The History of the Peloponnesian War

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HISTORY

PELOPONNESIAN WAR

TRANSLATED FROM THE GiiEEK

THUCYDIDES.

BY WILJilAM SMITH, A.M,,

KKCTOa or THB HOLY TRINITT IN CHBSTKR, AND CHAPLAIM TO THM
RiaHT HON. THB BARI. OP DKRBY.

A NBW SDITION, CORRBCTBD AND RKYISED,

NEW YORK:N
BARPBR & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,

StO * 881 PIARL STRUT,

nAmcLnc •q.vabb.

186 5. •-:?• *

p.-i • ■-:■

PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

BOOK IV.— [CONTINUID.]

Y1A» Tin.*

£ablt in the following summer, at the time of the new
moon, the sun was partially eclipsed ; and in the beginning
of the same month tne shock of an earthquake was felt.

The fngitires from Mitylene and Lesbos in general, who
to a great number had sheltered themselves on the continent,
assembled in a body, and having hired some additional suc-
cours in Peloponnesus, and drawn them over safely from
thence, surprise Rhntium ; but, in consideration of two thou-
sand Phocean statersf paid inmiediately down, they restored
it aj^n undamaged. This being done, they marched next
agamst Antandrus, and got possession of it by the treachery
of a party within the city, who betrayed it to them. It was
farther their intention to set at liberty those cities styled the
Actean, which had formerly been possessed by the Mitylene-
ans, but we^e now in the hands of the Athenians. But their
principal view was the possession of Antandrus, which, once
effectuaUy secured (for it lay convenient for the buildinj^ of
ships, as it had plenty of timber, and Mount Ida stood just
above it), they would then be amply furnished with all the
expedients of war ; nay, might act offensively from thence ;
m^ffat terribly annoy Lesbos, which lies near it, and reduce
^e JSohnn fortresses along the coast. This was the plan
which now they were intent to put in execution.

The same summer the Athenians, with a fleet of sixty
ships, and taking with them two thousand heavy-armed, a few
horsemen, the Milesians, and others of their confederates,

« Before Christ 424. t Above i900L sterling.

4 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK IV.

inad4 an expedition against Gythera. The command was
lodged with Nicias, son of Niceratus, Nicostratus, son of
Diotrephes, and Autocles, son of Tolmaeus. Cythera is an
island : it lies upon the coast of Laconia over against Malea.
The inhabitants are Lacedomonians, resorting thither from
the neighbouring coast. A magistrate was sent orer yearly
from Sparta by the style of judge of Cythera ; the garrison
of heayy-armed estabCshed there was regularly relieved ; and
no care omitted in the good government and management of
the place. It was the port which their trading-ships first en«
tered in their return from Egypt and Libya. It was the
chief security of Laconia against those piratical parties which
might infest it from the sea, from whence alone they are ca-
pable of doing them any mischief; for by its situation it hath
entirely the command of the seas of Sicily and Crete. The
Athenian armament, therefore, arriving here, with a detach-
ment of ten ships and two thousand heavy-armed, surprise a
maritime town which i& called Scandea. With the rest of
their force they made a descent on that part of the island
which, is opposite to Malea, and advanced towards the city of
Cythera, situated also on the sea, and they found immediate-
ly that all the inhabitants were drawn out into the field in
readiness to receive them. An engagement ensued, where*
in the Cythereans maintained their ground for a small space
of time, but then turning about, fled amain into their citadel.
They soon afterward capitulated with Nicias and his col-
leagues, aubmittin£ to the Athenians at discretion, bamng
only the penalty of death. Some of the Cythereans had be-
forehand obtained a conference with Nicias. This rendered
the capitulation more easy and expeditious, and not only the
present, but all future points were by this means speedily and
satisfactorily adjusted. For the Athenians insisted that they
should evacuate Cythera, because they were Iiacedsmonians,
and because the island lay so conveniently on the Laconic
coast. The accommodation being once perfected, the Athe-
nians, having secured Scandea, the fortress situated upon the
harbour, and fixed a garrison in Cythera, stood away for Asine
and Helas, and most of the adjacent places on the coast.
There they made descents, and reposing themselves in the
nights at the most convenient of those places, they spent
about seven days in ravaging the country.
The I^acedsmonians, though th«y saw the Athenians hat)

TEAR TItl.] PBLOPONKfiSIAN WAR. 5

possetsed themselves of Cythera, and eneeted farther that
they would proceed to make more such descents upon their
territories, yet nowhere drew together in a body to repulse
them. "Hiey only stationed thmr parties of guard in such
posts as were af greatost importance. In other respects they
exerted their atimost vigilance, being under apprehensions
that the very form of their government was in daimr of sob-
version. Their lose in Spucteria was unexpected and great
indeed. Pylus was now in the hands of the enemy, as was
also Oythera. War was bursting in- upon them on all sides
Mtth inesistible impetuosity. This compelled them, contrary
to their usual maxims, to form a body of four hundred horse
and archers. If they were ever dejected by the prevalence
of fear, at this juncture they were more feelingly so, when
they saw the necessity of entering the Hsts, contrary to all
that practice of war to which they had been inured, in a
naval contest, and in this against the Athenians, whose pas-
sion it was to compute as so much loss whatever they left un-
attempted. Their general misfortune besides, which so sud-
denly and so fast had poured in upon them, had thrown
them into the utmost consternation. They excessively dread-
ed the weight of such another calsmity as they had been
sensible of in the blow at Sphacteria. Intimidated thus, they
durst no longer think of fighting ; nay, in^atover measures
they concert^, they at once desponded of success, as their
minds, accustomed until of late to an uninterrupted career
of good fortune, were now foreboding nothing but disappoint-
ment. Thus, for the most part, while the Athenians were
extending their devastations all along their coasts, they re-
mained inactive. • Each party on guard, though the enemy
made a descent in the face of their post, knowing themselves
inferior in number, and sadly dispirited, maj^e no offer to
check them. One party indeed, which was posted near Cor-
tyta and Aphrodisia, perceiving the light-armed of the ene
my to be straggling, ran speedily to charge them ; but when
the heavy-arm^ advanced to their support, they retreated
with so much precipitation, that some, though few, of them
were killed and their arms rifled. The Athenians, after
etecting a trophy, re-embarked and repassed to Cythera.

From hence they sailed again along the coast of the Lime-
rian Epidaurus ; and, after ravaging part of that district, they
Arrived at Thyrea, which, though it -lies in the district called

6 PELOPONNBSIAN WAR. [boOK IV.

Cynuria, is the frontier town which parts Argia and Laconia.
lliis place belonged to the Lacedemonians, who had assi^
ed it for the residence of the exiled .£ginete, in requital
of the services they had done them at the time of the earth-

auake and the insurrection of the Helots, and farther, because,
bough subject to the Athenians, they had ever firmly abode
in m Lacedemonian interest. The ^ginets, thus again in-
vaded by the Athenians, abandoned the fortification upon the
seaside which they were busy in throwing up, and retreated
into the city, which waa the place of theur residence, seated
higher up, at the distance of about ten stadia* from the shore.
A party of Lacedemonians had been posted there to assist
those who were employed in the new fortification ; and yet,
though earnestly pressed by the .£ginet», they refused to ac-
company them within their walls, being averse to run the
risk of a new blockade. They chose rather to retreat towards
the eminences, as they judged themselves disabled by the in-
feriority of their number from facing the enemy, and remain-
ed there in a state of inaction.

By this time the Athenians, having completed thehr landing,
and advanced with their whole force, took Thyrea by storm.
They set the city in flames, and destroyed whatever was
within it. Such of the ^Eginetas as survived the instant car-
nage, they carried prisoners to Athens ; and with them Tan-
talus, son of Patrocles, who commanded there as general for
the Lacedemonians. He had been wounded, and so taken
prisoner. The^r also carried thither some few persons whom
they had taken in Oythera, such as for its security it was ex-
pedient to remove. These the Athenians, after a consulta-
tion, decreed " to be disposed of in the islands, but the rest
of the Cythereans still to occupy their own land, subjected to
the yearlv tribute of four talents ;t but the iGginete, as
manv as had been taken prisoners, to be all instantly nut to
death" (to gratify that eternal rancour they bore them),
*' and Tantalus to be kept in prison along with his country-
men taken in Sphacteria."

The same summer a suspension of arms was agreed on in
Sicily ; first, between the Camarineans and GeToans : and
then the other Sicilians, holding a general congress at Gela,

* About a mile.

t Seven hundred and seventy-five pounds sterling.

TEAR YIII.] PELOPONNE8IAN WAR. . 7

whither the ambaBsadors from the seyeral states resorted, en*
tered into conferences about the terms of a general recon-
ciliation. Manj different expedients were proposed on all
sides, and many disputes arose, each insisting on a repara*
tion suitablci to tbeir own private sense of grieyance. BnC
Hermocrates,* the son of Hermon, a Syracusan, who laboured
noet of any at a firm reunion, delivered his sentiments thus :

" I am here the reprosentatiTO, ye men of Sicily, of one,
ftod not the meanest, of the Sicilian states, nor yet the most
exhausted by war ; and what I am going to propose is calcn*
lated for, and will, I am convinced, most effectually secura,
the welfare of oar common country. And what need is
there now to run over in minute detail the calamities insepar-
able from war, in the hearing of men who have experienced •
them alii None ever plunge headlong into these through
an otter ijprnorance of them ; nor, when the views are fixed
on gratifying ambition, are men used to be deterred by fear.
The acquisitions proposed in the latter case are generally
imagined to overbalance danffers : and the former choose
rather to submit to hazards than suffer diminution of their
present enjoyments. Yet, where the parties, actuated by
these different views, embroil themselves at a juncture when
it is impossible to succeed, exhortations to a mutual agree-
aiea¥ are then most highly expedient.

*' To be influenced by such exhortations must at present
be highly for the advantage of us all. For it was the strong
desire of fixing our own separate views on a firm establisl^
ment which at first embroiled us in this war, and which at
present raiseth such mutual altercations even during our en-
deavours to effect an accommodation: and, in fine, unless

* This great and accomplished Syracusan seems to be usher-
ed into tfiu history with peculiar dignity, as the very mouth of
Sicily, exhorting them all to concorcfand unanimity, and teach«
ing them the method of securing the welfare and glory of their
common country upon the noblest plan. This is noted merely
to draw upon him the attention of the reader. He wUl act after-
-wardt in the most illustrious scenes, and show himself on all
occasions a man of true honour and probity, a firm and disinter-
estedpatriot, an excellent statesman, and a most able command-
er. The Athenians never had a more determined or a more
generous enemy. But that will not hinder our historian from
representing him in all his merit.

8^ .PEL0PONNE8IAN WAR. [bOOK IV

matters can be so eqaaily adjusted as to satisfy all parties,
we shall again have recourse to arms. Bat then, we ought
to recollect, that not merely for securing our separate inter*
ests, if we would act like men of sense, is this present con-
gress opened ; but, to concert the best measures within our
reach to preserve, if possible, our country from falling, and,
as I judge, in great danger of falling, a sacrifice to Athenian
ambition. It is to convince you how necessary a reunion is,
not so much from what I can urge as from the light these
very Athenians themselves bold out before you. Possessed
of a power iar superior to any other Grecians, here they lie
among us with a few ships, to note down our indiscretions ;
and, under the plausible pretext'of alliance, though with mal-
ice lurking in their hearts, they are studying to improve them
in a specious manner to their own advantage. For should
war be again our option, and in it should the assistance of
men be accepted, who, though uninvited, would be glad to in-
vade us, while we are harasmng and exhausting one anoth-
er, and cutting open for these Athenians a road to our sub-
jection, it is mucn to be apprehended that, when once thev
behold our strength at the lowest ebb, they will pay us a visit
with more formidable armaments, and exert thenr utmost en-
deavours to complete our destruction.

** It becomes each party among us, provided we know
what is really our interest, to form alliances and to launch in
hazardous attempts, rather to acquire what belongs to others
than to prejudice what themselves at present possess ; and to
rest assured that sedition must ruin our several states, nay,
Sicily itself, of which we, the joint possessors, are ready, are
all of us ready, to be supplanted by hostile treachery, while
mutually embroiled in our domestic quarrels. It is hi^h time
we were convinced of this, that every individual might be
reconciled with his neighbour, and community with* commu-
nity, and all in general combine together to preserve the
whole of Sicily ; that our ears be deaf to the mischievous
suggestions, that those among us of Doric descent are
enemies to every thing that is Attic, while those of Qhal-
cidic, because of that Ionian affinity^ are sure of their protec-
tion. The Athenians invade ua not from private enmity,
because we are peopled here from these divided races, bat to
gratify their lust after those blessings in which Sicily abounds,
and which at present we jointly possess Nay this thev

xBAR Vlll.] PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 9

have already clearly declared, by their ready compliance with
the inyitation of those of the Chalcidic race. For though
they have never claimed assistance from hence by viitae of
their natural attachments here, yet they have shown a great-
er readiness in support of those than any compact between
them required. Yet, though the Athenians be in this man-
ner rapacious, in this manner politic, by me at least they
ought to be forgiven ; since I blame not men who are
greedy of empire, but such ^ are too eager to bend their
necks to their yoke ; because it is the constant never-failing
turn of the human temper to control who will submit, but
to make head against more powerful encroachments. As
for us, who know these things, and yet will not timely pro-
vide against them, though each in this assembly be separately
convinced that it demands our greatest attention to unite in
dissipating a storm which threateps us all, we err strangely
in our conduct; especially when its diversion might be so
readily effected, would we only bring our private quarrels to
an amicable determination : for it is not from quarters of their
own that the Athenians rush thus to annoy us, but from
ground which belongs to those who invited them. Thus, of
course, without any intervening trouble, one war will not be
terminated by another, but dissension will at once subside in
peace. And these new-comers, who under specious colours
are here for our ruin, must return again witn a disappoint-
ment which they may as speciously palliate. So desirable
a benefit will at once infallibly accrue from proper determi-
nations in regard to the Athenians.

** That peace is the sreatest of human blessings, is a truth
which all the world allows: what hinders us, then, why
we should not firmly establish it with one another 1 or
do you rather imagine, that if the condition of one man be
happy and that of another be wretched, tranquillity will not
contribute sooner th<n warfare to amend the state of the lat- ,
ter, and to preserve the state of the former from a sad re-
verse 1 or that peace is not better calculated to preserve
unimpaired the honours and splendours of the happy, and all
other 1>les8ings, which, should we desceodto a minute detail,
might largely be recounted, or might be set in the strongest
light by opposing to them the calamities which ensue •m>ra
warl Fix your minds, therefore, on these eonslderationSi
that vou may not overlook my admonitions, but, in compliance

10 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK IV.

with them» look out respectively in time for expedients of
prevention.

<' In case it be presumed that success must result from
power, without taking into debate the justice or violence of
the cause, let me detect the dangerous fallacy of such a san-
guine hope, which must be blasted in the end. Many are
they, it is well known, who would have gratified their re-
venge on violent oppressors, and many who have exerted
their utmost force for their ann aggrandizement; yet the
first, so far from accomidishBig their revenge, have met
, destruction in its pursuit ; and it has been tSe fate of the
latter,, instead of enlarging, to suffer the loss of what they al-
ready possessed. For revenge is not certain, because justly
sought after to retaliate violence ; nor is power assured of
its end, because invigorated with sanguine expectation.
Events are for the most part determined by the fallible, on-
steady balance of futurity ; which, though deceivable as de-
ceit can be, yet holds out before us the most instructive
hints. For thus, armed equally beforehand with needful
apprehension, we embark into mutual contest with wise pre-
meditation. Now therefore, checked by the gloomy dread of
the yet invisible event, and awed on all sides by the terror8
which the presence of these Athenians spreads among us ;
deterred further by those hopes already blasted, which as-
sigred us alternately of success against one another, had not
they interfered to obstruct and control us ; let us send far
away from Sicily these enemies that are hovering about us ;
let us enter into firm and lasting union with one another ; at
least, let us conclude a truce for so long a time as can pos-
sibly be agreed, and defer our own private disputes to a re-
mote decision. In a word, let us acknowledge, that, if my
advice takes place, we shall continue free in our respective
communities, where, masters of ourselves and accountable to
none beside, we shall be enabled to recompense both our
friends and oui, foes according to their deserts. But, in case
it be obstinately, rejected, and the mischievous insinuations of
others prevail, why then adieu henceforth to the just vindi-
cation of our own .wrongs ; or, if we are violently bent
upon effecting it, we must strike up a friendship with unre-
lenting foes, and must range ourselves in opposition there
where nature kath most closely attached us.

*' For my x>wn part, who now, as I observed at setting out,

YXARVIII.] PSLOFONNS8IAN WAR. 11

rapveMfnt tbe greaftast of the Sieilian alatas, md in thia cktr-
acter am more aceusUmied to attack another than to defBad
myself, I here, in her iiame, conjure you to make oae of con-
viction, and unite together in a speedy aecommodatioD, nor
■o eagwly to thimt after the damage of onr foes as to ploQge
onrselves into irreparable mischiefs. I am not conseioos to
myself of that foolish hao||htiness of heart, which expecta to
be absolate in its own private will ; or that fortune, whose
master I am not, should attend my orders ; but I am ready
to give way to good sense and reason. And I require you
ail respectively Uius to give way to one another, aud not to
wait till you are compiled to do so by your enemies. It
can aigue no baseness for kinsmen to give way ter kinsmen,
a Dorian to a Dorian, or a Chalcidean to others of his own
race. Nay, what is most comprehensive, we are all neigh-
bours, all joint inhabitants of the same land, a land waaM
round b^ the sea, and all styled by the same eonmion name
of Sicilians. Wars indeed in the course of time I foresee
we shall wa^e upon one another, and future conferences will
again be held, and mutual friendship shall thus revive. But
wiien foreigners invade us, let us be wise enough to unite
our strength, and drive t^m from our shores : for to be
weakened in any of our members, must endsnger the destruc-
tion of the whole ; and to such confederates and such medi-
ators we will never for the future have recourse.

*< If to such conduct we adhere, we shall immediately pro-
cure a double blessing for Sicily. We shall deliver her from
the Athenians and a domestic war. For tbe future we shall
retain the free possession of her in our own hands, and mora
easily disconcert any projects that hereafter maif be formed
against ber.*^

Tlie Sicilians aeknowle<%ad the weight of thaee argumente
thus urged by Hermocratea, and all the aeveral parties joined
in one common resolution ** to put an end to the war, each
retaining* what they #ere at present possessed of ; but that
M(»gantina should be restored to the Gamaiineans upon
the payment of a certain sum of money to the Syracusans.**
Such also as were confederated with the Athenians, addressing
themselves to the Athenian commanders, notified their own
readiness to acquiesce in these terms, and their resolution to
be comprehended in the same peace. These approving the
measure, the last hand was put to tiie accommodation.

12 PBL0P0NNE8IAN WAR. [bOOK IV.

The Athenian fleet, which had no longer any business
there, sailed away from Sicily. But the people at Athens
numifested their displeasure against the commanders at their
return home, by passing a sentence of banishment against
Pythodorus and Sophocles, and subjecting Eurymedon, who
was the third, to a pecuniary mulct ; as if, when able to have
perfected the reduction of Sicily, they had been bribed to de-
sist. They had enjoyed so long a career of good fortune,
that they imagmed nothing could disconcert their schemes ;
that enterprises of the greatest as well as of small importance,
no matter whether adequately or insufficiently supported, must
be ended to their wish. This was owing to the unexpected
good luck with which most of their projects had of late suc-
ceeded, and now mYigorated all their expectations.

The same summer, the Megareans of the city of Megan,
pressed hard by the Athenians, who constantly twice a year
made an inroad into their territory with their whole united
force ; harassed at the same time by their own outlaws, who,
haying been ejected by the popular party in the train of a se-
dition, had settled at Pegs, and from thence were continually
plundering them, beffan to have some conference about the
expediency of recalling their ouUaws, that their city might
not doubly be exposed to ruin. The friends of these exiles,
perceiving such a design to be in agitation, insisted more
openly than ever that the affiiir should be re^arly consider-
ed. The leaders of the people, being convmced that their
own and the strength of the people united, in their present
low condition, couul not possibly overrule it, were so far influ-
enced by their fears as to make a sepjret ofier to Uie Athe-'
nian generaJs, Hippocrates the son of Ariphro, and Demos-
thenes the son of Alcisthenes, " to put the city into their
hands ;'* concluding they should be less endangered by such
a step than by the restoration of the exiles whom they them-
selves had ejected. It was agreed, that in the first place the
Athenians should take possession of the long walls (these
were eiffht stadia* in length, reaching down from the city to
Nisea iheir port), to prevent any Succour which might be sent
from Nisea by the Peloponnesians, since there alone they
kept their garhsen for the security of Megara. Af^er this,
they promimd their endeavours to put them in possession of

* About three quarters of a mile.

YEAR Till.] PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 13

the upper city. And this they would be able to effect more
easily when the former point was once secured.

The Athenians, therefore, when all was fixed and deter-
mined on both sides, crossed oyer by night to Minoa, the
island of the Megareans, with six hundred heayy-armed, com-
manded by Hippocrates, and sat themselyes down in a hol-
low whence the bricks for the wall» had been taken, and
which lay near enough for their purpose : while another body,
under Demosthenes the other commander, consisting of light-
armed Plataeans and the Athenian patrols, concealed them-
selves near the temple of Mars, which lies still nearer. Not
a soul within the city knew any thing of these motions, ex-
cepting those whose vigilance it concerned this night to ob-
serve them. When the morning was ready to break, the
plotters of Megara proceeded thus : —

Through a series of time they had established a custom to
have the gates of the long walls opened to them in the night,
by carrying out a wherry upon a carriage, which they persua-
ded the officers posted there they conveyed nightly down
the ditch into the sea, and so went upon a cruise. And be-
fore it was light, bringing it back again to the walls upon
the carriage, they conveyed it through the gates, that it
might escape the notice of the Athenian watch on Minoa,
who by this means might be eluded, as they never could
descry any boat in the harbour. The carriage was now at the
gates, which were opened as usual for the reception of the
wherry. This the Athenians observing (for this was the sig-
nal agreed on) came- running from their place of ambush to
take possession of the gates before they could be shut again.
The very moment the carriage was between, and obstructed
the closing them together, both they and the Megarean coad-
jutors put the watch which was posted at the gates to the
sword. The Plataeans and patrolling parties under Demos-
thenes rushed in first to that spot where the trophy now
stands, and having thus gained an entrance (for the Pelopon-
uesians who were nearest had taken the alarm), the Platseans
made good their ground against those who attacked them,
and secured the gates till the heavy-armed Athenians, who
were coming up with all speed, had entered.' Each of these
Athenians afterward, so fast as he got in, advanced along
the wall. The Peloponnesian guards, though few in num-
ber, made head against them for a time ; some of them soon

14 PBLOPONN6SIAN WAR. [bOOK IV.

dropped, and then the reet ran speedily off. They were dis-
mayed at auch an attack from their enemies in the night ;
and, as the treacherous Megareans fought against them, they
concluded that all the Megareans were combined together in
betraying them. It happened farther that an Athenian herald
had proclaimed, of his own accord, that " such Megareans as
were willing to side with the Athenians should throw down
their arms.'^ When the Peloponnesians heard this, they at
once quitted their posts ; and, seriously belieying that all the
Megareans had combined to betray them, fled amain into Ni-
sara.

At the time of morning's dawn, the long walls bein^ thus
surprised, and the Megareans within the city thrown into a
tumult, the agents for the -Athenians, in concert with all their
accomplices in the plot, insisted on the necessity to throw
open the city gates, and march out to battle ; since it had
been agreed between them, that so soon as ever the gates
were thus opened, the Athenians should rush in. There was
a method to be observed on their side, in order to be distin-
guished; this was, to besmear themselves with ointment,
Uiat they might receive no harm. Their security wooU have
been greater had they opened the gates at once ; for now
four thousand heavy-armed Athenians, and six hundred horse-
men, who had marched in the night from Eleusis, according
to a prior disposition, were at hand. But while the accom-
I^ces, properly besmeared, stood ready at the gates, one of
their own party, who was privy to the whole plot, discovered
it to the other Megareans. These, drawing up together, came
forward in a body, and denied " the expediency of marching
out (since formerly, when stronger than now, they durst not
hazard such a step), or running such a manifest risk of losing
the city ; and, should any one affirm the contrary, the point
should be instantly determined by blows." They gave not
the least hint as if they had discovered the design, but stren-
uously insisted that Uieir own measure was most advisable,
and stood firm together for the security of the gates. Thus
it was no longer possible for the conspirators to put their plot
in execution.

The Athenian commanders, being sensible that the project
bad been somehow crossed, and that they were not able them<
selves to take the city by storm, immediately ran up a wall to
invest Nisasa ; concluding that, could they carry it before any

TEAR Vlll.] PBL0P0NNB8IAN WAS. 15

succours came up, it weald be impossible for Megan U» hoM
out much longer. Iron and workmen, and all proper materials,
were quickly supplied them from Athiens. They began at the
wall which they had lately surprised ; they ran it along for some
time parallel with Megara, and then dovra to the sea on both
sides of Nisea. The work, both of ditch and wall, was divided
among the army. They made use of the stones and bricks ol
the suburbs, and haying felled some trees and wood, they
strengthened what was weak with an additional palisade. The
houses of the suburbs, being topped with battlements, served
the use of turrets. This whole day they plied hard at the
work ; and about the evening of the succeeding da^ it was near-
ly completed. Th^ ,(2[arrison mthin Nisea was m great con-
sternation. They laooured already under a scarcity of provis-
ions, which they had been used to fetch daily from the upper
city . Thus concluding that the Peloponnesians could not suc-
cour them with sufficient expedition, and imagining the Mega-
reans were combined against them, they capitulated with th^
Athenians on the following terms : —

*| To be' dismissed every man at a certain ransom, after
delivering up their arms.

** But as for the LacedsBmonians, their commander, and
every other person in that number, these to be disposed of
by the Athenians at discretion.^'

These terms being agreed to, they evacuated Nisea. And
the A thenians, having thus cut off their long walls from the
lUjI m,jhy Megareans, and possessed themselves of Nisaea,
were prej^ltring^ accomplish what was yet to be done.

But Brasidas7>«ai^ Tellis, the Lacedamonian, happened
at this time to be siboMN^ieyon and Corinth, levying forces
to march for Thrace. Hewa^o sooner informed of the sur-
prisal of the walls, than he trralbl^ for the Peloponnesians
m Nis»a, and lest Megara should b^'^en. He summoned
the Boeotians to attend him expeditiouelyN^th Iheir forces at
Tripodiscus (the place so named is a village of the Megaris,
under the mountain Geranea), whither he was marching him-
self, with two thousand seven hundred heavy-armed Corinthi-
ans, four hundred Phliasians, six hundred Sicyonians, and
what levies he had already made upon his own account. He
imagined he might come up before Nisaea could be taken.
But hearing the contrary (for he came up in the night to Tri-
podiscus}, with a picked body of three hundred men, before

16 P£LOPONN£SIAN WAR. [bOOK IV

the news of his march could be spread, he approached to the
city of Megara undescried by the Athenians, who were post-
ed near the sea. He intended to declare that he was ready
to attempt, and in fact would have been- g^ad to have effected,
the recovery of Nisaa. But it was principally his view to get
admission into Megara, and provide for its security. He de-
manded admission, assuring them he had great hope of recov-
ering Nisaea. But the factions in Megara, perplexed at thi?
step of Brasidas — on one side, lest he meant to reinstate the
exiles by ejecting them ; the other, lest the people with such
an apprehension might at once fall upon them, and their city,
thus plunged into a tumult of arms, might be lost,.if the Athe-
nians, who lay ready in ambush, should seize it, refused him
admittance ; and both factions thought proper, without any
stir, to await the event. For it was severally their full expec-
tation, that a battle must ensue between the Athenians and
these new-comers ; and then, without plunging themselves
into vnnecessary hazards, th^ might join their own favourite
party if victorious.

Brasidas, when he could not prevail, withdrew again to the
main of his army. By the succeeding dawn the Bceotians
joined him, who had resolved to succour Megara, even pre-
vious to the summons sent by Brasidas, since they regarded
the danger that place was in as their own. They were ac-
tually advanced with their whole force as far as Platsa ; and,
the messenger having met with them here, they became much
more eager than before. They sent forward a detachment
of two-and- twenty hmidred heavy-armed, and six hundret^
horsemen, but dismissed the multitude to their own homes
When tihe whole force was thus united, consisting of at least
six thousand heavy-armed, and the heavy-armed Athenians
stood drawn up in order near Nisssa and the seashore, while
their light-armed were straggling about the plain, the Bcbo-
tian cavalry made an unexpected sally against those strag-
glers, and chased them to the shore : for hitherto no aid
whatever had taken the field in behalf of the Me^areans.
The Athenian cavalry clapped spurs to repel the Boeotian, and
a battle ensued. The horse were a long time thus engaged,
and both sides claimed a victory. For the general of the
Boeotian cavalry, and a small number of his party, the Athe-
nians drove before them to Nisaea, where they put them to
the sword and rifled them. They remained masters of tha

YBARVIII.] PELOPONNE8IAN WAR. 17

dead bodies, gave them vp afterward by a trace, and erected
a trophy : but neither side bo keeping their ground aa to reiH
der the action decisive, they retreated as it were by consent ;
the Boeotians to th«ir main army, and the Athenians to Nissa.
Brasidas, after this, advanced nearer to the sea and to
the city of Megara with his army. Having occnpied there
some advantageous groond, they drew op in order and stood
still, imagining the Athenians would attack them; and as-
sured that the Megareans were intently observing for whom
the TJctory might declare. In both these respects, they judg-
ed their present posture the most judicious ; because it was
not their own business to attack, or voluntarily to run into
conflict and danger ; and thus, having manifestly exhibited
their alacrity to act defensively, a victory might justly be
ascribed to them without the expense of a battle. In regard,
farther, to the Megareans, the consequence could not but be
fortunate : for, in case the latter had never beheld them thus
prompt in their succour, they would have stopped all farther
risk, and so undoubtedly they should have lost the city, as
men completely vanquished ; but now, should the Athenians
dectine an engagement, the points for which they themselves
came thither must be secured without a blow ; which proved
to be the result. For the Megareans, when the Aiheniftna
came out and drew up in order close to the long walls, and
then, as the enemy did not advance to attack them, stood
quiet in their ranks ; their commanders also judging the has-
ard by no means equal, and themselves, who had so far been
successful, not at all concerned to beein an engagement
against superior numbers, in which, should they prevail, they
could only take Megara, but, should they miscarry, must lose
the flower of their domestic strength, especially as then- op-
ponents would act in probability with more darinff resolution,
since, as the large strength they had now in the neld consist-
ed only oC quotas from several constituents, they hazarded
but little ; thus facing one another for a considerable space,
%nd neither side presuming to make an attack, till each at
ength wheeled off, the Athenians first towards Nis»a, and
the Peloponnesians again to their former post : then, I say,
the Me^reans in the interest of the exiles, regarding Brasi-
das as victor, and animated by the refusal of attack on the Athe-
nian side, opened the gates of Megara to Brasidas himself,
and the several commanders from the auxiliary states ; and

18 PBL0P0NNB81AN WAR. [bOOK IV.

haviiig given them admiMioDi proceeded with them to consul-
Ution, while the partisans of the Athenian interest were ia
the utmost consternation.

Soon afterward, the confederates being dismissed to their
respective oities, Brasidas also himself returned to Corinth,
to continue his preparations for that Thraciaa expedition, in
which before this avocation he had been intently employed.

The Athenians also being now marched homewards, the
Megareans in the city, who had acted most zealoasly in favour
of Uie Athenians, finding all their practices detected, stole
off as fast as possible. The others, afUr concerting the
proper, stqw with the friends of the exiles, fetched them home
from Pege, having first administered to them the most sol-
emn oaths ** to thmk no more on former injuries, and to pro-
mote the true welfare of the city to the utmost of their
power."

But these, when reinvested with authority, and taking a
review of the troops of the city, having previously disposed
some bands of soldiers in a proper manner, picked out about
a hundred persons of their enemies, and who they thought
had busied themselves most in favour of the Athenians. And
having compelled the people to pass a public vote upon them,
they vreat condemned to die, and suffered an instant execu-
tion. They farther new-modelled the government of Megara
into almost an oligarchy. And this change, though introdu-
ced by an inconsiderable body of men, nay, what is more,
in the train of sedition, yet continued for a long space of
time in full force at Megara.

The same summer, the Mityleneans being intent on execu-
ting their design of fortifying Antandrus, Demodocus and
Anstides, who commanded the Athenian squadron for levying
contributions, and were now at the Hellespont (for lAmachus,
the third in the commission, had been detached with ten ships
towards Pontus), when informed of what was thus in agita-
tion, became apprehensive that Antandrus might prove of as
bad consequence to them as Ansa in Samos had already
done : wherein the Samian exiles, having fortified themselves,
were not only serviceable to the Peloponnesians at sea by
furnishing them with' pilots, but, farther, were continually
alarming the Samians at home, and sheltering their deserters.
From tnese apprehensions they assembled a force from among
their dependants, sailed thither, and having defeated in battle

YBAR Till.] PSLOPONMSBIAN WAR. 19

thotte vho eanM oat of Antandnis to oppose them, gtm once
more pOMoesion of that town. And no long time alter, Lam-
achus, who bad been detacbed to Pontua, haTHig anchored
in the river Calex in the district of Heraclea, lost all his
ships. A heaT^ rain had fallen in the upper conntry, and the
land-flood rnshing suddenly down, bore them all away before
't. He himself and the men under bis command were forced
to march over land through Bithynia (possessed by those
Thracians who are seated on the other side of the strait in
Asia) to 'Chalcedon, a colony of Megareans in the month of
the Eazine Sea.

This summer also Demosthenes, immediately after he had
quitted the Megaris, with the command of forty sail of Athe-
nians, arrived at Naupactus. For with him and with Hippoc-
rates, some persons of the Boeotian cities in those parts had
been concerting schemes how to change the goremment of
those cities, and introduce a democracy on the Athenian
model. The first author of this scheme was Ptceodorus, an
exile from Thebes, and matters were now read^ for execution.

Some of them had undertaken to betray Siphc : 8iph» is
a maritime town in the district of Hiespiae, upon the Ghilf of
Crissa. Others of Orchomenus engaged for Chsronea, a
town tributary to that Orchomenus which was formerly call-
ed the Minyeian, but now the Boeotian. Some Orehomenian
exiles were the chief undertakers of this point, and were
hiring soldiers for the purpose from Peloponnesus. Chaero-
nea is situated on the edge of Boeotia, towards Phanotis of
Phocis, and is in part inhabited by Phocians. The share as-
signed to the Athenians was the snrprisal of Beliom, a tem«
pie of Apollo in Tanagra, looking towards Euboea. These
things ftrther were to be achieved on a day prefixed, that the
Bcsotikns might be disabled from rushing to the rescue of
Delium with all their fbrce, by the necessity of staying at
honae to defend their respective habitations. Should the at-
tempt succeed, and Delium once be fortified, they easily pre-
sumed that, thooeh the change of the Boeotian government
might not suddenly be eflfected, yet, when those towns were
in their hands, when their devastations were extended all
over the country, and places of safe retreat lay near at hand
for their parties, things could not long remain in their former
posture ; but, m process of time, when the Athenians appear-
ed in support of the revolters, and the Boeotians eoula not

20 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [boOK IV.

nolle in a body to oppose them, the designed revolution must
necessarily take place. This was the nature of the scheme
at present in agitation.^

Hippocrates, having the whole force of Athens under his
command, was ready at the proper time to march into Boeo-
tia. But he had despatched jDemosthenes beforehand to'
Naupactus with forty ships, that, after he had collected a
sufficient force in those parts from the Acamanians and their
other confederates, he should appear with his fleet before
Siphe, which was then to be betraved to him. A'day also
was fixed upon between them, in which both of ihem were at
once to execute the parts assigned them.

Demosthenes, being arrived at Naupactus, found the Oeni*
adflB already compelled by the united Acarnanians into an
association with the confederates of Athens. He marched
away, therefore, at the head of the whole confederacy in
those parts, and invaded first Salynthius and the Agraeans ;
and iiaving carried some other points, got all in readmess to
show himself before Siphe at the time appointed.

About the same time this sunmier Brasidas, at the head
of seventeen hundred heavy-armed, began his march towards
Thrace. When he was come up to Heraclea in Trachis, he
despatched a messenger beforehand to his correspondents in
Pharsalus, to beg a safe conduct for himself and his army.
And as soon as he was met at Mehtia of Achea by Pansrus,
and Dorus, and Hippolochidas, and Torylaus, and Strophacus,
who had been formerly the public host of the Ghalcideans,
he continued his march forwards. Others also of the Thes*
salians assisted in conducting him, and from Larissa, Nicon-
idas, the friend of Perdiccas. The passage through Thessaly
without proper guides is always difficult, and must be more
so to an armed bod}r. Besides, to attempt such a thing
through a neighbouring dominion without permission first
obtained, hath ever been regarded by all the Grecians with a
jealous eye, and the bulk of the Tnessalians had been ever
well-aiSected to the Athenians. Nor could Brasidas have
possibly effected it, had not the Thessalian been rather de-
spotic than free governments. For upon his 'route he was
stopped at the river Enipeus by some of contrary sentiments
to the rest of their countrymen, who ordered him to proceed
at his peril, and taxed him with injustice in having come so
far withQut the general permission. His conductors told

YMAR VIII.] PELOPONNBSIAN WAR. 21

tHem in return, that ** without such permission he should not
proceed ; but, as he had come among them on a sudden, they
thought themselves obliged in friendship to conduct him.'*
Brasidas also gave them strong assurances that *<he was
come thither for the service of Thessaly and of them ; that
his arms were not intended against them, but against the
common enemy, the Athenians ; that he never suspected any
enmity between Thessalians and Lacedsmonians, why they
might not tread upon one another's ground ; that even now,
should they withhold their consent, he was^ neither willing
nor indeed able to proceed ; but," he conjured them, " how-
ever, to give him no molestation." Havmgheard these dec-
larations, they acquiesced and withdrew. Brasidas now, by
the advica of his conductors, advanced with the utmost speed
without ever halting, in order to anticipate fresh and more
potent obstruction. Nay, the very same day that he left
Melitia, he advanced as far as to Pharsalus, and encamped
upon the banks of the Apidanus. From thence he proceeded
to Phacium, and from thence into Penebia. Being so far
advanced, his Thessalian guides received their dismission ;
and the Periebians, who are tributaries to the Thessalians',
escorted him to Dium in the kingdom of Perdiccas ; it is a
fortress of Macedonia, situated under Mount Olympas, on the
Thessalian side. In this manner Brasidas, advancing so
expeditiously as to prevent all obstruction, completed his
passage through Thessaly, and arrived in the dominions of
Perdiccas and the region of Chalcis. For those in Thrace
who revolted from the Athenians had joined with Perdiccas
in procuring this auxiliary force out of Peloponnesus, because
the great success of the Athenians had struck a terror among
them. The Ghalcideans were persuaded that they should
be first attacked by the Athenians ; and in truth their neigh-
bour-states, who yet persevered in their obedience, were se-
cretly instigating them to it. Perdiccas, indeed, had not yet
declared himself their enemy ; but he dreaded the vengeance
of the Athenians for former ^dges; and now he had a
scheme at heart for the subjection of Arribeus, King of the
Lyncestians.

Other points concurred to facilitate the procurement of
such a succour from Peloponnesus, such as the misfortunes
by which the Lacedaemonians at present were afflicted : for,
the Athenians pressing hard on Peloponnesus, and not least

22 PELOPOKNESIAN WAR. [bOOK IV.

of all on Laconia, they hoped, in case they coold equally
annoy them in this quarter, by thus nuirching an army against
their dependants, to effect a diversion. And they were more
encouraged by the offers of maintenance for their tro(^, and
solicitations to support revolts. They were at the same time
glad of a pretext to rid themselves of their Helots, lest, in the
present state of affairs, now that Pylus was in hostile hands,
they might be tempted to rebel. This farther gave rise to
the following event : — ^Dreadin^ the youth and number of
these slaves (for many precautions have ever been put in
practice by Lacedsmonians to curb and awe their Helots),
they made public proclamation, that ** so many of them as
could claim the merit of having done signal service to the
Lacedaemonians in the present war, should enter their claims
and be rewarded with freedom." The view in this was to
sound them, imagining that such who had the greatness of
spirit to claim their freedom in requital of their merit, must
be also the ripest for rebellion. About two thousand claim-
ants were adjudged worthy, and accordingly were led about
in solemn procession to the temple, crowned with garlands,
as men honoured with their freedom. But, in no long time
after, they made away with them all : nor hath the world
been aUe to discover in what manner they were thus to a
man destroyed.

. Now also with alacrity they sent away seven hundred of
their heavy-armed under the orders of Brasidas. The rest of
his body were mercenaries, whom he had hired in Pelopon-
nesus. Anid it was in compliance with his own particular
desire that Brasidas was employed in the service by the
Lacedaemonians.

The Chalcideans, however, were highly satisfied' wit'r a
person who had ever passed in Sparta for one of the most
active and accomplished citizens ; and who, in his foreign
employments, had performed very signal services for ma
country. From his first appearance among them, his justice
and moderation so instantly recommended him to the adja-
cent cities, that some voluntarily submitted, and others were
by intrigue put into his possession. By him the Lacedae-
monians were actually empowered, if the accommodation
they wished for took {>lace, which it afterward did, to make
•zchange and restitution of towns, and so relieve Pelopon-
nesas from the hardships of war.

TEAR Vtll.] PBLOFONNESIAN WAR. 23

Nay mare, even in racceeding time, upon the bfeftking oat
itf the Sicilian war, the yirtue and pmdenee of Brasidae ex-
erted at this janctnre, which some attested hy their own expe-
rience, others upon sound and unsuspected report, imprinted
^a zeal on the confederates of Athens to go orer to the Laee*
dmncmians. For, havinff heenthe first sent oat to a foreign
trust, and approved in aU respects as a worthy mia, he left
behind him a strong presumption that the rest of his coun-
trymen were like himself.*

So soon, therefore, as it was known at Athens that he was
arriyed to ti^e upon him the conduct of afiaars hi Thrace, the
Athenians declared Perdiccas their enemy, aseribiDg this expe-
dition to his cabals, and by strengthening their garrisons kept
a strict watch oyer all their dependants in that quarter.

But Perdiccas, with hik own forces, and accompanied by
the body under Brasidas, marched against a ne^^fabonring
potentate, Arribsos, son of Bromerus, King of the Maeedooian
Lyncestians ; enmity was subsisting between them, and the
ccmquest of him was the point in Yiew. When he had ad-
vanced with his army, and in conjunction with Brasidas, te
the entrance of Lyncus, Brasidas communicated his intention
to hold a parley with Arribsus before he proceeded to act
offensively against him ; and, if possible, to brinff him over to
the LacedflBmonian alliance ; for ArribsBus had already no-
tified by a herald that he was willing to refer the points in
dispute to the arbitration of Brasidas. The Chalcioean am-
bassadors also, who followed the camp, were continually suff-
gesting to him that " he ought not to plunge himself rashly
Into difficulties for the sake of Perdiccas," designinff to
reserve him more entirely for their own service. And be-
sides this, the ministers of Perdiccas had declared it at Lace-
daemon to be their master's intention to brin^ over all the
neighbouring states into this alliance : so that it was entirdr
with public views that Brasidas insisted upon treating with
Arribsus. Bat Perdiccas urged in opposition, that **■ he had
not brought Brasidas to be the judge of his controversies, but
to execute his vengeance on the enemies he should point out
to him ; that it woi^d be unjust in Brasidas to treat with Ar-

* When Brasidas was beginning his march for Thrace, hs
wrote this letter to the ephoriat Sparta :— " I wiU execute your
oiders in this war, or die.*'— PIutarch*s lAconic ApotJu!gm$»

24 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [BOOK IV.

nbsBus, when he supported half the expense of his troops."
Yet, in spite of such remonstrances, and in open defiance of
him, Brasidas parleyed. And being satisfied with the offers
of Arhbaeus, he drew off his troops without so much as en*
taring his dominions. But henceforth Perdiccas, looking^
apon this step as an injury to himself, reduced his contribu-
tion of support from a moiety to a third.

Brasidas, however, the same summer, without loss of time,
continued the operations of war ; and, a little before the vin-
tage, being attended by the Chaicideans, marched towards
Acanthus, a colony of the Andrians. The inhabitants of this
place were embroiled in a sedition about his reception ; a
party who co-operated with the Chaicideans were for it ;
but the people opposed. Yet, fearing the loss of their fruit,
which was not quite got in, the people were at last prevailed
upon by Brasidas to grant entrance to himself without any
attendants, and, after giving him audience, to resolve for
themselves. Brasidas was admitted ; and, standing forth in
the presence of the people, for though a Lacedaemonian he
was an able speaker, he harangued them thus : —

*^ My commission from the Lacedssmonians and the march
of their troops hither under my command verify, O ye Acan-
thians, the declaration made by us, when first we began this
war against the Athenians, that we were going to fight for '
the liberties of Greece. But if our appearance here hath
been too long deferred, it should be ascribed to the unex-
pected turns of war nearer home, where, as we hoped to de-
molish the Athenians speedily without endangering you, we
ought to be exempted from any censure here : for now, you
behold us opportunely at hand, and intent in conjunction with
you to pull these tyrants down.

** I am surprised, indeed, that your gates should be barred
against me, or that my presence should any way chagrin you :
for we Lacedemonians, imagining we were going to confed-
erates, whose wishes were fastened upon us before their eyes
could behold us, and from whom we might depend upon the
most cordial reception; we, I say, have pierced forwards
through a series of dangers, marching many days together
through hostile territories, and surmounting every obstacle by
a zeal for your service. If, therefore, your affections are
alienated from us, or if you act in opposition to your own
and to the liberty of the rest of Greece, your conduct must

rSiJl YIII.] PEI.0P0NNS8IAlf WAR. 25

terribly diatiess va. And that, not only becance you yow-
■ebres reject us, but may by auch a step deter all othera, to
whom I shall afterward apply, from co-operating with me.
^Soch obstacles yon will laise before me, if yon, to whom
*fir8t I have addressed myself, you who are mastera of a city
of great importance, and are in esteem for your flood sense
and discretion, shoold refuse to receiye me. I shafi be utterly
unable to put a plausible colour upon such a refusal, and shall
be expofl|ed to reproach, as if I meant injustice under the
cloak of liberty, or came hither too weak ana impotent to make
head against the Athenian strength, should it be exerted
against me.

** And yet with that force, of , which at this Tery moment I
am honoured with the command, I marched myself to the suc-
cour of Nissa, and openly defied a superior number of Athe-
nians, who dechned the encounter. It is not therefore prob-
able that they can send hither a force to our annoyance equal
to that armament they employed at Nisea : nor am I sent
hither to execute the schemes 'of oppression, but to farther
the dellTerance of Greece. I have the secority of most sol-
emn oaths, sworn by the magistrates of LacedaNnon, that,
whatever people I bring oyer to their alliance shall remain
in free possession of their own liberties and laws. And, far-
ther, we are foibid the use of violence and fraud as the means
of rendering you dependant on us : but, on the contrary, are
to act in support of you who are oppressed with Athenian
bondage. Upon reasons so valid do I insist upon it, that I
am no longer suspected by you, having given you the strong-
est assurances that I am no impotent avenger, and that you
may boldly abet my cause.

"If there be any perM>n in this assembly who hesitates
upon the apprehension that I may betray the city into tho
hands of a ipvate cabal, let him bid adieu to his fears, and
distinguish himself in open confidence. I came not hither to
be the tool of fiction ; 1 am convinced that liberty can never
be re-established by me, if, disregarding ancient constitu-
tions, I enslave the multitude to the few, or the few to the
crowd. Such things would be more grievous than the yoke
of foreign dominion. And should we Lacedsmonians proceed
in this manner, our labours could never merit a return of
gratitude, but, instead of honour and ^lory, foul reproach
would be our portion. The crimes on wmch we have ground-

THU. — VOL, II. — c

26 PBLOPONN£&IAN WAR. [bOOK IT.

ed this wii against tbe Athenians would then appear u» be
oor own, and more odious in us for faaYing made parade of
disinterested virtue, than in a state which never pretended to
it : for it is more base in men of honour to enlarge their
power bf specious fraud than by open force. The lattmr,
upon the right of that superior strength with which fortune
hath invested it, seizeth at once upon its prey ; the other can
only compass it by the treachery of wicked cunning.

** It is thoe that in all concerns of more than orainary im-
portance we are accustomed to exert the utmost ciieum^tec*
tion. And besides the solemn oaths in jrour favour^, you can
receive no greater security of our honest intention than th«
congruity of our actions with our words, from whence the
strongest conviction most result, that with what I have sug-
gested you are obligMl in interest to comply. But, if all my
promises are unavailing, and you declare such ccmipliaDCe
mipossibte ; if, professing yourselves our sincere well-wishera,
you beg that a denial may not expose you to our resentments ;
if you allege that the dangers through which your libertv
must be sought overbalance the prize; that in justice it
o^^t only to be proposed to such as are able to embrace the
oirar, 'but that no one ought to be compelled against his own
inclinations ; I shall beseech the tutelary gods and heroes of
this island to bear me^^tness, that whereas 1 come to serve
you, and cannot persuade, I must now, by ravaging yoi»
country, endeavour to compel you. And, in acting thue, I
shall not be conscious to myself of mjustice, but shall justify
the step on two most cogent motives : for the sake of the
Laced«momans ; lest, while they have only your affectionay
and not your actual concurrence, they may be prejudiced
through the sums of money you pay to the Athenians : for
the 8tkt of all the Grecians ; that they may not be obstructed
by you in their deliverance from bondage. This is the end
we propose, and this will justify our prooeedinge : for without
the purpose of a public good, we Lacedasmonians ought not
to set people at liberty against their wills. We are not
greedy of empire, but we are eager to pull down the tyram^
of others. And how codld we answer it to the body of
Greece, if, when we have undertaken to give liberty to them
•a, we indolently sufifer our endeavours to be traversed by
yoill

«* IMiberate serioasly on ikmt important points, and an^

YEAR Uni.] PBLOPONNBSIAN WAR. 27

mate yoaraelves with the glorious ambition of being the fim
«rbo enter the lists for the liberties of Greece, of gaining an
eternal renown, of securine the uninterrupted possession of
your private properties, ana inresting the state of which yon
are members with the most honourable* of all titles."

Here Brasidas conclnded. And the Acantfaians, who had
already heard this affair laigely discussed on both sides, and
secretly declared their TOtes— the majority, because the arffu-
ments of Brasidas were pretailing, and because they dreaded
the loss of their froit, resolved to revolt from the Athenians.
Then they required of Brasidas himself to swear the oath
of their security, which the I^cedaemonian magistrates had
at his departure enjoined him to take, that ** whatever people
was brought over into their alliance by him should remain in
possession of their own liberties and laws," and this done,
they received his army. Not long after Stagyrus also, another
colony of the Andrians, revolted. And thus ended the trane-
actions of this summer.

Very early in the succeeding winter, when the strong places
of Boeotia were to- have been betrayed to Hippocrates and
Demosthenes, the Athenian commanders, preparatory to
which Demosthenes was to show himself with his fleet before
Siphs, and the other to march to Deliom, there happened a
mistake about the days prefixed for execution. Demosthenes,
indeed, who steered towards Sipha, and had on board the
Aoamanians, and many of the confederates of that quarter,
was totally disappointed. The whole scheme had been betray-
ed by Nicomachus, the Phocian of Phanotis, who gave in-
formation of it to the Lacedsmonians, and they to the Bceo-
tiaas. All Boeotians now taking up arms to prevent conse-
quences (for Hippocrates was not yet in their country to dis-
tress them on that side), Siphn and Chsronea are secured in
time. And so soon as the conspirators perceived that things
went wrong, they ^ve up all fkrther thoughts of exciting com-
motions in the cities.

Hippocrates having summoned into the field the whole force
of Athens, as well citizens as sojourners, not excepting even
foreigners who chanced at that time to be there, arrived too
late before Deiium, not before the BoBodans were returned
home again from Siphs. He encan^ed his forces, and set

♦Free.

28 i*ELOPONNESiAN WAR. [bOOK IV

about fortifying Delium, the temple of Apollo» in the follow
iog manner : — Roand about the temple and its precincts they
sunk a ditch : of the earth thrown up they formed a rampart
instead of a wall. They drove into the ground on each side
a row of stakes, and then threw on the vines they cot from
within the precincts of the temple. They did the same by the
stones and bricks of the adjacent building which had been
demolished, and omitted no expedient to give height and sub*
stance to the work. They erected wooden turrets upon such
spots as seemed most to require it. No part of the old
pile of the temple was now standing: the portico, which
stood the longest, had lately fallen down. They bejran the
work the thi^ day after theur marching out from Athens.
That day they plied it, and the following, and continued it on
the fifth till the time of repast. Then, the work being for the
most part completed, they drew off their army to the distance
of about ten stadia* from Delium, in order to return home.
Their light-armed indeed, for the most part, marched off di-
rectly ; but the heavy-armed, halting there, sat down upon
their arms.

Hippocrates stayed behind for the time necessary to poet the
proper guards, and to put the finishing hand to t^ose parts of
the fortification which were not yet perfectly completed.
But during all this space, the Boeotians had been employed
in drawing their forces together toTanagra. When, the quo-
tas from uie several cities were come up, and they perceived
the Athenians were filing off towards Athens, the other nders
of BoBOtia, for they were eleven in all, declared their resolution
not to engage, .since the enemy was no longer on Bosotian
ground : for the Athenians, when they grounded their iiniis,
were within the borders of Oropia. But Pagondas, the son
of ^oladas, one of the Bcsotian rulers in the right of Thebes,
and at this time in the supreme command, in concert with
Arianthidas, the son of Lysimachidas, declared for fightins.
He judged it expedient to hazard an engagement ; and ad*
dressing himself to every battalion apart, lest calling them to-
gether might occasion them to abandon their arms, he pre-
vailed upon the Boeotians to march up to the Athenians, and
to offer battle. His exhortation to each was worded thus : —

** It ought never, ye men of Bceotia, to have entered into the

* About an English mile.

TBAR VIII.] PBLOPONNBSIAN WAR. 29

hearts of any of your nilera, that it is improper for us to-«ttack
the Athenians, because we find them not apqn oar own soiL
For they, out of a neighbouring country, haye rudied into
BoBotia, and have fortified a post in it, from whence Uiey in-
tend to layage and annoy us. And our enemies in short they
are, in whatever place we find them, from what place soever
they march to execute hostitities against us. Now, therefore,
let lijm who hath judged this step we are taking hazardous and
insecure, acknowledge ^d forego his error. Cautious and
dilatory measures are not to be adhered to by men who are
invaded, and whose all is at stake ; they are expedient only
for those whose properties are secure, and who, bent on ra^
tne, exert their malice in the invasion of others. But it le
eternally the duty of you Boeotians to combat such foroigners
as presume to invade you, either upon* your own or your
neighbour's ground, no matter whicn. And this above all
must be done against Athenians, not only because they are
Athenians, bnt ^ause they are the nearest borderers upon
OS. For it is a maxim allowed, that no state can possibly
preserve itself free, unless it be a match for its neighbouring
powers.

'* Let me add farther, that when men are bent on enslaving
not neighbours only, but even such people as are more re-
mote, £>w can it be judged improper to encounter such, so
long as we can find ground whereon to stand t Call to mind,
for your present information, the Euboeans, situated in yon
island opposite to us ; call to mind the present disposition of
the bulk of Greece in regard to these Athenians, why should
we forget, that neiffhbourin^ states so often battle one anoth-
er about settling ueir vanoue boundaries ; whereas, should
we be vanquish^, our whole country will be turned merely
into one heap of limitation, and that never again by us to be
disputed 1 For when once they have entered upon it, they will
remain the masters of it all b^nd control. So much more
have we to fear from these neighbours of ours than any other
people.

" Those again, who, in all the daring insolence of superior
strength, are wont to invade their nei^bours, as these Athe-
nians now do us, march with extraordinary degrees of confi-
dence against such as are inactive, and defend themselves
only on their own soil. His schemes are mora painfolly c<mi-
pleted, when men sally boldly beyond their borders to meet

30 PSLOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK iT.

the Uvntder, and, if opportunity serves, attacli him first. Of
this truth our own experience will amply conyince us. For
ever sinee the defeat we gave these very men at Goronea,
when, taking the advantage of our seditions, they had possess-
ed themselves of our lands, we have kept Bosocia quiet from
every alarm till the present. This we ought now to remem-
- her, that the seniors among us may procefid as they then be
gun ; that the juniors, the sons of those sires who then dis-
played such uncommon bravery, may exert themselves to
preserve unblemished their hereditary virtues. We ought aO
to be confident, titot the god will fig^t on our side whose
temple they pollute by raising ramparts, and dwelling within
its verge : and, as the victims we have offered are fair and
auspicious, w^ ought at once to advance to the charge of
these our foes, and make them . know, that their lust and
rapine they only then can gratify when they invade such
cowards as abandon, their own defence : but from men who
were bom to vindicate their- own country for ever by the dint
of arms, and never unjustly to enslave another, that finMB
such men. they shall not get away v^thout that struggle
which honour enjoins."

In this manner Pagbndas exhorted the Boeotians, and .per-
suaded them to march against the Athenians. He put them
instantly in motion^ and led them towards the enemy, fat it
was now late in the day. When he had approached t^ spot
on which they were posted, he halted in a place from whence,
as an emixtehce lay between, they 6ouId have no view of one
another. There he drew up his men, and made all ready for
the attack. . ' _

When the news was brought to Hippocrates, who was yet
at Delium, that **■ the ^enemy is advancing to the charge,'* he
sent orders to ^e main body to form into the o^er of
battle. And not Ions after he himself came up^ having left
about three hundred horse at Delium, to guard that place in
case an attempt should be made upon it, or seizing a favour-
able opportunity to fall upon the rear of the Boeotians during
the engagement : not but that the Boeotians had posted a
party of their own to watch their motions, and find them em-
ployment. When, therefcnre, the whole disposition was per-
fected, they showed themselves on the top of the eminence,
and there grounded their arms, remaining still in the same
Older in which they designed to attack ; being in the whole

YBAJL Vli].] PEI^OPONNBSIAN WAfi* 31

■boat •even thousand heaTy-armed, more than tan thouaand
bffht-armed, a thousand horse, and five hundred targetiera.
']^^e right wing was composed of Thebans and those who
ranked with them ; the centre of the Haliartians, and Coro-
neansy and Copiehsians, and others that live about the lake
(Copaeis) ; and the left of Thespiensians, Tanagreans, and
Orcbomenians. In the wings were posted the cavalry and
light-armed. The Thebans were drawn up in files of twenty*
five ; the others variously, as circumstances required. And
8uch was the order and disposition of the Bceotians.

On the Athenian side, the heavy-armed, being in number
equal to their enemies, were drawn up in one entire body of
eight in depth. Their cavalry was posted on either wing.
But light-armed soldiers, armed as was fitting, the Athenians
bad ^one a^ this juncture, neither in the field nor in the city.
The number which had taken the field at first to attend tlua
expedition exceeded many times over the number of the ene
nay ; but then most of them had no arms at all, since the sum
mons bad been extended to all who resided in Athens, both
citizens and forei^ers. The crowd of these, so soon as eve«
the route was pomted homewards, were, excepting a few,
gone speedily off: but, when they were drawn up in the
ordej of battle, and were every moment expecting the charge,
Hippocrates, the general, showing himself in the front of the
Athenians, animated them with the following harangue : —

** The admonition, Athenians, I intend to give you, will bf
very concise, but such a one is sufficient to the brave ; I pre
tend not to encourage Athenians, but merely to remind them
of their duty. Let the thought be a stranger to every heart
among you, that we are going to plunge into needless haz-
ards in the territory of a foe. Be it the territory of a foe, yet
in H you must fight for the security of your own. And, if
we conquer now, the Peloponnesians will never again pre-
sume, without the aid of the Boeotian horse, to repeat their
inroads into Attica. By one battle, therefore, you acquire
thia, and secure your own land from future annoyance.
Charge therefore your enemies as you ought, with a spirit
worthy of the state of Athens — that state which every soul
among you boasts to be the first of Greece — and worthy of
your great forefathers, who formerly, at Oenophyta, under the
conduct of Myronides, defeated these people m the field, and
poaseaaed for a time all Boeotia as their prize."^

32 PBLOPONNESIA^ WAR. [boOK IT.

Hif)pocTate8 had not ffone along half the line encouraginff
them in this manner, when he was compelled to desist uid
leave the greater part of his army nnaddressed. For the
Boeotians, to whom Pagondas also had given but a short ex-
hortation, and had this moment finished the psBsn of attack,
were coming down from the eminence. The Athenians ad-
vanced to meet them, and both sides came running to the
charge. The skirts of both armies could not come to an en-
gagement, as some rivulets that lay between stopped them
equally on both sides. The rest closed firm in a stubborn
fight, and with mutual thrusts of their shields. The left wing
of the Boeotians, even to the centre, was routed by the Athe-
nians, who pressed upon those who composed it, but espe-
sially on the Thespiensians : for, the others who were
drawn up with them giving way before the shock, the Thes-
piensians were enclosed in a small compass of ground, where
such of them as were slaughtered defended themselves brave-
ly till they were quite hewn down. Some also of the Athe-
nians, disordered in thus encompassing them about, knew not
how to distinguish, and slew one another. In this quarter,
therefore, the Boeotians were routed, and fied towards those
parts where the battle was yet alive. The right wing, in
which the Thebans were posted, had the better of the Athe
nians. They had forced them at first to give ^ound a little,
and pressed upon them to pursue their advantage. It hap-
pen^ that Pagondas had detached two troops of horse (which
motion was not perceived) to fetch a compass round the
eminence and support the left wing, which was routed. These
suddenly appearing in sight, the victorious wing of the Atheni-
ans, imaginmg a fresh army was coming up to the charge, was
struck into consternation. And now being distressed on both
sides by this last turn, and by the Thebans, who pursued their
advantage close, and put them into a total disoraer, the whole
Athenian army was routed and fledv Some ran towards De-
lium and the sea, others to Oropus, and others towards
Mount Pames ; all to whatever place they hoped was safe.
But the Boeotians, especially their horse, and the Locrians,
who had come up to the field of battle just as the rout be^n,
pursued them with great execution. But the night putting
an end to the chase, the bulk of the flying army preserved
themselves more easily.

The day following, such of them as had reached Delium

TBaR VIII.] PEL0P0NNE8IAN WAR. 38

»nd Oropasy leaving behind a ganison in Beliam, which still
remained in their possession, transported themselTes by sea
to Athens. The Boeotians also, havinff erected a trophy, car-
ried off their own dead, rifled those of the enemy, and hay-
ing posted a guard upon the field of battle, retired to Tan-
agra, and called a consultation about the method of asaaolting
Delium.

A herald, farther, despatched, by the Athenians abpot their
dead, meets upon his way a herald of the Bosotians, who
turned him back by assurinff him that his errand would be
fruitless till he himself should be again returned. The lat-
ter, being come to the Athenians, declared to them in the
name of the B<sotians : —

** That by their late proceedings they had enormously vio-
lated the laws of the Grecians, among whom it was an estab-
lished rule, that amid their mutual invasions religions places
should be ever spared ; whereas the Athenians hud not only
fortified, but haa made Delium a place of habitation ; and
whatever profanations mankind can be guilty of, had been
there by them committed : that the water, which it would
even be impious for the Boeotians themselves to touch, unless
by way of ablution before they sacrificed, had been profanely
drawn by them for common use ; that for these reasons the
Boeotians, in the cause of the god and in their own, invoking
the associated demons and Apollo, gave them this early
notice to evacuate the sacred place, and clear it of all en-
cumbrances."

This message being thus delivered by the herald, the Athe-
nians returned this answer to the Boeotians by a herald of
their own : —

*' That they were hitherto guilty of nothing illegal in re-
gard to the holy place, nor would willingly l>e so for the
niture. They had no such intention when mey first entered
into it, and their view was merely to give an ejection from
thence to persons who had basely injured them. It was a
law among the Grecians for those who were masters of any
district, whether great or small, to be also proprietors of its
temples, which are to be honoured by them with the usual
forms, and with what additional ones they may be able to ap-
point. Even the Boeotians, as well as many other people, who
at this moment were possessed of lands from'^hich tney had
ejected the old proprietors, made a seizure first of those tem-

34 P£I.OPONN£SXAN WAR. [bOOK IT

^68 whi«b had belonged to othersi and continued in the free
poMOMion of them. Tor their own parts, could they conqiier
more of their territory, they should manfilUj retain it ; and ae
to the spot they now occupied, their position there was vol-
untary, and>a8 it was their own they would not quit it. It
was necessity alone made them use the water, which ought
not to be ascribed to any insolent or profane motive, but to
the preceding invasions their enemies had made, self-pres-
ervation agauwt which laid them under a present necessity
of acting as they did. It might with reason be hoped) that
every proceeding to which war and violence indispensably
obliged, would obtain forgiveness from the god: for the
altars are a refuge to involuntary offences, and transgression
is imputed only to those who are bad without compulsion,
and not to such as urgent necessities may render daring.
The guilt of impiety belonged more notoriously to such as in-
sisted on the barter of temples for the bodies of the dead,
than to those who are content to lose their just demands
rather than submit to eo base an exchange. " They farther en-
joined him in their name to declare, that " they would not
evacuate Boeotia, since the ground which they occupied in it
belonged to no Boeotians, but was now their own property,
acquired by dint of arms. All they required was a truce for
fetching off their dead, according to the solemn institutions
€^ their common country."

The Boeotians replied thus : ** If they are now in Boeotia,
let them quit the ground which belongs to us, and carry off
what they demand. But, if they are upon ground of their
own, they themselves know best what they have to do."
They judged, indeed, that Oropia, on which it happened that
the bodies of the dead were lying, as the battle had been
fought upon the lines of partition, belonged to the Athenian
jurisdiction, and yet that it was impossible for them to be
carried off by force ; and truce farther they would grant none,
where the point related to Athenian ground ; that it was,
therefore, the most proper reply, " they should quit their ter-
ritory, and 80 obtain their demands." The herald of the
Athenians having heard this, departed without effect.

Immediately after, the Boeotians, having sent for darters and
slingers from the Melian bay, and being re-enforced by two
thousand heavy-armed Corinthians, and the Peloponnesisn
fanisoQ which had evacuated Nissa, and a party of Megan^

TBAE TIII.J FBLOPOMNBSIAlf WAB. 95

ana, all wbaeh had joined tbem aince the battle, marched against
Deliam, and aasaalted the foriifieatioii. Thejr tried many
methods, and took it at last by the help of a machine of •
very pecnliar stnictura. Having split asunder a lai;ge sail-
yard, they hollowed it throughout, and fixed it to^^ther again
in a yery exact manner, so as to resemble a pipe. At its
extremity they fastened a caldron by help of chains, into which
a snout of iron was bent^ downwards from the ywd. The
inside, farther, of this wooden machine was lined almost
throughout with iron. They brought it from a distance to
the fortification on carriages, and applied it where the work
consisted chiefly of vines and timber. And when near
enough, they put a large bellows to that extremity of the yard
which was next themselves, and began to blow. But the
blast, issuing along the bore into the caldron, which was filled
with glowing coals, and sulphur, and pitch, kindled up a pr»>
digious fiame.. This set fire to the work, and burnt with so
much fury, that not a soul durst any longer stay upon it, but
to a man they abandoned it and fled away amain : and in this
manner was the fortress carried. Of the garrison, some weie
put to the sword, but two hundred were made prisoners.
The bulk of the remainder, throwine themselves on board
their vessels, escaped in safety to Athens.

It was the seventeenth day after the battle that Deliom
was taken. And not long after, a herald despatched by the
Athenians came again, but quite ignorant of this event, to
sue far the dead, which were now delivered by the Bceotians,
who no longer laid any stress upon their former reply.

In the battle there perished of the Boeotians very little
under five hundred ; of the Athenians, few less than a thou-
sand, and Hippocrates the general ; but of light-armed and
baggage-men a considerable number indeed.*

* The Athenians received in truth a terrible blow on this oc-
casion. The Boeotians, a people heavy and stupid to a proverb,
continued* ever after the terror of the Athenians, the politest
and most enlightened people upon earth. Nay, that gross and
stupid people had this day weUnigh completed the destruction
of all that was pre-eminently wise and good at this time upon
earth ; and done an irreparable mischief to sound reason and
good sense for ever after. When the two troops of horse, after
fetching a compass round the hill, had completed the rout of
the Athenians, who were now flying away with the utmost
speed, the divine Socrates was 1^ almost Hjone, facing the en-

86 PKLOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK IT.

Somewhat later in time than this battle, Demosthenes,
who, on bis appearance before Siph», had been disappointed
in his hope of having it betrayed to him, haying the landr
force still on board his fleet, consisting of four hundred heavy-
armed Acamanians, and Agrsans, and Athenians, made a
descent on Sicyonia ; but before all his vessels could land
their men, the Sicyonians had marched down to make head
against them. They defeated those that were landed, and
<£ased them again on board. Some they killed, and some
they took alive ; and afler erecting their trophy, they deliv-
ered up the dead by truce.

' During the former transactions at Delium, Sitalces also,
Kmg of the Odrysians, was killed in an expedition he had
formed against the Triballians, who encountered and van-
quished him. And Seuthes, the son of Sparodocus, his
nephew by the brother, succeeded him in the kingdom of the
Oarysians and the rest of Thrace over which he had reigned.

The same winter Brasidas, in conjunction with the alhes
of Thrace, marched against Amphipolis, an Athenian colony
upon the river Strymon.

The spot of ground on which this city now stands, Ans-
tagoias, the Milesian, formeriy, when he fled from King Dar
rius, had endeavoured to plant, but was beaten off by the Edo-
nians. Two-and-thirty yean after the Athenians made the
same attempt, having sent thither a colony consisting of ten
thousand of their own peofde, and such others as voluntarily
came in, all of whom were destroyed by the Thracians at
Drabeacos ; but after an interval of twenty-nine years, the
Athenians came hither again with a fresh colony led by Ag-

emy, and fighting and retreating like a lion overpowered. Alci-
biades, who served in the cavalry, was making off on horseback ;
but, seeing Socrates in such inuninent danger, he rode up to
him, covered his retreat, and brought him offsafe. He thus re-
paid him the great obligation he had formerly received from him
at Potidsa. Strabo relates further (Geog. i. 9), that Xenophon
also the same day owed his life to Socrates. Having fallen
from his horse, and being trampled among the crowd, Socrates
took him upon his shoulders, and carried him to a plape of
safety. Upon the whole, brutal strength and mere bodily merit
were never so near getting a total conquest over all the \ight
and understanding which numan nature has to boast of, that
did not come directly down from heaven.

Y£AB VIII.] PBLOPONNBSIAN WAR. 97

Don, the son of Nicias, who, havrng driven away the Edoniant,
built this city upon the spot of ground which had fonneriy
been called the Nine Roads. They rashed to the seizure
from Eion, a maritime emporium situated at the riyer's
mouth, and belonging to them. Eion is distant twenty sta-
dia* from the apot where the city now stands, aod which
by Agnon was named Amphipolis, because it is almost sur-
rounded by the Strymon, which floweth along it on both sides.
Running therefdre a wall from the river to the river, he
planted his colony on a spot conspicuous both to the land
and to the sea.

Against this place Brasidas, decampmg from Ame of Chal-
cidica, advanced with his army. About sunset he arrived at
Anion and Bromiscus, where the lake Bolbe issues into the
sea. From hence, after taking the evening repast, he con-
tinued his march by night. It was winter, and a snow was
falling. This favoured and encouraged his enterprise, as he
intended to surprise the people of Amphipolis, except such as
were privy to his design. For there resided in the place a
body of Argyllians, who are an Andrian eolony, and others
who acted in combination with him, some of them at the in-
stigation of Perdiccas, and others at that of the Chalcideans :
but in a more particular manner the Argyllians, who had a
place of residence very near it, who farther had ever been
suspected by the Athenians, and were really intent on the
ruin of the p^ace when now a fair opporinnity was within their
reach, and Brasidas at hand, who long before had been tam-
pering with these inhabitants of foreign mixture, in order to
have the city betrayed to him. The Argyllians at this junc-
ture received him mto their own city, and, revolting from the
Athenians, led his arn^ forward that very night to the bridge
over the Strymon. The city is seated at some distance from
this pass ; and it was not then defended by a fort as it is
now, but was only the station of a small party of guards.
Brasidas therefore easily forced the guard, being favoured in
some degree by treachery, not a little also by the season and
his own unexpected approach. He then pasted the bridse,
and was imm^iately master of all the effects of those Amdoi-
politans who reside in all die tract without the walls. This
passage was so sudden, that those within the city had no no-

* About two English miles.

36 PBLOPONNBSIAN WAR. [bOOK IT

tice of it ; and as to those withoat, many of them being
seized, and others flying for preservation within the wall, the
Amphipolitans were thrown into yast confusion, increased by
their mutual suspicions of one another. And it is said, that
if Brasidas, instead of permitting his troops to dUi^erse foi
pltmder, had advanced directly against the ci^, it most una-
voidaUy have fallen into his hands. Bat he, on the contrary,
having ordered them to halt, employed himself in the ravage
of what lay without ; and, finding nothing ^ectoated in ms
favour by accomplices within, he for the present desisted.
But those his aecomplices were overpowered in number by
the opposite party, who prevented their opening the gates
immediately to Brasidas ; and, acting in concert with Eucles
their commandant, who resided there by the orders of the
Athenians to guard the place, they despatched a messenger to
the other commander in Thrace, Thucydides, the son of Olo*
rus, who compiled this history, and was then in Thasns
(Thasus is an island, « colony of the Parians, and distant
about half a day^s sail from Amphipolis), pressing him tc
come instantly tcr their rdief.

Thucydides no sooner received this notice, than with the
utmost expedition he put to sea, with seven ships that hap-
pened to be at hand. He designed nothing so much as to
prevent, if possible, the loss of Amphipolis ; or, if that was
impracticable, to throw himself into £ion« and secnre it in time.

Brasidas, in the meanwhile, fearing at the approach of this
succour from Thasus, informed besides that Thucydides drew
an ample revenue from the working of his gold-mines in this
quarter of Thrace, and was on this account of great credit
among the principal persons ci this port a( the continent^
tried all possible expedients to get possession of the city be-
fore his arrival, lest his appearance among them might
animate the Amphipolitans with the^hoHpe of saeconr by sea
and from Thrace, which the credit of Thucydides might
easily obtain for their effectual ftreservation, and in pursuance
of this they might fefuse to capitulate. He sent them there-
fore very moderate terms, ordering his herald to jnroclaim
that " the Amphipolitans and Athenians within the city should,
if they desired it, be continued in the free possession of their
property, and of all their rights and liberties whatever : bat
those who refused to stay should have the space of five day^
allowed thera to quit the town and remove their effects.**

TBARTin.] PSLOPOKNESIAN WAK. M

This proposal was no sooner heard, than the inelinatioDs
of the many took a new turn. The Athenian interest had
bat a few snpporterfi in the city : the bulk of the inhabitants
were a mixture of foreign nations. There were also within
many persons, relations of those who had been made prison-
ers without. And thus, in their present consternation; the
proposal was generally received as mild and gentle. The
Athenians, for their part, who thought themselTes more ex-
posed to danger than the rest, ana had besides no hope of
speedy relief, were delighted with the offer of quitting the
place. So also were all the rest, that they were not to lose
their rights and liberties as citixens, and shopld thus escape
the danger they had dreaded, even beyond their hopes.
Upon this, the agents of Brasidas expatiated only on the
mildness and generosity of the terms he had offered, because
now they perceived that the multitude had altered their sea*
timents, and would no longer hearken to the Athenian com-
mandant. In short, an accommodation was perfected, and
they opened the gates to BraAlas, upon the conditions he
had proposed by his herald. And in this manner did the in-
habitants deliver up Amphipolis.

But in the evening of the same day, Thucydides and the
squadron came over to Eion. Brasidas mtrs already in poe
session of Amphipolis, and designed that very night to seise
Eion also. And unless this squadron had come in thus crit-
ically to its defence, at break of day it had been lost.

Thucjrdides instantly took care to put Eion in a posture of
defence, in case Brasidas should attack it ; and to provide
farther for its future security, when he had opened a refuge
there for such as were willing to remove thither from Am-
phipolis according to the articles of the late surrender.

But Brasidas on a sudden fell down the river with a lai]ge
number of boats towards Eion, designing, if possible, to seize
\he point of land that juts out from the walls, which would
have given him the command of the river's mouth. He en-
deavoured at the same time also to assault it by land, but waa
repulsed in both attempts. And now he effectually employed
his care in resettling and securing Amphipolis.

Myrcinus also, a city of Edonia, revolted to him upon the
death of Pittacus, King of the Edonians, who was killed by the
sons of (joaxis and his own wife Braures. Qapselot soon a^

40 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [fiOOK I¥.

ler did the same, and Oesyme : they ue colonies of the
Thracians. These events were owing to the practices of
Perdiccas, who came thither in person immediately after the
surrender of Amphipolis.

The loss of that city cast the Athenians into great conster-
nation, and with reason, because it was a place of great impor-
tance to them, since from thence they had materius for build-
ing ships, and a pecuniary revenue ; and farther, because, after
a safe conduct through Thessaly, the route was now open to
the Lacedaemonians as far as the Strymon, to annoy their de-
pendants. Yet, had they not possessed themselves of the
bridge, the lar^ lake formed above the river, and the check
given by the triremes stationed at Eion, would have hindered '
the Lacedasmonians from penetrating further. But all obsta-
cles appeared to the Athenians now quite easy to be sur-
mounted ; and their apprehensions that their dependants
would revolt alarmed them much. For Brasidas in the rest
of his conduct gave constant proofs of an excellent temper ;
and the declaration was evei|in his mouth, that " he had been
sent thither to restore the liberty of Greece." Accordingly,
the cities which were subject to the Athenians had no sooner
heard of the surrender of Amphipolis, together with the brave
exploits and the mild engaging deportment of Brasidas, than
they conceived the most ardent inclination to shake off the
yoke. They secretly despatched their agents to him, earnest-
ly desiring a visit from him, with respective assurances from
each that they would be the first to revolt. They judged
there was no longer room to. apprehend any bad consequen-
ces from such a step ; falsely estimating the Athenian power
to be much less considerable than it afterward i4>peared.
But this their judgment was founded more upon uncertain pre-
sumption than deliberate prudence. It is the turn of man-
kind, when their passions are warm, to give themselves up to
blind and sanguine hope, and to throw aside with despotie
scorn whatever seemeth to be counter to their wishes. It
was but lately that the Athenians had been vanquished by
the Bosotians : and Brasidas had been making such recitals as
might persuade, though in fact they were collusive, that at
Nisaea with his single force he o£fered battle to the Athe-
nians and they declined it. This made them confident, and
they became perfectly convinced that there was no longer a
■trength sufficient to chastise them. But what had the great-

r£4R VIII.] PBLOPONN£SIAN WAR. 41

est influence on th^ir thoa^U, and dispoaed them entirely to
ran all hazards, was the immediate pleasure they promised
themselves in a change, and that now they were going for the
first time to experience the sweets of Lacedaemonian friend'
ship.

These inclinations were perceived by the AtheniaQs, who
sent garrisons into each of these cities in order to curb themt
with as much expedition as the shortness of the time and
the wintry season would permit.

Brasidas also had sent to Lacedaemon, soliciting a speedy
re-enforcement, and was busy himself in providing materials
to build triremes in the Strymon. But the Lacedemonians
neglected to supply him, partly through the envy which the
leading men of Sparta had conceived against him, and partly
because their attention was principally confined to the recov-
ery of theit people made prisoners in Sphacteria, and to bring
the war to a conclusion.

The same winter the Megareans, having recovered theii
^ng wails, which were in the possession of the Athenians,
jvelled them with the ground.

Brasidas, thus master of Amphipolis, gathered together the
allies, and led them into the district called Acte. It is the tract
which stretches out into the sea from the canal which was
dug by Xerxes, and Athos, the highest mountain in Acte, is its
utmost verge upon the u£gean Sea. The cities in it are.
Sane, a colony of Andrians, seated close to the canal, and on
that part which faces the sea towards Eubcea ; Thyssus far-
ther, and Cleone, and Acrothous, and Olophyxus, and Bium,
which are promiscuously inhabited by various sets of barba-
rians, who speak both languages. There is also a small num-
ber of Chalcideans among them, but the bulk are Pclasgians
(the issue of those Tyrrhenes who formerly inhabited Lemnos
and Athens), and Bysaltians, and Crestonians, and Edonians ;
.they reside in small fortresses. Most of them went over to
Brasidas; but Sane and Bium stood out. He therefore
made his army halt on their lands, and laid them waste. Yet
as this had no eJSect, he marched from thence to Torone of
Chalcidica, then possessed by the Athenians. He hastened
thither at the invitation of a small i>arty, who were ready
to betray the city to him. Being arrived while yet it was
dark, he sat down about break of day with his army near the
temple of Dioscuri, which lies not at most above three stadia
If— D

42 P1SL01>0NNB8IAN WAR. [boOK IT

from the city.* The bulk of the Toroueans and the Athenian
garrison were ignorant of his approach : bat the accomplices,
who knew he would be panctaal, sent some of their body uii-
perceived to observe his approach. When these were thus
certainly assured he was at hand, they conducted back with
them to their friends seven men armed only with daggers.
Twenty had at first been selected for this service, but only
seven of them now had the courage to proceed : Lysistratus
the Olynthian was the person who commanded. They got
in by the wall towards the sea without causing an alarm, and
ascending from thence, slaughtered the guard in the citadel,
which is seated upon the most eminent spot, the whole city
being built on the declivity of a hill, and burst open the pos-
tern towards Canastneum. Brasidas, having since advanced
a little with the rest of his force, halted again. But he order-
ed a hundred tai^etiers to go before, that, when the gates
should be opened, and the signal given which was before
agreed on, they might break in first. These, after an inter-
val of time, wondered at the delay, and by mdually advan-
cing were got close to the city. Such of the Toroneans with-
in as acted in concert with those who had entered, when once
the postern was burst, and the gates leading to the forum
were thrown open after bursting the bar, in the first place con-
ducting some of them about, led them in at the postern, that
they might strike a sudden panic on the ignorant inhabitants
when attacked in rear, in flank, and on all sides. This done,
they lifted up the appointed signal of fire, and gave instant
admittance to the rest of the targetiers through the gates
which led to the forum.

Brasidas, when once he saw the signal, roused up his array
and led them running towards the place, shouting all at
once aloud, and thus striking the greatest consternation into
the inhabitants. Some immediately rushed in at the ^tes ;
others mounted over the square wooden maclunes, which, as
the wall had lately fallen down and was now rebuilding, lay
close to it for the raising of stones. Brasidas, with the bulk
of his force, betook himself immediately to the upper parts of
the city ; intending to seize the eminence, and possess him
self effectually of we place. The rest dispersed .themselve
equally through every quarter.

* Above a quarter of a mile.

T£AR Till.] PELOPONNSSIAM WAR. 43

Amid this surpriul, the majon^ of the Toroneans, quit*
ignoxapt of the plot, were in vast confusion ; but the agenta
in it and all their party quickly ranged with the assailanta.
The Athenians (for of them there were about fiAy beavy-
armed asleep in the fonim)» when they found what was done^
some few excepted who were slain instantly upon the spot,
fled away for preservation ; and some 1^ land, others in the
guard-ships stationed there, ^ot safe into Lecythus, a fort of
Sieir own. They kept this m their own hands, as it was the
extremity of the city towards the sea, stretched along on a nar-
row isthmus. Hither also those of the Toroneans who per-
severed in their 6delity fled to them for refuge.

It being now broad day, and the city firmly secured. Bras-
idas caused proclamation to be made to those Toroneans
^ who had fled for refuge to the Athenians, that " such m
were willing might return to their old habitations, and should
enjoy their rights without any molestation." But to the Athe-
nians a herald was sent expressly, comfnanding them " to evac-
uate Lecythus, which rightly belonged to the Chalcideans, and
a truce should be granted them to remove themselves and
their baggage." An evacuation they absolutely refused, but
requested one day's truce to fetch off their dead: hosolenm-
ly accorded two. During this space he was very busy in
strengthening the houses suljacent to Lecythus, and the Athe-
nians did the same within.

He also convened the Toroneans to a general assembly,
and harangued them very nearly in the same manner as ha
had done at Acanthus, " that it was unjust to look upon those
who had been his coadjutors in the surprisai of the city as
men worse than their neighbours, or as traitors ; they had no
ffl^laving views, nor were biased to such conduct by pecu-
niary persuasions ; the welfare and liberty of the city had
been their only object. Neither sliould they who had no
share in the event be more abridged than those who had.
He was not come thither to destroy the city, or so much as
one private inhabitant of It. For this very reason he had
caused the proclamation to be made to those who had shel-
tered themselves among the Athenians, because such an at-
tachment had not in the least impaired them in his esteem,
since it was entirely owing to their ignorance that they had
vhus undervalued the Lacedaemonians, whose actions, as they
were always more just, woul4 for thQ future entitle them

44 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK IV.

much more to their benerolence ; their terror hitherto liad
been merely the result of inexperience." He then exhorted
them in general " to take care for the future to be steady and
firm allies, since, should they henceforth offend, they would
be made answerable for the guilt. They were not chargea-
ble for the past, as they had rather been sufferers themselves
from superior force ; the preceding opposition, therefore, de-
served forgiveness.'*

Having spoken thus, and revived their spirits, when the
truce was expired he made assaults upon Lecythus. The
Athenians defended themselves from a paltry rampart and
the battlements of the houses. One whole day they effect-
ually repulsed them : but on the following, when a machine
was to be planted against them by the enemy, from whence
they intended to throw fire upon their wooden fences, and
the army was now approaching to the spot which seemed con-
venient for lodging their machine, and whence it might be
played off with e&ct, they raised for prevention a wooden
turret, the base of which was an edifice that lay ready at
hand, and carried up many buckets and tubs of water, and
heavy stones ; and upon it also many defendants were mount-
ed. But the edifice, too heavily laden, on a sudden was
crushed by the weight. The crash with which it fell was
great : and those of the Athenians who stood near and saw
It were rather concerned than terrified. But those at a dis-
tance, and especially such as were most remote, imagining
the place was already taken in that quarter, fled amain to the
sea and to their vessels.

When Brasidas perceived they were quitting the battle-
ments, and had himself beheld the accident, he led his arm>
to the assault, and immediately carried the fortress. Sucl
as were found within it were instantly destroyed : and the
Athenians, in boats and ships, after having thus abandoned it
to the enemy, crossed over to the Pallene.

But Brasidas (for in Lecythus theje is a temple of Minerva ;
and before he proceeded to the assault he had publicly pro-
claimed, that a reward of thirty minso* of silver should be
given the man who first mounted the rampart), coticluding
now that it was taken less by human than some other means,
reposited the thirty minee in the temple, as an offering to the

* m. l^. sterling.

TSAR IX.] PELOFOMNESIAN WAR. 45

goddess : and, having demoHahed LecyUraa and cleared all
away, he consecrated the whole spot as sacred to her. Du-
ring the remainder of the winter he provided for the secarity
of the places already in his possession, and was planning
liiture conquests. And with the end of this winter the eighth
year of the war expired.

Yery early in the spring of the ensuing summer, the Athe-
nians and Liacedsmonians made a truce to continue for a
year. The motives on the Athenian side were these : that
" Brasidas might no longer seduce any of their towns to re-
volt, before they were enabled by this interval of leisure to
act against him ; and besides, that, if they reaped any ad-
vantage from this truce, they might proceed to a farther ac-
commodation." On the Lacedaemonian side it was imagined
that ** the Athenians were under such terrors as in fact they
were ; and, afler a remission of calamities and misfortunes,
would more eagerly come into some expedients for a future
reconciliation; of course, would deliver up to them their
citizens, and come into a truce for a larger term." The re-
covery of these Spartans was a point on which they laid a
greater stress than ever, even during the career of success
which attended Brasidas. They foresaw, that in case he ex-
tended bis conquests, and even brought them to a balance
with their foes, of those they must for ever be deprived, and
the conflict then proceeding upon equal advantages, the dan-
gers also would be equal, and the victory still in suspense.

Upon these motives, both parties and their allies agreed to
a truce of the following tenour : —

" As to the temple and oracle of the Pythian Apollo, it
seemeth good unto us that access be granted to all who de-
sire it, without fraud and without fear, according to the laws
of our country. The same is approved of by the Lacedas-
monians and their allies now present ; and they promise to
Bend heralds on purpose, and to spare no pains to procure the
consent of the Boeotians and Phocians.

" As to the treasure belonging to the god, care shall be
taken by ns to find out those who have presumed to embezzle
it ; and this fairly and honestly, accordmg to the laws of our

* Before Christ 433.

46 PSLaPONNSSIAJN WAR. [bOOK IV

eountxy, both by you and by hb, and by all others who an
willing ; all proceeding respectiT«ly according to the laws of
their several constitutions.

** It hath farther seemed good to the LacedsBmoniaos and
their other allies, if the Athenians agree to the truce, that
both parties shall keep within their own bounds, and hold
what we are at present respectively possessed of; that is to
say, the former to keep in Coryphasmm,* within the moun-
tains of Bouphras and Tomeus ; the latter in Cythera ; with-
oat enlarging the communication for the procuring of alliance,
neither on our side against you, nor on your side against us
That those in Nisaea and Minoa pass not beyond the road that
leads from the gates of Megara, adjacent to the temple of
Nisus, towards the temple of Neptune, and from the temple
of Neptune canieth directly to the bridge laid across to Mi-
noa. That neither the Megareans nor their allies pass be*
yond the same road, nor into the island which the Athenians
have taken ; both keeping within their bounds, and upon nc
occasion whatever to have any intercourse with one another ;
the Megareans still to retain what they possess in Troezene,
and wMtever they hold by compact with the Athenians ; tc
have, farther^ the free use of the sea upon their own coasts,
and those of their allies,

*^That the Lacedaemonians and allies shall not navigate
the sea in a long ship,t but in any other vessel rowed with
oars, and of no larger burden than five hundred talents.^

** That by virtue of this truce, safe conduct be granted, both
of passage and repassage, either by land or sea, either to Pel
oponnesus or to Athens, to all heralds and ambassadors,
and their whole retinue, how numerous soever, commissioned
to negotiate the determination of the war^ or to get contro-
verted points adjudged.

" That so long as this truce be in force no deserters be
entertained, neither by you nor by us, whether they be free-
men or slaves.

** You shall do justice in our causes, and we shall do the
same for you, according to the laws of our respective consti-
tutions, to ^e end that all controversies may be judicially
settled without a war.

* In which stood the fort of Pylus.

t A ship of war. % Five-and-twenty tons.

7EAR IX.] PELOPONNSSIAIV WAR. 47

"These articles hare the approbation of the ]
ans and their allies. But, if any thing more honourable or
more just occurs to you, you are to repair to Lacedsmon,
and propose it there. For, whaterer points yon inay demon-
strate to be just, will in no degree whaterer be rejected, nei«
ther by the Lacedemonians nor by their allies : provided the
persons charged with these new commissions be sent widi
full powers to put to them the finishing hand, in the same
manner as you require the same conditions from us.

" This truce shall be in force for a year."

Ratified by the people.

The Acamantine tribe presided. Phanippus was the no-
tary public. Niciades was in the chair. Lacnes pronounced :
" Be it for the welfare and prosperity of the Athenians, that
a suspension of arms is granted upon the terms offered by the
LacedsBmonians and allies."

Agreed in the public assembly of the people,

" That this suspension shall continue for a year.

" That it shall take place this very day, being the four-
teenth day of the month Elaphebolion.

" That during this interral ambassadcws and heralds shall
pass between them, to adjust the terms upon which the war
should be definitively concluded.

"That the generals of the state and the presidents in
course shall first at Athens conyene an assembly of the peo-
ple, to adjust the terms upon which their embassy should be
empowered to put an end to the war. And,

" That the ambassadors, who were now present in the as-
sembly, shall give a solemn ratification that they will punctu-
ally abide by this truce for a year."

The LacedsBmonians and their allies agreed to these arti-
cles, and pledged their oath for the observation of them to
the Athenians and their allies at Lacedsmon, on the twelfth
day of the month Gerastius.

The persons who settled the articles and assisted at the
sacrifice were,

For the Lacedasmonians — Taurus the son of Echetimidas,
Athenaeus the son of Periclidas, Philocharidas the son of
Exyxidaidas. For the Corinthians — ^iEneas the son of Ocy-
tus, Eupbamidas the son of Aristonymus. For the Sicyoniane
— ^Damotimus the son of Naucrates, Onasimus the son of
Megacles. For the MegareaiM — ^Nicasus the son of Oecalo*.

48 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [BOOK IT

Menecrqttes the son of Amphidorus. For the Epidaurians —
Amphias the sod of Eupeeidas. For the Athenians — ^Nicos-
tratus the son of Biotrephes, Nicias the son of Niceratus,
Autocles the son of Tolmeus, generals of the state.

In this manner was a suspension of arms concluded, during
which they continued without interruption to hold conferences
with one another about settling the terms of a firm and last-
ingpeace.

During the interval these matters were thus in agitation,
Scione, a city in the Pallene, revolted from the Athenians to
Brasidas. The Scioneans indeed in the Pallene give out
that they are of Peloponnesus ; that their ancestors who set-
tled in these other seats were driven there originally by a
storm, which in their return from Troy dispersed the Achsans.
When they had notified their revolt to him, Brasidas passed
over to Scione by nieht. A party of his friends -sailed before
him in a trireme, and he followed at some distance in a fly-
boat, to the end that, if he should fall in with any vessel
larger than this boat, the trireme might make head against
her ; but if another trireme of equal strength should come
up to them, he judged she would neglect his smaller boat,
and would attack the ship, which would give him time to
complete his passage in security.

When he was safely landed, and had convened an assembly
of the Scioneans, he harangued them as he had done before
at Acanthus and Torone. But he added farther, that '* they
were a people most deserving of applause, since, though the
communication with the Pallene, as being an isthmus, was
cat off by the Athenians, who were masters of Potidaoa, and
they were by this means become islanders to all intents and
purposes, yet they had, without prior solicitation, advanced
bolaly towards liberty, nor could bear to lie in cowardly inac-
tivity till necessity forced them to such measures as tended to
their manifest welfare. This was ample proof that they were
ready to undergo any other the greatest perils, to obtain the
wished-for settlement of their state. He therefore regarded
them as in truth the most gallant friends of the Lacedtemoni-
ans, and would in all respects do proper honour to their worth."

The Scioneans were elevated by these handsome commen-
dations. All of them became full of spirits, not even those
•icepted to whom the prior steps had been by no means
agreeable. They cheerfully determined to sustain all future

ITEAR IX.] PELOFONNESIAN WAR. .^49

war, and in every shape gave Brasidas hoooorabie entertam-
ment. By public vote they placed upon his head a golden
cro^n as the deliverer of Greece, while every single Scio-
nean was busy in adorning him with ribands, and careasiiig
him like a victor in the solemn games. His stay at present
was short ; he only placed a small party in the town to se*>
cure it, and then repassed to Torone. But soon after he
transported thither the greater part of his force, designing,
with the aid of the Scioneans, to make attempts uponMende
and Potid«a, He concluded, however, that the Athenians
would lose no time in throwing in a succour as into an island,
and so he endeavoured to be beforehand with them.

He had already forme^ an intelligence to the prejudice of
those cities, to get them betrajed : and he was now intent
on executing his schemes agamst them. But during this
pause Aristonymus, despatched by the Athenians, and Athe-
naeus by the Lacediemonians, to circulate the news, arrived
in a trireme, and notified to him the suspension of arms. His
forces were then transported back to Torone.

The persons employed communicated the articles of the
truce to Brasidas, and all the Lacedemonian confederates in
Thrace declared their acquiescence in what had been done.
Aristonymus was yvell satisfied in other respects ; but finding,
by computing the (lays, that the revolt of the Scioneans was
too late in pomt of time, he protested against their being enti-
tled to the benefit of the truce. Brasidas, on the other hand,
urged many arguments to prove it prior in time, and refused
to restore that city. When theremre Aristonymus had re-
ported this affair at Athens, the Athenians in an instant were
ready to take up arms again for the reduction of Sciooe.
But the Lacedaemonians, by an embassy purposely despatch-
ed, remonstrated that '* they should regard such a proceeding
as a breach of the truce," and asserted " their right to the
city, as they reposed entire credit on Brasidas ; however,
they were ready to refer the dispute to a fair arbitration."
The others refused to abide by so hazardous a decision, but
would recover it as soon as possible by force of arms. They
were irritated at the thought, that persons seated as it were
upon an island should presume to revolt from them, and have
such confidence in the unprofitable land-power of the Laca-
dsmonians. There was, farther, more truth in the date of
the revolt than at present the Athenians could evince : for, in

THU. — VOIi. II. — B

50 PEL0P0NNE8IAN WAR. [bOOK IT.

fact, the Seioneans revolted two days too late. But at the
instigation of Cleon they immediately passed a decree, that
** the Scioneans should be reduced by force, and then pnt to
the sword.*' And their intention was recalled from all other
points to expedite the needful preparations for the execution
of this.

In the meantime Mende, also a city m the Pallene, and a
colony of the Eretrians, revolted from them. Brasidas re-
ceived them into his protection, thinking himself justified, as
toey had openly come over to him in the time of truce.
Besides, he had himself some reasons to recriminate upon
the Athenians, as violaters of the articles. Upon this ac-
count the Mendeans were more encouraged to the step, as
they saw Brasidas was determined to support them; and
were convinced, by the affair of Scione, diat he would not
abandon them. The design farther had been originally set
on foot by the few ; who, thocfgh they delayed it for a time,
were resolved to push it into execution : for they apprehend*
ed that a discovery might prove fatal to themselves, and so .
forced the bulk of theapeople to act against their inclination.
But the Athenians, who had quick intelligence of it, were
now exasperated much more than before, and redoubled theit
preparations a^inst both those places.

Brasidas, who soon expected the arrival of their armament,
conveyed away the wives and children of the Scioneans and
Mendeans to Olynthus of Chalcidica, and had them escort-
ed thither by five hundred heavy-armed Peloponnesians and
three hundred Chalcidic targetiers : the commander of the
whole escort was Polydamidas. Those left behind, expect*
ing soon to be visited by the Athenians, united their endeav-
ours to get things in good order for their reception.

In the interval Brasidas and Perdiccas marched togethei
a second time into Lyncus against Arribaras. They com-
manded their separate bodies ; one, the forces of the Mace-
donians subject to himself, and the heavy-armed Grrecians
who dwelt among them ; the other, the remainder of his own
Peloponnesians, re-enforced by Chalcideans and Acanthians,
and quotas from other cities such as they were abk to furnish.
The number of heavy-armed Grecians, computed together,
amounted to about three thousand : the cavalry that attended,
both of Macedonians and Chalcideans, was upon the whole
little less than a thousand, and the remaining crowd of Barbii'
rians was great.

TEAR IX.] PE!L0P0NNB8IAN WAR. 51

Breaking thus into the teiritoiy of Arribvos, nid findinf
the Lyncestians already in the field to oppose them, they alao
sat down and faced them. The infantry on each side wen
posted on an eminence, and a plain lay between them. This
yielding room for the excursions of the horse, the earalry of
both began a skirmish first. Bat then Brasidas and PenUie*
cas, so soon as the L3mcestian heavy-armed were moving first
from the eminence to the aid of their cavalry, and were
ready to engage, marched also down into the plaim to oppeee
them, where they charged and rooted the Lyneestians. A
^BX^e number of the latter were slain, the rest fled for preser-
vation to the eminences, and there stood qniet.

