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HISTORY OF ROME 



VOL.nL 



e 



THE 



HISTORY OF ROME 



BY 

THBODOR MOMMSEN 



TRANSLATED 
WITH THB AUTHOR'S SANCTION AND ADDITIONS 

BY 

WILLIAM P. DICKSON, D.D., LL.D. 

PBOFE8EK>R OF DIYINITT IN THE UMiyBBfilTY OF OLA800W 



WITH A PREFACE BY DR. LEONHARD SCHMITZ 



VOLUME III 



NEW YORK 

CHAKLES SCKIBNEE'S SONS 

1891 




A^'^l^ 



TO 



MT DEAR ASSOOIATEB 

FERDINAND HITZIG 

OF ZUBIOH 
AMD 

KARL LUDWIG 

OF VIKMMA. 



1862, 1853. 1864. 



PREFATORY NOTE. 



The ohangbs which the Author has nad occasion co 

make in the new edition of the third and fourth volumes of 
this work, have chiefly arisen out of the recent discovery 

of the Fragments of Licinianus, which have supplemented 

our defective information as to the epoch from the battle of 

Pydna to the revolt of Lepidus in various not unimportant 

points, but have also suggested various &esh difficulties. 



OONTEZnTTS 

OF 

THE THIRD VOLUME 



BOOK FOURTH. 

THE KEVOLUTION. 



CHAPTER I. 
Thb Subject Gouiitbibs down to the TiirEs of the Qiiacosi 13 

CHAPTER II. 
The Reforh Movemzmt and Tiberius Graccrus . . 92 

CHAPTER ni. 
The Revolution and Gaius Gracchus . • .129 

CHAPTER IV. 
The Rule of the Restoration . • .161 

CHAPTER V. 
Thx Fxoflss of the North .... 202 

CHAPTER VI. 

The Attempt of Marius at Revolution and the Attempt 

or Drusus at Reform ..... 2^8 

CHAPTER VII. 

The Revolt or the Italian Subjects, and the Sulpioian 

Revolution . . . . .27-3 



S, CONTENTS. 



PAOI 



CHAPTER Vni. 
Thi Eaot avo Kino Mithradates .... 829 

CHAPTER IX. 
QwNA AND Sulla ... . ?»VJ 

CHAPTER X. 
The Sullan Constitution . . . . 4Ib 

CHAPTER XI. 
The Commonwealth and its Economy , 471 

CHAPTER XII. 
Nationality, Religion and Education i (tOb 

OHAPTER XIIL 

L1TEIL.ITIIBS AKD AXT .... 5.J3 



BOOK FOTJETH. 



. THE REVOLUTION. 

^^ Aber sie treiben's toll ; 

Ich fiircht*, cs breshe.** 

Nicht jeden Wochenachluos 

Macht Gott die Zecbe. 

60KFBE 



CHAPTER 1. 

THS BUaiBOT OOITNTRIBS DOWN TO THB TIMES OF TBI 

ORACOHI. 

On the abolition of the Maccdonimi monarchy, the su- 
premacy of Rome was not only an established 
fact from the Pillars of Hercules to the mouth« 
of the Nile and the Orontes but, as if it were the final 
decree of fate, pressed on the nations with all the weight 
of an inevitable necessity, and seemed to leave them merely 
the choice of perishing in hopeless resistance or in hopeless 
endurance. If history were not entitled to insist that the 
earnest reader should accompany her through good and evil 
days, through landscapes of winter as well as of spring, the 
historian might be tempted to shun the cheerless taslc of 
tracing the manifold and yet monotonous turns of this 
struggle between power and weakness, both in the Spanish 
provinces already annexed to the Roman empire and in the 
African, Hellenic, and Asiatic territories, which were still 
treated as clients of Rome. But, however unimportant and 
subordinate the individual conflicts may appear, Uiey possess 
collectively a deep historical significance ; and, in particular, 
the state of things in Italy at this period only becomes 
intelligible in the light of the reaction which the provinces 
exercised over the mother-country. 

In addition to the territories which may be regarded ai 
natural appendages of Italy — in which, however, 
the natives were still far from being oompletelj 
subdued, and Ligurians, Sardinians, and Oorsicans were, not 
greatly to the credit of Rome, continually furnishing occa- 
sion for " village triumphs " — the formal sovereignty of 
Rome at the oommencement of this period was established 



14 The Subject Cav/nl^nea, [Book iv 

only in the two Spanish provinces, which embraced the 
larger astern and southern portions of the peninsula be* 
yond Uie P}Tenees. We have already (11. 24 bet seq,) at- 
tempted to describe the state of matters in the peninsula. 
Iberians and Celts, Phoenicians, Hellenes, and Romans were 
there strangely intermingled. The most diverse kinds and 
itages of civilization subsisted there simultaneously and at 
various points crossed each other, the ancient Iberian cul* 
ture side by side with utter barbarism, the civilized rela- 
tions of Phoenician and Greek mercantile cities side by side 
with the growth of a Latinizing culture, which was espe- 
cially promoted by the numerous Italians employed in the 
silver mines and by the large standing garrison. In this 
respect the Roman township of Italica (near Seville) and 
the Latin colony of Carteia (on the bay of Gibraltar) de- 
serve mention — ^the latter being, next to Agrigentum (ii. 
179), the first transmarine civic community of Latin tongue 
and Italian constitution. Italica was founded by Scipio the 
Elder, before he left Spain (548), for his vete- 
rans who were inclined to remain in the penin- 
sula — probably not as a burgess-communitv, however, but 
merely as a market-place.* Carteia was found- 
ed in 583 and owed its existence to the multi- 
tude of camp-children — the offspring of Roman soldiers 
and Spanish slaves — who grew up as slaves de jure but as 
free Italians de facto ^ and were now manumitted on behalf 
of the state and constituted, along with the old inhabitants 
of Carteia, into a Latin colony. For nearly thirty years 
afler the regulation of the province of the Ebro by Tibe- 
rius Sempronius Gracchus (575, 576; ii. 261) 
I he Spanish provinces, on the whole, enjoyed th • 
blessings of peace undisturbed, although mention is made 

* Itali<'4 must have been intended by Scipio to be what was called 
Ivk Italy /orvm et conc^iabiUutn civiwn Jiomanarum ; Aquae Sextiae ii 
Gaul had a similar origin afterwards. The formation of transmarine 
burgess-communities only began at a later date with Cailhage and 
Karbo : yet it is remarkable that Scipio already made a first step in a 
tertain sen^e, In that direction. 



Ohap. I.] The Siibject Govm,trie%, J i 

of one or two expeditions against the Celtiberians and Lusi- 
tanians. 

But more serious events occurred in 600. The Lusitii* 
nians, under the leadership of a ehief called 
T.t.«i*i^i«« PunicuSy invaded the Roman territory, defeated 
^^' the two Roman governors who had united to 

(^poM them, and slew a great number of their troops. 
The Vettones (between the Tagus and the Upper Douro) 
were thereby induced to make common cause with the 
Lusitanians ; and these, thus reinforced, were enabled to 
extend their excursions as far as the Mediterranean, and to 
pillage even the territory of the Bastulo-Phoenicians not 
far from the Roman capital New Carthage (Cartagena). 
The Romans at home took the matter so seriously as to 
resolve on sending a consul to Spain, a step which had not 
been taken since 559 : and, in order to accelerate 

|AJC ' ' 

the despatch of aid, they even made the new 
consuls enter on office two months and a half before the 
legal time. For this reason the day for the consuls enter- 
ing on office was shifted from the 15th of March to the 1st 
of January ; and thus was established the beginning of the 
year which we still make use of at the present day. But, 
before the consul Quintus Fulvius Nobilior arrived \vith his 
army, a very serious encounter took place on the right 
bank of the Tagus between the praetor Lucius Mummius, 
governor of Further Spain, and the Lusitanians, now led 

after the fall of Punicus by his successor Cae- 
i&s. 

sarus (601). Fortune was at first favourable to 
the Romans; the Lusitanian army was broken and th<ji 
CAmp was taken. But the Romans, already fatigued bjf 
■iieir march and falling out of their ranks in the disorder 
of the pursuit, were at length completely defeated by theii 
already vanquished antagonists, and lost their own camp in 
addition to that of the enemy, as well as 9/MK) dead. 

Tlie flame of war now blazed forth far and wide. The 
OeitibeiiM Lusitanians on the left bank of the Tagus, led 
^''' by Cauoaenus, threw themselves on the Celtid 

subject to the Romans (in Alentejo), and took their town 



16 The Svijeot Cowtiiries, [Book iv 

Conistorgis. The Lusitauians seat the standards taken 
from Mummius to the Celtiberians at once as an announoo* 
ment of victory and a summons to arms ; and among these, 
too, there was no want of ferment. Two small Celtiberian 
tribes in the neighbourhood of the powerful Arevacae (near 
the sources of the Douro and Tagus), the Belli and the 
Titthi, had resolved to settle together in Segeda, one of their 
tO¥nis. While they were occupied in building the walla 
the Romans ordered them to desist, because the Sempronian 
regulations prohibited the subject communities from found- 
ing towns at their own discretion ; and they at the same 
time required the contribution of money and men which 
was due by treaty but for a considerable period had not 
been demanded. The Spaniards refused to obey either 
command, alleging that they were engaged merely in en- 
larging, not in founding, a city, and that the contribution 
had been not merely suspended, but remitted by the Ro- 
mans. Thereupon Nobilior appeared in Hither Spain with 
on army of nearly 30,000 men, including some Numidi<an 
horsemen and ten elephants. The walls of the new town 
of Segeda still stood unfinished : most of the inhabitants 
submitted. But the most resolute men fled with their 
wives and children to the powerful Arevacae, and sum- 
moned these to make common cause with them against the 
Romans. The Arevacae, emboldened by the victory of the 
Lusitanians over Mummius, consented, and chose Cams, 
one of the Segedan refugees, as their general. On the 
third day after his election the valiant leader had fallen, but 
the Roman army was defeated and nearly 6,000 Roman 
burgesses were slain ; the 23rd day of August, the festival 
of the Volcanalia, was thenceforth held in sad remembrance 
by the Romans. The fall of their general, however, in- 
duced the Arevacae to retreat into their strongest town 
Numantia (Guarray, a Spanish league to the north of Sorin 
on the Douro), whither Nobilior followed them. Under 
the walls of the town a second engagement took place, in 
which the Romans at first by means of their elephants 
drove the Spaniards back into the town ; ^ut while doinj^ 



Oba¥. I] The Subject Coimtri48. 17 

BO they were thrown into confusion in consequence of on« 
of the animals being wounded, and sustained a second defeat 
at the hands of the enemy again issuing from the walls, 
lliis and other misfortunes — such as the destruction of a 
corps of Boman cavalry despatched tc call forth the contin* 
gents — imparted to the affairs of the Romans in the Hither 
province so unfavourable an aspect that the fortress of 
Ocilis, where the Bomans had their chest and their stores, 
passed over to the enemy, and the Arevacae were in a posi- 
tion to think of dictating peace, although without success, 
to the Bomans. These disadvantages, however, were in 
some measure counterbalanced by the successes which 
Mummius achieved in the southern province. Weakened 
though his army was by the disaster which it had sufferet^ 
he yet succeeded in iuflioting a defeat on the Lusitanian. 
who were imprudently scattered on the right bank of the 
Tagus ; and passing over to the lefb bank, where the Lusi- 
tanians had overrun the whole Boman territory, and had 
even made a foray into Africa, he cleared the southern 
province of the enemy. 

To the northern province in the following year (602) the 
162. senate sent considerable reinforcements and a 

MatoeihiB. jjg^ commander-in-chief to succeed the incapable 
Nobilior, the consul Marcus Claudius Marcellus, who had 
already, when praetor in 586, distinguished him- 
self in Spain, and had since that time given 
proof of his talents as a general in two consulships. His 
skilful leadership, and still more his clemency, speedily 
changed the position of affairs : Ocilis at once surrendered 
io him ; and even the Arevacae, confirmed by Marcellus in 
rhe hope that peace would be granted to them on payment 
uf a moderate fine, concluded an armistice and sent envoys 
to Borne. Marcellus could thus proceed to the southern 
province, where the Vettones and Lusitanians had professed 
Bubmission to the pra^^tor Marcus Atilius so long as he re- 
mained within their bounds, but after his departure had im* 
mediately revolted afresh and chastised the allies of Rome 
The arrival of the consul restored tranquillity, and, whil« 



18 The Subject Ootmtriee. [Boos rv 

he spent the winter in Gorduba, hostilitieB were suspended 
throughout the peninsula. Meanwhile the question of peace 
with the Arevacae was discussed at Home. It is a sigiiifi* 
oant indication of the relations subsisting among the Span- 
iards themselves, that the emissaries of the Roman party 
among the Arevacae were the chief occasion of the rejection 
of the proposals of peace at RomC) by representing that, if 
the Romans were not willing to sacrifice the Spaniards 
friendly to their interests, they had no alternative Eave 
either to send a consul with a corresponding army every 
year to the peninsula or to make an emphatic example now. 
In consequence of this, the ambassadors of the Arevacae 
were dismissed without a decisive answer, and it was rc^ 
solved that the war should be prosecuted with vigour. 
Marcellus accordingly found himself compelled in the fol- 
lowing spring (603) to resume the war against 
the Arevacae. But — either, as was assertedi 
fVom his unwillingness to leave to his successor, who was 
to be expected soon, the glory of terminating the war, or, 
as is perhaps more probable, from his believing like Grac- 
chus that a humane treatment of the Spaniards was the 
first thing requisite for a lasting peace — the Roman general 
after holding a secret conference with the most influential 
men of the Arevacae concluded a treaty under the walls 
of Numtuitia, by which the Arevacae surrendered to the 
Romans nt discretion, but were reinstated in their formei 
stipulated rights on their undertaking to pay money and 
furnish hostages. 

When the new cortimandeMn-chTef, the consul Lucius 
Lucullus, arrived at head-quarters, he found the 
war which he had come to conduct already tci> 
minated by a formally concluded peace, and his hopes of 
bringing home honour and more especially money from 
Spain were apparently frustrated. But there was a means 
of surmounting this difficulty. Lucullus of bis own accord 
attacked the western neighbours of the Arevacae, the Vt«> 
caei, a Celtiberian nation still independent and living on the 
^Hkst terms with the Romans. The question of the Span 



Chap. I.] The Svhject Countries. 11' 

iards as to what fault they had committed was answered by 
a sudden attack on the town of Cauca (Coca, eight Spanish 
leagues to the west of Segovia) ; and, while the terrified 
town believed that it had purchased a capitulation by heavy 
sacrifices of money, Roman troops marched in and enslaved 
or slaughtered the inhabitants without any pretext at all. 
,\fler this heroic feat, which is said to have cost the lives 
of some 20,000 men, the army proceeded on its march. 
Far and wide the villages and townships were abandoned 
or, as in the case of the strong Intercatia and Pallantia 
(Palencia) the capital of the Vaccaei, closed their gates 
against the Roman army. Covetousness was caught in its 
own net ; there was no community that would venture to 
conclude a capitulation with the perfidious commander, and 
the general flight of the inhabitants not only rendered booty 
scarce, but made it almost impossible for him to remain 
for any length of time in such inhospitable regions. In 
front of Intercatia, Scipio Aemilianus, an esteemed military 
tribune, the son of the victor of Pydna and the adopted 
gi'andson of the victor of Zama, succeeded, by pledging his 
word of honour when that of the general no longer availed, 
in inducing the inhabitants to conclude an agreement by 
virtue of which the Roman army departed on receiving a 
supply of cattle and clothing. But the siege of Pallantia 
had to be raised for want of provisions, and the Roman 
army in its retreat was pursued by the Vaccaei as far as the 
Douro. LucuUus thereupon proceeded to the southern 
province, where in the same year the praetor, Servius Sul- 
piouis Galba, had allowed himself to be drf(»ated by the 
Lusitanians. They spent the winter not far from each 
Pther — Lucullus in the territory of the Turdetani, Galba at 
Conistorgis — ^and in the following year (604) 
jointly attacked the Lusitanians. Lucullus g<ain- 
ed some advantages over them near the straits of Gades. 
Galba performed a greater achievement, for he concluded a 
treaty with three Lusitanian tribes on the right bank of the 
Tagus and promised to transfer them to better settlements ; 
whereupon the barbarians, who to the number of 7,00Q 



20 The Subject Cotmt/ries. [Book iv 

same to him for the sake of the expected lands, were 8op» 
rated into three divisions, disarmed, and partly carried off 
into slavery, partly massacred. War has hardly ever been 
waged with so much perfidy, cruelty, and avarice as by 
these two generals ; yet by means of their criminally ac- 
«]uired treasures the one escaped condemnation, and the 
>ther escaped even impeachment. The veteran Cato in his 
eighty-fiflh year, a few months before his death, attempted 
to bring Galba to account before the burgesses ; but the 
weeping children of the general, and the gold which he had 
brought home with him, demonstrated to the Roman people 
his innocence. 

It was not so much the inglorious successes which Lu- 

Viriathua. cullus and Galba had attained in Spain, as the 

outbreaic of the fourth Macedonian and of the 

third Carthaginian war in 605, which induced 

the Romans again to leave Spanish affairs for a time in the 

hands of the ordinary governors. Whereupon the Lusita- 

nians, exasperated rather than humbled by the perfidy of 

Galba, immediately overran afresh the rich territory of 

Turdetania. The Roman governor Gains Ve- 

tilius (607-8 1 *) marched against them, and not 

only defeated them, but drove the whole host towards a hill 

where it seemed lost irretrievably. The capitulation was 

* The chronology of the war with Yiriathus is far from being pre- 
cisely settled. It is certain that the appearance of Viriathus dates from 
the conflict with Vetilius (Appian, Ilisp. 61 ; Liv. lii. ; Oros. v. 4), and 
tliat he perished in 615 (Diod. Vat. p. 110, &c.); the dura- 
tion of his government is reckoned at eight (Appian, 
HUp. 63), ten (Justin, xliv. 2), eleven (Diodorus, p. 597), fourteen 
(Liv. liv, ; Eutrop. iv. 16 ; Oros. v. 4 ; Flor. i. 83), and twenty yeari 
(Vellei. ii. 90). The first estimate possesses some probability, because 
Ihe appearance of Viriathus is connected both in Diodorus (p. 591 ; 
Vai. p. 107, 108) and in Orosius (v. 4) with the destruction of Corinth, 
Of the Roman governors, with \\hom Viriathus fought, several undoubt- 
edly belong to the northern province ; for though Viriathus was at work 
chiefly in the southern, he was not exclusively so (Liv. lii.) ; coD8e< 
quently we must not calculate the number of the years of his leader 
ihip by the number of these names. 



csap. I.] The Subject Countries, 21 

virtually concluded, when Vlriathus — a man of liuuib!« 
origin, who formerly, when a youth, had bravely defended 
his flock from wild beasts and robbers and was now in more 
Rerious conflicts a dreaded guerilla chief, and who was one 
of the few Spaniards that had accidentally escaped from the 
perfidious onslaught of Galba — warned his countrymen 
against relying on the Roman word of honour, and prom- 
ised them deliverance if they would follow him. His lan- 
guage and his example produced a deep eflect : the army 
entrusted him with the supreme command. Viriathus gave 
orders to the mass of his men to proceed in detached par- 
ties, by difierent routes, to the appointed rendezvous ; he 
himself formed the best mounted and most trustworthy 
into a corps' of 1,000 horse, with which he covered the 
departure of the rest. The Romans, who wanted light 
cavalry, did not venture to disperse for the pursuit under 
the eyes of the enemy's horsemen. Aflier Viriathus and 
his band had for two whole days held in check the entire 
Roman army, he suddenly disappeared during the night and 
hastened to the general rendezvous. The Roman general 
followed him, but fell into an adroitly laid ambuscade, in 
which he lost the half of his army and was himself cap- 
tured and slain ; with difliculty the rest of the troops es- 
caped to the colony of Carteia near to the Straits. In all 
haste 5,000 men of the Spanish militia were despatched 
from the Ebro to reinforce the defeated Romans ; but Viria- 
thus destroyed the corps while still on its march, and com- 
manded so absolutely the whole interior of Carpetania that 
the Romans did not even venture to seek him there." Viria- 
thus, now recognized as lord and king of all the Lusitanians^ 
knew how to combine the full dignity of his princely posi- 
tion with the homely habits of a shepherd. No badge dis- 
tinguished him from the common soldier : he rose from the 
richly adorned marriage-table of his father-in-law, the prince 
Astolpa in Roman Spain, without having touched the golden 
plate and the sumptuous fare, lifled his bride on horseback, 
and rode ofl* with her to his mountains. He never took 
more of the spoil than the share which he allotted to cacli 



22 Th6 Subject Ootmtrtes. IBook IV 

of his comrades. The soldier recognized the general simpi} 
by his tall figure, by his striking sallies of wit, and above 
all by the fact that he surpassed every one of his men in 
temperance as well as in toil, sleeping always in full armoui 
and fighting in front of all in battle, it seemed as if in 
Ihat thoroughly prosa.c age one of the Homeric heroes had 
reappeared : the name of Viriathus resounded far and wide 
through Sp^iin ; and the brave nation conceived that in him 
at length it had found the man who was destined to break 
the fetters of alien domination. 

Extraordinary successes in northern and southern Spain 

marked the next years of his leadership (608-9). 
HisBuo- After destroying the vanguard of the praetor 

''^^"**' Gaius Plautius, Viriathus had the skill to lure 

him over to the right bank of the Tagus, and there to de- 
feat him so emphatically that the Roman general went into 
winter quarters in the middle of summer — on which ac- 
count he was afterwards charged before the people with hav- 
ing disgraced the Roman community, and was compelled to 
live in exile. In like manner the army of the governor — 
apparently of the Hither province — Claudius Unimanus 
was destroyed, that cf Gaius Negidius was vanquished, and 
the level country wf^ pillaged far and wide. Trophies of 
victory, decorated with the insignia of the Roman govern- 
ors and the arms of the legions, were erected on the Span- 
ish mountains ; people at Rome heard with shame and con- 
sternation of the victories of the barbarian king. The con- 
duct of the Spanish war was now committed to a more 
trustworthy officer, the consul Quintus Fabius Maximus 

Aemilianus, the second son Of the victor of 

14ft> 

Pydna (009). But the Romans no longer ven* 
'^ured to send the experienced veterans, who had just re- 
turned from Macedonia and Asia, forth anew to the detested 
Spanish war ; the two legions, which Maximus brought 
with him, were recent levies and scarcely more to be trust- 
ed than the old utterly demoralized Spanish army. Aflei 
the drst conflicts had again issued favourably for the Lusi- 
tanians, the prudent general kept together his troops for th« 



Chap. I.] Tli^ SuH^eet Countries. 28 

remainder of the year in the camp at Drso (Osuna, south* 
east from Seville) without aoceptii^g the enemy's offer of 
battle, and only took the field afresh in the following year 
(610), afler his troops had been qualified foi 
fighting by pettier war^re; he was then e& 
abled to maintain the superiority, and afler suocessful feats 
of arms went into winter quarters at Oorduba. But when 
the cowardly and incapable praetor Quinctius took the com- 
mand in room of Maximus, the Romans again suffered de- 
feat after defeat, and their general in the middle of summer 
shut himself up in Corduba, while the bands of 
Viriathus overran the southern province (611). 
His successor, Quintus Fabius Maximus Servilianus, the 
adopted brother of Maxim us Aemilianus, was sent to the 
peninsula with two fresh legions and ten elephants ; he en- 
deavoured to penetrate into the Lusitanian country, but 
after a series of indecisive conflicts and an assault on the 
Roman camp, which was with difficulty repulsed, he found 
liimself compelled to retreat to the Roman territory. Viri- 
athus followed him into the province, but, as his troops after 
the wont of Spanish insurrectionary armies suddenly melted 
away, he was obliged to return to Lusitania 
(612). Next year (613) Servilianus resumed 
the offensive, traversed the districts on the Baetis and Anas, 
and then advancing into Lusitania occupied ^ great many 
towns. A large number of the insurgents fell into his 
hands ; the leaders — of whom there were about 500 — were 
executed ; those who had gone over from Roman territory 
to the enemy had their hands cut off; the remaining multi- 
tude were sold into slavery. But on this occasion also the 
Spanish war proved true to its fickle and capricious char- 
acter. After all these successes the Roman army was at- 
tacked by Viriathus while it was besieging Erisane, defeats 
ed, and driven to ii rock where it was wholly in the power 
of the en^ny. Viriathus, however, was content, like the 
Bamnite general formerly at the Caudine pass, to conclude 
a peace with Servilianus, in which the community of the 
Lusitanian 3 was recognized as sovereign and Viriathus ao' 



iJ4 The Subject Countries. [Book TV 

knowledged as its king. The power of the Komans had nol 
increased more than the national sense of honour had de- 
clined ; in the capital men were glad to be rid of the irk- 
some war, and the senate and people ratified the treaty. 
But Quintus Servilius Caepio, the fiill brother of Servilianiiaj 
and his successor in ofQce, was far from satisfied with thi» 
complaisance ; and the senate was weak enough first to 
authorize the consul to undertake secret machinations against 
Viriathus, and then to view at least with indulgence his 
open breach of faith, for which there was no palliation. Sc 
Caepio invaded Lusitania, and traversed the land as far as 
the territories of the Vettones and Gallaeci ; Viriathus de- 
dined a conflict with the superior force, and by dexterous 
140. movements evaded his antagonist (614), But 

^* when in the ensuing year (615) Caepio renewed 

the attack, and was supported by the army, which had in 
the mean time become available from the northern province, 
making its appearance under Marcus Popillius in Lusitania, 
Viriathus sued for peace on any terms. He was required 
to give up to the Romans all who had passed over to him 
from the Roman territory, amongst whom was his own 
father-in-law ; he did so, and the Romans ordered them to 
be executed or to have their hands cut off. But this was 
not sufficient ; the Romans were not in the habit of an- 
nouncing to the vanquished all at once the fate to which they 
were destined. 

One behest afler another was issued to the Lusitanians, 
«. . ^ each successive demand more intolerable than 
its predecessor; and at length they were re- 
quired even to surrender their arms. Then Viriathus recol- 
lected the fate of his countrymen whom Galba had caused 
CO be disarmed, and grasped his sword afresh. But it was 
already too late. His wavering had sown the seeds of 
treachery among those who were immediately around him ; 
three of his confidants, Audas, Ditalco, and Minucius from 
Urso, despairing of the possibility of renewed victory, pro- 
cured from the king permission once more tc enter into 
negotiations for peace with Caepio, and employed it for th» 



Ghjlf. h] The Subject Ccunt/nes. >I6 

purpose of selliDg the life of the Lusitaniaii hero to the 
foreigners in return for the assurance of personal amnestj 
and further rewards. On their return to the camp they 
assured the king of the favourable issue of their negotiar 
tioDs, and in the following night stabbed him while asleep 
ill his tent» The Lusitanians honoured the illustrious chief 
by an unparalleled funeral solemnity at which two hundred 
pairs of champions fought in the funeral games ; and still 
more highly by the fact, that they did not renounce the 
struggle, but nominated Tautamus as their commander-in- 
ohief in room of the fallen hero. The plan projected by 
the latter for wresting Saguntum from the Romans was 
sufficiently bold ; but the new general possessed neither the 
wise moderation nor the military skill of his predecessor. 
The expedition was a total failure, and the army on its re- 
turn was attacked in crossing the Baetis and compelled to 
surrender unconditionally. Thus was Lusitania subdued, 
far more by treachery and assassination on the part of for- 
eigners and natives than by honourable war. 

While the southern province was scourged by Viriathus 
_ and the Lusitanians, a second and not less seri- 

ffmiiaxituu 

ous war had, not without their help, broken out 

in the northern province among the Celtiberian nations. 

The brilliant successes of Viriathus induced the Arevacae 

likewise in 610 to rise against the Romans ; and 

on that account the consul Quintus Caecilius 

Metellus, who was sent to Spain to relieve Maximus Aemili- 

anus, did not proceed to the southern province, but turned 

against the Celtiberians. In the contest with them, and 

more especially during the siege of the town of Contrebia 

which was deemed impregnable, he showed the same ability 

which he had displayed in vanquishing the Macedonian pre* 

tender; after his two years' administration 

(611, 612) the northern province was reduced 

to obedience. The two cities of Termantia and Numantia 

alone had not yet opened their gates to the Romans ; but in 

their case also a capitulation had been almost concluded, 

;uid the|p*eater par^ of the conditions had. be^iu fulAjled bj 

Vol. in— 2 



26 The Subject Countriea. [Booi it 

the Spaniards When required, however, to deliver up 
their arms, thej were restrained like Viriathus by their 
genuine Spanish pride in the possession of a well-handled 
sword, and they resolved to continue the war under the 
daring Megaravicus. It seemed folly : the consular aimy, 
the command of which was taken up in 613 by 
the consul Quintus Pompeius, was four times aa 
numerous as the whole population capable of bearing arms 
in Numantia. But the general, who was wholly una<y 
quainted with war, sustained defeats so severe under the 
walls of the two cities (613, 614), that he pre- 
ferred at length to procure by means of negotia- 
tions the peace which he could not compel. With Terman- 
tia a definitive agreement must have taken place. In the 
case of the Numantines the Roman general liberated their 
captives, and summoned the community under the secret 
promise of favourable treatment to surreiider to him at 
discretion. The Numantines, weary of the war, consented, 
and the general actually limited his demands to the small- 
est possible measure. Prisoners of war, deserters, and 
hostages were delivered up, and the stipulated sum of mone} 
was mostly paid, when in 615 the new general 
Marcus Popillius Laenas arrived in the camp. 
As soon as Pompeius saw the burden of command devolve 
on other shoulders, he, with a view to escape from the 
reckoning that awaited him at Rome for a peace which was 
according to Roman ideas disgraceful, lighted on the expe- 
dient of not merely breaking, but of disowning his word ; 
and when the Numantines came to make their last pay- 
ment, in the presence of their officers and his own he flatly 
denied the conclusion of the agreement. The matter was 
referred for judicial decision to the senate at Rome. While 
it was discussed there, the war before Numantia was sus- 
pended, and Laenas occupied himself with an expedition to 
Lusitania where he helped to accelerate the catastrophe of 
Viriathus, and with a foray against the Lusones, neighbcurs 
of the Numantines. When at length the decision of the 
senate arrived, its purport was that the war should be coiV 



OiiF. I] The Swlffeot Ootmtries. Srt 

taDued*--the state beetme tiius a party to the knavery ol 
Pompdus. 

With unimpaired courage and increased res^tment ^ 
Numantines resumed the struggle ; Laenas fci^ght 
against them unsuccessfully, nor was his suoce» 
sor Gaius Hostilius Mandnus more fortunate 
(617). But their discomfiture was occasioned 
not so much by the arms of the Numantines, as by the lax 
and wretched military discipline of liie Roman generals 
and by-^what was its natural consequence— the annually 
increasing dissoluteness, insubordination, and cowardice of 
the .Roman soldiers. The mere ruinour, which moreover 
was false, that the Cantabri and Vaccaei were advancing to 
the relief of Numantia, induced the Roman army to evacu* 
ate the camp by night without orders, and to seek shelter 
in the entrenchments constructed sixteen years before by 
Nobilior (p. 16). The Numantines, informed of their sud« 
den departure, hotly pursued the fbgitive army, and sur- 
rounded it : there remained to it no choice save to fight its 
way with sword in hand through the enemy, or to conclude 
peace on the terms laid down by the Numantines. Al* 
though the consul was personally a man of honour, he was 
weak and little known. Tiberius Gracchus, who served in 
the army as quaestor, had more influence with the Celtibe- 
rians from the hereditary respect in which he was held on 
account of his &ther who had so wisely regulated the prov^ 
ince of the Ebro, and induced the Numantines to be content 
with an equitable treaty of peace sworn to by all the staff 
officers. But the senate not only recalled the general ini- 
mediately, but afber long deliberation caused a proposal to 
be submitted to the burgesses that the convention should be 
treated as they had formerly treated that of Caudium, in 
other words, that they should refuse its ratification and 
should devolve the responsibility on those who had con* 
eluded it. By right this category ought to have included 
all the ofiicers who had sworn to the treaty ; but Gracchus 
and the others were saved by their connections ; Mancinui 
alone, whb did not belong to tlie circle of the highest uri» 



88 Tke Subject Uountriss, [BookIV- 

tocraoy, ^as destined to pay the penalty for his own and 
others' guilU Stripped of his insignia, the Roman consukir 
was conducted to the enemy's outposts, and, when the Nu- 
mantines refused to receive him that they might not on 
their part acknowledge the treaty as null, the late com- 
mander-in chief stood in his shirt and with his hands tied 
behind his back for a whole day before the gates of Nth 
mantia, a pitiful spectacle to friend and foe. Yet the bitter 
lesson seemed utterly lost on the successor of Mancinus, hia 
colleague in the consulship, Marcus Aemllius Lepidua, 
While the discussions as to the treaty with Mancinus were 
pending in Rome, he attacked the free nation of the Vao^ 
caei under frivolous pretexts just as LucuUus had done six- 
teen years before, and began in concert with the general of 
the Further province to besiege Pallantia (618). 
A decree of the senate enjoined him to desist 
from the war ; nevertheless, under the pretext that the cir* 
cumstances had meanwhile changed, he continued the siege 
In doing so he showed himself 8^ bad a soldier as he was a 
bad citizen. After lying so long before the large and strong 
city that his supplies in that rugged and hostile country 
failed, he was obliged to leave behind all the sick and 
wounded and to undertake a retreat, in which the pursuing 
Pallantines destroyed half of his soldiers, and, if they had 
not broken off the pursuit too early, would probably have 
utterly annihilated the Roman army, which was already in 
full course of dissolution. For this £iult a fine was im- 
posed on the highborn general at his return. His success- 
ise. ors Lucius Furius Philus (618) and Gains Cal- 

^**- purnius Piso (619) had again to wage war 

•gainst the Numantines; and, inasmuch as they did nothing 
It all, they fortunately came home without defeat. 

Even the Roman government began at length to per- 
ceive that matters could no longer continue on 
'LemUiA- this footing ; they resolved to entrust the subju- 
*"^ gation of the small Spanish country-town, as an 

extraordinary measure, to Scipio Aemilianus the first gen^ 
fal of Rome.. The .pecuniary means- for carrying on thf 



CfiAP. I.] The Subject Cou'iUriea, *^i 

waf were indeed doled out to him with preposterous parsi# 
mon/y and the permission to levy soldiers which he asked 
was even directly refused — a circumstance due, probably, 
to coterie-intrigues and to the fear of being burdensome to 
the sovereign people. But a great number of friends and 
dients voluntarily accompanied him ; among them was hia 
brother Maximus Aemilianus, who some years before had 
commanded with distinction against Viriathus. Supported 
by this trusty band, which was formed into a guard for the 
general, Scipio began to reorganize the deeply disordered 
army (620). First of all, the camp-followers 
had to take their departure — there were as many 
as 2,000 courtesans, and an endless number of soothsayers 
and priests of all sorts — and, if the soldier was not avail- 
able for fighting, he had at least to work in the trenches and 
to march. During the first summer the general avoided 
any conflict with the Numantines; he contented himself 
with destroying the stores in the surrounding country, and 
with chastising the Yaccaeans who sold corn to the Numan- 
tines, and compelling them to acknowledge the supremacy 
of Rome. It was only towards winter that Scipio drew 
together his army round Numantia. Besides the Numidian 
contingent of horsemen, infantry, and twelve elephants led 
by the prince Jugurtha, and the numerous Spanish contin- 
gents, there were four legions, in all a force of 60,000 men 
investing a city whose citizens capable of bearing arms did 
not exceed 8,000 at the most. Nevertheless the besieged 
frequently offered battle; but Scipio, perceiving clearl) 
that the disorganization of many years was not to be re* 
paired all at once, refused to accept it, and, when conflicts 
did occur in connection with the sallies of the besieged, the 
cowardly flight of the legionaries, checked with difficulty 
by the appearance of the general in person, justified his 
tactics only too forcibly. Never did a general treat his 
soldiers more contemptuously than Scipio treated the Nu- 
mantine army ; and he showed his opinion of it not only 
by bitter speeches, but above all by the course of action 
which h^ adopted. For the first time the Romans waged 



to The Sul^ect Countries. [Book l% 

«Far by means of mattock and spade, where it depended oa 
themselTes alone whether they should use the sword. 
Around the whole circuit of the dty, which was nearly 
three miles, there was constructed a double line of circum* 
vollation of twice that extent, provided with walls, towers, 
and ditches ; aud the river Douro, by which at first soma 
•applies had reached the besieged through the efforts of 
bold boatmen and divers, was at length dosed. Thus in all 
probability the town, which they did not venture to assaulti 
could not faii to be reduced through fanune ; the more aoi 
as it had not been possible for the citizens to lay in pro- 
visions during the last summer. The Numantines soon 
sufifered from want of everything. One of their boldest 
men, Retogenes, cut his way with a few companions through 
the lines of the enemy, and his touching entreaty that kina- 
men should not be allowed to perish without help produced 
a great effect in Lutia at least, one of the towns of the 
Arevacue. But before the citizens of Lutia had come to a 
^cision, Scipio, having received information from the parti- 
sans of Home in the town, appeared with a superior force 
before its vails, and compelled the authorities to deliver up 
to him the leaders of the movement, 400 of the flower of 
the youth, ^hose hands were all cut off by order of the 
Roman gebtiral. The Numantines, thus deprived of their 
last hope, sent to Scipio to negotiate as to their submission 
and called oa the brave man to spare the brave ; but when 
the envoys on their return announced that Soipio required 
unconditional surrender, they were torn in pieces by the 
furious multitude, and a fresh int^val elapsed before famine 
and pestilence had completed their work. h% length a 
second message was sent to the Roman head-quart^'rs, that 
the town was now ready to submit at discretion. When 
the citizens were accordingly instructed to appear on the 
Allowing day before the gates, ^they asked for some days' 
delay, to allow those of their number who had determined 
not to survive the loss of liberty time to die. It was 
granted, and not a fe^ took advantage of it. At last ths 
Duserable remnant appeared before the gates. Scipio choM 



0BAF. L] The Subject C(ywntrie9 81 

fifty of the most eminent to form part of his triumphal 
procession ; the rest were sold into slavery, the city wai 
levelled with the ground, and its territory was distributed 

among the neighbouring towns. This occurred 

in the autumn of 621, fifteen mouths after Sdpio 
tad assumed the command. 

The fidl of Numantia struck at the root of the opposi- 
tion that was still here and there stirring against Rome ; 
military demonstrations and the imposition of lines sufficec 
to secure the acknowledgment of the Roman supremacy it 
all Hither Spain. 

In Further Spain the Roman dominion was confirmed 

and extended by the subjugation of the Lusita- 
laeci oon- nians. The consul Decimus Junius Brutus, who 
^ came in Caepio's room, settled the Lusitanian 

war-captives in the neighbourhood of Saguntum, and gave 
to their new town Valentia (Valencia), like Carteia, a Latin 
188- \ constitution (616); he moreover (616-618) 
1S8-136. f traversed the Iberian west coast in various direc- 
tions, and was the first of the Romans to reach the shore 
of the Atlantic Ocean. The towns of the Lusitanians, 
which were obstinately defended by their inhabitants, both 
men and women, were subdued by him ; and the hitherto 
independent Gallaed were united with the Roman province 
after a great battle, in which 50,000 of them are said to 
have fallen. After the subjugation of the Vaccaeans, Lusi- 
tanians, and Gallaecians, the whole peninsula, with the ex- 
ception of the north coast, was now at least nominally sub- 
ject to the Romans. 

A senatorial commission was sent to Spain in order to 

organize, in concert with Scipio, the newly won 
latfonor provincial territory after the Romjin method $ 
^^ and Scipio did what he could to obviate the 

effects of the in&mous and stupid policy of his predeces- 
sors. The Caucani for instance, whose shameful maltreat- 
ment by Lucullus he had been obliged to witness nineteen 
years before when a military tribune, were invited by him 
)-) return to their town and to rebuild it. Spain begai 



B2 Hie Subject Countries, [Book IV 

once more to enjoy better times. The si.ppression of 
piracy, which found dangerous lurking ^places in the Baleare^ 
through the occupation of these islands by Quintus Caeciliua 

Metellus in 631 was singularly conducive to th« 

prosperity of Spanish commerce ; and in other 
respects also the fertile islands, inhabited by a dense popih 
Ution which was unsurpassed in the use of the sling, weip 
a valuable possession. How numerous the Latin«speaking 
population in the peninsula was even then, is shown by the 
settlement of 3,000 Spanish Latins in the towns of Palma 
and PoUentia (PoUenza) in the newly acquired islands. In 
spite of various grave evils the Homau administration of 
Spain preserved on the whole the stamp which the Catonian 
period, and primarily Tiberius Gracchus, had impressed on 
it. It is true that the Roman frontier territory had not a 
little to suffer from the inroads of the tribes but half sul> 
dued or not subdued at all on the north and west. Among 
the Lusitanians in particular the poorer youths regularly 
congregated as banditti, and in large gangs levied contribu- 
tions from their countrymen or their neighbours, for which 
reason, even at a much later period, the isolated homesteads 
in this region were constructed in the style of fortresses, 
and were, in case of need, capable of defence ; nor did the 
Romans succeed in putting an end to these predatory habits 
in the inhospitable and almost inaccessible Lusitanian moun- 
tains. But what had previously been wars assumed more 
and more the character of brigandage, which every tolerably 
efficient governor was able to repress with his ordinary re- 
sources ; and in spite of such inflictions on the border dis- 
tricts Spain was the most flourishing and best-organized 
country in all the Roman dominions ; the system of tenthf 
and the middlemen were there unknown ; the population 
was numerous, and the country was rich in com and cattle. 
Far more insupportable was the condition — intermediate 

between formal sovereignty and actual subjeo- 
teotod tion — of the African, Greek, and Asiatic statei 

which were brought within the sphere of Roman 
hegemony through the wars of Rome with Carthage, Mace 



Cblp. I.] The Subject Countries. 88 

donia, ai)d Syria, and their consequences. An in/lependcnt 
state does not pay too dear for its independence in acceptn 
ing the sufferings of war when it cannot avoid them ; a 
fltate which has lost its independence may find at least some 
compensation in the fact that its protector secures for il 
peace with its neighbours. But these client states of Home 
had neither independence nor peace. In Africa there prac- 
tically subsisted a perpetual border- war between Carthage 
and Numidia. In Egypt Roman arbitration had settled the 
dispute as to the succession between the two brothers 
Ptolemy Philometor and Ptolemy the Fat; nevertheless 
the new rulers of Egypt and Cyrene waged war for the 
possession of Cyprus. In Asia not only were most of the 
kingdoms — Bithynia, Cappadocia, Syria— likewise torn by 
internal quarrels as to the succession and by the interven- 
tions of neighbouring states to which these quarrels gave 
rise, but various and severe wars were carried on between 
the Attalids and the Galatians, between the Attalids and 
the kings of Bithynia, and even between Rhodes and Crete. 
In Hellas Proper, in like manner, the pigmy feuds which 
were customary there continued to smoulder; and even 
Macedonia, formerly so tranquil, consumed its strength in 
the intestine strife that arose out of its new democratic con« 
Btitutions. It was the fault of the rulers as well as the 
ruled, that the last vital energies and the last prosperity of 
the nations were expended in these aimless feuds. The 
client states ought to have perceived that a state which can- 
not wage war against every one cannot wage war at all, and 
that, as the possessions and power enjoyed by all these 
states were practically under Roman guarantee, they had in 
the event of any difference no alternative but to settle the 
matter amicably with their neighbours or to call in the 
Romans as arbiters. When the Achaean diet was urged 
by the R hod tans and Cretans to grant them the aid of the 
league, and seriously deliberated as to sending 
it (601), it was simply a political farce; the 
principle which the leader of the party friendly to Rome 
then laid down^-that the Achaeans were no longer at lib 
Vol. 111.-2* 



84 The Suljeci Cov/ntrU 8. [Book if 

erty to wage war without the permission of the Rociaas — 
expressed, doubtless with disagreeable precision, the simpk 
truth that the formal sovereignty of the dependent states 
was merely formal, and that any attempt to give li& to th« 
shallow must necessarily lead to the destruction of the 
shadow itself. But the ruling community deserves a oen« 
ture more severe than that directed against the ruled. It is 
fio easy task for a state any more than for a man to become 
reconciled to insignliicance ; it is the duty and right of the 
ruler either to renounce his authority, or by the display of 
an imposing material superiority to compel the ruled to 
resignation. The Roman senate did neither. Invoked and 
importuned on all hands, the senate interfered incessantly 
in the course of African, Hellenic, Asiatic, and Egyptian 
affairs ; but it did so after so inconstant and loose a fashion, 
that its attempts to settle matters usually only rendered 
the confusion worse. It was the epoch of commissions.^ 
Commissioners of the senate were constantly going to Caiv 
thage and Alexandria, to the Achaean diet, and to the courts 
,of the rulers of western Asia ; they investigated, inhibited, 
reported, and yet decisive steps were not unfrequently taken 
in the most important matters without the knowledge, oj 
against the wishes, of the senate. Cyprus, for instance, 
which the senate had assigned to the kingdom of Cyren^ 
was nevertheless retained by Egypt; a Syrian prinoiB 
ascended the throne of his ancestors under the pretext that 
he had obtained a promise of it from the Romans, while 
the senate had in tact expressly refused to give it to him, 
and he himself bad only escaped from Rome bv breaking 
their interdict; even the open murder of a Ivoman commis 
aioner who under the orders of the senate administered as 
guardian the government of Syria, passed totally unpim* 
ished. The Asiatics were very well aware that they were 
not in a position to resist the Roman legions; but they 
were no less aware that the senate was but little inclined to 
give the burgesses orders to march for the Euphrates or the 
Nile. Thus the state of these remote countries resembled 
that of the schoolroom when the teacher is absent or lax ' 



<3iup. I.] TJts Subject Countries. 85 

aiid the government of Rome deprived the nations at oneo 
of the blesaings of freedom and of the blessings of order. 
For the Romans themselves, moreover, this state of mat- 
ters was so far perilous that it to a certain extent left their 
northern and eastern frontier exposed. In these quarter i 
kingdoms might be formed by the aid of the inlaud couik- 
Iries situated beyond the limits of the Roman hegemony 
and in antagonism to the weak states under Roman proteo» 
tioD, without Rome being able directly or speedily to intei^ 
fare, and might develop a power dangerous to, and entering 
sooner or later into rivalry with, Rome. No doubt the 
condition of the bordering nations — everywhere split into 
fragments and nowhere favourable to political development 
on a great scale — ^formed some sort of protection against 
this danger ; yet we very clearly perceive in the history of 
the East, that at this period the Euphrates was no longer 
guarded by the phalanx of Seleucus and was not yet watched 
by the l^ons of Augustus. 

It was high time to put an end to this uncertain state of 
things. But the only possible way of ending it was by 
convei'ting the client states into Roman provinces. This 
could be done all the more easily, that the Roman provincial 
constitution in fact only concentrated military power in the 
hands of the Ronum governor, while administration and 
jurisdiction in the main were, or at any rate were intended 
to be, retained by the communities, so that as much of the 
old political independence as was at all capable of life 
might be preserved in the form of communal freedom. 
The necessity kir thb administrative reforni could not well 
be mistaken ; the only question was, whether the senate 
would put it off and mar it, or whether it would have the 
eonrage and the power dearly to discern and energetically 
to execute what was needful. 

Let us first glance at Africa. The order of things es- 
tablished bv the Romans in Libya rested in sub- 
•adi^ Stance on a balance of power between the No- 
"'^^^ mad kingdom of Massinissa and the city of 

Carthage. While the former was enlarged, confirmed, and 



86 The Suhject GmtUHes, [Book iv 

civiiiied under the vigorous and sagacious goverutnent of 
Massinissa (ii. 243), Carthage in consequence simply of  
8tate of peace became once more, at least in wealth and 
population, what it had been at the height of its political 
power. The Romans saw with ill-concealed and enyioui 
fear the apparently indestiuctible prosperity of their old 
rival ; while hitherto they had refused to grant to it any 
real protection against the constantly repeated encroach* 
ments of Massinissa, they now began openly to interfere in 
&vour of the neighbouring prince. The dispute whieh had 
been pending for more than thirty years between the city 
and the king as to the possession of the province of Em- 
poria on the Lesser Syrtis, one of the most fertile in the 
Carthaginian territory, was at length (about 
593) decided by Roman commissioners to the 
effect that the Carthaginians should evacuate those towns 
of Emporia which still remained in their possession, and 
should pay 500 talents (£120,000) to the king as compen- 
sation for the illegal enjoyment of the territory. The con- 
sequence was, that Massinissa immediately seized another 
Carthaginian district on the western frontier of their terri- 
tory, the town of Tusca and the great plains near the Ba- 
gradas ; no course was left to the Carthaginians but to com- 
mence another hopeless process at Rome. After long and, 
beyond doubt, intentional delay a second commission ap- 
peared in Africa ; but, when the Carthaginians were unwill- 
ing to commit themselves unconditionally to a decision to 
be pronounced by it as arbiter without an exact preliminary 
investigation into the question of right, and insisted on a 
thorough discussion of the latter question, the commission- 
ers without further ceremony returned to Rome. 

The question of right between Carthage and Massinissa 
_^ , thus remained unsettled ; but the mission gave 

The destruo- _^ ° 

^cn of Oar- rise to a more important decision. The head of 
loiyedcmat the commissi .m had been the old Marcus Catr 
at that time perhaps the most influential man ia 
the senate, and, as a veteran survivor from the Hannibali< 
war, still filled with thorough hatred and thorough dread of 



Ohaf. I.] The Subject Countries. 87 

the Phoenicians. With surprise and jealousy Gate had seen 
vlth his own eyes the flourishing state of the hereditary 
toes of Rome, the luxuriant country and the crowded 
streets, the immense stores of arms in the magazines and 
the rich materials for a fleet ; already he in spirit beheld a 
second Hannibal wielding all these resources against Roma 
In his honest and manly, but thoroughly narrow-minded, 
Attihion, he came to the conclusion that Rome could not b« 
secure until Carthage had disappeared from the face of th# 
earth, and immediately after his return set forth this view 
in the senate. Those of the aristocracy whose ideas were 
more enlarged, and especially Scipio Nasica, opposed this 
paltry policy with great earnestness; and showed how 
blind were the fears entertained regarding a mercantile city 
whose Phoenician inhabitants were becoming more and 
more disused to warlike arts and ideas, and how the exist- 
ence of that rich commercial city was quite compatible 
with the political supremacy of Rome. Even the conver- 
sion of Carthage into a Roman provincial town might have 
been practicable, and indeed, compared with the present 
condition of the Phoenicians, perhaps even not unwelcome. 
Gato, however, desired not the submission, but the destruc- 
tion of the 'hated city. His policy, as it would seem, found 
allies partly in the statesmen who were inclined to bring 
the transmarine territories into immediate dependence on 
Rome, partly and especially in the mighty influence of the 
Roman bankers and great capitalists on whom, after the 
destruction of the rich moneyed and mercantile city, its 
inheritance would necessarily devolve. The majority re- 
solved at the flrst fitting opportunity — ^respect for public 
opinion required that they should wait for such — ^to bring 
about war with Carthage, or rather the destruction of the 
<^*ty. 

The desired occasion was soon found. The provoking 
War be- violations of right on the part of Massinissa and 
SmSiaad ^^® Romans brought to the helm in Carthage 
^'"^^^w- Hasdrubal and Carthalo, the leaders of the 
patriotic party which was not irxieed, like the Achaeans 



88 TIu Suited (Jotmtries. [Book it 

• 

disposed to revclt against the Roman supieinacy, but wai 
at least resolved to defecd, if necessary, by arms against 
Massinissa the stipulated rights of the Carthaginians. Ths 
patriots ordered forty of the most decided partisans of 
Massinissa to be banished from the city, and made the peo 
pie sveftr that they would <m no aeoount ever permit theit 
nU;irn ; at the same time, in order to repel the attacks that 
might be expected from Massinissa, they formed out of the 
free Numidians a numerous army under Arcobarzanes, the 
grandson of Syphax (about 600). MassinissSi 
however, was prudent enough not to take arms 
now, but to submit himself unconditionally to the decision 
of the Romans respecting the disputed territory on the 
Bagradas; and thus the Romans could assert with some 
plausibility that the Carthaginian preparations must have 
been directed against them, and could in^st on the immedi- 
ate dismissal of the army and destruction of the naval 
stores. The Carthaginian senate was disposed to consent, 
but the multitude prevented the execution of the decree, 
and the Roman envoys, who had brought this order to Car- 
thage, were in peril of their lives. Massinissa sent his sou 
Gulussa to Rome to report the continuance of the Cartha- 
ginian warlike jHreparations by land and sea, and to hasten 
the declaration of war. After a further embassy of ten 
men had confirmed the statement that Carthage was in 
reality arming (602), the senate rejected the de- 
mand of Cato for an absolute declaration of war, 
but resolved in a secret sitting that war should be declared 
If the Carthaginians would cot consent to dismiss their 
army and to burn their materials fpr a fleet. Meanwhile 
the conflict had already begun in Africa. Massinissa had 
■ent back the men whom the Carthaginians had banished, 
under the escort of his son Gulussa, to the city. When the 
Carthaginians closed their gates against them and killed also 
some of the Numidians returning home, Massinissa put hi& 
troops in motion, and the patriot party in Carthage also 
prepared for the struggle. But Hasdrubal, who was placed 
td, the head of their army, was one of the usual incapable! 



€bap. I.] ^7i€ Subfeet Cowfvtries. S9 

• 

whom the Carthaginians were in the habit of employ lUg as 
generals ; strutting about in his general's purple like a 
theatrical king, and pampering his portly person even ia 
the camp, that Yai&«glorious and unwieldy man was little 
fitted to render help in an exigency which perhaps even the 
g^iius of Hamilcar and the arm of Hannibal could have w 
longer averted. Before the eyes of Scipio Aemilianu% 
who, at that time a military tribune in the Spwaish army, 
had been sent to Mossinissa to bring over African elephants 
for his commander, and who on this occasion looked down 
on the eoniliot from a mountain ^^ like Zeus from Ida,'' the 
Carthaginians and Numidians fought a great battle, in which 
the former, though reinforced by 6,000 Numidian horsemen 
brought to them by discontented captains of Massinissa^ 
and superior in number to the enemy, were worsted. Afler 
this defeat the Carthaginians offered to make cessions of 
territory and payments of money to Masainissa, and Scipio 
at their solicitation attempted to bring about an agreement ; 
but the prefect of peace was frustrated by the refusal of 
the Carthaginian patriots to surrender the deserters. Has- 
drubal, however, closely hemmed in by the troops of his 
antagonist, was compelled to grant to the latter all that he 
demanded-r^the surrender of the deserters, the return of the 
exiles, the delivery of arms, the marching off under the 
yoke, the payment of 100 talents (£24^000) annually for 
the next fifty years. But ev^a this oonvejation was not 
kept by the Numidians ; on the contrary the disarmed rem- 
nant of the Cartiiaginian army was cut to pieces by them 
on the way home. 

The Romans, who had care^lly abstained frona prevent* 
ing the war itself by seaiKWiable Interposition, 
llcnof wmr had SOW what they wished : namely, a service- 
by Rome. ^^^ pretext for war — for the Carthaginians had 
certainly now transgressed the stipulations of the treaty^ 
•that they should not wage war against the allies of Rome 
or beyond their own bounds (ii. 223, 237)- -aid an antago- 
nist already beaten beforehand. The Italian contingents 
weise summoned to Rome, and the ships were assembled ; 



AO Tke Subject Countries. [Book IT 

thf declaration of war might issue at any moment. Th« 
Carthaginians made every effort to avert the impending 
blow. Hasdrubal and Carthalo, the leaders of the patriot 
party, were condemned to death, and an embassy was sent 
to Rome to throw the responsibility on them. But at tiio 
iame time envoys from Utica, the second city of the Lib' 
/an Phoenicians, arrived there with full powers to surrender 
their community wholly to the Koman»-— compared with 
such obliging submissiveness, it seemed almost an insolenoa 
that the Carthaginians had rested content with ordering, 
unbidden, the execution of their most eminent men. The 
senate ^declared that the excuse of the Carthaginians was 
found insufficient ; to the question, what in that case would 
suffice, the reply was given that the Carthaginians knew 
that themselves. They might, no doubt, have known what 
the Romans wished ; but yet it seemed impossible to be^ 
lieve that the last hour of their loved native city had really 
come. Once more Carthaginian envoys — on this occasion 
thirty iii number and with unlimited powers— were sent to 
Rome. When they arrived, war was already declared 
(beginning of 605), and the double consular 
army had embarked. Yet they even now at- 
tempted to dispel the storm by complete submission. The 
senate replied that Rome was ready to guarantee to the 
Carthaginian community its territory, its municipal free- 
dom and its laws, its public and private property, provided 
that it would furnish to the consuls who had just departed 
for Sicily within the space of a month at Lilybaeum 300 
hostages from the children of the leading families, and 
would fulfil the further orders which the consuls in conform- 
ity with their instructions should give forth. The reply 
eas been called ambiguous ; but very erroneously, as even 
at the time clearsighted men among the Carthaginians them- 
selves pointed out. The circumstance that everything 
which ^hey could ask was guaranteed with the single except 
taon of the city, and that nothing was said as to stopping 
the embarkation of the troops for Africa, showed very 
clearly what the Roman intentions were ; the senate adboi 



Uhap. 1] The. Subjeai Counttnes. 41 

with tearfiil harshness, but it did not put on the semblance 
of concession. The Carthaginians, however, would not 
open their eyes ; there was no statesman found, who had 
the power tc move the ULstable multitude of the city either 
to thorough resistance or to thorough resigi^tion. Wheo 
they heard at the same time of the horrible deci'eo of war 
and of the endurable demand for hostages, they complied 
immediately with the latter, and still clung to hope, be^ 
cause they had not the courage fully to realize the import 
of surrendering themselves beforehand to the arbitrary will 
of a mortal foe. The consuls sent the hostages from Lily- 
oaeum to Rome, and informed the Carthaginian envoys 
tliat they would learn further particulars in Africa. The 
landing was accomplished without resistance, and the pro* 
visions demanded were supplied. When the Gerusia of 
Carthage appeared in a body at the head-quarters in Utica 
to receive the further orders, the consuls required in the 
first instance the disarming of the city. To the question 
of the Carthaginians, who was in that case to protect them 
even against their own emigrants — against the army, which 
had swelled to 20,000 men, under the command of Has- 
drubal who had saved himself from the sentence of death 
by flight — ^it was replied, that this would be provided for 
by the Romans. Accordingly the council of the city ob- 
sequiously appeared before the consuls with all their fleets 
material, all the military stores of the public magazines, 
all the arms that were found in the possession of private 
persons— to the number of 3,000 catapults and 200,000 
sets of armour — and inquired whether anything more waa 
desired. Then the consul Lucius Marcius Censorinus rose 
and announced to the council, that in accordance with the 
instructions given by the senate the existing city was to be 
destroyed, but that the inhabitants were at liberty to settle 
mew in their territory wherever they chose, provided it 
were at a distance of at least ten miles from the sea. 

This fearful command aroused in the breasts of the Phoe* 
ItestetanM nicians all the— shall we say mai^nanimouB or 
thaginiami! frenzied? — enthusiasm, which was displayed }»r6 



f 2 Tlie Svbject CoimUries, [Buoif IT 

riously by the Tyrians against Alexander, and subsequently 
by the Jews against Vespasian. Unparalleled as was th< 
patience with -which this nation could endure bondi^e and 
oppression, as unparalleled was now the tumultuous furj 
of that mercantile and seafiu*ing population, when the things 
at stake were not tlie state and freedom, but the beloved 
soil of their ancestral city and their venerable and deai 
home beside the sea. Hope and deliverance were out of 
the question ; soimd policy enjoined ev^i now an uncondi> 
tional submission. But the voice of the few who coub> 
selled the acceptance of what was inevitable was, like the 
call of a pilot during a hurricane, drowned amidst the furi- 
ous yells of the multitude ; which, in its frantic rage, laid 
hands on the magistrates of the city who had counselled the 
surrender of the hostages and arms, made such of the inno- 
cent bearers of the news as had ventured at all to return 
home expiate their terrible tidings, and tore in pieces the 
Italians who chanced to be sojourning in the city by way 
of avenging beforehand, at least on them, the destruction 
of its native home. No resolution was taken to defend 
themselves ; unarmed as they were, this was a matter of 
course. The gates were closed ; stones were carried to the 
battlements of the walls that had been stripped of the cata- 
pults ; the chief command was entrusted to Hasdrubal, the 
grandson of Massinissa ; the slaves in a body were declared 
free. The army of refugees under the fugitive Hasdrubal 
—which was in possession of the whole Carthaginian terri- 
tory with the exception of the towns on the east coast occu- 
pied by the Romans, viz., Hadrumetum, Little Leptis, 
Thapsus and AchuUa, and the city of Utica, and offered an 
invaluable support for the defence — ^as entreated not to 
refuse its aid to the commonwealth in this dire emergency. 
rJ, the same time, concealing in true Phoenician style the 
most unbounded resentment under the cloak of humility 
they attempted to deceive the enemy. A xnessage was sent 
to the consuls to request a thirty days' armistice for the 
despatch of an embassy to Rome. The Carthaginians wera 
well aware that the generals neither would nor could granf 



Orap. I.] The Hulject Counif^ies. lA 

this request, wliich had been refused already ; but the eon 

suIb were confirmed by it in the natural supposition that 

after the first outbreak of despair the utterly defencelest 

city would submit, and aooordingly postponed the attack. 

The preeious Interval was employed in preparing catapults 

and armour ; day and night all, without distinction of age 

or sex, were occupied in constructing machines and forging 

arms ; the public buildings were torn down to procure tim* 

ber and metal ; women cut off their hair to furnish the 

strings indispensable for the catapults; in bxi incredibly 

short time the walls and the men were once more armed. 

That all this could be done without the consuls, who were 

but a few miles off, learning anything of it, is not the least 

marvellous feature in this marvellous movement animated 

by a truly enthusiastic, and in fact superhuman, national 

hatred. When at length the consuls, weary of waiting, 

broke up from their camp at Utica, and thought that they 

should be able to scale the naked walls with ladders, they 

hund to their surprise and horror the battlements crowned 

anew with catapults, and the large populous city, which they 

had hoped to occupy like an open village, able and ready to 

defend itself to the last man. 

Carthage was rendered very strong both by the nature 

sitaatkm of ^^ ^^ situation * and by the art of its inhabit- 
Oarthaga j^^^^ ^jj^ ]^^ y^py frequently to depend on the 

protection of its walls. Into the broad gulf of Tunis, which 
is bounded on the west by Cape Farina and on the east by 
Gape Bon, there projects in a direction from west to east a 
promontory, which is encompassed on three sides by the 
sea and is connected with the mainland only towards the 
west. This promontory, at its narrowest part only about 
two miles broad and on the whole flat, again expands taw- 

* The line of the coast has been in the eoone of centuries 80 much 
ehsnged that the former local relations are but imperfectly recognisabls 
OB the ancient site. The name of the city is preserved by Cape Cart^ 
gena— «l80 ealled from the aaint^s tomb found there Ras Kidi bu Said* 
the eastern headland of the peninsula, projecting into the gulf with itr 
highest point rising to 898 feet above th4 level of the aea. 



44 The Suhjeci Countries. [Book IV 

ards the gulf, and terminates there in the two heights of 
Jebel-Khawi and Sidi bu Said, between which extends th4 
plain of El Mersa. On its southern portion which ends in 
the height of Sidi bu Said laj the city of Carthage. Th4 
pretty steep decliyity of that height towards the gulf «&<) 
Its numerous rocks and shallows gave natural strength to 
the side of the city next to the gulf, and a simple circunoH 
vallation was sufficient there. On the wall along the wesi 
or landward side, on the other hand, where nature afforded 
no protection, every appliance within the power of the art 
of fortification in those times was expended. It consisted, 
as its recently discovered remains exactly tallying with the 
description of Polybius have shown, of an outer wall of 
six and a half feet in thickness and immense casemates con- 
structed behind this wall probably along its whole extent ; 
these were separated from the outer wall by a covered way 
six feet broad, and had a width of fourteen feet, exclusive 
of the front and back walls, each of which was fully three 
feet broad.* This enormous wall, composed throughout of 

* The dimensions given by Beul6 {FovUlet d Carthage^ 1861) ars 
■B follows in metres and in Greek feet (1 = 0*309 m^tre) : — 

Outer wall. 2m&tres=6;^feet 

Corridor 1*9 " =8 " 

Front wall of Oftaemates 1 •< ^Z)i « 

Caaemate rooma. 4-2 *' =14 ** 

Back wall of casemates. 1 *' =3^ ** 

Whole breadth of the walls. 10*1 mdt. = 83 feet. 

Or, as Diodorus (p. 522) states it, 22 cubits (1 Greek cubit = 1^ foeC)^ 
while livy (op. Oros. iy. 22) and Appian (Pun. 95), who seem to haT« 
had before tbem another less accurate passage of Poljbius, state tht 
breadth of the walls at 80 feet. The triple wall of Appian — as is 
which a false idea has hitherto been difRised by Florus (i. 8 1)<— denotes 
liie outer wall, and the flront and back walls of the casemates. Thtfl 
this coincidence is not accidental, and that we have here in reality (h« 
remains of the famed walls of Carthage before us, will be evident tn 
every one : the objections of Davis (Carihagt and her RemaivM^ p. 870 
ft 8eq,) only show how little even the utmost zeal can educe in opposi- 
don to the main results of Beul6. Only we must maintais that all th« 
ancient authorities give the statements of which we are now speaking 
with reference not to the citadel-waiU but to the city-wall on the land 



OwAPi h] The StJ^ict Cknmiri^. 48 

large hewn blocks, rose in two stories, exclusive of :he bat- 
Uenients and the huge towers four stories high, to a height 
of forty-five feet,* and furnished in the lower range of the 
oasemates stables and provendc i^stores for 300 elephants^ 
in the upper range stalls for horses, magazines, and bar« 
ncks«f The citadel-hill,, the Byrsa (Syriac, Mrtha = cita- 
del), a comparatively considerable rock having a height of 
168 feet and at its base a circumference of fully 2,000 
double paces,! was joined to this wall at its southern end, 

ward side, of which the wall along the south side of the citadel hill was 
an integral part (Oroe. iv. 22). In accordance with this view, the ezca- 
Tations at the citadel hill on the east, north, and west, haTe shown no 
traces of fortifications, whereas on the south side they have brought to 
light the very remains of this great wall. There is no reason for re- 
garding these as the remains of a separate fortification of the citadel 
distinct from the city-wali ; it may be presumed that further excavations 
at a corresponding depth — ^the foundation of the city wall discovered at 
the Byrsa lies fifty-six feet beneath the present surface — will bring to 
light like, or at any rate analogous, foundations along the whole land- 
ward side, although it is probable that at the point where the walled 
Suburb of Magalia adjoined the main wall the fortification was either 
weaker from the first or was early neglected. The length of the wall 
as a whole cannot be stated with precision ; but it must have been very 
considerable, for three hundred elephants were stabled there, and the 
stores for their fodder and perhaps other spaces also as well as the 
gates are to be taken into account. It was very natural that the inner 
dty, within whose walls the Byrsa was included, should, especially by 
way of contrast to the suburb of Magalia which bad its separate dr* 
enmvallation, be sometimes itself called Byrsa (App. Pun, 117 ; Nepoi, 
ap, Serv. Aen, i. 868). 

* Such is the height given by Appian, /. e. ; Diodorus gives the 
hdght, probably inclusive of the battlements, at 40 cubits or 6^^ feet. 
The remnant preserved is still from 13 to 16 feet (4-6 metres) high. 

f The rooms of a horse-shoe shape brought to Ught in excavation 
have a depth of 14, and a breadth of 11, Greek feet ; the width of the 
•ntrances is not specified. Whether these dimensions and the propor- 
tions of the corridor suffice for our recognizing them as elephants' 
stalls, remains to be settled by a more accurate investigation. The par* 
tition-walls, which separate the apartments, have a thickness of 1*1 
m6tre = %\ feet. 

% Oros. iv. 22. Fully 2,000 paces, or — as Polybius must bave said 
»— 16 ttadia, are = about S,000 metres. The citadel'hil],'oD which tb< 



16 The Sktif^ (hufUrte$. [Book IV 

just as the rcx^-wall of the Oapitol wan joined to the dty* 
wall of Rome. Its summit bore the huge temple of th« 
God of Healing, resting on a basement of sixty steps. The 
south side of the city was washed partly by the shallow 
lake of Tunes towards the south-west, which was separated 
almost wholly fh>m the gulf by a narrow and low tongue 
of land running southwards from the Carthaginian penin* 
I ula,* pai-tly by the open gulf towards the south-east. A 
this last spot was situated the double harbour of the city, a 
work of human hands ; the outer or commercial harbour, a 
longish rectangle with the narrow end turned to the sea, 
fix)m whose entrance, only seventy feet wide, broad quays 
Htretched along the water on both sideis, and the inner cii^ 
cular war^harbour, the Cotbon,f with the island containing 
the admiral's house in the middle, which was approached 
through the outer harbour. Between the two passed the 
city-wall, which turning eastward from the Byrsa excluded 
the tongue of land and the outer harbour, but included the 
war-harbour, so that the entrance to the latter must be con- 
ceived as capable of being closed like a gate. Not far from 
the war-harbour lay the market-place, which was connected 
by three narrow streets with the citadel open on the side 
towards the town. To the north of, and beyond, the city 
proper, the pretty considerable space of the modern El 
Mersa, even at that time occupied in great part by villas 
and well-watered gardens, and then called Magalia, had a 
drcumvallation of its own dovetailed into the city-wall. 

oharch of St. Louib now standi), measures at the top about 1,400, half 
iray up about 2,600, metres in circumference (BeuI6, p. 22) ; for the 
cireiunfercnce at the base that estimate will very well suffice. 

• It now bears the fort Goletta. 

f That this Phoenician word sigiifies a basin excavated in a drcultf 
ihape, is shown both by Diodorus (iii. 44) and by its being employed by 
the Greeks to denote a ** cup." It thus suits only the inner harbour ol 
Carthage, and in that sense it is used by Strabo (xviL 2, 14, where it if 
itrictly applied to the admiraPs island) and Fest. Ep. v. Cothanea^ p. S7 
Appiaa (Fun, 127) is not quite accurate in describing the rectangulai 
harbour in front of the Cothon as part of it. 



ChiAF I.] The Subject Countries. 4t 

On the opposite point of the pcnlnsitla, the JabelRhawi 
near the modern village of Ghamart, lay the necropolis. 
These three — ^the old city, the suburb, and the necropolis- 
together filled the whole breadth of the promontory on its 
side next the gulf, and were only accessible by the two 
highways leading to Utica and Tunes along that narrow 
yongue of land, which, although not closed by a wall, yet 
afforded a most advantageous position for the armies taking 
Ih^ir stand under the protection of the capital with the 
view of protecting it in return. 

The difficult task of reducing so well fortified a city was 
rendered still more diflScult by the fact, that the resources 
of the capital itself and of its territory which still included 
800 townships and was mostly under the power of the emi- 
grant party on the one hand, and the numerous tribes of 
the free or half^free Libyans hostile to Massinissa on the 
other, enabled the Carthaginians simultaneously with their 
defence of the city to keep a numerous army in the field—- 
an army which, from the desperate temper of the emigrants 
and the serviceableness of the light Numidian cavalry, the 
besiegers could not afford to disregard. 

The consuls accordingly had by no means an easy task 
to perform, when they now found themselves 
compelled to commence a regular siege. Manius 
Manilius, who commanded the land army, pitched his camp 
opposite the wall of the citadel, while Lucius Censorinus 
stationed himself with the fleet on the lake and there began 
operations on the tongue of land. The Carthaginian army 
under Hasdrubal, encamped on the other side of the lake 
near the fortress of Nepheris, whence it obstructed the 
labours of the Roman soldiers despatched to cut timber for 
eoQstructing machines, and the able cavalry-leader in paiN 
dcnlar, Himilco Phameas, slew many of the Romans. 
Censorinus fitted up two large battering-rams on the tongue, 
and made a breach with them at this weakest place of the 
wall ; but, as evening had set in, the assault had to be post 
poned. During the night the besieged succeeded in filling 
up^ a great psrt of the breaehj and in sd damaging the R(V 



48 The Subject Countries. [Boot IV 

iTiau machines by a sortie that they coul i not work nexi 
day. Nevertheless the Romans ventured on the assault; 
but they found the breach and the portions of the wall and 
houses in the neighbourhood so strongly occupied, and ad 
vanced with such imprudence, that they were repulsed with 
severe loss and would have suffered still greater damage 
had not the military tribune Scipio Aemilianus, foreseeing 
the issue of the foolhardy attack, kept together his men m 
front of the walls and thus intercepted the fugitives. Ma 
nilius accomplished still less against the impregnable wal] 
of the citadel. The siege thus lingered on. The diseases 
engendered in the camp by the heat of summer, the depart- 
ure of Censorinus the abler general, the ill-humour and in- 
action of Massinissa who was naturally far from pleased to 
see the Romans taking for themselves the booty which he 
had long coveted, and the death of the king at the age of 
ninety which ensued soon after (end of 605), 
utterly arrested the offensive operations of the 
Romans. They had enough to do in protecting their ships 
against the Carthaginian incendiaries and their camp against 
nocturnal surprises, and in securing food for their men an 
horses by the construction of a harbour-fort and by forays 
in the neighbourhood. Two expeditions directed against 
Hasdrubal remained without success ; and in fact the first, 
badly led over difficult ground, had almost terniinated in a 
formal defeat. But, while the course of the war was in- 
glorious for the general and the army, the military tribune 
Scipio achieved in it brilliant distinction. It was he who, 
on occasion of a nocturnal attack by the enemy on the Ro- 
man camp, starting with some squadrons of horse and taking 
the enemy in rear, compelled him to retreat. On the first 
PKl^edition to Nepheris, when the passage of the river had 
(ak^'.n place in opposition to his advice and had almost occfr 
sioned the destruction of the army, by a bold attack in 
flank he relieved the pressure on the retreating troops, and 
by his devoted and heroic courage rescued a division which 
had been given up as lost. While the other officers, and 
the oonsul in particular, by theii", perfidy deter^'ed the toww 



Obap. I.] The Subject Countries. 49 

and party-leaders that were inclined to negotiate Scipio 
succeeded in inducing one of the ablest of the latter, Hi- 
milco Phameas, to pass over to the Romans with 2,200 
eavalry. Lastly, after he had in fulfilment of the charge 
of the dying Massinissa divided his kingdom among his 
three sons, Micipsa, Gulussa, and Mastanabal, he brough 
to the Roman army in Gulussa a cavalry-leader worthy of 
his father, and thereby remedied the want, which had hith- 
erto been seriously felt, of light cavalry. His refined and 
yet simple demeanour, which recalled rather his own &ther 
than him whose name he bore, overcame even envy, and in 
the camp as in the capital the name of Scipio was on the 
lips (9f all. Even Cato, who was not liberal with his praise, 
a few months before his death — ^he died at the 
end of 605 without having seen the wish of his 
life, the destruction of Carthage, accomplished — applied to 
the young officer and to his incapable comrades the Ho- 
meric line : — 

He only is a living man, the rest are gliding shades.* 

While these events were passing, the close of the year 
had come and with it a change of commanders ; the consul 
Lucius Piso (606) was somewhat late in appear- 
ing and took the command of the land army, 
while Lucius Mancinus took charge of the fleet. But, if 
their predecessors had done little, these did nothing at all. 
Instead of prosecuting the siege of Carthage, or subduing 
the army of Hasdrubal, Piso employed himself in attacking 
the small maritime towns of the Phoenicians, and that 
mostly without success. Clupea, for example, repulsed 
him, and he was obliged to retire in disgrace from Hippo 
Diarrhytus, after having lost the whole summer in front of 
it and having had his besieging apparatus twice burnt 
Neapolis was no doubt taken ; but the pillage of the town 
in opposition to his pledged word of honour was not spe* 
oially favourable to the progress of the Roman arms. The 
oourage of the Carthaginians rose. Bithyas, a Numidian 

* Qftoc ninn^tay, ro\ Si a Mai aitraoiKF^p, 

Vol. IlL— 3 



50 The Subject Goiif^ines. [Booe rf 

sheik, passed over to them with 800 horse; Carthaginian 
envoys were enabled to attempt negotiations with the kingi 
of Numidia and Mauretania and even with Philip the Maoe- 
donian pretender. It was perhaps internal intrigues — Ha»> 
drubal the emigrant brought the general of the same name^ 
who commanded in the city, into suspicion on account of 
his relationship with Massinissa, and caused him to be put 
to death in the senate-house — ^rather than the activity of th« 
Romans, that prevented things from assuming a turn still 
more favourable for Carthage. 

With the view of producing a change in the state of 
BoipioAemi- African aflairs, which excited uneasiness, the 
^'— Romans resorted to the extraordinary m'easu« 

of entrusting the conduct of the war to the only man who 
had as yet brought home honour from the Libyan plains, 
and who was recommended for this war by his very name. 
Instead of calling Scipio to the aedileship for which he was 
a candidate, they gave to him the consulship before the 
usual time, setting aside the laws to the contrary effect, and 
committed to him by special decree the conduct of the 
African war. He arrived (607) in Uti<^ at a 
very critical moment. The Rpman admiral 
Mancinus, charged by Piso with the nominal continuance 
of the siege of the capital, had occupied a steep cliff, far 
remote from the inhabited district and scarcely defended, 
on the almost inaccessible seaward side o£ the suburb of 
Magalia, and had united nearly his whole n<yt very nume* 
rous force there, in the hope of being able to penetrate 
thence into the outer town. In fact the assailants had been 
for a moment within its gates and the oimp-foUowers had 
flocked forward in a body in the hope of spoil, when they 
were again driven back to the cliff and, being without sup 
plies and almost cut off, were in the greatest danger. Scipio 
found matters in that position. He had hardly amved 
when he despatched the troops which he had brought with 
him and the militia of Utica by sea to the threatened point, 
and succeeded in saving its garrison and holding the cliff 
itself. Aller this danger was averted, the general proceeded 



Chap. I.J The Svhject Countries, h\ 

U^ the camp of Piso to take the command and bring the 
anny back to Carthage. Hasdrubal and Bithyas availed 
themselves of his absence to move their camp immediately 
tip to the city, and to renew the attack on the garrison of 
the cliff before Magalia ; but Sdpio appeared with the Yan- 
^ard of the main army in sufficient time to afford as8is^ 
ance to the post. Then the siege began afresh and mors 
earnestly. First of all Scipio cleared the camp of the 
mass of camp-followers and sutlers and once more tight- 
ened the relaxed reins of discipline. Military operations 
were soon resumed with increased vigour. In an attack by 
night on the suburb the Romans succeeded in passing from 
a tower — ^placed in front of the walls and equal to them in 
height — on to the battlements, and opened a little gate 
through which the whole army entered. The Carthaginians 
abandoned the suburb and their camp before the gates, and 
gave the chief command of the garrison of the city, amount- 
ing to 30,000 men, to Hasdrubal. The new commander 
displayed his energy in the first instance by giving orders 
that all the Roman prisoners should be brought to the bat- 
tlemepts and, afler undergoing cruel tortures, should be 
thrown over before the eyes of the besieging army ; and, 
when voices were raised in disapproval of the act, a reign 
of terror was introduced with reference to the citizens also. 
Scipio, meanwhile, after having confined the besieged to the 
city itself, sought totally to cut off their intercourse with 
the outer world. He took up his head-quartern on the 
ridge by which the Carthaginian peninsula was connected 
with (ibe mainland, and, notwithstanding the various at- 
tempts of the Carthaginians to disturb his operations, Ct>n« 
Btructed a great camp across the whole breadth of the istk 
mus, which completely shut off the city from the landward 
side. Nevertheless ships with provisions still ran into the 
harbour, partly bold merchantmen allured by the great 
gain, partly vessels of Bithyas, who availed himself of 
every &vourable wind to cx>nvey supplies to the city fram 
Nepheris at the end of the lake of Tunes ; whatever might 
DOW be the sufferings of the citizens, the garrison was stiL' 



52 The Subject CaufUries. [Book IT 

suflictently provided for. Scipio therefore consiructed a 
Bto»e mole^ d6 fe^ broad, running from the tongue of land 
between the lake and gulf into the latt^, so as thus to dose 
the mouth of the harbour. The city seemed lost, when the 
success of this undertaking, which was at first ridiculed by 
the Carthaginians as impracticable, became evident But 
me surprise was balanced by another. While the Roman 
labourers were constructing the mole, work was going for- 
ward night and day for two months in the Carthaginiar. 
harbour, Without even the deserters being able to tell what 
were the designs of the besieged. All of a sudden, just as 
the Romans had completed the bar across the entrance to 
the harbour, fifty Carthaginian triremes and a number of 
boats and skiffs sailed forth from that same harbour into 
the gulf — while the enemy were stopping up the old mouth 
of the harbour towards the south, the Carthaginians had by 
means of a canal formed in an easterly direction procured 
for themselves a new outlet, which owing to the depth of 
the sea at that spot could not possibly be closed. Had the 
Carthaginians, instead of resting content with a mere dem- 
onstration, thrown themselves at once and resolutely on 
the half-dismantled and wholly unprepared Roman fleet, it 
must have been lost ; when they returned on the third day 
to give battle, they found the Romuis in readiness. The 
conflict came off without decisive result ; but on their re- 
turn the Carthaginian vessels so ran foul of each other in 
and befbre the entrance of the harbour, that the damage 
thus occasioned was equivalent to a defeat. Scipio now 
directed his attacks against the outer quay, which lay out- 
side of the city walls and was only protected for the ex- 
Igeoicy by an earthen rampart of recent constiuction. The 
machines were stationed on the tongue of land, and a breach 
was easily made ; but with unexampled intrepidity the Car- 
thaginians, wading through the shallows, assailed the be- 
sieging implements, chased away the covering force which 
ran off in such a manner that Scipio was obliged to make 
his own troopers cut them down, and destroyed the ma 
chines. In this way they gained time to dose the breach 



Obaf. h] The JSuh;ect Countries. 68 

Scipio again estftblished the machines and set on fire tht 
wooden towers of the enemy ; by which means he obtained 
possession of the quay and of the outer harbour along with 
it. A rampart equalling the city wall in height was hers 
constructed, and the town was now at length completely 
blockaded by land and sea, for the inner harbour could only 
be reached through the outer. To ensure the completeness 
of the blockade, Scipio ordered Gains Laelius to attack the 
camp at Nepheria, where Diogenes now held the command * 
it was c^tured by a fortunate stratagem, and the whole 
countless multitude assembled there were put to death or 
taken prisoners. Winter had now arrived and Scipio sua* 
pended his operations, leaving famine and pestilence to 
complete what he had begun. 

' How fear^ly these mighty agencies had laboured in 
Cvptme of ^^^ work of destruction during the interval whil« 
tiMcity. Hasdrubal continued to vaunt and to gorman- 
dize, appeared so soon as the Roman army proceeded in the 
spring of 606 to attack the inner town, Has- 
drubal gave orders to set fire to the outer har« 
hour and made himself ready to repel the expected assault 
on the Cothon ; but Laelius succeeded in scaling the wall, 
hardly longer defended by the famished garrison, at a point 
&rther up and thus penetrated into the inner harbour. Thf 
city was captured, but the stru^le was still by no iiieaus 
at an end. The assailants' occupied the market-place con- 
tiguous to the small harbour, and slowly pushed their way 
along Uie three narrow streets leading from this to the 
citadel-^HBlowly, for the huge houses of six stories in height 
had to be taken one by one ; on the roo& or on beams laid 
over the street the soldiers penetrated from one of tiiese 
fortress-like buildings to that which was adjoining or oppo> 
site, and cut down whatever they encountered there. Thui 
mx days elapsed, terrible for the inhabitants of the city and 
full of difficulty and danger also for the assailants; a1 
length they ar^ved in front of the steep citadel-rock, whithei 
Hasdrubal and the force still surviving had retreated, T« 
procure a wid«r approach, Scipio gave orders to set fire to 



M The SuJtyect Countries. [Book if 

the captured streets and to level the rains ; en which oocfr 
rion a number of persons unable to fight, who were oon* 
oealed in the houses^ miserably perished. Then at last the 
remnant of the population, crowded together in the citadel, 
besought for mercy. Life was barely conceded to them, 
and they appeared before the victor, 30,000 men and 25,000 
women, not the tenth part of the former population. The 
Roman deserters alone, 900 in number, and the general 
Hasdrubal with his wife and his two children had thrown 
themselyes into the temple of the God of Healing; for 
them — for soldiers who had deserted their posts, and for 
the murderer of the Roman prisoners — there were no terms. 
But when, yielding to fimiine, the most resolute of them set 
fire to the temple, Hasdrubal could not endure to face 
death ; alone he ran forth to the victor and falling upon his 
knees pleaded for his life. It was granted; but, when 
nis wife who ¥dth her children was among the rest on the 
roof of the temple saw him at the feet of Sdpio, her proud 
heart swelled at this disgrace brought on her beloved per- 
ishing home, and, with bitter words bidding her husband be 
carefol to save his life, she plunged first her sous and then 
herself into the flames. The struggle was at an end. The 
joy in the camp and at Rome was boundless ; the noblest 
of the people alone were in secret ashamed of the most 
recent achievement of the nation. The prisoners were 
mostly sold as slaves ; several were allowed to languish in 
prison; the most notable, Hasdrubal and Bithyas, were 
sent to the interior of Italy as Roman state-prisoners and 
tolerably treated. The moveable property, with the excep* 
tion of gold, silver, and votive gifts, was abandoned to the 
pillage of the soldiers. As to the temple treasures, the 
booty that had been in better times carried ofi" by the Car- 
thaginians from the Sicilian towns was restored ; the bull 
of Phalaris, for example, was returned to the Agrigentines; 
the rest fell to the Roman state. 

But by far the larger portion of the city still remained 
Destrno- standing. We may believe that Scipio desir* 
ibBfe. ed its preservation ; at least he addressed a ape 



CHAP. l.l 2^ Subject Countries. 5fc 

dal inquiry to the Romjin senate on the subjeot. Sdpic 
Nasica once more attempted to gain a hearing for the de^ 
mands of reason and honour; but in vain. The senate 
ordered the general to level the city of Carthage and the 
suburb of Magalia with the ground, and to do the same 
nith all the townships which had held by Carthage to tn« 
last ; and thereafter to pass the plough over the site of Car* 
ihage so as to put an end in legal form to the existence of 
the city, and to curse the soil and site for ever, that neither 
bouse nor cornfield might ever reappear on the spot. The 
command was punctually obeyed. The ruins burned for 
seventeen days: recently, when the remains of the Cartha- 
ginian city wall were excavated, they were found to be cov- 
ered with a layer of ashes from four to five feet deep, filled 
with half-charred pieces of wood, fragments of iron, and 
projectiles. Where the industrious Phoenicians had bustled 
and trafficked for five hundred years, Roman slaves henc^ 
forth pastured the herds of their distant masters. Scipio, 
however, whom nature had destined for a nobler part than 
that of an executioner, gazed with horror on his own work ; 
and, instead of the joy of victory, the victor himself was 
haunted by a presentiment of the retribution that would 
inevitably follow such a misdeed. 

Arrangements had still to be made as to the future 
PkoTinoeof organization of the country. The earlier plan 
^**^ of investing the allies of Rome with the trans- 

marine possessions that she acquired was no longer viewed 
with favour. Micipsa and his brothers retiined in sub- 
stance their former territory, including the districts recently 
wrested from the Carthaginians on the Bagradas and in 
Emporia ; their long-cherished hope of obtaining Carthage 
as a capital was for ever frustrated ; the senate presented 
them instead with the Carthaginian libraries. The Cartha- 
giniau territory as possessed by the city in its last days— 
viz., the narrow border of the African coast lying immedi- 
ately opposite to Sicily, from the river Tusca (Wady Saine, 
opposite to the island of Galita) to Thenae (opposite to the 
island of Karkenah) — ^became a Roman province. In the 



56 The Svigect (Jawntries. [Book IT 

Ulterior, where tlie constant encroachments of Massinissr 
had more and more narrowed the Carthaginian dominions 
and Vacca, Zama, and Bulhi already belonged to Numidiaj 
the Numidians retained what thej possessed. But the 
c«reful r^ulation of the boundary between the Roman 
pn)V]nce and the Numidian kingdom, which enclosed it on 
three sides, showed that Rome would by no means tolerate 
in reference to herself what she had permitted in reference 
to Carthage ; while the name of the new province, Africa, 
on the other hand appeared to indicate that Rome did not 
at all regard the boundary now marked off as a definitive 
one. The supreme administration of the new province was 
entrusted to a Roman governor, whose seat was Utica. Its 
frontier did not need any regular defence, as the allied Nu- 
midian kingdom everywhere separated it from the inhabit- 
ants of the desert. In the matter of taxes Rome dealt on 
the whole with moderation. Those communities which 
from the beginning of the war had taken part with Rome — 
viz., only the maritime towns of Dtica, Hadrumetum, Lit- 
tie Leptis, Thapsus, Achulla, and Usalis, and the inland 
town of Theudalis — retained their territory and became 
free cities ; which was also the case with the newly founded 
community of deserters. The territory of the city of Car- 
thage — with the exception of a tract presented to Utica— 
and that of the other destroyed townships became Roman 
domainland, which was let on lease. The remaining town- 
ships likewise forfeited in law their property in the soil and 
their municipal liberties ; but their land and their constitu- 
tion were lefl to them on sufferance for the time being and 
until further orders from the Roman government, and the 
communities paid annually to Rome for the use of their 
soil which had become Roman a definitely fixed tribute 
{stipendium), which they in their turn raised by means of a 
property-tax levied from the individuals liable. The real 
gainers, however, by this destruction of the first commer- 
cial city of the West were the Roman merchants, who, as 
loon as Carthage lay in ashes, flocked in troops to Utica, 
and from this as their head-quarters began to turn to profit 



c*HAF. VJ The Subject Countries. 51 

able aocoant not only the Roman province, but also tbi 
Numidian and Gaetulian regions which had hitherto been 
closed to them. 

Macedonia also disappeared about the same time as Car 
'iCaood^nia thage from the ranks of the nations. The four 
Sfudoi small confederacies, into which Uie wisdom of 

Philip. ^Q Roman senate had parcelled out the ancient 

kingdom, could not live at peace either internally or one 
with another. The state of matters in the country appean 
from a single accideritally mentioned occurrence at Phacas, 
where the whole governing council of one of these confede» 
racies were murdered on the instigation of one Damasippus. 
y^ Neither the commissions sent by the senate 

(590), nor the foreign arbiters, such as Scipio 
^^' Aemilianus (603) called in after the Greek fash- 

ion by the Macedonians, were able to establish any tolera* 
ble order. Suddenly there appeared in Thrace a young 
man, who called himself Philip the son of king Persetts, 
whom he strikingly resembled, and of the Syrian Laodice. 
He had passed his youth in the Mysian town of Adramyt* 
tium; there he asserted that he had preserved the sure 
proofs of his illustrious descent. With these he had, after 
a vain attempt to obtain recognition in his native country, 
resorted to Demetrius Soter, king of Syria, his mother's 
brother. There were in fact some who believed the Adra- 
myttene or professed to believe him, and urged the king 
either to reinstate the prince in his hereditary kingdom or 
to cede to him the crown of Syria ; whereupon Demetrius, 
to piit an end to the foolish proceedings, arrested the pre- 
tender and sent him to the Romans. But the senate at* 
tached so little importance to the man, that it confined him 
in an Italian town without taking steps to have him even 
seriously guarded. Thus he had escaped to Miletus, where 
the civic authorities once more seized him and asked the 
Roman commissioners what they should do with the pris- 
oner. The latter advised them to let him go ; and they did 
BO. He now tried his fortune further in Thrace ; and, sm 
gularly enough, he obtained recognition and support thert 

Vol. III.— 3* 



66 The Sub;ek Cauntrie$. [Book rr 

not only from Teres the chief of the Thracian barbarianSi 
the husband of his father's sister, and Barsabas, but also 
from the prudent Byzantines. With Thracian support thfi 
so-called Philip invaded Macedonia, and, although he was 
def(*ated at first, he 30on gained one victory over the Mace- 
donian militia in the district of Odomantioe beyond the 
Strymon, followed by a second on the west side of the 
liver, which gave him possession of all Macedonia. Apoc- 
ryphal as his story sounded, and decidedly as it was estab- 
lished that the real Philip, the son of Perseus, had died 
when eighteen years of age at Alba, and that this man, so 
far from being a Macedonian prince, was Andriscus a fuller 
of Adramyttium, yet the Macedonians were too much ac- 
customed to the rule ol a king not to be readily satisfied 
on the point of legitimacy and to return with pleasure into 
the old paths. Messengers arrived from the Thessalians, 
announcing that the pretender had advanced into their ter- 
ritory ; the Roman commissioner Nasica, who, in the ex- 
pectation that a mere remonstrance would put an end to 
the foolish enterprise, had been sent by the senate to Mace- 
donia without soldiers, was obliged to call out the Achaean 
and Pergamene troops and to protect Thessaly against the 
superior force by means of the Achaeans, as far as was 
practicable, till (605?) the praetor Juventius 
appeared with a legion. The latter attacked the 
Macedonians with his small force ; but he himself fell, his 
army was almost wholly destroyed, and the greater part of 
Thessaly fell into the power of the Pseudo-Philip, who con- 
ducted his government there and in Macedonia with cruelty 
viekoiyof ^"^ arrogance. At length a stronger Eoman 
McteUus. army under Quintus Gaecilius Metellus appeared 
on the scene of conflict, and, supported by a Pergamene 
fleet, advanced into Macedonia. In the first cavalry combat 
the Macedonians retained the superiority ; but soon dissen* 
sions and desertions occurred in the Macedonian army, and 
the blunder of the pretender in dividiLg his army and de^ 
taching half of it to Thessaly procured for tlie Romans ao 
.48 easy and decisive victory (606). Philip f?ed tc 



OiAP. I.] The Svh^ect Countries. 6& 

the chieftain Byzes in Thrace, whither Meteli us followed him 
and after a second victory obtained his surrender. 

The four Macedonian confederacies had not voluntarily 
Prarinoeof submitted to the pretender, but had yielded 
Haoedonia. ^^jy ^ force. According to the policy hitherto 
pursued there was therefore no reason for depriving the 
Macedonians of the shadow of independence which the bat* 
tie of Pydna had still left to them ; nevertheless the king* 
dom of Alexander was now, by order of the senate, con- 
verted by Metellus into a Boman province. This case 
clearly showed that the Roman government had changed its 
system, and had resolved to substitute the relation of sub- 
jection for that of dependence ; and accordingly the sup- 
pression of the four Macedonian confederacies was felt 
throughout the whole range of the client-states as a blow 
directed against all. The possessions in Epirus which were 
formerly after the first Roman victories detached from 
Macedonia — the Ionian Islands abd the ports of ApoUonia 
and Epidamnus (ii. 91, 328), that had hitherto been under 
the jurisdiction of the Italian magistrates — were now re- 
united with Macedonia, so that the latter, probably as early 
as this period, reached on the north-west to a point beyond 
Scodra, where Illyria began. The protectorate which Rome 
claimed over Greece Proper likewise devolved, of course, 
on the new governor of Macedonia. Thus Macedonia re- 
covered its unity and nearly the same limits which it had 
in its most flourishing times. It had no longer, however, 
the unity of a kingdom, but that of a province, retaining 
its communal and even as it would seem its district organi- 
sation, but placed under an Italian governor and quaeslori 
whose names make their appearance on the native coim 
along with the name of the country. As tribute there was 
retained in the old moderate land-tax, as Paullus had ar- 
ranged it (ii. 858)— a sum of 100 talente (£24,000) which 
was allocated in fixed proportions c n the several communi* 
tics. Yet the land could not forget its old glorious dynasty 
A few years after the subjugation of the Pseudo-Philif 
another pretended son of Perseus, Alexander, raised titf 



60 The Subject Countries. [Ba/^. -sf 

baiiL^r of insurrection on the Nestus (Karasu), aoif. / 44 iq 
a short time collected 16,000 men ; but the quaestor \ ^lOius 
Tromellius mast/cred the insurrection without diffio*/V/ and 
pursued the fugitive pretender as far is Dar- 
dania (612). This was the last moT/meot of 
the proud national spirit of Macedonia, which two hniodred 
fears before had accomplished so great things ift Hellaa 
and Asia. Henceforward there is scarcely anytli^i?: else to 
be told of the Macedonians, save that they continued to 
reckon their inglorious years from the date iJ* vhich the 
country received its definitive prov/ittoitl orgakii- 
zation (608). 
Thenceforth the defence of the northern vod easbom 
frontiers of Macedonia or, in other words, o/ the fraalier 
of Hellenic civilization against the barbarians devolvxjd on 
the Romans. It was not conducted by them vith adequate 
forces or, on the whole, with befitting energy ; but with a 
primary view to this military object the great 7^gnatian 
highway was constructed, which as early as the time of 
Polybius ran from Apollonia and Dyrrhachium, the two 
chief ports on the west coast, across the inteinok* to Thes- 
salonica, and was afterwards prolonged to t^ie Hebrus 
(Maritza).* The new province became the natural basis, 
on the one hand for the movements against toAe turbulent 
Dalmatians, and on the other hand for the nun erous expedi- 
tions against the Illyrian, Celtic, and Thraciat. tribes settled 
to the north of the Grecian peninsula, whicL we shall after- 
wards have to exhibit in their historical connection. 

Greece Proper had greater occasion tikin Macedonia to 
congratulate herself on the fa\ ^ar of the ruling 
power; and the Philhelleno/ of Rome wew 

* This road was known even to the author oi he pseudo-Aristoteliaij 
ttoatise De MirabUibuM as a commercial route U.tween the Adriatic and 
Black seas, viz., as that along which the wine jars from Corcyra met 
half way those from Thasos and Lesbos. Evca now it runs substantiall) 
in the same direction from Durazzo, crossing the mountains of Bagon 
(Gandavian cliain) at the lake of Ochiida (Lychnitis), by way of If OBastir 
laSatonioa. 



Chip. I.] 7%6 Sulyect Ootmtries. 61 

pro1>ably of opinion that the calamitous efiects of the wai 
with Perseus were disappear ing, and that the state of thingt 
in general was improying there. The bitterest abettors of 
the now dominant party, Lyciscus the Aetolian, Mnasippuf 
the Boeotian, Chrematas the Acarnanlan, the infamous 
Epirct Charops whom honourable Romans forbade e^en to 
e<Qter their houses, descended one after another to thf 
grave ; another generation grew up, in which the old recol 
lections and the old antagonisms had faded. The senate 
tfanu^t that the time for general forgiveness and oblivion 
had come, and in 604 released the survivol« of 
those Achaean patriots who had been confmed 
for seventeen years in Italy, and whose liberation tht 
Achaean diet had never ceased to demand. NeverthelesF 
they were mistaken. How little Uie Romans with all theii 
Philhellenism had been successful in really conciliating 
Hellenic patriotism, was nowhere more clearly apparent 
than in the attitude of the Groi^ks towards the Attalids. 
King Eumenes II. had been, as a 4nend of the Romans, ex^ 
tremely hated in Greece (ii. 344) ; but scarcely had a cold- 
ness arisen between him and the .Romans, when he became 
suddenly popular in Greece, and the Hellenic votary of 
hope expected the deliverer from a ibreign yoke to come 
now from Pergamus as formerly from Macedonia. Social 
disorganization more especially was visibly on the increase 
among the petty states of Hellas now letl to themselves. 
The country became desolate not through war and pesti- 
lence, but through the daily increasing di»incHnation of the 
higher classes to trouble themselves with wife and children; 
on the other hand the criminal or the thoughtless flocked as 
hitherto chiefly to Greece, to await the recruiting officer 
there. The communities sank into daily deeper debt, and 
into financial dishonour and a corresponding want of credit: 
some cities, more especially Athens and Thebes, resorted in 
their financial distress to direct robbery, and plundered the 
neighbouring communities. The internal dissensions in the 
lei^ues also— 0. ^., between the voluntary and involuntary 
members of the Achaean oonibderacy— wwe by bo meam 



Omap. LI The Svbject ChanbrieB^ 

Macedonia assurances of the full loyalty of the Achaean 
league. Thereupon the long-expected Roman commissioc 
made its appearance, with Aurelius Orestes at its head; 
hostilities were now suspended, and the Achaean diet assem* 
bled at Corinth to receive its communications. They were 
of an unexpected and far from agreeable character. The 
Romans had resolved to cancel the unnatural and forced 
(ii. 829) inclusion of Sparta amor^ the Achaean states, and 
generally to act with vigour against the Achaeans. Some 
years before (591) these had been obliged to 
release from their league the Aetolian town of 
Pleuron (ii. 330) ; now they were directed to renounce all 
the acquisitions which they had made since the second 
Macedonian war — viz., Corinth, Orchomenus, Argos, Sparta 
in the Peloponnesus, and Heradea near Oeta — ^and to re- 
duce their league to the condition in which it stood at the 
end of the Hannibalic war. When the Achaean deputies 
learned this, they rushed immediately to the market-place 
without even hearing the Romans to an end, and communi- 
cated the Roman demands to the multitude ; whereupon 
the governing and the governed rabble determined with one 
voice to arrest at once the whole Lacedaemonians present 
iu Corinth, because Sparta forsooth had brought on them 
this misfortune. The arrest accordingly took place in the 
most tumultuary &shion, so that the possession of Laoonian 
names or Laconian shoes appeared sufficient ground for im- 
prisonment : in fact they even entered the dwellings of tie 
Roman envoys to seize the Lacedaemonians who had taken 
shelter there, and severe expressions were uttered against 
the Romans, although they did not lay hands ou their per- 
sons. The envoys returned home in indignatior, and made 
bitter and even exaggerated complaints in the senate ; but 
the latter, with the same moderation which marked all its 
measures against the Greeks, confined itself at first to repre 
sentations. In the mildest form, and hardly mentioning 
satisfaotion for the insults which they had suflTered, Sextua 
Julius Caesar repeated the commands of the Romans At the 
U7. diet in Aegiun (spring of 607). But the lead 



64: The Subjtd Cwniries. [Book it 

ers of afiairs in Adiaia with the new strategtu 
U7-1IC Critolaus at their head (itraUgw from May 

607 to May 608), as men versed in state tfffiura 
and &miliar with political arts, merely drew from tibat fiiel 
the inference that the position of Rome with reference to 
Carthage and Viriathus could not but be very unfitvourablc^ 
and continued at once to cheat and to affix>nt the Romans. 
Caesar was requested to arrange a conference of depnties 
of the contending parties at Tegea for the setUement of the 
question. He did so ; but, after Oaesar and the Lacedae- 
monian deputies had waited there long hi vain for the 
Achaean?, Critolaus at last appeared alone and informed 
them that the general assembly of the Achaeans was solely 
competent in this matter, and that it could only be settled 
at the diet or, in other words, in six months. Caesur there- 
upon returned to Rome; and the next national assembly 
of the Achaeans on the proposal of Critolaus formally de- 
clared war against Sparta. Even now Metellus made an 
attempt amicably to settle the quarrel, and sent envoys to 
Corinth ; but the noisy ecclesia^ consisting mostly of the 
populace of that wealthy commercial and manu&cturing 
city, drowned the voice of the Roman envoys and com- 
pelled them to leave the platform. The declaration of Cri- 
tolaus, that they wished the Romans to be their friends but 
not their masters, was received with inexpressible delight ; 
and, when the members of the diet wished to interpose, the 
mob protected the man after its own heart, and applauded 
the sarcasms as to the high treason of the rich and the need 
of a military dictatorship as well as the mysterious hints 
regarding an impending insurrection of numerous peoples 
and kings against Rome. The spirit animating the move- 
ment is shown by the two resolutions, that all clubs should 
be permanent and all actions for debt should be suspended 
till the restoration of peace. 

The Achaeans thus had war ; and they had even actual 
allies^ namely the Thebans and Boeotians and also the Chat" 

cidians. At the beginning of 606 Uie Achaeoni 

advanced into Thessaly to reduce to obedienor 



Ohak I J The Subject Countries. 65 

ITeraclea near Oeta, which, in accordance with the decrea 
of the senate, had detached itself from the Achaean league* 
The consul Lucius Muinmius, whom the senate had resolved 
to »3nd to Greece, had not yet arrived ; accordingly Metel* 
las undertook to protect Heraclea with the Macedonian 
legions. When the advance of the Romans was announced 
t(» the Achaeo-Theban army, there was no more talk of 
fignting; they considered only how they might best sacv 
ceed in reaching once more the secure Peloponnesus ; in all 
haste the army made off, and did not even attempt to hold 
the position of Thermopylae. But Metellus quickened the 
pursuit, and overtook and defeated the Greek army near 
Scarpheia in Loeris. The loss in prisoners and dead was 
considerable ; Critolaus was never heard of after the battle. 
The remains of the defeated army wandered to and fro in 
single troops, and everywhere sought admission in vain ; 
the division of Patrae was destroyed in Phocis, the Arcadian 
select corps at Chaeronea ; all northern Greece was evacu- 
ated, and only a small portion of the Achaean army and of 
the citizens of Thebes, who fled in a body, reached the 
Peloponnesus. Metellus sought by the utmost moderation 
to induce the Greeks to abandon their foolish resistance, 
and gave orders, for example, that all the Thebans, with a 
single exception, should be allowed their liberty ; his well- 
meant endeavours were thwarted not by the energy of the 
people, but by the desperation of the leaders apprehensive 
for their own safety. Diaeus, who after the fall of Crito- 
laus had resumed the chief command, summoned all men 
capable of bearing arms to the isthmus, and ordered 12,000 
slaves, natives of Greece, to be enrolled in the army ; the 
riih were applied to for advances, and the ranks of the 
frknds of peace, so far as they did not purchase their livet 
by bribing their tyrannical masters, were thinned by bloody 
prosecutions. The war accordingly was continued, and 
after the same style. The Achaean vanguard, which, 4,00C 
strong, was stationed under Alcamenes at Megara, dispersed 
as soon as it saw the Roman standards. Metellus was just 
about to order an attack upon the main force on the isth 



; 



66 The Subfea CoufUrieB. [Book IY 

muSy wb^i the consul Lucius Muminius with a few atttind 
ants arriyed at the Roman head-quarters and took the com- 
mand. Meanwhile the Acbaeans, emboldened by a success- 
ful attack on the too unguarded Roman outposts, offered 
battle to the Roman armj, which was about twice at 
strong, at Leucopetra on the isthmus. Hie Romans were 
sot slow to accept it. At the very first the Achaean horse- 
moi broke off en masse before the Roman cavalry of sii 
times their strength ; the hoplites withstood the enemy tiU 
a flank attack by the Roman select corps brought confu- 
rion into their ranks. This terminated the resistance. 
Diaeus fled to his home, put his wife to death, and took 
poison himselC All the cities submitted without opposi- 
tion ; and even the impregnable Corinth, into which Mum- 
mius for three days hesitated to enter because he feared an 
ambush, was occupied by the Romans without a blow. 

