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HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

THE SPIRIT OF FRANCE

HISTORY OF THE
WORLD WAR

FRANK H. SIMONDS

AUTHOR OF "THEY SHALL NOT PASS" — VERDUN

FULLY ILLUSTRATED

VOLUME ONE
THE ATTACK ON FRANCE

GARDEN CITY NEW YORK / V

DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY
1919

V.I

DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY

into foreign languages, including

the Scandinavian

<TO MY WIFE

PREFACE

The World War, entering its thirty-fourth month, as these lines are writ-
ten, has had three distinct phases, both on the military side and on the larger
and more significant human side. The three military phases are supplied by
the Marne campaign and its immediate consequences; the Russian campaign,
with its Balkan episode and its Verdun ending; the Allied offensive in the
west, which began at the Somme in July, 1916, and is still proceeding before
Arras and along the old Aisne battlefield.

In the Marne campaign Germany sought a complete triumph by a swift
and terrible thrust at France, the only one of her foes then in any sense pre-
pared for war. Her thrust was parried at the Marne and permanently blocked
at the Yser and at Ypres. Thereafter she had to turn east and restore the fail-
ing fortunes of Austria and protect her own imperilled marches.

In the Russian campaign Germany sought to dispose of Russia, as she had
endeavoured to dispose of France in the Marne campaign. Immediate success
escaped her in this field. Despite terrible defeats and long retreats, Russian
resistance was not broken, although the Russian Revolution, now the main
factor on the eastern front and unmistakably a consequence of Russian defeat,
gives to the German campaign of 1915 a value that was not perceived at the
time. What the permanent value will be remains problematical. But as she
had to turn east, with her western task incomplete in 1914, Germany had,
after a brief and glorious campaign on behalf of her Turkish ally, to return west
in February, 1916, and seek at Verdun what she had not attained on the
Marne. Her failure there cost her the initiative and condemned her to the
defensive.

The campaign which opened at the Somme is still proceeding. Since they
began their attack on July I, 1916, the Allies have steadily, if only slowly,
pushed the Germans back and the recent victory of Arras demonstrates that
the British army has at last reached a high state of efficiency, while there are
signs, far from conclusive to be sure, of a decline in German morale. At all
events, the Germans remain on the defensive and the end of this third phase
has not come.

Looking now to the broader horizon, it will be perceived that here, too,
there are three aspects. In its inception, in the first months of battle, the
conflict still seemed to men, not alone of neutral nations but of involved
nations, one more war, greater and more terrible than all past wars, but a war
comparable to them in origin and purpose.

Vll

viii PREFACE

But as the struggle progressed, it brought more and more clearly to the eyes
of men of all nations, save those of Central Europe, the truth that the German
attack was something more than a bid for world power; comparable with that
of France under Napoleon or Louis XIV, of Spain under Charles V. It be-
came clear that Germany was not attacking armies or nations alone, but also
the whole fabric of our common civilization and all the precepts and doctrines
of humanity, which represent the slow progress upward from barbarism.

The invasion of Belgium shocked the whole world. The crimes committed
by German soldiers in Belgium and northern France, crimes not belonging to
the order of excesses incident to war, but crimes ordered by commanding offi-
cers for the deliberate purpose of terrifying a helpless population and dis-
arming men by the brutality practised upon women and children, these slowly
but surely inclined the balance of neutral opinion against Germany. At first
these brutal and bestial crimes only gave new heart and new determination
to the nations directly assailed, but in the end they earned for Germany the
condemnation of neutral nations the world over.

In its third phase there came, together with the growing anger and detesta-
tion of German violence and the clearer perception of the danger of Germanism
to all civilization, the recognition that the war was, after all, one more stand
of autocracy against democracy, that in its essence the German thing, already
become abominable in the sight of all the non-German world, was the final
expression of militarism, which had its origin in caste and Crown; that the
"Superman" was only the old tyrant in a new disguise.

In this stage we have seen the Russian Revolution and the entrance of our
own country into the war. The clearest definition of the war, as it is now seen
everywhere save in the Central Empires, has been supplied by the President
of the United States in that document which determined in fact, if not tech-
nically, American enlistment.

In succeeding volumes I shall endeavour to set forth the development of this
world verdict upon German purposes and German methods. In the present
volume, I have sought merely to outline the events preceding the war and the
first campaigns in the struggle. Not until the first phase was completed had
the real character of German menace been established, save in the minds of
the French and Belgians on whose soil German armies had written their his-
tory of shame. Not until the war had entered its second phase was there
apparent that spirit which was to dominate the councils and arm the spirit of
the nations allied against Germany. Not until that hour was it to take
on, consciously, in the minds of millions, the character of a crusade, a concerted
defence of civilization against a new barbarism, which combined the science of
the head with barbarism of the heart, the weapons of the Twentieth Century
with the spirit of Attila.

And, conversely, when the war did take on this new character it became

PREFACE ix

something different from all wars of which we have trustworthy record — a war
fought not for territorial gain or battlefield success, but a war fought between
two ideas, two conceptions of life, of civilization, of humanity; two faiths, of
which there can be room for but one in this world, since each is utterly destruc-
tive of the other.

Tardily, perhaps, but completely in the end, we in America, far removed as
we are from the European world, have perceived the issues of the war. In-
stinctively the mass of men and women, the plain people of the United States,
like those of Britain and France, have prevailed over the wisdom of politicians
and the doubts of statesmen. Late, but not too late, the nation which had
Lexington and Concord in its own his tory, recognized that neutrality was im-
possible when a new battle for democracy was going forward. And almost at
the same moment there has been heard, broken as yet and uncertainly, a new
voice in Germany, repeating something of the words that now fill the world out-
side of the Central Empires. Whatever be the outcome of the war, at least
it is certain now that even German things will never be again what they were
when Prussian militarism crushed Belgium under an iron heel and German
necessity thrust its bayonet through international good faith and common
humanity.

My acknowledgments are due both to the French and to the British Gov-
ernments and General Staffs for the courtesy which permitted me to visit their
armies and their battlefields, among others the Marne, Nancy, Champagne,
and the Somme, escorted by officers who explained the actions, and for the
kindness and frankness with which th ey supplied all information at their dis-
posal. To the interest of the President of France I owe my opportunity to
visit Verdun and to meet General Petain during the great battle, and to Field-
Marshal Sir Douglas Haig I am indebted for the chance to see the British army
and to meet its Commander-in-Chief just before the battle of Arras and to
look eastward from Mont St. Eloi at Vimy Ridge, soon to fall to Canadian
valour. Nor should I fail to acknowledge here my gratitude to General Du-
bois, Governor of Verdun, who twice welcomed me to his ruined city and per-
mitted me to visit Fort de Vaux, newly reconquered from the German Crown
Prince.

On one other point I desire to make an explanation; the absence of any dis-
cussion of naval operations from my narrative is not due to any failure on my
part to appreciate the greatness or the importance of the work performed by
the fleets, and in an overwhelming majority of cases by the British fleet, but
to the fact that it was agreed at the outset that the history of the naval opera-
tions of the war should be written for a later volume. The subject is of too
great importance to be crowded in the space at my disposal in this volume.

In the years that have followed the outbreak of the war, during which I
have been writing steadily about its progress, I have made too many mistakes

x PREFACE

and been too frequently in error not to appreciate the limitations of the present
volume. It represents merely an effort to interpret fairly and to an American
audience the earlier incidents in the world struggle, hitherto mainly explained
to Americans by commentators belonging to nations already at war who have
reviewed the campaigns from the perspectives of belligerents, and have natur-
ally paid small attention to the point of view of the citizens of a nation sepa-
ated by its history, by its long neutrality, and by the expanse of the ocean from
the conflict.

In so far as I have been able, I have striven to make this book an American
comment upon a world war, and no one can be more conscious than am I of its
limitations.

FRANK H. SIMONDS.

Upper Montclair, New Jersey,

May i, 1917.

CONTENTS

PART I

rum

PREFACE. By Frank H. Simonds . vii

CHAPTER I
EUROPE BETWEEN 1871 AND 1904

I. THE FIRST YEARS. Germany under Bismarck — Franco-Russian Alli-
ance— Italy joins the Central Powers — Great Britain's splendid isola-
tion— France — The race for colonies. II. A NEW KAISER AND A
NEW POLICY — Bismarck's colonial failure — A new Germany — Indus-
trial expansion — The Kaiser's dream of empire — Germany vs. Eng-
land. III. ENGLAND AND FRANCE DRAW NEAR. The failure of the
Kaiser's policy — Fashoda. IV. THE CONVENTION OF 1904. The
"iron ring" — Anglo-French understanding — Germany's change of
policy , " 3

CHAPTER II
FROM TANGIER TO ARMAGEDDON

I. TANGIER, THE FIRST GESTURE. The opening of a new era — Delcasse
— The question of sea power — The Kaiser at Tangier — France bows.
II. ALGECIRAS — A GERMAN DEFEAT. Germany and Austria stand
alone — Great Britain's stand — Great Britain, France, and Russia
united — Growth of German hatred against England. III. AFTER
TANGIER — THE NEW FRANCE. France awakens — Great Britain's
apathy. IV. THE END OF THE CONCERT OF EUROPE. Italy draws
away from Germany. V. BOSNIA, THE SECOND GESTURE. Eng-
land and Russia draw close — The Young Turks — Austria annexes
Bosnia — Russia protests — Germany intervenes. VI. AGADIR — THE
THIRD AND LAST TIME. The Moroccan crisis — The Panther —
Great Britain supports France — Germany compromises. VII. A
GERMAN DISASTER. The Kaiser blamed for the Moroccan failure —
Germany prepares — France and Russia follow suit — "When ?" — Eng-
land misreads the signs — Turko-Italian war. VIII. THE FIRST
BALKAN WAR. The Turks defeated — The division of spoils. IX.
THE CONFERENCE OF LONDON. Its failure. X. THE SECOND

xii CONTENTS

FACE

BALKAN WAR. The Bulgarian defeat — A blow to Pan-Germanism—
The Rise of Serbia. XL BUKHAREST AND AFTER. The question of
nationalism — Serbian menace to Austria — Italy refuses aid to Austria
— Russia vs. Austria — The loss of German prestige — Armageddon. . 12

CHAPTER III
THE TWELVE DAYS

I. THE ASSASSINATION OF THE ARCHDUKE. Result of Pan-Slavic prop-
aganda— A month of calm — The Austrian ultimatum — A challenge
to Russia — The new crisis. II. THE AUSTRIAN CASE. The Pan-
Slav menace — Austria's misrule of the Slavs — Her right to self-preser-
vation— Serbia's position — Austria and Russia natural enemies — The
conflict inevitable. III. SIR EDWARD GREY. Fails to grasp sig-
nificance of situation — Invasion of Belgium supplies moral issue.
IV. THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM. Diplomatic interchanges of the
Powers — Austria declares war on Serbia — Russia mobilizes — Ger-
many declares war on Russia. V. GERMANY'S COURSE. Almost in-
evitable under the circumstances, for which she was largely responsi-
ble— She must fight or surrender. VI. BRITAIN AND GERMANY.
Britain's reasons for entering war — France and Germany. VII. SIR
EDWARD'S DILEMMA. The Powers bid for British support — The prob-
lem of Belgium — Of British and French fleets — Belgium invaded.
VIII. BELGIUM DECIDES TO FIGHT. England stands by the "scrap
of paper" — Triple Entente becomes a triple alliance — Italy proclaims
her neutrality — Bismarck's work undone 40

CHAPTER IV
THE GERMAN ATTACK

I. THE Two STRATEGICAL CONCEPTIONS. Decided to crush France
quickly, and then assail Russia. II. THE BELGIAN PROBLEM. '
French frontier strongly fortified — Switzerland both strong and
difficult — Belgian route chosen for military reasons — German plans
broken by "The Marne" — Abandoned after Battle of Flanders.
III. FRENCH STRATEGY. Germany's general plan correctly forecast
— Understanding with Russia — Plans for Franco-German frontier —
No decisive battle till all should be ready — Strategical retreat de-
ceived Germans — Results of Tannenberg — Aims of the contestants —
Franco-Russian plans fail through Tannenberg — Great importance of
the Marne Battle 78

CONTENTS xiii

FAGB

CHAPTER V
BELGIAN DEFENCE AND FRENCH OFFENCE

I. LIEGE. Strategic importance — Fortresses and plans for defence — Bel-
gian mobilization — German heavy artillery before Liege — The city
taken — Then the forts — Moral effect on England and France. II.
BELGIAN " BATTLES." Skirmishing behind the Geete — Haelen —
English and French support fails — King Albert retreats on Antwerp
before Kluck and Billow — Kluck occupies Louvain and Brussels —
Namur collapses before Billow's guns — Namur a real disaster. III.
THE MORAL VALUE. German plans carried out — Allies underesti-
mated German numbers and power of German guns — Gallant Bel-
gium victorious in defeat — Invasion of Belgium costs Germany good
will of neutrals. IV. FRENCH BEGINNINGS — MUHLHAUSEN. French
plans — Their mobilization well carried out — The first thrust — Miihl-
hausen taken, lost, retaken. V. MORHANGE — THE FIRST DISASTER.
The destined arena near Nancy — Armies of Heeringen and the Bavar-
ian Crown Prince — Battle of Morhange, or Metz — French broken —
Their field artillery outranged — Foch's "Iron Corps" — Retreating
French rally, save Nancy, and later drive back Germans. VI. NEUF-
CHATEAU AND CHARLEROi. Ruffy and Langle de Cary meet German
Crown Prince and Duke of Wiirtemberg in the Ardennes — French are
driven back before German artillery — They stand fast beyond the
Meuse — Lanzerac defeated at Charleroi by Billow — French retreat
becomes general, but there is no demoralization. VII. BRITISH
DISASTER. JofFre's plans altered — The British in great danger —
Kluck's attempt to "run around the end." VIII. THE GREAT
RETREAT. Tardiness of Field-Marshal French — A retreat by ex-
hausted troops — Smith-Dorrien's plight — Five days and nights of
fighting and marching — The Marne a French battle. IX. JOFFRE'S
LAST PLAN. French army retreats before German thrust through Bel-
gium— Germans think retreat a rout — Joffre has situation well in
hand . ._ . - . ~.^. . .86

CHAPTER VI

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

I. SEPTEMBER 5. What the French did at the Marne — JofFre's aims —
He offers Kluck a chance at Paris — Kluck refuses bait. II. KLUCK
TURNS SOUTHEAST. Thinks French are beaten — Exposes flanjk
to Maunoury — Gallieni informs Joffre — Joffre plans offensive — Issues

xiv CONTENTS

famous order — Role assigned to Maunoury — Role assigned to General
French. III. BRITISH FAILURE. General French's delay permits
Kluck's escape — British had small part in battle — Maunoury struck
in time — Prepared way for Foch's decisive blow — General French
failed like Grouchy. IV. THE BATTLE OF THE OURCQ. Maun-
oury attacks Kluck — Story of battle five days long — Inaction of Brit-
ish enables Kluck to withdraw after almost winning. V. LA FERE-
CHAMPENOISE. Billow facing D'Esperey retires with Kluck — Ger-
mans resolve to drive back Foch, at French centre — Foch, out-
numbered, is driven back — Borrows a corps from D'Esperey—
Launches drive at Prussian Guard — The Guard's line, stretched too
thin, is cut — Foch launches a general attack — Prussian Guard and
Hausen's army routed. VI. LANGLE DE GARY AND SARRAIL.
Langle de Gary withstands army of Wiirtemberg for three days,
behind the Ornain — Sarrail, near Verdun, resists all attacks of Crown
Prince's army — Parts played by various armies — Foch's blow decisive.
VII. THE CONSEQUENCES. Numbers engaged — Losses — French
outnumbered — French over-estimated victory — Germans under-
estimated defeat — Marne kills German hope of short war — Germans
stand at Aisne and entrench — Comparison with Franco-Prussian
War — German aims upset by "Miracle of the Marne." VIII. THE
SECOND BATTLE OF NANCY. Crown Prince of Bavaria and General
Heeringen try to cut French line — Castelnau repulses attacks with
great slaughter — This battle really a phase of Marne struggle — Fin-
ished long before The Marne ended. IX. TANNENBERG. Franco-
Russian plans for invasion of East Prussia worked well — Kaiser calls
Hindenburg — He engages army from Warsaw — Hindenburg's artil-
lery wins at Tannenberg — The other Russian army retires — Tannen-
berg a great victory — It saved Germany, as The Marne saved France . 115

CHAPTER VII
DEADLOCK IN THE WEST

I. THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE. After the Marne — French plans — Ger-
man army defeated but not routed — The British in the German re-
treat— German plans — They neglect to seize sea coasts — Moltke re-
placed by Falkenhayn — German offensive at St. Mihiel — French
turning movement, west of the Oise — Kluck halts Generals French,
Maunoury, and D'Esperey at the Aisne — Biilow halts Foch near
Rheims — Wiirtemberg and the Crown Prince in the Argonne — Threat-
ened envelopment of Verdun — Joffre fails to get round German right.
II. THE RACE TO THE SEA. General shifting of armies — Trench dead-

CONTENTS xv

PAGE

lock, Noyon to Nancy — Active front shifts to Flanders — French aims
—German aims— "Calais" — Churchill's blunder. Ill ANTWERP.
The appeal to neutral sympathies — Antwerp's strategic importance —
Belgians impede Germans — Louvain — Siege of Antwerp — Mechanic
vs. engineer — 42-centimetre guns — Antwerp, evacuated, surrenders —
Ostend falls — British danger. IV. THE BATTLES OF FLANDERS.
A deadly blow aimed at England — Many races engaged — The Yser
region — Belgians first engaged — Aid from British fleet — Belgians
o£>en sluices at Dixmude — "Golden Lads" of Brittany — Ypres —
Strategy disappears in the death grapple. V. CHECKMATE. French
and Belgians win on the Yser, the British at Ypres — Terrific losses —
Death of Lord Roberts — Another victory for Foch — Definite failure
of German plans — Germany must turn to Russia — Deadlock on west
front 149

CHAPTER VIII
THE EASTERN FIELD

I. RUSSIAN AND GERMAN PURPOSES. East Prussian field becomes less
important — Russians defeat Austrians at Lemberg — Consequences —
Russian aims — Germany tries to save Austria — The drive at Warsaw
fails — Germans, detained in Russia, allow French and British to pre-
pare— But British need more time. II. TURKEY'S ENTRANCE. Mili-
tary effect — Political causes — Anglo-Russian rapprochement — Ger-
many replaces England as Turkey's friend — British naval blunder
allows escape of Goeben and Breslau 175

CHAPTER IX
THE BATTLE OF LEMBERG

I. RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION. Exposed position of Poland — The Bobr-
Narew-Niemen barrier — Russian plans — Two armies enter East
Prussia — One is beaten at Tannenberg — Three armies against Austria
— IvanoflF to hold Austrians south of Lublin — BrusilofF, released by
Roumanian neutrality, joins Russky for main thrust. II. AUS-
TRIA'S PLANS. Russian speed and strength underestimated — Aims
of the two Austrian armies — One stands before Lemberg — The other
approaches Lublin — Situation on all the fronts. III. LEMBERG.
An eight-day battle — BrusilofF breaks the Austrian centre! — IvanofF
drives back Dankl — Lemberg a great Austrian disaster — Important
consequences 191

xvi CONTENTS

MOT

CHAPTER X
WARSAW

I. CONDITIONS OF THE FIRST BID. German strategy — Need to divert
Russians from Galicia — Capture of Warsaw possible — Comparison
with Early 's raid on Washington. II. AT THE GATES OF WARSAW.
Rapid advance of Hindenburg's two armies — Russian concentration
also rapid — Hindenburg before Warsaw — His orderly retreat — Effects
of his threat — Russians diverted from Galicia — But only for a short
time. III. LODZ. Hindenburg's second effort — Turns the Russians'
flank — First Russky, then Von Fra^ois, seems lost — But both es-
cape— Germans win battle and reenter Lodz — Deadlock on Polish
front. IV. THE THIRD BID FOR WARSAW. Russians press on toward
Cracow, even after defeat at Lodz — Hindenburg strikes again — Hin-
dered by bad weather, he fails — Deadlock again. V. SERBIA TRI-
UMPHANT AGAIN. Serbia defeated Turks in 1913 — Then the Bul-
garians— Then the Austrians at Jedar — But Austrians take Belgrad in
December, 1914 — Serbia seems lost — Austrians needed against Cos-
sacks— Serbia rallies — Belgrad retaken 200

CHAPTER XI
NEW HORIZONS AND NEW GERMAN PROBLEMS

I. NEW YEAR'S, 1915. Germany's political problems — Problems of sea
power — Germany's isolation. II. THE MILITARY PROBLEM. Ger-
many's plans failed in 1914 — Austria shaken by defeat at Lemberg —
Territorial gains and losses — Colonial losses — Germany's herculean
task. III. ITALY. Clamours for Italia Irredenta — Italy's hopes
with Allies — She joins them eventually, despite Dunajec. IV. Rou-
MANIA. Ambition of Roumanians — Their conflicting sympathies —
Roumania follows Italy. V. AUSTRIA. Her domestic racial troub-
les— Their effect on German policy 223

CHAPTER XII
ON THE EAST FRONT TO THE BATTLE OF THE DUNAJEC

I. IN THE CAUCASUS. Germans send Turks against Russians in the Cau-
casus— English position in Egypt and at Suez strengthened — Turks
beaten in the Caucasus. II. LAYING THE ROUMANIAN PERIL. Hung-
ary threatened — Germany warned — She makes demonstration against
Roumania — Drives back Russians — German loan to Bulgaria — In-
cursion into Serbia. III. THE BATTLE OF THE MASURIAN LAKES.

CONTENTS xvii

PACB

Russians strike again at East Prussia — Geographical conditions —
Hindenburg drives back Russians. IV. PRZEMYSL. Russian siege
successful — Russia takes 130,000 prisoners — This success of the Allies
followed by many reverses. V. THE BATTLE OF THE CARPATHIANS.
Review of Carpathian operations — Struggle at Dukla Pass — Russia
brought to a halt — Her burden too heavy ........ 241

CHAPTER XIII
IN THE WEST, NOVEMBER, 1914, TO MAY, 1915

I. THE PROBLEM. Germans very near success in the west in November
— Hopes and aims of both sides — Hopes of neither realized — British
military failure during first year — Little help for Russia from the west.

II. JOFFRE'S "NIBBLING." Allies too weak for a drive — The French
"nibble" in the Vosges — Their costly but indecisive efforts in Cham-
pagne— British offensive south of Lille — All aimed at relieving Russia.

III. NEUVE CHAPELLE. British win little at terrible cost — First use
of massed artillery fire — Disheartening British mistakes. IV. THE
SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES. French fail to abolish the St. Mihiel sali-
ent— Germans need a victory — They first use "poison gas'* — Allied
resentment — Inconsiderable net results — The steadfast Canadians —
Battle is inconclusive — But Germans gain some advantage. CON-
CLUSION. Review of events thus far covered — Important results of
the Marne — France there willed to live and there saved the Allies. 253

CHAPTER XIV
CONCLUSION 274

APPENDIX, The Early French Offensive 279

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

BACKGROUND OF THE WAR IN PICTURES ... 17 to 24

Napoleon's Cuirassiers at Waterloo — The Building of the German
Empire — The Man Who Built the German Empire — Bismarck as the
Greatest Statesman in Europe — "The Defence of the Longboyeau
Gate" — Four Generations of Hohenzollerns — Wilhelm II, German
Emperor.

BACKGROUND OF THE WAR IN PICTURES 41 to 48

Kaiser Greets Kaiser — Dropping the Pilot, Tenniel's Famous Cartoon
— M. Delcasse, French Foreign Minister in 1904 — Lord Lansdowne
— Two Staunch Friends and Promoters of the Entente Cordiale,
General Kitchener and Colonel Marchand — Czar Nicholas and
President Poincare — The Kaiser with a Former Friend, Albert of Bel-
gium— Lord Roberts and Lord Haldane — Archduke Francis Ferdi-
nand with His Morganatic Wife — The Arrest of the Assassin.

LORD ROBERTS OF KANDAHAR (in colour) 55

THE TWELVE DAYS (AUGUST 4-16, 1914) 67 to 74

King Peter of Serbia — William II, German Emperor — The Late
Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria-Hungary — The Rulers of the
Triple Entente — Mr. Asquith, British Premier, and Sir Edward Grey,
British Foreign Minister — Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, German Im-
perial Chancellor — Count Berchtold, Austrian Premier, 1914 — Diplo-
matists of the Twelve Days — To Provide the Sinews of War.

BELGIUM "THE COCKPIT OF EUROPE " IN PICTURES . 91 to 98

Albert of Belgium — Belgian Cavalry — One Shot From a German 42-
Centimetre Gun Put This Belgian Fort Out of Commission — Belgian
Battery on the March — War Enthusiasts in Brussels — Belgian
Soldiers at Rest During a Lull in the Fighting — A Typical Belgian
Soldier — General Leman, Defender of Liege — Awaiting the Uhlans —
The Invasion of Belgium, Epitomized in Pictures — Ruined Town
Hall at Ypres — Belgium Under German Rule.

GENERAL FOCH (in colour) 121

xix

xx LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

NOVEL PHASES OF MODERN WARFARE SHOWN IN PICTURES

133 to 140

A Hidden and Defended Machine Gun — The "Agent de Liaison" —
"Poison Gas" in the War — Machine-Gun Position in the Open —
Periscope and Metal Helmet — This is the Result When a Forest Be-
comes a Battlefield — Buckler, Hand-Grenade, and Helm — Barbed-
Wire Entanglements — The Gasoline Engine — Work and Play at the
Front.

HINDENBURG, HERO OF TANNENBERG (in colour) .... 145

"ST. GEORGE FOR ENGLAND!" FRANCE AND ENGLAND
STAND TOGETHER 159 to 166

British Highlanders Landing at Boulogne — General Joffre — General
Gallieni — Three French Generals — Lord Kitchener and Sir John
French — General Sir Douglas Haig and General Sir Horace Lock-
wood Smith-Dorrien — French Army Joins Belgians — British Artillery
in a Rearguard Action in Belgium — When the British Marines Dis-
embarked at Ostend They Received a Rousing Welcome From the
Belgians — British Artillery in Action — The Prince of Wales With His
Regiment — On the Marne Front — French Dragoons with Captive Uh-
lans— The Advance of French Machine Gunners and Riflemen — A Big
French Gun on the Railroad at Verdun — Two Remarkable Airplane
Photographs on the French Front.

GLIMPSES OF THE SQUADRONS OF THE AIR . * ,*~~. 183 to 190

Americans Who Flew for France — The Dreadnought of the Air — The
Battle Cruiser of the Air — The War in the Air — Women Volunteers
for the French Aerial Service — Aviator's Photograph of a Modern
Battlefield — A Pair of Able-bodied Zouaves from the Gold Coast of
Africa — Turcos — Canadian Troops — A True World War — Men of
Asia and Africa.

MEN AND GUNS OF THE TWO KAISERS ..... 207 to 214

The Imperial Guard Passes in Review Before Emperor William — Ger-
man Generals — One of Hindenburg's Thrusts at Warsaw — An Inci-
dent During the German Effort to Drive the Russians Home From
Galicia — Effect of the German Bombardment of Przemysl — General
Von Auffenberg — Typical Austrian Infantryman — Parcels From
Friends at Home Arrive to Cheer German Artillery Officers Before
Warsaw — The Austrians — One of the Skoda Howitzers That Re-
duced Liege.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS xxi

PACB

PICTURES OF TRENCH WARFARE ". 231 to 238

German Shelters of Sandbags, in the Dunes Along the Belgian Coast —
The Elaboration of Trench Warfare — An Observation Station — An
Underground Passage Dug by the Austrians at Dubus, Russia, With
an Outlet in a Church — Winter Quarters — Another Aspect of Life in
the Trenches — A Light Gun Elaborately Entrenched — Belgians En-
trenched Outside Antwerp — Underground With the British — Austro-
Hungarian Shelters in the Alps.

THE SLAVS IN THE WORLD WAR . . . . . . .25510262

Part of the Crack Cavalry Corps Formerly Known as the Czar's Own
Hussars — Four Russian Generals — Battery of Russian Howitzers
on the Polish Front — Russian Soldiers — The Former Czar's Body-
guard of Picked Cossacks Riding to the Defence of Warsaw — Russians
and Austrians — Serbia in the War — Serbian Troops on the March
Near the Austrian Border.

LIST OF MAPS

Why the Germans Went Through Belgium ........ 81

The First Battles, August 15-23, 1914 105

The Situation of the French and German Armies on August 30, 1914 . 113

The German Advance to the Marne 117

Kluck's Circle 119

Battle of the Marne, Sept. 5th 124

Battle of the Marne, Sept. 8th 125

Battle of the Marne, Sept. gth. 125

First Russian Invasion of East Prussia, Checked by Hindenburg at

Tannenberg 144

The German Retreat to the Aisne, Sept. 1015, 1914 151

The Race to the Sea 154

Deadlock in the West, Nov. 15, 1914 172

The Russian Offensive on all Fronts, Sept. I, 1914 193

The Russian Invasion of Galicia — Battle of Lemberg 197

The Russian Invasion of Galicia, About October I, 1914 201

Hindenburg's First Campaign for Warsaw, Oct. 20, 1914 . . . . 203

Hindenburg's Second Drive for Warsaw 206

The Battle of Lodz, During Hindenburg's Second Campaign for Warsaw 215

Deadlock in Poland, Dec., I9i4-May, 1915 219

Serbian Battlefields 221

Italia Irredenta 227

The Battle of the Masurian Lakes 246

The Galician Campaign, Sept., I9i4-May, 1915 250

PART ONE

HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

BY
FRANK H. SIMONDS

CHAPTER ONE

EUROPE BETWEEN 1871 AND 1904

I
THE FIRST YEARS

The full generation that lay between the signing of the Treaty of
Frankfort and the crisis of Tangier was marked by no very clear and
definite march of events. Between the Revolutions of 1848 and the
close of the Franco- Prussian War, Europe had lived through a long series
of wars, not comparable in magnitude or sacrifice to the Napoleonic
and Revolutionary struggles, but sufficiently considerable to satiate the
people of the various nations and reconcile the statesmen to pacific
policies. Germany, during the years of Bismarck, pursued a moderate
course. His greatest concern was to preserve and strengthen the great
structure he had reared. If the swift rise of France from defeat led him
to a minatory gesture in 1875, he heeded the warnings that came from
London and Petrograd. Throughout his period of power he skilfully
managed to keep the door to the Russian capital open, and while he
detested the British, he never sought to challenge them upon the water.

To be sure, the Russo-Turkish War and the settlement of the Con-
gress of Berlin led to an inevitable estrangement with Russia. Ger-
many, having to choose between Russia and Austria, decided for the
Hapsburg, and the Congress of Berlin, by destroying the Treaty of San
Stefano, deprived Russia of the fruits of her Turkish triumph, and
by putting the Austro-Hungarian Empire, through Bosnia and Herze-
govina, on the road to Saloniki, thus made a Franco-Russian alliance
inevitable. But in Bismarck's time this alliance was never a threat to
German interests nor to German supremacy on the Continent, for Russia
was in no mind to undertake the destruction of the Treaty of Frankfort to
satisfy her French ally, while France was not willing to invite another
invasion to replace the Crescent by the Cross at St. Sophia.

4 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

In 1 88 1, Bismarck, by clever manipulation, thrust France
into Tunis and effectively aided by Crispi, the inveterate foe of
France, was able to harvest from Italian anger the entrance of the
Italian Kingdom into the Austro-German Alliance, thus creating the
Triple Alliance, which was too strong to be challenged by France and
Russia, and, as a defensive alliance, served as the corner-stone of
European peace until the middle of the first decade of the Twentieth
Century.

Great Britain, moreover, inclined rather to the German than to the
Franco-Russian group. Her foreign policy was still in the Beacons-
field era. She regarded Russia as her true enemy. She had joined
Austria in vetoing the Treaty of San Stefano, as she had persuaded
France to join her in the Crimea. Friction between Russia and
Britain on the frontiers of the Indian Empire, with France all over the
world where colonial enterprises were clashing, contributed to keep
alive animosities born of the Crimean and Napoleonic wars. Thus,
while nominally pursuing that policy, known in its day as " splendid iso-
lation," Great Britain actually inclined toward the Germans and,
while Germany under Bismarck pursued a clearly pacific course, British
policy was markedly pro-German.

France, recovering materially from her terrible defeat with an alac-
rity that alarmed her conqueror, found herself for the time isolated in
Europe. Slowly the hope of a reconquest of the "Lost Provinces"
weakened in the eyes of the older generation while the newer generation
found its attention and its energies consumed in the domestic strife
between the Republic and its enemies, in the struggle with Boulanger-
ism, in the battle with the Church, and in that grotesque episode which
was the Dreyfus Case. It would not be fair to say that the memory of
Alsace-Lorraine was banished from the French mind, but it is true that
even Frenchmen believed it had disappeared in the mournful and ig-
noble years of the nineties. While German population increased
by millions, that of France stood still, until France found herself dis-
tanced by her great rival and no longer able to match army corps with
army corps on the open frontier of the Vosges. For France the years

EUROPE BETWEEN 1871 AND 1904 5

between Frankfort and Tangier were years recalling the equally un-
happy age of Louis XV. And in both periods there were not lacking
those who foretold the disappearance of France as a great nation and
spoke with ready conviction of the decadence of the French race,
forgetting how frequently in past centuries the flame of French genius
had grown dim, only to burst forth with new brilliance and dazzle the
world with its radiance. And in this time not only did the desire for
peace increase with each year in the hearts of the French people, but a
too-eager acceptance of the illusions of pacifism and internationalism
left the nation well nigh defenceless, when the crisis of Tangier brought
France within two steps of war.

In the closing quarter of the Nineteenth Century, too, the Great
Powers, with the exception of Germany and Austria, turned their eyes
beyond Europe and laboured to construct great colonial empires. France
spread her colours from Algiers to the Congo. Tunis, the Sahara, Sene-
gal, the regions of the Upper Niger, the shores of Lake Chad, and the
vast area between the Congo-Ubangi and the Atlantic were occupied.
Madagascar was conquered. Indo-China was expanded into a colony
greater than France in area.

Britain on her part kept pace with France in Africa, extended her
Indian Empire, expanded her commercial and political influence in
China, pushed France out of Egypt, and carried her conquests up the
Nile until Cecil Rhodes' dream of a British "all-red route" from the
Cape to Cairo was all but realized.

Russia on her side turned from the disappointments of the Dar-
danelles to the still unrestricted possibilities eastward to the Pacific
and southward to warm water at Port Arthur. Siberia began to rival
the American Far West in resources and opportunity and Russia seemed
destined to achieve at the expense of the Chinese what she had missed
in the estates of the Osmanli.

Even Italy, still struggling with the terrible problems of poverty
and misery, also embarked upon the colonial enterprise, only to find
disaster in Abyssinia and military disgrace at Adowa. Little Belgium,
through the efforts of her able if unscrupulous monarch, acquired the

6 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

vast empire of the Congo Free State and took rank with the Great
Powers in possessions beyond the seas.

II. A NEW KAISER AND A NEW POLICY

In all this time Germany alone stood still. Great as Bismarck
had been as the creator of the German Empire, he lacked the vision to
grasp the new horizons. While he remained in power, he gave only con-
temptuous attention to the colonial ambitions within his own country.
He welcomed the concentration of French energy upon colonial expan-
sion because it promised the gradual extinction of the Alsace-Lorraine
question. He skilfully turned every opportunity to account in bringing
the French and the British into collision. Nor was he less contented
to see Russia, forgetful of Constantinople and the Balkans, fixing her eyes
upon Vladivostok and Port Arthur.

More than all else, perhaps, this failure of Bismarck contributed to
the great catastrophe that he did not live to see. A new Germany was
rising, a Germany he neither understood nor recognized. The whole
fabric of German life was being made over and Germany was rapidly
transforming herself into a great commercial nation, into a factory na-
tion, into a nation whose organization, whose resources in minerals,
made her a rival of Great Britain; whose merchant marine was growing
by leaps and bounds and carrying the German flag into every sea and
every port. This new Germany felt it unjust, immoral, that she, alone of
the great nations, she, who had become in fact the most powerful nation
on the European continent, should be without her colonies, without lands
to which Germans could carry their language and their national faith,
colonies which might serve as the markets for German manufactures and
the plantations on which could be grown the raw materials needed by
German industry.

And it was this Germany that William II represented when at last
he came to the throne, speedily "dropped the pilot," and took from
Bismarck's control the direction of the policies of an Empire which had
been the Iron Chancellor's creation and for long years an instrument in
his hands. In his anxiety to preserve what he had brought into being,

EUROPE BETWEEN 1871 AND 1904 7

Bismarck had withheld Germany from the world competition in colonial
expansion, he had submitted to the naval supremacy of Britain, he had
smiled upon the Russian adventures in the Far East, he had uttered no
protest when Great Britain had added new empires to her vast realms.
And the world upon which William II looked when power at last came
to him, was a world already parcelled out, with but few and unattrac-
tive patches bearing the colour of the German Empire.

In the mind of the new Emperor it was clear from the outset
that the real barrier to German development, to rightful German ex-
pansion, to the acquisition of that place in the sun that soon appeared
in all German patriotic phrase, was Britain. It was Britain who held
the fairest spots upon the face of the earth, so far as colonial considera-
tions were concerned. It was British sea power that dominated the
trade routes. Moreover, British arms protected the sinking power of
Portugal, closed Morocco because it faced Gibraltar, was presently to
join with France in an agreement that should bestow upon the Republic
this rich and promising colonial field of Morocco, was to conquer the Boer
Republics toward which German eyes had been turjied, was to lend its
support to an American admiral in Manila Ba"y, when German thoughts
turned toward the expiring colonial empire of Spain.

Unless Germany possessed a great fleet, she must be contented to
accept British dictation abroad. The dictation was not aggressive,
the world had endured British supremacy at sea for nearly a century
without too much protest or too great discomfort. But the cardinal
doctrine of British policy_for centuries had been that the British fleet
should be supreme and there was no inclination in London, no matter
what party ruled in Westminster, to permit an equal on the blue water.

The decision of the Kaiser, summed up in the famous phrase, "Our
future lies upon the sea," involved an ultimate challenge to Britain.
No one can read the pages of British history from the days of the
Spanish Armada to the not-less-splendid moment of Trafalgar, without
recognizing this fact. Indeed the development of steam transport
and the change in the character of British industry had made it inevita-
ble that Britain would starve, unless she were able at all times to keep

8 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

the seas open and insure the inward flow to her ports of the food for her
dense population.

III. ENGLAND AND FRANCE DRAW NEAR

In the same fashion this challenge made it inevitable that in the end
Britain should join the Franco-Russian group, as in her long history she
had ever joined the weaker powers who made head against that Conti-
nental nation which at the moment crossed her path and challenged her
supremacy.

Germany could believe, did believe up to the fatal moment in August,
1914, that Britain would be beguiled into staying out of that European war
which was necessary to clear Germany's flanks, to dispose of a France
still mindful of Alsace-Lorraine and certain to take advantage of Ger-
man complications with other powers; the war that was necessary to
send the Slav back behind the Niemen and the Bug, no longer a rival of
Austria in the Balkans or a peril to Germany in East Prussia and Posen.
But this was to mistake the genius which underlies the stupidity of the
Anglo-Saxon in world affairs. For if Britain has always muddled her
affairs in times of peace and in the opening hours of conflict, her instinct
has saved her invariably.

In the early years of his reign William II seems to have cherished
the notion that he could deal with France and Russia without war.
Following the policy of Bismarck he encouraged the Russian to embark
in the Japanese War. The earlier years of his reign are marked by a
series of clumsy but no less sincere efforts to bridge the chasm that the
Treaty of Frankfort had opened between France and Germany. But
for this chasm there was but one bridge and this he could not take;
Germany would not surrender Alsace-Lorraine, even at the behest of its
young Kaiser, and no such idea ever entered the imperial mind.

Such hope as the Emperor may haVe entertained of winning France,
of making her his ally against Britain, perished with the wholly un-
expected termination of Anglo-French bickerings that followed Fashoda.
When Kitchener, after his successful campaign to Khartum, and Colonel
Marchand, after his memorable journey across Africa from the Congo

EUROPE BETWEEN 1871 AND 1904 9

to the Nile, met at the miserable little village of Fashoda, two great
imperial dreams came into collision. A century and a half before
France and Britain had met on the Ohio, and the whole story of Nine-
teenth Century Anglo-French colonial enterprise is a marvellous repe-
tition of the American episode. In Africa as in America, too, French ex-
plorers had out-distanced British.

There was a moment in 1898 when it seemed inevitable that France
and Britain were to fight one more war. But the crisis passed. France
bowed. The French Foreign Minister, Hanotaux, went into retirement,
as his successor Delcasse was to go after Tangier, seven years later.
Kitchener prevailed and Marchand retreated. When these two soldiers
met again, they met as allies on the hills of Artois, Marchand wearing
the stars of a Fjench general and Kitchener the master of Britain's
military establishment.

Oddly enough Fashoda left no permanent scar. France had to
decide between England and Germany. She chose to remain faithful
to Alsace-Lorraine. Britain on her part, having at last perceived the
solid foundation of French colonial conception, already beginning to feel
almost subconsciously the challenge of German sea power, held otit a
hand to France. More than all else, Edward VII, when he came to the
throne, animated as he was by a real affection for 'the French, opened the
way, by his skill and tact, for that Anglo-French Entente, which was to
threaten the whole edifice of German hope.

Thus, when the momentary bitterness had passed away, France and
Britain proceeded to the adjustment of all their world-wide quarrels.
There was a wholesale liquidation of claims and counterclaims, culmi-
nating in the famous agreement of 1904 by which France recognized
British supremacy in Egypt, and Britain withdrew her half-century-old
veto to French expansion in Morocco. Not since the Hundred Years
War had Anglo-French relations been placed on so friendly a basis and
henceforth French and British policies were to converge until a friend-
ship expanded into a virtual alliance and a virtual alliance into an actual
union in the presence of a common foe.

All of this was not the work of a moment. When the Boer War came

io HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

there were not a few Frenchmen who openly expressed their hatred for
Britain and their sympathy with the Africander Republics. To the very
eve of the Great War there were influential Frenchmen who still nour-
ished the ancient grudge against "perfidious Albion," as there were Brit-
ons who preserved the immemorial distrust of the " fickle Gaul." But,
for all this, Fashoda was a landmark in European history, and the Anglo-
French settlement that resulted carried with it the promise of the world
conflict that followed the 1904 agreement by a short decade.

IV. THE CONVENTION OF 1904

The Anglo-French arrangement of 1904 was a heavy and well-nigh
fatal blow to the policy of the German Emperor. With perfect accuracy
he foresaw that it was the first step in the inevitable drawing together
of France and Britain. Quite naturally he and the German nation as
well saw in it the deliberate purpose of Britain to return to the old policy
of balancing the Continental nations against one another and throwing
her decisive influence on the side opposing her immediate rival. From
this hour German teachers and German publicists were to speak with
growing bitterness of the "iron ring" that was being forged about the
Fatherland and the cult of hatred of Great Britain was to take on untold
and unsuspected expansion.

In an Anglo-French understanding, limited as it was at the outset
to a liquidation of lawsuits, to a settlement of wholly personal claims,
Germany beheld the British nation taking its stand behind the French
and giving its tremendous influence to encourage the French desire to
destroy the Treaty of Frankfort and regain the "Lost Provinces."

And with this date there disappears the German policy of placating
France which had long held sway in Berlin and had moved the Kaiser
to innumerable gestures, which had been coldly rejected by the French
or suffered to pass unnoticed. Out of this arrangement grew the Ger-
man conviction that one more war with France was necessary and that
there could be no realization of the dream of a German " place in the
sun" until the ever-enduring French resentment was disposed of by a
war, which should relegate France to the rank of a second-class nation

EUROPE BETWEEN 1871 AND 1904 n

and leave her too weak ever to cross German purposes again. By force
Germany was to try once more to separate France and Britain, without,
in fact, arriving at war, but the failure of Tangier was to confirm the
conviction born of the Anglo-French arrangement, and in it were the
seeds of all that wrath which was to come.

CHAPTER TWO

FROM TANGIER TO ARMAGEDDON

TANGIER, THE FIRST GESTURE

The Moroccan Crisis of 1905 was the first clear warning of what
was to come. It put forces squarely in opposition which were to meet
again and again thereafter in similar conflict until there was no longer
the smallest chance of preserving world peace. It was to open a new era
in European history, the end of which no man can now see. It preceded
the general conflict by less than ten years and it foreshadowed it with
such clarity that those who come hereafter will marvel at the blindness
that was subsequently displayed in many nations.

The Anglo-French Entente of 1904, while nominally a business ar-
rangement between two nations, in fact undermined the whole structure
of German policy. German challenge to British sea power was taking
shape, but German policy contemplated the separation of Britain from
the rest of Europe and gave its best effort to encouraging the bitterness
between Paris and London and between Petrograd and London. A
complete settlement between France and Britain foreshadowed a similar
liquidation between Britain and Russia, which did come in due time, and
beyond this it held out the menace of something more, of a possible
alliance between these three Great Powers.

Was this in the minds of the British and French ministers who signed
the treaty of 1904? Subliminally perhaps. Delcasse was a frank foe
of Germany. British foreign policy was in Tory hands and the Govern-
ment and the Crown alike felt the reality of the growing German chal-
lenge. More than any Englishman of his time Edward VII feared the
German danger, and more than any man he contributed to resolving the
difficulties between France and his own country. In the German mind, it
was his policy that led to the Triple Entente. In the German mind, he con-

FROM TANGIER TO ARMAGEDDON 13

ceivedaplanto build a circle of steel about Germany, to unite Britain with
France and Russia, to keep Germany from the realization of her dreams.
Many years may not solve this problem, and it seems inevitable that
Germans will read history one way and the rest of the world another.
It does seem clear, however, that Lord Lansdowne, who held the For-
eign Office, was mindful of the German challenge; it does seem patent
that Delcasse saw in an understanding with Britain the possibility of a
concentration of French energies toward national regeneration and de-
fence. But underneath all lies the solid fact that the original challenge
had been delivered by Germany to British sea power. Germany was
free to seek her future on the sea, but Britain was bound, in the nature of
things, to meet such a challenge as she best could.

At the moment it was announced, the Anglo-French agreement made
no great noise in Europe. Delcasse did not communicate it directly to
the German Government, a fatal blunder, as it now seems, but he in-
formed the German Ambassador at Paris, who notified his Government,
and Berlin gave no sign of disapproval, even gave an apparent assent.
The agreement itself, while insuring ultimate French political supremacy
in the Shereefian Empire, guaranteed the "open door" for all, and thus
for German quite as much as British trade.

But Germany was only waiting. For the first time since the Treaty
of Frankfort an international agreement of great importance — concern-
ing her but slightly, to be sure — had been made without regard to her.
This was a long and dismal descent from the days of the Congress of
Berlin, when Bismarck, acting for Germany, had presided at the council
of nations. This was the heaviest blow that had been struck at German
prestige since the Empire had been proclaimed at Versailles.

In the opening weeks of 1905 Germany spoke. Russia had been de-
feated at Mukden, her prestige was gone and her military reputation
had crumbled. France stood alone, notoriously ill-prepared for war.
Not even with British help could she hope to make head against the Ger-
man army, and there was yet no certainty that Britain would go to war to
help France. Accordingly the Kaiser landed in Tangier and suddenly
proclaimed the integrity of Morocco. He thrust a German sword

i4 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

through the Anglo-French agreement and Europe came to the first
grave crisis of the century.