The victors after ihii^ having erected a trophy, continaad
for two or three days in the same post, waiting for the lUyii-
ans, who were coming np to join Perdiceas for a stipnlated
pay. And then Perdiceas intended to advance fiirther against
the villages of Arribeus, and sit no longer inactive. Mende,
however, was still uppermost in the care of Brasidas : that
place must be lost, should the Athenians arrive before it in
the interval: the Illyrians besides were not yet come np.
He relished not the project, and was more inclined to go
back. This engendered some disputes between them, in the ,
midst of which the news was brought that the Blyrians had
deserted Perdiccar, and joined themselves with Arribnas.
Upon which it was soon resolved between them to retire, as
there was reason to dread the accession of men so renowned
for military valour. Yet the disagreement between them
prevented their fixing on any certain time for filing off.
Night came on, in which the Macedonians and the crowd of
Barbarians being struck with a sudden panic (as numerous
armies are apt to be, without any certain cause), and imagin-
ing that much larger numbers were coming against them than
in fact #as true, and that they were only not near enough to
attack them, they instantly took to their heels and hurried
homewards. Perdiceas for a time knew nothing of the mat-
ter, and when informed of it, was compelled by the flying
troops to dislodge in their company, without being able to
get' a sight of Brasidas : fqr ^y were encamped at a dis*
tance from each other.

At the dawn of day Brasidas perceived that the Macedo-
nians had dislodged, and tbAt the Illyrians and Arribens were
approaching to attack him. He therefore drew his forces to-

52 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK IV.

gether, ibrmiiiff & square with his faeaTy-armed, in the centie
of which he disposed all the crowd of light-armed ; and in
this form he intended to retreat. He appointed the youngest
men to sally out, in case the enemy anywhere attacked them ;
and he himself, with a picked body of three hundred, deter-
mined to bring up the rear in person, in order to sustain and
make good their retreat against the van of the enemy who
riunild press upon their rear. And before the enemy came
near, as well as the hurry would admit, be animated his sol-
diers thus : —

" Did I not suspect, ye men of Peloponnesus, that thus aban-
doned as you are, and ready to be attacked by Barbarians, and
these numerous too, you were in some consternation, I should
judge it needless to mstruct or to encoura^ you. But now,
against this desertion of our friends, and this multitude of our
enemies, I shall endeayour, by a short admonition and exhor-
tation, to raise within you the full grandeur of your souls.
Upon you it is incumbent to behaye with gallantry in every
martial scene, upon the account, not merely of acting in the
open field in the presence of so many confederates, but of
your own hereditai^ valour. Your souls ought not to be dis-
«inayed at a multitude of foes, since you were not bom under
governments where the many control the few, but where the
few command the many. And the only means by which you
acquired this noble privilege, was victorious perseverance in
the fields of battle. Yet of these Barbarians, your fears of
whom are the result of your ignorance, yon ought to be
informed, from what you have learned yourselves in former
conflicts against them with the Macedonians, as well as from
what I conjecture, and what I depend up<m from the accounts
of others, that in action they^ will be by no means terrible.
For when a hostile force, though in realitj weak, carrieth
with it the appearance of strength, a true discovery of its
state is no sooner obtained, than it redoubleth the courage
of their opponents. But men in whom valour is firmly im-
planted, none can assault with extraordinary spirit but such
as know them not. These enemies of yours are dreadful for
a while, merely till brought to .trial. Their multitude reQder-
eth them terrible to the sight ; the loudness of their shouts is
insupportable to the ear. Their weapons, brandished about
and clashing in the air, have a frightful and menacing look.
Bat their spirit will not answer their show when charging

TEAR IX.] PELOPONNEtVAN WAR. 58

against such as will sustain thehr shock. They ara not dntm

S) with skill, nor will they blnsh when compelled to qut
eir ground. To fly from' or to fly after an enemy is equal-
ly a matter of glory to them : by such things is their v^onr
established and rescued from reproach. For a battle where
every combatant is his own commander, leaveth a speciout
and handsome opportunity to each of providing for his safety.
They this moment judge it more safe to intimidate os at a
distance than to run to the charge : for otherwise, htfSon
this, they had attacked us. And yon plainly see, that all
the terror which now runs before them will vanish at the on-
set, as terrible only to sight and hearing. When, therefore,
they advance to the ch»ge, sustain it and repulse them:
and, when opportunity serveth, fall back into your ranks again
with regularity and order. You shall thus the sooner secure
your retreat, and be convinced for the time to come that
such rabbles, to men who can stand the first fury of their
onset, have only made, at a distance and by their pausing, a
vain and menacing parade of valour ; but snch as wiip give
ground and fly before them, they pursue with eagerness, and
are excellently brave when there is no resistance."

' AAer this exhortation Brasidas caused his army to file
leisurely off. The Barbarians perceiving it, pressed forward
vnth great noise and clamour, supposing that he fled, and
that they mi^t intercept and cut him off. But when the ap<
pointed parties sallied out from all quarters to receive them,
and Brasidas himself, with his picked body, sustained their
charge, they repulsed them at their first assault, to the great
surprise of the enemy. Afterward, receiving every repeated
attack, they beat them off continually ; and then, during the
intervals of pause, retreated in good order ; till at length,
the bulk of the Barbarians discontinued their efforto in the
plain against the Greeks under Brasidas, and leaving only
a part of their body to follow and annoy them in their retreat^
the rest wheeled speedily off to pursue the flying Macedonians,
and such as they overtook they slaughtered. To the narrow
pass, farther, between two hills, which was the entrance
into the territories of Arribcus, they hurried before in order
to secure it, knowing it to be the only route by which Bras^•
das could retreat. He was now drawing near it, and in the
most difficult part of the passage they were spreading them-
aelvee circularly to encompass him on all sides. Bet Brasi

54 FELOPONNR8IAN WAR. [bOOK IT.

das, pereeiTbg their design, ordered the three hundred that
marched wi^ him to advance full speed ap that hiU which
he thottfffat was most practicable^ and possess themselves of
it, and tnis with the utmost expedition, each as he was able,
without regarding form, and endeavour to drive the Barbari-
ans tb«ice, who were ahready posting themselves upon it, be-
fore they were joined by larger numbers, and could invest
him on all sides. They did so, attacked, and made them-
selves masters of the hill, which enabled the main body of the
Grecians to march up without obstruction. For now the
Barbarians were thrown into consternation when their detach-
ment had in this manner been beat off from the eminence.
And here they discontinued the pursuit, imagining the. ene-
my had already passed the frontier, and securra their retreat.

Brasidas, when once he was master of the eminences,
marched on without molestation; and the very same day
reached Amissa, the first place within the dominions of Per-
diccas. His soldiers, indeed, who were exasperated against
the Macedonians for having thus precipitately abandoned
them, whatever yokes of oxen they met with on their route,
or whatever baggage lay dropped upon the ground (as such
things it was l^ely should hsppen in a retreat by night and
confused by fear), the former they unyoked and cut to pieces,
and secreted the latter as lawful plunder. Here Perdiccas
first beean to regard Brasidas as his enemy, and ever aftei
forced himself against his inclinations to hate the Pelopon-
nesians ; not indeed in his judgment preferring the Athemans,
but, prevailed upon by the exigences of his own affairs, he
cast about for the means of being again reconciled to* the lat-
ter, and disentangling himself from the former.

Brasidas, having retreated through Macedonia to Torone,
found the Athenians ahready in possession of Mende. Judg-
ing it impossible now to pass over into the Pallene and drive
out the enemy, he chose to remain there and securely to gar-
rison Torone. For, during the time of the expedition into
Lyncus, the Athenians had put to- sea against Mende and
Scione with the armament they had provided, consisting of
fifty ships, ten of which were Ghian, of a thousand heavy-
armed of their own citizens, six hundred archers, a thousand
mercenary Thracians, and a body of targetiers furnished by
their adjacent dependants : Nicias the son of Niceratus, and
Nicottiatas the son of Diotrephes, had the command of Um

rSAR IX.] PELOPONMEBIAN WAR 65

whole. They weighed from Potidasa, and, laading at the
temple of Neptane, marched directly for Mende. "Hie Men-
deana, with their«own force and three hundred Scioneana
who were come to their succour, and the Peloponnesian aux-
iliariea, in all aeven hundred heavy-armed, under the com-
mand of Polydamidas, were encamped without the city upon
a atrong eminence. Nicias, taking with him a hundred and
twenty light-armed Methoneana, and sixty picked men of the
heavy-armed Athenians, and all the archers, attempted to
mount by a path that led up the eminence ; but, being galled
by the enemy, was not able to force the ascent. Nicostratua,
with all the rest of the ibrce, having fetched a compass
about, in order to mount in a remote quarter, where the as-
cent was impracticable, was quite thrown into disorder : and
thas the whole Athenian army narrowly escaped a total de-
feat. As therefore the Mendeans and allies maintained their
post the whole day, the Athenians drew off and encamped ;
and, when night came on, the M endeaiu withdrew into the
city.

The next day the Athenians, sailing round to the Scione
side, possessed themselves of the suburbs, and spent the
whole day in ravaging the country, as not a soul sallied out
to obstruct them ; for some bustles now were on foot in the
city inclining to a sedition. The three hundred Scioneans
departed also in the succeeding night to their own home : and
the day following, Nicias, ^vancing with a moiety of the
force wkhin their frontier, ravaged the district of the Scio-
Beans ; while Nicostratas, with the remainder, sat down be-
fore the upper gates of Mende, from whence the road leads
to Potidsa. But Pdydamidas, as the Mendeans and the
auxiliaries had chanced to ground their arms in this quarter
within the wall, drew them up in order of battle, and exhort-
«d the Mendeans to sally out. It was replied in a seditious
manner by one of the popular fiction, that '* they would not
sally, and would have nothing to do with the war." At such
a refusal Polydamidas having laid hands upon the person, a
tumult at once ensued, in which the people ran immediately
to arms, and, furious with anger, made towards the Pelopon-
nesians, and all those of the opposite faction who sided with
them. They fell upon and routed them in an instant, terri-
fied as they were at this sudden assault ; and the rates were
thrown open at the same time to the Athenians. They sup-

56 PELOPONNESIAM WAR. [bOOK IV

posed tbit insurrection had been made against them in con-
sequence of some previous combination ; and as many as
escaped out of the scuffle with life, fled away to the citad«I»
which was before in their possession.

But the Athenians (for Nicias was now returned belbre the
<nty) bursting into Mende, for it was not opened by composi-
tion, with their whole united force, plundered it as thcngli
taken by storm ; nay, the generals had some difficulty to re«
strain their soldiers from putting the inhabitants to the sword.
And after this thoy issued their commands to the Mendeana
to continue their government in the usual form, and to pro*
ceed judicially against those of their body whom they esteem^
ed (he principal authors of the revolt. Those in the citadel
they shut up with a wall extending on both sides to the sea,
and posted a guard to secure the blockade.

When in mis manner they had possessed themselves of
Mende, they marched against Scione. The inhabitants, with
the Peloponnesian aids, coming out to receive them, posted
themselves on a strong eminence before the city ; which, un-
less the enemy could take it, would infallibly prevent their
walling them about. But the Athenians stormed the post,
and, after an engagement, forcing them to dislodge, they
formed their camp, and having erected a trophy, got every
thing in readiness for the circumvallation. And no long time
after, while they were busied in this woik, the auxiliaries
blocked up in the citadel at Mende, having forced the guard
posted near the sea, got away by night ; and the major part
of them, escaping privily through the Athenian camp before
Scione, got safe mto that town.

When the circumvallation of Scione was in hand, Perdic*
cas, having despatched a herald for -the purpose to the Atheni>
an generals, strikes up a new treaty with the Athenians.
He took this step out of pure enmity to Brasidas, arising
from the retreat out of Lyncus ; and had begun from that
time to act in their favour : for it ha|>pened that at this very
juncture of time Ischagoras the Lace'daemonian was bringing
dp by land a re-enforcement to Brasidas. But Perdiccas, as
well to oblige Nicias, who, as he had renewed his alliance^
commanded him to give some conspicuous proof of his at-
tachment to the Athenians, as to gratify his own resentment
in refusing the Petoponnesians a passage through his domin-
ions, had gained the concurrence of his Thessalian friends ;

TEAR IX.] P£LOl»ONNESIAN WAR. 67

nnee with the chief persons of that conntry he had erer been
ciosely united by the hospitable ties, and so stopped the re-
enibrcement and their convoy that they dnrst not attempt to
pass through Thessaly. Ischagoras, however, and Aminias,
tnd Aristeps, reach Brasidas in person, being commissioned
by the Lacedsmonians to inspect the postnre of their affairs,
and brought vrith them sottie young men of Sparta, though
contrary to their laws, who were to take upon them the gov-
ernment of the cities which were no longer to be trasted
to their former managers. In effect, Clearidas, the son of
Gleonymos, they plac^ as governor in Amphipolis, and Epi-
telidas, the son of Hegesander, in Torone.

This same summer the Thebans demolished the walls of
the Thespiensians, alleging as the reason that they were
practisiDg with the Athenians. This demolition had ever
been intended, but its execution was now become more easy,
asthe flower of their youth had perished in the late battle
fought against the Athenians.

This summer also the temple of Juno at Argos was de-
stroyed by fire. Chrysis, the priestess, had placed a burning
torch too near the garlands, and unawares fell fiist asleep.
The flames broke out and were raging all around before they
were perceived. Chrysis indeed instantly, for fear of the
Aigives, flies away by night to Phlius. They, according to
the law enacted for that purpose, appointed another priestess
in her room, whose name was Phacinis. Eight years of this
war were elapsed, and it was the middle of the ninth when
Chrysis fled.

The circumvallation of Scione also was completed about the
close of this summer ; and the Athenians, leaving behind a
sufficient body to guaid it, drew off the rest of their army.

In the ensuing winter, things were quiet between the
Athenians and Lacedasmonians, because of the suspension of
arms. But the Mantineans, and Te^eate, and the confeder-
ates on both sides, en^ged at Laodicea of Orestis ; but the
victory was doubtful, "^ch. party routed a wing of their op-
ponents, and both sides erected trophies, and sent the spoils
to Delphi. Many, however, were slainr on both sides, and
the b^tle was drawn, the night putting an end to the con-
test. The Tegeats indeed passed the night upon the field,
and immediately erected a trophy. But the Mantineans with-.
drew to Bucolion, and afterward erected their trophy in oppo-
itian.

58 PBLOPOMMESIAN WAR. [bOOK I¥.

In the cUmo of this winter, and when the spring wm al-
ready approaching, Braaidas farther made an attempt upon
Potidsea. For, having approached it in the night, and applied
his ladders, so far he proceeded without causioff an alarm :
for the bell being passed by, during that interral, before he
that carried it forward could return, the moment was seized
for applying them.* However, Ihe alarm was taken before
he could possibly scale, upon which he drew off his araiy
without loss of time, not caring to wait for the return of day.
And thus ended the winter, and with it the ninth year of
this war, of which Thucydides hath compiled the history.

* The officers regularly went their rounds to see that all the
sentinels were at their posts. When they approached any
of them a little bell was rung, to which the sentinel was to
answer, in proof that he was at his post and awake. The inter-
val between the rounds was so considerable, and the vigilance
of the sentinel, as the bell was just gone by, might be so relax-
ed, that Brasidas hoped he might execute his scEeme.

TEAR X.] PBLOPONNSSIAN I^AK. 59

BOOK V.

Tbak X. The truce endeth. — Cleon sent commander uto
Thrace ; his proceeding there. — ^The battle of Amphipolia,
in which Braddaa and Cleon are kilIed.~A general peace,
styled the Nician. — An alliance, offensive and defensive, be-
tween the Athenians and Lacedemonians.— XL The peace
merely nominal ; and Thncydides proceeds In his history of
the Peloponnesian war.— The Corinthians practise against
the Lacedaemonians.— An Argive leagne.— No confidence be-
tween the principal states.— A trainof negotiations.— A separ-
ate alliance between the Lacedaemonians and Boeotians, con
tiary to article.— Panactam demolished. — XII. The demoli
tion of Panactam and the 8ei)arate alliance highly resented
at Athens. — ^Many are scheming a rupture, but especially
Alcibiadea. — By bis means a negotiation is brought on at
Athens, and an alliance formed with the Argires.— The Lace
daemonians forbidden to assist at the Olympic games.— XIIL
War between the Argives and Epidaurians.— The Lacedae-
monians throw a garrison into Epidaurus ; and the Athenians
replace the Helots and Messenians iA Pylos.- XIV. The
Lacedaemonians take the field against the Argives.— Two
large armies face one another witmn eight of Argos, yet part
without enipiging.— The Lacedaemonians take the field a sec
ond time. — ^The b^tle of Mantinea.— The Argives enter into
league with the Lacedaemonians.— XT. Fresh stirs at Arsos
in &voar of the Athenians.— XVI. Expedition of the Athe
mans against the Isle of Melos.— The conference in form, by
way of dialogue.— The Athenians become masters of that

Ih the following summer, the truce, made for a year, ex*
cued, of course, at the time of the Pythian games : and,
during this relaxation from war, the Athenians caused the
Delians to evacuate the Isle of Delos ; imagining that, upon
the taint of some crimes long since committed, they were not
sufficiently pure to perform due service to the god, and that
this yet was wanting to render that work of purgation com-

« Before Christ 42S.

60 PEL0P0NNB8IAN WlkR. [boOK V.

plete» in which, as I have already related, they thought them-
seWes justified in demolishinff the sepulchres of Sie dead.
The Delians settled again, so fast as they could remove them-
selves thither, at Atramyttium, bestowed upon them for thii
purpose by Phamaces.

Cleon,* having obtained the commission from the Athe-

* Cleon is now grown perfectly convinced Chat he is a very
hero, and hath prevailed upon a majority of the p^le of Athens
to be of the same mind, since, seriously and deUbemtely, they
intrust him with a most important and delicate commission.
He now imagines he can cany all before him, and pluck all the
laurels of Brasidas (rom the head of that aoccnnplished Spartan,
even without having Demosthenes for his second. We may
guess to what a height of insolence he was now grown, from the
blights of Aristophanes. And, to set it in the most ludicrous
view, the poet opens his play with Nicias and Demosthenes,
whom he paints in a very injurious manner ; and, no doubt, it
must have been venr gratmg to them, to see themselves repre-
sented in so low buffoonery upon the stage of Athena. " Demos-
thenes begins with a shower of curses on that execrable Paphla-
gonian, Cleon ; Nicias seconds him ; then both of them howl
together in a most lamentable duetto. They next lay their
heads together about some means of redress. DeEooethenes pro-
poseth getting out of their master Cleon's reach. * Let us go,
then,' says Nicias. * Ay ; let us go,' cries Demosthenes. < Say
more,' says Nicias, * let us go over to the enemv.' — * Ay ; over to
the enemy,' adds the other. * But first,' says Nicias, * let us go
and prostrate ourselves before the images of tbe gods.'— •< What
images?' says Demosthenes; *dost thou think then there are
any gods ?'— * I da'—* Upon what grounds ?'— ♦ Because I am un-
deservedly the object of their hatred.' " Such are the daring mis-
representations Aristophanes makes of characters thatby no
means deserve it ! Demosthenes afterward describes the arro-
gance of Cleon thus : " He hath one foot fixed in Pylus, and the
other in the assembly of the people. When he moves he struts
and stretches at such a rate, that his bum is in Thrace, his

hands in iEtolia, and his. attention among the tribes at hcnoe."
—Nicias then proposeth poisoning themselves by drinkipf bull's
blood, like Themistocles ;— " Or rather," says Demosthenes,

" a dose of good wine." This is agreed upon, in order to cheer
up their spirits, and enable them to confront Cleon, and play off
against him the seller of black-puddings. Nicias accordingly
goes and steals the wine. Yet, in spite of the most outrageouf
ridicule, and the opposition of all wise and honest men at Athens
we see Cleon now at the head of an army, to stop the rapid con
quests of Brasidas.

r£AllX.] PSI-OPONlfBSIAN WAR. 61

UADfl, went by aea into the Tlmcian dominioof, to mmri tm
the auapension of arms expired, baving under lua oommaiMl
twelve hundred heavy-anned Athenians^ three hundred hone-
men, and larger numbers of their allied forces. His whole
armament consisted of thirty sail. 'Touching first at Scione,
yet blocked up, he drew from thence the heafy-armed, sta-
tioned there as guards ; and, standing away, entered the
haven of the Colo^onians, lying at no great distance from To-
rone. Being here informed by the deserters that Brasidas was
not in Torone, nor the inhabitants able to make head against
him, he marched his forces by land towards that city, ana sent
ten of his ships about, to stand into the harbour. His first ap-
proach was to the new rampart, which. Brasidas had thrown
up quite round the city, in order to enclose the suburbs with-
in its 4:incture ; and thus, by the demolition of the old wall,
had rendered it one entire city. When the Athenians came
to the assault, Pasitolidas, the Lacedsmonian, who was com-
mandant, and the garrison under his command, exerted them-
selves in its defence. But when they could no longer main- -
tain it, and at the same time the ships, sent round on purpose,
had entered the harbour, Pasitelidas, fearing lest the ships
might take the town, now left defenceless, and, when the
rampart was carried by the enemy, he himself might be inter-
^ cepted, abandoned it mmiediately, and retired with all speed
' into the town : but the Athenians were ahready disembarked
and masters of the place. The land-force also broke in in-
stantly at his heels, by rushing along through the aperture in
the old wall ; and some, as well Peloponnesians as Toro-
neans, they slew in the moment of irruption. Some also they
took alive, among whom was Pasitelidas the commandant.
Brasidas was indeed coming up to its reUef, but, receiving
intelligence on his march that it was taken, he retired ; since
he was forty stadia* off, too great a distance to prevent the
enemy.

But Gleon and the Athenians now erected two trophies ;
one upon the harbour, the other at the rampart. They far-
ther doomed to slavery the wives and children of the Toro
neans. The male inhabitants, together with the Pelopon-
nesians and every Chalcidean that was found among them,
amounting in all to seven hundred, they sent away captives to

> About four miles.

62 PBLOPONNB8IAN WAR. [bOOK Xp

Athens. The Pelopoimeiiuifl indeed were afterward re-
leased, by Yirtae of the snbsequent treaty ; the rest were
fetched away by the Olynthtaas, who made exchanges for
them, body ror body.

Aboot the same time the Boeotians, by treachery, got pos-
session of Panactam, a fort npon the frontier, belonging to
the Athenians.

As for Cleon, having established a garrison at Torone, he
departed thence, and sailed round Athos, as bound for Am-
phipolis.

Bot two ▼essels about this time, bound for Italy and Si-
cily, sailed out of the harbour of Athens, having on board
Phasax, the son of Erasistratus, with whom two omer persons
were joined in commission, to execute an embassy there.
For the Leontines, after the departure of the Athenians fix>m
Sicily, in consequence of the joint accommodation, had en-
rolled many strangers as denizens of their city, and the pop-
ulace had a plan in agitation for a distribution of the lands.
-The nobles, alarmed at this, gain the concurrence of the Syra-
cnsans, and eject the commons. They were dispersed, and wan-
dered up and down as so many vagabonds ; while the nobles,
striking up an agreement with the Syracusans, abandoned and
left in desolation their own city, settling at Syracuse as free
citizens of that place. And yet, soon after, some of this num-
ber, dissatisfied even here, forsook Syracuse again, and seized
upon Phocsa, a quarter of the old city of the Xeontines, and
upon Bricinnis, which is a fortress in the Leontine. Hith-
er the greater part of the ejected commons resorted to them •
and adhering firmly together, from these strongholds they an-
noyed the country by their hostilities. When the Athenians
had intelligence of this, they sent out Phtaax, to persuade, by
all proper methods, their old allies in that country, and to
gain, if possible, the concurrence of the other Sicilians, to
take up arms for the preservation of the people of Leontium,
against the encroachmg power of the Syracusans. Phaax
upon his arrival, recommended the scheme successfully to
the Camarineans and Agrigentines. But his negotiations
meeting with some obstacles at Gela, he desisted firom ad-
dressing himself to the rest, since he was assured he could
not possibly succeed. Retiring therefore through the district
of the Siculi to Catane, and calling on his road at Bricinnie,
and having encouraged the malecontents there to persevere, he

TEAR X.] PBLOPONNESIAN WAR. 63

departed. Not but that, in this Sicilian voyage, both paasinff
and repassing, and also upon the coast of Italy, he haa urged
to several cities " how expedient for them was the Athenian
iiiendship."

He met also in his course with those Locrians who were
going to another settlement, after expulsion from Meesene
Tbey had been driven to this necessity by seditious ^tions
at Meseene, one of which had invited them thither since the
J0int accommodation among the Sicilians ; and now they were
forced to shift again, thouSi Messene had for a tune been en-
tirely in their power. Ph»ax therefore, meetioff with these
in their removal, gave them no annoyance ; for uie Locrians
had been at a conference with him, to concert the measures
of an agreement widk the Athenians. These, however, were
the only party of all the confederates who, when the Sicilians
had amicably ended their disputes, refused to tr«at with the
Athenians, and were brought to such submission since mere-
ly by a war, in which they were embroiled against the Itonians
nid Meleans, who bordered upon them, and were colonies of
their own. And, some time after this, Pheax truly returned
to Athens.

But Cleon, who from Torone was gone about by sea against
Amphipolis, marching away from Eion, made an assault upon
Stagirus, a colony of Andrians, but without success ; yet
Galepsus, a colony of the Thasians, he took by storm. He
sent farther ambassadors to Perdiccas, to summon his attend-
ance in the expedition, according to the tenour of the new al-
liance. He sent others into Thrace to Polles, King of the
Odomantians, that he wpuld hire as large a body of Inracians
as could be got, and bring them up under his own orders.
And, during this interval, be himself lay quiet at Eion.

But Brasidas, informed of these proceedings, placed him-
self in an opposite post at Cerdylium. This place belonged
to the Argilians, ana is seated on an eminence on the other
side of the river, and- at no«great distance from Amphipolis.
From hence he had a perfect view of all Cleon*s motions ; so
that now it was impossible for the latter to make any ap-

5h wilh his army, from thence to Amphipolis, without
discovered. Brasidas, however, suspected that Cleon
I approach, and, from a contempt of his opponents, would
certainly advance thither, without waiting for re-enforcements.
He had, at the same time, provided himself with fifteen

64 PBI.OP&NNSSIAN WAR. [bOOK V.

hundred mercenary Thracians, and had assembled all the
Edottian targetiers and horsemen. Of the Myrcinians and
Chalcideans he had a thoosand targetiers, besides those ia
Amphipolis. But his whole force of heavy-armed of all aorta
amounted to about two thousand ; and he had three hundred
Grecian horsemen. With a detachment, consisting of fifteen
hundred of these, Brasidas had posted himself at Cerdyliam ;
the rest were left in Amphipolis, under the orders of Clear!-
das.

Cleon remained without stirring for the present, but was
soon forced to such a step as Brasidas expected. The soU
diers were chagrined at their inactivity, ana were disparaging
his conduct by invidious parallels, " against hovv much skill
and courage, with how much unskilfulness and.,cowardice, he
was matched ;" and that, '* with the hiffhest regret they had
attended him from Athens on this e;cpedition." Sensible of
their discontent, and unwilling to disgust them more by too
long a continuance in the same post, he drew them up and led
them on. He acted now upon the vain conceit with which
his success at Pylus had puffed him op, as a man of great
importance. It could not 'enter his heart that the enemy
would presume to march out against aad offer him battle.
He gave out that " he was only advancing in order to view
the place : he waited indeed the arrival of additional forces,
not as if they were needful to his security, should the enemy
attack him, but to enable him completely to invest the city,
and to take it by storm." Being advanced, he posted his
troops upon a strong eminence before Amphipetlis, and went
in person to view the marshes of the Strymon, and the situ-
ation of the city on the side of Thrace, how it really was.
He judged he could retreat at pleasure without a battle. Not
so much as one person appeared upon the works, or issued
out at the gates ; for they were all shut fast. He now con-
cluded himself guilty of a mistake ia coming so near the
place without the machines, " as the town must infalUbly have
been taken, because abandoned."

Brasidas, however, had no sooner perceived that the Athe-
nians were, in motion, than, descending from Oerdyhum, he
marched into Amphipolis. He there waived all manner of
sally and all show of opposition against the Athenians. He
was afraid of trusting too much to his own forces, as he iadg-
ed them inferior to the enemy, not truly in numbers, lor so

fEAR X.] PELOPONNESIAN WAR 65

fiff they were nearly balanced, but in real worth; fortheAthe-
nian force appointed for this aervice was composed of the very
flower of Athens, and the choicest troops of the Lemniane
and Imbrians : for this reason he prepared to assail them
with art ; because in case he gave the enemy a view of his
numbers, and of the sorry manner in which they were armed,
he judged he should be less likely to ^in a victory than by
concealing them till the mooAent of action, and avoiding that
conteinpt which their real state would" have inspired. Pick-
ing out, therefore, a party of one hundred and fifty heavy-
aimed for himself, and appointing Clearidas to command the
rest, he designed to fall suddenly upon the Athenians in their
retreat ; concluding he should never again find them in this
forlorn manner, when the re-enforcements they expected were
come \tp. Calling, therefore, all his soldiers around him, as
he was desirous of animating them and letting them into his
scheme, he harangued them thus : —

" Ye men of Peloponnesus, let it suffice that I briefly put
you in mind that we are natives of that country which hatb
ever by valour preserved itself free, and that you of the Doric
aie now going to attack your opponents of the Ionic descent,
whom you are inured tq defeat. My words are chiefly de-
signed to inform you in what manner I have planned the
method of attack, lest, hazarding the event with so small a
party, and not with our entire force, may seem unequal to the
work, and may too much dispirit you. The enemy, I conjec-
ture, from an utter contempt of us, and a strong presumption
that we durst not come out into the field aeainst them, have
shown themselves before this city ; and this very moment,
disorderly, scattered as they are to view the situation, they
heartily despise us. The leader, therefore, who has the
most acuteness in detecting such blunders in a foe, and then
seizes the proper moment to fall upon them, as best enabled
by his own strength ; not so much in the open and regular
manner of a methodical fight, as with a surprise, most advan-
tageous in the present juncture ;— ^sucha leader may, for the
most part, be assured of success. Such stealths as these
draw after them the highest glory : by these the man who
overreaches his enemy the most, performs the most substan-
tial service for his iriends. While, therefore, haughtily pre-
suming on their own worth, they remain thus disordered, and,
by what appears to me are bent more on drawing off than re-

66 PBLOPONKSSIAN WAR. [»00K ▼

mftHiing bore ; daring this their intermission of purpose, and
before their resolutions can be regularly adjusted, I myself,
at the head of my chosen party, will be among them, if possi-
ble, and will rush with yigour into the centre of their anny.
And then, Clearidas, when once yon perceite that I am en-
gaged, and, as in probability it must be, have thrown
them into disorder, then, at the head of yours, accompanied by
the Araphipolitans and the rest of the confederates, throw
open the gates on a sadden for your sally, and advance vnlh
your cKraost speed to th6 charge. And thus, it may confi-
dently be hoped, the enemy most be thrown into the utmost
const^nation ; because a second body, thus running to ^e
charge, is more terrible to the foes than the present which is
already engaged. And show yourself now, Clearidas, that
gallant man, which in honour, as a Spartan, you ought to be.

•* You in general, ye confederates, I exhort to follow with
manly resolution, and to remember that good sddiers are
bound in duty to be full of spirit, to be sensible of shame,
and to obey commanders ; that this very day, if you behave
with valour, you are henceforth free, and will gain the hon-
ourable title of Lacedtemonian allies ; otherwise, must con-
tinue to be the slaves of the Athenians ; where the best that
can befall you, if neither sold for slaves nor put to death as
rebels, will be a heavier yoke of tyranny than you ever yet
have felt, while the liberty of the rest of Greece must by you
for ever be obstructed. But so dastardly behaviour I con-
jure you to scorn, as you know for what viUoable prizes you ,
are to enter the lists. I myself shall convince you that I am
not more ready to put others in mmd of their duty, than per-
sonally to discharge niy own through the whole scene of
action."

Brasidas, having ended his harangue, prepared to sally out
himself, and placed the main body un<3er the orders of Clear-
idas, at the gates which are called the Throeian, to be ready
to rush out at the appointed time;

To Cleon now, for Brasidas had been plainly seen coming
down from Cerd^lium ; and, as the prospect of the city lay
open to those vTithout, had been seen also when sacrificing
before the temple of Minerva, and forming the proper disposi-
tions : to Cleon, I say, who was now in a remote quarter to
ifiew the posts, advice is brought, that *< the vfhde force of
^ enemy was visibly drawn up within the city, and ths(» un-

YEAR X.] PEL0P0NNE8IAN WAR. 67

der the gates, many feet of horses and men might be discern-
ed, as ready for a sally." Upon hearing this he went to the
place, and was convinced by his own si^t. He determined,
however, not to hazard a battle before nis succours were ar-
rived ; and though he knew his motions could not be con-
cealed, he went off, and ordered the signal to be given for a
retreat ; commanding forther that the left wing should file off
6r8t, which, indeed, was the only method of drawing off se-
curely to Eion. But, as they seemed to him to be Ion? about
It, he wheeled off himself at the head of the right ; and thas,
exposing his men to the missive weapons of the enemy, was
drawing off his army.

At this instant Brasidas, perceiving it was time to attack,
since the army of the Athenians was already in motion, says
to those about him? and to all that were near, " These gen-
tlemen ^ait not for us, that plainly appeareth by the shaking
of their spears and heads ; for those who make such motions
are not used to stay for the enemy's approach. But let some-
foody throw me open the appointed gates, and let us boldly and
with an speed sally out against them." In effect, Brasidas,
issuing at the gates of the intrenchment, and the first of what
was then the long wall, advanced with all speed directly along
the road, where now standeth the^ trophy, to be seen l^ those
who pass along by the strongest part of the town, and, falling
upon the Athenians, dismayed not only at their own irregular
situation, but also terrified at his bold attack in the very cen-
tre of their army, he pots them to the rout. And now
Clearidas, sallying out according to order at the Thracian
gates, was advancing to second him. The consequence was,
that, by such an unexpected and sudden assault on both
sides, the Athenians were thrown into the highest confusion.
Their left wing, which inclined the most towards Eion, ae
having filed off first, was instantly broken, and fled. These
were no sooner dispersed in flight than Brasidas, advancing
to the attack of the right, is wounded : he dropped ; but the
Athenians are not sensible of it. Those who were near him
took him up and carried him off. This accident, however,
enabled the right wmg of the Athenians to maintain their
ground the longer ; though Cleon, who from the first had
never intended to stand an engagement, fled instantly away ;
and, bekig intercepted by a Myrcinian targetier, was skiiii.
But his heavy^armed imbodying together a^ gutting an mtuh

68 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK V.

nence, repulsed Clearidas, who twice or thrice attacked
them, and maintained their ground till the Myrcinian and
Chalcidic cavalry and the targetiers, surrounding and pouring
in their darts upon them, compelled them to fly. Thus tlie
whole Athenian army was distressed in a laborious flight :
they ran different ways among the mountains ; numbers had
been destroyed in the charge, others by the Chalcidic horse
and targetiers ; but the remainder escaped in safety to Eion.

Those who took up Brasidas, when he dropped in the ac-
tion, and bore him off, carried him into the city yet alive.
His senses remained till he heard his party were victorious,
and soon after that he expired.*

The rest of the army, with Clearidas, being come back from
the pursuit, rifled the dead and erected a trophy.

This done, all the confederates assisted under arms at the
funeral of Brasidas, whom they interred at the public expense
within the city near the place where the forum now stands :
and afterward the Amphipolitans, having enclosed his monu-
ment, performed sacrifice to him as a hero. They also en-
acted solemn games m his honour, and annual sacrifices.
Nay, they ascribed their colony to him as founder, after de-
molishing the edifices of Agnon, and defacing every memorial
which might continue the memory of his foundation. They
acted thus, partly out of real gratitude to Brasidas, whom
they regarded as their deliverer, and partly at this juncture
to show their high respect for the Lacedaemonian alliance, as
they stood in great dread of the Athenians : for, considering
their hostile embroilments with the Athenians, they thought
it neither for their interest nor satisfaction to continue the
honours of Agnon.

To the Athenians they also delivered the bodies of their
dead. The number of them, on the Athenian side, amount-
ed to six hundred, whereas the enemy lost but seven men.
This was owing to the nature of the fight, which had not

* The first embassy wWch came from the Grecians it Thrace
to Sparta, ailer the death of Brasidas, made a visit to his moth-
er Argileonis. The first question she asked them was, " Did
my son die bravely ?'* And when the ambassadors expatiated
largely in his praise, and said, at last, ** There was not such an-
other Spartan left alive ;''—*< You mistake, gentlemen," said
the mother : *' my son was a good man ; but there are many
better men than he in Sparta."--P2iaarc&*« Laconic Apoikegmt.

TEAR X.] PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 69

been carried on in a regular manner, but was rather a slaugh-
ter, in consequence of a surprise and sudden consternation.
After the reception of their dead, the Athenians sailed away
for Athens ; but those under the orders of Clearidas applied
diemselyes to resettle and secure Amphipolis.

About the same time, in the close of this summer, Ram-
phias, and Autocharidas, and Epicydias, Lacedemonians,
were conducting up, for the Thracian service, a re-enforce-
ment consisting of nine hundred heavy-armed. Being arri-
ved at Heraclea, in Trachis, they regulated there such things
as seemed to require an amendment ; and, during the seascm
they halted here, the battle of Amphipolis was fought, and the
summer ended.

But, early as possible in the succeeding winter, the re-
enforcement under Ramphias proceeded on their route as fai
as Pierium of Thessaly. But the Thessalians opposing their
farther passage, and Brasidas being now dead, to whom they
were conducting this supply, they returned home. They
imagined that their aid was no longer wanting, as the Athe-
nians, in consequence of their overthrow, had quitted that
counby : and themselves had not sufficient ability to carry
the plans into execution which Brasidas had been meditating.
But the principal motive of their return was their own con-
sciousness, at setting out, that the Lacedemonians were
more inclined to peace.

It so fell out, indeed, immediately after the battle of Am-
phipolis and the return of Ramphias from Thessaly, that nei-
ther of the parties meddled any longer with the operations of
war, but were more incHned to a peace. The motives on the
Athenian side were these : They had received a terrible blow
at Delium, and a second lately at Amphipolis : hence they
no longer entertained that assured confidence of their own
strengtn, which had formerly occasioned them to reject all
accommodations, as they imagined, in their then career of
success^ they should soon give law to their enemies. Now
also they were under apprehensions of their dependants, lest,
buoyed up by the late misfortunes of Athens, they might the
aobner be induced to revolt. And they heartily repented
now that they had neglected the fine opportunity which their
success at Pylus gave them, of bringing the dispute to a hap-
py termmation.

On the other hand, the Lacedemonians acted on these

70 PBLOPONNSSIAII WAR. [BOOK ▼

motiTes : they foond themseWes stnmgely mistaken in tiw
events of war. At its commencement, they imagined that
in the space of a few years they should entirely have demol-
ished the power of the Athenians, by laying their territory
waste ; but they had suffered a terrible calamity in the affair
of Sphacteria, such as never before had been the lot of Spar-
ta. Devastations now were extended over all their country,
from Pylos to Oythera. Their Helots had also in numbers
deserted to the foe ; and they lived in constant expectation
that those who yet persevered in their allegiance, gained by
the solicitations of tnose who were fled, mi^t, in the present
low ebb of Sparta, attempt to subvert their constitution, as
had formerly been the case. It happened, farther, that the
thirty years' truce with the Aigives was on the point of expi-
ring ; and the Ar^ves were unwilling to renew it, unless the
Cynuria was previously restored. They judged it, therefore,
a plain impossibility to make head at Uie same time against
both Ar^ves and Athenians. They had also a suspicion that
some cities of Peloponnesus would revolt from them to the
Argives, which proved afterward true.

Both parties, then, being respectively influenced by such
considerations, an accommodation was judged to be expe-
dient. The anxiety of the Lacedaemonians about it was not
the least, as they were eagerly bent on recovering their pris-
oners that had been taken at Sphacteria ; for they were all
citizens of Sparta of the first rank, and allied to the most
honoarable families. They had begun to solicit their liberty
so soon as ever they were taken ; but the Athenians, flushed
with conquest, at that time disdained to treat. Tet, after
the blow received at Delium, the Lacedaemonians, knowing
then they were become more tractable, laid bold of the fa-
vourable juncture, and obtained a cessation of arms for a year»
in which space they were, by article, to hold mutual confer-
ences, in order to settle an accommodation for a longer time.
And since the Athenians had now again more lately been
totally defeated at Amphipolis, and as well Cleon as Brasidas
was dead, both of whom had most strenuously opposed an ac
commodation ; the latter, because he was successful and
reaped glories in war ; the former, because, in a season of
tranquiUity, his villanies must needs be detected, and his bold
calumniations lose all credit ; the persons who at present
were chief in the management of either state were mora

TRAR X.] JPSLiOPONNXSIAfi WAR. 7l

fltrosgiy disposed than ewr to adjost disputes. These were,
Fieiatoanax, the son of Paasanias, King of the Lacedamoni-
ans, and Nicias, the son of Niceimtas, by far the most suc-
cessful general of that age. Nicias desired it, as hitherto he
had never heen defeated, and was bent on securing his own
prospierity on a lasting foundation, on obtaining a relaxation
of toils for himself, and of their present burdens for his fel-
low'Cittzeiie, and t>n leading his name iUustrions to posterity,
as one who had never involved his country ia calamity.
These views, he judged, could only be accomplished by v»>
cuity from danger, by exposing himself as litUe as possible
to the uncertainties of fortune ; and vacuity from4anger was
compatible solely with peace. Pleistoanax had been calumni-
ated by his enemies on the account of his restoration ; and
they invidiously sugeested to his prejudice, upon every loss
whatever which the Ijacedaemonians sustained, that such was
the consequence of trana^essing the laws in the repeal of his
banishment: for they laid to his charge that, in concert
with his brother Aristocles, he had suborned the prieetess
of Delphi to give one general answer to all the deputations
sent by the lAcedasmonians to consult the oracle, that " they
should bring back the seed of the demigod sen of Jove from
a foreign land into their own country : if not, they should
plough with a silver ploughshare ;^' and thus, at length, so
seduced the Lacedsemonians in the favour of an exile, resi-
ding at Lyceum, upon account of his precipitate retreat out
of Attica, as thouj^h purchased by iHribes from the enemy, and
from a dread of his countrymen dwelling 4n a house, one half
of which was part of the temple of Jupiter, that nineteen
years after they conducted him home with the same solemn
proeessioQ and sacrifices as those who were the original
foondeie of Lacedanneii had appointed for the inauguration
of their kings. Repining, therefore, at these calumniations,
and judging that, as peace giveth no room for miscarriage, and
that farther, if the Lacedemonians could recover the prisoners,
his enemies would be debarred of a handle for detraction ;
whereas, while the chances of war subsisted, the persons at
the helm of government must.be liable to reproaches for every
disaster, he was earnestly desirous to bring about an accom-
modation.

This winter, therefore, they proceeded to a conference ;
ttidi at the approach of spring, great preparations ware opeidy

72 , PELOPONNBSIAN WAR. [boOK ▼

in hand on the Lacedaeiiionian side, and a scheme for forti-
fying in Attica was circulated through all the states, in oider
to render the Athenians more compliant. Many meetings
were held, and many demands, with large justifications, were
urged on both sides, till at length it was a^eed that **■ a
peace should be concluded, each party restorm^ what they
had conquered in the war, but Nissea to remain m the hands
of the Athenians." Platea was nedemanded by the latter,
but the Thebans urged that it had not fallen into their hands
by force or by treachery, but they possessed it in pursuance
of a free and voluntary surrender. And, upon the same plea,
the Athenians kep^ Nisaea.

Things being so far adjusted, the Lacedaemonians called
together their confederates ; and all their voices, excepting
those of the BoBOtians, and Corinthians, and Eleana, and Me-
gareans, who were not at all satisfied with these proceedings,
concurring for a peace, they ratified the accommodation, and
solemnly pledged the observance of it to the Athenians, who,
in exchange, swore the same to the Lacedemonians, in effect
as followeth : —

"The Athenians and Lacedasmonians, and their allies,
have made peace on these terms, and every state hath swore
to their observance.

'* In regard to the common temples : Permission is grant-
ed, to aU who desire it, to sacrifice, to visit, to consult the
oracles, to send public deputations, in the prescribed forms of
every people, both by land and sea, without any molestation.

" That the sacred soil of the temple of Apollo at Delphi,
and Delphi itself, be ruled after its own model, be taxed at
its own discretion, and be administered by its own magis<
trates, whose determinations to be final, both in regard to
life and property, according to the primitive laws of the place.

" That this peace continue for the space of fifty years, be-
tween the Athenians and the confederates of the Athenians
on the one side, and the Lacedasmonians and the confeder-
ates of the Lacedaemonians on the other, without fraud and
without molestation, both at land and sea.

" Be it farther unlawful for either party to take up arms to
the detriment of the other ; neither the Iiacedaemonians and
their allies against the Athenians and their allies, nor the
Athenians and their allies against the Lacedaemonians and
their allies, without any fraud or evasion whatsoever.. And,

TEAR X.J PSLOFONNBSIAN WAR. 73

if any difference intervene between the contractmg pcrtiet,
let it be adjusted according to equity, and npon oatn, m inch
manner as they shall agree.

** Agreed, farther, that the Laced»monian8 and allies de-
liyer up Amphipolis to the Athenians.

** That, wnateyer cities the Lacedemonians deliver up to
the Athenians, leave be given to the inhabitants to remove at
their own discretion, with all their effects.

"That the cities which pay the assessments rated by
Aristides «njoy all their rights and privileges whatever.

" And, be it unlawful for the Athenians and their allies to
take up arms to the annoyance of those cities which pay that
assessment, from the time that this treaty be in force. Those
cities are, Argilus, Stagirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus,
Spartolus ; these cities to observe a strict neutrality, forming
no engagements with either Lac^smonians or Athenians.
Provided, that if the Athenians can by fair means prevail
upon these cities, it be lawful for the Athenians to admit
them confederates at their own free choice.

"That the Mecybemeans, and Saneans, and Singeans,
shall inhabit their own cities in the same manner as the Olyn-
thians and Acanthians.

" Agreed, farther, that the Lacedemonians and allies re-
store Panactum to die Athenians.

'* That the Athenians restore to the Lacedemonians Cory-
phasium,* and Cythera, and Methone, and Pteleum, and Ata-
lanta, and all the Lacedemonians, now prisoners of the state
at Athens, or public prisoners, in any quarter soever within
the dominions of Athens ; and to give leave of departure to
all the Peloponnesians blocked up in Scione, and to all the
confederates of the Peloponnesians whatever in Scione, and
to ^11 persons whatever whom Brasidas placed there. This
article also to extend to any confederates of the Lacedemo-
nians now public prisoners in Athens, or public prisoners in
any other qtiarter of the Athenian dominions.

*' That, in return, the Lacedemonians and allies release all
the prisoners, both Athenians and confederates, which are
now in their hands.

« That, in regard to the Scioneans, Toroneans, and Ser-

* This includes the fort of Pylus, seated on the cape of Cory-
phasiam.

T4 PSLOPONNRSIAN WAR. [bOOK'V.

n^Uant, and aay other city l>e)oii|;iqg of rijg^ht to the Athe-
munBf the Athenians to proceed with the cities specified, and
all the others, at their own discretion.

** That the Athenians shall swear ohservance to the Lace-
dsmonians and their allies separately, according to their
cities. Let both sides swear, in the most solemn manner,
according to the forms of each separate state ; luid the oath
to be conceived in these words : * I abide by my compacts
and the present articles, honestly, and without equivocation.'
Be an oath taken to the Athenians, by the Lacedemonians
and aUies, to the same purport.

" Be this oath renewed annually by the contracting parties.

" Be pillais erected at Olympias, at Pythus, at the isth-
mus, and at Athens, in the citadel, and at Lacedsmon, in the
Amycleum> with this treaty inscribed upon them.

** If any point be in ai^ manner or degree, for the present,
through forji^etfulness on either side, omitted ; or if any thing,
upon a serious consultation holden, be judged more proper,
the Lacedsemonians and Athenians are empowered, with all
due rc^d to their oaths, to make additions and alterations,
at their joint discretions. '

*' Pleistolas, presiding in the college of Ephori, puts this
treaty in force at Sparta on the twenty-seventh day of the
month Artemisius : at Athens, Alceus, the archon, on the
twenty-fifth day of the month Elaphebolion.

** Those who took the oath and sacrificed were : — .

"On the Lacedaemonian side,— Pleistolas, Bamagetus,
Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, Philo-
chandas, Zeuzidas, Antippus, Tellis, Alcinidas, JEImpediaa,
Menas, Lamphilus.

*' On the Athenian, — ^Lampo, Isthmionicus, Nicias, Laches,
Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Agnon, Myrtilus, Thrasy-
cles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, lolcius, Timocrates, X^eo, ha,-
machus, I&mosthenes."

This treaty was perfected upon the dose of the winter, in
the first commencement of the spring, immediately after the
Bacchanalian festivals at Athens. Ten complete years and
some few days over were elapsed since the first irruption
into Attica and an open commencement of the war. And
let him that would be assured of the truth compute only by
the seasons of the year, and not by those who, in the con-
tending states, were either archons, or, by the offices they

TEAR X.] rSIiOPOMl^fllAN WAR. 75

bore, had events dwtingmnhed by an enumontion of thair
names. For it cannot be exact^ known in what determinate
part, whether in the beginniqg or middle, or any other por-
tion, of a magiatraey, any important event occurred. But, if
the computation proceed by amnmera and winters, which
metfaMid I have (Swerved, auch an inquirer will find that these
two halyes being equivalent to a whole year, ten complete
aommere and £e aame number of wintera elapsed in the
coarse of this first part of the war.

The L«ced«momans, for to them it fell by lot to make the
first restitutions, released immediately what prisoners they
had in their hands ; and, having despatched Ischagoras, and
Menas, and Philocharidas, in the quality of their ambiusa-
dors to the cities of Thrace, ordered Clearidas to deliver up
AmphipoUs to the Athenians, and all the confederates there
to submit to the terms of the treaty, according to the stipula-
tion given for them. But this they positively refused, as
they judged the treaty prejudicial. Clearidas dso, to ingra-
tiate hiiuBelf with the Chaksid^s, would not deliver up An^
phipoUs, alleffin^ that, without their concurrence, he could
not possibly do it. He himself returned in person soon after
with the ambassadors, in order to make his defence at Lace-
dsmon, should Ischagoras accuse him there of disobey-
ing orders. His view was, farther, to try if the accommoda-
tion could by any means be evaded. But, when he found it
fast confirmed, he posted back with all speed to his govern*
ment, having express orders firom the Lacedasmonians to de-
liver up AmphipoHs ; or, if that was beyond his power, to
caase idl the Peloponneeians within that garrison instantly to
evacuate the place.

The confederates haf^Mued at this juncture to be at La-
cedflemon, where such of them as had hithorto refused to
accept the treaty were ordered by the LacedsBmonians to
accede to it. But this they positively refused, alleging the
same reason as before ; and plainly affiirnung that " they would
sot comevin till better terms than the present were obtained
for them." Their remonstrance had no effect upon the La-
cedMnonians, who sent them away without redress, and
struck up forthwith an alliance, offensive and defensive, with
' the Athenians. They had reason to conclude that ** the Ar-
rives would come to no a^ement with them," since thej
had lately declared a negative to their ambaasadws, AmpeU^

76 PELOPONNfiSIAN WAR. [bOOK V.

das and Lichas ; << and yet these Argiyes," they judged,
** could be no dreadful foe without the Athenians ; and that
the rest of Peloponnesus would ot now {Nresume to interfere,
who, without this method of prevention, would certainly have
gone oyer to the Athenians/' An Athenian embassy, there-
fore, being at this crisis resident among them, a conference
was holden, and the terms completely adjusted. The ratifi-
cation was made by solemn oath, and the articles of this alli-
ance, offensive and defensive, were these :—

** The Lacedaemonians enter into this alliance for the term
of fifty years. — Provided that

" If any enemy enter the territories of the Lacedsmonians,
and commit any ma'nner of hostilities to their prejudice, the
Athenians march forthwith to their succour, with all the pos-
sible means of redress, and with their whole united force.

" And, in case such invaders shall have withdrawn them-
selves, that the state under which they acted be declared an
enemy both to the LacedsemQuians ahd the Athenians, both
which are to join in acting offensively against that state, nor
to lay down their arms without the mutual consent of both
the contracting states.

" These terms to be observed with honour, with alacrity,
and without any fraud whatever.

" Provided, farther, that if any enemy enter the territories of
the Athenians, and commit hostilities to the prejudice of the
Athenians, the Lacedaemonians march forthwith to their suc-
cour, with all the possible means of redress, and with their*
whole united force.

** And, in case such invaders shall have withdrawn -them*
selves, that the state under which they acted be declared an
enemy both to Lacedasmonians and Athenians, both which
are to join in acting offensively against that state, nor to lay
down their arms without the mutual consent of both the con-
tracting states.

" These terms also to be observed with honour, with alac-
rity, and without any fraud whatever.

** Provided, farther, that if there happen any insurrec-
tion among the Helots, the Athenians march to the succour
of the Lacedflemonians with their whole strength, to the full
extent of their power.

" The same persons, on both sides, shall swear to the ob-
MTvance of these articles who swore to the former.

TBAB XI.] PEL0P0JNME8IAN WAR. Tf

" The oatha to be annually renewed ; for which poipoao
the LacedaBmonians shall give their attendance at Athens, at
the Bacchanalian festival ; and the Athenians theirs at La-
cedaemon, at the Hyacinthian.

'*Both parties to erect their pillar; one at Lacedemon,
near Apollo^, in the Amycleum ; the other at Athens, near
Minerva's, in the citadel.

" And, in case the Lacedaemonians and Athenians think
proper to make any additions or alterations in the terms of
this alliance, the same lawfully to be done by both, at their
joint discretion.

^ The oath of observance was sworn : —

** On the Lacedemonian side, by Pleistoanaz/ Agis, Pleis-
tolas, Danwgetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus,
Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Alcinidas,
Teilis, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus

** On the Athenian side, by Lampo, Isthmionicus, Laches,
Nicias, Eothydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Agnon, Myrtilus,
Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, lolcius, Timocrates,
Leo, Lamachus, Demosthenes."

This alliance was concluded in a very little time after the
treaty of peace ; and the Athenians now released to the La-
cedaemomans their Spartans, who were made prisoners at
Sphactena. The summer also of the eleventh year was now
begun ; and so far the transactions of these first ten years of
this war, closely carried on, have been regularly compiled.

YCAR XI. t

After the treaty of peace and the alliance, offensive and
defensive, between the Lacedaemonians and Athenitos, both
which were concluded after the ten years' war, at the time
when Pleistolas presided in the college of ephori at Sparta,
and Alcaras was archon at Athens, the peace became in
force among the acceding parties. But the Corinthians and
some of the Peloponnesian states were endeavouring the
overthrow of all these proceedings : and immediately there
arose another great combustion among the confederates
agamst Lacedaemon. More than this, as time advanced, the
uicedemonians became suspected by the Athenians, as they

* The kings sign this alliance, but did not sign the formei
treaty. t Before Christ 421.

78 PBLOPOKNBSIAN WAR. [bOOK V.

■flowed no great punctuality' in ezeenting the conditions of
the peace. For the space of six years and ten months, they
reirained indeed from entering one another's territory in a
hostile manner ; but, during such a correspondence, which
abounded in suspicions, they were, in all other respects, active
in a reciprocal annoyance. And at length, necessitated to
dissolve the treaty concluded at the ten years* period, they
engaged afresh in open war.

The same Thucydides, an Athenian, has also compiled an
account of these latter transactions in a regular series, ac-
cording to the summers and winters, down to that period of
time when the Lacedaemonians and their allies put an end to
the empire of Athens, and became masters of the long walls
and the Pirceus. The whole continuance of the war to this
period was twenty-seven years. And, if any man be inclined
to think that this intervening accommodation should not be
reckoned as war, he will find no arguments to support his
opinion ; for let him only survey the transactions as they are
distinctly related, and he will find it an absurdity to pro-
nounce that an interval of peace, in which neither all the
restitutions were made, nor the benefits obtained, which the
mutual stipulations required. And, setting these considera-
tions aside, in the Mantinean, and Epidatinc, and other wars,
transgressions wete committed on both sides. The confed-
erates also of Thrace continued still to be as great enemies
as ever ; and the Boeotians never agreed to more than a
bare cessation of arms, renewable every tenth day.

Including, therefore, the first war, which lasted ten years,
and that suspicious interval which enstied, and ended at hist
in a second open rapture, the whole contimiance, if compu-
ted by summers and winters, will torn out^ upon inquiiy, to
have been so many years, and some few additional days.
And such as laid stress upon the predictions of oracles can
assent only to this computation as genuine. For my own
part, I perfectly well remember that, not only at the com-
mencement, bat even during the whole oourse of the waT>
many such predictions were given out, that " it most needs
continue three times nine years." I also lived through its
whole extent, in the vesf flower of my understanding aad
strength, and with a close application of my thoughts, to gain
an exact insight into all its occurrences. It was farther my
lot to suffer a twenty years' exile from my country after TB(f

YSAR XI«] PSLOPOMKBSIAN WAR. 79

employment in the businese of Amphipolu, and to bo prMent
at the transactions of both parties, and not the least at those
of the Peloponnesians, in consequence of my banishmeiil,
by whidi means I had leisnre to gather more ample inform-
stioD about then. I shall relate therefore the quarrel and
breacli of the treaty, snbseqnent to the first ten jfeus, and the
incidents of the war which afterward ensued.

Upon the oonclosion of the treaty of peace for fifty years,
and the sobsequent alliance, the embassies from the different
states of Peloponnesus, who had been summoned thither to
giTe their ^Dcorrence, withdrew from Laced«mon. The
rest of them mdeed went direetly home ; but the Corinthians,
stopping in their return at Argos, began first, at a conference
with some of the raagistraey there, to insinuate, ** that since
the Lacedaemonians, not in order to senre but to enslsTe Pel-
oponnesus, had entered' into a treaty and an alliance, ofifen-
sive and defensire, with thehr once most inveterate foes, the
Athenians, it highly behooved the Argives now to watch trrer
the preservation of Peloponnesus, and to form a public reso*
lution,-^~that any Grecian state which is free and uneontrol*
led, which enjoys and supports an equal shve of rights and
privileges, might enter into an alliance, offensive and defon*
sive, with the Argives, for the guard of their mutual proper-
ties against their common foes : — this to be communicated
only to the few who were absolute masters of the decisions
of each state, and everywhere to shun all conference with
the bulk of the people, lest the scheme might be detected, in
case the multitude shouM refose their concurrence." They
assured them that the majority of the states were so exasper-
ated against the Lacedsmonians, that they would infallibly
come in. And, after suggesting such a course, the Corinthi-^
ans also returnied home.

The persons at Argos who had listened to these insinua-
tions reported the scheme, in the next place, to the whole
magistrMy and people of Argos. The Argives resolved ac-
coidingly, and elected a committee of twelve, with whom
such Grecians as desired it might agree upon an alliance, the
Athenians and LacedaBmonians excepted. Neither of these
states was permitted to treat with the Argives, without the
public consent of the whole people.

The Aigives were the more readily persuaded to such »
measure, as tAey plainly saw a war was unavoidable be two e c

80 PELOPONNBSIAN WAR. [bOOK V.

tfaemBelves and the Lacedemomans ; for th9 trace between
them was on the point of expiring. They were also animated
by the hope of gaining into their hands the sovereignty of Pelo-
ponnesus ; for, at this juncture of time, Lacedsmon lay under
the greatest discredit, and was fallen into utter contempt upon
account of their late disasters ; whereas the Argives were in
the hi^h vigour of their strength in all respects, as they bad
never intexfered in the Attic war ; and, having obseryed an
exact neutrality witli both, had been thriving in peace and
plenty. The Argives, therefore, in this manner invited those
Grecians who were willing to enter into their alliance.

The Mantineans and eiilies were the first wlft, out of a
dread of the Lacedemonians, accepted the proposal. For
these Mantineans, in the heat of the war against the Atheni-
ans, had seized and appropriated to themselves a certain dis-
trict of Arcadia subject to Lacedsmon, and now concluded
that the Lacedaemonians would never leave them in the quiet
possession of it, when they were at liberty to act for its re-
covery. This readily induced them to have recourse to the
league of Argos, regarded by them as a powerful state, which
had ever been at variance with Lacedsmon, and, like their
own, was democratical.

No sooner had the Mantineans revolted, than the rest of
Peloponnesus be^n to mutter that ** they ought also to take
the same step," unagining that revolt to have been founded
upon some stronger reasons than yet appeared ; exasperated
also against the Lacedsmonians for' sundry reasons, and,
above all, for this article in the peace with Athens,--— that " in
case the two states of J.iacedaBmon and Athens think proper
to make any additions or alterations, the same to be lawful.'*
For this was the clause which save the greatest alarm to
Peloponnesus, and inspired a jealousy that the Lacedsmoni-
ans might strike up a bargain with the Athenians to enslave
the other states : since, in justice, no alteration ought to be
made without the concurrence of the whole confederacy.
Alarmed, therefore, at these proceedings, many of them made
instant application to the Argives, exerting their several en-
deavours to obtain their alliance.

But the Lacediemonians perceiving what a combustion
was arisen in Peloponnesus, principally owing to the insinoa-
tions of the Corinthisns, who were also going to enter into
tiiis league with Argos, they despatched ambaaeadors to Cor

YEAR XI J PSI.OFONl«S8IAM WAft. 81

mth, from a desire to prevent what might enaue. Here they
repreaeated to them ** how criiaiDal their conduct had been,
in hayiDg thus originally fomented the present tumult; and
^hat, in case they abandoned the Lacedvmoniana and went
*7Ter to the Argive league/' they assured them that, "by
fuch a step, they muat break the most sacred oaths ; injus-
tice they bad already committed in refusing to accede to the
Athenian peaee, since, pursuant to old stipulationa. between
^m, whatever a m8}ority of the confederatea resolved was
to be binding on all, unless some god or hero enjoineii a dis-
sent." But the Corinthians, in the presence of aH those of
the confederacy who had not accepted the peace, and whose
attendance they had previously invited, replied to the Lac^
dsmonians without entering into a particular detail of the in-
juries they had done them, in not covenanting with the Athe»
niims for the restitution of Solium, or Anactoriura, or any
other point in which they thought themselves aggrieved ; but
speciously pretending that "• they could neyer abandon their
allies in Thrace, whom by solemn osths they were bound to
support ; oaths which they had severally sworn when they
first revolted in concert with the Potideans, and had on other
occasions since renewed :^' arguing from hence that " they
could not have violated the common oath of the confederates
in refusing their accession to the Athenian peace, since, as
they had sworn upon the faith of the gods to the former, they
coold not betray them without the guilt of periury. The
stipulation, indeed, ran thus : * unless some god or hero enjoix^
ed a dissent :' — their present dissent, therefore, appeared to
them to be a divine mjunction." So far they argued from
their former oaths ; and, in regard to the alhance offensire
and defensive with Argos, — '' They would bold consultations
with their friends, and take such steps as were expedient and
just." And with this answer the Lacedemonian ambassa-
dors departed home. An Argive embassy happened also at
the same time to be at Corinth, who pressed the Corinthians
to enter into their league wiliiout any farther hesitation.
They desired them to attend, at the next public meeting
they held, for a final answer.

There arrived soon after an embassy from the Eleans, who

made, in the first place, an alliance offensive and defensive

with the Corinthians ; and then from Corinth repairing to

Argos, became allies of the Argives, according to the schema

II.— G

82 PBL0PONNB8IAN WAR. [BOOK ▼.

pre-established for this purpose ; for a misunderstanding had
arisen between them ana the Lacedsemonians about Lepreum.
In a former war of the LepreatsB against a province of Arca-
dia, the Eleans had been prevailed upon to join the Lepreatae
for a moiety of the land that should be conquered ; and, at *
the conclusion of the war, the Eleans left all the land in the
management of the Lepreatas subject to the annual tribute
of a talent* to Olympian Jove, lliis was regularly paid till
the Athenian war ; but, that war being then made a pretence
of its discontinuance, the Eleans would have exacted it by
force. The others had recourse to the Lacedsmonians.
The dispute was referred to the Lacedsemonian arbitration ;
but the Eleans, taking up a suspicion that they should not
have justice, would not abide the reference, but began to rav-
age the territory of the Lepreatn. The Lace&monians,
notwithstanding this, proceeded to a sentence : — ^that ** the
Lepreatae were masters of their own conduct, and that the
Eleans were guilty of injustice :" and, as th^latter would not
abide by their arbitration, they threw a garrison of heavy-
armed into Lepreum ; but the Eleans, regarding this step as
the reception of a city by the LacedsBmonians which had re-
volted from them, and alleging the treaty in which it was
stipulated, — that, ** of whatever places the parties were pos-
sessed upon the commencement of the Attic war, the same
they should continue to hold at its expiration,** as if they had
met with injustice, they revolted to the Argives ; and the Ele-
ans entered into that league offensive and defensive, as has
been already related.

The Corinthians soon followed their example, and with the
Chalcideans, also of Thrace, became the allies of Argos. But
the Boeotians and Megareans, though they had threatened the
same thing, thought proper to drop it. They had been ill
used by the Lacedsemonians, but judged, however, that the
democracy of the Argives would be less compatible with their
interests, whose form of government was oligarchical, than
the polity of the Lacedemonians.

About the same time of this summer, the Athenians, be-
coming masters of the Scioneans, after a long blockade, put
all who were able to bear arms to the sword, and made their
wives and children slaves, and gave the land to be cultured
by t/ie Plateaus.

* 193/. 15«. sterling.

r£A& XI.] FSLOPONNE&lAli WAft* 88

They also again brought back the Deliana to Deioa ; in-
duced to it by the many defeats they had suffered in battle^
»nd the express oracle of the god at Delphi.

The Phocians also, and Locrians, began about this time to
. make war upoa one another.

And now the Corinthians and Argives, united in league,
go together to Tegea, to persuade its revolt from the Lace*
oaemonians. They saw it was a large district ; and, in case
they compassed its accession, they imagined the whole of Pel-
oponnesus would be at their beck. But, when the Tegeata
declared that " they would in no shape oppose the Lacede-
monians," the Corinthians, who till now had acted with great
alacrity, slackened in their zeal for contention, and began to
fear that no more of the states would come in. They pro-
ceeded, however, to the Bosotians, and solicited them " to
accede to the league between themselves and Argives, and
to co-operate with them for the common welfare." And, as
there were truces for ten days between the Athenians and
Boeotians, which were agreed upon soon after the peace for
fifty years was made, the Corinthians now pressed the Boeo*
tians " to accompany them to Athens, and solicit for truces
of the same nature for them ; but, in case the Athenians re-
fused to grant them, to renounce the suspension of arms, and,
for the future, never to treat without their concurrence."
The Boeotians, thus solicited by the Corinthians, desired a
longer time to consider about their accession to the Argive
league. To Athens, indeed, they bore them company, but
could not obtain the ten days' truces : for the Athenians an-
swered, " The Corinthians have a peace already, if they are
confederates of the Lacedsmonians." And, upon the whole,
the Boeotians absolutely refused to renounce their own truces,
though the Corinthians insisted upon it, and urged, with
some warm expostulations, that it had been so covenanted
between them. So there was only a mere cessation of arms
between the Corinthians and Athenians, without any solemn
ratification.

This same summer the Lacedsmonians took the field
with their whole united force, under the command of Pleisto-
anax, the son of Pausanias, King of the Lacedaemonians, and .
marched to the Parrhasians of Arcadia. These were subject
to the Mantineans, and, in consequence of a sedition, hadf in-
fited this expedition. But it was also designed, if possibleb

64 PfiLOPONNBBIAN WAR. [bo(MK V.

to demolish the fortress of Cypsela, which the Mantineans
had erected, and, as it was situated in Parrhasia, towards the
skirts of Laconia, had placed a garrison in it. The Laceda-
fnonians therefore ravaged the territory of the Parrhasians.
But the Mantineans, leaving their own city to the guard of
the Argives, marched themselves to the support of their
dependants. But, finding H impossible to preserve the for*
tress of Oypseta and the cities of the Parrhasians, they re-
tired. The Lacedaemonians also, when they had set the
Parrhasians at liberty, and demolished the fortress, withdrew
their forces.

The same summer also, upon the return from Thrace of
those soldiers who had served under Brasidas, and who came
home after the peace under the conduct of Olearidas, the La-
cedasmonians decreed " those Helots who had served undei
Brasidas to be free, and to hare permission to reside wher-
ever they pleased." And, no long time after, they placed
them together, with such persons as were newly enfranchised,
at Lepreum : it is situated between Laconia and Elea ; and
they were now at variance with the Eleans. As for those
Spartans who had been made prisoners in Sphacteria, and
had delivered up their arms, conceiving some fears aboat
them, lest, should they lay their late disgrace too much to
heart, as they were persons of the greatest rank, they might
introduce some innovations in the state, they declared them
infamous, even though some of the number were at this
time possessed of posts in the government. But this in-
famy extended no farther than to disqualify them from offices,
and from buying and selling : yet, in a short time afterward,
they were again restored to their full privileges.

The same summer also the Diotideans took Thyssns, i
town seated upon the Atbos, and confederate with the Athe-
nians.

Through the whole course of the summer, the communica-
tion was open between the Peloponnesians and Athenians.
Not but that the Athenians and LacedaBmonians began to be
jealous of one another immediately after the peace, as the
reciprocal restitution of places was not punctually performed.
For, though it had fallen to the Lacedaemonians' lot to begin
these restitutions, yet they had not restored Amphipdis and
other cities. They had compelled neither their confederates
in Thrace, nor the Boeotians, nor the Corinthians, to accept

YEAH Xl-l PELOPOKNESIAN WAR. 86

Ae peace, always pretending that, ^'ahoald they mfuae it,
they were ready to join with the Athenians in their corapal-
sioD ;" nay, they hmited to them a time, though not hy m
reeular written notice, " within which such as did not ac-
cede were declared enemies to both." The Atheniaasi there-
fore, seeing none of these points were JNit in actual executioDi
became jealous of the Lacedemonians, as men who acted in-
sincerely in etery step ; insomuch that, when Pyhis was re-
demauded, they refused its restitution, and heartily repented
that they had released the prisonen taken at Sphacteria.
They also kept possession of other places, and intended to do
so tUl the other side had performed their engagements. But
the Lacedaemonians alleged *< they had done every thing in
their power ; that, for instance, they had released such Athe-
nians as were prisoners among them, had recalled their sol-
diers from Thrace, and, wherever they were masters of the
execution, had performed it^ As to Amphipolis," they said,
** they were not so far masters of it as to maike an actual sniv
render. They had omitted no endeavours to brinff the Boeo-
tians and Gorin^ians to a compliance, to recover the disposal
of Panactum, and to obtain the dismission of those Atheni-
ans who were prisoners of war in Boeotia. Pylus, however,"
they insisted, ** should immediately be restored to them ; at
least, that he Messenians and Helots should be withdrawn,
as their people had been from Thrace ; and then the Athe-
nians, if they pleased, might conttnue to garrison that fortress
themselves." Many meetings were held, and much argumen-
tation passed between them this summer ; and at last they
prevailed upon the Athenians to withdraw from Pylus the
Messenians and others, as well Helots as all deserters what-
ever out of Laconia. These they transplanted to Crania of
Cephallene. This summer, therefore, was a season of inac-
tion, and the intercourse was open between them.

In the ensuing winter, for other ephori were in office, as
the authority of those under whom the peace was made was
now expired, and some who were averse to the peace had
succeeded, embassies attending from the whole confederacy,
the Athenians, and Boeotians, and Corinthians also being
present, and after much reciprocal altercation, coming to no
regular agreement, the rest of them separated to their own
knnes without effect. But Cleobulus and Xenares, those
two of the ephori who were most inclined to dissolve the

86 PBL0P0NNE8IAN WAR. [bOOK Y.

peace, detained the Bosotians and CorlDthians for » private
conference. In this they exhorted them " to act unanimoas-
Iv in promotion of their scheme ; in poisuance of which the
ficBotians should first make themselves a party in the Argive
leagae, and then employ their good offices to form an alliance
between the Argifes and Lacedemonians : for, by these meth*
ods, the- BoBOtians could least of all be necessitated to take
part in the Attic peace ; as the Lacedsmonians would prefer
the renewal of friendship and alliance with the Argives to the
enmity of the Athenians and the dissolution of Uie peace ;
since, to their certain knowledge, the Lacedasmonians had
ever been desirous to have the friendship of Argos, consist-
ently with their honour ; knowing it would facilitate the suc-
cess of their war without Peloponnesus." They also request-
ed the Boeotians ** to deliver up Panactum to the Lacedaemo-
nians ; that, exchanging it if possible for Pylus, they might get
clear of the main obstacle to a fresh rupture with the Athe-
nians."

The BcBOtians and Corinthians, instructed by Xenares. and
Cleobulus, and the party in their interest at Lacedemon, de-
parted, both, to report this scheme to their principals. But
two persons, of the greatest authority in the state of Argos,
were attending upon the road for their return. They met,
and conferred with them ** about the means of gaining the
concurrence of the Boeotians in this league, upon the same
footing with the Corinthians, and Eleans, and Mantineans :
for they were confident, were this point once completed, they
might easily become the arbiters of war or peace, either in
relation to the Lacedemonians (if they so determined, and
would act together with firm unanimity), or to take any other
state whatever."

The Boeotian ambassadors were highly delighted with this
discourse. The solicitations of these Argives happened to co-
incide with the instructions recommended to them by their
firiends at Lacedsmon. And the Argives, finding them sat-
isfied with their motion, assured ihem they would send am-
bassadors to the Boeotians, and so they parted.

But the Boeotians, at their return^ reported to the rulera
of Boeotia the proposals from Lacedemon, and those from the
Argives upon the road. The Boeotian rulers ^ere delighted,
and grew now more zealous than ever ; because, on both sides,
fi»m their Lacedsmonian friends, and also from the ArgtyeSf

rSAR Xf.] PBL0PONNE8IAM WAR. 87

ihe solickationa were concarrent. And, wery soon alUr, tiM
Argive ambasBadon anived to forward the despatch of the
treaty. The Bceotian nilerS) howeTer, at present, gave only
a Terbal approbation of the scheme, and then dismissed then, .
promising to send an embassy of their own to Aigos to per>
feet the alliance.

But, in the meantime, it was judged to be previoasly expo-
dient that the Boeotian rulers, and the Corinthians, and the
Megareans, and the ambassadors from the allies of Thrace,
should matually interchange their oaths, ** to act in support
of one another, if upon any occasion such support might be
requisite, and to enter neither into war nor pesce without
joint consent ;** and then the Boeotians and Megareans (for
these acted in union) to form a league with the ArgiTes : but,
before such exchange of oaths, the Boeotian rulers communi-
cated the whole of the plan to the four Boeotian councils, in
whom the sovereignty is lodged ; recommending it, as wor-
thy their confirmation, that " whatever cities were willinr
might mutually intorchange such oaths for their reciprocal
advantage." Yet the Boeotians who composed the councils
refused a confirmation; apprehensive it might tend to em-
broil them with the Lacediemonians, sboujd they pledge such
an oath to the Corinthians, who were now abandoning the
Lacedsmonian interest : for the rulers had not made them
privy to the scheme from Lacedemon, how '* Xenares and
Cleobulus, of the college of ephori, and their friends, advise
them to enter first into lea^e with the Argives and Corin-
thians, and then to extend it to the Lacedemonians." They
had presumed that the supreme council, though they secreted
these lights, would not resolve against a plan which them-
selves had predigested and recommended to them. But
now, as this affair took so wrong a turn, the Corinthians and
ambassadors from Thrace went home without effect ; and
the Boeotian rulers, who had all along[ intended, in case their
scheme had passed, to perfect an alliance with the Argives,
made no farther report to the councils in relation to the Ar-
gives, sent no embassy to Argos in consequence of theii
promise, but suffered the whole plsn to sink away in careless
and dilatory unconcern.

In this same winter the Olynthians, after a sudden assault,
took Mecybeme, which was garrisoned by Athenians.

After the former proceedings, — for conferences were still

88 PBLOIMJNNESIAW WAR. [boOB ^V.

continued between the Athenians and LacediBoionians about
those places they held from one another, the Lacedamo-
nians, conceiving some hope that, if the Athenians could re-
cover Panactum from the Bceotians, they also inight regain
Pylus, addressed themselves in solemn embassy to the £»o>
tians, and importuned them to deliver up Panactum and the
Athenian prisoners, that- they in return might get Pylus from
them. But the Boaotians persisted in a refusal, unless they
would make a separate alliance with them, as they had done
with the Athenians. Upon this the Lacedemonians, though
convinced that such a step would be injustice to the Athe-
nians, since it had been stipulated that, ** without joint con-
sent, they should neither make peace nor war,'* yet, bent on
the recovery of Panactum, that they might exchange it for
Pylus, the party at the same time among them who were
meditating a fresh rupture, inclining to the Boeotian interest,
made the requisite alliance in the very close of this winter on
the approach of spring. The consequence was, that Panac-
tum was immediately levelled with the ground; and the
eleventh year of the war was brought to a conclusion.

YKAR xn.*

Eafl^ in the spring of that summer which was now ap-
proachmg, the Argives, — ^when the expected embassy from
Boeotia was not arrived in pursuance of promise, when they
found that Panactum was demolished, ana a separate alliance
struck op between the Boeotians and Lacedflsmonians, — ^be-
gan to fear they should be totally abandoned, and that theii
whole confederacy would go over to the Lacedaemonians.
They concluded that, through the prevalence of the Lacede-
monian arguments, the Boeotians had been persuaded to level
Panactum and accede to the treaty made with Athens, and
that the Athenians were privy to all these steps ; and so, of
consequence, they themselves were now utterly excluded
from an alliance with the Athenians, and their former hopes
entirely blaster* that, in case disputes should arise, and their
treaty with the Lacedaemonians not be renewed, they might,
at worst, depend on gaining the Athenian alliance. The At-

K'ves, therefore, amid these perplexities, and the dread of
ling attacked at once by the Lacedaemonians and Te

* Before Christ 420.

TEAR XIl.J PELOPONNESIAN WAU. 89

geats, by the Bcsotians and Athenians, as they had formerly
refosed an accommodation with the Lacedemonians, and had
grasped in thought at the sovereignty of Peloponnesus ; — tiie
Argives, I say, had no longer one moment to lose, but de-
spatched instantly Eustropbus and iEson, whom they judged
to be per^ns most agreeable there, in embassy to Lace-
demon. They now judged it their interest to procure the
best peace which the present posture of aifaiis would allow
from the Lacedaemonians, and then quietly to attend the
event of things. In this view the ambassadors, on their ar-
rival, bad a conference with the LacedsBmonians about the
terms of a peace ; and at first the Argives insisted that, ** to
some state or private person should be referred, for equi-
table arbitration, the controversy between them about the dis-
trict of Cynoria ;" concerning which, as it is frontier to both,
they are eternally at variance : in this district stand the
cities of Thyrea and Anthena, and the possession of it is in
the hands of the Lacedemonians. But, at length, when the
Lacedemonians would not suffer any mention to be made of
this, declaring only that,. ** were they wiling to renew the
former truce, they should find them complying," the Argive
ambassadors, however, prevailed upon the Lacedaomonians to
agree to these proposals : that, ** for the present, a peace
should be concluded for the term of fifty years ; provided,
notwithstanding, that liberty remain to either party to send a
challenge, when neither was embarrassed by plague or war,
and the right of this district be then decided by arms between
Lacedasmon and Argos, as had formerly been done* when the

* Herodotus relates this remarkable piece of history in Clio.
"They had a conference,'* says he, " and came to an agreement,
that three hundred men on each side should decide the point by
combat, and the land contested should remain the property of
the victors ; that both armies in the meantime should retire
within their respective dominions, nor be present at the combat,
lest, by being spectators, of it, either of them, seeing their coun*
tiymen defeated, might run to their assistance, when articles
were settled, both armies drew off; those selected on each side
for the combat stayed behind and engaged. They fought it out
with equal resolution and fortune ; of six hundred men only
thiee were left alive ; two of them Argives, Alcinor and Chro-
mios ; and one Lacedemonian, Othryades ; these were all the
survivors when night came on. The Argives, as victors, ran in
haste to Argos ; but Othryades, for the Lacedaemonians, having
IL-H

90 PELOPONN£SIAN WAR. [bOOK V-

victory was claimed on both sides : and that, in this case, it
be not lawful to carry the pursuit beyond the boundaries of
either Argos. or Lacedsmon." These proposals, it is true,
appeared at first to the LacedaBmonians to be foolish : hut, at
length, as their necessary interest made them vastly desinme
of the Argive friendship, they complied with the demand, and
the terms agreed on were digested into vn-iting. But the
Lacedemonians, before they put the last hand to the treaty,
insisted on their previous return to Argoe, and reporting it to
the people ; and, in case the ratification was ^ven, to repair
again to Lacedemon, at the Hyacinthian festival, and swear
observance. And upon this they returned to Argos.

While the Argives were employed in this negotiation, the
Lacedaemonian ambassadors, Andromenes, and Pbedimus,
and Antimenidas, who were commissioned to receive Panac-
turn and the prisoners of war from the Boeotians, and deliver
them over into the hands of the Athenians, found, upon their
arrival, that Panactum was already demolished by the Boeo-
tians, upon pretext that, ** in former times, upon occasion ot
some dispute abopt it, an oath had been taken by the Athe-
nians and Boeotians, that neither should inhabit that place,
excluding the other, but should jointly possess it;*' but what
Athenian prisoners of war were in the hands of the Bcsotiane
were delivered up to Andromenes and his colleagues, who
carried and released them to the Athenians. They also re-
ported the demolition of Panactum, declaring this to be equiv-
alent to a restitution, as no enemy to Athens could occupy
that post for the future.

These words were no sooner heard than the Athenians
conceived the deepest resentments. They thought them-
selves injured by the Lacedaemonians, not only in the demo-
lition of Panactum, which ought to have been restored stand-
stripped the dead bodies of the Argives, and carried off their arms
to the place where his own side had encamped, continued upon
the field of battle. Next momihg both parties came to learn the
event ; and then, truly, each party also claimed the victory ; one
averring that a majority survived on their side ; the other main-
taining that even those had fied, while their ovm combatant had
kept his ground and spoiled the dead. In 8)i9rt, from wrangling
they came again to blows and a general engagement ; in which,
after great slaughter on both sides, the Lacedaemonians obtained
the victory."

YEAR XII.] PELOPONNSSIAN WAR. 91

mg, but also in the separate alliance made lately with the
Boeotians, of which they now had notice, in open contradic-
tion to their own declaration, ** of joining them to compel by
force such as would not accede to the treaty." They re-
flected also upon other points in which the engagements of
the treaty had been in nowise fulfilled, and concluded them-
selves overreached. For these reasons they gave a rough
answer to the ambassadors, and an instant dismission.

Upon so much umbrage, taken by the Athenians against
the Lacedaemonians, such persons at Athens as were willing
to dissolve the peace,^ set themselves instMitly at work to ac-
complish their views. Others were labouring the same point,
but none more than Alcibiades, the son of Clinias ;* a per-
son, in respect of age« even then but a youth ; at least he
would have passed for such in the other states, though for the
dignity of his birth he was much honoured and caressed. It

* Alcibiades is here be^nning his political intrigues, to open
the field for his own soanng and enterprising genius to dilate
itself more at large. Pericles was his near relation and guar-
dian ; Socrates was his friend and guide so long as virtue was
his care. Warmer |)a88ions soon gained the ascendant over
him ; smd he plunged into all the busy scenes of life, with that
intense application and flexible address to all persons and all
occasions, which surprised the world ; " more clumgeable than a
chameleon," as Plutarch expresses it, " since that creature can-
not put on a fair or white appearance." His character is thus
drawn in miniature by the neat and masterly pen of Comebus N e-
pos : " Nature," says he, " seems to have exerted her utmost pow-
er in Alcibiades. It is agreed by all writers who have made him
the subject of their pens, tliat a more extraordinary man never ^
lived either for virtues or vices. Bom in a most noble republic, of
a most honourable family, by far the handsomest person of his
age, fit for every thing, and fiill of address ; he was a.command-
er that made the greatest figure both by land and sea ; an orator
whom none could surpass ; nay, his manner and matter, when
he spoke, were quite irresistible. Exactly as occasion required,
he was laborious, persevering, indefatigable, generous ; splendid
in all his outward appearance, and at his table full of affability,
profuse of civility, and of the utmost dexterity in adapting him-
self to the exigences of time ; and yet, in the seasons of relax-
ation, and when business no longer required him to keep his fac-
ulties on the stretch, he was luxurious, dissolute, lewd, and in-
temperate. The whole world was astonished that so vast an un-
iikeness, and so different a nature, diould be united in the same

92 PEL0P0NNB8IAN WAR. [bOOK V-

seemed to him the most expedient step to form a good under-
standing with the Argives. Not but that his opposition to
other measures was the result of his ambition and a study of
contention, because the Lacedaemonians had employed their
interest in Nicias and Laches to perfect the treaty, slighting
his ^bssistance upon account of his youth, nor paying him the
deference he expected from the ancient hospitality between
that state and the family from which he was descended.
This, indeed, his grandfather had renounced ; but he himself,
in the Tiew of renewing it, had shown extraordinary civili-
ties to the Spartans who were made prisoners at Sphacteria.
Thinking himself, therefore, in all respects slighted, at this
crisis he began openly to oppose them: he affirmed, that
" the Lacedaemonians were a people who could not be trust-
ed ; that they had treacherously entered into the peace in
order to divert the Argives from their alliance, that again they
might attack the Athenians when left alone.'* Nay, farther ;
upon the first dissatisfaction between them, he secretly de*
spatched his emissaries to Argos, exhorting them ** at his invi-
tation to come to Athens, in company with the Mantine-
ans and Eleans, and solicit an alliance, since opportunity fa-
voured, and his whole interest should be exerted in their
support."

The Argives having heard these suggestions, and being
now convinced that the Boeotian separate alliance had been
made without the privity of the Athenians, who, on the con-
trary, were highly discontented at the Lacedaemonian pro-
ceedings, took no farther notice of their embassy at Laceda-
mon, though sent expressly there to negotiate an accommo-
dation, but recalled all their attention from thence to the
Athenians. They reflected that Athens, a state which from
long activity had been their friend, which was governed by a
democracy in the same manner as their own, and which was
possessed of a great power at sea, could most effectually sQp-
port them in case a war should break out against them. In
short, they lost no time in despatching their ambassadors to
the Athenians to propose an alliance, who were accompanied
by embassies from the Eleans and Mantineans.

A Lacedaemonian embassy also arrived in ^preat haste, com-
posed of Philocharidas, and Leon, and Endius, persons who
were judged most acceptable at Athens. They were afraid
lest the Athenians, in the heat of their resentment, should

rSAR XII.] PELOPONNB8TAN WAR. 93

dap ap an alliance with the Argives. Thej sent also by
them a demand of the restitution of Pylas, in lieu of Panac-
tom, and excuses for the separate alliance they had made
with ^e Boeotians, " which had been concluded without any
design of prejudicing the Athenians." Upon these points
they spoke before the senate,* notifying at the same time

* The Lacedemonian embassy have, on this occasion, their
first audience from the senate. The business of this history
has been hitherto transacted in the assembly of the ])eople :
ior, as the generals of the state were the chief'^ministers in time
of war, ana had a power of convening the people at their own
discretion, all points that required a speedy determination were
brought before the people in the first instance ; and the influence
of the senate, which operated in ordinary occasions, was check-
ed and suspended in tmie of war, which starts many extraordi-
nary oceasions, or left it in the will of the generals of the state
to ctH and treat as extraordinary whatever they pleased. By
these means the people had engrossed the power : the balance
which Solon designed always to preserve was in a great measure
lost, and the aristocratical mfluence was quite suspended.

As, therefore, the popular assembly had its note at first setting
out, the form and constitution of the senate now require an ex-
planation. At this time it consisted of five hundred persons, and
tor that reason is often styled the council of five hundred, and
sometimes, by Thucydides, the council of the bean, from the
manner of their election. Every year, on an appointed day,
each tribe returned the names of their members who were quali
fied and stood candidates for this honour. The names were
engraved on pieces of brass, and cast into a vessel ; the same
number of beans was cast into another vessel, fifty of which
were white and the rest black. They then proceeded to draw
out a name and a bean, and the persons to whom the white beans
were drawn became the senators of the year. Each senator had
a drachma, that is, seven pence three farthings, a day for his
salary.

In the next place, the names of the tribes were thrown into a
vessel, and into another nine black beans and one white one ; the
tribe to whose name the white bean was drawn took the first
course of presidency for a tenth part of the year, and the order
of the succeeding course was determined in the same manner by
the bean. How the fifty in course were again subdivided into
tens, and from these tens a chairman chosen for a day, has been
already expbdned in the note on the popular assembly. Book I.

The senate sat every dav in the prytaneum, or state-house,
where the presidents had also their diet. They were the grand
council of state r took into consideration all the affairs of the

94 PELOFONNESIAN WAR. [,B0OX V.

that <^ they were come with full power to put an end to all
disputes ;" by which they gave some alarm to Alcibiades,
lest, should they make the same declaration before the asseia-
bly of the people, it mi^ht have an influence upon the multi'^
tude, and an alliance with the Argives mig^t proTe abortiTC.

But ^Icihiades now contriyed to baffle them by art. He
prevailed upon the Lacedaemonians, by solemnly pledging hia
faith to them, that " in case they would disown, before the
people, the full powers with which they were invested, he
would engage for the restitution of Pylus ; for he himself
would then persuade the Athenians to it with as much zeal
as he now dissuaded, and would get all other points adjusted
to their satisfaction." His yiew in acting thus was to de^
tach them from Nicias, and to gain an opportunity of inveigh-
ing against them, in the assembly of the people, as men who
had nothing sincere in their intentions, ana whose profession?
were dissonant with themselves ; and so to perfect an alli-
ance with the Argives, and Eleans, and Mantineans. And
this artifice in the sequel took effect : for, when they were
admitted to ^n audience before the people, and replied to the
demand, when put, contrary to what they had said in the
senate, that " they had no such powers," the Athenians in
an instant lost all patience. And now, Alcibiades roaring
out aloud against the Lacedaemonians with much more vehe-
mence than he had ever done before, they listened greedily
to all he said, and were ready instantly to call in the Argives
and their companions, and to make them confederates. But
the shock of an earthquake being fek before any thing could
be formally concluded, the assembly was adjourned.

At the next day's assembly Nicias, though the Lacedaa-

commonwealth ;• debated, and voted by beans ; and whatever de-
terminations were thus made in the s^iate were afterward car-
ried down to the assembly of the people, to be ratified and pass-
ed into laws. By Solon's original constitution, nothing was to
be proposed to the people before it had been canvassed and ap-
proved in the senate : but this seems to have been eluded by the
generals oi the state, who had all the military business in their
lepartment, and a power to convene the people at their pleasure,
and lay matters before them in the first instance. To restore
the anstocratical power, and reduce that of the people, occa-
sioned a usurpation and sad confusion in Athens, as will be seen
in the eighth book oi this history.

YEAB XII.] PELOPONNS8IAN WAR. 95

monians had bean thus OTerreached, and fa« himaelf ioMom-
red by their public acknowledgment that they had no full
powers, spoke, however, on the Lacedsmonian side, insisting
** on the necessity of maintaming a good correspondence with
them, and deferring all agreement with the Ar^ves till they
eonld send to the Lacedemonians, and be distmctly inform-
ed of their final resolations. It makes,** said he, "for
yonr credit, bat for their disgrace, that a war should be
ayerted: for as your a&irs are in a happy posture, it is
above all things eligible for you to preserve your prosperity
unimpaired ; but they, in their present low situation, snould
pat aU to luueard in the hopes of redress.*' He carried it, in
short, that ambassadors should be despatched, he himself to
be one in the commission, ** earnestly to require of the La-
cedaemonians, that, if their intentions were honest, they
should surrender Panactum standing, and Amphipolis ; and
should, farther, renounce the alliance with the BcBotians, in
case they still refused to accede to the peace : this in pursu-
ance of the article, that * neither should make peace without
joint consent.* '* They ordered it to be added, farther, that
'* they themselves, could they have deigned to act unjustly,
had concluded before this an alliance with the Argives, as
they were alreadymttending and soliciting such a measure."
And, having subfoined their instructions in relation to all
other points in which they thought themselves aggrieved,
they sent away the ambassadors in commission along with
Nicias. These being arrived, and having reported their in-
structions, added, in conclusion, that "unless they would
renounce their alliance with the Bceotians, if still refusing
their accession to the peace, they would admit the Argives
and their associates into league.*' The Lacedsmonians re-
plied, " they would never renounce their alliance with theBoeo-
tians :** for the party of Xenares, the ephorus, and all those
who acted in the same combination, had still the majority :
however, at the request of Nicias, they renewed the oatijs.
Nicias was afraid of being forced to depart without settling
any one point of his commission, and of falling under public
censure (which really came to pass), as undoubted author of
the peace with the Lacedaemonians. And when, upon his
return, the Athenians had heard that no one point was adjust-
ed at Lacedsmon, they immediately conceived the warmest
indignation ; and, looking upon themselves as highly abased,

96 F£L0P0NN£8IAN WAR. [bOOK V

Alcibiades introducing the Argives and their associates, who
were still at Athens, they entered into treaty, and an alliance,
offensive and defensive, with them, as follows :-^

** The Athenians, and Argives, and Eleans, and Mantine-
ans, for themselves and their respective dependants on all
sides, have made a peace, to continue for the term of a hun-
dred years, without fraud and without violence, both at land
and at 8§a.

*' Be it unlawful to take up offensive arms, either by the
Argives, and Eleans, and Mantineans, or their dependants,
against the Athenians and dependants of the Athenians ; or
by the Athenians and their dependants against the Argives,
and Eleans, and Mantineans, and their dependants, without
any artifice or evasion whatsoever. On these conditions the
Athenians, and Argives, and Eleans, and Mantineans, to be
confederates for one hundred years.

" Provided that, in case an enemy invade the territoiy of
the Athenians, the Argives, and Eleans, and Mantineans
march to the succour of the Athenians, in strict conformity
to a summons received from Athens, in the most vieorous
manner they may be able, to the fulness of their abilities.

*< But if the enemvt after ravaging, be affain withdrawn,
the state under which they acted to be declared an enemy
to the Argives, and Mantineans, and Eleans, and AtKenians ;
and to be pursued with the offensive arms of all those confed-
erate states.

** And farther, that it be not lawful for any of the contract-
ing states to lay down their arms against that state which
hath so offended, without the consent of all the rest.

** The Athenians also to march to the succour of Argos,
and Mantinea, and Elis, in case an enemy invade the terri-
tory of the Eleans, or that of the Mantineans, or that of the
Argives, in strict conformity to a summons received from
any of those states, in the most vigorous manner they may
be able, to the fulness of their abilities.

''But if the enemy, after ravaging, be again withdrawn,
the state under which they acted to be declared an enemy
to the Athenians, and Argives, and Mantineans, and Eleans,
and to be pursued with the offensive arms of all these con-
federate sutes.

" And farther, that it be not lawful to lay down their arms
against the state which hath so offended, without thf joint
r '* these contracting states.

r£AR XII.] PBLOPONNB8IAN WAR. 97

*' Thmtno armed force be admitted to paes in order for war
through any of their retpectiTe dominions, or those of their
respective dependants, nor along their sea, unless such a pas-
sage be granted unanimously by all the contracting parties,
by the Athenians, and Argives, and Mantineans, and Eleans.

** Agreed, farther, that when the auxiliaries attend, the
state which summoned them supply them with thirty days'
provision so soon as they shall have entered the temtory of
the state which summoned their attendance^ atid the same at
their departure.

** And, if there be occasion for the attendance of such an
auxiliary force for a larger space, that the state which sent
for it maintain that force, by paying to every soldier, heavy-
armed and light-armed, and every archer, three oboli of
JEgiDA* a day, and a drachma of ^gina to eveiy horseman.

** But the state which sent for auxiliaries to have the su-
preme command, so long as the war continoeth within its
district.

*' If, farther, it be agreed by the contracting states to act
offensively with their united forces, the command then to be
equally divided among all the states.

** That the Athenians swear to observe these articles in
their own names and those of their dependants ; but the Ar-
gives, and Mantineans, and Eleans, and the dependants of
these, are to swear separately, each state for itself.

" Each party to take the oath in the most solemn fashion
of their own country, in the most sacred manner, with the
choicest victims. The terms of the oaths to be thus conceiv-
ed: *I will stand by the alliance, according to covenant,
justly, honestly, and sincerely ; and I will not transgress its
obligation by any £raud or evasion whatsoever.'

" To be sworn —

** At Athens, by the senate and the city magistrates : the
presidents in course to administer the oath.

" At Argos, by the senate, and the eighty, and the artynas :
the eighty to administer the oath.

" At Mantinea, by the demiurgi, and the senate, and the

♦ The value of three oboli of iEgina is about sixpence, and
the drachma of ^gina nearly one shilling, English ; for, accord-
ing to Dr. Arbuthnot, the talent of .£gina consisted of a bun-
dled Attic min», and, therefore, was larger than the Attic talent
in the proportion of one hundred to sixty. •

98 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK V,

other magistrates : the theori and poleraarchs to administer
the oath.

** At Elis, by the demiurgi, and the officers of state, and
the six hundred : the deminrgi and the ke^ers of the sacred
records to administer the oath.

" These oaths to be renewed : for which purpose the
Athenians to repair to Elis, to Mantineaf and to Ai]goe,
thirty days before the Olympic gamee. Bot the Argives,
and Eleans, and Mantiiieans, are to repair to Athens, ten
days before the great Panathensea.

'* The articles relating to this peace, and these oaths, and
thia alHance, to >be inscribed on a column of stone,

" By the Athenians, in the citadel :

" By the Argives, in the forum, in the tem|^e of Apolh> .

" By the Mantineans, in the temple of Jupiter, in the fo-
rum : and

*< All jointly to erect, by way of memorial, a braxen pillar
at Olympia, at the Olympics now approaching.

" If it be judged expedient, by any of the contracting
states, to make any additions to these articles already agreed,
whatever, in pursuance of this, be deemed proper, by the
joint determination of all parties, the same to be valid,"

A peace and alliance, offensive and defensive, were in this
manner concluded ; and those subsisting between the Lace-
daemonians and Athenians were not, upon this account, re-
nounced by either side.

The Corinthians, however, who were confederates of the
Argives, refused to accede ; but, what is more, they had
never sworn to the alliance made previous to this between
the Eleans, and Argives, and Mantineans, " to have the same
foes and the same friends." They pretended that the defen*
sive league already made was quite sufficient, "io succour
one another, but not to concur in an offensive war." In this
manner the Corinthians were drawing off from the league,
and again warped in their inclinations towards the Lacedae-
monians.

The Olympics were solemnized this summer, in which
Androsthenes, the Arcadian, was for the first time victor in
the Pancrace, and the Lacedaemonians were excluded the
temple by the Eleans, so that they could neither sacrifice nor
enter the lists. They had not discharffed the fine set upon
them by the Eleand*, by virtue of the O^pic laws, who had

YEAR XII.] FBLOPONNE8IAN WAR. 99

ehaiged them with a eonveymee of amM into the fort of
PhyrooD, and with throwing tome of their hearf-armed into
L^nreiM^ dnrinf the Olympic ceiaation. The fine impoaed
was two thouaand mine,* at the rate of two minv for every
heavy-armed soldier, agreeably to the letter of the law.

