghers, 547.
Clanwilliam, 69-70, 355, 357-60, 362,
460, 472 ; blockhouse line to, 364-5.
INDEX.
719
Clearance of crops, stock, etc., 98,
139, 147, 157, 160, 163-4, 166, 193,
199, 201-4, 207-8. 245, 247, 298,
301, 322, 410, 434, 477-9. 488 ;
measures for, in Orange River
Colony, 326-7.
Clements, Major-General R. A. P.,
D.S.O., 1-3, 128-30, 138, 193, 209.
216, 221, 295, 372 ; at Nooitge-
dacht, 13-22 ; in the Magaliesberg,
6-12.
Clifford, 457-8.
Clocolan, 53, 157,431.
Coal Drift, 253, 255.
Coal Mines, 195.
Codrington, Colonel A. E., 173-4, 176,
180, 467.
Coetzee, 39.
Coke, Major-General J. Talbot, 32.
Cold Brook, 369.
Coldstream Guards. See Regular
Units.
Cole, Lieut. -Colonel A. W. G. Lowry,
252, 263. 269, 319-20, 327-8,
338.
Colcnbrander, Lieut. -Colonel J. W.,
70, 142, 173, 175, 180, 383,
437-8, 444-S. 447-5* : relieves
Grcnfell in Northern Transvaal,
443-
Coles Kop, 89.
Colesberg, 60, 65-6, 78, 89, 94, 263,
366.
Colesberg Bridge, 90, 238, 263.
Collet, Major, 467.
Colleton, Lieut. -Colonel Sir R. A. W.,
Bart., C.B., 345, 415, 422.
Colliery, and hills (Belfast), 39.
Collins, Captain C. W., 313.
Colonial Defence Forces. See Colo-
nial Units, also Cape Colony.
Colonial Division. See Colonial
Units.
Colonial Forces, disbandment of, 25.
Colonial Office, 453-4.
Colonial troops, action of, prolongs
campaign, 355.
Colonial Units : —
Ashburner's Light Horse, 416-20.
Australian Bushmen (3rd regiment),
82-4, 142.
Australian Corps, 139, 489, 516.
Beddy's Scouts, 447, 451.
Bethune's Mounted Infantry, 56, 162.
Border Horse, 76.
Brabant's Horse (ist and 2nd), 65.
British South Africa Pohce, 410,
416-20.
Bushmanland Borderers, 363.
Bushveld Carbineers, 439.
Calvinia District Troops, 351.
Canadian Mounted Rifles, 496.
Cape Mounted Riflemen, 178-9, 232,
241, 279. 304, 369.
Cape Police, 238. 416-20.
Colonial defence forces, 72, 279-80,
283. 286-7, 368.
Colonial division, 55, 369, 4(12, 466.
Commander-in-Chief's Bodyguard,
55-
Cullinan's Horse, 416-20.
Damant's Horse, 388-91, 496.
Dennison's Scouts, 416-20.
Diamond Fields Horse, 416-20.
District Mounted Rifles, 361.
District troops, 467.
Driscoll's Scouts, 109.
Imperial Bushmen (3rd), 80 ; (4th),
142. 471.
Imperial Light Horse (brigade), 79-
80, 85, 116, 334. 387. 392, 395.
502 ; (ist regiment), 135, 322,
331. 387. 392. 400. 429: (2nd
regiment). 322, 331, 392. 400, 428.
Johannesburg Mounted Rifles, 215,
217-18,
Kaffrarian Rifles, 76, 369.
Kitchener's Fighting Scouts, 70,
440. 443, 445. 448-9. 451 ; (ist
regiment), 437-8 ; (2nd regiment),
321-3, 330-1. 333, 437, 439.
Kitchener's Horse, 2, 12, 17.
Local fencibles. Cape Colony, 277.
Local volunteers, 471.
720
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Colonial Units — continued.
Menne's Scouts, 212.
Namaqualand Border Scouts, 470-1.
Natal Police, 153.
Natal Volunteers, 154.
National Scouts, 447-8, 451.
Nesbitt's Horse, 233.
New South Wales Bushmen, 262.
New South Wales Contingent, loi.
New South Wales Mounted Rifles,
182, 192, 336.
New Zealand Corps, 1 39, 489.
New Zealand Mounted Rifles, 80.
379. 401.
New Zealand regiment (7th), 262 ,
427-8.
Pietersburg Light Horse, 446-7,
451.
Prince of Wales's Light Horse, 77,
233-
Queensland Imperial Bushmen, 84,
150, 401.
Railway Pioneer regiment. 333-4.
346.
Railway Pioneer regiment (4th).
Mounted Infantry, 347.
Scottish Horse. 185. 210, 215, 293-7,
486, 504; (ist regiment). 408,
500-1 ; (2nd regiment). 211, 306,
308-14, 500-1.
South African Constabulary, 170.
194. 255, 264, 304. 315. 324,
327. 333. 338. 346-7. 372. 376.
445. 500, 512-13. S«8, 520.
South African Light Horse, 164,
325. 401.
South Australian Bushmen, 105-7,
255-7-
Steinacker's Horse, 447-8, 451.
Thomeycroft's Mounted Infantry.
51, 159, 318, 488-9.
Town Guards, 361, 469-70.
Victorian Imperial Bushmen, 85.
Victorian Mounted Rifles, 4, 7, 132.
144. 5J4-; (5th), 203-4. 373-
West Australian Mounted Infantry.
148, 213.
Western Province Mounted Rifles,
355. 361. 363-
Zululand Native Pohce, 221.
Colonies, Secretary of State for, 230.
Colonists, loyalty of, 69.
Colt gun, 51 ; capture of, 152.
Columns, British — strength of, etc.,
22, 59, 92, no, 127, 138-9. 155, 171,
173. 180 185, 197, 203, 208, 222-3.
225. 228, 244, 269, 290-1. 299, 303.
306. 315, 319. 338. 346-8, 351. 370,
381, 405, 4i5-»6. 422. 434. 437-40.
447, 451-2. 474. 490, 5". 522;
tied to lines of blockhouses, 462.
472 ; without guns or transport,
492.
Colville. Lieut.-Colonel A. E. W., 28-9.
43-4. 103. 1 10-13, 116. 127. 147.
153-5. *S>9. 207, 20S>-io, 215-16.
218. 222-3. 249. 371. 377. 379. 381.
514. 522.
Colvin, Lieut.-Colonel F. F.. 223. 254.
258. 262. 269, 338, 381, 522.
Commadagga, 466-7.
Commander-in-Chief. See Lords
Kitchener and Roberts.
Commander-in-Chief's Bodyguard. See
Colonial Units.
Commando Drift (Vaal river), 133, 160,
481, 488, 493-
Commando Nek (north-east of Picks-
burg), 54.
Commando Nek (Magaliesbcrg), 3, 8.
128-9, 193, 292.
Commando Spruit, 481.
Commandos : — 328.
Badenhorst's, 113.
Bethlehem, 48-9, 336.
Beyers', 10-13, 19. 75. 'U- 437-42.
444-51.
Bezuidenhout's, 463-5.
Boksburg, 38, 145.
C. Botha's, 249.
C. J. Botha's, 237-9.
Chris. Botha's, 34, 220.
P. Botha's, 54-6.
Bouwers', 264, 278, 364-5, 460.
INDEX.
721
G. Brand's, 67, 89, 429.
Buys', 28.
Carolina, 39.
Celliers', 411-14, 418-20.
Conroy's, 351-2, 367, 468.
De Beer's, 132, '501, 505, 509.
J. H. De la Key's, 3, 12. 134, 295-
301, 411-14.
P. De la Key's, 194-5.
De Villiers' (rebels), 132, 433.
De Wet's, 45, 49. 53, 76, 88-91, 383-
404, 426-9.
Emmett's, 121, 515.
Erasmus', 225, 233-4, 236.
Ermelo, 36, 39.
Fouch^'s, 172, 174-6. 179, 334-5.
286. 368-9, 458. 463. 465-7-
Fourie's. 54, 76, 89.
Frankfort, 425.
Free Staters, 72, 104, 236, 383,
386.
Froneman's, 76.
Germiston, 40.
Haasbroek's, 76, 88.
Heilbron, 336, 477.
Hertzog's, 67, 87, 89, 94, 166, 430.
Hugo's, 283, 455.
Johannesburg, 38.
Kemp's. 411-14. 418-20.
Kirsten's (or Kerston), 264.
Kritzinger's, 62, 65-6. 71-4. 172-4,
179-80, 225-6, 233, 237-8, 287-8.
317-20, 367.
Krokodil river. 13.
Kroonstad, 336.
Krugersdorp, 10, 13.
Lategan's, 225, 232, 237, 282.
Lemmer's, 418.
Lichtenburg, 412.
Liebenberg's, 194, 325, 411-14.
Letter's, 237-41.
A. Louw's, 353, 363-4.
Jan Louw's. 468.
Lydenburg, 24, 36.
W. Malan's, 173-6, 178-9, 226-7,
237, 281-2, 364-5, 455-7. 463.
465-7.
VOL. IV.
S. G. Maritz's (Cape rebels), 224, 228,
271. 350-63. 365, 455. 468, 471.
Mears', 401.
Mentz's, 486-7.
Middelburg, 24, 40.
Muller's, 143, 203-4, 213.
Myburg's, 225, 233-4, 236, 286,
368-9.
Naude's, 366.
Nieuhoudt's (or Nienwoudt's), 67.
430-
D. Opperman's, 220, 305.
Petrusburg, 96.
Piet Retief, 118.
Potchefstroom, 298. 412.
F. J. Potgieter's, 192, 341-2. 344,
410. 501-3.
H. J. Potgieter's, 2ao.
Pretoria. 13.
H. Pretorius', 67.
M. G. Pretorius'. 439.
A. Prinsloo's. 215.
G. Pyper's, 462.
S. Pypers', 279, 285-6, 364, 462.
Rebels (Cape Colony), 225, 227, 374.
Rustenburg, 412.
Scheepers', 71-4, 172-6. 178-9,
227-9, 237. 242-3. 283-5.
Smit's, 237-40, 365, 462.
J. C. Smuts', 130, 195, 364. 270-9,
455. 469-71-
T. Smuts', 34.
Theron's, 233, 237-9, 243. 283-4.
460, 462.
Theunissen's, 67.
Trichardt's, 28.
Utrecht, 216.
P. Uys'. 439.
Van der Venter's, 264, 278-82,
364-5.
G. Van Niekerk's, 431.
Van Reenan's (rebels), 179-80,
225-6, 233, 236. 338. 364, 462.
Van Zyl's. 417.
Van Zyl's, 468, 501, 509.
Vermaas', 143, 341, 418.
Viljoen's, 143, 149, 207-9, 213.
46
722
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Com raandos — co ntin ued.
Von Tender's, 501.
Vrede, 336, 485.
Vryheid. 216.
Waterberg, 10, 13, 15.
Wessels', 67.
L. Wessels', 238. 456-7, 462.
P. Wessels', 368-9. 457-8.
W. J. Wessels'. 385. 388-91. 396.
401.
Winburg. 51.
Wolmaranstad. 341.
Zoutpansberg. 10. 13.
Commands in the Orange River Colony.
97-
Commissie Bridge (Caledon river), 266,
317-18, 320.
Commissie Drift (Caledon river), 97.
168. '
Commissie Drift (Oliphant river),
141-2, 214.
Commissie Hoek. 328.
Commissioners of districts, 29-30.
Compagnies Drift, 359.
Compass Berg, 71.
Compies river. 118, 200-1, 377-8.
Compton. Captain Lord D., 241-2.
Concentration, of Boer forces. Western
Transvaal, 184 : of British on Natal
border, 216.
Concentration camps for refugees. See
Appendix 12.
Conclusion of peace, 523-63.
Concordia, 469, 471-2.
Conference of Boer leaders, 108, 205-6,
270.
Conference, peace, negotiations, at
Middelburg, February 28th, 1901,
119-20, 126 ; April, 1902, at Klerks-
dorp, 533 ; Pretoria, 504, 508, 535 :
Vereeniging, 471, 473. 487. 541.
Congresses, Dutch, in Cape Colony, 61.
Connaught Rangers. See Regular
Units.
Conoviam, 53.
Conroy. Commandant E., 351-2, 367,
468. 473.
Constable, 54, 279, 360.
Constantia (north-west of Harrismith).
246.
Constantia (north of Rouxville), 164.
Consul, German Imperial, at Pretoria.
74.
Convoys, 3, 113, 115-17, 183; attack
on : Anderson's, 410-14 ; Crabbe's,
364, 455-6 ; A. C. Hamilton's, 430 ;
Pluraer's, 151 ; Von Donop's. 299;
capture of : by Bealson, 144 ; Ben-
son, 143 ; B. Campbell, 158 ; W. P.
Campbell, 121 ; Daw kins, 400 ; B.
Hamilton. 168 ; E. C. Knox. 122. 128;
Methuen. 192. 406 ; Rawlinson, 195 ;
Rimington. 401 ; Smith-Dorrien.
116; delay of. French's. 118.
Conway, 226 ; officer commanding at,
column of. 290, 370.
Cookhouse station. 174, 278.
Cookson, Colonel G. A., 14, 492, 494-7.
511.
Cooper, Colonel H.. C.M.G.. A.D.C..
470-2, 474.
Copeman, Major H. C, 253. 269. 327.
338.
Cornelia, 102, 329, 400.
Cornelius river. 246, 400, 426, 428, 479.
" Corral," 349 ; definition of, 1 14.
Correspondence of Boer leaders — see
Letters ; between Lord Kitchener,
Secretaries of State for the Colonies
and War. High Commissioner, and
Governor, Cape Colony, 230. 453 ;
for the Army, how dealt with — see
Appendix 9 ; re peace, negotiations
for, terms, etc., 524-39.
Cost of the War in South Africa. See
Appendix 18.
Coulson. Lieutenant G, H. B. (awarded
the Victoria Cross). 161.
Council of War, by Boers, 206-7, 334 ;
orders of. 208.
Counter-attack, at Moedwil, 297 ;
Rooiwal. 502 ; Vlakfontein, 187-8 ;
by du Moulin, 432 ; by Boers at
Vlaklaagte, 513.
INDEX.
723
Country, clearance of, of stock, etc. —
see Clearance ; Eastern Transvaal,
description of, 112 ; at Bakenlaiagte,
307.1
Cowan, Major B. W., 342.
Cow-catchers, an army of, 198.
Cox, Lieut. -Colonel F., 427.
Crabbe, Lieut. -Colonel E. M. S., C.B.,
65, 80-2, 84, 88-9, 92, 173-4, 179-80,
225-6, 233, 237-8, 244, 279, 284-6,
290. 360-2, 364, 370, 455-6. 459.
474-
Cradock, Lieut. -Colonel M., 78, 80, 92.
94, no, 138, 272.
Cradock, and district, 71, 173-4. 178,
225-6, 233, 239, 274, 277, 280, 456.
463-4, 466-7, 473 ; blockhouse line
to, 458.
Crandon, Private H. G. (awarded the
Victoria Cross), 211.
Crean, Surgeon-Captain T. J. (awarded
the Victoria Cross), 387.
Crewe, Lieut. -Colonel C. P., 54-6, 59,
76-7, 92, 94, 96-7, no, 171, 176,
179-80, 226, 228-9, 231, 244, 290,
370.
Criticism on British strategy, reply to.
435-6.
Crocodile river, 26, 208, 301-2. 443,
445.
Cronje, General A. P., 247.
Cronje, General P., 421.
Crossing of the Orange river, by De
Wet. 78, 90, 93.
Crossings of Orange river, assembly of
troops at, 231.
Crum, Captain F. M., 310, 314.
CuUinan's Horse. See Colonial
Units.
Cunningham, Troof>er A., 313.
Cunningham, Brigadier-General G. G.,
C.B.. D.S.O., 1-2, 6, 75, 128, 130-1,
136, 138, 195, 324, 347-8.
Customs union, 536.
Cyclists, 171, 180, 244, 405, 434, 437,
452. 490.
Cyfergat, 167.
VOL. IV.
Cyferpoort, 425."
Cypher Gat, 179, 458.
Cypherfontein, 150.
Czar of Russia, 24.
Dagga, 473.
Daggaboers Nek, 178.
Dalmanutha, 35, 377 ; attack on.
36-7 ; casualties at, 44.
Dalzell, Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. A. E.,
C.B., 347-8.
Damant, Colonel J. H., D.S.O., 252.
263, 266-7. 269. 316-17, 319. 329-35.
338. 383-4. 388-91, 402. 405. 424-5.
434. 475-7. 490. 494-6.
Damant's Horse. See Colonial
Units.
Damhoek, 193.
Damplaats, 486.
Daniel's Kuil. 488.
Darling. 361-2.
DarHngton, 174, 278. 466.
Dartnell, Brigadier-General Sir J. G..
K.C.B.. C.M.G., III. 113, 116-22.
127. 147, 217. 219. 222-3. 322-3.
331. 333-5. 338. 386-7. 391-2. 404.
Daspoort (east of Dewetsdorp), 46. 48.
52. 328.
Daspoort (north of ViUiersdorp), 424.
Dassiefontein (north-west of Nets
Poort). 459.
Dassiefontein (south-east of Rich-
mond). 74. 173. 465.
Davel, Commandant, 54. 248.
Davies. Lieut.-Colonel R. H.. 511.
Dawkins. Lieut.-Colonel J. W. G., 263,
269. 324-5. 338. 400. 405, 428. 434.
443-5.452. 5"-
De Aar. 65. 80. 87, 176. 225, 238, 243,
281. 351, 366. 462, 473 ; railway to.
238, 367 ; supply dep6t at. 67.
Dead, robbing of. etc.. at Bakenlaagte.
313 ; Tafel Kop. 390.
De Beer (Tolly). Commandant J., 132,
505, 509 ; at Rooiwal, 501.
Debts of the RepubUcs, 523, 525, 549.
De Eerste Poort, 89.
46*
724
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Deelfontein, 486.
Deep Dene, 319.
Defeat of Boers, effect of, 504.
Defensible posts, 255.
De Grootboom. 140, 142.
De Hoop, 460.
De Jager's Drift, 31. 217-18.
De Kalk, 85-6.
De Kraalen, 121.
Delagoa Bay : attacks on posts, on
the railway to, 35 ; railway, 34, 45.
126, 139, 146-7, 153. 199, 201, 204.
207-8, 210, 214-15, 298, 304, 315,
372-3. 376, 380. 437. 481. 5I5-J6.
S20-I : situation on the railway to,
23. 34-
De Lange's Drift (Klip river), 103. 329.
De la Rey, General H. J.. 1-4. 6-7,
9-13, 17, 21-2, 105-6, 108, 128-30,
133-6. 182, 184. 190, 205-7, 270,
295-301. 339. 344-5. 366. 383.
407-8, 415-16. 421, 445, 461,
475. 478. 49>-8. 501. 504-5. 528 :
at Tweebosch, 418-20 : at Yzer-
spruit, 410-14: "New Model"
of. broken, 503 : at the peace
conference, 533, 543-7, 556, 560-1,
563.
De la Rey, Commandant P., 194-5.
Delegates, Boer, to Europe, 24, 529-33,
538 : attendance at peace conference
refused by Lord Kitchener, 540.
Delegates, peace, sixty burghers from
commandos to Vereeniging, 541 ;
delay, effect on. 55J.
De Lisle, Lieut.-Colonel H. de B.,
D.S.O., 65, 67, 69-71. 74. 92. 100,
102-7, no, 168, 171, 173-4, 180,
197, 246-7, 250, 255-9. 261. 264. 269,
315. 321-2. 329, 331. 335. 338. 383-4.
395-6. 399. 405. 423. 426. 434, 475-6,
482, 490, 509, 511.
Do Naauwte, 444.
Dennison's Scouts. See Colonial
Units.
Denny. Lieut. -Colonel H. C, C.B., 447,
452.
Depression amongst the commandos
124.
De Put, 79. 88.
Derby, 119.
Derbyshire regiment. 5m Regular
Units.
De Roodepoort, 113.
De Rust. 256.
Dervishes, a rush of, 501.
Despatches. Lord Kitchener's, 332.
Destruction of blockhouses, systematic
attempt at, 483-4.
De Villiers, Commandant P. (Griqua-
town). 132, 433. 488.
Devondale, 346.
Devonshire regiment. See Regular
Units.
De Wagendrift, 442.
De Wet, Head-Commandant C. R., 1,
42-3. 45-54, 56-8, 62-3. 65-6, 68,
74-90, 93-6, 98-9. 104, 106. 108, 133,
131. 139, 166, 172-3, 205-7, 224. 227,
231. 243. 245. 270-1, 323, 330, 334-7.
350. 354. 357. 366, 383-8, 391-401.
421, 424-30. 461-2, 475-9. 505. 528;
breaks up his army, 54, 332. 398 ;
collecting votes on the question of
peace. 484 ; concentration of forces
of, 382 ; escapes from Elliot's
cordon, 403-4 ; plan of British,
to surround, 331 ; at the peace
conference, 533, 543-7. 556-7. S6o-i.
563 ; tactics of, 49.
De Wet, Commandant Piet, 356.
Dewetsdorp, and road, 46, 49, 52, 98,
162, 168, 251, 265-6, 320, 327-8.
Diamond Fields Horse. See Colonial
Units.
Diamond Hill, 436, 443.
Diary of a burgher, 125, 198.
Diepkloof, 213.
Difi&culties of the campaign, 68, 198-9,
265, 332.
DiflBculties of Sir L Hamilton's great
" drive," 509-10 ; of " drives "
generally, 520.
Dingaan's Day, 21.
INDEX.
725
Dipka, 476.
Director of Railways, 65. See also
Appendix id.
Director of Supplies. See .Appendix 5.