For days European peace seemed shattered. Germany demanded
that the question of Morocco should be reopened, that it should be sub-
mitted to a council of nations. Delcasse refused. In the end France
yielded, a weak and terrified ministry bowed. Delcasse went into exile,
a council was summoned to meet at Algeciras, and Biilow, the German
Chancellor, became a prince, in token of his sovereign's appreciation of
this "shining triumph,'3

II. ALGECIRAS — A GERMAN DEFEAT

But if this incident was a "crowning humiliation" for France, and
the going of Delcasse the greatest sorrow France had known since Sedan,
Germany lost at Algeciras almost all she had hoped to win. In this
conference Britain stood solidly behind the French. Russia was not
less loyal to her ally, while Italy displayed a lack of sympathy with her
German ally which roused bitterest recrimination in Berlin and was the
first authentic sign of the crumbling of the edifice of Bismarck. Ger-
many and Austria stood alone, the Moroccan question was dealt with in
a fashion that insured new troubles, but in effect, the predominant in-
fluence of France in Morocco received the seal of approval of Europe
and the door to German participation in Moroccan estates, which the
Anglo-French agreement had closed, was not reopened.

Germany had humiliated France and angered Britain. She had
thrust her sword into the balance against European peace, but it had not
prevailed. She had not separated France from England. She had
brought the two nations more closely together. Russia, already humili-
ated by defeats in the East, bore with ill-concealed resentment the effort
of the Kaiser to take advantage of temporary weakness in Russian armies.
Italy turned from Germany and Austria to France and Britain to make
arrangements for the realization of her own Mediterranean ambitions.

All this the Germans clearly perceived, all this was gall and wormwood
to the Kaiser. He had hoped to separate France from Britain but he
had, in fact, brought them closer together. He had hoped to show a

FROM TANGIER TO ARMAGEDDON 15

mastery of a European council comparable to that of Bismarck in the
Congress of Berlin but, save for Austria, he had been without friends in
the council, a majority of which had been frankly hostile. It was Brit-
ain and not Germany that actually prevailed at Algeciras, and there
was no mistaking the fact that Britain was even more willing than
France to risk a deliberate rebuff to Germany, even if it should carry
with it an appeal to arms.

Hence for Germany there was a new grievance against Britain, a
new accentuation of Anglophobic sentiment, a new looking forward to
"the day" which was becoming uppermost in German minds and hearts,
the day when the British obstacle to German hope should be removed
by a victory. But there were reasons why wise statesmanship should
have perceived the facts that were now disclosed. Germany had feared
that she would find herself faced by a triple alliance, she had made one
gesture of war and all three were disclosed united against her. Unless
she believed herself strong enough to face all three in arms, her course
was marked out by Bismarck's successful policy of separating Austria
and France and dealing with the former in 1866 and the latter in 1870.
Instead, the German policy tended fatally to unite three possible foes
and transform into allies, united against Germany, three nations widely
separated up to the moment of Tangier.

For France, Tangier was a memorable incident. It marks the
beginning of that new French spirit which was to blaze forth at the
Marne and at Verdun and fill the world with the glory of French courage
and patriotism. It was the beginning of the reconstruction of France,
politically, spiritually, nationally. The French perceived the danger,
the threat, the menace of German policy. They perceived that it had
become a question of the future existence of France, and to such a threat
France responded as she had to the menace of all Europe in the days of
the Revolution.

III. AFTER TANGIER— THE NEW FRANCE

If French politicians still fettered French preparation, if French
organization was still inferior to German, if France went to war in 1914

16 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

lacking in much, still there could be no comparison with 1905, when
France must have fallen at the first blow. And what was all-important,
the French mind was mobilized with the first call. France was saved
by Tangier, although ten years were to pass before even the French
would realize the fact of their deliverance.

With the British it was far different. The Tory ministry, which
negotiated the Anglo-French convention, went out of power shortly.
The Liberal Government that came into office turned the attention of
the nation to domestic problems and in the bitterness of class war and
Irish disputes the international situation passed from the minds of the
British people. They forgot Germany, the Empire, the outside world ;
they devoted their energies and their attention to domestic differences,
and they gave only impatient hearing to the few voices like that of Lord
Roberts, which from time to time warned them of the danger that was
Germany. Yet at the moment that they refused to recognize the outside
peril the British ministers declined to renounce the policy from which
flowed the danger. Faithful to the tradition of their race, they clung to
the idea that Britain should be supreme at sea, and if, for a few years, they
permitted British construction to fall perilously low by comparison
with Germany, they changed their policy in time. And they accepted
the legacy of friendship with France, they accepted the Moroccan com-
mitment of Lansdowne, they remained steadily resolved to surrender
nothing of British Empire or British influence to Germany, and only such
a surrender could have conceivably appeased Germans.

In all this there was a fatal paradox. Pretending or even believing
that Germany was friendly, the Liberal and Radical majority continued
to follow a course which gave Germany no promise of a realization of
her dreams. But against the danger that this policy brought they took
no adequate step and members of the Government like Haldane con-
tinued to call Germany their "spiritual home" and make frequent
visits to Berlin, after all real hope of an accommodation of Anglo-German
rivalry had passed. The voice of Lord Roberts calling for adequate
military preparation awakened only sneers from Liberals and
Radicals.

BACKGROUND OF THE
WAR IN PICTURES

NAPOLEON'S CUIRASSIERS AT WATERLOO

Waterloo (June 18, 1815) marked the overthrow of Napoleon's ambition to dominate^
Europe. Germany was the next nation to cherish the dream of world dominion

THE RISE OF GERMANY

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Empire and the creation of the Triple Alliance, in the days of the present Kaiser's father and grand-
father. He did not realize the need for colonial expansion, otherwise Germany might have
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FROM TANGIER TO ARMAGEDDON 25

And the people of Britain, lulled to sleep by their rulers, their pas-
sions stirred by home problems and domestic debates, gave no heed to
European matters. Thus it was that when at last the whole fabric of
the British Empire was in deadly peril, the British population was
totally oblivious to the truth, and Liberal journals could tell their read-
ers that the conflict which was breaking in the first days of August, 1914,
was without importance for Britain.

IV. THE END OF THE CONCERT OF EUROPE

For France, for Russia, for Germany, for Italy, Tangier is a land-
mark; its meaning was promptly made a part of the sum of human knowl-
edge of millions in these countries, henceforth it gave shape to the policies
and impulse to the purposes of the patriots of these nations. French-
man, Russian, and German, alike, perceived in it the sign of an inevitable
war, but the Briton saw nothing. From Tangier to the day when
Belgium was invaded, British understanding of international condi-
tions and British influence in the world declined until Germany could
believe that the British had forgotten her challenge to British sea power
and in July, 1914, could hope for a few brief hours that Britain would
remain neutral at Armageddon.

Finally, and this is of prime importance, with the Algeciras Confer-
ence there expired the legend of a concert of Europe. Henceforth there
were two groups of Great Powers and these groups naturally and inevi-
tably tended to take opposite sides on every question of international im-
portance that arose until their hostility paralyzed their influence and
enabled the small Balkan States to unchain the tempest, by their attack
upon Turkey in 1912.

After Tangier, too, it was plain that the understanding between
France, Britain, and Russia marched steadily toward an alliance in fact
if not in terms ; an alliance which, by accident or design, found common
ground in resistance to German policies. On the other hand, at Al-
geciras, Italy manifested patent weariness of the Triple Alliance, and
her course thereafter was away from Berlin and Vienna and toward
Paris and London. This course was to bring her into opposition with

26 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

Vienna over Tripoli and the Balkans and ultimately into alliance with
the foes of the Central Powers.

The Tangier incident therefore early forecast a time when Italy
would change sides, and this would leave Austria and Germany actually
outnumbered and outweighed in European councils and abolish that
real supremacy on the Continent which Bismarck had earned for Ger-
many and preserved to the hour when he surrendered his office to the
young Kaiser. With their larger ambitions wholly unrealized, Qermans
could foresee a time when they would be powerless to attain their
visions of a Germany proportioned upon their own conception of her
true stature.

And between Algeciras and Armageddon, Germany marched stead-
ily from disappointment to disappointment, while the whole edifice of
her power began to crack; not alone through the disaffection of Italy
but through the perils which the rise of a Slav state in the Balkans,
under Russian inspiration, brought to her one faithful ally, brought to
Austria, half of whose population was Slav.

Thus, one may say accurately that the ten years that followed
Tangier were but dominated by the consequences of this fatal episode.
Henceforth the whole stream of European history flowed between cir-
cumscribed banks toward the inevitable cataract, which was the World
War. Once it had entered these banks, the course was inescapable and
the destination, however hidden from the view of those who sailed the
stream, was ineluctable.

V. BOSNIA — THE SECOND GESTURE

Berlin had perceived with utter clarity that the entente between
Britain and France would inevitably bring Russia and her ancient
enemy into better relations. A Russian statesman had, indeed, re-
marked on the morrow of the Anglo-French convention, quoting from a
Russian proverb: "The friends of my friend are my friends." Such a
change would have the profoundest consequences in international
relations, for the antagonism of Britain, which had again and again
barred the Russian way to Constantinople, and British apprehensions

FROM TANGIER TO ARMAGEDDON 27

for the safety of the northern frontiers of India menaced by Russian ad-
vance, had been pivots on which German policy had turned for years.

And in 1907, Britain and Russia signed a document which in all
respects recalled the Anglo-French compact of three years before. The
questions that had divided the two nations, above all the question of
Persia, were solved by a mutually satisfactory partition of Persia into
zones. Britain and Russia, as it were, struck hands in compromise over
half a century of differences, and behind the things agreed was the
suggestion that, in due course, British opposition to Russian possession
at Constantinople would vanish.

Again German answer was tardy, but unmistakable. This time
Austria spoke, but the words were recognized as German. The Young
Turk Revolution had now come to shake the crumbling foundations
of Osmanli power. Europe stood amazed while a new and professedly
Liberal Party seized the reins of power in Constantinople and first tied
the hands of Abdul Hamid, and, when he plotted against it, threw him
into prison, stripped him of his power, and put a Sultan of their own
'choosing in his place.

For the moment there was a promise of progress, of a renewed and
reformed Turkey, and in that moment the various subject races of the
Turk — the Greek, the Bulgar, and the Armenian — shared in the efforts
of the Young Turks while even the faithful Albanians deserted their
friend the deposed Sultan. But the Young Turk cherished grandiose
dreams of a restoration, not of the Turkey that remained, by internal
reform, but even more strongly the dream of a restoration of the Turkey
of the past by the reconquest of the lost provinces of Bulgaria, of Ser-
bia, of Bosnia, and Herzegovina which had passed to the protection of
the Hapsburgs at the Congress of Berlin.

Seizing this pretext Austria in 1908 proclaimed the annexation of
Bosnia, while Ferdinand of Bulgaria proclaimed himself Czar of Bul-
garia, thenceforth beyond even the nominal sovereignty of the Turk.
The results of this annexation were tremendous. Austria had many
claims upon Bosnia, no colonial effort in European history had been
more successful on the material side. 'She had brought civilization,

28 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

industrial development, railroads, and highways to one of the least
advanced communities in the world. But by virtue of the mandate of
the Congress of Berlin her rule was unquestioned and the fiction of an
occupation had become only a fiction ; to translate it into a legal as well
as a nominal possession was to change nothing, but to bring instant
difficulties.

The Turkish protest was of no moment. But Serbia, now become
in fact the ward and protege of Petrograd as she had been of Vi-
enna in the days of the Obrenovitches, saw the extinction of her dream of
a restored Serbia, which should include the 2,000,000 Serbs who lived
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia, moved by her Serbian interests,
protested vehemently against the transformation of the agreement of
the Congress of Berlin into a "scrap of paper." France and Britain
supported Russia. Italy stirred uneasily, for she had no interest in
seeing Austria advance southward along the Adriatic or toward Salon-
iki. In all this Austria was a rival, not an ally.

At the critical moment there came from Berlin another gesture like
to that of the Kaiser at Tangier, but directed this time at Russia and
not France. Once more Germany thrust her sword into the balance,
and once more the governments of Paris, London, and Petrograd had
to decide between war and surrender. And as France had been helpless
in 1905, Russia, still suffering from her Japanese defeats, could not
venture to risk a war with Germany. Nor did France or Britain at this
moment manifest any strong enthusiasm for carrying their champion-
ship of Russia's protest to the firing line.

Russia therefore bowed, as France had bowed, but the time was to
come when Petrograd would say, when the Czar himself was to be re-
ported as saying: "We have stood this thing long enough." Russia
accepted her humiliation in the spirit in which France had accepted hers.
Henceforth the eyes of Russia turned toward Europe, toward the Balk-
ans ; the German gesture at Tangier had recalled France from Africa to
Europe, the Bosnian affair recalled Slav thoughts from Asia to the
Balkans.

Viewed at the moment, Bosnia was a shining success for German

FROM TANGIER TO ARMAGEDDON 29

diplomacy. But if for the moment the Triple Alliance seemed mighty and
the Triple Entente a broken reed, Bosnia, like Tangier, had consequences
which were unforeseen to the German statesmen who provoked the trial
of strength, consequences which abolished the profits of the play. Above
all, the blow did not permanently break the connection between Russia,
Britain, and France, which alone could have counted for a clear
success.

On the contrary, it did weaken still further Italian attachment to
the Triple Alliance, as it stimulated Italian apprehension of Austrian
ambitions in the Balkans and along the Albanian shore of the Adriatic.
From this was presently to flow the Italian attack upon Turkey, while
the expression of opinion in Rome, consequent upon the Bosnian inci-
dent, disclosed how rapidly the Triple Alliance was weakening, so far as
the Italian partner was concerned.

VI. AGADIR — THE THIRD AND LAST TIME

Before Italy stirred, however, there was one more great crisis — the
last before the coming of the general war — in which the two groups of
powers were ranged against each other. After Algeciras, Moroccan
affairs had gone from bad to worse; anarchy had spread and extended.
This anarchy had brought French troops to preserve the lives and
properties of Frenchmen in Casablanca and along the Algerian frontier.
In 1909 there had been a separate treaty between France and Germany,
which was accepted for the moment as eliminating the question of Mo-
rocco. But there had been subsequent delay on the French part in
carrying out terms, that Germany had insisted upon, for joint commer-
cial activity in German Kamerun and French Congo.

In 1911, accordingly, Germany reasserted her liberty; Morocco, as
Prince Biilow had said after Algeciras, was a bell which Germany could
strike whenever she desired to call anything to French attention. In
1911 French troops had gone to Fez, called there by the revolt of the
Moroccans. The expedition may or may not have been necessary.
The stay of the French troops may have been prolonged. These were
but incidents. The fact was that Morocco was no longer capable of

30 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

saving itself, the integrity proclaimed by the Kaiser at Tangier and re-
asserted at Algeciras had become an empty fiction.

In this situation and recognizing that French possession of Morocco
was now become inevitable and that "Tunisification" would shortly
close the Shereefian Empire to German desires unless Germany acted,
the Kaiser suddenly sent the notorious Panther to Agadir, thus
serving notice upon France and upon Europe that he purposed to share
in the division of the Moroccan estate. At the same moment Berlin
journals were filled with the promise of "West Marokko deutsch" and
colored maps appeared assigning to the Kaiser the Moroccan provinces
from the mouth of the Sebu to the Wady Dra.

Once more a European war seemed inevitable. Conversations
between French and German ministers made no progress. The " sword-
rattling" at Berlin was ominous. Presently the fact began to leak out
that Germany was demanding from France "compensation" for French
possession in Morocco, compensation amounting to most if not all of
French colonial estates in Central Africa. Meantime British influence
and British official actions tended more and more to take the form of
solid support of France.

The situation was made the graver because suddenly a new spirit
manifested itself in France. The Caillaux Ministry had given evidence
of bowing before Germany, as the earlier ministry had sacrificed Del-
casse in 1905. But now the French people suddenly spoke. There was
a swift and unmistakable reassertion of the old spirit of France, a firm
determination to make no further surrender, even though the alternative
should be war. Caillaux fell. A ministry made up of all the greater men
of France, headed by Raymond Poincare and containing Delcasse, came
into power. France in 191 1 had marched far from the days of 1905.

Then in London, Lloyd George, speaking for the Liberal Govern-
ment at a public banquet, uttered words that could not be mistaken,
and were not. He gave the assurance to the world that the Liberal and
Radical Government controlling British destinies did not purpose to
permit British interests to be sacrificed or to allow Britain to be ignored.
The words were of little consequence, the effect of the words was amaz-

FROM TANGIER TO ARMAGEDDON 31

ing. After a slight pause Germany changed her course, the Moroccan
dispute was settled by the mutual cessions of territory in Central Africa
by France and Germany. By the exchange France lost a hundred thou-
sand square miles of Congo territory, but she acquired title to Morocco
and placed her title beyond the reach of further German dispute.

VII. A GERMAN DISASTER

Agadir was, then, a defeat for Germany that approximated a disaster.
Here was no superficial success as at Tangier, here was no temporary
accession of prestige as after Bosnia. Germany had laid claim to a
share in Morocco, having in 1905 bestowed her protection upon the
Sultan. Her people had come to believe that there was in Morocco
a chance for German colonial development and a new "place in the sun."
But German power had yielded to British threat and French firmness
all that had been won at Algeciras, so far as Morocco was concerned,
and all that had been acquired in prestige through the Bosnian episode.
Germany had now acquired a few thousand square miles of Congo
swamps; France, " decadent" France, had annexed an empire, and her
possession had been insured by British interference. Agadir was to the
Germans as complete a disaster and national humiliation as Tangier
had been to the French.

To the Kaiser was ascribed the surrender to Britain. Never in his
reign had he known such unpopular hours, and even his son joined the
ranks of his critics. There persists a legend that, at the critical mo-
ment, he summoned the financiers of Germany and asked if they were
ready. Their negative response inclined his decision to peace, so the
story runs. But if this be only legend, there is solid fact enough to show
that his whole nation blamed him for his course. Looking to the future
it was plain that never again could William II safely run the risk of
thwarting the will of his countrymen, even to preserve European peace,
and the aftermath of Agadir was in many minds, when the crisis of late
July, 1914, placed in William's hands the destinies of Europe.

After Agadir the real hope of European peace vanished; Germany
turned feverishly to prepare. France presently returned to the three-

32 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

year law, to meet new German levies, and Germany responded with a
levee en masse, not to raise recruits but to raise money to meet the
needs of a war chest. Neither in France nor Russia was the future
misread. After Tangier many Frenchmen and some Russians may still
have preserved the hope of avoiding war. After Agadir there was no
hope. Only Britain again misread the truth and lapsed back into her
domestic quarrels, having by her brief intervention brought humiliation
to the proudest sovereign and disappointment to the most ambitious
people on the surface of the earth.

For Berlin, for Petrograd, for Paris, the question now became—
"When?" Men looked to the future wonderingly, conscious that a
storm was soon to break, and seeking to discover in the passing clouds
some sure sign of the approach of the whirlwind. Read the French
Yellow Book, published after the war began, and this state of mind is
disclosed beyond all cavil — disclosed as the state of mind of those
directing the fortunes of France, of Russia, and of Germany. So fixed
was this belief that when the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia was uttered
in July, 1914, men of all three nations simply said: "So it has come
at last!"

The Agadir crisis was followed promptly by the Italian attack upon
Turkey. Italy had found, in German activity on the west coast of
Morocco, a hint that there might be a subsequent voyage of the Pan-
ther to the Tripolitan coast. She had found, in the German demand
for "compensation" from France for French expansion in Morocco, a
warrant for demanding a compensation to match Austrian annexation of
Bosnia. She had found in the disorder created by the Young Turk
regime, in the disarray of Turkish military force, that opportunity to
which she had long looked forward. Finally, her consent to French and
British bargains in the Mediterranean had been purchased by their assent
to her own plan.

But the attack upon Turkey was an attack upon a nation which
in Berlin was looked upon as an ally. Austrian sensibilities were in-
stantly provoked by Italian naval operations in the Adriatic and, in
fact, Italy was charged in Vienna and Berlin with being faithless

FROM TANGIER TO ARMAGEDDON 33

to her allies and having attacked the solidarity of the alliance of the
Central Powers, to which, in fact, if not in theory, Turkey adhered.
Bernhardi could write in this very year that Germany ought to have
attacked Italy, when Italy assailed the Turk and the complete collapse
of the Triple Alliance was foreshadowed. Here was a new blow to the
edifice of German influence.

After the Tripolitan War had dragged on for many more months
without bringing much of glory to Italian arms, although Italian troops
slowly occupied the towns of the African coast, Turkey suddenly surrend-
ered, and the Treaty of Lausanne gave Tripoli to Italy. Turkish surrender
was due to the coming of a new storm, which was in its turn to add still
more to the anxiety of Austro-German statesmen, and a new peril to
Austro-German — and above all to German — policy.

VIII. THE FIRST BALKAN WAR

Turkish difficulties and defeats had now raised other hopes. The
Balkan States, long looking forward to the liberation of their Christian
brothers beyond their own frontiers and properly alarmed by the
programme of the Young Turks, seized the moment to unite in an alli-
ance against a common foe. To the amazement of Europe, the Greek
and the Bulgar put aside a hatred of a thousand years, the Bulgar and
the Serb compromised their Macedonian rivalries, and all three turned to
attack the Osmanli.

Until the discord between the two great groups of powers had par-
alyzed Europe, such an alliance would have been powerless before the
mandate of the Concert of Europe. But there was no concert, and
neither group cared to invite the hostility of this new alliance, so closely
balanced were the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. One group,
influenced by Russia, who had helped to form the Balkan Alliance,
hoped for its success; the other, stirred by their own ambitions in the
Balkans, hoped and expected Turkish victory.

But the Turk was swiftly and decisively beaten. The Bulgars de-
feated the main Turkish army at Lule Burgas, invested Adrianople, and
reached the base of the peninsula on which Constantinople stands.

34 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

The Serb avenged Kosovo at Kumanova, took Uskup, completed his
victory before Monastir, and flowed down the Vardar Valley toward
Saloniki, upon which Greek and Bulgarian troops were converging. Even
Greece, wiping out the disgrace of the earlier Turkish War, defeated the
Turkish armies before her and seized Saloniki, the prize of the Near
East, and at the same time sent her troops into Albania and conquered all
northern Epirus, investing Janinaas the Bulgars had invested Adrianople.
Here then was an end of Turkish empire in Europe. The real con-
test was over in as brief a time as that in which Germany had van-
quished France in 1 870. The prize had been won and the only question
was the division of it. Now at last Europe interfered. Repulsed at
the Chatalja, the outward lines of Constantinople, the Bulgar was served
with notice that he would not be permitted to hold the city, even if he
took it. Then Serb, Bulgar, and Greek were bidden to come to London
and put their case before the Concert of Europe at last reestablished. To
this conference the small States came, and it was to prove their ruin.
Only Greece refused to discontinue her military operations, while Bul-
garia declined to permit the revictualing of Adrianople.

IX. THE CONFERENCE OF LONDON

At this conference the aims of the Central Powers were at last
disclosed. The Balkan Alliance had been a blow to their whole purpose.
If it lasted it would bar the way to Austro-German expansion toward
the East ; it would erect a strong Serbia on the flank of Austria, a Serbia
responsive to Russian influence and ambitious to reclaim the millions
of southern Slavs remaining under Hapsburg rule. Italy looked with
frank disapprobation upon Greek progress northward to Avlona and
the Skumbi, and Italy and Austria agreed in opposing Slav expansion
southward from the Montenegrin boundary to the new Greek frontier.

Wherefore Austria served notice that there must be a free Albania.
On the surface the claim was fair. Albanians inhabited all the region
from the environs of Janina to Scutari, and there was patent desire on the
part of the Albanians to be free, not to be the subjects of a Greek or Slavic
sovereign. But the true Austrian purpose had no concern with the

FROM TANGIER TO ARMAGEDDON 35

wishes of the Albanians. Her desire was to break up the Balkan League.
If Serbia were denied the right to reach the sea, through northern
Albania, then it was inevitable that Serbia would seek compensation in
the Vardar Valley. Such compensation would be at the expense of
Bulgaria, for although Bulgaria and Serbia had signed a treaty parti-
tioning Macedonia before they went to war, Serbia and not Bulgaria
had conquered and held all of Macedonia and could remunerate herself
as she saw fit.

The comedy of Albania long occupied the representatives of the
Great Powers of Europe. Germany cleverly made Sir Edward Grey
the "honest broker" of the conference and used his ignorance of the
Near Eastern situation to destroy the Balkan League. He was permit-
ted to accommodate the differences between Austria and Russia over the
future boundaries between the Serb and the Albanian. There were mut-
ual concessions made with great show of good will, although it was of more
than passing consequence that the peace of Europe hung on the disposi-
tion of Ipek and Jakova, wretched Albanian villages unknown to most
of the millions who would have been called to arms had the Conference
of London ended in war.

Without regard to the mandate of Europe, Bulgaria burst impetu-
ously from the conference and returned to her work, which was the cap-
ture of Adrianople. This done, she bowed to the decision of London
and agreed to accept the frontier drawn from Midia to the Gulf of Enos,
while Greece consented to give up northern Epirus, and Serbia and Mon-
tenegro resigned Scutari and Durazzo. But now it was necessary to
settle the division of conquered territory between the three victors.
Serbia and Greece had agreed. But deprived of northern Albania,
through Sir Edward Grey's Albanian operation, Serbia insisted that she
be permitted to hold Macedonia west of the Vardar, while Greece insist-
ed upon keeping Saloniki, although agreeing to surrender Kavala and
northern Epirus.

X. THE SECOND BALKAN WAR

Bulgaria, driven by Austrian influence, declined all compromise,
insisted that she should have all that her treaty with Serbia had assured

36 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

her, and maintained troops in Saloniki as a sign of her determination
to possess this city also. To all appeals of Russia she remained deaf.
To all dictates of caution imposed by the alliance of Serbia and Greece
she turned a deaf ear. Even Roumanian warnings, combined with the
demand for "compensation" about Silistria, left her obdurate. Her
heart was set upon Macedonia and she refused to barter.

Finally in the closing days of June, 1913, a great Bulgarian army in
Macedonia attacked the Serbs, standing behind the Bregalnitza, won a
temporary advantage, but was presently forced to retreat, while a
Greek advance from Saloniki and a Hellenic success at Kilkis compelled
the rapid retirement of the Bulgars from all Macedonia. A Roumanian
army now entered northern Bulgaria, while the Turk reoccupied
Thrace and regained Adrianople. Bulgaria's ruin was complete.
She had heeded Austrian advice and Austria shared in her misfortune.
Austrian purpose to destroy the Balkan League had prevailed, thanks
to Sir Edward Grey, but it had raised up a dangerous Serbia, it had
enhanced not weakened Russian influence in the Balkans, and it had
shaken the ties that had bound the Roumanian to the Austrian for a gen-
eration. The Roumanian troops which had invaded Bulgaria had open-
ly proclaimed that they were following through Bulgaria the road which
led to Transylvania and Bukowina.

The Treaty of Bukharest confirmed the Bulgarian defeat. Serbia
acquired all of Macedonia and emerged from her trials a state equal in
area and importance to that Sardinia which had with French help driven
the Austrian out of Italy. Greece acquired all of the coast from her an-
cient frontier to the Mesta, including both Kavala and Saloniki. Rou-
mania took a province from Bulgaria, and the Turk made good his claim to
his Thracian districts. After two bloody wars and terrible sacrifices, Bul-
garia was able to show only a small strip of land between the Rhodopians
and the .ZEgean ; Macedonia was lost, and the dream of the hegemony of
the Balkans had gone temporarily to dust and ashes.

But the worst aspect of the Balkan settlement was the menace that
it carried to European peace, through the inevitable rivalries of Austria
and Serbia. Ever since the change of dynasties had given Petrograd

FROM TANGIER TO ARMAGEDDON 37

and not Vienna control at Belgrad, the relations between Serbia and
Austria had been bad. Time and again Austria had bullied and mis-
treated her small neighbour. The annexation of Bosnia had been as
heavy a blow to the Serb as the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Ger-
many had been to the Frenchman. By refusing to permit Serbia to
gain a window on the sea, Austria had renewed all Serbian resentment.

XI. BUKHAREST AND AFTER

Now, from Bukharest, Serbia emerged a considerable state; in the
eyes of her own soldiers and citizens she was a real military power
and the easy victories of her armies over Turk and Bulgar were taken
as a promise of future success over the Austrian. Beyond the Drina
and the Save were four million Serbs and two million Croats, toward
whom Serbians now looked as the Italians of the Sardinian Kingdom had
looked toward their brethren of the Milanese and the Kingdom of
Naples. Nor was there any mistaking the similar stirring of race
sympathy within the Hapsburg domains.

Worst of all, it was plain that Russia would henceforth regard
Serbia as a ward, and never, unless under threat of war, permit Austria
to strike the little Slav state. The growth and glory of a free Serbia
might shake the very foundations of the Hapsburg empire with its millions
of Slavs, uneasily bearing the German and Magyar yokes, but backed
by Russia, Serbia was bound to endure as a menace to Austria as far
as Austrian statesmen could see. Austria had challenged Russia in the
Bosnia time; Russia had temporarily bowed, but the real answer came
when Russia appeared at London, after the First Balkan War, to sup-
port the claims of the Serbs, and after Bukharest gave her protection
to the new and strong Serbia, which not alone closed the Hapsburg
pathway to the ^Egean, but dreamed of extending the renaissance of the
southern Slav to Fiume and to Triest, depriving German and Magyar
alike of a window on the sea, from which they had excluded the Serb.

The Treaty of Bukharest placed Austria-Hungary in jeopardy.
It had hardly been promulgated when Austria sought the permission
of her Italian ally to attack Serbia. Italy, as Giolitti later confessed,

38 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

declined. But the Austrian suggestion leaves no doubt as to the Aus-
trian purpose. The blow that was suspended in 1913 was to fall in 1914;
it could no longer be permanently prevented, after Serbia had made
good her place in the sun and Austrian diplomacy had proven bankrupt
in the Balkan wars.

Unhappily the question between Austria and Russia over Serbia
could no longer be regarded as one concerning them alone. Tangier,
Agadir, and the intervening Bosnian episode had transformed Europe
into two camps. A dispute between two nations, each belonging to
a different group, became instantly the cause for difference between
the two groups. Germany had twice challenged France and Britain,
and her challenge had contributed to binding them still more closely
together. The Anglo-French friendship had expanded to include Rus-
sia, the ally of France. And this relation between Russia, France, and
Britain had barred the road to German colonial expansion at Tangier
and Agadir, it had endeavoured to thwart Austrian purpose in the Balkans
in the Bosnian time, and it had, in fact, appeared as a potential force at
the Conference at London, if it had never been forced to declare its
solidarity, because no test question was pressed to an issue.

Such, in sum, was the transformation that Europe had undergone in
less than ten years. Such had been the inexorable consequences of
the Kaiser's determination to challenge British sea power and his sub-
sequent determination to prevent Britain from drawing close to Russia
and to France. Britain had met his challenge on the water. She
had drawn close to France and to Russia until a war was to show that
she stood with them absolutely. The play of ten years had all turned
against the German. His influence in Europe had been undermined ;
the safety of his Austrian partner had been compromised; the loyalty
of his Italian ally had been weakened and, as it turned out, destroyed;
and all this had happened to a Germany, every year growing stronger
in all that makes a nation strong and possessing an army unequalled in
Europe, unexcelled in history. In the minds of every German the
shadow of Britain had crossed the path of rightful Teutonic expansion,
and a Germany that felt she could win her rightful place in the sun by

FROM TANGIER TO ARMAGEDDON 39

the sword felt also that, in the preceding ten years, she had not only
failed to win it, but had actually lost it by reliance upon peaceful methods.
This was the Germany that spoke in July, 1914, less than a year
later. The Treaty of Bukharest, in restoring peace in the Balkans, had
doomed the peace of the world.

CHAPTER THREE

THE TWELVE DAYS

THE ASSASSINATION OF THE ARCHDUKE

The Treaty of Bukharest was signed on August 10, 1913. Such reser-
vations as to its provisions as may have been cherished in Petro-
grad, Vienna, and Rome, were abolished when the Kaiser — by a gesture,
memorable thereafter — conveyed to his brother-in-law, the King of
Greece, his recognition that the terms of this settlement were definitive.
And for ten months Europe settled back after two years of the acutest
apprehension. On the surface all was calm, although the subsequent
admissions of Giolitti have informed us that the ink was not dry on the
document of Bukharest when Vienna began to sound Rome on the
possibility of an attack upon Serbia. Rome was unresponsive and this
bad moment passed.

But on June 28, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his
morganatic wife were assassinated in the streets of Serajevo, the capital
of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The crime was committed by a man of Ser-
bian race, but a resident of Bosnia and a subject of the Emperor Francis
Joseph. The deed was an abhorrent one and if no evidence that the
world has yet been able to submit to any impartial jury has fixed upon
the Serbian Crown or the Serbian Government any complicity in the
murder, still the crime itself was manifestly the outgrowth of the
agitation of the Pan-Serbs, who aimed at extending the domain of
King Peter from the Drina to the Adriatic and from Cattaro to Fiume.
It was a logical and unmistakable consequence of the Serbian propaganda
for racial unity, which had been permitted in Belgrad and not unkindly
observed from Petrograd.

There were some days when Europe waited in the keenest anxiety

for a sign from Vienna. But no sign appeared and slowly, yet in the

BACKGROUND OF THE
WAR IN PICTURES

KAISER GREETS KAISER

Germany and Austria, the two faithful members of the Triple Alliance, salute each
other in the persons of their sovereigns, Wilhelm and Franz Joseph.

THE TWO KAISERS

DROPPING THE PILOT

GROWTH OF THE ENTENTE

THE CRIME OF SERAJEVO

DROPPING THE PILOT— TENNIEL'S FAMOUS CARTOON

A clash was inevitable between two such masterful natures as those of
William II and Bismarck. The ideas of the old man had been principally
confined to building and buttressing the strength, first of Prussia, then of
Germany, within her own borders. The young man, of broader vision,
looked beyond the seas and sought in other lands for Germany's place in
the sun. Bismarck was retired in 1890, two years after William's accession

TWO STAUNCH FRIENDS AND PROMOTERS OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE

President Fallieres of France, and King Edward VII of England — father of the present King and uncle
of the Kaiser. "More than any man of his time Edward VII feared the German danger and more than
any man he contributed to resolving the difficulties between France and his own country. Many Germans
believed he conceived a plan to build a circle of steel about Germany"

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CZAR NICHOLAS AND PRESIDENT POINCARE

This picture is evidence of a political friendship warmly cherished between the Powers to the east and west of
Germany. Even while the diplomatic interchanges of the Twelve Days (in August, 1914) were in progress, President
Poincare of France was returning from a visit to the Russian Czar.

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THE KAISER WITH A FORMER FRIEND— ALBERT OF BELGIUM

£The Kaiser in former years took such delight in visiting other monarchs that he was sometimes criticized at home
as a gad-about and received the nickname of Der Reise Kaiser — the traveling Kaiser. He has justified his wanderings
in the following terms. "On my travels I design not only to make myself acquainted with foreign countries and in-
stitutions, and to foster friendly relations with neighboring rulers, but these journeys, which have often been misin-
terpreted, have high value in enabling me to observe home affairs from a distance and submit them to a quiet examina-
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Photograph by International News Service

ARCHDUKE FRANCIS FERDINAND (HEIR TO THE AUSTRIAN THRONE)—

WITH HIS MORGANATIC WIFE
Both were killed by an assassin's bomb at Sarajevo, Bosnia, June 28, 1914

THE ARREST OF THE ASSASSIN

Austria asserted that his act was inspired by the Pan-Slavic propaganda in Serbia and declared war. Russia stood
behind Serbia- Germany stood behind Austria. Then came Armageddon.

THE TWELVE DAYS 49

end completely, the crime slipped from the headlines of the newspapers
and the minds of the public. On the surface, European politics seemed
in the most tranquil state in the long and troubled decade that had
passed. A British fleet visited Kiel; the French President set out for
Petrograd; there was not a ripple on the surface of the diplomatic
waters. This was, however, only the calm before the storm. On July
23d Austria sent to Serbia the most formidable ultimatum that one
state had ever addressed to another.

The ultimatum itself — in addition to prescribing rules and regulations
with reference to anti-Austrian propaganda and propagandists in Ser-
bia ; in addition to calling for the disbanding of patriotic societies with
aims inimical to Austria and the punishment of their leaders, who were
also servants of the Crown in the army and in the civil service — demanded
that Austrian officials should be associated with the Serbian in the car-
rying out of the tasks that were set. To this ultimatum there was added
a time-limit of forty-eight hours.

Here, then, on July 23d, was a new crisis, graver than the three
that had preceded, because, instead of abstract questions of territory
and commerce, there were now raised the concrete questions of national
honour and dynastic interest which were involved in the crime of Serajevo.
Ostensibly seeking to punish agitators, whose activities had led to the
killing of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian thrones ; ostensibly aiming to
put an end to an agitation injurious to Austrian safety, the Government
of Vienna had, in fact, challenged Russia, the avowed protector of Serbia.

If Russia did not now step forward to defend Serbia it was plain
that the kingdom would fall under the weight of Austrian arms, or if it
bowed to Austrian demands would pass actually, if not nominally, under
the influence of Vienna. If Russia stood aside and permitted this to hap-
pen, then her own prestige in the Balkans and among the Slav peoples
of Europe was gone. It was Bosnia over again, but Bosnia with a
new and still-more-disturbing set of complexities, for in annexing Bosnia
Austria had only transformed the name under which she exercised
authority in Bosnia, but now she would transform the actual condition
under which Serbia lived from independence to servitude.

50 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

And if Russia did step forward to protect Serbia, then she, by this
act, asserted that she claimed the right to exercise an actual protec-
tion over Serbia ; she claimed the right to speak for Serbia ; she extended
Russian influence and Russian power to the very shores of the Danube,
and from Belgrad, as from the Galician frontier, threatened the integ-
rity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. If Austrian will prevailed,
Serbia would become a Hapsburg appendage, but not less clear, once
the issue was raised, was the fact that if Russia intervened and prevailed,
Austrian safety was compromised and her prestige destroyed.

II. THE AUSTRIAN CASE

Stripped of all detail the fact was that Serbia, if not through direct
governmental action at least by general popular agitation and with
the benevolent blindness of the government, had plotted to undermine
Austrian unity. To be sure the movement had its origin in the fact that
Austria contained some million of Slavs, who were Serb by race, and
perhaps desired to become subjects of King Peter. It was a situation
on all fours with that which existed in Italy, before the Austrian
war with France. But, whatever the moral title of a nation to its own
territories and subjects, no nation can permit itself to be destroyed by
outside intrigue and no nation will voluntarily surrender provinces and
citizens.

When France undertook to assist in the liberation of northern Italy
from Hapsburg rule, war resulted, as it was bound to result. If Russia
now asserted on behalf of Serbia the same doctrine that Napoleon III
had practised with regard to Sardinia, Austria would have to fight. The
only difference was that Austria now raised the issue herself. She did
not raise the issue until the heir to the Hapsburg throne had been
murdered, although she had proposed to raise it ten months before the
crime ; but, having raised it, her own safety, her own integrity, her own
existence as a Great Power were at staKe.

And if one look squarely at the facts, there is little question that she
was bound to raise the issue, because this Pan-Slav agitation was
destroying the very foundations of her national existence. The right

THE TWELVE DAYS 51

of ten million Germans and as many Magyars to rule twenty-five million
Slavs may be questioned on the moral side, but the legal and inter-
national right of a nation to preserve itself cannot be questioned, save
on the basis of some law higher than that recognized by nations in their
common intercourse.

Austrian treatment of the Slavs within her boundaries, and her
treatment of the neighbouring Slav states, had been brutal and stupid.
She had gained their hatred and she had deserved it. She had sought
in the Balkan wars to thwart their growth and her policy had gone
bankrupt. But if her mistakes had gained her deserved hatred, and
her failures had enabled the very state that hated her most to menace
her existence, it was not less true that she was bound to defend her
existence and her unity.

In the minds of many, Serbia has come to share the glory of Belgium
and to occupy the niche of a martyr quite as completely. But the
idea is fallacious. Belgium threatened no one, plotted injury to no
one of her neighbours, permitted no propaganda of sedition which
menaced the security and order of either France or Germany, for example,
to be conducted from within her boundaries. Serbia did all these things.
She did them as Sardinia carried on the risorgimento; she did them
in the name and in the fact of patriotism; she sought to liberate and
unite the mass of her race, but this liberation was predicated on the
collapse of Austria.

If there had been no crime at Serajevo, it was inevitable that Austria
would presently take the sword against Serbia, because only by taking
the sword could she defend herself. But it was equally inevitable
that Russia, bound by race and religion to the Serbs, animated as she
had always been by the keenest race sympathy for her fellow Slavs,
would defend Serbia, who had become her soldier on the Danube, her
ally against Austria's dreams of an advance to the ^Egean. Actually
Serbia was only a detail in the rivalry between Romanoff and Hapsburg,
which was several centuries old.

Bismarck himself had hesitated in making an alliance with Austria,
because he foresaw that this meant to inherit the rival ry between the

52 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

two nations in the Balkans. His influence at Vienna had sufficed to
keep peace, but his support of Austria at the Congress of Berlin had
made a Franco-Russian alliance inevitable. For the moment, for his
own time, he had met this by expanding his alliance to include Italy,
by keeping on friendly terms with Britain, and by executing a "treaty
of reassurance" with Russia. But it had needed the skill of Bismarck
to keep the balance true and the successors of Bismarck had neither his
skill nor his resources. Italy and Austria were natural enemies and
he had made them allies, Russia and Austria were natural rivals and he
had kept them at peace with each other. But less than two decades
after he laid down the reins, natural tendencies had overcome fortuitous
circumstances.

The peril of the Balkan situation was no longer the peril of a war
between Austria and Russia, or between Austria and Germany on the
one hand and France and Russia on the other, with Italy a possible
ally of the Central Powers. The challenge of the Kaiser to Britain
had brought Britain back to the Continent. France herself would have
hesitated in the early nineties to fight on the Serbian issue for her Russian
ally. But the French spirit had undergone a new birth since Tangier
and Agadir.

Since the war came, volumes have been published devoted simply to
proving upon which of the several nations the responsibility for the
conflict rests and to demonstrating that one or the other of the nations,
during the fateful twelve days before the storm broke in its full fury,
actually desired war, or served the cause of peace more loyally, than its
neighbours.

Yet it seems probable that, in the long time hereafter, those details
will be forgotten by the historian, who will perceive that the twelve days
were of little meaning, that they marked a period after real hope of
peace had expired, that the whole system under which Europe had
lived for so long had been destroyed, and that the statesmen who laboured
so frantically in the closing hours were actually as impotent as medicine
men who hurl incantations and invoke charms to check the approach
of a cyclone.

THE TWELVE DAYS 53

III. SIR EDWARD GREY

In the Albanian time Europe had permitted Sir Edward Grey to
act as its agent. He had passed from one group to the other, persuading
Russia to resign Scutari to the new Kingdom of Albania, wheedling
Austria into consenting that Dibra should be Serbian. Austria and Italy
for once were agreed, both seeking to preserve from Serb and Greek alike
that Albania each hoped to inherit. Neither Russia nor Germany was
in a state of readiness for war, and France was, as she continued through
the critical days of 1914, willing to serve the cause of peace to her limit,
provided it did not interfere with her duty as an ally of Russia.

When the Serbian crisis came, Sir Edward Grey — still under the in-
fluence of his success over Albania, still convinced that he had to deal
with a question that could be adjusted as the Albanian had been —
began that earnest and industrious campaign to preserve the peace of
the world, which remains the admiration of the Briton — and the target
of the German. From first to last he had, in this campaign, the sup-
port of the French and the Italian statesmen; he had the assent of
Russia to all the propositions which he made ; but never, to the closing
hour, does he seem to have grasped the fact that he was in the presence
of a question which could not be settled by discussion about the
green table, since it involved the safety of Austria and the honour of
Russia.

The whole burden of Sir Edward Grey's words, messages, explana-
tions, discloses his conviction that to preserve the peace of Europe it
was necessary to persuade Austria to withdraw her ultimatum, to sus-
pend her action against Serbia, to consent to submit to the Concert
of Europe the question between Serbia and herself, which was the
question of her own integrity aggravated by the new problem raised
by the murder of the Archduke.

In the very nature of things Russia was prepared to consent to any
arrangement that spared Serbia, but any arrangement that spared
Serbia and submitted the Austro-Serbian question to the Concert of
Europe vindicated Russia's assertion of a right to protect Serbia and

54 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

was bound to constitute a moral victory for Russia and a new blow to
Austrian safety. Nor could Austria, remembering the experience of
Germany at Algeciras, anticipate a victory in any new international
gathering.

To Germany Sir Edward Grey continued to address appeals to
intervene to restrain Austrian action. Conceivably it had been Ger-
many who had moved Austria to action, to the despatch of the ulti-
matum, but of this there is as yet no sufficing proof. Unmistakably it lay
within the power of the German Government by a word, by a gesture,
to deprive Austria of the assurance German support gave. But this
would have been in fact a desertion of her one faithful ally at the
moment of deadly peril, and it would have foreshadowed the collapse
of the Austro-German Alliance, if it had not been but the prelude to the
collapse of the Dual Monarchy, already shaken by Slav intrigue within
and without.

Unless Russia abandoned her championship of Serbia, or Austria
consented to recall her ultimatum and leave to Europe the task of
disciplining her little neighbour — a task beyond the capacity of the fragile
Concert — war was bound to follow. And there never was any chance
that either Austria or Russia would surrender. When Sir Edward
Grey asked Germany to restrain Austria, Germany with perfect justice
retorted by asking Sir Edward Grey to restrain Russia. Always the
British Minister seems to have been obsessed with the immediate
present, always the action of Austria in issuing the ultimatum seems
to arouse his indignation and awaken his protest, but to the fatal
chain of events that had made Serbia a deadly peril to Austrian existence
he gave no thought.

Actually he accomplished nothing for good or for evil, actually he
sought peace by suggesting temporary devices that were of no value
and could be of no avail in the presence of the storm that was rising.
When the storm broke he found himself without a policy, so far as his
own Government was concerned, but bound by honour, if not by treaty,
to stand with France and with Russia. Nor was he alone bound by
honour. He had failed beyond all forgiveness, together with his as-

LORD ROBERTS OF KANDAHAR

As the last German attacks before Ypres were failing, there died within the British lines the one British
soldier who had foreseen what was now happening, whose words had been greeted with sneers, whose voice
had been almost silenced by the cheap and empty optimism of Liberal and Radical politicians. An old
and broken man he had gone to France at the moment of the crisis, to cheer on his well-loved Indian troops.
Lord Roberts died on the eve of a great victory which saved his own country from the worst he had feared
for it

THE TWELVE DAYS 57

sociates, in not warning the British people of the danger that had for ten
years been growing, but he now saw with utmost clarity that a Germany
victorious over France would be a Germany which Britain could not
resist and could not expect would refrain from attack.

German invasion of Belgium saved Sir Edward Grey, it saved Eng-
land, because it supplied a moral issue and a moral impulse which served
to enlist British effort until the nation at last perceived the material
interests, the national existence, that were at stake. But if the successor
of Bismarck will hereafter have to answer to his own people and in history
for having involved Germany in a war against three great nations at
once, the successor of Pitt and Beaconsfield will be indicted for having
brought Britain to the edge of Armageddon without permitting the Brit-
ish people to suspect that their life and their Empire were in jeopardy.

Having entered into an arrangement with France, by which the
French fleet was to guard British interests in the Mediterranean while
the British fleet concentrated against the German menace in the North
Sea, Sir Edward Grey could not desert France at the opening of the war,
even if there were no written alliance. But if the British people had not
been aroused by the invasion of Belgium it may be questioned whether
Sir Edward Grey could have persuaded his Government to make good
its obligations or his fellow countrymen to honour their Government's
commitments.