The Lacednmonians, upon this, despatched an embassy to
remonstrate against the injustice of the sentence ; that ^ the
cessation had net been notified at Lacedsmon when they
threw in their heavy-aimed."

The Eleans repUed, that "the cessation was aheady m
force ; fur they proclaim it first among themselves ; and so,
while they were quiet, and expected no such usage, they had
been wronged by a surprise.*'

The Lacedemonians retorted, that, ** if so, it was needless
for them to proceed to a publication of it in Lacedemon, if
the Eleans had already judged themsehres wronged. But
the fact was far different in the light they saw it, aira trespass
bad not been committed in any shape whatever.'*

But the Eleans adhered to their first charse, that " they
could not be persuaded the Lacedemonians had not wronged
them ; yet, in case they were willingr to surrender Lepreum
to them, they are ready to remit their share of the fine, and
to pay for them that part of it which was due to the god.**

But, when this would not content, it was urged again by
the Eleans, that^ ** if they were unwilling to part with it, they
should by no means surrender Lepreum ; but then, as they
were desirous to have the use of the temple, they must go
up to the altar of Olympian Jupiter, and swear, in the pres-
ence of the Grecians, that they would hereafter pay the fine.'*
But, as they also refused to comply with this, the Lace-
demonians were excluded the temple, the sacrifice, and the
games, and performed their own sacrifices at home. Tet the
rest of the Grecians, except the Lepreate, were admitted to
assist at the s<^mnity.

The Eleans, however, apiHrehensive they would sacrifice by
force, set a guard of their armed youths around the temple.
The<M» were re-enforced by the Argives and Mantineans, a
Ihoasand of each, and a party of Athenian horse who were at
\rg08 in readings to attend the festival. But a great con-
tt«mation had seized the whole assembly of united Greece^

* 2000 mine— 6,458<. 6«. 8d. sterling.

100 PELOPONNESiAN WAR. [bOOK V.

lest the LaGedsmoniant shoiild return with an amied lorcc ;
more especially wheo Lichas, the son of Aicbesilaus, a Lm-
cedaBmonian, was scourged iiiNthe coorse by the ooder offi-
cers, because, when his chariot had gained the prize, and the
chariot of the Bcsotian state was proclaimed victor, pursuant
to the exclusion of the Lacedsmonians from the race, he step-
ped into the midst of the assembly and crowned the chaxiot-
eer, desirous to make it known that the chariot belonged to
him. Upon this the whole assembly was more than ever
alarmed, and it was fully expected that some strange event
would follow : the Lacedaemonians, however, made no bustle ;
and the festival passed regularly through its train.

After the Olympics, the Argives and their confederates
repaired to Corinth, in ot^er to solicit the concurrence of
that state. A Lacedaemonian embassy happened also to
be there. Many conferences were held, and nothing finally
determined : but, upon feeling the shock of an earUiquake,
they parted each to their respective cities. And here the
summer ended.

In the ensuing winter a battle was fought by the Heracle-
ots of Trachis against the iSnianians, and Dolopians, and
Meliensians, and some of the Thessalians. For the border-
ing nations were enemies to the city of Heraclea, as this lat-
ter place had been fortified for their more especial annoyance.
From its foundation they had ever opposed it, preventing its
ffrowth to the utmost of their power ; and at this time they
defeated the Heracleots in a battle, in which Xenares, the
son of Cnidis, the Lacedaemonian commandant, was slain ; a
number also of the Heracleots perished. And thus the win-
ter ended : and the twelfth year of the war came also to an
end.

YEAR xin.*
The succeeding summer was no sooner begun than the
Boeotians, viewing the low estate to which it hM been redu-
ced by the late battle, took into their own hands the city of
Heraclea, and discharged Hegesippidas, the Lacedaemonian
commandant, as guilty of maleadministration. Tliey took
this city into their own hands, fronv the ap|irehension that,
danng the embroilments of the Lacedaemonians in Pelopon»

* Before Christ 419.

VKAR Xlli.] PBLOPONKESIAN WAR. 101

J the Athenians might seize it. The Lacedemonians,
bovrever, were chagrined at this step of the Boeotians.

This same jammer also, Alcibiades, the son of Clinias,
beii^ general of the Athenians, with the concurrence of the
Argives and their allies, entered Peloponnesus with a small
partj of heavy-armed Athenians and archers, and enlarged
his forces upon his route by the aids of the confederates in
those quarters ; where he not only made such a disposition
of a&irs as might best answer the views of the alliance, but
also, traversing Pelq>onne8U8 with his force, he both persua-
ded the Patreans to continue their works quite down to the
sea, and intended also to execute a plan of his own for erect*
ing a fort upon the Rhium of Achaia.* But the Corinthians
axA Sicyonians, and all such as were alarmed at the annoy-
ance this fort might give them, rushed out to prevent him,
and obliged him to desist.

The same summer a war broke out between the Epidauri-
ans and the Argives. The pretext was grounded on a viC'
tun due from the Epidaurians to the Pythian Apollo, as an
acknowled^ent for their pastures; for the Argives were
now the cmef managers of the temple. But, this pretended
grievance set apart, it had been judged expedient, by Alcibi-
ades and the Argives, to get possession, if possible, of Epi-
daurus, in order to prevent molestation on the side of Corinth,
and to render the passage of Athenian succours more expedi-
tious from ^gina than by fetching a compass about Scyl-
laeum. The Argives, therefore, were intent on their prepar-
ations, as resolved to take the field and act against Epidau-
ms, in order to exact the victim by force of arms.

But, about the same time, the Lacedaemonians also march-
ed out, with their whole force, as far as to Leuctra, upon
their own frontier, towards Lyceum, under the command of
A^, the son of Archidamus, their king. Not a man was
pnvy to the design of their thus taking the field, not even the
states from which the quotas were furnished out. But, when
the victims they sacrificed for a successful campaign proved
inauspicious, they again marched home, and circulated fresh

* This was a grand project indeed ! It aimed at no less than
the total ruin of Corinth, and putting an end to all the naviga-
tion of that trading and opulent city through the Bay of Crissa.
The Athenians were already entire masters of the sea on the
other side of the isthmus.

102 PBI.OPOMNB8IAN WAR. [boOK V«

orders to their coafederates to be ready to take the field
again after the next month, which was the month Cameius,*
the grand festival of the Dorians. Bat, when they were thas
withdrawn, the Argives, taking the field on the twenty-sev-
enth day of the month preceding Cameius, and though cel-
ebrating their own festival that very day, continued all this
inteimMiate time to make incursions and ravages upon £pi-
dauria. The £pidaurians sent about to solicit the succours
of their allies ; some of whom excused themselves as bound
to observe the approaching festivals, though others advanced
as far as the frontiers of Epidauria, and .then refused, to actw
And, during the space of time that the Argives were in Epi«
dauria, embassies from the several states held a congress at
Manttnea, at the request of the Athenians ; and, proceeding
to a cimference, Ephamidas, the Corinthian, remonstrated,
that " their words were by no means consistent with their
actions ; for while they were here sitting together upon the
terms of peace, ^ Epidaurians and allies, smd the Argives,
were opposing one another in arms : that, consequently, the
first thing to be done was to send deputations <m both sides
to disband those armies, and then orderly to proceed to treat
of peace." t Yielding, therefore, to the justice of such a re-
monstrance, they fetched the Argives out of Epidauria ; and,
returning to the congress, they were not able even then to
agree together : upon which the Argives once more entered
Epidauria, and resumed the ravage.

The Lacedaemonians now hflul taken the field, and were
advanced to Oaryaa ; but, as now again the victims sacri-
ficed portended no success to a campaign, they once more
withdrew.

The Argives also/ after ruining about a third of the terri-

* This festival was observed by most cities in Greece ; but
with the greatest pomp and solemnity at Sparta, where it be«m
the thirteenth of tne month Caineius, according to the Laced».
monian style, and lasted nine days. A camp was formed for its
celebration, in which thejr continued during the whole solemni-
ty, and observed strict military discipline. By these means, as
we find a little lower, the Argives, in this instance no slaves to
superstition, attended to the festival and war&re at the same
time, and annoyed the Epidaurians, while religious awe re-
strained the friends of the latter firom acting in their defence
—See Potter^ s ArchdBologia, vol. i., p. 408.

nSARXIY.] PE1.0P0NNB81AN WAR. 103

taij of Epidaiiria, were retamed.home. In this incnnioii
tbf^^ were assisted by one thousand* heavy-armed Atkeniaiu,
with Alcibiades at their head ; who, having heard^ that the
Lacedsmonians had now leil the field, as their service was
now no longer needful, marched away. And in this manner
the summer passed.

In the beginning of the next winter the Lacedemomana,
unknown to the Athenians, threw a body of men, to the nnm«
ber of three hundred, with Hegesippidas as commandant, into
Epidaurus by sea. Upon this the Argives repaired instant^
to Athens^ with remonstrances, that, " though it was ezpli*
citly mentioned in thtf^ treaty that no enemy should be suf-
fered to pass through their respective dominions, yet they had
permitted the Lacedsmonians to make this passage by sea
without molestation.* Unless, therefore, they wouui replace
the Messeuians and Helots in Pylus, to anooy the Lacedas-
monians, they should deem themselves agCTieved." Upon
this the Athenians, at the instigation of Alcibiades, under-
wrote this charge upon the Laconic column, that " the Lace-
daemonians were guilty of perjury ;" and removed the Helots
from Crania into Pylus, to resume their depredations, but re-
frained from any other act of hostility.

In the course of this wmter, though the Aigives and £pi-
daurians were at war, yet no regular battle was fought be-
tween them. The hostilities consisted of ambusca^s and
skirmishes, in which, accordiog to the chaoce of action, some
persons perished on both sides.

But in the close of winter, when the spring was now ap-
proaching, the Argives, provided with ladders for scaling, came
under Epidaurus, hoping to take it by surprise, as insuffi-
ciently manned by reason of the war^; buty failing of success,
they soon withdrew. And then the winter ended, and with
it ended also the thirteenth year of the wax.

"VBAR XIV. t

About the middle of the ensuing summer, when their con-
federates, the Epidaurians, were sadly distressed, when some

♦ The Argives, in this remonstrance, acknowledged the do-
minion of the sea, even on the coast of Pelopomeaus, to belong
to Athens.

t B^oreC%rist418.

104 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK V.

of the Peloponnesians had already revolted, and others
showed plainly a spirit of discontent, the Lacedaemonians
were clearly convinced that, unless expeditiously prevented,
the mischief would spread abroad. Upon this they took the
field against Argos with their whole force, both themselves
and their Helots ; and Agis, the son of Archidamus, King of
the Lacedemonians, commanded in chief. They were at-
tended in the field by the Tegeats, and all the other Arca-
dians whatever confederated with the Lacedemonians. But
the allies of the other parts of Peloponnesus, and those with-
out the isthmus, were assembled at Phlius : — ^the Boeotians,
consisting of five thousand heavy^armed, and the same nuna-
ber of light-armed ; five hundred horsemen, each attended by
a soldier on foot ; — the Corinthians, of two thousand heavy-
armed ; — ^the other confederates with their several quotas ; —
but the Phliasians with the whole of their force, because the
army was assembled in their district.

The Argives, who had some time before intelligence of
the Lacedemonian preparations, and that since they were
filing towards Phlius in order to join the forces assembled
there, now took the field themselves. They were joined by
a^ succour of the Mantmeans, strengthened by the addition
of their dependants, and three thousand heavy-armed Eleans.
Upon their march they fell in with the Lacedemonians at
Methydrium of Arcadia. £ach party posted itself upon a ri-
sing ground. The Argives got every thing in readiness to
attack the Lacedemonians while yet they were alone ; but
Agis, dislodginff by night and stealing a march, completed
his junction wiUi the body of confederates at Phlius. When
this was perceived by the Argives, they drew off early the
next dawn, first of all to Argos, and then to the pass on the
route of Nemea, by which they expected the Lacedemo-
nians, with their confederates, would fall into their country.
Yet Agis took not that route which they expected ; but, hav-
ing communicated his design to the Lacedemonians, and
Arcadians, and Epidaurians, he took a different route, though
much less practicable, and descended into the plains of Argos.
The Corinthians, and Pellenians, and Phliasians, followed
by another more direct route ; and orders had been given to
the Boeotians, and Megareans, and Sicvonians, to take the
route which leads to Nemea, on which the Argives were
posted, that, in case the Argives should march i\ito the plain

^ rSABXIV.] PBLOPONNBSIAN WAR. 105

to make head against the Laceda^onians, the last with their
caTafay might press npon their rear.

After these disposilions, and such a descent into the plain,
Agtt ravaged Saminthus and other places ; npon intelligence
if ^tHiich, the Aigives, so soon as it was day, dislodged from
Nemea to stop the depredations, and on their march met
with a body of Phliasians and Corinthians v and, ^ncoun-
tenng, slew some few of the Phliasians, while not a much
greater nnmber of their own men were destroyed by the Co
rintluaiie. The Boeotians also, and Megareans, and Sicyo-
otans, took the route of Nemea conformably to orders, and
» found the Argives already dislodged ; bat the latter, upon
entering the plain, and in yiew of the ravage made upon their
holds. Stew up in order of battle. The Lacedfemonians
stood regulaiiy drawn up on the other side. And now the
Aigires were shut up in the middle of their enemies : for,
on the side of the plain, the Lacedsmonians, and those in
their body, intercepted their return to the city ; on the high
ground above them were the Corinthians, and Phliasians, and
reUenians ; on the other part, towards Nemea, were the
Boeotians, and Sicyonians, and Megareans. Cavalry they had
none : for the Athenians were the only part of their confed-
eracy who were not yet come up.

llie bulk, indeed, of the Argives and confederates appre-
hended not the danger which at present environed them to
be so great ; but rather concluded they might engage with
advantage, and that they had caught the Lacedemonians fast
within their tenitory, and near to Argos itself. Two Argives,
however, — Tfara^llus, one of the five in command, and Alci-
phfOD, the public host of the LacedMnonians, — the very in-
stant the armies weie moving to the charge, had addressed
themselves to Agis, and proposed expedients to prevent a
battle, giving their word thftt " the Argives were ready to do
and to submit to justice, upon a fair and equitable arbitration,
in ease the Laoedmnonians had any charge against them ;
sad for the future would life at peace, if a present acconmio-
dation could be effected."

In thie manner these Argives presumed to talk, merely of
themsrives, and without the* public authority. Agis also, bv
his own private determination, accepted the proposals; and^
withont reporting them to the council of war, without can-
— mg Ifanigs maturely himself, or at least eommunicating

n.— I

106 PBLOPONNBSIAN WAR. [bOOK Y

only with one person of the number which had authority io
the army, granted them a four months' truce, " in which
space they wei^ to make good what engaflements they had
now made ;" and then instantly drew off ue army, without
imparting the reasons of his conduct to the other confeder-
ates. The Lacedasmonians, indeed, and confederates, fol-
lowed when he led them off, because their laws exacted such
obedience ; yet, among themselves, wew lavish of their coi-
sure against Agis, that, when so fine an opportunity of enga-
ging was in their power, when their enemies were hemmed in
on all sides, both by their horse and their foot, they were
drawn off, without performing any thing worthy of such
mighty preparations ; for, to this very day, a finer army of
Grecians had never appeared in the field. A most gallant
figure, in truth, it made, while they were all together at Ne-
mea. The Lacedsmonians were there to be seen with the
whole collected force of their state, accompanied by the Ar-
cadians, and Boeotians, and Corinthians, and Sicyonians, and
Pellenians, and Phliasians, and Megareans. The troops
which composed their several quotas were all picked men,
and were judged a match in the field of battle, not only for
the whole Argive alliance, but the addition of double strength.
This great army, however, laying all the time most heavy
imputations on the conduct of Agis, drew off, and were dis-
banded to their several habitations.

On the other part also, the Argtves were still much more
exasperated against those who had made this suspension with-
out public authority. They imagined the Lacedemonians
had escaped them when they had the finest opportunity of
striking a blow, inasmuch as the contest must luive been de
cided under the very walls of Argos, and in company with a
numerous and gallant alliance. And hence, upon their return,
at the Charadrum, the place where the crimes committed in
an expedition are adjudged, before they enter the city, they
were beginning to stone Thrasyllus, who, flying to an altar,
escaped with life: his effects, however, they confiscated to
public use.

But, after this, caipe up the Athenian succour, consisting of
a thousand heavy-armed and three hundred horsemen, com-
manded by Laches and Nicostratus. The Argives, who, after
all, were afraid to break the agreoment with the Laced»mo-
nians, ordered " them to be gone forthwith ;" and, though they

fBAR XIV.] PELOPONNESIAN WAR 107

requested a conference, refased to introduce them into the
assembly of the people till the Mantineans and Eleaos, who
were not yet departed, by great importunity obtained a com-
pliance. Here the Athenians,* in the presence of AlcilHades
their ambassador, assembled with the Axg;iyes and their allies,
averred, that " the susjpension was not valid, since agreed to
without the condent of the body of the confederates ; now,
therefore, as themselves were oome up opportunely to their
assistance, they were obliged in honour to prosecute the w«r.''
The confederates allowed the force of wis argument ^ s>d
the v/hole alliance, except the Argives, marched instantly
away against Orchomenus of Arcadia. But even the Argives,
tliough they stayed behind-ct first, were persuaded by su(£ rea-
soning, and soon after went also to take part in the expedi-
tion. Thus united, they sat down before and besieged Or-
chomenus. They made several assaults upon it, desirous for
other reasons to get it into their hands, but more particularly
because the host^es from Arcadia were lodged in that city
by the Lacedsmonians.

The Orchomenians, terrified at the weakness of their walls
and the multitude of their besiegers, and lest, as no relief ap-
peared, they should soon be exhausted, thought proper to
capitulate on these conditions : — *^ to be received into the con-
federacy ; to give hostages of their own body ; and to de-
liver up to the Mantineans those whom the Lacedaemonians
had lodged with them.''

Having thus got possession of Orchomenus, the confeder-
ates, in the next place, held a consultation " against what
other city, in their plan of conquest, they should next pro-
ceed." The Eleans exhorted them to. march against Lepre-
urn, but the Mantineans against Tegea ; and the Argives and
Athenians adhered to the Mantineans. The Eleans, upon
this, were ojQfended that they had not voted for the siege of
Ijopreum, and separated to their own home. But the rest of
the confederates set about preparations at Mantinea, as fully
bjBnt on the aiege of Tege« ; and even some of the citizens
of Tegea were exerting their eflforts within that city to betray
i( to them.

But the Lacedaemonians, after they were withdrawn from
Argos, in pursuance of the suspension of arms for four moatbs,

* {jachei and Nlcostratu^.

108 PELOPONNESXAN WAR. [bOOK V.

laid heavy charges upon Agis, for not conquering Argos at 8U
fair an opportunity, fairer than ever they had reason to ex*
pe'^t, " since so numerous and so gallant a body of confed-
erates could never affain, without greater difficulty, be assem*
bled together/' And when afterward the news arrived that
Orchomenus was taken, their indignation became more vio-
lent than ever. In such a ferment, they instantly resolved,
though not consistently with the calm Lacedsmonian temper,
that " his house must needs be demolished, and a fine of one
hundred thousand drachmas* be imposed upon Agis.*' He ear-
nestly pleaded against the execution of the sentence, that, " in
another expedition, he would purge the charge by some nota-
ble service to the state ; if not, they might then proceed to
punisji him at pleasure." Upon this they suspended the fine
and demolition, but passed a law upon the present occasion,
such as never before had been made among them ; for they
elected a committee often Spartans to attend him as a coun-
cil, without whose concurrence he was not permitted to lead
out their army into the field.

In the meantime a message is brought them from their
friends at Tegea, that " unless they come thither with the ut-
most expedition, Tegea will revolt from them to the Argives
and their confederates, and is only not revolted already."

To prevtsnt this, the whole Lacedaemonian strength, both
of citizens and Helots, is levied with more sharpness than had
ever been known l)efore ; and, taking the field, they marched
to Oresteum of Men&lia. An order was sent beforehand to
their Arcadian allies, to assemble and follow them directly
towards Tegea.

But when the whole of the Lacedaemonian strength was
thus marched to Oresteum, the sixth part of the number,
consisting of the more aged and younger classes, was from
thence again dismissed to Sparta, to take upon them the
guard of that place, while the rest of their military force
marched to Tegea ; and, not long after, their Arcadian con-
federates join them.

They sent also to Corinth, to the Boeotians, Phocians, and
Locrians, a summons of speedy aid into the Mantinean :
but for some of these the summons was too short; and
for the rest, it was by no means an easy task to take the field

* 3229^ 3s. id. sterling.

YEAR XIV.] PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 109

m separate bodies, and, waiting for their mntnal junction, to
force their passage through an enen^'s conntry ; for such lay
between to obstruct their advance : however, they were ear*
nestly bent to attempt it. The Lacedaemonians, ill the mean-
time, enlarged with such Arcadian parties as were alrea^
come up, marched on and broke into the Mantinean ; and,
having formed their camp near the temple of Hercules, they
ravaged the country.

The Axgives and their allies, when their enemies were
thus in sight, having posted themselves on a spot of ground
by nature strong and difficult of approach, drew up in or-
der, as ready to engage. The LacedsBmonians also im-
mediately advanced towards them, and even approached so
near as within the cast of a stone or a dart. But one of the
old e]in)erienced Spartans, perceiving that they were to attack
so difficult a post, roared out aloud to Agis,* that " he was
going to repair one evil by another,** as if, by his present ill-
judged eagerness, he was bent on making reparation for his
censured . retreat from Argos. Upon this, either struck with
such an exclamation, or whether upon a sudden his own
thoughts suggested to him a different conduct, he drew off
his army a^in with all possible expedition, before the battle
could be jomed ; and, wheeling from thence into the Tege-
atis, he turned a stream of water into the Mantinean, about
which, as apt to do great damage to the lands on which side
soever it flowed, the Mantineans and Tegeatae are eternally
at blows. It was his scheme to draw down the Argives and
^ir allies from their strong post on the eminence, in order
to prevent the turning of this stream, so soon as they knew
It was in agitation, and thus to gain an opportunity of fighting
in the plain. In pursuance of this, he halted the whole day
upon the stream, and accomplished its diversion. But the
Argives and their allies, surprised at this sudden and preci^
itate retreat, had been at first unable to conjecture what it
meant. At length, when the enemy was totally withdrawn

♦ Plutarch says it was an apothegm of this Agis, that Lace
dnnonians never asked concerning their enemies, " How many
Hie they?** bat, "Where are they ?** And that, when he was
hindered from lighting at Mantinea, he said, " They who would
rule over many must fight arainst many:** and, being asked
what was the number of me LacedaBmoniaDS, he replied
*• Enough to beat cowards.**

110 PEJUOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK «^

and quite out of their view, after lying inactively in theii
posts, and no orders received for a pursuit, they began a sec-
ond time to lay heavy imputations on their own commanders ;
— that, " Qp the former occasion, the Lacedaemonians, wher-
fairly caught near Argos, had been suffered to escape ; thai
now again, though they were openly flying, not a soul must
pursue them, but, through shameful indolence, their enemies
are preserved, and themselves are treacherously betrayed.'*
The commanders, upon the first noise of these clamours,
were highly chagrined ; but afterward they marched them
down from the eminence, and, advancing into the plain,
encamped them there, as determined to fight the ene-
my. The day following, ihe Argives and allies were
drawn up to.be in readiness for action should the enemy ap-
pear. And the LacedsBmonians, marching away from the
stream to reoccupy their former camp near the temple of
Hercules, on a sudden perceived that the whole body of their
foes were ready drawn up in order of battle, and had quitted
their strong post on the eminence.

At this crisis the Lacedaemonians were struck with a
greater astonishment than the memory of man could parallel.
For now, in an interval of time exceeding short, they were
bound to get every thing in readiness for fight : yet, such
was their diligence^ that in an instant they were formed into
a beautiful array, Agis, their king, issuing all the necessary
orders, according to law ; for, when a king leads their armies,
all orders are given by him : he himself declares what he
wills to be done to the general oflicers ;* they carry his or-
ders to the colonels ;t these to the captains ;t who afterward
forward them to the subalterns ;^ by whom they are com-
municated to all the private men under their respective com-
mands. The orders, when any such are requisite, are in this
method dispersed and circulated with the greatest expedition :
for, in the Lacedaemonian armies, ahnost the whole soldiery,
few only excepted, have a conmiand assigned in regular suo-
ordination ; and the care of executing orders is incumbent
upon numbers.

In their present array the left wing consisted of the Skiritn,
who, of alj the Lacedsemonians, ever claim this post as their

♦ Polemarcfas. + Lochages.

t Pentecontators. ^ Enomatarchs.

TBAR XIV.] FSL0P0NME8IAN WAR. 1 1 1

pecoliai ri^^t ; next them were posted the Brasideaa soldiers
wlio had served in Thrace, accompanied by those who had
lately been honoured with the freedom of Sparta ; then, along
the Une, were regularly posted all the troops which were com-
posed of pore Lacedemonians ; next to them stood the He-
leans of Arcadia, and beyond them the Mnnalians. In the
light wing were the Tegeate, bat in the utmost extent of it
some few Lacedemonians. Their cavalry was equally post
ed on both the wings : and in this form was the Lacedamo
nian disposition made.

On the side of the enemy the Mantineans had the right
vring, because the business fell upon their ground ; next to
thena were the allies from Arcadia ; then a picked body of
ArgiTes, to the number of a thousand, who long had been
exercised in the study of arms at the public school at Argos ;
and next to them stood the rest of the Argive forces : these
were followed by their own confederates, the Cleoneans and
Omeats. The Athenians were ranged in the outermost
body, and composed the left wing, supported by their own
cavdiy. Such was the order and disposition on both sides.

The army of the Lacediemonians had the appearance of
superior numbers : but exactly to write the number, either
of the several bodies on each side, or of their whole force,
I own myself unable. The amount of the Lacedemonians
was not known, because of the profound secrecy observed in
their polity ; and the amount of their enemies, because of the
ostentation ordinary to mankind in magnifying their own
strength, has been still disbelieved. However, from the fol-
lowing computation, an inquirer may discover the number of
the I^edaemonians who on this occasion were drawn up in
the field.

Besides the Skirits, who were in number six hundred,
seven battalions were in this engagement. Now in every
battalion there were four companies ; and in every company
four platoons ; in the first rank of every platoon were four
fighting soldiers. In regard to depth they were not equally
formed, as every colonel determined the depth at his own pri-
vate discretion ; but generally they were drawn up eight deep.
The front line of their whole force, excepting the Skirits,
consisted of four hundred and forty-eight men.*

. * The Lacedsmonian mora or brigade, consisted of four JocAi

112 P£LOPONNBSIAN WAR. [lOOK T

When both sides were ready, the «m«U respite before the
engagement was employed by the several commuidevB m Ani-
mating the soldiers under their respective orders.

To the Mantineans it was niged, that **the points for
which they were gomg to fight were their ceuatry and their
future fate, either role or slavery; that of role, wiiooe
sweets they had known, they might not be diveeted, and that
they might never feel again what slavery is.**

To the Argives, it was " for their ancient soveveigiity, and
the equal share of dignity they had once enjoyed in Pelopoo^
nesus, now timely to prevent an eternal submission to such
losses, and earn revenge for the many injuries a neigfabomiiig
state, unrelenting in its enmity, had done them.**

But to the Athenians, that "in hoDOor they were obli-
ged to signalise their valour in a conspicuous manner, in the
company of numerous and gallant allies : that should they gtm
a victory over the Lacedsmonians on Peloponnesian gronnd,
their own empire would be established and enlarged, and no
enemy would ever again presume to invade their territoriea."

And in this manner were the Argives and their confeder-
ates animated to the fight.

But the Lacedemonians were encouraging one another,
and, during martial strahw enjoined by their disdpiine, like
men of bravery as tbey were, each animated his neigfaboor
with the recital of the gallant acts they had performed to-
gether. They were persons who knew that a long experi-
ence in the toils of war conduced more to preservation than
a short verbal harangue, how finely soever delivered.

or battalions, equal to 2048 men : for a focAot, or battalion, con- '
sisted of four petoecostietj or companies, equal to 512 men ; a pen-
Uooatyt at company, of four enomatim, or platoons, equal to 128
men ; and eacn emnnaiia, or platoon, consisted ot 32. This is
the account of Thucydides, who computes the platoon by 4 in
front and 8 in depth. The platoon consisted therefore of 32 ;
which, multiplied by 4, is equal to 128, the number of a com-
pany ; which, also multipli^ by 4, is equal to 912, the number
of a battalion. The number ot battalions was seven, which
shows the number of Lacedaemonians to have been 3584 ; and
then, with the addition of 600 Skmim, who were posted on the
left, to have amounted, in the whole, to 4184 men. Or again,
the whole front line is equal to 448, multiplied by 8, the number
io depth, is equal to 3584, added to 600 Skirit<gf is equal to 4184.

TEAR XIV.] PELOPOKNSBIAN WAR. ^113

And now the mrmies were nratnally appHMching : the Ar-
streft and their aOiet advanced in a brisk and angry manner ;
bat the Laeedsmoniana mored elowly forwaida to the aoand
of man^r flotea, the mnaic which their lawa ordain, not from
any religioaa motire, bnt for adranetng with eqaal atepa,
keeping time with the notes, to prerent aU disorders in the
ranks ; accidents very frequent in large armies while drawing
to an enconnter.*

But, during the approach, Agis, the kinff, betfaenght him-
self of making a new disposition. It is ue constant case
with all armies, that, upon the right, their wings, while they
approach one another, ertend memselTOS too far, so that
constantly, on both ndes, the left wing is orerreached and
flanked by ^ enemy's right. This proceeds from the
dread eveiy soldier lies under of being exposed on his un-
armed side, which makes him eager to get it corered by the
riueld of the next person on his right, aiM positire that a firm
closing together in this'manner will render them impenetra-
ble to the shock of the enemy. This turn of the body is first

* Milton has made use of this Laeedamonian match to adom
fund raise his own noble poetry. It was full and strong in biJi
imaffination when he wrote the foUowiog lines.— Paradise Loot

"Anon they move
In perfect phalanx, to the Dorian mood
Of flutes and soft recorders ; such as raised
To height of noblest temper heroes old,
Arming to battle ; and, instead of rage,
Deliberate Taloor breathed, firm and unmoved
With dread of death to fli|^ or foul retreat ;
Nor wanting power to mitigate and snage,
With solemn touches, troubled thoughts, and chaae
Anguish, and doubt, and fear, and sorrow, and pain,
From mortal or immortal minds. Thus they.
Breathing united force, with fixed thoufht,
Moved on in silence to soft pipes, that cnarm*d
Their painfiil steps o'er the burnt soil : And now,
Advanced in view, they stand, a horrid front
Of drsadfiil length and dazzling arms, in ^ise
Of warriors old with ordered spear and shield.
Awaiting what command their mighty chief
Had to unpose. He through the armed files
Darts his experienced eye ; and soon, traverse
The whole battalion, views their order due."

1 14 PELOPONNESI^N WAR. [bOOK ▼.

beguzr by tne right-band man of this whole fipnt, and is tne
result of his constant xare to shift his defenceless side from
the aim of the foe- ; and the dread of being in the same man>
ner exposed obliges all the rest to follow his motion. And
thus, in the present approach, the Mantineans in their wing
had far overreached the Skiritae : but the Iiacedaemonians
and TegeatsB had done so, more in regard to the Athenians,
in proportion as they exceeded them in numbers. Agis, there-
fore, fearing lest the left wing of the Lacedemonians might be
quite surrounded, and judging that the Mantineans quite too far
overreached them, sent orders to the Skiritae and Brasideans
to wheel away from the spot where they were first posted,
and fill up the extremity of the line, so as to render it equal
to the Mantineans ; and, to supply the void thus made, he
ordered from the right wing two battalions, commanded by
general officers, Hipponoidas and Aristocles, to repair thither,
and, falling in, to clese up the ranks ; judging that their own
right would still be more than sufficient to execute their parts,
and the wing opposed to. the Mantineans might, by this dis-
position, be properly strengthened. But, as he issued these
orders in the very onset and close of battle, it happened that
Aristocles and Hipponoidas absolutely refused to change
their post, though for such disobedience, as apparently the
result of cowardice, they were afterward banished from Spar-
ta ; and, before the new disposition could be completed, the
enemy had begun to charge. Upon the refusal of these two
battalions to change their post, Agis countermanded those
marching to strengthen the Skiritae to their former places,
who now were unable to fall into the ranks, or close together
with those whom they had quitted : l>ut on this occasion,
more remarkably than ever, the Lacedsmonians, though in
all respects outdone in the military art, gave signal proofs of
their superiori^ iii true manly valour.

For, to come to particulars, when once they were at blows
with the enemy, the light wing of the Mantineans routed the
Skiritae and Brasideans. Then the same Mantineans, sup-
ported by their confederates and the thousand picked Ar-
gives, falling in at the void in the Ijacedaemonian line, which
was not yet filled up, did great execution upon them ; for, ta-
king them.m flank, they entirely broke them, drove them foi
shelter among their carriages, and made a slaughter of tha

TSilRXIT.] PBLOPONNESIAN WAR. llS

old men who were appointed for their guard. And in this
quarter the Lacedaemonians were cleaiij vanquished.

But in the other quarters^ and especially in the centre,
where Agis the king was posted, and round him the horse-
guards, styled the three hundred, falling upon those troops
which were composed of the elder Argives, and those which
are called the pentelochi, and upon the Cleoneans, and Or-
neatae, and those Athenians who ranked along with them,
they broke them in an instant, so that many of them durst
not stand to exchange a blow, but, so soon as they felt the
Lacedaemonian shock, turned about at once, and others were
trampled under foot in the great huny they were in to secure
their escape.

But when the main body of the Argives and their allies
was in this quarter routed, their foot on both the flanks were
instantly discomfited. PJow, also, the right of the Lacede-
monians and Tegeate, by the advantage of superior numbers,
had overreached and encompassed the Athenians. These
now, on all hands, were beset with danger ; in this quarter
they were surrounded by their enemies, m another they were
already vanquished ; and they must have suffered the most
of any part of the army, had it not been for the excellent
support their own cavalry gave them. It happened also that
Agis, when he perceived that the Mantineans and the thou-
sand Ajrgives had got the better on the left, commanded the
whole army to wheel off to the support of the vanquished.
And while this was executing, the Athenians laid hold of the
interval which this motion of the enemy and their drawing
off from around them occasioned/ to secure their own escape
without any opposition, accompanied by the Argives, who
were also vanquished with them.

But the Mantineans, and those who fought in company
with them, and the picked band of Argives, were now no lon-
ger intent on pressing upon their adversaries ; but, perceiving
their own side to be completely vanquished, and the Lacede-
monians approaching to their attack, they turned about and
fled. Yet numbers of them perished, and those chiefly Man-
tineans ; for the greatest part of the picked band of Argives
completed their escape.

The flight, however, was not precipitate, nor the distance to
a place of safety great : foi the Lacedemonians, till the en-

'tl6 PBLOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK T.

tmj flies, maintain their combats with long and steady
toil ; but, after a root, pursue them neither long nor /ar.

And thus, or rerj neariy thus, was the procedure of the
whole battle, the greatest that for many ages had been fought
among Grecians, and where the competition lay between
most renowned and flourishing states. The Lacedsmonians,
amassing together the arms of their enemies who had been
slain, imme&tely erected a trophy, and rifled the bodies of
^ dead. They also took up their own dead, and carried
them, to Tegea, where they received the rites of sepulture ;
and also deliTered,*upon truce, the slain of their enemy.
There fell of the ArgiTes, and Orneats, and Cleoneans,
seven hundred ; and two hundred of the Mantineans ; two
hundred also of the Athenians, including the .£ginets and
their several commanders. On th^ Lacedemonian side, as
the confederates were never bard pressed, what loss they suf-
fered is scarcely deservhig of notice ; and the exact number
of their own dead it is difficult to discover, but it was reported
to have been about three hundred.

When a battle was certainly to be fought, Pleistoanaz, the
other king, marched out to their^upport, with the whole body
of citizens, both old men and youths. But when he was ad-
vanced as fur as Tegea, he received the news of a victory,
and returned to Spaxta. The Lacedsmontans also sent mes-
sengers to countermand their allies from Corinth, and from
without the isthmus. And, being themselves returned to
Sparta, after giving dismission to their allies, as the Carneian
solemnities were at hand, they celebrated the festival. The
imputation also of cowardice, at that time laid to their charge
by the rest of Greece, because of their misfortune at Sphac-
teria, and some other instances of impolitic and dilatory con-
duct, by this one action they completely puiged away. Now
it was determined that then: depression had been merely the
result of fortune, but that in inward bravezy they were stili
themselves.

The day before this battle was fought it happened that the
Gpidaurians, with the whole of their strength, had made an
incursion into Argia, as left defenceless, and had done mat
execution on the guards left behind at die general march of
•he Argives.

ThMe thousand hoftvy-armed Eleans, as auxiliaries to the
Ifantineans, came up after the batUe ; as did also a thouaand

TEAR XIV.] PELOPONNS8IAN WAE. 117

Atbeaiaiw to join the fonner body, uprn which toe whole al-
liance marched immediately against Epidaurus, while the La-
cedamonians were solemnizing the Carneian festiyal. After
ID equal diatribation of the work, they began to raise a cir-
cumTallation around that city. The rest, indeed, soon de-
sisted ; hut the Athenians, conformably to their orders, com-
pleted theirs round the eminence on which stood the temple
of Juno. To guard this work, the whole alUance left behmd
a sufficient number draughted from their seyeral bodies, and
then departed to their reiqpective homes. And the summer
was now at an end.

In the first commencement of the succeeding winter, and
after the cebbration of the Carneian festival, the Ijacedemo-
nians immediately took the field ; and, advancing as far as
Te^ea, sent from thence to Argos proposals fi>r an accommo-
dation. There was alrea<fy in that city a party in their intel-
ligence, who were also bent on overturning the popular gov-
ernment at Argos ; and, since the event of the late fatal bat-
tle, they were enabled to use more cogent arguments to per-
suade the many into the accommodation. Their scheme was,
fint to enter into truce with the Lacedemonians, as prepara-
tory to an alliance, offensive and defensive, which was nexl in
agitation ; and, this pouit carried, then immediately to exe-
cute their plot a|[ain8t the people.

licbas, son of Arcesilaus, the public host of the Argives,
accordingly arrived at Argos, charged to make two demands .
in the name pf the Lacedsmoniana ; the one, " whether war
be still their option 1" the other, "how if their choice be
peace V Upon this a strong debate arose, for Alcibiadea
was present But the party who acted in the Lacedsmonian
interest prevailed with the Argivvs to accept their proposals
of an accommodation, which were as follows :~—

"Thus resolved by the Lacedsmonian council to com-
pound with the Argives.

" These to restore their children to the Orchomehians, and
their naen to the Msnalians ; to restore also to the Lacede-
monians their citizens now detakied at Mantinea ; to evacu-
ate Epidaurus and demolish their works.

«* .^id the Athenians, if they will not quit Epidaurus, to be
declared enemies to the Amves and to the Lacedemonians,
and to the confederates ot the Lacedemonians, And to the
coniiiderates of the Argives.

118 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK V

*' And, if the Lacedsemonians have in their power »ny
young men, to release them to all the states.

"In relation to the god,* we consent that an oath be ad*
ministered to the Epidaurians, and we grant the form to be
prescribed by the Argives.

" The states of Peloponnesus, both smali and great, to be,
none excepted, free, according to their own primitive consti-
tutions.

" And, if any state without Peloponnesus shall enter offen-
sively into the lands of Peloponnesus, succours to be united,
in pursuance of a general consultation of Peloponnesians
about the determinate and most expedient methods.

" All confederates of the Lacedemonians whateyer, with-
out Peloponnesus, shall enjoy ^he same privileges as those
of the Lacedsemonians and those of the Argives enjoy, each
remaining in free possession of their territories.

** These articles to be communicated to the confederates,
and ratification to be made, if they approve. If different
methods seem advisable to the confederates, all parties to de-
sist and return directly home."

These proposals, by way of preliminary^, the Argives ac-
cepted ; and the army of the Lacedaemonians was drawn off
from Tegea to their own home. And afterward, in the
course of mutual negotiation, the same party at Argos pre-
vailed upon their countrymen to renounce their aUiance with
the Mantineans and Eleans, and even with the Athenians, and
to strike up a peace and an alliance, offensive and defensive,
with the Laceasemonians. "The tenour of it was this : —

" Resolved thus, by the Lacedaemonians and the Argives,
on a peace and an alliance^ offensive and defensive, for the
term of fifty years.

" They shall do justice to each other reciprocally, with im-
partiality and equity, according to their several forms of law.

** The other states in Peloponnesus, comprehended in this
peace and alliance, shall continue in the enjoyment of their
own laws, their own independence, holding the same territo-
ries, doing justice with impartiality and equity, according to
their several forms of law.

* The Pythian Apollo. This article seems designed to adjust
the quarrel abouf; the victim, related in the transactions of tlw
last year.

»BAJl XIV.] ^PELOPONNBSIAN WAR. 119

"All confederates of the Lacedsmonians whatever, with
out Peloponnesus, fhall enjoy the same priyileges with the
Lacedsmonians themselves; and the Argive confederates*
shall enjoy the same with the Argives themselves: each
holding their respective territories.

** If a joint expedition be at any time requisite, a consnl-
tstion to be held, by the Lacedemonians and the Argives,
about the determinate -and most expedient methods of issuing
orders to the rest of the alliance.

** But, if any controversy arise between the states, either
those within or those without Peloponnesus, either concem-
Big their boundaries or any other point, it shall be determined
by judges.

" And, if any confederate state have a dispute with another
state, they shall go with a reference to that state which to
the contending states shall be thought most impartial. Pri*
vate persons, however, to be judged by the laws of that state
to which they are subject."

This peace and such an alliance were now perfected, and
the reciprocal damages of war and all other offences were
now buried in oblivion: imd, having already settled all
poinU to general satisfaction, they concurred in a suffi^ge
" to receive no herald nor embassy from the Athenians till
they were withdrawn out of Peloponnesus, and had given
up their fortifications at Epidaurus ;" and farther, " for the
future, to make neither peace nor war but with joint concur-
rence." Their attention was also extended to objects more
remote ; and in conjunction they despatched ambassadors to
the cities in Thrace and to Perdiccas, and seduced Perdiccas
to swear adherence to their league : not that he instantly de-
clared his revolt from the Athenians, but he was bent on ac-
complishing it ever since he saw the Argives had done it ;
for he was originally descended from Argos. They renewed
also their ancient oaths to the Chalcideans, and strengthened
them by the addition of new.

The Argives also despatched an embassy to the ^thenif
ans, requiring them to quit the works they had raised at Epi-
daurus. The latter, sensible that their soldiers were but a
handful of men when compared with those who were associa-
ted with them in that service, sent Demosthenes to draw
them off. He, upon his arrival, pretending to solemnize some
martial game without the fortress, when the rest of the gar-

120 PBLOPONNISSIAN HVAR. IbOOK T.

rifon was gone out to the spectacle, baired fast the gatef.
Afld afterward the Athenians, having renewed the peace
with them, surrendered the fortificatioDs they had raised into
the hands of the Epidaurians.

When the Argives had in tins maimer gone off from the
alliance, the Mantineans also, who at first stood out, finding
at length that without the Argives they could do nothing of
themselres, thought proper to accoimnodate their disputes
with the Lacedaemonians, and resigned ^ir; command orer
the cities of Arcadia. The LacedAmonians also and Ar-
gives, to the number of a thousand each, marched in com-
pany to Sicyon ; where, principally by the presence of the
Lacedaemonians, the government was "ishifted into the hands
of a smaller number. And, after transacting such points in
concert, they soon procured the demolition of the popular
government at Argos ; an4 >n oli^chy, suited to the Ijace'
dasmonian model, was erected in its stoad.

As the winter was now in its close, these transactions ran.
out nearly into the apring ; and the fourteenth year of the
war expired.

YBAB XV.*

In the following summer the IHctideans of Athos revolt-
ed from the Athenians to the Chalcideans ; and the Lace-
demonians resettled the state of Achaia, which for a time
had been under a management not a^rreeable to them. '

The people of Argos also, combming gradually together
and resuming their spirits, made an assault upon the few.
They waited fox a favourable opportunity, till the festival of
the naked games was celebrating at Lacedaemon. A battle
was fought within the precincts of Argos, in which the people
were the victors ; some of their opponents they slew, and
others they doomed to perpetual exile. The Lacedaemoni-
ans, when their adherents implored their succour, weref too
dilatory in moving; but at last they adjourned the gamea*
and marched away to their support ; and hearingr, when they
were come to Tegea, that ** the few were vanquished," they
determined to proceed no farther, maugre all the entreaties
of the new exiles ; but, retreating forthwith to Sparta, they
resumed the celebration of the p^ames. Yet, being afterward
attended by deputations from those in Argos, as weU as by

* Before Christ 417.

TBJL& ZV.] PBLOPOMNS81AN WAR. 121

»
■och aa had imen lately baiUBbcd, in the preaeiice of the
whole confeddracj, after many arguments had been urged on
both sades, they came to. a resolution that " the Argiyet in
the citj were guilty of injustice ;'" and a decree was passed
that '' they should march against Ar^os •" but, after all,
their proceeding &re dilatory and remiss.

In the meantime, the people of Argos, dreading the Laeo-
dsmonian strength, and readdressing themselves again to
Athens for a renewal of alliance, and proceeding to execute
a plan which they thought the strongest expedient of peser-
▼atioD, bailt long walls quite down to the sea, that, m case
th^ should be Mocked up by land, all proper supplies might
be thrown into the city by tea, through the good officee of the
Athenians. To this scheme of new fortifications some cities
also of Peloponnesus were privy underhand. The whole
body of the Argives without distinction, the citixens, their
wives, and their servants, forwarded the work ; and from
Athens they were supplied with carpenters -and masons.
And here the summcur ended:

Winter now succeeding, the Lacedemonians, when ad*
vertised of these new fortifications, marched their forces
against Aigos ; their own, and all those of their allies, ex*
cepting the Corinthian. Some new projects in their favour
were now also in agitation within Argos itself. The whole
army was commanded by Agis, the son of Archidamus, King
of the Laced«monians. Ine new turns they expected for
their service took no effect within the city ; but they made
themselves masters of the new^rected walls, and levelled
them with the ground. They also took Hysi», a town in
Argia ; and, haying put all the freemen found within that
place to the sword, they drew off, and dispersed to their sev-
eral cities.

After this the Argives marched their force into Phliasia ;
and, after iaTa||iQg that district, because the exiles from Ar-
gos had net with a reception there, they a^atn retired : for
nany of those exiles had taken up their residence at Phlius.
In the same winter the Athenians, exasperated against
Perdiccas, prevented all manner of importations into Mace-
donia. They charged him with <* taking part in the late
treaty, confirmed by the sanction of oaths, between the Ar-
gives and Laced«moniaas ; that, farther, when they had
made great preparations against the Chalcideam of Thiaee

122 PBL0P0NNB81AN WAR.. [bOOK V.

4
•nd Amphipolu, and Niciu, the son of Niceratus, was ap-
pointed to command in that service, he had yiolated his obli-
gations to act in concert, and that expedition came to nothing
purely through his secession : he was therefore an enemy to
Athens."

The winter expired in this manner ; and with it the fif-
teenth year of the war came also to an end.

YEAR XVI.*

When summer came on, Alcibiades, with twenty sail, ar*
nved at Argos, where he seized three hundred of the citizens,
whose fidelity to the Athenians, and adherence to the Lace-
demonian interest, were still suspected ; and these the Athe ■
nians secured in the neighbouring islands which were subject
to their dominion.

The Atheniana also undertook the reduction of Melos with
a naval force, consisting of thirty sail .of Athenians, six of
Chians, and two of Lesbians ; on board of which were trans-
ported twelve hundred heavy-armed Athenians, three hun-
dred archers, and twenty who threw the bow on horseback.
The number also of their dependants, from the contment and
islands, which attended, wiis about fifteen hundred heavy-
armed. The Meliansf are a colony of the Lacedasmonians,

* Before Christ 416.

t The origin of this colony is curious, according to the ac-
count given of it by Plutarch. — " When the Tyrrhenes were
masters of Lemnos and Imbnis, and made a practice of ravish-
ing the wives of the Athenians at Brauron, a mixed tn^eed was
the consequence; whom, as half barbarians, the Athenians
drove out of the isles. Thus exiled, they repaired to Tsenarus,
and were useful to the Spartans in their war against the Helots.
They were afterward rewarded for their good services with the
freedom of Sparta and liberty of intermarriage. Yet, not being
allowed the honour of serving the offices of the state, or a seat
in the council, they became afterward suspected, as caballing
together for bad designs, and projecting to overthrow the con-
stitution : the Lacedaemonians therefore apprehended them all ;
and, throwing them into prison, kept them confined under a
strong guard, till they could find out clear and incontestable
evidence against them. The wives of the prisoners came in a
body to the prison, and, after much prayer and entreaty, were at
length admitted by the guard to the signt and discourse of their
husbands. When once they had gained access, they ordered
them immediately to strip and change clothes with them: to

7EAR X7I.] PBLOPOKUBSfAN WAR. ^ 123

md had therefore refused to recetre Itw from the Athenians
in the same manner as the inhabitants of the other islands r^
eeived it. At first, however, they observed a strict neutral-
itj ; bat, in process of time, when the Athenians, br ra?a-
ging their conntiy, would have obliged them to act ofiensive-
^, they openly took, part in the war against them.

With a force so strong as has been described, Cleomedes,
the son of Lycomedes, and Tisias, the son of Tisimachus,
landed and encamped upon the island. Yet, before they
pioceeded^to hostilities, they sent a deputation from the army
to demand a conference ; whom the Melians refused to in-
troduce into the assembly of the people, but, in the presence
only of the magistrates and the few, commanded them to dehy-
er their instructions. Upon this the Athenian deputation ex-
pressed themselves as follows : —

*' Since to the peopje in full assembly we are precluded
from speaking, lest the many, hearing their true interest de-
clared at once by us in a continued discourse, and proved
by arguments fitted to persuade and too strong to be refuted,
might be wrought into our views, for such, we are sensible,
is the plain construction of this our guarded audience by the
few : to you, also, who now sit here, we recommend a method
of making that poiiit yet more secure, that, to the reasons
we ofier, you reserve not your objections for one formal de-
liberate reply, but, in case we offer any seeming incongruity,
you immediately interrupt us, and discuss the point. And
tell us, first, whether or not this proposal be agreeable."

The Melians, who composed the synod, answered thus :—

leave them their own, and, dressed in those of their wives, to make
their escape directly in that disguise. It was done ; the women
stayed behind, determined to endure whatever might be the con-
sequence ; and the guards, deceived by appearances, let out the
husbands instead of- the wives. They marched off* and seized
Taygeta ; then seduced the Helots to revolt, and promised to
support them ; which struck a great terrortmong the Spartans.
They sent to treat with them, and made up the matter on these
amaitioaa : * that they should have their wives restored safe to
them ; should be furmshed with money and vessels for remov.al ,
and, when settled in another country, should be reckoned a
colony and kinsmen of the Lacedaemonians.* A body of them
settled scHne time after in the Isle of Melos."— Qf tAe KtrntM of
Wommi,

124 FBLOPOKNBMAN WAR. [fiOOK T.

" The csttdowr of such Uisutely dehate, for mutual inibnn*
fttkm, is not to be disapproved ; and yet there seems to be
gieat inconsistency between such candour and those warlike
pireparatioBSy with which you no longer intend hereafter, but
ia present act have already beset us : for we perceive, that
hither you ate come to be authoritative judges of your own
plea, and that the decision must needs prove fatal to us :
•ince i£f superior in debate, we for that reason refuse submis-
sion, our portioB must be war ; and, if we allow your plea,
irom that moment we become your slaves."

Athbnians.^-*" To what purpose thisi if here you are
met together to retail your suspicions of future events, or to
talk of any thing but the proper means of extricating and
preserving your state from the present and manifest dangers
which environ it^ we had better be silent : but, if the latter
be your purpose, let us come to the point."

MstiANs. — " There is reason for it', and there ought to be
forgiveness, when men, so situated as we are, are liable to
. much disCractien both in speech and thought. The point for
which we are assembled is, it is true, no less than our future
preservation i it therefore, it must be so, let the conference
proceed in the method you require."

Atssn.-— <* As, therefore, it. is not our purpose to amuse
you with pompous details ; how, after completely vanquish-
ing the Mede, we had a right to assume the sovereignty, or
how, provoked by the wrongs received from you, we come
hither to earn redress ; we shall waive all parade of words
that have no tendency towards conviction ; and, in return,
insist from you that you reject all hopes of persuading us by
frivolous remonstrances ; that, as a colony of the Laceds-
monians, you were incapacitated from accompanying our
arms, or that wrongs in any shape you have never done us.
But, these things apart, let us lay all stress on such points
as may really, on both sides, be judged persuasive : since of
this you are as strongly convinced as we ourselves are sensi-
ble of it, that, in all human competitions, equal wants alone
produce equitable determination ; and, in what terms soever
the powerfal enjoin obedience, to those the weak are obliged
to submit."

Mil. — ** If this be so, we boldly aver, for, as you have
discarded justice from the question, and substituted interest
in its place, we must follow the precedent, that you ^Iso it

TSAR XVI.] PKI^OPONNSSIAN WAS. 125

concerns, we should not be da{»ited of the common privilege
of men ; but that to human creatures, e¥«F liable to so dan*
gerons a loss, the pleas of reason and equity, even though
urged beyond their exact limit»lioQ«» thoold be indidged ajod
allowed their weight. And more to you than to others ii
this proper to be suggested, lesl^ after satiating rerenge in
all its fury, should you ever he ove^thiown, yon may teach
your enemies how you onght to be treated."

Athbn. — "That afieets us not : for, though to our share
an overthrow of empire fidlv the event would render us nei-
.ther abject nor desponding; because men, inured to enlarged
command, as the Lacedasmonians for instance, are never ter-
rible to the vanquished. But our contest, at present, is not
against the Lacedaemonians. That revenge alone is tenible,
when subjects tumultuously rebel, and gain the ascendant
over snch as were once their master* ; and truly, to avert
such dangerous extremities, be the care intrusted to u«.
But, on the present occasion, that we are here for the en-
largement of our own power, and that what we have to urge
concerns the preservation of the state of Melos, these are
the points we are to establish. We are desirous to have our
power extended over you without obstraetion i and your pres-
ervation to be amply secured for the common benefit of us
both."

Mbl. — " And how can it torn out as beneficial for us to
become your slaves as it will for you to be our masters?'^

Athbn. — *' Plainly thus :>^because, instead of suffering
the extremities of conquest, yon may mwely become our sub-
jects, and we, by exempting you freim a total destruction,
shall gain your service."

Mbl. — ** But will not these terms content you : — that we
be permitted to persevwe in quiet ; tp be firiends to you, in-
stead of enemies ; but, in regard to war, to be strictly neu*
traH"

Athbn.^" No : for all your enmity cannot hurt ua so much
as the acceptance of such friendship from you. The latter, to
those over whom we rule, would suggest intimations of our
weakness : your enmity is a proof of our power."

Mbl. — ** Are your subjects then such sorry judges of equi-
ty and right, as to place upon the same level those who are
under no mannev ef tie, and uHie wer^ never indebted for

126 P8LOPONNE8IAN WAR, [bOOK ▼

their settlement to you, and thoie who, rerolting from y<ra,
haTo heen again reduced 1"

Athsn. — *<Why should they noti They know such a
sense of things may be well grounded in regard to both ; in-
asmuch as those who are exempted from our yoke owe such
exemption to their own superior strength, and, if we attack
them not, it is the pure result of fear. And hence the rednc
tion of you, besides enlarging our empire, will invest it with
more ample security ; especially when, seated on an island,
you are bound to submit to the masters of the sea, and to re<
main henceforth too weak for resistance, unless you areyicto-
rious at the present crisis."

Mel. — '* Do jou then conclude that what we have propo-
sed is incompatible with your own security 1 — For since, ex-
cluding us from the plea of justice, you endeavour merely to
persuade us into subserviency to your interest, we also are
again necessitated to insist once more on the profitable to
ourselves, and, by showing that with our welfare your own
also coincides, endeavour to prevail. What think you of all
those states which now stand neutral in your disputes 1 How
will you avoid their implacable hatred when, terrified at such
your usage of us, they must live in constant expectation of
your hostilities t And whidier can such conduct tend, but to
enlarge the number of your declared enemies, and to con-
strain others, who never designed to be your foes, to take up
arms against you, though to their own regret 1"

Athbn. — *' That never can be, since from states seated
on the continent we have nothing to apprehend ; they are
under no immediate necessity of guarding their liberty against
attacks from us. Those alone we dread who are seated in
islands ; and who, like you, refuse our government ; or who,
having felt the pains of subjection, are irritated against us.
Such are most likely to have recourse to violent measures,
and to plunge themselves and us into imminent dangers."

MvL. — ^**If this be so; and if you, ye Athemans, can
readily embark into so many perils to prevent the dissolution
of your own empire ; if states, by you enslaved, can do as
much to throw off your yoke ; — must it not be wretchedly
base and cowardly in us, who yet are free, to leave any meth-
od, even to the last extremity, untried, of averting slavexy V*

Athen. — ** If you judge of things as wise men ought, we
answer— Not For the point in which yon are at present

TEAR XTI.] FELOPOMlflSIAN WAR. 1S7

eoncenwd is not a trial of valoar upon equal tarms, in ordar
to escape the reproach of cowardice i bat yoar deliberationa
proceed at present about the means of self-preseryation, that
jou may not be obliged to encounter those who must by fu
overpower you." ^

Mkl. — " But we, on the contrary, know that the enter-
prises of war have sometimes yery different events to thoee
which superiority of numbers gave reason to expect ; and, in
regard to ourselves, that, if we yield at once, eternal despair
most be oui fate ; but, by acting resolutely in our own de-
fence, we may yet entertain a hope of success."

Athbn. — *' Hope in this manner is ever applied to be the
solace of danger^ And truly, in situations which can afibrd
to be disappointed, though ever prejudicial, it is not always
fatal.. But such as idly lavish their last resource, their very
all, upon hope (for it is prodigal by nature), are only by their
own ruin convinced of its delusion ; nay, when its delusion
is thus by sad experience discovered, and men should guard
themselves against it, it will not yet let go its hold in the hu-
man heart. Choose not, therefore, so fatal a resource for
yourselves in your present deetitute situation, hanging as you
are on the very brink of ruin. Let not your conduct resem-
ble the foolish behaviour of the mob of mankind, who, though
by human means their safety might be earned, yet, when ca-
lamity has chased away all visible hopes of redress, betake
themselves to others of a darker cast, to divinations and to
oracles, and all such ,vain expedients as hope suggests, to
draw them to their destruction.'*

MsL. — ** Difficult indeed, as we apprehend, and you well
know, the contest mnst prove to us against your strength and
fortune, matched as we are so unequally together. Yet the
confidence still supports us, that in fortune, since of divine
disposal, we shall not be inferior, as with innocence 6n our
side we stand against injustice ; that, farther, our deficiencies
in strength will be amplified by the addition o( Lacedsmonian
aid ; since it is incumbent upon them to suoport us, if from
no other motive, yet from the ties of blooa and a sense of
honour. And thus it is not entirely without good grounda
that we can form the resolution to withstand your efforts.'*

Athen. — ** Nor have we any reason to spprehend, on our
own account, that the divine benevolence will not equally
exert itself for us ; because neither our opinions nor our acts

128 PELOPON^ttSIAN WAR. [bo^K T.

are worse than thoM of the rest of mankind, either in regai|d
to the worship of the gods or an acknowledgment of ueir
pfrovidenco. For of the diTine nature we think like the rest
of the world ; and of men, that bejrood %. scruple they are im-
pelled, by the necessary bent of their natore, to seise domin-
ion wherever they have power. As f3r ourselves, we were
not the authors of this constitution, nor were we the fint
who digested it into practice. We found it already in foree ;
we hate accordingly applied it, and shall leave it behind u<>
for the practice of eveiy future a^ ; conscious that you ]rour-
selves, and every oihet state mvested with^ equal power,
vrould make the same exertion of it. And truly, so far as
relates to the gods, we have no more reason to distrust their
protection than our newhbouTS. But your sentiments of the
Lacedsonians are suoi that you are conSdent of support
from them because it will be base in them to refuse it.
Here we bless your simplicity, but envy not your folly. The
Lacedemonians, we alfsw, among one another, and in pay-
ing all due regard to the laws of their country, give ample
proofs of honour and virtue : but their behaviour towards the
rest of mankind, though it would open a large field of cen-
sure were it to be minutely examined, yet at present shall be
sKown by one concise declaration, that, according to the beet
lights we have been able to collect, they repute as- honoarable
tiie tilings which please them, and as just the things whick
promote their interest. Such maxims are not in ttie least
eonducive to your preservation : it is all chimera.'*

Mbl. — " No. We ground our hopes of relief from them
upon their own clear conviction of what their interest enjoins
them. This never can sufifer them to entertain a thought of
abandoning the Melians, who are a colony of their own ; of
beine faithless to the states of Oreece, who wish them weU ;
or of promoting the schemes of the common foe."

Athbn. — " Of consequence you imagine that their inter-
est is connected with your security ; that the duties of jus-
tice should in honour be observed, though attended with
dangers. But these are maxims which the Ijaced8Bmonians>
least of all men, have reaohition enough to observe in faet."

Mbl. — ** We have the strongest grounds to imagine that

in our defence they will hasaiti any dangers, from a sense

that their own preservation depends more en us than any

''^ >ople, as we are finely «taated for doing tliem Ml^

YEAR XVI. J PELOPONNK8IAN WAR. 129

vice in Peloponnesut, aod in affection are more faithfuUy
attached to them throagh the bands of consaDguinity/'

Athbn. — '* But the certainty of obtaining succour in the
mteryals of need seems not to depend so much on the
merit of those who implore it, as on the consciousness of su-
perior strength in those who are implored to give it : a max*
im this, to which no state adheres so strictly as the Lacedae-
monian. Hence, ever through a diffidence of their own do-
mestic force, they never dare even to invade their neighbours
without the concurrence of numerous aUies. There cannot,
therefore, be the least room to expect that they will transport
an aid into an island while we are masters of the sea.**

Mil. — <* Not perhaps of their own forces ; but they have
confederates enough to employ in this service. The sea of
Crete is wide and spacious ; a passage through it even the
lords of the sea will find it more difficult to obstruct than
those who sre intent on stealing it to effect with safety. Or,
grant they miscarxy in the attempt, at worst they can make a
diversion upon -your territory, or against the remainder of your
dependants who escaped the efforts of Brasidas. And then
your attention and your arms must be drawn from a quarter
where you have no right to fix them, for the necessary defence
^f your own home and your own appendage."

Atrkn. — "Though such turns may intervene, your own
experience should teach you to distrust them : for you are
not, cannot be ignorant, that the Athenians never yet would
condescend to raise a siege through hostile dread. But we
cannot avoid observing tl^t, in the whole course of this de-
bate, though declared by you to be held as the means of your
preservation, )rou have not so much as started one single
point npon which wise men can presume to fasten the least
conidence of redress. Your firmest security is placed in the
faint hope of some distant contingencies ; but your present
etrength is merely trifling against the extensive scope of your
antagonists. Nay, victims you must fall to your absurd pre-
sumptions, unless, when we are once withdrawn to give you
time to consult, you determine to try some other exjpedient.
Yoa will then no longer be controlled by that sense of shame
which, when dishonour glares before, and danger presses on,
pracipitates men into ruin. For though they see, with their
' eyes quite open, into what an abyss they are going to plunge,
yet, to avoid the imputation of what the world styles dishon-

n.— L

130 PBLOPONNSSIAN WAR. [bOOK ▼.

our, — so prevalent is the force of one bewitching eoond ! —
though vanquished by it, they scorn to yield to reason, wil-
fally embarrassing themselves with incurable calamities, and
contracting a more shameful weight of dishonour, through
their own mad obstinacy, than fortune could award them
Such consequences you are now concerned by mature delib-
erations to avoid. You are next to reflect that no shame
can attend your plying under the force of a most formidable
state ; a state which designs to make the moderate demands
alone, — that you would accept her alliance, and securely en-
joy your territory upon the condition only to pay her tribute ;
and, when war or safety is left to your own option, that you
would not peevishly prefer the worse. For those are the
men to maintain themselves in credit and prosperity, who
never suffer their equals to insult them, who pay proper re-
gard to their superiors, and towards their inferiors behave
with moderation. Reflect on these points while we with-
draw ; and remember, again and again, that your country
now calls for all your prudence, since, by the single delibera- .
tion of this single day, as either it takes a prosperous or sin-
ister turn, her fate will be determined."

Here the Athenians withdrew from the conference ; and
the 'Melians, after being some time alone, and resolving final-
ly to reject what they had already refused, gave in their an-
swer thus : —

" We continue, Athenians, in the very same sentiments we
have already declared. We shall not, in an instant of time,
abandon that liberty which, in the free possession of our own
state, we have enjoyed for the space of seven hundred years ;
which still we shall spare no endeavours to preserve, intrust-
ing it to that fortune which, by divine permission, has hitherto
preserved it, and to that redress we expect from human aid
and the Lacedemonians. But thus much again we offer :— to
be friends to you, enemies to neither, on condition you quit
our lands, after .an accommodation ratified between us to our
reciprocal satisfaction. '*

The Melians in this manner delivered their final answer
But the Athenians, the very moment they quitted the place
of conference, uttered themselves thus : —

" You, Melians, alone of all manldnd, aie the persons, so
%r as we can judge, who regard future contingencies as an
over-balance for instant dangers, and, through mad presun^p'

TEAR XVI.] PEL0P0NNB8IAN WAR. 131

tion, value things yet invisible as really actual. Bat, tlie
greater yonr dependance, the more rash yonr con6deiice apon
Lacedaemonians, upon fortune, >and upon hope, the mora
abundantly fatal your delusions will prove.*'

And, this said, the Athenian deputation retaned to their
camp.

But the Athenian commanders, upon this refusal of tnb-
mission from the Melians, applied themselves instantly to the
acts of war ; And, dividing the work in sharei to the several
parties in their army, completely shut up the Melians in a line
of circumvallation. And, when this was perfected, and a
sufficient number, both of the Athenians and their dependants,
were appointed to stay behind and continue the blockade both
by land and sea, they departed with the bulk of their forces.
Those, farther, who were left for this service, stayed behind
and continued the blockade.

About the same time the Argives, making an irruption into
Phliasia, and caught in an ambuscade laid for them by the
Phliasians and their own exiles, were slaughtered to the
number of eighty.

The Athenians, by their excursions from I^lus, committed
many depredations on the Lacedemonians. But these had
not influence enough upon the Lacedemonians to cause a re-
nunciation of the peace, or a renewal of the war. They only
proclaimed that ** their people had free leave to make repri-
sals on the Athenians."

The Corinthians also had a war with the Athenians, on
account of some private differences between them ; but the
rest of Pelt^nnesus interfered not in the quarrel.

The Melians, farther, assaulting it by night, carried that
part of the Athenian circumvallation which lay close to their
market. They slew the guards who were posted there ; and,
having gained a conveyance into the town for provisions, and
all necessary stores they could procure by money, they after-
ward withdrew, and discontinued all efforts of resistance :
but the Athenians took care for the future to place a stronger
guard upon their works. And here the summer ended.

In the winter which followed, the Lacedsmonians drew
out their forces in order to begin an expedition into Argia ;
but, when the victims offered on the frontiers boded no suc^
cess to the expedition, they again withdrew. Yet the Ar-
gives, as such an invasion had been intended against them,

182 PBLOPOMNBSIAN WAR. [bOOK ▼.

■Uipected it was owing to tho iotriguos of a laction within
their city ; some of whom they immediately secuced, bat the
seat escaped by flight.

About the same time also, the Melians carried another part
of the Athenian circamvallation^ Jis the partv by which it was
guarded was not numerous. But, upon such disturbances, a
strong re-enforcement was sent from Athens, under the com-
mand of Philocrates, the son of Demeas. The Melians were
now closely invested on all sides ; and, some schemes to be-
tray the town being in agitation among them, they thought
prop^"" to make a volunt^y surrender. This they did " at
the discretion of the Athenians ;" who put to death all they
found within the place able to bear arms, and made the women
and children slaves. The town they afterward repeopled
bv sending thither a colony of fiye hundred.

YSARXTI.] PSLOPOkNSfllAK WAR. 183

BOOK VI.

The Aihenian* M«olve <m the expedkion to Sieily.— Dsscription
of tint idlaiad.— YSAB XVII. Ttw debate m Uie aMembly of
tlie people ab Athens about the ezpedkion.— The generala
noDMiftted with full powere.— The amir of the Mercahes.-—
Departure of the grand fleet for Sicily. — Proceedings at Syra-
cuse. — ^The Athenian fleet arrives on the coast of luly. — AIci
biades recalled, to take his trial about the Mercuries and prof-
anation of the Mysteries.— A digression, containing .the true
account of a former re^ohition at Athens, begun by Harmodiua
and Aristogiton.— Alcilnades flies, and is proclaimed k traitor.
—The Athenians land at Syracuse.— A battle ensues, in
which the Athenians are Tictorious; but, soon after, they
return to Catana.— The negotiations at Camanna.— Alcibia-
des 2£t Sparta.— Xyill. The Athenians land again at Syra-
cuse, taKe EpipolaB by surprise, and begin to invest Syracuse
in form. — Battles; the Athenians carry on their works;
counterwork of the Syracusans. — Aid sent to Syracuse from
Peloponnesus, under the command of G^lipiius ; he arriver
at Tarentum.— The Athenians, bv openly joining the Argtves
against the Laeed»moDianS; violate the treaty of peace in
Greece.

In the same winter the Athenians came to a resolution to
ouike a second expedition against Sicily, with a larger force
than had been sent thither heretofore, under Laches and Eu-
rymedoQ, and to attempt its total reduction. The bulk of
the people was, in truth, ignorant of the largeness of the
island, uad of the multitude of the Grecians and Barbarians
by whom it was inhabited ; ignoruit, farther, that they were
going to embark in a war not much less considerable than
the Peloponnesian.

The compass of Sicily is little under eight days* sail for a
trading yessei ; and, thongh it be so large, it is severed from
the mainland, so as not to be part of the continent, by a gut,
in breadth about twenty stadia.* The manner in which it
was inhabited in the earliest ages was this ; and the several
nfttio&s which possessed it were these.

* About two mtlte

T«U — VOL. n. — M.

184 PELOPONNE8UM WAR. [BOOK VI

The Cyc ops and Lestriffons an said to be the most ancien
inhabitants of some part ot this country ; but^ from what stock
they were derived, or from whence they came hither, or what
is become of them since, I have nothing to relate. Poeticat
amusements must here suffice, or such information as every
man picks up for his own use.

The Sicanians appear to be the first people who, next to
those, inhabited this country ; thouffh, according to Uieir own
accounts, they are prior ; because they claim to themselves
the original tenure : but, according to the truest discoveries,
they are found to have been Iberians, who were compelled to
remove from the banks of the Sicanus, in Iberia, by the Lib-
yans. And from them, at that time, this island received the
name of Sicania, having before been called Trinacria. They
continue to this day to inhabit the western parts of Sicily.

After the taking of Troy, some of the Trojans, who had
escaped the AchsBans, arrived in their vessels upon the Sicilian
shore, and, forming a 'settlement adjacent to the Sicanians,
they all took jointly the name of Elymi ; and their cities were
Eryx and Egesta. They were also increased by the acces-
sion of some Phocians from Troy, who, having first been
driven to Libya by a storm, passed over afterward from
thence into Sicily.

The Siculi passed over first into Sicily from Italy, for
there they originally dwelt. They fled before the Opici ; and,
as the story is told, not without probability, having observed
t how the current set within the strait, and seized a favourable
gale, they crossed over upon rafts, and perhaps by some other
methods. There are, even to this very day, a people in Italy
called Siculi ; and that region, in a similar manner, obtained
its name of Italy from a certain Arcadian king, who bore the
name of Italus. These, crossing into Sicily with fonnidable
numbers, and vanquishing the Sicanians in battle, drove them
into the southern and western parts ; caused the name of the
island to be changed from Sicania to Sicily ; settled them-
selves in, and kept possession of, the richest tracts in the
country, since their passage hither was near three hundred
years earlier than the lauding of any Grecians in Sicily. Nay,
they continue to this very day in possession of the midland
and northerly parts of the island.

The Phoenicians also had settlements quite round the
coast of. Sicily. They secured the capes on the sea and th«

BAR XVI.] PJBLOPONNESIAN WAH. 135

mall circnmjacecfc isles, for the sake of trafficking \yith the
Sicilians : but when the Grecians, in considerable numbers,
began to cross over and fix their residence here, the Fhceni-
cians abandoned their other settlements, and, uniting togeth-
er, seated themseWes at Motya, and Soloeis, and Fanormus,
Dear to the Elymi ; secure of their own continuance in these
quarters from their friendship with the Elymi, and because,
from this part of Sicily the passage to Carthage is exceeding
short. So many were the Barbarians seated in Sicily ; and
such the order of their settlements. •

The first Grecians who came hither were the Chalcideans
of Euboea. Thucles led the colony which settled at Naxus,
and erected the altar of Apollo the Guide, which is still to
be seen without the city ; and on which the deputations, sent
from hence to the oracles, o£fer sacrifice before they begin
their voyage.

In the year following Archias, a Corinthian, of the race
of Hercules, founded Syracuse, having previously expelled
the Sicilians out of that island on which the imier city is
seated, though now no longer washed round about by the
sea : and, in process of time, the upper city also, being ta-
ken in by a wall, became exceeding populous.

In the fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse, Thucles
and his Chalcideans sallied forth out of Naxus ; and having
by force of arms driven away the Sicihans, they build Leon-
tium, and afterward Catana. But the Cataneans themselves
declared Evarchus their founder.

About the same point of time Lamis also, leading a colony
from Megara, arrived in Sicily, and planted them on a spot
called Trotilus, upon the river Pantacias. But, removmg
afterward from thence to Leontium, he associated himself a
short time with the Cataneans for the protection of his P^rty ;
vet, bein^ ejected by them, and then having founded Thap-
SOS, he died. His ^llowers, upon this, removed from Thap-
BUS ; and Hyblon, a Sicilian king, betraying another place into
heir hands, and becoming himself their conductor, they set-
led those Megareans who are called Hyblsean ; and, after a
ontinued possession of two huikbred and forty-five years,
Jiey were expelled out of their city and territory by Gelon,
tyrant of the Syracusans. Yet, before this ejectment, about
a hundred years after their settlement there, they had senr
out Pammilos, and built the city of Selinus. Pammilus had

136 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK VI.

come thither more lately from Megara, their mother cityi
and assisted them in making this new settlement at Sefinns.

Antiphemns from Rhodes, and Entimns from Crete, each
leading a separate colony, fonnded Gela in conjunction, in
the forty-fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse. The
name of this new city was taken from the river Gela : yet the
spot where the city now stands, and which was first walled
round, is called Lindii. But their polity was firamed upon
the Doric model.

In the hundred and eighth year, as near as possible, after
this last settlement, the Geloans built Acragas, giving the
city its name from the river Acragas. They declared Aristo-
nus and Pystilus to be its founders, and gave it the civil in-
stitutions of Gela.

Zancle was originally founded by a band of pirates, who
arrived there from Cyme, a Chalcidic city in Opicia ; though
afterwanl a numerous re-enforcement from Chalcis and the
rest of Euboea joined them, and possessed that district in
community. The founders were Perieres and Crataemenes ;
one of them from Cyme, the other from Chalcis. But the
name of Zancle was first of all given it by the Sicilians, be-
cause in shape it bears a resemblance to a scythe, and the
Sicilians call a scythe zanclum. But, in process of time,
these people were driven from thence by the Samians and
other lonians, who, flying from the Medes, had landed in Si-
cily. And, after a short interval, Anaxilas, tyrant of the
Rhegians, ejected the Samians, repeopled the city with a
number of mixed inhabitants, and changed its name to Mes-
sene, in honour of the country from whence he was originally
descended. Himera also was founded from Zancle by Eucli-
des, and Simus, and Sacon. Into this colony came also a
very numerous body of Chalcideans. Some exiles farther
from Syracuse, who had been worsted in a sedition, and were
distinguished by the title of Miletids, took up their residence
amonj^ them. Hence their dialect became a mixture of the
Chalcidic and the Boric ; but the Chalcidic model obtained
in their civil institutions.

Acr» and Casmense were founded by the Syracusans ;
AcrsB seventy years after Syracuse, and Casmena neai
twenty after Acrae. Camarina also was first founded by the
Syracusans, very nearly one hundred and thirty-five years
after the building of Syracuse ; its founders were Dascon antt

TBAR XVI.] PELOPONNKSrAN WAR. h//

Menecolas. But the Camarhiesiis being afterward dfiren
oat hj the arms of, the Syracusant, because of a revolt, in
pfocess of time Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, reeeiTed the
lands of the Camarineans as a ransom for some Syraeusan
prisoners of war, and taking upon himself to be their ibonder,
replanted Camarina. Tet once more again it was demol-
ished by Gelon ; and replanted a third time by the same
Gelon. So many natiobs of Greeks and Barbarians ibhabited
Sicily.

An island so large and so popnlous the Athenians were
passionately bent on invading. . Their truest and final view
was to compass its total reduction ; but the pretext, alleged
for a colour, was their readiness to succour such as by blood
were related, or by prior alliances had been attached, to them.
' An Egestean embassy, now residing at Athens, laboured the
point with all possible industry, and with extraordinary ear-
nestness press^ them to engage in it. For the Egesteans,
who border^ upon the Selinuntians, had been embroiled in
a war with the latter about some connubial points, and a
certain tract of land to which both laid claim. The Selinun-
tians, farther, assisted by their Syraeusan allies, pressed hard
upon them both by land and sea. And hence the Egesteans
were now suggesting at Athens that " they ought not to for-
eet their alliance with the Leontines, made by Laches in the
lormer war ;" requesting farther, that a naval force might be
sent thither for their succour. To this purpose many othei
aiguments were alleged by them, but the principal was this :
" If the Syracusans, who have overthrown the Leontines, be
left in the unmolested enjoyment of their conquest, and pro-
ceed still farther to destroy the remaining parties of that al-
liance, they will get into their hands the whole pow^r of Sicily.
Such an event would be attended with the utmost danger ;
lest, in consequence of it, as they were Doric by descent,
they might think themselves bound by the ties of blood to as-
sist with a powerful armament their kindred Dorians, and, in
quality of colonies, might succour those Peloponnesians by
whom they were originally planted, and thus form a combina-
tion to demolish the Athenian empire. In policy, therefore^
the Athenians were obliged to support the allies who yet re-
mained, ia order to make head against the Syracusans ; and
this the more readily, as they themselves would undertake to
fnmish them with sums of money equal to the exigences of
m2

138 PKLOPONNE8IAN WAR. [bOOK TI*

the wai-*' With luch ditcource the Atheniaiis were fre-
quently entertained in their popular assemblies, as the Eges>
tean ambassadors, still urging their point, had gained many
advocates to second their argumeints. And at length it was
decreed, that *' ambassadors should be previously despatched
to Egesta to inspect the state of their wealth, whether they
had such sums as they talked of in the pubUc treasury and
the temples ; and also to draw up a report of the present pos^
ture of their war against the Selinuntians." And, in pursu-
ance of this, the ambassadors from the Athenians were sent
to Sicily.

. The Lacedaemonians, in the same winter, joined by their
allies, those of Corinth excepted, and marchine into Argia,
ravaged a small part of that territory, and carried off the com,
having brought carriages for that purpose. They also remo-
ved the Argive exiles to Omea, and left them a small detach-
ment from their main army for the security of their persons.
A temporary truce being also made, during which the Omea-
t«B and Argives were to abstain from all hostilities against
one another, they drew off the army to their respective homes.

However, not long after this, the Athenians arrived with
thirty sail of ships and six hundred heavy-armed. The Ar-
gives, in conjunction with the Athenians, took the field with
all their strength, and besieged those in Omea for the space
of a day. But, as at night the besiegers removed to a distance
in order for repose, those of Omea made their escape. On the
day following the Argives, when sensible of their escape,
levelled Omea with the ground, and then withdrew. And
afterward the Athenians re-embaxked for Athens.

The Athenians also threvif in by sea a party of horsemen
into Methone, a frontier town of Macedonia. With these,
consisting of their own citizens and such Macedonians as hafl
refuged among them, they harassed the country belonging to
Perdiccas. But the Lacedamonians sent a summons of aid
for Perdiccas to the Chalcideans of Thrace, who kept terms
with the Athenians by traces renewed every tenth day ; these
however refused to march. Thus ended the winter, and
with it the sixteenth year of the war, of which Thucydidea
has compiled ths histoiy.

rSAH XVII.] PfiLOPOliBISiUN WAR. 139

In the succeeding year, very early in the spring, the Athe-
nian ambassadors returned from Sicily, accompanied hy the
Egesteans. ' They brought sixty talents of uncoined silrer,
being a month's pay for sixty sail of ships, the equipment of
which for succour they were instructed to solicit from the,
Athenians. Upon this, an assembly of the people was called,
and the reports of the £gestean and their own ambassadors ^
were received, consisting of many points, specious indeed, but*
false in fact ; and, so far as related to their treasure, that
" sums ample enough are already deposited in their temples
and their public treasury." In consequence of this, a decree
was made that " a fleet of sixty ships should sail for Sicily ;
the commanders, Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, Nicias, the
son of Niceratus, and Lamachus.-f the son of Xenophanes, to
be invested with full powers to act at their own discretion.
The whole armament to act as an aid to the Egesteans

» Before Christ 415.

t Lamachus, the third in this commission, seems to have
been picked out for the command from the peculiar constitution
of his own character, which was a proper mean between the
cautious and phlegmatic disposition of Nicias and the fiery im-
petuous ardour of Alcibiades. He was now ^according to Plu-
tarch) a brave old experienced officer. In nis youth he had
been remarkable for heat and fire : a length of service and
years mellowed him into the right temper to deliberate before
hand, and then gallantly to carry the point into execution;
but then he wanted the means of^ properly supporting the au-
thority and dignity of his post. He was now ranked with two
of the most wealthy and noble Athenians ; whereas his own
condition was low ; nay, he was (according to Plutarch) so ex-
ceedingly poor, that, before he went to any foreign command, he
was used to petition the state for a tittle money to furnish him
out, and even to buy him some shoes. Mr. Wass, in his notes on
Thucydides, refers us for his character to a comedy of Aristoph-
anes (The Achamians ) ; that is, to inquire after the character
(^ a plain blunt officer from a professed droll, or to seek truth
from nim who ridiculed all mankind. Aristophanes has repre-
sented Lamachus as a vain-glorious roaring bully, a mere thing
of arms, a creature of verbal pomp and parade ; contrary to all
the truth of history. Writers who live by turning great' and
good men into ridicule, should never be reckoned good evidence
as to the troth nad reality oC charaeters, when history diaaeata.

140 PBLOPONMBUAN WAR. [bOOjK TI

■gunst the SeUnimtuaw ; to replace alio ihe LeontiiieB in
their fonner habiutMMw, if the etate of the war gave them
leieere to execute that serrice; and to manafle all othier
points in Sicily as thej should jodge most beneficial for the
Athenian interest"

Bat the fifth day after this, another assembly of the people
was held upon the ways and means to expedite the equip-
ment of the fleet, and by proper decrees to supply the com-
manders with what might be requisite to accelerate their de-
^rture, Nicias, who against his will had been named for a
commander, was persu^ed that the pubUc determinations
were rash and premature, since, on short examination, and
motives merely specious, they were bent on the total reduc-
tion of Sicily, an Srduous undertaking ! Now, therefore, he
stood up ; and, having a mind to stop proceedings, he advised
the Athenians ss follows : —

" I am aware that the present assembly is held to concert
the means of expediting our preparations, and to get all in
readiness for the expedition to Sicily. But, in my sentiments,
we ought once more to resume the consideration of the pre-
vious point, * whether upon the whole it be advisable to equip
out such a fleet ;* and not, by rash and premature resolres on
points of such vast importance, through too easy compliance
with foreign solicitations, to embroil ourselves in an onne>
cessary war. For ray own part, troly, I am invested with
honour by the present measures, and no man upon earth is so
little anxious about hn own personal sffety. But Kt the
same time I pronounce that person to be a valuable member
of the public, who makes use of all his prudence to preserve
his own life and property : for such a one, purely for his own
private benefit, must be desirous that the public welfare flour-
ish and abound. But, however* neither in the preceding as-
semblies could the pre-eminence of honour awarded to me
bias me to speak in contradiction to my judgment ; nor eh^
it bias me at present ; but what I thnric tends most to Uie
public good, that only shall I utter.

" I am also sensible, that what I can urge may have but
little influence on Athenian tempers, when I attempt persua-
ding you to secure what you already possess, and not to haz-
aid the present for things invisible and future : but that your
eagerness is quite unseasonable ; and that the endsy which
you tee ssngninely propose, are not easy to be accoraphshed *
—'these things I shall clearly demonstrate.

TEAR XVII.] PILOPOWMBtUN Wi.a. 141

* To tikis pwpoM I mwn, thai if the inkendad expeditioik
ceedoy you ace goiag to leave many enemies behmd 700
e, and to take the moat certain method of fetching hither
more numerone opponents. Yon imagine, perhaps, that the
late peace will be firmly and constant^ obsenred, though it
was meiely a nominal peace, and that only so long as you re-
main inactiTe. Nay, each it has been made by the conduct
of aome even of our own community. And, should any con-
uderable ionse of ours have the unhappiness to sink under
hoetile efforts, oar old enemies will b« suddenly upon us ;-
since merely by caUunities they were reduced to an accom-
modation, aind, in a manner oKire disgraceful to themselves
than .to us, were necessitated to treat In the next place we
have found, that in the treaty itself many articles are still
controverted. There are, farther, divers states, and those by
no means the weakest, who have not accepted the accommo-
dation ; but, on the contrary, are still in arms against us ;
while others are inhibited meiely by ten-day truces, and that
only because the Lacedemonian measures are hitherto pa-
cific. But suddenly, perhaps, when once they find our
strength divided, the very measure into which we are now
precipiteting ourselves, they may fall upon us in a general
combination, augmented by the strength of Sicilv, whose ac-
cession to Uieir former confederacy they woula have been
ffad to purchase at any price. On these possibilities we are
bound sedately to reflect, that we may not plunge a state so
highly ezaked into superfluous dangers, nor fondly covet to
wrest their empire from the hands of others before we have
adequately ensured our own, since the Chalcideans of Thrace,
though so many years are now elapsed since they first revolted,
are not yet reduced ; and some other stetes on the continent
render us only a precarious obedience.

"Yet, to the Egesteans, our old allies, who are ioju-
rionsly oppressed, we are bound in honour to send a most
spee<^ succour. And, in the meantime, we continue to de-
fer avenging ourselves upon those whose revolt from us is of
long standing now, and whose injustice we are still obliged
to suffer, llioi^^h the latter, could we once bring them back
to their duty, we rai^t easily control for the future : but the
fanner, should we ever become their masters, remote and nu-
SDerous as they are, we should not without difiEiculty be able
^ ape. It nnst bo madoess, therefore, to invade that peo-

f42 PEL0P0NNB8IAN WIR. [bOOK TI.

pie, whom, though conquered, you can nerer reUtin in ^eir
obedience ; and who, in case the attempt against them miscarry,
will for the future be much more disaffected towards you than
they were before that attempt was made.

<* But it is farther my real opinion, that the Sicilians, as their
aiiairs are now circumstantiated, would become less formi-
dable to us if once reduced to the Syracusan yoke ; — and yet
on this remote contingency the Egesteans have chiefly insist-
ed, in order to alarm fus. Perhaps now it may come to pass,
that Its single states may combine against us to gratify the
Lacedemonians ; but, in the other case, it is quite improbable
that a united empire would hazard its own weliare to aemolish
another. For if, acting from a political precaution, they may
side with the Peloponnesians to overturn our empire, those
very Peloponnesians ma]r probably, from the same principle,
concur with us to demolish the Sicilian. As for us, the Gre-
cians there may have reason to dread us most if we go not at
all among them ; and, what is next to that, if we only give
them a sight of our power for a short time, and then withdraw.
But if, acting offensively, we incur miscarriage, they will in-
stantly despise us, and join our neighbouring foes io annoy us
here. For things that are placed most remotely from us, as
likewise those which yield no opportunity of adjusting our
opinion of them by experience, such, it is universally known,
are most apt to excite admiration. Reflect, ye citizens of
Athens, that your present elevation of spirits is owing to
your success against the Lacedaemonians and allies. You
crouched for fear under their first attacks ; till, having gained
the superiority over them, to their utter disappointment, yon
instantly despised them. And now, nothing less than Sicily
can content you. We by no means ought to be too much
buoyed up by the disasters of our foes, bnt only to be so far
confident as we are able fo awe their mtriguing tempers.
We ought to ascribe no other view to the Lacedamonians
than a vigilant care to seize the first opportunity of wiping off
their disgrace by giving us a blow, and thus recovering their
former reputation ; and that they are most earnest on accom-
plishing this, since, from time immemorial, the glory of mili-
tary valour has been their warmest, most prevailinff passion.
Our welfare, therefore, if we knew in what our welfare con-
sists, by no means summons us to enter the lists in behalf of
the Egesteans of Sicily, who to us are mere barbarians ; hot

TEAK XVIJ.] PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 143

to exert our utmost vigilance to guard our own constitution
from oligarchical encroachments.

** My duty obliges nie also to remind you, that we have
had out a short respite to breathe from the havoc made among
us by pestilence and war, and to repair the prodigious waste
of our fortunes and our lives. These, according to all the
rales of equity, should be reserved for our own domestic exi-
gences, and not be lavished away on a set of fugitives
who implore our protection, and are bound in interest to tell
specious falsehoods ; though, while plunging their neighbours
into hazards, they have iA>thing but words to contribute ; and,
shoold we redress them, know not how to be grateful ; but,
in case we miscarry in the attempt, must involve their friends
in their own destruction.

" If there be, farther, a person who, elevated with his own
designation to the command, incites you earnestly to sail :
heedful of nothmg but his own private views, nor qualified by
his years for so important a trust ; if his passion be merely to
excite admiration for his fine breed of horses, or, by the
gains of his commission, to repair the havoc of his fortune
caused by prodigality ; I conjure you to afford no such person
an opportunity to make a splendid figure at the expense of
yonr country : but rest convinced, that men of such a turn
will- be corrupt in public ofiice. as they are bad economists in
private life; that the enterprise in hand is a very arduous
trust, far beyond such measures or such exploits as a stripling
can devise or execute.

" I own myself intimidated by that crowd of youths who
sit by this person and abet his schemes. I am hence obliged
to implore the men of years and experience, who happen to
sit near them, by no means to dread that appearance of pusil-
lanimity which, in case this decree of war be revoked, might
be objected to them ; by no means to indulge the same raw
passions by which boys are actuated, so as to dote upon re-
mote contingencies. You, gentlemen, by experience are con-
vinced, that success exceedingly seldom results from hot and
sanguine presumption, but most frequently from calm and
prudent deliberation. In behalf, therefore, of yonr country,
which is now on the brink of more critical dangers than ever
it has known before, hold up your hands in opposition, and
■opport what I am going to move, namely, that Uhe Si-
cilians, confining themselves within their present limits, which

Ik

144 P£I<OPONN£SIAI«( WAR. [.BOOK VI

we do not pretend to abridge, with free navigation alon^ the
coast of the Ionian Gulf, and transacting their own aiSairs at
large through the whole extent of the Sicilian seas, be at lib-
erty to take care of their own concerns without any molesta-
tion :' and, in p^ticular, to return the E^esteans the fol-
lowing answer : — * Since, without the privity of the Athe-
nians, they have ahready invol,ved themselves in a war against
the SeUnuntians, let them also, without the concurrence of
the Athenians, bring it to a conclusion : that, moreover, we
shall form no alUance for the future, as has formerly been the
case, with men whose indirect behaviour we must be forced
to abet, though, when we stand in need of -reciprocal assist-
ance from them, we shall get none at all.'

" And you, sir, who at present preside in this assembly, if
ou are conscious that it is your duty to superintend the pub-
ic welfare, if you are desirous to behave like a worthy patriot,
put the question, and call upon the Athenians once more to give
their votes. And, in case you are afraid to act contrary to
order, in proposing what is counter to a former decree, reflect
liiat, when so great a crowd of witnesses is at hand to jus-
tify the step, you only act the part of a physician to your
country, which has swallowed down pernicious counsels ;
and that he best discharges the duty oi (irst magistrate who
will render to his country all the service he is able.; at least,
with his eyes open, will never suffer it to be hurt."

In this manner Nicias delivered his sentiments. But the
far greater part of the Athenians who were present declared
for the expedition, and against the repeal of what had been
already decreed. Some, however, there were, who made a
fruitless opposition.

The person who showed most ardour, and pressed them
most earnestly to proceed, was Alcibiades, the son of Clinias ;
partly from a resolution to oppose Nicias, with whom, in
other political points, he generally clashed, and because he
had calumniously glanced at him in his speech ; but princi-
pally because he was ambitious of being at the head of this
expedition. He presumed that not Sicily only, but Carthage
also, might be reduced by himself ; and, when he should be
the author of so great a success, that he must needs abound
in wealth and glory. His credit was great at present
among the citizens ; but the warmth of his passions threw
him into larger expenses than his fortune could sujpport, be-

YEAR XTII.] PBL0P0NNE8IAN WAR. 145

ing' ramptnoQB in every article of bfe, and especially in
horses ; and it was chiefly by ^1101 that the final OTerthrow of
Athens was at length occasioned. For the bulk of the city,
alarmed at the ^reat irregularity of his private life, the exces-
sive hiznry of his dress and diet, as also at that ffreaineas of
spirit which he showed in every single branch of his conduct,
turned oat enemies to him as a man who afiected the tyranny.
And thongh, when in pablic commands, he conducted the
war with the utmost bravery, yet, at home, each single citi-
zen was chagrined at his manners, and displaced him to make
room for others, which «oon drew after it the subversion ol
the state. Upon this occasion, therefore, Alcibiades stood
up, and advised the Athenians as follows :—

^ Tes, to me, ye citizens of Athe|is, in preference to
others, this command is doe; for with this I most needs be-
gin, since on this point Nicias has attacked me ; and I also
judge myself deserving of the tfost. In regard to those
things which have caused me to be so loudly censored, those
venr things give splendour to my ancestors and to myself,
and are of puUic emolument also to m^ country. The great
ma^ficence I disphyed at the Olympic solemnities has rais-
ed in the Ghreciars an idea of Athens far beyond its actual
stren^ ; though, previous to this, they entertained the hope
of bemg able totelly to war her down. For I jlm the man
who brouffht seven chariots thither, more than any private per-
son ever furnished out before ; who carried off the first, and
the second, and the fourth prize ; and in all other respects sop-
ported my quality as a victor. Such things, it Ihust be owned,
are declared to be honoured by the laws of Greece : and,
whenever achieved, they leave a high opinion of power be-
hind them. The splendid figure I have made at home,
whether in exhibiting entertainments for the public, or any
other method of munificence, may naturally excite the envy
of Athenians, but are to strangers instances of our grandeur.
And that man's extravagant spirit is not useless to the pub-
lic who, at his own private expense, does service not merely
to himself, but to a whole community. Nor on it imply in-
justice, for a person whose sentiments are genefoos and ex-
alted, to soar above the ordinary level ; since, should he af-
terward be reduced to a state of depression, no man is to
share in his reverse of fortune. As therefore in calamity we
are not to expect even civil salutations, let others in the mean
II.— M

146 PEL0P0MNE8IAN WAB. [bOOK VI.

time sabmitf as in justice they ought, to that assuroiog belut-
Tiour which prosperity inspires ; or; at least, let equality of
demeanour be first shown by him who demands it as a debt
from another. I am indeed aware, that persons of such un-
common elevation, and ail in general who, in some splendid
qualities, outshine the crowd, must, so long as they live, "be
the objects of spleen, chiefly to those who claim equality with
them ; and, in the next place, to those among whom they are
conversant : and yet, to succeeding generations, they leave an
ambition of claiming affinity to them, though quite groundless
and chimerical ; and to their country, whatever it be, the
haughty boast, that they were not aliens, were not^Senders,
but citizens of its own growth, and patriots «f tnie renown
and worth. Of such reversionary honours I own myself am-
bitious ; and, in order to succeed in the pursuit, have ever
rendered my name illustrious in private life ; ~ and as to my
public behaviour, reflect, Athenians, whether I am inferior to
any person whatever in performing good services to my
country. For I am the person who, without throwing you
into hazard or expense, have brought the strongest powers of
Peli^nnestts to act in your concurrence ; who reduced the
Lacedflsmonians to stake theiir all upon the fortune of. one
day at Mantinea. It is true they came off victorious from
the contest, but have not even yet so far resumed their spir-
its as to dare to act offensively.

** Such «re the exploits which my greener years, nay, even
that unnatural giddiness imputed to me, has achieved ; which,
by insinuating Rtnguage, has made the Peloponnesian strength
to ply before it, and, givins ener^ to my frantic humour, has
now persuaded the world that it is no longer to be dreaded ;
while, therefore, I flourish in this manner, while Nicias yet
continues to be esteemed fortunate, lay hold of that service
we are each of us able to perform ; and by no means repeal
the decree of our expedition to Sicily, as if intended against
a people we are not able to encounter.

** For in Sicily the cities swarm with crowds of promiscuous
disunited inhabitants ; inhabitants for ever used to sudden
revolutions and to perpetual fluctuations. And hence, not one
ot those crowds is equipped with such arms as are requisite
to defend a native soil, or to secure even persona] safety ; nox
is the region supplied with the needful stores of resistance.
It is the habit of each, either to execute his purpose by artful

rBAR XVI J.] PBL0PONNB8IAN WAR. ^ 147

laogoage, or to wrest it from the public by sedition. Thete
are all his resoarces ; and, if they fail, at the worst, he barely
shifts his habitatioii. It is therefore improbable that a rab*
hie, 80 jumbled together., wiU ever be onanimously guided
fay one concerted plan, or combine together for its just exe-
cution. Each , moment they will be veering about to suth
expedients as happen most to sooth their caprice ; and the
■lore, upon account of these seditions, in which, we are iQ>
formed, they are already embroiled.

** Their number of heavy-armed, it must also be observed,
is not 80 large as the pompous accounts of fame have made
it ; ner does the sum total of the Grecians among them turn
(rat so considerable as each city has computed for^her own.
But Crreece, in this manner, ever addicted most terribly to
bdie her own numbers, has been found, in the present war,
•caice able to provide herself with arms.

" Such, according to the best information I have been able
to collect, is the present condition of afiairs in Sicily. Nay,
there are means within our reach still more to facilitate its
reduction. For we shall obtain the concurrence of many
barbarians seated there, who, from inveteracy agaioBt the Syra-
cosans, will join bs to attack them. Neither can any obstacles
accrue from the situation of oar a^airs nearer home, if you
oolj view it in the just and proper light.

" The Inravery of our fathers, though opposed by the very
same enemies who at present, it is urged, should we sail
fat Sicily, must be left behind us, though opposed by all the
power of the Mode, erected this our empire by the sole re-
source of their superiority in naval power. The Peloponne-
sians, farther, have never had less hopes of being a match for
OS than at this veiy juncture, even though their strength be
in all its maturity of vigour. It is true, they have it ever in
their option to make imroads into our dominions, even though
we waive this expedition^; but, at sea, they never can be able
to hurt us ; the fleet we shall leave behind will be amply
si^cient to make head against them.