Discussion of terms of peace, and con-
clusion of, 540-63.
Disloyalty in Cape Colony, 60-63.
Dispersion of Boer forces, 96 ; effects
of, 99-100.
Disselfontein, 85-6.
Distance marched by Elliot's troops,
398 ; Jeudwine's column, 354.
Distribution of commands in the
Orange River Colony, 97.
District Commissioners, 29-30.
District Mounted Rifles. See Colo-
nial Units.
District troops. See Colonial Units.
Divisions. See Columns.
Dixon, Brigadier-General H. G., C.B.,
A.D.C., 136, 138, 182-4. 189-91.
197 ; at Vlakfontein, 185-8.
Doctors. See Appendix 7.
Dogs, watch, 35. '
Donkerhoek, 117.
Donkorp>oort. 443.
Dood's Drift, 326.
Doom (Hoeks) Berg (north-cast of
Steynsburg), 180, 226.
Doom Kloof, 459.
Doom Kop, 188-9.
Doom Nek, 178, 464.
Doom river. 70, 355, 357, 364.
Doom berg, 423.
Doornberg mountain (north-east of
Winburg). 58, 75, 91. 93. 159-60.
Doornbult (Brak Spruit), 344, 494,
504.
Doornbult (Orange River Colony), 99.
Doornbult (south of Lichtenburg), 191.
Doornbult siding, 508.
Doornfontein, 159.
Doornhock (west of Koflyfontein), 262.
Doomhoek (Magaliesberg), 7, 10.
Doomkloof, 403, 479.
Doornkop, 436.
Doomlaagte (east of Kimberley), 167.
Doornlaagte (north of Wolmaranstad),
494. 505-
Dooters Kraal, 85.
Dopper, regime of, 1 24.
Doran. Lieut. -Colonel B. J. C, 130,
178.226-9, 231-2, 237-40. 244. 272-4,
277-80, 282, 290, 367, 370, 456-7,
459. 463-7. 474-
Doran, Lieut.-Colonel W. R4 B., 282,
290, 203-4, 370, 455, 460. 462, 465-6.
474-
Dordrecht (Cape Colony), 225, 234,
236, 272-4, 277. 286-7, 368-9,
457-
Dordrecht (east of P. P. Burg). 122.
179-
Doris, H.M.S., 72.
Dorpsplaats, 202. \
Dorsetshire regiment. See Regular
Units.
Douglas, Major-General C. W. H.. i.
Douglas.Colonel W., D.S.O.. 139, 143-4,
148-9, 155. 199. 204. 207-8, 223.
Douthwaute, Commandant, 505.
Drafts, to South Africa. See .Appen-
dix 14.
Dragoon Guards. See ' Regular
Units.
Dragoons. See Regular Units.
Drakensberg mountains, 103, 219, 286.
368, 4*4-5. 428-9. 475. 480-2 ;
passes of, 217. 323. 423.
Drennan, 178, 463.
Dreyer, Commandant, 320.
Driefontein (west of Bethel), 517.
Driefontein (north-east of Ernielo),
201.
Driefontein (west of Hcrschel), 267.
Driefontein (north of Middelburg), 143.
Driefontein (south of Somerset East).
277.
Driefontein, battle of (1900), 394.
Driehoek (Komati valley), 148-9.
Driehoek (south of Reitz), 246.
Driekop, 96.
Driekuil, 494, 497-8, 505,
Driespruit. 102.
726
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Drifts of the Vaal, blockhousing of,
346.
Drinkwater, 151.
Driscoll, Major D. P., 109. 340-1,
433-4, 481, 490-1. 511.
DriscoU's Scouts. See Colonial
Units.
" Drives" : combination of, in Orange
River Colony, 326, 485 ; definition
of, 114 ; difiSculties of, 509-10, 520 ;
fortifications thrown up during, 509 ;
in the Eastern Transvaal, 517 ; on
large scale in Western Transvaal,
492, 506-10; Blood's, 140-6 ; Elliot's,
100-5, 168-9, 196, 246-50, 253,
255-61, 321-3. 383-S. 398-402, 423-
29, 475-7, 479-80 ; Fetherston-
haugh's, 189; French's, 113-22,
236-9, 458, 466 ; B. Hamilton's,
166-8, 373, 481, 485-7. 520-1 ; I.
Hamilton's, 499-503, 506-10 ; Keke-
wich's, 492, 494 ; F. W. Kitchener's,
492, 494 ; C. E. Knox's, 166 ; Lyttel-
ton's, 97, 157; Methuen's, 192;
Rawlinson's, 492, 494 ; Rochfort's,
492 ; Stephenson's, 459.
Drizzly Hill, 234, 369, 458.
Droogfontein, 319.
Drummond-Hay, Lieut. -Col. J. A. G.,
467.
Dublin Fusiliers, The Royal. See
Regular Units.
Du Cane, Major H. J., 70, 92, 423-4,
434. 47S-<5, 490.
Duff, Lieut. -Colonel C. E., 185-8, 302,
485, 487, 490.
Dugdale, Lieutenant F. B. (awarded
the Victoria Cross), 119.
Dullstroom, 26-7, 126, 143-4, 210-11,
214, 376-7, 380.
Du Moulin, Lieut. -Colonel L. E., 165,
167-8, 171, 245, 251-3, 263, 269, 319-
20. 327, 338, 430. 432, 434-
Dundas, 385, 388-9.
Dundee, 31, 56, 122, 154, 215-18,
222.
Dunlop, Lieut. -Colonel J. W., 399, 405.
Du Preez Lager Drift, 260.
Durban, 350.
Durham Militia artillery. Sec Militia
Units.
Du Toit, Lieutenant, 438.
Dwaal Spruit, 428.
Dwars river (south of Geelhout Kop),
443-
Dwars river (north of Pietersburg),
447-
Dwars river, and valley (north of Roos
Senekal), 141, 143.
Dwars Vlei siding (Cape Colony), 173.
Dwarsvlei (Western Transvaal), 2.
Dwyka river, 285.
Dynamite, capture of, by Boers, 469 ;
bombs, 471 ; mines, 206, 209.
Dysseldorp, 73.
East Kent regiment. See Regular
Units.
East London, 64, 349 ; railway to, 467.
East Surrey regiment. See Regular
Units.
Eastern Transvaal, blockhouse system
in, 371-3 ; situation in, 371-2. See
also Events in.
Eden's Kop, near Heidelberg, 28.
Edenburg, 46, 94, 96-7, 161, 164-5,
167, 245, 251-2, 267, 319, 325-6, 329.
431-
Edward VII., His Majesty the King,
546-7, 551, 561.
Edwards, Lieut. -Colonel A. H. M.,
C.B., 324, 338.
Eensgevonden, 258-9, 264, 489.
Eerste Geluk, 113.
Eerstefabrieken, 142, 149.
Eerstegeluk, 425.
Effects, of Boer defeat at Rooiwal,
504; of De Wet's inroad into Cape
Colony, 172.
Egypt, 279.
Elands Berg (south of Hopetown, Cape
Colony), 87.
Elands Berg (north-east of Smithfield),
163. 327-
INDEX.
727
Elands Berg (north of Volksrust), 117-
18, 183, 200-3, 216.
Elands Drift (Tarka river), 174, 277,
467.
Elands Kloof (south of Clanwilliam),
362.
Elands Kloof (south of Petrusville), 89.
Elands Kloof Drift (Government Drift,
Orange river), 288.
Elands Kop (north of Lindley), 102,
383. 385. 398, 400, 403, 424-5-
Elands Poort (south-west of Rich-
mond), 280.
Elands Poort (north of Tarkastad),
274-6.
Elands river (Cape Colony), 274-5, '^77-
Elands river (North-east Transvaal),
142, 214.
Elands river (Western Transvaal), 189,
191, 291, 293, 301-2.
Elands River Bridge, 58, 158, 334,
386-7, 392, 395, 423.
Elands River Drift, 335.
Elands Spruit, 424.
Elands Vallei, 362.
Elandsfontein (north of Bethel), 203-4.
Elandsfontein (south-west of Bethel),
517-
Elandsfontein (cast of Boshof), 258.
Elandshoek plateau, 104.
Elandskloof, 268.
Elandskop, 485.
Elandskraal, 8, 193.
Elandslaagte (west of Klerksdorp),
410.
Elandslaagte (Natal), battle of, 394.
Elandsriver station, 210.
Elliot, Major-General E. L., C.B.,
D.S.O., 97. 100-5, 108, no, 154-5,
'57. 159. 168-9, 171. 196-7, 245-8,
250-1, 253-6. 263-5. 269. 322-3, 325,
328-9. 331. 333-5, 338. 384-6, 388.
395-403. 405. 423-6, 429. 431.
433-4. 475-9. 482. 484-8, 490. 520 ;
" drives " of — see " Drives " ; plans
of. 321. 383.
Elliot. Captain H. W. D.. 368.
Elliot County, 286.
Elizabethsfontein, 364.
Elsjes Vlakte, 82-3.
Emmaus, and road, 166. 252, 432.
Emmett, General C, 121 ; capture of,
515-
Endurance of British troops, 242, 379,
399. 449. 493. 521.
Enemy, tenacity of, 327.
Engineers, Royal. See Regular
Units.
England, 24, 95. 176, 481.
Enghsh, Lieutenant W. (awarded the
Victoria Cross), 211.
Enkeldedooms, 142.
Entonyancni, district of, 219.
Entrenchments, 365 ; at Belfast, 37-8 ;
Fort Itala, 219; Ookiep, 471 ;
Pan, 41 ; daring " drives," 402,
509 ; of the passes, Western Natal.
155-
Enzelberg. 191.
Enzclpoort, 196.
Epitaph, to Scheepers, by President
Steyn, 285 ; to the Spartans at
Thcrmopyls, 313,
Equator, 75.
Erasmus. Commandant, 225, 233-4,
236, 253. 377.
Ermelo. district, and road, 25. 34.
42-3, 107. 1 12-14. 116. 123. 126.
130. 140. 146-8. 150, 199-200. 203-5,
209. 214. 305. 373-5. 378-9. 5«4-»5.
527 ; blockhouse line to. 372. 377-8.
512. 517-18.
Ermelo commando. See Commandos.
ErroU. Colonel C. G.. The Earl of.
K.T.. C.B.. 133.
Ersterling. 120.
Eshowe. 222.
Essex-Capell. Captain A.. 512-13.
Europe. Boer mission to. 206 ; sym-
pathy of. 230.
European cavalry, a charge of, 501.
Eustace. Major C. L. E., 141, 308, 310-
Evacuation of Wolmaranstad. 415.
Evans, Private C. N., 496,
728
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Evans, Colonel R. W., 154.
Evening Star, 53, 321.
Events in Cape Colony, December,
1900 — February 28 th, 1901, 60-92 ;
March — April, 172-80 ; June — Sep-
tember, 224-44 ; September — Octo-
ber, 270-90; January — May, 1902,
453-74 1 in the north-west and
west of, April — December, 1901,
349-70.
Events in the Eastern Transvaal, De-
cember 1st, 1900 — Januziry 31st.
1901,22-44; January — March, iii-
27 ; April — May, 139-55 ; June —
September, 198-223 ; November,
1901 — January, 1902, 371-81 ; Feb-
ruary— May, 512-22 ; actiou of
Bakenlaagte, 304-15.
Events in the Northern Transvaal,
April, 1901 — May, 1902, 435-52.
Kvents in the Orange River Colony,
December, 1900 — January, 1901,
45-59; February — June, 93-110;
April — June, 156-71 ; July — August,
245-69; August — November, 316-
38 ; December, 1901 — February,
1902, 382-405 ; February, 423-32 ;
March — May, 475-90.
Events in the Western Transvaal,
December, 1900, 1-22 ; January —
April, 1901, 128-38 ; May — August,
181-97 ; September — November,
291-303 ; November, 1901 — Janu-
ary, 1902, 339-48 ; January —
March, 406-22 ; March — May, 491-
511.
Evidence of Boer misdeeds, at Baken-
laagte, 313.
Expenditure, total, on the War. See
Appendix 18.
Explosion of dynamite at Ookiep, 472.
Express, 121.
Fair, Major J., 512.
Fairfax, Thomas, Lord (Parliamenta-
rian General), 382.
Familiehoek, 200,
Families, Boer, 385 ; rationed and
protected by the British, 261.
Fanny's Home, 385, 396, 399, 401-2,
482.
Fanshawe, Lieut. -Colonel H. D., 518-
20.
Fanshawe, Lieut.-Colonel R., D.S.O.,
102, no, 171, 395-6, 399, 405, 423-4,
426, 434, 475-6, 482, 490.
Farmer, Sergeant D. (awarded the Vic-
toria Cross), 20.
Farmers, the, of Cape Colony, rising of,
75; British kept at bay by, 411 ;
not liable for war tax, 523 ; ruined
condition of, financial assistance to,
523, 525, 548 ; subjugating a nation
of, lOI.
Farms, burning of, 125.
Farrell, Captain H. J., 6.
Fauresmith. 94, 96, 164, 167, 251-2,
266, 317, 325-6, 430, 433.
Fencibles, local, Cape Colony. See
Colonial Units.
P'estival, annual, of Boer States, 21.
Fetherstonhaugh, Major-Gen. R. S. R.,
C.B., 139, 155, 182, 188-92, 194,
197. 250, 291-3, 298, 303, 515-16.
522.
Fever, 58.
Ficksburg, 53-4, 97, 99, 156, 158-9,
321, 431, 477 ; blockhouse line to,
482.
Field artillery. Royal. See Regular
Units.
" Fiery Cross," The, 216.
Firman, Lieut.-Colonel R. B., 57, 334,
392-
Fish River station, 176, 178, 464.
Flags, Republican, 125, 357.
Florence (north of Lake Chrissic),
148.
Florence (north of Zastron), 318.
Follet, Lieut.-Colonel S. W., no, 165,
171. 369-70. 457-8. 474.
Food, shortage of, 3, 68, 82, 355, 377 ;
stores of, on the veld, 343.
Forbes, Colonel W., 52.
INDEX.
729
Forbes-Sempill, Captain the Hon. J.
(Master of Sempill), 288-9.
Force. See Columns.
Forestier- Walker, Lieut. -General Sir
F. W. E. F., K.C.B., C.M.G.. 63, 69,
176.
Fort Beaufort, 226.
Fort Dahl, 447.
Fort Edward, 446-7.
Fort Itala, attack on, 219-21.
Fort Prospect, attack on, 219-21.
Fort Shelton, 471.
Fort Weeber, 14 1-3.
Fortescue, Lieut. -Col. The Hon. C. G.,
C.M.G., D.S.O., 305, 315. 373.
381, 515. 517, 522-
Fortifications on railways, 402 ; during
" drives," 509.
Forts, dismantling of, 536.
Fosbery, Captain F. L., 38.
Fouch6, Commandant W. D., 172,
174-6, 179, 225, 234-6, 271-2, 274,
286, 368-9, 457-8. 463-7. 473. 538.
Fourie, Vice-Chief-Commandant P.,
51, 54, 76, 78, 81, 89.
Fouriesburg, 157-8, 335, 384. 397;
blockhouse line to, 482-3.
Fourteen Streams, 133-5.
France, 24.
Franchise, 536 ; grant of, to KaflSrs,
523, 526, 548.
Frankfort, 54, 93, 97, 100-2, 108, 249-
50. 323. 330-4. 383-4. 397. 399-401.
47 5. 479. 486, 488 ; blockhouse line
to, 329, 385. 388, 398, 402, 423-4,
476, 482, 485.
Frankfort commando. See Com-
mandos.
Franschmans Kop, 367.
Fraserburg (town), 67, 69-70, 455-6.
Fraserburg Road station, 282.
Frederick's Dal, 364.
Frederikstad, 131, 135-6, 194.
Free Staters, 270. See also Com-
mandos.
French, Lieut. -General Sir J. D. P.,
K.C.B., 2, 8, 21-2, 43, 111-17,
120-22, 125, 127-8, 138, 146-8. 151,
156, 199, 225-9, 231-2, 234. 236-9.
260, 265, 272, 274, 278, 280, 282.
286, 290, 317, 359, 368, 370, 443,
454, 461, 472, 474, 528 ; assumes
direction of affairs in Namaqualand,
469 ; plans of, 228 ; special efforts
to deal with Fouch6 and Malan,
465-7 ; tactics of, 358, 363 ; takes
command in Cape Colony, 224, 244.
Froneman, J. F., 350-1.
Froneman, General P., 54, 76 ; at the
peace conference, 5 56.
Fry, Lieut. -Colonel W., 7, 194. 197.
Fusilier regiments. See Regular
Units.
Gallwey. Lieut.-Colonbl E. J., C.B.,
151-2.
Gamka river, 285.
Gannafontein, 167.
Gans Vlei, 459.
Ganstfontein, 455.
Gansvlei Spruit, 480.
Garies, 469, 472.
Garratt, Lieut. -Colonel F. S., D.S.O..
195-7. 210, 216, 218, 222-3. 249,
254-8, 260-2. 269, 338. 371, 377.
381, 399, 401, 405. 427, 434, 475.
479-81, 485, 488, 490, 520. 522.
Garrison artillery. Royal. See Militia
and Regular Units.
Garrisons, control of. in Cape Colony,
224.
Garrisons of : Aberdeen, 466 ; Beth-
lehem, 157, 169; Forts Itala and
Prospect, 219 ; Helvetia, 25 ;
Jamestown, 179 ; Ladybrand, 321 ;
Ookiep, 470-1 ; Piquetberg, 361 ;
Tafel Kop, 344 ; Tontelbosch Kolk,
363.
Garstin, Colonel .\. A., C.M.G., 66, 92.
Garstlands Kloof, 178, 233, 239, 280.
Gatberg, 368.
Gatsrand, 2, 75, 128, 131, 136, 196
268, 271, 346,
Gawne, Lieut.-Colonel J. M.. 31.
730
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Geddes, Corporal, gallant conduct of,
1 06.
Geduld, 13s, 194, 341.
Geelhout Kop, 443-4.
Gelderland, 56.
Geluk (south of Hoopstad), 160.
Geluk (south of Lichtenburg), 492.
Geluks Poort, 82, 84, 86.
Gemsbokfontein, 130.
Gemsbokhoek Berg, 250, 425.
George (county), 243.
Gericke, Baron, Netherland Ambas-
sador, 528-31.
German Imperial Consul, Pretoria, 24.
Germans, the, 124.
Germiston, 130.
Germiston commando. See Com-
mandos.
Gestopfontein, 492.
Geysdorp, 508.
Ghazis, a rush of, 501.
Gilbert, Brevet-Major A. R., 432-4,
490.
Girdwood, Captain A. C, 300.
Glen, 261, 265, 321.
Glencoe, 122, 216-17.
Godwaan, 208.
Goemans Berg, 164.
Gogarty, Major H. E., 73, 92, 165,
171.
Going, Major G. N., 252, 269, 338.
Golden Gate, 158.
Goldsworthy, Captaun C. L., 241.
Goliathskraal, 258.
Goodehoep, 204.
Goodeverwachting, 148.
Gordon, Captain E., 241.
Gordon, Brigadier-General J. R. P.,
C.B., 22, 128-30, 138.
Gordon Highlanders, The. See Regu-
lar Units.
Gorras, 459.
Gorringe, Lieut. -Colonel G. F., C.M.G.,
D.S.O., 65-6, 72-4, 92, 173-4, 176,
179-80, 225, 233, 236, 238, 244,
272-5, 277-9, 290, 370.
Gottenburg, 477, 485.
Gough, Lieut.-Colonel H. de la P., 32,
216-18, 223.
Gouritz river, 283-4.
Gous Pan, 81.
Government: the British, 119, 230,
261 ; peace terms, negotiations and
conclusion of, 523-63 ; of Cape
Colony, 230, 272, 369 ; Holland,
528-34; Natal, 554; Orange Free
State, 107 ; peace negotiations of,
523-63 ; South African Republic,
107, 123, 140, 203, 214-15, 305,
376, 380, 515 ; peace negotiations of,
523-63 ; proposed meeting between
members of the Boer, 125, 203 ;
meeting of, 205-6.
Governor, The, Cape Colony, 230, 272.
See also Hely-Hutchinson, Sir
Walter.
Governor's (or Gouverneur's) Kop, 53,
321-2, 431.
Graaf Water, 359.
Graaif Reinet, 67, 71, 74, 175-6, 178,
226-9, 231-3, 237, 243, 274, 280,
282, 350, 456, 465-6 ; Dutch con-
gress at, 61 ; railway to, 278, 457,
463-
Grahamstown, 354.
Grant, Captain W. L., R.N., 72.
Grant, of a million pounds sterling to
meet Boer liabilities, 549 ; of three
millions, 550, 552.
Gras Kop, 154.
Gras Vlakte, 82.
Graspan (east of Hoopstad), 256.
Graspan (east of Reitz), 108 ; action
at, 105-7.
Grass fires, to cover attack, 105, 151,
167, 186-7.
Great Berg river, 358-62.
Great Fish river (east of Cradock), 175,
277.
Great Fish river (north-west of Suther-
land), 353.
Great Harts river. See Harts river.
Great Karroo, 367.
Green Hill (Nooitgedacht), 12, 19.
INDEX.
731
Grenadier Guards. See Regular
Units.
Grenfell, Lieut.-Colonel H. M., 46, 59,
62, 65-6, 71-4, 92, no, 173, 175-6.
180, 409, 415-17. 422, 452, 491,
500-3, 511 ; commands in the
Northern Transvaal, 437-43.
Grey, Lieut.-Colonel R., C.M.G., 199,
209-10, 223.
GreyHngstad, 28, 44, 111-12, 149-50,
210, 215, 334, 481, 485, 487 ; block-
house line from, 372.
Greytown, 222.