It is difficult to find any warrant in Sir Edward's course for the storm
of abuse that Germans have directed at him as a monster of bad faith,
but equally difficult is the task for one, writing with such facts as are
now at hand, to escape the belief that he acted with a blindness and a
fatuity almost passing human comprehension. His party associates
had kept Britain blind to the truth of world affairs for a decade, and
when the storm arrived there was lacking any national understanding
which could give force to the decisions of a Minister, at last aware of
the deadly peril of his country. He knew England must stand with
France to save her own life, but until Germany invaded Belgium, he was
destitute of any resource by which he could reveal to his fellow country-
men the imminence and the magnitude of their peril.

58 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

Those who saw Sir Edward in the closing hours, when the World
War had become inescapable, think of him as one who revealed in every
word and act the emotion of a man who had seen the hope and the work
of a lifetime gone suddenly to dust and ashes. He had believed that a
settlement with Germany, which would lay forever the peril of what was
now to occur, was possible. In the Bosnia time, in the Agadir crisis,
at the Conference of London, he had not only striven to avoid war, but
had found cause for hope that, since war had been avoided on these
three occasions, the cloud that had hung over Europe so long might be
finally dissipated.

His optimism had led him far afield. It had persuaded him to sacri-
fice the Balkan Alliance at the Conference of London, when he accepted
the Austro-German programme for Albania. It was to cost his own
country dearly in the first years of the war, which found her unprepared,
because a Liberal Government, under Sir Edward's influence, had turned
a deaf ear to all the warnings of those who saw Europe as it was and
not through the golden haze of lofty but insubstantial dreams of world
peace. Yet complete as had been his failure, absolute as had been his
misreading of the essential facts of his own time, when he occupied a
post of honour and responsibility, no one could doubt the sincerity of his
purposes or the tragedy, the personal tragedy, that came with the de-
struction of all his lifework.

IV. THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM

The Austrian ultimatum was despatched to Serbia on July 23d, and
it carried a time-limit of forty-eight hours. When it was sent, the
President of France, with the important members of the French Cabinet,
were on the sea, returning from Russia. The Irish crisis in Britain
seemed to be about to end in civil war. The Kaiser was in Norwegian
waters. There was no Russian ambassador in Vienna. The Caillaux
trial was dominating French attention and a French senator, speaking
in his place, had just called attention to grave defects in French military
organization.

In only one detail — but this a vitally important one — did chance

THE TWELVE DAYS 59

favour the Triple Entente. The British fleet had been mobilized for its
annual manoeuvres shortly before the crisis came and, on a hint from
Italy, received in the third week of July, demobilization was post-
poned. Thus British sea power was on a war footing at the crucial
moment. If Germany had ever planned a raid on British shores in the
first days of an Anglo-German conflict, as British naval authorities
believe — such a dash as the Japanese made at Port Arthur in the opening
hours of the Russo-Japanese War — the scheme was frustrated by the
accidental posture of British fleets and the timely Italian hint.

On Friday, July 24th, Austria informed Russia that she did not
have any intention to annex Serbian territory, and Russia replied by
asking an extension of the time-limit attached to the ultimatum to Serbia.
This was refused by Austria on Saturday, the day on which Russia issued
her first warning note, published in the Petrograd press, an official
assurance that Russia would not remain indifferent to the fate of Serbia,
which, through its Crown Prince, now acting as Regent, had appealed
to the Czar on the preceding day.

On this same day, Saturday, July 25th, just within the time-limit,
Serbia sent a reply to Austria, which contained a- surrender on most
points and an agreement to submit the rest to arbitration. Austria
forthwith declared the Serbian response to be unsatisfactory and with-
drew her minister from Belgrad.

On Sunday, July 26th, Sir Edward Grey began his task of accom-
modating the world crisis. He suggested that the case between Russia
and Austria be left to the mediation of the four Great Powers not di-
rectly concerned, acting through their ambassadors in Vienna and
Petrograd. These nations were, of course, Great Britain, France, Italy,
and Germany. Russia, having first suggested conversations directly be-
tween Vienna and Petrograd, a suggestion subsequently rejected by Aus-
tria, accepted Sir Edward's proposal but Germany rejected it on the
next day.

On Monday, July 27th, when Germany had rejected his proposal,
Sir Edward invited the German Government to present a formula of
mediation of its own. This elicited no response from Berlin, because

60 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

Germany had already on July 25th invited France and Great Britain to
restrain Russia, that is, to urge Russia to stand aside and permit Aus-
tria to punish Serbia. This proposal, described by the Germans as
"localization" of the disturbance, was rejected both by France and by
Great Britain.

A collapse of all preliminary efforts of Sir Edward follows the decla-
ration of war upon Serbia, by Austria, on Tuesday, July 28th, as fighting
commenced forthwith. Meantime the Kaiser, having returned from
Norway on Sunday night, now addressed his first message to the Czar
urging him to permit Austria to discipline Serbia. To this the Czar
responded the next day by urging that the whole matter be submitted
to The Hague, a suggestion never answered by the Kaiser.

Meantime the question of mobilization had become acute. Aus-
tria had been partially mobilizing against Serbia, and as early as July
25th the Russian Council had considered partial mobilization against
Austria, at the same time informing the German Government that
there was no hostile meaning for Germany in the approaching mobili-
zation.

Now on the 29th, Germany for the first time began to sound Great
Britain on the possibility of British neutrality if war should come.
Her proposals were promptly rejected by Sir Edward Grey.

By Friday, July 3Oth, general Russian mobilization was proclaimed,
but at the eleventh hour Sir Edward Grey suggested that the operations
of Austria against Serbia should be recognized as a punitive expedition
and that Austria, having reached a point within Serbian territory fixed
by agreement, should permit her future course to be submitted to a con-
ference of Powers. Austria assented to a portion of this suggestion and
for the first time manifested a decided change in spirit. Russia agreed.

But on July 3ist Germany addressed an ultimatum to Russia de-
manding that Russia desist from her mobilization within twelve hours.
This was naturally ignored by Russia and on Saturday, August ist, Ger-
many declared war upon Russia. A general war now became inevitable
and the only question that remained was as to the course of Britain and
Italy.

THE TWELVE DAYS 61

v. GERMANY'S COURSE

In all this period it is quite clear that the British and German states-
men, alike, pursued a course aimed, ostensibly and probably honestly,
at averting a general war. But Germany insisted that the war could
only be averted by action of Britain and France in restraining Russia
from intervening in the quarrel between Serbia and Austria, while
Britain insisted that Austria should be compelled, by her German ally,
to submit her dispute with Serbia to a European conference and asked
Germany to restrain Austria.

Such purposes were irreconcilable from the start and failed as they
were bound to fail unless one of the two great nations involved was
prepared to yield everything, as France had yielded at Tangier, and
Russia in the Bosnia time. Action by the German Emperor, in the
sense requested by Sir Edward Grey, would have brought down upon
him far more criticism at home than had beaten upon him in the Agadir
time. Peace was no longer to be preserved by a compromise between
the two groups of nations; the sole chance of avoiding war from July
23d onward was by the surrender of one of the groups and this, possible
in 1905 and 1909, was unthinkable in 1914.

Germany's course prior to the outbreak of the war, her relation to
the efforts to preserve peace made by Sir Edward Grey, has suffered
naturally from the odium that justly attaches to the manner in which
she acted, once the conflict had begun, both in invading Belgium and in
the manner in which she conducted operations on Belgian and French
soil, as well as on the high seas. This was inevitable if not entirely logical.
But certainly she was as fully entitled to support Austria as was France
to support Russia. France never considered demanding that Russia
should abandon Serbia, and it was equally unreasonable to expect Ger-
many to compel Austria to refrain from abolishing the Serbian menace,
once Austria had so admirable an issue as the assassination of the Arch-
duke furnished.

The fact that Germany alone was ready when the war came has con-
tributed to creating the conviction that she alone wished it. It is

62 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

unmistakable that for twenty years she had proclaimed her purpose,
through her acts, to modify the status quo; she had challenged Britain
on the sea, she had assailed France through Morocco, and backed Austria
against Russia. Her teachers and soldiers had proclaimed that only
through a victorious war could Germany attain her rightful place in the
sun. This was strange doctrine in the Twentieth Century, but familiar
doctrine in the preceding centuries that had seen the rise of France
and Britain. What is essential is that it be recognized that millions
of Germans held this doctrine. It was a doctrine that Europe
had resisted over years when Napoleon applied it, when Louis XIV
asserted it, when Charles V employed it. Europe was bound to
oppose it now, but in the larger view of history it will doubtless take
its place beside the other efforts of great races to revive the Roman
tradition and use their superior organization and unity to dominate
a continent.

That Germany actually procured the war, in the critical days of
July, is as yet a mere unsupported allegation ; that her whole course since
the present Kaiser came to the throne had made the war inevitable, is
hardly to be mistaken. That the language of her teachers and her
scholars, the words of her Emperor, and the frequent utterances of her
official spokesmen had ended by convincing the statesmen and several of
the peoples of Europe that Germany was seeking world power — thereby
bringing together nations whose unity, once achieved, threatened her
interests, her legitimate interests, perhaps all her hopes and ambitions—
certainly, is manifest.

But in all this the incidents of the days preceding the war
are of minor consequence. We may see and believe that the
war was the inevitable consequence of the new visions and pur-
poses of the German people, but it is difficult not to see and to
believe that the actual occasion of the outbreak was accidental and
that the decision for war rather than surrender had already been
reached, not by one but by all nations before Sir Edward Grey under-
took to perform that task at which Mrs. Partington had failed with
equal honour to herself.

THE TWELVE DAYS 63

VI. BRITAIN AND GERMANY

Something less than a hundred hours separate the German declara-
tion of war upon Russia from the British declaration despatched to
Germany after midnight on August 4th. In this time the real drama
concerns only Britain and Germany, for Italy in due course proclaimed
her neutrality while France affirmed her fidelity to her Russian ally.

In these momentous hours the whole play of German diplomacy was
to keep Britain out of the conflict, for reasons too obvious to need men-
tion. And it should be remarked that not only did Germany have good
reason to believe that she would succeed, but also that she came desper-
ately near to accomplishing her purpose, as will be disclosed when the
history of what took place in London on August 2d at last sees the light
of day.

Sir Edward Grey's role in this period is also plain. He knew that,
not because of Belgium, not because of sympathy for Albert's kingdom or
responsibility for its integrity, not because of unwritten but potent
claims of honour binding Britain to France, must his country enter the
war. Now at last he perceived that it had become a matter of life or death
for his own nation and that a German victory and the destruction of
France would leave Germany an enemy greater than Napoleon had been,
and more menacing than any foe England had known in her long his-
tory. Unmistakably his course was to find the cause on which his na-
tion could enter, just as Germany sought to abolish all causes.

In this situation Sir Edward's position was excessively difficult.
The Cabinet in which he sat was by no means resolved to fight. Some
of its members were frankly opposed to standing with France; others
were, to say the least, doubtful. Strong Liberal newspapers, on which
the majority party relied for support, openly proclaimed that there was
no reason for British participation. The country at large had no inkling
of the actual European situation and, thanks to Liberal-Radical rule
for nearly a decade, had been taught to regard all discussion of the Ger-
man menace as without other warrant than domestic political exigency
might supply. In the critical hour Britain was asleep and Sir Edward's

64 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

associates divided as to their duty and paralyzed by the lack of any
popular emotion which might supply a warrant for Governmental
action.

From this terrible dilemma Germany rescued Sir Edward by her de-
cision to strike at France through Belgium. But no one can read the va-
rious documents without feeling that for him Belgium was a pretext rather
than a policy. The right and the duty of Britain to defend Belgium were
manifest, but it was always as essential to British interest and policy
that France should be saved and only a sacrifice of British safety could
have resulted, if Sir Edward, lacking the Belgian issue, had been unable
to find some other on which he could bring his nation to the point of
war. Nor is it less plain that the moment France was involved in the
war, the commitments of the British Government in the matter of the
fleets bound Britain to stand by the Republic, no matter what course
Germany should take — short of guaranteeing to respect the integrity
of France, her colonies and her coasts, and to refrain from attacking
France.

This was clearly perceived by Lord Lansdowne, who had negotiated
the Anglo-French Convention of 1904 and, on the "black Sunday,"
when British Liberalism stood aghast and shaken before the abyss,
he joined with Mr. Balfour in a letter to Mr. Asquith affirming the belief,
which was the opinion of the whole Tory party, that France could not
be deserted. Conceivably this was the decisive gesture. But it was
not until the invasion of Belgium became a fact that there was the sug-
gestion of a resolved policy disclosed in the words or the actions of Sir
Edward or his associates.

It remains now, rapidly to summarize the events of the closing days
from August ist, the date of the German declaration of war upon Rus-
sia, until the expiration of the time-limit of the British ultimatum ad-
dressed to Berlin.

Meantime it should be recalled that Germany, in addition to
declaring war upon Russia, had demanded of France information as to
what the French attitude would be; had been informed that France
would follow the course dictated by her own interests ; and that in due

THE TWELVE DAYS 65

course she declared war upon the French Republic on August 3d, alleging
certain acts by French aviators over German soil that were too ridiculous
to obtain even passing credence.

vn. SIR EDWARD'S DILEMMA

On July 24th, following the Austrian ultimatum by twenty-four
hours, Sazonof, the Russian Foreign Minister, asked the British Am-
bassador in Petrograd to use his influence to have Britain declare that
she would stand with France and Russia. The conviction of Russian
officials, held consistently by Russian and French diplomacy alike, was
that the sole hope for peace was to be found in the chance that Germany
would not care to fight if she knew she would have Britain in the field.
This view was steadily rejected by Sir Edward Grey, who on July 25th
informed the British Ambassador at Petrograd that Great Britain
could give no assurance as public sentiment would not warrant a de-
cision to participate in a war over Serbia.

This attitude endured right down to the time of the German declara-
tion of war upon Russia. On July 3Oth the President of the French
Republic made an appeal to the British Ambassador in Paris and on
July 3ist he addressed a letter directly to King George, asking for an
assurance of British support. Both applications were rejected. But
it is fair to say for Sir Edward that at the same time he spoke with
far more explicitness to Germany, and as early as July 29th warned the
German Ambassador in London that he must not mistake the pacific
tone of British diplomacy for any assurance that Britain would stay
out. This warning was totally ignored in Berlin, where the ruling
statesmen pinned their faith to the weakness of British foreign policy
and the division in the British Cabinet.

On this same day the German Government made a clear bid for
British neutrality by offering to respect Dutch neutrality, to guarantee
Belgian integrity and independence, provided Belgium did not stand out
against Germany, and to give assurance not to annex French territory
in Europe if the war turned in Germany's favour. But Germany thus
tacitly declined to promise not to violate Belgian neutrality or to give

66 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

any pledge not to annex French colonies after the war. This was the
"shameful" proposal to quote Sir Edward Grey, which was rejected
upon July 30th.

On this same day, too, the French Ambassador in London reminded
the British Government of letters exchanged by France and Britain in
1912, after the Agadir crisis, which provided that, if the peace of Europe
should be endangered, the two nations should proceed to a discussion of
what they proposed to do. Actually this meant a discussion of combined
land and sea operations. Still Sir Edward remained \inresponsive and
King George, on Friday, July 3ist, could give only the vaguest of reas-
suring words to the appeal made to him directly by the President of the
French Republic.

And yet on this same day, the situation began to clear, for on this
day Sir Edward Grey addressed to France and to Germany an identic
note asking their purposes with regard to Belgian neutrality. By the
Treaty of 1839, reaffirmed by that of 1870, Britain had declared her
purpose to defend the neutrality of Belgium, an engagement made also
by Russia, Prussia, and Austria. France promptly agreed to respect
Belgian neutrality, but the British Ambassador at Berlin was unable
to get any response. The next day the German Ambassador inquired
in London whether a German pledge to respect the neutrality of Bel-
gium would insure British neutrality. Sir Edward Grey declined such
a bargain at once.

But on August ist a new problem arose. By virtue of an arrangement
made long before 1914, and probably after Agadir, French fleets had
taken over the British task in the Mediterranean that the British might
concentrate their fleets in the North Sea. The French Atlantic coast was
therefore undefended. Wherefore Sir Edward Grey was moved on this
day to give to the French Ambassador a promise to ask the Cabinet, which
met that afternoon, to agree that if the German fleet undertook to attack
the coasts of France, the British fleet would intervene. This assurance
was given by the British Cabinet and the French were informed of it on
August 2d.

On August 3d Germany on her part agreed to refrain from an

THE TWELVE DAYS
(AUGUST 4-16, 1914)

KING PETER OF SERBIA

In the Twentieth Century, one does not expect to see
a king, clad in velvet and ermine, riding through the
streets of his capital on a snow-white steed, with his
golden crown upon his head. But King Peter is quite
the old-fashioned, fairy-book monarch. In December,
1914, when his troops were about to begin their suc-
cessful effort to retake Belgrade, he rode along the
front of his line and harangued them, even as their chiefs
of remoter centuries were accustomed to do.

WILLIAM II, GERMAN EMPEROR

"The Soldier and the army," he said in 1891, "not parliamentary majorities and decisions, have welded
together the German Empire. My confidence is in the army." In 1900, he added, " If one wishes to decide
something in this world, it is not the pen alone that will do it if unsupported by the power of the sword."
And in 1906, " My first and last care is for my fighting forces on land and sea."

THE LATE EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH OF AUSTRIA HUNGARY

When he came to the throne in 1848, more than one revolution was in progress in his dominions. Dur-
ing his reign his army was badly beaten by the Germans and there was much dissension among the many
races over which he ruled. His domestic troubles were numerous and heartrending. They included the
assassination of his wife and the suicide of his son. Yet he lived on through a record-breaking reign of almost
seventy years, and died leaving his people engulfed in the greatest disaster of history.

THE RULERS OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE

Nicholas, once Czar of all the Russians (left), the only autocrat among the Allies, was a weak ruler, much under the
influence of his German wife and of wonder-working priests. But when revolution threatened he is said to have indignantly
repudiated the traitorous suggestion of one of his generals, to overcome "the canaille" by letting in the Germans.

King George of England (right) is more fortunate. A sovereign in name only, he occupies a secure position in
the hearts of his countrymen, as the focussing point and symbol of their patriotic but self-respecting loyalty.

THE RULERS OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE

M. Raymond Poincare, President of France, hurried back to France from Petrograd during the fateful Twelve
Days in 1914 and set to work on diplomatic correspondence with England. On July 3Oth, he made an appeal to the
British Ambassador in Paris, and the following day addressed a letter directly to King George asking for an assurance
of British support. Both applications were rejected. England refused to commit herself till she was sure that Ger-
many was to invade Belgium, and that the Belgians meant to resist.

MR. ASQUITH, BRITISH PREMIER AND SIR EDWARD GREY, BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER
Sir Edward Grey never grasped the inevitability of the World War. Consequently he was driven to a tempor-
izing policy as the great catastrophe drew near. In the clear light of retrospect it is evident his position demanded
that he should have warned the British people of the danger which had for ten years been steadily increasing

Mr. Asquith, like Sir Edward Grey, seems to have been simply bewildered in the crisis. They felt that they ought
to stand by France, but the invasion of Belgium was needed to stir the British public to action. Only after that event
was a definite settled policy disclosed by the words and acts of the Members of the Government.

DR. VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG— GERMAN IM-
PERIAL CHANCELLOR

For nearly forty years — he was born in 1856 — the
German Chancellor has held public office. He is a Brand
enburger, that is to say, a Prussian of the Prussians.
Before becoming Chancellor in 1909, he was the Prussian
Minister of the Interior (1905), and Imperial Secretary ot
State for the Interior (1907). His was the hard task of
confessing to the world on August 4, 1914, that Germany
was in "a state of necessity" which " knew no law," and
had therefore invaded Belgium.

COUNT BERCHTOLD, AUSTRIAN PREMIER,
1914

After the assassination of the Austrian Archduke,
Europe waited in the keenest anxiety for a sign from
Vienna. But no sign came and the crisis seemed to
have passed when, nearly a month after the crime of
Sarajevo, Count Berchtold sent to Servia the most formid-
able ultimatum that one state had ever addressed to an-
other. To this ultimatum was added a time-limit of
forty-eight hours. One wonders what was secretly going
on during these weeks of apparent inaction.

THE TWELVE DAYS 75

attack upon France by sea, if Britain would remain neutral, but de-
clined to give any commitment as to Belgium. This occasioned no sur-
prise because on the previous day Germany had informed the Belgian Gov-
ernment of its intention, provoked by alleged French activities, to enter
Belgian territory and to advance up the Meuse Valley to attack France.
On this same day Belgium addressed an appeal to Britain for diplo-
matic support and Sir Edward Grey told the Belgian Minister that a
German invasion would mean war with Great Britain. France offered
Belgium five army corps, which were declined. But the British assur-
ance sent to Belgium arrived only on the morning of the 4th of
August, when the German invasion of Belgium had begun.

VIII. BELGIUM DECIDES TO FIGHT

On Monday, August 3d, Belgium reached its heroic decision to
defend its own neutrality and responded to the brutal German ulti-
matum with a declaration of purpose, contained in moderate language,
which will remain memorable. In declaring that she purposed to
defend her soil against German violation she asserted that she had at
all times been equally prepared to defend herself against France or Britain
and thus demolished the whole German edifice of allegation, that France
was planning to attack Germany through Belgium.

Sir Edward Grey was getting on firm ground now. An invasion of
Belgium, unless Belgium were willing to defend herself, might still have
left his Cabinet cold, bu£ once Belgium had made up her mind to fight
he was assured that there would be little more hanging back in England.

August 4th is the last day. King Albert, now in the presence of
actual invasion, appealed to Great Britain, Russia, and France to help him
defend his country. Great Britain sent an ultimatum to Germany, which
expired at midnight, demanding that satisfactory assurances be furnished
of German determination to respect Belgian neutrality.

Notable on this last day, also, was the speech of the German Chan-
cellor in which he told his countrymen and the world that Germany was
in "a state of necessity" which "knew no law," and had therefore
invaded Belgium. It is in this speech, too, that he made the frank

76 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

admission that the invasion of Belgium was in violation of the rules of
international law. He went further and openly conceded that what was
being done was " a wrong that we will try to make good again as soon as
our military ends have been reached. When one is threatened as we
are, and all is at stake, he can only think of how he can hack his way
through."

When the public indignation of the world had become manifest,
the German Government endeavoured to find post-mortem warrant for
its course in Belgium by the "discovery" of documents in Brussels
alleged to disclose a conspiracy of Belgium with Britain and France.
Such devices were as futile as the efforts to find excuse for a declaration of
war upon France in imaginary aeroplane raids by French craft dropping
bombs over German cities. Whatever effect they may have had upon
German opinion, these fictions have long been dismissed by neutral pub-
lics, which have accepted as final the blunt, brutal, but at least honest
words of the German Chancellor spoken at the moment when the
decision had been made.

Not less memorable is the incident that marked the final interview
between the British Ambassador and the German Chancellor. To Sir
Edward Goschen, calling to take his leave of the Chancellor, Bethmann-
Hollweg made his famous inquiry as to the purpose of Great Britain
to make war upon Germany merely for the sake of " a scrap of paper."
The "scrap of paper" was the British guarantee of the integrity of Bel-
gium, contained in the Treaty of 1839 and reaffirmed in the document
of 1870. The full extent of German surprise, apprehension, and
anger, provoked by the decision of Great Britain, was revealed in this
interview for the first time.

Meantime, as Von Jagow had already told the British Ambassador,
the invasion of Belgium had become an accomplished fact and there
could be no drawing back for Germany. Accordingly, with expiration
of the time-limit of the British ultimatum at midnight on August 4th,
Great Britain declared war upon Germany. Thus the triple Entente in the
presence of the fact of war became a triple alliance at the precise moment
when the Triple Alliance was facing the defection of Italy, who promptly

THE TWELVE DAYS 77

announced that the terms of her alliance with Austria and Germany,
which were for action in a defensive war only, did not require her to
participate in a war which she considered aggressive on their part,
and that she therefore proclaimed her neutrality. This prompt dec-
laration of Italian neutrality was of incalculable military advantage to
France, since it automatically released for service on the German fron-
tier several army corps stationed along the Alps.

August 4, 1914, therefore, marks the complete ruin of the whole ed-
ifice that Bismarck had erected; his alliance had collapsed; the union of
all the rivals of Germany, which he had feared and in his life time pre-
vented, had come to pass. All of this, too, German statesmen might
have perceived would inevitably occur, had they been guided by
British tradition rather than contemporary British policy. Such, across
the centuries, had been the unfailing answer of Britain to a challenge to
her supremacy at sea.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE GERMAN ATTACK

I
THE TWO STRATEGICAL CONCEPTIONS

From the morrow of the Franco-Prussian War the German General
Staff, like the French, had been engaged in formulating the plans by
which they would act in the next war. With the lapse of years it had
come to be accepted as inevitable that the superior organization and
the largely increased population of Germany, together with her central
position, would enable her to take the offensive at the outset of opera-
tions. The alliance of France with Russia and of Germany with Austria
(and Italy had broadened the scope of the plans without changing the
essential fact that Germany would have the initiative. And as Italy
yearly moved farther away from her partners, her assistance was pres-
ently eliminated as a factor both by Germany and her enemies.

Having the offensive, the German problem was to decide whether
to attack France, leaving to Austria, reinforced by a few German covering
troops in East Prussia and Posen, the task of containing Russia until
France was disposed of, or to detain France at the strongly fortified and
easily defensible Alsace-Lorraine frontier, and level the main blow at
Russia. The decision was made for the attack upon France. Since it
failed, and perhaps before, the alternative has been strongly advocated,
but it is easy to understand and accept the reasons that controlled the
decision for France.

These reasons were various. As to Russia it was recognized that
her mobilization would be slow, it was known that in organization and
equipment her troops were inferior to the German. But it was equally
notorious that Russian strategy did not include an immediate offensive;
that the Russian plans for mobilization were to be carried out behind the
Bug and far east of Warsaw; that Russian strategy, in fact, rested upon

THE GERMAN ATTACK 79

the conception, enduring from the Napoleonic Era, of a retreat, without
decisive engagement, into the vast regions to the east, where Napoleon's
army had perished, where roads were few, transport difficult, and the
machinery of the German army would work at the least advantage.
Finally, this meant not a quick decision but a long delay; it meant
also, in a war opening in August, that Germany would meet winter
on the road to Moscow or Petrograd.

Speed, too, was the very essence of German strategy. Napoleon
had been defeated in the Waterloo campaign in less than a week after
he took the field. Six weeks had sufficed to dispose of Austria in 1866,
and the decisive battles of the Franco-Prussian War were not divided
by a longer span from the date of mobilization. German finance, the
whole nature of Germany's economic fabric, was not adjusted to a long
war. What was to be sought was a quick decision. This might also
serve to keep Britain out of the war as a French defeat might lead
Russia to abandon the struggle, when Paris had fallen.

A quick decision could only be obtained in the west, but such a
decision there might be expected to settle the war. At all events, the
French army beaten and flung back behind the Loire,^Paris and northern
France conquered, the Germans could send their best troops east and
rely upon reserves to meet the French efforts, while the costs of the
war would already be saddled upon a France which would no longer be
able to avoid paying the huge indemnity Germany had reckoned on in
her calculations before the war.

All German calculations had arrived at the same point that France
could be crushed within six weeks after the war broke out, that in this
time Russian activities would not become too serious for Austria to
deal with alone, or aided by a few German corps in the north. But
the success or failure of the German strategy would be measured by the
success or failure of the German army in bringing France to a decisive
battle early in the second month of the war, destroying the French field
armies in that battle and, thanks to the German heavy artillery, taking
Paris and all the barrier fortresses from Luxemburg to Switzerland.

Unhappily for Germany, the question of Belgium was involved by

80 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

reason of the manner in which French strategy, in the years following the
great French disaster of the Franco-Prussian War, had undertaken to
guard against the blow German strategy was preparing.

II. THE BELGIAN PROBLEM

Recognizing the growing superiority of Germany in numbers,
France had sought to meet this by the erection on her eastern frontier
of a splendid system of forts, based upon the four great fortresses of
Verdun, Toul, fipinal, and Belfort and buttressed by many other
detached forts connecting the larger strongholds. Actually a wall of
steel — with but one gap, southwest of Nancy — opposed itself to Ger-
man advance across the whole extent of Franco-German frontier.

Given German superiority in heavy artillery, these forts were likely
to fall, but defended by the whole field army of France, they would in all
probability hold out far beyond the six weeks' period and knowing
as we now know, that trench war was bound to come, there is no escape
from the conclusion that the decision of the German General Staff against
attempting to force this barrier, given their time limitation, was wise.

There was, then, only the road through Belgium, since the Swiss
route was unsuitable for use by great masses of men and Switzerland
had an army far more formidable than the Belgian. The decision,
therefore, was for the Belgian route and it was made many years before
the war. The proof of this is found in the strategic railroads built to
the Belgian frontier and signalled by military writers as early as 1909.
Well-built double-track lines led through the comparative wilderness
of the eastern Ardennes and ended exactly on the Belgian frontier.
They had no commercial value and served no peaceful purpose. But
they did enable Germany to mobilize vast masses, far more rapidly than
any one suspected would be the case, squarely on the Belgian frontier.

Once across the Ardennes, the road by the Meuse and Sambre val-
leys led straight into the plains of northern France. This road was
not barred by any French forts. The sole obstacles were the Belgian
fortresses of Liege and Namur, both out of date, both unprovided with
modern equipment, and both lacking in subsidiary defences. Germany

THE GERMAN ATTACK

reckoned, wisely, as the event showed, that these would prove no con-
siderable obstacle and would fall to her great howitzers with a minimum
of delay. As for the Belgian army, German High Command could hope
that it would not intervene. But if it did, it was too small and too poorly
organized to offer serious resistance. The event proved this to be true.

oMortiange

OCtampenoux

' *^ Strassbufg

Fortified Camps
4- +•»• Detached forts

WHY THE GERMANS WENT THROUGH BELGIUM

"A wall of steel, with but one gap, southwest of Nancy, opposed itself to German advance
across the whole extent of Franco-German frontier1"

With the political aspects, as well as the moral problems, involved in the
invasion of Belgium, German High Command did not concern itself.
It could hope again, that Britain, like Belgium, would not interfere
with the march of Teutonic hosts against France by the Belgian road.
It could believe that, even if Britain entered the war, she would not

82 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

send her scanty army to the Continent in time to intervene (another
calculation almost justified by the event). But it was satisfied that
even if this should take place, it still possessed a margin of superiority in
numbers and material, which would insure the victory, even at the very
worst.

It is impossible not to believe that German High Command over-
bore German diplomacy in the matter of Belgian neutrality, and that the
soldier imposed his will upon the statesman. The conviction of the
soldier was that, using Belgium as a highway, he could destroy France
in the time at his disposal and that no other method would avail. He
came so near to absolute success that it is impossible to criticize his de-
cision, on the military side.

Here then, in brief, is the whole German strategical conception for
the first thrust of the war. It was broken at the Battle of the Marne,
but it was not until after the battles of Flanders had made the western
deadlock absolute that it was finally abandoned. It supplies the clue to
all of the first phase of the war. In this conception all was foreseen
except the possibility of a French retreat without a decisive battle,
until the conditions of contest should have turned against the Germans
and the balance of numbers, rightly reckoned certain to be heavily with
the invader at the outset, should be partially restored.

III. FRENCH STRATEGY

French High Command had based its course upon the lessons of 1870.
It knew the purpose of Germany to risk all on a single throw and seek a
decisive victory in the opening weeks. It knew that Germany might
come through Belgium, but it could never be certain of this and it was
compelled to base its initial concentration upon the more probable ob-
jective of German attack, which remained the eastern frontier. But it
had made its plans to meet the Belgian thrust. What it could not foresee
was the number of troops Germany would send through Belgium, the
rapidity with which Belgian forts would fall, and the extraordinary
mobility of German troops, due to the unexpected use of motor trans-
port.

THE GERMAN ATTACK 83

It was understood between France and Russia that if the German
blow was directed at France, Russian troops would enter East Prussia
in the third week of the war, as they did. It was believed that this would
compel the Germans to return east and weaken their armies in France
before the decisive battle. The terrible defeat of the Russians at
Tannenberg partially wrecked this hope, but the Russian victories in
Galicia ultimately compelled the Germans to give over their efforts in
the west and go to the rescue of their Austrian ally.

It was the hope of the French, by taking the offensive in Lorraine
and Alsace, as well as in the Ardennes, if the Germans came through
Belgium, to win such successes as to imperil the German armies in the
north and force them to return to the Rhine to defend their own coun-
try. This hope expired in the heavy defeats of the French at Mor-
hange and Neufchateau in the first three weeks of the war. It was the
hope of the French, if they were beaten in these opening contests, to
stand on their own frontiers, before Nancy, behind the Meuse from
Verdun to Charleville and thence to Lille and break the fury of the Ger-
man assault on lines long foreseen. This hope was realized absolutely
before Nancy, momentarily behind the Meuse, but fell when the Ger-
mans succeeded in sending unexpected masses far west and over-
whelming the British. It was the further hope of the French, if all
these plans failed, that it would be possible to make a successful stand
behind the Aisne, the Oise, and the Somme. But the collapse of the
British and the unforeseen rapidity of Kluck's advance defeated this
hope also.

But beneath all these conceptions lay the fundamental purpose not
to risk the fate of the whole French field force until the chances of vic-
tory were unmistakable. There was to be no repetition of the blunders
of 1870, the defeat of French armies in detail, the isolation of Bazaine,
the sacrifice of MacMahon to political and dynastic considerations.
French High Command was even prepared to evacuate Paris, if neces-
sary, but it did not mean to risk a decisive battle, while the odds were
against it. This was the conception that dominated the whole French
campaign and led to the supreme victory of the Marne, which wrecked

84 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

the whole German strategy and obtained a tactical triumph on the
battlefield as well.

Thus, while the various French armies suffered local defeats, none
was ever routed, none was ever captured, and all retained their form
from the beginning to the end of the campaign. This purpose, and not
the local reverses suffered by the French in the opening days of the war,
explains the great retreat, which at the moment seemed to the world
the promise of French ruin and long deluded the German commanders
into believing that they had achieved the purpose for which they were
acting. But for the Russian disaster at Tannenberg, the whole French
fundamental conception might have prevailed, and after the Marne
the Germans might have been compelled to go back to their own frontier,
because of the Russian pressure in East Prussia and along the lower
Vistula.

The second phase of the war came with the German attack upon
Russia in May, 1915. At this time Germany definitely adopted the
plan of crushing Russia, while holding France and Britain in the west.
She was able to do this because, with all her successes, Russia had not
quite succeeded in performing her part of the Franco-Russian plan ; she
had not been able to invade East Prussia and make good her hold there.
But to understand the first months of the war, it is simply necessary to
see the rival plans working out, to observe Germany endeavouring to
crush France while holding back Russia, with Austrian aid ; France seek-
ing to avoid disaster and strike back at the favourable moment ; Russia
trying to take advantage of the despatch of German troops to the west
and sweep through East Prussia to the Vistula, while defeating Austrian
troops in Galicia and Volhynia.

Having been defeated at the Marne, Germany was able, by reason
of her heavy artillery and machine guns, instruments that she had ex-
pected to win for her the decisive battle, to take a defensive position in
France and hold it, but she never was able again to win a/iy considerable
ground on the offensive, even in her tremendous Verdun drive in 1916,
and she was unable to prevent her western foes from ultimately passing
to the offensive. All her conceptions for forty years had been of a swift,

THE GERMAN ATTACK 85

tremendous thrust, a colossal battle, and a victory that should settle the
fate of France for the period of the war, probably forever. When the de-
cision at the Marne was made absolute in Flanders, the whole character
of the war and the nature of the outcome were changed. That is the
reason why, in the minds of military writers, the Battle of the Marne
remains the most important incident in the first two years of the war.

Tannenberg was only less important than the Marne, since it
brought about the ruin of the original Franco-Russian conception, gave
Germany the necessary time to make good her hold in France and to
make her final effort in Flanders. Russian pressure in the east ulti-
mately became effective, precisely as French and Russian General
Staffs had expected, but it became effective in November, instead of
September, in Galicia, not in East Prussia. When it became effective
Germany had to abandon her western campaign, turn her attention to
the east, undertake a number of more or less limited efforts, and at
last organize her great drive against Russia, which began in late April,

If Joffre had been defeated at the Marne the whole German plan
would have succeeded precisely as Germany had calculated. If Hin-
denburg had been defeated at Tannenberg, the whole German plan
would have collapsed as French and Russian strategy had expected.
But Tannenberg was relatively a small affair, and Russia's losses, al-
though large, were insignificant compared with her main strength.
Hence she was able to keep on with Galicia and ultimately to force Ger-
many to abandon the west. On the other hand, the whole German plan
was defeated at the Marne because the bulk of German military strength
was used there.

CHAPTER FIVE
BELGIAN DEFENCE AND FRENCH OFFENCE

In the event of an attack coming from Germany, the main reliance
of Belgian defence was the fortress of Liege, situated some twenty miles
west of the German frontier, commanding the crossings of the Meuse
River and the railroad coming from the Rhine at Cologne to Brussels
and Antwerp, the great trunk line from Germany.

Liege was surrounded by twelve isolated forts, the work of the cele-
brated Brialmont. It had ranked in its day as one of the finest of
European fortresses, but it had been allowed to fall into disrepair and no
effort had been made, as in the case of the French fortresses of Verdun and
Belfort, to strengthen its works as the improvement in heavy artillery
became pronounced. These forts were isolated and they were neither
connected by any field works nor had there been any care taken to keep
their field of fire free by forbidding the construction of buildings.

The forts had permanent garrisons of trained artillerymen, but the
city itself was without any sufficient garrison and it had been calcu-
lated that it would take 75,000 men to defend its wide circle. Still it
was the general expectation of Europe that Liege, however insufficient
as a permanent barrier to German advance, would serve as a sufficient
obstacle to permit the arrival of French and British troops to the west
of the town and their junction with the Belgian field army. This
army, actually in process of reconstruction, had been organized and
trained with the idea that it would take its position west of Liege, be-
hind the Geete River, its right resting on Namur, its left upon the Diemer
at Diest. Here it was expected that it would be able, thanks to the
resistance of Liege, to hold a solid front and prevent the overflow of
German masses into the plain east of Louvain until aid came.

BELGIAN DEFENCE AND FRENCH OFFENCE 87

Belgian mobilization was ordered on August ist; it was completed
by August 6th. Something more than one hundred thousand men, the
field army of the nation, were then concentrated behind the Geete.
The King took command, establishing his headquarters at Louvain.

Meantime, there had been very striking developments. On August
4th, twelve regiments of German cavalry had crossed the frontier from
the direction of Aix-la-Chapelle ; moved rapidly west to the Meuse, which
they reached at Vise, just south of the Dutch frontier and north of Liege;
forced the crossing of the river, driving in a weak Belgian force, which
recoiled upon Liege; and thus gained the west bank of the Meuse.

On August 5th the Tenth German Army Corps under Emmich
reached the front of the eastern forts of Liege, demanded permission
to pass unopposed and, this permission being refused, undertook to take
the town by assault, seeking to penetrate between the forts.

At this time the whole 3d Division of the Belgian field army, and
two brigades of the 4th, occupied the ground between the forts and,
supported by their fire, successfully repulsed the German attacks through
the days of August 5th and 6th. On this latter day, however, the arrival
of masses of German troops, which began to cross the river above and
below, threatened to cut off the retreat of the field forces and General Le-
man, the commander of Liege, ordered these to retire upon the main
Belgian army concentrated behind the Geete. This retreat was suc-
cessfully conducted.

On August yth the German infantry penetrated between the forts,
occupied the city and the citadel, but were unable to take the forts.
These maintained their fire until German and Austrian heavy guns were
brought up, but under this attack they crumbled almost instantane-
ously. The last fort fell, accepting the Belgian official report, on
August 1 6th, but the German reports place it much earlier. Actually,
as an obstacle to German advance, Liege lost its importance by August
loth and the city itself was in German hands on the 7th.

As German mobilization and concentration were hardly completed
before August I2th, and the great advance did not begin until several
days later, it may be fairly said that Liege, despite the common belief

88 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

at the time, actually did not delay the Germans materially. It gave a
great moral impulse to French and British peoples, it earned a place in
history through the devotion of its defenders. It was, however, taken
with no great loss, in spite of contemporary reports. But it was not
taken by a coup-de-main as the Germans had hoped.

ii. BELGIAN "BATTLES"

Meantime the Belgian field army, having completed its concentra-
tion, was standing behind the Geete between Diest and Namur, that is
between the Meuse and the Diemer. Against it there now began to
beat the first waves of German advance, the screen of cavalry, which
preceded the advance of the infantry. On August I2th there was a
very sharp skirmish at Haelen, in which German cavalry were hand-
somely repulsed. This "battle" filled the press of the world at the time,
and, with the grotesque reports of the resistance at Liege, then current,
gave a totally inaccurate impression of what was happening.

From August I2th to August i8th this skirmishing continued, the
Belgian army keeping its position. Its expectation was that the French
and British troops would arrive in time to make possible the defence of
Belgium on the line of the Geete, or at the least on the lines of the
Dyle, famous in the wars of Louis XIV, one flank resting on Antwerp,
the centre covering Brussels, and the line continued through Namur
and prolonged by French troops behind the Meuse to the forts of Givet
in France. On August isth the first German attack upon the line
of the Meuse south of Namur at DLnant had been repulsed by French
troops, which had just entered the town.

On the morning of August i8th, however, the King of the Belgians
at last realized that the French and British would not arrive in time.
At that moment he was faced by six German corps — three advancing
from the Meuse, having crossed north of Liege; three from the south,
which had forced the passage of the river at Huy. These were the
advance corps of the armies of Kluck and Biilow respectively. Behind
them five more corps were known to be advancing. To face more than
500,000 Germans (eleven corps), the Belgians had about 100,000, the

BELGIAN DEFENCE AND FRENCH OFFENCE 89

value of two big corps. At this moment the British were just detraining
near Maubeuge, and the French army, which was to act with the Bel-
gians, was just south of Philippeville, on the edge of French territory.

It was useless to wait longer. Belgian resistance had been prolonged
to the last moment and, unless the army was now to be uselessly sacrificed,
a retreat was inevitable. Accordingly, on the morning of August i8th,
King Albert ordered a retirement upon the fortified camp of Antwerp,
which had been constructed with the idea of serving as a place of asylum
for the entire field army of Belgium in just such an emergency as had
now arrived. The retreat was made good on August I9th, and on
August 2Oth, the entire army, less a division detached to Namur, was
inside the Antwerp defences.

Meantime, the German army, now beginning to display that mobil-
ity which was due to an enormous train of motor transport, moved
rapidly forward, occupied Louvain on August iQth, entered Brussels
on August 2Oth, and then, turning half left, started for France. This
was the army of Kluck. On the same day that Louvain was occupied the
advance guards of Billow appeared before Namur, which was defended
by a weak division of Belgians, who, four days later, were to receive
as a reinforcement two battalions of French troops. These arrived
just in time to retire, thus doing precisely what Winston Churchill's
British detachments were to do in the case of Antwerp, less than two
months later.

Namur, like Antwerp and Liege, was defended by a circle of detached
forts, which were, however, in much worse condition than those of either
of the other fortress towns. Against these forts the Germans now
brought up the heavy artillery which had demolished the forts of Liege.
The bombardment began on August 2ist, the day after Brussels fell;
by the next day most of the forts were in ruins. The following day the
situation was hopeless and almost all the forts had been silenced. Ac-
cordingly the garrison, some 12,000 Belgians, together with the French
who had come so tardily, slipped out, just avoiding envelopment, and
retreated south. August 23d, then, saw the occupation of Namur,
which had been the corner-stone of the whole Anglo-French strategy

90 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

in the Belgian campaign. Two days later the last fort fell, but by this
time the war had gone south into France.

The fall of Liege was far more prompt than Allied commanders had
expected, but it did not gravely injure their plans. It did prevent a
junction between the Anglo-French and the Belgian armies, if such a
junction was ever contemplated. But this is not certain, for there were
grave dangers apparent in any campaign in eastern Belgium. The
collapse of Namur, under two days' bombardment on the other hand,
was not only unexpected, but turned out to be a real disaster, which was
the prelude to many that were now to follow.

III. THE MORAL VALUE

Such, briefly, is the story of the Belgian campaign, which lasted
from August 4th to August i8th, the date when the Belgian army retired
from the pathway of German advance. Belgian resistance continued
at Namur for five more days. Actually the Belgian army was only able
to hold back the cavalry screen of German advance for the days before
the infantry had concentrated and began its great drive. When this
began, the Belgian army had no choice but to get out of the way.

There were no engagements of any size during the whole period;
there was no battle, and the forts of Liege and Namur fell as the Germans
had calculated they would fall. In so far as they had reckoned on
Belgian submission the Germans had been disappointed, but otherwise
their plans had worked exactly as they expected them to work; they
had brushed the Belgian army out of the way in a minimum of time
and with inconsiderable losses. Having now contained the Belgian
field army in Antwerp, they turned south for the drive at Paris, August
2Oth, the date of the occupation of Brussels, marking the turn of
Kluck.

The surprises of this brief Belgian campaign were supplied by the
efficacy of German heavy artillery and the number of troops the
Germans had been able to mobilize and send through Belgium. Mis-
calculation on the first point had wrecked any Allied plan to join the
Belgian field army on the Geete or the Dyle. Miscalculation as to the

BELGIUM "THE COCKPIT
OF EUROPE" IN PICTURES

ALBERT OF BELGIUM (BORN 1875* ACCEDED
TO THRONE, 1909

The fighting king of "the Cockpit of Europe" is so old-fashioned
that he led his army in person and asked no better fate than to share
the hardships and dangers of his soldiers. His democratic attitude
toward his soldiers he himself has attributed in part to his observation
of the late James J. Hill's attitude toward his railroad employees —
for King Albert, before his accession to the throne, paid a long visit
to the United States, spending a large part of the time studying
American railroading as Mr. Hill's guest.

BELGIAN CAVALRY

Photograph by Paul Thompson

ONE SHOT FROM A GERMAN 42-CENTIMETRE GUN PUT THIS BELGIAN FORT OUT OF COMMISSION

Students of German strategy assert that the Germans long ago decided to strike quickly at France through Bel-
gium when "The Day" should come. The French frontier was strongly fortified. Switzerland was a difficult country
and strongly defended. There remained — Belgium, dangerously peaceful and prosperous, like the United States.
Her little army and her forts were easily reducible by the terrible German guns.

BELGIAN BATTERY ON THE MARCH

WAR ENTHUSIASTS IN BRUSSELS

Shouting, flag-waving crowds in the cities of Belgium enthusiastically voiced their approval of the Government's
decision to resist the violation of Belgian territory. And the little Belgian army, in full realization that the day of fairy-
tales was past, set itself to play the role of Jack, against the German Giant.

' " Copyright by the American Press Association

BELGIAN SOLDIERS AT REST DURING A LULL IN THE FIGHTING

Germans under Emmich arrived before Liege on August 5, 1914. For two days of almost incessant fighting General
Lehman with the third Division of the Belgian army maintained his defence of the city. Then fresh masses of German
troops arrived and to save his exhausted soldiers Lehman retired upon the main Belgian army concentrated behind
the Geete. The Germans occupied the city on the 7th, but the nearby forts held out against them for several days.

Awaiting the Uhlans

THE INVASION OF BELGIUM, EPITOMIZED IN PICTURES

The German hordes invaded the land which was open, flat, sea-girt, seeming to invite the invader.
The little Belgian army stood its ground as long as possible, resisting to the limit of its strength.
But it was all of no avail and the Germans marched into Brussels, the capital city, on August 2Oth, seventeen
days after crossing the border.

RUINED TOWN HALL AT YPRES

the sleepy little Flemish town of Ypres for more than a month raged one of the most intricate, confused,
and indescribable conflicts in all the history of the war; fought by men of more races, religions, colours, and nationalities
than any battlefield in western Europe had known since the onrush of the soldiers of Islam was halted on the field of
Tours. Asia, Africa, and even America and Australia shared in the glory and the slaughter.