" By What plausible arguments, therefore, can we excuse
oar behaviour, should we now pusillanimously desist 1 What
evasion can we find to deny our confederates the succour
they demanded 1 We are bound in honour, by the oaths we
have sworn, to undertake their redress. Unavailing is the pre-
text that they have never done such good offices for us. Our

148 PEL0P0N1VE61AN WAR. [bOOK VI

alliance with them was not made on the Gondition 6f their sail-
i \Dg hither to bring us succoar, but bf giving such full emploj
to our enemies there as might effectually deter them from
coming hither. The ready road to empire, as not Athenians
only, but every people who have risen to a summit of power,
by experience know, is ever to succour those who implore
our protection, whether they be Greeks or barbarians. For,
had it been the constant method to cherish indolent, inactive
measures, or minutely to litigate who in justice ought to be
protected, the enlargement of our empire had been but tri-
fling, or rather we had been liable to the loss of our origina.
portion. For a state invested with superior power is not only
openly opposed in the field, but recourse is had to every pre-
caution to prevent their appearance in it. Neither is it in our
power to prescribe exact or arbitrary limitations to our own
empire ; but we are by necessity compelled to cabal against
some, and with a high hand to keep others in subjection ; be-
cause, should we relax our command over others, we endan-
ger our own authority, and those we will not awe may be-
come our masters. Nor, farther, ought peace to be so much
the object of regard to you as it is to other people, unless
you new-model your government, and render it conformable
to that of your neighl^urs.

"Weigh therefore these arguments; and be convinced,
that thus only our interest is capable of any considerable ad-
vancement ; if we proceed against Sicily, and execute the ex-
pedition in (Mder to deject the haughty Peloponneeian spirit,
l^ 80 plain an instance how much we despise them, how
little fond we are at present of this inaetive interval, and how
eager to be^ again with a Sicilian voyage. And, by acting
thus, there is probability on our side, that, in case we subdue
the people there, we may gain the sovereignty over all Greece ;
or, at wont, we shall depress the Syracusan power : the latter
point alone vrill be an important service to ourselves and oor
allies. But, in case any measure of success attends ut, our
ships will enable us to secure our acquisitions, or at worst our
departure ; for, though the whole body of the Sicilians com-
nine together against us, we shall be absolute masters of our
own retreat.

" Let not therefore the words of Nicias, calculated merely

' to the service of sloth, and to raise dissensions between the

young and the old, disconcert your plan. But. let the nsoal

TEAR XVII.J PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 149

4ecorem take plac«, observant of which onr forefathers, at
wfaoae consultations both the seniors and the yoaths assisted,
exalted this state to its present height ; and do you now, ad-
hering to the established practice, endeavour its farther ezal-
tetion. Remember also that youth and age, if debarred one
another's reciprocal assistance, lose all their influence and
weight ; that, on the other hand, from the wildness of youth,
and the moderation of the middle-aged, and the consummate
prudence of the old, when tempered harmoniously together,
the most perfect strength must infallibly result ; that a state
which supinely gires way to sloth, like other things, for want
of exercis^e, must infallibly droop and pine away, and the whole
of her skill grow old and obsolete ; bat, when inured to un-
interrupted conflict, it is continually improving by practice,
and vnll gain a perfect habit of surmounting every obstacle,
not by a parade of words, but by active perseverance'.

"Upon the whole, I am firmly convinced, that a state
which has been accustomed to foil employ must soon droop
into destruction if it resigns itself to sloth ; and that such
persons take the best method ef infallibly securing their wel-
fare who adhere most steadily to their present customs and
laws, though possibly better might be substituted in their
•tead."

In this manner Alcibiades spoke. And the Athenians,
moved by his arguments, which were also seconded by the
entreaties of the Egestean and Leontine exiles, who, stand-
ing forth in the assembly, implored their protection, and, re-
minding them of their oaths, adjured them to redress their
wrongs, declared for the expedition with a warmer ceal than
at any time before. Nicias was convinced by this, that what-
ever dissuasion he could allege would be quite incapable to
change their resolves. Yet,' as possibly, by a minute detail
of the immense preparations he was going to demand, he
might cause them at once to change their sentiments, he
stood up again, and readdrisssed them as follows : —

" I perceive, Athenians, that your resolutions are fixed on
this expedition beyond the power of dissuasion ; and may its
event be such as your wishes portend ! But I shall once more
beg leave to communicate to you my own sense of the afiair.

*' According to the best information I have been able to
pTGcure, we are now going to invade a number of powetfol
^ties ; cities independent of one another, nor standmg m need

150 PEL0P0NNK81AN WAR. [soaK Tl.

of public revolutions f which people who cringe under the
yoke of slavery might rewJUly embrace, in or%r to render
their condition more supportable. Nor is it, farther, to be pre-
sumed that thej will readily exchange their own liberty fat
subjection to us, as they are numerous, at least for one island,
and many of them inhabited by Grecians. For, without reck-
oning Nazus and Catana, which I ho()e, upon account of their
affinity to the Leootines, will sjde with us, there are no less
than seven provided in all respects with as good martial ha-
biliments and stores as our own armies ; and more particu-
larly those against which we chiefly bend our course, Selinua
and Syracuse. These cities abound with soldiers heavy-
armed, with archers, and with dartej-s. They have a great
number of triremes, and plenty of hands to man tnem.
They possess a large quantity of wealth, not only in pri-"
vate purses, but in their public treasuries. So rich are even
the Selinuntians ; and to the Syracusans, farther, a trib-
ute is paid by several barbarians. But the points in which
they most of all excel us, are, that numerous cavalry of
wnich they are possessed, and com of their own growth suf-
ficient to answer all demands without foreign importations.
An armament, therefore, simply naval, will by no means be
sufficient to cope with such a strength. A large land- force
must accompany the naval, if we are desirous <^ performing
such achievements as may be worthy (he greatness of our
plan, and would not be debarred an opportunity of landing
by their numerous cavalry. And this will be yet more need-
ful, should the cities, alarmed at our approach, combine to^
gether against us, and no other friends but the Egesteana
join us, or supply us with a body of cavalry sufficient to couik-
tenance our landing. It would be a terrible disgrace should
wo be compelled by force to give over our design, or to send
for a larger supply, as if our counsels at first setting out were
rash and ill concerted. We must steer at once against them
with preparations in all respects well proportioned to the de-
sign, since we know that we are bound to a land far remote
from our own, and are under many disadvantages to grapple
with our foes. It will not be now your employment to march
to the relief of your dependants seated near to Athens against
a hostile invasion, where all the needful supplies woidd be
brought to your camp out of the territories of friends : bul
you are to roam to a distant climate, where yon cannot call

rSAR XYll.] PSLOPOMNSSIAM WAR. 151

one inch of groond your own, and from whence, in the four
winter monthe, yoa will scarcely be able to send a messenger
to Athens.

" In my opinion, therefore, it is incumbent vpon as to carry
(hither large parties of heavy-armed, to be raised out of our
own citizens, our allies, and our dependants, and an addi-
tional strength of Peloponnesians, if we are able to procwe it
by persuasion or by pay. Our archers and slingers mast be
also numerous, that we may be able to make good our de-
scent in spite of the Sicilian horse. We must also be at*
tended by supernumerary vessels, that we may be enabled
with greater ease to fetch in necessaries for our army. We
must also carry with us from Athens, in our tenders, a great
quantity of com, such as wheat and barley parched ; with
bakers, some of whom, for certain wages, must be obliged to
grind, that, if our armament lie anywhere weaiher-Gound,
we may not stand in need of the necessaries of life : ftfr, so
numerous as we must be, it will not be possible for every
city to receive us. All other provisions must be laid in by
oarselves to the utmost of our power, and we must trust feur
nothing to the care of others.

** But what concerns us most is, to canry from hence a fund
of money as ample as we C9n raise. As for that which the
Egesteans pretend is already laid up for our use, conclude it
to be so only so far as words are current : for, unless we set
out from Athens, not barely provided as well as those we
are to encounter, but, equality in strength for battle alone ex=
cepted, in all other respects far surpassing them in every
needful appointment, we shall hardly be able to reduce who
are to be reduced, or even to protect who are to be protected.
We should regard ourselves in the character of people who
are going to seek a new settlement among aliens and en*
* amies ; and as such are necessitated to render themselves
victots of the spot the very day they land ; or to rest assured,
if they then miscarry, that the whole of that region will be in
aims against them. Of this I own myself afraid ; against
this I am convinced that by repeated consultations we ought
timely to provide ; and, after all, must trust still farther to
the ffoodness of our fortune, hazardous, as we are but men.
Yet hence, I should be ^lad to set out in this enterprise with
as little occasion as possible to rely on uncertain fortune, and
to be amply provided with every expedient for a successful

162 PBLOPONNBBiAN WAR. [bOOK TI.

•xpadition ; ior kheM, to wj apprahcnsion, am the zmdied
mMM to Mcnre the pobiic welfare^ and the safety of nt wbft
are dettined for the voyage. But, if any man thinka my re»-
aons chimencaly I am ready to resign my command to his
■operior abilities."

In this manner Nieias delivered himself, with a view, ii
possible, to diseoura^ the Athenians from proceeding, by so
mat a demand of articles requisite to the design ; or at least,
that, in case he mast be obliged to ondertske the service, he
might set oat with such ample expedients of security.

Yet all this bulky and embarraasing demand of appoint-
ments could not raise in the Athenians the least aversion to
the expedition, but rather fastened their eagerness upon it
more intensely than ever; and Nieias prevailed on that side
of the question where he hoped to have been defisated. It
was now universallx agreed that his advice was just and
proper ; and, if obeyed, the expedition mast be attended with
all ima^able security. All ranks of men were now equally
seized with a fondness for the voyage ; for such as were ad-
vanced in years were confident that a career of success must
attend the enterprise, and that so formidable an armament
could not possibly miscarry ; the yonnffer sort were animated
with the desire of seeing so remote a clime, and gratifying at
large the curiosity of their tempers, assured that wtfety would
attend their course ; the bulk of the populace, and the sol-
diery in general, were pleased with their present assignment
of pay, and the hope of enlarging dominion, which would af-
ford them perpetual employ and- subsistence. The passions
of the generality were for these causes so vehemently elated
with this project, that soch as could by no means approve
were afraid to oppose it by a vote, lest they might be cen-
sured as men who malevolently opposed the public glory.
And by this all opposition was effectually quashed.

At length a certain Athenian, standing forth from among
the crowd, and calling aloud upon Nieias, told him " he must
no longer cast about for evasions, nor meditate delays ; but
declare expressly now, in the presence of them all, the partic-
ulars of the preparations which the Athenians should vote
him."

Nieias, though sorry at his heart, was obliged to reply,
that, ** in order to be exact, he ought to consult more leia-
orely with his colleagues : but, so far as he could judge in

TIAK XTII.] PBl^oPOimSSIAN WAE. 158

thk saddtn manner, they ought to set cot with a fleet coo*
■Bting^ of at least one hundred trbeiiies ; that the Athenians
themselTes ought to furnish as many transports for heavy
amied soldiers as was possible, and to send for an additioiial
number from their dependants ; that the number of heavy-
anned, both of Athenians and dependants, should at least
be fiTe thousand, and, if possible, more ; that to these the
rest of their preparations should be proportioned, such as
archers to be levied at home, and procured also from Crete,
not forgetting slingers ; and, in fine, that whatoT^ should be
jadged in any degree expedient, should be provided in good
time, and carried along with them in the fleet."

This the Athenians had no sooner heard, than they in-
stantly voted ** that the generals were invested with absolute
authority to determine the numbers of the expedition, and
the whole procedure of the voyage, at their own discretioo,
as might best promote the public welfare."

In pursuance of this, the preparations were immediately in
hand. Summonses for the quotas adjusted were sent to their
dependants, and the levies at home went briskly forwaid.
Atiiens was now folly recovered from the ^pestilence and a
loDg-eOntinued destructive war ; both in a multitude of young
men now arrived at the vigour of their age, and an increase
of the public revenues by favour of the peace. -By this means
aU the needful supplies were more easily provided : and thus
were the Athenians busied for the present in fitting out their
armament.

But, at this very juncture, almost all the statues of Mer-
cury, wherever found within the precincts of A^on*i &D<1 ac-
cording to the established custom they were very numerous,
both in the porches of private houses and the public tem-
ples, * * * * *f had th^ faces disfigured in the space of one

t I have omitted two words in the original, because I cannot
translate them with any precision or clearness. Thev are
9 Ttrpayavos tpyacia, opus quadratumf says one Latin translator ;
opus ex lapide quadrato, says another. Mr. Hobbes has it, Mer-
curies of square stone ; how such a description can be applica-
ble to a statue will be hard to conceive. Whether they allude
to the enclosure in which the statues were erected, or to the
form of the pedestals, or whether a Mercury was carved on any
or all the siaes of a square stone, I am not able to decide. The
Mercuries were very numerous ; and many of them, it is certain,
were strange, uncouth, and very bungling performances

154 PELOPOKNB8IAN WAR. [bOOK YU

night Hie aothon of this oatnge were not known ; but
large rewardt were offered by the state in order to discover
them, and a decree was also passed that, " If any person
knew of the commission of any other impiety of the same na-
ture, he shonld boldly inform the pubhc of it, whether he
were a citizen, or a foreigner, or a sfaye."

This accident, in troth, made a deep impression on their
minds : for it was construed as a bad omen in regud to the
expedition in hand, and as an evidence of some terrible com-
bination to introduce innovations and an overthrow of the
democracy.

An information was at length given in by some sojourners
and their footmen, relating indeed not at all to the Mercuries,
but to the defacements of other images committed formerly
by Fome young men in a frolicksome and drunken mood ; and
now, farther, *< they had celebrated the mysteries* in private
houses by way of mockery ;" and among- others they also ac
eused Alcibiades. The party most inveterate a^nst him
cauffht readily at this charge. As he was the mam obstacle
to the advancement of their own popularity and credit, they
concluded that, in case they could rid themselves of him,
they might at once become leaders of the state. Hence they
aggravated the charge, and bellowed aloud that '< those mys-
tic frolics, and the defacements of the Mercnries, stmck al
the very foundations of the democracy ; and that none of
these outrageous acts had been committed without his parti-
cipation." They alleged, as a circumstance that corroborate<*
the charge, the whole tenour of his behaviour, flagrantly licen
tioos, and quite inconsistent with a democratical constituti(m

Alcibiades endeavoured forthwith to clear himself the best
he could from all appearances of guilt, and declared himself
ready, before he entered upon the voyage, to submit to a
trial (for the armament was now almost completed), and, if
proved to be guilty, to suffer the penalties of law ; and only,
if acquitted, to take upon him the command. He conjured

* The sacred mysteries celebrated by the Athenians at Eleusis
Plutarch relates, that the informers were brought in by one
Androcles, a demagogue, a virulent foe of Alcibiadea. They de
posed, that one ThecMorus acted the part of the crier, Polytion
of the torch-bearer, Alcibiades that of the hierophant, and man)
of his intimates assisted and were initiated m solemn and formal
mockery.

rSiJt XTIl.] PBLOPONNXSIAN WAR. 155

ilieDi, futber, ** to leceire no calQiniiioas accuMtibot against
bim in his absence ; but, if be was really guilty, to put bim
instantly to deatb : tbat, in common prudence, it could not
be jusc^ed, to intrust a person so beavily cbaiged with
the command of so large an armament before bis innocence
bad been regularly explored."

But his enemies, apprehensive that, in case he was brought
to an immediate trial, he would be supported by all the fa-
vour of the soldiery ; and that the people, whose idol he was»
mi|^t possibly relent, because in compliment to him the Ar-
gires and some of the Mantineans accompanied the ezpedi*
tion, opposed and put off the prosecution. They put the
msnagement of this point into the hands of a set of orators,
who urged that ** for the present he might proceed in his voy-
age, that the expedition ought not to he deferred on his ac-
count, and upon his return a day should be assigned for his
trisL" Their design was to gather more heavy matter against
him, which in his absence could be more easily effected, and
then to recall him and force him to his trial. In short, it
was jesolTed that ** Alcibiades should go the voyage."

Things being thus determined, and the year now advanced
to the middle of summer, the fleet set sail for Sicily. Or-
ders had been issued before for the bulk of the confederates,
and victoalling-ships, and small craft, and all the tenders in
g»ieFal, to repair to and assemble together at Corcyra ; that,
from thence, m a body, they might cross the Ionian to the
Cvpe of Japygia. But such as were subjects of Athens, and
such of the confedetates as were then in the city, marching
down to the Pineus on the appointed day by morning's dawn,
went on board the ships in order to weigh and be gone.
They were conducted thither by a great crowd, it may be said
br the whole crowd of Athens, h^ citixens and strangers.
Hie former attended to perform the parting decorums where
their several attachments claimed it ; some to their iiriends,
some to their relations, and some to their own sons. The
whole company moved along with a medley of hope and lamen-
tation ; with hope, that success would attend their course ;
with lamentation, lest they might never meet ^gain. The
sad recollection occurred — to how great a distance from their
native soil they were going tO be sent ! And, now that the
hoar of departure was come, and when this moment they
were going to be dismissed into scenes of danger, the impres- .

156 PELOPONNSSIAK WAR. [bOOK TI.

•ions of terror were felt with mach keener senee than when
the expedition was only decreed. Howeyer, at the eight of
(their preeent strength, of the numerous expedients of a pros-
perous enterprise which their ejes beheld, their spirits were
again elated.

As for the strangers and the bulk of the crowd, they at-
tended merely for the pleasure of gazing at the means intend-
ed to accomplish a mat and stupendous design : for never
did any one state of Greece, before this time, equip by its
own strength such a powerful armament. It was the finest
and most glorious fleet that to this day the world had seen.
It is true, in number of ships and heavy-armed on board,
that which sailed against Epidaurus under command of Per-
icles, and that also against Potidea under Agnon, were by no
means inferior : for mose carried four thousand heavy-armed
soldiws, all native Athenians, with three hundred horsemen :
the number of their triremes was a hundred ; fifty more were
furnished by the Lesbians and Chians, besides a large nnm*
ber of confederates who attended those expeditions. B«t
then they were fitted for a voyage in comparison trifling, and
in a slight and penurious manner*

On the contrary, the present equipment was calculated for
a length of time, and completely fitted out for both services,
as occasion might demand, either of the sea or of the land.
The shipping, at the great expense of the captains of the sev-
eral triremes and of ttie state, was quite elaborate. The pay
assigned by the public to every mariner was a drachma* a
day. The number of new shipe for the battle and chase was
sixty; that of transports for the heavy-aimed, forty. The
several captains o( the triremes were very choice in makioff

as rowed

up their crews, and gave to such of the ]
on the uppermost bench, and to the sailors, a gratuity out of
their own pockets over and above the public pay. They had
farther adorned their vessels with images and all kinds of
sumptuous decorations. It was the high ambition of every
single captain to have his own ship excel all the rest of the
fleet in splendour and in swiftness.

The land-force was distinguished by the choiceness of their
levies and their aims ; and all the individuals vied' with one
uiother in the goodness of their accoutrements and equipage
whatsoever. It happened also on the same account that a

♦ 7 \.2d.

TMAR XVII.] PELOPONNSSIAN WAR. 157

wann contentioa was kindled among them, under what oflS-
cos they should be ranged ; and opportunity afforded to the
rest of Greece to construe the whole into a mere ostentation
of their power and opulence rather than an elective equip-
ment against a foe ; for, were a computation to be formed,
both of the public disbursements of the state on this occasion,
and the private expenses of the whole soldiery ; of the state,
what prodigious sums they had already advanced, and what
additional sums the generals were to carry along with them ;
of the soldiery, what each had expended on his own equipage,
every captain on the decoration of his vessel, and to how
much greater charges he was still liable ; without takmg into
the account the vast list of necessaries which, over and
above the public allowance, each private person was obliged
to lay in for so long a voyage, or the goods which a soldier
or trader might take with him on board for the sake of traffic ;
the amount of talents now carried out of Athens would, tun*
oat exceeding large.

Nor was it merely for the strangeness of the enterprise or
the splendour of its show that the armament was noised
abroad, but also for ^e numerous force with which it was
provide^ to attack the foe ; for the remoteness of the voy-
age, great as ever they had undertaken from their native
clime, and that prodigious expectation which was raised of
the event, in order to which the state had now exerted itself
quite beyond its strength.

When the whole force was got on board the fleet, when
the stowage of all necessary stores and all baggage whatever
was completely adjusted, silence then was proclaimed by
sound of trumpet : but the solemn prayers for a successful
expedition were not offered from every vessel apart, but in
behalf of all united, by the voice of a herald. The goblets
mingled with wine ran the circle of the whole armament, and
every crew as well as the commanders poured out the libations,
and drank success and happiness out of gold and sili^r cups.
The whole crowd that stood upon the beach, both of citizens
and such strangers as were there and wished them prosper-
ity, joined with them in the public prayer. And now, the
psan being sung and the libation finished, they put out to
sea.* After moving off at first in a line ahead, each vessel

* Many incidents are related by Plutarch, in the life of Nicias
rmv. — VOL II. — o

158 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK VI.

made afterward the best of her way to ^gina. And this ar-
mament made all possible haste to reach Corcyra, where the
force of their allies by which they were to be joined was al-
ready assembled.

Though the intelligence of such an intended invasion hsd
been brought to Syracuse from several quarters, yet for a
long course of time they would yield no credit to its tmth.
Nay, more, when an assembly was convened, such speeches
as follow were made by different persons ; some believing the
accounts received in relation to this armament of the Athe-
nians, others pronouncing them absolutely false. On this
occasion Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, standing forth in
the assembly, and as one convinced in his own mind that all
such accounts were true, addressed and advised his country-
men thus : —

** It will probably be my own fate, as it has been the fate
of others, to be disbelieved, when I speak of this intended
invasion as a matter of truth and certainty. And I also
know by experience, that both those who vent and those

in regard to the denunciations of the priests against this ezpedi.
tion, the coining and wresting of oracles both for and affainst it,
and omens which portended nothing bat misfortune. Mere hu-
man foresight, and a consciousness that the means were not
equal to the end proposed, gave the wisest and steadiest part of
the Athenian community a sad apprehension of the event. Soc-
rates constantly declared against it ; and assured his friends
it would draw after it the destruction of the state : this his pre-
sentiment soon became the public talk. Meton« the astrono-
mer, who was named to a post of high rank in the expedition,
feigned himself mad and set his house on fire. Others deny that
circamstance of his counterfeiting madness, and say he set his
house on fire by night, and appeared next morning on the forum
in an abject manner, and begged of his fellow-citizens, in order
to comfort him under so great a misfortune, to excuse his son,
who was to have commanded a trireme, from going the voyage.
An incident, farther, at the very time of the departure of the
grand fleet, gave many persons vast concern. The women
were then celebrating the rites of Adonis, in which many repre-
sentations of deaths and funerals were exhibited all over Athens ;
and the women, according to custom, were making heavy moan
and lamentation. This struck sad forebodings into people who
laid stress on such incidents, that this expensive and mighty ar-
mament, though now so vigorous and magnificent, would sooi^
moulder into ruin.

YEAR XTII.] PBLOPONNBSIAN WAR. 159

who retail such accounts of things as seem incredible, are
so far from effectually peisnading, that they generally incur
the imputation of nutdness. Yet no such apprehensiona
shall intimidate or strike me dumb, when such a weight of
danger hoTers ofer my country ; when in my own heart I
am conyinced that I am more clearly enlightened on the
point than any other person whaterer.

" For I assert that to be a matter of the highest certainty,
which' you hear only with a fit of stupid suiprise, that the
Athenians hsTe already set sail against us with a numerous
force, both for the service of the sea and the land. The pre-
text alleged by them is, execution df treaties with the Eges-
teans, and the restoration of the Leontines ; but the true mo-
tive is their ambition to enslave Sicily, and above all this our
own Syracuse, which, if once reduced, they are well assured
that nothing will be able afterward to give a check to their arras.
Taking it therefore for granted that they will be immediately
upon us, deliberate in what manner you may make the most
gallant defence in the present posture of your strength : care-
ful that through contempt you be not taken unprovided, nor
through incredulity abandon the means of preservation. Nor,
farther, let those who -are convince of their immediate ap-
pearance be terrified at the boldness or strength of their un •
dertaking ; for they will not be able to hurt us more than
we shall be enabled to retaliate upon them. Nor are they
more beyond our reach, because they invade us with so vast
an armament ; since this, in regard to the other Sicilians, will
plead more abundantly in our cause ; for, terrified at the foe*
they will be disposed with higher warmth of friendship to co-
operate with us. And if thus, in the train of affairs, we are
either enabled to defeat their arms,- or merely to force their
return, their schemes unexecuted, and their ambition disap>
pointed (for I am not in the least afraid that their sanguine
expectations can be glutted with success), such events would
reflect the highest glory upon you, and complete what I firmly
nope.

" It is a truth, evinced byfacts, that few considerable arma-
ments of either Grecians or barbarians which have been sent
out on remote expeditions, have returned successful. Nor,
farther, are our present invaders more numerous than the
Syracusans themselves, or their friends of the neighbouring
states, whose strength mere hostile dread will cement and

160 P£l«0FOlvMB81AJN WAR. [bOOK VI.

bind faat together. If, therefore, though merely for want of
needful supplies, they incur miscarriages on a foreign shore ;
if they prove unsuccessful, though chiefly through their own
misconduct, the whole honour must however rest with us, %a
if we had ruined their projects by art and management.
Even these very Athenians were indebted to a parallel coin-
cidence of events for the vast enlargement of their strength
and empire, when the Me4e, who gave out that he aimed the
Uow at Athens, was, contrary to all human expectation, dis-
concerted by a series of errors that were purely his own.
And some such fortunate coincidence, in our own behalf, we
have at present all imaginable reason to expect. -

** Let us, therefore, with active resolution, put our domestic
affidrs into a posture of defence, and despatch our ambassa-
dors to the Siculi, to keep firm in our friendship such as are al-
ready our friends, and to endeavour to procure the friendship
and concurrence of the rest. Nay, let our embassies reg-
ularly complete the whole circuit of Sicily, where they may
represent the common danger which equally threatens them
all. het them, farther, cross over to Italy to procure for us
their defensive alliance, or at least to negotiate a denial of
reception to the Athenians. I also judge it advisable to send
to Carthage: for exen the Carthaginians are not exempted
from the present dangers, but have been ever under appre-
hensions of receiving from them a visit at Carthage. It may
perhaps e£kctually occur to their thoughts, that, should they
now abandon us, the storm must soon extend itself to them ;
by which they may be determined, either secretly or openly,
l^ some expedient or other, to vindicate our cause. And,
were their inclination equal to their power, no people on the
globe could so easily redress us ; for they are possessed of
an immensity of wealth, which gives an easy and prompt
completion to the schemes of war and to every human enter-
prise. Let us send, farther, to Lacedemon and Corinth, re-
questing the despatch of immediate succours hither, and the
renewal of the war a^nst the Athenians.

** There is one pomt more, which in my opinion is more
critical and imp<Nrtant than all the rest : and which, though
perhaps, inured as you are to domestic indolence, it may not
gsin your ready approbation, I shall however boldly recom-
mendf. Would all of us in general who are inhabitants of
Sicily, or at least would o^y we Syracusans, with what

TEAR XVil.J PKLOPONNB91AM WAR. 161

othier people we can get to asaist ua«-put out inaUnily to tea
with all the ships we have in readiness, and victualled hut for
the apace of two months ; would we then give these Atheni-
ans the meeting either at Tarentum or Uape Japygia, and
there convince them, that, before they entor the lists of war
for the conquest of Sicily, they must fight for their passage
across the Ionian ; we should then strike them with the ut-
most terror, and infinitely perplex them with the thought that
from a friendly port we shall sally forth to guard our out-
works (for Tarentum will readily receive us), while they have
a long tract of sea to pass with all their cumbersome train,
and must find it hard, through so long a voyage, to be always
steering in the reffular order. As their course must thus be
slow, and must advance only in exact conformity to orders,
we should have a thousand opportunities to attack them. If
sgain they clear their ships for action, and in a body bear
down expeditiously upon us, they must ply hard at their oars ;
and, when spent with their toil, we can iall upon them. Or,
in case that may not be judged advisable, we have it always
in our power to retire into the harbour of Tarentum. And
thus the Athenians, if, in constant expectation of being fought
with at sea, they must make their passage with a small por-
tion only of their stores, will be reduced to great distress on
coasts which will afford them no supply. ShoukL they choose
to continue in their station, they must infallibly be blocked up
in it. Should they venture a passage, they must unavoidably
leave their tenders and store-ships ^hind : and, as they have
no assurance of a hearty reception from the cities on the
coasts, must be terribly dismayed.

'Vlt is my firm opinion that, amid that great perplexity of
thought which must result from these obstructions, they will
never presume to sail from Gorcyra *, or, at least, while they
are agitating the forms of procedure, and sending out spy-boats
to discover our numbers and position, the season of the year
must be protracted to winter ; or, utterly dispirited at so un-
expected a resistance, they will give up the voyage. This I
more readily expect, as I am informed that their most expe-
rienced commander has been forced into office against his in-
clination, and would gladly lay hold of the pretext to desist,
if such a show of resistance could be made by us as would
preserve his honour from suspicion. And I am perfectlv
convinced that rumour will increase and aggravate our strength.
II.-N

162 PSLOPONNBSIAN WAR. [bOOK Tt

Now the sentiments of mankind are constantly adjusted by
rumours : parity of danger is supposed, when an enemy de-
clares he is ready to begin the attack ; and such an enemy is
always more dreaded than he who betrays an intention mere-
ly to defend himself against an enemy's assaults. Such ex-
cess of fear must now n\\ to the lot of the Athenians. They
are invading us, with the fond presumption that we shall not
fight. They think they haye grounds for such a presumption,
because we have not concurred with the Lacedsemonians in
their demolition. But when* to their bitter disappointment,
they find we have the courage to act offensively, the sudden-
ness of our efforts will terrify them more than aJl the reality
of our expected strength could have done.

" Determine therefore to execute with bold and ready rfes-
olution the plan I have proposed ; or, if this must not pre-
vail, with the utmost expedition to get all things at home id
readiness for v^r. And let each Syracusan be firmly con-
vinced, that contempt of an enemy ought never to be shown
but in the heat of action ; that the conduct of those meif
must tend most highly to the pahlic preservation, who, alarm-
ed by a decent fear, judge it needful to prepare with all cau-
tion and alacrity, as if the danger was instant at our doors.
But these our enemies are actually coming ; they are already
(I know it well) upon the voyage ; they are this moment only
not in sight." •

In this manner Hermocrates spoke his sentiments. But
the popular assembly of the Syracusans was embroiled with
much variance and contention. One party cried out that " It
was all a joke ; the Athenians durst not think of invading
them.'* Another, " Hermocrates had truth and reason on his
side." A third, ** Let them comp ; what damage can they do
us which we are not able heartily to repay them 1" Others
betrayed an open contempt of the whole account, and laughed
at it as downright ridicqloas. The party was but small
which gave credit to Hermocrates, and trembled for the fu-
ture. At length Athenagoras stood up, who, being the first
magistrate of the people, and whose credit at this time was
highest with them, delivered himself as follows : —

'* The man who wishes the Athenians may not be so mad
as to come hither and run themselves headlong into our sub-
jection, is either a coward or traitor to his country. But for
those who vent such news, and endeavour to firighten you by

ITJEAR.XVII.] FB|«OPON«8SlAN WAR. 163

the teirible recital, at their aodaciousness, tiulji I am not in
the least surprised ; but I am creatly so at their folly, if they
imagine their yiews can escape detection ! Poor abject souls !
^aite dispirited within through their own pusillanimity, are
glad to spread consternation throughout a whole community ;
that, under the general panic, their own may lie veiled and un-
distinguished. And such is the effect which the present in-
formations may be ready to produce ; not from any grounds
of truth and certainty, but the fictions and falsehoods of an
iniquitous cabal, who are ever dabbling in the practices of fac-
tion.

" But you, Syracusans, I exhort to apply your good sense
on this occasion, and search after probabiUty ; not by consid-
ering such accounts as these men have pompously detailed,
but such enterprises as a wise and abundantly enlightened
people (for such I esteem the Athenians) are likely to under-
take. For what probability is there, that, leaving the Pelo-
ponnesians on their backs, when the war at home is not yet
brought 'to any settled, conclusion, they would wilfully em-,
bark in another of no less importance 1 For my part, I am
pei^uaded they rest well contented, that, so' many and so
powerful states as we Sicilians are, we have not yet thought
proper to invade them.

" But, allowing these informations to be true, and that "they
are actually coming, I am firmly persuaded that Sicily is better
able than Peloponnesus to war them down, by how much in
all respects it is better furnished with every resource of war ;
and that this our Syracuse alone is far superior in strength to
that, nay, double that armament, which by report now threat-
ens its invasion. For I know, assuredly, that no .horse can
follow in their train ; that, farther, none can be procured for
them in this country, if we abate an inconsiderable party which
the Egesteans may furnish. And I know that a body of
heavy-armed, equal in number to our own, can never be trans-
ported by them across^such a length of sea. The enterprise
18 bold indeed, to attempt so long a voyage hither with only
light and nimble ships, and to bring all those military stores,
the roll of which must be excessively large, in order to. attack
so great a city. Shall I therefore be tjerrifled at vain reports 1
I, who am £rmly persuaded that, if the Athenians were
possessed of a city on our coasts as considerable in all re
^ct8 as Syracuse itself, and should^ dare to provoke us ; iit

164 PBLOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK VI.

masters of the neighbouring territory, they should from thence
make war upon us ; even with such advantages they would
with difficulty escape a total destruction. And what there-
fore, in all human probability, must be their fate, when all
Sicily to a man will be combined to oppose them ? For now
their war must issue from a camp on the beach of the sea,
of which their ships must form the ramparts. They will not
be able to make long excursions from their tents and maga-
zines of needful stores, as our cavalry will bridle and control
them. But, in short, it is my firm opinion that they never
will be able to accomplish a descent, so far am I convinced
that our force is in all respects superior.

"I am well persuaded that all those obstacles which I
have hitherto recited, their own wise reflections have sug-
gested to the remembrance of the Athenians, and deterred
them from hazarding their own ruin ; and that our own male-
contents amuse us with fictitious accounts of things that nei-
ther have nor can have existence. This is by no means the
first occasion on which I have been able to detect theii
schemes. I am no stranger to their constant attempts of
fomenting faction, ever intent as they are, by forgeries like
these, or more malicious than these, or even by the open ef-
fort^ of sedition, to strike a panic among the Syracusan peo-
ple, and to seize the helm of your government. And I have
reason to apprehend that, among the many projects they at-
tempt, some one at length may be fatally successful. But
this must be charged to our own pusillanimity, who exert no
precautions to avert impending miseries, nor bravely oppose
the storm, though we perceive it to be gathering around us.
And from hence it unavoidably results, that our state is sel-
dom blessed with a season of tranquillity, but feels the bitter
lot of sedition on sedition, of more numerous struggles against
factions within than public hostilities without ; nay, some-
times tyranny and despotic rule have been our portion.

'* To guard the present times from such disastrous contin-
gences shall be my constant endeavour ; and, if favoured
with your concurrence, my care shall be successful. To this
end I must prevail upon you, who are the many, to co-operate
with me, while I inflict upon these artificers of faction the
punishment they deserve, not barely for overt conSmissions (foi
in these they are not easily caught), but for ail the treacher-
ous plots which, how desirous soever, they are not able to

TEAR XTTI.] PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 165

ezecDta : for we are not only to award our vengeance on
the open outrages of an enemy, bat to disarm bis malice by
wise precaution ; because the man who will not thus in time
disarm it, will feel its blow before he is aware.

*< On the few I have also to bestow, partly some reproofs,
partly some cautions, and fMirtly some instructions : for chieffy
by these methods I judge it feasible to deter them from their
factious designs. Let me therefore request from tou, ye
youths of Syracuse, the solution of ^ point which has fre-
quently occurred to my own imagination. What is it yon
would hare ? An immediate possession of the government of
your country 1 Why, the very laws of that country declare
you incapable of it : and these very laws were intended
rather to exclude you, so long as yon are unequal, than to give
you a disgraceful rejection when you shall be equal, to the
trust. But, farther, are you not piqued at heart at being
placed upon the samd rank and level with the bulk of your
fellow-citizens 1 And where would be the justice in awaiding
distinctions of honour and trust to those who are in no re-
spect differenced from others T It may perhaps be urged, that
a democracy is repugnant to the dictates boto of wisdom and
justice ; that the most opulent members of a state are enti-
tled to its highest honours, are best able to superintend the
public welfare. But to this I reply, that, in the first place,
by the word people is signified a whole community, including
its every individual ; but an oligarchy means only a party ;
in the next place, that men of opulence are the most suitable
guardians of the public treasure ; that men of understanding
and experience are best qualified to advise ; but the many,
after hearing, are the best judges of measures. And thus,
by a democracv, equality of nght and of privilege is most
fairly preserved, as well to the separate members as to the
whole community. An oligarchy indeed bestows an ample
portion of dangers on the many ; but in beneficial points it
not only assumes the larger share to itself, but by an un«
bounded rapacity monopoTizeth the public harvest. These
are the ends which the men of power and the raw inexperi-
enced youths among you ambitiously pursue ; ends incompat-
ible with the welfare of a ^reat and fiourishing state. The
accomplishment of these, f say, you have this very moment
in agitation ; though the world cannot furnish such a set of
fools, if you perceive not the pernicious tendency of your

166 PSLOPONNESIAN WAR. [bDOK Yi

■chemes. Nor can any set of Grecians, within mjr knowl-
edge, equal either your orutality or your yillany, if with open
eyes you dare proceed. Lay hold then at once of sound in-
formation, or repent if ahready informed, and unite in the in-
fallible advancement of the generiil welfare of the whole com-
munity. And let the men of probity among you rest perfect-
ly satisHed, that thus they shall obtain a proper share, nay,
more than a share, in those emoluments, which will equally
redound to all their country. But, in case vou give into dif-
ferent schemes, the hazard is great ; the whole of your plan
will be bafEed and confounded.

" Trouble us therefore no farther with your informations,
as we are privy to and shall certainly disconcert the views of
their authors : for the Syracusan state, even though the Athe-
nians actually invade us, will repel their efforts with a mag-
nanimity worthy of herself; and we have already a set of
brave commanders, who will effectually manage the point.
But, if not one tittle of these intended invasions be true, which
is my firm opinion, the state will not be struck into a panic
by your rumours, will never place the command of her forces
in your hands, so as to rivet a voluntary servitude upon her-
self. She, on the contrary, will exert her own vigilance and
discretion ; she will interpret the rumours you have spread
as so many acts against her welfare, and will not give up her
liberty to accounts expressly forged to terrify the ear ; but,
aware in time, by no means to intrust herself into your man-
agement, will leave no possible method of defence untried:"

Thus spoke Athenagoras. But here one of the generals
rising up, prevented any other person from continuing the de-
bate, and put an end to the present heats by delivermg him-
self thus : —

*' It is contrary to all decorum, both for those who speak
to pour forth calumniations against one another, and for those
who hear to receive them with attention. At present, we
are rather concerned to yield regard to the informations
which are brought us, that every individual in this commu-
nity may be timely prepared ^o repel the invaders. And, if
this should prove at last to be mere superfluity of care, yet
what harm can possibly accrue from such an equipment of
the state with horses, and arms, and such other habiliments
as are the glory of war 1 We ourselves shall take all proper
caie of the provisions of war and the levy of soldiers ; .and-

TSA&tZTlI.] PBLOPONNKftlAN WA». 18T

at die 8*me time shall ciicolate oar nwMengen to tke cities
around ns, and watch the appearance of the foe ; and shall
eipedke every point judged needful in the preaent emer-
gence. Some care of theae points has already been taken ;•
and what more we shall perceive to be expedient, we ahall
on the proper occasions^eommnnicate to you."

When the general had expressed himself thus, the Syra-
cusana broke- up the assembly and departed.

The Athenians, with the ro'enforcements of their allies,
were by this time all arrived at Corcyra. And the first thing
done l^ the commanders was to take a review of the whole
equipment, and to settle the order in which they were to an^
chor and form their naval station. They also divided it into
three squadrons, and cast lots for the command of each : to
the end that, in the course of the voyage, they might be wett
supplied with water, and harbours, and the proper necessa-
ries, wherever they might chance to put in -^ that, in other
respects, a better discipline might be kept up, and the men
be more inured to a ready obedience, as being under the in-
spection of an able commander in each several division.
These points being settled, they despatched three vessels to
Italy and Sicily, to pick op information what cities on those
coasts would give them a reception. And their orders were,
to came back in time and meet them upon the voyage, that
they might be advertised into what ports they might safely
enter.

These previous points being Adjusted, the Athenians, with
an equipment already swelled to so great a bulk, weighing
anchor from Corcyra, stood across for Sicily. The total of
their triremes was a hundred and thirty- four, to which were
added two Rhodian vessels of fifty oars. One hundred d(
these were Athenian, and of this number sixty were tight
ships fit for service ; the rest were transports for the soldiery.
The remainder of the fleet consisted of Chians and the other
allies. The total of the heavy-armed on board was five
thousand one hundred men. Of these, fifteen hundred were
citizens of Athens enrolled ; seven hundred were Athenians
of the lowest class (called Thetes), who served by way of
marines. The rest of the force consisted of the quotas of
their alliance ; some, of their own dependants ; five hundred
belonged to the Argives; the number of Mantineans and
meioeoaries was (wo hundred and fifty ; the archers in the

1

168 PJBLOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK VI

wlM>i6 amooDted to four hondred and eighty ; and of these,
ei^ty were Cretans. There were seven hundred Rhodian
eUngert, and a hundred and twenty light-armed Megarean
exiles : and one horse-transport attended, which carried thirty
horsemen.

So great an eqoipnient sailed out at first to hegin the war :
and, in the train of this equipment, went thirty storeehips
laden with com, and carrying on board the bakers, and ma-
sons, and carpenters, and all things requisite in the works of
fortification ; and also a hundred sail of smaU vessels, which
necessity demanded to attend the ships that carried the stores.
A large number also of small craft and trading-vessels sailed
voluntarily in company with the fleet, for the sake of traffic r
all which now, in one collected body, stood away from^ Cor-
cyra across the Ionian gulf.

The whole armament being got over to Cape Japygia, or
to Tarentum, as they severally could make the passage, sail-
ed along the coast ofltaly, where not one city would receive
them, would grant them a market, or suffer them to land,
barely permitting them to anchor and to water, though at
Tarentum and Ix>cri even that was denied them, till they ar-
rived at Rhegium, a promontory of Italy. At Rhegiom the
whole fleet was now assembled ; and without the city (for an
admission into it was refused them) they formed an encamp*
ment within the verge of Diana's temple, where also they
were accommodated by the Rhegians with a market.

Here, having drawn their vessels on shore, they lay some
time for refreshment ; and had a conference with the Rheei-
ans, in which they pressed them, as they were of Chalcidic
descent, to succour the Leontines, who were also Chalcideane.
'Their answer was, that ** they should side with neither party ;
but, whatever measures were judged expedient by the other
Italians, they should conform to those." The Athenians*
councils were now solely bent on the affairs of Sicily, in what
manner they might most successfully make their approaches. «
'They also waited for the return of the three vessels from
Egesta, which had previously been despatched thither : long-
ing earnestly for a report about the state of their treasure,
whether it was really such as their envoys at Athens had rep-
resented.

To the Syracusans, in the meantime, undoubted advice is
brought from several quarters, and by thetr own spies, that

YEAR XVll.] PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 169

»* the fleet of the enemy lay at Rhegiura." The truth of this
being uncontested, they prepared for their defence with the
atmost attention, and were no longer duped by incredulity.
They also sent about to the Siculi ; to some places, their
agents, who were to keep a watchful eye upon their conduct ;
and to others, ambassadors ; and into those towns upon the
coast which were exposed to a descent, they threw a garri-
son. In Syracuse, they examined if the city was provided
with the proper means of a defence, by a careful inspection
of the arms and the horses ; and all other points were prop-
erly adjusted, as against a war coming swiftly upon them,
and only not already present.

The three vessels detached beforehand to Egesta rejoined
the Athenians, yet lying at Rhegium, with a report that " the
great sums which had been promised them were quite anni-
rilated, since they saw only thirty talents* in specie." Upon
this the commanders were instantly seized with a dejection
of spirit, because their first Hbpe was thus terribly blasted ;
and the Rhegians had refused to concur with 'their attempts,
upon whom they had made their first essay of persuasion, and
with whom they had the greatest probability of success, aa
they were by blood allied to the Leontines, and had ever
shown themselves well disposed to the Athenian state. The
Egestean afiair had indeed taken no other turn than what Ni-
cias fully expected, but the other two commanders were qaite
amazed and confounded at it.

The trick made use of by the Egesteans, at the time that
the first embassy went thither from Athens to take a survey
of their treasures, was this : Having conducted them into the
temple of Venus at Eryx, they showed the ofiferings repos-
ited there, the cups, the flagons, and the censers, and the
other furniture of the temple, in quantity by no means small.
These, hcing all of silver, presented to the eye a vast show
of wealth, far beyond their mtrinsic value. Having also made
entertainments in private houses for those who came in the
vessels of the embassy, they amassed together all the gold and
silver cups of Egesta : they borrowed others Trom the adja-
cent cities, as well Phcenician as Grecian ; they carried theii
guests about from one house of feasting to another ; and each
exhibited them as his own property. Thus, all of them dis»

* 5812/. 10*. sterling.
IL—O •

IW PBLOPONNBSIAN WAR. {.BOOK VI.

ifiayiog generally the same Tassels, and great alnmdanee ap-
pearing at every place, the Athenians who made the voyage
were prodigioasly surprised at the splendid shows. Hence
it was that, on their return to Athens, they enlarged with a
kind of emulation which should magnify it most, on the. im-
mensity of wealth they had seen at Egesta. In this manner,
being deceived thonselves,. they obtruded the same fallacy
upon others ; but now, when the true account was spread
among them, that *' theie was no such wealth at Egesta,"
they were much censured and reproached by the soldiers.

The generals, however, held a consultation about the meth-
ods of proceeding. And here it was the opinion of Nicias,,
" that with their whole armament they should stand immedi-
ately against Selinus, the reduction of which was the principal
motive of the expedition ; and, in case the Egesteans would fur-
nish the whole armament with the proper supplies of money,
their councils might then ber regulated accordingly ; but,
otherwise, they should insist on their maintaining the sixty
sail of ships wbich had been sent expressly at their own re-
quest ; then, abiding by them, they should reconcile their dif-
ferences with the Selinuntians, either by force of arras or ne-
ffotiation : they afterward might visit other cities, and display
before them the mighty power of the Athenian state ; and,
havinff given such conspicuous proofs of their alacrity to sup-
port their friends and allies, might return to Athens ; provi-
ded that no sudden and unexpected turn of affairs might give
them opportunity to do service to the Leontines, or bring over
some other cities to their interest ; ever intent not to bring
their own state into danger by a needless profusion of blood
and treasure."

Alcibiades declared *< That it could never be justified, if,
alter putting to sea with so great an armament, they should
return with disgrace, and no effectual service done to their
c6untry ; that, on the contrary, they ou|[ht, by heralds de-
^Mttched expressly, to notify their arrival in these parts to all
the cities except Selinus and Syracuse ; that, farther, they
should try what could be done with the Siculi, in order to
persuade some of them to revolt from the Syracusans, and to
strike up treaties of alliance and friendship with others, that
•o they might provide a resource of provisions and re-enforce-
ments ; that the first trial of this kind should be made upon
the Messenians, who lay in the finest situation for favouring

VBAR XVII.] PELOPONNESIAM WAB. 171

their passage and descent into Sicily* ^whicfa meat open tu
them the most conTenient harbour and station for their arma-
mentj thus, gaining the concurrence of the cities^ and cer-
tain from whom they might depend upon assistance, the way
woold then be open for uem to make attempts upon Syra^
cuse and Selinus, in case the former refused to make up the
quarrel with the Egesteans, and the latter to sufier the re-
plantation of the Leontines.''

The opinion of Lamachus was diametrically opposite, since
he advised it ^* to be the most judicious measure to stand at
ODce sjQrainst Syracuse, and to try their fortune before that
city with the utmost expedition, while the)t were yet not
competently provided for resistance, and their consternation
was still in its heijght : because every hostile force is always
most terrible on its first approach ; and, in case it protract
the time of encountering the eyes of its foes, they must re-
cover their courage through familiarity with danger, and then
the sight of an enemy is more apt to inspire contempt : but,
should they assault them on a sudden while yet tneir ap-
proach is with terror expected, the victory must infallibly be
their own: in this case, all things would co-operate with
them to terrify the foe ; such as, the sight of their numbers,
which now only could appear in their greatest enlarsement ;
the forebodings of their hearts what miseries were likely to
ensue ; and, above all, the instant necessity they must lie
under of hazarding a 'battle : that, moreover, it was likely
that numbers of the enemy might be surprised }ret*roaming
abroad in the adjacent country, as stiU they were incredulous
of the approach of the Athenians : or, even though the Syra-
CQsans were safely retired with all their effects into the city,
the army must needs become masters of prodigious wealth,
if they should besiege the city and awe all around it ; that
by taking this step, the other Sicilians would be more dis-
couraged from succouring the Syracusans, and more easily
inclined to concur with the Athenians, and all shifts and de-
lays to keep clear of the contest, till one side was manifestly
superior, would be precluded." He added farther, that " they
should take care to possess thems'elves of Megaia, which was
DOW deserted, and not far from Syracuse either by sea or land,
as it would afford a fine station for their ships to lie in,
would shelter them upon a retreat, and give expedition t»
their approaches."

172 - PBLOPONNBSIAN WAR. [bOOK VI.

Bat, though Lamachus delivered his sentiments thas, he
soon gave up his own opinion and went over to that of Alci-
biades. And, in pursuance of this, Alcibiades with his own
single ship passed over to Messene ; and, having gained a
conference with the Messenians about an alliance offensive
and defensive, when no arguments he brought could persuade ;
when, on the contrary, they returned this answer, that ^* into
their city they would not receive them, though they were
ready to accommodate them with a market without the
walls," he repassed to Rhe^um ; and immediately the gen-
erals, having manned out sixty ships with the choicest hands
of the whole fleet, and taken in a requisite stock of subsist-
ence, steered away for Nazus, leaving the rest of the arma-
ment at Rhegium under the care of one of those in the com-
mission.

After a reception granted them into their city by the Naz-
ians, they stood away from thence to Oatana ; and, when
the Cataneans refused to receive them (for in that city vms
a party strongly attached to the Syracusans), they put into
the river Terias. After a n^t*s continuance there, the next
day they sailed for Syracuse ; keeping the rest of the fleet
ready ranged in a line of battle ahead. - But they had detached
ten beforehand, who were ordered to enter the great har-
bour of Syracuse, and to examine what naval force lay there
ready launched for service, and to proclaim from their decks
as th'ey passed along the shore — ^that '* the Athenians are
come into those parts to replace the Leontines in their own
territory, as they were bound in point both of alliance and
consanguinity ; that whatever Leontines therefore were now
residing at Syracuse, should without fear come over to the
Athenians, as friends and benefactors.'*

When the proclamation had been made, and they had
taken a view of'the city and its harbours, and of the adjacent
ground, what spots were most convenient for a descent and
the commencement of the war, they sailed back again to Ca
tana. A council of war had been held in that city, and the
Cataneans were come to a resolution " not to receive the ar-
mament ;" but^ however, they granted an audience to the
generals. At which, while Alcibiades harangued, and the
mhabitants of Catana were all in the public assembly, the
Athenian soldiers, without giving any alarm, pulled down a
little gate of a very sorry strocture, and then, entering the

YSAR XYII.] PBLOPOKNB8IAN WAR. 178

eitf y wmlkfld up and down in the mai^ot Bot eiich of Um
Cataneans as wnre of tb« Syiacaaan party no soonar foand
Ihat the anny was got in, than, stnick into a eudden conster-
nation, they stole presently out of the city. The number of
these was bat trifling. The rest of the inhabitants decreed
an alliance with the Athenians, and encoaraged them to fetch
over the remainder of their amameat from Khegiom.

This point being carried, the Athenians, having passed to
Rh^um, were soon with the whole of their fleet under sail
fat Catena, and, on their arriTal- there, they formed a proper
station for their ships and men.

Bat now intelltMnce was brought them from Camarina,
that " if they woald come to countenance them, that city
would declare on their side ;" and that ** the Syraousans are
hosy in manning their fleet." With the whole armament
therefore they steered along the coast, touchiog first at Syra-
cuse. And, when they found that uo fleet was there in read-
iness to pat to sea, ihey stood off a^in for Camarina ; and
there, approaching the shore, they notified their arrival by the
Toice m a herald. Admittance was however refused them,
the Camarineans alleging that " they were bound by solemn
oaths to receive only one single ship of the Athenians, unless
of their own accord they should recjuire a larger number.'*
Thus disappointed^ they put out again to sea ; and, having
made a descent on some part of the Syracusan territory, tbey
picked up a booty, till the Syracusan cavalry making *head
against them, and cutting off some of their light-armed who
had straggled to a distance, they re-embarked, and went
sgain to Catana.

On their return thither they found the Salaminian arrived from
Athens to fetch back Alcibiades, by public order of the state,
to take his trial for the crimes charged against him by his
country, and also some others of the soldiery who attended
him in the expedition, against whom informations had been
given that tbey were guilty of impiety in the affair of the mys-
teries, and against some of them in that of the Mercuries :
for the Athenians, «fter the departure of the fleet, continued
to make as strict an inquisition as ever into the crimes com
mitted in regard to the mysteries, and also in regard to the
Mercuries. What sort of persons the informers were, was
DO part of their concern ; but, in the height of jealousy, giving
eredit indiscriminately to all, through too great a deference

176 PELOPONNE81AN WAR. [bOOK YI

is the fcnith ; that, haTing for a length of time been familiai-
ised to the expectation, having rendered himself awful to the
citizens, and being supported by vigilant and trusty guards,
he received and enjoyed his power with abundant security.
He never had cause, as a younger brother must have liad, to
work his way through perplexities and dangers, as in that case
he could not by practice have been made an adept in the af-
fairs of government ; but it was accidental, and owing entirely
to subsequent misfortunes,' that Hipparchas got the title, and
passed in the opinion of succeeding >ages for one of the ty-
rants.

On Harmodius, therefore, who was deaf to his solicitations,
he executed his resentment in the manner predetermined :
for, a summons having been delivered to a sister of his, a
young virgin, to attend and carry the basket in some public
procession, they afterward rejected her ; alleging she never
had nor could have been summoned, because she was on-
worthy of the honour. This affront highly provoked Harmo-
dius ; but Aristogiton, out of zeal for him, was far more exas-
perated at it. The points needful to their intended revenge
were concerted with the party who concurred in the design ;
bat they waited for the great Panathensea to strike the
blow ; on which festival alone, without incurring su^icion,
such of the citizens as assisted in the procession might be
armed and gathered together in numbers. It was settled
that they themselves should begin ; and then, the body of
their accomplices were to undertake their protection against
the guards of the tyrant's family.

The persons made privy to this design were but few, from
a view to a more secure execution of it: for they presu-
med that even such as were not in the secret, when the at-
tempt was once in whatever manner begun, finding themselves
armed, would seize the opportunity, and readily concur to as-
sert their own freedom. When therefore the festival was
come, Hippias, repairing without the walls to the place called
Ceramicus, and there attended by his guards, was prescribing
and adjusting the order of the procession. Harmodius and
Aristogiton, each armed with a dagger, advanced to execute
their parts ; but, when they. saw one of their accomphces in
familiar conversation with Hippias, for Hippias was affable
and courteous to all men, they were struck with fear ; they
imagined the whole of their plot had been betrayed, and that

YEAR XYII.] PSLOPONNBSIAN WAR. 171

tinmdj they trem only net apprehended. Now, therefore
by a sudden tum of molotion, they detennined, if poniUe
to snatch a timely revenge upon him by whom they were ag*
ffrieTed, and on whose account they had embarked into sc
dangerous an afiair. In this hurry of thought they rushed
back into the city, and met with Hipparcfans at the place call •
ed Leoeorinm ; where, without any regard to their own safety,
they made an instant assault upon him. And thus, in all the
fory of passion, one actuated by jealou^, and the other by
reeentment, they wounded and killed him. As the people
immediately ran together, Aristogiton, by favour of the con-
course, escaped for the present, but, being afterward seized,
was unmercifully treated : but Hannodiuswas instantly slain
on the spot.

The news of this assassination being carried to Hippias at
the Ceramicus, he moved off immediately ; not to the scene
of action, but towards the armed accomplices in the proces-
sion,, before they could he informed of the fact, as they were
stationed at a distance. He artfully suppressed on his coun-
tenance all sense of the calamity ; and, pointing to a certain
spot, commanded them aloud to throw down their arms and
file off thither. This command they obeyed, expecting he
had something to communicate to them. But Hippias, ad*
dressing himself to his guards, orders them to take away
those arms. He then picked out, man by man, from among
them, such as he designed to put to the question, and ul
upon whom a dagger was found : for, by ancient custom,
they were to make the procession with a apear and a shield.

In this manner truly, from the anguish of irritated loye,*

And yet, so violently were tyrants detested at Athens, that
the memory of Haimodius and Aristogtton was ever after hon-
oured there, as martyrs for liberty and first authors of the ruin
of tyrants. Their praises were publicly sang at the great Pane-
thensea. No slave was ever caUed by their names. Praxiteles
was employed to cast their statues, which were afterward set
up in the forum : Xerxes indeed carried them away into Persia,
but Alexander afterward sent them back to Athens. Plutarch
has preserved a smart reply of Antipho the orator, who will ap-
pear in this history, to the elder DioAysius, tyrant of Syracuse
The latter had put the question, which was the finest kind of
brass? "That," replied Antipho, "of which the statues of
Hannodius and Aristogiton were made."

178 peloponnbsiaN wa.r. [book vi.

thii conspiracy took its rise, and this d«spen(e attempt ww
executed by Harmodiiis and Aristogiton, fitom the impulse of
a sudden consternation. Bat, after thia> the tyranny became
mope grievous upon the Athenians. Hq>piaa, who was now
more than ever alarmed, put many of the citizens to death,
and cast his thoughts about towards foreign powers, to secure
himself an asylum abroad in case ai a total reverse at home
To iBantidas therefore, the eon of Hippoclua, tyrant of
Lampsaeus; to a Lampsadene, thou^ he himself was an
Athenian, he married his daughter Archedice, knowing that
family to have a powerful interest with King Darius ; and
the monument oT that lady is now at Lampsaeus, and has
this inscription : —

" From Hippias sprung, with regal power array*d.
Within tins eartn Archedice is laid;
f By father, husband, brothers, sons, allied

To haughty thrones, yet never stained with pride." ,

For the space of three years after this, Hippias continued
in possession of the tyranny at Athens ; but, being deposed in
the fourth by the Lacedamonians, and the exiled Alcmsonide,
he retired by agreement to $iga»um ; from thence to ^snti-
das at Lampsaeus ; and from thence to King Darius : and,
with a command under him, he marched twenty years after
to Milrathon ; and, though much advanced in years, served
in that war with tb^ Medes.

The pec^le of Athens, reflecting on these pa^t transactions,
and recollecting all the dismal narratives jd)Ottt them which
tradition had handed down, treated with great sevoity and
deep suspicions all such as were informed against in relation
to the mysteries : and they construed the whole procedure as
the dawning of a plot to erect an oligarchical and tyrannic
power. And, as their passions were inflai^ed by such aj^re-
nensiotts, many wcHthy and valuable citizens were already
thrown into prison. Nay, it seemed as if their inquisition
was to have no end, since from day to day their indignation
gave into more increasing severity, and numbers were con-
stantly arrested. Here, one of those* who had been unpris^

" * This person, according to Plutarch in Alcibiades, was Ando
cides the orator, a man always reckoned of the oligarchical fac
tion : and one Timaeos, his intimate friend, who was a man of
small considen^tion at Athens, but remarkable for a penetrating
and enterprising genius, was the person who persuaded him to
turn informer.

»Ail XTII.] niLOPOllNSMAN WAR. 179

oMd on vawfknKm, mod « saipidoii too of beii^ ^^Mpiy con*

eeniod in tlie ciiino, it penoaded, by one of lut feiIow-pm»
oners, to tum «n ovideace, no matter whether of troth or
iiibehood. Many conjectavea have passed on both sides ;
bnt no one, neither at that time nor sinee, has been able
to discover the men who were really concerned in the af»
feir. The argnment which proTaiied apon this peison was,
'* the necessity for his taking snch a step, even thoogh he
had no hand in the commission, since by this he wooM iofal-
UUy procure his own safety, and deliver the city from its pres-
ent confusion : for he mnst be much more secore of taviog
his life by snch Tolontaiy confession on a promiie of indem*
nity, than he could possibly be should he persist in sn avow-
al of his innocence, and be brought to a trial/* In short,
this man became an evidence, both against hisuelf and
against others, in the affair of the Mereunea.

Great vras the joy of the Athenian people at this, as it was
thooght, undoubted discorepr : and, as they had been hij^ly
chagrined before at their inability to detect the erinunals
who had so outrageously insulted the multitude, they imme-
diately discharged this infoirmer, and all other prisoneri
whom he did not name as accomplices. Upon such as he
expressly named, the judicial trials were held. Some of
thOm they put to death, as many as were prevented by timely
arrests iifom fiyiag from justice ; but they promwnced the
sentence ef death against the fugitives, and set a price on
their heads. Yet tQl this while it was by no raeana clear,
that those #ho suffered were not unjustly condemned. Thus
much however is certain, that by such proceedings the pob-
Ue tranquillity was restored.

In regard to Alcibiades, the Athenians were highly incen-
sed against him, since the partj which were his enemies, and
had made their attacks upon him before his departure, contin-
ued still to inflame them. And now, as they presumed the
truth had been detected in relation to the Mercuries, it ap-
peared to them, beyond a scruple^ that he must also have
been guilty of^ the crimes charged ^against him about the
mysteries, upon the same ground of a secret combination
against the democTacy.

At this critical period of time, when the public confusion
was in all its heignt, it farther happened that, a Lacedsimo-
niao anny, though by iM> means large, advanced as far as to

180 - PBLOPONMBSIAN WAR. [bOOK .Y1

the istbimis, to •zecute tome scheme along witk the Bosoti
■ns. This was interpreted to the prejudice of Alcibiades, as
if they had now taken the field at his instigation, and not on
any account of obliging the Boeotians ; and that, " had they
not happily appiehendeid in time sach as had been infonned
against, Athens had now been infallibly betrayed." Nay, for
the space of a night, they kept guard under arms within the
city, in the temple of Theseus.

About the same time, also, the friends of Alcibiadea at
Arsos were suspected of a design to assault the people :
and those hostages of the Argives who were kept in custody
among the islands, the Athenians on this occasion delivered
op to the people of Argos, to be put to death on these suspi-
cions.

Thus reasons flowed in from every quarter for suspecting
Alcibiades. Desirous therefore to bring him to a trial and to
execution, they accordingly despatched the Salaminian to
Sicily, to order him and such others as they bad informations
affainst to repair to Athens. But it had been given them in
charge to notify to him that " he should /oUow them homo
in oj^er to make his defence,'' and by no means to put him
under arrest. This arrangement was owing to a desire of
preventing all stirs in the -army or in the enemy.; and, not
least of all, to their willinsness that the Mantineana and Ar-
gives should continue in uie service, whose attendance in the
expedition they wholly ascribed to the interest Alcibiades
had with them.

In pursuance of this, Alcibiades on boasd his own ship,
and accompanied by all those who were involved in the same
accusation, sailed away from Sicily mth the Salaminian for
Athens ; and when they were got to the height of Thuria,
they no longer followed ; but, quitting their ship, were no
longer to be seen. Censured a% they were^ they durst not
in fact undergo a trial. The crew of the Salaminiui exerted
themselves immediately in the search after Alcibiades and
his companions ; but, when they found the search was inef-
fectual, they gave it up, and steered away for Athens ; and
Alcibiades, now become a fugitive, passed over in a vessel
soon after from Thuria* to Peloponnesus. Bat the Athn-

* Somebody at Thuria, who knew Alcibiades, asked him
why he would not stand a trial, and trust his country I ** In other

YBAR Xrn.] PBL0P0NNB8IAN WA.R. 181

nians, upon his thus abandoning his defence, pronounced the
sentence of death against him and his associates.

After these transactions, the Athenian generals who re»
mained in Sicily having divided their armament into two
squadrons, and taken the command of each by lot, set sail
with all their united force for Selinus and £gesta. They
were desirous to know whether the Egesteans would pay
down the money ; to discover also the present posture of the
Selinontians ; and to learn the state of their quarrels with
the Egesteans. In their course, keeping on the left that
part of Sicily which lies on the Tyrrhene Oulf, they arrired
at Himera, which is the only Grecian city in this part of Si-
cily ; and, when denied reception here, they resumed their
course. Touching afterward at Hyccara, a Sycanian fortress,
but an annoyance to the Egesteans, they surprised it ; for it
was situated close upon the sea ; and having doomed the io*
habitants to be slaves, they delivered the place into the hands
of the Egesteans, whose cavalry was now attending on the
Athenian motions. The land-forces marched away from
hence through the territories of the Siculi, tilt they had again
reached Catana ; but the vessels, on board of which were the
staves,. came back along the coasts.

Nicias had proceeded from Hyccara directly to Egesta,
where, after transacting other points, and receiving thirty
talents,** he rejoined the grand armament at Catana : and here
they set up the slaves to sale,t and raised by the money paid
for them one hundred and twenty talents. t

They also sailed about to their Sicihan allies, summoning
them to send in their re-enforcements. With a division also
of their force they appeared before Hybla, a hostile city in

points I would ; but, when my life is concerned, I would not
trust my own mother, lest she should make a mistake, and put
in a black bean instead of a white one." And, wbien he was af-
terward told that his countrymen had passed the sentence of
death against him, he briskly rspUed, ** But TU make them know
that I am alive."— P/iitarc& in Aldbiades.

* 58121. 10«.

t Among the rest, Nicias sold at this sale Lais, the famous
courtesan, at this time a very young girl, whom her purchasers
carried to Corinth, where she set up and drove a prodigious
trade indeed.— J^hOarch in Nicias.

1 23,3501. steiiing.

183 PBU)PONNBSIAN WAR. [bQOK TL.

the ^Mtiiet of Gela, but were not ftble to take it. And here
the smnmer ended.

Winter now aucceeding, the Athenians begin immediately
to get all things in readiness for an attempt upon Syiaci^se.
The Syracnsans were equally intent on making an attack
apon them. For, since the Athenians had not thought prop-
er^ doling their first panic and consternation, to fall instantly
upon them, such a protiaction reinspired them day after day
with new rsTivin|^ courage : since, farther, by cruising on the
other side of Sicily, they seemed to affect a remoteness from
tbem; and, though showing themselves before Hybia, and
attempting the place, they had not been able to cany it, the
Syncwaas began now to treaA them with an open contempt.
Tliey even insisted, as might be expected from a populace
who are high in i^its, " that their generals should lead out
towards Gatana, since the enemy durst not venture to march
against them." The Syracasan horsemen also, sent daily
out to observe their motions, rode boldly up to (he camp
of the Athenians, insulting them in other respects, but es-
peciall|r with this sneering demand, ** Whether they were
not raUier eome to gain a settlement for themselves on a for-
eign shore, than to replace the I^eontines in their old pos-
i1"

The Athenian generals, informed of these bravadoes, were
desirous to seduce the whole strength of Syracuse to as great
a distance as possible from that city, that they" might snatch
an opportunity of transporting thither their own forces by
favour of the night, and seize a proper epoi whereon to fix
their encampment, without any obstruction from the enemy.
They were well convinced that their point could not be so
easily accomplished, should they endeavour to force a de-
scent in the face of the enemy, or by a land-march should
S've them an early notice of their design : for, in siich cases,
eir own light-armed, and that cumbersome train which
must attend, as they had no horse to cover their motions, must
suffer greatly from the numerous cavaby of the Sycacusans :
but, by the other scheme, they might preoccupy a spot of
ground where the cavalry could not ffive them any considera-
ble annoyance. Nay, what is more, the Syracusan exiles, who
followed their camp, had informed them of a piece of ground
convenient for their purpose near OlympiflBum.

In order therefore to accomplish the point, tbe generals

TSAR XTIl.] PELOPONNS8IAN WAR. 163

had leconne tQjb« foliowuur artifice : — Thtij dMpttehad in
emissaiy, of whose fidelity Siey were well aeenrea^ and who
might also pass with the generals of Syracnae as well affect-
ed to their cause. The person employed was a Oatanean.
He told them " he waa sent by their friends in Catana,"
with whose names they were acquainted, and knew well to
be of that number in Catana which persisted in stead&st at-
tachment to them : he said farther, that " the Athenians r^
posed themselves by night within the city at a distance frooi
their arms ; and that in taae they, the Syiacnsaas, on a day
prefixed, would, with all the forces of their city, appear bv ear*
ly dawn before the Athenian camp, the Cataneans would shut
up those within the city and set fire to their sbjpping, by
which means they might force the intrenchments, and render
themselves masters of the camp ; that, farther, the party of
Cataneans that would co-operate with them in this scheme
was very large, and already prepared to execute these points
he was now sent to propose."

The Syracusan generals, whose ardour other contingences
had already inflamed, and who had formed a resolntioiif even
previous to such encouragement, to march their forces towards
Catana, without the least reserve gave implicit credit to this
emissary ; and, having instantly pitched upon a day for exe»
cation, dismissed him. They also (for by this time the Seli-
nontian and some other anxiliaries had joined them) issueO
oat their orders for thc/whole military strength of Syracuse
to march out on the day appointed. No sooner, therefore,
were all the needful preparations adjusted, and the time at
hand at which they were to make their appearance, than,
on the march for Catana, they halted one night npon the
banks of the Symsthus, in the I^eontine district. But ths
Athenians, when assured they had thus taken the field, de-
camping instantly with the whole of their force, and with all
the Sicilian and other auxiliaries who had joined them, and
embarking themselves on board their ships and transports,
steered away by night for Syracuse : and, early the next
dawn, they landed on the intended spot near Olympieum,
intent on forming and securing -their encampment. The cav*
airy of the Syracusans, in the meantime, came up first to
Catena, and discovering that the whole Athenian krmy had
put to sea by ni^ht, they return with this mtelli^nce to their
foot. Upon this the whole amry, soon wheeling about, m-
turned with all speed to the defence of Syracuse.

184 PELOFONNBSIAN WAR. [bOOK VI

In the jpeantime the Athenians, as the enemy had a long
way to march, formed an encampment on an advantageous
spot without the least obstruction. On it they were possess-
ed of the advantage of fighting only at their own discretion,
and the Syracusan horse coald not give them the least an-
noyance, either during or before an engagement. On one
aide they were flanked by walls, and hoases, and trees, and
a marsh ; and on the other by precipices. They also felled
•ome trees that grew near ;- and, carrying them down to the
shore, they piled them into a barricade for the defence of their
ships, and to cover them on the side of Dascon. They also
ezpeditionsly threw up a rampart, on the part which seemed
most accessible to the enemy, of stones picked out for the
purpose, and timber, and broke down the bridge of the Ana-^
pus.

Thus busied as they were on fortifying their camp, not so
much as one person ▼entai'ed out of the city to obstruct their
proceedings. The first who appeared to make any resistance
were the Syracusan cavalry ; and, when once they had shown
themselves, the whole body of their infantry was soon in
aight. They advanced first of all quite up to the Athenian
works ; but, when they perceived that they would not sally
out* to fight them, they again retreated : and, having crossed
the road to Helorum, reposed themselves for the night.

The succeeding day the Athenians -and allies prepared for
eoragement, and their order of battle was formed as follows :
— ^The Argives and Mantineans had the right, the Athenians
the centre, and the rest of the line was formed by the other
confederates. One half of the whole force, which was
ranged in the first line, was drawn up by eight in depth. The
other half, being posted . near the tents, formed a hollow
square, in which the men were also drawn up by eight. The
latter were ordered, if any part of the line gave way, to keep
a ^ood look-out and advance to their support. And within
this hollow square they posted all the train who attended the
service of the army.

B Jt *^ne Syracusaos drew up their heavy-armed, which body
consisted of the whole military strength of Syracuse and aU
the confederates who had joined them, in files consisting of
sixteen. Those who had joined with auxiliary qubtas were
chiefly the Selinuntians ; and next, the horse of the Geloans,
amounting in the whole to about two hundred : the horse

YMAtL XTII.] PELOFONNSSIAN WAIiL. 18$

alM of the Camariiieaiu, about twenty in nambei^ and aboat
fi^ archers. But their horsemen they posted to the ri^^t,
being not fewer in nnmber than twelve hundred ; and, next
to them, the darters.

Tl^e Athenians beinj^ now intent on advancing to the
charge, Nicias, addressing himself in regular order to the
troops of the several states, animated them to the fight by the
folkming harangue, repeated in turn to the whole army.

"What need, my iellow-soldiers, of a long exhortation,
once we are here, determined, and resolute for action 1 for
this our present arrangement seems to me a stronger confir-
mation of your courage than any words could be, how elo-
quently soever delivered, if we were inferior i^ strength.
But when, Ar^ves, and Mantineans, and Athenians, and the
flower of the isles, we are here assembled toj^ether, how is
it possible, when such brave and numerous allies are to fight
ia company, that we should not entertain a steadfast, nay, the
wumest hope, that the victory will be our own 1 Nay, more,
as we have to do with a promiscuous crowd, the mob of a
city, not selected for service, as we have had the honour to
be; and who, it must be added, are but Sicilians; who,
though afifectioff to despise us, will never sustain our charge,
because their skill is far beneath their courage.

" Let every soldier, farther, recall to his remembrance, that
he ia now at a vast distance from his native soil, and near no
friendly land but what you shall render such by the efforts of
your valour. Such things I am bound to suggest to your
remembrance ; the reverse, I am well convinced, of what your
enemies utter for their mutual encouragement. They un-
doubtedly are roaring ^loud, * It is for your country you are
now to ^ht.* But f tell you, that from your country you are
now remote ; and, as such, must •either conquer, or not with-
out difiSculty ever see it again, since the numerous cavalry of
the enemy will press hard upon our retreat. Call therefore
to mind your own dignity and worth ; advance with alacrity
to assault your foes ; convinced that your present necessities
and wanU are far more terrible than the enemy you are to
engage."

^Hien Nicias had finished this exhortation he led on his

army towards the encounter. But the Syracusans were not

yet pr^ared, as by no means expecting to be charged so

flootn^ ; and some of the soldiers, as the city lay so near, were

11.— P

186 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [boOK TI.

straggled tllither. These however came running with all
eagerness and speed to gain their posts ; too late upon the
whole ; but, as each of them met with any number intent on
action, he ranged himself in their company. The Syracasani,
to do them justice, were not deficient in alacrity or cour-
age, neither in the present battle nor any of the following.
Iliey maintained their ground gallantly so long as their com-
petence of skill enabled them ; but when that failed them,
they were forced, though with reluctance, to slacken in their
ardour. However, though far from imagining that the Athe-
nians would presume to begin the attack, and though obliged
in a hurry to stand on their defence, they took up their arms,
and advanced immediately to meet their foe.

In the first place, therefore, the slingers of stones, with ei-
ther the hand or the sling, and the archers, on both sides, be-
gan the engagement ; and alternately chased one another, as
18 generally the case among the bodies of the liffht-armed.
In the next place, the soothsayers brought forwards and im-
molated the solemn victims ; and the trumpets summoned the
heavy -armed to close firm together and advance.

All sides began now to face : the Syracusans to fight for
their country ; each soldier among them for his native soil ;
to earn, for the present his preservation, and for the future
his liberty : on their enemies' side, the Athenians to gain pos-
session of a foreign country, and not to damage their own by
a dastardly behaviour ; the Argives, and voluntary part of the
confederates, to procure for the Athenians a happy accom-
plishment of their schemes, and again to visit their own coun-
try, to which they were endeared, victorious and triumphant ;
and that part of the confederacy which attended in obedience
to the orders of their masters, were highly animated by the
thought that they must earn their safety now at once, or, if
defeated now, must for the future despair ; and then, secretly
actuated perhaps by the distant hope that, were others redu-
ced to the Athenian yoke, their own bondage might be ren-
dered more light and easy.

The business being now come to blows, they for a long
time maintained the ground on both sides. It happened,
farther, that some claps of thunder were heard, attended
with li^tning and a heavy rain. This caused a sudden con-
sternation in the Syracusans, who now for the first time en-
gaged the Athenians, and had gained very little ezperience i»

YEAR XVII.] PEL0P0NNE8IAN WAR. 187

the affairs of war; but, by the more experienced enemy,
these accidents were interpreted as the ordinaiy effects of
the season ; and their concern was rather employed upon the
enemy, whom they found no easy conquest. But the Ar-
gives, having first of all defeated the left wing of the Syracu-
sans, and the Athenians being afterward successful in their
quarter of the battle, the whole Syracosan army was soon
thrown into disorder, and began the flight. The Atheniaot
however did not continue the pursuit to any great distance ;
for the Syracusan cavalry, as they were numerous and un-
broken, put a stop to the chase by assaulting those parties of
heavy-armed whom they saw detached for the pursuit, and
driving them back into their own line. Having pursued only
so fax as they could in an orderly and secure manner, they
again retreated and erected a trophy.

But the Syracusans, who had ralUed again in the road to
Heloram, and were drawn up as well as the present posture
of affairs would permit, sent a strong^etachment from their
body for the guard of Olympiaeum ; apprehensive that the
Athenians might otherwise seize the treasures that were de-
posited there. And, this beinff done, with the remainder of
their force they retired within the walls of Syracuse.

The Athenians in the meantime made no advances against
Olympiaeum ; but, after gathering together the bodies oftheir
slain, and laying them upon the funeral pyre, they passed the
night on the field of battle.

The next day they delivered up their dead under truce to
the Syracusans, of whom and their allies there had perished
about two hundred and sixty men ; and then gathered up the
bones of their own. Of the Athenians and their allies, about
fifty in all were slain : and now, with all the pillage they had
made of the enemy, they sailed back to Catana.

This was owing to the season of the year, now advanced
to winter. It was no longer judged possible for them to be
able to continue the war in their present post before they had
procured a supply of horse from Athens, and had assembled
others from their confederates in Sicily, that they might not
be entirely exposed to the horse of the enemy. They were
also intent on collecting pecuniary aids in those parts, and
some were expected from Athens : <' They might also obtain
the concunence of some other cities, which they hoped
would prove more tractable, since they had gained a batUe ;

188 PBLOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK VI

they wanted, farther, to furnish themseWes with provisions
and all necessary stores, which might enable them early in
the spring to make new attempts on Syracuse." Determin
ed by these considerations, they sailed back to Naxus and
Catana, in order to winter there.

The Syracusans, after they had performed the obsequies
of their slain, called a general assembly of the people. And
on this occasion Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, a mar
who was inferior to none in all other branches of human pru*
dence, who for military skill was in high reputation, and re-
nowned for bravery, standing forth among them, endeavoured
to encourage them, and prevent their being too much dis-
pirited by their late ctefeat.

He' told them, "that in courace they had not been worsted,
but their want of discipline had done them harm : and yet
the harm suffered by that was not near so great as they might
justly have expected ; especially when, no better than a rab-
ble of mechanic^, they had been obliged to enter the lists
against the most exprfienced soldiery of Greece ; that what
hurt them most was too large a number of generals, and the
multiplicity of commands w*^ich was thence occasioned, for
the number of those who commanded was fifteen, while the
Dulk of their army observed no discipline, and obeyed no
orders at all : but, were only a few skilful generals selected
fdr the trust, — would they only be intent this winter on train-
ing their bodies of heavy-armed, and furnish others with arms
who had none for themselves, in order to enlarge their nupa-
ber as much as possible, and inure therti to settled exercise
and use, — he assured them, thus, in all probability, they must
upon the whole be too hard for their foes, as their natural
portion of valour was sreat, and skill would be attained by
practice : that both of these would progressively become more
perfect ; discipline, by being exercised through a series of dan-
ger and inward bravery, would mierely of itself increase in
gallant confidence, when assured of the support of skill : as
to generals, that few only, and those invested with absolute
power, ought to be elected and confirmed by a solemn oath
from the people, that they were permitted to lead the army
where and how they judged best for the pubfic service : for,
by this means, what ought to be concealed would be less lia-
ble to detection, and all the schemes of war might be direct-
ed with order and certamtv of success *'

TEAR XYII.] PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 189

The Syracusans, who had listened to thi* ditcourse, de-
creed whatever he proposed. They elected Hennociatet
himself to be a general, and HeracUdes the son of Lysimir
chas, and Sicanus the son of Hexecestus ; these three.
They also appointed ambassadors to go to Corinth and Lace-
daemon, to procure the alliance of those states, and to per-
sgade the Lacednmonians to make hotter war upon the Athe-
nians, with an open avowal that they acted in behalf of the
Syiaensans ; that, by this means, they might either be obliged
to recall their fleet from Sicily, or might be less able to send
any re-enforcements to the army already there.

The Athenian forces, which lay at Gatana, soon made an
excursion from thence to Meesene, expecting to have it be-
trtyed into their power. But all the steps taken previously
for the purpose were totally disconcerted : for Alcibiades,
upon his qmtting the command when recalled to Athens, being
convinced within himself that exile must be his portion, be-
trayed the whole project, as he had been in the secret, to
soch persons at Messene as were attached to the Syracusans.
The first step this party took was to put to death all the per-
sons against whom he informed ; and, at the time of this at<
tempt, being quite in a ferment and under arms, they carried
their point, so that those who wished to give it were obliged
to refase admissioji.to the Athenians. The Athenians, there-
fore, after thirteen days' continuance on that coast, when the
weather began to be tempestuous, when their provisions fail-
ed, and no hope of success appeared, returned to Naxus * *,t
where, having thrown up an intrenchment round their camp,
they continued the rest of the winter. They also despatched
a trireme to Athens, to forward a supply of money and horse-
men to join them without fail by the beginning of the spring.

The Syracusans employed themselves this winter in forti-
fying their city. jThey enclosed Temenites within their
new works, and carried their wall through all that length of
ground which faces Epipolas, that, in case they should be un-
able to keep the field, the enemy might have as little room
as possible to raise counter-works of annoyance. They -also
placed a garrison at Megara, and another in Olympisum;
and all along the sea they drove rows of piles, wherever the

t In the ori^iinalis added mi epamK- But all the editors and
note-writers give it up, >md own they can make nothing of it.

190 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK VI.

ground was conveDient for descents. Knowing, also, that
the Athenians wintered at Naxas, they marched out with all
their force against Catana. They raraged the territory of
the Cataneans ; and, after burning the tents and camp of the
Athenians, they returned honoe.

Having also had intelligence that the Athenians had sent
an embassy to Camarina, under favour of a treaty made for>
merly with them by Laehes, to try if it were possible to pro-
cure their concurrence, they also despatched an embassy
thither, to traverse the negotiation : for the Camarinean's
were suspected by them, as if they had not cordially sent id
their quota of assistance for the first battle, and lest for th«
future they might be totally averse from acting in their support,
as in that battle they had seen the Athenians victorious ; and
so, induced by the former treaty they had made with the lat-
ter, might now declare openly on their side.

When therefore Hermocrates and others were arrived at
Camarina from Syracuse, and from the Athenians Euphe-
mus and his colleagues in the embassy, an assembly of the
Gamarineans was held, in which Hermocrates, desirous to
give them a timely distaste against the Athenians, harangued
them thus : —

" Our embassy hither, ye men of Camarina, has not been
occasioned by any fears we were under that you might be
too much terrified at the great equipment with which the
Athenians have invaded us ; but rather by our knowledge
with what kind of arguments they would impose on your un-
derstanding, by which, before we had an opportunity to remon-
strate, they might seduce you into a concurrence. Sicily in
fact they have invaded, upon such pretext as you have heard
them give out ; but with such intentions as we have all abun-
dant reason to suspect. And to me it is clear that their
schemes have no tendency to replant the Leontines, but rath-
er to supplant us all : for, how is it rec<^pcileable with com-
mon sense, that a people, who have ever bedu employed in
the ruin of the states which are neighbouring to Athens^
should be sincere in re<establishing a Sicilian people ; or, by
the bonds of consanguinity, hold themselves obliged to pro-
tect the Leontines, who are of Chalcidic descent, while on
the Chalcideans of Buboea, from whom these others are •
colony, they hold fast riveted the yoke of slavery 1 No ; it
is the same cruel policy that subjugated the Greciana m. that

YEAR XVII.J PSLOPONNSSIAN WAR. 191

part of the world, which now exerts itself to glut their ambi-
tioD in this.

" These .are those very Athenians who, formerly, having
been elected their common leaders by the well-designing lo-
nians and that confederate body which derived from them
their descent, on the glorious pretence of avenging themselves
on the Persian monarch, abused their trust by enslaving those
who placed confidence in them ; charging some with deserting
the common cause, others with their mutual embroilments,
and all, at length, with different but specious criminations :
and, on. the whole, these Athenians waged war against the
Mede, not in the cause of Grecian liberty, as neither did the
other Grecians in the defence of their own : the former
fought, not indeed to subject the rest of Greece to the Mede,
but to their own selves ; the latter, merely to obtain a change
of master ; a master not inferior in policy, but far more abun-
dant in malice.

" But though Athens, on manifold accounts, be obnoxious
to universal censure and reproach, yet we are not come hith-
er to prove how justly she deserves it, since your own convic-
tion precludes the long detail. We are much more concerned
at present to censure and reproach ourselves, since, with all
the examples before our eyes of what the Grecians in those
parts have suffered, who, for want of guarding against their
encroachments, have fallen victims to their ambition ; since,
with the certain knowledge that they are now playing the
same sophistries upon us, * the replantation of their kindred
Leontines,' * the support of the Egesteans, their allies,' we
show no inclination to unite together in our common defence,
in order to give them most si^al proofs, that in Sicily are
neither lonians, nor Hellespontmes, nor islanders who will
be slaves, though ever changing their master, one while to
the Mede, and soon after to whoever will please to govern ;
but, on the contrary, that we are Dorians^ who from Pelo-

Sonnesus, that seat of liberty and independence, came to
well in Sicily. Shall we, therefore, protract our union, till,
city after city, we are compelled to a submission T — we, who
are convinced that thus only \ve can be conquered, and when
we even behold that thus our foes have dressed up their
plan ; among some of our people scattering dissensions, set-
ting others to war down each other for the mighty recom-
penae of their alliance, cajoling the rest as may best sooth

192 PKL0P0NNE8IAN WAR. [bOOK TI

fhe pride or C8|»rice of each, and arailing themsehres of these
methods to work oor ruin 1 We even indulge the wild ima^
gination that, though a remote "inhabitant of SicHy be de-
strojed, the danger can never come home to onraelves ; and
ttoit he who precedes us in rain is.mihappy otdj ia and for
himself.

*< Is there now a man among 700 who imagines that mere-
ly a Syracusan, and not himself, is the object of Athenian en-
mity, and pronounces it hard that he must be exposed to
dangers in which I only am concerned 1 Let snch a one
with more solidity reflect, that not merely for what is mine,
but equally also for what is his own, he should associate with
ihe. though within my precincts ; and that this may be dmie
with greater security now, since as yet I am not quite de-
stroyMl, since in me he is sure of a steadfast ally, and before
he is bereaved of all support may hazard the contention.
And let him farther rest assured, that it is not the sole view
of the Athenian to bridle enmity in a Svracusan ; but, under
the colour of that pretext, to render himself the more se-
cure, by gaining for a time the friendship of another.

" If others, again, entertain any envy or jealousy of ISyra-
cuse (for to each of these great states are generally obnox-
ious), and would take delight in seeing us depressed, in order
to teach us moderation, though not totally destroyed, from »
regard to his own preservation ; these are such sanguine wish-
es, as, in the course of human affairs, can never be accom-
plished ; because it is quite impossible that die same person
shall build up airy schemes to sooth his own passions, and
then ensure their success. And thus, should some sinister
event take place, quite sunk under the weight of his own ca-
lamity, he would perhaps be soon wishing again that I was
so replaced as to excite his envy. Impossible this, for one
who abandoned my defence, who refused beforehand to par-
ticipate my dangers, — dangers, though not in nam'e, yet in real-
ity, his own : for, if names alone be regarded, he acts in the
support of my power ; but, if realities, of his own preservation.

** Long since, ye men of Camarina, it was incumbent on
you, who are borderers upon us, snd must be our seconds
in ruin, to have foreseen these things, and not to have abetted
our defence with so much remissness as you have hitherto
done it. You ought to have repaired to our support witfa'
free and voluntary aid ; with such as, in case the Adieniane

TEAR XVII.] p'ELC(1>0NNBS1AN WAR. 193

had begun first with Camarinia, you would hare come with
earnest prayers fo implore from us : so cordial and so alert
yon ffhould haye appeared in our behalf, to avert ns from too
precipitate submissions. But these things never were ; not
even you, nor any other people, have shown sttch affection
or alacrity for us.

" From timoroushess of heart yoti Wilt study perhaps to
manage both with us and the inTaders, and allege diat there
are treaties subsisting between yourselves and the Athenians.
Yet these treaties you never made to hurt your friends, but
to repel the efforts of your foes, should they dare to attack
yon. By them you are bound to give defensive aid to the Athe-
nians wnen attacked by others, and not when they, as in the
present case, injuriously fall upon your neighbours. Remem*
ber that the Rhegians, though even of Chalcidic descent,
have refused to concur with them in replanting the Leontines,
who are also Chalcideans. Hard, indeed, is your fate, if they,
suspecting some bad design to lie lurking under 41 fair justifi-
cation, have recourse to the wary moderate behaviour which
appearances will not warrant ; while you, on the pretended
ground of a rational conduct, are eager to serve a people who
are by nature your foes ; and join with most implacable ene-
Qiies to destroy your own kindred, to whom nature has so
closely attached you !

" In such a conduct there is no justice : the justice lies In
abetting our cause, and not dastardly shrinkinpr before the
terror of their arms. These arms arc not terrible, would we
only all combine in our mutual defence ; they are only so, i^
on the contrary, we continue disunited, the point which tho
Athenians labour with so much assiduity : for, even whidn
singly against us they entered the lists and were victorious,
yet they were not able to effectuate their designs, but were
obliged precipitately to re-embark. If united, therefore,
what farther can we have to /eai' 1 What hindera us from
associating together with instant alacrity and zeal 1 especial-
ly as we soon shall receive an aid from Peloponnesus, who in
all the business of war are far superior to Athenians. Re-
ject, I say, the vain presumption, that either it will be equita-
ble in regard to us, or prudential in regard to yourselvesj to
take part with neither side, on pretence that you have treaties
subsisting with both ; there is a fallacy in it, which, though
veiled under plausible words, the event will soon detect.

194 PBLOPONNESXAN WAR. ' [bOOK VI.

For if, through your determmation to abandon his support,
the party already attacked be vanquished, and the assailant
be invigorated by success, what can such absenting of your-
selves avail, but to help forward the ruin of the one, and af-
ford free scope to the pernicious schemes of the other t
And how glorious would the reverse of this conduct be,
would you exert your efforts to redress the injured, vrho also
by the ties of consanguinity have a right to expect it from
you ; to guard the common welfare of Sicily ; and not suffer
your friends, your good friends, the Athenians, to run out
mto a course of outrage '

" In a word, we Syracusans have now only this to add ;
that arguments are superfluous, either for the instruction of
you or of others, in points whose tendency you know as
clearly as ourselves : but we earnestly conjure you, and, if
prayers will not avail, we boldly protest against you, that, as
the worst designs are formed against us by our eternal foes,
the lonians, you would act as you ought ; if not, that by you
we are basely betrayed, Dorians by Dorians. If such must
be our fate, if by the Athenians we must be destroyed, they
will be indebted for their success to your determinations, but
the glory of it will be totally assumed by themselves. Nay,
the chief reward they will reap from the victory will be this,
to enslave the persons who enabled them to gain it. But
then, should the victory rest with us, you are uie men from
whom we shall exact revenue for all the dangers to which we
have been exposed. Examine things, therefore, and declare
your resolution, either at once, without embarking into dan-
gers, to put on the Athenian chains ; or, with us, to face the
storm and earn your, preservation ; not basely bending to the
yoke of foreign tyrants, and preventing an enmity with ua
which will not quickly be appeased."

In these words Hermocrates harangued the Camarineans
and, when he had ended, Euphemus, ambassador of the
Athenians, replied as follows : —

" Our journey hither was mtended for the renewal of a for-
mer alliance ; but, as this Syracusan has taken the liberty U
be severe upon us, we lie under an obligation to show the
justice of our title to that share of dominion which we now
possess ; and the strongest evidence of this he himself has
been pleased to give, by affifming that lonians have been
eternal foes to Dorians. The fact is incontestabJy trut

YEAR XYII.] PELOPONNKSIAN WAB. 195

•iDce we, who are lonians, have, been necessitated to stand
eyer upon onr guard against the encroaching designs of the
Peloponnesians, who are Dorians, who are our superiors in
number, and are seated upon our borders. When, therefore,
in the close of the Persian invasion, we saw ourselves masters
of a navy, we asserted our own independence from the gov-
ernment and guidance of the Lacedaemonians, since no shad-
ow of reason could be found why we should be obedient to
them any more than they to us, save only that in this critical
period their strength was mater. We were afterward ap-
pointed, by free election, uie leaders of those lonians who
had formerly been subject to the monarch : and the prefer-
ence awarded to us we continue to support ; assured that
(m\y thus we shall escape subjection to the Peloponnesian
yoke, by keeping possession pf a power which can effectually
awe all their encroachments : and> farther (that we may
come to particulars), it was not with injustice that we exact-
ed subjection from those lonians and inhabitants of the isles,
yrhom the Syracusans say we thought proper to enslave,
though connected with us by the ties of blood : for they
marched, in company with the Mede, against their mother-
country ; against us, theur founders. They had not the cour-
age to expose their own homes to ruin and devastation by an
honest revolt, though we with magnanimity abandoned even
Athens itself. They made slavery their choice, and in the
same miderable fate would have been glad to envelop us.
Thus solid are the grounds on which we found our title to
that extensive rule we now enjoy. We honestly deserve it :
since, in the cause of Greece, we equipped the largest fleet,
and exerted the greatest ardour, witnout the least equivoca-
tion ; and since those others, acting with implicit obedience
to the Mede, did all they could to distress us. To which let
it be added, that we were at the same time desirous to ob-
tain a strength sufficient to give a check to the ambition of
the Peloponnesians. Submissive, therefore, t\> their dictates,
we are not, will not be ; because, either in return for the repulse
of the barbarian by our single efforts, or in requital of the
dangers we bravely encountered in defence of the liberty of
those Icnians, greater than all the rest of Greece, or even
they themselves, durst hazard for their own, we have an un-
doubted right to empire.

<* But, farther, to guard Is own Uberties and rights it a

196 PELOPONNBSIAN WAR. [bOOK VI.

priTilege which, without either murauir or envy, wiU be allow-
ed to every state ; and now, for the security ojf these impor-
tant points to ourselves, have we ventured hither to beg your
eoncurrenc6 ; conscious, at the same time, ye men of Uama^
rina, that your welfare too coincides with our own. This wo
can clearly demonstrate, even from those criminations which
our adversaries here have lavished upon us, and from those
so terrible siispicions which you yourselves are inclined to
entertain of our proceedings. We are not now to learn that
men, who with some high degrees of horror suspect latent
mischief, may for the present be soothed by an insinuatiiig
flow of words ; but, when summoned to action, will so exert
themselves as is expedient for their welfare : and, consonant
to this, we have already hinted that through fear alone we
seiied that power which we now possess in Greece ; that
through the same motive we have ventured hither, to estab-
lish our Own security in concert with that of our friends ; ao
far from the view of enslaving them to ourselves, that we
are solely intent on preserving them from being enslaved by
others.

" Let no man here retort upon us, that all our solicitude
for you is unmerited and superfluous. Such a one must
know thi^t, so long as you are safe, so long as you are able
to employ the Syracusans, the less liable they will be to send
re-enrorcements from hence to the Peloponnesians for our
annoyance ; and, as 'this is the real state of thii^s, our con-
cern should moiit largely be bestowed upon you. By parity
of reason it also highly concerns us to replant the Ijcontinea :
not in order to render them vassals to ourselves, as their re-
lations of Euboea are, but to make them as strong^ and power-
ful as we are able ; that, seated as they then will be on her
confines, they may compensate our remote situation in afford-
ing a diversion ,to Syracuse : for, if the view be carried back
to Greece, we ourselves are there a match for our io&9. The
Ohalcidean ^ere, whom, after unjustly enslaving, we are
- taxec with absurdity for pretending to vindicate here, is high-
ly serviceable to us, because he is disarmed, and because he
furnishes us with a tribute : but, here in Sicily, our interest
demands that the Leontines, and the whole body of our
friends, be restored to the full enjoyment of all their liberty
and strength.
. ^ Now, to a potentate invested with superior power, or to

YSAB XVII.] PELOPONMESIAlf WAR 197

a state possessed of empire, nothing that is profitaUe can bo
deemed absurd ; nothing secure that cannot be safely man-
aged. Incidents will arise with which we must temporize,
and determine accordingly our enmity or friendship. But
the latter makes most for our interest here, where we ought
by no means to weaken our friends, but, through the strength
of our friends, to keep down and disable our enemies. Of
this you ought not to rest incredulous, as )rou know that over
our dependants in Greece we either hold tight or slacken the
rein, as squares best with the public senrice. We permit to
the Chians and Methymneans the free use of their liberties
and laws for a quota of shipping ; we do the same to many
for an annual tribute, exacted perhaps with somewhat of
rigour : others among them, who fight under our orders, are
al^Iutely free, though seated upon islands and easy td be
totally reduced, because they are commodiously situated to
annoy the Peloponnesian coast. And hence it may be de-
pended upon, that we shall make such dispositions also here
as are most expedient for our own interest, and may best
lessen the dread which, as was said before, we entertain of
the Syracusans.

** The point at which they aim is an extent of their rule
over you ; and when, by alarming your suspicions of us, they
have wrought yon to their own purpose, either by open force
or taking sulvantage of your desolate condition, when we are
repulsed and obliged to abandon your defence, they intend to
subdue all Sicily to their yoke. Such the event wUl unavoid-
ably proTC, if at present you adhere to them : for never again
will It be easy for us to assemble together so large an arma
ment to give a check to their ambition ; nor, when we are no
longer at hand for your support, will their strength against
pn be insufficient. It is vain in any man to indulge an opin-
ion that this may not be the case, since the very train of
things evinces its truth : for, when first you invited us hither,
it was not upon the suggestion of any other fear than this ;
that, should we suJOfer you to be subjected by the Syracusans,
the danger then would extend itself to us : and hifffaly unjust
it woula be now, if the ar^ment you successfulty enforced
with us should bse all its mfluence upon you, or should you
ground suspicions on our present appearance against them,
with a force superior to theirs, when you ought much more
entertain an endless distrust of them. The truth is this,

198 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK Vl.

that without your concurrence we are not able to continue
here ; and in case, with perfidy open and avowed, we make
■eixure of your cities, yet we are unable to retain their pos-
session, remote as they lie from Athens ; as cities so lar^e
we never could garrison ; and as they are farther provided m
■11 respects as well as any on the continent. But, on the
contrary, the Syracusans will jiot rush upon you from a camp
upon the beach ; but, posted in a city more formidable in
strength than the whole of our armament, they are ever medi-
tating your ruin, and, when they have seized a proper oppor-
tunity, will strike the blow. They have afforded you instan-
ces of this already, and a flagrant one indeed in the case of
the Leontines : and yet they have the effrontery now, by
words, as if you were so to be deluded, to exasperate you
against us, who have hitherto controlled their views, and de-
terred them to this moment from making all Sicily their prey.