The renewed regulation of the affiurs of Greece was en- 
^roYinotot trusted to a commission of ten senators in con- 
^^***^ cert with the consul Mummius, who left behind 

him on the whole a favourable reputation in the conquered 
country. Doubtless it was, to say the least, a foolish thing 
in him to assume the name of ^' Achaicus " on account of 
his feats of war and victory, and to build in the fulness of 
his gratitude a temple to Hercules Victor ; but, as he had 
not been reared in aristocratic luxury and aristocratic cor« 
ruption but was a " new man " and comparatively poor, he 
showed himself an up^right and indulgent administrator. 
The statement, that none of the Achaeans perished but 
Diaeus and none of the Boeotians but Pytheas, is a rhe- 
torical exaggeration: in Chalcis especially sad outrages 
occurred ; but yet on the whole moderation was observed 
ill the infliction of punishment. Mummius rejected the 
proposal to throw down the statues of Philopoeraen, the 
founder of the Achaean patriotic party ; the fines imposed 
on the communities were destined not for the Roman ex- 
chequer, but for the injured Greek cities, and were mostly 
remitted afterwards; and the property of those jaiton 
who had parents or children was not sold on public account 



Chap. L] The SubjdGt Goimtries. 67 

but handed over to their rehitives. The works of art alone 
were carried away from Corir.th, Thespiae, and other cities, 
and were erected partly in the capital, partly in the country 
towns of Italy : * several pieces were also presented to tlie 
Isthmian, Delphic, and Olympic temples. In the definitive 
organization of the country also moderation was in genc^ral 
displayed. It is true that, as wag implied in the very ith 
troduction of the provincial constitution (ii. 83), the special 
confederacies, and the Achaean in particular, were as such 
dissolved ; the communities were isolated ; and intercourse 
between them was hampered by the rule that no one might 
acquire landed property simultaneously in two communi- 
ties. Moreover, as Flamininus had already attempted (ii. 
297), the democratic constitutions of the towns were alto 
gether set aside, and the government in each community 
was placed in the hands of a council composed of the 
wealthy. A fixed land-tax to be paid to Rome was imposed | 
on each community ; and they were all subordinated to the 
governor of Macedonia in such a manner that the latter, as 
supreme military chief, exercised a superintendence over 
administration and justice, and could, for example, person- 
ally assume the decision of the more important criminal ^ 
processes. Yet the Greek communities retained "free-^ 
dom," that is, a formal sovereignty — reduced, doubtless, 
by the Roman hegemony to a name — which involved the 
property of the soil and the right to a distinct adminis- 
tration and jurisdiction of their own.f Some years later 

* In the Sabine villages, at Parma, and even at Itallca in Spain 
(p. 14), seyeral pediments marked with the name of Mummius have been 
brought to light, which onoe supported gifts forming part of the spoiL 

f Tho question whether Greece did or did not become a Roman 
province in 608, virtually runs into a dispute about woitif. 
It is certain that the Greek communities throughout re- 
mained <*free" {C. I, Or, 1643, 16; Caesar, B. O, iii. 4; Appian, 
MUkr, 68 ; Zonar. ix. 31). But it is no less certain that Greece wafl 
then ** taken possession of " by the Romans (Tac. Ann, xiv. 21 ; 1 
Maecab. viii. 9, 10); that thenceforth each community paid a fixe(2 
ftribnte to Rome (Pausan. vii. 16, 6 ; comp. Gic. De Frw, Com, 8, 6) 
the little Inland of Gyarus, for instance, paying 160 drachma annnall; 



68 The Sxibject Countries. IBwt. W 

not only were the old confederacies again allowed to have a 
shsiowy existence, but the oppressive restriction on th« 
alienation of landed property was removed. 

The communities of Thebes, Chalcis, and Corinth eX' 

(Strabo, z. 486) ; that the " rods and axes " of the RoBian governof 
thenoeforth ruled in Greece (Polyb. xxxviii. 1 c, ; comp. Cic Verr, I, i 
21, 66), and that he thenceforth exercised the superintendence over th* 
constitutions of the cities (CX /. Or, 1643), as well as in certain cases 
the criminal jurisdiction (C. /. Or, 1B4S ; Plut Cvnu 1\ just as the 
senate had hitherto done ; and that, lastly, the Mafiedomali proviiieial 
era was also in use ui Greece. Between these facts there is no incon- 
sistency, or at any rate none further than is involved in the position of 
the free cities generally, which are spoken of sometimes as if excluded 
from the province (e, g, Sueton. Cae^.^ 26 ; Colum. xi. 3, 26), sometimes 
AS assigned to it («. g. Joseph. ArU, Jud, xiv. 4, 4). The Roman do- 
manial possessions in Greece were, no doubt, restricted to the territory 
of Corinth and possibly some portions of Enboea (C, /. €h, 6879), and 
t there were no subjects in the strict sense there at all ; yet if we look to 
the relations practically subsisting between the Greek communities and 
the Macedonian governor, Greece may be reckoned as included in the 
province of Macedonia in the same manner as Mossilia in the province 
of Narbo or Dyrrhachium in that of Macedonia. We find even cases 

that go much further : Cisalpine Gaul consisted after 666 

of mere burgess or Latin communities and was yet made a 
province by Sulla, and in the time of Caesar we meet with regions 
which consisted exclusively of burgees-communities and yet by no 
means ceased to be provinces. In these cases the fundamental idea of 
the Roman pravineia comes out very clearly ; it was primarily nothing 
but a ** command," and all the administrative and judicial f^mcdoni of 
the commandant were originally collateral duties and corollaries of hia 
military position. 

On the other hand, if we look to the formal sovereignty of the free 
commimities, it must be granted that the' position of Greece wm not 

altered in point of constitutional law by the events of 608. 

It was a difference de faeto rather than <ie Jure^ when in- 
f tead of the Achaean league the indindual oommunities of Achaia now 
appeared by the side of Rome as tributary protecte*! states, and when, 
after the erection of Macedonia as a distinct Roman province, the Uvttsf 
relieved the authorities of the capital of the superintvudence over tbi 
Greek client-states. Greece therefore may or may not be regarded at 
a part of the ** command " of Macedonia, according as the practical 01 
the formal point of view preponderates ; but the former is justly redr 
9ned as the more important 



Chap. 1.] Th$ Svtfjed Goimtries. 6!» 

Det*nuition peHeuced a treatment more severe. There ii 
of Corinth, y^ ground for censure in the fact that the two 
form^ were disarmed and converted by the demolition of 
their walle into open villages ; but the wholly uncaUed*for 
elestruction of the flouriahing Corinth, the first commercial 
city in Greece, remains a dark stain on the annals of Rome. 
By express orders from the senate the Corinthian citizens 
were seized, and such as were not killed were sold into 
slavery ; the city itself was not only deprived of its walls 
and its citadel*-*a measure which, if the Romans were not 
disposed permanently to garrison it^ was certainly inevitable 
— but was levelled with the ground, and all rebuilding on 
the desolate site was prohibited in the usual forms of ac 
cursing ; part of its territory was given to Sicyon under 
the obligation that the latter should defray the expense of 
the Isthmian national festival in room of Corinth, but the 
greater portion was declared to be public land of Rome. 
Thus was extinguished " the eye of Hellas," the last pre* 
eioua ornament of the Grecian land, once so rich in cities. 
If, however, we review the whole catastrophe, the impartial 
historian must acknowledge — what the Greeks of this period 
themselves candidly confessed — that the Romans were not 
to blame for the war itself, but that on the contrary the 
foolish perfidy and the feeble temerity of the Greeks com- 
pelled the Roman intervention. The abolition of the mock 
sover^gnty of the leagues and of all the vague and perni- 
cious dreams connected with them was a blessing for the 
country ; and the government of the Roman commander- 
iohchief of Macedonia, however much it fell short of what 
was to be wished, was yet far better than the previous con- 
fusion and misrule of Greek confederacies and Roman com- 
missions. The Peloponnesus ceased to be the great har- 
bour of mearoenaries ; it is afiirmed, and may readily b€ 
believed, that with the direct government of Rome security 
and prosperity in some measure returned throughout the 
land. The epigram of Themistocles, that ruin had averted 
ruin, w^ applied by the Hellenes of that day not altogethei 
without reason to the {oas of Greek independence. Th# 



TO The Subject Cowntnet. [Boon iv 

singular indulgence, which Rome even now showed towards 
^he Greeks, becomes fully apparent only when compared 
with the contemporary conduct of the same authorities 
towards the Spaniards and Phoenicians. To treat barban 
ans with cruelty seemed not unallowable, but the Romans 
of this period, like the emperor Trajan in later times, 
deemed it ^ harsh and barbarous to deprive Athens and 
Sparta of the shadow of freedom which they still retained.'' 
All the more marked is the contrast between this general 
moderation and the revolti?ig treatment of Corinth — a treat- 
ment disapproved even by the apologists of the destruction 
of Numantia and Carthage, and far from justified, even ac- 
cording to Roman international law, by the abusive lan- 
guage uttered against the Roman deputies in the streets of 
Corinth. And yet it by no means proceeded from the bru- 
tality oi any single individual, least of all of Mummius, 
but was a measure deliberated and resolved on by the Ro- 
man senate. We shall not err, if we recognize it as the 
work of the mercantile party, which even thus early began 
to interfere in politics by the side of the aristocracy proper, 
and which in destroying Corinth got rid of a commercial 
rival. If the great merchants of Rome had anything to 
say in the regulation of Greece, we can understand why 
Corinth was singled out for punishment, and why the Ro- 
mans not only destroyed the city as it stood, but also pro- 
hibited any future settlement on a site so pre-eminently 
favourable for commerce. The Peloponnesian Argos thence- 
forth became the rendezvous for the Roman merchants, who 
were very numerous even in Greece. For the Roman 
wholesale traffic, however, Delos was of greater import- 
ance ; a Roman free port as early as 586, it had 
attracted a great part of the business of Rhodes 
(ii. 364), and now in a similar way entered on the heritage 
of Corinth. This island remained for a conmderable time 
the chief emporium for merchandise going from the East to 
>he West.* 

* A remarkable proof of this is found in the names employed W 
icsignate the fine bronxc and copper wares 6f Greece, which in the Hm» 



•Jhap. I.] Ths Subject Count7ne€. 71 

In the third and more distant continent the Roinwi 
dominion exhibited a deyelopment more imper* 
feet than in the African and Macedono-FIellenio 
ooun tries, which were separated from Italy only by nairow 
Mas. 

in Asia Minor, after the Seleucidae were driven baek, 
the kingdom of Pergamus had become the first 
o??«v°^ power. Not led astray by the traditions cf the 
gamiu. Alexandrine monarchies, but sagacious and dis- 

passionate enough to renounce what was impossible, the 
Attalids kept quiet ; and endeavoured not to extend theii 
bounds nor to withdraw from the Roman hegemony, but to 
promote the prosperity of their empire, so far as the Ro- 
mans allowed, and to foster the arts of peace. Neverthe- 
less they did not escape the jealousy and suspicion of 
Rome. In possession of the European shore of the Pro 
pontis, of the west coast of Asia Minor, and of the interior 
as far as the Cappadocian and Cilician frontiers, and in close 
connection with the Syrian kings— -one of whom, Antiochus 
Epiphanes ( + 590), had ascended the throne by 
the aid of the Attalids — ^king Eumenes II. had 
by his power, which seemed still more considerable from 
the more and more deep decline of Macedonia and Syria, 
instilled apprehension in the minds even of its founders. 
We have already related (ii. 359) how the senate sought to 
humble and weaken this ally afler the third Macedonian 
war by unbecoming diplomatic artifices. The relations-— 
perplexing from the very nature of the case — of the rulers 
of Pergamus towards the free or half-free commercial cities 
within their kingdom, and towards their barbarous neighs 
hours on its borders, became complicated still more pain- 
liilly by this ill humour on the part of their patrons. At 
It was not clear whether, according to the treaty of peaoft 

of Cicero were called iudiscriminately " Corinthian " or '^ Delian " 
eopper. Their designation in Italy was naturally derived not from tlM 
places of manufacture but from those of export (Plin. ff. N, zxxiv. S, 
•); allihough, of coAise, we do not mean to deny that similar vnaei 
were mntHfactured in Corinth audDelos themselvea 



72 Tke Svijject Cotintries. [Book IV 

ill 565, the heights of the Taurus in Pomphylia 
and Pisidia belonged to the kingdom of Syria 
or to that of Pergamus, the brave Selgians, nominally 
recognizing, as it would seem, the Syrian supremacy, made 
a prolonged and energetic resistance to Eumenes II. and 
Attains 11* in the almost inaccessible mountains of Pisidia^ 
The Asiatic Celts also, who for a time with the permissiou 
of the Romans had yielded allegiance to Pergamus, revolt- 
ed from Eumenes and, in concert with Prusias king of 
Bithynia the hereditary enemy of the Attalids, suddenly 
began war against him about 587. The king 
had had no time to hire mercenary troops ; all 
his skill and valour could not prevent the Celts from de- 
feating the Asiatic militia and overrunning his territory ; 
the peculiar mediation, to which the Romans condescended 
at the request of Eumenes, has already been mentioned 
(ii. 361). But, as soon as he had found time with the help 
of his well-filled exchequer to raise an army capable of 
taking the field, he speedily drove the wild hordes over the 
frontier ; and, although Galatia remained lost to him, and 
his obstinately continued attempts to maintain his footing 
there were frustrated by Roman influence,* he yet, in spite 

* Several letters recently brought to light (Miincheuer Sitzungs- 

bcrichte, 1860, p. 180 et seq.) from the kings Eumenes II. and Attains 

U. to the priest of Fessinus, who was uniformly called Attis (comp. 

Polyb. xxii. 20), very clearly illustrate these relations. The earliest of 

these and the only one wkh a date, written in the 84th year of the 

reign of Eumenes on the 1t\\ day before the end of Gorpiaeus, and 

therefore in 690-1 v. c, offers to the priest military aid in 

order to wrest from the Fesongians (not otherwise known) 

a holy place occupied by them ; the following, likewise from Eumenes, 

eibibits the king as a party in the feud between the priest of Fessinus 

and his brother Aiorix. Beyond doubt both acts of I^menes were in- 

duded among those which were reported at Bome in 690 

et 8eg, as attempts on his part to interfere further in GalUe 

affairs, and to support his partisans in that quarter (Polyb. xxxi. 6, 9 ; 

zxxii. 8, 6). On the other hand it is plain fhim one of the letters of 

his successor Attalus that the times had changed and his wishes had 

lowered their tone. The priest Attis appears to have at a conference af 

Apanoea obtained onoe more from Attslus the promise of ar9i»d aMlil 



Chap. I.] The Subject Lountrtes 73 

of all the open attacks and secret machinations which hia 
neighbours and the Romans directed against 
him, at his death (about 595) lefl his k jngdom 
m undiminished power. His brother Attains II. Philadel- 
phus ( + 616) with Roman aid repelled the at- 
tempt of Phamaces king of Pontus to seize the 
g\ ardianship of Eumenes' son who was a minor, and reigned 
In the room of his nephew, like Antigonus Doson^ as guar- 
diiQ for life. Adroit, able, pliant, a genuine Attalid, he 
had the art to convince the suspicious senate that the appre- 
hensions which it had for-merly cherished were baseless. 
The anti-Roman party accused him of applying himself to 
keep the land for the Romans, and of acquiescing in every 
insult and exaction at their hands ; but, sure of Roman pro- 
tection, he was able to interfere decisively in the disputes 
as to the succession in Syria, Cappadocia, and Bithynia. 
Even in the dangerous Bithynian war, which king Prusias 
IL, surnamed the Hunter (5721-605), a ruler 
who combined in his own person all the vices of 
barbarism and of civilization, began against him, Roman 
intervention saved him — although not until he had been 
himself besieged in his capital, and a first warning given 
by the Romans had remained unattended to and had even 
M-164. ^®®^ scoffed at by Prusias (598-600). But, 

when his ward Attains III. Philometor ascended 
138-188. ^^ throne (616-621), the peaceful and moderate 

rule of the citizen kings was replaced by the tyi*anny of an 
Asiatic sultan. The new king for instance, with a view to 
rid himself of the inconvenient counsel of his Other's 
friends, assembled them in the palace, and ordered his 

tnce; but afterwaids the king writes to him that in a state council held 
for the purpose, at which Athenaeus (certainly the known brother of 
the king), Sosandcr, Menogenes, Chlorus, and other relatives (ayayxau>») 
had been present, after long hesitation the majority had at length 
acceded to the opinion of Chlonis that nothing should be done without 
previously consulting the Romans ; for, even if success were obtained, 
they would expose themselves to its forfeiture and to the evil suspidoo 
^' whidi they had cherished also against hit brother ^ (Eumenes II.)- 

Vol. III.— 4 



74 I%e Subbed Countriea, [Book IV 

mercenaries to put to death iii*st them, and then their wivei 
and children. Along with such recreations he wrote treat* 
Ises on gardening, cultivated poisonous plants, and prepared 
wax models, till a sudden death carried him off. 

With him the house of the Attalids became extinct. In 
ProTinoeof ^"^^ ^^ event, according to the constitutional 
^«*** law which held good at least for the client-states 

of Rome, the last ruler might dispose of the succession by 
testament. Whether it was the insane rancour against hif 
subjects which had tormented the last Attalid during life 
that now suggested to him the thought of bequeathing his 
kingdom by will to the Romans, or whether his doing so 
was merely a further recognition of the practical supremacy 
of Rome, cannot be determined. The testament was made ; 
the Romans accepted the bequest, and the question as to 
the land and the treasure of the Attalids threw a new apple 
of contention among the conflicting political parties in 
Rome. 

In Asia also this royal testament kindled a civil wan 
War against Relying on the aversion of the Asiatics to the 
AristonicuB. foreign rule which awaited them, Aristonicus, a 
natural son of Eumenes II., made his appearance in Leucae, 
a small seaport between Smyrna and Phocaea, as a pre- 
tender to the crown. Phocaea and other towns joined him, 
but he was defeated at sea off Cyme by the Ephesians who 
saw that a steady adherence to Rome was the only possible 
way of preserving their privileges, and was obliged to flee 
into the interior. The movement was believed to have 
died away when he suddenly reappeared at the head of the 
new " citizens of the city of the sun," * in other words, ot 
the slaves whom he had called to freedom en masses nuM* 
tered the Lydian towns of Thyatira and Apollonis as well 

* These strange " Heliopolites ** may, according to the probobk 
▼ten which a friend has expressed to me, be accounted for by supposing 
khat the liberated slaves constituted themselves citizens of a town 
tleliopolis not otherwise mentioned or perhaps having an existenoa 
merely in imagination, which derived its name from the God of the Sua 
10 highly honoured in Syria. 



Ciup. tj The Siibfect Count nes» 7ft 

as a portion of the Attalio townships, and summoned bands 
of Thradan free-lances to join his standard. The struggle 
was serious. There were no Roman troops in Asia ; the 
Asiatic free ciMes and the contingents of the client-prinoet 
of Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Cappadocia, Pontus, Armenia 
could not withstand the pretender ; he penetrated by foroe 
of arms into Colophon, Samos, and Myndus, and already 
ruled over almost all his Other's kingdom, when at tlM 
close cf 623 a Roman army landed in Asia. Its 
commander, the consul and ponH/ex maximui 
Publius Licinius Crassus Mucianus, one of the wealthiest 
and at the same time one of the roost cultivated men in 
Rome, equally distinguished as an orator and as a jurist^ 
was about to besiege the pretender in Leucae, but during 
his preparations for that purpose allowed himself to be 
surprised and defeated by his too much undervalued oppo- 
nent, and was made a prisoner in person by a Thracian 
band. But he did not allow such an enemy the triumph 
of exhibiting the Roman commander-in-chief as a captive ; 
he provoked the barbarians, who had captured him without 
knowing who he was, to put him to death (be- 
ginning of 624), and the consular was only 
recc^ized when a corpse. With him, as it would seem, 
fell Ariarathes king of Cappadocia. But not long afler 
this victory Aristonicus was attacked by Marcus Perpenna, 
the successor of Crassus ; his army was dispersed, he him* 
self was besieged and taken prisoner in Stratonicea, and 
was soon afterwards executed in Rome. The subjugation 
of thd last towns that still offered resistance and the defini- 
tive regulation of the country were committed, after the, 
sudden death of Perpenna, to Manius Aquillini 
(625). The same policy was followed as in the 
case of the Carthaginian territory. The eastern portion of 
th) kingdom of the Attalids was assigned to the client 
kings, so as to release the Romans from the defence of the 
frontier and thereby from the necessity of maintaining a 
standing force in Asia; Telmissus (ii. 825) went to the 
Lycian confederacy ; the Eur<^>ean possessions in Thraos 



76 The Subject Gounttnes. [Book n 

were annexed to the province of Macedoaia ; the rest of 
the territory was organized as a new Roman provinoe^ 
which like that of Carthage was, not without design, desig- 
nated by the name of the continent in which it lay. The 
land was released from the taxes which had been paid to 
IVrgamus ; and it was treated with the same moderation 
AS Hellas and Macedonia. Thus the most considerable 
wtate in Asia Minor became a Roman province. 

The numerous other small states and cities of western 
Western ^^^^ — ^^^ kingdom of Bithynia, the Paphlago- 
^^* nian and Gallic principalities, the Lycian, Carian, 

and Pamphylian confederacies, the free cities of Gyzicus and 
Rhodes — continued in their former circumscribed relations. 
Beyond the Halys Cappadocia — after king Ariarathes 
V. Philopator (591-624) had, chiefly by the aid 
Oa^pa-' of the Attalids, held his ground against his 

^**'"' brother and rival Holophernes who was sup- 

ported by Syria — followed substantially the Pergamene 
policy, as respected both absolute devotion to Rome and 
the tendency to adopt Hellenic culture. He was the means 
of introducing that culture into the hitherto almost barbar- 
ous Cappadocia, and along with it its extravagancies also, 
such as the worship of Bacchus and the dissolute practices 
of the bands of wandering actors — the " artists " as they 
were called. In reward for the fidelity to Rome which had 
cost this prince his life in the struggle with the Pergamene 
pretender, his youthful heir Ariarathes VI. was not only 
protected by the Romans against the usurpation attempted 
by the king of Pontus, but received also the south-eastern 
part of the kingdom of the Attalids, Lycaonia, along with 
the district bordering on it to the eastward and in earlier 
times included in Cilicia. 

In the remote north-east of Asia Minor " Cappadocia 
on the sea," or more briefly the ''maritime 
state," Pontus, increased in extent and import- 
ance. Not long after the battle of Magnesia king Phar« 
naccs I. had extended his dominion far beyond the Halys t4i 
Tiu« ^n the frontier of Bithynia, and in particular had pos 



OsiF. LJ The Subject Countries. 71 

sessed himself of the rich Sinope, which was converted 
from a Greek free city into the residence of the kings of 
Pontus. The neighbouring states endangered by these en 
sroachments, N^ith king Eumenes II. at their head, had on 
that account waged war against him (671-575), 
and under Roman mediation had exacted from 
him a promise to evacuate Galatia and Paphlagonia ; hal 
tiie course of events shows that Phamaces* as well as hit 
successor Mithradates V. Euergetes (598 T-634), 
&ithful allies of Rome in the third Punic war 
as well as in the struggle with Aristonicus, not only re* 
mained in possession beyond the Halys, but also virtually 
retained the protectorate over the Paphlagonian and Gala- 
tian dynasts. This hypothesis alone serves to explain how 
Mithradates, ostensibly for his brave deeds in the war 
against Aristonicus, but in reality for considerable sums 
paid to the Roman general, came to receive Great Phrygia 
from the latter after the dissolution of the Attalid kingdom. 
How &r on the other hand the kingdom of Pontus about 
this time extended in the direction of the Caucasus and the 
sources of the Euphrates, cannot be precisely determined ; 
but it seems to have embraced the western part of Armenia 
about Enderes and Diwirigi, or what was called Lesser 
Armenia, as a dependent satrapy, while the Greater Arme- 
nia and Sophene formed distinct and independent kingdoms. 
While in the peninsula of Asia Minor Rome thus sub- 
Bvriaaad stantially conducted the government and, al- 
^®^ though various things were done without or in 

opposition to her wishes, yet determined on the whole the 
state of possession, the wide tracts on the other hand b^ 
yond the Taurus and the Upper Euphrates as far down as 
the valley of the Nile continued to be mainly left to then» 
selves. No doubt the principle on which the 
peace of 565 with Syria was based, viz., that 
the Halys and the Taurus should form the eastern boundary 
of the Roman dependencies (ii. S26), was not adhered to 
by the senate and was in its very nature untenable. The 
political horizon rests on illusion as well as the physical 



78 The Subject Countries, [Book iv 

if the state of Syria had the number of ehipa cf war and 
war-elophants allowed to it prescribed in the treaty of peace 
(iL 324), and if the Syrian army evacuated Egypt when 
half-won at the bidding of the Roman senate (ii. 365), 
these things implied the most complete recognition of hege- 
mony and dependence. Accordingly the disputes as to the 
throne in Syria and in Egypt were referred for settlemwil 
to the Roman government. In the former after the death 
of Antiochus Epiphanes (590) Demetrius after- 
wards named Soter^ the son of Seleucus IV., 
living as a hostage at Rome, and Antiochus Eupator, a 
minor, the son of the last king Antiochus Epiphanes, con- 
tended for the crown; in the latter Ptolemy 
mi4A. Philometor (573-608), the elder of the two 

170 brothers who had reigned jointly since 584, had 

161 been driven from the country (590) by the 

younger Ptolemy Euergetes 11. or the Fat 
117. ( + 637), and had appeared in person at Rome 

to obtain his restoration. B<»th affairs were 
arranged by the senate entirely through diplomatic agency, 
and substantially in accordance with Roman advantage. In 
Syria Demetrius, who had the better title, was set aside, 
and Antiochus Eupator was recognized as king ; while the 
guardianship of the royal boy was entrusted by the senate 
to the Roman senator Gnaeus Octavius, who, as was to be 
expected, governed thoroughly in the interest of Rome, re- 
duced the war-marine and the army of elephants agreeably 
to the treaty of 565, and was in the fair way of 
completing the military ruin of the country, 
in Egypt not only was the restoration of Philometor ac- 
complished, but — ^partly in order to put an end to the 
quarrel between the brothers, partly in order to weaken the 
still considerable power of Egypt — Cyrene was separated 
from that kingdom and assigned as a provision for Euer- 
getes. **The Romans make kings of those whom they 
choose," a Jew wrote not long afler thi&, " and whom they 
do not choose they drive away from their country and theii 
poople.'' But this was the last occasion — ^for a long timt 



Ohaf. L] The Subject Countries. 79 

—en vfhich tho Soman senate came forward in the afiairi 
of the East vi ith that ability and energy which it had uni 
formly displayed in the complications with Philip, Antio* 
chus^ and Perseus. Though the internal decline of the 
government was late in afiecting the treatment of foreign 
•flairs, yet it did affect them at length. The government 
became misteady and \ acillating ; they allowed the reins 
which they had just grasped to slacken and almost to slip 
from their hands. The guardian-regent of Syria was mur« 
dered at Laodicea; the rejected pretender Demetrius es- 
caped from Home and, setting aside the youthful prince, 
seized the government of his ancestral kingdom under the 
bold pretext that the Roman senate had fully empowered 
him to do so (592). Soon afterwards war broke 
out between the kings of Egypt and Cyrene re- 
specting the possession of the island of Cyprus, which the 
senate had assigned first to the elder, then to the younger ; 
and in opposition to the most recent Roman decision it 
finally remained with Egypt. Thus the decrees of the Ro- 
man government, in the plenitude of its power and during 
the most profound inward and outward peace at home, were 
derided by the impotent kings of the East ; its name was 
abused, its ward and its commissioner were murdered. 
Seventy years before, when the lUyrians had in a similar 
way laid hands on Roman envoys, the senate of that day 
had erected a monument to the victim in the market-place, 
and had with an army and fleet called the murderers to 
account. The senate of this period likewise ordered a 
monument to be raised to Gnaeus Octavius, as ancestral 
custom prescribed; but instead of embarking troops for 
Syria they recognized Demetrius as king of the land. 
They were foi sooth now so powerful, that it seemed super- 
fluous to guard their own honour. In like manner not only 
was Cyprus retained by Egypt in spite of the decree of the 
senate to the contrary, but, when after the death of Philo- 
metor.(608) Euergetes succeeded him and so 
reunited the divided kingdom, the senate allowed 
this also to talie place without opposition. 



M The Subject Countries. [Book rv 

AfYcr such occurrences the Roman influence in thest 
ludia. countries was practically destroyed, and event* 

^•"*^^*** pursued their course there for the present with, 

out the help of the Romans ; but it is necessary for the 
right understanding of the sequel that we should not wholly 
omit to notice the history of the nearer, and even of th< 
remoter, East. While in Egypt, shut off as it is on all 
sides, the status quo did not so easily admit of change, in 
Asia both to the west and east of the Euphrates the peo- 
ples and states underwent essential modifications during, 
and partly in consequence of, this temporary suspension of 
the Roman superintendence. Beyond the great desert of 
Iran there had arisen not long after Alexander the Great 
the kingdom of Palimbothra under Chandragupta (Sandra* 
cottus) on the Indus, and the powerful Bactrian state on the 
upper Oxus, both formed from a mixture of national ele- 
ments with the most eastern offshoots of Hellenic civiliza- 
tion. 

To the west of these began the kingdom of Asia, which, 
although diminished under Antiochus the Great, 

Decline of 

the kingdom Still stretched Its unwieldv bulk ^om the Hel- 
lespont to the Median and Persian provinces, 
and embraced the whole basin of the Euphrates and Tigris. 
That king had still carried his arms beyond the desert into 
the territory of the Parthians and Bactrians ; it was only 
under him that the vast state had begun to melt away. 
Not only had western Asia been lost in consequence of the 
battle of Magnesia; the total emancipation of the two 
Cappadocias and the two Armenias — Armenia proper in 
the north-east and the region of Sophene in the south-west 
— and their conversion from principalities dependent on 
Syria into independent kingdoms also belong to this period 
(ii. 324). Of these states Great Armenia in particular 
under the Artaxiads, soon attained to a considerable posi- 
tion. Wounds perhaps still more dangerous were inflicted 
on the empire by the foolish levelling . policy of his suc- 
cessor Antiochus Epiphanes (579-590). Al- 
though it was true that his kingdom resembM 



Vmat. L] The Subject Goimtnes, 81 

an aggregation of countries rather than a single state, and 
that the differences of nationality and religion among hit 
subjects placed the most material obstacles in the way of 
the government, yet the plan of introducing throughout hii 
dominions Hellenico-Roman manners and Hellenico-Romau 
worship and of equalizing the various peoples in a political 
as well as a religious point of view was under any circum* 
stances an absurdity ; and all the more so from the faotj 
that this caricatured Joseph II. was personally &r from 
equal to so gigantic an enterprise, and introduced his re- 
forms in the very worst way by plundering temples on the 
greatest scale and insanely persecuting heretics. 

One consequence of this policy was, that the inhabitants 
of the province next to the Egyptian frontier, 
the Jews, a people formerly submissive even to 
humility and extremely active and industrious, were driven 
by systematic religious persecution to open re- 
volt (about 587). The matter came to the sen- 
ate ; and, as it was just at that time with good reason in- 
dignant at Demetrius Soter and apprehensive of a combina- 
tion between the Attalids and Seleucids, while the establislt- 
ment of a power intermediate between Syria and Egypt 
was at any rate for the interest of Rome, it made no di0i< 
culty in at once recognizing the freedom and autonomy of 
the insurgent nation (about 598). Nothing, 
however, was done by Rome for the Jews ex- 
cept what coiild be done without personal exertion : in 
spite of the clause of the treaty concluded between the Ro- 
mans and the Jews which promised Roman aid to the iattor 
In the event of their being attacked, and in spite of the in- 
junction addressed to the kings of Syria and Egypt not to 
march their troops through Judaea, it was of course entirely 
leAi to the Jews themselves to hold their ground against the 
Syrian kings. The brave and prudent conduct of the insur- 
rection by the heroic house of die Maccabees and the inter- 
nal dissension in the Syrian empire did more for them than 
the letters of their powerful allies; during the strife be- 
tween the Syrian kings Trypho and Demetrius Nicator 
Vol. 1X1.-4* 



82 The Svbject Oouniries. [Bo<xk If 

autonomy and exemption from tribute were formally ao 
corded to the Jews (612) ; and soon afterwardi 
the bead of the Maccabaean bouse, Simon son 
of Mattathias, was even formally acknowledged by the na* 
tion as well as by the great king of Syria hi 
high priest and prince of Israel (615).* 
Of still more importance in the sequel than this insur- 
rection of the Israelites was the contemporary 
chUm en^ movement — probably originating from the same 
^^^ cause— in the eastern provinces, where Antioohus 

Epiphanes emptied the temples of the Persian gods just as 
he had emptied that at Jerusalem, and doubtless accorded 
DO better treatment to the adherents of Ahuramazda and 
Mithra than to those of Jehovah. Just as in Judaea — only 
with a wider range and ampler proportions — the result was 
a reaction on the part of the native manners and the native 
religion against Hellenism and the Hellenic gods ; the pro- 
moters of this movement were the Parthians, and out of it 
arose the great Parthian empire. The " Parthwa," or Par- 
thians, who are early met with as one of the numerous 
tribes merged in the great Persian empire, living first of all 
in the modern Rhorasan to the south-east of the Caspian 
sea, appear after 500 as an independent state 
under the Scythian, t. e., Turanian, dynasty of 
the Arsacidae. This state, however, only emei^ed from its 
obscurity about a century afterwards. The sixth Arsaces, 
17»-18«. Mithradates L (579 ?-618 ?), was the real founder 

of the great Parthian power. The Bactrian em- 
pire, in itself Edkr more powerful, but already shaken to the 
Tery foundation partly by hostilities with the hordes of 
Scythian horsemen from Turan and with the states of the 
Indus, partly by internal disorders, succumbed to him. He 
•ohieved almost equal successes in the countries to the west 

* From him proceed the coins with the iDScription "Shekel of 
Israel," and the date of the *' holy Jerusalem," or the " deliverance of 
Bion." The similar coins with the name of Simon, the prince (Kessi) 
of Israel, belong not to him, but to Bar-Gochba the leader of the bvBur 
gents in the time of Hadrian. 



Chap. I.] Tlis SfJjject Countries. 83 

of the great desert. The Syrian empire waa just then ib 
the utmost disorganization, partly through the failure of ihfi^ 
Ilellenizing attempts of AutiochusEpiphanes, partly through 
the troubles as to the succession that occurred aHer his 
death ; and the provinces of the interior were in full cours« 
of breaking off from Antioch and the region of the coast. 
In Commagene for instance, the most northerly province of 
Syria on the Gappadocian frontier, the satrap Ptolemaeus 
asserted his independence, as did also on the opposite bank 
of the Euphrates the prince of Edessa in northern Mesopo* 
tamia or the province of Osroene, and the satrap Timardius 
in the important province of Media ; in fact the latter got 
his independence confirmed by the Roman senate, and, sup- 
ported by Armenia as his ally, ruled as far down as Seleu- 
cia on the Tigris, Disorders of this sort were permanent 
features of the Asiatic empire : the provinces under their 
partially or wholly independent satraps were in continual 
revolt, as was also the capital veith its insubordinate and re- 
fractory populace resembling that of Rome or Alexandria. 
The whole pack of neighbouring kings — those of Egypt, 
Armenia, Cappadocia, Pergamus — incessantly interfered in 
the affairs of Syria and fostered disputes as to the succes- 
sion, so that civil war and the division of the sovereignty 
de facto among two or more pretenders became almost 
standing calamities of the country. The Roman protecting 
power, if it did not instigate these neighbours, was an in- 
active spectator. In addition to all this the new Parthian 
^npire from the eastward pressed hard on the aliens not 
merely with its material power, but with the whole supe- 
riority of its national language and religion and of \ts na- 
tional military and political organization. This is not yet 
iho place for a description of the revived empire of Cyrus ; 
.It is sufficient to mention generally the &ct that powerful as 
was the influence of Hellenism in its composition, the Par- 
thian state, as compared with that of the Seleucidae, was 
based on a national and religious reaction, and that the old 
Iranian language, the order of the Magi and the worship of 
Mithra, the oriental feudal constitution, the cavalry of thf 



W The Subject Countries. [Book IT 

desert and the bow aud arrow, first emerged there in rei 
newed and triumphant opposition to Hellenism. The jon- 
tion of the kings of Syria in presence of all this was really 
pitiable. The family of the Seleucidae was by no meacf 
so enervated as that of the Lagidae for instance, and some 
of them were not deficient in valour and ability ; they re- 
duced, it may be, one or another of those numerous rebels, 
pretenders, and intermeddlers to order ; but their dominion 
had so little of a firm foundation that it was unable to im- 
pose even a temporary check on anarchy. The result was 
inevitable. The eastern provinces of Syria under their un« 
protected or even insurgent satraps fell into subjection to 
the Parthians; Persia, Babylonia, Media were for ever 
severed from the Syrian empire ; the new state of the Par- 
thians reached on both sides of the great desert from the 
Oxus and the Hindoo Coosh to the Tigris and the desert of 
Arabiar— ^nco more, like the Persian empire and all the 
older great states of Asia, a pure continental monarchy, and 
once more, just like the Persian empire, engaged in per- 
petual feud on the one side with the peoples of Turan, on 
the other with the Occidentals. The Syrian state embraced 
at the most Mesopotamia in addition to the region of the 
coast, and disappeared, more in consequence of its internal 
disorganization than of its diminished size, for ever from 
the ranks of the great states. If the danger — which was 
repeatedly imminent-— of a total subjugation of the land by 
the Parthians was averted, that result must be ascribed not 
to the resistance of the last Seleucidae and still less to the 
influence of Rome, but rather to the manifold internal dis- 
turbances in the Parthian empire itself, and above ail to the 
incursions of the peoples of the Turanian bteppes into iti 
eastern provinces. 

This revolu^iion m the relations of the peoples in the 
...eaetion of interior of Asia is the turning-point in the hi» 
uA^t Uie ^^y ^^ antiquity. The tide of national move 
^•^ ment, which had hitherto poured from the west 

to the east and had found in Alexander the Great its last 
and highest exp7?s6ion, was followed by the ebb. On tht 



Chip. I.] The Subject Cotmtries. Sf 

establishment of the Parthian state not only were such Hel* 
lenic elements as may still perhaps have been preserved in 
Bactria and along the Indus lost, but western Iran also re 
lapsed into the track which had been abandoned for centu- 
ries but still was not yet obliterated. The Roman senate 
sacrifioed the first essential result of the policy of Alex 
ander, and thereby paye4 the way for that retrograde move 
ment| whose last ofishoots ended in the Alhambra of Gra- 
nada and in the great Mosque of Ck)nstantinople. So long 
as the country from Ragae and Persepolis to the Mediter^ 
ranean obeyed the king of Autioch, the power of Rome 
extended to the border of the great desert ; the Parthian 
state could never take its place among the dependencies of 
the Mediterranean empire, not because it was so very pow- 
erful, but because it had its centre far from the coast in the 
interior of Asia. Since the time of Alexander the world 
had obeyed the Occidentals alone, and the East seemed to 
be for these merely what America and Australia afterwards 
became for the Europeans. With Mithradates I. the East 
re-entered the sphere of political movement. The worli 
had again two masters. 

It remains that we glance at the maritime relations of 
Maritime ^^^^ period ; although there is hardly anything 
relations. ^ -^^ g^y^ except that there no longer existed 

anywhere a naval power. Carthage was annihilated ; the 
war-fleet of Syria was destroyed in accordance with the 
treaty ; the war-marine of Egypt, once so powerful, was 
under its present indolent rulers in deep decay. The minor 
states, and particularly the mercantile cities, had doubtless 
some armed transports ; but these were not even adequate 
for tka task — so difficult in the Mediterranean — of repress 
ing piracy Thii task necessarily devolved or« 
Rome as the leading power in the Mediter 
ranean. While a century previously the Romans had cori« 
forward in this matter with especial and salutary vigour 
and had in particular introduced their supremacy in the 
East by a maritime police energet «ally handled for the 
general good (ii. 91), the complete i uUity of this police al 



te The Subf'ect Coun:ries. [Book n 

the very beginning of this period is a distinct indication ci 
the futrfiilJy rapid decline of the aristocratic government 
Rome no longer possessed a fleet of her own ; she was con 
tent tc make requisitions for ships, when it seemed nece» 
■ar}', from the maritime towns of Italy, Asia Minor, and 
elsewhere. The consequence naturally was, that buccaneer- 
b^g became organized and consolidated. Something, per- 
haps, though not enough, was done towards its suppression, 
so &r as the direct power of the Romans extended, in tha 
Adriatic and Tyrrhene seas. The expeditions directed 
against the Dalmatian and Ligurian coasts at this epo6tk 
aimed more especially at the suppression of piracy in the 
two Italian seas ; for the same reason the Balearic islands 
were occupied in 631 (p. 32). But in the Mau- 
retanian and Greek waters the inhabitants along 
the coast and the mariners were left to settle matters with 
the corsairs in one way or another, as they best could ; for 
Roman policy adhered to the principle of troubling itself 
as little as possible about these more remote regions. The 
disorganized and bankrupt commonwealths in the states 
along the coast thus left to themselves naturally became 
places of refuge for the corsairs ; and there was no want of 
such, more especially in Asia. 

A bad pre-eminence in this respect belonged to Crete, 
which, from its favourable situation and the 
weakness or laxity of the great states of the 
West and East, was the only one of all th<^ Greek settle- 
ments that had preserved its independence. Roman com- 
missioners doubtless came and went to the island, but ao> 
oompiished still less there than they did even m Syria and 
Egypt It seemed almost as if fate had left liberty to the 
Cretans only in order to show what was tiie result of Hel- 
lenic independence. It was a dreadful picture. The old 
Doric rigour of the Cretan institutions had become just as 
in Tarentum changed into a licentious democracy, and th« 
chivalrous spirit of the inhabitants into a wild love of quar 
relling and plunder ; a respectable Greek himself testifies^ 
that in Crete alone nothing was accounted disgraceful that 



Chap. L] The Subject Countries. 87 

was lucrative, and even the Apostle Paul (quotes with ap 
proval the saying of a Cretan poet, 

I^erpetual civil \{ ars, notwithstanding the Roman efforts tc 
bring about peace, converted one flourishing township after 
another on the old '^ island of the hundred cities " into 
heaps of ruins. Its inhabitants roamed as robbers at home 
and abroad, by land and by sea ; the island became the re* 
oruiting ground for the surrounding kingdoms after that 
evil was no longer tolerated in the Peloponnesus, and above 
all the true seat of piracy ; about this period, for instance, 
the island of Siphnus was thoroughly pillaged by a fleet of 
Cretan corsairs. Rhodes — which, besides, was unable to 
recover from the loss of its possessions on the mainland 
and from the blows inflicted on its commerce (ii. 363) — ex- 
pended its last energies in the wars which it found itself 
oompelled to wage against the Cretans for the suppression 
of piracy (about 600), and in which the Romans 
sought to mediate, but without earnestness and 
apparently without success. 

Along with Crete, Cilicia soon began to become a second 
home for this buccaneering system. Piracy 
there not only gained ground owing to the im- 
potence of the Syrian rulers, but the usurper Diodotus 
Tryphon, who had risen from a slave to be king of Syric 
(606-615), encouraged it by all means in its 
diief seat, the rugged or western Cilicia, with a 
view to strengthen his throne by the aid of the corsairs. 
The uncommonly lucrative character of the traffic with the 
pirates, who were at once the principal captors of, and deal- 
ers in, slaves, procured for them among the mercantile pub- 
lic, even in Alexandria, Rhodes, and Delos, a certain tolera> 
tion, in which the very governments sympathized at least 
by inaction. The evil was so serious that the senate, about 
611, sent its best man Scipio Aemilianus to 
Alexandria and Syria, in order to ascertain oc 
the spot what oould be done with it But diplomatic rep 



88 The Sutged Countnes. [Book TV 

retentatioMS b^ the Romans did not make weak govenii 
ments strong ; there was no other remedy but that of di* 
rectly maintaining a fleet in these waters, and for this the 
Roman government lacked energy and perseverance. So 
all things just remained on the old footing ; the piratic fleet 
was the only considerable naval power in the Mediter- 
ranean ; the capture of men was the only trade that flour- 
ished there. The Roman government was an onlooker; 
but the Roman merchants, as the best customers in tiie 
iilave market^ kept up an active and friendly traffic with the 
pirate captains, as the most important wholesale dealers in 
that commodity, at Delos and elsewhere. 

We have followed the transformation of the outward 
General relations of Rome and the Romano-Hellenio 

'^°**' world generally in its leading outlines, from the 

battle of Pydna to the period of the Gracchi, from the 
Tagus and the Bagradas to the Nile and the Euphrates. It 
was a great and difficult problem which Rome undertook, 
when she undertook to govern this Romano- Hellenic world ; 
it was not wholly misunderstood, but it was by no means 
solved. The untenableness of the idea of Cato's time — ^that 
the state should be limited to Italy, and that its rule beyond 
Italy should be only a protectorate — was doubtless discerued 
by the leading men of the following generation ; and the 
necessity of substituting for this protectorate a direct sove- 
reignty of Rome, that should preserve the liberties of the 
communities, was doubtless recognized. But instead of 
carrying out this new arrangement firir iy, speedily, and 
uniformly, they annexed isolated provinces just as con- 
venience, caprice, collateral advantage, or accident led them 
to do so ; whereas the greater portion of the dependent 
states either remained in the intolerable uncertainty of their 
former position, or even, as was the case with Syria espe* 
eially, withdrew entirely from the influence of Rome. And 
even the government itself degenerated more and more into 
a feeble and short-sighted selfishness. They were content 
with governing from one day to another, and merely tran* 
acting the current business as exigency required. Thf^f 



Chap. I] The Subject Countries. 89 

were steTii masters towards the weak. When the free city 
of Mylasa in Caria sent to Pubiius Crassus, con- 
sul in 623, a beam for the construction of a 
battering-ram different from what he had asked, the chief 
nuigistrate of the town was scourged for it ; aod Crassus 
iras not a bad man, and a strictly upright magistrate. On 
the other hand sternness was wanting in those cases whera 
it would have been in place, as in dealing with the barbari- 
ans on the frontiers and the pirates. When the central 
government renounced all superintendence and all oversight 
of provincial affairs, it entirely abandoned not only the in« 
terests of the subjects, but also those of the state, to the 
governor of the day. The events which occurred in Spain, 
unimportant in themselves, are instructive in this respect. 
In that country, where the government was less able than 
in other provinces to' confine itself to the part of a mere 
onlooker, the law of nations was directly trampled under 
foot by the Roman governors ; and the honour of Rome 
was permanently dragged in the mire by a perfidy and 
faithlessness without parallel, by the most wanton trifling 
with capitulations and treaties, by massacring people who 
had submitted and instigating the assassination of the gene* 
rals of the enemy. Nor was this all ; war was even waged 
and peace concluded against the expressed will of the su- 
preme authority in Rome, and unimportant incidenUj, such 
as the disobedience of the Numantines, were developed by 
a rare combination of perversity and folly into a ciisis of 
&tal moment for the state. And all this took place with- 
out any effort to visit it with even a serious penalty in 
Rome. The sympathies and rivalries of the different co* 
teries in the senate contributed to determine the filling up 
of the most important places and the treatment of the most 
momentous political questions; and even thus early the 
money of foreign dynasts found its way to the senators of 
Borne. Timarchus, the envoy of Antiochus Epiphanes 
king of Syria (+590), is mentioned as the first 
who attempted with success to bribe the Romaa 
senate ; the bestowal of presents fk'om foreign kings on in 



90 The Subject Countries. [Book IV 

fluential senators soon became so common, that surprise waa 
excited when Scipio Aemilianus cast into the military chest 
the gifts from the king of Syria which reached him in camp 
before Numantia. The ancient principle, that rule was its 
own sole reward and that such rule was as much a duty and 
% burden as a privilege and a benefit, was allowed to fall 
wholly into abeyance. Thus there arose the new political 
economy which desisted from the taxation of the burgesses, 
but regarded the body of subjects, on the other hand, as a 
profitable possession of the community, which it partly 
worked out for the public benefit, partly handed over to be 
worked out by the burgesses. Not only was free scope 
allowed with criminal indulgence to the unscrupulous greed 
of the Roman merchant in the provincial administration, 
but even the commercial rivals who were disagreeable to 
him were cleared away by the armies of the state, and the 
most glorious cities of neighbouring lands were sacrificed, 
not to the barbarism of the lust of power, but to the far 
more horrible barbarism of speculation. By the ruin of 
the earlier military organization, which certainly imposed 
heavy burdens on the burgesses, the state, which was solely 
dependent in the last resort on its military superiority, un* 
dermined its own support. The fleet was allowed to go to 
ruin ; the system of land warfare fell into the most incredi- 
ble decay. The duty of guarding the Asiatic and African 
frontiers was devolved on the subjects ; and what could not 
be so devolved, such as the defence of the frontier in Italy, 
Macedonia, and Spain, was managed after the most wretched 
fashion. The better classes began to disappear so much 
from the army, that it was already difficult to raise the 
necessary number of officers for the Spanish armies. The 
daily increasing aversion to the Spanish war-service in par> 
Ucular, combined with the partiality shown by the magis 
trates in the levy, rendered it necessary in 602 
to abandon the old practice of leaving the seleo 
tion of t/ie requisite number of soldiers from the men liable 
to serve to the free discretion of the officers, and to substi* 
tute for it a drawing of the necessary number by ballot,-* 



Obap. I.] Tlie Subject Co%mt/ries 91 

certainly not to the advantage of the military e9p: it (ft 
eorpSy or of the warlike efficiency of the individual divi- 
sions. The authorities, instead of acting with vigour and 
strictness, extended their pitiful flattery of the people even 
to this field ; whenever a consul in the discharge of his 
juty instituted rigorous levies for the Spanish service, the 
tribunes made use of their constitutional right to arrest 
him (603, 616) ; and it has been already ob- 
served, that Scipio's request that he should be 
allowed a levy for the Numantine war was directly rejected 
by the senate. Accordingly the Roman armies before Car- 
thage or Numantia already remind one of those Syrian 
armies, in which the number of bakers, cooks, actors, and 
other non-combatants exceeded fourfold that of the so-called 
soldiers ; already the Roman generals are little behind their 
Carthaginian colleagues in the art of destroying armies, and 
the wars in Africa as in Spain, in Macedonia as in Asia, are 
regularly opened with defeats ; the murder of Gnaeus 
Octavius is now passed over in silence ; the assassination 
of Viriathus is now a masterpiece of Roman diplomacy ; 
the conquest of Numantia is now a great achievement. 
How completely the idea of national and manly honour was 
already lost among the Romans, was shown with epigram- 
matic point by the statue of the stripped and bound Man- 
dnus, which he himself, proud of his patriotic devotedness, 
caused to be erected in Rome. Wherever we turn our 
eyes, we find the internal energy as well as the external 
power of Rome rapidly on the decline. The ground won 
in gigantic struggles is not extended, nor in fact even main^ 
tained, in this period of peace. The government of the 
world, difficult in the attaiimient, was still more difficult in 
ihxi preservation; the Roman senate bad mattered the 
former task, but it broke down under the latter. 



CHAPTER n. 

ffHB ftBFORM MOVXMSNT AHD TIBSRII78 GRAOCHinL 

For a whole generation after the battle of Pydna vhi 
RoBmn ^'^^^ 8ta,te enjoyed a profound calm, scarcely 
MTenunent varied by a ripple here and there on the surfaoa 
period of tbe Its dominion extended over the three continentt^; 
the lustre of the Roman power and the glory 
of the Roman name were constantly on the increase ; all 
eyes rested on Italy, all talents and all riches flowed thither ; 
it seemed as if a golden age of peaceful prosperity and in- 
tellectual enjoyment of life could not but there begin. The 
Orientals of this period told each other with astonishment 
of the mighty republic of the West, " which subdued king- 
doms far and near, so that every one who heard its name 
trembled ; but which kept good &ith with its friends and 
clients. Such was the glory of the Romans, and yet no one 
Hsurped the crown and no one glittered in purple dress ; 
but they obeyed whomsoever from year to year they made 
their master, and there was among them neither envy nor 
discord." 

So it seemed at a distance; matters wore a different 
BpreAdof aspect on a closer view. The government of 
^*^y* the aristocracy was in full train to destroy its 

own work. Not that the sons and grandsons of the vao- 
quished at Cannae and the victors of Zama had so utterly 
degenerated from their fathers and grandfathers ; the differ- 
ence was not so much in the men who now sat in the senate 
as in the times. Where a limited number of old families 
of established wealth and hereditary political importance 
conducts the government, it will display in seasons of dan« 
ger an incomparable tenacity of purpose and power of 



(kuvi I1.J The Reform M<yoemenL 98 

heroic self-sacrifioe, just as in seasons of tranquility it will 
be ahortrsighted, selfish, and negligent — the germs of botfc 
results are essentially involved in its hereditary and col- 
legiate character. The morbid matter had been long ir 
existence, but it needed the sun of prosperity to develop it. 
There was a profound meaning in the question of Cato, 
" What was to become of Eome when she should no longe? 
have any state to fear 1 " That point had now been reached 
Every neighbour whom she might have feared was politi- 
cally annihilated ; and of the men who had been reared 
under the old order of things in the severe school of the 
Haooibalic war, and whose words still sounded as echoes of 
that mighty epoch so long as they survived, death called 
one afber another away, till at length the voice of the last 
of them, the veteran Cato, ceased to be heard in the senate- 
house and in the Forum. A younger generation came to 
he helm, and their policy was a sorry answer to that ques- 
tion of the veteran patriot. We have already spoken of 
the shape which the government of the subjects and the 
external policy of Rome assumed in their hands. In inters 
nal affairs they were, if possible, still more disposed to let 
the ship drive before the wind : if we understand by inter- 
nal government more than the transaction of current busi< 
ness, there was at this period no government in Bome at 
all. The single leading thought of the governing corpora* 
tion was the maintenance and, if possible, the increase of 
their usurped privileges. It was not the state that had a 
title to get the right and best man for its supreme magis- 
tracy ; but every member of the coterie had an. inborn 
Utile to the highest office of the state— a title not to be 
prejudiced by the unfair rivalry of his peers or by the en 
croachments of the excluded. Accordingly the c]i«iue prf> 
posed to itself, as its most important political aim, the 
restriction of re-election to the consulship and the exclusion 
of ^ new \nen ; *' * and in &ct it succeeded in ootaining th« 

* In 68Y the law restricting re-election to the consulBhip was sus 
p<>nded during the continutnoe of the war in Italy, that is, down to 561 



9i The Jlefarm Movement [Book iv, 

legal prohibition of the former about 603, and 
contented itself with a government of aristo- 
cratic nobodies. Even the inaction of the government in 
Its outward relations was doubtless connected with this 
policy of the nobility, exclusive towards commoner^ and 
distrustful towards the individual members of tlieir own 
order. By no surer means could they keep commoners, 
whose deeds were their patent of nobility, aloof from the 
pure circles of the aristocracy than by giving no oppoi> 
tunity to any one to perform deeds at all ; to the existing 
government of general mediocrity even an aristocratic con« 
queror of Syria or Egypt would have proved extremely 
inconvenient. 

It is true that now also there was no want of opposition, 
and it was even to a certain extent efiectuaL 
^^^tsat rpjj^ administration of justice was improved, 
^manent rj^^ administrative jurisdiction, which the senate 
riaS^ exercised either personally or by extraordinary 
commissions, as occasion required, over the pro- 
vincial magistrates, was confessedly inadequate. It was an 
innovation with a momentous bearing on the whole public 
life of the Roman community, when in 605, on 
the proposal of Lucius Calpumius Piso, a stand- 
ing senatorial commission {qtiaesiio ordinaria) was insti- 
tuted to try in judicial form the complaints of the provin- 
cials regarding the extortion of their Roman magiscrates. 
An effort was made to emancipate the comitia from the 

(it 884 ; Liv. xxvii 6). But aSter the death of Mareellus in 646 r^ 
elections to the conBulship, if we do not include the abdicating oonBiik 
of 592, onlj occurred in the years 647, 564, 660, 679, 686, 686, 691, 
696, 699, 602 ; consequently not oftener in those fifty-six years than, 
for instance, in the ten years 401-410. Only one of these, and thit 
the very last, took pkce in violation of the ten years' interval (L 403) ; 
and beyond doubt the singular election of Marcus Mareellus who wai 
consul in 688 and 699 to a third consulship in 602, with the special cir- 
cumstances of which we are not acquainted, gave occasion to the law 
prohibiting rc-electicn to the consulship altogether (Liv. Ep. 66) ; e» 
pcdally as this proposal must have been introduced before 006, seeing 
that it WIS supported by Cato (p. 56, Jordan). 



Obap. n.] And Tiberius Oracchua. 95 

Vote by preponderating influence of the aristocracy, Tlie 
^■^^^ panacea of Roman democracy was vote by bal- 

lot in the assemblies of the burgesses, which was intro- 
duced first for the elections of magistrates by 
*••• the Gabinian law (615), then for the public trl« 

W. bunals by the Cassian law (017), lastly foi the 

voting on legislative proposals by the Papirian 
isi law (623). In a similar way soon afterwards 

Ug. (about 626) the senators were by decree of the 

Ezciosioii oi people enjoined to surrender their public horse 
^inTffe^*" on admission to the senate, and thereby to re- 
cSSSwf nounce their privilege of voting in the eighteen 
equestrian centuries (ii. 379). These measuret^ 
directed to the emancipation of the electors from the rulin^^ 
aristocratic order, may perhaps have seemed to the party 
which suggested them the first steps towards a regeneration 
of the state ; in fact they made not the sliglitest change !» 
the nullity and want of freedom of the legally supreme 
organ of the Roman community ; indeed that nullity wa« 
only the more palpably evinced to all whom it did or did 
not concern. Equally ostentatious and equally empty was 
the formal recognition accorded to the independence and 
sovereignty of the burgesses by the transference of their 
place of assembly from the old Comitium below 
the senate-house to the Foruni (about 009). 
But this hostility between the formal sovereignty of the 
The public people and the practically subsisting constitu- 
•leetbnu. (jJq^ ^y^g j^ great part a semblance. Party 
phrases were in free circulation : of the parties themselves 
there was little trace in matters really and directly practi- 
cal. Throughout the whole seventh century the annual 
public elections to the civil magistracies, especially to the 
consulship and censorship, formed the real standing question 
of the day and the focus of political agitation ; but it wa« 
only in Isolated and rare instances that the diflerent candi* 
dates represented opposite political principles ; ordinarily 
die question related purely to persons, and it was for tho 
eonrse of affairs a matter of indifference whether the major* 



f)6 The Reform Movement [Book V9 

ity of the votes fell to a Caecilian or to a Cornelian. Tlic 
Romans thus lacked that which outweighs and compensate! 
all the evils of party-life — the free and common movement 
of the masses towards what they discern as a befitting aim 
—and yet endured all those evils solely for the benefit of 
the paltry game of the ruling coteries. It was company 
tively easy for the Roman noble to enter on the career of 
oflice as quaestor or tribune of the people ; but the consul- 
ship and the censorship were attainable by him only through 
great exertions prolonged for years. The prizes were 
many, but those really worth having were few ; the com- 
petitors ran, as a Roman poet once said, as it were ofer a 
race-course wide at the starting-point but gradually narrow- 
ing its dimensions. This was right, so long as the magis- 
tracy was — what it was called — an " honour " and men of 
military, political, or juristic ability were rival competitors 
for the rare chaplets ; but now the practical exclusiveness 
of the nobility did away with the benefit of competition, 
and lefl only its disadvantages. With few exceptions the 
young men belonging to the ruling fiimilies crowded into 
the political career, and their impetuous and premature am- 
bition soon caught at means more effective than useful action 
for the public good. The first requisite for a public career 
came to be powerful connections ; and therefore that career 
began, not as formerly in the camp, but in the anto-cham« 
bers of influential men. A new and genteel body of clientu 
now undertook — ^what had formerly been done only by de- 
pendents and freedmen — to come and wait on their patron 
early in the morning, and to appear publicly in his train. 
But the populace also was a great lord, and desired as such 
to receive attention. The rabble began to demand as its 
right that the future consul should recognize and honour the 
sovereign people in every ragged idler of the street, and 
that every candidate should in his " going round " {ambiti^s) 
salute every individual voter by name and press his hand. 
The world of quality readily entered into this degrading 
canvass. The true candidate cringed not only in the palace, 
but also on the street, and recommended himself to thf 



Gbap. It And Tiherivs Oraee/ius. J97 

multitude by flattering attentions, indulgences, and civilities 
more or less refined. Demagogism and the cry for reforms 
were sedulously employed to attract the notice and favour 
of the public ; and they were the more effective, the more 
they attacked not things but persons. It became the cus- 
tom for beardless youths of genteel birth to introduce them* 
•elves with ielat into public life by playing afresh the pari 
of Cato with the immature passion of their boyish elo- 
qiienoe, and by constituting and proclaiming themselves 
sUte-prosocutors, if possible, against some man of very 
high standing and very great unpopularity ; the Romans 
suffered the grave institutions of criminal justice and of 
political police to become a means of soliciting office. The 
provision or, what was still worse, the promise of magnifi- 
cent popular amusemente had long been the, as it were 
l^al, prerequisite to the obtaining of the consulship (ii. 
409) ; now the votes of the electors began to be directly 
purchased with money, as is shown by the prohibition 
issued against this about 595. Pwhaps the 
worst consequence of the continual courting of 
the favour of the multitude by the ruling aristocracy was 
the incompatibility of such a begging and fawning part with 
the position which the government should rightfully occupy 
in relation to the governed. The government was thus con 
verted from a blessing into a curse for the people. They 
no longer ventured to dispose of the property and blood of 
the burgesses, as exigency required, for the good of their 
oountry. They allowed the burgesses to become habituated 
to the dangerous idea that they were legally exempt from 
the payment of direct taxes even by way of advance-*-afler 
the war with Perseus no further advance was asked from 
the community. They allowed their military system to 
decay rather than compel the burgesses to enter the odious 
transmarine service ; how it &red with the individual magis* 
trates who attempted to carry out the conscription accord* 
ing to the strict letter of the law, has already been related 
(p. 91). 

In the Rome of this epoch the two evils of a dogenerati 

Vol. IIL— f) 



98 The Befarm Movement [Book iv 

oligarchy and a democracy still undeveloped but 
■SdB^ already cankered in the bud were interwoven ia 



a manner pregnant with fiital results. Accord- 
ing to their party names, which were first heard during this 
period, the ^ Optimates " wished to give effect to the wOl 
of the best, the ** Populares " to that of the oommunitjr ; 
but in &ct there was in the Rome of that day neither a true 
aristocraoy nor a truly selMetermining community. Both 
parties contended alike for shadows, and numbered in their 
ranks none but enthusiasts ' or hypocrites. Both were 
equally afiS^cted by political corruption, and both were in 
fiwt equally worthless. Both were necessarily tied down to 
the statuB gttOj for neither on the one side nor on the other 
was there found any political idea — to say nothing of any 
political plan — reaching beyond the existing state of things ; 
and accordingly the two parties were so entirely in agree* 
ment that they met at every step as respected both means 
and ends, and a change of party was a change of political 
tactics more than of political sentiments. The common- 
wealth would beyond doubt have been a gainer, if either 
the aristocracy had directly introduced a here<)itary rota- 
tion instead of election by the burgesses, or the democracy 
had produced from within it a real demagogic government. 
But these Optimates and these Populares of the beginning 
of the seventh century were far too indispensable for each 
other to wage such internecine war ; they not only could 
not destroy eadi other, but, even if they had been able to 
do so, they would not have been willing. Meanwhile the 
commonwealth was politically and morally more and more 
unhinged, and was veiling towards utter disorganization. 
The crisis with which the Roman revolution was opened 

flflirfia ArisiB. *^*^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^^ ^^® paltry political conflict, but 
out of the economic and social relations which 
the Roman government allowed, like everything else, sim- 
ply to take their course, and which thus found opportunity 
to bring the morbid matter, that had been long fermenting; 
without hindrance and with fearful rapidity and violence, to 
malurilgr. From a very early period the Roman ecoi.om^ 



CiAF. U] And Tiberim Graccku9. 9S 

was baaed ou the two factors — always in quest of each 
other, and always at variance— *the husbandry of the small 
farmer and the money of the capitalist. The latter in the 
dosest alliance with landholding on a great scale had already 
for centuries waged against the farmer-class a war, which 
seemed as though it could not but terminate in the destruo 
tion first of the formers and thereafter of the whole com 
monwealthi but was broken off without being properly d» 
dded in consequence of the successful wars and the compre^ 
hensive and ample distribution of domains for which these 
wars gave facilities. It has already been shown (ii. 441* 
•148) that in the same age, which renewed the distinction 
between patricians and plebeians under altered names, the 
disproportionate accumulation of capital was preparing a 
second assault on the farming system. It is true that the 
method was different. Formerly the small farmer had 
been ruined by advances of money, which practically re- 
duced him to be the mere steward of his creditor ; now he 
was crushed by the competition of transmarine, and espe- 
cially of slave^rown, com. The capitalists kept pace with 
the times ; capital, while waging war against labour or in 
other words against the liberty of the person, of course as 
it had always done under the strictest form of law, waged 
it no longer in the unseemly fashion which converted the 
free man on account of debt into a slave, but, on the con- 
trary, with slaves regularly bought and paid ; the former 
usurer of the capital appeared in a shape conformable to 
the times as the owner of industrial plantations. But the 
ultimate result was in both cases the same — the deprecia> 
tion of the Italian farms ; the supplanting of the petty hu» 
bandry, first in a part of the provinces and then in Italy, 
by the fiurming of large estates ; the prevailmg tendency to 
devote the latter in Italy to the rearing of cattle and the 
culture of the olive and vine ; finally, the replacing of the 
free labourers iu the provinces as in Italy by slaves. Just 
M the nobility was more dangerous than the patriciate, be- 
cause the former could not like the latter be set aside by a 
change of the constitution ; so this new power of capital 



loo ITie Jtefarm Moviment [Book n 

was more dangerous than that of the fourth and fifth oeni 
tunes, because nothing could be done to oppose it bj 
diauges in the law of the land. 

Before we attempt to describe the conrse of this second 
irreat conflict between labour and capital, \t is 
ttrcoDM- necessary to give here some indication of the 
******* nature and extent of the system of slavery. 
Vl e haye not now to do with the old, in some measure in* 
nocent, rural slavery, under which the farmer either tilled 
the field along with his slave, or, if he possessed more land 
than he could manage, placed the slave — either as steward 
or as a sort of lessee obliged to render up a portion of the 
produce— over a detached farm (i. 255). Such relations no 
doubt existed at all times — around Comum, for instance, 
they were still the rule in the time of the empire — ^but aa 
exceptional features in privileged districts and on humanely 
managed estates. What we now refer to is the system of 
slavery on a great scale, which in the Roman state, as foi* 
merly in the Carthaginian, grew out of the ascendancy of 
capital. While the captives taken in war and the heredi- 
tary transmission of slavery sufficed to keep up the stock 
of slaves during the earlier period, this system of slavery 
was, just like that of America, based on the methodically 
prosecuted hunting of man ; for, owing to the manner in 
which slaves were used with little regard to their life or 
propagation, the slave population was constantly on the 
wane, and even the wars which were always furnishing 
fresh masses to the slave market were not sufficient to cover 
the deficit. No country where this species of game could 
be hunted remained exempt from visitation ; even in Italy 
it was a thing by no means unheard of, that the poor free- 
man was placed by his employer among the slaves. But 
the Negroland of that period was western Asia,* where the 

* It was asserted even then, that the huiuan race hi that qnarlef 
was pre-eminently fitted for slavery by its lepecial power of enduranee 
Flautus (Zrtn. 542) commends the Syrians : ffemu quod patUniunnnm 
49t /tomtfmm* 



Chap, a] And Tiberius Oraco?ias. 101 

Cretan and Cilieian corsairs, the real professional siav» 
hunters and slave-dealers, robbed the coasts of Syria and 
the Gh*eek islands; and where, emulating their feats, th« 
Roman revenue-farmers instituted human hunts in the oU 
ent states and incorporated those ivhom they captured 
among their slaves. This was done to such an extent, thai 
about 650 the king of Bithynia declared him- 
self unable to furnish the required contingent, 
because all the people capable of labour had been dragged 
off from ' his kingdom by the revenue-farmers. At the 
great slave market in Delos, where the slave-dealers of Asia 
Minor disposed of their wares to Italian speculators, on one 
day as many as 10,000 slaves are said to have been disem- 
barked in the morning and to have been all sold before 
evening-— a proof at once how enormous was the number 
of slaves delivered, and how, notwithstanding, the demand 
atill exceeded the supply. It was no wonder. Already in 
describing the Roman economy of the sixth century we 
have explained that it was based, like all the great dealings 
of antiquity generally, on the employment of slaves (ii. 
434 et seg, 451).. In whatever direction speculation applied 
itself its instrument was invariably man reduced in law to 
the status of a beast of burden. Trades were in great part 
carried on by slaves, so that the proceeds belonged to the 
master. The levying of the public revenues in the lower 
departments was regularly conducted by the slaves of the 
associations that leased them. Servile hands performed the 
operations of mining, making pitch, and others of a similar 
kind ; it became early the custom to send herds of slavea 
to the Spanish mines, whose superintendents readily re> 
oeived them and paid a high rent for them. The vine and 
olive harvest in Italy was not conducted by the people on 
the estate, but was contracted for by a slave-owner. Tlie 
tending of cattle was universally performed by slaves. 
We have already mentioned the armed, and frequently 
mounted, slave-herdsmen in the great pastoral districts of 
Italy (ii. 441) ; and the same sort of pastoral husbandry 
soon became in the provinces also a &vourite object r f Ro 



102 The Befcrm Movement IBook n 

man speouladon — Dalmatia, for instance, was hardly ao 
^ quired (599) when the Roman capitalisto began 
to prosecute the rearing of oatde there on a 
great scale after the Italian fashion. But far worse in every 
respect was the plantation^system proper — the cultivation 
of the fields by a band of slaves not unfrequently branded 
irith iron, who with shackles on their legs performed the 
labours of the field under overseers during the day, and 
were locked up together by night in the common, frequent- 
ly subterranean, labourers' prison. This plantation<system 
had migrated from the East to Carthage (u. 16), and seems 
to have been brought by the Carthaginians to Sicily, where, 
probably for this reason, it appears developed- earlier and 
more fiilly than in any other part of the Soman domin- 
ions.* We find the territory of Leontani, about 80,000 
iugera of arable land, which was let on lease as Roman 
domain (ii. 178) by the censors, divided some decennia after 
the time of the Gracchi among not more than 84 lessees, to 
each of whom there thus fell on an average 300 iuperoy and 
among whom only one was a Leontine ; the rest were for- 
eign, mostly Roman, speculators. We see from this in« 
stance with what zeal the Roman speculators there walked 
in the footsteps of their predecessors, and what extensive 
dealings in Sicilian cattle and Sicilian slave-corn must have 
been carried on by the Roman and non*Roman speculators 
who covered the beautifiil island with their pastures and 
plantations. Italy however still remained for the present 
substantially exempt from this worst form of slave-hus- 
bandry. Although in Etruria^ where the plantatio&Hsystem 
seems to have first emerged in Italy, and where it existed 
most extensively at any rate forty years afterwards, it is 
extremely probable that even now trgoMtula were not want* 
ing ; yet Italian agriculture at this epoch was still chiefly 

* The hybrid Greek name for the workhouse {wrgasibulum^ from 
l^fsCo/co*, after the analogy of ttahvlum^ opermlum) \b an indicatioa 
that this mode of hasbandry came to the Romans from a region when 
the Greek language was used, but at a period when a Chorouf^ HeUesk 
aulture was not yet attained. 



Obap. nj And Tiberiua GraocAus. 10& 

carried on by free perse ns or at any rate by unchained 
Blaves, while the greater labours were frequently let out to 
oontraotors. The difference between Italian and Sicilian 
slavery is very clearly apparent from the fact, that the 
slaves of the Msmertine community, which lived after the 
. Italian fiishion, were the only slaves who did not 

take part in the SiciHan servile revolt of 619- 
022. 

The abyss of misery and woe, which opens before our 
eyes in this most miserable of all proletariates, we leave to 
be fathomed by those who venture to gaze into such depths ; 
it is very possible that, compared with the sufferings of the 
Roman slaves, the sum of all Negro suffering is but a drop 
Here we are not so much concerned with the hardships of 
the slaves themselves as with the perils which they brought 
upon the Roman state, a&d with the conduct of the govern- 
ment in coD&imtmg them. It is plain that this proletariate 
vas not oaUed into existenoe by the government and could 
not be directly set aside by it ; this could only have been 
accomplished by remedies which would have been still 
worse than the disease. The duty of the government was 
simply, on the one hand, to avert the direct danger to prop- 
erty and life, with which the slav^proletariate threatened 
the members of the state, by an earnest system of precau- 
tionary police ; and on the oth^ hand, to aim at the restric- 
tion of the proletariate, as &r as possible, by the elevation 
of free labour. Let us see how the Roman aristocracy 
executed these two tasks. 

The servile conspiracies and servile wiurs, breaking out 

everywhere, illustrate their management as re- 
al the spects police. In Italy the scenes of disorder 

which were among the immediate painful cons^ 
foenoQs of the Hannibalic war (ii. 466), seemed now to be 
renewed ; all at once the Romans were obliged to se'ze and 
execute in the capital 150, in Mintumae 450, in Sinneesi 

even 4,000 slaves (621). Still worse, as may 

be conceived, was the state of the provinces* 
At the great slave-market at Delos and in the Attic silver 



104 The Reform Movement [Book iv 

Diines aboat the same period the reyolted slaves had to bo 
put doYin by force of arms. The war against Aristonicus 
and his '^ Heliopolites " in Asia Minor was in substance a 
war of the landholders against the revolted slaves (p. 74 )« 
But worst of all, of course, was the condiu^n 
Sidiiaa of Sicily, the chosen land of the plantation sys 

^* ^^* tem. Brigandage had long been a standing evil 
there^ especially in the interior ; it began to swell into in 
Burrection. Damophilus, a wealthy planter of Enna (Cas 
trogiovanni), who emulated the Italian lords in the Indus 
trial investment of his living capital, was attacked and mur 
dered by his exasperated rural slaves ; whereupon the sav* 
age band flocked into the town of Enna, and there repeated 
the same process on a greater scale. The slaves rose in a 
body against their masters, killed or enslaved them, and 
summoned to the head of the already considerable insurgent 
army a juggler from Apamea in Syria who knew how to 
vomit fire and utter oracles, formerly as a slave named 
Eunus, now as chief of the insurgent-s styled Antiocbus 
king of the Syrians. And why not 'i A few years before 
another Syrian slave, who was not even a prophet, had in 
Antioch itself worn the royal diadem of the Seleuddae 
(p. 87). The Greek slave Achaeus, the brave " general " 
of the new king, traversed the island, and not only did the 
wild herdsmen flock from far and near to the strange stand- 
ards, but the free labourers also, who bore no goodwill to 
the planters, made common cause with the revolted slaves. 
In another district of Sicily Cleon, a Cilician slave, formerly 
in his native land a daring bandit, followed the example 
^hioh had been set and occupied Agrigentum ; and, when 
the leaders came to a mutual understanding, after gaining 
varicud minor advantages they succeeded in at last totally 
defeating the praetor Lucius Hypsaeus in person and hia 
army, consisting mostly of Sicilian militia, and in capturing 
his camp. By this means almost the whole island came 
into the power of the insurgents, whose numbers, according 
to the most moderate estimates, are alleged to have amount 
fed to 70,000 men capable of bearing arms. The Romauf 



CiuE II.J And Tiberius Gracohuh 101 

found themselves compelled for three successive yean 
(620-622) to despatch consuls and consular 
armies to Sicily, till, after several undecided 9sA 
even some unfavourable conflicts, the revolt was at hugth 
subdued by the capture of Tauromenium and of Enna 
The most resolute men of the insurgents threw themselvei 
into the latter town, in order to ho.d their ground in that 
impregnable position with the determination of men who 
da8}.air of deliverance or of pardon; the consuls Luciui 
Calpurnius Piso and Publius Rupilius lay before it for twc 
years, and reduced it at last more by famine than by arms/ 
These were the results of the preventive police system 
as it was handled by the Boman senate and its officials is^ 
Italy and the provinces. While the task of getting quit ol 
the proletariate demands and only too often transcends th« 
whole power and wisdom of a government^its repressiot f 
by measures of police on the other hand is for any largei \ 
commonwealth comparatively easy. It would be well witl ^ 
states, if the unpropertied masses threatened them with nc 
other danger than that with which they are menaced b} 
bears and wolves ; only the timid and those who trade upoi 
the silly fears of the multitude prophesy the destruction oi 
civil order through servile revolts or insurrections of the pro 
letariate. But even to this easier task of restraining the 
oppressed masses the Boman goYemment was by no meani* 
equal, notwithstanding the profound peace and the inex 
haustible resources of the state. This was a sign of iti 
weakness ; but not of its weakness alone. By right th^ 
Boman governor was bound to keep the highways clear an^ 
to have the robbers who were caught crucified, if they wer* 
slaves ; and that as a matter of course, for slavery is not 
possible without a reign of terror. At this period in Sicily 
% razzia was occasionally doubtless set on foot by the gov- 

* Even now there are not nnirequently found in front of Castrfr 
^ovanni, at the point where the aaoent is least abmpt 
Roman projectiles with the name of the oonmil of (>y^ 
£. Kio L.f, COM. 
Vol. 111.-5* 



106 2%e Reform Jlavemeni [Book iv^ 

emtOTy when the roads became too insecure ; iut, in crdei 
not to disoblige the Italian planters, the captured robben 
were ordinarily given up by the authorities to their matttert 
to be punished at their discretion ; and those masters wer« 
frugal people who, if their slave^herdsmen asked clothes, 
replied with stripes and with the inquiry whether Iravellerr 
journeyed through the land naked. The consequence of 
sudi connivance accordingly was, that on the subjugation 
of the slave^revolt the consul Publius Rupilins ordered all 
that came into his hands alive — it is said upwards of 20|000 
men — to be crudfied. It was in truth no longer possible 
to ahow indulgence to capital. 

The care of the government for the elevation of free 
TheitaUan labour, and by consequ^ioe for the restriction 
^unaatB, ^f ^^^ slave-prolctariate, promised fruits far 

more difficult to be gained but also far more valuable. 
Unfortunately, in this respect there was nothing done at all. 
In the first social crisis the landlord had been enjoined by 
law to employ a number of ^ree labourers proporticmed to 
the number of his slave labourers (i. 382). Now at the 
suggestion of the governmient a Punic treatise on agricul- 
ture (ii. 27), doubtless giving instructions in the system of 
planting after the Carthaginian mode, was translated into 
Latin for the use and benefit of Italian speculators — the 
first and only instance of a literary undertaking suggested 
by the Roman senate ! The same tendency showed itself 
in a more important matter, or to speak more correctly in 
the vital question for Rome — the system of colonization. 
It needed no special wisdom, but merely a recollection of 
the course of the first social crisis in Rome, to perceive 
that the only real remedy against an agricultural proletari* 
ate consisted in a comprehensive and regular system of 
emigration (i« 392) ; for which the external relaticms oi 
Rome offered the most favourable opportunity. Until 
nearly the dose of the sixth century, in fact, the continuous 
diminution of the small landholders of Italy was counter* 
acted by the continuous establishment of new farm^allot* 
ments (ii. 416). This, it is true, was by no means done t| 



Qbat, n.] And Tibei^ivs Chacchus. 107 

the extent to which it might and should have been done ^ 
not only was the domain-land occupied from ancient timet 
by private persons (i. 848) not recalled, but further occiipa^ 
tions of newly won land were permitted; and other very 
important aoqursitions, such as the territory of Capua, while 
not abandoned to occupation, were yet not subjected to dis* 
bibution, but were let on lease as usufructuary domains. 
Nevertheless the assignation of land had operated ben» 
fidally — giving help to many of the sufferers and hope to 
all. But after the founding of Luna (577) no 
ttaoe of further assignations of land is to be met 
with for a long time, with the exception of the isolated insti« 
tution of the Picenian colony of Auximum 
(Osimo) in 597. The reason is simple. After 
the conquest of the Boii and Apuani no new territory was 
acquired in Italy excepting the far from attractive Liguriaa 
valleys; therefore no other land existed for distribution 
there except the leased or occupied domain-land, the laying 
hands on which was, as may easily be conceived, just as 
little agreeable to the aristocracy now as it was three hun- 
dred years before. Hie distribution of the territory ac- 
quired out of Italy appeared for political reasons inadmissi- 
ble ; Italy was to remain the ruling country, and the wall 
of partition between the Italian masters and their provin- 
cial servants was not to be broken down. Unless the gov- 
ernment were willing to Set aside considerations of higher 
pcdicy or even the interests of their order, no course was 
left to them but to remain spectators of the ruin of the 
Italian farmei>class ; and this result accordingly ensued. 
The capitalists continued to buy out the small landholders, 
or indeed. If they remained obstinate, to seize their fields 
without title of purchase ; in whid: case, as may be sup- 
posed, matters were not always amicably settled. A pecu- 
liarly favourite method was to eject the wife and children 
iji the &rmer from the homestead, while he was in the fieldf 
and to bring him to compliance by means of the theory of 
^ accomplished fact." The landlords continued mainly to 
sniploy slavet instead of free labourers, because the fomm 



108 The Reform MovemerU [Book it 

oould aot like the latter be called away to military service , 
and thus reduced the free proletariate to the same level of 
misery with the slaves. They continued to supersede Ital- 
ian grain in the market of the capital, and to lessen its value 
over the whole peninsula, by selling Sicilian slave-corn at a 
mere nominal price. In Etruria the old native aristocracy 
in league with the Roman capitalistB had ai 
early as 620 brought matters to such a passi 
that there was no longer a free ^mer there. It could be 
said aloud in the market of the capital, that the beasts had 
their lairs but nothing was left to the burgesses save the air 
and sunshine, and that those who were styled the masters 
of the world had no longer a clod that they could call their 
own. The census lists of the Roman burgesses furnished 
the commentary on these words. From the end of the 
Hannibalic war down to 595 the numbers of the 
burgesses were steadily on the increase, tho 
cause of which is mainly to be sought in the continuous and 

considerable distributions of domain-land (ii. 
no. 

466) : afler 595 again, when the census yielded 

328,000 burgesses capable of bearing arms, there appears a 
regular falling off, for the list in 600 stood at 
147. 131. 324,000, that in 607 at 322,000, that in 623 at 
319,000 burgesses fit for service — an alarming 
result for a period of profound peace at home and abroad. 
If matters were to go on at this rate, the burgess-body 
would resolve itself into planters and slaves ; and the Ro* 
man state might at length, as was the case with the ParlM- 
ans, purchase its soldiers in the slave-market. 

Such was the extemal and internal condition of Rome, 
ideM of when the state entered on the seventh century 
i4iram. Qf i^ existence. Wherever the eye turned, it 

encountered abuses and decay ; the question could not but 
force itself on ev3ry sagacious and well-disposed maD, 
whether this state of things were not capable of remedy or 
amendment. There was no want of such men in Rome 
but no one seemed more called to the great work of politi* 
mi and social reform than Publius Corneliua Scipio Aem» 



UiAT. u ] And Tiherivs Ora^hv^. 109 

lianus Africanus (57()-625), the favourite son of 
BetpteAoiti' Aemilius Paullus and the adopted grandson of 
'^^ the great Soipio, whose glorious surname of 

Africanus he bore by virtue not merely of hereditary but 
of personal right. Like his &ther, he was a man temperate 
and thoroughly healthy, never ailing in body, and never at 
a loss to decide on the immediate and necessary course of 
action. Even in his youth he had kept aloof from the 
usual occupations of political novices — the attending in the 
antechambers of leading senators and the delivery of foren- 
sic declamations. On the other hand he loved the chase-— 
when a youth of seventeen, after having served with distino 
lion under his father in the campaign against Perseus, he 
had asked as his reward the free range of the deer forest of 
the kings of Macedonia which had been untouched for four 
years— and he was especially fond of devoting his leisure 
to sdentific and- literary enjoy ment, "Ry the care of his 
&ther he had been early initiated into that genuine Greek 
culture, which elevated him above the insipid Hellenizing 
of the semi-culture commonly in vogue; by his earnest 
and apt appreciation of the good and bad qualities in the 
Greek character, and by his aristocratic carnage, this Ro- 
man made an impression on the courts of the East and even 
on the scoffing Alexandrians. His Hellenism was especialJy 
recognizable in the delicate irony of his discourse and in 
the classic purity of his Latin. Although not strictly an 
author, he yet, like Cato, committed to writing his political 
■peechea — they were, like the letters of his adopted sister 
the mother of the Gracchi, esteemed by the later litleratorei 
as masterpieces of model prose — ^and took pleasure in sur- 
rounding himself with the better Greek and Roman lit" 
feraiij a plebeian society which was doubtless regarded with 
no small suspicion by those colleagues in the senate whose 
noble birth was their sole distinction. A man morally 
steadfast and trustworthy, his word held good with friend 
»nd foe ; he avoided bufjdings and speculations, and lived 
with simplicity ; while in money matters he acted not 
merely lnr.ourably and disinterestedly, but also with a ten* 



110 The Reform Jfcvemmt [Bom IV* 

demess and liberality which aeemed singular to the mercaQ 
tile spirit of his contemporaries. He was an able soldier 
and officer; he brought home firom the African war thi 
honorary wreath which was wont to be conferred on those 
who saved the Uves of dtizens in danger at the peril of 
their own. and terminated as general the war which he had 
oegnn as an officer ; circumstances gave him no opportunity 
of trymg his skill as a general on tasks really difficult 
Scipio was not, any more than his father, a man of geniui 
— ^as is indicated by the very fact of his predilection for 
Xenophon, the sober soldier and correct author— >but he 
was an honest and true man, who seemed pre-eminently 
called to stem the incipient decay by organic reforms. All 
the more significant is the &ct that he did not attempt it. 
It is true that he helped, as he had means and opportunity, 
to redress or prevent abuses, and laboured in particular at 
the improvement of the administration of justice. It was 
chiefly by his assistance that Lucius Cassius, an able man 
of the old Roman austerity and uprightness, was enabled to 
carry against the most vehement opposition of the Opt»- 
mates his law as to voting, which introduced vote by ballot 
for those popular tribunfds which still embraced the most 
important part of the criminal jurisdiction (p. 95). In like 
manner, although he had not chosen to take part in boyish 
impeachments, he himself in his mature years put upon 
their ^ial several of the guilUest of the aristocracy, la a 
« ke spirit, when commanding before Carthage and Numan- 
tia, he drove forth the women and priests to the gates ci 
the camp, and subjected the rabble of soldiers once more 
to the iron yoke of the old military discipline ; and when 
censor (612), he cleared away the smooth-ohinncd 
coxcombs among the world of quality and in 
earnest language urged the citizens to adhere more fiiithfully 
to the hone<^ customs of their fathers. Cut no one, and 
least of all he himself, could fail to see that increased stria* 
geney in the administration of justice and isolated inter* 
ference were not even first steps towards the healing of t\w 
organic evils under which the state laboured. These Soipic 



Obap. no And* TihttiMB Gn stcchxie. Ill 

did not touch. Gaias Laelius (consul iu 614), 
Scipto's eider friend and his political instructor 
ddid confidant, had conceived the plan of proposing the con* 
fiscation of the Italian domain-land which had not been 
given away but had been temporarily i>ccupied, and of giv« 
ing relief by its distribution to the visibly decaying Italian 
fiirmers; but he desisted from the project when he saw 
wha^ a storm lie was going to raise, and was thenceforth 
nanied the '' Judicious." Scipio was of the same opinion. 
He was fiilly persuaded of the greatness of the evil, . and 
with a courage deserving of honour he without respect of 
persons remoi*8elessly assailed it and carried his point, 
where he risked -himself alone ; but he was also persuaded 
that the country could only be relieved at the price of a 
revolution similar to that which in the fourth and fifth cen- 
turies had sprung out of the question of reform, and, right- 
ly or wrongly, the remedy seemed to him worse than the 
disease. So with the small circle of his friends he held a 
middle position between the aristocrats, who never forgave 
him for his advocacy of the Cassian-law, and the democrats, 
whom he neither satisfied nor wished to satisfy ; solitary 
during his life, praised after his death by both parties, now 
as the champion of the aristocracy, now as the promoter 
of reform. Do\Nn to his time the censors on laying down 
their office had called upon the gods to grant greater power 
and glory to the state : the censor Scipio prayed that they 
might deign to preserve the state. His whole confession 
of faith lies in that painful exclamation. 

But where the man who had twice led the Roman army 

TfiwiBt from deep disorganization to victory despairedi 

^"^^^^ a youth without achievements had the boldneat 

lo give himself forth as the saviour of Italy. He was 

called Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (591-^21 )• 

His &ther who bore the same name (consul in 

*"W *^ I ^'^^ ^^^ » censor in 585), was the true model 

of a Roman aristocrat. The brilliant magnifi- 

eence of his aedilidan games, not produced without oppress* 

ing the d^>endent communities, had drawn upon him th« 



112 The Reform Mcvemeni T^ok it. 

■eyere and deserved censure cf the senate (U 400); his 
interference in the pitiful process directed against the Scipioi 
who were personally hostile to him (ii. 335) gave proof of 
his chivalrous feeling, and perhaps of his regard for his own 
order ; and his energetic action against the freednien in hin 
ciensorship (ii. 420) evinced his conservative disposition. 
As governor, moreover, of the province of the £bro (ii* 
251 ), by his bravery and above all by his integrity he ren- 
dered a permanent service to his country, and at the same 
time raised to himself in the hearts of the subject nation an 
enduring monument of reverence and affection. 

His mother Cornelia was the daughter of the conqueror 
of Zama, who, simply on account of that generous inter- 
vention, had chosen his former opponent as a son-in-law ; 
she herself was a highly cultivated and notable woman, who 
after the death of her much older husband had refused the 
hand of the king of Egypt and reared her three surviving 
children in memory of her husband and her father. Ti- 
berius, the elder of the two sons, was of a good and moral 
disposition, of gentle aspect and quiet temper, apparently 
fitted for anything rather than for an agitator of the masses. 
In all his relations and views he belonged to the Scipionic 
circle, whose refined and thorough culture, Greek and na- 
tional, he and his brother and sister shared. Sclpio Aemi* 
lianus was at once his cousin and his sister's husband ; under 
him Tiberius, at the age of eighteen, had taken part in the 
storming of Carthage, and had by his valour acquired the 
commendation of the stem general and warlike distinctions. 
[t was natural that the able young man should adopt and 
develop, with all the vivacity and all the rigorous predsioo 
of youth, the views as to the pervading decay of the state 
which were prevalent in that circle, and more especially 
their ideas as to the elevation of the Italian farmers. Nor 
was it to the young men alone that the shnnking of Loeliui 
from the execution of his ideas of reform seemed to be not 
judicious, but weak. Appius Claudius, who had already 
been consul (611) and censor (618), one of thtt 
most respected men in the serate, censured tbt 



Chaf. II.] And Tiberius Graccfms. 113 

^ipiontc circle for having so soon abandoned the schemt 
of distributing the domain-lands with all the passionate 
vehemence which was the hereditary characteristic of thi 
Claudian house ; and with the greater bitterness, apparently 
because he had come into personal conflict with Scipio 
A.emilianus in his candidature for the censorship. Similar 
riews were expressed by Publius Crassus Mucianus (p. lb\ 
the pontifex maxtmus of the day, who was held in universal 
honour by the senate and the citizens as a man and a jurist. 
Even his brother Publius Mucins Scaevola, the founder of 
scientific jurisprudence in Borne, seemed not averse to the 
plan of reform ; and his voice was of the greater weight, 
as he stood in some measure aloof from party. Similar 
were the sentiments of Quintus Metellus, the conqueror of 
Macedonia and of the Achaeans, but respected not so much 
on account of his warlike deeds as because he was a model 
of the old discipline and manners alike in his domestic and 
his public life. Tiberius Gracchus was closely connected 
with these men, particularly with Appius whose daughter 
he had married, and with Mucianus whose daughter was 
married to his brother. It was no wonder that he cherished 
the idea of resuming in person the scheme of reform, so 
aoon as he should find himself in a position which would 
constitutionally allow him the initiative. Personal motives 
may have strengthened this resolution. The treaty of peace 
which Mancinus concluded with the Numantinea 
in 61T, was in substance the work of Gracchus 
(p. 27) ; the recollection that the senate had cancelled it^ 
that the general had been on its account surrendered to the 
enemy, and that Gracchus with the other superior officers 
had only escaped a like &te through the greater favour 
which he enjoyed among the burgesses, could not put the 
yoimg, upright, and proud man in better humour with the 
niliDg aristocracy. The Hellenic rhetoricians with whom 
he was fooi of discussing philosophy and politics. Die* 
phanes of My tilene and Gaius Blossius of Cumae, nourished 
within his soul the ideals over which he brooded : when bif 
intentions became known in wider circles, there was or 



OiiA^ a.| Aiui TtbvTiuif O-tuav/iu^, 115 

for agriculture and to pay a moderate rent to the state. A 
tolUgUtm of three men, who were regarded as ordinary abd 
standing magistrates of the state and were annually elected 
by the assembly of the people, was entrusted with the work 
of resumption and distribution ; to which was aderwarda 
added the important and difficult function of legally settlbig 
what was domain-land and what was private property. The 
distribution was accordingly designed to go on continuously, 
and to embrace the wh<de class that ^ould be in need oi it ; 
and in that view we must probably assume that, when the 
Italian domains which were very extensive and difficult of 
adjustment should be finally regulated, farther measures 
were contemplated, such as, for instance, the disbursement 
to the ailotmentKsommissioners of a definite sum annually 
inom ^e publio chest for the purchase of Italian lands for 
distribution. The new features in the Sempronian agrarian 
4iw, as compared with the Licinio-Bextiaii, were, first, the 
clause in favour of the hereditary possessors ; secondly, the 
leasehold and inalienable tenure proposed for the new allot- 
ments ; thirdly and especially, the pei^nanent executive, the 
want of which under the older law had been the chief rea- 
son why it had remained without lasting practical applica- 
tion. 

War was thus declared against the great landholders 
who now, as three centuries ago, found substantially their 
organ in the senate ; and once more, after a long interval, 
a single magistrate stood Ibrth in earnest opposition to the 
aristocratic government. It took up the corflict in the 
mode sanctioned by use and wont for such cases of para^ 
lyzing the excesses of the magistrates by means of the 
magistracy itself (i. 405). A colleague of Gracchus, Mar^ 
ous Octavius, a resolute man who was seriously persuaded 
of the objectionable character of the proposed domain law 
interposed his veto whvm it was about to be put to th« 
vote; a step, the constitutional effi^ct of which was to set 
■side the proposal. Gracchus in his turn suspended ths 
irasiness of the state and the administration of justice, and 
laced his soal on the pnbiio chest. Hie government a« 



116 TIj Reform JHovement [Boom n 

quiesoed — ^it was inoonvenient, but the year would draw to 
an end. Gracchus, in perplexity, brought his law to thi 
vote a second time* Octavius of course repeated his veto ; 
and to the urgent entreaty of his colleague and fortnei 
firiendy that he would not obstruct the salvation of Italy, hf 
might reply that on that very question, as to how Italy 
could be saved, opinions differed, but that his oonstitutioaal 
right to use his veto against the proposal of his colleague 
was beyond all doubt. The senate now made an attempt 
to open up to Gracchus a tolerable retreat ; two consular? 
challenged him to discuss the matter further in the senate 
house, and the tribune entered into the scheme with zeal. 
He sought to construe this proposal as implying that the 
senate had conceded the principle of distributing the do- 
main-land ; but neither was this implied in it, nor was the 
senate at all disposed to yield in the matter ; the discus- 
sions ended without any result. Constitutional means were 
exhausted. Id earlier times under such circumstances men 
were not indisposed to let the proposal go to sleep for the 
moment^ and to take it up again in each successive year, till 
the earnestness of the demand and the pressure of public 
opinion overbore resistance. Now things were carried with 
a higher hand. Gracchus seemed to himself to have reached 
the point when he must either wholly renounce his reform 
or begin a revolution. He chose the latter course ; for he 
came before the burgesses with the declaration that either 
ke or Octavius must retire from the college, and su^ested 
'JO Octavius that a vote of the burgesses should be taken as 
to which of them they wished to dismiss. Deposition from 
office was, according to the Roman constitution, a oonstitn* 
tional impossibility ; Octavius naturally refused to eonseni 
to a proposal insulting to the laws and to himsel£ Then 
Gracchus broke off the discussion with his colleague, an^ 
turned to the assembled multitude with the question whether 
a tribune of the people, who acted in opposition to the peo* 
pie, had not foifeited his office; and the assembly, long 
accustomed to agree to all proposals presented to it, and ion 
the most part composed of the agricultural proletariat 



Obaf IL] Afkd Tiberius Gracchus. Ill 

which had flocked iu from the (x>untry and was peiacnallji 
interested in the carrying of the law, gave almost unanh 
mously an affirmative answer. Marcus Octavius was at 
the biddirg of Gracchus removed by the lictors from the 
tribunes' bench ; and then, amidst universal rejoicing, the 
agrarian law was carried and the tirst allotmeiit-commis 
•loners were nominated. The votes fell on the author of 
lihe law along with his brother GaiOs, who was only twenty 
years of age, and his father-in-law Appius Claudius. Such 
a &mily-selection augmented the indignation of the aristoo 
racy. When the new magistrates applied as usual to the 
senate to obtain the moneys for their equipment and for 
their daily allowance, the former was refused, and a daily 
allowance was assigned to them of 24 a»«e« (1 shilling). 
The feud spread daily more and more, and became more 
envenomed and more personal. The difficult and intricate 
task of defining, confiscating, and distributing the domains 
caiTied strife into every burgess-community, and even into 
the allied Italian towns. 

The aristocracy made no secret that, while they would 

acquiesce perhaps in the law because they could 

gansof not do otherwise, the officious legislator should 

** ^ not. escape their vengeance; and the announce- 
ment of Quintus Pompeius, that he would impeach Grac- 
dius on the very day of his resigning his tribunate, was far 
from being the worst of the threats thrown out against the 
tribune. Gracchus believed, probably with reason, that his 
personal safety was imperilled, and no longer appeared in 
Uie Forum without a retinue of 3,000 or 4,000 men — a step 
which drew down on him bitter expressions in the senate, 
even from Metellus who was not averse to reform iu itself. 
Altogether, if he had expected to reach the end by the car^ 
rying of his agrarian law, he had now to learn that he was 
only at the beginning. The '' people " owed him gratitude \ 
but he was a lost man, if he had no farther protection than 
this gratitude of the people, if he did not continue indi& 
pensable to them and did not constantly attach to himself 
fresh interests and hopes by means of ^ther and jonoro com 



tl8 Tke Refarm Mcv et mm U [Book it 

prefaeonTC pniposals. Just at that tioie the kingv^om and 
wealth €€ the Attalida had fallen to the Romans hy the 
teetatnent of the last king of Pergamns (57) ; Graocfaur 
piopcieed to the people that the Pergaraene treasure should 
be distributed among the new landholders tor the procuring 
of the requisite impl^nents and stoek, and vindicated gene- 
rallyy in opposition to the existing practice, the right of Jm 
burgesses to decide definitively as to the new prortnce. 
He is said to have prepared fiirther popular measures, for 
shortening the period of service, for extending the right of 
appeal, fiii- abolishing the exclusive priinlege of the senators 
to act as civil jurymen, and even for the admission of the 
Italian allies to Roman citizenship. How far his projects 
in reality reached, cannot be ascertained ; this alone is cer- 
tain, that Gracchus saw that his only safety lay in inducing 
tiie burgesses to confer on him for a second year the office 
which protected him, and that, with a view to obtain this 
unconstitutional prol<Higation, he held forth a prospect of 
further reforms. If at first he had risked himself in order 
to save the commonwealth, he was now obliged to put the 
commonwealth at stake in order to his own safety. 

The tribes met to elect the tribunes for the ensuing year, 
He Miidts 1^^ ^he first divisions gave their votes for Grao- 
toSS^* chus; but the opposite party in the end pre- 
*™»**® vailed with their veto so far at least that the 

assembly broke up without having accomplished its objectj 
and the decision was postponed to the following day. For 
this day Gracchus put in motion all means legitimate and 
illegitimate ; he appeared to the people dressed in mourn- 
ing, and commended to them his youthful son ; anticipating 
that the election would once more be disturbed by the veto, 
he nmde provision for expelling the adherents of the aris- 
tocracy by force from the place of assembly in front of tlif 
Capitoline temple. So the second day of election came on ; 
the votes fell as on the preceding day, and again the veto 
was exercised ; the tumult began. The burgesses dispersed^ 
the elective assembly was practically dissolved ; the C5api 
u^Une trmple was dosed ; it was rumoured in the «ty, no^ 



3kAP. n.] Amd TiberiuB GhracchtM. 1 L9 

that Tiberius bad deposed all the tribunes, now that he had 
resolved to continue his magistracy without re-election. 

The senate assensbled in the temple of Fidelity, close 
Dvathof ^y ^h^ temple of Jupiter; the bitterest oppo- 
®*'*^'*"- Dents of Gracchus were the speakers in tl e wt- 
Ung ; when Tiberius moved his hand towards his forehead 
lo signify to the people amidst the wild tumult that his 
head was in danger, it was said that he was already sum- 
moning the people to adorn his brow with the regal chapleL 
The consul Scaevola was urged to have the traitor put to 
death at once. When that temperate man, by no means 
averse to reform in itself, indignantly refused the equally 
irrational and barbarous request, the consular Publius Scipio 
Nasioa, a harsh and passionate aristocrat, summoned those 
who shared his views to arm themselves as they could and 
to follow him. Almost none of the country people had 
oome into town for the elections ; the people of the city 
timidly gave way, when they ssiw the nobles rushing along 
with fury in their eyes, and legs of benches and clubs in 
their hands. Gracchus attempted with a few attendants to 
escape. But in his flight he fell on the slope of the Capitol, 
and was killed by a blow on the temples from the bludgeon 
of one of his furious pursuers— ^Publius Satureius and 
Lucius Rufus afterwards contested the infamous honour — 
before the statues of the seven kings at the temple of FideK 
ity ; with him three hundred others were slain, none of 
them by weapons of iron. When evening had come on, the 
bodies were thrown into the Tiber ; Gains vainly entreated 
that the corpse of his brother might be granted to him for 
buri^. Such a day had never before been seen by Ilome. 
The pairty-etrife lasting for more than a century during th€ 
first sodtd crisis had led to no such catastrophe as that with 
wfaidi the second began. The better portion of the aristoo 
racy might shudder, but they could lo longer recede 
The J had no choice save to abandon a great number of 
their most trusty partisans to the vengeance of the multi 
tilde, or to assume collectively the responsibility of the ouV 
nf^i the Isttor coarse was adopted. They gave oScia} 



ISO 2%s jRefami JHovemmt [Book I?. 

iSDOtion to the assertion that Graocfaus had wished to seiis 
the crown, and justified this latest crime by the primitire 
precedent of Ahala (i 378) ; in fact, they even committed 
the duty of further io /estigation as to the accomplices of 
Gracchus to a special commission, and made its head, the 
Cbnsul Publjus Popillius, take care that a sort of legal 
ftamp should be supplementarily impressed on the murder 
of Gracchus by bloody sentences directed against a large 
num1)er of inferior persons (622). Nasica, 
against whom above all others the multitude 
breathed vengeance, and who had at least the courage open* 
ly to avow his deed before the people and to defend it, was 
under honourable pretexts despatched to Asia, and soon 
afterwards (624) invested!, during his absence, 
with the office of Pontifex Maximus. Nor did 
the moderate party dissociate themselves from these pro- 
ceedings of their colleagues. Gaius Laelius bore a part in 
the investigations advei*se to the partisans of Gracchus; 
Publius Scaevola, who had attempted to prevent the mur- 
der, afterwards defended it in the senate; when Scipic 
Aemilianus, afier his return from Spain (622), 
was challenged publicly to declare whether he 
did or did not approve the killing of his brother-in-law, he 
gave the at least ambiguous reply that, so far as Tiberiuff 
had aspired to the crown, he had been justly put to death. 

Let us endeavour to form a judgment regarding these 
The domain momentous events. The appointment of an 
J^^^^ official commission, which had to counteract the 
itaeif. continual diminution of the farmer-class by the 

oontinual establishment of new small holdings from the 
resources of the stale, was doubtless no sign of a healthy 
condition of the national economy ; but it was, under ihe 
existing circumstances political and social, a judidoui 
measure. The distribution of the domains, moreover, was 
ill itself no political party-question ; it might have been 
cafried out to the last sod without changing the existing 
oonstitutio \ or at all shaking the government of the arist4io» 
racy. Ae httle could there be, in that case, any complaint 



Dbap. «1.] And Tiberius Gracchus. 131 

of a violation of rights. The state was ocnfe&sedly the 
owner of the occupied land ; the holder as a possessor on 
mere sufferance could not, as a rule, ascribe to himself even 
a bond fdt proprietary tenure, and, in the exceptional in* 
stances where he could do so, he was confronted by the &ct 
that by the Roman law prescription availed not against the 
date. The distribution of the domains was no abolition, 
but on the contrary an exercise, of the right of property ; 
ail jurists were agreed as to its formal legality. But the 
attempt now to carry out these legal claims of the state 
was far from being politically warranted by the circum- 
stance that the distribution of the domains neither infringed 
the existing constitution nor involved a violation of right. 
Such objections as have been now and then raised in our 
day, when a great landlord suddenly begins to assert in all 
their compass claims belonging to him in law but suffered 
for a long period to lie dormant in practice, might with 
equal and better right be advanced against the rogation of 
Gracchus. These occupied domains had been undeniably in 
heritable private possession, some of them for three hun- 
dred years ; the state's proprietorship of the soil, which 
from its very nature loses more readily than that of the 
burgess the character of private right, had in the case of 
these lands become virtually extinct, and the present hold- 
ers had universally come to tiieir possession by purchase or 
other onerous acquisition. The jurist might say what he 
would ; to men of business the measure appeared to be an 
ejection of the great landholders for the benefit of the agri- 
cultural proletariate ; and in ftict no statesman could give it 
any other name. That the leading men of the Catonian 
epoch were of the same opinion, is very clearly shown by 
their treatment of a similar case that occurred in their time. 
The territory of Capua and the neighbouring towns, which 
was annexed as domain in 543, had for the most 
part practically passed into private possession 
duriiig the following unsettled times. In the last years of 
the sixth century, when in various respects^ especially 
through the influence of Cato, the reins of govermnent were 

Vol- in.— 6 



193 The Reform, Movement [Book it. 

drawn tighter, the burgesses resoh ed to resume the Cam* 
{>aii]aii territory and to let it out for the benefit of th< 
treasury (582). The possession in this instauos 
rested on an occupation justified not by previooi 
inTitation but at the most by the connivanoe of the autliori* 
ties, and had continued in no case much beyond a genera- 
tion ; but the holders were not dispossessed except in con* 
sideration of a compensatory sum disbursed under the 
orders of the senate by the urban praetor Publius Lentulus 
(c, 589).* Less objectionable perhaps, but stiU 
not without hazard, was the arrangement by 
which the new allotments bore the character of heritable 
leaseholds and were inalienable. The most liberal prin« 
dples in regard to freedom of traffic had made Rome great ; 
and it was very little consonant to the spirit of the Roman 
institutions, that these new farmers were peremptorily 
bound down to cultivate their portions of land in a definite 
manner, and that their allotments were subject to rights of 
revocation and all the cramping measures associated with a 
system of commercial restriction. 