Grierson, Trooper N. H., 313.
Gries, 356.
Griqualand West, 60, 131, 262, 433.
Griquatown, 345, 367, 433. 488.
Grobelaar, Assistant-General, 435.
Grobelaar, Commandant, 10.
Grobelaar, Commandant S., 221.
Grobler's Drift, 424.
Groblers Kecht, 148.
Groen Kloof (north-west of Pearston),
240.
Groen Kloof (south of Philippolis), 262.
Groenfontein, 321.
Groenvlei (north-east of Heilbron), 249,
424.
Groenvlei (north of Lindley), 336, 486.
Groenvlei Drift, 246.
Groethoek, 440, 443.
Groot Gannapan, 506.
Groot Letaba river, 450.
Groot (Great) Zwart Berg, 361.
Grootdam, 486-7.
Groote Oliphant River station, 211,
518, 530.
Groote river, 279, 284.
Groote Zwarte Bergen, The, 73, 279.
Grootfontein, 328.
Grootklip, 249.
Grootpan (north-west of Bethel), 150.
Grootpan (east of Vryburg), 416.
Grootvallei, 256-7, 264.
Gruisfontein, action at, 408-9.
Gruisplaats, 425.
Gryze Kop, 238.
Guards, brigade of, 367 ; regiments of.
See Regular Units.
Guerrillas, 28, 124, 182, 184, 198,
227, 265, 343, 348, 357, 397, 421,
461, 504, 514, 519 ; definition of,
99-
Guinness, Major E., 310-11.
Guinness, Lieut.-Colonel H. W. N.,
C.B.. 141, 381.
Gumbi, Sergeant, 221.
Gun Hill (Bakenlaagte), 310-14, 390.
Gun Hill (Helvetia), 257.
Gunboats, 362.
Guns: Boer — 30, 49, 76, 113, 121-2,
134, 141, 144-S. 208-9, 397. 420,
494 ; destruction of, 141, 145, 438 ;
loss of, 85, 90, 135, 137, 146, 152,
346, 476, 503 ; British — 2, 7, 17-18,
22, 28, 30. 32, 36. 40-1, 43, 51-2.
5^7. 59. 7^7' 80, 92, iio-ii,
126-7, 132. 135. 137-9. 151. ISS.
157, 180-1, 183, 197, 203. 223, 225,
227, 233. 237, 244. 269, 275, 288,
290, 299-301, 303, 306-15, 346,
348, 351. 370. 38'. 389. 392-3. 407.
415-20, 422, 425. 434, 440, 452, 474,
490, 500, 511, 522 ; at Bakenlaagte,
314 ; Vlakfontein, 186-7 ; re-cap-
ture of, 318, 375, 401, 493 ; loss of,
at Dc Jager's Drift. 218 ; Sannah's
Post, 319; Tweebosch, 420 ; Twee-
fontein, 394 ; Wilmansrust, 204 ;
Yzerspruit, 414 ; 12- pn., 32, 36,
40 ; 4*7-in., 2, 17-18, 25-7 ; 5-ln.,
37, 437, 447 ; Howitxen, 55. 185,
187, 193, 299-300. See also Colt,
Krupp, Machine, Maxim, Maxim-
NORDENFELDT attd ViCKERS-MaXIM.
Guns, columns without, 492.
Haakdoornfontein, 142.
Haarlem, 73.
Haasbroek, Assistant-Head-Command-
ant Z. F., 51-2, 76, 86, 88.
Hacket-Thompson, Lieut.-Colonel F.,
197. 304. 315. 442.
Haencrtsburg, 438 449-50.
732
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Hagenstadt, 95.
Haig, Colonel D., C.B., 71-4, 89, 96-7,
no, 161, 163, 165, 171, 176, 179-
80, 224-7, 232-3. 274, 364. 459.
473-
Halfmaan, 486.
Halfmanshof, 359.
Hall, Colonel F. H., C.B., 437.
Halseston, 273.
Hamanskraal, 10, 21, 142, 442, 445.
Hamburg, 102.
Hamelfontein, 79-80, 367.
Hamilton, Major A. C, 319, 327-8, 338,
430. 434-
Hamilton, Major-General Bruce M., 56,
58-9, 80. 84. 87, 92, 97-8. no, 161,
163-8, 171, 245, 251-3. 255. 262-3,
266, 269, 317, 324, 327, 338 ; transfer
of, to Eastern Transvaal, 219, 221,
319; in command of Eastern Trans-
vaal, south of Delagoa Bay railway,
372. 373-9. 381-2. 481, 512-15, 517,
522 ; co-operates with Elliot in the
Orange River Colony, 485, 490 ;
great " drive " of, 520-1.
Hamilton, Brigadier-General E. O. P.,
154. 212, 385, 388, 398-9-
Hamilton, Brigadier-O'eneral G. H. C,
109, 188-9, 192. 194. 197. 216, 219,
222-3. 253, 291-2, 303. 315, 379,
381. 513, 518, 522.
Hamilton, Lieut. -General Sir I. S. M.,
K.C.B.. D.S.O., 505. 511 ; assumes
command in the Western Transvaal,
498 ; at Rooiwal. 499-503 ; great
" drive " of, 506-10 ; orders of —
see Appendix 4.
Hammonia, 45, 47. 54.
Hanover, and road, 60. 65. 89, 227.
229, 232. 239. 367.
Hantam's Berg, 355.
Harde Heuvel, 354.
Harley, Colonel G. E.. C.B.. 93, 97,
99. 156-9, 169, 171, 246, 249, 251,
269, 338.
Harmsfontein. 258.
Harris, Major O.. 165. 171.
Harrismith. and road. 54, 56-7, 93,
99. 104, 156-8, 169, 217, 219, 246,
249, 251, 322-3, 328, 331, 334-5.
386-7, 392, 401, 423. 434, 482, 485 :
blockhouse line to, 391, 398, 400,
424-5, 428.
Hart, Major-General A. FitzR., C.B.,
1-2, 8, 128, 163, 176, 234-6, 266-9,
286-7, 290, 317, 338, 368, 464.
Hartebeest Kuil, 175.
Hartebeestfontein (south of Brug-
spruit), 152.
Hartebeestfontein (north - west of
Nylstroom), 444.
Hartebeestfontein (north of Paarde-
kop), 200.
Hartebeestfontein, and hills (west of
Klerksdorp), 132, 136-7, 181-3, 191,
340-1. 409, 492.
Hartebeestspruit (north of Ermcio),
205.
Hartebeestspruit (north of Rusten-
burg). 301.
Hartenbosch. 488.
Harts river, and valley, i. 191. 406,
416. 477, 479, 494, 499, 502, 507.
See also Little Harts.
Hartzen Berg, 89.
Hattingh, General J., 336.
Hattingh, Field-Cornet J., 52.
Hay, 60.
Heath, Major F. C, 482, 490.
Heath, Major F. W., 431.
Heen-en-Weers Kop, 430.
Heidelberg (Cape Colony), 283.
Heidelberg (Eastern Transvaal), 21,
28, 43, loi, 108, 127, 15^, 188, 205,
210, 250, 317, 423-4. 477. 487. 512-
•3. 521.
Heilbron, and district, 54, 93, 99-103.
109, 249-50, 323-4, 330-1, 333-4,
336-7. 383-5. 389. 477. 479. 485.
488 • blockhouse line to, 329, 385,
398, 400, 402. 424, 476, 482.
Heilbron commando. See Commandos.
Heir to British Throne, at Cape Town.
355-
INDEX.
733
Hekpoort, district and valley, 21-2,
128-30, 189, 193-4. 442-
Heliographs, 50, 403 ; capture of De
Wet's, 424.
Helpmakaar, 160.
Helvetia (Eastern Transvaal), 25,
34-5 ; attack on, 26, 42.
Helvetia (Orange River Colony), 45,
163, 168, 251, 316, 319.
Helvetia kopjes, 27.
Hely-Hutchinson, Sir Walter F.,
G.C.M.G., 272.
Heneage. Major The Hon. H. G.. 286.
290.
Henniker, Lieut. -Col. The Hon. A. H.,
65. 69-70, 79-82, 84-6, 88-9, 92,
173-4, 176, 178, 180, 226, 244.
Henning, 66, 174.
Henry, Colonel St. G. C. C.B., 118-
19, 166-7, 17'- 196-7, 24s, 253-60,
262-3, 269. 325-6. 338. 345. 348.
Henwoods, 121.
Herbert, Lieut. -Colonel E. B., 45-6,
59. 65-6, TT, 92, no, 163-4, 171.
173, 180.
Herbert (district), 60.
Herschel, 287.
Hertzog, Assistant-Head-Commandant
Judge J. M. Barry, 42-3, 53,
62-3. 65-71. 74-5, 77-9, 87-9, 91,
94, 96, 164, 166, 172-3, 206, 224,
326, 350, 430-1 ; at the peace con-
ference, 544-6. 560. 563.
Hex river (Orange River Colony),
163.
Hex river (Western Transvaal), 301-2.
Hex Rivier hills, 334.
Hickie, Lieut.-Colonel W. B.. 182-3,
189-91, 197, 291-2. 298. 303, 326,
338-40, 34S-6. 348, 407. 409. 422,
Hickman, Colonel T. E., C.B., D.S.O.,
TT, 88-9, 92, 97-8, no, 161, 164-5,
171.
Hicks, Lieut.-Colonel H. T., C.B., 346,
348.
High Commissioner, the British. See
MiLNER, Lord.
High Veld, 104, 112, 145, 149, 199,
382, 446, 514; problem of, etc.,
371-2.
Highland Brigade, 492 ; change of
command of, 176.
Hildyard, Lieut.-General H. J. T., C.B..
31. 117, 120. 153-5.
Hill, Lieutenant H. N., 300.
Hindon, " Captain " J., 282, 442.
Hippisley, Lieut.-Colonel W. H., 474.
History, the present, omissions from,
202.
Hlomohlom, 215.
Hoare, Major R., 474.
Hobbs, Lieutenant R. F. A., 300.
Hoedspruit, 34.
Hoepel, 53.
Hofman's Drift (Vaal river), 160.
Hoi Spruit, 400, 426-7.
Holfontein (south of Hoopstad), 258.
Holfontein (west of Klerksdorp), 344,
416.
Holfontein Siding. 75.
Holland, the Government of. 528-33.
Holle Spruit, 179. 273. 457.
Holmes, Major H. G., 269, 331, 338,
402-3. 405, 423, 434, 482. 490.
Holnek (north of Amsterdam), 148.
Holnek (north-west of Roos Senekal),
144.
Hondeblafs river, 79, 88.
Hondeklip Bay, 356.
Honing Spruit, 256, 262.
Honingfontein, 57.
Honingspruit, 102.
Hoopstad, and district. 56, 133, 135.
160. 167, 196. 254-7. 481, 489. 491.
506.
Hopctield. 358, 362.
Hopctown, 64. 84, 86-8. 94. 238.
Hopewell, 440, 443.
Horse artillery, Royal. See Regular
Units.
Horses, 45 ; Boer, supply of, 68, 79,
81-2 ; capture of, 368-9, 375. 429,
464. 480. 486. 493 ; casualties
among, 107. 115, 191, 204, 233, 277.
734
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Horses — continued.
283. 285, 297, 340, 367, 406, 409,
432. 497, 502 ; collection of, in
Cape Colony, 63 ; Orange River
Colony, 97, 105, 169 ; sickness
among, 440 ; stops operations,
445-6 ; stampeding of, 296.
Hospitals. See Appendix 7.
Hostilities, in Boer territory, to cease
during peace negotiations, 508.
Houbaan, 334.
Houd Constant, 457, 463.
Hout Kraal. 80-1, 88, 366.
Hout Nek, 97.
Houwater, 67, 87.
Howard, Major C, 346.
Howitzers, 55, 185, 187, 193, 299-300.
See also Guns.
Hughes-Hallett, Lieut.-Colonel J. W.,
C.B., D.S.O., yy, 92, 204, 212, 223.
Hugo, Assistant-Commandant Judge
H. J.. 281, 285. 4SS.459.
Humans Rust, 327.
Humby, Major J. F.. 345.
Hunter-Weston, Lieut.-Colonel A. G.,
D.S.O., 232, 237-8, 244, 290. 366,
370.
Hussars, regiments of. See Regular
Units.
Hut Post (Springhaan Nek), 47-51.
Illustrations of the Witkoppies,
104.
Imperial Bushmen, Corps of. See
Colonial Units.
Imperial Light Horse. See Colonial
Units.
Imperial Yeomanry, 2, 65, 73, 227-8,
249,294-7, 339, 345. 389. 41 5. 457.
488 ; at Rooiwal, 500 ; Tweefon-
tein, 392-4 ; Vlakfontein, 185-6 ;
capture of, 192, 484.
Battalions : —
5th, 132, 181, 299, 410, 416-20.
loth, 132, 181.
nth, 334.
19th, 340.
Companies : —
30th, 390.
31st, 390.
86th, 416-20.
Devon, 16.
Fife, 16.
Scottish, 88. ■
Welsh, 52.
Other Units : —
Lovat's Scouts, 234-5, 267, 287-9,
368. 465-7.
Paget's Horse, 410-iij
Impilusi. See Umpilusi.
Ind, Shoeing-Smith A. E. (awarded the
Victoria Cross), 390.
Independence, declaration of, in Cape
Colony, 75 ; of the Republics, 75,
206, 555 ; question submitted to
burghers, 541 ; partial surrender of,
544-
India, ^5, gj, 355.
Indian Ocean, seaboard of, 74, 350.
Infantry, Mounted, 21, 33, 37, 39, jy ,
118, 195, 207, 306, 318-19, 321,
402, 484.
2nd battalion (Legge's), 2, 12.
3rd battalion, 306, 308-14.
4th battalion, 516.
6th battalion, 105-7.
9th battalion, 481.
1 2th battalion, 437-40, 444.
2oth battalion, 439-40.
25th battalion, 306, 308-14.
26th battalion, 371.
28th battalion, 494-6.
Burma, 488.
Unattached Units : —
Vth division, 30, 154, 219.
Connaught Rangers, 267, 287, 368,
Railway Pioneer regiment (4th)4
See Colonial Units.
Royal Irish Rifles, 347.
South Stafiordshire, 392, 394-5.
Gough's, 217-18.
McMicking's, 347.
Pine-Coffin's, 160.
Inglefield, Major N. B., 17-19.
INDEX.
735
Inglis, Captain S. W., 310.
Inhabitants of Cape Colony, attitude
of, 60, 230, 453-4.
Inhoek, 316.
Inktpan, 258.
Inniskilling Dragoons. See Regular
Units.
Inniskilling Fusiliers, The Royal. See
Regular Units.
Intelligence : Boer — 24-5, 145, 240 ;
British — 19, 32, 42, 75, 81, 177,
204-5, 212, 216, 224, 231, 258, 301,
306, 374, 380, 392-3. 401. 407, 439.
485, 491.
Intermediate Post (Springhaan Nek),
. 47. SI-
Intombi river, 119, 515.
Invalids, how dealt with — see Appen-
dix 7 ; statistics of — see Appendix
16.
Invasion, of Cape Colony, 42-3, 54,
58, 62, 108, 231 ; of Natal, 2 16-2 1 ;
rumours of, 29.
Irene, 346.
Irish Fusiliers, The Royal. See Regu-
lar Units.
Irish regiment, The Royal. See Regu-
lar Units.
Irregulars, behaviour of, at Tweebosch,
418-20.
Israels Poort, 46-7, 27-
Itala, fort at, attack on, 219-21.
Jacht Lust, 148.
Jackalsfontein, 413.
Jackson, Stonewall (Confederate Gen-
eral, America), 382.
Jackson, Lieutenant T. D., 313.
Jacobsdal, 166, 252, 262.
Jagersfontein, 96, 433.
Jagersfontein Drift, 252.
Jagersfontein hills, 263.
Jagersfontein Road, 166, 252, 264,
430.
Jagersrust, 333, 335.
Jagtpan, 167.
Jakals Vallei, 455.
Jamestown, and district, 176, 179,
234* 236, 286. 368, 457-8. 4f>4. 473-
Jammersberg Bridge, 327.
Jammersberg Drift, 266, 319-20.
Jan Boers Krjial, 362.
Jansenville, 175-6, 279, 463, 466.
Jardine, Captain W., 408.
Jaskraal, 142.
Jeffrejrs, Colonel H. B., 79, 92, 94,
no, 223.
Jericho, 445.
Jervis-White-Jervis, Colonel Sir J. H.,
Bart., 254, 258, 262, 338, 381, 522.
Jeudwine, Major H. S., 225, 244, 351-6, '
370.
Johannesburg, and district, 2, 22, 122,
129-30, 304 ; railway to, 9, 22, 27-8.
Johannesburg commando. See Com-
mandos.
Johannesburg Mounted Rifles. See
Colonial Units.
Johnson, Lieutenant R. C. M., 221.
Jolly Kop, 169.
Jones, Captain B. J., 484.
Jones, Major-General Inigo R., C.B.,
63, 65-6. 233, 367.
Joubert, Commandant-General P., 217.
Juriesfontein, 175.
Jurys Baken, 267.
Kaal Spruit, 264.
Kaalfontein (north of Bank), 194.
Kaalfontein (east of Geneva siding),
385. 395-
Kaal pan, 260.
Kaalplaats, 136.
Kaalvley, 258.
Kafl&r Kop (north of Fouriesburg), 55,
384-6, 395, 399, 401.
Kaffir river, 166, 327.
Kaffir Spruit, 115.
Kaffirkraal, 321.
Kaffirskraal, 150.
Kafhrstad, 205, 207.
Kaffrarian Rifles. See Colonial
Units.
Kakamas, 350, 352, 454, 468.
736
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Kalabas Drift (Riet river), 94.
Kalabas Kraal, 361.
Kalk Kloof (or Kalkkloof), 148.
Kalk Spruit, 388-9.
Kalkfontein (Cape Colony), 88.
Kalkfontein (north of Boshof), 167.
Kalkfontein (north-west of Karee
siding), 260.
Kalkfontein (east of Roos Senekal),
211.
Kalkkuil, 160.
Kalklaagte, 252.
Kalkoenkrans, 117, 200.
Kalkrans, 427, 479.
Kambula mountain, 32.
Kameel Drift. 85.
Kameel river, 142.
Kameelfontein (north of Bothaville),
326.
Kameelfontein (east of Kimberley), 99,
254.
Kameelfontein (north-east of Pretoria),
443-
Kamies Berg, 472.
Kammenassie mountains, 72.
Kandos Poort, 279.
Kane, Lieutenant H. R., 219.
Kanon Berg, 361-2.
Kanonfontein, 258.
Karabee, 83.
Kardouws Pass, 262.
Karee Kuil, 89.
Karee siding, 261.
Kareeboomskuil, 410.
Kareeboschfontein, 505, 507.
Kareekuil, 507.
Kareepan, 341-2.
Kareepoort, 341.
Kariega river, and valley, 74, 175, 278.
Karoslaagte, 259.
Karree Bosch, 232.
Karreepan (south by east of Hoops-
stad), 258.
Karreepoort (north of Odendaal Drift),
164.
Karreepoort (west of Philippolis), 262.
Karroos, The, 435,
Katdoombult, 258.
Katdoomplaat, 192.
Katkop, 225, 352, 367.
Kattegat, 89.
Kavanagh, Lieut. -Colonel C. T. McM.,
237-9, 243-4. 279. 283-6. 290.
360-2, 365, 370, 460. 472, 474.
Keesen Berg, 236. 238.
Keir, Lieut.-Colonel J. L., 158. 171,
402. 405, 424, 434, 475-7. 490.
492-5,511.
Kekewich, Colonel R. G., C.B.. 128-9,
138, 191-4, 197, 291-2. 298-9,
301-3, 329-44. 348, 383. 406-10,
415-16, 422. 491-4, 498. 503-S.
507-8, 511 ; at Moedwil, 293-7 ;
at Rooiwal, 499-502.
Kelly, Lieutenant J. B., 310.
Kemp, Vecht-General Jan, 136, 184,
186-90, 193, 291-3. 297, 299. 344,
411-14, 418, 445, 505 ; at Rooiwal,
501 ; rashness of, at, 504.
Kendrew, 175, 178, 226, 466.
Kenhardt, and district, 60, 70. 224,
350, 352, 467-8.
Kenna, Major P. A., V.C, 430-1, 434,
482, 490.
Kerr's Drift, 347.
Kestell, Rev. J. D., 557.
Khabanyana river, 5 1 .
Khaki clothing, worn by Boers, 275-6,
414. 493-
Kiba Drift (Orange river), 267.
Kikvorsch Berg, 66.
Killed. See Casualties, also Ap-
pendices 16 and 17.
Kimberley. 65, 252, 260, 433, 488 ;
railway to. 167, 255, 258. 509.
Kimberley column, 84, 99, 166. See
also Paris and Sitwell.
King's Kopje (Helvetia), 25-6.
King's Liverpool regiment. See Regu-
lar Units.
King's Own Royal Lancaster regi-
ment. See Regular Units.
King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry.
See Regular Units.
INDEX.
717
King's Shropshire Light Infantry.
See Regular Units.
Kings Crown, 457.
Kirkpatrick, Major H. P., 472, 474.
Kirsten (or Kerston), Commandant
Jan, 264.