*( Our arguments have a tendency directly opposite. We
have nothing in view but your certain and assured preserva-
tion, when we earnestly conjure you not wilfully to betray
the means which at present will result from our union, which
we can mutually exert in one another's behalf; and strongly
to represent to your own reflections that, even without the
concurrence of allies^a road to your reduction will at any
time be open to these Syracusans through their own superior
numbers ; but an opportunity exceedingly seldom afforded
you to make head against them with so large an auxiliary
body : and if, from groundless suspicions, you suffer now so
large a body to depart either unsuccessful or defeated, yet a
time will come when vou will ardently wish to see them re-
turn, though in a much less proportion of strength, and they
have it no longer in their power to cross the sea for your
support. Take care, therefore, Gamarineans, that neither
yourselves nor others be deceived by a too credulous belief
of the bold calumniations these Syracusans utter. We have
now laid before you the true ground of all those sad suspi-
cions which are fomented against us ; but shall again recall
them to your remembrance by a short recapitulation, that
they may have the proper influence upon you.

*' We declare, therefore, that we rule in Greece merely to
prevent our being enslaved ; but are intent on vindicating
uberty in Sicily, to suppress that annoyance which micht
otherwise be given us from hence : that mere necessity obli

YBAR XVri.] PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 199

ges US to embark in many nndeitakings, becanse we have
many sinister incidents to guard against : that now and
formerly we came hither to support those Sicilians who have
been unjustly oppressed ; nor uninvited, but solemnly con-
jured to take such steps. Attempt not, therefore, to divert
our pursuits, either by erecting yourselves into censors of our
proceedings, or into correctors of our politics ; a point too
difficult for you to manage : but, so much of our activity or
conduct as you can mould into a consistency with your own
welfare, lay hold of that, and employ it to your best advan-
tage ; and never imagine that our politics are equally preju-
dicial to all the world besides, but highly beneficial to the
bulk of the Grecians : for, through every quarter, even those
which we cannot pretend to control, both such as dread im-
pending mischiefs and such as meditate encroachments, lin-
ing hold on both sides of the ready expectation ; the former,
that redress may be obtained by our interposition ; the latter,
that, if we think proper to oppose them, their own safety will
be greatly endangered ; both sides, I say, are hence obliged ;
the latter, to practise moderation, though with regret ; the
former, to enjoy tranquillity without previous embroilments
of the public peace. The security, therefore, which now of-
fers itself to your acceptance, and is always ready for those
who want it, you are conjured by no means to reject ; but
relying, like other communities, on that quantity of support
we are able to afford you, put the change for once on the
Syracusans ; and, instead of being ever on the watch against
them, force them at length to be watchful and alarmed for
themselves."

Such was the reply of Euphemus. In the meantime the
real disposition of the Camarineans was this : at bottom they
were well affected to the Athenians, save only for the ambi-
tion they showed^ of enslaving* Sicily ; but had ever been
embroiled with the Syracusans, through that jealousy ever
to be found in a neighbouring state. But, as the dread of
victory on the side of the Syracusans, who were close upon
their borders, if earned without their concurrence, had influ-
enced their measures, they sent a small party of horse to suc-
cour them on the former occasion ; and looked upon them-
selves as obliged in policy to serve them underhand in future
exigences, but with all possible frugality and reserve ; and,
atme present juncture, that they might not betray any the

800 PSLOPOJNNSSIAN WAR. [BOOK VI.

least p^iality agunst the Athenians, as they were come off
Tictorious from a battle, to return the same impartial reply to
both. Determined, therefore, by these considerations, they
answered that, ** since a war had broken out between two
states, each of which was in alliance with themselves, they
judged the only method of acting consistently with their
oaths wquld be to observe a strict neutrality.*' Upon this
the ambassadors of both parties took their leaves and depart-
ed; and the Syracusans, within themselves, exerted their
utmost applications to get all things in readiness for war.

The Athenians, who were now encamped at Naxus, opened
negotiations with the Siculi, to draw over as many of them
as was possible into their adherence. Many of these, who
inhabited the plains, and were most awed by the Syracusans,
stpod resolutely out ; but the generality of jUiose who were
seated in the midland parU, as they were now, and had ever
kept themselves uncontrolled, sided at once with the Athe-
nians. They furnished them with com for the service of the
army, and there were some who supplied them with money ;
and then the Athenians, taking the field against such as
refused to accede, forced some to a compliance, and prevent-
ed others from receiving garrisons and aids from Syracuse.
During winter, also, they removed again from Naxus to Ca-
tana ; and having repaired th^r camp, which had been burnt
by the Syracusans, chose to pass the remainder of the winter
there.

They also despatched a trireme to Carthase to ask their
friendship, and wiiatever assistance could possuly he obtained :
they sent also to Tuscany, as some cities on that coast had
made them voluntary offers of assistance : and, farther, they
circulated their orders among the Siculi, and despatched in
particular one to the Egesteans, ** to send them as large a num-
ber of horses as they could possibly procure.'* They busied
themselves in collecting materials for chrcumvallation, such as
bricks and iron, and all other necessary stores ; being deter-
mined to carry on the war with vigour on the first approach
of npring.

The ambassadors, who from Syracuse were sent to Corinth
and Lacedcmon, endeavoured in their passage to prevail with
the Italians " not to look with unconcern on the Athenian

ceedings, since they also were equally involved in the
" But, when arrived at Corinth, they were admitted

proceed]
danger.*

YBAR Xril.] PEL0P0NNB81AN WAR. 201

to an audience, in which they insistad on a speedy supply,
npon the plea ofconsangvinity ; and the GorinuiiaQS came at
once to a resolution, by way of precedent to others, that
** with all possible ardour they would join in their defence.**
They even appointed an embassy of their own to accompany
them to Lacedflemon, whose instroctiotts were to second
them in soliciting the I^acedamonians ^ to declare open war
at home against the Athenians, and to fit out an aid for the
service of 'Sicily."

At the time that these joint embassies arriTed at LacedsB-
mon from Corinth, Alcibiades was also there. He had no^
sooner made his escape, attended by his companions in exile,
than in a trading-ressel he passed over from Thuria to Cyl-
lene in Elea ; and from thence he repaired to Lacedvmon.
Bnt, as the Lacedaemonians had pressed to see him, he went
thither under the protection of the public faith ; for he had
with reason dreaded -his reception there, since he hsd acted
so large a part in the affair of Mantinea.

It happened, farther, that when a public assembly was con-
vened at Sparta, the Corinthians, and the Syracosans, and
Alcibiades, all urged the same request, and were successful ;
nay, though the college of ephori, and those who prssided at
the helm of the state, had dressed np a plan, in pursuance of
which they were only to send their ambassadors to Syracuse
to hinder all accommodations with the Athenians, and were
^uite averse to the supplying them with real succours ; yet
Alcibiades, standing up, inflamed the Lacedaemonian fury,
and wrought them to his purpose by the following ha<
rangue :

**I lie under a necessity, in the' beginning of my dis-
course, to vindicate myself from the calumny which has been
charged against me, lest a jealousy of me might divert your
attention from those points which equally affect the common
cause. My ancestors, therefore, having upon some reasona-
ble grounds of complaint renounced the privilege of being the
public hosts of your embassies at Athens, I am the man who
again re-established this hospitable intercourse ; who in many
other respects endeavoured with great assiduity to oblige you,
and particularly in the calamity which fell to your share at
Pylus. I cheerfully persevered in these my favourable incli-
nations towards you, tilt you yourselves, bent on accommoda-
ting your differeneos with the Atheninta, employed my adver-

n.— Q

202 PBLOPONNESIAN WAR. IBOOK VI.

saries to negotiate yoar affairs ; and as thereby you invested
them with authority, you of course reflected disgrace on me.
With reason, therefore, after such provocations, yoa were af-
terward thwarted by me, when I supported the interest of the
Mantineans and the Argives, and introduced new measures
into the state, in opposition to you. Let, therefore, such of
your number as, chagrined at what they suffered then, continue
unjustly their resentments against me, weigh now the force
of those reasons on which I acted, and return to better tem-
per. If again I suffer in the opinion of any man, because I
have ever manifested an attachment to the interest of the
people, let him also learn that his enmity to me on that ac-
count is not to be defended. We have borne, from time im-
memorial, a steadfast, unrelenting aversion to tyrants : now
the whole of the opposition to the despotic power of one is ex-
pressed by this word, * the people ;* and on this principle alone
our firm and constant adherence to the multitude has been
hitherto carried on and supported. Besides, as the state of
which I was a member was purely democratical, I lay under
a necessity, in many respects, of conforming my conduct to
the established model; and yet I endeavoured to give the
public measures a greater share of moderation than the fran-
tic humour of the Athenians was judged capable of brooking.
But incendiaries started up ; such as, not only in earlier times,
but even in our own, have driven the people to more furious
measures, and have at length effected the exile of Alcibiades.
But, so long as the state was in my own management, I
thought myself justified, could I preserve it in that height of
grandeur and freedom, and on the same model of government,
in which I found it. Not but that the judicious part of our
community are sensible what sort of a government a democ-
racy is ; and I myself no less than others, who have such abun-
dant occasion to reproach and curse it : but, for madness
open and avowed, new terms of abhorrence cannot be invent-
ed ; though totally to subvert it we could in nowise deem a
measure of security, while you had declared yourselves our
foes, and were in the field against us: and all those pro-
ceedings of mine which, have proved most offensive to you,
are to be charged entirely to such principles as these.

" And now, in relation to these points on which you are
here assembled to deliberate, and I also with you, and about
which I am able to give you a greater light, I am bound ta

YEAR XYII.] PBLOPONNE81AN WAA. 203

do it — attend to whmt I am going to declare. Our principal

view in the expedition to Sicily was, if possible, to reduce
the Sicilians to oar yoke ; after them, we intended doing
the same by ihe Italians. We should next have attempted
the dominions of the Carthaginians; nay, Carthage itself.
Had these oqr views been successful, either in the whole or
the greater part, we should soon have given the attack to
i Peloponnesus ; assembhng for that purpose the whole Gre-
cian force, which the countries thus subdued must have
added to our own ; taking also into our pay large bodies of
Barbarians and Iberians, and other soldiers of those nations
which by general consent are famed for the most warlike of
all Barbanans. We should have built also great numbers of
triremes for the enlargement of our navy, as Italy would plen-
tifully have supplied us with timber ; with which, blocking up
Peloponnesus on all sides, and with our land-forces invading
it by land (after carrying your cities, some by storm, and
some by the regular siege), we hoped without obstruction to
have warred you down, and in pursuance of that to have
seized the empire of universal Greece. With money and ail
needful stores adequate to this extensive plan, the cities to
be conquered in those remoter parts would with all proper
expedition haye supplied us, without any demands on our own
domestic revenues. Such were to be the achievements of
that grand armament which is now abroad ; such, you may
rest assured, upon the evidence of a person who was privy to
every step, was its original plan ; and the generals who are
left in the command will yet, if they are able, carry it into
execution. And I must farther beg leave to tell you, that if
with timely succours you do not interpose, nothing in those
parts will be able to stand before them.

"The Sicilians are a people inexperienced in war; and
yet, would they unite and combine together in their mutual
defence, they might possibly even now be too hard for the
Athenians. But then the Syracusans, abandoned as they are
by the rest, and who already have seen their whole force de-
feated in battle, and who are blocked up in their own har-
bours by the enemy's fleet, will be unable long to resist the
great force of the Athenians which is already there. If,
therefore, Syracuse be taken, all Sicily is vanquished at a
stroke, and Italy becomes instantly their prey ; and then the
storm, which, as I intimated before, was to be directed agtinst

204 PBLOPONNBtSlAN WAR. [bOOK TI.

jott from that quarter, will in a abort tioM gather and eome
ponring down upon yon.

** Let no one therefore imaging that the end of yonr p»s-
ent. deliberation ia the aafety of Sicily, when PelopOBneans
itself will be endangered, nnless aome meaanrea of preven-
tion be executed with speed ; unless yoa send out a naval
force for the pieservation of 6ici]y, so dexterously appointed,
that the hands who man the ships and ply the oar may, on
the instant of their landing, become a body of heavy-armed ;
and, what in my judgment is better than ao army, a citizco
of Sparta to take upon him the command, that those who are
ready he may discipline to service, and force such to join as on
choice would refuse their concurrence : for, by such a step,
those who are already your friends will be animated 'with
h'gher degrees of resolution, and those who fluctuate at pres-
ent will join yon with a smaller sense of fear.

" It behooves you also to make war upon the Athenians at
home in a more declared and explicit manner ; that the Syrs-
cusans, convinced that you have their welfare at heart, may
make a more obstinate resistance, and the Athenians be ren-
dered less able to send re-enforcements to their troops in
Sicily.

" It behooves you farther to raise fortifications at Deoelea
in Attica ; a step which the Athenians have ever most terri-
bly apprehended, and think that in that point alone yon have
not put their resolution to its utmost trial in the present war ;
and that assuredly must be pronounced the most efiectoal
method of distressing an enemy, to discover what he dreads
most, and then know how to afflict him in his most tender
part : for it is a reasonable conclusion, that they will tremble
most at incidents which, should they take place, they are in-
wardly convinced must most sensibly affect them. As to the
benefits which you yourselves shall reap by fortifying Dece-
lea, and of what they shall be debarred, I shall pass over
many, and only concisely point out the most important. By
this, all the natural commodities of the country will fall into
yonr bands ; some by way of booty, the rest by voluntary con-
tributions. They will instantly be deprived of the profits of
the silver-mines at Laurium, as well as of the rents of their
estates and the fees of their courts. The tributes from their
dependants will also be paid with less punctuality \ since the
latter shall no sooner perceive that you are earnestly bentOB
wari than thev will show an open disregard for Athena

TEAR XYII.] PBL0F0NNK8IAN WAR. 805

^That ^ese or any of these pomu be exeeoted witb da-
epatch and vigour, depends, ye Lacednroonians, on yoonetres
alone. I can confidently aver that ali are feasible, and 1
think I shall not prove mistaken in my sentimeiits. I ought
not to e^er in the opinion of any Lacedanonian, though,
once accounted the warmest of her patriots, I now atreuo*
ously join the most inveterate foes of my country ; nor ought
my sincerity to be suspected by any, as if I suited my words
to the sharp resentments of an exile. I am driven from my
country through the malice of men who have prevailed
against me ; but not from your service, if you hearken to my
counsels. Tour enmity is sooner to be forgiven, who have
hurt your enemies alone, than theirs, who by cruel treatment
compel friends to be foes. My patriotism is far from thriving
under the injustice I have sufiered ; it was merely an offset
of gratitude for that protection I once enjoyed from my coun-
try Nor have I reason at present to imagine, that against
my country I am now going to march, so much as to recover
some country to myself, when at present I have none at alL
And I judge the person to be a true lover of his country, not
hrm who, exiled from it, abandons himself without a struggle
to his own iniquitous fate, but who, from a fondness for it,
leaves no project unattempted to recover it again.

** As these are my sentiments, I may fairly, ye Lacedamo-
nians, insist upon your acceptance of my service without di^
fidence or fear, whatever dangers or whatever miseries may
hereafter resolt. You weU know the maxim, which universal
consent will evince to be good ; that if, when an enemy, I
hurt you much^ when I am now become your friend, I can
help you niore. Nay, for the latter I am better qualified on
this very account, that I am perfectly acquainted with the
state of Athens ; whereas I was only able to conjecture at
yours : and, as you are now met together to form reso-
lutions on points of the highest importance, I conjure you
without hesitaticn to carry your arms at once into Sicily and
Attica ; to the end that, in the former, by the presence of a
small part of your forces, you may work out signal preserva-
tions, and at home pull down the present and even the future
growth of the Athenians ; that, for ages to come, yourselves
may reap security and peace, and preside at the helm of uni-
ted Greece, which will cheerfully acquiesce under your gui-
dance and oav vou a ftet ^m^tnnmlded obedience.'*

206 P£L0P0NNE8IAN WAR. [bOOK TI.

To this purpose Alcibiades spoke. And the Lacedwmo-
nisns, who had before some sort of intention to take the field
against Athens, though hitherto they protracted its execution,
were now more than ever animated to it, when Alcibiades
had given them such a deuil of affairs, whom they judged to
have the clearest insight into. them. Thereupon they turned
their attention immediately on fortifying Decelea, and send-
ing out a body of succour for the present service of Sicily.
They also appointed Gylippus, the son of Cleandridas, to go
and take upon him the command at Syracuse ; with orders,
by concertwg measures with the Syracusans and Corinthians,
to draw up a plan for the most effectual and most ready con-
yeyance of succours thither.

Gylippus accordingly issued out his orders to the Coriuthi-
ans, to attend him, without loss of time, at Asine, with two
ships ; and also to expedite the equipment of tho fleet which
they designed for this service, and to keep them in readi-
ness to sail when opportunity should require. Having so far
concerted measures, the ambassadors departed from Lace-
demon.

The Athenian trireme, also, despatched from Sicily by the
generals on that post, to demand supplies of money and a
body of horse, was by this time arrived at Athens ; and the
Athenians, on hearing their demands, drew up a decree, to
send away supplies to that armament, and a body of horse-
men.

And here the winter ended ; and the seventeenth year of
this war, of which Thucydides has compiled the history, came
also to an end.

YBAB XVIII.*

On the earliest approach of the spring which led on the
following summer, the Athenians in Sicily, hoisting from Ca-
tana, showed themselves on the coast of Megara, in Sicily,
of which the Syracusans, having dispossessed the inhabitants
iu the time of Gelon the tyrant, as I have already related,
continued masters of the soil. Having landed here, they
ravaged the country ; till, approaching a fortress belonging
to the Syracusans, and attempting it without success, they
retired, some by land, and the rest on board the fleet, into

» Before Christ 41i.

TEAR XVXII.] PEL0P0NNE8IAN WAR. 207

the river Tereas ; from whence, going agiin on siwre, thef
ravaged the plain* and set fire to, the growing com. They
also fell in with a small party of Syracusans, some of whom
they slew ; and then, erecting a trophy, went again on board.
' They next returned to Catana ; and, after victaaUtng there,
proceeded from thence, with their whole force, to the attack
af Centoripa, a strong fort belonging to the Sicali ; and, bav*
.ng made themselves masters of it by a capitulation, they
stood away, burning down in their passage the com of the
Inesseans and Hybleans. Upon returning to Catana, they
found there two hundred and £fty horsemen arrived from
Athens, though without horses, yet with all the proper furai-
ture, as if they could be better supplied with the former in
Sicily ; as also thirty archers, mounted, and three hundred
talents in silver.*

Ill the'^me spring the Lacedemonians also took the field
against Argos, and advanced as far as Cleonas ; but the shock
of an earthquake being felt there, they again retired ; and
after this, the Argives, making an irruption into the Thyreatis,
which borders upon themselves, took a vast booty from the La-
cedsmonians, which sold for no less than twenty-five talents, t

And not long after, in the same spring, the popular party at
ThespisB assaulted those in power, but without success;
and, though tL< Athenians marched away to their succour,
some of them vtere apprehended, and others were obliged to
take refuge at Athens.

In the same summer, the Syracusans had no sooner re-
ceived intelligence of the arrival of a body of horsemen
among the Athenians, and the design of advancing immedi-
ately to assault them, than it occurred to their reflections, that,
" in case the Athenians could not possess themselves of £pi-
poltB (a spot of ground which is only one continued crag, and
lies directly above the city of Syracuse), it would be difficult
to enclose them completely round with works of circumvalla-
tion,'«Ven though they should be defeated in open battle."
They applied themselves therefore to the guard of all the ap-
proaches to EpipolsB, that the enemy might not on a sudden
gain the eminence ; fur by other methods it was impossible
for them to carry that post. Excepting those approaches,
the rest pf the tract is an impracticable steep, inclining grad>

* 58,1351. t 48431. 15».

208 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK VI,

aslly quite down to the city, and commanding the view of
•veiy thine within it. Hence, therefore, because it risea with
a continoal aecent, it waa called b3F the Syracasans Epipols.
As Hermocrates and his coUeagoea bad now formally ta-
ken npon them the eommand» ine whole force of Syracase
marched out, by break of day, into a meadow, on the banks
of the Anapas, to pass under reriew ; where the first thing
they did was to select seven hundred of the choicest men
among the heavy-armed, to be commanded by Diomilus, an
exile from Andrus. These were a|>pointed for the guard of
Epipola, and to be ready for service, as they were always to
keep in a body, on any sudden emergence. But the Athe-
nians, who had mustered their forces on the preceding day,
had stood away from Gatana, and were come in the night
undiscovered to the spot called Leon, which is distant six or
seven stadia* from Epipole, where they disbarked their land-
forces, and then sent their ships to lie in the station^f Thap-
8U8. TbapsuB is a peninsula, joined to the mainland by a
narrow isthmus, and jutting out into the sea, at no great dia-
' tance from the city of Syracuse, either by land or by water.
The naval force of the Athenians, having secured their sta-
tion by a palisade across the isthmus, lay quiet in their posts ;
bat the land-army, without loss of tim^, made a running
march towards Epipolae ; and mounted by the pass of Eury-
alus, before the Syracusans, who were yet in the meadow bu-
sied in their review, discovered or were able to advance tu
prevent them. And now their whole force was in motion to
dislodge them ; each man with all possible alacrity, and more
particularly the seven hundred commanded by Diomilus ; but,
from the meadow to the nearest spot where they could come
up with the enemy, was a inarch of no less than twenty-five
8tadia.t To this it was owing ^at the Syracasans came to
the chaiqge in a disorderly manner ; and, being plainly re-
pulsed in battle at Epipole, were forced to retire within the
city. Diomilus also and about three hundred more lost their
lives in this engagement.

In pursuance of this, the Athenians, having erected a tro-
phy, and given up the bodies of the slain under truce to the
Syracusans, marched down the next day iu order of battle to
the very gates of the city : but, as the Syracusans refrained

• About half a mile t Two miles and a half

TEAR XVIII.] PSI.OPONNS8IAN WAK. 809

horn saHjiog o«t against tbein, they then drew off, and raieed
a fort at lAbdalum, on the very steepest edge of Epipolw,
iooking towards M^ra, which they intended as a repository
for their baggage and money, while themselves might be call-
ed off, either to fight or to carry on the works of a siege.

Soon nftsr &is they were joined by a body of three hun-
dred Egestean horse, and one fanodred more consisting of
Sieali «id Nazians, und some others m their alliance. The
Atboiiaii cavalry was in ail two hnndred and fifty : they had
procured some horses from the Egesteans and Cataneans, and
had |Nnrchaaed the rest : so that now they had got together a
body of horse amoanting in all to six hondred and fifty.

A garrison was no sooner settled in the fort of Labdalam
dian the Athenians ap|»roached toTyche ; where taking post,
they bnilt a waU in circle with great expedition, and by the
rapidity of their work stnick consternation into the Syraeu-
sans. Upon this they sallied oat with the fixed desi^ of
hazarding an engagement, as they saw the danger of dallying
any loiter. The armies on both sides were now beginning
to foce each other; but the Syraeusan generals, observing
that their own amy was in disarray, and could not easily be
formed in proper order, made them .all wheel off again into
the city, ^cept a party of their horse : these, keeping the
fiekl, prevented the Athenians from carrying stones and
stnggiing to any distance from their posts. . Bat at length,
one Athraiian band of heavy-armed, sopported by the whole
body of their cavalry, attacked and put to flight these Syraeu-
san horsemen. Thev made some sUnghter among them, and
erected a trophy for this piece of success againet »e enemy's
cavalry.

On the day following, some of the Athenians i>egan to raise
a wall along the norttiem side of the circle ; vHfkile others
waro empl^ed in carrying stones and timber, which they
laid down in hei^ all alonff the place called Trogilus, near
to the line marked out for the circnmvallation, which was to
reach, by the shortest confess, from the great harbour on one
side to the sea on the oth^r. ^t the Syraoosaos, who were
pnaeraaHy gwded by the advice of Hermocrates, gave up all
tboi^ts of BaUyi]^f ont for the futore, with the whole
ttttmg^ of tha ct^, to give battle to the Athenians. It was
judg«l sBore advisable to ran along a wall in length, which
«ottldeottbaiine inialuoh tha Ajthaoiia swMddiww<^daaigii>

210 ' PBLOPONMESIAN WAR. [boOK TI.

ed to pAM, and which, cotild they effect it in time, most en*
tirely exclude the enemy from perfecting their circumtalla*
tion. Nay, farther, in case the enemy should come op in a
body to interrupt the work, they might give them full employ
with one division of their force, whiie another party might
raise palisades to secure the approaches ; at least, as the
whole of the Athenian force must be drawn out to oppose
them, they would be obliged to discontinue their own works.
To raise therefore the prpjected work, they issued out of the
city ; and beginning at the foot of the city wall from below
the Athenian circle, they carried on from thence a transverse
wall, cutting down the olive-trees in the sacred grove, of
which they built wooden turrets to cover their work. The
Athenian shipping was not yet come round from Thapsos
into the great harlx>or ; but the Syracusans continued masten
of all the posts upon the sea, and consequently the Athenians
wera obliged to fetch up all necessary stores from Thapsus
across the land.

When it appeared to the Syracusans that all their pali-
sades and the transverse wall were sufficiently completed, in
which the Athenians had given them no manner of interrup-
tion, as they were under apprehensions that, should they di-
vide their force, they might be exposed to a defeat, and at
the same timer were ardently intent on perfecting their own
circumvallation, the Syracusans drew off again into the city»
leaving only one band of heavy-armed for the guard of tbeii
counter-wall.

In the next place, the Athenians cut off the pipes which
by subterraneous ducts conveyed the drinking-water into the
city ; and, having farther observed that the Syracusans kept
within their tenu during the heat of the day, but that some
had straggled into the town, while those posted at the pati*
sades kept but a negligent guard, they picked out three hun-
dred of their heavjr-armed, and, strengtheninff them with a
choice party of their light-armed sddiers, oraered them to
march With all possible speed and attack the counter-work.
The rest of their force was to march another way, since,
headed by one of the generals, it advanced towards the city,
to employ the S3rracusans in case they sallied : while the
other detachment, headed by the other general, attacked the
palisade which covered the sallyport. Accordingly, the
thrM hundred asMmlted snd earned the palisade, which thoM

TEARXYIII.] PELOFONNESIaN WAR. 211

who were posted for its gusrd alRindoned, and fled for shel-
ter behind the works which enclosed Temenites. The par-
suers however entered with them ; but were no sooner got
in than they were again forcibly driven out by the Syracu-
sans ; and here some of the Argives and a small namber of
Athenians were slain.

Bat now the whole army, wheeling nbout, demolished the
counter-work, and pulled up the palisade. The- piles of
which it was composed they carried off in triumph, and erect-
ed a trophy.

The next morning the Athenians resumed their work of
circnmvallation, and continued it across the crag which is
above the marsh, and lies on the quarter of Epipolas that
looks towards the great harbour. This was the shortest cut
for their circumvalTation downwards, across the plain and the
marsh, till it reached the harbour. Upon this the Syracu-
sans, issuing again, raised another palisade, beginning from
the city, and stretching quite across the marsh. They also
drew up an intrenchment along the palisade, entirely to pre-
vent the Athenians from continuing their works quite down
to the sea. The latter, when they had perfected their work
along the crag, were bent on demolishing the new palisade and
intrenchment of the Syracusans. For this purpose they had
ordered their shipping to come about from Thapsus into the
great harbour of Syracuse. They themselves, at the morn-
ing's dawn, marched down from Epipols into the plain ; and
then, crossing the marsh, where the mud was hardest and
best abU to bear, by the help of boards and planks which they
laid upon the surface, they carried almost the whole length of
the palisade and intrenchment early in the morning, and were
soon after masters of the whole. This was not effected with-
out a battle, in which the Athenians were again victorious.
The routed Syracusans fled different ways ; those who had
composed their right, towards the city ; and those who had
composed their left, towards the river. But,~with a view of
intercepting the passage of the latter, the three hundred
chosen Athenians marched with all speed to seize the bridge.
The Syracusans, alarmed at this step, as the body consisted of
the bulk of their horse, face about on the three hundred, and
put them to flight, and then break in upon the right wing of the
Athenians. By so unexpected a shock the first band in that
wiog was thrown into disorder. Lam^chus, observing it, ^d

212 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK VI

vanced to their support from the left, with' a small party ot
archers that happened to be near him, and the whole body of
the Argives. Having crossed a ditch that lay between, sec-
onded only by a few, while the bulk of his party made a full
stop, he was instantly slain \* as were also five or six of those
by whom he was accompanied. The Syracusans caught up
their bodies with all possible expedition, and bore them off to
a place of security on the other side of the river. They
were in great measure obliged to make a precipitate retreat,
since the rest of the Athenian army^was now coming up to
attack them.

But now, such of the Syracusans as had fled at first to-
wards the city, having gained leisure to observe such turns
m their favour, caught fresh courage from the sight ; and,
forming a^in into order, stood their ground against that body
of Athenians which faced them. They also sent a de-
tachment to attempt the circle mi EpipolsB, concluding it to
be unmanned for the present, and might at once be taken.
This detachment in fact made itself master of the outwork,
and demolished it for about ten plethres in length ; but the
circle itself was defended by Nicias from all their attempts.
Nicias, being much out of order, had been left to repose him-
self within the circle. He therefore issued orders to his ser-
vants to set fire to all the machines and the timber which
were lying before the wall ; for he was convinced that thus
alone, in such a total want of bands for their defence, any
safety coald be earned. The event answered his expectation ;
for when the flames began to mount, the Syracusans durst
not any longer come near, but thought proper to desist and
march away.

For now the Athenians, who by this time had chased the
enemy from off the plain, were remounting the ascent to de-
fend their circle; and, at the same instant of time, their
fleets conformable to the orders they had received, was stand-
ing in for the great harbour. The Syracusans upon the high

* Plutarch, in the life of Nicias, circumstantiates the manner
in which the old general lost his life in character. Gallicrates,
a good soldier, but of great impetuosity, rode at the head of the
Syracusan horse : being challenged out by Callicrates, Lama-
chus alone enafaged personallv with him. Lamachus received
the first y^muM; he then retunied the blow, and dropped. Hie
irtatottlirt fell «t the same time, and they both expiMd togetlmr.

YEAR XVIII.] PELOPONNX8I4N WAB. 213

ground beheld the sight: which occasioned them and the
whole Syracosao army to retire precipitately into the city ;
conclading themseives no longer able, without an aagmenta*
tion of their present strength, to hinder the completion of the
Athenian works qnite down to the sea.

After this the Athenians erected a trophy, and, in pomi--
ance of a trace, delivered np their slain to the l^rracasana,
and received in exchange the body of Lamachua, and of those
who fell with him.

The junction of iheir whole armament, both of their land
and naval force, being now completed, they began again,
from £pipol» and the crag, to invest the Syracusans wuh a
double wall, which they were to continue quite down to the
sea. The necessary provisions to supply their army were
brought in from all the coasts of luly. Many also of the Si*
cnli, who had hitherto stood aloo^ declared sow for the
Athenians, and came intQ their alliance, who were £uther
j.oined by three vessels with fifty oars from Hetniria.

All other points equally contributed to elevate their hopes :
for the Syracusans had begun to despair of being able to
sustain the siege, as they had no glimpse of any approaching
succour from Peloponnesus. They were tossing to and fro
among themselves some proposals for an accommodation, and
had even sounded Nicias upon that head, who, by the death
of Lamachus, was left invested with the sole command.
Nothing definitive was however concluded, though, as might
reasonably be expected from men in high perplexity, and
more straitly besieged than ever, many proposals were made
to him, and many more were agitated within the city. The
distresses, alsp, which environed them at present, struck into
them mutual suspicions of one another : nay, they even di-
vested of their charge the generals who were in authority
when these distresses came upon them, as if all was owinff
to their misconduct or treachery, and chose in their stead
Heraclides, and Eucles, and Tellias.

In the meantime Gylippus, the Lacedaemonian, and the
ships from Corinth, were come up to Leucas, designing with
the utmost expedition to pass over from thence to Sicily.
But terrible accounts came thick upon them here, and all
agreed in broaching the same untruth, that " S3rracuse was
completely invested on all sides.'* Gylippus upon this gave
up all hopes of saving Sicily ; but, having the preservation of

214 FSL0P0NNE8IAN WAR. [bOOK ?I.

Italy atiU at heart, he and Pythen the Corinthian, with the
small sqaadron at hand, consisting only of two Laconic and
two Corinthian vessels, crossed over the Ionian Gulf with all
possible despatch to Taientam. The Corinthians, besides
their own ten now fitting oat, were to man two belonging to
the Leucadians, and three more belonging to the Ambraci
ots, and follow them as soon as possible.

The first step of Gylif^us, now arrived at Tarentum, was
to go in quality of ambassador to Thuria, claiming privi-
lege for it, as his father had been a denizen of that state ; but,
finding himself unable to gain their concurrence, he w«igh-
ed from thence/ and stood along the coast of Italy ; but in
the Terinean Gulf he met with a hard gale of wind, which in
this gulf, when in a northerly point, blows generally with great
and lasting violence, and now drove him from his course, and
blew him out into the open sea, where he stood again the re-
bufif of another violent storm, but at, length reached Tarentum.
He there laid his vessels on ground, which had been dam
aged in the foul weather, and refitted them for service.

When Nicias found that be was on his passage, he betray-
ed an open contempt of so trifling a squadron, as the Thuriaiia
had already done before him. It appeared to him, that so
petty a squadron could only be fitted out for piratical cruises,
and therefore he sent out no detachment to hinder his ap-
proach.

About the same time of this summer the Lacedemonians,
with their own domestic forces augmented by the junction
of their allies, made an irruption into Argos, and ravaged
great ptut of that territory; The Athenians put out to sea
with thirty sail to succour the Argives, which procedure was,
beyond all denial, the clearest violation of the treaties be*
tween them and the Lacedsemonians. Hitherto they had
only exercised robberies upon them from Pylus ; and, ma-
king descents rather on any other coast of Peloponnesus than
Laconia itself, had left it to the Argives and Mantineans to
make war against them. Nay, though the Argives had fre-
quently pressed them, that with an armed force they would
barely land on the Laconic coast, and, after committing nevei
so small ravage in their company, immediately to retire, they
had positively refused. But now, under the command of
Pythodorus, and Lespodias, and Demaratus, they made a
descent at Epidaurus-Limera and Prasia, comniitted large de-

TEAR XVIil.] FSLOPONNE8IAN WAR. 215

vasUtion on the adjacent conntrj, and aflbided the Laced«-
monians a most specious and jostifiabli pretext to act oflbn-
si^elj against Athens.

When the Athenian fleet had sailed homewatds' from
Argos, and the Lacedemonians also were withdrawn, the
Argires broke into Phliasia, where they laid waste part of
the Lacedaemonian tenitory, and made some slaughter of the
people, and then returned to Argos.

816 PBLOPONNBIIAN WAR. [bOOK VXI

BOOK VII.

The aiege o£ Syncuae is carried on so vigorously by Niciaa, thai
the Syiacusans think of asurreoder.— At this cnsis arrive the
Peloponnesian succours and Gylippus, the Spartan, which
gives a new turn to the siege.— A counter-work is raised, to
stop the Athenian circumvaUation ; engagements ensue.— Ni-
cias is now in a bad situation.— He sends home a succinct de-
tail of affairs by letter.— A re-enforcement is ordered him from
. Athens, under the command of Demosthenes.— The Lacedae-
monians resolve to renew the war at home. — ^Ykar XIX. At-
tica invaded, and Decelea fortified.— A naval engagement in
the harbour of Syracuse, in which the Athenians are superior.
—In the meantime Athens is sadly distressed by the enemy.
— A massacre at Mycalesus. — A seafight on tfie coast of
Achaia. — A second engagement in the harbour of Syracuse,
to the advantage of tne Syracusans. — The reinforcement
arrives from Athens. — Demosthenes attempts Epipolse with-
out Success.— Debates about raising the siege, which at length
is resolved.— The instant they are embarking the moon is
eclipsed, upon which superstition detains them. — The Syra-
cusans attack them both by land and water.— The Athenians
are worsted in every engagement ; at length lose all their ship-
ping. — They retreat by land, are pursued, sadly distressed, and
totally subdued. — Nicias and Demosthenes sre taken prisoners
and put to death.

Gyi^ippcs and Pythen, when they had refitted their shi{M,
stood along the coast from Tarentum to I^ocri Epizephyrii.
Here they received more certain information that Syracuse
was not yet completely invested, and that a succour of force
might be thrown into the town by the way of Epipolse. They
went next to consultation, whether, ** keeping Sicily on the
right, they should endeavour at all hazards to enter Syracuse
by sea ; or, with Sicily on their loft, should steer first to Hi-
mera ; from whence, attended by the forces of that state and
whatever additional strength they could persuade to join
them, they should march thither over land.*' It was deter^
mined to go first to Himera, especially as the four Athenian
vessels were not yot arrived at Rhegium, which Nicias at last,
npon the certain intelligence that they were :.ow at Locri«

nSAR XVlII.] PSLOPONNE8IAN WAR. 217

Had detached to obeenre them. To be beforehar d, thcreforo*
with this detachment, they pasaed thimigh rae atraita, and,
having toached only at Rhegiom and Measene, arriTe at Hi*
mera ; while in the latter place, they prevailed upon the Hime-
rians to concur with them in the war, and not only to intrust
their troopa under their command, but even to tttpply with
trma soch of the mariners as had navi^ted the Teasels, and
;rere therefore unprovided; for, theur shipping they had
drawn ashore, and laid up at Himara. The Selinuntiaoa
ilso, by a messenger despatched on purpose, they had sum-
moned to meet them, with all their united strength, at a de-
termined place upon their route. The Oeloaos also, and
some of the Sieoli^ promised to attend with a party, though
by no means considerable. The latter of these were disposed
better than ever to the service, since Archonides was lately
dead (who, reigning over some of the Siculi seated in these
parts, and having a great influence over them, had declared
for the Athenians) ; and since Grylippus appoared to them to
be sent from Lacedsemon with a full purpose to do them
service.

And now Gylippus, havine assembled an army, which con-
sisted of about seven hundred of those who narigated or
came on board his vessels, and for whom he had provided
arms ; of heavy-armed and light-armed Himerians, amount-
ing together to a thousand men and one hundred horsemen ;
of some light-armed Selinuntians ; a small party of Geloan
horse ; and a body of Siculi, in all a thousand, began his
march for Syracuse.

The Corinthians in the meantime were sending out tho
other ships as fast as they could equip them for the service,
to follow with all possible expedition from Leucaa . and Gon-
gylus, one of the Corinthian commanders, who with a single
ship set out last from Leucas, is the first who arrives at Syra-
cuse ; and that but a small space of time before the approach
of Gylippus. Finding therefore, upon his arrival, that the
Syracusans were going forthwith to hold a public assembly,
in which the terms of putting an end to the war were design-
ed to be adjusted, he dissuaded them from so precipitate a
step, and animated their drooping resolutions by strong assu-
rances that " other ships would instantly arrive ;'* and that
** Gylippus, the son of Cleandridas, was sent thither by the
LsredaBmonians to take upon him tne command." The Sv

21 S PELOPONNS8IAN WAR. [bOOK VII

rtcutana aecorjjin^y reramed their spirits, and immediately
marched oat orthe town, with the whole of their strength, in
order to meet Gylippos ; for by this time they had received
intelli^nce that he was actually approaching.

Gyuppns, upon his route, had made himself master of le-
gas, a fortress belonging to the Siculi ; and now, at the head
of his army, drawn up in order of battle, he came up to
EpipolsB. Having mounted by the pass of Euryalns, as the
Athenians had done on their first approach, he marched, in
conjunction with the Syracusans, towards the Athenian cir>
cumvallation. He happened to arrive at that critical junc-
ture, when the Athenians had completely finished seven or
eight stadia* of the double wall extending to the great har-
bour ; when, in consequence, but a very small part remained
incomplete, and on which they were labouring with their
highest application. On the other side of their circle, towards
Trogilus, the stones for completing their work had been laid
ready in heaps almost down to the beach, and some parts of
their work on that side stood but half completed, though
others had received the finishing hand. To such extremity
of dan^r were the Syracusans now reduced.

Gylippus and the Syracusans coming thus suddenly upon
them, the Athenians at first were struck with consternation ;
but formed, however, in order of battle, to give them a re-
ception. But Gylippus, having ordered his forces to halt,
despatched a herald to the Athenians, proclaiming that, *' in
case they would evacuate Sicily within the space of five
days, with their arms and baggage, he would readily grant
them a truce." Such offers they received in a contemptuous
manner,t and, disdaining to return an answer, ordered the
herald to move off. And now both sides were busy in mar-
shalling and disposing their men for battle.

But Gylippus, who had made an observation that the Syra-

* About three quarters of a mile.

t Nicias (says Plutarch) disdained to return an answer. But
some of his soldiers laughed outright, and asked, " if, at the ar-
rival of a mantle and staff from Sparta, the Syracusans were be- _
come so full of spirits as to despise the Athenians; who had '
lately given up to the Lacedaemonians three hundred of their
countrymen who had been their prisoners, all of them better
soldiers, and who combed their hair, too, much better than Gy-
lippus." '

TSARXVIII.] PSLOPONNB8IAN WAR. 219

I were in great confusion, and could not easily be form-
ed into proper order, made his army fall back into more opeu
ground. Nicias gave them no disturbance while they were
making this motion ; but, without advancing, stood cloeo nn«
der his works ; and, when Gylippus found that the enemy
would not move forwards to attack him, he made his forces
wheel off to the high ground called Temenites, where they
reposed themselves for the night.

The next morning he drew up the greatest part of his army
before the works of the Athenians, to prevent their sending
out succours to more distant posts ; for he had detached a
party to attack the fort of Labdalum, which he carried by
storm, and put all the garrison found within it to the sword.
Labdalum was so situated, in regard to the Athenian posts,
that they could have no view of what was transacting there.
The same day also an Athenian trireme, as it was entering
the harbour, was taken by the Syracusans.

After so much success, the Syracusans and allies set about
raising a counterwork along Epipols. Beginning at the city,^
they carried it upwards towards the single wall which had
an oblique incUnation ; and intended that, in case the Athe-
nians could not stop its completion, it should entirely exclude
them from perfecting their circumvallation. The Athenians,
naving perfected their works to the sea, had now remounted
the emmence ; and, as some parts of their work were but
weak, Gylippus drew out his army by night, and was march-
ing to demolish those: but the Athenians, who passed the
n^t without their works^ were no sooner aware of it, than
they also marched away to defend them. Upon which Gylip-
pus, finding them alarmed, desisted, and made his army re-
treat to their former posts. This, however, occasioned the
Athenians to raise those parts of their wall to a greater height,
and to take the guard of it upon themselves, as among the
body of their confederates they had divided the guard of the
rest of their works, allotting a proper charge to each.

Nicias also judged it expedient to fortify the spot called
Plemmyrium. Plemmyrium is a point of land over against
Syracuse, which, jutting out before the ffreat harbour, ren-
ders the mouth of it very narrow. " If this were fortified,"
he thought, "the importation of necessaries for the army
would ^ better secured ; because then, from a smaller dis-
tance, they could at any time command the harbour where

220 FELOPOMNESIAN WAR. [boOK YIl.

the Syneasaii shipping lay f and, thonld it be their ill fortane
to be straitened by sea, might easier fetch in supplies than in
the present station of their fleet at the bottom of the great
harbour." Now also he began, with greater attention than
before, to study how to distress them by sea; convinced,
since the arrival of Qylippns, how little room he had to hope
for success by land. To this spot therefore he ordered his
fleet, and drew his land-forces down, and immediately erect-
ed three forts. In these the greatest put of the baggage was
laid op ; and the transports and tight ships were immediately
stationed there. To this project, however, the havoc that
afterward ensued among the seamen is principally to be as*
scribed ; for, as they suffered in this station under scarcity
of water, and the mariners were frequently obliged to fetch
both water and wood from a distance, since near at hand they
were not to be had, the Syracusan horse, who were masters
of the country, slaughtered them in abundance. The Syraco-
sans had posted a third part of their cavalry at their fortress
of Olympieum, to bridle the marauding exeufsions of the en-
emy at Plemmyrium.

Now also Niciaa received intelligence that the other Corin-
thian ships were in their passage. To watch their approach,
he therefore detached twenty sail, who were appointed to
cruise about Locri, and Rhegium, and the capes ot Sicily, in
order to intercept them.

Gylippus in the meantime was employed in building the
counter-wall along Epipolae, making use of the stones which
the Athenians had laid ready in heaps for the continuation
of their own work. It was also his daily custom to draw up
the Syracusans and aHies in order of battle, and lead them
out beyond the point of the countep>wall ; which obliged the
Athenians to draw up likewise, to observe their motions.
And, when Gylippus judged he could attack them with ad-
vantage, he instantly advanced ; and, the charge being given
and received, a battle ensued in the space between their
respective works ; but so narrow, that no use could be made
of the Syracusan and confederate horse. The Syracusans
and allies were accordingly defeated. They fetched oflf their
slain by truce, and the Athenians erected a trophy. But
Gylippus, having assembled the army round him, thought
proper to make this declaration in the presence of them all :
—that *< the defeat was not to be charged on their want of
bravery, but on his own indiscretion ; he had deprived them

rSAR XTIIl.] PELOPONNE8IAN WAR. 221

of the serrice of thoir own ca^aliy aod dartera, by ranging
his battle in too confined a spot between the works ; that he
woald now again lead them oat in a more judicious manner."
He exhorted them, therefore, **to imprint it strong on their
remembrance, that as in resl strength they were not inferior*,
it woaid be intolerably disgraceful if they, who to a man were
Peloponnesians and Dorians, should not manifest themselves
io resolotdy brave, as to conquer and drive out of their coun-
try a parcel of lonians and islanders, and a promiscuous rab-
ble of hungry adventurers." Having addressed them thus,
he lay on the watch to seize a proper opportunity ; and, as
soon as he had ^ined it, led them on agam to the charge.

It was the opmion of Nicias, and in general of all the Athe-
nians, that ** though it was not their own interest to Bring on
an^ngagement, yet it highly concerned them to put a stop to
the counter-work which the enemy was raising to hinder their
progress ;" for, by this .time, the wall of the Syracusans had
only not overreached the extreme point to which the Athe-
nians had brought their circumTallation, ** and, should it be
extended farther, it would give the enemy this double advan-
tage, — a certainty of conquest whenever they thought proper
to fight, and a discretionary power not to fight at all." De-
termined by these considerations, they drew out in order to
give the Syracusans battle.

Gylippus soon began the engagement. He had now drawn
up his heavy-armed without the works, and at a greater dis-
tance from them than before. He had posted the cavalry
and the darters on a wide and open spot, yet unoccupied by
the works on either side, and posted then» so that they flank-
ed the Athenians In the ardour of the engagement, the cav-
alry broke in upon the left win^ of the Athenians, which was
ranged against thera, and entirely routed them. In conse-
quence of which, the remainder of the army was soon defeated
by the Syracusans, and in the greatest disorder retired for
shelter behind thekr works. And nig^ht no sooner came on
than the Syracusans, without loss of time, began to carry for-
ward their own works, which they soon exteikled beyond the
Athenian circumvallation ; by which they gained this great
point, that they could no longer be invest^ on all sides by
the Athenians ; and tde latter, though masters in the field,
win henoeforwani «Seet«iaUy atopped from perfectiqg thtir
ciPDtiBiTaUatioi!!.

222 FELOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK TO

After this, twelre shipBof the Corinthians, and Arabraciots,
and Leucadians, the remainder of the squadron designed fx
this service, having given the Athenian guard-ships the slip,
came into the harbour of Sjrracase : thej were connmanded
4)7 Erasinides, a Corinthian. By these the Sjracosans
were now assisted in carrying on their work, tilt it was com
pletely joined to the traverse wall.

Gylippus now made a circuit over Sicily, in order to pro-
mote the common canse, and to procure additional forces
for the services both of land and sea ; and to solicit the con-
cu/rence of such states as hitherto had manifested either no
great inclination, or an open repugnance, to join in the preattet
war. Other ambassadors were also despatched by the Syra-
cusans^nd Corinthians to Lacedaemon and Corinth, instructed
to solicit a speedy re-enforcement, to be transported into Sici-
ly either in trading-vessels, or in boats, or by any other expe-
ditious methods, since the Athenians had also sent for re-en-
forcements from Athens. The Syracusans also assigned
complements of men to their shipping, and sedulously- trained
them to the service of the sea, as designing on this element
also to try their fortune ; nay, they laboured with alacrity
and application to increase their strength in all respects.

Nicias, being sensible'of this, and conscious that the strength
of the enemy and his own inability became daily greater, de-
spatcl)ed his messengers also to Athens, a custom he had
ever observed, and upon all occasions, to report the particu
lars of his proceedings. But in his present situation it was
more requisite than ever ; since now he was convinced that
he was environed with dangers ; and unless, with the utmost
expedition, they recalled their troops, or sent them another,
and that a strong, re-enforcement, no hopes of preservation
remained. Apprehensive, farther, that the persons he should
send, either through want of proper address, or through defect
of courage, or a passion to sooth the populace, might suppress
the truth, he sent a true account of things in a letter written
with his own hand. By this method he concluded that his
own sentiments of things could not be concealed or invalida-
ted by messengers ; that the Athenians would be informed
of the truth, and might accordingly adjust their resolutions.
These messengers therefore departed, instructed to deliver
the letter which he intrusted to their -eare, and what farther
they were to add by word of mouth. Nicias in the mcttntipif

TEAR XTIII.] PELOPONliESIAN WAR. 228

kept within the limits of his camp, more anxious to gutid his
•battered forces from aunoyancey than to plunge into fresh
and spontaneous dangers.

In the close of this summer Euetion, an Athenian general
marched, in conjunction with Perdiccas and a large body of
Thracians, against Amphipolis ; yet could not render himself
master of that city. But then, setting out from Imereum,
he brought his triremes about into the Strymon, and blocked
it up on the side of the river : and here this summer ended.

In the beginning of winter the messengers from Nicias ar-
rived at Athens, where they gave such accounts of things as
he had charged them to give, and resolved such questions as
were asked them. They also delivered his letter, which the
clerk of the state stood up and read aloud to the Athenians.
The contents were these : —
*• Athenians,

" The many letters from time to time received from me
have given you all proper information, so iar as relates to
past transactions; and it is now high time you should be
made acquainted with our present situation, that your coun-
sels may be adjusted in a proper manner.

'* After, therefore, we had defeated, in several engage-
ments, the Syracusans, against whom you sent us out, and
when we had thrown up those works before their city within
which we are at this moment lying, Oylippus the Lacedemo-
nian came upon us, at the head of an army, brought from
Peloponnesus, and augmented by the troops of some Sicilian
states. In the first battle be was routed by us ; but in the
last, pressed hard by their numerous cavalry and darters, wo
have been forced to retire within our intrenchments. Being
therefore obliged, by the superior numbers of the enemy, to
discontinue our circumvallation, we are this moment lying
upon the defensive. Nor indeed are we able to draw out our
whole force for action, as detachments of our heavy-armed
are remotely employed in the guard of our works. They
have farther run up a single wall to cut our lines ; so that
there remains no longer a possibility for us to complete the
circumvallation, unless, re-enforced by a numerous body of
troons, we are enabled to assault and demolish the counter-
work. And, in consequence of this, we, who designed to be-
siege others, may with much more propriety be said to suffer
a siege ourselves, at least bv land : for we dare not make anv

224 P£L0P0NN£S1AN WAR. [bOOK ▼!!.

diattnt ezcumons into the adjacent country, for fear of the
horse. .

" What is more, they have sent ambassadors to Pelopon-
nesus, to solicit re»en(brcements. Gylippus also is making
the tour of the Sicilian states, vrith a view to obtain the con-
currence of such as are at present neutral, and to prevail with
the rest to intrust their additional levies for the service both
of land and sea under his command : and, according to my
present intelligence, they are fully bent to attack, at one and
the same time, our intrenchments, with their land-forces by
land, and with their ships by sea. And, though I say by sea,
let not the sound be too terrible in your ears : for they know
very well the present state of our navy ; which, though at
first a most complete equipment, for the cleanness of the
ships and the health and vigour of the seamen, yet at present
has scarce a ship which is not leaky ; so long have they been
necessiuted to keep the sea, while their hands have daily
been mouldering away : for, in fact, we have no opportnnity
to lay them dry and careen them, as we are under continual
apprehensions of being attacked by the ships of the enemy,
equal, nay, superior in number to our own. That they will
attempt it we have most certain ground to beUeve ; but the
seasons of doing it are entirely in their option, which also
enables them to preserve their vessels ever fit for service, as
they are not necessitated to be continually in action to strike
awe into others ; nay, we should hardly be able to do the like,
though the number of our shipping were much larger than it
is, or though we were exempted from the necessity we now
he under of keeping guard with them all : for, in case we
make the least abatement of our vigilance^ we should be dis-
tressed for want of necessaries, which even now we fetch in
with difl^ulty in the very teeth of the enemy. To this most
be ascribed the great waste of our seamen which has ahready
been made, and whose number lessens from day to day;
since, obliged to fetch wood, and water, and forage, from re
mote places, they are intercepted by the enemy's horse
Even our servants, who have nothing to dread from our ruin
«ted condition, desert us daily : and such foreigners as were
forced on board our fleet depart with impunity to their own
cities ; while others, who were allured to the service by the
(greatness of our jMy, and imagined they were rather come to
plunder than to fight, when, contrary to their hopes, they be-

YSAR XVni.] PELOPONNB8IAN WAK. 225'

hold kbe enemy possessed of a numerous fleet, and making a
brafe resistance in every quarter, some catch at the least pre-
text to go over to the enemy, and others make shift to skulk
away, never again to be retrieved in so wide a country as
Sicily. Nay, some of those who, having attended us hither
from Athene, and since prevailed with the captains of triremes
to accept of the service of Hyccarian slaves in redemption of
their own, have by this means subverted our naval discipline.

" I am writing to men well enlightened in naval affairs, and
perfectly convinced, that the flower of an equipment is but
of short duration, and how few of those on board are skilled
at steering the vessel or managing the oar. But what gives
me the most acute vexation is this, — that, though command-
er-in-chief, I am utterly unable to put a stop to these disor-
ders, since your tempers, Athenians, are hard to be managed ;
and am quite at a loss from whence to repair the waste that
has been made of our seamen. The enemy have abundant
resources everywhere at hand, whereas necessity- points out
only one to us, — that place from whence we had who now
remain, and who are for ever lost : for Naxus and Catana,
the cities which still persevere in our alliance, are unable to
recruit us ; and, should the enemy get one circumstance
more in their favour, that the towns of luly, which at present
supply us with food, deterred by the discovery of our low
condition and the noni^pearance of a re-enforcement from
Athens, go over to the Syracusans, the war will be finished
to their hands without costing them a blow, and we shall be
left to the mercy' of the enemy.

** I could have sent you much more pleasing accounts of
things, but none so proper to give you a clear idea of the pos-
ture of your affairs here, and such as you ought to have before
yon proceed to deliberate upon them ; and at the same time,
as I am by no means a stranger to Athenian tempers, since
I know you to be fond of hearing what will give you pleasure,
but are afterward inflamed with anger if any article in event
drops short of your expectation, I thought it highly concerned
my own safety to tell you nothing but the truth. And let me
here conjure you,, to entertain no resentm«it either against
private soldiers or commanders ; since, in labouring those
points which are the principal ends of the expedition, they
liave fully done their duty.

** BuL since all Sicily lit in arms against us, and since our

226 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK Fll.

enemies expect a re-enforcement from Peloponnesus, resolve,
without loss of time, that, as your forces are not sufficient to
keep the enemy in play, they must either be recalled, or be
re-enforced with a body not inferior to the first equipment,
with both a land and a naval force, and a large pecuniary sup-
ply. For myself, I must insist that a successor be sent me ;
since I am quite disabled by a nephritic disorder from con*
tinuing in the command : and I think I have just title to ex-

rct my dismission from you ; since, in the vigour of my Hfe,
have been intrusted by you with several commands, in
which I did you some signal services.

" Whatever you determine, put it in execution on the first
approach of spring; and, above all things, keep clear of
delays : for the ready supplies given the enemy in Sicily will
soon enable them to act ; and those expected from Pelopon-
nesus, though they must be longer in coming up, yet, depenc^
upon it, that, unless you exert your utmost vigilance, some
of them will steal hither, as before, through all your guards,
and some will infallibly be here before you.'' Such were the
advices brought them by the letter of Nicias. The Atheni-
ans, however, when they had heard it read, would not so far
comply with the request of Nicias as to give him his dismis-
sion ; but that, afflicted as he was in body, the whole burden
of affairs might not lie too heavily upon him, they appointed
two persons, already in Sicily, Menander and Eathydemus, to
assist him in the command, till those who by the public vote
should be joined with him in the commission could arrive.
They also decreed him a re-enforcement, consisting both of
a land and naval force, to be levied among the Athenians
upon the roll and their dependants ; and, & colleagues to
share in the command, Demosthenes the son of Alcisthenes,
and Euiymedon the son of Thucles. Eurymedon, by order,
began his passage for Sicily about the winter solstice, at the
head of ten sail of ships, and with a supply of twenty talents
of silver ;* empowered, fartner, to assure them, that ** a large
re-enforcement will soon come up, as the state had seriously
interested itself in their welfare. '* Demosthenes stayed behind
to forward the equipment, and was intending to set out on the
first approach of spring. He was busied in assembling to-

Either their contingents from the dependant sUtes, and in
vying among them both money, and shipping, and soldiers

♦ 3875/. sterling

TBAR XYIIlJ PBL0P0NNE8IAN WAR. 2S7

The Athenians, farther, sent out twenty sail, to eraise oa
the coasts of Peioponnesos, and to take eare that no one
passed over from Corinth and Peloponnesns into Sicily. For
the Corinthians, upon the arrtral of the ambassadors, and the
advice they brought, that " the face of affairs was moch alter-
ed for the better, *' priding themselvea in the reflection that'
their former equipment had arrived in time to contribute to
this tarn, became now more alert than ever, and got trans-
ports in readiness to carry over a body of their own heavy-
armed into Sicily, while the Lacedemonians were intent on
doing the same from other parts of Peloponnesas. The Co-
rinthians, farmer, manned out five-and-twenty sail ; design-
ing to hazard an engagement with the guard-ships stationed
at Naupactus, or to disable the Athenians who lay there from
giving their transports the least molestation, by keeping their
own triremes ready ranged in oider of battle in the very face
of that squadron.

The Lacedemonians also were preparing for an invasion
of Attica, in pursuance of a former resolution, and in compli-
ance, farther, with the pressing instances both of Syracusans
and Corinthians. They had no sooner heard of the re-en-
forcement intended to be sent by the Atheniana to Sicily,
than, by making a diversion, they designed to stop its execu-
tion. Alcibiades also codtinued warmly importuning them
te execute his plan of fortifying Decelea, and to proceed
briskly with the war. But the motives which at this present
juncture animated the Lacedemonians most, were, that the
Athenians, if engaged in a double war, both against them-
selves and against the Sicilians, must become a much more
expeditious conquest ; and, farther, the Athenians were the
first aggressors in violating treaties. In the former war they
were well convinced the first offence was chargeable on their
own heads, because the lliebans had surprised Platea while
treaties were in fact subsisting. Nay, contrarv to an express
stipulation m a preceding treaty, that " arms snould never be
taken up against the party wluch was willing to abide by a
judicial determination,'* they themselves had refused to soIh
mit to a trial, though claimed by the Athenians. To a con-
duct so ungeneroos they concluded that their ill success in
the war ought fairly to be imputed ; and reflected, with self-
accusations, not only on the calainity they had suffered at
I^lus, hut on all their other losses in every quarter of tne

228 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. . [bOOK VII.

war. Bat now, ■ince the Athenians, with an eqajpineat of thir-
ty sail, had committed derastations at Epidaams, at Prasic,
and at other placea, and continued to inifest their domimone
by robberies from Pylus ; nay, as often as disputes had inters
vened about the intent of articles in the last treaty, in which
'the Lacedsmonians appealed to a judicial detemunatien, the
others had haughtily refused it ; concluding hence, that the
Athenians were become as guilty ag^pressors now^ as them-
selves had been on the former occasion, with cheerful pre-
sage of success, they determmed for war. In order to it,
they demanded this winter from their*allies their contingents
of iron, and got all the needful materials in jeadiness to exe-
cute their plui of fortification. Resolved, at the same time,
to transport an aid to Sicily in vessels of burden, they began
to levy It at home, and exacted the quotas of augmentation
from their confederates. And thus the winter ended ; and
the eighteenth year of this war, of which Thucydidee has c
piled the history, came also to an end.

The followmg spring no sooner approached, than, at an
earlier date than on any former occasion, the Lacedaemonians
and allies invaded Attica ; and Agis, the son of Archidamus,
Kii^ of the Lacedemonians, had the command of the army.
At first they ravaged the country, particularly the plains ; and
this being done, having allotted out the work in portions to
the several states, they set out about fortifying Decelea.
Now Decelea is distant at most but one hundred and tweisty
stadiaf from the city of Athens, and lies at the same distance
or very little more from Boeotia ; but in the plain, and on the
finest spot of ground, from whence effectually to annoy them,
was their fortress raised ; and might be seen from the veiy
walls of Athens.

In this manner the Peloponnesians and allies erected a
fortress within Attica itself; while, in the same portion of
time, their friends in Peloponnesus embarked a body of heavy-
armed on board their transports, and sent them off for Si-
oily. For this service the Laoadmnoniaas picked out ftom
th* veiy best of the Helots, and of those eitizens of Sparta

•BMBraChriatiia. iAfaoQtiamilsft

TEAR XIX.] PBLOPONNBSIAN WAA. 220

'wlio were newly enfnmdiiMd, liroDi both together, tax him-
drisd hea^-erated, and aopointed Heocritae, e SpaHan, te
command them : and the Boeotians eent three hondred he**
▼v-armed, commnaded bjr Xeno and Nicon of Thebes, and
Hegesander of The«p». These were fint embarked at
TflBnaras in Lacenia, and thenee put oat to sea.

Soon after these the Corinthiaos sent away five handnd
heavy-anned ; some from Ckirinth itself, othevs hired from the
Arcadians ; and appointed Alexarehns, a Coriathiaa, to com^
mand them. The 3ieyomans also sent two hundred heavy-
aimed along with the Corinthians, and at their head Saigeos
a Sicyoni^an.

But the five-and-twenty sail of Corinthians, whieh laaneh-
ed out to sea in the depth of winter, lay ranged in an oppo>
arte station to the twenty Attic at Naapactns, to ffive leisare
for the embarcation of the heaTy-armed on board the trans-
ports from Peloponnesns. On this account, principally, they
were manned and fitted oot to sea, that they might divert
the attention of the Athenians from the transport-fleet that
was now putting out, and fasten it wholly upon the hostile
appearance of these triremes.

In the meantime the Athenians, even during the fortifica-
tions in band at l>ecel($a, and at the earliest approach of
spring, sent oat thirty sail to cruise on the coasts of Petopon-
nesQs, under the command of Charicles, the son of Apollo-
doras. His instructions were, farther, to touch at Argos,
and to summon them, in conformity to the treaty of alliance,
to embark a body of heavy-armed en board the fleet.

Demosthenes, also, according to promise, the^ sent away
for Sicily, with a numerous fleet, eonsistinff of sixty ships of
Athens and five of Chios, on board of which were twelve
hundred enrolled Athenians, and as large a number of island-
ers as with the utmost industry they had been able to draw
together. They had also amassed, from their other confed-
erates subject to Athens, all manner of supplies they were
able to furnish for carrying on the war with vigour. But De-
mosthenes was farther instructed to sail at first in company
with Charicles, and assist him in the cruise on the coast d
£aconia. Demosthenes, therefore, having stood over to
^gina, continued there till the remainder of his force, whieh
was yet behind, had completely joined him, and Charicles
had taken on board the Argive auxiliaries.

230 PfiLOPONMESIAN WAR. [bOOK Vli.

About the ■ame time in this epring Grylippus eUo retmn-
ed to SjiracuBe, at the bead of as large a force aa he could
collect from the different atatea i^ith whom hia perauaaions
had been effectual ; and, having convened the Syracuaana,
he told them that " they ought to man out aa large a number
of shipping as they -poasibly could, and try their fortune in a
naval engagement; such a atep, he had reaeop to hope,
might be attended with consequences which would amply
compensate the danger, and invigorate the war."

These instancea of Gylippus were well seconded by Her-
mocrates, who took uncommon pains to encourage hia coun-
trymen to attack the Athenians by sea. "The latter,"- he
told them, " were far from enjoying theix nayal skill aa an
hereditary right, or a privilege from time immemorial ezclu-
aively their own. In fact, they were by nature landmen
much more than the Syracusans ; and neceasity alone, in the
Medish invasion, had forced them to try their fortune at eea.
By enterprising men, as the Athenians were, such aa were
most darmg in^opposin^ them muat needs be regarded as the
most formidable enemies. True, they had been uaed to in-
timidate their neighbours, not by a real superiority of strength,
but by their darins, enterprising genius ; and now, by the aame
methods, themselves might become formidable even to the
Athenians." He assured them, " for his own part, he was per-
fectly convinced that the Syracusans, if by an effort of bold
resolution they would on a sudden attack the Athenian fleet,
might reap more benefit from the terror which such a step
would strike upon the foe, than could accrue to the Atheniana
from their superior skill when compared with Syracuaan in-
experience." He pressed them, therefore, ** to try their for-
tune by sea, and bid adieu to fear."

Thus animated by Gylippus, and by Hermocrates, and by
others, the Syracusans were eagerly bent on action by sea,
and manned out their fleet : and when the whole waa ready
for service, Gylippus, by favour of the night, at the head of
hia land army, marched down to the forta at Plemmyrium, in-
tending to assault them on the land side. The triremes of the
Syracusans, at the same instant of time, as had been concert-
ed beforehand, to the number of thirty-five, were sailing up odt
of the great harbour, while forty-five were going about out of
the lesser harbour where their dock lay. The latter went
round, designing to complete their junction with the other

fBAR XIX.] PBLOFONNK8IAN WA£. 281

squadron, and then in a body to stand against PlaaBmynwn,
that the Athenians on both sides might be thiown into con-
fosion. The Athenians lost no time, but instantly manned
oot sixty Tessels. With twenty-five of the number they en-
gaged the thirty-five Syracusan in the great harbour ; with
the rest they went to meet the other squadron, that was com-
ing about from the dock. A smart engagement immediately
ensued, in the mouth of the great harbmir. The dispute wss
a long time obstinately maintained ; one side exerting them-
selves to clear the passage, but the other to obstruct it.

In the meantime Gylippus, — as the Athenians posted at
Plemmyrium had flocked down to the seaside, and with their
utmost attention were looking at the battle on the water, —
Gylippus seized the opportunity ; and, no sooner had the
mornmg dawned, than, to the great surprise of the enemy,
he attacks the forts. He first makes himself master of the
laigest of the three, and afterward carries the two lesser,
the defendants of which, seeing the largest so easily taken;
had abandoned their posts ; nay, on the surprisal of the first,
those who had manned it, throwing themselves on board ths
boats and a transport that lay at hand, found no small diffi-
culty in getting away to the camp ; for, as the Syracusans
, had now the better of the engagement with their squadron in
the great harbour, they detached one of their nimblest tri-
remes to pursue the fliers. But, at the time the other two
forts were csrried, the Syracusans were plainly vanquished,
which gsve them who abandoned the last an opportunity to
sail away without obstruction : for that Syracusan squadron
that was engaged before the harbour's mouth, having forced
their way tltfough the Athenian fleet, by sailing forward in a
disorderly manner, and continually running foul one upon an-
other, gave the Athenians tin opportunity to regain the day :
for this squadron they soon routed, and afterward that with-
in the harbour, by which they had been vanquished. They
also sank eleven ships of the enemy, and made a slaughter of
all their crews, those of three ships excepted, to whom they
. granted quarter ; and all this with the loss only of three ships
'on their own side. Having aflerward drawn ashore the
shatters of the Syracusan fleet, and piled them into a trophy
•n the little isle before Plemmyrium, they retired to their
main encampment.
Thus unsuccessful were the Syracusans in their naval en

23S PELOPOMN£8lAN Wi^R. [bOOK VIJ.

gag«ment. They had earried, however, the forts at Plem -
my Hum; and, to signalize each of their acquisitions, they
erected three several trophies. One also of the two forts
that were taken last they levelled with the groand, but the
other two they repaired and garrisoned.

In this surprisal of the forts many were slsin, -and many
were made prisoners, and a great stock of wealth reposited
there became the prize of the enemy : for, as the Athenians
had made use of these forts by way of magazine, much
wealth belonging to merchants, and com in abundance, were
found within : much also of the stores belonging to the cap-
tains of the^hips of war, inasmuch as forty masts for trirenoes,
and other materials of refitment, had been laid up there ; and
three triremes were hauled ashore to be careened. Nay,
this surprisal of Plemmyrium was one of the chief, if not the
greatest source of all the distress which the Athenian army
suffered in the sequel ; for no longer was the sea open to
them for the secure importation of necessary supplies. From
this time Uie Syracusans rushed upon them from thence, and
awed all their motions. The convoys could no more get-in
without fighting their way. Besides that, in all other re-
spects, it struck a great consternation, and even a dejection
of mind, amOng the troops.

The next step taken by the Syracusans was to send out to
sea a squadron of twelve ships, under the command of Aga-
tharchus, a Syracusan. One of these ships was to proceed to
Peloponnesus, and land an embassy there, which had instruc-
tions " to notify a present hopeful posture of affairs, and to
press the prosecution of the war in Greece with all possiblr
vigour." The other eleven stood over to the Italian coast
having received intelligence that a number of small vessels
laden with stores for the Athenians, were coming up. They
intercepted and entirely destroyed most of these ; and thf
timber on board them, which was ready wrought for ths
Athenians to frame together into ships, they burnt to asfae*
on the shore of Caulonia. This done, they stood away foi
Locri ; and, while they lay in that road, one of the transport*
from Peloponnesus, having on board the heavy«armed froo
Thespie, came in. The Syracusans removed those heavy
armed into their own ships, and returned with them to Syra

cuse.

The Athenians with twenty sail were stationed at Megara,

7CAR XIX.] P£LOPONNSBUN WAR. Stt

in Older to inteicepC thoir reton ; whoiv ono ship alono,
wi& aU the crew, fell into their hands. They were not aUo
to come up with the rest ; sinpe, eloding all portait, thej r^
covered with secarity their own harbours. '

There happened idso a skirmish, in the harboar of Syra-
cose, about the piles which the Syracosans had driven down
in the sea before their old docks, that their vessels might rido
in safety behind them, and the Athenians be unable to stand
in among them and do any damage to their shipping. Close
ap to those piles the Athenians had towed a raft of prodiffions
sixe, on which turrets and parapets to cover the defendants
were erected, while others in long boats were fasteninff cablea
round the piles, and, by the help of a machine convement for
the purpose, craning them up ; and soch as th^ broke, a set
of divers sawed o£f close at the bottom. The Syracosans in
tho meantime were pouring their missive weapons upon them
frmn tiie docks, which were plentifully returned by those
posted on the raft. In short, the Atheniuis plucked op most
of the piles ; but one part of the stoccade was exceeding dif-
ficult to be demolished, as it lay out of sight ; for they had
driven down some of the piles in such a manner that their
heads emerged not above the surface of the water. This
rendered all access exceeding dangerous ; since, ignorant
where they lay, a pilot would be apt to bulge his vessel as if
it were upon a shelve. But even these the divers, for a pe-
cuniary reward, searched out and sawed away. And yet, as
fast as this was done, the Syracusans drove down a fresh set
of piles. The contrivances both of annoyance and prevention
were strenuously exerted on both sides, as might justly be
expected from two hostile bodies posted so near one another ;
the skirmishings were often renewed, and every artifice of
war was successively practised.

The Syracusans, farther, had despatched embassies, com-
posed of Corinthians, and Lacedsmonians, and Ambraciots,
to the cKies of Sicily, " to notify the surprisal of Plemmyrium,
and to give a jost representation of the naval engagement in
which they had been defeated ; not so much by the strength
of the enemy as by their own confusion : in other respects to
assure them, that their hopes of success were high, and that
they firmly depended on receiving soon an aid from them,
composed both of a land and naval force : since the Athe-
nians were also in expectation of a re-enforcement from

831 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK TII.

Athflfus, the approach of which, would their friends antieipftte.
the Athenians at present there must be totally destroyed, and
the war brought at once to an end." Sach schemef were
now in agitation in Sicily.

But Demosthenes, when he had assembled the whole of
the armament with which he was to pass over to the relief
of those in Sicily, weighing from iEgina, and standing over
to Peloponnesus, completed his junction with Charicles and
the squadron of thirty sail of Athenians under his com-
mand ; and, as a body of heavy-armed had been taken on
board the latter from Argos, they steered together for the
coast of Laconia. And here, first, they ravaged in part £pi
dauTus Limera ; and proceeding from thence to that part of
Laconia which lies over against Gythera, and where stands
the temple of Apollo, having ravaged part of the adjacent
country, they enclosed and fortified a neck of land which
might serve as a receptacle to such of the Helots as deserted
the Lacedemonians ; from thence, banditti-like, as was done
from Pyltts, to infest the country. This convenient spot was
no sooner taken in than Demosthenes stood away for Corcy-
ra, that he might take on board the auxiliaries there, and
make the best of his way to Sicily. But Charicles stayed till
he had put the place into a state of secure defence, and fixed
a garrison in it. This being done, he carried back his squad-
ron of thirty sail to Athens, and the Argives at the same
time received their dismission.

This summer there arrived at Athens thirteen hundred
Thracian targetiers, of those called Machasrophori, and who
were originally Dians. This body was intended to have been
sent with Demosthenes into Sicily ; but, as they arrived not
till after his departure, the Athenians had reeolved^to send
them back again to their own homes in Thrace. To retain
them merely for the sake of the war waged against them from
Decelea, they thought, would plunjo^e them in too large an ex-
pense, since the pay of every soldier was a drachma* a day :
for now, since Decelea, which had been fortified this spring
by the joint labours of the whole united army, continued to
be garrisoned by detachments from the several states, which
at certain intervals of time relieved one another in a regular
» it gave tenible annoyance to the Athenians, knd

* 7 3-4d.

TBA& XIX.] PSLOPONNKSiAM WAA. 235

caused asnong them soeh IwYoc of their effeete, and such a
destmction of their meo, as threw them into ^eat diatieaa.
AU preceding incarsions of the enemy having been only
transient, had left them in the peaceable enjoyment of their
lands lor the rest of the year ; but now, as they awed the
coantry by <me continued blockade, and as by intervals they
received considerable augmentations to enable them to give
grestar annoyance, as even the regular garrison was periodic
cally obliged to scour the country and plunder for their own
subeietrace ; and as Agis, King of the Lacedamonians, who
with the utmost diligence prosecuted the war, in person di-
rected all the operations, the Athenians were sorely press-
ed : for they were debarred the whole produce of their own
lands ; more than twenty thousand of their slaves had desert-
ed to the enemy, and a large part of these were mechanics of
the city ; their whole stock ot sheep and labouring cattle was
lost beyond retrieve ; their horses, — as the horsemen were
obliged every day to mount, either to ride towards Decelea,
to awe the excursions of that garrison, or to guard some im-
portant posts in the country, — their horses were either lamed
by nmning incessantly over hard or rugged ground, or by
wounds- were disabled for service ; the constant supplies of
provisions for the city, which used to be fetched from Eubcsa
to Oropus, and to be brought in from thence through Dece-
lea as the shortest passage, were now forced to go round the
cape of Sunium by sea, which considerably enhanced their
price. For want also of foreign commodities the city was
equally distressed ; and Athens was now reduced to be
merely a place of arms. To keep guard on the Ji>attlements
by day, the citizens were obliged successively to relieve one
another ; but the whole body of the city, except the horse-
men, mounted guard by night. The latter ever under arms
without, the rest on the constant guard of the city walls, and
" this for a summer and winter without any intermission, were
leduceti^to a very low condition. But the point which press-
ed hardest upon them was, having two wars at once upon
th^r hands ; and yet their obstinacy had risen to so high a
pitch, as, had it not been visible to all the world, the bare
mention of its possibility would have been quite incredible : for
who would have believed that this people, so closely blocked
op at home by the Peloponnesians, should scorn to give up
Sicily 1 nay, should persevere, with unabating zeal, to carry

236 PELOPONNBSiAM WAR. t8tH>K VIL

on the siege of Syraente, a city in no reipect inferior even
to Athene itself 1 that thej should exhibit such an estonirii-
ing proof of their strength and their oonrage to the eyes of
(Greece ; ifhere, upon the fifst breaking oot of the war, aonie
people had imagined that, in ease the Pdoponnesians invaded
Attica, they could not hold oat above one year entire, theogfa
others had sllowed them two, and others t{»ree, bat nobody
a longer space ; and thst, inJthe seventeenth year after the first
invasion of this kind, they sfaoold attempt the conquest of
Sicily ; and, when deeply gashed in every part, by one war
alreaidy upon ^eir hands, should wilfully plunge into another,
as formidable in all respects as that waged against them from
Peloponnesus t But now, when, besides wMt they had suf-
fered already, they were terribly annoyed from Decelea, and
other incidents had exacted from them very large diabnrae-
ments, their finances were reduced to a very low ebb. At
this period, therefore, instead of the tribute paid them by their
dependants, they exacted a twentieth of the value of all com-
modities imported and exported, which they thought would
replenish their coffers faster than the foraier method ; for
their disbursements were not as they bad been in preceding
times, but had been increased in the same proportion as the
scenes of war had been enlarged, while their annaal revenue
was constantly decreasing.

Unwilling, therefore, in the present ebb of their tieasares,
to defray the charge of this body of Thracians, who came too
late for Demosthenes, they sent them back to their own coon-
try with all possible haste. Diitrephes was the person pitched
upon to coffduct them home ; and was instraoted^ that ** in
the passage (for they were to go through the Eoripus) he
should employ them, if opportunity offermi, against the one
my.** He landed therefore near Tanagra, and in a harryins
manner carried off a booty from thence. About the ahnt o7
evening he also crossed the Euripus from Chalcis of EnboBa : '
and, having landed his Thracians in Booetia, led thei^ agauvit
Mycalessus. His design was not discovered that night,
though he baited at the temple of Mercury, which is disHmt
from Mycalessus but sixteen* stadia at most. But early the
next morning he assaulted this city, which is of large extent :
he carried it on the first attack, as there was no guard to re-
sist him, and the inhabitants could never have imagined that

* More than a mile and a half.

TEAR XIX.] PJBLOPONNBSiAN WAR. 837

a maritime body wovid have marched so fv into the conntiy
to make attempts upon them. The waU, besides, was weak :
in some places it was fallen, and the remaining part of i^was
low ; and the gates, from too great a confidence of security,
had been left open. No sooner had the Thracians broken
into Myealessus, than they gutted both houses and temples ;
they massacred the inhabitants, showing no regard to either
old age or youth, but vmiting their fuiy on all that came in
^eir way ; they butchered even the women and the children ;
nay, idl the labouring cattle, and erery creature that had life
wluch came before their eyes ; for the Thracians, when once
their fury is inflamed, are as insatiable of blood as any other
the greatest savages in the barbarian world. On this occasion
the canfasiim was terrible, and every ghastly method of de-
straction was exemplified in act ; they even fell upon the pub-
lic aehool, which was a very large one, when the youth of the
town had but just get in, and hacked all the children to pieces.
And thus this whole city was involved in a calamity, a great-
er than which no city bad ever felt : nay, a calamity unex-
pected and dreadful indeed !

The Thebana had no sooner intelligence of it than they
marched to their assistance ; but came not up with the Thra-
cians till they were retired to some distance from the town,
where they recovered from them their booty, and, having put
them 10 flight, continued th^ chase down to the Euripus and
the sea, where the vessels which had brought them lay at an-
chor. Here they made a slaughter of most of those who en-
deavoured to get on board, Imt could not swim ; since the
persons left in the vess^ when they saw what {>assed on the
shore, put them oflf beyond their reach. But, in the other
parts of the retreat, the Thracians behaved with some gal-
lantry against the Theban horse, which attacked them first ;
since, spying frequently out on their pu^uers, and rallying
again after the discipline of their country, they made good
their retreat ; and thus few of this body were destroyed. A
number^ further, who stayed behind in the city to plunder, were
fooAd there and put to the sword. The whole number of the
dain among this body of thirteen hundred Thracians amount*
ed to two hundred and fifty men ; though, in return, they
killed of Thebans, and others who accompanied by way of
aid, of horse and heavy-armed together, iboni twenty, and
AkiqdmidMof Thebeg, one of the nileraof BoMtia : the lives

238 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK VIL

of some more Mycaleasians were also lost in their coin|Mmj.
Such was the ceJamity which fell to the unhappj lot of Mycar
lesstis ; and which, for excess of horror, is more to be de-
plored than any oUier of the tragical events of this war.

DemosUienes, who, after marking out the fortification, had
stood away from Laconia to Corey ra, surmrising a tranaport
vessel which rode at anchor in the road of Phia of the Eleana,
on board of which a number of heavy-aFmed Corinthians
were to pass over into Sicily, sunk that vessel : but the
mariners, having saved themselves by flight, foand afterward
another vessel, and proceeded on the voyage.

From hence Demosthenes came up to Zacynthus and Ce-
phallene, where he took -their heavy-armed on board, and
sent for those of the Messenians from Naopactus. He also
crossed over to the opposite continent of Acamania, to Alyzia
and Anactorium, boui belonging to the Athenians. Thas
employed as he was in augmenting bis force, Eurymedon, re-
turning from Sicily, whither he had been sent in the winter
to carry a supply of money for the army, met him ; and,
among other intelligence, relates, that *' he had heard, since
he was \ipon his return, that Plemmyzium had been taken by
the Syracusans." Conon also, who commanded at Naupac-
tus, came to them with advice, that ** the five-and-twenty
sail of Corinthians which lay over against their squadron had
not quitted that station, and even threatened them with an
engagement." He exhorted, therefore, these commanders
to detach some vessels thither, since their squadron at Nao-
pactus, consisting only of eighteen ships, was not a match
for the enemy, whose squadron amounted to twenty-five.
Upon this Demosthenes and Eurymedon detached ten of the

{)rime sailers, among those under their ovni command, to fol-
ow Conon for the re-enforcement of the squadron at Nau-
pactus. *

The two former continued to assemble forces for the grand
expedition. Eurymedon, for this purpose, sailed to Corc^ra
commanded them to man out fifteen snips, and selected him*
self the heavy-armed for the service ; for, as he was returned
from carrying the stores, he joined himself with Demosthenes
in the command, in pursuance of the prior nomination. De»
mosthenes was collecting a body of slmgers and darters from
the towns of Acamania.
The ambassadors from Syraeute, who mtre sent roand lo

YEAR XU.] PBLOPONNESIAN WAR. 239

the SiciUan cities after the surprisal of Plemmyrinmf had buc-
eeeded in their negotiations ; and, having assembled a large
body of snccouis, were intent on bringing them up. Nicies,
who had gained an early intelligence of their motion, sent to
such of the Sicuii as lay upon their route and were in his al-
liance (namely, the Centoripes, and AlicyaBans and others),
** by no means to yield a free passage to the enemy, but to
assemble in a body and obstruct their march." It was impos-
sible for them to reach Syracuse by any other route ; for the
Agrigentines had refused them a passage through their terri-
tories. Now, therefore, the Sicilians being on their march,
the Sicnli, in compliance with the request of the Athenisns,
had placed three different ambuscades in their way. From
these rushing suddenly upon them, as they were advancing
in a careless manner, they destroyed about eight hundred men,
and all the ambassadors, except one Corinthian ; and this
Corinthian brought up afterward to Syracuse all those who
escaped by flight, the number of whom amounted to fifteen
hundred.

About the same time the Camaripeans also sent up a body
of succours, consisting of five hundred heavy-armed, three
hundred darters, and three hundred archers. The Geloans
also sent them a squadron of about five sail, besides four hun-
dred darters and two hundred horsemen.

Now almost all Sicily, except the Agrigentines (for these
still adhered to their neutrality), all the rest of the island, I
say, who hitherto had stood aloof to observe events, united
themselves against the Athenians in behalf of Syracuse :
though the Syracusans, after the blow they had just received
from the Sicuii, thought it not proper to attack the Athenians
again upon a sudden.

* But Demosthenes and Eurymedon, having now completed
their *embarcations at Corcyra and on the continent, at the
head of this united and powerful armament crossed over the
Ionian to Cape Japygia; and, standing away from thence,
reached the Choerades, islands of Japygia. Here they took on
board their fleet a party of Japygian darters, to the number
of fifty, and one hundred more of the Messapian nation ; and,
after they had renewed a friendship of ancient date with
Artas (who, being lord of these islands, supplied them with
the darters), they proceeded to Metapontium m Italy. Upon
the |ilea of an alliance subsisting between them, 'they pre-

240 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK ¥11.

▼ailed upon the Metapontians to farnish tbem out threa hun-
dred more, and two triremes, with which augmentation they
stood along the coast to Thuria; where, on their arriva),
they found that the party who had acted against the Athenian
intereat had in a late sedition heen driven out of the city.
Desirous here to take a view of the whole armament, and tc
know whether any part had straggled and was left behind ;
hoping, farther, to prevail upon ue Thuriana to join them
with Uieir forces in the most cordial manner ; and, smce their
welfare was connected with that of Athens, to declare the
friends and foes of the Athenians to be equally their own,
they stayed some time at Thuria, and completed their de-
signs.

To return to the Peloponnesians. About the same portion
of time, their squadron of five-and-twenty sail, which, to fa-
vour the passage of the transports to Sicily, lay ranged in op-
position to the fleet at Naupactus, having now made all things
ready for an ensasement, and equipped out some additional
vessels, which had almost equalised their number to that of
tbe Athenian ships, take their station at Rhypica, near £ri-
neus of Achaia. As the place in which they rode was bent
in the form of a crescent, the land-force of the Corinthians
and the adjacent confederates, who marched to their assist-
ance, was posted upon each wing of the squadron, on the jut^
ting necks of land, while the ships drawn up close together
composed the centre of their arrangement ; and Polyanthea
the Corinthian commanded the fleet.

The Athenians, with thi^e-and- thirty sail, under the com-
mand of Biphilus, weighed from Naupactus and stood io
against them. At first, the Corinthians lay still without mo-
tion ; but, so soon as it was judged necessary for them to act,
and the signal-fla^ was accordingly hoisted, they advanced t9
charge the Athenians, and an engagement ensued. The con-
tention was maintained a long time on both aides. Three of the
Corinthian vessels were destroyed, while not a single ship on
the Athenian side was sunk, though seven were disabled for
service by blows they had received from the enemy's beaks,
by which their forecastles had been shattered by th^ Cohn-
thian ships, made firm and compact for this venr purpose by
stays on each side of the beak. The event of the engage-
ment remaining doubtful, from whence both sides took occa^
sion to claim the victory, the Athemans however being i

TSAR XIZ.] PBLOFONNBSIAN WAB. 241

of all the wreck of the enemy's fleet, which the wind dreve
right into the sea, and which the Corinthians made no efforts
to recover, they dropped away from each other. Yet no
kind of ^pursuit was attempted, and no prisoners were taken
by either: for the Corinthians and rek>ponnesians, who
fought close under the ahore, were by that enabled to make
an easy escape ; bat, on the Athenian aide, not even a single
ship was sunk : snd yet, when the Atheniana had aailed
back to Naopactus, the Corinthiane immediately aet up a
trophy, as if the victory was their own, becauae they had dis-
abled a larger number of the enemy. They farther looked
upon themselves aa not defeated, because their enemiea were
not clearly victorious : for it is the way with the Corinthians
to pronounce themselves victors if they sre not sadly beaten ;
whereas, the Athenians esteem themselves defeateid if they
have not made a signal conquest. But farther, when the
Peloponnesiana had retired from their station, and the land-
army waa dismissed, the Atheniana erected a trophy. The
•pot they choae whereon to place this token of their victory
was distant about twenty stadia* from Erineus, the station
in which the Corinthians rode. Such was the event of this
naval engagement.

Demosthenes and £urymedon, so aoon as the Thurians had
got in readinesa seven hundred heavy-armed, with three hun-
dred dartera, to attend them in the expedition, ordered the
fleet to coast along the shore towards the Crotoniatis ; while
themselves, after having taken a review of all their land-army
upon the banks of the Sybaris, marched them over Isnd
throagh the Thuriatis. But, when they were advanced to the
river Hyliaa, they were met by a measenger from the Croto-
matsB, intimating to them that " their consent should never
be given for the passage of this army through their domin-
ions ;" upon which they wheeled off downwards towards the
sea and the mouth of tke Hylias, where they halted a night,
and were joined by the whole body of the fleet.

The next morning they re-embarked and proceeded along
the coast, tduehinff at every city except Locri, till they ar-
rived at Fetra, in the district of Rhegium.

But, during this interval, the Syracusans, who had received
advice of the approach of the re-enforcement, determined to

* About two miles.
11.— 'I

242 t»EL0P0NNE8IAN WAR. [BOOK Vll

make another attempt vrith their fleet and the whole augment'
ed body oL their land-anny^ which they had assembled to-
gether for this very design of attacking the Athenians again
before the re-enforcement arriyed. But, like men who in the
former action had clearly perceived what would give them
advantages over the enemy, they had made some alteration in
the structure of their vessels ; having shortened the heads
of their ships, they made them more firm and compact, and
fastened very substantial stays to each side of the beak ; they
strengthened these again by rafters of six cubits in lengthy
which were laid along the ribs both within and without, w
the same manner as the Corinthians had strengthened the
whole prow of their ships for the last naval engagement
against the squadron at Naupactus. By these means the
Syracusans concluded they should .gain an advantage over
the ships of the Athenians, which were of a different struc*
ture, as in the prow they were but weak, because of theii
usual practice, in an engagement, not to charge ahead, but by
tacking about to strike upon the sides ; that, farther, should
the battle be fought in the great harbour, where sea-room
would be small and the ships be crowded, this must be also
an advantage in their favour ; since, darting themselves ahead,
they mi\st needs shatter the prows of the enemy, when vdth
compact and solid beaks they struck against such as were
hollow and weak : that again, for want of sea-room, the
Athenians would be too much straitened to make their tacks,
or to run through their lines, which were points of art on which
the^ chiefly relied ; they were determined to the utmost of
their power to check all attempts of the latter sort, and the
narrow space in which they must engage would of itself pre-
vent the former ; and now they intended with dexterity to
turn to their own advantage the method of striking ahead,
which on the former occasion appeared to be an error in the
masters ; that hence infallibly the day must be their own ;
for the Athenians, if once repulsed, would not have room to
go round and return to the charge, since thus they must
directly be forced on the shore, which lay but a small distance
from their camp, and would sadly cramp them up ; that they
themselves must be masters of the rest of the harbour, while
the enemy, crowded together, in case they should be forced
to ^ve way, must be driven into narrow compass, and even
falling foul on one another, a total confusion and disorder

YfiA& XIX,] P£L0P0NNB81AN WAR. 243

must certainly foUow : for, what hurt the Athemaos moat, in
all their naval engagements, was their inability to make use
of the whole harbour for tacking about or returning to the
charge, in the same manner as the Syracusans : that, finally,
the Athenians could not possibly get out into wider sea, as
the entrance of the harbour and the space behind the lines of
battle were in their own command; nay, other obstacles
would co-operate, such as Plemmyrium, which would now
oppose any attempt of this kind, and the Tery nature of the
harbour's mouth, which was exceeding narrow.

By such a project the Syracusans had given an Increase to
their former sjiill and strength ; and, animated more than
ever by the thought of having improved from their errors in
the former engagement, they sallied out to encounter the en-
emy both with tneir land and naval force. Gylippus showed
himself a small portion of time before the rest at the head
of the infantry ; whom, sallying out of the city, he drew up
near the Athenian intrenchment, in that (quarter where it
faced the city. Then the garrison of Olympiaum, to a man,
as well heavy-armed as horsemen, with all the light-armed
parties of the Syracusans, came and drew up on the other
quarters ; and, immediately after, the ships of the Syracusans
and their allies came sailing forwards.

The Athenians at first imagined that at present they were
threatened only with an assault by land ; but when, on a sud-
den, they saw the fieet bearing down against them, they
were struck with confusion. Some of them were taking post
upon and without the intrenchments, to make head against
the assailants; others had sallied forth to encounter the
troops from Olympiaeum, and those from remoter parts com-
ing on with full speed, a numerous body of horsemen and
darters. The rest were hurrying on board to man the ships,
or to give what assistance they could upon the beach : and
no sooner were the proper complements on board, than sev-
enty-five ships stood out to meet the enemy ; but then the
number of the enemy's vessels was about eighty.

Great part of this day was spent in advancing towards
and retiring from on^nother, and in reciprocal endeavours
to seize advantages : but neither side was able to execute
any remarkable piece of service, excepting that the Syracu-
sans sank one or two of the Athenian ships ; upon which they
parted, and at the same time the land-army drew off 4rom the
intrenchments.

244 PSLOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK TII.

The day following the Syractisaas )my qviet, afibrding the
enemy no room to gaess at their future designs.

But Nicias, conscious to himself that hitherto no advanta-
ges had been gained by sea, and fully expecting that the en-
emy would repeat their attempt, obliged the captains of the
triremes to repair their ships if anywise damaged, and station-
ed the transports before the piles which Uiey bad driven
down in the sea, to secure the niips, and lock up as it were
that space in which they lay. The transports he ranged in
a line, at the distance of the breadth of two plethra* from one
another ; that, in case a ship was repulsed, it might run in
hither as a place ot security, and might again stand out with-
out any molestation. In perfecting these dispositions the
Athenians were all this day employed from morning to night.

The next day the Syracusans, earlier in the morning- than
before, and with the same parade of their land and naval
force, came out to attack the Athenians. Now again, facing
eacH other in the lines of the engagement, they spent great
part of the day in the same endeavours as b^ore to over-
reach and surprise one another ; till at length Aristo, the son
of Pyirhicus, a Corinthian, and the most expert seaman in the
fleet of Syracuse, persuaded the commanders of that fleet .
to despatch their orders to the magistrates within the city,
" with all expedition to bring the provisions which were for
sale down to the beach of the sea, and hold the market there ;
nay, farther, to compel all those who had any meat to sell to of-
fer it instantly on the beach, that the mariners might come
ashore and dine under the sides of their vessels ; so that, after
a short repast, they might this same day unexpectedly fall upon
the Athenians. '* This counsel being approved, the necessa-
ry orders were despatched away, and the market was furnish-
ed out. Then suddenly the Syracusan fleet fell back, and
stood away towards the city ; where, disembarking with all
possible haste, they took their repast.

But the Athenians, who ascribed this droppmg oflT of the
enemy to a consciousness of their own inferiority, quitting
their own ships as if there was iK>thiog farther to be done,
diverted their attention to their own affairs, and especially to
prepare a refreshing meal for themselves, confident there would

* A plethron is said by some to contain li44, by others, 1000
square feet.

TSAR XIX.J PEXOPONlfBAlAN WAR. 845

be no engtget aent on Hue day : bQt« on a MiddMi, the Syra-
cusans, repairing on board, stood oat a Mcond time to gtva
theaa battle, ^uien the Athenians, in much hony and ood*
fosion, and most of them still fasting, re-emharking without
any regularity or order, with great difficulty, after a conaid-
erable mterrai, stood out to reeeiTe them. For a certain
space each stood npen their gnard, and declined the charge.
At length it oeeurred to the Atheoiana that it waaimpmdent
to dally so lon^, and ezhaast their spirits by the mere labour
of the oar, which ought rather to be exerted on an expeditioas
attack. Upon which, animating one another with a shoot,
they darted upon the enemy, and the enga g em e nt began.

llie Syracosans received the first shock without giving
vray, and, keeping the heads of their Tessels right against the
enemjri executed their project, and with their strengthened
beaks shattered the forecastles of the Athenian ships ; while
their darters, who were ranged along the decks, galled the
Athenians sorely with their missiTe weapons ;> though not
««ear ao much as did the crews of some light Sjrracusan boats,
which scoured about the enemy's fleet ; sometimes getting
under their wards and gliding alon^ the sides of their Tessels,
and from these close positions aiming their darts at the mar-
iners. In fine, the Syracosans, persevering in this manner
to gaU &eir foes, were masters of the day ; while the Athe-
nians, beiae pot to flight, were obliged to retire, through the
mtert-als of the line of transports, into their own station.
The 8y -ac^san ships pursued as fiur aa to this line of trana*
ports ; bi *. were obliged to stop there, for foar of the ma-
chines* whxh hung upon the yards of the transports to bar
all approach. Two ships, indeed, of the Syracusans, elevap
ted with #nc *e8s, approached too near, and were sunk ; and
another, wi^^h aU her crew, was taken by the enemy. And
now the Syracnsars, who in the action had sunk seven ships
of the enemy, had damaged many, had taken many prisoners,
and made great slaufrhtcr, judged it proper to retire. They
then erect^ trophies a^ vi^torr-^as :*i two engagements, and
plumed themselves in the asstiracne, that by sea they had
the superiority over the enemy ; presuming, at theaame time»

* Called dolphins, from their form. Thev w«re massy, made
of lead, and hung upon the sail-yards by cords and pulleys ; and
when throvm into the enemy's ships, either burst or sunk then

^6 PBLOPONNESIAN WAR. BOOK ¥11.

that they must soon be Tictoir.oq8 also by land : upon which
they got every thing in readiness to atUck them once more
on both elements.

But at this crisis Demosthenes and Euiymedon arrived
at the head of the re-enforcement from Athens ; which con-
sisted of seventy-three sail of ships, including foreigners ; of
about, five thousand heavy-armed of their own and Uieir con-
federate troops ; besides a considerable number of darters, as
well Barbarian as Grecian, and slingers, and archers, and a
complete supply of all military stores. The first appearance oi
this grand re-enforcement struck the Syracusans and their al-
Ues with no small consternation. It looked as if the war
must be endless, and themselves exposed to dangers that
knew no bounds. They saw that, in spite of the annoyance
which Decelea, now fortified, gave them, the Athenians were
arrived before Syracuse with another armament as great and
as formidable as the former; and that, in every view, the
strenffth of Athens most be quite insurmountable. And now
also the Athenians, who remained of the former armament,
respired from that dejection of spirit into which a series of
misfortunes had plunged them.

Demosthenes, after taking a view of the present posture of
affiurs, thought it absolutely necessary to avoid delays, and
keep clear of those errors which had done so much prejudice
to Nicias : for Nicias, at his first appearance, struck a uni-
versal consternation; and yet, by declining the immediate
attack of Syracuse, and loitering a whole winter away at Ca-
tana, he became an object of contempt, and Gylippus had
time to land a succour from Peloponnesus, which disconcert-
ed all his measures. That succour, however, the Syracu-
sans could never have sent for, had Nicias assaulted them on
his first approach ; for, deluding themselves with the thought
that they were a match for their foes, they would have found,
by sad experience, that they had indulged a cruel mistake,
and must the same moment have been mvested on all sides :
and, in such a state, though they had invited those succours,
yet no effectual relief could have been obtained from them.

Demosthenes, therefore, reflecting on these past mistakes,
and sensible that he himself, this very moment, on the first
day of his arrival, appeared most terrible in the eyes of the
enemy, resolved without loss of time to improve the present
consternation which his re-enforcement had struck among

lAAR XIX.] PEL0P0KKE8IAN WAR. 847

them. He farther took notice, that the coanter-work of the
Syracusans, by which the Athenians had been excluded from
perfecting their circumvallation, consisted only of a single
wall ; and, in case the heiffhts of Epipole conld again be re-
gained, with the camp which at first had been occupied there,
that work might easily be carried, since the defenoants coold
not fiow be able to withstand the Athenian strength ; he de-
termined therefore to pat this project in execution ; judging
that, in case it succeeded, it would be a means of bringing
the war to a speedy conclusion : for, if the scheme took place,
the surrender of Syracuse must soon follow ; at worst, he
would draw off the army, and not waste the lives of those Athe-
nians who were employed in this service, and the strength
of the whole state, to no manner of purpose.