BELGIAN DEFENCE AND FRENCH OFFENCE 99

second factor was shortly to lead to heavy defeats at Mons and Charle-
roi. Nor were German numbers in Belgium to be measured solely
by the ten corps of Billow and Kluck (an eleventh was detached to
watch the Belgians in Antwerp). Still a third army, composed of three
Saxon corps under Hausen, coming west through the Ardennes and
aiming at the Meuse crossings south of Namur, notably at Dinant, was
to surprise the Allies completely and further contribute to the destruc-
tion of all their plans. By August 2ist hardly less than 700,000 German
troops had crossed Belgium and were approaching the French frontier.
In addition there were the army of the Grand Duke of Wurtemberg,
five corps strong, which was in the Belgian Ardennes north of Sedan, and
the army of the Crown Prince, also containing five corps that had
passed through Luxemburg and was just breaking into France about
Longwy. Twenty-three corps were then employed by the Germans —
aside from two cavalry corps, a corps left in Belgium, and twenty-one
were to come on the battlefield of the Marne. Eight additional corps
were presently identified in Alsace-Lorraine.

Even the briefest military summary of the Belgian episode cannot,
however, completely ignore the moral value. The Belgians had failed,
as did the Spartans at Thermopylae. A dwarf had met a giant, and, as
invariably happens outside of fairy tales, the dwarf had been beaten.
Yet the decision of Belgium to resist, transformed the character of the
whole war in the minds of the nations which were now fighting Ger-
many; it contributed materially to influencing Italian sentiment; it
gave form and colour to the world conflict, and it had an influence
which cannot be measured either by the paltry numbers or the insig-
nificant skirmishes, the very names of which were forgotten in a few
days by a world that was to see a Battle of the Marnc within a fort-
night after Namur fell.

Had Belgium failed to resist German invasion, the whole significance
of the German decision to disregard the Treaty of 1839 would have been
lost. As it was, Belgium became in a very real sense the issue of the war,
and popular sympathy in neutral countries all over the world was lost
to Germany at the outset of the conflict. This would have been of

ioo HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

minor consequence had Germany been able to win that decisive victory
which alone could justify the invasion of Belgium even in her own eyes.
But when the decision of the Marne turned against her and the war
became not a short and swift triumph but a long and terrible agony,
the Belgian incident was a heavy and a permanent handicap.

No one who was alive in the August days, when Belgian resistance
began, and dwelt outside of German or Austrian frontiers, will ever for-
get the instant and enduring impression that Belgian heroism created,
and nowhere more than in America was the Belgian incident destruct-
ive of German hopes of sympathy and even of more practical assistance
in her tremendous struggle. But for Belgium it is not difficult to be-
lieve that American neutrality would have taken a very different charac-
ter, and it is far from improbable that the Allies would have failed to
find in America that source of munitions which was to contribute so
much to save them from disaster in the first two years of the war.

IV. FRENCH BEGINNINGS — MUHLHAUSEN

Of a necessity, French mobilization was based upon the assumption
that Germany would attack from Alsace-Lorraine. Modifications to
follow the disclosure of a purpose to use Belgium had long been pre-
pared. But it was not only a question whether the Germans would
pass through Belgium at all ; there was also the question as to whether
they would make the main or even a considerable attack from this
direction. There could be no way of knowing about this in advance.
Accordingly the French had always assigned five army corps to act
between the Meuse and the Sambre and relied upon the British expedi-
tionary army to supply the balance needed to hold the line in this
region should the Germans come this way. Presumably they also
relied upon the Belgian army.

French mobilization proceeded with extreme regularity. The great
masses of men were equipped and concentrated within the time set.
There was nothing of the disorder and confusion of 1870, although a
lack of guns and of equipment was presently signalled, when it came to re-
serves. The French mobilization was slower than the German, of which

BELGIAN DEFENCE AND FRENCH OFFENCE 101

it fell far short in the numbers it prepared for the first shock, but it
was an eminently successful operation.

Meantime, while mobilization was proceeding, the French undertook
their first thrust. A large garrison had been maintained in peace times
in the fortress of Belfort, commanding the gap between the Vosges and
Switzerland. This garrison, reinforced by the first troops mobilized,
stepped out and over the frontier on August yth, the day the Germans
penetrated Liege. The next day it had reached Altkirch and defeated
a German force. On August 9th it entered Miihlhausen, next to
Strassburg the largest city of Alsace-Lorraine. This success thrilled
France and was accepted as proof of the approaching deliverance of the
"Lost Provinces."

But on the night of August 9th a surprise attack by the Germans
turned the French out of Miihlhausen, which was retaken after desperate
street fighting. In this first operation French commanders began to
display faults which were to prove expensive a little later. New
forces had now to be sent to Alsace; General Pau took command, suc-
ceeding the general that had failed. By August I9th the French were
back in Miihlhausen, while other detachments were overflowing from all
the Vosges crests and approaching the Rhine. Unhappily for the French
this campaign was to come to a sudden end, because of the first real
disaster not far away.

V. MORHANGE — THE FIRST DISASTER

In all the military discussion which preceded the present war it was
fully recognized that the first great clash between the French and Ger-
man troops, in the next struggle, would come east of Nancy and along
the frontier which had been created by the Treaty of Frankfort. No
forts, on either side of the line, barred this natural gateway between the
valleys of the Rhine and the Moselle. Nancy iteelf was but eleven
miles from the frontier. North of this gateway the forts of Metz and
Thionville in Germany, the Verduu-Toul barrier in France, closed the
way; south, the Vosges and the forts of Spinal forbade any general oper-
ation, as far as the Belfort gap. But here in a fairly open country it was

102 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

believed that the first, and perhaps the decisive, battle of the war would
be fought.

French mobilization and concentration were here completed behind
the Moselle and the Meurthe, while the covering troops occupied their
regular post upon the considerable mass of hills, known as the Grand-
Couronne of Nancy, just across the Meurthe, and extending north al-
most to Pont-a-Mousson. Despite a few early skirmishes at the
frontier, the Germans seem to have made no especial effort even to
disturb the French concentration.

But about August I2th there came the first official announcement
of French operations. These seemed to push steadily forward; by
August 1 3th there was a French success across the German frontier.
In the week that followed, the movement swelled into something ap-
proaching a real invasion. By August I9th, the day Miihlhausen was
reoccupied, the French had passed the line of the Metz-Strassburg rail-
road and were in Saarburg, Dieuze, and Delme, fifteen or twenty miles
from the frontier. This was the high-water mark.

On August 2oth the French army at last came in contact with the
main German force, the army of the Crown Prince of Bavaria, while
a second German army, that of Heeringen, was signalled west of Strass-
burg and north of the Donon Mountain. These two armies faced
respectively the armies of Castelnau and Dubail. They seem to have
waited for the French attack upon positions carefully selected and pre-
pared.

The battle which followed, named Morhange by the French and
Metz by the Germans, is noteworthy, apart from its local value, as reveal-
ing the type of engagement in all the first days of the war. The French,
advancing to attack, displaying much impetuosity and some lack of
discipline, came suddenly under the fire of the heavy German artil-
lery— field artillery, not the sort of gun that had already levelled the
forts of Liege.

This heavy artillery outranged the French field gun, the famous
"75," and, unsupported by any artillery, the French infantry were
beaten upon by a storm of shells, fired from a distance and by an unseen

BELGIAN DEFENCE AND FRENCH OFFENCE 103

foe. They were also held up by barbwire entanglements and trenches.
After a brief engagement a French corps — the Fifteenth, of Marseilles
—broke and fled. Its rout compromised the whole army although the
Twentieth Corps — the famous Iron Corps, commanded by Foch, who
here won his first laurels — now, and in the subsequent retreat, performed
miracles. At the same time the Germans passed to the attack. The
end of the invasion of Lorraine had come.

In the next days the French retirement was rapid; some thousands of
prisoners, some guns, and several flags were left in the German posses-
sion. By August 23d the Germans were well within French territory,
the)' had occupied Luneville, pressed beyond to Gerbeviller, were at the
edge of the Grand-Couronne, hardly eight miles from Nancy. They had
now got about as far into French territory as the French had been in
German territory at the Battle of Morhange. But this was another
high-water mark.

With great rapidity the French troops, which had retaken Muhlhau-
sen, were drawn out of Alsace and brought back to the Nancy front.
They were put into action, while many French batteries were massed on
the Saffais plateau, a few miles south of Nancy. The German advance
was halted, and the French, passing to the offensive, pushed the Germans
back materially.

Thus the German victory of Morhange was without real conse-
quence. It was a severe defeat for the French and wrecked their offen-
sive. But the defeated troops were able to rally and save Nancy. In
the opening days of September and during the time of the Battle of the
Marne a new German attack on this front was beaten down, and the
French, although weakened by the transfer of several corps to the Marne,
were still able first to repulse a new and heavier attack and later to take
the offensive and push the Germans back to the frontier. There a dead-
lock ensued which endured right through the next two years. But
after September, 1914, the Nancy front became inactive.

Morhange was the first considerable Franco-German battle since the
War of 1870. It was a real defeat for the French and, taken with the
defeats that followed, it unpleasantly suggested Worth and the earlier

io4 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

debacle. But the French rally showed, as German official reports later
conceded, that French armies were not like those of forty-four years
before.

VI. NEUFCHATEAU AND CHARLEROI

At the moment when the Battle of Morhange was opening, two more
French armies, north of Verdun, on a front from Luxemburg to the
point where the Meuse quits France, were also taking the offensive.
These were the armies of Ruffey, north of Verdun, and of De Langle de
Gary, north of Sedan. A day after the defeat of Morhange these ar-
mies were heavily beaten in the same fashion. In the difficult region of
the Ardennes they came suddenly in contact with armies of the Ger-
man Crown Prince near Virton, south of Arlon and of the Duke of
Wiirtemberg north of Neufchateau. Once more the German heavy
artillery triumphed, and the French, caught before barbwire entangle-
ments, deprived of all artillery support, were repulsed in disorder, lost
flags and guns, and surrendered the offensive.

Having won the encounter, the German troops now pressed forward.
The French retired, first behind the Othain and the Semois and then be-
hind the Meuse. Their retreat was more orderly than that of their
fellows at Morhange. Behind the Semois and the Othain they were
able to inflict heavy losses on the Germans and subsequently made good
their position behind the Meuse, as Castelnau's troops had made good
theirs before Nancy. Henceforth the retirements of these two armies —
Ruffey's which passed to the command of Sarrail shortly, and De Langle
de Gary's — were never seriously shaken. They shared in the general
retreat because they were compelled to keep their alignment with the
other armies. But as late as August 28th they inflicted heavy losses
on the Germans, who were attempting to cross the Meuse all the way
from Sedan to Dun.

These two opening engagements were French defeats and they con-
tributed to raising German hopes and expectations, but the really de-
cisive action was elsewhere. It was in the triangle between the Meuse
and the Sambre and westward about Mons that the real blow was now

BELGIAN DEFENCE AND FRENCH OFFENCE 105

about to fall. Against this triangle, in which four French regular corps
and some divisions of reserves and African troops were standing, their
left prolonged by the British army, thirteen German corps, the armies
of Kluck, Btilow, and Hausen, were now striking, having already dis-
posed of the Belgian field army.

THE FIRST BATTLES, AUGUST I5TH-23D, 1914

A-Belgians C-Lanzerac E-RufFey G-Dubail

B-British D-DeLangledeCary F«-Castelnau H-Pau

On August 22d, two days after Morhange and one day after Neuf-
chateau, the French army commanded by Lanzerac, holding the cross-
ings of the Sambre about Charleroi, was suddenly attacked by Biilow.
A terrific battle followed. There was street fighting of the most desper-
ate character, ground was taken and lost, the losses on both sides were

io6 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

very heavy, and by night the French had been pushed back across the
Sambre and the Germans held the river crossings. Lanzerac had lost
the day but he was still capable of renewing the conflict. Unhappily
at this time he learned that Namur was about to fall and that the army
of Hausen, three corps strong and hitherto unsuspected, had forced the
crossing of the Meuse at Dinant and was advancing across his rear,
seeking to cut his line of retreat to France.

A retreat was inevitable and the French drew back rapidly until
their flanks rested upon the forts at Givet and Maubeuge. By the next
day all danger of envelopment was over, but the superior numbers of
the enemy necessitated further retreat. The following day the misfor-
tunes that had overtaken the British involved the Lanzerac army, soon
to pass to the command of Franchet d'Esperey, and it was unable to
stand again until it had reached the Oise. There, on August 3Oth, it
inflicted a heavy check upon the Prussian Guard at Guise. But by
this time its retreat, due to the British situation, had involved the ar-
mies of De Langle and Ruffey, which were compelled to leave the Meuse
and retire south.

By August 23d, then, four French armies had been defeated on Bel-
gian or German soil and driven back into French territory. Two had
suffered something like routs at Morhange and at Neufchateau ; a
third had lost a considerable battle at Charleroi but had left the field
in order; all would soon be restored to fighting shape. The time had
promptly passed when there was a chance that the first German vic-
tories would have decisive results. Already a new French army, under
Foch, was ready to enter the line at the north between De Langle and
Lanzerac.

To understand what followed, it is of prime importance to recognize
that all the French armies were by August 3oth in shape to attack
again, and from the Oise to the Meuse north of Verdun the French
line was intact. Only by grasping this fact is it possible to under-
stand how the French, after another week of retreat, were able sud-
denly to pass to the offensive and win the decisive Battle of the
Marne

BELGIAN DEFENCE AND FRENCH OFFENCE 107

VII. BRITISH DISASTER

In his original conception, it seems clear that Joffre had intended to
hold the army of Lanzerac and the British at the French frontier facing
Belgium until the magnitude of the German blow through Belgium could
be measured. During this time he relied upon his armies to the east,
and particularly the army operating from Nancy into Lorraine, to deal
heavy blows that might compel the Germans to draw back troops from
Belgium to reinforce their armies in Alsace and Lorraine. In this plan
the British and Lanzerac's armies would have stood from the Scheldt
to the Meuse resting upon Valenciennes, Maubeuge, and Givet.

Yielding to the appeals of the Belgians, and apparently to the urgings
of French politicians, however, Joffre changed his plan and sent Lanzerac
and the British northward to Charleroi and Mons just before the defeat
of his Lorraine army ended all chance of lessening the force of the German
blow coming from Belgium. This change in plan led to the subsequent
disasters, for it threw two small armies, still imperfectly concentrated and
amounting to barely seven corps, against the mass of Germans, thirteen
corps strong. We are bound to conclude, too, that Joffre had no concep-
tion as to the numbers the Germans would send through Belgium or as
to the rapidity of their movement, thanks to motor transport.

These miscalculations, together with an error not yet explained, were
now to bring the British to the edge of ruin. On Sunday, August 23d,
the British army, two corps strong, perhaps 80,000 men, took their
positions behind a canal, extending their front from the Scheldt at
Conde to a point of junction with Lanzerac north of the Sambre near
Binche. Mons was the centre of their position. Here they were at-
tacked, before they had time to entrench/'by masses of German troops
whose approach seems to have been almost totally unexpected.

The battle which followed was severe, but never reached a decisive
point. At some places the British retired to straighten their line, and
German heavy artillery caused material but not excessive losses. All
the afternoon the British held on; there was nothing to suggest that they
were facing a foe overwhelmingly superior in numbers, and not the

io8 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

smallest hint that they were threatened with envelopment on their
left flank. At this moment the British army was at the extreme west
or left of the whole Allied front, extending from Switzerland right up to
Conde. West of Conde to Lille the British believed their flank was cov-
ered by French reserves.

But about five o'clock in the afternoon Field-Marshal French suddenly
received a despatch from Joffre informing him that Namur had fallen,
that the Lanzerac army had been in full retreat for many hours, and that
there were in front of the British not two corps, as they had thought, but
four, while a fifth was now swinging round their left flank, which they had
believed was covered by French reserves, and was striking for their rear.

Why the message came so late, what had become of the French re-
serves toward Lille, why the British had not been informed earlier of
the retreat of Lanzerac, why their own observation corps had failed
to discover the size of the German army, these are questions that must
wait until the end of the war for answer. But with this despatch the
veil is lifted from German purpose. It was now plain that Kluck, who
had been at Brussels on August 2Oth, had swung west and south; that
with 300,000 troops he was now rushing forward in a desperate effort
to get around the end of the whole Allied line, interpose between it and
Paris, and produce a Sedan, tenfold magnified.

In his front, now, he had less than 80,000 British troops. His fifth
corps — four were facing the British — had passed through Tournai and
was moving toward Cambrai, while a vast horde of German cavalry
were driving through northwestern France spreading panic and dis-
order and reaching for the British line of communications with the
Channel. August 23d, the day after Charleroi, two days after Neuf-
chateau and three days after Morhange, is the day the campaign entered
its decisive stage.

On this day we see very clearly that unless the British army can get
away, unless its retreat can be effected and its left flank covered, Kluck
will interpose between Paris and all the Allied armies. And Kluck is to
play the decisive part in the German plan. Not until two weeks later,
when he comes to grief in the opening phase of the Battle of the Marne,

BELGIAN DEFENCE AND FRENCH OFFENCE 109

is he to lose the advantage gained through his appearance in an over-
whelmingly superior force on the extreme flank of the Allied armies.

VIII. THE GREAT RETREAT

In the presence of an impending calamity, Field-Marshal French
displayed that slowness of action which so long marred British opera-
tions in the war. Not for many hours did he actually begin his retreat;
hours that were precious were lost; and lost, nearly brought ruin.
By seven o'clock the next night, however, his army was back in France
with its right resting on the forts of Maubeuge and the centre at Bavay.
At this point French recognized the peril that confronted him. It was
plain that the Germans were endeavouring to drive him in on Maubeuge,
as Bazaine had been driven in on Metz in 1870. This would mean the
ultimate capture of his army and would uncover the flank of all the
French armies to the east. Accordingly, despite the weariness of his
troops, French ordered the retreat to be continued through the night.

Now begins that period of terrible suffering for the British army,
which tried the temper of the veterans, resulted in the loss of many
prisoners and some guns but in the escape of the army. On the night
of August 25th the two corps were widely separated : one was south of
Cambrai to the west, and the other at Landrecies to the east. Here
the First Corps, about Landrecies, was beaten upon by a terrific night
attack, which it managed to repulse. But the troops were becoming
totally exhausted. August 26th was "the most critical day of all."
The burden was borne by the Second Corps, Smith-Dorrien's, rein-
forced now by a fresh division just arrived. Ordered to resume the
retreat at daybreak, Smith-Dorrien found it impossible and was com-
pelled to fight until three o'clock in the afternoon before he could break
off the engagement, which was fought about the town of Le Cateau but
better known as the Battle of Cambrai. On this day an appeal for
help made to Sordet, of the French cavalry, could not be answered, and
the Second Corps stood alone, for the First Corps was still too far away
to render any assistance.

But late in the afternoon the Germans, on their side, began to show

i io HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

weariness. Smith-Dorrien was able to get his troops on the road. All
through the night and through the next day and night the retreat
continued, but the crisis was passed. August 28th, the British were back
at the Oise from Noyon to La Fere and a new French army had come up
on their left, the Army of Maunoury, sent by Joffre after he had meas-
ured the extent of the German thrust through Belgium. Five days of
fighting and marching, day and night, separated Mons from the British
arrival at the Oise, but the army that reached the Oise was no longer in
shape for the battle that Joffre was planning. It was not, in fact, to
regain its confidence or its cohesion until after the Battle of the Marne.
Nor was it able, in that struggle, to perform the allotted task. Yet
it is difficult to believe that any, save a veteran army of professional
soldiers, could have endured these five terrible days and lived.

In this whole period it was the pluck and the endurance of the
individual soldiers that saved the day. Just detrained, these men had
suddenly been flung into a battle, their own corner of which was bigger
than Waterloo, and their immediate enemy's numbers surpassed, three
times over, those Napoleon brought on to his last battlefield.

While they were still holding their ground at Mons, the British were
forced to retreat because the defeat of the French army at Charleroi
had left the British to the west "in air." Magnificently supported by
the French army of Lanzerac on their right at Guise, they were not
supported by French cavalry on their immediate left until the critical
day of Cambrai-Le Cateau had passed.

At the time, British public opinion, misled by grotesque reports
published in British newspapers and fired by the enthusiasm of having a
fighting army on the Continent for the first time in sixty years — for the
first time in a century one might say, for the Crimea hardly counted in
popular imagination — fired by the undoubted rapidity and efficiency
of British mobilization and transport, gave the British army in the
retreat and at the Marne a role which it did not play. Not only was
the Marne a French battle, but the greatest blow struck at the Germans
in the retreat was struck at Guise and not at Le Cateau, and by the
French and not the British. In point of fact the real glory of the British

BELGIAN DEFENCE AND FRENCH OFFENCE in

army in the opening months was earned at Ypres, where it died, as few
armies ever have died. But no praise can be too high for the manner
in which the private soldiers met a great and utterly unforeseen crisis.

It is essential to point, here, the difference between the situation of
the British army on August 28th and that of the French armies at its
right and left. All these latter were not only intact but in a condition
to take the offensive. Two fresh armies, those of Foch and Maunoury,
had come up in the centre and at the left. Joffre had now been able to
correct the errors of his early concentration and to meet the unforeseen
German concentration. But the necessarily precipitate retreat of the
British had opened a gap in his line. This and the condition of the
British army now combined to compel him to take the great decision,
which led directly to the Battle of the Maine.

ix. JOFFRE'S LAST PLAN

In all his disappointments Joffre had never surrendered the idea of
taking the offensive at the right moment. He never conceived the
opening reverses as anything but incidental, while German High Com-
mand wrongly interpreted them as evidences of complete collapse.
Having been beaten at all points in his first attack, Joffre was pre-
pared to fight again at the frontier. This became impossible when the
size of Kluck's army was disclosed. By August 3Oth Joffre was again
ready to attack along the lines of the Somme, the Oise, and the Aisne.
He did attack at Guise and north of Rethel, winning a pretty little suc-
cess at the former place.

But at this point he had to face the question of risking the decisive
battle, with the British exhausted and in retreat far south of the Somme.
He chose still to retreat, calling back his victorious troops from Guise ;
but the decision was not due to the early defeats the French had suf-
fered, it was due to the collapse of the British, incident to the unforeseen
strength of the armies that the Germans had sent through Belgium,
the failure of French reserves to cover their flank, and the undreamed-of
rapidity with which Kluck, thanks to Tnotor transport, had pushed his
advance south from Mons to the Somme.

ii2 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

On August 3<Dth Joffre knew that Russian armies were in East
Prussia and Galicia; he could calculate that Russian success inside of
German territory would promptly compel the Germans to draw back
troops from his front. This calculation was to be wrecked on the next
day, when the Germans began the conflict at Tannenberg which was to
destroy Russian pressure in Prussia. Believing that Russia would be
able to fulfil her part, Joffre could afford to wait, even if waiting neces-
sitated further retreat. But by August 3oth all his armies were re-
stored to fighting condition, had indeed been reorganized and strength-
ened, while Sarrail and D'Esperey had replaced Ruffey and Lanzerac.

Between August 2oth, the date of Morhange, and August 3Oth, Joffre
had, then, rearranged his armies, restored their cohesion, prepared the
instrument he was to use. On the latter date he still found the op-
portunity lacking, hence he ordered a new retreat, but with fixed limits
and with the clear purpose to attack again with only a brief delay. He
had now escaped any great disaster, he knew his foe's plans, and he had
the resources to prepare his own answer.

By September ist the whole French line from Verdun to the Somme
is in retreat, Maunoury's army is to come back on the entrenched line
of Paris, Sarrail's is to swing in until one flank rests on Verdun, the
other on the Ornain west of Bar-le-Duc, the remaining armies are to
draw back south of the Marne, with the Seine as their southernmost
limit of retreat. Meantime more troops are to be brought west from
the Lorraine front. When this new concentration is complete, the
French will have overcome all the handicaps imposed upon them by the
size of German armies sent through Belgium and will have survived the ini-
tial defeats with only incidental losses. The morale of the French armies
will not be impaired, their ammunition will be renewed, and the Germans
will now begin to show the strain of their long, forced marches and begin
to outrun both their ammunition and their heavy guns.

To understand the French strategy it is essential to remember that
the French Commander-in-Chief necessarily kept in mind the events of
1870. Then the first battles had resulted in heavy defeats for the French
armies. But following them these armies had been separated, Bazaine

BELGIAN DEFENCE AND FRENCH OFFENCE 113

had been shut up in Metz, and MacMahon, driven by political pressure,
had led his army to the disaster of Sedan. In 1914 the initial defeats
had come, all the offensive plans had been wrecked, but the central
idea of preserving the cohesion of all the armies and preventing isola-
tion or envelopment had been rigidly adhered to from the outset.

THE SITUATION OF THE FRENCH AND GERMAN ARMIES ON AUGUST 30, 1914

Between August 2oth, the date of Morhange, and August 3Oth, Joffre had rearranged his armies,
restored their cohesion, prepared the instrument he was to use

On the battlefield, French commanders showed themselves gravely
inferior to German in the opening engagements, but French High Com-
mand was never shaken by the first reverses, never provoked into pre-
mature offensives, never permitted political pressure to drive it to risk a
decisive engagement under unfavourable conditions. And by September

ii4 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

ist the advantage passed sharply to the French side; it was the Ger-
man strategy that now began to break down. ^ If the French Com-
mander was totally deceived as to the magnitude of the German thrust
through Belgium and as to the efficacy of German heavy artillery, the
German General Staff was utterly misled as to the condition of French
armies after the first battles and soon permitted itself to be led into a
fatally defective position and thus lost the decisive battle for which it
had been planning for over forty years.

CHAPTER SIX

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

I
SEPTEMBER 5

On September 5, 1914, at noon, a French battery of "75*5" leaving
the village of Iverny, something less than twenty miles due east of Paris
and less than five from Meaux, suddenly came under the fire of a Ger-
man battery on the Monthyon-Penchard hills, a little to the east.
The captain was killed and the battery made a hasty retreat. These
were the first shots fired in the Battle of the Marne. The next four days
saw the greatest battle of modern history, fought by far more than two
million men over a front of not less than one hundred and fifty miles —
from the environs of Paris to the forts of Verdun.

In this battle, a German army, which had moved from victory to
victory, whose marching flank had passed from Liege through Brussels
almost to the gates of Paris, was turned back, compelled to retreat,
on one flank not less than seventy miles, leaving behind it guns, flags,
and prisoners. More than this, the decisive battle, for which German
military men had been preparing for forty years, was lost; the promise
of a swift, short, and irresistible blow, which the violation of Belgian neu-
trality held out, was vitiated; the offensive was lost, and a beaten army
was compelled to dig itself into trenches from which it would be able
to make no considerable advance during the next two years of the war.

This is what the French call the " Miracle of the Marne." While it
was going forward, no detailed accounts were possible. After it was
completed, the great events that followed robbed it of public interest.
I shall endeavour to set forth briefly the story of the decisive phases of
this battle as it was told to me on the battlefields by French officers,
a year and a half later, or as it is disclosed in the writings of French
military critics unhappily little translated as yet.

u6 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

To understand the course of this gigantic struggle it is necessary
first to dismiss the familiar legend that the French armies, which won
the battle — the British contribution was insignificant — were ever
routed. The battle was not the sudden rally of thousands and hundreds
of thousands of soldiers, who had been for days fleeing before a vic-
torious enemy. It was the result of a clear, cool, and deliberate plan,
and it was in obedience to this plan that the several French armies,
together with the small British force which fought at the Marne, had
been drawn back from the frontier to the field of the conflict.

The sole purpose of French strategy in the opening days of the war had
been to keep these armies intact until the direction and nature of the
main German thrust were disclosed. Incident to this plan, and not for
political or sentimental reasons, as was asserted at the time, Joffre had un-
dertaken several minor offensives, in Alsace, in Lorraine, and in Belgian
Luxemburg. These had resulted in the defeats of Morhange, Neuf-
chateau, and the useless victory, after initial defeat, about Miihlhausen.

All the armies engaged in these battles had retired to their earlier
positions and made good their lines, repulsing all attacks. But the
French army sent north toward Belgium, together with the British
expeditionary force, had been beaten upon by an unexpectedly large
German mass coming in three armies through Belgium. The French
army had suffered defeat at Charleroi and had retreated in good order;
the British army had almost found destruction, because upon it the
full force of the German blow had fallen.

All this was clear to Joffre in the first days of the last week of August.
The Germans, having the initiative, had elected to send a huge mass of
troops through Belgium, and the troops were not discovered in full
numbers until they had reached and passed the Franco-Belgian frontier.

But starting about August 25th, Joffre set himself to the task of
matching his troops against the Germans, of reconcentrating his armies
until he should have equal or superior numbers at the decisive point;
he was never to have equal numbers at all points. While this recon-
centration was going on he always foresaw a new French offensive.

About September ist it looked as if the moment had arrived. He

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

117

had assembled two new armies, one in the centre and one on the left,
on the flank of the British, thus abolishing the peril that Kluck's army
had had for him after Mons. On the line of the Somme, the Oise, and
the Aisne, from Amiens to Verdun, the French armies were ready, but
unhappily the British army, having suffered disproportionately, had

KEY

^BRITISH
1 FRENCH

GERMAN
XXXXIE CAVALRY

I-Kluck
II-Bulow

THE GERMAN ADVANCE TO THE MARNE

III-Hausen V-The Crown Prince VII-Heeringen

IV-Wiirtemberg VI-The Bavarians

retreated too far. Therefore, despite local advantage in several con-
flicts, notably at Guise, Joffre determined on a new retreat. When this
was accomplished, his line would rest at either end on Paris and Verdun.
His centre would curve south almost to the Seine. From this point he
planned to attack the Germans.

ii8 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

This retreat, which began about September ist and ended by Sep-
tember 4th, placed the Germans in a difficult dilemma. In retreating
south of Paris, Joffre offered Kluck, on the German right, the chance
to attack the city. It was a tempting bait, but Kluck wisely refused it.
Such an operation would consume too much time and would require
weakening the line elsewhere to get necessary numbers. But, having
refused it, Kluck had no choice — since he was compelled to keep in touch
with Billow — but to turn southeastward and march straight across the
face of the forts of Paris. His objective was the left wing of the French
field armies; the purpose of the whole German host was, of course, to
smash the field forces of France.

II. KLUCK TURNS SOUTHEAST

Kluck's turn southeast was safe only if there was but a small gar-
rison in Paris. If there was an army, then, when his front had got
south of Paris, his flank and rear would be open to attack from this
direction and he would be in exactly the position that the British had
been in at Mons and at Cambrai. And as the British were on the end of
the whole Anglo-French line from the Vosges, west, and it was thus
exposed, so the whole German line would now be exposed.

We now touch on the first of the two determining circumstances of
the Battle of the Marne, which in French history are known as the
Battle of the Ourcq and of La Fere-Champenoise, respectively. Kluck,
in common with all German generals, seems to have been satisfied
that the opening conflicts of the war had been decisive; he seems to
have been sure that he had before him only beaten troops, and he had no
suspicion of the fact that Joffre had concentrated before Paris a new
and strong army, that of Maunoury, which was now prepared to
strike on his flank as he had struck on the Anglo-French flank from Mons
to the Oise.

It was in the evening of September 3d that General Gallieni, com-
manding the Paris camp, learned from his observers that Kluck's army
had begun to turn away from Paris and was marching southeast from
Senlis toward Meaux and the crossings of the Marne. He communicated

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

119

the fact to Joffre by telephone, and on the next day there was arranged
the plan which precipitated the Battle of the Marne. The credit for
this plan is still disputed by partisans of the two generals. It was on the
day following (September 5th) that Joffre published his famous order an-
nouncing that the moment to attack had come, thanks to the blunders
of the enemy; that failure would not be forgiven, and troops that could
not advance must die on their positions.

Actually, it was planned that the Maunoury army, emerging from
the intrenched camp of Paris and moving due east, should attack the
small flank guards which Kluck had left facing Paris; drive them east
across the Ourcq River, which runs from the north down into the Marne
above Meaux; and, passing the Ourcq, cut across the rear both of Kluck's
and Billow's armies. The mass of Kluck' s army was far south of the
Marne, in front of the British and the Fifth French Army, under
Franchet d'Esperey. A very good parallel for Maunoury's blow, as
planned, is that delivered by "Stonewall" Jackson on Hooker's right at
Chancellorsville.

O Oyill«ma-V«nlj

ORevigny

gBar-le-Duc.

KLUCK S CIRCLE

About Sept. 1st, at Senlis, Kluck began to move eastward away from Paris. On Sept. 5th
the van of his army was south of the Mame beyond Coulommiers. At that time his rear and
flank guard just north of Meaux was attacked by Maunoury coming from Paris. Kluck then
drew back the mass of his troops in a complete circle north of the Marne and west of the Ourcq.
On Sept. Qth, following the reverse of Hausen, he began his retreat upon Soissons

120 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

To the British was assigned precisely the role that Napoleon as-
signed to Grouchy in the Waterloo campaign. Field-Marshal French's
army was expected to engage and hold Kluck's army while Maunoury
struck its flank and rear. Kluck had two corps south of the Marne
facing the British, in addition to cavalry; the British had three corps
facing the Kluck army, and on its right the line was prolonged by Gen-
eral Conneau's cavalry to the left of D'Esperey.

III. BRITISH FAILURE

In this particular mission the British failed exactly as did Grouchy,
and the consequence of their failure was the escape of Kluck and the
restriction of the extent of the Allied victory. The failure long re-
mained unknown to the British public, which was early informed and
generally believed that the British had won the Battle of the Marne and
saved France. The fact was quite different. Not only were the Brit-
ish not actively engaged at the Marne, but had they been able to do that
which had been hoped, if not expected of them, Kluck might have been
destroyed and the Battle of the Marne might have been as immediately
conclusive as Waterloo.

The story of the British failure is simply told. On September 4th
Generals Gallieni and Maunoury went by automobile to Field-Marshal
French's headquarters at Melun. They asked the British commander
to change front and attack the two corps of Kluck's army facing him ;
this attack was requested for the following day, September 5th. At the
same time Maunoury was to attack the flank and rear guards of Kluck
along the Ourcq. Such an operation would crush Kluck in the closing
blades of a scissors-like movement. Here was the major strategy of the
Marne.

But Field-Marshal French declared that he could not get ready to
attack in less than forty-eight hours. He did not get ready and as a
result Kluck drew his two corps out of the front of the British, put them
in against Maunoury, totally wrecking the whole strategic conception
of the French High Command and coming within the narrowest margin
of destroying the Maunoury army under the walls of Paris.

MARSHAL FOCH

This is the man whose tremendous thrust routed the Prussian Guard at the Battle of the Marne.
Launched at exactly the right moment it went through the Guard " as a knife goes through cheese,"
routed the whole army of Hausen, and earned for Foch, Joffre's verbal decoration as " the first strategist in
Europe." A few weeks later, through his generalship and the help of the flower of the British Army, Foch's
troops won the terrible struggle that we call Ypres. There is a legend that this time he won commendation
from Lord Roberts who, after studying his plans, is said to havp remarked to officers of his staff, "You
have a great general." His appointment as Generalissimo of the Allied forces marked the beginning of
their final forward drive to victory.

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 123

All that was left in front of the British was a cavalry screen, but
this sufficed to hold up the British advance. Field-Marshal French's
army did not get across the Marne until September 9th, and the British
left, whose aid was most desired, did not get across the river in time to
help Maunoury at all.

Thus to all intents and purposes the British were not engaged in the
Marne at all. On this point the British and French commentators of
any authority are completely in agreement. Here is the end of the
legend that the British saved anything at the Marne ; the sole question
must be whether what was lost by reason of their failure was unavoid-
ably lost. Could French have moved more swiftly? Did he let the
supreme opportunity of the war slip through his fingers? Unmistak-
ably this is the view of the French military commentators and to this
view British military criticism now points clearly.

Field-Marshal French's apologists insist that Maunoury struck too
soon and that the responsibility for the failure was his and not the
British commander's. But will such a defence hold ? We know now
that the decisive blow in the battle was struck by Foch on September
9th and at La Fere-Champenoise. We know that it was struck when
his army was in a critical condition and that it succeeded only because
Maunoury's attack, opened on September 5th, had just produced
that dislocation in the German lines which opened the gap through
which Foch penetrated.

We may say without hesitation, then, that Maunoury did not at-
tack prematurely. He attacked at the moment fixed by Joffre, who
was surveying the whole battlefield of which Field-Marshal French
saw but one corner, and he attacked because Joffre perceived that the
hour had come beyond which it was dangerous to wait. Whatthap-
pened on September 9th, prior to the moment Foch seized the chance to
save himself and France, completely demonstrated the correctness of
Joffre's view.

This would show that Maunoury*s attack was not premature, but
it would not prove that Field-Marshal French was tardy, or "over
cautious" to use the severe words of one British commentator. But,

124

HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

unfortunately for French, his whole record is against him. He delayed
at Mons; he procrastinated in the retreat, notably at the moment of
Guise, under conditions that had tragic consequences for one French
commander; he was late in sending up supports at Neuve-Chapelle
and Loos. All these delays were fatal to success at the moment, and
the cumulative effect of them led to his retirement from the command
of the British army in France.

On his own record, supported as it is by a wealth of testimony with

IV-Wiirtemberg
V-Crown Prince

BATTLE OF THE MARNE, SEPT. 5TH

A-Maunoury D-Foch I-Kluck

B-British E-De Langle de Gary II-Biilow

C-Franchet d'Esperey F-Sarrail III-Hausen

Note — The small black and white square above Meaux represents the Fourth Reserve Corps left

by Kluck to cover his flank

respect to his actions during the Battle of the Marne — when he con-
tinued to appeal to the hard-pressed Maunoury to send him reinforce-
ments, after he had permitted all of Kluck's army but a cavalry screen
to escape from his front and attack Maunoury — it is difficult to escape
the conviction that Field-Marshal French failed to rise to the greatest
opportunity of the war, either because he did not perceive it or lacked
the necessary energy and initiative.

At all events, as to the main fact there can be no doubt. The British

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

125

BATTLE OF THE MARNE, SEPT. 8TH

Armies distinguished by same symbols as on previous map. The small square north of the

British represents the cavalry corps

BATTLE OF THE MARNE, SEPT. 9TH

Armies distinguished as above. The arrow shows attack by Foch's Forty-second Division which

won the Battle of La Fere-Champenoise

126 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

were never seriously engaged at the Battle of the Marne and did not
make any material contribution to the French victory. Field-Marshal
French failed as completely here as did Grouchy in the Waterloo cam-
paign. Grouchy 's failure cost his Emperor a throne; French's failure
did not have anything like so grave consequences, but it did deprive
France of the maximum of possible profit from a magnificently con-
ceived stroke, and it almost infallibly saved the army of Kluck from
destruction.

IV. THE BATTLE OF THE OURCQ

On September 5th Maunoury 's army was on the move, one half ad-
vancing straight against Kluck's flank guard, the Fourth Reserve Corps,
the other circling round from the north and aiming at the flank and rear of
that corps. Maunoury had considerably less than 100,000 men at the
outset ; his army was doubled as the engagement proceeded, but it was
made up of very heterogeneous elements, Algerian and Moroccan troops,
reservists, and only a few first-line units. It had before it on September
5th not many more than 40,000 Germans.

The battlefield of the Ourcq is a broad, level plateau, stretching
north from the Marne and ending on the east abruptly, where it falls
down into the deep Ourcq Valley. To the eye it seems perfectly level,
save for two wooded hills, a few miles east of Meaux, the hills of Mon-
thyon and Penchard. It is cut by several brooks, contains a number of
small villages, but is without walls, hedges, or anything that would offer
great obstruction to troops, or artillery fire. Several large farm build-
ings, recalling the Chateau of Hougoumont at Waterloo, played a sim-
ilar role in the battle.

In the afternoon of September 5th this army of Maunoury advanced
and came in contact with the German troops on the hills of Monthyon
and Penchard. These hills were taken in the evening hours. By the
morning of September 6th the Germans were recoiling toward the very
edge of the plateau, with the Ourcq Valley at their backs. A number of
villages were taken by storm, notably Barcy and Etrepilly, and the
French from the north were able to threaten a flanking movement

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 127

which promised to turn the Fourth Reserve Corps out of their posi-
tion.

But now comes the change. Kluck seems to have appreciated
the full extent of the peril incredibly swiftly. By September 6th he
was drawing his troops from the front of the British. Actually he was
able to withdraw first the Second (active) Corps and then the Fourth
(active) Corps, leaving only cavalry under Marwitz to hold the British.
With these troops he counter-attacked Maunoury, threw him back
materially on September 8th, and on the next day bent the northern flank
of the French army back until it stood at right angles to the rest of the
line, and on this day seemed destined to drive Maunoury back into Paris.
On the night of September 9-10, the Paris garrison stood to arms and
Maunoury' s troops waited anxiously for daybreak, still with orders to
attack, but expecting to be attacked and destroyed. After three and
a half days of fighting they were at the end of their strength.

When daylight came on September loth the Germans were gone.
For Kluck the retreat to the Aisne had begun, but it was not a retreat
due to his own defeat. The first blow of the French had been parried;
the failure of the British to retain even one corps of Kluck's army before
them, their extreme slowness of movement, had permitted Kluck to
recojicentrate his army, escape from the vicious position in which he
stood when battle began, had enabled him to throw back Maunoury's
army, insure his retreat, and to come within an ace of winning a deci-
sive battle.

V. LA FERE-CHAMPENOISE

If it had failed in its chief purpose, still the effect of Maunoury's
attack had been to dislocate not only Kluck' s army, but that of Billow
to the east, the army which had won Charleroi and now faced the Fifth
French Army along the Grand Morin, south of Montmirail and east to
the marshes of St. Gond. This army drew back to keep its alignment
with Kluck, heavily pursued and fighting many minor engagements
right across the battlefields of the famous Napoleonic campaign of 1814.
Montmirail, Vauchamps, and Champaubert woke from a century of

128 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

peace to new carnage. But the fight between D'Esperey and Biilow
was not to the finish, because Biilow was steadily compelled to retire to
keep his contact with Kluck. Hence this part of the whole Battle of the
Marne is of relatively minor importance. Had Kluck attacked Paris,
D'Esperey's army might have played another and decisive role, for
Joffre had also prepared for this consequence.

To the east of D'Esperey was the army of Foch, which now played
the decisive part. This army stood, at first, with its advance guards
on the north side of the famous marshes of St. Gond, a strange swamp
full of stagnant ponds and crossed by only a few highways. This was a
considerable military obstacle. Behind it ran a line of hills, north of
the town of Sezanne and dropping away to the southeast, looking down
on La Fere-Champenoise from the Plateau of Euvy and losing them-
selves in the monotonous plain of the Camp de Mailly.

When Maunoury's attack compelled the immediate retreat of Khick's
troops south of the Marne and the ultimate retrogression of Biilow, the
German High Command resolved to seek victory by a redoubled pres-
sure upon Foch, who held the French centre. In a word, the Germans
undertook to break the French line, the whole line from Paris to Verdun,
and to break it at the exact centre, which was where Foch stood. Foch
was heavily outnumbered, and although he began, on September 7th, a
brave offensive, he was steadily driven south and suffered great losses.
The fighting here was the most sanguinary of the whole engagement,
and there are ten thousand graves in the little town of La Fere-Cham-
penoise alone.

Nor was this the worst. Not only was Foch driven south, but his right
or eastern flank was driven very far south, until his army, instead effacing
north, faced nearly east, and a wide gap began to open in the whole French
line between Foch and the French army of De Langle de Cary to the east.

September 9th is here, as at the Ourcq, the decisive day. On this
day Franchet d'Esperey, having cleared Biilow from the banks of the
Petit Morin and finding his Tenth Corps freed by Billow's withdrawal
to the northwest, toward Kluck, lends this corps to Foch, and it now
begins to act on the western flank of the German centre.

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 129

This aid assures the safety of Foch's western flank and he now with-
draws his 42d Division from this flank, transports it eastward to Linthes,
and very late in the afternoon suddenly launches it in a terrific drive
at the Prussian Guard between the marshes of St. Gond and La Fere-
Champenoise.

At this point the German line has been thinned as a result first of
the withdrawal of Billow toward Kluck and secondly in consequence of
the eagerness of the Germans to press their advantage to the south, where
they were at the point of piercing the whole French line about Gourgan-
con. These two movements, going on at the same moment, stretch the
lines of the Prussian Guard — which is charged with preserving the con-
tact between Billow's army on the west and Hausen's in the centre
facing Foch — as an elastic is stretched by pulling both ends. The 42d
Division goes through the Guard as a knife cuts through cheese, as the
French afterward explained; it throws the Saxons in and about La
Fere-Champenoise into disorder which becomes a rout, for Foch at the
same moment launches a general attack.

This tremendous thrust earned for Foch Joffre's verbal decoration
as "the first strategist in Europe." It routed the Prussian Guard,
which lost most of its artillery; it crumpled up the flank of the two
Saxon corps; it routed the entire army of Hausen, who was forthwith
retired in disgrace. It resulted in the wild retreat of the whole Hausen
army as well as that of the Prussian Guard. Here, and only here, was
there anything approaching a great battlefield triumph. Billow had
retired with little or no disorder; Kluck had retrieved his earlier reverses,
and, at the moment when Foch struck his blow, was winning the Battle
of theOurcq.

But the retirement of Kluck and Billow and the disaster which had
overtaken the German centre, under Hausen, together decided the fate
of the battle. It was on the receipt of news of this disaster that Kluck
started his rapid retreat to the Aisne; that Billow at last gave over his
effort to regain control of the north bank of the Marne, which he had
too hastily abandoned ; and from Paris to Vitry-le-Francois the German
armies all took the homeward roads.

i3o HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

VI. DE LANGLE DE GARY AND SARRAIL

It remains very briefly to mention the incidents to the east. Here,
behind the Ornain, the army of De Langle de Gary stood for three days
rigidly on the defensive, beating off German attacks made by the
army of Wiirtemberg on a front from Vitry-le-Francois to Revigny.
More physical destruction was done here than anywhere along the battle-
field, and the ruins of Sermaize supply evidence of the wanton fury of the
Bavarians. But like the battles around Montmirail, these contests were
without issue, because the decision at La Fere-Champenoise ultimately
compelled the Bavarians to retire.

As for the army of Sarrail, standing from Revigny north to Souilly,
where it touched the positions held by the garrison of Verdun, it resisted
all attacks of the army of the Crown Prince, operating east of the Ar-
gonne, to penetrate its front and isolate Verdun. It had a bad moment
when its rear was threatened along the Meuse at Forts Tryon and
Liouville by a drive coming from Metz, but the garrisons of these forts
held out until aid came, and the destruction of the bridges of the Meuse
proved sufficient to bar the Germans.

For the armies of Kluck, Billow, and Hausen the day of September
9th was decisive, and as early as September 6th the first two were in
partial retreat. But both the Wurtemberg army and that of the Crown
Prince held on for several days more and retired in good order in the
end, when the recoil of the armies to the west made their retreat neces-
sary to keep the alignment. Of the five German armies only those of
Kluck and Hausen actually put forth their whole strength, and of these
only that of Hausen was decisively beaten. Of the French armies,
only those of Maunoury and Foch were engaged to the limit, and Maun-
oury failed to accomplish his purpose because he did not get the help
from the British that was expected.

Had the plan conceived by Joffre or Gallieni, or by both together,
been realized, the Germans would have suffered a decisive defeat and
would have been unable to remain in France. Had Hausen been able
to break the French centre, even after Maunoury's attack and the

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 131

retreat of Kluck and Billow, the Battle of the Marne would have ended
in a decisive victory for the Germans and the French army would have
been cut in two, one fragment driven in on Paris, the other on the bar-
rier fortresses to the east.