Kitchener, General H. H., Lord,
G.C.B., G.C.M.G., etc., 1-2. 21, 34,
41-3. 47. 56. 58. 75. 77, 87. loi,
112, 119-20, 123, 126, 132, 136,
139, 146, 157. 163, 165, 198, 205,
214, 222, 251, 265-6, 287, 319,
322, 326-7, 329, 348, 382-3, 392,
398, 401. 404. 417, 429. 465, 487,
491, 493, 498, 506, 508, 512, 515,
519 ; and the Government of Cape
Colony, 230-1, 272 ; at the peace
conference, terms, etc., 523-63 ;
despatches of, 332 ; plans of, to
surround De Wet, 331 ; scheme of,
for " drives " in the Orange River
Colony, 423-4, 475-7 ; to subjugate
the Eastern Transvaal, 372 : takes
measures for the safety of Cape
Town, 364 ; visits Cape Colony, 229 ;
Middelburg, 119-20; Klerksdorp,
492.
Kitchener, Major - General T, W.,
126-7, 139. 141-4. 148-9. 155.
204-5, 3<)7. 2i(). 212-14, 216, 218,
221-3, 437 ; ••* th^ Western Trans-
vaal, 491-9, 502, 505, 507-9, 511.
Kitchener's Fighting Scouts. See
Colonial Units.
Kitchener's Horse. See Colonial
Units.
Klaarstroom, and district, 72, 173.
Klaver Vlei, and road. 351-2.
Klein Letaba river, 446.
Klein Marsfontein hills. 316.
Klein Oliphant river, 148.
Klein Sedan, 384.
Klein Waaihoek, 262.
Klein Zevenfontein, 327.
Klein Zwarte Berg, 284.
Kleinfontein (Botha's Berg, Eastern
Transvaal), 144.
Kleinfontein (east of Zeerust), 299.
Kleinkop, 102.
Kleinplaats, 340-1.
Klerksdorp, district, and road, 2, 22,
109, 132-7, 181-3, 188-9, 190-2,
194-6, 216, 250-1, 253-5, 291-2,
298. 325. 339-44. 346. 348. 407,
409-11. 413-16, 420, 477-8. 480.
482, 489. 491-3. 498, 505-6 ; Boer
leaders meet at, to consider peace
proposals, 533-4.
Klerksdorp — Pretoria railway, i, 507.
Klip Bank, 362.
Khp (river) basin, 103.
KUp Drift (Brak river). 83, 462,
Klip Drift (Wilge river), 246.
Klip Gat, 358.
Klip river (Orange River Colony), loi,
103, 154. 250, 424-6.
Klip river (west of Frankfort), 323.
Klip Spruit, 209.
Klipbankspruit. 144. 211.
Klipdam, 437.
Klipdraai hills, 443.
Klipdrift, 340, 499.
Klipfontein (south-east of Bethel),
151.
Klipfontein (south of Ermelo), 1 16.
Klipfontein (north of Ookiep), 470-2.
KHpgat, 445.
Klipkloof, 140.
Klipkoppies, 150.
Klipkraal, 151.
KHpkrans, 189-90, 194.
Klipoog, 249.
Klippan (south-east of Brugspruit),
152.
Klippan (west of Wolmaranstad).
342-
Klipplaat (Cape Colony), 74, 278,
463-
Klipplaat (north of Rustenburg), 302.
KUpplaatdrift, 143.
Kliprif, 340.
KHprug, 117.
KHpspruit (north-west of Belfast), 143,
145.
VOL. IV.
47
738
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Klipspruit (west of Bothaville), 492.
Klipstapel, 520.
Knapdaar, 175, 225.
Knox, Major-General Sir C. E., K.C.B.,
45-6, 48, 52-6, 58-9, 62, 65, 75-8,
80-1, 83-4, 88, 92-3, 96-7, 101-2,
110, 123, 157-60, 166-7, 170-1.
245. 253, 255. 263-4. 269, 327,
338. 402, 429-31. 433-4. 477. 480-1,
490.
Knox, Colonel E. C, iii, 113, 117,
119-20, 122, 127-8, 130, 138, 149-52,
155, 176, 199-203, 223.
Knox, Major-General Sir W. G.,
K.C.B., 160, 170.
Knysna, 72.
Kobe mountains, 357.
Koedoes Kop, 141.
Koedoesdraai, 196, 255.
Koffyfontein, 96, 262-3, 432.
Kokskraal, affair at, 430.
Komati Poort, and railway, 9, -jt,
435. See also Delagoa Bay rail-
way.
Komati river, and valley, 34, 148-9,
204, 214, 305.
Koms Berg, 357.
Koornfontein, 152.
Koperfontein, 190.
Kopje AUeen, 160, 257.
Kopjes Kraal, 260.
Kopjes station, 109, 324, 485.
Kopjesvlei, 191, 503.
Koppiesfontein, 258.
Koranna Berg, 159, 321, 431.
Korannafontein, 182, 192, 341, 415,
507-
Kordemoersfontein, 364-5.
Korn Spruit, 421.
Kosterfontein, 189, 298.
Koude Heuvel, 240.
Koudeveld Bergen, 175, 227-8, 465.
Kouka river, 279.
Kraai river, 179, 234, 236.
Kraaipan, 420.
Kraal Kop, 258.
Kraankuil, 87-8, 90, 173.
Kraans Pan, 82-3.
Kransfontein, 327.
Kriegars Kraal, 277.
Kritzinger, Commandant P. H., 42-3,
53, 62-3, 65-6, 68. 71-5, 77, 91, 98,
163-5, 172-4. 225-8, 233, 237,
265-7, 271, 287-9, 317-20, 366, 454,
456, 528 ; driven into Orange
River Colony, 238 ; returns to Cape
Colony, 179-80. 367 ; visits Orange
River Colony. 176.
Krogh. J. C. 546. 560, 563.
Krokodil River commando. See Com
MANDOS.
Krom Spruit. 334, 485, 487.
Kromdraai (south of Ermelo). 115-16,
153. 183.
Kromdraai (east of Springs), 146, 149-
50.
Kronihoek, 200.
Krommellboog Spruit, 195.
Kromrivier, 7> 10.
Kromspruit. 55.
Kroonstad, 56. 58. 75. 97, 100, 105,
108, 160-1, 168-70. 216, 250, 254,
257-8, 260-1, 321, 323, 325, 330-1,
333-6. 383-4. 388, 402, 423-4, 431,
475. 477-8. 489 ; blockhouse hne
to, 395. 398-9. 426, 479, 485 ;
railway to, 400, 403, 476.
Kroonstad commando. See Com-
mandos.
Kruger. H. E., President S. P. J.. 453 ;
silence of, 206.
Kruger's Drift, 164, 166.
Krugersdorp, 2-3, 6, 8-11. 20-2,
128-31, 136, 184. 189. 194-5, 346.
447 ; railway to, 9, 21.
Krugersdorp commando. See Com-
mandos.
Krugerspost, 127, 140.
Kruidfontein, 256.
Kruisfontein. 121.
Kruitfontein, 260.
Krupp guns, 144 ; capture of, 480 ;
shells for. 158.
Kuruman, 131,
INDEX.
739
Laagers, Boer, capture of, 102, 132,
137, 141-2, 152, 154, 182, 192-4,
196, 201, 211, 255-9, 292-3, 302,
305, 326, 329, 371, 410, 430, 438.
443. 506.
Laatstedrift, 143, 211.
Lacedaemonians, 313.
Ladismith, 243, 279, 283-4.
Lady Frere, blockhouse line to, 368.
Lady Grey, 288, 369, 458, 464.
Ladybrand, 97, 157, 253, 321, 331 ;
blockhouse line to, 326, 431.
Ladysmith, 156, 350.
Lagersdrift, 145.
Laing's Nek, 156.
Laingsburg, 283-4, 360.
Lake Chrissie, 114, 123, 147-9, 504-
517-
Laken Vallei, 459.
Lamberts Bay, 42, 70, 359. 362 ;
blockhouse line to, 364-5.
Lambton, Lieut. -Colonel The Hon. C,
16.
Lancaster Hill (Vryheid), 30-1.
Lancaster regiment. The King's Own
Royal. See Regular Units.
Lancers. See Regular Units.
Landdrost Monde, 1 59.
Lang Kloof, 239.
Langberg, 121.
Langdraai, 121.
Lange Berg (Orange River Colony),
387. 391. 395-
Lange Bergen (CaF>e Colony), 243, 360.
Langgewacht, 117.
Langkloof (Wilge river, Eastern Trans-
vaal), 145, 516.
Langkuil, 257.
Languages, English and Dutch, 523,
52s. 536. 547-
Langverwacht (north of Utrecht), 121.
Langverwacht (south of Vrede), 426,
479-
Lansdowne, The Most Hon. H. C. K.,
Marquis of, K.G., G.C.S.L, etc.,
528. 531-4.
Lapfontein, 456, 459.
VOL. IV.
Lategan. Commandant H. W., 225.
232, 237, 239, 282.
Lauriston, 286.
Lawley, Lieut. -Colonel The Hon. R. T.,
423-4. 434. 475. 477. 48s. 487. 490.
518-20, 522.
Lawrence, Lieut.-Colonel The Hon.
H. A., 474.
Leader, Lieut.-Colonel H. P., 408-9,
422, 500.
Leaders, Republican, 107.
Lean, Major K. E., 253, 266, 269, 272,
290, 327-8. 338.
Leeuw Berg, 80, 84.
Leeuw Hoek, 238.
Leeuw Kop (Orange River Colony),
58, 75, 246.
Leeuw river, 50.
Leeuw Spruit, 246, 482.
Leeuwbank Drift, 108.
Leeuwboschen, 191.
Leeuwdoom hills, 347.
Leeuwdoorns, 347.
Leeuwfontein (south of Balmoral),
152.
Leeuwfontein (north-west of Klerks-
dorp), 340, 416.
Leeuwfontein (north of Middelburg),
143-
Leeuwfontein (south-west of Rich-
mond), 456.
Leeuwfontein (north of Tafel Kop,
Western Transvaal), 291.
Leeuwfontein (west of Ventersdorp),
182-3, 408.
Leeuwfontein (west of Wolmaranstad),
342.
Leeuwkop (north of Harrismith), 479.
Leeuwkop (north-east of Kimberley),
433-
Leeuwkrantz, 256.
Leeuwkuil (south of Frankfort), 246.
Leeuwkuil (east of Geysdorp), 417,
419.
Leeuwnek, 122.
Leeuwpan (north-east of Geysdorp),
494-
47*
740
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Leeuwpan (east of Hoopstad), 256-7.
Leeuwpoort (north of Bethlehem),
169.
Leeuwpoort (west of the Bronkhorst
Spruit), 150.
Leeuwspruit (east of Geysdorp), 416-
17-
Leeuwspruit (east of Reitz), 246.
Lefroy, Lieutenant B. P., 219.
Legalie's Location, 451.
Legard, Captain D'A., 180.
Legdaar, 207.
Legge, Lieut. -Colonel N., D.S.O., 12-
13-
Legislature, Cape Colony, 177, 272.
Leliefontein (north of Garies), 469.
Leliefontein (south-east of Venters-
burg), 90, 93, 160.
Lemmer (Senior), General, 418.
Lemmer (Junior), General, 415.
Lemoenfontein Drift, 88.
Lemoenskraal, 424.
Leniency of peace terms, 555.
Lessons of the campaign, 421, 497,
504.
Letjesbosch, 74.
Letskraal siding, 280, 457.
Letters, rep>orts, etc., from Boer
leaders, 107, 123-4, 131, 140, 216,
222, 227, 273, 285, 298, 305, 366,
388, 411. 453, 461, 528; for the
Army, how dealt with — see Appen-
dix 9 ; relating to peace proposals,
524-6, 533-5. See also Appendix 3.
Leyden, 321.
Leydsdorp, 449-50.
Liabilities, Boer, incurred in the field,
523, 525, 549.
Libenbergs Vlei river, 55, 108, 169,
246, 330-1. 383-5, 388, 396-400,
426, 476-7, 479-80, 482, 485-6.
Licences for firearms, etc., 526, 547.
Lichtenburg, district, and road, i, 131,
136. 181, 183, 191-2, 292, 344,
406, 409, 416, 421, 475, 508 ;
attack on, 1 34 ; blockhouse line to,
407, 492 ; reinforcements for, 492,
Lichtenburg commando. See Com-
mandos.
Lichtenstein, 320.
Liebenberg, General P. J., i, 194,
325, 340, 411-12.
Light order of columns, neither guns
nor transport, 492.
Lilliburn, 116, 148.
Limoen Kloof, 236.
Limpopo river, 435.
Lincelles, 318.
Lincolnshire regiment. See Regular
Units.
Lindequee Drift, 195, 324, 333,
346-7-
Lindley, district, and road, 54-7, 101-2,
105, 108, 169, 250, 321, 330-1,
334-7. 383-S. 402-3. 423. 475. 477-
482, 486, 488 ; blockhouse line to,
395. 398-9. 426. 476. 479. 485-
Lindleys Poort, 291, 293, 298, 339.
Lindsay, Captain M. W., 310.
Lindsell, Lieut.-Colonel R. F., C.B.,
173. 180.
Lines of communication, Bloemfon-
tein to Orange river, 176; east of
Pretoria (Delagoa Bay railway), 212,
223, 298 ; attacks on, December
29th, 1900, 24 ; January 7th, 1901,
35-41 ; casualties, 44 ; renewed
attacks on, 125, 153 ; enemy's
efforts to destroy, generally, 245 ;
north of Pretoria, 437 ; Orange
River Colony, 170; Standerton rail-
way, 153.
Linyana Spruit, 52-3.
Lisbon, 64.
Little, Brigadier-General M. O., 482,
490.
Little Caledon river, 158.
Little Harts river, 183, 191, 406,
416-17, 492.
Little Salt river, 361.
Liverpool regiment. The King's. See
Regular Units.
Lloyd, Major F. C, 253, 269, 338.
Lloyd, Captain T. H. E., 312.
Index.
741
Local fencibles and forces. See Colo-
nial Units.
Local volunteers. See Colonial
Units.
Loeries Fontein, 352-3, 355.
Lokoala, 53.
Long, Colonel C. J., 45-6, 59, 110.
Los Berg, 195-6, 262, 324, 346.
Loskop, 169.
Lotter (Cape rebel), 225, 237-9, 271 ;
capture of, 240-1.
Louis Trichardt, 438-9, 446.
Louw, Commandant A., 353, 363-4.
Louw, Commandant Jan, 468.
Lovat, Major S. J., Lord, D.S.O..
288-9, 457. 464. 466-7, 474.
Lovat's Scouts. See Imperial Yeo-
manry.
Lowe, Colonel W. H. M., 65-6, 70-2,
74, 89, 92, 102-5, no, 161, 169.
171, 246, 250, 255-61, 269, 321,
335. 338. 383. 492-3. 497. 511-
Lowry-Cole, Lieut. -Colonel A. W. G.
See Cole.
Loyal North Lancashire regiment.
See Regular Units.
Loyalty, in Cape Colony, 69.
Luckhoff, 94, 96, 166-7, 251, 362-3.
325-
Luipaardsfontein, 54.
Lukin, Lieut. -Colonel H. T.. D.S.O..
178-80, 232, 241, 244, 279-81, 290,
369-70, 466-7. 474.
Lund, Captain F. T., 236-7, 231-2,
239, 244, 281, 290. 364, 370, 455-^.
459. 474-
Liineberg, 117-20, 201.
Luxemburg, 167.
Lydenburg, and district, 35, 136,
140-1, 147-8, 207-8, 211, 216,
250. 304. 376. 381-2. 443.
Lydenburg commando. See Com-
mandos.
Lyle, Major H. T., 137.
Lyle, Captain J. C. V., 448-9.
Ljmes, Lieutenant W. P., 310-11,
314.
Lyttelton, Lieut.-General The Hon.
N. G., C.B., 41, 77-8. 87, 89, 96-7.
no. 126, 161, 163, 171, 174;
assumes command in Natal, 216.
Maaritsdrift, 251.
Mabusa Spruit, 117, 199-200, 379.
McCarthy, Corporal J., 313.
McCracken, Lieut. -Colonel F. W. N.,
208.
McCracken's Hill, 40.
McKenzie, Lieut. -Colonel D., 116,
331. 338. 392. 404.
McKinnon's Post, 238.
McLean, Captain A. C, 395.
McMicking, Major H., D.S.O.. 346-8,
439-42. 452.
McQueen, Captain, 448-9.
MacAndrew, Lieut. -Colonel J. R., 240,
279-80, 290, 370.
Macbean, Colonel F., 23.
MacDonald, Major-General Sir H. A.,
K.C.B., D.S.O.. 62-3, 65-6, 92, 176.
Macdonald, Captain M., 470.
Machadodorp, 25-6, 35, 148-9, 207-8,
210; attack on, 36. 43; casualties
at. 44.
Machine guns. 33, 59, 93, no, 137,
138, 155, 171, 180, 197, 323. 244.
269, 290, 303, 315, 348, 370, 381.
423, 434, 453. 474, 490. 511. 522.
MacKenzie, Lieut.-Colonel Colin J.,
C.B., 176, 373, 375, 378, 381. 485-7.
490. 514, 517. 530, 533.
Mackenzie, Lieut.-Colonel G. F. C,
C.B., 345.
Mackenzie, Captain J. R., 408.
Mafeking, 133, 181-3, 191, 392, 298,
348, 443 ; railway to, 443, 461,
494-
Magaliesberg mountains, and valley,
1-2, 4, 7-22, 189-90. 192-3, 393,
295. 437 ; situation in, 128-9.
Magalipsi, 443.
Magato Nek (or Hoek), 291, 293-4,
298. 339-
Magnets Hoogte. 141.
742
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Mahamba, 119, 121, 371.
Mahlabitini, and district, 153.
Mahon, Major Sir W. H.. Bart., D.S.O.,
283.
Majoors Drift, 423, 425, 428, 475, 482,
488.
Majuba mountain, 9, 125, 393.
Makauws Drift, 431.
Makoiespan, 498.
Makwasi Berg, 341-2, 344, 410.
Makwasi Spruit, 340.
Malan, Fighting-General (Lieutenant)
W., 173-6, 178-80, 225-7, 229,
231-2. 237, 281-2, 363-4, 4SS-9.
462-3, 465-7. 528.
Malips river, 141.
Malipspoort, 446, 448-51.
Malmesbury, 357-8, 360-2.
Mamre, 360.
Manchester regiment. See Regular
Units.
Map, showing physical features of
Cape Colony, 358.
Mapoch's Gronden, 145.
Marais, Commandant, 438.
Marais siding, 175, 278.
Maraisburg, 176, 179, 237, 274, 277,
464, 466-7.
Marches, forced, 352, 359-60, 379, 424,
516-17.
Maribogo, 182, 420, 508.
Marico, and district, 301, 416.
Marienthal, 1 18-19.
Maritz, Commandant S. G.. 224, 228,
271, 350-63, 365, 367, 383, 455.
468-9, 471.
Mark's Drift, 86.
Marker, Captain R. J., 85.
Marsala, 402.
Marshall, Major W. R., 402-3, 405,
423, 434, 482, 490.
Marston Moor, 504.
Marten, Second-Lieutenant L. H., 310.
Martial law, absence of, in Cape
Town, 177 ; administration of, in
Cape Colony, 230, 272 ; for Cape
ports, 178, 272 ; for Cape Town, 358.
Martin, Lieut.-Colonel H., C.B., 156.
Martin-Leake, Surgeon-Captain A.
(awarded the Victoria Cross), 513.
Maryvale, 117, 375.
Maseru (farm), 53.
Massy, Major W. G., 93-4, 98, no, 171.
Matala's Location, 446.
Matjesfontein, 69-70, 243, 284-5, 364.
455. 460.
Mauch Berg, 147, 199, 204.
Mausers (Boer rifles), 220, 312.
Maxim gun, 32, 38, 88, 135, 142, 209,
235. 275. 410, 412, 439, 476. 501.
Maxim-Nordenfeldt gun, 387.
Maxwell, Lieut.-Colonel C, 97, no,
161, 163-5, ^7^-
Maygar, Lieutenant L. C. (awarded the
Victoria Cross), 373.
Mayne, Lieut.-Colonel G. N., 345.
Mears, Commandant, 150, 401.
Measures for subjugation of the Orange
River Colony, 326.
Mecca, 9.
Medical arrangements. See Appen-
dix 7.
Mediterranean, 255.
Melani Kop, 428, 480.
Melkboschfontein, 35.
Melmoth, and district, 154, 219-20,
222.
Menne's Scouts. See Colonial Units.
Mentz, Commandant F., 426, 477,
486-7.
Mequatlings Nek, 53, 157, 159, 253,
431-
Methuen, Lieut. -General P. S., Lord,
K.C.V.O., K.C.B., C.M.G., i. 131-5.
137-8, 181-3, 188-92, 194, 197,
291-2, 298-9, 301, 303, 339-45.
348, 383, 406-7, 409. 416, 422, 477,
491-2, 507 ; at Tweebosch, 417-20.
Meyer, General Lucas J., 206 ; at the
peace conference, 546, 560, 563.
Meyershoop, 117.
Meyerton, 207.
Middel Post (north-west of Kenhardt),
468.
INDEX.
743
Middel Post (north of Sutherland),
460.
Middel Water, 335.
Middelbult, 494, 498, 505.
Middelburg, and road (Eastern Trans-
vaal), 23, 34-5, 41, III. 113, 125,
143, 146, 148, 203, 207, 209-11,
213-15, 249, 304-6, 373, 515 ; peace
conference at, 119-20, 126, 523-4;
peace proposals at, basis for final
terms, 540, 545-6, 549.
Middelburg commando. See Com-
mandos.
Middeldrift, 153.
Middelkop, 479.
Middelkraal, 152, 207, 209.
Middelplaat, 151.
Middclplaats, 86-7.
Middle Hill (Helvetia), 25-6.
Middle Mount, 463, 465.
Middle Water, 240.
Middleburg (Cape Colony), 64, 67,
71, 176, 224, 226-7, 239> 233.
237-9, 280, 359 ; blockhouse Une
to, 458.
Middlesex regiment. See Regular
Units.