Now, therefore, the Athenians began to act offensively ,
and, in the first place, sallying out from their camp, they rav-
aged the country along the banks of the Anapus, and were
now again, as on the first approach, masters without control
both by land and sea ; for in neither element durst the Syra-
cusans any longer come out to check their motions, abating
what small resistance was made by the cavalry and darters
from Olympiaeum.

In the next place, Demosthenes thought proper to try what
could be done against the works of the enemy by the help of
machines. But when, upon applying them, those machmes
were fired by the Syracusans, who from the top of their
works made a gallant defence ; and, though the army attack-
ed in several quarters at once, they were everywhere re-
pulsed ; be determined fo waste no longer time upon the
trial : but, having prevailed with Nicias and his other cot-
leagues in command to assent to the scheme he had formed
to recover Epipols, he proceeded to put it in execution.
Tet, by daylight, it wa9 judged impossible for them either
to march or to mount the ascent without being discovered.
Upon this, having issued out his orders, that every man
should take with him subsistence for five days, and that all
masons and carpenters should attend the march, with proper
store of missive weapons, and all needful materials for rais-
mg now works in case the attempt was successful, he put
himself, about the first sleep, at the head of the whole army,
and, assisted by Eurymedon and Menander, marched towards
EpipoltB. But Nicias was left behind in the intrenchments.

848 PEL0P0NNE8IAN WAR. [bOOK Til

Whoi now (hey were advanced to the pass of Euryalus,
bj which the first army gained formerly the ascent, they were
yet undiscovered by the Syracusan guards ; and, mounting
the heights, surprised the fort which was there manned by the
Syracusaos, and slaughtered some of the defendants. But the
majority flying amain towards the camps, of which there
were three among the advanced intrenchments of Epipolao
(one of Syracusans, a second of other Sicilians, and a third
of the confederates), they spread the alarm, and also notified
the enemy's approach to the six hundred Syracusans, who at
first were selected for the guard of this quarter of Epipolae.
These sallied out instantly to stop their progress ; and De-
mosthenes, with his Athenians, falling in with them, put them
to flight, after they had made a gallant stand. Upon this suc-
cess they immediately pushed forwards, that they might im-
prove the present ardour of the soldiers to the immediate
conppletion of those points for which they had made this bold
attempt. Another party, which bad been advancing all along
without a check, surprised the counter- work or the Sjrracu-
sans; of whidi, since abandoned by its defendants, they
were throwing down the battlements.

But now the Syracusans and their confederates, and Gy-
lippus with the body under his command, marched out of
their intrenchments ; yet, havine been attacked in so darmg
a manner amid the darkness of the night, they had not recov-
ered their surprise when they fell in with the Athenians ;
and thus, not able to stand the first shock, they were obliged
to give way for a time ; but, as the Athenians pushed forwards
witn great irregularity, as if the victory was quite their own ;
eager, farther, to make themselves masters of all the tract
not yet cleared of the enemy, for fear lest, should they slacken
in their ardour, the enemy might have time to rally in a body,
the BfBotians first put a stop to their career ; and, rushing
boldly upon them, routed anid put them to flight. By this
turn the Athenians were thrown into so much disorder and
confusion, that the particulars which followed cannot easily
be gathered, neither from themselves nor their antagonists ;
for, even in dayli/g^ht, when objects are clearest to the sight,
men present in a battle are not able to see all that passes ;
each single combatant can barely relate what happened about
his own person. When, therefore, armies engage amid the
darkness of the night (though this is the only instance of i

VSAR XIX.] PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 249

between powezfal annies in the present war), how is it pos-
sible to come at the knowledge of the several incidents!
The moon indeed shone at this tihie ; but then they onl^ saw
one another as objects appear by moonlight, so as to discern
the appearance of human bodies, but not to distinguish be-
tween friends and enemies. The heavy-armed, farther, nu«
XBerolu on both sides, were too much crowded for want of
room. One party of the Athenians was already clearly de-
feated ; another, Qi^)roken by the first attack upon them, was
pushing forwards. Of the remainder of their army, a great
part had already mounted the ascent ; yet some were still
busied in mounting up ; but none of these, when they were
got upon the eminence, knew which way to advance ; for
before them (as the rout was begun) there was one grand
medley of confusion, and the tumult was so loud that no
sounds could be distinctly heard. The Syracusans and their
confederates were animating one another with loud exulta-
tions (for the season of the night made all signals useless) to
complete the blow, and were clearing before them all that
came in their way : but the Athenians were prying about for
one another, and regarded every thing they met, even though
they fell in with their own friends, as the flight was now begun,
for an assured enemy. Obliged^ farther, by frequent itera-
tions to demand the word, as the only method to distinguish
one another (all calling out aloud for it at the same instant of
tone), they heightened the general distraction, and clearly
discovered their own word to the ecemy. But then they had
not equal opportunities to discover that of the enemy ; be-
cause, as the latter were now the victors, and kept more in
bodies, it was less liable to detection. Hence it came to
pass, that, though a stronger party of the Athenians fell in
with a weaker party of their foes, yet they judged it best to
fly ; because they were sensible that their own word was di-
vulged -, and, as they could not return the word of the Syra-
cusans, they must unavoidably be cut to pieces. But what
had Uie greatest effect, and did most hurt to the Athenians,
was the sinsing the psan ; since that used on both sides, be-
ing nearly w same, raised the utmost confusion : and, when
ihe Argives and Ck>rcyreans, and all others of Doric descent,
^ho were with the Athenians, began from time to time their
, it struck the same alarm into the Athenians as when the

Boemy themselves sang it ; 90 that, in short, falling in among

250 PELOPONNESJAN WAR. [fiOOK YII

one another* in different quarters of the army, when once
the confusion had risen to a height (friends against friends,
and citizens against fellow-citizens), they not only impressed
a reciprocal terror, but proceeded to blows with so much fniy
that they could not easily be parted. The pursuit was briskly
followed ; in which many of^ them, plunging headlong down
the precipices, were dashed in pieces, because the pass dowB
wards from Epipolae was too narrow for their numbers. But
of those who irom the heights got down into the plain, many,
and all in general who came in the first armament, since bet-
ter experienced in the country, escaped in safety to the camp ;
whereas, of the last comers, some, straggling into by-ways,
were bewildered in a country to which they were utter stran-
gers, and at break of day were cut to pieces by the Syracu
san horse, who scoured the plains.

On the day following the Syracusans erected two trophies
on EpipolsB ; one on the summit of the pass, and the other
where the Boeotians first stopped the enemy's progress. The
Athenians also obtained a truce, to fetch off their dead ; the
number of which was large,* both in their own^ troops and
those of their allies ; and yet more arms were taken by the
enemy than bore proportion to the slain : for, of the number
of light-armed who were pushed to the brink of the precipices,
and, throwing away their shields, were obliged to leap down,
though some pe'rished by the faH, yet others escaped with life.

But, after this, the Syracusans, highly animated again with
this fresh unexpected turn in their favour, sent out Sicanas,
at the head of fifteen sail, to Agrigentum, now embroiled in
a sedition, with orders to exert the utmost of his power to
reduce it to their obedience. Gylippus also made once more
the tour of Sicily, to levy another army ; confident that, with
such a re-enforcement, he could carry the vei^ intrench-
ments of the enemy by storm, since affairs had taken such a
favourable turn on Epipol®.

In the meantime the Athenian generals were employed in
the needful consultations since the last misfortune and the
present universal dejection of their troops. They saw that
all their attempts were blasted by ill success, and that the
soldiers were chagrined at the continuance of bo fruitless a

♦ Plutarch puts it at two thousand ; but Diodorus Sicaltu
says It was two thousand five hundred.

TSAR XIX.] PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 251

service : for a sickness spread among their people from a
double cause ; from the present season of the year, in which
the human body is most subject to disorders, and the marshy
nnwholesome ground on which they were encamped ; besides
that, in every respect, their situation appeared desperate and
qaite beyond the power of redress.

The opinion of Demosthenes was therefore totally repug-
nant to a longer continuance before Syracuse. He urged
'* the immediate execution of the scheme he had formed be-
fore he made the late dangerous attempt upon Epipolas ;
which, since it had miscarried, they should no longer protract
their departure, while yet the season of the year was proper
for their voyage homeward, and they had strength enough in
the last re-enforcement to force their passage in spite of the
enemy." He affirmed, " It would be more conducive to the
public welfare to turn their arms against those who were
erecting fortifications within Attica itself, than against the
Syracusans, whose redaction, now was almost impracticable;
and that it was madness^to persist any longer in a siege which
dissipated the wealth of the state in fruitless vain expenses."
In this manner Demosthenes declared his sentiments.

As for Nicias, though convinced within himself that their
affairs were in a bad situation, yet he was unwilling with his
own mouth to confess their low condition, or that a departure
should be fixed by the general votes of a public council, where
all that passed must bo reported to the enemy; because,
should the determination be formed in this manner, the exe-
cution could not go forward without the enemy's privity.
Besides, as he knew the state of the enemy somewhat more
perfectly than others, he imagined there were grounds to hope
that the state of the latter would soon become worse than
their own, would they only continue to press the siege. A
want of supplies must soon reduce them to great straits ; and
this the sooner, as, by the accession of the last squadron,
themselves were now again ousters of the sea : and, what
is more, in Syracuse itself there was a party which wished to
see the city fall into their hands. These had despatched
their agents to Nicias, and insisted he should not quit the
siege. Yet, thus enlightened as he was, in reality he knew
not how to act, as his mind was balanced between two meas-
ures, which equally required mature deliberation: but, for
the present, he openly declared himself in council against

252 PBL0P0NNES1A^ WAR. [book Vli

drawing off the army. He told them, " he was perfectly well
assured that the Athenians would never forgive him, should
he carry their troops from Sicily without peremptory orders ;
that the lifair would not then lie under the cognizance of
such as here advised it, and with their own eyes were con-
vinced of the necessity of such a step ; but of men who would
form their judgments upon the spiteful calumniations of others,
and the influence some malicious demagogues would have
over their understandings, by which their fate would be deter-
mined." He farther represented, that " many, nay, the
greater part of the soldiers, who now formed the troops, and
make such tragical outcries about the perils that environ them
at present, would change their notes so soon as they were
landed at Athens, and ascribe their return to the treachery
and corruption of their commanders.** For such reasons, he
declared, " as he was well acquainted with Athenian tempers,
he would choose, rather than be undone at Athens by base
criminations and an unjust sentence, to hazard the hist ex-
tremity, and perish, if so it mu<4t be, under the violence of
the enemy." He maintained, however, that "the state of
the Syracusans was worse than their own. The demand
upon them for the pay of foreigners was large ; their expenses '
in securing the outworks of Syracuse were high ; they had
now supported a large navy for the space of an entire year ;
want therefore must soon come upon them, and they must
shortly be totally distressed ; because the sum of two thou-
sand talents* they had already expended of their own stock,
and had even contracted a large debt besides : and, in case
they abate of their present punctuality, or making good the
appointments of the forces they have on foot, their strength
must moulder away ; since it consisted, not like the Atheni-
ans, of troops which must serve, but of such as were only
discretionary aids." He concluded with " the necessity they
lay under, from the ties of duty, to continue the siege with
vigour, and by no means expose a superior strength to ruin,
through a false presumption that they were inferior in pomt
of supplies."

Nicias expressed himself on this occasion with an air of neat
confidence, as a person perfectly well acquainted with the state
of Syracuse and the failure of money there, and because thert

• 3ff7fiOOl. sterling.

TEAR XIX.] PBLOPONN^SIAN WAR. 263

«vas % fwtj within tke city which acted in fsvonr of the Athe-
fiiass, and had advised him, by their agente, " by no meane
to Tatse the siege." And, what is uMNre, he placctd a stronger
dependance now upon the feet than ever he had done be*
fore the late nnsnccessfui engagement. ^

As to the proposal of continuing the siege, Demosthenes
would not yield the least decree of attention to it : "If the
army must not evacuate Sicily withovt a peremptory order
from Athens, but must persist in this destructive service, he
judged it would be better to draw them off to Thapsus or to
OaUna, where they might find opportunity enough to make
incursions with the land-army upon the tenritones of the ene-
my, and, by committuig devastations, might highly distress
them. Their fleet might then engage in the open sea ; not
in a space confined wid straitan«l, which was the greatest
advantage to the enemy, but in sufficient sea-room, where
all their superior skill might foiriy be exerted, where they
would be able to make their tacks, and bear down again
upon the foe with greater agility, and more violent shocks,
than could be done in the limitary space of a close pent-un
harbour. Upon the whole, he affirmed, thai his consent shoula
never be given le a longer continuance in their present posts ;
but he was for moving off with all possible expedition, and
they had not a moment to lavish upon delay.**

EUiryi|aedon then declared that his sense of things coin-
cided with that of Demosthenes ; and, Nicias persisting in the
contrary opinion, a fit of languor and su^nse ensued, attended
miitk the secret imagination that the positiveness o( Nicias re-
sulted from some stronger hopes of success he had conceived
above his colleagues. And in this manner the Athenians
fell into dilatory measures, and continued in their camp be-
fore Syracuse.

But in this interval Gylippus and Sicanus returned to Syra-
cuse : Sicanus truly disappointed of Agrigentum, for he was
advanced no farther than Gela when the sedition in favour of
the Syracusans was brought to an amicable period ; but when
Gylippus was returned at the head of a numerous body, con-
sisting of levies made in Sicily, and the heavy-armed troops
from Peloponnesus, who in the spring had put to sea on board
the tran^rt, but came over last from Africa to Selinus ; for
into Afma they had been driven by contrary winds; and,
hftvinflr there been furnished by the Cyreneans with two tri-

254 FELOPONNJ&SIAN WAR. [bOOK Vli.

remes and a set of pilots, as' thej coasted along the African
shore, they relieTsd the Evesperitas, then Uoeked up by the
Libyans. The latter they defeated in a set battle ; and, pro-
ceeding from thence along the shore, they reached Neapolis,
a Carthaginian mart, from whence lies the shortest cut to Si-
cily, being only a passage of two days and a night. ' Hence
therefore they stood across, and landed at Selinus.

With this accession of strength, the Syracusans unstantly
prepared to attack the Athenians again both by land and sea.
But the Athenian genends, finding they had received so large
an augmentation, and that the posture of their own affairs
was so far from being changed for the better, that day after
day it grew worse in every respect ; and, what was worst of
all, that their troops were quite exhausted with fatigue and
sickness, they repented now in earnest that they had not drawn
off in time ; and, as Nicias now no Icmger opposed that step
with the same vehemence as he had done before, but merely
endeavoured that it should not be determined in public coun
cil, they issued out orders, with the utmost secrecy, that the
whole armament should hold themselves in readiness to put
to sea upon a signal given ; but, all things now ready, the
very moment they are going to embark the moon is eclipsed ;
for it was now tbe«time of the full. The bulk of the army,
struck with the awful appearance, call out upon the generals
to halt ; and Nicias, always addicted too much to superstition
and such vulgar scruples positively declared that " it should
no more be debated whether they should remove or not,' tiU
the three times nine days were pa^ which the soothsayers
prescribe on such occasions." So, for this reason, a longer
stay was forced upon the Athenians, who had been too dila-
tory already.*

* That the bulk of an army or a fleet should be frightened at
such appearances, is no wonder at all : they are ever ignorant;
and the most daring of them in other respects have been much
addicted to superstition. But one cailnot help being surprised
at the ignorance and superstition of Nicias ; one cannot help
pitying: &i^d deploring the foible of a man who had so good a
heart. Plutarch expatiates largely on this occasion. " Even
the vulgar," says he, *' at this time were well apprized that an
eclipse of the sun was often occasioned, about the time of the
change, by an interposition of the moon : but, as to the moon,
by the mterposition of what body, and how on a sudden, at tha

YEAR XIX.J PBLOPONNESIAN WAR. 255

The Syracnsans, who had soon an intelligence of their de-
signs, were now more animated than ever to press hriskly on
the Athenians, as on men who had given proof of their own
inward conviction that they were no longer a match for their
foes either by sea or on land ; since with other thoughts they
never could have projected a re-embarcation. Apprehensive,
ai the same time, that, should they remove to any other quar-

full, its light fades away or emits variety of colour, was not easy
for them to conceive. They thought it a straiige occurrence,
and sent from God as a prognostic of great calamities. The first
person who wrote a clear and bold solution of the enlightening
ai^ obscuration of the moon, was Anaxagoras, who now had
not been long dead ; nor was his account in everybody's hands,
but conceal^, imparted only to a few, and that with caution and
assurances of secrecy. The world could not bear that natural-
ists and meteor-mongers, as they were then styled, should seem
to restrain the divine power by quaint argumentations, invisible
operations, and necessary consequences: for such attempts
Protagoras was banished ; and Pericles, with much ado, procu-
red the release of Anaxagoras when thrown into prison. Nay,
Socrates, who never meddled with any of these points, was
however put to death upon the charge of philosophizing. It was
not till late that the glory of Plato shone abroad ; who, by his
irreproachable life, and subjecting natural necessities to a divine
and sovereign power, cleared away all bad imputations from
studies of this kind, and, by a mathematical beginning, opened
a field to other sciences. And thus his friend Dion, at what
time he was setting sail from Zacynthus against Dionysius, was
not at all disheartened by an eclipse of the moon, but landed
safe at Sjrracuse, and ejected the tyrant. It was the misfortune
of Nieiaa, at this juncture, not to have even a skilful soothsayer
with faim ; for his intimate, Stilbides, who had cored much of
his ifuperstition, had died a little before; since this portent, as
Philochorus says, was not a bad one, but an excellent good one,
for a flying army ; since acts which are accompanied with fear
stand in need of concealment, and light is ever an adversary to
them. Besides, after eclipses of the sun or moon, it was the
usual custom, as Autoclides has informed us, to hold only a
three days' cessation from business. But Nicias persuaded him-
self that a complete revolution of the moon ought to be waited
for ; as if with his own eyes he had not seen ner shine bright
again, when she had passed the shadow and the earth's inter-
position. Yet, throwmg up all attention to other points, he
minded nothing but sacrificing, till his enemies attacKed him *
—Life of Nieiaa.

256 PSLOPONNBSIAN WAR. [SOOK Til.

ter of Sicily, they would become more difficult of reduction,
they saw the necessity of engaging them by sea without s
moment's loss, while yet they had an advantage in compelling
them to fight. Upon this they ordered the complements of
men on board their ships, and exercised their crews as many
days as .were judged sufficient : but, when opportunity offer-
ed of acting with advantage, on the first day they assaulted
the Athenian intrenchments ; and a party of heavy-armed
and horsemen, though not nunkerous, sallying out at some of .
the ports to beat them off, they cut off some of the heavy-
armed from the rest of that party, and, having put them to
flight, followed the pursuit. As the spot, farther, on which
the assault was made, was narrow, the Athenians lost seventy
horses, and a small number of their heavy-armed. Nothing
more happened on this day, as the army of the Syracnaans
now made their retreat.

But, on the day following, they stood out with their fleet,*
to the number of seventy-six ships ; and, at the same tkne^
the land-army marched up to the mtrenchments. The Athe-
nians launched out, with fourscore and six,, to give them a
reception; and thus charging one another, an engagement
ensued. Eurymedon commanded the right wing of the Athe-
nian fleet, and endeavoured to overreach and surfoond the
ships of the enemy. For this purpose he opened his line,
and stood alon^ too close to the land ; which gave the S3rra-
cusans and their allies, who had now defeated tne centre of
the Athenians, an opportunity to intercept him in the bottom
and recess of the harbour, where they slew Euiymedon him-
self, and destroyed the ships which had separated in his com-
pany ; and, this done, they gave chase to the whole Athenian
fleet, and drove them ashore.

Gylippus now, perceiving that the ships of the enemy were
defeated and driven aground quite wide of the piles and their

* Plutarch adds, that, " on this occasion, the very lads c

out in fishing'boats and skiffs, taunting and insulting the Athe-
nians. One of these lads, Heraclides, of a noble fomiiy, who
had advanced too near, was in great danger of being intercepted
by an Athenian vessel But Pollichus, the uncle of the lad,
alarmed for his safety, charged instantly with the ten triremes
he had under his command. The rest of the Syracusan fleet,
now alarmed for Pollichus, ran in at once, and brougfai oo a gen>
ngagement."— ij^e o/ JViciM.

TBAR XtX.] PBL0P0NKB8IAN WAR. 257

camp, formed instantly a design to make slangliter of the men
as they were leaping on shore, and of giving the Sjnracusaiia
an opportunity easily to draw off all t^ ships from land, of
which they were entire masters. At the hsiad, therefore, of
one division of the land>force, he marched down to the pier
to second the fleet. The Tjrnheiiea happened to have been
posted nearest by the Athemans ; who, seeing a body of the
enemy running down thither in a diaorderty ipanner, advan-
ced eagerly to m^t them ; and charging briskly on the van,
put them to flight, and drove them into the Lake of Lysioselia:
nut, soon after, a re-enforcement of Syracosans and then
allies coming up, the Athenians also iidvanced with speed to
succour their friends ; and, trembling for their ships, soon
came to an engagement with them, and after rooting, pur-
sued them amain. They slaughtered now a great number of
the heayy-armed; and, what was more, preserved the far
greater part of their fleet, and towed again to their fbmwr
moorings all their ships, except eighteen, which the Sjrracn-
sans and their allies made prizes, and pot all the men on board
them to the sword. With a view, farther, to destroy the rest
by setting them on fire, they filled an old transport-ship with
fascines and combustible matter, and, as the wind blew right
upon the Athenians, set her on fire, and let her drive in
among them. The Athenians, trembling for the ships, put
all their endues instantly at work to extinguish the names ;
which, haVmg at length effectuated, and kept this fire-ship
clear of their own vessels, they were delivered from this im-
minent danger.

After this the Syracusans erected a trophy for their victo-
rious engagement on the water, and for the interception of
the party of the heavy-armed before the intrenchments, where
they had taken so many horses. The Athenians also did the
same, for the repulse siven by the Tyrrhenes to the land-
forces of the enemy, and their being chased into the lake, and
the larger success they afterward obtained with the rest ol
their army.

But now, when, beyond the reach of doubt, the Syracu-
sans, though at first alarmed at the large re-enforcement of
shipping brought agamst them by Demosthenes, had gained
a si^al victory by sea, the Athenians were plunged into a
total dejection of spirit : they were thunderstruck by the re-
verse of misfortunes so little pxnected ; and began to repent,

258 PBLOPONMBSIAN WAR. [bOOK VII.

with much more bitterness of thought, that they had ever en-
gaged in so fatal an expedition. They had invaded states
w^e policy was already of a piece with their own ; whose
form oif government was popular, like that of Athens ; and
which flonrished in shipping, in horses, and each article of
power : and yet, finding themselves unable to give any meas-
ure of success to their projects by introducing diss^isions
among them through political embroilments, nor even by a
pqwenul force, superior to that of their foes, able to ward off
the many blows they had received, they had fallen beforehand
into great anxieties ; and now, sadly beaten as they were at
sea, one thought of which they never could hitherto have con>
ceived, their despondency became more violent than ever.

From this time the Syracusans scoured the whole harbour
without having any thing to fear. They had also formed a
scheme of barring up its mouth ; that the Athenians, thou^
never so intent upon it, might for the future not have it in
their power to steal awi^. Their care and diligence were no
longer employed on the view alone of their own preservation,
but on the larger view of ruining the Athenians. They con-
cluded, and justly too, that the latter turns in their favour had
given them the ascendant over these invaders ; and, could
they but compass the total overthrow of this body of Atheni-
ans and their allies, the grand achievement would strike all
Greece with admiration. Nay, more, all other Grecians must
reap the fruits of such success ; of whom some would in an
instant recover freedom, and others be delivered from the fear
of losing it; for the remaining strength of Athens would
never be able to stand against that weight of war with which
she must be soon encompassed about. And thus, could they
(Syracusans) be the glorious authors of such desirable events,
they must infallibly become objects of wonder, not only to aU
, the present age, but to latest posterity. And of a truth, con-
sidered in such a light, it was great and glorious ambition to
aim at the conquest, not only of the Athenians, but also of
their whole extensive and combined alliance ; and this, not
merely to earn laurels for themselves, but for the auxiliaries
also who had engaged in their cause ; since, exposed in the
front of the war with the Lacedemonians and Corinthians,
they had subjected their own state to the fury of a storm
^hich threatened them all, and, by their own personal valour
n naval engagements, had contributed most to such a height
of success.

YEAR XIX.] P£LOPONI>i£SIAN WAR, 259

The Tanous people now got together at this one city of
Syracuse were so yery namerous, as to be exceeded only by
the comprehensiTe roll of those who, in the series of the
present war, sided either with the states of Athens or Sparta.
The catalogue is subjoined of those who mustered in the of-
fensive and defensive armies at Syracuse ; who fought against
or in behalf of Sicily ; who joined for the reduction or preser-
vation of this island, not so much from just and lawful mo-
tives, or a concurrence resulting from the ties of blood, as
from policy, or interest, or direct compulsion.

The Athenians, truly, in quality of lonians, had voluntarily
corae hither against the Syracusans, who were Dorians ; at-
tended by those who spoke the same dialect and used the
same institutions with themselves, the Lemnians, and Imbri-
ans, and those ^ginetn who were the present possessors of
JCgina. The Hestieans, farther, now inhabiting Hestis in
Eubcsa, as an Athenian colony, had joiaed in the expedition.
Of the remaining numbers, some came alon^ with them be-
cause they were dependants : some, though mdependent, be-
cause they were confederates : and some there were who at-
tended merely for their pay. The dependants and tributaries
were the Eretrians, and Chalcideans, and Stvrensians, and
Carysthians, from Euboea ; from the islands, the Geans, and
Andrians, and Teians ; from Ionia, the Milesian^, and Sami-
ans, and Chians ; of these the Chians, being not subjected to
a tribute, but only to furnish, a quota of shipping, though in-
dependent at home, yet followed their arms. And all these
hitnerio recited were lonians and Athenian colonies, except-
ing the Carysthians, for these last are Dryopes ; but, as sub-
jected to Athens, not so much from choice as lonians as by
mere compulsion, they now followed their masters against
Dorians. To these were added ^olians ; the Methymneans,
for instance, who were to furnish shipping, but were exempt-
ed from tribute ; the Tenedians, farther, and ^niana, who
were tributaries ; but these, being iEolians, were now com- .
polled to fight against other ^Eolians ; namely, their own
founders, the Boeotians, who adhered to the Syracusans.
The Platasans did the same, and were the only Boeotians that
acted against Boeotians upon the justifiable pretext of lasting
enmity. The Rhodians, farther, and Cytherians, attended,
though both of Doric descent: the Cytherians, truly, who are
a Xacedasmonian colony, bore arms at this juncture on the

260 PELOPONNBSIAN WAR. [BOOK TIf.

Atheniau side, against the Lacedflemonians, mider the com-
mand of Gyiippos ; and the Rhodians, Argives by descent,
were obliged to turn their arms against the I>)ric Symcosans ;
nay, against the Geloans, a colony of their own, now aetiDg
in concert with the Syracusans. Of the people of the isles
on the coast of Peloponnesus came the Cephallenians and
Zacynthians; independent, in fact, bat through their situation
controlled in some measure by the Athenians, who are mas-
ters of the sea. The Gorcyreans, farther, who were not only
of Doric, but, what is more, were eren of Corin^an original,
as being a colony of the latter, and by blood allied to the for-
mer, fr6m compulsion, as they gave ont for a colour, though
in truth from deliberate malice, since opposing the Corinthi-
ans, whom they hated, followed the Athenians with an ar-
dour inferior to none. The Messenians also, now styled
Messenians of Naupactus, and those from Pylus, which was
still held by the Athenians, were brought along to the war ;
to whom must be added a small party ef Megarean exiles,
who by a sad rererse of fortune now took part acainst the
Selinuntians, who were also Megarean. The residue of the
confederates were engaged rather upon free and spontaneous
choice. The Argires, lor instance, not more from obligations
of subsisting treaties than the rancour they bore the Lace-
dsmonians, and the gratification of private spleen, thoodi
Doric, yet ifollowed the Ionic Athenians against their Done
kindred. But the Mantineans and the rest of the Arcadians,
who were mercenaries, and eternally habituated to act against
any foe pointed out to them, ware now so far influenced by
gain as to regard those Arcadians as their enemies who
came over on this occasion in company with the CorinUiians.
The Cretans also and .^tolians were there, allured by an ad-
rantageous pay ; and thus it happened that the Cretans, who, in
concert with the Rhodians, had founded Gela, readily took paii
for the sake of gain, not with, but against, a colony which
Uiemselves had planted. There was also a body of Acama-
nian auxiliaries, partly induced to join by the pay they receiy-
ed, but principally by their personal regard for Demosthenes
and their attachment to the Athenians. And thus have we
run them over to the utmost boundary of the Ionian Gulf.
Of the Italic nations, the Thurians, and those Metapontians
whom intestine feuds had reduced to the necessity of fighting
lor subsistence, joined their arms ; and^ of the Sicilian, ths

YBAR XIX J PELOPONNSSIAN WAR. • 261

Nazians and CaUneans ; of barbanan« the iOgesteana, who
weie the fint poven of this grand contention, and the major
part of the Sicoli ; and, out of Sicily, some of the Tyrrhenes,
fr<nn enmity to the Syracusans, and the mercenary Japygians.
So many nations were assembled together at present under
the command of the Athenians.

The aaxiliaries, on the side of the Syracasans, were the
Camarineans, who bordered close upon them, and the Gelo-
ans, who were situated ne^t the Camarineans. To proceed
regularly : as the Agrigentines were neutral, the Selinunti-
ans next occur, who are seated beyond the Agrigentines,
since they inhabit that tract of the island which faces Africa.
Then the Himereans, the only Grecian people who inhabit
that part of the island which Ues off the Tyrrhene Sea, and
were the only body which came from thence to the aid of Sy>
racuse. The several nations of Greek descent settled in Si-
cilyv being all Doric, and independent, acted together in con-
cert, or the barbarous people they had those Siculi alone
who did not openly revolt to the Athenians ; but, out of Sicily,
the LacedflBmonians sent them a citizen of Sparta to com-
mand, and a body of Neodamades and Helots. By a Neoda-
ma« is meant a citizen newly enfranchised. The Corinthians
alone aided them both with shipping and a land-force, in con-
junction with the Leucadians and Ambraciots, by blood alli-
ed to Syracuse. From Arcadia also came a body of merce-
naries, sent by the Corinthians; and the Sicvonians, who
acted on compulsion ; and of those who dwell without the
Peloponnesus were the Boeotians. But, besides these foreign
aids, the Sicilians, as possessed of great and powerful cities,
furnished out in all respects a much greater and well-appoint-
ed foice ; for by them a numerous lx>dy of heavy-armed, of
ships, and horses, and other kinds of military force, in an
amasing abundance, were raised and brought to Syracuse.
And yet it most be said, that the domestic force of the Syra-
cusans was nM»e to be considered than all the rest, from the
greatness of their state and the immediate urgency of those
perils with which they were environed.

These were the aids, the numerous aids, assembled together
by the contending parties ; and at this juncture all these were
present on each side of the contest; and from this crisis
neither party received any accession.

The Syracusans therefore and their confederates thought.

262 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK VII.

since the signal victory they had gained upon the water, it
would be a brave exploit, and highly for their glory, to make
the whole extensive camp of the Athenians their prize, and
cut off their retreat on both elements, both by land and sea.
With this project they immediately barred up the great har-
bour, the mouth of which is about eight stadia* over, with a
line of triremes placed side by side, and other vessels and
boats moored fast together by anchors ; and got every thing
besides in readiness, in case the Athenians should venture on
another engagement. Their every view was now become
large and aspiring.

When the Athenians saw the harbour thus barred up, and
perceived, farther, the whole of the enemy's designs, it was
judged high time to go to consultation. The commanders
of the different bodies were called to council,' with the gener-
als ; in which, upon representations made " of the great dis-
tress to which they were reduced, and that they had not a
stock of provisions ample enough for their immediate subsist-
ence (for, bent on sailing away, they had sent already to
Catana to countermand any fresh convoys), and, unless they
could recover their mastery at^ea, it would be impracticable
for the future to obtsun a supply,'* they came to a final reso-
lution ** to quit their intrenchments on the higher ground,
and before the station of their shipping to raise a circular
work, of as little compass as possible, but sufficient to serve
for a magazine suid hospital, and to this only to assign a
guard ; as for the rest of the land-army, they were to oblige
every soldier to go on board, that all the ships which were
yet undamaged, or had been laid up for want of hands, might
be completely manned ; and thus they must 6ght their pas-
sage out of the harbour ; and, if it succeeded, make directly
for Catana ; but, if repulsed, they would bum their shipping,
and, moving off in one body by land, would endeavour, by the
most expeditious marches, to reach the nearest place that
would receive them, whether Barbarian or GrSbian.*'

Such was the plan resolved on, and which they began im-
mediately to execute ; for now, abandoning their upper in-
trenchments, they drew down to the beach, and manned the
whole of their shipping, on board of which they forced, with
out exception, all such as had youth and vigour enouf^h to

* Near a mile.

7EAR XIX.] PBLOPONNESIAN WAR. 263

be of aerYice there. The whole namber of ships they were
by this means enabled to man amounted to a hundred and ten.
They also placed on board the fleet a large nmnber of arch-
ers, the darters of the Acamaniaos, and other foreign aaxil-
iaries ; and provided in all other respects for action, as well
as their condition would permit, or the nature of the project
required.

When things were thus in great forwardness, Nicias, taking
notice that the soldiery were much detected by the great de-
feats which, contrary to their wonted custom, they had re-
ceived by sea, and yet desirous to hazard another engagement
as soon as possible, because pinched for want of necessary
subsistence, he gathered them all round about himself, and
endeavoured to raise their drooping spirits by the following
exhortation, the first of the kind he had ever made : —

** My fellow-soldiers, whether of the Athenian or the con-
federate troops ! the bold attempt we are now going to make
is of equal concern to each individual among us ; since, not
more for victory over our foes than for the preservation of
ourselves and our country, we are now to fight ; and, if our
naval efforts be crowned with victory, each of us may again
be blessed with the sight of his own native city. Away,
therefore, with these faces of despair, this painful dejection,
fit only for a raw unexperienced multitude, who, unsuccess-
ful in their first attempts, for ever afterward bid adieu to
hope, and by unmanly fear anticipate misfortunes !

" As for you, Athenians, who form so considerable a pari
of this assembly, experienced as you are in such variety of
warfare ! and you also, our allies, who have ever fought un-
der our banners ! recall to your reflections the unexpected
turns of war ; encourage the hope that fortune may at length
declare for us, and determine once more to engage the foe
with a spirit worthy of that numerous strength of which, by
ocular demonstration, you see yourselves this moment pos-
sessed. Those points, of which we perceive we may avail
ourselves against the narrowness of the harbour's mouth,
against such a multitude of vessels as will be crowded to-
gether, and against that particular disposition of soldiers on
their decks, from which, on the former occasion, we suffered
so much ; all these, I must tell you, are as well adjusted
a^ our present condition will permit, by the united care of us
your generals and your own masters : for many archers and

864 PELOPONNESIA^ WAR. [bOOK VII.

darters shall now line yom decks, and that crowd of soldiers,
which, when we engage in the open sea, we never can use, be
cause the vessels woukl be too heavily laden to allow the prop-
er exertion of our skill ; that crowd, I say, in this pent-up con-
tracted space, shall give to our naval battle the strength and
stability of a land-engagement. We have also devised the
proper means to compensate the inferior structure of our
ships ; and, in return for the consolidated beaks of our enemy,
have provided the ships with grapplipg-irons, which will hold
fast a vessel that. has run against you from getting clear, provi-
ded those on board will perform their duty ; because, as neces-
sity enforces us now to fight ajaere land-batUe from our decks,
it highly concerns us neither to be beaten off ourselves, nor to
suffer them to get clear from our grapple ; especially when
all the ambient shore, .excepting the small tract now occupied
by our own army, is hostile in regard to us. Mindful of these
things, it behooves you to fight it out so long as strength and
vigour shall enable you, and never yourselves to be dnven on
such a shore ; but, when once your ship has erappled wiih a
foe, never once to think of loemg your hold tiU you have
cleared the enemy's decks of all the defendants. But these
pohits I give in chaige to the heavy-aimed, not less than to
the seamen ; since tms method of engagement is more partic-
ularly your province, and since it ^1. remains within your
power to earn a glorious victory, by putting your land method
into practice. But the seamen I exhort, and with my exhor-
tations minjgle my entreaties, not to shrink too much under
the sensibility of past defeats, m your decks are now better
armed in all respects than they were before, and as the num-
ber of the shipping is enlarged. Recall the idea of thai heart-
delighting privilege, of which you are now to secure the con-
tinuance : — ^to you I speak, who, though not of Athenian ex-
tnction, have hitherto been regarded and honoured as Athe-
nians ; and, for speaking well our language, and appropriating
our manner, have been admired through the whole extent of
Greece, have participated the benefits of our largely-extended
empire, not less than .ourselves in point of profit, and much
more than ourselves in striking awe into your vassals^ and be-
ing exempted from the attacks of injustice. Since, therefore,
you alone have freely shared our empire with us, you are
bound by all the ties of honour by no means to desert its
piesent vindication. Then, in open despite of those Oorin-

TEAK XIX.] PELOPONNBSIAN WAR. 265

thians whom jon have so often conquered, mod of those Si-
cilians not one of whom durst look us in the face so long as
the rigour of our fleet was unimpaired, drive your foes befora
you, and strike into them the plain conviction, that your
military skill, though struggling with weakness and misfor-
tunes, is yet &r superior to all their strength and luck uni-
ted.

**Bat, to the native citizens of Athens among you, I must
once more suggest, that you have now no longer in your
docks such another fleet as this, nor have left behind you
such another body of heavy-armed. If, therefore, your 'im-
mediate fate be any thing less than victory, your enemies
will sail and be directly at Athens ; and the remainder of our
forces there will no longer be able to repulse the united as-
saults of their domestic foes and such foreign invaders. Nay,
the infallible result must be, that you at once put on the
chains of Syracusans, against whom you are conscious with
what intentions you at first came here, while your country
must be forced to submit to a Lacediemonian bondage
Now, therefore, summon all your courage, to earn the da)
in which your own liberty and that of Athens is to be the
victor's prize : and let each individual amon^ you invisorate
himself with the thought, nay, let it throw spirit and lite into
whe whole army,^-that those who are now to engage on board
this present fleet are the whole of the land and naval force of
your country ; are the surviving support of the state and the
great name of Athens. In so momentous a conflict, whoever
among you excels in military skill or inward bravery, that
person had never so fine an opportunity to give demonstra-
tion of his superior worth, or to perform a great service for
himself, or for the welfare of his country."

Nicias, after he had finished this earnest exhortation, order-
'^ them to repair directly to their posts .on board the fleet.

As all this hurry of preparation lay within their view, Gylip-
9ua and the Syracusans could not escape the conviction that
the Athenians were bent on another engagement. They had,
moreover, received intelligence of the new project of the grap-
(ing-irons. As, therefore, they had provided against every
thing besides, they also made provision ^o counterwork thac
project. For this purpose they had covered the prows, and al-
most the whole gunwale of their ships, with hides ; that, when
the grappling-iron was thrown, it might slip off and catch no
II.— X

266 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. - [bOOK Vih

hold. And no sooner were all their preparations completed^
than the Syracasan generals, in concert with Gylippus, anima-
ted their men to engage with resolution, by the following ha-
rangue : —

** That yoor past achievements have been glorious indeed,
and for the acquisition of greater honour and glory that you
are now on the brink of engaging, the generality of you, ye
Syracusans and confederates, are well convinc^, and need
not at present to be informed ; for otherwise you could nevei
have persisted so far in this warm career of bravery and suc-
cess ; but, if there be a man among you whose sense ol
things drops short of their real position, we shall now throw
upon it the needful illustration.

*' This land, our property, the Athenians have invaded :
aiming, in the first place, at enslaving Sicily ; and, had this
design succeeded, at inflicting an equal fate on Peloponnesus
and the rest of Greece. And yet these very Athenians, who
enjoy already the largest tract of empire that any ancient or
modem state of Greece has at any time enjoyed, you are the
first who have bravely resisted ; and of that navy, on which
they erected their encroaching pile of power, are plainly the
victors in several engagements ; as again, in that which' now
approaches, you will assuredly beat them. For men who
have received such severe checks in a point for which they
so highly plumed themselves, will for the future have a much
worse opinion of their own merit than if they had never con-
ceived so high a value of it ; and, when all their towering pre-
tensions are so unexpectedly blasted, their subsequent efiTorts
must of course drop short of their real strength : and this,
you may rest assured, is the present state of yonder Athenians.
And by parity, in regard to ourselves, that proportion of
strong we enjoyed at first, with which, though far inferior
in skdl, we boldly and successfully presumed to withstand
them, must now be suitably enlarged ; and, with the farther
accession of this inward assurance, that we are really the
best, since we have beaten the best seamen in the world, oux
hopes of success are in every light redoubled ; and then hu-
man experience teaches us that, in every competition, the
warmest hope is ever accompanied with the greatest resolution.

" But farther, thAe late alterations which they have intro-
duced among their shipping, in order to equalise and balance
ours, have been a long time familiar to our own jH^ctice ;

fBAR XIX.J PBLOPONNBSIAN WAS. 267

and each of their new pirepantionfl we shall deztenrasly im-
prove to our own advantage : for when, contrary to the long
and inveterate discipline of their fleet, there are crowded to-
gether upon their decks a numerous body of heavy-armed, at
well as another numerous body of mere terra firma darters,
as they may properly be styled ; when thus Acamanians and
other landmen are forced on board, who even sitting would
be unable to poise and direct their weapons, how can they
avoid endangering their vessels 1 or, jumbled confusedly to-
gether, and tottering under motions to which they are not
inured, how can 4hey escape a total disorder 1

" What still makes more against them, the multitude of
their shipping will only serve the more to embarrass them ;
and4et this dispel the fears of those who may be afraid of en-
gaging against their superior numbers ; for a multitude of
ships in a contracted space will be more slow in executing
orders, and are at the same time most easily exposed to the
annoyance which our preparations are contrived to give them.
And now attend to the true and real situation of me foe, as
from good intelligence we are enabled clearly to declare it to
you.

" Environed on all sides with misfortunes, and distressed
in a present want of the necessaries of life, they are become
quite desperate : and hence, though they have resigned all
con6dence in their real strength, yet in the fury of despair
they ar^hrowing themselves upon the decision of fortune ;
that either, if the passage can be forced, they may launch out
to sea ; or, that project failing, may attempt a retreat by
land ; as if to a worse condition than their present it were
not inf the power of fortune to reduce them. Warmed,
therefore, with brave resentments, let us also try the encoun-
ter against such wild confusion, and against the fortune of
our inveterate foes, now treacherously bent to finish their de-
struction. . Let us charge with the full conviction, that on an
enemy who would justify their invasion on the principle of
redressing wrongs, it is most fair and equitable to satiate all
the fury of revenge ; nay, more, that vengeance on a foe is an
appetite of nature, and commonly said to be the sweetest of
all human enjoyments. But that those men yonder are our foes,
our most bitter, unrelenting foes, you need no farther proofs ;
since, bent on enslaving this our country, they first made the
voyage ; and, had this their odious pr^ect been successful,

268 PBItOPOMNSSlAN WAR. [boOK VII.

on oui citizens they had inflicted the most cruel torments, on
our wives and children the most indecent enormities, and on
Syracuse the most ignominioos appellation. In a woHl of so
iast retaliation, to indulge a tenderness of mind, or to think
It gain to let them depart without additional revenge, will be
a matter of just reproach ; for the latter is all they will be
able to effect, even though at len^h they may be Tietors.
But to us, could we execute the fair and equitable wishes of
our hearts, by inflicting upon them the ponishnkent they well
deserve, aiid in setting' the liberty of all Sicily, as it has been
ever enjoyed by us, beyonil the reach of uiy future insults,
how glorious must such achievements be \ for such critical
moments of adventure are most rarely to be met with ; which,
if unsuccessful, can do the least disservice ; but, if success-
ful, draw after Xhem the most valoaUe acquisitions."

When the Syracusan generals, seconded by Gylippus, had
finished this their exhortation to their own soldiers, they also,
in their turn, repaired inuned lately on board their fleet, as
th^ found was alreadjr done by the Athenians.

But Nicias, whose mind was surcharged with present cares,
sensible how extreme the danger, and how nearly approach*
ing, since this very moment they were only not in motion ;
and once more reflecting, that, as generally happens in affairs
of such prodigious moment, some points might yet be left
imperfect, something of energy, and weight, and influence
be yet left unsaid ; he called out again upon every siflgle cap
tain of the fleet, addressing himself separately to them, with
the honourable mention of their fathers, themselves, and their
tribe ; and conjuring each, by his own distinguishiiig 6ple]^
dour, whatever it was, ** not now to betray it, nor tarnm those
hereditary virtues on which their ancestors had founded their
glory ;" reminding them earnestly of the uninterrupted free-
dom of their country, and the privilege they had ever enjoyed
of living in it quite free and uncontrolled; asserting other
arguments, such as, with men who had their all so much at
stake, might have influence and weight ; no matter now how
trite or hackneyed by frequent repetitions, or how equaUy ap-
plicable to every case, as fetched from the endearments of
their wives, and their ofispring, and their paternal gods ; such
as from every topic, in a plunge of horror and Aatrsss, are
rung in the ears of men, as likely to animate and persuade.
And thus at last, though fearful that not evoa yethe had said

7BAR XIX.] PBLOP019NESIAN WAR. S69

enoogh, but sR thst the time would permit, he parted from
tbem ; end plaeinff himself at the head of the land-army,
maiehed down to ue beach ; where he drew them up in as
krg& a tine as ^ley cooML possibly fbrm, diat their appearance
might haTe the greater effect in imboldening those on board
the fleet.

And now Demosthenes, and Menander, and Enthydemns
(for these went on boeard to command the fleet), setting clear
from their moorings, stood away directly towards the barri-
cade of the harbour, and that interral of its mouth not yet
completely barred, in order to clear the passage. The Syra-
coeans also and their allies had now launch^ forth against
them with their usual number of ships. A detachment of
these were so stationed as to guard the passage ; the rest
were spread circularly quite round the harbour, that on all
sides at once they mi^t attack the Athenians, and their land-
army <m like beach might second them on approaches to the
shore. The Syracusan fleet was commanded by Sicanus and
Aeathaichus, who were respectively stationed in each of the
wings, while Pyihen and the Corinthians composed the centre.

When the Atheniaus were come up to the barricade, they
tan boldly at it ; and, by the violence of the first shock, they
beat off the vessels ranged about h, and were intent on clear-
ing away the whole barricade. But here, the Syracusans and al-
lies falling in among them from every quarter, a general en*
gagement ensued, not only at the banicade, but in every part
of the harbour. Obstinate it really proved, and such a battle as
they had never fought before. Great, in truth, was the ardour of
the seamen on boUi sides, in running upon the enemy when-
ever the word was given ; and great was the art exerted by
the officers, in attack, and defence, and reciprocal contention.
The soldiers on board exerted aU their efibrts, that, when
ship came close with ship, no stretch of military skill
should be omitted on the hatches. Every individual, abiding
ftrmly in his post, strained all his dili^nce to signalize bis
own befaavionr. But, as numerous ships were fafiing in to-
gether among one another in little sea-room, and so large a
nuBtber never fought before in so small a space (since the
amount of both fleets fell little short of two hundred), the di-
rect ineursions with the bedc were few, because room was
wanting for tacks and passages ; but boardings were frequent,
•• the Tosaels were continually running foul of one another,

270 PfiLOPONNESlAN WAR. [bO'>K Y

or, Id sheering off, met others which were coming ta ; aijj,
so long as a vessel was in her approach, those on tbid hatch-
es poured plentifully against her whole showers of jaTeUns,
and arrows, and stones ; but, when they were once come to
grappling, the soldiers, closing in firm battalion, e&deaToored
by force to board one another. Nay, it most frequently hap-
pened, through the straitness of sea-room, that the very
moment one party boarded the en^ny, the very same mo-
ment they were also boarded themselves, as two vessels lay
often alongside of an enemy : nay^ sometimes more, by ne
cessity mingled and squeezed fast together. In the meantime,
the care of the officers was not confined to one single point,
but distracted on all sides by a whole round of perils : they
were here intent on their own defence, and there on the annoy-
ance of the enemy. And, farther, the prodigious crash that
was made by such a number of ships, running at the same in-
stant upon one another, struck such dismay and loss of hear-
ing, that the voices of those who issued out orders could no
longer be distinguished. Xioud, besides, were the exhorta-
tions and shouts of the officers on both sides, partly in con-
formity to rule, though swelled at present by the ardour of con-
tention. Among the Athenians it was shouted amain — ** To
force the passage, and now of never to exert their utmost
stretch of bravery to earn a safe return to their native
country :" among the Syracusans and their allies — " How
glorious it would be to hinder their escape, and by present
victory for every one among them to increase the growing
honours of his country !" The conmianders also, on both
sides, if they saw a vessel dropping off before it was over-
powered by the enemy, called out aloud by name on the cap-
tain, demanding, on the Athenian side, ** Did they retire on
the wild presumption that yonder most hostile shore would
prove more friendly to them than the open sea, which by long
prescription they had claimed as their own province V But,
on the Syracusan — " Would they, who were perfectly assured
that the Athenians wanted nothing so much as to escape,
would they fly first from those who were flying 1" The land-
army, farther, of each party upon the beach, while yet the
battle was alternately fluctuating on the water, felt the utmost
anxiety and the most painful conflict of mind ; earnestly bent,
as the one domestic party was, "on gaining accumulated
honours ;" but fearful, as the other invading party was be*

fBAR XIX.] PEL0P0NNE8IAN WAR. 271

ome, th«t " their condition might aoon become worse than
t was ftlready :" for, the whole hope of the Athenians cen-
«iiDg at present in that fleet, their anguish for the event was
more aente than ever they had felt, and was sggravated by
tkeir own position on the beach, which ^ve them a clear, nn-
interrapted prospect of all that passed m the battle upon the
water. The scene waai)ut a trifling distance from their eyes ;
and, as the looks of all of them were not at the same instant
fastened upon the same spectacle, if any saw their own party
preTailing, they grew at once i exalted, and immediately began
an invocation to the gods, that the eflforts of their friends
might be crowned with success ; while another party, behold-
ing those who were vanquished, uttered a loud shriek which
ended in a gioan ; and, by the sight of such affecting turns,
were more subdued in> spirit than those who were actually
engaged in this medley of honor. Others, farther, who were
intent upon a quarter of the engagement where the event was
yet in suspense, and no judgment amid such confusion could
be formed, adjusted the contortions of their bodies to theii
inward fears, and passed that interval in extremity of aa-
guish ; for each single moment they were within a little of
escaping or being sunk. And thus, in one and the same
anny of Athenians, so long as the event was under decision,
a whole medley of noises was heard together; — shrieking
— efaouting — victory I — undone! — undone! — and all other
sounds of various import, which, in such extremity of dan-
ger, a numerous body of men may be forced to utter.

Those, farther. On board, were equally sensible of all the
quick alternatives of passion ; till at last, after the battle had
for a long time been obstinately maintained, the Syracusans
and allies put the Athenians to open flight ; and, plying brisk-
ly in the chase, with obstreperous clamour and loud exultar
tiona drove them upon the beach. And here, the land-sol-
diers who had served on board, excepting such as had been .
taken in the deeper water, leaping in all parts, as they sever-
ally could^ on the shore, ran in great confusion for shelter to
the camp. The army on the beach, with passions no longer
diversilied, but with one and the same uniform vehemence,
having expressed their resentment of the horrible conclusion
by a loud shriek and a hearty groan, some hurried along the
beach to succour the shipping ; others to defend what yet
remained of their intrenchments ; while a third party, and the

272 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK Til

bulk of the army, confined their vdiole care to themsehre^
and were solely intent on their own personal preservation.
The horrid consternation in which this moment they were
nniyersally plunged, was greater than Athenians had ever- fell
before. They suffered now what on a former oceasion they
had made others suffer at Pyfais. There the Lacedasmonians,
having first lost their fleet, had the fsrther noortification to
see all their gallant Spartans in the island' undone. And
now Che desperate condition of the Athenians offered no glim-
mering of safety on the land, unless some miraculous contin^
gency should take place in their favour.

After an engagement so hardy and well disputed, after the
sinking of a large number of ships and the death of numbers
3n both sides, the Syracusans and their allies, who were
masters of the day, took op the shatters and the dead. This
being done, they sailed in triumph to the city, and erected a
trophy.

But the Athenians, quite sunk with the weight of their
present misfortunes, never so much as once entertained the
ihought of recovering their shattered vessels or their dead,
but were contriving lu>w to decamp by favour of the iqpproach-
ing night Demosthenes, upon this, repairing to Nicias, de-
clared it as his own opinion, that, *^ manning at once the whole
number of their vessels, they should exert their utmost efibrts
to fotce their passage out of the harbour early the neatt
dawn ;*' affirming, that " they had still a larger number of
shipping fit for service than the enemy :" for the Athenians
haa yet about sixty left, whereas those of the enemy were
under fifty. Nicias came into the proposal ; but, when both
joined in issuing proper orders for the execution, the seamen
flatly refused to go on board. Dispirited aa they were by
the last great blow, they had resigned all hope of ever beat-
ing these enemies again. No measure now remained but a
retreat by land, on which the universal attention was henc^
forth employed.

Hermocrates, the Syracusan, had conceived a suspieion
that such a step would be taken by them ; and, foreseeiiw
what difficulties might arise if so large an army should march
across the country, and, posting tbenMelves afresh on Sicilian
ground, should again resume Uieir spirits and renew the war
against Syracuse, he waited upon those in authority, ana
suggested to then*, that " they ought not» by any ralea of

rSARXIX.] P^OPONNCSlAlf WAR. 273

pdicj, to let the eatmf steid off hj oigiit (iiMerting here ham
own sentiments of the affair) ; but that all the Syracusans and
thttr allies, sallying out ia ar body, sfaonld preoccopy and se-
e«re the reads, and in good time beset and pat strong gnaids
in all the passes.'' The magiatrates were sensible, as much
as he who ga^e this advice, hew reasonable it was, and de-
clared theoMelTes for its execntion : bat then, '* the men who
now, indulging their joy §ar the late victory, wei» inteitt on
recreatioDs, and as, besides, it waa a festival time (for this veiy
day they were perfonning the a&nivenary sHerifice to Her-
cules), in all probability woaU refose to march ; because,
transported as they, were with soocess, the generality no
doobt wore celebrating the festival with good cheer and wine ;
and any thing might sooner be hoped from them than obedi*
ence to an mer for taking up their arms and sallying forth
at a minute's notice." As the magistrates were convinced
thai things would so torn ont, the scheme was judged im-
practicable, and Hermocrates could in nowise prevail : bnt
he thought of an artifice to play off against the foe ; afraid
lest the Athenians, dislodging quietly by night, might possess
themselves of the most difficult passes before any opposition
cottljd reach them, he despatched some of his most trusty
friends, under an esecHrt of horse, to the Athenian camp so
aoon as it was dark ; who, riding up so near to the intrench-
ments that their words might he distinctly heard, and calling
out aloud on seme persons to come forth, since they were a
party sent from his friends in Syracuse to bring Nicias some
in^Uigence, charged them to carry word immmiiately to Ni-
ciasy " I7 no means to draw off the amiy by night, because
the Syracusans had beast the roads ; bnt to dewier his march
till daylight, when be had leisure to make the pn^er disposi-
tions:'* and aftor delivering this massage they rode off,
while those who received it went and reported it faithfully to
the Athenian generafa.

Wrought upon by this piece of intelligence, in which they
were far from suspecting any fraud, they continued all night
in their posts ; and then, as they had not dislodged at once
in a hurry, they thov^ht it advisable to stoy there but one day
longer, that the soldiers might pack up and carry away with
them as large a part as was possible of their necessary stores.
The rest of the baggage it Was agreed should be abandon^
sd to the C0Mmy : they wore only to cany €&, each peoon

274 PBLOPONNfiSIAN W^R. [bOOK YII.

for himself, what was absolutely necessaiy for food and rai-
ment.

But, in this inter^, the Syracasans and Grylippns, by sal-
lying out with the land-forces, had gained a march before
them, had blocked up the roads along the country by which
it was judged the Athenians would march, and had posted
strong guards upon all the fords of brooks and rivers ; nay,
their detachments stood ready drawn up in battalia to beat
off the enemy from the most convenient passes. Standing
out farther intd the harbour with their fleet, they dragged
from the shore the Athenian shipping : some fibw of these
they burnt, as the Athenians had designed to do ; bat the
residue at their leisure, from the spot i^ere each lay strand-
ed, they took in tow and carried away to the city. And this
being done, when Nicias and Demosthenes judged that they
bad completed such preparations for their march «s were ab-
solutely needful, the dislodgment of the whole army was pot
in execution on the third day from the naval engagement.

Terrible indeed it was, not only when viewed in one par-
ticular light, as that they retreated because they had lost the
whole of their fleet, and all their mighty hopes had termina-
ted in such personal danger to themselves, and such as even
boded the ruin of Athens, but the very abandoning of the
camp presented to their sight the most cutting spectacles, and
struck each soul among them with heart^iercing anguish ;
for, as the dead lay uninterred upon the surface of the earth,
when the remains of an old acquaintance, thus miserably laid
out, arrested the eyes of a soldier, he was instantly seized
with regret and horror. But the living, who on account of
wounds and sickness were left behind, were causes of much
^ater affliction to the sound than Were even the dead ; and,
in truth, were much more to be deplored than those who had
no longer a being ; for, bursting out into prayers and lamen-
tations, they occasioned a wild irresolution of thought ; ear-
nestly entreating that they might not be left behind, snd
screaming out aJoud on each by name, as they saw a friend,
or an acquuntance, or an old comrade, moving off, throwing
their arms about their necks, and so dragged along while they
could keep their held ; but, when strength and bodily vigour
failed and left them destitute of resource, they pave them the
last adieu, not without a shower of curses and a hideous howl.
By such cutting incidenta the whole aimy was filled with

rSAR XIZ.] PlLOPOKnXSlAM WAR. S75

lean and a irild irreadatioii ; so that they could wnt depart
without the highest regret, though from a spot so hostile,
whrare they had sofiered more than tears coald atteyiate ; and
the dread of more, which yet might be impending, was ibex*
preasible. Dejection of the heiul and seif-accnsation m-ere
eeneral through all the troops ; and they resembled nothing
less than a large subjugated ci^, whose numerous inhabitants
were escaping from the fiiry of a sack ; for the amount of
those who were now marching off together was not less than
forty thousand men. ««

Of these, the generality carried off merely what necessary
subsistence fhey nad scraped together ; but the hearf-armed
and horsemen, contrary to custom, were now obliged to carry
their own sustenance themselves beneath their armour ; some,
because they had none ; others, because they durst not trust
their servants. The desertions had for a long time been
large, but of late in greater numbers than ever. Neither
were they thus provided with sufficient stores ; for there was
no longer any com to be found in the camp. Na^, truly, the
general calamity and equability of misfortunes, which in many
cases alleviate the pain, as numbers are involved, were unable
to render the present evils in any degree supportable ; espe-
cially when the thought occurred, &om wnat-a height of
splendour and preceding glory, to what a plunge and misera-
ble state they were now reduced ! for a most cruel turn of
fortiine this really proved to a Grecian army ; who, coming
hither to enslave others, were departing now with the sad
alternative of fearing to be made slaves themselves ; and, in-
stead of the prayers and p«eans with which they first began
the Toyage, were now dislodging with omens that portended
nothing but misery : those, farther, ^ho came hither as lords
of the ocean, were now stealing avray by land, from hence-
forth to be saved, not by naval skiU, bat the perseversnce of
a land-army. However, all these reflections put their patience
nothing on the stretch, in comparison of that weight of mis-
ery which this veiy instant was hovering over their heads.

Nicias, perceiving the whole army to be overwhelmed ii?
despair, and sunk in this plunge of distress, addressed him
self severally to the troops, exhorted, and comforted, by every
topic which occurred, each single party, whom he visited by
turns, elevating his voice far beyond the ordinary pitch, to
suit the eamestnesB of his heart, in hope that, the louder he

276 PBLOPONHXSIAII WAE. [XOOK TO.

spolM, Uie moM extenuYe afieet it aig^t have upon tb* hMr-
en.

" Eyen yet, and in the proaent low abb ef oar fortune^ nj
dear countiymeB and coafedMatoa, we oogbt to encoiBage
bepe. Inaunces may be given of anniea wbo have bean na-
cned from a deeper plimge of dangeia than that w^iich U now
oar portion. Nor oaght yoo to torture younelvee wiUi tea
painful regret at what you suffer, or at the uamarited miaer-
lat which thia moment envinm you about. £va& I nijwnl^
who have much less room to boast of a conatitution aiqienar
to hardshipa than the meanest soldier in ycMir lanka (lor youi
own eyea can witness to how low a state my bodily infinai-
ties have reduced me), who, howevar) in the contiiuied h^
piness of my former course of liie,.or in any ether rag^od,
«n inferior to none among you, yet am buffeted rKm, by ths
storms and outrages of fortvme, as cruelly as aver ware the
vilest and most abject of my feUovF-cieaturaa. It ia true, I
have aver habitually worshipped the goda, with a aonsciafc-
tious deference to established laws : and have made juatica
and beneficence to man the constant praotice of my hfe.
Upon the strength of this, when I look forward to the fu-
ture, my mind is enlivened with invigorating hope : thangh I
own these misfortunes, so far undeserved, strike no little ter-
ror on my thoagbta. But better timea, perhaps, may be ap-
proaching ; for sure our enemies have been bleased with an
ample measure of success ; and, though some deit^ may have
frowned at first on this our expedition, yet by thia time bia
wrath must be fully wreaked upon us. We are not the first
instance of a people wbo have wantonly invaded the poaaea-
sions €4 another ; many such ofi^ces have taken their rise
from the impulse of human passions, and have been poiuahed
with auch a measure of vengeance as human nature waa able
to endure. Good reason, therefore, have we now to hope far
a milder fite from the ofi^nded deity ; who, depreaaed aa we
are, seem objects of compassion more than of resentment.
Cast, therefore, your eyes on the fine bodies of heavy-armed,
and the ooodly numbers which even now compose your re-
treat, and let the si^t revive and cheer your droopin|^ spir-
its. Conclude that, wherever you choose to halt,.you are of
yourselves that instant a mighty community ; such aa bo
other Sicilian people can presume to stand beibre, should j^ea
attack i. Dor to dispossessi wherever you think proper to settle.

YJtkK XIX.] PBLOPONIflBSIAM WAR. 277

But, tiiat fOQT march be ordeiiy and sale, be that the care 9^
each individual among yeur ranks, made warm and earnest
bj the theof ht that, on whalerer spot yoa may be compel
led to fight, on that, if crowned with Tictorj, yoa regain a
country and a bdwark of your own. Bnt then, oar nuNrdi
most be continaed both day and ni^t, with anabating ipeed,
because oar stock of piOTision is bat scanty ; and, ean wo
but rejsch some iriendly territory belonging to the Sieoli,
who, hom their excessive dread of the Syraenssns, will ever
presMve their attachment to os, conclnde yonrselves that
moment to be beyond the reach of dan^r : send, therefore,
yoor messengers beforehand to them, with orders to meet oe
on OUT roate, and bring us the needful supplies of food. On
the whole, my fellow-soldiers, leai assored that the hist n^
cessity enjoins you to be resolutely brave ; since to coward-
ice BOW no place of shelter is any longer open ; and only if
yoa stem the efforts of your foes can you again be happy in
the Mijoyment of those scenes your eyes so fondly regret ;
end can Athenians re-erect the extensive power of the Athe*
oian state, how low soever it may be fallen at present : for
they are men who make a state, not walls nor snips by men
abandoned."

With these words of encouragement Nicias ran regularly
through all the ranks of the wnole arm>f ; careful, at the
same time, if he saw any parties stragglmg from the main
bo^/t and quitting the order of the march, to fetch them up
and replace them. Demosthenes ejCsrted himself as diligently
in his own department, encouragioghis troops with the same
energy and ardour of address. The body under Nicias,
drawn np in a square, led the van of the march ; that under
Demosthenes bioo|^t up the rear : while the baggage-men,
and the nnmeroos crowd that attended the caaqi, marched
withiii the centre of the heavy-aimed.

When ihey were advanced to the place of fording the
Anapiis, they found a body of Syracusans and allies drawn
op in battalia there to oppose the passage : but, putting
these to flight, they gained Uie pawage of that river, and ad
vanced into the country beyond ; though their march was ter-
ribly harassed by the incursions of the Syracusan horse, and
oy the missive weapons which the lighfr-armed of the enemy
lionred in from time to time among them : and yet, in this

278 PBLOBONNSSIAN WAR. [boOK TII.

day's march, the Athenians advanced abovt forty stadia,* and
nalted for the night upon an eminence.

C^ the ensuing day, by early dawm, they were again in
motion, and advanced about twenty stadia ;t when, descending
into a certain plain, they halted and formed an encampment.
Their design in this was to fetch in some provisions, for the
adjacent country was inhabited, and to get a proper supply
of water to carry along with them ; for in the country beyond,
through which their route was fixed, no springs were to be
met with for the length of several stadia. But, during this
halt, the Syracusans, advancing beypnd them, threw up a
work across their route to stop their farther progress. The
spot chosen for this was a strong emmence, flanked on both
sides by an inaccessible crag, and known by the name of
Acreura-Lepas.

On the day following Uie Athenians resumed their march ;
but the horse and numerous darters of the Syracusans and
allies stopped their advance, the latter pouring in their weap-
ons upon, and the former riding up and disordering their
ranks. For a long time, it is true, the Athenians maintained
the skirmishes against them; but at length they retreated
again to their last encampment. And now all farther sup-
plies of provisions were totally cut off; it being no longer
possible to fetch in any, for fear of the horse.

But, decampinff early in the morning, they continued their
march, and forced their progress to the eminence which was
fortified by the new work. Here they found the Syracusan
infantry drawn up before them in firm and deep battalia,
posted also on the strong eminence they had occupied on pur*
pose ; for the pass was irety narrow. The Athenians march-
ed up and assaulted the wcdc ; but, being pelted by shovrers
of darts from the eminence, which was very steep, and so
gave those upon it a great advantage in throwing their weap-
ons home, and finding themselves unable to force it, they
again drew off, and attempted it no farther. It happened, at
the same time, that some claps of thunder were heard, accom-
panied with rain, effects not unusual in this season, as the
year was now in autumn ; and yet these accidents contributed
stall more to dispirit the Athenians, who concluded that every
thing now acted in combination for their destruction. During

* About four miles. f Two miles.

TSAH XiX.J PBL0P0NNB8IAN WAR. S79

this interral of inaction Qjhppna and Uie SyracnsMis sent
off a detachment of their forces to throw up a work in their rear,
where the enemy had already passed : but the Athenians
sent also a detachment of their own body, which prevented
its execution ; and, after this, wfaeelinff off with their whole
body more into the plains, they halted were for the night.

The n6xt morning they, began to moYe forward again :
and now the Syracusans, besetting them quite round in a
circle, poured volleys of darts and arrows among them, and
wounded numbers. If, indeed, the Athenians sallied out
against them, they retreated ; but when the Athenians drew
back, they then pressed upon their retreat ; and, falling in
chiefly among their rear, if at any time they put small parties
to flight, they jitruck a consternation into the whole army.
But, Tot a long time, in such a train of skirmishings, the Athe-
nians made good their ground ; and advancing afterward the
length of five or six stadia,* they halted in a plain. Here
also the Syracusans no longer molested them, but withdrew
to their own camp.

This night it was determined by Nicias and Demosthenes,
that, since the army was reduced to so low a condition, and
began already to be pressed with a total failure of provisions ;
since, farther, large numbers had been wounded in the many
incidental assaults of the enemy, they should first kindle a
great number of fires, and then march the whole army off, no
longer by the route which they had first projected, but by an-
other towards the sea, quite contrary to that which the Syra-
cusans had already preoccupied and guarded. The residue
of the march was no longer pointed towards Catana, but to
the other coast of Sicily, towards Camarina, and Gela, and-
the cities in that quarter, both Grecian and Barbarian. In
pursuance of this, a large number of fires being kindled,
they dislodged in the dead of ni^ht. «

This part of their retreat (as is the general fate of armies,-
but especially of the greatest, ever subject to fears and pan-
ics, particularly when moving in the night and on hostiU
ground, and conscious, farther, that the enemy is close at
their heels) was made in a sad and disorderly manner. The
column, indeed, under Nicias, which composed the van, kep*
firm together in a body, and quite outmarched t^ rest of th<

* About half a mile.

280 PBL0P0NNB81AN WAR. [bOOK VII.

•nny : ^t that under Demosthenes, being one half at least,
if not the majof part, of the whole' force, was separated from
the van, and came on in great confusion and disorder. Hew-
•▼er, by the dawn of day, they reached the coast ; and, gain-
mg the great road which is. called the Helorine, took their
route along it, thai, after they had reached the river Cacypa-
ris, they might pierce upwards along the course of that riyer
into the heart of the country: for thus they hoped to meet
with the Siculi, whom they had summoned to be ready on
their route. Bot, when they had gained the sight of that
river, they found its hanks afready occupied 1^ a Syracusan
guard, busy in throwing up a rampart and palisade to defend
its passage. This party tney soon dispersed, and passed the
river, and from thence advanced towards another river, the
Erineus ; for thus their guides had planned their route.

In the meantime the Syracusans and allies, when the day
was clearly broke, and ^ey knew the Athenians had stolen
off, began in general to throw heavy imputations on Oylippus,
as if the Athenians had made their escape throug:h his conni-
vance. Tet, begmning the pursuit with all possible expedi-
tion (and it was easily discovered what route they had taken),
they came up with them about the hour of repast : and, as
they fell in first with the column under the orders of Demos-
thenes, which composed the rear, and had moved in a more
slow and disorderly manner than the van, because the dark-
ness of the night had so highly incommoded ai^d confounded
their march, they immediately chaiged them and fought.
The Syraeosan cavalry beset them quite round (the more
easily, indeed, as they were separated from the van), and
drove them into one crowded heap. But the column under
Nicias was now fifty stadia* before them ; for Nicias led
them forward with great celerity, concluding that their safety
consisted, not in lingering voluntarily at so critical a period,
or exposing themselves to an engagement, but in pushing for-
ward with their utmost speed, and fighting only when by abso-
hite necessity they were compelled to fight. But then De-
mosthenes was involved in a much more laborious and con-
tinued toil ; because, as he filed off last, the enemies were
left upon his roar ; and, soon convinced that they had begun
the pursuit,^* wia obliged, not so much to move forward, as

* About five miles.

YSAR 3LIX.] PfiLO|>ONM£&iAN WAA. ^1

to draw up his troops in the order of battle, till by such neces-
sitated lingering he was environed by them, uid himkelf and
the body of Athenians under him were thrown into high tu-
snult and confusion : for now, hemmed in as they were on
a certain spot, quite surrounded by walls, and whence the
issues both on one side and the other were full of oUve-
trees, they were terribly galled on their flsnks by the darts of
the enemy. This kind of annoyance the Syracusans wisely
chose to ffive them, and to d^line all close engagement ; be-
cause, to nazard the latter against enemies now become quite
desperate, they judged would make more for the advantage
of the AUienians than of themselves : though, at the same
time, a kind of frugality, inspired by the great career of suc-
cess they had ah^y obtained, taught them not to exhaust
their strength on superfluous encounters, and persuaded them
that thus they might efifectually subdue and make this great
aimy their prisoners. When, therefore, for the whole remain-
der of the day, they had ^^alled them on all sides with missive
weapons, and now perceived that the Athenians and their al-
lies were reduced to a miserable plight, by the wounds which
they had received and the other calamities which lay hard
upon them, GyUppus, in concert with the Syracusans and al-
Ues, caused a herald to proclaim — first, that " such inbabi-
taots of the isles as would come over to them should rest in
the secure enjoyment of their libefty :" upon which some
cities, Jthough not many, went over to them : and, in the next
place, after some time, a surrender was agreed on of the whole
body of troops commanded by Demosthenes, on the terms
that " they should deliver up their arms, and no one should
suffer death, either by public execution, or the miseries of a
prison, or the want of necessary subsistence.'* Thus this
whole body, to the number of six thousand men, surrendered
themselves prisoners, and produced all the silver they had
about them, which they were commanded to throw into the
hollows of shields, four of which in this manner were filled full
with spoil ; and these prisoners the victors immediately led
away to Syracuse.

But Nicias and the column under his command arrived the
same day on the banks of the Erineus ; and, having passed
that river, halted on an emmence. The day following the
Syracusans, coming up to his post, notified to Nicias, that
*" those under Demosthenes had swrendered,'' and summoned
II.— Y

88S pfiLOPoiffnB«iAK WAR. [book^i

him to follow tiieir csampie. Ineredolom of the ftrt,^
begge d leave to send ont « honeman to diseover the tnitii ;
tHio upon his return affirming that **lhejbad aetualljeuneD-
dered,^' Nieias sent an intimation to Gylifipmand the Syxaeu-
tans ^t he was readj to stipulate, in tM name of tiie Athei>
nians, that " whatever sums the Sjraeusans had ox po ud ed in
tins war should be fairly reimbufved, on eondition the faraes
under his command might have free depirture ; bat, tiH the
money could be paid, he would leave with them a number of
Athenians as hostages for pefibrmance, a man for a talent."

Gylippus and the Syrscusans refused the ofier ; sad, resu-
ming oronsive measures, ranged thmr parties quite round the
eminence, and poured in their missive weapons iipon then
till the evenmg. This body of troops was also sadly dis-
tressed for want of bread and necessary subsistence. Watch-
ing, however, for the dead and silent hours of the night, they
were then determined to continue their march. They accord-
ingly took up their arms ; the Syracusahs perceived it, and sang
the ptean or alarm. The Athenians men thus convinced that
they could not dislodge without being discovered, and so
grounded their arms agam, all but one party of three hundred
men ; for these having forced themselves a passage through
the guards, made off in the night as fost as it was possible.

So soon as the day appeared, Nieias, at the head of his
troops, led them forwards. But the Syracusans and allies
pressed upon him on all sides in the usual manner, pouring in
volleys of darts and iavelhis. The Athenians made the beet
of their way to reach the river Asinarus ; not only because,
annoyed on all sides by the irruption of the numerous caval-
ry and skirmishing parties, they concluded they should be
eased of these couM they once pass that river, but also through
bodily fatigue and a vehement desire to eztmguish their thirst.
When, therefore, they were upon the bank, they rushed into
the river ; no longer observant of order, but each single siMier
intent on passing the first of the army. And the enemy, who
now pressed hard upon tiiem, had rendered the passage al-
ready a business of toil : for, obliged as they were to go down
in confused heaps, they Ml and trampled upon one another ;
some, embarrassed by their spears and luggage, uaet with in«
stent destruction ; ethers, entangled in the crowd, were cai-
ried away by the current. The hither bank of the river was
new Mled with iJ^iasMsaiis ; and, it beiBg nateraHy s l as p ,

r

XMAK XIX.] P£LOPOIiM««IAN WAA. 888

tfaflgr pound down their dwto npoa th» AdMiiii>M» nnmbin
of wnom were drinking greedily of the stream, conAisedly
hampered together in the hollow of the chanoeL The Pelo*
ponnestans, plunging in a£ter thera» made a great daajg^ter
of those who were in the river. The water was immediatelv
discoloured with blood ; but the stream, polluted with mud
and gore, deterred them not from drinking it greedily, nor
many of them from fighting desperately for a draught of it.
But, in short, when the carcasses of the dead began to lit
heaped one upon another in the river, and the whole army
was become a continued carnage,* of some in the rivw,
and those who were making off from the banks by the hoiaa-
men of the foe, Niciaa surrendered himself prisoner to Qy-
lippu8,.into whose power he chose to fall sooner than into
that of the Syracusans. He told him, that *' he himself and
the LacedflBmonians might decide his fate as best pleased
themselves : but entreated that a stop miffht be put to the
slaughter of his soldiers.'' Upon this, Gyl^pus issued out
orders to give quarter ; and ttius they earned off the rem*
nants of this body as prisoners of war, such excepted as were
secreted by their captors, the number of which was large.
Having, isither, detached a party in pursuit of the three hun-
dred, who in the night had broken through the guard, they
ajso made them prisoners. The whole number now collected
together as the public prize was not jarge ; but very numer-
ojis were they wno were clandestinely secreted. Not a town
in Sicily but was crowded with them, since these had not
surrendered upon terms Uke those under Demosthenes. A
considerable number had also perished ; for this was a terrir
hie slaughter ; nay, there was no one greater in the course
of the Sicilisn war ; and in the preceding skirmishes, which
.had b&PP^Q^ ▼^'7 frequently during the march,. not a few
had been slain. Yet, notwithstandmg all this, many madia
their escape ; some from the scenes of action, and others
from their prisons, from whence they afterward gained an

Xrtunity to run away. These repaired to Catana» as a
resort.
And now the Syracusans and aUies, in one grand colleotiva
body, having amassed together as large a number of prisoaera.

* According to Diodorus Siculus, the number of the
«mQimted to eighteen thousand men.

284 PELOPOtfNESlAN WAR. [boOK VII.

M they ]>omibIy could, and all the tpoils, retained m triampb
to Sjracase. The balk of prisoners, whether of die Athe-
nians or their confederates, whom they had taken, they thrust
down into the quarries, concluding that from such a confine-
ment they could not possibly make escape ; but Niciaa and
Demosthenes, in spite of all the remonstrances of 6yli|^ns,
they butchered : for Grylippus imagined that the fini«tiit>g of
this vFtr would invest himself wim pre-eminent deerees of
glory, if, besides the rest of his achieyements, he could cany
home to the Lacedemonians the generals of the enemy. It
had, farther, so happened, that, one of these, that is, I>emo9>
thenes, was regarded as their most inveterate enemy, because
of his exploits against them in the Island of Sphacteria and Py-
lus ; ana the other, Nicias, as their most sincere well-wisher,
from his behaviour on those very incidents : for Nicias had
strenuously exerted himself in beha|f of those Lacedemonians
who were made prisoners in the island. It was he who pre-
vailed with the Athenians to sign the treaty, in pursuance of
which they* were released. For such services done them,
the Lacedemonians had a kindness for him ; and it had been
chiefly owing to his assurance of this that he surrendered
himself prisoner to €^lippus. Bat a party of the Syracusans,
as was generally reported, fearful, because they had kept up
a correspondence with him, lest, if put to the torture, he might
now, amid the general prosperity, involve them in tioul^ ;
others also, and, not least of all^ the Corinthians, lest, as he
was rich, he might purchase the connivance of his keepers to
get his liberty, and then again might have influence enough
to foment fresh stirs to their prejudice, obtained the con-
currence of their allies, and put him to death. For these, or
reasons most nearly neighbouring to these, was Nicias doom-
ed to destruction ; though the man, of all the Grecians in the
present age, who least deserved so wretched a catastrophe,
since his whole life was one uniform series of piety towards
the Deity.*

As for those who were doomed to the quarries, the Syra-
cusans treated them at first with outrageous severity. As
great numbers were crowded together in this hollow dun-
geon, the beams of the sun, in the first place, and then the
suffocating air, annoyed them in a more terrible manner^ be-

* Mr. Hobbes, in his translation, has omitted this last oomat

YBAR XIX.] PBLOPONNCSIAH WAR. 285

came the apeitoie wee left nncoverad ; end eadi eoeeeeding
Dij^t, the rerene of the preceding day, aotamnal and nipping,
thioagh such Ticissitodee, threw them into stranse dieoiden.
Thns straitened as they were for room, they did whatevei
they had to do on one and the same spot ; and the caieaasee
of those who died lay heaped up promisciMmsl^ together, as
some expired of thew wounds, ana others penshed thioogh
the Ticissitndes of air they saffered, or some other sach dead-
ly cause. At length the stench became intolerably noiMme :
and they were farther oppressed with hunger and thirst : for,
daring the space of eight months, the allowance to each was
only a cotyl* of water and two cotylst of bread a day. Nay,
whatever species of misery numbers cooped up in so close a
confinement might be liable to suffer, not one of these but
pressed cruelly upon them. They were all thus thronged
and dieted together for seventy davs : but, after this term,
all but the Athenians, and such of the Sicilians and Italians
as had joined with them in the invasion, were sold out for
slaves.^
What the whole number of prisoners was, it is hard ex-

* Little more than half a pint, f About 32 solid inches.
t " The decent and engaging behaviour of the Athenians was
of great service to them; for by it they either soon obtained
their liberty, or were highly esteemed and caressed by their
masters. Some of them were indebted for their freeaom to
Euripides. The Sicilians, it seems, were fonder of the muse
of Euripides, than were even the people who lived in Greece it-
self. If tbe strangers, who were often resorting to Sicily,
brought them any specimens or morsels of his poetry, they
learned them by neart, and with high delight communicated
them to their friends. It is said that several, who by this
means earned their Uberty, went afterward to wait upon Eurip-
ides, in token of their gratitude ; assuring him, some of them,
that they had hem released from slavery for teaching their
masters what pieces of bis writings they were able to repeat ;
and others, that, when vagabonds after the defeat, they had been
supplied with meat and drink for singing some of his lines.
This is not to be wondered at : since even a Caunian vessel,
which, being hard chased by pirates, and endeavouring to get
for refuge into a Sicilian harbour, was however kept off by force ;
till at length, being asked whether they could repeat any of Eu-
ripides' verses, they aiiswered in the affirmative ; upon which
they obtained immediate reception and refuge."— Pfutorcft m tkt

386 PXUOPOMMSMMf WAR. [sOCtfC \U.

Mtly to rekte; b«kt how«w« thffjr ernd^ not be fewmr than
S0v«» IbooiMid. And this ppoY«d to be the greatest Gkecitn
exploit of all that bappensd u the oourae of this ww ; and, in
mj opiiiieD, of all thatoeonned in the whole histoijF oi Greece ;
since the eient to the 'vieURs was most gloiioas, and to the
vanqoiihed most calamitous ; for in every respect the; were
tolaUjr •verpowered, and their miseries w no respect Itad anr
mitigation ; in abort, root and branch, as is commonly sai^
their land-army Mid their shipping were now mined ; nay,
nothing belonging to them waa e3csnq>ted from deetmction ;
and few, out S[ ^ their nnmbera, had the good lodwie to re-
visit their native coontiy.
Such, were the transsctions in Sicily.*

* Some Iambic venes of an unknown author are fbimd at
the end of this book in the later Greek editions ; voA I beg the
reader to accq»t the following translation of them z^—
"The pride of Klory* the exalted height,
The freqnent trophies on the land and ssa.
The long career of well-deserved success,
On which their great forefithers towered aloft.
While Persia trembled at the Athenian name.
Now droopU at once !— A chaos soon sncc ee d s .
Of anarchy, destruction, and distress :
Lowebb'dthe state, as high it ^nt had ilow'Sd.'*

VAWi:nC.] nLOFOKHBSIAN WiR. MT

^%e news of tHe tff^ B i tl i iuw in Sicily cftmet a great coBatofiM-
tifm at Atbeiia.— AU Gveece is in combination agaiaat tlMa;
and thoir depandauUi tfe meibtatingi«Toka.— Yiak XX. Ba*
TOU of the Chiana.— An alliance betwaan Dariua Notlwa and
the Lacedamonians.— The war tranaCBrrad to Ionia. — Battla
of Miletus. — A second alliance between Darius and the Laca-
damonians.— Proceedings at Chios. — Revolt of Rhodes. —
The politic conduct of Alcibiadea : his intriffues.— A sedition
among the Atheniana at Samoa in &Toor of an oKiarchy. —
Phvynichus counterpleta Alcibiadea. — A third alliance be-
tween Darios and the Lacednmonian8.-*YBAS XXf. Pro-
ceedings at Chios. — The democracy overtamed in aewenl
placea of the Athenian jutisdictum : and at Athena, by the in-
fluence of Antipho, Phrynichus, ana Theramenea.— A council
of four hundred take upon them the government. — ^The army
at Samos declares for the democracy, recalls Alcibiadea, and
electa him geaeraL^Athens full of factions. — Phrynichus
atabbed.— A tumult; m the midst of which the fleet of the
enexBy appeara in sight.— Battle of Eretria, and revolt of fiu-
besa. — ^Tne four hundred are dmoaad, and a new form of gov-
ernment settled at Athena.— The banishmfant of Alcibiadea
repealed.— Battle of Cynos-Sema.

TBAB ZIX«

When the news was reported at Athens, no belief for a
long time waa given, even tnough the most creditable part of
the soldiery, who had made their escape from this disastrous
business, proved it by a circumstantial relation, that so total
a deatruction was become their lot.* But no sooner were
they convinced of its reality, than their resentments burst

* Plutarch, from report, tells an odd story on this occaaion.
•* A stranger, who (it seems) had come ashote at the Piraus,
and had set him down in a barber's shop, began to talk about
the overthrow in Sicily as a point well known at Athens. The
baii)er, hearing it before any other person had the news, ran
with all speed up into the city ; and, having first informed the
magiatrates of it, spread the report in an instant all over the fo-
rum. Conatemation and tumult at once ensued. The magte-
tratea convened an aaaembly of the .people, and produced the

288 P£LOPOMN£8iAN WAR. [bOOK VII;.

lorth agunst those of the orators who had advised and recom-
mended the expedition, as if their own sufirages had never
concurred to its execution. They farther Tented their gall
against those retailers of oracles and foretellers of futoie
events, against all in general, who, pretending privity to the
will of heayen, had elevated their hopes with the certain con-
quest of Sicily. On all sides now all manner of disasters
environed them about ; and never had Athens been thrown
into so great a consternation and dejection as at the present
juncture : for now, besides what each private family suff<»ed,
as the public at the same time had lost the bulk of its heavy-
armed and horsemen, and that flower of its youth which they
saw it impossible to replace, they were sorely dejected. Con-
scious, farther, that they had not shipping sufficient in their
docks for a fresh equipment, nor money in the public treasury,
nor even hands to man what vessels they had left, they gave
up all hope of deliverance in the present plunge. Their en-
emies from Sicily they imagined would soon enter the Pinras
with a powerful navy, especially as they were flushed with
such a career of success ; and their enemies nearer home
would now; for a certainty, redouble their preparations, and
with the utmost resolution fall upon them at once both by sea
and land, and be farther strengthened by the revolt of theii
own temporizing confederates. At last, however, they agreed
it was their duty to do what mi^t yet be done ; not basely
to abandon their own preservation, but to fit out a navy, bj
collecting from all possible resources both timber and money ;
and timely to secure their own dependant states, above all
Euboea ; and to reduce the expenses of the civU administrsp
tion with all possible economy ; and to lodge the sovereigntj
in the hands of a select body of old experienced statesmen,
whose maturer counsels might, if possible, yet extricate tht
state from its present misfortunes. $uch an effect had the
general consternation now upon them, an effect not unusual
with a people, that they became heartily disposed to ordei

barber before them. He was called upon to tell from whom hs
had the news ; and when he could not name the person, being
looked upon as an idle fellow and a disturber of the public peace,
he was unmediately tied upon the wheel, and a long tinM
whirled round upon it, till several persons arrived who gave s
minute and circumstantial account of the whole.**— Xi/e of

YEAR XIX.] PELOPONNESiAN WAR. 289

their goverament ariffht. And, as to such rcaohilioiis ih&y
came, thej proceeded, farther, to pot them in ezocatioo:
and the summer ended.

In the beginning of the ensuing winter, animated by the
terrible blow the Athenians had received in Sicily, the wh^^
body of Greece was alert against them. Even toch as had
hitherto observed a strict neutrality, without so much aii
waiting for a formal invitation to accede, thouffht it incum*
bent upon themselves no longer to bo absent from the war,
but Toluntarily to enter the lists against the Athemaas. Not
a state but reasoned thus: that *< themselves also, these
Athenians, had they succeeded in Sicily, vynild undoubtedly
have attacked ;*' and then concluded that, " as the war foi
certainty was very nearly finished, it would be glorious for
them to have a hand in its completion.*' But the old -con-
federates of the Lacediemoniaiis, as their desires were greater,
so they exerted themselves now with higher alacrity than ever
to procure a speedy relaxation of their heavy burdens. Yet,
in a most remarkable manner, such states as were dependant
upon Athens manifested their readiness to revolt, even be-
yond the bounds of caution ; since now they formed their
judgments in all the warmth of indignation, and could discern
no probable method by which the Athenians could retard their
ruin for another summer.

All these circumstances coinciding, the Lacedaemonian
state became prodigiously alert : and, above all, with the ej^-
pectation that their confederates of Sicily, with a powerful le-
enforcement, as their navies must now of necessity act in
concert, would be with them, in all probability, very early in
the spring. In every view their hopes were aailant and elate.
They determined to go on with the war wiQiout any delay ;
concluding that, if once brought well to a conclusioo, they
should ever for the futu]:e be released from suck daoffers as
had lately threatened from Athens, in case Sicily had been
reduced ; and, should they now demolieh their competitors,
must remain for the future supreme leaders of Greece, withr
out fear of a reverse.

Instantly, therefore, Agis their king, though in »«J»y»
of winter, sallying forth with a body of uoops from Decelee,
marched round &e confederacy, levying sums of money foi
the service of the marine. Turning his route to the MehaB
Gulf, he took a large booty iiom the (Etsans, against whom

n.— Z

290 PBLOPONNESIAK^ WAB. [boOK Yllh

(heir enmity had been of long dnration, ivhich he conTerted
into money. He also compelled those Achaeans who were
seated in the Phthiotis, and other states in this quarter depend-
ant on Thessaly, spite of all the complaints and murmurs of
the Thessalians, to give him some hostages for their good be-
• lutvionr, and to furnish him with money. He disposed of
these hostages into safe custody at Corinth, and spared no
pains to get them over into the alliance.

The I^cedsmonians, farther, circulated an order among
their states for the building of one hundred sail of ships.
They taxed themselves and the Boeotians to furnish respect-
ively twenty-five t the Phocians and Locrians fifteen ; the
Corinthians fifteen ; the Arcadians, and Pellenian's, and Si-
cyonians, ten ; the Megareans, and Troezenians, and Epidau-
rians, and Herciionians, ten. They went to work with all
other needful preparations, that they might prosecute the war
briskly upon the first approach of spring.

The Athenians, on the other hand, were not remiss in
preparing for their own defence ; since, in pursuance of the
plan they had formed, they were busy during all the winter
m building of ships, having collected proper quantities of tim-
ber ; and in fortifying Sunium^ that the navigation of their
victuallers round that cape might be preserved from molesta-
tion. They also evacuated tlTe fortress in Laconia which
they had raised in the voyage to Sicily ; and in all respects,
where thdy judged themselves involved in any less needful
expense, they contracted their disbursements with the utmost
frugality. But their principal care was keeping a close eyp
upon their dependants, that they might not revolt.

Amid these employments of both parties, which were noth-
ing less than most earnest preparations on all sides, as if war
was just in its commencement, the Euboeans took the lead,
and sent ambassadors this winter to treat with Agis about a
revolt from the Athenians. Agis accepted what terms they
proposed ; and sent for Alcamenes, the son of Sthenelaidas,
and Melanthus, from Lacedasmon, to pass over as command-
ers into Euboea. Accordmgly they arrived, with a body of
citizens newly enfranchised,* to the number of about three
hundred ; and Agis was preparing for their transportation ;
but in this interval the Lesbians arrived, with declarations
of their readiness to revolt ; and, as they were seconded by

» Neodamodetf.

7KAR XIX.] PBL0P0NNB8IAN WAR. 29J

the Tecommendations of the Boeotians, Agia was pemuded
to put off for a time the afiair of Eubcea, and began to ezpe*
dite the revolt of the Lesbians, having assigned them Alca-
menea for their govenKQ-, who was to have passed over to
EnbcBa. The Boeotians promised to send them ten ships,
and Agis-ten. These points were transacted without the
privity of the Lacedsmonian state ; for Agis, so long as he
continned at Decelea, having under his command the armv
of the atate, Was invested with a power of sending detect
ments whithersoever he thought proper, and to levy men and
money at his own discretion : and it may with truth be af-
firmed, that the confederates, during this period, paid a much
greater deference to him than t6 the state of Lacedsmon ;
for, having a powerful force under his own orders, he was
formidable in his every motion. And thus he arbitrarily set-
tled the negotiation of the Lesbians.

But then the Chians and the Erythneans, who were also
desirous to revolt, addressed themselves, not to Agis, but at
Lacedsmon. In their company also went thither, an ambas-
sador from Tissaphernes, who was lieutenant for Darius, the
son of Artaxerxes, in the maritime provinces of Asia. Even
Ti^aphemes concerned himself now to inflame the Pelopon-
nesian ardour, and promised them large supplies : for lately
he had been summoned by the king to make returns of the
revenue of his government ; which, not being able to exact
from the Grecian cities, because of the Athenians, he was
run into a large airear. He concluded, therefore, that, could
he demolish the Athenians, he then with great ease might
levy the tributes ; what is more, miffht make the Lacedemo-
nians confederates to the king ; and might at length convey
to him, either alive or dead, Amorges, the bastard son of Pis-
suthnes, who had revolted in Caria, as the king had expressly
commanded. The Ohians, therefore, and Tissaphernes, were'
now negotiating this pdmt in concert.

Oalligitus, the son of Laophon, a Megarean, and Timago-
ras, the son of Athenagoras, a Cyzicene, both exiles from
their native places and refuged with Phamabazus, the son
of Phamabacus, arrived at Lacedsmon about the same point
of time, conmussioned by Phamabazus to procure an aid of
ahipping for the HeUespont, by which he might be enabled
^the very same thing as Tissaphernes desired) to work the
*evolt of the cities within his dutrict fiom the Athenian obe

292 PSLOPOHNBSIAN WAJU [bOOK YUI.

diflDce, b«c«aM of the tnbutei, and exp«ditioatly to gain foi
hiBwelf the credit of havkig procured for his maeter the alti-
aace of the Lacedemonians. As the agents of Phamabazas
and those also of Tissaphemes were negotiating tbe aaoM
point, though apart from each other, a great debate aroae
among the statesmen at Lacedasmon; one party insisting,
with vehemence, that an aid of shipping and a land-foree
should be sent to Ionia and Chioe ; another party, that they
should be sent first to Hellespont. The Lacedaemonians,
however, comj^ed by far the soonest with the demands of
the CiuMis and Tissaphemea. Alcibiades, indeed, espoused
the cause of the latter, from an extraordinary zeal to mark he-
reditary friendship to Endius, who at this juncture presided in
the college of epheri. On this account it was that the family
of Alcibiades, m compliment to this friendship, had taken a
Lacedemonian name ; for this Endiul was the son of an Al-
cibiades. Yet, previously, the Lacedemonians despatched
Phryms, a person bom and educated in those parts, to Chios,
to inspect the state of affairs there, and report whather they
had so lar^e a number of shipping as they pretended, and
their situation in other respects equalised the fine account
they had given of it. Accordingly, when Phiynis had report-
ed ** that all the accounts they had heard were true," the
Chians and Erythreans were instantly admitted alliea. They
voted, farther, to send them forty sail of shipping, as there
were already assembled at Chios not fewer than sixty from
places which the Chians named. Ten of these they design-
ed to despatch, as soon as possible, under tb# command of
Melanchndas, who was q>pointed admiral But afterward, the
shock of an earthquake being felt, instead of Melanchi^as
they sent Chalcideas ; and, instead of tea, equipped ia Laco-
nia only five ahips for their service.

Here the winter ended ; and the niaeteenth year of thia
war came also to an end, of which l^bocydides has compiled
the history.

Summer now coming on, as the Chiana were moat ear-
nestly soliciting the drapatek of the sfaip% and abo afraid
lest the Athenians should get notice of their tnmsaetiiNiBi for

Qhriatr4ia

TBAR XX.] PSLOPONNK8IAN WAR. 899 '

the whole of the negotiatum had been carried en wilhoqt the
knowledge cf the latter, the LaeedemeBiaiie aent to Coiioth
tfasee citiaens of Sparta, to prevaii with that atate for the
tran^ortation of their shipa vnth all poiaihle expedition aeroaa
the iethaans, from the other aea into that which hea tewarda
Athene, that ail in a body night atand awaj for Chiea ; aa
well those which Affis had deatined for liie aenriee of Leaboa
aa ^e rest. The vAole nrnnber of shipping beknifliBg to the
aHianee, new aaaembied together there, aoioaBted to thirty-
nine.

But Oanigitos truly and Timagoma refuaed, in the name
of Phamabazns, to have any paiticipation in the ecpedition to
Cfaioa; nor woold part with the money they had brought
with them, which waa fire-and-twenty talenta,* to diaborae
this equipment. They^ mtended to get another fitted out,
which shoold sail away under their own orders.

As for Agis, when be now perceiyed that the Lacedemo-
nians were detennined to go first to Chios, he no lonsrer suf-
fered his own projects to ciasn wiui tnose ot tne state ; oat
the confederates now assembling at Corinth proceeded to
draw up a plan of operations. It was accordingly agreed
that they should go first to Chibs, under the coattnand of
Chalcideus, who fitted out the five ships in Laeonia ; from
thenee to Lesbos, under thTconsmand of Alcamenes, whom
Agis had destined for that scrrice: in the last place they
^ould proceed to Hellespont, and in thia aervice it was
agreed beforehand that Clearebits, the son of Ramphias,
should take upon him the command. But the first step
should be the transportatien of a moiety of their shipping
across the isthmus, which were immediately to stand out to
sea, that the attention of the Atheniana might be ieaa enga-
ged upon such as were already ki their course than on those
which were to follow : for now they detarmiaed to cross the
sea in an open insulting manner, aa ^ey contemned the pres-
ent impotence of the Athenians, because they had no consid-
erable force anywhere at sea.

When these resolutions were formally completed, they im-
mediately transported one-aiid-»twenty ahipa. Expeditioua
sailing was earnestly solicited ; but the Corinthians declared
a leluctanee to go the voyage till they had celebrated the

* 4843/. 15«. steriing.
bb2

' 294 PBLOPOMNBSIAN WAA. [bOOK VIII

Isthmian games, which were at hand. To remoye this obsta*
cle, Agis declared himself ready to have the wh<^e procedure
chargM to his own accomit, thai they might be cleared from
a breach of the Isthmian cessation. The Corinthians not
complyuiff with this proposal, and delay necessarfly resulting
iirom it, we Athenians gained by this an earlier discovery of
the negotiations of the Chians ; and, despatching Aristocn-
tes, one of their generals, charged them openly with the guilt
of such a procedure. The Chians as strenuously denying the
charge, they commanded them to send away their shipping
forthwith to Athens by way of pledge for their safety.

The Chians accord^gly sent seven. But the detachment
of these was entirel]^ owing to the popular party of that island,
who had been kept in otter ignorance of the late negotiation.
The few who were privy to it had no mind to incur the pop*
ular resentment before they were enabled to stem its fnty ;
especially as now they had resigned all hope of the arrival of
the Peloponnesians, whose motions were exceedingly dilatory.

In the meantime the Isthmian games were solemnized;
and at these the Athenians, who had the regular invitation
sent them, assisted in form. The practices of the Chians
became here more apparent to them than ever. No sooner,
therefore, were they returned to Athens, than they put all
the needful expedients in readineds, to prevent the squadron
which was to sail from Cenchrese from passing undiscovered.