It will be granted that these objections to the Sem- 
pronian agrarian law were of no sm^ weight. Yet they 
were not decisive. Such a practical disinheriting of the 
holders of the domains was certainly a great evil ; yet it 
was the only means of checking, at least for a long time, an 
evil much greater still and in fact directly destructive to 
the state — the decline of the Italian farmer-class. We can 
well understand therefore why the most distinguished an4l 
patriotic men even of the conservative party, headed by 
Gaius Laelius and Scipio Aemilianus, approved and desired 
the distribution of the domains viewed in itself. 

* This fact, hitherto only partially known ftotn Cioero (2>0 /«. Agr, 
fi. 81, 82 ; comp. Liy. xliL 2, 19), is now substantiated by the fragmenti 
of LicinianuB, p. 4. The two aocoants are to be combined to thto 
effect, that Lentulus ejected the possessors in consideration of a oom* 
pensatory snm fixed by him, but accomplished nothing with actual pro- 
prietors, as he was n:)t entitled to dispossess them and they would nol 
consent to sell 



Gbap. n.] And Tiberius Chacchus. 138 

But, if the aim of Tiberius Gracchus probably appeared 
The domain to the great majority of the wife friends of theic 
l^SMbu^ country good and salutary, the method which he 
B"""^ adopted, on the other hand, did not and could 

not meet with the approval of a single man of note or of 
patriotism. Borne about this period was governed by the 
senate. Any one who carried a measure of administration 
against the majority of the senate made a revolution. It 
was a revolution as respected the spirit of the constitution, 
when Gracchus submitted the domain question to the peo- 
ple ; and a revolution also as respected the letter, when he 
destroyed not only £ot the moment but for all time coming 
the tribunician veto— the corrective of the state machine, 
through which the senate constitutionally got rid of the in- 
terferences with its government — ^by the unconstitutional 
deposition of his colleague, which he justified with unworthy 
sophistry. But it was not in this step that the moral and 
political mistake )f the action of Gracchus lay. There are 
no set forms of high treason in history ; whoever provokes 
one power in the state to conflict with another is certainly 
a revolutionist, but he may be at the same time a saga- 
cious and praiseworthy statesman. The essential defect of 
the Gracchan revolution lay in a fact only too frequently 
overlooked-^in the nature of the then existing burgess* 
assemblies. The agrarian law of Spurius Cassius (i. 363) 
and that of Tiberius Gtacchus^had in the main the same 
tenor and the same object ; but the enterprises of the two 
men were as diverse, as the former Koman burgess-body 
which shared the Volscian spoil with the Latins and Hernici 
was dififerent from the present which erected the provinces 
of Asia and Africa. The former was a eivic community, 
which could meet together and act tugetner ; the latter was 
a great state, the union of whose members in one and the 
same collective assembly, and the leaving to this assembly 
the decision, yielded a result as lamentable as it was ridicu* 
lous (ii. 406). The fundamental defect of the policy of 
antiquity — ^that it never fully advanced from the dvic fora 
of constitution to that of a state or, which is the 6am« 



1S4 The S^form Moveikeni [Bo«ti^ 

thitig, (torn ^te l^y^eln of coik^tive adsemblies to4i |>ar1iaF 
'nieiitftt'7 sydtem-^in this oas6 avet>ged itfiielf. The sovei 
t^igti a&semblj of Rottie Wftd what th^ ^^vei^ign aissembly 
in England Would be, if instead <tf lending representatives 
bU the eledtbts of England should meet, together as a par- 
liament—an trtiw^ieldy imaas, wildly agitatied by all interests 
)it)d al! ;>ai9sioni3, in wfai^h inteilllgenee was totally lost ; a 
body, wliich was neither able to take a comprehensive view 
of things nor even to form a redoliltioli of its own * a body 
above all, in which, saving hi rare exeeptional eases, a 
couple of hundred or thousiand individuals aooidentally 
picked up from the streets of the capital acted and voted in 
name of the burgesses. The burgesses found themselves, 
as a rule, nearly as satis/factorily represented by their actual 
representatives in the tribes and Centuries as by the thirty 
lictors who legally represented theim in t^e curies ; and just 
as what was called the decree of the cnriiss was nothing but 
a decree of the magistrate who convoked the lictors, so the 
decree of the tribes and centuries at this time was in 4iib- 
stance simply a decree of the proposing magistrate, legal- 
ized by some cottsehtients assembled for the occasion. But 
while in these Voting-assemblies, the torniHa, though they 
were fer from dealing strictly in the matter of qualification, 
It was on the whole but^esses alone that appeared, in tiie 
mere popular assemblages on the other hand — the tofi^tiimu 
' — every one in the shape of a mah was entitled to take his 
place and to shout, Egyptians and Jews, street-boys and 
slaves. Such a ** meeting " certainly had no sigttificance in 
the eyes of the law ; it could neither vote nor decree. But 
it practically ruled the street, and already the opinion of 
the street was a power in Rome, so thstt it was of some 
Importance whether this confused mass recfived the com- 
munications made to it with silence or shouts, whether it 
lipplauded and rejoiced or hissed and howled at the orator 
Not many had the courage to lord it over the populace at 
Bcipio Aemilianus did, when they hissed him on account of 
his expression as to the death of his brother-in-hyw. " Ye, 
he «aid, " to whom Italy is ndt mother but stiep-motlief 



cbap. n.] And Tiberius Or^acchiuf. 12i 

ought to k^ep silence ! " anc| wj^en tibeir fuiry grew still 
louder, ^' sorely you do not think that I will fear those let 
loose, whom I sent in chains to the slave^market % " 

That the rusty machinery of the comitia should be made 
nse of &]> the^ elections ai|d for le^slation, waa l)ad enough. 
But when those mas§esT*<4ibe wmtia primarilyf and practa 
cally also U)e contiams — were permitted to interfere in this 
administiktioDi and the in^trquiient which the senate em* 
ployed to prevent suQh int(^ferencea was wrestod out of iMf 
hands; when this so-called burgess-body waa allowed to 
decree to itself lands and all their appurtenances put of the 
public pujree ; w^n any one, whoa^ circumstances and his 
influence with the proletariate enabled to comnumd the 
streets for a few hpurs, found it possible to impress on his 
projects the legal stamp of the sovereign people's will, 
Borne had reached not the^ beginning, but the end qf pppu- 
kr freedom — ^had arrived not at democracy, hut b^ mon- 
archy. For that reason in the previous period Cato and 
those who shared his views neve^r brought such questions 
before the burgesses, but discussed them solely in the sen* 
ate (ii. 426). For that reason <^ntemporariea of Gracchus, 
the men of the Scipiooic circle, described the Flapiinian 
agrarian law of 522-^the firat step in that fatal 
career*-^«8 the beginning of the decline of Ro» 
man greatness. For that reason they allowed th^ anthor 
of the domain-distribution to &I1, and saw in his dreadful 
^d as it were a means of warding off similar attempts in 
future, while yet they maintained and turned to steeounik 
wUh all lieir enei^y the distribution of the domains which 
he had carried — so sad waa the stat.e of things in. lieimei 
that honest patriots were forced into the horrible hypoeriay 
of abandQAing the criminal, and yet appropriating the fruit 
of his crirae^ For that reason too the oppcmenliB of Qriio- 
ehus were in a certain sense not wrong, when they aeoused 
him of aspiring to the crown* It is a fresh g^onnd of 
chai'ge against him rather than a justification, that he him- 
self was probably a stranger to any such thought. Th6 
aristocTatic government was so thoroughly pernicious, that 



1S6 I'he Befoftfh Movement. [Book TV 

die citizen who was able to depose the senate and to pui 
himself in its room might perhaps benefit the eommon 
wealth more than he injured it. 

But such a bold player Tiberius Gracchus was not Hi 
^^ was a tolerably able, thoroughly well-meaning, 

conservative patriot, who simply did not icnow 
wha< he was doing ; who in the ftillest belief that he was 
calling the people evoked the rabble, and grasped at the 
crown without being himself aware of it, till the inexorable 
concatenation of events urged him irresistibly into the 
career of the demagogue-tyrant. Then the family commis- 
sion, the interferences with the public finances, the further 
'•reforms'* exacted by perplexity and despair, the body- 
guard taken from the pavement, and the conflicts in the 
streets displayed the melancholy usurper more and more 
clearly to himself and others ; and at length the unchained 
spirits of revolution seized and devoured their incapable 
conjurer. The infamous butchery, through which he per- 
ished, condemns itself, as it condemns the aristocratic &o> 
tion whence it issued ; but the glory of martyrdom, with 
which it has embellished the name of Tiberius Gracchus, 
came in this instance, as usually, to the v/rong man. The 
best of his contemporaries judged otherwise. When the 
catastrophe was announced to Scipio Aemilianus, he uttered 
the words of Homer : 

and when the younger brother of Tiberius seemed disposed 
to come forward in the same career, his own mother wrots 
to him : ^ Shall then our house have no end of madness t 
where shall be the limit ? have we not yet enough to l;« 
ashamed of, in having confused and disorganized the statot ** 
So spoke not the anxious mother, but the daughter of Um 
conqueror of Carthage, who knew of a mirfortune yet 
greater than the death of her children. 



A 



CHA1>TER m. 

TH2 BBVOLUnOH AHD OAIVS OBA00HU8. 

T^BERiDS Gracohus was dead ; but his two works, the 
ffbettwmSs- distribution of land and the revolution, survived 
Mbix^g ^ ^^^1^ author. In presence of the starving agri- 
thedomaioa. cultural proletariate the senate might venture 
on a murder, but it could not avail itself of that murder to 
annul the Sempronian agrarian law ; the law itself had been 
far more strengthened than shaken by the frantic outbreak 
of party fury. The party of the aristocracy friendly tow- 
ards reform, which openly &voured the distribution of the 
domains — headed by Quintus Metellus, just about this time 
(623) censor, and Publius Scaevola — in concert 
with the party of Scipio Aemilianus, which was 
at least not disinclined to reform, gained the upper hand for 
the time being even in the senate ; and a decree of the sen- 
ate expressly directed the triumvirs to begin their labours. 
According to the Sempronian law these were to be nomi- 
nated annually by the community, and this was probably 
done ; but from the nature of their task it was natural that 
llie election should fall again and again on the same men, 
and new elections in the proper sense occurred only when a 
place became vacant through death. Thus in the place of 
Tiberius Gracchus there was appointed Publius Crassut 
If uoianus, the father-in-law of his brother Gains ; and after 
^ the Ml of Mucianus in 624 (p. 75) and the 

death of Appius Claudius, the business of dis- 
tribution was managed in concert with the young Gaiua 
Gracchus by two of the most active leaders of the mov» 
ment party, Marcus Fulvius Flaocus and Gains Papiriua 
Oarbo. The very names of these men are vouchers that 



128 The Bewjihaion [Book IV 

the work of resiuning and distributing the occupied domain* 
land was prosecuted with zeal and enei^; and, in fact) 
proofe to that efiect are not wanting. As early 
as 622 the consul of that year, Publius Popil* 
lius, the same who presided oyer the prosecutions of the 
adherents of Tiberius Gracchus, recorded on a public monu* 
ment that he was '' the first who had turned the shepherds 
out of the domains and installed fiurmera in their stead ; " 
and tradition otherwise affirms that the distribution extend* 
ed over all Italy, and that in the fc^merly existisg com- 
munities the number of farms was everywhere augmented 
— ^for it was the design of the Sempronian agrarian law to 
elevate the farmeixdass not by the founding of new com- 
munities, but by the strengthening of those already in ex- 
istence. The extent and the comprehensive effect of these 
distributions are attested by the numerous arrangements in 
the Koman art of land-measuring referable to the Gracchan 
assignations of land ; for instance, the due placing of bound- 
ary-stones so as to obviate future mistakes appears to have 
been first suggested by the Gracchan courts for defining 
boundaries and by the distributions of land. But the num- 
bers on the burgess-rolls give the clearest evidence. The 
131. census, which was published in 623 and actually 

^^ took place probably in the beginning of 622, 

yielded not more than 319,000 burgesses capable of bear-, 
ing arms, whereas six years afterwards (629) in 
place of the previous fiJl ing off (p. 108) the num* 
ber rises to 395,000, that is 76,000 of an increase—- beyond 
all doubt solely in consequence of what the aUotment-com« 
mission did for the Roman burgesses. Whether it multi- 
plied the &rms among the Italians in the same proporUoii 
may be doubted ; at any rate what it did accomplish yielded 
a great and beneficent result It is true that this result was 
not achieved without various violations of respectable inters 
ests and existing rights. The allotment-commission, com- 
posed of the most decided partisans, and absolute judge in 
its own causey proceeded with its labours in a reckless luui 
•▼en tumultuary fiishion ; public notices summoned every 



Chaf. iul] And Uatus (jfraochua. 139 

one, who was able, to give inforiQation regarding the extent 
of the dom^n-ianda ; the old land-register^' were inexorably 
referred to, and not only was occupation new and old re^ 
voked without distinction^ but in various cases actual prV* 
vate property, as to which the) holder was unable satiafaor 
toi Uy to prove his tenure, was also confiscated. Loud snd 
foi the most part, w^l founded as were the oomplaintSi tbe 
senate allowed t^ diatribators to pursue their course ; it 
was dear that, if the domain question was to be settled at 
all, the matter oould not be carried through without some 
such uttceremonioua vigour of action. 

But this aoqui^scQuce had its limit. The Italian dwukin^ 
iu8iup«a. land was not exclusively in the hands of Boman 
SS^io^ikflmi. burgesses ; large tracts of it had been assigned 
liaass. JQ exclusive usufruct to particular allied com<- 

munities by decrees of the people or senate, and other por* 
tions had been occupied with or without permission by 
Latin burgesses. The triumvirs at length attacked these 
possessions also. The resumption of the portions simply 
occupied by non-burgesses was no doubt allowable in formal 
law, and not less in all probability the resump^iion of the 
domain-land handed over by decrees of the senate or even 
by state>treaties to the Italian communities, since therebjf 
the state by no means renounced its ownership and to all 
appearance gave its grants to comjnunities, just as to pri- 
vate perscHie, subject \o revocation. But the complaints of 
these allied or subject communities, that Rome did not 
keep the treaties concluded with them, could not be simply 
disr^arded like the complaints of the Roman citiaeiKS Ibn 
jurod by tbe acts of the commissioners. Legally tht 
former might be no better founded than the latter; bul| 
while in the latter case the matter at stake was the private 
interests of members of the state, in reference to the Latin 
possessions the question arose, whether it was politically 
right to give fresh offence to communities so important in 
a military point of view and already so greatly estranged 
from Rome by numerous disabilities de jure and de facU 
fii. 393 et seq,) through this severe injury to their materia? 

Vol. IIL--6* 



\V^ 



ISO The Revolution [fiooK V9 

interests. The decision lay in the hands of the middU 
party ; it was that party which after the fall of Graoehua 
had, in league with his adherents, protected reform against 
the :^ligarchy, and it aloLe was now able in concert with the 
oligarchy to set a Jmit to reform. The Latins resorted 
personally to the most prominent man of this party, Sdpia 
Aemilianusy with a request that he wonld protect their 
rights. He promised to do so; and mainly through his 
influence,* in 625, a decree of the people with- 
drew from the commission its jurisdiction, and 
remitted the decision respecting what were domanial and 
what private possessions to the consuls, to whom, where no 
special laws enacted otherwise, it constitutionally pertained. 
This was simply a suspension of further domain-distribution 
under a mild form. The consul Tuditanus, by no means 
Graochan in his views and little inclined to occupy himself 
with the difficult task of agrarian definition, embraced the 
opportunity of going off to the Illyrian army and leaving 
the duty entrusted to him unfulfilled. The ailotment<>om* 
mission no doubt continued to subsist^ but, as the judicial 
regulation of the domain*land was at a standstill, it was 
impelled to remain inactive. The reform-party was deep- 
ly indignant. Even men like Publius Mucins and Quintus 
Metellus disapproved of the intervention of Scipio. 

Other circles were not content with expressing disap« 
proval. Scipio had announced for one of the 
uonof following days an address respecting the rela* 

^^ tions of the Latins ; on the morning of that day 
he was found dead in his bed. He was but fifty-six years 
of age, and in full health and vigour ; he had spok^i in 
pi blio the day before, and then in the evening had retired 
earlier than usual to his bedchamber with a view to prepare 
the outline of his speech for the following day. That he 

* To thig occasion belongs his oration contra legem iudiciarium 7\^ 
ffraeehi — which wc are to understand as referring not, as has been 
iiserted, to a law as to the indicia puhlica^ but to the supplementary law 
annexed to his agrarian rogation : ui triumviri iudicarent, qua ptAHeul 
affer^ qua prittatvs ettet (Lir. Ep. Iviii. ; See p. 114 above). 



Cbat. ni.] And OaiuB QracchuB. 13] 

beeame the yictim of a political assassination, cannot be 
doubted ; he himself shortly before had publicly mentioned 
the plots formed to murder him. What assassin's hand 
had during the night slain the first statesman and the first 
general of his age was never discovered ; and it does not 
become history either to repeat the reports handed down 
firom the contemporary gossip of the city, or to set about 
the childish attempt to ascertain the truth 0*1 i of such mate- 
rials. This much only is clear, that the instigator of the 
deed must have belonged to the Gracchan party ; the assas 
sination of Scipio was the democratic reply to the aristo- 
cratic massacre at the temple of Fidelity. The tribunals 
did not interfere. The popular party, justly fearing that its 
leaders Gains Gracchus, Flaccus, and Carbo, whether guilty 
or not, might be involved in the prosecution, opposed with 
all its might the institution of an inquiry ; and the aristoc- 
racy, which lost in Scipio quite as much an antagonist as 
an ally, was not unwilling to let the matter sleep. The 
multitude and men of moderate views were shocked ; nono 
more so than Quintus Metellus, who had disapproved of 
Scipio's interference against reform, but turned away with 
horror from such confederates, and ordered his four sons to 
carry the bier of his great antagonist to the funeral pile. 
The funeral was hurried over ; with veiled head the last of 
the &mi]y of the conqueror of Zama was borne forth, with- 
out any one having been previously allowed to see the face 
of the deceased, and the flames of the fiineral pile consumed 
the remains of the illustrious hero and with them the traces 
of the crime. 

The history of Rome presents various men of greater 
genius than Scipio Aemilianus, but none equalling him in 
moral purity, in the utter absence of political selfishness, in 
irenerous love of his country, and none, permps, to whom 
destiny has asmgned a more tragic part. Conscious of the 
beat intentions and of no common abilities, he was doomed 
to see the ruin of his country carried out before his eyes, 
and to repress within him every earnest attempt to save \\ 
because he clearly perceived that he should only thereby 



182 The Bevclution [Book IV 

Aggravate the evil ; doomed to the necessity of sanctioiuog 
outrages like that of Nasiea and at the same time of de 
fending the work of the victim against his murderers. Yol 
he might say that he had not lived in vain. It was to him, 
at least quite as much as to the author of the Semproniao 
law, that the Roman burgesses were indebted for an in^ 
crease of nearly 80,000 new &rm-allotments ; he it was too 
who put a stop to this distribution of the dommns, when il 
had produced such benefit as it could produce. That it was 
time to leave it off, was no doubt disputed at the moment 
even by well-meaning men ; but the £ust that Guus Grac- 
chus did not seriously recur to those possessions which 
might have been and yet were not distributed under the 
law of his brother, tells very strongly in favour of the 
belief that Scipio hit substantially the right moment. Both 
measures were extorted from the parties — the first from the 
aristocracy, the second from the friends of reform ; the lat- 
ter its author paid for with his life. It was his lot to fight 
for his country on many a battle-field and to return home 
uninjured, that he might perish there by the hand of an 
assassin ; but in his quiet chamber he no less died for Rome 
than if he had fallen before the waUs of Carthage. 

The distinbution of land was at an end ; the revoludon 
Dcnooniio went on. The revolutionary party, which pos- 
tmSiw ^bo sessed in the allotment-commission as it.were a 
•ndPimxm eonstituted leadership, had eveu in the lifetime 
of Scipio skirmishes now and then with the e\istin|^ govera- 
raent. Carbo, in particular, one of the mo«< disunguished 
men of his time in oratorical talent, had as tribune of the 
i« people in 623 given no small trouble to the sen- 

a9^A 

ate; had carried voting by ballot in the bur- 
gesB-assemblies, so &r as it had not been introduced already 
(p. 05) ; and had even made the significant proposal to 
leave the tribunes of the people free to reappear as oandi" 
dates foi the same office in the year immediately following^ 
and thus legally to remove the obstacle by which Tiberiuk 
Gracchus had primarily been thwarted. The scheme had 
been at that time frustrated by the resistance of Scipio; 



Oaat m] And Oavua Gracchus. 188 

Bome years later, apparently after bia death, the law passed. 
The piincipal oljject of the party, however, was to revive 
the action of the allotment-commission which had been 
practically sus^nded ; the leaders seriously talked of r^ 
moving the obstacles which the Italian allies interposed to 
the scheme by conferring on them the rights of citizenship, 
and the agitation assumed mainly that direction. In order 

mto meet it, the senate in 628 got the tribune of 
the people Marois Junius Penniis to propose the 
dismisaal of all n<m-burge86ea from tha capital, and in spite 
of the resistaooe of the democrats, particularly of Gaius 
Gracchus, and of the ferment occasioned by this odious 
measure in the Latin communities, the proposal was carried. 

m Marcus Fulvius Flaceus retorted in the follow* 

ing year (629) as consul with the proposal that 
every ally should be allowed to ask for Boman citizenship 
and to get a vote of the oomitia on hia requeat. But he 
stood almost alone — Carbo had meanwhile changed his 
colours and was now a zealous aristocrat, Gaius Gracchus 
was absent as quaestor in Sardinia—and the project was 
frustrated by the resistance not of the senate merely, but 
also of the burgesses, who were but. little inclined to extend 
their privilegea to a still wider circle, Flaocus lefb Bome 
to undertake the supreme command againati the Celts ; by 
his Transalpine conquests he prepared the way for the great ~ 
schemes of the democracy, while he at the same time; wkh* 
drew out of the difficulty of having to bear amis against, 
the allies instigated by himself. 

Fregellae, situated on the borders of Latium and Cam 
pania at the principal passage of the Liris in the> 
tf Fro- midst of a large and fertile territory, at thai 

fftttM. ^^^ perhaps the second citv of Italy and in the 

discussions wiUi Rome the usual moathpieca of all the 
Latin colonies, began war against Rome in consequence of 
the rejection of the proposal brought in by Flaceus — the 
first instance which had occurred for a hundred and fifty 
years of a serious inaurrectioD, not brought about^ by for 
»l£n powers, in Italy against t]^Q Roman he^gemoiiy. Buir 



184 TAs JRevohiUoi [Book T9 

on this oooasion the fire was successfully extinguished be 
fore it had caught hold of other allied communities. Not 
through the superiority of the Roman arms, but through 
the treachery of a Fregellan Quintus Numitorius Pulius, 
the praetor Lucius Opimius quickly became naaster of th« 
revolted city, which lost its civic privileges and its walls 
tnd «ras converted like Capua into a village. The colony 
of Fabrateria was founded on a part of its ter* 
ritory in 630; the remainder and the former 
city itself were distributed among the surrounding com- 
munities. This rapid and fearful punishment alarmed the 
allies, and endless impeachments for high treason pursued 
not only the Fregellans, but also the leaders of the popular 
party in Rome, who naturally were regarded by the aristoo* 
racy as accomplices in this insurrection. Meanwhile Gaius 
Gracchus reappeared in Rome. The aristocracy had first 
sought to detain the object of their dread in Sardinia by 
omitting to provide the usual relief, and then, wh«i without 
caring for that point he returned, had brought him to trial 
as one of the authors of the Frei^ellan revolt 

126-124* 

(620-30). But the burgesses acquitted him; 
and now he too threw down the gauntlet^ became a candi- 
date for the tribuneship of the people, and was nominated 

to that office for the year 681 in an elective 

assembly attended by unusual numbers. War 
was thus declared. The democratic party, always poor in 
leaders of ability, had from sheer necessity remained virtu- 
ally at rest for nine years ; now the truce was at an end, 
and this tame it was headed by a man who, with more hon- 
esty than Carbo and with more talent than Flaccus, was in 
every respect called to take the lead. 

Gaius Gracchus (601-633) was very different from hit 

brother, who was about nine years older. Like 
enios the latter, he had no relish for vulgar pleasures 

^ and vulgar pursuits ; he was a man of thorough 
culture and a brave soldier ; he had served with distinction 
before Numantia under his brother-in-law, and afberwarda 
in Sardinia. But in talent, in character, and above all it 



Chap. III.] And 6avu8 Orat^cfius. 185 

passion he was decidedly superior to Tiberius. The clear- 
ness and self-possession, which the young roan aflerwardi 
displayed amidst the pressure of all the varied labours 
requisite for the practical carrying out of his numerous 
laws, betokened his genuine statesmanly talent; as the 
passionate devotedness faithful even to death, with which 
tils intimate friends clung to him, evinced the loveable na- 
ture of that noble mind. The discipline of suffering which 
he had undergone, and his compulsory reserve during the 
last nine yeiirs, augmented his energy of purpose and ao* 
tion; the indignation repressed within the depths of his 
breast only glowed there with an intensified fervour against 
the party which had distracted his country and murdered 
his brother. By virtue of this fearful vehemence of tem- 
perament he became the foremost orator that Rome ever 
had ; without it, we should probably have been able to 
reckon him among the first statesmen of all times. Among 
the few remains of his recorded orations several * are, even 
in their present condition, of heart^tirring power ; and we 
can well understand how those who heard or even merely 
read them were carried away by the impetuous torrent of 
his words. Yet, great master as he was of language, he 
was himself not unfrequently mastered by anger, so that 
the utterance of the brilliant speaker became confused or 
faltering. It was the true image of his political acting and 
sufiering. In the nature of Gaius there was no vein, such 
as his broAer had, of that somewhat sentimental but very 
short-sighted and confused good-nature, which would have 
desired to change the mind of a political opponent by en- 
treaties and tears ; fiiBy and firmly resolved, he entered oa 

* Sadi are llie words spoken on the announcing of his projecls of 
law : — ** If I were to speak to you and ask of you, seeing that I am of 
noble descent and have lost my brother on your account and that theru 
Ib now no survivor of the descendants of Publius Afncanus and TiberiuM 
Gracchus excepting only myself and a boy, to allow me to take rest for 
tfie present, in order that our stock may not be extirpated and that an 
of&et of that family may still survive ; you would perhaps readily graaf 
me such a request." 



186 The Ee^olMtion [B«ok IV 

the career of revolutioo and strove to rc^h the goal of 
vengeance. *' To me too," his mother wrote to him, ^ DOth< 
ing seems finer and more glorious than to retaliate on an 
enemy, so far as it can be done without the counti j 's ruin» 
But if this is not possible, then may our enemies continue 
ind remain what they are, a thousand times rather than that 
>ur country should perish." Cornelia knew her son ; his 
veed was just the reverse. Vengeance he would wreak on 
the wretched government, vengeance at any price, though 
he himself and even the conuaonwealth were to be ruined 
by it. The presentiment, that fate would overtake him as 
certainly as his brother, drove him only to make haste, like 
a man mortally wounded who throws himself on the foe« 
The m<^her thought more nobly; but the son — with his 
deeply provoked, passionately escited, thoroughly Italian 
nature-— has be^i more lamented than blamed by posterity, 
and posterity has been right in its judgment. 

Tiberius Gracchus had come before the burgesses with 
Aiterationi * siuglc administrative reform. What Gaius 
*ttt**ti nb" introduced in a series of separate proposals was 
omiw nothing else than an entirely new constitution ; 

the foundation-stone of which was furnished by 
the innovation previously introduced, that a tribune of the 
peoftle should be at liberty to solicit re-election for the fol- 
lowing year. While this step enabled the popular chief to 
acquire a permanent position and one which protected its 
holder, the next object was to secure for him material powei 
OT^ in other words, to attach the multitude of the capital— 
for that no reliance was to be placed on the country people 
coming only from time to time to the city, had beejgt suffi- 
eiently apparent — ^with its interests steadfastly to its leader 
Dis^rfiy^iiiQ,^ This purpose was served, first of all, by intro> 
of graia diicing distributions of com in the capital. Thi 
grain accruing to the state from the provincial tenths had 
already been frequently given away at nominal prices tc 
thd burgesses (ii« 442). Gracchus enacted that every bur 
gess who should personally present himself in the capita! 
ihould thenceforth be allowed monthly a definite quantity «» 



Oka& m.] And Chiu^ Oracchus, Itl 

apparently 5 nwdii (1^ ba^el) — from the public stores, at 
G^ oiseg (3(i) for the modiua^ or not quite the half of a lo^v 
average price (ii. 443, note) ; for which purpose the publie 
coriMitores were enlarged by the construction of the new 
SesDpronian graearies. This distributions—which coiise- 
quuitly exciuded the bmrgesses living out of the capital, and 
could not but attract to Rome the. whole mass of the bur^ 
gess-proletariate^^waa designed to bring t)ie burgesiskprole- 
tamie of the capital, which hitherto had mainly depended 
OB the aristocracy, into dependence on t^ leaders of the 
movement-party, and thus to supply die new mai^ter of the 
state at once with a body-guard and with a firm mtyprity in 

thecomitia. For greater security as regards 
iiMor^e? the latter, moreover, the order of voting, still 
°^ subsisting in the eomUia centuriata^ according 
to which the five property-classes, in each tribe gave theii 
votes one after another (it 418), was done away ; instead 
of this, all the centuries were in future to vote after one 
another in an order of succession to be fixed on each occa- 
sion by lot. While these enactments were mainly designed 
to procure for the new chief of the state by means of the 
dty-proletariate die complete command of the capital and 
thereby of die state, the amplest control over the comitial 
machinery, and the power in case of need of strilcing terror 
into the senate and magistrates, the legislator certainly at 
die same tame set himself with earnestness and energy to 
redress the existing social evils. It is true that the Italian 
j^griu^^ domain question was in a certain sense settled, 
Uwi. Tjj^ agrarian law of Tiberius and even the allots 

ment-commisMon still continued legally in. force ;. the agra- 
rian law carried by Gracchus can have enacted nothing new 
lave the restoration to the commissioners of the jurisdiction 
wkich they had lost. That the object of tais step was only 
tc save the prindple, and that die diiitribution of lands, if 
resumed at all, was resumed only to a v^y limited extent^ 
is riiown by the burgess-roll, which gives exacdy the same 

numbor of persona for the years 629 and 639. 

Gwus beyond doubt did not proceed! furthei* iv 



188 The Hevol/ution Book IV 

this matter, because the doinain-land intended foi distribu* 
tion by his brother vas already in substance distributed, 
and the question as to the domains enjoyed by the Latins 
could only be taken up anew in connection with the very 
^ooj of difficult question as to the extension of RomaL^ 
^^^"** citizenship. On the other hand he took an im 

portant step beyond the agrarian law of Tiberius, when he 
proposed the establishment of colonies in Italy — ^at Tareu- 
turn, and more especially at Capua — ^and by that course 
rendered the domain-land whidi had been let on lease by 
the state and was hitherto excluded from distribution, liable 
to be also parcelled out, not, however, according to the pre- 
vious method, which did not contemplate the founding of 
new communities (p. 128), but according to. the colonial 
system. Beyond doubt these colonies were also designed 
to aid in permanently defending the revolution to which 
they owed their existence. Still more signifi- 
rine ooio* cant and momentous was the measure, by which 
*** Gains Gracchus first proceeded to provide for 
the Italian proletariate in the transmarine territories of the 
state. He despatched to the site on which Carthage bad 
stood 6,000 colonists selected perhaps not merely from Ro- 
man burgesses but also from the Italian allies, and con- 
ferred on the new town of Junonia the rights of a Roman 
burgess-colony. The foundation was important, but still 
more important was the principle of transmarine emigra- 
tion which it established. It opened up for the Italian pro- 
letariate a permanent outlet, and a relief in fact more than 
provisional; but it certainly abandoned the principle of 
■tate-law hitherto in force, by which Italy was regarded 
exclusively as the governing, and the provincial territory 
txclusively as the governed, land. 

To these measures having 'm mediate reference to the 
great question of the proletariate there was 
tto&B of the added a series of enactments, which arose out 
^******''* of the general tendency to introduce prindplei 
milde^r and more accordant with the spirit of the age thar 
the antiquated severity of the existing constitution. Tc 



Chap. Ill] And Ooius Orocohiuf. 139 

this head belong the modificatioiis in the military system. 
As to the length of the period of service there existed 
under the ancient law no other limit, except that no citizeu 
was liable to ordinary service in the field before completing 
his sixteenth or after completing hia forty-sixth year. 
When, in consequence of the occupation of Spain, tlie ser^ 
vice began to become perman^it (ii. 249), it seems to have 
been first legally enacteil that any one who had been in the 
field for six successive years acquired thereby a right to dis- 
charge, although this discharge did not protect him from 
being called out again afterwards. At a later period, per- 
haps about the beginning of this century, the rule arose, 
that a service of twenty years in the in&ntry or ten years 
in the cavalry gave exemption from further military ser- 
vice.* Gracchus renewed the rule—which was often, in all 
probabiMty, violently infringed — ^that no burgess should be 
enlisted in the army before the commencement of his seven- 
teenth year ; and also, apparently, restricted the number of 
campaigns requisite for full exemption from military duty. 
Besides, the clothing of the soldiers, the value of which had 
hitherto been deducted from their pay, was henceforward 
furnished gratuitously by the state. 

To this head belongs, moreover, the tendency which is 
on various occasions apparent in the Gracchan l^islation, 
if not to abolish, at any rate to restrict, capital punishment 
still further than had been done before — a tendency, which 
to some extent made itself felt even in military jurisdiction. 
From the very introduction of the republic the magistrate 

* Thus the Btatement of Appian {IIi$p. IB) that six years' service 
entitled a man to demand his discharge, may perhaps be reconciled wi^i 
the better known statement of Folybius (vi. 19), respecting which hst- 
qiurdt (AUertlL iil 8, 286 A. 1680) lias formed a correct judgment 
Tha time, at wliioh the two alteralaoDS were introduced, cannot bo de* 
twmined ftirther than that the first was probably in existence as early 
as 608 (Nitzsch, Oracehen, p. 2S1), and the second oer* 
tainly as early as the time of Polybius. That Gracchus 
reduced the number of the legal years of seryice, seems to fellow from 
Asconius in Comd. p 68 ; oomp. Plutarch, Ti, Chracth, 16 ; Dio, Ft 
IS, V, Bekk. 



140 The RevoltUion [Qqok it 

had lost the right of inflicting capital punishment on th« 
buigess without consulting the community, except undec 
rcartiAl law (i. 326, 561 )• As this right of appeal ol tiie 
part of the burgess appears soon after the period of ilu» 
Gracchi available even in the oaoip, and the right of thf 
general to inflict capital punishments appears restricted W 
allies and subjects, the source of the change is probably t^ 
he sought in the law of G<8ius Gracehos de provocttfumM^^ 
The right of the community to inflict or rather to costfirm 
sentence of death waa also indirectly but materiaUy limited 
by the fact, that Gracchus withdrew the cognisance of those 
public crimes which most frequently ^ve occasion to ci^>i- 
tal sentences — ^poisoning and murder generally-r^from the 
burgesses, and entrusted it to permanent judicial oomhMSr 
sions. These could not, like the tribunals of the people, be 
broken up by the intercession of a tribune, and. tjiere noi 
only lay no appeal from them to the community, but their 
sentences were as little subject to be annulled by the com- 
munity as those of the old institute of civil jurymen. In 
the burgess-tribunals it had, especially in strictly political 
processes, no doubt long been the rule that the accused re^ 
mained at liberty during his trial, and was allowed by sur< 
tendering his burgess^rights to withdraw from punishment 
and to save his life and freedom as well as his property, so 
far, of course, as no civil claims were made good against the 
latter. But preliminary arrest and complete execution of 
the sentence remained in such cases at least legally possible, 
and were still sometimes carried into efiect even against 
persons of rank ; for instance, Lucius Hostilius Tubulus, 
praetor in 612, who was capitally impeached for 
a heinous crime, was refused the privilege of 
exile, arrested, and executed. On the other hand the judl* 
cial commissions, which originated out of the form of dvil 
prooess, could not from the first touch the liberty or life of 
the citizen, but at the most could only pronounce sentence 
of exile ; this, which had hitherto been a mitigation of pun« 
ishmcnt accorded to one who was found guilty, aow became 
for the first time a formal penalty. This involuntary eyilf 



CkA^. III.] And tkriw "Omuychus. 141 

however, like the voluatary, left to the person banished hn 
l^^operty, so far as it was not exhausted in satisfying claims 
for compensation and fines. 

Lastly, in the matter of debt Gains Gracchus made no 
'chetation. But very respe(^ble authorities assert that he 
held out to those in debt the hope of a diminution or r» 
mission of claims ; which, if it is correct, must likewise be 
y«ckoned among those popular measures of a radical stamp. 

While Gracchus thus leaned on the support of the mul- 
titude, whieh partly expected, partly received 
iiteeiia6«- fV*om him a material improvement of its posi- 
* tion, he laboured with equal energy at the ruin 
of the aristocracy. Perceiving clearly how insecure was 
the power of the head of the state if based merely on the 
proletariate, he applied himself above all to split the aria- 
tocracy and to draw a part of it over to his interests. The 
elements of such a rupture were already in exist^ce. The 
aristocracy of the rich, which had risen as one man against 
Til)erius Gracchus, consisted in foot of two essentially dis- 
similar bodies, which may be in some measure compared 
to the peerage and the city aristocracy of England. The 
one embraced the practically close circle of the governing 
senatorial &milies who kept aloof from direct speculation 
and invested their immense capital partly in landed prop- 
erty, partly as sleeping partners in the great companies. 
The main body of the second class was composed of the 
speculators, who, as managers of these companies, or on 
their own account, conduct^ the large mercantile and pecu- 
niary transactions throughout the range of the Roman hege- 
mony. We have already shown (ii. 449 ei seq.) how the 
latter dass, especially in the course of the sixth century, 
graduallj took its place by the side of the senatorial aris- 
tocracy, and how the legal exdusion of the senators from 
Ki^rimkttile pursuits by the Claudian ordinance, suggested 
by GaiuB Flaminius the precursor of the Gracchi, drew an 
outward line of demarcation between the senators and the 
mercantile and nM>neyed men. n the present epoch th< 
m^i^antilfe afistocracy began, under the Laine of t^ eqviitt 



14S The £evoliUian [Book i? 

lo exercise a dedsive influeDoe in politiGal affairs. Thit 
appellation, which originally belonged only to the burgess* 
cavalry on service, came gradually to be transferred, at any 
rate in ordinary use, to all those who, as possessors of an 
estate of at least 400,000 sesterces, were liable to cavaiiy 
service in general, and thus comprehended the whole upper 
ranks, senatorial and non-senatorial, of society in Rome. 
But not long before the time of Gains Gracchus the law had 
declared a seat in the senate incompatible with service in 
the cavalry (p. 95), and the senators were thus marked off 
from those • capable of serving as equites ; and accordingly 
the equestrian order, taken as a whole, might be regarded 
as representing the aristocracy of speculators in contradis- 
tinction to the senate. Nevertheless those members of sen- 
atorial families who had not entered the senate, more espe- 
cially the younger members, did not cease to serve as 
equites and consequently to bear the name ; and, in fiict, 
the burgess-cavalry properly so called — that is, the eighteen 
equestrian centuries — in consequence of being made up by 
the censors continued to be chiefly filled up from the young 
senatorial aristocracy (ii. 379). 

This order of the equites — that is to say, substantially, 
of the wealthy merchants — ^in various ways came roughly 
into contact with the governing senate. There was a natu- 
ral antipathy between the genteel aristocrats and the men 
to whom money had given rank. The ruling lords, espe- 
cially the better class of them, stood just as much aloof 
from speculations, as the men of material interests were 
indifferent to political questions and coterie-feuds. The 
two classes had already frequently come into sharp col- 
lision, particularly in the provinces ; for, though in general 
the provincials had far more reason than the Roman capi* 
talists had to complain of the partiality of the Roman 
magistrates, yet the ruling lords of the senate did not con* 
descend to countenance the greedinesses and injustices of 
tlie moneyed men at the expense of the subjects bo thor- 
onghly and absolutely as was desired. In spite of their 
agreement in (^posing a common foe such as was Tiberiuf 



Obap. m.] And Gaiua Oracchus, 14S 

Onuxshus, a deep gulf lay between the nobility and the 
moneyed aristoeracy ; and Gains, more adroit than hli 
brother, enlarged it till the alliance was broken up and the 
mercantile class ranged itself on his side. That the exter- 
nal privileges, through which afterwards the 
If £^ men oi equestrian census were distinguished 
^™ from the rest of the multitude-— the golden fin- 

ger-ring instead of the ordinary ring of iron or copper, and 
the separate and better place at the burgess-festivals — were 
first conferred on the equites by Gains Gracchus, is not cer- 
tain, but is not improbable. For they emerged at any rate 
about this period, and, as the extension of these hitherto 
mainly senatorial privileges (ii. 374, 379) to the equestrian 
order which he brought into prominence was quite in the 
style of Gracchus, so it was in very truth his aim to im 
press on the equites the stamp of an order, similarly close 
and privileged, intermediate between the senatorial aristoc- 
racy and the common multitude ; and this same aim was 
more promoted by those class-insignia, trifling though they 
were in themselves and though many of equestrian rank 
might not avail themselves of them, than by many an ordi* 
nance far more intrinsically important. But the party of 
material interests, though it by no means despised such 
honours, was yet not to be gained through these alone. 
Gracchus perceived well that it would doubtless duly fall 
to the highest bidder, but that it needed a great and sub- 
stantial bidding ; and so he offered to it the revenues of 
Asia and the jury courts. 

The system of Roman financial administration, undei 
l^xaiioa which the indirect taxes as well as the domain- 
cf Asia.. revenues were levied by means of middlemeui 
in itaelf granted to the Roman capitalist-class the most ex- 
tensive ac vantages at the expense of those liable Us tax»> 
tion. But the direct taxes consisted either, as in most 
provinces, of fixed sums of money payable by the com- 
munities — which of itself excluded the intervention of Ro* 
man capitalists — or, as in Sicily and Sardinia, of a ground 
tenth, the levying of whjch for each particular community 



144 The BevaltUian [Boom V9 

was le&ied in the provinces themselves, so that wealthy 
proTinmals regularly, and the tributary communities diem* 
selves very frequently, fiurmed the tenth of their districts 
and thereby kept at a distance the dangerous Roman mid- 
dlemen. Six years ago, when the province of Asia had 
ftiUen to the Romans, the senate had organized it substan 
^ally according to the first system (p. 75). Gaius Grao 
chus * overturned this arrangement by a decree of the peo 
pie, and not only burdened the province, which had hithertc 
been almost free from taxation, with the most extensive in- 
direct and direct taxes, particularly the ground-tenth, but 
also enacted that these taxes should be exposed to auction 
for the province as a whole and in Rome — a rule which 
practically excluded the provincials from participation, and 
called into existence in the body of middlemen for the 
decumaey seriptura, and vecHgalia of the province of Asia 
an association of capitalists of colossal magnitude. A sig 
nificant indication, moreover, of the endeavour of Gracchus 
to make the order of capitalists independent of the senate 
was the enactment, that the entire or partial remission of 
the stipulated rent was no longer, as hitherto, to be granted 
by the senate at discretion, but was under definite eontin 
gencies to be accorded by law. 

While a gold mine was thus opened for the mercantile 
class, and the members of the new partnership 
constituted a great financial power imposing 
«ven for the government— *a " senate of merchants "— * defi- 
nite sphere of public action was at the same time assigned 
to them in the jury courts. The field of the criminal pro> 
oedure whidi by right fell to be conducted before the bu^ 
geosoD was amoi^ the Romans from the first very narrow, 
and was, as we have already stated (p. 140), still forthei 
narrowed by Grracchus. Most processe8-<-both such as re* 
iated to public crimes, and civil causes--*were decided eithei 

* That he, and not Tiberias, was the author of this law, ntm 
aiipearo from Fronto in the letters to Yerus, init. Comp. Graoohiis t^ 
«eU. XL .0 ; Cic. de Jiq>. iii. 29, and Verr. iil 6, 12 ; yeUei..ii: S. 



Chap. UL] And Gwivs Grocchus, 145 

by single jurymen \iudice8\ or by commissioiis partly pcr- 
manenty partly extraordinary. Hitherto both the former 
and the latter had been exclusively taken from the senate ; 
Gracchus transferred the functions of jurymen — ^both in 
strictly civil processes, and in the case of the standing and 
temporary commissions — to the equestrian order, directing 
% new list of jurymen to be annually formed after the anal- 
o^Y of the equestrian centuries from all persons of eques- 
trian rating, and excluding the senators directly, and the 
young men of Senatorial families by the fixing of a certain 
limit of age, from judicial functions.* It is not improbable 
that the selection of jurymen was chiefly, made to fall on 
the same men who played the leading part in the great 
mercantile associations, particularly those farming the reve- 
nues in Asia and elsewhere, just because these had a very 
close personal interest in sitting in the courts ; and, if the 
lists of iudicei and the societies of publicani thus coincided 
as regards their chie&, we can all the better understand the 
significance of the counter-senate thus constituted. The 
substantial effect of this was, that, while hitherto there had 
been only two authorities in the state — the government as 
the administering and controlling, and the burgesses as the 
legislative, authority — ^and the courts had been divided be- 
tween them, now the moneyed aristocracy was not only 
united into a compact and privileged class on the solid 
basis of material interests, but also, as a judicial and con- 
trolling power, formed part of the state and took its place 
almost on a footing of equality by the side of the rulir^ 
aristocracy. All the old antipathies of the merchants 
against the nobility necessarily, from this time forth, found 
only too practical an expression in the sentences of the 
juiymen ; above all, when the provincial governors were 
called to account, the senator had to await a decision in- 

* We still possess a great portion of the new ordinance— -primarily 
Mscasioned by this alteration in the penonn^ of the judges— for the 
standing commission regarding extortion ; it is known under the iiunf 
of the Seryilian, or rather A^cilian, law de rtpetundia. 

Vol. liT.— 7 



146 The JR&VollUwn [Book Vf 

yolving his civil ex Btenoe at the hands no longer as former 
ly of his peers, but of great merchants and bankers. The 
feuds between the Roman capitalists and the Roman gov« 
emors were transplanted from the provincial administrai 
tion to the dangerous field of ^^hese processes of reckonhig. 
Not only was the aristocracy of the rich divided, but care 
was taken that the variance should always find fresh nour- 
ishment and easy expression. 

With his weapons — the proletariate and the mercantile 

iConaxdiiMii ^^^^ — ^^^^ prepared, Gracchus* proceeded to his 
^7^^^ main work, the overthrow of the rulinc: aristocy 
«v that of racy. The overthrow of the senate meant, on 
the one hand, the depriving it of its essential 
functions by legislative changes; and on the other hand, 
the ruining of the existing aristocracy by measures of a 
more personal and transient kind. Gracchus did both. 
The function of administration, in particular, had hitherto 
belonged exclusively to the senate ; Gracchus took it awayi 
partly by settling the most important administrative ques- 
tions by means of comiUal laws or, in other words, practi« 
cally through tribunician dictation, partly by restricting the 
senate as much as possible in curr^it affairs, partly by 
taking business after the most comprehensive fashion into 
his own hands. The measures of the former kind have 
been mentioned already. The new master of the state 
without consulting the senate meddled with the state-chest, 
by imposing a permanent and oppressive burden on the 
public finances in the distribution of com ; meddled with 
the domains, by sending out colonies not as formerly by 
decree of the senate but by decree of the people ; and med- 
dled with the provincial administration, by overturning 
through a law of the people the financial constitution given 
by tne senate to the province of Asia and substituting for 
it one altogether different. One of the most important of 
the current duties of the senate — the arbitrary fixing of the 
respective spheres of duty of the two consuls — was not 
withdrawn from it ; but the indirect pressure hitherto ex- 
errised in this way over the supreme magistrates was neiar 



CaiP. m.] And Oatm Oracchus. 14 1 

tralized by directiog the senate to fix the spheres of duty 
before the consuls concerned were elected. With unrivalled 
activity, lastly, Gains concentrated the most varied and most 
complicated functions of government in his own person. "^N 
He himself watched over the distribution of grain, selected 
the jurymen, founded the colonies in person notwithstanding 
that his magistracy legally chained him to the city, regu 
lated highways and concluded building-contracts, led the 
discussions of the senate, settled the consular elections-— in 
short, he accustomed the people to the fiiot that one man 
was foremost in all things, and threw the lax and lame ad« 
ministration of the senatorial college into the shade by the 
vigour and dexterity of his personal rule. 

Gracchus interfered with the jurisdiction, still more 
energetically than with the administration, of the senate. 
We have already mentioned that he set aside the senators 
from the ordinary judicial functions ; the same course was 
taken with the jurisdiction which the senate a^ the supreme 
administrative board assumed in exceptional cases. Under 
severe penalties he prohibited — apparently in his renewal 
of the law de provocatione * — the appointment of extraor- 
dinary commissions of high treason by decree of the sen- 
ate, such as that which after his brother's murder had sat 
in judgment on his adherents. The effect of these meas- 
ures was, that the senate wholly lost the power of control, 
and retained only so much of administration as the head of 
the state thought fit to leave to it. But these organic mea» 
ures were not enough; the governing aristocracy for the 
time being was also directly assailed. It was a mere act 
of revenge, which assigned retrospective effect to the last- 
mentioned law and by virtue of it compelled Publios 
Popillius — the aristocrat who after the death of Naslca, 
which had occurred in the interval, ^as chiefly obnoxious 
to the democrats — to leave the country. It is remaji'kable 
that this proposal was only carried by eighteen to seven 

* This and the Uir ne quU iudieio cirtumvmiaiHr may faave beei 
Uentical. 



148 The HevoltUum [Book n 

teen votes in the assembly of the tribes — a sign how muck 
the influenee of the aristocracy still availed with the multi 
tudei at least in questions of a personal interest. A simi 
lar but fkr less justifiable decree — the proposal, directed 
against Marcus Octavius, that whoever had been deprived 
of his office by decree of the people should be for ever in- 
capable of filling a public post — was recalled by Gracchus 
At the request of his mother ; and he was thus spared the 
disgrace of openly mocking justice by legalizing a notorious 
violation of the constitution, and of taking base vengeance 
on a maj) of honour, who had not spoken an angry word 
against Tiberius and had only acted constitutionally and in 
accordance with what he conceived to be his duty. But of 
very different importance from these measures was the 
scheme of Gaius — which, it is true, was hardly carried into 
effect — to reinforce the senate by 300 new members, that is, 
by just about as many as it previously had, and to have 
them elected from the equestrian order by the comitla — a 
creation of peers after the most comprehensible style, which 
would have reduced the senate into the most complete de- 
pendence on the chief of the state. 

This was the political constitution which Gaius Gracchus 

projected and, in its most essential points, car- 
S'tSe^- ^^^^ o^^ during the two years of his tribunate 
^tjfttionof ^^j^ ^2), without, so far as we can see, en 
Ss^sb" countering any resistance worthy of mention, 

and witiiout requiring to apply force for the at- 
tainment of his ends. The order in which these measures 
were carried can no longer be recognized in the broken ac- 
counts handed down to us, and various questions that sugr 
gost themselves have to remain unanswered. But it does 
not ^em as if, in what is missing, many elements of mate- 
rial im])ortance can have escaped us ; for as to the principal 
matters wo have information entirely trustworthy, and 
Gaius was by no means like his brother urged on furthei 
and further by the current of events, but evidently had s 
well-considered and comprehensive plan, the substance o( 
which he fully embodied in a series of special laws. 



Qsip. nL] And Gat us OracGhvs. 14ft 

Now the Sernpronian constitution itself shows very 
dearly to every one who is able and willing to see, that 
Gaius Gracchus did not at all, as many good-natured people 
in ancient and modern times have supposed, wish to place 
the Roman republic on new democratic bases, but that on 
the contrary he wished to abolish it and to introduce in it* 
Btead a Tyrannis — that is, in modem language, a monarchy 
not of the feudal or of the theocratic, but of the Napoleonic 
absolute, type— in the form of a magistracy continued for 
life by regular re-election and rendered absolute by an un- 
conditional command of the formally sovereign comitia, an 
unlimited tribuneship of the people for life. In fact if 
Gracchus, as his words and still more his works plainly 
testify, umed at the overthrow of the government of the 
senate, what other political organization but the Tyrannis 
remained possible, after overthrowing the aristocratic gov- >^ 
emment, in a commonwealth which had outgrown collective 
assemblies and had no knowledge of parliamentary govern- 
ment ? Dreamers such as was his predecessor, and knaves 
such as after times produced, might call this in question ; 
but Gaius Gracchus was a statesman, and though the formal 
shape, which that great man had projected for his great 
work, has not been handed down to us and may be con- 
ceived of very variously, yet he was beyond doubt aware 
of what he was doing. While the intention of usurping 
monarchical power can scarcely be mistaken, those who 
survey the whole circumstances will scarcely blame Grao> 
chus for it. An absolute monarchy is a great misfortune 
for a nation, but it is a less misfortune than an absolute 
oligarchy ; and history cannot censure one who imposes do 
a nation the lesser suffering instead of the greater, least of 
ill in the case of a nature so vehemently earnest and so far 
nloof from all that is vulgar as was that of Gaius G racchu8« 
Nevertheless it may not conceal the fact that his whole 
legislation was pervaded in a most pernicious way by con 
flicting tdms ; for on the one hand it aimed at the publio 
good, while on the other band it ministered to the persona} 
objeotfl auid in &ct the personal vengeance of the ruler 



152 The HevohUion [Book iy 

times stupid, sometimes knayish, and its talk of the sov^ 
i*eigDty of the people — lay like an incubus for five hundred 
years upon the Roman commonwealth and only perished 
along with it And yet this greatest of political trans^ 
gressors was the regenerator of his country. There ii 
scarce a fruitful idea in Roman monarchy, which i« nol 
traceable to Gains Gracchus. From him* proceeded the 
maxim — founded doubtless in a certain sense in the nature 
of the traditionary laws of war, but yet in the extension 
and practical application now given to it foreign to the older 
state-law — ^that all the land of the subject communities was 
to be regarded as the private property of the state; a 
maxim which was primarily employed to vindicate the 
right of the state to tax that land at pleasure, as was the 
ease in Asia, or to apply it for the institution of colonies, 
as was done in Africa, and which became afterwards a 
fundamental principle of law under the empire. From 
him proceeded the tactics adopted by the demagogues and 
tyrants, whereby with the support of material interests 
they broke down the governing aristocracy, but subse- 
quently legitimized the change of constitution by substi- 
tuting a strict and judicious administration for the previous 
misgovemment. To him, in particular, are traceable the 
first steps towards such a reconciliation between Rome and 
the provinces as the establishment of monarchy could not 
but bring in its train ; the attempt to rebuild Carthage 
destroyed by Italian rivalry and generally to open the way 
for Italian emigration towards the provinces, formed the 
first link in the long chain of that momentous and bene- 
ficial course of action. Right and wrong, fortune and mis- 
fortune were so inextricably blended in this singular man 
and in this marvellous political constellation, that it may 
well beseem history in this case — though it beseems her but 
seldom — to reserve her judgment. 

When Gracchus had substantially completed the new 
constitution projected by him for the state, h« 
MonMto applied himself to a second and difficult work< 
The question as to the Italian allies was still uo 



Chap. ILL] And Gmu GracohvsB. 15d 

decided. What were the views of the democratic leaden 
regarding it, had been rendered sufficiently apparent (p 
133). They naturally desired the utmost possible exten- 
sion of the Roman franchise, not only in order to render 
the domains occupied by the Latins liable to distribution. 
but above all in order to reinforce their following by the 
enormous mass of the new burgesses, to bring the comitial 
machine still more fully under their power by widening the 
body of privileged electors, and generally to abolish a dis- 
tinction which had now with the Bill of the republican con- 
stitution lost all serious importance. But here they en- 
countered resistance from their own party, and especially 
from that band which otherwise readily gave its sovereign 
affirmative to all which it did or did not understand. For 
the simple reason that Roman citizenship seemed to these 
people, so to speak, like a partnership which gave them a 
claim to share in sundry very tangible profits, direct and 
indirect, they were not at all disposed to enlarge the num- 
ber of the partners. The rejection of the Ful- 
vian law in 629, and the insurrection of the Fre- 
gellans arising out of it, were significant indications both 
of the obstinate perseverance of the fraction of the bur- 
gesses that ruled the comitia, and of the urgent impatience 
of the allies. Towards the end of his second 
tribunate (632) Gracchus, probably urged by 
obligations which he had undertaken towards the allies, 
ventured on a second attempt In concert with Marcus 
FJaccus — who, although a consular, had again taken the 
tribuneship of the people, in order now to torry the law 
which he had formerly proposed without success — he made 
a proposal to grant to the Latins the full franchise, and to 
the other Italian allies the former rights of the Latins. 
But the proposal encountered the united opposition of the 
senate and the mob of the capital. The nature of this coa- 
lition and its mode of conflict are clearly and distinctly seen 
from an accidentally preserved fragment of the speeck 
which the consul Gaius Fannius made to the burgesses in 
Dpp«>titiou to the proposal. '' Do you then think," said tht 
Vol.. IIL— 7* 



154 The Revolution [Book iy 

Optimate, *' that, if you confer the franchise on the Latin^ 
you will be able to find a place in future — just as you an 
now standing there in front of me — in the burgess-assem- 
bly or at the games and popular amusements ? Do you 
not believe, on the contrary, that those people will occupy 
every spot % " Among the burgesses of the fifth century, 
who on one day conferred the franchise on all the Sabinea, 
such an orator might perhaps have been hissed ; those of 
the seventh found his reasoning uncommonly dear and the 
price of the assignation of the Latin domains, which waa 
offered to it by Gracchus, far too low. The very circum- 
stance, that the senate carried a permission to eject from 
the city all non-burgesses before the day for the decisive 
vote, showed the fate in store for the proposal. And when 
before the voting Livius Drusus, a colleague of Gracchu8| 
interposed his veto against the law, the people received the 
veto in such a way that Gracchus could not venture to pro* 
ceed further or even to prepare for Drusus the fate of Mar 
cus Octavius. 

It was, apparently, this success which emboldened the 
Overthrow Senate to attempt the overthrow of the victori- 
ofOraodhna. QQg demagogue. The weapons of attack were 
substantially the same with which Gracchus himself had 
formerly operated. The power of Gracchus rested on the 
mercantile class and the proletariate; primarily on the 
latter, which in this conflict, wherein neither side had any 
military reserve, acted as it were the part of an army. It 
was clear that the senate was not powerful enough to wrest 
dther from the merchants or from the proletariate their 
new privileges ; any attempt to assail the corn-laws or the 
new jury-Arrangement would have led, under a somewhat 
grosser or somewhat more civilized form, to a street-riot in 
presence of which the senate was utterly defenceless. But 
it was no less clear, that Gracchus himself and these mer* 
chants and proletarians were only kept together by mutual 
advantage, and that the men of material interests were 
ready to accept their posts, and the populace strictly so- 
called its bread, quite as well from any other as from Ghiui 



Chaf. m.] And Gaiua Otaochas. 15fi 

Gracchus. The institutioDs of Gracchus stood, for the mo- 
ment at least, immoveably firm with the exception of a sin* 
gle one*-his own supremacy. The weakness of the latter 
lajK in the fact, that in the constitution of Gracchus no rela^ 
tions of allegiance subdsted at all between the chief and the 
army ; and, while the new constitution possessed all othet 
elements of Titality, it lacked one— -the moral tie between 
ruler and ruled, without which every state rests on a pede» 
tal of clay. In the rejection of the proposal to admit the 
Latins to the J&anchise it had been demonstrated with de* 
oisive clearness that the multitude in lact never voted for 
Gracchus, but always simply for itself. The aristocracy 
conceived the plan of offering battle to the author of the 
corn-largesses and land-assignations on his own ground. 

As a matter of course, the senate offered to the prol^ 
BiTai dema- ^"^^ ^^^ merely the same advantages as Grao- 

gpsiam of chus had already assured to it in com and other- 
toe smate. * 

TheUTian wisc, but advantages still greater. Commis- 
sioned by the senate, the tribune of the people 
Marcus Livius Drusus proposed to release those who re- 
ceived land under the laws of Gracchus from the rent im- 
posed on them (p. 114), and to declare their allotments to 
be free and alienable property ; and, further, to provide for 
the proletariate not in transmarine, but in twelve Italian, 
colonies, each of 3,000 colonists, for the planting of which 
the people might nominate suitable men ; only, Drusus 
himself declined — in contrast with the Gracchan fiMMily- 
tolltgium — to take part in this honourable duty. Probably 
the Latins were named as those at whose expense the plan 
was to be carried out, for there does not appear to havt 
now existed in Italy other occupied domain-land of any ex- 
tent save that which was enjoyed by them. We find enao^ 
ments of Drusus — such as the regulation that the punish* 
ment of scoui^ing should only be allowed to be inflicted on 
the Latin soldier by the Latin officer set over him, and nol 
by the Roman officer — which were to all appearance intend* 
ed to indemnify the Latins for other losses. The plan wai 
not the most refined. The attempt at rivalry was too cl«ar , 



156 The Revolution [Book n 

the endeavour to draw the fair bond betAveen the noblei 
and the proletariate still closer by their exercising jointly a 
tyranny over the Latins was too transparent ; the inquiry 
suggested itself too readily, In what part of the peninsulsi 
now that the Italian domains had been mainly given away 
already — even granting that the whole domains assigned to 
the Latins were confiscated — was the occupied domain-land 
requisite for the formation of twelve new, numerous, and 
compact burgess-communities to be discovered % Lastly 
the declaration of Drusus, that he would have nothing to 
do with the execution of his law, was so dreadfully prudent 
that it was almost the height of absurdity. But the clumsy 
snare was quite suited for the stupid game which they 
wished to catch. There was the additional and perhaps de- 
cisive consideration, that Gracchus, on whose personal iur 
fluence everything depended, was just then establishing the 
Carthaginian colony in Africa, and that his lieutenant in the 
capital, Marcus Flaccus, played into the hands of his oppo- 
nents by his vehemence and incapacity. The "people" 
accordingly ratified the Liviau laws as readily as it had 
before ratified the Sempronian. It then, as usual, repaid its 
latest, by inflicting a gentle blow on its earlier, bene&ctor, 
declining to re-elect him when he stood for the third time 
as a candidate for the tribunate for the year 638 ; 
on which occasion, however, there are alleged to 
have been unjust proceedings on the part of the tribune 
presiding at the election, who had been formerly offended 
by Gracchus. Thus the foundation of his despotism gave 
way beneath him. A second blow was inflicted on him by 
the consular elections, which not only proved in a general 
sense adverse to the democracy, but which placed at the 
head of the state Lucius Opimius, who as prae- 
tor in 629 had conquered Freg«llae, one of ths 
most decided and least scrupulous chiefs of the strict 8rii(o> 
eratic party, and a man firmly resolved to get rid of tfaeit 
dangerous antagonist at the earliest opportunity. 

Such an opportunity soon occulred. On the lOth of 
ut December, 682, Gracchus ceased to be tnbunf 



Chap. HI.] And Q i%u% Oracchu9. 161 

^j of the people; on the 1st of January, 633, 

Atfeudtoo Opimius entered on his offioe. The first attack, 
marine ooio- as was fair, was directed asrainst the most useful 
Dovn&iiof and the most unpopular measuie of Gracchus, 
™' the restoration of Carthage. While the tran» 
marine colonies had hitherto been only indirectly assailed 
through the greater allurements of the Italian, African hy- 
aenas, it was now alleged, dug up the newly-placed boundary* 
stones of Cartilage, and the Roman priests, when requested, 
certified that such signs and portents ought to form an express 
warning against rebuilding on a site accursed by the gods. The 
senate thereby found itself in conscience compelled to have 
a law proposed, which prohibited the planting of the colony 
of Junonia. Gracchus, who with the other men nominated 
to establish it was just then selecting the colonists, appeared 
on the day of voting at the Capitol whither the burgesses 
were convoked, with a view to procure by means of his 
adherents the rejection of the law. He wished to shun acts 
of violence, that he might not himself supply his opponents 
with the pretext which they sought ; but he had not been 
able to prevent a great portion of his faithful partisans, 
who remembered the catastrophe of Tiberius and were well 
acquainted with the designs of the aristocracy, from appear- 
ing in arms, and amidst the immense excitement on both 
sides quarrels could hardly be avoided. The consul Lucius 
Opimius offered the usual sacrifice in the porch of the Capi- 
toline temple ; one of the attendants assisting at the cere- 
mony, Quintus Antullius, with the holy entrails in his hand, 
haughtily ordered the " bad citizens " to quit the porch, and 
seemed as though he would lay hands on Gains himself; 
whereupon a zealous Gracchan drew his sword and cut the 
man down. A fearful tumult arose. Gracchus vainly 
sought to address the people and to avert from himself the 
responsibility of the sacrilegious murder ; he only furnished 
his antagonists with a fresh and formal ground of accusa- 
tion, as, without being aware of it in the confusion, he in 
terrupted a tribune in the act )f speaking to the people— 
an offence, for which an obsolete statute, originating at tb* 



158 The Revol/wUan [Bmk V9 

time of the old dissensions between the orders (L 355), had 
prescribed the severest penalty. The consul Lucius Opi 
mius took his measures to put down by force of arms ths 
insurrection for the overthrow of the republican constitut 
tion^ as they chose to designate the events of this day. He 
himself passed the night in the temple of Castor in the 
Forum *, at early dawn the Capitol was filled with Cretan 
aixiherSy the senate4iottse and Forum with the men of the 
government party— 4he senators and the section of the 
equites adhering to them — who by order of the consul had 
all appeared in arms and each attended by two armed 
slaves. None of the aristocracy were absent; even the 
aged and venerable Quintus Metellus, well disposed to re- 
form, had app-iared with shield and sword. An officer of 
ability and experience acquired in the Spanish wars, Ded- 
mus Brutus, was entrusted with the command of the armed 
force ; the senate assembled in the senate>house. The bier 
with the corpse of Antullius was deposited in front of it ; 
the senate, as if surprised, appeared en masse at the door in 
order to view the dead body, and then retired to determine 
what should be done. The leadei'S of the democracy had 
gone from the Capitol to their houses ; Marcus Flaccus had 
spent the night in preparing for the war in the streets, while 
Gracchus apparently disdained to strive with destiny. Next 
morning, when they learned the preparations made by their 
opponents at the Capitol and the Forum, both proceeded to 
the Aventine, the old stronghold of the popular -party in 
the struggles between the patricians and the plebeians. 
Gracchus went thither silent and unarmed ; Flaccus called 
the slaves to arms and entrenched himself in the temple of 
Diana, while he at the same time sent his younger son 
Quintus to the enemy's camp in order if possible to arrange 
a compromise. The latter returned with the announcement 
that the aristocracy demanded unconditional surrender ; at 
the same time he brought a summons from the senate Uf 
Gracchus and Flaccus to appear before it and to answer for 
their violation of the majesty of the tribimes. Gracchm 
wished to comply with the summc ns, but Flaccus preventi 



Chap. HI.] And Gums Gracehtis. 168 

ed him from doing 80« and repeated the equally weak and 
mistaken attempt to move such antagonists to a oompro- 
mise. When instead of the two cited leaders the young 
Quintus Flaccus once more presented himself alone, the 
consul treated their refusal to appear as the b^inning of 
open insurrection against the government ; he ordered the 
mess^iger to be arrested and gave the signal for attack on 
the Aventine, while at the same time he caused proclama* 
tion to be made in the streets that the government would 
give to whosoever should bring the head of Gracchus or of 
Flaccus its literal weight in gold, and that they would 
guarantee complete indemnity to every one who should 
leave the Aventiue before the beginning of the conflict. 
The ranks on the Aventine speedily thinned; the valiant 
nobility in union with the Cretans and the slaves stormed 
the almost undefended Mount, and killed all whom they 
found, about 250 persons, mostly of humble rank. Marcus 
Flaccus fled with his eldest son to a place of concealment, 
where they were soon afterwards hunted out and put to 
death. Gracchus had at the beginning of the conflict re- 
tired into the temple of Minerva, and was there about to 
pierce himself with his sword, when his friend Publius 
Laetorius seized his arm and besought him to preserve him- 
self if possible for better times. Gracchus was induced to 
make an attempt to escape to the other bank of the Tiber ; 
but when hastening down the hill he fell and sprained his 
foot. To gain time for him to escape, his two attendants 
turned to face his pursuers and allowed themselves to be 
cut down, Marcus Pomponius at the Porta Trigemina under 
the Aventine, Publius Laetorius at the bridge over the 
Tiber where Horatius Codes was said to have once singly 
withstood the Etruscan army ; so Gracchus, attended only 
by his slave Euporus, readied the suburb on the right bank 
of the Tiber. There, in the grove of Furrina, were after- 
wards found the two dead bodies ; it seemed as if the slave 
had put to death flrst his master and then himself. The 
heads of the two fallen leaders were handed over tc the 
government as required ; the stipulated price and mor^ war 



160 the Revolution. [Book IV 

paid to Lucius Septumuleius, a man of quality, who <]» 
iivered up the head of Gracchus, while the murderers of 
Flaocus, persons of humble rank, were sent away with 
empty hands. The bodies of the dead were thrown into 
the river ; the houses of the leaders were abandoned to the 
pillage of the multitude* The war&re of prosecution 
tgainst the partisans of Gracchus began on the grandest 
scale; as many as 8,000 of them are said to have been 
strangled in prison, amongst whom was Qnintus Flaccus, 
eighteen years of age, who had taken no part in the confUet 
and was universally lamented on account of his youth and 
his amiableness. On the open space beneath the Capitol 
where the altar consecrated by GamiUus after the restora* 
tion of internal peace (i. 384) and other shrines erected on 
similar occasions to Concord were situated, these small 
chapels were pulled down ; and out of the property of the 
killed or condemned traitors, which was confiscated even to 
the portions of their wives, a new and splendid temple of 
Concord with the basilica belonging to it was erected in 
accordance with a decree of the senate by the consul Lucius 
Opimius. Certainly it was an act in accordance with the 
spirit of the age to remove the memorials of the old, and 
to inaugurate a new, concord over the remains of the three 
grandsons of the conqueror of Zama, all of whom — ^first 
Tiberius Gracchus, then Scipio Aemilianus, and lastly the 
youngest and most vehement, Gaius Gracchus — ^had now 
been engulfed by the revolution. The memory of the 
Gracchi remained officially proscribed; Cornelia was not 
allowed even to put on mourning for the death of her last 
son ; but the passionate attachment, which very many had 
felt towards the two noble brothers and especially towurds 
Gaius during their life, was touchingly displayed also after 
their death in the almost religious veneration which th« 
multitude, in spite of all precautions of police, continued 
to pay to their memory and to the spots where they had 
fidlen. 



CHAPTER I\ 

THS RULE OF THB RB8T01 ITIO/T. 

Till De\/ Structure, which Gaiua Grtochus had reared, 
became on his death a ruin. His death indeed. 



OMgoTerii- like that of his brother, was primarily a mere 
**^^' act of vengeance ; but it was at the same time 

a very material step towards the restoration of the old con- 
stitution, when the person of the monarch was taken away 
from the monarchy just as it was on the point of being 
established. It was all the more so in the present instance, 
because after the fall of Gains and the sweeping and bloody 
prosecutions of Opimius there existed at the moment abso- 
lutely no one, who, either by relationship to the &llen chief 
of the state or by pre-eminent ability, might feel himself 
warranted in even attempting to occupy Uie vacant place. 
Gains had departed from the world childless, and the son 
whom Tiberius had lefb behind him died before reaching 
manhood ; the whole popular party, as it was called, was 
literally without any one who could be named as leader. 
The Gracchan constitution resembled a fortress without a 
commander; the walls and garrison were uninjured, but 
the general was wanting, and there was no one to take poi^ 
session of the vacant place save the very government which 
had beec overthrown. 

So it accordingly happened. AfVer the decease of Gaiui 
Gracchus without heirs, the government of the 
ttonduto- senate as it were spontaneously resumed its 
'^'*^^* place ; and this, was the more natural, that it 
had not been, in the strict sense, formally abolished by 
GaiuB Gracchus, but had merely been reduced to a practical 
nullity by his exceptional proceedings. Yet we fhouM 



162 The Rule of the Restoratwii. [Book iv 

greatly err, if we should discern in this restoration nothing 
further than a relapse of the state-machine into the old 
track which had been beaten and worn for centuries. Ilefl< 
toration is always revolution ; but in this case it was not sc 
much the old government as the old governor that was ro* 
stored. The oligarchy made its appearance newly equipped 
in the armour of the tyrannic which had been overthrown. 
As the senate had beaten Gracchus from the field with hia 
own weapons, so it continued in the most essential points 
to. govern with the constitution of the Gracchi ; though cer 
tainly with the secret intention, if not of setting it aside 
entirely, at any rate of thoroughly purging it in due time 
from the elements really hostile to the ruling aristocracy. 

At first the reaction was. mainly directed .against per- 
PxoMcn- sons. Publius Popillius was recalled from ban- 
democrate.^ ishment afler the enactments relating to him 
^^^ had been cancelled (633), and a warfare of 

prosecution was waged against the adherents of Gracchus -, 
whereas the attempt of the popular party to have Lucius 
Opimius after his resignation of ofiice condemned for high 
treason was frustrated by the partisans of the government 
(634). The character of this government of the 
restoration is significantly indicated by the prog- 
ress \.f the aristocracy in soundness of opinion. Gaius 
Carbo, once the ally of the Gracchi, had for long been a 
convert (p. 133), and had but recently shown his zeal and 
his usefulness as defender of Opimius. But he remained a 
renegade : when the democrats raised the same accusation 
against him as against Opimius, the government were not 
unwilling to let him iall, and Carbo, seeing himself lost be- 
tween the two parties, died by his own hand. Thus the 
men of the reaction showed themselves in personal ques* 
lions pure aristocrats. But the reaction did not immedi« 
ately attack the distributions of grain, the taxation of the 
province of Asia, or the Gracchan ordinances as to the jury 
men and the tribunals ; on the contrary, it not only spared 
the mercantile class and the proletariate of the capital, but 
continued to render homage, as it had already done in the 



Ciup. IV.J The BvU of the JRestoration. 162 

introduction of tbe Livian laws, to these powera and espe- 
cially to the proletariate far more decidedly than had been 
done by the Gracchi. This course was not adopted mei'ely 
because the Gracchan revolution retained a hold on the 
minds of its contemporaries and protected its creations j 
the fostering and cherishing of the interests of the populace 
at least by the aristocracy were in &ct perfectly compatible 
with their own advantage, and nothing further was sacrificed 
by such a policy than merely the public weal. 

All those measures which were devised by Gains Grao* 
sbB doniAiii cl^us for the promotion of the public welfare— 
£3^^^ the best but, as may readily be conceived, also 
restoration. ^^ most unpopular part of his legislation- 
were allowed by the aristocracy to drop. Nothing was so 
speedily and so successfully assailed as the noblest of his 
projects, the scheme of introducing a legal equality first 
between the Roman burgesses and Italy, and thereafter be- 
tween Italy and the provinces, and — inasmuch as the dis^ 
tinction between the merely ruling and consuming and the 
merely serving and working members of the state was thus 
done away — at the same time solving the social question 
by the most comprehensive and systematic emigration 
known in history. With all the determination and all the 
peevish obstinacy of dotage the restored oligarchy obtrudeo 
the principle of deceased generations — ^that Italy must re- 
main the ruling land and Rome the ruling city in Italy-*- 
afiresh on the present. Even in the lifetime of Gracchus 
the claims of the Italian allies had been decidedly rejected, 
and the great idea of transmarine colonization had been 
subjected to a very serious attack, which became the imme- 
diate cause of Gracchus' fall. After his death the scheme 
of restoring Carthage was set aside with little difiiculty by 
the government-party, although the several allotments 
already distributed there were left to the recipients. It is 
true that they could not prevent a similar settlement of the 
democratic party from succeeding at another point : in the 
di'jrse of the conquests beyond the Alps which Marcui 
F ecus had be^n, the colony of Narbo (Narbonne) wai 



164 The Bvle 9f the Restoration. [Book n 

founded there in 636. the oldest transmarine 

118. 

burgessH^ity in the Roman empire, which, in 
Bpite of manifold attacks by the government-party and in 
spite of a proposal directly made by the senate to abolish 
it, permanently held its ground. But, apart from thish— in 
its '.solation not very important — exception, the government 
was uniformly successful in preventing the assignation of 
land out of Italy. 

The Italian domain-question was settled in a similai 
spirit. The Italian colonies of Gains, especially Capua, 
were cancelled, and such of them as had already been 
planted were again broken up; that of Tarentum alon« 
was allowed to subsist in the form of the new town of 
Neptunia placed alongside of the former Greek community. 
So much of the domains as had already been distributed by 
non-colonial assignation remained in the hands of the recipi- 
ents ; the restrictions imposed on them by Gracchus in the 
interest of the commonwealth — the ground-rent and the 
prohibition of alienation — had already been abolished by 
Marcus Drusus. With reference on the other hand to thf 
domains still possessed by right of occupation — ^which, ovei 
and above the domain-land enjoyed by the Latins, must 
have mostly consisted of the estates retained by their hold- 
ers in accordance with the Gracchan maximum (p. 114) — it • 
was resolved definitively to secure them to those who had 
hitherto been occupants and to preclude the possibility of 
future distribation. It was primarily from these lands, no 
doubt, that the 36,000 new farm-allotments promised by ' 
Drusus were to have been formed ; but they saved them- 
selves the trouble of inquiring where those hundreds of 
thousands of iugera of Italian domain-land were to be 
found, and tacitly shelved the Livian colonial law, which had 
served its purpose ; the far from important colcny of Scy* 
lacium (Squillace) is perhaps the only one referable to tlte 
eolonial law of Drusus. On the other hand by a law, 
"vhioli the tribune of the people Spurius Thorius carried 
under the instructions of the senate, the allot- 
ment-commission was abolished in 635, and a 



CnAP. IV J The Rule of tike BeeUyratim. 16i 

fixed rent was imposed on the occupants of the dom&m-land, 
the proceeds of which went to the benefit of the populac€ 
of the capital — apparently by forming part of the funi ^i 
the distribution of corn ; proposals going still further, in- 
cluding perhaps an increase of the largesses of grain, were 
averted by the judicious tribune of the people Gaius Marius. 
The final step was taken eight years aflerwardr 
(643), when by a new decree of the people * the 
oooupied domain-land was directly converted into tlie rent- 
free private property of the former occupants. It was 
added, that in future domain-land was not to be occupied at 
all, but was either to be leased or to lie open as public 
pasture ; in the latter case provision was made by the fix« 
ing of a very low maximum of ten head of large and fifty 
head of small cattle, that the large herd-owner should not 
practically exclude the smalL In these judicious regula- 
tions the injurious character of the occupatiou-system, 
which moreover was long ago given up (ii. 889), was at 
length officially recognized, but unhappily they were only 
adopted when it had already deprived the state in substance 
of its domanial possessions. While the Ik>man aristocracy 
thus took care of itself and got whatever occupied land was 
still in its hands converted into its own property, it at the 
same time pacified the Italian allies, not indeed by confer- 
ring on them the property of the Latin domain-land which 
they and more especially their municipal aristocracy en- 
joyed, but by preserving unimpaired the rights in relation 
to it guaranteed to them by their charters. The opposite 
party was in the unfortunate position, that in the most im- 
portant material questions the interests of the Italians ran 
diametrically counter to those of the opposition in the capi 
tal ; in fact the Italians entered into a species of league with 
Uio Roman government, and sought and found protection 
from the senate against the extravagant designs of various 
Boman demagogues. 

* It is in great part still extant and known under the en ^necflu 
name, w jioh has now bean banded down for three hundred yeacBi ol 
the Thorian agrarian law. 



166 The Bute of the JKeetoratum. [Book it 

While the restored government was thus carefnl thoi^ 

oughlj to eradicate the germs of improvement 

faurUkSiuid which existed in the Graochan constitntion, it re^ 

SSwrraSlr Plained completely powerless in presence of the 

the restora- hostile powers that had been, not for the general 

weal, aroused by Gracchus. The proletariate 

of the capital continued to have a recognised title to all* 

ment ; the senate likewise acquiesced in the selection of the 

jurymen from the mercantile order, repugnant though this 

yoke was to the better and prouder portion of the aristoo* 

racy. The fetters which the aristocracy wore did not be* 

seem its dignity ; but we do not find that it seriously set 

itself to get rid of them. The law of Marcus Aemilius 

Scaurus in 632, which at least enforced the con- 

122. 

stitutional restrictions on the suffrage of freed- 
men, was for long the only attempt — and that a very tame 
one— -on the part of the senatorial government once more 
to restrain their mob-tyrants. The proposal, which the con« 
sul Quintus Caepio seventeen years after the introduction 
of the equestrian tribunals (648) brought in for 
again entrusting the trials to senatorial jurymen, 
showed what the government wished ; but showed also how 
little it could do, when the question was one not of squan- 
dering domains but of carrying a measure in the face of an 
influential order. It broke down.* The government wap 
not emancipated from the inconvenient associates who 
shared its power ; but these measures probably contributed 
still further to disturb the never sincere agreement of the 
ruling aristocracy with the merchant-class and the proletari- 
ate. Both were very well aware, that the senate granted 
all its concessions only from fear and with reluctance ; pe]> 

* This is apparent, as is well known, from the farther oo^rse of 

events. In opposition to this view stress has been laid on the f&ct thai 

In Valerius Maximus, vi. 9, 18, Quintus Caepio is called patron of the 

senate ; but on the one hand this does not prove enough, and on tlui 

other hand what is there narrated does not at all cult the 

 ■■I 

consul of 648, so that there mnst be an error either in <b# 
lame or in the facts reported. 



Chaf. IV.] The Hvle qf the Hestoratiork. 161 

inanently attached to the rule of the senate by considera- 
tions neither of gratitude nor of interest, both were very 
ready to render similar services to any other master who 
offered them more or even as much, and had no objection, 
if an opportunity occurred, to cheat or to th vart the senator 
Thus the restoration continued to govern with the desiret 
and opinions of a legitimate aristocracy, and with the con 
stitution and means of government of a tyrannis. Its ruU 
not only rested on the same bases as that of Gracchus, but 
it was equally and in fact still more deficient in strength \ 
it was strong when in league with the populace it overthrew 
valuable institutions, but it was utterly powerless when it 
had to face the bands of the streets or the interests of the 
merchants. It sat on the vacated throne with an evil con- 
science and divided hopes, indignant at the institutions of 
the state which it ruled and yet incapable of even systemati^i 
cally assailing them, vacillating in all its conduct except 
where its own material advantage prompted a decision, a 
picture of faithlessness towards its own as well as the oppo- 
site party, of inward inconsistency, of the most pitiful im- 
potence, of the meanest selfishness — an unsurpassed ideal 
of misrule. 

It could not be otherwise ; the whole nation was in a 
state of intellectual and moral decline, but espe- 
therestoniF dally the Upper classes. The aristocracy be- 
"* fore the period of the Gracchi was truly not 

over-rich in talent, and the benches of the senate weM 
crowded by a pack of cowardly and dissolute nobles; 
nevertheless there sat in it Scipio Aemilianus, Gaius Lae- 
lius, Quintus Metellus, Publius Crassus, Publius Scaevola 
and numerous other respectable and able men, and an ob- 
server favourably predisposed might be of opinion that th6 
senate maintained a certain moderation in injustice and a 
certain decorum in misgovernment. This aristocracy had 
been overthrown and then restored ; henceforth there rested 
on it the curse of restoration. While the ar stocracy had 
formerly governed outright, and for more than a century 
without any sensiMe opposition, the crisis which it nad now 



168 The Rule of the Restoratio^i. LBook XV 

passed through revealed to it, like a flash of lightning in a 
dark night, the abyss which yawned before its feet. Was it 
any wonder that henceforward rancour always, and terror 
wherever they durst, characterized the government of the 
lords of the old nobility % that those who governed con 
fronted as an united and compact party, with &r more 
sternness and violence than hitherto, the non«governing 
multitude? that family-policy now prevailed once more, 
just as in the worst times of the patriciate, so that, e, g.^ 
the four sons and (probably) the two nephews of Quintus 
Metellus — with a single exception persons utterly insignifi- 
cant and some of them called to office on account of their 
very simplicity — attained within fifteen years 
(631-645) all of them to the consulship, and all 
with one exception also to triumphs — to say nothing of 
sons-in-law and so forth % that the more violent and cruel 
the bearing of any of their partisans towards the opposite 
party, he received the more signal honour, and every out- 
rage and every in&my were pardoned in the genuine aristo- 
crat ? that the rulers and the ruled resembled two parties 
at war in every respect, save in the fact that in their war* 
fare no international law was recognized ? It was unhappily 
only too palpable that, if the old aristocracy beat the people 
with rods, this restored aristocracy chastised it with scor- 
pions. It returned to power ; but it returned neither wiser 
nor better. Never hitherto had the Roman aristocracy 
been so utterly deficient in men of statesmanly and military 
capacity, as it was during this epoch of restoration between 
the Gracchan and the Cinnan revolutions. 

A significant illustration of this is afforded by the chief 
of the senatorial party at this time, Marcus 
Aaniiins Aemilius Scaurus. The son of highly aristo- 
'^""' cratic but not wealthy parents, and thus com- 
pelled to make use of his far from mean talents, he raised 
lift, himself to the consulship (639) and censorship 

^^ (645), was long the chief of the senate and the 

political oracle of his order, and immortalized his name 
not only as an orator and author, but also as thA originatof 



Ohap. iv.i The Bute of the Bestoration. 169 

of some of the principal public buildings executed in this 
century. But, if ve look at him more closely, his greatly 
praised achievements amount merely to this much, that, a? 
a general, he gained some cheap village triumphs in the 
AlpS) and, as a statesman, won by his laws about voting 
and luxury some victories nearly as serious over the revo- 
lutionary spirit of the times. His real talent consisted in 
this, that, while he was quite as accessible and bribable as 
any oUier upright senator, he discerned with some cunning 
the moment when the matter began to be hazardous, and 
above all by virtue of his noble and dignified appearance 
acted the part of Fabricius before the public. In a military 
point of view, no doubt, we find some honourable excep- 
tions of able officers belonging to the highest circles of the 
aristocracy ; but the r«de was, that the noble lords, when 
they were to assume the command of armies, hastily read 
up from the Greek military manuals and the Roman annals 
as much as was required for holding a military conversa- 
tion, and then, when in the field, acted most wisely by en- 
trusting the real command to an (^cer of humble lineage 
and tried discretion. In fact, if a couple of centuries earlier 
the senate resembled an assembly of kings, these their suc- 
cessors played not ill the part of princes. But the in- 
capacity of these restored aristocrats was fully equalled by 
their political and moral worthlessness. If the state of re- 
ligion, to which we shall revert, did not present a faithftil 
reflection of the wild dissoluteness of this epoch, and if the 
external history of the period did not exhibit the utter de- 
pravity of the Homan nobles as one of its most essential 
elements, the horrible crimes, which came to light in rapid 
succession among the highest circles of Rome, would alone 
suffice to indicate their character. 

The administration, internal and external, was what was 
AdminbtHb- ^ ^ expected under such a government The 
^ere^ra- social ruin of Italy spread with alarming rapid* 
tton. iiy . since the aristocracy had given itself legal 

permission to buy out the small holders, and in its new 
arrogance allowed itself with growing frequency to driv^ 

Vol. III.— 8 



170 I%e Side of the Restoration, [Book it 

them cut, the j&rms disappeared like raindrops in the s9<^ 
That the eoonomio oLgarchy at least kept pao^ 
of Italy. with the political, is shown by the expression 
^ employed about 650 by Lucius Marcius Philip* 

pus, a man of moderate democratic views, that there wer^ 
unong the whole burgesses hardly 2,000 wealthy &milies« 
A practical commentary on this state of things was onoe 
more furnished by the servile insurrections, which during 
the first years of the Gmbrian war broke out annually in 
Italy, e. g^ at Nuceria, at Capua, and in the territory of 
Thurii. This last conspiracy was so important that the 
urban praetor had to march with a legion against it and yet 
overcame the insurrection not by force of arms, but only 
by insidious treachery. It was moreover a suspicious cir- 
cumstance, that the insurrection was headed not by a slave, 
but by the Roman knight Titus Vettius, whom his debtr> 
had driven to the insane step of manumitting his slaves and 
declaring himself their king (650). The appre- 
hensions of the government with reference to 
the accumulation of masses of slaves in Italy are shown by 
the measures of precaution respecting the gold-washings of 
Victumulae, which were carried on afler 611 on 

149L 

account of the Roman government : the lessees 
were at first bound not to employ more than 5,000 labour- 
ers, and subsequently the workings were totally stopped 
by decree of the senate. Under such a government as the 
present there was every reason in fact for fear, if, as was 
very possible, a Transalpine host should penetrate into 
Italy and summon the slaves, who were in great part of 
kindred lineage, to arms. 

The provinces suffered still more in comparison. We j 
The pioy- shall have an idea of the condition of Sicily and 
inoM. Asia, if we endeavour to realize what would be 

the aspect of m/itters in the East Indies provided the Eng 
lish aristccracy were similar to the Roman aristocracy of 
that day. The legislation, whidi entrusted the mercantile 
class with control over the magistrates, compelled the latter 
to make common cause to a certain extent with die former, 



Ceaf. TV.] The £ule of the ResUration. 171 

aod to purchase for themselves unlimited liberty of plun* 
dering and protection from impeachment by unconditional 
^^ indulgence towards the capitalists in the prov- 

inces. In addition to these official and semii 
official robbers, freebooters and pirates pillaged all the coun« 
tries of the Meditorranean. In the Asiatic waters mort 
especially the buccaneers carried their outrages so &r that 
even the Roman government found itself under the neces- 
sity in 652 of despatching to Cilicia a fleet| 
mainly composed of the vessels of the depend* 
ent mercantile cities, under the praetor Marcus Antonius, 
who was invested with proconsular powers. This fleet cap- 
tured a number of corsair-vessels and destroyed some 
strongholds ; and not only so, but the Romans even settled 
themselves permanently there, and in order to the suppres* 
sion of piracy in its chief seat, the rugged or western 
Olicia, occupied strong military positions — the first step 
towards the establishment of the province of Cilicia, which 
thenceforth appears among the Roman prov- 
fcion of* inces.* The design was commendable, and the 
^^^'^ scheme in itself was well devised ; but the con- 

* It is assumed in many quarters that the establishment of the 
proTinoe of CSIicia only took place after the GUdan expedition of Pub- 
_ litis ServiUus in 676 e< nq^ bnt erroneously ; for as early 

92. as 662 we find Sulla (Appian, MUht, 67 ; B. C, i. 77 ; 

•^ '•• Victor, 76), and in 674, 676, Gnaeus Dolabella (Cic Verr 

i 1, 16, 44) as governors of Glicia— which leaves no altematiye but to 
place the establishment of the province in 662. This 
view is further supported by the &ct that at this time the 
expeditions of the Bomans against the corsairs — €, g.^ the Baleario^ 
Ugurian, and Dalmatian expeditions— appear to have been ordii^rilj 
directed to the occupation of the points of the coast whence piracy 
issued ; and this was natural, for, as the Bomans had no standing fleet, 
the only means of effectuiUy checking piracy was the occupation of 
Ihe coasts. It is to be remembered, moreover, that the idea of a pro^ 
vinda did not absolutely involve possession of the country, but in itself 
ImpUed no more than an independent military command ; it is very 
possible, that the Bomans in the first instance occupied nothing in this 
rugged country save stations for their vessels and troops. 

The plain of eastern Cilicia remained down to the war againitf 



172 The Jiule of ike EestoraUon. [Bcok it 

tinuanoe and the increase of the evil of | iraey iu the Asiatic 
waters, and especially in. Qlicia, unhappily showed the in* 
adequacy of the meass with which die pirates were assailed 
from the newly acquired position. 

But nowhere did the impotence and penrersity of the 

Eoman provincial administration come to lieht 

•r the in so naked colours as in the insurrections of the 

'**' slave proletaiiate, which seemed to have revived 

on their former footing simultaneously with the restoration 

of the aristocracy. These insurrections of the slaves swell- 

ing from revolts into wars — ^which had emerged 

just about 620 as one, and that perhaps the 
proximate, cause of the Gracchan revolution— were renewed 
and repeated with dreary uniformity. Again, as thirty years 
before, a ferment pervaded the body of slaves throughout 
the Roman empire. We have already mentioned the Italian 
conspiracies. The miners in the Attic silver-mines rose in 
revolt, occupied the promontory of Sunium, and issuing 
thence pillaged for a length of time the surrounding coun- 
try. 

Similar movements appeared at other places. But 

the chief seat of these fearful commotions was 
sioUian once more Sicily witli its plantations and its 

■Uve-war. jjordcs of slaves brought thither from Asia 
Minor. It is significant of the greatness of the evil, that an 
attempt of the government to check the worst iniquities of 
the slaveholders was the immediate cause of the new insur- 
rection. That the free proletarians in Sicily were little 
better than the slaves, had been shown by their attitude in 
the first insurrection (p. 104) ; after it was subdued, the 
Eoman speculators took their revenge and reduced numbers 
»f the free provincials into slavery. In consequence of a 

Tigranes attached to the Syrian empire (Appian, Syr, 48) ; the distrioti 
to the Dorth of the Taurus formerly reckoned as belonging to Gilicia— • 
Osppadocian Cilicia, as it was called, and Gataonia — ^belonged to Capp* 
docia, the former from the time of the breaking up of the kingdom of 
Attalus (Justin, xxxTii. 1 ; see above, p. 75), tlie Ir-tter proba):ly evM 
from the time of the peace with Antiochus. 



Gbu it.] l%e Hide qf ti€ Seetoradan. 178 

sharp enactment issued against this by the sen- 
ate in 650, Publius Licmius Nerva, the governor 
of Sicily at the time, appointed a court for deciding on 
daims c£ freedom to sit in Syracuse. The court went ear* 
nestly to work ; in a short time decision was given in eighl 
huedred processes against the slave-owners, and the number 
of causes in dependence was daily \m the inerease. The 
terrified planters hastened to Syracuse, to compel the Ro^ 
man governor to suspend such unparalleled administration 
of justice ; Nerva was weak eAough to let himself be terri- 
fied, and in harsh language informed the non»free persons 
requesting trial that they should forego their troublesome 
demand for right and justice and should instantly return to 
those who called themselves their masters. Those who 
were thus dismissed, instead of doing as he bade them, 
formed a conspiracy and went to the mountains. The gov- 
ernor was not prepared for military measures, and even the 
wretched militia of the island was <iot immediately at hand ; 
so that he concluded an alliance with one of the best known 
captains of banditti in the island, and induced him by the 
promise of personal pardon to betray the revolted slaves 
into the hands of the Komans. He thus gained the mas* 
tery over this band. But another band of runaway slaves 
succeeded in defeating a division of the garrison of Enna 
(Castrogiovanni) ; and this first success procured for the 
insui^ents-— what they especially needed — arms and rein- 
forcements. The armour of their fallal or fugitive oppo- 
nents furnished the first basis of their military organization, 
and the number of the insurgents soon swelled to many 
thousands. These Syrians in a foreign land already, likt 
Iheir predecessors, seemed to themselves not unworthy to 
be governed by kings, as were their countrymen at home ; 
and — ^parodying the trumpery king of their native land 
down to the very name— they placed the slave Salvlus at 
Hhm head as king Tryphon. In the district between Enna 
•nd Leontini (Lentlni) where these hands had their head^ 
quarters, the open country was wholly in the hands of th« 
insurgents and Morgantia and other walled towns wen 



176 The jRule of the Restoration. [Book i? 

Whether this was true or not, his successoi 
Gaius Servilius (^2) obtained no better results ; 
and both generals were afterwards criminally indicted and 
oondamned for their conduct in office — ^hich, however, was 
not at all a certain proof of their guilt Ath» 
nion, who after the death of Tryphon (652) was 
invested with the sole command, stood victorious at. the 
Yff^ head of a considerable army, when in 663 Mauius 

A^ijiuuf. AquilliuSy who had during the previous year difr 
tinguished himself under Marius in the war with the Teu' 
tones, was as consul and governor entrusted with the con* 
duct of the war. After two years of hard conflicts — ^Aquil* 
lius is said to have fought in person with Athenion, and to 
have killed him in single combat — the Roman general at 
length put down the desperate resistance, and vanquished 
the insurgents in their last retreats by famine. The slaves 
on the island were prohibited from bearing arms and peace 
was again restored to it, or, in other words, its recent 
scourges were relieved by its former tormentors ; in &ct, 
the victor himself occupied a prominent place among the 
numerous and energetic robber-magistrates of this periods 
Any one who still required a proof of the internal quality 
of the government of the restored aristocracy might be i^e- 
ferred to the origin and to the conduct of this second Sicilian 
slavcowar, which lasted for five years. 

But wherever the eye turned throughout the wide sphere 
of Roman admimstration, the same causes and 
pendisnt the same effects appeared. If the Sicilian slave* 
*****"* war showed how far the government was irom 

being equal to even its simplest task of keeping in check 
the proletariate, contemporary events in Africa displayed 
the skill with which the Romans now governed the depend- 
ent states. About the very time when the Sicilian slave- 
war broke out, there was exhibited before the ejea of the 
astonished world the spectacle of an unimportant client- 
prince able to carry out a fourteen years' usurpation and 
insurrection against the mighty republic which had shat^ 
tered the kingdoms of Macedonia and Asia with one blow 



ChA¥. rv.] The Bute qf the Be^toraUor^ 177 

of its weighty arm — and that not by means of arms, but 
through ^e pitiiiil diaracter of its rulers. 

The kingdom of Numidia stretched fit>m the rivef 
Molochath to the great Syrtis (li. 244), border- 
ing on the one side with the Mauretanian king* 
dom of Tlngis (the modern Morocco) and on the other with 
Gyrene and Egypt, and surrounding on the west, south, and 
east the narrow district of coast which formed the Roman 
proTinoe of Africa. In addition to the old possessions of 
the Numidian ehiefe, it embraced by far the greatest por- 
tion of the territory which Carthage had possessed in Africa 
during the times of its prosperity — ^indnding several im- 
portant Old-Phoenician cities, such as Hippo R^ius (Bona) 
and Great Leptis (Lebidah) — ^altogether the largest and best 
part of the rich seaboard of Northern Africa. Numidia 
was beyond questicm, next to Egypt, the most considerable 
of all the Roman client-states. After the death 
of Massinissa (605), Scipio had divided the sove- 
reign functions of that prince among his three sons, the 
kings Micipsa, Gulussa, ^.nd Mastanabal, in such a way that 
the firstbom obtained the residency and the state-chest, the 
second the charge of war, and the third the administration 
of justice (p. 49). Now after the death of his two brothers 
Massinissa's eldest son, Micipsa,* reigned alone, a feeble 
peao^l old man, who occupied himself more with the study 
of Greek philosophy than with afiairs of state. As his sons 

* The following taUe exhibits the geccalogy of the NmnidiHi 
ininoes: — 

MassmiBsa, 516-605 (^38-149). 

! 

ICislT)*^ OvluBn, ICattaaalMl, 

*l>6M(im ^beli(neni(116). •!• before eS6 (11^ 

i I L-. 

T i j ITasaiTa, | | 

id^CfflML Hicflapaall. Hloipfla -f 648 Gauds, Imroitt^ 

 ea +cT687 (DIod. (HI). + before 666 +650 

(m)b (117). J.607)L (78). (W4X 

Hiempsal II. Okyniwh 
JaUI. 
Jiiball. 

Vol. in.~8* 



IW The Rule (yf the ReHoration. L^ook n 

were not yet grown up, the reins of government were pra(> 
tically held by an illegitimate nephew of the king, the 
prince Jugurtha. Jugurtha was no unworthy 
grandson of Massi^issa. He was a handsome 
man and a skilled and courageous rider and hunter; his 
countrymen held him in high honour as a dear and sag»> 
oious administrator, and he had displayed his military abil* 
i!:^.y as leader of the Numidian contingent before Numantia 
under the eyes of Scipio. His position in the kingdom, 
and the influence which he possessed with the Roman gov* 
ernment by means of his numerous friends and war-com- 
rades, made it appear to king Micipsa advisable 
to adopt him (634), and to arrange in his testa- 
ment that his own two elder sons Adherbal and Hiempsal, 
and his adopted son Jugurtha along with them, should inherit 
and govern the kingdom, just as he himself had done in 
conjunction with his two brothers. For greater security 
this arrangement was placed under the guarantee of the 
Roman government. 

Soon afterwards, in 636, king Micipsa died. The testa- 
^^^ ment came into force: but the two sons of 

^e war for Micipsa — the vehement Hiempsal still more 
cUan 8ncce»- than his weak elder brother — soon came into so 
violent collision with their cousin whom they 
looked on as an intruder into the legitimate line of succes- 
sion, that the idea of a joint reign of the three kings had to 
be abandoned. An attempt was made to carry out a divi- 
sion of the heritage ; but the quarrelling kings could not 
agre^ as to their quotas of land and treasure, an(f the pro- 
tecting power, to which the duty of decision by right be- 
longed, gave itself, as usual, no concern about these affairs. 
A rupture took place ; Adherbal and Hiempsal were diSi 
posed to characterize their father's testament as surrepti- 
tious and altogether to dispute Jugurtha's right of joint 
inheritance, while on the other hand Jugurtha came forward 
as a pretender to the whole kingdom. While the discus* 
sions as to the partition were still going on, Hiempsal was 
made away with by hired assassins ; then a civil war arosf 



Cbaf. IV.] The Jiidle of the Beetoration. 179 

Detween Adh<rbal and Jugurtha, in which all Namidia took 
part. With his less numerous but better disciplined and 
better led troops Jugurtha conquered, and seized the whole 
territory of the kingdom, subjecting the chiefs who adhered 
to his cousin to the most cruel persecution. Adherba' 
escaped to the Roman province and proceeded to Rome to 
make his complaint there. Jugurtha had expected this, and 
had made his arrangements to meet the threatened interven- 
tion« In the camp before Numantia he had learned more 
firom Rome than a lesson in tactics ; the Numidian prince, 
introduced to the circles of the Roman aristocracy, had at 
the same time been initiated into the intrigues of Roman 
coteries, and had studied at the fountain-head what might 
be expected from Roman nobles. Even then, sixteen years 
before Micipsa's death, he had entered into disloyal negotia- 
tions as to the Numidian succession with Roman comrades 
of rank, and Scipio had been imder the necessity of gravely 
reminding him that it was becoming in foreign princes to 
be on terms of friendship with the Roman state rather than 
with individual Roman citizens. The envoys of Jugurtha 
appeared in Rome, furnished with something more than 
words : that they had chosen the right means of diplomatic 
persuasion, was shown by the result The most zealous 
champions of Adherbal's just title were with incredible 
rapidity convinced that Hiempsal had been put to death by 
his subjects on account of his cruelty, and that the author 
of the war as to the succession was not Jugurtha, but Ad<- 
herbaL Even the leading men in the senate were shocked 
at the scandal ; Marcus Scaurus sought to check it, but in 
vain. The senate passed over what had taken place in 
silence, and ordained that the two surviving testamentary 
heirs should have the kingdom equally divided between 
tiiem, and that, for the prevention of fresh quarrels, the 
division should be undertaken by a commission of the sen- 
ate. This was done: the consular Lucius Opimius, well* 
known through his services in setting aside the revolution, 
had embraced fhe opportunity of gathering tlie reward of 
his patriotism, and had got himself placed at the head of 



180 The RuU of the JSegtaration. [Book n 

the commissi >D« The division tumed out thoroughly is 
&vour of Jugurtha, and not to the disadvanti^e of the comF 
missioners; Cirta (Constantine) the capital with its port 
of Rusicade (Philippeville) was no doubt given to Adher- 
bal, but by that very arrangement the portion which fell to 
him was the eastern part of the kingdom consisting almost 
wholly of sandy deserts, while Jugurtha obtained the fer- 
tile and populous western half (what was afterwards Malt- 
retania Caesariensis and Sitifensis). 