Military history of Perthshire, 504.
Military railways, system of. See
Appendix 10.
Militia, 63.
Militia Units : —
Royal Garrison artillery, Durham
company, 221.
The Royal Warwckshire (5 th), 470.
The Prince of Wales's Own (West
Yorkshire) (4th), 283.
The South Wales Borderers (3rd),
410.
Mill (Molen) river, 246, 475.
Milleralc, 475.
Mills, Lieut.-Colonel G. A., C.B., 222.
Milne, Lieut.-Colonel R. L., D.S.O.,
346. 348.
Milner A., Lord, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.,
4S3-4. 537. S39-40, 544-6. 549-53.
560-3.
Minchin, Lieut.-Colonel C. F., D.S.O.,
253. 269, 327, 338.
Mkusi river, 515.
Mobility of Boers, 68.
Modder river, 42, 95, 165-7, 196, 250-2,
254-5, 258, 260, 262, 264, 321, 325,
421, 431-2 ; Elliot's " drive " tOt
257-61.
Modder River station, 254, 257, 262-3,
326.
Modderfontein (Cape Colony), 274-7.
Modderfontein (Gatsrand), 75, 130-1.
Moedwil, 344, 504 ; action of, 293-8.
Moeras river, 243.
Moeyelykhcid, 143.
Mokari Drift, 320.
Molen Spruit, 424.
Molteno, and district, 255-6, 234-5,
272-3. 458. 463-
Money, Lieut.-Colonel C. G. C. (C.E.),
C.B.. 134.
Monro, Colonel S. C. H.. 56-9, 92,
97, no, 161-5, 171. 179-80, 225-6,
234-6, 244, 271-4, 286-7, 290,
368-70. 457-8. 474-
Montagu, 243, 285. 458.
Monument Hill (Belfast), 37-9.
Mooi Hoek, 457.
Mooi river, blockhouse Une to. 345.
Mooifontein (south of Bethel), 151.
Mooifontein (north of Lindley), 384.
Mooigelegen, 346.
Mooihoek, 158.
Mooiklip, 1 2 1-2.
Mooimook river, 361.
Mooiplaats (east of Pretoria), in.
Mooiplaats (north-east of Vryburg),
406.
Mooipoort, 117.
Mooiwater, 159.
Moolmans Spruit, 484.
Moore, Lieut.-Colonel M. G., 234-6.
244, 267, 269, 287, 290, 316, 338,
368-70, 464, 474.
Moorrccsburg, 356, 358, 360-2.
Moos river, 144-5. 211, 214, 517.
Morgenzon (north of Blauw Kop), 202.
744
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Morgenzon (east of Reitz), 246, 401.
Morgenzon (west of Warm Bath), 445.
Morgenzon (near Zulu border), 122.
Mortimer, and station. 233, 467.
Mossel Bay, 72, 283.
Mount Prospect, 156.
Mount Stewart, 278.
Mounted Infantry. See Infantry,
Mounted.
Mounted Infantry Plateau (Vryheid),
30.
Movement of troops, by railway, 64.
See also Appendix 10.
Mowbray, 104, 487.
MuUer, Vecht-General, 38, 143, 203-4,
206, 213, 377, 515-16.
Mullers Pass, 215.
Munitions of war, importation of, for
enemy, 177.
Munster Fusiliers, The Royal. See
Regular Units.
Murray, Lieut. -Colonel The Hon. A.,
no, 163-5, 171. 179-80, 225, 234,
244, 267. 269, 287-90, 316, 338.
Murray, Major F. D., 310, 312.
Murray, Lieut.-Colonel W. H. E., 345.
Murraysburg, 71, 74, 176, 228, 231,
278, 456-7. 459. 463-5-
Myburg, Commandant C, 225, 233-4,
236, 252, 271-2, 274, 286, 368-9.
Naauwpoort (Cape Colony), 65, yj ',
railway to, 367.
Naauwpoort (Botha's Berg, Eastern
Transvaal), 143.
Naauwpoort (south of Rustenburg),
129-30, 134, 136, 183-4, 188-9,
191, 193, 292-3, 339, 345.
Naauwpoort Nek (Brandwater basin),
158, 335-
Naboomspruit, 439, 441.
Namaqualand, and district, 224, 455,
462, 467-9, 472-3-
Namaqualand Border Scouts. See
Colonial Units.
Namaqualand Field Force, 469.
Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor, 46-7.
Naseby, 164, 504.
Natal, 34, 56, 117, 125, 129, 147, 153-4.
186, 199, 217, 293. 304-5. 307. 317.
321-3, 328, 350, 377, 423, 425,
478-9, 514; blockhouse line to,
398 ; borders of, 102, 217-22 ;
Government of, 554 ; invasion of,
rumours of, 29 ; railway of, 27-8 ;
re-invasion of, plans for, 42, 216 ;
suppHes from, for General French's
force, 112-13, 117. 5etf a/50 Appen-
dix 1.
Natal Hill (Machadodorp), 36.
Natal Police. See Colonial Units.
Natal Volunteers. Sec Colonial Units.
Nation, The British, and military
preparedness, 421.
" National Murder," 107.
National Scouts. See Colonial Units.
Native drivers, shot by Boers, 430.
Naude, Commandant, 366.
Ndwandwe district, 219.
Nels Poort station, 173, 231-2, 456,
459. 464-5-
Nelskop, 351.
Nelspruit, 35, 147-8, 207-8.
Nesbitt's Horse. See Colonial Units.
Nesham, Lieutenant T. P. W., 418.
Netherland, The, Government of,
528-33.
New Bethesda, 71, 238, 280-1.
New Holstein, 53, 159.
" New Model," De la Rey's, broken,
503-
New South Wales, contingents from.
See Colonial Units.
New Zealand, contingents from. See
Colonial Units.
Newcastle, 103, 215.
Newmarket, 476.
Newspapers, Republican, sympathies
of, 177.
Ney (French Marshal), 397.
Ngoana, 48, 50-2.
Ngomi forest, 515.
Nicholson, Lieut.-Colonel J. S., D.S.O.,
. 304-
INDEX.
745
Nicholson's Nek, 27, 186.
Nickalls, Major N. T., 276, 457-8.
Niekerksvlei, 113, 116.
Niet Gedacht, 456.
Nieuhoudt (or Nieuwoudt), Command-
ant C, 67, 430-1,
Nieuwoudtville, 352-3.
Nieuwveld range, 357, 457.
Nixon, Colonel J. E., 425, 428, 434,
475. 479-81, 485, 488, 490, 520,
522.
Nkandhla, and district, 153-4, 219,
221, 377.
Nondweni, 377.
Nooitgedacht (east of Machadodorp),
35 ; attack on, 40-1 ; casualties at,
44-
Nooitgedacht (Magaliesberg), 8, 11.
193, 295 ; actional, 13-22 ; position
at, 12.
Nooitgedacht (north of Poplar Grove),
167.
Nooitgedacht (south of Rooiwal), 503.
Nooitverwacht, 507.
Norfolk regiment. See Rkgular
Units.
Norman castles (Witkoppies), 104.
Northamptonshire regiment. See
Regular Units.
Northern Transvaal, 95 ; description
of, 435 ; Grenf ell's transfer to, 176 ;
its occupation and importance,
436-7 ; situation in, 382. See also
Events in.
Northumberland Fusiliers. Sm Rxgo-
LAR Units.
Norval's Pont, 63, 78, 93, 96-7, 262 ;
railway to, 64, 265.
Notes, issued by South African Re-
pubhc, S48-9.
Nqutu, and district, 32, 122, 219.
Nurses. See Appendix 7.
Nylstroom, 439-44.
Odendaal, Field-Cornet G., 369.
Odendaal Stroom, 62.
Olievenberg, 96.
OUfants Nek, 2-3, 6-8, 10, 22, 128,
191, 193, 19s, 292-3, 339.
Olifants river (ClanwilUam, Cape
Colony), 359.
Olifants river, and valley (Outdtshoorn,
Cape Colony), 72, 279, 284.
Oliphant river, 113, 140-2, 144-6,
149-50, 152, 199, 203, 205, 207,
211, 213-15, 305, 375, 516.
OUphant River drifts, 437.
Ohphants Kop, 214.
OUphant's Poort, 141.
Oliver, Second-Lieutenant L. M., 336.
Olivier C, 546, 560, 563.
Oliviers Hoek Pass, 335.
Omdraai Vlei, 462.
Omdurman, battle of, 503.
Omissions from this history, 202.
Omkyk, 468.
Onbekend, 113.
Ongers river, 67, 87, 473.
Onverdacht, action at, 57.
Onverwacht (Cape Colony), 78.
Onverwacht (south-east of Ermelo),
30 1 ; affair at, 379-80.
Ookiep, 356, 468-9. 473 ; siege of,
470-2.
Oorlogs Poort (north-west of Aberdeen,
Cape Colony), 279, 237.
Oorlogs Poort (north-west of Dor-
drecht, Cape Colony). 236, 457.
Oorlogs Poort (east of Reddersburg,
Orange River Colony), 168, 245.
Oorzaak, 2, 7, 193.
Oosthuizen, Acting-Commandant O..
297.
Openbaar. 94.
Oppenheim, Captain L. C. P., 504. 5m
also Preface.
Opperman, General D., 220, 505,
380.
Orange Free State : army of, 46 ;
executive of, meets Transvaal
Government, 205-6 ; president of —
see Stevn, M. T. ; terms of peace
for, negotiations, and conclusion of,
523-63-
746
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Orange river, i, 42, 45, 47, 62-3, 65,
74, 76-8. 81, 83-6, 88-91, 93,
96-8, 163-5, 167, 172-3, 176, 233,
236-9, 261-8, 270, 273, 286-9,
317-18, 366, 462, 468, 473.
Orange River bridge, 94.
Orange River Colony, 65, 68, 75-8,
123, 139, 173. 177-9, 192, 202,
207, 210-11, 216-17, 222, 231, 238,
271-3, 286, 326, 350. 357, 367, 454,
506, 521 ; " cockpit," the, of the
campaign, 475 ; clearance and
subjugation of, 326 ; commands in,
97 ; districts of, 263 ; " drives "
in, scheme for, 423-4, 485 ; Govern-
ment of, 205-6 ; B, Hamilton
enters, 485 ; situation in, 382-3,
392-3. 397-
Orange River station, 166.
Order, The, of the Bath, 170, 180, 217,
224.
Orders : by the Commander-in-Chief,
331 ; to Blood, 205 ; Clements, 2,
56 ; Elliot. 323, 335 ; Fetherston-
haugh, 293; French, 112, 465;
Garratt, 195 ; B. Hamilton, 87, 163,
251 ; Hart, 267-8, 287 ; Kekewich,
193 ; by Benson, 308, 314 ; Scobell,
240, 242 ; Elliot, 247 ; French, 1 14,
278 ; I. Hamilton — see Appendix
4 ; Plumer, 94 ; Wynne, 177 ; by L.
Botha, to attack Benson, 305 ;
for re-invasion of Natal, 217.
Ordnance Department, The Army, and
Stores. See Appendix 8.
O'Reilly's Pan, 346, 406.
Orr, Major A. S., 381.
Ortlepp's Request, 90.
Oshoek, 495.
Ossenberg, 228.
Otter Spruit, 256.
Otters Hoek, 283.
Otto's Hoop, I, 131.
Oud Agatha, 450.
OudeMuur, 455.
Oudeberg, 457, 465.
Oudenaarde, 317.
Oudtshoorn, and district, 72, 243, 279,
283-4.
Owen, Lieut. -Colonel H. M., 85, 255-6,
269.
Oxfordshire Light Infantry. See Regu
LAR Units.
Paarde Gras Vallei, 459.
Paarde Vallei, 238.
Paarde Verlies, 369.
Paardeberg, 167, 263, 374.
Paardeberg Drift, 262.
Paardefontein, 150.
Paardehoek, 331, 334.
Paardckop (station), 216, 425, 517.
Paardekraal (south of Vredefort), 100.
Paardenkop, 425.
Paardenkraal, 246.
Paardeplaats (north-west of Klerks-
dorp), 416.
Paardeplaats (west of Lydenburg),
144.
Paauwpan, 87.
Paget, Major-General A. H., C.V.O.,
10, 19, 21, 23, 77, 92-5, IIO-II,
128-9, 138.
Paget's Horse. See Imperial Yeo-
manry.
Palala, 443.
Palala River valley, 443.
PaUng Kloof, 467.
Palmes, Major P., 183.
Palmietfontein (north of Belfast),
143-
Palmietfontein (south-east of Boshof),
254, 259.
Palmietfontein (north by west of
Klerksdorp), 182.
Palmietfontein (north of Wolmaran-
stad), 341-2.
Palmietpan, 254.
Pampasfontein, 327-8.
Pampoen Poort, 459.
Pan, 23, 35, 209, 214, 515 ; attack on
post at, 41 ; casualties at, 44.
Pandamsfontein, 254.
Paris (France), 24, 124.
INDEX.
747
Paris, Major A., 84, 86-7, 89, 92, 99,
no, 166-7, 171. 245, 253-5, 258,
261, 269, 338, 416, 422 ; at Twee-
bosch, 417-20.
Park, Lieut.-Colonel C. W., A.D.C.,
127, 139-44, 147-8, 153, 155. 199,
204, 207-8, 210-12, 214, 223, 304,
376-7, 380-1, 515-17. 520-2.
Parke, Lieut.-Colonel R. K.. C.B.,
65, 67, 70. 73, 92.
Parsons, Colonel Sir C. K.C.M.G.. 46.
S3. 59. 65, 67. 69-70. 92. no. 173,
175. 180.
Parys (south of Villiersdorp). 102.
Parys, and district (west of Wolvehoek
station). 100, 109, 249-50, 324,
346-7.
Passage of the Orange river, by De
Wet, 78, 90, 93.
Passes of the Drakensberg, closing of,
217.
Patchoana mountain, 47-51.
Patriotism of irregulars, unreliability
of, 421.
Patriots Klip, 368-9.
Patten. Captain A.. 4-5.
Payne. Lieut.-Colonel R. L., 23.
Peace. 450-1. 474, 510, 521 ; Aide-
Memoire from the Netherland
Government. as to. 529-31 ;
Articles of, 547-63 ; Boer proposals
for. 544-5 ; Botha refuses terms of.
119. 126 ; conclusion of negotiations
for. 523-63 ; conference at Middel-
burg, 119-20, 126; at Vereeniging,
471, 473. 487 ; correspondence
relating to. 524-39 ; discussion of
terms, etc., 540-63 ; hostilities to
cease during, 508 ; negotiations for,
107 ; none without independence,
206 ; terms of, offered by British
Government, 523-4 ; text of, 560-3.
Pearston, 174-5, *78. 226, 279-80.
457. 463, 466.
Pella. 468.
Peninsula (War). 397.
Pepworth Hill, 141.
Perth, 102, 334.
Perthshire, military history of, 504.
Petersburg. 225-6, 239-40, 463.
Petrusburg. and road, 95-7, 166-7,
251-2. 431.
Petrusburg commando. See Com-
mandos.
Petrusville, 65, 86. 88, 173.
Philippolis, 62, 78. 94. 96, 164. 166-7,
252, 262-3. 266. 430-1.
Philipstown. 60. 65, 79-81. 88-9.
Physical features of Cape Colony,
358.
Piccadilly, 3.
Piekeniers Kloof, 362.
Pienaars Pan, 81.
Pienaars River station, 443.
Piet Retief. and road. 11 7-21, 142,
199-200, 216 ; blockhouse line to.
372. 377. 379-
Piet Retief commando. See Com-
mandos.
Pietermaritzburg. 350.
Pietersburg, 9-10, 95, 139, 141-2.
145-6. 438-9. 441. 443, 446-9; its
occupation and importance. 435-7.
Pietersburg Light Horse. See Colo-
nial Units.
Pieterskraal. 143.
Pietersrust. 121.
Pilands Berg. i.
Pilcher. Colonel T. D.. 46. 53-6. 59,
76. 78. 80. 83. 92-3, 96-7. 99. I03,
MO, 157-61, 166-7, ^71, '76. 245.
250, 253, 265-6. 269. 271-4, 286, 290.
316-17. 327. 329. 338. 368, 430,
434, 481, 488. 490.
Pilgrim's Rest. 380.
Pilson, Major A. F., 36.
Pine-Coffin, Major J. E., 93, no, 160,
171, 254-5, 257, 259-61. 266. 269.
321. 331. 338.
Pink. Lieut.-Colonel F. J.. C.M.G..
D.S.O.. 103. no, 154-5.
Piquetberg (town and county), 69-70,
357-64.
Piquetberg mountains. 360. 363.
748
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Piquetberg Road station, 356, 358-9,
361, 455-
Pitsani, 346.
Pitville, 148.
Pivaan river, 120, 201.
Pivaanspoort, 201.
Plan of campaign, and of commanders :
Boer — 34, 42, 68, 108, 114, 172,
207, 216-17. 270, 357, 359, 383 ;
miscarriage of, 297 ; in Cape Colony,
461 ; British — 42, 94, lOO-i, 112,
139, 146, 228, 237, 242, 255, 265,
326-7. 331, 358, 363. 384. 400. 423-4.
439. 475. 485. 506; marred by
railway delay, 516.
Plat Kop Drift (Kraai river). 234.
Plat Nek. 121, 371,
Plat Rust, 229.
Platberg, 262.
Platkop, 334.
Platrand. 147. 152, 154. 200, 202-3,
205 ; afiair at, 212.
Pleasant Gift. 428.
Plesier. 55-6.
Plettenberg Bay. 72.
Plumer, Brigadier-General H. C. O..
C.B., 77-89. 92-6, no. 129-30.
138-42. 145-7. 149-52. »55. 165,
199-203, 222-3. 249-50, 254-5,
257-63, 269, 287, 316-20, 338, 371,
373. 376. 379-81. 435. 437. 514.
522.
Pokwani, 141. 144.
Pompey siding, 78, 265.
Pongola Bosch, and " bush," 200,
202, 320. 371.
Pongola river. 120-1.
Ponies, capture of. 249, 256. 356.
Pont, at Mark's Drift. 86.
Poortje (south of Aberdeen. Cape
Colony), 175-6. 231-2.
Poortje (south of Bethlehem), 169.
Poortje (east of Vrede), 425.
Pope. John (Federal General, America),
382.
Poplar Grove, 252, 254, 260.
Port Alfred, railway to. 64.
Port Elizabeth, and railway. 64, 242.
278. 350, 357-
Port Nolloth, 356, 469-70 ; railway
to, 468.
Port Scheiding, 141.
Porterville, 362.
Post oflSce, military, the work of. See
Appendix 9.
Postal and telegraph union, 536.
Positions, attack on, steepest side
most favourable to, 393-4.
Potchefstroora, 2, 128. 131. 133, 136,
183, 192, 195, 298, 324. 491 ; rail-
way to. 22.
Potchefstroom commando. See Com-
mandos.
Potfontein (Cape Colony), 87. 366.
Potgieter, Commandant F. J., 192,
341-2, 344, 410 ; at Rooiwal.
501.
Potgieter, Commandant H. J., 220-1.
P. P. Burg, 120, 122, 201.
P. P. Rust. 142. 440.
Pram Bergen. 473.
Pram Kop. 105. 329. 426. 485.
Presidents. See Burger, S., and
Steyn. M. T.
Pretoria, 6-7, 24, 44, loi, 147, 153,
188, 194, 206, 216, 232, 266, 292.
298. 376. 437. 439. 442. 504. 5 10.
521. 534 ; peace delegates to, 535 ;
delegates leave, 541 ; the loss of,
its bearing on Boer warfare, 436.
Pretoria commando. See Com-
mandos.
Pretoria — Delagoa Bay or Komati
Poort railway, y^, 139, 146, 210.
Pretoria — Klerksdorp railway, i.
Pretoria — Rustenburg road, safety of,
3-
Pretorius, defeat of the Zulus by, in
1838, 21.
Pretorius, Commandant H., 67.
Pretorius, Commandant M. G., 439,
518.
Price, Colonel R. H., C.M.G.. 369, 458,
463-5-
INDEX.
749
Price-Davies, Lieutenant L. A. E.
(awarded the Victoria Cross),
217.
Prieska, and district, 60, 67, 70, 81,
83, 224, 367, 462.
Prince Albert (town), 243, 279-80,
282-3, 285-6.
Prince Albert Road, 70, t2. 455.
Prince of Wales's Light Horse. See
Colonial Units.
Prinsloo, Assistant-Commandant A..
215.
Prinsloo, General M., 48-51, 335-6,
396-
Prinsloo, General M., surrender of,
to Hunter, 112.
Priors siding, 78, 164, 263, 316.
Prisoners of war: Boer — 52, 85, 88,
97, 102-3, 105, 107-9, 116-19,
121-2, 127, 132, 134-7. 141-4. 146,
149-50, 152-4, 159. 162-4, 166-8,
175. 179-83. 189. 191-3, 195-6.
200-3, 208-9, 211-15, 225, 229, 232,
241. 248-54, 256-60, 262-3, 280.
292-3, 298, 301-2. 304-6. 316,
318, 322-6, 330, 332, 334-5, 339-46.
351. 367-9. 371. 374-81. 397-402,
404, 406-10, 424, 428-31, 438-40,
443-6. 449-51. 457. 460. 463-4. 477.
479-80, 486-7. 493. 503. 505. 509.
513-17. 520-1 ; return of, 523-4,
547; British — 15-16, 26-7. 29, 34.
37-8. 55, 73, 96, loi, 167. 192,
204, 209. 218. 225. 251, 259. 286.
298. 314. 319. 321. 330. 333. 340.
355. 376. 394. 415. 420. 450. 484,
489, 514; brutality of Boers to,
430 ; deprived of uniform, 497.