When the festivad was over, the latter, with one-and-twen-
ty sail, under the command of Alcamenes, stood out to sea
in order for Chios. And the Athenians, advancing against
them, at first with an equal number of ships, stood off agam
into open sea; but, when the Peloponnesians would not fol*
low them far, but stood into the land, the Athenians disap-
peared ; for, having among tiieir number the seven ships of
the Chians, they thought it not safe to trust them : but, hav-
ing afterward manned out others, to the amount of thirty-sev-
en, they drove the enemy along the coast into Pirsus of the
Corinthians : this is a desert harbour, and the last upon the
confines of Epidauria. One ship, indeed, which the enemy
came up with at sea, the Peloponnesians lost ; but all the
rest they drew together to a station within the harbour. Hero
the Athenians attacked them, on the water with their ships,
and by land with a party sent purposely on shore. The at-
tack was attended with great confusion, and carried on in a

y£AR XX.] P£LOPONK£SIAN WAR. 295

diaorderiy manner. The perty of the Athenians which at-
tacked from the land disabled the bulk of the sqaadron, and
killed the conunan4er Alcamenes ; some also of their own
people perished in the action. But, when the dispute was
ended, they posted a sufficient number of their ships to lie
facing those of the enemy ; and, with the remainder, anchored
near a little island, on which, as it lay at a small distance, they
formed an encampment, and sent away to Athens for a re-en-
forcement.

In favour of the Peloponnesians came up, on the day fol-
lowing, not only the Corinthians, but soon after a number also
of others, from the adjacent country, in aid of the squadron ;
who, perceiving that the preservation of it would be a work
of laborious toU on so desert a coast, were sadly perplexed.
Some argued vehemently for setting the ships on fire ; but
at length it was concluded to draw them ashore, and, en-
camping with their land-forces round them, to guard them
ixom the enemy till some convenient opportunity should offer
of getting them away. Agis, also, vfhen informed of their
situation, sent to them Thermo, a citizen of Sparta.

To the LacediBmonians the first advice that had been sent
was this : — that ** the squadron had set sail from the isth-
mus ;" for orders had been given Alcamenes by the ephori,
that, when this point was executed, he should despatch a
horseman to them: and immediately then they had deter-
mined to despatch away the commander Chalcideus, accom-
panied by Aksibiades, with the five ships of their own equip-
ment ; but, at the instant they were ready to move off, the
news arrived that " the squadron had been driven into Pi-
raeus." Dejected by this unexpected event, because they
had stumbled in the very first entrance on an Ionian war, they
no longer persisted in the design of sending away their own
ships, but even thought of recalling some of those which were
already at sea. But, as this was discovered by Alcibiades,
he again persuaded Endius and the other ephori by no
means entirely to give up the expedition ; assuring them,
that, " by a timely despatch, they yet might make that islltnd
before any information of the disaster which had befallen the
squadron could reach the Chians ; and of himself, were he
once in Ionia, he could easily effectuate the revolt of the cities,
by opening their eyes in respect to the weakness of the Athe-
nians and the hearty and vigorous interposition of the Laco-

206 PSLOPONNSSIAN WAR. [bOOR VIII.

dsoKmians, since on these topics he shoald be heaid wilb
greater deference than any other person whatever." He
^80 priyately encouraged Endius with the prospect of " greftt
glory to himself, if t&ough him Ionia could be broaght to
revolt, and the king be made confederate to X«ced«noD,
while Agis had no hand in these masterly strokes of policy ;*'
for he happened now to be at variance with Agis.* By sneb
insinuations Aleibiades prevailed upon the ephori axid En-
dius, and sailed away with the five ships, in company with
Ghalcidens, the Lacedemonian ; and the vojrage they per-
formed with all possible expedition.

About the same time the sixteen ships, which had been at
the war of Sicily under the orders of Gylippus, regained in
safety the Peloponnesian ports. They had been intercepted
near Leucadia, and terribly harassed by twenty-seven sail of
Athenians, commanded by Hippocles, the son of Menippas,
who was stationed there to watch the return of the fleet from
Sicily. Yet only a single ship was lost. The rest, escaping
the Athenian chase, arrived safe in the harbour of Corinth.

But Chalcideus and Alcibiades, who were now upon their
voyage, stopped and detained whatever they met, that their
course might not be divulged : and, touching first at Cory-
eus on the main, and there setting at liberty such as they
had detained, and gaining a conference with some of the
Chians who were privy to their designs, by whom being ad>

* No reasons are here assigned for the variance between Ai*
cibiades and Agis. Numbers of probable ones might occur
fiom the different tnnpers and manners of the persons : but we
leani from Plutarch that Alcibiades had been intriguing wita
Timea, the wife of Agis, and had a son by her, who was called
Leotychides, disowned afterward by Agis, and incapacitated
from succeeding to the throne. Alcibiades was always disso-
lute ; and yet this, it seems, was merely to gratify his pride,
since he declared his intention in this intngue to have been thai
his descendants might rei^ at Sparta. This fine gentleman
from Athens was exceedingly agreeable in the eyes of her
Spartan majesty ; even though his deportment at Sparta wae
such as if he had been trained from his birth in the severe dis
cipline of ^ycurgus. He-, was a thorough Spartan— shaved
dose, plunged into cold water, could make a meal on dry bread,
and feast on black broth. " One would think,** says Plutarch,
** he had never kept a cook in his life, never seen a perftinef
nor ever worn a Milesian robe."— Z«/Jr of Alcibiadea,

YEAR XX.] PBLOPONNSBfAN W4R. 297

▼ned to malM directly for the haibonr of Cfafoe, wHhoat say
formal notification, they arrived there, entirely nnezpected by
the Ohians. By thia, the many were thrown at once into aa-
tmushment and tenor ; bot the few had so conducted matters ^
that the council was that moaMnt sitting; in which Ohaici- '
dens and Aleibiades being admitted, they said->»that "many
other ships were coming op ;'* bat, suppressing aU mention of
tho squadron blocked up at Pinnis, the Chians deefaued a
revolt from th^ Athenians, and the Erythrvaas soon foUowod
their example.

So far suecessfu], they passed on with three thips to Cla*
zomens, and caused that city also to revolt. Instantly upon
this the Claxomenians cvessed over into the continent, sad
fortified PoUchne, to be a place of safe resort for themselves,
in ease obliged to qnit the itle they occupied at ]NreseDt. AU
the revolters, in short, were warmly employed in fortifying
their towns, and making preparations for war.

At Athens the news soon arrived of the revolt of Chioe.
They were now convinced that horrid and apparent dangers
alreacfy environed them about, and that the rest of their depoid*
ants would not long be quiet, when the most powerful state
among them had thrown off the yoke. Now, therefore, the
thousand talents,* which through ail the courae of the war they
had religiously refrained from touching, the penalties being dis-
charged which the law indicted upon him who should move, or
whoever should vote it, amid their present constematioa, they
decreed " should be employed in the public service, and that
a large number of ships should by this means be equipped ;
that, farther, from the squadron which blocked up Piraus,
eight ships should immediately be detached ;" which, accord-
ingly, quitting the blockade, pursued the squadron under
Chcdcideus, but, being unable to come up with them, return-
ed again. This detachment was commanded by Strombi*
chides, the son o( Diotimns ; that " soon after twelve others,
under the orders of Thrasycles, diould repair to Chios, there
also to be detached from the same blockade.'* Having,
moreover, fetched off the seven vessels belonging to the Chi-
ans, which assisted in forming the blockade at Pirwis, they
set at liberty the slaves who were on board them, and threw
all the freemen into prison. But, to replace the whole num-

* 193,7801. sterling.

298 ' PBLOPONMESIAN WAB. I BOOK VIU.

ber detached from the blockade of the PelqKniiiesiai»» they
loet no time in fitting out other yeasels and sending them to
that post. They hiS also a scheme for the expeditious equip-
ment of thirty more. Great, indeed, was their ardour ; and
' nothing of sinall importance was taken in hand, as^the point
in agitation was no less than the recovery of Chios.

In the meantime Strombichides, with the eight sail of
ships, arrived at Samos ; and, takinff with him one Samian
TOMel, stood onwards to Teoe, and required of them " to
have no participation in the present commotions." From
Chios, also, Chakideus was now coming over to Teos, with
a fleet of three^and-twenty sail, and the land-force of the Cla-
zomenians, and also of the Eiythraaans, attending his motions,
was marching thither by land : but Strombichides, having
timely notice of their approach, put out again: before their ar-
rival. Standing out aloof into open sea, he had a view of
this numerous fleet in their course from Chios ; upon which
he fled amain to Samos. But the enemy followed in pursuit.

The Teians, who at first refused admittance to the land-
forces, when now the Athenians plainly fled, thought proper
to open their gates. Here the bulk of them were inactive for
a time, attending the return of Chalcideus from the pursuit.
But, when time wore on without his appearing, they demolish-
ed of their own accord the wall which the Athenians had built
on the side of Teos facing the continent. In this they were
dso assisted by a small party of Barbarians, who in this inter-
val bad joined them, and* were commanded by Tages, the
deputy of Tissaphernes.

But Chalcideus and Alcibiades, when they had chased
Strombichides into Samos, having furnished the mariners of the
Peloponnesian vessels with proper arms, left them as a garrison
in Chios. Having manned their Teasels afresh at Chios, with
an addition of twenty others, they stood away for Miletus, as
meditating its revolt. This was owing to Alcibiades ; who,
having an interest in persons of the first rank among the Mi-
lesians, made it a point to effectuate their accession before
the fleet should come up from Peloponnesus, and to secure
the whole honour to the Chians and himself, and Chalcideus
and Endius who had sent him, in pursuance of his engage-
-ments, to work the revolt of the cities, with the sole power
of the Chians and with Chalcideus. Having therefore per-
formed the greatest part of their voyage thither without being

TSAR XX.] PSIiOPONNSSIAN WAR. 299

disetfveied, and prevented by a siiiaU portion of time Strom*
bichidesi and also Tfaraaycles, who was lately come up from
Athens with twelve ships, and in junction with the former
followed after them, they cansed Miletus to revolt. The
Athenians indeed, with nineteen sail, arrived upon their heels ;
but, as the Milesians denied them a reception, they took Uietr
station at Lade, an adjacent island.

The first alliance between the king and the Lacedemonians
was made immediately after the revolt of Miletus, by Tissa-
phemes and Chalcideus, as follows : —

"On these terms the Lacedemonians and confederates
make an alliance with the king and Tissaphemes —

" Whatever region or cities the king possesses and the an-
cestors of the king possessed, be those the king's.

"And, out of those. cities, whatever sums of money or
any other supply went to the Athenians, let the king and the
Lacedemonians and confederates jointly stop, that the Athe-
nians may no longer receive those sums of money, nor any
other such supply.

" And the war against the Athenians let the king and (be
Lacedemonians and confederates jointly carry on.

" And be it unlawful to put an end to the war against the
Athenians without the consent of both the contracting par-
ties ; of the king on one«ide, of the Lacedemonians and con-
federates on the other.

"If, farther, any revolt from the king, be they'dechued
enemies to the Lacedemonians and confederates.

" And, if any revolt from the Lacedemonians and confed-
erates, be thoy declared enemies, in the same manner, to the

king."
Thisi

I alliance was now formally concluded.
Lnmediately after this, the Ghians, who had Aianned out
ten additional ships, stood away to Anea, being desirous to
pick up some information of what was doing at Miletus, and
at the same time to cause the revolt of the cities. Here,
being reached by an order from Chalcideus to return back to
Chios, with an inthnation that Amorges with a land-army
would soon be upon them, they sailed away to the temple of
Jupiter. From hence they descried sixteen ships, which
Diomedon was bringing up from Athens, fiom whence he had
sailed somewhat later than Thrasycles. Upon this discovery
thi^ fled amain with a single ship to Ephesns, but with the

300 psLOPoirarsnAN WAR. [book Tin.

TCst of their fleet to Teoe. Four indeed of the number, wlndi
their crewe had abandoned, the Athenians took ; yet all the
hands escaped on shore ; but the remainder reached in safety
the city of the Teians. After this, the Athenians stood away
into Samos ; hot the Ohians, putting again to sea with tlw
lesidae of their ships, and attended by a land-force, caused
Lebedos to revolt, and also Era. And, these points carried,
both the land*force and the squadron returned respectively tn
their own hones.

About the same time the twenty sail of Pdoponnesians,
wfiich had been ^ased into Pimus, and lay blocked up there
by an equal number of Athenians^ having made an unexpect-
ed sally upon the enemy, and got the better in a naval engage-
ment, took four of the Athenian ships : and, sailing away from
Genchres, were again fitting out for the voyage to Chios and
Ionia. Astyochus also came down thither from Tjacedsnton
as admiral, in whose hands the whole command at sea was
now lodged.

When the land-army had quitted Teos, Tissaphemes in
person came thither with « body, and, after completely demol-
ishing those parts of the wall before Teos which were yet
left standing, marched away.

Not long after his d^rture, Diomedon, arriving there with
ten sail of Athenians, in order to gain a reception, made a
truce with the Teians. From thence he coasted along to
£rB, and assaulted the place ; but, not being able to take it,
he sailed away.

Coinciding with this in point of time, an insurrection was
made at Samos by the people itgainst the nobility. The
Athenians, who with three ships were then Ijing at S&mos,
assisted the former. On this occasion the Samian people
massacred about two hundred persons, all of the nobdity.
Four hundred others they condemned to exile ; and, baring
divided among themselves their lands and houses, and ob-
tained from t& Athenians a decree of being governed by their
own constitutions, as men whtfse fidelity was no longer to be
suspected, they assumed the whole civil administration, leav
ioff no share of it in the hands of the landed gentry, and ab-
solutely prohibiting to the people all alliance for the future
with them, so as neither to give their daughters' to them nor
over to many theirs.

After these transactiens. during the same awmner, die

YSAR XIX.] PBLOPOMMXSJAN WAR. 301

i^auoMf pro«Mding with uMteting ardour, l«ft noUuBamidoii*
to compaM the r»voU of the citiei. Eyoii without relopon-
neuaa aid thfiy mado them yiaita with their own aingle force ;
and, desirous at the same time to inTolve as laige a number
as possible in their own dangers, they undertook a voyage
with thirteen sail of ships to Lesbos. This squared encUy
with the lAcedamonian plan ; which was, to make the sec-
ond attempt upon that island, and from thence to proceed to
Hellespont. The land-force, at the same time, of such of
the Peloponnesians as weie at hand, and their adjacent allies,
attended their motions by the route of Clazomens and Cyme :
these were commanded br £oalas, a Spartan ; but the fleet
was under the eiders of Deizisdas, a native of those parts :
and those ships, steering first towards and arriving at Mo*
thymne, eaximdi its revolt.t ♦ ♦ ♦ « ♦

But Astyochos, the Lacedamoniaa admiral-in-chief, put*
ting to sea from Cenchrec, where he had taken upon him the
command, with four sail of shipping arrived at Chios : and,
the third day after his arrival there, twenty-five sail of Athe-
nians, commanded by Leon and Diomedon, reached the Isle
of Lesbos ; for Leon had been lately sent from Athens with
a re-euforcflment of ten. On the very evening of that day,
AstjMichos pot out again to sea, with the addition of one
Chian ship, and stood away for Lesbos to give them all the
assistance in his power. Accordingly he touched first at
Pyrrha, proceeding from thence the day following to £ressus,
where information met him that Mitylene had been taken by
the Athenians at a shout ; for the latter, as their arrival was
entirely unexpected, standing boldly into the harbour, seized
at 6nce all the Chian vessels ; and then landing, and gainmg
a victory over such as made any head against them, became mas-
ters of the city. Astyochus, inibnaed of this event by the
Ereasians, and the Chian ships under the command of £ubu-
Itts from Metfaymne, — ^which, having been left in the harbour
at that place, had fled at once when Mityleae was taken,
three oS them oame op safe to Astyochus, but one had fallen
into the hands of the Athenians ;— Astyochus now desisted

t From what follows if looks as if some words were wantmg
here. The Latin tnoisls'tors hvre endeavoured to supply it,
thus :-^ And the Chians, leaving four ships here for the defenw
of the place, stoodnway with the rest to Mitylene, andi»nsed it
te revuU."

TH(r. — VOL. II

302 PSLOFONNKSIAN WAR. [bOOK Till.

from proceeding to Mitylene. HaTiBg effectuated the rsrolt
of Eressos, and provided the inhiMtants with anna, he or-
dered the soldiers from on hoard his own squadron to march
by land, under the command of Eteonicus, towards Antissa
and - Methymne ; while himself, with his own ibips^ and
the three Ghians, advanced along the shore towards the same
places. He hoped the Methymneans, upon the sight of this
succour, woidd resume their spirits and abide by their rerolt.
But, when every thing in Lesbos seemed to act in concert
against his scheme, he took his landmen again on board, and
made the best of his way back again to Chios. The forces,
farther, that had attended the motions of his squadron, and
which were to have proceeded with him to Hellespont, were
dismissed to their respective cities. After this they were
joined at Chios by six ships, which were sent thither by the
confederate fleet of Peloponnesians assembled at Cenchrete.

The Athenians in the meantime were employed in reset-
tling the state of affairs in Lesbos. Standing across from
thence, and demolishing Polichne, on the continent, lately
fortified by the Clazomenians, they removed all the latter
back again to their city in the island, excepting such as were
authors of the revolt ; for these had retired to Daphnus. And
thus Clazomens once more .became subject to the Athenians.

The same summer the Athenians, who with twenty ships
had stationed themselves at Lade to awe Miletus, having
made a descent at Panormus in the Milesian territory, killed
Chalcideus, the Lacedemonian, who with a handful of men
endeavoured to repulse them. The thnrd day after this ac-
tion they re-embarked ; but first erected a trophy, which the
Milesians thought proper to demolish, as not fixed en a spot
which was the property of the victors.

Leon also and Diomedon, at the head of the Athenian
fleet on the station of Lesbos, assembling together what force
they could from the Oinusse islands, which he before Chios,
and from Sidusa and Pteleum, fortresses of their own in Ery-
threa, stood away from Lesbos in a body, and carried on the war
by sea against the Chians. The land-soldiers on board them
were some of the heavy-armed of the public roll of Athens,
now pressed into this service. At Cardamyle they landed ;
and at BoHssus, having routed in battle a body of Chians that
made head against them, and done great execution upon them,
they reduced all the places in that quarter of the island. At

TSAR XX.] PBL0P0NMB8IAN WAR. 308

FhuuB, alao^ they foofht a MeoDd tuM with great tiieeeM ;•
andy a third time, at £euconiiim : but as, after theae repeat*
ed defeats, the Chiana no longer showed themselves in tthe
field to oppose them, the victors made cruel ravage on that
rich and fertile country ; and which, from the invasion of the
Modes to the present period of time, had been totally exempt
ed from the miseries of war : for, next to the Lacedamo-
nians, the Chians were the only people who (as far as I have
been able to observe) have enjoyed aseriesof pubUc prosper-
ity with a steady and uniform moderation, and, in proportion
as their state increased in wealth and power, made suitable
accessions to its domestic splendour and security. Nay, even
their late revolt, if this should chance to be ascribed to a want
of judicious and cautionary measures, they never ventured to
declare, till they had fortified the hazardous step with numer*
otts and gallant confederates, and saw plainly that the Athe-
nians (as even the Athenians themselves could not possibly
deny), after the blow received in Sicily, were plunged into
the lowe&t depth of impotence and distress. If, therefore,
they proved mistaken, it was one of those cases inseparable
from the constant mutability of human affairs, where numbers
were involved in the same mistake with themselves, who yet,
in their judgment, were perfectly convinced that the entire
Tuin of Athens was fast approaching.

Now, therefore, blocked up as they were by sea, while
their lands all arojind were ravaged by the enemy, a party
among them were concerting the method of delivering up the
city into the hands of the Athenians. But those in the admin-
istration, getting wind of their design, rafrained indeed from
making a bustle about it in public ; but, fetching over Astyo-
chus, the Lacedemonian admiral-in-cbief, with his four ships,
from Erythre, they consulted how to prevent the execution of
tiie plot by the mildest and most sentle methods, either by ta-
king hostages for the fidelity of ue suspected, or some other
such cautionary expedients. In this posture stood afUrs at.
Chios.

But, from Athens, in the close of the same sununer, one thou-
sand fiye hundred heavy-armed Athenians, and a thousand Ar-
gives (for five hundred Argives, who were but light-armed, the
Athenians had equipped in the manner more complete), with
the addition of a thousand confederates, in eight-and-forty
iail of ships, including the transports of the heavy-anned, and

304 PBLOPOM^SSIAN WAR. . [bOOK Vlll.

put under the commiind of Phrrnkhaa, and Ooomaeles, and
StironidM, sailed away to SasMS, and, thence stretching over
to Miletus, encantped themselves before it. The Mileetaae
marched out into the field, to the amount of ei^t hundred
heavy-armed, assisted hy the Pdoponnesians who cane over
with Ghakideus, and a body of foreign meicenaries fumieb-
ed bj Tissaphemes. Tissaphemes also assisted them in
person with an aid of cavdrf ; and thus battle wae joined
against the Athenians and confedetates. The Argives, of
whom a whole wing was composed, -advanced before the
rest of the line ; and, contemiafig tfadr enenrf too much,
as lonians, and unable to stand their shock, they charged ie
a disorderly mamter, were routed by the Milesians, and no less
a number than three hundred of Uieir body were destroyed.
But the Athenians beat first the Peloponneshuis, and thm
cleared the field of die Barbarians and aU the rabble iA the
enemy, yet came not at all to an engagement with the Mi-
lesians : for the latter, returning towards the city firora the
chase of ^e Argires, no sooner perceived that their own side
was Tanquished than they quitted the field of battle. The
Athenians, therefore, as victors, posted themselves under the
very walls of Miletus. It is observable that, in thie battle,
the lonians had on both sides the better of the Doriane: for
the Athenians beat those Peloponnesians who were ranged
a|[ainst them ; and the Milesians did the same by the Ar-
gives. But now, after erecting a trophy, as the town was
seated on an isthmus^ the Athenians were preparing to cut it
off by a work of circumvaltation, conchiding that, '* if they
once could get possession of Miletus, they should easily com-
pleto the reduction of the other states.'' ^

It was now about the close of evening, and advice was
brought them that ** five-and-fifly sail of ships from Pelopon-
nesus and Sicily were only not at hand:** f<M>, from Sicily,
where Hermocrates the Syracusan strenuoosly advised to go
On with what yet remained in regard to the total demolition
of the Athenians, twenty sail of Syracusans and two of Seli-
nuntiaas came over. The Peloponnesian fleet, which bad
been fitting out, was now ready for service ; and both these
were sent out in conjonetion, ondelr the orders of Theramenes
.the L4Hsed«nonian, who was to carry them to Aetyochue the
adniaral4B-«hief. They arrived first at Eleus, an istand be-
Being tlMie JuibMMd thM Che Athnuans 1^

YBABXX.] PSLOPONNSSIAN WAR. 306

bsfore MiletQfl, they departed thenee ; and, steering fiist mtQ
the Gnlf of lasoa, were< desirous to pick up information how
things went at Miletus,. Akibiades had now rode to Teichi-
nssa, in the Milesian ; in which quarter of the gulf the fleeu
had Gome to anchor for the night, and receiTed there a full
account of the battle. Alcibiades had been present at it, and
had given his assistance to the Milesians and Tissaphemes.
He therefore earnestly pressed them, " unless they were de-
siroas to see all Ionia lost, and all their great expectations
blasted at once, to repair with all possible expedition to the
succour of Miletus, and by no means to suffer it to be invest-
ed by a circumvallation." In pursuance of this it was re-
solved, that at the first dawn of day they should stand away
to its succour.

But Phrynichus, the Athenian commander, when advised
from Lerus of the certain arrival of this united fleets even
though his colleagues declared openly for keepinff their ground
and hazarding- an engagement by sea, protested boldly, that
*' such a step, for his own |Murt, hie could not take ; and, were
he able to hinder it, that neither they nor any one should force
him to it : for, since it would be afterward in their power,
when they had got better intelligence of the numbers of the
enemy, and made what posnble accessions they could to their
own, «id when they had prepared for action in an ao^le and
ieisurely manner, — since it would be still in their power to
fight, the dread of a shameful or reproachful imputation
should not bend him to risk an engagement against his judg-
ment. It could be no matter of reproach to the Athenians to
retire with their fleet when the exigences of time required it;
but, in every respect, it would be highly reproachful to them .
should they fight and be vanquished. He would not there-
fore involve the state, not only in reproach, but in the great-
est of dangers ; the state which, but just now respiring
firom the terrible blows it had received, scarce thought it oru-
dential with most ample preparation to choose voluntary haz-
ards, or even, when the last necessity demanded, to strike
first at the enemy ; why now, when no necessity compelled,
most it be thrown into wilful, spontaneous dangers 1" He ez-
h<»ted them, therefore, " without loss of time to carry the
wounded on board, to re-embark their troops, and, securing
what baflgage they had brought along with them, to leave
behind what booty they had got from the enemy, that theic
IX.— A A

806 PBLOPONNBSIAN WAR. [bOQK VIU.

■hips might not be too deeplj laden, end make the beet of
their way to Samos ; and from thence, after oottectng to-
gether what additional force tfaej conld, to eraich for and
seize the seasons of advantage to attack tiieir foes." The
advice of Phrfniehus, thas given, was ptevailing, and aecoid'
mgly was pat in eieention. He wae regarded, not only «b the
present but on future occasions, not eiSy for tbia, b«fc idl the
subsequent instances of his oondoet, as a man of an fOEcatteBt
understanding.

In parseanceof this, the Atheniana, so aeon mt the evaaing
was closed, made the best of tiieir way liom Miietaa, and
left the victory imperfect. And the Aigivee, withont making
the least stay, chagrined as4hey were at their late defeat, de-
parted immediately from Samos to retarn to Aigoe.

The Peloponnesians, early the next dawn, weig^iipg Crom
Teichinssa, stood into Miletns. Ahn one day's jBt^4n that
harbour, on the next, having augmented their aqoadron with
the Chian ships, which had formeily been chased in company
with Chalcideus, they determined to go back again to Tei-
chiussa to fetch off what stores they had landed there. Ac*
cordingly, when they were thus returned, Tissapbexnee, being
come up with his land-army-, persuaded them to atand directly
against lasus, in which his enemy Amoigee at that instant
lay. Thus, falling on lasus by surprise, the inhabitants of
which expected none but an Athenian squadron, they became
masters of it. In this action the Syiacasans svere the per-
sons who gained the greatest honour. Amoi|;as, farther, the
bastard son of Pissuthnes, who was a reyolter from the king,
was taken pnsoner by the Peioponneeians. They deliveied
• him up to Tissaphemes, thatrif he pleased he might send him
to the king, in obedience to his orders. lasoa, farther, they
put to the sack ; and the army made on this occasion a very
large booty, for this city had ever been reraariuble for its
wealth. They gave quarter to the auziliariea in the aervice
of Amorges : and, without conmittiag the ieaet insult upon
them, todc them mto their own troops, ae the balk oi them
were Peioponneeians. They delivered up the town into the
hands of Tissaphemee, as hkewiae all the priaooers, whether
slaves or freemen, upon ooveaant to reeaive froiB him a
Boric stater* for each. This beii^ done, thay again repaired
to MiletQs : and from hence Hmj detached PtodantiM^ tbaMP

♦ 11. I2t. 31d.

TSAR XZ.] PELOPONNBSIAN WAR. 307

of Leon, whom the Lacedsmonians had «ent ezpresaly to b«
goVorooT of Chios, to march over land to Erythne, having
under his command Uie auxiliaries who had served under
Araorses ; and appointed Plulippas to command at Miletas
A<nd the summer ended.

The winter now succeeding, after Tissaphemes had garri-
soned and provided fat the security of lasos, he repaired to
Miletus, and distributed a month's subsistence, in pursuance
of his engagements at Lacedtemon, to all the ships, at the
rate of an Attic drachnn* to each mariner by the day ; but
for the remainder of time he declared he would only pay at
the rate of three oboii,t till he had consulted the king^s
pleasure ; and, in case his master's orders were for it, he said
he would make it np a complete drachma. But, as Hermoc-
rates, the Syracusan commander, remonstrated sharply against
this usage ^or Theramenes, not regarding himself as admi-
ral, since now he was at the head of the fleet merely to carry
it np to Astyochus, was very indolent about the article of
pay), it was at length compromised, that, excepting the five
supernumerary ^ips, the crews of the rest should' receive
more than three oboli a man : for to the five-and-fif^y ships
he paid three talentst a month ; and, for the rest, as many as
exceeded that number, pay was to be famished at the rate of
only thre« oboli a day.

* 7%d. * t Half a drachma.

t Ther " '

^ _ here is manifestly a fault here ; for rpi*i three, in the on
ginal, should be read rptaKovrat tbirty, talents a month. Mr.
Hobbes has taken the pains to compute, and finds that the Pelo-
ponnesian ships carried eighteen men apiece. What ! only so
sinall a crew as eighteen men for a ship of war with three banks
of oars? or, where the ccnnplement was perhaps two hundred,
did Tissaphemes only pay a tenth part of that number? Xeno-
phon, in the first book of his Greek history, enables us toset att
to rights. Lysander is negotiating with Cyrus for an increase
of pay. Cyrus insists upon the former agreement made by
Tissaphemes, that every ship rfiould receive but thirty minas a
month. The dfflly pay of each was of course one mins, or one
hundred drachmas : whence it appears, that, at three oboli, or
half a drachma a man, the pay of sixty ships, each carrying two
hundred men, would be just thirty talente. Thirty talents, there
fijre, paid to fifty-five ships for a month, were two talents and a
half above three oboli a day : and hence it seems pretty eldttr,
that the c<Rnpl0ment of a reloponnesian sl^p of war was tw«
)iundred i

308 PELOPOIVNESIAM WAR. [BOOK Till.

The same winter, the Athenians now lyinff at Samos had
been re-enforced by the arrival of five-and-^irty sail from
Athens, under the command of -Charminus, and Stiombichi-
des, and Euctemon ; and they had farther assembled all their
ships from Chios, and others. A resolution was therefwe
taken, after assigning each his particular conunand by lot, to
make up against it with a nayal force, and awe Miletus ;
but to send against Chios both a naval and a land-force ; and
this ^pcordingly they put in execution: for in fact Strom-
bichides, and Onomacles, and Euctemon, with a squadron of
thirty sail and a body, of transports, which had on board a de-
tachment from the thousand heavy-armed which came against
Miletus, stood away for Chios, as this service had fallen to
them by lot ; but the rest of the commanders who now re-
mained at Samoa, having under then seventy-four ships,
were quite lords of the sea, and sailed boldly up to awe Mile*
tus.

Astyochus, who happened at |his juncture to be in Chiosi
selecting hostages ,as a prevention against treachery, Uiought
proper for the present to desist, when he heard of the arrival
of the squadron under Theramenes, and that their engage-
ments with Tissaphcmes were much altered (ot the better.
But, taking with him ten sail of Pelopennesians, and ten ol
Chians, he put to sea ; and, having made an attempt upoa
Pteleum, though without success, he crossed over to Clazo-
men». He there summoned such of the inhaDiUnts as were
attached to the Athenians to remove with their effects up to

I have another proof at hand, which will confirm what has al-
ready been said, and serve at the same time to ascertain the
number of men on board a ship of war. In the sixth book Tfau-
cydides says, the Egesteans brought to Athens sixty talents, as
a month's pay for sixty ships. He says also, that in the Sicilian
expedition the daily pay of the Athenian seamen was raised to a
drachma a man. Now a talent a month, reckoning thirty days
to the month, is two minae a day ; and two mine are just two
hundred drachmas. Hence, it is plain, the complement of an
Athenian ship was two hundred men ; and, according to the
fcmner computation, that of a Peloponnesien ship was, as might
reasonably be expected, exactly the same. This is a farther
confirmation that there is a mistake in the printed copies of the
wjipnal, as was said above; where, instead of three talents,

SSS^tJE??"* **"* ^•^^.^' ^' ^^^^^* should have been read
thirty talents, amounting in English money to 58121, 10s.

rBAR XX.] PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 309

Daphnus, and leave him in postession of the place ; Tamaa,
farther, the sub-governor of Ionia, joined with him in the
summons. But, when the inhabitants rejected this offer, he
made an assault upon the city, which had no fortifications ;
yet, miscarrying in the attempt, he pat off ag^ to sea in a
nard gale of wind, and reached, with those ships that kept up
with him, Phocea and Cyme : but the rest of the squadron
was by stress of weather forced over to the isles which lie
near to Clazomenas — Marathusa. and Pele, and Brimussa ;
and whatever effects belonging to the Clazomenians had by
way of security been deposited there, during eight days' con-
tinuance, which the stormy weather obliged tnem to stay,
they partly plundered and partly destroyed ; and, having se-
cured their booty on board, got away to Phocea and Cyme,
and joined Astyochus. But, while he was yet in this station,
ambassadors reached him from the Lesbians, imparting to him
their desires to revolt. Him, indeed, they persuaded ; but,
when the Corinthians and the rest of the confederates de-
clared their repugnance, because of the former miscarriage,
he weighed from thence and made sail for Chios. » And now,
a etorm dispersing his squadron, at last they all came in,
though from different quarters to which they had been driven,
and rejoined him at Chios.

The next step to this was the junction of Psedaritus ; who,
being now at Erythrae, after marching by land from Miletus,
passed over in person with the troops under his command to
Chios. He had also with him about five hundred soldiers,
taken out of the'five ships under Chalcideus, who had been
left behind with their arms.

But now, the Lesbians notifying again their readiness to
revolt, Astyochus, in a conference with Pasdaritus and the
Chians, ''maintained the necessity of going thither vrith a
squadron to support the revolt of Lesbos ; since, in conse-
quence of it, they must either enlarge the number of their con-
federates, or, even though miscarrying in the design, must
hurt the Athenians." But they were deaf to this remon-
strance ; and Poedaritus positively declared that he should not
be attended by the ships of Chios. Upon this, taking with
him five sail of Corinthians, a sixth ship belonging to McMra,
and one more of Hermione, and all the Laconian which he
himself brought thither, he stood away from thence to his sta-
tion at Miletus, uttermg grievous threats against the Chians,

310 PBLOPONl^ESlAN WAR. [bOOK VIII.

that, ** how low Boever they might be leduced, they sho'uid
never receive any succour from him" Accordingly, toucU-
iog first at Corycus of Erythtis, he moored theje for the night.
The AtheniaQs, who, from Samos« with a considerable
strength, were now bound against Chios, were lying at the
same instant of time on the other side of the cape, but so
stationed that neither party knew of the nearness of the
other. At this juncture, a letter being delivered from Paeda.-
ritus, that " a party of Erythrseans, who had been prisoners at
Samoa and released from thence, were coming to Erytfaras to
betray that place,*' Astyochus put out again mmiediately for
Erythrs *, and thus narrowly, on this occasion, did he escape
falling into the hands of the Athenians. Psdaritus, farther,
had made the passage upon this afiair; and both having
joined in making all necessary inquiries about those who
were accused of this piece of treachery, when they found the
whole to have been a plot of the prisoners at Samoa merely
to recover their liberty, they pronounced them innocerft, and
so departed, the latter to Chios ; but the other, in pursuance
of his first designation, made the best of his way to Miletus.

In the meantime the armament of the Athenians, haiing
sailed round from Corycus to Arginum, fell in with three
long vessels of the Chians, and no sooner had descried than
they gave them chase. And now a violent storm arose, and
the vessels of the Chians with great difficulty escaped into har-
bour : but, of the Athenian squadron, three, which had most
briskly followed the chase, were disabled and driven ashore at
the city of the Chians ; the crews of them were partly made
prisoners, and partly put to the sword. The rest of the fleet
got into a safe harboar, which is known by the name of Pheeni-
cus, under the Mimas. From hence they afterward took their
course to Lesbos, and got all in readiness to raise fortifica-
tions.

From Peloponnesus, the same winter, Hippocrates the La-
cedjemonian, putting out to sea with ten sail of Thurians
commanded by Doricus, the son of Diagoras, and two col-
leagues, with one ship of Laconia and one of Syracuse, ar-
rived at Cnidus. This place was now in revolt from Tissa^
phernes. Those of Miletus were no sooner advised of the
arrival of this squadron, than they sent them orders, with
one moiety of their shios to keep guard upon Cnidus, and
with the other to post themselves at the Triopium, in ordei

TBAR XX.I PBIiOPONHBSlAN WAR. 811

to taka voder tkeir cmvoj thtt trading^vMMlt which were
in their coarse from Egypt. . The Triopium is a point in the
territory of Gnidas, jutting oat into the see, and a temple of
Apollo. Bat the Athenians, informed of their desi^s, and
standing away from Samoa, took six of the ships which were
•tattoQMl at the Triopium : the cfewe, indeed, quitted their
ships, and reached the shore. This being done, the Tictors sail-
ed directly to Gnidas ; and, making an assault apon that city,
which was quite unfortified, had Tery nearly taken it. ^
the next day they renewed the assault : yet, as the inhabi*
tants had taken care to make it more secure by favour of the
night, and the men, escaped from the vessels tricen at Trio-
pmm, bad thrown themselves into the place, they did less
damage than on the preceding da/. After scouring and lay-
kig waste the territo|7 of Onidus, they sailed back to Samoa.

About the same time, Astyechus having rejoined the fleet
at Miletus, the Peloponnesians were still abounding in all the
needful expedients of war. Good pay was regalarly advan-
eed them, and the soldiers had store of money yet remaining
of the rich booty they made at lasus. The Milesians, far*
ther, sustained with ataciity the buiden of the war. It was,
however, the opinion of the Peloponnesians, that the first
treaty miade with Tissaphemes by Chalcideus was in some
articles defective and less advantageous to themselves. Upon
this they drew up and ratified a second in the presence of
Thetamenes. The articles of it are these :—

** Stipulated, by the Lacedemonians and confederates,
with Kmg Darius and the sons of the king and Tissaphemes,
that peace and amity subsist on the following conditions : —

** Whatever province or city soever belongs to Kipg Darius,
or did belong to his father or ancestors, against them in a
hostile manner not to march) and no injury to do, are bound
both Lacedamonians and confederates of the Laeedsmoni-
ans. Not to exact tribute from any such places, are bound
both Lacedflemcmians and confederates of the Laced»monians.
Neither shall King Darius, nor ftny subject of the king, march
in a hostile manner against, nor do any injury to, the Lace-
daemonians and confederates.

**But, in case the LacedsBmonians or confederates need
any assistance whatever from the king, or the king from the
Lacedsemonians and confederates, wl^tever either party can
'"' ^ the other to be right, let that be done.

312 PBIiOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK YUl,

** Be the war against the Athenians and confederates cslt
ried on by both parties in strict conjunction : and, in case
an accommodation be taken in hand, be it settled by both
parties acting in conjunction.

" But, whatever army be brought into the teiritories of the
king at the request and summons of the king, the king to de-
fray the expense.

** And, if any of the states comprehended in this league
with the king invade the tenritories of the king, the others to
oppose and act with sll their power in defence of the king.

" And, if any province belonging to the king, or subject to
his dominion, invade the territory of the Lacedaemonians or
confederates, the king to oppose, and with all. his power to
defend the party invaded/*

When the finishing hand was put to this treaty, Therame-
nes, after delivering up the fleet to Astyochus, puts to sea in
a fly-boat, and entirely disappears.

But the Athenians from Lesbos, having now made their
passage and landed their forces in Chios, and being masters
of the coast and sea, fortified Delphinium ; a place remarka-
bly strong by nature towards the land, abounding, farther,
with harbours, and seated at no considerable distance iwm
the city of the Chians. And now the Chians, di^irited by
the many defeats they had already received, and, what is
worse, far from being actuated by general unanimity (but, on
the contrary, Tydeus the Ionian and his adherents having
been lately put to death by Podaritus for atticising, and the
rest of the citizens obliged by necessity to submit to the few,
each individual among them suspecting his neighbour), the
Chians now remained quite inactive. Thus, for the reasons
above mentioned, they neither looked upon themselves, nor
the auxiliaries under Psedaritus, as a match for the enemy.
Yet, as their last resource, they sent to Miletus, requesting
Astyochus to come over Xo their succour. But, as he was
deaf to their entreaties, Psedaritus sent a letter to Laceds-
mon about him, which accused him of injustice. And to this
situation were brought the Athenian affairs at Chios.

Their squadron also at Samos made several visits to the
squadron of the enemy at Miletus ; but, as the latter refused
to come out to engage them, they returned again to Samos,
without committing any hostilities.*

From Peloponnesus, in the same winter, twenty-seven sail

TSAR XX.1 PSL0P0NNE8IAN WAK. 313

of ships, equipped bj the Lacedsmofnitns for FhanialMxiu, ai
the instance of his agents, Calligitiis the Memreao and Ti-
magoras the Cyzicene, pot oat to aea, and made over to Ionia,
aboot the solstice. Antisthenes the Spartan was on board as
admiral. With him the Lacedemonians sent also eleren
Spartans, to be a council to Astyochus ; in the number of
whom was Lichas, the son of Areesilaus. To these an order
«ras given, that, **when arrived at Miletus, they should in
concert act in all respects as might be best for the service ;
and this squadron, or one equal in strength, or laiger or small-
er, at their own discretion, should proceed to Hellesponf for
the service of Phamabazus, and be sent away under the com-
mand of Clearchus the son of Ramphias, who accompanied
them in the voyage ; and, in case it was judffed expedient
by the council of eleven, to dismiss Astyochus nom the chief
command, and substitute Antisthenes.*' On account of the'
letters of Psedaritus, they began to suspect the fomier. This
squadron, therefore, standing out to sea irom Melea, airived
first at Melos ; and, falling in with ten sail of Athenians,
they took and burnt three of them, which their crews had
abandoned : but, -apprehensive that those Athenian ships
which had escaped might advertise the fleet at Samoa of their
approach, as was actually the case, they stretched away for
Crete ; and, for better security, keeping a good look-out, and
taking more time, they made land first at Caunus of Asia.
From thence, as being now beyond the rsach of danger, they
despatched a messenger to the flleet.at Miletus, to attend and
bring them up.

But, about the same juncture of time, the Ghians and P»-
daritus, not bearing to acquiesce under the dilatoiy answers
of Astyochus, pressed him, by repeated messages, " to eome
over with the whole of his force, and relieve tiiem from the
present blockade ; and by no means to look indolently about
him, while the most important of the confederate states in
Ionia was shut up by sea, and by land exposed to rapines :*'
for the domestics of the Chians, being many in number, na^,
the laigest that any one community except the Lacedsmoni-
ans kept, and accustomed, because of their multitude, to be
punished with extraordinary severity for their misdemeanors,
no sooner judged that the Athenian forces, by throwing up
works, had gained a sure footing in the island, than large
numbers of them at once desert^ to the enemyi and were

THU. — VOL. II. — D D

814 PKL0P0MMS8IAN WAR. [BOOK YIU.

afUrward the persoiw wlio, as perftctly well Mquainted with
the conntiy, committed the hesTiest depredations. The Chi-
aas therefore Qiged that *'the last necessity called upon him,
while jet there was hope or a possibitity of success remaining
(the works round Delphinium yet ineomplete, and a larger cii-
ele even still to be taken in and fortified for the securi^ of
the camp and the fleet), to undertake their relief." Upon
this As^oehus, who, to yetify his threats, had neyer be-
fore thought seriously about it, being now conyinced that
the whole confederate body was bent on their presMvaiion, de-
terfnined in person to ^ to their succour.

But, just at this crisis, advice is brought himirom Cannus
that ** twenty-seren sail of ships and the assistant couneil of
Lacedasmonians are arrived." Coholoding, upon this, that
ereiy other point ought to be postponed to this large re-
enforcement, that his junction with it might be effected in
order to invest them with the sovereignty of the sea, and that
the Lacedemonians who came to inspect his own conduct
might securely finish their voyage ; throwing up immediately
all concern for Chios, he sailed away for Caunus. But, hav-
ing landed in his passage at Cos Meropidis, the inhabitants
of which had refuged themselves in the mountains, he rifled
the city, which was quite unfortified, and had lately been
tumbled into ruins by an earthquake, the greatest that had
been felt Acre in the memory of us now living. By excur-
sions also, through all the country, he made prixe of all he
found, excepting seamen ; for such he dismissed unhurt.

From Cos advancing by niffht to Cnidus, he is dissuaded
by the Cnidians from landing his men ; but, on the contrary,
widiont loss of time to get out to sea, and make head against
twenty sail of Athenians, which Charminus, one of the com-
manders from Samos, had under his orders, and with them
was watching the approach of. the twenty-seven sail coming
up from Peloponnesus, which Astyochus was now going to
join : for they at Samoa had received from Miletus advice of
their commg, and Charminus was appointed to cruise for
them about Cyme, and Chalce, and Rhodes, and the coast
of Lycia ; and by this time he knew, for a certainty, that
they were lying at Caunus.

Astyochus, therefore, without loss of time, stood away for
Cyme, with a view to surprise the ships of the enen^ at sea
before they could get any adviee of his approach. A heaw

YSAR XX.] PKJUOPONMSSIAM WAR. 316

nOD aad thick cloudy wcaUwr occaf ioned Um dupcraimi of
his YMsels in the darl^ and sadly disoidared him.

When BBOming brok^, ihe fleet being widely iieparated and
the left wing driven already within the view of the Atheniana»
the remainder yet driving in confusion about the island, Char-
minus and the Athenians launched out against them with all
possible estpedition* though with fewer than twenty sail, ima-
gining this to be the squadron from Caunus whose approach
they were to observe ; and proceeding instantly to action,
they sunk three and disabled others. They had by far the
better in the action, till the numerous remainder of hbstile
ships appeared, to their great consternation, and encompassed
them round on all sides. Then, taking to open flight, they
lost six of their ships ; but with the remainder reached in
safety the Isle of Teuglussa, and from thence proceeded to
Halicarnassus.

This being done, tho Peloponnesians, putting back to Cn»-
dns, and the^twenty-seven sail from Caunus completing here
their junction with them, they put out again to sea in one
body ; and, after erecting a trophy at Cyme, returned again
to their anchorings at Cnidua.

The Athenians, on the other hand, had no sooner been in-
formed of the engagements of the squadrons, than with the
whole of their fleet they put out from Samoa, and made the
best of their way to Cyme. And yet against the fleet *t
Cnidus they made no sallies,, as neither did the enemy aeainst
them ; but, after taking up the tackling of the vessels left at
Cyme, and making an assault upon Lorima on the continent,
they returned to Samoe.

The whole united fleet of the Peloponnesians, now lying
at Cnidus, was busy in refitting completely for service ; and
the Lacedemonian council of eleven had a conference with
Tis6a]^emes, who was now come to them, in which they
notified to him their dislike of some things in past transac-
tions ; and, in regard to the future operations of war, debated
in what manner they might be carried on for their joint ben-
efit and convenience. But Lichas was the person who scru-
tinized most closely into the past, and expressed a dissatis-
faction with both treaties; affirming that <*even the last,
settled by Theramenes, was far from being good ; but that
terrible it would be, should the king now claim, upon that
pretext, the possession of that tiact of country of which either

816 PBL0P0NNE81AN WAR. [bOOK VUL

he or his ancestors had formerly been masters : for thus he
might be enabled once more to enslaye all the islands, and
ThessaJy, and Locris, qaite as far as Boeotia ; while the La-
cediemonians, instead of freeing, wonld be obliged to impose
the Median sabjection on the Gteciaiis. He insisted, there-
fore, that a better treaty should be made, or at least the
former should be instantly disannulled ; for on terms like the
present they would scorn to take pay from the king." Net^
tied at this, Tissaphemes went from them in a fit of choler,
without bringing affairs to any kind of settlement.

The scheme now next in agitation was a voyage to Rhodes,
which the most powerful persons there had by embassies soli-
cited them to undertake. They were full of hopes to bring
into their subjection an island by no means mconsiderable ei-
ther for number of mariners or soldiers ; and at the same
time judged themselves able, by their present alliances, to
defray the expense of their fleet withoat requesting pay from
Tissaphemes. Accordingly, this winter, with gr^at despatch,
they put to sea from Onidus ; and arriving first at Camirus,
on the Rhodian coast, with ninety-four ships, Uiey struck a
consternation into the multitude, who knew nothing of past
transactions, and were the sooner tempted to abandon their
dweilinffs as the city was not guarded by the least fortifica-
tion. The Lacedemonians, afterward, summoning to a con-
ference these, and the Rhodians also ifrom two other cities,
Lindus and lelysus, persuaded them to revolt from the Athe-
nians. Rhodes accordingly went over to the Peloponnesians.

At the same juncture of time, the Athenians, who had dis-
covered their design, put out with their fleet from Samos,
earnestly bent on preventing the scheme. They were seen
indeed out at sea by the enemy, but made their appearance
a little too late. For the present, therefore, they put back
to Chalce, and from thence to Samos ; and afterward, ma-
king frequent trips from Chalce, and Cos, and Samos, they
warred against Rhodes.

The Peloponnesians exacted from the Rhodians a sum
amounting to about two-and-thirty talents ;* and having laid
their ships sground, continued with them eighty days without
•nbiecting them to any farther imposition.

During this interval of time, nay, extended farther back,

* 6.9001. sterling.

TEAR XX.] PELOPONNE8IAM WAR. 3l1

oefiHe they undertook this enterprise against Rhodes, the fol-
lowing transaction happened :-^

Alcibiades, after the death of Chalcideos and the battle of
Miletus, falling under the suspicion of the Peloponnesians,
and throoffh them a letter haying beeii sent from Lacedasmon
to Astyocnus to pot him to death, for he was an enemy to
Agis, and his Ureacbery in other respects was become noto>
nous, Alcibiades, I say, fearful of his life, withdrew himself
first to Tissaphemes, and, in the next place, did all in his
power to undermine what interest the Peloponnesians had in
him. Ghrown at len^gth his dictator in every aiSair, he abrids-
ed their pay ; that, instead of an Attic drachma,* diree obdi
only should be given them, and that too with no punctuality
He advised Tissaphemes to remonstrate with them, that '* the
Athenians, who through a long tract of time had gained ex-
perience in naval afiairs, paid only three oboli to their sea-
men ; not so much througn a principle of frugaUty, as to pre-
vent their seamen from growing insolent through too much
plenty ; some of them would otherwise render their bodies
less fit for fatigue, by having wherewithal to purchase those
pleasures by which weakness is occasioned; and others
woold desert, and leave their arrears to balance their deser-
tion." He instructed him farther, how, by seasonable gratui-
ties to the commanders of ships and generals of the states,
he mi^ht persuade them all to acquiesce in his proceedings,
excepting the Syracusans ; for, among these, Hermocrates
alone made loud remonstrances in behalf of the whole alli-
ance. Nay, Alcibiades himself took upon him to give the
denial to such states as petitioned for money ; making answer
himself, instead of Tissaphemes, that, for instance, ** the Chi-
ans were void of all shame : who, though die most wealthy
of the Grecians, and hitherto ptteserved by the auxiliary ef-
forts of others,^ yet are ever requiring strangers to expose their
lives and fortunes to keep them free." As for other states,
he maintained ** they acted basely, if, when subjected to vast
expenses before they revolted fxfim the Athenians, they refu-
sed to lay out as much, nay, a great deal more, in their own
defence." He was also dexterous at proving that ** Tissa-
phemes, since now he supported the war at fis own private
expense, was in the right to be frugal ; but assuredly, when

* Six oboli, or 7|d. sterling.

D D 3

318 PBLOPONIfBSIAN WAR. [bOOK VUI

retnnifl were made him from the king, he wodid make op the
present abatement of pay, and do strict justice to every single
state." He farther suggested to Tissaphemes, that **he
should not be too much in a hurry to bring the war to a con-
clusion; or entertain the wish, either by bringing Hp the
Phoenician fleet which he had provided, or by tal^g into pay
a larger number of Grecians, to turn the superiority at land
and sea in &vour of the Lacedsmonians. He ought rather
to leave both parties pretty nearly balanced in strength ; and
so enable the king, when one of them became troublesome,
to let the other party loose against them : whereas, should
the dominion in both elements be given exclusively to either,
he would then be distressed for want of sufficient power to
pull down the triumphant state ; unless at a prodigious ex-
pense, and through mfinity of danger to himself, he should
choose to enter the list in person and war them down. The
risks incurred by the other method were far more eligible,
because attended with a smaller proportion of expense ; and
his master might lie by with perfect security, while he was
wearing out the Grecians by their own reciprocal embroil-
ments." He moreover hinted to him, that "the Athenians
were the best suited of the two to share the dominion with
him ; because they were less desirous of power on the conti-
nent, and by their peculiar turn of politics and military con-
duct were better adapted for this purpose. They would be
glad, at the same time, to subdue the maritime parts to their
own yoke, and to that of the king all Grecians whatever who
live upon the continent. The Lacedaemonians, on the con-
trary, came thither with the sole passion to set them free ;
nor in common prudence could it be judged Jikely, that men,
who were this moment employed to deliver Grecians from
the yoke of Grecians, would in that case be stopped by any
thing but a superior force from delivering them also from the
yoke of Barbarians." He advised him, therefore, «« in the first
place, to wear out the strength of both ; and, after clipping
as much as possible the wings of the Athenians, then instantly
to drive the Peloponnesians from off his coast."

The larger part of this advice Tissaphemes determined to
follow, so far at least as may be gathered from his actions ;
for, satisfied by this means with Alcibiades, as a person who
on these points gave him sound advice, and resigning himself
up to his guidance, he paid but sorrily their subsistence to the

VBAR XX.] PKLOPONNB8IAN WAE. 319

Pirioponnenans, and would not suffer ^m to •Dgago at mi.
By the oonaCant pretext that the PhcBnician fleet was coming
Ofk, and then with ao great a eopeiioiity of atrength the war
might he hvonefat to a dear deeieuni, he TQined ail eperatioBa
of war ; he aurored the Tigoor of thek i^eett which in faet
warn etneng and mighty, imenaibly to moulder away, and die-
concerted them ao^ openly in other veapecta, that loa motirea
in doing it were no hmger to be concealed.

Such was the advice which Akibiadea gave to Tiaaaphemea
and the king, when he had opportunitiea, and which he really
thongfat to be the beat in ptuicy ; but at the aame time he
had deep in hia heart and m his atudy hia own return to hia
country ; asaured within faimadf, that, if he preserved it finMi
a total dieatmction, he might find a time to compaaa hia own
restoratian : and nothing, he judged, could expedite his pur*
poee more, than if it appeared to the world that Tiaaaphenea
was his friend : which also was veiified by fact.

For, when the Athenian troops at Samos perceived that he
had so strong an interest with Tissaphemes, and Alcibiadea
had already paved the way by sending intimations beforehand
to the men of influence and authority among them, how desi*
rous he was ** they should patronise his return with the con*
sent of the persons of the greatest honour and worth in their
company ; aince only under an oligarchy, but not under an
iniquitous cabal, or that democraqr which had fonnerly baiH
ished him, could he even desire it ; and, thus recalled, he
would come and join his carss with theirs for the public wel*
£u«, and procure them fiurther the friendship of Tissapher-
nea ;" when, more than this, the officers of those Athenians
at Samoa, and the men of highest authority among them, were
vofamtarily inclined to put an end to the democracy, the
method of bringing it about began to be agitated first in the
arpy, and from thence aoon made a stir in Athens itself.

Some persons paaaed over from Samos to concert matteia
with Alcibiadea ; who gave them room to hope that <* he
could render first Tissaphemes, and in the next place the
king, their friend, if they would dissolve the democracy ;
since on this sole condition could the king be assured of
their sinoeiity." This contributed to enhance their aanguine
expectations, that on thia dieir afliaira might take a new turn,
in which men of firat rank in the community, who in the
pieaent managsment were most depressed, might recover the

320 FBLOPONMBSIAN WAR. [bOOK VIII.

adminukntion, and gain the ascendant over their enemiee.
Returning, therefore, to Samos, they took in the most proper
peEBons uiere to be assiatahta to the acheme ; and to the
many made public declarations, that '* the king might be made
their friend, and supply them with money, were Alcibtades re-
called, and the democracy suspended." The effect of these
declarations on the many was this, that, though for the pres-
ent they were chagrined at the scheme in agitation, yet,
soothed by the flattering hope of the royal subaidiee, they re-
frained from all manner of tumult.

Bnt the set which was caballinff in favour of an oliguchy,
after such open declarations to Uie multitude, reconsidered
the promises of Alcibiades among themselves, and with a
larger number of their associates. The scheme was judged
by all the rest to be feasible and sure ; but Phrynichus, who
was yet in the command, declared a total disUke of it. It ap-
peared to him (which was really the case) that *^ AlcAnades
cared as little for an oligarchical as a democraticai (B;ovem-
ment ; and that no other thought lay seriously at his heart
than to throw the present ^yemment into some state of con-
fusion, which his friends might so far improve as to carry his
recallment. Of consequence, the first pomt themselves should
guard against was, not to be thrown into seditions for the
benefit of the king. It was not probable (he plainly told
them), when the Peloponnesians had gained a power by sea
equal to their own, and were masters of cities not the most
inconsiderable amid the king's dominions, that the latter
should turn the bslance in favour of the Athenians, in whom
he had no confidence, at all, while he might firmly depend
upon the friendship of the Peloponnesians, who had never
done him any harm. . As for confederate states, to whom they
were to give a certain pledge of future oliearchy by setting up
that government among themselves, he told them he was well
aAsurod that on that account neither such as had revolted
would the sooner return, nor such as were at present their
own would the longer continue in their duty ; since the point
on which their wishes turned was, not to be enslaved by an
oligarchy rather than a democracy, but to recover their Ub-
erty, indifferent equally to either form. As for those of their
feUow-citizens to whom was given the appellation of worthy
and good, even they would perplex the train of government
as jnoch as the people, when, by cajoling that people^ and an-

YBAR XX.] P£I.OFONMBSIAM WAR. 321

thoritatiTely leading them into a series of bad meuures, they
would principally regard their own private emolaments : and,
should they be subjected to the caprice of such, to die by vio-
lence and without a trial must be the general fate ; whereas
the people was a sure resource in seasons of extremity, and
ever tempered the fury of the great. He was well convinced,
the states, enlightened by a long tract of experience, judged
of their government in the same light. Upon the whole,
therefore, the negotiations of Alcibiades, and all at present
opon the carpet, could in nowise be improved by him."

The party, however, associated together in this design,
abiding by Uieir former determinations, resolved to proceed to
their execution, and were preparing to send Pisander and
others by way of deputation to Athens, to set on foot the ne-
gotiations concerning the return of Alcibiades, the dissolution
of the popular government there, and the gaining over Tissa-
phemes to the Athenian friendship.

Phrynichus, now convinced that the return of Alcibiades
would be brought upon the carpet, and the Athenians assured-
ly srrant it ; apprehensive, farther, that, from the opposition
he had given it at their consultations, he should be exposed
to his resentments, as one who had endeavoured to stop it,
had recourse to the following project : he sent to Aatyochus,
admiral-in-chief of the Lacedaemonians, who yet continued in
the station of Miletus, a secret hint, by letter, that ** Alcibia-
des is ruining their affairs, by endeavouring to gain over Tis-
saphemes to the Athenians ;'' and, after giving him a clear
explanation of other matters, he pleaded " the candour of As-
tyochus in his own excuse, if he desired in this msnner to
ruin his mortal foe, though with some prejudice to the welfare
ftf his country." But Astyochos had given up all thoughts
of putting Alcibiades to death, especiuly as now he never
came within his reach ; yet, on this occasion, making a visit
to him and Tissaphernes at Magnesia, be communicated to
them the advices sent him from Samos, and became himself
an informer. He was accused by report, not only on this
but many other occasions, to have made court to Tissapher-
nes for his own private lucre ; and, for the same reason, when
the pay was not fully rendered before, he suffered it much more
pliantty than in duty he ought to have done. Alcibiades sent
away immediate notice to Uie managing party at Samos, that
he treachery of Phrynichus was detected by his own letter,
II.— B B

322 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK VUI

and insisted upon it that he be put to death. I^hrynichas, ter-
ribly alarmed, and pushed to the very brink of destruction
by such a discovery, sent again to Astyochas, blaming his
indiscretion on a former occasion in not keeping bis secret,
end assuring him that **n&rr he was ready to deliver up to
ms fury the whole force of the Athenians ftt Samoa" (dis-
tinctly recitinff to him the particulars by which, as Samoa
was unforti6ed, the whole scheme might be accomplished),
and that " undoubtedly he ought not to be censured if, when
his unrelenting foes had reduced him to such extremity ol
danger, he chose to do this, or even more than this, rather
than be destroyed by their rancour." But this proposal also
Astyochus communicated to Alcibiades.

Phrynichus, perceiving in time that Astyochus betrayed
him, and that notice each moment was only not arrived from
Alcibiades about the contents of his last, anticipated the dis-
covery, and became himself informer to the array, that ** the
enemy had resolved, as Samos was unfortified, and the whole
of their fleet not securely stationed within the harbour, to en-
deavour a surprise : of this he had gained the most certain
informations ; and therefore Samos ought necessarily to be
put into a posture of defence with the utmost expedition, and
proper guards in every respect be appointed." He himself
commanded, and consequently was empowered to see this
put in execution. All hands were instantly at work on the
fortification ; and Samos, though otherwise intended soon to
De, was b^ this piece of artifice immediately secured : and,
no long time after, came .etters from Alcibiades, importing
that " the army was betrayed by Phrynichus, and in pursu-
ance of it the enemy was coming to surprise them." Their
opinion of the good fiuth of Alcibiades was not in the least
established by this : it was argued that, as he was privy to
the plans of the enemy, from a prmciple of enmity he had
fastened upon Phrynichus the charge of being their accom-

Klice. Bj the last notification, therefore, he was so far from
urting him, that he only confirmed his evidence.
Yet, subsequent to ttus, Alcibiades ccntinued to make use
of all his address and persuasion with 1 issaphemes to gain
him over to the Athenians, who in fact s^od most in terror
of the Peloponnesians, because they had a larger fleet at hand
than the Athenians ; but was inwardly inclined, were it any
how feasible, to comply with his sagges^ons ; especially a%

ireAA XX.] PELOFOKNSSIAM WAR. 328

ever since the jar at Cnidas aboat the tnaity of Tbenmeiiea,
he had been exasperated against the PeUHNmnesians ; for
that jar had already happen^ at the tune ot their expedition
to Rhodes ; and the suggestion of Alcibiades, formerly men-
tioned, that " the -?iewa of the Lacedemonians were to aet
the cities free," waa yet more verified by the behaviour of
lichas, who had affirmed, that ** it was an article never to be
suffered in treaty, that the king should have those cities o(
which either himself or his ancestors had at any time been
possessed." And in truth Alcibiades, as one who had impor-
tant concerns at stake, continued with much zeal and assiduity
to ingratiate himself with Tissaphemes.

The Athenian deputies, with Pisaoder at their head, who
were sent from Samos, had do sooner reached Athens than
they obtained an audience from the people ; where, after
touching in a summary manner upon many other advantages,
they expatiated chiefly on this, that " by recalling Alcibiades,
and making an alteration in the democratical form of govern-
ment, they might gain the friendship of the king and a supe-
riority over the Feloponnesians." Large was the number
of those who would not hear the proposal against the democ-
racy. The enemies, farther, of Alcibiades were loud in their
clamours, that " shameful it would be if so enormous a trans-
gressor of the laws were recalled ; one, to whose crimes, in
point of the mysteries, the Eumolpidas and Ceryces* had
borne solemn attestation, the consequence of which was his
exile ; nay, had farther denounced a curse upon those who
should restore him." Pisander, interposing to put a stop to
this violent opposition and these tragical outcries, addressed
himself apart to each of these opponents, and asked them
BiQglj* ** whether any hope they had left of saving their coun-

* These were sacerdotal families at Athens, descended from
Eumolpus and Ceryx. The f<»rmer of them instituted the Eleu-
sinian mysteries ; and it was the grand privilege of his descend-
ants to preside at and regulate those sacred rites. Who Ceryx
was, and what the particular privileges of bis descendants, any
ferther than that (according to Suidas) they were " holy and
venerable,^ is not agreed. All of them were commanded to
pronounce the solemn curse on Alcibiades When he was out-
lawed. Yet one priestess (as Plutarch relates), Theano, the
^ughter of Menon, refused to obey ; alleging, that ** it was her
t: ty to bless, vai^ not to corse."

S24 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK YIII.

ity, now that the Peloponnesians had as many ships apon the
sea as tiiey had themselves, hat a larger numbet of confeder-
ate states, besides supplies of money &om the king and Tisea-
phernes, while themselves were quite exhausted, unless some-
body could persuade the king to declare in theii favour 1"
And when those to whom the demand was put replied in
the negative, he proceeded to make them this plain declara^
tion : " And yet this turn in your favour can never take place,
unless we temper our form of government with greater mod-
eration, and intrust the administration in the hands of the
few, that the king may have room to place confidence in us :
for we are at present to consult about the very being of the
state, and not to litigate the forms of its administration. The
sequel may again enable us to return to the primitive form, if
we find it expedient ; and we shall recover Alcibiades, the
only man alive who is able to accomplish the point."

The people, in fact, upon the first mention of an oligarchy,
were stung to the heart : yet afterward, convinced by Pisan-
der that no other resource was left, dispirited by fear, and en
couraged at the same time by a distant hope that anothei
change might in the sequel be brought about, they yielded u{
the point to the necessity of the state. Accordingly they
passed a decree, that ** Pisander and the ten joined with him
in the deputation should pass the sea, and ^negotiate ^e af
fair with Tissaphernes ana Alcibiades, in the method judged
by them most conducive to the public service." At the
same time, as Pisander had preferred a charge of maleadmin-
istration against Phiynichus, they discharged him and his
colleague Skirondas from their commands, and sent away
Diomedon and Leon to take upon them the command of the
fleet. The article with which Pisander chareed Phrynichus
was the betraying of lasus and Amorges. The truth is, he
thought him by no means a proper person to be let into a
share of their intrigues with Alcibiades.

And thus Pisander, after visiting in order all the several
juntos of the accomplices, already tormed in the city with the
view to thrust themselves into the seats of judicature and the
great ofiices of state ; and exhorting them severally to act
with unanimity, and by general concurrence to labour the de-
molition of the popular government ; and, after adjusting all
previous measures to guard best against dilatory proceedmgs,
repassed the sea to Tissaphernes, accompanied bj his ten as-
sociates in the doutation.

<

TEAR XZ.] PELOPONNB8IAN WAR. 325

In the same winter, Leon and Diomedon, being arrired a
their post, at the head of the Athenian fleet, made an expedi-
tion against Rhodes ; and there they found the ships of the
Peloponnesians hauled ashore. They made a deseent upon
the coast ; and, after defeating in battle such of the Rhodians
as made head against them, Uiey stood away for Chalce, and
for the future carried on the war more from thence than from
Cos ; for in that station Uiey were better enabled to watch
the motions of the Peloponnesiau fleet.

But at Rhodes arrived Xenophantidas, a Lacedasmonian,
despatched by Psedaritus from Chios, with advice that ** the
works of the Athenians were almost perfected ; and unless,
with the whole of their shipping, they come over to relicTe
them, all is lost at Chios." A resolution accordingly was
taken to endeavour their relief; bat, in the meantime, raeda-
ritns, at the head of his body of auziUaries and the Chians,
with all the force he could assemble together, sallied out
against the rampart which the Athenians had raised around
their ships, demolished a part of it, and made himself master
of those vessels which were hauled ashore. The Athenians
ran from all quarters to their defence ; and, having first en-
gaged and put to flight the Chians, the rest of the forces
under Psedaritus were also defeated. Psedaritas was killed,
as were numbers also of the Chians, and many arms were
taken : and, after this, the Chians were blocked up by sea
and land more closely than ever, and a terrible famine raged
among them.

The Athenian deputation, headed by Pisander, having
reached Tissaphemes, entered into conference about terms
of accommodation. Alcibiades now, as the conduct of Tis-
saphemes was still dubious and wavering, since he stood in
great awe of the Peloponnesians, and inhered to that rule
of policy he had learned from him, ** to war both sides out,**
Alcibiades now had recourse to another piece of refinement,
causing Tissaphernes to insist upon such exorbitant terms
that no accommodations could ensue. Tissaphernes, truly,
seems to me to have proceeded in this manner from his own
voluntaiy motives, because fear was predominant in him ; but
in Alcibiades it was purely art ; since, as he found the other
would not agree upon any terms whatever, he affected to
strike the conceit into the Athenians that it really was in his
DOwer to manacre him at pleasure, and that he was already

FBL0P0NNS8IAN WAR. [bOOK VUh

wrought to their purpose and willing to come to terms, where-
as the Atkeniaos would not offer enough: for Alcibiades
himself made such extravagant demands (since, though Tis*
saphemes assisted at the conference, the other managed it),
that, though the Athenians had yielded to the far greater
part, yet the breaking off the treaty would be thrown at their
doors. It was insisted, besides other demands, that " all Ionia
should be given up," and, what iaimore, " all the islands on
the Ionian coast ;" and other points. The Athenians seeming
to acquiesce in these, at length, upon the third meeting, lest
the smallness of his ovm influence should be plainly detected,
he demanded leave " for the king to build a fleet, and to sail
along the Athenian coasts, wherever, and with whatever force
he pleased." Here all accommodation was over : the Athe-
nians, concluding these points insuperable, and that they were
abused by Alcibiades, broke off in indignation and returned
to Samoa.

In the same winter, immediately after breaking off the con^
ference, Tissaphernes repaired to Caunus, with intuition to
bring the Peloponnesians again to Miletus, and to form other
compacts with them, the best he should be able, to sup^y
them farther with pay, and by all means to avoid an open
rupture. He was m fact apprehensive, that, should so large
a fleet be deprived of subsistence, or, necessitated to engage
with the Athenians, should suffer a defeat, or should the
mariners quit their vessels, the Athenians then would carry
their point without thanks to him : but his greatest fear was
this, lest for the sake of subsistence they should ravage the
continent. Upon all these considerations, and the prudential
motives arising from each, co-operating with his principal
maxim of balancing the Grecians against one another, he seat
for the Peloponnesians, paid them their arrears of subsist*
ence, and made the following treaty, the third of the kind,
with them : —

" In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, Alezippi-
das presiding in the college of ephori at Lacedaamon, articles
are signed, m the plain of Masander, between the Lacede-
monians and confederates on one side, and Tissaphernes,
Hieramenes, and the sons of Phamacus, on the other, con*
ceming the affairs of the king and those of the Lacedasmo*
nians and confederates.

<*The whole of the king's donumons situate in Ama be

IrJBAR XX.J PSLOPONNESIAN WAR. 3S7

long to the king ; and all his own dominions let the kin^ gov-
ern as to him seems meet.

'* The Lacedsmonians and confederates are not to enter
the dominions of the kins to commit any act of hostility
tfrhatever ; nor he those of the Contracting parties for any aet
>f hostility whatever.

** And in case any of the Lacedemonians or confederalM
enter in a hostile manner the dominions of the king, the La-
cedaemonians and confederates are bound to restrain them :
and, in case any subjects of the king act in a hostile manner

r'nst the Lacedemonians and confederates, be the king
bound to restrain them.

** Tissaphemes shall pay subsistence to the ships now upon
the station, according to the rates agreed on, till the king's
fleet comes up.

" But the Lacedsemonians and confederates, so soon as the
king's fleet shall be come up, shall have it in their own op-
tion to maintain, if they please, their own fleet ; or, in case
they choose to take subsistence frotn Tissaphemes, he is
bound to supply them. Yet the Laced smonians and confed-
erates, at the expiration of the war, shall repay to Tissa^
phernes whatever sums they may thus receive from him.

** When the king's fleet comes up, let the ships of the La-
cedsemonians, and those of the confederates, and those of the
king, carry on the war in concert, by the joint counsels of Tis-
saphemes and of the Lacedaemonians and confederates.

** And, whenever a peace with the Athenians is thought
advisable, it shall be concluded by the joint consent of both
parties."

The treaty was made and ratified in' these terms: and,
after this, Tissaphemes employed himself with diligence to
bring up the Phcenician fleet, as has been mentioned, and duly
to perform all the branches whatever of his engagements.
At least he was willing to convince the Peloponnesians, by
the measures he took, that he was heartily in earnest.

In the close of this winter the Boeotians got possession of
Oropus by treachery, though an Athenfan garrison was in it.
The business was effectuated by the management of a party
of Eretrians, and those Oropians who were plotting the re
volt of Eubcea : for, as this town was situated over against
Eretria, it' was impossible but, while in Athenian hands, it
tnqst terribly annoy both Eretria and the rest of Euboea.

328 PBLUPONNESIAN WAR. [BOOK VUI'

Having therefore thus gained Oropus, the Eretrians repaired
to Rhodes, inviting the Peloponnesians to come over to Eu-
bosa ; but their inclinations were rather to relieve Chios, now
sadly distressed. Putting therefore from Rhodes with the
whole of their fleet, they stood away to sea ; and having
gained the height of Triopium, they descried the Athenian
squadron out at sea in a course from Chalce ; yet, neither ma-
km^ any motion to bear down upon the other, one fleet pursned
their couf se to Samos, the other put into Miletus. They were
now convinced that, without fighting at sea, they could not
possibly relieve Chios.

Here this winter ended : and the twentieth year of this
war expired, the history of which Thucydides has compiled.

YEAR XXI.*

In the ensuing summer, upon the first commencement of
the sprinff, Dercylidas, a Spartan, at the head of an army
not considerable for numbers, was sent over land to Helles-
pont to effectuate the revolt of Abydos : they are a colony of
the Milesians. The Chians also, while Astyochus was per-
plexed about the method of relieving them, were necessitated,
by the intolerable closeness of the blockade, to hazard an en-
gagement at sea. It happened, while Astyochus was yet in
Rhodes, that Leon, a Spartan, who came over with Antis-
thenes, though merely as a passenger, had arrived at Chios
from Miletus, to act as governor after the death of Psdari-
tus, with twelve sail of shipping draughted from the squad-
ron stationed at Miletus ; of these, five were Thurian, four
Syracusan, one belonged to Anaea, another was Milesian, and
one was Leon's own. Upon this, the Chians having sallied
out with all their force, and carried a strong post from the
enemy, and at the same time their fleet, consisting of six-
and-thirty sail, launching forth against the thirty-two Athe-
nians, an engagement followed ; and, after a battle hotly
maintained on both sides, the Chians and allies, who had not
the worst of the dispute, sheered off again into harbour ; for
by this time-it began to grow dark.

Instantly upon this, Dercylidas having completed his
march from Miletus, Abydos in Hellespont revolted to Dercyl-
idas and Pharnabazus ; and two days after Lampsacus did
the same.

« Before Christ 411.

7SAR XXI.] PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 3S9

Bat inteUigence of this having reached Strorabichidea ai
Cluoa, and he, with four-and-twenty sail of Athenians, inclu-
ding the transports which carried the heavy-armed, stretching
thiuer with alt possible expedition, the liainpsacenes sallied
OHt to repulse htm. He defeated them in battle ; and, hav-
in|^ at ft shout made hhnseif master of Lampsacus, which waa
quite onfottified, he gave up all the effects and slaves for pil-
lage to his men ; and, alter re-establishing such as were nee
in ^eir old habitations, proceeded agawst Abydos: but,
finding them deaf to all schemes of accommodation, and him-
self unable to reduce them by force, crossmg over to the spot
opposite to Abydos, he garrisoned Sestus.a city in the Cher-
sonesuB, which had formerly belonged to the Medea, and put
it in a condition to guard the Hellespont.

During this interval of time the Chians had very much en-
larged their room at sea ; and those stationed at Miletus, and
even Astyochus, upon receiving the particulars of the late
engagement, and advice that Strombichides was drawn off
wiUi so many ships, began to be high in spirits. Astyochus,
accordingly, arriving at Chios with only two ships, carried off
along with him what shipping was there, and with the whole
force was now at sea, in order to make an attempt upon Samos.
But when the enemy there, because mutually embroiled in
jealousies, came not out against him, he returned again to
the station of Miletus ; f<Mr, about this time, or rather before*
the democracy was overturned at Athens.

The deputation, at the head of which was Pisander, were no
sooner returned to Samos from Tissaphemes, than they found
their schemes had gained a stronger footing in the army, and
that the Samians had been encouraging the men of power
among the Athenians to join their efforts with them for the
erection of an oligarchy, though a party was very busy in op-
posing them, with a view to quash the projected alteration.
The Athenians, farther, at Samos, had in private conferences
come to a resolution, <*to think no longer of Alcibiades,
since he showed himself so averse to join them, and in fact
was by no means a proper person to have a share in an oli-
garchical administration ; but, merely from a principle of self-
preservation, as now they were environed with dangers, they
should take aU possible care that the project should not dtop
m the execution. That, farther, they should prosecute the
war with vigour, and contribute largely towards it from their
II.— Co

330 PBLOPONNBSIAN WAR. [bOOK VIII

own private purses, and answer every other exigence of eer-
vice, since, no longer for others, but their own sakes, they
must continue the struggle.'* Determined, therefore, to pro-
ceed in this manner, they despatched Pisander and half the
former deputation once more to Athens, to manage the exe-
cution of the project there: to whom, farther, instructions
were given, at whatever places in their dependancea they
should touch upon the voyage, to set up the oligarchy. The
other half they sent severally about to other of the dependant
sUtes. Diotrephes also, who was now at Chios, but appoint-
ed to take upon him the command of the Thracian provmces,
they ordered away immediately to his post.

Diotrephes, upon his arrival at Thasus, dissolved the pop-
ular government ; and, in the second month at most after
this, the Thasians forti6ed their city as men who no longer
cai ^d for an aristidcracy under Athenian influence, but were
in daily expectation of receiving liberty from the Lacedsmo-
nians : for a number of their countrymen, driven oat by the
Athenians, were now refuged among the Peloponnesians.
These were labouring the point with tlkeir correspondents in
Thasus, to bring off their shipping, and declare a revolt.
The present alteration, therefore, fell out exactly to their own
wish ; their state was restored to its ancient form without
any trouble ; and the people, who alone were able to dis-
concert them, were divested of their power. In Thasus,
therefore, the event took an opposite turn to what those Athe-
nians who laboured the oligarchy had at heart ; and, in my
judgment, the case was the same with many other of their
dependant states : for, having now their eyes open to their
own welfare, and being exempted from the dread of suffering
for what others did, they ran mto the scheme of a total inde-
pendence, which they preferred before the precarious aitua*
tion of being well governed by the Athenians.

Pisander and his colleagues, in the course of their voyage,
observed their instructions, and dissolved the popular govern-
ments in the cities where they touched. From some of these
they also procured parties of heavy-armed to aid them in th^
grand project, and so landed at Athens. Here they found af-
fairs in great forwardness, through the activity of their accom-
plices : for, some of the younger sort having combined to«
gether in a plot against Androcles, who had the greatest sway
among the people, and had also been deeply concerned in

YEAR XXI. J FBL0P0NNE8IAN WAR. 381

nnishing Alcibiades, they secretly despatched mm. On him,
for a doable reason, because of his influence with the people,
and with the thought that it might oblige Alcibiades, whose
recallment was now expected, and through his interest the
friendship of Tissapheraes, they chose first to wreak their
fury. Of some others also, nrhose tractability they doubted,
they had rid themselves by tne same practices. A specious
harangue had, farther, been dressed up for the purpose, that
** none ought to receiTO the public money but such as serred
the state in war with their persons ; that affairs of state
ought not to be communicated to more than five thousand,
and those to be men who were best qualified, by their estates
and personal bravery, to serve the public."

This vnth the majority of the city had a fair outside, since
such as should concur in the change bid fairest for a share in
the administration. Yet still the assembly of the people and
the council of the bean* continued their meetings ; but thou
they only passed such decrees as were approved by the cabai.
Nay, of this number were all who spoke, and who had pre-
viously considered together what should bo said upon every
occasion : no other person pi^esumed at any time to oppose
their motions, through dread of a cabal which they saw was
large ; or, did any one venture to open his mouth, by some
dexterous contrivance he was certainly put to death. Who
were the agents in these murders, no inquiry at all ; and of
who were suspected, no kind of justification. The people,
on the contraiy, looked on with stupid gaze, and such a fit
of consternation as to think it clear gsdn not yet to have suf
fered violence, even though they held their tongues ; ima-
gining, besides, that the conspiracy had spread much farther
Uian It really bad, they were quite dispirited. To discover
any certainty of their numbers they were tjuite unable, be-
cause of the great extent of the city, and their ignorance how
hr their neighbours might be concerned. On the same ac
count it was also impossible for him who deeply resented his
condition to bemoan himself in the hearing of another, or to
participate counsels for reciprocal defence : he must eithe
have opened his mind to one whom he did not know, or to
an acquaintance in whom he durst not confide ; for all the
3opalar party regarded one another with jealous eyes, as in

* The senate.

832 PSLOPONNBSIAN WAR. [boOK VIH.

MND* measure invohred in the present machinations. Sons
in fact were c<mcenied who coald never have been suspected
of oligarchical principles ; and these men gave rise to the
great diffidence whicn spread amonff the many, and dieir
after it the highest security to the schemes of the few, as it
kept alive that mutual distrust which reigned among the
people.

Pisander therefore and his aasociates^ arriving at this veiy
juncture, ^ve the finishing stroke without delay. In the first
place, havmg called an assembly of the people, they moved
for a decree, " That a committee of ten should be elected
with full discretionary power. This committee of ten ehoidd
draw up the form of a decree, to be reported to the people
on a day prefixed, in what marnior the state may be best ad-
ministered.*' In the next place, when that day came, they
summoned an assembly of the people at Colonus : this is a
temple of Neptune, without the city, and distant from it about
ten stadia.* And here the committee reported no other pro-
posal than this ; " that it be lawful for any Athenian to deUrer
whatever opinion he himself thought proper." They then en-
acted heavy penalties against any man who hereafter should
accuse the speaker of a breach of law, or should bring him
into any trouble whatever.

This being done, it was now, ^thout the least reserve oi
ambiguity, moved, that "no magistrate whatsoever should
continue in his post upon the old establishment, nor receiTe
a public salary ; but that five presidentst be chosen, who
should choose one hundred persons, and each of these hun-
dred should name three persons for associates : that these
persons should enter into the senate, be invested absolutely
with the administration, and should farther be empowered to
convene the five thousand whenever they should deem it
proper."

risander was the person who made this proposal, and who
also in other respects showed himself openly one of the most
zealous to pull down the democrwy. But he who contriTed
the whole of the plan, and by what steps the a&ir should be
thus carried into execution, was Antipho, a man who in per*
sonal merit was second to no Athenian then alive, and th
greatest genius of his time to devise with sagacity, and in

* One English mile* f II^M^poi.

TKAR XXI.] PSI.OPOIfNE8IAN WAR. 333

geniotislj to ezpreas what he had once devised. At the as-
semblies of the people, or any public debate, he never assist-
ed, if he could possibly decline it ^ since the miiltitade was
jealous of the {freat reputation he had gained : yet, in the
courts of judicature or appeals to the people, he was the
only person who was able effectually to serre those clients
who could get him for their patron. And this same Antioho,
when in process of time the government of the four hunored
was quite demolished, and severely prosecuted by the people,
is judged to have defended their conduct, and pleaded in a
cause where his own life was at stake, the best of any person
that down to this time was ever heard to speak.

I%rynichus also was another who singularly distin^ished
himself in his zeal for the oli^rchy. He dreaded Alcibiades,
as conscious that he was privy to the whole of the corre-
spondence he had carried on with Astyochus. He proceed-
ed thus, on the supposition that Alcibiades would never be
restored by an oh^rchical government : and then he was a
man in whose capacity and zeal, if once engaged, the great-
est confidence might reasonably be placed.

Theramenes, farther, the son of Agnon, a man who both in
speaking and acting made no ordinary figure, had a principal
share in the dissolution of the popular government : no won-
der, therefore, as the business was managed by so many and
so able agents, that, spite of every obstacle, it was brought to
effect. OrievoQs indeed it was to the Athenian people to
submit to the loss of their liberty a century after tne expul-
sion of their tyrants ; during which period they had not only
been independent, but accustomed, for above faialf that space,
to snte law to others.

To return. When, in the assembly of the people, not a
■onl was heard to oppose the motion, it passed into a law, and
the assembly was adjourned. They afterward introduced the
four hundred into the senate, in the following manner : —

The whole body of the citizens were daily under srms
either upon tiie waUs or in the field, to bridle the excursions
of the enemy from Decelea. Therefore, on the day appointed,
they suffered such as were not in the secret to repair to their
posts as usual : but, to those in the plot, it had been privately
notified, **by no means to repair to their post, but to lag be-
hind at a distance ; and, in case any one should strive to op-
pose what was now to be agitated, they should take up arms

334 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK Till

and quell all opposition." Those to whom these orden
were previously imparted were the Andrians and Teiaos,
three hundred of the Carysthians, and other persons now es-
tablished in ^gina, whom the Athenians had sent thither br
way of colony, hut were now invited to repair to Athens with
their arms to support the scheme. When these dispositions
were fonned, the four hundred (each carrying a concealed
dagger, and guarded by one hundred and twenty youths of
Greece, whose hands they had employed when assiissination
was the point) broke in upon the counsellors of the bean,*
who were this moment sitting in the senate-house, and called
out to them "to quit the place and take their salaries.^t
Accordingly they had ready for them the full arreacs due
to them, which they paid to each as he went put of the
\iouse. In this manner the senate, without giving the least
opposition, removed themselves tamely from their office ; and
the rest of the citizens made no ejQfort to check such proceed-
ings, and refrained from any the least tumult.

The four hundred, having thus gained possession of the
senate-house, proceeded immediately to ballot for a set of pres-
identst from among their own body ; and made use of all the
solemn invocations of the deities and the sacrifices with which
the presiding magistrates execute their office. By their sub-
sequent proceedings they introduced considerable alterations
in the popular form of government ; excepting that, on ac-
count of Alcibiades, they refrained from recalling exiles ; but,
in all other respects, they ruled with all possible severity.
Some persons, whose removal was deemed convenient, though
few in number, they got assassinated ; some they threw into
prison, and some they banished. To Agis, also. King of the
Lacedeemonians, who was still at Becelea, they despatched a
deputation, notifying "their readiness to accommodate all
disputes, and that with greater confidence he might proceed
to make up matters with them than with a democracy which
was not to be trusted."

Agis, full of the imagination that the city would not quietly
submit to these changes, and that the people would not thus
tamely part with their ancient liberty ; or, should they now

♦ The senate of five hundred.

t The stated salary for a senator of Athens was a diachma
or aevenpence three nirthings a day.

TBARXXJ.] PELOPONNBSIAN WAR. 335

behold his iramjproas army approaching, that public coinbu*-
tions must ensue among them ; unable to persuade himself
that at the present juncture they could possibly be kept from
tumults, — Agis, I say, returned no proposal of terms to the
deputation which came to him from the four l^dred. But,
having sent for a numerous re-enforcement from JPeloponnesus,
he advanced soon after, with the garrison of Decelea and the
fresh re-enforcements, up to the very walls of Athens. He
took this step on the presumption that " thus, either thrown into
utter confusion, they might be mastered whenever he gave the
word, or even at the first sight of his approach, through the
^eat confusion which in all probability must follow both with-
in and without ; since, to make himself master of the long
walls,' as there could not be hands at leisure for their defence,
he could not fail."

But when, upon his nearer approach, the Athenians within
were thrown into no stir or bustle at all ; when even they
caused their cavalry, and detachments of their heavy-armed,
light-armed, and archers, to sally out into the field, who made
a slaughter of such as were too far advanced, and became
masters of their arms and dead bodies ; finding then he had
proceeded upon wrong presumptions, he again drew off his
army. After this, he himself, with the former garrison, con-
tinued in the post of Decelea ; but the late re-enforcement,
after some continuance in the country, was sent back to Pelo-
ponnesus. ^

Tet, subsequent to this, the four hundred persisted in send-
ing deputies to Aeis with as much eagerness as ever ; and
he now receiving Uiem in a better manner, with encourage-
ments to proceed, they even sent an embassy to Lacedsmon
to propose a treaty, being of all things desirous to obtain an
accommodation.

They also sent to Samoa a deputation of ten, in order to
satisfy the army, and give them ample assurance that " the
oligarchy was not set up for the prejudice either of the state
or any individuals, but as the only expedient left to preserve
the whole community ; that the number of those who now
had the management was five thousand, and not barely four
hundred ; and yet, on no occasion whatever had the Atheni-
ans, partly through employment in their armies abroad or other
foreign avocations, ever met together, to consult on affairs of
state, in numbers so large as five thousand." Having in-

<36 PSLOFONNESIAN WAR. [BOOK Till.

straeted them to msert some other alleviating pleas, they sent
them away upon the first instant of the change they bad
made ; apprehensive of what actually came to paaa, that the
bulk of their seamen would never quietly subput to aa oli^-
chical government, and an opposition beginning there mig^t
overturn all that had hitherto been done.

For at Samoa some stirs had already arisen about the oli-
garchy, and that which is now to be recited hwpened exactly
at the time that the four hundred seized the aoministrttbion at
Athens.

The party which at this juncture were subsisting at Samos
aeainst the nobility, and were of the popular side, caving now
altered their schemes, and followed Uie suggestions of Pisan-
der ever since his return from Athens, and gained the con-
currence of Athenians at Samos, combined together by oa^
to the number of about three hundred, and resolved to fall
upon their antagonists as factious on the side of the people.
Accordingly, they murdered one Hyperbolus/ an Atnemaa,

* This was the person whom the ostracism made in some
measure famous, and who made the ostracism auite infamous.
Plutarch has repeated the story thrice. The foUowing extract
is taken from the life of Nicias.

" When the opposition was very hot at Athens between Afci-
biades and Nicias, and the day for ostracising was drawing on,
which at certain intervals the people of Athens were need to en-
force, and send away into a ten years' exile some one citizen
fsuspected of designs against their liberty, (Mr odious for being too
illustrious or rich, each of these grand competitors was under
grievous appr^ensions, and with reason too, that it might be his
own lot to be exiled on this occasion. Alcibiades was hated for
his way of lijfe, and for his bold and enterprising genius. Nicias
was envied on account of his wealth ; his way of living was
neither sociable nor popular ; as he avoided a crowd, ana herd-
ed with a few intimates, he gave great distaste ; besides, as he
had often opposed the caprices of the people, and constrained
them to pursue their real mterest, he was deep in their diaplras
ure. In short, the omtest ran high between toe young and mil
itary men on one side, and the old pacific Athenians on the other,
while each were endeavouring to throw the .ostracism upon the
bated object. Bat, «

* Parties ran high, and scoundrels got renown.'^

, ** Such dissensions in the community gave scope to knaves ana
"Doendianea. There was one Hyperbolus, of ' Perithads^ v«i

TEAR XXI.] PELDPONNESIAN WAR. 337

R sctirry feHow, and banished by the cwtimeieiB^ not from a
dread of hi« influence or wei|^, bat for the profligacy of hia
life, and his bdng a public disgrace to his country. In this
they were countenanced by Charminns, one of the command-
ers, and some of the Athenians associated with them, to whom
they gave this pledge ci fidelity. Some other acts of the
same nature they committed by instroctions from them, and
had it in agitation to multiply ^eir blows ; but these marked
out for destruction jetting wind of their design, communi-
cated the whole to £eon and Diomedon, who thought of an
oligarchy with high regret, because their credit was high with
the people ; to Thrasybulus* also and Thrasyllns, the former •

assuming, without the least reason to be so ; however, by dint
of impudence working himself into power, and the disgrace of
his country so soon as he had made himself conspicttous in it.
On this occasion Hjrperbotus conkl bare no snspkiOB of becom-
ing himself the butt of an ostracism ; he had a much better title
to the gallows. Presuming, on the contrary, that, when either
of these great men were exiled, he himself could easily make
head against the other, he manifested great pleasure at the con-
test, and irritated the fury of the people against them both.
Nicias and Akibiades, perceiving his roguish intent, conferred
privately together ; and, getting their several fiM;tions to unite,
secured one another, and threw the votes on Hyperbolus. Such
a turn at first gave the Athenimis much j^ieasure and diversion ;
yet soon after they were highly chained, by reflecting that
nmking such a scoundrel the object of it was shaming the ostra-
cism for ever. There was dignity even in punishments: the
ostracism was of such a nature as to suit a Thucydides, an Aris-
tides, and men of such exalted characters. It was clear honour
to Hyp^boltts ; and gave him room to boast, that, though a
seounorel, he had been distinguished like the ^atest and best
Athenians ; as Plato, the comic poet, says of hmi,
< He always acted worthy of himself.
But quite unworthy of such high reproof :
The shdl was ne'w designed to honour scoundrels.'
In a word, no person was ever banished bv the ostracism after
Hyperbolus ; it was he who closed the Ust.^*

♦ Thrasybulus, whose name now first occurs, acts a very high-
spirited and noble part in the close of this history. "If virtus
could be weighed merely by itself, without any regard to out-
ward circumstance, I should not hesitate (says Cornelius Nepos)
to prefer him before all the great men in Greece. But I aver,
that no^ one o^ them ever surpassed him in integritT* in resolii

338 PELOPONNBSIAN WAR. [bOOK VIII.

captain of a trireme, and the latter of a band of heayy-anaed ;
and to snch others as were judged most likely to stem the
fury of the conspirators. These they conjured " not to look
calmly on till their destruction should be completed, and
Samos rent away from the Athenians, by which alone till
now their empire had been preserved and supported." Lis-
tening therefore to these representations, they privately ex-
horted every smgle soldier not to suffer such proceedings,
and more earnestly than others the Paralian, since all that
sailed in that vessel were citizens of Athens, all free, and ene-
mies determined, from time immemorial, to an o%archy, even
when it had no existence. Leon also and Diomedon never
went out to sea without leaving them some ships for their
guard ; insomuch that, when the three hundred made their
attempt, as all these united in their obstruction, but most
heartily of all the Paralians, the popular party at Samos was
rescued from destruction. Thirty of those three hundred
they even slaughtered, and three of the most fieictious among
the survivers they doomed to bamshment. Then, having
published an indemnity for the rest, they continued to sup-
port the democracy at Samos.

Bat the Samians and soldiery despatched the Paralus with
all expedition to Athens, having on board her Chsreas, Uie
son of Archestratus, an Athenian, who had borne a considera-
ble share in the last turn of affairs, charged with a notification
of these last transactions ; for yet it was not known at Samos
that the four hundred had seized the administration. No
sooner, therefore, were they come to their moorings, than the

tion, in grandeur of soul, and true patriotism. Yet, I know not
how it is, though nobody excelled nimin real merit, many have
outstripped him in point of fame. In the Peloponnesian war
(the part of it which now remains), Thrasybulus did many things
without Alcibiades ; Alcibiades did nothing without Thrasybu-
lus; and yet the otner, through a happiness peculiar to himself,
reaped the glory and benefit of all." So says this elegant Ro-
man writer. The reader will soon see some of Thrasybu-
lus's exploits, separately from and in concert with Alcibiades :
but the glory of^ his lite was ridding AUiens some years after
of thirty tyrants at a blow ; for which he was rewarded by a
wreath of olive, the most honourable recompense his mtefiil
countrymen could bestow upon him. He was ever a firm, in-
trepid, disinterested patriot; and lost his life at last in the ser
vice af his country.

7BAR XXI.] PELOPONNBSIAN WAR. 339

four hundred caused two or ^ree of the crew of the Parslue
to be d ra gged away to priaon ; the retidue they tnmed over
from that Teasel mto another ship of war, and ordered them
away as a guard-ship for the station of Eubooa. But Chare-
as, sensible in what train afiairs were going, had the good
fortune to m^e his escape ; and, returning a^ain to Samoa,
related to the soldiery all that had been done m Athens, ex-
aggerating every point with abundant severity : — that *' every
citizen was now kept in awe with whips and scourges, and
that even theur own wives and children daily felt the inso-
lence of those tyrants ; nay, they have it now in agitation,
that if any on duty at Samos shall presume to oppose their
pleasure, immediately to arrest and imprison the whole of
their kindred ; and, in case the former will not submit, to put
the latter to death." On many other points he also expatia-
ted, all aggravated with falsehoods.

His audience, in the first instant of their passion, were
fully bent on the destruction of all those who nad appeared
most active for an oligarchy, and, in short, of all who had any
hand in its promotion ; but, being stopped by the interposi-
tion of others more moderate, and listening to the remon-
strance, that *' they ouffht not to accelerate the ruin of their
country, now that a fleet of the enemy lay almost ranged
against them for battle/* they desisted. And, afterward,
those who had openly avowed the design of restoring the de-
mocratical form at Samos, namely, Thrasybulus the son of
Lycus, and Thrasylius (for these had the principal aeency in
this new revolution), caused every soldier to swear the most
solemn oaths, more especially such as were for an oligarchy,
that '* they would submit to no form but the democracy, and
would act in this cause with general unanimity ; and, farther,
would zealously prosecute the war against the Peioponnesians ;
that eternal enemies they would remain to the four hundred,
and would enter into no treaty of accommodation with them.*'
All the Samians, farther, that were old enough to bear arms,
took the same oaths ; and henceforth the army communicated
all their affairs to the Samians, and gave them an insight into
all the dangers which might attend the sequel ; convinced
that otherwise no safe resource remained for either ; but if
the four hundred or the enemy at Miletus proved too hard for
them, their rum was unavoidable.

Terrible were the present embroilments of the times, while

MO PBL0P0NNS8IAN WAE. [bOOK VIU.

those At Saaios wieow tijing to w-etiMA the democsicy «t
Athena, and thow »t Athens to force an otigaMhical hna i^Mm
the army. The aoldien, farther, immedwteljr aummmiftti a
general aeaemUy, in which they deposed thms former cobk
manders, and all such captains of trimnes as fell under their
suspicions, and th«i chose others to fiU up the Tacanciee,
both captains of triremes and land-oonunanders, among whom
were Thrasyhulns and Thrasylles. The last rose up in the
assemUy aiad encouraged them by evMy topic of persvaakm;
par tici:darly, that *< th^ had not the least reason to be dis-
pirited, ^ough Athens herself had revolted from them ; far
this was merely the secession of a minority from men whose
numbers wem greater, end who were better ftumished for ev-
ery exigence ; because the whole navy of Athene was their
own, by which they could compel dependant states to|»ay in
their former continffenta of tribute as foUy as if they sailed
on such an errand from Athens itself. Even yet they were
masters of a city at Samos, a city despicable in no respect,
but which once in a former war had wellnigh wrested the
eo^e of the sea from the Athenians. The seat of wai^ in
Vegard to their public enemies, would continue the same as
it was befoare ; nay, by being masters of the fleet, they were
better aUe to procure all t& needful sv^i^iies than their op-
ponents who were now st Athens. It was purely owing to
their own peciriiar situaftiea at Samos that the others had
hitherto beea naeters of the entrance into the Pireus ; and
they soon should be hi^y distrsssed if they refused to r»>
store them their ancient polity, since these at Samos oonld
more easily bar them the use of the sea thaa be baned up by
them. What assistance Athens had hkherto given uiem
against the en«ny was but trifling, and 'of no real impor-
tance. Nothing could be lost from that quarter, which was
no longer able to supply them with mon^, since wkh that
they had been sc^pbed by the army ^ nor to send them any
valuable instructions, for the sake of which alone the troops
abrosd were sabmissive to the orders of the state at home.
Nay, in some points, those at Athens had most egiegioasly
offended, since they had oveartumed the laws of ueir eonn*
tnr, which those here had preserved, and were ezertiii^ theii
effi>rt8 to compel others to the observance of them ; and,
therefore, in every method of valuation, the men who hero
provided well for the public welfare wove in no respect

irXAK XXI.] PSLOPONNBSIAN WAR. 341

wone patriots than the men at Athens. Even Aldbiades,
^ould they grant him an indenmity and a safe return, would
reaxtily proenre them ^e king's alliance : and, what had the
greatest weight, should they miscarry in every branch of their
present designs, many places of refuge lay always open to
men possessed of so considerable a fleet, in which they might
find n-erii cities and another coimtry."