There was a time when it was generally believed that the Battle of
the Marne was won by the operations near Paris, and there is a legend
of a victory won by the transport of troops through Paris in taxicabs.
The troops were transported in taxis, but they arrived not in time to
win the Battle of the Marne, but only in time to save the Battle of the
Ourcq. Equally fallacious is the story of the British part in the battle.
The British were never actively engaged in the battle at all; they
never had anything but rearguards to deal with, and these rearguards
held them up until the chance for a supreme success had totally dis-
appeared.

It is open to question whether Foch would have been able to deal
his decisive blow if Maunoury's thrust had not compelled the retirement
of Billow, by making Kluck draw his corps north of the Marne and west
of the Ourcq, thus dislocating the whole German front. But it is not
open to question that the blow of Foch was decisive. It was delivered
by a beaten army almost at the last gasp, an army which had been
recoiling under pressure for three days and had suffered losses that
amounted to extermination in the case of some of its units. American
army officers who visited the battlefield before the bodies had been
removed will some day supply conclusive evidence of the bitterness of
the conflict as measured by the carnage.

VII. THE CONSEQUENCES

No estimate of total losses, of prisoners, of booty, has ever been pub-
lished. But it seems conservative to estimate that of the 2,250,000 men
engaged between Verdun and Paris there were more than 300,000
killed or wounded. The French loss was not less than the German;
it may have been more, for the French in many fields did the attacking.
Certainly between the opening of the campaign and the end of the
German retreat after the Marne the French losses exceeded the German

i32 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

—the losses in killed and wounded — while the total of prisoners taken
by the Germans in the various fortified positions, Maubeuge, Longwy,
etc., were very much greater.

It is reasonably certain that the Germans outnumbered the French
on the battlefield, but owing to faults of German concentration and de-
ploying the French certainly got much more out of their inferior num-
bers, while the Germans seem to have handled their masses badly and to
have suffered from an excess of numbers at certain unimportant points.

The consequences of the battle were wholly misunderstood at first
by both the French and the Germans. The French believed that they
had won a victory which would turn the Germans out of France. The
Germans believed that they had merely suffered a minor reverse and
that after a new concentration they would be able to take the offensive
again and renew their bid for a decision. Both illusions perished at the
Aisne. Here the Germans were able to repulse the French and dig in,
but on their side they never were able to get on their feet and advance
again.

Actually the Battle of the Marne broke the German offensive,
wrecked their whole strategy, which was to bring the French to a decisive
battle in the first six weeks of the war, win that battle, and put the French
out of the war. They advanced to the Marne seeking a second Sedan,
and the French there won an Antietam. All the original German con-
ceptions were definitely defeated in this battle ; they were compelled to
retreat, to give over the offensive, to accept a long war. But, save for
the Prussian Guard and the Saxons of Hausen, they were nowhere routed,
and they were able within a week after the decisive day of the Marne,
September 9th, to halt the Allies along the Aisne, establish their front
unbroken from the Aisne to the Meuse, and even to undertake a new
attack. But this failed almost instantly.

It is essential — as has been said before and cannot be said too often —
to keep in mind, in examining the Battle of the Marne, the story of the
opening weeks of the Franco-Prussian War. The two conflicts began in
much the same way. In both cases German mobilization put more
troops and better-equipped troops into the field. In both cases all the

NOVEL PHASES OF
MODERN WARFARE
SHOWN IN PICTURES

A HIDDEN AND DEFENDED MACHINE GUN

Except for the noise, which resembles a pneumatic rivetting machine, this gun gives the
enemy no indication of its whereabouts. It fires through a painted net curtain.

THE "AGENT DE LIAISON"

This French soldier's official designation is as sinister as his appearance. He is an agent de liaison. It is a relief
to know that this means simply telephone operator. He wears his mask as a protection against poison-gas bombs.
A hand grenade is in the pouch suspended from his belt.

Photograph by Paul Thompson

"POISON GAS" IN THE WAR

The upper picture shows the cylindrical containers from which the poison gas emanates. The Austriaus left
them behind when the Russians drove them from this position. Trenches have to be dug sometimes when gas-bombs
and shells are exploding close at hand. These British "Tommies" are wearing respirators as a protection against
poisonous fumes.

MACHINE-GUN POSITION IN THE OPEN

Where guns and men are protected only by small dugouts and shell-craters — conditions
which obtain during an advance

PERISCOPE AND METAL HELMET

The French soldiers soon bowed to grim necessity and gave up the blue tunics and red trousers endeared to them
by a romantic and glorious tradition. These entrenched poilus are sensibly making themselves as safe and comfortable
as they can. Clad in serviceable and inconspicuous "horizon" blue uniforms with metal helmets, one man is trying
a pot-shot with his rifle, which is equipped with a periscope so that he need expose himself no more than is necessary,
while his comrade is solacing himself with a glance at his favorite Paris newspaper.

*x JlLirfh i} \ u &

^ >^i ^^^^jjB.^t.LU^. Lli^.^t.lL^

THIS IS THE RESULT WHEN A FOREST BECOMES A BATTLEFIELD

BUCKLER, HAND-GRENADE AND HELM

History repeats itself in war as in other human relationships In 1913 the world thought the day of warriors with
steel helmets and shields had passed forever. But here is one very much alive. He is a grenadier, too, in the original
sense of the term, for he stands ready to throw a hand-grenade in the face of his enemy.

Photograph by the International Nevis Service

BARBED WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS

Barbed wire has been used in the World War on an unprecedented scale. These troops (upper picture) are advanc-
ing upon an abandoned fort by the side of a formidable entanglement which has been firmly anchored by stout posts.
The French have invented a gun (lower picture) which fires into the midst of the wire entanglement a hook attached
to a cable. The hook is then hauled back, supposedly bringing with it large masses of the wire.

THE GASOLINE ENGINE

The gasoline engine has greatly increased the mobility of modern troops. The
lower picture shows a little British fortress that can be moved at the rate of twenty-five
or thirty miles an hour, wherever there is a decent road. The upper and middle pictures
show one method the Germans have adopted for increasing the mobility of their artillery.
The armoured car affords protection to the gun-crew while in transit to the point at which
they are needed. Arrived on the ground the car's armour is removed (as shown in the
tentre picture and the gun cleared for action in two or three minutes.

WORK AND PLAY AT THE FRONT

These French gunners (upper picture) are working to excellent purpose in a dugout carefully concealed from the
air-scouts of the enemy.

This seems a strange place for a candy-shop, yet it is doing a big business. The Young Men's Christian Association
maintains many little booths like this, just back of the firing line. The soldier's small change is apt to burn a hole in
his pocket, and he highly appreciates such opportunities to get rid of it in exchange for sweets and other little luxuries.

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 141

opening battles were won by the Germans. But at this point the par-
allel stops short. Instead of Mars-la-Tour and Sedan, with their fatal
terminations, you have an orderly retreat of all French armies until a
new concentration permits a fresh offensive, and when this happens you
have a German retreat followed by a German rally, which ends in a
deadlock and more than three years of trench war.

This, after all, is the "Miracle of the Marne." The German High
Command said: "We have more men, better guns, better troops; we
will violate the neutrality of Belgium, turn the French fortresses and,
arriving in the plains of northern France, we will destroy the French
armies, take Paris, and then turn east and dispose of Russia. We shall
win the war in six weeks and take Paris in seven. We shall hold France
to ransom and dispose of the French danger for all time."

Not one detail of this grandiose plan was realized. Not one detail
has been realized after three years of war. We all see that if France
had failed, Russia would have been conquered, and even the British
Empire would have come to the edge of ruin. But France did not fail.
She won her greatest victory in a wonderful history with but the least
possible support from Britain; she saved herself, Britain and Russia,
and after the Marne the war had new horizons and different possibilities.
Thus in every sense the Battle of the Marne was one of the few truly
decisive battles in all human history, a battle whose consequences,
though we may not yet accurately measure them, seem, at the distance
of nearly three years, incomparably greater than on the day when the
world first learned that the German invasion would not reach Paris.

VIII. THE SECOND BATTLE OF NANCY

During the whole of the first week of September, ending before the
Battle of the Marne reached its decisive stage, another contest was going
forward on the front which had been successfully maintained by the
French after their defeat at Morhange. Coordinating their movements
with those of the armies to the west, eight German corps under the
Crown Prince of Bavaria and General Heeringen, in the decisive hours,
acting under the eyes of the Kaiser himself, undertook to cut their way

i42 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

through the gap in the French barrier forts between Toul and £pinal
and thus arrive on the flank and rear of all the French armies righting
from Verdun to Paris.

Had this drive succeeded, the decision of the Marne would have been
reversed, and German strategy would have triumphed despite the
checks elsewhere. It did not succeed, because, although his armies
were heavily depleted to reinforce armies to the west, General de Castel-
nau was able to repulse all attacks in fighting which was unquestionably
the most costly to the Germans in the whole period of the war preceding
the struggles in Flanders. Unfortunately the larger issues at the Marne,
the proximity of the western battlefield to Paris, have served to obscure
these operations. Thus, precisely as the victory of Foch at La Fere-
Champenoise is little known save to military men; although it did, in
fact, decide the Marne, the success of De Castelnau, which permitted
the victory of the Marne and held the whole eastern line of the French
field armies, has, as yet, no place in current history.

When the German attack began, De Castelnau stood thus : his left
or northern flank rested on the Moselle south of Pont-a-Mousson and on
the Plateau of Ste. Genevieve, a gentle hill, which is the northern ex-
tremity of the Grand-Couronne. Thence it followed the Grand-Cour-
onne, facing the little Seille River, to the Plateau d'Amance, at the
southern end of the Grand-Couronne. Here the ground falls sharply
and the French line passing through the Forest of Champenoux and a
dozen little towns, scenes of desperate fighting, still unknown, crossed the
Meurthe at the foot of the Plateau of Saffais-Belchamps, due south of
Nancy, and extended along the ridge between the Meurthe and the
Moselle, south toward the Vosges.

This was a position long ago surveyed as the final line of French re-
sistance if the German attack came from Alsace-Lorraine. Every
higher officer in France knew it. Here, if anywhere, the French could be
expected to make a successful resistance — and they did.

The first attack came upon Ste. Genevieve. The Germans advanced
south on both sides of the Moselle, took Pont-a-Mousson, entered the
Forest of the Advance Guard, and opened a cross fire upon the French

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 143

at Ste. Genevieve. Despite orders to retire, the French, only a bat-
talion strong, held on and repulsed massed attacks, after which the
Germans left 4,000 bodies in the Bois de Facq. Finally, just as he was
withdrawing in obedience to peremptory orders, the French Com-
mander perceived that the Germans were also drawing out, whereupon
he returned to his lines.

The second and main attack came at the other end of the Grand-
Couronne on the edge of the Plateau d'Amance and through the large
Forest of Champenoux. No more desperate fighting in the whole war
has occurred than here. Heavily outnumbered, the French were driven
back to the western edge of the forest; the Germans for a brief hour
seized a small farm at the foot of the Plateau D'Amance but were
driven out. Terrific righting and enormous losses marked the engage-
ments to the south, notably about the little village of Corbessaux. In
front of the Plateau of Saff ais-Belchamps the Germans were slaughtered
in masses, attempting to cross the Meurthe.

A final attack, around Amance and the Forest of Champenoux —
currently believed to have been made while the Kaiser, surrounded by his
guard in white uniform, waited at Eply to enter Nancy — was rolled back.
Before Foch had won his great struggle at La Fere-Champenoise, the
drive through Lorraine was over and the Second Battle of Nancy had
saved the eastern barrier to France. Afterward, as the Germans
began to draw troops out of this line to meet the new situation in the
west, the French pushed out, retook Pont-a-Mousson and Luneville,
and reestablished their front along the frontier from the Vosges to
Pont-a-Mousson.

The Second Battle of Nancy was a defensive battle to save the main
French operation, westward at the Marne. It was really a vital phase of
the Marne itself, the foundation on which JofFre built his whole strategy;
it was probably bloodier than any fight at the Marne, and its relative
value must be recognized to appreciate the whole picture of the Marne
campaign. It was won by the army that had been defeated at Mor-
hange, but by only a fraction of the force that fought in that disastrous
engagement, for Joffre had long ago depleted it to supply troops for his

144 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

new armies and to reinforce the others, while the Battle of the Marne
was still in progress.

IX. TANNENBERG

To complete the story of the Marne, it is necessary to recount now
the disaster that overtook the Russian army, which had invaded East
Prussia from Warsaw. In the general Franco-Russian plan, it was

FIRST RUSSIAN INVASION OF EAST PRUSSIA, CHECKED BY HINDENBURG AT
TANNENBERG, AUG. 31, iqi\

Two Russian armies were sent into East Prussia, one from the Niemen front and the other
north from Warsaw. Hindenburg defeated the Warsaw army decisively at Tannenberg and the
other army then drew back

A-Rennenkampf P-Samsonoff

agreed that Russia should promptly invade East Prussia if Germany
sent her masses through Belgium and against France. It was believed
that such an operation would mean that Germany would have to
leave her eastern front insecurely guarded and that a Russian inva-

HINDENBURG, VICTOR OF TANNENBERG

When the Russians surprised the Germans by their quick mobilization and invasion of East Prussia,
in August, 1914, the German Emperor summoned General Hindenburg from retirement and gave him com-
mand in the region which he had made a life study. He concentrated most of his forces about the Russian
Warsaw army in the region he knew so well. Having drawn a net about his victims he massed his heavy
artillery and practically annihilated the Russian army, which lost about 100,000 troops with guns and flags
innumerable. This was the victory of Tannenberg, which made Hindenburg the idol of the German people.

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 147

sion would promptly force her to withdraw troops from France in
advance of the decisive engagement.

Accordingly two Russian armies were at once sent into East Prussia,
one from the Niemen front and the other north from Warsaw. Both
won immediate and considerable successes, and the Germans on the
day they reached Brussels learned that Russian armies were carrying
the whole eastern frontier and advancing after victories at Gumbinnen
and Insterburg, toward Konigsberg and toward the east bank of the
Vistula north of Thorn. Refugees fleeing before the storm were flowing
into Berlin at the precise moment that French and Belgian exiles were
reaching Paris.

So far the Allied plan had worked amazingly well and the promptness
of Russian invasion had taken the Germans by surprise.

Now, however, the Emperor summoned Hindenburg from retire-
ment and gave him command in the region which he had made a life
study. Hindenburg acted promptly. Leaving only a screen of troops
in front of the Russian army advancing from the east, he concentrated
his forces about the Russian Warsaw army in the difficult swamp
region he knew so well. Having drawn a net about his victims, he
massed his heavy artillery and practically annihilated the Russian army,
which lost more than 100,000 troops with guns and flags innumerable.
This was the victory of Tannenberg, celebrated on Sedan Day by all
Germany as a deliverance from deadly peril.

After Tannenberg, the other Russian army drew" back safely and
Hindenburg still lacked the numbers to press it hard, but he was able
to clear German territory, and the mass of German armies in France
were permitted to go forward to their decisive battle without fear for this
eastern front. Half the Franco-Russian strategic conception had been
wrecked. After the Marne the Germans would not be forced to face
immediate peril in the east as well as the west. They could still con-
centrate their energies on retrieving the situation at the Aisne.

The French victory at the Marne and the great Russian triumph
at Lemberg obscured the Allied mind and the mind of the neutral world
as to the value of Tannenberg. It has not even now, outside of Ger-

i48 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

many, received its just appraisal. Yet, to judge it rightly it is only
necessary to consider what would have been the German situation if,
at the moment the Marne had been lost, Russian troops had occupied
all of Prussia east of the Vistula. This would have happened but for
Tannenberg; it would have happened infallibly if the action of the two
Russian armies had been properly coordinated, for their combined
strength was far greater than Hindenburg's.

For this disaster Lemberg was no counterweight, because Germany
and not Austria was the true enemy and German disaster might have
ended the war. Had the Germans been driven behind the Lower Vistula
all their later and successful campaigns would have been impossible and,
taken with the collapse of Austria at Lemberg and the defeat of the
Marne, the Central Powers would have found themselves at the close
of the second month of war in a situation difficult in the extreme, if not
well-nigh desperate.

All this was avoided by Hindenburg's amazing victory, one of the
most complete in history and rivalling any Napoleonic combination in
skill and effectiveness. More than all else this German victory at the
other end of Europe robbed the Marne of its greatest possible fruits
and condemned northern France to a German occupation which still
persists. The victory on the eastern front enabled Germany to go
forward to the Marne without hesitation; it did not enable her to win
this battle, but after the retreat to the Aisne it permitted her to concen-
trate her energies and her resources in new attacks upon the west which
did not terminate until the Battle of Flanders in mid-November.

Therefore, just as the Marne deprived Germany of any chance to
get a quick decision on her main front, the disaster of Tannenberg
deprived the Allies of any similar chance for a prompt victory. Later
historians will certainly do fuller justice to the importance and service
of Tannenberg to Germany. It was not the greatest German victory
of the war, but certainly it was the most useful, and as such it can rank
only second to the Marne in the first two years of the contest. It is
hardly too much to say that it saved Germany almost as unmistakably
as the Marne saved France.

CHAPTER SEVEN

DEADLOCK IN THE WEST

I
THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE

On the morrow of the victory of the Marne, French purpose is clear.
A great strategic victory has been won, the whole German conception
has been broken. All the German armies are in retreat. It is essen-
tial to pursue these armies; to turn the retreat into a rout, if possible;
in any event, to prevent the Germans from taking root in France and
from presently stepping out in a new general offensive, reopening the
decision of the Marne. In all save the last of these purposes French
strategy failed.

This failure, although materially affected by the condition of the
French army after its long struggle and the disorganization of French
cavalry, was due primarily to the fact that only one German army, and
that the smallest, Hausen's, had actually been beaten on the battlefield.
German armies had allowed themselves to be drawn into a hopelessly
bad position; they had suffered heavy losses and, in the case of the
Saxon army, a real rout; but they had, in the main, seen the danger in
time; drawn themselves out of the trap with great skill and speed; and
begun a retreat, which if rapid was, in the main, orderly, and successful.
In justice to the British, it should be added that if their share in the
Battle of the Marne was insignificant, their part in the pursuit was con-
siderable and they not only did exceedingly well but, having recovered
from the disorganization incident to their long retreat, came into this
operation relatively fresh and thus in condition to do what would have
been beyond the strength of their exhausted allies had they been unaided.

In this same time the purpose of German strategy was to take a new
position in France; reestablish contact between the various armies sepa-
rated by the movements of the battle; and then seek, in a new contest, to

149

ISO HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

win that decisive battle which they had lost at the Marne. The Ger-
man official statements did not admit the loss of the Battle of the
Marne. From September 3d to September I3th they preserved a
complete silence on western operations. It is clear, too, that German
High Command, even as late as September 25th, did not regard the Marne
as the decisive action, and remained confident that a new battle would
win whatever had been temporarily lost.

And in this time German High Command lost forever the chance to
seize the French and Belgian seacoasts, which lay open to their occupa-
tion from the moment that they passed the Somme until their new efforts
from the Oise to the Meuse had been checked. We shall see, a few weeks
later, a frantic effort to repair this great error, when it was too late.
For this blunder, together with rumoured mistakes in the Battle of the
Marne not yet established, the younger and lesser Moltke was pres-
ently to lose his great position as master of the German General Staff,
turning over his office to the Kaiser's favorite, Falkenhayn, whose star
was to set before Verdun as Moltke's set on the road to Calais.

German armies were able to realize many of the hopes and concep-
tions of their commanders in the weeks following the Marne. They
did make good their position in France, behind the deep Aisne, resting
on the hills from Noyon to the Craonne Plateau. They did restore
contact between all their armies and they were able, within ten days
after the decisive day of the Marne, to renew the offensive. But they
were not able to reopen the decision of the Marne, because, while they
were beginning a new offensive between Noyon and Verdun and striking
a heavy blow south of Verdun, at St. Mihiel, French High Command
opened a great turning movement, west of the Oise, which compelled
the Germans to displace their armies, sending masses from Lorraine
and Champagne to Picardy and Artois, and thus resigning their plans
farther east.

All these operations, very complex when read in official bulletins
and utterly confusing to the public at the time they took place, become
perfectly simple if the main purposes are kept in mind. You have first
the French and British pursuit, begun on September roth. You have

DEADLOCK IN THE WEST

next the complete check of this pursuit, after September I3th, when
Kluck stands behind the Aisne, digs himself in and, reinforced by the
troops and guns which are freed by the capture of Maubeuge on Septem-
ber yth, stops Field-Marshal French, Maunoury, and D'Esperey. By

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THE GERMAN RETREAT TO THE AISNE, SEPT. IOTH-I5TH, 1914

The purpose of German strategy was to take a new position in France, reestablish contact
between the various armies, and then seek, in a new contest, to win that decisive battle which they
had lost at the Mame

September i8th Kluck is able to take the offensive and drive the British
and French out of some of the ground they have taken north of the
Aisne.

Meantime to the east, Biilow, Einem (who succeeds Hausen),
Wiirtemberg, and the Crown Prince, have retired slowly, save for the

152 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

Saxons, who disappear soon as an army. The German line curves
around Rheims and through the Argonne. By the third week in
September, Biilow, who has held up Foch just outside of Rheims, at-
tacks, takes the forts of Brimont and Nogent-l'Abbesse, bombards the
cathedral at Rheims, but is checked. Wiirtemberg and the Crown Prince
make a considerable advance west and east of the Argonne, but are
stopped in turn. Troops from Metz make a sudden and successful
attack upon the barrier forts south of Verdun, and take St. Mihiel.

No one of these three attacks had immediately important military
consequences, yet all three are of permanent interest — that of Biilow,
because of the bombardment of the Cathedral of Rheims, which had a
greater moral effect upon the French nation than anything but the vic-
tory of the Marne; that of the Crown Prince because, taken together
with the operations about St. Mihiel, it had a very great value in a later
phase of the war, when the Germans attacked Verdun.

The Crown Prince was checked after a few days. But he got for-
ward sufficiently on the road along which he had recently retreated to
occupy the town of Varennes, and from this and other points was able,
with his heavy artillery, to cut the Paris-Verdun railroad by indirect
fire. Even more complete was the success to the south, where the
Germans, by taking Fort Camp des Remains and occupying the west
bank of the Meuse, facing St. Mihiel, were able to cut the Commercy-
Verdun line. There was a moment when it seemed possible that they
might actually penetrate through the breach they had opened in the
French barrier and join hands with the Crown Prince. This danger
passed; Verdun was not enveloped, but it was left practically without
rail communication with the rest of France, a circumstance which con-
tributed gravely to its danger when the Germans returned to the at-
tack in February, 1916.

About September 2oth Joffre, now assured that he cannot break the
German lines, which have become a wall of trenches from the Vosges
to the Oise, begins to send troops to work around the German right,
which does not extend west of the Oise. These troops come east from
Amiens and aim at St. Quentin and the whole network of railroads on

DEADLOCK IN THE WEST 153

which the German armies depend for their supplies. So confident are
the French of the success of this thrust that at this time Millerand, the
French Minister of War, forecasts the immediate retirement of the
Germans from France, and London has a rumour that Kluck has sur-
rendered.

Nothing like this happens. Instead, the Germans begin to answer
the French flanking operation by bringing troops of their own from their
main front and putting them in west of the Oise. These troops very
quickly put an end to the first French flanking operation ; they retake
Peronne, Roye, Lassigny, and win an action at Bapaume, establishing
in this sector that front which will endure up to the time of the great
Battle of the Somme in the summer of 1916.

II. THE RACE TO THE SEA

But Joffre sticks to his plan. He has brought De Castelnau from
Lorraine with much of the army which had defended Nancy. Oddly
enough the army of De Castelnau, which has long faced the army of
Rupprecht of Bavaria east of the Moselle, arrives west of the Oise just in
time to meet the same German army. A general dislocation of French
and German armies is going forward, General Mand'huy, brought from
the Aisne and put in command of a new army, encounters Billow, brought
over from before Rheims. Finally the Grand Duke of Wiirtemberg
arrives from the Argonne and faces Foch but recently commanding the
army which had reconquered Rheims.

And with this general dislocation the German hope of resuming the
offensive between the Oise and the Moselle expires. The campaign
enters the second phase. The front from Noyon to Nancy becomes
relatively unimportant and the deadlock of trench war along this
line becomes absolute. Now the field of operations is between the Oise
and the sea and the centre of conflict mounts day by day to the north.
The French and the Germans are exactly in the situation of two boys
building rival towers out of blocks and each trying to build the higher
structure. Joffre puts De Castelnau in about Roye and he encounters
Rupprecht of Bavaria. He puts Mand'huy in and he meets Billow

154

HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

east of Arras. He puts Foch in and Foch encounters, not merely Wiir-
temberg come from the Argonne but Besseler, striking south, when the
Antwerp episode is completed. Even Field-Marshal French, quitting
his trenches near Soissons, will presently arrive at Ypres.

THE RACE TO THE SEA

Now the field of operations is between the Oise and the sea, and the centre of conflict mounts
day by day to the north. The French and the Germans are exactly in the situation of two boys
building rival towers out of blocks and each trying to build the higher structure

The French strategy begins to reveal itself. As the French line
mounts to the north it points first toward Lille, lost in the first hours of
the invasion and subsequently retaken, then toward Antwerp, where
the Belgian army still stands, with a line of retreat open to the south,
on the west bank of the Scheldt.

DEADLOCK IN THE WEST 155

What this means the German High Command at last perceives. It
can no longer continue its effort to advance between the Oise and the
Meuse, it has been compelled to draw off troops in Lorraine and Cham-
pagne to meet the new thrust in Picardy and Artois. Already the ac-
tive front has mounted into Flanders. Unless a change comes promptly
the French line will extend until it reaches Belgium, joins with the
Belgian front behind the Scheldt, and not only will there ensue a trench
deadlock from Holland to Switzerland, but the Germans will be per-
manently excluded from the Belgian seacoast. If such a deadlock ensues,
then there is an end to all hope — and already this hope is becoming
remote — of a quick decision over France, and a short war.

There remains in late September only a gap forty miles wide be-
tween the French lines in position from Lille southward and the Chan-
nel. Unless German troops can penetrate this gap and come south,
sweeping behind the Channel ports of Calais and Boulogne, the whole
western campaign will have ended in a stalemate and the French, Brit-
ish, and Belgians will hold an unbroken line from Antwerp to Bel-
fort.

Hence in the latter half of September begins the new and final
German concentration. German strategy has now three purposes: to
take Antwerp and capture the Belgian army, thus preventing a junction
of the Belgians with their allies; to move south through the gap between
Lille and the Channel, taking the Channel ports and finally, if possible,
thus regaining the initiative ; to reopen the decision of the Marne and
win a real victory north of Amiens. Even if this last object is not
realized the Germans can hope to shorten their front by establishing
their western flank on the sea near the mouth of the Somme and at the
same time complete the occupation of northern France and that sea-
coast which would be the logical base for operations against Britain.
And for the German people this last phase is summed up by the word
"Calais," as the earlier drive was comprehended in the magic term
"Paris."

For clarity and convenience we may regard the Battle of the Aisne
as covering all the operations between Soissons and St. Mihiel in the

156 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

time in which the Germans endeavoured to regain the initiative and ad-
vance over the ground they had covered on the road to the Marne. We
may regard the "Race to the Sea" as describing the complicated opera-
tions following the effort of the French to outflank the Germans be-
tween the Oise and the Channel, which resulted in extending the dead-
lock of trench warfare at right angles to the old front nearly as far north
as the city of Lille.

Then comes the German effort to destroy the Belgian army in Ant-
werp and drive south through the open gap between Lille and the sea,
which results in the capture of Antwerp and the advance south as far as
the Yser and Ypres, the occupation of most of the Belgian seacoast, and
finally the bloody defeats at the Yser and Ypres, where the French and
British close the last gap in the line from the sea to Switzerland and thus
checkmate German strategy.

In capturing Antwerp the Germans won a moral not a military vic-
tory, since the Belgian army escaped. But the occupation of the Bel-
gian seacoast was a considerable material advantage and it was due
primarily to the fatal interposition of Winston Churchill, who made his
celebrated entrance into Antwerp after King Albert and the French
General Staff had agreed upon an evacuation, inevitable by reason of
German progress through the Belgian defences. Yielding to the im-
portunities of Churchill, King Albert delayed his evacuation for two
days. When he did leave he lost a whole division, crowded into Dutch
territory by the Germans ; his army was disorganized by its pressed re-
treat; it was no longer possible to hold the line of the Scheldt; and the
Germans were not only able to take Ostend and the Belgian seacoast,
but also to seize Lille, the greatest manufacturing city of northern
France, which they still hold after two years and a half.

Only by a narrow margin did the intervention of Churchill miss caus-
ing the capture of King Albert's whole army and a great Allied dis-
aster. Never was there a better example of the folly of political inter-
ference with military operations, no single blunder in the whole opening
days of the war was more costly to the Allies than this grotesque ven-
ture of a British Cabinet Minister into the realms of higher strategy.

DEADLOCK IN THE WEST 157

III. ANTWERP

It was the Siege of Antwerp which supplied the single unmistakable
circumstance of the October fighting and on the human side the only
dramatic incident in a war which had now become a bewildering tangle
of operations obscure to the contemporary observer and without im-
mediately apparent result. From the attack on Liege to the Battle of
the Aisne the world had looked eagerly for a Sedan or a Waterloo. But
in October it was plain that the time for Sedans and Waterloos was pass-
ing.

Thus it was that the first shots of the German cannon before Ant-
werp on September 29th instantly drew the attention of the world to
an action which was easily comprehensible, and already promised to be
promptly decisive. More than this, there was in the final stand of Bel-
gian patriotism an appeal to American admiration, lacking in all else
in a war between rival cultures, ambitions, races. For a nation whose
own history began at Lexington, the resistance of the weak to the strong,
the defence of liberty by the few against the many at the cost of life, of
all that men could hold dear, was a moving spectacle. For Americans
there was bound to be in the final tragedy of the Belgians a claim on
sympathy. Already to the neutral eyes beyond the Atlantic the Bel-
gian resistance had taken on the character of that of Holland to Spain,
of the Greeks to the Persians.

On the military side the German attack upon Antwerp was easily
explicable. German attempts to force a short road into northern
France by taking Verdun had failed. West of the Oise and the Scheldt
the Allied advance was pushing north toward Antwerp. If the Allies
and the Belgians should join hands, German hold on Belgium would be
precarious, for Antwerp was now like the citadel of a captured fortress,
which still held out. But far more serious was the fact that such a junc-
tion would close the last open gap on the western front and rob Ger-
many of her only remaining chance not merely to reverse the decision of
the Marne, but also to reach the Channel and the North Sea, facing the
British coast.

158 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

Already Belgian resistance had contributed seriously to impeding
German plans. In the days when every German soldier was needed
in France, an army corps had to be kept in Belgium to protect the
German lines of communication and contain the Belgian field army in
Antwerp. At the moment of the Battle of Charleroi the Belgian army
had made a sortie, in the course of which it had almost reached Louvain.
The destruction of this city followed this fighting, and was an act of re-
prisal by the Germans, who ruthlessly executed many men and women.
This deed promptly filled the civilized world with horror and awakened
protest in all lands. Again, at the Battle of the Marne, a second Belgian
sortie had detained troops which were starting south and held them
until the critical days of the retreat to the Aisne were passed.

To rid themselves of this annoyance, to clear their flanks, to prepare
the way for a final attack to the south, the Germans now resolved to
have done with King Albert and his gallant little army. The closing
days of September, therefore, saw Belgium approaching her final agony.

In all military history of the future the capture of Antwerp must
necessarily be a landmark. Here, briefly, terribly, the superiority of
the gun over the fort, of the mechanic over the engineer, was demon-
strated. Aside from Paris, there was no city believed to be as strongly
fortified as Antwerp, and the fate of Antwerp gave a new value to the
French for the recent deliverance of Paris. Unlike Paris, however,
its position on the neutralized Scheldt and near the Dutch frontier
prevented complete investment. Along its southern front, ten miles
distant, the Nethe flowed through deep marshes, forming a natural
moat, strengthened by forts once held to be impregnable.

Before these forts, in trenches long ago prepared, stood the whole
Belgian field army, reinforced in its last days by British marines. All
that the art of the engineer, all that the courage of brave men fighting
with their backs to the wall could contribute to making a fortress im-
pregnable, were to be found in the ancient Flemish city.

Yet before the German artillery, Antwerp's defences crumbled with
incredible rapidity. What the 42-centimetre gun and the Austrian
"305" had accomplished at Liege, at Namur, at Maubeuge, but hith-

"ST. GEORGE FOR
ENGLAND!" V

FRANCE AND ENGLAND
STAND TOGETHER

BRITISH HIGHLANDERS LANDING AT BOULOGNE

'VIVE LA REPUBLIQUE!"

GENERAL JOFFRE

GENERAL GALLIENI

General Joffre commanded the French during the first seventeen months of the war, was then retired.as Mar-
shal of France, and in April, 1917, came to America as a member of the French War Commission. He was the idol of
the soldiers who spoke of him affectionately as "Grand-papa" and "Our Joffre." His ringing message to the army
before the Battle of the Marne will long be remembered: "Cost what it may, the hour for the advance has come; let
each man die in his place, rather than fall back."

General Gallieni was the defender of Paris. On the evening of September 3d, he learned from his observers
that Kluck's army had begun to turn away from Paris and was marching southeast toward Meaux and the Marne. He
telephoned this news to Joffre and the next day the plan for the Battle of the Marne was arranged.

THREE FRENCH GENERALS

Photograph by Paul Thompson

These generals were all active during the first year of the war. "Grand-papa Joffre" stands in a characteristic
attitude with field-glasses "mobilized." At Joffre's right and left are Castelnau and Pau. All three are good-naturedly
quizzing the orderly who stands at attention while the man at the extreme left enjoys seeing his comrade "on the
carpet. "

LORD KITCHENER AND SIR JOHN FRENCH

There were persistent rumors of differences between Lord Kitchener, British Secretary of State for War, and Sir
John French, Commander of the British Expeditionary Army. General French was relieved of his command six months
before Lord Kitchener's tragic death at sea, June 5, 1916.

The British believed for some time that their help enabled the French to win the Battle of the Marne. But to
all intents and purposes the British were not engaged in the Marne at all. When JofFre asked for instant action, Field
Marshal French replied that he needed forty-eight hours in which to get ready. He failed to rise to the greatest oppor-
tunity of the War, either because he did not perceive it or because he lacked the necessary energy and initiative. That
is the verdict of French criticism and British students of the war are being driven to the same conclusion.

GENERAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG AND GENERAL SIR HORACE LOCKWOOD SMITH-DORRIEN

Sir Douglas Haig succeeded Sir John French in command of the British forces in France. He is a more active
man than his predecessor and nearly ten years younger, having been born in 1861. Throughout his military career he
has been concerned chiefly with cavalry, and he possesses all the cavalryman's traditional fire and dash.

General Smith-Dorrien commanded the Second Corps of the British Army during the terrible days of the retreat
which preceded the Marne.

FRENCH ARMY JOINS BELGIANS

The advance guard of the French Army on their way to join the Belgians.
French marines welcomed by the residents of Ghent.

THE ADVANCE OF FRENCH MACHINE GUNNERS AND RIFLEMEN

Some types of machine guns may be carried by one man. Others are carried piecemeal by two or more. In this
case the second man has the gun itself on his shoulder while the third man follows with the tripod.

A BIG FRENCH GUN ON THE RAILROAD AT VERDUN

The big German 42-centimetre guns seemed in the early days of the War to be irresistible and incomparable. But
. with the appearance of such creations as this the French artillery regained its traditional superiority.

TWO REMARKABLE AIRPLANE PHOTOGRAPHS ON THE FRENCH FRONT

(Above). The devastated city of Clermont, in the Argonne region. It was burned by the Germans at the Battle
of the Marne. Roofless ruined walls are all that remain in the foreground. Up the road toward the top of the pic-
ture a cluster of buildings is seen which must have been just beyond the zone of fire.

(Below.) The French aviation camp near Verdun. One can plainly see the hangars with the insect-like war-planes
in front of them. Behind the hangars motor trucks are parked, and behind these are tents, the living quarters of the
aviators.

DEADLOCK IN THE WEST 167

erto behind a veil, they now did in the full sight of the whole world. In
less than a week these forts which had been pronounced impregnable were
heaps of dust and ashes, and German troops had forced the river defences
and the field trenches, driving the Belgians before them. By October
yth the Krupp shells were falling about the noble tower of the Antwerp
Cathedral. The city and the suburbs were breaking out in flames. The
end was in sight.

The next day the field army of Belgium, commanded by its still-
undaunted King, crossed the Scheldt on pontoons, moved west along the
Dutch frontier, accompanied by the British contingent, and made good its
escape to join the Allied armies, still moving up from the south, although
20,000 Belgians forced across the Dutch frontier were disarmed and in-
terned. Meanwhile, by every ship, train, road, thousands of refugees,
fleeing from the shells that were falling in Antwerp, flowed out to Hol-
land, to England, to France. A new migration of a people had begun.

The end came on October 9th, when the city surrendered, the re-
maining Belgian forces escaping to Holland and there laying down the
arms they had wielded so valiantly. Not a city, but a nation, had
fallen. For England only less than for Belgium, the fall of Antwerp
had been a terrible blow. The " pistol pointed at the heart of England,"
as Napoleon had described the city, was now in the hands of William II.

With the fall of Antwerp and that of Ostend, which promptly fol-
lowed on October I5th, British public opinion at last recognized that a
new Napoleonic war, with the same issues and many of the same cir-
cumstances, was before them. British observers already foretold ac-
curately the launching of German submarines and German Zeppelins
from Zeebrugge. A new Napoleon had reached the Channel. Once
more it was for the British people to watch the narrow strip of sea
as they had a century before. But now it was necessary also to watch the
skies for that new engine which had added so much to the terror of war.

IV. THE BATTLES OF FLANDERS

In late October there opened between La Bassee and the sea the
most deadly campaign the war had yet seen. For the next six weeks, on

168 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

a front of barely forty miles, some hundreds of thousands of men strug-
gled by day and by night for the possession of a score of villages lying
straight across the pathway of the new German advance, between the
Lys and the mouth of the Yser. When it had ended, in part through the
exhaustion of both combatants, the Germans had gained a few parcels
of territory, a few wrecked villages, but in the main the line stood as it
had stood in the opening hours of the conflict, despite the fact that the
German Emperor had come himself to spur on his brave but beaten sol-
diers and that the whole German nation had set its heart upon Calais.

The purpose of the German strategy was plain. Antwerp taken,
Ostend captured, there was an apparent opportunity to sweep down the
coast past Calais and Boulogne; to seize Dunkirk, the last French for-
tress in the north; to take root on the eastern shore of the Straits of
Dover; to bring by canal and river the submarines, already so fatal to
British warships, to threaten England with invasion as Napoleon had
threatened it; to menace London by Zeppelin fleets; by heavy artillery
and mines, to close the Straits of Dover and leave the port of London
as dead as that of Hamburg. Underlying all these magnificent details,
too, was the dominant determination to regain the offensive, to take
up again the road to France.

Once Antwerp fell, the army corps released from this operation
drove south upon the heels of the retreating Belgians. From every
corner of the German Empire garrisons and artillery were gathered up
for a supreme thrust, a thrust through France but in part aimed at
England, the nation now become the object of the concentrated hatred
and wrath of all Germany.

Not less rapid was the concentration of the Allies. Coming north
across the French frontier, French regular troops, British forces with-
drawn from the Aisne in early October, Sikhs, Ghurkas, all the Indian
contingent now to have their baptism of fire, Senegalese and Moroccan
riflemen, Turcos and Legionnaires — finally the retreating remnant
of the Belgians reinforced by French and British divisions — gathered
around the sleepy little Flemish town of Ypres, on the shores of the
North Sea at Nieuport, and behind the Yser River and the canal that

DEADLOCK IN THE WEST 169

joined it to the Lys, to meet the storm. And once more the post of
honour and danger fell to Foch under whose supreme command the
Britons and the Belgians, as well as the French, fought.

A more admirable country for defence than the Yser front it is
difficult to imagine. Eastward from the dunes stretched an intricate
maze of river, canal, and ditch — much of the land subject to inundation,
once the sluices were open ; all of it certain to become a swamp when the
first storms of winter began. On this front a dozen large and small
villages and hundreds of little stone farmhouses offered cover. Trenches
dug to-day might be flooded to-morrow; artillery dragged within range
over level fields one day might be submerged and bemired the next.

Such was the country between the Yser and the sea. Here and
about Ypres for more than a month there continued, with slight inter-
ruption, one of the most intricate, confused, and indescribable conflicts
in all the history of war, fought by men of more races, religions, colours,
and nationalities than any battlefield in western Europe had known
since the onrush of the soldiers of Islam was halted on the field of
Tours. Asia, Africa, and even America and Australia shared in the
glory and the slaughter.

The first blow fell along the seacoast south of Ostend, fell upon the
remnant of Belgian forces, led by their intrepid King standing behind
the Yser River at Nieuport, where it enters the sea. Here for days the
Belgians maintained an unequal combat. At the critical moment a
British fleet took station beyond the dunes and with its heavy artillery
beat down the German advance, after a slaughter which was terrible.

Halted here, the Germans moved inland and came on again about
Dixmude, half way between Ypres and Nieuport. Here once more they
made progress until the Belgians in their despair opened the sluices and
the water flowed over fertile fields carrying ruin with it, turning the
whole country into a lake, drowning the invaders in numbers, creating
an obstacle impassable for the present, repeating the exploit of the
Dutch in their glorious fight against Alva.

Eastward from Dixmude, which presently, after the most desperate
of struggles and after changing hands many times, remained with the

i7o HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

Germans — who were halted in its ruin by the ever-memorable resistance
of the famous Fusiliers Marins, the "Golden Lads" of Brittany — the
attack was directed at Ypres. Here the British stood. Here the
Kaiser's wish was gratified and the troops of England met the gallant
Bavarians; but they did not succumb. At points the line bent back.
Such real gains as were made, were made by the Germans, but the line
held. Day and night the slaughter went on. Trenches, hills, farm-
houses were taken and retaken. Villages and towns were transformed
into heaps of ashes.

To add to the horror autumn began, and sleet and rain, finally snow,
fell, transforming the whole country into a swamp. In the inextricable
tangle of roads, buildings, and ruined towns, the bodies of men lay un-
buried for days. The streams and ditches were choked with the human
wreckage. All semblance of strategy vanished.

Tactical considerations were subordinated to the simple, single pur-
pose of an advance by the mere weight of numbers. It became not a
struggle based on the application of modern theories, but a death grapple
between thousands and hundreds of thousands of men, transformed by
suffering, by deprivation, by the misery of the autumn storms, to mere
animals, clad in clothes reduced to rags or undiscoverable beneath the
outward layers of mud.

Again and again more losses, frightful attrition, seemed to bring
the German effort to a standstill. Yet always in a few hours or days
new thousands returned to the charge. Always, too, they came forward
fearlessly, a song upon their lips. Regiments of youths took the place
of the older men of the first line, but the boys were not less brave than
the men, the recruits than the veterans.

V. CHECKMATE

Such were the battles of Flanders, the Battle of the Yser, won by
the Belgians and the French, the Battle of Ypres won by the British
and the French. Never was a race more closely run. Never was vic-
tory nearer to the Germans than in the early days of November. The
jerry-built dyke that Joffre had stretched across the last open gap on his

DEADLOCK IN THE WEST 171

front barely held. On November I5th, when the last effort of the
Prussian Guard failed, the British Expeditionary Army had become
almost a memory and its losses had passed anything in British history.
At Ypres fifty thousand British were killed, wounded, or captured — a
third of the whole Expeditionary Army. On the same field the French
lost seventy thousand and the Belgians twenty thousand. As for the
German loss, it certainly passed a quarter of a million.

Memorable, hereafter, will be the fact that as the last German at-
tacks before Ypres were failing, there died within the British lines the
one British soldier who had foreseen what was now happening, whose
words had been greeted with sneers, whose voice had almost been si-
lenced by the cheap and empty optimism of Liberal and Radical poli-
ticians. Come to France at the moment of the crisis, come to cheer his
well-loved Indian troops, now fighting bravely on the western line,
Lord Roberts died on the eve of a great victory, which saved his own
country from the worst he had feared for it. Worth repeating, too, is
the legend, credited to De Souza, that having studied the maps, having
examined the plans and preparations of the French general, who held
supreme command over British and French troops alike, Lord Roberts
said to staff officers of Foch : "You have a great general."

At Ypres the British troops did all that was expected of them, and
more could not be expected of any troops. "Wipers" of the English
"Tommy" deserves a place beside Waterloo and Blenheim in British
military history. Yet here, as elsewhere, it was the British soldier who
shone, for the generalship was French and the victory was won through
the genius of that general who had delivered the decisive thrust at
the Marne. And for Foch the supreme test came in the midnight
hours of a day in which his son and son-in-law had died on the field of
honour.

But however close the race, the decision was absolute. The whole
German conception of a swift, terrible, decisive thrust at France had
ended in the bloody shambles of the Yser and Ypres. Not a French
army had been destroyed, not a French army had been captured.
The great battle that was to come six weeks after the declaration of war

172

HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

had come ; it had been a French victory, not a Waterloo or a Sedan, but a
victory compelling a general German retreat dislocating their whole
strategic conception. After that retreat it had never been possible to
regain the offensive and renew the bid for a decision. Each separate

Mezieres&i r^^

* V Virton i Ol -

^, O ^m! uLu«mborf

DEADLOCK IN THE WEST, NOV. 15, 1914

November 1 5th sees the end of the effort that began on August 5th before Liege. Behind
her trench lines Germany held most of the industrial regions of France and the larger part of
French machinery and minerals. All Belgium, save one tiny morsel, was in her hands. France
was in no position to take the initiative, and almost two years were to pass before Britain could
put sufficient forces in the trenches to permit the beginning of a considerable offensive

offensive effort from St. Mihiel to Nieuport had been beaten down al-
most where it had started.

Save for Russian defeat at Tannenberg, the defeat at the Marne
might have necessitated a retreat to the Rhine. Hindenburg's victory

DEADLOCK IN THE WEST 173

had given Germany two more months in the west. She had used them
up and now the eastern situation had become critical. Russian pressure
in East Prussia had not recalled German corps from the Marne or before
the Marne. But Russian victories in Galicia, the disasters that had
overtaken Austria and seemed to forecast her collapse, the crisis in Hin-
denburg's campaign in Poland cried out for attention.

November I5th, then, sees the end of the effort that began on
August 5th before Liege. In that time Germany had overrun Bel-
gium and occupied more than 8,000 square miles of France and devas-
tated much more; she had approached Paris, and on September 5th
its suburbs were visible where her armies stood, but, within sight of the
prize, she had been compelled to recoil, and from that hour until the
end in Flanders, her strategy had conformed to Joff re's and her purposes
had all wrecked in conflict with his will.

Behind her trench lines Germany now held most of the industrial
regions of France and the larger share of French machinery and minerals.
All Belgium, save one tiny morsel, was in her hands. France, after her
terrific struggle, was in no shape to take the offensive, and almost two
years were to pass before Britain could put sufficient forces in the
trenches to permit the beginning of considerable offensive. Germany's
prevision in the matter of heavy artillery and machine guns gave her
armies a real and long-enduring advantage in trench war.

But the other side of the picture was unmistakable. Germany had
staked all on a quick decision ; she had become involved in a long war.
She had planned to dispose of her enemies in detail, destroying first
French military establishments and then Russian; she had failed to
destroy France, and Russian armies were now pounding down to the
Carpathians.

Despite her manifest gains and her brilliant preliminary victories,
Germany had, then, lost the first round of the war. She had lost it at
the Marne and all her desperate struggles from the Marne to the Yser had
availed her nothing. Now at last she must go east and deal with Russia ;
new horizons and new victories beckoned; but while she turned her face
east, Britain and France, behind the dyke they had erected in the west,

174 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

began to gather up their strength for a renewal of their offensive in a
future which was far more distant than they could dream.