Privations endured by troops, 82-3,
1 18-19. 242, 493.
Problem of the High Veld, 112. See
also High Veld.
Proclamation by Smuts, for governance
of Cape Colony, 462.
Prospect, fort at, attack on, 219-
20.
Protection of Boer families. 261.
Pulteney. Colonel W. P., D.S.O., in,
113, 117, 120-2, 127-8. 138-9, 143-6,
148-9, 155, 204-5, 207, 215, 218,
222-3, i7i. 373. 376. 379-81. 514.
522.
Purcell, Captain J. F., 241.
Purchas, Captain E. C, 183.
Pursuit of enemy versus clearance of
crops, etc., 98.
Putfontein (south of Pretoria), in.
Putfontein (west of Ventersdorp), 183.
Putters Kraal station, 273-4.
Pylkop, 446-9, 451.
Pyper, Lieutenant G., 455, 462, 473.
Pypers, Co.Tiniandant S., 279, 285-6,
363, 462. 473.
QuAGGAFONTEirf (west of Lindley), 384,
395. 399.
Quaggafontein (east of Rouxville). 318 ;
action at, 287-8.
Quaggapan, 259.
Quaggas Drift. 228.
Quaggas Nek, 277.
Queen, Her Majesty the, of Holland,
528-31, 534.
Queensland, contingents from. See
Colonial Units.
Queenstown, 287.
QuickC, Captain F. C. 256.
Raadbl, 99.
RadclyflFe, Captain C. E.. 28-9.
Railway Pioneer regiments. See Colo-
nial Units.
Railways, 43, 63, 405-4 ; attacks on,
36-42, 125 ; delay on, 516 ; Bloem-
fontein. 93, 167-8. 225, 258, 262.
264-S ' Bulu\vayo, 443 ; Cape Town,
242. 279, 282. 284, 354. 357, 363,
461 ; De Aar. 238. 367 ; Delagoa
Bay. 23, 139, 146, 199, 201, 204,
207-8, 210, 214-15, 298, 304, 315.
372-3. 376. 380. 437. 481. 515-16.
520-1 : East London, 467 ; forti-
fications on, 402, 509 ; Graaff
Reinet. 278. 457, 463 ; importance
750
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Railways — continued.
of, 64-5, 72, 243 ; Johannesburg —
Krugersdorp, 9, 21 ; Johannesburg —
Potchefstroom, 22 ; Johannesburg —
Standerton, and Natal, 27-8, 43,
125, 127, 153. 201, 210, 423, 425,
481, 485, 520; Kimberley, 167,
255, 258, 509; Klerksdorp — Pre-
toria, I, 507 ; Kroonstad, 400, 403,
476; Mafeking, 443, 461, 494;
military, system of — see Appendix
10 ; Naauwjxxjrt, 367 ; Norval's
Pont, 64, 265 ; Port Elizabeth, 242 ;
Port Nolloth, 468 ; Sterkstroom—
Dordrecht, 273 ; Stormberg — Ros-
mead, 66 ; Vryburg, 507.
Ramagoep's Location, 447.
Ramah, 96, 164, 166, 252, 325.
Ramahutshe, 264.
Rand Berg, 202, 514.
Rations, for Boer families, 261.
Rawlinson, Colonel Sir H. S., Bart.,
C.B., 135-8, 182-3, 189-91, 195,
197, 222-3, 254-8, 260-1, 265-7,
269, 287, 316-17. 329. 338, 371,
373-5. 377-8, 381, 400, 402, 405,
423-6, 428-9, 434. 475- 478, 480,
490-4, 498-9. 505. 507. 509. 5" :
at Rooiwal, 502-3.
Rayner station, 179, 236.
Reay, Lieut.-Colonel C. T., C.B.,
157-8, 171, 246, 251, 269, 334, 338.
Rebellion in. Cape Colony, 60-1. 68,
172, 224, 349-50, 360 ; Cape Town,
177.
Rebels, 225, 227, 274, 350-63, 365,
417 ; penalties in prospect for, 352 ;
recruits, 356, 468-9 ; strength of,
453 ; terms to, in Cape Colony,
230 ; treatment of, under peace
terms, 553-4.
Recruiting, tables of. See Appendix
IS-
Reddersburg, 46, 163, 168.
Reeves, Brigadier-General J., 36.
Refugees, 103 ; concentration camps
for — see Appendix 12.
Regular Units.
Cavalry : —
ist (King's) Dragoon Guards, 77,
80, 85. 135, 256.
2nd Dragoon Guards (Queen's Bays),
423. 504. 518-19.
3rd (Prince of Wales's) Dragoon
Guards, 77.
5th (Princess Charlotte of Wales's)
Dragoon Guards, 513.
6th Dragoon Guards (Carabiniers),
194, 210.
7 th (Princess Royal's) Dragoon
Guards, 65, 486.
1st (Royal) Dragoons, 194.
2nd Dragoons (Royal Scots Greys),
465-7. 513-
5th (Royal Irish) Lancers, 37, 40-1,
332-
6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons, 117, 336.
7th (Queen's Own) Hussars, 423,
5 1 8-19.
9th (Queen's Royal) I^ancers, 163,
165, 179, 226, 241-2, 369.
loth (Prince of Wales's Own Royal)
Hussars, 232, 237-8, 242, 460.
1 2th (Prince of Wales's Royal)
Lancers, 232, 237, 242, 286, 358.
13th Hussars, 371.
i6th (Queen's) Lancers, 52, 227, 359,
365. 472.
17th (The Duke of Cambridge's Own)
Lancers, 165, 179-80, 225, 227,
233, 272, 274-8, 290, 370. 457-8.
i8th Hussars, 211, 213-14, 513.
19th (Princess of Wales's Own)
Hussars, 36, 213-14, 513.
Artillery : —
Royal Horse : 233, 390.
G. battery, 77.
J. battery, 21.
O. battery, 495.
P. battery, 2, 14, 17, 137, 495.
Q. battery, 151.
T. battery, 495.
U. battery, 318-19.
INDEX.
751
Serving as cavalry, 402; mounted
rifles, 495.
Royal Field :
4th battery, 299-301, 410, 416-20.
8th battery, 2, 17-18, 21, 185-8.
1 8th battery, 437.
28 th battery, 185-8, 294-7.
37th (Howitzer) battery, 299-301.
38th battery, 416-20.
66th battery, 41.
69th battery, 32, 219.
75th battery, 4, 439-40.
79th battery, 220.
8 1 St battery, 213.
83rd battery, 213, 438.
84th battery, 37, 306, 308-14.
85th battery, 437, 440.
Vickers-Maxims, 2 ; XL section, 390.
Royal Garrison : Eastern division, 17.
Royal Marine : 416.
Engfineers : —
Royal Engineen, 2, 116, 300.
1st Field troop, 306-14.
Foot Guards : —
Grenadier Guards (2nd), 392.
Grenadier Guards (3rd), 80.
Coldstream Guards (2nd), 79.
Scots Guards (2nd), 321, 324.
Infantry : —
The Buffs (East Kent) (2nd) [former-
ly 3rd Foot], 208, 306, 308-14, 414.
The King's Own (Royal Lancaster)
(2nd) [formerly 4th Foot], 30-2.
The Northumberland Fusiliers (ist)
[formerly 5th Foot], 299-301,
345, 410, 414, 416-20.
The Northumberland Fusiliers (2nd)
[formerly 5th Foot], 2, 11, 14-16.
The Royal Fusihers (City of London)
(2nd) [formerly 7th Foot], 470.
The King's (Liverpool) (ist) [for-
merly 8th Foot], 25-7.
The Norfolk (2nd) [formerly 9th
Foot], 298, 492.
The Lincolnshire (2nd) [formerly
loth Foot], 439-40.
The Devonshire (ist) [formerly nth
Foot], 127, 142, 213.
The Devonshire (2nd) [formerly
nth Foot], 28.
The Suffolk (ist) [formerly 12th
Foot], 345.
The Prince Albert's (Somersetshire
Light Infantry) (2nd) [formerly
13th Foot], 151.
The Prince of Wales's Own (West
Yorkshire) (2nd) [formerly 14th
Foot], 4-5, 7, 114, 371.
The Bedfordshire (and) [formerly
16th Foot], 76.
The Royal Irish (ist) [formerly
1 8th Foot], 37, 381.
The Royal Welsh Fusiliers (ist)
[formerly 23rd Foot), 345.
The South Wales Borderers (2nd)
[formerly 24th Foot], 131, 183.
The King's Own Scottish Bor-
derers (ist) [formerly 25th Foot],
185-8. 345-
The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers (ist
[formerly 27th Foot], ij.
The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers
(2nd) [formerly io8th Foot], 447-9.
The Worcestershire (1st) [formerly
29th Foot], jj.
The East Surrey (2nd) [formerly
70th Foot], 470.
The Duke of Wellington's (West
Riding) (ist) [formerly 33rd
Foot], 437.
The Border (1st) [formerly 34th
Foot], 21.
The South Statiordshirc (ist) [for-
merly 38th Foot], 392.
The Dorsetshire (2nd) [formerly
54th Foot], 219.
The Prince of Wales's Volunteers
(South Lancashire) (ist) [for-
merly 40th Foot], 219.
The Oxfordshire Light Infantry (ist)
[formerly 43rd Foot], 324, 347.
752
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Regular Units (Infantry) — continued.
The Sherwood Foresters (Derby-
shire) (ist) [formerly 45th Foot],
185-8. 293-8.
The Loyal North Lancashire (ist)
[formerly 47th Foot], 183, 299-
301, 346, 416-20.
The Northamptonshire (2nd) [for-
merly 58th Foot], 139, 437,
447-
Princess Charlotte of Wales's (Royal
Berkshire) (2nd) [formerly 66th
Foot], 36, 40-1, 208, 233, 243.
The King's Own (Yorkshire Light
Infantry) (2nd) [formerly 105th
Foot], 2, 4-6, 12, 16.
The King's (Shropshire Light In-
fantry) (2nd) [formerly 85th
Foot], 37, 39.
The Duke of Cambridge's .Own
(Middlesex) (2nd) [formerly 77th
Foot], 32.
The Duke of Edinburgh's (Wiltshire)
(2nd) [formerly 99th Foot], 139,
437-8. 440. 447-
The Manchester (2nd) [formerly
96th Foot], 157.
The York and Lancaster (ist) [for-
merly 65th Foot], 32.
The York and Lancaster (2nd) [for-
merly 84th Foot], 32.
The Gordon Highlanders (ist) [for-
merly 75th Foot], 37, 39.
The Gordon Highlanders (2nd) [for-
merly 92nd Foot], 139, 437, 430,
441.
The Queen's Own Cameron High-
landers (ist) [formerly 79th Foot],
20, 304. 442.
Princess Victoria's (Royal Irish
Fusiliers) (2nd) [formerly 89th
Foot], 36.
The Connaught Rangers (ist) [for-
merly 88th Foot], 234-6.
Princess Louise's (Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders) (ist)
[formerly 91st Foot], 4,
The Prince of Wales's Leinster
regiment (Royal Canadians) (ist)
[formerly looth Foot], 156.
The Royal Munster Fusiliers (ist)
[formerly loist Foot], 151, 433.
The Royal Dublin Fusiliers (ist)
[formerly 102nd Foot], 219.
The Royal Dublin Fusiliers (2nd)
[formerly 103rd Foot], 346.
The Rifle Brigade (The Prince Con-
sort's CKvn) (ist), 28-9, 44.
Army Service Corps. See Appen-
dices I, 5 and 6.
Royal Army Medical Corps (including
Bearer companies, Field hospitals,
etc.). See Appendix 7.
Reid, Lieutenant G. E., 142.
Reitz, State Secretary F. W., 107,
206 ; at the peace conference, 544,
546, 560, 563.
Reitz (town), 54-6, 58, 97, 101-2, 105,
158-9, 246. 330. 334. 336, 383, 385,
395-6. 398-400, 426, 476, 482 ;
surprise of, 247-8.
Reitzburg, and area, 109, 249-50, 256,
324, 326, 347, 478.
Remounts, department of, etc., 224.
See also Appendix i i .
Rensburg Drift (Vaal river), 100, 324,
347-
Rensburghoop, 152.
Reports, etc. See Letters.
Republican Governments, 24 ; flags
of, 124, 357 ; the cause of, in Cape
Colon}', 61.
Republics, the, 365, 429, 461 ; life of,
271 ; see also Peace negotiations,
523-63.
Retief's Nek, 157-8, 321-2, 485.
Revolution, general, in Cape Colony,
75. 131-
Rexford, 54, 57, 335, 431.
Reynolds, Major P. G., D.S.O., 347.
491. 5"-
Rhenoster Berg, 226, 239.
^-O
INDEX.
753
Rhenoster Kop (Cape Colony), 456.
Rhenoster Kop (Eastern Transvaal),
23-4. 42, 516.
Rhenoster Kop (north-west of Kroon-
stad), 256.
Rhenoster river, loi, 109, 161, 251,
262, 324, 330, 347, 384, 399, 404.425-
Rhenoster Vlakte, 81.
Rhenosterfontein (north-west of Nels
Poort), 459.
Rhenosterfontein (south of Rusten-
burg), 293.
Rhenosterspruit, 341, 494, 498.
Rhodes, and district, 234, 271-2, 286,
368-9.
Rhodesia, 435.
Richardson, Captain J. J., 347.
Richmond, 71, 74, 226-7, 229, 232,
237. 239. 280, 367, 456. 459, 463.
465.
Richmond Road, 457, 463, 473.
Rickertsdam, 299.
Riebeek Kasteel, 361.
Rienzi, 424.
Riet river, 94, 163, 165-6, 251-2, 255,
263-4, 326. 431-2.
Riet Spruit (Eastern Transvaal), 147.
Riet Spruit (Orange River Colony),
388.
Riet Spruit (Western Transvaal), 136.
Riet valley, 89.
Rietfontein (south-east of Bethel), 113.
Rietfontein (north-east of Carolina),
149.
Rietfontein (west of Klerksdorp), 415.
Rietfontein (east of Lindlejrs Poort),
299.
Rietfontein (north-west of Lydenburg),
141. '44-
Rietfontein (west of Pretoria), 2, 8.
19-21, 193.
Rietfontein (east of Tafel Kop, Western
Transvaal), 291.
Rietfontein (north of Tafel Kop, West-
ern Transvaal), 339.
Rietfontein (south-west of Venters-
dorp), 407.
VOL. IV.
Rietfontein (north of Welverdiend),
190.
Rietfontein (east of Wolvehoek), 330.
Rietfontein Ridge, 90.
Rietgat (south-east of Lichtenburg),
409.
Rietgat (west of Vrede), 246-7.
Rietkuil (north-east of Bethlehem),
482.
Rietkuil (west of Klerksdorp), 416.
Rietpan (east of Bethel), 151.
Rietpan (north of Bethlehem), 56.
Rietpan (south of Doom Kop, Western
Transvaal), 339.
Rietpan (east of Hoopstad), 256.
Rietpoort. 335, 384.
Riet|>ort Pass, 103.
Rietput, 328.
Rietspruit (north of Amersfoort),
200.
Rietspruit (near Ermelo), 123, 125-6.
Rietvlei (north-west of Bethel), 153.
Rietvlei (west of Ermelo), 209.
Rietvlei (west of Klerksdorp), 494.
Rietvlei (south-east of Lichtenburg),
409.
Rietvlei (south-east of Senekal), 54,
322.
Rietvlei (south of Vlakfontein, Stander-
ton railway), 28.
Rietvlei (east of Vryheid), 121.
Rifle Brigade, The. See Regular
Units.
Rifle practice, want of, 504.
Rifles, retention of, at conclusion of
war, 524, 547 ; thrown away by
burghers, 202.
Rimington, Colonel M. F., C.B., 117,
119-20, 147, 150-2, 155, 199-202,
222-3, 249-50, 269, 321-4, 329-31,
333-8. 383-4. 388-90, 400-2, 404-5,
423-7. 434. 475-7. 479-80. 485,
488, 490, 520, 522.
Rinderpest. 407.
Rising of the farmers, in Cape Colony,
75-
Riversdale, 283.
48
754
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Robbing the dead and wounded, at
Bakenlaagte, 313.
Roberts, Field-Marshal, The Right
Hon. F. S.. Lord, K.P.. G.C.B.,
V.C, etc., etc., i, 232, 421, 435-6,
498, 528.
Roberts Drift, 329.
Robinson Pass, 283.
Roche, Lieut. -Colonel The Hon. U. de
R. B., C.B., 131.
Rochfort. Colonel A. N.. C.B., 165.
167-8, 171, 245, 251-3, 263, 269,
319. 327-8, 338. 416. 422, 423,
429-31, 433-4. 478. 481. 488, 490-3.
502, 505-8, 511.
Rocky Hill (Machadodorp), 36, 42.
Rogers, Sergeant J. (awarded the
Victoria Cross), 170.
Roggeveld mountains, 64, 70, 353, 460.
Rolspruit, 1 13.
Romans, 404.
Rome, 314.
Romilly. Lieut.-Colonel F. W., C.B.,
D.S.O.. 157-8, 171.
Rondavel, 456.
Rondedraai, 246, 476.
Roode Berg (Cape Colony), 238.
Roode Bergen (Orange River Colony),
158. 335-
Roode Hoogte, 173, 280.
Roode Kloof, 235.
Roodekopjes, 246.
Roodekraal, 396.
Roodekrans, 517.
Roodekranz, 144. -
Roodepan (east of Belmont), 262.
Roodepan (north-west of Lichten-
burg), 407-8.
Roodep)oort (south of Dewetsdorp), 328.
Roodepoort (west of Johannesburg),
131-
Roodepoort (north of Kopje AUeen),
161.
Roodepoort (north of Middelburg),
144-5.
Roodepoort (north of Wakkerstroom),
202.
Roodepoortje, 145.
Roodewal (south of Greylingstad), 28.
Roodewal (Orange River Colony), 102,
399. 421-
Roodewal (south-west of Rustenburg),
189-90.
Rooi Berg, and hills, 439, 445.
Rooi kraal, 144.
Rooipoort (south-west of Bethel), 113.
Rooipoort (south-west of Venters-
dorp). 134.
Rooipoort (north of Wolmaranstad),
340-1.
Rooirantjesfontein, 416, 492, 507.
Rooiwal (Harts river), 406, 504-5 ;
action at, 499-503.
Rooiwal (south-east of Hoopstad), 257.
Roos Senekal, 123, 126, 140, 143-4,
146-7, 152, 211, 213, 380, 515, 521.
Rosmead, and railway, 66-7, 228.
Ross, Commandant, 426.
Ross, Major C, 476.
Rotterdam, 117, 200, 379-80.
Rouxville, and district, 45, 62, 65, 75,
77-8, 164, 179, 267-8, 289, 317-18,
320.
Rowley, Captain C. A., 219.
Royal Artillery. See Regular Units.
Royal Canadian regiment. See Regu-
lar Units.
Royal Cavalry regiments. See Regu-
lar Units.
Royal Engineers. See Regular Units.
Royal Horse artillerymen, as cavalry,
402.
Royal Infantry battalions. See Regu-
lar Units.
Royal Marine artillery. See Regular
Units.
Rudolph (Free State officer), 356.
Rundle, Lieut. -General Sir H. M. L.,
K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., 54, 57-9,
97, 99, no, 156-8, 169, 171, 217,
219, 245-6, 249-51, 265, 321-2,
329. 331. 334-S. 338. 386, 391-5.
405, 423, 434.
Runny mede,*266, 317.
INDEX.
755
Rupert, Prince (Royalist General),
382, 504.
Russia, 397 ; Czar of, 24.
Russian cavalry at Balaklava, 501.
Rust, 246, 476.
Rustenburg, district, and road, 1-4,
6-8, lo-ii, 19, 21, 128-30, 189,
193-4, 291, 293. 302, 348, 440-
Rustenburg commando. See Com-
mandos.
Rustenburg — Pretoria road, safety of,
3-
Rustfontein, 246.
Rustplaats, 119.
Saasi's Drift, 443.
St. Helena (Eastern Transvaal), 200.
St. Helena Fontein. 360.
St. Martin's summer, 61.
St. Petersburg, 24.
Salt river, 278.
Sand Drift, 62. 78, 88-9, 173, 366-7.
Sandclifi, 117.
Sandeman, Captain V. S., 275-6.
Sangars, 221.
Sannah's Post, 321 ; affair at, 318-19.
Sardinia, 255.
Saxony, 463.
Scandinavia, 324.
Scandinavia Drift, 324.
Scarlett, Brigadier-General the Hon. J.
Yorkc, 501.
Schaapkraal (south of Bethel), 113.
Schaapkraal (north-east of Rusten-
burg), 292.
Schaapplaats (south-east of Venters-
burg), 160.
Schanskopjes, 327.
Scheepers, Commandant, 71-4, 172-6,
178, 224, 227-9, 231-2, 237. 242-3,
271, 279, 283-5, 354. 35;-«. 528 ;
epitaph to, 285.
Scheepers Nek, affair at. 217-18.
Scheeperslaagte, 122.
Scheerpan, 257-8.
Scheerpoort, 7.
Schiedam, 167.
VOL. IV.
Schietfontein, 507.
Schietkraal, 465.
Schikhoek, 119.
Schilder Kranz, 369, 457-8.
SchildpadVallei, 362.
Schmidt's Drift, 488.
Schoeman's Drift, 195, 256, 346, 491.
Scholtz, Commandant, 221.
Schombie, 237.
Schoon Spruit, and district, 136-7,
183, 298 ; blockhouse line on the,
339. 492.
Schoonoord, 507.
Schoon water, 148.
Schraalfontein, 326.
Schuilhoek. 202.
Schurve I^rgen, 292.
Schurvekop. 113, 517.