After eneh occurrences m the assembly conToned by the
soldiery, and the condosion ^ their mutual exhortations,
they continued their preparations for wac with unremitting
diligence. But the deputaUon of ten, sent from the four
hmidred to Samoa, being informed of these proceedings when
they were advanced in their voyage so far as Dslos, thought
proper to proceed no farther.

About this very time, the Pelopcmnesians on board the
fleet stationed at Miletus clamoured loudly among themselves,
that '* they were betrayed by Astyochus and 'Hssaphemes ;
as the former had already refused to engage, when themselves
were hearty and in fine condition, and the fleet of the Athe-
nians was small ; nor would do so even now, when the latter
were reported to be embroiled with intestine seditions, and
th^ own ships were daily impairing ; but, under pretext of a
Phoenician fleet to be brought up by Tissa^emes, an aid
merely nominal, and which would never jom them, he was
mining all by dilatory measures. Aud as for Tissaphemes,
it was never his intention to bring up that fleet ; but he was
plainly undermining the strength of theirs, by not supplying
them constantly and fully with their pay. The time, there-
fore, they insisted, ought no longer to be thus idly wasted,
but an engasemeot hazarded at once." Yet in such clam-
ours those deepest concerned were the Syracusans.

The confederates and Astyochus himself being affected
with these clamours, and having declared in a counsel of
war for engaging the enemy forthwith, as they had received
undoubted intelligence of the confusions at Samos ; putting
out to sea with the whole of their fleet, amounting to a hun-
dred and twelve sail, and having ordered the Milesians to
march Ihither over ten^ they stood away for M^rcale. At
GlanesB of Mycale the Athenians were now lying, with eighty-
two ships of the Samian department : for in this quarter of
Mycale S«&os lies, but a small distance from the conti
«ent : but, when tiiey saw the fleet of the Peloponnesians ap*

342 PELOPONNEStAN WAR. [bOOK TUI.

proeching, they retired to Samos, judging their own strength
insnfEcient for an engagement with the foe which might
prove decisive. Besides, as they had discovered the inten-
tion of those at Miletns to venture an engagement, they ex*
pected Strombichides from the Hellespont, who was to briM
to their assistance the ships on the station of Chios wfai^
had gone up to Abydos ; and a message had already been
despatched to hasten him up. For these reasons they- pUed
away to Samoa. The Peloponnesians, arriving at Mycale,
encamped upon the shore, along with the land-forces of the
Milesians and those sent in by the bordering people. On the
next day, when they were folly bent on standing directly
against Samoa, advice was brought them that ^ Strombichides
had come up with the ships from the Hellespont ;" upon which
they made the best of their way back again to M[i]etu8.
And now the Athenians, having gained so lai^ge an acces-
sion of strength, showed themselves immediately before
Miletus, with a hundred and eight sail, desirous of coming
to an engagement with the enemy. But, as nothing stirred
.out against them, they also returned to Samoa.

In the same summer, immediately after the former move-
ments, the Peloponnesians, who had waived coming out to
an engagement, since with the whole of their strength they
thought themselves by no means a match for their enemy,
and were now reduced to great perplexities about the methods
of procuring subsistence for so numerous a fleet, especially as
Tissaphemes was so remiss in his payments, sent away to
Phamabazus (pursuant to the prior instructions from INslo-
ponnesus) Clearchus, the son of Ramphias, with a detach-
ment of forty sail ; for Phamabazus had demanded such a
force, and was ready to support tiie expenses of it ; and it
had been farther notified to them in form that Byzantium was
ripe for a revolt. And thus this detachment of Peloponne-
sians, having run out far to sea to get clear of the Athenians
during the course, met vrith very tempestuous weather. The
bulk of them, it is true, with Clearchus, rode it out to Delos,
and from thence returned again to Miletus. But Clearchus,
setting out again, travelled over land to Hellespont, and took
upon him the command. Ten ships, however, of the detach-
ment, under Elixus, the Megarean, who was joined in the
command, reached the Hellespont without damage, and effect*
nated the revolt of Byzantium. The Athenians at Samos* in*

TBAR ZXI.] PSLOPONNESIAN WAR. 343

fonned of these incidents, sent away a detachment to the
Hellespont, to support and guard the adjacent cities : and a
small engagement happened before Byzantium, between eight
ships on a side.

Those who were in the management at Samoa, and aboye
all Thiasybulus, adherinff still to the sentiments they had en-
tertained ever since the last turn of afl^s there, that Alci-
biades must needs be recalled ; the latter at last obtained, in
fuU assembly, the concurrence of the soldiery. Accordingly*
when they had voted a return and an indemnity to Alci-
biades, Thrasybolus repaired immediately to Tissaphemes,
and brought Alcibiades back with him to Samos ; con-
vinced their last resource depended on his being able to
aUenate Tissaphemes from the Peloponnesians. Hereupon,
an assembly being called, Alcibiades at large expatiated upon
and deplored the malignity of his fate, in having been exiled
from his country : and then, having amply run over every
topic relating to the present posture of affairs, he raised their
expectations high in regard to the future. He magnifie^t
with a mighty parade of words, his own interest in Tissaphep-
nes ; from the view, not only to intimidate the patrons of the
oligarchical government at Athens, and put a stop to their
cabals, but also to render himself more respectable to those at
Samos, and to raise up their confidence in him as high as
possible : to give the enemy, farther, as many handles as he
was able to calumniate Tissaphemes, and to lower all their
present sanguinary expectations. Those were the schemes
of Alcibiades, when, with all imaginable ostentation, he gave
the strongest assurances to his audience, that Tissaphemes
had pledged his word to him, that, could he once firmly de-
pend upon the Athenians, they never should be distressed
for want of supplies while he had any thing left ; nay, though
at last he should be forced to turn into ready cash the very
bed he lay on ; and the Phoenician fleet, already come up to
Aspendus, he would join with the Athenians, but never with
the Peloponnesians ; the only pledge of fidelity he required
from the Athenians was, for Alcibiades to be recalled, and
pass his word for their future conduct.

The army, delighted with these and many other soothing
topics, proceeded immediately to associate him with the rest
of the commanders, and implicitly trusted every thing to their
management. Not a man was any longer to be found among

944 PXLOPONNBHIAN WAR. [bOOK ITUI.

them who vtoold have parted with his present eonfidoioe ef
eertsiD security, and revenge on the four hundred, for all tfa«
treasure in the tmrverse. Nay, they were ready this yeiy
moment, apon the strength of what Alcibiades bad said, to
slight the enemy now at hand, and steer directly for fiie Pi-
rous. Bat, though numbers with vehemence recommended
the step, he stopped their ardoar by ramonstranees, that
" they ought by no means to thiidc of steering for the Pimas,
and leave their nearer enemies upon their backs ; but, in re-
lation to the operations of war, since he was elected a gen-
eral (he said), ne would first go and confer with Tissaphemss,
and would then proceed to action.'* Accordingly, the as-
sembly was no sooner dissolved than he inunediately depart-
ed, that he might appear in all respects to be perfectly united
with Tissaphemes ; desirous also to raise himself in his
«steem, ana give him a sensible proc^ thathe was appcmited
a general ; and, by virtue of this, enabled either to do him
servioe or to do him hann. It was the peculiar fortune of
Alcibiades to awe the Athenians by TissiEiphexnes, and Tis*
saphemes by the Athenians.

The Peloponnesians at Miletus had no sooner heard of the
recall of Alcibiades, than, as bsfore they suspected treacheiy
in Tissaphemes, they now loudly vented invectives against
him. What more inflamed them was, that, ever since the
Athenians showed themselves before Miletus, and they had
refused to put out to sea and engage them, Tissaphemes had
slackened more than ever in his payments ; and thus, hated
by them for that reason sufficiently before, he now became
more odious on account of Alcibiades. The soldiers again,
as on former occasions, ran together in parties, and enumera-
ted their grievances. Nay, some of higher rank, perecms of
real importance, and not merely the private men, were full of
remonstrances, that ** they had at no time received their full
subsistence : his payments had been always scanty, and even
those had never been regular ; in short, unless they were led
directly against the enemy, or earned to some other staticm
where they might be sore of subsistence, the crews would
abandon their vessels. And the whole blame of all that be-
fell ought to be charged upon Astyochus, who for private
lucre endured patiently the caprices of Tissaphemes.*' Em-
ployed as they were in thus enumerating grievances, a tomult
actuaHv broke out against Astyochus : for the manners b»

TBAR XXI.J PSLOPOKNBSIAN WAR. 345

longing to the Sjrracnsan and Thurian Teasels, by how much
Ihey enjoyed the greatest liberty of sdl others in the fleet, by
flo much the more heightened in confidence did they flock about
him and demand their pay. Upon this Astyochus returned
an answer too fall of spirit, threatening hard that Dorian*
ivho seconded and encouraged the demands of his men, and
even lifting his staflf and shaking it at him. This was no
sooner pereeived by the military crowd than, seamen as
they were, with a loud uproar, they rushed at Astyochus to
knock him down ; but, aware of their desi^, he fled for ref*
oge to an altar. He escaped, indeed, without any blows,
and the fray was ended without any harm committed.

The Milesians also made themselves masters, by surprise,
of a fort erected by Tissaphemes at Miletus, and obliged the
garrison left in it to evacuate the place. These things
pleased the rest of the allies, and not least of all the Syracu-
sans. lichas, however, was by no means satisfied with
these proceedings. He insisted " the Milesians were obliged
in duty to be submissive to Tissaphemes ; and that all others
who lived in the dominions of the king lay under the same
obli^tion, and were bound to pay due regard to his just au-
thority, till such time as the war was handsomely completed."
This drew upon him the resentment of the Milesians ; and,
because of these expressions and some others of the same
nature, when he afterward died of a natural disease, they
wrould not suffer him to be buried in a spot of ground which
the Lacedsmonians who were among tnem had chosen fo)
his interment.

While affairs were thus sadly embroiled between the sol-
diery on one side, and Astyochus and Tissaphemes on thp
other, Mindarus arrived from Lacedaemon, as successor to
Astyochus in the chief command of the fleet. Accordingly
he took the command upon him, and Astyochus sailed away
for home. But with him, as ambassador, Tissaphemes sent
one of his own creatures, by name Gaulites, a Carian, who
spoke both languages, to accuse the Milesians about the sei-
zure of the fort, and also to make apologies for his conduct.
He knew that the iMilesians were already set out with an out-
cry, chiefly against him ; and that Hermocrates was gone
•Vith them, well armed with proofs that Tissaphemer^ in con-

* Hermocrates.
II.— D D

346 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [boOR VIII.

cert with Alcibiades, baffled all the Peloponnesian schemes,
and basely tampered with both the warring parties. But
an enmity had always subsisted between these two about
the payments of subsistence. And at length, when Hermoc-
rates was banished from Syracuse, and other Syracasans
came to Miletus to take upon them the command of the Sjrra-
cusan vessels (namely, Potamis, and Myscon, and Demai-
chus), Tissaphemes vented his choler more bitterly than ever
against Hermocrates, now an exile ; and, among his other
accusations of him, affirmed, that <* he had demanded a sum
of money, which being refused him, he had ever since decla-
red himself his enemy." Astyochus, therefore, and the Mi-
lesians, and Hermocrates, had now sailed for Lacedaemon.

By this time also Alcibiades had repassed from Tissapher-
nes to Samoa ; and from Delos the deputation sent from the
four hundred on the late revolution to sooth and gain the
concurrence of those at Samos, arrived also while Alcibiades
was there. Upon which, an assembly being called, they en-
deavoured to open the cause. The soldiers at first refused
to hear them, and roared aloud for the murder of those who
had overturned the popular government. At length, with
great difficulty, being quieted, they gave them a hearing.

The deputies remonstrated, " that not for the ruin of Ath-
ens was this new change introduced, but purely for its pres-
ervation, in nowise to betray it into the hands of the enemy ;
because that might have been done effectually upon the late
approach of its enemy to her walls, since they were in power.
Every single person among the five thousand was intended to
have a regular share in the administration. Their friends
and relations are not treated in an insolent manner, as Chae-
reas had maliciously suggested to them ; nay, were not in
the least molested, but everywhere remained in the undis-
turbed possession of their property."

Though on these topics they amply enlarged, yet they were
heard with no manner of complaisance, but with manifest in-
dignation. Different methods of proceedm^ were recom-
mended by different persons ; but the majority declared for
sailing away at once for the Piraeus. On this occasion Alci-
biades first showed himself a true patriot ; nay, as much a
patriot as ever Athenian had been ; for, when the Athenians
at Samos were hurried furiously along to invade their own
selves, the plain consequence of which was giving up at ODee

TEAR XXI.] PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 347

Ionia and Hellespont to their public foes, he mollified their
fury ; and, at a crisis when no other man living could have
been able to restrain the multitude, he persuaded Uiem to
desist from this strange invasion ; and, by reprimanding those
whose private resentments burst out most violently against
the deputies, prevented mischief. At length, he himself dis-
missed them with the following answer : — That *' tne admin-
istration in the hands of five thousand he had no intention to
oppose : but he ordered them to give an immediate discharge
to the four hundred, and to restore the council of five hundred
to their prior state. If, farther, from a principle of frugality,
they had made retrenchments, in order that those who serv-
ed in the armies of the state might be better subsisted, he
praised them altogether. He then recommended to them a
steady resistance, and by no means in any shape to give way
to the enemy ; for, could the state once be secured from its
public foes, a reconciliation among its members might easily
be hoped for; but, should either party be once destroyed,
either this at Samos, or theirs at Athens, none would soon be
left to be reconciled at all."

There were present at this audience ambassadors from the
Argives, who brought assurances of aid to the people of
Athens at Samos. Alcibiades commended them for their
zeal ; and then, exhorting them to hold themselves in readi-
ness to come upon a summons sent, he civilly dismissed
them. These Argives came to Samos in company with the
Paralians, who had been lately turned over by the four hun-
dred into a vessel of war, to cruise round Eubcea, and to
carry to Lacedsmon the ambassadors, Lespodias, Aristophou,
and Melesius, sent thither from the four hundred. But, when
advanced to the height of Argos, they put the ambassadors
under arrest, as chief agents tn pulling down the democracy,
and delivered them up to the Argives. They had no busi-
ness now at Athens, and so came from Argos to Samos, con-
Toyinff the Argive ambassadors in the trireme which they had
seized.

The* same summer, Tissaphemes, about that juncture of
time in which the Peloponnesians were most furious agamsc
him for the other reasons, and the recallment of Alcibia-
des, as having now pulled off the mask and declared for
the Athenians, desirous, as in truth it appeared, to efface the
t)i^ impressions they had entertained of him, got ready to go

348 PBL0P0NNE8IAN WAR. [bOOK Vlll

to Aspendus to the Phoenician fleet, and prerailed with Lichaa
to bear him company. In regard to the Peloponnesiana, he
declared that he substituted his own lieutenant, Tamas, to
pay them their subsistence, while he himself should be absent.
Various accounts are vented about this step ; nor can it cer-
tainly be known with what view he repaired to Aspendus, or
why, when there, he did not bring up the fleet. That a Phoe-
nician fleet, consisting of one hundred and forty-seven sail,
was now come up to Aspendus, is allowed on all sides ; but
why they did not come forward, is variously conjectured.
Some think he went out of sight mereljr to carry on his old
scheme of wearing away the Peloponnesians ; and, in conse-
quence of diis, Tamas paid in their subsistence which he was
ordered to pay, not better, but even worse than Tissaphernes.
Others say it yna that, since he had brought the Phoenicians
to Aspendus, he might save large sums by dismissing them
there, as he never had sincerely designed to niake use of their
service. Others, again, attribute it to a desire to quiet the
clamours against him at Lacedaemon, and to get himself rep-
resented there as one abounding in good faith, and who was
actuaOy gone to bring up a fleet fairly and honestly fitted out
for service.

But, in my opinion, the true solution of the mystery is
this : he would not bring them up, merely to wear out and to
balance the strength of the Grecians, that, during his absence
and this studied prolongation, the latter might be running
into rains ; and, farther, for the sake of balancing, to join
with neither party, for fear of making them too strong ; for,
had he once determined to join heartily in the war, the con-
sequence was certainly beyond a doubt. Had he brought
them up to join the Lacedaemonians, he must in all probabil-
ity have given them the victory, since already their naval
strength was rather ei^ual than inferior to that of their oppo-
nents. But, that their rain alone was designed by him is
plain from the excuse he made for not bringing up that fleet :
he pretended they were fewer in number than the king had
ordered to be assembled : yet, if this were so, he might have
ingratiated himself more abundantly with the king, if he made
a great saving of money for his master, and with less expense
had accomplished his service. To Aspendus, however, what-
ever was his view, Tissaphernes repairs, and joins the Phoe
nicians ; nay, farther, at his own desire, the Peloponnesians

ITEAR XXI.3 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 349

sent Philippus, a noble LacedaBmonian, with two triremes, to
take charge of this fleet.

Alcibiades had do sooner received intelligence that Tis8»-
phemes was at Aspendus, than, taking with him thirteen sail,
he hastened thither after him, promising to those at Samoa
an assured and important piece of service : for " he would
either bring the Phoenician fleet to the Athenians, or at least
prevent their junction with the Peloponnesians." It is prob-
able that, from a long acquaintance, ne was privy to the whole
intention of Tissaphemes never to bring up this fleet ; and
his project was now to render Tissaphernes still more odious
to tne Peloponnesians, for the regard he showed to himself
and the Athenians, that so he might at last be necessitated
to strike in with the latter. He stood away therefore directly
by Phaselis and Caunus, and held on his course upwards.

The deputation sent from the four hundred bemg return-
ed from Samos to Athens, reported the answer of Alcibiades ;
how ** he encouraged them to hold out, and give way in no
shape to the enemy : and that his confidence was great he
should be able thoroughly to reconcile them with the army,
a.nd give them victory o?er the Peloponnesians.'* By this
report they very much revived the spirits of many of those
who had a share in the oligarchy, and yet would gladly extri-
cate themselves from the business upon assurances of indem-
nity. They had already begun to hold separate cabals, and
show open discontent at the train of affairs. They were
beaded by some of principal authority even in the present
oligarchy, and who f^led the great offices of state, namely,
Theramenes, the son of Agnon, and Aristocrates, the son of
Sicelius ; and others who were most deeply concerned in the
late transactions ;* and from a dread, as they gave out, of

* Theramenes was very expert at turning about and shifting
his party. He got by it tbe nickname of Cothurnus, or the
Buskin ; because the tragedian's buskin was made large enough
for any foot to go into it. He was, however, a man of great abil-
ities, and generally regarded as a lover of his country. His
turns were dexterous, well-timed, and made with a view to
public good. Cesar, when making Cicero a compliment, liken-
ed him to Theramenes. He was deeply concerned in all the
subsequent revolutions at Athens. He put the finishing hand
to the peace with the Lacedaemonians after the taking of Athens
by Lysander when they demolished their long walls, opened

350 PELOPONIfESIAW WAR. [.BOOK Vlll

the army at Samos^ and Alcibiades had concurred in sending
an embassy to Lacedsmon, lest by nnseasonable dissents from
the majority they might have done mischief to the public.
Not that they hastened themselves even now to put an uttei
end to the oligarchical government, but to enforce the neces-
sity of making use of the five thousand not merely in name,
but in act, and to render the polity more equal. This was,
it must be owned, the political scheme which they all pre-
tended ; but, through pnvate ambition, the majority had given
into that course, by which an oligarchy, founded upon the
ruins of a democracy, is ripe for subversion : for it was the
daily claim of each single person concerned, not to be equal
with the rest, but to be pre-eminently the first; whereas^
when out of a democracy a preference is awarded, the dis*
tinction is the more easily brooked, as if it were the real con
sequence of superior worth. But what of a certain^ eleva-
ted them most, was the great influence of Alcibiades ar
Samos, and their own consciousness that this business of ar
oligarchy carried with it no prospect of firm or lasting' contin-
uance. A contention, therefore, ensued among them, which
of them should show the greatest zeal for the people.

But such of the four hundred as made the greatest opposi-
tion to this new scheme, and were leaders of their party ;
namely, I^rynichus, who formerly, during his employment as
general at Samos, had embroiled himself with Alcibiades ,
and Aristarchus, one of the most violent and also most invet-
erate opponents of the people ; and Pisander, and Antipho.
and others of the greatest influence amon^ them ; who
formerly, upon establishing themselves first m the govern-
ment, and ever since the army at Samos had dissented from
them in favour of the democracy, had bestirred themselves
in sending embassies to Lacedsmon, in more firmly establish-
ing the oligarchy, and erecting a new fortification on the spot
which is called Eetioneia : — these, I say, exerted themselves
with much greater ardour than ever since the return of the
deputies from Samos, as they plainly saw the inclinations of
numbers ; and some of their own body, on whose perseve-

their harbours, and gave up their shipping. He was afterward,
nominally, one of the thirty tyrants : for he soon began to op
pose them; first with moderation, then with vehemence; which
exasperated them so that they put him to deith.

YEAR XXI.] PELOPONNESJAN WAR. 351

ranee they had highly depended, were entirely changed. They
even caused Antipho, and Phrynichus, and ten others, to »ot
ODt with all expeaition ; so apprehensive wer^ they of fresh
opposition, both in Athens itself and from Samoa; and
charged them with instructions to strike up an accommoda-
tion with the Lacedaemonians upon anj tolerable terms they
could possibly procure : they also carried on with redoubled
diligence the new works at Eetioneia. These works were
intended, as was given out by Theramenes and his party, not
so much to keep out of the Piraeus those from Samoa, should
they endeavour to attempt it, as to enable themselves, at
their own discretion, to receive both the ships and land-forces
of the enemy ; for Eetioneia is the mole of the Pirieus, and
the entrance into it opens at the end of this mole. The new
work was therefore joined in such a manner to that which
guarded it before, on the side of the land, that a small party
posted behind could command the entrance : for the extremi-
ties of it were continued down to the fort in the very month
of the harbour, which was narrow ; and both the old wall,
which was built on the land side, and this new fortification
within, reached down to the sea. They also enlarged and
secured the great portico, which adjoined to the new work
erected in the Piraeus, and kept it entirely in their own cus-
tody. Here they obliged all the citizens to lodge what com
they already had, and all that should hereafter be imported ;
and here only to expose it to sale and to vend it.

These proceedings had for a lone time drawn sharp insin-
uations from Theramenes ; and, when the embassy returned
from Lacedaemon without bringing to any manner of issue a
general accommodation for the whole of the state, he averred,
that " by this new work the safety of the city was visibly en-
dangered :" for from Peloponnesus, at this instant of time,
at the request of the Eubceans, no less than forty-two sail of
ships were on the coast of Laconia ; some of which were
Italian, from Tarentum and from Locri, and some Sicilian ;
and al were now bound for Eubcea. At the head of this
equipment was Hegesandridas, a Spartan, the son of Hege-
sander. Theramenes maintained, that ** it was set out less
for Eubcea than for those who were now fortifying at Eetio-
neia ; and, unless we stand upon our guard, they will surprise
andjcomplete the ruin of Athens." There was really some-
thing in the conduct of the men he accused to countenance

352 PBIX>PONNESlAN WAR. [bOOK TUI.

tin chaige ; nor was it merely the ontciy of slander. ThoM
who now composed the oligarelij were principally desirous t«
Mcsei t e in tbeir hands the whole appendage of the republic
if this were imnracticable, to secure the shipping and walls,
and subsist with independence ; bat, should they be unable
to conqtass diis, rather than 611 the first Tictims to the de-
mociacy re-established, to let in the enemy ; and, resigning
their shqiping and foit^cations, to mske any terms whatever
for the state, provided they could obtain security for their
own persons. Tliey accelerated therefore this new work;
which was so contnVed as to have posterns, and sally-ports,
and passages enough to let in the enemy ; and they proceeded
with all imaginable despatch, in order to outstrip prevention.
Hitherto, mdeed, this charge against them had only been
whiipered with an air of secrecy among a few : but when
Flirynichus, upon his return from the embassy to Lacedsmon,
was treacherously stabbed by one of the patrol in the forum,
at the hour of public resort, being got but a few steps from
the house where the councfl was sitting, and dropped down
dead upon the spot ; when, farther, the assassin made law
escape ; and a stranger from Argos, who assisted at the fact,
being apprehended and tortured by the four hundred, discov-
ered not the name of any one person who set them on, nor
made any farther confession than that '* he knew large num-
bers met at the bouse of the officer who commanded the
patrol, and at other places;" then, at length, as nothing
could be made of this affair, Theramenes and Aristocrates, and
as many either of the four hundred or of others as were com-
bined with them, proceeded to act in a more open and res-
olute manner : for by this time the fleet was come round
from Laconia ; and, riding before Epidaurus, had made rava-
ges upon Mg^iM, Theramenes therefore averred it improb-
able that, " were they intended for Eubosa, they would ever
have put into iEgina, and then go again and lie at Epidauras,
unless they had been sent out at Uie express invitation of
those whom he had always accused of traitorous designs;
and it was impossible to be passive any longer under such
practices.'* In fine, after many speeches made to excite a
tumult, and many suspicions disseminated abroad, they fell to
work in earnest : for the heavy-armed, posted in the Phrsus
to cany on the new works of Eetioneia, among whom Aristoc-
rates himself was emploved at the head of his own band, laid

7BAR XXI.] PEL0P0NNE8IAN WAR. 353

under an arrest Alezicles, who commanded there for the ohp
garchy, and was a most vehement adversary to the oppoaita
party ; and carrying him into a house, put him under confine-
ment. To this action they were also imboldened by the con-
cnrrence of others, as well as by Hermon, who commanded
the patrol assigned for Munychia ; and, what was of most
importance, it was openly countenanced by the whole body
of the heavy-armed. The news of it was immediately car-
ried to the four hundred, who were this moment assembled
together in council ; and all, excepting thoee dissatisfied with
their measures, were ready to run to arms, and vented terri-
ble threats agaiust Theramenes and his associates.

But he, apologizing for himself, declared his readiness to
take up arms along with them, and attend them to the rescue
of Alexicles ; and, taking with him one of the generals who
was in his secret, he hurried down to the Pirnus. Aiistar*
chus also ran down to assist ; as did, ftirther, the young men
belonging to the cavalry of the state.

Great, in truth, was the tumult, and full of horror ; for
those who were left in the upper city imagtiied that the Pi-
rsBus was already seized, and that Alexicles was slain ; and
they in the Pirsus each moment expected an assault from
those in the city. Not without difficulty could the men
of years and experience stop such as were wildly running up
and down the streets, and rushing to arms. And Thncjrdi-
des, the Pharsalian, public host of the state, who happened
then to be at Athens, threw himself with lively zeal in the
way of all who were flocking down ; conjurine them earnest-
ly " not to finish the ruin of their country, when the enenry
lay so near to strike the blow." But thus, at length, their
fury abated, and the effusion of one anoUier's blood was pre-
vented.

As for Theramenes, he was ho sooner ^t down to the Pi-
rsus, than, assuming authority (for he hbnself was at this
time a general), he pretended to rate the heavy-armed for this

Siece of mutiny, at least so far as mere making a noise could
o it , while Aristarchus and all the opposite fkction werft
angry with them in earnest. But the bulk of the heavy-arm-
ed drew together in a body, and betrayed no sign of regret
for what they had done. Nay, they demanded aloud nom
Theramenes, " if, in his judgment,' these new works were
raised wrth a good desisrn or would not better be demolish*

354 PBLOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK VUI

edV* His reply was this: that, "if they thought it expe-
dient to demoUsb them, his opinion should concur with
theiis." Hereupon, at a signal given, the heavy-armed, and
many others who belonged to Uie Piraeus, rushed on in a
moment, and pulled down all the new fortification.

The watchword now published to the multitude was this :
— ** Whosoever would have the administration lodged in the
five thousand instead of the four hundred, let him join in the
work :*' for even still they judged it pohtic to veil their de-
sign under the name of the five thousand, and not to say
downright, '* Whosoever would have the democracy restored,"
lest possibly the former might have been actufilly in force,
and a person speaking to any one of them might spoil all by
some madvertent expressions: and, on the same account,
the four hundred would neither have the five thousand de-
clared, nor yet have it known that they had never been ap-
pointed. To admit so large a number into a share of the
government, they judged was in fact a mere democracy ; but
that leaving the matter in suspense would strike a dread of
his neighbour into every Athenian.

The next morning the four hundred, though highly disor-
dered in their politics, assembled however in council. But
those in the Pirsns, after enlarging Alezicles, whom they
had put under confinement, and completing the demolition of
the new works, marched to the theatre of Bacchus in Mu-
nychia, and there, all armed as they were, held a formal as-
sembly ; and then, in pursuance of what had been resolved,
marched directly into the upper city, and posted themselves
in the Anaceum. Here they were accosted by a select com-
mittee sent from the four hundred, who man to man reasoned
calmly with them ; and, perceiving any to be tractable, plied
them mth persuasions to proceed m a gentle manner, and to
restrain the fury of their associates ; giving them assurances,
that *< the five thousand would be declared ; and from them, by
regular succession, at the pleasure of the five thousand, the
four hundred should be appointed ;" conjuring them, in the
meantime, ** not to forward, through impatience, the destruc-
tion of the state, nor give it up for a prey to the public ene-
my." The whole multitude of the heavy-armed, attentive
to these arguments, on which many expatiated at large, and
pressed home upon numbers, became more tractable than they
were at first, and were most tenibly alarmed at the mention

YEAR XXlJ P£L0P0NN£8IAN WAK. 355

of the total deiitiuctioii of their polity. It was at last con-
cluded that, on a set day, an assembly should be held in the
temple of Bacchus, to devise an accommodation.

But, when this assembly, to be held in the temple of Bac-
chus, came on, and all parties were only not completely met,
came in the news that *' the two-and-forty sail and Hegesan-
dridas were coasting along from Megara towards Salamis.'*
Not one of the -heavy-armed this moment but pronounced it
true, what before was given out by Theramenes and his
friends, that " to the new fortifications these ships are now
bound ;" and it was judged that in the nick of time they had
been levelled with the ground : but Heeesandridas, as per-
haps had beforehand been concerted, only hovered about at
Epidaurus or the adjacent coast. It is however probable, that
on account of the present sedition among the Athenians, he
lay for a time in this station, in hope to seize some fair op-
portunity to strike a blow.

Be tms as it will, the Athenians no sooner heard the news,
than, to a man, they flocked down amain to the Pirsus ; less
alarmed at their own domestic war than at invasion from a
public enemy, no longer remote, but at their very ports.
Some of them threw themselves on board what shipping was
ready ; others launched such as were aground ; and oth-
ers posted themselves upon the walls and at the mouth of the
harbour.

But the Peloponnesian fleet, having sailed by and doubled
the Gape of Sunium, came to anchor between Thoricus and
PrasiaB, and proceeded afterward to Oropus. Hereupon the
Athenians, in all imaginable hurry, manning out their ships
with what hands could be got on this sudden emergency, as
in a city distracted with sedition, and yet eager to stave off
the greatest danger that had ever threatened it (for, as Atti-
ca was occupied by the enemy, Eubcea was now Uieir all),
caused Thymochans, a commander, to stand away with their
fleet to Eretria. On their arrival there, and their junction with
such as were already in Euboea, they amounted to six-and-
thirty sail, and were immediately forced to engage : for He-
gesandridas, after the hour of repast, came out in line of bat-
Ue from Oropus.

The distance of Oropus from the city of the Eretrians,
across the sea, is about sixty stadia ;* and therefore, upon

*■ About six EngliBh miles.

856 PELOPONNSSIAN WAR. [bOOK'YIII

his approach, the Athenians ordered their mei: or. board, im-
agining the soldiers to be ready at hand to obey their orders ;
whereas they happened not yet to be returned from the mar-
ket, whither they had gone to buy provision: for, through
the management of the Eretrians, nothing could be got by
way of sale, except in such houses as lay in the most remote
quarters of the city ; with an intent that the enemy might at-
tack the Athenians before they were all embarked, and oblige
them in a hurrying and disorderly manner to begin the fight
Nay, a signal had even been held out to the enemy from
Eretria towards Oropus, at what time they ought to come
forward to the attack.

Upon so short a notice, the Athenians, having formed their
line as well as they were able, and engaging the enemy be-
fore the harbour of Eretria, made however a gallant resistance
for a time. At length, being compelled to sheer off*, they
were pursued to land ; and as many of them as ran for safe-
ty to the city of the Eretrians suffered the most cruel treat-
ment, in being murdered by the hands of men whom they
supposed their friends. Such, indeed, as could reach the fort
of Eretria, which was garrisoned by Athenians, were safe ;
as also the vessels which could make Chalcis.

But the Peloponnesians, after making prizes of two-and-
twenty Athenian vessels, and either butchering or making
f>risoner8 all on board them, erected a trophy : and, no long
time after, they caused all Eubcea to revolt, excepting Oreus,
which an Athenian garrison secured, and then settled the
state of that island at their own discretion.

When advice of what was done at Euboea reached Athens,
the greatest consternation ensued of all that had to this day
been known. Not even the dreadful blow received in Sicily,
though great concern, in truth, it gave them, nor any other
public disaster, caused so terrible an alarm among them : for,
at a time when their army at Samos was in open revolt ;
when they had no longer either shipping in store or mariners
to go on board ; when they were distracted with intestine se-
dition, and ready each moment to tear one another to pieces ;
and on the neck of all these this great calamity supervened,
in which they lost their fleet, and, what was of more conse-

auence, Euboea, which had better supplied their necessities
jau Attica itself,— -had they not ample reason now to fall into
otter dejection 1 Bu t what alarmed them most was the pzox

TEAR XXI.] PBLOPONNESIAN WAR. 367

imity of ruin, in case the enemy, flushed with their late soc-
ees8, should stand immediately into the Pirsus, now utterly
destitute of ships. Not a moment passed but they imagined
they were only not in the very harbour ; which, iu truth, had
they been a kttle more daring, they might easily have been.
Kay, had they made this step ^nd blocked up Uie city, they
must infallibly have increased the seditions within it ; must
have necessitated the fleet to come over from Ionia, though
averse to the oligarchy, in order to prevent the ruin of their
own relations and the total destruction of their country ; and,
in the meantime, Hellespont, Ionia, the isles even up to £u-
boea, in a word, the whole empire of Athens, must have been
their own. Yet, not in this mstance only, but many others,
the Lacedaomonianq showed themselves most commodious
enemies for the Athenians to encounter; for, as nothing
diflfered more than their respective tempers ; the one being
active, the other slow ; enterprising these, but timorous those,
especiallyin naval competitions ; they gave them many advan-
tages. The truth of this the Syracusans most plainly show-
ed, who very nearly resembled the Athenians in disposition,
and so warred against them with the highest spirit and suc-
cess.

Terrified, however, at these tidings, the Athenians made
a shift to man out twenty vessels, and convened an assembly
of the people, on the first report of their loss, in the place
which IS called the Pnyx, and where generally that assembly
was held. In this they put an end to the administration of
the four hundred, and decreed " the supreme power to be
vested in the five thousand, which number to consist of all
such citizens as were enrolled for the heavy armour ; and that
no one should receive a salary for any public magistracy ;
whoever ofiended in this point they declared a traitor."
Other frequent assemblies were afterward held, in which
they appointed nomothets,* and filled up the other posts in

» The general course of appointing nomothets was by lot.
Their number in the whole was a thousand and one. Their busi-
ness was not, as the name seems to imply, to make new laws,
since that belonged to the supreme power lodged in the people ;
but to inq>ect such as were already made, to reconsider such as
were thought to be or were complained of as grievous, and
regularly report such as ought to be continued or ought to be
repealect.

358 PELOPONNKSIAN WAR. [bOOK VIII.

the gorernment. And now, at least, though for the first time
in my opinion, the Athenians seem to have modelled their

S»Ternment aright. A moderation, finely tempered between
e few and the many, was now enforced : and, from the
low situation in which their afikirs were now plunged, this
enabled Athens to re-erect her head.

They decreed, farther, the recallment of Alcibiadesand his
adherents; and, despatching a deputation to him and the
army at Samos, exhorted them to exert their utmost efforts
for the public service.

In the first moments of this new revolution, Pisander and
Alexicles, with their partisans, and in general all the great
sticklers for the oligarchy, withdrew pnTately to Decelea.
But Aristarchus, who was one of the generals of the state,
took a different route from all the rest ; and, carrying off a
party of archers, though rank Barbarians, went off towards
Oenoe : Oenoe was a fortress of the Athenians on the fron-
tiers of Boeotia. But the Corinthians, on a provocation pecu-
liar to themselves, having procured the concurrence of the
Boeotians, held it now blocked up, because a party of their
countrymen, drawing off from Decelea, had been put to the
sword by a sally of the garrison from Oenoe. Aristarchus,
therefore, having in a conference settled matters with the be-
siegers, deceived the garrison in Oenoe, by assuring them
that, " as their countrymen in Athens had made up ul their
quarrels with the Lacedaemonians, they also were bound to
deliver up this place to the Boeotians ; and that this was an
express provision in the treaty." Giving credit therefore to
him as in public command, and ignorant of all the late trans-
actions, because closely blocked up, they agreed with the en-
emy and evacuated the fortress. In this manner the Boeo-
tians regained possession of abandoned Oenoe : and thus the
oligarchy and sedition were suppressed at Athens.

But, about the same space of time in the current summer,
in regard to the Peloponnesians at Miletus : — ^When none of
those who were substituted by Tissaphernes during his ab
sence at Aspendus made regular payments ; and nothing
could be seen either of Tissaphernes or the Phoenician fleet ;
and Philippus, who accompanied him, sent advice to Minda-
rus, the admiral-in-chief ; and Hippocrates, farther, a citizen
of Sparta, who was then at Phaselis, advised him also that
^ this fleet would never join him, and in all respects they

Y£AR XXI.] PBLOPONNBSIA.N WAR. 359

were shamefully abused by Tissaphernes ;" as Pharnabazus
had made them an invitation, and declared himself ready^ if
aided by the confederate fleet, to enjgrage as strongly as Ti»
saphemes for the revolt of what cities yet remained in sub-
jection to the Athenians ; Mindarus, hoping to find more
Sonctuality in the latter, with notable conauct, and by a sud-
en signal to the fleet, that his motions might not be discov-
ered at Samos, weighed from Miletus with seventy-three sail,
and bent his course to the Hellespont. Bat, earlier this sum-
mer, sixteen ships had steered their course thither, and rav-
aged part of the Chersonesus. Mindams met with tempest-
uQQs weather in his passage, which forced him to put into
Icarus ; and, after staying there five or six days for want of
vreather to keep the sea, lie arrived at Chios.

Thrasyllus, so soon as informed of the departure from Mi-
letus, stood after him with five-and-fifty sail, making the best
of his way lest the other should enter the Hellespont before
he reached him. But, gaining intelligence that he was put
into Chios, and concludmg he designed to remain there, he
fixed his scouts at Lesbos and the opposite continent ; ^t,
if the Peloponnesian fleet put out, their motions might be de-
scried. He himself, repairing to Methymne, ordered quanti-
ties of meal and other necessaries to be prepared, that, in case
he should be forced to stay in these parts, he might make
frequent cruises from Lesbos arainst Chios.

But, as Eressus in Lesbos had revolted, his design was
farther to attempt its reduction, in case it were feasible :
for some of the Methymnean exiles, and those not the most
inconsiderable of the number, having brought over from
Cyme about fifty heavy-armed who were most firmly attached
to their cause, and hired others from the continent, which in-
creased their number to about three hundred, Anaxarchus,
the Theban, in respect of consanguinity, being chosen their
leader, assaulted first Methymne ; and, being repulsed in the
attem^ by the Athenian garrison which came up from Mity-
lene, and then driven quite oflf by a battle fought in the field,
they retired across the mountain, and made Eressus -revolt.
Thrasyllus, therefoie, steerinff with his fleet against Eressus,
projected an assault. But Thrasybulus, with five ships from
Samos, arrived there before him, upon information received
of the repassage of the exiles ; yet, coming too late before
Eressus to prevent a revolt, he lay at anchor before it. Two

860 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK Till.

Other ships, also, bound homeward from the Hellespont, <
in, and the Methymnean. All the ships in the fleet amounted
l^w to sixty-seven, from which they draughted an anny for
the operations of land, as fully bent, if possible, to take £res-
sus by a bold assault, with engines and all the arUr of attack.

In the meantime, Mindarus and the Peloponnesian fleet at
Chios, after two whole days' employment in taking in proTis-
ions, and receiving from the Chians every man on board
three Chian tesseracosts,* on the third da^ with urgent de-
spatch launched out from Chios into the wide sea» that they
might not be descried by the fleet before Eressus ; and leav-
ing Lesbos on the left, stood over to the continent There,
putting into the harbour of Cratenei on the coast of Phocea,
and taking their noon repast, they proceeded along the coast
of Cvme, and supped at Arginuse of the continent, against
Mitylene. From thence, at dead of night, they went forward
along the shore ; and, bein^ arrived at Harmatus, which lies
facing Methymne, and havug eaten their dinner there, they
passed with the utmost speed by Lectus, and Larissa, and
Amaxitus, and other adjacent places, and reached Rhetium
of the Hellespont before midnight. Not but that some ships
of the fleet got up no farther than to Sigaoum and some
other adjacent places on that coast.

The Athenians, who were lying with eighteen sail at Ses-
tus, when the lights were waved by their own friends for sig-
nals, and they beheld numerous fires kindled on a sudden on
the hostile coast, were well assured that the Peloponnesians
were approaching. The same night, therefore, under favour
of the dark, and with the utmost expedition, they crept along
under the Chersonesus, and reached Eleus, desirous to put
out to sea and avoid the enemy ; and, for the sixteen ships
at Abydos, they stole away unperceived of the Abydians,
though notice had -been sent them from their friends just ar-
rived, to keep a good look-out, and not suflfer them to steal
oflf. Yet morning no sooner appeared than, findings them-
selves in sight of the fleet under Mindarus, and that they
were actually chased, they could not all get ofif. The greater

* This, according to Spanheim, was a month's pay, since he
explains it by forty-three Chian drachmas. But the words will
not bear sncn a construction : a tesseracost was, it is most prob-
able, a coin peculiar to the Chians ; but of what value it u not
known, nor is it of any great importance.

YBAE XXI.] PBLOPONNESIAN WAR. 361

pait, indeed, fled aafe to the continent and Lemnos; bat
four, that got last under sail, were overtaken by the eneimr
near Eleus ; one, also, that ran ashore at the temple of PrS-
tesilaos, they seized with all her hands ; and two moie, the
crews of which escaped. One, farther, but abandoned, they
Duint at Imhrus.

This done, the ships from Abydos having joined thepo, and
the whole fleet being now increased to fourscore and six sail,
they spent the rest of the day in investing Eleus ; but, as it
would not surrender, they drew off to Abydos.

Tlie Athenians, who had been deceived by their scouts,
and never imagined that so large a number of hostile shi[M
could pass along undescried, were very coolly carrying on their
siege ; but yet were no sooner informed of the enemy's mo-
tions, than* instantly quitting Eressos, they advanced with the
utmost ejq>edition to secure the Helleq)ont. They also
picked up two ships of the Peloponnesians ; which, running
out too boldly to sea in the late pursuit, fell m amone them :
and, coming up only one day after them, they anchored at
Eleus, and reassembled from Imbrue the ships which had fled
thither. Five whole days they spent here in getting every
thin^ in readiness for a genersd engagement : and after this
respite they came to an action in the following manner.

The Athenians, ranged in line of battle ahead, stood alon^g
ihore towards Sestus. The Peloponnesians, aware of their
design, stood out to sea from Abydos, to be ready to receive
them : and, as both sides were determined to engage, they
unfolded their lines to a greater length ; the Athenians, along
the Chersonesus, reaching from Idacus to Arrhian», in tSi
sixty-eight sail ; and the Peloponnesians over against them
from Abydos to Dardanus, being eighty-six. The line of the
Peloponnesians was thus formed : the Syracusans had the
right ; and on the left was ranged Mindarus, and the ships
most remarkable for being good sailers. Among the Atheni-
ans, Thnsyllus had the left, and Thrasybulus the right : the
rest of the commanders were regularly posted, according to
their rvpk. The Peloponnesians, showing most eagerness to
b«gin the engagement, endeavoured with their lefl to over-
reach the ri^t of the Athenians, in order to exclude them,
if poesible, from stretching out into the main sea, qjid, by
keeping them cramped up, to force their centre against the
shrn, which was not far distant. The Athenians, aware of
U.— B x

362 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [boOK Tltl.

the enemy's design to shut them up, plymg Qp abead, fbieed
themselves an opening, and in velocity beat them all to
nothinff.

By uiese motions, the left of their line became extended
beyond the cape called Cynos-sema. The consequence itt
which was exposing their centre, composed only of the weak-
est ships, and those ranged at too great a distance from one
another ; especially as in number of vessels th^y were quite
inferior, and as the coast round the Cynos-sema was sharp,
and in an acute angrle runs out into the water, so that part
of the line on one side was out of sight of the other. The
Peloponnesians, therefore, chaiging the centre, drove at once
the ships of the Athenians upon the beach ; and, being so far
manifestly victors, leaped boldly on shore to pursue them.
But n^either those under Thrasybulus could assist the centre
from the rieh't because of the multitude of ships that stood
in to awe uem ; nor could those under Thrasynus do it from
the left, because the interposition of Gape Cynos-eema hid
from him the view of what had passed ; and at the same time
the Syracusans and others, who, equal in strength, lay hard
upon him, prevented his moving. At length, the Peloponne-
sians, presuming the victory their Own, broke their order to
give different chase to single ships, and in too heedless a
manner threw confusion upon a part of their own line. And
now those under Thrasybulus, finding the squadron opposed
to them began to slacken, stopped all farther extension of
their line ahead ; and, tacking upon them, resolutely engaged,
and put them to flight. Charging next the dispersed ships
of the Peloponnesians, which composed the squadron tlut
presumed itself victorious, they made havoc ; and, by striking
them with a panic, routed the greater part without resistance.
Now also the Syracusans were beginning to eive way before the
squadron under Thrasyllus ; and, seeing others in open flight,
were more easily tempted to follow their example. The de-
feat now beinff manifestly given, and the Peloponnesians fly-
ing away for belter, first towards the river Pydius,<'and after-
vTard to Abydos, the Athenians made prize of only an in-
considerable number of shipping ; for the Hellespont, being
narrow, afforded short retreats to the enemy. However, they
gained a victory by sea, ;nost opportune indeed in their pies-
«nt situation ; for hitherto, afraid of the naval strength of
the Peloponnesians, because of the reboflTs they had UMs

YJ54^xif.J*. PELOPONNESIAN WAR> " ... . . . B63

r^c^r^ed froiA it,, and the calamitous event of th«i $kwAii'e|;- ;
: |]^ituui,.'frptadr this moment they stopped aU ftiiiQfJbs a«1£:%c. -
cb^tioDf^or gi;!0undles8 exaggerations of the'''c^i^9^j^'^it}r .
tqf.-^«ar.; Some shipcf of the enemr in fact they! too]|UvftciOr-. .:
•iMKe;* c^CjChlan, five Oorinthiaii, two^ AmfaA^iat,;.£R^,
^ Hi^ifiti^ ;-%Ut, of Leucadian, ai^ Lae^sDmonikft> iuidSyra^ '
' cui'i^H' and.'t'ellenean, a sinele one bfjeao.h': "bTj^t ^eqr'.mejr '•-*
sofieisd'.th'e .loss of fifteen ships of their oWn: -"* ',-^' \^. , ;> *
■ '•Aft^^reicting a trophy upon the Cape of Cynoi^seni^iji^' . •
|Hc»ing up; the shatters of the fight, and giving uj>,' jQaA^if.'
n^qfl, \W\T dtiad to the enemy, they despatched 9, tnrenie':]^'
JSiiejiH to noufy the victory. On the arrival of Ihip viessel, :
£>^. ft, heme, lifter hearing the new8;of 'thi0^-ud|oj|^-;foi
ftSc£H9, gfi^^itly resumed their spirits, which 'had>|oen de-.
je(;isd iy the recent misfortui^es at I7ul>(sa. aiid/the sfid--
^(»etA *of Uie Esr^clition, and hoped the. state inight<igkiq^ r^-
s^^r^jf Its powc^r if tliey cheerfully exerted their effqrts'in its

\\ni\k d4y after the battle, the AtheniaitSf H^-'^^ig

3iWpeiiyyjt futed their fieset at S^tusi sailad agaMntCyzicue,

." viJfam\\ biid toyplUid; and, descrying eight ahios froim By^mv

ti[^ j^iqg ai a dehor under Hatpagiom ind PWipljiBj- ih^

:. cfftwjcieiT *^il tow^r^s-Aen^-j *nd^ hnviug ip "tatU^upjp ^*j

y • sbratP fife's a ^ **f^ ^ ^r jgpew^/n *d o p rin ea of them, ajl ; ; Ki^]Af¥:,

.. f^ih^iffa !^^^hL^str Q/ziicdS] .which was cjuitc Hnfortirit4t thjip

. tbilkce'^ it'oupt fnoi^';anffoxiiciFd krge contribmt&y-Wm'St.

,^ur, J«ri rig 'this intepriJ;thfl Pelopofiiie*Una raade a'iri|i

' $fKmh ^^hydas io f^eu4, and bro^ight off as many of ihi^ir ^wn

*-*^-^ wj;iih bad, been. tkken as were able to aail ; the tiisidu*

SleiiliAiifa jpriA. TfaTe^ n bo d e^paich^d Uippoc ra te^ and

-^^^ t» ii^iibb^. ti)fttfth up -thttit fleet from thence. -*

. ■ ^bout<h(| aami^apaee of time, Alcibiades also, at th&he>^'

^^f^his/squadi^OB of thirteen sail, returned from Caunu's a^.

vSpfaaa^. inta th0kharl)ou)r:of Samos, reporting that "by his

•/q^i^i^g«B(ient;he>lttd diverted 'the junction of the Phoenicijta

'^ 'If wJOii j^ jE^opodSnesians; a^d madd Tissaphemes a fastiQi^

Eid.t^-^veV .fo the Atheflians;"*. After enlarging his*

Sbsf^sK'^"^^ ^^ ^®^ ^^ ^^ ^^ leave of Alcibia- ;

^e^ho^j^J^e^^'e dirioQify#to* know, what became of him

vei^ t£aB»ucceeded so WeU under him and his active

''V;Uiat^6 Lacisdftmomans, having received several

hpy^and and-se^ inc^lo^t two hundred ships, were

•/v*-. .. O. '•■ • : ■ •.. .• '" •
'■^.\, • * • •• • .

. J •»— 'J* • ■ . . I • .

364 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [bOOK VIII

squadron by the addition of nine more just manndd, he* levied
large contributions upon the Halicamassians, and fortified
Cos. -J^fter these exploits, and putting the government of
Cos into proper hands, he returned again, about autumn, to
Sambs. '",

. From' Aspendus also Tissaphemes rode back pom-haste
into Ionia, so soon as advised of the departure of'ih^ Pelo-
ponnesian fleet from Miletus for the Hellespont.
'- :Bat, as the Peloponnesians were now in the Hellespont,
: the Antandrians (who»are of iEolic descent), having procured
from Abydos a party of heavy-armed, who marched across
Mount Ida, received them into their city, provoked to'tl^
step by the injurious conduct of Arsaces, a Persian, lieulefMipi
to Tissaphemes. This man, pretending he bad ehenues'.l^.
cope with whom yet he never named, prevailed with the })%t
lians settled in Adramyttium, because they had been ob]%e2
by the Athenians to quit Delos in the affiur of the e*](pi^jlj&iiK

again necessitated to sue for peace. After such great senilssv
Alcibiades returned triumphant to Athens. Th? whols/eity..
flocked down to the Piraus to meet him. All strove Ul«get S
sight of Alcibisdes : they caressed bim, crowned, him, cuase^ '
the authors of his exile, and hurried him aWa^ to an ats^giny.
of 'jkh«: people. .There he harangued them for a tU|^9;«llKb-

. sWriM and 's)ied tears in abundance ; then haranfu^ ihioi
u^. In short, they undid all tbeyjttid eVef d^ne^^iwiAt U^^
400^ Alcibiades for a time was all m all'at.'Athens. * Xet, ina^k

' sequent commands, he happened not to be successful ; 4 cnm
which his countrymen very seldom {xsHrghye. Hebecame a sea
ond time an exile from Athens. His great abilities made hnii|.
continual terror both to foieign and domestic eoeodlM. SC^
now he persevered to serve his country, by oibaUinr w t^jA •
favour, and advising them on critical occasions. •Yet all il^ vaijr:-*
Lysander was soon master<^ the Piraeus and of Athens. Aleibia- '
des retired into Pbrygia, and was handsombty supported, by the *
bounty of his friend rhamabazus ; who, howevj^r, was wrougfaf/

. upon at \9fitf by the joint solicital^ns of his««Qemi^ anc^ (hKv
puia of its necessity for the service of the king, tq iindertaks l^. ^
destruction. The agents of Phardabazus &Drst)^ot attempt liqB
in an open manner, but set fire to his house by iiigl4> lO^Uu ' '
ing in clothes to damp the flames, he sot 6tit ssjie/ ThtfM

' rians soon spied him, shot him to d€m with*.arroinrs vm^^

. then cut ofr his head, and carried it to Ph$riiabasas: ^ ^
only add, that he was but forty years old whiM^ sras%«s
stroyed. • . .'^"

YEAR XXI.] PELOPONNBSIAN WAR. 365

to attend him in this tecret expedition ^th the flower of their
strength ; and, leading them forwards with all the show of
friendship and alliance, watched the opportunity when they
were busy at their meal, surronnded them with a body of his
own soldiers, and Ahot tHem to death with darts. Fearing
him, therefore, becaase of this instance of a cruel temper,
lest some such act of violence he might execute also upon
them, as in other respects he had imposed some burdens upon
them which they could not bear, the Antandrians ejected his
garrison out of their citadel. But Tissaphemes, perceiving
how deeply the Peloponnesians were concerned in this affair,
Vkd esteeming himself sadly injured also at Miletus and Cni-
4us (since in those places too his garrisons had been ejected) ;
and. fearing they would proceed to other commissions of the
samp nature ; cha^ined moreover that perhaps Phamabazus,
in less time and with less expense, having obtuned their con-
ounmnce, should make a greater progress against the Athe
niam ; — ^he determined in person to repair to Hellespont, ic
ordev to expostulate wilh them about their late proceedmgy
at Antander, and to wipe off, as handsomely ai he could, the
a8|ieI'Sions thrown upon his own conduct in regard to the
Phclnician fleet and -other points. Arriving therefore first a^
£pbesu% he efliered sacrifice to Dianat ***♦*♦
Wlven'tfie winter following this summer shall be ended,
tl)« tw0nty-first jear of the war will be also completed.

•*J^ere breaks off abruptly the History of the PeloptXmesian
Wk by Thucvdides. The adjustment of time annexed seems
|Mnly of anotoer hand.

INDEX.

Abn^chus, i. 150.

Acanthus, ii. 74.

Acanunians ; enter into an alliance with the Atheniane, i. 943.
244 ; excellent slingers, 256 ; conquer the Ambradota, 346 '
make peace with them, 350.

Achamiana, i. 211.

Admetus, king of the Moloesians, i. 182.

JBantidasi tyrant of Lampeacaa, ii. 178.

^gineta, formerly of great power at aea, i. 103 ; etir up the
war against the Athenians, 134 ; conqpcied by the Athenians
at sea, 159 ; how and why expelled .Algina by the Athenians
216 ; are settled by the LaceasBmonians at Thyrea, ib. ; how
used by the Athenians when they reduced Thyrea, ii. 6

.Egyptians, which of them most warlike, i. 162

.£neas, ii. 47.

^Qesias, i. 195.

^nians, ii. 259.

JSolians, tributary to Athens, ii. 250.

^amides, i. 123.

^Bson, ii. 89.

^tolians, l 96; iuTaded by the Athenians, 339; defeat them.
340.

Agamemnon, i. 96.

Agatharchidas,!. 257.

^Agatharcus, ii. 232.

Agesander, i. 186. •

Agesinpidas, ii. 103.

Agis, km^ of Sparta, i. 333, 354 ; he commands against the Ar-
gives, ii. 104 ; lets them go without a battle, 105 ; is accused
for it at Sparta, 107 ; marches a second time against them,
106 ; gains the victory at Mantinea, 115 ; fortifies Decelea in
Attica, 228; makes an unsuccessful attempt oa Athens, 335.

Agnon, 1. 267; the son of Nicias, colleague to Pericles, 169;
beaiegeth Potid9a,235; the founder of Amphipolia, ii. 36, 68.

Agrttans, i. 348. -

Agrianians, i 267.

Agrigentines, neutral in the Sicilian war, ii. 261.

AlcttUfk archon at Athens, ii. 77.

368 INDEX.

Alcamenes, i. 290, 294» 295.

Alcibiades, son of Clinias, ii. 91 ; his expedition into Peloponne
8U8, 101 ; and to Argos, 122 ; named for one of the command
en in Sicily, 139 ; nia speech on that occasion, 145 ; is ao
cused about the Meicories, and for profaning the mysteries,
154, 173 ; insists on a trial, 154 ; sets out for Sicily, 155 ; his
opinion at a council of war, 170 ; is recalled to take his trial,
173 ; flies and is outlawed, 180 ; takes refuge at Sparta, 201 ;
his speech at Sparta, ib. ; adviseth the Lacedemonians about
prosecuting the war, 292, 295 ; sent to Chios with Chalcide-
us, 296 : his transactions at Miletus, 298 ; goes to Tissapher-
nes, and becomes a favourite, 317 ; contrives his own recall-
ment to Athens, 319 ; his quarrel with Phrynichus, 320 ; is
recalled, 343, 358 ; his management at Samoa, 343, 346 ; goes
to Aspendus, 348.

Alcidas, the Lacedaemonian admiral, sent to Lesbos, i.284, 290 ;
he flies, 293 ; returns to Peloponnesus, 322 ; sails to Corcyra,
325 ; one of the three leaders of the colony to Heraclea, 336

Alcinidas, ii. 74, 77.

Alciphron, ii. 105.

Alcmsonj i. 273.

Alcmsomds, ii. 178.

Alezarchus, ii. 229.

Alezicles, put under arrest, ii. 353 ; flies to Decelea, 358.

Alexippidas, ii. 326.

Ambraciots, aid the Corinthians against the Corcyreans, i 109 •
make war on the Amphilochians, 245 ; and the Acamanians,
254 ; make another expedition against both, 342 ; take Olpts,
344; are defeated, 346; make peace, 350; send aid to the
Syracusans, ii. 261,

Ameiniades, i. 244.

Aminias, ii. 57.

Aminocles, i. 102.

Amorges, revolts from the king of Persia, ii. 291 ; is taken pris-
oner by the Peloponnesians, and delivered to Tissapliemes,
306.

Ampelidas, ii. 75.

Amphias, ii. 48.

Amphilochians, i, 245« 349.

Amphissensians, i 341.

Amyntas, i. 267.

Amyrteus, i. 162,

Anazarchus, ii. 359.

Anaxilas, ii. 136.

Andocides, i. 126.

Androcles, ii. 330.

Andromenes, ii. 90.

Androsthenes, ii. 96.

INDBX. 369

Andiians, ii. 250.

Anthippus, ii. 74, 77.

Anticles, i. 166.

Antimenidas, ii. 90.

Aiitiochu8» king of the OreatianB, i. 254.

Antiphemos, ii. 136.

Antipho, ii. 332, 350, 351.

Ahtiflthenes, ii. 313, 328.

Antitanians, i. 254.

Apodoti, i 338.

Arcadians, famished with ships bj Agamemnon in the Trojan

expedition, i. 98; mercenaries, n. 260.
Archedice, ii. 178. >

Archelau8,i.270.
Archestratns, i. 129.
Archetimus, i. 111.
Archias, of Camarina, i. 309.
Archas, the Corinthian, founder of STracnse, ii. 135.
Archidamus, king of Sparta, his speech about the war, 1. 143 ;
commands in the inTasion of Attica, 202 ; his speech, ib. ;
commands in another invasion, 227 ; and against rlataea, 247.

Archonides, ii. 217.

Argyllians, a colony of Andrians, ii. 37.

Argives, have thirty years* traces with the Lacedsmonians, ii.
70 ; are irritated by the Corinthians against the Lacedaemoni-
ans, 79 ; aim at bemg a leading state, 80 ; make war upon the
Epidaurians, 101 ; are surroui^ed by the Lacedaemonians, but
let go, 106 ; are defeated at Mantinea, and make peace, 115*
119.

Arianthidas, ii. 28

Aristagoras, ii. -96.

Aristarchas, ii. 350, 353, 358.

Aristeas, son of Pellicas, i 111.

Aristeus, son of Adimantus, i. 130, 133, 244.

Aristeas, the Lacedaemonian, ii. 57.

Aristides, son of Lysimachus, i. 150.

Aristides, son of Archippns, i. 387, ii. 18.

Aristocles, ii. 71, 114.

Aristocaetes, ii. 74. •

Aristocrates, ii. 77, 349, 352.

Anstogiton, i 105, ii. 174.

Aristo, ii. 244.

/ristonons, of Larissa, i. 213.

Aristophon, ii. 347.

Aristotle, son of Timocrates, i. 345.

Arribseus, kinar of the Lyncettians, ii. 21 ; warred againtt b?
Brasidas and Perdiecas, 23, 50.

Aitabazus, i. 177.

370 INDBX.

Aitaphenies, i. 387.

Artu, ii. 239.

Artmzenes Longimanus, i. 158 ; begins to reign, 163 ; dies, 387.

Asqpins, son of Pfaonnio, his exploits and dea^, i. 277.

Astymachns, i 310.

Astyochns, the Lacedmnonian admiral, ii. 300, 310 ; goes to Chi-
os, 301 ; in great danger, 310; refuses to saccour the Chians,
ib. ; betrays Phrynichns, 321 ; is mutinied against by his own
seamen, and returns to Sparta, 345.

Athenians, gave shelter at first to all who would settle among
them, L 94 ; had war with the .£ginet«, 134 ; how ther be-
came a naral power, 105 ; abandoned Athens and fought at
Salamis, 139 ; rebuilt their walls, 149; made war against the

^ King of Persia under Pausanias, 153 ; gain a Tictory at £ury-
medon, 156 ; reduce the isle of Thasos, ib. ; receive the He-
lots, and settle them at Naupactus, 158 ; their war in £gypt,
ib., 161 ; with the Corinthians, ib. ; and Epidaurians, and
iGgineta, 159; with the Lacedemonians, 161 ; Boeotians,
164; Sicyonians, 163; Cyprians, ib. ; recover Chsrona, ib.;
defeated at Coronea, ib.; reduce Euboea, 165; make wai
apon Samoa, 167 ; miake alliance with the Corcyreans, 122 ;
assist ihem against the Corinthians, 123 ; their measures with
the PotidsBans, 128 ; make war upon Perdiccas, 130 ; fight
the PotidiBans and Corinthians, 131 ; besiege Potidaea, 134;
deliberate about the Peloponnesian war, 186 ; prepare for de-
fence, 200 ; send their fieet to cruise upon Peloponnesus, 214 ;
attack Methone, ib.; invade Locns, 215 ; eject the.£ginete
from the isle of iElgma, 216 ; make an alliance with Sitalces,
217 ; take Solium and Astacus, ib. ; invade the Megaris, 218 ;
fortify Atalante, ib. ; celebrate the public funeral, 219 ; are
afflicted with the plague, 228 ; send their fleets to cruise on
Peloponnesus, 234 ; are angrv with Pericles, 235 : take Poti-
d»a, 246 ; war upon the Chalcideans, 253 ; fight tne Pelop<m-
nesians at sea, 257; send a fleet to XJesbos, 275 ; besiege Mit-
ylene, 276 ; reduce it, 291 ; seize the isbnd of Minoa, 309 ;
send a fieet to Sicily, 332 ; their war in 'Acarnania, 337 j are
defeated by the JStolians, 340 : their proceedings in Sicily,
353 ; they seize and fortify Pylus, 354 ; fight between them

« and the Lacedemonians, 359 ; fig^t the Syracusans, 36&-370 ;
invade the Corinthians, 382 ; take Anactorium, 387 ; conquer
Cythera, ii. 4 ; take Thvrea, 6 ^ surprise Nisea, 15 ; in^e
BoBOtia, and are defeated at Delium, 27, 32 ; I6se Amphipolis,
37 ; make a truce with the Lacedemonians, 45 ; take Mende,
54 ; besiege Sclone, 56 ; eject the Delians, 59 ; are conquered
by Brasidas at Amphipolis, 67 ; make a peace, 72 ; take Sci-
one, 82 ; want to break the peace, 91 ; make an alliance with
the Aigives, 96; invade and reduce Melos, 122; determine
on the Sicilian expedition, 133 ; their preparations, 153 ; they

IN9BX. 371

■ul for Sicily, 1^ ; land at Sjrracuse, 183 ; fight^ 184 ; solicit
the alliaDce of Camarina, 190.; take Epipolae. 206; besiege
Syracuse, 200 ; fight with Gylippus, 220 ^ sena a re-enforce-
ment to Syracuse, 227 ; fight the Corinthians at Erineus, 240 ;
defeated in the attack of Epipole, 249 ; are raising the siege,
254 ; are stopped by an eclipse of the moon, ib. ; fiiht the Mt-
tle in the harooor, 289 ; march away, 274 ; forceoT to surren-
der, 281, 283 ; their ccmstemation at Athens, 288 : their meas-
ures, 290 ; take Mitylene, 301 ; subdue the Clazomenians,
302; besiege the Chians, ib. ; defeat the Milesians, 304; quit
Miletus for fear of the Pelqponnesians, 306 ; fight and are de-
feated, 315 ; solicit the friendship of Tissaphemes, 324 ; fight
with Uie Chians, 329 : lose their democracy, ib. ; lose £u-
bcea, 356 ; defeat the Peloponnesians in the battle of Cynos-
sema, 361, 362.

A-thennus, ii. 47.

Athenagoras, his speech at Syracuse, ii. 162.

Atreus, i. 99.

Autocles, ii 4, 48.

B.

Battus, i. 382.

Boeotians, ejected out of Ame, i. 101 ; conquered by the Athe-
nians at Oenophyta, 161 ; become free. 164 ; win the battle of
Delium, ii. 32 ; besiege Detium, 34 ; take Panactum, 62 ; send
aid to the Syiacusans, 227.

BcBOtian rulers, eleven in number, ii. 28, 86 ; four councils, 87.

Bomiensians, i. 339.

Bottiieans, i. 129, 253, 270.

Brasidas, saves Methone, and receives the public commendation
at Sparta, i. 215 ; is of the council to Alcidas, 325 ; his gallant
behaviour at Pylus, 300; saves Megara, ii. 17; marchee to
ThracQ» 20 ; his character, 22 ; marches against the hynce&-
tians, 23 : harangues the Acanthians, 24 ; gets possession of
Amphipolis, 39 ; is repulsed at Eion, ib. ; marches into Acte,

- 41 } takes Torone, 43 ; and Lecythus, 44 ; crowned by tho^
Scioneans, 48 ; marches a second time against the Lvnces-'
tians, 51 ; his brave retreat, 52 ; midLes an unsuccessml at-
tempt on Potidsa, 58 ; opposes Cleon at Amphipolis, 64 ; re-
solves to attack, ib. ; harangues, 65 ; sallies, 67 ; conquers
and dies, 68 ; his funeral, ib.

Braures, ii. 39.

Byzantines, revolt from the Athenians, L 167.

C.

Callias, son of CaUiades, i. 131 ; killed, 132.
Callicrates, i. 111.
,i.339.

872 INDBX

Camarineana, twice ejected ii. 137; their conduct in the Skii

ian war, 173, 199.
Cambyses, i. 102.
Carcinus, l 214.
Carians, i. 96, 98. .
Carthaginians, i. 103, ii. 160, 203.
Carystnians, i. 155, ii. 259..
Cataneans, dwell under Mount iEtna, i. 351 ; reduced by the

Athenians, ii. 173, 261.
Cecrops, king of Athens, i. 207.
Ceryces, ii. 323.
Chaereas, ii. 338, 339, 346.
Chalcideans of EuboBa, make war with the Eretrians, i. 103 ;

subject to the Athenians, ii. 259.
Chalcideans of Thrace, revolt from the Athenians, i. 129 ; de-
feat them, 253 ; enter into league with the Argives» ii 82.
Chalcideus, the Lacedemonian admiral, ii. 295; his exploits,

298, 299 ; killed by the Athenians, 302.
Chaonians, i. 254.
Charicles, ii 229, 234.
Charminus, an Athenian commander, ii 308 ; defeated by the

Peloponneaians, 315 ; helps the oligarchical party at Samos,

337.
Charaeadas, son of Euphilitus, i. 332; killed, 334.
Chionis, ii. 74, 77.
Chians, suspected, ii. 294 ; revolt from the Athentana, 207 ; their

war, 301.
Chrysis, i. 195, ii. 57.
Citicians, i 164.

Cimon, son of Miltiades, takes Eion, i. 154, 155 ; beats the Per-
sians at Eurymedon, 156 ; dies in the expedition to Cyprus,

163.
Clearchus, ii. 342.
Clearidas, command^ in Amphipolis, ii. 57, 65 ; conquers Cteon

with Brasidas, 68 ; endeavours to break the peace, 75.
Cleippides, i 275.
Cleobulus, ii. 85.
Cleomedes, ii. 123.
Cleomene^, i 175.
Cleon, his speech, i 296 ; commands at PVlus, 373, 380 ; his

coDunand m Thrace, ii. 60, 63; conquered by Brasidas, and

killed, 67.
Cleopompus, i. 235.
Cnemus, the Spartan, commands a squadron against Zacynthas,

i. 244 ; sent mto Acamania, 254 ; retires from Stratus, 256.
Conon, ii 238.
Copiensians, ii 31.
Corcyreans, founders of Epidamnus, i. 108 ; were tbemaelVM t

INDEX. 373

Corinthian colony, 109; make war upon Epidamnus, ib.;
beat the Corinthians at sea, 112 ; beg the alliance of Athens,
113 ; their speech at Athens, 114 ; their success, 122 ; engage
the Corinthians at sea, 123; their sedition, 385; aid the
Athenians in the war of Sicily, ii. 2G0.

Corinthians, first built ships or war, i. 103 ; their ouarrel with
the Corcyieans about Epidamnus, 109 ; their speech at Athens,
118; continuation of their war with the Corcyreans, 123;
send aid to Potidsa, 132 ; hate the Athenians, 133 ; their first
speech at Laced»mon, 134 ; their second, 170 ; excite discon-
tent in Peloponnesus, ii. 77, 79 ; make alliances with the
Eleans and Argives, 82 ; aid Uie Syracusans, 206, 227.

Coroneans, ii. 30.

Cranians, i. 218.

Cranonians, i 213.

Cratamenes, ii. 136.

Crestonians, ii. 41.

Cretans, ii. 260.

CroBsus, i. 104.

Cyclops, ii. 134.

Cylon, the history of him, i. 174.

Cynes, i. 272.

Cyrus the elder, i. 103.

Daithus, ii. 74.

Damagetus, ii. 74.

Damag[on, i 336.

Damotimus, ii. 47.

Darius, king of Persia, succeeds Cambyses, i. 103 ; reduces the
isles, ib.

Darius, son of Artaxerzes, ii. 291 ; his leagues with the Lacedas
monians, 299, 311,386.

Dascon, ii. 137.

Delians, removed out of Delos by the Atiienians, ii. 59 ; brought
thither again, 83.

Demaratns, ii. 214.

Demarchus, ii 346.

Demodochus, ii. 18.

Demosthenes, i. 335 ; his war in .£tolia, 339 ; his seizure of
and exploits at Pylus, 355-358 ; his harangue, 358 ; his at-
tempt on Megara, it 13 ; carries up a re-enforcement ajndnst
Syracuse, 229 ; anivM at Syracuse, 246 ; repulsed at Kpipo-
1», 248 ; is for raising the siege, 251 ; decamps, S74 ; surren-
ders with the troops under his command, 281 ; is put todeath;
284.

Demoteles, i. 369.

Dercylidas, ii. 328.

374 INDEX.

Derdar, i. 130.

Deneans, i. 271.

Diana, i 267.

~)ictideana, take Tbraaus, u.

levolt from the Atfuwrianii, ib.
DLemponia, L 196.
0iitriphea,iL236.
Diodotoa, hia apeech, L 301.
DiomedoD, beaiagea the Chiana, ii 302 ; fitvoan the democracyi

337.
Diotimua, L 123.
Diotfephea, ii. 330.
Diphilaa, ii. 240.
IXuopea, i. 155.
Dorcia, i. 153.
Doriana, in Peloponnemia, 1 101 ; fofondera of LacedsBiiioD, i. 160,

336; bordering on the Cariana, 202; warred upon by the

Phociana, 160 ; perpMStoal enemiea to loniana, ii. 194.
Dorieua the Rhodian* i. 278.
Dorieua the Thurian, ii 310.
Droana of Thrace, i. 271.

E-
Edoniana, i 156, 270, ii 41.
Egeateana, at war with the Selinuntiana, ii. 137; aolieit aid of

Athens, ib. ; their trick, 169.
Eleana, defeated by the Atheniana, L 215 ; an alliance with the

Corinthiana and Argivea, ii 81 ; with the Atheniana, 96.
Eleuainiana, waired againat Eractheiia,.i 207.
Elymi, ii. 134.
Empediaa, ii 74, 77.
Enoius, the Spartan, ii 292; ambaaaador to Athena, 92; bia

enmity with Agia, 295, 296.
Entunus, the Cr^an, founder of Gela, ii 136.
Eordians, i 270.
Epidamniana, haraaaed with aeditiona, i 108 ; beg aid at Cloxcy-

>ra, ib. ; at Corinth, 109 ; beaieged by the Corcyreana. 110 ;

reduced, ib.
Epitadaa, i 358, 379.
Epiteiidaa, ii 57.
Erectheua, i 207.
Eretiiana, at war with the Chalddeana, i 103 ; aubject and

tributary to Athena, ii. 259.
Eiythrnane, ii 298.
Eteonicus. ii. 302.
Etheane, i. 157.
Eualaa, ii. 301.
Evarohua. tyrant of Aatacua. i 217 ; anotber of the name, ii. 135.

INDBX. .^5

Eubalus, ii. 301. ^

Kucles the Athenian, U. 38«

Eucles the Sjracunn, iL 213.

Euclides, founder of Kimera, ii 136.

Euctemon, ii. 308.

ETesperita, ii. 254.

Eumachus, i. 218.

Eumolpids, ii. 323.

Eomolpus, i 207.

EnphamidM, i. 218, ii. 47.

Euphemus, his speech at Camarina, IL 194.

Eoiylochas, the Spartan, L 341, 344, 346.

Emymachus, L 196, 199.

Eurymedon, sent to Corcyra, i. 327; to Sicily, 354 ; is fined for

retaminff, ii. 12 ; sent thither again, 226 ; arrives at Syracuse,

246; killed, 256.
Eurystheus, king of Micene, i 99.
Earytanians, i. 338.
Enstrophas, ii. 89.
Euthydemus, ii. 74, 77 ; a commander at Syracuse, 226 ; unsuc*

cessiul in the last battle, 271.

G.

Gelon, king of Syracuse, ii. 135, 137.

Geloans, build Acragas, ii 136 ; aid the Syracusans 261.

Gets, i. 267.

Glauco, i. 126.

Goazis, ii. 39.

Gongylus the Eretrian, 1. 176.

Gongylus the Corinthian, ii. 217.

Grsans, i. 268.

Grecians, account of the old, i. 94 ; how they undertook the
Trojan expedition, 98 ; applied themselves to maritime affidis,
103, 104.

GyUppus, sent to command at Syracuse, ii. 206 ; arrires there,
218 ; his battles, 220 ; takes Plenmiyiium, 231 ; procures
succours, 253 ; fights the Athenians, 256 ; st(^ their decamp-
ment, 274 ; takes Nicias prisoner, 283 ; brings home the fieeC
from Sicily, 296. '

Gyrtonlans, i. 213.

H.

Haliartians, ii. 31

Harmodius, history of him, ii. 174.

Hegesander. ii 229.

Kegesandridas, ii. 351, 355b

HecesippidAsrii. lOa

H^len, 1. 98.

376 INDEX.

HeUaoicus, i. 154.

Hellen, son of Deucalion, i. 95.

Helots, their levolt from and war with the Lacedaemonians, i

156, 157 ; are feared, and two thousand of them made awaf

with, ii. 22.
Heracleots, ii 100.
Heraclids, kill Enrysthens, i. 99.
Heraclides the Syracosan, ii 189, 213.
Hereans, ii. 111.
Hermmidas, i 277.
Hennocrates, his speech to the Sicilians, ii. 7 ; to the Syraca

sans, 158; his character, 1Q8 ; enconragea the Syractisans,

ib. ; made a commander, 189 ; his speech at Gamarina, 190 ;

his stratagem, 273 ; banished, 346.
Hermon, ii. 353.
Hesiod, i 338.
Hessians, i. 342.
HestisBans, i 165, ii. 259.
Hestiodoras, i 247.
Hierensians, i 336.
Hierophon, i. 345.
Hippagretes, i. 379.
Hipparchas, history of hun, ii. 174.

Hippias, the eldest son of Pisistratns, history of him, ii 174.
Hippias the Arcadian, i 294.
Hippoclus, the tjrrant of Lampsacns, ii. 178.
Hippoclus, son of Menippos, u. 296.
Hippocrates the Athenian, ii. 12 ; his attempt on Megara, 13 ;

his harangue, 31 ; killed at the battle of Delium, 35 ; tyrant i

ofGela, 137. i

Hippolochidas, ii. 20. i

Hipponicus, i. 335. |

Hipponoidas, ii 114. I

Homer, i 95, 99, 343.

HyaBans, i. 342. j

Hybleans, ii 207. i

Hyblon, ii 135,
Hyperbolus, ii 336.

I _ ^

Iberians, ii. 134, 203.
lUyrians, i 110, ii. 51.
Imbrians, i 276, ii. 259.
Inarus, an African king, revolts from the Persian monarch, i

158; crucified, 162.
lolcius, ii. 74, 77.
lonians, had a great fleet in the reign of Cyrus, and were mas

ters at sea, i. 108 ; subdued by Cyras, 103, 104 ; revolt, 153 ;

INDBX. 377

' used to MsemUe at Delos, 343 ; enemies to the Dorians, ii.
194.
Ippensians, L 341.
Isarchidas, i. HI.
Ischagoras, ii. 57, 74, 77.
(socrates, L 257.
(sthmionicus, ii. 74, 77.
ltalQ8,ii. 134.
[tamanes, i. 294.
Ity8,i2ia

LacedaBmonians, their power in Peloponnesus, i 99 ; their dress,
97 ; were the first wno stripped in the public games, ib. ; de-
molished tjrrants, 104 ; deluded by Themistocles, 151 ; accuse
him, 181 ; war against their Helots, 157 ; at war with the
Athenians, ib. ; and the Dorians, 160; beat the Athenians at
Tanagra, 161 ; make a truce for five years, 163 ; begin the
holy war, 164 ; make a thirty years* trace with the Athenians,
165 ; consult about the Peloponneaian. war, 143 ; determine
for it, 148 ; send embassies to Athens to spin Dut time, 174 ;
invade Attica, 202 ; assign Thyrea to the JBginet», 216 ; in-
vade Attica, 227; make war on Zacynthus, 243; march to
Plataea and besiege it, 247 ; invade Acamania, 254 ; fight at
sea, 257 ; their project to seize the Pirous, 265 ; invade At-
tica, 282;tresolve to succour the Mityleneans, ib.; become
masters of Platea, 309 ; put the Platsans to death, 321 ; beat
the Corcyreans at sea, 326 ; send a colony to Heraclea, 335 ;
their expedition against the Amphilochians, 344 ; invade At-
tica, 354; their eiKleavours to recover Pylus, 356; send an
embassy to Athens to solicit' a peace, 362 ; vanquished in
Sphacteria, 379 ; make away with two thousand Helots, ii. 22 ;
take Amphipolis, 39 ; make peace vnth the Athenians, 45 ;
march into Arcadia, 83 ; forbid to assist at the Olymmc games,
98; succour the Epidaurians, 103; gain a victory at Mantinea,
115 ; determine to succour the Sirracusans, 206 ; fortify De-
celea, 228 ; succour the Chians, 294 ; enter into a league with
the Persian monarch, 299, 311, 326 ; take lasus, 306 ; fight
with and beat the Athenians, 313 ; seize Rhodes, 316 ; aie
beaten at the seafight of Cynos-sema, 362.

Lacedemonius, son of Cimon, i. 123.

Laches, commander of the Athenian fleet in Sicily, i. 332, ii.«74,
77 ; makes war on Myle, i. 334 ; defeats the Locrians, 343.

Laco, i. 310.

Lespodias, ii. 214, 347.

Lwstrigons, ii. 134. V, i j

Lamachufl, loseth a squadron, n. 19 ; one of the three command

n— ff

378 IHDBX.

enin SicUy, 139 ; hn Ofnomi *t acMiieaoCw«r,ni; IdIM
212.
JjasBSMj ii. 135.
Lamphilusy iL 74, 77.
Lampo, ii. 74, 77.
Leseans, L 268, 269. ^

Learchus, i. 244. ^^ *.« . ^ o^ i ««»

LeiimiaiM,L276,ii.65; accompany the Athenians to Si«Iy,?5a
Leocrates, i. 159.
Leon the LacedflBmonian, i. 336.
Leon the Athenian, ii. 301, 362, 324, 325. .

lieontines,! 369; atwarwiththe Syracastms, 332 ; insedition,

ii.62.
Leotychidea, i 149.
Lesbians, i. 21*7.
Lencaclians, aid the Corinthians againat the Coreyreans, 1. 109 ,

join the AmbTacioto, 254. ^^. ^ _, , ,, ^,

Lichas, his embassies, ii. 76, 117; pnUie host of the Aigires,

117 : his dispute ^th Tissaphernes. 315, 3i5 ; his death, 345.

Locnana, Ozofian, i. 96 ; lose Nanpftctus» 158 ; confederate with

the Athenians, 33a
Locrians, EpizephyrifiB, ii. 216.
Lycophron, i. 258, 382.
Lyncestians, i. 269, ii. 21, 51.
Lysides, L 286.
Lysistiatos, ii 42.

M.

Macaiios, i. 341, 347.

llacbon, i. 257. .

Mantinetms, i. 347, 348; war with the Tegeat», ii. 57; make
alliance with the ArgiYos, 80; at war with the Lacedsmo-
nians, 83 ; renew the peace with them, 120 ; mercenanes, 260.

Megabetes, i. 177. • ^

Megabazus the Persian, i 162; son of Zomrras, jb.

Mogareans, aid the Corinthians against Corcyia,!. UO ; probib.
ited the haifooora and markets of Athens^ 134 186 : schpe
to betray their city to the Athenians, ii. 12; demohsh their
long walls, 41.

Meleans, iL 63.

Melanchridas, ii 292.

Melanthiis, ii. 290.

Heleas, i 277.

IM^AlAflsndfiF i. 246

Melians, their conference with the Athenians, a 123 ; besioged
131 ; reduced, 132. .

Meliensians,i336; fight with ^e HanMOootSi ii lOO.

Menander, an Athenian commander m Sicily, u. 226, 069.

lUBsx. 379

Menas, u. 74, 77.

Mendeans, ii. 50.

M«Me^U8, ii 187.

M«QM»ate0, ii 48.

Menon, L 213.

Mesflenians of Peloponnesos, ejected by the Lacedaemoniaiis, i
157 ; settled by the Athenians at NaupactQs, 158 ; take Pheia,
215 ; replaced at Pylos, 381.

Messenians of Sicily, at war with the Naxiaos, i. 3<S9.

Metagenes, ii. 74, 77.

If etapontians, ii. 280.

Methymnians, i. 285, ii 259.

Miciades, i. 123.

Milesians, their war with the Samians, i. 166 ; beat the Argives,
ii 304 ; demolish the fort bnilt by Tissaphemes, 345,

Mindarus, the Lacednmonian admiral, ii 345, 358, 359 ; defeat-
ed, 362.

Minos, his naval power, i 96, 96.

Mityleneans, revolt from the Athenians, i 275 ; thetr spee(ih at
Olympia, 278 ; reduced, 291 ; ordered to be massacred, 295.

Molossians, i 254.

Mycalessians, massacred, ii. 237.

Myonensians, i 341.

Myrcinians, ii. 64.

Myronides, i 159, 161, ii. 31.

Myrrhihe, is. 175.

Myrtilus) ii. 74, 77.

Myscon, ii. 346.

N.

Naaclide8,'i. 196.

Na^dans, favour the Athenians, ii. 172, 261 ; vaagoish the Mes-
senians, i 369.

Nicanbr,i254.

Nicias, son of Niceratus, i 308, 372, 382, ii. 4, 48 ; lus speeches,
ii. 140, 149. 185. 263, 276 : takes Minoa, i 308; attacks Metos.
335 ; invades the Corinthians^ 382 ; takes Cyfhera, ii. 4 ; and
Mende, 56 ; besieges 8cioiie,ib. ) author of the peaee, 71, 95 ;
temed for tb« eommaad te Sicily, 139 ; his opinnta at a conn-
dl of war, 170 ; daftats thib Syraeusans, 187, 221 ; his strata-
gam, 212; left in th» sole cokHfiasAid, 213; his letted to the
Athenians, 223 ; refuseth to raise the siege of Syracuse, S51 ;
raiseth the siege, 274; iuztefideA to Gy^ppua, 283; put to
death, 284.

Nk&s, the CvBtaii, of Qorlyna, i 9I».

Nicomachus, ii 27.
Nicomeeies, 1. 160.

380 IMDSX.

NicoDj ii. 229.

Nicomdas, ii. 20.

Micostntns, aids the pooalar Action at Comrn>i 321; takM

Cythera, iL 4 ; takas Hende, 66; beaiegw Sdone, ib. ; 106.
Nymphodonia, i. 216.

O.

Odomantiaps, i. 271, iL 63.

Odryaiana, i 268, 260.

Oeanthiana, i. 342.

Oeoiadn, i 256, 350 ; imraded bjr the Atheniana, 277 ; received

into their alliance, ii. 20.
Oetsana, i. 336, ii 290.
Qlynthiana, il 87.
Onasimus, it 47.
Onomacles, iL 306.
Ophioniana, L 338.
Opidans, ii 134.
Oreatea, L 162. '
Oreatiana, L 254.
Oradua, i. 254.
OropiaDa, L 214.

P.

Pachea, aent by the Athemana to reduce Bfitrlene, L 265 ; takes
it, 291 ; and Notium, 294 ; -and Pynha and Eraaaua, ib.

Pttdaritua, or Pedaritna, ii. 306, 309, 310, 312 ; lulled, 325.

Paeoniana, i. 260.

Pasondaa, hia harangnea to the BcBOtiana, iL 26 ; wina the bat
Ue of Delium, 32.

Palirenatana, i 217.

Panunifais, ii. 136.

Pansana, L 271.

Pandion, L 216.

Paraliana, L 836.

ParaTsana, L 254.

Pariana^ iL 38.

Paaaamaa^ captain-geneni of Greece, L 152 ; anbdoea Cypnia.
ib.; beaiegea Byiantinm, 153; growa a tyrant, ib.; leoaUed
and tried at Sparta, ib. ; retoma to HeUeroont, 176 ; hia letter
to Xerxea, 177 ; dxiTen fiom Byzantium, 178 ; betiayed, 160 ;
atarved to death, 181.

Panaaniaa, son of Pleiatoanaz, L 290.

PelopB, L 98.

• Peloponneaiana, their coloniea, L 101 ; their character, 168 ;
oriffinally Dorians, iL 195 ; their war with the Atheniana» aea
Atheniana and r

Persbiana, iL 21.

INDEX. d6]

r of Macedonia, hit pdlitieal tiuiis, i 130, 131, 217
267 ; inVaded by Sitalcea, 267 1 in coDJunctioii with Brasidas
inTaaea AriilMraa, ii. 23, 66; qoarFsIs with Braaidaa, 56 «
makea peace with the Atheniana, ib. ; is again their enemy, 121.
Periclea, commands the Atheniana, i. 164 ; conquers Eubooa, ib. :
and Samoa, 166 ; his speech for war, 187 ; makes the fiinerai
oration, 219 ; his speech in defence of hiinself, 236; his deatb
and character, 241, 242.
Perieres, ii. 136.

Persians, at TheimopylsB, i. 378 ; their noble cnstom, 268.
Phfloactans, i. 109.
PhsBsx, ii. 62.
Phaedimus, ii. 90.
Phadnis, priestess of Juno, ii. 57.
' Phanomaclms, i. 247.
Phamabazua, it 291, 313.
Phamaces, i. 244.
Pharsalians, i. 213.
Phereans, i. 213.

Philippua, the Lacedemonian, iL 307, 358.
Philocharidas, ii. 47, 74, 77, 92.
Philocrates, ii. 132.
Philoctetes, i 100.
Phliasians, i. 110.
Phoceans, built Maraeilles, i. 102, 103 ; beat the Carthaginians

at sea, ib.
Phocians, at war with the Dorians, i. 160 ; recover the temple

of Delphi, 164.
Phcenicians, exercised piracy, L 98 ; inhabited the isles, ib. ; had

settlements in Sicily, ii. 134.
Phormio, an Athenian commander, i. 133, 168 ; commands their
fleet at Naupactua, 246; beata the PelopODnesians at sea,
258 ; prepares for a second engagement, ib. ; his harangue,
261 ; beats them again, 264.
Photius, i. 254.

Phrrnichus, ii. 303 ; his intrigue against Alcibiadea, 321 ; deprived
of the command, 324; is of the oligarchical ftction, 333, 350;
is assassinated, 352.
Pierians, i. 269.
Pisander, overturns the democracy at Athens, ii. 323, 329, 350 ,

flies to Decelea, 358.
Pisistratus, the tyrant, i. 343, ii. 174 ; purifies Delos, i. 343 ;

dies an old man, ii. 174.
Pisistratus, the son of Hippias, ii. 175 ; dedicated altars, ib.
Pissuthnes, i. 166, 167, 294.
Pittacus, ii. 39.
Platnana, eonfederate with Athena, i. 196 ; besieged, 247 ; a body

388 uiDBz.

rmfa^tm-i wnMndw.aoO; thMri

iL 71, 77, 83.
PlaMtalu,iL74,77.
PiBirtinrhm,ilTO.

P<rf]M, iL 63.

Polymthes, iL 240.

Pf^cntetytjiantof 8HDio%Da«l«ifal«kMa*iMB; ^flmaeaiw

UbBDea to the Delian Apollo, ib., 343.
Polydamidas, ii 50, 56.
Polynksdes, L 213.
PotidaBaiifl, originaUy from Cotinlfa, i UB; de»rted by ^

Athenians, 132; beneged, 133, 235; sanaadflr^ailk. \

Protodemns, L 244.
Procles, L 335, ii 74, 77.
Procne, i 216.
Pioteas, L 123, 214.
Prozeniu, L 343.
Ptnodorus, iL 19.
Pystillut, ii. 136.
Pythen, ii 214, 216.
Pythias, i. 323.
Pytbodonis,thettcfaoiiatAib«is,Llfl5; tbe son of Isakwhiifl,

in the command, L 351, ii 74, 77, 214 ; banished, 12.

R.
Ram])hias, L 186, ii. 60.
Rhegians, i. 332 ; attacked by the Locriaoa^ i. 353,368 ; aeutnJ

in the Sicilian war, iL 168.
Rhodiana, PoiiobyilMceni, ii.ae9.

».
SabylJnthns, i. 254.
SacoD, ii. 136.

Sadocas, son of Sitalcea, L 217; made a oiiizeQ of Athens, ib.
Salaetbus, sent to Mitylene, L 290 ; taken prisoner and put to

death by the Athenians, 295.
Salynthius, king of the Agrisans, L 350.
Samians, conquered by the Athenians, L 166; their inwnectioD,

iLSOO.
Sargeus, ii. 229.
Scioneans, of the Pallene^ originally from Pelopoonesus, ii 48 :

revolt, ib. ; crown Brasidas, ib. ; reduced wa severely tuoftted

by the Athenians, 82.
foimdas. ii. 334.
Scythians, i 267, 269.

iNDBx« ass

d«ynmitiaBm ii. S60; at war ¥nth the RgPitatna, 197.

SennyliaBs, ii 73.

Seathes, i. 268, iL 36 ; anccoeda Sitalcea m the mofdoin of
Odt^as, i im ; nanieetlM aaler of PevdUcctt^ 271.

Bicamana, iL 134.

Sicilians, ii. 6, 11.

8ictili,ii. 134,200,213.

Bicyoniana, L 161, 163, ii. 3ii

Simonidea, i 356.

Simiia,ii. 136.

Singeana, ii. 73.

SfaitiaiM, i. 260.

Sitalcea, king of Thrace, 1216, 244; ally to the Athemana, 217;
invadea the Macedoiiiaii8,9^ ; hia po«rer,a69; eoMnieied hr
the TribiOliuia, ii. 86. -^ ^

Socrates, aon cf Antagenaa. L 814.

Sophoclee, aon of Soatiatidea, i. 351 ; aent to Sicily, 354; hia
acta at Coreyrt, 385; haniahed from Athflnb, ii 12.

Steaagoras, i. 168.

Sthenelaidaa, hia speech, i 147.

Stratonice, i. 271.

Stratians, conqaer the Chaoniana, i. 265.

Strombichidea, ii. 207; his ezptoita, -308, 342.

Styphon, i. 379.

Btyienaians, ii. 259.

Syracnaana, at wtp: with the Leostinea, i. 332 ; are defeated by
the Atheniaiis, 368 ; dmw up against the Athemana, iL 184 ;
prepare for battle, ib. ; are defeated, 187 ; ftortify their city,
189; aend ambaasadora to Camarina, 190; to Cozinth and
Sparta, 200 ; engage and are defeated by the Atheniana, 208,
1213: raise their coonter-woriu, 210; areabont treating with
Nicias, 2^3 ; prepare their fleet, 230; attack thia Athenians by
land and sea, 231 ; erect two trophies, 250 ; prepue again for
an engagement, 8S6; defeat them again, ib. ; prepare for the
last battle, 262; engage, 269 ; an victorioqa, 272; stop the
Atheniana by a stratagem, 273 } pnrsae them and take them
all prisoners, 281, 283 ; send aid to the PeloponnesiAne* 304,
361.

Tamus, ii. 309.

Taatalus, a Laeedaraonan comiBander, ii. 6.

Tanras, ii. 47.

Tegeite, fight with the Mantineana, ii. 57.

ToHea, 11.74,77.

Telliaa, il 213.

Temenidw, i. 260L

Tenediana, i. 275, ii. 259.

884 iNDU.

Teiuis, i. 293, ii «SQ, 996.

Teresf&ther of Sitalcet, I 216; how he got the Tringdmii «
OdiyHB, lb. ; «iilmrged it, ib.

Teatiaplus, i 292 ; hit advice to Aleidas and the Peloponnesiaiit,
ib.

Thanrps, king of the Moloflsians, i. 254.

Thasians, revolt from Athens, i. 156 : defeaited, ib. ; beg aid fram
the LacedBmonians, ib. ; surrenoer, 157.

Thsanetas, i 286.

Theagenes, i. 174. •

Thebana, surprise Platsa, i. 196 ; their speech to the Lacede-
monians against the Plateans, 315 ; demolish the walls ol
Thespia, ii. 57.

Themistocles, i. 139, 181, 186; by his advice the battle was
fought in the strait of Salamis, 139 ; is sent ambaasador to
Sparta, 150 j deludes the Lacednmoniaos, ib. ; gets the long
w^lls aiKl Pu»u8 secured, ib. ; banished Athens by the ostra-
cism, 182; resides at Aigos, 181 ; accused by the Lacedmno-
nians, ib. ; flies to Corcyn, 182 ; to Admetus, ib. ; the dan-
ger he escaped, ib. ; his letter to the king of Persia, 183 ; his
character, 184.

Theramenes, the Athenian, ii. 333 ; one of those who overtnmed
the democracy, ib. ; turns to the other side, 349.

Theramenes, the Lacedssmonian, carries the fleet to Asia, ii. 3Mw

Thermo, ii. 295.

Theseus, i. 207.

Thessalians, drive the Bcsotians from Ame, i. 101 ; confederate
with the Athenians, 158 ; send them aids, 160, 213 ; theit
form of government, ii. 20.

Theucles, founder of Naxus, ii. 135.

Thracians, overthrow the Athenians, i. 156, ii. 36 ; are fimn i.
216 ; their sordid custom, 268; fi|^t with the Thebans after
the massacre at Mycalessus, ii. 237.

Thrasybnlus, ii. 337 ; supports the democracy, 338 ; made a
commander, 340; brings back Alcibiades,343; beats the Pel-
oponnesians at sea, 3C3.

Thrasycles, it 74, 77.

Thrasyllus, the Argive, ii. 105.

Thrasyllus, the Athenian, ii. 337, 340, 361, 362.

Thraaymelidas, i. 359.

Thucles, see Theucles.

Thuc3rdides, son of Oloms, why he wrote the history of the war,
i. 93, 105-107, ii. 78 ; had the plague, L 228 ; his gold-minss
and great credit in Thrace, ii. 38 ; coramanda in Thrace, ib. ;
arrives too late to save Amphipolis, 39 ; secures £ioD, ib. ;

^_wa8 an exile for twenty years, 79.

Thucydides, the colleague of Agnon and PhorHUO, i. 168.

Thucydides, the Pharsahan, ii. 353.

nfi>£]i 986

Tfaymochttw, ii. 356.

TflaUBaB0,i.268.

Timagons of GyBem, iL 991, 299.

Tinuigone of Tegea, i. 244.

Timanor,! 111.

Timocrates, i 258 ; kiUs hiiDself, 294, 265.

TiflamemiSy i. 336.

Tisander, i. 341.

Tiaiaa, ii 123.

TiMaphemes, Uenteiiaiit of Darius, n. 291, 304 ; hit compacts
and leagaes with the PelopODneaiana, 299, 307, 311, 315, 325,
326 ; is conqaered at Miletus by the Athenians, 304 ; fortifies
lasos, 307 ; pays the Lacedemonian ships, ib. ; lessens their
pay by the adyice of Alcibiades, 317 ; wants to be reconciled
to the Lacedsmonians, 325 ; inTeighed against by the mariners,
341, 344; why he did not bring up the PhiBnician fleet, 348.

Tlepolemus, i 168.

Tohnidas, son of Tohmras, i. 161, 164.

Tolophonians, i. 341.

Tracninians, L 336.

Treiians, i. 268.

TribaUians, conquer Sitalces, king of the Odrysians, ii. 36L

Tritsensians, i. 341.

Trojans, how enabled to resist the Oreeks for ten years, i. 101 ;
some of them settled in Sicily after the taking of Troy, ii 134.

Tydens, ii 312.

Tyndarus, i. 96.

Tyrrhenes, ii. 257, 261.

U.
Ulysses, i 368.

X.
Xenares, Ephoros at Sparta, ii 85.
Xenares. commander of the Heraclaots, killed, ii IOOl
Xenoclides, i. 123, 351.
Xeno, ii. 229.
Xenophantidas, ii. 325.
Xenophon, son of Euripides, i 246, 253.
Xerxes, i 169, 177 ; his letter to Pausanias, 177.

Z.

Zacynthians, a colony oi Achnans, i. 243 ; aid the Athenians m

the Sicilian war, ii.260.
Zeuxidas, ii 74, 77.

c\ o

X

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