With the close of the fighting about Ypres the western battle falls
to the level of a deadlock, which endured until March, 1917, with no
material change in the battle fronts.

CHAPTER EIGHT
THE EASTERN FIELD

With the failure of the German effort at Ypres, the western field
loses its importance for more than a year and a quarter. It is not until
the colossal bid for Verdun in February, 1916, that the events on the
French and Belgian front take on that importance which they had in the
opening days of the war. It is, of course, true that long before the
battles of Flanders in October and November the eastern field had
been the scene of many terrific engagements, and of campaigns whose
relation to those in the west is not patent, yet, for the purpose of nar-
ration, it is simpler to deal first with the western operations right
through the Battle of the Marne until the decision there had been made
absolute in Flanders, and then examine in detail the eastern operations
from the morning of hostilities.

These operations were seen only confusedly and understood but
little in the early days of conflict. There is lacking still and will re-
main wanting for many years, perhaps, that complete detail which we
already possess in the case of the French operations in the west. But
it is possible to perceive, upon the least scientific study, that from the
opening days of the eastern struggle until the German victory at the
Dunajec transformed the whole eastern situation, two very clear and
well-defined plans were working out.

In the last days of August, acting in strict conformity with a pre-
arranged plan made by the French and Russian General Staffs, two
Russian armies were sent into East Prussia, where one found disaster
at Tannenberg and the other was compelled to fall back to the frontier
and assume a defensive posture. Despite subsequent ventures, leading
directly to a second disaster, the Battle of the Masurian Lakes, the

•IS

i76 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

East Prussian field was thenceforth of secondary interest and import-
ance.

On the other hand, concomitant with the Russian defeat at Tannen-
berg was the first of the two great Russian victories about Lemberg,
which exercised a permanent influence upon the eastern campaign
down to the Battle of the Dunajec. In these battles about Lemberg the
military establishment of Austria was temporarily wrecked and Russian
strategy henceforth was concentrated upon the effort to make absolute
the consequences of the early victories, to enforce the decision of Lem-
berg, and put Austria out of the war.

This purpose led to the steady pressure upon Austria on the Galician
front, to the advance to the San, to the suburbs of Cracow, and finally,
when further progress in this direction was proven impossible, to the
gigantic campaign in the Carpathians, which aimed at passing the crests
of this range and pouring down into the Hungarian Plain. In the course
of the effort many battles, most of them Russian victories, were fought,
and the great fortress of Przemysl, with a huge garrison, was captured.
The disaster at the Dunajec occurred while the fighting in the Carpathi-
ans was still going in the Russian favour, but it is nevertheless true that
Russia had failed to achieve her main purpose, when she was forced to
give it over.

By contrast with the Russian campaign and purpose, the German
efforts in the east were directed at preventing Russia from crushing
Austria. These efforts were not originally or mainly confined to sup-
porting Austria in Galicia; rather the Germans undertook, by a cam-
paign of their own, to compel Russia to turn her attention away from
Austria and give the Austrians time, under German direction, to get
on their feet again. In addition, the German plan had the local object
to take Warsaw, seize the west bank of the Vistula River, one of the
most serious military obstacles in Europe, and thus insure their own
eastern front.

When they began their operations in Poland in October, at the mo-
ment they were also attacking Antwerp and preparing for their final
effort to break the decision of the Marne, the Germans had only small

THE EASTERN FIELD 177

effectives, and their advance to the outskirts of Warsaw suggests
Early's dash for Washington in 1864, designed primarily to shake Grant's
grip on Petersburg and Richmond. Even if they did not get Warsaw,
which was a gamble, the Germans expected, justly, to compel the Rus-
sians to send troops from Galicia and thus give Austria respite. In
this they were entirely successful.

The second drive, begun in November and leading promptly to the
terrible Battle of Lodz, was a more serious undertaking. This time the
Germans not only expected to relieve the pressure on the Austrians but
also to get Warsaw. Temporarily they helped the Austrians, but they
failed wholly in the attempt to get Warsaw, and the Austrians were
soon in danger again.

November saw, in the west, the final surrender of the German pur-
pose to abolish the decision of the Marne. This was given over, not
because it was proven hopeless — in fact, the Germans were almost at the
point of victory when they stopped at Ypres — but because it was no
longer safe to attempt to deal with their eastern front with the slender
effectives which they had there. Up to this moment the Russian cam-
paign had not materially affected the western. It had drawn two Aus-
trian corps out of Alsace at the perilous moment of the Marne, but it
had not compelled the Germans to withdraw troops from the western
front. On the contrary, they had sent at least six new corps to Belgium
for the Ypres and Yser battles.

Had the Russians won at Tannenberg their pressure would have
begun to affect the Germans in the west before the Battle of the Marne.
When the Russians failed, the Germans were able to go right ahead with
their western campaign until November. But at this point the Battle
of Lemberg began to have consequences, which the Battle of Tannen-
berg would have had, had it been a Russian victory. With her western
campaign unwon, Germany had to go east in November. So far, the
Franco-Russian strategy had prevailed over the German, but the
result had been reached so tardily that German armies in the west
had been able to dig in on French and Belgian soil from the Vosges to
the sea.

178 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

After Lodz, Germany turns east and gives her main attention to the
Russian front. When she began in November, it is clear that her High
Command expected to take Warsaw and beat down the Russian danger
before spring, using several corps borrowed from the western front,
which had now fallen to the level of trench war. Her High Command
obviously had expected to return to the west in the spring and try again
to abolish that Marne decision, always weighing upon Germany, because
if this decision were to stand, time would be allowed Britain to arm,
equip, and munition her millions.

Once Germany did turn east she began a tremendous effort. In
December, in January, and in February there are terrific attacks on the
whole Polish front facing Warsaw and one great attempt to get to War-
saw and behind Warsaw from East Prussia. But all these fail. The
February failure establishes the fact that Warsaw cannot be taken from
the north or from the west and new Russian victories in Galicia make it
clear that the Germans' effort to relieve Austria by her campaign for
Warsaw has failed.

Sometime in February at the latest, Germany discovers that it
will not be possible to shake Russia off in time to go back west and re-
new her effort to get France, still her main foe, out of the war in the
spring and summer of 1915. Instead, it is .clear that Austria must be
kept in the war by a major effort directed against Russia. It is then
become essential, since Russia must be attacked, that the blow shall be
sufficiently heavy to put Russia out of the war altogether and leave
German hands free to deal with France, reinforced by Britain, before
Britain has reached the point in her preparation where she will be
strong enough to lend France the necessary aid.

Here is the genesis of the great German campaign of the summer
of 1916, which begins in Galicia and ends far in Russian territory. With
this campaign we are not concerned now. But what it is necessary to
recognize is that Russia succeeded in defending Warsaw and holding
back Germany, while beating in upon Austria, just long enough to pre-
vent Germany from returning to the western field in 1915. In doing
this she gave France and Britain fifteen months to prepare. The ser-

THE EASTERN FIELD 179

vice was invaluable. In performing it, Russia invited that German
attack which brought her to the edge of ruin. But she, also, escaped.

Here, then, is the whole story of the eastern campaign in the period
which we are now to examine. In this time Russia is crowding more
and more steadily in upon stricken Austria, pushing her back from Lem-
berg, from the San ; coming close up to Cracow and then, checked here,
turning toward the Carpathians and struggling up and in places over
summits. And in the same time Germany is attempting, with ever-
diminishing success, to compel Russia to let up on Austria by attacking
Russia in Poland. German pressure is great enough to rob Russia's
blow of just that weight which would have made it completely decisive,
but it fails to divert Russian attention sufficiently. So at last we come
to the decision to spend the summer in the east and direct the main
blow in the spring and summer against the eastern enemy.

While all this is happening in the eastern field, Great Britain and
France are making every effort to get their military forces into shape
to take the pressure off their Russian ally in the spring. But the task
is far too great and too long for the British. More than a year is to
pass after the Battle of the Dunajec before Britain can be armed or
munitioned; France, after the sacrifices of the Marne, is not strong
enough, alone, to break the German lines in the west. The failure of
all the French and British efforts from Alsace to Flanders supplies the
German High Command with proof that their campaign against Russia
can be pushed in the spring without danger to their western front. It
is the failure of Allied efforts in the west straight through the winter,
that makes the Russian burden so great, and it is the failure in the
spring that precipitates the catastrophe of the Dunajec.

ii. TURKEY'S ENTRANCE

The whole course of the eastern operations was affected and Russian
disaster finally achieved through the intervention of Turkey on the side
of the Central Powers. In the days when Antwerp had fallen and
Warsaw seemed on the point of yielding to Hindenburg, the Turk sud-
denly put his sword at the service of the two Kaisers. Conceivably this

i8o HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR .

Turkish decision could not have been prevented either by Allied diplo-
macy or Allied naval action, but the event is the first in a long series of
reverses for Allied statesmanship and High Command in the Near East,
which changed the whole course of the war in its second year.

The military effect of Turkey's decision was not measured by the
new front it opened on the Russian Caucasus or the British lines at
Suez. Turkish military operations were neither fortunate nor influ-
ential, aside from the defence of Gallipoli. But when Turkey entered
the war, Russia was automatically cut off from the outer world for many
months by winter on the north and by Turkish forts at the Bosporus.
The result was that her munitionment was gravely affected. Before
spring she had exhausted all her stocks of ammunition, and when the
German blow came in April she was almost without heavy shells. This
was the prime cause of all the subsequent reverses. This was Turkey's
real service to her allies and her terrible revenge upon her hereditary
enemy.

The political causes of Turkey's entrance are not hard to fathom.
With the rapprochement of Russia and Britain, the latter resigned, in
fact if not by formal engagement, her long-standing role of the defender
of the Turk. It was well understood in Stamboul, as elsewhere, that the
Persian bargain between Russia and Sir Edward Grey had an implied
consent to eventual Russian possession at the Straits. Under the stress
of circumstances, because British title to the Suez Canal had been made
absolute by the French withdrawal from Egyptian ambitions — a part of
the 1904 bargain — Constantinople lost its old value for the British,
England resigned her position as the first friend of the Sultan, and the
Kaiser instantly and eagerly replaced his rival at the Golden Horn.

When the Balkan States attacked Turkey, Germany and Austria
hoped for their defeat. Britain and her Russian and French friends
hoped for their victory, and Russia and France contributed materially
to training and munitioning the armies that won at Lule Burgas, Kum-
anovo, and Yenidze-Vardar. It was, too, by virtue of an understanding
with France, Russia, and Great Britain, that Italy attacked Turkey and
took Tripoli.

THE EASTERN FIELD 181

No Turkish statesman could mistake the fact that France and
Britain had abandoned the policy which produced the Crimean War and
the abrogation of the Treaty of San Stefano. No Turkish statesman
could misunderstand the evidence that proved that Russia would never
again have to resign Czarigrad at British behest. So far as London,
Paris, and for that matter Rome, were concerned, Russia was free to
take Constantinople. Therefore a victory of Russia and her allies in
the war that had now broken out meant a Russian attack upon Turkey,
with the consent of Russia's allies.

Turkey could have no illusion as to German ambitions. An Os-
manli Empire administered by Prussian officials was as hateful to the
Turk as a lost Constantinople, but this peril, if patent, was not immedi-
ate ; he could hope that the outcome of the war would leave the enemies
of Germany strong enough to prevent this, even though they were de-
feated. He could hope that the turn of events might save him as it had
saved him for so many decades. But the Russian danger was immedi-
ate, unmistakable, carried with it a death sentence for him.

Actually the Turkish decision was procured by the intervention of
two German warships, the Goeben and the Breslau, which were caught
in the western Mediterranean at the moment of the declaration of war
and fled via Palermo to the Dardanelles, escaping the whole French
and British fleets. Had British and French warships followed them
up the Straits, sunk them under the very eyes of the Turkish Govern-
ment, the course of events might have been altered and the worst of
Allied disasters avoided. But Allied purpose had not yet reached this
point; Allied admirals lacked the courage of Nelson in the case of
Copenhagen.

With the safe arrival of these ships, Turkey was lost to the enemies of
Germany. Aided by their presence, Enver Pasha was able to throw his
government into the hands of the Germans. More than this, these
same ships, at last issuing forth from the Bosporus and attacking Rus-
sian ports and shipping, provoked that Russian declaration of war
which placed Turkey definitely on the side of the Central Powers.
Count d'Erlon's blundering march and countermarch in the Waterloo

182 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

campaign was only one degree more disastrous to his Emperor than was
this failure of British naval officers to the Allied cause — French ships
were then engaged in covering the transport of French troops from
Morocco and Algeria to France — to the whole Allied cause in the spring
and summer of 1915.

GLIMPSES OF THE
SQUADRONS OF THE AIR

AMERICANS WHO FLEW FOR FRANCE

This picture shows some of the members of the Escadnlle Lafayette, an organization
made up of American aviators. From left to right: Lieutenant de Laage de Mieux
(the French instructor), Johnson, Rumsey, McConnell, Thaw, Lufbery, Rockwell,
Masson, Prince, and Hall. Within a short time after this photograph was taken,
McConnell, Rockwell, and Prince, had been killed in action.

THE DREADNOUGHT OF THE AIR

The huge Brequet air cruiser, used for bombardment purposes and carrying machine
guns as well as racks for launching bombs.

THE BATTLE CRUISER OF THE AIR

The new model Nieuport fighting machine mounts at great speed, rising to 7,000 feet in six minutes, and flies as
high as 20,000 feet. The machine gun is mounted on the hood and shoots through the rapidly revolving propeller.

THE WAR IN THE AIR

This giant Zeppelin was brought down in the suburbs of London by anti-aircraft guns. The envelope burned up
but the gondola was barely scorched. The whole incident afforded the British an excellent opportunity for studying
the secrets of German Zeppelin construction. The upper picture shows a German dirigible intact.

WOMEN VOLUNTEERS FOR THE FRENCH AERIAL SERVICE

This picture reminds one of the photographs of the crater-pitted face of the moon. But in reality it is an avia-
tor's photograph of a modern battlefield. The numerous spots are the craters made by shell-explosions. The heavy
lines drawn with mathematical precision are fortifications; and the lighter lines, more or less wavering, are the trenches.

SOLDIERS FROM

ALL THE
SEVEN SEAS

A PAIR OF ABLE-BODIED ZOUAVES FROM THE GOLD COAST OF AFRICA

Decent Europeans at the front were often hard put to it, to explain the horrors of war to half-
civilized men like these, who were familiar with such scenes among savage men and beasts in
the African jungles. But as missionaries had assured them that such behaviour was abhorred
by civilized men, they were much puzzled by the " frightfulness" rampant in France and Belgium.

TURCOS

In this war of many nations, men and costumes of all sorts were to be met with. This picture shows a group
of French Turcos from Algeria, solicitous as to the manner of preparation of their midday coffee.

CANADIAN TROOPS

A large proportion of the sparse population of Canada crossed the sea to fight for the mother country. With
them went many Americans. After a period of training in England the Canadians and the Americans stood shoulder
to shoulder in the trenches in France-

A TRUE WORLD WAR

From all quarters of the globe men come together to resist aggression by the Hohenzollern and the Hapsburg.
Never before in the history of the world — not even in the Crusades — were men of such diverse and wide-scattered races
banded together in a common cause. Here are Cossacks from Russia, Sikhs from India, and English Colonials from
New South Wales.

A SENEGALESE INFANTRYMAN

ANNAMESE SOLDIERS

MEN OF ASIA AND AFRICA

Few realise that there were troops of Mongolian race on the battlegrounds of Europe. The Japanese have taken
a hand only upon the sea and at Kiao Chau. But here (upper picture) is a column of soldiery from French
Cochin-China marching to their camp near Versailles. The lower picture shows a French Senegalese battalion going
forward into action in the great Somme offensive.

CHAPTER NINE

THE BATTLE OF LEMBERG

I
RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION

Russian mobilization, for which the preliminary orders were given
as early as July 25th, was conditioned upon circumstances of Russia's
western frontier. Here Poland projects, like a fist against a pillow,
to use a familiar figure, deep into the block of Teutonic territories.
Thus Russian armies operating about Warsaw or to the west of Warsaw
would be fatally exposed to German or Austrian attacks coming south
out of East Prussia or north out of Galicia, which touches the longitude
of Brest-Litovsk, more than a hundred miles east of Warsaw.

This situation Russia was in the process of remedying when the war
broke out. North of Warsaw from the Vistula, at the point where the
Bug enters it, to the Niemen, the Russians had stretched a line of forts,
beginning at Novogeorgievsk and ending at Kovno on the Niemen.
This was the famous Bobr-Narew-Niemen barrier, but it derived its
main strength not from fortifications but from the swamps and from the
rivers that give it the name it bears. Westward, Warsaw had once been
guarded by forts, buc these had been demolished and Russian armies
had planned, when the scheme of fortifications was complete, to stand
before Warsaw, on the Blonie line, a system of field fortifications sug-
gesting the Chatalja lines. Thence southward the Vistula supplied an
admirable defensive position being in itself a serious military obstacle, a
broad deep river with high wooded banks.

But Russian preparation had only begun, and south of the Vistula,
from Ivangorod to the Volhynian province, there was a gap, between
Lublin and Cholm, through which Austrian armies could advance upon
Brest-Litovsk, operating far in the rear of Warsaw and behind the line
of the Vistula. Until this gap had been closed, all positions to the west-

191

i92 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

ward were gravely imperilled. And it is worth noting that the German
advance to Warsaw, when it came, was successful because of this gap.

In this posture Russia was compelled to mobilize behind the Bug
instead of the Vistula, using the Niemen and the three fortresses of the
Volhynian triangle, Rovno, Dubno, and Lutsk, to guard her flanks. Only
covering troops were left in Warsaw, and it was not until the strength
of German numbers going west and the weakness of the army left in the
east were disclosed, that Russia began her forward movement in Poland,
the first positive evidence of which was the army pushed north out of
Warsaw to the disastrous Battle of Tannenberg.

It seems now unquestioned that Russian mobilization, slow as it was
because of the vastness of Russian area and the paucity of Russian rail-
roads, took both the Germans and the Austrians by surprise and later
led them to make angry charges about Russian preparations before the
Serbian crisis. But this is a debate for the future. What is clear is
that, by the middle of August, Russian armies were beginning to move.
This movement was in two distinct areas. Two armies, one from the
Niemen and one from the Vistula at Warsaw, pushed into East Prussia,
met with considerable success in the third and fourth weeks of August,
and were then brought to a dead halt by the disaster at Tannenberg,
which destroyed one of the armies and eventually forced the retirement
of the other.

The second group of armies was the more considerable and did not
number less than a million, at least twice the strength of the other two
armies combined. This group was divided into three armies commanded
by Ivanoff, Russky, and Brusiloff, names that were to become famous in
the history of the war. Ivanoff's army was based upon Brest-Litovsk
and by the middle of August was moving south covering Lublin and the
gap that opened toward Brest-Litovsk. His mission was to hold any
Austrian invasion south of Lublin, but the main thrust was to be made
by the other armies.

Russky's army came west along the Kiev-Lemberg railroad, having
Kiev as its base, and advanced directly upon Lemberg, crossing the Ga-
lician frontier about Brody in the fourth week of August. Brusiloff

THE BATTLE OF LEMBERG

193

brought his army up along the Odessa-Lemberg railroad, taking the field
only when it became clear that Roumania intended to remain neutral.
The original mission of this army was to protect Odessa and south-
western Russia from Roumanian attack, if Roumania remained faithful
to her alliance with Austria and Germany. The release of this army
actually made the victory of Lemberg possible and in this way Roumania

THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE ON ALL FRONTS, SEPT. 1ST, 1914

I-Rennenkampf III-Ivanoff V-BrusilofF

II-Samsonoff IV-Russky

194 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

served her old allies an evil turn quite comparable with that served them
by Italy, when her proclamation of neutrality released French troops to
fight at the Marne. Brusiloff crossed the frontier near Tarnopol, also
east of Lemberg, and advanced toward this city, his flank along the
Dniester. His junction with Russky was completed before the battle
began and his part in the first engagement was decisive.

ii. AUSTRIA'S PLANS

It was Austria's mission in Austro-German strategy to meet the main
Russian thrust and parry it, while Germany was disposing of France.
At the very outset it is plain that the High Command of the Dual Alliance
fatally underestimated the speed and the force of the Russian blow.
Thus Germany borrowed two of the best Austrian corps for her western
drive and was putting them into operation in Alsace when Austrian dis-
aster came. In addition, three or four more corps had been sent south
to deal with Serbia. This latter army was far too small to fight an
offensive campaign with the well-equipped and well-trained veterans of
King Peter and suffered immediate and terrible disaster at the Jedar,
while Russia was still just beginning to get across the frontier into
Galicia, a full week before Tannenberg, and about the time of
Charleroi.

It may be doubted whether Austria actually put in the field against
Russia many more than 600,000 troops at the outset. In any event, she
was outnumbered by at least two to one. She further invited disaster
by dividing her armies. One (Auffenberg's) she stationed across Galicia
from north to south, east of and covering Lemberg; its right or southern
flank rested on Halicz on the Dniester, its northern flank was behind the
Bug, and its centre behind the Zlota Lipa, on high ground. This position
was excellent and it had been protected by well-constructed field works,
but it was far too extended for the number of troops Austria had avail-
able.

The second Austrian army (Dankl's), leaving railhead at the San,
moved straight north into the Lublin gap, aiming at Brest-Litovsk and
having for its ultimate purpose to compel the Russians to evacuate War-

THE BATTLE OF LEMBERG 195

saw and all of Poland. This was an exceedingly ambitious thrust, it was
entirely beyond the capacity of the army and the generals that first un-
dertook it, but it did actually succeed less than a year later, and its
success demonstrated the weakness of the Russian position and the
wisdom of the original Russian strategic conception, which called for an
evacuation of all the territory west of the Bug.

It will be noted that neither the Russians nor the Austro-Germans,
in the opening days, undertook any operations in that part of Poland
west of Warsaw. The Germans lacked the numbers for any such opera-
tion; the Russians were stopped by the concentration of Austrian armies
opposite Lublin, which had a deadly menace for any army west of War-
saw. It is only after the German thrust at Warsaw, made possible by
Tannenberg, had been undertaken and failed, that Russia ventures into
this area, resigning the Galician field for the moment, and then she comes
within a hairsbreadth of a crushing defeat at Lodz and makes no further
effort in this field, standing stolidly on the defensive.

The opening of the last week in August, then, sees these two major
efforts on foot. Russia is advancing with her two armies along the Kiev
and on the Odessa railroads and standing firm with her Third Army about
Lublin; Austria is holding one army before Lemberg and sending the
other north into Volhynia and actually approaching Lublin, its presence
already signalled by Austrian reports of victories about Krasnik. We
may calculate that the Austrian armies are outnumbered about two
to one and that as the armies before Lemberg begin the battle, the
Austrians have learned that the Serbians have just won a sweeping
victory at the Jedar and that Austrian invasion of Serbia has been
abandoned.

Meantime, to complete the eastern picture, one Russian army is
approaching Konigsberg, having won a battle at Gumbinnen, and a sec-
ond is approaching Allenstein in East Prussia, while Hindenburg is
already preparing his amazing counterthrust. In the west Namur has
fallen, the French have been beaten at Morhange and Charleroi, and all
the Allied armies are beginning the great retreat which Berlin and
Vienna interpret to be the collapse of French military power.

i96 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

III. LEMBERG

The First Battle of Lemberg lasted not less than eight days. In its
earlier stages it began along the Zlota Lipa, but the Austrians presently
retired to their main front behind the Gnila Lipa, their southern flank
still at Halicz and their centre about Krasne, on the Brody-Lemberg
railroad, where it is joined by the Tarnopol-Odessa railroad there left
behind the Bug. All this ground was again to be fought over by Brusi-
loff's great offensive in June, 1916.

The fact that the Austrian resistance finally collapsed has somewhat
misled the world as to the nature of the struggle. It was exceedingly
severe and for many days the Russians, despite heavy losses, were able
to make no progress. Finally Brusiloff broke through to the south to-
warjd the Dniester and about Halicz, which he took. ^ This success im-
perilled the whole Austrian line and it retreated through and beyond
Lemberg — which fell on the first days of September, just at Tannenberg
time — and took its stand behind the chain of Grodek lakes, a few miles
west of Lemberg, its left flank reaching and passing Rawaruska.

This time the decisive thrust is made by Russky.^ His numbers are
so much superior to Auffenberg's that he is able to turn his flank, and the
Austrian line swings at right angles around Rawaruska and runs east and
west ; Russky takes Rawaruska, breaks the whole centre of the Austrians
and throws the entire force, shaken by its defeats before Lemberg, into
an utter rout.

Meantime Ivanoff, having at first retired before Dankl and permitted
him to follow deep into Russian territory and become separated from
Auffenberg, turns and delivers a heavy blow. Dankl's army is now left in
air, its southern flank exposed by the collapse of Auffenberg, and he is com-
pelled to make a disorderly retreat, approximating a flight, back to and
across the San, giving up Jaroslav and coming back behind the Wisloka
and approaching Cracow. Auffenberg' s army retires over the Carpathian
passes into Hungary. Before the Austrian flight had at last paused the
Russians announced that they had taken 250,000 prisoners, vast num-
bers of guns, and an enormous store of munitions and material.

THE BATTLE OF LEMBERG

197

In point of fact, Lemberg was one of the complete disasters of military
history ; it brought the Austrian war establishment to the edge of ruin
and disclosed a fundamental weakness, which, despite German effort and
temporary success in the summer campaign of 1915, could not be quite
cured and was revealed afresh on the same ground in the campaign that
opened the summer of 1916. Differences of race, the manifest lack of

THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF GALICIA — BATTLE OF LEMBERG

A-Russky C-Ivanoff E-Dankl

B-Brusiloff D-Auffenberg

sympathy on the part of Slav contingents with their task of fighting Rus-
sians to please their German and Magyar masters, defective training
and insufficient preparation, above all inadequate numbers for the task
assigned, all these things combined to make Lemberg an Austrian dis-
aster of first magnitude.

The immediate consequences were the loss of all of Galicia to the
San, the advance of Russian troops beyond the San as far as the Wisloka,
the investing of Przemysl, the passage of the Carpathians by Cossack raid-

198 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

ing parties, and the first arrival of the invader in the Hungarian Plain.
Austrian troops had to be recalled from Alsace and from Serbia to re-
trieve the lost situation and the first demand was made upon Germany to
come to the aid of her Austrian ally. By the battle Austria lost 20,000
square miles of territory; Lemberg, a city of more than 200,000 people;
the great oil district of eastern Galicia. She lost also not less than half
of her first-line troops, counting the Jedar casualties, and, in addition,
material of war which could only slowly be replaced.

Austrian defeat at Lemberg coincided with German repulse and re-
treat at the Marne. But for the unhappy disaster at Tannenberg, the
second week in September would have seen all the armies of the Central
Powers in retreat or rout. Had Tannenberg not released Hindenburg's
army, it would have been from the western armies that Germany would
have had to draw corps to repair the Galician situation. She was not
now compelled to do this, but the consequences of Lemberg were ulti-
mately to put a term to western operations for a year and a half.

The decision at Lemberg did not endure so long as did that of the
Marne; the Germans abolished it at the Dunajec in April. But while
the decision stood, it continued to hamper and embarrass German effort.
Russia was temporarily compelled to withdraw from the region west of
the San, by the first German drive at Warsaw; after Lodz, she was still
before Cracow, and it required a new effort in Poland to compel her to
abandon her thrust for Cracow. Then she turned to the Carpathians,
and the immediate demand of Hungary compelled Germany to send
troops to guard Hungarian passes.

In the end Germany had to give over the attack upon Warsaw through
Poland and turn her main attention to Galicia. When she did this she
reversed the decision of Lemberg and promptly turned the Russians
out of Galicia, but this was only in the last days of April, and the Russian
victory had begun in the last days of August. Lemberg is, then, the
second great Allied victory of the war, ranking immediately after
the Marne. It gave the world its first evidence of the new character of
Russian armies, demonstrated that the evils of the Japanese War had
been remedied, and that Russian generalship was as good as German or

THE BATTLE OF LEMBERG 199

French. Disasters due to the failure of ammunition somewhat marred
this new reputation, but in 1916, when munitions had been supplied,
Russian armies began to win new victories of an impressive character.

It is fair to say that Lemberg and the Marne together demonstrated
that Germany had terribly underestimated her Continental foes. Two
years were to pass before she was to reform her estimate as to British
troops. But by the middle of September she and her Austrian ally had
fought three great battles, as she had planned, which should have de-
cided the issue of the war, but two had been lost, and the third had only
saved Germany from ruin and had not crushed France or Russia.

CHAPTER TEN

WARSAW

I
CONDITIONS OF THE FIRST BID

About October ist the Russians had passed the San in Galicia and
were moving toward Cracow, the first investment of Przemysl had begun,
and Cossacks were pouring through the still-unfortified passes of the
Carpathians and penetrating the Hungarian Plain. In the west the
Siege of Antwerp was approaching its promptly decisive stage, and the
German campaign to abolish the decision of the Marne by a final of-
fensive through Flanders was taking final shape.

It was now necessary to aid the Austrians, but it was not possible to
withdraw troops from the west, unless Germany was willing to accept
a deadlock from Switzerland to the North Sea, and she was far from
ready to do this. There remained the possibility of using the larger
portion of the army of Hindenburg, which had won Tannenberg and
pursued the second Russian army in East Prussia — that of Rennenkampf
— from the very gates of Konigsberg across the frontier. Gathering
up the mass of this army and leaving the balance to retreat slowly before
the Russians, the German General Staff might transport it rapidly,
by those admirable strategic railroads which follow the frontier in a
semicircle from East Prussia to Cracow; put it in at Lodz, which had
fallen into German hands early in the war; call upon Austrian troops,
returning from Serbia or from Alsace, and make a sudden drive at
Warsaw.

If the drive achieved the maximum of success, Warsaw would be
captured, together with Ivangorod to the south, the objective of the
Austrian fraction of Hindenburg's army; Germany would, at a single
thrust, win the west bank of the Vistula, an enormously strong military
position. Behind this line she could hope to stand inexpugnably and

WARSAW

201

devote her efforts to preparing to renew the conflict in the west in the
spring.

But if this maximum was not realized, there was a minimum that
was assured, Russia had no troops of material consequence between
Lodz and Warsaw: most of her military strength was now in Galicia

RUSSIAN INVASION OF GALICIA, ABOUT OCTOBER I, 1914

The Russians were moving tcrvard Cracow, the first investment of Przemysl had begun,
and Cossacks were pouring through the still-unfortified passes of the Carpathians and penetrating
the Hungarian Plain

pressing against the Austrians and moving toward Cracow. Unques-
tionably the first sign of a German thrust for Warsaw would compel the
Russians to give over their Galician operations, draw out many corps
and send them to save Warsaw, and thus dislocate their whole Galician
concentration. When this began the Austrians could undertake a new
offensive in Galicia, designed to crush the weakened Russian armies,
and the danger to Cracow, as well as the menace to Hungary through
the Carpathians, would be abolished.

202 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

This was the main purpose of the offensive toward Warsaw. Austria
must be helped. The help she required could still be furnished without
any draft upon the western lines, but such help would not be sufficient
to win a decisive battle, if Russia made a prompt concentration. It
could only get Warsaw if speed enabled the Germans to seize that strong
position before Russian numbers could be brought up. It was a serious
bid for Warsaw, but it was a bid begun with the full recognition that
it had at best no more than half a chance of success.

In the Civil War, Lee sent Early against Washington with precisely
the same purpose in view. It was possible that Early might get Wash-
ington. If he did, the success would be of enormous political and moral
value; but even if he failed he was likely to compel Grant, hanging
doggedly to his footing before Petersburg, to weaken his front to relieve
Washington, and this would give Lee a respite. It might lead Grant to
abandon his whole effort to get Richmond, from his position south of
the James. Early failed, as did Hindenburg, because troops from the
other front arrived in time. But unlike Lee's thrust, that of Hinden-
burg succeeded in dislocating the other enemy concentration, that in
Galicia.

There was further, a political purpose in the German thrust. The
attitude of the Poles toward the conflicting nations was obscure. It
was possible and reasonable for the Germans to hope that the Poles,
if a German invasion carried Warsaw, might turn from their Russian
allegiance and become the allies of the invader, as they had in the
Napoleonic time when they furnished the great Emperor with at least
one marshal and some of his best and bravest troops. This German
hope was not realized, partly because the failure to get Warsaw neces-
sitated a retreat, in which Poland was laid in ashes by contending armies,
but it was an important consideration in the German mind and it was a
possibility recognized fully by the Russians.

II. AT THE GATES OF WARSAW

Under these circumstances and about October ist, Hindenburg began
his advance in two columns — one following the railroad east from Kalisz

WARSAW

203

to Warsaw; the other, mainly composed of Austrians, moving north-
east along the railroad from Cracow to Ivangorod. Combined, these
armies did not number six army corps, possibly there were but five;
certainly their total strength was less than that of Kluck's army in the
Marne campaign. These armies had something like a hundred miles
to go; they had, when the advance began, practically no Russian

AUSTRIA/ > HliNGAR

HINDENBURG S FIRST CAMPAIGN FOR WARSAW, OCT. 2O, 1914

The German thrust for Warsaw diverted the Russians from their operations in Galicia.
This was its main purpose. In the Civil War, Lee sent Early against Washington with a pre-
cisely similar object in view

troops before them, and they had reasonably good roads to follow.
They began with the full expectation of taking Warsaw within the fort-
night, and the news of the fall of Antwerp overtook them on the road
and gave them new enthusiasm.

With little or no fighting, moving with almost incredible rapidity,
these two armies advanced until, on October i4th, one army stood on the

204 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

outskirts of Warsaw, in the suburb of Prushkow, seven miles from the
centre of the city, while the other had cleared the west bank of the
Vistula before Ivangorod. At this moment German shells fell within
the Polish capital, German aeroplanes bombed the city, there was a
general exodus of the population, and the world believed that Warsaw
was to share the fate of Antwerp. So sure did German victory now
seem to the Turk that, under German pressure, Enver Pasha chose
this moment to put his country into the conflict.

But Russian concentration was just prompt enough. While the
Germans were in the suburbs of Warsaw, Siberian regiments pushed
through the town and began to defend the outskirts. They were the
advanced guards of eight corps, which came to Ivangorod and to
Warsaw in the next few days. For a whole week there was sharp
fighting before Warsaw, where Hindenburg stood checked but not con-
vinced. But presently the Russian reinforcements crossed the Vistula
about Ivangorod and north of Warsaw and came in on both flanks of the
Hindenburg forces. October 2ist Hindenburg broke off the engage-
ment. He had never fought to the limit ; he had stood before Warsaw
long after the possibility of taking the town had passed, to preserve
the threat as long as possible. His Austrian allies before Ivangorod
had suffered severely; he had gotten off far more lightly.

Beginning October 2ist, the first thrust at Warsaw transforms
itself into a swift and orderly retreat, such as Frederick the Great taught
Europe to expect from his Prussians, and in trim columns Hinden-
burg moved back to the frontier. As he retreated, the fact was dis-
closed that he had constructed fieldworks along his route, foreseeing
retreat, and these gave his rearguards admirable protection. In this
retreat he destroyed roads, railroads, bridges, actually abolishing most
of the means of communication in Poland.

Meanwhile, in Galicia, the effect of the Warsaw drive had been ex-
actly what had been hoped. The Russians had come out of the Car-
pathians and retired behind the San. The Austrians had rallied and
taken the offensive, reaching and in spots passing the river. Przemysl
had been relieved ; there was a moment when the reconquest of Galicia

WARSAW 205

seemed to be within Austrian possibilities. But this moment passed.
As the Germans retired from Warsaw the Russians in Galicia retook the
offensive. This time, passing the San, they again — and as it turned out,
finally — invested Przemysl and approached Cracow at the precise mo-
ment when the armies which had saved Warsaw and Ivangorod were
coming southwest, and that of Ivangorod threatened Cracow from the
north as the Galician army now threatened it from the east.

Thus the real benefit of Hindenburg's thrust was shortlived. By
the time he had fallen back to the German and Austrian frontiers, his
retreat was mainly toward the southwest, the Russian menace in
Galicia had become even more serious than it had been when he started.
He had but postponed the danger for a moment and he had now to deal
with it in an aggravated form.

III. LODZ

We have now come to the moment when the western and eastern
campaigns merge. Hindenburg is now compelled to make a second
effort to relieve the Austrians in Galicia and save Cracow. He has
still only very restricted numbers. The Germans are making their
last desperate effort in Flanders; they have failed against the Belgians
and French from Nieuport to Dixmude ; they are attacking the British
about Ypres, and the British are holding on doggedly while the French
are striving to reinforce them. Unless the Germans can now break
through in the west in a brief time, they will have to abandon the
western effort and turn their attention eastward. The Russian pres-
sure— which, in Allied plans, made before the war, should have become
effective in the last days of August — is about to count in the last days
of November.

For his second effort Hindenburg takes advantage again of the
strategic railroads which run in a circle about the Russian frontier.
In his drive at Warsaw he had used these railroads to move troops from
East Prussia to Silesia. When he had failed at Warsaw he had retired
southwest upon Cracow and Breslau, destroying Russian railroads as he
retired. The Russian troops had followed him through Lodz and even

2O6

HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

to the Silesian boundary. But, owing to the configuration of the ter-
ritory, they were now farther from Warsaw than German troops at
Thorn would be, and they had behind them only the ruined roads
and railroads, which Hindenburg had wrecked.

/GERMAN

^AUSTRIAN

RUSSIAN

HINDENBURG S SECOND DRIVE FOR WARSAW

Hindenburg left only Austrians to deal with the advancing Russians on the front from Cra-
cow to Kalisz, moved north to the gap between the Vistula and Warthe rivers, and there sent in
several corps under Mackensen

MEN AND GUNS OF
THE TWO KAISERS

THE IMPERIAL GUARD PASSES IN REVIEW BEFORE EMPEROR WILLIAM

At the left of the Kaiser is General Lowenfeldt, and at the extreme right General

Von Billow.

GENERAL VON MOLTKE

GENERAL VON FALKENHAYN

GENERAL VON HEERINGEN

CROWN PRINCE RUPERT OF BAVARIA

General Von Moltke, nephew of the great Moltke of Bismarck's day was Chief of Staff at the outbreak of the
World War. Because of his failure to seize and hold the French and Belgian seacoast when opportunity offered and
because of rumored mistakes in the Battle of the Marne, Moltke lost his position and turned over his office to the
Kaiser's favorite, Falkenhayn, whose star was to set before Verdun as Moltke's set on the road to Calais.

The armies of General Von Heeringen and Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria met the French after they had pene-
trated German territory some fifteen or twenty miles, about a fortnight after the War began. The battle was an
undoubted German victory. The French "7s's" were outranged by the heavy German field artillery, and in three
days the French were driven back across the border and the invasion of Lorraine was at an end.

A fortnight later, while the Battle of the Marne was on; these same generals fought another engagement on this
same front — "the Second Battle of Nancy." They were opposed, as before, by the French general Castelnau. Their
aim was to cut through the gap in the French barrier forts between Toul and Epinal and thus arrive on the flank and
rear of all the French armies. Though fighting under the eyes of the Kaiser himself they were repulsed with great
slaughter — else the Battle of the Marne might have ended very differently.

Photograph by Paul Thompson

GENERAL MACKENSEN

GENERAL LUDENDORFF

THE KAISER IN WARTIME

GENERAL VON KLUCK

General Mackensen, conqueror of the Russians under Dmitrieff at the Dunajec, in the spring of 1915. The
trapped Roumanian army surrendered to him in December, 1916.

Genera' Ludendorff, close associate of Hindenburg. He has been called "the brains of Hindenburg," and even the
"real German dictator." His mastiff-like visage recalls the bull-dog countenance of Hindenburg and even more the
resolute mask of the old "Iron Chancellor" Bismarck.

The Kaiser's wartime photographs betray the fact that he has aged greatly during the conflict. This shows him
in his field uniform, with helmet covered so as to offer no glittering mark to sniping aviators. For all the dozens of
gaudy uniforms in which he used to take so much delight, he has never been indiscreet enough to lead an army in per-
son— except at manoeuvres. He is said, however, to have waited "in shining armour" to take part in one or two trium-
phal entries which failed to come off.

General Von Kluck, about August 23d, made a desperate effort to "run around the end" of the Allied line, inter-
posed between it and Paris and produce another Sedan. He did not quite succeed, and immediately found himself in a
very dangerous position during the Battle of the Marne. Thanks to Sir John French's failure to rise to the occasion,
Kluck was able by dint of desperate fighting against the gallant Maunoury to make good his retreat to the Aisne.

Photograph by Paul Thompson

ONE OF HINDENBURG'S THRUSTS AT WARSAW
There is plenty of room on this broad road for ammunition and supply trains to advance along with the infantry.

AN INCIDENT DURING THE GERMAN EFFORT TO DRIVE THE RUSSIANS HOME FROM GALICIA

The German soldiers are coming out of the garrison church at Przemysl, after attending Sunday morning service.
Few civilians are in the street and the shop-windows are tightly shuttered.

EFFECT OF THE GERMAN BOMBARDMENT OF PRZEMYSL

GENERAL VON AUFFENBERG (Right)

The unlucky Austrian general from whom the Russians
captured a quarter of a million prisoners at the Battle
of Lemberg, one of the great disasters of military history
which brought the Austrian war establishment to the verge
of ruin.

Photograph by Paul Thompson

TYPICAL AUSTRIAN INFANTRYMEN

As is shown in another part of this book the Austrian
makes a good and courageous soldier. Men of many
diverse races fight under the colours of the Dual Monarchy
yet no dissension has appeared.

PARCELS FROM FRIENDS AT HOME ARRIVE TO CHEER GERMAN ARTILLERY

OFFICERS BEFORE WARSAW

THE AUSTRIANS

It was Austria's mission in Austro-German strategy to meet the main Russian thrust and parry it, while Germany
was disposing of France. But Austria was unable to carry out her part of the program, and when she had been de-
feated by the Serbians at the Jedar and by the Russians at Lemberg, Germany was compelled to draw troops from
the western front to send to her rescue and thus lost her own chance for a quick victory over France

The upper picture shows some of the celebrated Rangers Corps guarding a road; the lower one, a group of officers
seated before one of the guns used in bombarding Antwerp.

ONE OF THE SKODA HOWITZERS THAT REDUCED LIEGE

On August 7th, the German infantry penetrated between the forts before Liege and occupied the city and the
citadel; but they were unable to take the forts. These maintained their fire till German and Austrian heavy guns were
brought forward. Under this attack the forts crumbled almost instantly. They were the work of the famous
Brialmont, and supposed to be very strong. But they had been allowed to fall into disrepair and their reduction proved
to be child's play to the mighty new engines of destruction.

WARSAW

215

Accordingly Hindenburg left only the Austrians to deal with the
advancing Russians on the front from Cracow to Kalisz and moved
his mass right along the frontier north to Thorn and the gap between
the Vistula and Warthe rivers and there sent in several corps under
Mackensen, soon to earn world fame. These troops moved rapidly

THE BATTLE OF LODZ, DURING HINDENBURG S SECOND CAMPAIGN

FOR WARSAW

Troops hurried eastward soon turn the balance against the Russians, and December 6th
the Germans reenter Lodz after six weeks of the most sanguinary fighting. German official re-
ports claim 100,000 Russian prisoners

across the flank and rear of the Russians to the southeast, turned their
flank and presently interposed between them and Warsaw, much as
Kluck sought to interpose between the Anglo-French forces and Paris
in the September campaign in the west.

Here, then, in the last days of November, while the Battle of Ypres
is just ending, is the promise of a second Tannenberg, the capture of a
large Russian army, and the ultimate fall of Warsaw. The position of

2i6 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

the Russian army is desperate, it would seem, because its northern
flank is turned by the Germans, while it is assailed in front by more
Germans, and the Austrians have advanced north from Cracow, threat-
ening its southern flank. But the Russians escaped, showing again the
same qualities which shone, even in disaster, in the Manchurian campaign.

At the moment when Russky, who commanded at Lodz, seemed lost,
the Germans on his northern flank are involved by a thrust out from
Warsaw and south from the Vistula made by troops brought down from
East Prussia and out of the fortress garrisons. Two German corps
are surrounded and Petrograd, long silent in the midst of disaster,
suddenly claims a huge success. This does not happen. General von
Francois, the German commander whose corps are trapped, manages to
fight his way out, by exertions which the Russians frankly concede to
have been "unbelievable." The Germans are helped by failures of
Rennenkampf, who once more, as in the Tannenberg times, discloses
tardiness and now goes into retirement.

But already the situation has compelled the Germans to borrow aid
from the west. The end of the western campaign has come and the
decision of the Marne stands. Troops hurried eastward soon turn the
balance against the Russians and December 6th the Germans reenter
Lodz after six weeks of the most sanguinary fighting the war in the east
had yet seen. German official reports claim 100,000 Russian prisoners;
the Russians claim material captures, but the actual effect of all the
fighting has been, in the immediate area of conflict, to reproduce western
conditions of deadlock, and the Polish front rapidly tends to descend into
the same state of trench warfare that has obtained on the Aisne since
the middle of September.

IV. THE THIRD BID FOR WARSAW

When in October the Russians began their advance from Warsaw,
following Hindenburg toward Cracow, it seems clear that they tempora-
rily renounced the Galician field as the main theatre of operations and
put forth their full strength in Poland. After Lodz they again reverted
to their old idea. Lodz demonstrated clearly that it would be impos-

WARSAW 217

sible to move west out of Poland. It was, in fact, as the Germans said
in their official announcements at the time, a permanent check to Rus-
sian offensive toward Silesia and Posen.

On the other hand, while the first Hindenburg advance toward
Warsaw had checked the Russian operations in Galicia and turned them
into a retirement behind the San, the Lodz operation did not affect the
Galician field and the Russians still continued to press on toward
Cracow, after their Polish army had evacuated Lodz, and retired toward
Lowicz and Skierniewice, covering Warsaw. A new effort was re-
quired to relieve the Galician situation. This new effort was made in
Poland ; in it we see, unmistakably, the contribution of troops brought
from the west. The necessity for this operation was revealed in the
.severe defeat suffered by Austrian armies coming up out of the Car-
pathians and seeking to relieve Przemysl and redeem western Galicia.

Accordingly Hindenburg resumed his pressure in Poland; from the
Lower Vistula south before Lodz he began a terrific frontal attack upon
the Russians, employing the numbers he had now borrowed from the
west. Under this pressure the Russians retired slowly, giving over
Lowicz and Skierniewice and retiring upon Warsaw. They finally
took their stand on the eastern banks of the Bzura and Rawka, little
rivers which together stretch straight across the front of Warsaw from
the Lower Vistula for many miles south. Below this system the Rus-
sians fortified the banks of the Pilitza and then of the Nida, which enters
the Upper Vistula north of Tarnow.

The position was largely accidental. The Russians had intended to
defend Warsaw from the Blonie lines, much nearer the city; the Bzura is
more than twenty miles west of the Polish capital. But little by little
they discovered that their lines held; they found that they had been
driven into a defensible position, and they hung on. At the same time
they drew back from before Cracow, north of the Vistula, standing
behind the Nida, south of it behind the Dunajec. They had now
entered the lines they were to hold from December until May between
the Lower Vistula and the Carpathians, and until August before War-
saw.

218 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

The German attacks upon the Bzura-Rawka lines recalled the
similar efforts in Flanders, at the Yser and before Ypres. German
losses were exceedingly heavy; German gains were inconsiderable, a
trench here, a farmhouse there. Meantime the weather had come to
the rescue of Russia. An early and severe winter had destroyed Napo-
leon. The winter of 1914-1915 was one of the mildest in Polish history
and the roads were turned into swamps. The superior mobility of the
Germans was abolished as a factor and they were unable to use their
heavy artillery because of the difficulties of transport. These condi-
tions had materially affected the Lodz operation; they had an almost
decisive influence now.