Schurvepoort (east of Reitz), 105.
Schurwe Berg, 32.
Schweizer Rencke, 132, 191, 344, 346,
502-3. 505, 507-8.
Scobell. Colonel H. J., no, 171, 173,
175-6, 178-80, 225-6, 228-9, 231-2,
237-42, 244. 274. 278-81. 290,
368-70. 457, 474.
Scots Greys, Royal. See Regular
Units.
Scots Guards. See Regular Units.
Scott, Lieut. -Colonel A. B., 192, 377-8,
Sii.
Scott. Lieutenant W., 389-91.
Scottish Horse. See Colonial Units.
Seacow river, 78, 89-90.
Searchlight, used by armoured trains,
209, 507. 509-
Secretaries of State, for Foreign
Affairs, 528 ; for the Colonies, 230 ;
for War. 230 ; Boer p>cace proposals
to. 536-9.
Selika Drift. 443.
Selous river, and valley, 189, 293-4,
297.
Selouskraal, 189.
Senekal, 54-7. loi. 159. 169, 253, 424,
43«. 433. 477-
Serfontein station, 323.
48*
756
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Settle, Major - General Sir H. H.,
K.C.B., D.S.O., 46, 65-70, 80, 174,
176, 180, 225 ; covers Cape To\vn,
69.
Seven Weeks Poort, 284.
Seymour, and district, 237. 277.
Seymour, Lieutenant R. H., 310.
Shea, Major J. S.. D.S.O.. 255-7.
Shearman, Captain E. R. A., 460.
Sheep, slaughter of. 169.
Sheepskins, used on the feet, by Boers,
33-
Shekleton, Lieut. -Colonel H. P., 134-5,
138. 197-
Shela river, 118, 200-1.
Sheldon station, 174, 277-8.
Shelton, Lieut. -Colonel W., 468, 470-2.
Shepherd, Lieutenant R. E., 312.
Sherborne, 66.
Sherbrooke, Lieutenant N. C. H., 311.
Ships, hospital. See Appendix 7.
Shooting of British troops at Rooiwal,
503-4-
Shott, Lieutenant H. H., 162.
Shropshire Light Infantry. See Regu-
lar Units.
Shute. Major H. G. D., D.S.O., 65-6,
71. 92.
Sicily. 255.
Sick, treatment of, etc. See Appen-
dix 7.
Sickness, among horses, 440, 445-6.
Siege of : Ookiep, 470-2 ; Tontelbosch
Kolk, 363.
Signal, attack directed by, at Itala,
220.
Signal Hill (Machadodorp), 36.
Silvcrkop, 149.
Silver ton, 149.
Simpson, Lieut. -Colonel G. G., 373,
377-8.
Situation in ; Cape Colony, 60-1, 224,
230-1. 271. 349-50, 383, 453-4. 461,
473 ; the Eastern Transvaal, 371-2 ;
Magahesberg, 2, 128-9; Northern
Transvaal. 383 ; Orange River
Colony, 245, 382-3, 392-3. 397 I
South Africa, 382 ; Western Trans-
vaal, I, 128, 348, 382, 420-1. 491-2 ;
on the Delagoa Bay railway, 23.
Sitwell, Lieut.-Colonel W. H., D.S.O.,
433-4,481, 490, 511.
Slabberts Nek, 321-2.
Sladen, Major J. R. F.. 105-6, 108.
Slagboom, 142, 214.
Slaghoek, 144.
Slangapies Berg, 117-18, 200-2.
Slangfontein, 466.
Slik Spruit, 78, 328.
Slyp Steen. 85.
Smaldeel (Orange River Colony). 76,
167.
Smaldeel (north-east of Vryheid), 121.
Smit, Field-Cornet D., 232, 237-40,
364, 459, 462, 473.
Smith, Major S. Bogle, 252, 263, 269,
319, 327-8, 338.
Smith-Dorrien, Major-General H. L.,
D.S.O., 36-7, 43, 111-21, 126-7, 140.
Smithfield, and district, 62-3, 75, 27>
163-4, 168, 264, 266, 316, 327.
Smithvale, 232.
Smuts, Assistant-Commandant-General
J. C. (Attorney-General), 75, 107,
1 30-1, 195, 231, 262, 264-7. 272-81.
286-9, 316-17. 320. 354, 357-8. 364.
367. 383. 454. 467. 469-71. 473;
assumes command of Boer forces
in Cape Colony. 363 ; at the peace
conference, 544-6, 556 ; character
of, 271 ; confidence of, 453 ; invades
Cape Colony, 268, 270 ; issues pro-
clamation for governance of Cape
Colony, 461 ; tactics of, 455 ; views
of, on the situation in Cape Colony,
365-6. 453, 461.
Smuts, General T., 34-6, 206 ; de-
prived of command. 212.
Sneeuw, 228. 278.
Sneeuw Bergen, 64, 71, 74, 172-3,
226, 232, 238.
Snyman's Hoek, 483.
Solomon, Hon. Sir Richard, K.C.M.G.,
K.C., 546.
INDEX.
757
Somerset, 485.
Somerset East (county and town),
174-5, 178, 226, 278-80, 463. 467.
Somersetshire Light Infantry. See
Regular Units.
Somersfontein, 164, 262.
Somosierra, 46.
Soudan, tribesmen of, 504.
Soult (French Marshal), 397.
South Africa, improved situation in,
382.
South African Constabulary. See
Colonial Units.
South African Light Horse. See
Colonial Units.
South African Republic, peace terms
for, negotiations and conclusion of,
523-63-
South Australian contingents. See
Colonial Units.
South Hill (Helvetia), 25-6.
South Lancashire regiment. See Regu-
lar Units.
South Staffordshire regiment. See
Regular Units.
South Wales Borderers. See Militia
and Regular Units.
Spandouws Kop, 229.
Spartans, epitaph to, at Thermopylae,
313-
Spekboom river, 381.
Spelonken mountains, 446.
Spens, Brigadier-General J., C.B.,
A.D.C., 147-8. 153. 155. 199. 204.
207-8, 210-U, 216, 21Q. 223, 250,
321-3. 331. 333. 338. 371. 373-4.
376. 378-9. 381. 485. 487. 490.
514, 517, 520, 522.
Spies : Boer — 68 ; British — 306.
Spion Berg, 69, 459.
Spion Kop, 394.
Spitz Kop (Bamboes mountains), 464.
Spitz Kop (Sneeuw Bergen), 173, 226,
237. 239, 280, 464.
Spitzkop (south-east of Vryheid), 122.
Spitzkop (north of Wakkerstroom),
480.
Spitzkrans, 169.
Sporting terms, definition of, 1 14.
Springbok, 469.
Springbok Vlakte, 83.
Springbokfontein, 378.
Springbokspruit, 200.
Springfield Drift. 169, 245-6.
Springfontein, 94, 97-8, 164, 195, 252,
262, 266-7, 319-20, 430.
Springhaan Nek, and Post, 46-52.
Springs, in, 130, 150, 152, 195, 210,
215. 304. 3 IS. 373. 376. 379. 477.
518, 520; affair near, 513.
Spruit Zonder Drift, 480-1.
Spruitplaats, 192.
Spruyt, General C, 206.
Spytfontein (east of Lindley), 336.
Spytfontein (south of Ventersburg),
160.
Stabbertswaag, 402.
Stampedes, 19. 115, 296, 313, 540, 410.
495. 502.
Standerton, and road, 46, loi, 103.
105. 113, 116, 147, 149-54. 156.
200, 202-3, 215-17, 222, 249, 315.
323. 329. 331. 333. 371. 376. 378,
424, 491. 514 ; blockhouse line to.
372-3, 378. 517 ; railway to, 27, 43,
125, 127, 153, 201, 209, 423. 435,
481, 485, 517-18, 520.
Stanhouders Kraal. 262.
Staple Ford, 466.
Statistics, general, Boer and British,
567-705 (Appendices).
Steele's Drift, 250.
Steelpoort river. 140-1, 145, 211. 214,
515-
Steenkamp, Commandant Piet, 297,
299.
Steenkool (or Steenbok) Spruit, 150,
152, 199, 203, 210, 215, 306,
517-
Stcenkoppies, 194.
Steinacker's Horse. See Colonial
Units.
Steinkopf. 469-72.
^tellenbosch Vallei, 175, 232.
758
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Stenekamps Kop, attack on block-
house at, 483-4.
Stenkamps Berg, 24, 140, 380.
Stephenson, Major-General T. E., C.B.,
284, 290, 359-62. 364, 370, 459, 465,
473-
Sterkfontein (east of Boshof), 259.
Sterkfontein (north of Ermelo),
205.
Sterkfontein (north-west of Nyl-
stroom, 444.
Sterkfontein (north-west of Venters-
dorp), 339.
Sterkstroom (Cape Colony), 225. 237,
273. 464.
Sterkstroom river, and valley (Western
Transvaal), 193, 292-3.
Stewart, Lieut. -Colonel H. K., 217-18,
223, 373. 377-8. 381. 514, 517. 520,
522.
Steyn, H. E. President M. T., 49, 54,
75, 83, 104, 107-8, 124, 140, 205-7,
245-7. 323. 396. 426, 428, 546 ;
addresses Kritzinger's burghers,
367 ; denounces peace terms, 556 ;
narrow escape of, 248 ; Scheepers'
epitaph by, 285 ; moves to De la
Key's laager, 478 ; to peace con-
ference, 533, 535 ; illness of, compels
him to retire from, 541.
Steyn, Field-Cornet, 248.
Steynsburg (Cape Colony), 60, 65,
174, 179-80, 225, 236, 272 ; block-
house line to, 458.
Steynsburg (north of Fouriesburg),
322.
Steynsdorp, 148.
Steytlerville, 73.
Stock (cattle and sheep), capture of,
by British, 32, 96-7, 99, loi, 103,
107-9, 116, 118-19, 121-2, 133,
136, 141, 146. 149-50. 152-3, 158-9.
161, 163-6, 168-9, 182, 192, 200-3,
208, 211, 249, 251, 253, 255-61,
263, 304, 322-3, 329, 332, 335,
340-5, 352, 371, 376, 429, 443-4,
477, 480, 493.
" Stops," 86, 94, 97, 108, 121, 142, 147-
194, 486 ; definition of, 114.
Stores, Boer, captured, 476 ; ordnance —
see Appendix 8.
Storm Bergen, 64, 272, 473.
Stormberg, and railway, 66, 225, 272,
274, 286, 465 ; blockhouse line to,
368.
Stormfontein, 238.
Straffontein, 153.
Straker, Lieutenant E. O., 310.
Strategy: Boer — 62. 91, 108, 357,
365-6, 383, 461, 528 ; errors in,
349 ; British — 65, 265 ; criticisms
on, 435.
Strength of: Boer forces — 21, 113,
321, 324, 330, 356, 485, 518;
Badenhorst's, 444 ; Beyers', 10, 19, 75,
113 ; Chris. Botha's, 220; C. Botha's,
249; L. Botha's, 34, 43, 115, 219;
Cape rebels, 453 ; De Beer's, 132 ;
De la Key's, 3, 134, 297, 411,
418, 499; De Villiers', 132, 433;
De Wet's, 45, 49, 53, 76, 94, 384,
393. 397 ; Emmett's, 121 ; Fouche's,
179 ; Hertzog's, 63, 67, 88, 94 ;
Kemp's, 184 ; Kritzinger's, 63,
174, 179 ; I,ategan's, 232 ; W.
Malan's, 173, 199 ; Maritz's, 358 ;
Mentz's, 477 ; MuUer's, 143 ;
Myburg's, 368 ; Opperman's, 220 ;
H. J. Potgieter's, 220 ; Pretorius',
439; Prinsloo's, 215; Scheepers',
228 ; Smit's, 462 ; J. C. Smuts',
130; Theron's, 233; Uys', 439;
G. Van Niekerk's, 431 ; Viljoen's,
26; P. Wessels', 368; W. J.
Wessels', 385 ; in the High Veld,
199 ; near Carolina, 43 ; near
Vlaklaagte, 43 — see also Appendix
20; British forces — .\lderson's, 21,
III ; Allenby's, 11 1; Babington's,
128 ; Banon's, 165 ; Beatson's,
203 ; Benson's, 306 ; Bethune's,
jy ; Broadwood's, 247 ; Byng's,
47, 165 ; B. Campbell's, 157 ;
W. P. Campbell's, 1 11 ; Chapman's,
INDEX.
759
377 ; Clements', 2 ; Colenbrander's,
447, 451 ; Colville's, 28, 11 1
Crewe's, 55, 76 ; Cunningham's
347 ; Dartnell's, 1 1 1 ; Denny's, 447
Dixon's, 184-5 ; Edwards', 324
Elliot's, 100; French's, in, 228
Gogarty's, 165 ; Gordon's, 128
Gorringe's, 72 ; Grenfell's, 415
437, 440 ; Harris', 165 ; Hick
man's, jj ; Jeudwine's, 225, 351
Kekewich's, 128 ; F. W. Kitchener's
126; E. C. Knox's, III ; McMick
ing's, 440; Mills', 222; Milne's, 346
Monro's, 56 ; Murray's, 288 ; Paris'.
416; Plumer's, 139; Pulteney's,
III, 128 ; Rochfort's, 165 ; Sande-
man's, 275 ; Smith-Dorrien's, 43,
III ; Thorneycroft's, 47 ; Von
Donop's, 299 ; W. H. WiUiams',
165 ; at Helvetia, 25 ; in Cape
Colony, 172 — see also Appendix
13 ; of loyalists in Cape Colony,
69 ; on Eastern L. of C, 35 ;
states of, 22, 59, 92, no. 127. 138-9,
15s, 171, 180, 197, 203, 223. 244.
269, 290, 303, 315, 338, 348, 370,
381, 405, 422. 434. 452. 474. 490.
Sii. 522.
Strijdpoort, 246, 423, 425.
Strong, Lieutenant C. P.. 107.
Strongholds. Boer, 104. 183-4.
Stryd Poort, 273.
Strydenburg, 67, 81. 84, 87. 462.
Strydkraal, 200.
Strydplaats (south-east of Vrede).
426.
Strydplaats (south of Vryheid), 122.
Subjugation of Orange River Colony,
326.
Successes of Boers, inutiUty of, 421.
Suffolk regiment. The. See Regular
Units.
Sunday river, 175, 466.
SuppHes, 67, 169, 193 ; Elliot's, 105 ;
for Boers, in Cape Colony, 68-9 ;
plenitude of, 199 ; short of. 3, 68,
355. 377 ; ^or E)e Wet's force, 76 ;
French's, 112-13, 116-18, 120, 156
— see also Appendix i ; in Cape
Colony, 224 ; of the veld, 343 ;
Plumer's, 81-3, 95 ; system of —
see Appendix 5 ; Wyndham's, 229.
Surrender: of Boers — 118, 143-4. 149.
211, 214, 241, 346, 376,409,429,439.
444, 451, 486, 509, 516-17 ; con-
ditions of. 524-6. 547: of British — 16,
26-7, 259, 280. 414. 420, 469.
Suspected persons, in Cape Town. 177.
Sutherland, and district, 69-70, 173.
240. 279. 282, 284. 286, 353-6. 358.
362-4. 455. 460-2.
Sutherland, Sergeant, gallant conduct
of, 106.
Swanepoerls Poort, 74.
Swartwater, 200.
Swaziland, and border, 43, 1 16-18, 121,
140, 149, 212, 222, 375 ; blockhouse
line to. 371. 377. 379.
Sweetwater, 267.
Swellendam, 243, 283-4.
Swinburne, Lieutenant, 513.
SybilU. H.M.S., 70.
Syferfontein, 306.
Syferkuil. 136.
Sympathy with enemy. 177.
Systematic attempt to destroy block-
houses, 483-4.
Taaibosch Spruit. 135-6. 181, 194,
408 : blockhouse line along the. 407.
Taaiboschfontein. 459.
Taaiboschspruit. 117.
Tabakplaats, 141.
Tabaksberg. the. action on, 76. 159.
Table Bay. 75.
Tactics : Boer — 64-6. 89-90. 208. 306,
331. 337. 384. 396. 401. 455. 50>.
528 ; British — 88. 147. 266, 344,
400 ; central point of, 263 ; in
earlier operations, 437.
Tafel Kop (cast of Frankfort), 101-2,
249. 399. 423-5, 475-6 ; action near,
389 ; blockhouse line to, 385. 388.
398, 480.
76o
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Taiel Kop (Western Transvaal), 136,
182-4, 188-9, 194, 293, 344, 407 ;
blockhouse line to, 344.
Tafelkop (north-west of Ermelo), 378.
Tafelkop (north of Fauresmith), 252.
Tandjes Berg, 225-6, 233, 239-40,
457. 463.
Tanqua river, 357.
Tanqua valley, 355.
Tarka (county), 226.
Tarka river, 174.
Tarkastad, 174, 225-6, 233, 274, 277,
466-7.
Taungs, 131-2, 191-2.
Tax, not to be imposed on landed
prop>erty, 548.
Taylor, Lieut.-Colonel H. d'A. P.,
253, 266, 269, 272-3, 290, 327,
431-
Tenacity of the enemy, 327.
Terms of peace, negotiations for and
conclusion of, 523-63.
Teman, Colonel T. P. B„ C.M.G.,
D.S.O., 431, 434, 481. 488-90.
Thabanchu, and district, 46-51, 53,
76. 97. 99. 170, 253, 264, 385 ;
blockhouse line, 264, 318, 326.
" The Anglo-Boer War," by General
B. Viljoen, 35.
The Groote Zwarte Bergen, 73.
The Union of the Boer people from
Table Bay to the Equator, 75.
The Willows, 238.
Theatre of war. Cape Colony, the
main, 461.
Thebus, 179, 237, 467.
Thermopylae, epitaph to Spartans at,
313-
Theron, Commandant J., 233, 237-9,
243, 271, 283-4, 356-62, 460, 462,
473-
Theunissen, Commandant H., 67.
Thomas, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Godfrey,
Bart., 14, 17-18.
Thompson, Captain T,, 318.
Thomson, Major N. A., 438, 444.
Thorndale (Hekpoort valley), 21.
Thomeycroft, Colonel A. W., 46-53,
59. 65, 67. 69-70, 74, 87-9, 92, 97,
no, 158-61, 166-7, 171. 245, 250,
253. 265-9, 287, 289, 316-18, 327.
338, 430-1. 434. 482, 489. 498. 507.
509, 511.
Thomeycroft 's mounted infantry. See
Colonial Units.
Thorold, Captain F. T., 310.
Three Sisters station, 457, 459, 464.
" Three Years' War," by C. R. De Wet,
83. 90, 99. 404. 427-
Tiger Kloof Spruit. 386-7, 391.
Tintasdrift, 122.
Tomlin, Major M. H., 481, 490.
Tontelbosch Kolk, 352-3, 355, 462
473 ; the siege of, 363.
Toom Nek, 179, 236.
Toovernaarsrust, 12 1-2.
Torres Vedras, 64.
Touws river, 70, 284-5.
Toverwater river, 228.
Town Guard. See Colonial Units.
Trains: armoured, 80-1, 209, 228, 238,
362, 366, 402, 442, 467. 507, 509 ;
hospital — see Appendix 7 ; wreck-
ing of, 41, 125-6, 156, 232,
441-2.
Transkei, 234.
Transport, 224 ; columns without,
492 ; system of — see Appendix 6.
Transvaal, 65, 69, 107-8, 124, 177,
203, 231, 245, 249, 261, 264, 330—
see also Events in Eastern,
Northern and Western ; Govern-
ment of, 205-6, 214-15, 305, 380
515-
Transvaalers, 205-6, 270.
Transvalia, 200.
Travers, Major J. H. du B., 183.
Traynor, Sergeant W. B. (awarded the
Victoria Cross), 1 14.
Treason, in Cape Town, 177.
Trekpoort, 258.
Treurfontein, affair at, 406-7.
Trichardt, Commandant P. T., 28,
5 1 5-16.
INDEX.
761
Tucker, Lieut. -General Sir C, K.C.B.,
93, no, 170-1, 327, 434. 481.
Tugela river, 42.
Tulbagh (Cape Colony), 70.
Tulbagh (Orange River Colony), 102.
Tweebosch, 416, 421, 478 ; action at,
417-20.
Tweedraai, 150.
Tweefontein (north of Amersfoort),
147.
Tweefontein (east of Bethlehem), 169,
232. 392-3. 395, 397. 401 ; action
at, 394.
Tweefontein (north-west of Ermelo),
207.
Tweepannon, 340.
Tweepoort, 54-5.
Twenty-Four river, 359.
Twyiel Poort, 89.
Twyfelkopspan, 260.
Tzamen, 159.
UiLEN Kraal, 361.
Uitenhage (Cape Colony), 74, 278, 466.
Uitenhage (south-east of Serfontein
station), 323.
Uitgedacht, 207.
Uitgezocht, 151.
Uithoek, 121.
Uitkomst (west of Graafi Reinet), 228.
Uitkomst (south of Machadodorp). 148.
Uitkyk (south of Heilbron), 102.
Uitkyk (north-east of Standerton), 200,
202.
Uitkyk (north-west of Wolmaranstad).
342.
Uitspan, 116.
Uitspanfontein, 455, 459.
Uitzicht, 151.
Umpilusi river, and valley, 1 16-17,
149. 377-
Umtali river, nj.
Umvolosi river, 122.
Union of the forces of De Wet and
Hertzog, 89.
Union, the, of the Boer peoples from
Table Bay to the Equator, 75.
Uniondale, 72-3, 242.
Upington, 468.
Urmston, Lieut.-Colonel E. B., 376-7,
380-1, 515-17. 521-2-
Utrecht, 29-30, 35, 118-20, 201-2,
215-16, 218, 222 ; attack on, 32-4.