This was bad; but matters soon beosime worse. In 
01^9 of order to be able under the sembUnee of sel^ 
^^^'^ defence to defraud Adherbal of his portioOi 

Jugurtha provoked him to war ; but when the weak man, 
rendered wiser by experience, allowed Jugurtba's horsemen 
to ravage his territory unhindered and contented himself 
with lodging complaints at Rome, Jugurtha, impatient of 
ceremony, began the war even without pretext. Adherbal 
was totally defeated in the region (^ the modem Philippe- 
ville, and threw himself into his capital of Cirta in the ind" 
mediate vicinity. While the siege was in progress, and 
Jugurtha's troops were daily skirmishing with the nume* 
rous Italians who were settled in Cirta and who took a more 
vigorous part in the defence of the city than the Africans 
themselves, the commission despatched by the Roman sen* 
ate on Adherbal's first complaint made its appearance; 
composed, of course, of young inexperienced men, such as 
4e government of those times regularly employed in the 
«uUinary missions of the state. The envoys demanded that 
ilugurtha should allow them as deputed by the protecting 
power to Adherbal to enter the dty, and generally that h$ 
should suspend hostilities and accept their mediation, Ju- 
gurtha summarily rejected both demands, and the enyoys 
hastily returned home — ^like boys, as they were — ^to report 
to the Others of the city. The fathers listened to the ren 
port, and allowed their countrymen in Cirta just to fight on 
»s long as they pleased. It was not till, in the fifth month 
of the siege, a mess^iger of Adherbal stole through tha 
entrenchments of the enemy and a letter of the king fiill 



CteAk. lyj The RuU of the Eestoration. 18^ 

of the most urgent entreaties reached the senate, that th€ 
latter roused itself and actually resolved — not to declare 
war as the minority demanded, but to send a new embassy 
-^an embassy, however, headed by Marcus Scaurus, the 
great oonqueror of the Taurisci and the freedmen, the im- 
posing hero of the aristocracy, whose mere appearance 
would suffice to bring the refractory king to a different 
mind. In &ct Jugurtha appeared, as he was bidden, at 
Utica to discuss the matter with Scaurus ; endless debates 
were held ; when at length the conference was oondudedf 
not the slightest result had been obtained. The embassy 
returned to Rome without having declared war, and the 
king went back again to the siege of Cirta. Adherbal found 
himself reduced to extremities and despaired of Roman 
support ; the Italians in Cirta moreover, weary of the siege 
and firmly relying for their own safety on the terror of the 
Roman name, urged a surrender. So the town capitulated. 
Jugurtha ordered his adopted brother to be executed amid 
<aruel tortures, luid all the adult male population of the 

town, AfHcans as w«ll as Italians, to be put tc 

the sword (642). 
A cry of indignation rose throughout Italy. The minor* 

ity in the senate itself and every one out of the 
intenrm- senate unanimously condemned the government, 
^^°* with whom the honour and interest of the coun- 

try seemed mere commodities for sale ; loudest of all was 
the oondemoing voice of the mercantile daas, which was 
most directly affected by the sacrifice of the Roman and 
Italian merchants at Cirta. It is true that the majority of 
the senate still struggled ; they appealed to the class-inter« 
ests of the aristocracy, and set in motion all their con* 
trivanoes of obstruction and delay, with a view to preserve 
BlaU loiter 1^ peace which they loved. But when Gaius 
Memmius, designated as tribune of the people foi* next 
jrear, an active and eloqiaent man, brought the matter pub 
iicly forward and threatened in his capacity of tribune to 

call the worst ofienders to judicial account, the 

senate permitted war to be dedared (641^4l^ 



189 Ths Hide of the . Restoratwn. [Book iy 

against Jugurtha. The step seemed taken in earnest 
The envoys of Jugurtha ivere dismissed from Italy without 
being admitted to an audience ; the new consul Lucius Cal- 
pumius Bestia, who was distinguished, among the members 
of his order at least, by judgment and aciiyity, prosecuted 
the warlike preparations with energy; Marcus Scaurus 
himself took the post of a commander in the African army. 
b a short time a Roman army was on African ground, and 
marching upward along the Bagradas (Mejerdah) advanced 
Into the Numidian kingdom, where the towns most remote 
from the seat of the royal power, such as Great Leptis, 
voluntarily sent in their submission, while Bocchus king of 
Mauretania, although his daughter was married to Jugurtha^ 
offered friendship and alliance to the Romans. Jugurtha 
himself lost courage, and sent envoys to the Roman head« 
quarters to request an armistice. The end of the contest 
seemed near, and came still more rapidly than was ex- 
pected. The treaty with Bocchus broke down, because tlie 
king, unacquainted with Roman oustomsi had oonceivea 
Uiat he should be able to conclude a treaty so advantageous 
for the Romans without any gratuity, and therefore had 
neglected to furnish his enyoys with the usual market price 
of Roman alliances. Jugurtha at all events knew Roman 
institutions better, and had not omitted to support his pro- 
posals for an armistice by a due accompaniment of money ; 
but he too was deceived. After the first negotiations it 
turned out that not an armistice merely buUa peace was 
purchaseable at the Roman head-quarters. The royal treas- 
ury was still well filled with the savings of Massinissa ; the 
Treaty be- transaction was soon settled. The treaty was 
twMa^RoiM concluded, after it had been for the sake of form 
■id>A. submitted to a council of war, whose consent 

was procured after an irregular and extremely summary 
discussion. Jugurtha submitted at discretion ; but the vio 
tor was merciful and gave him back his kingdom undimiD 
jshed, in consideration of his paying a moderate fine an<i 
delivering up the Roman deserters and the war 
elephants (643) ; the greater part of the lattei 



Obip. l\r.] The EuU of ike RestcraiiAm. 188 

the king afterwards repurchased by bargaining with th« 
individual Boman commandants and officers. 

On the news of this peace the storm once more broke 
forth in Rome. Everybody kiiew how the peace had been 
brought about ; even Scaurus was evidently open to bribery, 
only at a price higher than the ordinary senatorial average. 
The legal validity of the peace was seriously assailed in the 
senate ; Gaius Memmius declared that the king, if he had 
really submitted unconditionally, could not refuse to appear 
in Rome, and that he should accordingly be summoned be- 
fore them, with the view of ascertaining how the matter 
actually stood as to the thoroughly irregular negotiations 
for peace by hearing the two contracting parties. They 
yielded to the inconvenient demand : but at the same time 
granted a safe-conduct to the king inconsistently with the 
law, for he came not as an enemy, but as one who had made 
his submission. Thereupon the king actually appeared at 
Rome and presetted himself to be heard before the assem* 
bled people, which was with difficulty induced to respect 
the safe-conduct and to refrain from tearing in pieces on the 
spot the murderer of the Italians at Cirta. But scarcely 
had Gaius Memmius addressed his first question to the. 
king, when one of his colleagues interfered in virtue of his 
veto and enjoined the king to be silent. Here too African 
gold was more powerful than the will of the sovereign peo- 
ple and of its supreme magistrates. Meanwhile the discus- 
sions respecting the validity of the peace so concluded went 
on in the senate, and the new consul Spurius Postumius 
Albinus zealously supported the proposal to cancel it, in 
the expectation that in that case the chief command in 
Africa would devolve on him. This induced Massiva, a 
grandson of Massinissa living in Rome, to assert before 
the senate his claims to the vacant Numidian kingdom ; 
apon which Bomilcar, one of the confidants of king Jugur- 
tha^ doubtless under his irtstructions made away with the 
rival of his master by assassination, and, when he wai 
proaeouted on account of it, escaped with Jugurtha's ud 
from Rome 



184 The Bute of the JReO&raUm. [Book if 

This new otttrage perpetrated under the e/es of the 
Oaooeiiinc Roman government was at least so far effectual, 
treaty. ^^^ ^^^ senate now cancelled the peace and 

o?wa?*^**" dismissed the king from the city (winter of 
111-110. 64^-^44). The war was accordingly resumed, 

and the consul Spurius Alhinus was invested with the com^ 
mand (644). But the African army down to iti 
lowest ranks was in a state of disorganization 
corresponding to such a political and military superintend- 
ence. Not only had discipline ceased and the spoliation of 
Numidian townships and even of the Roman provincial 
territory become during the suspension of hostilities the 
chief business of the Roman soldi^y, but not a few officers 
and soldiers had as well as thdr generals mitered into secret 
understanding with the enemy. It is easy to see that such 
an army could do nothing in the field ; and if Jugurtha on 
this occasion bribed the Roman general into inaction, as 
was afterwards judicially asserted against the latter, he did 
in truth what was superfluous. Spurius Albinus therefore 
contented himself with doing nothing. On the other hand 
his brother who after his departure assumed the interim 
command — the equally foolhardy and incapable Aulas Pos- 
tumins— *in the middle of winter fell on the idea of seizing 
by a bold €<mp de main the treasures of the king, which 
were kept in the town of Suthul (afterwards Calama, now 
Giielma) difficult of access and still more difficult of con* 
quest. The army set out thither and reached the town; 
but the siege was unsuccessful and without prospect of re- 
sult, and, when the king who had remained for a time with 
his troops in front of the town went into the desert, tiie 
Roman general preferred to pursue him. This was pre- 
wisely what Jugurtha intended ; in a nocturnal assauU, 
which was ^voured by the difficulties of the ground and 
the secret understanding which Jugurtha had with some in 
the Roman army, the Numidiaas captured thf 
Hon of th« Roman camp, and drove the Romans, many of 
itoMQd^ whom were unarmed, before them hi the most 
^^^^' complete and disgraceful rout. The eonsequenet 



CoAP. lYJ The RviU i^the Beetorat/ion, ISfli 

was a oapitulation, the terms of which — ^the inarching off 
of the Roman army under the yoke, the immediate eyacui*> 
tion of the whoie Numidian territory, and the renewal of 
the treaty cancelled by the serAte — were dictated by Ju> 

gurtha and accepted by the Romans (in the 

beginning of Q4&). 
Tlrls was too much to be borne. WHile the Atncan* 

were exulting and the prospect — thus suddenly 
tkmuLtb* opened up—of such an overthrow of the aliec 
^^ domination as had been reckoned scarcely possi* 

ble was bringing numerous tribes of the free and half-free 
inhabitants of the desert to the standards of the victoriou? 
kingi public opinion in Italy was vehemently aroused 
agiunst the equally corrupt and pernicious governing aris 
tocracy, and broke out in a storm of prosecutions which, 
fostered by the exasperation of the mercantile class, swept 
away a succession of victims from the highest circles of the 
nobility. On the proposal of the tribune of the people 
Gmus Mamilius Limetanus, in spite of the timid attempts 
of the senate to avert the threatened punishment, an extra- 
oi^nary jury-commission was appointed to investigate the 
high treason that had occurred in connection with the ques- 
tion of the Numidian succession ; and its sentences sent the 
two former commanders in chief Gains Bestia and Spurius 
Albinus as well as Lucius Opimius, the head of the first 
African commission and the executioner withal of Gaius 
Gracchus, along with numerous other less notable men of 
the government party, guilty and innocent, into exile. 
That these prosecutions, however, were only intended to 
^[>pease the excitement of public opinion, in the capitalist 
oiFoles more especially, by the sacrifice of some of the pe]> 
sons chiefly compromised, and that there was in them not 
the slightest trace of a revolt against the aristocracy or 
aristocratic government in itself, is shown very clearly by 
the fiiot that no one ventured to attack the guiltiest of the 
guilty, the prudent and powerful Scaurus ; on the contrary 
he was about this very time elected censor and also, incredii 
ble as it may sefm, diosen as one of the pre9?dent8 of th< 



186 The Rule of the BesUxration. [Bow IV 

extraordinary coirmission of treason. Still less was any 
attempt even made to interfere with the functions of th« 
goyenmient, and it was left solely to the senate to put an 
end to the Numidian scandal in a manner as gentle as pos» 
Bible for the aristocracy; for that it was time to do so^ 
0ven the most aristocratic aristocrat probably began to 
perceive. 

The senate in the first place cancelled the second treaty 
of peace — ^to surrender to the enemy the com* 
of tl^ mI^ mander who had concluded it, as was done some 
^* thirty years before, seemed according to the 
new ideas of the sanctity of treaties no longer necessary-— 
and determined, this time in all earnest, to renew the war. 
The supreme command in Africa was entrusted, as was 
natural, to an aristocrat, but yet to one of the few men of 
quality who in a military and moral point of view were 
iceteiinBap- equal to the task. The choice fell on Quintus 
Ihlfil^.**' Metellus. He was, like the whole powerful 
mand. family to which he belonged, in principle a rigid 

and unscrupulous aristocrat : as a magistrate, he, no doubt, 
reckoned it honourable to hire assassins for the good of the 
state and would probably have ridiculed the act of Fabri- 
cius towards Pyrrhus as romantic knight errantry, but he 
was an inflexible administrator accessible neither to fear nor 
to corruption, and a judicious and experienced warrior. In 
this respect he was so far free from the prejudices of his 
order that he selected as his lieutenants not men of rank, 
but the excellent ofHcer Publius Rutilius Rufus, who was 
esteemed in military circles for his exemplary discipline 
and as the author of an altered and improved system of 
drill, and the brave Latin former's son Gains Marius, wb< 
had risen from the pike. Attended by these and other abk 
officers, Metellus pre-sented himself in the course 
jf 645 as consul and commander in chief to th€ 
African army, which he found in such disorder that the 
generals had not hitherto ventured to Ifad it into the en& 
my's territory and it was formidable to none save the un 
happy inhabitants of the Roman province. It was sternlj 



Qbap. IV.] The Rule of the JSestoration. 187 

and speedily reorganized, and in the spring oi 
646* Metellus led it over the Numidian fron 
tier. When Jugurtha perceived the altered state of things^ 
he gave himself up as lost, and, before the struggle begaOi 
made earnest proposals for an aooommodation, requesting 
Benewaiof ultimately nothing more than a guarantee for 
^•^^" his life. Metellus, however, was resolved and 
perhaps even instructed not to terminate the war except 

* In the fiiaoinatiiig and clever description of this war bj Salluat 

the chronology has been unduly neglected. The war terminated in the 
sununer of 649 {e, 114); if therefore Marius began hia 

^ management of the war as consul in 647, he held the com- 

mand there in three campaigns. But the narrative de- 

Bcribes only two, and does so ri^tly. To all appearance Metellus went 
to Afirica as early as 646, but, as he arrived late (c. 87, 
44), and the reorganization of the army cost time (c. 44), 

he only began his operations in the following year ; and in like manner 

Marius, who was likewise detained for a con^derable time in Italy by 
his military preparations (c. 84), entered on the chief com« 
mand either as consul in 647 late in the season and after 

^^* the close of the campaign, or only as proconsul in 648 ; 

TOflL so that the two campaigns of Metellus thus fall in 646, 

^^106?^' \ ^"^i ^^ ^^^ ^^ Marius in 648, 649. With this view the 

circumstance also very well accords, that the battle at the 

Muthul and the siege of Zama must, from the relation in which they 

stand to Marius' candidature for the consulship, be neces* 

sarily placed in 646. In no case can the author be pro* 

^^' nounced free from inaccuracies; Marius, for instance, is 

even spoken of by him as consul in 649. 

The question would be easily settled, if the senate had prolonged 

Ihe command of Metellus and that prolongation had delayed Marius' 

departure ; for this could not apply to the campaign of 

646, for which Marius could make no daim at all to the 

107. command, but only to that of 647. But that hypothesis, 

hitherto current, rests only on an interpolation of c, 78, 7 

imliiig In the best manuscripts of both families, and is in itself inv 

probable, for the decree of the senate could not in law trench on the 

resolution of the people, and Sallust nowhere says one word as to 

Marius having voluntarily yielded so far, but rather the contrary. At 

the defective passage referred to there stood probably something quite 

different— perhaps : [«t {Mario) %Ui OtUHa provmda «§] ietfpaulo [i 

mtuUus] deerewrat ; «a ret/ruUraJmL 



168 The Rule of tiie Hcstaratian. IBodn l¥ 

With the unconditional subjugation and exoiiutioi of tha 
daring client-prince ; which was in fact the only issue that 
oould satisfy the Romans. Jugurtha since tlie victc»ry over 
Albinus was regarded as the deliverer of Libya from the 
rule of the hated foreigners ; unscrupulous and cunning aj 
he was, and unwieldy as was the Roman government, h« 
might at any time even after a peace rekindle the war in 
his native country ; tranquillity would not be secured, a&J 
the removal of the African army would not be possible, 
until king Jugurtha ^ould oeaae to exist. Offidally Metel- 
lus gave evasive answers to l^e proposals of the king; 
secretly he instigated the envoys to deliver their master 
dead or alive to the Romans. But, when the Roman gene^ 
ral undertook to compete with the African in the field 
of assassination, he there met his master; Jugurtha saw 
through the scheme, and, when he oould not do otherwise, 
prepared for a desperate resistance. 

Beyond the utterly barren mountain-range, over which 
Bstfcie OB l&y the route of the Romans into the interior, a 
the MuthuL pjain Qf eighteen miles in breadth extended bb 
far as the river Muthul, which ran parallel to the mountain- 
chain. The plain was destitute of water and of trees ex- 
cept in the immediate vicinity of the river, and was only 
intersected by a ridge of hills covered with low brushwood. 
On this ridge of hills Jugurtha awaited the Roman army. 
His troops were arranged in two masses ; the one, includ- 
ing a part of the in&ntry and the ^ephants, under Bomil- 
car at the point where the ridge abutted on the river, the 
other, embracing the flower of the in&ntry and all the cav* 
airy, higher up towards the mountain-chain, concealed by 
the bushes. On debouching from the mountains, the Ro- 
mans saw the enemy in a position completely commanding 
their right flank ; and, as they oould not possibly remain 
on the bare and arid crest of the chain and were under th« 
necessity of reaching the river, they had to solve the difli- 
cult problem of gaining the stream through the entirely 
open plam of eighteen miles in breadth, under the eyes of 
the enemy's horsemen and without light cavalry of theit 



I 

i 



Chap. IV.] Tlie BuU of the Eestoraiion. IM 

own. Metellus despatched a detachment under liufua 
straight towards the river, to pitch a camp there ; the mail) 
body marched from the defiles of the mountain-chain in an 
oblique direction through the plain towards the ridge of 
hillsy with a view to dislodge the enemy from the lattei 
But this march in the plain threatened to become the de^ 
•tniction of the army ; for, while Numidian infantry occu« 
pied the mountain defiles in the rear of the Romans as the 
latter eracuated them, the Roman attacking column found 
itsfilf assailed on all sides by swarms of the enemy's horse, 
who charged down on it from the ridge. The constant on* 
set of the hostile swarms hindered the advance, and the 
battle threatened to resolve itself into a number of con* 
fused and detached conflicts ; while at the same time Bomil- 
car with his division detained the corps under Rufus, to 
prevent it from hastening to the help of the hard-pressed 
main army. Nevertheless Metellus and Marius with a 
couple of thousand soldiers succeeded in reaching the foot 
of the ridge ; and the Numidian infantry which defended 
the heights, in spite of their superior numbers and favour- 
able position, fled almost without resistance when the 
legionaries charged at a rapid pace up the hill. The Nu- 
midian infantry held its ground equally ill against Rufus ; 
it was scattered at the first charge, and the elephants were 
all killed or captured on the broken ground. Late in the 
evening the two Roman divisions, each victorious on its 
own part and each anxious as to the fate of the other, met 
between the two fields of battle. It was a battle attesting 
alike the uncommon military talent of Jugurtha and the 
indestructible solidity of the Roman infantry, which alone 
bad converted their strategical defeat into a victory. Ju- 
gurtha sent home a great part of his troops after the battle, 
and restricted himself to a guerilla warfare, which he like- 
wise managed with skill. 

The two Roman columns, the one led by Metellus, the 

otb«r by Marius — ^who, although by birth and 

Moopiedby rank the humblest, occupied since the battle oa 

tbeBomaas. ^j^^ Muthul the fiTSt place among the ohiefe of 



190 The Rule of the Eeat&ratiim. [Bo<a IT 

the staff— traversed the Numidian territory, oceapied tie 
towns, and, when any place did not readily open its gates, 
put to death the adult male popu1ati<»i. But the most eon* 
siderable of the towns in the yalley of the Bagradas, Zama, 
opposed to the Romans a serious resistance which the king 
energetically supported. He was even successful in sun 
prising the Roman camp ; and the Romans found them- 
selves at last oompelled to abftDdon the siege and to go into 
winter quarters. For the sake of more easily provisioii* 
ing his army Metellus, leaving behind garrisons in the con- 
quered towns, transferred it into the Roman province, and 
employed the opportunity of suspended hostilities to insti- 
tute fresh negotiations, showing a disposition to grant to 
the king a peace on tolerable terms. Jugurtha readily 
entered into them ; he had at once bound himself to pay 
200,000 pounds of silver, and had even delivered up his 
elephants and 300 hostages, as well as 3,000 Roman deserts 
ers who were immediately put to death. At the same 
time, however, tlie king's most confidential counsellor, 
Bomilcar — who not unreasonably apprehended that, if peace 
should ensue, Jugurtha would deliver him up as the mur- 
derer of Massiva to the Roman courts — was gained by Me- 
tellus and induced, in consideration of an assurance of im- 
punity as respected that murder and of great rewards, to 
promise that he would deliver the king alive or dead into 
the hands of the Romans. But neither that official negotia- 
tion nor this intrigue led to the desired result. When Me- 
tellus brought forward the suggestion that the king should 
give himself up in person as a prisoner, the latter broke off 
the negotiations ; Bomilcar's intercourse with the enemy 
was discovered, and he was arrested and executed, lliese 
diplomatic cabals of the meanest kind admit of no apology ; 
but the Romans had every reason to aim at the possession 
of the person of their antagonist. The war had reached a 
point, at which it could neither be carried &rther nor abaa 
doned. The state of feeling in Numidia was evinced by 
the revolt of Vaga,* the most considerable of the citief 

* Or Tacca, now Beja on the Mejerdah. 



OtaAP. IV.] The Rvle of the RestoroMon. 191 

oooupied by the Romans, in the winter of 
646-7; on which occasion the whole Ronian 
garrison, officers and men, were put to death with the ex* 
oeption of the commandant Titus Turpilius Silanus, who 
was afterwards — ^whether rightly or wrongly, we cannot 
tell— -condemned to death by a Roman court-martial and 
executed for having an understanding with the enemy. The 
town was surprised by Metellus on the second day after its 
revolt, and given over to all the rigour of martial law ; but 
if such was the temper of the easily reached and compara- 
tively submissive dwellers on the banks of the Bagradas, 
what might be expected farther inland and among the rov- 
ing tribes of the desert 1 Jugurtha was the idol of the 
Africans, who readily overlooked the double fratricide in 
the liberator and avenger of their nation. Twenty years 
afterwards a Numidian corps which was fighting in Italy for 
the Romans had to be sent back in all haste to Africa, when 
the son of Jugurtha appeared in the enemy's ranks ; we 
may infer from this, how great was the influence which he 
himself exercised over his people. What prospect was 
there of a termination of the struggle in regions where the 
combined peculiarities of the population and of the soil 
allowed a leader who had once secured the sympathies of 
the nation to protract the war in endless guerilla conflicts, 
or even to let it sleep for a time in order to revive it at the 
right moment with renewed vigour % 

When Metellus again took the field in 647, Jugurtha. 
nowhers held his ground against him ; he ap- 
warinthe peared now at one point, now at another far dis- 
^ tant ; it seemed as if they would as easily get 

the better of the lions as of these horsemen of the desert. 
A battle was fought, a victory was won ; but it was difli* 
cult to say what had been gained by the victory. The king 
had vanished out of sight in the distance. In the interior 
of the modem beylik of Tunis, close on the edge of the 
great d'ssert and separated from the valley of the Mejerdah 
by an arid and treeless steppe of forty-five miles in breadth, 
there were situated amidst oases provided with springs two 



193 The Rule of ike Hestaration. [Book iy 

strong places, Thala to the north (afterwards Ihelepte, neat 

Husch-el-Cheme), and Capsa (Ka&a) &rther south ; Jagur- 

tha had retired to the former town with his children, hia 

treasures, and the flower of his troops, there to await better 

times. Metellus ventured to follow the king through a 

desert, in which his troops had to carry water along with 

U&em in skins; Thala was reached and fell after a forty 

days' siege ; but the Roman deserters destroyed the most 

▼aluable part of the booty along with the building in whidi 

they burnt themselves after the capture of the town, and— 

what was of more consequence — king Jugurtha escaped with 

his children and his chest. Numidia was no doubt virtually 

in the hands of the Romans ; but, instead of their object 

being thereby gained, the war seemed only to extend over 

a field wider and wider. In the south the free Gaetulian 

tribes of the desert began at the call of Jugurtha a national 

war aeainst the Romans. In the west Bocchus 

taniaa oom- king of Mauretania, whose friendship the Ro- 
piicationa. ^^^^ y^^^ .^ ^^^j.^^ ^.^^^ despised, Seemed now 

not indisposed to make common cause with his son-in-law 
against them ; he not only received him at his court, but, 
uniting to Jugurtha's followers his own numberless swarms 
of horsemen, he marched into the region of Cirta, where 
Metellus was in winter^uarters. They began to negotiate : 
it was clear that in the person of Jugurtha he held in his 
hands the real prize of the struggle for Rome. But what 
were his intentions — ^whether to sell his son-in-law dear to 
Uie Romans, or to take up the national wai* in concert with 
that son-in-law — neither the Romans nor Jugurtha nor per- 
haps even the king himself knew ; and he was in no hurry 
to abandon his ambiguous position. 

Thereupon Metellus left the province, which he had 
iCariuBcom- ^®*^ Compelled by decree of the people to give 
■anto^izi- up to his former lieutenant Marius who was 
now consul ; and the latter assumed the supreme 
^'^' command for the next campaign in 648. He 

was indebted for it in some degree to & revolution. R-ely- 
ing on the services \('h)ch he had rendered and a* the sum 



Chap. IV.] 'The Hule of the Restoration. 193 

time on oracles which had been ooixRiiiniicated to hini, he 
had resolved to come forward as a candidate for the c msul- 
ship. If the aristocracy had supported the constitutional, 
and in other respects quite justifiable, candidature of this 
able man, who was not at all inclined to take part with the 
opposition, nothing would have come of the matter but the 
enrolment of a new jbmilj in the consular Fasti. Instead 
of this the man of non-noble birth, who aspired to the high- 
est public dignity, was reviled by the whole governing caste 
as a daring innovator and revolutionist; just as the plebeian 
candidate had been formerly treated by the patricians, but 
now without any formal ground in law. The brave officer 
was sneered at in sharp language by Metellus — Marius was 
told that he might wait with his candidature till Metellus' 
son, a beardless boy, could be his colleague — ^and he was 
with the worst grace suffered to leave almost at the last 
moment^ diat he might appear in the capital as 
a candidate for the consulship of 647. There 
he amply retaliated on his general the wrong which he 
had suffered, by criticising b^ore the gaping multitude the 
conduct of the war and the administration of Metellus in 
Africa in a manner as unmilitary as it was disgracefully un- 
£iir ; and he did not even disdain to serve up to the darling 
populace — always whispering about secret conspiracies 
equally unprecedented and indubitable on the part of their 
noble masters — the silly story, that Metellus was design- 
edly protracting the war in order to remain as long as pos- 
sible commander-in-chief. To the idlers of the streets this 
was quite clear : numerous persons unfriendly for reasons 
good or bad to the government, and especially the justly 
indignant mercantile order, desired nothing better than such 
an opportunity of a;nnoying the aristocracy in its most sen- 
sitive point : he was elected to the consulship by an enor- 
mous majority, and not only so, but, while in other cases 
by the law of Gains Gracchus the duty of determining the 
respective functions to be assigned to the consuls lay witk 
the senate (p. 147), he was exceptionally invested by decree 
of the people with the supreme command in the African war. 
Vol. m.— 9 



194 The Ride of ths Bestaratian. [%>ok IV 

AcGordiogly he succeeded Metellus in 648 ; but his con« 
lOQ, fident promise to do better than his predecessor 

55^^ and to deliver Jugurtha bound hand and foot 
'•*^*« with all speed at Rome was more easily given 

than fulfilled. Marius carried on a desultory war&re with 
the Gaetulians ; he reduced several towns that had not prei 
viously been occupied ; he undertook an expedition to 
Capsa which surpassed even that of Thala in difficulty, took 
the town by capitulation, and in spite of the conventioCi 
caused all the adult men in it to be slain — the only means ^ 
no doubt, of preventing the renewed revolt of that remote 
city of the desert; he attacked a mountain-stronghold — 
situated on the river Molochath, which separated the Nu« 
midian territory from the Mauretanian — whither Jugurtha 
had conveyed his treasure-chest, and, just as he was about 
to desist from the siege in despair of success, fortunately 
gained possession of the impregnable fastness through the 
coup de main of some daring climbers. Had his object 
merely been to harden the army by bold razzias and to 
procure booty for the soldiers, or even to eclipse the maixsh 
of Metellus into the desert by an expedition going still 
farther, this method of war&re might be allowed to pass 
unchallenged ; but the main object to be aimed at, and 
which Metellus had steadfastly and perseveringly kept in 
view — the capture of Jugurtha — ^was in* this way utterly 
set aside. The expedition of Marius to Capsa was an ad- 
venture as aimless, as that of Metellus to Thala had been 
judicious; but the expedition to the Molochath, which 
passed along the border of, if not into, the Mauretanian ter* 
ritory, was directly repugnant to sound policy. King Boo- 
chus, in whose power it lay to bring the war to an issue 
favourable for the Romans or endlessly to prolong it, now 
concluded with Jugurtha a treaty, in which the latter ceded 
to him a part of his kingdom and Bocchus promised actively 
to support his son-in-law against Rome. The Roman army, 
which was returning from the river Molochath, found itself 
one evening suddenly surrounded by immense masses of 
Mauretanian and Numidian cavalry ; they were obliged to 



Chap. IT.] The BuU of the JSistoration. 19* 

fight just au the divisions stood without forming in a propei 
order of battle or following any leading command, and had 
to deem themselves fortunate when their sadly-thinned 
troops were brought into temporary safety for the night on 
two hills not far remote from each other. But the culpable 
negligence of the Africans intoxicated with victory wrested 
from them its consequences; they allowed themselves t4 
be surprised in a deep sleep during the morning twilight by 
the Roman troops which had been in some measure re- 
oi^anized during the night, and were fortunately dispersed. 
Thereupon the Eoman army continued its retreat in better 
order and with greater caution ; but it was yet again assailed 
simultaneously on all the four sides and was in great danger, 
till the cavalry officer Lucius Cornelius Sulla first dispersed 
the squadrons opposed to him and then, rapidly returning 
from their pursuit, threw himself also on Jugurtha and Boc- 
chus at the point where they in person pressed hard on the 
rear of the Roman infantry. Thus this attack also was suc- 
cessfully repelled ; Marius brought his army 
back to Cirta, and took up his winter quarters 
there (648-9). 

Strange as it may seem, we can yet understand why the 
Romans now, after king Bocchus had com- 
tirauBwith menoed the war, began to make most zealous 
^ ^ exertions to secure his friendship, which they 
had at first slighted and thereafter had at least not specially 
sought ; by doing so they gained this advantage, that no 
formal declaration of war took place on the part of Maure- 
tania. King Bocchus was not unwilling to return to his old 
ambiguous position : without dissolving his agreement with 
Jugurtha or dismissing him, he entered into negotiations 
with the Roman general respecting the terms of an alliance 
with Rome. When they were agreed or seemed to be so, 
the king requested that, for the purpose of concluding the 
treaty and receiving the royal captive, Marius would send 
to him Lucius Sulla, who was known and acceptable to th« 
king partly from his having formerly appeared as envoy of 
the senate at the Mauretanian court, partly from the com 



196 I^ RuU of the JSesiorahon. [Book nr 

mendatioiis of the Mauretanian envoys destined for Rome 
to whom Sulla kad rendered servioes on their way. Mariui 
was in an awkward position. His declinii^ the suggestion 
would probably lead to a breach ; his aooepting it would 
throw his most aristocratic and bravest officer into the 
hands of a man more than untrustworthy, who, as every 
one knew, played a double game with the Romans and with 
Jugurtha, and who seemed almost to have contrived the 
scheme for the purpose of obtaining for himself provisional 
hostages from both sides in the persons of Jugurtha and 
Sulla. But the wish to terminate the war outweighed every 
other consideration, and Sulla agreed to undertake the peril 
ous task which Marius suggested to him. He boldly de- 
parted under the guidance of Voiux the son of king Boo- 
chus, nor did his resolution waver even when his guide led 
him through the midst of Jugurtha's camp. He rejected 
the pusillanimous proposals of flight that came from his 
attendants, and marched, with the king's son at his side, 
uninjured through the enemy. The daring officer evinced 
the same decision in the discussions with the sultan, and 
induced him at length seriously to make his choice. 

Jugurtha was sacrificed. Under the pretext that all his 
surrander requests wcrc to be granted, he was allured by 
Son of**"' ^is own &ther-in-law into an ambush, his attend- 
jngvrUM. ^jjjg ^QY^ killed, and he himself was taken pris- 
oner. The great traitor thus fell by the treachery of his 
nearest relatives. Lucius Sulla brought the crafly and 
restless African in chains along with his children to the Ro- 
man headquarters ; and the war which had lasted for seven 
years was at an end. The victory was primarily associated 
With the name of Marius. King Jugurtha in royal robes 
and in chains, along with his two sons, preceded the tri- 
umphal chariot of the victor, when he entered 
Rome on the 1st of January 650 : by his orders 
the son of the desert perished a few days afterwards in the 
subterranean city-prison, the old tulUanum at the Capitol-- 
the '^ bath of ice," as the African called it, when he crossed 
the threshold in order either to be sti angled or to perish 



Gbap. rv.J The JRvie of ih^ Restoration. 197 

from oold and hunger there. But it eould not be denied 
that Marios had the least important share in the actual suc- 
cesses : the conquest of Numidia up to the edge of the de» 
ert was the work oi Metellus, the capture of Jugurtha was 
the work of Sulla, and between the two Marius played a 
part somewhat eompromishig the dignity of an ambitious 
dpstart. Marius reluctantly tolerated the assumption by 
his predecessor of the name of conqueror of Numidia ; hs 
fiew into a yiolent rage when king Bocdius afterwards con* 
seorated a golden sculpture at the Capitol, which represent* 
ed the surrender of Jugurtha to Sulla ; and yet in the eyes 
of unprejudieed judges the seryices of these two threw the 
general^ip of Marius very much into the shade — more 
especially Sulla's brilliant expedition to the desert, which 
had made his courage^ his. presence of mind, his acuteness, 
his power ov^ men to be recognized by the general him* 
self and by the whole army. In themselves these military 
rivalries would have been of little moment^ if they bad not 
been mixed up with the conflict of political parties, if the 
opposition had not supplanted the senatorial general by 
Marius, and if the party of the government had not, wit^ 
the deliberate intention of exasperating, praised Metellus 
and still more Sulla as the military celebrities and preferred 
them to the nominal victor. We shall have to return to 
the fatal consequences of these animosities when narrating 
the internal history. 

Otherwise, this insurrection of the Numidian elientrstate 

passed away without producing any noticeable 

iiQnS"'**^ change either in political relations generally or 

ETumidia. ^^^^ ^ thosc of the African province. By a 

deviation from the policy elsewh^e followed at this period 
Numidia was not converted into a Boman province ; eviP 
dently because the country could not be held without an 
army to protect the frontier against the barbarians of the 
desert, and the Romans were by no means disposed to 
audntain a s^banding amaiy in Africa* They contented them^ 
■elves aooordingly with annexing the most westerly di^rid 
of Numidia, probably the tract from the river Moloehatb 









'•-^ 



ubap. IV.] The Rvle of the Eestoratim. 1»» 

that among the governiiig lords of Rome everything wai 
treated as venal — the treaty of peace and the right of inter- 
cession, the rampart of the camp and the life of the soldier ; 
the African had said no more than the simple truth, when 
on his departure from Rome he declared that, if he had only 
gold enough, he would undertake to buy the city itself. 
But the whole external and internal government of this 
period bore the same stamp of miserable baseness. In our 
case the accidental fact, that the war in Africa is brought 
nearer to us by means of better accounts than the other 
contemporary military and political events, shifts the true 
perspective; contemporaries learned by these revelations 
nothing but what everybody knew long before and every 
intrepid patriot had long been in a position to support by 
&cts. The circumstance, however, that they were now fur- 
nished with some fresh, still stronger and still more irre- 
futable, proofs of the baseness of the restored senatorial 
government — a baseness only surpassed by its incapacity — 
might have been of importance, had there been an opposir 
tion and a public opinion with which the government would 
have found it necessary to come to terms. But this war 
had in £su)t revealed the utter nullity of the opposition no 
less than it had exposed the corruption of the government. 
It was not possible to fi^overn worse than the 

117—100 

restoration governed in the years d37-645; it 

was not possible to be more defenceless and forlorn llian 

was the senate in 645 : had there been in Rome 

100 

a real opposition, that is to say, a party which 
wished and urged a fundamental alteration of the constitu- 
tion, it must necessarily have now made at least an attempt 
to overturn the restored senate. No such attempt took 
place ; the political question was converted into a personal 
one, the generals were changed, and one or two useless and 
unimportant people were banished. It was thus settled, 
that the sa<»lled popular party as such neither could nor 
would govern ; that only two forms of government were at 
all possible in Rome, a iyrannia or an oligarchy ; that, so 
long as there happened to be nobody sufficiently well 



800 The Rule of the RedaraUon. [Book iy 

known, if not sufiioiently important, to usurp tbe r^ency 
of the state, the worst misinanagement endangered at th« 
most individual oligarchs, but never the oligarchy ; that on 
the other hand, so soon as such a pretender appeared, noth- 
ing was easier than to shake the rotten curule chairs. In 
this respect the coming forward of Marius was sigiiifioanti 
just because it was in itself so utterly unwarranted. If the 
ourgesses had stormed the senate-house after the defeat of 
Albinus, it would have been natural, not to say proper ; 
but after the turn which Metellus had given to the Nu- 
midian war, nothing more could be said of mismanage 
ment, and still less of danger to the commonwealtb, at 
least in that respect ; and yet the first ambitious officer who 
turned up succeeded in doing that with which the older 
Africanus had once threatened the government (ii. 425), 
and procured for himself one of the principal military com" 
mands against the distinctly expressed will of the govern* 
ing body. Public opinion, unavailing in the hands of the 
so-called popular party, became an irresistible weapon in 
(he hands of the future king of Rome. We do not mean 
to say that Marius intended to play the pretender, at least 
at the time when he canvassed the people for the supreme 
command in Africa ; but, whether he did or did not under* 
stand what he was domg, there was evidently an end of the 
restored aristocratic government when the comitial machine 
began to make generals, or, which was nearly the same 
thing, when every popular officer was able in legal fashion 
to nominate himself as general. Only one new element 
emerged in these preliminary crises ; this was the introduo* 
tion of military men and of military power into the politi- 
cal revolution. Whether the coming forward of Marius 
would be the in* mediate prelude of a new attempt to super- 
sede the oligarchy by the iyrannisy or whether it would, as 
in various similar cases, pass away without further conse- 
quence as an isolated encr:)achment on the prerogative of 
the government, could not yet be determined ; but it could 
well be foreseen that, if these rudiments of a seoond tyrat^ 
%u should attain any development, it was not a statesnuui 



Ciup. IV.] The jRtele of the Restoration. 201 

like Gaius Gracchus, but an officer that would become itf 
head. The contemporary reorganization of the military 
system — which Marius introduced when, in forming hiii 
army destined for Africa, he disregarded the property-quali 
hcation hitherto required, and allowed even the poorest bup- 
gess, if he was otherwise serviceablci to enter die legion as 
a volunteer — may have been projected by its author on 
purely military grounds ; but it was none the less on that 
account a momentous political event, that the army was no 
loBg^r^ as formeriy, composed of those who had moeh, no 
longer even, aa m the most recent times, composed of thos« 
who had somethings to lose, but became gradually converted 
into a host of people who had nothing but their arms and 
what the general bestowed on them. The vxim* 
toisncy ruled in 650 as absohitdy as in 6Sd; 
but the signs of the impending catastrophe had multiplied, 
gad on the political horison tfae sword had beguA to sj^pssv 
by tlie side of the cvowb. 
TobDI.— 0» 



CHAPTER V. 



TBI PB0PLX8 OF TBX HORTH. 



VkoM the close of the sixth oenturj the Roman 

munitj ruled over the three great peninsulaf 
Bom to the projeotiiig from the northern continent into the 
Mediterranean, at least taken as a whole. Even 
there however — ^in the north and west of Spain, in the val- 
lej8 of the Ligorian Apennines and the Alps, and in the 
mountains of Macedonia and Thrace — ^tribes wholly or par* 
tially free continued to defy the negligent Roman govern- 
ment. Moreover the continental communication between 
Spain and Italy as well as between Italy and Macedonia 
was very superficially provided for, and the countries be- 
yond the Pyrenees, the Alps, and the Balkan chain — ^the 
great river basins of the Rhone, the Rhine, and the Danube 
—In the main lay beyond the political horizon of the Ro- 
mans. We have now to set forth what steps were taken 
on the part of Rome to secure and to round off her empire 
in this direction, and how at the same time the great masses 
of peoples, who were ever moving to and fro behind that 
mighty mountain-screen, began to beat at the gates of the 
northern mountains and rudely to remind the Graeco-Ro- 
man world that it was mistaken in believing itself the sole 
possessor of the earth. 

l^et us first glance at the region between the western 
She oounfay Alps and the Pyrenees. The Romans had for 
jj^nSd**^ long commanded this part of the coast of the 
^^^•* Mediteriunean through their client city of Mas> 
silia, one of the oldest, most faithful, and most powerful of 
the allied communities dependent on Rome. Its maiitime 
stations, Agatha (Agde) and Rhoda (Rosas) to the west 



caiAP. v.] The Peoples of the North. 20a 

ward, and Tauroentium (Ciotat), Olbia (Hy^res?), Anti 
polls (Antibes), and Nicaea (Nice) on the east secured the 
navigation of the coast as well as the land-route from the 
Pyrenees to the Alps ; and its mercantile and political con- 
„ ^, ^ nections reached far into the interior. An ex* 
with tiie Li- pedltion into the Alps above Nice and Antibes, 
^^ directed against the Ligitrian Oxybii and Doci- 

etes, was undertaken by the Romans in 600 
part] ; at the request of the Massiliots, partly in their own 
nteresi; and after hot conflicts, some of which were at* 
tended with much loss, this district of the mountains was 
compelled to fiimish thenceforth standing hostages to the 
Massiliots and to pay them a yearly tribute. It is not 
improbable that about this same period the cultivation of 
the vine and olive, which flourished in this quarter after 
the model set by the Massiliots, was in the interest of the 
Italian landholders and merchants simultaneously prohib* 
ited throughout the territory beyond the Alps dependent 
and the 8a- on Massilia.* A similar character of financial 
iMd. speculation marks the war, which was waged by 

the Romans under the consul Appius Claudius 
^^ in 611 against the Salassi respecting the gold 

mines and gold washings of Victumulae (in the district of 
Vercelli and Bard and in the whole valley of the Dorea 
Baltea). The great extent of these washings, which de- 
prived the inhabitants of the country lying lower down of 
water for their fields, first gave rise to an attempt at media- 
tion and then to the armed intervention of the Romans. 
The war, although the Romans b^an it like all the other 

* If CSoero has not allowed himself to fall into an aiiachimlsni 
when ho makes Africanus say this as early as 626 (d$ Eep» 
lit 9), the view indicated in the text remains perhaps the 

only possible one. This enactment did not refer to Northern Italy and 
Liguria, as the cultivfttion of the vine by the Genuates in 
687 (iL 446, note) proves ; and as little to the immediate 

territory of Massilia (Just, xliil 4 ; Poeidon. .PV. 26, MiUL ; Strabo, iv. 

179). The large export of wine and oil from Italy to the reunion of the 

Rhone in the seventh century of the dty is well known. 



204 Tlie Feoples of Uie North. [Book IT 

wars of this period with a defeati led at last to the subjib 
gation of the Salassi, and the oession of the gold district to 
the Boxoan treasury. Some Ibrty years after 
wards (654) the colony of Eporedia (Ivrea) was 
instituted on the territory thus gained, ddefly doubtless 
wiUi a view to command the westero, as Aqjuileia com- 
manded the eastern, passage of the Alps. 

These Alpine wars first assumed a more serious chara<y 
TraoBai ine *^^» when Marcus Fulvius Flaeous, the faithful 
roiatioiis of ally of Gaius Gracchus, took the chief command 
us. in this quarter as consul in 629. He was tb» 

first to enter on the career of Transalpine con 
quest. In the much divided Celtic nation at this period the 
canton of the Bituriges had lost its real hegemony and re- 
tained merely an honorary presidency, and the actually 
leading canton in the region from the Pyrenees to the Rhine 
and from the Mediterranean to the Western Ocean was that 
ffiie of the Arvemi ; * so that the statement seems 

AnreniL ^^^ quite an exaggeration, that it could bring 
into the field as many as 180,000 men. With them the 
Haedui (about Autun) carried on an unequal rivalry for the 
hegemony ; while in north-eastern Gaul the kings of the 
Suessiones (about Soissons) united under their protectorate 
the league of the Belgic tribes extending over to britain. 
Greek travellers of that period had much to tell of the 
magnificent state maintained by Luerius, king of the Arver- 
nians — ^how, surrounded by his brilliant train of clansmen, 
his huntsmen with their pack of hounds in leash and his 
band of wandering minstrels, he travelled in a silver-mount- 
ed chariot through the towns of his kingdom, scattering the 
gold with a full hand among the multitude, and gladdening 
above all the heart of the minstrel with the glittering show- 
er. The descriptions of the open table which he kept in an 
enclosure of 1500 double paces square, and to which overy 
one who came in the way was invited, vividly reir jnd us 

* In Auveigne. Th«ir capital, Nemetnm or Nemoaus, la; not Ini 
fkom Qennont 



VBAT. y ] The jPeoples of ike JSlorUi. 20A 

of the marriage-table of Camacho. In faot^ the ikiitnaK>uc 
Arvemian gold coins of this period still extant show that 
the canton of the Arvernians had attained to extraordinary 
iiealth and a oomparatively high standard of civilization. 
The attack of Flaceus, however^ vas in the first instanoe 
directed not against tJbe Arvemi, but against the 
ttieAUobzo- smaller tribes in the district between the Alpa 
erni. And the Rhone, where the originid Liguriaa in 
habitants had become mixed with subsequent 
arrivals of Celtic bands, and there had arisen a Celto-Ligu- 
rian population resembling in this respect the Celtiberians. 
He fought (629, 630) with success against the 
Salyes or Salluvii in the region of Aix and in 
the valley of the Durance, and against their northern neigh- 
bours the Yocontii (in the departments of Vaucluse and 
Dr6me) ; and so did his successor Gaius Sextius Calvinus 
(631, 632) against the Allobroges, a powerful 
Celtic clan in the rich valley of the Is^re, which 
had come at the request of the fiigitive king of the Salves, 
Tutomotulus, to help him to reconquer his land, but was 
defeated in the district of Aix. When tiie Allobroges nev- 
ertheless refiised to surrender the king of the Salyes^ Gnaeus 
Domitius Ahenobarbus, the successor of Calvinus, pene- 
trated into their own territory (632). Up to 
this period the leading Celtic tribe had been 
spectators of the encroachments of their Italian neigh- 
bours ; the Arvemian king Betuitus, son of the Luerius 
already mentioned, seemed not much inclined to miter on a 
dangerous war for the sake of the loose relation of dient 
ship in which the eastern cantons might stand to him. But 
when the Romans showed signs of attacking the Allobroges 
in their own territory, he offered his mediation, the rejeo* 
lion of which was followed by his taking the field with all 
his forces to help the Allobroges ; whereas the Haedui em- 
braced the side of the Romans. On receiving accounts of 
the rising of the Arvemi the Romans sent the 
consul of 633, Quintus Fabius Maximusi to 
meet in concert with Ahenobarbus the impending attAck* 



906 Th£ Peoples cf the North. [Bo<« iv. 

On the southern border of the oanton of the Allobroges al 
the oor fluenoe of the Is^re wiUi the Rhone, on the 8th of 
August 633, the battle was fought which decided 
the mastery of southern Gaul. King Betuitus, 
when he saw the innumerable hosts of the dependent dans 
marching over to him on the bridge oi boats thrown acrosn 
Ihe Rhone and the Romans who had not a third of their 
numbers forming in array against them, is said to have ex- 
elai£ied that there were not enough of the latter to satisfy 
t^e dogs of the Celtic army. Nevertheless Maximus, a 
grandson of the victor of Pydna, achieved a decisive vic- 
tory ; the bridge of boats broke down under the mass of 
the fugitives ; liie greater part of the Arvemian army was 
destroyed. The Allobroges, to whom the king of. the 
Arvemi declared himself unable to render further assist* 
anoe, and whom he advised to make their peace with Maxi* 
mus, submitted to the consul ; whereupon the latter, thence- 
forth called AUobrogicus, returned to Italy and lefb to 
Ahenobarbus the no longer distant termination of the Ai^ 
vemian war. Ahenobarbus, personally exasperated at king 
Betuitus because he had induced the Allobroges to surren* 
der to Maximus and not to him, possessed himself treacher* 
ously of the person of the king and sent him to Rome, 
where the senate, although disapproving the breach of fidel- 
ity, not only kept the betrayed captive, but gave orders 
that his son, Clongonnetiacus, should likewise be sent to 
Rome. This seems to have been the reason why the Ar* 
verrian war, already almost at an end, once more broke 
out, and a second appeal to arms took place at Yindalium 
(above Avignon) at the confluence of the Sorgue with the 
Rhone. The result was not different from that of the first : 
on this occasion it was chiefly the African elephants that 
scattered the Celtic army. Thereupon the Arverni submit- 
ted to peace, and tranquillity was restored in the land of 
the Celts.* 

* The battle at Yindaliam is placed by the epitomator of layy and 
bj OroeiQB before that on the Isara ; but the reverse order is supported 
by Floms and Strabo (iv. 191), and is C4mfirmed partly by the circum* 



CiuA v.] The Peoples of iJie North. 201 

The result of these military operations was the institu* 
tion of a new Boman province between the 
Varbo.^ maritime Alps and the Pyrenees. All the 
tribes between the Alps and the Rhone became 
dependent on the Romans aud, so far as they did not pay 
tribute to Massiliay probably became now tributaries of 
Rome, In the country between the Rhone and the Pyre- 
nees the Arvemi retained freedom and were not bound to 
pay tribute to the Romans ; but they had to cede to Romo 
the most southerly portion of their direct or indirect terri 
tory— the district to the south of the Cevennes as far as the 
Mediterranean, and the upper course of the Garonne as far 
as Tolosa (Toulouse). As the primary object of these 
occupations was the establishment of a knd communication 
between Italy and Spain, arrangements virere made imm^ 
diately thereafter for the construction of the road along the 
coast. For this purpose a belt of coast from the Alps to 
the Rhone, from 1 to ]f of a mile in breadth, was handed 
over to tiie Massiliots, who already had a series of maritime 
stations along this coast, with the obligation of keeping the 
road in proper condition; while from the Rhone to the 
Pyrenees the Romans themselves laid out a military high- 
way, which obtained from its originator Ahenobarbus the 
name of Via Damitia, 

As usual, the formation of new fortresses was combined 
j^^^^ ^^ with the construction of roads. In the eastern 
ttementa in portion the Romans chose the spot where Gaius 

too region 

of «he Sextius defeated the Celts, and where the pleas- 

antness and fertility of the region as well as the 
numerous hot and cold springs invited them to settlement ; 
a Roman township sprang up there — the ** baths of Sex- 

ttenoe that Mazimiis, sfioording to the epitome of Uvy and Pliny ffm 
Jf^ yii. 50, fought it when consul, partly and especially by the Gapito* 
Ihie Fasti, according to which Maximus not only triumphed before 
Ahenobarbus, but the former triumphed over the Allobroges and the 
Idng of the Arremi, the lictter only over the Aryemi. It is clear that 
the battle with the Allobroges and ArvemJ mutt have taker, place 
earlier than that with the Arvemi alone. 



208 Ths PeqpUsqfthe JVbrtL UBooe if 

tius," Aquae Sextiae (Aix). To the west of the Rhone thM 
Romans settled in Narbo, an ancient Celiie town on the 
navigable river Atax (Ande) at a small distance from tb€ 
sea, which is already mentioned by Hecataeus, and which 
even before its occupation by the Romans was the rival oi 
Massilia as a place of stirring commerce, and as sharng the 
trade in British tin. Aquae did not obtain civic rightSi but 
remained a standing camp ; * whereas Narbo, although in 
like manner founded mainly as a sentinel outpoet againat 
the Celts, became, as ^ Mars' town," a Roman burgesaKX)!- 
ony and the usual seat of the governor of the new Tramh 
alpine Celtic province or, as it was more frequently called* 
the province of Narbo. 

The Graoohan party, which suggested these extensionn 
Th«adTanoe ^^ territory beyond the Alps, evidently wished 
g^^ to open up th^:<e a new and imiaeasurable field 
oiMckediqr for thdr plans of colonization,-*^ field whieh 
tiie KrtSft- offered the same advantages as Sicily and Africa^ 
'^ and could be more easily wrested from the na* 

tives than the Sicilian and Libyan estates from the Italian 
capitalists. The fall of Gaius Gracchus, no doubt, gavet 
occasion here also to restrictions on the acquisition of terri- 
tory and still more on the founding of cities ; but^ if the 
design was not carried out in its full extent, it was at any 
rate not wholly frustrated. The territory acquired and, 
still more, the foundation of Narbo-*a settlement on which 
the senate vainly endeavoured to inflict the fiU;e of that at 
Carthage^ — ^remained standing as parts, of an unfinished 
structure, exhorting the future successor of Gracchus to 
continue the building. It is evident that the Roman mer- 
cantile class, which was able to compete with Massilia ia 
the Gallo-Britannio traffic at Narbo alone, protected that 
settlement from the assaults of the Optimates. 

• Aquae was not a coIodj, as Liyy says {Ep, 61), but a catteUvm 
(Strabo, iv. 180 ; Ydleius, i, 16 ; Madnrig, Ojmc, I 303). The samt 
Holds true of Italica (p. 14), >iQd of many other places — Yindoiiissa, tat 
instance, nerer was in law anything else than a Celtic village, but wai 
withal a fortified Roman camp, and a place of very considerable import', 
ance. 



^^^ 



Ch*/. r.] Th4 Fecniea of the Nwth. 20» 

A problem similar to that in the north-west had to be 
niTTto. ^^t with in the north-east of Italy ; it was ii 

like manner not wholly neglected, but was 
solved still more imperfectly than the former. With the 
foundation of Aquileia (571) the Istrian penin* 
sula came into possession of the Romans (11, 
233) : in pM*t of Epirus and the former territory of the 
lords of Soodra they had already ruled for some consider*' 
able time previously. But nowhere did their 
dominion reach into the interior ; and even, on 
the coast they exercised scarcely a nominal sway over the 
inhospitable district between Istria and fipirus, whidi, with 
its wild series of mountain-caldrons broken neither by 
river-valleys nor by coast^platns and arranged like scales 
one above another, and with its chain of rocky islands 
stretching along the coast, separates rather than connects 
Italy and Greece. Around the town of Delmium clustered 
the confederacy of the Delmatians or Dalmatians, whose 
manners were rough as their mountains. While the neigh- 
bouring peoples had already attained a high degree of cul- 
ture, the Dalmatians were as yet unacquainted with money, 
and divided their land without recognizing any special right 
of property in it, afresh every eight years among the mem- 
\^st% of the community. Brigandage and piracy were the 
(Hily native trades. These tribes had in earlier times been 
in loose relations of dependence on the rulers of Scodr% 
and had been' in consequence chastised by the Roman expe- 
ditions against queen Teuta (ii. 91) and Demetrius of Pha- 
ros (ii. 93) ; but on the accession of king Genthius they 
had revolted and had thus escaped the &te which involved 
southern lUyria in the fall of the Macedonian empire and 
rendered it permanently dependent on Rome (ii. 357). 
The Romans were glad to leave the &r from attractive re- 
gion to it8el£ But the complaints of the Roman Illyrians, 
particularly of the Daorsi, who dwelt on the Narenta to 
the south of the Dalmatians, and of the inhabitants of the 
Island of Issa (Lissa), whose cmitinentai stations Tragyrium 
(Trau) and Epetium (rear Spalato) suffered severely from 



210 The Peoples of the North. [Book v 

the natives, compelled the Koman government to despatch 
an embassy to the latter, and on receiving the reply that 
the Dalmatians had neither troubled themselves hitherto 
about the Romans nor would do so in fiitm^y to send 
thither an army in 598 under the consul Gaiui 
Maicius Figulus. He penetrated into Dalma 
tift) but was again driven back into the Roman territory. 

TMirsubiu- ^^ ^^ ^^^ ^"^ ^^® succcssor Publius Scipio 
gaiion. Nasica took the large and strong town of Del- 

mium in 599, that the confederacy conformed 
and professed itself subject to the Romans. But the poo) 
and only superficially subdued country was not sufficiently 
important to be erected into a distinct province : the Ro> 
mans contented themselves, as they had already done in 
the case of the more important possessions in Epirus, with 
having it administered from Italy along with Cisalpine 
Gaul ; an arrangement which was, at least as a rule, re* 
tained even when the province of Macedonia had been 

erected in 608 and its north-western frontier had 

146. 

been fixed to the northward of Scodra.* 

But this very conversion of Macedonia into a province 

TheBomaBs directly dependent on Rome gave to the rela- 

Ito^^d tions of Rome with the peoples on the north- 

Thraoe. g^g|j greater importance, by imposing on the 

Romans the obligation of defending the everywhere ex- 

posed frontier on the north and east against Uie adjacent 

barbarian tribes ; and in a similar way not long afterwards 

(621 ][ the acquisition bv Rome of the Thracian 

Chersonese (peninsula of Gallipoli) previously 

belonging to the kingdom of the Attalids devolved on the 

Romans the obligation hitherto resting on the kings of Per< 

gamus to protect Lysimachia against the Thracians. From 

the double basis furnished by the valley of the Po and the 

province of Macedonia the Romans could now advance in 

• P. 69. The Pirustae in the valleyB of the Drin belonged to th* 
proTlnoe of Macedonia, but made forays into the aetghbooring lUyiioim 
(Oaieaar, B. G, y. 1). 



Chap. V.] The Peo'ples of the North. 211 

eames€ towards the region of the headwaters of the Khine 
and towards the Danube, and possess themselves of the 
northern mountains at least so far as was requisite for the 
security of the south. 

In these regions the most powerful nation at that time 
The tribes at ^*® *^® great Celtic people, which according ta 
effheKhSr ^® native tradition (i. 422) had issued from iti 
and along settlements on the Western Ocean and poured 
itself about the same time into the valley of the 
Po on the south of the main chain of the Alps and into the 
regions on the Upper Rhine and on the Danube to the north 
of that chain. Among their various tribes, both banks of 
the Upper Rhine were occupied by the powerful and rich 
Helvetii, who nowhere came into immediate 
contact with the- Romans and so lived in peace 
and in treaty with them : at this time they seem to have 
stretched from the lake of Geneva to the river Main, and to 
have occupied the modern Switzerland, Suabia, and Fran- 
conia. Adjacent to them dwelt the Boii, whose 
settlements were probably in the modern Ba- 
varia and Bohemia.* To the south-east of these we meet 

« *^The HeWetii dwelt,*' Tacitus says (Germ, 28), ** between the 
Hercynian Forest («. e., here probably the Rauhe Alp), the Rhine, and 
the Main ; the Boii farther on.*' Posidonius also (op. Strab. vii. 298) 
states that the Boii, at the time when they repulsed the Gimbri, in- 
habited the Hercynian Finest, i. e., the mountains from the Rauhe Alp 
to the Bohmerwald. The circumstance that Caesar transplants them 
^ beyond the Rhine " (B, Q, i. 6) is by no means inconsistent with this, 
for, as he there speaks from the Helvetian point of view, he may very 
well mean the country to the north-east of the lake of Constance; 
whidi quite accords with the fact, that Strabo (vii. 292) describes the 
former Boian country as bordering on the lake of Constance, except 
that he is not quite accurate in naming along with them the YindeUd as 
dwelling by the lake of Constance, for the latter only established them- 
■elves there after the Boii had evacuated these districts. From these 
settlements the Boii were dispossessed by the Marcomaniii and other 
Oormanlo tribes even before the time of Posidonius, consequently 
before 650 ; detached portions of them in Caesar's time 
roamed about in Caiinthia (B, G, i 6,) and came tiMief 
lo the HdvetU and into western Ganl • another swarm found new set 



312 The Peoples of the North. [Book r? 

with aLOther Celtie stock, which made its appearaDoe is 
TwmaA Stjria and Carinthia under the name of the 

Taurisci and afterwards of the Norici, in Friuli, 
^^*™*' Carniola, and Istria under that of the Ciini 

Their city Noreia (not far from St. Veit to the north of 
Klagenfurt) was flourishing and widely known from the 
iron mines that were even at that time zealously wrought 
in those regions ; still more were the Italians at this very 
period allured thither by the rich seuna of gold brought 
to light, till the natives excluded them and took this Cali- 
fornia of that day into thdr own hands. These Celtic 
hordes streaming along on both sides of the Alps had after 
their fiew^ion occupied chiefly the flat and Mil country ; the 
Alpine regions proper and likewise the district along the 
Adige and the Lower Po were not occupied by them, and 
remained in the hands of the earlier indigenous population. 

Nothing certain has yet been ascertain/ed as to 

RflAfi 

Enganei, the nationality of the latter ; but they appear 
^°^ under the name of the Raeti in the mountains 

of East Switzerland and the Tyrol, and under that of the 
Euganei and Veneti about Padua and Vemee; so that afr 
this last point the two great Celtic streams almost touched 
each other, and only a narrow belt of native population 
separated the Celtic Cenomani about Brescia from the Celtic 
Camians in Friuli. The Euganei and Veneti had long been, 
peaceful subjects of the Romans ; whereas the peoples of 
the Alps proper were not only still free, but made regular 
forays down from their mountains into the plain between 
the Alps and the Po, where they were not content with 
levying contributions, but conducted themselves with fear* 
ful cruelty in the places whidi they captured, not unfre* 
quently slaughtering the whole male population down t6 
the infant in the cradle — the practical answer, it may be 



tlementB on tho Flattensee, where it was aimifailated aboul 
700 by the Getae; but the district^the "Boian deaert," 

ae it was called— preserved the name of this the moBt hanuascd of atf 

the Qeltic peoples (oomp. ii, 284, fwte). 



Ckaf. v.] The Fecplee of the North. 218 

presumed, to tJie Roman razzias in the Alpine vaKcjs. 
How dangerous these Raetian inroads were, ap- 
pears from the fact that one of them about 660 
destroyed the considerable township of CJomum. 

If these Celtic and non-Celtic tribes having their settle- 
ments upon and beyond the Alpine chain were 
^K^i already variously intermingled, there was, as 
may easily be conceived, a still more compre- 
hensive intermixture of peoples in the countries on the 
Lower Danube, where there were no high mountain ranges, 
as in the more western regions, to serve as natural walls of 
partition. The original Illyrian population, of which the 
modem Albanians seem to be the last pure survivors, was 
throughout, at least in the interior, largely mixed with 
Celtic elements, and the Celtic armour and Celtic method 
of warfare. were probably everywhere introduced in that 
quarter. Next to the Taurisci came the Japy- 
des, who had their settlements on the Julian 
Alps in the modern Croatia as far down as Fiume and 
Zeng, — a tribe originally doubtless Illyrian, but largely 
mixed with Celts, ^ordering with these along the coast 
were the already-mentioned Dalmatians, into whose rug- 
ged mountains the Celts do not seem to have penetrated ; 
whereas in the interior the Celtic Scordisci, to 
whom the tribe of the Triballi which was for- 
merly especially powerful there had succumbed, and who 
had played a principal part in the Celtic expeditions to 
Delphi, were about this time the leading nation along the 
Lower Save as far as the Morava in the modern Bosnia 
and Servia. They roamed far and wide towaids Moesia, 
Thrace, and Macedonia, and fearful tales were told of their 
savage valor and cruel customs. Their chief stronghold 
was the strong Segestica or Siscia at the point where the 
Kulpa &Us into the Save. Tlie peoples of the modem 
Hungary, Wnllachia, and Bulgaria still remained for the 
present beyond the horizon of the Romans ; the latter came 
into contact with the Thracians alone on the eastern frontier 
of Macedonia at the Rhodope mountains. 



214 The Peoples of the North. [Bo3k it 

It would have been no easy task for a government mor« 
oonflioto on energetio than was the Roman government of 
tb« froniiar, ^^^^ ^^ ^ establish an organized and adequate 

defence of the frontier against these wide domains of bar- 
barism ; what was done for this important object under 
(he auspices of the government of the restoration, did not 
come up to even the most moderate requirements. There 
intheAipa, seems to have been no want of expeditions 
^^ against the inhabitants of the Alps : in 636 

there was a triumph over the Stoeni, who were probabh 
^ settled in the mountains above Verona ; in 659 

the consul Lucius Crassus caused the Alpine 
valleys far and wide to be ransacked and the inhabitants 
to be put to death, and yet he did not succeed in killing 
enough of them to enable him to celebrate a village tri- 
umph and to couple the laurels of the victor with his ora- 
torical fame. But as the Romans remained satisfied with 
razzias of this sort which merely exasperated the natives 
without rendering them harmless, and, apparently, with 
drew the troops again after every such inroad, the state of 
matters in the region beyond the Po remained substantially 
the same as before. 

On the Thracian frontier they appear to have given 
themselves little concern about their neighbours ; 

in Thraoflu 

los. except that there is mention made in 651 of con- 

flicts with the Thracians, and in 657 of others 
with the Maedi in the border mountains between Macedonia 
and Thrace. 

More serious conflicts took place in the Illyrian land, 

where complaints were constantly made as to 

^^^ the turbulent Dalmatians by their neighbours 

and those who navigated the Adriatic ; and along the wholly 

exposed northern frontier of Macedonia, which, according 

to the significant expression of a Roman, extended as far as 

the Roman swords and spears reached, the conflicts with 

the barbarians never ceased. In 619 an expedi* 

tion was undertaken against the Ardyaei or Var* 

daei and the Pleraei or Paralii, a Dalmatian tribe on th« 



Chap. V.] Ths I'eopUs of the North. 216 

coast to the iiDrth of the mouth of the Narenta, wnich was 
incessantly perpetrating outrages on the sea and on the 
opposite coast : by order of the Romans they removed from 
the coast and settled in the interior of the modem Herze- 
govina, where they began to cultivate the soil, but, unused 
to their new calling, pined away in that inclement region. 
At the same time an attack was directed from Macedonia 
against the Scordisci, who had, it may be presumed, made 
common cause with the assailed inhabitants of 

1281 

the coast. Soon afterwards (625) the consul 
Tuditanus in connection with the able Decimus Brutus, the 
conqueror of the Spanish Gallaeci, humbled the Japydes, 
and, after sustaining a defeat at the outset, at length carried 
the Roman arms into the heart of Dalmatia as far as the 
river Kerka, 115 miles distant from Aquileia; the Japydea 
thenceforth appear as a nation at peace and on friendly 

terms with Rome. But ten years later (635) 

the Dalmatians rose afresh, once more in con- 
cert with the Scordisci. While the consul Lucius Cotta 
fought ag»inst the latter and in doing so advanced apparent- 
ly as far d^ Segestica, his colleague Lucius Metellus after- 
wards named Dalmaticus, the elder brother of the con- 
queror of Numidia, marched against the Dalmatians, con- 
quered them and passed the winter in Salona (Spalato), 
which town henceforth appears as the chief stronghold of 
the Romans in that region. It is not improbable that the 
construction of the Via Gabiuia, which led from Salona in 
an easterly direction to Andetrium (near Much) and thence 
farther into the interior, falls within this period. 

The expedition of the consul of 639, Marcus Aemiliua 

Scaurus, against the Taurisci'*' presented more 
TheBonutai the character of a war of conquest. He was 

the first of the Romans to cross the chain of the 



^^ eastern Alps at their lowest elevation between 

Trieste and Lay bach, and contracted hospitable relations 

* They are called In the Triumphal FasU QaXii Kami ; and in 7io* 
tor lAffvTf Taurisd (for Buch should be the reading instead of Um 
Ne«lT^ Xt^t^ H CawriKi), 



S18 Ths Peoples of the NoHh. [Book it 

tory eipeiliti^a of mounted warriors, nor a '^ ver aa^ruM ' 
of young men emigrating to a foreign land, bi.t a migratory 
people that had set out with their wcn.en and children, witk 
their goods and chattels, \o seek a new home. The waggon, 
which had everywhere among the still not fully settled peo- 
ples of the north a difierent importance from what it had 
among the Hellenes and the Italians, and which universallj 
accompanied the Celts also in their encampments, was 
among the Cimbrians as it were their house, where, beneath 
the leather covering stretched over it, a place was found for 
the wife and children and even for the house-dog as well as 
for the furniture. The men of the south beheld with as* 
tonishment those tall lank figures with the fair locks and 
bright-blue eyes, the hardy and stately women who were 
little inferior in size and strength to the men, and the chilr 
dren with old men's hair, as the amazed Italians called the 
flaxen-haired youths of the north. Their system of war- 
fere was substantially that of the Celts of this period, who 
no longer fought, as the Italian Celts had formerly done, 
bareheaded and with merely sword and dagger, but with 
copper helmets often richly adorned and with a peculiar 
missile weapon, the materU ; the large sword was retained 
and the long narrow shield, along with which they probably 
wore also a coat of mail. They were not destitute of cav- 
alry ; but the Romans were superior to them in that arm. 
Their order of battle was as formerly a crude phalanx pro- 
fessedly drawn up with just as many ranks in depth as in 
breadth, the first rank of which in dangerous combats not 
unfrequently tied together their metallic girdles with cords 
Their manners were rude. Plesh was frequently devoured 
raw. The bravest and, if possible, the tallest man was king 
of the host. Not unfrequently, after the manner of the 
Celts and of barbarians generally, the time and place of the 
combat were previously arranged with the enemy, and 
sometimes also, before the battle began, an individual oppo* 
nent was challenged to single combat. The conflict was 
ushered in by their insulting the ennmy with unseemly ges- 
tures, and by a horrible noise — the men raising th«*ii V^tle 



Cb4p. t.] Ths Peoples qf the Ifarth. 318 

sb^at, and the women and ohildren increasing the din b^ 
drumming on the leathern covers of the waggons. Tht 
Cimbrian fi>ugiit bravdy— death on the bed of honour was 
deemed by him the only death worthy of a free man — ^but 
after l^e victory he indemnified himself by the most savage 
brutality, and sometimes promised b^rehand to present 
to the gods of battle whatever victory should place in the 
power of the victor. The effects of the enemy were brokeii 
in pieces, the horses were killed, the prisoners were hanged 
or preserved only to be sacrificed to the gods. It was the 
pries te sses— grey-haired women in white linen, dresses and 
unshod— -who, like Iphigenia in Scythia, offcired these sacri- 
fices, and prophesied the future from the streaming blood 
of the prisoner of war or the criminal who formed the vie- 
tim. How much in these customs was the universal usage 
d the northern barbarians, how much was borrowed from 
the Celts, and how much was peculiar to the Germans, can* 
not be ascertained ; but the practice of having the army 
accompanied and directed not by priests, but by priestesses, 
may be pronounced an undoubtedly Grermanic custom. 
Thus marched the Qmbri into the unknown land— an im« 
mense multitude of various origin which had congregated 
round a nucleus of Germanic emigrants from the Baltic—* 
not without resemblance to the great bodies of emigrants^ 
that in our own times cross the ocean similarly burdened 
and similarly mingled, and with aims not much less vague ; 
carrying their lumbering waggon-castle, with the dexterity 
which a long migratory life imparts, over streams and 
mountains; dangerous to more civilized nations like the 
wave and tiie hurricane, and like these capricious and un» 
accoimtable, now rapidly advancing, now suddenly pausing, 
Nmlng aside, or receding. They came and struck like 
bghtning ; like lightning they vanished ; and unhappily, in 
the dull age in whidi they appeared, there was no observer 
who deemed it worth while accurately to describe the mar- 
vellovB meteor. When men afterwards began to trace the 
ehain, of which this emigration, the £rst Germanic move* 
m«it which toudied the orbit of ancient civilization, was a 



S90 The Peoples of ths North. [Book n 

link, the direct and liying knowledge of it had long passed 
away. 

This homeless people of the Cimbri, whidi hitherto had 
oimWan ^^^ prevented from advancing to the south by 
M? oa^^ the Celts on the Danube, more especially by tbs 
^'^^ Boiiy broke through that barrier in oonsequenoe 

of the attacks directed by the Romans against the Danubian 
Celts; either because the latter invoked the aid of their 
Cimbrian antagonists against the advancing legions, or be^ 
cause the Roman attack prev^ited them from protecting as 

hitherto their northern frontiers. Advancing 
Oiirbo. through the territory of the Soordisci into the 

Tauriscan country, they approached in 641 the 
passes of the Garnian Alps, to protect which the consul 
Gnaeus Papirius Carbo took up a position on the heights 
not far from Aquileia. Here, seventy years before, Celtic 
tribes had attempted to settle on the south of the Alps, but 
at the bidding of the Romans had evacuated without resist- 
ance the ground which they had already occupied (ii. 232) ; 
even now the dread of the Transalpine peoples at tlie Ro- 
man name showed itself powerfully. The Cimbri did not 
attack ; indeed, when Carbo ordered them to evacuate the 
territory of the Taurisci who were in relations of hospital- 
ity with Rome — ^an order which the treaty with the latter 
by no means bound him to#make — ^they complied and fol- 
lowed the guides whom Carbo had assigned to them to es- 
eort them over the frontier. But these guides were in fact 
instructed to lure the Cimbri into an ambush, where the 
consul awaited them. Accordingly an engagement took 
place not far from Noreia in the modern Carinthia, in which 
(he betrayed gained the victory over the betrayer and in- 
ftieted on him considerable loss ; a storm, which separated 
the combatants, alone prevented the complete annihilation 
of the Roman army. The Cimbri might have immediately 
directed their attack towards Italy ; they preferred to turn 
to the westward. By treaty with the Helvetii and the 
Bequani rather than by force of arms they made their way 
to the lefb bank of the Rhine and over the Jura, and ther« 



tJfcAF. v.] Th^e Peoples of the NcrOi. 281 

some jeors after the defeat of Carbo once more threatened 
the Roman territory by their immediate vicinity. 

With a view to cover the frontier of the Rhine and the 
immediately threatened territory of the Allo» 
fiiianiu. broges, a Roman army under Marcus Junius 
^^ Silanus appeared in 645 in Southern Gaul. Th« 

Cimbri requested that land might be assigned to Uiem 
where they might peacefully settle—- a request which oei^ 
tainly could not be granted. The consul instead of reply* 
iog attacked them ; he was utterly defeated and the Roman 
camp was taken. The new levies which were occasioned 
by this misf(»rtune were already attended with so mudi 
difficulty, that the senate procured the abolition of the laws 
—-probably proceeding from Graius Gracchus — which limited 
the obligation to military service in point of time (p. 139)» 
But the Cimbriy instead of following up their victory over 
the Romans, sent to the senate at Rome to repeat their re* 
^uest for the assignment of land, and meanwhile employi'd 
themselves, apparently, in t.he subjugation of the surround* 
ing Celtic cantons. 

Thus the Roman province and the new Roman army 
igj^^of were lefi for the moment undisturbed by the 
tato^^i^ Germans ; but a new enemy arose in Gaul itsel£ 
am Gaul. The Helvetii,.who had suffered much in the con- 
stant conflicts with their north-eastern neighbours, felt them- 
selves stimulated by the example of the Gmbri to seek in 
their turn for more quiet and fertile settlements in western 
Gaul, and had perhaps, even when the Qmbrian hosts 
marched through their land, formed an alliance with them 
for that purpose. Now under the leadership of Divioo the 
forces of the Tougeni (position unknown) and of the Tigo- 
rini (on the lake of Murten) crossed the Jura,* and reached 

* The usual hypotheaia, that the Tougeni and Tigorini had advanced 
at the flame time wltli the G!mbri into Gaul, cannot be supported bj 
Btrabo (viL 208), and is little in harmony with the separate part acted 
by the Helvetii Our traditional accounts of this war are, besides, s« 
fragmentary that, just as in the case of the Samnlte wars, a conneoted 
histofical narration can only lay claim to approximate accuracy, 



832 TAe PeopU^ qfthe North. Ifioos nr 

the territor J of the Nitiobroges (about Agen on the Gft 
Defeftiof roDiie). The Roman anrij under the odMul 
x«Qgiiui& LudUB Gwsius Longinus, vrhich they here en 
eounteredy allowed itself to be decoyed by the Helvetii into 
«r ambuahy in which the general himself and his legate, the 
ooDsulfur Gaius Piso, along with the greater portion of the 
foldiers met their death ; Gaius Popilliua^ the interim com- 
mander-in-chief of the force which had escaped to the camp, 
was allowed to withdraw under the yoke on condition of 

surrendering half the property whic^ the troops 

carried with them and furnishing hostages (647). 
fie perilous was the i^te of things for die Romans, that 
one of tihe most important towns in their own provincei 
Tolosa, rose against them and placed the Roman garrison 
in chains. 

But, as the Cumbrians, continued to employ themselres 
elsewhere, and the Helvei^i did not further molest for the 
moment the Roman province, the new Roman command^^ 
in*chief, Quintus Servilius Giepio, had fiiU time to recover 
possession of the town of Tolosa by treachery and to empty 
at Idsure the immense treasures accumulated in the old and 
&mous sanctuary of die Celtic Apollo. It was a desirable 
gain for the embarrassed exchequer, but unfortunately the 
gold and silver vessels on the way from Tolosa to Massilia 
were taken from the weak escort by a bind of robbers, and 
totally disappeared : the consul himself and his staff wers^ 

it was alleged, the instigators of the onset (648). 

Meanwhile they confined themselves to the 
strictest defensive as regarded the chief enemy, and guard- 
ed the Roman province wiUi three strong armies, till it 
should please Uie Cimbrians to repeat their attack. 

They came in 649 under their king Boiorix, on this 

occasion seriously meditating an inroad into 
0eA«tof Italy. They were opposed on the right bank 



of the Rhone by the proconsul Caepio, on the 
left by the consul Gnaeus Mallius Maximus and by his 
legate, the consular Marcus Aurelius Scaurus, under him at 
the head of a detached corps. The first onset fell en ths 



Oha*. tj The PecpleB of the NartK 298 

latter ; he was totally defeated and brought in person as a 
prisoner to the enemy's head-quarters, where the Cimbriaii 
king, indignant at the proud warning given to him by th« 
captive Boman not to venture with his army into Italy, put 
him to death. Maximus thereupon ordered his colleague 
to bring his army over the Rhone : the latter complying 
with reluctance at length appeared at Arausio (Orange) on 
the left bank of the river, where the whole Roman force 
now stood confronting the Cimbrian army, and is alleged 
to have made sueh an impression by its considerable num- 
bers that the Cumbrians began to n^jotiate. But the two 
lead»« livBd in the most veh^nent discord. Maximus, an 
•bscore and incapable man, was as consul the legal superior 
of his prouda* and better born, but not better qualified, 
proconsular colleague Caepio; but the latter refused to 
occupy a common camp and to devise operations in concert 
with him, and still, as formerly, maintained his independent 
command. In vain deputies from the Roman senate en« 
deavoured to effect a reconciliation ; a personal conference 
between the generals, on which the officers insisted, only 
widened the breach. When Caepio saw Maximus nego- 
tiating with the envoys of the Cimbrians, he fiincied that 
the latter wished to gain the sole credit of their subjuga- 
tion, and threw himself with his portion of the army alone 
in all haste on the enemy. He was utterly annihilated, so 
that even his camp fell into the hands of the 
enemy (6 Oct. 649) ; and his destruction was 
followed by the no less complete defeat of the second Ro- 
man army. It is asserted that 80,000 Roman soldiers and 
half as many of the immense and helpless body of camp- 
followers perished, and that only ten men escaped: this 
much is certain, that only a few out of the two armies suo- 
eeeded in escaping, for the Romans had fought with the 
river in their rear. It was a calamity which materially and 
morally fiir surpassed the day of Cannae. The defeats of 
Carbo, of Silanus, and of Longinus had passed without pro* 
duoing any permanent impression on the Italians. Thejr 
were accustomed to open every war with disasters; thi 



224 The Peoples of the North. [Book it 

invincibleness of the Roman arms was so firmly estab 
lished, that it seemed superfluous to attend to the prettj 
numerous exceptions. But the battle of Arausio, the alarms 
ing proximity of the victorious Cimbrian army to the uo* 
defended passes of the Alps, the insurrections bieaking out 
afresh and with increased force both in the Roman territory 
beyond the Alps and among the Lusitanians, the defencelesi 
condition of Italy, produced a sudden and fearful awakening 
from these dreams. Men recalled the never wholly forgot- 
ten Celtic inroads of the fourth century, the day on the 
Allia and the burning of Rome : with the double force at 
once of the oldest remembrance and of the freshest alarnqi 
the terror of the Gauls came upon Italy ; through all the 
West people seemed to be aware that the Roman empire 
was beginning to totter. As after the battle of Cannae^ 
the period of mourniDg was shortened by decree of the 
senate.* The new enlistments brought out the most pain- 
ful scarcity of men. All Italians capable of bearing arms 
had to swear that they would not leave Italy ; the captains 
of the vessels lying in the Italian ports were instructed not 
to take on board any man fit for service. It is impossible 
to tell what might have happened, had the Gmbrians im« 
mediately after their double victory advanced through the 
gates of the Alps into Italy. But they first overran the 
territory of the Arverni, who laboured to defend them* 
selves in their fortresses against the enemy; and soon, 
weary of sieges, set out from thence, not to Italy, but west* 
ward to the Pyrenees. 

If the torpid organism of the Roman polity could still 
The Roman ^^ brought to recover of itself its healthy ao* 
oppodtion. |.Jqj,^ ^^^ recovery could not but take place noW| 

when, by one of the marvellous chances in which the his- 
tory of Rome is so rich, the danger was sufficiently immi* 
nent to rouse all the energy and all the patriotism of the 
burgesses, and yet did not burst upon them so suddenly as 
to leave no space for the development of their resources. 

• To this, beyond doubt, the fragment of Diodonw (Tol pi laaf 



Chap. V,] The Peoples of the Ifarth. 228 

Bui the very same phenomenay which had occurred fouf 
jears previously after the Afi'ican defeats, presented theixi* 
seiyes afresh. In fact the African and Gallic disasters were 
essentially of the same kind. It may be that primarily tk« 
blame of the former fell more on the oligarchy as a whole^ 
that of the latter more on individual magistrates ; but pub^ 
lie opinion justly recognuEed in both, above all things, the 
bankruptcy of the government, which in its progressive de- 
velopment imperilled first the honour and now the very e» 
istence of the state. People just as little deceived them- 
selves then as now regarding the true seat of the evil, but 
as little now as then did they make even an attempt to 

apply the remedy at the proper point, ^ey 
woseeii* saw well that the system was to blame ; but on 

this occasion also they adhered to the method 
of calling individuals to account. Doubtless, however, this 
second storm discharged itself on the heads of the oligarchy 

so much the more heavily, as the calamity of 

649 exceeded in extent and peril that of 645* 
The sure instinctive feeling of the public, that there was no 
resource against the oligarchy except the tyrannise was once 
more apparent in their readily consenting to every attempt 
by officers of note to tie the hands of the government and, 
under one form or another, to overturn the oligarchic rule 
by a dictatorship. 

It was against Quintus Gaepio that their attacks were 
first directed ; and justly, in so far as he had primarily 
occasioned the defeat of Arausio by his insubordination, 
even apart from the probably well-founded but not proved 
charge of embezzling the Tolosan booty; but the fury 
which the opposition displayed against him was essentially 
augmented by the iact that he had as consul ventused on 
an attempt to wrest the office of jurymen from the capital- 
ists (p. 166). On his account the old venerable principle, 
lliat the sacredness of the magistracy should be respected 
even in the person of its worst occupant, was violated; 
■nd, while the censure due to the author of the calamitous 
day of Oannae had been silently repress^ within tht 
Vol. IXL—IO* 



ai26 The PwpliB of the tfortii. [Boos lY 

breast^ the author of the defeat of Arausio waa hj deeret 

of the people unoonstitutionally deprived of his prooonsut 

ship, and-->what had not occurred ainoe the oriais in which 

the monarchy had perished-*his property wai 

confiscated by the state (6491). Not long 

afterwards he was by a second decree of the burgesses 

^ expelled from the senate (660). But this was 

not enough ; more victims were desired, and 

above all Caepio's blood. A number of tribunes of the 

people fiivaurable to the opposition, with Lucius Appuleiua 

_ Saturninus and Gaius Norbanus at their head, 

loa 

proposed in 651 to appoint an extraordinary 
judicial commissicm in reference to the embezzlement and 
treason perpetrated in Gaul ; in spite of the practical abo* 
lition of imprisonment previous to trial and of the punish- 
ment of death for political offences, Caepio was arrested 
and the intention of pronouncing and executing in his case 
sentenee of death was openly expressed. The government 
party attempted to get rid of the proposal by tribunioian 
intervention; but the interceding tribunes were violently 
driven from the assembly, and in the furious tumult the 
first men of the senate were assailed with stones. The iuf 
vestigation could not be prevented, and the war of prosecu- 
tions pursued its course in 651 as it had done 

108b 

six years before ; Caepio himself, his colleague 
in the supreme command Gnaeus Mallius Maximus, and 
numerous other men of note were condemned : a tribune 
of the people, who was a friend of Caepio, with difficulty 
succeeded by the sacrifice of his own civil existence in sav- 
ing at least the life of the chief person accused.* 



* The depoeitioii from office of the prooonsul Caepio^ with 

was oombined the confiscation of bia property (Liv. JEjf>, 67X was prob* 

ably pronounced by the assembly of the people immedt 

ately after the baUle of Arausio (6th October, 649). That 

Mme time elapsed between that act and his proper downfall, is clearly 

diown by the proposal made in 660, and aimed at Caepic^ 

that depofiition from office should involve the forfeitnr* ol 

a seat la the aeaa^^) (Aaconius in Oomtl^ p. 18), The fragmcata d 



auF. v.] I%e Peoples of the North. 221 

Of more importance than this measure of revet ge waa 
the question how^ the dangerous war beycnd the 

auder-iB. Alps was to be further carried on, and firat of 
all to whom the supreme command in it was to 

be committed. With an unprejudiced treatment of the 



LiomianaB (p. 10 ; (M, JfofitlJiM 06 4and«m caumm qm m% §i Oepio £. 
Satumini rogadow e eivUaU eat eiio [?] siec^ ; whi^ tbrows light oa 
the allusion in Cic ds Or. ii. 28, 125) now infonn us that a law foo- 
poeed by Lucios Appuleius Saturnlnus brought about this eatastn^Iie. 
This is evidently no other than the Appuleian law as to the nUntUti 
maUdoM of the Roman state {Cie. de Or. 0. 25, 107 ; 49, 201), i, r^ 
the piopoeal of Satuminus for the appointment of an eztraordinar| 
commission to investigate the treasons that had taken place during the 
Cimbrian troubles. The commission of inquiry as to the gold of Toloaa 
(Cic de i\r. D. ill 80, Ii) arose out of tho Appuleian law, in the very 
aame way as the special courts of inquiry — further mentioned in that 

passage— as to a scandalous bribery of judges ont of the 
^^ Modan law of 6 IS, as to the oecurrenees with the Vestals 

ua out of the Peduoaean law of 641, and as to the 7ugurtfaine 

11^ war oat of the Mamilian law of 644. A comparison of 

these cases also shows that in such special conmiissions— 
dilTerent in this respect from the ordinary ones — even punishmei^ts 
affecting life and limb might be and were inflicted. The fact that else- 
where the tribune of the people, Gains Norbanus, is named as the per* 
son who set agoing the proceedings against Gaepio and was afterwards 
brought to trial for doing so ((^c. de Or, il. 40, 161 ; 48, 199 ; 49, 200; 
Or, Part, 80, 105, et al.) is not inconsistent with the view ^ven above ; 
for the proposal proceeded as usual from several tribunes of the people 
{ad fferenn, I 14, 24 ; Cic. de Or, ii. 47, 197), and, as Satuminns was 
already dead when the aristocratic party was in a position to think of 
retaliation, they fastened on his colleague. As to the period of this 

second and final condemnation of Gaepio, the usual very 

inconviderate hypothesis, which places it in 659, ten yean 
after the battle of Arausfo, has been already 1 ejected. It rests amply 

on the fact that Crassus when consul, consequently in 

669, spoke in favour of Caepio (dc. Brut, 44, 162); 
which, however, he manifestly did not as his advocate, but on thr #coa> 
rfon when Korbanus was brought to account by Publius Sulpicius Kufiia 

for his conduct toward Caepio in 659. Formerly we 
ui placed this second accusation in 660 ; now that we know 

1^ that it originated from a proposal of Satuminus, we can 

only hentate between 651, when he was tribune of the 
^aople iat the first time (Plutarch. Har. 14 ; Oros. v. 17 ; App. i. S\8 ; 



828 The Peopled oj the Worth. [Booe IT 

matter it was not difficult to make a fitting choice. Romi 
was no doubt, in comparison with earlier times, not rich in 
military notabilities ; yet Quintus Maximus had command 
ed with distinction in Gaul, Marcus Aemilius Scaurus and 
Marcus Minucius in the regions of the Danube, Quintui 
Metellus, Publius Butilius Rufus, Gaius Marlus in Africa ; 
and the object proposed was not to defeat a Pyrrhus or a 
Hannibal, but again to make good the oflen tried superioiv 
ity of Roman arms and Roman tactics in opposition to the 
barbarians of the north — an object which required no hero, 
but merely a stem and able soldier. But it was precisely 
a time when nothing was so difficult as the unprejudiced 
settlement of a question of administration. The govern- 
ment was, as it could not but be and as the Jugurthine war 
kad already shown, so utterly bankrupt in public opinion, 
that its ablest generals had to retire in the full career of 
victory, whenever it occurred to an officer of mark to vilify 
them before the people and to get himself as the candidate 
of the opposition appointed to the head of a&irs. It was 
no wonder that what took place after the victories of Mo- 

Diodor. p. 608, 631), and 664, when he held that office » 
second time. There are not materials for deciding the 
point with entire certainty, but the great preponderance of probabilit> 
is in £Bivour of the former year ; partly because it was nearer to the dis- 
astrous events in Gaul, partly because in the tolerably full accomits oi 
the second tribunate of Satuminus there is no mention of Quintal 
Gaepio the father and the acts of violence dhrected against him. The 
circumstance, that the sums paid back to the treasury in consequence 
of the decisions as to the embezzlement of the Tolosan booty were 
claimed by Satuminus in his second tribunate for his schemes of coloui* 
zation {De Viris III. 78, 6, and thereon Orelli, Ind, Legg. p. 187), ifl 
not in itself decisive, and may, moreover, have been easily transferred 
by mistake from the first African to the second general agrarian law of 
Satuminus. 

The &ct that afterwards, when Norbanus was impeached, his im 
peachment proceeded on the very ground of the law which he had 
taken part in piggesting, was an ironical incident common in the Roma^ 
political procedure of this period (Gic. BrvA, 89, 806) and sliould not 
mislead ns into the belief that the Appuleian law was, like the latei 
^Araelian, a gc^neral law of high treason. 



GiAP. v.] Tht Peoples of the North. 239 

tellus was repeated on a greater scale afler the defeats of 
Gnaeus Mallius and Quintus Caepio. Once more Gaius 
Marius came forward, in spite of the law which prohibited 
the holding of the consulship more than once, as a candi* 
date for the supreme magistracy ; and not only was he 
uom nated as consul and charged with the chief command 
in the Gallic war, while he was stUl in Africa at the head 
uf the aimy there, but he was re^invested with the consul* 
ship for five years in succession (650-654)* 
This proceeding, which looked like an inten* 
tiooal mockery of the exclusive spirit that the nobility had 
exhibited in reference to this very man in all its folly and 
shortsightedness, was unparalleled in the annals of the re- 
public, and in &ct absolutely incompatible with the spirit 
of the £ree constitution of Home. In the Roman military 
system in particular — the transformation of which from w 
burgess-militia into a body of mercenaries, begun in the 
African war, was continued and completed by Marius dur- 
ing his £ve years of a supreme command unlimited through 
the exigencies of the times still more than through the 
terms of his appointment — the profound traces of this un- 
oonstitutional commandership-in-chief of the first demo- 
cratic general remained visible for all times. 

The new commander-in-chief, Gains Marius, appeared in 
650 beyond the Alps, followed by a number of 
Homande- experienced officers— among whom the bold 
^^ captor of Jugurtha, Lucius Sulla, soon acquired 

fresh distinction — and by a numerous host of Italian and 
allied soldiers. At first he did not find the enemy against 
whom he had been sent. The singular people, who had 
Bouquered at Arausio, had in the mean time (as we have 
already mentioned), alber plundering the country to the 
west of the Rhone, crossed the Pyrenees and. were carrying 
on a desultory warfare in Spain with the brave inhabitants 
of the northern coast and of the interior ; it seemed as if 
the Germans wished at their very first appearance on the 
aistoric stage to display their want of persevering grisp. 
So Marius found ample time on the one hand t( reduce ^hi 



tSO Ths Peoples of the North. [Bock IV 

revolted Tectosages to obedienee, to confirm afresh thi 
wavering fidelity of the subject Gallic and Liguriar. cantons, 
and to obtain support and contingents within and without 
the Roman province firom the allies who were equally with 
the Romans placed in peril by the Cimbri, such as the Ma^^ 
stliotBy the Allobrt^es, and the 8equani ; and on the other 
hand, to discipline the army entrusted to him by strict 
superintendence and impartial justice towards all whether 
high or humble, and to prepare the soldiers for the more 
serious labours of war by marches and extensive works of 
entrenching— particularly the construction of a canal of the 
Rhone, afterwards handed over to the Massiliots, for fadli* 
tating the transit of the supplies sent from Italy to thd 
army. He maintained a strictly defensive attitude, and did 
not cross the bounds of the Roman province. 

\t length, apparently in the course of ^1, the wave of 
^^ the Cimbri, after having broken itself in ^>ain 

Tii«Oiii.M, on the brave resistance of the native tribes and 
•ad Hei- especially of the Celtibenans, flowed back again 
over the Pyrenees and thence, as it appears, 
passed along the shore of the Atlantic Ocean, where every«> 
thing from the Pyrenees to the Seine submitted to the terri^ 
ble invaders. There, on the confines of the brave confede* 
racy of the Belgae, they first encountered serious resist- 
ance ; but there also, while they were in the territory of 
the Vellocassi (near Rouen), considerable reinforcements 
reached them. Not only three cantons of the Helvetii, in- 
cluding the Tigorini and Tougeni who had formerly fought 
iigainst the Romans at the Garonne, associated themselves, 
apparently about this period, with the Gmbri, but these 
were also joined by the kindred Teutones under their king 
Teutobod, who had been driven by events which tradition 
has not recorded from their home on the Baltic sea to ap* 
pear now on the Seine.* But even the united hordes were 

* The view here presented rests in the main on the comparatlyel| 
trustworthy aooount in the EpitDme of Livy (where we shotdd read 
Yw^ni tfi OdUiam in V^tUoeasM m Teutoma eoniufixerunt) and in Obae- 
i(aenl ; to Ihe disregard of anthorltlea of lesser weight, whidi make tfaf 



OuF. v.] The PeaplsB of ike North. 981 

unable to overcome the brave resistance of the 
fto^^ r^ Belgae. The leaders accordingly resolved, now 
^ ^^ that their numbers were thus swelled, to entef 
tn all earnest on the expedition to Italy w]iich they had 
i«veral times contemplated, in order not to encumber 
themselves with the spoil which they had heretofore collect- 
ed, tJiey lefb it behind under the protection of a division of 
0^000 men, which after many wanderings subsequently gave 
rise to the tribe of the Aduatud on the Sambre. But, 
whether from the difficulty of finding supplies on the Alpine 
notttes or from other reasons, the mass again broke up into 
two hosts, one of which, composed of the Cimbri and Tigo» 
rini, was to recross the Rhine and to invade Italy through 
the passes of the eastern Alps already reconnoi* 
tred in 641, and the other, composed of the 
newly arrived Teutones, the Tougeni, and the Ambrone»— 
the flower of the Gmbrian host already tried in the battle 
of Arousio— was to invade Italy through Roman Graul and 
M. the western passes. It was this second division, 

^prortoee ^^^^ ^ ^^ summer of 652 once more crossed 
of<teiiL ^^ Rhone without hindrance, and on its left 
bank resumed, after a pause of nearly three years, the 
struggle with the Romans. Marius awaited them in a well 
chosen and well provisioned camp at the confluence of the 
Is^re with the Rhone, in which position he intercepted the 
passage of the barbarians by either of the only two mill* 
tary routes to Italy then practicable, that over t^ Little 
8t. Bernard, and that along the coast. The Teutones at> 
tacked the camp which obstructed their passage ; for three 
consecutive days the barbarians assailed the Roman en* 
trenchments, but their wild courage was thwarted by the su- 
periority c^the Romans in fortress-war&re and by the pru- 
dence of the general. After severe loss the bold aFSoclatet 

Teutones appear bj the side of the Cimbri at an earlier date, sonce of 
Ihem, snch aa Appian, CeU. 13, even as early as the battle of Noreia. 
Therewith we connect the notices in Caesar (B, G^. I 88 ; il 4, 29) ; a« 
the invadon of the Roman province and of Italy by Ac 
. Cimbri oan only mean the eipeditfon of 66S. 



S88 The Peoples of the Nai^h. [Booe iy 

Tesolved to give up the assault, and to march onward tc 
Italy past the camp. For six suGoessive days they contln> 
ued to defile — ^a proof of the cumbrousness of their bag< 
gage still more than of the immensity of their uumberSi 
The general permitted the march to proceed without attacifii 
ing them. We can easily understand vhy he did not allow 
himself to be led astray by the insulting inquiries of the 
enemy whether the Romans had no commissions lor their 
wives at home ; but the &ot, that he did not take advantage 
of this rash defiling of the barbarian columns in front of 
the concentrated Roman troops for the purpose of attack, 
shows how little he trusted his unpractised soldiers. 

When the march was over, he broke up his encampment 
and followed in the steps of the enemy, preserv- 
Aqwe ing rigorous order and carefully entrenching 

***'*^ himself night after night. The Teutones, who 

were striving to gain the coast road, marching down the 
banks of the Rhone reached the district of Aquae Sextiae, 
followed by the Romans. The light Ligurian troops of the 
Romans, as they were drawing water, here came into col- 
lision with the Celtic rearguard, the Ambrones ; the con« 
fiiot soon became general ; after a hot struggle the Romans 
conquered and pursued the retreating enemy up to their 
waggon-stronghold. This first successful collision elevated 
the spirits of the general as well as of the soldiers ; on the 
third day after it Man us drew up his array for a decisive 
battle on the hill, the summit of which bore the Roman 
camp. The Teutones, long impatient to measure them- 
selves against their antagonists, immediately rushed up the 
hill and began the conflict. It was severe and protracted : 
up to midday the Germans stood like a wall ; but the un- 
wonted heat of the Proven9al sun relaxed their energies, 
and a fidse alarm in their rear, where a band ol Roman 
eamp*boys ran forth from a wooded ambuscade with loud 
shouts, fully decided the breaking up of the wavering ranks. 
The whole horde was scattered, and, as was to be expected 
in a foreign land, either put to death or taken prisoners 
^mong the captives was k?ng Teutobod ; amons; tiie killed 



(huF. v.] The Peoples ofths North. 338 

• multitude of women, who, not unaoquaitted with the 
treatment which awaited them as slaves, had oaused them- 
•elves to be slain in desperate resistance at their waggonii^ 
or had put themselves to death in captivity, after having 
vainly requested to be dedicated to the servioa 
of the gods and of the sacred virgins of Vesta 
^mmer of 652). 

Thus Gaul was delivered from the Germans ; and it was 
oimixriaBi time, for their brothers-in-arms were already on 
BLiuiy. ^Q south «de of the Alps. In allianoe with the 
Helvetii, the Qmbri had without difficulty passed from the 
Seine to the region of the sources of the Rhine, had crossed 
the chain of the Alps by the Brenner pass, and had de- 
scended thence through the valleys of the Eisach and 
Adige into the Italian plain. Here the consul Quintus 
Ltttatius Gatulus was to guard the passes; but not fully 
acquainted with the country and afraid of having his flank 
turned, he had not ventured to advance into the Alps, but 
had posted himself below Trent on the lejfb bank of the 
Adige, and had secured in any event his retreat to the right 
bank by the construction of a bridge. When the Gmbri* 
ans, however, pushed forward in dense masses from the 
mountains, a panic seized the Roman array, and legionaries 
and horsemen iran off, the latter straight for the capital, the 
former to the nearest height which seemed to afford secur- 
ity. With great difficulty Catulus brought at least the 
greater portion ci his army by a stratagem back to the 
tiTer and over the bridge, before the enemy, who com- 
manded the upper course of the Adige and were already 
floating down trees and beams against the bridge, succeeded 
in destroying it and thereby cutting oflf the retreat of the 
army. But the general had to leave behind a legion on 
the other bank, and the cowardly tribune who led it was 
already disposed to capitulate, when the centurion Gnaeus 
Petreius of Atina struck him down and cut his w$y through 
the midst of the enemy to the. main army on the right 
bank of the Adige. Thus the army, and in some degree 
fven the honour of their arms, was saved b it the conaa' 



284 Tne Peoples of the Nar^ [Boos I? 

quences of the neglect to occupy Ihe passes and of the toe 
hasty retreat were yet very seriously felt. Catulus wal 
obliged to withdraw to the right bank of the Po and to 
leave the whole plain ^tween the Po and the Alps in th# 
power oi the Cimbri, so that eommunioation was main- 
tained with Aquileia only by sea. . This took 
place in the summer of 652, about the same 
time when tiie decisive battle betweeit the Teutones and th^ 
Romans occurred at Aquae Sextiae. Had the Cimbri con 
tinued their attack without interruption, Rome might have 
been greatly embarrassed ; but on this ocesjiion alao th^ 
remained fiiithful to their custom of resting in winter, and 
all the more, because the rich country, the unwonted quar* 
ters under the shelter of a roof, the warm baths, and the 
new and abundant supplies for eating and drinking invited 
them to make themselves comfortable for the momenti 
Thereby the Romans gained time to encounter them with 
united forces in Italy. It was no season to resume — as the 
democratic general would perhaps otherwise have done— 
the interrupted scheme of conquest in Gaul, which Gaius 
Gracchus had probably projected. From the battle-field 
of Aix the victorious army was conducted to the Po ; and 
after a brief stay in the capital, where Marius refused the 
triumph offered to him until he had utta*ly subdued the 
barbarians, he arrived in person at the united 
armies. In the spring of 658 they again crossed 
the Po, 50,000 strong, under the consul Marius and the pro* 
consul Catulus, and marched against the Cimbri, who on 
their part seem to have marched up iJie river with a view 
to cross the. mighty stretun at its source. 

The two armies met below Vercellae not far from the 

confluence of the Sesia with the Po,* just at the 

tbc Ran- spot where Hannibal had fought his first battle 

*in« piaiiu ^^ jj^^.^jj g^jj rpjj^ ambri desired batde, and 

* It Is injudicious to deviate from the traditional account and tg 
transfer the field of battle to Verona : in ao doing the &ct is orerlooked 
4iat a whole winter and various moTementa of troops intervened bs- 
tween the conflicts on the Adige and the decisive engag:emeiit| and thai 



QiAP. T.] 2'he Peoples qf the Noftth. S&fl 

Aooording to their custom sent to the Romans to sottle ths 
time and plaoe for it ; Marius gratified them and named the 
next day — ^it was the 30th Juljr, 653'-*-«nd tlM 
Raudioe plain, a vide level spaoe^ which the 
superior Roman cavalrjr found advantageous ibr ih^ movia* 
Kents. Here they fell upon the enemy expecting them and 
yet tak«i by surprise; foir in the dense raoniiog mist the 
Celtic cavalry found itself in hand-to-hand oonfiiet with the 
stronger cavalry of the Romans before it antidpsfted attack, 
and was thereby thrown bade upon the infiintry wiiioh was 
just making its dispositions for battle. A complete vio* 
tory was gdned with slight loss, and the Cimbri were anni- 
hilated. Tliose might be deemed fortunate who met death 
in the battle, as most did, including the brave king Boiorix ; 
more fortunate at least than those who afterwards in despair 
laid ^nds on themselves, or were obliged to seek in the 
dave market of Rome the master who might retaliate on 
the individual Northman for the audacity of having coveted 
the beauteous south before it was time. The Tigorini, who 
had remained behind in the passes of the Alps with the 
view of subsequently following the Cimbri, ran off on the 
news of the defeat to their native land. The human avi^ 
lanche, which for thirteen years had alarmed the nations 
•from the Danube to the Ebro, from the Sdne to the Po, 
Tested beneath the sod or toiled under the yoke of slavery ; 
the forlorn hope of the German migrations had performed 
its duty; the homeless people of the Cimbri and theii 
'Comrades were no more. 

The political parties of Rome continued their pitiflil 

quarrels over the carcase, without troubling 

Midtiiepu^ themselves about the great chapter ia the 

l'^ world's history the first page of which was thus 

Cttidufl, aoooidtog to ezptess statement (Plat Jib*. 24), had retrested 
to the right bank, of the Po. The atatemeiits that the Cimbri were de- 
featod on the Po (Hier. Qhron.\ and that they were defeated wher« 
Btilicho afterwards defeated the Getae, t. e., at Cberasco on the T(wsarO| 
although both Inaccurate, point at least to Yercellac much rathei haa 
to Verona. 



286 The Peoples of the North. [Book IV. 

opened, without even giving way to the pure feeling that on 
this day Rome's aristocrats as well as Rome's demociati 
had done their duty. The rivalry of the two generals-— ^ 
who were not only politteal antagonists, but were also set 
at variance in a military point of view by the so difiereat 
results of the two campaigns of the previous year— broke 
out immediately after the battle in the most offensive form, 
Catulus might with justice assert that the centre division 
which he commanded had decided the victory, and that his 
troops had captured thirty-one standards, while those of 
Marius had brought in only two ; his soldiers led even the 
deputies of the town of Parma through the heaps of the 
dead to show to them that Marius had slain his thousand, 
but Catulus his ten thousand. Nevertheless Marius was 
regarded as the real conqueror of the Cimbri, and justly ; 
not merely because by virtue of his higher rank he had 
held the chief command on the decisive day, and was in 
military gifts and experience beyond doubt &r superior to 
his colleague, but especially because the second victory at 
Vercellae was in fact r^idered possible only by the first 
victory at Aquae Sextiae. But at that period it was con- 
siderations of political partisanship rather than of military 
merit which attached the glory of having saved Rome from 
the Qmbri and Teutones entirely to the name of Marius» 
Catulus was a polished and clever man, so graceful a speak- 
er that his euphonious language sounded almost like elo- 
quence, a tolerable writer of memoirs and occasional poems, 
and an excellent connoisseur and critic of art ; but he was 
anything but a man of the people, and his victory was a 
victory of the aristocracy. The battles of the rough farmer 
on the other hand, who had been raised to honour by the 
common people and had led the common people to victory, 
were not merely defeats of the Cimbri and Teutones, but 
ftlso defeats of the government : there were associated with 
them hopes far different from that of being able once more 
to carry on mercantile transactions on the one side of the 
Alps or to cultivate the fields without molestation on ths 
other Twenty years had elapsed since the bloody corpse 



Chap. V.] Ths Peoples of the North. 237 

o^ Gaius Gracchus had been flung into the Tiber ; for twen 
tj years the goyernment of the restored oligarchy had been 
endured and cursed ; still there had risen no avenger foi 
Gracchus, no second master to prosecute the building which 
he had begun. There were many who hated and hoped, 
many of the worst and many of the best citizens of the 
■tote : was the man, who knew how to accomplidi this veii« 
geanoe and these wishes, found at last in the son of the day- 
labourer of Arpinum % Were they really on the tlireshold 
of Aa ■o-madi dreaded and so-muoh desired seoond vbtoIii- 
tfoot 



CHAPTER VL 

fm ATniiPT OF MABIU8 AT RBYOLITTIOV AVD TBB AffTmrV 

OF DBrSUS AT BBFORM. 