By January ist the attempt to get Warsaw by frontal attack has
failed. It will be resumed in January and February, combined with a
thrust south from East Prussia, via Mlawa and along the railroad up
which the Russians had marched to disaster in the Tannenberg time.
But it will fail again, and this failure will be absolute. Meantime, the
Russians will abandon their momentary plan to move west from Poland
toward Breslau and through Galicia to Cracow. They will more and
more direct their energies toward forcing the passes of the Carpathians
and reaching the Hungarian Plain.

Well into February the Germans will continue their efforts to get
Warsaw from the front and from the north. In all of this time they
will content themselves with bolstering up Austrian defence in Galicia
by more and more considerable reinforcement, and by a gradual taking
over, first of High Command and then of the direction of the smaller
units. It is not until the February attacks fail, and the Russian line
before Warsaw is proven too strong to be broken, that Germany, in her
turn, will go to Galicia and make her main effort in the field where, for
many months, Russia has been steadily progressing.

January ist, then, is a date when it is possible to dismiss the Warsaw
operation as actually terminated, despite subsequent efforts. From the
Baltic to the Carpathians the line begins to take the same stationary
form that the western line has already assumed. There is a slight
fluctuation in East Prussia; it will be February before the Germans,

WARSAW

219

having won the Battle of the Mazurian Lakes, can announce that East
Prussia is freed from the invaders. But actually the decision has been
reached, Warsaw cannot be taken from the north or from the west.
Germany must make up her mind to this, and when she makes up her
mind it will be too late to hope to resume the great western offensive in
the spring.

DEADLOCK IN POLAND, DEC., I9I4~MAY, 1915

January 1st is the date when it is possible to dismiss the Warsaw operation as actually
terminated, despite subsequent efforts. The line begins to take the same stationary form that
the western line has already assumed

Instead, there must be prepared a new eastern campaign and that
campaign will have for its real purpose, not alone taking Warsaw and
the line of the Vistula, not merely abolishing the threat of Austria, but
destroying the military power of Russia and compelling a separate peace ;
in a word, adopting against Russia the strategy and purpose which
failed against France at the Marne.

220 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

V. SERBIA TRIUMPHANT AGAIN

While the German advance from Lodz upon Warsaw was going
forward, a fresh Austrian disaster attracted the attention of the world.
As far back as the first days of November, Austria, hoping permanent
relief from the German operations toward Lodz, had detached troops
to dispose of the Serbian nuisance, which, since the victory of the Jedar,
had injured Austrian prestige and imperilled Hapsburg power in all the
Slav regions, but particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

And once more it was reserved for Serbia, prime cause of all the
terrible world conflict, to give Europe a great surprise, the fourth in three
brief years, and to win a shining and conspicuous triumph.

In 1913, at the outset of the First Balkan War — when Europe pre-
serving the memory of Slivnitza, forecast Serbian defeat, and the
invasion of Serbia by the Turks was prophesied by those most hopeful
of Bulgarian victory — it was the Serb and not the Bulgar who proved
irresistible, invincible, won back Old Serbia at Kumanovo, Macedonia
at Monastir, and captured the Turkish Commander at Adrianople.

A few months later, when Austria had precipitated the Second
Balkan War to destroy King Peter's nation, it was the Serb and not
the Bulgar who again prevailed, and the Battle of Bregalnitza as com-
pletely shattered the legend of Bulgarian invincibility as the reverse
of Mars-la-Tour had wrecked that of France. The victims of a breach
of faith, attacked by night and without warning, without declaration
of war, the Serbs rallied, took the offensive, sent the Bulgars in rout
back over the Rhodopians and restored to Serbia the southern half of the
empire of the great Dushan.

Finally, in the opening month of the World War, when the fortune of
the Allies in the west was most desperate, it was the victory of the
Serb at the Jedar which opened the more prosperous period that cul-
minated at the Marne. At the Jedar four Austrian army corps had
been routed, Austrian prestige in the Balkans shattered, the first
Slav triumph won in that long series which by December was to bring
Austria to the lowest ebb in her history since the Hungarian Revolution.

WARSAW

221

On December ist Serbia was once more in the presence of grave
peril. The October drive of Germany had released several army corps
of Austrians in Galicia and Poland, and these came south to complete
the work of destroying the troops of King Peter, who had for months
defended their frontiers. Before this overwhelming force the Serbs
had retreated. All the corner of Serbia between the Save and the Drina
was lost. Coming east from Bosnia the Austrian right approached Bel-
grad, which for four months had defied daily bombardment ; the centre

'.^jitrovitza^ Leskovatz
1 MONTENEGRO )

tM. /.••

SERBIAN BATTLEFIELDS

I — The Jedar, August, 1914. In the opening month of the World War, when the fortune
of the Allies in the west was most desperate, it was the victory of the Serb at the Jedar which
opened -the more prosperous period which culminated at the Marne

II — Valievo, December, 1914. One of the most complete of Austrian disasters

222 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

reached Valievo, the left penetrated to Uchitza, on the Serbian Morava.
Presently Belgrad fell, a birthday present to the aged Francis Joseph,
the only conquest of his army in the whole struggle.

In the first week in December the fate of Serbia seemed sealed. A
second Belgium, another little state destroyed in the contest between
the great, seemed assured. Austrian armies appeared certain to reach
Nish, the temporary Serbian capital, to open the Orient Railway to the
Bulgarian frontier and persuade Bulgaria, still smarting from her defeat
by Serbia, to cast her lot with the two Kaisers and open her territory
for the passage of the Turks to the battlelines of western Europe.

In the moment of greatest peril, however, Serbia was saved — partly
by her own courage, by her own determination, without which destruc-
tion was inescapable; partly by the new advance of the Russians.
While the Austrian troops were still before Belgrad, Cossacks once more
crossed the Carpathians, swept down into the Hungarian Plain; panic
reached the very gates of Budapest, and three army corps were hurriedly
recalled from Serbia to defend Hungary. Once more at the critical
moment the Austro-German Alliance had to surrender triumph in one
field because of deadly peril in another.

No sooner had the three corps been withdrawn than the Serbs again
took the offensive. Old King Peter, now stricken in years and infirmi-
ties, but retaining something of the fire that earned him his cross of the
Legion of Honour as a soldier of France in 1 870, rode in front of his troops,
mounted on a white charger, and harangued them as their chiefs of re-
mote centuries were accustomed to do. Then followed one of the
most complete of Austrian disasters. In a few days the whole force
had fled across the frontiers, leaving thousands of prisoners, many
cannon, and much material, behind them. Belgrad was retaken; by
December I5th Serbia was free of Austrians, saved for the time being;
saved until the third — and fatal — attack, the Balkan drive of Macken-
sen almost a year later.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

NEW HORIZONS AND NEW GERMAN PROBLEMS

I
NEW YEAR, 1915

The New Year — which was to witness the most brilliant military
triumphs of Modern Germany, triumphs rivalling the Napoleonic cycle-
opened dismally enough for Berlin. Five months of war and a million
casualties had sufficed to complete the destruction of all the initial
plans and hopes of Germany. The supreme hope, that of a short war,
had gone glimmering and Lord Kitchener's forecast of a three-year war
had begun to find converts even in Germany. And the prospect of a
long war raised new problems, of which the military, if it was not the
most pressing, was by no means the least.

In point of fact, new political considerations were now becoming
apparent. There was the question of Austria, a question at once politi-
cal and military; there was the problem of Italy, destined to become
more and more grave as the months passed until the spring should see
the House of Savoy again in the field against the House of Hapsburg.
There was, too, the similar and only less serious problem of Roumania,
which was not to find so speedy a solution as that of Italy, but was des-
tined to prove even more dangerous to German safety. There was the
additional necessity to care for Turkish defence, a necessity which would
grow with the months and become pressing in the spring, when the
Allied fleets knocked at the door of the Dardanelles and Allied armies
took root on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

Finally, the problem of sea power was beginning to become acute.
A world which too eagerly and too completely accepted the British
view as to the effect of the British blockade was not completely mis-
taken in recognizing thus early that the British fleet would steadily

and increasingly hamper the domestic economy of Germany and compel

223

224 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

her to employ one expedient after another to meet the shortage
incident to the blockade. Only in food did the reckoning prove radi-
cally mistaken and even in this department there was discomfort, with-
out immediate or intolerable privation.

The sense of this closing net, the anger at the nation which thus
struck the whole German people while it remained removed from the
weight of German arms, was to drive the German Government, the
naval school of Tirpitz, into a submarine campaign that would involve
neutrals, and in the case of the greatest of all neutrals, the United States,
produce a situation which after many clashes would at last add the
United States to the nations at war with Germany.

The paralysis of the German merchant marine; the closing of the
seas to the German flag while British, French, and even Belgian ships
still sailed the ocean and brought to French and British ports the muni-
tions and supplies essential to preserve them, while their own factories
were still unready and their own industrial system not yet readjusted;
the resources of ships and sailors, which permitted the transport of
armies; the arrival of colonial troops from Australia, Canada, India,
which permitted the nations to redress the balance which was with
Germany at the outset, thanks to her superior preparation; these were
things that exercised an ever-growing influence upon German thought
and German action.

Nor could there be any mistaking the resentment in the whole
Fatherland, as it was recognized that, so far as the world was concerned,
Germany had become a besieged city, and German explanations and
German statements, save for the few fugitive messages sent through the
air, were condemned to satisfy German readers alone; while the world,
the neutral world to which Germany desired to appeal, found its evi-
dence and drew its conclusions from anti-German sources alone.

II. THE MILITARY PROBLEM

Looking first at the military problem, it was plain on January I,
1915, that German prospects, without being desperate, were dark. It
was true that men, the world over, too promptly began to compare the

NEW HORIZONS AND NEW GERMAN PROBLEMS 225

posture of Germany in 1915 with that of Napoleon in 1813. The out-
side world neither understood the enormous accession of faith and con-
fidence the restricted victories of the opening phase had brought to
Germans, and the unparalleled magnitude of German effort which was
to come, nor could they realize, as the Germans did, how futile were
many of the hopes in Allied quarters of the prompt arrival of Kitchen-
er's millions and the limitless flow of Russian masses.

Yet, despite the exaggerations, the fundamental conception of the
non-Teutonic world was correct. Germany had failed at the Marne and
in her subsequent efforts to reverse the decision of the Marne. Her
armies now stood on the defensive in the west and there was no promise
that the initiative could be reclaimed. Two months of terrible slaugh-
ter before Warsaw had proven as sterile as the murder done in the battles
of Flanders. Warsaw stood as Calais and Boulogne stood.

Looking southward to Austria the picture was dismal in the extreme.
The defeat of Lemberg had shaken the whole fabric of Hapsburg mili-
tary life. After Lemberg the efforts of German commanders to rally
and reorganize Austrian armies had saved the armies, but it had failed
to make them victorious. Temporary Russian retirements in Galicia
had again and again been followed by Russian victories, and in the last
days of the year a second Serb triumph had revealed the permanent
disorder of Austrian forces. The Russian armies were again pressing up
and over the Carpathians, and from Budapest came insistent demands
that Germany should guard the Magyar marshes against the Slav danger.

Reckoning on the basis of country occupied, it was true that Ger-
many was now fighting in foreign lands, for the most part. The East
Prussian invasions had been repulsed, but not until grave injuries had
been done to Junker estates. Not less than 8,000 square miles of in-
dustrial France, holding in peace times 2,000,000 people, was occupied,
as was the bulk of Belgium and some 15,000 square miles of Russian
soil. But, to balance this, France clung to a corner of Alsace, Russia
to a paring of East Prussia, and Austria had lost in Galicia and Bukowina
nearly 35,000 square miles of territory including the oil-fields of Galicia.

If anything else were needed to incline the balance toward the Allied

226 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

side, it could be found in the isolation and inevitable extinction of Ger-
man colonial power. Togo and the Kamerun were both lost, Kiaou-
Chau and the islands of the Pacific were gone. The doom of German
Southwest Africa had been sealed by the failure of the Boer rebellion,
and a Boer General, Louis Botha, was gathering up the troops which
would presently conquer it. German East Africa still endured, but
not even a German could believe that it would permanently escape the
fate of the other colonies.

On the military side Germany had now once more to bend her ener-
gies to restore Austria. She had to reckon on the eventual demand of
the Turk for guns, and men to man them. The chance of a resumption
of the offensive in the west in the spring was already fading, but the
failure meant more time for France and Britain, aided by the workshops
of America, to restore the balance in numbers and preparation. The
story of how Germany met the military problems is one of the most
magnificent in military and industrial history. Unfortunately for her,
the political problems were beyond her capacity — beyond all human
capacity, probably — and, as it turned out, her military successes could
only in part postpone the political perils that were now revealed.

III. ITALY

Of all the political problems, that of Italy was the most dangerous.
Count Nigra had once said that Italy and Austria, in the nature of
things, could only be allies or open enemies. The Triple Alliance had
been denounced by Italy in the opening days of the war. With the
denunciation of the fact of the Treaty, although the letter endured for
some months thereafter, Italian hopes turned again to the Irredenta, and
the Italian people, far more promptly than the Crown or the politicians,
began to clamour for the acquisition of the Trentino and Triest, of the
islands of the Adriatic and the lost Venetian province of Dalmatia,
still adorned by some of the most splendid monuments of Ancient Rome.

Such an agitation could have but one consequence unless Austria
were prepared to resign Triest and the Trentino, and Austria was not
prepared for any such sacrifice. Under the influence of Germany she

NEW HORIZONS AND NEW GERMAN PROBLEMS 227

tardily, very tardily, consented to certain cessions, but they were too
slight to satisfy Italian demand. Bismarck, in refusing to allow his
ally of 1866 to acquire Trent, had sown the seeds of later disaster, and
almost from the morning of the war it was clear that Italy would even-
tually enter the alliance against Germany.

Turkish participation merely increased Italian agitation for war,

ITALIA IRREDENTA

As soon as the Triple Alliance was denounced, Italian hopes turned to the Irredenta, and
the Italian people began to clamour for the acquisition of the Trentino and Triest

because the alliance of the Turk with the Central Powers, besides re-
opening the Tripolitan question, assured the latter of supremacy in the
eastern Mediterranean, where Italy had great ambitions, all of which
ran counter to those of Berlin and Vienna but found ready hearing and
small opposition in Allied capitals. It was a desirable thing for Italy
that Germany and Austria should be beaten. It would be a fatal
thing for many Italian hopes if they won.

Nor was it less essential that Italy should contribute to the defeat of

228 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

the Central Powers, if she was to share in the results. There were in
Greece and Serbia eager aspirants for the eastern shores of the Adriatic
and the islands and shores of Asia Minor. The noise of Allied fleets
before the Dardanelles forts presently awoke echoes in Rome that Ger-
man diplomacy could not silence. The hereditary antipathy to the Aus-
trian and the longing for Triest mounted with the weeks until they
reached a point in popular emotion where Prince Billow grimly conceded
that "the street" had won; and Italy, despite the fears of her Sovereign
and the opposition of Giolitti, her most influential politician, was
plunged into the world strife.

We shall see that the decision came too late to prevent the German
victory of the Dunajec, which transformed the whole face of the eastern
war for a year. We shall see that Italian hesitations, taken with Allied
blunders in the Balkans, combined to clear the way for the great drive
through Serbia to Constantinople. But also, at a still more distant
time, we shall see Italy sending her troops to Saloniki, as she had sent
them to Valona, before she entered the war. We shall see her, at a
critical moment, extending her declaration of war to include Germany.

But in January, 1915, the Italian danger was only apparent, it was
not yet imminent, and Berlin could believe for many months that Italy
would remain neutral. To this end she exerted all her efforts, and it was
with an eye to the moral effect in Rome that she prepared the greatest
of her victories, the Dunajec, which, unhappily for her, came just too
late to check Italy's course, although it did avail to restrict the influence
of Italy in the war for nearly a year. Fatally, however, the prospect
of a long war was beginning to weigh upon Berlin, for if a swift victory
such as those of 1866 and 1870 might have left the neutrals still recon-
ciled to their roles, a long war held out attractions to their racial and
national hopes which could not be mistaken.

IV. ROUMANIA

Not less real than the Italian was the Roumanian danger. Within
Austrian and Hungarian frontiers there lived more than 3,250,000 people
of Roumanian tongue and race. They were a majority in the great

NEW HORIZONS AND NEW GERMAN PROBLEMS 229

Hungarian province of Transylvania; the largest group amongst the
many races in numbers in Temesvar; a considerable element in Buko-
wina. All these provinces touched the Roumanian frontier. In every
Roumanian heart there had been for many years a desire to achieve the
re-union of Roumania, as that of Italy had been achieved in the previous
century. Could the Austrian provinces be won, Roumania would be-
come a compact state of nearly 100,000 square miles, as large as the
mainland of Italy; if not a Great Power, second only to Spain among the
lesser nations of Europe.

Such hopes had seemed impossible of realization until the Second
Balkan War first revealed the weakness of Austrian policy and the
crumbling of the Hapsburg edifice. Until that time Roumania had, per-
force, consented to remain a minor member of the firm of the Triple
Alliance, and, as Italy had been drawn to Berlin by the quarrel with
France over Tunis, Roumania had been influenced in the same sense by
the gross injustice and ingratitude of Russia after the Turkish War.
In that conflict Roumanian troops had saved the Russian army at Plevna,
but Russia had robbed Roumania of her portion of Bessarabia and flung
her a morsel of the Bulgarian Dobrudja as an insufficient recompense.

Ruled by a Hohenzollern, who in the opening days of the World
War sought to cast the lot of his country with the head of his House,
Roumania had marched with Berlin, Vienna, and Rome — held not a little
by the presence of Italy in the partnership, which enlisted the Rou-
manian tradition of Latin origin — from the era of the Congress of Berlin
to the outbreak of the Balkan wars. But when Austria, eager to crush
Serbia, had given her support to the creation of a Bulgaria even greater
than that which had been erected by the Treaty of San Stefano and abol-
ished by the Congress of Berlin, Roumanian allegiance faltered.

Bulgaria was the rival of Roumania in the Balkans and had openly
declared her purpose to reclaim the Dobrudja. Bulgarian plans looked
forward to achieving a hegemony in the Balkans comparable to that
which Prussia had achieved in Modern Germany. To all such plans
Roumania was necessarily hostile, because they both threatened her
integrity and menaced her influence. When Austria sacrificed Bukhar-

23o HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

est for Sofia, Bukharest openly altered her policy; accepted Russian
warrant for attacking Bulgaria; and, by her attack in 1913, completely
demolished the whole structure of Austrian statecraft. Moreover, the
Roumanian soldiers who invaded Bulgaria openly announced that they
were taking this route to Transylvania and Bukowina.

Once the breach had been made, the consequences were inevitable.
Roumania followed Italy in declaring her neutrality when the war came,
despite the desire of the King, whose subsequent death soon removed a
Teutonic ally not less potent than Constantine of Greece. When Ital-
ian policy began to drift toward the Allies, Roumania tacitly followed.
More and more Roumanians looked over the Hungarian boundaries
to where, beyond the Transylvanian Alps, millions of their race broth-
ers suffered something approaching intellectual and moral slavery under
the Magyar yoke.

When the first Russian victories brought the Slav to the Roumanian
boundaries of Bukowina and even across the Carpathians into the Hun-
garian Plain, Roumanian patriots and politicians listened eagerly to
Russian promises, based upon Roumanian participation. Only Russian
disaster could abolish or postpone such participation. Had Russian di-
plomacy been a little less stiff or Roumanian demands a little less grandi-
ose, Roumania might have followed Italy at once. As it was, the Dunajec
postponed what it could not prevent. At Bukharest, as at Rome,
German diplomacy was to perform miracles, but the ultimate failure
was already assured, short of German victory in the war, when 1915
began.

V. AUSTRIA

The military side of the Austrian problem was plain. But the
political aspects were not less patent to Berlin. Half of the Austrian
population was Slav. In the opening battles Czech, Croat, Serb, and
even Polish regiments fought with something less than half-hearted
zeal. The Italians from Triest and the Trentino, the Roumanians from
Transylvania and Temesvar, easily succumbed to the assault of enemies
a degree less hateful to them than the races whose yoke they bore. The
vast Russian captures after Lemberg, the Serbian disasters, the later

GERMAN SHELTERS OF SANDBAGS, IN THE DUNES ALONG
THE BELGIAN COAST

RELAl

COUREUfiS

THE ELABORATION OF TRENCH WARFARE

A typical trench on the western front, braced to prevent caving in, with the usual boardwalk and the
numerous telephone and telegraph lines needed in a modern communication system. The shell case, hang-
ing from the cross beam, is struck when a gas attack is discovered, as a warning to all within hearing to put
on masks. The inset shows an underground telephone exchange which is part of the system of communi-
cation between the front lines and headquarters in the rear.

AN OBSERVATION STATION

These are placed in buildings, trees, shell craters, etc. — wherever the observer can see the effect of his
batteries' fire. Telephone communication back to the gun is arranged and the observer then reports as to
the range, the movements of his own and the enemy's infantry, etc.

AN UNDERGROUND PASSAGE DUG BY THE AUSTRIANS AT DUBUS, RUSSIA, WITH AN OUTLET

IN A CHURCH

A LIGHT GUN ELABORATELY ENTRENCHED

Note the curtains which are closely drawn when there is danger of aerial observation. These guns
are used to cut wire entanglements, destroy parapets, silence enemy artillery, and for barrage fire either with
or without gas shells.

BELGIANS ENTRENCHED OUTSIDE ANTWERP

In this final stand of Belgian patriotism against the German invaders there is a strong appeal to Amer-
ican admiration. For a nation whose own history begins at Lexington, the resistance of the weak to the
strong, the defense of liberty by the few against the many, at the cost of all that men hold dear, is a moving
spectacle.

UNDERGROUND WITH THE BRITISH

(Above) King George inspects a trench won from the Germans.

(Below) These British Red Cross Officers have "dug themselves in" very comfortably and are just
sitting down to dinner. Cave life is not always incompatible with good cheer.

NEW HORIZONS AND NEW GERMAN PROBLEMS 239

Galician defeats, were all due in some part to the failure of the subject
races of Austria and Hungary.

Yet it was of prime importance to prevent this disintegration from
spreading, because every evidence of crumbling was but a new incentive
to Roumanian and Italian appetite, and every Austrian disaster had an
echo in Bukharest and in Rome which no one could mistake. It was
not alone that the crumbling of Austria weakened the Central Alliance
directly, but it was also that each new crack, each fissure, in the Aus-
trian unity was a new invitation to other nations to enlist and add their
numbers and resources to the enemies of Germany.

Napoleon faced the same problem in 1813, when he lingered in
eastern Germany, because he realized that a retreat behind the Rhine
would mean that his German allies would, either from desire or neces-
sity, enter the ranks of his foes ; as they did, when, at last, after the dis-
aster at Leipzig, he was compelled to retire behind the old frontiers.
More than all else this political situation forced itself to German atten-
tion in the shaping of the campaigns of 1915. It compelled the aban-
donment of the west, quite as much as any military consideration.
It compelled Germany to allow to Britain the time to begin to get her
masses in the field, and it held Germany in the east until February, 1916.

More and more it became clear that, while Germany continued to
win victories, she could count on the neutrality of Roumania and the
annoying rather than dangerous hostilities of Italy. But only in vic-
tory was there safety. On the military side, the Austrian armies would
take on new efficiency when a German general and German artillery
had won the Dunajec, and the great Russian retreat from the Carpathi-
ans to the Beresina began. But once the Russian counter-offensive
came, Austrian armies would crumble in a new disaster comparable
to that of Lemberg and having more immediately unfavourable conse-
quences.

More and more Austria became a burden, a deadweight upon Ger-
man military and civil policy. Less and less useful became Austrian
military assistance, and greater and greater became the share of Ger-
many in the work of the Alliance. But in addition to this was the posi-

24o HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

tive peril that grew out of the long-standing enmities Austrian policy
had engendered or out of the weaknesses -inherent in the heterogeneous
nature of Hapsburg populations, weaknesses that at one time contri-
buted to the breakdown of the Austrian army and to the growth of the
number of nations at war with Germany.

All this is clearer now than at the moment — yet little was hidden
from German eyes — when the Kaiser's Ministers, with the opening of
the new year, took up the problems of a long war and were compelled
to estimate the assets and liabilities of their new undertaking. These
influenced the military situation ; they compelled strategy to bow before
considerations of state; they forced the Germans to make their main
effort in the east; and, even at this early date, they made clear the
consequences of immediate or eventual failure either in the east or the
west. From the task of destroying France, Germany was now defi-
nitely recalled to devote her best skill to the salvage of Austria.

CHAPTER TWELVE

ON THE EAST FRONT TO THE BATTLE OF THE DUNAJEC

IN THE CAUCASUS

The first days of January saw a considerable Turkish disaster on the
Russian frontier in the Caucasus. Into this difficult region, where
campaigning was made the more difficult by the severity of the winter,
the Turks had, in obedience to German dictation, sent several of their
best corps. The ostensible purpose was to recover the famous fortress
of Kars, lost after a gallant defence in the last Russian war. But,
in fact, Kars had small value for the Turks. The real purpose of their
effort was to compel the Russians to divert troops to this front from the
Austrian frontier and thus take off some of the pressure upon their
hard-pressed German ally.

For the Turk there were much more pressing services to be per-
formed near at hand. His entrance into the war had cost him the last,
shadowy title to his ancient Egyptian estate, and the friendly Khedive
had lost his throne. Britain had proclaimed a protectorate and placed
an Anglophile ruler on the Khedivial throne, thus completing the work
of making good her position in Egypt, recognized by France in the
famous and fatal agreement of 1904. To Suez and to Cairo and to the
lost African provinces, Tunis and Tripoli, opportunity seemed to beckon
the Osmanli along the road that his Arab predecessors of the Caliphate
had marched.

That such a venture might have succeeded seemed and seems pos-
sible. Britain still lacked the men to defend Egypt; the native troops
were at least cold to their Christian masters, if they were not disloyal.
Time had not been allowed for the fortification of the shores of the
Suez Canal, which, less than a year after, were to face and master a

Turkish attack. Could Suez have been reached, and the canal blocked,

241

242 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

the injury to Britain would have been great, although by no means as
considerable as German military writers announced a year later, when
the road from Berlin to Byzantium had been opened and Germany found
a Teutonic purpose to be served by Osmanli effort at Suez.

German control of Turkish military policy was, however, complete,
and while the proclamation of the Holy War was still stirring the
imagination of the world, even if it fell flat in Islam, beyond the immedi-
ate territories of the Turk ; while the world was looking for revolts in India
and Egypt, in Tripoli and Tunis; while it was expecting Turkish attack
at Suez, several Turkish corps were making the difficult advance from
Erzerum toward Kars, and the Russian troops, heavily outnumbered,
were falling back into the Caucasian marshes, south and east of Batum
and Trebizond.

In this difficult country, suffering from insufficient equipment and
from the rigours of a terrible winter, the Turks, after brief preliminary
successes, met complete disaster. Of three corps, one, with its Turkish
and German officers, was captured. Two more, striving to cover the
retreat, were heavily beaten, losing flags, guns, and prisoners. Not less
than 100,000 Turkish troops were thus eliminated from the battleline,
and German prestige suffered its first heavy blow in Constantinople,
a blow from which it did not recover until the successful defence of the
city a few months later.

From this moment and for more than a year the Caucasus front loses
its importance. The subsequent changes in position were not consider-
able. The Russians did not bring many troops east from the Galician
front ; the German purpose was not served by the Turkish effort. But
when, in the next winter, the Russians were ready to move in this
Armenian district, the fall, first of Erzerum and then of Trebizond, to
the sword of the Grand Duke Nicholas, gave the world the first hint
of the renaissance of Russian military strength, so shaken at the Duna-
jec and after.

II. LAYING THE ROUMANIAN PERIL

In December and early January Austrian disaster had for the second
time led the world to believe that a collapse of the Dual Empire might

ON THE EAST FRONT 243

presently change the whole face of the conflict. While Russian armies
again passed the central and eastern Carpathian passes, other forces
swept Bukowina and approached Transylvania. The occupation of
the Crownland was a fair invitation to Roumania to join the conflict
on the Russian side and receive Bukowina as a bribe and Transylvania
as a reward for participation.

For Germany the problem was promptly set to protect Hungary,
grown impatient through disaster and anxious because of impending
attack from Serbia, from Galicia and Bukowina, and because of the
possibility of Roumanian hostility. The resignation of Count Berchtold
and the selection of Baron Burian were evidences that, within the em-
pire, Hungarian apprehensions were recognized. The visit of Count
Tisza to the Kaiser was a sign that Germany had been warned.

This warning Germany received with all possible attention and acted
upon with amazing promptness. Thus in January, while the Russian
occupation of Transylvania was being discussed, German troops were
brought south and concentrated in lower Hungary. Their purpose,
it was duly announced from Vienna and Berlin, was a new invasion of
victorious but stricken Serbia. Yet a few weeks later these troops ap-
peared in Transylvania, and moved east, parallel to the Roumanian
frontier, as a warning to the Hohenzollern king of this state that, to
take Transylvania, he must fight the head of the House of Hohenzollern.

Under the pressure of these troops, Russian armies in Bukowina
speedily began to give ground. Like the Shenandoah Valley in our
Civil War, Bukowina was becoming a thoroughfare of invasion and a
pathway of destruction. Step by step they were driven from before
the Borgo and Kirilibaba passes ; they were cleared out of the foothills
of the Carpathians, and by the middle of February their retreat had
halted at the Sereth River, a few miles south and west of Czernowitz
and the Russian frontier; more than two thirds of Bukowina had been
reconquered, and the Germans had interposed a wall of troops between
the Czar and his prospective Roumanian ally.

At the same time there came from Budapest new rumours of Russian
disaster, of the suicide of a Russian commander, and the capture of the.

244 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

General Staff of the defeated army. These rumours were duly denied,
but there remained the solid fact that Bukowina had been reconquered;
the invitation to Roumania to participate in the war had been abruptly
cancelled by German arms, and from Bukharest there came no more
reports of the intervention of the Latin state without delay. On the
contrary, there were credible reports of the release of vast stores of
grain previously purchased by Germany and Austria, temporarily held
up by the Roumanian Government, but now permitted to go north. A
military campaign waged for obvious political ends had succeeded.

Nor did the quieting of Roumania end the success of German policy.
A German loan to Bulgaria again stimulated rumour that Ferdinand and
his Bulgarian subjects were contemplating an entrance into the war
on the German side, were planning to retake Macedonia, to strike at
Serbia and Greece, and, by cutting the Orient Railway, shut off the
Slav state from Saloniki and foreign supplies, and, by invading the
Valley of the Morava, open a road between Berlin and Constantinople
and thus unite the Central European nations. This rumour, however idle
at the moment, supplied an interesting forecast of what was to come,
and gave Allied diplomacy a warning which it stupidly failed to take.

Finally, from Albania came a fresh incursion into Serbia along the
marches of the Drina, directed at Prisrend and the territory still popu-
lated by Albanians but ceded to Servia and Montenegro by the Treaty
of London. Here was new work for the Serbian army, calculated to
keep it occupied, south of the Danube and away from Bosnia, until
Germany had dealt with Russian activity in the southeast.

Such, briefly summarized, were the purpose and achievement of Ger-
man arms in Bukowina. Thus promptly and completely had the Kaiser
answered the appeal for help made a few weeks before ; thus had he justified
the affection and esteem in which he had long been held by the Hungari-
ans, and temporarily silenced the whispers of discontent in Budapest.

III. THE BATTLE OF THE MASURIAN LAKES

To answer the Austro-German thrust through Bukowina and over
the Carpathians, the Russians chose to strike at East Prussia. Strateg-

ON THE EAST FRONT 245

ically such a move was advantageous because it meant moving troops
a far shorter distance away from Warsaw, which remained the centre
of military operations in the whole eastern front. Practically, could
East Prussia be overrun, the whole Russian front would be straight-
ened ; a great province, a source of food supply to Germany, would be
conquered; and, ultimately, the German position between the Bzura
and the Nida in Russian Poland would be exposed to attack in the
flank and rear.

Thus, while the main Russian and German armies faced each other
west of Warsaw on the lines they had taken when Hindenburg's great
offensive against the Polish capital had been halted in December, new
armies were directed against the German positions north of the Vistula
and south of the Niemen, on a front from Tilsit to Johannisberg, while
another force moved down the north bank of the Vistula toward Thorn.

Again, as in the case of Tannenberg, the geographical circumstances
explain the military operations. Inside the eastern frontier of East
Prussia some fifty miles there extends from north to south, between
Insterburg and Johannisberg, that intricate tangle of water known as
the Masurian Lakes, out of which flows the Angerapp River, which
joins the Inster at Insterburg to make the Pregel, a stream that enters
the sea at Konigsberg. West of this region Samsonoff had suffered his
great disaster in September at Tannenberg. To this obstacle the Rus-
sians had returned in October after defeating a German invasion of
Suwalki Province at the Battle of Augustovo.

For three months Russian and German forces had faced each other
in this region with little or no change of position. Now the Russians
undertook to turn the Germans out of their strong position behind the
Masurian Lakes by attacking from the north and south; that is, by
coming in on the flanks. At the outset this move met with apparent
success. Coming west on the solid ground between the Niemen and
the Angerapp rivers, the Russians approached Tilsit, took Pilkallen,
began to talk again of a siege of Konigsberg. At the same time, to the
south of the Masurian region, between the East Prussian frontier and
the Vistula, they made headway toward Thorn.

246

HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

In the first week in February, however, Hindenburg countered with
terrific force. The first sign was a renewal of the German offensive
south of the Vistula and along the Bzura-Rawka front. On this line the
Germans began a series of desperate assaults, which were announced
as a new drive at Warsaw. Petrograd proclaimed the slaughter in these

THE BATTLE OF THE MASURIAN LAKES

Seven months after the war had broken out German soil was practically free of Russians.
Line A-B shows the Russian front before the battle. The arrows show the lines of the Rus-
sian retreat

fights the greatest in the whole war, and there were circumstantial
reports that the Kaiser himself had been shocked by the sacrifice of
life in a forlorn undertaking.

By the second week in this month, however, the truth became ap-
parent. The German attacks had been mere screening movements to
cover the withdrawal of troops from this front to East Prussia, and

ON THE EAST FRONT 247

very soon Petrograd began to concede defeat and retreat in East
Prussia, while Berlin announced a second Tannenberg and the capture of
40,000 Russians. In any event, it was clear that by the use of auto-
mobiles, by again employing the strategic railways along the East Prus-
sian frontier, the Germans had rushed overwhelming forces into East
Prussia, beaten the Russian flanking force between the Niemen and
the Angerapp and completely redeemed East Prussia, save for a little
corner about Lyck.

By February I5th German troops were advancing eastward all along
the front from the Vistula to the Niemen, were across the Russian fron-
tier in many places, and were still driving the Russians back toward
their fortresses of Kovno, Grodno, Bielostok, and Ostrolenka; that is,
behind the Niemen and the Narew. Seven months after the war had
broken out German soil was practically free of Russians, and from the
Roumanian frontier to the Baltic German troops, with the support of
their Austro-Hungarian allies, were advancing. Their success in East
Prussia was to tempt them to one more bid for Warsaw, from the north,
but this failed, like the others. The road to Warsaw ran neither through
East Pjussia nor northern Poland.

IV. PRZEMYSL

The disaster of the Masurian Lakes, which divided the attention of
the world with the Allied naval operations just beginning before the
Dardanelles, was counterbalanced in the following month by the Russian
capture of Przemysl on March 22d. Invested for a moment in Septem-
ber, relieved when Hinde'nburg made his first drive for Warsaw, and
promptly surrounded again when the Russians resumed the road to
Cracow before the Battle of Lodz, Przemysl had been shut in ever since.
Its surrender was one of the most spectacular incidents in the war and it
did much, temporarily, to destroy the effect of recent Russian reverses and
checks. Since Bazaine had laid down his arms in Metz four decades
before, Europe had seen no such capitulation, and Russian estimates
placed the number of captives at 130,000.

Before his surrender, the Austrian commander, General Kusmanek,

248 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

had destroyed all the forts, blown up the bridges, turned the rifles and
cannon into useless junk. But this diminished the material rather than
the moral effect of the victory. Actually the last considerable fortress of
Galicia, east of the Dunajec and north of the Carpathians, had now fallen.
As for the numbers of prisoners, they astonished the whole world and
explained a surrender which took the Russians by surprise. Like
Metz, Przemysl had fallen to hunger, and, like the Lorraine fortress, it
had fallen because it was provisioned to hold a garrison, not a host.

The siege itself had been marked by no considerable military effort.
The Russians had merely invested the place and sat down before it. A
few brief attacks had demonstrated that it was beyond the resources of
their artillery train. Now and again there had been sorties ; a desperate
effort by Hungarian troops just preceded the surrender. Several at-
tempts on the part of the Germans and Austrians to relieve it had come
close to success, but ultimately failed. Time and hunger did the rest.

In the closing days of the siege, cats and dogs had sold for prices re-
calling the Paris market in 1871. There seems to have been much mis-
management of resources, and the defence shed little lustre on Austrian
arms. The last sortie of the Hungarians seemed to the Russians useless
sacrifice, for it was promptly and completely checked.

With the fall of Przemysl the Galician campaign entered its final
stage. The troops released by the surrender joined the armies that had
long been battling in the Carpathians, advancing when opposed only by
Austrians, retreating when German reinforcements came up. Each
attack after retreat found the passes more strongly fortified, found the
task more terrible. Still Russia stuck to it, and with the fall of Przemysl
the world looked for the arrival of spring and the Russians together in
the Hungarian Plain.

In this it was mistaken. Carpathian hopes, like the expectations
aroused by the Allied fleet before the Dardanelles, were soon to be de-
stroyed, and one failure after another was to meet Allied armies and
fleets in the whole eastern field. Yet it is worth recalling that the mo-
ment when Przemysl fell was the most fortunate moment, from the Allied
point of view, since the struggle had opened. Austrian collapse, German

ON THE EAST FRONT 249

surrender, these were the things that the press of the world outside
German and Austrian territories talked of at the very moment when
Germany had gotten well forward in the preparation of that tremendous
thrust at the Dunajec, which was to usher in a full year of Teutonic
victories.

Przemysl is a high-water mark; dead low water in Allied prospects
comes something more than a year later, with the disaster and surrender
of the British at Kut-el-Amara. It remains, now, briefly to ex-
amine the final phases of the great Carpathian battle in which the
Russian flood was finally checked, the Russian armies were exhausted
and shaken by their terrible efforts and losses, and the failure of Russian
munitions brought disaster comparable in modern military history only
with that of Napoleon in the Moscow campaign.

V. THE BATTLE OF THE CARPATHIANS

There had been fighting in the Carpathians as early as September,
after Lemberg, when the Cossacks crossed the range. There had been
new and more serious fighting in October and November, when the Rus-
sians came west again and approached Cracow. But it was not until
the new year that the Russians definitely abandoned the attack to the
west and set their faces toward the south and strove to cross the Carpa-
thians into Hungary. Their attempts to the south on the edge of Rou-
mania, designed to influence Roumanian policy, had met a swift check at
German hands, and Bukowina had been cleared of Slavs in January and
February. Similar German operations, made in response to Hungarian
appeals, had closed the passes immediately to the north of Bukowina,
through which the shortest rail line to Lemberg goes.

By March, when the Battle of the Carpathians takes its final form,
the Russian effort is concentrated upon the Dukla and Lupkow passes
while the Austrians and Germans are now on the north side of the Car-
pathians from this point south to the frontiers of Roumania.

The passes by which the Russians were now seeking to reach
Hungary are the lowest in the range. The Dukla is but 1,500 feet at the
crest and opens easily into the headwaters of the affluents of the Hun-

250

HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

garian Theiss. In this pass, as in several of the others, there had been
terrific fighting all through the winter and the casualties had been ex-
ceedingly heavy. White uniforms had been adopted to deceive the
outposts, every device had been employed to aid the assailant and the
defender, alike. And slowly but steadily the Russians had progressed
in the Dukla until they were actually at the edge of the Hungarian Plain.
But in the other passes the stiffening of German reinforcements had
permanently checked the Slav.

artfeid «-(&i*&?tf^ VTurka J I

Extreme Line of Russian Invasion

Approximate Front during Battle of the Carpathians

THE GALICIAN CAMPAIGN, SEPT, I9I4~MAY, 1915
Russia's Carpathian Army literally beat itself to pieces against the barrier that faced it

The opening weeks of April saw the crisis. A stupendous Russian
effort gained still more ground at a frightful cost. The world believed
that Russia was forcing her way through the passes, when, by the third
week in April, IvanofFs army came to a practical but not an absolute
standstill. The cost had been beyond the resources of Russia in men, in
guns, above all in ammunition. To the south, Austrian troops, with

ON THE EAST FRONT 251

German contingents, were actually breaking out in the foothills of the
Carpathians on the Galician side, threatening the flank of the Russians
in the Dukla and the Lupkow.

Actually the Battle of the Carpathians was over, although it had two
more weeks to run. Germany had succeeded at last in erecting a bul-
wark against Russian floods in Galicia, as she had promptly broken the
force of Russian invasion twice in East Prussia. By the third week in
April there is something approaching a deadlock along the whole east-
ern front from the Baltic to the Roumanian frontier. There is, as yet, no
sure sign of the Russian halt, but it had come.

Looking backward we may now perceive that Russia had for all the
months since November, since the opening of the Battle of Lodz, been
bearing an ever-increasing burden of German effort. Her mission to
deal with the Austrians had been triumphantly discharged by the victory
of Lemberg and its immediate consequences. All German efforts to
abolish this Lemberg decision by Polish and East Prussian drives upon
Warsaw had failed. Only when Germany had sent her troops into Ga-
licia and Bukowina had Russian advance slowed down. Przemysl, in late
March, had been an authentic sign of Russian strength; the attack
upon the Carpathian passes had been a final proof of Russian devotion
and determination. But Russia had now reached the point where she
must have aid, and effective aid, from her western allies. If they were
ready to begin, if Anglo-French efforts in Flanders and France recalled
German troops from Galicia and Poland, Russia was still capable of
useful service.

But if this help did not come, Russia could no longer bear the burden
she had been bearing through the months of furious fighting that sepa-
rated Lemberg and Tannenberg from Przemysl and the Carpathians.

The best of Russia's officers and of her first-line soldiers had found
their graves on the fields of victory and defeat in East Prussia, Poland,
and Galicia. The Carpathian Army had literally beaten itself to pieces
against the barriers that faced it. Russian military achievement had
surpassed her own and her enemies' expectation, but no Russian warn-
ing, although there had been many, had sufficed to moderate the hopes

252 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

and expectations of the western allies of the Slav. They were soon to be
undeceived.

It remains, now, to look westward and examine rapidly the progress
of events from the German defeat at Ypres to the moment when Russian
effort was checked at the summit of the Carpathians and Russia began to
lack the strength to continue the work begun at Lemberg and carried
forward, to the very great advantage of her western allies, up to the
arrival of spring. It is well to remember, too, that at this moment Rus-
sia had at last realized, through the failure of the Allied fleets in the
Dardanelles, that she was to receive no immediate aid in munitionment
or supplies, of which she stood in desperate need, from her western
allies.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

IN THE WEST, NOVEMBER, 1914, TO MAY, 1915

I
THE PROBLEM

When the German attack in Flanders ceased and the Germans began
to transport some fraction of their main force eastward to relieve
Hindenburg in his Lodz venture, to aid him in his later attacks upon
Warsaw and finally to prop up the crumbling Austrian armies, they left
a field upon which they had missed victory by the narrowest margin.
Napoleon was never nearer to winning Waterloo than were the Germans
to achieving a complete success about Ypres. Had Russian pressure
been one whit less severe, had Austrian collapse been one degree less
imminent, it is difficult to believe that the Germans would have missed
arriving at Calais and crushing in the whole western flanks of the Allies.

When the German flood at last subsided it left behind it a victorious
but well-nigh-annihilated foe in Flanders. To meet the storm the Allies
had flung into the gap the most heterogeneous mass of men that Europe
had known since the Mohammedan invasion. Asia and Africa, Australia
and Canada, were represented by white, by black, and by yellow troops
who fought beside the French, the Belgians, and the British. Sailor
lads from Brittany marched shoulder to shoulder with the Senegalese ;
troops from British India held ground within sight of Arabs and Berbers
from Algeria and Morocco. Languages, customs, religions of four con-
tinents and a score of races were represented in this strange horde.

Actually the Allies had striven, as men strive when there is a break
in the dyke, to stop the rapidly growing gap by every conceivable and
available resource. Never in military history was there such a jerry-
built wall as stretched across the pathway of German floods, wavered
and faltered under German attack, and just held at the final mo-
ment, when, with the eastern crisis becoming ever more insistent, the

253

254 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

Germans, under the eyes of their emperor, called upon the famous
Prussian Guard to deliver the final blow.

And when the wave at last was spent, there stretched from Switzer-
land to the sea that long line of trenches which henceforth for more than
two years was to be the western front. Such an ending to a Franco-
German campaign had been foreseen neither in Berlin nor in Paris.
That such a condition would endure, not for months but for years,
was a thing wholly hidden from German and French High Command
in November, 1914.

For the Germans there was the firm belief that a few months of
winter campaigning would dispose of the Russians, permit the capture of
Warsaw, and that spring would see the return to the west of the troops
borrowed from the west for the winter months.

As for the Allies, their forces already began to talk of that happy hour
when Kitchener's "Million" would arrive, by Easter at the latest, and
the long German lines would be broken, the whole of France delivered,
and the decision of the Marne enforced along the Rhine. No one yet
foresaw the magnitude of German resources or effort ; no one yet fore-
saw that the heavy artillery, prepared to win field battles and reduce
fortresses ; the machine guns, which only in the German army had been
provided by thousands to obtain victory in the decisive battle in the
open field, would give Germany an advantage in trench warfare enabling
her to hold her lines, not for weeks or months, but beyond the date of
the second anniversary of the war, with wholly insignificant changes.

Actually, the German problem had been posed in the east ; it was the
problem of disposing of Russia by spring and returning to the west to
reopen the Marne verdict in the summer and win the war in the first
year. The problem of the Allies was to reorganize their shaken armies,
to raise the British forces that could supply the necessary superiority
of numbers in the west, and to provide that heavy artillery and ammuni-
tion which were utterly lacking and without which the attack, in the
new conditions of war, was a mere murder. All this it was impera-
tively necessary that the Allies should accomplish before Russia was
beaten down by the whole weight of German attack — before the victory

THE SLAVS IN
THE WORLD WAR

PART OF THE CRACK CAVALRY CORPS FORMERLY KNOWN AS THE
CZAR'S OWN HUSSARS

PICTURES OF RUSSIAN AND
SERBIAN SOLDIERS

GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS

GENERAL RENNENKAMPF

GENERAL RUSSKY

GENERAL BRUSILOFF

FOUR RUSSIAN GENERALS

The Grand Duke Nicholas, uncle of the Czar, is a real soldier and an able soldier. Though a Romanoff his political
tendency is toward liberalism. The Czar was probably jealous of him, and after his abdication a plot was launched
to offer Grand Duke Nicholas the crown.

General Rennenkampf. After winning Tannenberg from one Russian army under Samsonoff, Hindenburg pursued
a second, that of Rennenkampf, from the very gates of Konigsberg across his frontier. Later, two German corps
under Von Francois were surrounded and Petrograd claimed a victory. But it failed to materialize. The trapped
Germans by exertions which the Russians frankly conceded to have been "incredible" found their way out, thanks to
the tardiness of Rennenkampf, who went at once into retirement after this fiasco.