Utrecht commando. See Commandos.
Uys, Commandant P., 439.
Uyskraal, 142, 214.
Vaal basin, 333.
Vaal Krantz, 121.
Vaal river, 2, 84-6, 100-2, 108-9,
1 1 5-16, 133-4, 136, 146. 148. 151.
153, 160, 167, 183, 191, 195-6,
199-200, 202, 206-7, 209-10, 249-51,
253-6, 260, 262, 323-4, 329-30.
333-4. 347. 373. 376. 378-9. 424.
475, 478, 481, 485, 487, 49'-3.
505-6, 508 ; blockhouse line to.
34$, 512 : drifts of the, blockhouses
at, 346.
Vaalbank (north-cast of Bethel), 207.
Vaalbank (south-west of Carolina),
205.
Vaalbank (south of Lichtenburg), 492.
Vaalbank (south-east of Reitz), 246.
Vaalbank (north-east of Utrecht), 118.
Vaalbank (west by south of Venters-
dorp), 493 ; blockhouse line to, 407.
492.
Vaalbank (north-cast of Vryheid), 122.
Vaalpan, 362.
Vaalspruit. 319.
Vaalwater river, 214.
Val station, 512, 517, 531.
Vallancey, Major H. d'E., 446-7.
Vallentin, Major J. M., 153, 379-80.
Valour, of British, at Bakenlaagte,
310-13-
Valsch river, 160-1, 255-6, 325, 383-4,
404, 424-S. 477. 482.
Valsch River Drift, 357.
Value of railways, for military opera-
tions, 64-5.
Van der Merwr, 284.
Van der Merwe, Field-Cornet, 164.
^62
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Van der Venter, Commandant, 264,
278-82, 363-4, 368, 455, 460.
Van Dyksdrift, 152, 203-4.
Van Dyksput, 153.
Van Heerden, Commandant J., 297,
465-6.
Van Niekerk, A., 350.
Van Niekerk, Field-Comet G., 431.
Van Reenan, G. H. P., 179-80, 225-6,
233, 236, 238. 363. 462.
Van Reenen's Pass, 156, 323 ; block-
house line to, 423-5, 428.
Van Rensburg, Commandant, 438.
Van Rhyns Dorp, 71, 356-7, 365,
453, 460, 462, 468, 472 ; capture
of, by Boer force, 355.
Van Stades Drift, 256.
Van Tender's Drift, 175.
Van Wyks Vlei, 351.
Van Zyl (rebel). Commandant, 468,
501, 509-
Van Zyl (rebel). Commandant, 417-18.
Vant's Drift, 219, 221.
Var Kens Kop, 280.
Varkfontein (north of Boshof), 433.
Varkfontein (north of Victoria West),
473-
Vaughan, Major C. D., 491, 511.
Vaughan, Major J., 457.
Vecht Kop (south of Heilbron), 102,
399-
Vecht Kop (north-east of Zastron),
287-8, 318, 327.
Veld, supplies on, 343 ; blockhouse
line across, 364.
Veld fires. See Grass fires.
Venter, Field-Comet, 439.
Venter, Field-Cornet H. S., 369.
Venter's Poort. 96.
Venters Spruit, 400.
Venter's Valley, 80, 89-90.
Ventersburg, 93, 97, 397, 423.
Ventersburg Road, 160.
Ventersdorp, district of and road, i,
22, 128-30, 133-6, 183, 189, 192,
194, 291-3, 298, 339 ; blockhouse
line to, 345.
Ventershoek, 163, 327.
Venterskroon, and district, 253, 346.
Venterstad, 65, 174, 238, 272.
Verbliden, 159.
Verblyding, 152.
Vereeniging (south-east of Ermelo),
115, 147.
Vereeniging (Vaal river), 102, 109,
195, 207, 210, 249, 346, 485, 521 ;
burghers, peace delegates, to, 541 ;
peace conference at, 471, 473-4,
487-8, 549, 554-5.
Verkykers Kop, 251, 329, 399, 403.
Verlaten Dam, 86.
Verlaten Kloof, 455.
Verloren Vallei, 362.
Vcrmaakfontein, 320.
Vermaas, Commandant H. C. U., 134,
341. 418.
Verzamel Berg, 103, 154-5, 212,
425.
Vet river, 159, 254, 256-8.
Vet River station, 161, 166, 257-8.
Veterinary Department, Army, sur-
geons, etc. See Appendix ii.
Vialls, Major H. G., C.B., 82-4, 142.
Vickers-Maxim guns, 2, 14, 22, 28-9,
51-2, 59, 76, 85, 92, no, 127, 132,
135. 137-8. 144. 151. 155. 162, 171,
180, 185, 187, 197, 203, 213, 223,
244, 269, 290. 294, 299-300, 303,
306, 308. 312, 314-15. 348, 370.
177' 381. 392, 408. 410, 412, 415-18,
422, 434, 437-8, 440, 452, 474, 490.
493- 495. 500. 503. 511, 522. See
also Appendix 4.
Victoria, 52.
Victoria (Australia), contingents from.
See Colonial Units.
Victoria Crosses, 20, 38, 114, 119,
148, 161, 170, 211, 217, 220, 238,
297. 373. 387. 390, 513- See also
Appendix 19.
Victoria West, 67, 237, 2»i ; Dlock-
house line to, 364, 459.
Victoria (West) Road, 280, 364, 459.
Victoriaspruit, 336.
INDEX
763
Viljoen, General B., 23-7, 34-6, 39,
42, 107, 114, 123-4, 126, 140, 143-7,
149-52, 203, 205-11, 213-14, 216,
377, 382, 515 ; capture of, 380-1.
Villiersdorp, 102, 199, 207, 209-10,
329. 333-4. 400, 477. 485-6.
Vinkfontein, 238.
Vinknest, 476.
Virginia siding, 160-1.
Vissers Drift, 88.
Vlak Laagte, 463.
Vlakfontein (Heidelberg railway), 28.
Vlakfontein (north of Lydenburg),
140.
Vlakfontein (north of Reitz), 246.
Vlakfontein (south of Rustenburg),
130, 184-5, '9°' 291, 296, 504 ;
action at, 186-8.
Vlakfontein (south of Sannah's Post),
3IH-I9.
Vlakfontein (north of Tafel Kop,
Western Transvaal), 339.
Vlakfontein (Vaal river), 100.
Vlakhoek, 2. 185-6, 189.
Vlaklaagte, 28, 43, 207 ; affair at,
512-13.
Vlaknek Pass, 103-4.
Vlakplaats, 194.
Vlakpoort, 277.
Vlaktefontein, 236.
Vliegenpan, 447.
Voet Pad, 459.
Vogel river, 174, 280, 457.
Vogel Vlei, 273.
Vogeldraai, 246.
Vogelfontein (east of Bethlehem), 387.
Vogelfontein (east of Hanover), 227.
Vogelstruis Drift, 362.
Vogelstruisfontein, 361.
Volksrust, 46, 120, 147, 153, 222. 320,
373. 380, 477.
Volunteers, 24th Middlesex (Post
Office). See Appendix 9.
Von Donop, Lieut. -Colonel S. B.. 292,
299-301, 303. 342, 345, 348, 409-11,
415, 422, 491, 499-501. 511.
Von Tonder, Commandant R., 501.
Voor Sneeuw Berg, 232.''
Vosburg, 67.
Vrede, 90, 101-2, 105, 123, 125-6,
140, 156, 205, 246, 249-50, 331, 397.
425, 481 ; blockhouse line to, 377,
398-9, 426-7.
Vrede commando. See Commandos.
Vredefort (town), 109, 195, 255-6, 324.
Vredefort Road (station), 101-2, 249,
324, 326, 333.
Vrouw Pan, 82-3.
Vryburg, 131, 192, 345-6, 348, 406,
409, 416, 506-7 ; railway to, 507.
Vryheid, and district, 29, 33, 120-2,
216-17, 219, 221-2, 514 ; attack on,
30-2.
Vryheid commando. 5m Commandos.
Vuurfontein, 505, 507.
Vygehoek. 141.
Wagbn Drift, 262-3.
Wagendrift, 143, 146.
Wagon Hill, 188, 394.
Wagons, loss of, 81.
Wakkerstroom, district, and hills, 29,
32. 118-20, 147, 154, 183, 200-1,
216, 222. 249, 380, 514 ; blockhouse
line to, 371-2. 379.
Walker. Major H. B.. 140.
Walkraal, 255.
Walspruit, 52.
Wanbestuur, 133.
War, cost of — see Appendix 18;
prisoners — see Prisoners of War ;
Secretary of State for, 230; tax,
farmers not Uable for, 523, 526;
liabilities incurred by the enemy
during, 523.
Warburton, 1 16.
Warden, Major K. E., 175.
Warfare. See Guerrillas.
Waring. Sergeant H.. 346.
Warm Bath (north of Pretoria). 10, 19,
439-40. 443-5-
Warmbath (Eastern Transvaal), 215.
Warnock, Squadron - Quartermaster
Sergeant, 312-13.
764
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Warren, Lieut.-Gen. Sir C, G.C.M.G.,
K.C.B., 60.
Warrenton, 133, 254.
Warringham, 321.
Warwickshire regiment, The Royal.
See Militia Units.
Waistage, etc., in the Axmy in South
Africa. See Appendix 16.
Watch dogs, 35.
Water, scarcity of, 445.
Water Kloof, 225, 239-40, 457.
Waterberg, and* district, 436, 439.
Waterberg commando. See Com-
mandos.
Waterberg hills, 445.
Water bron, 258.
Waterford, 174.
Waterval (east of Fraserburg), 455-6.
Waterval (south-west of Rustenburg),
185-6.
Waterval (north-east of Vryheid), 121.
Waterval Boven, 25-6.
Waterval Drift (Riet river), 421.
Waterval Drift (Wilge river. Eastern
Transvaal), 23.
Waterval river (east of Heidelberg),
108, 205, 207, 245, 512.
Waterval river, and valley (north of
Lydenburg), 140-1, 143.
Waterval station (east of Greyling-
stad), 206 ; blockhouse line to,
372-
Watervaldrift (north-east of Piet
Retief), 200.
Watervalhoek, 215.
Watts, Major C. N., 296-7.
Welchman, Second-Lieutenant E. T.,
371-
Welgelegen, 200.
Welgevonden (Cape Colony), 84-6.
Welgevonden (Mabusa Spruit), 200.
Welgevonden (north of Vryheid),
120-1.
Welkom, 121-2.
Welsh Fusiliers, The Royal. See
Regular Units.
Welstand, 520,
Weltevreden (south of Bank station),
196.
Weltevreden (south-east of Carolina),
148.
Weltevreden (east of Philipstown), 90.
Weltevreden (east of Springs), 153.
Welverdiend, 128, 136, 183, 191.
Wepener, 49, 98, 168, 251, 317, 319-20,
327-
Wessels, General J. B., 248.
Wessels, Commandant, 67.
Wessels, Commandant L., 238, 367,
456-7, 462. 473.
Wessels, Commandant P., 368-9,
457-8.
Wessels, General W. J., 385, 388-91,
396, 401, 426.
West Australian contingents. See
Colonial Units.
West Riding regiment. See Regular
Units.
West Rietfontein, 433.
West Yorkshire regiment. See Militia
and Regular Units.
Western, Lieut. -Colonel W. G. B., loi,
108-10, 171, 192, 196-7, 253,
255-61, 266-7, 269, 286-7, 290,
327, 338, 430, 432-4. 490-1. 511.
Western Province Mounted Rifles.
See Colonial Units.
Western Transvaal, problem of, 190 ;
situation in, i, 128, 348, 382, 420-1,
491-2 ; troops from, 265 ; troops
for, 491 ; Sir I. Hamilton assumes
command in the, 494 ; his great
" drive " in the, 506-10. See also
Events in.
Wheat Lands, 463.
White, Lieut. -General Sir George S.,
G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., V.C, 186.
White, Lieut.-Colonel The Hon. H. F.,
262.
White, Lieutenant H. H. R., 310.
White, Lieut.-Colonel W. L., 45, 52-6,
59, 97, no, 161, 163-5, 168, 171,
180, 244, 245, 269, 338, 462, 468-9,
472, 474.
INDEX.
765
White flag, 16, 241, 429, 509 ; misuse
of, 201.
Widgeon, H.M.S.. 72.
Wiesbaden, 317.
Wiggin, Major E. A., 371.
Wilanspruit, 57.
Wildfontein, attack on, 40 ; casualties
at, 44.
Wildfontein Farm (Cape Colony), 179.
Wildschuts Berg, 274, 277.
Wilge river (Eastern Transvaal), 23,
113, 142, 145-6. 149-50. 152. 183,
214, 30s. 315. 371. 513. 5»6-i7.
Wilge river (Orange River Colony), 10 1 ,
105-6, 108, 246, 249, 323, 329, 333.
388, 391. 393. 396. 398-400, 423-6.
428-9, 433, 479. 482. 487-
Wilge River station. 153, 372, 516.
Wilgeboomsspruit, 299.
Wilgeboschdrift, 251.
Wilkinson, Lieutenant F. A., 27.
Willemsfontein, 267, 287, 316.
Williams, Captain B., 82.
Williams, Lieut. -Colonel E. C. Ingou-
ville, D.S.O., 93, 98-101, no, 171,
182-3, 189-92, 197, 291-2. 298,
303. 373. 375. 378, 381. 5i5-»7. 520.
522.
Williams, Major F. A., 392-5, 405.
Williams, Lieut.-Colonel W. H., 45.
52-3. 59. 65-6, 71-2, 74, 89, 92.
no, 161, 163-7, 171. 24s, 251-2.
263. 269, 319-20, 325-6, 331, 338.
Williston, 69, 71. 353, 455, 462, 473 ;
blockhouse line to, 364, 459.
Willowmore, 72-4, 175, 227, 237,
242-3, 279, 281-3. 463.
Willson, Major-General M. W., C.B.,
136, 138, 181-2, 197, 422.
Wilmansrust, affair at, 203-4.
Wilson, Lieut.-Colonel A. E., 173, 175.
180, 321-3, 330-1. 333-5. 383-5.
402, 40s, 424. 434, 437-40. 442.
452, 475-7. 490. 5"-
Wiltshire regiment. See Regular
Units.
Winbult, 56.
Winburg, 51, 54-6, 75-6, 95, 97, 159,
170, 253, 259, 321, 325, 331, 335.
384-6, 400, 423-4. 431. 461.
Winburg commando. See Commandos.
Windhoek, 24, 26, 143-5, 380.
Windsorton, 254, 258.
Wing, Lieut.-Colonel F. D. V., 373.
375. 377-8. 485, 513-14. S^7. S^o.
522.
Winkelhaak (west of Ermelo), 151.
Winkelhaak (north of the Zwart
RuggensJ, 293.
Winter EJerg, 174, 226, 277.
Winterhoek, 238.
Wire, barbed, and entanglements,
33. 35. 38. 40. 221, 257. 360, 403,
480, 484, 495-6. 509.
Witbank (south of Bethel), 151.
Witbank (east of Brugspruit). 142,
149.
Witbank (south of Ermelo). 378.
Witbank (east of Heidelb.>rg), 205.
Witbank (Vaal river). 347.
Witkhp (south of Lydenburg), 143.
Witklip (north-east of Springs), 153.
WitkHp (north by west of Wolmaran-
stad), 507.
Witkop. 256.
Witkopjes (or Witkoppies) (south-east
of Reitzburg), 109, 347.
Witkoppies (south of Vrede), 104, 251,
329-
Witkrans (south-west of Bothavillc).
256.
Witkrans (south-west of Carolina), 148.
Witmoss, and station, 178, 233, 237.
Witpoort (north of Belfast). 213.
Witpoort (north of Wolmaranstad),
341.478.
Witpoortje. 183.
Witpunt, 115-16, 200.
Witte Bergen (Cape Colony), 285.
454-
Witte Bergen (Orange River Colony),
55. 321-2, 325. 431.
Witte Drift, 364.
Witteputs station. 167.
yes
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Witwatersrand range, 9, 129, 183, 194.
Witzies Hoek, 158, 323, 329, 334.
Wodehouse, 60.
Wolf nest, 246.
Wolhuter's Kop, 4, 128, 193.
Wolmarans, Major, 378.
Wolmarans, Field-Cornet F., 298.
Wolmaranstad, i. 132-4, 182, 192,
341-2, 344, 409-11, 421, 501 ;
evacuation of, 415 ; President Steyn
to. 541.
Wolmaranstad commando. See Com-
mandos.
Wolrige-Gordon, Major J. G., 4-7.
Wolve Hoek Farm, 285.
Wolve Kop, 62, 327.
Wolve Kuil, 80-1.
Wolvehoek, 100- 1, 347, 402, 477 ;
blockhouse line to, 385, 400, 423.
Wolvepan, 254.
Wolvespruit, 415.
Women, Boer, spirit of, 206.
Wonderboom, 121-2.
Wonderfontein (Eastern Transvaal), 35,
III, 126, 145, 148, 201, 254, 373 ;
attack on posts at, 40, 43-4 ; block-
house Hnc to, 372 ; casualties at. 44.
Wonderfontein (east of Hoopstad),
256-7.
Wonderfontein (east of Zeerust), 292.
Wonderheuvel, 485.
Wonderkop, 321-2.
Wonderwater Drift, 196, 262.
Woodbush, 438.
Woodman, Lieutenant C, 310.
Woodside, 425.
Wools-Sampson, Colonel A., C.B., 306,
314-15. 374. 407- 491-
Worcester, 243; Dutch congress at, 61.
Worcestershire regiment. See Regu-
lar Units.
Wormald, Major F., 358-60, 362-4, 370,
457. 459. 463, 473-4-
Wounded, at Bakenlaagte, shooting
of, etc., 313 ; at Tafel Kop, out-
rages on, 390. See also Casualties
and Appendices 16 and 17.
Wylly, Lieut.-Colonel H. C. 296, 298.
Wyndham. Lieut.-Colonel G. P., 164,
171, 179-80. 225, 227-9. 231-2,
234, 238-9. 244, 283-5, 290, 358-
60, 362, 364, 370, 460, 472, 474.
Wynne, Major-General A. S., C.B.,
176-8, 224, 243, 363.
Yatman, Captain C, 14-15.
Yeomanry. See Imperial Yeomanry.
Yeomanry Hill (Nooitgedacht), 17-20.
York and Lancaster regiment. See
Regular Units.
Yorkshire Light Infantry, The King's
Own. See Regular Units.
Young, Major A., 314.
Young, Sergeant-Major A. (awarded
the Victoria Cross), 238.
Younghusband, Colonel G. J., C.B.,
462, 465, 473-4.
Yzerspruit, 196, 341. 410, 416, 418-19.
421, 478 ; action at, 411-14.
Zaaifontein, 122.
Zaaiwater, 150.
Zaam Dam, 424.
Zak river, 363.
Zamenkomst (south-west of Stander-
ton), 424.
Zamenkomst (north-east of Thaban-
chu), 53.
Zamerfontein, 259.
Zand Drift, 360-1.
Zand river, 57, 257.
Zand Spruit (south-east of Ermelo).
378.
Zand Spruit (north of Hoopstad), 256.
Zandbank, 119, 121.
Zandfontein (north of Aliwal North),
287, 327.
Zandfontein (south of Olifants Nek),
291.
Zandheuvel, 258.
Zandrivierspoort, 439-42, 444.
Zandspruit (south-west of Amster-
dam), 117.
INDEX.
767
Zandspruit (Standerton railway), 28,
103, 212, 222.
Zastron, 42, 62, 264-7, 271, 287, 318,
366-7.
Zeekoe Gat, 229, 278.
Zeekoehoek, lo-ii.
Zeekoevlei, 425.
Zeerust, and road, i, 131, 189-91,
250, 292-4, 298-9, 301, 339.
Zekoe Spruit, 149.
Zevenfontein, 2CX).
Zilikat's Nek, 181.
Zoar, 200.
Zoete Inval, 257.
Zoetendalsvlei, 425.
Zoetwater, 460.
Zondagskraal, 150.
Zonneschyn, 316.
Zorgvleit, 246, 385.
Zout Pan, 82, 84.
Zout river, 362.
Zoutpans Drift, 88.
Zoutpansberg commando. See Com-
mandos.
Zoutspruit, 260.
Zuiker Hoek, 200.
Zuikerbosch Rand, 424.
Zuikerboschhoek, 143.
Zuikerkran, 122.
Zulu impis, 15, 376, 402, 501.
Zululand, and border, 43, 120, 122,
153-4, 377 ; invasion of, 219-22.
Zululand Native Police. See Colonial
Units.
Zulus, 9 ; defeat of, by Pretorius
(1838), 21.
Zuur Berg, 66, 176, 179. 238.
Zuur Vlakte, 236 ; action at, 234.
Zuurberg mountains (north of Port
Elizabeth), 277-8, 466.
Zuurberg Poort, 73.
Zuurefontein, 362.
Zuurfonte'n (Cape Colony), 226.
Zuurfontein (north of Doom Kop>
Western Transvaal), 339.
Zuurfontein (south of Fauresmith),
94-
Zuurfontein (south-east of Kroonstad),
323-
Zuurpoort, and Pass, 74, 228, 465.
Zwagers Hoek (Cape Colony), 178, 233.
Zwagershoek Pass, 143.
Zwart river, 229.
Zwart Ruggens, i, 190, 291, 293, 339.
Zwartfontein, 385.
Zwartkoppies (near Dullstroom, East-
em Transvaal), 25-7, 126.
Zwartkoppies (Orange River Colony),
252.
Zwartrand, 492.
Printed at The Ckapel Fiver Press, /Ciugsttm^ Surrey.
DT Maurice, (Sir) John Frederick
930 History of the war in
M38 South Africa
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