Oiiim Marius, the soil of a poor d«y4abouier» was boi» 
in^ in 599 at the village of Cereatae then belonging 

^'"^'^ to Arpinum^ which afterwards obtained munici- 

pal rights as Cereatae Marianae and still at the present day 
bears the name of ^^ Marius' home " (Casamare). He was 
reared at the plough, in circumstances so humble that they 
seemed to preclude him from access even to the magistra- 
cies of Arpinum : he learned early — what he practised 
afterwards even when a general — to bear hunger and thirst, 
the heat of summer and the cold of winter, and to sleep on 
the hard ground. As soon as his age allowed him, he had 
entered the army and in the severe school of the Spanish 
wars had rapidly raised himself to the position of an ofli- 
cer. In Scipio's Numantine war he, at that time twenty- 
three years of age, attracted the notice of the stern general 
by the neatness with which he kept his horse and his ao- 
coutrements, as well as by his bravery in combat and his 
propriety of demeanour in camp. He had returned home 
with honourable scars and warlike distinctions, and with 
the ardent wish to make himself a name in the career on 
which he had gloriously entered; but, as matters then 
stood, a man of even the highest merit could not attain 
those political offices, which alone led to the higher military 
posts, without wealth and without connections. The young 
officer acquired both by fortunate commercial speculations 
and by his union with a maiden of the ancient patrician 
gens of the Julii. So by dint of great efforts and after 
various rejections he succeeded, in 639, in at^ 
taining the praetorship, in which he found oppor 



GiuF. VI] Mariwf AUempi a$ JSevolution. 380 

tanity of displaying afresh his military ability as governof 
of Further Spain. How he thereafter in spite of the aris^ 
107. ; tocracy received the oonsulship in 647 and^ as 
^ ^'^ proconsul (648, 649), terminated the Afrioaa 
war ; and how, called after the calamitous day of ArauskI 
to the superintendence of the war against the Germans, hi 
had his consulship renewed for four sucoessivt 
years from 650 to 653 (a thing unexampled in 
Ihe annals of the republic) and vanquished and annihilated 
the Cimbrians in Cisalpine^ and the Teutones in Transalpine^ 
Graul — ^has been already related. In his military position 
he had shown himself a brave and upright man, who ad» 
ninistered justice impartially, disposed of the spoil with 
vare honesty and disinterestedness, and was thoroughly in* 
corruptible ; a skilful organizer, who had brought the some- 
what rusty madiinery of the Roman military system once 
more into a state of efficiency ; an able general, who kepi 
the soldier under discipline and withal in good humour and 
at the same time won his affections in comrade-like inters 
course, but looked the enemy boldly in the face and joined 
issue with him at the proper time. He wae not, as far as 
we can judge, a man of eminent military capacity ; but the 
very respectable qualities which he possessed were quite 
sufficient under the existing circumstances to procure for 
him such a reputation, and by virtue of it he had taken his 
place in a fashion of unparalleled honour among the consv- 
lars and the triumphators. But he was none the better 
fitted on that account for the brilliant circle. His voice re- 
mained harsh and loud, and his look wild, as if he still saw 
before him Libyans or Cimbrians, and not well-bred and 
refined colleagues. That he was superstitious like a genu 
ine soldier of fortune ; that he was induced to become a 
candidate for his first consulship, not by the impulse of his 
talents, but primarily by the utterances of an Etruscan 
kartupw ; and that in the campaign with the Teutonea a 
Syrian prophetess Martha lent the aid of her oracles \o the 
opancil of war, — ^these things were not, in the strict senses 
nnarifltocratic : in such matters, then as at all Ume«, Uwi 



940 Ths Attmypt of MwriuB [Boo^iv 

bighest and lowest strata of society met. But the want oi 
political culture was unpardonable; it was ereditable, m 
doubt, that he had the skill to defeat the barbarians, but 
what was to be thought of a consul who was so ignorant of 
Uie rules of etiquette as to appear in triumphal costume in 
the senate! In other respects too the plebdan character 
aAung to him. He was not merely— according to aristo- 
eratic phraseology — a poor man, but, what was worse, fru- 
gal and a declared enemy of all bribery and corruption. 
After the manner of soldiers he was not nice, but was fond 
of his cups, especially in his later years ; he knew not the 
art of giving feasts, and kept a bad cook. It was likewise 
awkward that the consular understood nothing but Latin 
and had to decline conversing in Greek ; that he felt die 
Greek plays wearisome might pass— he was probably not 
the only one who did so — ^but to confess his feeling of 
weariness was ni^ve. Thus he remained throughout life a 
countryman cast adrift among aristocrats, and annoyed by 
the keenly felt sarcasms and still more keenly felt sympsr 
thy of his colleagues, which he had not the self-command to 
despise as he despised themselves. 

Marius stood aloof from parties not much less thaL 
Poiitieai from sodety. The measures which he carried 
^^^ "^ in his tribunate of the people (635)— a better 
*"*• control over the delivery of the voting-tablets 

with a view 'to do away with the scandalous frauds that 
were therein practised, and the prevention of extravagant 
proposals for largesses to the people (p. 165)-^do not bear 
the stamp of a party, least of all that of the democratic, 
but merely show that he hated what was unjust and irra- 
tional ; and how could a man like this, a farmer by birth 
and a soldier by inclination, have been from the first a revo- 
lutionist? The hostile attadcs of the aristocracy had nc 
doubt driven him subsequently into the camp of the oppo 
nents of the government ; and there he speedily found him 
self elevated in the first instance to be general of the oppo* 
sition and destined perhaps for still higher things hereafter. 
Bat this was far more the effect of the atringoit force of 



CiuF. VI.] At HevohUion. 241 

circumstances and of the general need which tlje opposition 
had for a chief, than his own work ; he had at any rate 
j^^ sine J his departure for Africa in 647-8 hardly 

tarried, in passing, for a brief period in the 
^®'' capital. It was not till the latter half of 653 

that he returned to Rpme, victor alike oyer the Teutones 
and over the Gmbri, to celebrate his postponed triumph 
iiow with double honours-nlecidediy the first man in 
Rome, and yet at the same time a novice in politics. It 
was certain beyond dispute, not only that ^arius had saved 
Eome, but that he was the only man who could have saved 
it ; his name was on every one's lips ; the nobles acknow- 
ledged his services ; with the people he was more popular 
than any one before or afber him, popular alike by his vir- 
tues and by his faults, by his unaristocratio disinterested* 
ness no less than by his boorish uncouthness ; he was called 
by the multitude a third Romulus and a second Camillus ; 
libations were poured forth to him like the gods. It was 
no wonder that the head of the peasant's son grew giddy at 
times with all this glory ; that he compared his march from 
Africa to Gaul to the victorious processions of Dionysiua 
from continent to continent, and had a cup — ^none of the 
smallest — ^manufactured for his use after the model of that 
of Bacchus. There was just as much of hope as of grati* 
tude in this delirious enthusiasm of the people, which might 
have led astray a man of colder blood and more mature 
political experience. The work of Marius seemed to his 
admirers by no means finished. The wretched government 
oppressed the land more heavily than did the barbarians : 
on hin\, the first man of Rome, the favourite of the people, 
the head of the opposition, devolved the task of once more 
delivering Rome. It is true that to one who was a rustic 
and 41 soldier the political proceedings of the capital were 
strange and incongruous : he spoke as ill as he commanded 
well, and displayed a far firmer bearing in presence of the 
lances and swords of the enemy than in presence of the 
applause or hisses of the multitude; but his inolinationii 
were of little moment. The hopes of which he was the 
Vol. III.— 11 



S42 The Attempt of Ufarius [Booi IV 

object constrained him. His military and political position 
was such that, if he would not break with his glorious past, 
if he would not deceive the expectations of his party and 
in fiict of the nation, if he would not be unfiuthful to hii 
own sense of duty, he must check the maladministration of 
public aifairs and put an end to the govemment of the res- 
toration ; and if he only possessed the internal qualities of 
a head of the people, he might certainly dispense with those 
which he wanted as a popular leader. 

He held in his hand a formidable weapon in the newly 

orffanized army. Previously to his time the 

military or- ftindamental principle of the Servian constitu* 

ganuatum. ^.^^^ — y^^ which the levy was limited entirely to 

the burgesses possessed of property, and the distinctions in 
equipment were regulated solely by the property qualifica^ 
tion (i. 132, 397) — had necessarily been in various respects 
relaxed. The minimum census of 11,000. asses (£43), which 
bound its possessor to enter the burgess-army, had been 
lowered to 4,000 (£17 ; ii. 417). The earlier six property- 
classes, distinguished by their respective armaments, had 
been restricted to three ; for, while in accordance with the 
Servian organization they selected the cavalry from the 
wealthiest, and the light-armed from the poorest, of those 
liable to serve, they arranged the middle class, the proper 
in&ntry of the line, no longer according to property but 
according to duration of service, in the three divisions of 
hastaii^ prineipeSy and triarii. They had, moreover, long 
ago brought the Italian allies to take part to a very great 
extent in war-service ; but in their case too, just as among 
the Roman burgesses, military duty was chiefly imposed on 
the propertied classes. Nevertheless the Roman military 
i)y stem down to the time of Marius rested in the main on 
that primitive organization of the civic militia. But it was • 
no longer siited for the altered circumstances of the state. ! 
The better classes of society kept aloof more and more ^ 
from service in the army, and the Roman and Italic middle 
class in general was disappearing ; while on the other hand 
the considerable military resources of the extra-Italian 



Chaf. VI.] At B^volution. 243 

allies and subjects .lad become available^ and ihu Italian 
proletariate also, pr?perl7 applied, afibrded at least a very 
useful material for military objects. The burgess-cavalry 
(ii. 380), which was meant to be formed from the class of 
the wealthy, had practically given up service in the field 
even before tlie time of Marius. It is last mentioned as ao 
actual corps d^armU in the Spanish campaign of 
614, when it drove the general to despair by its 
insolent arrogance and its insubordination, and a war broke 
out between the troopers and the general waged on both 
sides with equal want of principle. In the Jugurthine war 
it continues to appear merely as a sort of guard of honour 
for the general and foreign princes ; thenceforth it wholly 
disappears. In like manner the filling up of the comple- 
ment of the legions with properly qualified persons bound 
to serve proved in the ordinary course of things difficult ; 
so that exertions, such as were necessary after the battle of 
Arausio, would have been in all probability really imprac* 
ticable with the retention of the existing rules as to the 
obligation of service. On the other hand even before the 
time of Marius, especially in the cavalry and the light in- 
fiintry, extra-Italian subjects — the heavy mounted troopers 
of Thrace, the light African cavalry, the excellent light in- 
fantry of the nimble Ligurians, the slingers from the Bale* 
ares — were employed in daily increasing numbers even b^ 
yond their own provinces for the Homan armies ; and at 
the same time, while there was a want of qualified burgess- 
recruits, the non-qualified poorer burgesses pressed forward 
imbidden to enter the army ; in fact, £rom the mass of the 
civic rabble without work or averse to it, and from the con* 
siderable advantages which the Roman war-service yielded, 
the cnlisf ment of volunteers could not be difficult. It was 
therefore simply a necessary consequence of the politio^ 
and social changes in the state, that its military arrange- 
ments should exhibit a transition from the system of the 
burgess-levy to the system of contingents and enlisting; 
that the cavalry and light troops should be mainly formed 
out of the contingents of the subjects — in the CirabriM 



8i6 The Attempt qf Martus [Book^v 

Bftn army seems certainly in substance to havi 
oiflcanoe? Originated not in political, but in military, mo 

the Marian ,^ ,. , , , , . 

miiitaiy M- Uves ; and to have been not so much the work 
"^ of an individual, least of all of a man of oal* 

cukting ambition, as the remodelling which the force oi 
drcumstanoes enjoined in institutions which had become 
untenable. It is probable that the introduction of the sys- 
tem of inland enlistment by Marius saved the state in a 
military point of view from destruction, just as several 
centuries afterwards Arbogast and Stilicho prolonged itf 
existence for a time by the introduction of foreign enlist 
inent. Nevertheless, it involved a complete — ^although not 
yet developed — political revolution. The republican con^ 
stitution was essentially based on the view that the citizen 
was also a soldier, and that the soldier was above all a dtl- 
sen ; it was at an end, so soon as a soldier-class was formed. 
To this issue the new system of drill, with its routine bor- 
rowed from the professional gladiator, necessarily led ; the 
military service became gradually a profession. Far more 
rapid was the effect of the admission — ^though but limited 
—-of the proletariate to participate in military service; 
especially in connection with the primitive maxims, which 
conceded to the general an arbitrary right of rewarding his 
soldiers compatible only with very solid republican institu- 
tions, and gave to the able and successful soldier a sort of 
title to demand from the general a share of the moveable 
spoil and from the state a portion of the soil that had been 
won. While the burgess or farmer called out under the 
levy saw in military service nothing but a burden to be 
undertaken for the public good, and in the gains of war 
nothing but a slight compensation for the far more con* 
ftiderable loss brought upon him by serving, it was other- 
wise with the enlisted proletarian. Not only was he for 
(he moment solely dependent upon his pay, but, as theie 
was no Hdtel des Invalides nor even a poorhouse to receive 
him after his discharge, he necessarily desired for the future 
also to abide by his standard, and not to leave it otherwise 
than with the establishment of his civic status. Ilis only 



Chap. VL] At devolution. S4) 

home was the camp, his only science war, his only hope the 
general — ^what this implied, is clear. When Marius after 
the engagement on the Raudine plain unconstitntionallj 
gave Roman citizenshii. «>n the very field of battle to twc 
cohorts of Italian allies in a body for their brave conduct^ 
he justified himself aA;er wards by saying that amidst the 
Doise of battle he had not been able to distinguish the voice 
of the laws. If once in more important questions the in- 
terest of the army and that of the general should concur to 
produce unconstitutional demands, who could be security 
that then other laws also would not cease to be heard amid 
the dashing of swords ? They had now the standing army 
the soldier-class, the body-guard ; as in the civil constitu 
Cion, so also in the military, all the pillars of the future 
monarchy were already in existence: the monarch alone 
was wanting. When the twelve eagles circled round the 
Palatine hill, they ushered in the Kings; the new eagle 
which Gains Marius bestowed on the legions proclaimed 
the advent of the Emperors. 

There is hardly any doubt that Marius entered into the 

brilliant prospects which his military and politi- 

prqjecti of cal positiou Opened up to him. It was a sad and 

^ troubled time. Men had peace, but they did 

not profit by peace ; the state of things was not now such 
as it had formerly been after the first mighty onset of the 
northern peoples on Rome, when, so soon as the crisis was 
over, all energies were roused anew in the fresh conscious* 
ness of recovered health and had by their vigorous develop- 
ment rapidly and amply made up for what waa lest. 
Every one felt that, though able generals might still onc^ 
and again avert immediate destruction, the commonwealth 
was only the more surely on the way to ruin under the 
government of the restored oligarchy ; but every one felt 
also that the time was past when in such cases the burgess- 
body provided its own redress, and that there was ne 
amendment so long as the place of Gains Gracchus re* 
mained empty. How deeply the multitude felt the blanK 
that was left after the disappearance of thoae two illustri 



850 The Attempt of Marius [Booa it 

Meanwhile been recognized as illusory, and tLere had 
sprung up in many minds a misgiving that this Gmochao 
agitation tended towards an issue whither a very lai^ por* 
lion of the discontented were by no means willing to follow 
it. In ftict, amidst the chase and turmoil of twenty years 
thete had bean rubbed off and worn away very much of 
the firesh enthusiasm, the stead&st fidth, the moral puritj 
of effort, which mark the early stages of revolutions. But, 
if the democratic party was no longer what it had been 
under Gaius Gracchus, the leaders of the intervening period 
were now as fiir beneath their party as Gaius Gracchus hdd 
been exalted above it. This was implied in the nature of 
the case. Until there should emerge a* man having the 
boldness like Gaius Gracchus to grasp at the supremacy of 
the state, the leaders could only be stop-gaps : either politi- 
cal novices, who gave furious vent to their youthful love of 
opposition and then, when duly accredited as fiery dedaim- 
ers and favourite speakers, effected with more or less dex- 
terity their retreat to the camp of the government-party ; 
or. people who had nothing to lose in respect of property 
and influence and little usually either to gain or lose in re- 
spect; of honour, and who made it their business to obstruct 
and annoy the government from personal exasperation or 
even from the mere pleasure of creating a noise. To the 
former sort belonged, for instance, Gaius Memmius (p 
183) and the well-known orator Lucius Crassus, who turned 
the oratorical laurels which they had won in the ranks of 
the opposition to account in the sequel as zealous partisans 
of the government. 

But the most notable leaders of the popular party 
^^ about this time were men of the second sort. 

Such were Gaius Servilius Glaucia, called by 
Ok)ero the Roman Hyperbolus, a vulgar fellow of the low* 
est ongin and of the most shameless streetreloquence, but 
effective and even dreaded by reason of his pungent wii» ^ 
. ^ . A°^ h^s better and abler associate, Lucius Appu* 

leius Saturninus, who even according to th€ 
%eoounts of his enemies was a fiery and impTti)b'v<i speaker 



Cbaf. ti.] At HevoltUiafi, 251 

and WBs at least not guided bj motives of vulgar selfish 
fiess. When he was quaestor, the charge of the importsr 
lion of corn which had fallen to him in the usual way had 
been withdrawn from him by decree of the senate, not so 
much perhaps on account of maladministration, as in order 
to confer this^ust at that time popular— oflioe on one of 
the heads of the government-party, Marcus Scaurus, rather 
than upon an unknown young man belonging to none of 
^e ruling fiimilies. This mortification had driven the as- 
piring and sensitive man into the ranks of the opposition $ 
and as tribune of the people in 651 he repaid 
what he had received with interest. One scan* 
dalous affidr had then followed hard upon another. He had 
spoken in the open market of the briberies practised in 
Rome by the envoys of king Mithradates — these revela- 
tions, compromising in the highest degree the senate, had 
wellnigh cost the bold tribune his life. He had excited a 
tumult against the conqueror of Numidia, Quintus Metel- 
_ lus, when he was a candidate for the censors*! ir> 

IQS* 

in 652, and kept him besieged in the Capitol till 
the equites liberated him not without bloodshed; the re^ 
taliatory measure of the censor Metellus — ^the expulsion 
with infamy of Satuminus and of Glaucia from the senate 
on occasion of the revision of the senatorial roll — ^had only 
miscarried through the remissness of the colleague assigned 
to Metellus. Satuminus mainly had carried that excep- 
tional commission against Caepio and his associates (p, 
226) in spite of the vehement resistance of the government- 
party ; and in opposition to the same he had carried the 
keenly contested re-election of Marius as consul 
for 652. Satuminus was decidedly the moet 
•nergetic enemy of the senate and the most active and elo- 
quent leader of the popular party since Gaius Gracchus ; 
but he was also violent and uuscrapulous beyond any of 
bis predecessors, always ready to descend into the street 
and to refute his antagonist with blows instead of words. 

Such were the two leaders cf the so-called popuhir 
party, who now made common cause with the victoriouj 



252 The Atiempt of Marina [Book iv 

general. It was natural that they should do so ; their in^ 
terests and aims coincided, and even in the earlier candidal 
lures of Marius Satuminus at least had most decidedly and 
most eflfectively taken his side. It was agreed 
between them that for 654 Marias should be* 
oome a candidate for a sixth consulship, Satuf rinus for a 
lecond tribunate, Glancia for the praetorship, in order that, 
possessed of these dices, they might carry out the intend* 
ed revolution in the state. The senate acquiesced in the 
nomination of the less dangerous Glaucia, but did what it 
could to hinder the election of Marius and Saturninus, o 
at least to associate with the former a determined antago- 
nist in the person of Quintus Metellus as his coilei^e in 
the consulship. All appliances, lawful and unlawful, were 
put in motion by both parties ; but the senate was not suc- 
cessful in arresting the dangerous conspiracy in the bud. 
Marius did not disdain in person to solicit votes and, it was 
said, even to purchase them ; in fact, at the tribunician 
elections when nine men from the list of the government* 
party were proclaimed, and the tenth place seemed already 
secured for a respectable man of the same complexion 
Quintus Nunnius, the latter was set upon and slain by a 
savage band, which is said to have been mainly composed 
of discharged soldiers of Marius. Thus the conspirators 
gained their object, although by the most violent means. 
Marius was chosen as consul, Glaucia as praetor, Saturni- 
nus as tribune of the people for 654 ; the sec- 
ond consular place was obtained not by Quin- 
tus Metellus, but by an insignificant man, Lucius Valerius 
flaccus : the confederates might proceed to put into execu- 
tion the fiirther schemes which they rontempla- 
ted and to complete the work broken off in 63& 
Let us recall the objects which Gains Gracchus pursuedg 
iiieAppa. ^^^ ^^ means by which he pursued them. His 
leUn lAWB. object was to break down the oligarchy within 
and without. He aimed, on the one hand, to restore the 
power of the magistrates which had become completely d«^ 
pendent on the senate to its original sovereign rights, and 



CtaAF. VI] At Revolution. 25S 

to re-convert the senatorial assembly from a governing iiiu: 
a deliberative board ; and, on the other hand, to put an end 
to the aristocratic division of the state into the three classei 
of the ruling burgesses, the Italian allies,, and the subjects, 
by the gradual equalization of those distinctions which wer« 
inoompatible with a government not oligarchical. These 
ideas the three confederates revived in the colonial laws, 
1^ which Saturninus as tribune of the people had 

partly introduced already (651), partly now 
introduced (654).* As early as the former year 
the interrupted distribution of the Carthaginian territory 
had been resumed primarily for the benefit of the soldiers 
of Marius — ^not the burgesses only but, as it would seem, 
also the Italian allies — ^and each of these veterans had been 
promised an allotment of 100 iugera, or about five times 
the size of an ordinary Italian farm, in the province of 
Africa. Now not only was the provincial land already 
available claimed in its widest extent for the Romano-Italian 
emigration, but also all the land of the still independent 
Celtic tribes beyond the Alps, by virtue of the legal fiction 
that through the conquest of the Cimbri all the territory 
occupied by these had been acquired de jwr€ by the Ro- 
mans. Gains Marius was called to conduct the assignatioue 
of land and the farther measures that might appear neces* 
sary in this behalf; and the temple-treasures of Tolosa, 
which had been embezzled but were refunded or had still to 
be refunded by the guilty aristocrats, were destined for the 
new recipients of lands. This law therefore not only re- 
vived the plans of conquest beyond the Alps and the pro* 

* It 18 not possible to distinguish exactly what belongs to the first 

«nd what to the second tribunate of Saturninus ; the more especially, 

M in both he evidently followed out the same Gracchan tendencieai. 

The Africftn agrarian law is definitely placed by the treatise Bt Virii 

III. 78, 1 in 661 ; and this date accords with the tennina* 
103 

tion, which had taken place just shortly before, of the 

Jugnithina war. The second agrarian law belongs beyond doubt to 
100. ^^^* '^^ treason-law and the corn-law have been onl) 

103.' conjecturally placed, the former in 661 (p. 226), the hittef 

***• in 664. 



956 The Attempt cf Martus [Book I? 

&ther a yehement antagonist of the popular party, with a 
band of devoted partisans dispersed the oomitia by vio- 
lence. But the hardy soldiers of Marius, who had flo(;ked 
in crowds to Rome to vote on this occasion, quickly lalUed 
and dispersed the city bands, and on the voting ground 
thus reconquered the vote on the Appuleian laws was suo 
cessfuUy brought to an end. The soindai was grievous; 
but when it came to the question whether the senate would 
comply with the clause of the law that within five days 
after its passing every senator should on pain of forfeiting 
his senatorial seat take an oath £siithfully to observe it, all 
the senators took the oath with the single exception of 
Quintus Metellus, who preferred to go into exile. Marius 
and Saturninus were not displeased to see the best general 
and the ablest man among their opponents removed from 
the state by voluntary banishment. 

Their object seemed to be attained ; but even now to 
Th«iuiof those who saw more clearly the enterprise could 
SSSy^'*" notJ appear other than a failure. The cause of 
P"^' the failure lay mainly in the awkward alliance 

between a politically incapable general and a street-dema- 
gogue, able but recklessly violent, and filled with passion 
rather than with the aims of a statesman. They had agreed 
excellently, so long as the question related to their plans 
alone. But when the plans came to be executed, it was 
very soon apparent that the celebrated general was in poli*- 
tics a mere incapable ; that his ambition was that of the 
&rmer who would cope with and, if possible, surpass the 
aristocrats in titles, and not that of the statesman who Je- 
lires to govern because he feels within him the power to do 
io ; that every enterprise, which was based on his personal 
standing as a politician, must necessarily even under ths 
most &vourable circumstances be ruined hj himself. 

nithoiit leaTlng aons (Strabo, iv. 188), ib tot inoonsistent with this fi(ir. 
for tb) younger Gaepio fell in 664, and the elder, vhtf 
ended lis life in exile at Smyrna, may very well hare sur 

H^vdhim. 



Obap. yi.] At lievoitUian. 967 

He knew neither the art of gaining his antagonists, nor 
that of keeping his own party in subjection* 
eT&ewboie The opposition against him and his comradet 
''*'^"***^* was even of itself sufficiently considerable ; foi 
not only did the government party belong to it in a body, 
out also a great part of the burgesses, who g'ciarded with 
icalous eyes their exclusive privileges against the Italians ; 
and by <bo course which things took the whole class of the 
wealthy vras also driven over to the government. Satur- 
ninus and Glaucia were from the first masters and servants 
of the proletariate and therefore not at all on a good foot- 
ing with the moneyed aristocracy, which had no objection 
now and then to check the senate by means of the rabble, 
but had no liking for street-riots and violent outrages. As 
early as the first tribunate of Saturninus his armed bands 
had their skirmishes with the equites ; the vehement oppo- 
sition which his election as tribune for 654 en- 
countered shows clearly how small was the 
party favourable to him. It should have been the en* 
deavour of Marius to avail himself of the dangerous help 
of such associates only in moderation, and to convince all 
and sundry that they were destined not to rule, but to serve 
him as their ruler. As he did precisely the contrary, and 
the matter came to look quite as if the object was to place 
the government in the hands not of an intelligent and vigor- 
ous master, but of e mere canaille^ the men of material 
interests, terrified to death at the prospect of such confu- 
sion, again attached themselves closely to the senate in 
presence of this common danger. While Gains Gracchus, 
clearly perceiving that no government could be overthrown 
by means of the proletariate alone, had especially sought 
to gain over to his side the propertied classes, those who 
desired to continue his work began by producing a reoon* 
eilialion between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie. 

But the ruin of the enterprise was brought about, still 
▼ariuM more rapidly than by this reconciliation of ene* 
Xaiinsaad mies, through the dissension which the mori 
Ko^ea. than ambiguoas behaviour of Marius necesHarily 



358 The Attempt of JUarvm [Book I? 

produced among its promoters. While the decisive pro 
posals were brought forward by his associates and carried 
after a struggle by his soldiers, Marius maintained an atti 
tude wholly passire, as if the political leader was not bound 
quite as much as the military, when the brunt of battle 
came, to present himself everywhere and foremost in per 
son. Nor was this all ; he was terrified at, and fled from 
the presence of^ the spirits which he had himself evoked. 
When his associates resorted to expedients which an hon« 
ourable man could not approve, but without which in fact 
the object of their efforts could not be attained, he attempt- 
ed, in the fashion usual with men whose ideas of political 
morality are confused, to wash his hands of participation in 
those crimes and at the same time to profit by their results. 
There is a story that the general once conducted secret 
negotiations in two different apartments of his house, with 
Satuminus and his partisans in the one, and with the depu* 
ties of the oligarchy in the other, talking with the former 
of striking a blow against the senate, and with the latter of 
interfering against the revolt, and that under a pretext 
which was in keeping with the anxiety of the situation he 
went to and fro between the two conferences — ^a story as 
certainly invented, and as certainly approprbite, as any in- 
cident in Aristophanes. The ambiguous attitude of Marius 
became notorious in the question of the oath. At first he 
seemed as though he would himself refuse the oath required 
by the Appuleian laws on account of the informalities that 
had occurred at their passing, and then swore it with the 
reservation, " so fai as the laws were really valid ; " a 
reservation which annulled the oath itself, and which of 
course all the senators likewise adopted in swearing, so thai 
by this mode of taking the oath the validity of the laws 
was not secured, but on the contrary was for the first time 
really called in question. 

The consequences of this behavicur — stupid beyond par 
allel — on the part of the celebrated general soon developed 
themselves. Saturninus and Glaucia had not undertake 
the revolution and procured for Marius the supremacy of 



Chup. VL] At SeodhA^um. 259 

the state, in ordei' that they might be disowned and sacri- 
ficed by him ; if Glaucia, the &yourite jester of the people^ 
had hitherto lavished on Marius the gayest flowers of hit 
jovial eloquence, the garlands which he now wove for him 
were by no means redolent of roses and violets. A total 
rapture took place, by which both parties were lost ; foi 
Marius had not a footing sufficiently firm singly to main- 
tain the colonial law which he had himself called in ques* 
tion and to possess himself of the position which it assigned 
to him, nor were Satuminus and Glaucia in a condition to 
continue on their own account the work which Marius had 
begun. 

But the two demagogues were so compromised that 
Satnminiu ^^Y could not recede ; they had no alternative 
iaoiated. g^y^ ^ resign their offices in the usual way and 
thereby to deliver themselves with their hands bound to 
their exasperated opponents, or now to grasp the sceptre 
for themselves, although they felt that they could not bear 
its weight. They resolved on the latter course ; Satumi- 
nus would come forward once more as a candidate for the 
tribunate of the people for 655, Glaucia, although 
praetor and not eligible for the consulship till 
two years had elapsed, would become a candidate for the 
latter. In fact the tribunician elections were decided thor^ 
oughly to their mind, and the attempt of Marius to prevent 
the spurious Tiberius Gracchus from soliciting the tribune* 
ship served only to show the celebrated man what was now 
the worth of his popularity ; the multitude broke the doors 
of the prison in which Gracchus was confined, bore him in 
triumph through the streets, and elected him by a great 
majority as their tribune. Saturninus and Glaucia sought 
to control the more important consular election by the ex- 
peiHent for the removal of inconvenient competitors which 
had been tried in the previous year ; the counter^iandidate 
of the government-party, Gains Memmius — the same who 
eleven years before had led the opposition against them 
latiiniiaiM (p* ^^^) — ^^ suddenly assailed by a band of 
"■^•*» ruffians and beaten to death* But the govern 



960 The Attempt of Marim [BookIV 

inenVpart} had only waited for a strikiDg event of this sort 
in order to employ force. The senate required the consul 
Gaius Marius to interfere, and the latter in reality professed 
his readiness now to draw in behalf of the coLservati^i 
party the sword, which he had obtained from the demoo 
racy and had promised to wield in its favour. The young 
men were hastily called out, equipped with arms from the 
public buildings, and drawn up in military array ; the sen* 
ate itself appeared under arms in the Forum, with its vene* 
rable chief Marcus Scaurus at its head. The opposite party 
were perhaps superior in a street-riot, but were not prepared 
for such an attack ; they had to defend themselves as they 
could. They broke open the doors of the prisons, and 
called the slaves to liberty and to arms ; they proclaimed 
— so it was said at any rate — Saturninus as king or general ; 
on the day when the new ti'ibunes of the people had to 
enter on their ofRce, the 10th of December d54 

100, 

a battle occurred in the great market-place — the 
first which had ever been fought within the walls of the 
capital. The issue was not for a moment doubtful. The 
Populares were beaten and driven up to the Capitol, where 
and over. ^^ supply of water was cut off from them and 
powered. ^.jj^y were thus compelled to surrender* Marius, 
who held the chief command, would gladly have saved the 
lives of his former allies who were now his prisoners; 
Satuminus proclaimed to the multitude that all which he 
had proposed had been done in concert with the oonsol* 
even a worse man than Marius was could not but shudder 
at the inglorious part which he played on this day. But he 
had long ceased to be master of affairs. Without orders 
the young nobles climbed the roof of the senate-housi. in 
the Forum where the prisoners were temporarily oonfiued, 
stripped off the tiles, and with these stoned thdr victims. 
Thus Satuminus perished with most o^ the more notable 
prisoners. Glaudsi was found in a lurking-place and like- 
wise put to death. Without trial or sentence there died on 
this day four magistrates of the Roman people — a praetor, 
a quaestor, and two tribunes of the people — ^and a numbet 



CiuF VI.] At lievoliUian. 261 

of other well*known men, some of whom belonged to good 
families. In spite of the grave faults by which the chiefs 
had invited on themselves this bloody retribution, we ma\ 
nevertheless lament them : they fell like advanced post£^ 
which are left unsupported by the main army and are forced 
to perish without object in a conflict of despair. 

Never had the government-party achieved a more com* 
plete victory, never had the opposition suffered 
of thegoY- a more severe defeat, than on this 10th of De- 
^'"^^ oember. It was the least part of the success 

that they had got rid of some troublesome brawlers, whose 
places might be supplied any day by associates of a like 
stamp ; it was of greater moment that the only uian, who 
was then in a position to become dangerous to the govern- 
ment, had publicly and completely effected his own annihi- 
lation ; and most important of all that the two elements of 
the opposition, the capitalist order and the proletariate, 
emerged from the strife wholly at variance. It is true 
that this was not the work of the government ; the fabric 
which had been put together by the adroit hands of Gains 
Gracchus had been broken up, partly by the force of cir- 
cumstances, partly and especially by the coarse and boorish 
management of his incapable successor ; but in the result 
it mattered not whether calculation or good fortune helped 
the government to its victory. A more pitiful 
uticaUy UA. position Can hardly be conceived than that occu- 
pied by the hero of Aquae and Vercellae after 
such a downfall — all the more pitiftil, because people could 
not but compare it with the iclcU which only a few months 
before surrounded the same man. No one either on the 
aristocratic or the democratic side any longer thought of 
the victorious general on occasion of filling up the magis- 
tradcA ; the hero of six consulships could not even venture 
to become a candidate in 656 for the censorship. 
He went away to the East, ostensibly for the 
purpose of fiilfilliiig a vow there, but in reality that he 
might not be a witness of the triumphant return of his 
mortal foe Quintus M^tellus ; he was suffered to go. He 



263 The Attempt of Mariw [Book IT 

returned and opened his house ; his halls stood empty. H« 
always hoped that conflicts and battles would occur and that 
the people would once m>re need his experienced arm ; ha 
thought to provide himself with an opportunity for war in 
the Easty where the Romans might certainly have found 
sufficient occasion for energetic interference. But this also 
miscarried, like every other of his wishes ; profound peace 
continued to prevail. Yet the longing after honours once 
aroused within him, the oflener it was disappointed, ate the 
more deeply into his mind. Superstitious as he was, he 
cherished in his breast an old oracular saying which had 
promised him seven consulships, and in gloomy meditation 
brooded over the means by which this utterance was to 
obtain its fulfilment and he to obtain his revenge, while he 
appeared to all, himself alone excepted, insignificant and 
innocuous. 

Still more important in its consequences than the set* 
ting aside of the dangerous man was the deep 
equestrian exasperation against the Populares, as they were 
^^'^^' called, which the insurrection of Saturninus lefl 

behind in the party of material interests. With the most 
remorseless severity the equestrian tribunals condemned 
every one who professed oppositional views ; Sextus Titius, 
for instance, was condemned not so much on account of his 
agrarian law as because he had in his house a statue of 
Saturninus ; Gains Appuleius Decianus was condemned, 
because he had as tribune of the people characterized the 
proceedings against Saturninus as illegal. Even for earlier 
injuries inflicted by the Populares on the aristocracy satis- 
faction was now demanded, not without prospect of success, 
before the equestrian tribunals. Because Gaius Norbanus 
had eight years previously in concert with Saturninus driven 
the consular Quintus Caepio into exile (p. 4226) 
he was now (659) under his own law accused of 
high treason, and the jurymen hesitated long — not whether 
the accused was guilty or innocent, but whether his ally 
Saturninus or his enemy Caepio was to be regarded as thus 
more deserving of their hate — till at last they decided fof 



Gbap.VI.] At Revolution, 368 

acquittal. £ven if people were not more fiivoumbly dis- 
posed towards the govemment in itself than before, yet| 
after having found themselves, although but for a rc ;>ment, 
on the verge of a real mob-rule, all men who had anything 
to lose could not but look on the existing government m a 
different light ; it was notoriously wretched and pernicious 
for the state, but the anxious dread of the still mon 
wretched and still more pernicious government of the pro- 
letariate had conferred on it a relative value. The current 
now set so much in that direction that the multitude tore ii\ 
pieces a tribune of the people who had ventured to post- 
pone the return of Quintus Metellus, and the democrats 
began to seek their safety in league with murderers and 
poisoners — ridding themselves, for example, of the hated 
Metellus by poison — or even in league with the public 
enemy, several of them already taking refuge at the court 
of king Mithradates who was secretly preparing for war 
against Rome. External relations also assumed an aspect 
&vourable for the govemment. The Roman arms were 
employed but little in the period from the Cimbrian to the 
Social war, but everywhere with honour. The only serious 
conflict was in Spain, where, during thq recent 
years so trying for Rome (649 9eq,\ the Lusi- 
tanians and Celtiberians had risen with unwonted vehemence 
against the Romans. In liie years 656-661 the 
consul Titus Didius in the northern and the con- 
sul Publius Crassus in the southern province not only re- 
established with valour and good fortune the ascendancy of 
the Roman arms, but also razed the refractory towns and, 
where it seemed necessary, transplanted the population of 
the strong towns among the mountains to the plains. We 
shall show in the sequel that about the same time the Ro- 
man government again directed its attention to the East 
which had been for a generation neglected, and displayed 
greater energy than had been heard of for long in Gyrene, 
Byria, and Asia Minor. Never since the commencement of 
the revolution had the govemment of the restoration been 
io /^rmly established, or so popular. Consular law? weM 



970 Attempt of Drusua at Reform. [Book it 

domains as well as Sicily in order to raise the Italian farmei 
oisss, and yet retain the government as before ; to whick 
feil to be added the consideration, that they could not more 
effectually obviate future agitations than by providing that 
all the land at all disposable should be brought to distribu- 
tion by the aristocracy itself and that according to Drusua^ 
own expression, nothing should be left for future dem» 
gogues to distribute but *' the dirt and the daylight.'' lu 
like manner it was for the government-— whether that might 
bo a monarch, or a dose number of ruling families-— very 
much a matter of indifference whether the half or the whole 
of Italy possessed the Boman franchise ; and hence the re- 
forming men on both aides probably could not but coincide 
in the idea of averting the danger of a recurrence of the 
insurrection of Fregellae on a larger scale by a judicious 
and reasonable extension of the franchise, and of seeking 
allies, moreover, for their plans in the numerous and influ- 
ential Italians. While in the question of the headship of 
the state the views and designs of the two great political 
parties were palpably different, tiie bcBt men of both camps 
had many points of contact in their means of operation an^ 
in their reforming tendencies; and, as Scipio Aemilianus 
may be named sJike among the adversaries of Tiberius 
Gracchus and among the promoters of his reforming efforts, 
so DruBUs was the successor and disciple no less than the 
antagonist of Gains. The two high-born and high-minded 
youthful reformers had a greater resemblance than was 
apparent at the first glance ; and, personally also, the two 
were not unworthy to meet, as respects the substance of 
their patriotic endeavours, in purer and higher views above 
the obscuring mists of prejudiced partisanship. 

The question at stake was the passing of the laws drawn 
up by Drusus. Of these the proposer, just like 
im the Ga:us Gracchus, kept m reserve for the moment 

^^^ ^ the hazardous proposal to confer the Boman 
franchise on the Italian allies, and brought forward at first 
only the laws as to the jurymen, the assignation of land, 
•and the distribution of gi*ain« The capitalist party offered 



Chaf. vl] Attempt of Dru^fOB at Reform. 271 

the most yehement resistance, and, in consequence of thi 
irresolution of the greater part of the aristocracy and th^ 
vacillation of the comitia, would beyond question have ca^ 
ried the rejection of the law as to jurymen, if it had been 
put to the vote by itself. Drusus accordingly embraced al* 
his proposals in one law ; and, as thus all the burgesses in* 
(erested in the distributions of grain and land were com- 
pelled to vote also for the law as to jurymen, he succeeded 
in carrying the law with their help and that of the It-alians, 
who stood firmly by Drusus with the exception of the large 
landowners, particularly those in Umbria and Etruria, whose 
domanial possessions were threatened. It was not carried, 
however, until Drusus had caused the consul Philippus, who 
would not desist from opposition, to be arrested and car- 
ried off to prison by a bailiff. The people celebrated the 
tribune as their bene&ctor, and received him in the theatre 
by rising up and applauding ; but the voting had not so 
much decided the struggle as transferred it to another 
ground, for the opposite party justly characterized the pro 
posal of Drusus as contrary to the law of 656 
(p. 264) and therefore as null. The chief oppo- 
nent of the tribune, the consul Philippus, summoned the 
senate on this ground to cancel the Livian law as informal ; 
but the majority of the senate, glad to be rid of the eques* 
trian courts, rejected the proposal. The consul thereupon 
declared in the open market that it was not possible to gov* 
em with such a senate, and that he would look out for 
another state-council : he seemed to meditate a c&wp d*ita(. 
The senate, convoked accordingly by Drusus, after stormy 
discussions pronounced a vote of censure and of want of 
oonfidence against the consul ; but in secret a great part of 
the majority began to cherish apprehension respecting the 
revolution with which they seemed to be threatened on the 
part both of Pmlippus and of a large portion of the capi- 
talists. 

Other circumstances added to that apprehension. One 
of the most active and eminent of those who shared the 
views of Drusus, the orator Lucius Crassus, died sudden 



272 AUem^t of JDru9UB at Reform. [Book rv 

fi \j a few days after that sitting of the senate 

(Sept. 063). The connections foimed by Drit 
SUB with the Italians, which he had at first commonicafced 
only to a few of his most intimate friends, became gradu- 
ally divulged, and the furious cry of high treason which la 
antagonists raised was echoed by many, perhaps by moofc, 
men of the government party. Even the g^erous wwrmng 
which he communicated to tiie consul Philippua, to beware 
of the murderous emissaries of the Italians at the federal 
festival on the Alban Mount, served only furthw to com 
promise him, for it showed how deeply he was involved in 
the conspiracies springing up among the Italians. 

Philippus insisted with daily increasing vehem^ice on 
the abrogation of the Livian law : the miuority 
law an- grew daily more lukewarm m its d^ence. A 

return to the former state of things soon ap- 
peared to the great multitude of the timid and the irresolute 
in the senate the only way of escape, and a decree cance- 
ling the law on account of informality was issued* Drusus, 
after his fashion sternly acquiescing, contented himself with 
the remark that it was the senate itself which thus restored 
the hated equestrian courts, and waived his right to render 
the decree of cassation invalid by means of his veto. The 
attack of the senate on the capitalist party was totally rC" 
pulsed, and willingly or unwillingly they submitted once 
more to the former y<:^<&. 

But the great capitalists were not content with having 
Mmderof conquered. One evening, when Drusus at his 
Druaoa, entrance hall was just about to take leave of the 

multitude which as usual escorted him, he suddenly dropped 
down in front of the imi^e of his &th^ ; an assassin's hand 
had struck him, and so surely that a few hours afterwards 
he expired. The perpetrator had vanished in the evening 
twilight without any one recognizing him, and no judicial 
Investigation took place ; but none such was needed to 
bring to light in this case the dagger with which the aristoo 
racy pierced its own flesh. The same violent and terrible 
end, which had swept awa} the democratic reformers, waf 



C5HAP. VI.] Attempt of DriLsvJi at JReform. 27S 

destined also for the Gracchus of the aristocracy. It in* 
Yolved a profound and melancholy lesson. Reform was 
frustrated by the resistance or by the weakness of the aris- 
tocracy, even when the attempt at reformation proceeded 
from their own ranks. Drusus; had staked his strength and 
his life in the attempt to overthrow the dominion of the 
merchants, to organize emigration, to avert the impending 
civil war ; he himjseli' saw the merchants ru]ii3g mere vim^ 
lutely than ever, found aU bis ideas of reform frustrated, 
and died with the consciousness that his sudden death would 
be Ite mgnai for the most fearfol dvil war that ever <iea(^ 
]«ted the &ir land of Ixt^j. 
Voi. III.— 18* 



CHAPTER Vn. 

BKTOLT or THX ITALIAK SUBJECTS, AND THS SULPIOIAI 

BBTOLUTION. 

Fboh the time when the defeat of Pyrrhus had put an 

end to the last war which the Italians had waged 

nditi^ for their independence— or, in other words, for 



nearly two hundred years — ^the Roman primacy 
had now subsisted in Italy, without having been once shaken 
in its foundations even under circumstances of the utmost 
peril. Vainly had the heroic family of the Barcides, vainly 
had the successors of Alexander the Great and of the 
Achaemenidae, endeavoured to rouse the Italian nation to 
contend with the too powerful capital ; it had obsequiously 
appeared in the fields of battle on the Guadalquivir and on 
the Mejerdah, at the pass of Tempe and at Mount Sipylus, 
and with the best blood of its youth had helped its masters 
to achieve the subjugation of three continents. Its own 
position meanwhile had changed, but had deteriorated 
rather than improved. In a material point of view, doubt- 
less, it had in general not much ground to complain. 
Though the small and intermediate landholders throughout 
Italy suffered in consequence of the injudicious Roman 
legislation as to corn, the larger landlords and still more 
the mercantile and capitalist class were flourishing, for the 
Italians enjoyed, as respected the financial profits of the 
provinces, substantially the same protection and the same 
privileges as Roman burgesses, and thus shared to a great 
extent in the material advantages of the political ascendancy 
of the Romans. In general, the economic and social condi* 
tion of Italy was not immediately dependent on political 
distinctions; there were allied districts, such as Umbria 



Chap. VII.] Iim)oU of the Italian Suhjeots. 278 

-and Etruria, in which the olass of free &rmers had mostly 
disappeared, while in others, such as the valleys of the 
Abruzzi, the same olass still maintained a tolerable footing 
or was almost unaffected — just as a similar diversity could 
be pointexi out in the different Roman tribes. On the otiter 
hand the political inferiority of Italy was daily displayed 
more harshly and more abruptly. No formal open breach 
of right indeed occurred, at least in the principal questions. 
The communal freedom, which under the name of sove> 
reignty was accorded by treaty to the Italian communities, 
was on the whole respected by the Roman govemmetat; 
the attack, which the Roman reform party at the com- 
mencement of the agrarian agitation made on the Roman 
domains guaranteed to the more privileged communities, 
had not only been earnestly opposed by the strictly con- 
servative as well as by the middle party in Rome, but had 
been very soon abandoned by the Roman opposition itself. 
But the rights, which belonged and could not but belong 
Disahiiities ^^ Bomc as the leading community — the su- 
StheraP preme conduct of war-affairs, and the super- 
j«*"* intendence of the whole administration — ^were 

exercised in a way which was almost as bad as if the allies 
had been directly declared to be subjects without rights. 
The numerous modifications of the fearfully severe Roman 
martial law, which were introduced at Rome in the course 
of the seventh century, seemed to have remained wholly 
limited to the Roman burgess-soldiers : this is certain as to 
the most important, the abolition of executions by martial 
law (p. 180), and we may easily conceive the impression 
which was produced when, as happened in the Jugurtbine 
war, Latin officers of repute were beheaded by sentence of 
the Roman council of war, while .he lowest burgess-soldier 
had in the like case the right of presenting an appeal to the 
civil tribunals of Rome. The proportions in which the 
burgesses and Italian allies were to be drawn for military 
service had, as was fair, remained undefined by treaty ; but, 
irhile in earlier times the two had furnished on an average 
equal numbers of soldiers (i. 151, 432), now, although th« 



2 76 jR&voU of the itaUan Subjects^ [Book iv 

proportions of the population had changed probably k 
fayour of the burgesses rather than to their disadvantage^ 
the demands on the allies were bj degrees increased dispro 
portionately (i. 541, ii. 394), so that on the one hand the} 
had the chief burden of the heavier and more costly service 
imposed on them, and on the other hand th^e were two 
allies now regularly levied for one burgess. In like manna- 
with this military supremacy the civil superintendence 
which (induding the supreme administrative jurisdiction 
which could hardly be separated from it) the Roman gov- 
emment had always and rightly reserved to itself over the 
dependent Italian communities, was extended in such a way 
that the Italians were hardly less than the provindals aban- 
doned without protection to the caprice of any one of the 
numberless Roman magistrates. In Teamim Sidioinum, 
one of the most considerable of the allied towns, a consul 
had ordered the chief magistrate of the town to be scourged 
witibi rods at the stake in the market-place, because, on the 
consul's wife expressing a desire to bathe in the men's bath, 
the municipal officers had not driven forth the bathers 
quickly enough, and the bath appeared to her not to be 
clean. Similar scenes had taken place in Ferentinum, like- 
wise a town optimi juris, and even in the old and important 
Latin colony of Gales. In the Latin colony of Venusia a 
free peasant had been seized by a young Roman diplomatist 
not holding office but passing through the town, on account 
of a jest whidi he had allowed himself to make on the Ro- 
man's litter, had been thrown down, and whipped to death 
with the straps of the litter. These occurrences are inci- 
dentally mentioned about the time of the Fregellan in8iu> 
rection ; it admits of no doubt that similar outivges fre* 
qiently occurred, and of as little that no real satisfik^tion 
for suck misdeeds could anywhere be obtained, whereas the 
right of appeal — not easily violated with impunity — pro- 
tected in some measure at least the life and limbs of tb« 
Roman burgess. In consequence of this treatment of the 
Italians on the part of the Roman government, the vari* 
•nee, which the wisdom of their ancestors had carefully fog 



Cbap. vn.] And the likdpician Hevohsium, 3T7 

tered between t^e Latin and the oUier Italian oommanidee, 
could not fiul, if not to disappear, at any rate to undei^o 
abatement (ii. S97). The fortresses of Rome and the disi 
tricts kept to their allegiance by the fortaresses lived now 
under the like oppression; the Latin oould remind the 
Picentine that they were both in like n anner '^ subject to 
the fasces ; " the overseers and the slaves of former days 
were now umted by a common hatred towards the oonunoD 
despot. 

While the present state of the Italian allies was thus 
transformed from an endurable dependence into the most 
oppressive bondage, they were at the same time deprived 
of every prospect of obtaining b^ter rights. With the 
suhjugation of Italy the Roman burgess-body had closed its 
ranks ; the bestowal of the franchise on whole communities 
was totally given up, its bestowal on individuals was great- 
ly restricted. Even the full liberty of migration belonging 
to the Old Latin bui^gesses, which procured for such of 
their members as transferred their abode to Rome the civi- 
ias iine raffrcugio there, had been curtailed in a manner 
oflfensivei to the communities concerned (ii. SM). They 
now advanced a step farther : on occasion of the agitation 
whidi contemplated the extension of the Roman franchise 

126 ua ^ ^^ '^^ ^" ^^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^' ^^ ^^^ *^ 
migration to Rome •atis itself attacked, and all 

the non-burgesses resident in Rome were directly ejected 

by decree of the people and of the senate from the capital 

(pp. IdH, 154) — a measure as odious on account of its il« 

liberality, as dangerous from the various private interests 

which it injuriously affected. In short, while the Italian 

allies had formerly stood to the Romans partly in the rela- 

tion of brothers under tutelage, protected rather than ruled 

and not destined to perpetual minority, partly in that of 

slaves tolerably treated and not utterly deprived of the 

hope of manumission, they were now all of them subject 

nearly in equal degree, and with equal hopelessness, to the 

rods and axes of their Roman masters, and might at th< 

atmost presume like privileged slaves to ^ansinit the kiok« 



S78 BevdU of the Italian Subjects^ [Book IV 

reoeived from their masters onward to the {>oor proTin 
dais. 

It belongs to the nature of such differences that, re 
^ _^ strained by the sense of national unity and bv 

the remembrance of dangers surmounted in 
oommon, they make their appearance at first gently and as 
it were modestly, till the breach gradually widens and thfl 
relation between the rulers, whose might is tiieir sole right, 
and the ruled, whose obedience reaches no farther than their 

fears, manifests at l^urth undiseuiaedly the char- 
wmT^ acter of force. Down to the revolt and razing 
^^' of Fregellae in 629, which as it were officially 

attested the altered character of the Roman rule, the fer- 
ment among the Italians did not properly wear a revolu- 
tionary character. The longing after equal rights had 
gradually risen from a silent wish to a loud request, only to 
be the more decidedly rejected, the more distinctly it was 
BifflenitTof announced. It was very soon apparent that a 
fusS^? voluntary concession was not to be hoped for, 
tion. and the wish to extort what was refused would 

not be wanting; but the position of Rome at that time 
hardly permitted them to entertain any idea of realizing 
that wish. Although the numerical proportions of the bur- 
gesses and non-burgesses in Italy cannot be properly ascer- 
tained, it may be regarded as certain that the number of 
the burgesses was not very much less than that of the Ital- 
ian allies ; for nearly 400,000 bui^esses capable of bearing 
arms there were at least 500,000, probably 600,000 allies.* 

* These figures are taken fh>ro the numbers of the census of 689 

and 684 ; there were in the former year 894,886 burgesses 

* capable of bearing arms, In the latter 910,000 (acconUng 

to Phlegon Fr. 12 MfilL which statement Clinton and his copyists erro- 
neously refer to the census of 668 ; according to Liv. Bp. 
98 the number was — by the correct reading — 900,000 

pefBons). The only figures known between these two— those of the 
census of 668, which according to Hicronymus gaye 
468,000 persons— proTyably turned out so low only because 

the census took place amidst the crisis of the revolution. As an fau 

orraao of the population of ^taly is not concelrable in tlie period f row 



(Jbat. yn.] And the StUpieian Revolution. 279 

So long as with such proportions the bui^esses were united 
and there was no outward enemy worthy of mention, the 
Italian allies, split up into an endless number of isolated 
dyic and cantonal communities, and connected with Borne 
by a thousand relations public and private, could nevef 
attain to common action ; and with moderate prudence the 
government could not fail to control their troublesome and 
indignant subjects partly by the compact mass of the bur- 
gesseSy partly by the very considerable resources which the 
provinces afforded, partly by setting one community against 
another. 

Accordingly the Italians kept themselves quiet^ till the 
revolution besan to shake Rome ; but, as soon 

The ItaUaiu . • , , , i i . i 

and the Ro- as it had broken out, they entered mto the 
.man partus. ^^^^,^1^^^ ^^^ agitations of the Roman parties, 

with a view to obtain equality of rights by means of the 
one or the other. They had made common cause first with 
the popular and then with the senatorial party, and gained 
equally little by either. They had been driven to the con- 
viction that, while the best men of both parties acknowl- 
edged the justice and equity of their claims, these best men, 
aristocrats as well as Populares, had equally little power to 
procure a hearing for those claims with the mass of their 
party. They had also observed that the most gifted, most 
energetic, and most celebrated statesmen of Rome had 
found themselves, at the very moment when they came 
forward as advocates of the Italians, deserted by their own 
adherents and had been accordingly overthrown. In all the 

689 to 684, and even the Sullan assignations of land oaa 
at the most have bu^ filled the gaps which the war had 
made, the surplus of fully 600,000 men capable of bearing arms maj be 
referred with certainty to the reception of the allies which had taken 
place in the interval. But it is possible, and eren probable, that in 
these fiital years the total amount of the Italian population may have 
retrograded rather than advanced : if we reckon the total deficit at 
100,000 men capable of bearing arms, which seem? not excessive, there 
were at the time of the Social War in Italy three non-buigeases for two 
burgessesL 



S8C BewjU of the Italian Subjects^ [Bdox IV 

vidasitoddfl of the thirty years of revoltttioB and resteer*' 
tion governments enough had been instaUed and deposedl, 
but) however the prc^ramme mi^t vary, a sfaort-sighted 
and narrow-minded spirit sat always at the helm. 

Above all, the reoent ooomroKoes bad clearly show* 
how vain was the eipeotation of tiie Italians that 
■zidiiieoH. their claims would be altoaded to by Borne. 
'*'^^' So long as Idie demands of the Italimas were 

mixed up wi<ii those of the revolutionary party and had ia 
the hands of the latter been re|eoted by the folly of the 
masses, they might still resign themselves to the belief 
that the oligar^y had been hostile merely to the proposers, 
not to the proposal itself and that there was still a possi- 
bility that the more intelligent senate would aooept a mea^ 
nre whidi was compatible with the nature of die oligarchy 
and salutary for the state. But the reoent years, in whidi 
the senate once more ruled almost absolutely, had shed only 
too disagreeable a light on the designs of the Roman oli- 
garchy also. Instead of the expected modifiea- 
^eiidate- tloBs, there was issued In 639 a ocHisular law 
law!*^ which most strictly prohibited the non-lmrgesses 

from laying claim to the franduse and threat- 
ened tran^ressors with trial and punishment — a law whi<^ 
threw back a large number of most respectable persons 
who were deeply interested in the question of equfldizatios 
from the ranks of Romans into those at the Italians, and 
which in point oi indisputable legality and of politioal folly 
stands completely on a parallel with that &mous act which 
laid the foundation for the separation of North America 
from the mother-counlay ; in fiiet it became, just like that 
act, the proximate cause of the civil war. It was only so 
much fhe worse, that the authors of this law by no means 
belonged to the obstinate and incorrigible Optimates ; they 
were no other than the sagacious and -universally honoured 
Quintus Scaevola— -destined like George Grenville by nature 
to be a jurist and by fate to be a srtatesman, who by hia 
equally honourable and pernicious rectitude inflamed more 
than any one else first the war between senate and equitet 



c^p. VII.] Jndthe Stilpieian BevoluUon. 281 

and then that between Romans and Italians — ^and the oratoi 
Lucius Crassus, the friend and ally of Drusus and altogether 
one of the most moderate and judicious of the Optimates. 

Amidst the vehement ferment, which this law and th<^ 
The Italians numerous processes arising out of it called forth 
•BdDnuiu. throughout Italy, the star of hope once mora 
appeared to arise for the Italians in the person of Miarcua 
Drusoa. That which had been deemed almost impossible 
—that a conservative should t^e up the reforming ideas 
of the Gracchi, and should become the diampion of equal 
rights for the Italians-*-had nevertheless occurred ; a man 
of the high aristocracy had resolved to emancipate the ItaU 
ians from the Sicilian Straits to the Alps and the govern- 
ment at one and the same time, and to apply all his earnest 
seal, all his thorough devotedness to these generous plans 
of reform. Whether he actually, as was reported, placed 
himself at the head of a secret league, whose threads rami- 
fied through Italy and whose members bound themselves 
by an oath * to stand by each other for Drusus and for the 
common cause, cannot be ascertained ; but, even if he did 

* The fbrm of oath is preserved (ia Biodor. Vai. p. 118) ; it runs 
thus : ^ I swear by the Capitoline Jupiter and by the Roman Vesta and 
by the hereditary Mars and by the generative Sun and by the nourishing 
Earth and by the divine founders and enlargers of the City of Rome, 
that those shall be my friends and those shall be my foes who are 
friends or foes to Ihrusus ; also that I will spare neither mine own life 
nor tiie life of my children or <tf my parents, except in so far as it is 
fat the good of Drusus and those who share this oath. But if I should 
become a burgess by the law of Drusus, I will esteem Rome as my 
iMHne apd Drusus as the greatest of my benefactors. I shall tender thto 
oath to as many of my fellow-citizens as I can ; and if I swear truly, 
may it fare with me well ; if I swear falsely, may it (kre with me ilL** 
But we sbidl do well to employ ^is account wi& caution ; It is derived 
ddier from the speeches ddivered against Drusus by Fhilippus (which 
seems to be indicated by the absurd title ** oath of Iliilippus " prefixed 
by the extractor of the formula) or at best from the documents of 
•riminal procedure subsequently drawn up respecting this conspiracy in 
Rome; and even on the latter hypothesis it remains questionable^ 
whether this form of oath was elicited from the aceused or iminted It 
then in the inqtdry. 



382 MevcU of the Italicm SutjeoUj [Book IT 

not lead himself to acts so dangerous and in fact unwarrant- 
able for a Roman magistrate, yet it is certain that he did 
not keep to mere general promises, and that dangerous con* 
nections were formed in his name, although perhaps without 
his consent or against his will. With joy the Italians heard 
that Drusus had carried his first proposals with the consent 
of the great majority of the senate ; with still greater joy 
all the communities of Italy celebrated not long afterwards 
the recovery of the tribune, who had been suddenly a&> 
tacked by severe illness. But as the further designs of 
Drusus became unveiled, a change took place ; he could not 
venture to bring in his chief law ; he had to postpone, he 
had to delay, he had soon to retire. It was reported that 
the majority of the senate were vacillating and threatened 
to fall away from their leader ; in rapid succession .the 
tidings ran through the communities of Italy, that the law 
which had passed was annulled, that the capitalists ruled 
aiore absolutely than ever, that the tribune had been strudc 

by the hand of an assassin, that he was dead 

(autumn of 663). 
The last hope that the Italians might obtain admission 

to Roman citizenship by agreement was buried 
ttJnSto" ^^^ Marcus Drusus. A measure, which tiiat 
wToiT^ conservative and energetic man had not been 

ftfain«t able under the most &vourable circumstances to 

induce his own party to adopt, was not to be 
gained at all by amicable means. The Italians had no 
course left save to submit patiently or to repeat once more, 
and if possible with their united strength, the attempt which 
had been crushed in the bud five-and-thirty years before by 
the destruction of Fregellae — so as by force of arms either 
to destroy Rome and succeed to her heritage, or at least to 
compel her to grant equality of rights. The latter resolu* 
tion was no doubt a resolution of despair; as matters 
stood, the revolt of the isolated urban communities against 
the Roman government might well appear still more hope* 
less than the revolt of the American colonies against the 
British empire ; to all appearance the Roman government 



Chip. Vll.] And the Sulpioiati Hevdution. 288 

might with moderate attention and energy of action consign 
this second insurrection to the fate of its predecessor. But 
was it less a resolution of despair, to sit still and allow 
things to take their course 1 When they recollected ho^ 
the Romans had been in the habit of behaving in Italy with- 
out provocation, what could they expect now that the most 
considerable men in every Italian town had or were alleged 
to have had — ^the consequraices on either supposition being 
pretty much the same — an understanding with Drusus, 
which was immediately directed against the party now vio^ 
torious and might well be characterized as treason 1 All 
those who had taken part in this secret league, all in fact 
who might be merely suspected of participation, had no 
choice left save to begin the war or to bend their neck be* 
neath the axe of the executioner. 

Moreover, the present moment presented comparatively 
favourable prospects for a general insurrection throughout 
Italy. We are not exactly informed how far the Romans 
had carried out the dissolution of the larger Italian confede- 
racies (i. 541) ; but it is not improbable that the Marsians, 
the Paeiignians, and perhaps even the Samnites and Lucani- 
ans still preserved their old forms of federation, though 
these had lost their political significance and were in some 
cases probably reduced to mere associations for festivals 
and sacrifices. The insurrection, if it should now begin, 
would still find a rallying point in these unions ; but who 
could say how soon the Romans would proceed to abolish 
these also 1 The secret league, moreover, which was alleged 
to be headed by Drusus, had lost in him its actual or ex- 
pected chief, but it continued to exist and aflbrded an im- 
portant nucleus for the political organization of the insur- 
rection ; while its military organization might be based on 
the &ct that each aUied town possessed its own armament 
and experienced soldiers. In Rome on the other hand no 
serious preparations had been made. It was reported, m- 
deed, that restless movements were occurring in Italy, and 
that the communities of the allies maintained a remarkable 
JDteroourse with each other ; but instead of calling the cdti 



284 MevdU of the Italian Subfeots^ [Boor IT 

^ns in all haste to arms, the gcvemiog corpoiiition oon 
tented itself with exhorting the magistrates in the custom 
ary fashion to watchfulness and with sending out spies to 
learn farther particulars. The capital was so totally uode* 
fended, that a resolute Marsian officer Quintus Pompaedivi 
Silo, one of the most intimate friends of Drusus, is said to 
have formed the design of steiUing into the city at th(« head 
of a band of trusty assodates carrying swords under their 
clothes, and of seizing it by a coup de main. Preparations 
were accordingly made for a revolt; treaties were con- 
cluded, and arming went on silently but actively, till at last, 
as usual, the insurrection broke out through an accident 
somewhat earlier than the leading men had intended. 

The Roman praetor with proconsular powers, 6aiu9 

Servilius, informed by his spies that the town 
the ioror- ^ of Asculum (Ascoli) in the Abruzzi was sliding 
iS^ua hostages to the neighbouring communities, pro* 

ceeded thither with his legate Fonteius and a 
small escort, and addressed to the multitude, whicn was 
just then assembled in the theatre for the celebration of 
the great games, a vehement and menacing harangue. The 
sight of the axes known only too well, the proclamation of 
threats that were only too earnest, threw the spark into the 
fiiel of bitter hatred that had been accuroulatang for oentu- 
ries ; the Roman magistrates were torn to pieces by f^ 
multitude in the theatre itself^ and immediately, as if it 
were their intention by a fearful outrage to cut off every 
chance of reconciliation, the gates were closed by command 
of the magistracy, all the Romans residing in Asculum 
were put to death, and their property was plundered. The 
revolt ran through the peninsula like the flame through the 

steppe. The brave and numerous people of the 
and fiabei- Marsians took the lead, in connection wit^ the 

1* 

small but hardy confederades in the Abmzzi — 
the Paelignians, Marrucinians, Frentanians, and Vestiaian^, 
The brave and sagacious Quintus Silo, already mentioned, 
was here the soul of the morement. The Marsiaiis were 
the first formally to declare iigainst the Romans, whraes 



Chap. VII.] Af^ the Sulpicion lievohUion, 285 

the war retained afterwards the name of the Marsiaii war. 

The ei^ainple thus given was followed b} the 
BdafLvn Sammte communities, and generally by the roasf 

of the communities from the Lirib and the 
Abruzzi down to i^alabria and Apulia ; so that all Central 
and Southern Ital^ was soon in arms against Rome. 

The Etruscans and Umbrians on the other hand held by 

Rome, ds they had already taken part with the 
ftifliidiyi* equites against Drusus (p. 271). It is a signifi* 
°^ cant fact, that in these regions the landed and 

moneyed aristocracy had from ancient times preponderated 
and tha middle class had totally disappeared, whereas among 
and near the Abruzzi the farmer-class had preserved its 
purity and vigour better than anywhere else in Italy : it 
was from the farmers accordingly and the middle class in 
general that the revolt substantially proceeded, whereas the 
municipal aristocracy still went hand in hand with the gov 
emment of the capital. This also readily explains the fact, 
that there were in the insurgent districts isolated communis 
ties, and in the insurgent communities minorities, adhering 
to the Roman alliance ; the Vestinian town Pinna, for in- 
stance, sustained a severe siege for Rome, and a corps of 
loyalists that was formed in the Hirpinian country under 
Minatius Magius of Aedanum supported the Roman operas 
tions in Campania. Lastly, there adhered to Rome the 
allied communities optimi juris — in Campania Nola and 
Nuceria and the Greek maritime towns Neapolis aud Rhe- 
gium, and in like manner at least most of the Latin colo* 
nies, such as Alba and Aesemia — just as in the Hannibalio 
war the Latin and Greek towns on the whole had taken 
part with, and the Sabellian towns against, Rome. The 
forefadiers of the city had based their government of Italy 
cm an aristocratic classification, and with skilful adjustment 
ef 1^ degrees of dependence had kept in subjection the less 
privileged communities by means of those with better 
rights, and the burgesses within each community by means 
of the municipal aristocracy. It was only now, under the 
incomparably wretched gov^nment of the oligarchy, that 



SS6 BevoU of tlie Italian SuhjecU. i;book ir 

the solidity and strength with which the statesmen of tht 
fourth and fifth centuries had joined together the stones of 
their structure were thoroughly put to the test ; the build 
ing, though shaken in various ways, still held out against 
this storm. When we say, however, that the more favoured 
towns did not at the first shock abandon Rome, we by no 
means affirm that they would now, as in the Hannibaliv! 
war, hold out for a length of time and after severe defeats, 
without wavering in their allegiance to Rome ; that fieiy 
trial had not yet been endured. 

The first blood was thus shed, and Italy was divided 

into two great military camps. It is true, as 
aTfilhS fa- we have seen, that the insurrection was still very 
jj^^gf far from being a general rising of the Italian 

allies ; but it had already acquired an extent ex* 

ceeding perhaps the hopes of the leaders themselves, and 

the insurgents might without arrogance think of offering to 

. the Roman eovernment a fair accommodation. 

Rejection of _, ° ^ i -i -i i 

thepropo- Ihey sent envoys to Rome, and bound them« 

sals for SB 1 11 1. . i»'i 

noo(iiiimod»- selves to Jay down their arms m return for ad- 
^^ mission to citizenship ; it was in vain. The 

public spirit, which had been so long wanting in Rome, 
seemed suddenly to have returned, when the question was 
one of opposing with stubborn narrow-mindedness a de- 
mand of the subjects just in itself and now supported by a 
considerable force. The immediate efiect of the 

OoniisifiBioii T 1 • • • • 1 

of high Italian insurrection was, just as was the case 

treason. ^^^ ^^^ defeats which the policy of the govern- 

ment had suffered in Africa and Gaul (p. 185, 225), the 
commencement of a series of prosecutions, by means of 
which the judicial aristocracy took vengeance on those men 
of the government whom they, rightly or wrongly, looked 
upon as the primary cause of this mischief. On the pro- 
posal of the tribune Quintus Varius, in spite of the resist- 
ance of the Optimates and in spite of tribunician inter' 
ference, a special commission of high treason — formed, of 
course, from the equestrian order which contended for th« 
proposal with open violence — was appointed for the inveati' 



OuAP. VIl.] And the Sulpician Reoolution. 287 

gation of the conspiracy instigated by Drnsus and widely 
ramified In Italy as well as in Rome, out of which the in 
Burrection had originated, and which now, when the half of 
Italy was under arms, appeared to the whole of the indig* 
nant and alarmed burgesses undoubted treason. The sen- 
t<>Dces of this commission greatly thinned the ranks of th« 
Bonatorial party favourable to mediation : among other men 
of note Drusus' intimate friend, the young and talented 
Oaius Cotta, was sent into banishment, and with difficulty 
the grey-haired Marcus Scaurus escaped the same fate. 
Suspicion went so far against the senators favourable to the 
reforms of Drusus, that soon afterwards the consul Lupus 
reported from the camp to the senate regarding the com- 
munications that were constantly maintained between the 
Op ti mates in his camp and the enemy ; a suspicion which, 
it is true, was shown to be unfounded by the arrest of Mar- 
sian spies. So far king Mithradates might not without rea> 
son assert, that the mutual enmities of the factions were more 
destructive to the Roman state than the Social War itself. 

In the first instance, however, the outbreak of the insur- 
Energ«tio rection, and the terrorism which the commission 
'**^*®^* of high treason exercised, produced at least a 

semblance of unity and vigour. Party feuds were silent ; 
able officers of all shades^-democrats like Gains Marius, 
aristocrats like Lucius Sulla, friends of Drusus like Publius 
Sulpicius Rufus — placed themselves at the disposal of the 
government. The lai^esses of com were, apparently about 
this time, materially abridged by decree of the people with 
a view to husband the financial resources of the state for the 
war ; which was the more necessary, as, owing to the 
threatening attitude of king Mithradates, the province of 
Asia might at any moment f^iU into the hand of the enemy 
and thus one of the chief sources of thf, Roman revenue bb 
dried up. The courts, with the exception of the commi»- 
Bion of high treason, in accordance with a decree of the 
senate temporarily suspended their action ; all business 
Btoo4l still, and nothing was attended to but the levying of 
■oldlers and the manufacture of arms. 



988 ItevaU of the Italian Subjei^y [Book it 

While the leading state thus collected its energies in Um 
Political prospect of the severe war impending, Uie in- 
oxganiia- Burgents had to solve the more diiBcult task of 
tawnneo- acquiring political organization during the strug- 
gle. In the territory of the Paelignians situated 
in the centre ol the Marsian, Samnite, Marrucinian, and 
Vestinian cahtons and consequently in the heart of the in- 
surgent districts, in the beautiful plain on the river Pescara, 
OfviKwi- ^b^ town of Ck>rfinium was selected as the Op- 

iiott-Rome. positiou-Rome or city of Italia, whose citiz^- 
ship was conferred on the burgesses of all the insurgent 
commdnities ; there a Forum and a senate-house were staked 
off on a suitable scale. A senate of five hundred members 
was charged with the settlement of the constitution and the 
superintendence of the war. In accordance with its direc- 
tions the burgesses selected from the men of senatorial rank 
two consuls and twelve praetors, who, just like the two con- 
suls and six praetors of Rome, were invested with the su- 
preme authority in war and peace. The Latin language, 
which was even then the prevailing language among the 
Marsians and Picentes, continued in official use, but the 
Samnite language which predominated in Southern Italy was 
placed side by side with it on a footing of equality ; and 
the two were made use of alternately on the silver pieces 
which the new Italian state began to coin in its own nan^e 
after Roman models and afler the Roman standard, thus 
practically abolishing the monopoly of coinage which Rome 
had exercised for two centuries. It is evident from these 
arrangements — and was, indeed, a matter of course— -that 
the Italians now no longer thought of wresting equality of 
rights from the Romans, but purposed to annihilate or sub- 
due them and to form a new state. Byt it is also obvious 
that their constitution was nothing but h pure copy of that 
of Rome or, in other words, was the ancient polity handed 
down by tradition among the Italian nations from time im- 
memorial — the organization of a city instead of the consti* 
fciiticn of a stat^— with collective assemblies as unwieldj 
apd jseless as the Roman comitia, with a governing oorp» 



CiiAF. VII.] And the Stdptoian. Hevdntian. 2S9 

ration whioh oontained within it the same elements of oK- 
garchj as the Bomaii senate, with an exeeutiye administered 
in like manner by a plurality of co-ordinate supreme magis- 
trates. This imitation descended to the minutest details ; 
for instance, the title of consul or praetor held by the 
jDAgistrate in chief command was after a victory exchanged 
by the general of the Italians also for the title of Impe- 
rator Nothing in fact was changed but the name ; on the 
coins of the insurgents the same image of the gods appears, 
the inscription only being changed from Rofna to Italia. 
This Rome of the insurgents was distinguished — ^not to it? 
advantage — from the original Rome merely by the circum- 
stance, that, while the latter had at any rate an urban de- 
velopment and its unnatural position intermediate between 
a city and a state had formed itself at least in a natural 
way, the new Italia was nothing at all but a place of con- 
gress for the insurgents, and it was by a pure fiction of law 
that the inhabitants of the peninsula were stamped as bur- 
gesses of this n«w capital. But it is significant that in this 
case, where the sudden amalgamation of a number of iso- 
lated cantons into a new political unity might have so natu- 
rally suggested the idea of a representative c(»stitution in 
the modem sense, no trace of any such idea occurs ; in fact 
the very oppo8ite course was followed,* and the communal 
organization was simply reproduced in a far mor^ absurd 
manner than before. Nowhere perhaps is it more cleArly 
apparent than in this instance, that in the view of antiquity 

* Even from our scanty information, the best part of which is given 
by Biodorus, p. 638 and Strabo, v. 4, 2, this is very distinctly apparent ; 
§ot example, the latter expressly ^ys that the buigess-body chose the 
magistrates. That the senate of Italia was meant to be formed ia 
another manner and to have different powers from that of Rome, has 
been asserted, but has not be«i proved. Of course in its first composi« 
tion care would be taken to have a representation in some degree uni- 
form of the insurgent cities ; bat that the acnators were to be regularly 
deputed by the communities, is nowhere stated. As little does the 
eommission given to the senate to draw up a constitution exclude its 
promulgation by tlie magistrate? and ratification by die assembly of tha 
tieople. 

Vol. in.--13 



S90 JletfoU of the ItaUM SubfecU, (Btoi^.f 

* free coii8kitati<m wbs ineeponble from die appearanoe cf 
the flOTereign people in penoa in their ei JleotiTe aaeembliei 
or from a avie ijrpe, and that the great fundamental idea «>f 
the modem republloan-oonstitational state, viz., the expreat 
•ion of the sovereignty of the peof^e bj a representative 
assembly — an idea without whidi a free state would be a 
diaoa— is wholly modem. Even the Italian polity, al- 
though it approximated to a €ree state in its somewhat rep 
resentatiye soiates and in the diminished importance of the 
oomitia^ never was able in the case either of Rome or of 
Italia to cross the boundary-line. 

Thus began, a few months after the death of Drusus, in 

tiie winter of 663-4, the struggle — as one of the 
WiHrtike coins of the insurgents represents it— of the 
ggjm- Sabelllan ox against the Roman she-wolf. Both 

sides made zealous preparations : in Italia great 
stores of arms, provisions, and money were accumulated ; 
in Rome the requisite supplies were drawn from the prov- 
inces and particularly from Sicily, and the long-neglected 
walls were put in a state of defence against any contin- 
gency. The forces were in some measure equally balanced. 
The Romans filled up the blanks in their Italian contingents 
partly by increased levies from the burgesses and from the 
inhabitants — already almost wholly Romanized— of the Cel- 
tic districts on the south of the Alps, of whom 10,000 served 
in the Oampanian army alone,* partly by the contingents 
of the Numidians and other transmarine nations ; and with 
the aid of the free cities in Greece and Asia Minor they 
collected a war fleetf On both sides, without reckoning 

* The bidleCfl found at Aseulam show that the Qnuia were very 

numerous also in the army of Strabo. 

f We still hare a decree of the Roman senate of 22. May Stt, 
which grants honours and advantages on their discharge to 
three Greek thip^Mptalns of Carystos, Glazomenae, and 

Mileius for faithful services rendered since the commencement of the 
Italian war (664). Of the same nature is the account of 
Hemnon, that two triremes were summoned from Her» 

Blea on tho Bb^ Sea for the Italian war, and that they returned in th« 

tleventh year with rieh honorary gifts* 



Crap, vii.] And the Std^'tcian JSevd^ian, 291 

garrisons, as many at 100,00(^ soldiers were brouglit into 
the field,* and in the ability of their men, in military taotics 
and armament^ the Italians were nowise inferior to the 
Romans. 

The conduct of the war was very difficult both for the 

insurgents and for the Romans, because the tor* 
Stt^ll?^ ritory in revolt was very extonsive and a great 
32|^^^ number of fortresses adhering to Rome were 

scattered up and down in it : so that on the one 
hand the insurgents found themselves compelled to combine 
a si^e-warfare which broke up their forces and consumed 
their time with the protection of an extended frontier ; ana 
on the other hand the Romans could not well do otherwise 
than combat the insurrection, which had no proper centre, 
simultaneously in all the insurgent districts. In a military 
point of view the insurgent country fell into two divisions ; 
in the northern, which reached from Picenum and the 
Abruzzi to the northern' border of Campania and embraced 
the districts speaking Latin, the chief command was held on 
the Italian side by the Marsian Quintus Silo, on the Roman 
side by Pnblius Rutilius Lupus, both as consuls ; in the 
southern, which included Campania, Samnium, and generally 
the regions speaking Sabellian, the Samnite Gains Papius 
Mntilus commanded as consul of the insurgents, and Lucius 
Julius Caesar as the Roman consul. With each of the two 
commanders-in-chief there were associated on the Italian 
side six, on the Roman side five, lieutenant-commanders, 
each of whom conducted the attack or defence in a definite 
district, while the consular armies were destined to act mora 
freely and to strike the decisive blow. The most esteemed 
Roman officers, such as Gaius Marius, Quintus Catulus, and 
the two consulars of experience in the Spanish war, Titni 
Didins and Publius Crassus, placed themselves at the dis- 
posal of the consuls for these posts ; and, though the Ital- 
ians had not names so celebrated to oppose to them, yet the 

* That this statement of Appian ie not exaggerated, is shown bj 
ttie ballets found at Aeculum, which name among others the twentiefti 
Vegion. 



292 BevoU of the Italian Suiye<^^ [Book n 

result allowed that their leaders were in a miiitary {>oint of 
viow nowise inferior to the Romans. 

The offensive in this thoroughly desuHory war was oft 
the whole on the side of the Romans, but was nowhere de 
dsively assumed even on their part. It is surprising that 
the Romans did not collect their troops for the purpose of 
Bttacking the insurgents with a superior force, and that the 
insurgents made no attempt to advance into Latium and to 
throw themselves on the hostile capital. We are however 
too little acquainted with their respective oireumstanoes to 
judge whether or how they could have acted otherwise, 01 
to what extent the remissness of the Roman government on 
the one hand and the looseness of the connection among the 
federate communities on the other contributed to this want 
of unity in the conduct of the war. It is easy to see that 
with sudi a system there would doubtless be victories and 
defeats, but the final settlement might be very long de> 
layed ; and it is no less plain that a clear and vivid picture 
of such a war-— which resolved itself into a series of en- 
gagements on the part of individual corps operating at the 
same time, sometimes separately, sometimes in combinap 
tion — cannot be prepared out of the remarkably fragm.ent<- 
ary accounts which have reached us. 

The first assault, as a matter of course, fell on the for 
Oomxnence. Presses adhering to Rome in the insurgent dis- 
ipent of tb« tricts, whlch in all haste closed their irates and 

war. ' ^ 

rhe carried in their moveable property from the 

country. Silo threw himself on the fortress 
designed to hold in check the Marsians, the strong Alba, 
Mutilus on the Latin town of Aesemia established in the 
heart of Samnium : in both cases they encountered the 
most resolute resistance. Similar conflicts probably raged 
in the north around Firmum, Hatria, Pinna, in the soutb 
around Luceria, Beneventum, Nola, Paestum, before and 
while the Roman armies gathered on the borders of the 
msurgent country. After the southern army under Caesar 
10. had assembled in the spring of 664 in Campania 

Campauia which for the most part held by Rome, and 



Omap. vn.] And the JSutpician BevcluUon. 298 



dflMBp had provided Capuar—with its domain 6o im< 
portant for the Roman finances — as well as the 
more important allied cities with garrisonsy it attempted to 
4s8ume the offensive and to come to the aid of the smaller 
divisions sent on before it to Samnium and Lucania under 
Marcus Maro^lus and Publins Crassus. But Caesar was 
repulsed bj tfie Samnites and Marsians under Publiup Vet 
tius Scato with severe loss, and. the impoi^ant town of 
Venafirum thereupon passed over to the insurgents, into 
whose hands it dc^vered its Roman garrison. By the d^ 
feotion of this town, which lay on the military road from 
Campania to Samnium, Aesemia was isolated, and that 
fortress already rigorously assailed found itself now exclu- 
sively dependent on the courage and perseverance of its 
garrison and its commandant Marcellus. It is true that as 
incursion, which Sulla happily carried out with the same 
artful audacity as his expedition to Bocdius, relieved the 
hard-pressed Aesemians for a moment ; never* 
tiikeaby theless they were after an obstinate resistance 
^ili^*^ compelled by the extremity of famine to capitu- 
late towards the end of the year. In Lucania 
too Publius Crassus was defeated by Marcus Lamponius, 
and compelled to shut himself up in Grum^itum, which fell 
after a long and obstinate siege. With these exceptions, 
they had been obliged to leave Apulia and the southern dis* 
triots totally to themselves. The insurrection spread ; 
, _ , when Mutilus advanced into Campania at the 
head of the Samnite army, the citizens of Nola 
surrendered to him th^r city and delivered up the Roman 
garrison, whose commander was executed by the orders of 
Mutilus, whil(9 the men were distributed through Uie victo- 
rious army. With the single exception of Nuceria, which 
adhered firmly to Rome, all Campania as &r as 
tortiSBmofli Vesuvius was lost to the Romans; Salernum, 
fieitoiBimi. Stabiae, Pompeii, Herculanenm declared Ibr the 
insurgents; Mutilus was able to advance into 
the region to the north of Vesuvius, and to besiege Acenrae 
his SamnitoLuoaniaa array. The Numidians, who 



194 ReooU of the lia^ia^i SuiyeaU^ [Book IV 

wore in great numbers in Gaesftr'a army, began to pass ovei 
In troops to Mutilus or rather to Ozyntas, the son of 
Jugurtha, who on the aarrender of Venusia had Mien into 
die hands of the Samnites and now appeared among their 
ranks in regal purple ; so that Caesar found himself com- 
pelled to send home the whole African corps. Mutilits 
rentured even to attack the Roman camp ; but he was re- 
pulsed, and the Samnites, who while retreating were as* 
■ailed in the rear by the Roman cavalry, left nearly 6,000 
dead on the field of battle. It was tiie first notable success 
which the Romans gained in this war; the army proclaimed 
the geteral imperator^ and the sadly fiillen courage of the 
capital began to revive. It is true that not long aflerwardte 
the victorious army was attadsed in crossing a river by 
Marius Egnatius, and so emphatically defeated that it had 
to retreat as far as Teanum and to be reorganized there ; 
but the exertions of the active consul succeeded in restoring 
his army to a serviceable condition even before the arrival 
of winter, and he reoccupied his old position under the 
walls of Acerrae, which the Samnite main army under 
Mutilus continued to besiege. 

At the same time operations had also begun in Central 
Italy, where the revolt in the Abruzzi and the 
wtfh fhe r^on of the Fucine lake threat^ied the capital 
^ in dangerous proximity. An independent corps 

under Gnaeus Pompeius Strabo was sent into Pioenum in 
order that, resting for support on Firmum and Falerio, it 
might threaten Asculum ; but the main body of the Roman 
northern army took its position under the consul Lupus on 
the borders of the Latin and Marsian territories, where the 
Valerian and Salarian highways brought the enemy nearest 
to the capital ; the rivulet Toleous (Turano), which crosses 
the Valerian road between Tibur and Alba and falls into the 
Velino at Rieti, separated the two armies. The consul 
Lupus impatiently pressed for a decision, and did not listen 
to the disagreeable advice of Marius that he should exercdsa 
his men*~unaccuBtomed to service — ^in the first instance hi 
petty war&re. At the vejry commencement the division 0/ 



Stur, Ylti And the Sulpician H&vdkUion. 296 

Gaius Perpenna, 10,000 strong, was totally defeated, where- 
apon the eommander-in^chief deprived the defeated general 
of his command and united the remnant of the corps with 
Ihat which was under the orders of Marias, but did not 
•How himself to be deterred from assuming the offensive 
and crossing the Tolenus in two divisions, led partly by 
himself, partly by Marius, on two bridges constructed not 
fiur from each other, Publius Scato with the Marsians con* 
fronted them ; he had pitched his camp at the spot where 
Marius crossed the brook, but, before the passage took 
place, he had withdrawn thence, leaving behind the mere 
posts that guarded the camp, and had taken a position in 
ambush farther up the river. There he attacked the other 
Roman corps under Lupus unexpectedly during the cross* 
ing, and partly cut it down, partly drove it into 
Sefeatand ^he river (lltb June 664). The consul in per- 
tS^ «>n and 8,000 of his troops fell. It could scarce- 
ly be called a compensation that Marius, be- 
coming at length aware of Scato's departure, had crossed 
the river and not without loss to the enemy occupied their 
camp. Yet this passage of the river, and a victory at the 
same time obtained over the Paelignians by the general 
Berviua Sulpicius, compelled the Marsians to draw their line 
of defence somewhat back, and Marius, who by decree of 
the senate succeeded Lupus as commander-in-chief, at least 
prevented the enemy from gaining further successes. But, 
when Quintus Caepio was soon afterwards associated in the 
command with equal powers, not so much on account of a 
conflict which he had successfully sustained, as because he 
had recommended himself to the equites then leading the 
politics of Rome by his vehement opposition to Drusus, he 
allowed himself to be lured into an ambush by Silo on the 
pretext that the latter wished to lietray to him his army, 
ind was cut to pieces with a great part of his force by the 
Marsians and Vestinians. Marius, after Caepio's tall once 
more sole commander-in-chief, through his obstinate resist 
mce prevented his antagonist from profiting by the advaii> 
tages which he had gained, and gradually penetrated &r inU^ 



390 JS&voU of the Italian Subjects j [Book iv 

the Marsiau lerritory. He long refused battle ^ when he a: 
length gave it, he vanquished his impetuous opponent, who 
left on the battle-field among other dead Herius Asinius th« 
ehieflain of the Marrucini. In a seoond ^igagement ths 
army of Marius and the corps of Sulla ^rhich belonged to 
the army of the south oo-operated to inflict on the Marsiana 
a still more considerable defeat, which cost them 6,000 
men ; but the glory of the day remained with the youngei 
officer, for, while Marius had given and gained the battle, 
Sulla had intercepted the retreat of the fugitives and de> 
atroyed them. 

While the conflict was proceeding thus warmly and 
pi^jeniaii ^^^ Varying success by the Fucine lake, the 
^^' Picenian corps under Strabo had also fought 

with alternations of fortune. The insurgent chiefs, Gaius 
ludacilius from Asculum, Publius Vettius Soato, and Titus 
Lafrenius, had assailed it with their united forces, defeated 
it^ and compelled it to throw itself into Firmum, where 
Lafrenius kept Strabo besieged, while ludacilius moved into 
Apulia and induced Canusium, Venusia, and the other towns 
still adhering to Rome in that quarter to join the insurgents. 
But on the Roman side Servius Sulpicius by his victory 
over the Paelignians cleared the way for his advancing into 
Picenum and rendering aid to Strabo ; Lafrenius was at* 
tacked by Strabo in front and taken in rear by Sulpicius, 
and his camp was set on fire ; he himself fell, the remnant 
of his troops fled in disorder and threw themselves into 
Asculum. So completely had the state of afi&irs changed 
in Picenum, that the Italians now found themselves confined 
to Asculum as the Romans were previously to Firmuo., 
and the war was thus once more converted into a sr^ege. 

Lastly, there was added in the course of the year to th« 
two difllicult and straggling wars :n southern and 
sSamsa central Italy a third in the north. The state of 
eoQfbctB. matters apparently so dangerous for Rome after 
die first months of the war had induced a great portion of 
the Umbrian, and isolated Etruscan, communities to declan 
fi>r the insurrection ; so that it became necessary tro dea 



)(^p. Vll J And the SiUpician Revoltttum. 991 

patch against the Umbrians Anlus Plotiud, and against the 
Etruscans Lucius Porcius Gato. Here however the Bomana 
encountered a far less energetic resistance than in the Mari 
aian and Samnite countries, and maintained a moat decided 
auperioritj in the field. 

Thus the severe first year of the war came to an «id, 
leaving behind it, both in a military and political 
u^i^^ point of view, sorrowful memories and dubious 
n^^ibm prospects. In a military point of view both 
tbd^wT^ armies of the Romans, the Marsian as well as 
the Campanian, had been weakened and dis- 
couraged by severe defeats ; the northern army had been 
compelled especially to attend to the protection of the capi- 
tal, the southern army at Neapolis had been seriously 
threatened in it9 communications, as the insurgents could 
without much difiiculty break forth from the Marsian or 
Samnite territory and establish themselves between Rome 
and Naples; for which reason it was found necessary to 
draw at least a chain of posts from Cumae to Rome, In a 
political point of view, the insurrection had gained ground 
on all sides during this first year of the war ; the secession 
of Nola, the rapid capitulation of the strong and large Latin 
colony of Venusia, and the Umbro^Etruscan revolt were 
suspicious signs that the Roman symmachy was tottering 
to its very base and was not in a position to hold out 
against this last trial. They had already made the utmos' 
demands on the burgesses ; they had already, with a view 
to form that chain of posts along the Latino-Campanian 
coast, incorporated nearly 6,000 freedmen in the bui^eBS- 
militia; they had already required the severest sacrifices 
fix>m the allies that still remained faithfiil ; it was not pos- 
nble to draw the string of the bow tighter without hazard 
ing everything. 

The temper of the burgesses was singularly depressed. 

After the battle on the Tolenus, when the dead 

e^y^tiia bodies of the consul and the numerous citizens 

.lUwiaiM. ^^ ^^^ ^^^ |j^ fallen with him wer« brought 

back .from the neighbouring battle-field to the eap^tal and 
Vol. Ill— 13* 



MO BevoU of (he Italian SiOjects^ [Booi n 

Lucius Caesar conferred the Roman franchise on the bui^ 
gesses of all those communities of Italian allies which had 
not up to that time openly declared against Rome ; a second, 
emanating from the tribunes of the people Marcus Plautius 
Silvanus and Gaius Papirius Carbo, laid down for every 
man who had oitixenship and domicile in Italy a term of 
two months, within which he was to be allowed to acquire 
the Roman franchise by presenting himself before a Roman 
magistrate* But these new burgesses were to be restricted 
in a way similar to the freedmen, inasmuch as they could 
only be enrolled in eight, as the freedmen only in four, of 
the thirty 'five tribes ; whether the restriction was personal 
or, as it would rather seem, hereditary, cannot be deter- 
mined with certainty. 

This measure related primarily to Italy proper, which 

Bestowal of ** ^^^ *^°^® extended northward little beyond 
lAtfai rights Ancona and Florence. In Cisalpine Gaul, which 

on the 

Italian was in the eye of the law a foreign country, but 

in administration and colonization had long 
passed as part of Italy, all the Latin colonies were treated 
like the Italian communities. Of the other hitherto allied 
townships in that quarter those — ^not very numerous — ^situ- 
ated on the south side of the Po received the franchise ; but 
the country between the Po and the Alps was in conse* 
quence of a law brought in by the consul Stfabo 
in 666 differently treated. It was organized 
after the Italian dvio constitution, so that the communities 
not adapted for this, more especially the townships in the 
Alpine valleys, were assigned to particular towns as de* 
pendent and tributary villages. These new town-communi- 
ties, however, were not presented with the Roman franchise, 
but, by means of the legal fiction that they were Latin colo> 
uiea, were invested with those rights which had hitherto 
belonged to the Latin towns of inferior privileges. Thus 

the Md ; the Plautian Was probably parsed, as was ordi 
m ^^ oarlly the role with tribunidan proposals, immediately 

after the tribunes entered on office, consequently in Deo 
W or Jan. S66. 



i 



Cukw. YIL] And the Sulpician RevcinUicn. 801 

Italy at that time ended practically at the Po, v» .ide th« 
Transpadane country was treated as an outlying depend- 
ency ; undoubtedly because the region between the Apen- 
nines and the Po had loag been organized afker the Italian 
model, whereas in the more northerly portion — in which, 
excepting Eporedia and Aquileia, there were no civic or 
Latin colonies^ and from which in &ct the native tribes had 
been by no means dislodged as they were from the south* 
em district — Celtic habits and the Celtic cantonal constitu^ 
Uoo still in great part snbsisted. 

Considerable as these concessions were, if we compile 
them with the rigid exdusiveness which the Roman burgesfr^ 
body had retained for more than a hundred and fifby years, 
they were far from including a capitulation with the actual 
insurgents ; they were on the contrary intended partly to 
retain the communities that were wavering and threatening 
to revolt, partly to draw over as many deserters as possi* 
ble irom Idie ranks of the enemy. To what extent these 
laws and especially the most important of them — that of 
Caesar— were applied, cannot be accurately stated, as we 
are only able to specify in general terms the extent of the 
insurrection at the time when the law was issued. The 
diief result at any rate was that the communities hitherto 
/ Latin — not only the survivors of the old Latin confederacy 

such as Tibur and Praeneste, but more especially the Latin 
oolonies, with the exception of the few that passed over to 
the insm^ents— were thereby admitted to Roman citizen- 
ship. Besides, the law was applied to the isolated towns 
*>f the allies between the Po and the Apennines, such as 
Ravenna, to a number of Etru6can towns, and to the allied 
dtles that remained &i^ul in Southern Italy, such as 
Nuoeria and Neapolis. It was natural that individual con> 
munitdes, hitherto specially privileged, should hesitate as U\ 
the acceptance of the franchise ; that Neapolis, W example^ 
should scruple to give up its former treaty with Rome— 
which guaranteed to its citizens exemption from land-service 
and their Greek constitution, and perhaps domanial advaii> 
tages besides — lor the very restricted privileges oi new bur 



803 BewM qfihe Italian Subfede^ [Book iy 

geases. It w&s probably in virtue of oonventioiis concluded 
on account of these scruplea that this city, a& well as Bh» 
gium and perhaps other Greek communities in Italy, even 
after their admission to Roman citizenship, retained un< 
changed their former communal constitution and Greek as 
their official language. At all eyentSy as a consequence of 
these laws, the circle of Roman burgesses was eztraordi* 
narily enlaii^ed by the merging into it of numerous and im* 
portant civic communities scattered from the Sicilian Straits 
to the Po ; and, further, the country between the Po and 
the Alps was, by the bestowal of the privileges of the most 
fiivoured allies, as it were invested with the legal reversion 
of full citizenship. 

On tiie strength of these concessions to the wavering 
Seoond year oommunities, the Romans resumed with fresh 
of the war. oourage the conflict against the insurgent dis* 
tricts. They had pulled down as much of the existing 
political institutions as seemed necessary to arrest the prog* 
ress of the conflagration ; the insurrection thenceforth at 
any rate spread no fiirther. In Etruria and 
§m^ *^^ Umbria especially, where it was just beginning, 
§iJ^^^~ it was subdued with singular rapidity, still more^ 
probably, by means of the Julian law than 
through the success of the Roman arms. In the former 
Latin colonies, and in the thickly*peopled region of the Po, 
there were opened up copious and now reliable sources of 
aid : with these, and with the resources of the burgesses 
themselves, they could proceed to subdue the now isolated 
conflagration. The two former comraanders-inKshief re- 
lumed to Rome, Caidsar as censor elect, Marius because his 
conduct of the war was blamed as vacillating and slow, and 
the man of sixty-six was dedared to be in his dotage. This 
objection was very probably groundless; Marius showed 
a* Icjast his bodily vigour by appearing daily in the drcua 
at Rome, and even as commander-in-chief he seems to have 
displayed on the whole his old ability in the last campaign 
but he had not achieved the brilliant successes by which 
alone after his political bankruptcy he could rehabilitats 



c%AF. vc.] And ths Suiptcian Be/ooluHan. 308 

himself in public opinion, and so the celebrated cLampion 
was to his bitter vexation now, even as an ofiicer, uncerei 
moniously laid aside as useless. The place of Marius in 
'khe Marsian army was taken by the consul of this year, 
Lucius Porcius Cato, who had fought with distiDCtion in 
Etruria, and that of Caesar in the Campanian army by hit 
lieutenant Lucius Sulla, to whom were due some of ths 
most material successes of the previous campaign ; Gnaeuf 
Strabo retained*— now as consul— *the command which he 
had held so successfully in the Picenian territory. 

Thus b^an the second campaign in 665. The insur* 
gents opened it, even before winter was over, by 
War In the bold attempt — ^recalling the grand passages 

oeannm. ^^ ^^ Samnite wars— -to send a Marsian army 
of 15,000 men to Etruria with a view to aid the insurrec- 
tion brewing in Northern Italy. But Strabo, through 
whose district it had to pass, intercepted and totally defeat* 
ed it; only a few got back to thmr far distant home. 
When at length the season allowed the Roman armies to 
assume the offensive, Cato entered the Marsian territory and 
advanced, successfully encountering the enemy there; but 
he fell in the region of the Fudne lake during an attack on 
the enemy's camp, so that the exclusive superintendence of 
the operations in Central Italy devolved on Strabo. The 
Ateaium latter employed himself partly in continuing the 
''^'^^^^ siege of Asculum, partly in the subjugation of 
the Marsian, Sabellian, and Apulian districts. To relieve 
his hard-pressed native town, ludacilius appeared before 
Asculum with the Picentine levy and attacked the besiegiug 
army, while at the same time the garrison sallied forth and 
threw itself on the Roman lines. It is said that 75^000 
Romans fought on this day against 60,000 Italians. Vic- 
tory remained with the Romans, but ludacilius succeeded in 
throwing himself with a part of the relieving army into 
the town. The siege resumed its course; it was pro* 
tracted^ by the strength of the place and t^e desperate 

* Leaden buQett with the ^isme of the legion which threw tben^ 
i&d sometimes with curses against the *' runaway slaves **— and accord 



S04 RevcU of the Italian Stdffeeii, [Buor if 

defeuoa c^ the inhabitants, who fought with a reeolleition 
of the terrible declaration of war within its walls. When 
fudacilius at length after a brave defence of aeveral montha 
saw the day of capitulation approach, he ordered the chie& 
of that section of the citizens which was fiivourable to 
Borne to be put to death under torture, and then died by 
sad MB. kls own hand. So the gates were opened, and 
tuerad. Roman executions were substituted for Italian ; 

all officers and all the respectable citizens were executed, 
the rest were driven forth to beggary, and all their property 
was confiscated on account of the eMe. During the siege 
and after the fall of Asculum numerous Roman corps 
marched through the adjacent rebel districts, and induced 

one after another to submit. The Marrucini 
ff tlMfSaM- yielded, after Ludus Sulpicius had defeated them 
uS^i decidedly at Teate (Chieti). The praetor Gains 

Cosconius penetrated into Apulia, took Salapia 
and Cannae, and besieged Canusium. A Samnite corps 
under Marias Egnatius came to the help of the unwarlike 
r^on and actually drove back the Romans, but the Roman 
general succeeded in defeating it at the passage of the Au« 
fidua ; Egnatius fell, and the rest of the army had to seek 
shelter behind the walls of Canusium. The Romans again 
advanced as far as Venusia and Rubi, and became masters 
of all Apulia. Along the Fucine lake also and at the 
Majella mountains — the chief seats of the insurrection — the 
Romans restored their ascendancy ; the Marsians succumbed 
to StrabcN lieutenants, Quintus Metellus Pius and Gains 

Cinna, the Vestinians and Paelignians in the 

following year (666) to Strabo himself; Italia 
the ci^ital of the insurgents became once more the modest 
Paelignian country-town of Corfinium ; the remnant of the 
Italian senate fled to the Samnite territory. 

The Roman southern army, which was now under tht 

iD^y Romaii-M>r with the itucription '' hit the Picentes " or ** hit Pooh 
peins " — (he former Roman, the latter Italian — are even now sometimsf 
fbttnd, belonging to that period, in the region of AscolL 



Cbap. vn.] And the Sulpioian RevoluUon. 908 

BuMnffation ^^''^w^^^^^ ^^ Lucius SuUa, had at the same timt 
rf^apa^i* assumed the offensive and nad penetrated into 
jfoia. southern Campania which was occupied by the 

enemy. Stabiae was taken and destroyed by 
^ Sulla in person (30 April 665) and Ilerculaneiiim 

b} litus Didius, who however fell himself (11 June) app^^ 
rently at the assault on that city. Pompeii resisted longer. 
Hie Samnite general Lucius Cluenttus came up to bring re- 
lief to the town, but he was repulsed by Sulla ; and when^ 
reinlbrced by bands of Celts, he renewed his attempt, he 
wais, ehi*s6y owing to the wavering of these untrustworthy 
associates, so totally defeated that his camp was taken and 
he himself was cut down with the greater part of his troops 
in their flight towards Nola. The grateM Roman army 
oonferred on its general the grass-wreath — ^the homely badge 
with which the usage of the camp decorated the soldier who 
had by his energy saved a division of his comrades. With- 
out pausing to undertake the siege of Nola and of the other 
Campanian towns still occupied by the Samnites, Sulla at 
Soiia In ^^^^ advanced into the interior, which was the 

^•"^'"^ head-quarters of the insurrection. The speedy 
capture and fearful punishment of Aeclanum spread terror 
throughout the Hirpinian country ; it submitted even before 
the arrival of the Lucanian contingent which had set itself 
in motion to render help, and Sulla was able to advance 
unhindered as far as the territory of the Samnite confede- 
racy« The pass, where the Samnite militia under Mutilus 
awaited him, was turned, the Samnite army was attacked in 
rear, and defeated ; the camp was lost, the general escaped 
wounded to Aesernia^ Sulla advanced to Bovian>'m, the 
capital of the Samnite country, and compelled it to surren* 
der by a second victory obtained beneath its walls. The 
advanced season alone put an end to the campaign there. 

The position of aflfairs had undergone a most complete 
Theinfur- change. Powerful, victorious, aggressive as was 
SeiiSo^ the insurrection when it began the campaign of 
JJJJP*^- 665, it emerged from it deeply humbled, every- 
is- where beaten, and totally hopeless. All nortli* 



306 JSevM of the Italian SvitjecU^ [BookI? 

nil Italy was pacified. In central Italy both coasts were 
wholly in the Roman power, and the Abruzzi almost entire* 
ly ; Apulia as far as Venuaiay and Campania as far as Nola^ 
were in the hands of the Romans ; and by the occupation 
of the Hirpinian territory the communication was broken 
off between the only two regions still persevering in open 
resistance, the Samnite and the Lucano-Bruttian* The field 
of the insurrection resembled the scene of an immense con* 
Oagration dying out ; everywhere the eye fell on ashes and 
ruins and smouldering brands; here and there the flame 
still blazed up among the ruins, but the fire was everywhere 
mastered, and thwe was no further threatening of danger. 
It is to be regretted that we no longer suffici«Dtly disceni 
in the «.uperficial accounts handed down to us the causes of 
this sudden revolution. While undoubtedly the dexterous 
leadership of Strabo and still more of Sulla, the more eneiw 
getio concentration of the Roman forces, and their quicker 
offensive action contributed materially to that result, politi* 
cal causes were probably at work along with the military in 
producing the singularly rapid fall of the power of the in- 
surgents ; the law of Silvanus and Carbo probably fulfilled 
its design in carrying defection and treason to the common 
cause into the ranks of the enemy, and misfortune, as has 
so frequently happened, probably fell as an apple of discord 
among the loosely connected insurgent communities. 