Russky and BrusilofF commanded two of the five armies which took part in the great Russian offensive in August,
and September, 1914. They operated in Galicia, while Rennenkampf and Samsonoff invaded East Prussia.

Photograph by Underwood t5? Underwood

RUSSIAN SOLDIERS

The Russian muzhik makes a good soldier. To begin with there is an inexhaustible supply of him. He has great
endurance, is patient, good-natured, and obedient, but lacks initiative. On the whole he has given a good account
of himself in the war. He would have done better had he been equipped and supplied as efficiently as the soldiers of
the other races. Moreover, there is good reason for the suspicion that he has sometimes been led to his undoing by
traitorous pro-German generals.

Photograph by Underwood & Underwood

THE FORMER CZAR'S BODYGUARD OF PICKED COSSACKS RIDING TOJ
THE DEFENCE OF WARSAW

RUSSIANS AND AUSTRIANS

When Russians and Austrians are pitted against each other as man to man in a fair encounter, this is apt to be
the result. The Austrians march to the rear as prisoners. The Austrians have more spirit and dash, but they lack
the stolid strength and steadfastness of the Russian peasants. Moreover, the Russians are racially a unit; while the
Austro-Hungarians are of many races, and the Slavic blood in many makes them laggards in war against their kinsmen
of the steppes.

SERBIA IN THE WAR

The raw material of which Serbian soldiers are made.

The finished product.

Gallant little Serbia was finally overcome by the overwhelming strength of her adversaries. But the world will
not soon forget the splendid succession of victories which preceded her days of disaster. In the First Balkan War
she defeated the Turks at Kumanovo, at Monastir, and at Adrianople; in the Second Balkan War she shattered the
legend of Bulgarian invincibility at Bregalnitza; in the opening month of the World War when the fortune of the Allies
was most desperate it was the victory of the Serb at Jedar which opened the more prosperous period which culminated
at the Marne. In the early days of December Belgrad fell, but once again the Serbians rallied. Belgrad was re-
taken; by December 15, 1914, Serbia was free of Austrians, saved for the time being, saved until the third — and fatal
— attack, the Balkan drive of Mackensen almost a year later. In October, 1918, the Serbian army again showed its
mettle in its marvellous dash to final victory.

IN THE WEST, NOVEMBER, 1914, TO MAY, 1915 263

of Lemberg, which had given the Russians the initiative and the advan-
tage in the east, should have lost its influence.

We have seen that the Germans failed in the east. All their mighty
efforts were insufficient to abolish the consequences of the initial Aus-
trian collapse and the early Russian triumphs in time to resume the
western campaign in the spring. Not less absolute was the Allied
failure in the west. For another year, after the critical spring, Kitch-
ener's million, as an offensive force, was to be a myth. The task set for
Britain was beyond the capacity of any nation, untrained to wars of the
national sort and lacking the resources in trained men which conscrip-
tion alone supplies.

Without Britain, France could not free her soil. Almost a million
French had been killed, wounded, or captured in the first four months of
the war. The industrial districts of France had been seized and were
held. France could and did address herself to the task of organizing
her national life within a brief time. But such organization was for long
beyond the capacity of British Government or people. Months after
the need for heavy explosives had been disclosed, the faults of the
British military system — its inability to learn — combined to keep the
munition works at the task of turning out useless shrapnel.

From political, military, and industrial aspects, the story of the Brit-
ish department of Allied effort, deduction of course being made for the
Navy, remains the story of failure, of inability to perceive the char-
acter and magnitude of the war, of failure to understand the new hori-
zons, the new conditions, to grasp the fundamental fact that the war
could only be won when Britain conscripted her youth and set her ma-
turity to the organized task of munitionment. Under the strain of the
first really considerable war in British history, the whole fabric of Brit-
ish Imperial life broke down.

On the military side the British failure was complete in all but de-
fensive operations. The world knew little of the original campaign of
Field-Marshal Sir John French. The legend that he had saved the
French before the Battle of the Marne and contributed the decisive
thrust in this engagement served to deceive and delude the British

264 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

themselves. Not even Neuve Chapelle opened their eyes and it re-
quired the dismal slaughter at Loos in September, 1915, to demonstrate
the need of a new commander-in-chief and of a new system.

Field-Marshal Sir John French's services to his country and to the
Allied cause at the Aisne and at Ypres were incontestably great. On the
latter field the British army — the old army — died, holding a line whose
collapse would have brought ruin to the Allied defence in the west.
Not a little of the failure of the British commander must, in fact, be
charged to Lord Kitchener. We shall not know until history has cleared
the ground how far the commander in the field was blocked, handicapped,
finally exhausted by an administration of the War Department, which
in such instances as that of heavy explosives starved the army in
France because it misunderstood the conditions of the new warfare.
Yet in the light of such evidence as exists, the recall of the Field-
Marshal seems to have been inevitable and the responsibility for failure
in the field in some part his own.

As for the British army, more was asked it than could fairly be asked
of any army in the first year of the war. And what it did was a larger
portion of the impossible than was then conceivable. It fought with
rifles against machine guns — with shrapnel against high explosives; it
manufactured its bombs out of jam tins and matched them against
the products of prepared machinery. It was often defeated but never
conquered; and never — save between Mons and the Marne — greatly
disorganized.

In the nature of things this British army was for nearly two years a
"forlorn hope"; it could not be compared on the military side with the
highly organized German armies or with the French conscript armies ;
yet, without its contribution, the war would have been irrevocably
lost in the first year; and after the first year, its mounting strength and
growing efficiency were recognized even by the foe.

During the first two years of the war, this British army never had
an equal chance, most of its offensives were sheer sacrifices, made
gallantly and willingly, but foredoomed to defeat because equipment was
lacking and training was still to be acquired. Political blunders, such

IN THE WEST, NOVEMBER, 1914, TO MAY, 1915 265

as Antwerp and Gallipoli, added further burdens and led to further
disastrous consequences. Many of the blunders were censurable
and indefensible; many were the inevitable concomitants of national
unpreparedness. Yet the critic who recognizes necessarily the fail-
ure, from the military point of view, feels his words unfair, in the
presence of the spirit and the devotion of the men who held the line
from the first Ypres battle to the coming of the new armies or died unhesi-
tatingly in the opening days of the Somme, a sacrifice to the tuition of
a nation which had to learn modern warfare in the most expensive of all
schools.

With the weapons they had; with the officers that were available —
officers as destitute of training as their men; under the burden of the
most powerful attack military history records, both in numbers and in
mechanical appliances, the British army hung on ; and if the original
"contemptible little army" died on the line, its presence there prevented
an immediate disaster to the Allied cause and its tenacity insured the
coming of the other British armies which were to know victory and
regain the offensive.

The close of the period we are now to review was to reveal the fact
that the Allies in the west were still unready. A moment was to come
when, coincident with the fatal thrust that Mackensen was to deliver
against Radko Dimitrieff at the Dunajec, German attacks in Flanders
were to disclose the fact that Russia could not be relieved by pressure
exerted on Germany's western front and must go from retreat to re-
treat until the coming of winter found her terribly beaten armies at the
Beresina and Dwina.

The military operations in this period are of practically no value,
compared to that attaching to the struggles in the east, because
they resulted in no tactical or strategic advantage to either side-
did, in fact, no more than contribute to revealing the fact that Rus-
sia could expect no help in the west, at the precise moment when
the temporary success of Russia had compelled Germany to turn all
her attention for the summer campaign toward Warsaw and not toward
Calais.

266 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

n. JOFFRE'S "NIBBLING"

To the operations in the west in the period we are now to examine,
and, indeed, for many months thereafter, there was applied the pictu-
resque term of "nibbling." Actually, these operations were local offen-
sives, undertaken in all but one of the more considerable instances by
the French, and they were designed to keep as many German troops as
possible occupied, to prevent the transfer to the east of any large
number of army corps, to strain German resources in men and munition
by a double pressure on the eastern and western fronts. Beside
these purposes local objectives were insignificant.

The world misunderstood these operations completely. It saw in
each activity from Switzerland to the North Sea the evidences of
a grandiose attempt to reach the Rhine or the lower Meuse. It did
not understand the weakness of the Allies, the difficulties of the
British, the inadequate resources of the French — in men as a result of
their terrible losses, and in munitions because of German occupation
of so much of the industrial portion of France. From November to
May the whole outside world waited for the new Allied "drive" in the
west, were waiting for it when the German thrust at Ypres crushed in
half of the whole salient and won a local success more considerable than
any the Allies had achieved in all the months preceding.

The first of these "nibbles" was in some respects the most consider-
able and successful. In December French forces appeared along
the western slopes of the Vosges and beyond the summits in that
corner of Alsace to which the French had clung after they had aban-
doned Miihlhausen in August. They flowed down the valley of the
Thur and reoccupied Thann; they approached the village of Cernay,
which is the key to Miihlhausen, and, after long and desperate fighting,
took the mountain of Hartmannsweilerkopf, from which they could look
down into Miihlhausen a scant ten miles away.

But despite local successes in the villages of Steinbach and Anspach,
despite a slight advance along the plain toward Altkirch, the larger
purpose could not be realized. The French were unable to break the

IN THE WEST, NOVEMBER, 1914, TO MAY, 1915 267

German line at the point where it left the plain and approached the Vos-
ges. Miihlhausen could not be taken, nor were any of the later efforts
more successful. Some little territory was won north of the Thur, some
more Alsatian villages were "redeemed," upward of 350 square miles
of Alsace was reunited to France, but although each new general who
came to the Vosges eagerly undertook, with the limited resources allowed
him, to break through to Miihlhausen, the failure was absolute.

Checked in Alsace, the French turned to Champagne and endeavoured
to push up the slopes of the hills north of Soissons and beyond the Aisne,
where Kluck had held the British in September. Again there was a
preliminary success in early January, the gain of several miles. But
as promptly came a German counter-thrust and this time the French
lost, not alone what they had gained, but the ground turned over to them
by the British when Field-Marshal French had gone north in October.
Only on the southern bank of the river were the French able to hold.
Germany claimed a crushing victory and talked rather obscurely of
Gravelotte; the French explained that the floods in the river behind
them had made their position indefensible. Neither statement is
worth considering. The Germans never tried to advance farther;
the French were unable to progress on this front until April, 1917. The
local operation promptly lost all importance.

In February the French undertook a still more ambitious operation
in Champagne, on the ground which was to see the great and desperate
attack in the following September. Over a narrow front and for the
possession of insignificant ridges commanding a railroad line vital to
German communications, the French and Germans fought for weeks.
The battleline rested on the east upon the Argonne and from the
western flank the cathedral of Rheims was visible. After casualties
not much under 200,000 for the French and German combined — and the
French loss was much the heavier — there ensued a new deadlock. The
French had gained rather less than a quarter of a mile on a front less than
a dozen. But there was never much promise that they would actually
penetrate the German lines, and any original hope was promptly extin-
guished when German reserves arrived.

268 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

While this last attack was going forward the British undertook their
first, and for the present period their last, offensive, attacking in the
district south of Lille. This effort is worth examining in more detail
because it disclosed the extent of the weakness of British organization
and was the first of that series of failures, extending through Gallipoli
and Loos, to Kut-el-Amara, which revealed how little British military
training had kept pace with that of continental nations in later years,
and how long was to be the task of organizing new British armies.

But in dismissing these early French operations it is well to recall
that each of them was designed primarily to aid the Russians and to
divert German attention from Galicia and from Poland; the Alsatian
attack coincided with the great drive of Hindenburg to the Bzura-
Rawka line ; the Champagne attack with the opening of the Battle of
the Carpathians ; and the Soissons fight which just preceded it with the
demand of the Hungarians for German aid to repulse the Russian
menace in Bukowina and the growing Roumanian threat, due to Russian
victories in the Crownland.

In this synchrony of operations east and west it is possible to see
what the French were striving to do, not on their own frontier primarily
but in the wide field of the continental strife. Nor can one doubt
that, while their efforts were not fully successful in this larger field
nor of any real consequence locally, they did materially reduce the
pressure upon their Slav ally and postpone the day when Germany was
able to regain the offensive in the east.

III. NEUVE CHAPELLE

On March loth at Neuve Chapelle, a few miles southwest of the
great city of Lille and just north of the strong German post of La
Bassee, which had seen desperate fighting in October and November,
the British launched a great attack upon a four-mile front. The im-
mediate objective of the attack was the Aubers ridge, which in military
comment is described as the key to the city of Lille itself.

This attack was preceded by the first of those avalanches of artillery
bombardment to become familiar thereafter and to be described at once

IN THE WEST, NOVEMBER, 1914, TO MAY, 1915 269

by the Germans, who gave it the enduring name of drum-fire. Under
this storm of fire, delivered from 300 guns concentrated in a narrow
area, the German first-line trenches disintegrated, even the second line
was shaken, and the British infantry made its first advance with little
or no serious opposition, finding the ground strewn with German dead,
and capturing scores of men overcome by the noise and shock of the fire.

But beyond the first-line trenches the British came under machine-
gun fire from scattered points in which the German second line had not
beeh destroyed. They also suffered severely as a result of the miscal-
culation of their own guns, but the fatal circumstance was the failure
of reserves to arrive.

There was a moment when it seemed as if the road to Lille was open.
But the British could not seize the moment, and it passed forever. After
two days the Germans were able to repulse all attacks with terrific
slaughter. The British had gained a mile on a front of four; the ruins
of the village of Neuve Chapelle were in their hands, but the larger
success had been lost. British Command had failed to synchronize men
with guns, to prepare reserves to follow the first waves of attack. What
was to happen at Loos and Gallipoli on a far larger scale had now oc-
curred at Neuve Chapelle.

In this battle, which filled the bulletins at the time but is now
hardly more than a forgotten skirmish, the British first tasted the cup
of bitterness which the Germans had drunk to the dregs in the Battle of
Ypres. Under German artillery and machine-gun fire, the British losses
surpassed that of the British contingents who fought with Wellington
at Waterloo. The "butcher's bill" had been 13,0x30 casualties; the
gains, a mile of territory, 2,coo German prisoners, and the privilege of
burying 3,0x30 Germans fallen to British guns.

In Allied strategy this blow in Artois had been delivered in strict
conjunction with the French offensive far off in Champagne and at the
moment when the arrival of German reserves on the latter field disclosed
the fact that Germany was weakening her line before the British. In
September a similar double thrust was to be undertaken in Champagne
and Artois, which would cost the French 120,000 casualties and the

270 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

British 60,000. Looking back to it, after the mighty struggles of the
later months, Neuve Chapelle seems insignificant. Yet it was the first
time that a considerable use was made of massed fire. It forecast
exactly the tactics Mackensen was to employ in his great victory in
Galicia not many weeks later, and it did come within sight of a con-
siderable triumph that might have restored Lille to France.

In the first blush London celebrated Neuve Chapelle as the " battle
bigger than Waterloo" ; but the later disclosures changed the whole tone
of British comment, and England presently realized that a meaningless
local gain had been achieved at a frightful cost, because British troops
had fallen under their own guns and British reserves had wholly failed
to arrive at the moment when real victory was within easy grasp.
Taken with the scandal over the shell supply — which soon developed
and revealed that the British High Command was still sending shrapnel
in limited quantities to an army that required heavy explosives in
enormous quantities and could not get them at all — Neuve Chapelle was
a saddening incident to the British people.

IV. THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES

In early April the French undertook an interesting campaign to
abolish the St. Mihiel salient, the single breach in the yoke of permanent
French fortifications from Verdun to Switzerland, which the Germans
had been able to make in September. Coming out from Metz and
ascending the valley of the little Rupt de Mad, the Germans had
actually crossed the Meuse, taken foot on the west bank, and also
captured Fort Camp des Romains, above the town of St. Mihiel on the
cast bank.

The ground held by the Germans was a narrow spearhead thrust
straight through the armour of France. Never had the Germans been
able to widen the wound or deepen it after the first thrust, but they re-
mained in possession of a portion of the hills of the Meuse and they cut
the railroad from Commercy to Verdun. Now the French, coming
north out of Toul and south out of Verdun, endeavoured to break this
salient along its sides. Some initial success they had at Les Sparges;

IN THE WEST, NOVEMBER, 1914, TO MAY, 1915 271

they took several hills and a village or two. But then they were
stopped. German heavy artillery in Fort Camp des Romains held
them up. The local success did not hide the larger failure. A still more
ambitious effort in July, and from the Bois-le-Pretre, above the west of
Pont-a-Mousson, similarly failed. Verdun was left in danger and the
extent of the danger was to be disclosed in February, 1916.

Finally we come to the last of the battles in the west in the period
under examination, the Second Battle of Ypres, which coincided almost
exactly with the date at which the world believed that Kitchener's
million were to begin their triumphal advance in the west; and it
terminated in a local German success at the moment when Mackensen
was to regain for Germany the initiative in the east.

The new blow fell on April 22d. It was delivered by relatively
small contingents, and it is plain that the Germans had no expectation
of anything but a local triumph, the moral effect of which would far
surpass the military. Not only did it come in an hour when the news
from the east was to fill the world, but the Allied failure at the Dar-
danelles had dashed the hopes of all the enemies of Germany and a
shining Teutonic triumph held out a promise to hold Italy to neutrality.
Again, the Allies were already collecting an army to send to the
Dardanelles on the most foolish of all ventures and German pressure
was conceivably calculated to withhold troops from the Near East.

The German attack was preceded by the first discharge of "poison
gas" of the war. Not since the slaughter in Louvain and the bombard-
ment of Rheims had any event made such a noise in the world as this first
use of gas as a weapon of destruction. It added instantly to the horrors
of conflict and it was in violation of all the restrictions that humanity
and international agreement had placed about the conduct of war. It
instantly changed the whole temper of the British, who suffered most
severely, mainly in the Canadian contingent ; it abolished quarter on the
western front for many months, and it brought in its train a savagery
and brutality that the wars of the Nineteenth Century did not know.

Even in its immediate purpose, this weapon was unsuccessful. It
did not give Germany a shining triumph. It did not open a gap in the

272 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

Allied defence, it merely brought to horrible death a few thousands of
Allied soldiers, and, before many weeks had passed, the Allies had pre-
pared an apparatus protecting their soldiers and had in their turn
adopted this hideous method of killing, which subsequently brought
as many thousand Germans to terrible agony and frightful death.

In selecting the Ypres front as the point of attack, the Germans had
pitched upon the point best known to the outside world in the whole Al-
lied line from Belfort to Nieuport. Here the Germans had attacked in the
autumn and by but a shadowy margin failed to get through. Belligerent
and neutral nations, watching for the advance of the Kitchener army, still
hardly taking shape, saw, instead, what seemed to be a new German
drive for Calais and for several days a real German advance. Nor were the
military reasons less weighty in determining the point of attack ; Ypres
was a salient on which the Germans from higher and encircling ground
could pour down a converging fire, cutting all the lines of communication.

The original attack fell to the west of Ypres, at the moment when
this beautiful city, with some of the most interesting monuments of
Flemish art, was melting into dust and ashes under a terrific cannonade.
At the point where the French and British lines touched — the French
position held largely by native troops — the Germans launched immense
clouds of gas. First amazement and then terror followed. The men
who had endured artillery fire and faced death with unfaltering courage
for many months broke and fled, a gap opened in the Allied front.

This break exposed the flank of the Canadians. They, too, had
suffered from the gas, but less severely than their French neighbours.
They did not break or immediately retreat. They extended to cover
the exposed flank and hung on. No reserves were available for hours,
and in these first hours nearly a third of the Canadian contingent died or
were wounded and captured on their lines. Presently the crisis passed.
Reinforcements arrived, the Belgians extended their aid to the French,
the British brought up troops from the south. Ypres was not lost, the
dyke between the Germans and Calais still held.

It is worth recalling, too, that for England, the Canadian contingent
bore the brunt as the Australian Anzacs were to win equal glory at

IN THE WEST, NOVEMBER, 1914, TO MAY, 1915 273

Gallipoli. In the history of the British Empire the Second Battle of
Ypres may well prove memorable, for Canadian loyalty there gave
shining answer to German forecasts of colonial secessions; while in
German Southwest Africa, British South Africa was presently to emu-
late the example of Canada in Flanders and Australia and New Zealand
at the Dardanelles.

The Second Battle of Ypres lasted five days; by the third the Ger-
mans no longer claimed to be making progress and at points they were
presently pressed back, but the whole Ypres salient had to be flattened
out. Actually the British gave up more ground than they had surren-
dered in the First Battle, but solely because of the collapse of the French
line to the west, under the poison gas attack. Guns, prisoners, ground,
the Germans had taken, but the triumph was local and of no permanent
value on the military side.

Yet the lesson of the Second Battle of Ypres was unmistakable, al-
though the world was long in learning it. A swift, heavy blow had dis-
closed the fact that the Allies were unready. Their previous offensives had
disclosed the same weakness. Now it was clear that only by heroic efforts
could they check a German attack. They could not break the German
lines, they could only with difficulty hold their own. The whole British
front had been affected by the attack and new dispositions had to be made.

Before she went east, Germany had undertaken one attack to den>
onstrate that she need fear no real danger from the Anglo-French quar-
ter. She had established the fact. Not until September would her
western lines be threatened and not until July, 1916, would the British
be ready to take an effective share in the western offensive operations.
The legend of "Kitchener's Million" disappeared in thin air, the hope
of the speedy deliverance of France vanished, the first authentic sign
of German recovery was now perceived by the world which was to have
a second and greater proof in a few hours.

In the major problem, to reorganize, to get forward in time to take
the pressure off Russia, France and Britain had failed at the moment
when the Russian strength was becoming inadequate for the task on the
Russian front.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN
CONCLUSION

While the echoes of the guns about Ypres were filling the world, the
Austro-German army of Mackensen attacked and almost destroyed the
Russian army, commanded by Radko Dimitrieff — the victor of Lule
Burgas — which stood behind the Dunajec River, in western Galicia. The
immediate consequence of this disaster was the dislocation of the whole
Russian front ; the eventual result, the retreat from the Carpathians and
the Vistula to the Dwina and the Beresina.

These great events do not concern the present narrative, they be-
long, as I see it, to the second phase of the war, the attack upon Russia.
With the Battle of the Dunajec ends that first phase, comprehended in
the attack upon France and the consequences of this attack. These
consequences, since the attack failed, were the deadlock in the west
and the loss to Germany of the initiative in the east and west. To
obtain the necessary numbers to deal the colossal blow that should
destroy France, Germany had weakened her eastern front and relied
upon Austria to hold up Russia. Still relying upon Austria mainly,
after the Marne, Germany had elected to endeavour to reopen the
decision of the Marne in all the weeks from September to the middle of
November.

Compelled at last to go east, while the Battle of Flanders was still
unwon and the decision of the Marne stood, Germany had then to labour
under the disadvantages which had resulted from the successes won by
Russia over Austria and the position gained in Galicia. Not until
the Dunajec did Germany finally restore the balance, not until the
Dunajec did she escape from the consequences of the Marne campaign,
consequences which affected the eastern quite as much as the western
field.

Had the Allies been prepared to take the offensive in the west,

274

CONCLUSION 275

when Germany at last turned eastward in November, they would have
won the war. Had they been able in the spring, when the German at-
tack at the Dunajec began, to make a similar attack in the west, Ger-
man disaster would have been immediate. The failure in the autumn
enabled Germany to erect those colossal dykes against the Allies in the
west which extended from the North Sea to Switzerland. Failure
in the spring condemned Russia to bear that terrible burden which
almost brought irreparable disaster and real German victory.

In the spring of 1915 it was plain that the advantage belonged to the
alliance which could strike the first heavy blow, but the superficial circum-
stances alike favoured the Allies and seemed to indicate that they would be
able to retain the initiative which they had won at the Marne and bring
Germany to swift and complete defeat. All this was impossible because
Great Britain had been unable to transform herself into a military nation
and to do in months what her Allies and enemies had achieved only
by long years of patient and universal training. As for France, she
lacked the numbers, now, to risk alone the supreme effort, for if it failed,
German victory in the west, while Britain was still unprepared, was
inevitable.

In this situation there was allowed to Germany a new opportunity,
and as it turned out, another year, in which to win the war. If she could
dispose of Russia and return to the west before Britain had at last organ-
ized her millions and her industries, she might hope for the complete vic-
tory that had escaped her in the Marne conflict. But if she failed in the
east, if she were compelled to come west with the Russian task incom-
plete, as she had been compelled to go east while France still stood, then
German failure in the second phase would be as patent as it was now in
the first.

Only victory in the east, followed by triumph in the west, could per-
manently abolish the decision of the Marne. Unless it was abolished
the time was bound to come when Germany would have to face fresh
millions coming from Britain and find herself outnumbered and deprived
of all the advantages that superior preparation and organization had
given her at the start. This is what did happen, but not until the sum-

276 HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

mer of 1916. And as it did happen the decision of the Marne stood, and
stands, the one great event in the whole World War from August, 1914,
to September, 1916.

All that the science, knowledge, skill, genius of two races could mo-
bilize met at the Marne in a struggle in which the fate of one race, at least,
was in the balance, and if France fought for life, Germany fought for a
world power that could hardly have escaped her had she prevailed. But
she did not prevail ; everything she hoped to attain escaped her on this
field. Afterward she still had numbers, the fruits of her years of prepa-
ration remained in her hands, but the moment had escaped her and did not
return. Had Napoleon won at Waterloo, his old domination of Europe
would not have been regained, but had Germany won at the Marne,
William II would have attained an eminence that Napoleon never
reached in his most fortunate hour.

At the Marne, France willed to live ; in the gravest hour in the his-
tory of their race, French commanders and French soldiers alike dis-
played not merely the courage that was traditional and was equalled by
German devotion, but those qualities which have often given France the
supremacy in Europe and have never failed to save her when her condi-
tion seemed desperate. And by her will to live, France saved Britain,
Russia, Europe, from a German domination, which in the German mind
was to renew the glories of the Roman Empire.

A second sacrifice and a second agony were to be demanded of the
French people at Verdun, but the stakes of that terrible contest were in-
comparably smaller, and the greatest possible fruit of German victory on
the Meuse would have been provinces and indemnities. Nor was there
ever a grave danger of this harvest. At the Marne, Germany fought for
a World; at Verdun, for a War; and while she fought at Verdun, her
statesmen talked of a victorious peace, which if it still indicated great
ambitions, no longer disclosed Napoleonic aspirations.

With all its mighty events, with all its noble and splendid pages, the
history of the first two years of the great conflict is the history of the
Battle of the Marne. We have seen in these chapters how Germany
strove to abolish that decision ; we shall see in those which describe the

CONCLUSION 277

attack upon Russia how she continued to strive to abolish it in tremen-
dous struggles from the Straits of Dover to the Golden Horn, from the
Meuse to the Beresina; but after splendid successes, we shall see the
continuing failure. Like Marathon, the Marne was a mortal wound;
but, unlike Marathon, it did not kill at once.

MR. SIMONDS'S HISTORY OF THE PROGRESS
OF THE WAR WILL BE CARRIED FOR-
WARD IN THE SUCCEEDING VOLUMES.

EDITOR

APPENDIX

THE EARLY FRENCH OFFENSIVE
By FRANK H. SIMONDS

APPENDIX

THE EARLY FRENCH OFFENSIVE
By FRANK H. SIMONDS

In the third week of August, 1914, a French army crossed the frontier of
Alsace-Lorraine and entered the Promised Land, toward which all Frenchmen
had looked in hope and sadness for forty-four years. The long-forgotten
communiques of that early period of the war reported success after success,
until at last it was announced that the victorious French army had reached
Saarburg and Morhange, and were astride the Strassburg-Metz railroad.
And then Berlin took up the cry, and France and the world learned of a great
German victory and of the defeat and rout of the invading army. Even
Paris conceded that the retreat had begun and the "army of liberation" was
crowding back beyond the frontier and far within French territory.

Then the curtain of the censorship fell and the world turned to the west-
ward to watch the terrible battle for Paris. In the agony and glory of the
Marne the struggle along the Moselle was forgotten; the Battle of Nancy, of
Lorraine, was fought and won in the darkness, and when the safety of Paris
was assured the world looked toward the Aisne, and then toward Flanders.
So it came about that one of the greatest battles of the whole war, one of
the most important of the French victories, the success that made the Marne
possible, the rally and stand of the French armies about Nancy, escaped the
fame it earned. Only in legend, in the romance of the Kaiser with his cavalry
waiting on the hills to enter the Lorraine capital, did the battle live.

When I went to France one of the hopes I had cherished was that I might
be permitted to visit this battlefield, to see the ground on which a great battle
had been fought, that was still unknown country, in the main, for those who
have written on the war. The Lorraine field was the field on which France
and Germany had planned for a generation to fight. Had the Germans re-
spected the neutrality of Belgium, it is by Nancy, by the gap between the
Vosges and the hills of the Meuse, that they must have broken into France.
The Marne was a battlefield which was reached by chance and fought over by
hazard, but every foot of the Lorraine country had been studied for the fight
long years in advance. Here war followed the natural course, followed the
plans of the general staff prepared years in advance. Indeed I had treasured
over years a plan of the Battle of Nancy, contained in a French book written
long ago, which might serve as the basis for a history of what happened, as it
was written as a prophecy of what was to come.

281

282 APPENDIX

When the Great General Staff was pleased to grant my request to see the
battlefield of Nancy I was advised to travel by train to that town accompanied
by an officer from the General Staff, and informed that I should there meet an
officer of the garrison, who would conduct me to all points of interest and ex-
plain in detail the various phases of the conflict. Thus it fell out, and I have
to thank Commandant Leroux for the courtesy and consideration which made
this excursion successful.

In peace time one goes from Paris to Nancy in five hours, and the distance
is about that from New York to Boston, by Springfield. In war all is different,
and the time almost doubled. Yet there are compensations. Think of the
New York-Boston trip as bringing you beyond New Haven to the exact rear
of battle, of battle but fifteen miles away, with the guns booming in the dis-
tance and the airplanes and balloons in full view. Think also of this same
trip, which from Hartford to Worcester follows the line of a battle not yet
two years old, a battle that has left its traces in ruined villages, in shattered
houses. On either side of the railroad track the graves descend to meet the
embankments; you can mark the advance and the retreat by the crosses which
fill the fields. The gardens that touch the railroad and extend to the rear of
houses in the little towns are filled with graves. Each enclosure has been
fought for at the point of the bayonet, and every garden wall recalls the
Chateau of Hougoumont, at Waterloo.

All this was two years ago, but there is to-day, also. East of Bar-le-Duc
the main line is cut by German shell fire now. From Fort Camp des Remains
above St. Mihiel German guns sweep the railroad near Commercy, and one
has to turn south by a long detour, as if one went to Boston by Fitchburg,
travel south through the country of Jeanne d'Arc and return by Toul, whose
forts look out upon the invaded land. Thus one comes to Nancy by night,
and only by night, for twenty miles beyond there are Germans and a German
cannon, which not so long ago sent a shell into the town and removed a whole
city block beside the railroad station. It is the sight of this ruin as you enter
the town which reminds you that you are at the front, but there are other re-
minders.

As we ate our dinner in the cafe, facing the beautiful Place Stanislas, we
were disturbed by a strange and curious drumming sound. Going out into
the square, we saw an airplane, or rather its lights, red and green, like those
of a ship. It was the first of several, the night patrol, rising slowly and steadily
and then sweeping off in a wide curve toward the enemy's line. They were
the sentries of the air which were to guard us while we slept, for men do
sentry-go in the air as well as on the earth about the capital of Lorraine. Then
the searchlights on the hills began to play, sweeping the horizon toward that
same mysterious region where beyond the darkness there is war.

The next morning I woke with the sense of Fourth of July. Bang! Bang!

APPENDIX 283

Bang! Such a barking of cannon crackers I had never heard. Still drowsy,
I pushed open the French windows and looked down on the square. There I
beheld a hundred or more men, women, and children, their eyes fixed on some-
thing in the air above and behind the hotel. Still the incessant barking of guns
with the occasional boom of something more impressive. With difficulty I
grasped the fact. I was in the midst of a Taube raid. Somewhere over my
head, invisible to me because of the wall of my hotel, a German airplane was
flying, and all the anti-aircraft guns were shooting at it. Was it carrying
bombs? Should I presently see or feel the destruction following the descent
of these?

But the Taube turned away, the guns fired less and less frequently, the
people in the streets drifted away, the children to school, the men to work,
the women to wait. It was just a detail in their lives, as familiar as the in-
coming steamer to the commuters on the North River ferryboat. Some
portion of war has been the day's history of Nancy for nearly two years now.,
The children do not carry gas masks to school with them as they do at Pont-
a-Mousson, a dozen miles to the north, but women and children have been
killed by German shells, by bombs brought by Zeppelins and by airplanes.
There is always excitement of sorts in the district of Nancy.

After a breakfast broken by the return of the airplanes we had seen de-
parting the night before for the patrol, we entered our cars and set out for the
front, for the near front, for the lines a few miles behind the present trenches,'
where Nancy was saved but two years ago. Our route lay north along the
valley of the Meurthe, a smiling broad valley, marching north and south and
meeting in a few miles that of the Moselle coming east. It was easy to believe
that one was riding through the valley of the Susquehanna, with spring and
peace in the air. Toward the east a wall of hills shut out the view. This was
the shoulder of the Grand-Couronne, the wall against which German violence
burst and broke in September, 1914.

Presently we came to a long stretch of road walled in on the river side by
brown canvas, exactly the sort of thing that is used at foot-ball games to shut
out the non-paying public. But it had another purpose here. We were
within the vision of the Germans, across the river, on the heights behind the
forest, which outlined itself at the skyline; there were the Kaiser's troops and
that forest was the Bois-le-Pretre, the familiar incident in so many commu-
niques since the war began. Thanks to the canvas, it was possible for the French
to move troops along this road without inviting German shells. Yet it was
impossible to derive any large feeling of security from a canvas wall, which
alone interposed between you and German heavy artillery.

We passed through several villages and each was crowded with troops;
cavalry, infantry, all the branches represented; it was still early and the sol-
diers were just beginning their day's work; war is so completely a business here-

284 APPENDIX

Transport wagons marched along the roads, companies of soldiers filed by.
Interspersed with the soldiers were civilians, the women and children, for none
of the villages are evacuated. Not even the occasional boom of a gun far off
could give to this thing the character of real war. It recalled the days of my
soldiering in the militia camp at Framingham in Massachusetts. It was
simply impossible to believe that it was real. Even the faces of the soldiers
were smiling. There was no such sense of terribleness, of strain and weariness
as I later found about Verdun. The Lorraine front is now inactive, tranquil;
it has been quiet so long that men have forgotten all the carnage and horror
of the earlier time.

We turned out of the valley and climbed abruptly up the hillside. In a
moment we came into the centre of a tiny village and looked into a row of
houses, whose roofs had been swept off by shell fire. Here and there a whole
house was gone; next door the house was undisturbed and the women and
children looked out of the doors. The village was St. Genevieve, and we were
at what had been the extreme front of the French in August, and against this
hill burst the flood of German invasion. Leaving the car we walked out of the
village, and at the end of the street a sign warned the wayfarer not to enter
the fields, for which we were bound: "War-^-do not trespass." This was the
burden of the warning.

Once beyond this sign we came out suddenly upon an open plateau, upon
trenches. Northward the slope descended to a valley at our feet. It was cut
and seamed by trenches, and beyond the trenches stood the posts that carried
the barbed-wire entanglements. Here and there, amidst the trenches, there
were graves. I went down to the barbed-wire entanglements and examined
them curiously. They at least were real. Once thousands of men had come
up out of the little woods a quarter of a mile below; they had come on in that
famous massed attack, they had come on in the face of machine gun and
"seventy-fives." They had just reached the wires, which marked high water.
In the woods below, the Bois-de-Facq, in the fields by the river, 4,000 Germans
had been buried.

Looking out from the trenches the whole country unfolded. Northward
the little village of Atton slept under the steep slope of Cote-de-Mousson, a
round pinnacle crowned with an ancient chateau. From the hill the German
artillery had swept the ground where I stood. Below the hill to the west was
Pont-a-Mousson, the city of 150 bombardments, which the Germans took
when they came south, and lost later. Above it was the Bois-le-Pretre, in
which guns were now booming occasionally. Far to the north was another
hill, just visible, and its slope toward us was cut and seamed with yellow slashes.1
Those were the French trenches, then of the second or third line; beyond there
was still another hill, it was slightly blurred in the haze, but it was not over
five miles away, and it was occupied by the Germans. From the slope above

APPENDIX 285

me on a clear day it is possible to see Metz, so near are French and German
lines to the old frontier.

Straight across the river to the west of us was another wood, with a glorious
name, the Forest of the Advance Guard. It swept to the south of us. In
that wood the Germans had also planted their guns on the day of battle. They
had swept the trenches where I stood from three sides. Plainly it had been a
warm corner. But the French had held on. Their commander had received
a verbal order to retreat. He insisted that it should be put in writing, and
this took time. The order came. It had to be obeyed, but he obeyed slowly.
Reluctantly the men left the trenches they had held so long. They slipped
southward along the road by which we had come. But suddenly their rear
guards discovered that the Germans were also retreating. ' So the French came
back and the line of St. Genevieve was held, the northern door to Nancy was
not forced.

Looking down again it was not difficult to reconstitute that German as-
sault, made at night. The thing was so simple the civilian could grasp it. A
road ran through the valley and along it the Germans had formed; the slope
they had to advance up was gentle, far more gradual than that of San Juan.
They had been picked troops selected for a forlorn hope, and they had come
back four times. The next morning the whole forest had been filled with dead
and dying. Not less than a division — 20,000 men — had made the terrible
venture. Now there was a strange sense of emptiness in the country; war had
come and gone, left its graves, its trenches, its barbed-wire entanglements;
but these were all disappearing already. On this beautiful spring morning
it was impossible to feel the reality of what happened here, what was happening
now, in some measure, five miles or more to the north. Nature is certainly
the greatest of all pacifists; she will not permit the signs of war to endure nor
the mind to believe that war itself has existed and exists. *

From St. Genevieve we went to the Grand Mont d'Amance, the most fa-
mous point in all the Lorraine front, the southeast corner of the Grand-
Couronne, as St. Genevieve is the northern. Here, from a hill some 1,300
feet high, one looks eastward into the Promised Land of France — into German
Lorraine. In the early days of August the great French invasion, resting one
flank upon this hill, the other upon the distant Vosges, had stepped over the
frontier. One could trace its route to the distant hills among which it had
found disaster. In these hills the Germans had hidden their heavy guns, and
the French, coming under their fire without warning, unsupported by heavy
artillery, which was lacking to them, had broken. Then the German invasion
had rolled back. You could follow the route. In the foreground the little
Seille River could be discerned; it marked the old frontier. Across this had
come the defeated troops. They had swarmed down the low, bare hills; they
had crossed and vanished in the woods just at my feet; these woods were the

286 APPENDIX

Forest of Champenoux. Into this forest the Germans had followed by the
thousand, they were astride the main road to Nancy, which rolled white and
straight at my feet. But in the woods the French rallied. For days there
was fought in this stretch of trees one of the most terrible of battles.

As I stood on the Grand Mont I faced almost due east. In front of me and
to the south extended the forest. Exactly at my feet the forest reached up
the hill and there was a little cluster of buildings about a fountain. All was
in ruins, and here, exactly here, was the high-water mark of the German
advance. They had occupied the ruins for a few moments and then had
been driven out. Elsewhere they had never emerged from the woods; they
had approached the western shore, but the French had met them with machine
guns and "seventy-fives." The brown woods at my feet were nothing but a
vast cemetery; thousands of French and German soldiers slept there.

In their turn the Germans had gone back. Now, in the same woods, a
French battery was shelling the Germans on the other side of the Seille. Under
the glass I studied the little villages unfolding as on a map; they were all
destroyed, but it was impossible to recognize this. Some were French, some
German; you could follow the line, but there were no trenches; behind them
French shells were bursting occasionally and black smoke rose just above the
ground. Thousands of men faced each other less than four miles from where
I stood, but all that there was to be detected were the shell bursts; otherwise
one saw a pleasant country, rolling hills, mostly without woods, bare in the
spring which had not yet come to turn them green. In the foreground ran
that arbitrary line Bismarck had drawn between Frenchmen forty-six years
before — the frontier — but of natural separation there was none. He had cut
off a part of France, that was all, and one looked upon what had been and was
still a bleeding wound.

I asked the French commandant about the various descriptions made by
those who have written about the war. They have described the German
attack as mounting the slope of the Grand Mont where we stood. He took
me to the edge and pointed down. It was a cliff almost as steep as the
Palisades. "C'est une blague," he smiled. "Just a story." The Germans
had not charged here, but in the forest below, where the Nancy road passed
through and enters the valley of the Amezeule. They had not tried to carry
but to turn the Grand Mont. More than 200,000 men had fought for days in
the valley below. I asked him about the legend of the Kaiser sitting on
a hill, waiting in white uniform with his famous escort, waiting until the road
was clear for his triumphal entrance into the capital of Lorraine. He laughed.
I might choose my hill; if the Emperor had done this thing the hill was "over
there," but had he? They are hard on legends at the front, and the tales that
delight Paris die easily on the frontiers of war.

But since I had asked so much about the fighting my commandant promised

APPENDIX 287

to take me in the afternoon to the point where the struggle had been fiercest,
still farther to the south, where all the hills break down and there is a natural
gateway from Germany into France, the beginning of the famous Charmes
Gap, through which the German road to Paris from the east ran, and still runs.
Leaving Nancy behind us, and ascending the Meurthe Valley on the eastern
bank, turning out of it before Saint Nicholas du Port, we came presently to
the most completely war-swept fields that I have ever seen. On a perfectly
level plain the little town of Haraucourt stands in sombre ruins. Its houses
are nothing but ashes and rubble. Go out of the village toward the east and
you enter fields pockmarked by shell fire. For several miles you can walk from
shell hole to shell hole. The whole country is a patchwork of these shell holes.
At every few rods a new line of old trenches approaches the road and wanders
away again. Barbed-wire entanglements run up and down the gently sloping
hillsides.

Presently we came out upon a perfectly level field. It was simply torn by
shell fire. Old half-filled trenches wandered aimlessly about, and beyond, un-
der a gentle slope, the little village of Corbessaux stood in ruins. The com-
mandant called my attention to a bit of woods in front.

"The Germans had their machine guns there," said he. "We didn't know
it, and a French brigade charged across this field. It started at 8:15, and at
8 30 it had lost more than 3,000 out of 6,000. Then the Germans came out of
the woods in their turn, and our artillery, back at Haraucourt, caught them
and they lost 3,500 men in a quarter of an hour. Along the roadside were in-
numerable graves. We looked at one. It was marked: "Here 196 French."
Twenty feet distant was another; it was marked: "Here 196 Germans." In
the field where we stood I was told some 10,000 men are buried. They were
buried hurriedly, and even now, when it rains, arms and legs are exposed.

Two years had passed, almost two years, since this field had been fought for.
The Germans had taken it. They had approached Haraucourt, but had not
passed it. This was the centre and the most vital point in the Lorraine battle.
What Foch's troops had done about La Fere Champenoise, those of Castelnau
had done here. The German wave had been broken, but at what cost ? And
now, after so many months, the desolation of war remained. But yet it was
not to endure. Beside the very graves an old peasant was ploughing, guiding
his plough and his horses carefully among the tombs. Four miles away more
trenches faced each other and the battle went on audibly, but behind this line,
in this very field where so many had died, life was beginning.

Later we drove south, passing within the lines the Germans had held in
their great advance; we travelled through Luneville, which they had taken and
left unharmed, save as shell fire had wrecked an eastern suburb. We visited
Gerbeviller, where in an excess of rage the Germans had burned every structure
in the town. I have never seen such a headquarters of desolation. Every-

288 APPENDIX

thing that had a shape, that had a semblance of beauty or of use, lies in com-
plete ruin, detached houses, a chateau, the blocks in the village, all in ashes.
Save for Sermaize, Gerbeviller is the most completely wrecked town in France.

You enter the village over a little bridge across the tiny Mortagne. Here
some French soldiers made a stand and held off the German advance for some
hours. There was no other battle at Gerbeviller, but for this defence the town
died. Never was death so complete. Incendiary material was placed in
every house, and all that thoroughness could do to make the destruction com-
plete was done. Gerbeviller is dead, a few women and children live amidst
its ashes, there is a wooden barrack by the bridge with a post-office and the
inevitable postcards, but only on postcards, picture postcards, does the town
live. It will be a place of pilgrimage when peace comes.

From Gerbeviller we went by Bayon to the Plateau of Saffais, the ridge be-
tween the Meurthe and the Moselle, where the defeated army of Castelnau
made its last and successful stand. The French line came south from St.
Genevieve, where we had been in the morning, through the Grand Mont, across
the plain by Haraucourt and Corbessaux, then crossed the Meurthe by Dom-
basle and stood on the heights from Rosieres south. Having taken Luneville,
the Germans attempted to cross the Meurthe coming out of the Forest of
, Vitrimont.

Standing on the Plateau of Saffais and facing east, the whole country un-
folded again, as it did at the Grand Mont. The face of the plateau is seamed
with trenches. They follow the slopes, and the village of Saffais stands out
like a promontory. On this ridge the French had massed three hundred
cannon. Their army had come back in ruins, and to steady it they had been
compelled to draw troops from Alsace. Miihlhausen was sacrificed to save
Nancy. Behind these crests on which we stood, a beaten army, almost routed,
had in three days found itself and returned to the charge.

In the shadow of the dusk I looked across the Meurthe into the brown mass
of the Forest of Vitrimont. Through this had come the victorious Germans.
They had debouched from the wood; they had approached the river, hidden
under the slope, but, swept by the hell of this artillery storm, they had broken.
But few had lived to pass the river, none had mounted the slopes. There were
almost no graves along these trenches. Afterward the Germans had in turn
yielded to pressure from the south and gone back. Before the Battle of the
Marne began the German wave of invasion had been stopped here in the last
days of August. A second terrific drive, coincident with the Marne, had like-
wise failed. Then the Germans had gone back to the frontier. The old boun-
dary line of Bismarck is now in many instances an actual line of fire, and
nowhere on this front are the Germans more than three or four miles within
French territory.

If you should look at the map of the wholly imaginary Battle of Nancy,

APPENDIX 289

drawn by Colonel Boucher to illustrate his book, published before 1910, a
book describing the problem of the defence of the eastern frontier, you will
find the lines on which the French stood at Saffais indicated exactly. Colonel
Boucher had not dreamed this battle, but for a generation the French General
Staff had planned it. Here they had expected to meet the German thrust.
When the Germans decided to go by Belgium they had in turn taken the offen-
sive, but, having failed, they had fought their long-planned battle.

Out of all the region of war, of war to-day and war yesterday, one goes
back to Nancy, to its busy streets, its crowds of people returning from their
day's work. War is less than fifteen miles away, but Nancy is as calm as
London is nervous. Its bakers still make macaroons; even Taube raids do not
excuse the children from punctual attendance at school. Nancy is calm with
the calmness of all France, but with just a touch of something more than calm-
ness, which forty-six years of living by an open frontier brings. Twenty-one
months ago it was the gauge of battle, and half a million men fought for it; a
new German drive may approach it at any time. Out toward the old frontier
there is still a German gun, hidden in the Forest of Bezange, which has turned
one block to ashes and may fire again at any hour. Zeppelins have come and
gone, leaving dead women and children behind them, but Nancy goes on with
to-day.

And to-morrow? In the hearts of all the people of this beautiful city there
is a single and a simple faith. Nancy turns her face toward the ancient fron-
tier, she looks hopefully out upon the shell-swept Grand-Couronne and beyond
to the Promised Land. And the people say to you if you ask them about war
and about peace, as one of them said to me : " Peace will come, but not until
we have our ancient frontier, not until we have Mej:z and Strasbourg. We
have waited a long time, is it not so?"

END OF VOLUME ONE

THE COUNTRY LIFE PRESS
GARDEN CITY, N.Y.

D
521

Simonds, Frank Herbert

History of the World War

v.1

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CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY

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