We see only — and this fact points to an internal break* 
ing up of Italia, that must certainly have been 
moe of the attended by violent convulsions— that the Sam* 
**'°^*®*' nites, perhaps under the leadership of the Map- 
sian Quintus Silo who had been from the first the soul of 
d^> insurrection and after the capitulation of the Marsians 
had gone as a fugitive to the neighbouring people, now 
Assumea another organization purely confined to their own 
land, and, aAer ^ Italia" was vanquished, undertook to con* 
rinue the struggle as ** Safini " or Samnites.* The strong 

* The me denarii with Safimm. and G. JMU in Oaoan charaeteif 
belong to this period ; for, as long as the dengnatlon Italia w$M 



Oiup vil.] And the Sulpicicm HevoluHan, 807 

Aesornia was oonyerted from the fartreas that had curbed, 
into the last retreat that sheltered, Samnite freedom ; an 
army assemlded consisting, it was said, of 30,000 in£intry 
and 1,000 cavalry, and was strengthoned by the manumis- 
sion and incorporation of 20,000 slaves ; five generals were 
placed at its head, among whom Silo was the first and 
Mutilus next to him. With astonishment men saw the 
Samnite wars beginning anew after a pause of two hundred 
years, and the resolute nation of fiirmers making a fresh 
attempt^ just as in the fifth century, after the Italian cob- 
federation was shattered, to force Borne with their own 
hand to recognize their country's independence. But thii 
resolution of the bravest despair made not much change im 
the main result; although the mountain«war in Samnium 
and Lucania might still require some time and some sacri« 
fices, the insurrection was nevertheless already substantially 
at an end. 

In the meanwhile, certainly, there had occurred a fresh 
Outbreak of <^inplication, for the Asiatic difiiculties had ren- 
ttMBMithra- dered it imperatively necessary to declare war 
against Mithradates king of Pontus, and for next 
year (666) to assign one consul and a consular 
army to Asia Minor. Had this war broken out a year 
earlier, the contemporary revolt of the half of Italy and 
of the most important of the provinces would have occa- 
sioned immense peril to the Roman state. Now that the 
marvellous good fortune of Rome had once more been 
evinced in the rapid collapse of the Italian insurrection, this 
Asiatic war just beginning was, notwithstanding its being 
mixed up with the expiring Italian struggle, not of a n*ally 
dangerous character ; and the less so, because Mithradates 
\n his arrogacce refused the invitation of the Italians that 
he should afford them direct assistance. Still it was in a 
high degree inconvenient. The times had gone by, when 
they without hesitation carried on simultaneously aa ^taliao 

veteined by the insurgents, no single caaton eonld, as a aoTeiti^i 
tower, coin money with its own name. 



308 JSevoU of the Italian Subjects^ [Book it 

and a transmarine wai ; the state-cheat was already after 
two years of warfare utterly exhausted, and the formation 
of a new army in addition to that already in the field 
seemed scarcely practicable. But they resorted to such 
expedients as they could. The sale of the sites that had 
Irom ancient times (i. 154) remained unoccupied on and 
near the citadel to persons desirous of buildings which 
yielded 9,000 pounds of gold (£360,000), furnished t\m 
requisite pecuniary means. No new army was formed, but 
that which was under Sulla in Campania was destined to 
embark for Asia, as soon as the state of things in southern 
Italy should allow its departure ; which might be expected, 
from the progress of the army operating in the north under 
Strabo, to happen soon. 

So the third campaign in 606 began amidst favourable 
prospects for Rome. Strabo put down the last 
Thiid resistance which was still offered in the Abruzzi« 

oampa gxu j^ Apulia Coscouius' successor, Quintus Metellus 
Pius, son of the conqueror of Numidia and not unlike his 
&ther in his strongly conservatiye views as well as in mili- 
Captare of ^'X endowments, put an end to the resistance 
Venaaia. j^y ^^ capture of Venusio, at which 3,000 armed 
men were taken prisoners. In Samnium Silo no doubt suc- 
ceeded in retaking Bovianum ; but in a battle, in which he 
engaged the Roman general Mamercus Aemilius, the Ro- 
mans conquered, and — ^what was more important than the 
victory itself — Silo was among the 6,000 dead 
whom the Samnites left on the field. In Cam- 
pania the smaller places, which the Samnites still occupied, 
were wrested from them by Sulla, and Nola was invested. 
The Roman general Aulus Gabinius penetrated also into 
Iiucania and gained no small advantages ; but, after he had 
&llen in an attack on the enemy's camp, Lamponius the 
insurgent leader and his followers once more held almost 
undisturbed command over the wide and desolate Lucana 
Bruttian country and even made an attempt to seize Rhe- 
^um, which was frustrated, however, by the Sicilian gov- 
ernor Gaius NorbanuB. Notwithstanding isolated mi» 



Gbap. yii.] And^ Sulpunan SevohUitn. 80t 

ehanoea the Romans w^e coqatantly drawing nearer to the 
attainment of their end ; the fall of Nola, the submission 
of Samnium, the possibility of rendering considerable forces 
Available for Asia appeared no longer distant, when the tarn 
taken by affairs in the capital unexpectedly gave fresh life 
to the well-nigh extinguished insurrection. 

Home was in a fearful ferment. The attack of Drusus 
Ffinen* in "P^^ ^^^ equestrian courts and his sudden down- 
^****** &11 brought about by the equestrian party, fol- 

lowed by the two-edged Varian warfare of prosecutions, 
had sown the bitterest discord between the aristocracy and 
the bourgeoisie as well as between the moderates and the 
ultras. Events had completely justified the party of con- 
cession; what they had proposed voluntarily to bestow, 
Rome had been more than half compelled to concede ; but 
the mode in which the concession was made bore, just like 
the earlier refusal, the stamp of obstinate and shortsighted 
envy. Instead of granting equality of rights to all Italian 
communities, they had only expressed the inferiority in 
Theiw- another form. They had received a great uum 

rtovaipf tiie ber of Italian communities into Roman citizen 

franobiso 

anditoUmi^ ship, but had attached to what they thus con 
ferred an injurious stigma, by placing the new 
burgesses alongside of the old on nearly the same footing 
as the freedmen occupied alongside of the freeborn. They 
had irritated rather than pacified the commimities between 
the Po and the Alps by the concession of Latin rights. 
Lastly, they had withheld the franchise from a considerable, 
and that not the worst, portion of the Italians — the whole 
of the insurgent communities which had again submitted ; 
and not only so, but, instead of restoring in a legal shape 
the former treaties annulled by the insurrection, they had at 
the utmost renewed them as a matter of tavour and ren- 
dered them revocable at pleasure.* The disability as re- 

* Lidnianus (p, 15) under the year 667 says: deditidia omnihy» 

[<»]9t<a[s] data ; qui poUieUi miUt[a] milia wUitum ttt 

XV, , . . cohortes mUerurU ; a statement in which lArfM 

account (EpU. 80) : Balieis popufi$ a $enaiu eiviian dtOa t§t reappef/i 



810 jRevolt of the Italian StdjedSj [JBuok it. 

garded the right of voting gave the deeper ofienoe, tihat it 
was-— *as tihe comitia were then constituted — politioally ab* 
surd and the hypooritica] oare of the government for the 

fai a somewhat more preoise shape. The dtdUicU were aooording to 
Roman state-law those pertgrini Uberi (Ghiius L 18-16, 25, Ulp. x3L 14 
xxii. 2), who had become subject to the Romans and had nol been 
admitted to alliance. They might retain life, liberty, and property, and 
might be formed into communities with a constitution of their own ; 
the freedmen who were by legal fiction placed on the same footing with 
the d^diHeii (it qyi deditieiorum numero mnf, only by erroneous usage 
and rarely by the better authors called directly dedUicU ; GaL i 12, 
Ulp. L 14, Paul. iY. 12, 6) as well as the kindred liherU LaHni luniani^ 
were probably a/roAM^f?, nuUiuB eertae civitaiU dttea (Ulp. zx. 14 ; 
comp. Dig. xMii. 19, 17, 1) ; but neither the Latins nor the dedUteii 
themselves were necessarily anoltdK:. The latter nevertheless were 
destitute of rights as respected the Roman state, in so far as by Roman 
state-law every dedUio was necessarily unconditional (Polyb. xxL 1 ; 
comp. XX. 9, 10, xxxvL 2) and all the privileges expressly or tacitly 
conceded to them were conceded only preeario and therefore revocable 
at pleasure (Appian, Hisp. 44) ; so that the Roman state, whatever it 
might immediately or afterwards decree regarding its dediticii, could 
never perpetrate as respected them a violation of rights. This destitu- 
tion of rights only ceased on the conclusion of a treaty of alliance 
(Liv. xxxiv. 67). Accordingly daditio and /oedu9 appear in oonstitu- 
tional law as contrasted terms excluding each other (Liv. iv. 80, xxviiL 
84 ; Cod. Theod. viL 13, 16 and Gothofr. thereon), and of precisely the 
same nature is the distinction current among the jurists between the 
quasidediticii and the quan Latini^ for the Latins are just the foedertiH 
eminently so called (CSc. pro BaH. 24, 64). 

According to the older constitutional law thers were, with the 

exception of the not numerous communities that were declared to have 

forfeited (heir treaties in consequence of the Hannibalic war (ii 892^ 

no Italian dediticii ; in the Plautian law of 664-6 the 

description: qui foeder<Ui$ eivitatibiu adacripH /ueruni 

(Oic. pro Arch, 4, 7) still included in substance all Italians. But as the 

deditteU who received the franchise supplementarily in 60T 

cannot reasonably be understood as embracing merely the 

Bruttii and PIcentes, we may assume that all the insurgents^ ?n far ai 

Ihey had laid down their arms and had not acquired the franchise under 

the Plautio-Papiriau law, were treated as dediticii, or — ^which is the 

lame thing— that their treaties cancelled as a matter of course by the 

insurrection (hence qui foedenUi fitentfU in the passage of CSicero dted| 

vere not legally renewed to them <m their surrender 



CkuF vn.] And' the Sulpieian JSevoltHi^^n. 811 

unstained purity of the electors appeared to every ui^ 
prejudiced person ridiculous ; but all these restrictions were 
dangerous^ inasmuch as they invited every demagogue to 
carry his ulterior objects by taking up the more or less 
judt demands of the new burgesses and of the Italians ox- 
HMoniiiirv cluded from the franchise. While accordingly 
eifeci^&6 the more dear-seeing of the aristocracy atuld 
MtiBeeii- not but find these partial and grudging conces- 
sions as inadequate as did the new burgesses and 
the excluded themselves, they further painfully felt the ab^ 
sence from their ranks of the numerous and excellent men 
whom the Varian commission of high-treason had exiled, 
and whom it was the more difficult to recall because they 
had been condemned by the verdict not of the people but 
of the jury-courts ; for, while there was little hesitation as 
to cancelling a decree of the people even of a judicial char* 
acter by means of a second, the cancelling of a verdict of 
jurymen by the people appeared to the better portion of 
the aristocracy as a very dangerous precedent. Thus 
neither the ultras nor the moderates were content with the 
issue of the Italian crisis. But still deeper in- 

luriiuu 

digpaation swelled the heart of the old man, who 
had gone forth to the Italian war with revived hopes and 
had come back from it reluctantly, with the consciousness 
of having rendered new services and of having received in 
return new and most severe mortifications, with the bitter 
feeling of being no longer dreaded but despised by his ene- 
mies, with that gnawing spirit of vengeance in his heart, 
which feeds on its own poison. It was true of him also, as 
of the new burgesses and the excluded ; incapable and awk^ 
ward as he had shown himself to be, his popular name wm 
■till a formidable weapon in the hand of a demagogue. 

With these elements of political convulsion was com- 
.^^ bined the rapidly spreading decay of the hon 

iS^ay ourable soldierly spirit and of military disci* 
*****^ *• pline* The seeds, which were sown by the en* 
rolment of the proletariate in the army, developed them 
«elve« with alarnung rapidity during the demoraHxing iiv 



SI 2 Bifwdt of the JtiMan SuiyecU, [Bom it 

Burrectionary war, which oompelled Rome Uy admit to th« 
aervice every man capable of bearing arms without distino 
tion, and which above all carried political partisanship 
directly into the headquarters and into the soldiers' tent 
The effects soon appeared in the slackening of all the bonds 
of the military hierarchy. During the siege of Pompeii 
the commander of the Sullaii besieging corps, the consulat 
Aulus Postumius Albinus, was put to death with stones 
oad bludgeons by his soldiers, who believed themselves be- 
trayed by their general to the enemy ; and Sulla the com- 
mander-in-chief contented himself with exhorting the troops 
to efface the memory of that occurrence by their brave con- 
duct in presence of the enemy. Hie authors of that deed 
were the marines, from of old the least respectable of the 
troops. A division of legionaries raised chiefly from the 
city populace soon followed the example thus given. In- 
stigated by Gains Titius, one of the heroes of the market- 
place, it laid hands on the consul Cato. By an accident he 
escaped death on this occasion ; Titius was arrested, but 
was not punished. When Cato soon afterwards actually 
perished in a combat, his own officers, and particularly the 
younger Gains Marius, were — whether justly or unjustly 
cannot be ascertained — designated as the authors of his 
death. 

To the political and military crisis thus beginning fell to 
EooDomio be added the economic crisis — perhaps still more 
°^*^ terrible— which set in upon the Roman capital- 

ists in consequence of the Social war and the Adatic trou« 
bles. The debtors, unable even to raise the interest due 
and yet inexorably pressed by their creditors, had on the 
one hand entreated from the proper judicial authority, the 
urban praetor Asellio, a respite to enable them to dispose 
of their possessions, and on the other hand had searched 
out once more the old obsolete laws as to usury (i. 390) 
and, in accordance with the rule established in olden times, 
had sued their creditors for fourfold the amount of the in- 
terest paid to them contrary to the law. Asellio lent him* 
■alf to l)end the de facto existing^law to the letter, and 



Chap, vn.] AndiAe SuljHoian JSevolut'ion. ^VS 

tioned in the usual way the desired actions for interest 
whereupon the offended creditors assembled in the Forum 
under the leadership of the tribune of the people Lucius 
Murder of Cassius, aiid attacked and killed the praetor in 
'^*""* front of the temple of Concord, just as in his 

priestly robes he was presenting a sacrifice — an outrage 
which was not eyen made a subject of investiga- 
tion (665). On the other hand it was said in . 
the circles of the debtors, that the suffering multitude could 
not be relieved otherwise than by "new account-books/' 
that is, by legally cancelling the claims of all creditors 
against all debtors. Matters stood again exactly as they 
had stood during the strife of the orders ; once more the 
capitalists in league with the prejudiced aristocracy made 
war against, and prosecuted, the oppressed multitude and 
the middle party which advised a modification of the rigid 
letter of the law ; once more Rome stood on the verge of 
that abyss into which the despairing debtor drags his 
creditor along with him. But since that time the simple 
civil and moral organization of a great agricultural city had 
been succeeded by the social antagonisms of a capital of 
many nations, and by that demoralization in which the 
prince and the beggar meet ; now everything had come to 
be on a broader, more abrupt, and fearfully grander scale. 
When the Social war brought all ' the political and social 
elements fermenting among the citizens into collision with 
each other, it laid the foundation for a new revolution. An 
accident led to its outbreak. 

It was the tribune of the people Publius Sulpicius Rufus 
who in 666 proposed to the burgesses to declare 
Thi Sui- that every senator, who owed more than 2,000 
fieUniawB. fj[gj^^j^( (£82), should forfeit his seat in the sen- 
ate ; to grant to the burgesses condemned by non-free jury 
courts liberty to return home ; to distribute the new bur* 
gesses among all the tribes, and likewise to allow the right 
of voting in all tribes to the freedmen. They were propo- 
sals which from the mouth of such a man wer^ 
infcJ?^ at least somewhat surprising. Publius Sul» 

Vol. IIL— 14 



314 lievoU of the Italian Sufyectn^ [Book iv. 

*>•• picius Ruius (born in 630) owed bis political 

importance not so much to his noble birth, his important 
connections, and his hereditary wealth, as to his remarkable 
oratorical talent, in which none of his contempcrariet 
equalled him. His powerful voices his lively gesture! 
sometimes bordering on theatrical display, the luxuriant 
copiousness of his flow of words arrested, even if they did 
not convince, his hearers. As a partisan he was from the 
outset on the side of the senate, and his first 
public appearance (059) had been the impeach- 
ment of Norbanus who was mortally hated by the govern** 
ment party (p. 262). Among the conservatives he be- 
longed to the section of Crassus and Drusus. We do not 
know what primarily gave occasion to his solicit- 
ing the tribuneship of the people for 666, and 
on its account renouncing his patrician nobility ; but he 
seems to have been by no means rendered a revolutionist 
through the fact that he, like the whole middle party, had 
been persecuted as revolutionary by the conservati%es, and 
"to have by no means intended an overthrow of the constitu- 
tion in the sense of Gains Gracchus. It would rather seem 
that, as the only man of note belonging to the party of 
Crassus and Drusus who had come forth uninjured from the 
storm of the Varian prosecutions, he felt himself called on 
to complete the work of Drusus and finally to abolish the 
still subsisting disabilities of the new burgesses — for which 
purpose he needed the tribimate. Several acts of his even 
during his tribuneship are mentioned, which betray the very 
opposite of demagogic designs. For instance, he prevented 
by his veto one of his colleagues from cancelling through a 
decree of the people the sentences of jurymen issued under 
the Varian law ; and when the late aedile Gains Caesar un* 
constitutionally became a candidate for the consulship, pass* 
ing over the praetorship with the design, it was alleged, of 
getting the charge of the Asiatic war afterwards entrusted 
to him, Sul picius opposed him more resolutely and sharply 
than any one else. Entirely in the Fpirit of Drusus, ha 
thus demanded from himself and from others primarily and 



Chap. VII.] And the iSfulfpiGian Mevolution. 315 

especially the maintenance of the constitution. But in fact 
he was as little able as was Drusus to reconcile things that 
were incompatible, and to carry out in striqt form of law 
the change of the constitution which he had in view — • 
change judicious in itself, but never to be obtained from thi 
great majority of the old burgesses by amicable mean&. 
His breach with the powerful family of the Julii — ^among 
whom the consular Lucius Caesar, the brother of Gaius, in 
particular was very influential in the senate — and with the 
section of the aristocracy adhering to it, beyond doubt 
materially co-operated and carried the irascible man through 
personal exasperation beyond his original design. 

Yet the proposals brought in by him were of such a 

nature as to be by no means out of keeping 
of these wlth the personal character and the previous 

party-position of their author. The equalization 
of the new burgesses with the old was simply a partial re- 
sumption of the proposals drawn up by Drusus in favour 
of the Italians and, like these, only carried out the require* 
ments of a sound policy. The recall of those condemned 
by the Varian jurymen no doubt sacrificed the principle of 
the inviolability of such decisions which Sulpicius himself 
had just practically defended ; but it mainly benefited in 
the first instance the members of the proposer's own party, * 
the moderate conservatives, and it may be very well con- 
ceived that so impetuous a man might when first coming 
forward decidedly combat such a measure and then, indig- 
nant at the resistance which he encountered, propose it him 
self. The measure against the insolvency of senators was 
doubtless called forth by the exposure of the economic con- 
dition of the ruling families — so deeply embarrassed not- 
withstanding all their outward splendour — on occasion of 
the last financial crisis. It was painful doubtless, but yet 
in itself conducive to the rightly understood interest of the 
aristocracy, that, as was necessarily the effect of the Sulpi- 
cian proposal, all persons should withdraw from the senate 
who were unabie speedily to meet their liabilities, and thai 
die ooterie<«y8tem, which found one of its main supports 11 



316 lUvoli of the Italian Subjectg^ [Book it 

the insolvency of nuuij senators and their oonatquent d» 
pendence on their wealthy colleagues^ should be checked \rf 
Che removal of the notoriously venal portion of the sena. 
tors. At the same time, of course, we do not mean to d^ 
that such a ourification of the smate-honse so abruptly and 
invidiously exposing the senate, as Rufus proposed, would 
certainly never have been proposed without his personal 
quarrels with the heads of Uie ruling coteries. Lastly, the 
regulation in fiivour of the freedmen had undoubtedly the 
primary object of making its proposer master of the street; 
but in itself it was neither unwarranted nor incompatible 
with the aristocratic constitution. Since the freeJmen had 
begun to be drawn upon for military service, their demand 
for the right of voting was so £ur justified, as the right of 
voting and the obligation of service had always gone hand 
in hand. Moreover, looking to the nullity of the oomitia, 
it was politically of very little moment whether one sewer 
more emptied itself into that slough. The difficulty which 
the oligardiy felt in governing with the comitia was lessened 
rather than increased by the unlimited admission of the 
freedmen, who were to a very great extent personally and 
financially dependent on the ruling &milies and, if rightly 
used, might just furnish the government with a means of 
controlling the elections more thoroughly than before. This 
measure certainly, like every other political favour shown 
to the proletariate, ran counter to the tendencies of the 
aristocracy friendly to reform ; but it was for Rufus hardly 
anything else than what the corn-law had been for Drusus 
—a means of drawing the proletariate over to his side and 
of breaking down with its aid the opposition against the 
truly beneficial reforms which he meditated. It was easy 
to foresee that this opposition would not be slight ; that the 
narrow-minded aristocracy and the narrow-minded hour^ 
qeoisie would display the same stupid jealousy afber the 
ftubduing of the insurrection as they had displayed before 
its outbreak ; that ths great majority of all parties would 
secretly or even openly characterize the partial concessions 
made at the moment cf the most formidable danger as un- 



Cbap. vn.] A nd the Svlpicia/n jRevohiidon. 31? 

seasonable compliances, and would passionately resist every 
attempt to extend them. The example of Drusus had 
shown what came of undertaking to carry conservative re^ 
forms solely in reliance on a senatorial majority ; it was i 
course quite intelligible, that his friend who sliared hb 
views should attempt to carry out kindred designs in oppo 
sition to that majority and under the forms of demagogism. 
Rufus accordingly gave himself no trouble to gain the Bei> 
ate over to his views by the bait of the jury courts* lU 
found a better support in the freedmen and above all in th« 
armed retinue — consisting, according to the report of his 
opponents, of 3,000 hired men and an " opposition-senate ^ 
of 600 young men from the better class — with which ha 
appeared in the streets and in the Forum. 

His proposals accordingly met with the most decided 
resistance from the majority of the senate, which 
01 the gov- first, to gain time, induced the consuls Lucius 
•™™®^'' Cornelius Sulla and Quintus Pompeius Rufus, 
both declared opponents of demagogism, to enjoin extraor- 
dinary religious observances, during which the popular 
assemblies were suspended. Sulpicius replied 
by a violent tumult, in which among other vic- 
tims the young Quintus Pompeius, son of the one and sou- 
in-law of the other consul, met his death and the lives of 
both consuls themselves were seriously threatened — Sulla is 
said even to have escaped only by Marius opening to him his 
house. They were obliged to yield ; Sulla agreed to ooun^ 
termand the announced solemnities, and the Sulpician pro- 
posals now passed without further difficulty. But this wai 
far from determining their fate. Though the aristocracy in 
the capital might own its defeat, there was now — ^for the 
first time since the commencement of the resolution— -yet 
another power in Italy which could not be overlooked, viz., 
Positioii of ^^e ^^o strong and victorious armies of the proi 
®*-'^ consul Strabo and the consul Sulla. ITie politi* 

eal position of Strabo might be ambiguous, but Sulli^ 
although he had given way to open violence for the mo 
ment, was on the best terms with the majority of the sen 



ftlS BmxfU of the Italian StdyecU, [Book n 

Ate ; and not oiuy so, but he hfld, immediately after ooiu» 
termanding the solemnities^ departed for Campania to join 
his army. To terrify the unarmed consul by bludgeons oi 
the defenceless capital by the swords of the legions, amount* 
ed to the same thing in the end : Sulpioius expected that hia 
opponent, now when he could, would requite violence with 
violence and return to the capital at the head of his legions 
lo overthrow the conservative demagogue and his laws along 
with him. Perhaps he was mistalcen. Sulla was as eager 
for the war against Mithradates as he was probably averss 
to the political exhalations of the capital ; considering his 
original spirit of indifTerenoe and his unrivalled political 
nonchalance, there is great probability that he by bo means 
meditated the coup cPitat which Sulpicius expected, and that| 
if he had been let alone, he would have embarked without 
delay with his troops for Asia so soon as he had captured 
Nola, with the siege of which he was still occupied. 

But, be this as it might, Sulpicius, with a view to parry 

the anticipated blow, conceived the scheme of 
nom^ted taking the supreme command from Sulla ; and 
KSicf S*" ^^^ *^^® purpose joined with Marius, whose name 
2^'* was still sufficiently popular to make a proposal 

to transfer to him the chief command in the 
Asiatic war appear plausible to the multitude, and whose 
military position and ability might prove a support in the 
event of a rupture with Sulla. Sulpicius probably did not 
overlook the danger involved in placing that old man—- not 
less incapable than vengeful and ambitious — at the head of 
the Campanian army, and as little the scandalous irregular- 
ity of entrusting an extraordinary supreme command by 
decree of the people to a private man ; but the Yetj tried 
incapacity of Marius as a statesman gave a sort of guarantee 
Aat he could not seriously endanger the constitution, and 
above all the personal position of Sulpicius, if he formed a 
correct estimate of Sulla's designs, was one of so imminent 
peril that such considerations could hardly be longer heeded. 
That the worn-out hero himsel should readily meet th« 
wishes of any one who would employ him as a eondottiere. 



Chap VII.] And tKe Sulpzeian JRevolution. 816 

• 

was a matter of course ; his heart had now for many yean 
longed for the command in an Asiatic war, and not lesf 
perhaps for an opportunity of settling accounts thoroughly 
with the majority of the senate. Accordingly on the pro* 
posal of Sulpicius Gains Marius was by decree of the peo 
pie invested with extraordinary supreme, or as it was called 
proconsular, power, and obtained tiie command of the Cam* 
panian army and the superintendence of the war against 
Mithradates; and two tribunes of the people were des- 
patched to the camp at Nola, with a view to. have the army 
handed ever to tJiem by Sulla. 

Sulla was not the man to yield to such a suninK>ns. If 
BniiA«8 re- ^^Y OHO had a vocation to the chief command in 
^"^ the Asiatic war, it was Sulla. He had a few 

years before commanded with the greatest success in the 
same theatre of war ; he had contributed more than any 
other man to the subjugation of the dangerous Italian insur- 
rection; as consul of the year in which the Asiatic war 
broke out, he had been invested with the command in it 
after the customary way and with the full consent of his 
colleague, who was on friendly terms with him and related 
to him by marriage. It was expecting a great deal to sup* 
pose that he would, in accordance with a decree of the sove- 
reign burgesses of Rome, give np a command undertaken 
in such circumstances to an old military and political an- 
tagonist, in whose hands the army might be turned to none 
could tell what violent and preposterous proceedings. Sulla 
was neither good-natured enough to comply voluntarily with 
such an order, nor dependent enough to be compelled to do 
so. His army was — partly in consequence of the altera* 
tions of the military system which originated with Marius, 
partly from the moral laxity and the military strictness of 
its discipline in the hands of Sulla — ^little more than a body 
of mercenaries absolutely devoted to their leader and in- 
different to political affairs. Sulla himself was a hardened, 
eool, and clear-headed man, in whose eyes the sovereign 
Roman burgesses were a rabble, the hero of Aquae Sextiae 
a bankrupt swindler, formal legality a mere phrase, Rom« 



3S0 Bevcit of the lidUan ShJyecU^ H^k iy. 

itself a city without a garrison and with its walla half i« 
ruins, whidi could be far more easily captured than Nolo. 

On these views he acted. He assembled his soldiers-— 
there were six l^ons, or about 35,000 men— 
mtidion and explained to them the summons that had 
^^^ arrived from Rome, not forgetting to hint that 

the new commander-in-chief would undoubtedly lead to 
Asia Minor not the army as it stood, but another formed 
of fresh troops. The superior officers, who still had mora 
of the citizen than the soldier, kept aloof, and only one of 
them followed the general towards the capital ; but the sol- 
diers, who in accordance with earlier experiences (ii. 410) 
hoped to find in Asia an easy war and endless booty, were 
furious ; in a moment the two tribunes that had come from 
Rome were torn in pieces, and from all sides the cry arose 
that the general should lead them to Rome. Without delay 
the consul started, and forming a junction with his like- 
minded colleague by the way, he arrived by quick marches 
— ^little troubling himself about the deputies who hastened 
from Rome to meet and attempted to detain him — ^beneath 
the walls of the capital. Suddenly the Romans beheld 
columns of Sulla's army take their station at the bridge 
over the Tiber and at the Colline and Esquiline gates ; and 
then two legions in battle array, with their standards at 
their head, crossed the sacred boundary within which the 
law had forbidden war to enter. Many a worse quarrel, 
many an important feud had been brought to a settlement 
within those walls, without a Roman army venturing to 
break the sacred fence of the city ; that step was now taken, 
primarily for the sake of the miserable question whether 
this or that officer was called to command in the East. 

The entering legions advanced as far as Uie height of 
Borne ^ho Esquiline; when the missiles and stones 

•*"P**^ descending in showers from the roofs made the 
soldiers waver and they began to give way, Sulla bran« 
dished a blazing torch, and with firebrands and threats of 
setting the houses on fire the legions cleared their way to 
the Esquiline Forum (not far from S. Maria Maggiore), 



Chap, vii.] Afid the Sulpicicm Hevohiiion. 321 

There the force hastily collected by Marius and Sulpiciui 
awaited them, and by its superior numbers repelled the first 
advancing columns. But reinforcements came up from the 
gates ; another division of the Sullans made preparations 
for turning the defenders by the street of the Subura ; the 
latter were obliged to retire. At the temple of Tellus, 
where the Esquiline begins to slope towards the great 
Forum, Marius attempted once more to make a stand ; he 
adjured the senate and equites and all the citizens to throw 
themselves across the path of the legions ; it was in vain. 
Even when the slaves were summoned to arm under the 
promise of freedom, not more than three of them appeared. 
Nothing remained for the leaders but to escape in all haste 
through the still unoccupied gates ; after a few hours Sulla 
was absolute master of Rome. That night the watchfires 
of the legions blazed in the great market-place of the 
capital. 

The first military interventfon in civil feuds had fully 
demonstrated, not only that the political strug- 
laa rtttoni- gles had reached the point at which nothing save 
open and direct force proves decisive, but also 
that the power of the bludgeon was of no avail against the 
power of the sword. It was the conservative party which 
first drew the sword, and which accordingly in due time 
experienced the truth of the ominous words of the Gospel 
as to those who first have recourse to it. For the present 
they triumphed completely and might put the victoiy into 
formal shape at their own pleasure. Asa matter of course, 
the Sulpician laws were characterized as legally null. Theii 
author and his most notable adherents had fled ; they were, 
twelve in number, proscribed by the senate to be arrested 
Death of ^^^ executed as enemies of their country. Pub* 
SuipiQiiu. jjyg gulpicius was accordingly seized at Lauren- 
turn and put to death ; and the head of the tribune, sent to 
Sulla, was by his orders exposed in the Forum at the very 
rostra where he himself had stood but a few days before in 
the fiiU vigour of youth and eloquence The rest of tht 
proscribed were pursued * the assassin? were on the traci 

Vol, IIT.-H* 



822 BeooU of the Italian SyhjectSj [Book nr 

Flight of o^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^^ Gaius Marius. Although th« 
*^«*'"' general might have clouded the memory of hit 

glorious days by a suooession of pitiful proceedings, lom 
that the deliverer of bis country was running for his life, ha 
was oDoe more the victor of Vercellae, and with breathless 
suspense all Italy listened to the incidents of his marvellous 
flight At Ostia he had gone on board a transport with the 
view of sailing for Africa ; but adverse winds and want of 
provisions compelled him to land at the Circeian promoa 
tory and to wander at random. With few attendants and 
without trusting himself to a roof, the grey*haired consular, 
often suffering from hunger, found his way on foot to the 
neighbourhood of the Roman colony of Mintumae at the 
mouth of the Garigliano. There the pursuing cavalry were 
seen in the distance ; with great difficulty he reached the 
coast and a trading-vessel lying there withdrew him from 
his pursuers ; but the timid mariners soon put him ashore 
again and made off, while Marius stole along the beach. 
His pursuers found him in the salt-marsh of Minturnae sunk 
to the girdle in the mud and with bis head concealed amidst 
a quantity of reeds, and delivered him to the civic authori- 
ties of Mintumae. He was placed in prison, and the town- 
executioner, a Cimbrian slave, was sent to put him to death ; 
but the German trembled before the flashing eyes of his old 
conqueror and the axe fell from his hands, when the general 
with his powerful voice haughtily demanded whether he 
dared to kill Gaius Marius. When they learned this, the 
magistrates of Minturnae were ashamed that the deliverer 
of Rome should meet with greater reverence from slaves to 
whom he had brought servitude than from his fellow-citizens 
to whom he had brought freedom ; they loosed his fetters, 
gave him a vessel and money for travelling expenses, and 
sent him U) Aenaria (Ischia). The proscribed with the ex 
ception of Sulpicius gradually met in those waters ; they 
landed at Eryx and at what was formerly Carthage, but the 
Roman magistrates both in Sicily and in Africa sent them 
away. So they escaped to Numidia, whose sandy deserts 
gave them a place of refuge for the winter But the king 



CPbap. yn.] And the StUptoian Hevolutiofi^ 323 

Hienipsal II., whom they hoped to gain and who had seemed 
for a time willing to unite wi'jh them, had only done so to 
lull them into security, and now attempted to seize their 
persons. With great difficulty the fugitives escaped from 
his cavalry, and found a temporary refuge in the little island 
of Kerkiua (Rerkena) on the coast of Tunis, We know 
Dot whether Sulla thanked his fortunate star that he h&d 
been spared the odium of putting to death the victor of the 
Cimhrians ; at any rate it does not appear that the magi»* 
trates of Mintumae were punished. 

With a view to remove existing evils and to prevent 
Legislation future revolutions, Sulla suggested a series 
of suUa. ^£^ jjg^ legislative enactments. For the hard- 
pressed debtors nothing seems to have been done, except 
that the rules as to the maximum rate of interest were 
enforced ; * directions moreover were given for the forma- 
tion of a number of colonies. The senate which had been 
greatly thinned by the battles and prosecutions of the Social 
War was filled up by the admission of 300 new senators, 
who were naturally selected in the interest of the Optimates. 
Lastly, material changes were adopted in respect to the 
mode of election and the initiative of legislation. The 
arrangement for voting in the centuriate comitia 
introduced in 513 (ii. 417), which conceded an 
equal voice to each of the five property-classes, was again 
exchanged for the old Servian arrangement, under which the 
first class alone, having estate of 100,000 sesterces (£1,000) 
or upwards, possessed almost half of the votes. Practi 
cally there was thus introduced for the election of consuls, 
praetors, and censors, a census which really excluded the 
non-wealthy from exercising the suflfrage. The legislative 
initiative in the case of the tribnnes of the people was re- 

* It is not dear, what the le» vnetaria of th^ consuls Sulla and 
f^ Rufus in the year 6.66 prescribed in this respect ; but tlM 

simplest hypothesis is that which regards it as a renewal 
^' of the law of 897 (I 366^ so that the highest allowable 

rate of interest was again ^^th of the capital for the year of taff 
tnonths or 10 per cent, for the year of twelve months. 



8S1 HevoU oftht Italian ISuJyects^ [Bocvk i^ 

stricted by the rule, that every proposal had hcuoeforth U 
be submitted by them id the first iustanoe to the senate add 
could only come before the people in the event of the sen* 
ate approving it. . 

These enactments which were called forth by the Sul« 
pician attempt at revolution from the man who then came 
forward as the shield and sword of the constitutional party 
—the ctnsul Sulla— bear an altogether peculiar character. 
Sulla ventured, without consulting the burgesses or jury« 
men, to pronounce sentence of death on twelve of the most 
distinguished men, including magistrates actually in office 
and the most fiunous general of his time, and publicly to 
defend these proscriptions ; a violation of the venerable and 
sacred laws of appeal, which met with severe censure even 
from very conservative men, such as Quintus Scaevola. 
He ventured to overthrow an arrangement as to the elec* 
tions which had subsisted for a century and a half, and to 
restore the electoral census which had been long obsolete 
and proscribed. He ventured practically to withdraw the 
right of legislation from its two primitive &ctors, the magis* 
trates and the comitia, and to transfer it to a board which 
bad at no time possessed formally any other privilege in 
this respect than that of being asked for its advice (i. 408), 
Hardly had any democrat ever exercised justice in forms so 
tyrannical, or disturbed and remodelled the foundations of 
the constitution with so reckless an audacity, as this con* 
servative reformer. But if we look at the substance instead 
of the form, we reach very different conclusions. Revolu* 
tions have nowhere ended, and least of all in Home, without 
demanding a certain number of victims, who under forma 
more or less borrowed from justice atone for the fault of 
defeat as though it were a crime. Any one who recalls the 
succession of prosecutions carried on by the victorioui 
party after the fall of the Gracchi and Saturninus (p. 120, 
162, 262) will be inclined to yield to the victor of the 
Esquiline market the praise of candour and comparative 
moderation, in so fer as, first, he without ceremony accepted 
aa war what was really such and proscribed the men whc 



Obap. yii.] And the Sn^oian Revolution. 831 

were defeated as enemies beyond the pale of the law, and, 
secondly, he limited as far as possible the number of vio 
tims and allowed at least no ofiensive outbreak of fury 
against inferior persons. A similar moderation appears in 
the political arrangements. The innovation as respects 
legislation — the most important and apparently the mosi 
eomprehensive — in fact only brought the letter of the coo* 
■titntion into harmony with its spirit. The Roman legisla- 
tion, under which any consul, praetor, or tribune could pro- 
pose to the burgesses any measure at pleasure and bring it 
to the vote witliout debate, had from the first been irra- 
tional and had become daily more so with the growing 
nullity of the comitia; it was only tolerated, because in 
practice the senate had claimed for itself the privilege of 
previous deliberation and regularly crushed any proposal 
put to the vote without such previous deliberation by means 
of the political or religious veto (i. 409). The revolution 
had swept away these barriers; and in consequence that 
absurd system now began fully to develop its results, and 
to put it in the power of any petulant knave to overthrow 
the state in due form of law. What was under such cir- 
cumstances more natural, more necessary, more truly con- 
servative, than now to recognize formally and expressly the 
legislation of the senate to which effect had been hitherto 
given by a circuitous process 1 The renewal of the electoral 
census was in a somewhat similar position. The earlier 
constitution was thoroughly based on it; and 
the reform of 513, while restricting the privi* 
leges of the men of wealth, had rigorously retained the 
principle of excluding the burgesses rated below 11,000 
iasterces (£110) from any sort of influence on the elections. 
But since that year there had occurred an immense financial 
revolution, which would itself have justified a nominal 
raising of the minimum census. The new timocracy conse^ 
quently changed the letter of the constitution only with a 
view to remain fiiithfiil to its spirit while it at the same 
lime in the mildest possible form attempted at least to 
check the disgraceful bribery with all the evils therewith 



S20 li&voU qf the Itattan Sutyjeds^ [Book n 

oonneeted. Lastly, the regalations in favour of debtors and 
the resumption of the schemes of colonization gave express 
proof that Sulla, although not disposed to approve the im- 
petuous proposals of Sulpicius, was yet, like Sulpicius and 
Drusus and all the more far-seeing aristocrats in general; 
fhvourable to material reforms in themselves ; and withal 
ire may not overloolc the circumstance, that he proposed 
these measures after the victory and entirely of his own free 
will. If we combine with such considerations the fact^ that 
Sulla allowed the principal foundations of the Gracchan 
constitution to stand and disturbed neither the equestrian 
courts nor the largesses of grain, we shall fmd warrant for 
the opinion that the Sullan arrangement of 666 
substantially adhered to the ziatuz quo subsist- 
ing since the fall of Gaius Gracchus ; he merely, on the one 
hand, altered as the times required the traditional rules that 
primarily threatened danger to the existing government, 
and, on the other hand, sought to remedy according to his 
power the existing social evils, so far as either could be done 
without touching ills that lay deeper. Emphatic contempt 
for constitutional formalism in connection with a vivid ap- 
preciation of the intrinsic value of existing arrangements, 
clear perceptions, and praiseworthy intentions mark this 
legislation throughout. But it bears also a certain frivo- 
lous and superficial character ; it needed in particular a great 
amount of good nature to believe that the fixing a maximum 
of interest would remedy the complications of debtor and 
creditor, and that the right of previous deliberation on the 
part of the senate would prove more capable of resisting 
future demagogism than the right of veto and religion had 
previously been. 

In reality new clouds very soon began to overcast the 
Keworan- dear sky of the conservatives. The relations 
pneatkmi. ^f ^gj^^ assumed daily a more threat-ening char- 
acter. The state had already suffered the utmost injury 
through the delay which the Sulpician revolution had occi» 
sioned in the departure oi the army for Asia ; the embarkap 
tion could on no account be longer postponed. Meanwhile 



Chap. VII.] And the Sulptctan Jievolvtion. 827 

Sulla hoped to leave behind him guarantees ag&inst a ne\f 
assault on the oligarchy in Italy, partly in the consuls who 
would be elected under the new electoial arrangements, 
partly and especially in the armies employed in suppressing 
the remains of the Italian insurrection. In the consular 
comitifty however, the choice did not fall on the candidates 
set up by Sulla, but Lucius Cornelius Cinna, 
who belonged to the most determined opposi 
tion, was associated with Gnaeus Octavius, a man certainly 
of strictly Optimate views. It may be presumed that it 
was chiefly the capitalist party, which by this choice retali- 
ated on the author of the interest-law. Sulla accepted the 
unpleasant election with the declaration that he was glad to 
see the burgesses making use of their constitutional liberty 
of choice, and contented himself with exacting from both 
consuls an oath that they would faithfully observe the exist* 
ing constitution. Of the armies, the one on which the mat 
ter chiefly depended was that of the north, as the greater 
part of the Campanian army was destined to 
depart for Asia. Sulla got the command of the 
former entrusted by decree of the people to his devoted 
colleague Quintus Rufus, and procured the recall of the 
former general Gnaeus Strabo in such a manner as to spare 
as far as possible his feelings — the more so, because the 
latter belonged to the equestrian party and his passive atti- 
tude during the Sulpician troubles had occasioned no small 
anxiety to the aristocracy. Rufus arrived at the army and 
took the chief command in Strabo's stead ; but a few days 
afterwards he was killed by the soldiers, and Strabo re* 
turned to the command which he had hardly abdicated. 
He was regarded as the instigator of the murder ; it is cer- 
tain that he was a man from whom such a deed might be 
expected, that he reaped the fruits of the crime, and that he 
punished the well-known perpetrators of it only i^ith words. 
The removal of Rufus and the commandership of Strabo 
formed a new and serious danger for Sulla ; yet he did noth* 
mg to deprive the latter of his command. Soon aflerwards, 
when his consulship expired, he found himself on the one 



328 H&wlt of the Italian SvbjecU. [Boos I? 

hand urged by his successor Cinna to depart at length fot 
Asia where his presence was certainly uigently needed, and 
on the other hand cited by one of the new tribunes before 
the bar of the people ; it was clear to the dullest eye, that 
a new attack on him and his party was in preparation, and 
that his opponents wished his removal. Sulla had no alter* 
native save either to push the matter to a breach with 
Cinna and perhaps with Strabo and once more to march on 
Rome, or to leave Italian affairs to talte their course and to 
remove to another continent. Sulla decided— 

Hall* 

embazki for whether more from patriotism or more from in- 



difference, will never be ascertained — ^for the 
latter alternative; handed over the corps left behind ir 
Samnium to the trustworthy and experienced Quintus Me* 
tell us Pius, who was invested in Sulla's stead with the pro- 
consular command in chief over Lower Italy ; gave the 
oonduct of the siege of Nola to the propraetor Appiutr 
Claudius ; and embarked with his legions in th« 
b^inning of 667 for the Hellenio East. 



I 

J 



CHAPTER VIIJ. 

THK BAST AKD KINO M ITHRa DATK8. 

Thb State of breathless excitement, in which the revih 
of the lution kept the Roman government by perpetiK 
ally renewing the alarm of fire and the cry to 
quench it, made them lose sight of provincial matters gen« 
orally ; and that most of all in the case of the Asiatic East, 
whose remote and unwarlike nations did not thrust them* 
selves so directly on the attention of the government as 
Africa, Spain, and the neighbouring Transalpine peoples. 
After the annexation of the kingdom of Attalus, which 
took place contemporaneously with the outbreak of the 
revolution, for a whole generation there is hardly any evi- 
dence of Rome taking a serious part in Oriental afiairs — 
with the exception of the establishment of the province of 
_ Cilicia in 652 (p. 171), to which the Romans 

108. 

were driven by the boundless audacity of the 
Cilician pirates, and which was in reality nothing more than 
the institution of a permanent station for a small division 
of the Roman army and fleet in the eastern waters. It 
was not till the downfall of Marius in 654 had 
in some measure consolidated the government 
of the restoration, that the Roman authorities began anew 
to bestow som3 attention on the events in the East. 

In many respects matters still stood as they had done 

thirty years ago. The kingdom of Egypt with 

its two appendages of Cyrene and Cyprus was 

broken up, partly de jure^ partly de facto^ on the death of 

Euergetes II. (637). Cyrene went to his natu 

ral son, Ptolemaeus Apion, and was for ever 

separated from Egypt. The sovereignty of the latter 

formed a subject of contention between the widow of the 



830 Tlie East and [Bow IV 

last king Cleopatra (+ 665), and his two soni 
81*. Soter II. Lathyrus (+ 673) and Alexander I. 

(+ 666) ; which gave occasion to Cyprus alsc 
to 8(*parale itself for a considerable period from Egypt 

The Romans did not interfere in these compli- 



cations ; in fact, when the Cyrenaean kingdom 



fell to them in 658 by the testament of the 
childless king Apion, while not directly rejecting the a4v 
qaisition, they lefb the country in substance to itself by 
declaring the Greek towns of the kingdom, Cyrene, Ptole- 
mais, and Berenice, free dties and even handing over to them 
the use of the royal domains. The supervision of the gov- 
ernor of Africa over this territory was fix>m its remoteness 
merely nominal, far more so than that of the governor of 
Macedonia over the Hellenic free cities. The consequences 
of this measure — which beyond doubt originated not in 
Philhellenism, but simply in the weakness and negligence 
of the Roman government — were substantially similar to 
those which had occurred under the like circumstances in 
Hellas ; civil wars and usurpations so rent the land that^ 
when a Roman officer of rank accidentally made his appear- 
ance there in 668, the inhabitants urgently be- 
sought him to regulate their aflfairs and to estab- 
lish a permanent government among them. 

In Syria also during the interval there had not been 
much change, and still less any improvement. 
During the twenty years' war of succession be- 
tween the two half-*brothers Antiochus Grypua 
•^ •^ (+658) and Antiochus of Cyzicus (+659), 

which afler their death was inherited by their sons, the 
kingdom which was the objexit of contention became almost 
an empty name, inasmuch as the Cilician searkings, the 
Arab sheiks of the Syrian desert, the princes of the Jews, 
and the magistrates of the larger towns had ordinarily more 
to say than the wearers of the diadem. Meanwhile the 
Romans established themselves in western Qlicia, and the 
important Mesopotamia passed over definitively to ih« 
Partbians. 



Chap. VIIL] Kmg Mithradates. 831 

The monarchy of the Ai-sacidae had passed through a 
ThePftr- dangeroiis crisis about the tifn^ cf the Gracchi, 
thianitate. chjefly in consequence of the inroads of Turanian 
tribes. The ninth Arsacid, Mithradates IL or the Great 
11W7 (030?-667?), had recovered for ;the state its 

position of ascendancy in the interior of Asia, 
repulsed the Scythians, and advanced the frontier of the 
kingdom towards Syria and Armenia ; but towards the end 
of his life new troubles disturbed his reign ; and, while the 
grandees of the kingdom including his own brother Orodes 
rebelled against the king and at length that brother over- 
threw him and put him to death, the hitherto 

Armenia. . * __ 

unimportant Armenia rose into power. This 
country, which since its declaration of independence (ii. 
259) had been divided into the north-eastern portion or 
Armenia proper, the kingdom of the Artaxiadae, and the 
south-western or Sophene, the kingdom of the Zariadridae, 
was for the first time united into one kingdom by the 

Artaxiad Tigranes (who had reigned since 660) ; 

and this doubling of his power on the one hand, 
and the weakness of the Parthian rule on the other, enabled 
the new king of all Armenia not only to free himself from 
dependence on the Parthians and to recover the provinces 
formerly ceded to them, but even to bring to Armenia the 
titular supremacy of Asia, as it had passed from the Achae- 
menids to the Seleudds and from the Seleucids to the 
Arsacids. '>*^ 

Lastly in Asia Minor the territorial arrangements, 

which had been made under Roman influence 

after the dissolution of the kingdom of Attalus 
(p. 75), still subsisted in the main unchanged ; except that 
Great Phrygta, after Gaius Gracchus had discovered the 
dealings between Mithradates Euergctes and the consul 
Aquillius (p. ISiO), had been again withdrawn from the king 
of Pontus and united as a free country with the Roman 

province of Asia, like Hellas with Macedonia 

(about 634). In the condition of the dependent 
itato> -the kingdoms of Bithynia, Cappadocia, T^ontus, the 



832 The East and [Book IV 

principalities of Paphlagonia and Gralaija, the numeroui 
city*league8 and free towns — ^no outward change was at 5rst 
discernible. But, intrinsically, the character of the Roman 
rule had certainly undergone everywhere a material altera- 
tion* Partly through the constant growth of oppression 
naturally incident to every tyrannic government^ partly 
through the indirect operation of the Roman revolution— in 
the seizure, for instance, of the property of the soil in the 
province of Asia by Gains Gracchus, in the Roman tenths and 
customs, and in the human hunts which the collectors of the 
revenue added to their other avocations there — ^the Roman 
rule, barely tolerable even from the first, pressed so heavily 
on Asia that neither the crown of the king nor the hut of 
the peasant there was any longer safe from confiscation, that 
every stalk of com seemed to grow for the Roman decu* 
manus^ and every child of free parents seemed to be bom 
for the Roman slave-drivers. It is true that the Asiatic 
bore even this torture with his inexhaustible passive en- 
durance ; but it was not patience and reflection that made 
him bear it peacefully. It was rather the peculiarly Orien« 
tal want of power to take the initiative ; and in these peace- 
ful lands, amidst these effeminate nations, strange and terri- 
ble things might happen, if once there should appear among 
them a man who knew how to give the signal for revolt. 
There reigned at that time in the kingdom of Pontus 
Mithradates VI. sumamed Eupator (bora about 

ISO-AS 

MifhradatM 624, -f 091) who traced back his lineage on the 
°^ ^' father's side in the sixteenth generation to tcing 
Darius the son of Hystaspes and in the eighth to Mithra- 
dates I. the founder of the Pontic empire, and was on the 
mother's side descended from the Alexandridae and the 
Beleucidae. After the early death of his father Mithradates 
Euergetes, who fell by the hand of an assassin at Sinope, 
he had received the title of king about 634, wh^ 
a boy of eleven years of age ; but the diadem 
brought to him only trouble and danger. His guardians, 
and even as it would seem his own mother called to take a 
part in the government by his father's will, conspired against 



Crap. VIII.] Eifig Miihradates. 889 

the boy-kiDg's life. It is said that, in order to escape from 
the daggers of his legal protectors, he became of his own 
accord a wanderer, and during seven years, changing his 
resting-place night aflei Aight, a fugitive in his own king- 
dom, led the life of a homeless hunter. Thus the boy grew 
into a powerful man. Although our accounts regarding 
him are in substance traceable to written records of con- 
temporaries, yet the legendary tradition which is generated 
with the rapidity of lightning in the East early adorned the 
mighty king with many of the traits of its Samson and 
Rustem. These traits, however, belong to his character 
just as the crown of clouds belongs to the character of the 
highest mountain-peaks ; the outline of the figure appears 
in both cases only more coloured and &ntastic, not die^ 
turbed uv essentially altered. The armour, which fitted the 
gigantic frame of king Mithradates, excited the wonder of 
the Asiatics and still more that of the Italians. As a run- 
ner he overtook the swiflest deer ; as a rider he broke in 
the wild steed, and was able by changing horses to accom- 
plish 120 miles in a day ; as a charioteer he drove with six- 
teen in hand, and gained in competition many a prize — it 
was dangerous, no doubt, in such sport to carry off victory 
from the king. In hunting on horseback, he hit the game 
at full gallop and never missed his aim. He challenged 
competition at table also — he arranged banqueting matches 
and carried off in person the prizes proposed for the most 
substantial eater and the hardest drinker— and not less so 
in the pleasures of the harem, as was shown among other 
things by the licentious letters of his Greek mistresses, 
which were found among his papers. His intellectual wants 
he satisfied by the wildest superstition — the interpretation 
of di cams and the Greek mysteries occupied not a few of 
the king's hours — ^and by a rude adoption of Hellenic civili- 
zation. He was fond of Greek art and music ; that is to 
say, he collected precious articles, rich furniture, old Per- 
sian and Greek objects of luxury-— his cabinet of rings was 
&raous — he had constantly Greek historians, philonophersi 
and poets in his train, and proposed prizes at his court-festi 



334 The Ukui and [Book iy 

vals not only for the greatest eaters and drinkers, but aisc 
for (<he merriest jester and the best singer. Such was the 
man : the sultan corresponded. In the East, whe/e th< 
relation between the ruler and the ruled bears the character 
of natural rather than of moral law, the subject resembles 
the dog alike in fidelity and in falsehood, the ruler is cruel 
nud distrustful. In both respects Mithradates has hardly 
been surpassed. By his orders there died or pined in per^ 
petual captivity for real or alleged treason his mother, his 
brother, his sister espoused to him, three of his sons and aa 
many of his daughters. Still more revolting perhaps is the 
fact, that among his secret papers were found sentences of 
death, drawn up beforehand, against several of his most 
confidential servants. In like manner it was a genuine trait 
of the sultan, that he afterwards, for the mere purpose of 
depriving his enemies of trophies of victory, caused his 
whole harem to be killed and distingui^ed his favourite 
concubine, a beautiful Ephesian, by allowing her to choos«i 
the mode of death. He prosecuted the experimental study 
of poisons and antidotes as an important branch of the 
business of government, and tried to inure his body to pan 
ticular poisons. He had early learned to look for treason 
and assassination at the hands of everybody and especially 
of his nearest relatives, and he had early learned to practise 
them against everybody and most of all against those near* 
est to him ; of which the necessary consequence — attested 
by all his history — was, that all his undertakings finally 
miscarried through the perfidy of those whom he trusted. 
At the same time we doubtless meet with isolated traits of 
high-minded justice : when he punished traitors, he ordina 
rily spared those who had become Involved in the crime 
simply from their personal relations with the leading cul- 
prit ; but such fits of equity are to be met with in evmy 
barbarous tyrant. What really distinguishes Mithradates 
amidst the multitjde of similar sultans^ is his boundless 
activity. He disappeared one fine morning from his paiaos 
and remained unheard of for months, so that he was given 
over as lost ; when he returned, he had wandered incognito 



caAP. VIII.1 £ing MUhradatea. 335 

through all western Asia and reconnoitred eve ryv here tha 
country and the people. In like manner he was not onlj 
generally fluent in speech, but he administered justice to 
each of the twenty-two nations over which he ruled in iti 
own language without needing an interpreter — a trait sig 
nificant of the versatile ruler of the many-tongued East 
His whole activity as a ruler bears the same character. So 
&r as we know (for our authorities are unfortunately alto- 
gether silent as to his internal administration) his energiesi 
like those of every other sultan, were spent in collecting 
treasures, in assembling armies — ^which were usually, in his 
earlier years at least, led against the enemy not by the king 
in person, but by some Greek condottiere — in efforts to add 
new satrapies to the old. Of higher elements^-desire to 
advance civilization, earnest leadership of the national oppo- 
sition, special gifts of genius — there are found, in our tradi- 
tional accounts at least, no distinct traces in Mitbradates, 
and we have no reason to place him on a level even with 
the great rulers of the Osmans, such as Mohammed II. and 
Suleiman. Notwithstanding his Hellenic culture, which sat 
on him not much better than the Roman armour sat on his 
Cappadocians, he was throughout an Oriental of the ordi- 
nary stamp, coarse, full of the most sensual appetites, super- 
stitious, cruel, perfidious, and unscrupulous, but so vigor- 
ous in organization, so powerful in physical endowments, 
that his defiant laying about him and his unshaken courage 
in resistance frequently look like talent, sometimes even 
like genius. Granting that during the death-struggle of the 
republic it was easier to offer resistance to Rome than in 
the times of Scipio or Trajan, and that it was only the com- 
plication of the Asiatic events with the internal commotions 
of Italy which rendered it possible for Mithradates to resist 
the Romans twice as long as Jugurtha did, it remains never^ 
Iheless true that before the Parthian wars he was the only 
enemy who gave serious trouble to the Romans in the 
East, and that he defended himself against them as the lion 
of the desert defends himself against the hunter. Still wa 
ve not entitled, in accordance with what we know, tc reoogr 



386 The EaH and [Book rr 

nke in him more tban the reaistanoe to be expected from m 
vigorous a nature. 

Buty whatever judgment we may form as to the indi^ 
Tidual character of the king, his historical position remaini 
in a high degree significant. The Mithradatic wars formed 
at once the last movement of the political opposition ofiered 
by Hellas to Rome, and the beginning of a revolt against 
the Roman supremacy resting on very different and fiir 
deeper grounds of antagonism — ^the national reaction of the 
Asiatics against the Occidentals. The empire of Mithra- 
dates was, like himself Oriental ; polygamy and the sy^ 
tem of the harem prevailed at court and generally among 
persons of rank ; the religion of the inhabitants of the 
country as well as the oflBcial religion of the court was pre- 
eminently the old national worship; the Hellenism there 
was little different from the Hellenism of the Armenian 
Tigranidae and the Arsacidae of the Parthian empire. The 
Greeks of Asia Minor might imagine for a brief moment 
that they had found in this king a support for their political 
dreams; his battles were really fought for mattera very 
different from those which were decided on the fields of 
Magnesia and Pydna. They formed — ^after a long truoe^ 
a new passage in the huge duel between the West and the 
East, which has been transmitted from the struggle of 
Marathon to the present generation and will perhaps reckon 
its future by thousands of years as it has reckoned its past. 

Manifest however as is the foreign and un-Hellenic char- 
acter of the whole life and action of the Cappar 
aiitifls of docian king, it is difficult to define what national 
Asia Minor, gi^nient preponderated in it, nor will research 
perhaps ever succeed in getting beyond generalities or in 
Attaining clear views on this point. In the whole circle of 
an(.ient civilization there is no region where the stocks sub- 
sisting side by side or crossing each other were so nume- 
roiv9, 60 heterogeneous, so variously from the remotest 
times intermingled, and where in consequence the relations 
of the nationalities were so obscure, as in Asia Minor. The 
Semitic ]>opulation continued in an unbroken chain from 



CJHij-. VIII.] King Mithradates. UST 

Syria to Cyprus and Cilicia, and to it;, the original stock of 
the population along the west coast in the Carian and 
Lydian provinces seems also to have belonged, while the 
north-western point was occupied by the Bithynians, who 
were related to the Thracians in Europe. The interior and 
the north coast, on the other hand, were filled chiefly by 
indo-Germanic peoples most nearly cognate to the Iranian. 
In the case of the Armenian and Phrygian languages * it la , 
^certained, in that of the Cappadocian it is highly prob- 
able, that they had immediate affinity with the Zend ; and 
the statement made as to the Mysiatis, that among them 
the Lydian and Phrygian languages met, just denotes a 
mixed Samitio-Iranian population that may be compared 
perhaps with that of Assyria. As to the regions stretching 
between Cilicia and Caria, more especially Lycia, there is 
still, notwithstanding the full remains of the native lan- 
guage and writing that are in this particular instance extant, 
a want of reliable results, and it is merely probable that 
these tribes ought to be reckoned among the Indo-Germans 
rather than the Semites. How all this confused mass of 
peoples was overlaid first with a net of Greek mercantile 
cities, and then with the Hellenism called into life by the 
military as well as intellectual ascendancy of the Greek 
nation, has in general outline been set forth already. 

In these regions ruled king Mithradates, and that first 
of all in Cappadocia on the Black Sea or Pontus 
as it was called, a district in which, situated as 
it was at the north-eastern extremity of Asia Minor tow- 
ards Armenia and in constant contact with the latter, we 
may presume that the Iranian nationality preserved itself 
with less admixture than anywhere else in Asia Minor. 
Not even Hellenism had penetrated far into that region. 



* The words quoted as Phry^pan BayaXwi = Zeus and the old rojal 
Ltme Mavtq baye been beyond doubt correctly referred to the Zend 
hagha = Grod and the Germanic Manniu^ Indian Maniu (Lassen, Zti^ 
9ehrift der deutsehm morgenUind, Ottelltehaft, vol x. p. S29 M^.y 

Vol. m,— 15 



M8 The Eaui and [Bool iv 

With the esoeptkm of the ooeat where seyend origiiiallj 
Greek setUemPoti subsisted — especiaUy the important oomi 
merdsl martSy Tr^)ezu8y Amisos, and above all Sinope, the 
birthplace and rendoKse of Mithradates and the most fluiuw 
ishing city of the empire — the country was still in a very 
prmitive condition. Not that it had lain waste; on the 
•>}iitraryy as the province of Pontus is still one of die most 
fertile on the &e» of the earth, with its fields of gnhk alter- 
nating with forests of wild fruit trees, it was beyond doubt 
even in the time of Mithradates well cultivated and also 
comparatively populous. But there were hardly any towns 
properly so called; the country possessed nothing but 
strongholds, which served the peasants as places of reRige 
and the king as treasuries for the custody of the revenues 
which accrued to bim ; in the Lesser Armenia alone, in &ct, 
there were counted seventy-five of these little royal forts. 
We do not find that Mithradates materially contributed to 
promote the growth of towns in his empire ; and situated 
as he was, — ^in practical, though not perhaps on his own 
part quite consdous, reaction against Hellenism, — this is 
easily explained. 

He appears more actively employed — ^likewi>e quite in 

the Oriental style — in enlai^ing on all sides his 
of^^toiT^ kingdom, which was even then not small, though 
^2^^^''*^ its compass is probably over-stated at 2,300 

miles: we find his armies, his fleets, and his 
envoys busy along the Black Sea as well as towards Ar- 
menia and Asia Minor. But nowhere did so free and ample 
an arena present itself to him as on the eastern and north- 
ern shores of the Black Sea, the state of which at that time 
we must not omit to glance at^ however difficult or in fiict 
impossible it is to give a really distinct idea of it. On the 
eastern coast of the Black Sea — which, previously almost 
an known, was first opened up to more general knowledge 

by Mithradates — the region of Colchis on the 

Phasis (Mingrelia and Imeretia) with the ini' 
portant commercial town of Dioscurias was wrested from 
the native princes and converted into a satrapy of Pon^.us. 



CiiAP. VUL] King Mitkradates. 33* 

Of stain greater moment were his enterprises in the north.* 
The wide steppes destitute of hills and treei^ 
riioresofttM whioli Stretch to the north of the Black Sea, of 
the Caucasus, and of the Caspian, are by reason 
of thdr natural conditions— -more especially from the varia* 
tlons di temperature fluctuating between the climate of 
Stockholm and that of Madeira, and from the absolute des- 
titution of rain or snow which occurs not unfrequently and 
lasts for a period of twenty-two months or longer — ^little 
adapted for agriculture or for permanent setUemeat at all ; 
and they always were so, although two thousand years ago 
the state of the climate was probably somewhat less un- 
favourable than it is at the present day.f The various 
tribes, whose wandering impulse led them into these re 
gions, submitted to this ordinance of nature and led (and 
still to some extent lead) a wandering pa^oral life with 
their herds of oxen or still more frequently of horses, 
changing their places of abode and pasture and carrying 
their effects along with them in waggon-houses. Their 
equipment and style of fighting were consonant to this 
mode of life; the inhabitants of these steppes fought in 
great measure on horseback and always in loose array, 
equipped with helmet and coat of mail of leather and 
leather-covered shield, armed with sword, lance, and bow-^ 
the ancestors of the modern Cossacks. The Scythians 
originally settled there, who seem to have been of Mon- 
golian race and akin in their habits and physical appearance 
to the present inhabitants of Siberia, had been followed up 
by Sarmatian tribes advancing from east to west, — Sauro- 

* They are here grouped together, because, though they were in 
part doubtless not executed till between the first and the second w« 
irlth Rome, they to some extent preceded even the first (Memn. SO ; 
Justin xxxTiii. h ap fin. ; App. Milhr, 18 ; Eutrop. y. 5) and a narra^ 
live in cfaronologieai order ia in this case absolutely unpracticable. 

f It is Tery probable that the LXtraor^uary drought, which is the 
ehief obstacle now to agriculture in the Crimea and in these regions 
generally, has been greatly increased by the dtsappeai-ance of the fores (a 
df central and southern Russia, which formerly to aome extent protect '4 
the coast-pro fincet from the parching north-east wind. 



MO ITke Ead and [BooK iv 

nuitae, Roxolani, JazygeSy — who are oommonly reckoned of 
Slarcmian descent, althoiigfa the proper names, whidi we 
are entitled to ascribe to them, show more affinity with 
Median and Persian names and those peoples perhaps be» 
longed rather to the great Zend stock. Thracian tribes 
moved in the opposite direction, particularly the Getae, wbc 
raadied as far as the Dniester. Between the two there iiir 
traded themseWes — ^probably as offsets of the great Ger* 
manic migration, the main body of which seems not to have 
touched the Blade Sea — ^the Celts, as they were called, on 
the Dnieper, the Bastarnae in the same quarter, and the 
Peucini at the mouth of the Danube. A state, in the 
proper sense, was nowhere formed ; every tribe lived by 
itself under its princes and elders. 

In broad contrast to all these barbarians stood the Het 
lenic settlements, which at the time of the 
in ibat mighty impetus given to Greek commerce had 

'^ been founded chiefly by the efforts of Miletus 

on these coasts, partly as trading-marts, partly as stations 
for prosecuting important fisheries and even for agriculture^ 
for which, as we have already said, the north-western shores 
of the Black Sea presented in antiquity conditions less un- 
favourable than at the present day. For the use of the soil 
the Hellenes paid here, like the Phoenicians in Libya, tax 
and ground-rent to iJie native rulers. The most important 
of these settlements were the free dty of Chersonesus (not 
for from Sebastopol), built on the territory of the Scythians 
in the Tauric peninsula (Crimea), and maintaining itself in 
moderate prosperity under circumstances far from favour* 
able by virtue of its good constitution and the public spirit 
of its citizens ; and Panticapaeum (Kertch) at the opposite 
side of the peninsula on the straits leading from the Black 
Sea to the Sea of Azov, governed since the year 
457 u.c. by hereditary burgomasters, afterward« 
called kings of the Bosporus, the Archaeanactidae, Sparto* 
ddae, and Paerisadae. The culture of com and the fisher 
ies of the Sea of Azov had rapidly raised the city to pro* 
perity. lu twritory still in ihe time of Mitluradates eia* 



Ohap. Yin.] Rng Mithradates. 341 

braced the lesser eastern division of the Cri /nea mcluding 
the town of Theodosia, and on the opposite Asiatic conti* 
nent the town of Phanagoria and the district of Sindioe. 
In better times the lords of Panticapaeum had ruled the 
peoples on the east coast of the Sea of Azov and the valley 
of the Kuban, and had commanded the Black Sea with their 
fleet ; but Panticapaeum was no longer what it had been 
Nowhere was the sad decline of the Hellenic nation felt 
more deeply than at these distant outposts. Athens in its 
good times had been the only Greek state which fulfilled 
there the duties of a leading power—-duties which certainly 
were specially brought home to the Athenians by their need 
of Pontic grain. AfVer the downfall of the Attic maritime 
power these regions were, on the whole, lefb to themselves. 
The Greek land-powers never succeeded in any serious in- 
tervention there, although Philip the father of Alexander 
and Lysimachus sometimes attempted it ; and the Romans, 
on whom with the conquest of Macedonia and Asia Minor 
devolved the political obligation of becoming the strong 
protectors of Greek civilization at the point where it needed 
such protection, utterly neglected the summons of interest 
as well as of honour. The fall of Sinope, the decline of 
Rhodes, completed the isolation of the Hellenes on the 
northern shore of the Black Sea. A vivid picture of their 
position with reference to the roving barbarians is given to 
us by an inscription of Olbia (near Oczakow not &r from 
the mouth of the Dnieper), which probably falls somewhere 
about the time of Mithradates. The citizens had not only 
to send annual tribute to the court-camp of the barbarian 
king, but also to make him a gift when he encamped befor« 
the town or even simply passed by, and in a similar way to 
buy off minor chieftains and in fact sometimes the whole 
horde with presents ; and it fared ill with them if the gift 
appeared too smalU The treasury of the town was banki 
rupt and they had to pledge the votive oflerings. Mean- 
while the savage tribes were thronging without in front of 
the gates ; the territory was laid waste, the field-hbouiem 
were dragged away en masse, and, what was won t of all^ 



84B Ths JSa.4 and FBook rr 

the weaker of their barbarian neighbours, the Scythian^ 
sought, in order to shelter themselves irom the pressure ol 
the more savage Celts, to obtain possession of the wallea 
town, so that numerous citizens were leaving it and the in 
habitants now contemplated its entire surrender. 

Such was the state in which lllithradates found matters 
itfiibradates ^'^^"^ ^^^ Macedonian phalanx crossing the ridgf 
gw^jfo' of the Caucasus descended into the valleys o! 
nm king. the Kuban and Terek and his fleet at the sam6 
time appeared in the Crimeioi waters. No 
wonder that everywhere, as had already been the case in 
Dioscurias, the Hellenes received the king of Pontus with 
open arms and regarded the hal^Hellene and his Cappado- 
cians armed in Greek fashion as their deliverers. What 
Rome had here neglected, became apparent. The demands 
on the rulers of Panticapaeum for tribute had just then been 
raised to an exorbitant height ; the town of Chersonesus 
found Itself hard pressed by Scilurus king of the Taurio 
Scythians and his fifty sons ; the former were glad to sur- 
render their hereditary lordship, and the latter their long- 
preserved freedom, in order to save their last possession, 
their Hellenism. It was not in vain. Mithradates' brave 
generals, Diophantus and Neoptolemus, and his disciplined 
troops easily got the better of the peoples of the steppe. 
Neoptolemus defeated them at the straits of Panticapaeum 
partly by water, partly in winter on the ice ; Chersonesus 
was delivered, the strongholds of the Taurians were broken, 
and the possession of the peninsula was secured by judi- 
ciously constructed fortresses. Diophantus marched against 
the Roxolani (between the Dnieper and Don) who came 
Ibrward to the aid of the Taurians ; 80,000 of them fled 
Vefore his 6,000 phalangites, and the Pontic arR>s penetratea 
as far as the Dnieper. Thus Mithradates acquired here a 
aecond kingdom combined with that of Pontus and, like the 
latter, mainly based on a number of Greek commercial 
towns, ft was called the kingdom of the Bosporus ; it em 
braced ^e modern Crimea with the opposite Asiatic prom 
pntory, and annually furnished to the royal chests and 



Chap, viil] King MUhradates. 348 

magazines 200 talents (£48,000) and 270,000 bushels of 
grain. The tribes of the steppe themselv^es from the north 
slope of the Caucasus to the mouth of the Danube entered, 
at least in great part, into relations of dependence on, or 
treaty with, the Pontic king and, if they furnished him with 
no other aid, afforded at any rate an inexhaustible field for 
recruiting his armies. 

While thus the most important successes were gaine) 

towards the north, the king at the same time 

extended his dominions towards the east and the 
west. The Lesser Armenia was annexed by him and con- 
verted from a dependent principality into an integral part 
of the Pontic kingdom ; but still more important was the 
close connection which he formed with the king of the 

Greater Armenia, He not only gave his daugh- 
with ter Cleopatra in marriage to Tigranes, but it 

^*'*'***' was mainly through his support that Tigranes 
shook off the yoke of the Arsacidae and took their place in 
Asia. An agreement seems to have been made between 
the two to the effect that Tigranes should take in hand to 
occupy Syria and the interior of Asia, and Mithradates Asia 
Minor and the coasts of the Black Sea, under promise of 
mutual support ; and it was beyond doubt the more active 
and abler Mithradates who brought about this agreement 
with a view to cover his rear and to secure a powerful ally. 
Lastly, in Asia Minor the king turned his eyes towards 

Paphlagonia and Cappadocia.* The former was 
S2£ wd claimed on the part of Pontus as having been 
SvSJr^ bequeathed by the testament of the last of the 

Pylaemenidae to king Mithradates Euergetes: 

* The chronologj of the following events can only be determined 
i|>proximatel7. Mithradates Eupator seems to have practically entered 

on the government somewhere about 640; Sulla*s inter 
te. vention took place In 662 (Liv. Ep, 70) with which accords 

as4B ^^ calculation assigning to the Mithradatic wars a period 

of thirty years (662-691) (Plm. H. K vil 26, 9Y). In the 
interval fell the quarrels as to the Paphlagonian and Gappadocian sue 
■enioii, with which the bribery attempted by Mithradates in Bomc 



844 ThsHutand [BookI^ 

Against this, however, legitimate or illegitiniatc |iretenden 
and the land itself protested. As to Cappadocia, the Pod 
tic rulers had not forgotten that this country and Cappa* 
docia on the sea had been formerly united, and continually 
cherished ideas of reunion. Paphlagonia was occupied by 
Mithradates in concert with Nicomedes king of Bithyniai 
with whom he shared the land and thereby drew him wholly 
over to his interests. To cover in some degree the manifest 
violation of right, Nicomedes equipped one of his sons with 
the name of Pylaemenes and designated him as nominal 
ruler of Paphlagonia. The policy of the allies adopted still 
worse expedients in Cappadocia. King Ariarathes VI. was 
killed by Gordius, it was said by the orders, at any rate in 
the interest, of Ariarathes' brother-in-law Mithradates 
Eupator: his young son Ariarathes could only meet the 
encroachments of the king of Bithynia by means of the 
ambiguous help of his uncle, in return for which the latter 
then suggested to him that he should allow the murderer of 
his father, who had taken flight, to return to Cappadocia. 
This led to a rupture and to war ; but when the two armies 
stood ready fur battle, the uncle requested a previous con- 
ference with the nephew and thereupon cut down the un> 
armed youth with his own hand. Gordius, the murderer 
of the father, then undertook the government by the direo 
tions of Mithradates ; and although the indignant popula 
tion rose against him and called the younger son of the last 
king to the throne, the latter was unable to offer any per 
manent resistance to the superior forces of Mithradates.. 
The speedy death of the youth placed by the people on the 
throne gave to the Pontic king the greater liberty of action, 
because with that youth the Cappadocian royal house Ik> 
came extinct. A Pseudo-Ariarathes was proclaimed as 

(Diod. 681) apparently in the first tribunate of Satumlnui 
22^ in 661 (p. 261) was probably connected. Marios, wbo left 

Rome in 666 and did not remain long in the East, found 
Mithradates already in Gappadoda and negotiated with him regarding 
his aggressions (ac. ad Brut, I 6 ; Plut. Mar. 81) ; Ariarathes YL bai 
•onsequently been bj that Ume put to death. 



J 



n:? 



Chap. VIIL] King MUhradoUs. 841 

nominal regent, just as had been done in Paphlagonla ; 
under whose name Gordius administered the kingdom ai 
lieutenant of Mithradates. 

Mightier than any native monarch for many a day had 

been, Mithradates bore rule alike over the north- 
Mi£». ern and the southern shores of the Black Sea 

and £ir into the interior of Asia Minor. The 
resources of the king for war by land and by sea seemed 
immeasurable. His recruiting field stretched from tlie 
mouth of the Danube to the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea ; 
Thracians, Scythians, Sauromatae, Bastamae, ColchianS| 
Iberians (in the modern Georgia) crowded under his ban- 
ners ; above all he recruited his war-hosts from the brave 
Bastarnae. For his fleet the satrapy of Colchis supplied 
him with the most excellent timber, which was floated 
down from the Caucasus, besides flax, hemp, pitchy and 
wax ; pilots and ofiicei*s were hired in Phoenicia and Syria. 
The king, it was said, had marched into Cappadocia with 
eOO scythe-chariots, 10,000 horse, and 80,000 foot; and he 
had by no means mustered for this war all his resources. 
In the absence of any Roman or other naval power worth 
mentioning, the Pontic fleet, with Sinope and the ports of 
the Crimea as its rallying points, had exclusive command 
of the Black Sea. 

During these aggressions on all sides and the formation 

of this imposing power — the development of 
•nd Mithxa- which occupied perhaps a period of twenty years 



— the Roman senate was a patient on-looker. 
It was passive, while one of its dependent states became 
developed into a great military power, having at command 
more than a hundred thousand armed men ; while the ruW 
of that state entered into the closest connection with thr 
Dew great king of the East who was placed partly by his 
aid at the head of the states in the interior of Asia ; while 
he annexed the neighbouring Asiatic kingdoms and princi^ 
palities under pretexts which sounded almost like a mockery 
of the ill-informed and far distant protecting power : whiles 
In fine, be even established himself in Europe and ruled m, 
Vol. til— 15* 



Mtf Tke E(ui and [b««e n 

king orer the Taaric peniiuolay and as lord-pn)tector alnKMt 
to Uie Maoedooo-Thraeian frontier. Hiese drcnmstanoei 
indeed formed the subject of dtsoossioa in the senate ; but 
when the illostrioos eorporation consoled itself in the affiui 
of the Paphlagonian suecessioo with the &et that Mithras 
dates appealed to the testament and Nioomedes to lut 
Pseudo-Pyhiemenes, it was eyidenUy not so mndi deceived 
as gratefbl for any pretext whidi spared it from interference. 
Meanwhile the complaints became daily more numerous and 
BK>re urgent. The princes of the Tauric Scythians, whoff 
Hithradates had driven from the Crimea, tamed for help tc 
Borne ; those of the senators who at all reflected on the 
traditional maxims of Roman policy could not but recollect 
that formerly, tmder circumstances so wholly different, the 
crossing of king Antiochns to Europe and the occupation 
of the Thracian Chersonese by his troops had become the 
signal for the Asiatic war (ii. 309), and could not but see 
that the occupation of the Tauric Chersonese by the Pontic 
king ought still less to be tolerated sow. The 
tion of tbs scale was at last turned by the practical reunion 



of the kingdom of Cappadocia, respecting which, 
moreover, Nicomedes of Bithynia — who on his part had 
hoped to gain possession of Cappadoda by another Pseudo- 
Ariarathes, and now saw that the Pontic pretender excluded 
his own — ^would not fail to urge the Roman government to 
intervention. The senate resolved that Mithradates should 
reinstate the Scythian princes — so far were they driven out 
of the track of right policy by their negligent style of gov- 
ernment, that instead of supporting the Hellenes against 
the barbarians they had now on the contrary to support the 
Scythians against those who were half their countrymen. 
Paphlagonia was declared independent, and the Pseudo- 
Pylaemenes of Nicomedes as well as Mithradates were 
directed to evacuate the portions of the country which they 
had oooupiod. In like manner the Pseudo-Ariarathes was. 
to retire from Cappadocia, and, as the representatives of ths 
country refused the freedom proffered to it, a king was onct 
gyiAMni more to be appointed by free popular electiair 






Cbap, VIII.] jETing MUhradates. 841 

toCappa*. The decrees sounded energetic enough ; only it 
was an error, that instead of sending an army 
they directed the governor of Cilicia, Lucius Sulla, witl) the 
handful of troops whom he commanded there against th<i 
pirates and robbers, to interfere in Cappadocia. Fortu 
nately the remembrance of the former energy of the Ho- 
mans defended their interests in the East better than the 
existing government did, and the energy and versatility of 
the governor supplied what the senate lacked in both r^ 
spects. Mithradates kept back and contented himself with 
inducing Tigranes the great king of Armenia, who held a 
more fi*ee position with reference to the Homans than he 
did, to send troops to Cappadocia. Sulla quickly collected 
his forces and the contingents of the Asiatic allies, crossed 
the Taurus, and drove the governor Gordius along with his 
Armenian auxiliaries out of Cappadocia. This proved 
effectual. Mithradates yielded on all points ; Gordius had 
to assume the blame of the Cappadocian troubles, and the 
Pseudo-Ariarathes disappeared ; the election of king, which 
the Pontic faction had vainly attempted to direct towards 
Gordius, fell on the estimable Cappadocian Ariobarzanes. 
When Sulla in following out his expedition arrived in 
the region of the Euphrates, in whose waters 
tacfcbo?^' the Roman standards were then for the first 
So^i?and t^"™® reflected, the Romans came for the first 
ttbe^Parthi- i-ijj^g i^|.^j contact with the Parthians, who in 

consequence of the variance between them and 
Tigranes had occasion to make approaches to the Romans. 
On both sides there deemed a feeling that it was of some 
moment, in this first contact between the two great powers 
of the East and the West, that neither should renounce its 
claims to the sovereignty of the world ; but Sulla, bolder 
llian the Parthian eiivoy, assumed and maintained In the 
ronference the place of honour between the king of Cappfl«* 
docia and the Parthian ambassador. Sulla^s fame was more 
increased by this greatly celebrated conference on the 
Euphrates than by his victories in the East ; the Parthian 
•nvoy afterwards forfeited his life to his master's renen^ 



848 The East and [Book l¥ 

OMDt. But for the moment this contfxt had no further rei 
miJt. The other decrees of the senate against Mithradatei 
were carried into eiSecty Paphlagonia was evacuated, the 
restoration of the Scythian chieflains was at least promised 
by Mithradates; the earlier itaiu9 quo in the 
East seemed to be restored (662). 
So it was alleged ; but in fact there was little trace of 
any real return of the former order of things. 
Sons^P^ S(»rce had Sulla left Asia, when Tigranes king 
J^^J*" of Great Armenia fell upon Ariobarzanes the 

new king of Cappadociay expelled him, and re« 
instated in his stead the Pontic pretender Ariarathes. In 
Bithynia, where afler the death of the old king 
Nicomedes 11. (about 663) his son Nicomedes 
111. Philopator had been recognized by the people and by 
the Roman senate as legitimate king, his younger brother 
Socrates came forward as pretender to the crown and pos- 
sessed himself of the sovereignty. It was clear that the 
real author of the Cappadocian as of the Bithynian troubles 
was no other than Mithradates, although he refrained from 
taking any official part. Every one knew that Tigranes 
only acted at his beck ; but Socrates also had marched into 
Bithynia with Pontic ti'oops, and the legitimate king's life 
was threatened by the assassins of Mithradates. In Paph* 
lagonia the native princes maintained themselves in the in- 
terior, but Mithradates commanded the whole coast as far 
•s the Bithynian frontier, having either reoccupied these 
districts by way of supporting Socrates, or having never 
really evacuated them. In the Crimea even and the neigh- 
bouring countries the Pontic king had no thought of le- 
cedingy but on the contrary carried his arms fiuther and 
fiirther. 

The Roman government, appealed to for aid by the 
Aq«fliiat kings Ariobarzanes and Nicomedes in person, 
lentioAito. despatched to Asia Minor in support of Lucius 
Cassius who was governor there the consular Maniut 
Aquillius, an officer tried in the Cimbrian and Sidlian wars 
-HK)I| however, as general at the head of an army, but at 



Qup. Tm.] King Mithradates. &18 

an ambassadoF*— «nd directed the Asiatic client states and 
Mithradates in pai'ticular to lend armed assistance in cas6 
of need* The result was as it had been two years before. 
The Roman officer accomplished the commission entrusted 
to him with the aid of the small Roman corps which th« 
gOYemor of the province of Asia had at his disposal, ani* 
(b* levy of the free Phrygians and Galatians; king Nic^ 
medes and king Ariobarzanes again ascended their tottering 
thrones; Mithradates, although under various pretexts 
evading the summons to Ornish contingents, gave to the 
Romans no open resistance ; on the contrary the 
Bithynian pretender Socrates was even put to 
death by his orders (664). 

It was a singular complication. Mithradates was fully 
rhe state of ©oJ^vinced that he could do nothing against the 
thinninter^ Romans in open conflict, and was therefore 

mediato be- * 

tween war firmly resolved not to allow matters to come to 
an open rupture and war with them. Had he 
not been so resolved, there was no more &vourable oppor- 
tunity for beginning the struggle than the present : just at 
the time when Aquillius marched into Bithynia and Cappa- 
docia, the Italian insurrection was at the height of its power 
and might encourage even the weak to declare against 
Rome; yet Mithradates allowed the year 664 
to pass without profiting by the opportunity. 
Nevertheless he pursued with equal tenacity and activity 
his plan of extending his territory in Asia Minor. This 
strange combination of a policy of peace at any price with 
a policy of conquest was certainly in itself untenable, and 
W.1S simply a fresh proof that Mithradates did not belong 
to the class of genuine statesmen ; he knew neither how to 
prepare for conflict like king Philip nor how to submit like 
king Attains, but in the true style of a sultan was perpetu- 
ally fluctuating between a greedy desire of conquest and the 
sense of his own weakness. But even in this point of view 
his proceedings can only be understood, when we recoiled 
that Mithradates had become acquainted by twenty years* 
experience with the Reman policy of th&t day. He knew 



S50 TkBEaatand [BmI? 



rery weD tlittt the Roman goyeniinent were fiv from de 
nrous of wsr: that they in lact, looking to the aerioni 
danger with ichich thdr role was threatoied by the riae of 
any general of repatation, and with the freah remembraner 
of the Cimbnan war and Marias^ dreaded war still more 11 
pomble than he did himadil He acted aooor^ngly. Ilf 
was not afraid to demean himaelf in a way which would 
have giTen to any energetie government not fettered bj 
selfish eonsiderations mantfbld ground and occasion fi>r d^ 
daring war; but he earefblly avoided any open mptora 
which would have placed the senate nnder the necessity of 
declaring it. As soon as men appeared to be in earnest he 
drew bacic, before Sulla as well as before AqutUius; he 
hoped, doubtless, that he would not always be ormironted 
by energetic generals, that he too would, as wdl as Jugur- 
tha, faX\ in with his Scaurus or Albinus. It must be owned 
that this hope was not without reason ; although the very 
example of Jugurtha had on the other hand shown how 
foolish it was to confound the bribery of a Roman com- 
mander and the corruption of a Roman army with the con* 
quest of the Roman people. 
Thus matters stood between peace and war, and looked 
quite as if they would remain lonir in the same 
M^aboat indecisive position. But it was not the inten- 
^^' tion of Aquillius to allow this ; and, as he could 

not compel his government to declare war against Mithra- 
dates, he made use of Nioomedes for that pur- 
pose. The latter, who was under the power of 
the Romaa general and was, moreover, his debtor for the 
accumulated war expenses and for sums promised to the 
general in person, could not avoid complying with the sug* 
gestion that he si ouid b^in war with Mithradates. Tlit 
declaration of war by Bithynia took place ; but, even when 
the vessels of Nicomedes closed the Bosporus against those 
of Pontus, and his troops marched into the frontier districts 
of Pontus and laid waste the region of Amastris, Mithra* 
dates remained still unshaken in his policy of peace ; in* 
stead of driving the Bithynians over the frontier, he lodged 



Cbap. vnr.] Kmg MithradoUea. 861 

a oomplaiut with the Boman envoys and asked them cjthef 
to mediate or to allow him the prlvil^e of selMefenoe. 
But he was informed by Aquillius, that he mutt under all 
oirczimstauoes refrain from war against Nicoraedes. That 
indeed was plain. They had employed exactly the same 
policy against Carthage ; they allowed the vietim to be set 
upon by the Roman hounds and forbade its defending itself 
gainst them. Mithradates reckoned himself lost, just as 
the Carthaginians had done; but, while the Pho^iicians 
yielded from despair, the king of Binope did the very oppo- 
site and assembled his troops and ships. ^ Does not even 
he who must succumb," he is reported to have said, ^ de- 
fend himself against the robber 1 " His son Ariobarzanes 
received orders to advance into Cappadocia ; a message was 
sent once more to the Roman envoys to inform them of the 
step to which necessity had driven the king, and to demand 
their ultimatum. It was to the effect which was to be 
anticipated. Although neither the Roman senate nor king 
Mithradates nor king Nicomedes had desired the 
rupture, Aquillius desired it and war ensued 
(end of 665). 

Mithradates prosecuted the political and military prepa- 
rations for the passage of arms thus forced upon 
JJ2^ ^^™^ '^^^^ ^^ ^^s characteristic energy. First 
dSSr^ of all he drew closer his alliance with Tigranes 

king of Armenia, and obtained from him the 
promise of an auxiliary army which was to march into 
western Asia and to take possession of the soil there for 
king Mithradates and of the moveable property for king 
Tigranes. The Parthian king, offended by the haughty car- 
riage of Sulla, though not exactly coming forward as an 
antagonist to the Romans, did not act as their ally. To the 
Greeks the king endeavoured to present himself in th«5 char- 
acter of Philip and Perseus, as the defender of the Greek 
nation agafnst the alien yoke of the Romans. Pontic en- 
voys were sent to the king of Egypt and to the last rem- 
oant of free Greece, the league of the Cretan cities, and 
adjured those for whom Rome bad already forged her chaiBf 



Cbap. nil] King Mithradates. 369 

superior miliiiiry organization ; but still the East was U 
arms against the Romans, while in the westei a half of the 
empire also matters looked far from peaceful. 

However much it was in itself a political necessity for 

Rome to declare war against Mithradates, yel 
fter^eparftT ^^ particular moment was as unhappily chosen 
^^J^J^*^ as possible ; and for this reason it is very prob* 

able that Manius Aquillius brought about the 
rupture between Rome and Mithradates at this precise time 
primarily from a selfish view to his own interest For the 
mcment they had no other troops at thdr disposal in Asia 
than the small Roman division under Lucius Cassius and the 
militia of western Asia, and, owing to the military and 
financial distress in which they were placed at home in con* 
sequence of the insurrectionary war, a Roman army could 

not in the most favourable case land in Asia 

88a 

before the summer of 666. Hitherto the Ro- 
man magistrates there had a difficult position ; but they 
hoped to protect the Roman province and to be able to hold 
their ground as they stood — the Bithynian army under king 
Nicomedes in its position taken up in the previous year in 
the Paphlagonian territory between Amastris and Sinope, 
and the divisions under Lucius Cassius, Manius Aquillius, 
and Quintus Oppius, &rther back in the Bithynian, 6ala- 
tian, and Cappadocian territories, while the Bithyno-Roman 
fleet continued to blockade the Bosporus. 

In the beginning of the spring of 666 Mithradates as- 
sumed the offensive. On a tributary of the 
Sithradates Halys, the Amnias (near the modern Tesch 
iSS^SSnor K(Jpri), the Pontic vanguard of cavalry and 
igfat-armed troops encountered the Bithyman 
army, and notwithstanding its very superior numbers so 
broke it at the first onset that the beaten arnny dispersed 
and the camp and military chest fell into th€ hands of the 
victors. It was miunly tc Neoptolemus and Archelaus that 
the king was indebted for this brilliant success. The far 
more wretched Asiatic militia, stationed farther back, ther» 
upon gave themselves up as van.][uished, even before they 



8S4 TkeEiMtand [BookIY 

encountered the enemy ; when the generals of Mithradatet 
approached them, they dispersed. A Roman division was 
defeated in Cappadooia ; Cassius sought to keep the field in 
Phrygia with the militia, but he discharged it again without 
venturing on a battle, and threw himself with his few trust- 
worthy troops into the towns on the upper Maeander, paiw 
ticularly into Apamea. Oppius in like manner evacuated 
Pamphylia and shut himself up in the Phrygian Laodicea; 
Aquillius was overtaken while retreating at the Sangarius 
in the Bithynian territory, and so totally defeated that he 
lost his camp and had to seek refuge at Pergamus in the 
Roman province; the latter also was soon overrun, and 
Pergamus itself fell into the hands of the king, as likewise 
the Bosporus and the ships that were there. After each 
victory Mithradates had dismissed all the prisoners belongs 
ing to the militia of Asia Minor, and had neglected no step 
to raise to a higher pitch the national sympathies that were 
from the first directed towards him. Now the whole coun- 
try as far as the Maeander was with the exception of a few 
fortresses in his power ; and news at the same time arrived, 
that a new revolution had broken out at Rome, that the 
consul Sulla destined to act against Mithradates had instead 
of embarking for Asia marched on Rome, that the most 
celebrated Roman generals were fighting battles with each 
other in order to settle to whom the chief command in the 
Asiatic war should belong. Rome seemed SEeal* 
mao moTo- ously employed in the work of se]f*destr notion : 
""^"^ ^ it is no wonder that, though even now minoii- 
ties everywhere adhered to Rome, the great body of the 
natives of Asia Minor joined the Pontic king. Hellenei 
and Asiatics united in the rejoicing which welcomed the 
deliverer ; it was usual to complim^t the king, in whom 
as in the divine conqueror of the Indians Asia and Hellas 
once more found a common meetlng«point, under the nams 
of the new Dionysus. The cities and islands sent messes 
gers to meet him, wherever he went, and to invite ''the 
delivering god " to visit them ; and in festal attire the oiti« 
sens flocked forth in front of their gates to receive him 



(^AP. YUI.] King MUhradates. 055 

Several places delivered the Roman officers sojoarning 
among them in chains to the king ; Laodicea thus surrei> 
dered Quintus Oppius, the commandant of the town, and 
Mjtiiene in Lesbos the consular Manius Aquillics.**^ Thi 
whole fury of the barbarian, who gets the man before whom 
he has trembled into his power, discharged itself on the un- 
happy author of the war. The aged man was led through^ 
out Asia Minor, sometimes on foot chained to a powerful 
mounted Bastamian, sometimes bound on an ass and pro* 
claiming his own name; and, when at length the pitiful 
spectacle again arrived at the royal quarters in Pei^amus, 
by the king^s orders molten gold was poured down his 
throat — in order to satiate his avarice, which had really 
occasioned the war — till he expired in torture. 

But the king was not content with this savage mockery, 
^^^^ which alone suffices to erase the' name of its 

iflBaedfhna author from the roll of true nobility. From 
ftgeaerai £phesus king Mithradatee issued orders to all 
the governors and cities dependent on him to 
put to death on one and the same day all Italians residing 
within their bounds, whether free or slaves, without distinc- 
tion of sex or age, and on no account, under severe penal- 
ties, to aid any of the proscribed to escape ; to cast forth 
the corpses of the slain as a prey to the birds ; to confiscate 
their property and to hand over one half of it to the mur- 
derers, and the other half to the king. The horrible orders 
were—- excepting in a few districts, such as the island of Cos 
—•punctually executed, and eighty, or according to other 
•ooounts one hundred and fiityy thousand — if not innocent, 
At least defenceless — ^men, women, and children were slaugh- 
tered in cold blood in one day in Asia Minor ; a fearful 
execution, in which the good opportunity of getting rid of 
debts and the Asiatic servile willingness to perform any 
executioner's office at the bidding of the sultan had at least 
as much part as Uie comparatively noble feeling of revenge; 

* Retribution came upon the authors of the arrest and surrender <A 
AquUUus twenty-five years afterwards, when after Ifithradates' deati 
his son Fharnsees handed them over to the Romans. 



SS6 Tlie Eaut and [Book r7. 

In a political point of view this measure was not cnly with- 
out any rational object — ^for its financial purpose might h«vc 
been attained without this bloody edict, and the natives of 
Aria Minor were not to be drivoi into warlike seal even by 
the oonsciousness of the most blood-stained guilt — but even 
opposed to the king's designs, for on the one hand it ooni' 
polled the Roman senate, so &r as it was sdll capable of 
energy at all, to an energetic prosecution of the war, and 
on the other hand it struck at oot the Romans merely, but 
the king's natural allies as well, the non>Roman Italians. 
This Ephesian massacre was altogether a mere meaningless 
act of brutally blind revenge, which obUuns a fidse sem« 
blance of grandeur simply through the colossal proportions 
m which the character of sultanic rule was here displayed. 

The king's views altogether grew high ; he had begun 
the war from despair, but the unexpectedly easy 
SjJJf^ victory and the non-arrival of the dreaded Sulla 
^J^J^^ occasioned a transition to the most highflown 
hopes. He made western Asia his home ; Per- 
gamus the seat of the Roman governor became his new 
capital, the old kingdom of Sinope was handed over to the 
king's son Mithradates to be administered as a vioeroyship ; 
Cappadocia, Phrygia, Bithynia were organized as Pontic 
satrapies. The grandees of the empire and the king's 
fiivourites were loaded with rich gifts and fiefs, and not only 
were the arrears of taxes remitted, but exemption from 
taxation for five years was promised, to all the communities 
— a measure which was as much a mistake as the massacre 
of the Romans, if the king expected thereby to secure the 
fidelity of the inhabitants of Asia Minor. 

The king's treasury was, no doubt, copiously replenished 
otherwise by the immense sums which accrued from the 
property of the Italians and other confiscations; for instance 
in Cos alone 800 talents (£195,000) which the Jews had 
deposited there were carried off by Mithradates. The 
northern portion of Asia Minor and most of the islands 
belonging to it were in the king's power ; except the petty 
Paphlagonian dynasts, there was hardly a district whick 



Chaf.yui.j Kmg MWiradatea. 867 

still adhered to Rome ; the whole Aegean Sea waj com- 
manded by his fleets. The south-west alone, the city-leaguei 
of Caria and Lycia and the city of Rhodes, resisted him. 
[n Caria, no doubt, Stratonicea was reduced by force of 
arms; but Magnesia on the Maeander successfully with- 
stood a severe siege, in which Mithradates* ablest officer 
Arohelaus was defeated and wounded. Rhodes, the asylum 
of the Romans who had escaped from Asia with the gov* 
ernor Lucius Cassius among them, was assailed on the part 
of Mithradates by sea and land with immense superiority 
of force. But his sailors, courageously as they did their 
duty under the eyes of the king, were awkward novices, 
and so Rhodian squadrons vanquished those of Pontus four 
times as strong and returned home with captured vessels. 
By land also the siege made no progress ; afler a part of 
the works had been destroyed, Mithradates abandoned the 
ente]*prise, and the important island as well as the mainland 
opposite remained in the hands of the Romans. 

But not only was the Asiatic province occupied by 

Mithradates almost without defending itself, 

Bionof chiefly through the Sulpician revolution break- 

^*™^ ing out at a most unfavourable time; Mithra* 

dates even directed an attack against Europe. Already 

since 662 the neighbours of Macedonia on her 

92. 

northern and eastern frontier had been renewing 
their incursions with remarkable ardour and perseverance ; 
^ ^ in the years 664, 665 the Thracians overran 

PicdatcKT Macedonia and all Epiinis and plundered the 
thoThm- temple of Dodona. Still more smgular was the 

circumstance, that with these movements was 
combined a renewed attempt to place a pretender on the 
Macedonian throne in the person of one Euphenes. Mith* 
radates, who by way of the Crimea maintained connections 
with the Thracians, was hardly a stranger to all these 
events. The praetor Gaius Sentius defended himself, it is 
true, against these intruders with the aid of the Thracian 
Dentheletae ; but it was not long before mightier opponenti 
tame against hin. Mithradates, carried away by his suo 



858 TAelSasiand ibook iv 

c6Mes, had formed iht bold reaolutimi that h« would, liki 
Antioehusy bring the war for the soverdgntjr of Asia to a 
ileoision in Greece, and had bj land and sea direeted thither 
niTMeaiid ^^^ flower of hia troops. His son Ariarathea 
IJ^w^^ penetrated from Thrace into the weakly-defend 
fthsPfKU) ed Macedonia, subduing the country as he ad^ 

vanced and parcelling it into Pontic satrapieSi 
Abdera and Philippi became the principal bases for the 

operations of the Pontic arms in Europe. The 
fleet in tba Pontic fleet, Commanded by Mithradates* best 
***^' general Archelaus, appeared in the Aegean Sea, 
where scarce a Roman sail was to be found. Delos, the 
emporium of the Roman commeixse in those waters, was 
occupied and nearly 20,000 men, mostly Italians, were 
massacred there; Euboea suffered a similar fate; all the 
islands to the east of the Malean promontory were soon in 
the hands of the enemy ; they might proceed to attack the 
mainland itsel£ The assault, no doubt, whidi the Pontic 
fleet made from Euboea on the important Demetrias, was 
repelled by Bruttius Sura, the braVe lieutenant of the gov- 
ernor of Macedonia, with his handful of troops and a few 
vessels hurriedly collected, and he even occupied the island 
of Sciathus ; but he could not prevent the enemy £rom 
establishing himself in Greece proper. 

There Mithradates carried on his operations not only by 

arms, but at the same time by national propa* 
proeeedingi gaudism. His chief instrument for Athena was 
*^' one Aristion, by birth an Attic alave, by prot 
fession formerly a teacher of the Epicurean philoaophy 
now a minion of Mithradates ; an excellent master of per- 
Fuasion, who by the brilliant career which he pursued at 
court knew how to dazzle the mob, and gravely to assure 
them that help was already on the way to Mithradates irom 
Carthage, which had been for about sixty years lying in 
ruins. These addresses of the new Pericles and the prom 
tse of Mithradates to restore to the Athenians the island of 
Delos which they ha^l formerly possessed were so far efFe(^ 
ual that, while the few persons possessed of judgmenf 



Ohap. vm.] Kmg Mithradaies. 359 

escaped from Athens, tne mob and one or two literati whose 
heads were turned formally renounced the Roman rule. So 
the ex*philosopher became a despot who, supported by his 
bands of Pontic merc^iaries, commenoed an in&mous and 
bloody rule ; and the Piraeeus was converted into a Pontic 
harbour. As soon as the troops of Mithradates gained a 
footing on the Greek continent, most of the small free states 
— *the Achaeans, Laconians, Boeotians — as far as Thcssaly 
joined them. Sura, after having drawn some reinforce- 
ments from Macedonia, advanced into Boeotia to bring help 
to the besieged Thespiae, and engaged in conflicts with 
Archelaus and Aristion during three days at Chaeronea ; 
but they led to no decision and Sura was obliged to retire 
when the Pontic reinforcements from the Pelo* 

88 87 

ponnesus approached (end of 666, beg. of 667), 
So commanding was the position of Mithradates, par- 
ticularly by sea, that an embassy of Italian insui^ents in* 
vited him to make an attempt to land in Italy ; but their 
cause was already by that time lost, and the king rejected 
the suggestion. 

The position of the Roman government began to be 
critical. Asia Minor and Hellas were wholly, 
of the Bo- Macedonia to a considerable ext^t, in the 
'°^"" enemy's hands ; by sea the Pontic flag ruled 

without a rival. Then there was the Italian insurrection, 
which, though baffled on the whole, still held the undisputed 
command of wide districts of Italy ; the barely hushed 
revolution, which threatened every moment to break out 
afresh and more formidably ; and, lastly, the alarming com- 
mercial and monetary crisis (p. 312) occasioned by the in- 
ternal troubles of Italy and the enormous losses of the 
Asiatic capitalists, and the want of trustworthy troopa. 
The government would have required three armies, to keep 
dcwn the revolution in Rome, to crush completely the in- 
surrection in Italy, and to wage war in Asia ; it )iad but 
one, that of Sulla ; for the northern Army was, under the 
untrustworthy Gnaeus Straba simply an additional embar- 
rassment. Sulla had to choose which of these three taski 



860 The East and [Book n 

he would ondertake ; he decided, as we have seen for thi 
Asiatic war. It was no trifling matter— we should perhaps 
say, it was a great act of patriotism — ^that in this conflid 
between the general interest of his country and the special 
interest of his party the former retained the ascendancy^ 
■rid that Sulla, in spite of the dangers which his remova 
ft om Italy involved for his constitution and his party, land 
ed in Jie spring of 667 on the coast of Epirus. 
Bttiia'fl But he came not, as Roman commanders-in-chief 

^^ had been wont to make their appearance in the 
East. That his army of five legions or of at most 30,000 
men,* was little stronger than an ordinary consular army, 
was the least element of difference. Formerly in the 
Eastern wars a Roman fleet had never been wanting, and 
nad in fact without exception commanded the sea; Sulla, 
sent to reconquer two continents and the islands of the 
Aegean, arrived without a single vessel of war. Formerly 
the general had brought with him a full chest and drawn 
the greatest portion of his supplies by sea from home; 
Sulla came with empty hands — for the sums raised with 
difficulty for the campaign of 666 were expend- 
ed in Italy — and found himself exclusively left 
to depend on requisitions. Formerly the general had found 
his only opponent in the enemy's camp, and since the close 
of the struggle between the orders political factions had 
without exception been uiiitexl in opposing the public foe ; 
but Romans of note fought under the standards of Mithra- 
dates, large districts of Italy desired to enter into alliance 
with him, and it was at least doubtful whether the demo- 
cratic party would follow the glorious example that Sulla 
had set before it, and keep truce with him so long as he was 
fighting against the Asiatic king. But the vigorous gene- 
ral, who had to contend with all these embarrassments, was 
not accustomed to trouble himself about more remote oan- 

* We must recolle<.t that after the outbreak of the Social War tbc 
legion bad at least not more than half the number of men which it ha4 
previously, as it was no ^ODger accompanied by Italian contingentai 



Chap. Till.] King Mithradates. 361 

gers before finishing the task immediately in hand. W hen 
his proposals of peace addressed to the king, which sub- 
stantially amounted to a restoration of the state of matters 
before the war, met with no acceptance, he advanced just as 
G^^ece he had landed, from the harbours of Epirus to 

Jihki^iirfod Boeotia, defeated the generals of the eliemy 
ArchBlaus and Aristion there at Mount Tilphossium, and 
ttflelr that victory possessed himself almost without resist- . 
tince of the whole Grecian mainland with the exception of 
the fortresses of Athens and the Piraeeus, into which Aris- 
tion and Archelaus had thrown themselves, and which he 
&iled to carry by a coup de main, A Roman division under 
Lucius Hortensius occupied Thessaly and made incursions 
into Macedonia; another under Munatius stationed itself 
before Chalcis, to keep off the enemy*s corps under Neopto- 
lemus in Euboea ; Sulla himself formed a camp at Eleusis 
and Megara, from which he commanded Greece and the 
Peloponnesus, and prosecuted the siege of the city and har- 
bour of Athens. The Hellenic cities, governed as they 
always were by their immediate fears, submitted uncondi- 
tionally to the Romans, and were glad when they were 
allowed to ransom themselves from more severe punish- 
ment by supplying provisions and men and paying fines. 

The sieges in Attica advanced less rapidly. Sulla found 
Protracted himself Compelled to prepare all sorts of heavy 
•iegeof besieginsr implements for which the trees of the 

the Pi- Academy and the Lyceum had to supply the 

timber. Archelaus conducted the defence with 
equal vigour and judgment; he armed the crews of his 
vessels, and thus reinforced repelled the attacks of the Ro- 
mans with superior strength and made frequent and not 
ieldom successful sorties. The Pontic army of Dromi- 
ehaetes advancing to the relief of the city was defeated 
under the walls of Athens by the Romans ajfler a severe 
struggle, in which Sulla's brave legate Lucius Licinius 
Murena particularly distinguished himself; but the siege 
did not on that account adv£uice more rapidly. From 
Macedonia;, wher6 the Cappadocians had meahwhiler defi- 

Vol. IIL-~16 



86S The Mat and [Book iv 

vXtAj estabiished themaelves, plentiful and regular suppliei 
arrived by sea, which Sulla was not in a condition to cut 
off from the harbour-fortress ; in Athens no doubt provl- 
sions were beginning to fidl, but from the proximity of the 
two fortresses Archelaus was enabled to make various 
attempts to throw quantities of grain into Athens, vrhioh 
were not wholly unsuccessful. So the winter 
of 667-3 passed away tediously without result. 
As soon as the season allowed, Sulla threw himself with 
vehemence on the Piraeeus ; he in fiK^t succeeded by mis- 
siles and mines in making a breach in part of the strong 
walls of Pericles, and immediately the Romans advanced 
to the assault; but it was repulsed, and on its being re- 
newed crescent-shaped entrenchments were found construct- 
ed behind the fiillen walls, from which the invaders found 
themselves assailed on three sides with missiles and com- 
pelled to retire. Sulla then abandoned the siege, and con- 
tented himself with a blockade. In the meanwhile the pro- 
visions in Athens were wholly exhausted ; the garrison 
attempted to procure a capitulation, but Sulla sent back 
their fluent envoys with the hint that he stood before them 
not as a student but as a general, and would accept only 
unconditional surrender. When Aristion, well knowing 
what fate was in store for him, delayed compliance, the 
ladders were applied and the city, hardly any longer de- 
fended, was taken by storm (I March 668). 
Atheiu Aristion threw himself into the Acropolis, 

*' where he soon afterwards surrendered. The 

Koman general left the soldiery to murder and plunder in 
the captured city and the more considerable ringleaders of; 
the revolt to be executed ; but the city itself obtained back 
from him its liberty and its possessions— «ven Delos, which 
had just been presented to it by Mithradates — and was thuf 
once more saved by its illustrious dead. 

The Epicurean schoolmaster had thus been vanquished ; 

but the position of Sulla remained in the highest 

Miitionof degree difficult, and even desperate. He had 

now been more than a year in the field without 



. VIII.] King Mithradates. 363 

having advanced a step worth mentioning; a single pari 
mocked all kis exertions, while Asia was utterly left to 
itself, and the eooquest of Macedonia by Mithradates' lieu* 
tenants had recently been completed by the capture of 
Want of ft Amphipolis^ Without a fleet — it was becoming 
'***' daily more apparent-— it was not only impossi* 

ble to secure his communicaUons and supplies in presence 
of the ships of the enemy and the numerous pirates, but 
impossible to recover even the Piraeeus, to say nothing of 
Asia and the islands ; and yet it was difiicult to see how 
ships of war were to be got. As early as the 
winter of 667-8 Sulla had despatched one of 
his ablest and most expert officers, Lucius Licinius Lucul- 
lus, into the eastern waters, to raise ships there if possible. 
Luculius put to sea with six open boats, which he had bor« 
rowed firom the Rhodians and other small communities ; |^ 
himself merely by an accident escaped from a piratic 
squadron, which captured most of his boats ; deceiving the 
enemy by changing his vessels he arrived by way of Crete 
and Gyrene at Alexandria ; but the Egyptian court rejected 
his request for the support of ships of war with equal 
courtesy and decision. Hardly anything illustrates so 
clearly as does this fact the sad decay of the Boman state, 
which had once been able gratefully to decline the offer of 
the kings of Egypt to assist the Romans with all their naval 
force, and now itself seemed to the Alexandrian statesmen 
bankrupt. To all this fell to be added the financial embar- 
rassment; Sulla had already been obliged to empty the 
treasuries of the Olympian Zeus, of the Delphic Apollo, 
and of the Epidaurian Asklepios, for which the gods were 
oompensated by the moiety, confiscated by way of penalty, 
of the Theban territory. But far worse than all this mill" 
tarj and financial perplexity was the reaction of the politi* 
eal revolution in Rome ; the rapid, sweeping, violent aooom« 
plishment of which had far surpassed the worst apprehen- 
sions. The revolution conducted the government in the 
capital ; Sulla had been deposed, his Asiatic command had 
been entrusted to the democratic consul Marcus Valerim 



CiTAF. YIIL] King MUhradaiea. 361 

a few moBths is order to be the spectators <^ a battle be 
tween Sulla and Flaccus. 

In the plain of the Cephissus not fiur fipom Ghaerone% in 
March 668, the armies met. Even includiDg the 
Bftta«of division driven back from Thesaaly, which had 
chaeronea. auQeeedfid in accomplishing its juaetdon with the 
Roman main army, and including the Greek eontingentai 
the Roman army found itself opposed to a foe three times 
as stroi^ and particularly to a. cavalry fiur superior and 
from the nature of the field of battle very dangesrous^ 
against which Sulla found it necessary to protect his flanks 
by digging trenches, while in front he caused a chain of 
palisades to be introduced between his first and second lines 
for protection against the enemy's war-chariots. When the 
war^hariots rolled on to open the battle, the first line of 
the Riomana withdrew behind this row of stakes: the 
chariots, rebounding from it and scared by the Roman 
slingers and archers^ threw themselves on their own line 
and carried confusion both into the Macedonian phalanx and 
into the corps of the Italian refiigees. Archekus brought 
up in haste his cavalry from both flanks, and sei^ it to en- 
gage the enemy, with a view to gain time for rearranging 
his in&ntry ; it charged with great fury aad broke through 
the Roman ranks ; but the Roman in&ntry rapidly formed 
in dose masses and courageously withstood the hfifrsemen 
assailing them on every sid& Meanwhile Su^ himself on 
the right wing led hie cavalry against the exposed flank o£ 
^e enemy ; the Asiatic in&ntry gave way befoee it was 
even properly engaged, and its giving, way carried confusiiMi 
also into the masses of the cavalry. A g^seiial. attaek oi 
the Roman infiintry , which through the wavering desAeaoaiif 
of the hostilie ca^valry gained time to breathe^ decided the 
victory. The closing of the gates of the eamp, which 
Archelaus ordesed to check the flight, only in<»*eased the 
slaughtcar, and yrhm. the gates at lengUi were opened, the 
Romaiis entered at the same time with tbe Aaiatios. It is 
said that Archelaus brought not a twelfth part of hta foms 
in safi'ty to Chalcis ; Sulla followed him to the Emipuft; 



•M 7%e EoM amd [Boos I?, 

he WM not in a pontion to enm Uuit narrow arm of tb€ 



It was a great yictorj, but the results were trifling, 
mi^ .M^ P^'^y heoanae of the want of a fleet, partly be- 
7S canse the Roman conqueror instead of pursuing 

^'^'^* the Tanqaiahed was under the necessity in the 

lirst instance of protecting himself against liis own country- 
men. The aea was still exdusively covered by Ponti<i 
aquadronsy which now showed themselves even to the west* 
ward of the Malean promontory ; even after the battle of 
Qiaeronea Archelaus landed troops on Zacynthus and made 
an attempt to establish himself on that island. Moreovei 
BnUAaad Ludus Flsccus had in the meanwhile actually 
'^''^"'^ landed with two legions in Epirus, not without 
having sustained severe loss on the way from storms and 
from the war-vessels of the enemy cruising in the Adriatic : 
his troops were already in ThesflAly ; Sulla had in the first 
instance to turn thither, llie two Roman armies encamped 
over against eadi other at Melitaea on the northern slope 
of Mount Othrys; a collision seemed inevitable. But 
Flaoeus, after he had opportunity of convincing himself tba^ 
Sulla's soldiers were by no means inclined to betray theii 
victorious leader to the totally unknown democratic com 
mander4n-chie^ but that on the contrary his own advanced 
guard began to desert to Sulla's camp, evaded a conflict to 
whidi he ¥ra8 in no respect equal, and set out towards the 
north, with the view of getting through Macedonia and 
Thrace to Asia and there paving the way for ftuther results 
by subduing Mithradates. That Sulla should have allowed 
his weaker opponent to depart without hindrance, and in 
stead of following him should have returned to Athens^ 
where he seems to have passed the winter of 
668-9, is in a military point of view surprising. 
We may suppose perhaps that in this also he was guided 
by political motives, and that he was sufficiently moderate 
and patriotic in his views willingly to forego a victory over 
his countrymoi at least so long as they had stOl the Aisiatioi 
to deal with, and to find the most l.lerable solution of tfc» 



Obaf Tin.] King Miihradates. 367 

unhappy dilemma in allowing the armies of the revolutioi 
in Asia and of the oligarchy in Europe to fight against thi 
common foe. 

In the spring of 669 there was again fresh work in 
^ Europe. Mithradates, who continued his prepa« 

Smmd Pon- rations indefatigably in Asia Minor, had sent an 
■witto army not much less than that which had been 

extirpated at Chaeronea, under Dorylaus to 
Euboea ; thence it had, after a junction with the remains of 
the army of Archelaus, passed over the Euripus to Boeotia. 
The Pontic king, who judged of what his army could do by 
the standard of victories over the Bithynian and Gappado- 
cian militia, did not understand the unfavourable turn which 
things had taken in Europe; the circles of the courtiers 
were already whispering as to the treason of Archelaus; 
peremptory orders were issued to fight a second battle at 
once with the new army, and not to fail on this occasion in 
annihilating the Romans. The master's will was carried 
out, if not in conquering, at least in fighting, 
Orchome- The Romans and Asiatics met once more in the 



plain of the Cephissus, near Orchomenus. The 
numerous and excellent cavalry of the latter flung itself 
impetuously on the Roman infantry, which began to wavei 
and give way : the danger was so urgent, that Sulla seized 
a standard and advancing with his adjutants and orderlies 
against the enemy called out with a loud voice to the sol- 
diers that, if they should be asked at home where they had 
abandoned their general, they might reply — at Orchomenus. 
This had its effect ; the legions rallied and vanquished tha 
enemy's horse, afler which the infantry were overthrown 
with little difficulty. On the following day the camp of the 
Asiatics was surrounded and stormed ; far the greatest por- 
tion of them fell or perished in the Copaic marshes ; a few 
only, Archelaus among the rest, reached Euboea. The 
Boeotian communities had severely to pay for their renewed 
revolt from Rome, some of them even to annihilation. 
Nothing opposed the advance into Macedonia and Thraoe ; 
Philippi was occupied, Abdera was voluntarily evacuated 



•68 The Bid and [Book it 

by the Pontic garrison, the European oontinent in gener% 
was cleared of the enemy. At the end of the 
third year of the war (669) Sulla was able to 
take up winter quarters in Thessaly, with a view to bc^ 
the Asiatic campaign in the spring of 670,* for 
which purpose he gave orders to build ships ia 
the Thessalian ports. 

Meanwhile the circumstances of Asia Minor also had 
BcMikmiB undergone a material change. If ki^g Mithn^ 
AMt^mnor dates had once come forward as the liberator of 
Sn^»- the Hellenes, if he had introduced his rule with 

the recognition of civic independence and with 
remission of taxes, their brief rejoicing had been but too 
rapidly and too bitterly followed by disappointment. He 
had very soon emerged in his true character, and had be- 
gun to exercise a despotism far surpassing the tyranny of 
the Roman governors — a despotism which drove even the 
patient inhabitants of Asia Minor to open revolt. The 
sultan again resorted to the most violent expedients. His 
decrees granted independence to the places whidi turned to 
him, citizenship to the tneioeci^ full remisdon of debts to the 
debtors, lands to those that had none, freedom to the slaves ; 
nearly 15,000 such manumitted slaves fought in the army 
of Archelaus. The moat fearful scenes were the result of 

* The chronology of these events is, like all their details, eDTe]q)ed 
in an obscurity which investigation is able to dispel, at most, only par- 
tially. That the battle of Oiaeronea took place, if not on tlie same 
day as tlie storming of Athens (Panaan. L ^X ^ '"^J ™^ ^'^^^'"^ after- 

wards, perhaps in March 668, is tolerably certain. Thai 

the succeeding Thessalian and the second Boeotian cao^ 
2* paign took up not merely the reminder of 668 but alia 

the whole of 669, is in itself probable and is rendered still 
more ao by the fact that Sulla's enterprises in Asia are not su£Bcient to 
01 more Aan a single campaign. lacinianus also appears to indicate 
^^ that Sulk returned to Athens for the winter of 668-669 

and there took In hand the wo^ of investigation and poiw 
iatuneoi* after which he relates the battle of Orehomeiiua. The crosa- 

ing of Sulla to Asia has aoco id ingl y been placed not la 

669, but in 670. 



CuAWi YUL] King Mithradaies. 361 

this liigh-haiided subveraion d all existisg order. Th« 
most considerable mereaoitile citiea, Smyrna, CoIcphoDi 
Ephesus, Tralles, Sardes^ dosed their galies ag^Bst the 
king's governors or put them to deaths and dedared for 
Rome.* On the other hand the king's lieutenant DiodoruSj 
a philosopher of note like Ariation:^ of another sohool, but 
equally aTailable for the worst of serviceBy under the. in* 
Btructions of hia master oauaed the wbole town-OQimeil of 
Adnunyttium to be put ta deaitk The Ghiaiu^ who Wtfv^ 
suspected of an inciinatiou> to Rome^. wcdfo fined iit the firat 
instance in 2,000 talents (£480,000) and, when the payment 
was found not correct, they were en fMt»9$ put oa board 
ship and deported in chaina under the oharge of their own 
slaves to the coast of CoIchiSy. while their iahind waa occu- 
pied with Pontic colonista. The king gave, onders that th^ 
chiefs of the Celts in Asia Minor should all be put to death 
along with their wives and chOdren in one. day,, and that 
Galatia should be converted into a Pontie satrapy. Moat 
of these bloody edicts were carried, into effect either at 
Mithradates' own headquarters or ia Galatia, but the few 
who escaped placed themselves at the head of their power 
ful tribes and expelled Eumachus, the governor of the king, 
out of their bounds. It may readily be coneelvod that. such 
a king would be pursued by the daggers of assassine; si»* 
teen hundred men were condemned to death, by the royal 
courts of inquiention as having been implicated in such 
conspiracies. 

While the king waa thus, by hiasuiddal fury provoking 
iiiffldiiis his temporary subjects to rise in arms againsl: 
ii«ei on the him, he was at the same timje hard pressed by 
^^^ the Romans in Asia, both by sea and by land. 



* Tb« nsolutton of the citizens of Ephesos to this, effect has re 
oentlj been found (Waddington, Additions to Lebas, Ir.tcr, iii. 186 a). 
Tliey had, acoording to their own statement, fallen into the power of 
Mithradates '* the king of Gappadocia," being frightened by tho magnl 
iude of his forces and the suddenness of hi? attack ; but; when- oppor« 
tunity offered, they declared war against him '* for tho ride {fi'j^mmy 
If tlie Romans and the oonmon ireal.'^ 
VoT. TIL— 16* 



870 The Etui and [Book n 

Lueallaa, after the fiulure of his sttempt to lead forth thi 
E^ptian fleet against Mithradaten, had with better aao 
eess repeated hia effi>rts to procare vessels of war in the 
Syrian maritinie towns, and rdnforeed his nasoent fleet in 
the ports of Cyprus, Pamphylia, and Kiodes till he found 
himself strcMig enough to proceed to the attack. He dez- 
teronsly avoided the measoring himself against snperio? 
forces and ye'; obtained no inconsiderable advantages. The 
Ctaidian island and peninsola were occupied by him, Samoa 
was assailed, Col<^lion and Qiios were wrested finom the 
enemy. 

Meanwhile Flaceos had proceeded with his army through 

Macedonia and Thrace to Byzantium, and thence, 
^SrmiA passing the straits, had reached Chaloedon (end 
ij^ of 668). Hiere a military insurrection broke 

out against the general, ostensibly because he 
embezzled the spoil from the soldiers. The soul of it was 
one of the ddef officers of the army, a man whose name 
had become a prov^b in Rome for a true mob-orator, 

Grains flavius Fimbria, who, after having difiered 

with his commander-in-chie^ transferred the dem- 
agogic practices which he had begun in the Forum to the 
camp. Flaocus was deposed by the army and soon after- 
wards put to death at Nioomedia, not fiur from Chalcedon ; 
Fimbria was installed by decree of the soldiers in his stead. 
As a matter of course he allowed his troops every indul- 
gence; in the friendly Cyzicus, for instance, the citizens 
were ordered to surrender all their jnroperty to the soldiers 
on pain of death, and by way of warning example two of 
the most respectable citizens were at once executed. Never 
thdess in a military point of view the change of com- 
mander-in-chief was a gain ; Fimbria was not, like Flaocus, 

an incapable general, but enersetio and talented* 
fiotofyst At Miletopolis (on the Rhyndacus to the west 
^ of Brussa) he defeated the younger Mithradatea, 
who as governor of the satrapy of Pontus had marched 
Against him, completely in a nocturnal assault, and by thil 
victory opened his w.iy to Pergamus, the capital formerly 



Chip. VIIL] King MithrodcUes. 871 

of the Roman province and now of the Pontic king, whence 
he dislodged the king and compelled him to take flight to 
the port of Pitane not far off, with the view of there em- 
barking. Just at that moment Lucullus ap|)eared in those 
waters with his fleet ; Fimbria adjured him to render assists 
ance so that he might be enabled to capture the king. But 
the Optimate was stronger in Lucullus than the patriot; 
Peiiioiu ^® sailed onward and the king escaped to Mity- 
-jojdtionof lene. The situation of Mithradates was even 
dateoi thus sufliciently embarrassed. At the end of 

669 Europe was lost, Asia Minor was partly in 
rebellion against him, partly occupied by a Roman army ; 
and he was himself threatened by the latter in his immedi- 
ate vicinity. The Roman fleet under Lucullus had main 
tained its position on the Trojan coast by two successful 
naval engagements at the promontory of Lectum and at the 
island of Tenedos ; it was joined there by the ships which 
had in the meanwhile been built by Sulla's orders in Thes- 
saly, and by its position commanding the Hellespont it 
secured to the general of the Roman «eenatorial army a safe 
and easy passage next spring to Asia. 

Mithradates attempted to negotiate. Under other cir- 
cumstances no doubt the author of the edict for 
tiousfor the Ephesian massacre could never have cher- 



ished the hope of being admitted at all to terms 
of peace with Rome ; but amidst the internal convulsions 
of the Roman republic, when the ruling government had 
declared the general sent against Mithradates an outlaw and 
subjected his partisans at home to the most fearful persecu- 
tions, when one Roman general opposed the other and yet 
both stood opposed to the same foe, he hoped that he should 
be able to obtain not merely a peace, but a favourable peace, 
lie had the choice of applying to Sulla or to Fimbria ; he 
caused negotiations to be instituted with both, yet it seemt 
from the first to have been his design to come to terms with 
Bulla, who, at least from the king's point of view, seemed 
decidedly superior to his rival. His general Archelaus, ai 
instructed by his master, asked Sulla to ce^e Asia to thi 



S7S The East and [Boox IT 

king and to expect in return the king's aid against tbt 
denaocratic party in Rome. But Sulla, cool and dear aa 
ever, while urgently desiring a speedy settlement of Asiatic 
affairs on account of the position of things in Italy, esti- 
mated the advantages of the Cappadocian alliance for the 
war impending over him in Italy as very slight, and wai 
altogether too much of a Itoman to consent to so disgraod* 
/ul and so injurious a concession. 

In the peace conferences, which took place in the winter 

of 669-70, at Delium on the coast of Boeotia 
iM]iaiiii»- opposite to Euboea, Sulla distinctly refused tc* 
j2i^ cede even a foot's-breadth of land, but, with 

good reason faithful to the old Roman custom 
of not increasing afler victory the demands made before 
battle, did not go beyond the conditions previously laid 
down. He required the restoration of all the conquests 
made by the king and not wrested from him again — Cappa* 
docia, Paphlagonia, Galatia, Bithynia, Asia Minor and the 
islands — the surrender of prisoners and deserters, the de- 
livering up of the eighty war^vessels of Archelaus to rein- 
force the still insignificant Roman fleet; lastly, pay and 
provisions for the army and the; very moderate sum of 
8,000 talents (£720,000) as indemnity for the expenses of 
the war. The Chians carried off to the Black Sea were to 
be sent home, the families of the Macedonians who were 
friendly to Rome and had become refugees were to be re- 
stored, and a number of war-vessels were to be delivei*ed 
to the cities in alliance with Rome. Respecting Tigranes, 
who in strictness ought likewise to have been included in 
the peace, there was silence on both sides, since neither of 
the contracting parties cared for the endless further arrange* 
ments which would be occasioned by making him a pa^y« 
The king thus retained the state of possession which he had 
before the war, nor was he subjected to any humiliation 
affecting his honour.* Archelaus, clearly perceiving tW 

* The statement that Hlthradates in the peace stipulated for \m 
lodljy to the towns which had embraced his side (M^mnon^ 96) seem^ 



CtoAF. Tm.) King MHivradates. 37& 

much comparaUvely beyond e2;pectatioQ Uras obtaiQed aa4. 
that moro was not obtainable, concluded the preliminarie« 
and an armistice on thess conditions, and withdrew the 
troops from ^he places which the Asiatics still possessed in 
£urope 

But Mithradates rejected the peace and demanded at 
^KJB. least that the Romans should not insist on the 
surrender of the war- vessels and should concede 
to him Paphlagonia; while he at the same time asserted 
that Fimbria was ready to grant him &r more favourable 
oonditions. Sulla, offended by this placing of his offers on 
an equal footing with those of a private adventurer, and 
having already gone to the utmost measure of concession, 
broke off the negotiations. He had employed the interval 
to reorganize Macedonia and to chastise the Dardani, Sinti, 
and Maedi, in doing which he at once procured booty for 
his army and drew nearer Asia ; for he was re- 
oeedato^ solved at any rate to go thither, in order to 
^ come to a reckoning with Fimbria. He now at 

once put his legions stationed in Thrace as well as his fleet 
in motion towards the Hellespont. Then at length Arche- 
laus succeeded in wringing from his obstinate master a re- 
luctant coos^t to the treaty ; for which he was subse- 
quently regarded with an evil eye at court as the author of 
the injurious peace, and even accused of treason, so that 
some time afterwards he found himself' compelled to leave 
the country and to take refuge with the Romans, who readily 
received him and loaded him with honours. The Roman 
soldiers also murmured; their disappointment doubtlesa 
At not receiving the expected spoil of Asia probably con* 
tributed to that murmuring more than their indignation— - 
in itself very justifiable — that the barbarian prince, who had 
murdered eighty thousand of their countrymen and had 
brought unspeakable misery on Italy and Asia, should b« 

looking to ihe cbwacter of the victor, and of th^ Tanquishedi, fur fron* 
^rodibl^, and it is. iiot.giFen bj Appiiw of. bj Uciniamu^ Tb^ neg^ect^ 
«d to draw up tb/e treaty of pQ4C« in writing, aod tbie ni^lec^ aitfirwanll 
lidft room for various misrepresentations. 



874 TheEadand [Book ly 

alloiNed to retLrn home unpunished with the greatest part 
of the treasures which he had collected by the pillage of 
Asia. Sulla himself was probably painfully sensible that 
the political complications thwarted in a most yexatioui 
way a task which was in a military point of view so sim- 
ple, and compelled him after such victories to content him- 
self with such a peace. But the self^lenial and the sagacity 
with irhich he had conducted this whole war were only dis- 
playe(^ afresh in the conclusion of this peace ; for war witb 
a prince, to whom almost the whole coast of the Black Ses 
belonged, and whose obstinacy was clearly displayed by 
the very last negotiations, would still under the most &vour- 
able drcumstances require years, and the situation of Italy 
was such that it seemed almost too late even for Sulla to 
oppose the party in power there with the few legions which 
he possessed.* Before this could be done, however, it was 

* Armenian tradition also is acquainted with the fint If tthradatie 
war. Ardaaches king of Annenia— Hoees of Gborene tells us — ^was 
not content with the second rank which rightfully belonged to him in 
the Persian (Parthian) empire, bat compelled the Parthian king Arscha^ 
gan to cede to him the supreme power, whereupon he had a palace 
built for himself in Peraia and had coins struck there with his own 
image. He appointed Arschagan yiceroy of Persia and his son Dicran 
(Tigranes) Ticeroy of Armenia, and gave his daughter Ardaschama in 
marriage to the great prince of the Iberians Mihrdates (Mithradates) 
who was descended from Mihrdates satrap of Darius and govemor ap- 
pointed by Alexander over the conquered Iberiaiis, and ruled in the 
northern mountains as well as over the Black Sea. Ardasches then took 
Croesus the king of the Lydians prisoner, subdued the mainland be- 
tween the two great seas (Asia Minor), and crossed the sea with hmu. 
roerable tcsmIb to subjugate the West. As there was anarchy at that 
time in Bome, he nowhere encountered serious resistance, but his sol 
diors kili^ each other and Ardasches fell by the hands of his own 
troops. After Ardasches^ death his successor Dicrana marched agalnsl 
the army of the Greeks (t. «., the Romans) who now in turn inyaded thi 
Armenian land ; he set a limit to their advance, handed oyer to hif 
brother-in-law Mihrdates the administration of Madschag (Mazf&a io 
Gappadoda) and of the interior along with a considerable force, and 
returned to Armenia. Many years afterwards there were still pointed 
out in the Armenian towns statues of Oreek gods by welMcnown mas 
tors, trophies of this campaign. 



Cbap. Tin.] King MUh/radatea. 87B 

absolutely necessary to overthrow the bold officer who was 
at the head of the democratic army in Asia, in order thai 
he might not at some future time come from Asia to the 
help of the Italian revolution, just as Sulla now hoped to 
return from Asia and crush it. At Cypsela on the Hebrus 
Sulla obtained accounts of the ratification of the peace by 
liithradates ; but the march to Asia went on. The king, 
it was said, desired personally to confer with the Roman 
general and to cement the peace with him ; it may be pre- 
sumed that this was simply a convenient pi^text for trans- 
ferring the army to Asia and there putting an end to 
Fimbria. 

So Sulla, attended by his legions and by Arohelaus, 
Peace at crossed the Hellespont ; after he had met with 
Dardanofl. Mithradates on its Asiatic shore at Dardanus 
and had orally concluded the treaty, he made his army con 
tinue its march till he came upon the camp of Fimbria at 
Thyatim not far from Pergamus, and pitched his own close 
beside it The SuUan soldiers, far superior to 

Bulla 

tninat the Fimbrians in number, discipline, leadership, 

and ability, looked with contempt on the dis- 
pirited and demoralized troops and their uncalled com- 
mander-in-chief. Desertions from the ranks of the Fim^ 
brians became daily more numerous. When Fimbria 

We hare no diiBculty in recogninng here Tarioiui &ct8 of the first 
Mithradatio war, but the whole narradve is evidently confused, fur. 
nished with heterogeneous additions, and in particular transferred by 
patriotic fiilsification to Armenia. In just the same way the victory 
over Grassus is afterwards attributed to the Armenians. These Orien- 
tal accounts are to be reoeiyed with all the greater caution, that they 
•re by no means mere popular legends ; on the contrary the acoonnii 
of JosepbuB, EnsebiuB, and other authorities current among the Chris- 
tians of the fifth century have been amalgamated with the Armenian 
traditions) and the historical romances of the Greeks and beyond doubt 
the patriotic fancies also of Moses himself have been laid to a consider* 
able extent under contribuUon. Bad as is our Occidental tradition in 
Mself, to call in the aid of Oriental tradition in this and similar cases— 
IS has been attempted for instance by the uncritical Saint-Martin— cm 
only lead to still further confusion. 



AP. vni.] Sing MithradateB. 871 

' by th9 yal»e of the spoil afterwards carried in tri 
'vhich amounted in precious metal to only about 
0. The few communities on the other hand that 
''.d &ithful— particularly the island of Rhodes^ 
of Lycia, Magnesia on the Maeuoder'-^werf 
1 ; Rhodes received back at least a portion 
lis withdrawn from it after the war agidnal 
. 0(33). In like manner compensation was made 
. as possible by free charters and special favours to the 
Chians for the hardships which they had home, and to the 
Ilienses for the insanely cruel maltreatment inflicted on them 
by Fimbria on account of the negotiations into which the^ 
had entered with Sulla. Sulla had already brought the 
kings of Bithynia and Cappadocia to meet the Pontic king 
at Dardanus, and had made them all promise to live in 
peace and good neighbourhood ; on which occasion, how- 
ever, the haughty Mithradates had refused to admit Ario- 
barzanes who was not descended of royal blood — the slave, 
as he called him — to his presence. Gaius Scribonius Curio 
was commissioned to superintend the restoration of the 
legal order of things in the two kingdoms evacuated by 
Mithradates. 

The goal was thus attained. After four years of war 
the Pontic king was again a client of the Romans, and a 
single and settled government was restored in Greece, 
Macedonia, and Asia Minor ; the requirements of interest 
and honour were satisfied, if not adequately, yet so far as 
circumstances would allow ; Sulla had not only brilliantly 
distinguished himself as a soldier and general, but had the 
skill in a path crossed by a thousand obstacles to preserve 
the difficult mean between bold perseverance and prudeiit 
concession. Almost like Hannibal he had fought and con- 
quered, in order that with the forces, which the first victory 
gave him, he might prepare forthwith for a second and 
severer struggle. After he had in some degree compen* 
Bated his soldiers for the fatigues which they had undergone 
by luxurious winter-quarters in rich Western Asia, he in 
^ the spring of 671 transferred then: in 1,60C 



S7 8 The East and J^ng MUhradates. [Book IT 

fiaiia em- vessels froDi Ephesus to the Piraeeus and thenot 
JjJ*»*w by the land route to Patrae, where the vesself 
again lay ready to convey the troops to 6run> 
disium. His arrival was preceded by a report addressed 
to the senate respecting his campaigns in Greece and Asia, 
die writer of which appeared to Icnow nothing of his depo 
; tl ^HM 4hA Ante herald of the impending rettaHr» 



CHAPTER IX 

OIKKA AND SULLA. 

state of suspense and uncertainty existing in Italj 
when Sulla took his departure for Greece in ths 
Ftementin beginning of 667 has been already described : 
^' the half-suppressed insurrection, the principal 

army under the more than half-usurped command of a 
general whose politics were very doubtful, the confusion 
and the manifold activity of intrigue in the capital. The 
victory of the oligarchy by force of arms had, in spite or 
because of its moderation, made various classes discontent- 
ed. The capitalists, painfully affected by the blows of the 
most severe financial crisis which Rome had yet witnessed, 
were indignant at the government on account of the law 
which it had issued as to interest, and on account of the 
Italian and Asiatic wars which it had not prevented. The 
insurgents, so far as they had laid down their arms, be- 
wailed not only the disappointment of their proud hope 
that they would obtain equal rights with the ruling bur- 
gesses, but also the forfeiture of their venerable treaties and 
their new position as subjects utterly destitute of rights* 
The communities between the Alps and the Po were like- 
wise discontented with the partial concessions made to 
them, and the new burgesses and fireedmen were exasperated 
by the cancelling of the Sulpician laws. The populace of 
the city suffered amid the general distress, and found it in* 
tolerable that the government of the sabre was no longer 
disposed to acquiesce in the constitutional rule of the blud* 
geon. The adherence of those outlawed afler the Sulpician 
revolution, who resided in the capital — a body which had 
remained very numerous in consequence of the remarkable 



880 Cfinna and Sulla. [Boos IT 

moderation of Sulla — l&boured zealously .o procure per 
miision for theso to return home ; and in particular aomi 
ladies of weaitb and distinction spared for this purpose 
neither trouble nor money. None of these grounds of HI- 
humour were bul^ aa to furnish any immediate prospect of 
a tresh violent collision between the parties ; the; were a 
great part of an aimless and temporary nature ; but thfff 
«11 fed the general discontent, and had already been mors 
or less concerned in producing the murder of Kufus, tha 
repeated attempts to assassinate SuUa, the issue of the eon- 
sular and tribunician elections Sor S67 partly in 
iavour of the opposition. 
The name of the man whom the discontented bad sum- 
^^ moned to the head of the state, Lucius Comdiua 

Cinna, had been hitherto scarcely heard of, ex- 
cept so far as be had distinguished himself as an of&aex in 
the Social War. We liave less information r^srding the 
personal standing and the original designs of Qnna than 
regarding those of any other party leader in the Roman 
revolution. The reason is, to all appearance, simply tbst a 
man so thoroughly vulgar and guided by the lowest selfish 
ness had from the first no comprehensive political plans 
whatever. It was asserted at his very first appearance that 
le had sold himself for a round sum of money to the oenr 
>urges8es and the uoterie of Mariue, and the charge looks 
'ery credible ; but even were it false, it remains nevertba- 
ess significant that a suspicion of tlje sort, such as was 
lever expressed agunat Saturninut and Solpictus, attached 
o Cinna, In fact the movement, at the head of which he 
>ut himself, has altogether the appearance of worthlessnesa 
toth as to motives and as to aims. It proceeded not to 
nuch fromra party as ii-om a numlter of dissatisBed persona 
rithout stfictly political aims or notable suppm-t^ who had 
nainly undertaken to carry out the recall of the exiks by 
egal or illegal means. Cinna seems to have been admitted 
nto the conspiracy only by an after-thought and merely 
tecause the intrigue, which in consequence of the restaricttM 
if iiM\ tribunioian powers needed a consul to hriag forward 



€kAP. IX.] Oinf9a and SuUa, 881 

its proposals, saw in him among th« consulai 

candidates ibr 667 its fittest insti'ument and so 
puriied kim forwsird as consul. Among the lead^s appear 
ing in the second rank oS the movement were some ablet 

heads; soch was the tribune xsi the people 

Ghioeus Papirius Carbo, who had mode himself 
a tiamo by his impetuous popular eloquence, and above all 

Quinties Sertorius, one of the most talented of 

Roman officers and a niAn in every respecrt ex- 
o^lesnt, who since his candidature for the tribuneship of the 
people had been a personal enemy to Sulla and had been 
led by this quarrel into the ranks of the disaffected to which 
he did not at all by nature belong. The proconsul Strabo, 
although at vnHance with the government, wbs yet far from 
going along with this faction. 

So long as Sulla was in Italy, the confederates for good 

reasons remained quiet. But when the dreaded 
theOinnan pTocousul, yielding uot to the exhortations of 
WTO utMHL ^j^^ consul Cinna but to iJie urgent state of mat- 
ters in the East, had embarked, Cinna, supported by the 
m^^ority of the college of tribunes, immediately submitted 
tiie projects of law which had been concerted as a partial 

reaction against tive Sullan restoration of 666. 

They embraced the political equalization of the 
new burgesses and the fVeedmen, as Sulpicius had proposed 
it, and the restitution of those who had been banished in 
^nsequ^ice of the Sulpician revolution to their former 
status. The new burgesses flocked en masse to the capital, 
tbat along with Uie freedmen they might terrify, and in case 
of need force, their opponents into compliance. But the 
governnient party was determined not to yield ; consul 
stood against consul, Gnaeus Octavius against Lucius Cinna, 
and tribune against tribune ; both sides appeared in great 
part arm<ul on the day of voting. The tribunes of the 
senatorial party interposed their veto; when swords were 

drawn against them even on the rostra, Octavius 
tto emm- employed fotae against force. His compact bands 
"^ 6f annsid men not only cleared the Via Sacra 



889 (Xnna and Sulla. [Book IT 

Bod the Forum, but also, disregarding the commands of 
their more gentle-minded leader, exercised horrible atrocii 
ties agunst the assembled multitude. The Forum swam 
with blood on this ** Ootavius' day," as it never did befon 
ur afterwards — ^the number of corpses was estimated al 
ten thousand. Cinna called on the slaves to purchase firco 
dom for themselves hj sharing in the struggle; but his 
appeal was as unsuccessful as the like appeal of Marius in 
the previous year, and no course was left to the leaders of 
the movement but to take flight. The constitution supplied 
no means of proceeding farther against the chiefs of the 
oonspiracy, so long as their year of office lasted. But a 
prophet probably more loyal than pious had announced that 
the banishment of the consul Cinna and of the six tribunes 
of the people adhering to hira would restore peace and 
tranquillity to the country ; and, in contbrmity not with 
the constitution but with this r'X)unsel of the gods fortunately 
laid hold of by the custodiers of oracles, the consul Cinna 
was by decree of the senate deprived of his oflice, Lucius 
Cornelins Merula was chosen in his stead, and outlawry was 
pronounced against the chiefs who had fied* It seemed as 
if the whole crisis were about to end in a few additions to 
the number of the men who were exiles in Numidia. 

Beyond doubt nothing further would have come of the 
movement, had not the senate with its usual 
DMuin' remissness omitted to compel the fugitives to 
^' quit Italy as soon as possible, and had there not 

been a possibility that the latter might, as the champions 
of the emancipation of the new burgesses, renew in their 
own favour to some extent the revolt of the Italians. With^ 
out obstruction they appeared in Tibur, in Praeneste, in all 
the important communities of new burgesses in Latium and 
Campania, and asked and obtained everywhere money and 
men for the furtherance of the common cause. Thus sup 
ported, they made their appearance among the army be* 
sieging Nola. The armies of this period were democratic 
and revolutionary in their views, wherever the general did 
not attach them to himself by his personal influence ; the 



Giur. IX.] OifMha ami SuUa. 888 

speeches of the fugitive magistrates, some cf whom, espA 
eially Cinna and Sertorius, were &vourably remembered by 
the soldiers in connection with the last campaigns, made a 
deep impression ; the uncx)nstitutional deposition of the 
popular consul and the interference of the senate with the 
rights of the sovereign people told ou the common soldier, 
and the gold of the consul or rather of the new burgessea 
made the breach of the constitution clear to the officers. 
The Gampanian army recognized Cinna as consul and swore 
the oath of fidelity to him man by man ; it became a 
nucleus for the bands that flocked in from the new bur 
gesses and even from the allied communities ; a consider^ 
able army, though consisting mostly of recruits, soon moved 
from Campania towards the capital. Other bands ap- 
proached it from the north. On the invitation of Cinna 
those who had been banished in the previous year had 
landed at Telamon on the Etruscan coast. There were not 
more than some 500 armed men, for the most part slaves 
Ujna&ngia ^^ ^^^ refugees and enlisted Numidian horse- 
'^^^^ men ; but, as Gaius Marius had in the previous 

year been willing to fraternize with the rabble of the capi- 
tal, so he now ordered the ergastula in which the landhold* 
ers of this region shut up their field-labourers during the 
night to be broken open, and the arms which he offered to 
these for the purpose of achieving their freedom were not 
despised. Reinforced by these men and the contingents oi 
the new burgesses, as well as by the exiles who flocked to 
him with their partisans from all sides, he soon numbered 
6,000 men under his eagles and was able to man forty ships, 
which took their station before the mouth of the Tiber and 
gave chase to the corn-ships sailing towards Rome. With 
these he placed himself at the disposal of the "consul^ 
Cinna, The leaders of the Gampanian army hesitated ; the 
more sagacious, Sertorius in particular, seriously pointed 
out the danger of too closely connecting themselves with a 
man whose name would necessarily place him at the head 
of the movement, and who yet was notoriously incapable 
of any statesmanlike action and haunted by an insane thiraf 



Cbap. IX] Cinna a/nd SuUa, 385 

consul Octayius when Marius had by an understa iding with 
one of the officers of the garrison penetrated into the Janicu- 
lum, and by which in fact the insurgents were successfully 
beaten off again with much loss, showed that he was far 
from intending to unite with, or rather to place himself 
under, the leaders of the insurgents. It seems rather to 
-bave been his design to sell his assistance in subduing the 
insurrection to the alarmed government and citizens of the ^ 
capita] at the price of the consulship for the next year, and 
thereby to get the reins of government into his own hands. 
The senate was not, however, inclined to throw itself 

into the arms of one usurper in order to escape 
tions or from another, and sought help elsewhere. The 
the^toii^ franchise was by decree of the senate supple- 

mentarily conferred on all the Italian communi- 
ties involved in the Social War, which had laid down their 
arms and had in consequence thereof forfeited their old alli- 
ance.* It seemed as it were their intention officially to 
demonstrate that Bome in the war against the Italians had 
staked her existence for the sake not of a great object but 
of her own vanity : in the first momentary embarrassment, 
for the purpose of bringing into the field an additional thou- 
.sand or two of soldiers, she sacrificed everything which had 
.been gained at so terribly dear a cost in the Social War. 
In fact, troops arrived from the communities who reaped 
the benefit of this concession; but instead of the many 
legions promised, their contingent on the whole amounted 
to not more than, at most, ten thousand men. It was of 
more moment that an agreement should be come to with 
the Samnites and Nolans, so that the troops of the thoi^ 
oughly trustworthy Motellus might be employed for the 
protection of the capital. But the Samnites made demands 
which recalled the yoke of Caudium — ^restitution of the 

* P. 809. That there was no confirmation by the oomitia, is dear 
from Cic. PhU, xii. 11, 27. The senate seems to have made use of the 
form of simply prolonging the term of the Plautio-Papirian law (p. 
800), a course which by use and wont (i. 409) was open to it and practi 
oaUy amounted to conferring the franchise on all Italians. 

Vol. in.--17 



S86 Oimna and ShiOa. [Bora If 

■poil taken from the Samnites and of tlidr prisoners and 
deaerten^ renoneiation of the booty wrested hj the Sam* 
nites from the Romans, the bestowal of the franchise on ths 
Samnites themselTes as well as on jhe Romana who had 
{Mused over to them. The senate rejected even m this 
emergencj terms of peace so disgrao^l, but instmcted 
Metellus to leaye behind a small diTision and to lead m 
person all the troops that could at all be dispensed with in 
southern Italy as quickly as possible to Rome. He obeyed. 
But the consequence was, that the Samnites attacked and 
defeated Plautius the legate left b^ind by Metellus and his 
weak band ; that the garrison of Nola marched out and set 
on fire the neighbouring town of Abella in alliance with 
Rome ; that Cinna and Marius, moreover, granted to the 
Samnites everything they asked — what mattered RoraaD 
honour to them ?— -and a Samnite contingent reinforced the 
ranks of the insurgents. It was a severe loss also, when 
aA^er a combat un&vourable to the troops of the govern- 
ment Ariminum was occupied by the insuigents and thus 
the important communication between Rome and the val- 
ley of the Po, whence men and supplies were expected, was 
interrupted. Scarcity and famine set in. The large popu- 
lous dty numerously garrisoned with troops was but in- 
adequately supplied with provisions ; and Marius in particu* 
lar took care to cut off its supplies more and more. He 
had already blocked up the Tiber by a bridge of ships ; 
now by the capture of Antium, Lanuviuro, Aricia, and 
other places he gained control over the means of land com- 
munication still open, and at the same time appeased tem- 
porarily his revenge by causing all the citizens, wherever 
resistance was offered, to be put to the sword with the ex* 
ception of those who had possibly betrayed to him the 
town. Contagious diseases ensued and committed dreadful 
ravages among the masses of soldiers densely crowded 
round the capital ; of Strabo's veteran army 11,000, and of 
the troops of Octavius 6,000 are said to have fallen victimi 
Defttiiof to them. Yet the government did not despair* 
■^'^ and the sudden death of Strabo was a forti> 



Ciup. IX.} Cinna and SuUct. 381 

Date eyent for it^ He died not of the pestilence^ buU-^aii 
was alleged at leasts— of the effects of a thunderbolt which 
had struck his tent; the masses, exasperated on many 
grounds against him, tore his corpse from the bier and 
dragged it through the streets. The remnant of his troops 
was incorporated by the consul Octavius with his army. 
After the arrival of Meteilu? and the decease of Strabo 
the army of the gorernment was again at least 
Of fhe goT- a match for its antagonists, and was able to array 
*™'" itself for battle against the insurgents at the 

Alban Mount. But the minds of the soldiers of the gov- 
ernment were deeply agitated ; when Cinna appeared in 
front of them, they received him with acclamation as if he 
were still their general and consul ; Met^lus deemed it 
advisable not to allow the battle to come on, but to lead 
back the troops to their camp. The Optimates themselves 
wavered, and fell into variance with each other. While one 
party, with the honourable but stubborn and shoiisighted 
consul Octavius at their head, perseveringly opposed all 
concession, the more experienced and more judicious Metel- 
lus attempted to bring about a compromise ; but his con- 
ference with Cinna excited the wrath of the ultras on both 
ddes: Cinna was called by Marius a weakling, Metellus 
was called by Octavius a traitor. The soldiers, unsettled 
otherwise and not without cause distrusting the leadership 
of the untried Octavius, suggested to Metellus that he 
should assume the chief command, and, when he refused, 
began in crowds to throw away their arms or even to 
desert to the enemy. The temper of the burgesses became 
daily more depressed and troublesome. On the proclama* 
tion of the heralds of Cinna guaranteeing freedom to the 
slaves who should desert, these flocked in troops from the 
eapital to the enemy's camp. But the proposal that the 
senate should guarantee freedom to the slaves willing to 
lioQ^Q enter the army was decidedly resisted by Octa* 

oapitaiatei. vius. The government could not conceal that 
it was defeated, and that nothing remained but to come tc 
terms if poadble with the leaders of the band, as the over 



890 Oinna and SuUa [Book n 

of Ardyaeans (p. 214), cliieflj Berred as bis executioners^ 
and did not neglect, amidst these Satamalia of their nevt 
fireedom, to plunder the houses of their former masters and 
to dishonour and murder all whom thej met with there. 
His own associates were in despair at this insane fury; 
Sertorius adjured the consul to put a stop to it at any pricci 
and even Cinna was alarmed. But in times such as these 
were, madness itself becomes a power ; man hurls himself 
into the abyss, to save himself from giddiness. It was not 
easy to restrain the furious old man and his band, and least 
of all had Cinna the courage to do so ; on the contrary, he 
chose Marius as his colleague in the consulship for the next 
year. The reign of terror alarmed the more moderate of 
the victors not much less than the defeated party ; the capi« 
talists alone were not displeased to see that another hand 
lent itself to the woiic of thoroughly humbling for once the 
haughty oligarchs, and that at the same time, in consequ^ce 
of the extensive confiscations and auctions, the best part of 
the spoil came to themselves — in these times of terror they 
acquired from the people the surname of the ^ hoarders.'' 

Fate had thus granted to the author of this reign of 
terror, the old Gaius Marius, his two chief wishes. He 
had taken vengeance on the whole pack of nobles that had 
embittered his victories and envenomed his defeats ; he had 
been enabled to retaliate for every sarcasm by a stroke of 
the dogger. Moreover, he entered on the new year once 
more as consul ; the vision of a seventh consulate, which 
the oracle had promised him, and which he had sought for 
thirteen years to grasp, had now been realized. The gods 
had granted to him what he wished ; but now too, as in the 
old l^endary period, they practised the fatal irony of de- 
stroying man by accomplishing his wishes. In his early 
eonsulates the pride, in his sixth the laughingnstock, of his 
fellow-citizens, he was now in his seventh loaded with the 
execration of all parties, with the hatred of the whole na> 
tion; he, the originally upright, able, gallant man, was 
branded as the crack-brained chief of a reckless band of 
robbers. He himself seemed to feel it. His days weri 



Gbat. IX.] Omna and Sulla. 391 

passed as in delirium^ and by night his couch denied him 
rest, so that he grasped the wine-cup in order merely to 
drown thought. A burning fever seized him ; after being 
stretched for seven days on a sick bed, in the wild fancies 
of which he was fighting on the fields of Asia Minor the 
battles whose laurels were destined for Sulla, he expired on 
the 13th Jan. 668. He died, more than seventy 
Death of years old, in Ml possession of what he called 

™* power and honour, and in his bed ; but Nemesis 

assumes various shapes, and does not always expiate blood 
with blood. Was there no sort of retaliation in the £M3t, 
that Rome and Italy now breathed more freely on the new^ 
of the death of' the £unous saviour of the people than at 
the tidings of the battle on the Eaudine plain 1 

Even after his death individual incidents no doubt 
occurred, which recalled that time of terror ; Gaius Fim- 
bria, for instance, who more than any other during the 
Marian butcheries had dipped his hand in blood, made an 
attempt at the very funeral of Marius to kill the universally 
revered poniifex maximus Quintus Scaevola 
(consul in 659) who had been spared even by 
Marius, and then, when the poniifex recovered from the 
wound he had received, indicted him criminally on account 
of the offence, as Fimbria jestingly expressed it, of having 
not been willing to let himself be murdered. But the 
orgies of murder at any rate were over. Sertorius called 
together the Marian bandits, under pretext of giving them 
their pay, surrounded them with his trusty Celtic troops, 
and caused them to be cut down en masse to the number, 
according to the lowest estimate, of 4,000. 

Along with the reign of terror came the tyrannis. 
Cinna not only stood at the head of the state for 
•foimuu four years in succession (667-670) as consul, 
"^ but he regularly nominated himself and his col- 

leagues without consulting the people ; it seemed as if these 
democrats set aside the sovereign popular assembly with 
intentional contempt. No other chief of the popular party 
before or afterwards, possessed so perfectly absolute a powei 



/ 



892 Cmna cmd SiMa. [Bms n 

in Italy and in the greater part of the provinces for so long 
a time almost undisturbed, as Cinna ; but no ono can be 
named, whose government was so utterly worthless and 
aimless. The law proposed by Sulpicius and thereafter by 
Cinna himself, which promised to the new burgesses and the 
freedmen equality of sufirage with the old burgesses, was 
naturally revived ; and it was formally confirmed by a de- 
^ cree of the senate as valid in law (670). Cec 

sors were nominated (668) for the purpose of 
distributing all the Italians, in accordance with 
it, into the thirty-five tribes — ^by a singular conjuncture, in 
consequence of a want of qualified candidates for the cen* 
sorship the same Philippus, who when consul 
in 663 had been the prmcipal occasion of the 
miscarriage of Drusus' plan for bestowing the franchise on 
the Italians (p. 271), was now selected as censor to inscribe 
them in the burgess-rolls. The reactionary institutions 
established by Sulla in 666 were of course over- 
thrown. Some steps were taken to please the 
proletariate — for instance, the restrictions on the distribu- 
tion of grain introduced some years ago (p. 287), were 
probably now once more removed; the design of Gains 
Gracchus to found a colony at Capua was in reality carried 
out in the spring of 671 on the proposal of the 
tribune of the people, Marcus Junius Brutus; 
Lucius Valerius Flaccus the younger introduced a law as 
to debt, which reduced every private claim to the fourth 
part of its nominal amount and cancelled three>fourths in 
favour of the debtors. But these measures, the only posi- 
tive ones during the whole Cinnan government, were with- 
out exception the dictates of the moment ; they were based 
— aud this is perhaps the most shocking feature in this 
whole catastrophe — ^not on a plan possibly erroneous, but 
on no political plan at all. The populace were caressed, 
and at the same time offended in a very unnecessary way 
by a meaningless disregard of the constitutional rules o^ 
election. The capitalist party might have furnished soma 
•upport| but it was injured in the most sensitive point by 



Chap. IK.] Vinna and Sulla. JBOS 

the law as to debt. The true mainstay of the government 
was — wholly without any oo-operation on its part — the new 
burgesses; their assistance was acquiesced in, but nothing 
was done to regulate the strange position of the SamuiteSy 
wh^ were now nominally Roman citizens^ but evidently 
regarded their country's independence as practically the 
real object and prize of the struggle and remained in arms 
to defend it against all and sundry. Illustrious senators 
were struck down like mad dogs ; but not the smallest step 
was taken to reorganize the senate in the interest of the 
government, or even permanently to terrify it ; so that the 
government was by no means sure of its aid. Gains Grac- 
chus had not understood the fall of the oligarchy as imply- 
ing that the new master might conduct himself on his selP 
created throne, as legitimate cipher-kings think proper to 
do. But this Cinna had been elevated to power not by 
his will, but by pure accident; was there any wonder 
that he remained where the storni*wave of revolution had 
washed him up, till a second wave came to sweep him away 
again 1 

The same union of the mightiest plenitude of powei 
cinna and ^^^ ^^^ most Utter impotence and incapacity in 
*^^ those who held it, was apparent in the warfare 

waged by the revolutionary government ag^nst the oli- 
garchy — a warfare on which its existence primarily de- 
itaiyuid pended. In Italy it ruled with absolute sway, 
ttfi proT- Of the old burgesses a very large portion were 
AtTonrofthe on principle favourable to democratic views; 
goTenmum ^^^ ^^^ ^^^^ greater mass of quiet people, while 

disapproving the Marian horrors, saw in an oligarchic resto^ 

ration simply the commencement of a second reign of terror 

by the opposite party. The impression of the 

outrages of 667 on the nation at large had been 

comparatively slight, as they had chiefly afiected the mert 

aristocracy of the capital ; and it was moreover somewhat 

effaced by the three years of tolerably peaceful government 

(hat ensued. Lastly the whole mass of the new burgesses 

— thre^fifths perhaps of the Italians — ^were decidedly, if ndi 

Vol. III.- 17* 



S84 CSnna and SuUa. [Book n 

fcvourable to the present goyemment, yet oppoeed to tli« 
olif^archy. 

Like Italyi most of the provinces adhered to the oli- 
garchy — Sidly, Sardinia, the two Gauls, the two Spains. 
in Africa Quintus Metellus, who had fortunately escaped 
the murderers, made ah attempt to hold that province for 
the Optimates ; Marcus Crassus, the youngest son of ths 
Publius Crassus who had perished in the Marian massacre^ 
went to him from Spain, and reinforced him by a band 
which he had collected there. But on their quarrelling with 
each other they were obliged to yield to Grains Fabias 
Hadrianus, the governor appointed by the revolutionary 
government. Asia was in the hands of Mithradates ; con- 
sequently the province of Macedonia, so far as it was in the 
power of Sulla, remained the only asylum of the exiled oli- 
garchy. Sulla's wife and children who had with difficulty 
escaped death, and not a few senators who had made their 
escape, sought refuge there, so that a sort of senate was 
soon formed at his head quarters. 

The government did not &il to issue decrees against the 

oligarchical proconsul. Sulla was deprived by 

agaiiMt the comitia of his command and of his other 

^ honours and dignities and outlawed, as was also 

the case with Metellus, Appius Claudius, and other refugees 
of note ; his house in Rome was razed, his country estates 
were laid waste. But such proceedings did not settle the 
matter. Had Gains Marius lived longer, he would doubt- 
less have marched in person against Sulla to those fields 
whither the fevered visions of his death-bed drew him ; the 
measures which the government took afber his death have 
heen stated already. Lucius Valerius Flaccus the younger,* 

* Lucius Yaierius Flaocoa, whom the Fasti name aa oonsul in 6A&, 
was not the oonsul of 664, but a younger man of the same 
name, perhaps son of the preceding. For, first, the law 

which prohibited re-election to the consulship remained legally in fiill forcf 
from c. 603 (p. 98) to 678, and it is not probable that what 
was done in the case of Scipio Aemilianus and MariTig wai 

done also for Flaocua. Secondly, there is no menticn anywhere, whei 



Obaf. UL] Cmna and Sulla, 894 

who after Marius' death was invested with the consulship 
and the command in the East (668), was neither 
soldier nor officer ; Gains Fimbria who acoom- 
(Mtnied him was not without ability, but insubordinate ; ths 
army assigned to them was even in numbers three times 
weaker than the army of Sulla. Tidings successively 
ftrrived; that Flaocus, in order not to be crushed by Sulla, 
had marched past him onward to Asia (668) ; 
that Fimbria had set him aside and installed 
himself in his room (beg, of 669) ; that Sulla had 
concluded peace with Mithradates (669-670). 
Hitherto Sulla had been silent so £ur as the authorities 
ruling in the capital were concerned. Now a letter from 
him reached the senate, in which he reported the termina- 
tion of the war and announced his return to Italy ; he stated 
tliat he would respect the rights conferred on the new bu]> 
gesses, and that, while measures of punishment were inevi- 
table, they would light not on the masses, but on the 
authors of the mischie£ This announcement frightened 
Cinna out of his inaction : while he had hitherto taken no 
step against Sulla except the pladng some men under arms 
and collecting a number of vessels in the Adriatic, he now 
resolved to cross in all haste to Greece. 

On the other hand Sulla's letter, which in the circum- 
Attempts stances might be called extremely moderate, 

dther FlacooB is named, of a double oonsulship, not even where it wai 
necessary as in Cic. pro F7ac€, 82, 77. Thirdly, the Lucius Valerius 

Flaccus who was active in Rome in 669 as prineeps se-ia^iia 
lJ[ and consequently of consular rank (Liv. 83), cannot have 

been the consul of 668, for the latter had already wt that 
time departed for Asia and was probably already dead. The ;oiisul 
IMi 97 ^^ ^^* censor in 657, is the person whom Cicero {ad AU, 

viii. 8, 6) mentions among the consulars present in Rom/S 
*'* ^ in 667 ; he was in 669 beyond doubt the oldest of the oil 

eensors lifing and thus fitted to be princepa senatus ; he was also the 

itUerrex and the magitter eguiCum of 672. On the othef 
^] hand, the consul of 668, who perished in KicomedJa (p^ 

870), was the father of tfao Lucius Flaccus defendeil h§ 
doero (pro Flaet 2n, 61, comp. 88, 65. 82, 77). 



' 398 (Xnna and Stdla. [Book It 

•aw Tetjr well that Italy oould not be ettbdu«Al with fivi 
legions if it remained united in resolute resistance. Tc 
settle aooounts with the popular party and their incapable 
autocrats wo«M not have been difficult ; but ho saw opposed 
(o him and miited with that party the whole mass of those 
who desired no oligarohic restoration with its terrors, and 
ibove all the whole body of new burgesses — both those 
who had been prevented by the Julian law from taking part 
In the insurrection, and those whose revolt a few years be- 
fore had brought Borne to the brink of ruin. 

Sulla fully surveyed the situation of afi&irs, and was &r 
HifinodBni- removed from the blind exasperation and the 
^*^^ obstinate rigour which characterized the majority 

of his party. While the edifice of tlie state was in flames, 
while his friends were being murdered, his houses destroyed, 
his family driven into exile, he had remained undisturbed 
at his post till the public foe was conquered and the Roman 
frontier was secured. He now treated Italian aflTairs in the 
same spirit of patriotic and judicious moderation, and did 
whatever he could to pacify the moderate party and the 
new burgesses, and to prevent the civil war from assuming 
the &r more dangerous form of a fresh war between the 
old Romans and the Italian allies. The first letter which 
Sulla addressed to the senate had asked nothing but what 
was right and just, and had expressly disclaimed a reign of 
terror. In harmony with its terms, he now presented the 
prospect of unconditional pardon to all those who should 
even now break off from the revolutionary government, 
and cauied his soldiers man by man to swear that they 
would meet the Italians thoroughly as friends and fellow- 
citizens. The most binding declarations secjired to the new 
burgesses the political rights which they had acquired ; so 
that Carbo, for that reason, wished hostages to be furnished 
to him by every civic community in Italy, but the proposal 
broke down under general indignation and under the oppo- 
sition of the senate. The chief difficulty in the position of 
Sulla really oonsisted in the &ct, that in consequence of th€ 
fikithlessness and perfidy which prevailed the new burgessef 



'CuA». DL] Oinria and StUla. 3M 

had every reason, if not to suspect his perscmal designs, to 
doubt at any rate whether he would be able to induce the 
majority of the senate to keep their word after the viotory. 
In the spring of 671 Sulla landed with his legions in the 
port of Brundisium. The senate, on receiving 
Buita :&fuhi the news, declared the commonwealth in danger, 
^ ^* and committed to the consuls unlimited powers ; 
but these incapable leaders had not been on their guard, and 
were surprised by a landing which had nevertheless been 
foreseen for years. The army was still at Ariminum, the 
ports were not garrisoned, and — ^what is almost incredible 
—there was not a man under arms at all along the whole 
south-eastern coast. The consequences were soon apparent, 
and iB rein- Brundisium Itself, a considerable community of 
<^Mdi^ new burgesses, at once opened its gates without 
•ad desert- resistance to the oligarchic general, and all Mes* 
sapia and Apulia followed its example. The 
army marched through these regions as through a friendly 
country, and mindful of its oath uniformly maintained the 
strictest discipline. From all sides the scattered remnant 
of the Optimate party flocked to the camp of Sulla. Quin« 
tus Metellus came from the mountain ravines of Liguria, 
whither he had made his escape from Africa, and resumed, 
as colleague of Sulla, the proconsular command committed 
^^ to him in 667 (p. 828), and withdrawn from 

him by the revolution. Marcus Crassus in like 
manner appeared from Afnca with a small band of armed 
men. Most of the Optimates, indeed, came as emigrants 
of quality with great pretensions and small desire for fight- 
ing, so that they had to listen to bitter language from Sulla 
himself regarding the noble lords who wished to have them- 
selves preserved for the good of the state and could not 
even be brought to arm their slaves. It was of more im- 
portance, that deserters already made their appearance from 
the democratic camp— for instance, the refined and respected 
Lucius PhOippuB, who was, along with one or two notori* 
Dusly incapable persons, the only consular that had come t« 
terms with the revolutionary government and accepted 



iM Cfitma and Sulla. [Book FT 

offioes under it. He met with the most gracious r«ceptioB 
from Sulla, and obtained the honourable and easy oharge of 
oooupying for him the province of Sardinia. Quintui 
Lucretius Ofella and other serviceable officers were likewiss 
received and at once employed ; even Piiblius Cethegus, one 
of the senators banished after the Sulpician Smeute by Sullsi 
Dbtained pardon and a position in the army. 

Still more important than these individual accessions 
was the gain of the district of Picenum, which 
was substantially due to the son of Strabo, the 
young Gnaeus Pompeius. The latter, like lus father origi 
nally no adherent of the oligarchy, had acknowledged the 
revolutionary government and even taken service in Cinna's 
army ; but in his case the fact was not forgotten, that his 
father had borne arms against the revolution; he found 

himself assailed in various forms and even threatened with 

I 

the loss of his very considerable wealth by an indictment 
charging hini to give up the booty which was, or was allied 
to have been, embezzled by his father after the capture of 
Asculum. The protection of the consul Carbo, who was 
personally attached to him, still more than the eloquence 
of the consular Lucius Philippus and of the young Lucius 
Hortensius, averted from him financial ruin; but he re- 
mained uneasy. On the news of Sulla's landing he went to 
Picenum, where he had extensive possessions and the best 
municipal connections derived from his father and the Social 
War, and set up the standard of the Optimate party in 
Auximum (Osimo). The district, which was mostly in* 
habited by old burgesses, joined him ; the young men, 
many of whom had served with him under his Either, readily 
ranged themselves under the courageous leader who, not yet 
twenty-three years of age, was as much soldier as general, 
sprang to the front of his cavalry in combat, and vigorously 
assailed the enemy along with them. The corps of Picenian 
volunteers soon grew to three legions; divisions under 
doelius. Gains Albius Carrinas. Lucius Junius Brutus*' 

* ^e •An only sappoae thi" to be the Bmtus referred to, auM 



Chap. IX.] Oinna and Sulla. 401 

DamnsippuSy were despatched firom the capital to put 
down the Picenian insurrection, but the extemporized gene* 
ral, dexterously taking advantage of the dissensions tha* 
arose among them, had the skill to evade them or to beat 
them in detail and to efiect his junction with the main army 
of Sulla, apparently in Apulia. Sulla saluted him as impe* 
rator, that is, as an officer commanding in his own name and 
holding not a subordinate but a parallel position, and dis> 
tinguished the youth by marks of honour such as he showed 
to none of his noble clients — probably not without the col- 
lateral design of thereby administering an indirect rebuke 
to the want of energetic character among his own partisans. 
Reinforced thus considerably both in a moral and mate- 
^^^^ ^ rial point of view, Sulla and Metellus marched 
Campania from Apulia through the still insurgent Samnite 

oppoeed by * *^ ° 

Norbanua districts towards Campania. The main force of 
-^ ^^-^ the enemy also proceeded thither, and it seemed 
as if the matter must there be brought to a decisive issue. 
The army of the consul Gains Norbanus was already at 
Capua, where the new colony had just established itself with 
all democratic pomp ; the second consular army was like* 
wise advancing along the Appian road. But, before it 

arrived, Sulla was in front of Norbanus. A last 
aT%OT7^ attempt at mediation, which Sulla made, led only 
J^^JJ" to the arrest of his envoys. With fresh indig- 
TiSS! nation his veteran troops threw themselves on 

the enemy ; their vehement charge down from 
Mount Ti&ta at the first onset broke the enemy drawn up 
in the plain ; with the remnant of his force Norbanus threw 
himself into the revolutionary colony of Capua and the new- 
burgess town of Neapolis, and allowed himself to be block- 
aded there. Sulla's troops, hitherto not without appreheiv 
don as they compared their weak numbers with those of 
the enemy, had by this victory gained a full conviction of 
their military superiority ; instead of pausing himself to 

Marcus Bnitus the father of the so-called Liberator wai 
tribuno of the people in 671, and therefore ooulvl not com' 
nuuid in the field. 



#08 Citma a/nd SvUa. [Bmk IT 

besiege the remains of the defeated army, Sulla left the 
(owns where they took shelter to be invested, and advanced 
along the Appian highway against Teanum, where 
or 8cipk)*« Scipio was posted. To him also, before begia« 
*™^^' ning battle, he made fresh proposals for peace ; 

apparently in good earnest. Scipio, weak as he was, entered 
kito them ; an armistice was concluded ; between Cales and 
Teanum the two generals, both members of the same noble 
getis^ both men of culture and refinement and for many 
years colleagues in the senate, met in personal ccmference » 
they entered upon the several questions ; they made such 
progress, that Sqipio despatched a messenger to Capua to 
procure the opinion of his colleague. Meanwhile the sol* 
diers of the two camps mingled ; the Sullans, copiously 
furnished with money by their general, had no great diffi- 
culty in persuading the recruits — not too eager for warfare 
— over their cups that it was better to have them as com* 
rades than as foes ; in vain Sertorius warned the general to 
put a stop to this dangerous intercourse. The agreement, 
which had seemed so near, was not effected ; it was Scipio 
who denounced the armistice. But Sulla maintained that 
It was too late and that the agreement had been already 
concluded ; whereupon Scipio's soldiers, under the pretext 
that their general had wrongfully denounced the armistice, 
passed over m masBe to the ranks of the enemy. The scene 
closed with an universal embracing, at which the command- 
ing officers of the revolutionary army had to look on. Sulla 
gave orders that the consul should be summoned to resign 
his office, which he did, and should along with his staff be 
escorted by his cavalry to whatever point they desired ; 
but Scipio was hardly set at liberty when he resumed the 
insignia of his dignity and began afresh to collect troops, 
without however executing anything further of moment 
Sulla and Metellus took up winter quarters in Campania 
and, after the failure of a second attempt to come to terms 
wjfii Norbanus, maintained the blockade of Capua during 
the winter. 

The results of the first campaign in fevour of SulU 



'^r. ELI 0vim4i and SuUa. 40a 

were the submission of Apulia, F!cenum, and 
ttonTon Campania, the dissolution of the one, and the 
****^ *'**** vanquishing and blockading of tl.e other, ooii> 
sular army. The Italian ccmmunities, compelled severally 
to choose between their two oppressors, already entered in 
many instances into negotiations with him, and caused the 
political rights which had been won from the of^osition" 
party to be guaranteed to them by formal separate trealiM 
on the part of the general of the oligarchy. Sulla cherished 
the distinct expectation, and intentionally made boast of it, 
that he would overthrow the revolutionary government in 
the next campaign and again march into Rome. 

But despair seemed to furnish the revolution with fresh 
energies. The consulship was committed to two of its 
most decided leaders, to Carbo for the third time and to 
Gains Marius the younger ; the circumstance that the latter, 
who was just twenty years of age, could not legally be 
invested with the consulship, was as little heeded as any 
other point of the constitution. Quintus Sertorius, who in 
this and other matters proved an inconvenient critic, was 
ordered to proceed to Etruria with a view to procure new 
levies, and thence to his province Hither Spain. To re- 
plenish the treasury, the senate was obliged to decree the 
melting down of the gold and silver vessels of the temples 
in the capital ; that the produce was considerable, is clear 
from the fact that after several months* war&re there was 
still on hand nearly £600,000 (14,000 pounds of gold and 
6,000 pounds of silver). In the considerable portion of 
Italy, which still voluntarily or under compulsion adhered 
to the revolution, warlike preparations were prosecuted with 
vigour. Newly-formed divisions of some strength came 
from Etruria, where the communities of new burgesses 
were very numerous, and from tiie region of the Po. Thf 
veterans of Marius in great numbers ranged themselves 
under the standards at the call of his son. But nowhere 
were preparations made for the struggle against Sulla with 
such eagerness as in the insurgent Samnium and some dis 
triots of Lucania. It was owing to anything but devotioi 



f 04 dnrna and SvUa. [Book ^V. 

towards the revolutionary Roman government, that nume* 
rous contingents from the Oscan districts reinforced their 
armies ; but It was well understood there that an oligarchy 
restored by Sulla would not acquiesce in the dB facto inde* 
pendenoe of these lands as the lax Gnnan government had 
now done ; and therefore the primitive rivalry between lh« 
Sabellians and the Latins was roused afresh in the struggle 
against Sulla. For Samnium and Latium this war was as 
much a national struggle as the wars of the fifth century ^ 
they strove not for a greater or less amount of political 
rights, but for the purpose of appeasing long-suppressed 
hate by the annihilation of their antagonist. It was no 
wonder, therefore, that the war in this region bore a char* 
acter altogether different from the conflicts elsewhere, that 
no compromise was attempted there, that no quarter was 
given or taken, and that the pursuit was continued to the 
very uttermost. 

Thus the campaign of 672 was begun on both sides with 
augmented military resources and increased ani- 
mosity. The revolution in particular threw 
away the scabbard : at the suggestion of Carbo the Roman 
comitia outlawed all the senators that should be found in 
Sulla's camp. Sulla was silent ; he probably thought that 
they were pronouncing sentence beforehand on themselves. 
The army of the Optimates was divided. The procon. 
- sul Metellus undertook, resting on the support 
olS* IT" of the Picenian insurrection, to advance to Upper 
J?]^t£ ^^y» w^ile Sulla marched from Campania 
Jgg«^ straight against the capital. Carbo threw him- 
self in the way of the former; Marius would 
encounter the main army of the enemy in Latium. Ad- 
vancing along the Via Latina, Sulla fell in with the enemy 
not far from Signia ; they retired before him as far as the 
so-called -'Port of Sacer," between Signia and the chief 
stronghold of the Marians, the strong Praeneste, 
•t fk^k^ There Marius drew up his force for battle. Hit 
^ army was about 40,000 strong, and he was in 

savage fury imd personal bravery the true son of his father | 



Chap. IX.] Cinna and Stdla, 40A 

but his troops were not the well-trained bands with which 
the latter had fought his battles, and still less could this in^ 
experienced young man bear comparison with the old mas* 
ter of war. His troops soon gave way ; the defection of a 
division even during the battle accelerated the defeat. More 
dian the half of the Marians were dead or prisoners ; the 
remnant, unable either to keep the field or to gain the other 
bank of the Tiber, was compelled to seek protection in the 
neighbouring fortresses ; the capital, which they had neg- 
lected to provision, was irrecoverably lost. In 
massaores consequence of this Marius gave orders to 

^^ Lucius Brutus Damasippus the praetor com- 
manding there to evacuate it, but before doing so to put to 
death all the notable men, hitherto spared, of the opposite 
party. This injunction, by which the son even outidid the 
proscriptions of his father, was carried mto effect ; Dama- 
sippus made a pretext fur convoking the senate, and the 
marked men were struck down partly in the sitting itself, 
partly on their flight from the senate-house. Notwithstand- 
ing tfie thorough clearance previously effected, there were 
still found several victims of note. Such were the late 
aedile Publius Antistius, the father-in-law of Gnaeus Pom- 
peius, and the late praetor Gaius Carbo, son of the well- 
known friend and subsequent opponent of the Gracchi (p. 
162), since the death of so many men of more distinguished 
talent the two best judicial orators in the desolated Forum ; 
the consular Lucius Domitius, and above all the venerable 
ponti/ex maximus Quintus Scaevola, who had escaped the 
dagger of Fimbria only to bleed to death during these last 
throes of the revolution in the vestibule of the temple of 
Vesta entrusted to his guardianship. With speechless hor- 
ror the multitude saw the corpses of these last victims of 
the reign of terror dragged through the streets, and thrown 
Into the river. 

The broken bands of Marius threw themselves into 
fiiflge of Norba and Praeneste, strong cities of new bur- 
Pneaeste. gesses in the neighbourhood : Marius in person 
with the treasure and the gi'eater part of the fugitives entered 



106 Oifma and SuUa. [Book n 

the latter. Sulla left an able officer, Quiiitus Ofella, before 
Praeneste just as he had done in the previous year bt^fore 
Cnpua, with instructions not to expend hia strength in the 
siege of the strong town, but to enclose it with an extended 
^cenpatian ^^^® o^ blockade and starve it into surrender. 
•I Home. Uq himself advanced from different sides upoA 
the capital, which as well as the whole surrounding distrid 
he foutd abandoned bj the enemy, and occupied without 
resistance. He barely took time to compose the minds of 
the people by an address and to make the most necessary 
arrangements, and immediately passed on to Etruria, that 
in concert with Metellus he might dislodge his antagonist? 
from Northern Italy. 

Metellus had meanwhile encountered and defeated C^ 
Meteiin* ^'® lieutenant Carrinas at the river Aesis (Esino 
gj^ between Ancona and Sinigaglia), which separated 

Kortbem the district of Picenum from the Gallic prov- 
ince ; when Carbo in person came up wi^ his 
superior army, Metellus had been obliged to abstain from 
any farther advance. But on the news of the battle at 
Sacriportus, Carbo, anxious about his communications, had 
retreated to the Finminian road, with a view to take up his 
headquarters at its rallying point Ariminum, and from that 
point to hold the passes of the Apennines on the one hand 
and the valley of the Po on the other. In this retrograde 
movement different divisions fell into the hands of the 
enemy, and not only so, but Sena Gallica was 
Ms^d on stormed and Carbo's rearguard was broken in a 
^"gyjj^ brilliant cavalry engagement by Pompeius; 
nevertheless Carbo attained on the whole hit 
object. The consular Norbanus took the command in the 
valley of the Po; Carbo himself proceeded to Etruria 
But the march of Sulla with his victorious legions to Etxn- 
ria altered the position of affairs ; soon three Sullan armies 
from Gaul, Umbria, and Rome established communications 
with each other. Metellus with the fleet went past Arim>* 
num to Ravenna, and at Faventia cut off the communic^ 
tlon between Ariminum and the valley of the Po, Into whick 



Ohaf. UL] Cinna and Sulla. 407 

he sent forward a division along the great road to Placentia 
under Marcus Lucullus, the quaestor of Sulla and brother 
of his admiral in the Mithradatic war. The young Pom 
peius and his contemporary and rival Crassus penetrated 
from Picennm by mountain-paths into Umbria and gained 
the FlamiQian road at Spoletmm, where they defeated Car- 
bo's legate Carrinas and shut him up in the town ; he suo- 
ceeded, however, in escaping from it on a rainy night and 
making his way, though not without loss, to the army of 
Carbo. Sulla himself marched from Rome into Etruria 
with his army in two divisions, one of which advancing 
along the coast defeated the corps opposed to it at Satumia 
(between the rivers Ombrone and Albegna) ; the second led 
by Sulla in person fell in with the army of Carbo in the 
valley of the Clanis, and sustained a successful conflict with 
his Spanish cavalry. But the pitched battle which was 
fought between Carbo and Sulla in the region of Chiusi, 
although it ended without being properly decisive, was so 
far at any rate in favour of Carbo that Sulla's victorious 
advance was checked. 

In the vicinity of Rome also events appeared to assume 
a more favourable turn for the revolutionary 
about Frae- party, and the war seemed as if it would again 
"*"**' be drawn chiefly towards this region. For, 

while the oligarchic party were concentrating all their en- 
ergies on Etruria, the democracy everywhere put forth the 
utmost efforts to break the blockade of Praeneste. Even 
the governor of Sicily Marcus Perpenna set out for that 
purpose; it does not appear, however, that he reached 
Praeneste. Nor was the very considerable corps under 
Marcius, detached by Carbo, more successful ; assailed and 
defeated by the troops of the enemy which were at Spo* 
letium, demoralized by disorder, want of supplies, and 
mutiny, one portion went to Carbo, another to Ariminum, 
the rest dispersed. Help in earnest on the other hand 
came from Southern Italy, There the Samnites under 
Pontius of Telesia, and the Lucanians under their experi- 
enced general Marcus Lamponius, set out without its being 



40& Cmna oauL SuUa, [Book it 

possible to prevent their departure, were joined in Cun* 
pania where Capua still held out by a division of the gjup 
rison under Gutta, and thus to the number, it was said, of 
70,000 marched upon Praeneste. Thereupon Sulla himself 
leaving behind a corps against Carbo, returned to Latium 
and took up a well«chosen position in the defiles in front of 
Traenoste, where he intercepted the route of the relieving 
army.* In vain the garrison attempted to break through 
tlie lines of Ofella, in vain the relieving army attempted to 
dislodge Sulla ; both remained immoveable in their strong 
positions, even after Damasippus, sent by Carbo, had rein- 
forced the relieving army with two legions. 

But while the war stood still in Etruria and in Latium, 
matters came to a decision in the valley of the 



SoSvJiMM Po. There the general of the democracy, Gaius 
iti^^' Norbanus, had hitherto maintained the ascend- 
ancy, had attacked Marcus Lucullus the legate 
of Metellus with superior force and compelled him to shut 
himself up in Placentia, and had at length turned against 
Metellus in person. He encountered the latter at Faventia, 
and immediately made his attack late in the afternoon with 
his troops fatigued by their march ; the consequence was a 
complete defeat and the total breaking up of his corps, of 
which only about 1,000 men returned to Etruria. On the 
news of this battle Lucullus sallied from Placentia, and 
defeated the division left behind to oppose him at Fidentia 
(between Piacenza and Parma). The Lucanian troops of 
Albinovanus deserted in a body : their leader made up for 
his hesitation at first by inviting the chief officers of the 
revolutionary army to banquet with him and causing them 
to be put to death ; in general every one, who could dc so, 

* It is stated, that SoUa occupied the defile by which alone IVae* 
nesto was accessible (App. 1, 90) ; and the sequel showed that the road 
to Rome was open to him as well as to the relieving anny. Beyoad 
doubt Sulla posted himself on the cross road which turns off from the 
Via Latina, along which the Samnites adyanced, at Yalmontone towards 
Palcstrlna ; in this case Sulla communicated with the capital ty dit 
Pkraenestine, and the enemy by the Latin or Labican, road. 



Gbaf. EL] Cinna and SuUa. 409 

now concluded his peace. Ariminum with all its stores 
and treasures fell into the power of Metellus ; Norbanus 
embarked for Rhodes; the whole land between the Alps 
and Apennines acknowledged the government of the Opti- 
mates. The troops hitherto employed there 
cnpied V ' Were enabled to turn to the attack of Etruria, 
^^ the last province where their antagonists still 
kept the field. When Carbo received this news in the 
camp at Clusium, he lost his resolution ; although he had 
still a considerable body of troops under his orders, he 
secretly escaped from his headquarters and embarked for 
Africa. Part of his abandoned troops followed the example 
which their general had set, and went home ; part of them 
were destroyed by Pompeius : Carrinas gathered together 
the remainder and led tliem to Latium to join the army of 
Praeneste. There no change had in the meanwhile taken 
place; and the final decision drew nigh. The troops of 
Carrinas were not numerous enough to shake Sulla's posi- 
tion ; the vanguard of the army of the oligarchical party, 
hitherto employed in Etruria, was approaching under Pom- 
peius ; in a few days the net would be drawn tight around 
the army of the democrats and the Samnites. 

Its leaders then determined to desist from the relief of 
Praeneste and to throw themselves with all 

'^ftA flfti 111 

nitesand their united strength on Rome, which was only 
attoek™ a good day's march distant. By so doing they 
^™*' were, in a military point of view, ruined ; their 

line of retreat, the Latin road, would by such a movement 
fall into Sulla's hands ; and, even if they got possession of 
Rome, they would be infallibly crushed there, enclosed as 
they would be within a city by no means fitted for defence, 
and wedged in between the far superior armies of Mecellua 
and Sulla. Safety, however, was no longer thought of; re- 
venge alone dictated this march to Rome, the last outbreak 
of fiiry in the passionate revolutionists and especially in the 
despairing Sabellian nation. Pontius of Telesia was in 
earnest, when he called out to his followers that, in order 
to get rid of the wolves whi^h had robbed Italy of firee*. 
Vol. IIL— 18 



410 Oinna and SuUa. [Bock IT 

dom, the forest in which they harboured must be destroyed. 
Never waa Rome in more fearful peril than on the lat 
NoTember, 672, when Pontius, Lamponms, Gar* 
rinas, Damasippus advanced along the Latiir 
road towards Rome, and encamped about a mile from the 
Colline gate. It was threatened with a day like the 20th 
July, 805 u.o. or the 15th June, 455 a.d. — the 
days of the Celts and the Vandals. The time 
was gone by when a coup de main against Rome was a 
Ibolish enterprise, and the assailants could have no want of 
connections in the capital. The band of Tolunteers whidi 
sallied from the city, mostly youths of quality, was scat- 
tered like chaff before the immense superiority of for(». 

BfttUeatfha ^^ ^^^7 ^^P® ^^ safety rested on Sulla. The 
OoUiiMKito. latter, on receiving accounts of the departure 
of the Samnite army in the direction of Rome, had like- 
vfise set out in all haste to the assistance of the capital. 
The appearance of his foremost horsemen under Balbus in 
the course of the morning revived the sinking courage of 
the citizens ; about midday he appeared in person with his 
main force, and immediately drew up his ranks for battle 
at the temple of the Erycine Aphrodite before the Colline 
gate (not £blt from Porta Pia). His officers adjured him 
not to send the troops exhausted by the forced march at 
once into action; but Sulla took into consideration what 
the night might bring on Rome, and, late as it was in the 
afternoon, ordered the attack. The battle was obstinately 
contested and bloody. The left wing of Sulla, which he 
led in person, fell back as &r as the city wall, so that it 
became necessary to dose the city gates ; stragglers even 
Drought accounts to Ofella that the battle was lost. But 
on the right wing Marcus Crassus overthrew the enemy 
and pursued him as far as Antemnae ; this somewliat re- 
lieved the left wing also, and an hour after sunset it in turn 
b^an to gair. ground. The fight continued the whole night 
and even on the following morning ; it was only the defec- 
tion of a division of S,000 men, who immediately turned 
thnir arms against their former comrades, that put an end 



^4r. VL] OiHna and Svlua. 411 

to the struggle. Rome was saved. The army of the in- 
aargentSy for which there was no retreat, was completely 
extirpated. The prisoners taken in the batt^ 
UMprinn- —between 3,000 and 4,000 in number, indud* 
"" ing the generals Damasippus, Carrinas, and the 

aeverelj wounded Pontius — ^were by SuUa's orders on the 
third day after the battle brought to the Villa Publica in 
the Gampus Martius and there massacred to the last man, 
BO that the clatter of arms and the groans of the dying 
were distinctly heard in the neighbouring temple of Bel- 
lona, where Sulla was just holding a meeting of the senata 
It was a ghastly execution, and it ought not to be excused ; 
but it is not right to forget that those yery men who per* 
ished there had fidlen like a band of robbers on the capital 
and the burgesses, and, had they found time, would have 
destroyed them as fiir as fire and sword can destroy a city 
and its citizens. 

With this battle the war was, in the main, at an end. 
BiegM. '^^^ garrison of Praeneste surrendered, when it. 

Praaneste. learned the issue of the battle of Rome from 
the heads of Carrinas and other officers thrown oyer the 
walls. The leaders, the consul Gkiius Marius and the son 
of Pontius, after haying fitiled in an attempt to escape, fel 
on each other's swords. The multitude cherished the hope^ 
in which it was confirmed by Cethegus, that the yictor 
would eyen now haye mercy upon them. But the times 
of mercy were past. The more unconditionally Sulla had 
up to the last moment granted full pardon to those who 
came oyer to him, the more inexorable he showed himself 
toward the leaders and communities that had held out to 
the end. Of the Praenestine prisoners, 12,000 in number, 
most of the Romans and indtyidual Praenestines as well 
as the women and children were released, but the Roman 
senators, almost all the Praenestines and the whole of the 
Bamnites, were disarmed and slaughtered; and the rich 
dty was giyen up to pillage. It was natural that, after 
iuch an occurrence, the cities of new burgesses which had 
not yet passed oVer should continue their resistance with 



J 



41S Cfinna and Stdla- [Book if 

the utmost obttinaoy* In the Laiin town of 
Norba for instance, when Aemilius Lepidus go; 
into it by treaaon, the oitixenii killed eaeh other and set firt 
themaelrea to their town, solely in <»^er to deprive tbeli 
exeoutionera of yengeance and of booty. In Lower Italj^ 
Neapolis had already been taken by assault, and Capua 
had, as it would seem, been voluntarily surren- 
dered ; but Nola was only evacuated by the 
Samnites in 674. On his flight from Nola the 
last surviving leader of note among the Italians, the consul 
of the insurgents in the hopeful year 664, Graius 
Papius Mutilus, disowned by his wife to whom 
he had stolen in disguise and with whom he had hoped to 
find an asylum, fell on his sword in Teanum before the door 
of his own house. As to Samnium, the dictator declared 
that Rome would have no rest so long as Samnium existed, 
and that the Samnite name ought therefore to be extirpated 
from the earth ; and, as he verified these words in terrible 
fashion on the prisoners taken before Rome and in Prae- 
neste, so he appears to have also undertaken a raid for the 
purpose of laying waste the country, to have captured 
Aesemia* (674?), and to have converted that 
hitherto flourishing and populous region into thu 
desert which it has since remained. In the same manner 
Tuder in Umbria was stormed by Marcus Crassus. A 
longer resistance was offered in Etruria by Populonium 
and above all by the impr^nable Volaterrae, which gath- 
ered out of the remains of the beaten party an army of 
four legions, and stood a two years' siege conducted first 
by Sulla in person and then by the former praetor Gains 
Gurbo, the brother of the democratic consul, till at length 
in the third year after the battle at the Collins 
gate (675) the garrison capitulated on condition 
of free departure. But in this terrible time neither mili 
tar) law nor military discipline was regarded ; the soldiera 

* Hardly any ether name, probably, can be conoealed under the 
wrmpl reading in Li v. 89 mtam in SamrUo ; oomp. Strabe, v 8, 10 



OtuF. IX.] Oinna and Sulla. 418 

raised a cry of treason and stoned their too compliant gene- 
ral , a troop of horse sent by the Roman government out 
down the garrison as it withdrew in terms of the capita- 
lation. The victorious army was distributed throughout 
Italy, and all the insecure places were furnished with strong 
garrisons : under the iron hand of the SuUan officers the 
last quiverings of the revolutionary and national opposition 
slowly died away. 

There was dtill work to be done in the provinces. Sar> 
^ dinia had been speedily wrested by Luciua 

inoes. Phillppus from the governor of the revolution- 

ary government Quintus Antonins (672), and 
Transalpine Gaul offered little or no resistance; but in 
Sicily, Spain, and Africa the cause of the party defeated in 
Italy seemed by no means lost. Sicily was held for them 
by the trustworthy governor Marcus Perpenna* Quintus 
Sertorius had the skill to attach to himself the provincials 
in Hither Spain, and to form from among the Roipans 
settled in that quarter a not inconsiderable army, which in 
the first instance closed the passes of the Pyrenees : in this 
he had given fresh proof that, wherever he was stationed, 
he was in his place, and amidst the incapables of the revo- 
lution was the only man practically useful. In Africa the 
governor Hadrianus, who followed out the work of revo- 
lutionizing too thoroughly and began to give liberty to the 
slaves, had been, on occasion of a tumult instigated by the 
Roman merchants of Utica, attacked in his official residence 
and burnt with his attendants (672) ; neverthe- 
less the province adhered to the revolutionary 
government, and Cinna's son-in-law, the young and M% 
Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus, was invested with the 
supreme command there. Propagandism had even been 
carried from thence into the client-states, Numidia and 
Mauretania. Their legitimate rulers, Hiempsal 11. son of 
Gauda, and B<^d son of Bocchus, adhered to Sulla ; but 
with the aid of the Cinnans the former had been dethroned 
by the democratic pretender Hiarbas, and similar feudi 
agitated the Mauretanian kingdom. The consul Carbo who 



414 Oinna and JSuUa. [Book iv 

had fled from Italj tarried on the iilaijd Cossyra (Pantel 
laria) between Afrioa and Sicily, at a loss, apparently 
whether he should flee to Egypt or ahould .attempt to r» 
new the struggle in one of the faithful provinces. 

Sulla sent to Spain Gaius Annius and Gaius Valeriui 
Flaocus, the former as governor of Further 
Spain, the latter as governor of the province of 
the Ebra They were spared the difficult task of opening 
up the passes of the Pyrenees by force, in consequence of 
the general who was sent thither by Sertorius having been 
killed by one of his officers and his troops having theroi 
g^rioriiM ^^^ melted away. Sertorius, much too weak 
amtarki. to maintain an equal struggle, hastily collected 
the nearest divisions and embarked at New Carthage — for 
what destination he knew not himself, perhaps for the coast 
of Africa, or for the Canary Islands — it mattered little 
whither, provided only Sulla's arm did not reach hinu 
Spain then willingly submitted to the SuUan magistrates 
(about 673) and Flaocus fought successfUly with 
the Celts, through whose territory he marched, 
and with the Spanish Celtiberians (674), 
Gnaeus Pompeius was sent as propraetor to Sicily, and, 
when he appeared on the coast with 120 sail and 
six legions, the island was evacuated by Per* 
penna wi^.out resistance, Pompeius sent a squadron 
thence to Cossyra, wbVoh captured the Marian officers so- 
jouminf; there. Mancus Brutus and the others were im* 
mediately executed; but Pompeius had enjoined that the 
oousul Carbo shoujl<( be brought before himself at Ldly* 
baeum in order UMt, unmindful of the protection accorded 
to him in a session of peril by that very man (p. 400), he 
might personally hand him over to the execu- 
tioner(672). 
Ha ring been ordered to go on to Africa, Pompeius with 
his army, which was certainly far more nume- 
rous, defeated the not inconsiderable forces col* 
ieoted by Ahenobarbus and Hiarbas, and, declining for the 
time to be saluted as imperaiOTy he at once gave the lignal 



CHAjf. IX.] Oinna and SiiUa. 41fi 

for the assault of the enemy's oamp. He thus became 
master of the enemy in <Kie day ; Ahenobarbus was among 
the &lien : with the aid of king Bogud, Hiarbas was seiied 
and slain at Bulla, and Hiempsal was reinstated in his 
hereditary kingdom ; a great razzia against the inhabitants 
of the desert, among whom a number of Oaetulian tribes 
recognized as free by Marius were made subject to Hiemp- 
sal, reyived in Africa also the fiillen repute of the Roman 
name *. in forty days after Pompetus' landing in Africa ^11 
was at an end (674?). The senate instructed 
him to break up his army— an implied hint that 
he was not to be allowed a triumph, to which as an extra* 
ordinary magistrate he could according to precedent make 
no claim. The general murmured secretly, the soldiers 
loudly ; it seemed for a mom^t as if the African army 
would revolt against the senate and Sulla would have to 
take the field against his son-in-law. But Sulla yielded, 
and allowed the young man to boast of being the only 
Roman who had become a triumphator before he was a 
senator (12 March, 676) ; in fact the ** Fortu* 
nate,^ not perhaps without a touch of irony, 
saluted the youth on his return from these easy exploits as 
the " Great." 

In the East also, after the embarkation of Sulla in the 
spring of 671, there had been no cessation of 
Ffttbdifli- • war&re. The restoration of the old state of 
Mifhr»- things and the subjugation of the several towns 
***** cost in Asia as in Italy various bloody strug- 

gles. Against the free dty of My tilene in particular Lucius 
LucuUus was obliged at length to bring up troops, after 
having exhausted all gentler measures ; and even a victory 
in the open field did not put an end to the obstinate resist- 
ance of the citizens. 

Meanwhile the Roman governor of Asia, Lucius Mu 
rena, had fallen into fresh difiiculties with king Mithradatea. 
The latter had since the peace busied himself in strength- 
ening anew his dominion, which was shaken even in the 
north Tn provinces; he had pacified the Colchians by ap 



ftl6 Oinnu and 8vUa» [Book n 

pointiog his able son Mithradates as their governor; he 
had then made away with that son, and was now preparing 
for an expedition into his Bosporan kingdom. The asser- 
tion of Archelaus who had meanwhile been obliged to seek, 
an asylum with Murena (p. 373), that these preparations 
were directed against Rome, induced Murena^ under tira 
pretext that Mithradates still kept possesion of Cappa* 
docian frontier districts, to move his troops towards the 
Cappadocian Oomana and to violate the Pontic, 
frontier (671 )• Mithradates contented himself 
with complaining to Murena and, when this was in vain, 
to the Roman government. In fact commissioners from 
Sulla made their appearance to dissuade the governor, but 
he did not submit ; on the contrary he crossed the Halys 
and entered on the undisputed territory of Pontus, where- 
upon Mithradates resolved to repel force by force. His 
general Gordius had to detain the Roman army till the 
king came up with far superior forces and compelled bat- 
tle; Murena was vanquished and with great loss driven 
back over the Roman frontier to Phrygia, and the Roman 
gamsons were expelled from all Cappadocia. Murena had 
the effrontery, no doubt, to call himself the victor and to 
assume the title of imperator on account of these events 
^ (672) ; but the sharp lesson and a becond admo- 

nition from Sulla induced him at last to push 



the matter no farther ; the peace between Rome 

and Mithradates was renewed (673). 

This foolish feud, while it lasted, had postponed the 

ohptvre jf reduction of the Mytilenaeans ; it was only after 

Xytfiisne. ^ i^j^g siege by land and by sea, in which the 

Bithynian fleet rendered good service, that Murona's suo* 

cessor succeeded in taking the city by storm 

^^* (675). 

The ten years' revolution and insurrection were at an 
Qcaigaii end in the West and in the East ; the state had 
v^' once more unity of government and peace within 

and without. After the terrible convulsions of the last 
years even this rest was a relief. Whether it was to for 



OftAP. IX.] Cinna and SuUa. 41T 

nlsh more than a mere relief; whether the remarkable maa 
who had succeeded in the difficult task of vanquishing the 
public foe and in the more difficult work of subduing the 
revolution, would be able to meet satisfactorily the most 
difficult task of all — the restoration of social and political 
order shaken to its very foundatioiui— remained to be d# 
llded hereafter. 



CHAPTER X. 

THB SULLAH OOMSTirUTIOir. 

ABomr the time when the first pitched battle yiaa fbiighl 
between Romans and Romans^ in the night oi 



the '6th Julj 671, the venerable temple, whidi 



had been erected by tJie kings, dedicated by the 
youthful republic, and spared by the storms of five hun- 
dred years — the temple of the Roman Jupiter in the Capi- 
tol — ^perished in the flames. It was no augury, but it was 
an image of the state of the Roman constitution. This, 
too, lay in ruins and needed reconstruction. The revolu- 
tion was no doubt vanquished, but the victory was fiir from 
implying as a matter of course the restoration of the old 
government. The mass of the aristocracy certainly was of 
opinion that now, after the death of the two revolutionary 
consuls, it would be sufiicient to make arrangements for 
the ordinary supplemental election and to leave it to the 
senate to take *8uch steps as should seem farther requisite 
for the rewarding of the victorious army, for the punish- 
ment of the most guilty revolutionists, and possibly also 
for the prevention of similar outbreaks. But Sulla, ia 
whose hands the victory had concentrated for the moment 
all power, formed a more correct judgment of things and 
of men. The aristocracy of Rome in its best epoch had 
not risen above an adherence — ^partly noble and partly 
narrow— -to traditional forms; how could the clumsy col- 
legiate government of this period be expected to carry out 
with energy and thoroughness a comprehensive reform of 
the state ? And at the present moment, when the reof nt 
crisis had swept away almost all the leading men of the 
■enate, the vigour and intelligence requisite for such av 



CiiiLP. X.J The StUlan CanstUution. 419 

enterprise were less than ever to be found there. I Tow 
thoroughly useless was the pure aristocratic blood, and 
how little doubt Sulla had as to its worthlessness, is shown 
by the fact that, with the exception of Quintus Metellui 
who was related to him by marrii^e, he selected all his 
bistruments out of what was previously the middle party 
•nd the deserters from the democratic camp — such as 
Lucius Flacous, Lucius Philippus, Quintus O&Ua, Gnaeuf 
Pompeius. Sulla was as much in earnest about the resto* 
ration of the old constitution as the most vehement arlsto* 
cratic emigrant; he understood however, not perhaps to 
the full extent — for how in that case could he have put 
hand to the work at aU ? — ^but better at any rate than his 
party, the enormous difficulties which attended this work 
of restoration. Comprehensive concessions so far as con* 
cession was possible without affecting the essence of oli* 
garchy, and the establishm^t of an energetic system of 
repression and prevention, were both in his view.unavoid 
able ; and he saw clearly that the senate as it stood would 
refuse or mutilate every concession, and would papliamen- 
tarUy ruin every systematic reconstruction. If Sulla had 
already after the Sulpician revolution carried out what he 
deemed necessary in both respects without asking much of 
their advice, he was now determined, under circumstances 
oi far more severe and intense excitement, to restore the 
oligarchy^not with the aid, but in spite, of the oligarchs 
—by his own hand. 

Sulla, however, was not now consul as he had been 
Sulla ngent then, but was furnished merely with procon- 
of Borne. gular, that is to say, purely military power : he 
needed an authority preserving with all possible strictness 
constitutional forms, but yet extraordinary, in order to 
impose his reform on friends and foes. In a letter to the 
senate he announced to them that it seemed to him indis- 
pensable that they should place the regulation of the state 
in the hands cf a single man equipped with unlimited 
plenitude ot power, and that he deemed himself qualified 
to fulfil this difficult taf«k. "Diis proposal, disagree&ble af 



429 The SuIUm CbnstUiition. [Bms it 

There wis not a little of defeat in this last victory of tin 
oligarchy, 

Sulla had not sought and had not desired the diflicuU 
and dreadful labour of the work of restoration * 
but, as no other course was left to him but 
0IiIk« to leave it in utterly incapable hands or to undertake 
it in person, he set himself to it with remorseless energy. 
Pint of all a settlement had to be tweeted in respect to 
the guilty. Sulla was personally indined to pardon. San- 
guins as he was in temperament^ he could doubtless break 
forth into violent rage^ and weJl might those beware who 
saw his eye gleam and his cheek colour ; but the chronic 
vindLctiveness, which charaott^risGed Marius in the irritability 
of his old age, was altogether foreign to Sulla's easy dispo* 
sition. Not only had he borne himself with comparatively 
great moderation after the revolution of 666 
(p. 824) ; even the second revolution, which 
had perpetrated so fearful outrages and had affected him 
in person so severely, had not disturbed his equilibrium. 
At the same time that the executioner was dragging the 
bodies of his friends through the streets of the capital, he 
had sought to save the life. of the blood-stained Fimbria^ 
and, when the latter died by his own hand, had given 
orders for his decent burial. On landing in Italy he had 
earnestly offered to foi^ve and to forget, and no one who 
came to make his peace had been rejected. Even after the 
first successes he had negotiated in this spirit with Ludus 
Scipio ; it was the revolutionary party, which had not only 
broken off these negotiations, but had subsequently, at the 
last moment before their downfiill, resumed the massacres 
afresh and more fearfully than ever, and had in fact con- 
spired with the old enemies of their country for the de- 
struction of the city of Borne. The cup was now full. Bj 
virtue of his new official authority Sulla, immediately aftei 
assuming the regency, outlawed as enemies of their country 
all the civil and military officials who had taken an active 
part in favour of the revolution afler the convention witk 
Scipio (which according to Sulla's assertion was Tslidlji 



Cbak X.] The SuUan CanstUuhan iSt 

eondttded), and such of the other bm^esses as had in anj 
marked manner aided its cause. Whoever killed one ol 
tfaeae outlaws vras not only exempt from punishment like 
an executioner duly fidfilling his office, but also obtained 
for the execution a compensation of 12,000 denarii (£480) ; 
kov one on the contrary who befriended an outlaw, even 
the nearest relative, was liable to the severest punishmenti 
The property of the proscribed was forfeited to the state 
like the spoil of an enemy ; their children and grandchil- 
dren were exduded from a political career, and yet, so far 
as they were of senatorial rank, were bound to undertake 
their share of senatorial burdens. The last enactments 
also applied to the estates and the descendants of those 
who had fallen in conflict for the revolution — penalties 
which went even beyond those enjoined by the earliest law 
in the case of such as had borne arms against their father 
land. The most terrible feature in this system of terror 
was the indefiniteness of the proposed categories, against 
which there was immediate remonstrance in the senate, and 
which Sulla himself sought to remedy by directing the 
names of the proscribed to be publicly posted up and fix- 
ing the 1st June 673 as the final term for clos- 
ing the lists of proscription. 
Much as this bloody roll, swelling from day to day and 
froKrip- amounting at last to 4,700 names,* excited the 
tton-ikk jygi; horror of the multitude, it at any rate 

* This total is ^ven by Valerius MazimiiB, iz. 8, 1. According to 
Apy«ian {B, C, L 96), there were proeoribed by Sulla nearly 40 aena- 
tor«^ which number subsequenUy received some additions, and about 
1,600 equites; according to Florus (il 9, whence Augustine de Oiv, 
Dei, ill. 28), 2,000 senators and equites. According to Plutarch (SulL 
$1), 620 nvnes were placed on the list in the first three days ; accondU 
big to Orosius (t. 21), 680 names during the first, days. There Is no 
material contradiction between these rarious reports, for it was not 
senators and equites alone that were put to death, and the list remained 
open for months. When Appian, at another passage (i. 108), mentions 
as put to death or banished by Sulla, 16 oonsulars, 90 senators, 2,600 
equites, he there confounds, as the context shows, the victims of tht 
dTil war throughout with the Tictims of Sulla. The 16 oonsnlais wevr 



tU I%e SuUan CanMULuHm. [teoc I? 

checked in some degree the mere caprice of the ezecQtioiiii 
ere. It was not at least to the personal resentment of tha 
regent that the mass of these victims were sacrificed ; his 
furious hatred was directed solely against the Marians, tha 
17, authors of the hideous massacres of 667 and 

^ 672. By his command the tomb of the victor 

of Aquae Sextiae was broken open and Ids adies were 
scattered in the Anio, the monuments of his victories ovei 
Africans and Germans were overthrown, and, as death had 
snatched himself and his son from Sulla's vengeance, his 
adopted nephew Marcus Marius Gratidianus, who had been 
twice praetor and was a great fiivorite with the Roman bur- 
gesses, was executed amid the most cruel tortures at the 
tomb of Gatulus, who was the most to be regretted of all 
the Marian victims. In other cases also death had already 
swept away the most notable of his opponents: of the 
leaders there survived cnly Gaius Norbanus, who laid 

« 
102. W. — Qointus CatuluB, oodsuI in 662 ; Marcus Antonius, 656 ; 

97. 95. Publius Craraua, 667 ; Quintus ScaeYoIa, 669 ; Lucius 

91 9a 8a. Bomitius, 660 ; Lucius Caesar, 664 ; Quiutus Rufus, 666 ; 
87-A. 87. Lucius Ginna, 667-670; Gnaeus OetaTius, 667; Lucius 
87. 86. 86. Morula, 667 ; Lucius Flaccus, 668 ; Onaeus Carbo, 669, 
n! S;| ^'^^* ^"^^v ^^^ NortMuus, 671; Lucius Scipio, 671; 
89. Gaius Marius, 678 ; of whom fourteen were idlled, and 

one, Lucius Scipio, was banished. When, on the other hand, the 
Livian account in Eutropius (▼. 9) and Orosius (▼. 22) specifies as swept 
away {eofuwnpti) in the Social and Civil wars, 24 consulars, 7 prae^ 
torians, 60 aedilicians, 200 senators, the calculation includes partly the 

men who fell in the Italian war, such as the consulars 
SJ^ £ Aulus Albinus, consul hi 666 ; Titus Didius, 666 ; Publiuf 

Lupus, 664; Lucius Gato, 666; partly perhaps Quintui 
MetelluB Numidicus (p. 268), Manius AquilUus, Gaius Marius the lither, 
Gnaeus Strabo, whom we may oertainly regard as also victims of tfasi 
period, or oUier men whose fate is unknown to us* Of the fonrtsen 
vonsttUurs killed, thre»— Rufus, Cinna, and Flaccus — fell through mill* 
tary revolts, while dght SuUan and three Marian consulars fell as vie- 
tfms to the opposite party. On a comparison of the figures given above, 
60 senators and 1,000 equites were regarded as victims of Marius, 40 
senators and 1,600 equites as victims of Sulki ; this fiimishes a standard 
— «t least not altogetlier arbitrary— for estimating the extent of tht 
l^Behi•f on both sIom. 



Cbap. X] The SvUcm Constitution. 488 

hands on himself at Rhodes, while the ecclesia was delib- 
erating on his surrender; Lucius Scipio, whose insignifi- 
cance and probably also his noble birth procured for hina 
indulgence and permission to end his days in peace at hii 
retreat in Massilia ; and Quintus Sertorius, who was wan- 
dering about as an exile on the coast of Mauretania. But 
jreSi the heads of slaughtered senators were piled up at the 
Servilian Basin, at the point where the Vicus Jugaritu 
Q|>eix6d IntQ the Forum, where the dictator had ordered 
them to be publicly exposed ; and among men of the second 
and third rank in particular death reaped a fearful harvest. 
In addition to those who were placed on the list for their 
services in or on behalf of the revolutionary army with 
iittle discrimination, sometimes on account of money ad* 
vanced to one of its officers or on account of relations of 
hospitality formed with such an one, the retaliation fell 
specially on the ^' hoarders " — ^those capitalists who had sat 
in judgment on the senators and had speculated in Marian 
confiscations ; about 1,600 of the equites, as they wero 
called,'" were inscribed on the proscription-list. In like 
manner the professional accusers, the worst scourge of the 
nobility, who made it their trade to bring men of the 
senatorial order before the equestrian courts, had now to 
suffer for it — ^**how comes it to pass," an advocate soon 
after asked, ^^ that they have left to us the tribunals, when 
they were putting to death the accusers and judges ? " The 
most savage and disgraceful passions raged without re* 
straint for many months in Italy. In the capital a Celtic 
band was primarily charged with the executions, and Sullan 
soldiers and subaltern officers traversed for the same pur- 
pose the different districts of Italy ; but every volunteer 
was also welcome, and the rabble high and low pressed 
forward not only to earn the rewards of murder, but also 
lo gratify their own vindictive or covetous dispositions 
ander the mantle of political prosecution. It sometimes 
happened that the assassination did not follow, but pte- 

* The Sextus Alfenus, froquently mentioned in CScero's orttion M 
behalf c( Pablias Quinctios, was one of these. 



186 The SuUan Canstitatim. [Book iv 

oed(>d, the pladng of the name od the list of the pro 
•cribed. One example ahows the way in which these &Le^ 
outlons took place. At Larinum, a town of new burgesaei 
and favourable to Marian views, one Statins Albius Oppi* 
aniens^ who had fled to Sulla's head-quarters to avoid a 
charge of murder, made his appearance after the victory as 
commissioner of the regent, deposed the magistrates of the 
town, installed himself and his friends in their room, and 
caused the person who had threatened to accuse him, along 
with his nearest relatives and friends, to be outlawed and 
killed. Numbers thus fell — including not a few decided 
adherents of the oligarchy — ^as the victims of private hos- 
tility or of their own riches : the fearful confusion, and the 
culpable indulgt,nce which Sulla displayed in this as in 
every instance towards those more closely connected widi 
him, prevented any punishment even of the ordinary crimes 
that were perpetrated amidst the disorder. 

The confiscated property was dealt with in a similar 
Conflsnt- ^^y* iSulla from political considerations sought 
^^'"^ to induce the respectable burgesses to take part 

in its purchase ; a great portion of them, moreover, volun- 
tarily pressed forward, and none more zealously than the 
young Marcus Crassus. Under the existing circumstances 
the utmost depreciation was inevitable; indeed, to some 
extent it was the necessary result of the Roman plan of 
selling the property confiscated by the state for a round 
sum payable in ready money. Moreover, the regent did 
not forget himself; while his wife Metella more especially 
and other persons high and low closely connected with him, 
3ven freedmen and boon-companions, were sometimes aU 
lowed to purchase without competition, sometimes had the 
purchase-money wholly or partially remitted. One of his 
0eedmen, for instance, is said to have purchased a property 
of 6,000,000 sesterces (£60,000) for 2,000 (£20), and ons 
of his subalterns is said to have acquired by such specu* 
lations an estate of 10,000,000 sesterces (£100,000). Ths 
indignation was great and just; even during Sulla's regency 
an advocate asked w better the nobility had waged civil 



Gra^. X.] T/iS /Stdlun Co7i8tituHon. 421 

war solely for the purpose of enriching their freednien and 
slaves. But in spite of this depreoiatlon the whole pro* 
oeeds of the confiscated estates amounted to not less than 
350,000,000 sesterces (£3,500,000), which gives an approx- 
imate idea of the enormous extent of these confiscations 
falling chiefly on the wealthiest portion of the burgesses. 
It was altogether a fearful visitation. There was no longer 
any process or any pardon ; mute terror lay like a weight 
of lead on the land, and free speech was silenced in the 
market-place alike of the capital and of the country-town. 
The oligarchical reign of terror bore doubtless a different 
stamp from that of the revolution ; while Marius had 
glutted his personal vengeance in the blood of his enemies, 
Sulla seemed to account terrorism in the abstract, if we 
may so speak, a thing necessary to the introduction of the 
new despotism, and to prosecute and make others prosecute 
the work of massacre almost with indifference. But the 
reign of terror presented an appearance all the more hor- 
rible, when it proceeded from the conservative side and 
was in some measure devoid of passion; the common- 
wealth seemed all the more irretrievably lost, when the 
frenzy and the crime on both sides were quite equally bal- 
anced. 

In regulating the relations of Italy and of the capital, 

Sulla— although he otherwise in general treated 
BAnoe of fts null all state-acts done during the revolution 
right^^e!^ except in the transaction of current business— 
^oo^ycon- firmly adhered to the principle, which it had 

laid down, that every burgess of an Italian com- 
munity was ipso /ado a burgess also of Rome ; the dis- 
tinctions between burgesses and Italian allies, between old 
burgesses with better, and new burgesses with mors re- 
stricted, privileges, were abolished, and remained so. In 
the case of the freed men alone the unrestricted right of 
luflrage was again withdrawn, and the old state of matton 
was restored. To the aristocratic ultras this might seem 
A great concession , Sulla perceived that it was necessary 
to wrest these mighty levers out of the hands of the revo 



A80 The SuOan OatisMution. [Bo«ik it 

portions of land were otherwise applied, as in thft oaae ol 
the lands bestowed on the temple of Diana at Mount 
Tifata ; others, such as the Volaterran domain and part of 
the Arretine, remained undistributed; others in fine^ ao 
cording to the old abuse legally forbidden (p. 164) but now 
reviving, were taken possession of on the part of Sulla'i 
favourites by the right of occupation. The objects which 
SuUa aimed at in this colonization were of a varied kind. 
In the first place, he thereby redeemed the pledge given to 
his soldiers. Secondly, he in so doing adopted the idea, in 
which the reform-party and the moderate conservatives 
concurred, and in accordance with which he had himself as 
early as 666 arranged the establishment of a 
number of colonies — the idea namely of aug- 
menting the number of the sni^U agricultural proprietors 
in Italy by a breaking up of the larger possessions on the 
part of the government ; how seriously he had this at heart 
IS shown by the renewed prohibition of the annexation of 
allotments. Lastly and especially, he saw in these settled 
soldiers as it were standing garrisons, who would protect 
his new constitution along with their own right of prop" 
erty. For this reaspn, where the whole territory was not 
confiscated, as at Pompeii, the colonists were not amalga- 
mated with the town-community, but the old burgesses and 
the colonists were constituted as two bodies of burgesses 
associated within the same enclosing wall. In other re- 
spects these colonial foundations were made on the same 
legal basis and in the same military form as those of pre- 
vious times; the circumstance that they were based not 
directly, like the older ones, but only indirectly on a law, 
inasmuch as the regent constituted them by virtue of the 
clause of the Valerian law to that effect, made no difference 
dejure. To designate them as military colonies in contrast 
with the older ones, is only justifiable in so far as the dis- 
tinction between the soldier and the burgess, which was in 
other instances done away by the very colonization of the 
soldiers, was intended to remain and did remain in foroe 
in the Sullan oolonies even after their establiahment Bai 



GHiLP. X.] Th£ SuUom Constitution. 431 

these colonies formed, as it were, the standing army of the 
senate. 

Akin to this practical institution of a standing army for 

the senate was the measure by which the regent 
UanfteedT Selected from the slaves of the proscribed up« 
gJJ^ wards of 10,000 of the younge^st and most vig" 

orous men, and manumitted them in a body. 
These new Cornelians, whose civil existence was linked to 
the legal validity of the institutions of their patron, were 
designed to be a sort of body-guard for the oligarchy and 
to help it to command the city populace, on which, indeed, 
in the absence of a garrison everything in the capital pri- 
marily depended. 

These extraordinary supports on which the regent made 

the oligarchy primarily to rest, weak and ephe- 
AboWdon meral as they doubtless appeared even to their 
PjJJ^gJ^^ author, were yet its only possible buttresses, 

unless expedients were to be resorted to — such 
as the formal institution of a standing army in Rome and 
other similar measures — ^which would have put an end tc 
the oligarchy &r sooner than the attacks of demagogues. 
The permanent foundation of the ordinary governing power 
of the oligarchy was of course necessarily the senate, with 
a power so increased and so concentrated that it presented 
a superiority to its non-organized opponents at every single 
point of attack. The system of compromises followed for 
forty years was at an end. The Gracchan constitution, still 

spared in the first Sullan reform of 666, was 

now utterly abolished. Since the time of Gains 
Gracchus the government had conceded, as it were, the right 
of emeute to the proletariate of the capital, and bought it 
off by regular distributions of corn to the burgesses domi* 
died there; Sulla abolished these largesses. Gaius Grao> 
idius had organized and consolidated the order of capitalists 
by the letting of the tenths and customs of the province of 
Asia in Rome ; Sulla abolished the system of middle-men, 
and converted the former contributions of the Asiatics into 
fixed taxee, which were assessed on the several districtp 



482 TAe SuUan ConstUu^ion. [Book it 

•ooording to Uie valuation-rolls drawn up for the purpose 
of gathering in the arrears.* Gfaiua Gracchus had by en- 
trusting the oiBoe of jurymen to men of equestrian censui 
procured for the capitalist class an indirect share in ad 
ministration and in government, which proved not seldom 
stronger than the official executive; Sulla abolished the 
equestrian and restored the senatorial courts. Gains Grao> 
thus or at any rate the Gracchan period had conceded to 
the equites a special place at the popular festivals, such as 
the senators had for long possessed (ii. 380) ; Sulla abol- 
ished it and relegated the equites to the plebeian benches.! 
The equestrian order, created as such by Gaius Gracchus, 
was deprived of its political existence by Sulla. The 
senate was to exercise the supreme power in legislation, 
administration, and jurisdiction unconditionally, indivisibly, 
and permanently, and was to be distinguished also by out- 
ward tokens not merely as a privileged, but as the only 
privileged, order. 

For this purpose the governing board had, first of all 

to have its ranks filled up and to be itself placed 

Uon of the OH a footing of independence. The numbers of 

"^ the senators had been fearfully reduced by th« 

recent crises. Sulla no doubt now gave to those who were 

* That Sulla*8 aasessment of the five years' arrears and of the wai 
eipensea levied on the communities of Asia (Appian, MHkr, 62 et dL\ 
formed a standard for the future, is shown by the facts, that the distri* 
bution of Asia into forty districts is referred to Sulla (Casaiodor. Chron, 
670) and that the Sullan apportionment was assumed as a basis in the 
case of subsequent imposts (Cic. pro Flaec. 14, 82), and by the further 
circumstance, that on occasion of building a fleet in 672 
the sums applied for that purpose were dedneted from the 
payment of tribute (ex peeunia veeHpali papulo Romano : Cio. Verr, L 
I 8R, 80). Lastly, Cicero (ad Q.fr. t 1, 11, 88) directly says, that the 
Greeks ** were not in a position of themselves to pay the tax fanpoeed 
on them by Sulla without jm^/tcam." 

f P. 148. Tradition has not indeed informed us by whom that law 

was ifisued, which rendered it necessary that the earlier privilege should 

be renewed by the Roscian theatre-law of 687 (Becker* 

Friedl&nder, iv 531); but under the circiixnstances thf 

Mthor of that )aw was undoubtedly Sulla. 



CkiAF. X.] The SuUan Oonstuutian. 438 

exiled by the equestrian courts liberty to retuim, for in- 
stance to the consular Pablius Rutilius Rafu& (p. 265), who 
howerer made no use of the permission, and to Gaius Cotta 
the friend of Drusus (p. 287) ; but this made only slight 
amends for the gaps which the revolutionary and reaction- 
ary reigns of terror had created in the ranks of the senate. 
I** com le- Accordingly by Sulla's directions the senate had 
wMintnueA its complement extraordinarily made up by the 

tip by extn- * ^ r ,/ 

otcHonry addition of about 300 new senators, whom the 
assembly of the tribes had to nominate from 
among those of equestrian census, and whom they selected, 
as was natural, chiedy from the younger men of the sena- 
torial houses on the one hand, and from Sullan bfllicers and 
others brought into prominence by the last revolution on 
the other. For the future also the mode of admission to 
the senate was regulated anew and placed on an essentially 
Admission ^^JAferent basis. As the constitution had hitherto 
to the Ben- stood, men entered the senate either through the 

ate CbrougA ^ 

the qnaefi- summons of the censors, which was the proper 
and ordinary way, or through the holding of 
one of the three curule magistracies — ^the consulship, the 
praetorship, or the aedileship — to which since the passing 
of the Ovinian law a seat and vote in the senate had been 
de jure attached (ii. 375). The holding of an inferior 
magistracy, of the tribunate or the quaestorship, gave 
doubtless a claim de facto to a place in the senate — inas- 
much as the censorial selection especially turned towards 
the men who had held such offices — but by no means a 
reversion de jure. Of these two modes of admission, Sulla 
abolished the former by setting aside — ^at least practically 
"- the censorship, and altered the latter to the effect that 
the right of admission to the senate was attached to the 
quaestorship instead of the aedileship, and at the same time 
the number of quaestors to be annually nominated was 
raised to twenty.* The prerogative hitherto legally per- 

* How mniy qaaeskirs had been hitherto chosen annually, is nol 
knowii. After 487 there were eiglit of them— -two urban, 
two military, and four naral, quaeetors (i. 669; 54a). Va 

Vol III.— 19 



484 Ths SuUaoh Constitu^n. [Book It 

AboUUoB taiDing to the oensors, although practical]} 
etnirafai no longer exercised in its original serious im 
S^M? port^-of deleting any senator from the roll, 
*^ with a statement of the reasons for doing so, 

at the revisals which took place every five years (ii. 381 ) 
-"likewise fell into abeyance for the future ; the irremovo- 
able character which had hitherto de facto belonged to the 
senators was thus finally fixed by Sulla^ The total num- 
Y)er of senators, which hitherto had probably not much 
exceeded the old normal number of 300 and often perhaps 
had not even reached it, was by these means considerably 
augmented, perhaps on an average doubled * — an augmenta- 
tion which was rendered necessary by the great increase 

these there fell to be added the quaestora employed in the provineea 
(ii. 88). For the naral qaaestora at OstlR, Galea, and so forth were by 
no means discontinued, and the military quaestors could not be em- 
ployed elsewhere, since in that case the consul, when he appeared as 
commander-in-chief, would haye been without a quaestor. Now, as 
down to Sulla's time there were nine provinces, and moreover two 
quaestors were sent to Sicily, he may possibly have found as many as 
eighteen quaestors in enstence. But as the number of the supreme 
magistrates of this period was considerably less than that of their 
functions (p. 440), and the difficulty thus arising was coustantly reme> 
died by extension of the term of office and other expedients, and as 
generally the tendency of the Roman government was to limit as much 
as possible the number of magistrates, there may have been more 
quaestorial functions than quaestors, and it may be even that at this 
period no quaestor at all was sent to - small provinces such as Cilida. 
Certainly however there were, al^'eady before Sulla's time, more than 
eight quaestors. 

* We cannot strictly speak of a fixed nun(kber of senators. Thoufj^ 
tlie censors before Sulla prepared on each occasion a list of #300 per 
sons, there always fell to be added to this list those non-senators who 
ftUed curule offices between the time when the Iis^ Was drawn up and 
^e preparation of the next one ; and after Sulla there were as many 
senators as there were surviving quaestoriana. But it may be probably 
assumed that Sulla meant to bring the senate up to 500 or 600 mem- 
bors ; and this number results, if we assume that 20 ne^r members, at 
an average age of 80, were admitted annually, and wc estimate the 
tterage duration of the fsenatorial dignity at from 25 to 30 years. At 
A.&nmerously attended ^:ting of the senate in Cicero's time 41 Y mea» 
b^ wei^e. present. 



Cbaf. Z.] The SuUom VomtUutum. 4M 

of the duiiob of the senate through the transference to it 
of the functions of jurymen. As, moreover, both the 
eitraordinarilj admitted senators and the quaestors were 
nominated by the eomitia iribuUi^ the senate, hitherto rest* 
ing indirectly on the choice ot the people (i. 407), waj 
now thoroughly based on direct popular election ; and thi)s 
made as close an approach to a representative government 
as was compatible with the nature of the oligarchy and the 
notions of antiquity generally. The senate had in course 
of time been converted from a corporation intended merely 
to advise the magistrates into a board commanding the 
magistrates and sel^goveming ; it was only a consistent 
advance in the same direction, when, the right of nomi- 
nating and cancelling senators originally belonging to the 
magistrates was withdrawn from them, and the senate was 
placed on the same legal basis on which the magistrates' 
power itself rested. The extravagant prerogative of the 
censors to revise the list of the senate and to erase or add 
names at pleasure was in reality incompatible with an 
organized oligarchic constitution. As provision was now 
made for a sufficient regular recruiting of its ranks by the 
election of the quaestors, the censorial revisions became 
superfluous ; and by their abeyance the essential principle 
at the bottom of every oligarchy, the irremoveable char* 
acter and life-tenure of the members of the ruling order 
who obtained seat and vote, was definitively consolidated. 
la respect to legislation Sulla contented himself with 

reviving the regulations made in 666, and secur* 
Segniatioiw ^°8 ^ *^® senate the legislative initiative, whidi 
tmffloinoii ^^ ^^^8 belonged to it practically, by legal 

enactment at least as against the tribunes. The 
burgess-body remained formally sovereign ; but so far as 
its general assemblies were concerned, while it seemed to 
the regent necessary carefully to preserve their names, he 
was still more careful to prevent any real activity on their 
part. Sulla dealt even with the franchise itself in the 
most contemptuous manner ; he made no difficulty either 
in conceding It to Uvi new burgess-comipunities, or ^r be 



48A THe SkMoH CotuMuUtm. [Bom It 

tftoiring It on Spaniards and Celts en mane ; ii faet, pfob 
abl jT not without desigB, no steps were taken at all for th€ 
adjustment of the burgess-roll, whioh nev^rthdeas after ae 
violent rerolutions stood in urgent need of a revision, if 
the government was at all in eameit with the legal privi* 
leges attaching to it. The legfslativo functions of the corai« 
tia^ however, were not direetly rostrioted; there was no 
need In fllct for domg so, ibr In consequence of the lietter 
aecured initiative of the senate the people could not readily 
ngahist the will of the government intermeddle with ad* 
ministration, finance, or criminal jurisdiction, and its legis 
lative co-operation was once more reduced in substance to 
the riglit of giving assent to alterations of the constitution. 
Of greater moment was the participation of the bur* 
gesses in the elections — ^a participation which, apparently, 
could not be dispensed with without disturbing more Uian 
Sulla's superficial restoration could or would 
reatotedin disturb. Iiie interferences of the movement 
oofi^r party in the sacerdotal elections were set aside ; 
^^ not only the Domitian law of 650, which trans- 

ferred the election of the supreme priesthoods generally to 
the people (p. 248), but also the similar older enactments 
as to the PonHfex Maximus and the Curio Mcaimua (ii. 
424) were cancelled by Sulla, and the colleges of priests 
received back the right of sel^-completion in its original 
absoluteness. In the case of elections to the magistracies 
the mode hitherto pursued was on the whole retained ; ex« 
cept in so &r as the new regulation of the military com- 
mand to be mentioned immediately certainly involved as 
its consequence a material restriction* of the powers of the 
burgesses, and indeed in some measure transfei*red the right 
of bestowing the appointment of generals from the bur- 
gesses to the senate. It does not even appear tliat Sulla 
now resumed the previously attempted restorati' n of the 
Beivian voting-arrangement (p. d23) ; whether it was tliat 
he regarded the particular composition of the voting-divi^ 
sions as altogether a matter of iadifierenoe, of whether il 
was that this cl^&t arr^mgement seeiped to him to aingmfiitt 



CflAr. £.] The SuU^n O&nsiitution. 4Stl 

llw dangerous infltience of i^e oftpitidists. Only the q^all- 
fioations were restored and partially raised. The 
S^Se^^- limit 6f age requisite for the holding of each 
^JSS^^ office was enforced afresh ; as was also the ei^ 
actment tiiat every candidate for the consulship 
^ould have previously held the praetotship, and ev^f 
eandidate for the praetorship should have previously held 
1^ quaestorshtp, whereas the aedileship was allowed to be 
passed over. The various attempts that had been recently 
made to establish a lyrannU under the form of a consul 
ship continued for several successive years led to special 
rigour in dealing with this abuse ; and it was enacted that 
at least two years should elapse between the holding oi* 
one magistracy and the holding of another, and at least ten 
years should elapse before the same office could be held a 
second time. In this latter enactment the earlier ordinance 
of 412 (i. 403) was revived, instead of the ab- 
solute prohibition of all re-election to Uie con- 
sulship, which had been the favourite idea of the most 
recent ultraK)ligarehical epoch (p. 93). On the whole* 
however, Sulla left the elections to take their course, and 
sought merely to fetter the authority of the magistrates in 
such a way that-^let the incalculable caprice of the comitia 
call to office whomsoever it might — ^the person elected 
should not be in a position to rebel against the oligarchy. 
The supreme magistrates of the state were at this period 
practically the three colleges of the tribunes of 
Jthe^^u- *^® people, the consuls and praetors, and the 
naterfthe censors. They all emerged from the Sullan 
restoration with materially diminished rights^ 
more eepecially the tribunician office, which appeared to 
the regent an instrument indispensable doubtless for sena 
torial government, but yet — as generated by revolution and 
having a constant tendency to generate fresh revolutions 
in its turn — requiring to be rigorously and permanently 
shackled. The tribunician authority had arisen out of the 
right to annul the official acts of the magistrates by veto, 
and, eventually, to fine any one who should oppose thai 






488 7%a SuUan (knsiiiution. [Bow n 

right and to take steps for Us fiuther punishment; this 
was still left to the tribunes, excepting that a heavy fine, 
destroying as a rule a man's civil existence, was imposed 
on the abuse of the right of intercession. The fiirtho? 
prerogative of the tribune to have access to the people at 
pleasure, partly for the purpose of making oommunieatloni 
to them, partly for the purpose of submitting laws to thf 
vote, had been the lever by which the Gracchi, Saturninua, 
and Sulpicius had revolutionized the state ; it was not abol- 
ished, but its exercise was probably made dependent on a 
permission to be previously requested from the senate.* 
Lastly it was added that the holding of the tribunate should 
in future disqualify for the acceptance of a higher office-— 
an enactment which, like many other points in Sulla's re^ 
toration, once more reverted to the old patrician maxims, 
and, just as in the times before the admission of the ple- 
beians to the civil magistracies, declared the tribunate and 
the curule offices to be mutually incompatible. In this way 
the legislator of the oligarchy hoped to check tribunician 
demagogism and to keep all ambitious and aspiring men 
aloof firom the tribunate, but to retain it as an instrument 
of the senate both for mediating between it and the bur- 
gesses, and, should circumstances require^ for keeping in 

• To this the words of Lepidtu in Sallust (IRtL I 41, 11 IMetsoh) 
refer : pan^ihu B&mamu . . . agiiamdi incp9^ to which Tacitiis (^im. 
tti 27) alludes : 9taiim turMit ZqAdi roffatkmUmt tiegue mtUto poai 
iribumB reddUa Uemtia quoguo veUeat poptdum offi/andi. That the 
tribunes did not altogether lose the right of discussing matters with the 
people is shown by Gic. De Leg, ill. 4, 10 and more clearly by tba 
pl^Uciium de Tfiermenaibua^ which liowever in the opening formula 
also designates itself as issued de smiUiuB §mferUia, That the .consuls 
en the otiier hand could under the Sullan arrangements submit prop<^ 
•als to the people without a previous resolution of the senate, la shown 
not only by the silence of the authorities, but also by the coi rse of the 

W_^ revolutions of 667 and 676, whose leaders fo: this very 

reason were not tribunes but consuls. Accordingly w< 

find at this period consular laws upon secondary questions of adrtioifr 
tration, such as the com law of 681, for whicb at Mbf$ 

• times we should have certainly found vMUeUik 



CftAP. X.] The SuUan Ocmstitutum. 489 

check the magistrates; and, as the authority of the kii^ 
and afterwards of the republican magistrates over the bur 
gesses scarcely anywhere comes to light so clearly ns in 
the principle that they exclusively had the right of addreas- 
ing the people, so the supremacy of the senate, now first 
kgallj^ established, is most dtstinctty apparent in tills per- 
mission wiiidi the leader of the people had to ask from the 
ae&ate for every transaction with his constituents. 

The consulship and praetorship also, although viewed 
by the aristocratic regenerator of Rome with a 
SlShi?^ more favourable eye than the thoroughly sus- 
maSstiacy. picious tribunate, by no means escaped that 
distrust towards its own instruments which is 
throughout characteristic of oligarchy. They were re- 
stricted with more tenderness in point of form, but in a 
way very sensibly felt. Sulla here began with the parti- 
tion of functions. At the beginning of this 
^^^ra? period the arrangement in that respect stood as 
JrtSrariM follows. As formerly there had devolved on 
^re^ the two consuls the collective functions of the 
toae of supreme magistracy, so there still devolved on 

them all those ofhcial duties for which distinct 
functionaries had not been by law established. This latter 
course had been adopted with the administration of justice 
in the capital, in which the consuls according to a rule in- 
violably adhered to might not interfere, and with the trans- 
marine provinces then existing — Sicily, Sardinia, and the 
two Spains — in which, while the consul might no doubt 
exercise his imperiMm, he did so only exceptionally. In 
the ordinary course of things, accordingly, the six fielda 
of special jurisdiction — the two judicial appointments in 
the capital and the four transmarine provinces — were ap- 
portioned among the six praetors, while there devolved on 
the two consuls by virtue of their general powers the 
management of the non-judicial business of the capital and 
the military command in the continental possessions. Now 
as this general authority was doubly provided for, the on« 
consul in reality remained at the disposal of the govern- 



^ "^ 



142 The SuUan OmstUution. L^ook IT 

eoune which was compatible with the nature of prorogai 
Uon, aince the oflidal authority of aupreme magistrate! 
acting in Rome and In the provinoea respectively, although 
differently entered on, was not in strict state-law difiereni 
In kind« 

Such was the state of things which Sulla found existing, 
and which formed the basis of his new arrange 
^StlS^"" ment. Its main principles were, a complete 
Jj^^"* ^ separation between the political authority which 
governed in the burgess-districts and the military 
authority which governed in the non-burgess districts, and 
an uniform extension of the duration of the supreme magis- 
tracy from one year to two, the first of which was devoted 
sepanUoii *® coM^ and the second to military functions, 
of^the nouti. Locally the civil and the military authority had 
»i^^ certainly been long separated by the constitu- 
tion, and the former ended at the pomeritim^ 
where the latter began ; but still the same man held the 
supreme political and the supreme military power united in 
bis hand. In future the consul and praetor were to deal 
.with the senate and burgesses, the proconsul and propraetor 
were to command the army ; but all military power was 
out off by law from the former, and all political action from 
the latter. This primarily led to the political 
Oauieraoted separation of the region of Northern Italy from 
jtoaproT- yxa\j proper. Hitherto they had stood doubt- 
less in a national antagonism, inasmuch as 
Vorthern Italy was inhabited chiefly by Ligurians and 
Celts, Central and Southern Italy by Italians ; but, in a 
political and administrative point of view, the whole conti- 
nental territory of the Roman state from the Straits to the 
Alps including the Dlyrian possessions — ^bui^ess, Latin, 
and non«Italian communities without exception — was in the 
ordmary course of things under the administration of the 
supreme magiati'Ates who were acting in Rome, as in fact 
her colonial foundations extended through all this territory, 
\ooording to Sulla's arrangement Italy proper, the r >rtht 
em boundary of which was at the snme time changed frorv 



Ohap. X] The SaUan ConatUvMoiu 448 

the Aesis to tho Rubico, was — as a region now inhabited 
without exception by Roman citizens-— made subject to Xh\ 
ordinary Roman authorities; and it became one of the 
fundamental principles of Roman state-law, that no troops 
and no commandant should ordinarily be stationed in this 
district. The Celtic country south of the Alps on the other 
hand, in which a military command could not be dispensed 
with on account of the continued incursions of the Alpine 
tnhes, was constituted a distinct governorship after the 
model of the earlier transmarine commands.* Lastly, as 

* For this hypotheda there is no other proof, except that Celtic 
Italy was as decidedly not a proyince—in the sense in which the word 
signifies a definite district administered by a governor annually changed 
— in the earlier times, as it certainly was one in the time of Caesar 
(comp. Licin. p. 39 ; data crat et SuUae pravincia Gallia Cualpina). 

The case is much the same with the advancement of the frontier ; 
we know that formerly the Aests, and in Caesar's time the Rubico, 
separated the Celtic knd from Italy, but we do not know when the 
boundary was shifted. From the circumstance, indeed, that Marcus 
Terentios Yarro LucuUus as propraetor undertook a regulation of the 
frontier in the district between the Aesis and Rubico (Orelli, Inacr, 
670), it has been inferred that that must still have been provincial land 
at least in the year after LucuUus' praetorship 679, since 
the propraetor had nothing to do on Italian soiL But it 
was only within the pomerium that every prolonged imperium ceased 
of itself ; in Italy, on tlie other hand, such a prolonged impeiium was 
even under Sulla's arrangement — though not regularly existing — at any 
rate allowable, and the office held by LucuUus was in any case an ex- 
traordinary one. But we are able moreover to show when and how 
LucuUus held such an office in this quarter. He was ahready before the 
Sullan reorganization in 672 engaged as commanding officer 
in this very district (p. 407), and was probably, just like 
Pompeius, furmshed by Sulla with propraetorian powers ; in this char- 
acter he must have regulated the boundary in question in 
672 or 678 (comp. Appian. L 95). No inference therefore 
ttiay be drawn from this inscription as to the legal position of North 
Italy, and least of all for the time after Sulla's dictatorship. On the 
other band a remarkable hint is contained in the statement, that Sulla 
advanced the Roman pameritim (Seneca, de Brev. VtiaSy 14 ; Dio, xliiL 
60) ; which distinction was by Roman stateJieitv' only accorded to one 
#ho had advanced the bounds not of the empire, but of the dty-^-tfaal 
to, the bounds of Italy (i. 146). 



M6 The SuUofi CoMiihUion. [Book iv 

oltimatelj dependedy beoftme formallj at least dependent 
on the senate. 

Lastly we have already observed that the highest of aL 
magistradesy the censorship, though not forraally 
ibc SUS abolished, was shelved in the same way as th« 



*^^ dictatorship had previously been. Practically it 

4ijight certainly be dispensed with. Provision was other* 
wise made for filling up the senate. From the time that 
Italy was practically tax-free and the army was substantially 
formed by enlistment, the register of those liable to taxfti 
tion and service lost its chief significance ; and, if disordei 
prevailed in the equestrian roll or the list of those entitled 
to the suffirage, that disorder was probably not altogether 
unwelcome. There thus remained only the curr^t finan- 
cial functions which the consuls had hitherto discharged 
when, as frequently happened, no election of censors had 
taken place, and which they now took as a part of their 
ordinary official duties. Compared wil^ the substantial 
gain that by the shelving of the censorship the magistracy 
lost its crowning dignity, it was a matter of little moment 
and was not at all prejudicial to the sole dominion of the 
supreme governing corporation, that— with a view to satisfy 
the ambition of the senators now so mudi more numerous 
-—the number of the Pontifices was increased from eight 
(i. 386), that of the Augurs from nine (i. 886), that of the 
Custodiers of Oracles firom ten (i. 882), to fifteen each, and 
that of the Epulones firom three (ii. 478) to seven. 

.In financial matters even under the former constitution 
the decisive voice lay with the senate ; the only 
ofSe point to be dealt with, accordingly, was the 

"^^^^ re-establishment of an orderly administration. 
Bulla hao found himself at first in r.o small pecuniary difli* 
eulty ; th) sums brought with him from Asia Minor were 
soon expended for the pay of his numerous and constantly 
swelling army. Even after the victory at the Colline gats 
the senate, seeing that the state-chest had been carried, off. to 
Praeneste, had been obliged to resort to urgent measiuieib 
Various building-sites in the capital and several portions of 



Ohaf. X] The Stdlan Constitution. 447 

the Gampanian domains were exposed to sale, the client 
kings, the freed and allied communities, were laid undei 
extraordinary contribution, their landed property t»jd their 
custom 9>reTenues were in some cases confiscated, and in 
others new privileges were granted to them for money. 
But the residue of nearly 600,000/. found in the publk 
chest on the suiTcnder of Praeneste, the public auctions 
which soon began, and other extraordinary resources, re* 
lievcd the embarrassment of the moment. Provision was 
made for the future not so much by the reform in the 
Asiatic revenues, under which the tax-payers were the prin* 
cipal gainers, and the state-chest was perhaps at most no 
loser, as by the resumption of the Gampanian domains, to 
which Aenaria was now added (p. 429), and above all by 
the abolition of the largesses of grain, which since the time 
of Gains Gracchus had eaten like a canker into the Roman 
finances. 

The judicial system on the other hand was essentially 
ReorganuBi- revolutionized, partly from political cousidera- 
^rifi*^ tions, partly with a view to introduce greater 
lem. unity and usefulness into the previous very in- 

suilioient and unconnected legislation on the 
PreTioasar. subject. Over and above the courts in which 
'*'***™*^ * the whole burgesses decided on appeals from 
the sentence of the magistrate, there existed at this time 
Ordinary ^^^ sorts of procedure before jurymen. In the 
P"'*^®**"'* ordinary procedure, which was applicable to all 
cases adapted according to our view for a criminal or civil 
process with the exception gf crimes immediately directed 
against the state, one of the two praetors of the capital 
technically adjusted the cause and a juryman {ittdex) nomi- 
nated by him decided it on the basis of this adjustment. 
The extraordinary procedure again was applicable to par- 
ticular civil or criminal cases of importance, for which, in 
stead of the single juryman, a special jury-court had been 
appointed by special laws. Of this sort wen» 

•BdBpedai the special tribunals constituted for particular 
^wttww$, ^5gg^ ^g^ g^ p^ ig5^ 22^^ . ^},g standing commi* 



148 The SuUan Con^Uution, [Book w 

•ional tribunals, such as were appointed for ezaetians (p^ 
M), for poiaoning and murder (p. 140), perhaps also fox 
bribery at elections and other crimes in the eoune of the 
ontuiBTtni seventh oentury ; and, lastly, the court of the 
^**^ hundred and hve or more briefly the hundred 

men, also called, from the shaft of a spear employed in the 
process as to property, the spear-court (Aosfo). The period 
and circumstances in which this spear-court which had juris* 
dietion in processes as to Roman inheritance, originated, ars 
involved in obscurity ; but they must, it may be presumed, 
have been nearly the same as in the case of the essentially 
Amn» erimin/oommi»<»>. n.eut>on«] above. A. to tl^ 
presidency of these difierent tribunals there were different 
regulations in the respective ordinances appointing them: 
thus there presided over the tribunal as to exactions a prae* 
tor, over the court for murder a president specially nomi- 
nated from those who had been aediles, over the RpeajMM>urt 
several directors taken from the f<Nrmer quaestors. The 
lurymen both for the ordinary and for the extraordinary 
procedure were, in accordance with the Graoohan arrange* 
ment, talcen from the non-senatorial men of equestrian cen* 
sus; in the case of the spear^sourt alcme, t^ree jurymen 
were, nominated by free election from each of the thirty- 
Bve tribes, and the court waa composed of these hundred 
%nd five men. 

SulSa's leading reforms were of a threefold character, 
Soij^ First, he very considerably increased the num* 

Q'^^'^'^^o'**^ ber of the jury-courta. There were heneeforth 
separate judidal commissions for esiaotions; for murder, 
including arson and peijury ; for bribery at elections ; for 
high treason and any dishonour done to the Romsn name; 
for adultery ; for the most heinous cases of fraud— the forg* 
ing of wills and of money ; for the most heinous violations 
of honour, particularly for injuries to the person and dis* 
turbanoe of the domestio peaee ; perhaps also for erabezzlei 
ment of pubMc moneys, for usury and other crimes ; and 
for each of these old or new tribunals Sulla issued a special 
ordinance setting forth the crime and form of criminal pre 



Obap. X.] The SuUan Conatitviion. 44S 

oedure. The authorities, moreoTer, were cot deprhed tif 
tibe right to appoint in case of emergeney special courts foi 
special groups of crimes. As a result of this arrangement 
the popular tribunals on the one hand, and the ordinary 
judicial procedure on the other, were materially restricted, 
nasaiuoh as processes of high treason for instance wert 
srlthdrawn horn the former, and tlie more serious falsiliea* 
tionB and injuries from the latter ; but apart from this thei*e 
was no change in either institution. Secondly, as respects 
the pre«dency of the courts, six praetors, as we have 
already mentioned, were now available for the superintend* 
ence of the different jury-courts, besides whom special di- 
rectors were named for particular tribunals. Thirdly, the 
senators were once more installed in the office oi jurymen 
in room of the Gracchan equites : in the spear-court alone, 
so far as we know, the previous arrangement oontinui^d to 
subsist. 

The political aim of these enactments — to put an end 
to the share which the equites had hitherto had in the gov* 
emmeiit — is clear as day ; but it as little admits of doubt, 
that these were not mere measures of a political ten<Jency, 
but that they formed the first attempt to amend the Itoman 
criminal procedure and criminal law, which had since the 
struggle between the orders fallen more and more into con> 
fusion. From this Sullan legislation dates the distinction — 
substantially unknown to the earlier law — between civil and 
criminal causes, in the sense which we now attach to these 
expressions; hence^^rth a criminal cause appears as that 
which comes before the bench of jurymen, a civil cause as 
that which comes before the individual iudex* The whole 
body of the Sullan ordinances as to the quae$4ion€8 may be 
eharacterized at once as the first Roman code after the 
Twelve Tables, and as the firsts criminal code specially issued 
at all. But in the details al 10 there appears a laudable and 
liberal spirit. Singular as it may sound regarding the 
author of the proscriptions, it remains nevertheless true 
that he abolished the punishment of death for political 
uffenoes; for, as according to the Rom^n custom which 



MO ne SuUan OoMtituitau. [Bmb I? 

BoDb reuined unchanged the people only, md not the jinry* 
oommission could sentence to forfeiture of life or to im 
prisonment (p. 140), the transference of processes of high 
treosDn from the burgesses to a standing commission amount 
ed to the abolition of capital punishment for such off^ices. 
On the other hand, Uie restriction of the pernicious special 
eommissions for particular cases of high treason, of whicb 
Ihe Variao eommission (pi 286) in the Social war had heea 
a spedmea, Ukawise involved an improvement. Hie wIm^ 
reform was of singular and lasting benefit, and a permanent 
monument of the practical, moderate, statesmanly spirit, 
which made its author well worthy, like the old decemvirs^ 
to step forward between the parties as sovereign mediator 
with his code of law. 

We may regard as an appendix to theae criminal laws 
^^ the police ordinances, by which Sulla, putting 

the law in room of the censor, again enforced 
good discipline and strict manners, and, by establishing new 
maximum rates instead of the old ones which had long been 
antiquated, attempted to restrain luxury at banquets, fun^ 
rals, and otherwise. 

Lastly, the development of an independent Roman mu- 
nicipal system was the work, if not of Sulla, at 
mnnicipai any rate of the Su!ian epoch. The idea of or- 
'^^^^ ganically incorporating the community as a sub- 

ordinate political unit in the higher unity of the state was 
originally foreign to antiquity ; city and state were through- 
out the Helleuo-Italic world necessarily coincident, and it 
was otherwise only under Oriental despotism. In so fiir 
there was no proper municipal system from the outset 
either in Grece or in Italy. The Roman policy especially 
adhered to this view with its peculiar tenacious consistency ; 
even in the sixth century the dependent communities of 
Italy wore either, in order to their keeping their municipal 
constitution, constituted as formally sovereign states of noi» 
burgesses, or, if they obtained the Roman franchise, wers 
^although not prevented from organizing themselves af 
CK^mmonii^'ealths— deprived of strictly municipal rights, si 



c&AP. X.] The SvUan OonsUtution, 451 

mat in all b. rgoss-oolonies and burgess-m««ii«ct7na oven tht 
administration of justice and the charge of buildings dei 
volved on the Roman praetors and censors. The utmost to 
which Rome consented was to allow at least the most urgent 
lawsuits to be settled on the spot by a deputy {prae/ectu$) 
of the praetor nominated from Rome (i. 540). The provi* 
inces were similarly dealt with, except that the governor 
there came in place of the authorities of the capital. In 
the fi^e, that is, formally sovereign cities the civil and 
criminal jurisdiction was administered by the municipal 
magistrates according to the local statutes; only, unless 
altogether special privileges stood in the way, every Roman 
might either as defendant or as plaintiff request to have his 
cause decided before Italian judges according to Italian law. 
For the ordinary provincial communities the Roman gov- 
ernor was the only regular judicial authority, on whom de- 
volved the superintendence of all processes. It was a great 
matter when, as in Sicily, in the event of the defendant 
being a Sicilian, the governor was bound by the provincial 
statute to give a native juryman and to allow him to decide 
according to local usage; in most of the provinces this 
seems to have depended on the pleasure of the presiding 
magistrate. 

In the seventh century this absolute centralization oi 
the public life of the Roman community in the one focus 
of Rome was given up, so &r as Italy at least was con* 
cerned. Now that Italy was a single civic community and 
the civic territory reached from the Arnus and Rubico down 
to the Sicilian straits (p. 429), it was necessary to consent 
to the formation of smaller civic communities within that 
larger unit. So Italy was organized into communities of 
fbll burgesses ; on which occasion also the larger cantons 
that were dangerous from their size were probably broken 
up, so for as this had not been done already, into several 
• tmaller town*districts (p. 292). The position of these new 
communities of full burgesses was a compromise between 
that which had belonged to them hitherto as allied statei*, 
and that which by the earlier law would have belonged tQ 



462 The SuUan OmHitution. [BomI' 

iheiQ as integral parts of the Roman eomnunity. Theii 
faaais waa in general the constitution of the fwiner formally 
soyereign Latin commcnitj, or, so fiu* as their oonstitutioii 
In its prindples resembled the Roman, that of the Romas 
old patridan-eonsalar oommunity ; only care was taken o 
apply to the same institutions in the munieipmm laniec 
difierent from, and inferior to, those used in the capital, ir, 
in other words, in the state. A burgess-assembly was 
placed at the head, with the prerogative of issuing muniid- 
pal statutes, and nominating the municipal magistrates. A 
municipal council of a hundred members acted the part of 
the Roman senate. The administration of justice was con- 
ducted by four magistrates, two regular judges correspond- 
ing to the two consuls, and two market-judges correspond- 
ing to the curule aediles. The functions of the censorship, 
which recurred as in Rome, every five years and, to idl 
appearance, consisted chiefly in the superintendenoe of pub< 
lie buildings, were also undertaken by the supreme magis- 
trates of the community, namely the ordinary duumviri^ 
who in this case assumed the distinctive title of duumviri 
*^with censorial or quinquennial power.** The municipal 
funds were managed by two quaestors. Religious functions 
primarily devolved on the two colleges of men of priestly 
lore alone known to the earliest Latin constitution, the mu- 
nicipal Pontifices and Augurs. 

With reference to the relation of this secondary politi- 
cal organism to the primary organism of the 
Uiemiint- State, all political prerc^tives generally be- 
t^Bta^ longed to the former as well as to the latter, und 
consequently the municipal decree and the mi* 
perium of the municipal magistrates be und the munidpsl 
burgess just as the decree of the people and the consular 
imperium bound the Roman. T%is led, on the whole, to a 
ooorilnate exerdse of power by the authorities of the state 
and of the town ; both had, for instance, the right of valua* 
tion and taxation, so that in the case of any municipal valuaF I 

tkms and taxes those prescribed by Rome were not takes i 

Into aooounti ^-^ "* * ^«a; public buildings might be in ! 



Grip. X.] The SuHian Constitution. 468 

stituted both by the Roman magistrates throughout Italj 
and by the mwiiQifMil authorities in Uieir own district, and 
so in other eaaea. In the event of ooUision, of course the 
cfMnmunity yidded to the state and the decree of the pe<^ 
file invalidated the municipal decree. A formal division 
oi funetioDs probably took place only in the administration 
of jmtice, where the system of pure co-ordination would 
iiave led to the greatest confusion. In criminal prucednre 
probably all capital causes, and in civil procedure those 
snore difficult cases which presumed an independent action 
on the part of the presiding magistrate, were reserved for 
the authorities and jurymen of the capital, and the Italian 
municipal courts were restricted to the minor and less com^ 
plicated lawsuits or to those which were very urgent. 

The origin of this ItaMan municipal system has not been 
lUfle of the recorded. It is probable that its germs may be 
vmnicipium. tracfcd to exceptional regulations for the great 
bui^ess-colonies, which were founded at the end of the sixth 
oentury (ii. 895) ; at least several, in themselves indifferent, 
formal difierences between burgess-colonies and burgess- 
municipia tend to show that the new burgess-colony, which 
at that time practically took the place of the Latin, had 
originaily a better position in state-law than the for older 
hvLrgesa^municipium, and the advantage can perhaps have 
only consisted in a municipal constitution approximating to 
the Latin, such as afterwards belonged to all burgess-colonies 
and hurgesaFmunicipia, The new organization is first dia* 
tinotly traceable in the revolutionary colony of Capua (p. 
892) ; and It admits of no doubt that it was first fully ap- 
plied, when all the hitherto sovereign towns of Italy had to 
he organized, in consequence of the Social War, as bui^ess- 
aomm unities. Whether it was the Julian law, or the cen- 
sors of 668, or Sulla, that first arranged the de- 
tails, cannot be determined : the entrusting of 
tlie oenaorial functions to the ckmmviri seems indeed to have 
bean introduced after the analogy of the SuUan ordinance 
superseding the censor^ip, but may be equally well referred 
to the primitiins Latin oonatitution to vhidt- the censorshif 



454 The 8vUan OonstUuHofi. [Book rv 

was unkncwn. In any case this munidpal constitation— 
inserted in, and subordinate to, the state proper — is one of 
the most remarkable and momentous products of the Sullaii 
period, and of the life of the Roman state generally. Ant 
tiquity was certainly as little able to dovetail the city intc 
the state as to develop of itself representative government 
and other great principles of our modem state-life ; but it 
carried its political development up to those limits at which 
it outgrows snd bursts its assigned dimensions, and this was 
the case especially with Rome, which in every respect 
stands on tho line of separation between the old and the 
new intellectual worlds. In the Sulian oonstitntion the col« 
lective assembly and the urban character of the common- 
wealth of Rome on the one hand vanished almost into a 
meaningless form ; the community subsisting within the 
state on the other hand was completely developed in the 
Italian mnnieipium, Down to the name, which in such 
cases no doubt is the half of the matter, this last constitu- 
tion of the free republic carried out the representative sys- 
tem and the idea of the state resting on the basis of the 
municipalities. 

The municipal system in the provinces was not altered 
by this movement ; tho municipal authorities of the non- 
free towns continued — special exceptions apart^^to be con- 
fined to administration and police, from which no doubt a 
certain jurisdiction, over slaves guilty of crimes fi>r exam- 
ine, could not be separated. 

Such wa» the constitution which Lucius Cornelius Sulla 
^ S^^^ ^^ ^^^ commonwealth of Rome. The seiip 
produced bj ate and equestrian order, the burgesses and pro- 
norganin- Ictariate, Italians and provincials, accepted it as 
^^ it was dictated to them by the regent, if not 

without grumbling, at any i*ate without rebelling : not so 
'^gp^^ging^ the SuUan officers. The Roman army had 
orttMoOoar. totally changed its character. It had certainly 
been rendered by the Marian reform more ready for actioo 
and more militarily useful than when it did not fight befon 
tjie walls of Numantia; but it had at the same time beet. 



Obaw. X.] The iSvUan Constitution. 455 

converted from a burgess-force into a set ot meroenariei 
who showed no fidelity to the state at all, and proved 
faithful to the officer only when he had the skill personally 
to gain their attachment. The civil war had given fearful 
evidence of this total revolution in the spirit of the amiy : 
six generals, Albinus (p. 312), Cato (p. 312), Rufus (pw 
lfci7), Flaccus (p. 370), Cinna (p. 396), and Gaius Carbo 
(p. 41 i), had fallen during its course by the hands of their 
soldiers : Sulla alone had hitherto been able to retain the 
mastery of the dangerous crew, and that only, in fact, by 
giving the rein to all their wild desires as no Roman geno* 
ral before him had ever done. If the blame of destroying 
the old military discipline is on this account attached to 
him, the censure is not exactly without ground, but yet 
without justice ; he was indeed the first Roman magistrate 
who was only enabled to discharge his military and politi- 
cal task by coming forward as a condottiere. He had not 
however taken the military dictatorship for the purpose of 
making the state subject to the soldiery, but rather for the 
purpose of compelling everything in the stat«, and esp«>- 
cially the army and the officers, to submit once more to 
the authority of civil order. When this became evident^ 
an opposition arose against \Am among his own staff. The 
oligarchy might play the tyrant as respected other citizens ; 
but that the generals also, who with their good swords had 
replaced the overthrown senators in their seats, should now^ 
be summoned to yield implicit obedience to this very sen* 
ate, seemed intolerable. The very two officers in whom 
Sulla had placed most confidence resisted the new order 
of things. When Gnaeus Pompeius, whom Sulla had 
entrusted with the conquest of Sicily and Africa and had 
selected for his son-in-law, after accomplishing his . task 
received orders from the senate to dismiss his arniy, ho 
omitted to comply and fell little short of open insurrection. 
Qnintus Ofella, to whose firm perseverance in front of 
Praeneste the success of the last and sorest campaign was 
essentially due, in equally open violation of the newly 
lisued ordinances became, a candidate for the consulship 



iM The SuiUm CanMtuiim. [Book it 

without having held the infenor magistracies* With Pom 
peitia there was effected, if not a cordial reconciliation, at 
auj rale a compromise. Sulla, who knew his man snffi 
cientlj not to fear him, did not resent the impertinent re 
nark which Pompeius uttered to his face, that more people 
ocmcemed themsclres with the rising than with the setting 
fiun ; and accorded to the vain youth the empty honours 
to whicn his heart clung (p. 415). If in this instance he 
appc^ared lenient, he showed on the other hand in the case 
of Ofella that he was not disposed to allow his marshals to 
take advantage of him ; as soon as the latter had appeared 
tinconstitutionally as candidate, Sulla had him cut down in 
the public market-place, and then explained to the assem- 
bled citizens that the deed was done by his orders and the 
reason for doing it. So this significant opposition of the 
staff to the new order of things was no doubt silenced for 
the present ; but it continued to subsist and iumished the 
practical commentary on Sulla's saying, that what he did 
on this occasion could not be done a second time. 

One thing still remained — perhaps Uie most difficult of 

all: to brinir the exceptional state of thinffs 

ofeonrtitii. into accordance with the paths prescribed by 

tioDAi ordar. ^^ ^^ ^ ^^^ \H,yis. It was facilitated by the 

ciroumstanoe, that Sulla never lost sight of this as his ulti- 
mate aim. Although the Valerian law gave him absolute 
power and gave to each of his ordinances the force of l&w, 
he had nevertheless availed himself of this extraordinary 
prerc^ative only in the case of nieasures which were of 
transient importance and to take part in which would sim- 
ply have uselessly compromised the senate and burgesses, 
aapeoially in the case of the proscriptions. Ordinarily he 
kad himself observed those regulations which ha prescribed 
i>r f he future. That the people were consulted, we read in 
the law as to the quaestors which is still in part extant : 
and the same is attested of other laws, «. g. the sumptuary 
law and those regarding the confiscations of domains, h 
like manner the senate was previously consulted in the 
nore important admiiristrstive acts tuch.afi^ui the sendim 



uhap. X.] The Svllan OonMitutian. 457 

forth and recall of the AfHcan army aiid in the conferring 
of the charters of towns. In the same spirit Sulla caused 
consuls to be elected even for 673, through 
which at least the odious custom of. dating 
officially by the regency was avoided ; nevertheless the 
power still lay exclusively with the regent^ and the election 
was direct<3d so as to fall on secondary personages. But 
in the following year (674) Sulla revived the 
ordinary constitution in full efficiency, and ad- 
ministered the state as consul in concert with his comrade 
in arms Quintus Metellus, retaining the regency, but allow- 
ing it for the time to lie dormant. He saw well how dan- 
gerous it was for his own very institutions to perpetuate 
the military dictatorship. When the new state of things 
seemed likely to hold its ground and the largest and most 
important portion of the new arrangements had been com- 
pleted, although various matters, particularly in coloniza- 
tion, still remained to be done, he allowed the 

79. 

elections for 675 to have free course, declined 
re-election to the consulship as incompatible with his own 

ordinances, and at the beginning of 675 resigned 
Sulla rerfgDs the regency, soon after the new consuls Publius 
the regeDoy. ge^^jijug ^nd Appius Claudius had entered on 

office. Even callous hearts were impressed, when the man 
who had hitherto dealt at his pleasure with the life and 
property of millions, at whose nod so many heads had 
fallen, who had mortal enemies dwelling in every street 
of Rome and in every town of Italy, and who without an 
ally of eqital standing and even, strictly speaking, without 
the support of a fixed party had brought to an end his 
work of reorganizing the state, a work offending a thou- 
sand interests and opinions — when this man appeared in 
the market-place of the capital, voluntarily renounced his 
plenitude of power, discharged his armed attendants, dis* 
missed his lictors, and summoned the dense throng of bur- 
gesses to speak, if any one desired from him a reckoning. 
All were silent : Sulla descended from the rostra, and on 
f}y>t, attend^ only by his friends, returned 4» Ms dwelling 
Vol. in.— 20 



156 The SuOan CatiBtUutum. [Bo ml if 

through the midst cf that very populace whidi eight yean 
before had razed his house to the ground. 

Posteritj has not justlj appreciated either Sulla him- 
f^iif ^tft tr ^^ ^' ^^* work of reorganization, as indeed It 
or SoliA. ;g vont to judge un&irly of persons who op- 
pose themselves to the current of the times. In fact Sulla 
is one of the most marvellous characters— we may even 
say a unique phenomenon — in history. Physically and 
mentally of sanguine temperament, blue-eyed, fair, of a 
complexion singularly white but blushing with every pas- 
sionate emotion — ^though otherwise a handsome man with 
piercing eyes — ^he seemed hardly destined to be of more 
moment to the state than his ancestors, who since the days 
of his great-great-grandfather Publius Cornelius Rufinua 
(consul in 464, 477), one of the most distin- 
guished generals and at the same time the most 
ostentatious man of the times of Pyrrhus, -had remained 
in second-rate positions. He desired from life nothing but 
serene enjoyment. Reared in the refinement of such cul- 
tivated luxury as was at that time naturalized even in the 
less wealthy senatorial families of Rome, he quickly pos- 
sessed himself of all the fulness of sensuous and intellectual 
enjoyments which the combination of Hellenic polish and 
Roman wealth could secure. He was equally welcome as 
a pleasant companion in the aristocratic saloon and as a 
good comrade in the camp ; his acquaintances, high and 
low, found in him a sympathizing friend and a ready helper 
In time of need, who gave his gold with far more pleasure 
to his embarrassed comrade than to his wealthy creditor. 
Passionate was his homage to the wine-cup, still more pas- 
sionate to women ; even in his later years he was no longer 
the regent, when af^r the business of the day was finished 
he took his place at table. A vein of irony — we might 
perhaps say of buffoonery — pervaded his whole nature. 
Even when regent he gave orders, while conducting the 
public sale of the property of the proscribed, that a dona- 
tion from the spoil should be given to the author of a 
wretched panegyric which was banded to him, on condition 



CkM. Z.] The SuUan CanstUutian. 459 

that the writer should promise never to sing bis pitusei 
again. When he justified before the burgesses the execu- 
tion of Ofella^ he did so by relating to the people the &ble 
of the countryman and the lice. He delighted to choose 
his companions among actors, and was fond of sitting at 
wine not only with Quintus Roscius — the Roman Talmi^— 
but also with far inferior players ; indeed he was himself 
not a bad singer, and even wrote farces for performance 
within his own circle. Yet amidst these jovial Bacchanalia 
he lost neither bodily nor mental vigour; in the rural 
leisure of his last years, he was still zealously devoted to 
the chase, and the circumstance that he brought the writ- 
ings of Aristotle from conquered Athens to Rome testifies 
at least to his interest in more serious reading. The spe- 
dfic peculiarites of Roman character rather repelled him. 
Sulla had nothing of the blunt hauteur which the grandees 
of Rome were fond of displaying in presence of the Greeks, 
or of the pomposity of narrow-minded great men ; on the 
contrary he freely indulged his humour, appeared, to the 
scandal doubtless of many of his countrymen, in Greek 
towns in the Greek dress, or induced his aristocratic com- 
panions to drive their chariots personally at the games. 
He retained still less of those half«patriotic, half-selfisli 
hopes, which in countries of free constitution allure every 
youth of talent into the political arena, and which he too 
like all others probably at one time felt. In such a life as 
his was, oscillating between passionate intoxication and 
more than sober awaking, illusions are speedily dissipated. 
Desiring and striving probably appeared to him folly in a 
world which withal was absolutely governed by chance, 
and in which, if men were to strive after anything at all, 
this chance could be the only aim of their efforts. He 
followed the general tendency of the age to be addicted at 
once to unbelief and to superstition. His whimsical ere* 
dulity was not the plebeian superstition of Marius, who 
got a priest to prophesy to him for money and determined 
his actions accordingly ; still less was it the sullen belief 
of the fanatic in desticy ; it was that faith in the absurd, 



iSO The SuUan (hMtUutim. [Book iv 

whidi neMssarllj Aiakes Vn appearance in every man ^he 
has thoToughlj ceased to believe in a connected order of 
things— ^he superstition of the fortunate plajer, who deems 
himself privileged by &te to throw on each and every 
occasion the right number. In practical questions SuUt 
understood very well how to satisfy ironically the demands 
of religion. When he emptied the treasuries of the Greek 
temples, he declared that the man oouid never fail whose 
ehest was replenished by the gods themselves. When the 
Delphic priests reported to him that they were afraid to 
send the treasures which he asked, because the harp of the 
god emitted a clear sound when they touched it, he re- 
turned the reply that they might now send them all the 
more readily, as the god evidently approved his designs. 
Nevertheless he fondly flattered himself with the idea that 
he was the chosen favourite of the gods, and in an alto 
gether special manner of that goddess, to whom down to 
his latest years he assigned the pre-eminence. Aphrodite. 
In his conversations as well as in his autobiography he 
often plumed himself on the intercourse which the immor- 
tals held with him in dreams and omens. He had more 
right than most men to be proud of his achievements ; he 
was not so, but he was proud of his uniquely faithful for- 
tune. He was wont to say that every improvised enter* 
prise turned out better with him than those which were 
systematically planned ; and one of his strangest whims — 
that of regularly stating the number of those who had 
fallen ou his side in battle as nil — was nothing but the 
childishness of a child of fortune. It was but the utterance 
of his natural disposition, when, having reached the culm in 
atlng point of his career and seeing all his contemporaries 
at a dizzy depth beneath him, he assumed the designation 
of the Fortunate — Sulla Felix— as a formal surname, and 
bestowed corresponding appellations on his children. 

Nothing lay farther from Sulla than systematic ambi« 

tion. He had too much sense to regard, liiie 

Btio«i"oa- the avei-age aristocrats of his time, the inscrip- 

^*^' tioii of his name -!u the roll of the. consuls ar 



Ohap. X.] The JSuUan Ganstitution. 461 

the aim of his life ; he was too indifTerent and too little of 
an ideologue to be disposed voluntarily to engage iu th« 
reform of the rotten structure of the state. He remained 
•^r^where birth and culture placed him — in the circle of 
fashionable society, and passed through the u&wU routine 
of office ; ho had no occasion to 0xert himself, and leil such 
exertion to the political working bees, of whpin there waf« 
in truth no waat Thus in 647| oq the distri 
bution of the quaesterial appointments, aoeic|ent 
brought him to Africa to the head-quart^^s of Gaid^ Marlins* 
The untried man-of-faahion from the capital was npt very 
well received by the rough boorish general and his 9xperi> 
»iced staff. Provoked by this reception Sulla, feiiFless and 
skilful as he was, rapidly made himself master of the pro- 
fession of arms, and in his daring expedition to Mauretania 
first displayed that peculiar combination of audacity and 
eunning with reference to which his contemporaries said of 
him that he was half lion half fb^, and that the fox in him 
was more dangerous than the lion. To the young, high- 
born, brilliant officer, who was confessedly the real means 
of ending the vexatious Numiditm war, the most splendid 
eareer now lay open : he took part ^o iu the Cimbrian 
war, and manifested his singular talent for orgfmizatip^ in 
the management of the difficult task of providing supplies ; 
yet even now the pleasures of the dipital hj^ far more 
attraction for him than war or even poUtlos. During his 
praetorship, which ofiice he h^ld in d61 afler 
having failed in a previous candidature, it onoe 
more chuioed that in his province, the least important of 
all, the first victory over king Mithrad^tes and th^ firsi 
treaty with the mighty Arsacids, as well as their finife 
humiliation, occurred. The civil war followed. I^ was 
Sulla mainly, who decided the first act of it — ^the Italian 
insurrection — in favour of Rome, and thus won for himself 
the consulship by his sword; it was he, moreover, who 
when consul suppressed with energetic rapidity the Sulpi- 
dan revolt. Fortune seemed to make it her business t^ 
eclipse the old hero Marius by means of this yoppger pflicer 



<«4 The S\aian C<miiituti<m. [Boot It 

judgtTient can be passed save one of inexorable and rer 
moneleas condemnation; and, like everything else oon 
neeted with it, the SuUan constitution is inv(^ved in thai 
condemnation. Bnt we do not wrong the aaeredness of 
history through a praise which the gifted character of a 
bad man bribes us into bestowing when we suggest that 
Sulla was &r less answerable for the Sullaa restoration 
than the body of the Roman aristocracy which had ruled 
as a clique for centuries and had every year become more 
enervated and embittered by age, and that all that was 
hollow and all that was nefarious ther^n is ultimately trace- 
aMe to that aristocracy. Sulla reorganized the state— -not, 
however, as a landlord who puts his shattered estate and 
household in order according to his own discretion, but as 
a temporary manager who faithfully obeys his instructions : 
it is superficial and false in such a case to roll the final and 
essential responsibility over from the master to the man- 
ager. We estimate the importance of Sulla much too 
highly, or rather we dispose of those terrible proscriptions, 
ejections, and restorations — ^for which there never could be 
and never was any reparation— on far too easy terms, when 
we regard them as the work of a bloodthirsty tyrant whom 
accident had placed at the head of the state. These and 
the terrorism of the restoration were the deeds of the aris- 
tocracy, and Sulla was nothing more in the matto* than, tc 
use the poet's expression, the executioner's axe following 
the conscious thought as its unconscious instrument. Sulla 
earried out that part with rare, in fact superiiuman, perfeo 
tion ; but within the limits which it laid dowc for him, his 
working was not only grand but even useful. Never has 
any aristocracy deeply decayed and decaying still farther 
from day to day, such as was the Roman aristocracy of 
that time, found a guardian so willing and able as Sulla to 
wield for it the sword of the general and the pen of the 
l^slator without any regard to the gain of power for hin^ 
•elf. There is no doubt a difference between the case cf aa 
ofiicer who reuses the sceptre from public spirit and that 
•f one who throws it away from er^nui ; but, so &r as con 



Crap, xj Th-c SvUan Gon8ttivMon, 465 

cerns the total absenoQ of political selfishness-!— althougb, 
it is true, in this resp^t only-r-rSulla deseryes to be name^ 
side by side with Washington. 

But the whole country — ^and not the aristocracy n^erely 

— was n^ore indebted to him than posterity is 
Biiiiaa coa* Willing to oonfess. Sulla definitely terminated 

the Italian revolution, in so far as it was based 
on the disabilities of individual less priyileged districts as 
compared with others of better rights, and, by compelling 
himself and his party to recognize the equality of the rights 
of all Italians in presence of the law, he became the real 
and final author of the full political unity of Italy: — a gain 
which was not too de^ly purchased even by so mai^y trou- 
bles and streams of blood. Sulla however did more. For 
more than half a century the power of Rome had been 
declining and anarchy had been her permanent condition : 
for the government of the senate with the Gracchan con- 
stitution was anarchy, and the government of Cinna and 
Carbo was a yet far worse illustratipp of the absence of a 
master-hand (the sad image of which is most clearly re- 
flected in that equally confused and unnatural league with 
the Samnites), the most uncertain, most intolerable, and 
most mischievous of all conceivable political conditions — 
in &ct the b^inning of the end. We do not go too far 
when we assert that the long-undermined Roman comipon- 
wealth must have necessarily fallen to pieces, had not Sulla 
by his intervention in Asia and Italy saved its existence. 
It is true that the constitution of Sulla had as little endur- 
ance as that of Cromwell, and it was not difilicult to see 
that his structure was no solid one ; but it is arrant thought- 
lessness to overlook the fact that without Sulla most prob- 
ably the yery site of the buildjng would hi^ve been swept 
away by the waves ; and even the blame of its want of 
stability does not fall primarily on Sulla. The statesman 
builds only so much as in the sphere assigned to him he 
can build. What a man of conservative views could do 
to aave the old co46titution, Sulla did ; and he himself had 
a foreboding that, while he might probably erect a fortres% 
Vol. IIL— 20* 



i66 The 8uUan OanmfUutian. [Booil IT. 

he would be unable to create a garrison, and that the uttei 
wortalessness of the oligarchs would render any attempt 
to save the oligarchy vain. His constitution resembled a 
temporary dike thrown into the raging breakers; it was 
no reproach to the builder, if some ten years afberwarda 
the waves swallowed up a structure reared in defiance of 
nature and not defended even by those whom it sheltered 
The statesman has no need to be referred to highly com« 
mendable isolated reforms, such as those of the Asiatic 
rcTenue-system and of criminal justice, that he may no . 
summarily dismiss Sulla's ephemeral restoration : he will 
admire it as a reorganisation of the Roman commonwealth 
judiciously planned and on the whole consistently carried 
out under infinite difficulties, and he will place the deliverer 
of Rome and the accomplisher of Italian unity below, but 
yet in the same class with, Cromwell. 

It is not, however, the statesman alone who has a voice 
in judging the dead ; and with justice outraged 
i^Sf^^ human feeling will never reconcile itself to what 
Sr^eX^* Sulla did or sufiered others to do. Sulla not 
^rerton^ Only established his despotic power by unscru- 
pulous violence, but in doing so called things 
by their right name with a certain cynical frankness, 
through which he has irreparably offended the great mass 
of the weakhearted who are more revolted at the name 
than at the thing, while the cool and dispassionate charac- 
ter of his crimes makes them certainly appear to the moral 
judgment more revolting than the crimes that spring from 
passion. Outlawries, rewards to executioners, confiscations 
of goods, summary procedure with insubordinate officers 
had occurred a hundred times, and the obtuse political 
morality of andent civilization had for such things only 
lukewarm censure ; but it was unexampled that the names 
of the outlaws should be publicly posted up and their 
heads publicly exposed, that a set sum should be fixed foi 
the bandits who slew them and that it should be duly eiv 
tered in the public account- books, that the confiscated prop* 
ert} should be brought to the hammei like the ppoil of av 



(Trap. X.] The SuUcm Constitutioti. 461 

«meray in the public market, that the general should order 
A refractory officer to be at once cut down and acknowledge 
the deed before all the people. This public mockery of 
humanity was also a political error ; it contributed not a 
tittle to envenom later revolutionary crises beforehand, and 
on that account ev«i now a dark shadow deservedly rests 
on the memory of the author of the proscriptions. 

Sulla may moreover be justly blamed that, while in all 
important matters he acted with remorseless vigour, in 
subordinate and more espedally in personal questions he 
very frequently yielded to his sanguine temperament and 
dealt according to his likings or dislikings. Wherever he 
really felt hatred, as for instance against the Marians, he 
allowed it to take its course without restraint even against 
the innocent, and made it his boast that no one had better 
requited friends and foes.* He scorned not to take advan- 
tage of his place and power to accumulate a colossal for- 
tune. The first absolute monarch of the Roman state, he 
forthwith verified the maxim of absolutism — that the laws 
do not bind the prince — ^in the case of those laws which he 
himself issued as to adultery and extravagance. But his 
lenity towards his own party and his own circle was more 
pernicious for the state than his indulgence towards him- 
self. The laxity of his military discipline, although it was 
partly enjoined by his political exigencies, may be reckoned 
as coming under this category ; but far more pernicious 
was his indulgence towards his political adherents. The 
extent of his forbearance occasionally is hardly credible ; 
for instance Lucius Murena was not only released from 
punishment for defeats which he sustained through arrant 
folly and insubordination (p. 416), but was even allowed a 
triumph ; Gnaeus Pompeins, who had behaved still worse, 
was still more extravagantly honoured by Sulla (p. 41ft, 
456). TI)e extensive range and the worst enormities of 

* Euripides, Mtdsa, 807 :— 

Mijdfiq fit ^avXifif hmBm^ roft^^i* 
Mtj^ ^avxduav, aXXd Ocvti^ov r^onov, 



MS Th§ ComfMiMimlih {^^^ lY 

more thin 900 millions of ttileroes (JB2fO0O,00O) ; tliat ii^ 
Vat two4liiidt of die earn wMeh the kh^ of E^ypt drew 
from Us eomitvj Mmuelly. The proportion can only seem 
strange at the tet glanoe. The Ptolemies tamed to aoi 
oouttt die yalley of the Nile as great plantation-owners, and 
drew immense sums from their monepoly of the oommer* 
cial intereoorse with the Bast; the Roman treasorj was 
not much more than lihe joint militarj ehest of Ihe com« 
inimities nnited under Rome's protection. The net prodnoe 
was probably still less in proportion. The only provinces 
yielding a oonsideraUe surplos were perhaps Sidly, where 
the Carthaginian system of tazAtion prevailed, and more 
eapeoially Asia from the time that Gains Gracchus, in order 
to provide for his largesros of oei^, had carried out the con- 
fiscatioQ of the soil and a general domanial taxation there. 
According to manifold testimonies the finsnoes of the Ro- 
man state were essentially dependent on the revenues of 
Asia. The assertion sounds quite credible that the other 
provinces on an average cost nearly as much as they 
brou^t in ; in fi»t those which required a considerable gar- 
rison, such as Idle two Spains, Transalpine Gaul, and Mac^ 
donia^ probably oilen cost more than tbey yielded. On the 
whole certainly ^ Roman treasury in ordinary times pos- 
sessed a surplus, which enaMed tliem amply to defray the 
expense of the buildings of !te state and city, and to ao* 
cumulate a reserve-fund ; but even the figures appearing for 
these objects, when compared with tiie wide domain of the 
Roman rule, attest the smaH amount of the net proceeds of 
the Roman taxea. In a eertshi sense limrefore Uie old prin* 
eiple equally honourable and jodiciou^— that the political 
hegemony dionld not be treated as a privilege yielding 
profit— still governed Rome^s finandal adndinistriition of 
the provinces as it had governed that of ftaiy« What the 
Roman community levied fr^m its transmarine subjects 
was, as a rule, re-exp«ided for the military security of the 
transmarine possessions ; and if these Roman imposts foil 
more heavily on those who paid tJiem than tJie earlier taxa 
tieii. in so fry as thfey wete in great part expended abroad 



Craf. XI.] Af^ its ISom&my. 48A 



the BubBtitution, ott th« oth^r hiibd, of a sh^e vxxXet ana 
a oetitralizod mlKtary adminisimtion for the ixMwiy petty 
rulers and armies mvoWed a V^ry oonsiderable financial 
savitig. It fir tme^ however, that tiik praidple of a bettef 
and earlier age oame ftom the Tery first to be ii^nged and 
mutilated by the numerotts exceptioiis ^hich were allowed 
to prevail. The ground-ten^ levied by Hiero and Car 
thage in Sicily went fiir beyond tbe amount of an annual 
war-edntribution. With justice moreorer Skapio AemiH« 
anus says in CioerO) that it was unbeooming for the Bomaa 
burgess^body to be at the same time the ruler and the tax* 
gatherer of the nations. The impropriation of the customs- 
dues was not compatible with ^ principle of dinnterested 
hegemony, and the hi^ rates of the customs as well as the 
vexatious mode of lerying them were not fitted to allay the 
sense of the injustice thereby inflicted. Even as early prob** 
ably as this period t^ name of publioMi became synony- 
mous among the Eastern peoples with that of rogue and 
robber : no burden contributed so much as this to malte the 
Roman name of^nsive and odious especially in the East. 
But when Gains Gracchus and those who called themselves 
the ** popular party " in Rome came to tbe h^m, political 
sovereignty ww* dedared in plain terms to be a rig^t which 
entitled every one who shiu^ in it to a number of bushels 
of com, the hegemony was converted into a direct owner- 
ship of the soil, and the most complete system of making 
the most of that ownership was not only introduced but 
with shsTneless candour legally justified and proclaimed* 
It was certainly not a mere aeddent, that the hardest lot ia 
this respect fell precisely to the two least warlike j»t>vinoss^ 
Sicily s^ Asia. 

An approximate measure of the oonditdon of Roman 
finance at this period is fhmished, in the absence 
d^djQMio of definite statements, first of all by the publk 
^ buildii^. In 1^ eu'Her portion of this epoch 
these were prosecuted on the greatest scale, and the con» 
Btructiott of roads in particular had at no time been so eneri 
getically pursued. In Italy '^ «(reat southern highway of 



506 Natumaiity^ Rdigion^ [Book if 

igrioulturistty the cleverness of its merchants, found no 
adequate scope in the peninsula; these circumstances and 
the public service carried the Italians in great numbers to 
the provinces (p. 498). Their privileged position thr^^ 
rendered the Roman language and the Roman law privi- 
le|;ed also, even where Romans were not merely transacting 
business with each other (p. 451). Everywhere the Italians 
kept together as compact and organized masses, the soldiers 
in their legions, the merchants of every larger town as spe- 
cial associations, the Roman burgesses domiciled or sojourn* 
log in the particular provincial assize-district as **' circuits ** 
{eonvtntvLZ civium Bomanorum) with their own list of jury- 
men and in some measure with a communal constitution ; 
and, though these provincial Romans ordinarily returned 
sooner or later to Italy, they nevertheless gradually laid the 
foundations of a settled population in the provinces, partly 
Roman, partly mixed, attaching itself to the Roman set- 
tlers. We have already mentioned that it was in Spain, 
where the Roman army first acquired a permanent char- 
acter, that distinct provincial towns with Italian constitution 
171. were first organized — ^Carteia in 583 (p. 14), 

^'7- Valentia in 616 (p. 31), and at a later date 

Palma and Pollentia (p. 32). Although the interior was 
still far from civilized, — the territory of the Yaccaeans, for 
instance, being still mentioned long after this time as one 
of the rudest and most repulsive places of abode for the 
cultivated Italian — authors and inscriptions attest that as 
early as the middle of the seventh century the Latin lan- 
guage was in common use around New Carthage and else- 
where along the coast. Gracchus first distinctly developed 
the idea of colonizing, or in other words of Romanizing, 
the provinces of the Roman state by Italian emigration, and 
endeavoured to carry it out ; and, although the conservative . 
opposition resisted the bold project, destroyed for the most 
part the colonies first established, and prevented its con- 
tinuation, yet the colony of Narbo was preserved intact, 
important even of itself as extending the range of the Latin 
tongue, and far more inriportan't still as the landmark of • 



0«AP. XII.] And Education. 501 

great idea, the foundfttion-stone of a mighty stricture ta 
oome. Hie ancient Gallicism, and in iact the modem 
French type of character, sprang out of that settlementi 
and are in their ultimate origin creations of Gaius Grao- 
ohus. But the Latin natiiMiality not only filled the bounds 
^f Italy and began to pass beyond them ; it came also to 
acquire intrinsically a deeper intellectual basia We find it 
In the course of creating a classical literature, and a higher 
Instruction of its own ; and, though in comparison wit3 the 
Hellenic classics and Hellenic culture we may feel ourselves 
tempted to attach little value to the feeble hothouse pro- 
ducts of Italy, yet, so far as its historical development was 
primarily concerned, the quality of the Latin classical lit^ 
rature and the Latin culture was of J&r less moment than 
the fact that they subsisted side by side with the Greek ; 
and, sunken as were the contemporary Hellenes in a literary 
point of yiew, one might doubtless apply in this case also 
the saying of the poet, that the living day-labourer is better 
than the dead Achilles. 

But, however rapidly and vigorously the Latin language 
and nationality gain ground, they at the same 
time recognize the Hellenic nationality as hav- 
ing an entirely equal, indeed an earlier and better title, and 
enter everywhere into the closest alliance with it or become 
intermingled with it in a joint development. 1>9 Italian 
revolution, which otherwise levelled all the non-l^tin na- 
tionalities in the peninsula, did not disturb the Gree"^ cities 
of Tftrentum, Rhegium, Neapolis, Loori (p. 302). M like 
manner Massilia, although now enclosed by Roman ^rri- 
tory, remained a Greek city and in that very capacity /M*ni* 
ly connected with Rome. With the complete Latinizing ^t 
Italy an increased Hellenizing went hand in hand. In tkp 
higher circles of Italian society Greek training became an 
integral element of their UAtive culture. The 
consul of 623, the ponti/ex maximus Publius 
Crassus, excited the astonishment even of the native Greeks, 
when as governor of Asia he delivered his jul^cxal decisions^ 
the case required, sometimes in ordijjary 0*-eek, some 



SOS N(UUnuilitjfj ReUgion^ [Bcok nr 

times in one of the four dialeots which had beoome written 
languages. And if the Italian literature and art for long 
looked steadily towards the East, Hellenic literature and 
art now began to look towards the West. Not only did 
the Greek cities in Italy maintain a lively intellectual inter 
wurse with Greece, Asia Minor, and £gypt, and confer on 
the Greek poets and actors who had acquired celebrity thers 
the like recc^ition and the like honours among themselyes ; 
in Rome also, after the example set by the destroyer of 
Corinth at his triumph in 608, the gymnastic 
and aesthetic recreations of the Greeks-— compe- 
titions in wrestling as well as in music, acting, reciting, and 
declaiming— came into vc^ue.* Greek men of letters even 
thus early struck root in the noble society of Rome, espe- 
cially in the Scipionic circle, the most prominent Greek 
members of which — ^the historian Polybius and the philoso- 
pher Panaetius — belong to the history of Roman rather 
than of Greek development. But even in other leas illus- 
trious circles similar relations occur; we may mention 
another contemporary of Sdpio, the philosopher Clito< 
machus because his life at the same time presents a vivid 
view of the great intermingling of nations at this epoch, 
A native of Carthage, then a disciple of Cameades at 
Athens, and afterwards his successor in his professorship, 
Clitomachus held intercourse from Athens with the most 
cultivated men of Italy, the historian Aulus Albinus and 
the poet Lucilius, and dedicated on the one hand a scientific 
work to Lucius Censorinus the Roman consul who opened 
the siege of Carthage, and on the other hand a philosophic 
eonsolatory treatise to his fellow-citizens who were conveyed 
to Italy as slaves. While Greek literary men Df note had 
futherto taken up their abode temporarily in Rome as am- 
bassadors, exiles, or otherwise, they now began to settle 

* The statement that no " Greek games ** were exhibited in Rome 

Mf before 608 (Tac. Ann, ziv. 21) is not accurate : Greek artUtf 

iBL (xfx'^lrak) and athletes app eared as early as 568 (Lir. zxzix 

tfl. 22), and Greek flu^players, tragedians, and png^ilists in Ml 

(Pol. XXX. 18). 



Chap, xit.] And EducoUon. 501 

there ; for instance, the already mentioned Panaetius lived 
in the hoDse of Scipio, and the hexameter-maker Archias of 
Antioch settled at Rome in 652 and supported 
himself respectably by the art of improvising 
and by epic poems on Roman consulars. Even Graites 
Marius, who hardly understood a line of his carmen and 
was altogether as ill adapted as possible for a Maeoenasi 
oould not avoid patronizing the artist in verse. While in< 
tellectual and literary life thus brought the more distin- 
gnished, if not the purer, elements of the two nations into 
connection with each other, on the other hand the arrival 
of troops of slaves from Asia Minor and Syria and the 
mercantile immigration from the Greek and half-Greek East 
brought the coarsest strata of Hellenism — ^largely alloyed 
with Oriental and generally barbaric ingredients— into con- 
tact with the Italian proletariate, and gave to that also a 
Hellenic colouring. The remark of Cicero, that new phrases 
and new fashions first make their appearance in maritime 
towns, probably had a primary reference to the semi-Hel- 
lenic character of Ostia, Puteoli, and Brundisium, where 
with foreign wares foreign manners also first found admicK 
sion and became thence more widely difiused. 

The immediate result of this complete revolution in the 
Mixture of relations of nationality was certainly far from 
p«>p>«^ pleasing. Italy swarmed with Greeks, Syrians, 

Phoenicians, Jews, Egyptians, while the provinces swarmed 
with Romans ; sharply defined national peculiarities every- 
where came into mutual contact, and were visibly worn off; 
it seemed as if nothing was to be left behind but the gene^ 
ral impress of utilitarianism. What the Latin charactet 
gained in diflusion it lost in freshness ; especially in Roma 
itself, where the middle class disappeared the soonest and 
most entirely, and nothing was left but the grandees and 
the beggars, both in an equal measure cosmopolitan. CScero 
assures us that about 660 the general culture in 
the Latin towns was higher than in Rome ; and 
Ihis is confirmed by the literature of this period, whoss 
pleasantest, healthiest^ and mi>8t characteristic product«i| 



5i2 Nationality^ Jidigiarif [Book IV 

behind it, and bad arrived at the stage at which there is nol 
only no origination of really new systems, but even the 
power of apprehending the more perfect of the older sys- 
tems begins to wane and men restrict themselves to ths 
repetition, soon passing into the scholastic tradition, of the 
less complete dogmas of their predecessors ; at that stagi^ 
accordingly, when philosophy, instead of giving greater 
depth and freedom to the mind, rather renders it shallow 
and imposes on it the worst of all chains— chains of its 
own Ibrging. The enchanted draught of speculation, always 
dangerous, is, when diluted and stale, certain poison. The 
contemporary Greelcs presented it thus flat and diluted to 
the Bomans, and these had not the judgment either to re- 
fuse it or to go back from the living schoolmasters to the 
dead masters. Plato and Aristotle, to say nothing of the 
sages before St>crates, remained without material influence 
on the Roman culture, although their illustrious names were 
freely employed, and their more easily understood writings 
were probably read and translated. Accordingly the Ro- 
mans became in philosophy simply inferior scholars of bad 
teachers. Besides the historico-rationalistic view of reli- 
gion, which resolved the myths into biographies of various 
benefactors of the human race living in the grey dawn of 
early times whom superstition had transformed into gods, 
or Euhemerism as it was called (ii. 476), there were chiefly 
three philosophical schools that came to be of importance 

for Italy ; viz., the two dogmatic schools of Epi- 
^^ "^ curus ( + 484) and Zeno (+ 491) and the scepti- 
S4L cal school of Arcesilaus (4-513) and Cameades 

S18-1S9. (541-625), or, to use the school-names, Epicu' 

reanism, the Stoa, and the newer Academy. 
The last of these schools, which started from the impossi* 
bility of assured knowledge and in its stead only conceded 
as possible a provisional opinion suflficient for practical re- 
quirements, presented mainly a polemical aspect, seeing 
that it caught every proposition of positive faith or of phi- 
losophic dogmatism in the meshes of its dilemmas. So far 
it stands nearly on a parallel with the earlier method of thf 



Cttkr. XII.] And Education. 518 

sophists ; except that, as might be expected, the sophists 
made war more against the popular faith, Carneades and hit 
disciples more against their philosophical colleagues. On 
the other hand Epicurus and Zeno agreed both in their aim 
of rationally explaining the nature of things, and in their 
physiological method, which set out from the idea of mat^ 
ter. They diverged, in so far as Epicurus, following the 
atomic theory of Democritus, conceived the first principle 
as rigid matter, and evolved the manifoldness of things out 
of this matter merely by mechanical variations ; whereas 
Zeno, forming his views after the Ephesian Heraditus, in* 
troduces even into his primordial matter a dynamic antago* 
nism and a movement of fluctuation up and down. From 
this are derived the further distinctions — ^that in the Epicu- 
rean system the gods as it were did not exist or were at the 
most a dream of dreams, while the Stoical gods formed the 
ever active soul of the world, and were as spirit, as sun, as 
God powerful over the body, the earth, and nature ; that 
Epicurus did not, while Zeno did, recognize a government 
of the world and a personal immortality of the soul ; that 
the proper object of human aspiration was according to 
Epicurus an absolute equilibrium disturbed neither by 
bodily desire nor by mental conflict, while it was according 
to Zeno a manly activity always increased by the constant 
antagonistic efforts of the mind and body, and striving after 
a harmony with nature perpetually in conflict and perpetu- 
ally at peace. But in one point all these schools were 
agreed with reference to religion, that faith as such was 
nothing, and had necessarily to be supplemented by refleo" 
tion — whether this reflection might consciously despair ot 
attaining any result, as did the Academy ; or might reject 
the conceptions of the popular faith, as did the school of 
Epicurus ; or might partly retain them with explanation of 
the reasons for doing so, and partly modify them, as did 
the Stoics. 

It was accordingly only natural, that the first contact of 
Hellenic philosophy with the Roman nation equally strong 
in faith and adverse to speculation should be of a thoroughly 

Vol. IIL-22* 



516 NatumalUyy Religion^ rBooK lY 

more partisans than Euhemerism and the sophistic school 
and this was probably the reason why the police continued 
to wage war against it longest and most seriously. But this 
Roman Epicureanism was not so much a philosophic system 
as a sort of philosophical mask, under which — very much 
against the design of its strictly moral foimder — thoughtless 
aensual enjoyment dressed itself out for good society ; one of 
the earliest adherents of this sect, for instance, Titus Albu- 
ciuSy figures in the poems of Lucilius as the prototype of the 
Roman Hellenizing to bad purpose. 

Far different were the position and influence of the Stoic 
wu^^ philosophy in Italy. In direct contrast to these 

^'^ schools it attached itself to the religion of the 

land as closely as science can at all accommodate itself to 
&ith. To the popular finith with its gods and oracles the 
Stoic adhered on principle, inasmuch as he recognized in it 
an instinctive knowledge to which scientific knowledge was 
bound to have regard, and even in doubtful cases to subor 
dinate itself. He believed in a different way from the peo* 
pie rather than in different objects ; the essentially true and 
supreme God was in his view doubtless the world-soul, but 
every manifestation of the primitive God was in its turn di- 
vine, the stars above all, but also the earth, the vine, the soul 
of the illustrious mortal whom the people honoured as a 
hero, and in fact every departed spirit of a former man. 
This philosophy was really better adapted for Rome than 
for the land where it first arose. The objection of the pious 
believer, that the god of the Stoic had neither sex nor age 
nor corporeality and was converted from a person into an 
idea, had a meaning in Greece, but not in Rome. The 
coarse allegorizing and moral purification, which were char- 
icteristic of the Stoical doctrine of the gods, destroyed the 
very narrow of the Hellenic mythology ; but the plastic 
power of the Romans, scanty even in their epoch of simplic- 
ity, had produced no more than a light \eil enveloping the 
orighial intuition or the original notion out of which the di- 
vinity had arisen*-a veil that might be stripped off without 
special damage. Pallas Athene might be indignant, when sht 



Cbap. xn.] And Editcattan. 517 

found herself suddenly transmuted into the idea of memory : 
Minerva had hitherto been in reality not much more. The 
supernatural Stoic, and the allegoric Roman, theology coin 
eided on the whole in their result. But, even if the philo^ 
opher was obliged to designate individual propositions of the 
priestly lore as doubtful or as erroneous — as when theStoioS| 
for example, rejecting the doctrine of apotheosis, saw in Her- 
oules, Castor and Pollux nothing but the spirits of distm* 
guished men, or as when they could not allow the images o/ 
the gods to be regarded as representations of divinity— it 
was at least not the habit of the adherents of Zeno to maRe 
war on these erroneous doctrines and to overthrow the false 
gods ; on the contrary, they everywhere evinced respect and 
reverence for the religion of the land even in its weaicnesses. 
The inclination also of the Stoa towards a casuistic morality 
and -towards a systematic treatment of the professional scien- 
ces was quite to the mind of the Romans, especially of the 
Romans of this period, who no longer like their fathers prac- 
tised in unsophisticated fashion self-government and good 
morals, but resolved the simple morality of their ancestors 
into a catechism of allowable and non-allowable actions; 
whose grammar and jurisprudence, moreover, urgently re- 
quired a methodical treatment, without possessing the ability 
to develop such a treatment of themselves. So this philos- 
ophy thoroughly incorporated itself, as a plant borrowed no 
doubt from abroad but acclimatized in Italian soil, with the 
Roman national economy, and we meet its traces in the 
most diversified spheres of action. Its earliest appearance 
beyond doubt goes further back ; but the Stoa was first 
raised to full influence in the higher ranks of Roman society 
by means of the group which gathered round Scipio Aemil- 
ianua. Panaetius of Rhodes, the instructor of Scipio and 
of ail Scipio's intimate friends in the Stoical philosophy, 
who was constantly in his train and usually attended him 
^vcn on journeys, knew how to adapt the system to dever 
men of the world, to keep its speculative side in the back- 
ground, and to modify in some measure the dryness of the 
lerminology and the insipidity of its moi%l catechism, mor« 



S80 NatiimalUy^ Bdigian^ [Book if 

his fnendt. Diis wm a real inatmotion. Stilo howeref 
waa not a profenional achoolmaatery bat he taught lit^ra^ 
tare and rhetoric, juat aa juriaprudeooe was taught at Rome^ 
in the character of a senior fHend of aapiring young men, 
not of a man hiring out his services and at everj one's 0001* 
mand. 

But about hia time began also the scholastic higher 

instruction in Latio, separated both from ele- 
ufjl^lili^ mentary Latin and from Greek instruction, and 
■BdriMto- imparted in special establishments by paid jnaa- 

tersy ordinarily manumitted slaves. That its 
spirit and method were throughout borrowed from the 
exercises in the Greek literature and language, was a mat- 
ter of course ; and the scholars also consisted, as at these 
exercises, of youths, and not of boys. This Latin instruc 
tion was soon divided like the Greek into two courses ; in 
so fiir as the Latin literature was first scientifically pre- 
lected on, and then a technical introduction was given to 
the preparation of panegyrics, public, and forensic orations. 
The first Roman school of literature was opened about 
Stilo's time by Marcus Saevius Nicanor Postumus, the first 

separate school for Latin rhetoric about 660 by 

Lucius Plotius Gallus; but ordinarily instruo- 
tions in rhetoric were also given in the Latin schools of 
literature. This new Latin schooMnstruction was of the 
most comprehensive importance. The introduction to the 
knowledge of Latin literature and Latin oratory, such as 
had formerly been imparted by connoisseurs and masters 
of high position, had preserved a certain independence in 
relation to the Greeks. The critics of language and the 
masters oi oratory were doubtless under the influence of 
Hellenism, but not absolutely under that of the Greek 
school-grammar and school-rhetoric; the latter in particu- 
lar was decidedly an object of dread. . The pride ns well 
as the sound common sense of the Romans revolted against 
the Greek assertion that the ability to speak of things, 
which the orator understood and fdt, intelligibly and at- 
tractively to his peers in the mother-tongue cojid b< 



Ohap. XII.] Afid EduocUwn. S31 

learned in the school by school-rules. To the solid prao 
tical advocate the procedure of the Greek rhetoricians, so 
totally estranged from life, could not but appear worse for 
the beginner than no preparation at all ; to the man of 
thorough culture and matured experience the Greek rhet(^ 
rio seemed shallow and repulsive ; while the man of serious 
conservative views did not fail to observe the close affinity 
between a professionally developed rhetoric and the trade 
of the demagogue. Accordingly the Scipionic circle had 
shown the most bitter hostility to the rhetoricians, and, if 
Greek declamations before paid masters were tolerated 
primarily perhaps as exercises in speaking Greek, Greek 
rhetoric did not thereby find its way either into Latin ora- 
tory or into Latin oratorical instruction. But in the new 
Latin rhetorical schools the Roman youths were trained as 
men and public orators by discussing in pairs rhetorical 
themes ; they accused Ulysses, who was found beside the 
corpse of Ajax with the latter's bloody sword, of the mui- 
der of his comrade in arms, or upheld his innocence ; they 
charged Orestes with the murder of his mother, or under* 
took to defend him ; or perhaps they helped Hannibal with 
a supplementary good advice as to the question whether he 
would do better to comply with the invitation to Rome, or 
to remain in Carthage, or to take flight. It was natural 
that the Catonian opposition should once more bestir itself 
against these offensive and pernicious conflicts of words. 
The censors of 662 issued a warning to teach- 
ers and parents not to allow the young men to 
spend the whole day in exercises, whereof their ancestors 
had known nothing ; and the man, from whom this wam« 
ing came, was no less than the flrst forensic orator of his 
age, Lucius Licinius Crassus. Of course the Cassandra 
spoke in vain ; declamatory exercises in Latin on the cur- 
rent themes of the Greek schools became a permanent in- 
gredient in the education of Roman youth, and contributed 
their part to educate the very boys as forensic and political 
players and to stifle ul the bud all eam^t and true elo* 
quenoe. 



Chap. XIII.] JAUraiure ana Art. 557 

breathes throughout the same spirit as his practical action. 
It was the task of his life to write the historj of the union 
of the Mediterranean states under the hegemonj of R(»ne. 
From the first Punic war down to the destruction of Car- 
thage and Corinth his work embraces the fortunes of ali 
the civilized states — ^^namely Greece, Macedonia, Asia Minor, 
Syria, Egypt, Carthage, and Italy — and exhibits in causal 
connection the mode in which they came und^ the Roman 
protectorate; in so far he describes it as his object to 
df^monstrate the fitness and reasonabl^iess of the Roman 
hegemony. In design as in execution, this history stands 
in dear and distinct contrast with the contemporary Roman 
as well as with the contemporary Greek historiography. In 
Rome history stiii remained wholly at the stage of chroni- 
cle ; there existed doubtless important historical materials, 
but what was called historical composition was restricted—' 
with the exception of the very respectable but purely indi- 
vidual writings of Cato, which at any rate did not reach 
beyond the rudiments of research and narration — partly to 
nursery tales, partly to collections of notices. The Greeks 
had certainly exhibited historical research and had written 
history ; but the ideas of nation and state had been so com- 
pletely lost amidst the distracted times of the Diadochi, 
that none of the numerous historians succeeded in following 
the steps of the great Attic masters in spirit and in truth, 
or in treating from a broad point of view the matter of 
world-wide interest in the history of the times. Their his- 
tOTies were either purely outward records, or they were 
pervaded by the verbiage and sophistries of Attic rhetoric 
and only too often by the venality and vulgarity, the syco- 
phancy and the exasperation of the aga. Among the Ro- 
mans as among tte Greeks nothing existed but histories of 
cities or of tribes. Polybius, a Peloponnesian, as has been 
justly remarked, and holding intellectually a position at 
least as tax aloof from the Attics as from the Romans, first 
stepped beyond these miserable limits, treated the Roman 
materials with ma^^ure Hellenic criticism, and furnished a 
be**'' history, which was not indeed universal, but which was al 

^/ 
lis 6^ 



;^' 



r "'r' 



It 



664 JAtenUwrt am,! Art. [Book If 

lorio anc philosophyt in m> fiur as these now became essential 
elements of the usual Roman training and thereby first be» 
gan to be dissodated fix>m the professional sdenoes properly 
so called. 

In the field of letters Latin philology flourished vigor* 
ously, in dose association with the philological 
treatment*- long ago firmly established — of 
Greek literature. It was already mentioned that about the 
beginning of this century the Latin epic poets found their 
diUuk«wuiQM and revisers of their text (p. 629) ; it was also 
noticed, that not only did the Sdpionio circle generally in- 
sist on correctness above everything else, but several also 
of the most noted poets, such as Acoius and Lucilius, busied 
themselves with the regulation of orthography and of gram- 
mar. At the same period we find isolated attempts to de- 
velop archaeology irom the historical side; although the 
dissertations of the unwieldy annalists of this age, such as 
those of Hemina ^ on the Censors " and of Tuditanus " on 
the Magistrates,'' can hardly have been better than their 
chronicles. Of more interest were the treatise on the 
Magistracies by Marcus Junius the friend of Gaius Grac- 
chus, as the first attempt to make the investigation of anti- 
quity serviceable for political objects,* and the metrically 
ocnnposed J)idascaU(ie of the tragedian Accius, an essay 
towards a literary history of the Latin drama. But those 
early attempts at a sdentifio treatment of the mother-tongue 
still bear very much a dileHante stamp, and strikingly re- 
mind us of our orthographic literature in the Bodmer-Klop- 
stock period ; and we may likewise without injustice assign 
but a modest place to the antiquarian researches of this 
epoch. 

The Roman, who established the investigation of the 

^^ Latin language and antiquities in the sprit of 

the Alexandrian masters on a sdentifio basis, 

^^' was Lucius Aelius Stilo about 660 (p. 627). 

* The aflsertaon, for instance, that the quaestors were nominated 
in the regal period by the burgesses, not bj the king, is as oertainlj 
blse AS it obviondy bears the impress of a partisaa charactei. 



Gbap. xm.] Literaiure and Art. 505 

He iirgt went back to the oldest monuments of the laii* 
l^uage, and commented on the Saliar litanies and the Tvtelya 
Tables. He devoted his special attention to the comedj of 
the sixth century, and first formed a list of the pieces of 
Plautus which in his opinion were genuine. He sought^ 
after the Greek fashion, to determine historically the origin 
of every single phenomenon in the Roman life and dealings 
and to ascertain in each case the^ *' inventor," and at the 
same time brought the whole annalistic tradition within the 
range of his research. The success, which he had among 
his contemporaries, is attested by the dedication to him of 
the most important poetical, ilud the most important his- 
torical, works of his time, the Satires of Lucilius and the 
Annals of Antipater ; and this first Roman philologist in- 
fluenced the studies of his nation also in future times by 
transmitting his spirit of investigation both into words and 
into things to his disciple Varro. 

The literary activity in the field of Latin rhetoric was, 
^^ ^ ^ as might be expected, of a more subordinate 

kind. There was nothing here to be done but 
to write manuals and exercise-books afler the model of the 
Greek compendia of Hermagoras and others; and these 
accordingly the schoolmasters did not fail to supply, partly 
on account of the need for them, partly on account of van- 
ity and money. Such a manual of rhetoric has been pre- 
served to us, composed under Sulla's dictatorship by an 
unknown author, who according to the &8hion then prevail- 
ing (p. 530) taught simultaneously Latin literature and 
Latin rhetoric, and wrote oii both ; a treatise remarkable 
not merely for its close, clear, and firm handling of the sub- 
ject, but above all for its comparative independence as r^ 
spects Greek models. Although in method entirely depend- 
ent on the Greeks, the Roman yet distinctly and even 
abruptly rejects all " the useless matter which the Greeks 
had gathered together, solely in order that the science 
might appear more difficult to learn." The bitterest cen* 
sure is bestowed on Uie hair-splitting dialectics — that 
^ loquacious science of inability to speak " — who«^ finished 



568 Literature and Art. IBckml n 

Ihe order of matters.* A striotly systeiQatic treatnient of 
the law of the land soon foUowedL. Its founder was the 
poniifex maximut Quintus Mudus Soaevola (oon- 
sul in i659, + 672, (p. 265, 405, 519), in whos6 
fiiiuily jurisprudence was, like the supreme priesthood 
hereditary. His eighteen books on the lit Civik^ whiek 
embraced the positive materials of jurisprudence— legisla 
tive enactments, judicial precedents, and authorities — ^pardj 
from the older collections, partly from oral tradition in as 
great completeness as possible, formed the starting<fK>int 
and the model of the complete systems of Roman law ; in 
like manner his compendious treatise of ''Definitions" 
(o^oi) became the basis of juristic summaries and partlcu« 
larly of the books of Rules, Although this development 
of law proceeded of oourse in the main independently of 
Hellenism, yet an acquaintance with the philo8ophtco-prac> 
tical systematizing of the Greeks beyond doubt gave a gen- 
eral impulse to the more systematic treatment of jurispru- 
dence, as in fact the Greek influence is in the case of the 
^ast-mentioned treatise apparent in the very title. We have 
already remarked that in several more external matters 
Roman jurisprudence was influenced by the Stoa (p. 517). 
Art exhibits still less pleasing results. In architecture, 
sculpture, and painting there was, no doubt, a 
more and more general diflfusion of a dilettante 
interest, but the exercise of native art retrograded rather 
than advanced. It became more and more customary for 
those sojourning in Grecian lands personally to inspect the 
works of art ; for which in particular the winter-quarters 
^^ of Sulla's army in Asia Minor in 670-671 

formed an epoch. Connoisseurship developed 
itself also in Italy. They had commenced with articles in 
silver and bronze ; about the commencement of this epoeb 
they began to esteem not merly Greek statues, but also 

* 0ato*8 book probably bore the title J)e Turi» DiadpUna (Oell 
iBL SOX ^*' 0^ Brutus the title Db lure dvili (Cic. pro Olvent, 61( 
141 ; De OraL ii. 66, 223) ; that they were easentially collectioCiS of opio 
»Mis, is shown by Cioero {J>e OraL il 38, 142). 



Gbap. xnLJ Liierai^re amd AH. 569 

6re^ pictures. The first picture publidy exhibited in 
Borne was the Bacchus of Aristides, which fiucius Mum- 
mius withdrew from the sale of the Corintliian spoil, be- 
cause king Attalus offered as mudi as 6,000 denarii (£26C) 
for it. The buildings became more splendid ; and in par- 
iruiar transmarine, espedally Hymetti&n, marble (Cipollin) 
lAme into use for that purpose — the Italian marble quaiTiea 
were not yet in operation. A magnificent colonnade still 
admired in the time of the empire, which Quin- 
tus Metellus (consul in 611) the conqueror of 
Macedonia constructed in the Campus Martius, enclosed the 
first marble temple whidi the capital had seen ; it was soon 
followed by similar structures built on the Capitol by Scipio 
28a. Nasica (consul in 616), and on the Qrcus by 

^^' Gnaeus Octavius (consul in 626). The first 

private house adorned with marble columns was that of the 
orator Lucius Crassus (-f- 663) on the Palatine 
(p. 500). But where they could plunder or 
purchase, instead of creating for themselves, they did so ; 
it was a wretched indication of the poverty of Roman 
architecture, that it already began to employ the columns 
of the old Greek temples ; the Roman Capitol, for instance, 
was embellished by Sulla with those of the temple of Zeus 
at Athens. The works, that were produced in Rome, pro- 
ceeded from the hands of foreigners ; the few Roman artists 
of this period, who are particularly mentioned, are without 
exception Italian or transmarine Greeks whp had migrated 
thither. Such was the case with the architect Hermodorus 
from the Cyprian Salamis, who among other works restored 
the Roman docks and built for Quintus Metellus 

14S. 

(consul in 611) the temple of Jupiter Stator in 
the basilica constructed by him, and for Dedmus Brutus 
1S8. (consul in 616) the temple of Mars in the 

ilaminian circus; with the sculptor Pasitelea 
^' (about 665) from Magna Giaecia, wh > furnkhed 

images of the gods in ivory for Roman temples ; and with 
the painter and philosopher Metrodorus of Athens, who 
was written for to paint the pictures for the triujiph of 



570 Literature mtkd Art. [Bo«k it 

Lucius PauUus (587). It is significant that the 

coins of this epoch exhibit in comparison with 

those of the pravious period a greater variety of types, but 

a retrogression rather than an improvement in the catting 

of the dies. 

Finally, music and dancing passed over in like manner 
from Hellas to Rome, solely in order to be there applied 
to the enhancement of decorative luxury. Such foreign arts 
were certainly not new in Rome ; the state had from olden 
time allowed Etruscan flute-players and dancers to appear 
at its festivals, and the freedmen and the lowest class of the 
Roman people had previously followed this trade. But it 
was a novelty that Greek dances and musical performances 
should form the regular accompaniment of a fiwhionable 
banquet. Another novelty was a dancing-school, such as 
Scipio Aemilianus full of indignation describes in one of 
his speeches, in which upwards of five hundred boys and 
girls — the dregs of the people and the children of magis- 
trates and of dignitaries mixed up together — received in- 
struction from a balletrmaster in &r from decorous castanet- 
dances, in corresponding songs, and in the use of the pro- 
scribed Greek stringed instruments. It was a novelty too 
— ^not so much that a consular and p(mtifex maximus like 
Publius Scaevola (consul in 621) should catch 
the balls in the drcus as nimbly as he solved 
the most complicated questions of law at home — ^as that 
noble young Romans should display their jockey-arts before 
all the people at the festal games of Sulla. The govern- 
ment occasionally attempted to check such practices ; as for 
instance in 639, when all musical instruments, 
with the exception of the simple flute indigenous 
in Latium, were prohibited by the censors. But Rome was 
no Sparta ; the lax government by such prohibitions rather 
drew attention to the evils than attempted to remedy them 
by a sharp and consistent application of the laws. 

If, in conclusion, we glance back at the picture as s 
whole which the literature and art of Italy unfold to our 
vi«w from the death of Ennius to the beginning of the 



CkAF. xin.] Literatu/re and Art. 571 

Ciceronian age. we find in these respects as com{.ared with 
«he preceding epoch a most decided decline of productive 
ness. The higher kinds of literature — such as epos, tragedy, 
history — ^have died out or have been arrested in their de> 
velopment. The subordinate kinds — ^the translation and 
imitation of the intrigue-piece, the farce, the poetical an<i 
prose brochure — ^alone prosper ; in this last field of litera 
ture swept by the full hurricane of revolution we meet with 
the two men of greatest literary talent in this epoch, Graiuf 
Gracchus and Gains Lucilius, who stand out amidst a num* 
ber of more or less mediocre writers just as in a similar 
epoch of French literature Courier and B^ranger stand out 
amidst a multitude of pretentious nuHities. . In the plastic 
and delineative arts likewise the production, always weak, 
is now utterly null. On the other hand the receptive en- 
joyment of art and literature flourished ; as the Epigoni of 
this period in tRe political field gathered in and used up th^ 
inheritance that fell to their fathers, we find them in this 
field also as diligent frequenters of plays, as patrons of 
literature, as connoisseurs and still more as collectors in art. 
The most honourable aspect of this activity was its learned 
research, which put forth a native intellectual energy, more 
especially in jurisprudence and in linguistic and antiquarian 
investigation. The foundation of these sciences which prop* 
erly falls within the present epoch, and the first small be* 
ginnings of an imitation of the Alexandrian hothouse poetry, 
already herald the approaching epoch of Roman Alexandrin- 
ism. All the productions of the present epoch are smooth- 
er, more free from faults, more systematic than the creatioof 
of the sixth century. The literati and the friends of litera- 
ture ol this period not altogether unjustly looked down on 
their predecessors as bungling novices : but while they ridi- 
ouldd or censured the defective labours of these novices, the 
mo8t gifled of them probably confessed to themselves tliat 
the season of the nation's youth was past, and ever and 
anon perhaps felt in the still depths of the heart a secret 
longing to wander once more in the delightful paths of 
f outbful error. 

END OF TBI THIRD VOLUMS. 



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